THE ROLE OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS ON TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS

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By

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To my dear family

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for any award or any other degree or diploma in any university or other institution.

Yoko MİZUMOTO

March, 2010

ABSTRACT

Yoko MİZUMOTO   **March 2010**

The aim of this study is to understand the cause and effect of the role of Turkish immigrants on Turkish-German relations. The obtaining of citizenship is an important process in the transformation of migrant to immigrant. The theory of Etienne Balibar states that it is necessary to constitute collective power relations, and have representative organizations and administrative institutions for collective actions. As a result, individual power grows and the right of equality progresses within the social sphere. Citizenship cannot be formed without the existence of communities and associations. It is a tool to improve foreigners' activities in public. Thus, this study was deliberated to show how Turkish immigrants affect the German society politically and economically, according to Balibar's theory. This study aims to deal with various topics from the emergence of Turkish migrants to the Turkish economical and political movements in order to understand their awakening nationality, citizenship and community in Germany.

Key words:

Immigrant, Citizenship, Remittances, Entrepreneurs, Political Party

KISA ÖZET

Yoko MUZİMOTO   **Mart 2010**

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye-Almanya ilişkilerinde Türk göçmenlerinin rolünü ve etkisini açıklamaktır. Almanya'ya geçici olarak giden göçmenlerin vatandaşlığa kabul alma aşamasına gelmeleri önemli bir süreçtir. Etienne Balibar'ın teorisine göre, kollektif güç ilişkilerinin kurulması ve kollektif atılımlar için temsili kuruluşlar ve yönetici organların bulunması gereklidir. Böyle bir durumda, bireysel güç artar ve eşitlik hakkı sosyal alanda gelişme gösterir. Vatandaşlık, toplulukların ve birliklerin olmaması durumunda şekillenemez. Bu, yabancıların kamusal alandaki faaliyetlerini geliştirmek için bir araçtır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, Balibar'ın teorisi çerçevesinde, Türk göçmenlerinin Alman toplumunu siyasal ve ekonomik anlamlarda nasıl etkilediğini göstermeyi planlamaktadır. Yine bu çalışma, Türk göçmenlerinin Almanya'da harekete geçen milliyetçilik, vatandaşlık ve topluluk anlayışlarını anlamak için onların göçmen olarak ortaya çıkışlarından Türk ekonomik ve siyasal hareketlerine kadar pek çok farklı konuyu ele almayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler:

Göçmen, Vatandaşlık, Gelirleri, Girişimciler, Siyasi parti

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CE	Council of Europe
COMECOM	Communist Economic Community
CSU	Christian Social Union
DM	Deustschmark (the unit of money in Germany)
DITIB	The Presidency of Religious Affairs
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ECS	European Coal and Steel Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FDG	Federal Republic of Germany
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDP	Free Democratic Party
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNP	Gross Domestic Product
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IGMG	National Opinon Muslim Gemeinschat
IT	Information Technology
MEB	Ministry of National Education
MSP	Turkish National Salvation Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SDP	Social Democratic Party
ODA	Official Development Aid
TBB	Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Federation
TCN	Turkish Country National
TDU	Turkish-German entrepreneurs Association
WW II	World War Second

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Since globalization emerged into society, the term "border" cannot be defined clearly because of having common media, culture, trade, finance and production across boundaries. Consequently, people can easily translate from one nation to another under the global society, borders notwithstanding. "Migration" is closely related to globalization and has caused problems of mobile labor. However, migrants play a vital role in the economy, accompanied with their ever extending associations and organizations

Europe with its ever-permeable borders has diversified classes and multiplied ethnicities. As the migrant population in Europe increases, it becomes more difficult to define not only borders but also nations. "Migrant" is an important element in the dynamics of the social sphere.

When a migrant settles in a country, s/he becomes an immigrant. Rising immigration rates in European societies have challenged commonly held notions of national identity and have forced a re-examination of concept of citizenship[1]. Germany, the country of the migration process, is known as the guest workers

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[1] Giddens, Anthony, (2001), Sociology 4th Edition, UK: Policy Press, p.259.

model. During the 1960's the German government admitted migrants into their country under a temporary scheme in order to fulfill work demands within the labor market. However, migrants were not accepted citizenship even after settling for long periods.

Giddens outlines the theory of "Push and pull factors", arguing about its avocation in early migrant theory[2]. As an example of the "pull" factor, we can state that the Turkish immigrants were attracted to prosperous labor markets and better living conditions in Germany; 'pulling' them towards better standards of living abroad. They then established associations to link and maintain contact with family and friends within Germany. I am intrigued by the German-Turks, both by their immigration and the effect they have on Germany, economically and politically.

According to the Etienne Balibar, migrant workers; used as commodities, are generally ranked the bottom of social class. Consequently, it has given a birth to an increase in the different social classes, and induced a non-egalitarian society. In doing so it has lead to a rise in class struggles and, in essence, forced forward the labor movement ushering in a new era of reforms. This struggle gave birth to the

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[2] Ibid.

incompatible social dichotomy between "Public" and "Private" [3]. To increase

individual rights, it is necessary to constitute collective power relations and have

representative organizations and administrative institutions for collective actions. As

a result, individual power grows and the right of equality progresses within the social

sphere. Examples of organizations and institutions which have been used for

collective action include parties, unions, cooperatives, and collective conventions.

For a long time, Germany had taken a stance on "Jus sanguinis": nation or

citizenship is not determined by place of birth, but by having an ancestor who is a

national or citizen of the state. However, the German nationality law was amended in

2000 to give privilege to immigrants. They introduced a limited "Jus soli" to

encourage naturalization. The acquiring of citizenship is a way of keeping a balance

in politics. Social status and insurance are warranted by the host country. This, in

turn, links to collective interests of class or group.

In present day, the exercise of citizenship comes hand in hand with

belonging to a nation, including that of inheritance or naturalization. However,

people's nationalism stems from feelings or sentiments and religion elements.

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[3] Balibar, Etienne (1998), "Propositions on Citizenship", Translated By Simon J. Ctritchley: The University of Chicago, p.726.

German-Turks have made their way through a unique process. Here in my study, I discuss the process of the emergence of German-Turks, the enlargement of their public space and the effect on German society. My aim is to demonstrate that "Turkish immigrants" are not passive citizens but have vital power to redefine the distinction between "national" and "foreigner" as criterion of political citizenship[4]. In this context, for more than two decades, the question has been raised whether the current Turkish immigrants could be marginalized or integrated.

This study is divided into two parts; the first part deals with the Turkish migrants' history after the WWII, and the current German policy towards immigrants after the end of the guest worker's recruitment. The latter part of the study deals with the enlargement and effects of the Turkish community on public space, under the restriction of the 'alien' sphere.

This study deals with a wide array of issues, from the history of Turkish migrants, to the Turkish economical and political movements, to understand their awakening nationality, citizenship and community. In this study, I make references to "The impact of immigration on German's society" by EMN (European Migrant Network), "The frontier of Europe" by Japanese expert of EU study: Machiko Yatani,

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[4] Ibid., p.727.

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and "The integration or exile" by Masanori Naito who conducted research in Islamic movements of Muslim migrants in Europe. The first half of my thesis is based on those respective authors.

On the other hand, the latter part makes references mainly to "Workers' Remittances and Economic Growth: Evidence from Turkey" by Kadir Karagöz, "Weltoffenheir schafft Jobs" by Antoine Pecoud, and an internet site of data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Furthermore, HWWI (Hamburg Institute of International Economics) and DIW (German Institute for Economic Research) associations are used to understand the effects of Turkish remittances and entrepreneurs in Germany. Herald Schoen's publication, "Turkey's bid for EU membership, contrasting views of public opinion, and vote choice Evidence from the 2005 German federal election", is supplied to obtain knowledge on the role of Turkish suffrage in German politics. Thus, the first chapter talks about the perspective on the aspect of a unified people, according to Etienne Balibar's theory. Nationalism or nation form stems from the feelings and depends on classes which constitute an essence of exclusion between visible or invisible borders. This theory is contributed to study the cleavage in the immigrant society between the German and Turkish.

The second and third chapters deal with the history of Turkish-German relations after WWII and the decision making process of integration policies. My aim here is to focus on the background of the emergence of Turkish immigrants in Germany, since it was due to this influx that led to the amendment of Germany's constitution to accommodate immigrants.

In the final chapter, the role of the Turkish elites and its accompanying Islamic associations is brought to light. Their strong nationality and the enlargement of their community bring about dynamism within German society. Through their embarkation of business and politics, the Turkish elites have pioneered in improving the status of immigrants.

Germany and Japan accomplished miraculous economic reconstruction after the Second World War. Germany recruited workers from many countries in Europe and this proved to be a test for the Germans to coexist with multi-cultural immigrants. Currently, Japan is suffering from birth-rate decline and the government is recruiting nurses and social workers from Indonesia and the Philippines. Consequently, we will have to face the challenge of living with Muslim immigrants. From the changing process from homogenous state to immigrant society in Japan, it will be useful to study the case of Germany. Thus the study of German's decision-making process for

Turkish immigrants would contribute to the understanding of living alongside

Muslim migrants in my country, Japan.

CHAPTER Ⅰ

THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY THROUGH

NATION, RACE AND RELIGION

1.1. The Emergence of Heterogeneous Elements

Politics concerns the use of power to secure opportunities and determine the course of governmental activities. The realm of politics may fall well above that of state institutions themselves. Therefore, power is an important element in the dynamics of the social sphere[5].

1.1.1. How Societies Define Their Own Nations

After the advent of globalization, change has been shaping modern societies. Although the old patterns still remain, the global order is definitely transforming. These transformations are not restricted to only economics, but are equally prominent within the domains of politics, culture and personal life. Globalization is breaking down established boundaries both internally and externally, and internationally and domestically[6]. By means of global migration, media and

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[5] Giddens, Anthony, (2001), p.59.

[6] Balibar, Etienne (2004), We, The people of Europe, Translated by James Swenson, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p.15.

telecommunications, the world is becoming a global village.[7] We can say that the most influential tool of globalization is migration; it leads to multiculturalism, with various ethnic groups and cultures interacting and living side by side, promoting the idea of a global village. Under the umbrella of globalization, people cross over borders which have become ambiguous to define. In addition, greater ambiguity of the territorial boundaries results more complex issues of people's identity on European territory; people of a nation migrate collectively and their identity becomes difficult to describe. I would like to define nationalism, and then focus on the internal and external borders in relation to identity and ethics.

Nation, nationality and nationalism are associated with the idea of relations between individual and society. Intrinsically, nationalism is not deeply rooted in human nature; rather it develops from the "feelings" or "sentiments"[8]. Nationalism is strongly linked with modern industrialism; in which economic development and complex divisions of labor lead to more effective systems of state and government than those existing before. Furthermore, under economic development strong ideas

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[7] McLuhan, Marshall (1992), Global Village Translated by Bruce, R. Powers, London: Oxford University Press, pp.3-6.

[8] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.12.

of nationalism, promoted by global competition, resulted in almost xenophobic tendencies with people becoming more consciously aware of outsiders. In consequence, they unify as a community on the basis of a common language, ethnicity and religion[9]. The nationality of origin is an inversion of the new community; but it is this inversion that individuals and groups use to preserve their individual identity and group identity. Thus, nationality is intricate and paradoxical between the nation models of citizenship and the idealized images of origins. When discussing national citizenship, there exist two models: the "French path" and the "German path"[10]. The former model is a political nation and the latter a cultural nation, from which originate political institutions that are symbolic of racial feelings and descendant history[11]. A nations, or nationalities, character is effectively bonded by sentiments, collective memories, political ideologies and structures, administration, economic interests and other elements. It is not one, but all of these factors, which need to be taken into consideration, when attempting to unify populations in the framework of the same institution.

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[9] Balibar, Etienne and Wallenstein, Immanuel (1998), Race, Nation, Class Ambiguous Identities, Translated by Chris Turner, London: Verso, pp.37-38.
[10] Balibar, Etienne (2004),p.17.
[11] Ibid., p.37.

Balibar uses the example of Marxist theory; that nation is a link between state and society, political community and individuals, social groups and public sphere[12]. It is the combination of all these elements which constitute a nation and a reproduction of these elements is what maintains a nation's deep-rooted sense of identity. Such reproduction has both internal and external conditions that can change and be easily broken. Therefore, attention has to be paid to the private and public spheres which are ambivalent to circumstances. Actually, the 'nation-form' is not focused on the individuality of its subjects, rather the significant changes of the economic and ideological structures. It is this which define the "nation-form".

1.1.2. Visible and Invisible Borders through Feelings and Sentiments

Nationalism or nation form stems from the feelings or sentiments; therefore, it could be argued that it does not have deep roots in human nature. There are two types of nation forms; the genealogical form that is transmitted from generation to generation determining the conscious and unconscious identities and the language of communication, and the cultural form which produces its own kinds of identification.

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[12] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.17.

States tend to abhor taking over strong control of communication, definition of culture and national language from the administrative influence of clans and churches. Hence, nationalities deeply relate with communities and are capable of replacing other communities by either making their existence superficial, or sometimes combining with them [13]. Thus, nation form within traditional or contractual society is associated with the state and its citizens, namely people within a border that have been embodied in the same nationality and historical individual.

Nationalism is an organic ideology, which occurs across all classes with transnational ideology, and the substance of its content is exclusive between visible or invisible boundaries. Exclusion; as essential to the nation-form, presents social inequalities to people whether one is a national or a foreigner, or belongs to the community or not. Sometimes a majority of citizens within a nation find ways to push foreigners out, or to admit them and integrate or assimilate them, or to expel certain nationals by imaginarily representing them as foreigners[14].

Another important aspect to discuss when considering nationalism is ethnicity. It is one of the most powerful models of construction identities, which are composed of cultural characteristics founded on the representation of genealogies

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[13] Balibar, Etienne and Wallersterin, Immanuel (1998), p.45.
[14] Balibar, Etienne (2004), pp.103-110.

and religious or linguistic affinities. Assmann Aleida insisted that ethnicity is the structure of identity that can be viewed from two points: primary identity which is given by nature and historical roots, and secondary identity which is derived with time from change in public atmosphere (e.g. school, workplace, etc) [15].

The other aspect is the "individual personality." Every individual creates an identity for her/himself. When two extreme situations prove to be incompatible, they transform into a unique social role form. It means that they have changed course and the continuous passage from one identity to another. This experimental process alters the direction people take under the influence of modern nations and consequently, their primary identifications. Not all ethnicities can be immediately transformed into secondary identifications. A primary identity, in order to be incorporated into a national identity, makes people recede from translating the other identity.

As a prominent symptom, borders cannot be defined clearly by the increment of globalization, and this in turn leads to violence which is a product of multicultural problems stemming from linguistic, religious, geographical, or historical identity. This is not formally considered to be what politics refers to as one of the legitimate mediations of secondary national identity, but rather an annoyance

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[15] Ibid., p.112.

of acts that people struggle with, arising from differences between primary and secondary identities[16].

Psychoanalysts call it a "borderline syndrome"; people affected by ambivalence attitudes to identities in social relations, anomie or negative identities, while developing along the path of their primary identity. Moreover, the borderline syndrome is not "civilization's discontent", but its decomposition. Presently, the whole world, including Europe, confronts the tasks and challenges of immigrants' presence which may lead to violence due to clash of identity and class difference. Hence, we cannot escape the question of the nation and its historical and social functions.

1.1.3. The Other Essence of Identification

Nationalism, through feelings or sentiments, creates the ethnic, religious and class struggles. Therefore, within the borderless region of the European Union, it is difficult to define citizenship. The concept of citizenship is as old as politics itself and its characters are associated with the state; hence citizens are a principle of public sovereignty and are acknowledged to participate in political decisions in an individual capacity. Balibar has already shown that each political regime builds its

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[16] Balibar, Etienne (2004), "Europe as Borderland", Nimegen: University of Nijimen, pp.1-4.

distribution of powers according to a specific definition of citizenship. Although it juridically delimits individuals and certain rights and duties, this definition crystallizes the constitutive social relations and the level of the individual within the society[17].

For enlargement and transformation of individual rights to occur, collective action leading to collective power relations proves to be indispensable. This can more or less be achieved through representative organizations and administrative institutions. As a result, the power of the individual grows, and there is progress in equality. However, developments of certain state institutions can emphasize the cleavage between different classes. That is to say, citizenship, with the rise of individual power and collective power relations, organizations and institutions is the tool that maintains balance in ambivalence. Citizenship in a hierarchical society is based on the right of human labor, and only when the relation of an individual is redefined, can we say that citizenship has achieved concrete existence[18].

Accordingly, the struggle for citizenship is not only through the internationalization of basic culture but also through the flexibility of the national

[17] Anthony, Marc (1994)," Landmarks of World Civilization", Vol. 2, Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, p.2.
[18] Ibid.

and racial barriers; which were set up within the domains of communication and groups, of which history has implanted in the soil of old Europe.

1.2. Are Borders Defined by a Nation?

Border is a term that defines not only the line of separation between neighboring states, but also the component to preserve all the functions of sovereignty within states [19]. Indications of racism could be attributed to the reactionary demands to up-hold sovereignty of the states and is related to nationalism and citizenship. The notions of nationalism and racism cannot be equated, yet the elements of race and nation are never very far apart[20]. When people advocate racism, it induces anti-sentiments for the presence of immigrants. Under the constitution of nation-states, racism is the essence of individual political movements. According to the Balibar's theory, racism started developing within the field of nationalism, and has been ubiquitous in the modern era. Additionally, it is associated with the economic or psychological explanations which are presuppositions or subsidiary effects of nationalism.

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[19] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.35.
[20] Balibar, Etienne and Wallenstein, Immanuel, (1998), p.37.

In present day, neo-racism is argued to be inevitable, and deep certain characteristics of xenophobia persist which induce cultural identities. Modern states egalitarian exists, but the capacity of the national communities is limited both internally and externally, especially in terms of universal suffrage and political citizenship[21].

Thus, nationalism and racism cannot be separated from each other by applying "classical schemas of causality" (historical events), "mechanistic" (nationalism and racism) or "spiritualistic" (people's subconscious). Theoretically, racism has a philosophical history which is inherent in man's subconscious by nature or birth. Winant argues that human nature is affected by a system of natural differences, but the principal importance of the criterion is genealogy which is a category of pure nature[22]. Universally, we tend to accept the notion of man's genetic inheritance or cultural tradition, but at the end of the day, human aggression or altruism brings to our awareness the various ideas of xenophobia, ethnocentrism and tribalism.

Racism is not entirely derived from human nature; it is also affected by the social sphere. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, class struggle and race

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[21] Ibid., pp.52-61.
[22] Winant, Howard (2000), "Race and Race Theory", Philadelphia: Annual Reviews, pp.169-171.

struggle went hand in hand with each other. The struggle was supposed to establish

for all time each nation's status and place in the hierarchy of nations. It was like a

supplement to universality, the ideology of the race struggle was able in a way to

draw a line around the universalism of class struggle and set against it a different

conception of the world[23].

1.2.1. Is Race a Compound of Historical Aspects?

A nation is a sociopolitical division, linked to the actual or potential

boundaries of a state. On the other hand, an ethnic group is supposed to be a cultural

division. It is based on certain continuing behaviors, and the behaviors descend from

generation to generation within state boundaries. Even in the global society, the

historical social aspect is essential, because persons are persuaded to act in a certain

way even with the passage of time. Behavior patterns of the past are a central

element in the socialization of individuals and a tool in the maintenance of group

solidarity[24]. Hence, it is preeminently a moral phenomenon, a political phenomenon,

and always a contemporary phenomenon. These race, nation and ethnic groups in

terms of genetically continuous groups, historical sociopolitical groups and cultural

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[23] Balibar, Etienne and Wallenstein, Immanuel, (1998), pp.204-206.

[24] Balibar, Etienne, (2002), Political and the Other Scene, Translated by Christine, J. James Swenson, Chris Turner, London: Verso, pp.56-61.

groups are all human constructs, all inventions of the past and all contemporary political phenomena. These three historical structures are associated with the basic structural features of the capitalist world-economy. In particular, ethnic group is related to the creation of internal structures, and thus the axial between ethnic group and division of labor, engendered polarization of core-periphery. This phenomenon expands in a Europe-centered capitalist world-economy. After the Cold War, various national movements came about and demanded new sovereign states[25]. Race struggle with world-economy and nationalist movements gave rise to both internal disintegration and external aggression. Immanuel Wallerstein said that;

"Race and racism unite intrazonally the core zones and the peripheral zones in their battles with each other, whereas nation and nationalism divide the core zones and peripheral zones intrazonally in the more complex intrazonal as well as intrazonal competition for detailed rank order[26]."

The root causes of problems associated with peoplehood lie in the basic contradictions of the historical system, inequality, and constant restructuring of economic processes. Peoplehood stems from a major institutional construct of historical capitalism. On the contrary, classes stem from different constructs of

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[25] Balibar, Etienne and Wallenstein, Immanuel (1991), pp.96-100.
[26] Ibid., pp.36-39.

people, not from contradictions in social communities but historical systems. Thus,

class racism is strongly connected with racism within world-capitalism society[27].

1.2.2. Heterogeneous Elements and Assimilation

An immigrant is a heterogeneous peoplehood who is prey to rejection and

conflict and struggles repeatedly to fight against such behavior. This affair of

struggle within a state is known as an "immigrant problem". The factors of the

problem are the differential standards in life and social welfare; in terms of

employment, accommodation, social security, schooling and morals. All of the

formations of immigrants are complex, so it is difficult to simply accept and

assimilate into the host society.

The categories of immigrants and immigration are constituted in these

elements; geographical origins, specific histories, and conditions of entry into the

national space which are wholly heterogeneous[28]. To territorialize means to assign

identities to collective subjects within given structures of power, therefore we can

categorize and individualize a human-being inside a territory. However, immigrants

who cannot be assimilated resist territorialization and they live beyond the territory,

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[27] Ibid., p.79.
[28] Ibid.

namely in an anti-political or counter-political space. It is clearly distinguishable how

the national and foreigner express sovereignty, as a power to unify populations, to

maintain stability and to draw the borderline within the territory[29]. The national

citizen in a given territory experiences private freedom and public subjection and

through this secures the settlement of religious conflicts among the population within

the national borders. However, with the arrival of globalization, European territories

have established supra-national borders. As a consequence, there are not only

religious boundaries, but also various forms of maintaining equilibrium between

internal and external conflicting forces, provided by stronger and broader global

borders.

1.3. The Dilemma of Different Religion in Society

Civilization is the cause of population movement. Improvements in

transportation made migration easier, quicker and cheaper. Advancements in

communication encouraged the pursuit of economic opportunities and promoted

relations between migrants and their families back home. In the last two decades of

the twentieth century, immigration created a new dilemma that is contradictory and

changing, with the balance of power shifting significantly in Europe. Actually,

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[29] Balibar, Etienne (2004), pp.10-11.

immigrants are seen as profitable for future population growth in Western societies,

but Westerners suffer from the gaps; different languages, different religions, different

cultures now occupy their jobs and land. By the early 1990s two-thirds of the

migrants in Europe were Muslims. Thus, the population of Muslim immigrants was

increasing, to make up for the labor shortage[30]. As we have discussed, civilization

can be divided into "materials" and "morals", with morals contained in culture,

ethnicity, language and religion.

Samuel P. Huntington expressed a term "fault line" which means:

> Conflicts are particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims. At the local or micro level, fault line conflicts occur between neighboring states from different civilizations, between groups which are attempting to create new states out of the wreckage of old[31].

I shall now shift my attention to Turkey and Germany in that fault line. I

will begin with Turkey, which is trying to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.

The Copenhagen criterion states that:

> Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities, and the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the

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[30] Ibid., pp.14-22.
[31] Huntington, P., Samuel , (1997), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, pp.207-.208.

candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union[32].

Since the end of the 1990s, democratization in Turkey could not be achieved without pressure from signatories for EU membership. Presently, Turkey is still working to achieve this criterion, and as seen from the results of the amendment of the law and economic reforms, there has been noticeable progress.

Today's Germany; the host country for many Turkish immigrants, recognizes that Turkey can play a crucial role for the EU because of its strategic geographical location. About 9 percent of the population in Germany constitutes of foreigners[33]. Above all, the Turks occupy a high proportion of the foreign population and have even made up a little town, so-called "little-Istanbul". The German government previously considered how to adapt the Turkish immigrants to the German society. Whereas before it had taken steps to exclude Turkish migrants, it is now trying to integrate them with the Germans, to live together in a multi-cultural society. After such changes in policy Turkey became the biggest trade partner of Germany. Moreover, by int

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[32] Cini, Michelle (ed.) (2007), European Union Politics, Second Edition: New York, Oxford Press, pp.426-427.
[33]"Islam and Identity in Germany", (2007: March 14), European Report, No.181, pp.1-4.

egrating rapidly developing business elite within the country, Turkey would begin gain national and economic power, and this could pave its way for the European Union membership.

In the following chapters, I shall cover the presence of Turkish immigrants in Germany as a result of the history of the Turkish German relations.

CHAPTER ΙΙ

GERMAN POLITICS TO INTEGRATE THE TURKISH MIGRANTS

2.1. Turkish Migration to Germany

After the Second World War, the total unemployment within the Federal Republic of Germany was 94,856, whereas the number of job vacancies was 572,758[34]. In 1961, Germany and Turkey signed an agreement, enticing earners from the secularist Muslim country with prospects of work and stability, while at the same time, providing Germany with a cheaper workforce. The agreement has resulted into the emergence of Turkish migrants in Germany and this leads to the examination of Turkish immigrants today.

Turkey had declared war against Germany in the late stages of the Second World War and it inevitably became a victorious country when Germany was defeated. In the post war period, Turkey maintained good relations with Germany, and diplomatically relations were fully recovered by 1951. Then in 1952, Turkey became a full member of NATO[35].

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[34] Eryılmaz, Aytaç (2002), "40 years in Germany-At Home Abroad": DOMIT, p.1.
[35] Ibid.

As an opportunity to regain international position, the then French foreign

minister; Robert Schuman, established the European Coal and Steel Community

(ECS). The primary goal of the ECS was to manage the coal and steel industry as a

community in 1950 to prevent further recurrence of a war. This was not only the

origin of the European Union, but also a step for Germany towards making a

comeback into the international arena. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the

already tensed relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued to

deteriorate. West Germany was required to remilitarize the framework of NATO and

ECS, and it retrieved its sovereignty in 1955.

Through progress, Germany has advanced, and is catching up with America,

but at the same time, it is facing the migration problem[36]. Such circumstances have

forced the German government to discontinue accepting foreign guest workers,

because of the shift in industrial and energy structures and the oil crisis in the 1970s.

During the 1960s and 1970s, Germany had identified foreigners as labor force, but

they had to change the policy for immigrants and foreign labor under the economical

conditions. To deal with the foreign workers was not easy, as special policy-changes

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[36]Urwin, W., Derek (2007), "The European community: From 1945 to 1985, in EU", Michelle, Cini
(ed.), European Union Politics, New York: Oxford Press, p.14.

for immigrants needed to be adopted. The immigration problem affected the German society, because the migrants summoned their families, and the second generation of the workers started to settle in Germany. Germany had the task of catering for not only the foreign worker, but also the families and the next generation of German-Turks in their society.

In the middle of the 1950s, Germany's development increased and it exploded into rapid economic growth. The extraordinary economic growth was referred to as the "economic miracle"[37]. Under the circumstances, it caused the increase in demand for labor. However, the German youth were needed for and recruited in the army. Hence, the lack of labor became a serious problem in the Federal Government of Germany. To make up for the shortage in labor, the government started to contract foreign guest workers.

The first labor agreement was concluded with Italy in 1955. With the initiation of the agreement, guest workers came from European countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece[38]. In 1974, the Turkish-German migration agreement; signed in 1961, was officially nullified due to the 1973 oil crisis. This agreement was the fundamental pact for the origin of Turkish migrants in Germany.

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Eryılmaz, Aytaç (2002), p.2.

The Verbal note agreement states: 'The worker's permits could be prolonged only for three years and the labor and residence permits were limited to two years[39].'

The above regulation was based on the "rotation principle"[40]. The guest workers stayed in Germany for a certain period, and then new workers came to work instead of the former workers. It was convenient for the Turkish government to rotate Turkish workers, so that the Turkish industry could improve with a well-trained work force. The guest workers were engaged in the construction industry, iron, steel and metal industries, mining industry, brickfields, textile industry, etc. Manual labor was essential in developing its economy, so guest workers were deployed by the host country, Germany. From 1963 to 1973, the number of foreign labor increased from 550,000 to 2.6 million. In total, about 14 million foreign workers came to Germany, and about 11 million left the country during this period. In 1989, the number of the foreign resident population in the Federal Republic amounted to almost 4.9 million[41].

When the rotation system started, it could not function effectively. From the employers' point of view, the system was turning out to be inefficient as new employees had to be taught every two years, which essentially limited the capabilities of the migrant workers. Consequently in 1964, the German Ministry of

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[39] Ibid., P.2
[40] Ibid

Foreign Affairs abolished the treaty on limited stay. As a result, many workers

decided to stay; and bring their families from Turkey, from that period on.

The German government now sees the foreigner not as a tool of labor but an

immigrant. It has been wrestling with the immigrants' problem since that time.

However, to change the law for foreigners was difficult because it had to be adopted

not only by the government, but also the German citizens. The more the foreign

population increased, the more the German society suffered from gaps between

cultures, problems with unemployment and second generation immigrants[42].

2.1.1. The Law of Migrants during the 1980s

After the Schmidt administration stopped contracting labor workers from

foreign countries, in 1964, Kohl's government decided a continuation of the policy;

of restraining the increasing number of foreign workers. The early Schmidt regime,

Social Democratic Party (SPD) in coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP);

during the coalition cabinet, put forward a lax policy compared to that of the Kohl

administration[43]. However, when Helmut Kohl was elected in 1976, in coalition with

CDU/CSU, the foreign policy underwent changes as well. One of Kohl's platform

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[41]Yatani, Machiko (ed.) (2007), p.80.
[42] Kohlmeier, M., Schimany, P., (2005), "The impact of immigrant on Germany's society", Germany: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees Migration and Integration Research Department, p.45.
[43] Morii, Yuichi (2007), Yatani, Machiko（ed.), p.87.

policies was to carry out the "Return Support Law" for migrants[44]. He stressed the background of the law, which stated that the migrant issue occupied an important position in the German society, at the time of the economic recession. The characteristic of his policy restricted the influx of foreigners to Germany, whilst encouraging them to return to their own countries. Additionally, he emphasized for the foreigners staying in Germany to integrate with the German society.

Although the return law was executed in 1983, the number of migrants did not decrease much, even after the government constituted a law to reward returners. The foreign (economic) issue in Germany was to have temporary laborers to supplement the labor shortage, but instead it turned into a social, immigrant issue which continued throughout the 1980s[45].

2.2. Turning Point in the Basic Policy for Immigrants

In the 1990s, a dramatic change in foreign law was needed to accommodate the shift in the political aspects, of not only Germany, but also Europe. Firstly, to unite Europe, the EC constituted the Maastricht treaty to establish EU at the EC summit, which was signed in 1993.

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[44] "Gesety yur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern vom" (1983), BGBL. S. Vol.1377.
[45] Morii, Yuichi (2007), Yatani, Machiko（ed.), p.88.

According to Article 8:

Every citizen of the Union could move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States[46].

This treaty enabled the free flow of immigrants across Europe, effectively breaking down nation states, and formerly existing boundaries. The second significant event for Germany in the 1990's, was the unification of East and Western Germany. Through its unification, Germany regained center stage in its role in Europe. Hence, people from the Eastern Soviet-block, and Turkey, surged to Germany where they were assured a stable economy and a status of being in the EU[47]. Additionally, refugees started to flow in as well to Germany. They came mostly from Turkey, and those with German origins applied for German citizenship, but almost all of the refugees were recognized as economic refugees who did not qualify for asylum.

However, the government could not send them back to their countries under the asylum pact of 1951, thus even though they were not accepted as refugees, the applicants stayed in Germany as immigrants. On top of that, with the social disorder after the end of the Cold War, immigrants and social integration of foreigners were points of issue in Germany.

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[46] Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm (13 Sep 2009).
[47] Szabo, F., Stephen (1992), pp.101-102.

The Alien Act was executed in 1991 to implement the integration of foreigners. This law was constituted under Kohl's administration (the CDU and FDP coalition cabinet) whose policy was different for each party. CDU took a stand on restraining foreigners, whereas FDP's policy was more liberal. Hence, the law took into account both policies; diluting it, and did not produce satisfactory outcomes[48].

In the early 1990s, because of the social and economic disorder due to the break up of the Soviet Union, there was an influx of immigration into to Germany. After the unification of Germany, extreme right wing parties triggered discrimination of foreigners. Particularly, in the eastern part of Germany, the youth of neo-Nazi groups attacked foreigners[49]. The most tragic affairs included the setting of fire on a Turkish family's house, causing the death of three victims in Holstein. As immigration increased, the xenophobic atmosphere steadily grew stronger. To accompany this was a drastic increase in unemployment.

Article 16 [Citizenship; extradition]

(1) No German may be deprived of his citizenship. Citizenship may be lost only pursuant to a law, and against the will of the person affected only if he does not become stateless as a result.

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[48]Morii, Yuichi (2007), "The Expansion of Germany and EU-Mainly the Turkey Joining Problem of EU", in Yatani, Machiko（ed), The Fronteer of EU, Tokyo: Sinyamasya, p.94.

[49] Kirdar, G., Murat (2005), "Determinants of Return Migration of Turkish Immigrants in Germany": Preliminary and Incomplete, p.3.

(2) No German may be extradited to a foreign country.

To cope with immigration and refugee problems, the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition government amended Article 16 of the Constitution[50]. Through the amendment, the number of refugee applicants declined as it became difficult to pass as refugees. However, Turkish applicants occupied a high percentage of applications. During the 1990s, a coup d'état left Turkey in confusion and many Kurds and Turks were persecuted on grounds of ethnicity and freedom of speech, so they escaped to Germany. Although many steps had been taken to 'stem the tide' of immigration into Germany, external complications continued to force the mass-migration of foreign nations, from one place or another. (Figure1) As Turkey is a member of European dominated institutions, such as NATO and CE, Turkish nationals felt they had the same rights of immigration, as that of other Europeans.

2.2.1. Dual Citizenship and Birth Right Citizenship

In 1993, the government put a brake on the influx of refugees, but they had at hand the more critical task of integrating immigrants into the German society. Beginning from the 1960s, the Turkish moved to Germany as guest workers who later called their families and then the second generation grew up there. Since the

Turkish population was large, the German government could not think economically and politically anymore without considering Turkish immigrants. In the context of the immigrant issue, the German government has come up with the concept of a multicultural society to follow the American model.

Germany had adopted "jus soil" for citizenship, but when the SPD/Green coalition came to power in 1998, one of its first activities was the amendment of the citizenship legislation[51]. The party took a more liberal stance on the policy for foreigners than did CDU/CSU. Consequently, the German immigrant policy resulted into a new movement. The initiation of dual citizenship was aimed at making immigration easier for people in the Germany society.

According to the law concerning nationality since 1913, the children whose mother or father had a German citizenship could qualify for German citizenship[52]. However, after the amendment of the law, the government adopted birthright citizenship and naturalization. Birthright citizenship is whereby a person born in Germany to a foreign parent, who has resided in Germany lawfully for eight years and has held unlimited residency permit for at least three years, would automatically

[50] Kirdar, G., Murat (2005), p.5.
[51] Borkert, M., Bosswick, W., (2007), "Migration Policy-Making in Germany-Between National Reluctance and Local Pragmatism?", Italy: Imiscoe Working Paper, No.20, p.13.
[52] Ibid.

be granted German citizenship[53]. Before the constitution of the new law, 1.5 million German-born foreigners, who would have been classed as non-Germans, could now potentially more easily integrate themselves in society.

In accord with the naturalization law of 2000, when children are born in Germany, they would automatically obtain the German citizenship. However, if the children arrive when they are between the ages of 18 and 23, they must opt for a single citizenship. In other words, dual citizenship is accepted only for people below 18, but when they come of age, they have to choose only one nationality. The naturalization law excluded adult immigrants, permitting them to have dual citizenship. It was easier to get German citizenship before the new naturalization law, but when they wanted to apply for German citizenship, they had to clear some requirements. These include living in Germany for more than eight years, and to acquire sufficient German language.

2.2.2. Highly Skilled Migrants in Germany

In the advent of globalization, Germany had to deal with the decrease in economy arising from global competition. To make up for the lack of human resources; in Information Technology (IT), and to develop its IT industries, the

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[53] Anil, Merih (2004), p.8.

government adopted a new migration policy, the so-called "Green Card". It called for scientists with special technical knowledge, teaching or scientific personnel in prominent positions, or specialists and executive personnel; with special professional experience, receiving a statutory health insurance scheme and a salary corresponding to at least twice the earnings of the standard immigrant[54].

This system made reference to the American H-1B visa, to which the German Green Card was closely related. Under the German version, foreign experts could work in certain positions in German companies, for up to a period of five years. Through the Green Card, 50,000 to 75,000 job vacancies whose specialty were IT, were supplied by information and communication technology (ICT). The innovative and competitive capability of the technology sector was rapidly growing in Germany[55]. The characteristic of the Green Card system offered a flexible and non-bureaucratic reaction to labor shortages in the market. The government aimed to receive educated migrants who came from Eastern Europe and India, not low-wage

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[54] "Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners (Immigration Act)",
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d89aa2d4.html [accessed 24 December 2009].
[55] Kolb, Holger (2005), "The German Green Card: Germany", Migration Research Group.
http://www.focus-migration.de (10 Nov 2009).

workers. Thereon, the eastern European population in Germany increased in form of not only asylum-seekers and low-wage workers, but also Green Card migrants.

After the inflow of high-educated migrants, there developed a polarization of migrants into high- and low-wage workers. According to Figure 3, the highest percentage of Green Card holders came from India and the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, the number of Turkish coming into Germany was not more of IT specialists, but asylum-seekers.

In addition, after the unification of Germany, the unemployment rate started to increase rapidly, as seen in Figure 2. When the government had first started to accept guest workers, almost all of the migrants were blue-collar workers. However, as more second and third generation immigrants grew up and enrolled in higher education, and the naturalization number increased, the gap between the Germans and immigrants decreased, and so did the difference in class within immigrants.

2.3. Turkish Awareness on Naturalization

The adaption of the dual citizenship, even if it was for limited age groups, affected the status of foreigners. The German government stipulated an immigrant condition whose feature made it easier for the immigrants to integrate, i.e. to be able to integrate and for naturalization to occur, one had to know sufficient German

language. Hence, non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and the government took the initiative to provide courses in German language, starting from basic grammar, which aimed to decline the situation of migrants not adjusting to the German society, because of lack of knowledge of the language[56].

Turkish migrant workers started coming to Germany from the 1960s. Now the second and third generations in Germany occupy about 53 % of the total Turkish in Germany. In the course of time, half of the number of German-Turkish decided to stay back in Germany. Actually, only one-third of them returned to Turkey, following the return support law[57]. Presently, majority of the Turkish choose to settle in Germany, and what's more, one-third of the Turkish adults in total have obtained German nationality and where the second generation is concerned, about 50 percent of them are German nationals (Figure5).

Even though the German government adopted dual citizenship, the number of citizenship applicants did not change drastically; since the Turkish immigrants did not feel the need to obtain German citizenship (Figure 6). This phenomenon shows that applicants who had already acquired German-citizenship; and stayed behind, did

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[56] Beck, Eric (1999), "Language Rights and Turkish Children in Germany", London: SAGE Publications, pp.6-7.
[57] Avcı, Gamze (2006), "Comparing Integration Policies and Outcomes: Turks in the Netherlands and Germany", UK: Turkish Studies, 7 (1), pp.68-70.

not actually desire German citizenship, even when they passed its prerequisites. At the end is an appendix of some figures showing that the Turkish have multiple identities which stem from the following circumstances: a sense of belonging, nationality and belief in Islam. (Figure 7) According to the appendices, we see that their identities are very complicated. Figure 8 shows that in 2000, German-Turkish were still preoccupied by the sense of belonging to Turkey. But what's remarkable is that many German-Turks have a sense of belonging to both countries, Germany and Turkey[58]. The Turkish immigrants assimilate and obtain German identities but for the most part of it, they tend to lean towards Turkey.

Through Figures 4 to 6, we can observed that the German-Turks do not want to go back to their home country, but at the same time, they choose not to abandon their Turkish citizenship even though the number of German citizenship holders has been on the rise since 1999. Presently, the number of applicants has been declining. Moreover, Turkey is speculated to be in a dilemma between politics and religion. It has been longing to be part of the Europe Union since the Ataturk revolution, but as seen in Germany, even when the Turkish are away from their home country, their life depends on Islam, and it plays an important role in the host society. According to

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[58] Morii, Yuichi（2007）, Yatani, Machiko（ed.）, p.107.

figure 8, Turkish immigrants waver between their German and Turkish identities as the generation shifts to the next.

As I mentioned previously, the emergence of Turkish migrants in Germany started in the 1960s. During that time, in the first generation, the German government recognized migrants as temporary guest workers. For the Turkish, Germany was simply a place to earn capital and due to the fact that the majority of the first generation migrants lack German ability, they tended to stay and communicate within their Turkish communities. Some of them run their own grocery shops or small businesses, where they do not find the need for German language.

As for the second and third generations born in Germany, some of them take up higher education during which period they belong to the German society, but their parents and relatives know only Turkish. When they go back home, they retreat to the 'little Istanbul'.

I will now analyze the theory from the angle of the Turkish immigrants. Balibar stated that "To be civilized means to have polished manners." So even though immigrants have their own unique culture and custom, they are expected to adapt to being "civilized" German's. But at the same time they are adamantly trying

to maintain their native culture[59]. This comes with two meanings: moral (law) and material values (identity). Karl Marx also distinguished these values as superstructure (spiritual) and infrastructure (material). The "spiritual" aspect is inherited from culture, values and ideals.

On the other hand, "material" is connected to the fundamental Marxist argument, regarding the divisions in the economical class. With improvements in industrial technology and other developments in the West, the spread of common culture has become phenomenal in the modern world, globalizing societies and removing the complications of migrating into another culture[60]. Hence, it is an interaction between "spiritual" and "material" elements. People also struggle to adjust to settle in society; if their economic status is low or they are dealt with unfairly, they feel alienated from the country. And then again, even when they communicate only with their own nationality or refuse to associate them-selves with the host culture, they still experience isolation despite their high economical status and high salaries.

At this point, I choose to differ with Karl Marx's argument on superstructure (spiritual) and infrastructure (material). The early immigrants did not need to fulfill

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[59] Yılmaz, Hakan (2007), "Turkish Identity on the Road to the EU: Basic Elements of French and German Oppositional Discourses": Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 9 (3), pp. 294-295.

the material element, i.e. obtaining citizenship. To satisfy the "spiritual" elements,

they instituted development of communities and organizations through their own

means. Their children live a more complicated life in the cleavages between the

German and Turkish societies. They insist on retaining their ethnicity whilst

acquiring the German language and citizenship. Citizenship is the instrument for

accomplishing their material elements. To maintain their ethnic identity, they

established associations.

The issue of political space is important in showing the definition of the

concept of "borders", and their "institutions" in the active sense. These terms are

central to reflecting on being a German citizen, and more generally, political

associations. This is indeed one way of introducing the relationship between

"citizenship" as an institution or an ideal, and warped the historical societal form of

the Federal Republic of Germany[61].

In my study of this chapter, I brought to light the presence of Turkish

immigrants in Germany, their conflict with identities, behavior and position in the

society; while taking into account the Germans' attempts in integrating them into the

society at large. I also touched on the emergence of institutions among marginalized

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[60] Braudel, Fernand (1995), A History of Civilizations, New York: Penguin Books, pp.4-6.

Turkish immigrants, their characteristics and role effects on society. This chapter would aid in the understanding of chapter 4, which analyzes the process of enlargement of the institutions from inner Turkish society to the public society. I shall also deal with the role of Islam in the dilemma of Turkish immigrants' integration. Turkish sense of belonging inclines not towards Germany, but Turkey. However, to become a German citizen; and to have an open political space, is necessary in making great progress within the sovereign power of Germany, including supra-national organizations, or in imposing economic forces through leading to automatic domination of the market. This will be discussed in further detail in the latter chapters.

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[61] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.2.

CHAPTER III

THE DILEMMA OF TURKISH IMMIGRANTS FOR INTEGRATION WITHIN GERMAN SOCIETY

3.1. The Formation of Immigrant Societies

It stems from cultural diversity; the phenomena explaining an ethnically diverse society. The reality is, more often than not, many groups of the same ethnicity living in segregated communities formulating a migrant society. These phenomena show that 'alien' immigrants cannot adapt themselves to the host country; this is referred to as a "failed integration". Immigrants form communities, and establish organizations for sharing amongst themselves their identities and customs, culture, religion, economic status etc[62]. Gradually, foreign organizations extended, and it became indispensable to live in the German society. In this chapter, I will mention over the emergence of Islamic foundations to counterplot the host society's foreign policy whilst considering the formation of a migrant society.

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[62] Cooper, Robert (1999), "Integration and Disintegration", Journal of Democracy, 10 (1), pp.1-2.

3.1.1. The Background of Immigrant Societies

What brought Turkish migrants to Germany was the bilateral agreement signed between Turkey and Germany in 1961 to send the Turkish as guest workers in Germany. The first Turkish workers were under the impression that Germany was only a working place to earn money, hence even under tough working conditions, they could endure the hardships. However, later they decided to call their families and settle in Germany where a better welfare system was guaranteed than in Turkey.

The Turkish is occupied as the majority of foreign workers in Germany. The immigrants tended to cluster in particular areas where living costs were relatively cheaper, and consequently established a Turkish community whereby they were free to practice their culture and custom. Furthermore, the wider the gap between the natives and migrants, the more problems both the Germans and Turkish faced. As the second and third Turkish generations grew up, they needed to be taught their mother tongue and the Islamic culture. To solve the issue of raising their families and establish private space, the migrants felt it necessary to uphold their Turkish cultural inheritance and ensure they maintain their united Turkish identity.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the essence of identity comes from "feelings" or "sentiments". Nation and ethnicity are associated with the idea of relations

between the individual and society. Turkish migrants recognized that they could not adapt to the German society under the anti-foreign, different religion atmosphere, and thus they tried to unite as a community formulated on a common language, ethnicity and religion. Once these communities expanded, they established institutions; places to teach their native language/ teach German study the Koran and offer sporting activities for children. By increasing the number of associations and participating in them, migrants had more power than simply being individuals within the host society. On the other hand, the more solidarity the migrants had, the more marginalized they were within German society.

3.2. The Emergence of Islamic Foundations to Counterplot Foreign Policy

According to the Basic Law, Germany takes a neutral position on religion. However, whereas the Jewish community, Catholic and Protestant churches are all recognized publicly, Islam is not seen as a registered association since it must conditionally have a democratic structure with a membership list[63].

Accordingly, the Jewish, Catholics and Protestants pay states tax and can administer publicly and children can take religious education to gradually formulate their respective religious identities. However, for the Muslims, no related curriculum

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[63] Tol, Gonul (2008), "Institutionalization of Islam in Germany and the Netherland": Beyond EU Jurisdiction": European Diversity and Integration Conference, p.5.

is offered in public schools, hence it was necessitated to establish private lessons to teach the language and Koran for children who were born in Germany. As a result, the community of Turkish migrants mitigated a sense of alienation from the host society. Associations were their instruments to express political and religious concerns.

3.2.1. The Classification of Institutions and Their Role for Immigrants

The representatives of Islamic associations in Germany are Süleymancı, Nurcu, National Opinion Muslim Gemeinschat (IGMG), The presidency of Religious Affairs (DITIB). Different processes were undertaken while establishing the respective organizations. Süleymancı pioneered activities in the host country. It focuses on the teachings of "Süleyman doctrines", named after the leader, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan, and has been offering Koran courses for children since 1949 as an alternative to the state controlled courses. Moreover, it has extended its network around Europe from the mid-1960s, and established Islamic cultural centers and associations (İslam Kültür Merkezleri Birliği).

The Nurcu community is an organization of reading groups led by seniors who studied Risale-i Nur; Said Nursi's commentaries on the Koran[64]. These textual communities were on a mission to make developments in faith and science. After Said Nursi's death, Fethullah Gülen (1938-) became a preacher who advocated Said Nursi's doctrine, and adopted Max Weber's theory for modern Islam. Currently, the group has spread to mainly Turkic Muslim countries and the group of media consists of Zaman newspaper published in 15 countries, Smanyolu-TV channel, CHA news agency, and the weekly magazine Aksiyon. In addition, they have instituted numerous schools, universities and companies not only in Turkic Muslim countries, but also in Europe and Asian countries. The group has extended gradually to make the most of both education and media[65].

After Süleymancı, IGMG has been the next campaigner in Europe, which has supported migrants since 1995. This organization was first established by Necmettin Erbakan to assist the Turkish National Salvation Party (MSP). Until 1997, the foundation had strong political relations with its home country. Currently, IGMG is dedicated in providing religious education, vocational training and supplies on a

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[64] Azak, Umut (2008), "Islam and Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands": Turkish Studies, p.7.
[65] Ibid.

large scale and long-term basis. There are more than 450 mosques in Berlin, which is one of the centers for their activities. Forty-five of these mosques are regulated by Turkish Muslim organizations, and sixteen of them belong to İGMG which are under the government-controlled DITIB[66].

DITIB is a different kind of organization above all the others. It is a state institution, representative of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and not individuals. The institution reflects similar foundations to that of the Republic of Turkey, and was established by Mustafa Kemal. He aimed to create a modern nation-state united by a common Turkish Muslim identity, likened to French positivism. Hence, it was established to institute control of religion in place of the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Law and Charitable Foundation of 1924. Regarding its foreign activities, the first office was founded in Berlin in 1982 which originated from the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism during the 1980s. Thus, the Turkish government reinforces control not only in domestic organizations and activities, but in foreign countries as well.

Now DITIB has 889 member associations, each registered as a non-profit cultural association and their main activity is to send trained Imams on four-year

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[66] Naito, Masanori (1995), "Integration or Exile: German Ausländer Politik and Turkish Migrants", Hitothubashi Journal of Social Studies 27 special issues, p.81.

basis for the Turkish immigrants. Until 2006, there were approximately 530 imams employed by the Turkish government who have been working in Germany on a limited contract. Besides overseeing mosques, DITIB associations also offer folklore, Turkish and German classes, and provide scholarships to children of Turkish migrants to attend university[67]. When it comes to its administration in a foreign country, DITIB does not have a clashing, but rather a cooperative relationship with other associations within the host country intended to preserve Turkish culture and religion.

3.2.2. Integration or Marginalization?

Muslim associations were established to band together the Turkish mainly for language courses and vocational training, and to preserve their Turkish culture, mother tongue, religion and folklore. The Turkish migrant society diversified and expanded within Germany whilst maintaining political and ideological ties with Turkey. Since the Turkish migrated to Germany, they have been suffering from racial discrimination. Therefore, they resorted to developing their own villages and communicate among their own nationality.

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[67] Gibbon, James (2007), "Religion, Immigration, and the Turkish Government in Germany Reexamining the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB)": Princeton University, p.7.

The associations could obstruct the contact with German society, possibly causing immigrants to communicate with only their same ethnic group, hence the failed attempts at integrating the society. The more exclusionist policy initiated in Germany towards foreigners, the more the Turkish marginalized their own immigrant community behind the shield of Muslim organizations. In fact, as a result of the exclusionist policy in society, the German-Turkish are more conscious of their ethnic identity than are the French- and Dutch-Turkish[68].

Contrary to my presumption, the number of those wearing headscarves has been gradually widespread in the second generation (Figure 1). The figure is surveyed amongst Turkish, and other origins of Muslims, who depend strongly on their religion. In other words, from the second generation onwards, they are inclined to the authority of Islam because their ethnic and national identities are fragmented and they hover between Turkish and German identities.

Although they place more emphasis on their national (home), ethnic and Muslim identities, it does not mean that they do not participate in the German society (Figure 2). The second-generation and onwards, in particular, relate less with Germans socially, but maintain a good rapport when it comes to economy.

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[68] Rund, E., Evelyn (2007), "Koopmans, The Cultural Integration of Turkish Immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands: A Controlled Comparison": Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, pp.8-10.

According to Figure 2, when we compare with Netherlands and France, Turkish immigrants in Germany had been more adapted to the German labor market around 1960s. It was only after the Turkish immigrant workers began to settle, uniting with their families, did the situation change for helping lower-skilled immigrants, Turkish labor unions have cooperated with the German professional education system to enable easy access into the labor market.

Due to strong cultural assimilation pressures, German-Turks vehemently resist ethnic and religious domain especially when measured up against French-Turks and Dutch-Turks. However, when it comes to business, Germany is the biggest trading partner of Turkey in Europe. Multi-ethnicities and languages play an essential role for Germany to be a powerful nation, economically and politically. As a result, the German-Turkish who are well-conversant with both German and Turkish languages are the key trading partners and actors for the issue of EU membership.

When all is said and done, the Turkish are making efforts to integrate within the Western society while maintaining their own culture. This is achieved through such actions as; the Fetullah Gülen movement, whose goal is to constitute schools and centers of education for Turkish immigrants[69]. They are offered an opportunity

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[69] Ibid.

to learn the German and Turkish languages alongside religion, so consequently, to be 'contemporary Muslims' having multicultural notions of political identity and community. Moreover, the government of Turkey sends Turkish teachers through the Ministry of National Education (MEB)[70]. They teach Turkish history and culture which includes some religious instructions. Germany considers these integration approaches on the Turkish side as a means of disintegration and shows reluctance to extend these schools, organizations and system. According to the local German news [71], when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned against assimilation and loss of Turkish identity, CDU scowled their displeasure.

Evelyn[72] argued that it could be argued that some sections of German society are reluctant to coexist with Muslims. The Turkish, in turn, due to feelings of racial discrimination, retreat to their own communities and instutions. This enables them to stand united and form a stronger coalition to be able to project their concerns. Also, under the refuge of such organizations, they ardently preserve their traditions and culture which are then handed down to following generations. However, this

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[70] Ibid.
[71] " CSU Head Questions Turkey's EU Entry after Erdogan's Speech",
http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20080212-10295.html, (12.12.2008)
[72] Rund, E., Evelyn (2007), p.12.

integration leads to the widening of the gap between host and migrant societies, so called marginalization.

Samuel P. Huntington uses the terminology fault-line to define the separation between Muslim and Christian identities. Germany has not erased this line and uses it to maintain the equilibrium while pursuing this, profits each other. Not only economy, but also cultural and religious integration is a key to have a good relationship with Turkey. In the following chapter, I will discuss the economical and political relations that arise in the Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF TURKISH MIGRANTS IN THE GERMAN SOCIETY

4.1. The Relationship between Migrants and the Turkish Economy

Remittance has an effect on developing countries as a short-range plan, compared to Official Development Aid (ODA). The ODA could be described as technical cooperation that comprises of donor government agencies, which contribute funds to developing nations and multilateral institutions, and are geared towards economic development and promoting welfare within developing countries[73]. However, it is likely to be influenced by the economic conditions in both donor and developing countries, and its development aid does not show significant results on the figures in a short period of time.

Turkey depends on remittance as its foreign exchange. Since the 1960s, Turkey's main source of foreign exchange has been in the form of remittances that the workers receive. From this perspective, Turkey's revenue ranks highly in the world today.

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[73] McDonald, Scott (2006), "Labor Migration and Remittances: Some Implications of Turkish Workers in Germany": University of Sheffield, p. 5.

Up to now, the proportion of remittances from Germany occupies a high percentage. When compared to the amount of remittances being received from other European countries, into Turkey, it is German-Turks which remit the most. Gradually, as associations were established and expanded in the German society, there emerged new businesses. "Entrepreneurship" is the new way of earning capital whereby the Turkish apply their trade techniques previously gained in Turkey, directly into the foreign state. Globalization facilitates a great extent of their businesses, and the emergence of Turkish elite and its associations play a new role between Turkey and Germany.

4.1.1. Turkish Migrants and Remittances

Remittances serve as savings, investments, development, consumption, and poverty and income distribution in the recipient countries. The remittances growth provides an impact for a short time in receiving countries through savings and investments, and demand and output from consumption[74]. Thus, remittances play an important part in not only obtaining foreign exchange but also in benefitting own households in home countries.

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[74] Karagöz, Kadir (2009), "Workers' Remittances and Economic Growth Evidence from Turkey", Journal of Yaşar University, p. 1898.

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Turkish migrants started to come to Germany as guest workers from the 1960s following the workforce agreement made with Germany, and the Association Agreement with the European Community. Although the flow of Turkish workers to Europe stagnated; Germany is still the most important host country for Turkish migrants. The trigger of migrating Turkish in Germany was originated from the failed economic policy in Turkey, so called Five Year Development plan. This plan was aimed to stimulate and develop industry within the country, but it was not successful. So, as a means of acquiring foreign exchange, the Turkish government encouraged nationals to seek work in Europe. In the period between 1963 and 1977, Turkey made efforts to catch up with the wave of global rapid industrialization and economic growth. It did, however, dominate the agriculture industry at this time. Nevertheless, it did not yield sufficient national revenues and foreign investments to improve the technological sector. Therefore, on the basis of unstable economy and the flow of unemployment, "[exporting] surplus labor power" proved to be the best way to compensate for a 12.5 percent unemployment ratio[75].

Germany, by making use of the Turkish labor force, the government could counteract the chronic labor shortage, cheaply and flexibly. In spite of this, the

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[75] Bakkal, Ilter (2001), "The Political Economy of the Costs and Benefits of Turkish Accession to the European Union", ESCA meetings in Charleston, pp.1-4.

temporary arrangements gave rise to various problems: firstly, a vast number of immigrants came about from family unifications and illegal labor migrations, and secondly, this induced the need for amendment of the constitution. The German government was at a loss in overcoming these difficulties, while the Turkish migrants used to send their remittances to Turkey which was crucial for the benefit of the social sphere in Turkey.

Figure 11 shows that remittances of Turkish migrants were not recorded in the Turkish balance of payments because of small percentages during the 1960s. Initially, because of the small numbers of migrants, the German government took care of their livelihood from 1964 to 1967. As a result, the Turkish migrants could remit almost all of their income, until the economic crisis hit Germany[76].

After 1974, the persistent increase in inflation rates brought a decline in the migrants' amount of remittance flows. On that account, the Turkish government implemented an economic policy in order to encourage migrants' remittances[77]. Even so, it tried in vain to recover the remittance revenues as the remittances continued to decline through the 1980s'. This decline was attributed to unstable Turkish politics, resulting from the military regime, and later, the economic crisis in 1994.

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[76] Kohlmeier, M., Schimany, P., (2005), pp.27-28.
[77] Sonmez, Y., McDonald, S., (2008), p.9.

Until the end of 1998, workers' remittances occupied 2.3% of the Turkish GDP and 10.6% of export revenues. This was about 6 times the foreign direct investment (FDI) received. Then the great earthquake disaster in 1999 happened and Turkey experienced a downward trend in remittances flow, which had been more of an investment motive for migrant remittances than that of altruism. By the end of the 1990s, the number of Turkish migrants coming to Germany decreased from 400,000 a year to 70,000, compared to the peak of 1980s.

From the beginning of 2000, workers' remittances have stagnated. The decrease in remittances was an outcome of the migrants' unification with their families in Western Europe[78]. Thus, entrepreneurship became more common in recent years, rather than remitting to home country. With the increase of settled migrants (family units), there was no more need to send money to Turkey for families and this caused a decline in the remittances, particularly in the investment-oriented ones.

When discussing the issue of the value of remittances depends on the type of workers. Since the 1990s, there have emerged two types of workers: skilled and unskilled, and this division is reflected in the difference in amount of remittances

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[78] Karagöz, Kadir (2009), pp. 1895-1896.

from the migrants (Table 2). According to a recent German policy, they prefer to invite skilled workers to unskilled ones, so as to improve the Information Technology (IT) sector. As the trend goes, the more skilled labor sent to Germany, the less revenue from remittances Turkey earns. Referring to table 2, remittances sent from Germany to Turkey by unskilled workers are around $0.36 billion, whereas those sent by skilled workers are about $0.04 billion. Thus, when skilled workers populated Germany instead of unskilled workers, the revenue of remittances to Turkey declined[79].

As is the tendency, unskilled laborers migrate to Germany in the pursuit of money for children's education, taking out insurances and working as entrepreneurs in the future. This motivation makes the migrant workers dynamic[80]. On the other hand, skilled workers are inclined to have a desire for experiences and improvement of their own skills, rather than for remittances. For the Turkish government, remittances had been the most important source of acquiring foreign exchange, and to develop the domestic economy. However, the government has now turned to, and puts emphasis on, entrepreneurial activities for foreign exchange and foreign investments.

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[79] McDonald, S., Sonmez, Y., (2006), pp.7-9.
[80] Ibid.

Actually, over 1,000 firms experience German participation (more than 50% investment share) in Turkey[81]. Turkish investment in Germany is 7.2 billion DM, while German investment in Turkey is only 1 billion DM (1995). Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany own 42,000 businesses in 54 different industries employing 186,000 workers, 15% of which are Germans[82]. Hence, when the government got the country back on the track of economic recovery, investment, rather than remittances, was the main factor in enhancing economic relations between Germany and Turkey.

4.1.2. Turkish Entrepreneurs in Germany

When running a personal business, it is not easy to maintain the sense of independence, high income and life satisfaction. Therefore, entrepreneurship would be a risky venture. However, it does have an element of dynamism that can be injected into the economy and affect the future development of a country. Furthermore, entrepreneurship resolves serious unemployment issues and welfare drains through job creation, at the least for the self-employed.

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[81] Bacik, G., Aras, B., (2004), "Turkey's Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?", Alternatives, 3 (1), P.63.
[82] Ibid.

Lead to the development of Turkish entrepreneurship within Germany when foreign labor recruitment froze in 1973, with the oil crisis cum global recession. The German government made attempts for the Turkish to return to their home country, but most of them chose to stay in the host country.

They decided to abandon their plans of return, and invested their savings in Germany, initially meant for their life in Turkey[83]. The move by the Germans was geared towards barring the inflow of guest workers, and to resolve the permanent settlement of temporary workers. But it instead triggered the emergence of Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany.

At the outset, the number of self-employed Turkish immigrants was less than 2% of non-German workers who were self-employed in 1970, but the proportion increased to 8.8% in 1998. Turkish consisted of the biggest minority group whose businessmen were estimated at 51,000 in 1998, and had increased threefold by 2000[84]. Hilman[85] argued that there was approximately six thousand German-Turkish enterprises employing 20,000 persons in Berlin. This percentage was preeminently higher than that of the other non-German immigrants. This

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[83] Constant, A., Zimmermann, F. Klaus, Yochanan (2007), "What Makes an Entrepreneur and Does it Pay? Native Men, Turks, and Other Migrants in Germany": Black Well publishing, pp. 71-73.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid, p.74.

phenomenon showed the difficulties immigrants faced as paid-workers within the German society. In 1998, 20.3% of the non-German workers were unemployed. This figure was almost twice as high as that of German workers (10.5%). In particular, the percentage of German-Turks which were unemployed reached 22.7%, which was the highest compared to all of the other European nations[86].

Owing to the lack of knowledge of German language, and cultural difference, Turks were discriminated against and segregated as 'aliens' within the society. One more reason to explain the remarkable growth in the rate of self-employment is that relations with family, relatives and neighbors, heightened the sense of traditional (Turkish) culture with the "little-Istanbul" communities. This intensified the Turkish sense of belonging, causing enlargement of their communities under the anti-foreign sphere, leading to a desire to 'settle down'. The first generation of Turkish immigrants launched their own businesses under the above-mentioned nationalistic conditions, and tended to employ the Turkish living in Germany. Hence the entrepreneurial activities were strongly associated with their communities. In Germany, most occupations require specific professional training. However, many non-Germans were more often than not inadequately professionally

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[86] Bacik, G., Aras, B., (2004), p.64.

trained and educated[87]. Since they did not have access to the German social network

and were discriminated against by local employers, entrepreneurship still turned out

to be the best option under the circumstances even when they lacked specific

qualifications and had a poor command of the language. Furthermore, the alienated

Turkish society needed manpower to supply imports and provide foreign products.

First generation entrepreneurs set up businesses in Germany as an

alternative for overcoming their difficult situation as paid-workers. On the other

hand, the second generation German-Turks entered into entrepreneurship for

different reasons. Compared with the native Germans of the similar period, it is clear

that the second-generation Turkish immigrants continued to experience inferior

economic conditions. Nonetheless, they seem to have more favorable labor market

prospects than their parents'[88].

First generation entrepreneurs were those born in Turkey who later moved

to Germany after the age of twelve. Second generation entrepreneurs arrived in

Germany before the age twelve, or were born in Germany, as children of business

owners, with at least one immigrant parent. The difference between the first and

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[87] Cyrus, Norbert (2005), "Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Germany": The European
Research Project, pp.27-28.
[88] Kogan, Irena (2003), "A Study of Employment Careers of Immigrants in Germany": MZES, pp.10-12.

second-generation entrepreneurs who took up tertiary education and did not, is reflected in the sustainment and enlargement of Turkish businesses in Germany[89].

According to Figure 12, the distribution of education in both generations, at the least, includes apprenticeship and vocational school. Where occupations are concerned, knowledge-intensive services are the most popular among Turkish entrepreneurs. The first Turkish businesses accommodated migrants' special needs (restaurants, cafés and grocery stores). However, now in the second generation, through internationalization, Turkish business elite have come forth in the German society; German-Turkish business activities have indeed become an all-important aspect in affirming the immigrants' place in Germany.

With the influence of globalization, native Germans were not left unaffected by foreign cultures and habits especially with the food sector in Germany. This phenomenon facilitated in boosting Turkish entrepreneurships with trade.

Ethnic cuisines are now consumed by nearly everybody and this has promoted the growth of restaurants run by immigrants. Moreover, multiculturalism opened the doors for promoting German-Turkish markets. Now, through the markets, there is more and more contact with Germans and the mainstream economy. 86.7%

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[89] Ibid.

of the Turkish businessmen have German customers and 72.9% of them collaborate with Germans for their supplies[90].

Turkish businessmen's trading enterprises have existed since the beginning of their dealings in economy in Germany, but this activity turned into a new form and picked up the Turkish trade internationally. Products not only circulated from Turkey to Germany, but also several German-Turkish firms exported their products to Turkey[91]. For instance, in the textile industry, clothes were produced in Turkey and sold in Germany. The more telecommunication, internet and computer advancements take place, the more the tourism sector flourishes. German-Turkish entrepreneurs invest in Turkey's tourism industry, and use their German language skills to efficiently deal with German tourists[92].

As I mentioned, the German-Turkish businesses are based on their communities. When immigrants increased and communities enlarged, business elite emerged in the German-Turkish society. These elite established an organization called the TDU (Turkish-German entrepreneurs association)[93].

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[90] Ibid., p.13.
[91] Ibid., p.6.
[92] Morgil, Orhan (2001), "The Turkish-German Economic Relations and The European Union": Akdeniz I.I.B.F. Dergisi, p.151.
[93] Pecoud, Antoine (2003), "Self-Employment and Immigrants' Incorporation: The Case of Turks in Germany": Immigrants & Minorities, 22 (2), pp.247-248.

This association aims to contribute to German-Turks' integration in Germany by facilitating their business activities. TDU participates in journalism and public debates to promote their activities and give a new image of Turkish entrepreneurs as an important turning point.

Migrants, especially Turkish ones, were labeled as troublemakers in Germany, but their economic activities are providing potential solutions for immigration problems. By encouraging entrepreneurship, not only the social status of Turkish minority would improve but also their living standards would elevate. The German-Turks' social status has been established gradually through their enterprises, and they have started to take political interest within small and medium-sized ventures. In the present state of affairs, although there are more and successful self-employed German-Turks, money is still not readily available for supporting their political activities. All the same, their activities affect not only the German and Turkish political relations, but also the EU's.

4.2. Increase of Turkish Involvement in German Politics

Power is an element of dynamism in the changing social sphere. Since people have been crossing borders, multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity remain the sources of power in social dynamism. Turkey lies in the center of Middle East, but

on the edge of Europe. The Turkish bring about new dynamism to Germany and play a role in mobilizing Europe which encounters developments by their involvement. Migrants serve a purpose in not only making up for the shortage in labor, but also in enriching the host country economically. Turkish migrants came to Germany during the 1960s as temporary workers. But from this time, they continuously settled in Germany as immigrants.

Even when they were accepted to work in Germany, they were seen as outsiders in terms of religion and culture[94]. In addition, they tended not to associate themselves with the host communities; thus, they have gradually been isolated from the German society. As the Turkish population increases, there are more signs of marginalization and escalation of their communities. In spite of this, the mobilization of citizens is a center of activity, and acts as a catalyst in political issues. In other words, Turkish migrants are on the periphery, and at the same time, central to producing effects in the German society, e.g. the change in the foreign policy to accommodate the Turkish. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, associations cannot come about in the society without citizenship. Alternation of generations of German-Turks

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[94] Balibar, Etienne (2004), pp.35-40.

has enabled the expansion of associations, and entrepreneurship has vitalized economy in the German society.

4.2.1. The Emergence of the German-Turk Elite

The emergence of the German-Turk elite promoted Turkish participation in the political field. Cem Özdemir is one of the successful Turkish immigrants. He is a member of the Green Party, the first person of Turkish descent to be elected to the Bundestag in October, 1994. He described his childhood as such through an interview: "I come from a working-class family, and my father has very little schooling. My parents both came to Germany as guest workers. I did very poorly in school, but I worked hard to improve myself and went on to the university and got my degree"[95]. His path to becoming a member gave hopes to non-Germans and he became a role model for them on how to be self-assertive within the German society, I believe. His election as a Green Party member was an accomplishment as a German-Turk. He was elected as the leader of that party; a first for a top political party, or for that matter, any party, to choose an 'immigrant' to lead their political party[96].

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[95] Weber, Barbara (2007)," Interview with a Turkish member of the Bundestag", p.2. *www.ciel.usj.edu.lb/observatoire/.../ImmigrationandPoliticsinGermany.pdf (2 Nov 2009).*
[96] Ozdemir, Cem (2007), "Muslim Integration in Europe-could we learn something from the United States?", http://www.ourshareurope.org/documents/essays/Cem-Ozdemir.pdf (4 Nov 2009), p.1.

Generally, non-Germans, especially the German-Turks, tend to have a low level of education, and occupy a high percentage of university dropouts, even the second and third generations. However, there are a number of Turks who have been successful, and their careers have advanced gradually. Cem Özdemir is a not an exception; Serkan Tören become a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP); Sevim Dağdelen has been in the Left Party since 2005. Both the politicians were born in Germany and have German identities; nevertheless, they have been treated unfairly as non-Germans in the society. They applied for and got German citizenships, but then had to deal with the immigrants' issue in accordance with the respective characteristics of their parties[97].

These are not the only examples of successful German-Turks, but the percentage remains low. Forty percent of young immigrants do not get traineeship positions, 23 percent leave school without graduating, and 70 to 80 percent of young Turks have no qualifications. The majority are working class, and they do not earn enough money. These phenomena are attributed to the lack of language skills and

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[97] The FDP's Serkan Tören, "I Didn't Want to Leave the Choices to Others', The Left's Sevim Dağdelen: 'My Origins Don't Define My Political Beliefs" , The Local Germany's News in English, http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20090918-22013.html (22 Sep 2009).

education[98]. With an increase in non-Germans, there would be improvements in the citizenship issue and immigrants' education system.

Such participation in politics and the voting behavior of non-Germans had been ignored in the past. Currently, however, the German government is making efforts to ameliorate the Citizenship Law, and change the Foreigner's Law to (Im)migrant's Law to accommodate the growing rate of immigrants. This condition has given rise to conflicts between state authorities, political parties and immigrant associations. Normally, major political parties evade the immigrants' rights issue, but then again, local and federal German state authorities consider it positively to have supporters.

As mentioned already in this study, almost all of the German-Turkish belong to associations which are their tools of making claims i.e. political decisions, organizing campaigns, etc. Taken individually, the position of foreigners in the public domain is passive; their voices cannot reach the society at large. Nonetheless, by establishing associations, they are availed the opportunity of being active citizens in the society. Associations without the citizenship-factor are not efficient in accentuating immigrants and their issues. Under the umbrella of associations,

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[98] Kogan, Irena (2003), pp.13-15.

Turkish elite emanated and flourished, and their involvement in the political field was enhanced. German political parties have been trying to get votes from immigrants; in turn, the immigrants place their hopes on parties to listen to their voices. They play an active role in the host country's political structure.

4.2.2. Turkish Associations' Relations with Political Parties and Beyond the EU

TBB (Berlin-Brandenburg Turkish Federation) and Cemaat (Berlin Turkish Community) are representative organizations that both back up Turkish immigrants in terms of low education, and high unemployment situations, and support political parties which are based on their respective features. However, these associations' approaches diverge when it comes to German political parties; namely into social democrats (TBB) and conservatives (Cemaat). These associations may have different policies but they continue to support the Turkish immigrants [99].

TBB has maintained good relations with all political parties but is especially affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SPD). The executive director of the TBB chairs the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration within the SPD. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Migration is a working group that specializes in immigrants' issues and presents

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[99] Tol, Gonul (2008), pp.4-12.

reports to party authorities[100]. The treasurer of the TBB is a member of the SPD in

the women's commission, and it is also a well-known fact that the executive director

of the TBB is married to Dilek Kolat, SPD member of the Berlin Senate[101].

On the other hand, some members of Cemaat support Christian Democratic

Union (CDU), even though they are of different religions. Superficially, their

respective policies and interests are far apart, i.e. the main feature they employ is

religion, whereas the social democrats perform materialistically. As a result,

conservative religious Turks tend to support CDU, while the other Turks stand

behind the SPD and the FDP. Moreover, non-members hold support for the Green

Party or the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Cemaat brings out the differences

in the extent of religion and nationality that motivate supporters to choose their

various parties. Cemaat lays stress on Turkish nationality, whereas TBB emphasizes

that Turkishness is simply an ethnicity. The former association is prone to intensify

Turkish nationality and cause segregation between the Turkish and host society.

Although immigrants' communities, institutions and associations tend to hamper

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[100] Ibid.
[101] Yurdakul, Gökçe (2006)," State, Political Parties and Immigrant Elites: Turkish Immigrant Associations in Berlin": Routledge, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.22, p.440.

integration in the host country, their implementation does promote immigrants' education, work and status[102].

The recent elections in September, 2009 saw the SPD taking just 23 percent of the votes, plunging by 11.2 percent compared to the preceding election four years ago, the party's worst record since the Second World War. This result reflected that with Mrs. Merkel, who is the country's first female chancellor in conservative CDU, there was expected to take place a social change from the once traditional Germany. When we focus on the recent election by region, we see that where immigrants reside in high populations, there are more SPD, Green and Left seats (Figure 4). These small parties make efforts to win votes from non-Germans, but during this election, SPD's plan failed. By backing up the non-Germans, it encountered a great deal of subjective skepticism from German voters. In addition, the increase in the unemployment rate arouses feelings of anti-Turks in young Germans because of the economic crisis. These factors became a hindrance to SPD's victory[103].

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[102] Naito, Masanori (1995), pp.5-7.
[103] Ögelman, N., Money, J., and Martin, P. (2002), "Immigrant Cohesion and Politic Access in Influencing Foreign Policy", SAIS Review, 7 (2), pp.155-157.

The SPD and Green Party express positive reactions about Turkey's accession to the EU. However, Germany's voice affects matters of the European Union. Consequently, SPD would have to face not only the German public, but also the French administration. The CDU chancellor, Mrs.Merkel, considers it important to improve friendly relations with Turkey and to review the education system for young immigrants. Yet, when it comes to the amendment of the citizenship law, and to Turkey's membership in the EU, the party takes a passive attitude.

In sum, Turkish form the majority of immigrants in Germany. Currently, their activities extend from business to politics. The German-Turks may be marginalized in the German society, they do, however, have power to bring change. According to Etienne Balibar's theory, migrant workers have contractual relations with proprietors. Consequently, it resulted into a non-egalitarian society, which has given rise to class struggles and the history of the labor movement spread out into reforms. This struggle gave birth to the incompatible social dichotomy between "Public" and "Private".

Notwithstanding, foreigners have been active citizens in public through the establishment of associations and acquisition of citizenship in the host country. With the increase of their individual rights, it has become possible to constitute collective

power relations and representative organizations for collective actions. As a result, individual power has grown and the right of equality has progressed within the social sphere. Entrepreneurship is highly connected with the Turkish economy as a means of earning foreign exchange and promoting business between Turkey and Germany. By being members in the cabinet, the Turkish evidently express their will to improve their position in society. Additionally, Germany plays a central role in Turkey's membership to the EU. Its voice serves an important purpose in the EU. Turkey's development in economy and politics might pave its way into the EU. That would, at the same time, depend on Turkey's accomplishing the Copenhagen criteria. I will leave that for another day.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between "citizenship" and "community" is a prerequisite element in nation building as the historical framework, according to Etienne Balibar's theory. Citizenship is a tool of active participation in political life. It (citizenship) could exist without a community "integrating" citizens[104]. Foreigners' participation in the public domain has contributed to develop a universal existence (same language, culture, identity, religion, etc) with the community. The objective of a community is to institute public schools or associations, and then can citizenship be recognized in a nation. The symbolic universalism is to unite the human species beyond any differences. Indeed, if men are free, it is portrayed through associations or institutions in the social sphere.

However, in a universalized sphere, there exist two paradoxical movements: assimilation and subjection, by whose movements' nation-formation is constituted; and substantialism and formalism. The former implies that a community is established by the citizen's participation within a single traditional culture, language, or ethnic heritage, even if it has not been inherited from birth or entirely assimilated into substantialism. The latter suggests that citizenship would stem

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[104] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.58.

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entirely from individual adherence to certain moral values, from the respect for certain judicial constitutional rules[105].

Personally, a nation should assume inclusive nationalism and multi-identity. It has to welcome and integrate immigrants and induce common criteria so as to create a comprehended society that is adoptable and can be transmitted from generation to generation. In fact, it is about the existence of a certain individual identity and moral value in the universal sphere. Thus, as Etienne Balibar states, there inherently exist different classes, minor ethnicities and religions within a nation. They give birth to systematically formulated inequalities, and constitute active as well as passive citizenship. That is where associations and institutions come in, to endorse individuals whose functions are important for establishing citizenship in a nation. Institutions correlate with social exclusions; the more the Turkish resort to social exclusions, the more institutions there are, a cause and effect reaction.

On the other hand, the German-Turkish perspective, the Europe Union has developed gradually and faces the challenging task of preventing conflicts between East and Central European countries. The more the sphere of European influence enlarges, the easier the mobilization of peoplehood becomes. What's more,

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[105] Ibid., p.59.

globalization has facilitated the spread of knowledge and technology enabling easy contact with people. The root cause of rising numbers migrants into Germany was the recruitment of workers to make up for the labor shortage after the Second World War. Although the number of migrants declined and recruitment stopped due to the oil shock in 1973, the population continued to rise as the workers united with their families in the host country.

Germany is now occupied by a large number of Turkish immigrants as foreign residents. When the guest workers' policy ended, Turkish immigrants started to run their own shops in the Turkish community. They shunned contact with native-Germans, opened halal foods and glossary shops, set up a Turkish broadcasting station, magazine and newspaper agents and established schools. Migrants in the same situation will all attempt to protect their own culture and religion which is being threatened as they are forced to live as the minority. It could be argued that only through similar sentiments, religion and ethnicity, will people fully embrace the ideas of nationalism. This is an argument which currently fragments much of the developed world, as the issue of immigration continues to develop.

In the process from marginalization to integration, community plays a crucial role. The representatives of Muslim associations are: Süleymancı, Nurcu,

National Opinion Muslim Gemeinschat (IGMG) and The Presidency of Religious

Affairs (DITIB). These institutions are concerned with the question of unifying

individuals, and preserving culture and identity for the Turkish. Additionally, the

citizenship comes charged with a wealth of the "common good" of workers for

nationals[106].

Consequently, the transition from simply citizenship to active citizenship in

public space emphasizes the tension between the logic of a singular society and the

interior exclusions that are its interactions. This can be seen in the situation of the

Turkish immigrants in Germany. The reason behind citizens' being in a social role,

and giving them the right of status, encourages their community participation openly,

resulting into universalization. The active involvement in social life leading to a

condition of solidarity and the inherent ethnic and religious differences are opposite

sides of the same coin. The two contradicting movements, exclusion and inclusion

coexist with one another in society.

All in all, the principle of integration is to establish foreign institutions

publicly. The German integration policy is known as failed integration, this is due to

the reversing effects of marginalization, as a direct result of such policy. Turkish

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[106] Balibar, Etienne (2004), p.61.

immigrants seem to be the burden of German society on the surface, but it is argued that they are actively promoting public common good, for both German nationals, and immigrants alike.

In a multi-cultural society, the idea of the 'nation' exists as social inequalities, namely differences in political, social and economic status. To accompany this, is the important role in which race plays in order to create such a diverse, intrinsic society. To acquire citizenship means acquiring a tool of change, giving immigrants a voice in society and politics. As a result we see immigrants developing an improvement in social status and a more active role within business. On the contrary, when discussing the benefits for the German nation state, granting citizenship to Turkish immigrants, will lead to the encouragement of profits when trading with the Republic of Turkey, through the active role of German-Turkish entrepreneurs.

In conclusion, gaining identity through the establishment of community and development of associations will eventually promote a sense of 'being', bridging the border between German nationals and German-Turkish within society.

Appendix 1

Figure 1: Refugee's Applicants by Nation (%)

**-Source: Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 2: Unemployment Rate: Total and Foreign Nationals, 1972-2008 in

**Germany –Source Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 3: Number of Turkish Immigrants by Naturalization in Berlin Since 1980

**Souce-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 4: The Desire to Return to Turkey (%)

Source-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005

Figure 5: Citizenship (%)

**Source-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 6: The Desire to Get German-Citizenship (%)

**Source-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 7: A Sense of Belonging to Turkey (%)

**Source-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005**

Figure 8: Mean Values for Different Identification Variables

(1 not at all to 5 completely).

Source-Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge, Migtationsbericht, 2005

83

Figure 9: Worker's Remittances in Turkey (1965-2004) (%)

-Source: Development Finance Statistics, World Bank, 2007

First Generations Second Generations

Teritary Educations Appreticeships Primary/Secondry Educations

**Figure10: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Turkish Entrepreneurs in %**

-Source: Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) 2008-2009, N=58

Figure11: German General Election 2009 (%)

Legend: CDU ■ SPD □ FDP □ LEFT ■ GREENS ■ OTHERS

By Region

BERLIN

Legend: GREENS ■ SDP □ LEFT □ CDU ■ FDP ■ OTHERS

BRANDENBURG

Legend: LEFT ■ SPD □ CDU □ FDP ■ GREENS ■ OTHERS

BREMEN

	Social contacts with Nationals at work	Private social Contacts with nationals
Netherland	69	21
Germany	76	24
France	67	26

Table 1: Mean values for social contact variables by country (%)

	Unskilled Labor	Skilled Labor
UK	0.02	0.01
France	0.03	0.003
Germany	0.36	0.04
Italy	0.002	0.0004
Rest of EU 15	0.12	0.01
New 12 EU countries	0.003	0.001

Table 2: Remittances received by Turkey from EU countries (in billions of US $s) (%)

Apendix 2: List of Political Party in 2009

Name	Leader
Christian Democratic Union, CDU	Angela Merkel

Ideology	Position
Christian Democracy and Conservatism	Centre-Right

International Organization	
Centrist Democrat International and International Democrat Union	

Votes (2009)	Seats in Bundestag
27.3%	194

Name	Leader
Social Democratic Party, SPD	Sigmar Gabriel

Ideology	Position
Social Democracy	Centre-Left

International Organization	
Socialist International	

Votes (2009)	Seats in Bundestag
23.0%	146

Name	Leader
Free Democratic Party, FDP	Guido Westerwelle

Ideology	Position
Liberalism	Centre Liberal

International Organization	
International	

Votes (2009)	Seats in Bundestag
14.6%	93

Name	Leader
The Left	Lothar Bisky,

Ideology	Position
Democratic Socialism	Left-Wing

International Organization
Party of the European Left

Votes (2009)	Seats in Bundestag
11.9%	76

Name	Leader
Alliance '90/The Greens	Claudia Roth, Cem Özdemir

Ideology	Position
Green Politics	Centre-Left

International Organization	
International Democrat Union	

Votes (2009)	Seats in Bundestag
6.5%	45

Name	Leader
Christian Social Union, CSU	Horst Seehofer

Ideology	Position
Christian Democracy and Conservatism	Centre-Right

International Organization	
International	

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