

Post-Cold War  
US National Security Policy  
and the Middle East:  
A Case Study of the Gulf War

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by

Halis Kaya

Fatih University

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## APPROVAL PAGE

**Student** : Halis Kaya  
**Institute** : Institute of Social Sciences  
**Department** : International Relations  
**Thesis Subject** : Post-Cold War US National Security Policy and the Middle East: A Case Study of the Gulf War  
**Thesis Date** : February 2010

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assist. Prof. Savaş Genç  
**Head of Department**

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Lütfullah Karaman  
**Supervisor**

### Examining Committee Members

Prof.Dr. Lütfullah Karaman .....

Prof.Dr. Ömer Çaha .....

Assist.Prof. Savaş Genç .....

It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Karakuyu  
**Director**

## **AUTHOR DECLARATIONS**

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
2. The advanced study in International Relations graduate program of which this thesis is part has consisted of:
  - i) Research Methods courses both in the undergraduate and graduate programs.
  - ii) Examination of International relations theories as well as security studies including individual, national and international security analyzes and US national security policies over the case study of the Gulf War.

Halis Kaya

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**Enstitüsü** : **Sosyal Bilimler**  
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## **KISA ÖZET**

### **Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Amerikan Milli Güvenlik Politikaları ve Ortadoğu: Örnek Olgu Analizi Olarak Körfez Savaşı**

**Halis Kaya**

Milli güvenlik konusunun çalışılması dış faktörleri olduğu kadar iç faktörleri de analiz etmesi yönünde araştırmacıya geniş bir hareket alanı sağladığı için dış politikanın anlaşılmasında kapsamlı ve açıklayıcı bir çerçeve sunar. Her iki kaynaktan da gelen datalar objektif bir şekilde analiz edilirse, dış politika çalışmalarındaki önemli bir boşluk doldurulmuş olacaktır. Dış politikanın bu iki kaynağı sentetik ve çok boyutlu bir yaklaşımla ele alınmalıdır. Dış tehditleri içerdeki temel değerlerle ilişkilendirmek suretiyle milli güvenlik analizi buna olanak tanır. Bu bakış açısıyla Körfez Savaşı üzerinde yoğunlaşarak Soğuk Savaş sonrası Amerikan dış politikasının temel unsurlarını analize tâbi tuttuk. Körfez Savaşı Sovyetlerin çöküşü ve Soğuk Savaşın bitişinden sonraki ilk Amerikan askeri müdahalesiydi. Olayın bu özelliği bize Soğuk Savaş dönemi güvenlik ve dış politika mantığından nelerin tevarüs edildiği ve bunların tek kutuplu Dünya sistemine büyük strateji (grand strategy) sağlamak için Soğuk Savaş sonrası global koşullarında nasıl dönüştürüldüğünü tespit etme imkanı sunmuştur. Teorik bir zemin sağlamak amacıyla güvenlik kavramının tarihsel ve teorik boyutları ortaya konmuştur.

#### **Anahtar Kelimeler**

Devlet, Güvenlik, Milli Güvenlik, Amerikan Dış Politikası, Tek Kutuplu Dünya Düzeni, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi, Körfez Savaşı

**University** : **Fatih University**  
**Institute** : **Institute of Social Sciences**  
**Department** : **International Relations**  
**Supervisor** : **Prof. Dr. Lütfullah Karaman**  
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#### **ABSTRACT**

### **Post-Cold War US National Security Policy and the Middle East: A Case Study of the Gulf War**

**Halis Kaya**

Studying national security provides an overall interpretive framework for understanding foreign policy because it helps researcher to analyze the foreign as well as domestic factors that shape foreign policy. If the data of both sources is objectively studied, an important gap in the study of foreign policy might be fulfilled. A synthetic and multidimensional approach should study the dynamic interaction between the both sources of foreign policy behavior. By relating foreign threats to internal core values, the analysis of national security facilitates such assessment. From that perspective this thesis examines post-Cold War US national security policy by concentrating on the Gulf War. The Gulf War was the first US military intervention after the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This special feature of the event gives us the opportunity to grasp what was inherited from Cold War logic of security and foreign policy and how they were transformed under the post-Cold War global conditions to provide grand strategy for unipolar World system. In order to provide a theoretical framework historical and theoretical aspects of security concept were investigated.

#### **Keywords:**

State, Security, National Security, US Foreign Policy, Unipolar World System, Theory of International Relations, Gulf War

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The basic problems which stand at the core of all interest in international relations are security, power and peace. If it were a requirement to make a hierarchical arrangement among them security may acquire the priority. State as the basic actor of international relations aims to protect its interest from all kinds of threats which mainly can stem from its interactions among other states and from other sources. The presence of potential threats means that the interests of a state always stand in an insecure condition which differs according to existing security structure. It also can be said that power and peace get their importance from their role in guiding to action which emanate from the problem of insecurity. The problem of insecurity is very inclusive both in dimension and variation. It occupies all the levels of analysis from individual to global, and a range of sectors containing cultural social economic political and military ones.

Individuals can be affected from insecurity in all levels. Individuals are the smallest units that experience insecurity but because of their limited power they cannot express this in effective way and extent. For that reason, a variety of organizations play that role on behalf of individuals. These organizations carry the problem of individual insecurity to a level at which adequate resources become attainable to take remedial or long term action. The logic and mode of practices of these organizations differ from individuals in handling insecurity problem and means used to resolve the problem. Because of their power, method and structure they exist in level of action that different from individuals.

The more interactions among these organizations are competitive the more problem of insecurity is increased. It is the modern state that represents the highest form of such organization. Because of the authority that provides state the right to have a wide scope of command over individuals within it and supremacy to use legal



force against them constitutes the base of distinctive system of international relations. In addition to that, because the competition between states exists inevitably, international relations become dominated by insecurity.

Insecurity is not only a problematique between states, but also between subnational powers within a state and supranational powers within global system. But the concepts of security, power, and peace are mainly resorted and conceptualized to explore the problematique of insecurity primarily at the levels of state and international system. Nevertheless, because the logic, incentives, and objectives of national security dominate and shape the structure and mode of working of international security the subject in this thesis reveals to be national security.

On the above mentioned theoretical basis, in this thesis the concept of security will be studied especially at state level and in national character to understand the Gulf War. The main subject is the Gulf War because it was the first war fought by the United States, the sole superpower of newly emerging international system, against Iraq which was the only aggressor and serious threat to the status quo backed by the United States in the Persian Gulf zone. By analyzing incentives, methods, and objectives of this war the aim of this study is to grasp what was inherited from Cold War political and military mind-set and how these elements were transferred into the new post-Cold War conditions.

To this end, by employing case study method, this thesis will take the Gulf War as its case. In social sciences methodology there are two classes of methods which are named as Quantitative and Qualitative. Quantitative methods aim to achieve data in the form of formulas. On the other hand, qualitative methods seek to attain data in the form of theories and conceptual generalizations. The field of international relations has for many decades witnessed the very important role of qualitative methods. It can be said that the determiner factor in the reason why qualitative methods have been important in IR research is that case study methods which have

significant advantages in studying complicate issues and complex phenomena. “Some of the most prominent subjects of study, for example wars and the formation of new international systems often involve interaction effects among many structural variables. The prominence of qualitative methods in IR thus reflects these methods’ advantages in studying complex phenomena that lies at the heart of the subfield” (Bennett and Elman, 2007: 171). In this regard, the Gulf War stands as an explanative indicator of transformation of US national security policy of Cold War into the conditions of unipolar international system in the example of the Middle East.

Chapter one, “Human Nature, Security and State” is structured to provide an overview of the historical and theoretical background and reciprocal interaction of these three basic concepts which were enriched to some extent by our intellectual interpretations about them. Conflict and the disharmony of difference have been seen as inevitable features of human nature by a paradigm which has dominated the field of International relations. Sociobiology provided some arguments based on the theory of evolution to reinforce this mode of thought. “Accepting the ‘scientific’ argument that human nature is naturally violent, ethnocentric, and competitive, human nature promises to further entrench a conception of security which focuses on distinct, competitive groups defined by their differences and prone to war” (Busser, 2006: 1).

Starting from prevailing theories during the Middle Ages concerning human nature, security and state the chapter will begin by giving a general intellectual framework of the time. In this respect ideas of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas come into prominence to be understood. In second step the two fathers of the idea of modern state, Machiavelli and Hobbes, were surveyed in their fundamental views on the subject.

In the last part of the chapter, the field of contemporary international relations will be examined. In this part, existing orthodox school in security studies will not be a subject of a detailed criticism. Instead, an outline of the underlying theoretical postulates of current school of postwar security studies will be given. There are evident difficulties and potential collusions for all attempts to make a generalization about the mentioned orthodoxy from which traditional security studies was born. However, it is not an obstacle to argue that despite the fact that there are differences dividing mainstream of security studies into opponent and competing camps, the actors of these debates share generally similar ontological and epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, the defenders of the traditionalist approach in the study of security take the world into consideration from the state centered view. Epistemologically, all of their postulates have been based on scientific and objectivist paradigm of knowledge. In this section I will briefly explain these main shared assumptions.

In order to provide a theoretical framework for our case study of the Gulf war, Chapter Two will be devoted to analysis of the concept of security in detail. While doing this, the chapter will follow the theoretical structure of Barry Buzan who is one of the prominent representatives of Copenhagen School of international relations. He studies concept of security in three levels, namely, individual, national and international, all of which will be reviewed in the chapter.

The security of individuals and the security at the international level are also parts of spectrum of Buzan's security interest. Beyond that international system is a particular unit of analysis itself. But in the final analysis, his interest on these levels and unit of analysis stems from their impact upon states. This central role of state in his perspective has two main justifications. He asserts that, the mediation of the driving forces of security both at the individual and international level is made by state. State determines the mode of function of system and creates bases and means for the reconciliation of these two groups of forces. Justification of the superiority of

national security is that there is no other actor existing to do such a mentioned task (Buzan,1991).

“For over four decades, the fundamental ordering principles of international politics and the basic elements of American Grand strategy remained in static. The boundary between the Eastern and Western blocks came to define mutually exclusive zones of military protection, economic production, and relative political homogeneity” (Oye, 1992: 4). The ‘the post-war order’ collapsed in 1989 and 1990, and a ‘new world order’ started to emerge. Accordingly, the third chapter examines the consequences of these developments for US national security strategy. “Will the end of the cold war improve global prospects for peace, prosperity, and justice? What coherent strategies, if any, will come to replace America’s traditional interlocking commitments to global military containment” (Oye, 1992: 4). I argue that the postwar order and the restructuring of American security policy East-West may have significant implications for these aspects of international affairs. By eliminating the specter of the Soviet security threat, the end of the Cold War removes incentives for superpower involvement in regional conflicts in periphery, or by another expression, in less important regions in American national security strategy. The concluding section of this chapter evaluates the grand strategy of the United States that may emerge during this critical period of transition.

The adjustment to the post-Cold War was a very crucial problem for both opinion leaders and American Public. During the Cold War there was one substantial East-West conflict, but now the actors of International system have interdependent interests. While they can ally on some issues, they can also oppose each other on others. “The Cold War was a period of certainty and stability. The United States, with its huge market and productive capacity, controlled the international economy. The East-West conflict was the dominant security issue. It gave order to the world. Nostalgia for the Cold War was especially powerful during the early months of the Bush administration” (Schneider, 1992: 61). The world experienced dramatic changes but United States wanted to stand dominant still. Inexistence of the Cold

War dynamics and rules made the issues more difficult for the United States. “It will have to adjust to a world of complex competition, shifting allegiances, and diplomatic surprise. Can the United States do anything to restore a measure of stability and certainty in this new, unpredictable world? President Bush thinks so. On September 11, 1990, almost two years in his presidency, he finally came up with his vision of ‘a new world order’” (Schneider, 1992: 61).

International system was in a structural transformation and as a sole superpower of this transformation; the United States sought international legitimacy. United Nations was the only source of this legitimization. UN has been ineffective under the Cold War political and military conditions shaped according to democracy and communism opposition. During that time, political actors, whether they are sub-national, national or supranational, provided legitimization for their actions by making reference to their camp’s ideological paradigms. Therefore international law had no binding force over political actors of international system. The transformation of the international system was an essential occasion to give authority back to United Nations. In the related chapter, sincerity of the United States at this mission will also be examined.

In conclusion, a general reconsideration of the method and objectives discussed throughout the thesis will be made. It will also be supportive to summarize the findings about the subject.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **HUMAN NATURE, SECURITY AND STATE**

Understanding the concepts that are at the core of various sciences and disciplines depends on understanding of the three meta-concepts which bear the basic determining quality on the formation of human's world view; these are God, human and universe. These concepts, which also have determining role at the divergence of the philosophical systems from each other, according to meaning content and level of centrality they have, stands at the position of being source, channel-scene and purpose of being and existence within the hierarchical structure of philosophical system.

When it is considered in terms of science, disciplines and schools, one of these three meta-concepts comes into prominence and undertakes a determining role in accordance to their subjects and priorities. For example, whereas the meta-concept which comes into prominence in religious sciences is God, it is universe in physical sciences and human being in social sciences. While universe and human meta-concepts always have a particular position within the hierarchical order of subjects of sciences, God meta-concept may be excluded out of this order. However, even in this exclusion case, God concept usually makes it obligatory for the system to have a first-degree inevitable and strong justification.

Interdependence of ideas about human nature, security and state constitutes one of the crucial aspects of our theoretical investigations about national security issue on the basis of international politics/relations. When limited scope of an introduction

part is taken into consideration, although it is seen impossible and unnecessary to handle this interdependence in detail, it is useful to state outlines of the subject as background information.

It is the meta-concept of human being which brings out the concept of security that is the core element of this thesis as a meta-concept and one of the central concepts of international relationships. Because, security is one of the two basic quests with freedom having existential quality which human being steers for. Human's quest for security actualizes in a line which expands and deepens from material assets such as life and ownership to spiritual assets such as honor and self-esteem. Limits and character of this line of quest differ depending on human's psycho-ontological perception manner and level shaped in the socio-cultural environment offered by historical context.

Quest for freedom, the other one of the two basic existential quests, is shaped parallel to the quest for security. Each step taken in the quest for security corresponds to a step taken in the quest for freedom. These steps are sometimes in favor of and sometimes against each other. The constructive relationship between security and freedom is an effort to achieve a balance by optimization. Because, destructive results of conditions, where the relationship is far away from balance, on individual and institutional actors and bodies of politics have been experienced in history and are still being experienced.

One of the most important conditions for understanding human's quest for freedom and security and, the determining relationship between them which is mentioned above in general is the idea about human nature that human being has in his mind. When one considers it in terms of the concept of security, central to the thesis, it is seen that the idea about human nature directly affects the formation of the concept of security and by the same token the meaning, content and the level of importance which are to be attributed to it. This clear impact of the idea about human nature on the formation of the concept of security is also an indicator that it is one of

the leading subjects among those which acquire deliberate inquiry in the fields of politics and international relations. Henry Adams says that "Knowledge of human nature is the beginning and the end of political education" (Adams, 1918: 180). It has never been possible for thinkers to agree on what is the objective knowledge of human nature and what excessively negative or naively wishful thinking about it. "Because we differ in our conceptions of who we are, difficulties exist in agreeing upon what is a fit society and the methods appropriate and necessary for bringing it into being. Conflicting conceptions of human nature play a role in shaping and energizing all levels of political competition and conflict, from the interpersonal through the global" (Steiner, 1980: 335).

The idea about human nature that is to be possessed of, determines the character of actions taken and institutions established by human being in the name of internal and external sovereignty.<sup>1</sup> From that perspective, making an analysis through comparison between the idea of human nature of those thinkers who had prominent effect upon the formation of character of modern state by laying its intellectual foundations and the idea about human nature dominating in the medieval scholastic thought would provide a framework for a better understanding of the idea of security which came into force in modern state.

### **1.1. Medieval Thought**

The doctrine of original sin, which was one of the dominant doctrines of the medieval thought, has played a vital role in the formation of individual and social mentality, practices, and institutions and interactions among them. According to this

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<sup>1</sup> When the subject is the impact of the relationship between security and human nature on the way state implements its own sovereignty, the issue should be approached by making distinction between internal and external sovereignty. Because, in a historical and theoretical evaluation, it would be seen that the character of sovereignty practices of the state which is to be implemented in internal affairs and in relationships with the society differs inevitably from those sovereignty practices implemented against other states in international arena. Although Wilsonianism expresses that the norms and principles of internal policy should be the aim of the foreign policy this view has never become a strong and pervasive approach in international relations.



doctrine, although human gets into individual and social life by coming to face to face with himself and life in a condition under dominant and effective negativities of the original sin committed; actually, the struggle expected to be performed with patience for all his lifetime is to discover his good nature befouled by original sin and to reveal it with God's grace. According to Christian theology some of the original nature of man had been sacrificed or distorted in the aftermath of the Fall<sup>2</sup>. "Post-lapsarian<sup>3</sup> 'nature' was regarded to be a perversion of its source, since mankind was created good and immortal but chose to be evil and mortal. In particular the range of sins deplored by the Western tradition of Christianity-pride, covetousness, lust, and the like-tended to be profoundly anti-social" (Nederman, 1988: 4).

The contradiction between being egoistic and social at the same time has been a very challenging problematic in social sciences. "Since in their sinful condition human beings were essentially egoistic, it was hard to see how they could continue to manifest any 'natural' disposition to associate" (Nederman, 1988: 4). St. Augustine put the matter as, "there is nothing so social by nature, so anti-social by sin [corruption of his nature], as man [human race]" (Augustine, 1958: 268)

"In the long centuries of the collapse of classical culture, the idea of there being a 'human predicament' gradually emerged. It reflected the sense of insecurity and pessimism with which man had come to look at this world. Augustine fully shared this mood" (Jones, 1969: 169). While Augustinian idea about human nature was the dominant idea in Medieval Age, it was not the only strong one. In general, the problem of man's social and individual nature has been classified by scholars into two medieval lines of approach. These two lines of approach is an expression of two different school of philosophy whose roots go to classical Greek philosophy.

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<sup>2</sup> Original sin is result of the Fall of Man, when Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit of a tree in the Garden of Eden. The first important action of the first human beings was this first sin. This is traditionally accepted to be the cause of "original sin", the fallen state from which human beings can be saved only by God's grace ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Original\\_sin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Original_sin)).

<sup>3</sup> Fall of man from innocence after the commitment of the original sin.

The first model was formulized essentially by Augustine, asserting that “at least within the limits of the *civitas terrena*<sup>4</sup>, man's perverted nature renders him susceptible to discord and strife. It is necessary, therefore, for men to introduce political institutions in order to enforce peace and earthly justice, compelling submission to a coercive power capable of suppressing behavior which arises from wrongly ordered passions” (Nederman, 1988: 4). “The natural man is the slave of evil, and divine grace alone can make him free. Now, divine grace can not be brought about by man, it is entirely dependent on God’s freedom. God saves man because he desires it, but he does not save all men. He chooses among them, and destines a certain number for salvation” (Weber, 1925: 153).

“In this sense organized human relations can hardly be regarded as an extension of man's natural propensities; they are artificial and purely conventional institutions designed (albeit at the behest of divine inspiration) to bridle those people who, as residents of the earthly city only, are unable to control the consequences of fallen human nature” (Nederman, 1988: 4-5).

One of the major reasons of Augustinian idea, which arises from pure Christian theology, not considering social and political institution as natural structures is that it supposes human will as to be weak and inadequate to reach goodness and divine grace. On the other hand, the idea, which gained strength by the end of medieval times and reached its highest expression at St. Thomas Aquinas, is more optimistic than Augustinian idea about human nature and will.

“Because Aquinas has neither earlier Augustinian nor the latter Protestant belief in the wholesale corruption of human desires and choices, he can treat human nature as it is as a tolerably reliable guide to human nature as it ought to be” (MacIntyre, 1998:

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<sup>4</sup> The early Christian philosophy of Augustine of Hippo was by and large a rewrite of Plato in a Christian context. The main change that Christian thought brought was to moderate the Stoicism and theory of Justice of the Roman world, and emphasize the role of the state in applying mercy as a moral example. Augustine also preached that one was not a member of his or her city, but was either a citizen of the City of God ‘*Civitas Dei*’ or the City of Man ‘*Civitas Terrena*’ (<http://encyclopedia.stateuniversity.com/pages/17647/political-philosophy.html>).

118). This second optimistic version of human nature generally ascribed to the Middle Ages “(of an Aristotelian provenance) proposed that no factor could preempt man's impulse to associate, since society in general and political society in particular represented the fulfillment of the range of man's physical and spiritual needs. Each primary form of human community—from the family to the political body—has its own specific telos or purpose within the natural scheme (Nederman, 1988: 5). Each part of that scheme provides a proper base for the maturity of human being. “The household exists for economic security, the village for defense and exchange, the polls (which the medievals extended to encompass cities, provinces, and kingdoms) for the intellectual and moral improvement of citizens” (Nederman, 1988: 5). Different from modern condition and understanding, cities were accepted as the means of intellectual and moral improvement. It can be concluded from that understanding of city, the man of Middle Ages did not see economic improvement as a condition of individual and social progress.

Nederman identifies the condition of “the complete and self-sufficient life of human happiness ordained by God” as “fully articulated social and political system” and justifies his approach by saying that “the fact that men often behave unjustly and anti- socially does nothing to diminish their fundamental and inalterable nature. Within each human creature rests a principle of motion which impels him to join together with his fellows in spite of all apparent impediments” (Nederman, 1988: 5). Carlyle argues that this formulation of human nature made by Aquinas was a “recovery of the profound organic conception of Aristotle” and it had little influence beyond a small circle came together around Aquinas. “The traditional theory of the conventional and mechanical character of political society was too firmly fixed to be shaken even by the immense influence of St. Thomas, and it continued to dominate European Political theory until the genius of Rousseau finally restored to Europe the organic conception of the state” (Carlyle, 1913: 10).

## **1.2. Modern Thought**

Coming to the modern period, Machiavelli and Hobbes appear as the two philosophers who played the most important role in the birth of the idea of modern state. Compared with Machiavelli, Hobbes' ideas and analysis on human nature are more elaborate. Hobbes, as a system philosopher, builds his approach to human nature on the principals of natural sciences whose foundations have been laid by Kepler and Galileo. On the contrary, Machiavelli, by passing his experiences acquired during his fluctuating political life and conclusions achieved through them from the filter of his knowledge of history and strong judgement, formulizes and presents them in the form of book of advice.

According to Davutoğlu the most significant contribution of Machiavelli revealed in two matters. They are “Western intellectual history and the emergence of the national state”. Machiavelli made that contribution by making “clear-cut definition of the state as artifact created by human beings”. His ideas provided an intellectual basis for both secularism and absolute supremacy of national state. This supremacy had great affect especially over ecclesiastical authority. He succeeded at this by making safety and improvement of the state paramount issues of political sphere. “From this perspective he was a pragmatic philosopher, thinking on the theory of preservation of the state rather than on the theory of the state itself. Therefore the philosophical qualities of his theory may be discussed, but it can not be denied that he was the founder of the realistic approach in the history of political theory” (Davutoğlu, 1993: 175). Although, as we pointed out, Machiavelli had no any strong systematic paradigm on political philosophy his works and conceptualizations “are of primary importance as the most genuine documentary expressions of ideas implicit in the political realities of his age. Shocking as his principles appeared to be, not merely to the men of the modern age but also to those of his own century, they were yet the principles of the process by which the modern world was being built up out of the ruins of the medieval system” (Wilde, 1928: 212-213).

Arnhart argues that because Machiavelli formulated “a new standard appropriate for the modern state” he represented a break “with all previous traditions of political virtue”. That traditional political virtue was a composition of pagan and Christian views and they “assume that all people share a common moral knowledge that they possess by nature.” Arnhart makes a comparison between classical and modern understandings on political nature. Accordingly, Aristotle asserts that “humans are by nature political animals bound together by their shared understanding of good and the just. But in modern political life, don’t we see human beings as isolated individuals pursuing their own selfish interests in competition with one another?” (Arnhart, 2003: 114). Machiavelli thinks that the ends of social and economic life are not ambiguous to speculate on them, but they are given. “They are the attainment and holding down of power, the maintenance of political order and general prosperity, and these latter, in part at least, because unless you maintain them, you will not continue to hold power. Moral rules are technical rules about the means to these ends. Moreover, they are to be used on the assumption that all men are somewhat corrupt” (MacIntyre, 1998: 127).

Arnhart identifies the above mentioned problematique by very proper questions. If the state, as Machiavelli concludes, is an artifact,

“aren’t we compelled to conclude that because human beings are not naturally bound together by moral bonds, they cannot live together unless they are forced to do so? Doesn’t this suggest, then, that political order can arise only when great founders impose by violence their own personal forms on the otherwise formless matter of humanity? In this way, a Machiavellian could maintain that the immorality of Machiavelli’s teaching must be accepted as an inevitable feature of the political life of the modern state. The modern state arises as an artificial construction because it must be imposed upon human individuals who are not naturally inclined to live together. Aristotle’s state, by contrast, arises by nature because it fulfilled the natural human inclination to live in communities. Aristotle’s city is a product of nature. Machiavelli’s state is work of art” (Arnhart, 2003: 115).

Believing that most human beings are “ungrateful, fickle, hypocrites and dissemblers, evaders of dangers, lovers of gain”, Machiavelli concludes that is better for political rulers to be feared than loved by their subjects. In the discourses, he declares: “Whoever desires to found a state and give it laws, must start by assuming that all men are bad and ever ready to display their vicious nature, whenever they may find occasion for it” (Arnhart, 2003: 127).

Machiavelli, like Plato and Aristotle, made a great influence on political practice. He succeeded at that by “changing the way political leaders thought about what they did”. We conclude this from his writings which contain “many of the dominant themes of modern thought”. Some of them can be pointed out as “political life as artificial rather than natural, government as coercive force, self-interest as the strongest human motive, and generally a realistic lowering of political standards from what *ought* to be to what *is*. On the other hand, some of the most prominent features of later political thought do not appear clearly in Machiavelli’s work” (Arnhart, 2003: 130). MacIntyre argues that “Following the age of Machiavelli”, there could be an expectation for a “rise of a kind of moral-cum-political theory in which the individual is the ultimate social unit, power the ultimate concern, God an increasingly irrelevant but stil inexpungeable being, and prepolitical, presocial timeless human nature the background of changing social forms. The expectation is fully gratified by Hobbes” (MacIntyre, 1998: 127). “One point in particular is the concern for turning the study of politics into a science. Because of the achievements of the great scientist of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, modern political philosophers (like Hobbes) sought to apply the new methods of science to political studies: political thought was to be replaced by political science” (Arnhart, 2003: 130).

The first significant step to base state, in terms of its root, character and purpose, on a new philosophical framework which was constituted on the new principals of natural sciences, has been taken by Hobbes. This new formulation, which has a characteristic of being response to the needs caused by new human, society, state and

international system typologies, places the relationship between human nature and quest for security as the primary element of existence of the state. For Ahrens Dorf, the basis of the modern state was not “humans' hopes for salvation or their desire to fulfill their political natures”, but that basis was “their fear of death and desire for self-preservation [and security]”. As Ahrens Dorf puts “the thesis of Hobbes in particular is that this desire for security is the most reliable and rational desire of our nature, and any state based on satisfying that desire is, unlike premodern forms of political organization, fully in harmony with human nature and hence fully capable of solving the problem of anarchy” (Ahrens Dorf, 2000: 579).

### **1.3. Contemporary Thought**

“Two of the most influential formulations of realist thought were authored by Hans Morgenthau and E.H.Carr, both of whom objected to what they saw as idealism’s failure to take into consideration the underlying natural laws that caused humankind to tend towards violence and aggression” (Busser, 2006: 2). The first systematic theory of the laws to which, nation state towering on the intellectual foundations we put forth above generally and international system whose basic actor is nation state are subjected, has been made by Hans j. Morgenthau. Moreover, E. H. Carr is accepted as the first important precursor of political realism. “Brian Porter has recently written that ‘The Twenty Years’ Crisis’, 1919-39, [by E. H. Carr] published in 1939, ‘sounded the death knell of utopianism [liberalism] as a respectable intellectual tradition’” (Cited in Booth, 1991: 527). “The mainstream of the contemporary discipline of international relations still relies on key principles first enunciated by scholars in the post-Second World War era. The arguments of the so-labelled classical realists remain some of the defining concepts in IR and still shape the general orientation of scholarly study in the field” (Busser, 2006: 2).

“Realism took over the study of international politics almost entirely from this point; it still largely sets the agenda. It stresses the tragic and conflictual side of relations between states, sees foreign policy in terms of pursuit of the national

interest, defined as power. One of the most familiar sentences in the whole subject is that of Hans J. Morgenthau: ‘International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power’” (Cited in Booth, 1991: 529). “Hiroshima 1945 can be seen as the culmination of a 300-year span of history dominated by sovereign states with realist outlooks, Machiavellian ethics and Clausewitzian philosophy of war. The destruction of that city by a single bomb symbolizes what can happen when traditional thinking about the games nations play is kitted out with modern military technology” (Booth, 1991: 529).

Morgenthau formulizes his approach to the relation between politics and human nature as,

“Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature... Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature. Real man is a composite of "economic man," "political man," "moral man," "religious man," etc. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. A man who was nothing but "moral man" would be a fool, for he would be completely lacking in prudence. A man who was nothing but "religious man" would be a saint, for he would be completely lacking in worldly desires” (Morgenthau, 1978: 4-15).

Each element in this multidimensional structure of human being is important in terms of increasing human’s skills of perceiving and understanding reality in proportion to their existence and by undertaking check and balance functions. Despite its being taken under consideration in some aspects, multidimensionality of human being is not evaluated by Morgenthau as a source of power which can preponderate to humans’ lust for power, because, according to him “humans behave as they do because they possess *animus dominandi*. That is, they seek power because human nature is fundamentally egoistic and malignant” (Cited in Petersen, 1999: 83).

Waltz offered that to overcome the impasse we should move discussion from the individual or human level of analysis to "the framework of state action “-i.e., to the systems level of analysis. His contribution at that point starts with the assumption that the international system is an "anarchical" one in which each state makes



judgement on "its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire" (Waltz, 1959: 159). At the system level of analysis, although there are many possible means to suggest, the idea of world government comes into forth almost at the first sight.

Under the condition of international anarchy, world government appears to be the proper solution for the dangers of the anarchy. At that point, Waltz warns that "we might find ourselves dying in the attempt to unite, or uniting and living a life worse than death," because "the amount of force needed to hold a society together varies with the heterogeneity of the elements composing it," (Waltz, 1959: 228). In that sense, heterogeneity is accepted as the most determiner aspect of the international system.

At the system level of analysis the question of human nature is not to be then into consideration. This systems level defense of balance of power, argues Waltz, is more analytical than traditional realist propositions on the subject. The superiority of his method comes from the logic of the system and it does not take the theories about human nature as its basis of analysis (Waltz, 1959: 238). Accordingly, war, the most prominent problem of international relations, is accepted not as a consequence of egoistic nature of human being but as a result of improper structure, dynamics, and functioning of international system. Waltz does not see international anarchy as a fatal disease and its main destructive symptom, war, can be minimized by the implementation of balance of power politics (Waltz; 1959: 228-238).

When we achieve to concept of human from the concept of security we come up with state which is the embodiment of political practices of human being at the highest level. State is the embodiment of political practices of human being at the highest level and the highest level at which his security quest is fulfilled at the same time. Because of this characteristic, state also takes part in those concepts which are necessary to be considered in historical and theoretical grounds in order to understand the concept of security.

“There can be no question that the object we refer to when we use the term ‘state’ is no fixed in character. The essential meaning of the term refers to autonomous, territorially organized political entities in which machinery of government is in some sense recognizably separate from the organization of society” (Buzan, 1995: 187). Within this definition lies a wide array of sociopolitical constructions, through there will always be a relation between rulers and subjects. In most, there will also be relations with other autonomous political entities. Where this is so, states will face with security problems arising from interplay of threats and vulnerabilities among them (Buzan, 1995: 187).

Even in the system level of analysis, the relation between internal and external faces security problem. Buzan provide such a integrative perspective and argues that,

For all states, the security problem has two faces, internal and external. States can be just as thoroughly disrupted and destroyed by internal contradictions as they can be external forces. These two environments may function more or less separately, as when an internally coherent state is threatened by aggressive neighbors (Britain vs. Nazi Germany, Japan vs. United States), or when an unstable state disintegrates largely on its own initiative (the Roman Empire, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Soviet Union). They may also work together, as when internal divisions provide opportunities for intervention by outside actors (China during the 1930s, Pakistan in 1971, Lebanon after 1976). For those historical and sociological reasons it is necessary to take into account the changing quality of both the internal construction of states and the external environment formed by their relations with each other (Buzan, 1995: 189).

When the domestic aspect is taken into consideration, it can be said that the major strong states “have been evolving...toward higher levels of internal integration. For much of the 5000-year history of state, this integration has been about the mechanism of territorial control and about increasing the cohesion of the ruling elite. Recently, it has been more about linking rulers to people, and state to society and territory” (Buzan, 1995: 190). “In absolute monarchies, people and territory were added to or subtracted from any given state quite causally. Boundaries changed

according to fortunes of war, the balance of power, and manipulations of dynastic marriage and succession. In such a state, security concerns focused very much on the interests of ruling family” (Buzan, 1995: 190). In modern age, with the progress in institutionalization, the mechanic features of states and international systems have become more determiner in achieving positive or negative outcomes which emanate from their interactions.

Regardless of being positive or negative, the relationship state establishes with society through its political activities and institutions, an inevitable alienation between the human being and the state is to be experienced under any condition. Because, state is the embodiment of alienated image of man’s himself from himself in spite of himself for himself in the quest for security and freedom.<sup>5</sup> On the cover of the first edition of Leviathan, Monarch’s, who gathered the absolute sovereignty and power in himself being represented by a supraman coming into existence by aggregation of single human beings can be read as a symbol depicting this alienation. Although ruled people participate to the embodiment of Leviathan via transferring/devolving their right of rule and posses specialty and importance of being the components from which it came into being eventually Leviathan, both in corporeal and ontological manner, comes into existence in a different realm of existence and practice.

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<sup>5</sup> In Turkish the sentence is like that: çünkü devlet güvenlik ve özgürlük arayışında, insanın kendisinin kendisinden kendine rağmen kendisi için yabancılaşmış imgesinin vücut bulmuş halidir.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

Before making a historical and political analysis about a subject, in our example it is national security policy of U.S. in the given period, making a conceptual and theoretical investigation would provide more opportunity to see what kind of denotations and connotations the subject has in the mind of people from different cultural and political backgrounds. For example a geographical definition, such as Middle East, can have different meanings according to from where the subject is looking at the object both in the manner of his concrete geographical position and his ideological presuppositions. By following that consideration we will start our thesis by a conceptual and theoretical analysis of the concept of security especially in the context of national security.

Studying national security provides an overall interpretive framework for understanding foreign policy because it forces researcher to analyze the foreign as well as domestic factors shaping policy. If the information from both sources is objectively studied, a big gap in the study of American foreign policy might be fulfilled. A synthetic approach should study the dynamic interaction between the both sources of foreign policy behavior. By relating foreign threats to internal core values, the national security approach facilitates such assessment. From that perspective we will study US national security policy by concentrating on the post-Cold War period. This period of time gives us what was inherited form Cold War logic of security and foreign policy and how they were transformed under the post-Cold War global conditions to provide grand strategy for unipolar World system.

Certainly, it is a fact that with the end of the Cold War search for a new security understanding found a legitimated ground to further its efforts. Narrowly described concept of security seemed to be inadequate to explain the collapse of the Soviet

Union and various problems that occurred since its collapse. This crucial inadequacy of the concept attempted to be overcome by the proposition of the new conceptualization of security which is called broader security. The Copenhagen School was the leading center for such efforts whose most prominent scholar is Barry Buzan. His and other scholar's works on broader security made visible and important impacts on mainstream of traditional security studies. Krause and Williams argues that "many scholars have found themselves challenging the core foundations of the neorealist position" because there occur many questions while studying on core conceptions as "who or what is being secured, from what threats, and by what means". However, it should be noted that "not all these scholars oppose all elements of the neorealist position. Scholars such as Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, for example, have contributed greatly to advancing the logic of Waltzian structural realism" (Krause and Williams, 1996: 242)

Many of the analysts attempted to include nonmilitary issues into the security agenda. The editors of the most well-known journal in the field of security studies, *International Security*, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller asserted that "the end of the East-West confrontation has revealed in its wake . . . a different set of dangers, not really new but previously overshadowed by Cold War preoccupations" (Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995: 3). Lynn-Jones and Miller identifies new objects and context of security studies as "no longer will the field of international security be overwhelmingly fixated on how to deter the Soviet Union or how to reduce the risk of nuclear war between the superpowers. The newly revealed agenda is broader in its focus, giving much greater attention to previously neglected sources of conflict" (Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995: 3).

The concept of security, stands at the center of our subject, is a multi-dimensional concept that has the possibility to bear different meanings as a result of the factors we mentioned. Each possible set of meaning bearing various meaning layers within itself is a result and at the same time an indicator of this multi-dimensionality. From this point of consideration, analysis of the concept of security on three basic

dimensions is seen appropriate to provide a solid framework. In Kenneth Waltz's terminology these levels of analysis is named as images. He formulates the interdependence and importance of these levels of analysis as, "The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine the world policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results" (Waltz, 1959, 238).

## **2.1. The Concept of Security**

According to Buzan, the condition to have a "proper understanding of national security problem" is to "understand the concept of security". Accordingly, "in much of its prevailing usage, especially by those associated with state policy-making, this concept is so weakly developed as to be inadequate for the task. I seek to demonstrate that a simple-minded concept of security constitutes such a substantial barrier to progress that it might almost be counted as part of problem" (Buzan, 1991 : 1-2).

Buzan argues that if look at the use of concept of security in international relations we can see "the principle evidence for the underdevelopment of security as a concept". To support his argument Buzan makes a comparison between literature on power and security and says that "the literature on power contains not only a mass of empirical work but also a well-developed body of theoretical writing. One might reasonably expect to find a balance for any widely used academic concept, but until recently, this was not the case for security" (Buzan, 1991: 4). There are ontologically-prior questions that are to be answered, but this task has not been done convincingly yet. First, what is expected to be secured? Second, what constitutes the condition of security? Third, how does the security discourse develop and enter the sphere of common and intellectual usage? Forth, how amount is security needed? "In addition to answering these questions, it is necessary to recognize that security may

be defined not merely as a goal but as a consequence-this means that we may not realize what it is or how important is until we are threatened with losing it. In some sense therefore, security is defined and valorized by the threats which challenge it” (Ullman, 1983: 133).

According to Buzan the concept of security has a “general use in International Relations and other disciplines” and has a central organizing role both for practitioners and academics. There is no specific use of it as a precise concept and “the literature on it is very unbalanced. A large and flourishing body of work exists on the empirical side dealing with contemporary national security problems and issues. Most of this comes out of the sub-field of strategic studies, for which security is a central normative focus” (Buzan, 1991: 4). “Conceptualization of security” for Lipschutz, “are to be found in *discourses of security*”. These are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit state and the interests that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995: 8). Lipschutz identifies the discursive character of the concept of security by saying that, “there are not only struggles over security among nations, but also struggles over security among notions” (Lipschutz, 1995: 8).

Until 1980, there were little progress in “conceptual literature on security” and today “there still no coherent school of thought”. Buzan puts this historical fact as, “the enthusiasm for collective security after the First World War had some promise in this direction, but failure of both League of Nations and United Nations to measure up to the task truncated interest in this whole approach” (Buzan, 1991, p. 4).

The concept of security, according to Buzan, “became much more prominent and in some ways better developed” in 1980s. “This was the result of relentless pressure of interdependence on the older ways of thinking of both Realists and Idealists. For Realists, interdependence raised the profile of economic, environmental and societal issues in the international system, as against narrower, and often nationalist, agenda of power politics” (Buzan, 1991: 13). “Whereas much of the intellectual debate takes

the state more-or-less for granted as the subject of practice and the object of study” (Lipschutz, 1995, p. 3).

Because “realism no longer reflected the preoccupations of much of the international agenda” and “strategic studies because after three decades of development and implementation of its central doctrine of deterrence” both disciplines became “vulnerable to the interdependence critique”. Buzan argues that, as a “response, “the Neorealists, most notably Kenneth Waltz with his influential structural theory of power politics, put the security motive at the center of state behaviour in an anarchic system” (Buzan, 1991: 12). In a famous and often quoted passage, Kenneth Waltz concludes, “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power” (Waltz, 1979: 126).

Realist scholars and strategists, with the new journal *International Security*, responded the critics of interdependence theory by attempting to broaden their objects and scope of study. “Calls to use security logic to add economic, political, societal... issues to the strategic agenda became commonplace. What it forced them to take on board was the inescapable fact that the whole structure of interdependence involved intense, often competitive, interactions among many different, and firmly established states” (Buzan, 1991: 13). “Vulnerabilities arising from growing economic transactions and linkages have resulted from the increasing allocation of goods and services by international market forces. Such vulnerabilities meant loose of autonomy in economic decision making, and they have meant increasing economic entanglements that constrain foreign policy choices” (Crawford, 1994: 52).

The major purpose of security can be summarized as the pursuit of freedom from threat. Because states are the actors of the international system, in this context security can be described briefly as their ability to maintain their independent identity, national sovereignty, and their societal integrity. At the purpose of security, states and societies may sometimes clash and be in harmony with each other. The



first circle of security is about survival, and other circles surrounding this circle hierarchically includes other substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Security concern primarily deals with the pursuit of human collectivities from threat, and only secondarily deals with the personal security of individual human beings. For that reason, the standard unit of security in the contemporary international system is sovereign nation state.

The problem of national security can be studied through the concepts of power, peace, and security. Until 1980s, two of them, power and peace, dominated the field of international relations and national security as its one prominent subject. “Those who favour the approach through power derive their thinking from the Realist school of International Relations represented by writers such as E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau. And those who favour the approach through peace are more loosely associated into Idealist school” (Buzan, 1991: 2). The emerging post-Cold War international system seemed to be dealt more comprehensively with the concept of security because of unrevealing Cold War and bipolar structure of the post-war international system brought with itself a need and ground of analysis for a more versatile concept.

The main question of security studies is ‘security of what’. If a proper answer is not given to that question than it would be almost impossible to have a clear understanding of the concept of security. “To answer simply ‘the state’, does not solve the problem. Since the security of any referent object and level cannot be achieved in isolation from the others, the security of each becomes, in part, a condition for the security of all” (Buzan, 1991, p.26). The structure of our thesis is built on the need to explore the referent objects of security on several different levels. I have taken the method of three levels of analysis from Waltz and it is composed of individual, state and international levels.

## **2.2. Levels of Security Analysis**

“Deepening the conceptualization of security not only provides an important means of criticizing traditional security studies, but it also is a vital part of reconstructing the approach on alternative, more critically oriented basis” (Jones, 1999:103). From that point of consideration we study the concept of security on the basis of broaden understanding of security which stands on three levels. These levels are individual, national and international. However, in the final analysis, our interest in these levels centers on their impact upon state. We offer two main justifications for adopting this state-centric perspective. Empirically, we argue that the security dynamics at the international and sub-state levels are all mediated through the state.

### **2.2.1. Individual Security**

“The individual represents the irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security can be applied. This fact makes individual security a good starting point for a more wide-ranging analysis” (Buzan, 1991: 35). It would not be a consistent approach to take individual and state into consideration as separate units while thinking on security. In the example of state, although it is not the exact total of its constituent human individuals, both state and individuals carry some important specialties and characters from each other.

The quest for freedom and security, which is among the basic existential quests of human being, that is a social and political creature by nature, is quite determinant over human behavior in individual and social realms and over forms and functions of his institutionalization process in political realm. Human is in a constant quest for security, which changes in terms of form, level and content; because, it is an inevitable/natural obligation to protect his life, material and spiritual values against risks of destruction and annihilation which can arise from nature, man or man-made things, to continue his existence and to realize himself spiritually.

According to Waver, an alternative concept of security has been formulated by Johan Galtung and Jan Oberg, “based on four sets of positive goals related to human needs: survival, development, freedom, and identity”. Waver points the inclusive character of the formulation as, “within this framework, security becomes the combined defence policy for each need category, the totality of defence endeavours of the entire human-societal organization” (Waver, 1995: 48). “The baseline in the Galtung/Oberg conception is the individual level. Security is then linked to all other goals, since they are all generated from the individual level: the individual has various needs and can be hurt by threats to these needs, and this makes everything a potential security problem” (Cited in Waver, 1995: 48).

“Security for individuals cannot be defined so easily. Different aspect of individual security are frequently contradictory (protection from crime versus erosion of civil liberties), and plagued by the difficulty of distinguishing between objective and subjective evaluation (are threats real or imagined?)” (Buzan, 1991: 36). Dictionary definitions of security give the flavour of these difficulties with their reference to being protected from danger (objective security), feeling safe (subjective security), and being free from doubt (confidence in one’s knowledge). The referent threats are very vague, and subjective feeling of safety has no necessary connections with actually being safe (Buzan, 1991: 36). So it can be accepted as an endless effort to struggle to reach persuasive condition of security. For that reason individuals or people and state should be aware of their realities in objective manner, meaning that to know how amount do individual sociological and historical determiners let them to be in absolute security.

“This aspect of security indicates one of its dangerous sides. In this regard efforts to achieve security can be self-defeating. Paranoia is the logical endpoint of obsession with security. There is a cruel irony in that meaning of secure which is unable to escape” (Buzan, 1991: 37). For Ullman, there is inversely proportional relation between security and vulnerability. If security increases vulnerability decreases. We can see that relation both in the sphere of policy and daily life. “At the

most basic level of individual survival, this is a law of nature, seemingly as well understood by animals as by humans. At that level it is a reflexive response. Reducing vulnerability becomes a matter of policy, rather than of reflex action, when it seems necessary to calculate the costs and benefits involved” (Ullman, 1983: 146)

Pressures generated by social, economic and political spheres constitute the most of threats for individuals. But individuals cannot avoid from these threats because they find themselves embedded in a human environment whose components are those spheres. “Societal problems come in a wide variety of forms, but there are four obvious basic types: physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure or destruction of property, denial of access to work or sources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of normal civil liberties) and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation)” (Buzan, 1991: 37). “The existence of such threats to individuals within the society points to the great dilemma which lies at the root of much political philosophy: how to balance freedom of action for the individual against the actual and potential threats which such freedom poses to others” (Buzan, 1991: 37). “Conflict inevitably follows, because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power is simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another” (Hobbes, 1982: 26).

“The relations between state and individual carry integral and conflictual character at the same time. The state is a major source of both threats to and security for individuals. Individuals provide much of the reason for, and some of the limits to, the security seeking activities of the state” (Buzan, 1991: 35). “The tradeoff between liberty and security is one of the crucial issues of our era. In virtually every society, individuals seek security against the state, just as they ask the state to protect them against harm from other states [and various sources of dangers]. Human and [individual] rights and state security are thus intimately related”. (Ullman, 1983: 130-131).

“If one expects to find a two-edged relationship between state and individual security as the normal human condition, then it is useful to set out the character of the condition in more detail. The individual citizen faces many threats which emanate either directly or indirectly from state. These can occupy an important place in person’s life” (Buzan, 1991: 43). “Such threats can be grouped into four general categories: those arising from domestic law-making and enforcement; those arising from direct administrative or political actions against individuals or groups; those arising from struggle over control of state machinery; and those arising from the state’s external security policies” (Buzan, 1991: 44). Kolodziej argues that, the problem of security, by realist thinkers, like Hobbes, thinks that the root of the problem of security can be found “in the insatiable and incompatible needs of individuals and groups”. According to Kolodziej, “in its purist form, security arises, paradoxically, from human freedom. Competing security regimes and the principles of authority and legitimacy relied upon to arbitrate between rival personal and group claims project the dilemma of freedom to the level of society and the state” (Kolodziej, 1992: 424).

“Although individual security does represent a distinct and important level of analysis, it is essentially subordinate to the higher-level political structures of state and international system. Because this is so, national and international security cannot be reduced to individual security” (Buzan, 1991: 54). Compared with national and international security, individual security stand as unit of micro level analysis which is generally studied in the field of political theory and political psychology.

“Nevertheless, the importance of individual security is that individual pursuit of security has a variety of influences on national security. Where state and citizens are severely at odds, domestic disarray may threaten the coherence of state in ways that make the concept of national security difficult to apply” (Buzan, 1991: 54-55). Not only the concrete possessions of individuals but also their identity affairs do have great determinant role over the formation and implementation of national security both in the domestic and international domains.

### **2.2.2. National Security**

For all of its levels, whether individual, national or international, it can be said that security issue ranks prominently among problems that are vital for humanity in all time and space. The reason for the centrality of national security is that states dominate many of conditions that determine security at the other two levels.

For Kirshner “globalization changes the nature of the game”. The actors those embark on national security approach can retain state-centered perspective even if they “assume to retain the same goals they have always pursued”. Kirshner points a danger that “failure to account for the influence of globalization will make it increasingly difficult to understand the changes in the balance of the power, prospects for war, and strategic choice embraced by states” (Kirshner, 2006: 1). As a field of inquiry, Trout and Harf argues that national security approach stands for a consistent “effort to place the expanded context of strategy and policy in international affairs within an intellectual framework. The subject matter, concentrating on the presence of force as an instrument of policy, expands across a wide range of issues related to planning, building, sustaining, employing, controlling, limiting, or reducing such force” (Trout and Harf, 1982: 2).

In a general way, for Wolfers, national security “does suggest a direction of policy which can be distinguished from several others which may present themselves as alternatives. It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole” (Wolfers, 1952: 481). “We are accustomed to thinking of national security in terms of military threats arising from beyond the borders of one’s own country. It draws attention away from the nonmilitary threats that promise to undermine the stability of many nations during the years ahead” (Ullman, 1983: 133). Thinking national security only in military sense is also a result of short term approach to the subject and problems of national security. The national security strategy, argues Leffler, “acknowledges that power plays a key role in the behavior of nations and

functioning of the international system. Proponents of that approach believe that a nation's power depends on its political stability, social cohesion, and economic productivity as well as the number of its troops, tanks, planes, ships, missiles, and nuclear warheads". (Leffler, 1990: 143-144).

States are larger and more complicated entities than individuals, and they are more amorphous in character. While one can identify individuals with ease, and be fairly certain about the meaning of threats and injuries to them, the same exercise cannot easily be applied to collective units like nations and states (Buzan, 1991: 57). Although the state, says Buzan, has an ambiguous character as the main actor of international system, International Relations accepts it as the central unit of analysis. "Socio-political centrality and military power make the state the dominant unit in the international system despite its anthropomorphic coherence. Consequently, one cannot avoid the difficult task of unraveling the interplay between the ambiguous symbol of security and the ambiguous structure of state" (Buzan, 1991: 58). "As a consequence of this ambiguity, national security approach assumes that fears of foreign threats are a consequence of both real dangers in the external environment and ideological precepts, cultural symbols, and mistaken images" (Leffler, 1990: 144).

"Given their fundamental character, all states will share bottom line security concerns about maintenance of territorial base and their political autonomy. If the threat is of external armed attack aimed at seizing territory or resources, or overthrowing government, then, within the limits of resources, conceptions of security will tend to be similar in all states" (Buzan, 1995: 188). A threat to national security, writes Ullman, "is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state" (Ullman, 1983: 135).

In a situation that state clashes with its domestic constituents it becomes very difficult to apply national security because of the sensitivity of the problem. “The most profound of all the choices relating to national security” argues Ullman, “is the tradeoff with liberty, for at conflict are two quite distinct values, each essential to human development. At its starkest, this choice presents itself as: how far must state go, in order to protect themselves against adversaries that they regard as totalitarian, toward adopting totalitarian-like constraints on their own citizens” (Ullman, 1983: 131)

‘Security dilemma’ plays a very determiner role in the relations of states and in their national security strategies. Baldwin provides a very illuminative description of the ‘security dilemma’,

“For most, however, the principal security contradiction is between their own national security and that of other states. The contradiction between states is captured in the idea of the power-security dilemma. This dilemma operates most clearly in the military and economic sectors, where power has zero-sum quality, where the legitimate pursuit of self-interest easily raises threats to others, and where real possibilities for aggressive behaviour exist. This suggests that the ‘winner’ of such a competition could be a state surrounded by insecure states. The question of whether insecure neighbours are good neighbours, however, should be carefully considered” (Baldwin, 1997: 22).

Tracing the essence of the state to the socio-political level gives us a major clue about how to approach the idea of national security. If the hard of state reside in the idea of it held in the minds of population, then that idea itself becomes a major object of national security (Buzan, 1991: 64). A state without a binding idea might be so disadvantaged as to be unable to sustain its existence in a competitive international system. This line of analysis suggests a simple descriptive model that can be used to guide exploration into the nature of the state and national security (Buzan, 1991: 65).

Although the idea of state is the most abstract feature of the nation state, it is the central element of the model. The political identity of a nation state can only be



constructed by theorizing an idea which stands at the heart of the state. There are two major sources for the idea of state; nation and organizing ideologies. The importance of nation to the idea of state, Buzan claims, “is hinted at by the term national security itself. National security implies strongly that the object of security is the nation, and raises questions about the links between nation and state. A pure model of nation state would require that the nation precede the state, and in a sense give rise to it, as in the case of Japan, Germany, Poland, Swaziland and others” (Buzan, 1991: 70). Since both culture and race are malleable qualities, there is no reason in principle why states cannot create nations as well as be created by them. The United States provide an outstanding example of this process by which diverse territories and peoples can be forged into a self-regarding nation by the conscious action of government (Buzan, 1991: 71).

“Organizing ideologies are perhaps the most obvious type of higher idea of state. These can take the form of identification with some fairly general principle, like Islam, or democracy, or some more specific doctrine, like republicanism or communism” (Buzan, 1991: 79). “Many varieties of political, economic, religious and social ideology can serve as an idea of state, and will be closely connected to the state’s institutional structures. Since these ideologies address the bases of relations between government and society they define the conditions for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics” (Buzan, 1991: 79).

There is a very close relationship between national security policy and absolutism. Because vulnerability has a broad spectrum, any attempt to secure the idea of state can cause a absolutist political implementations. “Making the idea of state secure might logically be seen to require either a heavily fortified isolationism aimed at keeping out corrupting influences, or an expansionist imperial policy aimed at eliminating or suppressing threats at their source. The Wilsonian idea of making the world safe for democracy by eliminating other forms of government has overtones of this theme” (Buzan, 1991: 81-2). “In studying the systemic sources of foreign policy behavior, the national security approach demands that analysts distinguish between

realities and perceptions [as in the example of communism]. This task, as simple as it sounds, is fraught with difficulty because it is often harder for analysts to agree on what constituted an actual danger than on what was a perceived threat” (Leffler, 1990: 144)

### **2.2.3. International Security**

The making national security policy requires choices about both the objectives of policy (ends), and the techniques, resources, instruments and actions which will be used to implement it (means). As has been demonstrated before, many complex logical difficulties arise which, because they reflect the fundamental character of the national security problem itself, will always impinge on policy choices. These difficulties spring from the essentially contested nature of security as a concept.

In an anarchic international system one cannot obtain a complete security. So, it is the most prominent logical problem when national security is viewed as the ultimate end in an anarchic system. “The structure of system and its interacting dynamics complete this dilemma by ensuring that any attempt to acquire, or even move towards, complete security by any actor will stimulate reactions which raise the level of threat in proportion to the measures taken” (Buzan, 1991: 330-31). Keohane put it as that “the world might be moving in the direction of a global [and international] security paradigm if institution-building continues and leads to complexes of common practices, shared rules of behavior, and capabilities for the enforcement of these rules” (Keohane, 1989, 163).

Haftendorn evaluates the dichotomy between national and international security very successfully and gives a synthesis of features of the problem,

“The logical problems that afflict security policy-making can be grouped under two headings: first, strategic choice, and second, characteristics of the security problem that work against the application of logic. The problem of strategic choice starts with the tautology that the purpose of the national

security policy is to make the state secure, or at least sufficiently secure if one rejects the possibility of absolute security. The question of how this is to be achieved is the opening point for strategic discussion about the interrelation of ends and means. International security, in contrast to national security, implies that the security of one state is closely linked to that of other states, at least of one other state. States are interdependent in their security affairs such that security of one is strongly affected by the actions of the other, and vice versa. This structure identified by Keohane and Nye as complex interdependence; they assume that the realization of mutual vulnerability leads to the formation of regular patterns and to the evolution of regimes” (Haftendorn, 1991: 9)

“The whole enquiry assumes that threats exist, and that insecurity is a problem because of vulnerability to those threats. The choice is between taking action to reduce vulnerability, and trying to eliminate or reduce the threats by addressing their causes at source. The first of these options is national security strategy, because it is largely within the threatened state” (Buzan, 1991: 331). “The second is international security strategy, because it depends on the adjustments of relations between states either directly, or by making changes in the systemic conditions that influence the way in which states make each other feel more (or less) secure” (Buzan, 1991: 331). “At first glance, the paradigm of national security responds to political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of global security follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a community of mankind and political processes controlled by enlightened men” (Haftendorn, 1991: 6-7).

In the case of adopting national security strategy, first of all that approach focuses on reducing vulnerabilities of the state. Counteracting against those explicit threats with equal force and means is accepted as the strategy for reducing vulnerabilities. For example, if the vulnerability is arising because of military threats then this national security strategy requires meeting the threat by one’s own military forces or by forming an alliance against the source of threat. Possibility to meet the threats at the time of their emergence and ability to keeping the measures under control during security seeking operation are the major advantages of national security strategy. If

resources are broad, theoretically it is possible to take measures against all specific threats by counteracting against them.

“The problems with national security strategy are that few countries have the resources to make it work, that its logic operates only on the state level and therefore misses the broader dimensions of the security problem, and that it tends to produce a ruinously expensive and psychologically counterproductive obsession with security” (Buzan, 1991: 333). “Great powers will be able to make it work to some extent, but even they will not be able to ignore the powerful feedback of security logic on the system level. Because the national security strategy ignores the sources of threats, it risks both an open-ended commitment to expenditure of resources and failure to deal with the systemic security dynamics” (Buzan, 1991: 333). Even under the pressure of security dilemma, common goals and cooperation are required as systemic preoccupations. For Axelrod and Keohane “cooperation is not equivalent to harmony. Harmony requires complete identity of interest, but cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such situations cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others” (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985: 226)

As a condition of well being of other states, common goals and cooperation give each state a stake. According to Jervis, “to the extent that they expect to cooperate in the future”, all the actors of cooperative system “want to be strong, especially if they think they may again contain the former enemy. Far from states’ values being negatively interdependent (as is often the case in world politics), they are positively linked: each gains if the other is satisfied, and willing and able to carry out its international obligations” (Jervis, 1985: 67). When an international security strategy is applied, for Buzan “security policy focuses on the sources and causes of threats, the purpose being not to block or offset the threats, but to reduce or eliminate them by political action. The Early History of the European Community, for example, represents an international security strategy aimed at solving the rivalry between France and Germany” (Buzan, 1991: 334). The advantages of international security

strategy can be summarized as, “it addresses the security problem at the regional and system levels squarely, and offers a prospect of a much more cost-efficient security policy than that available with a national security strategy. If threats have been eliminated at source, then resources do not have to be wasted in meeting each of them on its own terms” (Buzan, 1991: 334).

It is very common theory that to prevent destructive conflict and war, a liberal international economy is very crucial and essential for international system and political economy. Understanding of liberal political economy constructs correlation between economic structure and security structure. According to that despite liberal economic system disheartens actors to appeal the use of force, the other systems could not.

Barry Buzan challenges the validity of this theory on two levels. First, he argues that “the theory is seriously unbalanced in its attempt to associate liberal structures exclusively with benign effects on the use of force, and mercantilist structures exclusively with malign ones” (Buzan, 1984: 597). “Liberal structures can also, and in their own terms, stimulate the use of force, while mercantilist structures can be benign. Second, he argues that the whole attempt to link economic structure, whether liberal or mercantilist, to international security overrates the determining role of economic factors in the broader issues of peace and war” (Buzan, 1984: 597). For instance Cordell Hull, the U.S. secretary of state from 1933 to 1944 asserts that:

...unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war... if we get a freer flow of trade-freer in the sense of fewer discrimination and obstructions-so that one country would not be deadly jealous of another and the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby eliminating economic dissatisfaction that breeds war, we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace (Spero and Hull, 2003: 3)

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **POST-COLD WAR US NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST**

Before the Gulf crisis, there had been a need to rethink U.S. foreign policy. With the collapse of Soviet Union and emergence of a new unipolar world system, the erstwhile cornerstone of foreign policy that had served the United States for forty years-containment-had suddenly become outdated and irrelevant. Strategists and commentators had begun to notice the vacuum of policy and urged a basic reappraisal of foreign policy in the light of new international realities.

Although the world has been changed in political and economic sense during the late 1980s, the U.S. foreign policy debate has not adopted to that change. “The Vietnam experience split the bipartisan foreign policy consensus that dominated American politics for 20 years after World War II. The democrats became the party of peace. The republicans became the party of strength. The end of the Cold War might have repaired that division” (Schneider, 1992: 36). “Without a communist threat, and with republican presidents Reagan and Bush endorsing detente, both peace and strength might have become less controversial. As the debate over Persian Gulf demonstrated, however, the deep political divisions over foreign policy were not about to go away, even without a Cold War” (Schneider, 1992: 36).

#### **3.1. A Glance at Historical Legacy and Roots of Foreign Policy: Construction of National Identity and Individual Security**

From the beginning, the people of America or American nation have built their essential identity in contrast to an unwanted “other”. The enemies of America were

always the enemy of liberty as it is now. On psychological ground an American individual feels himself in need of protection against that other. This mission can only be fulfilled by the state apparatus in the name of individual. This relation makes individual obedient to the state and in permanent consent about security policies.

Because at the time of independence of American nation, it was impossible to distinguish them from British nation culturally, they draw a line between two nations on political ground. Britain symbolized aristocracy and despotism; America, democracy, equality and republicanism. Until the beginning of twentieth century, the United States defined itself as the opposition of Europe. Europe was the symbol of the past: immature, unfree, unequal determined by feudal land system, monarchic rule and imperialistic passions. On the contrary, America was the symbol of future: free nation, equal individuals and republican rule. From the beginning of twentieth century the United States revealed on the global system and accepted itself not as the opposite and enemy of Europe but rather as the guardian of Western civilization against newly emerging enemy of that civilization, Nazi Germany.

As victor of the Second World War, the United States gained a role to be the leader of the free democratic world against the Soviet Union and communist world. During the Cold War the United States created and implemented many foreign policies, but containment and defeat of communism was the leading national purpose. In the cases of clash of that purpose with other aims or interests, they were always dominated by the former purpose. During forty years almost all the crucial American foreign policy initiations, as well as domestic policies, were justified by this overwhelming priority.

Discourse articulated by governmental institutions or civil organizations during the Cold War was emphasizing simultaneity of individual and national security. Under the conditions of Cold War American government as well as individuals faced substantial dangers and this brought huge obligations and it was required to play the role of leadership. In individual level, Americans were expected to conduct in a

manner which is both consistent with and constitutive of this global leadership. Because of this interrelation, in the absence of the Cold War, the ground and aims of major political initiatives and strategic programs become invalid.

### **3.2. American Involvement in the Middle East**

Before making a historical and political analysis about an issue making a conceptual investigation would provide more opportunity to see what kind of connotations does the subject has in the mind of people from different cultural and political positions. For example a geographical definition can have different meanings according to from where the subject is looking at the object both in the manner of his concrete geographical position and his ideological presuppositions. If we analyze the geographical definition of the Middle East by keeping that consideration in mind we can see a good and valid example for this assertion.

The concept of the Middle East as a geographical definition contains historical and conjectural meanings depending on cultural political strategic and economic and geographical determiners. For an example West Asia, as a geographical definition, can be used by people from different geographical places such as from Japan.

Theorization of such concepts and identifications by Western scholars and specialists also reflexes similar subjectivity. The usage of the concept of Near East had entered into the literature not on the basis of objective physical geographical characteristics but on the basis of jeocultural line distinction which contains same mentioned subjectivity. “The term “Middle East” was invented in 1902 by the American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan, to designate the area between Arabia and India, with its center-from the point of view of the naval strategist-in the Persian Gulf. Both names, Near East and Middle East are recent but not modern; both are relics of a world with Western Europe in the center and other regions grouped around it” (Lewis, 1994: 3).



“The United States has been involved in the affairs of the Middle East since well before an American naval captain coined that term in the first decade of the twentieth century. The character of this involvement has been mixed, from supporting missionarism and various forms of colonial or military oppression to assisting forces for self determination” (Long, 1976: 133). “Specific involvement in the Gulf dates to support for the new states that slowly emerged from the dust of the Ottoman Empire and post-War colonial clutches of Great Britain. Critical U.S. economic interest in the region did not start until when U.S oil companies discovered oil in Bahrain and Kuwait in the early 1930s” (Long, 1976: 133).

With the discovery of oil in the region the geopolitical importance of the Middle East raised dramatically. The great political and military competition started from that time. With the discovery of oil in Iran in the 1920s and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1938, the region acquired a new strategic importance for international superpowers. “During World War I the British coined the term Middle East for their Cairo regional command post. Outmaneuvering their French ally’s military and diplomatic administrative bureau of the “Proche Orient” (Near East), they politically and symbolically redefined the region as if to anticipate the World’s energy need” (Henry and Springborg, 2001: 8). In this historical event it can be seen how the political and economic interest of great powers determines not only the historical course of a region but also its geographical name whose roots go back centuries.

The geopolitical shift changed the ground of competition between superpowers. It is the fact that with the discovery of oil Great Power competition moved from the Near East to the Middle East, and eventually to North Africa as well. “In World War II Winston Churchill understood the entire region to be Europe’s “soft underbelly” and the Allies’ campaign to liberate Nazi Europe started in North Africa. American and British forces converged on Tunisia in 1943, driving Rommel’s forces out, before liberating Sicily, Italy, and eventually France” (Henry and Springborg, 2001: 9). Liberation of mentioned western countries was not seen as the whole solution of the problem. Envisioned economic development was dependant to the natural

resources of old colonies of western countries. For that reason unwanted administrations of old colonies were not let to be on power at the expense of the western interests.

The power balance changed in favor of the United States as the leading actor of the allied countries of the Second World War victory. Because she controlled 73 percent of oil Great Britain continued to preserve supremacy in the Gulf as of 1939. “Following World War II, its share declined to 49 percent while the U.S. share climbed to 44 percent. It was not until successful, CIA-engineered overthrow of the democratically elected Mossadegh government in Iran in 1953 that the United States surpassed Great Britain; its share declined to 20 percent while the U.S. share rose to 54 percent by 1954” (Kuroda, 1994: 59). However, not only political interests of the United States but also its economic interests required to support the Great Britain. Vital importance of Iranian oil for the economy of Great Britain was very clear for the United States. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s investment in Iran was GB’s biggest source of income among overseas pro-British countries. From that investment Britain gained about \$400 million for a year in a time postwar conditions made global economic circumstance very frail.

Through the administration of Ronald Reagan, support took various forms, especially military, both overt and covert. This policy went fairly undisturbed and unnoticed until 1979 when the US-friendly regime in Iran, one of what the Nixon administration had called the “twin pillars”, fell to one of the forces of radical Islam. Thus, they may be distinguished from what might be called the forces of status quo Islamism, such as the regime in Saudi Arabia, which, in the 1970s, was the other pillar of US policy and has been one of several strategic partners in the Gulf since. It should be recalled that the first, unhesitating act of the administration of George Herbert Walker Bush in 1990 after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was the defence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, before taking action to defeat Iraqi occupying troops in Kuwait (Huntington, 1999: 6).

### **3.3. From Need to find Power to Serve American Purposes to Need to Find Purposes for the Use of American Power**

A fundamental shift has taken place in the way Americans think about national security. Sometime during the late 1980s, people started to think nonmilitary issues a more serious threat to their national security than military issues. In 1990, the Americans Talk Security Project asked people to name what they consider to be the “one or two greatest threats to their country’s national security.” Ninety percent cited non military threats, such as violent crime, pollution, health-care costs, the federal budget deficit, nuclear waste, and economic competition from other countries. When asked directly, whether military adversaries or economic competitors pose the greater threat to their national security, the majority said economic competitors. And when asked, “which is more important in determining one country’s influence on in the world today-economic power or military power?” the answer, by almost three to one, was economic power. All you have to do is to look at what is happening to the Soviet Union to understand how critical economic power is (Schneider, 1992: 55).

The sense of economic decline and vulnerability explains a good deal of what both public and opinion leaders see as a diminishing world leadership role for the United States. It also explains one of the most severe limitations on American foreign policy: There isn’t any money.

According to Chicago council study, a majority of public was willing to increase spending on education, social security, and drug programs. And a polarity now wants to cut defense spending. In fact, attitudes toward defense spending are just about the same now as they were in 1974, at the end of the Vietnam War. Even the Persian Gulf commitment was susceptible to the pressure of limited resources. A few days before the expiration of January 15, 1991, deadline for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, *Time* magazine and Cable News Network took a poll and found most Americans supportive of U.S. military action. By almost two to one, the public felt that the liberation of Kuwait was worth fighting for. (Schneider, 1992: 56).

For 50 years, American foreign policy was based on the existence of a totalitarian threat—first fascism, then communism. During almost all of the nation’s previous history, isolationism was the prevailing doctrine of American foreign policy. Now that the United States has achieved its mission of defeating totalitarianism, commentators were quick to forecast a return to isolationism. The public’s response to the Persian Gulf crisis suggests that those concerns may have been exaggerated. Americans showed little inclination to give up their country’s world leadership role.

The subject of American national interest has been discussed intensively since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sometimes such discussions resulted with confusion. The majority of this confusion stemmed because of the new conditions of the post-Cold War global circumstances. This new circumstance was structured by the discussions of “the end of history”, “stress between north-south bipolarity”, “clashes of civilizations”. Ambiguity in the idea about what was the American interest in such a world can be accepted a normal outcome of newly emerging dynamics of new global system.

Bush’s critics argued that in the case of the Persian Gulf, their international interests are stronger than their national interests. The President conceded the point. He said, with some pride, “This is not...the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.” Why should America assume the world’s burden? Because, Bush said, “there is no substitute for American leadership.” The new world order that Bush envisioned is one in which the United States goes beyond its own national interests. America also commits itself to defending international interests including peace, stability, and the rule of law. The new world order will be maintained and protected by the United States. And United States will do it with the support of its international partners—including the Soviet Union (Schneider, 1992: 62).

The need for a new definition of national interest became very evident and urgent. The most crucial point in that new definition was to build it on a multilateral and multidimensional ground. It means that all new emergent actors should be taken into consideration whether they are state level or supra-state level actors. Kissinger was writing to recommend that what is needed is “a definition of national interest that commands consensus at home while accommodating the interests of other societies.” There are now problems in both areas and Americans need to be reoriented to the new realities. Hill describes the new order by Kissinger’s words, as to “be more like the European state system of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War” (Hill, 1994: 196). In the system of balance of power of nineteenth century Europe the power of a few actors of the system played a role to equilibrate each other in a power oriented international system. As a result the possibility of a war could be kept in a low degree.

The perceptions and strategies of new conditions were different than the previous. Motives and goals of the nation states were also different. The new preeminent states will not perceive threats identically, nor will they be prepared to run the same risk. New perceptions and policies to accord with the new era, Kissinger speculates, will require a redefinition of national security that includes new concept of national interest. Such a concept should be, in Kissinger’s words, “more discriminating in its purpose, less cataclysmic in its strategy and above all, more regional in its design” than that of the Cold War. “Any other approach will court progressive irrelevance” (Cited in Hill, 1994: 196). We can conclude from the analysis of Kissinger that the concept of security is much related with the definition of national interest. So, when the definition of national interest changes according to transformations in national regional and global dynamics the definition of security also changes. But it should be kept in mind that such changes in definitions do not occur in the substance of the concepts but occur in their accidents.

The most substantial question concerning American role in the post-Cold War world was probably asked by Rabbit Angstrom, the harried central character of John Updike’s novels: “Without the Cold War, what is the point of being an American?”

“If being American means committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interest” (Huntington, 1999: 12). We can say that these questions about national identity and national interest are related with national security issue because of their role in the conception and construction of perception of individual and state security. In this sense it is obvious that the change in the international system with the end of the Cold War did not only affect the political psychology of states but also psychology of individuals whose identities has been shaped by ideological confrontation with the other.

The answers to these ideological questions also will constitute the framework of new American global foreign policy. This aspect of problematique brings the possibility of implementation of deterrence policy into question in the post-Cold War political, economic and military condition. “Deterrence theory builds upon a straight forward assumption about why states go to war. War is assumed to be the product of a rational decision calculus in which costs and benefits are calculated against each other. Only when expected benefits of going to war exceed the expected costs of doing so will a state to go war” (Hastedt, 2000: 119). “The Persian Gulf War was an important test case. If deterrence could not be made to work outside of the context of deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on United States or one of its key allies, then U.S. security policy would need to be anchored around a different strategic doctrine in the post-Cold War era” (Hastedt, 2000: 119).

### **3.4. The New World Order and the Gulf War**

Because the Gulf War was the first war fought after the end of the Cold War by the United States in the Middle East it played a role to be the test scene of the discourse of the new world. New World order became the catch phrase of U.S. policy in the Gulf during the crisis and war. “The ‘new strategy’ that unfolded was heavy in rhetoric and light in substance. The new world order swung between something newly emerged (an international system without the cold war and dangers of bipolar confrontation) and a condition that the United States as sole surviving superpower sought to establish” (Hill, 1994: 184). It was understood that it was more difficult to be sole superpower in an unstructured international system. Without an “other” the object of the strategies became ambiguous.

“The latter implementation implied a new era of peace where a benign internationalism would be imbued with liberalist values and institution in rising democracies. What internationalism in actuality signified for U.S. policy in a world of unchallenged military superiority was made manifest in the Gulf War and its aftermath” (Hill, 1994: 184). It was nothing but the determination of the rules and goals of international system by the United States. This approach is supposed to be realized as internationalism with the devotion of world countries by their unquestioned obedience.

One month after the Gulf crisis broke out, the creation of a new world order was declared as an objective. Speaking to Congress in September 1990, President Bush said: “We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge; a new era in which nations of the world can prosper and live in harmony” (Cited in Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 131).

Secretary of State Baker expressed mainly the same ideas at a news conference in Brussels when he attended a NATO meeting: “We believe Iraq’s unprovoked invasion and continued occupation of Kuwait is a political test of how the post-Cold War world will work.” He elaborated: It would be a test of the “institutions of collective security” or rather of Western security (NATO and the Western European Union), of how well they could be adapted to confront today’s dangers and tomorrow’s threats” (Cited in Hill, 1994:185).

The Persian Gulf War also confirmed the old division in American politics: Democrats was the party of peace, Republicans the party of strength. A lot of people expected that division to disappear with the end of the Cold War. Republicans would lose the peace issue. Why do we need a military buildup if the United States no longer faces a communist threat? In fact, some conservatives opposed President Bush’s Gulf policy precisely for that reason. It would not be a good war because there was no communist threat. The same logic said the Democrats would lose the peace issue. With the end of the Cold War, democracy flourished and peace was breaking out all over. Republicans Reagan and Bush became the architects of a new world order. Initially, many liberals saw Bush’s Gulf policy as the sort of nonideological, internationalist commitment they could endorse without compunctions. It would not be a bad war because this time, the United States was on the right side. Moreover, President Bush scrupulously went about getting support for his Gulf policy from Communist powers, Third World countries, and the United Nations (Schneider, 1992: 67).



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **A CASE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND**

### **POST-COLD WAR US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

### **FOR THE MIDDLE EAST: THE GULF WAR**

The colonial power of the time, Great Britain, has established political and economic relations with the administration units of the Gulf region a century before. “From the time Britain signed its secret treaty with the Shaikh of Kuwait in 1899 until its independence in 1961, Kuwait fell firmly within Britain's sphere of influence. Kuwait's foreign policy was largely shaped by the requirements of the Government of India, which exerted a major influence over Britain's policy in the Persian-Arabian Gulf until 1947” (Brown, 1994: 66).

Starting from the late 1960s the Persian Gulf gained a significant importance for the United States after the withdrawal of military forces of Britain from East of Suez which started in 1968 and finished in 1971. The reason of that significant importance was the increasing dependence of the United States on Gulf Oil and growing Soviet interest and meddling in the region.

“Under the Carter and Reagan administrations the Persian Gulf came to be defined as the third major theater of U.S.-Soviet military competition (after Europe and Northeast Asia), with a high priority in U.S. military planning and force procurement” (Johnson, 1989:122-23).

Iran revolution in 1979, is one of the most historical turning points for the U.S. security interests in the region. This event created new focus and the “focus will

continue for a long time to come, given the presence of weak states, radical regimes, rapid political change, huge oil fields, and large petroleum incomes. These conditions make for aggressive states, potential internal instability, and the need for U.S. involvement to maintain its interests in the region” (Schneider, 1992: 428)

“The new trends in the Middle East are largely a result of diffusion of power, not so much because of both superpowers’ decline-indeed, Iraq’s challenge-the traditional expectation- but because of that of the USSR alone. Indeed, Iraq’s challenge to the rule of regional politics in 1990 was an effort to replace Moscow as the strategic umbrella for the Arabs” (Rubin, 1992: 417). “The effect of the Soviet decline on American policy, however, was to free the United States from previous constraints about a direct military presence and the use of force. The regional situation made Persian Gulf security the top priority of U.S. interests in the era” (Rubin, 1992: 417).

In the Cold War’s aftermath, the Middle East’s unique features make it the testing ground for a new era in U.S. policy and a restructured world order. This role was highlighted and accentuated by the fact that the period’s first crisis-Iraq’s August 1990 seizure of Kuwait and the international effort to reserve it-took place there.

#### **4.1. A Brief Historical Background**

It would not be wrong to say that the framework and mind set of the Cold War determined the post-Cold War U.S. Middle East policy. The main factors which caused U.S. response to the Soviet Union were the involvement of the S.U. in the emergent dynamics of the region and emergence of the pro-Soviet totalitarian regimes in the Middle East.

“Three events in the 1970s were crucial to the definition of the threat in the Gulf and to subsequent U.S. military planning. The first was the 1973 oil embargo imposed by Arab oil producers on the United States and the Netherlands in the midst of the 1973 Middle East war” (Johnson, 1989: 123). “The embargo and the related (and more important) cut in Arab oil production precipitated a price rise, stimulated fears of a future effort by producers to use the oil weapon to "strangle" the West, and generated proposals for the use of U.S. military force to seize the oil fields in the event of such a strangulation effort” (Johnson, 1989: 123). “Following the fourfold OPEC price increases of 1973-74, people began to think of military force as a means of maintaining access to Persian Gulf oil. Perhaps the last act of this drama was the creation of a U.S. Rapid Deployment Force in the early 1980s to serve as a tripwire if Soviet forces invaded Iran” (Rubin: 1992: 418).

“ The second development was the 1979 Iranian revolution which destroyed the principal pillar of the two-pillar (Iran-Saudi Arabia) U.S. policy in the Gulf and sharply increased U.S. fears about stability in the region. Chaos in Iran led to a drop in oil production which helped trigger another large rise in world oil prices” (Johnson, 1989: 123). The consequences of this event were devastating not only in economic sense but also in political and ideological. Iran had a very strategic importance for the Persian Gulf policy of the United States. As an expression of this importance president Nixon described Iran as the “policeman” of the Persian Gulf. “Its friends and foes alike agree that the Iranian revolution has had major impact upon the Muslim world and the West. For some, it has been a source of inspiration and motivation; for others, revolutionary Iran has symbolized an ominous threat to the stability of the Middle East and the Security of the West because it has been associated with terrorism” (Esposito and Piscatori, 1990: 317).

Soviet Union became the major military threat to the Gulf, after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. This event led to President Carter to make his well known statement in 1980, State of the Union address, subsequently named as ‘Carter Doctrine’: “Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf

region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force” (Cited in Johnson, 1989: 123). A "Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force" (RDJTF or RDF) was established in March 1980 by the earmarking of existing forces. Planning for it had been proceeding in response to events in Iran. “An effort was also initiated to obtain bases in the area and to expand U.S. lift capabilities. The RDJTF was subsequently transformed by President Reagan into a new military command, the U.S. Central Command or CENTCOM” (Johnson, 1989: 124).

Before the military intervention to the Persian Gulf done by US troops in 1990 upon Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, there had been an intense pressure over US government from think tanks. In a policy analysis produced by such institute clearly indicates that pressure:

“Yet at a time when the threat to oil supplies has risen appreciably, nobody in the Reagan administration is suggesting that U.S. CENTCOM might have to send in the troops... However, if the RDF is not going to be used at a time when Western oil supplies are threatened with drastic curtailment, under what circumstances would it be used? When one considers that an ever-increasing share of resources is being devoted to the RDF, a long look at the history of the force is warranted. One defense analyst notes that the FY 1985 Department of Defense (DOD) budget allocates \$59 billion for the RDF, "of which about \$47 billion is for the Persian Gulf.” (Ravenal, 1984: 17).

U.S. concern about the security of the Gulf had been always at high level until an occasion to intervene the region born after the end of the cold war. U.S. supported Iraq against Iran during 1980-1988 devastating war; despite its dictatorial leadership, Iraq was not seen as a serious threat against U.S. interest in the Gulf. It is useful to examine the origins of the new tension in the Iraqi-U.S. relationship before Iraq invasion of Kuwait.

There were two important consequences of the Iran-Iraq War. The first one is that Iraq as the victor side of the war gained a powerful position in the region. Secondly,

Iraq became a strategic means for the United States to control and intervene to the region. In Iraq policy, Government and the Congress were not agreeing. The Iraq policy was always criticized by the Congress. Anti-Iraq publicity about Iraq's massacre of Halapja intensified the critics of the Congress. In addition to that because they were not pleased from the empowerment of the Iraq in the region, Israeli lobby came into front to support the criticisms of the Congress on U.S. relations with Iraq. However, the affect of these criticisms could not change the basic dimensions of U.S.-Iraqi relationship until the 1990. The expense of the victory of the war was very huge for Iraq. Saddam Hussein found the country in a debt crisis.

The natural sources and wealth of the Gulf Region became the major interest of Saddam Hussein. He started to express his intention explicitly. "A series of Iraqi statements at the highest levels caught Washington's attention and generated serious concern about Iraqi policy. Especially troubling to U.S. officials was an important speech given by Saddam Hussein to the Arab Cooperation Council in Amman, Jordan, in February 1990" (Telhami, 1994: 159). Saddam thought that his victory at war with Iran could provide him a leader position in Arab world to persuade them to unite in a policy of confrontation to U.S. presence in the Gulf.

Saddam Hussein opposed the presence of U.S. navy in the Persian Gulf, warning that "if the Gulf people along with other Arabs are not careful, the Arab Gulf region will be governed by the U.S. will", and "suggested that Arab investments in the United States be moved elsewhere. Israel or not, these statements were bound to raise red flags in Washington and cause some rethinking about the relationship with Iraq" (Cited in Telhami, 1994: 159).

## **4.2. US Grand Strategy, International Security and the Persian Gulf**

“In the simplest terms, a state's grand strategy is its plan for making itself secure. Grand strategy identifies the objectives that must be achieved to produce security, and describes the political and military actions that are believed to lead to this goal” (Walt, 1989: 3).

Since the Second World War, the name of the grand strategy which the United States has implemented is containment. There were two fundamental aims of that strategy. The first goal was to prevent the Soviet Union from territorial expansion and the second was to avoid a major war. And the means to achieve those goals had two dimensions. The first dimension was to structure military alliance with Western Europe and Japan and the second dimension was to deploy armed forces in Europe and Far East.

Huge economic expenses and difficulty in strategy implementation of containment brought a new version of it: finite containment. Finite containment is a grand strategy model theorized by George F. Kennan, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Walter Lippmann. It suggests containing Soviet expansion directly on the Eurasian landmass. “In addition to maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent, this strategy would preserve present U.S. alliances with Western Europe, Japan, and Korea (at roughly the current level of ground and air forces), along with the U.S. commitment to protect Western access to Persian Gulf oil” (Walt, 1989: 6).

Whether as an element of “containment” or, narrowly described, “finite containment”, the Gulf region always acquire a strategic position in U.S. grand strategy. A common explanation of the U.S. intervention had to do with the end of the Cold War. In this view, the Gulf crisis was the perfect occasion to anchor an era of Pax Americana.

The East-West confrontation has largely receded from view. This confrontation dominated the international security agenda during the Cold War. “Revealed in its wake is a different set of dangers, not really new but previously overshadowed by Cold War preoccupations. The newly revealed agenda is broader in its focus, giving much greater attention to previously neglected sources of conflict” (Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1995: 3)

With the end of the Cold War two concepts has come into prominence in the field of international security. They were “interdependence” and “collective security”. Interdependence was a result of newly emerging multipolar international system which came into existence as a result of change in power structure in world politics. And the need of security of all states could only be answered collectively. “The United States was likely to remain the only country with leading position in both economic and military power, yet it will have to cope with unprecedented problems of interdependence that no great power can solve itself... The classical agenda of international security among independent nations will continue alongside these new problems of international interdependence” (Nye, 1990:520). In this respect, United Nations was expected to take significant determiner role to be the actor of the implementation of collective security in the name of international security. The concept of interdependence of states constitutes the main framework of contemporary international order. Seyom Brown and Robert O. Keohane believe that “since countries are no longer selfsufficient, interdependence has increasingly tied them to each other as a result of which their security has also become interdependent. Today, issues such as nuclear weapons, poverty, environment, human rights, food and energy resources concern all world communities which must of necessity cooperate with each other” (Cited in Sajedi, 2009: 80).

#### **4.3. Search for Legitimacy and its Failure**

The new foreign policy of the United States after the Cold War and during the Gulf war have structured on the rhetoric of “the new world order”. It has supposed to

fill the gap emanated after the concept of containment had become irrelevant for the post Cold War foreign policy. At that time the rhetoric of the new world order had no well defined meaning and structure. However, strategists and academicians spent considerable effort to make the concept strong theoretically and persuasive in implementation

After the end of the Cold War, an order was envisaged to be created that had motivated the founders of the UN in 1945. “Liberated from Cold War shackles, a revitalized UN would now finally be able to implement an international order of Wilsonian idealism, a world safe for democracy and for free peoples. No mention was made of that other Wilsonian principle, self-determination” (Hill, 1994: 188).

“The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and U.S. reaction to it have provided occasion to confirm various theoretical propositions about U.S. foreign policy. Few people take at face value the official explanation that international principles and the UN Charter were driving forces behind the intervention of the United States” (Telhami, 1994: 153).

A military intervention was not under consideration, said Bush, but subsequently he backed off from his statement. Because Saudi Arabia could be the next target of Saddam, Bush administration turned its attention to Saudi Arabia. “Four days after invasion, in response to a request from Saudi King Fahd, Bush ordered U.S. paratroopers and air crafts to guard Saudi oil fields as part of Operation Desert Shield. The number of U.S. forces sent to Saudi Arabia were with predictions of up to 400.000 by early 1991” (Hastedt, 2000: 70).

“In regard to the effort at deterrence, a strong case can be made that U.S. policymakers did not come close to implementing a coherent deterrent strategy. The United States neither possessed the capability to rise the costs to Iraq of an invasion of Kuwait (much less defeat any such effort) nor did it clearly communicate its position to Iraq” (Hastedt, 2000: 120).



A question rises at that point as: “could Saddam Hussein have been deterred if a deterrence strategy had been properly executed?” Most probably the answer should be no. “If Saddam’s primary motivation for invading Kuwait grew out of economic desperation, then it is possible that he would have pressed forward regardless of military costs because of the perceived consequences of inaction-continued economic problems that could lead to his overthrow” (Hastedt, 2000: 121).

In November 1990, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against an aggressor. It was only the second time in U.N. history, and the first time in 40 years, that such action had been approved. In this regard, significance of the resolution was very high for giving such a critical authorization in a time when the sole superpower of the world faced a test or a task whose possible consequences would be the indicator of code of conduct of the post-Cold War political arena. In that sense two kinds of possibilities were to become realized. The first option was the implementation of the resolution by coalition forces in the leadership of the United States in the legitimized limits described by the resolution. The second option was to abuse such a critical resolution by resorting to unproportional use of force against Iraqi forces.

“Those states with long and deep traditions of democracy seemed all too ready to rush headlong into the cruel, merciless, and vengeful war in the Gulf; to deploy massive force to maintain resource hegemony and satisfy geopolitical ambitions” (Falk, 1994: 536). “Despite the rhetoric that legitimized the war in the name of democracy, this was a war about pricing oil and the U.S. capacity to establish itself as the leader of post-cold war global security arrangements or, as George Bush expressed it, the new world order” (Falk, 1994: 536).

“The United States provided the lion’s share of troops and weapons while Saudi Arabia and Japan provided lion’s share of the funds. Allied pledges to the United States to offset the costs of Operation Desert Storm totaled \$41.7 billion. The explicit subsidies that were part of Operation Desert Storm are being mirrored by calls for

full funding of American bases and troops in Asia and Central Europe” (Oye, 1992: 28). “Such praetorian partnership may permit the United States to exert substantial influence on international military affairs without accelerating American relative economic decline. The Bush administration’s rediscovery of the forcefulness of the principled defense of national sovereignty, international law, and the United Nations serves the useful function of legitimating praetorian partnerships” (Oye, 1992: 28).

The coalition forces which came together and took action against Iraq were supposed to take their legitimacy from UN resolution against Iraqi aggression toward Kuwait. U.S. intended to implement such an operation as an indicator of new conditions of the new world order. In the rhetoric of U.S. UN was the main source of legitimacy. But in the process of war almost all considerations and restrictions of UN were violated. Failure of mission of UN in the case of the Gulf War was tragic and far reaching. “The essence of this failure was the refusal of the Security Council to control the United States and the coalition, allowing the UN to become formally associated with waging unrestricted warfare in a manner that, according to an UN report, reduced Iraq to preindustrial conditions, resulting in ‘near apocalyptic’ devastation (Falk, 1994:37).

#### **4.4. Strategic Foundations of U.S. National Security Policy for the Gulf War**

National Security Directive (NSD) is a document issued by the president to construct national security policy and supply federal resources without the permission of Congress under the authorization of the National Security Act 1947. If we look at the history of NSD, these two examples can be explanatory about the character and functions of NSD. As a first example, a secret directive was issued by President Truman in 1950 to carry undercover operations to provoke unrest and revolt in the Eastern bloc. And secondly, J. F. Kennedy also authorized occupation plan of Cuba<sup>6</sup> by a NSD but failed to achieve its goal, and so forth.

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<sup>6</sup> This unsuccessful and disgraced invasion venture to overturn Cuba’s leader Castro is known as Bay of Pigs.

Being the last national security policy document concerning Persian Gulf security in the last phase of the Cold War period, NSD 26 is one of the most crucial directives among its similars. This document includes the political incentives and strategic objectives that have been established during the Cold War's bipolar global system. In addition to that, as we will see at the next document of our analysis, the main concerns and objectives of the document presents a continuation in its main objectives. By analyzing NSD 26 and Defense Planning Guidance, the first crucial national security document of the post-Cold War period, we will able to see this continuation in main objectives and conversions in subsidiary means.

In NSD 26 Iraq was given a position by United States to play its role in the balance of power strategy against Iran.

Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both Gulf and the Middle East. The United Stets Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach by Iraq of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response.<sup>7</sup>

During the Iran-Iraq War the United States strongly tilted toward Iraq, furnishing it with substantial economic assistance and large amounts of indirect military aid to prevent Iran from achieving a hegemonic position in the Gulf and spreading its revolution ideology. This policy was based on balance of power considerations, and it was successful. But at different stages in its relation with Iraq after the Iran-Iraq war, the United States employed a number of strategies that either failed to accomplish their purpose or produced mixed results.

With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the question arose whether a change in U.S. policy was desirable or required. A few specialists in the Bush administration

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>

argued that balance-of-power considerations now dictated ending economic and military assistance to Iraq, since it had emerged from its successful war to constitute a potential new threat to regional stability. These estimates were based not merely on balance-of-power logic but also on a belief that Saddam Hussein harbored ambitions for achieving hegemony in the region (George, 1993: 33).

U.S. administration did not even reduce the direct economic and indirect military support to Iraqi government. Evidently the Bush administration did not regard it as inevitable that Iraq, successful in its war with Iran, would pose a threat to the regional balance of power—the second reason why policy change was not seriously considered. The dominant mind-set of U.S. policymakers was that Iraq would continue to be preoccupied with attempting to recover from its destructive war with Iran and would not pose serious threats for some time. Washington did not perceive Saddam Hussein as committed to an expansionist foreign policy aiming at a hegemonic role, one that would constitute a new threat to U.S. and western interests in the region. And third, the administration no doubt wished to continue its policy of wooing Iraq away from the Soviet Union.

There is ample reason to believe that the administration's policy toward Saddam Hussein prior to the Gulf crisis was based squarely on the assumption that he could be encouraged to play a constructive, responsible role. This assumption was supported by evidence that Saddam had displayed restrained behavior during the Iran-Iraq War. This restraint seemed to indicate that he was moving toward greater moderation in attitudes and behavior.

This image of Saddam evidently played a fundamental role in the adoption of NSC Directive 26, which set the basis for U.S. policy toward Iraq. According to Don Oberdorfer, substantial proposition of NSC 26 is that after the war with Iran, Baghdad became "prepared to play a more constructive international role" (Oberdorfer, 1991). Excerpts from the directive, declassified and made available to Congress in May 1992, stated that "normal relations between the U.S. and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle

East." The directive recognized important differences with Iraq over chemical and biological weapons, its nuclear aspirations, the state of human rights in Iraq, and its meddling in Lebanon and other Middle East states, but nonetheless held that "the U.S. Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq." And, specifically, U.S. companies were to be encouraged to participate in the postwar reconstruction of Iraq as long as they did not abet nuclear proliferation.

Various indications in Saddam Hussein's behavior during the Iran-Iraq War encouraged U.S. policy to move in this direction:

- Iraq began to distance itself from the Soviet Union's policy in various Third World countries.
- Iraq became less hostile to the Arab-Israeli peace process.
- Saddam expelled some (though not all) leading terrorists.
- Iraq apologized and eventually paid \$27 million in a compensation package for families of the thirty-seven victims of the Iraqi missile attack on the USS *Stark* in the Persian Gulf.
- Iraq agreed to restoring diplomatic relations with the United States and treated American officials in Iraq in a strikingly friendly way.
- Iraq eased restrictions on foreign travel.

The warnings about the access to Persian Gulf and security of GCC states were also strongly stressed by the U.S. defense administration in NSD 26:

Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional

power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military intervention.<sup>8</sup>

The war with Iran had left Iraq with foreign debts of \$80 billion (one and a half times its gross national product), a shattered economy, and low oil prices. All told, the war had cost Iraq an estimated \$500 billion. Its economic plight was desperate. The worse it grew, the more acute became Saddam's resentment against his Gulf Arab neighbors (Neff, 1991: 34). He believed he had saved these dynastic regimes from a rising tide of fundamentalism by his war with Iran, conveniently forgetting that it was his ambitions that had started the war. But now in the postwar period, the Gulf states were showing little interest in assuaging Iraq's financial crisis (Neff, 1991: 34). On the contrary the GCC states came out from Iran-Iraq war gainful. The United States calculated this disadvantageous position of Iraq and pressured it to feel itself irremediable and U.S. tried to appear as the sole savior for Iraq. The approach and guarding commitment of the United States was clear and strong for the GCC states. It is clearly seen in NSD 26:

it is important for the United States to continue to nurture the mutually beneficial and enduring cooperative security relationships with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States<sup>9</sup> that grew out of the Iran/Iraq war. The department of Defense should seek to maintain and, if possible, increase its peace time and contingency access to friendly regional states, and to broaden the scope of security cooperation through military exercises, repositioning arrangements and contingency planning.<sup>10</sup>

GCC states were very strategic for United states not only for their possessing over 60 percent of the world oil reserves but also for their huge waging capabilities for arm industry of the United states. Even this later important factor could not stop the United States to sale arms to Iraq. But when Iraq came out as victorious from the war with Iran owing to military and intelligence assistance of the United States, Israel faced a potential enemy capable of developing nuclear weapons and directing missile attacks on its soil. This potential threat has

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Saudi Arabia was a prime mover in setting up the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981. Other members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf>

been concerned by the United States in all main security strategies. Therefore Israel should be given the guarantee of being secured from such potential threats as expressed in NSD26:

The United States will sell U.S. military equipment to help friendly regional states meet their legitimate defense requirements, so long as such sales do not present a security threat to Israel. The Secretaries of State and Defense should develop a strategy for long-term program of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states that serves our national interest but does not increase Israel's security burden<sup>11</sup>.

After the Gulf crisis erupted, administration leaders acknowledged that their policy had been to try to resocialize Saddam Hussein and that it had failed. President Bush was quoted as saying there had been "some reason to believe that perhaps improved relations with the West would modify his behavior." And the president's special assistant for national security affairs, Brent Scowcroft, also acknowledged that the object of the earlier approach to Saddam was to make this ambitious president a reasonably responsible member of the international community (Cited in George, 1993: 36).

Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is another strategic document which is prepared routinely every few years by the Defense Department. DPG 1992 was prepared in a commission headed by Paul Wolfowitz who was undersecretary of defense for policy (the Pentagon's third-highest ranking civilian). Excerpts from this Pentagon's plan were published by New York Times in March 8, 1992 titled as "Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival'". This Document was the first important determinative document prepared after the end of the Cold War and also after the Gulf War. In this regard the document reflects the impacts of both post-Cold War new international political structure and lessons taken from the Gulf War.

"DPG, also known as the Wolfowitz draft called for Washington to cap its victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War by gearing foreign policy to overriding goal of ensuring that the United States would remain the world's only superpower. In both tone and content, the argumentation advanced in support of this position caused

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

widespread offense and alarm” (Tschirgi, 2007: 10). “Referring less than diplomatically to the possibility that future political challenges might emanate from such countries as Germany and Japan, the document’s unilateralist bent and emphasis on U.S. military might seemed to rest on contempt for close allies and unbridled arrogance vis-à-vis the rest of the world” (Tschirgi, 2007: 10).

DPG was the military’s compass for planning, building, and developing forces in fiscal years between 1994 and 1999. While newer officially finalized, in fact, it was a completed document, and a working draft of the DPG. The full text was not reproduced, but the content is well known and appears to line up closely with the principles put forth in the 2002 National Security Strategy. The first objective advanced by the DPG was to “prevent the reemergence of a new rival”:

This Defense Planning guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence. The new international environment has also been shaped by the victory of the United States and its coalition allies over Iraqi aggression – the first post-cold-war conflict and a defining event in U.S. global leadership<sup>12</sup>.

This required the United States to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would be sufficient to generate global power. The authors of the draft argued that “beyond deterring attack on the United States, the United States should be prepared to use force to “preclude threats” and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, the draft advised that the United States should be “postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated.” The document contained the word “preempt”. “The broad suggestion was that military should be reconfigured to support the United States as a benevolent global hegemon. DPG detailed the nature and scope of threats faced by the United States in 1992 in a

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html>



manner consistent with the September 17, 2002, National Security Strategy” (Halper and Clarke, 2004: 145).

The end of the postwar world has freed the Bush administration to depart from routinized and institutionalized lines of policy that held for over four decades. In a period of dramatic and often unpredictable international change, improvisation is necessary and reversals of policy are inevitable (Oye, 1992: 24). Because the administration does not control the sequences of issues presented to it and because prior decisions constrain later options, accidents of timing are determining the contours of future American grand strategy. What foreign policy is likely to replace the traditional American grand strategy of global containment (Oye, 1992: 24)? The finite containment which we mentioned about it under the head of “U.S. grand strategy for the Persian Gulf” seems to be appropriate to and explanative for the new U.S. grand strategy whose one main aspect was outlined below:

while the U.S. cannot become the world’s “policeman,” by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict<sup>13</sup>.

The priority of the Persian Gulf for the security strategy of the United States in the post-Cold War era was because of absence of potential global competitor in the near future. For that reason, the United States focused on potential of non-democratic power’s domination on critical regions especially Iraq’s domination on Persian Gulf. This point is expressed in DPG 1992 by including the need for additional forces:

There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future potential global competitor. But because we no longer face either a global threat or a hostile, non-democratic power

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

dominating a region critical to our interests, we have the opportunity to meet threats at lower levels and lower costs – as long as we are prepared to reconstitute additional forces should the need to counter a global threat re-emerge<sup>14</sup>.

There were no place for both outside and regional dominators in the Middle East especially in Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. To achieve this goal, enhancement of deterrence strategy is seen as necessary. Deterrence strategy was implemented against Iraq before it invaded Kuwait but it could not get a positive result. It is understood from DPG 1992 that U.S. administration planned to deter Iraq after exposing it to politically economically and militarily ruinous plight.

In the Middle East, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region's oil. We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect U.S. nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways. As demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian Peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to play a role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security<sup>15</sup>.

As pointed out in the document implicitly by expressing international seaways, it is also very important to prevent Iraq from reaching an exit to the sea which is possible only from Persian Gulf. In that sense, Kuwait is a strategic barrier for Iraq in such a possibility. The immediate reaction of the United States to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq was triggered by this mentioned geopolitical concern. Expression of this concern can be seen in an official document dated 1939. Foreign Secretary of British government warns Indian officials about that concern by making a future prediction: "...it is understandable that the State which controls the Mesopotamian plain should desire to have undivided control of at least one good means of access to the sea, and Lord Halifax thinks that on a long view it is likely that, if Iraq were given this access, it would make for steadier conditions in that part of the world in years to come"<sup>16</sup> (Cited in Brown, 1994: 69).

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html>

<sup>16</sup> Despatch dated 16 Dec 1939 from Lacy Baggallay, Foreign Office, to the India Office in CO 732/16/17

## CONCLUSION

The theoretical depth and explanative strength of the concept of security in international relations provided us a big opportunity to maintain our case study on the Gulf War to understand post-Cold War U.S. national security policy in the Middle East.

It is also become evident that case study method as a branch of qualitative methods is very strong tool to penetrate into a subject. Having opportunity to analyze actors events and documents of a subject, case study method provided us a collection of wide and supportive data about our subject.

In the first chapter we saw how important the concepts of human nature, security and state in the formation of political paradigm of the time. Almost all political thinkers dealt with these essential concepts from the perspective of their philosophical tradition.

The concept of security required a more detailed consideration. Our investigation on the concept of security in chapter two provided us a strong theoretical background about the concept and showed how crucial it is in the field of International relations. Traditional understandings of security in international relations have tended to rely on the assumption that the referent object of security is the modern political state which needs to be secured against rival states and other external threats. “This conception relies heavily on the so-called security dilemma, the ever-present threat that outside states might use their power to launch an attack. The driving force behind the security dilemma has alternately been described as the anarchical nature of the international system and the aggressive and competitive nature of human beings themselves” (Busser: 2006: 1). What might have been a breakthrough was John Herz’s idea of ‘security dilemma’ in the early 1950’s, a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its

own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening (Herz, 1950). “The security dilemma idea is widely acknowledged in the literature, but the Cold War environment proved to be infertile soil for such a liberal seed, restricting most people’s view to the action-reaction dynamics of rival powers” (Buzan, 1991: 4).

We used three levels of analysis to make concept of security more comprehensive. Kenneth Waltz formulized those levels of analysis by attaining the concept of “image”. Waltz explains the interrelation of three levels of analysis as, “All three images [levels of analysis] are a part of nature. So fundamental are man, the state and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two” (Waltz, 1959: 160).

In chapter three we focused on the importance and role of the Middle East in U.S. foreign policy. “For roughly the last two century the Middle East has been more consistently and more thoroughly ensnarled in great power politics than any other part of the non-Western world” (Brown, 1984: 3). “This distinctive political experience continuing from generation to generation has left its mark on Middle Eastern political attitudes and actions. Other parts of the world have been at one time or another more severely buffeted by an imperial power, but no area has remained so unremittingly caught up in multilateral great power politics” (Brown, 1984: 3). That strategic situation and fragile security structure of the Middle East attracted U.S. interest after the Cold War too. We can summarize our conclusions of the Gulf War which was fought for above mentioned reasons as below.

The demise of Soviet influence eliminated the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region. There were no longer any superpowers to which Iraq or Syria could turn for military hardware or assistance. As a consequence, Middle East countries became vulnerable without their security sustainer.

The policy was new in the sense that the United States alone could not financially wage war against Iraq, a third world power, without damaging its own economy. This required that Bush ask Great Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and other nations (including the Soviet Union and China) for their assistance. In the past, world superpowers did not ask other nations for financial or military assistance; they carried out their military plans unassisted. This fact showed that one of the three aspects of national security structure which are political economic and military strength was missing in the example of the United States. This was an indicator of how capable the United States at its endeavor to shape new international system.

The United States which brought victory for the Allied Forces during World War II, established UN in 1945. Since then, U.S. influence has gradually waned as smaller nations multiplied. The Gulf War marked a departure from this historical trend and demonstrated to the world that the United States was again a superpower to be reckoned with at the UN. But this image did not last long. As the time passed the details of the Gulf War became well known by public and academy and it was seen that U.S. had not leaded a peace and security seeking war as it was mentioned in chapter four.

The policy was a new order in the sense that, for the first time in history, President Bush placed Israel and its Arab neighbors on one side against Iraq. Israel gained a strong security shield in the eyes of Arab country thanks to Unite States, Israel's constant protector.

The Bush administration was threatened by the prospect of becoming involved in a protracted and bloody civil war in Iraq. More Americans would have been killed, and the president's poll ratings would have suffered. President Bush "wants to sign on the dotted line and get the hell out of there," a senior administration official said. "He has no, I mean absolutely no, intention of putting the United States in the middle of a civil war. The problems of U.S. involvement could far outweigh the problems of (Saddam Hussein's) remaining in power" (Cited in Schneider: 1992: 66).

The ending of the Gulf War constitutes an unusual, in some ways a unique, case of war termination. “Saddam Husain’s aggression was quickly transformed into psychological battle between the forces of evil (as personified by Saddam himself) ranged against civilized Western world” (Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 178-179). “It was considered imperative, therefore, to act swiftly against Iraq’s aggression and restore Kuwait to its rightful owners. In contrast, relatively little information was presented to the western audiences about religious and territorial complexities of the Middle East” (Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 178-179).

Ending of the Gulf War resembles, in some respects, the ending of the war with Nazi Germany and Japan: “the enemy was decisively defeated, and terms for a cease-fire were not negotiated with, but imposed on, the adversary. But the terms imposed on Iraq, unlike those for Germany and Japan, were not those of unconditional surrender, military occupation of the entire country, and replacement of the existing regime with a military government” (George, 1993: 89). “Rather, for various reasons the United States was determined to avoid too much involvement in postwar Iraq. Though the UN coalition's military and political war aims in the Gulf War were extensive, they were limited in comparison with the terms imposed on Germany and Japan” (George, 1993: 89). Bush administration still had a hope to gain Saddam as an obedient ally in the Persian Gulf security to balance the potential threat of Iran toward GCC states. It was understood lately that the motives of Saddam Hussein had changed because of his expectation from the newly emerging post-Cold War regional power dynamics. But the U.S. administration was engaged to read new dynamics from Cold War perspective.

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