# SECURITIZING INTERNATIONALLY:

# THE CASE OF KOSOVA

Thesis submitted to the

Institute of Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations

by

Erdoan SHIPOLI

Fatih University

June 2010

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*For all those who do not give up their cause!*

# APPROVAL PAGE

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**Institute**          : Institute of Social Sciences

**Department**          : International Relations

**Thesis Subject**          : Securitizing Internationally: The Case of Kosova

**Thesis Date**          : June, 2010

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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**Head of Department**

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

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**AUTHOR'S DECLARATION**

1.  The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2.  The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

i)  Research Methods course during the undergraduate study

ii)  Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.


Erdoan SHIPOLI

Istanbul

June, 2010

# ABSTRACT

**Erdoan SHIPOLI**                                                                                          **June, 2010**

## SECURITIZING INTERNATIONALLY: THE CASE OF KOSOVA

Securitization theory is a new and alternative approach to Security Studies. It is developed on the discourse of 'speech act theory' and explains how security is done by speeches of some influential actors, towards a certain audience, naming an issue as a security issue, to protect a referent object from threats or group of threats.

Kosova has had a war in hot pursuit during the years 1997-1999, but I argue that this was a war that was fought in decades, in a cold way. What happened in the late 1990s that Kosova became a security issue to the world, which resulted in the NATO intervention? How has Kosova been securitized during these years? These are some of the questions this thesis analyzes.

Despite of explaining how Kosova was securitized, I claim that the securitization theory can be expended by re-configuring the actors. In my analysis and observations I saw that the domestic way of securitizing issues does not always work internationally, because of the differences in the audience, referent objects, securitizing actors, time, and other circumstances. Nevertheless, the securitization theory had put an important step in analyzing and understanding security.

**Key words:**

Securitization theory, Security Studies, Copenhagen School, Kosova, NATO, CNN effect, Yugoslavia.

# KISA ÖZET

**Erdoan SHIPOLI**                                                            **June, 2010**

## ULUSLARARASI GÜVENLİKLEŞTİRME: KOSOVA ÖRNEĞİ

Güvenlikleştirme teorisi Güvenlik Çalışmalarına yeni ve alternatif bir yaklaşımdır. "Sözeylem teorisi" söylemi üzerine bina edilmiştir ve bazı etkin aktörlerin, belli bir dinleyici kitlesine, bir mevzuyu güvenlik sorunu olarak ele alarak, bir nesneyi tehlike veya tehlikelerden korumak için konuşmalarıyla güvenliği nasıl gerçekleştirdiklerini açıklar.

Kosova 1997-1999 yılları arasında sıcak savaş yaşamış olmasına rağmen bu savaşın aslında on yıllardır "soğuk" bir şekilde zaten varolduğunu iddia ediyorum. 1990'ların sonunda ne oldu da Kosova, NATO müdahalesi ile sonuçlanan, dünya için bir güvenlik konusu haline geldi? Bu yıllarda Kosova nasıl güvenlikleştirildi? Bu tez, bunları ve benzeri soruları analiz etmektedir.

Kosova'nın nasıl güvenlikleştirildiğini anlatmama rağmen güvenlikleştirme teorisinin, aktörlerin yeniden yapılandırılması ile genişletilebileceğini iddia ediyorum. Analiz ve gözlemlerimde dinleyici kitlesi, güvenlikleştirilen obje, güvenlikleştiren aktörler, zaman ve diğer bazı durumlar nedeni ile yerel güvenlikleştirme konularının uluslararası alanda işlemediğini gördüm. Ancak yine de güvenlikleştirme teorisi güvenliği anlama ve analiz etmede çok önemli bir adımdır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:**

Güvenlikleştirme teorisi, Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Kopenhag Okulu, Kosova, NATO, CNN etkisi, Yugoslavya

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU              European Union

FRY             Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

KLA             Kosova Liberation Army

KVM             Kosovo Verification Mission

NATO            North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OSCE            Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

UN              United Nations

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing the acknowledgments part is very risky, this is what they told me and I can see it now in practice. This is because after finishing everything I am sure I will remember names that deserve recognition but I forgot. So let me start by apologizing in advance in advance. Writing this book was not easy, because this is a project that puts down all my work from the high school, to the university years, and the MA work. This was a difficult road and I it would be impossible to go through it if it was not for the help of a number of people.

Firstly, I have to thank to my family. My father Adnan SHIPOLI, who has always been there for me and trusted me at all times. My mother Suzana SHIPOLI, for being the best mother in the world, and raised me and my sisters in the best way that children can be raised. My sisters, Erzana and Rita SHIPOLI, for always covering me up, and looking good after my mother and father, when I was not around. And I have to thank my fiancé Denitsa Pirinova SOKOLOVA, for always encouraging me to do a good job. I must not forget Denitsa's family for trusting her to me.

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As I mentioned at the beginning, there are many others whose names are not here, but who supported me and helped me all along. I thank all of them, my extended family, teachers, and friends.

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Erdoan Shipoli

Istanbul. June, 2010

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# PREFACE

In this thesis I have tried to analyze how Kosova was securitized at the international level, so the extraordinary means –air bombing- can be used against Serbian aggression towards the population of Kosova. I have looked at the case of Kosova from the securitization perspective, where I analyzed only the labeling of Kosova as a threat, so these extraordinary means can enter into the action. Although there have been other cases before the Kosova crises, it was exactly Kosova that was successfully securitized towards the international audience, and these extraordinary measures were taken. This makes Kosova an important case study.

Securitizing of Kosova does not mean that Kosova was not a security issue, and that it was just constructed like that. On the contrary, I argue that Kosova was a security issue at the international level, and I only analyze how it was rightly presented as such.

While researching Kosova, we find that international and domestic securitizations vary on different grounds. In this thesis I hope to contribute to the theory of securitization, and I argue that the radius of the audience, securitizing actors, referent objects, and other factors, shall be widened, in order to understand international securitization. This hypothesis is best tested by the way Kosova was securitized.

I have used the name Kosova, for the region that has recently declared its independence, bordering Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The Albanians use the name Kosova and the Serbs use Kosovo. It was only later that the English world have adopted the name Kosovo. But because the majority of the province use the name Kosova I prefer to use it as the name of the local majority, instead of using the name of the local minority. There are no other

considerations in using this form of the name, other than the origins of the name, from the local

majority.

**SECURITIZING INTERNATIONALLY: THE CASE OF KOSOVA**

*"All that is required for evil to triumph is that good men do nothing."*

**Edmund Burke**


# INTRODUCTION


One of the most discussed issues in international politics today is, without a doubt, security. What we understand from security, what shall and shall not be included in these discussions, and who provides security, are all questions open to debate. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has developed a critical theory of 'securitization'. This theory explains to us how some issues become security issues and some do not, and who categorizes those issues as such. My purpose in this thesis is to develop the theory of securitization further and explain why and how some issues in the international arena become security issues for certain states, or the globe as a whole, by applying it to the case of Kosova.

By analyzing the case of securitization of the Kosova conflict, I aim to show the main differences between domestic and international securitization. It is clear in the domestic securitization as to who talks security and who categorizes the issues as such, but in the international arena these distinctions are blurred, and I aim to analyze the differences and the similarities between the actors and the elements of domestic securitization and international securitization.

Kosova can be considered as one of the most successful and earliest examples of international securitization, resulting in an independent state in 2008. Several internationally influential leaders and actors have played important roles in this case, in different parts of the conflict, in different sides, at different phases and time-periods. A number of local and

international leaders have been involved in securitizing Kosova. Kosova, at the same time, was a test case to the international leaders and world powers, on how serious they were in protecting and promoting universal values that they preached.

### Why and How an Issue is Made a Security Problem

According to the securitization approach, the leader or an elite group (the securitizing actor), spots an enemy, constructs a threat, and makes the speech act towards the audience, which are the people living in that country, in highlighting a certain issue as a security issue. This is how the securitization of domestic issues happens. Why does it (elite group) do so? Why do they use these means but not others? What about international issues? Who is responsible, or who has the power to securitize? Why do they do so? What is the effect of the speech act of an international leader, such as the General Secretary of the UN, and who does he aim to influence? How do they depict an enemy and how is the threat constructed? Most importantly, who is the audience that the threat is presented and is asked for legitimizing extraordinary measures? Are these concepts the same internationally and domestically? These are the questions that I aim to tackle in my thesis.

I will try to answer the above questions with particular examples from Kosova, in order to contribute to the literature of securitization approach at the international level. I decided to analyze this case because it no doubt was the most successfully securitized international issue. I will also try to answer the following question: why has Kosova been securitized? This is an important question, which is discussed by many scholars, because there are different claims on why Kosova was securitized by particular actors at a particular time.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand how certain international issues are securitized at home, among allies and enemies. Securitizing an international issue is expectedly more difficult then securitizing a domestic issue, because international issues are not of high interest to the people of a particular country, -towards whom the securitization is made and who give the right to act- because the threats might not involve them, or their interests, directly. Securitizing an international issue takes much more energy and work of the leaders and decision-makers of certain states. I also want to shed light on the influence of the leaders with international prestige, towards the peoples and the elites of different states. Today when a government's leader speaks the other leaders listen carefully. The world of politics, economics, and security is so inter-related that the speech of a leader in one part of the world influences developments in another part of the world. In fact, today no leader speaks only according to their nation's interest, but they consult allies before they take any decision. This is a result of the interconnectedness of states and interests, which complicates politics on one hand, but also prevents conflicts, on the other, as it makes conflicts very costly.

There are two contributions this study aims to make. One is theoretical, which has to do with the development of the security studies and the theory of "securitization" in international platform. I will contribute to the theory of securitization by observing how Kosova, as an international issue, was securitized. The securitization theory is right to explain how issues are securitized at the domestic level, but when it comes to the international level, like the case of Kosova, the securitization is more complex. The actors and the methods change, which makes international securitization different from the domestic one. This, I hope, will contribute to further discussion on securitization theory, and will open a way to broadening the securitization theory. By analyzing the securitization of Kosova I will explain the complexity of the actors

involved, and the methods used, which are different from the domestic securitization. The other contribution is empirical, providing first hand information, and observations, on the case of Kosova. Interestingly there are many books written on the issue of Kosova, but unfortunately most of them are subjective. Some are pro-Albanian while some are pro-Serbian works. This subjectivism and bias confuse the public and do not contribute to the objective study of the case. I, on the other hand, aim to give empirical information as an insider, and objective comparison of what happened in Kosova. I hope that this modest work of mine initiates more fruitful discussions on security studies in general, and the case of Kosova in particular.

After surveying the literature on securitization and the security studies in general, I focus on researching certain cases at different times, to analyze how security studies have evolved and how the ways of securitization have changed. For my case study I focus on media reports, governmental and non-governmental official reports, and speeches made in different places and on various occasions, at different times, by the most influential actors in the case of Kosova. Although academically there is very little written documentation on the period before and during NATO's intervention in Kosova, I try to analyze the timeline before the intervention, and to connect different cases and meetings, which had significant effects on the decision of intervention.

**Present State of Security and Securitization Studies**

Security Studies is a relatively new discipline, compared to other natural and social sciences. Security studies literature dates from 1940s (Waever and Buzan, 2007) but was understood by, and written for, security, in the academic fields, was the states' safety against, mainly, military threats. This is why 'security studies' is considered an underdeveloped

discipline, yet. The golden ages of the security studies are considered to be 1950s and 60s, which were very productive and influential years, for the study of security. The years 1965-1980, on the other hand, are considered to be the years of stagnation in terms of theory development and institutionalization of security studies. (Waever and Buzan, 2007). In early 1990s Stephan Walt (1991) has labeled security studies as a discipline, which studies the threat, the use of military force as well as the control of it.[1] But security studies have developed and improved by time. Today there are a lot of different approaches on how to study and analyze security. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), focused on different sectors of the state and society, despite the military, to better understand security studies. In another work, Buzan and Waever (2003) have shifted the focus of state concentration to regionalism as a better point of analysis of security.

While there is a big debate on what would be a proper definition of security, there is a general confusion created by mixing up 'survival' and 'security'. Hobbes also mentioned on this misconception when he wrote that "by safety one should understand not mere survival in any condition, but a happy life so far as that is possible", (quoted in Booth, 2007: 103) claiming here that survival is not enough for a person to feel safe, and that while survival is the state of being alive, security is about living without fear (Booth, 2007: 107) of being threatened at all times.

I classify "security" definitions by security studies scholars, into two main groups: one group claims that security is the absence of threats to the existence of the nation and the state, as well as the core values (Martin, 1983: 12; Mroz, 1980: 105; Buzan, 1991: 17); and the other group claims that security means to maintain these values, the nation, or the state, by victory even when they are challenged and the war unavoidable (Bellany, 1981: 102; Hartland-Thunberg, 1982: 50; Luciani, 1989: 151; Buzan, 1991: 17). I classify the security definitions into

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[1] For more definitions of security, see: K. M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security,*

two main groups, but there are some which are marginal. Such is the definition of Ole Waever, who sees security as a construct by certain people, who utter the word "security", and by this speech act they move an issue to a security issue, even if it might or might not be a security issue, so they can block a development (cited in Buzan 1991: 5-6).[2] Similarly, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen (2009) argue that security is about making exceptional decisions, where the distinction between Self and Other is completely clear. Prior to these, Mohammed Ayoob (1984) considers security' to mean the immunity of a sovereign state or nation towards external threats.

What we understand by security is a debatable topic among different academic circles, but in my opinion security is something constructed, which makes people feel safe in the absence of threats to their life, comfortability, and property, by assuring that even if these values are threatened, they will be maintained by victory. I claim that it is constructed because we can see that an issue can be constructed as a threat or a security problem even though it was not considered as such earlier. If we use the words of Steve Smith (1999), "Security is what states make it." (Smith, 1999: 87). By constructing a security threat, one aims to take consent of the people to deal with the threatened issue at any price.

Different and critical approaches of security studies were necessary for the development of security studies with the end of the Cold War. The traditional consideration of the military as the sole sector of analyzing security, and the state as the only referent object, have failed in explaining other interactions between states, and threats that come to property and the comfort of the citizens of the state. The narrowness of the military and state-centric analysis of security was analytically, politically and normatively insufficient and problematic (Buzan and Hansen, 2009:

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(Cambridge – Malden: Polity press, 2007), pp. 13-14.

[2] For more definitions on security, see: Buzan, Barry. (1991). "Peoples, states, and fear". (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers). pp.13-20.

180-190). The peaceful ending of the Cold War, the growing violence inside the states, immigration, and epidemics challenged the military and state-centric analysis of security studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Before the Cold War, the movements of one country's army has triggered a high level of insecurity, while today migration, poverty, rape, drugs, or economy trigger more insecurity than the movements of a country's army, even if that country is a neighbor. The level of analysis has also changed, as have the areas of analysis. While state was the only referent object before and during the Cold War, after the Cold War we have other referent objects and levels of analyzing and organizing security. Regions are considered to be an important level of analyzing interactions among states, as that is the level that most of the interactions between states happen.

Many approaches to security in the security studies literature have been developed in time. Conventional constructivism, which is a materialist approach, considers ideational factors, such as culture, beliefs, norms, ideas, and identities, as important in security studies. Critical constructivism, mostly concerned with military security, includes referent objects other than the state as very important.[3] The Copenhagen school[4] widens the set of referent objects, including societal and identity security, mainly in the regional level. The contribution of this school is the definition of securitization, where some groups construct their own security and threats. Critical security studies emphasizes human security over state security. The feminist security studies[5] consider that women play a big role in security policies through military as well as non-military

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[3] For more on constructivism and security studies, see: Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). pp. 191-199.

[4] For more on Copenhagen School, see: Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). pp. 212-217.

[5] For more on the evolution of feminist security studies, see: Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). p. 208.

functions. They also argue that there are some security problems specific to gender, which are not recognized within military and state-centric analysis of security studies. Human security views human beings as the primary referent object of security, and consider that the international security studies should include poverty, underdevelopment, hunger, and other human problems, among the issues it deals with. Peace research looks towards reducing the use of force in international relations, criticizes the dangers of strategic debates, and highlights individual security parallel, or even against, the national and state security. Post-colonial security studies points to the need of the ISS to study non-Western security theories that incorporate colonial history as well as state formations in the third world. This approach considers the ISS to be a state-centric as well as western-centric area of study. Poststructuralist security studies consider discourse rather than ideas as an important concept in the ISS. The followers of this approach consider that sovereignty and security are products of political practices. Strategic studies focuses on military dynamics. The important concepts of this approach are those on war, nuclear proliferation, deterrence, arms racing, arms control, etc. This is the traditional approach of military and state-centric literature. (Neo)realism, a state-centric, conflictual assumption of the nature of international relations, and materialist approach. This approach played a big role in shaping the international security studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 30-45).

Even today we can see that what keeps the security agenda busy are the military threats, perceived or real, to the state or national security. We can say that security has direct relation with state, fear, and threats. It is obvious that security is in proportional relations with insecurity. More security means less insecurity and vice-versa. But, it is essential that there exist insecurity to be able to talk about security, so in a way 'security' needs 'insecurity' to keep it's meaning in politics. This led to the development of different security sectors and to the study of

securitization in general. This explains the shift of security studies from monopolized military concerns, to a broader field, where different sectors are included (economic, political, societal, environmental), although military still keeps its dominance above the others.

The idea of state and government, according to Hobbes (1998) and Locke (1960), was the protection of life and property from the foreigners, which later evolved to the protection of liberties as well. In the state of nature the people are surrounded by threats of every kind, in a word, by chaos. In order to overcome this, the states and the governments are formed, and this is the first step towards the establishment of security. The state served as the highest insurance for the elimination of insecurities. Traditionally these insecurities were mainly military threats to the state security posed from outside of its borders, and must be handled militarily. In Walter Lippman's words "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger in having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war." (quoted in Ayoob, 1995: 5).

When insecure, states try to race with other states in order to feel more secure. This brought the concept of "security dilemma" to the security studies. Because of the lack of hegemonic authority at the international level, higher to that of the sovereign states, we can say that international relations among states are done in an anarchic structure, where every state tries to maximize its own national and state interests, and where the security of the state is its primary interest. Because of this, there is always a fear of being attacked by another state as long as the other state is building up stronger military resources than its own, and this is why the states seem to always arm themselves to protect their borders (Hertz, 1950). A single gun has multiple meanings; for some it can be a source for food and living as in a hunter's family; while for some it poses a threat of being attacked by someone who owns a gun as in a killing spree at schools.

Symbols like this can have different meanings in different situations, by different people (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 40-45). Under such conditions of anarchy in the international level, the interstate relations are developed in competition with each other, which leads to a dilemma on each other's intentions (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

But, nonetheless there is no strict definition of security dilemma. Some explain it as "what one does to enhance one's own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure" (Posen 1993: 28), others "the security dilemma describes a condition in which efforts to improve national security have the effect of appearing to threaten other states thereby provoking military counter-moves. This in turn can lead to a net decrease in security for all states" (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002: 292), or "the situation where one state's attempts to increase its security appear threatening to others and provoke an unnecessary conflict" (Montgomery 2006: 151).[6]

Up until 1990s what is meant by security is military security only, and the state is the exclusive referent object, while the individual sacrifices part of his freedom in exchange for security, which can be provided only by the state (Fierke, 2007: 42). The relations among other actors are centered in the relations between states, and the state is the most important and, generally, the only referent object for security. Later the scope of security increased, to include referent objects other then the state, such as societal security, political security, environmental security, and other sectors. While in classical security literature the societal security meant the threat posed to the state by the society, now we can also consider the society, or a collectivity, as threatened by certain state policies, which needs to be considered under security. Despite the referent object, in contrast to the classical literature, the alternative security literature talks on the

change of the securitizing actors, the actors who are allowed to speak security. Until recently it was the state as the only actor who was allowed to speak security, and in this system there were the high state elite or the military staff as the actors, but now the securitizing actors are more diverse and they can speak security and securitize issue in a wider range (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 70-71). For security to be provided, and talked about, there are several actors needed. The threats, the threatened, the threatening actors, then the protector, the protection means, and the ground where these relations happen, are all elements that are needed for a security issue to be considered as such.

The broader way of thinking international security, like the regions and the globe, despite the state, is developed in the post-Cold War era. There are mainly three theoretical perspectives that analyze the levels of international security after the Cold War. They are the neorealist, the globalist, and the regionalist perspectives (Fierke, 2007: 6). The *neorealist* perspective is a state-centric theory, and it claims that the power structure in the world is usually bipolar, but if it is not that then it is either unipolar or multipolar. The *globalist* perspective, unlike the neo-realist perspective, is not statist and it acknowledges the cultural, transnational, and international actors as important in the development of the security and the relations between states in the international arena. The *regionalist* perspective, on the other hand, sees the region as the most important level of studying security. It tries to explain that the security communities and the security measures are taken in regional level rather then local or global levels (Fierke, 2007).

Regionalist perspective, developed by Buzan and Waever (2003), is something in the middle of neorealist and globalist perspectives. While neorealists are too local, considering the state as the gravity of security and considering several big powers as the only ones that the

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[6] For further review on definitions of Security dilemma see: Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The*

security in the world is rooted, the regionalists claim that the security is developed among the states of the same region, in relation to each other. On the other hand, the globalists give room for every kind of actors, organizations, governments, and transnational corporations, in analyzing security, which complicates the explanation of the security of a state, and explains very little the security interactions of the states among each other and the regions at a group level. The regionalist perspective narrows the scope of the globalists and widens the scope of the neorealists, in considering the regions as the most important level in dealing with the security in the world. For one thing, security studies cannot be explained only by considering the local security of a state, in an interconnected world of globalization; and for another, security cannot be understood from such a big range of actors that have little or no impact in the security of a state, claimed by globalists (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 6-11). This is so because the security interdependence is more intense among neighbors and the states in the regional complexes, rather than the ones outside of it. In such a complex the distribution of power and the relation between them as friends or enemy is more distinctive. Buzan et. al. (1998: 201) explain the security complex as:

> "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. The formative dynamics and structure of a security complex are normally generated by the units within it – by their security perceptions of, and interactions with, each other. But they may also arise from collective securitizations of outside pressures arising from the operation of complex metasystems, such as the planetary environment or the global economy."

Here we can understand that the relations among the states in the security complex, or region, are influenced by domestic causes, each trying to maintain its own security from the threats coming from the other states of the same complex, or external factors, which push them to be together to face the common threats from the outside.

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*Security Dilemma,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.8-9.

Some scholars, like Buzan (1991), argue that it is because of the changes of priorities among the military, political, societal, economic, and environmental threats, that shifted the narrow military agenda of Security Studies to the broader one of International Security Studies.[7]

In the case of Bosnia and Kosova there was a need for the international community to intervene in the name of individual security of the people living there, to halt the bloodshed. Because of this, some institutions that did not previously exist are formed and try to provide the individual security for the people of these failed countries. These institutions then served for protecting collectivities, not just individuals, in ethnic wars. And this new role gave new direction to the security studies. In different places of the world the ethnic, religious, or other groups are exposed to threats because of who they are. The government they live in usually is the threat, and today these groups need external help, and protection, to be treated well. Not all of these groups get the help that the western powers gave to the ethnic groups in Balkans. But, with the intervention in Kosova, NATO and the UN accepted a new obligation of helping not only the individuals but also the groups, vulnerable to state violence.

When we consider the European Union or the ASEAN as communities, we can see that the community can sometimes be a referent object, also. It is these communities that engage states in arranging their relations with non-military means, short of war, and because of these communities those states learn to live together despite the hostilities they had in history. At this point the community is the one that needs protection and if threatened it needs actions to secure it (Fierke, 2007: 43). Some states in the community are only secured when the community is secured, in other cases they are threatened by other states in the community and the threats from outside of it. It is essential for them to live and be part of that community. I believe that this is

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[7] For a broad literature review on the evolution of Security Studies, see: Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen,

one of the reasons why most of the third world countries want, and try, to be part of regional communities such as ASEAN, NATO or the EU. This is especially true for the third world states which consider their security linked to the membership in a bigger security community.

Lately some of the scholars have focused on referent objects above the individual and any group. Threats to the environment are different to the threats posed to the states, groups, or individuals. Buzan and Waever have developed another concept, which analyzes the construction of threats beyond the middle-level, regional, platform. They called it "macrosecuritisation" (Buzan and Waever, 2009; Buzan and Hansen 2009). Such are the events of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons, climate change, and the global war on terror. These macrosecuritisations need constellations in order to be successful, argue Buzan and Waever (2009), who add that the constellations of the global war on terror are constructed threats such as the 'axis of evil', or the securitization of religion (secularism vs. Christianity, or Christianity vs. Islam). These threats concern the whole globe, and the problem remains on who shall take actions against such threats. Because these threats do not threaten the state or the individuals directly, the attention towards them is low. Fierke (2007) suggests that the burden to address these security threats lies on governmental as well as non-governmental organizations alike. But dealing with these global threats, or trying to fight them, needs a lot of resources that some of the powerful countries do not want to give up. Fighting the global warming needs the developed countries reduce their gas emission, and the developed countries, led by the US and China, do not want to give up their economic development for the reduction of global warming. The opportunity cost of some countries is not the same as the opportunity cost of the other countries, and the acts of a country destroys the best option of the other.

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*The Evolution of International Security Studies,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

If we divide by sectors, we can see that the security of the groups can be grouped into five sectors: the military, the political, the economical, the societal, and environmental securities (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998). It is important to note that the trend of viewing security through different sectors is a new idea and it was developed after the Cold War.

We can consider that the birth of the International Security Studies (ISS) were part of the debates after the Second World War, on how to protect the state against external and internal threats. What distinguished the ISS from War Studies and Military History is the concept of 'security', which is placed at the core of ISS to distinguish and also connect it to other disciplines (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 4-11). Buzan and Hansen (2009) also consider that there are mainly four questions that structured the ISS. Firstly, the question of whether to consider the state as the only referent object. Secondly, the question of whether to include the internal as well as external threats to the study of security. Thirdly, the question of whether to expend security beyond military concerns. And finally, the question of whether to see security as inescapably tied to the dynamics of dangers, urgency, and threats.

**Present State of Studies on Kosova's International Relations**

Kosova is a small state, which did not attract too much attention of the scholars prior to the NATO intervention. Although a small state, Kosova has been an important territory in history. This is what has been the focus on Kosova, prior to NATO intervention. If we read the literature written before the start of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, what we read about Kosova is mostly on the history of the two Kosova wars: the war between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, and the war of Balkan rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. The journalist, novelist, and critic, Rebecca West, wrote one of the earliest observations on the region, and the

earliest modern description of Battle of Kosova, in 1930s. In her work, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, she made an observation of Yugoslavia, by traveling there and writing this book on the road. Kosova is a sacred place for the Serbs, where they associate it with the sacrifice that Prince Lazar (Tsar Lazar) did, for the eternity of his people. It is explained that in the 1st Kosova war, in 1389, St. Elijah came to Prince Lazar and offered him a choice; either to choose the kingdom on earth where he and his troops would be victorious, or to choose the heavenly kingdom where he would die together with his troops but they would get an eternal kingdom in heaven (West, 1941). And this is why West (1941) associated Kosova with sacrifice, which Lazar did for the place in heaven of himself and his compatriots. Similarly David Fromkin (1999) explained Kosova as a place of sacrifice, for the same reason.

Other than the Kosova battles, Kosova is not a place that is much written about, until the late 1980s and then 1990s, when the dissolution of Yugoslavia started and the conflict in Kosova raised. The problem started with the rise to power of Milosevic, and his use of Serbian nationalism to come to that power, which resulted in the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Silber and Little, 1997). Julie Mertus (1999) claims, rightly, that during this time of the rise of nationalism there were constructions of truths and myths from Serbs towards the Albanians, and vice versa. She observed, in her book *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, that the nationalism raised in the level of "racism" where they started constructing myths about each other's physical, and mental, differences. She claims that with the rise of nationalism,

> Slurs against Kosovo Albanians shifted. No longer referred to as "white hats" (alluding to the hats worn by men in traditional Albanian dress), a sexualized imagery of Albanian men and women was adopted. In the mainstream Serbian and Yugoslav presses, Albanian men were declared to be rapists, although Kosovo had the lowest reported incidents of sexual violence in Yugoslavia. Albanian women were portrayed as mere baby factories, despite statistics indicating that the childbirth rates of urban Albanian women and those of other urban women in Yugoslavia were nearly identical (Mertus, 1999).

These constructed "truths" were important because the people did not care to find out what truth really is, but what they believe to be true. Several incidents, -the Paracin incident, the poisoning of the Albanian school-children, or the Martinovic case- were portrayed differently by the two different groups, blaming each others' intentions. The best work on the events before the Kosova war is doubtless written by Mertus in *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, and I will briefly explain the main events that she observed, later.

Kosova was an autonomous province, together with Vojvodina, which had extended rights according to the 1974 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1974, after many struggles and a lot of waiting, the Albanian administrators at the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, backed up by a small number of other ethnic administrators, achieved their will to pass the 1974 constitution, which would bring Kosova a political and economic independence (Abrashi and Kavaja 1996). This constitution brought substantial power to Yugoslavia's six republics, as well as the two provinces of Serbia, namely Kosova and Vojvodina. The provinces had their central banks, separate police, judicial and educational system. They elected deputies to the Serbian parliament, had their own assemblies, and were made constituent members of the Yugoslav federation, which gave their leaders seats in the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia after Tito's death. This diminished the power of Serbia, which had around 10 million people before but only 6 million after the 1974 constitution. On several occasions the provinces allied with other republics against Serbia, which minimized the disparity between Serbia and other republics (Silber and Little, 1997). The constitutional amendments made all the other republics of Yugoslavia happy, which had the fear of domination by Serbia, but this also left a thorn in the eye of the Serbian nationalists, who aimed at elimination of Albanian representatives, ethnic

cleansing of the Albanians, and the physical liquidation of the Albanians, soon after (Abrashi and Kavaja, 1996; Silber and Little, 1997).

The Albanian population of Kosova was firm on preserving the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, which gave them the rights they never had before, and after. One of the main actors against Milosevic's campaign was the Trepca mine and the miners, who went on two marches of nearly 50 kilometers, and twice went on hunger strike in the mine, 1000 meters under the earth. One of the administrators of Trepca, Burhan Kavaja, in a personal interview told me that the miners were the first securitizing actors, to make the issue Kosova an international issue. "Although there were violent attacks on Albanians before the strike of Trepca miners, it was this time that the international community started hearing our voices", claims Kavaja. In their book Kavaja and his colleague Aziz Abrashi, claim that it was exactly in Trepca that the ethnic cleansing at works started, afterwards this became a wider problem, touching all the economic spheres in Kosova. These were steps taken by Serbia, for serbinization of Kosova. Firing the Albanian administrators and workers, from Trepca mine, and state owned companies, and replacing them with Serbs and Montenegrins, was a strategy planned long before, with the hope of ethnically cleansing Kosova from Albanians (Kavaja and Abrashi, 1996). This resulted in thousands of ethnic Albanians migrating to Europe and elsewhere in the world, for a better life of their own, and financially help their families back in Kosova.

The situation got worse in 1980s, and Julie Mertus (1997) considers that in eight years, half of the Albanian adult population living in Kosova, around 584 thousand, were arrested, interrogated, interned or remanded. The result of all these conflicts and nationalistic propaganda resulted in loosing Yugoslavia altogether. Although Mertus (1997) identifies four main events that initiated the conflict in Kosova, she considers that it is not easy to explain the roots of the

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conflict, because the ancient hatreds were helped and promoted by the media propaganda, political speeches, etc. which installed a sense of fear and victimization in the Serbian population. Why Kosova was important during the 1980s is because it is from there that Serbian nationalism rose and from there did the Yugoslav conflicts start. The main events that shaped the Serbia-Kosova conflict were: 1981 student demonstrations, which were shown as counter-revolutionary by the Serbian media, but nevertheless it got some attention in Western media and it initiated the first steps towards the decentralization of Yugoslavia; the Martinovic case, which made Kosova a Serbian problem, where the media portrayed the event as the attack of the Albanian separatists against the Serbs; the Paracin massacre, where an Albanian soldier killed four Yugoslav soldiers, only one being a Serb, made Kosova a Yugoslav problem, which helped Milosevic argue for the military built up of Kosova; finally, the poisoning of the Albanian schoolchildren was the last straw in the division of the Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs. The last event helped Milosevic take over the police and other governmental institutions in Kosova, and it also ushered in the creation of a parallel Kosova Albanian society (Mertus, 1997).

Silber and Little (1997) argue, in their book *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*, that the death of Yugoslavia was far from a natural death. It was a death designed by Milosevic, and helped by the Serbian elite and intellectuals, who had nothing to gain but everything to loose by the shift of a one-party rule of Yugoslavia. This book explains the use of Serbian nationalism, by Milosevic, to achieve his power firstly in Serbia and then in Yugoslavia. Although Milosevic wanted to step in the place of Tito, when he saw this as impossible he diverged his focus in creating a large Serbian state in early 1990s, argue the authors. This provoked other nations to rise against these wicked ideas of Milosevic and declare their independence, which resulted in the death of Yugoslavia.

The literature of the studies on international relations of Kosova, during this period of time, is more or less along this line: the 1974 constitution, the rise of Serbian nationalism.

The late 1990s is another period, very important period, for Kosova, which finds its way in the literature of the academia. The hot conflict in Kosova started in 1997 and this was the first time that Kosova was taken as an important agenda in an international meeting. This was the meeting of Contact Group foreign ministers, in the annual session of the UN General Assembly in New York, where the parties showed deep concern over the situation in Kosova, and asked both, the Serbs and the Albanians, to pursue their demands in politically, and not use violence by any means. This was a warning but no threats were articulated yet (Latawski and Smith, 2007). In March 1998, U.S. special envoy, Robert Gelbard, called Kosova Liberation Army a terrorist organization, which encouraged Milosevic to pursue his genocide in Kosova, and encouraged the Kosovars to arm themselves and not listen to their acting president, pacifist, Ibrahim Rugova. Few days later, Gelbard recanted, claiming that what he meant was to condemn all the terrorist actions of both groups and not categorize KLA among the terrorist organizations (Campbell, 2000). This shows how little were the western decision makers, politicians, intellectuals, elite, and people, informed on what was going on in Kosova, all of this a result of the lack of proper literature on the region.

Afterwards, Kosova gained much of the international media attention. The UN passed the resolution 1160, in March 1998, which spoke of serious political and human rights violations in Kosova. In September the same year resolution 1199 was passed, which used a stronger language against the 'human catastrophe' happening in Kosova. The UN Secretary-General then called for both parts to halt the looming 'humanitarian disaster' in Kosova, immediately (Latawski, 2007). These were the warnings given to both parts of the conflict, prior to the war in 1999. But these

are important because NATO has argued its right to intervene in light of these resolutions, which recognized the humanitarian disaster and human catastrophe happening in Kosova. NATO then decided that the FRY had continuously violated UN resolutions, and this had created a catastrophe that threatened to destabilize the surrounding region. The dangerous situation in Kosova had made it necessary and justified the military actions of NATO against the FRY, to support the political aims of the international community, where all people can live peacefully in a secure environment (NATO, 1999b; Latawski, 2007).

Prior to NATO intervention, there were many diplomatic struggles to handle the Kosova issue in a political manner. As a result of these diplomatic struggles, Milosevic finally agreed in October 1998, to let a small group of Kosovo Verification Mission, led by the OSCE, to monitor. The OSCE formed an unarmed KVM, which began operating in November 1998 (Latawski, 2007).

But, the most important diplomatic measures taken were the Rambouillet rounds of negotiations, initiated by the Contact Group, consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. The proposal at Rambouillet offered substantial autonomy for Kosovar Albanians and held out the eventual prospect of a referendum that might lead to independence. This formula was accepted by the Kosovar Albanians, after many face-to-face negotiations of international leaders and the Kosovar Albanian representatives, but was rejected by the Serbian group. This division of the Serbs led to the withdrawal of the KVM and the decision of NATO to use the airpower (Latawski, 1997). Stephan Hosmeler (2001) thinks that the reason of non-acceptance of the Rambouillet formula, by the Serbian team, was that it would have been very dangerous for Milosevic to accept such terms without a fight. Hosmeler is right, because after all Milosevic has promised that Kosova would be a part of Serbia, forever.

In March 23, 1999, NATO initiated its first, historical, humanitarian intervention. For the next 78 nights, NATO waged an air-war, to ultimately force the Yugoslav, Serbian, forces to withdraw from and stop the humanitarian genocide in Kosova. NATO moved its forces (KFOR) in Kosova on June 12, 1999, to establish basic law and order, and to provide protection to the people of Kosova, of any ethnic origin. What makes Kosova important is that here NATO demonstrated its ability to resolve conflicts and hold together in an objective. NATO lost no soldier in the battle, and committed no ground troops (Nardulli, 2002). Having all these in mind, NATO's mission in Kosova was a major success, in all fields.

The wars in former Yugoslavia, including Kosova, occupied a good portion of the literature of intra-state ethnic and civil wars. Bosnian war occupied the literature with the 'lift and strike' strategy proposal, where the UN would lift the arms embargo imposed on the Bosnian government, and conduct the air strike against Bosnian Serb positions. This strategy divided American and European policy makers and scholars, with the Americans being more in favor of this strategy than the Europeans. NATO's few days bombing campaign's success in 1995 supported the intervention in Kosova in 1999. In this intervention, first of its kind, NATO bombed the Serbian military and infrastructure for 78 days, and successfully brought back the refugees who fled Kosova en masse. The literature on the new type of intervention has emerged with the Kosova war, being the first operation conducted only by air strikes, with zero lost of NATO soldiers in the mission (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). Kosova occupies a central place in the literature of new lessons for intervention and conduct of wars.

**Structure of Thesis**

The first chapter will elucidate further the whole area of Security Studies, and the difference between domestic and international security, as well as on the CNN effect as an important factor in security studies.

In the second chapter I will discuss securitization theory. Because security is something constructed, I will focus on the building block of the securitization theory, as they are important to understand how something is constructed. Afterwards I will analyze, separately, domestic and international securitization, continuing with their comparison, and concluding with what we can do to expand the securitization theory. This chapter makes the main part of my theory discussion in the thesis.

The third chapter will be an analysis of Kosova, my case study, and the region. Knowing the region and the regional interactions is important, when one speaks on Balkan's conflicts. The history, the ethnic composition, the religious composition, and the neighborhood relations are very important to know when analyzing the conflicts, or the states, in Balkans. Firstly, I will explain the region as a whole; then I will explain Yugoslavia, as a bigger union or federation, where Kosova was part of; afterwards I will explain Kosova as the smallest unit of analysis; and finally I will briefly look at the Kosova and regional conflicts, to understand the historical, ethnical, and religious differences, as triggers for the last conflict in Kosova.

The fourth chapter is the main part of the thesis, where I will analyze my case study, and apply the theoretical discussions in this case study. Here I observe how and why Kosova was securitized. Observing this case will help the reader understand the differences between domestic and international securitization. In this chapter, after explaining how Kosova was securitized, I discuss the need for the securitization of Kosova. Afterwards, I evaluate the securitization of

Kosova, to understand the lessons that Kosova taught us on security in general and securitization in particular.

Finally, I conclude that the securitization theory has room for improvement and that Kosova taught us some lessons on how to rethink securitization theory again. Kosova has had consequences for the theory, and I will comment on future implications that the Kosova case has in the securitization theory, the security studies, European security, NATO, and the security relations of super powers in the 21$^{st}$ century.

# CHAPTER 1

**Security Studies**

Security is a level of dealing with the issues beyond politics, the issues that need immediate and more attention, the issues that are above politics. When people link an issue with the security of someone or something, they give more importance to the issue and prioritize it from other issues that politics handles. As Thierry Balzacq argues "the enunciation of security itself creates a new social order wherein 'normal politics' is bracketed" (Balzacq, 2005; 171). We must make a distinction between objective and subjective security, that is the real security concern and the imagined security concern. But that study would be beyond this work, which analyzes how the Kosova issue became a security issue in the international arena, not the fact if it really was a real or an imagined security concern.

There is a challenge for the leaders of the state and the decision makers on security issues: What will happen if we take security actions? And, what will happen if we do not? (Buzan et. al., 1998: 26-32). This is a dilemma in security, because whatever decision is made the consequences can be dive. At the same time, this dilemma is used when interest groups or elites try to give importance to an issue and try to lead the government to deal with that issue.

When we answer the above questions, or when we speak about security, we must have a referent object to speak about. We shall ask the question - The security of what? – to be able to find the referent object. Although the state is a good referent object, it does not always give the right and complete answer. To answer simply as 'the state' is not satisfactory enough, especially when we take in consideration that the state is a constructed entity and it is composed of many other groups and individuals inside of it, while at the same time the state as an entity is a member

of bigger groups and collectivities. Selecting the referent object is an important step when one speaks about security, and the referent object is an important indicator if one issue is to be taken as a security issue or not (Buzan, 1991). The third world countries are obsessed with security, as the lack of stateness makes the elite vulnerable to internal and external threats in political, economical, or societal areas (Ayoob, 1995: 4). This is a concern that shall take the attention of the developed countries also, because the higher the number of poor third world countries, the higher the threats towards the developed countries. If we analyze the security threats, especially terrorist attacks, we can argue that they usually, but not always, come from poorer countries. We can thus conclude that the poor countries must be given a chance to develop in order to have a more secure world (Stern and Ojendal, 2010). There is a direct relation between development and security (Stern and Ojendal, 2010). But for the developed countries the meaning of security is broader, and so is the group of referent objects. The state is not anymore the only referent object; other objects such as values, individuals, international organizations, or unions, gained importance lately and are subject to being selected as important referent objects.

Consequently, what we understand by security has a direct relation with insecurity. Insecurity, on the other hand, is in direct relation with the threats. According to Booth and Wheeler (2008: 10) there are three types of insecurities, "the fatalist, the mitigator, and the transcender". The first type, the fatalist, is the idea that insecurity will always be present in the international politics and there is no escape from that; the second type, the mitigator, is the idea that insecurity can be decreased to the minimum from time to time but it cannot be eliminated as a whole; and the third type, the transcender, is the idea that on a global scale it is the human society that determines if the insecurity will be eliminated or not, it is up to the human society to choose to eliminate the insecurity.

Here is the ultimate challenging question of the dilemma between feeling secure or insecure: What are the plans of the others? The first dilemma is how to interpret the intentions, the capabilities, and the moves of the others. There are two alternatives of interpretation of these moves. The moves are either interpreted as moves for self-defense purposes and the policy-makers do not respond by taking any counter measures of military means; or they are interpreted as intentions and capabilities for offensive purposes and the policy-makers take measures to protect the state from these threats. The second dilemma is how to respond? After the interpretation, the decision-makers are supposed to respond to the moves taken by the others. The signal given back shall either say that we will not react to your moves as we believe in your good intentions; or that we will assure ourselves that we are safe against your moves, and make a move to increase our own capabilities. Here rises the possibility of raising the level of hostility if the intensions and capabilities of the others are interpreted as offensive, and the decision-makers respond by taking military measures (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 2-10). In this case the race of uncertainty about the intentions of the others grows from one side to the other, which theoretically can continue to infinity. This dilemma is very sensible, and one needs to understand first the intentions of the others and then respond accordingly, but with care not to provoke the others, by making them feel unsafe by your response, otherwise the increase in one's own security will increase the insecurity of the others.

Feeling secure is changeable in relation to time and other circumstances. While sometimes some issues must be securitized, in different times these issues must be desecuritized. Today several states see China as a threat to their security, but differently from traditional understanding of military security, China is seen as an economic threat to the security of the national economy rather then a military threat to the nation state. But we shall not limit the

referent objects just to the sectors of the state and the society. While in the traditional understanding of security the referent object was the state, and sometimes the nation, in the alternative, critical, approach of security studies, there are different circles of the collectivities in the society taken as the referent objects, too. Such are the individuals, the community, the globe, the region, the union, etc.

Individual security has gained attention in the academia as Rousseau's notion of social contract failed. Individuals are the most vulnerable unit to threats, nowadays. In social contract the state has the obligation to protect the individuals, but we saw that during the two world wars and the other local wars afterwards, the individuals are the victims and the state cannot provide protection for them. On the other hand, in some of the third world states, the state is the direct threat to the individual, and it is the source of harm for its citizens (Fierke, 2001: 43). This happened in the former Yugoslavia, where the individuals were threatened by the state mechanisms, which made the new states to emerge.

**Domestic and International Security**

Domestic and international security must be analyzed separately, because they have different elements to consider and they both are different in the system. The actors are different in both cases, and the methods of dealing with security vary. Domestic security has less actors and threats than the international security. But one thing that they share is the challenge to provide security at home and internationally. The international system is usually anarchic in itself (with few exceptions like the EU), while the state is usually not, but there are some exceptions, like the former Yugoslavia in 1990s, which was an environment in the absence of central legitimate government. In the domestic level what the government and the leaders try to

do is avoid anarchy, which is considered as the most insecure system of a state. Anarchy does not mean chaos, but rather it means the absence of a central government (Buzan, 1991; Bull, 1977). Sometimes in anarchy the system regulates itself and puts its own rules, like the interaction in the international arena. But that is rear and it does not work in the domestic level, so for security in the domestic level, the anarchy needs to be avoided.

Nevertheless, in both, the domestic and international security issues, the referent objects are very important and according to the referent object one can label an issue as a domestic or an international security issue.

*Domestic Security*

When we speak about security, we need to have a referent object, as mentioned previously, and also an objective or subjective threat. Human beings are encircled by threats all over, and this makes them feel pressure from outside, and automatically take precautions beforehand. Buzan (1991) has pointed four basic types of threats: to the physical well being, to the economic status, to the rights, and to the position or the statutes. Here the individual is taken as a referent object towards whom the state has the obligation to protect from the above-mentioned threats. But in domestic security, the state is also taken as a referent object in the sense of preserving the state from the inner, rebellious, awakening of any group of people. Threats to the state as a referent object may also be: political, by pressuring the government on a particular policy; the overthrow the government, by imprisoning the leaders and bringing chaos, or *coup d'état*; or secessionism (Buzan 1991: 119) from the mainland by some regions in the periphery. These threats are mainly true for the states that are weak but they are not avoidable for the strong states also, like Spain, Canada, Turkey or Great Britain.

Often, in some parts of the world, the state is also a threat to the individual. This again has to do with the distinction between strong and weak states, but I will dsicuss that distinction below. The security threats of the state that threaten the individual are mainly of the rights of individual nature, when the rights and liberties of the individuals can be violated. Such threats can be economic (when the state seizes property from an individual), political (violating the right of political participation), social (public humiliation), physical (pain, injury), freedom (unlawful imprisonment), etc. These threats can come for several reasons, like: the enforcement of the domestic law; political and administrative actions against groups or individuals; struggles of

some elite groups over control of state machinery; or state's internal and external policies of handling security (Buzan, 1991: 44).

The threats from the state, or to the state, usually vary according to how strong the state is, in relation to the power it holds in the international arena, as well as the democracy and human rights records. There is no single indicator that portrays a state as strong or weak, but Buzan (1991) has written some of the conditions of separating the weak and strong states. These distinctions can be seen from the level of political violence, the role of security enforcement agents (such as military and police) in everyday life of the citizens, political struggle on the ideology which is to be used to organize the state, the lack of the identity and the presence of several ethnic or national identities within the state (like in Yugoslavia), the lack of a clear hierarchy of political authority (like in Yugoslavia), and the high state control of the media. One or several of these conditions, are present in today's weak states, but overcoming the above problems, will make a state stronger, more secured, trustful, and more democratic.

Because the third world states find themselves in the early stages of state formation, and they see that they are weak, they link security to power, where power is an instrument of their security (Ayoob, 1995: 4). This is done because they lack a say in the system of states that they just became members of, or a bigger community in which they want to become a member. But sometimes power also triggers more threats, and thus more insecurity, especially in the strong states. Take the USA as an example; because it is the biggest economic and military power in the world, it is a subject to the al-Qaeda attacks, such as the 9/11. The security concerns and solutions are not the same everywhere. While the third world countries are obsessed by power, the first world countries trigger threats because of the power they have.

*International Security*

As I pointed out above, international and domestic securities differ in the actors that speak security, in the referent objects, in the relations between the individuals, between the states, and individual-state relations. A very important concern of states, nowadays, is the international political system. This is because the states are political constructs (Buzan, 1991: 146), which can change from time to time, according to the interests of the international actors, balance of power in international platform, and the currents inside the state itself. For an issue to become an international security issue there needs to be several states involved, and the threat shall be a threat to more than two states. Although security is about 'survival', in domestic as well as international platform, they differ as to the type of survival concerned. While in domestic security survival means the protection of the state from the inner and outer threats to its territorial integrity or sovereignty, in international security survival is about protection, in an anarchic international order, from the threats posed to the referent object from other referent objects, or group of referent objects, outside of its control and sovereignty. Some international security issues concern different countries at the same time; like human rights, environment, economy, or other issues where several countries are threatened. At this time, the state elite may ask for extraordinary means that normally would not ask for, to keep the threats blocked (Buzan et al., 1998: 21).

At the international level there is anarchy, also. But while domestic anarchy means the absence of central government, international anarchy involves more states and governments, and this complicates the anarchical system of the international order (Buzan, 1991: 21). International anarchy is not chaos, and it shall not be misconceptiolized as such. The international anarchy means that the global governance power is decentralized, and with the change of balance of

powers the hegemony changes, which is possible every moment of time. States are the actors who struggle for power and cooperation in this anarchical system, like the individuals do in a single state. Ayoob (1995: 1) argues that the third world countries have difficulties to adopt to the international system because they have difficulties at adopting to a group or individual sovereign states in the international market and the principle of sovereign state. Third world countries have difficulties playing according to the rules laid down by the developed countries. They leave very less competitive opportunities in the international markets for the third world, and the principle of state sovereignty helps the developed countries to be protective of their markets and values, against the influence of the third world. This makes it more difficult for the third world countries to interact with the other states on an equal footing. Yet, third world countries have a multidimensional relationship with the international order, in group or individual level, and they need the international system for development and engagement in world politics.

The international security regime is composed of security communities, where states come together to form these communities so they can be stronger together and minimize the possibility to fight one another. The communities are formed by the states, who have shared identities, or values, who have multidimensional relations, and long-term shared interests with each other (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31). We can talk about a formed security community whenever states become integrated to the point where they will assure each other that they will settle their differences without war (quoted by Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3). This can happen in two forms; first when several independent states come together under one larger unit, like the USA or like the EU wants to be; and second, when states retain their independence but come together under

the same values and interests, to form a kind of unity against a common threat (quoted by Adler and Barnett, 1998: 7), something like NATO, the OSCE, or the EU today.

To be able to form a community where there is assurance of settling conflicts without war, there shall be insecurity felt among the states, so the necessity for such cooperation arises. After the insecurity there must be signals given to each other that we can cooperate and mutual desecuritization measures to win each other's trust must be taken. And finally, after forming the community, there need be common threats, perceived or objective, to keep this security community alive, where the community as a whole shall securitize these common threats (Weaver, 1998). But nevertheless, a security community does not imply that there are no differences or conflicts inside the community, but rather it means that the actors in the community agree to cooperate and to settle their conflicts without war.  Usually there is a will towards maintaining the status quo, but the possibilities of internal and external transformations are not rare, like it happened in former Yugoslavia or in former Czechoslovakia.

On the way towards forming a security community, there are three phases that this process must pass through. In the first phase the states share common ideas and concerns on security; in the second phase they build common institutions and organizations; and finally in the third phase the common interests are institutionalized and there is shared identity, values, and future on security (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 48-56). On the third phase there are several changes that happen in nation states in terms of understanding and dealing with security, like military planning, the meaning of security and insecurity, threatening actors, referent objects, and the way of response to these threats.

We can argue that the best security communities to analyze are the ones that are regionally formed, because of the shared identities they have with each other, historical conflicts they had

with each other, and common threats they face from outside of their borders. These interactions among the actors in the community make them interdependent in security, and form a successful security community in the region. In analyzing security communities, and security in general, regional security communities are the best to analyze, as these are between units and global actors, so not too small and not too big to analyze. The difference between units and regions is that the regions do not have actor quality and usually they cannot act as a single actor, but on the other hand regions also have an anarchical system in its own, where different independent actors act according to their best interests, and there is power balance among the polarities in the community. As the difference between regional and global communities is less obvious, then how can we put a red line between these two communities? It usually has to do with actors who are present in the community (Buzan and Waever: 2003), but, this criterion is not strictly true neither. We know that China is a global actor, but what about Iran, the community where Iran is a part, shall it be called a global or a regional community? Russia also. Russia was a great power but now it is rather a regional power. We can also say that global security is rather a platonic aim, whereas regional security communities are easier to form and they are present in the reality, where different actors are interdependent with each other and they cannot consider their own security without the security of the others in the region.

Buzan and Waever (2003) argue that there are three eras in the modern world history of regional security communities: the era from 1500 to 1945, the era from 1945 to 1989, and the era since the 1990. There are larger regional security communities and there are smaller regional security communities, but the larger ones are formed out of subcommunities, which play an important role in the balance of power in the Regional Security Communities (RSC). Balkans is also a RSC but, like in the colonial regions, when the secession is drawn out by great powers,

then the communities are constructed and they are not durable. This has shown to be the case in the former Yugoslavia, where the secessions were drawn by the great powers, and the community itself felt apart soon, as the borders were neither ethnically drawn, nor were they drawn by the identity of the people and their values.

In the third world countries, the main level of security is domestic security, and this is why in some places regional communities were unsuccessful, because other powers -and not the idea of first insecurity, then common security concerns, and finally common ideology of security in the community- constructed them (Ayoob, 1995). The presence of powerful states identifies the community. If there is a great power present, then there is a global security community but when there are only regional powers present, the community is only a regional security community.

The regional powers have an undefined role. They are taken as serious and important in the balance of power in the rivalry of the global powers, but sometimes are excluded in the equations of high politics and security (like India are Iran). Sometimes regional communities may trigger super power conflicts (Balkans, Middle East), but they obviously do not get as much attention as the global powers. The great powers are difficult to define as well. The list of the great powers changes consequently with the balance of power and priorities in the international agenda. First World War, Second World War, Cold War, economic crises, the distribution of natural resources etc. change the list of the great powers constantly. But if we must define a great power, then it is a power that has an important role in global politics, global security, global economy, and international relations. They have the capability of acting in more then one region and they see themselves as prospective super powers, but they are also recognized as such by the other powers. The European Union, for example, plays between being a regional power and a great power. It depends on how others see it, if they consider the EU as a great power then it is a great

power, but for some issues, when it is also seen as a regular regional power, that is the role and the influence it can have (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 30-35). Superpowers, on the other hand, are the powers that have broad range of capabilities influencing the whole international system. They must have economic, political, and military capabilities according to this ranking, to influence every region in the world, balancing or favoring one part more then the other. The rank must be accepted by other powers, and the superpower must see itself as such. Sometimes the superpowers act like guarantors to smaller states and peace in the world, but sometimes they are seen as a threat (as the USA in the Middle East). They have a role in the securitization and desecuritization of nearly all the issues with global concern. The number of superpowers must be one of the differences between the Cold War era and post-Cold War era, where in the latter era we have only the USA as the superpower.[8]

**Conclusion**

Security is something constructed. To answer the question: - what is security? - depends on what we understand out of it, as everyone may understand something different. At the political level, security is a move to deal with issues beyond politics; but in societal level, security is to feel safe, in absence of threats towards the people's life, property, values, and quality of life. Security is in direct relation to insecurity and threats, because to feel secure one needs to eliminate insecurities and threats.

At political level there is always a security dilemma among states and governments. The first dilemma arises from the intentions of the others and their capabilities to do harm. The

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[8] To read more on security complexes, powers, regions, and their interactions, see: Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: The structure of international security,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

second dilemma is how to respond to the security build-up of the other states, in such a way as not to trigger further build-up. Third world countries are more concerned with security, because their insufficiency to protect themselves against bigger powers makes them skeptic.

Security is interchangeable and interdependent. While you might feel secured in one situation; you may feel insecure in another situation, depending on the international and regional balance of powers. This is true for both, individual and collective security, because one's security depends on the security and the acts of the others around.

I have divided security into domestic and international, because they vary in their methods of dealing with security, the threats, and the referent objects. In domestic security the referent object is usually the state, and/or the nation. But lately the individual is also being placed at the center of the security concerns in the domestic level, although the individual may be a threat and a victim, towards the state, at the same time. The threats may come from individuals and groups from within the state, who threaten the political system, as well as the legitimacy of the government. But the threats may also come from the groups out of the state borders. On the other hand, the state and the nation are also the referent objects in the international security, but this group is expended to the globe, the union, and the regional communities, as well. The threats are usually from outside of state boundaries, who threaten the territory and the sovereignty of the state. The threats and the security vary from state to state in relation to how strong the state is. Especially in the third world, the power is believed to define a state as strong or weak. We also have global referent objects, like the human rights, global economy, environment, etc. which are subjects to the security studies.

Regional security communities are easiest to analyze. A security community needs to have trust between its members. They need to desecuritize their previous securitizations, and then

securitize their common referent objects and identify their common threats. Regional security communities are important and easier to analyze because they are not as big as global communities, which are too large to analyze; and they are not as small as units (states), which do not always bring objective results when analyzed. The regional security communities differ according to their power and their strength they have, in the international arena. This strength is defined according to powers that are members to these communities.

The forces that have driven the development of the International Security Studies literature can be categorized in mainly five categories: the distribution of power and the great power politics, the impact of technological innovations in security studies, the key security events after the Second World War and especially after the Cold War, the internal dynamics of academic debates, and the institutionalization of the international security studies (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 50-65).

In the following chapter I will discuss how we name an issue a security issue, in domestic and international level, and how we deal with it in both levels. Although a new area of study, securitization -construction of security issues- explains the ways of naming a security issue, and the presentation of this issue as such. The challenge dilemma that exists is whether that securitized issue is a real security issue or not. An issue that is subject of security concerns must be securitized to have that meaning; otherwise it will not have the importance it needs to be dealt in security level, and we call this the 'silent dilemma' (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The paradox is that some issues, even if they are not security concerns, might be constructed and given importance to be dealt in security level, just to serve a particular part of the society or a group. The next chapter analyzes and explains how issues are securitized, and how these methods are

different in domestic and international level. It also explains, in detail, the actors of securitization, in domestic and international levels.

# CHAPTER 2

**Securitization Theory**

Securitization is a new, and alternative, approach to the traditional security theories. Securitization is the third, and the upper, level of dealing with issues. Security theory has three main roots: the speech act theory, the Schmittian understanding of security and exceptional politics, and the traditionalist security debates. In light of these three roots the securitization theory emphases the role of the authority in confronting and constructing the threats and enemies, as well as the ability to take decisions and adopt emergency measures (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). There are three levels of dealing with issues in the domestic system as well as the international system. The first one is non-politization, which means not dealing with the issue at all; the second one is politization, which brings up the issue to the discussions in the public realm, and: the third level is securitization, which prioritizes the issue by naming it a security issue, bringing it above politics, as existential issue that shall be immediately dealt with (Waever, 1998; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

The issues in the first level are issues that the state, government, does not want to deal with, these are the issues that are taken off the agenda and are not at the disposal of the public for discussion. The second level issues, politicized issues, are served to the public for discussion and debate, and this way the decisions on how to deal with them are taken. Non-politicized issues sometimes are brought to the politicized level so the public can discuss them, and those issues gain a little more importance. The third level issues, securitized issues, are issues that bypass the public, and are presented as existential issues that only high politics, can deal with them. They are not served to the general public to be discussed, but rather are portrayed, correctly or not (Waever, 1999), that they are existential priorities, which need immediate actions, so the right of

using extraordinary means must be granted by the public (Buzan and Hansen, 2009; Buzan and Waever, 2009).

Usually an issue is securitized by a speech act, for which I will discuss later, and the uttering of the word security when talking about that issue. Some issues are sometimes taken from the securitized level to the politicized level, like the Cyprus issue, or the Armenian issue in Turkey today, and these issues become open for the public to discuss the way that should be followed to deal with them. Usually for the issues in the securitized level, the actors who deal with them, ask for extraordinary means, without limitations, which normally would not be used in everyday politics. Politicization is the middle ground for dealing with issues, and usually serves as the intermediate when the importance of an issue is changed; while we can say that securitization is "a more extreme version of politization" (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). Another case that has to do with the theory of securitization, but is usually misinterpreted, is the case of desecuritization. Desecuritization is not the case when an issue is not a security issue anymore, or when a threat does not exist anymore, but rather it is the case when an issue is brought back to the low politics, and it is politicized for the public to discuss it and the government to take relative responsibilities towards it (Waever, 1995; 1998; Williams, 2003). European Union, as a security community, is formed with the process of desecuritization of the relations between the member states, which means that the label "security" in the relations among each other is taken off and the cooperation with each other is presented as a cheaper and better option (Waever, 1998: 69). Asecuritization, on the other hand, is the state when an issue is so well politicized that it cannot be securitized anymore (Waever, 1998; Williams, 2003).

Securitization has a large field of application, from the narrow understanding of military and state issues to the wide understanding of whatever worries that concern the people.

Securitization is taken, by some scholars, as a part of politics, as a continuation of politics when the normal politics does not work. A securitized threat does not mean that it always exists, but it means that it is presented as such, correctly or incorrectly, by portraying it as an existential threat that if we do not deal with it now we will not be able to deal with it later and all other issues and threats will be irrelevant. This is because either we will not exist if we do not deal with it by all the means we have now, or because we will not be free to deal with it anymore (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1998). The securitization of an issue is usually based on a security dilemma; there is a dilemma on how to accept and interpret a security threat and how to respond to it (Booth and Wheeler, 2008). When an issue is securitized it does not mean that it is always just socially constructed as such without in reality being so, but it means that it is presented as an existential issue, -sometimes objectively and correctly, but sometimes just constructed and incorrectly-, for the government elite to have the extraordinary means in their hand.

The aim of the securitization studies is to analyze who securitizes, what are the referent objects, with what results, and under what conditions. These are some of the concepts that are essential for reading the securitization studies, and I will give much more room for explaining these concepts, below. These concepts are not the same in domestic securitization and international securitization. They differ in the scale, the nature of the threats, the nature of the referent objects, as well as the importance of different sectors and conditions of the time. When an issue is securitized, let it be domestically or internationally, it might have a chain reaction (Buzan, 1991), where other states respond to that securitization with securitizing the first state as a threat, or other regions securitizing different international issues in response to the first securitization. Russia, for example, securitized Orthodox heritage against the US led NATO securitization of the Kosova conflict.

**The Building Blocks of the Securitization Theory**

Securitization theory, developed mostly by Waever and Buzan, analyses how an issue is brought up to the level of security, by the speech act. In this process there are several actors and objects, as well as concepts, for which I must take your attention on, in order to understand how securitization is done. I grouped all these concepts, objects, and actors, into "building blocks" of the securitization theory. I must also say that although securitizing an issue is to construct it as a security issue, it does not mean that it is not so. Sometimes issues that are not objective matters of security are also securitized, but the issues that are a real matter of security need to be securitized, also, as they must be presented as such, otherwise we will not understand if they are a security issue or not. In my thesis I do not argue if the securitized issues are real security issues or not, but rather I focus on how the securitization is done, domestically and internationally.

**Referent object:** The most important block of the security studies is the referent object, and so it is important in the securitization theory, also. The referent object is the object, which has the right to survive, and it bears existential importance, so whatever means shall be taken to secure its survival shall be legitimate. When this referent object is threatened the appointed authorities shall do whatever it takes to assure its wellbeing. Because it has existential importance, the measures shall be taken immediately and the priority shall be high because if we do not deal with this issue immediately then all the other issues will be irrelevant, as we will not be who we are now if we fail to protect this referent object. Traditionally the state and sometimes the nation have been the best securitized referent objects, but this has changed with time and today whatever concerns the people can be a referent object. Scale and size of the object are very important determinants of a successful referent object (Buzan et al., 1998), but so are the time

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and the conditions at the state agenda, for a successful referent object. It is important to note that a referent object can sometimes be a threat to a conflicting party, and it can be an existential referent object to the other part. Kosova can be considered as such; the Albanians wanted an independent Kosova, and this was their national cause, their referent object; the Serbs, on the other hand, saw this as a threat to their territorial integrity. Similarly is the nationalism (one group uses nationalist drives to excite the mass, and the other uses the rise of nationalism as a threat), annexation (one group wants to annex to a country or a union, and the other group sees this as a threat), etc.

**Securitizing actors:** Another important block in the securitization theory is the securitizing actor, the actor who makes the speech act. This is the actor who labels a threat to the referent object, and talks security to the public, by presenting the existential threat. It can be an individual or a group, who does the securitizing speech act. Mostly these actors are institutions and people with influence, like the political leaders, governments, lobbyists, pressure groups, and bureaucracies (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). It is important that the ones who do the speech act, the securitizing actors, are the appropriate people, as they must win the legitimacy of the public in order to securitize an issue (Williams, 2003). The agriculture minister, for example, is not appropriate to do a speech act on national security, but he can securitize the forests against global warming. The securitizing actors, usually, are not the referent objects, as it is not appropriate to argue your own survival, or the survival of your position in the society, but their argument would be that there is a need for securitizing the nation, state, principles, values, etc.

**Threats:** To be able to securitize a referent object, there must be a threat that needs to be eliminated for the continuation of the existence of that referent object. Picking up a threat is an

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important process, to legitimize the securitization of a particular object. The threat needs to be one that there is fear against, and that if it is not dealt with, it can endanger the existence of the referent object that one wants to securitize, and even it can endanger bigger referent objects, like the lives of the people. Threat can also be socially constructed, to show that there is insecurity, and they can sometimes lead to paranoia, the securitization of nonexistential threats. But this does not mean, as I claimed above, that this is always the case, as sometimes there are cases of complacency also, the nonsecuritization of existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 56-58). There are existential threats, which exist in relation to the historical or geographical enmity between neighbors, or even the relation between states; and nonexistential threats, which do not really exist but are constructed to serve an elite or a pressure group. The biggest challenge is to recognize the existing and the non-existing threats. But different sectors have different existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998). Political sector's existential threats, for example, are the threats posed to the sovereignty, and sometimes the ideology of the state; in the societal sector the threats to the identity of groups, to the nation, and sometimes religion, are the existential threats (Buzan et al., 1998, Waever, 1998). But, in the societal sector religion can also be a threat to the other ideology of the state. Turkey has for many years securitized secularism against Islam, and it has been constructed as something that is threatened and needs to be safeguarded (Bilgin, 2008). Extraordinary measures, like: coups, imprisonment of leaders who preached religious ideologies, or even the closure of political parties; were taken, several times, to guard secularism.

**Functional actors:** despite the referent objects and the securitizing actors, there are some actors who influence the process of securitization, and these actors are grouped under the "functional actors" category in the Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et. al., 1998). These actors have a big role in drawing the path of the securitization process. Such actors

can be: factories, in the environmental sector, which do not securitize and are not referent objects; religious parties, in the societal and political sectors, if they do not take active part in the securitization process either as referent objects, threats, or securitizing actors (Buzan et al., 1998), etc.

**Securitizing move:** When a threat is presented towards a referent object, and we have the securitizing actors, as well as functional actors, we still cannot talk about a securitized issue. We call this a 'securitizing move'. The securitization is still not finished without the audience accepting it and legitimizing the use of extraordinary means. By accepting it is not meant that the audience shall give a unanimous or majority consent, or that a referendum be held, but rather that the audience argues it and is convinced that that referent object needs security measures, and this issue needs priority (Buzan, et al., 1998). This way the securitizing actor gets the legitimacy to use the means that normally would not be able to do, to protect the survival of the referent object.

**Audience:** The speech act is directed towards the public, who give the consent of securitizing that particular referent object. We call this public as the 'audience', because they are the ones that listen to the speech act given by the securitizing actor. It is very important that the audience accepts your act, not only in security, but also your speech act (like getting married, naming somebody, or betting) (Austin, 1962). Otherwise the act is not finished completely. This makes audience as another, one of the most important, block of securitization theory. The audience is one of the most distinguished differences in the domestic and the international securitizations.

**Speech act:** The securitization theory is based on the speech act of the language theory, first argued by Austin, which is described as 'doing things with words' (Austin, 1962). The referent object, the threat, the securitizing actors, the audience, the functional actors, are all part

of the speech act, that in our case can be re-defined as the 'security speech act'. Waever (1995) argues, and I share his view, that the security is a communicative act, which affects the audience who is listening, and acting accordingly. Waever (1995), also argues that by giving the label 'security' to something, one gives a particular political significance, which is attached to the 'existential threats' and the 'extraordinary means'. By naming something as a security issue, it is like naming a baby with a particular name, naming a ship, marrying, or betting. By the speech act something is not presented, but something is done (Austin, 1962), the speech act is not limited to communication, but it is equivalent to action (Austin, 1962; Waver, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998; Booth, 2007). In politics, when something is equated to security then it is a priority policy for the government and the people, because a security labeled issue is also equated with wellbeing and existence.

Austin (1962) argues that in the speech act the utterances are neither true nor false. When I say I do want to take this woman as my wife, or I bet, or I declare war, there is no true or false, these are performative utterances for a performed action, in fact I performed an action by declaring something. This is true because when one says at the alter "I do", then the marriage happens; or when one says "I bet", then the betting is happening; or when one "declares war", then the war is declared; and there are no other action needed to finish the act. The same stands with security, when one profiles an issue as a security issue then the action has happened, there is no true or false, grammatically they are all true, but in reality that is not important, the important thing is that it becomes automatically a security issue, which is later discussed by the audience to issue legitimacy for using means that could not be normally used.

Now that we saw the main building blocks of securitizations, there are some other details that we must know, for a successful securitization. When something is done by words it is

important that the right person does it, and that the circumstances are right. For naming an issue as a security issue the person who is engaged with the security issues shall do it, for naming a baby it is important that the parent or someone appointed by the parents name him/her, to bet it is important that the counterpart accepts it, and when we say "I give" it is important that the act happens also. It is important that the appropriate person, in appropriate circumstances, says the words; the audience and the persons involved accepts it; and, the act is conducted (the security measures are executed, the promised thing is given, etc.) (Austin, 1962: 10-20).

Sometimes the exact words may not be used also. To securitize an issue you do not have to always use the word "security". But by showing the threats, presupposing the consequences, and making other suppositions, securitization happens. Some words have synonymous meanings as well. By pronouncing the word "defense" the same priority as saying "security" is given to an issue (Buzan et al., 1998).

It is very helpful that the appropriate conditions are made before securitizing an issue. Trauma, for example, is a good tactic for exaggerating the importance of the referent object and the need for fighting the threat, and preparing the ground for securitization. George W. Bush has used trauma by the media to securitize the war on terrorism, by making the media show very often the explosions of the 9/11 attacks (Fierke, 2007), which is less dangerous and the death toll is very less in comparison to the number of car accidents in the USA, today. One of the most important elements for a successful securitization is the imposition of fear and panic. This is what media does and what some securitizing actors decide to do in their speech acts. For the people, the audience, to give you the right to use the extraordinary means, they shall fear of loosing the referent object, or moreover, their most important values or most valued things.

As a summary, the securitization of an issue has several steps, which must be followed as a process for a successful securitization. The securitizing actors securitize certain issues towards the audience, and ask for the use of means that normally would not be legal to use, to be able to defend a certain referent object. Presenting a dangerous threat towards the referent object is the key. The securitization is done when the audience also accepts the issue as a security issue, and that issue is brought to high politics. This makes securitization a more radical form of political act. For a securitization it is not always necessary to use the words 'security', or the use of the word 'security' does not always constitute a securitizing move, but rather showing the threats, the importance and priority of the referent object, and the existential situation to deal with it, (otherwise we will not live or we will not be free to deal with it later if we do not deal with it now, by all the means we have) the securitization move happens. The securitizing actor, therefore, claims the right to use all the means available to defend the right of survival of the referent object, and it claims that this issue is so important that it cannot be left to the normal politics to deal with (Waever, 1995; Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan, 2003; Buzan and Hansen, 2009). With this, the situation has turned constructivist, which means that the audience is not concerned with knowing if the issue is a threat or not, but it is focused on the assumption of what will happen if we deal or if we do not deal with the issue. Nonetheless, the politicians, leaders, lobbyists, governments, or interest groups, take securitization as a continuation of another form of politics to deal with issues. The securitizing actors may differ from time to time and from the conditions that are present, but some actors may have different roles, different audiences, different threats, and different referent objects, to securitize at the same time. A head of a EU member state needs to securitize his state and nation in the EU; then he needs to securitize the EU as a community towards the people, and the opposition; and he also needs to securitize the

identity of his nation against the migration that is present across the EU, or the new common identity that the EU wants to create.

**Domestic Securitization**

I divide securitization into two, the domestic securitization and the international securitization. These two differ in the concepts of the securitization theory, so they must be analyzed separately. Domestic securitization is more constructive and close, whereas international securitization is more difficult to be made and is open to different voices.

Securitizing actors in the domestic securitization are more or less known: the elite of the country, the interest groups, the government, or political leaders. Usually the securitization of domestic issues is done to preserve the status quo, and prevent change. According to the traditional securitizing actors, generally change means instability (Buzan, 1991: 303), and security is the protection of the available status quo, which includes the position of the leaders, elite, and interest groups, in the government.

Territory, ideology, and nation, are usual referent objects for securitization in the domestic realm. Since the state rests on its physical existence, and since most of the conflicts are historically done for territory, territory is the referent object which has the existential right of survival, although sometimes it may be sacrificed in considerable measures for defending the population and sovereignty of a state (Buzan, 1991: 92-96). I agree with Buzan that there are four types of links between state and nation: the primal nation-state, the state-nation, part nation-state, and multinational-state, (Buzan, 1991: 72-76). The first category is the idealist, where the state's obligation is to protect the nation, and thus the bond between these two is best in this category; the second category of relations is the process where the state is a constructed entity, it

is made up of several different backgrounded groups of people, and it has constructed for them the language, arts, customs, way of life, etc. The best example that may be put under this category is the USA, who is lately founded, and is made up of immigrants, who find something common that the USA gives to them, and feel as one nation in one country; the third category is when a nation is divided into several states, and those states do not have just a small immigrant group of that nation, but rather this nation constitutes a good portion of the overall population of those countries, as minorities or even majorities. Such an example are the Albanians, who are divided in Albania, Montenegro, Kosova, a part of the remaining southern-Serbia, and Macedonia; and the fourth category is the category of the states that have been formed, usually by great powers, which consist of several nations in one country. Such states are: Canada, Switzerland, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. One of the problems of the Balkans, in this sense, is that the states were constructed in 1912 and after the First World War, artificially. Some nations were divided in several states, and some states artificially try to keep different nations in their boundaries. This was the problem in Yugoslavia in the first place, with Bosnia, with Kosova, and even with Macedonia.

The threats that all the states are open to are the military and environmental ones, whereas the economic, societal, and political threats give insecurities to most of the states (Buzan, 1991: 97). But in domestic security, the threats are usually constructed to suppress domestic unrest or domestic awakening. These are usually external threats, that are said to threaten the territory and the ideology of the state. Turkey, for example, has used Greece, Syria, Iran, and other neighbors, as threats to its territory so the military elite absorbed large amount of government funds for the military, and when a rule was broken, or a liberty violated, it was justified under the plan for defense against the threats that came from the neighbors. On the other hand, secular ideology of

the state was 'threatened' for decades by the import of radical Islam from the Middle East, and this way the relations of the Turkish people with the Middle East was cut. Any act by a group to awaken the religious feelings of the population were suppressed by the government and the military, constructing them as threats that came from abroad to disturb the Turkish secular republic, and threaten the sovereignty of the Turkish government. For defending the state against these two 'threats', extraordinary means, like military coups, were legitimized and used under the label 'security'. From the new AK Party policy of 'zero-problem neighborhood' we can see that these threats were just constructed to serve a small circle of people. The AK Party government started having relations with all the neighbors, and the territory or the secular state of the Turkish republic is in its place. But, nevertheless, the AK Party government also securitized some other issues, like the EU membership, to be able to gain the right to use all the means to fight against some non-democratic establishments in Turkey.

Mass media plays a very important role both in domestic securitization and in the international securitization alike. But, because the securitizing actors in the domestic issues are more limited, it is much effective and easier to use the media for securitization, whereas in international issues the media can have different voices and different point of views. As far as the domestic policies of security are concerned, what we see in media is usually what sells but where the media is state controlled then we get is what serves the interest of the government (Buzan, 1991: 347-353). This must be one of the main differences between domestic and international issues. When the media is state controlled then the domestic issues are portrayed in that way that serves the interests of the government. This can be an issue of the international coverage as well, but the international issues do not concern just one state.

**International Securitization**

Like domestic securitization, in the international securitization the concepts and the elements of security are very important. Although they change in scope and roles of the actors, the process of securitization must be completed for an international issue to be securitized, also. Unlike the domestic securitization, international securitization needs to be better organized and have more collective actors of securitization (among others: international mass media, conferences, reports, etc.), rather than individual securitization actors (Bahador, 2007). The leaders are very important, but not all the leaders that are influential in the domestic securitization are also influential in international one. The most important securitizing actors in the international arena are states. They securitize each other, the common issues that threaten firstly their interests, then the regional interests, and finally the global interests. The states are important securitizing actors because the international society is the society of states in itself, it is composed of states, and the main actors are the states themselves (Buzan et al., 1998). But lately, the media, the INGO-s, and some international leaders and institutions are replacing the power of states to securitize. The CNN effect, for example is one of the main agenda-setting actors in the wider international platform, and the media can influence the issues that must be politicized or securitized by states. The UN is another example. The UN, as an institution, can securitize an issue by pronouncing the phrase "this is a threat to international peace and security", which is a right given to the UN by Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Buzan et al., 1998: 149-151). The same logic is valid for interventions in domestic politics of states by the UN: imposition of sanctions, or just condemning an act (like the case of Israeli attack of 2008 in Gaza). The interventions are usually legitimized, by the international society, when referring to cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or bad governance. But, in the case of interventions we have double securitization.

The international society securitizes the values of human rights, and the violations of them are shown as legitimate arguments for intervention, whereas the state towards which the international society intervened securitizes its sovereignty, claiming that every state is sovereign and has the right to defend its survival and sovereignty. Both of these are true according to international declarations, covenants, and charters; but the power of the state towards which the intervention is happening is important in the legitimization of intervention; and so is the power of the state, or group of states, that intervene.

We have had several examples of international securitizations from pre-modern times, and we still have considerable examples of international securitizations, today. The crusades are nothing but securitized acts, which had devastating results. The religion was securitized, which led people of same heritage take actions against the 'others'. The holy land was occupied by 'infidels' and this is an existential security issue (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 345).

Europe, on the other hand, is a multi-phased securitization community. In Europe, and especially the EU part of Europe, we have got a number of different types of securitizations. The main problem is that the Europeans do not forget their past, and they surely do not want their future to look like their past. The idea of the EU is integration, and this is a mechanism that leads to the securitization of the past, as a 'divided past with a lot of conflicts'. This fear of the past generates securitization of national identities in the EU, so a new 'common' identity is more secure. For the securitization, there is a threat needed, and the source of the threat becomes the 'other'. But, in the case of Europe, the 'other' is the Europe itself, its notorious past is the threat, and the security of the nation states is the referent object (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998). Europe's securitization does not suffice with its past. There are some other groups, who securitize the national identities, against European integration. European integration is seen, by

some, as the threat to loosing the national identities of the states, and thus the integration is portrayed as a threat. The usual threats of this securitization are the immigrants and the refugees, which swept the EU over last few decades (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 356-364). I think that one of the reasons for the last securitization in the mind of the Europeans, is the decreasing number of the national population. This makes the immigrants a threat to their jobs, welfare, political positions, etc.

Although most of the energy on security of Europe is focused on its notorious past and integration, the other issues such as environment, immigration, ethnic conflicts, or organized crime and terrorism, are also securitized. This makes Europe, and especially the EU, a multi-phased securitization community. The media and the extreme political parties are the main securitizing actors in the EU. Unfortunately there is a rise in the extreme political parties in Europe, such as Sweden, Switzerland, France, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, and they make politics on the discourse of hatred against immigrants and other ethnic groups. But media is also very influential, like everywhere in the world, and the control of the media by certain groups, results in securitization of many different issues at the same time, in Europe.

Media is a knot in the international securitization. The speech acts, by the leaders and the other securitizing actors, for the international securitizations are usually made in the media. And what gets most of the media coverage, where speech acts are made, are the conferences and meetings of different heads of state where they 'share' their thoughts about issues. Media also sets the agenda. Usually the meetings of the heads of states go around issues that got a big media coverage, and they become primary issues.

How are the international issues securitized? By whom, towards whom? This is the challenging question, that I aimed to answer in this chapter of my thesis. This is the difference

that I want to attract attention of the readers, and hope to bring up further discussions by valued scholars of security studies.

Unlike domestic securitization, the securitization of international issues is more complex and less clear. There are multiple agents and objects, in the securitization of international issues, that are not present or are not so influential in the domestic securitization. While it is clear in the domestic securitization, about who has the power to securitize, the international securitization involves a broader range of securitizing actors. When the referent object is the state or the nation, then it is more or less certain about who speaks security, but speaking on issues that might not be 'ours' is not always easy to define who has the right, or the responsibility, to speak security. The international securitizing actors include, beside the leaders of the state, the leaders of the international organizations, such as the secretary general of the UN or NATO (Buzan et al., 1998; Buzan and Hansen, 2009), and also experts on that particular issue, which is to be securitized. On the other hand the CNN effect has a bigger role, also. It prioritizes the issues, sets the agenda, draws solutions, and is a platform for the leaders to do the speech act 'internationally'. This is why it is more difficult to decide on who has the power or the responsibility to securitize in the international platform. The audience is also unclear, and the legitimacy to use the extraordinary means is given by different audiences, usually silent audience. The international securitization lacks a formal procedure of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998: 152), with different changing actors, objects, understandings, and ways of consent.

*The CNN Effect*

The media, and especially the international media, play a very big role in prioritizing issues. In the international issues media has a bigger role then in the domestic issues, because when things happen from far, media is the best medium we can trust for the right information. The international media corporations can prioritize an issue, bring an issue in the agenda, accelerate policy decision-making process, and challenge a government's decision. Cragg Hines (1999) wrote, in The Houston Chronicles, on father Bush's decision to act in Somalia back in 1992:

> "Finally, in 1999, George Bush himself asserted that it was news media coverage that motivated him to intervene in Somalia: Former President Bush conceded Saturday that he ordered US troops into Somalia in 1992 after seeing heart-rending pictures of starving waifs on television . . . Bush said that as he and his wife, Barbara, watched television at the White House and saw 'those starving kids . . . in quest of a little pitiful cup of rice', he phoned Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 'Please come over to the White House', Bush recalled telling the military leaders. 'I – we – cannot watch this anymore. You've got to do something.'"

We call this the 'CNN Effect'. Although the other worldwide news agencies -the Associated Press (AP), Reuters, and Agence France-Press (AFP)- are bigger, and have much more staff, we call this effect as the CNN effect (Bahador, 2007: 13). This does not mean the effect of the CNN itself, but the international media in general. It is worth to quote Babak Bahafor at leangth, to understand why we call this 'the CNN effect':

> "At 2:38 am, on January 17, 1991, the residents of Baghdad were woken by the launch of the first Gulf War. […] Later that same night, a senior officer at Pentagon Command Center checked his watch while speaking to those planning the air attack and stated, while watching one broadcast, "If the cruise missile is on target…the reporter will go off the air about…Now!" He was right. At that moment, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) reports from Baghdad stopped broadcasting. These networks were relying on Iraqi communications network, which had just been destroyed. Cable News Network (CNN), which was transmitted over a dedicated circuit set up before war, however, remained on air. For the next two weeks, CNN was the only American television network broadcasting from Iraq. As a result, this relatively new and renegade organization that promised to be different by delivering 24-hour news surged in recognition and prestige. Its subscription base, in fact, grew substantially over the period of the Gulf War. Its name also became synonymous with rapid image and information transmission from the scene of action and, more importantly, the implication of this phenomenon on politics and foreign policy." (Bahador, 2007: 3)

According to a study by Piers Robinson, most of the people in the West and especially the USA, receive their information from television. While in 1962 only 29% of the Americans considered their primary information source to be the television, in 1980 this figure jumped to 51%. It is important that after the 9/11 attacks this figured jumped to 81% of the Americans who consider the television as their primary source of news. I agree with Robinson that this can be a result of the visuals following the news in the television, which are usually emotional, and the changing pictures have a big effect on the psychology of the people (Robinson, 2002), as one picture is worth a thousand words. The second most influential agent of the CNN effect is considered to be the newspaper. In this case we can argue that framing is one of the most important process of the CNN effect, as it depends on how the news is framed so the issues are prioritized. Visual representation of September 11 attacks, or the war in Iraq, were key actors for the development on how people perceived threats and security, in the USA (McDonald, 2008). Political images can influence the people to support the government or the opposition; coverage of certain countries prioritize them over others, which is true for tourism but also for conflict resolution of certain countries; and also the decisions of government that are taken earlier can be framed in a way to support them and present them as right, or to oppose them and challenge the government to withdraw their decisions.

During the 2001-2002 US war in Afghanistan, there was a new alternative to the CNN effect, the Al-Jazeera effect. While the CNN covered the technological precision, strategy, and euphemistic description of events, the Al-Jazeera was more focused on covering the human consequences of the war (Bahador, 2007). This situation portrayed the CNN effect as western controlled effect, while alternatively there was Al-Jazeera, which could get more into the ground and frame the other side of the story, the human consequences. This was the first time an

international media entered in the field and framed the other side of the story, apart from the western perspective. Al-Jazeera got the pictures of the wounded children and other casualties, but at the same time it got videos of Osama bin-Laden, which attracted the attention of the western public, also. It was, and still is, considered as the fastest first-hand source of news in the Middle East. Other visual tools have declined the importance of the CNN effect, as well. Today, an owner of a videophone, a digital camera, or a lap-top, is a potential producer of a first hand image of information, and the internet became a cinema for the wide audience, where this information flows in a speed of light. The pictures of Abu Ghraib have shown that these images taken by cheap technology can become important securitizing actors and trigger emotional responses (Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

When framing an issue, the media uses certain words to give direction to the story. There are either empathy words or distancing words, with which the journalist or the editor gives direction to what they support or oppose. Like in the securitization theory, using certain words helps you construct you cause. As I mentioned above, you do not have to always use the word security, other words such as 'genocide', 'massacre', 'crimes against humanity', etc., can be used to securitize an issue. Similarly; empathy words, such as 'friend', 'ally', 'victims' etc.; and distancing words, such as 'undemocratic', 'other', 'enemy', etc., are useful in the securitization and the desecuritization process.

There are two types of media manufacturing. The executive, where media conforms to the governmental executives; and the elite, where the media conforms to the political elite of the state, let them be executive, legislative, or administrative. Sometimes the elite version may work against the government, like the Vietnam War, or the Iraqi War (Robinson, 2002). The media influence is most successful when there is uncertainty in the public and among the decision-

makers, on certain issues. The media is limited on its influence when there is a certainty in acting for a special issue.

The biggest effect of the 'CNN effect' is the agenda setting effect. The media affects the agenda by identifying a certain issue as a priority and push the policy-makers towards dealing with that issue prior to the other issues. In foreign-policy decisions, mostly, the media has a very big effect. The emotional pictures displayed on the television prioritize that region, and pushes the decision-makers to respond. Despite identifying the problem, the media also influences the course of action, which must be taken by the government, when the issue is on the agenda, also. This occurs when the policy-makers are in search for solutions to the problem (Linsky, 1998: 130-145; Robinson, 2002: 38; Bahador, 2007: 9). When there is uncertainty, the media can 'help' the government make up its mind. But, when the policy is certain, the media can help the government gain public support, and enable the policy-makers implement the decision they took, and pursue that course of action, by building domestic 'constituency' (Robinson, 2002: 12-40).

There are some other effects of the CNN effect, which come secondary after the agenda-setting effect. These effects are: the accelerant effect, the impediment effect, the propaganda effect, and the challenging effect. The accelerant effect accelerates the process of decision-making, of the government, by putting public pressure. Even if something is happening in a country far away from the audience of the CNN, the media can present an issue as a priority, as existential to human rights values, and this will make public pressure to the government to take immediate decisions to stop atrocities, and respond to the injustice. This usually happens with 24-hour coverage of the issue. The accelerant effect shortens the time of decision-making by the government, on the fear that it will be too late if they do not act now. The impediment effect, on the other hand, is the opposite. It is usually an effect on the military issues, where it questions the

military engagements of the home country, by usually framing human casualties of the enemy, or collateral damages of the enemy. Despite of this, they show suffering people -usually children, women and elders- of the enemy side, whose properties were destroyed by the military actions of the home government. The other scenario is to question the legitimacy of the engagement by bringing on questions of "is it our business?" Here usually pictures of home military casualties, and financial losses are pictured and brought to the agenda. The propaganda effect usually occurs when certain groups, like interest groups, or lobby groups control certain media. These groups want the government to get involved in the issues they think are important, and they try to shape the government's priorities by directly affecting the decision-makers. The challenging effect, usually challenges the government policies of getting involved in 'other peoples' wars, or getting involved in other humanitarian missions, when the domestic issues are not set right (Bahador, 2007: xv-11; Robinson, 2002).

As I argued above, in most of the CNN effects, the public opinion is the key mediator between the media and the government. They are the ones that make the pressure on the government, and question government's responsibility if it does not act on time. This is why the media targets the public, which then pressures the politicians, who want to win the next elections, also.

### The Differences Between the Domestic and International Securitization

The main difference between the domestic and international securitization is that the state has lost its monopoly, of being the only referent object that needs to be securitized and being the main securitizing actor, which decides on issues that are given priority (Buzan et al., 1998). The multiplication of security concerns in the world has shifted the attention of security studies to

other, non-state, concerns. Different sectors of security, and different conflicts, have interlinked the security concerns, and the actors of securitization (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 360). The other differences, after the differences of the referent object and the securitizing actors, are the audience and the conduct of the speech act.

We cannot speak about one audience in the international securitization, as well as we cannot define how the speech act is done. Therefore the relation of the speaker and the audience is less than clear. The speech act facilitators are used more often in the international securitization, such as the media, and the way of addressing the audience differs from the level of the audience. The international issues that are securitized, prioritized, also change from time to time and from place to place, which makes the international securitization unclear (Fierke, 2007). The fact that 9/11 is securitized and global issues such as climate change, international viruses, poverty, migration, etc. (which have much more victims then the 9/11, lasted for much longer than the 9/11, and are more dangerous than the terrorists who plotted the 9/11 attacks) are not, shows that international securitization is not very successful and is much more difficult. I will try to analyze why this is so.

The domestic securitization is a one-layer process, where the elite, or certain groups or individuals, securitize an issue towards their own people, while the international securitization is multi-layered in this sense. Firstly, the securitizing actors try to securitize that issue towards the elite of every government, and then towards the people of those governments, or of those security communities. We will see this difficulty of recognizing the right audience, when I speak on my case study. Although these might look as small and very few differences between the domestic and international securitizations, these are the most important knot points of the securitization theory.

**Expanding the Present Securitization Theory to Explain International Securitization**

The securitization theory has a procedure, certain actors, objects, and other elements of securitization, and there are other certain conditions under which the securitization is done. In the international securitization this does not stand. The case of the international securitization is more complicated as the role of the actors change constantly. While the elite of a state is the securitizing actor at one level, it is also an audience at another level where another, internationally influential elite, securitize an issue. The actors, objects, and the conditions, of the international securitization, are interchangeable, and they are broader, which are not explained by the securitization theory. While in domestic securitization the media is more or less limited to the local media, and its influence is limited, at the international level the media, or the CNN effect, is what affects the decision makers most. Press statements, interviews, and conferences, are some other actors which play a key role in the international domain, whereas they are not so influential in the domestic domain.

The securitization theory, as far as I understand it, lacks in explaining and including these new factors of securitization, and thus lacks explaining how the international securitization happens. In the international securitization we need to understand who is speaking security, towards whom; and, who is listening, at what time, and place. All things are interrelated with each other, but at the same time they change from time to time, and place to place. For example, we cannot speak of the same influence when the NATO Secretary General, the Libyan Prime Minister, the Turkish Prime Minister, The British Prime Minister, or the US President, talk about a certain international issue, such as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time we

cannot talk of the same audience in a country if one group gets the information from the CNN and the other from Al-Jazeera, although they might be of the same nationality.

The securitization theory also takes securitization of an issue as a one layer process, while in the international domain there are several securitization moves for the same issue. Firstly, the people of a certain country securitize their cause towards the international audience of influential readers. Then the international leaders, who have international influence, securitize an issue towards the elite of the nation-states. Afterwards, the elite of the states address to the people of those states, which later results in gaining consent of using all the means for protecting that referent object, or not. At different phases the importance and the influence of other actors, such as media and conferences, play a different role, but nevertheless in international securitization the media effect is always present and important.

The referent objects are also different in domestic and international securitizations. In domestic domain the state, the nation, and the tangible referent objects are better securitized, and are more successful referent objects. In international domain, on the other hand, non-tangible referent objects showed to be good referent objects as well, like the case of Kosova. Identity and values, are referent objects that are, or try to be, commonly securitized referent objects in the international level.

By applying the securitization theory to my case study I aim to improve the securitization theory by expanding it to the international domain. Firstly, I will analyze how Kosova was securitized by the Kosovars, with different disobediences, protests, and violent acts; secondly I will analyze how some international leaders brought Kosova to international attention, and securitized it by interviews, conferences, and international media, towards the decision makers of member countries of allies or unions; thirdly, I will analyze how these decision makers, by using

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their local TV-s and speeches, securitized Kosova towards their domestic audience; and finally, I will analyze how Kosova was securitized, at all levels, before, during, and after the NATO campaign, to legitimize the intervention. These were all done in protection of 'values', something that is not so practicable in the domestic securitization.

**Conclusion**

The 'securitization theory' asks two questions from us: Firstly, why do we call an issue a security issue? What are the implications of calling it so – or of not calling it so? (Waever, 1999: 334).

In this chapter firstly, I explained the securitization theory, how it evolved and what it contains. Secondly, I explained the main concepts, building blocks, of the securitization theory, as they are very important to be able to understand security studies. Thirdly, I analyzed the domestic and international securitizations, separately, so we can understand their differences and similarities. Fourthly, I compared these two levels of securitization, where I explained my arguments of my thesis contribution. Finally, I critically examined the weakness of securitization theory regarding international securitization. Consequently, as my contribution, I tried to bring in the international dimension to the securitization theory by demonstrating how international securitization works.

In the following chapters I will demonstrate how the theoretical view I outlined in this chapter can be applied to the Kosova case. I will demonstrate how securitization theory can help us better understand the Kosova case, and, in turn, how the Kosova case helps us better understand and improve the securitization theory. This way I will interlink my theoretical and empirical explorations.

# CHAPTER 3

**A Birdview to the International Relations of Kosova**

In this chapter, I will present a quick flashback, on Kosova's international relations, the region, neighbor conflicts, as well as the genesis of the problems that led to the war in Kosova. I will do this because it is important to know the historical, religious, and ethnic dynamics, to be able to understand the conflict of Kosova and the region. Because there have been many constructions of 'truths' in Kosova, which I think led to war, it is important for us to have this historical knowledge. Firstly, I will give some background information on the Balkans, as a wider region where Kosova lies. Secondly, I will shrink my focus to Yugoslavia, where Kosova was an autonomous province. Thirdly, I will give some information on Kosova, and the historical, religious, ethnic, and cultural dynamics inside of her. Finally, I will explain some regional conflicts, which brought unrest in Balkans, destruction of Yugoslavia, and triggered the war in Kosova.

**The Balkans**

The Balkans has always been a land of conflicts. It has changed hands from one empire to another and finally to several nation states, but still it is in unrest. Situated in a strategically important region, -between Western Europe, Central Asia, and Anatolia- Balkans has always been a point where vast conflicts happened. We shall remember that the Kosova war, between the Ottoman Empire and the Western powers in 1389, has been the birthplace of several nationalist movements in the region. Later in 1448 a similar war happened between the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, for the control of the Balkans, which shows clearly

that even at that time the Balkans was an important region to control. During the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkans has been the birthplace of nationalist movements of different nations living there. In fact these movements are considered to be the ones that started the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

During the First and the Second World Wars, the Balkans was also a battleground of great powers. The First World War started in the Balkans, when a Serbian soldier assassinated the heir of the Austro-Hungarian throne. In the First World War the great powers, Austro-Hungaria, Italy, Germany, Russia, Serbia, and others, were all engaged in occupying the Balkans. Similarly, in the Second World War the Balkans was a region of several powers fighting with each other for the control of territories in the Balkans. First the Italians, then the Greeks, the Germans, the Russians, and all the Balkan nation states fought with each other for occupying territories in the Balkans.

During the Cold War, the Balkans was a battlefield of the two blocs, the communist bloc and the western liberal bloc, in terms of influence. Western aids to the regional powers to align them with the democratic states, and the Eastern ideological influence to align them with the communist states, were the main concerns for the Balkans.


**Yugoslavia**

After the Second World War, the subject population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire we divided into three new states: Poland in the east, Czechoslovakia in the north, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the south. In 1929, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would adopt a new name – Yugoslavia (Fromkin, 2002). The nation-states in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were almost all Slavic. The Albanian majority in the region of Kosova,

and the Albanian minority in the region of Macedonia, was the only different ethnic group in the FRY. The name Yugoslavia was taken from the Slavic languages, meaning the southern Slavs.

Yugoslavia was composed of six republics; Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro; and two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosova. Today there are seven separate countries that came out of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from late 1980s until early 2000s. This was clear with the death of Tito, when everyone understood that the ethnic problems in this region were openly superseded successfully by empires, firstly Roman, then Byzantine, then Ottoman, and finally Tito (Fromkin, 2002). What will be the next empire or system that will succeed the ethnic division in this region was an open question at the beginning of Tito's death, but afterwards it was understood that these feelings will not be superseded anymore.

The first republic to separate from the FRY was Slovenia, succeeded by Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently the name of Yugoslavia was changed to the Serbia and Montenegro Union, in 2003. In 2006 Montenegro and Serbia separated into two separate countries, and also Kosova declared its independence in 2008, this way the Serbia-Montenegro union was dissolved. Now there are seven separated states. The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a very good example of transformation from one multi-national state to several nation-states, or part-nation states.

**Kosova**

Situated in the southeastern Europe, Kosova is a region in the mountainous geography of the Balkan Peninsula. Europe being a motherland of wars, and conflicts, influenced the situation of Balkans, which has been a conflict zone for more than five hundred years. Kosova's

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geographical situation, the line between Western Europe and the orient, the line between the two axis of the Cold War, and the source of the two World Wars, makes it a gravity of conflicts.

Kosova gained its importance during the first Kosova War of 1389, between the Ottoman Empire and the nationalist rebel movements of the Balkans. The battle that happened just outside of today's Pristina was the birthplace of Serbian nationalism, and from that time it is considered as the heart of Serbian nationalism. On the other hand, Kosova is also considered as the heart of Albanian nationalism, which claims to exist from the time of their Illyrian ancestors. Illyrians lived in western Balkans, where today is Albania and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosova was the boundary between Illyrians and Thracians, another could-be ancestors of the Albanians. Kosova has been a tribal land of Dardanians, and the earlier name of the territory of today's Kosova was Dardania. It is almost sure that Dardanians were Illyrians, and the Albanians base their arguments of being the children of Illyrians on this fact. Anyhow, the debate of Albanian ancestors is open to interpretations and debate, and there is no clear fact if Albanians were Illyrians or Thracians (Malcolm, 1999: 28-40).

Balkans is a region of conflicts, but Kosova has been the gravity of these conflicts for centuries. Positioned in the middle of the Balkan Peninsula, it has played an important role as a route of trade for eastern travelers to Europe and for the European travelers to the Orient.

Between the two World Wars, the Yugoslav government saw the Albanian Muslim majority in Kosova as a problem and they wanted to make this problem go away. In this discourse the Yugoslav government refused to be bounded to League of Nations' commitments to protect minority rights, and it initiated a program to settle Serbs in Kosova. In this program the government closed the Albanian schools, seized the property of the Albanian, and hardened the conditions enough for the Albanian to start migrating for better life conditions (Fromkin, 2002:

144-145). The government negotiated a deal with Ataturk's successor in Ankara, on the eve of the World War II, where they will be sending Muslim families to Turkey and Turkey would accept them for a certain price per family (Fromkin, 2002). Fortunately the World War II prevented this from happening.

Composing of 95% of Albanians, Kosova has six ethnic groups living in its boundaries, with the Serbian minority being the largest group after the Albanian majority.

During the Yugoslavia years, Kosova had the status of an autonomous province, given in 1974. By the 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, Kosova, and all the republics and autonomy provinces of FRY, could separate from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with a referendum. This status of Kosova was taken away in 1989 when Slobodan Milosevic came to power and he committed himself to ethnic cleansing of the Albanians in Kosova. This has spurred unrest and disobedience among the people in Kosova, which resulted in the ethnic war of 1997-1999, resulting in the first NATO wide intervention in a sovereign country. What the oppressed Albanian majority wanted was the emancipation of Kosova from the Yugoslavia, as other republics, prior to 1997, did.

**The Conflict of Kosova and Other Regional Conflicts**

Firstly, let us determine what war is. Although the word 'conflict' is broader than just the meaning of war, in the regions where Kosova is situated conflicts have most of the time resulted in bloody wars. According to Clauswitz: "War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." (Clauswitz, 1976: 5). Clauswitz (1976) argues that war does not always mean the occupation of the territory of the enemy, sometimes the enemy can also comply with the conditions given because sacrificing what we demand may be better off then waging a

war. But nevertheless, the aim of the war is to disarm the enemy, whatever our will is. There are no absolutes in war; there are negotiations and probabilities, which makes war what Clauswitz (1976: 19-20) called "[it is] war of all branches of human activity, the most like a gambling game." This is why the time is important in war, the longer the war the smaller the chances for the probability to win; the more rapid and quick attacks, the higher the chances to win. War has a changing identity, and its determinants are: time, intensity, hatred, historical records, etc. But, nevertheless, war is just a continuation of doing politics by other means, which differ from diplomacy in principles, rules, and methods of conduct. In this case we equate war with securitization, as securitization was just another step of politization, and war is just another step of doing politics, pushing for the will and interest of your state. In Clauswitz's terms:

"… war is an instrument of policy; it must necessarily bear its character, it must measure with its scale: the conduct of war, in its great features, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws." (1976: 363).

War is the continuation of politics, which involves violence. But, war has to be prevented before it starts. This is why security is needed. Security, as it is mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, is the power to prevent war, but if war cannot be prevented then it is the assurance to be victorious. A securitized issue is a priority because it needs the means to be successful in defending the interests on that issue if it is being threatened, and like war, securitization is a political process.

To be able to prevent criticism after something wrong has happened, the important leaders securitize situations, like the Kosova case, or otherwise they have to say they are sorry, and that their policies have failed. Such mistakes, in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, etc. have put pressure on the world leaders to act faster in Kosova. Bill Clinton committed in 1998: "we did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful name: genocide." (Dunne and Kroslak, 2001: 380). This regret shows why Clinton and the others

did not wait for long until they said that the crimes committed by the Serbian authorities in Kosova were clear signs of genocide.

To be able to analyze the conflict in Kosova, we first need to analyze the security community in the region. We can argue that the EU is a security community, with power to securitize and desecuritize issues, as well as act upon threats. But, Europe has had a bitter history of conflicts and relations between the states situated in this continent. Integration is seen as a global security project of establishing the European security community, with the aim of preventing external pressure, mostly from the US; preventing the threats that come from within, the threat to go back to its history; and preventing the rise of nationalism, again (Buzan and Waever: 2003). Balkans, on the other hand, is a region that is very important for the European security community, as it is the region where the conflicts start, and it is a hot region, where nationalism may rise again. The importance of security in Balkans were shown several times in speeches of European leaders, but the speech of Tony Blair in the EU/Balkan Summit in Zagreb, in 2000, is to the point:

> "Europe is the Modern Europe. It was founded fifty years ago, in the rubble that was left after the Second World War. We surveyed what was left of our continent. We saw the extermination camps, the piled bodies of the victims and the pathetic masses of survivors. And we made a promise. We vowed Never Again. It was on that pledge that we built the Modern Europe,"

and he continued further,

> "The 15 member states of the EU – countries that in the lifetime of my father were at war with one another – are now working in union, with 50 years of peace and prosperity behind us. And now, holding out the prospect of bringing the same peace and prosperity to the Eastern and Central European nations and even to the Balkan countries." (Blair: 2000).

In fact, the fear that the European countries have against the threat of their nationalist past is not to be ignored. The Balkans has shown that the return to the historical feelings can have bloody consequences. The best example is the Yugoslavia, where several nation-states used to live under the federation of Yugoslavia, up until they started to "otherize" each other. Serbs in Croatia referring to their Croatian neighbors as "Ustasa" (Fierke, 2007: 133), the feeling of not

being similar with the other ethnic groups, and the speech of the Milosevic, made in Fushe Kosove / Kosovo Polje, where he promised to his fellow Serbs that they 'will never be beaten again', bringing back the memories of the rise of Serbian nationalism in the war with Ottomans in the fourteenth century (Kavaja and Abrashi, 1998). This has prevented Balkans from being a regional security community, to being a subcommunity of the European regional security community (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 395). The Yugoslavian examples show how nationalist ideas can impose systematic fear, which is far more dangerous than individual fear, as individual fear makes the individuals do anything against the threat they fear, but the systematic fear organizes the individuals and establishes groups to fight the threat, which is the source of that fear.

There are several bonds and similarities between Kosova and Rwanda, but the war in Bosnia is what made the west decide on intervening in Kosova, before the situation escalated. As Mohammed Ayoob (1996) argues, the atrocities of the Serbs against the Bosnians are likely to affect the conflicts in the third world, and the failure of the west to protect the Bosnians will be a very important determinant of the scope of the atrocities, as this failure has signaled them that they cannot get away with the atrocities.

While the American delegates and Milosevic were negotiating in Dayton, the Albanian Kosovars were hoping for an accord on the autonomy of Kosova also, but the Serbs did not approach to anything that considered the situation of Kosova, and this resulted in the absence of Kosova from the Dayton agreement (Clark, 2001). This angered, divided, and scared the Kosovar Albanians, which made them get organized and fight, in contrast to their pacific politics that they were conducting until that day. But, Kosova was not out of the agenda of the western politicians, before the war started either. Several threats were issued to Milosevic, on his 'to be'

actions in Kosova. The best known is the Christmas warning by President George Bush in 1992, where he stated that "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and Serbia proper." (quoted in Clark, 2001: 108; Coll, 2001: 131). On the other hand, Srebrenica massacre was a very important accelerator for the decision to act fast in Kosova. The Western powers did not want new Srebrenica headlines in the newspapers and TVs; they did not want to see those pictures again (Clark, 2001; Henriksen, 2007).

When it comes to how Serbian-Kosovar conflict emerged, there are different thoughts on the emergence of the Serbian and Albanian nationalisma against each other. Julie Mertus (1999) argues that the rise of Serbian nationalism against the Kosovar-Albanians had started before the emergence of Milosevic, by depicting the Kosovar Albanians as terrorists, a revolutionary movement, and a threat to the Serbian people. This freed the Serbian population from any moral concern for act they would commit against the Kosovar Albanians, as they were the victims of the Kosovar Albanian terror. The Serbian media presented several 'truths', for the Kosovar Albanians. The 1981 student demonstrations were presented as revolutionary movements; the Paracin accident, where an Albanian Yugoslav soldier killed four soldiers in a shoot-out in the army barracks, from which only one was a Serb, was presented as an open war of Albanian 'terrorists' against the entire country. This provided Milosevic with material for his campaign, and led to military build up in Kosova (Mertus, 1999; Fierke, 2007: 66-67). As far as the human rights are concerned, with Milosevic coming to power there were all the human rights of the Albanians, living in Kosova, violated. These include the removal of the elected authorities of Albanian origin, the ban of the minority languages, the confiscation of the property of Albanians, unlawful detentions, terror campaigns, deportations, murderous cleansings, etc. In fact from the

early 1980s Kosovars were exposed to terror by the Serbian state mechanisms. The Albanian Kosovars were taken out of their jobs, the students were banned from studying in the university and most of the high schools. Furthermore, the Albanian language was banned in the media, the Albanian teachers of all levels of education -including the primary school- were beaten in front of their pupils, the activists and politicians were imprisoned, and the people were subjected to arbitrary arrest, rape, and sudden deaths (Mertus, 1999; Booth, 2001; Dunne and Kroslak, 2001). But, this is more obvious with the coming of Milosevic as the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This situation led to the establishment of the non-violent parallel state of Kosova, who pretended to be a sovereign state with a government in exile.

After Dayton, the Kosovars felt that their non-violent movement was not taken seriously and the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) was established (by the people in the villages who were mostly exposed to Serbian harassments) to get the attention of the international community, and thus taken seriously (Mertus, 1999; Clark, 2001; Fierke, 2007). Shortly after Dayton, the civil war in Albania happened, and it was these events that gave moral to the Kosovar Albanians to fight for their independence. Despite moral, some argue, the events in Albania made the access to the light weapons easier, for the KLA members (O'Neill, 2002). With the emergence of the KLA the Serbian terror increased, and this triggered the western attention.

The media played a very big role here; this was one of the rear times that the media had moral influence on the western leaders and their states, which was what the Albanian freedom-fighters wanted. This was the time when the human rights and values were securitized, like never before, giving pressure to the international leaders to act. Afterwards the leaders started condemning the attacks of the Serbian security forces on the Albanian unarmed population. This resulted in the NATO's intervention to halt the Serbian genocide towards the Albanian

population, in Kosova, and to stop the second Srebrenica to happen. Here we can see that as long as there was no securitization, there was no action by the west, but when the securitization happened, then the actions began. The situation in Kosova evolved faster than it was thought, catching the West unprepared to act, and after they did, they lacked goals (Clark, 2001; Henriksen, 2007). The west wanted to warn Milosevic by showing that they are serious when telling him that he shall halt the attacks against the Albanian population. They were hoping to bring Milosevic to NATO's conditions, but not to invade Serbia. This resulted with the lack of targets after the main targets, which were foreseen to be hit in three days, were hit. With the intervention continuing and Milosevic not approaching to the conditions of NATO, there was an uncertainty on the goals that NATO wanted to achieve with the attacks, also. The first idea was to bring Milosevic back to Rambouillet, but now there was no turning back to Rambouillet, after so many attacks going on.

Prior to the attacks the Contact Group (including Russia) exhausted all the diplomatic means in calling for the Serbian government to stop attacking the Albanian population in Kosova, and violating their human rights. There was an estimate that with the coming of winter, in 1998, tens of thousands of Albanian people had been threatened, as they were driven off their homes (Arkin, 2001). The resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council was adopted, calling for the Serbian authorities to cease-fire, and return all the refugees and internally displaced people, to their homes.

Richard Holbrooke, the mastermind of Dayton agreement, flew to Belgrade on October 5, to negotiate an agreement with Milosevic to withdraw excessive military forces from Kosova, and let an international verification mission enter Kosova, to verify the agreement. After few months of pause, with the verification mission inside Kosova, the Serbian paramilitary group

massacred 45 people in a village in Kosova, Racak. This was the peak of the Milosevic's intentions, where obvious signs of genocide were shown. The international community invited the Albanian and the Serbian groups in Rambouillet, France, to negotiate and end the violence in the field immediately. With the failures of the last round of Rambouillet talks in March 19, NATO started the bombardment of Serbian military bases in Serbia and Kosova, in March 23. This was one day after the Serbian government authorized "Operation Horseshoe", which was launched for ethnic cleansing in Kosova, where approximately one million Kosovar Albanians were displaced from their homes, either deported out of the borders of Kosova, or internally displaced. We can see in this case that the NATO intervention, or the NATO war, was a political mean of the west to make Milosevic sit on their table and accept their will, which Clauswitz argued in 1976.

The NATO intervention had many causes behind. The first one was humanitarian intervention, the second one was security and stability in the region, and the third one was the defending of the human rights, values, and principles, to maintain a humane and peaceful world. NATO argued that the refugee flow, interethnic violence, the threat to stability and security in the region, and the vast violation of human rights, which included genocide and ethnic cleansing, are the legitimate grounds for intervention (Coll, 2001: 131-137). NATO's objectives were clear: demonstrate, deter, damage, and degrade (Arkin, 2001: 6). The clear objectives, and the ground to which the NATO intervened, make Kosova be a sui-generis for military interventions in many ways. Firstly, Kosova was the first intervention with a humanitarian purposes rather then national interests. Secondly, it was the first time for NATO to act as an organization, with full authorization from its member states. And thirdly, Kosova was the first example of a victory from the air, without engaging in a ground combat, and this made the Kosova war be the first

war that had no soldier casualties of the striking power. These practices assured Kosova an important place in the military history of the world (Kurth, 2001: 63).

Some skeptics raise questions as to whether Kosova shall be the first and the last humanitarian intervention, as it might be used for national interests of some other powers; like Russia, who intervened in Georgia to 'prevent' Georgian 'genocide' against the South Ossetians. Kosova has shown that when there are institutions, or international organization, conducting this intervention, than it cannot be misused, and the intervention can be conducted lawfully under the humanitarian intervention principle. But, such interventions must not be led and conducted by a single country, like the case with Russian intervention in Georgia.

The case of Kosova has brought another role to NATO, which is to act without prior mandate from the United Nations Security Council (Buzan and Waever, 2003). Now new questions may arise, whether NATO will take part in the combat of terrorism? Or whether NATO will have another role defending the governments who have been ruled out by military coups, especially in the third world? The conflict in Kosova opened new discussions and challenges for NATO, and new roles are expected to be assigned to NATO.


### Conclusion

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Europe has always been a place of unrest, where conflicts triggered each other. The latest conflicts in the Balkans showed that the return of Europe's past could have severe consequences, which are unwanted by Europeans. Europe has succeeded in forming a regional security community, and mostly this has been achieved by integration. Today integration is seen as a further security assurance as well as a threat in itself, as it might threaten the nation states, and their values. On the other hand, the Balkans failed to be

a regional security community, but formed a subcommunity under the European regional security community. Kosova also made it clear that small states need to have external support for survival. The small states need the external help not only for their survival, but also for their struggle of separatism, for forming their state, and resolving their security concerns in violent or peaceful ways. Even after the secession, the support of a bigger power, like the support of Turkey to Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is crucial (Ayoob, 1991: 52-53). This was shown very clearly in the struggle of the Kosovar Albanians before, during, and after the war; during the bombardments; during the negotiations and struggles for a peaceful solution; and even today -when the economy is unstable, the region is unstable, the threats are not gone- when Kosova needs foreign help for state formation and reconstruction.

Most of the conflicts, disagreements, and hatreds, in Kosova, Balkans, and Europe, are constructed. But, they are constructed over centuries and today they have found good base in the minds of people. But, nevertheless, Kosova was very quickly securitized, in comparison to other conflicts. In the next chapter, I will observe how the securitization of Kosova has happened, with special reference to the role of the CNN effect. Then I will try to answer the question: why Kosova was securitized? Afterwards, I will evaluate securitization theory in light of the Kosova case, where I will point to how international securitization happens. Finally, I will give some ideas on what Kosova taught us in the securitization theory, security studies, and politics.

# CHAPTER 4

**The Case of Kosova: Securitization of Kosova**

Kosova is one of the earliest and best examples of international securitization. Therefore, by applying the securitization theory to the case of Kosova I will show the differences between domestic and international securitization. To this purpose, I will demonstrate how and why different actors, at the same or different times, did the securitization of the Kosova conflict on different grounds, to different audiences. Moreover, same actors in different levels have securitized Kosova, at different times, also. Several moves by ethnic groups, the leaders of Kosova, and the international leaders, that I will mention and that happened before the intervention in 1999, will help me explain that the securitization of Kosova is not made only in late 1990s, but it is a product of decades of ethnical and religious hostilities in Yugoslavia, and a product of securitizing moves by the local actors in Kosova. It will be very insufficient and wrong, to consider the securitization of Kosova only in 1990s, because we cannot understand how the conflict in Kosova emerged, and how the securitization of Kosova happened, if we do not consider the events before that, as well as historical events. To this purpose I explained the historical and ethnical composition of Kosova, and the region. And again, to this purpose I will refer to the securitizing moves that happened before 1990s in Kosova, like the strikes of the miners, the student demonstrations, the poisoning of the school-children, etc.

When we look at the speech acts of the leaders, who were involved in securitizing Kosova, and the resolutions from conferences and meetings on Kosova, we can see that there were several audiences towards whom the securitization is made. The presidents, especially the US President Bill Clinton, addressed to the public, and to the Congress or Parliaments at home, to securitize

Kosova and issue the right to NATO to intervene. Leaders who were appointed in international institutions, like General Wesley Clark, had a harder job. They had to convince the decision-makers, -the politicians of the other countries, including ambassadors, ministers of foreign affairs, interior ministers, prime ministers, and Presidents- and the public.

What the securitizing actors used as the best argument was the genocidal violence that was happening in Kosova. Robin Cook equated the deportations of the Kosovar Albanians from Pristina by trains, with what happened during Hitler's and Stalin's time (Dunne and Kroslak, 2001: 36). And because of this "the air strikes have one purpose only: to stop the genocidal violence" (quoted in Bates et. al., 1999) stated George Robertson, then the British Defense Secretary. But what is genocide? How do we define it? There are a lot of different thoughts on what genocide is. The word was invented from Raphael Lamkin, who was a Jew born in Poland. He devoted his life to stand against genocide and in his 1944 study of Nazism he brought a Latin and a Greek word together to invent the word 'genocide' –from Greek 'genos' (tribe or race) and from Latin 'cide' (killing). He defined it as a 'coordinated plan of different actors aiming at destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of the annihilating the groups themselves' (quoted in Dunne and Kroslak, 2001: 28). 'Genocide' is a 'securitization term', when one pronounces genocide they claim that something must be done to stop it, otherwise we may have to deal with another holocaust.

The elements of genocide, seen on television all around the world, helped the securitizing actors while they were doing their speech acts, and it was easier to argue, rightly, that the NATO intervention is needed for the protection of human rights values and international peace. But, this has not been easy all at once. President Clinton, while he addressed the nation and the congress, on explaining the purpose of the bombing, he stood on three objectives: "to demonstrate

NATO's opposition to aggression, to deter President Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on helpless civilians, and, if necessary, to damage Serbian capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future" (quoted in Robinson, 2002: 95). The reason why he had to address both, the nation and the Congress, was because his situation was not helped by the fact that the Senate and the House were controlled by the opposition, and he needed to convince both, the elite who have the right to vote the bill, and the people, for public support. On the other hand, although the UN could not take a resolution to give the right for intervention, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the UN, argued that it is a tragedy that two interests of international community had compelled in the case of Kosova. First that the regional actors act without a prior resolution from the UN, and the second that the UN failed to protect the human rights, and show its effectiveness against violations of internationally recognized values (Coll, 2001: 138). On September 1999's address to the General Assembly, Annan legitimized the NATO intervention claiming that if NATO stood aside and watch the crimes committed in Kosova, we would have same situations as we previously had in India, Vietnam, Tanzania, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Uganda. He went further by saying that staying aside when the atrocities happened in these states did not win credibility to the international community, and he argued that no group of states, who are committed to protect human rights, shall stand aside if there are not enough votes in the General Assembly, or the Security Council, to intervene (cited in Wheeler, 2001:159). Similarly Clinton noted, "We don't want in the Balkans to have more pictures like we've seen in last few days so reminiscent of what Bosnia endured" (quoted in Henriksen, 2007).

NATO's credibility was at question especially when it threatened Serbian authorities several times and done nothing. This makes us think that although the intervention was humanitarian, NATO had its interest to raise its credibility, show that NATO had a role even

after the Cold War finished, and establish the dominance of US-led NATO on interpreting the international law even if it is needed to act without a UN Security Council resolution (Herring, 2001). US Secretary of Defence William Cohen, and General Hugh Shelton, argued that NATO had three major interests in intervening in Kosova:

> "preventing the destabilization of 'NATO's south-eastern region'; ending repression by Serbia which had produced a refugee flow 'overtaxing bordering nations' infrastructures, and fracturing the NATO alliance'; and responding to Serbian conduct which had 'directly challenged the credibility of NATO'. Cohen and Shelton asserted that 'had NATO not responded…its own credibility, as well as the credibility of the US security commitments throughout the world, would have been called into question" (Cohen and Shelton, 1999)

General Clark, on the other hand, had several audiences for securitization and many issues to securitize. His first audience was Solana -as his superior in the NATO command-, then the US Secretary of Defence, then the US President, and then the US Congress. On international level he had the ambassadors, commanders, foreign policy ministers, presidents, and people, as an audience. He had to securitize Kosova in different levels: firstly he had to securitize for the intervention; then for the phase two –where the targets were multiplied-; then phase three –where the bridges and some civilian targets were included-; then Apaches; and finally the ground forces. In his memoir, he writes that the hardest securitization was when he had to securitize Kosova in the level to legitimize the use of the Apache helicopters, and the bombing of some critical targets, like bridges, TV stations, electric distribution centers, etc. (Clark, 2001).

US President, Bill Clinton, was pro-intervention from the beginning of the conflict, but he had difficulties with the Senate and the House of the representatives, because of the republican majority. Together with Clark, they used the idea of 48 hours war at first so they start the intervention. Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, also argued that there was no need for ground troops as the operation is expected to be short, in his first press conference. The first night of bombardment Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that this operation is not

a long-term (Arkin, 2001: 6-9). But afterwards, General Shalton, and Secretary of Defence Cohen, claimed that the bombings will continue until Milosevic is deterred, and if needed, until Serbia is incapable of waging war again, against the innocent people in Kosova (DOD New briefing, Wednesday, 24 March 1999; Statement by the President to the Nation, 24 March 1999). Bill Clinton, in his address to the nation on the first day of the bombing campaign, stated:

> We act to *protect thousands of innocent people* in Kosovo from mounting military offensive. We act to *prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results.* We act to *stand united with our allies for peace…* Our mission is clear: to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's purpose so that the Serbian leaders understands the imperative of reversing course, to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serbian military's capacity to harm the people of Kosovo." (Washington Post, 24 March 1999; Clinton, 2004: 1368).

And he asked for the American people to "have a little resolve here, to stay with your leaders, to give us a chance to really see this thing through. This air campaign is not a 30-second ad." (quoted by Arkin, 2001: 13).

But the plan was prevailed by Clark in the first night of the campaign, in the NATO's press room:

> "The military mission is to attack Yugoslav military and security forces and associated facilities with sufficient effect to *degrade its capacity to continue repression of the civilian population and to deter further military actions against its own people.* We are going to systematically attack, disrupt, degrade, devastate, and ultimately destroy these forces and their facilities and support, unless President Milosevic complies with the demands of the international community. In that respect the operation is going to be as long and difficult as President Milosevic requires it to be." (Clark, 2001: 203)

In his book, Clark also explains how he had difficulties in bringing the Kosova issue to the Pentagon's agenda at the beginning, which was refused by the Secretary of Defence, and by Joe Ralston, to be put to debate in the Senate. Afterwards, he had to bring the Kosova issue to the State Department. He spoke to Talbott, and claimed that the source of the problem is Milosevic himself, and if NATO does not act then Milosevic will use force and there will be a humanitarian catastrophe. He then had to talk to President Clinton, and finally securitize Kosova to Secretary

Cohen (Clark, 2001: 118-133), so they can get an ultimatum for Milosevic, and if he does not stop, bomb him. It is worth to quote Clark at length:

 "Mr. Secretary, we're running out of time to save NATO and our credibility. It will be all over in Kosovo by mid-October, Milosevic will have used forces, made 350,000 homeless and killed who knows how many, and we will have stood by and done nothing but posture. Sir, we need to stop him. You need to help us get an ultimatum to Milosevic." (Clark, 2001: 133).

On the European level, the securitization was more complicated. There were several states that had the voting rights in NATO, and the securitization, by national leaders and politicians, was not only made to their public and representatives, but was made to the public and the representatives of the other states also. The best way to do this was the TV, which was used a lot from the European leaders, and the others, alike. There was a little debate, by the NATO member states, on whether the intervention was legal or illegal, moral or immoral. Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary, argued in the House of Commons Foreign Affaires Committee in April 1999: "[t]he legal basis for our action is that the international community states do have the right of use of force in the case of overwhelming humanitarian necessity" (quoted in Wheeler, 2001: 154). The British government also argued that the Security Council resolutions 1199 and 1203 identified that Milosevic caused the threat to peace and security in the region, and that the military intervention is justified to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. But these were the legitimizing moves, made by the British, for the intervention in Kosova. Whereas the most important speech act, a securitizing move, is made by Prime Minister Blair, when he addressed the House of Commons, saying that Kosova was 'in the doorstep of Europe'. Blair was arguing that Kosova is Europe's problem, being in the European continent, not far-away from the European Union. Cook also wrote:

"There are now two Europes competing for the soul of our continent. One still follows the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. The other emerged fifty years ago out from behind the shadow of the Second World War. The conflict between the international community and Yugoslavia is the struggle between these two Europes. Which side prevails will determine what sort of continent we live in. That is why we must win." (Cook, 1999).

Despite the British, the French Prime Minister Chirac, in a series of his writings, was advocating that it is time for France and Europe, to show its identity and its commitment for the destiny of the humanity, because now the war is here, and we must have anti-war politics to act and stop this (Chirac, 1999: Le Monde 11 March 1999; quoted by Buzan and Waever, 2003). This shows that France feared its past, and wants to stop a vast conflict, by engaging at preventing smaller regional conflicts. By the statements of Blair, Cook, and Chirac, we can understand that the securitization of Kosova, in Europe, has been made referring to the Europe's peace in danger, and fearing that not doing anything about that, will threaten Europe's unity, and bring back the Europe of the Second World War. Chirac and Blair had another joint statement where they gave the message that they will be ready to consider all forms of intervention in case the political agreement is impossible. Similarly, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher, one day earlier, stated that even though he is not a 'friend' of using force, he will consider this as the last resort if necessary, because when massacres happen one must act (Daadler and O'Hanlon, 2000).

Javier Solana, together with Wesley Clark, were the main international securitizing actors as they had position to respond to international criticisms, national and international leaders, and public. I remember Solana's statement in giving the green light to NATO airplanes, for the bombing campaign. His statement was very clear, on what they wanted to achieve, why they must intervene, and what was at risk,

> We are taking action following the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government's refusal of the International Community's demands: (1) Acceptance of the interim political settlement which has been negotiated in Rambouillet; (2) Full observance of limits on the Serb Army and Special Police Forces agreed on 25 October; (3) Ending excessive and disproportionate use of force in Kosovo … Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against civilian population of Kosovo. *We must also act to prevent instability spreading in the region."* (Solana, 1999a)

NATO securitized Kosova, in January 30, 1999, by a statement issued in NATO reports, regarding its strategy: "The crises in Kosovo remains a threat to peace and security in the region. NATO's strategy is to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations on an interim political settlement for Kosovo, thus averting a humanitarian catastrophe" (NATO, 1999). By this statement NATO has securitized the European region, from the threat of the escalation of humanitarian catastrophe in Kosova. NATO has used their media assets very effectively. The website [www.nato.int](www.nato.int) has published many reports of the Operation Allied Forces as well as videos of target strikes in Yugoslavia. Despite of that, NATO has organized conferences to give briefs of what is happening before the mission started and while it was going on. In their briefs, and reports, NATO has securitized Kosova focusing on three main points. Firstly, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) has violated the United Nations Security Council resolutions. Secondly, the threat of regional destabilization as a result of the humanitarian catastrophe initiated by the Yugoslav security forces, headed by Slobodan Milosevic. Thirdly, the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanian people, a sign of ethnic cleansing and discrimination, is a clear sign of humanitarian catastrophe that needs to be taken seriously (Latawski and Smith, 2007). These acts of aggression cannot be defended on any ground, which have made the action of NATO necessary and justified it in the same way. Furthermore, NATO has put forward that the military action is just a support for the political aims of the international community for a peaceful, multi-ethnic, democratic, and secure Kosova.

As an institution NATO was not the only institution that securitized the Kosova issue to the public. Similarly the OSCE, its mission KVM, then the Rambouillet conference, and other conferences, were all very important securitizing actors for Kosova. The OSCE published in a report that the cleansing in Kosova was systematically organized, dictated by a strategy and not

by breakdown in command and control (Hosmler, 2001). When the Kosovo Verification Mission published their first report, they stated that the violence in Kosova, towards the Kosovar Albanians, is headed by the highest Serbian authorities. They also reported that there was no breakdown in command and control, so everything was systematically organized, targeting firstly the males of fighting ages, as potential KLA members, and then the activists, politicians, religious leaders, intellectuals, teachers, students, and human rights activists. Several Albanian staff members of the KVM were beaten, killed, or molested by the Serbian security forces, which is another detail that took part in the KVM's report. The report also included the fact that the children and the women were not excluded from the violence, where a lot of women and young girls were raped, while young boys were killed because of their potential to grow up as guerilla fighters. In this context the report claimed that the children had psychological harassments also, where a lot of them were forced to look at their fathers, mothers, or relatives, being killed in front of their eyes (O'Neill 2002).

On the other hand, how the Rambouillet conference securitized Kosova, was that because the Serbian negotiating team refused to sign and the Albanian team did sign, this showed that the Serbs were not committed to multi-cultural, democratic, and secured Kosova (Latawski and Smith, 2007). Rambouillet was not only a securitization towards the public, for legitimizing the intervention. Albright and the others use Rambouillet to get the Europeans engaged in the conflict, which was a very important and successful policy (Daadler and O'Hanlon, 2002).

Here we can see that a securitizing actor may be an institution, which publishes statements, and the audience is not always "the people". The governments of the states involved in NATO, are the ones that its statements refer to, and ask for action. In international platform, another type of securitization is done by statements from important institutions, which may have little or no

effect in domestic securitization, but are key actors in international securitization. Kosova is a very good example of international securitization, and understanding how the same issue is securitized differently by different actors, towards different audiences, in different places, will help us see the difference between domestic and international securitization.

The securitization was focused mainly on the moral objectives, identity, human rights, and principles of international law, against the genocide that the Serbian authorities were posing towards the Kosovar Albanians. The Racak massacre was the zenith of the securitization, which resulted in NATO's decision to intervene in Kosova. The statement of William Walker, the US ambassador who led the Kosovo Verification Mission, was the key speech act that led NATO to intervene. In his statement he said: "I know a massacre when I see one. I've seen them before, when I was in Central America. And I'm looking at a massacre now… There are about forty of them in the ditch, maybe more. These aren't fighters, they're farmers, you can tell by looking at their hands and their clothes. And they've been shot at close range." (Clark, 2001: 158). The pictures of Walker walking around the dead bodies made it in all television world-wide, and showed that this is a question of genocide, violation of human rights, security, and a rising threat of Europe's next Holocaust. The moral objectives led to the public support for the intervention, although states were thought to intervene on other grounds, the public gave their support because of the moral to defend the ones in humanitarian need. This war was a war to define what the international values are, as President Bill Clinton puts it: "everything, from the strength of our economy to the safety of our cities, to the health of our people, depends on the events not only within our borders, bur half a world away" (quoted by Bacevich, 2001: 176).

In the conflict of Kosova, the leaders with international influence, such as Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Javier Solana, etc. played a very big role as the securitizing actors, towards the

people, and the elite of the nation states. But, nevertheless, media was a very important actor in securitizing Kosova. The influence of the speech of Walker would not be so high if there were no pictures and videos of atrocities committed by Serbian authorities in Racak, in the background of Walker. This is one of the differences between the international and national securitizations. In international securitization, the international media plays a much higher and important role, than do the national media, in securitizing national issues. Below I will analyze how statements in the media, by important leaders, played a big role for securitization. The media was used as a speech act arena, as well as a securitizing actor in itself. The media influence, known as the CNN effect, has played a key role of a securitizing actor in the Kosova issue. Besides of being a speech act arena, the media securitized Kosova by pictures, videos, interviews, as well as the way they framed the news. This, I argue, is another difference when domestic and international securitizations are in question.

*CNN Effect:*

The CNN played a very big role in the securitization of the Kosova issue. The CNN effect is not related directly to the CNN as a channel, but covers the media in general. In international securitization there is no single audience, because several media portrays an issue differently. Because there are different actors in the international securitization –like the elite, the government, the people, etc.- different approaches by the securitizing actors must be used, to successfully securitize an issue. But, nevertheless, the media plays a very big role towards any of the audiences, and helps the securitizing actors find and show arguments for securitization.

In the case of Kosova the media was used for speeches, and for documenting arguments against Serbian oppression. Several international leaders, who were engaged in the case of

Kosova committed that it was the media that helped them securitize Kosova. Clinton declared that "It is obvious to me that the support in the US and Europe for our actions in Kosovo has increased because of what people see going on" (quoted in Robinson, 2002: 180). Similarly Tony Blair, Richard Holbrooke, Madeleine Albright, Wesley Clark, and others, have expressed their gratitude to the media, for helping them get this operation through.[9] Despite helping these leaders to securitize the case of Kosova, the media has pushed them to take actions. Christopher Hill, the US Ambassador to Macedonia at that time, stated that "the press reinforced the pressure that we have to do something in Kosovo" (quoted in Robinson 2002, 95). The media has not only helped the securitizing actors, like Clinton, Blair, Hill, Albright, Clark, or Solana, to securitize Kosova to the public, but it also helped, and played bigger role, in securitizing Kosova to the elite of the world powers, by pushing them to think for an intervention, and think of the catastrophe that waiting can bring.

Each televised massacre, killing, burning of villages, and suffering, exposed the failure of the west to stop the bloodshed. These images showed that there is no need for a speech act always. This pushed the people to pressure their governments for action, or at least the governments felt like they are pressured and that they have to do something. Each incident was making much more pressure, and this was in advantage of the Albanian population and the KLA, who made sure to show all the Serbian atrocities. Some even think that the reason for Adem Jashari, the commander in chief and the founder of the KLA, for not surrendering or hiding his family was that he wanted the world to know what the Serbs are capable to do. The killing and massacring of more than 50 members of his family, by the Serbian forces, definitely drew west's attention, and provided the Albanians with the television images (Bahador, 2007: 67). According

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[9] For more interviews please check the interviews at "War in Europe"

to Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000), the picture of a massacred victim in Kosova, printed in the New York Times in September 30, 1998, and the New York Times laying in the table of the National Security Council meeting in the White House Situation Room, reminded everyone present that they must do something or there would be similar atrocities as the ones in Bosnia. Albright is reported to have said that this is Milosevic's response to the statements made a week earlier by NATO and the UN. On the other hand, Sandy Barger claimed that this picture of the Gornje Obrinje massacre represented a crossing of the "atrocities threshold" (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2000: 43).

How does the media influence the public, be they the decision making elite, or the people in general? Blame is a very important concept when one securitizes an issue or tries to legitimize an intervention. It is important because if you want to enter in somebody else's war then you have to justify that you are defending the blameless. According to a study made by Babak Bahador (2007), during the 15-month period before the intervention, 92 western policy-related documents put blame to the Serbian side, 67 such documents were neutral or blamed no side, and only 2 documents blamed the Kosovar Albanians.

When framing the news, there are either empathy or distancing words used. The empathy words make the audience, the viewer, feel nearer to the victim on the TV, whereas the distancing words make the audience, the viewer, feel different, and distant from the victim on the TV. In the case of Kosova the ratio of empathy over distancing words was 1969 to 586, according to a study made by Piers Robinson (2002). According to this study, the most used empathy words were: refugees, people, women, and children; while the distancing words mostly used were: Muslim, Albanian, Kosovar, men, and soldier. Not all the media uses the same keywords, empathy words

over distancing words, or success over failure words. The newspapers, for example, seemed to be more critical of the intervention, while the TVs more supportive. But, nevertheless, between April and May, there was vast media, especially American based, coverage of Kosova. Thousand of articles were published in the biggest American newspapers, like the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*; Kosova and Operation Allied Forces covered most of the time in the bulletins of CBS and CNN; and this made Kosova an important place to act, and legitimized its securitization, by giving eminent importance to this issue (Robinson, 2002). But, before the intervention there were several issues that, I think, took most of the media coverage on Kosova: the Drenica massacre; the massacre at the Arberi e Eperme (in serbian: Gornje Obrinje); the Racak massacre; the Rambouillet conference on negotiations; and the last diplomatic efforts to settlement, before the first day of intervention.

As it is mentioned above, the CNN effect was a key aspect in the securitization of Kosova. It helped the securitizing actors, at different level and different times, to document the need for an intervention. Firstly, the Albanians got the televised images, and used them to ask for external help. Afterwards, the leaders of NATO, the USA, and the European powers, used those same images as arguments of why they needed to intervene. On the other hand those images pushed these leaders to act faster, as not to have same situations as in Bosnia.

At the same time the CNN effect was used for securitizing Kosova to the elite of the governments, the congress, parliament, etc. When we take in consideration the effect of the media, we can see the difference in the international securitization versus the domestic one. We cannot speak of the same audience, when some people take the information from the BBC, some from the CNN, some others from Al-Jazeera, and some from Tanjug. The media constructs the audience, and their mind. As Beneddict Anderson (1983) argued, the audiences were imagined

communities and afterwards they were constructed, so there is no single international community, or audience. But how did the securitization happen? I will try to analyze the impact of the media, and how the international leaders securitize Kosova at different levels, and different times. I will try to keep to three main massacres that happened in Kosova, as they got the main media coverage in Kosova, and see how the international leaders dealt with these news.

After the massacre of Prekaz, in 1998, when the villagers went to identify and take the bodies of their killed relatives, the pictures of the massacred made it immediately in the internet websites. These were broadcasted by most of the western media, and this got the vast attention on Kosova for the first time (Bahador, 2007). Similarly in the massacre of Arberi e Eperme, immediately after the Serbian forces left the ground, the international journalists went to the ground and filmed the atrocities that happened, together with the villagers. For the next weeks these images filled the TV news bulletins and the newspaper front-pages. Images and videos of still burning houses; massacred women, children, and elders; and mourning relatives of the victims were broadcasted instantly. Interviews of the villagers who could escape the Serbian forces and who could describe how their relatives –sometimes their mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, or children- were gunned down in close range, made the tragedy more powerful to western audiences, who felt empathy for the victims (Bahador, 2007: 80-90).

The final strike for intervention, I think, was made after the Racak massacre. I remember looking at the television when William Walker, the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), gave a speech on what he saw in Racak, and from then I knew that NATO's intervention was not too far. The images that were shown in the background of Walker's speeches were of bodies shot in close range, one above the other, of children, men, women, elders, of various ages. There were around 45 dead bodies, some mutilated. These images were followed by crying

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villagers, when finding their dead relatives, some even fainting. But what made these images more shocking was the presence of William Walker himself in the scene, walking among the dead bodies (Bahador, 2007: 85-90), with bitter and shocking facial expression. In one scene I remember him saying to the journalists on the body of a victim "he's been beheaded? … Jesus Christ … lets give him the dignity of covering him up", and "this is about as horrendous and even as I have seen and I have been in some pretty nasty situations" (these citations may not be identical, but I tried to recall what I heard in 1999, and these were some of the words given by all the televisions in the world). Later in a press conference in Pristina Walker stated: "I've seen all the ingredients of a massacre" (CNN news: January 16, 1999).

All these three scenes have something in common: the images of dead bodies, mainly women, elders, and children, who could not escape from the Serbian forces, or, like in Racak, men who were separated from their families and shot at a close range. These were not fighters of the KLA, as the Serbian authorities claimed. In these situations the keywords were mentioned: massacre, human rights, atrocities, genocide, intervention, etc. and this is why we can consider these as pioneers of securitization of Kosova, by the media coverage. First two of these incidents were the media led actions, but the last one was two-sided as there were government observes, the KVM, and the media, who came to the scene at the same time and reported the incident (Bahador, 2007).

To analyze how these incidents affected the process of securitization of the Kosova issue, it is important to analyze some of the speeches made by the American leaders, to the congress, to the people, and to their allies in Europe, for the securitization of Kosova, after the Drenica massacre. This was the biggest incident, until March 1998, that was equated with Srebrenica.

Madeleine Albright, when talking for the meeting of Contact Group in March 9, 1998, stated: "We were in the same room that we had been in during Bosnian discussions. I thought it behooved me to say to my colleagues that we could not repeat the kinds of mistakes that had happened over Bosnia, where there was a lot of talk and no action and that history would judge us very, very severely." (Little, 2000). Similarly she made reference to the Drenica massacre in other high-level meetings. While in a trip to discuss Kosova with European leaders, in Italy, Rome, Albright stated: "We are not going to stand by and watch Serb authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia" (quoted in Bahador, 2007: 135-136), and afterwards stated in the media that: "History is watching us... In this very room our predecessors delayed as Bosnia burned..." (quoted in Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2002: 24).

Albright was not the only one who made references to the failure of stopping the atrocities in Bosnia, while talking on the need for intervention in Kosova. President Clinton stated in a joint press release with UN Secretary-general Kofi Annan, that: "We do not want the Balkans to have more pictures like we've seen in the last few days so reminiscent of what Bosnia endured" (White House, 1998).

The statements for securitizing Kosova and the need for intervention aiming to stop the atrocities in Kosova, were not done only by the leaders of the governments. The images of atrocities that were happening in Kosova were brought into the agenda of the US Congress, also. The Maryland representative made reference to the picture of an Albanian mother and her small child, in the Washington Post, to ask the House of the Representatives to speak out for those in Kosova (Congressional record, 1998a). Similarly; New York Congressman Ben Gilman, brought the case of Kosova into the agenda in a debate in the House of Representatives, calling the Serbian actions as brutal and horrifying, and making reference to the Drenica massacre

(Congressional record, 1998b); New York Congressman Eliot Engel called the actions of the Serbian military as tyranny, and he called those images as "something that we ought not see in the year 1998" (Congressional record, 1998c); leading Democratic senator on foreign policy, Joseph R. Biden, called for an end to the violent repression of the people of Kosova, referring to the massacres that were happening for two weeks long now (Congressional record, 1998d); Senator Chris Dodds from Connecticut, in the March 18, 1998, congressional meeting, asked for an action by the American representatives and the Nation, stating. It is essential to quote him at length:

> I think it is appropriate, in light of events we have all seen in our newspapers and television stations, events that have occurred in Kosovo in the last couple of weeks, to speak, to be heard. . . . we will be heard expressing, I think, the outrage of our constituents across this country, regardless of where we live, letting those who are suffering know that their voices are being heard, letting those who perpetrate this violence and outrage know that we know what is going on and we will not forget it" (Congressional record, 1998e).

This led to a resolution passed by the US Congress to call for an end to violent repression of the people of Kosova.

Afterwards, with the Massacre of Arberi e Eperme (this massacre is usually mentioned as the massacre of Gornje Obrinje, as that is the name that the Serbs used for the village, and then it was adopted by English speakers. But the villagers of this village, nearly all Albanian, use the name Arberi e Eperme), the securitization became easier for Albright and the others. By this time the audience was already influenced by what they saw on TV and what they read in the newspapers. Now the securitization was done for the intervention to take place more rapidly, and as the massacre of Drenica, the massacre of Arberi e Eperme was very influential, also. The images coming from Arberi e Eperme influenced the decision makers who earlier were against the military intervention. This incident was one of the most influential incident to the National

Security Council, that led them be sure they need to take actions against Milosevic.

Speaking for this incident and its effect to the American ruling elite, Albright explained in her memoir:

> "On September 30, we held a meeting of the Principals Committee in the White House Situation Room. On the table in front of us was a photograph from that morning's New York Times. In the center of the photo was the image of a dead body, skeletal in appearance, mouth open, seeming to issue a last silent cry. The body was one of eighteen women, children and elderly awaiting burial in the Kosovo town of Gornje Obrinje...That morning, as I looked at the photo and read the accompanying story, I thought again of my vow not to allow a repeat of the carnage we had witnessed in Bosnia." (Albright, 2003: 388)

Similarly, Holbrooke, recalling that day in the White House Situation Room, said:

> "The [New York] Times sat in the middle of the oak table in the middle of the situation room like a silent witness of what was going on. And it was one of those rare times where a photograph just kind of, that terrible photograph of that dead person in that village was kind of a reminder of a reality and it had a real effect on the dialogue" (War in Europe, 2000).

But the images of this massacre did not influence just the ones at the governments. Several lawmakers brought this issue in the Congress, and from early October until late October several meetings of Congress focused on the issue of intervention in Kosova. While the Clinton administration wanted to bring this issue as an important issue, securitize it; some republicans at the congress were opposing this, and having in consideration the number of Republican Senators and Representatives, and the impeachment ordeal that President Clinton just survived, Clinton had difficulties to pass his idea of intervention (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2002). This shows best that the audience in international securitization is different at different times, for the same securitizing actor. Clinton had to plan a good securitizing move to present to the Congress. Nevertheless, there were several senators and representatives who were doing their best to securitize the war in Kosova and ask for intervention, referring to the media images. In the October meeting in congress, the person who was the biggest supporter for intervention, Elliot Engel asked for immediate response by the congress, to the Serbian authorities, referring to what

the people were seeing in media and what was happening in Kosova:

> "We read about it in the paper today on the front page, that there were several massacres, that bodies were found of innocent civilians, men, women and children, as the Serbian police forces and military units continue their campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo...Mr. Speaker, it is time for action. We need to have immediate NATO air strikes on Serbian positions in Kosovo so that the innocent civilians will not continue to be slaughtered...I have a letter signed by 18 of our colleagues on both sides of the aisle calling on the President to issue immediate air power with NATO allies to stop the carnage...The time for military strikes is now." (Congressional record, 1998f).

Similarly, David Skaggs asked for intervention, in the House of Representatives, after the Arberia e Eperme massacre, although he was opposing the military intervention at the beginning. In October 2, he asked for US led NATO intervention to stop the atrocities, which were filmed by different media groups (Congressional record, 1998g). In October 6, Senator Mike DeWine, from Ohio, and in October 8, Senator Paul Wellstone, from Minnesota, warned that new pictures of Tuzla and Mostar were going to come if immediate intervention does not take place (Congressional record, 1998i; 1998j). And on October 12, Senator Tom Daschle, from South Dakota, claimed that now is the time for the US and NATO to show that they are serious about what they said to Milosevic, and they are serious on protecting the human rights values in the world, by stopping the slaughter of the innocent civilians in Kosova (Congressional record, 1998k).

We can finally say, for the massacre of Arberi e Eperme, that it was an incident that deepened the securitization of Kosova, among the people in the USA, the government officials, and the lawmakers. The above speeches and images show how this issue has been securitized in the USA, who led the NATO intervention, and later on securitized the Kosova issue among their European allies.

The greatest transformation for intervention, in the US congress, happened with the Racak massacre. Until then many of the congressmen, particularly those of the Republican Party, were

critical about Clinton's foreign policy, especially Balkan policy (Bahador, 2007: 210-220). But after the Racak massacre, there was a big shift towards intervention, which means that the Kosova crisis has been securitized in the congress, and media has played a big role. According to Joseph Biden, then a leading figure of democrats in the foreign policy:

"For the American people and many in Congress, the horror wrought by Milosevic was brought home in horrific fashion when images of the massacre in the village of Racak were transmitted around the world in January 1999. Forty-five Kosovar Albanians were slaughtered, and the pictures of their corpses galvanized public opinion in favor of some Western action." (Biden, 2000: xiv).

Immediately that week, a member of the House of Representatives, Steny Hoyer, claimed that what ambassador Walker called genocide is surely genocide and a crime against humanity. He also warned the congress that because America is the leader in the upholding of these principles, it has a responsibility to punish, and stop the genocide in other places of the world, not only deal with the issues inside the USA (Congressional record, 1999a). These speech acts, and the televised images, led to the debate in the House of Representatives in March 11, 1999, to discuss a resolution of sending American troops for peacekeeping mission in Kosova. A marathon of debates continued for hours and a lot of pros and cons of intervention were discussed. Those who were pro intervention always argued that the new TV images of massacres would soon be broadcasted if there is no intervention to stop those massacres from happening. Congressman David Bonier of Michigan claimed that if a "NO" answer comes from the congress that day then nobody can stop Milosevic from committing other massacres and atrocities, and this would be a green light given to him to commit more Racaks (Congressional record, 1999c). Later in the session even more emotional remarks were made, where speakers associated themselves, and the American people, with the Kosovar Albanian victims. Such remarks were made by Congresswoman Alcee Hastings:

"Last night on ABC News, seven little boys stood without their mother and father in Kosovo who had

done nothing but go somewhere to look for food. I stand here to say that I am committed with those seven children in the hopes that somewhere along the way we can provide what is necessary for peace and stability through our efforts in the NATO alliance to ensure that they grow up and, yes, become just as free as all of us in this great country (or Congressional record, 1999e).

After many hours of debate, finally a resolution in support of the U.S. peacekeepers in Kosova was passed, by 218 votes in favor, 205 against, and 10 abstentions. The securitization was made, and was successful as the resolution passed, but still there were so many votes against. And then, in March 23, just hours before the NATO military intervention, the Senate also passed a resolution for military intervention in Kosova, but this resolution was passed when all the diplomatic efforts, in Rambouillet and afterwards, were exhausted. The Senate authorized "the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Congressional record, 1999f).

Before the final vote of the Senate, Clinton made another speech act to securitize Kosova and the intervention, and this speech act is what everyone remembers of Clinton, and I think this is the speech act that gave the final drive to the securitization in the Senate, and their decision of support:

> "We should remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January –innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire- no because of anything they had done, but because of who they were … our firmness is the only thing standing between them and countless more villages like Racak … make no mistake, if we and our allies do not have the will to act, there will be more massacres." (Clinton, 1999a).

The debate was opened by the republican Senator, John McCain in late April, but it failed until the March debates in the Senate, where a lot of reference was given to the media, by the senators, and the speeches of the senators backed up by the media pictures successfully securitized Kosova. Paul Wellstone securitized the intervention by stating:

> "As we all know, Milosevic has already carried out numerous massacres and, other atrocities in Kosovo, including the killing of more than 40 ethnic Albanian civilians in the village of Racak in January. Right now, there are tens of thousands of refugees on the move in Kosovo. These refugees are facing very basic problems of survival. They lack shelter. They need blankets and stoves. The

fighting has knocked out the electricity and water supplies. There are people right now huddling in cellars, and in unfinished houses, with their families. According to an account in the New York Times, people who are refugees themselves are giving shelter to refugees. One family is giving shelter to 80 people...It is almost certain that we will soon be hearing more stories of massacres and displacements, of women and children and elderly men being summarily executed, and of further atrocities...I find it hard to stand by and let Milosevic continue with his relentless campaign of destruction." (Congressional record, 1999g).

Similarly Barbara Mikulski of Maryland stated:

"Reports from last night indicate that further humanitarian catastrophes are imminent. Serbia is moving aggressively to overrun and drive thousands more ethnic Albanians from their homes. The Serbs have deployed 40,000 army and police units in Kosovo. Over the past week- end, over 10,000 Kosovo Albanians were forced to flee their homes fearing for their lives. And for good reason: a brutal Serbian attack on the village of Racak in January resulted in the death of 45 civilians. Some of my colleagues have argued that we should consider military action only if further humanitarian atrocities occur. We cannot wait for genocide to occur before we act." (Congressional record, 1999h).

After this final incident, and the final securitization moves, the intervention started. It is to be noted that the CNN effect was not only present during these above-mentioned incidents, although these incidents were the most-covered situations in Kosova, but the CNN and the media in general were used by the leaders at different times, to reach to the people, to the Congress, the governments of the allies etc. Just after the speech made by Clinton in March 19, and the Senate resolution in March 23, Joe Biden, stated for the CNN that "[Yugoslav president Slobodan] Milosevic will engage in ethnic cleansing. The number of refugees will be in the magnitude of tens of thousands. The region will be destabilized. And our interests will be badly hurt" (CNN, 1999). Here Biden securitized in the most traditional way, linking the security of the region, and the interest of the USA, with the situation of Kosova. He made the Kosova crises a primary issue that the USA must deal, otherwise the region will be destabilized and the US interests threatened.

But even before the Kosova crises, Holbrooke was very savvy in using the media to push for Dayton peace agreement, and drive his way of diplomacy. He knew that all the sides were carefully watching his brief media reports, and he was using this very wisely. As Clark

mentioned in his memoire "Milosevic would often say, as Holbrooke would begin to describe the latest meeting with the Croats or Bosnian Muslims, 'Yes, I saw your report on CNN.'" (Clark, 2001: 60). With media he got everyone interested, informed, and alarmed. And this is a masterfully handled media asset.

When we compare the media coverage in Kosova and in the other regions of the world, we can see that the media plays a big role in securitizing an issue and bringing it to the agenda. But this is helped by the interest of the elite, the lawmakers, and the decision makers, who pushed the media to cover what they though it was right. The silence of the elite for the case of Rwanda, and the lack of media coverage makes my point. The media remains differential unless there is a group who wants to challenge the official policies (Robinson, 2002), and wants to securitize an issue, as the Albright-Clinton group was in the case of Kosova. The executive elites' wish and the media coverage go hand in hand when it comes to bringing something to the international agenda.

### The Need for the Securitization of Kosova: Why was Kosova Issue Securitized?

To securitize is to construct, but this does not mean that the threat does not exist, that they are less real (Bilgin, 2008). By securitizing the actors present the threat, and in the case of Kosova this is what happened. There was silence to what Serbian authorities have done in Bosnia, and what they started to do in Kosova, so there was a need of securitization by the Albanians, to ask for foreign help. At the same time there was a need for securitization by the international leaders, who wanted public support to act.

The securitization of Kosova happened several times by different actors. Milosevic securitized Kosova, as a cradle of Serbian nationalism and religious heritage, so he can rise the

Serbian nationalism in Kosova and ethnic cleans it. Afterwards the Albanians felt the need to securitize Kosova, which tells us that even if you may be the victim, your cause cannot be heard until you successfully securitize it. The western leaders, and states, on the other hand, securitized Kosova because of the criticism they were getting from the public, on their inefficiency to protect the values that they claimed they stand for. In Kosova the need for securitization, by international leaders, was not just for the bombing. There were different types and levels of securitization, starting with the need for securitization so the bombing starts, and continuing with the need for the securitization of Kosova for the second and third phases of the bombing campaigns.

The student riots, the demonstrations, and the public violence by the KLA were all done so the attention of the West could be drawn and securitization be made. We can also consider the decision of Adem Jashari, the pioneer of the KLA, not to evacuate its family and sacrifice them, as a move of getting international attention, and securitizing Kosova. Henriksen (2007) even thinks that the violence of the KLA in the first place was for getting international coverage, and making the world leaders think of what is happening there. This violence indicated, claims Henriksen (2007) and I agree, that we are not waiting and sticking to Rugova's non-violence campaign, and now we are going to be more active. To indicate this, the KLA killed three Serbs just before the Dayton agreement, and then the Serbian police entered and harassed a whole village, killing dozens, which made the population go to the protests on the road, and thousands of them attending funerals. This got the attention of the west, and gave the message of failure of Rugova's pacifist politics. A KLA commander, Remi, later committed that "We did not have adequate firepower for larger operations, but we could provoke the Serbs by using snipers. Our intention was to get NATO to intervene as fast a possible." (quoted in Hanriksen, 2007: 148).

Similarly, the strikes and marches of miners of the Trepca mine, in Mitrovica, was a securitizing move by Albanians, to make Kosova a security issue. In November 17, 1988, the miners of the Trepca mine started to march towards Prishtina. After a 52 km march, around 3000 miners arrived in Prishtina, walking. What the miners wanted was that their administrators come back, after being dismissed from their jobs; to stop the discrimination of Albanians; and not to change the 1974 constitution. Although the international media coverage was limited, it was a first step where the Albanians were able to explain their cause (Abrashi and Kavaja, 1996). In a personal talk with Mr. Burhan Kavaja, then a director of a division in Trepca, told me that they decided to put Mrs. Juljana Gashiq, an administrator in the mine and the Serb leader of Stari Terg Communist Alliance, to lead the marches, so the people and the international community can understand that this is not a march of the Albanians only, but of people who are against discrimination. Afterwards, on February 2 and 3, 1989, the miners went on strike 1000 meters below the earth surface, asking for the FRY administrators to come and talk to them on the fate of the Albanians in Kosova. According to international minor conventions, where Trepca mine was a member of, if the miners of a mine go on strike for more than three days and three nights, then all the miners of these conventions make a silent strike (Abrashi and Kavaja, 1996: 29-35). Having this in mind, the miners went on strike so their voices can be heard and Kosova be securitized, and this was achieved as many international media covered these strikes, including the UK's *The Guardian.* After the FRY administration promised that the constitution will not change and that no one from the Trepca mine will be imprisoned when the strike finishes, the miners came out of the mine, but unfortunately, to find out that immediately afterwards the constitution changed and some of the Albanian administrators of Trepca imprisoned, including Aziz Abrashi and Burhan Kavaja. Even when in prison Burhan Kavaja and Aziz Abrashi were

trying to securitize Kosova. When talking to Mr. Kavaja, he remembers that when he went in the court, after the imprisonment, he saw that there were many representatives of foreign embassies in Belgrade, which came to listen to the court hearing. Seeing this as a good opportunity, Mr. Kavaja started explaining the history of the Albanian discrimination in Kosova, and how it came until the strikes and the marches. This way he tried to give a message to these representatives and bring Kosova to a security level for them.

On the other hand, the need for the securitization of Kosova, by the international leaders, arose for the protection of human rights and values. In Kosova the human rights and values were violated, and these violated values are the values that the western countries say they stood for. When securitizing Kosova, the western countries showed their willingness to protect these values even if they needed to violate state sovereignty (Bacevich and Cohen, 2001: 97). The reason why there needed to be a securitization, the leaders claimed, was that if nothing is to be done, then those values that are so much mentioned, stand for nothing, and the western states cannot bare the result of failure. As President Clinton said in an address to the nation: "there are times when looking away simply is not an option […] we cannot respond to every tragedy in every corner of the world [but this does not mean that] we should do nothing for no one" (Chomsky, 1999: 66). In an article Clinton wrote for the New York Times he said:

> "we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause for peace. […] We cannot respond to such tragedies everywhere, but when ethnic conflict turns into ethnic cleansing where we can make a difference, we must try, and that is clearly the case in Kosovo. […] Had we faltered, the result would have been a moral and strategic disaster. The Kosovars would have become a people without a homeland, living in difficult conditions in some of the poorest countries in Europe" (New York Clinton, 1999b).

Similarly Clinton's allies shared the same idea of securitizing the values that the west ought to protect. Tony Blair, in an article he wrote for *Newsweek*, claimed, "in this conflict we are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated. For a world where those responsible for such

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crimes have nowhere to hide" (Blair, 1999). Joschka Fischer and Secretary Albright, on the other hand, advocated the notion of Ulrich Beck that humanism is a new mission of NATO (Cohen, 1999). Jacques Chirac, French President, claimed that the issue in question is not only Kosova, but the peace in Europe and the human rights (Latawski and Smith, 2007). Czech President, Vaclav Havel, in an address to the Senate and the House of Commons of the Parliament of Canada, explained that this is the first war that is being fought in the name of certain principles and values, rather than interests. He called the war in Kosova as the most ethical war that one can be fought, claiming that NATO is not fighting against threats to its people, but against the threats of other human beings, which gives them precedence over the rights of states (Havel 1999). Solana, on the other hand, claimed that out of the plight of the Kosovars, the future of Europe is what is being threatened now. This war, according to Solana, is a war between two views of European values, the international community and Milosevic. What Milosevic presents is a Europe of pure states, nationalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia. Whereas what NATO represents is a Europe of integration, democracy, and ethnic pluralism. "If this positive vision of Europe is to prevail, if Europe is to enter the 21$^{st}$ century as a community of states practicing democracy, pluralism and human rights, we simply cannot tolerate this carnage as its center", claimed Solana (1999b).

From here we can see that the American leaders, and their European counterparts, advocated for the protection of human rights and values, and the case of Kosova showed that the securitization for these values was a must, and that the west is serious on protecting these values that the west stands for. Because of this, the bombing is justified, as NATO needed to intervene so it can stop the violent ethnic cleansing and establish its credibility (Chomsky, 1999). War and manhood are constructed to fit together, going to war is something a man does; not going to war

is a loser's job. A real man does not run from engaging in war (Fierke, 2007).

The securitization of Kosova came just at the right time, when the western states, members of NATO and NATO itself, were being criticized and their credibility was at stake. This shows us that Kosova was brought to the security level because NATO had to do something so it can win its credibility back. Because one cannot act without firstly constructing, securitizing, presenting, a need for intervention, then Kosova was securitized first. This way NATO showed its efficiency, and tried to overcome the critics from the inability to intervene in East Timor, Somalia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can certainly say that the war in Bosnia was very important in the decision to securitize Kosova, during the securitization of Kosova, as well as during the intervention. The credibility of NATO hit the bottom in Bosnia and NATO leaders saw that they lost too much blood with Bosnia. The criticism was so high that some authors even called the Western alliance as 'dead' because of its inability to act and stop the fighting in Bosnia (Latawski and Smith, 2007). In response to these criticisms NATO felt the need to securitize Kosova and intervene in Kosova. Robin Cook and Joseph Biden were among those who thought that what NATO, Britain, and the USA, lost is not just their face but also their credibility, and their confidence in their security (Latawski and Smith, 2007). Pentagon, on the other hand, reported that NATO's credibility is US's first interest in the operation in Kosova, in their After-Action Report on Kosovo Operations. Therefore, NATO's action was a collective defense one, not against an aggression to territory, but against the threats to values of the Euro-Atlantic community, that they ought to protect (Latawski and Smith, 2007; Nardulli et. al., 2002; Fromkin, 2000). This can be seen best in the NATO's statement of April 23, 1999:

> "The crises in Kosovo represents a fundamental challenge to the values for which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence pursued buy the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic. We will not allow this campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail." (NATO, 1999e)

**Evaluation of the Securitization of Kosova**

Buzan et al. named three steps for a successful securitization: "existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by braking free of rules" (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). Although the actors vary, these three steps are also important for an international securitization. The most difficult step, in international securitization, is the third step, because there are several audiences and this brings more criticism, as lesser is the unity and more is the diversity.

Because NATO intervened in Kosova, and the elite and the people of the member countries later legitimized the intervention, we can say that Kosova was successfully securitized, overall. It was successfully securitized because there was an existential threat, there were emergency actions, and finally, for the first time, a group of powerful states succeeded in taking the legitimacy of braking free of rules of sovereignty, and act to protect new values. The audience, in general, accepted the escalation of the war as a threat, and saw it as legitimate (by silent acceptance) to intervene in protection of the human rights and values. But, in Kosova the elite audience was also very important. While the securitizing actors securitized Kosova and were successful in doing so with the people as the audience, they were also successful in securitizing Kosova among the elite of the states, such as the ones at NATO, taking in consideration how difficult is to take a decision at NATO. Clark explains this difficulty:

> "There is a subtly that reflects not only the nuances of the complex issues but also the tortuous process of the consensus building. Agreements are not voted; they are place 'under silence.' Disagreement is noted by 'braking the silence' on a proposal. The North Atlantic Council meets in different groupings, 'ambassadors only,' or 'ambassadors plus four,' tailored to promote the most effective exchanges" (Clark, 2001: 15).

Despite these difficulties, Kosova was securitized, successfully, among several audiences, which resulted in the intervention and braking free of rules. As security lies among the subjects,

neither with the objects nor with the subjects, then we can say that as long as the audience accepted the existential threat, the securitization was successful, because the success of the securitization is measured from the acceptance of the audience not the securitizer (Buzan et al., 1998: 31).

In the case of Kosova, the 'CNN factor' played a huge role. In Clark's words "people began to speak jokingly of the need to follow the itinerary of CNN correspondent Christiane Amanpour, whose stunning on-the-scene visuals and reporting could make a distant crisis an instant domestic political concern" (Clark, 2001: 8-9). This helped the leaders of governments to explain, investigate, coordinate and confirm the need for a securitization of Kosova, among the elite, and it also helped the governments explain, coordinate, and legitimize the need for a securitization, and intervention, to the people.

Fear is an element that can help a successful securitization, and the massacres' remedies, which were broadcast on TV, implemented fear of escalation, to the people around the world. Although the securitizing actors were the leaders, and the securitizing power differs from the importance of the leader in the world arena, still because this power is not absolute, other securitizing actors had more powers during different times. Such an actor was the Racak massacre, which was a key-point to trigger NATO planes in the Yugoslavia, and I think it was the most successful securitizing actor that could trigger such a big operation (Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Buzan et al., 1998; Henriksen, 2007).

### Conclusion: What did Kosova Teach us?

As mentioned above, the Kosova and the Bosnian wars taught us several lessons. Firstly, the wars in the 20th century changed, and there are more actors; secondly, the start of new

conflicts is bad governance, by the elite, which makes the people rise and start internal conflicts with, usually, external help; thirdly, ending a conflict is more difficult than starting one, taking in consideration so many actors involved; and finally, conflict resolution is wider than ending a conflict. Containment, preventation, reconciliation, peacebuilding, intervention, etc. all enter in the area of conflict resolution (Romsbotha, et al., 2005).

Laura Silber and Allan Little (1997) argue that what the Yugoslav wars have taught us is that the strong, rather then the just, will be the victorious in post-Cold War era. They say that one needs a big army, rather then a good argument, to win a war. They argue that the wars in Yugoslavia showed that there is no such a thing as collective security, and no international will to protect the weaker and just states against the stronger and unjust states. But, although this might have been true, to an extent, before the Kosova war, we can argue today that with the Kosova war these arguments do not stand anymore. What the Kosova war taught us is that the just won; and that the promotion of good arguments were the most important weapons of the Kosovar Albanians, while big army was a disaster for Milosevic, in the long run. For the first time there was international will to protect the weak against the strong, and this has shifted the conduct of war, and the conduct of international relations in the modern world. Based on this, we can argue that Kosova was a great step in transforming modern international relations, international law, and international security, in practice.

But, beside the nature of the conflicts, we have learned other lessons also. We have learned now that the EU is a mature security community because it shares: mutual compatibility of values; strong economic ties and expectations of more; multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions; a growing degree of institutionalized relationships; mutual responsiveness; and

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mutual predictability of behavior (Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 190-200), and this makes us more optimistic about a good future of the EU.

We have also learned that by trusting, you risk, and this dilemma that rises can never be escaped, as when security is in question, there are a lot of levels of uncertainty, but nevertheless the trust –and the risk- is the path to peace and security (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).

As far as securitization is concerned Kosova has taught us that you need to securitize your issue if you want someone to help. Securitization is something constructed, but this does not mean that the threat does not exist. We saw that the securitization of Kosova was a need, because you don't get the deserved attention if you don't get public. Today, we see that the decision for securitization and intervention was right, but not all the things that deserve to be securitized are done so. Katrina or Tsunami, have had much more victims, then an ethnic conflict or a terrorist attack, but they did not rise to the level of a security issue (Fierke, 2007), and this is an unfortunate situation, because these are cases that the securitization is needed at large. Lene Hansen (2000), called this as "the silent security dilemma", and it happens when the subject has no potential of speaking its own security. This is what happens with the women who have been raped, the people infected by epidemics, who cannot speak up their (in)security because of fear of humiliation or of being seen as threat to the society (Buzan and Hansen, 2009). The same happened with the Katrina or Tsunami victims, who had no possibility to speak up their security and securitize their cause. If Kosova's cause was not securitized the same would happen to its citizens. The international community would not intervene, and the ethnic cleansing and mass killing would continue. This is why even when an issue is a security issue it needs to be securitized by someone or some groups, otherwise it will not be at the level it needs to be, and it will not have the importance it needs to have.

In the conclusion, I will explain what we learned new about securitization in light of the case of Kosova. Although my contribution is small and modest, I hope that it will be a catalyst for further discussions. Afterwards, I will also explain the future implications of the case of Kosova, how it changed the security perceptions and studies, as well as how it developed the area of peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention.

# CONCLUSION

### Rethinking securitization theory in light of Kosova

This thesis began with the questions: why was Kosova securitized? And, how was it securitized? To try to answer these two questions I firstly surveyed Security Studies as a discipline, then I explained the securitization theory, following by the explanation of the international relations of Kosova, and then trying to observe how many actors securitized Kosova. Putting in practice the securitization theory, in Kosova, some other questions emerged. Kosova is certainly not the classical example of securitization, as it was not a securitized issue in the domestic realm. By observing this, I came to conclude that there are different securitizations at different level, which is the main argument of this thesis. Buzan and Waever, as well as many others, have talked about different approaches of securitization, but what has usually been analyzed, are the examples on domestic realm, rarely on regional level, and lately on global, systematic, level.

I think I need not to discuss again about how securitization happens, but I shall say that the classical securitization is usually true at the domestic level, where the securitizing actors are more or less known; the method of securitizing, the speech act, is usually similar; and the audience is usually the public. In the systematic level, what Buzan and Waever have called "macrosecuritization" (Buzan and Waever, 2009), they have committed that the securitization theory is short in examining the different levels of securitization. What we can see with the case of Kosova, is that the international securitization, securitizing some issue internationally, is a level between the domestic securitization and the macrosecuritization. This is what I argue to be my contribution to the theory, by analyzing the case of Kosova, how it became an international problem, and how it was successfully securitized, as the extraordinary means to save the referent

objects were taken internationally. I agree with Weaver, that the securitization theory is new and there needs to be many studies and particular examples observed, so we can develop this theory (Williams, 2003). I hope this case study made a modest contribution.

But what difference has the case of Kosova shown with respect to domestic and international securitizations? The domestic securitization and the international securitization differ in many points, but three are most important. Firstly, the securitizing actors are very limited in the domestic securitization. Secondly, the securitizing form of speech act, that the securitization theory explains, is very narrow when it comes to international securitization. And thirdly, the time of analysis and observation, of securitization theory, is narrow, because it focuses only at the moment of intervention (McDonald, 2008). The question is, what does the international level expect the scholars to analyze? Firstly, the claim of the securitization theory that the securitization is constructed by the speech act of dominant actors, is narrow when it comes to the international securitization, because in the international securitization there is no static audience, the audience changes at different levels, and so do the securitizing actors. Different actors enter the game of securitization and they have different influence at different times. Secondly, the speech act is not the only form of naming, or uttering, a security concern. In international securitization, more then in the domestic securitization, the pictures, videos, and media, are other forms of securitization. As an old saying goes 'a picture is worth a thousand words', and this is very true for international securitization. Kosova has shown that pictures of massacres and other human rights violations, were much more important than the speech acts of other actors involved. At this point we can even argue that media is one of the most important securitizing actors (Williams, 2003), in international securitization. Especially today, when the Internet gives us room for publications, technology has enabled everyone to be a securitizing

actor for an international issue, and Ronald Deibert (1997) called this as the effect of 'hypermedia'.. This made Hollywood, the actors, and media, as important securitizers (McDonald, 2008; Semetko, 2009) in the international level. Thirdly, the Kosova issue has shown that the international issues are securitized in a longer period of time. While analyzing a domestic securitization we can focus on the time of the speech act, and the requirement of extraordinary means, the international securitization needs much more time to be securitized (Balzacq, 2005), and focusing only at the time of the intervention is insufficient when we analyze the securitization of international issues, such as Kosova.

I must agree with Thierry Balzacq (2005), who argues that public valuably provides their government with 'moral' support, but not with 'formal' support that 'mandates governments to adopt a specific policy'. While in the domestic securitization, the public is directly involved with fighting the threat posed to the referent object, and this is why it issues the right of using the extraordinary means, in the international securitization the division between the moral and the formal support, or issue, of using extraordinary means, is more vivid. Although this is present in the domestic level also, but with lower difference, the international securitization makes this difference more seen, because it is the governments and the parliaments of the states, who are directly involved in fighting the threat posed to the international referent object, not the public. Nevertheless, the moral support is very important, and it is a push for getting the formal support also (Row, 2008). This teaches us that securitization must be done at different levels, for the same referent object, for one to get the moral and the formal support (Row, 2008). Because the distinction between moral and formal support is more vivid in the international securitization, then the process of securitization at different levels is harder and more important, at the international level, also.

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Despite the role of the media, the international organizations, conferences, symposia, and reports, are other important securitizing actors in the international level. The question that I wondered about Kosova's securitization and then I started writing this thesis was: Some people and institutions have more influence than other in determining the agenda of security. So, do these people and institutions always have this credibility? If not always, then when do they have this credibility to determine this agenda, at what circumstances, time, and place? Like the people as the securitizing actors, the international institutions also have different voices when it comes to securitizing an issue (Jackson, 2006). We saw in the case of Kosova that the UN was an important securitizing actor at the beginning of the conflict, but then it lost its securitizing power to NATO and the KVM of the OSCE. The importance of the international institutions is determined in the similar way as the importance of the security communities. Firstly, it depends on who is a member of that organization or institution; and secondly, it depends on how funded that institution or organization is (Jackson, 2006). I argue that not including these actors in the securitization theory makes it more difficult for us to analyze the securitization of international issues, as well as it leaves the theory incomplete.

Table 1, illustrates some differences between domestic and international securitizations.

| | **Domestic Securitization** | **International Securitization** |
|---|---|---|
| **Securitizing Actors** | Political elite, governmental officials, influential local people (such as activists) | International political leaders, media, influential international people, international organizations |
| **Audience** | Public | Public, political leaders of governments (decision-makers), international leaders |
| **Securitizing Methods** | Speech act | Speech act, visual images |

**Table 1.** The differences between the domestic and the international securitizations.

I would like to finalize my thesis with some comments on the future implications of the conflict of Kosova, in the security studies, as well as international relations.

**Future implications**

It is very important to know what the war in Kosova has changed in the international relations, security studies, international politics, peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and humanitarianism. Having in consideration that Kosova case was NATO's first full intervention for humanitarian purposes, shows that the conduct of wars, peacebuilding, and humanitarianism has changed. While it is discussed that states engage in wars to protect their threatened interests, Kosova has shown that today we can talk of interventions for humanitarian purposes, to halt humanitarian catastrophes, and for the first time we can leave self-interests aside.

The case of Kosova, however, is not the first time that an international institution intervened in a war. The 1990-1991 Gulf War was undertaken to defend Kuwait's territorial integrity, but it was supported by a UN mandate. On the other side the UN did not support the intervention of Kosova by any mandate, and this duty lied in the shoulders of NATO states, who appointed themselves another responsibility for protection of human rights in case of state violence. The wars in Kosova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Somalia, have shifted the discourse from 'war' to 'humanitarian intervention', for legitimizing governments to conduct interventions in the name of human rights. The media, on the other hand, helps them in this legitimization and makes them demand that 'something must be done' (Buzan and Hansen, 2009).

The humanitarian intervention brought a dilemma to the international law: the dilemma of

a 'legitimate war'[10]. This is an important topic that needs more space to be discussed, but another important dilemma is the time of intervention. While some, truly, argue that the intervention shall be conducted as soon as the crises starts, so the number of victims remains small, some others argue that before an intervention all the diplomatic means shall be used, which takes a lot of time and every minute counts another victim. This is a paradox that the states shall calculate, because if there is a chance to settle a conflict without intervention or fighting, then it is better to do so, but if a lot of time passes, then the number of victims rises (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2002). A similar paradox or dilemma rises with the effect of the securitization moves. In Kosova we have shown that some actions of both sides had counter-productive effects, and unintended outcomes. By poisoning the Kosovar Albanian school-children in Kosova, Milosevic wanted to point out the insufficiency of the Kosovar Albanian police in Kosova, and use it as a pretext to replace them by Serbian police. This, on the other hand, was wisely used by the Kosovar Albanians to show the brutality of the Serbs, and securitize Kosova. The protests of the Kosovar Albanian population in Kosova and the violence of the KLA, to securitize Kosova, were used as arguments by Milosevic to 'fight terrorism and separatism'.

Another implication is that the change of discourse in conducting wars is not present only in the international arena. Kosova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, show us that territoriality and sovereignty cannot be considered conditions of individual security (Messari, 2002). This way the discourse of security is changed, also, from 'the state as a provider of individual security' to the state as a 'threat to individual security'.

Other implication of the war in Kosova is that future wars may be fought for other reasons than territory, sovereignty, or the state as a whole. Kosova has drawn new lines in the conduct of

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[10] For more discussions on the justification and morality of wars, see: Walzer, Michael. (1977). *Just and*

wars, making values as important reason for conducting a war (Chomsky, 2000). Tony Blair proclaimed that Kosova has taught us to fight "for values, a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated [and] those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide." (quoted in Chomsky, 2000: 1-2). Vaclav Havel, on the other hand, claimed that the bitter experiences of the two World Wars, and the evolution of civilization, have made us understand that human rights are more important than the states (Chomsky, 2000: 1-4).

Kosova has been considered as a project for collective defence, but not of the member states of NATO, as stated in the Article 5, but of "values of Euro-Atlantic community" (Latawski and Smith, 2007: 160-170). Similarly, as Javier Solana argued, the war in Kosova was not a conflict between the two ethnic groups or two states in the region. It was a conflict of the Belgrade government and the international community. This was a conflict between the Milosevic's vision of Europe of ethnically pure states, nationalism, authoritarianism, and xenophobia; and the NATO's and EU's vision of Europe of integration, democracy and ethnic pluralism (Latawski and Smith, 2007). This was a test for the European and the NATO powers, to measure their conscious on human rights and values that they are said to be built on. And these values were the ones that kept the Euro-Atlantic community together, like never before. Kosova initiated a strong sense of common security in Europe, which resulted in the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) following the Operation Allied Force (Daalder and O'Hanlon, 2002; Latawski and Smith, 2007). We can conclude in this way, that we can see a more united Europe when common security and defence is at stake, which is another implication that came out of the experience in Kosova.

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