

Tülin TUNA

**VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY:
THE CASE OF 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN
ISTANBUL GAZIOSMANPAŞA**

M.A. Thesis In Political Science and
Public Administration

Thesis submitted to the
Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
Political Science and Public Administration

by
Tülin Tuna

Fatih University
June 2009

June-2009

© Tülin Tuna

All Rights Reserved, 2009

To my family and husband

APPROVAL PAGE

Student : Tülin TUNA
Institute : Institute of Social Sciences
Department : Political Science and Public Administration
Thesis Subject : Voter Behaviors in Turkey: The case of 2007 General
Elections in Istanbul Gaziosmanpaşa
Thesis Date : June 2009

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Head of Department
Assist. Prof. Şammas SALUR

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Supervisor
Assist. Prof. Michelangelo GUIDA

Examining Committee Members

(Prof. Dr. Ömer ÇAHA)

(Assoc. Prof. Gökhan BACIK)

(Assist. Prof. Michelangelo GUIDA)

It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

Director
Assoc. Prof. Gökhan BACIK

AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution.

Tülin TUNA

June, 2009

ABSTRACT

Tülin TUNA

June 2009

VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ISTANBUL GAZIOSMANPAŞA

The aim of this dissertation is to understand the dynamics of voter behaviors and to present the social cleavages in Istanbul Gaziosmanpaşa district in 2007 general elections.

The survey was conducted in July 2008 in eight quarters of Gaziosmanpaşa district which covers 28 percent of voters. A questionnaire has been applied to sample including 601 people through face to face meeting. The data are analyzed by the SPSS program.

As a result of this survey, it appears that deep cleavages still exist in Turkish society; especially, the ethnic identity and religion have a crucial effect on voter behaviors as well as socio-economic factors.

The first chapter of this dissertation draws a conceptual frame. Indeed, this chapter includes how the electoral behaviors have changed and in what ways they have transformed in Turkey. The second chapter investigates the 2007 general elections, the effect of the presidential election process, the campaigns of political parties and their election programs are examined. The third chapter scrutinizes Gaziosmanpaşa's geographical position, human and political geography. Furthermore, this chapter investigates Gaziosmanpaşa municipality and the works of Justice and Development Party district organization. The fourth and the last chapter analyzes the scope, method and sample of the survey and collected in details. In addition, this chapter analyzes the effect of demographic factors, regional distribution, ethnic structure, regional cleavages, center-periphery cleavage, '*Kulturkampf*', 'threat factor', party images and vote volatility on voter behaviors.

Key words:

Political Participation, Voter Behaviors, 2007 General Elections, Social Cleavages, *Kulturkampf*.

KISA ÖZET

Tülin TUNA

Haziran 2009

TÜRKİYE'DE SEÇMEN DAVRANIŞLARI: İSTANBUL GAZİOSMANPAŞA'DA 2007 GENEL SEÇİMLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

Bu araştırmanın amacı 2007 genel seçimlerinde İstanbul Gaziosmanpaşa ilçesinde seçmen davranışlarının dinamiklerini anlamak ve ilçedeki sosyal ayrılıkları göstermektir.

Araştırma Gaziosmanpaşa'nın yüzde 28'ini kapsayan 8 mahallede Temmuz 2008'de yapılmıştır. İlçede toplam seçmenin binde 1,14 üne tekabül eden 601 kişi ile yüz yüze görüşülerek anket uygulanmıştır. Elde edilen veriler SPSS programı ile analiz edilmiştir.

Yapılan araştırmanın sonucunda, toplum içerisinde hala derin ayrılıkların olduğu görülmüştür. Özellikle, seçmen tercihlerinde sosyo-ekonomik faktörlerin yanı sıra etnik kimlik ve din daha etkilidir.

Araştırmanın birinci bölümü kavramsal çerçeveden meydana gelmektedir. Ayrıca, bu bölümde Türkiye'de seçmen davranışlarının nasıl değiştiği ve nasıl şekillendiği görülmektedir. İkinci bölümde 2007 genel seçimleri, Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim sürecinin etkisi, siyasal partilerin kampanyaları ve seçim programları incelenmektedir. Üçüncü bölümde Gaziosmanpaşa'nın coğrafi durumu, insani ve siyasal yapısı dikkatle incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, bu bölümde Gaziosmanpaşa belediyesi ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ilçe teşkilatının çalışmaları araştırılmıştır. Dördüncü ve son bölümde araştırmanın kapsamı, yöntemi ve örnekleme ve veri toplama tekniği detaylı bir şekilde analiz edilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu bölümde demografik faktörlerin, bölgesel dağılımın, etnik yapının, bölgesel ayrılıkların, merkez-çevre ayrılıklarının, *Kulturkampf*, korku faktörünün, parti imajlarının ve oy değişkenliklerinin seçmen davranışları üzerindeki etkisi analiz edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Siyasal Katılım, Seçmen Davranışları, 2007 Genel Seçimleri, Sosyal Ayrılıklar, *Kulturkampf*.

LIST OF CONTENTS

VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY:	I
THE CASE OF 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN ISTANBUL GAZİOSMANPAŞA	I
APPROVAL PAGE	IV
AUTHOR DECLARATIONS	V
ABSTRACT	VI
KISA ÖZET	VII
LIST OF CONTENTS	VIII
LIST OF TABLES	X
LIST OF FIGURES	XI
LIST OF APPENDICES	XII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	XIII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	XV
INTRODUCTION	2
CHAPTER I	6
VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY	6
1.1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	6
1.2. THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY	9
1.2.1. GENDER FACTOR.....	10
1.2.2. AGE FACTOR	13
1.2.3. EDUCATIONAL FACTOR.....	14
1.2.4. PROFESSIONAL FACTOR.....	16
1.2.5. RELIGIOUS AND ETHNICAL FACTOR	18
1.2.6. URBAN FACTOR.....	20
1.2.7. REGIONAL FACTOR.....	25
1.2.8. MASS MEDIA FACTOR	33
CHAPTER II	36
THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY:	36
PROCESS AND RESULTS	36
2.1. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS ON 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS	36
2.2. THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS	40
2.3. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND PROGRAMS	44
2.3.1. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS.....	44
2.3.2. THE ELECTION PROGRAMS	45
2.4. WHY AKP RE-WON THE ELECTION WHILE IN POWER?	51

CHAPTER III	55
GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF GAZİOSMANPAŞA... 55	
3.1. GAZİOSMANPAŞA AND ITS GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION	55
3.2. GAZİOSMANPAŞA’S HUMAN GEOGRAPHY	58
3.3. GAZİOSMANPAŞA’S POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY	62
3.3.1. THE ACTIVITIES AND WORKS OF THE AKP IN GAZİOSMANPAŞA	65
CHAPTER IV	70
THE VOTER BEHAVIORS IN GAZİOSMANPAŞA.....	70
4.1. THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE SURVEY	70
4.2. THE POPULATION AND THE SAMPLE	70
4.3. THE TECHNIQUE USED IN COLLECTING DATA	72
4.4. THE FACTORS THAT IMPACT VOTERS’ BEHAVIOR IN GAZİOSMANPAŞA	73
4.4.1. GENDER FACTOR.....	73
4.4.2. AGE FACTOR	75
4.4.3. EDUCATIONAL FACTOR	77
4.4.4. PROFESSIONAL AND INCOME FACTOR	79
4.4.5. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION AND ETHNIC STRUCTURE IN THE DISTRICT.....	83
4.4.6. REGIONAL CLEAVAGES	87
4.4.7. CENTER-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGES	90
4.4.8. RELIGIOUS FACTOR	94
4.4.9. “THREAT” FACTOR.....	98
4.4.10. PARTY IMAGES	100
4.4.11. THE ELECTORAL VOLATILITY	103
4.4.12. MASS MEDIA FACTOR	106
4.4.13. DETERMINING THE PARTY PREFERENCE.....	108
4.4.14. THE CANDIDATE FACTOR.....	109
4.5. ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS	111
CONCLUSION.....	114
APPENDICES	116
BIBLIOGRAPHY	121

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: GENDER, AGE, EDUCATION PARTY DISTRIBUTION (%).....	11
TABLE 2: VOTE DISTRIBUTION: PROFESSION	17
TABLE 3: CITY AND VILLAGE POPULATION AND THEIR INCREASE RATES ACCORDING TO CENSUSES (1927-2007)	21
TABLE 4: NONVOTING RATES IN 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS.....	26
TABLE 5: 2002 AND 2007 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS.....	42
TABLE 6: INCOMING IMMIGRATES TO GAZIOSMANPAŞA AS TO AGE GROUPS (1995-2000).....	59
TABLE 7: INCOMING IMMIGRATES TO GAZIOSMANPAŞA AS TO EDUCATION LEVEL (%).....	59
TABLE 8: THE PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS IN THE AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD IN GAZIOSMANPAŞA POPULATION (1990-2000)	60
TABLE 9: ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN GAZIOSMANPAŞA DISTRICT	61
TABLE 10: EMPLOYED POPULATION BY OCCUPATION	62
TABLE 11: THE PARTICIPATION RATE BETWEEN 1983 AND 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN GAZIOSMANPAŞA	63
TABLE 12: GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA BETWEEN 1983 AND 2007 YEARS	65
TABLE 13: THE SURVEYED QUARTERS	71
TABLE 14: EDUCATION LEVELS, AGE OF VOTERS AND GENDER OF VOTERS CROSSTABULATION	78
TABLE 15: IDENTITY	86
TABLE 16: LANGUAGE	87
TABLE 17: VOTERS' PLACES OF BIRTH	92
TABLE 18: PLACES OF BIRTH OF THE VOTERS' FATHERS.....	93
TABLE 19: QUESTIONS ON RELIGIOUS PRACTICES	95
TABLE 20: IS SECULARISM UNDER THREAT IN TURKEY?	100
TABLE 21: HOW AKP VOTERS SEE THEIR OWN PARTY (%)	101
TABLE 22: HOW AKP VOTERS SEE CHP (%)	101
TABLE 23: HOW CHP VOTERS SEE THEIR OWN PARTY (%)	102
TABLE 24: HOW CHP VOTER SEE AKP (%)	102
TABLE 25: HOW MHP VOTERS SEE THEIR OWN PARTY (%).....	103
TABLE 26: VOLATILITY AMONG AKP VOTERS	105
TABLE 27: VOLATILITY AMONG CHP VOTERS.....	105
TABLE 28: VOLATILITY AMONG MHP VOTERS.....	106
TABLE 29: CHARACTERISTICS OF CANDIDATE	111

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: THE RATE OF GENDER - 1999	12
FIGURE 2: THE RATE OF GENDER- 2007	12
FIGURE 3: THE RATE OF AGE - 1999.....	14
FIGURE 4: THE RATE OF AGE- 2007	14
FIGURE 5: THE EDUCATION LEVELS - 1999.....	15
FIGURE 6: THE EDUCATION LEVELS - 2007.....	15
FIGURE 7: ECONOMIC WELL-BEING - 2007	17
FIGURE 8: VOTE DISTRIBUTION: PROFESSION	18
FIGURE 9: TO DEFINE VOTERS OWN IDENTITIES (%).....	19
FIGURE 10: ISTANBUL / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF ÜMRANIYE	25
FIGURE 11: MARMARA REGION / GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS OF KOCAELI	27
FIGURE 12: THE AEGEAN REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS OF MUĞLA	28
FIGURE 13: THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF ANTALYA	29
FIGURE 14: CENTRAL ANATOLIA REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF NIĞDE	30
FIGURE 15: THE BLACK SEA REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF RIZE	31
FIGURE 16: THE SOUTHEASTERN ANATOLIA REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF DIYARBAKIR	32
FIGURE 17: EASTERN ANATOLIA REGION / THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF ERZURUM	33
FIGURE 18: THE MAP OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA.....	56
FIGURE 19: DISTRIBUTION OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA DISTRICT POPULATION AS TO REGIONS-BORN	58
FIGURE 20: GENERAL ELECTIONS RESULTS OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA BETWEEN 1983-2007 YEARS	65
FIGURE 21: DISTRICT OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA.....	71
FIGURE 22: GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE SURVEY	74
FIGURE 23: GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF THE SURVEY: PARTY PREFERENCES.....	75
FIGURE 24: AGE OF VOTERS	75
FIGURE 25: AGE OF VOTER: PARTY PREFERENCES	77
FIGURE 26: EDUCATION LEVELS (%)	77
FIGURE 27: EDUCATION LEVEL.....	79
FIGURE 28: VOTER PROFESSION (%).....	80
FIGURE 29: INCOME LEVEL (%)	80
FIGURE 30: VOTER PROFESSION.....	81
FIGURE 31: INCOME LEVEL	82
FIGURE 32: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION.....	83
FIGURE 33: IDENTITY OF QUARTERS	84
FIGURE 34: SPOKEN LANGUAGE IN QUARTERS	85
FIGURE 35: KARADENİZ QUARTER- GAZIOSMANPAŞA.....	88
FIGURE 36: GAZI QUARTER- GAZIOSMANPAŞA.....	89
FIGURE 37: IS SECULARISM UNDER THREAT IN TURKEY?	99
FIGURE 38: INFORMATION ON PARTIES (%)	107
FIGURE 39: READING NEWSPAPER (%)	107
FIGURE 40: PARTY PREFERENCE 1	108
FIGURE 41: PARTY PREFERENCE 2	109
FIGURE 42: PARTY PREFERENCE 3	109

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: THE SURVEY QUESTIONS	116
APPENDIX 2: SEX OF VOTER, 2007 VOTE AND EDUCATION LEVEL CROSSTABULATION	119
APPENDIX 3: THE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS OF TURKEY	120

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADNKS	<i>Adrese Dayalı Kayıt Sistemi</i> (Address Based Population Registration System)
AKP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> (The Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	<i>Anavatan Partisi</i> (Motherland Party)
ATP	<i>Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi</i> (The Bright Turkey Party)
BBP	<i>Büyük Birlik Partisi</i> (The Grand Union Party)
BTP	<i>Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi</i> (The Independent Turkey Party)
CHP	<i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> (Republican People's Party)
DEHAP	<i>Demokratik Halk Partisi</i> (Democratic People's Party)
DP	<i>Demokrat Parti</i> (Democrat Party)
DSP	<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i> (The Democratic Left Party)
DYP	<i>Doğruyol Partisi</i> (True Path Party)
DTP	<i>Demokratik Toplum Partisi</i> (The Democratic Society Party)
EP	<i>Emek Partisi</i> (The Labor Party)
EU	European Union
FP	<i>Fazilet Partisi</i> (Virtue Party)
GP	<i>Genç Parti</i> (The Young Party)
HADEP	<i>Halkın Demokrasi Partisi</i> (The People's Democracy Party)
HAK-PAR	<i>Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi</i> (The Right and Freedoms Party)
HDI	Human Development Index
HP	<i>Halk Parti</i> (The People's Party)
HÜR-PAR	<i>Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi</i> (The Liberty and Change Party)
HYP	<i>Halkın Yükselişi Partisi</i> (The People's Ascent Party)
İP	<i>İşçi Partisi</i> (Workers Party)
KDD	<i>Kemalist Düşünce Derneği</i> (The Association for Kemalist Thought)
LDP	<i>Liberal Demokratik Parti</i> (The Liberal Democratic Party)
MHP	<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i> (The Nationalist Action Party)
MP	Members of Parliament
ÖDP	<i>Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi</i> (The Freedom and Solidarity Party)
ÖSS	<i>Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı</i> (The Student Selection Examination)
ÖSYM	<i>Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Sınavı</i>

	(The Student Selection and Placement Office)
RP	<i>Refah Partisi</i> (Welfare Party)
SHP	<i>Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi</i> (The Social Democratic People's Party)
SIS	<i>Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü</i> (The state Institute of Statistics)
SSK	<i>Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu</i> (Social Insurance Institute)
SP	<i>Saadet Partisi</i> (The Felicity Party)
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Science
TESEV	<i>Türkiye Sosyal ve Ekonomik Etüdler Vakfı</i> (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
TKP	<i>Türkiye Komünist Partisi</i> (The Communist Party of Turkey)
TOKİ	<i>Toplu Konut İdaresi</i> (Housing Development Administration)
TÜSES	<i>Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik ve Siyasal Araştırma Vakfı</i> (Turkish Social Economic and Political Research Foundation)
YÖK	<i>Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu</i> (Higher Education Institution)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge all those who have contributed to the preparation of this thesis directly or indirectly.

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Michelangelo Guida for his most invaluable guidance, advices, criticisms, encouragements and insight throughout this research. I consider myself to be a lucky person, and the most important reason throughout thesis was getting to learn a lot from my supervisor who always had his doors open for me.

I would like to thank Fatih University to have generously financed the fieldwork for this research. I am appreciative for the contribution of Prof. Ömer Çaha, who helped in developing the fieldwork, and for his valuable comments and suggestions on my thesis. Moreover, I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Kemal Özden, Assist. Prof. Şammas Salur and Assist. Prof. Ertuğrul Gündoğan who always support my M.A. studies. Then, I would like to thank Yıldırım Erbaş, Engin Şahin and Elçin Karlı for their never ending support for my work, and encouraging me whenever I could not see the end of my study myself. And special acknowledgement for the editing of the text goes to Hüseyin Gündoğdu.

I would like to express my love to my mother and my father, who always encouraged and believed in me. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my husband, Serhan Tuna, for his unique patience and emotional support he had shown me throughout my work.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the survey is to understand voter behaviors and to show the social cleavages –like ethnic and religious diversities— in Istanbul Gaziosmanpaşa district in 2007 general elections.

Gaziosmanpaşa district, thanks to its being a mosaic society, furnishes us with a very good case study for acquiring critical tools to identify the main factors influencing Turkish urban voters. It is one of the most important districts of Istanbul because of its swift growth of population. The population of the district have nourished due to the rapid immigration since 1952. The population share of Gaziosmanpaşa district was eight percent of Istanbul’s total population in 2007. Besides this district become the focus of the study because it hosts different ethnic and religious identities such as the *Alevi* and it is representative of Istanbul’s lower-class and middle-class.

The survey includes 2007 general elections, because the polarization among political parties and the social cleavages in society become more evident in 2007 general elections. Especially, the climate of tensions increases together with the presidential election process. Because of the Turkish Parliament’s failure to select a new president, Parliament took the early elections decision. The elections are held on July 22, 2007 instead of November 4.

The data used in this survey were extracted from the survey questioning “Electoral Behaviors: The cases of Gaziosmanpaşa and Üsküdar” which was supported by Fatih University Scientific Research Funds. The survey was made in eight quarters which host 28 percent of Gaziosmanpaşa district. A questionnaire has been applied to a sample including 601 people through face to face meeting, the

number of which corresponds to 1.14 per thousand of the overall district voters. The survey comprised 24 questions.¹

While analyzing the survey results conducted in Gaziosmanpaşa we tried to answer the following questions: How much are socio-economic factors influential on party preferences among the Gaziosmanpaşa electorate? To what extent the regional factor impact on voting behaviors? How the dichotomy between center and periphery which still keeps its influences in Turkey would reflect on electoral behaviors in Gaziosmanpaşa? Do ethnical identity and religious belief influence party choices of them?

This dissertation the first chapter analyzed the political participation in Turkey in a brief theoretical framework. After that, the factors that affect voter behaviors in Turkey are examined. The definition of political participation together with its dimensions, forms and typologies are examined.

Moreover, this chapter is examined not only the demographic characteristics such as gender, age and education in terms of their influence on electoral behaviors, but also the effect of occupational factors on voter's party preferences. And some examples are given about these characteristics. Then, the factors like religion, ethnicity, media and urbanization are enumerated. Furthermore, this chapter is to discuss how the electoral behaviors has changed and in what ways they have changed in Turkey. Moreover, the results of public surveys carried out by analysis firms during the 2007 elections and the studies of previous elections were scrutinized.

The second chapter firstly investigates the effects to the 2007 general elections of the presidential election process. After that, the thesis is scrutinized the political parties which participated in 2007 general elections together with their campaigns and election programs. It also focuses on the influences of the AKP's

¹ See Appendix 1.

activities, which was the governing party following the 2002 and the dominant party in Gaziosmanpaşa.

This chapter reviews the AKP's position. How come that this party, which succeeded in one local and two general elections of the Turkish political history, has obtained from the Turkish electorate such a support that no party had reached it at any rate over the last 50 years. Moreover, this chapter details the dynamics lying in the background of Turkish electorates' behavior.

The third chapter analyzes Gaziosmanpaşa district with its main features. This chapter firstly analyzes Gaziosmanpaşa's geographical position, and the width of the district borders. It secondly examines carefully district's human geography. Furthermore, this chapter scrutinizes voters' demographic properties such as education, income and occupational levels. Thirdly, this chapter emphasizes district's political geography and analyzes voters' party preferences and participants to elections from 1983 to 2007.

Finally, the AKP took 45 percent vote in 2002 and 55 percent vote in 2007 in Gaziosmanpaşa district. These votes include the maximum rates for the AKP from second election constituency of Istanbul in 2002 and 2007 general elections. For this reason, this chapter analyzes the works of municipality and the AKP district organization in Gaziosmanpaşa district.

In the last chapter, the data of our survey are exposed and analyzed. First of all, this chapter handles technical parts of survey and explains the examination of scope, method and sample of the survey and the data collecting technique. Secondly, this chapter evaluates the results of the survey. The influences of voters' demographic properties such as age, gender, education and occupation and income on the party preferences are primarily scrutinized. After that, the chapter investigates the influences of regional differences and ethnic identity on voter behaviours. A comparison is done on two quarters namely Karadeniz and Gazi in Gaziosmanpaşa district in order to understand the influences of regional cleavages. This chapter

examines the center and periphery dichotomy which still keeps its influences in Turkey, how this dichotomy reflects electoral behaviors in Gaziosmanpaşa? Before dichotomy is analyzed, the knowledge is given about it in details. Moreover, the influence of “threat” factor especially is used in the election programs in 2007 election process by opposition parties on voter behaviors are scrutinized. Furthermore, this chapter investigates in this context the reflection of religion on electoral behaviors. This chapter exposes party images and vote volatility among elections 1999, 2002, 2007 and now and finally analyzes mass media factor and leader effect on voter behaviors in Gaziosmanpaşa district.

CHAPTER I

VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY

Voters in a democratic state participate in the political actions, affect mechanisms and are influenced by politics in exchange. One of the basic indicators of modern politics is that it provides the citizens with appropriate circumstances which increase their participation in political area.

In this chapter, firstly the political participation will be analyzed in a briefly theoretical frame. The definition of political participation together with its dimensions, forms and typologies are to be examined separately. Then the factors that affect voting behaviors in Turkey will be illustrated. Moreover, not only the demographic characteristics such as gender, age and educational in terms of their influence on voting behaviors but also the effect of professional factors on people's party preferences will be examined. And some examples will be given about these characteristics. Then, the factors of religious, ethnical, media and urban will be enumerated. Furthermore, this chapter is to include how the voting behaviors has changed and in what ways they has transformed in Turkey. By means of the given samples, the results of public surveys carried out by analysis firms in 2007 elections and the ones in previous elections will be scrutinized.

1.1. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The values, beliefs, attitudes and expectations of voters play a determining role once they reached adulthood in the political system. This is because voters have influence on the decision-making process at various levels of local, state, and national government, provided that they willingly take part in political participation.² Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel defined political participation as “those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support governments and

politics”.³ Similarly, Sidney Verba, Norman Nie and Jae-on Kim define it in terms of the influence citizens have in the selection of government personnel.⁴ Political participation shortly, includes all the activities of voters that seek to influence government policies.

Taking part in political activities can come through different levels and various ways. Robert Dahl classifies dimensions of the political participation interest, concern, information and activity. Interest means that “how curious one is to know what is happening”. Concern means “how important one feels the decision is”. Information means that “how much knowledge one has about the decision”. Lastly, activity means “how much one overtly participates in the decision”.⁵

Most contemporary definitions of political participation involve some forms of action or activity of citizens seeking to influence the political process either directly or indirectly. Political participation can take two basic forms as conventional and unconventional. Conventional forms include activities such as voting, campaigning and contacting with elected officials. They involve all those activities that take place within a relatively prescribed, structured, and institutional environment. Unconventional forms of participation include however, all those activities by citizens, groups, and organizations that do not follow the routinized institutional forms of politics, such as social protest, demonstrations, picketing, political violence, radicalism, and revolution. Activities of this nature aim at changing of political system partially or totally.⁶

² Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1984), *Çağdaş Siyasal Bilim Teori Olgu ve Süreçler* (The Modern Political Science, Theory, Fact and Processes), İstanbul: Beta, p. 199.

³ Milbrath, Lester W. and Goel, M.L. (1977), *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?*, Chicago: Rand McNally, p. 2.

⁴ Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman H. and Kim, Jae-on (1987), *Participation and Political Equality*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 46.

⁵ Dahl, Robert A. (1965), *Modern Political Analysis*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, pp. 56-57.

⁶ Kourvetaris, George A. (1996), *Political Sociology: Structure and Process*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University, p. 136.

There are a number of models and typologies of conventional political participation. Milbrath described a three-tiered hierarchy of political participation such as the apathetic, the spectator and the gladiators: Apathetics are those who do not participate or who have withdrawn from the political process; Spectators are those who are minimally involved; and Gladiators are those who are active in politics. In their later work, Milbrath and Goel extended Milbrath's typology by dividing the gladiator group into four conventional subtypes such as contact specialists, communicators, party and campaign workers and community activists and one unconventional subtype such as protesters.⁷

As mentioned, voting is a fundamental process and a conventional form of participation in the political process. Voting is an easily performed behavior. It has more rich and reliable data than the other participation forms. Voting action has very great importance because of its nature bringing about extensive, social and economic results. This action is the most active tool in terms of providing the sensitiveness of political leaders against voters.⁸

The election process determines the administrators who will govern the society. Furthermore, votes indirectly determine the government policies which are to be applied by administrators. Richard Rose and Harve Mossawir determined six voting functions in that way, first of all, electors' votes express a preference which makes difference between administrator and politics. Secondly, votes are effective tools among electors and candidates. The candidate, who thinks to be selected, should evaluate his or her decisions in order to gain the preference of elector. Thirdly, vote constitutes action which approves dependence or loyalty of voter to political regime. Fourthly, vote can cause coldness feeling for elector against political regime. Sure that this event is not only result of one election. This can be the result of a lot of elections. Therefore this event may cause voter not to participate

⁷ Milbrath and Goel (1977), pp. 5-24.

⁸ Özbudun, Ergun (1975), *Türkiye'de Sosyal Değişim ve Siyasal Katılma* (Social Changing and Political Participation in Turkey), Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, p. 7 and Kalaycıoğlu, (1984), p. 258.

willingly in political system. Fifthly, vote can be a behavior which has emotional significance for voters who votes in election. At this situation, behavior of voter may not have political content. Lastly, vote may constitute behavior which does not include any functions for some voters. Therefore voter may be unconcerned to political life. Six voting functions of Rose and Mossawir can take shape all together at behavior of elector.⁹

While elector votes in election, he enters interaction together with political leader and to establish relation with political regime.¹⁰ Thus, electors, unconsciously, determine which political leaders remain or do not remain in political arena. As a result of this, electors will play a role at political regime. The important point is that which factors affect the voter in the eve of elections. The following part will answer the question: “What are the factors which affect voter behaviors?”

1.2. THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT VOTER BEHAVIORS IN TURKEY

According to political science and political sociology literature, the most important subject for participation studies is “the factors which determine a participation level.”¹¹ The factors which determine a participation level can be expressed as “political sources.”¹² The factors or sources which determine a participation level put forward which factors affect behavior that based on participation.

At this point, voting, which is one of the political participation actions, would be stated how effected from political resources. Party preferences of voters determine

⁹ Bowman, Lewis and Boynton, G.R. (1974), *Political Behaviour and Public Opinion: Comparative Analyses*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, pp. 157-164.

¹⁰ Kalaycıoğlu, (1984), p. 253.

¹¹ Çaha, Ömer (2004), *Seçmen Davranışı ve Siyasal Partiler* (The Voter Behavior and Political Parties), İstanbul: Fatih University, p. 56.

¹² Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1983), *Karşılaştırmalı Siyasal Katılma, Siyasal eylemin kökenleri üzerine bir inceleme* (The Comparative Political Participation), İstanbul: İstanbul University, p. 17.

which factors affect voting. For this reason, demographic characteristics such as gender, age, educational and professional factors' influence on party preferences will be examined. And some examples will be given about these characteristics. After that, religious and ethnical factor, regional factor, leader factor, media factor and urban factors' influence on party preferences will be examined.

1.2.1. Gender Factor

Analyzing gender as a factor influencing political participation and preferences, we notice a discrepancy between male and female. Milbrath and Goel had explained in their "Political participation";

*The finding that men are more likely to participate in politics than women is one of the most thoroughly substantiated in social science... The gap between men and women is widest among lower-status people, and narrowest among the upper-status.*¹³

Ersin Kalaycıoğlu alleges that the discrepancy in gender roles drastically result from the factors coming out of social structure. He sets forth that the level of education, occupational status, the experience of urban life and the opportunity of benefiting from the means of mass communications take a large share in the shaping process of these roles.¹⁴

When we analyze the results of survey about political preferences, made by KONDA after 2007 elections, we notice that the party preferences of women change as the level of education rises. For example, the survey shows that the higher educated women preferred left wing parties, such as the CHP. The most of the women preferring the right wing parties are the ones graduating from elementary and high schools.

¹³ Milbrath, and Goel (1977), pp. 116-117. Italic is mine.

¹⁴ Kalaycıoğlu, (1983), p. 116.

Table 1: Gender, Age, Education Party Distribution (%)¹⁵

			AKP	CHP	MHP	Ind.	Other	Total
Women	18-28 Age	Under Secondary School	62	10	9	8	12	100
		High School	36	28	16	3	16	100
		University	33	43	11	2	11	100
	29-43 Age	Under Secondary School	56	15	12	6	11	100
		High School	36	35	17	3	9	100
		University	19	70	7	0	4	100
	44+ Age	Under Secondary School	57	15	10	7	11	100
		High School	25	38	19	3	16	100
		University	10	72	7	3	7	100

Furthermore, there is also a difference between women and men in terms of voting behavior. Analyzing the results of survey which are made by Yılmaz Esmer¹⁶ in 1999 and KONDA¹⁷ in 2007, the differences between men and women are even more evident.

¹⁵Ağırdır, B. (2007), “Sandığın içindekini ne belirledi?” (What the vote in the ballot box determined?), *KONDA*, 17-18. http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/sandigin_icindeki.pdf (12 May 2008).

¹⁶ Esmer, Yılmaz (2002), “At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior”, in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 99-102.

After the April 1999 elections, Esmer made survey to understand the factors affecting the changes in voter preferences, based on the survey made with 1.741 voters interviewed immediately after voting.

¹⁷ Erdem, T. (2007)^A, “Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırmaları” (The Political Tendencies Research), *KONDA*, 14. http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, (12 May 2008).

25.843 people were taken to a face to face interview in the research.

Figure 1: The rate of Gender - 1999





Figure 2: The rate of Gender- 2007



According to the results of the survey which is done at every two election process, the rate of male voters is more than the rate of female ones among the MHP voters. However, the rates of women are more than the rate of men among Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP) and the AKP voters in both election periods. The explanation of these rates can be that the woman branches of these parties work very effectively.¹⁸

¹⁸ White, B. Jenny (2002), *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*, London: University of Washington Press.

1.2.2. Age Factor

Another factor outside voter control is age. Differences of age bring out different electoral behaviors, too. Young voters, probably because of their energy and time,¹⁹ propound for stronger ideologies and for unconventional forms of political participation. With progress in age, people prefer to support more compromising efforts and stand for the regular participation in conventional forms of politics.

In Turkey, Esmer²⁰ (1999) and KONDA²¹ (2007) measured the changes regarding this behavior. On one hand, the more extreme party (MHP) mobilized many votes between the age intervals of 18 to 22 and 23 to 34 owing to its uncompromising stance and extreme policy. On the other hand, moderate parties tried to grasp more votes rather from older voters. However, the AKP in 2007 elections, have been particularly successful in attracting votes from all ages, even if its moderate policies attract the over 44 slightly more than the younger votes.²²

According to the survey results, the MHP takes maximum vote from the young voters at every two election period. These results verify the young voters' close interest to strong ideologies like the MHP.

¹⁹ Kalaycıođlu, (1983), pp. 21-23.

²⁰ Esmer, (2002), pp. 99-102.

²¹ Erdem, (2007)^A, p. 15.

²² Turan, İter (1986), *Siyasal Sistem ve Siyasal Davranış* (Political System and Political Behavior), İstanbul: Der Yayın, p. 80.

Figure 3: The rate of Age - 1999





Figure 4: The rate of Age- 2007



1.2.3. Educational Factor

Education is a tool to transfer political values, consequently it has an important role.²³ Education places voters into the social status, procures skills and resources required for political activity. Moreover, education provides abilities in order to understand complex political relations. The level of education is the one most closely associated with voter choice.

²³ Kalaycıoğlu, (1983), p. 26, and Turan, (1986), p. 77.

If results of survey which are made by Esmer²⁴ in 1999 and KONDA²⁵ in 2007 are analyzed, differences between levels of education can be understood better.

Figure 5: The Education Levels - 1999





Figure 6: The Education Levels - 2007



According to the survey's results; while the FP and the AKP are preferred more by lower educated voters in the two elections, the CHP is preferred more by

²⁴ Esmer, (2002), pp. 99-102.

²⁵ Erdem, (2007)^A, p. 16.

higher educated voters. The condition of the FP and the AKP which are preferred more by the lower educated can be explained by the fact that voters of the right parties are founded and supported mostly by lower educated conservative voters. More educated people presumably prefer the parties of the leftist orientation most. This is why the CHP voters consisted of educated people rather than the uneducated in 1999 and 2007. The MHP seems to be more popular among the junior high school and high school level educated. As we have already seen, the MHP has higher appeal on younger voters.

1.2.4. Professional Factor

Professions and wages have been occurred at the results of urban environment and of education possibilities. Professions and wages are factors which affect directly political participation. Qualities and functioning conditions of profession have affected political participation.²⁶ Voters with a good and well retributed profession level perform difficult participation kinds²⁷ more than easy participation kinds²⁸ as to a lower profession level.²⁹

If results of survey which are made by KONDA³⁰ in 2007 are analyzed, differences between professional factors can be understood better.

²⁶ Turan, (1986), p. 77.


²⁷ Difficult participation kinds are, “to contact directly with the government and bureaucracy”.

²⁸ Easy participation kinds are, “to vote, to discuss about political and social problems”.

²⁹ Kalaycıoğlu, (1983), p. 31.

³⁰ Erdem, (2007) ^A, p. 21.

Figure 7: Economic Well-being - 2007



In 2007 general election period, the AKP represents more electors who have lower and lower middle income. However, the CHP represents more electors who have upper and upper middle income.


Vote distribution regarding profession is analyzed;

Table 2: Vote Distribution: Profession³¹

	CHP	DP	AKP	MHP
Civil Servant	9,7	4	3,4	6,5
Private Sector Worker	5,7	1,3	2,3	3,4
Worker	8,9	8	11,2	11,4
Little Trades	7,5	9,3	7,9	10,4
Merchant	0,3	0	0,6	1,5
Self-employment	5	2	2,8	2,7
Marginal Sector	0,3	0	1	1,7
Farmer	5	16,7	10,7	8,2
Retired	15,1	12	11,2	7,3
Housewife	26,4	26,7	39,5	26,4
Student	9,2	4,7	3	9,2
Unemployment	8,2	8,7	3,2	8,2

³¹ Erdem, (2007)^A, pp. 22-23.

Figure 8: Vote Distribution: Profession



The AKP mobilize more votes from workers, marginal sector workers, farmers, and housewives. Especially in this point, the effective working of the woman branch of the AKP is emphasized. The CHP takes more votes from civil servants, private sector workers, the self-employed, the retired and students. Also, the MHP takes more votes from workers, and a less from merchants and students.

1.2.5. Religious and Ethnical Factor


Religious and ethnical identities are as significant as gender and education for shaping preference of voters and forming a social structure. The religious factor is related with devoutness level of voter. The religious values, rhetoric and symbols are effective factors in political participation.³² If voter attaches importance to religious values in daily life, he or she shows interest for political parties which heed religious values. Both religious values and ethnic factors occur as significant determinants for the social identities of voters in Turkey. Furthermore, Şerif Mardin mentions that in

³² Erçins, Gülay (2007), “Türkiye’de Sosyo-Ekonomik Faktörlere Bağlı Olarak Değişen Seçmen Davranışı” (The Changing Voter Behavior depending from Socio-economic Factors in Turkey), *C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, 8 (2): 36.

Turkey, the influence of religion as an ideology has emerged with the multiparty system.³³

If results of the surveys made by TESEV³⁴ in 1999 and in 2002 and KONDA³⁵ in 2007 are analyzed, firstly voters define themselves through national identity (Upper identity), secondly, through religion, and then through their ethnic identity.

Figure 9: To Define Voters Own Identities (%)



As to the results of surveys, relative weights of identity alternatives have not changed in a whole sample for 7-8 years. In fact, if we investigate the surveys before this, we will see this situation has not changed.³⁶ “Being citizens of Turkey” is the most importance identity component. Electors who define themselves with the

³³ Mardin, Şerif (2007), *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset* (Religion and Politics in Turkey), İstanbul: İletişim, p. 221.

³⁴ Toprak, B. and Çarikoğlu, A. (2006), “Değişen Türkiye’de Din Toplum ve Siyaset” (Religion, Society and Politics in the Changing Turkey), *TESEV*, 27-39. http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJ/S/PDF/DEMP/Degisen%20TRde%20Din-Toplum-Siyaset.pdf, (12 May 2008).

The first research was made in 1999. The second one was conducted between May 6 and June 11 in 2006. In that research 1492 people were interviewed face to face in their own houses. The graphics given are my inference out of that research. The input data given actually amount to 100 percent, but in the graphic it does not fit to 100 percent. This is because some data are not used in the graphic.

³⁵ Erdem, T. (2007)^B, “Biz Kimiz?” (Who are we?), *KONDA*, 14-29. http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, (12 May 2008).

Each data used in the graphic is counted out of 100 percent.

³⁶ Mardin, Şerif (1983), *Din ve İdeoloji* (Religion and Ideology), İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 114-120. The survey was made in İzmir in 1968. There were 163 samples in the survey. According to the results of survey, 50,3 percent of people described themselves as Turkish and 37,5 percent of people defined themselves as a Muslim.

religious identity are in a majority in the three surveys. The ethnical identity has showed an increase from 1999 to 2007. Especially in 2007, development of free and tolerant social environment in Turkey has seen an increase in ethnic based identification. Voters publicly show their identities in society. According to the explanation of KONDA, during the public survey conducted upon a size of 48.000 people, it was seen that citizens did not avoid answering the questions, previously the same question was considered very sensible.

There can be similarities between the values and world view of voters and the values of the political parties which are supported by voters. As to the results of TESEV, political affinity of voters are analyzed, it is seen that while 46.1 percent of the CHP voters define themselves “Citizen of the Turkish Republic”, 60 percent of the AKP voters define themselves as “Muslim”. Besides, 57 percent of Democratic People’s Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, DEHAP) the voters define themselves as “Kurds” and 11.1 percent of the voters define themselves as “*Alevi*”. 2.7 percent of voters who define themselves “*Alevi*” prefer to vote for the CHP. “Ethnic Turkish identity” comes after Muslim and citizenship identities among the voters the MHP. So the MHP voters insist on their civic form of nationalism rather than the very limited interpretation of an ethnic Turkish nationalism.

1.2.6. Urban Factor

Keleş defines urbanization as on increase in the city number of cities and population living in the cities in a narrow meaning. Moreover, he defines urbanization in a broader meaning as an accumulation of population process which increases the number of the city as parallel to industrialization and economic development, provides development of the city, creates the organization, the specialization, and division of labor in the society, and causes human behavior and relationship variations.³⁷

³⁷ Keleş, Ruşen (2000), *Kentleşme Politikası* (The Politics of Urbanization), Ankara: İmge, p. 19.

Table 3: City and Village Population and Their Increase Rates According to Censuses (1927-2007)

Census Year	Total	City Population	%	Village Population	%
1927	13.648	3.306	24.2	10.342	75.8
1935	16.158	3.803	23.5	12.355	76.5
1940	17.821	4.346	24.4	13.475	75.6
1945	18.790	4.687	24.9	14.103	75.1
1950	20.947	5.244	25.0	15.703	75.0
1955	24.065	6.927	28.8	17.138	71.2
1960	27.755	8.860	31.9	18.895	68.1
1965	31.391	10.806	34.4	20.585	65.6
1970	35.605	13.691	38.5	21.914	61.5
1975	40.348	16.869	41.8	23.479	58.2
1980	44.737	19.645	43.9	25.092	56.1
1985	50.664	26.866	53.0	23.799	47.0
1990	56.473	33.326	59.0	23.147	41.0
2000	67.803	44.006	65.0	23.797	35.1
2007	70.586	49.747	70,4	20.838	29,5

By 1950 the rate of urban population was generally low in Turkey. As shown in the graphic below, Turkey embarked a rapid urbanization process after 1950.³⁸ As to the eve of 2007, urban people rate 70 percent in total. This situation shows that the fundamental element of urbanization process in Turkey is the migration from the rural areas to the big cities.

In the village area impracticability³⁹ of living conditions has a significance effect for urbanization process. In the village area living conditions based on low economic efficiency of agricultural activity, agricultural mechanization, attainment of boundary of arable lands, decline of agricultural area, the share in the national

³⁸ D.İ.E. (2002), *2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri / İstanbul* (The General Population Census 2000, The Social and Economic Characteristics of the Population/ İstanbul), Ankara: D.İ.E. and The results of 2007 are quoted from ADNKS.

ADNKS; is a registration system which records and updates population data in accordance with places of residence, keeps close tabs on population movements and matches people with residence addresses according to identity numbers in MERNİS records.

³⁹ Karpat (1976) and Kongar (1998) express the impracticability of agricultural areas as “repulsive” forces and the functions of the cities as “impulsive” ones in their own terminology.

income and decline of labor force.⁴⁰ Furthermore, in the city a new job and high price, education and health facilities have a very important effect for immigration. The rapid immigration which eventuates at the result of attraction of the cities causes to be constituted problematic urbanization because of the failure of urban facilities and services. The populations who come from rural areas settle down to the outskirts of city more than job areas of city.⁴¹ Therefore, unemployment rate increases continuously in the cities. Beside unemployment, at the result of rapid urbanization process, there is serious problem of accommodation because the housing market was prohibitive to the poor migrants and the state failed to provide enough cheap houses. Then, the populations who come from rural areas settle down in the outskirts of city build “Shanty towns”.⁴²

“Shanty towns” is the house which is built a single storey at the minimum standard. Generally, “Shanty towns” is an unlicensed construction over public or private domain. Especially, in Turkish “*gece*” means *night* and “*kondu*” means *placed* or *put*; thus the term “*gecekondu*” literally means *placed (built) overnight*. “Shanty houses” were constructed in a very short time by people migrating from rural areas to the outskirts of the large cities.⁴³

This form of urbanization occurs without permission over land of municipalities, land of government and land of other peoples by people migrating from rural areas to the outskirts of the large cities. Politicians, on their side, have given title deed to shanty town so they provide legal position to shanty town in order to collect votes of shanty population especially chose to election.⁴⁴ Besides, politicians provide urban service to these regions such as water, electric and road.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Keleş, (2000), p. 552.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 559.

⁴² Ibid, p. 562.

⁴³ Karpat, Kemal (1976), *Türkiye’de Toplumsal Dönüşüm* (The Social Transformation in Turkey), translated by Abdülkerim Sönmez (2003), Ankara: İmge, pp. 38-39.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 118.

⁴⁵ Kongar, Emre (1998), *21. yy Türkiye 2000’ li yıllarda Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (The Social Structure of Turkey in the 2000s), İstanbul: Remzi, p. 567.

Therefore, they contributed to the legitimization and the spreading of squatting and also to urbanization of these immigrants coming from rural areas.

Urbanization is a fundamental element which has given shape to social, economic and political structure in Turkey.⁴⁶ As a result of urbanization, which increased as a dimension of modernization, the concept of “citizenship” developed. Thus, the political participation appeared in the city with the concept of “citizenship.”⁴⁷ Urbanization factors constitute some kinds of political participation because incentivates the formation of interest groups, cooperatives, local associations and neighborhood organizations in Turkey.

While the political participation in cities is more independent and conscious, people in rural areas take part in politics under the influence of their environment.⁴⁸ The immigrants from rural areas start to modify their traditional political preferences as they urbanize.⁴⁹ This is because their needs change and they have to meet these new needs. What is more, their political awareness increases in time. People demand from local and national politics to solve their problems. They do this especially by means of voting. Although people of rural areas are more conservative, in contrast the city people are more liberals. This difference can also be observed among city wards. This originates from the effect of squatting. The new immigrants settle down in suburb areas and their conservative votes are replaced by flexible ones in accordance with their changing basic needs.⁵⁰

If Ümraniye, on the Asian side of Istanbul, is a good example to be investigated, urbanization in squatter area can be seen clearly. It is known that the population of Ümraniye, which was a thin village attached to have a population of 501 of Üsküdar, in 1940. I was converted to a municipality in 1963, land population

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 549.

⁴⁷ Keleş, (2000), pp. 31-34.

⁴⁸ Çukurçayır, M. Akif (2000), *Siyasal Katılma ve Yerel Demokrasi* (The Political Participation and Local Democracy), Ankara: Yargı, p. 81.

⁴⁹ Karpat, (1976), p. 318.

⁵⁰ Keleş, (2000), p. 33.

reached 14.800 people in 1965, 22.963 in 1970 and 38.730 in 1975. Ümraniye's municipality status was revoked by military administration in 1980 while the population was 71.954 and it was attached again to Üsküdar municipality. However, Ümraniye won back its municipality statute and returned district center in 1989. As to census of the 1990, the population was 242.091.⁵¹ The population increased to 446.219 according to census of 2000.⁵² And according to the result of 2007 ADNKS the population is 897.260.

Especially, there was migration from Bulgaria, Bosnia, Şile and the Black sea until 1980 in Ümraniye. After 1980, there was migration from Sivas, Gümüşhane, Diyarbakır and Tunceli. People were migrating from rural area to outskirts of cities had constituted a poor sector and they had accelerated a land occupation because of helplessness.⁵³ The general election result of Ümraniye will be examined between 1991 and 2007.⁵⁴ The effect of the Islamist right party⁵⁵ was seen between 1991 and 1999 general elections. But, the Islamist right party has started to lose its effect in 1999 year and it has leaved its situation to the AKP which is known as a liberal right. Ümraniye generally has a population consisting of conservative people. First of all, this may be reckoned as that the originally immigrants of this region vote for the leading parties in order to meet some urgent needs such as title deeds. Secondly, these parties represent Anatolian people. It was seen that the Islamist right and the liberal right have represented low class electors since the 1980s but also- as we will see in the next chapters- because they advocate radical social changes. People who migrate to this city chose these parties in order not to lose their identity. Especially, people who work to accommodate an ever-changing social atmosphere at district catch on social identities.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp. 40-41.

⁵² D.I.E. (2002), p.25.


⁵³ Keleş, (2000), p. 36.

⁵⁴ TÜİK, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>.

⁵⁵ The Welfare party (*Refah Partisi*, RP) or The Virtue party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP).

Besides that, the votes of the Kurdish HADEP which is based on ethnic identity increased in 2002 general election. The party won the third position. Although the DTP nominated an independent candidate in 2007 election, not a remarkable decrease appeared in the rate of votes though.

Figure 10: Istanbul / The General Election Results of Ümraniye



1.2.7. Regional Factor

The regional factor has a significant effect over the political preference. In Turkey, there are enormous regional discrepancies, particularly in participation. Turkey is such a country that cultural and regional diversities⁵⁶ can easily be observed. An apparent reason of this can be maldistribution of modernization from West to East. Ethnical structure, cultural, historical, geographical and economical differences create huge gaps between the West and the East regions. These entail some differences between the political behaviors of voters among regions.

⁵⁶ Secor, Anna J. (2001), "Ideologies in crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s". *Political Geography*, 20 (5, June): 539-560 and Jefferson West, William (2005), "Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: an Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections". *Political Geography*, 24 (4, May): 499-523.

More importantly, differences between the political behaviors of voters depend on discontent degree of their social and economical living conditions.

“Human Development Index”⁵⁷ (HDI) levels of regions and elector behaviors were compared; it was determined that the people who live in regions which have low HDI level opt out at a high percentage in the elections. Furthermore, it appears that there is a higher abstention rate with an increasing HDI level.

Table 4: Nonvoting Rates in 2007 General Elections

Region	Province	HDI	Nonvoting percentage in 2007 general elections (%)
The Southeastern Anatolia	Diyarbakır	0,668	28,97
The Eastern Anatolia	Erzurum	0,661	20,14
The Central Anatolia	Niğde	0,712	17,88
The Black Sea	Rize	0,725	19,67
The Mediterranean	Antalya	0,788	15,63
The Marmara	Kocaeli	0,869	13,19
The Aegean	Muğla	0,857	13,06

Table 4 compares the HDI with the participation rates in the 7 Turkish regions. It is evident that an increase in HDI is inversely proportional to participation rates. Moreover, the two provinces with one of the lowest HDI -Diyarbakır and Tunceli- have also the lowest participation rates.⁵⁸

The party preferences of the electors in some provinces that are selected from seven regions of Turkey between 1983 and 2007 general elections will be investigated. The vote distribution of parties will be observed according to regional differences. The center-right parties and center-left parties such as the AKP, Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP), True Path Party (*Doğruyol Partisi*-

⁵⁷ Akder, H. (2004), “Technical Note: Computing the Indices”, *Human Development Report (2000) / UNDP*, 63-69.


<http://hdr.unthe DP.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/turkey/name.3296.en.html>. (12 May 2008) The expected lifetime was counted within the criteria of literacy rates, education process, schoolization and income levels.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 65.

DYP), the DSP, and the CHP generally gain more votes from western regions. The HADEP is preferred more by eastern but mainly southeastern regions.

The general election results, which are made between 1983 and 2007 years, of some provinces that are selected from seven regions of Turkey are taken hand in the graphics below. The Marmara and the Aegean regions are socio-economically most developed regions of Turkey. The commerce, industry and tourism centers are intensively populated areas. It is seen that the electors of the Marmara and the Aegean regions mostly prefer the moderate parties.⁵⁹ The moderate parties have started to lose votes in the Marmara region since 1987 general elections. Especially in industrial cities that have high HDI levels between 1991 and 1995 general elections, the RP increasingly gained more votes. The areas that have some ethnic groups such as Georgian, Abhasian, Laz, and Bulgarian tend to align with the social surroundings and opt for conservative parties provinces that have high industrialization.


Figure 11: Marmara Region / General Elections Results of Kocaeli



⁵⁹ TÜİK, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>.

The center parties have always been very strong in the Aegean region.⁶⁰ It is seen that there are continuous competition between center-right and center-left parties. Especially, while the center-right parties were supported more intensively between 1983 and 1995 years, the votes of the center-left parties have increased since 1999 general election. The political preferences of voters appear to affect cultural structure of the Aegean region.

Figure 12: The Aegean Region / The General Elections Results of Muğla




The center-right parties have started to lose vote after the 1983 elections in the Mediterranean region.⁶¹ The electors who go far from the center parties have tended to Turkish nationalism since 1995. After 1999, the radical Turkish nationalism has started to melt. In 2002 the CHP, which is a center-left party, become the first party in the area. However, in 2007 the AKP, which is a center-right party, managed to become the first party.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.


Figure 13: The Mediterranean Region / The General Election Results of Antalya



The center-right parties are more effective in Niğde which is a typical province of Central Anatolia region.⁶² After 1991, the effect of the RP that is Islamist party and the MHP that is nationalist party has increased over region. The AKP that is a center right party has been effective over the region since 2002. The political preferences of voters have been affected traditionally by the dominance of nationalist-conservative values.

⁶² Ibid.

Figure 14: Central Anatolia Region / The General Election Results of Niğde




The Black Sea Region has provinces with similar HDI level except Zonguldak. Since the economy of Zonguldak is based on mining industry and intensive worker population, this province is socio-economically different from the other Black Sea provinces.

Rize may be a good example of the area. It is seen that the center parties have strong effect between 1983 and 1999 in Rize.⁶³ Especially, the ANAP took the majority of votes in this period. When the leader of the ANAP changed in 1989, the party took much more votes between 1991 and 1999. This is because the new leader –Mesut Yılmaz— homeland was Rize. In respect to the conservative attitudes of the region, we have to consider also the influence of the “*hemşehrilik*” (belonging to the same hometown or village) on voters. When the leader of the ANAP changed again in 2002, party’s vote rate sharply decreased. AKP replaced it, obtaining the same rate of votes. Incidentally, AKP leader is also originally from this province.

⁶³ Ibid.

Figure 15: The Black Sea Region / The General Election Results of Rize




Southeastern Anatolia is socio-economically an underdeveloped region of Turkey. The region has a very low HDI. The population of the region is composed merely by Kurds. The political preferences of the voters are affected by this ethnical structure. The CHP had gained the majority of the votes between 1983 and 1995.⁶⁴

In the following electoral context the Kurdish party HADEP obtained the majority of the votes but was prevented by the ten percent national threshold, which presented it to win seats. For this reason in 2007, the heir of the banned HADEP joined elections as independent.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Figure 16: The Southeastern Anatolia Region / The General Election Results of Diyarbakır




The Eastern Anatolia region has the lowest rate of HDI level in Turkey. This low rate is influential on participation. 20.14 percent of the electorate deserted the polling stations in 2007 elections.

When the political preferences are analyzed, it is seen that the center parties have strong influence between 1983 and 2007 in the Eastern Anatolia region.⁶⁵ Moreover, nationalist and Islamist parties (MHP and RP/FP) are influential between 1987 and 2007. Especially, the voters prefer the MHP which is Turkish nationalist party in 2002 and 2007 elections. However, this is the case of Erzurum where there is not a relevant Kurdish population. Whereas, in the other Eastern Anatolia provinces such as Hakkari, Van, Şırnak and Tunceli voters preferred DEHAP and independent candidates in the last elections.

Lastly, while the center parties like the ANAP and the DYP lost their votes after 1999, the AKP superseded them as a new center-right party.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Figure 17: Eastern Anatolia Region / The General Election Results of Erzurum



1.2.8. Mass Media Factor

Mass media factors have developed day by day together with technological improvements. With the improvement of the means of mass communication, it is now easier for people to be informed about their environment, social structure surrounding them and the events happening around. This also reshaped and gave a new dimension to politics, because the communication means not only aim at informing, educating or entertaining the people but also making him alert about political happenings and conditions.

Especially during election campaigns, some systematic communication activities and political advertorials –which are oriented to inform or convince people— are packed so as to gain votes from target population. These activities aim at affecting the elector preferences on behalf of the nominated candidates or the party itself and at attaining more votes on the election day from the party’s supporters.

Politicians generally benefit from brochures, newspapers, photographs, advertising or spot films, radio, television and recently from the internet while they

are campaigning, making propaganda or canvassing electorates. Though all of these means affect the masses of people, their degree of importance differ in accordance with how they are used or how easily they are used. For example, TV might be accepted as the most favorite communication mean since it calls upon audiovisual senses more effectively. According to results of the TÜSES survey in 1995 year, TV was the foremost information resource which affects electors' social and political ideas. Moreover, daily newspapers follow.⁶⁶ Likewise, Nural İmik conducted a research in order to determine how and how much the electorates are affected by communication means used in elections before 22 July 2007.⁶⁷ In this research, electorates are asked which communications mean they preferred most during electoral campaigns; 79 percent of the participants answered TV, 10.5 percent for newspapers and periodicals and another 10.5 percent for the internet.

Means of mass communication are crucial instruments for establishing the necessary links between people and politicians during election times. However, their effects on political attitudes have not been proven yet. Many researchers stand for that the media just reinforce the existing condition in the eve of election.⁶⁸ Laurel Elder and Steven Greene stated that:

The impact of media on voting decision, however, is far from straightforward. Several studies have revealed, and to varying degrees attempted, to explain a phenomenon referred to as 'hostile media phenomenon' or 'negative projection'..... These results suggest that media is not supplying a direct cue for presidential preferences and hence that our conceptualization of media and its impact is more complex than imaged.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Erder, Necat (1995), *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı* (Constituencies of Political Party and the Bases of Social Democracy in Turkey), Ankara: TÜSES, pp. 96–97.

⁶⁷ İmik, N. (2007, November), "Siyasi Partilerin Medyada Yer Almasının Seçmenin Oy Verme Davranışına Etkisi" (The effect on voting behaviour of the presence of political parties in the media.), *International Symposium on Media and Politic*, Ege University, pp. 877-887. The survey was done with the 420 voters in Malatya and Elazığ.

⁶⁸ Milburn, Michael A. (1998), *Sosyal Psikolojik Açıdan Kamuoyu ve Siyaset* (Public Opinion and Politics according to Social Psychology), translated by Ali Dönmez and Veli Duyan, Ankara: İmge, p.247.

⁶⁹ Elder, Laurel and Greene, Steven (2003), "Political information, gender and the vote: the differential impact of organizations, personal discussion, and the media on the electoral decisions of women and men", *The Social Science Journal*, 40, p. 387.

Also, Michael Milburn explicated that the short term campaigns via mass media are not much influential on electorates' preferences, but a long term campaign period before elections can raise the influence.⁷⁰

Moreover, informal networks, family and peer groups seem to be highly influential in the country. In many parts of Turkey tribal links or *hemşehri* networks are capable to mobilize votes and to dominate information on politics. Especially, Michalengelo Guida stated that

Comparison with other areas of the country shows *that villagers in Turkey do participate more to the election*, probably because this is the only moment they can influence politics. Villagers are also usually more cautious in their vote, because they usually make fewer mistakes than the townsmen... Here, it seems credible *that open vote in villages may help voters in their choice*.⁷¹

In addition, Nurhat mentioned that according to the results of a survey in Turkey among villagers, the political participant where “the collective vote” (*birleşik oy*) is common is forced by the local elites (*ağalar*) according to the local feudal structure.⁷² In this circumstance, there is the actual voter—who, however, does not make a choice according to his beliefs—, those who take decisions—usually the feudal lord or the tribal leader— and finally those who communicate the choice of the “lord” to the voters.

⁷⁰ Milburn, (1998), pp.248-249.

⁷¹ Guida, M., (2009, March). “Feudal Control of Politics: the Example of the Province of Urfa”, in the European University Institute in Montecatini Terme, *Competition over resources, rural poverty and agrarian policies in MENA*, Panel conducted at the Tenth Mediterranean conference, Florence, Italy, p.34.

⁷² Nuhurat, Cenap, (1971), “Türkiye Köylerinde Olağandışı Oy Verme” (The Extraordinary Voting in Turkey Villages), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 26, winter: 220-221.

CHAPTER II

THE 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS IN TURKEY: PROCESS AND RESULTS

This chapter will examine the effects of the presidential election process to the 2007 general elections. It will also analyze the political parties which participated in 2007 general elections, the campaigns and their election programs. Especially the influences of the AKP's activities, which were the governing party following the 2002 and the 2007 general elections, will be investigated.

This chapter will review the AKP's position. How come that this party which succeeded in one local and two general elections of the Turkish political history has obtained from the Turkish electorate such a support that no party had reached it at any rate over the last 50 years. Moreover, this chapter will detail the dynamics lying in the background of Turkish electorates' behavior. First of all, the events coinciding with the presidential election process will be investigated. After that the answer will be searched to the question "May the victory of AKP be based up on these events?"

2.1. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION PROCESS ON 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The incident which characterized the 2007 elections was the presidential election. The seven-year term of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer officially ended on May 16, 2007. According to the Constitution, the parliament was required to elect a successor by that date.

The question of electing the 11th president triggered a deep systemic crisis in Turkey. The ruling AKP numerically had the capacity to elect their preferred candidate as the new president in the third round of the elections in the Parliament.

The AKP had a time 365 seats over 550 Members of Parliament. Their candidate was then the foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, who has been seen as the conciliatory, mild face of the party. Gül is widely respected as an effective foreign minister who helped to secure the opening of Turkey's membership talks with the European Union (EU) in 2005 and worked to smooth relations with the United States after the Parliament refusal to allow the opening to a front from Turkey into Iraq. However, the candidacy of Gül had caused more controversy. Because, the candidate has roots in Turkey's Islamist movement and his wife wears a head scarf. Some secularists considered it as a symbol of both Islamism and bigotry.

The main opposition party and secular groups opposed to the president candidate of the AKP. They stressed on the principle of laicism. Laicism principle was imposed from Westernizing reforms on the country in the 1920s and 1930s. As one of those reforms, the French concept of *laïcité*⁷³ was imported to Turkey. *Laïcité* is a strict version of secularism. Grounding their arguments on these reforms, Turkish women were prohibited from wearing headscarf in public institutions.⁷⁴ Thus, because of Mrs. Gül's headscarf, the choice of a president became an emotional fight for the identity of the state. Furthermore, the other important event is the president position:

Many people in Turkey believe that there is a competition between the AKP and state elites led by civil and military bureaucrats. Turkey has a mixed constitutional regime, with the president as the key actor, in which political elites represent short-term interests whereas state elites are responsible for long-term interests. According to this model, the capacity of political elites is limited because high-level bureaucrats –

⁷³Migdalovitz, Carol (2007), "Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power", *CRS Report Congress*, (10, September):2.

"The assembly of the new Turkish Republic passed sweeping *laicist* reforms in the name of modernization at Atatürk's initiative. Reforms include abolition of the Ottoman caliphate, whose ruler held both temporal and religious power, closing of religious schools while establishing a system of public education, outlawing of religious brotherhoods, replacing the Muslim calendar with one beginning with the Christian era, supplanting Islamic law with a new civil code based on Swiss law and a new penal code adapted from Italian law, among other measures. Laicite is said not just to separate mosque and state, but to subordinate the mosque to the state."

⁷⁴ Moreover, Sezer who was a previous president refused to invite head scarf-wearing wives of AKP officials and Members of Parliament to receptions at Çankaya, the official residence.

such as army generals, university rectors, high-ranking judges, ambassadors, and the like- are appointed by the president.⁷⁵

Such secular elites believe that an AKP president would damage Turkey, so it would mean the ultimate Islamization of state institutions. Some secular elite groups such as the Association for Kemalist Thought (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği-ÇYDD*), the retired soldiers, the extreme nationalist İP and the CHP built mass demonstrations to warn the Turkish people off the secular order's imminent destruction. They argued that the country will end up by being more conservative and by putting the life styles of the secular social segments under pressure. Fierce criticisms as well as the boycotting of the elections by the opposition, in addition to rallies on the streets in major cities –Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir— have put the legitimacy of the presidential elections into doubt.

Before the presidential election, the CHP declared that a two-third quorum was required to elect a president in the first two rounds of voting. If Gül was elected with less than 367 Members of Parliament's attending, they would apply to the Constitutional Court to stop the process. Actually, 367 were not the prerequisite in previous presidential elections. The Constitution had no clear regulation about the number of deputies to be present.⁷⁶ On April 27, parliament convened for the first round of balloting to elect a president. The CHP and two other small parties⁷⁷ walked out from the chamber in order to render invalid the AKP majority's vote for Gül.

⁷⁵ Bacık, Gökhan (2008), "The parliamentary elections in Turkey, July 2007, *Electoral Studies*, 27 (2, June): 377-378.

⁷⁶ ARTICLE 102. "The President of the Republic shall be elected by a two-thirds majority of the total number of members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and by secret ballot. If the Turkish Grand National Assembly is not in session, it shall be summoned immediately to meet.If a two-thirds majority of the total number of members cannot be obtained in the first two ballots, between which there shall be at least a three-day interval, a third ballot shall be held and the candidate who receives the absolute majority of votes of the total number of members shall be elected President of the Republic. If an absolute majority of votes of the total number of members is not obtained in the third ballot, a fourth ballot will be held between the two candidates who receive the greatest number of votes in the third ballot; if the President of the Republic cannot be elected by an absolute majority of the total number of members in this ballot, new general elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be held immediately. The term of office of the incumbent President of the Republic shall continue until the President-elect takes office."

⁷⁷ The Truth Path Party and the Motherland Party.

AKP held 353 seats; Gül received 357 votes with 361 deputies present.⁷⁸ The CHP quickly declared that the election was illegal. Moreover, the CHP's leader warned that the country might face domestic conflict.⁷⁹

Then, the army also got involved in the process. Before midnight on April 27, after the first round of the presidential election, the website of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff released a message,⁸⁰ stating "It must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces... are the sure and certain defenders of secularism.... They will make their position and stance perfectly clear as it needs to be. Let nobody have any doubt about this."⁸¹ The press released also described local public events with fundamentalist overtones that it called "an open challenge to the state, in the apparel of religion."

Meanwhile, the CHP petitioned the Constitutional Court to annul the vote. On May 1, 2007, the Court decided that the process lacked 'reconciliation' in the Parliament and considered the first round of vote invalid. Gül's selection was null because of the lack of a two-thirds quorum. The election would be repeated, but the opposition did not change its stance and forced Abdullah Gül to withdraw from his candidacy. The government, then, called for early general elections. Besides, it proposed changes to the Constitution regarding the duration of the presidency, the tenures of the president of parliament and the procedures for directly electing president. The Republican People's Party went to the Constitutional Court to annul the voting once more, but this time the Court rejected the appeal as the timing of the application was not right according to the law. In the end, the changes mentioned above in the Constitution were left to be decided by a referendum after the general elections.

⁷⁸ In contrast, President Özal was elected by 263 and Demirel by only 244 votes.

⁷⁹ Bacık, (2008), pp. 377-378.

⁸⁰ The message was known in the press as the "e-memorandum" or, more darkly, the "e-coup".

⁸¹ "Text of General Staff Statement", (2007),

http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_AR_SIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html, (1 March 2008).

The Economist explained the electors' perception during the presidential election process; "Among other things this seems a strong rebuke by voters to the army, which had hinted at interfering in the AKP's choice of presidential candidate. Though Turks still respect their army, most do not feel it should intervene in politics. They are also rewarding a government that has delivered good results and punishing opposition parties that offered incoherent and unconvincing policies."⁸²

All these events which were experienced during the presidential election process had caused damage on the society's perception regarding judicial elite and the army. It is obvious that the AKP benefited from this for its own propaganda and demanded voters' support. Perhaps, some hesitant voters opted for AKP just because of the army and the judiciary intervention. However, damage emotion which is based on the presidential election process has an effect which limited the success of the AKP. If eight survey data of KONDA which had been performed periodically since February 2007 is examined, the votes of AKP would have fell under 40 percent even after the equally distribution of hesitant votes. It is seen that the AKP had had alternating vote rate between 40 or 50 percent.⁸³

2.2. THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN 2007 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The High Electoral Committee approved a list of 21 political parties with all the characteristics demanded by law to participate to the twenty third general elections. However, only 14 political parties and 699 independent candidates competed in general elections. These parties were the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- AKP), the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP), the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP), the Workers' Party (*İşçi Partisi*-İP), the Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP), the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*-SP), the Bright Turkey Party (*Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi*-

⁸² "The lesson from Turkey", (2007), *The Economist*, http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9549614&CFID=8420103&CFTOKEN=50646487, (16 March 2008).

⁸³ Erdem, (2007)^A, p. 27.

ATP), the Independent Turkey Party (*Bağımsız Türkiye Partisi-BTP*), the Labor Party (*Emek Partisi-EP*), the Young Party (*Genç Parti-GP*), the People's Ascent Party (*Halkın Yükselişi Partisi-HYP*), the Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberal Demokratik Parti-LDP*), the Freedom and Solidarity Party (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi-ÖDP*) and the Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi-TKP*).⁸⁴

The ten percent national threshold changed the strategy of some of the smaller parties. Some parties like the Motherland party (*Anavatan Partisi-ANAP*), the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP*), the Great Union Party (*Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP*), the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi-DTP*), the Social Democratic People's Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi-SHP*), the Right and Freedoms Party (*Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi-HAK-PAR*) and the Liberty and Change Party (*Hürriyet ve Değişim Partisi-HÜR-PAR*) did not participate in the elections.

Since the pro-Kurdish DTP would not be able to pass the 10 percent national threshold, the DTP decided to promote 65 candidates as independents.⁸⁵ Some parties also used the same strategy. For instance, the leaders of the BBP and the ÖDP participated as independent candidates in elections. As a result, the number of independent candidates increased to 699. It was 197 in the 2002 general elections. The opposition parties of both the left and the right attempted to unite the two separate blocs to ensure that they would pass the ten percent minimum vote required in order to gain seats in parliament. On the center-right, the DYP and the ANAP attempted to unite as a new party under the name "Democrat Party (DP)". However, this effort failed and the ANAP declared that it would not participate in the elections on June 8, 2007. On the left, the CHP and the DSP were more successful in agreeing

⁸⁴ "The results of 2007 general election", <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/secim/>, (10 February 2008)

⁸⁵ "65 candidate of the DTP", <http://www.haberler.com/dtp-bagimsiz-65-adayini-tanitti-haberi/>, (6 February 2008).

to run as an electoral coalition, but after the elections, they former two groups in Parliament.

On July 22, 2007, according to the official election results, there were 42.799.303 voters registered, while 36.056.293 ballots were casted. At 84.16 percent, the voting participation rate has been among the highest ever in Turkish history.⁸⁶ The results of the elections determined that the parliament would host three party blocs, as well as contingents of independents. Out of 550 seats, 341 would belong to the AKP, 112 to the CHP, 71 to the far-right MHP and 26 to the independents, most of who were backed by DTP. However, the DSP reclaimed its identity in the new parliament after the coalition passed the threshold. 20 independent candidates formed a group under the name of the Democratic Society Party in the parliament. Moreover, one of the other independent candidates was the representative of BBP and another candidate of ÖDP.⁸⁷

Vote percentages of the political parties between 2002 and 2007 general election results are shown in table 2.1.⁸⁸ The AKP increased its share of the national vote from 34.28 percent in 2002 to 46.58 percent.

Table 5: 2002 and 2007 General Election Results

⁸⁶ High Election Commission (YSK), <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html>, (15February 2008).

⁸⁷ One parliamentary who was elected for MHP, [Mehmet Cihat Özönder](#), died in a traffic accident on [26 July 2007](#).

⁸⁸ “The results of 2007 general election”, High Election Commission (YSK), <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm> and <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2007secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>, (10 February 2008).

	Percentages of 2002 General Election results	Percentages of 2007 General Election results
AKP	34,28	46,58
CHP	19,39	20,88*
MHP	8,36	14,27
DYP-DP**	9,54	5,42
INDEPENDENTS	1,00	5,24***
GP	7,25	3,04
SP	2,49	2,34

* Entered into an election coalition with the DSP.

** DYP changed its name into DP.

***DTP candidates entered the contest as independents.

The AKP is the first party that raised its vote about 12 percent while in the power. Before that it was Democrat party that increased its vote from 52.7 percent in 1950 to 57.6 percent in 1954. This indicates that the AKP has received a victory particular to it in the Republican Turkey.⁸⁹

The CHP votes increased only 1.49 percent as compared to the 2002 elections. Despite the pre-electoral coalition with the DSP, the party increased its share of vote only marginally. In the 2002 elections, the MHP had taken only 8.36 percent of the votes, an insufficient amount for passing the ten percent threshold. However, the MHP fared relatively better, almost doubling its vote to 14.47 percent in 2007. The DP votes decreased from 9.54 percent in 2002 to 5.42 percent in 2007. The party did not pass the ten percent threshold. Just after the elections the leader of the DP, Mehmet Ağar resigned from his position. Another party with large losses was the GP. Despite its populist propaganda, the GP's votes diminished from 7.25 percent in 2002 to 3.04 percent in 2007. The SP did not pass also the ten percent threshold in 2007 elections. Its vote decreased from 2.49 percent in 2002 to 2.34 percent in 2007. Besides, independents' votes increased from 1.00 percent to 5.24 percent in 2007. Three parties were constituted by independents in the parliament. 20

⁸⁹ Tuncer, (2003), p. 25.

independent candidates had constituted the DTP. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu rejoined the BBP and Ufuk Uras rejoined the ÖDP.

2.3. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND PROGRAMS

The election campaigns and programs of the political parties can be different from each other through discrepancy of the party conceptions. If the election campaign and programs of the political parties which participated in 2007 general election are examined, it is clearly seen that there is disparity among the political parties. 16 parties had participated in 2007 general elections. However, there are only three parties (the AKP, the CHP, the MHP) which won seats in the Parliament. These parties crossed the ten percent threshold. Furthermore, there are the independent candidates, which were successful in the elections and eventually formed parliamentary groups.

2.3.1. The Election Campaigns

The election campaigns of the political parties in 2007 general election were very active like every election campaign. The political parties organized election campaigns that include slogans and efforts different from each other. As, Tanju Tosun aptly points out the 2007 general elections marked the war a many slogans developed by political parties.⁹⁰

The AKP's slogan was "*Durmak yok, Yola devam*" (We'll not stop, we'll keep on our path). Erdoğan dominated practically every election meetings throughout Turkey. He participated into 54 meetings ranging from the east to the west part of Turkey.⁹¹ The AKP campaigned mainly on government's successful economic performance. Moreover, the AKP reiterated their commitment to end both the terror and regional differences within Turkey against the opposition candidates. For this

⁹⁰ Tosun, Tanju (2009), *Türk Siyasal Hayatında Seçimler ve İzmir* (Elections and Izmir in Turkish Political Life), Ankara: Orion, p.165.

reason their motto throughout the campaign has been “*Tek ulus, Tek bayrak, Tek ülke, Tek devlet*” (One fatherland, one flag, one country, one state).

The CHP and the MHP were criticized for basing their election strategy on threat conceptions and defense of Republican values. The CHP based its campaign on warnings of a joint threat to the regime, namely secularism.⁹² The MHP emphasized its campaign on the problem of security such as terror and Kurdish problem. Deniz Baykal staged meetings in 31 provinces. CHP used slogan the campaign “*Halkı ezdirmeyeceğiz, Ülkeyi soydurmayaçaz, Devleti böldürmeyeceğiz*” (We won’t crush the people, we won’t rob the country, we won’t allow the division of the country) though its campaign. Devlet Bahçeli regulated meeting in 19 provinces. The MHP used the election campaign “*Tek başına MHP*” (MHP alone in power) slogan. The DSP together with its independent candidates emphasized the rights of different ethnicities or minorities. They argued that the state had to accept the existence of different identities.

2.3.2. The Election Programs

When the election programs of these four parties are investigated in general, it is seen that the program of the AKP included what the party had made from 2002 to 2007. It did not include rigorously what it would do after 2007. It program was something like an annual report. The program of the CHP emphasized that Turkey was “at the crossroads of moderate Islam and secularism”. Thus, policy of apprehension was aimed. The program of the MHP aimed at the policy of apprehension and emphasized that “our country and our citizens were under risk because of splitting threat.” The program of the DTP implied Kurdish identity policies.

⁹¹ “Hangi Lider kaç Miting yaptı?” (Which Leader make how much declaration?), <http://ates64.blogcu.com/3662429/>, (15 February 2008).

⁹² Göksel, A. B. and Bitirim, S. (2007, November), “AKP ve CHP’nin Seçim Bildirgelerinin İnternet Ortamında Temsili: Sanal Propaganda” (The Election Declaration of AKP and CHP on the Internet: Imaginary Propaganda), *International Symposium on Media and Politic*, Ege University, p. 356.

It can be said that “the priority was given to human rights on issue” which was often expressed in the programs under the pressure citizens. Especially, it is seen that the basic elements of the human life such as social life, education, economy and health is given priority in the programs of the parties. These elements affect the party preference of the voters.

Urbanization, unemployment, education and health politics of the AKP, the CHP and the MHP will be examined because there are serious problems about these politics. For example; the towering problem about education is the student selection examination (namely ÖSS). The young cannot pick the faculties or departments that they want. As to economy, the high unemployment rates are in the front rank. According to the researches held by Turkish Statistical Institute, the average rate of unemployment for the year 2007 was 9.9 and it increase everyday.⁹³ The electorates expect tangible solutions for such problems that have a basic importance for human life.

Now let us scrutinize this question within the view of electoral programs prepared by the parties.⁹⁴

Firstly, there were common promises of the political parties about urbanization. The parties determined that people who lived in the cities have needs regarding infrastructure, communication, trade, education, health, social services, entertainment, culture, and sport complexes. The parties aimed at supplying these needs. If we examine the AKP policies, it can be seen that the party aimed at the increasing of house number from 250.000 to 500.000. Besides, the party determined that if a city had the population over five thousand, a sports complex would be built there. And if a city had the population over twenty thousand, also a youth center

⁹³ TÜİK, “Unemployment Problem”, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Gosterge.do?metod=IlgiliGosterge&id=3491>, (3 June 2008).

⁹⁴ “The election program of the MHP”, <http://www.mhp.org.tr/beyaname/beyan0.php>, (20 February 2008), “The election program of the AKP”, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname.asp>, (20 February 2008) and “The election program of the CHP”, http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=museum&page=show&entry_id=1274, (20 February 2008).

would be built. “Single-step service” and “Single-stop office” would be established in order to facilitate the city life. “Single card” project would be offered to service. Therefore the citizen would perform all operations with single card and red tape would be ended.

The CHP stated “private administration model” about its urbanization policy for Istanbul. Therefore, the party would increase duty, authority and responsibility of head official of a district. The party would supply “houses, buildings and infrastructures” which resist earthquake. They determined that the application plan of these would be informed in first three months of power. The CHP promised to improve the pedestrian roads and metros and rail communication systems in the city center. Moreover, the party promised to decrease the house credits. The minimum credit rate would be low from one percent interest. The citizen who has only one house which is low from 100 m² would exempt from giving the council tax.

The MHP promised to constitute urban planning and the city administration information system. The state lands will be converted to building land. Thus the cost of house will be decreased. The houses which were built by the government for commercial benefits would be demolished. Houses would be built only for lower income citizens. Moreover, the MHP gave importance and priority to investments which promote recycling.

Secondly, the unemployment is a chronic problem of Turkish economy. Every political party promised some projects for fighting unemployment. The AKP, the CHP and the MHP promise to support “a common job project” for young and vocational schools in order to escape from unemployment. The long having fixed credits will be given to the young who wants to establish a job. Besides, there were projects of the AKP and the MHP for women to pursue a career. The unemployment policy of the AKP had three main components which would be applied as pieces of whole. These are decreasing of loads over workforce and becoming flexible market, development of active workforce programs and occupational education-workforce

market. “Occupation development center” would be established in every province. The Social Insurance Institute (*Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu*-SSK) employees’ premium rate would be started with five points and will be reduced gradually. The treasure of state would pay insurance premium to handicapped citizens.

The CHP promised that unemployment would reduce by half in five years. The CHP designated that the economic model would be adapted to domestic manufacture and export which based on domestic manufacture. Some people who immigrate from rural to urban areas and who are unemployed would be applied “return to village project”. Thus, their return to agricultural action would be promoted. The treasure of state would pay insurance premium for poor people. The treasure would pay 300 TL every month for poorest families as a “citizenship right”. Moreover, it would pay the minimum wage for widowed and orphan people each month.

Unemployment policy of the MHP promised that the citizens who take minimum wage would not pay tax. Besides, a salary which is a half of the minimum wage would be paid to the unemployed heads of families. Also an extra salary would be paid to retired people as “preparing merit for winter” in every September month.

Thirdly, the education policies of the AKP, the CHP and the MHP have come across a common denominator in their election programs: compulsory education, vocational education and the university entrance examination. The CHP promised 10 year and the AKP and the MHP 12 year compulsory education. Vocational education would be more widespread. Besides, the CHP and the MHP promised that the university entrance examination would be abolished, while the AKP declared that the system would be restructured. The education policy of the AKP promised that preschool education rate would be raised to 50 percent from 25 percent. The school day would not be divided into two; the classrooms would have not more than 30 students. Free textbook distribution would continue. There would be no student’s computer-illiterate. Guidance and psychological counseling services would be

professionally structured. Programs would be developed for protecting the young from substance abuse and bad habits. The students would continue their higher education based on the points they got from the examinations that would be held during 10th, 11th and 12th grades, instead of the Student Selection Examination (*Öğrenci Seçme Sınavı-ÖSS*) held during their last year in high school. Articles 130 and 131 of the Constitution would be amended to restructure the Higher Education Institution (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu-YÖK*) and the Student Selection and Placement Office (*Öğrenci Seçme ve Yerleştirme Merkezi- ÖSYM*).

The education policy of the CHP promised that all children would be subject to two-year preschool education. The state would distribute the textbooks and give food allowance to students. Educational and social counseling services for disabled families would be expanded. ÖSS would be abolished. Two-thirds of students would be directed to vocational education, and one-third to general education in the last two years of their 10-year compulsory education. The students would have vocational or general cultural education in the two-year secondary education (high school), which was not compulsory. The successful ones in vocational education would continue to vocational high schools without taking any exams. The ones who succeed in general education would continue to university without taking ÖSS. Open University system would be improved. The problems in the back payment of scholarships would be solved.

The education policy of the MHP engaged that preschool education would be included within the scope of primary education. Classrooms would have less than 30 students. A ministry of Science and Technology would be established. Vocational courses would be launched for youngsters with criminal records. Social-cultural atmospheres would be encouraged for protecting the youth from gambling, prostitution, anarchy and terrorism. ÖSS would be abolished. A university transition based on success in secondary education and Continuation Examination that would be held at the end of secondary education would be applied. The universities would have administrative-financial autonomy. YÖK would be responsible for

determination of standards, coordination and planning. Private universities would be encouraged. Besides, becoming lecturer or faculty member would be encouraged. The teachers would be granted 230 TL as monthly improvement compensation.

Fourth, health policies of the parties would be analyzed in turn. The AKP and the MHP held out generalizing the family medicine country-wide. The health policy of the AKP promised that all of children who were under eighteen years old would become under health security by “general health insurance”. The green card would be removed and the country would be where every people would have insurance.

The health policy of the CHP engaged that all citizens who had the certificate of birth would benefit equally from all of the health services. The health insurance premium of the poor people would be paid by the state.

The health policy of the MHP promised that the preventive and basic health services would be provided by the state without charge. Every citizen would select his or her own doctor in hospitals.

The electioneering program of the DTP was different from the other programs. The DTP did not resemble other parties such like the AKP, the CHP, etc. The party stressed only over “Kurdish” in the election program. The program contained “must” word instead of “will” word. The program represented the independent candidates. For this reason, this expression could be used. Namely, if any candidate is chosen, he or she must fulfill these conditions. The program includes that the restrictive and forbidding legal barriers which frustrate activities of the political parties must be abolished. The new political party law which plays an independent and effective role in the formation of democracy and political area must be enacted. The higher election barrage must be abolished. Furthermore, the delegates and political parties that have Kurdish identity must be found acceptance. The legal and juridical arrangement must be made to use Kurdish language in the public area. “Multilingual formal service and political action” freedom must be

provided. The barriers which are before development and exploration of Kurdish language, letters and education must be annulled.⁹⁵

2.4. WHY AKP RE-WON THE ELECTION WHILE IN POWER?

Several activities of the AKP contributed to the results of the 2007 general elections. The AKP made many reforms in the fields of economy, health, education and employment which played a significant role in Turkish voters' choices. During the years preceding the 2002 elections, especially the economic programs of several coalition governments failed. However, by 2007, there was a turnaround. Firstly, the economic reforms will be examined. After that, the other reforms will be taken hand in turn.⁹⁶

The AKP have constituted a confidence atmosphere in economic field in the country. GDP annual growth rate which was approximately 0.3 percent between 1997 and 2001 had increased approximately to 7.3 percent between 2003 and 2006. The national income which was 181 billion dollars in 2002 had increased to 400 billion dollars rising 2.2 times in 2006. While the average per capita national income was 2.598 dollars in 2002, it increased 5.477 dollars towards the ends of 2006. While the unemployment rate was 10.3 percent in 2003, it decreased to 9.9 percent in 2006. And thanks to this, 976 thousand workers had employed. There were some discounts at the tax rates. The top rate of the income tax had decreased from 45 percent to 35 percent. Furthermore, the rate of the value added tax which was taken from education, health sector, tourism sector, medicine, basic foodstuffs, cloth, ready-made clothes and textile reduced from 18 to 8 percent. The six zero digits were obliterated off Turkish Lira. This event has provided an increase in the value of the lira. Inflation turned out to be a single digit for the first time. It decreased to 7.7 per

⁹⁵ "DTP declared their electioneering program", http://www.atilim.org/haberler/2007/06/16/DTP_secim_beyannamesini_acikladi.html, (23 February 2008).

⁹⁶ The Justice and Development Party program, (23 February 2008).

cent towards the end of 2005 and by increasing 2 percent it reached 9.7 percent in 2006.⁹⁷

The AKP government had made some reforms about education. More importantly, the AKP had started a free schoolbooks campaign for primary and secondary schools. The government attached importance to the pre-school education. The rate of pre-school education which was 11 per cent had increased to 25 per cent. For primary and secondary school, 110 thousand new classrooms were reared and thousands of schools were opened. Moreover, 750 vocational schools were opened in order to educate well-qualified staff member. The government paid a definite and certain amount the poorest 6 percent segment of population every month for every child to increase the number of student who attended to primary and secondary schools. This amount was paid to mother of children and the amount which was paid for girl kept higher. For instance; 18 TL were paid monthly for boy who went to primary school and 22 TL were paid monthly for girl who went to primary school. The school attendance rates of regions which had especially a low socio-economic status increased by this project. Especially the school attendance of girls increased. Monthly credit and scholarship amount which had been 45 TL for university increased to 150 TL.⁹⁸

There were some influential reforms about the health. Especially, the Social Insurance Institution hospitals and other public hospitals were alienated to Ministry of Health. Every patient who had social security provided by Social Insurance Institution could take her or his medicine from contracted drugstores. Besides, the rate of value added tax (*Katma Değer Vergisi-KDV*) which was taken from the health services which were given by the health institution was decreased from 18 to 8 percent.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Ibid, (2008), pp. 25-57.

⁹⁸ Ibid, pp. 64-76.

⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 76-83.

The AKP government provided social relief and solidarity to the citizens. Coal, which had been used in poor neighborhoods for house heating, was allocated to citizens who needed. Moreover, until 2008, the government had never increased electricity price.

The AKP's success in applying active and nationwide politics strengthened the common sense of belonging among all citizens. It also accelerated the social and economic improvement in every region of Turkey. Throughout the country especially in the east and the southeast regions, the AKP started employment mobilization such as education, health, justice, road and drinking water fields. The school and hospital numbers were redoubled around these regions. For this reason, rural development program was started to apply. 1.256 projects were supported within the context of this program. Moreover, the village infrastructural supporting project (KÖYDES) and the municipality infrastructural supporting project (BELDES) were improved in order to solve infrastructure problems. For instance; during the period between 2005 and 2006, all villages were granted 11.706 drinking water projects, 24.280 kilometer asphalt roads and 32.023 kilometer immature and stabilize roads within the context of village infrastructural supporting project. Furthermore, 21.000 drinking water projects, 50.000 kilometer asphalt roads and 45.000 kilometer immature and stabilize roads would have been accomplished within the context of this project by the end of 2007.¹⁰⁰

The AKP government developed some projects in order to increase the life quality of the citizens. For this reason, the government started the “public housing mobilization” within the context of Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ). Heretofore, a total of 280 thousand houses were built and approximately 140 thousand houses were completed together with social equipments and

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 152-161.

landscaping. Thereby the citizens could pay for these houses in 10, 15 and 20 year installments.¹⁰¹

In the next chapter I will investigate the geographical position and the political structure of Gaziosmanpaşa.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.172.

CHAPTER III

GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF GAZIOSMANPAŞA*

This chapter draws a profile of Gaziosmanpaşa district to better understand its society and voter behaviors. Initially the chapter will investigate Gaziosmanpaşa's geographical position, its human and political geography. Then, it will analyze Gaziosmanpaşa administration and the works of the AKP district organization.

3.1. GAZIOSMANPAŞA AND ITS GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION

Gaziosmanpaşa is one of the 32 districts of Istanbul placed on the European side of the city. The district, which was a late residential area of Istanbul, has improved after 1950s and had been made “district” (*ilçe*) in 1983. Gaziosmanpaşa area was formerly in the boundaries of Eyüp and Çatalca districts. Today's town center was named as “*Taşlıtarla*” among public because of its stony and lean location. Houses had been built in “*Taşlıtarla*” by the state for the Balkans' refugees. “*Taşlıtarla*” was a quarter of “*Küçükköy*” which bounded to Rami sub-district of Eyüp until 1958. Afterwards, “*Taşlıtarla*” became the center of Göktepe sub-district, which was established in Eyüp district. In 27 August 1963, “*Taşlıtarla*” became the center of Gaziosmanpaşa district which was constituted around the sub-district because of its population growth. And it has been started to be mentioned as “Gaziosmanpaşa”. Some quarters of Rami sub-district and some villages of Hadımköy sub-district, which bounded to Çatalca district, became parts of Gaziosmanpaşa district. Moreover, before 1970, Tayakadın village of Çatalca and before 1990 Yeniköy, which was a rural area of Çatalca, were bounded to Gaziosmanpaşa. Thereby, Gaziosmanpaşa center of district has reached today's boundaries.

* Law 5747 of 2008 split the district into three new districts (Arnavutköy, Sultangazi, and Gaziosmanpaşa). In this thesis Gaziosmanpaşa district is intended in its pre-2008 borders.

Gaziosmanpaşa takes part among big districts of Istanbul. While the district territories spread over 116 square kms in a survey of 1965, territories increased 217 square kms area in 2000. There are currently 28 quarters (*mahalle*) within Gaziosmanpaşa boundaries.¹⁰² Furthermore, there are 12 quarters, which are bounded up to five other towns (*belde*),¹⁰³ and 5 villages (*köy*)¹⁰⁴ in contiguous districts.¹⁰⁵

Figure 18: The Map of Gaziosmanpaşa



Gaziosmanpaşa is one of the most important districts of Istanbul because of its swift growth of population. While the annual growth of population of Istanbul

¹⁰² These are 50. yıl, 75. yıl, Bağlarbaşı, Barbaros, Cebeci, Cumhuriyet, Esentepe, Fevziçakmak, Gazi, Habipler, Hürriyet, İsmetpaşa, Karadeniz, Karayolları, Karlitepe, Kazımkarabekir, Malkoçoğlu, Merkez, Pazaiçi, Sarıgöl, Sultançiftliği, Semsipaşa, Uğurmumcu, Yeni, Yenidoğan, Yıldıztabya, Yunusemre and Zubeydehanım quarters.

¹⁰³ These are Arnavutköy, Boğazköy, Bolluca, Haraççı and Taşoluk towns.

¹⁰⁴ These are Çilingir, Hacımaşalı, İmrahor, Tayakadın and Yeniköy villages.

¹⁰⁵ "Gaziosmanpaşa Kentrehberi" (The City Map of Gaziosmanpaşa), [http:// kentrehberi.gaziosmanpasa.bel.tr/?map.jsp](http://kentrehberi.gaziosmanpasa.bel.tr/?map.jsp), (4 March 2008).

was 33.1 per thousand between 1990 and 2000, the annual population growth of some districts which have rural area like Gaziosmanpaşa were above 50 per thousand. The annual population growth of Gaziosmanpaşa was 64,8 per thousand.¹⁰⁶ In 1985 Gaziosmanpaşa population which included 5 percent of Istanbul population had 289.841 people and nestled 1.790 people per square kilometer in the same year. The district population was 393.667 in 1990 and 752.389 in 2000. The population densities were 2.415 people in 1990 and 3.467 people per square kilometer in 2000.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the population of Gaziosmanpaşa has increased by 1100 percent in 42 year period between 1965 and 2007. While the numbers of population were 89.538 in 1965, the number has increased to 1.013.048 in 2007.¹⁰⁸ The population share of Gaziosmanpaşa was 8 percent of Istanbul population in 2007.

According to the result of 2007 “Address Based Population Registration System” (ADNKS)¹⁰⁹ the population has been counted as 1.013.048 people and the population densities have increased to 4.760 people per square kilometer. Besides, Gaziosmanpaşa is not only the most crowded district of Istanbul but also of Turkey.¹¹⁰ According to 2007 ADNKS it is determined that the district has a very young population. The population less than 30 ages is more than half of total population.¹¹¹ Furthermore, while the urban population rate of Gaziosmanpaşa district was 87.6 percent according to 2002 census of population, the population rate have been 87.9 percent in 2007. On the basis of these data, it can be said that Gaziosmanpaşa have not perfectly accomplished an urbanization process, yet.

¹⁰⁶ Sedat, Murat (2006), *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul'un Nüfus ve Demografik Yapısı* (The Population and Demographic Structure of Istanbul from Yesterday to the present), İstanbul: İ.T.O., p. 97.

¹⁰⁷ “The History of Gaziosmanpaşa Municipality”,
<http://www.gaziosmanpasa.bel.tr/bpi.asp?caid=165&cid=529>, (15 March 2008).

¹⁰⁸ “The population of Gaziosmanpaşa”,
http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnks=&report=turkiye_ilce_koy_sehir.RDF&p_il1=34&p_ilce1=414&p_kod=2&desformat=html&ENVID=adnksEnv, (15 March 2008).

¹⁰⁹ See page 21.


¹¹⁰ “The History of Gaziosmanpaşa Municipality”, (2008) and Sedat, (2006), pp. 90-107.

¹¹¹ The population under 30 ages are 57,5 percent.

3.2. GAZİOSMANPAŞA'S HUMAN GEOGRAPHY

The human geography of Gaziosmanpaşa has a cosmopolite structure. The population of the district have nourished with rapid immigration. This immigration especially has taken root from some regions. According to the state institute of statistics (SIS) unpublished district sources, 63.1 percent of district population were born outside Istanbul. Beside a relevant part that were original of the Balkans, populations who were born in the Black Sea (18.2 percent), the Central Anatolia (17.5 percent) and the Eastern Anatolia (14.0 percent) regions have immigrated to the , too.¹¹²

Figure 19: Distribution of Gaziosmanpaşa District Population as to Regions-Born



If the distribution of immigrants to districts of Istanbul between 1995 and 2000 is investigated, it is seen that the rate of immigrants to Gaziosmanpaşa district is 6.9 percent. Especially, young age groups immigrate to Gaziosmanpaşa. The population who are over 50 ages and under 15 age groups have lower rate than 15-24 and 25-49 age groups in total immigrants.¹¹³

¹¹² Sedat, (2006), p. 148.

¹¹³ Ibid, p. 372.

Table 6: Incoming Immigrates to Gaziosmanpaşa as to Age Groups (1995-2000)

Total	5-14	15-24	25-49	50+
63 602	12 747	24 425	22 514	3 912

Moreover, if distribution of incoming immigrants to districts of Istanbul as to education levels between 1995 and 2000 is investigated, it is seen that education levels of Gaziosmanpaşa district have lower rate than the other districts of Istanbul. The rate of illiterate immigrants is 10.8 percent. Furthermore, the rate of the ones completing no school is 18.4 percent and the rate of those completed at least a school is 70.6 percent. 64.6 percent of immigrants are graduates from primary school and 5.49 percent are graduates from higher schools.¹¹⁴

Table 7: Incoming Immigrates to Gaziosmanpaşa as to Education Level (%) (1995-2000)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
62.354	6.753	55.601	11.529	44.069	28.499	5.239	103	6.167	1.639	2.422
6,87	10,8	89,1	18,4	70,6	64,6	11,8	0,23	13,9	3,71	5,49

1)Total, 2)No Literacy, 3)Total Literacy, 4)Non-graduate, 5)Total graduate, 6)Primary education, 7)Secondary education, 8)Secondary school and their equivalents vocational schools, 9)High school, 10) High school and their equivalents vocational schools, 11)Higher education and institutions.

When the number of household members within Gaziosmanpaşa population is assessed in percent, between 1990 and 2000, it is seen that majority of houses have been constituted by 4 household members. While the percent of six and seven household in general population was high in 1990, this number decreased in 2000. And the number of houses which have consisted of two or three household increased in 2000.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 377.

¹¹⁵ D.İ.E. (1993), *1990 Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri İstanbul* (The General Population Census, The Social and Economic Characteristics of Population/ İstanbul), Ankara:D.İ.E., p. 172 and D.İ.E. (2002), p. 242.

Table 8: The percent of Household Members in the Average Size of Household in Gaziosmanpaşa Population (1990-2000)

Years	Total	1	2	3	4	5	6	7+
1990	100	3.5	10,0	15.9	24.8	19.6	11.9	14.2
2000	100	3.2	12.1	20.2	28.1	17.7	9.1	9.5

When the education level of Gaziosmanpaşa district is investigated in total population according to the results of 2000 census of population, it can be inferred that the rate of literate in population over and equals 6 years is 91.4 percent in the district and the rate of illiterate is 8.6 percent. Meanwhile, when distribution by sex of literate and illiterate people who are over and equal 6 years is handled, it is figured out that 21.1 percent of men and 78.9 percent of female are illiterate and 53.5 percent of male and 46.5 percent of women are literate.¹¹⁶ The difference in literacy between male and female is lower than of illiteracy. The 76.1 percent of literate population completed their school in the district. The percent of primary school graduates in the population who accomplished to complete a school is 50.3. Also, the 11.2 percent are secondary school graduates, the 11.9 percent graduated from high school and 2.7 percent is higher educated. Moreover, if the distribution by sex is examined, 48.4 percent of primary school graduates are female and 51.6 percent are male. 49.8 percent of secondary school graduates are female and 50.2 percent are male. 41.2 percent of high school graduates are female and 58.8 percent are male. 37 percent of higher educated are female and 63 percent are male.

The other important subject is economic life in Gaziosmanpaşa district. The basis of economic life is constituted by small-scale retailing, contract manufacturing and outward processing. 60 percent of population is employed in these fields.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, 2000 census of population (SIS) data indicates that 46.8 percent of population over and equals age 12 are in labor force. 73.6 percent of active

¹¹⁶ Sedat, (2006), pp. 184-185 and D.İ.E. (2002), pp. 99-134.

¹¹⁷ "The History of Gaziosmanpaşa", (20 March 2008).

population in labor force is male and 19.3 percent are female. The total employed population is 86.1 percent. And 87.8 percent of male and 79.6 percent of female take place in total employed population. Moreover, unemployed rate of population is 13.8 percent in Gaziosmanpaşa district. The 12.1 percent of this unemployed population is male and 20.3 percent is female. The total rate of not in labor force populations are 53.1 percent. The bulk of these populations consist of housewives. Students and retired populations follow them. The rates of housewives in women who live in Gaziosmanpaşa are 82.3 percent. The rate of students among female population is 11.7 percent and the rate of students among male population is 45 percent. The rate of retired women is 4.1 percent and the rate of retired men is 39 percent.

If the distribution of economic activity in the center of district is investigated, it is seen that the rate of manufacturing industry is 49.7 percent. This rate is nearly half of the economic activities. Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels sectors with 18.70 percent ensue right off the reel. Public, social and personal services with 14.20 percent rates take part in economic activity.¹¹⁸

Table 9: Economic Activity in Gaziosmanpaşa District

Manufacturing Industry	49.70%
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels	18.70%
Public, Social and Personal services	14.20%
Transport, Communication and Storage	5.89%
Construction	5.66%
Finance, Insurance, Real estate and Business service	4.53%
Electricity, Gas and Water	0.52%
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing	0.33%
Mining and Quarrying	0.13%

Besides, when the distribution of employed population by occupation in the district is examined, it is deducted that over a half of population (59.6 percent) work

¹¹⁸ D.İ.E. (2002), pp. 200-201.

in non-agricultural production and related works such as transport equipment operating and laboring. And 12.7 percent work as merchants, shopkeepers and sales workers and 10 percent of population work in clerical works and so forth.¹¹⁹

Table 10: Employed Population by Occupation

Nonagricultural production and Related workers	59,60%
Commercial and Sales workers	12,70%
Clerical and Related workers	10,00%
Service workers	9,46%
Scientific, Technical, Professional and Related workers	5,80%
Administrative and Managerial workers	1,78%
Agricultural, Animal husbandry, Forestry workers	0,38%
Unknown	0,12%

3.3. GAZİOSMANPAŞA’S POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Gaziosmanpaşa’s population mostly consists of conservative-right voters. As in the data given in the second chapter, the reason of this can be stemmed from the high rates of young, low educated, low income, inadequately urbanized population. So a district which has high education and income levels and adequate urbanization has a left wing inclined political structure; on the other hand a district which has low education and income levels and inadequate urbanization has a conservative-right tendency.

Furthermore, the needs of persons have increased in accordance with the changing conditions of recent times. This made it necessary to give higher importance for municipal affairs in order to meet these needs. Not only the degree of development, but also the qualities of the services given by municipalities determine the political preferences of the electorates especially in local elections. That is to say, the districts which have high education and income levels and an advanced urbanization can also have electorates who have conservative-right inclinations.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 198-199.

When political geography of Gaziosmanpaşa is explained between 1983 and 2007, political participation had high level in 1983 and 1987. The reason of high participation can take root from will of the new civil government after the prolonged martial law from 1980 to 1983. However the rate of participation has decreased since 1991. Especially in 2002 the participation rate was lower than ever. This low participation appeared because of mistrust against previous governments. Some political scientists state that there are relation between political trust and political participation and vote. For example; Ray Teixeira said that “progressive industrial countries which have democracy increase skepticism system oriented. And the effect of this event entails to abstain from voting and to not participate in politics.”¹²⁰ After 1999 elections, DSP, ANAP and MHP established a fragile coalition government citizens were hit because of the serious economic crisis of those years. For this reason 2002 elections had low participation rate.¹²¹

Table 11: The Participation rate between 1983 and 2007 General Elections in Gaziosmanpaşa

Years	The participation rate
1983	92,54%
1987	92,74%
1991	82,43%
1995	84,27%
1999	84,16%
2002	80,17%
2007	83,68%

If we examine the results of the general elections from 1983 to 2007 in Gaziosmanpaşa¹²², it is seen that the People’s Party (HP) took approximately 50

¹²⁰ Akgün, Birol (2007), *Türkiye’de Seçmen Davranışı, Partiler Sistemi ve Siyasal Güven* (The Voter Behavior, The Parties System and The Political Trust in Turkey), Ankara: Nobel, pp. 136-137.

¹²¹ “The participant rate between 1983 and 2007 general elections in Gaziosmanpaşa”, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>. (21 March 2008).

¹²² “Results of the general elections (1987-2007) in Gaziosmanpaşa”, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>. (21 March 2008).

percent of the votes in 1983 elections.¹²³ However the HP did not take once again high vote after 1983 in Gaziosmanpaşa district. The condition of People's Party in Gaziosmanpaşa in 1983 and after 1983 elections is depended on that the district did not take too much immigrants at beginning of 1980 years and the majority of populations were formed people who are educated and living in center.¹²⁴

Furthermore, the effects of the right parties (ANAP, RP and AKP) were seen between 1987 and 2007 general elections. Electors preferred mostly conservative parties. Especially, there was increase in the vote rate of the ANAP after 1987 and in those of the RP after 1991. The RP had started to lose its effect in 1999 and it had leaved its situation to the AKP which is known as a liberal right party. After 2002, there was serious increase in the votes of the AKP. Especially, the AKP took maximum vote in 22 July 2007 elections from Gaziosmanpaşa district which is in the second election constituency of Istanbul.¹²⁵ These parties represent Anatolia people. It was seen that right have represented low class electors. And it is seen that there are too much immigration of young age population who is low educated to Gaziosmanpaşa district. And people who migrate to this city in order not to lose their identity select these parties. Especially, people who work to accommodate ever-changing a social atmosphere at the district catch on social identities.

Moreover, the votes of the HADEP¹²⁶ which is based on ethnic identity increased in 2002 general election. The DTP does not participate in 2007 general elections. The party proposed independent candidates in elections. For this reason,

¹²³ The name "People's Party (HP)" was replaced by Republican People's Party (CHP).

¹²⁴ This result can be inferred especially from the interview made in March 3, 2008 with Mehmet Sevigen who was then İstanbul deputy of CHP and vice secretary general, but resigned when this thesis is being prepared. Sevigen who grew up in Gaziosmanpaşa came forward as an İstanbul deputy candidate in 1983. He says he was living in district town and was working actively for People's Party then and alleges that being freemen of a district (in the meaning that fellows living in the same town) is very important especially in underdeveloped territories and people feeling themselves as fellow townsmen prefer the ones growing up among them and vote for these kind of candidates as a work of love and grace.

¹²⁵ "Gaziosmanpaşa AK Parti'nin Kalesidir." (Gaziosmanpaşa is the castle of the AKP.), (2007, August 25), *Durum*, p.5.


¹²⁶ The name of the party was converted to DTP in 2007 elections.

the vote rates of independent candidates increased. Moreover, it is seen that there are neither Turkish nationalism nor Kurdish nationalism as a dominant ideology in the district.

Table 12: General Elections Results of Gaziosmanpaşa between 1983 and 2007 years

Years	AKP	ANAP	DYP-DP	RP-FP-SP	MHP	DSP	HP-SHP-CHP	GP	HADEP-DEHAP	IND.
1983	-	36,53	-	-	-	-	44,11	-	-	0
1987	-	37,07	11,86	8,06	-	12,64	28,61	-	-	0,1
1991	-	24,47	15,58	21,16	-	23,13	15,14	-	-	0,18
1995	-	17,18	12,55	31,92	3,5	19,87	9,19	-	4,37	0,11
1999	-	10,09	6,65	28,09	9,79	26,96	8,52	-	6,21	0,02
2002	45,48	2,38	4,27	5,33	4,52	0,88	15,23	9,33	7,62	0,05
2007	55,37	-	2,35	4,17	8,65	-	16,64	4,83	-	6,59

Figure 20: General Elections Results of Gaziosmanpaşa between 1983-2007 years



3.3.1. The Activities and Works of the AKP in Gaziosmanpaşa

The AKP took 55 percent of the votes from Gaziosmanpaşa, which is in the second election constituency of Istanbul, in 22 July general elections. Around 230.000 people voted for the AKP. This vote is maximum rate for the AKP in second

election constituency.¹²⁷ Moreover, this vote is more than 10 percent of the overall votes in all the regions of the country.¹²⁸ The AKP took 46.54 percent of the votes in Turkey overall. The population density and the effective working the municipality and district organization might have affected the preferences of the Gaziosmanpaşa electorates. Nearly a half of all the population living in Gaziosmanpaşa supported the AKP. Cahit Altunay, who is the head of the AKP district organization, alleges that “Gaziosmanpaşa is the castle of the AKP”.¹²⁹ But how AKP has obtained this much support? What kind of activities they did?

First of all, Gaziosmanpasa municipality may be scrutinized. Afterwards, the activities of the AKP district organization are to be examined in the election time.

Gaziosmanpaşa Municipality;

Gaziosmanpaşa Municipality has been administrated for approximately four years by the AKP. The mayor Erhan Erol expresses that since his victory the mayoral election, he has started to change the district with “3K project”.¹³⁰ “3K project”¹³¹ includes institutional, urban and cultural transformation.

Within the context of institutional transformation, municipal offices have been regulated. Redundant 350 officers were dismissed. The number of institutions which were privatized has been redoubled. For instance, cleaning work, park maintenance and repair work have been privatized.

¹²⁷ The vote rates of AKP in other districts in the same environment are; Bayrampaşa %50,37, Beşiktaş %18,62, Beyoğlu %47,41, Eminönü %44,35, Eyüp %46,07, Fatih %47,14, Kağıthane %52,96, Sarıyer %36,97 and Şişli %32,05.

¹²⁸ By the same token, in the elections held in 2002 AKP had 160.123 votes which rated as 45.48 percent and it was also 10 percent more than overall vote rates of AKP.

¹²⁹ *Durum*, (2007), p.5.

¹³⁰ Döndaş, İ. (2008), “‘Türkiye’nin köyü’ değil ülkenin ve İstanbul’un geleceği olduk” (We have become the future of İstanbul not the village of Turkey), *Star*, <http://www.stargazete.com/index.asp?haberID=136903>, (25 February 2008).

¹³¹ 3K stands for “*Kurumsal, Kentsel, Kültürel*” in Turkish.

There are a lot of works to be done, within the context of urban transformation, in Gaziosmanpaşa which proves what an intensive “shanty town” is. At first hand, park and sports areas have been given importance because of great number of young age population in the district. The number of parks which were built and reorganized is approximately 150. Importances were given to utilities, intercommunication and landscape services. In addition, outwalls of buildings have been painted in order to prevent visual pollution.

Within the context of cultural transformation; the municipality constructs multi-purpose sport complexes and cultural centers in order to strengthen social structure, to retain colorful ethnic and cultural structure and to meet the needs of young people who account for approximately a half of the population. In particular, the mayor’s building was transformed into a cultural center for cultural activities. There are exhibition hall, conference hall and cinema in this cultural center.

Furthermore, the municipality furnishes some services regarding health, social service and carrier. For instance, “*Hanım masası*¹³²” was set in order to educate women about health and education. And the municipality has allocated a bus for cultural activities.¹³³

The AKP’s District Organization;

In order to understand the success of the AKP in Gaziosmanpaşa, Justice and Development Party district organization needs to be investigated. In particular, the organization’s efforts may be examined in the election time.

After 2007 election, Gaziosmanpaşa “*Durum*” newspaper published an interview with Cahit Altunay, AKP Gaziosmanpaşa branch’s head. Altunay evaluated their endeavors for 2007 elections.¹³⁴ He stated that the AKP had had a

¹³² Women board.

¹³³ *Star*, (25 February 2008).

¹³⁴ *Durum*, (2007), p.5.

preliminary plan for the elections like other political parties. He denoted that making a bad plan is better than no planning. What to be done was asked from the members of the organization and the nerve endings of the plan were formed according to the polls made among them. Besides, these attempts were not supervised by a member or the organization staff. They propagated these endeavors to all party liners. They targeted on working together with team spirit which was composed by all party members in the organizations from the district itself to the headquarters. He implied that these attempts, of course, met with too many obstacles, but they regarded “continuity” as a principle for them to succeed. Besides, Altunay explained continuity with this expression; “the thing which drills a stone is not the power of water, but the continuity of driblets”¹³⁵. They have already started to work for 2009 local elections although 2007 general elections just ended.

Altunay stated that there were 18.000 volunteers who worked actively in the election time. The number of party members has come at 95.000 with the new registries. The organization performed “*Aşkın Yürüyüşü*” almost every day into the quarters of the district with present deputies and the candidates in the eve of the elections. The aim of “*Aşkın Yürüyüşü*” was to meet with public and to listen to their problems. After these marches, they visited the related associations, foundations and institutions around the Gaziosmanpaşa district.

Furthermore, there were nine people who have worked for every quarter during five years. These people had visited voters and had listened to their problems. Thereby, they had determined the sick, the handicapped, the disabled and the poor people together with the orphans in each quarter. None of these had been made for discrimination. They aimed at not gaining ballots of these people but enabling them to meet their needs.

Finally, 3.500 people who represented the constituency of the AKP served in front of the ballot boxes in the Election Day. Moreover, there were people, who were

¹³⁵ “*Taşı delen suyun gücü değil, damlacıkların devamlılığıdır.*”

responsible for schools and also observers other than these 3.500 people. That is to say, a total of 6.500 people served for the district in July 22 elections.

The next chapter will try to flash a beam of light on these data by means of the questionnaire work applied around Gaziosmanpaşa. It will also scrutinize by what conditions the political preferences of the residents are affected and what determines these kinds of behaviors.

CHAPTER IV

THE VOTER BEHAVIORS IN GAZIOSMANPAŞA

This chapter analyzes the survey that we conducted July 2008 in the district of Gaziosmanpaşa making a questionnaire 601 people. The survey was concentrated on eight quarters of the district to emphasizes socio-economic and ethnical factors.

4.1. THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE SURVEY

The aim of this survey is to identify the political approaches and behaviors of the electorates residing in the district. The party preferences of the electors, the changes in these preferences and the reasons why the electors change their preferences were analyzed in detail.

The political decisions made by electors emerge under different influences and they may also be capricious.

A possible way of identifying by which factors and under what occasions the changes in political behaviors happen is to scrutinize these political behaviors considering the time and the place in which they realize. This research attempts to show up the shifts occurring in the elections in the course of time, the political cleavages turning up on account of place and the reasons for all of these. The subject matter of this survey, them, is the factors influencing the electoral preferences.

4.2. THE POPULATION AND THE SAMPLE


The population consists of all citizens equal and above 18 year old living in Gaziosmanpaşa district. Since it has a population growth due to both internal and external migration, Gaziosmanpaşa is a buffering district hosting different ethnic identities.

The sample was drawn from an articulated area constituting 28 percent of Gaziosmanpaşa mass of electorates. While selecting the sample, relevance was given to the amplitude of electorates but also the diverse ethnic structures of the quarters involved. The following quarters were included in the survey taking the quantity of electors voting in 2007 general elections into consideration.

Table 13: The Surveyed Quarters

Quarters	Number of Voters	Percent	Targeted number of polls	The number of realized polls ¹³⁶
Bağlarbaşı	16.175	11%	66	82
Gazi	13.785	9%	54	37
Hürriyet	17.493	12%	72	104
Karadeniz	33.109	23%	138	131
Kazım Karabekir	21.402	14%	84	34
Merkez	16.477	12%	72	93
Şemsipaşa	14.083	9%	54	91
Zübeydehanım	14.431	10%	60	29

Figure 21: District of Gaziosmanpaşa



¹³⁶ As it is seen less polls were conducted in some quarters. The reason for this is that the residents in these quarters avoided answering the poll questions. Especially some residents appraised their unrest saying “Did you come to divide us?”

Also the sample was randomly selected and its size is 601 which corresponds 1.14 per thousand of the aggregate electors in the district. Since the political preference is taken as a criterion, the political distribution of the sample was matched with the results of 2007 general elections. Accordingly, there is an important parallel between the percent we obtained and the election results.¹³⁷

This indicates that our sample corresponds to a wedge of electors which represent the electorates who voted in 2007 general election.

4.3. THE TECHNIQUE USED IN COLLECTING DATA

It has been estimated that Gaziosmanpaşa would be represented by eight sub districts. Therefore the survey was conducted in 8 quarters of Gaziosmanpaşa during the time between 14 and 23 July 2008.

When taking the number of voters of 2007 elections into account the quarters which represent the structure of the district best and have a large amount of electors were preferred. The quarters were predecided and the questions were asked to a definite number of people selected randomly.

A poll was prepared, which comprised 24 questions¹³⁸ that would reveal electoral behaviors and the possible changes in preferences happening in the course of time. However, some questions turned back with answers that were empty or useless, so these answers were not examined.

For example, interviewed were asked on what shaped their party preferences and from where they gained information about the parties they voted for. Also, it was asked whether the laicism was under threat or not, thus the effect of cultural division was tried to be revealed. Moreover, the electors were asked for which parties they

¹³⁷ According to formal results, 55.37 percent of Gaziosmanpaşa electors voted for the AKP in 2007 general elections. When we analyze the survey results, it is seen that vote rate of AKP in Gaziosmanpaşa district is 49 percent.

¹³⁸ See Appendix 1.

voted in 1999 and 2002 elections in order to be able to determine the volatility. To measure the sample's ability to represent, electors were asked for which party they voted in 2007 elections. Moreover, the party images in electors' minds were tried to be identified. The last 10 questions wanted to clarify the demographic characteristics of the electors such as gender, age, education, occupation, income, birth place, identity, daily language and worship frequency. The effect of regional cleavage on the voter behaviors was targeted by asking to electors where they and their fathers were born. The reason for asking the question about daily language was clarifying the question on ethnic identity. Also, the reason for asking the worship frequency was to understand the effect of religious cleavage on the voter behaviors.

The data gained within these questions were assessed by the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) program.


4.4. THE FACTORS THAT IMPACT VOTERS' BEHAVIOR IN GAZIOSMANPAŞA

The factors that impact voters' behavior in Gaziosmanpaşa such as demographic factors, regional distribution, ethnical structure, regional cleavages, center-periphery cleavage, '*Kulturkampf*', 'threat' factor, party images, the electoral volatility and the leader factor will be analyze.

4.4.1. Gender Factor

In this study the great majority of the subjects were male electors. The male electors constitute 73 percent of the sample, while the female ones are 27 percent. The lack of male electors in the sample is that an important part of the survey was applied to retailers and craftsmen in the center of the sub districts. To include the male electors the survey was applied in the houses by entering the back streets of quarters.

Figure 22: Gender Distribution of the Survey




There were three parties standing out with 2007 general elections and the gender differences among the voters of these parties will be analyzed firstly.

38.9 percent of the subjects voting for the AKP were female, while the 45.1 percent were male electors. The female percentage of the CHP voters was 26.5 percent, while the 15.9 percent were male. The gender distribution among the MHP voters was like this; the 5.6 percent were women and the 10,3 percent were men.

According to the survey results, the party which had the biggest percentage of female electors was the CHP, while the one which had the biggest percentage of male electors was the MHP. We can base the increase in the CHP's female votes on the education level of these women. Because the more educated women are, the more possibly they change their party preferences. According to the survey results, the majority of the highly educated female electors voted for the CHP. On the contrary, the women graduating from at most primary schools mostly preferred the AKP.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ See Appendix 2.


Figure 23: Gender Distribution of the Survey: Party Preferences



4.4.2. Age Factor

The electors being included in the survey were selected from different age groups. The youngest electors group between 18 and 24 had a percentage of 18.3 percent, while the percentage of the oldest electors who were over 70 was just 0.5 percent. The survey was applied largely to the middle aged electors. In this context, the age group of 25 to 39 was 43.4 percent, the ones 40 to 54 were 31.8 percent and the electors aged between 55 and 69 had a percentage of 6 percent.

Figure 24: Age of Voters



The age differences and their reflections to votes for the three parties mentioned were like following.


The electors aged between 25 and 39 who belong the second youngest group mostly preferred the AKP with a percentage of 47.5 percent. The percentage of the AKP voters among the electors in the age interval of 40 to 54 was 33 percent.

The CHP mostly gained votes from the youngest electors. The percentage of the electors aged between 18 and 24 and voted for the CHP was 20 percent. The second youngest group which was 25 to 39 preferred the CHP with a vote rate of 17.2 percent. From the people belonging to the age interval of 40 to 54, the CHP had a vote percentage of 19.3 percent, while the oldest group opted out in favor of the CHP with just a percentage of 22.2 percent.

The MHP voters were largely in middle age. 14.6 percent of the electors aged between 40 and 54 voted for the MHP. Whereas just 8.18 percent of the youngest voters' group—namely those between 18 and 24—preferred the MHP, the 5.7 percent of the electors aged between 25 and 39 voted for the MHP and just a percentage of 5.5 percent among the people in the age interval to 55 to 69 opted out for the MHP.

The MHP failed to gain the expected vote rate from the young electors. According to the survey results, the CHP replaced the MHP in this age group compared to the past elections. This may be because the MHP polled their votes in 2007 elections from the real ideologues. On the other hand, that the closing down of the meeting places for the idealists (*Ülkü Ocakları*) in the metropolitan districts by the order of Devlet Bahçeli, the president of the MHP, might have resulted in such a conclusion.


Figure 25: Age of Voter: Party Preferences



4.4.3. Educational Factor

The voters interviewed had different education. This indicates that our survey group represents the electors from diverse education levels. Among the informants of our survey; the 28 percent were primary school graduates, 19 percent were secondary school graduates, 32 percent graduated from high schools, 2 percent from vocational high schools and the 13 percent had a license diploma. The remaining 1 percent, however, were illiterate.

Figure 26: Education Levels (%)



When we scrutinize the distribution of gender and age in accordance with the level of education, it will be seen that both women and men were graduated mostly from primary schools or high schools. Also there were no non-school graduates in the age groups of 18 to 24 and 25 to 39. The more old the people are the less educated they are according to our survey. However, in the age interval of 18 to 40 the university graduates were heftier.

Table 14: Education Levels, Age of Voters and Gender of Voters Crosstabulation


Sex of Voters	Education Levels	Age of Voters					Total
		18-24	25-39	40-54	55-69	70+	
Female	No Literacy	0	0	0	2	0	2
	Literacy	0	1	7	2	0	10
	Primary School	3	13	19	2	1	38
	Secondary School	10	6	8	0	0	24
	High School	19	28	9	0	0	56
	Vocational High School	5	2	0	0	0	7
	University and Other	17	7	1	0	0	25
Total		54	57	44	6	1	162
Male	Empty	0	4	1	0	0	5
	No Literacy	0	0	1	1	0	2
	Literacy	0	5	7	1	0	13
	Primary School	3	60	51	18	1	133
	Secondary School	7	44	36	4	1	92
	High School	27	70	35	3	0	135
	Vocational High School	3	2	2	1	0	8
	University and Other	16	19	14	2	0	51
Total		56	204	147	30	2	439

50.2 percent of the electorates voting for the AKP were primary school graduates. 34.5 percent high school graduates and 47.4 percent secondary school graduates ensue. As to the CHP, we can see 33.3 percent of the electors graduating from vocational high schools and 25.1 percent graduating from high schools. 22.3 percent university graduates. 12.2 percent primary school and 13.7 percent of these electors, however, were secondary school graduates. Moreover, the MHP electors are

enumerated as; 9.9 percent from high schools, 8.6 percent from primary and 7 percent from secondary schools and 10.5 percent from universities.

According to the survey results, the low educated electors tend to prefer the AKP. As mentioned in the first chapter, education is positively related to leftist orientation. From this point of view, when we have a look at the education levels of both the CHP and the AKP voters we see that the electors opting for the CHP are more educated.


Figure 27: Education Level



4.4.4. Professional and Income Factor


According to the profession to be held, the informants included in the survey were from different job families such as craftsmen, self-employed, clerks, workers, pensioners, housewives, farmers, students and unemployed men. The highest rate profession groups included in the sample was self-employed, with 32 percent, the lowest ones; however, were clerks with 4. Within the rate of the self-employed electors, the biggest part was occupied by the craftsmen with a percent of 26 percent and this rate is followed by the housewives with 14 percent.

Figure 28: Voter Profession (%)



The income levels of the electors included in the survey are classified as 0 TL, under 500 TL, 500 to 1000 TL, 1000 to 1500 TL and over 1500 TL. The poorest piece, namely under 500 TL, was 26 percent, electors' rate, whose income between 500 to 1000 TL, were 35 percent, who were in the group of middle income. The electors mostly belong to the middle income level. The ones gaining in the interval of 1000 to 1500 had a percent of 29 percent. The electors earning over 1500 TL were 10 percent.

Figure 29: Income Level (%)




The income levels of the electors voting for the related three parties are as to follow.

Among the voters for the AKP 30.6 percent were employee, 51.1 percent of voters were housewives. 37.5 percent of voters were retired and 37.1 percent of voters were students. 32.1 percent of them, however, were unemployed. Among the working electors, 42.7 percent were self-employed and 48 percent were craftsmen or retailers.

On the other hand, of the electors voting for the CHP 18.3 percent were employee, 23.8 percent were housewives. 15.6 percent of voters were retired and 17.1 percent of voters were students. 28.5 percent of them, however, were unemployed. The CHP voters were self-employed (19 percent) and retailers (14.2 percent).

The subjects who voted for the MHP were officer with a percentage of 16.6 percent. 4.7 percent of voters were housewives, 9.3 percent of voters were retired and 5.7 percent of voters were students. Besides, the unemployed ones had a percentage of 7.1 percent. The MHP voters were self-employed (9.7 percent) and retailers (11.6 percent).

Figure 30: Voter Profession




39.3 percent of the AKP electors earn 0 TL and 37.5 percent of voters earn less than 500 TL. 37 percent of electors earn 500 and 1000 TL. Besides, 52.9 percent of electors were overwhelmingly in the middle income level (1000-1500 TL). 49.2 percent of the AKP voters earn over 1500 TL.

43.1 percent of the CHP electors were in the poorest income level with an income under 500 TL. On the other hand, the ones who were in the middle income level with 500 to 1500 TL occupied a percentage of 34.8 percent. The CHP voters were mostly in the low income level. Just 14.2 percent of them earned over 1500 TL which we accepted as high income level.

Among the MHP electors, the poorest leveled ones were 11.8 percent and 20.2 percent of them were in middle income level which was 500 to 1500 TL. The MHP voters were overwhelmingly were in the middle income level. Lastly, 9.5 percent of the MHP voters were earning over 1500 TL.


Figure 31: Income Level



4.4.5. Regional Distribution and Ethnic Structure in the District

According to the survey results, the immigrants to Gaziosmanpaşa are mostly from the Black Sea Region. However, in the quarters of Gazi and Zübeydehanım the immigrants from the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia regions were more than the other quarters. Also, in these quarters there are no original Istanbul inhabitants. Gazi quarter has least immigrants from the Black Sea Region. Among the quarters the one hosting most immigrants from the Black Sea Region is Karadeniz quarter. In the quarters Hürriyet, Şemsipaşa, Merkez and Bağlarbaşı mostly the original Istanbul inhabitants reside.


Figure 32: Regional Distribution



In order to determine the ethnic identities of the subjects we asked the question “We are all Turkish citizens, but we can belong to different origins; which


identity do you feel yourself belonging to? By giving no choice for them to select or making no guidance, the subjects were set free to define themselves however they want. The subjects answered this question in 20 different forms. As shown in the following table, in all quarters the Turkish identity predominantly stands out. In the quarters Zübeydehanım and Gazi the resident electors defined themselves mostly as Kurdish, Turk-Kurdish and *Alevi* together with Turkish. Also, in both of these quarters, though scarcely, we encountered to *Zaza* and Turk-*Zaza* identities.

Figure 33: Identity of Quarters



We asked the informants which are their mother languages in order to ratify the answers they gave regarding their identities. As shown in the following table, in all quarters overwhelmingly the Turkish language is spoken. In the quarters Zübeydehanım and Gazi they speak, together with Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish-Kurdish. Also in these two countries, though rarely, *Zaza* language and Turkish-*Zaza* language are spoken.

Figure 34: Spoken Language in Quarters



In the following table, as to the answers the subjects gave their identity groups are compared with the parties they voted for.

93 percent of the electors voted for the AKP in 2007 general elections defined themselves as Turkish, 4 percent as Kurdish and 1 percent as Turkish-*Laz* and *Laz*.

87 percent of the CHP voters regarded themselves as Turkish, 7 percent as *Alevi* and 1 percent as Kurdish, Georgian, Turkish-Azerbaijani, Turkish *Zaza* or just human.

94 percent of the MHP voters characterized themselves as Turkish, 2 percent, however, as Kurdish, Yoruk or Albanian.

Table 15: Identity

2007 vote						
	AKP Frequency	AKP Percent (%)	CHP Frequency	CHP Percent (%)	MHP Frequency	MHP Percent (%)
Empty	2	1	1	1	0	0
Turk	239	93	99	87	51	94
Kurd	9	4	1	1	1	2
Turkish-Alevi	0	0	8	7	0	0
Georgian	0	0	1	1	0	0
Turkish-Kurdish	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkish-Laz	2	1	0	0	0	0
Yoruk	1	0	0	0	1	2
Turkish-Azerbaijani	0	0	1	1	0	0
World Citizen	0	0	0	0	0	0
Circassian	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkmen	1	0	0	0	0	0
Albanian	0	0	0	0	1	2
Turkish-Zaza	0	0	1	1	0	0
Bosnian	1	0	0	0	0	0
Ottoman	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laz	2	1	0	0	0	0
Human	0	0	1	1	0	0
Kurdish-Gypsy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkish-Gypsy	1	0	0	0	0	0
Karamanoglu	1	0	0	0	0	0
Total	261	100	113	100	54	100

In order both to determine the languages they speak and to ratify the answers about their identities the question “which language do you speak with your family and in your daily lives?” was asked.

As it is seen in the table 95 percent of the voters for the AKP speak Turkish in daily life. 4 percent speak Turkish-Kurdish and 1 percent just Kurdish.

Similarly, of the electors opted for the CHP in 2007 General Elections 95 percent speak Turkish in daily life. 3 percent of them prefer Turkish-Zaza and 1 percent Turkish-Kurdish and Turkish-Bosnian.

Lastly, among the MHP voters 98 percent speak Turkish in daily life and 2 percent speak Kurdish.

Table 16: Language

	2007 vote					
	AKP Frequency	AKP Percent (%)	CHP Frequency	CHP Percent (%)	MHP Frequency	MHP Percent (%)
Turkish	247	95	108	95	53	98
Kurdish	2	1	0	0	1	2
Turkish-Kurdish	11	4	1	1	0	0
Circassian	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkish-Zaza	0	0	3	3	0	0
Turkish-Bosnian	0	0	1	1	0	0
Zaza	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	261	100	113	100	54	100

4.4.6. Regional Cleavages

If Turkey has considerable regional cleavages,¹⁴⁰ those cleavages appear to be represented in Gaziosmanpaşa's quarters. The result of survey show considerable regional cleavages among Gaziosmanpaşa's quarters.

The comparison can be done among the neighborhoods of Karadeniz and Gazi. Karadeniz quarter is a squatter area disorderly developed by immigrants coming from different parts of Anatolia. Especially, the Karadeniz neighborhood is predominantly inhabited by immigrants from the Black Sea. The minimal real estate and land value price per square meter here is 281 TL.¹⁴¹ This indicates that the socio-economic condition in this quarter is much low. As the *Radikal* newspaper's survey shows, the majority of those earning between 0 and 1200 TL chose AKP.¹⁴² According to our survey, in Gaziosmanpaşa, 30 per cent of AKP voters earn between 500 and 1000 TL a month and 18 per cent have no earnings at all. Moreover, since 1991, middle class areas of Istanbul have been voting for Islamist parties because of their economic assistance and rooted social activists. Karadeniz quarter population


¹⁴⁰ Secor, (2001), pp. 539-560 and Jefferson West, (2005), pp. 499-523.

¹⁴¹ The average was calculated with the prices indicated by Gaziosmanpaşa municipality for the 2008 council tax.

¹⁴² Ağirdır, (2007).

inclines toward the center-right parties and Islamist parties.¹⁴³ Indeed, in the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections RP-FP gained respectively 30.4 and 35 percent of the votes always confirming itself as the first party in Karadeniz. In 2002, mobilizing the RP-FP with the votes taken from the other center-right parties' votes, AKP obtained 52 per cent of the votes, bettering its performance in the 2007 elections with 64 per cent of the votes.

Figure 35: Karadeniz Quarter- Gaziosmanpaşa



The Gazi quarter is a squatter area predominantly inhabited by immigrants, especially from eastern regions. A Kurdish community is also living in the Gazi neighborhood. The minimal real estate and land value price per square meter is only slightly less than that of the Karadeniz neighborhood (180 TL), yet the electoral panorama is completely different.¹⁴⁴ Since 1983, the first parties in the area have been the leftist parties (HP, SHP and since 2002 CHP), which mobilized in the last two elections 56.5 and 60.7 percent of the votes. AKP has not been capable of obtaining more than 20 per cent of the votes.¹⁴⁵ In the Gazi neighborhood, there is an

¹⁴³ TÜİK, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>.


¹⁴⁴ Zeyneloğlu, Sinan (2006), "İstanbul'un Seçim Coğrafyası: 1999-2002" (The Election Geography of Istanbul: 1999-2002), *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107: 95.

¹⁴⁵ TÜİK, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>.

important concentration of *Alevi* immigrants¹⁴⁶ that appears to strongly support the left.¹⁴⁷ The area became notorious in March 1995 when harsh protests erupted after a coffeehouse was riddled with bullets, killing one and wounding numerous people. Protesters clashed with police for days because of the rumors that the police post might have been involved in the terrorist attack. 15 more people died in the incidents that followed.

It is evident from this comparison that the socio-economic factors are not enough to understand voting behavior in full.

Figure 36: Gazi Quarter- Gaziosmanpaşa



¹⁴⁶ Around Gaziosmanpaşa there are three meeting houses (*cemevi*) which are places of worship for *Alevi* citizens. One of these houses is in Gazi quarter.

¹⁴⁷ On religious bases of voting: Çarkoğlu, Ali (2005), "Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage". *Turkish Studies*, 6 (1, June):286-287 and Ayata, A. Güneş and Ayata, Sencer (2002), "Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting", in S. Sayarı and Y. Esmer, *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp.145-148.

4.4.7. Center-Periphery Cleavages

The center-periphery dichotomy adapted to the Turkish context by Şerif Mardin¹⁴⁸ furnished us with a very important starting point, but it needs to be updated to contemporary Turkish society. According to Mardin, during the Ottoman period, the center controlled the Imperial house and its various coalitions from Istanbul. Its essential political nature remained unchanged during the Republican period, especially with regard to the various ways in which it related to the periphery and dominated the political scene. The ‘center’ is culturally more self-confident and effectively has controlled the state and its political apparatus, at least up to 2002. The primary social groups comprising the modern-day reflections of the ‘center’ are the high-level bureaucrats (especially of the security circles and the judiciary), various layers of mostly state-dependent businesses, and the various branches of the intellectual community and academia.

The ‘periphery’ is predominantly conservative and resentful of the marginal role that it had in the Kemalist revolution and the following economic and political transformations. It started to contrast the ‘center’ with the spreading of modernization outside the big urban areas and the introduction of the multi-party regime in the 1950s. Indeed, competitive politics forced all political elites to address the periphery and to respond to their issues. The most evident result was the shift toward the recognition of certain public roles of religion—today—by all political forces. Moreover, new elites emerged from the periphery and were capable of affirming themselves among intellectual circles and in the market.

The rapid urbanization also changed this dichotomy geographically because a large portion of the periphery physically moved from the rural areas to the big industrial cities. Consequently, the periphery had even greater chance to participate and influence Turkish society. Since the 1960s, Turkey has assisted a process of

¹⁴⁸ Mardin, Şerif (1975), “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”, in E.D. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, pp. 17-32.

impressive internal migration from the rural areas toward the big urban areas. Geographically the divide between center and periphery disappeared. However, immigration toward cities has favored the creation of new squatter areas that, despite having become parts of the urban landscape of cities like Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, never mixed with the previous population and preserved physical and social divisions. In Istanbul, a good example is Gaziosmanpaşa is socially and architecturally different from older areas of the megalopolis or the upper classes' neighborhoods. Inside the district itself, many immigrants settled according to their place of origin or religious belief; for instance, in Gaziosmanpaşa, the Karadeniz neighborhood is predominantly inhabited by immigrants from the Black Sea (as the name of the neighborhood anticipates) and the Gazi neighborhood is predominantly *Alevi*.

Once the geographical borders were trespassed, to redefine the center-periphery social dichotomy behavior seems to be influenced strongly by the *Kulturkampf* existing in Turkish society. The term—which literally means 'cultural divide'—applied by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu to the Turkish case and originally referred to German policies in relation to secularity and the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, enacted from 1871 to 1878 by the Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In the Turkish case, the term can help us to indicate the deep cultural cleavages of Turkish society. During the nineteenth-century reform movements, two completely different and even irreconcilable images of 'good society' began to take root. One of those images was built around the conception of 'science and progress' as the core values that define the substance of human existence, nature, society, and politics. This is the predominant attitude among the elites of the 'center'. The rival *Kulturkampf* of those who were attracted to the image of good society constructed around the preservation of traditional lifestyle, its corresponding values and understandings of morality, work, family, and other aspects of life emerged in opposition to this camp.¹⁴⁹ Since the establishment of the Committee of Union and Progress in early twentieth-

century, political parties have been established according to this cultural divide. As in the contraposition between CHP and the Democrat Party in the 1950s, AKP and CHP seem to represent now the two opposite fronts of this cultural war.¹⁵⁰

Regional cleavages are also part of a different and sometimes contrasting worldview, particularly when these regional differences were brought from the peripheries to the center by immigration. For first generation immigrants their political socialization has started in the periphery and strongly influenced by their environment. In the city, the influence of the region of birth is maintained through kin relationships, marriages, and the strong *hemşehri* (fellow countryman) networks. Second generation immigrants inherited their family strong local identity and networks. Moreover, this generation experiences the periphery only during vacations yet their political socialization was experienced in the urban and social ‘periphery’ of Istanbul, which has failed to develop its own inclusive identity.

Survey shows that 34 percent of AKP voters in Gaziosmanpaşa were born in the Black Sea region of Anatolia, and 44 percent of voters’ fathers were born in the Black Sea region. Only 34 percent of voters were born in Istanbul, and only 13 percent of voters’ fathers were born in Istanbul.

Table 17: Voters’ places of birth

Region	AKP (%)	CHP (%)	MHP (%)
Istanbul	34	40	34
Marmara	3	13	6
Black Sea	34	18	25
Aegean Sea	1	2	-
Mediterranean	4	3	6
Central Anatolian	9	14	13
Eastern Anatolian	10	8	4
South-eastern Anatolian	5	-	6
Abroad	-	2	6

¹⁴⁹ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (2005), *Turkish Dynamics, Bridge across Troubled Land*, New York: Palgrave, pp. 50-51.

¹⁵⁰ Çaha, (2008), p. 274.

Table 18: Places of birth of the Voters' fathers

Region	AKP (%)	CHP (%)	MHP (%)
Istanbul	13	21	11
Marmara	5	19	6
Black Sea	44	23	30
Aegean Sea	1	3	-
Mediterranean	4	4	7
Central Anatolia	14	17	19
Eastern Anatolia	12	8	6
South-eastern Anatolia	5	1	6
Abroad	2	4	15

Istanbul is a city that rapidly grew with immigration from various regions of Anatolia. However, from another survey of Gaziosmanpaşa's mosaic conducted in 2002, it is evident that Black Sea voters are overrepresented in AKP.¹⁵¹ AKP appears to be representative of the new immigrant class, which is emerging as new political and economic elite in the country. Parties' structure and previous studies¹⁵² have shown that leaders are more important than the parties' political views, ideology, and targets. Indeed, the AKP leadership represents this divide. The mayor elected in 2004 of Gaziosmanpaşa -Erhan Erol- was born respectively in the Black Sea city of Kastamonu. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in a squatter area of the European side of Istanbul from a family that immigrated from Rize, again in the Black Sea region. Moreover, six out of 25 members of Erdoğan's second cabinet are from the Black Sea region and 16 more were born in the Turkish periphery.

On the other hand, among CHP voters, Istanbul as a place of birth is overrepresented yet CHP voters from the Black Sea region are 18 percent. CHP,

¹⁵¹According to ADNKS, Gaziosmanpaşa district include 210.661 citizens born in the Black Sea region.

Kılıç, Yasin (2009), "İstanbul'un memleket haritası" (The Hometown Map of Istanbul), *Zaman*. <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazdir.do?...> (20 February 2009).

¹⁵²Çaha, Ömer, Toprak, Metin and Dalmış, İbrahim (2004), "Siyasal Parti Üyelerinde Siyasal Katılım Düzeyi: Kırıkkale Örneği" (The Level of Political Participation for the Political Party Members': Kırıkkale Case Study), in Ömer Çaha (eds.), *Seçmen Davranışı ve Siyasal Partiler* (Voter Behavior and Political Parties), İstanbul: Fatih University, pp. 79-85.

then, seems to represent the original Istanbul townsmen protecting their status and position in a hybrid megalopolis.

From survey, it seems that MHP is the party that demonstrates itself to be capable of addressing voters from all over the country, even if it fails to address voters born in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia among which the ethnic factor is particularly influential.

4.4.8. Religious Factor

Religiosity also has been a fundamental cleavage in Turkish society. Another important aspect of the *Kulturkampf* is the divide among the conservative-religious components of the Turkish population and the more secular class. In this case religious and cultural values inevitably influence their voting behavior. To measure religiosity among voters, a strict interpretation of Sunni Islam, which consider regular religious practices as indicative of religiosity was used. This may be controversial and not universally accepted. However, as the responses to survey shows, it is a helpful discrimination that shows a different approach to religion and its relevance in daily and public life.

Thus, participants were asked in the survey how often they prayed the *namaz* (the five daily prayers). For male voters was also asked if they attend Friday prayer. The former prayer is certainly a symbol of religiosity and can help us in understanding their rigour in Muslim practice. The latter is certainly a demonstration of belief, yet because it implies a more ritual practice and it is a social event, it represents willingness to participate in communal religious events.

Table 19: Questions on religious practices

	AKP (%)			CHP (%)			MHP (%)		
	<i>Never</i>	<i>Occasionally</i>	<i>Orderly</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Occasionally</i>	<i>Orderly</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Occasionally</i>	<i>Orderly</i>
How often do you perform the daily prayer (<i>namaz</i>)?	7	38	55	48	45	7	6	79	15
How often do you attend Friday prayer? Male respondents only.	1	16	59	23	23	13	7	35	41
How often do you go to Mosque?	13	64	23	53	37	6	19	73	6
Fast	1	6	93	11	19	66	4	7	89
Pray	0	15	85	2	23	71	0	28	72
To read the Holy Koran	33	45	22	67	24	5	54	33	13
How often do you wear the headscarf? Female respondent only.	6	2	16	31	2	4	11	2	4

AKP voters demonstrate to be more religious conferring to the party a more Islamic identity. 55 percent of them declare to regularly pray the *namaz* and 38 to occasionally pray. Only 7 percent never pray the *namaz*. 59 percent of AKP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and only 1 percent declares to never attend the weekly prayer in the mosque. 64 percent of AKP voters regularly go to Mosque and 64 to occasionally go to mosque. 93 percent of AKP voters orderly fast and only 1 percent never fast. 85 percent of AKP voters orderly pray. Only 15 percent occasionally pray. 22 percent of them orderly read the Holy Koran. 45 percent occasionally and 33 percent never read the Holy Koran. Among female AKP voters, 16 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and only 6 percent declares to never wear it. Wearing the veil cannot be assumed as a demonstration of religiosity. It has been adopted many times as a political symbol and not always is worn for religious purposes yet the family and cultural factors do influence the woman choice. However, analyzed together with *namaz* indicate a conservative worldview.

The responses to the same questions by CHP voters show a political movement generally composed by non-practicing Muslims. 48 percent of CHP voters declare to never pray the *namaz* and 45 occasionally pray it. Only 7 percent orderly pray the *namaz*. Just 13 percent of CHP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and 23 percent declares to never attend the prayer in the mosque refusing also the weekly communal ritual. 6 percent of CHP voters regularly go to Mosque and 53 to never go to mosque. 66 percent of CHP voters orderly fast and only 11 percent never fast. 71 percent of CHP voters orderly pray. Only 23 percent occasionally pray. 67 percent of them never read the Holy Koran. 24 percent occasionally and only 5 percent orderly read the Holy Koran. Among female CHP voters, only 4 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and 31 percent declares to never wear it.

Also in this case MHP is more moderate, showing that its members have a mixed approach to religion. 6 percent of MHP voters declare to never pray the *namaz* and 79 occasionally pray it. However, only 15 percent orderly pray the *namaz*, yet 41 percent of MHP male voters regularly attend the Friday prayer and a small minority of 7 percent declares to never attend the prayer in the mosque demonstrating a mild approach to religiosity and strong emphasis on the public aspects of religion, which keep on being a fundamental characteristic of Turkish nationalism. 73 percent of MHP voters occasionally go to Mosque and only 6 to regularly go to mosque. 89 percent of MHP voters orderly fast and only 4 percent never fast. 72 percent of MHP voters orderly pray. Only 28 percent occasionally pray. 13 percent of them orderly read the Holy Koran and 54 percent never read. Among female MHP voters, 4 percent regularly wear the Islamic headscarf, and 11 percent declares to never wear it. However, we have to remember that, in 2007, MHP worked, together with AKP, to remove the prohibition to use of headscarf in universities.

Religious practices seem to be an important factor in party choice. This appear to be particularly true after the ‘28 February process’ that reintroduced in the country a polarization in views and a more radical divide among people of different degrees of religiosity. The ‘28 February process’ is the major event that imposed a

complete revolution of ideas and partisanship. In 1996, the historic leader of political Islam in Turkey, the advocate of *Millî Görüş* and leader of the Islamist *Refah* party, Necmettin Erbakan, became Prime Minister in a coalition government called *Refahyol*. The secular establishment feared that Erbakan was leading to a collapse of the Kemalist state and progressively took measures to contrast the bold *Refah* policy. Then, on February 28, 1997, it presented the cabinet with a long list of demands aimed at curbing the influence of the Islamists on the economy, on education and inside the state apparatus. The most conspicuous demand was about the introduction of compulsory eight-year primary education in state schools. The idea behind this was that this would put the allegedly miseducated schools for preachers and prayer leaders (*İmam-Hatip Okulları*) out of business at middle school level. These schools were very popular among the poorer sections of the population (because of the many opportunities for scholarships) and among conservatives. Graduates of these schools had access to college-level education and ultimately to the universities, and since the schools produced many times the number of graduates that could be employed in the religious establishment, most of these graduates found places in other branches of the state apparatus and civil society.

The cabinet officially accepted the recommendations on March 13, but did not do much about them. After six weeks the patience of the military had run out and in a nine-hour meeting of the National Security Council, the army top brass put forward its demands again, this time as an ultimatum. Trade unions and employers' federations got together in a 'front for secularism' on May 21 and on the same day the secularist prosecutor at the Supreme Court in Ankara demanded the closure of *Refah* because of its anti-secular stands. Five days later, the army dismissed 161 officers and NCOs on suspicion of Islamist leanings. In June, the army started briefings for journalists and members of the judiciary on the fundamentalist threat. Under enormous pressure by the military and the withdrawal of his coalition partner, Erbakan eventually resigned and *Refah* was banned on January 16, 1998. Also the popular mayor of Istanbul and now Prime Minister, Erdoğan, was banned from

politics together with many other members of the *Refah* as well as MÜSİAD, the society of Muslim businessmen.

4.4.9. “Threat” Factor


The '28 February process' widened the divide between parties and increased suspicions among voters. In fact, the divide between secularist and religious-conservatives is also evident in the 'threat' factor. The 2007 elections were very much concentrated on the issue of secularism and followed by the ambiguous verdict of the Constitutional Court on AKP, which punished the party for its offences against secularism but did not close it—as happened in the past in the case of RP and FP.¹⁵³ Today, the political debate and polemics between AKP and the main opposition party CHP is still mainly on secularism and the abuse of religion. AKP affirms to be secular but would like to allow the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in universities and public offices, while seeing a more moderate approach to religion.

On its side, CHP fears that AKP is threatening Kemal Atatürk's secular reforms and is attempting to bring Turkey back to the dark years of the middle Ages. In 2007, the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, which is the ideologically closer to CHP, broadcasted a series of powerful advertorials asking citizens if they are aware of the threat to secularism and to the modernity of the state and to 'support the Republic (*Cumhuriyet*)'.¹⁵⁴ There was a widespread fear among CHP voters that the republican institutions are under threat.

¹⁵³ See chapter 2. Especially when the electioneering programs of the political parties are examined, it is seen how effectively they stressed on these threat policies.

¹⁵⁴ Videos are now available on *Youtube*: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrZzeM21Q3Y>, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yjhZc_DjcQA, and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XuTrDIS88JA>.

Figure 37: Is secularism under threat in Turkey?



Indeed, CHP voters have no doubts on the issue. A clear majority (80 percent) fear that secularism is under threat, and accordingly they approach AKP policies with great suspicion. On the contrary 85 percent of AKP voters clearly state that secularism is not under threat in the country governed by their own party.

As appears from figure 40, MHP voters seem to be a bit confused on the issue. 33 percent of MHP voters see secularism in Turkey under threat but 63 percent of the MHP voters interviewed do not see the threat. This approach is probably due to the strong attacks against the AKP administration and its use of Islamic values and, on the other hand, a pragmatic approach to religion.

The ‘threat’ factor seems to increase in *non-sunni* areas (Table 20). Secularism is not only an ideological issue. It appears to be also an issue between *Alevi*, generally center-left and the new immigrants of the emerging new Turkish elites especially *Sunni*. Thus, secularism is also a symbol of social conservatism: CHP represents those who would like to avoid changes of the status quo, and of those who would like not to lose their ethnic position.

Table 20: Is secularism under threat in Turkey?

Zübeyde Hanım (%)			Kazım Karabekir (%)			Gazi (%)		
<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>NA</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>NA</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>NA</i>
64	31	1	22	71	7	52	45	3

4.4.10. Party Images

During the survey, many veiled women or apparently religious interviewed stated that secularism in the country was under threat. After few questions, it appeared that they interpretation was slightly different. For instance, veiled women felt that secularism actually protects their right to dress as they please. As words in Turkish assume different meaning, this difference in interpretation of political terms is pretty common because the *Kulturkampf* created different—and sometimes contrasting—understandings of the basic political concepts, such as nationalism, democracy, and obviously secularism.

To understand the variability of certain basic concepts used in the political discourse, we asked the people interviewed to evaluate on a scale from one to five¹⁵⁵ the major political parties' main characters. AKP voters see their party as a moderate center-right party, religious but moderately secular (Table 21). They see their party also as moderately Kemalist and mildly Islamist. At the same time they see their own party as moderately Turkish nationalist and a bit Kurdish nationalist. They see their party generally as a democratic organization and hardly fascist. Finally, they see their party moderately statist and much privatization. On the other hand, AKP voters see CHP as a moderately secular party, *areligious*, moderately on the left side of the political spectrum. At the same time CHP is considered not as the champion of Kemalism or of Turkish nationalism, even if CHP was established by the founder of the Turkish Republic. At the same time they do not consider CHP as a democratic party (Table 22).

¹⁵⁵ 1=never;2=little;3=middle;4=much;5=completely.

Table 21: How AKP voters see their own party (%)

	1	2	3	4	5
Secular	8	12	44	26	10
Religious	2	3	33	47	15
Left	45	19	26	9	1
Right	4	6	37	36	17
Kemalist	7	17	43	26	7
Islamist	65	16	11	6	2
Kurdish Nationalist	50	33	13	3	1
Turkish Nationalist	2	7	27	45	19
Democrat	4	8	41	35	12
Fascist	83	9	4	2	2
Statist	5	9	43	33	10
Privatization	0	3	29	36	32

Table 22: How AKP voters see CHP (%)

	1	2	3	4	5
Secular	18	22	25	25	10
Religious	63	30	6	1	0
Left	14	22	21	22	21
Right	54	36	8	2	0
Kemalist	14	22	26	20	18
Islamist	91	7	2	0	0
Kurdish Nationalist	64	16	13	3	4
Turkish Nationalist	17	26	29	22	6
Democrat	22	33	34	8	3
Fascist	53	24	11	6	6
Statist	15	29	39	12	5
Privatization	30	43	21	4	2

CHP voters see their party as certainly secular, little or even non-religious. They also see their own party on the center-left of the political spectrum, as a Turkish nationalist, and certainly as a Kemalist party. It is interesting that generally they do not see their party as a completely democratic (Table 23). CHP voters see AKP as their inverse image. AKP is seen as not at all secular or Kemalist, religious and usually on the right. A considerable majority of CHP voters see AKP as Islamist and not as representative of Turkish or Kurdish nationalism. Finally, AKP is also generally considered as partially democratic (Table 24).

Table 23: How CHP voters see their own party (%)

	1	2	3	4	5
Secular	3	3	4	39	51
Religious	34	26	20	16	4
Left	7	5	14	41	33
Right	41	23	15	18	3
Kemalist	2	2	4	29	63
Islamist	93	4	2	1	0
Kurdish Nationalist	65	19	13	1	2
Turkish Nationalist	4	4	24	48	20
Democrat	4	4	23	54	15
Fascist	84	10	4	2	0
Statist	3	2	29	49	17
Privatization	21	28	32	17	2

Table 24: How CHP voter see AKP (%)

	1	2	3	4	5
Secular	28	20	30	14	5
Religious	7	10	24	40	16
Left	58	18	15	5	0
Right	10	11	33	26	15
Kemalist	30	20	29	15	4
Islamist	47	15	14	12	9
Kurdish Nationalist	51	25	15	4	2
Turkish Nationalist	13	14	26	30	12
Democrat	20	16	36	20	6
Fascist	36	18	17	15	10
Statist	43	24	20	10	2
Privatization	11	18	12	19	40

Secularism and Kemalism are evidently interpreted in two different ways by AKP and CHP voters, precisely because they have a contrasting worldview. However, the divide among different images of parties appears to be again religion.

It is also interesting that both groups of voters do not recognize their own party as certainly democratic. This is probably due to the lack of democracy inside the party and the recognition by voters of the importance of charismatic party leadership. However, voters of MHP—which has many times been associated with

fascist and chauvinist attitudes—consider their party as extremely democratic (the majority of answers were 4 and 5) as well as Kemalist and moderately religious.

Table 25: How MHP voters see their own party (%)

	1	2	3	4	5
Secular	0	11	24	54	11
Religious	4	6	48	31	11
Left	68	2	11	17	2
Right	2	11	26	22	39
Kemalist	2	4	37	33	24
Islamist	79	19	2	0	0
Kurdish Nationalist	85	7	6	2	0
Turkish Nationalist	0	0	11	26	63
Democrat	6	11	24	48	11
Fascist	64	15	9	8	4
Statist	4	4	42	30	20
Privatization	22	29	26	19	4

4.4.11. The Electoral Volatility

In the interim periods from one election to another, electors can change their preferences or continue to vote steadily for a certain party. Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu expressed as the reasons of volatility that “deterioration of leadership credibility, failing economic performances and an overall inability to respond to the demands and expectations of the voters at large are partially responsible for this continual shift in search of a better alternative among the available parties.”¹⁵⁶

Moreover, Hazama stated that “cleavage-type volatilities were nearly as strong as retrospective-type volatilities during the pre-1980 period. During the post-1980 period, however, cleavage-type volatilities became far less significant than retrospective-type volatilities. Total electoral volatility was more reflective of

¹⁵⁶ Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, (2007), p.35.

retrospective-type volatilities than cleavage-type volatilities during the post-1980 period than during the pre-1980 period.”¹⁵⁷

In our survey the respondents in our sample were asked which parties they voted for in 1999 and 2007 elections and also which party they would vote for if an election was to be held today in order to reveal the volatilities amid the parties.

The party volatilities among the electors of the AKP, the CHP and the MHP since 2007 elections were so revealed.

The impact of the continuing economic crisis could be seen on party preferences of voters. From 1999 to 2002 elections nearly half of the electorate has shifted from one party to another.¹⁵⁸ And increasing volatility seems to benefit the new center-right party. The newly established AKP gathered significant electoral support. As Table 26 shows, the AKP clearly had the FP voters.¹⁵⁹ Also the electors in our sample were asked which party they would vote for in an urgent election and according to the answers it is seen that the vote rate of the AKP decreases, while the rates of undecided voters and the abstainers increase. If we optimistically consider about the reasons of increasing undecided votes, we can say that in this case the reason may lie the fact that voter are met forced by the present conditions to take a decision. For this reason the voters do not formulate any choice. On the other hand, after 2007 election economical problems and social cleavages may be influential on this volatility.

¹⁵⁷ Hazama, Yasushi (2003), “Social Cleavages and Electoral Support in Turkey: Toward Convergence?”, *The Developing Economies*, 3, Fall: 367-368.

Cleavage-type volatilities: Cleavage structures include right-left volatility and systemic volatility.

Retrospective-type volatilities: Voters’ retrospective evaluations of government performance include incumbent volatility and traumatic volatility.

¹⁵⁸ See Appendix 3.

¹⁵⁹ Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, (2007), pp. 35-36.

Table 26: Volatility among AKP Voters

	1999	2002	Now
FP-SP	90	3	1
MHP	19	3	5
AKP	-	201	197
ANAP	48	7	-
DYP-DP	17	3	3
GP	-	5	-
DSP	-	-	1
CHP	1	1	-
Other	7	-	3
Could not cast the vote	13	13	-
Abstention	63	21	12
Null	-	-	2
Undecided	-	-	33
Independent	-	-	4
Invalid	2	3	-

Among the electors voting for the CHP in 2007 elections the abstainers in 1999 elections were too many, while the rate of abstainers diminished in the succeeding elections. After 1999 elections the rate of votes for the CHP considerably increased. In case of a possible election the number of hesitants, on the other hand, increases, too.

Table 27: Volatility among CHP Voters

	1999	2002	Now
FP-SP	-	-	-
MHP	2	-	2
AKP	-	-	3
ANAP	6	2	-
DYP-DP	2	-	-
GP	-	1	-
DSP	-	8	2
CHP	68	85	92
Other	4	-	2
Could not cast the vote	4	2	-
Abstention	26	15	3
Null	-	-	-
Undecided	-	-	9
Invalid	1	-	-

The electors voting for the MHP in 2007 elections were observed as quite stable, because the 59 percent of the MHP electors voted for it in both 1999 and 2002 elections. And in case of an election the votes for the MHP seem to be increased. The abstaining votes which were 22 per cent in 1999 elections gone mostly to the AKP in 2002 elections. For now the abstaining votes seem to be replaced by undecided electors.

Table 28: Volatility among MHP Voters


	1999	2002	Now
FP-SP	2	-	-
MHP	32	32	36
AKP	-	8	2
ANAP	4	3	-
DYP-DP	2	1	1
GP	-	-	-
DSP	-	1	-
CHP	-	2	2
Other	1	-	1
Could not cast the vote	1	2	-
Abstention	12	5	2
Null	-	-	-
Undecided	-	-	10
Invalid	-	-	-

4.4.12. Mass Media Factor

Within the survey questionnaire the respondents were asked where they received information about the party they would vote for.

37 percent of the AKP electors and 26 percent of the MHP electors stated that they received the related information from their families. Especially we can say that the AKP voters construct preservation of traditional lifestyle with family preference. However, 43 percent of the CHP voters stated that they gathered the necessary information from the mass media and press. Actually if we combine the visual media and printing press in the following table, we can see that on the MHP voters the effect of mass media is more than their families. Moreover, the ones who marked the choice “other” answered the question as “it is my opinion.”


Figure 38: Information on Parties (%)



In the survey our subjects were also asked “how often do you read newspapers?”

The voters for the three parties told that they periodically read daily newspapers. 55 percent of the AKP electors, 72 percent of the CHP electors and 65 percent of the AKP electors read papers every day.

Figure 39: Reading Newspaper (%)




4.4.13. Determining the Party Preference

Another question asked to our subjects was “What determines your party preference?”. Since only one reason may not be enough for them, our subjects were requested to enumerate their reasons in three ranks.


Within the context of survey, when the first rank reasons are examined, it is seen that what determined the preferences of 30 percent of the AKP electors is party leader a fortiori. 45 percent of the CHP electors and 28 percent of the MHP electors put political ideas of the party in first rank. That the AKP electors marked the choice “party leader” in first rank may result from the charismatic leadership of Erdoğan. Among CHP and MHP voters ideology result more important. Indeed these two parties have a more established and old ideology.

Figure 40: Party Preference 1




When the second rank preferences of the subjects are scrutinized, it is regarded that 15 percent of the AKP electors stressed the effect of political idea and another 15 percent marked the party program. 20 percent of the CHP voters and 27 percent of the MHP voters put the party ideology in the second rank.

Figure 41: Party Preference 2



The third rank preferences of the subjects reveal that 26 percent of the AKP electors, 23 percent of the CHP electors and 34 percent of the MHP electors stated that party operations affected their opinions lastly of the three.

Figure 42: Party Preference 3



4.4.14. The Candidate Factor

Our subjects were also asked to enumerate the most outstanding features that they want to see in a candidate. Since more than one feature may be influential, our subjects were requested to mark three features in ranks.

For the electors preferring the AKP the honesty and reliability of the candidates stand out in first rank with a percentage of 69 percent. In the second rank our subjects marked the nationalism with a percentage of 20 percent. In third rank, however, with a percentage of 17 percent they picked out the feature of democracy.

The electors of both the CHP and the MHP looked for the features of honesty and reliability in the first rank with a percentage of 68 percent. The CHP electors determined more than one feature for the second rank. They marked the features of nationalism, decisiveness and liberalism with a same percentage of 17 percent. Similar to the AKP and the CHP electors, the MHP electors picked out “nationalism” in the second rank with 34 percent. The CHP electors marked the “democracy” in the third rank as another outstanding feature that they want to see in a candidate. The MHP voters, however, with a percentage of 18 picked the characteristic of diligence in the last rank.

Consequently, the most outstanding characteristic that all of the three parties’ electors want to see in candidates came out as honesty or reliability. It is not a case, them, that the CHP candidate for Istanbul in the 2009 local elections built all his campaign on honesty.

Table 29: Characteristics of Candidate

	Characteristic of Candidate 1			Characteristic of Candidate 2			Characteristic of Candidate 3		
	AKP %	CHP %	MHP %	AKP %	CHP %	MHP %	AKP %	CHP %	MHP %
Empty	0	2	2	0	3	2	0	2	2
Honesty/Reliability	69	68	68	8	14	7	4	4	2
Nationalism	8	9	17	20	17	34	4	8	6
Religiousness	2	0	2	8	0	2	11	2	4
Decisiveness	1	5	2	12	17	6	10	9	13
Diligence	9	3	7	16	10	11	16	14	18
Adroitness	3	1	0	7	7	7	9	10	7
Youth	1	2	0	0	1	2	2	4	2
Liberalism	2	4	0	10	17	9	8	14	13
Intelligence	0	1	2	2	0	0	2	3	4
Patriotism	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Experience	2	3	0	7	5	11	16	8	16
Democracy	3	2	0	10	9	9	17	21	11
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

4.5. ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS

The results of the survey conducted in Gaziosmanpaşa compared with the official statistics help us to understand voting behaviors in Istanbul and to perhaps find some interpretation keys for understanding voter behaviors in other Turkish districts.

The most important point coming out from this survey held around Gaziosmanpaşa is the outstanding effect of social cleavages on voter behavior. Generally when the results of the elections are skimmed social cleavages may not be seen obviously. However, when the survey is divided to quarters, the cleavages are more clearly observed. As in the comparison of Karadeniz and Gazi quarters, although the education or income levels of them are similar to each other, the election results are quite different. This, one more time, indicates that socio-economic factors have no prevalent effect on elector preferences. The differences in party preferences among quarters seem to be done changing ethnical structures of the quarters.

The center-periphery dichotomy set forth by Şerif Mardin changed geographically because of the rapid urbanization because a large portion of the periphery physically moved from the rural areas to the big industrial cities. Nowadays center-periphery dichotomy becomes influential inside the cities. Also, the AKP and the CHP seem to represent now the two opposite fronts of this dichotomy. In this context, according to the survey results the birth places of the subjects confirm this situation. The majority of the CHP electors were born in Istanbul which is one of the biggest city centers in Turkey, while the AKP electors mostly were born in Black Sea (or have a family background in the Black Sea region), which is in a periphery area. Rapid and unplanned urbanization, moreover, created in the very center of Turkey a series of social peripheries. Despite its position in Istanbul province, Gaziosmanpaşa still represent the social periphery because of its population socio-economic status.

Besides the well known “socio-economic” and “regional” factors, *Kulturkampf* appears as a crucial factor influencing citizens’ votes. This appeared very clearly in the different attitudes toward religious practices and in the different understanding of the same political concepts. When the responds of the subjects about religious practices are skimmed, the AKP voters demonstrate to be more religious conferring to the party a more Islamic identity. The CHP voters show a political movement generally composed by non-practicing Muslims’ religious rituals. MHP voters are more moderate.

Before 2007 elections as an influence of *Kulturkampf* the threat factor was tried to be understood. When the survey results of the quarters that we selected are examined, the effect of the “threat” factor was observed in the quarters in which electors having different ethnical identities such as *Alevi* live.

The other important influence of social cleavage on elector behaviors emerges while determining the party images. The AKP voters define themselves as moderate religious and secular but less democrat. On the other hand, the CHP voters

define themselves as more secular but less democrat and religious. As things stand, the AKP electors look political conservatives and the CHP electors as attitude conservatives.

Moreover, according to the results of survey, the electoral volatility among parties can indicate as the impact of retrospective evaluations of government performance.

Also the effect of the media on the MHP and the CHP electors is considerable, while the AKP electors are influenced not by media but mostly by their families. This reveals the traditionalist structure of the AKP electors. In addition, the AKP voters stress that they are affected mostly by party leader as they decide their political preferences, while the CHP and the MHP underline the importance of the party's political idea and ideology. In both cases, the center-periphery dichotomy and irreconcilable images of *Kulturkampf* show its effect on electors' preferences once again.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation attempted to understand the Turkish voter behavior by focusing on the case of Istanbul's district of Gaziosmanpaşa. The district, mainly urban and part of a huge megalopolis cannot be seen as representative of the city or the country at all. However, working at micro-level has permitted us to better understanding the deep cleavages existing in Turkish society, which seems to be represented in the area but may disappear in a macro analysis.

Two important conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of the data obtained from our survey on 601 citizens in the district. The first conclusion is that, despite Turkey's advancement toward modernization, what appear to be crucial for the interpretation of electoral results are still the deep cleavages inside society. The economic and social position of the voter is relevant as well as the capability of a party of delivering services. It is without doubt that the fame of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan derived from his capability as mayor of Istanbul in solving basic problems like the sewerage system, drinkable water, and public transport, something that previous administrations were somehow incapable of realizing. As Prime Minister, he continued to deliver better services and also to make it possible that lower social classes or underdeveloped areas of the country benefited from an economic boom. However, the polarization among CHP and AKP also represents the polarization along a center-periphery dichotomy—readapted to the contemporary Turkish context. CHP represents a section of the population that has represented for many years the modern elite in control of the country's economy and administration¹⁶⁰, but that is losing its relevance. AKP represents the immigrated masses from the periphery, which today plays a bigger role in the system and demands a more equal distribution of the resources. At the same time it represents the new conservative elites that are gaining strength in the economy, politics, and academia. This change can be observed especially when we make a comparison among the quarters in Gaziosmanpaşa.

Secondly, the relevance of these cleavages as a dominant factor in the political system is worrying. Turkey's main political parties fail to address voters horizontally, compromising their duty of uniting civil society. Indeed, as this thesis attempted to demonstrate, political parties seem to be built on primordial ties (religion and place of origin) rather than on ideologies or policies, and consequently they are polarizing society vertically. This occasion is clearly observed especially in Gazi and Zübeydehanım quarters of Gaziosmanpaşa. To the effect that these quarters without volatility or refraction continue to support the CHP from 1983 then on, although their socio-economic levels are out of sounding. This situation results from the ethnical and religious structure of the quarters. As Kalaycıoğlu and Esmer state that religion, the place of origin or ethnic identity is of utmost importance for electors rather than socio-economic level.¹⁶¹

In addition, as Seymour Martin Lipset noticed, “democracy needs cleavage within linguistic or religious groups, not between them.”¹⁶² Consequently, the inability of political parties to have a bridging function among the social cleavages and their persistence in aligning themselves on cleavages will not eliminate the tensions existing now inside Turkish society. On the contrary, this reality poses a threat to the process of democratization in the country. It means that the country is going toward a strengthening of the current polarization and also, despite the fact that a large majority is backing the winning party, the government will always lack legitimacy in front of a relevant portion of Turkish society belonging to the center.

¹⁶⁰ Toprak and Çarkoğlu, (2006), p. 97.

¹⁶¹ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1994), “Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s”, *Sage Publications*, 27 (3, October): 420 and Esmer, (2002), p. 111.

¹⁶² Lipset, Seymour M. (1963), *Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics*, New York: Anchor Books, p. 81.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Survey Questions

Tarih: _____ İlçe: _____ Mahalle: _____

Seçmen Davranışları ile ilgili Anket soruları

Bu çalışma Fatih Üniversitesi Öğretim Görevlisi Michelangelo Guida ve Araştırma Görevlisi Tülin Varlı Tuna tarafından araştırma projesi kapsamında yürütülmektedir. Yapılan araştırma sonucu elde edilen bilgiler saklı tutulmak kaydı ile başka bir amaç için kullanılmayacaktır.

E-mail: mguida@fatih.edu.tr Tel: (0212) 866 33 00
tvarli@fatih.edu.tr Dahili: 5077- 5081

1- Herhangi bir derneğe üye misiniz?

1) Evet üyeyim. Hangisi? _____ 2) Hayır üye değilim.

2- Herhangi bir partiye üye misiniz?

1) Evet üyeyim. Hangisi? _____ 2) Hayır üye değilim.

3- Ne kadar sıklıkta gazete okuyorsunuz?

1) Her gün okurum. 4) 15 günde 1 ya da 2 okurum.
2) Haftada 1 ya da 2 okurum. 5) Ayda 1 okurum.
3) Haftada 3 ya da 4 okurum. 6) Hiç okumam.

4- Sizce Türkiye’de en önemli sorun nedir?

1) Enflasyon/Hayat Pahalılığı 4) Siyasi istikrarsızlık 7) Eğitim
2) İşsizlik 5) Rüşvet, yolsuzluk 8) Terör
3) Ekonomik İstikrarsızlık 6) Sağlık/Sosyal güvenlik

5- Oy vereceğiniz Parti hakkında karar verirken nereden bilgi alıyorsunuz?

1) TV/ Radyo Hangi 3) Aile 7) İş arkadaşı
TV/Radyo? _____ 4) Yakın Arkadaş 8) Partinin gezici arabaları
2) Gazete/İnternet Hangi 5) Yakın Akraba 9) Diğer _____
Gazete/İnternet? _____ 6) Parti Teşkilat yayını

6- Parti tercihinizi neye göre belirliyorsunuz? (Üç tane sırasıyla işaretleyiniz.)

1) Liderine 5) Kadrosuna 8) Dini görüşüne
2) Siyasi Görüşüne 6) Hedeflerine 9) Halka yakınlığına
3) İdeolojisine 7) Programına 10) İcraatlarına
4) Belediyelerdeki başarısına

7- Seçtiğiniz partinin barajı aşamayacağını bilmenize rağmen, yine de o partiye oy verir misiniz?

1) Evet veririm. Nedenini açıklayabilir misiniz? _____
2) Hayır vermem.

8- Hangi nedenle parti değiştirmeyi düşünürsünüz?

1) Parti yönetimi 5) Parti programı ve kadrosu
2) Partinin icraatçı olmaması 6) Partinin yolsuzluğa karışması
3) Partinin çizgisini değiştirmesi 7) Barajı aşamayacağından dolayı
4) Parti lideri 8) Bilinmeyen

9- Adaylarda aradığımız en belirgin özelliğin üç tanesini aşağıya sırasıyla sıralar mısınız?

1) Dürüstlük ve güven 5) Çalışkanlık 9) Zekilik
2) Milliyetçilik 6) Beceriklilik 10) Hemşerilik
3) Dindarlık 7) Gençlik 11) Tecrübe
4) Kararlılık 8) Özgürlükçülük 12) Demokratiklik

10- 1999 yılı genel seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz?

1-FP	
2-ANAP	
3-MHP	
4-CHP	
5-DYP	
6-HADEP	
7-Diğer	

8- Bağımsız	
9- Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim.(10.1)	
10-Yaşım tutmadığından oy kullanmadım.	
11-Geçersiz oy kullandım.	

10.1-Sadece “Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim.” diyenler cevaplayacak. Neden sandığa gidemediniz?

- 1) Kayıtlı değildim. 4)Düşüncelerimi temsil eden bir parti olduğuna inanmıyorum.
- 2) Demokrasiye inanmıyorum. 5)Partilere güvenmiyorum.
- 3)Siyasilere güvenmiyorum 6)Diğer. Açıklayınız. _____

11- 3 Kasım 2002 seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz?

1-AKP	<input type="checkbox"/>
2-CHP	<input type="checkbox"/>
3-GP	<input type="checkbox"/>
4-DEHAP	<input type="checkbox"/>
5-DYP	<input type="checkbox"/>
6-ANAP	<input type="checkbox"/>
7-SP	<input type="checkbox"/>
8-MHP	<input type="checkbox"/>
9-DSP	<input type="checkbox"/>

10-Diğer	<input type="checkbox"/>
11-Bağımsız	<input type="checkbox"/>
12-Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim.(11.1)	<input type="checkbox"/>
13-Yaşım tutmadığından oy kullanmadım.	<input type="checkbox"/>
14-Geçersiz oy kullandım.	<input type="checkbox"/>

11.1- Sadece “Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim.” diyenler cevaplayacak.

Neden sandığa gidemediniz?

- 1) Kayıtlı değildim. 4) Siyasilere güvenmiyorum.
- 2) Demokrasiye inanmıyorum. 5)Partilere güvenmiyorum.
- 3) Düşüncelerimi temsil eden bir parti olduğuna inanmıyorum. 6)Diğer. Açıklayınız. _____

12- 22 Temmuz 2007 seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy verdiniz?

1-AKP	<input type="checkbox"/>
2-CHP	<input type="checkbox"/>
3-MHP	<input type="checkbox"/>
4-SP	<input type="checkbox"/>
5-GP	<input type="checkbox"/>
6-DP	<input type="checkbox"/>
7-BTP	<input type="checkbox"/>
8-LDP	<input type="checkbox"/>
9-İP	<input type="checkbox"/>
10-TKP	<input type="checkbox"/>

11-Diğer	<input type="checkbox"/>
12-Bağımsız	<input type="checkbox"/>
13-Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim. (12.1)	<input type="checkbox"/>
14-Yaşım tutmadığından oy kullanmadım.	<input type="checkbox"/>
15-Geçersiz oy kullandım.	<input type="checkbox"/>

12.1- Sadece “Bir nedenle sandığa gidemedim.” diyenler cevaplayacak.

Neden sandığa gidemediniz?

- 1) Kayıtlı değildim. 4) Siyasilere güvenmiyorum.
- 2) Demokrasiye inanmıyorum. 5)Partilere güvenmiyorum.
- 3) Düşüncelerimi temsil eden bir parti olduğuna inanmıyorum. 6)Diğer. Açıklayınız. _____

13- Şu an genel seçim yapılırsa hangi partiye oy vermeyi düşünürsünüz?

14- Aşağıdaki tabloya AKP, CHP ve MHP yi nasıl yerleştirirsiniz?

AKP	Hiç	Az	Orta	Çok	Tamamıyla
Laik	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dindar	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solcu	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sağcı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Atatürkçü	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Şariatçı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Devletçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Özelleştirmeci	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Demokrat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Faşist					
Türk Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kürt Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

CHP	Hiç	Az	Orta	Çok	Tamamıyla
Laik	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dindar	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solcu	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sağcı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Atatürkçü	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Şariatçı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Devletçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Özelleştirmeci	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Demokrat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Faşist					
Türk Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kürt Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

MHP	Hiç	Az	Orta	Çok	Tamamıyla
Laik	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dindar	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Solcu	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sağcı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Atatürkçü	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Şariatçı	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Devletçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Özelleştirmeci	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Demokrat	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Faşist					
Türk Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kürt Milliyetçi	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

15-Cinsiyetiniz: 1)Kadın 2)Erkek

16- Yaşınız: 1) 18-24 yaş 2) 25-39 yaş 3) 40-54 yaş 4) 55-69 yaş
5) 70 yaş ve yukarısı

17- Doğum yeriniz: İl _____ (1) Köy 2) Kasaba 3) Merkez)

18- Babanızın doğum yeri: İl _____ (1)Köy 2)Kasaba 3)Merkez)

19- Eğitim durumunuz: 1) Okur-yazar değil 2) Okur Yazar 3) İlkokul
4) Ortaokul 5) Lise 6) Meslek Yüksek Okulu 7) Üniversite ve üstü

20- Ne işle uğraşıyorsunuz?

1) İşçi 2) Serbest Meslek 3) Ev hanımı 4) Memur 5) Emekli
6) Öğrenci 7) Esnaf 8) İşsiz

21- Gelir durumunuz: 1) 0YTL 2) 500YTL altı 3) 500-1000YTL arası
4) 1000-1500 YTL 5)1500YTL üzeri

22- Hepimiz Türk vatandaşız, ama değişik kökenlerden yörelerden olabiliriz; siz kendinizi ne olarak hissediyorsunuz?

23- Aile içinde günlük yaşamda hangi dili kullanmaktasınız?

24- Aşağıdaki tabloda kendinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?

	Düzenli	Ara sıra	Hiç
Namaz Kılmak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Oruç Tutmak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cuma namazına gitmek (Yalnız erkekler için)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Camiye Gitmek	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Dua etmek	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Kuran okumak	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Başörtüsü Takmak (Yalnız kadınlar için)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Appendix 2: Sex of Voter, 2007 Vote and Education Level Crosstabulation

Education Level	Sex of Voter	2007 vote		
		AKP	CHP	MHP
Empty	Male	2	-	-
	Total	2	-	-
No Literacy	Female	2	-	-
	Male	1	-	1
	Total	3	-	1
Literacy	Female	5	2	-
	Male	5	4	2
	Total	10	6	2
Primary school	Female	22	5	1
	Male	64	16	11
	Total	86	21	12
Secondary school	Female	9	5	2
	Male	46	11	10
	Total	55	16	12
High school	Female	13	20	3
	Male	53	28	16
	Total	66	48	19
Vocational High school	Female	1	3	-
	Male	4	2	-
	Total	5	5	-
University and other	Female	11	8	3
	Male	23	9	5
	Total	34	17	8
Total		261	113	54

Appendix 3: The General Election Results of Turkey

	1999 Elections	2002 Elections	2007 Elections
AKP		34,43	46,58
ANAP	13,22	5,11	
DYP/DP	12,01	9,54	5,42
RP/FP/SP	15,41	2,49	2,34
DSP	22,19	1,22	
CHP	8,71	19,41	20,88
MHP	17,98	8,35	14,27

* The results of 2007 general election, High Election Commission (YSK), <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/1999secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2007secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>, (10 February 2008).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

- Akgün, Birol (2007), *Türkiye’de Seçmen Davranışı, Partiler Sistemi ve Siyasal Güven* (The Voter Behavior, The Parties System and The Political Trust in Turkey), Ankara: Nobel.
- Ayata, A. Güneş and Ayata, Sencer (2002), “Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting”, in S. Sayarı and Y. Esmer, *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Bowman, Lewis and Boynton, G.R. (1974), *Political Behaviour and Public Opinion: Comparative Analyses*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Çaha, Ömer (2004), *Seçmen Davranışı ve Siyasal Partiler* (The Voter Behavior and Political Parties), Istanbul: Fatih University.
- Çaha, Ömer, Toprak, Metin and Dalmış, İbrahim (2004), “Siyasal Parti Üyelerinde Siyasal Katılım Düzeyi: Kırıkkale Örneği” (The Level of Political Participation for the Political Party Members’: Kırıkkale Case Study), in Ömer Çaha (eds.), *Seçmen Davranışı ve Siyasal Partiler* (The Voter Behavior and Political Parties), Istanbul: Fatih University.
- Çaha, Ömer (ed.) (2008), *Türkiye’de Seçmen Davranışı ve Siyasi Partiler* (The Voter Behavior and Political Parties in Turkey), Istanbul: Orion.
- Çukurçayır, M. Akif (2000), *Siyasal Katılma ve Yerel Demokrasi* (The Political Participation and Local Democracy), Ankara: Yargı.
- Dahl, Robert A. (1965), *Modern Political Analysis*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- D.İ.E. (1993), *1990 Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri/İstanbul* (The General Population Census, The Social and Economic Characteristics of Population/ Istanbul), Ankara: D.İ.E.
- D.İ.E. (2002), *2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı, Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri/İstanbul* (The General Population Census, The Social and Economic Characteristics of Population/ Istanbul), Ankara: D.İ.E.
- Esmer, Yılmaz (2002), “At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior”, in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Erder, Necat, (1995), *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partilerin Seçmenleri ve Sosyal Demokrasinin Toplumsal Tabanı* (Constituencies of Political Party and the Bases of Social Democracy in Turkey), Ankara: TÜSES.

- Guida, M. (2009), "The Political Geography of Üsküdar", in Coşkun Yılmaz (ed.), *International Symposium on Üsküdar VI*, İstanbul: Municipality of Üsküdar.
- Guida, M. (2009, March). " Feudal Control of Politics: the Example of the Province of Urfa", in the European University Institute in Montecatini Terme, Competition over resources, rural poverty and agrarian policies in MENA, Symposium conducted at the Tenth Mediterranean conference, Florence, Italy.
- Göksel, A. B. and Bitirim, S. (2007, November), "AKP ve CHP'nin Seçim Bildirgelerinin İnternet Ortamında Temsili: Sanal Propaganda"(The Election Declaration of AKP and CHP on the Internet: Imaginary Propaganda), *International Symposium on Media and Politic*, Ege University.
- İmik, N. (2007, November), "Siyasi Partilerin Medyada Yer Almasının Seçmenin Oy Verme Davranışına Etkisi" (The effect on voting behaviour of the presence of political parties in the media), *International Symposium on Media and Politic*, Ege University.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1983), *Karşılaştırmalı Siyasal Katılma, Siyasal eylemin kökenleri üzerine bir inceleme* (The Comparative Political Participation), İstanbul: İstanbul University.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1984), *Çağdaş Siyasal Bilim Teori Olgu ve Süreçler* (The Modern Political Science, Theory, Fact and Processes), İstanbul: Beta.
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (2005), *Turkish Dynamics, Bridge across Troubled Land*, New York: Palgrave.
- Karpat, Kemal (1976), *Türkiye'de Toplumsal Dönüşüm* (The Social Transformation in Turkey), translated by Abdülkerim Sönmez (2003), Ankara: İmge.
- Keleş, Ruşen (2000), *Kentleşme Politikası* (The Politics of Urbanization), Ankara: İmge.
- Kongar, Emre (1998), *21. yy Türkiye 2000' li yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (The Social Structure of Turkey in the 2000s), İstanbul: Remzi.
- Kourvetaris, George A. (1996), *Political Sociology: Structure and Process*, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1963), *Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics*, New York: Anchor Books.

Mardin, Şerif (1975), "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", in E.D. Akarlı and G. Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi University.

Mardin, Şerif (1983), *Din ve İdeoloji* (Religion and Ideology), İstanbul: İletişim.

Mardin, Şerif (2007), *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* (Religion and Politics in Turkey), İstanbul: İletişim.

Milbrath, Lester W. and Goel, M.L. (1977), *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?*, Chicago: Rand McNally.

Milburn, Michael A. (1998), *Sosyal Psikolojik Açından Kamuoyu ve Siyaset* (Public Opinion and Politics according to Social Psychology), translated by Ali Dönmez and Veli Duyan, Ankara: İmge.

Özbudun, Ergun (1975), *Türkiye'de Sosyal Değişim ve Siyasal Katılma* (Social Changing and Political Participation in Turkey), Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi.

Sedat, Murat (2006), *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul'un Nüfus ve Demografik Yapısı* (The Population and Demographic Structure of İstanbul From Yesterday to the present), İstanbul: İ.T.O..

Tosun, Tanju (2009), *Türk Siyasal Hayatında Seçimler ve İzmir* (Elections and İzmir in Turkish Political Life), Ankara: Orion.

Turan, İlder (1986), *Siyasal Sistem ve Siyasal Davranış* (Political System and Political Behavior), İstanbul: Der.

Tuncer, Erol (2003), *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Seçimler (1877-2002)* (From Otoman to Today Elections (1877-2002)), Ankara: TESAV.

Verba, Sidney, Nie, Norman H. and Kim, Jae-on (1987), *Participation and Political Equality*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

White, B. Jenny (2002), *Islamist Mobilization in Turkey*, London: University of Washington Press.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Bacık, Gökhan (2008), "The parliamentary elections in Turkey, July 2007", *Electoral Studies*, 27 (2, June).

Çarkoğlu, Ali (2005), "Political Preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage". *Turkish Studies*, 6 (1, June):286-287.

- Elder, Laurel and Greene, Steven (2003), "Political information, gender and the vote: the differential impact of organizations, personal discussion, and the media on the electoral decisions of women and men", *The Social Science Journal*, 40: 387.
- Ercins, Gülay (2007), "Türkiye’de Sosyo-Ekonomik Faktörlere Bağlı Olarak Değişen Seçmen Davranışı" (The Changing Voter Behavior depending from Socio-economic Factors in Turkey), *C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, 8 (2).
- "Gaziosmanpaşa AK Parti’nin Kalesidir." (Gaziosmanpaşa is the castle of the AKP), (2007, August 25), *Durum*.
- Hazama, Yasushi (2003), "Social Cleavages and Electoral Support in Turkey: Toward Convergence?", *The Developing Economies*, 3, Fall.
- Jefferson West, William (2005), "Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: an Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections". *Political Geography*, 24 (4, May).
- Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin (1994), "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s", *Sage Publications*, 27 (3, October).
- Migdalovitz, Carol (2007), "Turkey’s 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power", *CRS Report Congress*, (10, September).
- Nuhrat, Cenap (1971), "Türkiye Köylerinde Olağandışı Oy Verme" (The Extraordinary Voting in Turkey Villages), *A. U. Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 26, winter.
- Secor, Anna J. (2001), "Ideologies in crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s". *Political Geography*, 20 (5, June).
- Zeyneloğlu, Sinan (2006), "İstanbul’un Seçim Coğrafyası: 1999-2002" (The Election Geography of İstanbul: 1999-2002). *Toplum ve Bilim*, 107.

INTERNET

- Ağırdır, B. (2007), "Sandığın içindekini ne belirledi?" (What the vote in the ballot box determined?), *KONDA*,
http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/sandigin_icindeki.pdf.
(12 May 2008).
- Akder, H. (2004), "Technical Note: Computing the Indices", *Human Development Report (2000) / UNDP*,
http://hdr.untheDP.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/turkey/name_3296_en.html. (12 May 2008).

- Döndaş, İ. (2008), “Türkiye’nin köyü’ değil ülkenin ve İstanbul’un geleceği olduk” (We have become the future of Istanbul not the village of Turkey), *Star*, <http://www.stargazete.com/index.asp?haberID=136903>, (2008, 25 February).
- DTP declared their electioneering program, http://www.atilim.org/haberler/2007/06/16/DTP_secim_beyannamesini_acikladi.html, (23 February 2008).
- Erdem, T. (2007)^A, “Siyasal Eğilimler Araştırmaları” (The Political Tendencies Research), *KONDA*, http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, (12 May 2008).
- Erdem, T. (2007)^B, “Biz Kimiz?” (Who are we?), *KONDA*, http://www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf, (12 May 2008).
- “Gaziosmanpaşa Kentrehberi” (The city-guide of Gaziosmanpaşa), <http://kentrehberi.gaziosmanpasa.bel.tr/?map.jsp>, (4 March 2008).
- “Hangi Lider kaç Miting yaptı?” (Which Leader made how much demonstration?), <http://ates64.blogcu.com/3662429/>, (15 February 2008).
- High Election Commission (YSK), <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/index.html>, (15 February 2008).
- High Election Commission (YSK), <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm> <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2007secim/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.htm>, (10 February 2008).
- Kılıç, Yasin (2009), “İstanbul’un memleket haritası” (The Hometown Map of Istanbul), *Zaman*, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazdir.do?...> (20 February 2009).
- “Text of General Staff Statement”, (2007), http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html, (1 March 2008).
- “The election program of the MHP”, <http://www.mhp.org.tr/beyanname/beyan0.php>, (20 February 2008).
- “The election program of the AKP”, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/beyanname.asp>, (20 February 2008).
- “The election program of the CHP”, http://www.chp.org.tr/index.php?module=museum&page=show&entry_id=1274, (20 February 2008).

- “The population of Gaziosmanpaşa”,
http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnks=&report=turkiye_ilce_koy_sehir.RDF&p_il=34&p_ilce1=414&p_kod=2&desformat=html&ENVID=adnksEnv , (15 March 2008).
- “The History of Gaziosmanpaşa Municipality”,
http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaziosmanpa%C5%9Fa,_%C4%B0stanbul, (15 March 2008).
- “The participant rate between 1983 and 2007 general elections in Gaziosmanpaşa”,
<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>. (21 March 2008).
- “The results of 2007 general election”, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/secim/>, (10 February 2008).
- “The lesson from Turkey”, (2007), *The Economist*,
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9549614&CFID=8420103&CFTOKEN=50646487, (16 March 2008).
- Toprak, B. and Çarkoğlu, A. (2006), “Değişen Türkiye’de Din Toplum ve Siyaset” (Religion, Society and Politics in Changing Turkey), *TESEV*,
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJE/PDF/DEMP/Degisen%20TRde%20Din-Toplum-Siyaset.pdf, (12 May 2008).
- TÜİK, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/secimdagitimapp/secim.zul>.
- TÜİK, “Unemployment Problem”,
<http://www.tuik.gov.tr/Gosterge.do?metod=IlgiliGosterge&id=3491>, (3 June 2008).
- “65 candidate of the DTP”, (2007), <http://www.haberler.com/dtp-bagimsiz-65-adayini-tanitti-haberi/>, (6 February 2008).