THE THEORY OF REFERENCE AND SIGNS IN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME

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Osman PEKER

Fatih University

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For Prof. Dr. Alparslan Açıkgenç whom I am proud of being his student.

APPROVAL PAGE

Student : Osman PEKER
Institute : Institute of Social Sciences
Department : Philosophy
Thesis Subject : THE THEORY OF REFERENCE AND SIGNS IN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME
Thesis Date : June 2010

  I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

(Assist Prof. Şengül Çelik)
Head of Department

  This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

(Prof. Alparslan Açıkgenç)
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

(Prof. Alparslan Açıkgenç)   ………………………. .

(Prof. Dr. Mohamed Bakari)   ………………………

(Assist Prof. Ali Çaksu)   ……………………….

  It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

(Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Karakuyu)
Director

AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

i) Heidegger's references and signs in Being and Time.

ii) The importance of references and signs in grounding reality and truth against skepticism.

Osman PEKER

June, 2010

ABSTRACT

Osman PEKER   **June 2010**

THE THEORY OF REFERENCE AND SIGNS IN HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME

This thesis aims to explore the theory of reference and signs in context of the problem of reality and truth in Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The thesis consists of three chapters apart from the Introduction and Conclusion. The first chapter explains basic concepts in *Being and Time*. It explores close relationships between these concepts and provides understanding of the theory of reference and signs. The second chapter explores the theory of reference and signs in detail. It explains that references open the worldliness of the world and being-in-the-world of Dasein via signs. The third chapter explains the problem of reality and truth and how Heidegger opposes skepticism. The essence of truth and reality is ground in existence of Dasein. The conclusion part of the thesis gives process of Heidegger's thoughts as an answer to the skepticism.

Key words:

Worldliness of the world, being-in-the-world, reference, sings, reality, truth, skepticism.

KISA ÖZET

Osman PEKER   **Haziran 2010**

HEIDEGGER'IN VARLIK VE ZAMAN ADLI ESERİNDE GÖSTERGE VE İŞARET TEORİSİ

Bu tez, Heidegger'in *Varlık ve Zaman* adlı eserinde gösterge ve işaretler teorisini gerçeklik ve hakikat sorunu bağlamında ele almaktadır. Tez, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri hariç üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm *Varlık ve Zaman*'da temel kavramları açıklamaktadır. Bu bölüm, bu kavramlar arasındaki yakın ilişkiyi göz önüne sermekte ve gösterge ve işaretler teorisi için bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. İkinci bölüm gösterge ve işaretler teorisini ayrıntılı olarak ele alır. Bu bölüm, göstergenin; dünyanın dünyasallığını ve Dasein'in dünya içinde varlık oluşunu işaretler aracılığıyla açık hale getirdiğini ifade eder. Üçüncü bölüm, gerçeklik ve hakikat problemini ve Heidegger'in şüpheciliğe nasıl karşı çıktığını açıklar. Gerçeklik ve hakikatin özü Dasein'in varoluşu üzerine bina edilmiştir. Tezin sonuç bölümü Heidegger'in şüpheciliğe cevap olarak düşüncelerinin sürecini özetle ele alır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dünyanın dünyasallığı, dünya içinde varlık, gösterge, işaretler, gerçeklik, hakikat, şüphecilik.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

The basic problem of Heidegger's philosophy and indeed the major project of his entire philosophical career was the question: 'What is the meaning of being?' For this vein, he struggled to analyze the entire history of philosophy from his own ontological perspective by discussing problem again and again in order to scrutinize it. The courses that he offered on ancient philosophy for years shaped his search for being. Heidegger thought that philosophers of nature perceived being a priori and directly. However, this understanding remained hidden thanks to the influence of metaphysics. This metaphysics showed itself as a Western ontology epistemologically oriented and dualist understanding in Cartesian tradition. In this context, the purpose of Heidegger was to reinterpret this dualist and epistemological understanding connected to Cartesian tradition and develops a theory which was based on a purely ontological basis.

Heidegger's most influential work is undoubtedly *'Being and Time'*. Besides, some thinkers working on Heidegger interpret the *Contributions to Philosophy* as one of the most important works of Heidegger. Although it may be hard to compare *Being and Time* with Plato's *Republic* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; nevertheless it can be compared with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[1] During the recent decades, the influence of Heidegger's philosophy continued increasingly on theologians, psychologists, and sociologists as well as philosophers. *Being and Time* has been one of the hardest philosophy books in terms of its language among the all philosophy books written in all times.

In this study, my purpose is to examine Heidegger's theory of reference and signs and its importance as discussed primarily in *Being and Time*. This theory has a characteristic which ground the most important concepts that Heidegger contributed to philosophy, such as, world and worldliness.[2] Heidegger, in the project of transforming western metaphysics, he considered the being of Dasein within the context of being-in-the-world. Heidegger's theory of reference and signs has an important impact on the concept of being-in-the-world; and world and worldliness have a central place in his understanding of Dasein. Without reference and signs, it is impossible to make the fundamental ontological interpretation of world and worldliness. Heidegger developed ideas about reality and truth; thus transforming the traditional western metaphysics thanks to the concepts of world and worldliness provided on the basis of such doctrines as the ones under studying this thesis. These ideas brought a new perspective to the problem of skepticism.

I planned my study in three parts being closely connected to Heidegger's *Being and Time*. I shall try to analyze Heidegger's basic thoughts and concepts in *Being and Time* for understanding the theory of reference and sign in Chapter I. This is because Heidegger starts *Being and Time* with a quote from Plato's *Sophist*: "We thought we knew what we meant by the expression 'Being' but now we are perplexed." He thinks that we must reawaken our understanding of the question: what is being?[3] Today this question has been forgotten. Because of this, Heidegger thinks that we should raise a fresh the question of being.

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[1] Inwood, Michael, Past Masters: Heidegger, Oxford: Oxford Üniversity Press 1997 p.2.
[2] Dreyfus, Hurbert, L. *Being-in-the-World,* (London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 89.
[3] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), Untitled First Page.

What we look for in this question is being. Being determines beings as beings. But the being of beings is itself not a being. Our primary philosophical step to understand the question of being is not to determine beings as beings by following them back in their origin to another being. Due to this, being does not have the character of beings. Thus being requires its own kind of exhibition which is fundamentally different from the discovery of beings. Therefore the meaning of being requires its own conceptualization. This conceptualization must be distinctive from the concepts which we explore beings with them.

Under the circumstances we should ask which being we are looking for so that it becomes clear in which *being* we will disclose being. For instance can trees, cats, and stars be exemplary beings? In this questioning Heidegger is actually looking for a being that is raising this very question. Therefore this being is always us who ask the question of being.[4] We conceptualize this being as Dasein which is always us in each case. Heidegger does not use "person" or "self" to refer to the subject who raises the question of being because these concepts have specific histories and interpretations. "Dasein" means "being-there" in the sense of an activity. Dasein is a living being and does not exist as a thing. Its character is a function of its activity which always has potentialities to realize. Hence Dasein differs from everything else in the universe because it interprets not only what it encounters but itself as well.

Dasein itself is different from other beings. Dasein is not an object of scientific research. In this case for this ontological project we need a specific method for analysis the being of Dasein. Heidegger proposes as his method phenomenology,

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[4] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 28.

which question the "how" in philosophical research not the "what" concerning objects. Phenomenology is opposed to arbitrary and accidental concept constructions. The term phenomonogy has two components: phenomenon and logos. These terms come from Greek terms "phenomenon" and "logos". Phenomenology means "to let what shows itself be seen from itself." In other words, to use Husserl's expression it means "to the things themselves." Phenomenology therefore does not designate the object of its research and does not describe its content. Phenomenology grasps its object and everything about this object must be directly indicated and demonstrated.

In this phenomenological analysis Heidegger uses some new and specific concepts such as ontic, existential, existentiell, present at hand, thing at hand, circumspection, conspicuousness, environment, in-order-to, relevance, world and worldliness. The web of these concepts will be analyzed in this chapter in order to clarify Heidegger's ground upon which he built his theory of reference and signs.

I shall attempt to explain reference and signs in the second chapter. My main thesis which I shall try to defend in this chapter is that reference and signs are foundation for the understanding of worldliness. In this context, I shall analyze the concept of reference in depth.

Heidegger benefits signs for comprehending the phenomenon of reference clearly. Signs are unique kinds of useful things. Nevertheless they do not belong to different ontological category from equipment. Signs disclose how the intelligibility

of the equipmental context should be understood. Thus, signs disclose world and worldliness.[5]

There are threefold relationship between signs and reference. Firstly, the indicating depends on the structure of useful thing, and the in-order-to (reference). Secondly as the character of useful things at hand, the indicating of signs belongs to a totality of useful things, to a referential context. Thirdly, the surrounding world becomes accessible to circumspection as a result of handiness of signs. Signs are ontic at hand as a useful thing which indicates the ontological structure of handiness, referential totality, and worldliness. Reference is ontological ground of signs. Moreover, it is ontological condition of handiness.

We encounter with things at hand in the world. Because of this, things at hand and world have an ontological relation. The world exists a priori at things at hand that we come across. Thus, becoming of things at hand comes into open inside of the world. But the world is itself is not whether a thing at hand or present at hand. The world is like referential web. We understand beings as specific kind of object in this web. We discover beings as they are referred to something in the world. These beings are related with each other. The character of being of things at hand is relevance. To be relevant means something become together with something else. We say that this relation of togetherness is a reference.

As we develop our discussion in this chapter we shall show that according to Heidegger Dasein connects a network of relevance. So it understands its being in the context of being-in-the-world. Because of Dasein's way of being is relevance, Dasein

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[5] Carman, Taylor, *Heidegger's Analytic*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 233.

is ontic possibility of discovery of beings encountered. Thus we recognize their relation to each other with being of Dasein and things at hand. So Dasein is always already referred itself to an encountered world throughout its existence. It is thus my purpose to argue in the third chapter that Heidegger's theory of reference is built upon such a ground where Dasein is seen within a network of reference and relations.

In chapter 3, firstly I shall explain Heidegger's thoughts about reality. Since ancient Greece, the problem of relation between human being and outer world has been an important topic of discussion in philosophy. During the history of philosophy, philosophers thought themselves as an independent observer. For example, Descartes imagines himself thinking of beeswax. Hume thinks himself as an audience of the game of billiards. Kant describes himself sitting on the shore of a river watching a ship. Therefore, these three philosophers-while exploring the relationship between human being and the world-handle human being as independent observer from the world instead of as a player within the world.[6]

Heidegger changes this perspective which perceives human being as an independent observer from the world and the epistemology that this perspective is based on. According to the understanding of Heidegger, human beings are not observers but players existing in the world.

To get rid of this interpretation of the being, we need to show reality as one of the many modes of being and the relationship between Dasein with world and being at hand ontologically. Reference and signs are basic ground for this purpose. Using the

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[6] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 39.

reference and signs, we will clarify ontological structure of the concepts of worldliness of the world. Thereafter we will be clarified that the meaning of the concept of reality based on the ontological structure of Dasein.

Ontologically, reality is based on the being of Dasein. But, this can bring the question that is reality based on the existence of Dasein. The existence of outer world is based on the existence of Dasein. This situation does not mean that real things are based on the existence of Dasein or not because reality is a mode of Dasein's existence. Therefore, reality cannot exist without Dasein. For example, mountains and stars do not depend on Dasein in terms of their location and features. But reality which is a mode of Dasein's interpretation depends on Dasein's existence. Therefore, as long as Dasein exists, being exists. When Dasein does not exist, independence does not exist either. In this situation, we can neither talk about the existence of the beings in the world nor their nonexistence.

After the explanation of reality I shall argue Heidegger's thoughts about truth and I shall show the basic role of reference and signs for Heidegger's understanding of truth. Truth has ontological meaning in Heidegger. For approaching to this ontological basic I shall exhibit the importance of worldliness of the world and existential structure of Dasein's being and basic role of reference and signs.

The question of what is the relationship between the nature of truth and the question of being has been on the agenda of philosophers since the ancient philosophy. In traditional thought, if a statement or a belief corresponds to the world or the real things, it is true. Truth shows itself in statement or judgment.

However, in terms of phenomenology, truth becomes apparent through knowing's being of true showing itself. In this case, the relation of correspondence becomes apparent in the phenomenal context of showing. Correspondence becomes possible by virtue of the true affirmation or showing of things.[7] This affirmation or showing is realized in a statement.

When we make a statement, the statement is directed to the object itself, which is the subject of the statement. The thing conveyed in the statement is that the being is exactly as it is. Therefore, what is showed in the statement is the discovering being of the statement. The being, which appears in stating, shows itself as it is in itself. In other words, this being exists by itself in the way as we discovered by showing it in the statement.

Dasein, by its essence, is as its disclosedness. For this reason, it means that as long as it discloses and discovers the world, it truly exists by its essence. Dasein exists in truth. By this, it is not meant that Dasein ontically involves in all truths one by one. Dasein's being in truth has an ontological meaning. We mean that the disclosedness of Dasein's being belongs to its existential constitution.

In this context, we can easily say that no truth can be expressed in a world where Dasein, which is the being that expresses the statement, does not exist. However, the trueness of the statement and the conditions that are required to express the statement are different. Trueness is about statement's congruency with reality. Dasein's being, on the other hand, is about the possibility of truth. Dasein conceptualizes reality. In

[7] Gelven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p.128.

this way, we have the condition that is necessary to talk about the relationship between statement and reality.

After we explained by aid of the theory of reference and signs that truth is based on Dasein's understanding as the being-in-the-world we can say that the beings that are in-the-world without Dasein will continue to be but we cannot say that reality, being, and truth will continue be. Therefore, truth and reality are based on Dasein's being.

CHAPTER 1

THE GROUND FOR THE THEORY OF REFERENCE AND SIGN

Heidegger starts *Being and Time* with a quote from Plato's *Sophist*: "We thought we knew what we meant by the expression 'Being' but now we are perplexed." He thinks that we must reawaken our understanding of the question: what is being?[8] Today this question has been forgotten. Because of this, Heidegger thinks that we should ask again the question of being. This question was very important for Plato and Aristotle. Their thoughts come from this question but after them, the question of being was not asked as a "thematic question of actual investigation."[9]

There are some prejudices which are rooted in ancient ontology. There are three traditional characterizations of being. First of these prejudices about being is the most universal concept and a characterization of the whole reality. Beingness is the most general feature and we obtain it through abstraction. We look at cats, dogs, birds, etc., and abstract mammalness. Then from mammals and vertebrates, we abstract animals. Then, we obtain the livingness of all living things. At last we attain beingness.[10] Whereas we cannot think the universality of being as a universality of genus.

Aristotle clarifies that the unity of universality of "being" is a unity analogy. For instance, the being of colors is not same with the being of a color. Again, Aristotle

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[8] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), Untitled First Page.
[9] *Ibid,* p. 1.

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thinks that "the being of real objects differs from the being of imaginary objects such as unicorns."[11] According to Aristotle, the question of being is about how to unify reality through the multiplicity of categories. Aristotle's thought is to analyze the concept of being related to his theory of substance and attribute. Thus when it is said that being is the most universal concept, this does not mean that being is the clearest concept which does not need any explanation. On the contrary, the concept of being is the most obscure concept.

The second prejudice about the concept of being is indefinability. This explanation comes from its highest universality but we cannot understand being as a being. Being cannot be characterized by attributing it to beings. Being cannot be derived from higher concepts by way of definition and cannot be represented by lower ones. Being cannot be contrasted with anything else as it does not mention about any kind of being. Therefore we should say that being is not something like a being.[12]

The third prejudice about being is its characterization as the self-evident concept. Self-evidence means that what we want to understand is almost known as an average kind of intelligibility because we already live in an understanding of being and every thought can be examined as containing the copula "is".[13] Nevertheless the meaning of being is still in darkness. Therefore the question of the meaning of being should be raised afresh. To ask the meaning of being means to endeavor sufficiently the formulation of the question.

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[10] Dreyfus, Hurbert, L. *Being-in-the-World,* (London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 10.
[11] *Ibid,* p. 10.

Now, we should formulate the question of the meaning of being and make clear that the question of being is a privileged question. We know that as asking, questioning needs prior guidance from what it seeks. The meaning of being must therefore already be available to us in a certain way. Yet we do not know the meaning of being. Nevertheless when we ask "what is being", we stand in an understanding of the "is" without being able to determine conceptually what the "is" means. Accordingly, what we look for namely the meaning of being is not totally unknown, even though it is at first totally incomprehensible.

1.1. The Need for the Fundamental Ontology

What we look for in this question is being. Being determines beings as beings. But the being of beings is itself not a being. Our primary philosophical step to understand the question of being is not to determine beings as beings by following them back in their origin to another being. Due to this, being does not have the character of beings. Thus being requires its own kind of exhibition which is fundamentally different from the discovery of beings. Therefore the meaning of being requires its own conceptualization. This conceptualization must be distinctive from the concepts which we explore beings with them.

When we say being, we think the being of a being. So for the meaning of being we will be searching a being. In this condition we should ask which being we are looking for so that we shall discover in which being we will disclose the meaning of being. We should ask which being is exemplary being and in which meaning does it

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[12] *Ibid,* p. 11.

have priority. For instance can trees, cats, and stars be exemplary beings? How can we single out a particular being to interrogate, when being characterizes every being? To ask questions and structures of questions are specific conditions of a being but this being is not any being. This being is always us who ask the question of being.[14]

Accordingly the meaning of the question of being should be enlightening of this being in its being. Asking this question, as a mode of being of a being, is itself fundamentally determined by what is asked about in it. We conceptualize this being as Dasein which is always us in each case. Heidegger does not use "person" or "self" to refer to the subject which raises the question of being because these concepts have specific histories and interpretations. "Dasein" means "being-there" in the sense of an activity. Dasein is a living being and does not exist as a thing. Its character is a function of its activity. Dasein differs from everything else in the universe because it interprets not only what it encounters but itself as well.

This approach can be considered as anthropocentric. But Heidegger thinks that the question of being can best be understood if we understand ourselves as questioners. He does not think that the term human is the same as 'being'. Thus his interest is not to investigate all of the human species so he does not mean anthropology in the technical sense. For instance, he is not interested in painting because painting says slightly about our understanding of being.[15]

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[13] *Ibid,* p. 11.
[14] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 28.
[15] *Ibid,* p. 29.

For explicit formulation of the question of the meaning of being we need an appropriate explanation of Dasein with regard to its being. But unless we previously understand being in general can we appropriate the explanation of Dasein? This question is very important, because we can ask this question for any philosophical inquiries. For instance in Plato's *Meno*, Meno says: "How will you look for it, Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? ...If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?"[16] So in order to inquire something, we must have previously known something. Socrates' answer is a myth. He says that we knew everything before we were born and we forgot everything when we came to this world. Because of this all learning is just remembering. From this myth we understand that we can know something unclearly without knowing it clearly and if we think about this thing which unclearly known we can attain a clear understanding about this thing.

1.2. Dasein as the Subject Holding the Meaning of Being

Heidegger does not think that there is no circularity in exploring the question concerning the meaning of being. He thinks that there is a circle but it is not a vicious circle. The main point is not to escape from this circularity but to escape from the vicious circle. If Heidegger would give a perfect description of being, he would be stuck in a vicious circle. Thus he gives a general explanation of Dasein's being whereupon he tries to give more description constantly. Due to this, we can think that this circle has spiral structure. Every turn gives deeper information about being.

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[16] Plato, *Meno*, tr. G. M. A. Grube, 2nd edn, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1981), p. 13. (80d).

Because of this, for determining a being in itself we do not need obvious concepts beforehand an understanding of the meaning of being. Besides we could not acquire any ontological knowledge until now. Beings are already given tentatively in their being. This understanding of presupposing being grows out of the average understanding of being in which we are always involved and belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein.[17]

Under the guideline of the formal structure of this question we have made clear that this question is a unique one, what is not clear is that this question is most basic and concrete question. Being is always the being of a being. We can break into pieces these beings so scientific researches can study these areas with their methods. For instance, physicists investigate time, space, energy and matter. But they do not investigate being of these things. To clarify being of these entities is the function of philosophy.[18]

Sciences presume some ontologies in their researches so that any research at all would be possible. But all ontologies must illuminate the meaning of being. Accordingly we need a fundamental ontology which asks the meaning of being basically. Thus philosophy is more fundamental than all other sciences. Nevertheless we may think that science can give us the sufficient concept and explanation about these entities. But all explanations need some presuppositions and these presuppositions cannot be changed by more information about these entities. For

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[17] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 31.
[18] *Ibid,* p. 32.

changing of these presuppositions we need to change the particular ontology of these fields so we need fundamental ontology.

We said that for explicit formulation of the question of the meaning of being we need appropriate explanation of Dasein with regard to its being. Dasein itself is different from other beings. Dasein is not an object of scientific research. Because of this, Dasein's being is a question for itself when Dasein realize itself. This question of being is inescapably for us. The philosophical analysis of being is radicalization of our primordial understanding of ourselves.

For instance, what I will do is to depend on my choices in everyday life. Today I can write my thesis, read a novel or watch the TV serial "Heroes". Today I can choose one tomorrow another one. In the broad sense I choose my profession, my religion or ideology. So what I choose is to build myself. But clouds and mountains are always what they are. They cannot have identity. They cannot change themselves.

I live my life. I have an understanding of my life and possibilities about my life. Like this, I am aware of the world which I do whatever I can do. If I am a doctor, I understand what a hospital is, what patient is… So I understand not only myself, but besides these environment in which I live. In this way Dasein understands itself in its being in a specific condition and being becomes clear to Dasein in this condition. Understanding of being is a determination of Dasein's being.

1.3. Basic Concepts of the Fundamental Ontology

In this context, Heidegger uses some very important concepts. Ontology means a philosophical investigation of being. Ontological means pertaining to being. Ontical means pertaining to characteristic of beings. For instance how many cells are there in human brain is an ontic question. But what is the way of being human brain is an ontological question. Ontical questions are related to sciences but ontological questions are philosophical.

Dasein is always in a specific condition and can act in one way or another. We will call to this being of Dasein *existence*. Its essence comes from that in each instance its being is its own. Dasein always chooses itself in every condition. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence and its possibility of to be itself or not. Dasein always chooses its possibilities and in every condition grows in these possibilities. So Dasein makes a decision for its existence in every condition. *Existential* means pertaining to existence. Existential analysis is an investigation of Dasein. For instance, how does Dasein relate to its possibilities is an existential question. We will say *existentiell* to some individual Dasein's own existence. Should I lose weight is an existentiell question. In our everyday life we have understanding of ourselves. This understanding is defective so pre-ontological but this understanding is necessary for developing an ontology of Dasein.[19]

Ontic constitution of Dasein prescribes possibility and necessity of this existential analysis of Dasein. But existence defines Dasein. For ontological analysis of Dasein

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[19] *Ibid,* p. 34.

we need a previous glimpse of *existentiality*. Nevertheless, existentiality is a constitution of being of the being that exist. But the idea of constitution of being needs the idea of being. Other ontologies are constructed on the ontic structure of Dasein. This structure includes in itself the determination of a pre-ontological understanding of being. Therefore fundamental ontology must construct on existential analysis of Dasein.

Thus we can see that Dasein have some priority over other ontologies. The first priority is an ontic priority. This being is defined in its being by existence. The second priority is an ontological priority. Dasein is in itself ontological on the basis of its existence. Accordingly, the ontological analysis of Dasein is fundamental ontology and the question of being is the radicalization of pre-ontological understanding of being that belongs to Dasein. We can show these terms in the following manner:

Object of inquiry:	Being	Beings
Type of inquiry:	Ontological	Ontic
Terms of inquiry:	Existentials	Categories
Status of Occurrence in inquiry:	Factical	Factual
Type of self-awarenes in inquiry:	Existential	Existentiell[20]

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[20] Gelven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 24.

We know that it is not enough to find the particular being that is to function as the primary being to be interrogated. We need clear appropriation and securing of access to this being. This being is Dasein. But how should this being become accessible and be envisaged in a perceptive interpretation?

Dasein is nearest to us but at the same time we ourselves are Dasein. Therefore, Dasein is ontologically hidden to us. As nearest to us Dasein has an understanding of itself for a certain interpretation of it. Dasein tends to understand its own being related the world. This understanding is a specific and categorical constitution of the being of Dasein. This approach is ontic so nearest to Dasein ontically but farthest from itself ontologically.

1.4. The Methodology of the Fundamental Ontology

Dasein is not pre-ontologically foreign to itself. For analysis of Dasein we need an access. We can find this access in average everydayness of Dasein. We can find essential structures in every mode of being of factual Dasein. After the interpretation of pre-ontological analysis of Dasein we must show that the meaning of being of Dasein is temporality. Time is the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being.

The meaning of Dasein shows itself in temporality. Thus temporality is the condition of historicity of Dasein. At the same time historicity is the condition of the history of Dasein. Dasein has its history and understands itself through history. Thus its past does not follow after Dasein but rather goes ahead of it. Dasein interprets

itself in tradition of history. The ontological understanding of Dasien is rooted in this tradition. Because of this we need destructuring of traditional content of ontology.

For this, we should explain Heidegger's method namely phenomenology. The main duty of ontology is to bring into the open being of beings. Ontology does not mean any particular philosophical discipline. Ontology must be developed from particular questions and procedures demanded by the "things the themselves". We mean phenomenological method with "things the themselves". Phenomenology is "how" about philosophical research not "what" of the objects. Phenomenology is opposed to arbitrary and accidental concept constructions. The term phenomonogy has two components: phenomenon and logos. These terms come from Greek terms phenomenon and logos.

Phenomenon means what shows itself, the self-showing and manifest. Thus when beings show themselves as itself, we will say phenomenon to this beings. But sometimes beings can show themselves as they are not in themselves. We wills say this self-showing *seeming*. Besides these two concepts, phenomenon and seeming, there is another concept *appearance*. Appearance is the appearance of something.

Thus appearance does not mean that something shows itself. Something is known through appearance that shows itself. Appearing is a not showing itself. But appearing needs something which appears in the basic of the concept of phenomenon. Phenomena are never appearances but every appearance is dependent upon phenomena. Also an appearance must be a phenomenon or a seeming. As a result all of these concepts depend upon the concept of phenomenon.

The basic meaning of logos is *speech.* We mean with speech to make manifest "what is being talked about "in speech. Speech lets us see from itself what is being talked about. Speech has the character of speaking or vocalization in words. Logos lets something be seen thus this thing can be true or false. In this meaning truth is to let beings talked about be seen as something unconcealed and being false is to deceive beings talked about.

Phenomenology means that to let what shows itself be seen from itself. In other words it means to the things themselves. But this expression is not clear. Phenomenology does not designate the object of its research and does not describe its content. Phenomenology grasps its object and everything about this object must be directly indicated and demonstrated. Nevertheless which thing is the object of phenomenology, namely phenomenon is not clear. Phenomenon does not show itself in immediacy. It is concealed pretty much against things that show itself explicitly but nonetheless phenomenon is constitutes these things' meaning and ground.

Most things independent from us but their being is related to being of Dasein. Thus, we can only meet the being of things through encountering of Dasein with beings. To search some hidden realm is useless for our aim. For instance when I want to discover the being of the bird I should investigate the phenomenon of animal being. I will be doing a phenomenological ontology of bird when I describe it in this manner.[21]

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[21] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 40.

We will say phenomenal to what is explained with phenomenon so we speak of phenomenal structures. All conceptual tools about this explanation are called phenomenological. Phenomenon is what constitutes being. We search being over the specific being which is Dasein. Dasein has ontological priority over all other beings. Thus phenomenological research must be the interpretation of Dasein itself. This interpretation has a character of hermeneutics. Accordingly this hermeneutic must be the basic of all other ontological inquiries and an analysis of the existentiality of existence of Dasein.

The question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the emptiest. But the character of Dasein does not contradict with this because the meaning of being displays itself throughout the interpretation of Dasein. But Dasein is in itself historic. Thus this ontological investigation becomes a historical interpretation.

Our task is the analysis of being. This being is always ourselves. The being of this being is always mine. Because of this, the essence of this being lies in its to be. The whatness (essential) of this being must be understood in terms of its being (existential). But the term existence does not have ontological meaning of the traditional expression of existentia which objective presence (Vorhandenheit). This term existentia does not appropriate to characterize being of Dasein.

The essence of Dasein lies in its existence so the characteristic of Dasein are not objectively present attributes but rather possible ways of the existence of Dasien. Dasein has the character of always-being-my-own-being (femeinigkeit). Because of being is always my own, Dasein is never understood with genus of beings. So we

should use personal pronoun for Dasein like "I am" or "You are". Dasein is always its possibility. Because of this it chooses itself in its being. It can win itself or lose. It can be *authentic* so to speak win itself or *inauthentic* so to speak lose itself.

For instance, we may think of a galaxy. An astronomer is working on it. The galaxy is objective presence. Astronomer thinks about its size, mass, wideness, birth and death. But the galaxy has not any connection to its own being. It cannot concern its own being so cannot prefer its any possibilities or interpret itself. However, the astronomer is not any kind of object. If we ask him that what are you he probably does not answer it as I am a blond man. His answer may be like this: I am a scientist, father, Turk etc. These are not just a fact like to be big or blue. These are dimensions of his identity and part of his past and future. Thus he can interpret himself through these characteristics. He always chooses himself. Thus, if we look at him as a thing we never understand human being adequately.[22]

Because of two characteristics which the priorities of existentia over essentia and to be always-being-mine show that analytic of this being is unique phenomenal investigation. But in the beginning of analysis of Dasein, Dasein is not precisely in particular existence rather in indifference of everydayness. This everydayness constitutes the ontic immediacy of Dasein. But in this everydayness so to speak inauthenticity the structure of existentiality lays a priori.

Heidegger calls all explications arising from an analytic of Dasein *existentials*. These characters of being are different from determinations of beings so to speak

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[22] *Ibid,* p. 44.

categories. Existentials and categories are the two fundamental possibilities of the characteristic of being. Two kinds of expressions are related to these two possibilities: who (existence) or what (objective presence)

Scientific investigations cannot analyze philosophical problems about Dasein. These sciences' departure point is concept of subject and previous ontological structure of this concept can not examine from these sciences. Accordingly sciences like psychology, anthropology, and biology cannot give an unequivocal and adequate answer to the question of being of beings.

1.5. Ontological Categories of Dasein as the Ground of Reference and Signs

Everydayness of Dasein is not the same thing as primitiveness. Everydayness is a kind of being of Dasein. But in primitive life, Dasein can be seen absorbed in phenomena more then sophisticate societies. Nevertheless this condition is not enough for developing of the idea of a natural concept of the world. The world images which we found in primitive cultures should have owned prerequisite idea of world.

Dasein exists. So Dasein is always myself. Mineness belongs to existence of Dasein. Dasein becomes itself in the conditions of the possibility of authenticy and inauthenticy. All determinations of being of Dasein which are similar to these must be understood as grounded upon being-in-the-world.

The concept of being-in-the-world must be seen as a whole. But this concept has several constitutive structural factors.

1. In-the-world: Because of this concept we have the tasks of questioning structure of world and defining the idea of worldliness.

2. The being which is always in the way of being-in-the-world: We should determine who is in the mode of average everydayness of Dasein.

3. Being in as such: The ontological constitution if in-ness itself is to be analyzed.

Any analysis of one of these constitutive factors involves the analysis of the others. Therefore, we should see the whole phenomenon each time. With being-in we are disposed to understand being-in something, like as water is in the glass. This kind of relationship is ontological characteristic which we call categorical. This categorical relationship belongs to beings. Dasein has not this kind of relationship. Being-in is an existential of Dasein. Being-in does not designate a spatial "in one another" of two things objectively present because the world "in" does not mean a spatial relation.

As an existential "being with world" does not mean the being-objectively-present-together of things. Dasein is objectively present but this present is different from beings' objectively present. Dasein has its own kind of presence. We say *facticity* to objective presence of Dasein. We understand with facticity that Dasein as an innerworldly being has being-in-the-world and Dasein encounters with being of beings in its own world.

For instance, a philosophy teacher teaches in high school, he has a wife and two children. His world is his job and his family. He knows something about his students, his colleagues, equipment of class, environment of school, his wife's family and his children's life. Whether he likes it or not, his existence is attached to his world. This is his facticity.

Because of Dasein' facticity the being-in-the-world of Dasein is already dispersed in definite ways of being-in. We can give some examples for this kind of being-in: to produce, to use, to undertake, and to observe. These ways of being-in have the character of *taking care*. Taking care has ontological character and it is existential.

Our task should clarify the phenomenological characterization of knowing as a being-in and toward-the-world. Knowing is not an externally thing like corporeal qualities. It must be inside. In this condition we can ask that how this knowing subject goes out from inside to external world. There is not a similar condition. Knowing is a mode of being of Dasein as being-in-the-world and has its ontic foundation in this constitution of being. Thus being-in-the-world as a fundamental constitution requires a prior interpretation.

For understanding the being-in-the-world we should examine the world as a phenomenon. We can search ontic descriptions of beings or ontological interpretation of the being of these beings. But in these searches "world" is already presupposed. In fact, we do not ask any kind of innerworldly beings or any kind of world. As a phenomenological questioning we are searching *worldliness* of world in general. Worldliness is an ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive

factor of being-in-the-world. Thus worldliness is an existential characteristic of Dasein.

For instance, philosophy teacher's world takes place from his profession, wife and children. Like this, we can say the world of soccer, the world of animals. But worldliness refers to the being of the worlds, the basic structure that describes all Dasein's world. When we think these worlds generally we think the world as separate parts like scientists do.

We examine the worldliness in everydayness of Dasein and the closest world of everyday Dasein is the surrounding world. So we shall seek the worldliness of the surrounding world (*environment)* through the beings encountered within the surroundings.

We shall exhibit phenomenologically the being of the beings encountered in the surrounding world under the guidance of the everyday being-in-the-world. We will say *association* to this everyday being-in-the-world. The closest kind of association is a handling, using and taking care of things. Our phenomenological question is initially related to the being of those beings which we encounter with relation taking care of.

We shall call the beings encountered in taking care *useful things*. For instance things for working, things for driving… But in fact there is no such thing as a useful thing. Being of all useful things belongs to totality of useful things. A useful is basically something in order to… Useful things never show themselves initially by themselves.

However, we should not think that all human actions come from some kind of productive activity of tools. There are many different activities and these are not related to productive activities like teaching philosophy, talking about political issues. These activities can require using things but they cannot reduce to utility. Thus surrounding world is not equivalent to worldliness. But surrounding world is mainly a clue to worldliness. Using something is clearer than teaching or talking for bringing into the open worldliness.[23]

The association of useful things, that is, opening a door with a key, cannot grasp these beings thematically. When we use a key we encounter with the key as what it is. The act of opening the door itself discovers the specific "handiness" of the key. We shall call the useful thing's kind of being in which it reveals itself by itself *handiness*. When we just look at the things we cannot discover handiness. With theoretical perspective, we cannot understand handiness. Our association with useful things has references of the in-order-to. This kind of association is called *circumspection*.

For understanding this context, we should think about the key. We know the key by using it. This circumspection is a know-how that uncovers the key as what it is. The key refers to a totality of equipments like door, lock, key chain etc. Our understanding of the integrity of the equipment is more essential than comprehension of the key. The function of the key is to open a door. We use the key for this aim so the key has an *in order to.* The key is made of natural resources. It refers to nature

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[23]*Ibid,* p. 49

like iron, steal, plastic etc. Also the key refers to a user who locks or unlocks the door. This context carries us to the concept of *reference*. The concept of reference is very important to understand the worldliness but we are not ready for explaining this concept yet. For now, we can say that reference contains different kinds of relations.[24]

At specific moments, our attention is brought to worldliness through the key. For instance, I try to unlock the door but the key is broken. Or I am looking for my key but cannot find it. In this condition, I cannot lock my house's door. This situation is bothering me. On another condition, I am looking for my coins in my pocket but my keys are standing in my way so I am being constrained.[25]

These uncomfortable conditions force us to pay attention to reference. With these conditions, I become aware of the totality of equipment. When the key is missing or malfunctions, I become aware of things which are related to the key. So the world becomes a totality of references. Although we do not know precisely references yet, we can say that reference is a network of significance. With this network, beings have the meaning for us. As the phenomenon of reference arises out of this ground it needs to be elaborated on this basis. Therefore, we shall next try to examine how Heidegger introduces his theory based on this ontological ground.[26]

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[24]*Ibid,* p. 51.
[25] *Ibid,* p. 51.
[26] *Ibid,* p. 52.

CHAPTER 2

REFERENCE AND SIGNS

We have so far argued that reference and referential totality are foundation for the understanding of worldliness. We shall now attempt to analyze the concept of reference in depth. But before we begin our analysis, we should try to examine the concept of reference in order to see Heidegger's contribution to the understanding of reference.

The concept of reference caused intensive discussions especially in 20th.century. Basic problems are how do word refer, reference and meaning and reference and truth in these discussions. These problems discussed around description theories, causal theories and hybrid theories but these discussions based on tradition of Western philosophy. Because of this, all these approaches are handled depend on conflict of object and subject.

Heidegger sets against this conflict and uses different concepts which we explained in the first chapter. Thus, these discussions do not have relation directly to our approach. After a brief discussion concerning reference theories in history we can turn to our main subject. As Heidegger argues "signs" as simples for cases of reference sheds light on our comprehension of the phenomenon of reference itself. It is important to understand what Heidegger means by "signs" because a sign also "indicates" just like reference. It therefore becomes crucial for us to investigate what he means by signs which shall facilitate our understanding of his theory of reference.

2.1. Signs as Discloser the Worldliness

Signs are unique kinds of useful indicators. Nevertheless they do not belong to different ontological category from equipment. Signs disclose how the intelligibility of the equipmental context should be understood. Thus, signs disclose world and worldliness.[27]

> A sign is not a thing that stands to another thing in the relation of showing; it is rather a piece of equipment that explicitly raises a totality of equipment into circumspection, so that together with it the worldly character of the available announces itself.[28]

Therefore the function of signs is to give us an orientation within our environment. But at the same time we should remember that for Heidegger environment is the world of Dasein. The distinctive feature of signs as useful indications is indicating, such as boundary stones, signals, and flags. Indicating is some kind of referring and referring means to relate. However, we cannot use referring as genus for different references like sign, symbol, signification, and expression. Relation is a formal definition and we can use it in every kind of context.

> Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every "indicating" is a reference, but not every reference is an indicating. This means that every "indicating" is a relation, but not every relation is an indicating.[29]

[27] Carman, Taylor, *Heidegger's Analytic*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 233.
[28] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p. 84.
[29] *Ibid,* p. 72.

Symptoms, marks, and hallmarks are some examples for signs but we should differentiate these signs from such things as residues, monuments, symbols, appearances, and significations. We can formalize these things on the basis of their formal relational structure.

Heidegger gives an example for signs. His example is a red arrow which assembles motor cars for indicating which direction the car will take at the intersection. We can give another example such us turning signal of a car. When I see the left turn signal on the car ahead of me starting to flash, I know that the car will turn left. So I look back my right and wait for this car. This sign is a useful thing for the driver, me and everybody paying attention to the driver. Thus, this turning signal of the car is handy within the world in the totality of the context of useful things which belongs to vehicles and traffic regulations. As a useful thing this pointer is built by reference.[30] I interpret the left turn signal by responding capably. I do not stare light by analyzing it theoretically. My response to the left turning signal has relation of consistence with whole system of references. If the system of references were different my responses would also be different too. For instance, if I start to live in London my response will be opposite.

We should also remember that when Heidegger dealt with the thing at hand as an existentiale, namely as a category of Dasein's equipment, he analyzed as existential state in which the equipment is found as an "in-order-to", which expresses the practical purpose in the use of Dasein's equipment. Reference actually lies within this purposive use as an "in-order-to", because of him an equipment is always for

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[30] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 53.

something which expresses a reference; in other words "something refers to something". He gives "hammer" as an example; i.e. hammer refers to its use, namely hammering. Within this totality of equipmental context sign indicates to only one relation. For instance, there is an indicator in my tool bag which points to the location of the hammer. It is thus clear that both sign and reference indicate, but in this existential indication reference indicates like a sign, but it explicitly raise a totality of the equipment that can be acknowledged as environment.

Therefore signs have the feature of in-order-to and its explicit serviceability is for indicating something. We can think this indicating as a kind of "referring" but this "referring" as indicating is not the ontological structure of the sign as a useful thing. As indicating, "referring" is based on the serviceability of useful things. On the other hand this does not convert a being to a sign. Thus for instance, useful thing "hammer" is qualified by serviceability but it does not become a sign.

> The "referral" of indicating is the ontic concretion of the what-for of serviceability, and determines a useful thing for that what-for. The referral "serviceability for," on the other hand, is an ontological, categorical determination of the useful thing as useful thing. The fact that the what-for of serviceability gets its concretion in indicating is accidental to the constitution of the useful thing as such.[31]

In this way, the distinction between referral as serviceability and referral as indicating come into the open. Useful things which indicate have eminent uses in

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[31] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p. 73.

heedful associations. Thus, we should investigate what the indicating of sign means. For this firstly we should define the appropriate way of associating with things that indicate. We can think the appropriate way of dealing with signs with same example, arrow. We can mention about step aside or stop. Step aside as a choosing direction is possible only owing to being-in-the-world of Dasein. Dasein is always in a direction. Thus, arrow address to a spatial being-in-the-world. Signs, like arrow, show wherein we live, what our heedfulness is related with, and what the involvement is.

Signs provide encountering with things at hand. Thus because of signs, a totality of useful thing becomes the object of circumspection and provides making itself known of worldliness of thing at hand. Signs always show what we live in, the place in which being interested appears, and what its relation. We can see clearly distinctive character of useful thing as signs in the process of establishing a sign. In the establishing a sign, surrounding world is announced to circumspection through a thing at hand. This occurs in and through a circumspective anticipation. This thing at hand needs to take over circumspection.

We may thus observe in Heidegger's discussion that there are threefold relationship between sign and reference. The first is the fact that indicating depends on the structure of useful thing, and the in-order-to (reference). The second is as the character of useful things at hand, the indicating of signs belongs to a totality of useful things, to a referential context. The third is the surrounding world becomes accessible to circumspection as a result of handiness of signs. Sign is an ontic at hand as a useful thing which indicates the ontological structure of handiness, referential

totality, and worldliness. Within the Heideggerian outlook then reference is the ontological ground of sign. Thus we cannot comprehend reference as a sign. Reference is ontological condition of at hand. Now, we should handle in which way the reference is ontological condition of at hand and foundation of worldliness.

2.2. Referential Totality as the Foundation of Worldliness

We encounter with things at hand in the world. Because of this, things at hand and world have ontological relation. The world exists a priori at things at hand that we come across. Thus, becoming of things at hand comes into open within the world. But the world is itself is not whether a thing at hand or present at hand. The world is like a referential web. We understand beings as a specific kind of objects in this web.

Living in a specific culture means conceiving the wide scale and complicated web of concepts, rolls and functions. Driving a car or producing a furniture need internalization of this web. We see beings just as whatever these beings are seen in this web like wheel, table or furniture. This totality builds the world. Because world is not an object, it is not an object of circumspective concern.[32]

We said that the structure of useful thing of things at hand in the world is reference. This shows that things at hand itself the have character of being referred. We discover beings as they are referred to something in the world. These beings are related to each other. The character of being of things at hand is relevance. To be relevant means something become together with something else. We may conclude from this that this relation of togetherness is a reference.

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[32] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 51.

All beings are in any event relevant. What the relevance is about is the what-for of serviceability and the wherefore of usability. When we encounter with one of a lot of equipment for specific mission we notice that this equipment is suitable for service and included to the mission. But there is an end of this wide scale and complicated referential relations which constitute this serviceability.[33]

> What the relevance is about is the what-for of serviceability, the wherefore of usability. The what-for of serviceability can in turn be relevant. For example, the thing at hand which we call a hammer has to do with hammering, the hammering has to do with fastening something, fastening something has to do with protection against bad weather. This protection "is" for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein, that is, for the sake of a possibility of its being. Which relevance things at hand have is prefigured in terms of the total relevance.[34]

Things at hand are always actually or potentially involved in a task. This task can also be in larger tasks. But these totalities of relevance are always grounded in a reference relation in which there is no further relevance. This is for-the-sake-of-which that belongs to being of Dasein. For instance the handiness of hammer is for the sake of protecting Dasein. The handiness of chair is for the sake of sitting Dasein. These modes of practical activity are via their nature contributors to Dasien's modes of existence in the world. Thus the world is aspects of being of Dasien and Dasein'

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[33] *Ibid,* p. 51.
[34] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p. 84.

being is being-in-the-world. However, this does not mean that at bottom; we are all selfish. This possibility is about the possibilities of being of Dasein.[35]

Relevance of things at hand is previously assigned in term of the total relevance. For instance, total relevance of a factory is prior to a hammer. Now, we should approach concept of relevance for disclosing of phenomenon of worldliness.

Ontically relevance is to let thing at hand be as whatever it is and for being as it is. Letting be does not mean to bring something to its being and produce it. It means to discover something that is already a being in its handiness and thus let it be encountered as the being of this being. Dasein can be in ontic relevance with encountered things at hand because of association in ontic sense. On the other hand, relevant in ontological sense is related to the freeing of every thing at hand as a thing at hand. We can always discover relevance only on the basis of a relevant totality beforehand discovered. Thus we should primarily discover the worldly character of thing at hand encountered. We cannot understand this worldly character as thing at hand.

An understanding of being belongs to the being of Dasein so the understanding of being-in-the-world belongs to the essential content of its understanding of being. We should handle this pre-ontological understanding of Dasein. Dasein has been referred to an in-order-to in understanding a context of relations whether can be authentic or inauthentic. Dasein is always referred in terms of a for-the-sake-of-which or the final

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[35] *Ibid,* p. 52.

point to the with-what of relevance. So Dasein is always lets beings be encountered as things at hand. We encounter with beings in context of relevance.[36]

> As that for which one lets beings be encountered in the kind of being of relevance, the wherein of self-referential understanding is the phenomenon of world. And the structure of that to which Dasein is referred is what constitutes the worldliness of the world.[37]

In this way Dasein has an understanding of itself. Dasein connects network of relevance. So it understands its being in the context of being-in-the-world. Because of Dasein's way of being is relevance, so to speak be things at hand, Dasein is ontic possibility of discovery of beings encountered. Thus we recognize relation each other with being of Dasein and things at hand. So Dasein is always already referred itself to an encountered world throughout its existence.

2.3. Some Objections about System of Referential Network

It can be objected that substantial structure of beings is lost in a simple system of relations when we define beings of things at hand as relevance and worldliness is a referential network. Besides, it can say that this referential network system is just in our mind and because of this; beings in the world are just thoughts.

We can answer these objections differentiating these structural diversities. First is the being of things at hand which initially encountered. Second is the being of beings so to speak; in other worlds, objective presence of beings. Third is worldliness of the world which the being of the ontic condition of discovering innerworldly beings.

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[36] Dreyfus, Hurbert, L. *Being-in-the-World,* (London: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 92.

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These first two distinctions are categories and related to all beings except Dasein. The third kind of being is an existential determination of being-in-the-world which belongs primarily to Dasein.

This referential context that composes worldliness does not remove beings of things at hand in the world because we can just explore substance of beings on the basis of worldliness of the world. Thus we can access to objective presence of beings. The worldliness of the world cannot comprehend with terms which are produced from speculative mind for the purpose of understanding the present at hand objects and its specialties.

> The referential context that constitutes worldliness as significance can be formally understood in the sense of a system of relations. But we must realize that such formalizations level down the phenomena to the extent that the true phenomenal content gets lost, especially in the case of such "simple" relations as are contained in significance. These "relations" and "relate" of the in-order-to, for-the-sake-of, the with-what of relevance resist any kind of mathematical functionalization in accordance with their phenomenal content.[38]

This argument is based on two points. These are indefiniteness of context and distinction between knowing about how and why. For instance, the possibility of encountering with a nippers and hammer as a tool for repairing something is based on comprehending the rolls of these handy things, other handy things which have

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[37] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p. 80.
[38] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p. 82.

functional connection, and relations with themselves in the complex web of reference. However, this process of comprehension does have limits. We cannot consume this process preparing some list of references. There is not any method for set forth a closed series which show all possibilities and context about our example nippers and hammer. This approach tries to reduce our understanding of handy things to present at hand. Because of this the aim of this approach is to reduce our understanding of serviceability of handy things to limited series, so to speak, in which condition handy things can be used. This approach convicts to failure from beginning.

Now we should handle the distinction between knowing about how and why. To encounter with a nippers and hammer as a thing at hand is related to utilize the nippers and hammer as a tool. This serviceability of nippers and hammer cannot be understood with theoretical approach. When we use the purposive knowledge for understanding a handy thing and its serviceability, analyzing and synthesizing a handy thing does not give us handiness of this thing and its serviceability. It can give us just its matter, length, weight etc.[39]

At the same time the purposive knowledge has an internal problem. For, purposive knowledge has to depend on previous knowledge or else it does not have any previous knowledge. In the first case there is an eternal regression. In the second case we should answer why this purposive knowledge was chosen. So we can ask why we cannot choose the one which is not based on proposal knowledge. Thus if we want to use the purposive knowledge for understanding handiness of things at

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[39] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 56.

hand and serviceability of handy things then we would be telling off a roll to purposive knowledge whose practicing is impossible or unnecessary.[40]

But there can be another argument about knowledge for present at hand things. For encountering with objects as things at hand or present at hand, these objects have to have some specific material qualities like density and weight. If nippers has not density and weight we cannot use it for repair. For encountering with object material structure of these objects are necessary. In this condition, we can say that all reference relations which built the world of everydayness activities are based on and dependent to material world.[41]

For answering this argument, as Mulhall argues, we should differentiate ontic and ontological analysis. This confusion causes this argument. Material structure of an object is necessary for its function. But this is an ontic grade. In ontic grade we encounter with a lot of kind of things at hand and present at hand things and practice of these objects. However, in ontological grade we interrogate these things which we encounter.[42]

We interrogate what the things at hand, present at hand, and being of material objects means and which conditions are necessary for human world as practice activities. For understanding this phenomenon we need the concept of the world and ontological interpretation of this approach. We cannot investigate this ontological

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[40] *Ibid,* p. 56.
[41] *Ibid,* p. 57.
[42] *Ibid,* p. 58.

approach with categorical thought which is appropriate for theoretical understanding.[43]

So far we have tried to investigate how important the concepts of reference and signs are for understanding the phenomenon the world and worldliness. The concepts of world and worldliness give us a chance to provide a solution for skepticism. Now we will approach these solutions about skepticism, which is closely related to Heidegger's analysis of reality and truth within this existential structure of Dasein's fundamental ontology.

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[43]*Ibid,* p. 58.

CHAPTER 3

UNDERSTANDING OF REALITY AND TRUTH AGAINST SKEPTICISM

In previous chapter I have tried to show that Heidegger in the first place sets the preliminary concepts of his fundamental ontology. As we analyzed his approach and method to his existential ontology in the first chapter we come to the concept of worldliness. It is in this analysis that we encounter the phenomenology of reference as an existential state of Dasein. We thus attempted in the second place in analysis of his theory reference as the main objective of the second chapter. There are questions now to be answered and as a preliminary to our discussions of reality and truth in this chapter we may consider first of all these questions.

The foremost question that we would like to deal with is whether Heidegger's theory of reference can be used in logic. We know that most theories of references prior to or contemporaneous to Heidegger developed in a logical context. What is, if any, the relation of Heidegger's theory to these logical approaches? We may argue that if one tries to interpret Heidegger's analysis as a logical theory this attempt will defeat his purpose. For a logical theory of reference by its very notion takes concepts as its starting point and tries to analyze how concepts denotes or refers to "something" which may be takes as the meaning of the very concept in question. This is because what determines reference is not mere concepts and notions but rather the existential dealing of Dasein within the world. In fact concepts arise in this total referential context. In that case the logical approach totally ignores this

ontological dimension. Therefore, it is not the question of the logical use of Heidegger's approach but rather the inappropriate logical approach for the analysis of reference as an existential phenomenon. Within this analysis I would like to argue that Heidegger is not against the use of his theory within a logical context provided that this existential approach is maintained.

This brings us to the second question: how can we apply Heidegger's theory of reference in logic? I have not been able to find an answer for this question in his *Being and Time*. But it seems to me that he simply ignores this question. It would be interesting to compose his theory within certain logical theories such as Russerl's theory of denotations. But since this is not my purpose in this study I shall leave it for a future project and concentrate on the ontological implication of his theory as reflected on his scrutiny of realty of truth.

3.1. Reality Against Skepticism

In traditional metaphysics reality is defended against skepticism with logical arguments. In other worlds in previous metaphysics philosophers raise the question of skepticism and try to prove reality against the skeptic position discursively. This issue becomes irrelevant in the Heideggerian position. It is thus my purpose to analyze this position as an existential approach to the problem of skepticism. As we shall see in Heidegger's analysis the question of skepticism is eliminated on the basis of Dasein's existential dealing within the world.

3.1.1. Reality as a Mode of Being-in-the-World.

Since ancient Greece, the problem of relation between human being and outer world, in other words the problem of whether there is a world beyond our experience or not has been an important topic of discussion in philosophy. However, Skepticism has had a central importance with Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy in the Western philosophy. Descartes presents three arguments about whether we can know the world beyond our experience or not. First of these arguments is perceptual illusion which is about whether the objects are actually as they are seen or not. For instance, a straight stick which we submerge in the water is seen as broken. The second argument is that this world as a whole can be a dream. Finally, he presents the argument of "Deceiving Demon Argument." Historically speaking, this argument has been the most successful one.[44]

With this argument, Descartes says that a demon which is almighty for everything can shape our experience and show a nonexistent world as existent. This demon can also shape every kind of intrinsic material needed for knowing the truth as it is almighty. Descartes tries to overcome skepticism with the understanding of almighty and absolutely good God in his Sixth Meditation. According to this understanding, God will not let such a deceit as Good needs to be absolute good. On the other hand early modern philosophers accept Hume's skepticism. But Berkeley emphasizes the fact that it is not important how we know the objects by saying that

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[44] Barry, Stroud, *The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1984).

objects are just ideas. Kant tries to deconstruct skepticism with "transcendental argument."[45]

However, a common tendency among these philosophers distinguishes the relationship between human beings and world. For example, Descartes imagines himself thinking of beeswax. Hume thinks himself as an audience of the game of billiards. Kant describes himself sitting on the shore of a river watching a ship. Therefore, these three philosophers-while exploring the relationship between human being and the world-handle human being as independent observer from the world instead of as a player within the world.[46]

Heidegger changes this perspective which perceives human being as an independent observer from the world and the epistemology that this perspective is based on. According to the understanding of Heidegger, human beings are not observers but players existing in the world. Now, we can see how Heidegger achieves his purpose.

As we showed in previous chapters, Dasein already has a pre-ontological worldview. This pre-ontological understanding usually has the feature of inauthentic understanding of the world. Therefore, both in ontic and ontological contexts, it takes the being of the existing things as a target for itself. Dasein primarily understands a being in the context of present at hand objects by ignoring the existence of the things at hand. As a result of this, being gains the meaning of reality and the basic

[45] Blattner, William, *Heidegger's Being and Time,* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1996), p.109.

[46] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 39.

determination of the being becomes substance. Ontological understanding of Dasein is subjected to this understanding and Dasein becomes a being like the other beings. With this understanding, the modes of beings such as being at hand remain hidden as we reduce beings to present at hand objects. As a result, the fundamental analysis of Dasein becomes impossible.

To get rid of this interpretation of being, we need to show reality as one of the many modes of being and the relationship between Dasein with world and being at hand ontologically. So, we need to handle the problem of reality with its conditions and borders. We can handle this problem primarily within the context of probability of outer world in relation with being because we should have access which is convenient for the real ones to analyze the reality. Therefore, the problem of reality intertwines with the problem of outer world.

3.1.2. The Problem of the Existence of Outer World.

We can turn the problem of the existence of outer world into a question of how we can know the existence of outer world. Heidegger argues that knowing is a specific manner of Dasein. Knowing –either in the context of trying whether a knife is sharp or not; or doing a scientific experiment-is an activity in the context or certain practices. So, knowing is only a specific mode of Dasein and Dasein exists in the sophisticated network which forms the culture and society.[47]

If we understand knowing as an isolated relationship between the present at hand subject and present at hand object, we come across skepticism and we cannot

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[47] *Ibid,* p. 44.

overcome it, because, in this situation, we understand knowledge as a feature of present at hand beings. However, knowledge is not a feature of a known object. Therefore, we need to understand knowledge as an intrinsic characteristic of the subject who knows the knowledge. This causes the problem of cell of consciousness. How the knowing subject can disclose intrinsic beings and essence as the hypothetical objects of knowledge? In this situation, the subject can never be sure about the existence of the objects corresponding to his own ideas.[48]

Therefore, we can only reach a real being as an object of knowledge only as a real being in the world. The ontological basis of this access is upon being-in-the-world which is the basic constitution of Dasein. So the question of whether the world really exists or not and whether the existence of the world can be proved or not is meaningless as a question asked by Dasein. This question cannot be asked by anyone apart from Dasein. At the same time, as an adverb of being in a question, it intertwines with the world and being-in-the-world.

The world discloses essentially with the existence of Dasein. We already explore the world within the disclosedness of the world. "With the disclosedness of the world, the 'world' has in each case been discovered too."[49] The world in quotation marks expresses beings that can exist in the world in Descartian context. While I go on living my life, things disclose themselves to me. For example, if I am a teacher, the school building and classes are handy for me. Similarly, blackboard, chalk, and

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[48] *Ibid,* p. 45.
[49] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p.188.

eraser are handy too. All these entities within-the-world are always disclosed as a being in the world.[50]

Thereby, we explore real beings in this already disclosed world. The ones asking the questions about the reality of the outer world cannot manage to solve the problem because they are concerned about the beings in the world in other words the objects.

Therefore, it cannot answer the skeptical attacks as it perceives the relationship of subject and object as the being of two present at hand beings which are together. But, if we understand knowing as a mode of being in the world, this skeptical attack becomes invalid. When I know how the being of beings is related to each other and perceive them, I also exist in the similar way that they do. Briefly, analyzing Dasein in terms of essentially being-in-the-world, takes the possibility of asking a question from the hands of a septic.[51]

The understanding that sees knowledge as an isolated relationship between subject and object cannot undermine skepticism. This understanding cannot explain the mode of human activity involved with objects which are seen as the logical and metaphysical foundations of reciprocal relationships between the world and us. While this model interprets the human knowledge as an isolated relationship between two present at hand beings, it totally excludes the world phenomenon. Reaching the world phenomenon through this model is impossible. Therefore, we have to pay

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[50] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger an Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 80.
[51] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 45-46.

attention to one of the convenient modes of Dasein's being's type which is the understanding of being at hand.[52]

Heidegger mentions Kant as an example for the ones who cannot reach the world phenomenon and solve the problem of skepticism. Kant sees it as a scandal of philosophy and general ethics that the evidence for the existence of outer objects has not been given yet.

> ... it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us . . . must be accepted merely on faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof.[53]

As a solution for this problem, Kant says that the absolute and empirical consciousness of myself proves the being of outer objects in the place. But here the word of self corresponds to the present at hand beings. Hence, the expression of the consciousness of myself represents the consciousness of self as a present at hand thing. Hence, this expression represents both the being of objects and consciousness.

Kant's proof depends on change and invariability which belong to the essence of time. My being as a present at hand thing which means being of multiplicity in terms of experience assumes changing as present at hand. But definition in time has to assume something whose specifity does not change in time. These things cannot exist in me because my own being in time is pre-determined by this invariable. In this

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case, the current change in me is stabilized empirically, a constant current is also stabilized paralleling to this. Awareness of their existence in time of experiences stabilizes the invariance both inside and outside of me equally.

However, Kant does not abandon the isolated approach to the subject. The expectation of evidence for the presence of outer objects shows that he wants to find the solution of the problem within the subject in other words me. Therefore, as the time that will bear the evidence can only be experienced inside of me and be the supporting point of jumping to the outer uses empiric evidence while proving.

What Kant is trying to prove is the enforced togetherness of changing and unchanging beings. Even if we bring two present at hand things in equal places, we cannot show the beings of subject and object together. The things determined under the guidance of time about the being of the changing and unchanging together are not proved for the togetherness of the inside and outside. If Kant could see the total of difference and togetherness of inside and outside, he could have understood what is assumed with the so called assumptions ontologically. Therefore, the condition of not being given evidence for the existence of outer things but it has to be given will disappear itself.

The real scandal is, therefore, the expectation of such evidences instead of the outer evidences that have not been given yet. The source of these expectations is the approaches which are not ontologically efficient. According to these inefficient approaches, the world is being tried to be proved in terms of an independent being. What is inefficient in here is not the evidences but that the one seeking for the evidence could not determine the mode of being as needed. If we understand Dasein

truly, we can see that to prove necessarily togetherness of two beings is not enough. We can see that proving the compulsory togetherness of two beings is not enough. Also, we can see that the thing that such approaches try to prove already exists in the being of Dasein.

When we believe the reality of the outer world, no matter how we apply to a different way that does not need proof, we actually demand for proof. Therefore, once again, we show an unrelated approach to the problem. Dasein-when it attempts such approaches and similar ones- is always late as a being that has always existed in the world.

The efforts such as believing the reality of the outer world, proving this reality, and assuming this reality primarily assumes a subject without a world. This subject without world is never sure about its own world and it is in need of providing a world for itself. In this station, being-in-the-world is brought to primarily to the levels of suspicion, certainty, and belief. But these attitudes are already composed of the conditions of being-in-the-world.

It is impossible to handle the problem of reality within the context of whether the outer world exists or not; whether it can be proved or not. The subject issued in this problem, Dasein itself refuses such a formulation of a question. What we have to prove is not whether the outer world exists or not, or how it exists. What we need to show is why Dasein as a being in the world misses out the world epistemologically. The reason for this is that Dasein handles being as present at hand thing. When it cannot reach the understanding of being in the world, there is no way apart from trying to relate the isolated subject with the world. As a result, various

epistemological movements ignore the existential analytic of Dasein and do not bring a fundamental perspective to the problem.

The beings in the world are already in the situation of disclosedness with Dasein as being-in-the-world. This existential expression is in harmony with the main thesis of realism which puts forward the idea that the world really exists but realism says that the reality of world needs to be proved and it is provable. Realism tries to explain the reality with ontic and real relations of integrations among real things.

In this context, idealism has superiority over realism. When idealism emphasizes that being and reality only exist outside of consciousness, it discloses that idea that being cannot be explained with beings. But it constructs the interpretation of reality on a hollow because, here, it cannot disclose the issue of the understanding of being, how it is possible, and whether Dasein has a constitution of being or not. Therefore, we can say that this is an ontological problem of Dasein.

3.1.3. The Problem of what the Reality is in the Ontological Perspective

The concept of reality expresses the being of being which is existent in the world. Conceiving the beings in the world ontologically can only be possible through disclosing the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. This is founded on the phenomenon of the world. The phenomenon of the world belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein. Again, it is possible in only certain limits to describe the reality of real being phenomenologically without putting forward the existential ontic ground properly.

Dilthey tried this. According to Dilthey, the real ones can be experienced through motive and willpower. Reality is resistance, in other words being resistant. Once again, according to Dilthey, motive and avoiding it appear in the same consciousness. But, the concepts such as the context of being as appearing, the meaning of being as included, the relation of being as being actually real need to be determined ontologically. However, Dilthey is careless to the life ontologically. Therefore, he could not do such determination.[54]

Scheler rehandles Dilthey's interpretation of reality as resistance. Scheler understands Dasein as being existent in Kant's understanding. According to Scheler, we can be aware of the being of being in relationship with motive and willpower. In here, the criticism towards Dilthey is valid. So, the ontic fundamental analysis of life and analysis of reality determines the disclosedness of resistance and phenomenal prerequisitions of it.[55]

Resistance expresses not being able to go through and not being able to go to the other side. But, in this situation the objectives of motive and willpower have already been assumed. The resistance that we come across when we aim something can be thought in terms of relatedness itself. Therefore, referentiality is founded on the disclosedness of totality of references. In other words, we can only explore the experience of resistance ontologically on the disclosedness of the world.

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[54] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p.194.
[55] *Ibid,* p. 194.

With resistance we can only explore the beings that we come across in the world and determine their contents and directions. But, we cannot provide the disclosedness of the world by culminating these experiences. The disclosedness of the world already assumes it. The option of being resistant is based on the foundation of disclosedness of the being in the world.

In the light of my foregoing discussion I can further argue that, when we determine the reality as resistance, we should take two things into consideration. When we do that, we would only choose one character among various characters of reality and we need to assume the outer world beforehand. Being resistant characterizes the beings in the world not the world itself. Consciousness of reality is one of the contexts of being in the world. Reality does not have a priority among the modes of beings. At the same time, reality cannot characterize things like world and Dasein ontologically.

Ontologically, reality is based on the being of Dasein. But, this can bring the question that is reality based of the existence of Dasein. The existence of outer world is based on the existence of Dasein. This situation does not mean that real things are based on the existence of Dasein or not because reality is a mode of Dasein's existence. Therefore, reality cannot exist without Dasein. For example, mountains and stars do not depend on Dasein in terms of their location and features. But reality which is a mode of Dasein's interpretation depends on Dasein's existence. Therefore, as long as Dasein exists, being exists. When Dasein does not exist, independence does not exist either. In this situation, we can neither talk about the existence of the

beings in the world nor their nonexistence. Because being at present at hand is only meaningful in terms of Dasein's understanding of being.[56]

Similarly, we can say that the similar beings exist in similar spatiality. In here, we should say that the space neither exists in subject and object. Space should be disclosed by Dasein during the process of disclosing the world. Therefore, space is disclosed by Dasein and Dasein exists spatially. This means that we need to also analyze the spatial existence of Dasein, which I shall attempt next.

3.1.4. Dasein's Spatiality

Present at hand things are stabilized in the system of mathematical coordinates in Cartesian understanding of spatiality. Space has mathematical structure in this understanding. Spatial locations are placed in an objective system which consists of coordinates in the world. In this system, each subject corresponds to series of numbers. In this understanding, when objects are related to mathematical coordinates, the world turns into a place of observation. We can think of this situation as a theater play. In the theatre, audiences are actually separate from the play. Although audience can look into the world of players, they do not join the world of representation and also they do not exist in this representative world. Therefore, the world that we cannot be in is actually an exclusive world which cannot be communicated with.**[57]**

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[56] Gelven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p.127.
[57] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 52.

This model assumes that the basic relationship between people and objects is spatial thanks to their propinquity. Therefore, the relationship between people and objects can be thought as two objects staying next to each other. This model assumes that as water can remain in the glass, human beings can remain in the world in a similar way.[58]

This Cartesian model ignores the being of human beings thanks to the perspective that it has. For example, when we pour the water out of glass, it is still water. However, it is impossible to think of a human being who is not in the world. We should not think of getting out of the world as getting to the outside of the world. When we go somewhere in the space or to another universe or to heaven and hell, we still continue being in a world. Space for Dasein does not have an objective structure and it does not mean a subjective space in terms of Kant's understanding. Dasein perceives things at hand as propinquity and distance.[59]

Dasein essentially has a feature of being in the world. Therefore, there is an intrinsic relationship between Dasein and world. In this situation, we need to perceive the relationship between Dasein and the world properly in order to interpret both Dasein and the world better. It is impossible to understand the concept of happiness without knowing anything about the event and situations that form it. Therefore, the being of the human being is only understandable within the context of the relationship between human being and the world.[60]

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[58] *Ibid,* p. 40.

[59] Gilven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 67.

[60] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 40-41.

Facing of a human being with an object is not same as the facing of an object with another object. For example, although a tableau can touch a wall, we cannot say that it faces the wall because wall is not an object belonging to the world of tableaux. In here, Dasein's being in the world is ignored. Being-in-the-world means having a certain understanding of being. A being that has such an understanding of being can touch the wall and perceive the wall as a wall in other words it can face the wall. [61]

Human beings primarily perceive objects as things at hand. Objects do not only have the feature of present at hand things in other words they are not the objects of theoretical reasoning. They also have the feature of being things at hand. While Dasien is using something or completing a work, Dasein faces things at hand. Space discloses itself during this regarding. In this context, space which is disclosed when Dasein faces with things at hand is not a space that can be measured mathematically. Therefore, Space and spatiality do not exist in subject and the world. It is disclosed by Dasein when Dasein discloses the world. Dasein exists spatially. Dasein is spatial.[62].

We saw whether an independent outer world exists or not and in this context, from the explanations that we made about the ontic nature of reality, we understood that basically the solution of this problem is based on the concepts of the world and the disclosedness of the world. As we showed in previous chapters, we can disclose the concept of the world with the concept of worldliness. For this, we should have the understanding of referential totality. We showed in our foregoing discussion that

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[61] *Ibid,* p. 40-41.
[62] *Ibid,* p. 40-41.

reference and signs play important roles in disclosing the referential totality. The basic constructive power of reference and signs is disclosed here. So, we showed that Heidegger's solution about skepticism is possible with the understanding of the concepts of reference and signs.

3.2. Truth against Skepticism

In traditional epistemology, the problem of truth in large is related to correspondence of a statement and real thing. In this view, if a statement corresponds to the world or the real things, it is true. Truth shows itself in statement or judgment but separation of subject and object of knowledge cause skeptical criticism and philosophers cannot accomplish this destructive critique. According to Heidegger, the problem of how knowledge is possible if subject and object are really separated from each other cannot be answered within the schema of this traditional epistemology. For this, we need to clarify ontological foundation of the truth. When we expose the ontological structure of truth by using phenomenological method, truth's way of being will be revealed. Truth is a way of existential structure of Dasein's being. In order to explain the relation of truth and existential structure of Dasein I shall show referential context of worldliness of the world of Dasein. Thus, I shall try to show in this section the importance of the theory of reference and signs for understanding of Heidegger's approach to truth.

3.2.1 The Concept of Truth

What is the relationship between the nature of truth and the question of being? This question has been on the agenda of philosophers since the ancient philosophy. It

can be seen that truth and being are thought together in ancient Greek philosophy. Parmenides thought the being and the understanding about being together, and the being of the beings was first discovered by Parmenides. Thinking in this way, he was trying to follow the thing that shows itself in itself. In other words, his thinking was directed by truth. [63]

Aristotle states that Parmenides and the philosophers like him, who think a fundamental connection between being and truth, are directed by matter itself. Therefore, Aristotle referred to the investigations of these philosophers as doing philosophy about truth or the appearance of truth. He described philosophy itself as the science about truth. The characteristic of this science is that it deals with the being as being.

In these investigations, truth was not used as a theory of knowledge or as a theory of judgment because truth and matter, or the thing shows in itself, refers to the same thing. If truth and being, as Parmenides thinks, are linked with a fundamental connection, truth and Dasein's understanding of being must be linked with a fundamental connection.

In order to reveal this, the concept of truth should be discussed. First, the traditional concept of truth should be discussed and its ontological foundations should be revealed. Next, depending on this discussion, we should make the phenomenon of truth visible, and try to reveal truth's way of being.

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[63] Gorner, Paul, *Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2007), p. 95.

In traditional metaphysics, if a statement or a belief corresponds to the world or the real things, it is true. Truth shows itself in statement or judgment. Aristotle is among the leading proponents of this idea. According to him, the actual place of truth is the judgment, and truth should be defined as correspondence. [64] Aristotle states: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true."[65]

This definition of truth was criticized by Neo-Kantian thinkers in the 19th century, and accused of being a backward realism. However, these thinkers overlooked the fact that Kant himself was adherent to this concept of truth. According to Kant and Neo-Kantians, truth is related to the inquiry of the structure of thought and experience. To Kant, truth and appearance, or mistake, is in judgment. In other words, it has a mental aspect and not related to the experienced object. Truth and falsehood are related to the conceptual structure of the mind and are only possible there. In this context, in Kant, the relation between the subject and the object appears between the mechanism of psychology and the ideal judgment-contents like a priori concepts.

Be that as it may, the basic problem that derives from the subject-object distinction arises. This problem is the question of how knowledge is possible if subject and object are really separated from each other. Kant tries to solve this problem by internalizing the subject-object distinction. However, despite this, Kant

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[64] Blattner, William, *Heidegger's Being and Time,* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1996), p.120.
[65] Aristotle, *Metaphysics, Book 4*, trans. by Hugh Lawson, (London: Penguin Group, 2004), p.1001b25.

could not save himself from adhering to the traditional definition of correspondence. [66]

In spite of this, Heidegger argues, we do not completely repudiate the traditional theory of correspondence here. This theory is inadequate for a fundamental analysis. Therefore, it is not an adequate source to reach the phenomenological source at the basis of the things. It is an approach that shows the things mistakenly in addition to concealing them. For this reason, it should be put under profound analysis in order to reach a keen comprehension of truth. [67]

3.2.2. Analysis of the Correspondence Theory

Correspondence is a relationship but not every relationship is correspondence. For example, a sign, as we have seen, signifies a signifier. However, in this case, there is not a relationship of correspondence between the sign and the signified. Again, it would not be true to perceive correspondence as equality. For instance, the number 5 is equal to 22 minus 17 in quantity. Thus, these two numbers are in correspondence with each other. Therefore, we should discuss what kind of a relationship correspondence is in order to reveal truth's structure of being.

The traditional metaphysics seem to have the tendency that, the true assertions concerning reality is knowledge. Knowledge thus becomes possible by judging. In judgment, judging as a real psychic process should be distinguished from the thing that is judged as ideal content. The element forming the relation of correspondence is

[66] Tietz, John, *An Outline and Study Guide to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Frankfurt: Humanities Online, 2001), p.117.
[67] Carman, Taylor, *Heidegger's Analytic*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 251.

the ideal judgment-content. Therefore, the relation of correspondence is about the relationship between ideal judgment-content and the real object which is judged.[68]

However, in terms of phenomenology, truth becomes apparent through knowing's being of true showing itself. In this case, the relation of correspondence becomes apparent in the phenomenal context of showing. Let's assume that a person turned his back against the wall and made this kind of a true statement: the picture on the wall is askew. This person is talking not about a representation the picture but about the picture itself. His claim is verified when he turns his back and looks at the picture, and sees that the picture is really askew. The truth of this statement will show itself by the person turning his back and looking at the wall, and perceiving the picture hanging askew there. Thus, correspondence becomes possible by virtue of the true affirmation or showing of things.[69] This affirmation or showing is realized in statement. Therefore, statement and stating should be discussed with regard to the method of phenomenology.

3.2.3. Broad Explanation of Statement

Heidegger's analysis begins by arguing that when we make a statement, the statement is directed to the object itself, which is the subject of the statement. The thing conveyed in the statement is that the being is exactly as it is. Therefore, what is showed in the statement is the discovering being of the statement. The being, which

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[68] Heidegger, Martin, *Being and Time*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, (New York: State University of New York, 1996), p.198.
[69] Gelven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p.128.

appears in stating, shows itself as it is in itself. In other words, this being exists by itself in the way as we discovered by showing it in the statement.

Statement can be clarified by being discussed within three contexts. First of all, statement means projection. Statement makes beings visible moving from themselves. For example, in the statement of ' the hammer is too heavy', what is being made visible is not about an imagination of hammer but is about the hammer itself. On the other hand, in a statement, the subject is determined by the verb. What is being told in the statement is the hammer itself, and what determines it is the description 'too heavy'. In this way, the statement is narrowed with this description. The description 'too heavy' is based on the concept 'hammer'. Accordingly, description limits our view to the thing that shows itself, or the hammer. Thirdly, statement means informing. Statement as informing identifies its subject, and brings it to our attention. Thus, we share the being, whose identification we bring into attention, with others. Both we, as the ones who make the statement and others can share what we state as informing. For this, there is no need for the being we bring into attention to be concrete. In this case, we become capable of transferring the things we state to others orally. However, during these transferring the things we bring into attention by statement would be concealed to us to an extent. However, knowledge that originates in rumor has a valid meaning because it aims at what is mentioned in the statement.

The hammer, which is the object of the statement, is at hand as principally as a tool. When this being becomes an object of the statement, its being of at hand is clouded and its structure of present at hand appears. This appeared present at hand

being is determined by its this or that aspect. In this way, qualities are obtained. However, in this process, what-for the object is cannot reach the totality of relatedness. In this way, the object loses the capacity of reaching the referentiality of the surrounding world that expresses the connections of referring. In this case, the object is reduced to the structure of present at thing's showing. Thus, by virtue of statement, the possibility of a purely visual showing emerges. [70]

The thing, which should be paid attention to here, is that what is showed is not a correspondence between knowing and object. In the same way, it is not a correspondence of the contents of consciousness among themselves either. What is showed is the discovered being of the being itself. Therefore, when we say affirmation, we understand the being's showing of itself in being itself. Because knowing finds itself in a discovering being directed towards the real being. That the statement is true mean it is being discovering. For this reason, truth is not related to the traditional understanding of correspondence that is defined as the subject's correspondence to the object.

However, being true as the discovering being is only possible on the basis of being in the world. To clarify this point, the phenomenon of truth should be discussed on the basis of being in the world.

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[70] Inwood, Michael, *Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction,* (New York: Oxford University Pres 1997), p.47.

3.2.4. Fundamental Form of Truth, the Disclosedness of the World

Based on our above discussion Heidegger goes on to establish that being true as the discovering being is a way of Dasein's being. In order to explain truth phenomenologically, existential-ontological foundations of discovering should be discussed. Discovering is a way of being of being-in-the-world. The being discovered of the being-in-the-world is based on the disclosedness of the world. By virtue of Dasein's disclosedness, the phenomenological structure of truth is reached.

Dasein, by its essence, is as its disclosedness. For this reason, it means that as long as it discloses and discovers the world, it truly exists by its essence. Dasein exists in truth. By this, it is not meant that Dasein ontically involves in all truths one by one. Dasein's being in truth has an ontological meaning. We mean that the disclosedness of Dasein's being belongs to its existential constitution. And here, the existential meaning of Dasein's being in truth should be explained.

Disclosedness comprises the totality of Dasein's structure of being which appears by Dasein's phenomenon of care. Dasein's being and its disclosedness should be thought together with the 'discoveredness' of beings in the world. At the same time, to Dasein's constitution of being belongs throwness, and it is the establisher of Dasein's disclosedness. By virtue of throwness, Dasein exists with beings that always exist in a certain world. In addition, projection belongs to Dasein's structure of being. With projection, Dasein is in a being that is directed towards its capacity of being. Dasein understands itself both through the beings in the world and through its capacity. In this way, Dasein discloses itself in itself.

In addition, falliness belongs to Dasein's structure of being. Dasein primarily and mostly is closed to itself in its own world. Those discovered and disclosed are in the condition of closeness due to idle talk, curiosity, and uncertainty. Beings show themselves but they are in a state of appearance. Therefore, because Dasein is by essence falliness, it is in truthlessness with regard to its constitution of being. Because to Dasein's facticity belongs closeness. Therefore, Dasein is equally in truthlessness by essence. Beings in the world can be closed or discovered because of being discovered by virtue of Dasein.[71]

Dasein expresses itself while being with the beings in the world. Dasein expresses itself as a discovering being directed towards the beings. Its expression of itself is in the form of statement. Statement expresses the discoveredness of beings. When statement is expressed, it virtually turns into a thing at hand in the world. In this way, statement turns into a thing at hand that we can understand and convey to others through talking on it again.

Statement is a thing at hand. The being that it connects with as a discoverer is a thing at hand in the world or present at hand. However, the connection presents itself as present at hand despite the fact that connection emanates from the phenomenon that discoveredness, which is preserved in the connection, is always the discoveredness of some things. Connection itself happens to possess the character of present at hand because it is about a relationship among the beings. In this case, the discoveredness of some things turns into the suitability of the statement, which is

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[71]Gelven, Michael, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,* (Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 131-132.

made as present at hand, with a present at hand. When the elements' way of being, which constitute the relationship, are understood only as present at hand, connection shows itself as a correspondence that is present between two presents at hand.

In this way, we encounter truth as a present at hand, and start to understand all beings as presents at hand. After that, statement is considered as the interpretation of a present at hand in terms of its capacities of being present at hand. An exactly this interpretation shapes the meaning of being, and truth's way of being is condemned to be close.

When we consider statement as the context in which discoveredness appears and as a way of being in the world, we can say that it is based on Dasein's discovererness and disclosedness. Dasein's disclosedness is the ontological condition for the capacity of statements' being true or false (discovering or concealing), and this expresses the original truth. In this context, therefore the fact that truth is related to Dasein's being should be discussed.

3.2.5. Truth's Relation to Dasein's Being

Because disclosedness is an essential structure of Dasein's being, Dasein by its essence is in truth. The being of truth depends on the being of Dasein because Dasein's being is necessary for the beings to be discovered and disclosed. For example, let's think of Einstein's energy formula of $E = m.c^2$. The relationship between energy, mass, and speed in this energy formula exists as long as the universe exists. However, it becomes truth for us when Einstein formulated these relationships. In other words, this formula is truth only if Dasein is. Einstein's this

formula was not true before being discovered. We should not derive from this statement the conclusion that this formula is wrong. This formula was neither true nor wrong before Einstein. This formula has become true as a result of Einstein's works. In this way, this formula has become reachable for Dasein. The beings that are discovered by virtue of Einstein's works by this way makes themselves visible as they are. [72]

In this context, we can easily say that no truth can be expressed in a world where Dasein, which is the being that expresses the statement, does not exist. However, the trueness of the statement and the conditions that are required to express the statement are different. Trueness is about statement's congruency with reality. Dasein's being, on the other hand, is about the possibility of truth. Dasein conceptualizes reality. In this way, we have the condition that is necessary to talk about the relationship between statement and reality.

Returning to Einstein's formula, we need to know the meanings of the concepts of energy, mass, and speed before testing the trueness of this formula. In other words, we need to distinguish the true or false applications of these concepts; for example, we need to distinguish what mass is, and what energy is. In this case, these conceptual structures become the expression of reality. Without these conceptual structures, we would not know whether a formula is congruent with the concerned part of reality. Therefore, we can discuss the question of truth only within the context of conceptual frameworks that we already know. [73]

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[72] Polt, Richard, *Heidegger An Introduction,* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 84.
[73] Mulhall, Stephen, *Heidegger and Being and Time,* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 100.

It can be argued that what determines the validity of these conceptual frameworks is the structure of reality. And it can be stated that we return to the criteria of trueness in this case as well. However, the meaning of the concepts of a formula is shaped by the rules which determine how we should use these concepts. And these rules are not in a relationship of congruity with reality.

For example, let's take the concept of nitric oxide (or nitrogen monoxide). Let's define the concept of nitric oxide as a gas whose chemical composition is NO. We do not make a claim about reality by making this definition. In other words, this definition does not have a value of right or wrong. We just say that if a chemical composition is NO, it is nitric oxide. This case does not say whether the gas at our hand is nitric oxide, but just says that instead of a name about a particular gas we can use another name.[74]

Conceptual frameworks, because they are the condition of our ability to think on reality, does not have the relationship of congruity with reality. At the same time, we have to use a conceptual framework in every research. Therefore, the concepts we have are not possible to show the essential nature of reality. Knowing that a gas we possess does not have the chemical composition of NO does not that show that the concept of nitric oxide represents reality in a wrong way, but just shows that the concept we use is inapplicable. In this case, because our definition is devoid of the capability to represent reality wrongly, we should say that it is also devoid of representing reality rightly. Therefore, we should think the relationships of conceptual frameworks with reality within the context of congruity. We reveal the

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[74] *Ibid,* p. 101.

essential nature of phenomena by using conceptual frameworks. Only by this way we are able to talk on phenomena. [75]

Here, we should make a distinction between truth that is related to reality and the essence of reality. Truth that is related to reality can exist in the absence of Dasein. However, the essence of reality is not about a phenomenon about real things. The essence of reality cannot exist in the absence of Dasein. The essence of the characteristics of things is not a function of how these things exist in the world. This essence is a function of how the conceptual framework is structured about the things. And this function is basically belongs to Dasein, and is based on Dasein's understanding as the being-in-the-world. Thus, we can say that the beings that are in the world without Dasein will continue to be but we cannot say that reality, being, and truth will continue be. Because these concepts have a meaning in the essential nature of reality. Therefore, all truth is according to Dasein's being, not according to Dasein. [76]

From another perspective, the one who assumes truth is not us. In reality, the ontological condition of our being able to assume some things is truth itself that enables assumption. Assumption means understanding something as the basis of being for another being. This understanding is possible with the disclosedness of Dasein. In this case, when we say assumption, we understand the thing for the sake of which Dasein is. Dasein reveals its possibility of being in its being. By this way, as being-in-the-world, to Dasein's being and its possibility of being belong

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[75] *Ibid,* p. 102.
[76] *Ibid,* p. 103.

disclosedness and discovery in an essential manner. For this reason, because Dasein settles in its being, it assumes its self which it determines as disclosedness. Thus, the assumption of truth in itself has Dasein's meaning of being. Therefore, truth becomes apparent already with our being. Dasein itself is bound to be as my or her Dasein, as truth is bound to be as Dasein's disclosedness. [77]

So far we understood that truth is not related to the traditional understanding of correspondence that is defined as the subject's correspondence to the object. Due to the discovering is a way of being of being-in-the-world and discovering being of the statement is only possible on the existential structure of Dasein, namely the basis of being-in-the-world, the problem of truth is based on worldliness of the world. We said that reference and signs have basic role to bring into open the ontological structure of worldliness of the Dasein's world. In this way I hope the importance of the theory of reference and signs will be clarified for overcoming skeptical objections about truth.

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[77] Gorner, Paul, *Heidegger's Being and Time*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 2007), p. 104.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

I have argued in the thesis that reference and signs are foundation for understanding of worldliness of the world. In this way I tried to find the ontological foundation about the problem of skepticism in Heidegger's thought about reality and truth. Therefore, I tried to illustrate that the theory of reference and signs is the basic structure for the problem of skepticism. In this study a closer examination of *Being and Time* shows that reference is central to Heidegger's analysis of Being. On this general argument it is possible to reach the following results on the basis of this thesis.

In the firs place an attempt to understand the basic concepts and approaches of Heidegger's thoughts in *Being and Time* shall show that Heidegger sets the preliminary concepts of his fundamental ontology. On the basis of his theory of reference after the analysis of his approach and method to his existential ontology, we come to the concept of being-in-the-world. I tried to show that all determinations of being of Dasein must be understood as grounded upon being-in-the-world. I have tried to discriminate between the meaning of being-in as ontological context with the meaning of spatial "in one another" of two things objectively present because the world "in" does not mean a spatial relation. Dasein encounters with being of beings in its own world. Ontological analyze of the world takes us to the concept of worldliness.

Worldliness is an ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-world. Thus worldliness is an existential characteristic of Dasein. Worldliness refers to the being of the worlds, the basic structure that describes all Dasein's world. Worldliness has ontological relation with the concepts of reference and sign.

In the second place, the theory of reference and signs is the structure of useful things in the world because we discover beings as they are referred to something in the world. All beings are in any event relevant with each other. For comprehending the phenomenon of reference clearly I tried to examine unique kinds of useful things called "signs". Signs, as belonging to a totality of useful things, so to speak, to a referential context disclose the ontological meaning of the world and worldliness. The world is itself is not whether a thing at hand or present at hand. The world is like referential web and aspects of being of Dasien which is being-in-the-world.

In this manner it is possible to see how important the concepts of reference and signs are for understanding the phenomenon the world and worldliness. The concepts of world and worldliness give us chance to provide a solution for skepticism, which is closely related to Heidegger's analysis of reality and truth within this existential structure of Dasein's fundamental ontology.

Thirdly, as we have seen it is possible to argue that reference and signs are ontological foundations of reality and truth against skepticism. For this reason, I tried to explain the problem of reality. Since ancient Greece, philosophers-while exploring the relationship between human being and the world-handle human being as independent observer from the world. Heidegger changed this perspective.

According to the understanding of Heidegger, human beings are not observers but players existing in the world.

Ontologically, reality is based on the being of Dasein because reality is a mode of Dasein's existence. Therefore, reality cannot exist without Dasein and as long as Dasein exists, being exists. When Dasein does not exist, independence does not exist either. In this situation, we can neither talk about the existence of the beings in the world nor their nonexistence because being at present at hand is only meaningful in terms of Dasein's understanding of being.

Understanding of being-in-the-world is based on the concepts of the world and the disclosedness of the world. We can disclose the concept of the world with the concept of worldliness. For this, we should have the understanding of referential totality. But prior to this I showed that reference and signs play basic role in disclosing the referential totality. As a result, I showed that Heidegger's solution to the problem of reality is possible with the understanding of the concepts of reference and signs.

Second I explained the problem of truth. In traditional thought, if a statement corresponds to the world or the real things, it is true. Truth shows itself in statement or judgment. According to Heidegger, if we understand knowing as an isolated relationship between the present at hand subject and present at hand object, we come across skepticism and we cannot overcome it. But, if we understand knowing as a mode of being-in-the-world, skepticism becomes invalid. Briefly, analyzing Dasein in terms of essentially being-in-the-world, takes the possibility of asking a question from the hands of a skeptic.

Due to understanding of the concept of being-in-the-world, the problem of truth is based on world of worldliness. Consequently, because of the concepts of world and worldliness based on the reference and signs, Heidegger's explanation about the problem of truth is based on the theory of reference and signs.

In traditional metaphysics reality and truth are defended against skepticism with logical arguments. In other worlds in previous metaphysics philosophers raise the question of skepticism and try to prove reality and truth against the skeptic position discursively. This issue becomes irrelevant in the Heideggerian position. It was thus my purpose to analyze this position as an existential approach to the problem of skepticism. As I tried to show that in Heidegger's analysis, the question of skepticism is eliminated on the basic of Dasein's existential dealing within the world. In the light of foregoing discussion we can see that Heidegger is compelled to think with specific concepts which he built in his fundamental ontology. Already the cause of bereaving the possibility of interrogation from skeptics is to inhibit thinking in object-subject opposition.

Reference and signs are not equipments of knowledge to be acquired in ontic meaning and consequently they are not scientific methods or apparatus to acquire knowledge in traditional sense. Also reference and signs do not constitute an epistemological theory which explains the process of acquiring knowledge in the mind and the structure of human knowledge. Rather reference and signs are ontological tools which provide the possibility of knowledge and come into open the ontological structure of the world.

Unlike the argument saying that we can understand a meaning of object merely in connection with other objects, in a referential web is a structure which provides the ontological structure of Dasein giving rise to obtain the knowledge of these objects. Therefore to think the theory of reference as a theory of knowledge is not appropriate.

If we handle the theory of reference as a theory of knowledge which is based on object-subject opposition in the meaning of traditional epistemology, such as Descartes and Kant's theory of knowledge, we would take the bait of skepticism. At the same time if we approach the theory of reference and signs as a theory of meaning reckoning without ontological project and method of Heidegger, we understand Heidegger in entirely wrong terms.

Because of this, we can merely explain the contribution of the theory of reference and signs by position and importance of this theory in his general ontological project. In the light of this perspective, we can consider that the phenomenological investigation of Heidegger is focus on ontological structure of Dasein. Therefore he tries to handle afresh accumulated philosophical questions. In this way, I hope I explained the theory of reference and signs as the basic ground for Heidegger's answer to the skepticism.

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