

**GULF CRISIS of 1990-1991;
IMPACT of CHANGE in
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY**

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by

Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL

Fatih University

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Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL

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Especially thanks to my wife, and my family.....

APPROVAL PAGE

Student : Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL
Institute : Institute of Social Sciences
Department : International Relations
Thesis Subject : Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991; Impact of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy
Thesis Date : October 2010

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Savaş GENÇ
Head of Department

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. M.Lütfullah KARAMAN
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. M.Lütfullah KARAMAN

Assoc. Prof. Savaş GENÇ

Assist. Prof. Kemal ÖZDEN

It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

Assoc. Prof. Mehmet KARAKUYU
Director

AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:
 - i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
 - ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL

October, 2010

ABSTRACT

Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL

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Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991;

Impact of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy

The Gulf Crisis, which began by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991, paved the way for the Middle East to gain a new dimension to its characteristic of being "unable to be shared" by the super powers throughout the history. "The Gulf Crisis", which can be evaluated as the consequence of power balances after the Cold War, had many impacts on Turkey. Turkey had to quit the "policy of neutrality", which she had been practicing since the Second World War, by this crisis. Before and after the war Turkey always spent efforts in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. Turgut Özal, the President of Turkey in the period had huge impact on the processes of decision making and putting them into effect.

The most important upshot of the Gulf war on Turkey was the termination of Turkey's economic effect on the Middle East. Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline was closed, and the commercial activities with Iraq were put an end. The number of all the commercial and financial operations done through Turkey decreased. Moreover, the poised hammer power remained in Turkey, and the period of poised hammer power in Turkey was extended in certain periods.

In this study, the impacts of "1990-1991 Gulf Crisis", which emerged as an extension of the Cold War, on Turkish Foreign Policy are scrutinized.

Key words:

Cold War, Turkey, Middle East, The Gulf Crisis, Turkish Foreign Policy, UN, USA

KISA ÖZET

Abdülkadir ŞENGÜL

Ekim 2010

1990-1991 Körfez Krizi'nin

Türk Dış Politikasının Değişimine Etkisi

1990-1991 yılında Irak'ın Kuveyt'e girmesi ile başlayan Körfez Krizi, Orta Doğu'nun geçmişten bu yana süper güçler tarafından "paylaşılmasını" yeni bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Soğuk savaşın ardından, değişen güç dengelerinin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilebilecek olan "Körfez Krizi"nin, Türkiye açısından bir çok etkisi olmuştur. II.Dünya savaşından sonra dış politikada "tarafsızlık politikası" uygulayan Türkiye, bu kriz ile "tarafsızlık politikasını" terk etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Savaşın öncesinde ve sonrasında Türkiye daima, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün korunması yönünde çabalar sarf etmiştir. Dönemin Cumhurbaşkanı olan Turgut Özal'ın kriz süresince Türk Dış Politikasının karar alma ve uygulanması yönünde büyük etkileri olmuştur.

Körfez savaşının Türkiye üzerinde en önemli etkisi, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'daki ekonomik etkinliğinin sona ermesi olmuştur. Kerkük-Yumurtalık boru hattı kapanmış, Irak ile yapılan ticari işlemler bitmiştir. Bölgedeki Türkiye üzerinden yapılan tüm ticari ve ekonomik işlemler azalmıştır. Ayrıca, çekiç güç Türkiye'de kalmış ve çekiç güç'ün Türkiye'de kalacağı süre belli periyotlar halinde uzatılmıştır.

Bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaşın bir uzantısı olarak ortaya çıkan "1990-1991 Körfez Krizi"nin Türk Dış Politikasına etkilerini anlatılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Soğuk Savaş, Türkiye, Orta Doğu, Körfez Krizi, Türk Dış Politikası, Birleşmiş Milletler, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri

LIST OF CONTENTS

DEDICATIONAL PAGE.....	iii
APPROVAL PAGE.....	iv
AUTHOR DECLARATIONS.....	v
ABSTRACT.....	vi
KISA ÖZET.....	vii
LIST OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER I.....	4
TURKEY AND HER FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD... 4	4
1.1 Historical Backdrop: Turkey During the Cold War.....	4
1.2. Turkey After the Cold War.....	5
1.3 Changing Framework/Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy.....	7
1.3.1 New Trends in World Order After the Cold War.....	7
1.3.2 Fluctuations in Turkey’s Strategic Importance.....	8
1.3.3 Emergent Opportunities for Turkey and Her Foreign Policy.....	12
CHAPTER II	
GULF CRISIS AND WAR AT THE OPENING OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA.....	16
2.1 Historical Backdrop.....	16
2.1.1 Middle East in the World Affairs Before the Post-Cold War.....	16
2.1.2 Middle East After the Cold War.....	17
2.2. Causes of Conflict and War in Broader Perspective.....	19
2.2.1 The Relevance of Oil in the Middle East.....	20
2.2.2 Iraq’s Initiatives in Increasing Armament.....	22
2.2.3 Emerging Economic Crisis After the Iran-Iraq War.....	25
2.2.4 Stress in Relations Between Iraq and Western Countries.....	26
2.2.5 Iraq’s Demand and Efforts to Increase Oil Prices.....	27
2.2.6 Backround of Problems Between Iraq and Kuwait.....	28
2.2.7 The Regime Problems in Iraq.....	31
2.3 Development of theGulf Crisis and War.....	33
2.3.1 Birth of the Crisis.....	33
2.3.2 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait.....	36
2.3.3 Un Intervention / 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm).....	37
2.3.4 Related Decisions by the United Nations and Diplomatic Initiatives.....	38
2.3.5 American Diplomatic Policy and Initiatives During The Military Intervention.....	40
2.3.6 Results of UN Intervention.....	45
2.3.7 Mistakes of Saddam Hussein.....	47
2.3.8 U.S. Gains.....	49
2.4 Attitudes of Powerful Countries During Crisis and War.....	50
2.5. Attitude of Middle East Countries During Crisis and War.....	53
CHAPTER III.....	56
TURKEY AND HER POLICY DURING THE GULF CRISIS AND WAR.....	56
3.1 Historical Backdrop:Turkey in the Middle East Till the End of the Cold War... 56	56
3.2 Turkey’s Situation During the Crisis and War.....	61

3.3 Changing Turkish Foreign Policy in Relation with the Crisis and War	64
3.4 Characteristics of Turkey's New Policy	67
3.5 Main Goals of Turkey's Active Foreign Policy.....	71
3.6 Results of Turkey's Policy with Special Reference to Turkey's Economic Losses.....	75
3.7 The Saliency of Turgut Özal in Relation with the New Policy During the Crisis and War	78
3.8 Özal's Distinctive Place in the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making	82
CONCLUSION	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY	917

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANAP	Motherland Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DYP	Democratic Party
EU	European Union
IAEA	International Atom Energy Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PGCC	Persian Gulf Cooperation Council
PKK	Parti Karkerani Kurdistan
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party
TBMM	Turkish Grand National Assembly
UN	United Nations
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Committee
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WW I	World War I
WWII	World War II

INTRODUCTION

The end of World War II paved the way for a fundamental change in international system. The balance of powers was changed in the post war period; the structure of postwar politics between the countries, which has been continuing up to now, altered remarkably. Two new powers, i.e. the United States of America and the Soviet Russia, which were also named as super States, dominated the world in the post war period. Furthermore, the fact that European states came out of the war as weakened and that there was no effective security system in the continent, made way for these two countries to establish their dominance over Europe by using their economic and military force. With the invitation of the Western European countries, all of a sudden, the US saw herself as the protector of these countries. Among two powerful states of the former system Germany was defeated in the war, and England, although it was victorious in the war, was weakened especially in terms of military. Hence, European balance of powers in the prewar period was lost and the developments led to the birth of the formation of a bipolar system, divided into two new blocks which were ideologically enemies to each other.

On account of the fact that the countries in war did not have confidence to each other after the Second World War, the countries did not withdraw from the regions they occupied. The communist revolution in Czechoslovakia and the siege of Berlin had been the main reasons that incited of Cold War. Expansionist attitudes of the Soviet Union towards Europe accelerated confrontation by causing anxiety and fear in Western states. In fact, the origin of disputes between the USA and the Soviet Union goes back to as far as 1941.¹ The Soviet expatriation of Red Army to Europe in 1944, laid its desires bare about this region.² Notwithstanding, Western-Soviet alliance continued until the end of the war owing to the German threats. Moreover, England believed that her collaboration with the Soviet Union in the post war period

¹ Walter Lafeber, *America Russia and the Cold War 1945-1990*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1991, p.8.

² Raymond Smith, "Ernest Bevin, British Officials and British Soviet Policy 1945-47", Ann Deighton (Der), *Britain and the First Cold War*, London : Macmillan, 1990 p.37.

would benefit her to sustain her status in Middle East.³ Hence, England wanted to keep the alliance on. Whereas the US insisted that the Eastern European states must assign their own destiny freely, The Soviet Union explicitly announced that it would not show any tolerance to any neighboring enemy state. The expansionist attitude of the Soviet Union after the war was one of the main factors that led the West to unite.

The responsibilities of the outbreak of Cold War are on both the East and the West countries alike. The fact that these two poles misunderstood each other reciprocally is a significant element. Furthermore, economic market search of the USA played a significant role in the division of Europe.⁴ Meanwhile, policies of the Soviet Union towards the Eastern Europe and the fear and anxiety originating from it pave the way for the emergence of Western European Union.

By the 1950s, the European states believed that there was an explicit Soviet threat against them. In response, the Soviet Union stated that the US policies included hostile elements against them. Despite these reciprocal suspicions, the Western Europe did not want the USA to protect them in the earlier periods of the Cold War and they were of the opinion that the Western European Union was capable of protecting them against the Soviet Union.⁵ The Soviet threat, in the perspective of Western European states, was political rather than military. However, the Prague military coup, which took place in February 1948, and the Berlin siege that follows it and finally the Korean War in 1950 pave the way for the alteration of these ideas. These developments not only accelerated the foundation of the Western Union, but also made the US leader of the Union. Due to these developments, the Union became military dominated organization.

The Marshall Plan, which was put forward by the USA and aims at the construction of Europe, was assessed as an imperialist policy by the Soviet Union, and considered as the continuation of the Truman Doctrine. The plan, which was rejected by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European population that it dominated, was a development that the USA also desired to be applied for the Western Europe.

³ John Kent, "The British Empire and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-49", Ann Deighton (Der), *Britain and the First Cold War*, London: Macmillan, 1990, p.16.

⁴ Thomas Patterson, *The Origins of the Cold War*, Toronto: D.C. Heat and Company, 1974, p.xvii.

⁵ Hugh Mcdonald, *The Soviet Challenge and the Structure of European Security*, Southampton: Edward Edgar, 1990, p.97-98.

The Soviet Union established the Cominform against the Marshall Plan. As a result of these developments, the confrontation between the East and the West became more definite in its economic, political and military character.

In the first years following the WW II, there was no war between the East and the West, but the prevalent condition seemed to be like a war. The US had become leader in the Western Europe; and it used to have nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union kept the largest military power in Europe active by dominating the Eastern Europe. Hence, the war period alliance was giving its place to confrontation that was increasingly becoming military focused.⁶

The Marshall Plan for the USA became the beginning of a closer collaboration with Europe. Political indefiniteness in Europe led these countries to a number of searches for security in the continent. As a result, France, England and the Benelux countries formed a military pact, which was backed by the US. On the other hand, the Soviet Union expressed its disturbance from the establishment of the Pact. Meanwhile, the siege of Berlin by the Soviet Union was a turning point for the foundation of NATO. As a reaction to issuing a new money currency to the market in Berlin in 1948 by the Western countries, the Soviet Union took Berlin completely under siege. However, despite the siege, the USA and England resisted the pressure and did not give any tolerance.⁷ The siege, which continued almost for a year, shaped the East-West relationships to a great extent and required a need for a Western Union.

Foundation of NATO formed the final point for the complete emergence of the Cold War. It can be said that ideological aims of the US are the main reasons of the formation of the foundation of Marshall Plan and NATO. Thus, the aim of the USA was not only protecting the Western Europe against the Soviet Union, but also set a new economic market open to American economic system. Another important reason was that England was not able to protect Europe and the Mediterranean region against the menace of communism anymore.⁸

⁶ Peter Colvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, London: Longman; 1987, p.12-15.

⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose, *The Military Dimension of Berlin and NATO*, Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974, p.176.

⁸ Joseph Frankel, *International Relations in a Changing World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p.43.

CHAPTER I

TURKEY AND HER FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

1.1 Historical Backdrop: Turkey During the Cold War

Turkey, which had a constant position with its strategic significance in respect to the Western alliance, had policies accordingly and tried to preserve the condition of the world politics by playing the alliance role, which was expected from her. Since the roles that it had to play were assigned by the others and the static system, it was not possible for Turkey to have vision for the future and new expansion policies.

By not joining the WW II, in the post war period, Turkey faced Soviet Union pressure again which threatened territorial integrity of Turkey. The requests of the Soviet Union from Turkey can be listed under three headings. These are: re arrangements of the borders, to revise the Montreaux Convention on the Turkish Straits in favor of the Soviet Union and entitle the Soviet Union to have military base on the Straits. As it is stated in the Truman Doctrine, it was essential to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Hence, the USA and England declared that they would help Turkey and the region against the Soviet pressures.

It may be said that the most important problem that kept Turkey busy in the post war period is expansionist policies of the Soviet Union.⁹ The Soviet Union explicitly expressed its aims on Turkey in the foreign policies it applied. No doubt, all these statements were a threat to the independence of Turkey. However, Turkey resisted against these threats and did not show any tolerance.¹⁰

The attitude of England was far from satisfying Turkey while the Soviet pressure was going on. Moreover, due to her own economic problems, England had

⁹ Abdülkadir Baharçiçek, "Soğuk Savaşın Sona Ermesinin Türk Dış Politikası Üzerindeki Etkileri", *21. Yüzyıl Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2000, p.63.

to halt the aid she had earlier been giving for Turkey.¹¹ On the other hand, England notified Turkey that to abide within the Western system in the long run, the political system of Turkey must be democratized. England used to think that the Soviet Union would not use military power against Turkey, but would try all means step by step to dominate Turkey.¹² Furthermore, England was not in a condition to send any support to Turkey other than air support in case of a probable war. Hence, England wanted the USA to take political responsibility and requested it to help Greece and Turkey. England explained to the US that Greece and Turkey, which form the north part of Middle East territory, are important countries politically and strategically. It showed that without financial and military back up of the USA, it was impossible for England to carry out its policies in the Middle East. Upon these progresses, in 1946, the USA declared that it would help Turkey. Therefore, in the Cold War period, Turkey had always been a region between two super powers, where there were constant disputes and struggles over dominance.

1.2. Turkey After the Cold War

When the Cold War ended, Turkey entered into a completely different position. The regions which became most problematic places in the New World Order were just at the vicinity of Turkey. It was not possible to think these regions without Turkey. It was inevitable that the efforts for the centralization of the Balkans, Caucasia, the Central Asia, the Middle East and Mediterranean regions in the world politics would certainly affect Turkey, which had opportunities and impacts in these regions. In addition to closeness to the regions which would affect the history of the world in new era, being close to the basic problems that threat the Western states and in a position to impact them, in a perfect meaning, made Turkey front country of the West and the world politics.

¹⁰ Joseph C.Satterthaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol.401, (1972), p.77.

¹¹Peter Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs 1947-1948*, London: Oxford University Press, 1952, p.7.

¹² Roger Wm. Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951, Arab Nationalism, The United States, and Postwar Imperialism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.79-83.

Right after the Cold War, in the regions surrounding Turkey, ethnic and religious oriented clashes increasingly happening one after another, put Turkey, which was away from these disputes for decades while progressing its domestic system forward as an island of stability, overtly in the middle of an ocean of chaos.

By the collapse of the Soviet Union after the Cold War, a great source of threat for Turkey was removed, and also its foreign policy got rid of limitation. On the other hand the fact that Caucasia and Central Asian Turkic republics got their independence, with which Turkey has cultural, religious and historical ties, facilitated Turkish foreign policy to gain a broad vision. This was one of the most significant factors in the agenda then. From then on, a vast Eurasian region stretching from the Balkans to the depth of Asia has been open before Turkey. Natural developments afterwards, were the radical expansions of Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's active political, economic, diplomatic and military activities in these regions.¹³

Turkey, with its geostrategic significance, its geopolitical sensitive structure that has the potential of affecting the structure of international system, as a matter of fact, is an important country that may alter the world politics in global developments. While international system was having a fundamental change, and the end of the Cold War, Gulf crises and wars, September 11 attacks targeting America, and Afghanistan and Iraq wars of America bore certain effects on the change; it was inevitable and natural for Turkish foreign policy to alter by being affected from the developments within and out of the country. Accordingly, not so long after the end of the Cold War, for a while, the Turkish authorities faced the probability of the decrease of strategic importance on which Turkish traditional foreign policy was based on. This event was the first serious crisis that Turkish foreign policy came across after the Cold War.

¹³ William Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol.1, (1993), p.234; Shireen Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture", *The International Spectator*, Vol.1, (1999), p.66.

1.3 Changing Framework/Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy

1.3.1 New Trends in World Order After the Cold War

In the critical turnover, when the then-prevailing world order collapsed and there was a transition to the new one, the Turkish authorities had to attribute more significance to security and defense. They were to follow and watch emergent developments that took place in various frontiers simultaneously closely. The issues that they had to deal with varied from European unification to emergence of independent republican generations that speak Turkish in the Central Asia and Caucasia; from tragic developments in the Balkans to restlessness in the Middle East to Caucasia.¹⁴ Turkey, all at once, found itself surrendered with instabilities, indefiniteness and disputes. Thanks largely to the proximity to the region where there were chaos, Turkey became a country open to threats against its security.¹⁵

Turkey had to watch the developments in the regions bordering former Soviet Union closely. However, strategic priorities explicitly shifted to the dangers originating from the southern region. The problems mentioned by Iran, Syria and Kurdish separatists and the threats now were concerning the Turkish authorities more.¹⁶ Territorial integrity within the frame of Kurdish issue was the most important issue in the agenda.

Defense collaboration between the countries which are regional competitors and enemies of Turkey, their beginning to set up alliance relationships were other issues that worried the Turkish authorities in addition to serious threats and dangers. In respect to them, taking precautions and search of balancing alternatives against the entrepreneurs of which they were not sure of unless they would be directed to them, seemed to be mandatory.¹⁷ Probably none of the neighbors of Turkey could dare to

¹⁴ Şükrü Gürel, "A General Appraisal of Current Turkish Foreign Policy", Mustafa Aydın (Der), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, Ankara: International Relations Foundations, 1998, p.12.

¹⁵ Süleyman Demirel, "Turkey and NATO at the Threshold of a New Century", *Perception*, Vol.4, No.1, (1999), p.9; Malik Mufti, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.52, No.1, (1998), p.33, citation from Hikmet Çetin.

¹⁶ Ian O.Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1992, p.24,27; James Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey: Problems, Policy Choices and Mediterranean Security*, London: Brassey's, 1991, p.98,114.

¹⁷ Mufti, p.35,36,37,40.

attempt to resist Turkish military power, which would be like an adventure to them. In other words, a single country might not have been a threat to Turkish security. However, they might have been a serious problem for Turkey if they could act in collaboration or at least they could contribute to the intentions of the global friendly or enemy countries that are trying to benefit from the weakening of Turkey.¹⁸ Turkey's drowning in regional problems or cul-de-sac disputes between Turkey and the neighbors, no doubt, would serve to the desires of the countries who wanted to get rid of dependence to Turkey or those who wanted Turkey to be weaker.

The most dangerous probability in terms of security was that in the 1990s and afterwards Sevres scenarios were put into agenda by the elites of Turkey. Accordingly, Turkey's western allied friends could apply scenarios of separating Turkey that they wrote in 1920s when it was a perfect time. A more dangerous development that led to the creation of nightmare scenarios within the frame of Sevres syndrome was that due to the activities of USA, which was a strategic partner to Iraq and Kurdish problems, became a threat to the existence of Turkey.¹⁹

1.3.2 Fluctuations in Turkey's Strategic Importance

By the end of the Cold War, removal of the East and West tension, put the question of whether there was a decrease in the strategic importance of Turkey on the agenda. Whether Turkey was among the losers in the new period, and entered into a tendency of marginalization in the world politics were among the questions people were curious about. Such a probability meant a negative development from Turkey's point of view, and would be a back step in the Turkish foreign policy on account of the fact that decrease of Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of the West would cause them to be reluctant in providing military assistance and economic help to Turkey; and the Western countries would have more negative attitudes in the issues concerning Turkey.

¹⁸ Şadi Ergüvenç, "Turkey's Strategic Importance in Military Dimension: A Regional Balance Holder", Mustafa Aydın (Der), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, İstanbul: International Relations Foundation, 1998, p.63,67.

¹⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *Türk Dış Politikası Yol Ayrımında Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Yeni Sorunlar, Yeni İmkanlar ve Yeni Arayışlar*, İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2006, p.18.

As a result of decrease in strategic importance, Turkey's stay beyond Western political, military, economic and cultural constructions would be a serious development that would change domestic and foreign politics of Turkey fundamentally. This would mean a failure of Turkey's traditional foreign policy and a Western type of political system; and hence would symbolize the fact that westernization adventure ended in fiasco. On the other hand, in a period when vagueness and disputes became common in the vicinity, Turkey's loss of Western link, which guarantees its security, was not something that Turkey desired at all.

Outbreak of the Gulf crisis and then the Gulf War, in which Western powers used powers beyond the area of NATO, demonstrated the strategic value of Turkey once again dramatically. The fact that this event, to which western powers especially America place great importance, took place right beside Turkey, proved that Turkey was not given up in respective to geopolitics and geostrategic terms.

There were basic opinions about the perception of strategic significance of Turkey at the beginning of the post Cold War period. Since Turkey is one of the basic countries backing on regional power balance, it could not be ignored by the great powers.²⁰ Under the circumstances, great powers had to take seriously the opinions of Turkish leaders about their policies of the region. The fact that Turkey became an effective power, whose opinion had to be taken into account of the opportunities offered by the Cold War, and being an influential country on the region which concerns the USA and the European countries closely, brought some positive reflections. At this point, whether the interest of Turkey and the Western countries would clash with each other was crucial.²¹ While the block system of the Cold War collapsed, and then new centers of powers were being set up, Turkey, as the most powerful state of the region, had drawn attention of those centers with the significant position it had.²² In the lights of these developments, it is possible that the Turkish foreign policy was shaped by Turkey's desire to undertake regional leadership. The

²⁰ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Changing Security of Turkey", Mustafa Aydın (Der), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, Ankara: International Relations Foundations, 1998, p.81.

²¹ Lesser, p.39; Ergüvenç, p.63.

²² Kamran İnan, "Yeni Dünya Düzenin İçin Türkiye ve Oluşan Yeni Dengeler", *Değişen Dünyada Türkiye ve Türk Dünyası Sempozyumu*, Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1993, p.56.

basic anxiety of Turkey while after such a desire was not to emerge as a center of independent power; however, it was trying not to lose its strategic position in Westerners' perspective in the period when there was no more Soviet threats; and Turkey tried to show the western statesmen how it was important for the west.²³

Geographic position of Turkey was among the most important military and strategic values that drew attention of the world states. Due to its geographic location, it may serve as a bridge and collaboration within the frame of critical sea, land and air ways; and it might also serve as an obstacle in limiting the dangers. The shortest cut and the easiest way to link the crucial sources of the world such as petroleum and gas had been passing through Turkey. Moreover, on account of its geographical location, Turkey had a chance to impact and involve in developments and crises in strategic regions such as the Balkans, Caucasia, the Central Asia, the Middle East, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean; it could also serve as negotiator for the Western states.²⁴ Turkey's huge land area could form a massive barrier against attacks and threats towards the West; and provide strategic depth in responding these attacks and making them ineffective.

Many strategists were of the opinion that the defense and the security of the West at the beginning of the post Cold War period started at the south and east borders of Turkey. In this respect, Turkey had a crucial position in preventing and getting rid of regional wars, terrorism, drug smuggling, and organized crimes that concerned the West. Furthermore, Turkey was pretty desirous in playing the role that serves to the interest of the West.²⁵

Turkish leaders were especially focusing on the fact that Turkey was the only country to symbolize and protect western interests in the Middle East and the surrounding regions. In their opinion, by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, serious security gaps and vagueness emerged; and Turkey had a crucial position to fulfill these gaps and assist the West in providing the security.²⁶

²³ Meltem Müftüleri-Bac, "Turkey's Predicament in the Post-Cold War Era", *Futures*, Vol.28, No.3, (1996), p.265.

²⁴ Ergüvenç, p.62-63.

²⁵ Ergüvenç, p.63-65.

²⁶ Müftüleri-Bac, p.256-257.

Turkey was one of the powers that brought security and stability into the light in Euro Atlantic region.²⁷ The colossal army that it has was an additional strategic value in preventing threats and risks against the stability of the West. Moreover, the alliance Turkey maintained with the West, contributed to the formation of balances in favor of the West in the strategic region and assured stability in the wing regions of the West. In this frame, the Gulf War offered a chance for Turkey to demonstrate its significance for the West, and Turkey opted to benefit from the opportunity; in a moment when the West especially the USA needed a crucial help, Turkey played a very vital role in making the war a success against Iraq by offering military facilities and territories to the service of the West.²⁸ In the perspective of the Americans, especially in those of the Europeans, Turkey was forming a decisive block in preventing disputes and chaos emerging in the surrounding regions against the interests of the Europeans. On the other hand, the Europeans wanted to benefit from the protective shield provided by Turkey; however, despite it they were not eager to take Turkey within their security organization. Under the prevalent conditions, Turkey emerged as the most critical country to serve to the regional interests of the West. By letting the Western states use its territory, Turkey could make it possible for the west to involve the regional crises rapidly. Especially for the Western states to interfere the developments in the Middle East in the fastest and most effective way could only be achieved by using the forces that they had to place in Turkish territories.²⁹

For the western strategists the role that Turkey would undertake in the Middle East crises was much more vital. Being aware of this fact, it was natural for Turkish authorities to aim at using it in increasing its effect on the world politics. By opening military facilities to the use of the West in critical events and emphasizing on the fact that it controls clean water sources, Turkish leaders were trying to demonstrate that it

²⁷ Ömür Orhun, "The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A Southern Perspective", *Perceptions*, Vol.4, No.1, (1999), p.30.

²⁸ Ergüvenç, p.65-66-67.

²⁹ Jed C. Snyder, *Defending the Fringe: NATO, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf*, London: Westview Press, 1987, p.77-122-123.

had a geographical position to effect entire developments in the Iran Gulf region directly and absolutely.³⁰

Furthermore, Turkey's position to be in control of sea traffic between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea was another point that the western statesmen emphasized on. This sea route was crucial for the Soviet Union to sustain its economical and military force during the Cold War period. Turkey's quality to control sea routes in the region was an important phenomenon to show that in a probable Middle East crisis Turkey could play vital roles.

Another important issue was that Turkey was not a country to be ignored for it had a great economic capacity. Rapid economic development was another indicator which showed that Turkey could be an important economic center. It is an obvious fact that economic improvements contribute to the developments of democracy.³¹ In short, Turkey with its growing economy would always be a potential partner for the USA and the European states. Besides, economy was an important factor to normalize Turkey's relationships with basic powers such as Russia.³²

1.3.3 Emergent Opportunities for Turkey and Her Foreign Policy

Alterations that occurred in international arena after the end of the Cold War brought up some opportunities and benefits for Turkish foreign policy in addition to problems and complexities. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey out of a blue had the comfort of being surrounded by weaker states in the East instead of colossal Soviet power. Hence, instead of a powerful Soviet neighbor, weaker neighboring states emerged and thus national power of Turkey increased.

End of the Cold War meant to be fundamental changes in international atmosphere. It was inevitable for these fundamental changes to cause serious shifts in the strategic importance of Turkey. The regions in the vicinity of Turkey, with the emergence of certain issues and opportunities, became more linked to each other.

³⁰ M. Evert, "Turkey's Strategic Goals: Possibilities and Weaknesses", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.4, No.4, (1993), p.32.

³¹ William Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, No.1, (1993), p.235.

³² Uslu, p.29.

The position of Turkey, as a country belonging to these regions interdependent to each other, gained new dimensions; and became more concerned country with global policies.

While NATO, the European Union and some other international organizations had some structural and strategic changes in order to cope with the new atmosphere; it was not possible for Turkey's interests, policies and benefits to be effected from the developments. Turkey as a country located at the intersections of European countries, crucial regions and continents that are strategic partners to the USA, could not stay indifferent to the alterations in international system and the reactions that global forces showed to the changes. In the following period, Turkey progressed a lot in rescuing itself from the models of conservative, static and single dimensional policies.³³

In the newly formed international system, Turkey has left its former foreign policy attitudes that were full of suspicions aside, and give the impression of an actor more steady, effective and robust. When it is needed, Turkey does not hesitate to act alone on the conditions that concern its vital national interests.³⁴ It is obvious that the characteristics that new world system affected global and regional policies of Turkey, which had a strategic central position in the system. In addition, increase in diplomatic, economic and military power of Turkey made Turkey an effective force in its region. In the Western points of view, this increase in Turkey's force factors also sharpened it as a strategic partner in the regions covering problematic regions in the world stretching from the Balkans to the Central Asia and the Middle East. It meant that due to proximity to the important places or being part of it, Turkey would be an important part of strategic equations.³⁵ Regional issues, which have capacity to impact general security atmosphere, have been observed in plenty around Turkey, and it would be an inevitable partner to the West in solving or surrounding the problems.

Turkey, beyond these developments, also came to the forefront in carrying and marketing energy sources. Newly constructed or ongoing constructions of pipe

³³ Uslu, p.53.

³⁴ Uslu, p.53.

³⁵ Uslu, p.54.

lines for the transportation of such vital natural resources as petroleum and gas would be more important from now on wards in the world politics. Most of these pipelines are at the locations surrounding Turkey; even some would pass through Turkish territory. In this respect, Turkey seems to be an indispensable partner for the West. Geographic position of Turkey has some superiority in transporting energy resources. Proximity to petroleum and gas resources in the Iran Gulf, the Caucasia and the Central Asia forms an obvious advantage for Turkey. Turkey also has an important geographical position in transporting these resources to the world market and can offer alternative routes in every respect. In addition, another considerable point is that when the projects are completed, Turkey can reach to these sources, which it also needs, cheaply.³⁶ Such a development would accelerate economical progress of Turkey; hence an important weak point as an obstacle on the way to Turkey's development and being a regional and even global power would be removed.

In respect to global forces in the near future, especially for the USA and Western countries, the importance of the countries surrounding Turkey will increase. Within the scope of probable scenarios facing the future, in respect to military operations that the western countries wanted to carry out; no matter whether they are air or land operations, Turkey will always be an appropriate base and supply center or at least this probability will be kept in the minds of the Western statesmen.³⁷

Another aspect of Turkey's importance for the West is also put on the agenda when there is armament in the surrounding region. One of the emergency issues that stroke the attention of the Western countries was that the countries which cannot cope with the new system of the world are in struggle for having ballistic arms and weapons of mass destruction. The efforts in this respect and the countries fulfilling their aims generally concentrated on the region around Turkey. Turkey, as a country to perceive similar threats and eager to collaborate with the west in this matter, is an important actor in the region that the West can collaborate with. Hence, in order to remove the threats that weapons of mass destruction cause, Turkey must be included

³⁶ Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O.Lesser and F.Stephan Larrabee, *Türk-Batı İlişkilerinin Geleceği: Stratejik Bir Plana Doğru*, translated by Işık Kuşçu, Ankara: ASAM, 2001, p.xii-xiii.

³⁷ Uslu, p.56.

to the cooperative policies of the West and must be taken into the defense settlement against the ballistic missiles. This is crucial for the security of the West.³⁸

The prevalent condition of Russia is another issue related to Turkey's importance for the West. The activities that Russia is going to carry out in future, the policies it is going to follow and the roles it will play concern the interests of the West closely as much as Turkey's security. In case the vehement competition between the West and Russia is renewed in future, it is obvious that Turkey will be among the leading countries in the competition.

In short, there have been important developments in economic, commercial, military and strategic activities of Turkey. In addition to them, vital geographic position that Turkey has, and its strategic importance for global politics have placed Turkey among the leading actors of the region and the world. Since Turkey is located at the crossroads where the West and the East, the North and the South, Christianity and Islam meet, it has a potential of affecting countries as far as thousands of kilometers away.³⁹ The Cold War period, in which Turkey was heavily dependent on the gigantic allies, has already passed. In comparison to Cold War-time Turkey, modern Turkey has a lot more alternatives in foreign policy. Turkey is equipped with more capacity and facilities in adapting multidimensional approach within its national interests. Its relationships with the West would be forming the centre of the foreign policies as it has been since the foundation of the Ottoman State.

³⁸ Khalilzad, Lesser and Larrabee, p. xiii.

³⁹ Uslu, p.59.

CHAPTER II

GULF CRISIS AND WAR AT THE OPENING OF THE POST COLD WAR ERA

2.1 Historical Backdrop

2.1.1 Middle East in the World Affairs Before the Post-Cold War

The Middle East has constantly been the centre of restlessness on account of its heterogenic structure in terms of politics, ethnicity, and that it shelters potentials for many clashes and actors, and that all these are established on very sensitive balances. The region has been a stage for interreligious conflicts, diverse nationalism clashes, political conflicts between different ideologies, various societal conflicts, and interstate self interests and power struggles throughout the 20th century.

After the WWII, there were two significant alterations emerged in the global and regional environments, which includes Turkey. The first alteration was the Cold War environment, which would continue for over forty years between the East and the West blocks after the war. The Cold War affected not only the relationships between these two poles, but also rapidly divided the Middle East region into two poles in parallel to global polarization. Egypt, Iraq, Algeria and Syria were on the line of the Soviet Union at various times, whereas Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan stayed with the USA Block. Hence, the Middle East had become a region of the Cold War for the super powers to form their area of dominance directly or indirectly. The second alteration was, as an addition to conflicts emerged from the Cold War perceptions of the East and the West in the region, the foundation of the State of Israel. Majority of the countries in the region had seen Israel as a product of the West that was created in their own land, which was invaded by the Westerners in the World War I; and also as an extension of the West against whom they had to fight

with. As a reaction to this, the countries in the region went on war with Israel (thus, indirectly with the West) in the years 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973.⁴⁰

The region has also characteristic of being a place where the most sensitive relationships of the international politics take place in an intricate way. All the great or super powers in the history or at present, have tried to establish an area of dominance in the region, and thus they tried to take socio-cultural-religious resources of the region under control; accordingly they fought with each other. The existence of the global struggle was seen explicitly in the period of the Cold War. On the one hand the USA tried to take the region from England and played the role of a possessor. On the other hand, the Soviet Union found ally countries by dominating the region and thus tried to maintain the control of the region. As a result, the Cold War polarization reflected on the region in the same way in many problems emerged in the Cold War such as crises, conflicts, and war etc. the Arab-Israel conflicts can be shown as the most important example to it. During the conflicts, the USA and other Western states tried keep the region under control by supporting Israel persistently. On the contrary, the Soviet Union increased her influence on the region by helping the Arab states or Palestine.

2.1.2 Middle East After the Cold War

The condition in the Middle East during the Cold War was developed in an environment, in which balances were maintained in accordance with bipolar world order; and the region had been a location where the power combats between the poles took place. It was seen that sometimes the East block and sometimes the West block was effective in the region. However, it was observed that the East block was somehow more effective on the region and this impact continued until the end of the period. Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, towards the end of the 20th century, the USA singled out as a global power dominant in the world politics; and the world rapidly turned into a single-poled position under the American hegemonies. The perceptions of threats have also changed in the new

⁴⁰ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1998, p.264-279.

period. The affair of controlling the world is based on having right to say in the strategic regions by developing regional politics. The regions in the forefront in this frame are the areas covering the North Africa, the Middle East, the Caucasia, the Caspian region and the Central Asia. The reasons why these regions came to forward are;

- The idea that the resources, where the terror is emerged, are in these fields,
- Availability of energy sources and transit ways; and thus increasing strategic importance of the region.

Apart from the world dominant theories towards the end of the 20th century, the increasing need for energy in the world paved the way for the formation of a new strategic perception based on “those who control the energy resources also control the world”. It has been observed that the new factor to designate global sovereignty is based on the control of global resources, and within the frame of this understanding the USA focused on the Central Asian and the Middle Eastern states, where the USA did not establish a complete influence during the Cold War; and hence formed a new regional area of dominance. Maintaining a control of the energy sources in the region and their way of transfer and limitation of the influence of the Soviet Union and China on the countries in the region were also aimed at. It is also thought that the energy to which the Europe is dependent on and the increasing Chinese control on the needs of energy also contributed to the strength of this hegemony.

By the end of the Cold War, the East-West conflicts that started after the Second World War and continued for 45 years, terminated in peaceful and democratic ways. The end of the Cold War was perceived as the victory of the West, especially that of the USA. As a matter of fact, the USA singled out of the process as the only super power of the process and the most powerful country of the international system. First of all, the tension in the world terminated swiftly with the end of the war, the place of tension began to be replaced with confidence and cooperation. While the military forces began to lose their importance, economic

progresses came to forefront with the production and the use of information. There were also commencements of important developments on the issues that concerned the entire world such as human rights, environment, drug and health. On the other hand, it can also be said that Germany and Japan are the concealed winners of the Cold War. It was seen that Germany came out of the process not only as an economic power but also the one that completed its political unification. The end of the Cold War paved the way for the decrease of the strategic importance of Turkey on account of the fact that the Western block which was formed during the war against the East Block, entered the process of disengagement by the removal of the East Bloc. With the termination of the polarization between the East and the West, the Warsaw Pact ended in 1990 as a result of the democratization began in the Eastern European countries in 1989. Then, the collapse of the Soviet Union went down on history as the indication of the complete end of the Cold War. All these developments show that bipolar world order had been ended and a new distribution and structure of power were emerged.

2.2. Causes of Conflict and War in Broader Perspective

The power balance at the Basra Gulf with the occupation and annexation attempt of Iraq on Kuwait faced the threat of breakdown for the third time after the war between Iran-Iraq and the revolution in Iran. On account of the developments in Iran and Afghanistan, and the war between Iran-Iraq, the Gulf countries founded the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to sustain their stability and the regional power balance. On the other hand, in response to these developments, the USA abandoned the Nixon Doctrine, which formed the frame of the foreign policy during the 1970s, and followed a more active attitude, and increased its military existence in the region accordingly.⁴¹ However, all these developments did not prevent the emergence of a new crisis. Iraq occupied Kuwait on 02 August 1990 and soon declared that it was the nineteenth city of Iraq. With this event, the balance of power in the Middle East as well as in the Basra Gulf turned in favor of Iraq. This occurrence jeopardized the

⁴¹ Tayyar Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda Basra Körfezinde Güç Dengesi*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1996, p.214.

security of petroleum, and economic interests of the USA and the Western states in the region. Thus, that Iraqi occupation would inevitably turn into the so-called Gulf Crisis.

The reasons of this Gulf Crisis, in broader perspective, can be examined under the following headings.

2.2.1 The Relevance of Oil in the Middle East

Raw material resources are important factors in designating national power. It is so because the strength of a country in industry is directly proportional with how much raw material resources the country has. Industrial power brings military power with it. Any country having these strengths is in a position to have right to say something on the world. The Western states, the USA at the outset, especially after the WW I, tried to establish a power to have right to say something on the raw material resources in order to have these two strengths. Among these raw material sources, petroleum has still been continuing its importance in the world because of its cheap production and variety of the area of usage, and having no alternatives in most of the areas it is used. This is also an indication of the reason why the Middle East is so much on the agenda.

65,3 % of the petroleum reserves in the world is in the Middle East region. Saudi Arabia alone has 25 % of the reserves; Iraq follows her with 11 % and the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iran with 9 % shares. The reserves in the region showed increase in the 1980s, then, apart from the increase of 12,5 billion barrel in Iraq reserves and 9,5 billion barrels in Qatar reserves, it either remained static in general or decreased.⁴² The importance of the Middle East economies in the international relations lie on the energy resources that the region possesses and the petroleum obtained from these resources. It is important to note that energy forms the base of economies in the 20th century. In addition, over 50 percent of the energy consumed in the world currently is met by petroleum. Hence, the Middle East has been one of the mostly talked regions in international politics due to its petroleum

reserves, production capacity, and the increasing demand for petroleum and the incomes.

At the beginning of the 1990s, even before the Gulf Crisis broke out, the Middle East had already become the center of interests for the USA and the Western countries with 1 trillion barrel petroleum reserve capacity. The numbers in 1990 put forward what the Arab countries and Iran petroleum and gas meant.⁴³

The oil reserve in Iraq is thought to be as huge as to meet the petroleum needs of the USA for a hundred years. After necessary investments are done and all the reserves are operated, it is believed that the oil reserves in Iraq might extend over 300 billion barrels and thus will surpass even the Saudi Arabia, the largest petroleum producer in the world. When the petroleum quality of the two countries in the region is analyzed in terms of the size of the reserve, Saudi Arabia and Iraq petroleum is in high quality but the production cost in Iraq is at cheapest level. Therefore, the most profitable oil reserves in the world are in Iraq. The importance of Iraq petroleum increases day by day in terms of the global energy resources. With the available petroleum, Iraq is the 3rd most important petroleum country after the Saudi Arabia and the Iran.

There is another reason why petroleum is so much important for the USA. Perhaps this reason has become the most prior issue in the USA. As it is known, petroleum marketing is done with dollar; over 50 percent of the dollar demanded in the world market is used in the petroleum marketing. When the effectiveness of Euro in the world market is kept in mind, the anxieties of the USA are completely justifiable. Due to petroleum, the shift of available reserves from Dollar to Euro would cost for the USA inflation increase to unbelievable extends. Since such condition would shake the confidence in dollar in the international markets, this probable development may trigger more serious crises. The most important factor that may protect the USA from this bad condition is the petroleum. The OPEC countries keep on abiding with their decisions in selling petroleum with dollar. However, on condition that OPEC countries decide to transfer to Euro from Dollar,

⁴² Sevil Yıldırım, *Dünyada ve Türkiye’de Petrol*, Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Ekonomik Araştırmalar ve Değerlendirme Genel Müdürlüğü, 2003, p.10.

⁴³ Suat Parlar, *Barbarlığın Kaynağı Petrol*, İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2003, p.552-553.

no one can impede the collapse of the USA. Thus, the USA can only realize her dreams as long as she controls the petroleum exporting countries and petroleum resources, in short as long as it controls petroleum.⁴⁴ Occupying Kuwait, thus having over 20 percent of the petroleum reserves, Iraq would have the most effective position among the OPEC members, and would have chance to designate the monetary unit of dollar marketing. In the 1990s there was no Euro but “four national” currencies namely Frank, Yen, Sterling and Mark had probability to replace dollar. Therefore, the USA has to possess petroleum directly and establish a control mechanism in the Middle East by intimidating the countries possessing petroleum.

2.2.2 Iraq’s Initiatives in Increasing Armament

The Middle East region has become identified with conflicts and wars throughout the history and in the modern days, and remembered by many people as such. The probability of the formation of a war environment due to the clashes originating from the restlessness and disagreements in the Middle East is more than the other places in the world. This probability leads the Middle Eastern countries to have policies of “being at least as powerful as the rival”.

When we examine the armament efforts in the region closely, it can be said the reason lying under their aim is that the countries especially the USA strengthens some countries in the Middle East in respect to military, and establishes “regional polices”, who would apply their policies. For example, with the Nixon Doctrine, the USA undertook the responsibility to protect security in the Middle East. As it is obvious, during the reign of Nixon the USA stated that it was not in a position to carry out all the decisions, plans and programs about the defense of the independent states alone, and wanted the allies of the USA to put their hands under responsibilities. Accordingly, the USA would develop its diplomatic relationships with the Middle Eastern countries, and would provide them economical and technical supports; and would detect the self efforts of the Middle East countries in response to it. As a matter of fact, under the circumstances the Nixon doctrine was given a

⁴⁴ Tayyar Arı, *Irak, İran ABD ve Petrol*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007, p.115.

special feature, and the “Twin Pillar” policy, which aimed at increasing armaments in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two great powers in the region in addition to Iraq, was put into effect.⁴⁵ According to Nixon plan, the capacities of these countries, which would be in charge of the defense of the region, in respect to quality and number would develop with the American arms

There are two aspects of armaments: one is “commercial” and the other one is “dominance/hegemonic”. Whereas in the “commercial” aspect of the armament is profit, in the “dominance/hegemonic” it is to establish dependence of a country as well as to form a structure to protect the interests of the imperialist powers.⁴⁶ Hence, both the hegemony was sustained on the countries and millions of dollars flow to selling countries.

Iraq began to increase her military capacity before the war of Iran-Iraq and continued during the war. While accelerating the production of nuclear and chemical weapons herself, on the other hand it made the country just like an ammunition store with the arms she bought from the Western countries. In this respect, Iraq also continued her military research and development activities and production of weapons.

Receiving the support of the West, Iraq accelerated over armament with the Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, it can be said that what Iraq gained most in the war against the flow of billions of dollars it spent was advanced armament systems that it bought from various countries from Russia to China, France to Argentina and even Germany. America’s preference of Iraq against Iran facilitated Iraq to supply required materials for the development of chemical and biologic weapons. Iraq produced these lethal weapons, missiles and long-ranged planes with the brain power, effort and financial contributions it received from several countries. Consequently, Iraq became a power that could threaten the most important political and economic centers of the Middle East. Iraq especially developed the rocket types it bought from the Soviet Union and equipped them with chemical and biologic

⁴⁵ Arı, *2000’li Yıllarda*, p.73.

⁴⁶ Mehmet Kocaoğlu, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Işığında Orta Doğu*, Ankara: Genkur Yayınları, 1995, p.174.

heads.⁴⁷ It is assessed that Iraq first began to search chemical weapons in 1973 as contrary to the failure of the Arabs to have any success against Israel and thus their humiliation. As a matter of fact there are reports about the unproven assertions that Iraq first had its attempts to use chemical weapons against the Kurds, who revolted in the years between 1973 and 1975.

One of the assistants of the over-armament of Iraq had been the Soviet Union. Saddam Husain headed towards Moscow as a response to armament of Iran Shah, who had been “historical enemy” of the Israel and the Arabs, by the USA; and the Soviet Union did not hesitate to meet the needs of Iraq about the arms generously. According to statistics, the Soviet Union contributed to the strengthening of Iraq Army by giving tanks, war planes, helicopters and missies in great amounts between the years 1973 and 1980. In addition, England had been the leading country in Europe to provide Iraq with military equipments. England also conducted technology transfers to Iraq to a considerable extent.

Iraq had become the leader of the region owing to the expenses on arms during and after her war with Iran. By the end of 1989, it became obvious throughout the world that Iraq had connections with international firms for the trade of spare weapon parts and chemical materials.

Having annual income of 35 billion dollars from the petroleum resources, Iraq possessed huge number of weapons and military equipment from various sources during and after the war with Iran. While doing this business, Iraq spent money easily, even in some black marketing, without thinking of money; Iraq increased its military power. To Iraq, the best way to play high was to be the best in respect to military and risk everything in order to maintain it.

Iraq, with this military power, was defined as having the fourth largest army in the world. According to the majority of the opinions, especially the USA allowed Iraq to build the fourth powerful army deliberately; and thus by increasing the self-confidence of Iraq, she was provided a chance to carry out crazy activities easily. In short, it was a psychological trap. The efforts of Iraq in armament after the war were interpreted as the will of taking the region under its sovereignty. However, the

⁴⁷ Doğu Ergil, *Körfez Bunalımı*, Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1990, p.25.

external loan of 80 billion dollars was the greatest barrier ahead of this aim. In 1989, Iraq played a pioneering role in the foundation of Arab Cooperation Council, to which Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen were participated. This alliance bothered Kuwait, which was the leading country to support Iraq. The fact that Iraq was not eager to abandon Bubiyan and Warba islands and that did not sign any treaty on the borders with Kuwait despite the end of the war, naturally bothered Kuwait from the behaviors of Iraq.⁴⁸

After the Gulf Crisis no one wanted the military power of Iraq to be destroyed completely for the fact that under the circumstances the power balance of the region would alter in favor of Iran and Syria; “Iraq barrier” ahead of the Shii radicalism would be destructed. The Arabs included in the above-mentioned alliance also did not want it since the complete annihilation of Iraq military power would result in the most powerful Arab military power against Israel, to be withdrawn from the stage.

2.2.3 Emerging Economic Crisis After the Iran-Iraq War

Starting in 1980 and continuing for 8 years until its end in August 1988 ceasefire, Iran-Iraq War had been an important factor that led Saddam Husain to occupy Kuwait. The fact that the war was spread to a long span of 8 years, it consumed most of the resources in Iraq. As a matter of fact, these resources were not sufficient in meeting the costs of the war, Iraq got into a gigantic burden of loan. That would be an important factor to push Hussain to the occupation of Kuwait.

One of the main reasons why Iraq went through a huge sum of loan was the arms that Iraq bought during the war. Iraq spent half of the gross national product only in 1984 to buy arms. On the other hand, the cost of the arms Iraq imported between the years 1982-1985 was 42,8 billion dollars. At the end of the 8 years of wartime, Iraq had no gaining, while more than 100 thousand people were killed, and there were 100 billion dollars of loan for only armament and 560 billion dollars of indirect expenditure. This shows us how terrible the condition of Iraq was at the end of the war. This failure of the Baghdad administration dragged them to find different

⁴⁸ Charles A. Kupchan, *The Persian Gulf and The West: The Dilemmas of Security*, Boston: Ullen ann

solutions in order to remove the destruction and debt made during the war.⁴⁹ Furthermore, it led Saddam Husain to seek another victory abroad. Only a victory to be made could survive Baas administration and Saddam Husain government before the people of Iraq. Through such a victory, thus obtaining a new resource of petroleum and a transit way to the Gulf, Iraq would be one of the greatest powers in the Middle East region. Of course, the victory to be made must not have jeopardized the work of Iraq, which was already in a terrible condition. All these realities of Iraq were indicating a single address: Kuwait.

2.2.4 Stress in Relations Between Iraq and Western Countries

While the military expenses of Baghdad increased and in that respect placed Iraq at the first in the region, international reaction also became immense. Israel as well as the Western countries claimed at the beginning of the 1990s that Iraq was a nuclear power. Rejecting all the assertions, Saddam Husain stated that they did not need nuclear weapons, and that they had sufficient amount of chemical weapons for a probable attack by Israel.

Upon a statement of the USA and England that they revealed a smuggling operation on 29 March 1990 that Iraq carried a nuclear weapon trigger through Heathrow airport, the tension between the West and Iraq increased. Saddam Husain rejected the accusations against him by stating that the equipment, which was claimed to be nuclear weapon trigger, was used for other aims. In addition, he went on to say that the Western firms and intelligence organizations tried to trap Iraq, which would never be possible. He repeated that they had no need for nuclear weapons as they had adequate amount of chemical weapons that may dissuade a probable nuclear attack. In his statement, Saddam told that the Western states target the developments of military and industrial capacity of Iraq, and that they try to legalize the probable attacks of Israel.⁵⁰ However, the West did not find the

Unwin, 1987, p.514.

⁴⁹ Burhan Bozgeyik, *Orta Doğu Üzerine Oynanan Oyunlar - Körfez Savaşının Perde Arkası*, İstanbul: Yeni Asya Yayınları, 1991, p.66.

⁵⁰ Nadim Jaber, "The Iraq-West Confrontation: Background and Reactions", *Middle East International*, Vol.373 (1990), p.3.

intentions of Saddam Husain in regard to not having nuclear power as convincing, and Iraq was drawing attention as the only country with nuclear weapon capacity in the Arab world.⁵¹

Iraq and Israel declared that they were in a competition to nuclear armaments in May and June of 1990 and the “balance of terror” began to be talked about. Hence, the terms of “dissuasion” and “retaliation” entered to the military terminology in the Middle East.

2.2.5 Iraq’s Demand and Efforts to Increase Oil Prices

Iraq, which has the second largest petroleum reserve in the world, gets almost entire external incomes from the exportation of petrol and petroleum products. The Bagdad administration thought the petroleum incomes as the only source to rectify 100 billion dollars of foreign debt and the destructions within the country. However, there was something wrong with it. The over production of Kuwait by exceeding the quotas of OPEC meant to be decreases in the petroleum prices, which was already too low for Iraq.

The thesis Iraq put forward as a reason to its occupation of Kuwait was that Kuwait pumped cheap petroleum to the market and incurred losses of 14,5 billion dollars in the previous year for Iraq.⁵² According to Saddam Husain, a dollar reduce in the prices of petroleum makes Iraq lose one billion dollar a year. To him, such a loss of an exporting country meant a gain for the importing country. The USA, the Western countries and Japan are among the leading petroleum importing countries from OPEC.

The Iraq administration spent great efforts to increase the petroleum prices before the crisis. Iraq insistently continued its assertions that the Gulf countries especially Kuwait produced petroleum exceeding the quota, and as a result of these endeavor and Iraq’s insistence to increase the price to 25 dollars a barrel, the OPEC, increased the price of the petroleum from 18 dollars to 21 dollars and that there

⁵¹ “Saddam Wants His Bomb”, *The Middle East*, Vol.187 (1990), p.11.

⁵² *Sabah* 3 August 1990

would be a strict coordination in maintaining the quota in the meeting held in Genève on 25 July 1990.⁵³

2.2.6 Background of Problems Between Iraq and Kuwait

Kuwait had been an Ottoman territory from the beginning of the 16th century to 1916. The central Ottoman State did not concern with Kuwait, which had no economic and strategic importance, until the end of the 18th century. The Ottoman Government concerned with Kuwait only after the Western companies' use of the Gulf in their trade with the Asian countries. The Ottoman Empire's efforts to establish sovereignty in the region faced reactions of the Western countries especially those of England. Local Kuwait administration acted in balance towards the Ottomans and England in the period until the WW I. In this frame, Kuwait accepted the dominance of England with an agreement it signed with England secretly in 1899.⁵⁴

Utub tribe including El Sabah family took refuge in Basra, which was an Ottoman state then; then, from Bahrain in the 1700s upon the pressure they received shelter from Iran. Later with the permission of the Ottoman State, some of them settled in Kuwait, which was a shelter of fishermen and the summer houses of the Ahsa tribes then. The tribes settled in Kuwait were traditionally begun to be administered by Al Sabah family.

Like the other Gulf territorial units, Kuwait also became the center of interest for England in the 1800s. Bothered with the activities of the English in the region, the Ottoman State controlled strategic locations such as Kuwait, and Bahrain through Basra. However, it was a passive control period. Especially after the Paris treaty in 1856, the Ottoman State, which was eager to approve its area of dominance to the European states especially to England, started activities in the Gulf of Basra and thus tried to maintain an effective control on Kuwait.

⁵³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Yirminci Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, 2010, p. 879.

⁵⁴ Republic of Turkey, Kuwait Embassy web page, the notes section of Information, Kuwait History (<http://kuveyt.be.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=103>)

England started to have single sided attempts in 1878 excusing the activities of piracy in the Gulf. This would affect the Ottoman-English relationships for a long time. In the same period, conflicts of some traditional powers with each other in the Nejd region (Central Saudi Arabia) also affected Kuwait. Especially the tendency of Ibn Rashid, who was an important power in the interior regions, to spread dominance towards Kuwait, was an important factor in it. With the instigation of the English people, the Kuwait governor, upon their anxieties that they could not be protected by the Ottomans any more, signed a secret treaty with the British people in 1899.

There were the Germans and the Russians at the stage at the beginning of the 1900s. The fact that especially the destination of the Baghdad railways, which was franchised to the Germans, was designed to extend Kuwait caused serious problems between the Ottoman State and England. The Ottoman-English treaty signed in 1913 contributed to the reformation of the region. In accordance with this agreement, England agrees to connect Kuwait to the Ottoman State as an autonomous province in return for the Ottoman's giving up its claims over Bahrain. The boundaries between Iraq and Kuwait were designated with this agreement. Hence, the borders of Kuwait were drawn. According to it, Umm Qasr remained with the Turks, Bubiyan and Warba islands were left to Kuwait. However, the First World War capsized all the balances. The 1913 Treaty, which also specified the borders of Kuwait, was not approved by the parties due to war. Upon the occupation of Basra by the English, the active relationships of the Ottoman State with Kuwait came to an end. By the end of mandatory administration on Iraq, which was left to England, the border between Iraq and Kuwait was re-designated with the reciprocal letters diplomacy of the administrators of the parties in 1932.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, Iraq demonstrated its dissatisfaction by claiming that Kuwait is a part of Iraq, and attempted to have annexation for many times. The first of them took place at the beginning of the 1930s. Upon a positive approach of Kuwait to the schemes of King Gazi to unite Kuwait and Iraq, which also included economic benefits, England put pressure on the Kuwait Sheikh to prevent the actualization of the plan.

⁵⁵ Kupchan, p. 514.

The second annexation attempt came into a question with England's withdrawal from Kuwait in 1961 and recognizing the independence of it. General Kasım did not recognize the independence of Kuwait claiming that it was the part Iraq; in contradiction, he declared annexation of Kuwait on 26 June 1961. However, at the time Iraq was having enough trouble with the Kurds and thus did not deploy adequate military power to the Kuwait border; thus the declaration of annexation just remained on paper. Meanwhile, upon the help request of Kuwait from England against a probable attack of Iraq, England sent aircraft carrier and war ships, and then deployed soldiers to Kuwait on 1 July 1961. Since the attempts on UN level did not reach at any conclusion due to the hindrance of the Soviet Union, the Kuwait problem was moved to the Arab League. The Arab countries supported Kuwait and an army composed of the soldiers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria replaced the British soldiers.⁵⁶

It is observed that after the fall of General Kasım, new Iraq government, which continued for a short time, gave up the claims of Iraq on Kuwait.⁵⁷ Since the aim of the new government in Iraq was to develop the relationships with the Arab states, an agreement was signed with Kuwait in 1963 to form a united commission to confirm the borders specified in the agreement made in 1932 as the final borders. In return for this, Kuwait would provide economic assistance to Iraq and in an appropriate condition it would annul defense agreement signed with England. Kuwait was accepted to the membership of the United Nations on 14 May 1963.⁵⁸ However, by the re-establishment of the Baas Party power in Iraq in 1963, the claims of Iraq over Kuwait were again put on agenda.

With the Baas Party's retaking the power over completely, Iraq repeated the claims over Kuwait with a louder voice. Meanwhile, England had a statement that it would withdraw from the region in four years. Under the circumstances, Kuwait was deprived of the dissuasive power and helps of England, and thus felt it necessary to

⁵⁶ W.H.Nelson, "What's the Answer for the Gulf?" *Proceedings* (December 1990), p.33.

⁵⁷ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.221.

⁵⁸ UN web site, "<http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml>"

be ally with Iraq in order to protect its interests related to security. Accordingly, Kuwait declared the annulment of defense agreement with England in May 1968.⁵⁹

The other reasons at the background of Iraq's annexation of the territory of Kuwait emerged in the 1970s, when the petroleum production increased. In addition to the fact that the Bubiyan water was quite appropriate for the establishment of a petroleum terminal, Iraq wanted to possess Bubiyan and Warba islands of Kuwait in order to reach petroleum bed. Iraq began to put pressure on Kuwait to rent Bubiyan and Warba islands to it and sign a treaty of borders in the way Iraq desired. Upon Kuwait's rejection of these conditions, Iraq occupied Kuwait. However, due to deploying troops to Saudi Arabia border on the one hand and diplomatic contacts with the Arab League on the other hand, and also against the financial sanctions, Iraq had to withdraw from the border region that it occupied. By the year 1975, Iraq put pressure on Kuwait to leave Warba Island to Iraq and rent Bubiyan Island for 99 years to Iraq. In the same year Iraq signed treaties with Iran and Algeria, and despite the fact that there was no need for the presence of soldiers at the Umm Kasr border, only in 1977 Iraq withdrew from the aforesaid region. By its attack to Iran in 1980, Iraq put again pressure on Kuwait to rent Bubiyan and Warba islands for a long time excusing that it was needed for the protection of Umm Kasr. However, given the fact that Iraq was in war with Iran then and needed financial and political supports from Kuwait, Iraq gave up the pressures on Kuwait.⁶⁰

2.2.7 The Regime Problems in Iraq

Frequently emergent problems with the neighbors in the foreign policy of Iraq and the reason that they turned into a war is the inconsistency between the society and the government. Iraq has a quite complex society structure. Iraq is consisted of various ethnic and religious groups. In terms of ethnicity there are the Arabs, the Kurds, the Turkmens and few Asuris, the Iranians and the Armenians. According to a population census in 1991, out of 18 million population 75 % was the Arabs, 20 % was the Kurds and 5 % was Turks and the rest were consisted of the other minor

⁵⁹Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.222.

ethnic groups. A vast majority of the society is Muslim; in Shii-Sunni distinction, Shiis are dominant.⁶¹

There have been two valid administration types in the history of Iraq: the reign of Kingdom between the years 1921-1958, and the Republican Era after 1958. The name of the second one is an administration of republic but still the way it was operated was not a real republic for the fact that the representatives of the republic were not selected by the public but they came to the power with military coups. The people of Iraq experienced many military coups and attempts. After every coup there has been a new authoritative leader and administrations. There were 7 military coups and attempts between the years 1936-1958; and 5 coups and attempts between 1958 and 1968. Two of these military coups are very significant for the history of Iraq: the first one is the coup of Abdul Kasım in 1958; and the second is the Baas coup in 1968. The 1958 coup terminated the rules of kingdom and brought so called democracy to Iraq. The most important characteristic of the 1958 coup was the changes in the foreign policy of Iraq. Abdul Kasım withdrew Iraq from the Bagdad Pact and started to develop the relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Baas Party, which came to power in 1968 with a military coup, became the most important rule in the recent history of Iraq by adopting an ideology based on socialism and the Arab nationalism.⁶²

It is in fact better to examine Baas reign in two periods. The first period is the time span between 1963 and 1979, and the second period is the period of Saddam starting from 1979. After the unification of the character of Saddam with the Baas administration, a dictatorial regime was born. The Saddam period, which started with a bloodless beginning, turned into a completely bloody reign. This bloody rule was operated first against the oppositions with Iraq, then splashed to the countries in the vicinity, and would finally continue with the war and occupations.⁶³ Saddam did not only hesitate to mash his political rivals, the ones contradicting his ideas or those hesitating against his orders but also he forced thousands of people to massacre,

⁶⁰ *Economist*, March 27, 1982.

⁶¹ Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda*, p.18.

⁶² Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kışkırcısında Dış Politika, Körfez Savaşı - Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*, Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2000, p.91-92.

mandatory migration and massive tortures. The citizens were constantly taken under custody; the ones to be suspicious were arrested arbitrarily, they were interrogated under cruelty, and were beheaded without any trial or they were somehow missing.⁶⁴ There had been such a police force that Saddam was informed about everything that was happening in Iraq. Hence, people had such a condition that they did not even trust their own family members.⁶⁵

The regime of Iraq sustained in a perfect auto control system. The one at the top of this auto control system was Saddam Husain, who had no responsibility towards anyone or anything. In the year after he got leadership, he showed himself first in the Middle East and then in the world by challenging Iran. By the year 1990, he was in a position to have a structure to do anything, and he occupied Kuwait despite the opposition of the entire world and thus caused the Gulf Crisis.

2.3 Development of the Gulf Crisis and War

2.3.1 Birth of the Crisis

The emergence of the crisis was in fact the claim of Iraq State President Saddam Husain on 17 July that Kuwait and United Arab Emirates exceeded the petroleum production amount and cost 14 billion dollars of loss for Iraq. Moreover, Iraq asserted that Kuwait stole petroleum from Iraq by opening petroleum wells in Iraqi territories; and demanded compensation of 2,4 billion dollars.⁶⁶ Iraq also started to deploy soldiers to the Kuwait border at the mid of July.

Hence, Iraq prepared an environment for the occupation and annexation of Kuwait. Justifying it, Iraq tried to actualize its historical claims on Kuwait by using power, and thus approached to its final ambition to be the single dominant power in the region. In case Iraq adds Kuwait to its territory it would be the second largest

⁶³Yılmaz Kalkan, *Bir Orta Doğu Gerçeği- Irak ve Saddam Hüseyin*, İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1991, p.63.

⁶⁴Ergil, p.12.

⁶⁵Kalkan, p.66.

⁶⁶Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda*, p.224.

petroleum reserve in the world after Saudi Arabia. Therefore, there would be no power standing ahead of this potential power of Iraq in the region.⁶⁷

There were some other reasons that led Iraq to such attitudes. Firstly, the USA supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, which led Iraq to think that the USA will be tolerant to them. If we especially focus on the economical point; by occupying Kuwait Iraq would get rid of its debt to Kuwait and would also hunt down the petroleum reserves of Kuwait. This would also give Iraq chance to determine the oil prices.⁶⁸ The Iran-Iraq war did not result in the way Iraq expected; moreover, Iraq had to bear the expenses of the war herself. Hence, Saddam Husain did not want to pay back the debts of approximately 50 billion dollars to the countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that supported Iraq financially during the war. Iraq asserted that by fighting against Iran, it had prevented the threat of Khomeini regime to the Arab countries in the region, and thus the expenses of the war had to be shared.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Kuwait claimed that Saddam Husain was not willing to pay the debts to Kuwait and that he was trying to be the sole leader in the region; and thus Kuwait carried the issue to the United Nations. Iraq accused Kuwait of preparing an opportunity for the Western countries to intervene the Gulf region by moving the issue to the international platform as applying to the United Nations.

There had been in many respects an interesting meeting between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi administrators in Jeddah on 01 August 1990 before the crisis. The meeting, which was intended to solve the problems, became the final meeting for the parties to see each other face to face directly before the occupation. The interesting thing about the meeting was that the dialogues in the meeting, which took about one and half hour, was not declared to the press. In fact the meeting went by quietly until the financial issues, but with the commencement of the financial topics, the atmosphere of the meeting was tightened. The Iraqi authorities wanted 10 billion dollars debt from Kuwait; however, the Prince of Kuwait said that they could give 9 billion dollars loan just to humiliate Iraq. Izzet Ibrahim, who represented Iraq and was the second man in the Baas Party, told that he was not authorized to receive any amount

⁶⁷ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.224.

⁶⁸ Steve A. Yetiv, "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.197, No.2 (1992), p.197-198.

of loan less than 10 billion dollars.⁷⁰ In order to solve the problem, in a dinner party, the King of Saudi Arabia Fahd made gesture making a commitment that he would give the difference of 1 billion dollar unreturned. After the dinner party, Kuwait Prince Saad stated that they also had to discuss the issue of borders. When the Kuwait Prince Saad said that they would give 9 billion dollars on condition to solve the border issue, the already tense atmosphere reached its climax. In response to İzzet İbrahim's following statement;

*"Iraq knows how to take this money from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia very well"*⁷¹

Aiming at England and the USA, Prince Saad said:

*"Kuwait has powerful friends and they would make them pay the money they loan from Kuwait back"*⁷²

These words of threats were the final exchanges of speeches between the two sides.⁷³

On the other hand, while diplomatic contacts were intensified, the USA stated that it does not expect the crisis between the two countries lead to a war. In fact, the attitude of the USA was to provide Iraq chance to attack before the end of the Desert Storm Operation that is 28 February; so that the USA would get a chance to intervene.⁷⁴ Besides, despite Saddam's deployment of soldiers to the Kuwait border, there was no any warning from the American administration. The CIA informed the White House on 24 July about Iraq's placement of troops at the border of Kuwait. The CIA sent satellite photographs of Iraq deploying 30.000 Iraqi soldiers to the border. The CIA observed all the developments and informed the administration. The USA administration, which knew every single detail of all these developments, did not give any information the General Secretary of the United Nations. The USA continued such attitudes even after the later phases of the crisis.⁷⁵

⁶⁹ Toktamış Ateş, "Körfez Krizi" *İktisat Dergisi*, Vol.306 (n.d.), p.16.

⁷⁰ Pierre Salinger, "The United States, The United Nations, and The Gulf War", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.49, No.4 (1995), p.601.

⁷¹ Kupchan, p.602.

⁷² Kupchan, p.602.

⁷³ Kupchan, p.602.

⁷⁴ Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda*, p.226.

⁷⁵ Kupchan, p.599-600.

2.3.2 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

The Gulf crisis, which was originated with the occupation of Kuwait, emerged as a product of completely irrational policies of Saddam Husain, who did not or did not want to see many things. Since Saddam Husain continued his wrong attitude which began with the occupation of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the solution of the problem through diplomatic means was not also possible; as a result UN Security Council warned Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally or that there would be a use of multinational force led by the USA approved with the decision number 678. As a matter of fact, the air raids that began on 17th October turned into a military operation until 24th February. By the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait on 27th February and the declaration of the US President about the end of the war, Gulf Crisis officially ended in terms of the military dimension.⁷⁶

Entering Kuwait by means of an occupation on 2 August 1990, and then trying to strengthen its control in Kuwait; Iraq declared the annexation of Kuwait on 8 August and also declared it as the 19th city of Iraq on 28 August. Under the circumstances, as soon as receiving the news that Iraqi troops passed the border over, Prince el-Saad phoned American Embassy and conveyed his demand for an immediate help. The American government, which knew that the crisis would reach to this extent but did not attempt to do anything intentionally, started an extraordinary mobility on the request of the Prince. Although the occupation period was the time of evening in the US (due to time difference), they worked very hard with an utmost speed at night, and prepared documents seizing all the possessions of Iraq and Kuwait in the USA as a precaution. Even more, the USA wanted the same precautions to be taken in the Europe and the Asia.⁷⁷

The USA government waited for 4,5 months to start taking an action on 17 January 1991. There are some reasons for it.

⁷⁶ Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda*, p.228.

⁷⁷ Eric Laurent, *Çöl Fırtınası* translated by Erden Akbulut-Ahmet Sensılay, İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1991, p.25-26.

Firstly, in order to have legal international backup, through the UN, Bush wanted Iraq to terminate its occupation. However, the US preferred to wait for the UN documents authorizing it to have military intervention to Iraq.

Secondly, it was needed to have a Desert War to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Hence, it was necessary to take time to prepare the army.

Thirdly, there was a Vietnam Syndrome. In order for the USA not to fall down to another Vietnam quagmire, it needed backup from the other countries. Hence, a decision to establish a multinational force was taken in Saudi Arabia on 7th August.

Finally, in order to have the public support of America, Bush placed importance on the attempts of negotiating but did not get any result. Tariq Aziz-James Baker meetings in Genève on 9th January, attempts of the Arab countries (Jordan, Algeria, Libya, Yemen and Palestine Liberation Organization) that support Iraq, and the diplomatic attempts of the UN Secretary Perez de Cuellar did not bring any help.

The crisis, which started on 2 August, had a long process of diplomatic attempts especially economic sanctions, and finally with the 678 numbered decision of the UN Security Council, a military intervention to Iraq began on 17 January 1991. The war, which would continue for 44 days between the dates 17 January-28 February, ended as a great victory of the coalition forces formed against Iraq. The land operation held between 24-28 February and ended with the defeat of Saddam Husain was named as “War of 100 Hours”. This war was also a serial of international military, economic, diplomatic and psychological conflicts; it was in fact the second largest international war that took place after the WW II.⁷⁸

2.3.3 Un Intervention / 1991 Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm)

As it was required by the 678 numbered decision of the Security Council, on account of the reason that Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait until the midnight of 15 January 1991, hundreds of American and English planes taking off from Saudi

⁷⁸ Uğur Güzel, *Saddam Hüseyin*, İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2005, p.173.

Arabia began to bomb military targets in Iraq in the morning of 17 January 1991 (at 02:30 with the Baghdad Time). The main targets were radar facilities, pre-warning systems, airports, missile bases and the destruction of the ways for the logistics to 42 divisional Iraqi troops gathered in Kuwait.⁷⁹ In fact, the decision taken in the American congress on 12 January 1991 in the light of 678 numbered UN decision, gave the President authority of war to expel Iraq from Kuwait. As a matter of fact, coalition forces led by an American general carried out 'Operation Desert Storm' until 24 February as an air raid. In this period diplomatic initiatives of Iran State President Rafsanjani, the Soviet Leader Gorbachov, Gulf Cooperation Council and others were resulted in vain. The land operation of the coalition forces, which began on 24 February and ended by UN representative's information on 27 February about Iraq's declarations of the acceptance of the "660, 662 and 674 numbered UN decisions, and that they gave up their claims over Kuwait and that they could withdraw completely" forms the second phase.⁸⁰

The USA brought Saddam to heel after 100 hours of land operation, and not being satisfied with it, the US stated that it would smash Iraq until it would not be possible for Iraq to move, which it put into effect with the 687 numbered UN Security Council decision on 3 April 1991, which kept Iraq under a complete supervision in the post war era. This decision, which would have the attribution of just like a Constitutional Law of the UN decisions from now on, is the decision with the longest text.⁸¹

2.3.4 Related Decisions by the United Nations and Diplomatic Initiatives

During the Gulf Crisis, which began with the Iraqi occupation to Kuwait, for an international problem, the UN organization and especially Security Council had been seen in the most active position since the very foundations in 1945. The Security Council that had not been active for fifty years started to be active after this crisis. In this, there are also impacts of the developments in the Eastern Bloc and the

⁷⁹ Armaoğlu, p.886.

⁸⁰ Tayyar Arı, *Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğu, Siyaset, Savaş ve Diplomasi*, Bursa: MKM Yayınları, 2008, p.578-579.

end of the Cold War. In addition, the fact that the problem started to affect the interests of the USA and the Western states also have shares in it.

Accordingly, the Security Council led by the USA took the decisions numbered 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677 wanted Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and solve the problems between the parties with diplomatic means. However, upon the impossibility of it, the decision numbered 678 and dated 29 November 1990 authorizing the use of force to Iraq was accepted.

Following the decision numbered 660 and dated 2 August 1990 that anticipates Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally, the decision numbered 661 and dated 6 August that stipulates economic sanctions was taken. The 661 numbered decisions was a binding one for the UN countries. As a matter of fact, a day after the decision, Turkey declared that it closed Yumurtalik Pipe Line. The decision also presupposed the formation of an effective system of supervision for the application of the economic sanction. Then, on 25 August another decision, numbered 665 was taken anticipating sea blockade application and use of force against the ships not abiding by it. Yet the decision numbered 666 stipulated that the economic sanctions were to be carried out under the supervision of the Security Council and that if there were needs for humanitarian aids, they would be conducted under the supervision of the UN. The decision on air blockade went down on history as the decision numbered 670. This decision anticipated that the countries would not allow their air spaces to be used for the planes going to Iraq and Kuwait. The final decision, which is still a hot topic in international debates, is the decision number 678 dated 29 November 1990. In accordance with this decision, if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January 1991, collaboration with the Kuwait government will be carried out for the maintenance of international peace and security, and all the necessary precautions would be taken against Iraq.⁸² In other words, Iraq is ordered to obey UN decisions until 15 January, otherwise UN would intervene to reestablish peace and security in the region.

⁸¹ Armaoğlu, p.886.

⁸² Christopher Greenwood, "Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Some Legal Issues", *The World Today*, Vol.47, No.3 (1991), p.39.

Numbers of diplomatic options were focused on during the crisis. The first of them is the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and as a result formation of a new government in Kuwait and the proposal for parliamentary elections. The ones proposing this option claimed that with a decision to be taken in the Security Council, the attack that Iraq would have to the region will be considered as the one carried against the five permanent members of the Council.⁸³

Another opinion came from the French President François Mitterrand. To him, it was necessary to make a four-phased plan. According to it, while Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, the foreign forces will also withdraw at the same time. Then a conference would take a place where Lebanon and Palestine issues will also be discussed. Finally, there would be a general disarmament in the Middle East.⁸⁴

Another option was the one which was proposed by the countries supporting Iraq and instantly rejected by the countries that opposed Iraq. It is the solution of the problems within the Arab states and that the foreign powers would not intervene to it. This suggestion, which was proposed by especially the Jordan King Hussein and supported by Yasser Arafat, was opposed by the other Arab countries as well as the USA and England.⁸⁵

None of the aforesaid proposals had been possible to be carried out. Neither had there been any result of the diplomatic initiatives conducted meanwhile. The most important of these initiatives was the meeting of James Baker and Tariq Aziz in Geneva on 9 January 1991. In the statement given after the meeting, Baker emphasized that Iraq government did not show any flexibility in withdrawing from Kuwait. There was also no positive result of the meeting between the UN General Secretary and Saddam in Iraq on 14 January. In his statement, Perez de Cuellar explained that there had been no progress maintained in Iraq so far.⁸⁶

2.3.5 American Diplomatic Policy and Initiatives During the Military Intervention

⁸³ Geoffrey Kemp, "The Gulf Crisis: Diplomacy or Force?", *Survival*, Vol. 32. No.6 (1990), p.513.

⁸⁴ Kemp, p.513.

⁸⁵ Kemp, p.514.

⁸⁶ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.235.

In the structure of the international system, the USA had been seen to become a superior or leader country relatively among the equal ones in the post Cold War Era especially after the developments in the Eastern Bloc. Under the circumstances there were two alternatives before the USA. The first of them is that the USA forces would either go back to their own country, and would not join the regional conflicts. The second was that it would prevent the emergence of regional threats that dangers her interests. It was not possible for the USA to select the first alternative. Because in such a condition, the powers emerging as a result of regional conflicts, would also take other countries under their dominance, and thus may become a direct threat to the interests of the USA. Hence, benefitting from the opportunities bestowed by its position aiming at playing the role of a balancing power state, the USA preferred the second of the above options.⁸⁷ This policy kept the USA away from the regional problems as well as gave chance to intervene them when needed. In this new period after the Cold War, rather than having direct intervention, the USA used UN mechanism as a negotiator; and thus became advantageous in many respects. After the destruction of bipolar world order, it became easier for the USA to have the UN take the decision the USA wanted. By acting with the UN decisions as a negotiator, the USA did not undertake sole responsibility of political, economic and military dimensions.

Under the light of the decision number 678 dated 29 November 1990 anticipating Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait until 15 January or else there would be a use of force, the American Congress granted the President George Bush with an authority of war in a decision taken on 12 January 1991 in order to take all the necessary steps to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.⁸⁸ Following it, “Desert Storm Operation” started on 16th January. The President Bush, in a letter he sent to the House of Representatives and the Senate, summarized the basic targets of the USA for the crisis under the following headings:

- The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait,
- Restoring legal Kuwait government to the power,
- Protection of the American citizens in the other countries,

⁸⁷ Ari, *2000’li Yillarda*, p.235-236.

- To maintain stability in the region that has a vital importance for the American national interests.⁸⁹

The first diplomatic initiative was carried out by Iranian President Rafsanjani to Iraq, but Saddam did not respond it positively.

Apart from a few urgent meetings of PGCC during the crisis, it had no other impact. They could not prevent the crisis turn into an occupation, nor did they contribute anything to diplomatic solutions. Moreover, they could not demonstrate any reaction against Iraq before they saw the clear reaction of the USA. However, although they had no contribution to the solution, they acted with the coalition forces during the war.⁹⁰

Meanwhile, a statement by the Iraq Revolutionary Forces Commanding Council that Iraq may withdraw from Kuwait, gave hope to the world for a short time.⁹¹ Iraq declared that in accordance with the UN decision numbered 660, to have an honorable and acceptable solution; Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait under the following conditions:

- There would be an extensive peace in air, land and sea,
- Ally countries would undertake the responsibility to reconstruct Iraq, to erase all the debts, and removing all the Iraq-related UN decisions and their negative effects on Iraq,
- Withdrawal of the USA and her ally forces from the region in a month, and letting the region as a place refined from all the foreign soldiers and bases,
- Withdrawal of Israel from the Palestine territories and Golan and South Lebanon or to apply the same UN sanctions to Israel,

⁸⁸ *Congressional Digest*, Vol.70, No.3 (1991), p.73.

⁸⁹ "The President's Letter to Congressional Leaders", *"Congressional Digest"*, Vol.70, No.3 (1991), p.68.

⁹⁰ Yetiv, p.200.

⁹¹ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.237.

- For the future of Kuwait, the administrative right of the El-Sabah family would be removed and the new administration would be designated with democratic means.⁹²

The USA stated that these proposals of Iraq did not bear any new element and that they just had new demands. After these demands, the USA told Iraq “to withdraw from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally” by reminding Iraq of the UN decision numbered 660 and dated 2 August 1990,

The USA and England along with the other ally countries rejected these offers of Iraq. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, Iran and Japan stated that there are affirmative aspects of the proposals of Iraq. The Soviet Union offered a peace plan about the matter. According to the plan;

- Iraq would withdraw until 1 August border unconditionally,
- The withdrawal would start right after a day from the ceasefire,
- The withdrawal would be completed in 21 days,
- All the war prisoners would be set free in 72 hours,
- The UN decisions would be ineffective,
- Ceasefire and withdrawal would be supervised by the neutral observers.

The Soviet Union did not want Iraq to dominate the region as an independent force, nor did it want the region to be put under the control of Iran. Thus, the Soviet Union tried to prevent the destruction of the power balance in the region, which was in favor of Iran. This initiative of the Soviet Union worried the American administrators owing to the fact that the initiative abruptly passed into the hands of the Soviet Union. Bothered with the issue, Bush rejected the offer kindly by thanking Gorbachov.⁹³

On the other hand, a land operation was started by the coalition forces a day after the President Bush’s statement that if Iraq does not withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally until 23rd February, a land operation would start. Upon a statement of UN representative to Iraq on 27th February that Iraq accepted the UN decisions

⁹² *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Vol. 49, No.7, (n.d.), p.424.

⁹³ *Maclean’s*, (March 4, 1991), p.25.

numbered 660, 662 and 674 and that Iraq gave up its claims over Kuwait, and that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait completely, President Bush declared that the war ceased and so did the “Desert Storm Operation”.

The conditions of the ceasefire were designated by the multinational military committees meeting held on 3 March 1991. Accordingly,⁹⁴

- The prisoners would be set free, and this would be supervised by the Red Cross and within this frame immediately a group of prisoners would be set free.
- Iraq would give information about the missing soldiers of the multinational force and if there were, the dead ones would be given back,
- Iraq would give required information about the mines that were placed to Kuwait and the Gulf territory,
- The multinational force would not withdraw from the Iraqi territory until Ceasefire treaty was signed.
- Iraq would not open fire to the soldiers of multinational force, not even accidentally.

This treaty makes Iraq accept the conditions of the multinational force. By this agreement, a significant step was made for the military side of temporary ceasefire; and within the same day UN Security Council prepared a plan for a 679 numbered decision within the legal frame of ceasefire. According to this scheme the following issues were drawn up;

- The war prisoners would be set free,
- The commodities that Iraq took from Kuwait would be given back,
- Economic and military sanctions on Iraq would continue,
- Iraq would accept all the UN decisions,
- The multinational force would remain in Iraq until ceasefire was signed,
- If needed, there would be use of military force against Iraq.

Finally, with the UN Security Council decision taken in the session number 2981 and numbered S/RES/687 and dated 3 April 1991, the conditions of ceasefire

⁹⁴ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.239.

with Iraq were fixed. Accordingly, Iraq was required to accept and respect the territorial integrity and independence of Kuwait. Furthermore, the refinement of Iraq from all the nuclear, biologic and chemical weapons and the annihilation of ballistic missile with a range exceeding 150 kilometers were focused on. In order to supervise Iraq whether the conditions are fulfilled or not, an IAEA team would carry out works in collaboration with a special commission (UNSCOM) to be formed by the UN. There was also need for the supervision of the expenditures for the basic food and medicine for the people of Iraq. This would also be supervised by a special commission. The sanctions would continue until it is decided that Iraq fulfills all the decisions taken by the UN, and when it was made sure that Iraq fulfilled the conditions, the sanctions would be removed. In order to afford required purchasing, the UN will decide the amount of external petroleum sale, and some of them would be spent for the UN officials in Iraq, and some would be spent as a war compensation that Iraq had to pay. Finally, it was reminded that all the UN member countries must abide by this and previous decisions.⁹⁵

2.3.6 Results of UN Intervention

After the UN intervention all the nuclear and chemical weapon facilities of Iraq were destroyed, the military power was reduced to almost zero, and economic power had a strong stroke. The Iraq armed forces, which was defined as the fourth largest war machine in the world before the war, was almost completely destructed. Furthermore, according to the 678 numbered UN Security Council decision, the current economic sanction would continue and the nuclear, chemical and biologic weapons that Iraq possessed would be completely annihilated.

On the other hand, by sending SCUD missiles to Israel, Saddam thought that he could drag Israel into the war and thus it would be possible to break the ally in the Arab states against Iraq; however, he could not achieve his goal as Israel did not respond it.

⁹⁵ “UN Security Council”, Web Site (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenElement>)

After seeing this result, it is possible to state that Saddam occupied Iraq with a wrong decision and again with a wrong decision issued an invitation to intervention. If Iraq had withdrawn from Kuwait before the 15th January in accordance with the UN decisions, she would have prevented a disaster and would have been more profitable. She would have prevented the annihilation of the entire military power and saved Iraq from a gigantic sum of compensation. On the other hand, she could have followed her claims over Kuwait in a democratic environment at the right times in accordance with the international law.⁹⁶

After this cheap victory that the coalition forces achieved in four days, the number of death toll was 85 thousand in the Iraqi side, the number of prisoners was 175 thousand whereas the death toll of the alliance was 234 and that of the injured was 479. Meanwhile, a question comes to minds. How could Iraq, while having the fourth most powerful army in the world, be defeated so easily in such a short time? There are many reasons for it. First of all, the ally armies were much powerful than Iraqi armies in terms of the quality, and the 8 years of war with Iran made Iraq exhausted. Secondly, it is Iraq's failure to effectuate superiority in the air and establishment of effective and simultaneous coordination in the region which was known since the WW II. Thirdly, superficial and extreme self confidence based on a single weapon (Scud missiles). Fourthly, it is Saddam's mistake in political estimation (having an occupation out of a blue). In short, Saddam attacked on a wrong place at a wrong time. This wrong estimation dragged the people of Iraq to a complete catastrophe. The most important and the long ranged result of the First Gulf War was the strengthening of the fundamental movements in the Middle East and the North Africa.⁹⁷

In fact, Saddam was not in a role to construct a nation in the pre war period. In other words, with the statement of Laipson, "He had never undertaken a mission in his country like Tito did", even he could not reach to the position in which a nation gathered around.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Arı, *2000'li Yıllarda*, p.242.

⁹⁷ Sander, p.570-573.

⁹⁸ Gökhan Bacık, "Irak'ın Geleceği Üzerine Tartışmalar", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol.6/1, (2000) p.76.

As a result, with the intervention of UN, Iraq was prevented from breaking the balance of power. A new unbalanced condition emerged in the region owing to the destruction of military, economic and political capacity of Iraq. Iran had become the strongest state in the region. Iran, which increased its political influence with the policies she applied during the crisis, benefitted from the increase of the prices in the petroleum, and thus developed her economic capacity.⁹⁹

2.3.7 Mistakes of Saddam Hussein

After the occupation of Kuwait on 02 August, Saddam Hussein tried to strengthen the control of this country; and accordingly he declared the annexation of Kuwait as the nineteenth city of Iraq on 08 August. The mutual uncompromising attitudes of Iraq and USA clogged the ways to the solution of the problem. Saddam Husain thought that the alliance against them would break down and the economic sanction against them would end up soon, but he was mistaken in it. Yet what is more important, he could not guess that the Arab states would form such a barrier against him. Upon placing the foreigners in Kuwait and Iraq to strategic targets, Saddam tried to take assurance from the USA for not attacking. However he was not succeeded in it, Moreover, he attracted the reactions of the people in the world. Iraq, this time, set the prisoners free aiming at establishing an enmity between the USA and the ally countries, and thus destroying the alliance against Iraq. Accordingly, Iraq also tried to use the issue of Palestine; in a statement given on 12 August Iraq said that in case Israel withdraws from the Arab territories that it occupied and agrees on the foundation of a Palestine state, there would be similar arrangements in Kuwait. However, it also proved futile as there was no response from the other side.

Saddam was in a dilemma by occupying Kuwait. On the one hand, by occupying Kuwait, Iraq wanted to add the petroleum reserves and the foreign investments of the country to her resources, and thus become the only sovereign power and the leader of the Arab nations; on the other hand he thought that

⁹⁹ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.243.

international pressures on him to withdraw from Kuwait would be a perfect fiasco ; yet conversely, it would turn out to be a political suicide for him.¹⁰⁰

Besides, Saddam Husain did not give a chance to the attack of the USA and the American administration to risk such a war. Iraq used to think that an alliance led by America is the one that might break at anytime and every single passing time was in her favor. The attitude of the Soviet Union also influenced the policy of Saddam. Iraq thought that the Soviet Union would not allow the USA to use force. As a matter of fact, in a statement on 29 October, the President of the Soviet Union Mihail Gorbachov said that military solution in the Gulf Crisis cannot be acceptable. However, the Soviet Union voted affirmatively for the UN decision, dated 29 November, of the authorization of the use of military force. In addition, Saddam hoped to solve the problem diplomatically and thus he would have a political victory. However, it was a solution that the USA never approached to as it could increase the dominance of Iraq and the political prestige of Saddam in the region. Besides, such a probability of Saddam's political victory also contradicts with the national interests of the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Moscow would be bothered with Iraq's attitudes towards being a sovereign power in the region.¹⁰¹

During the diplomatic conversations, Iraq was eager to withdraw from Kuwait if the petroleum regions in the north, and Warba and Bubiya islands were given to Iraq; however, as explained above, the USA did not approach to such a solution for the reason that it would increase Saddam's political power and Iraq's dominance over the region. Hence, although the solutions that anticipate compromise with Iraq were adapted by Iraq and Saudi Arabia time to time, they were rejected by the USA from the beginning of the crisis to the end.¹⁰²

Since the beginning of the 1990, it was drawn an attention that Iraq desired to be the super power in the region and accordingly developed a missile of 200 km range. Moreover, these missiles had the capacity to be turned into long-range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it was claimed that Iraq continued her activities by reconstructing Osirak nuclear reactor, which was bombed by Israel in 1981 to stop

¹⁰⁰ James A.Philip, "Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Persian Gulf", *The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder*, No.798 (1990), p.7.

¹⁰¹ Ari, *2000'li Yillarda*, p.230.

the chemical weapons production of Iraq. Therefore, it was not possible for the USA to offer a compromising solution to Iraq, which had already been a complete threat in the region with her conventional, chemical and nuclear weapons; and thus Iraq had also been a threat for Israel, the most important ally of the USA in the Middle East region.

On the other hand, while the sanction in accordance with the UN decision numbered 661 weakened the economic and military power of Iraq day by day, Saddam thought that time was passing by in his favor on account of the fact that while the USA and the Western powers increased their military forces in the Gulf, there was also increase in the number of people participating the demonstrations opposing the war. Saddam thought that such a condition would affect the political stability of the USA as well as her allies in the region, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE. Therefore, by the advancement of the crisis, Saddam planned to focus on the Arab nationalism and Islamic values, and thus show herself as the vindicator of these values. The expectation of Saddam that the countries in the region would support him did not end in vain. There were some developments before the crisis that led Saddam to such expectations. In the Arab Summit held in Baghdad on 10 May 1990, Saddam had the impression that the Arab countries supported Iraq to develop nuclear and chemical weapons against a probable attack of Israel to the Arab world. The common result in the summit was that Iraq had to undertake the role of Egypt, whose role was discredited in the Arab world, in the resolution of the Palestine problem. Thus, in the following days after 2 August, the Arab alliance formed against Iraq disappointed Saddam Husain.¹⁰³

2.3.8 U.S. Gains

The fact that the USA deployed 500.000 soldiers to the Middle East and devastated Iraq with an absolute defeat showed the leadership of America in the international arena and that it was an indication that the USA got rid of Vietnam Syndrome. An important reason for it was that a significant share of the cost of the

¹⁰² Philip, p.12.

war was met by some countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates.

Another gain was that the USA got rid of the arms, which she had to get rid of as stipulated by the treaty of disarmament and also became outdated, by using them in the war atmosphere and thus it also tested and developed the arm system in the real war atmosphere.

Some other possible gains of the USA were: trading weapons and having huge profits from the conservative Gulf countries, which did not fall Saddam, in the post war period; keeping Iraq by applying sanctions or dividing it into three parts and taking the petroleum exportation of this country under control; and during the war declaring that a “New World Order” was founded.¹⁰⁴

By winning the war, the USA increased her strategic existence in the region in a way to intervene the disfavored developments in the region, and had a chance to reform the region; and showed that she could punish those who opposed the world order that she preferred, destroyed the Vietnam syndrome, and the economic recess was removed. However, the USA also understood that it was not that easy to form a new Middle East order by bringing the Arabs and Israel together.¹⁰⁵

As a result, in order to reach the crisis that took place in the Middle East, which the USA declared as “vital area of interests”, with an absolute resolution, the USA succeeded in uniting the Western allies and the other Arab countries under the umbrella of the UN; and thus the American based decisions were legalized.

2.4 Attitudes of Powerful Countries During Crisis and War

The European countries showed different reactions to the occupation of Kuwait. While England stayed with the USA since the beginning of the crisis, Germany was reluctant to involve in the crisis. James Baker criticized Germany saying that “Germany, which was everywhere in the world when there was a chance

¹⁰³ James M.Wall, “Hussein’s Designs, Bush’s Intentions”, *The Christian Century*, (1991), p.251-252.

¹⁰⁴ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt: II: 1980-2001*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010, p. 255.

of export income, is not in a place where she should be in the right time”.¹⁰⁶ However, Germany had a financial support of two billion dollars first in the mid November and later donated another two billion dollars, thus making four billion dollars in total. However, Germany did not send any military troop to the Gulf region. Germany showed her constitutional law for the reason of it, and stated that she would not be able to enter any military area apart from that of the NATO.

England kept on her attitude that she had since the beginning of the Gulf Crisis, even when it turned into a war. England, which stayed at the foremost in political reactions as well as military contribution in the alliance formed against Iraq, used the advantage to focus on “special attention” by mentioning historical and cultural ties with America. No matter if the basis for the “special attention” are the cultural and historical ties, the main factor had been the common interest for the petroleum of the Middle East since the beginning of the second half of the 20th century.

According to England, even if Iraq had to evacuate Kuwait, the economic sanctions must have continued. On condition that a strategic security system is established in the region, Iraq had to face a strong military control in order to prevent probable formation of a new strong military power.

France as a first reaction in the days after the occupation kept a distance to the impact of the USA and wanted to conduct her own unique initiative. Speaking at the UN on 24 September, French President Mitterrand offered a completely different proposal for the solution from that of the Americans. Mitterrand ,with due emphasis, said that “if Iraq expresses her intention to withdraw and set the prisoners free, everything can be possible”. This is completely different attitude, which is not to have debates over sanctions before Iraq completely withdraws from Kuwait, from the American one. Moreover, the French President proposed to have an international Middle East peace conference, where Lebanon, Israel-Arab disputes would be discussed. This contradicted with the policies of Bush administration, who already stated that no tie can be established between Israel and the Gulf crisis and Israel-

¹⁰⁵Nasuh Uslu, “Körfez Savaşı ve Amerika’nın Politikaları”, *Ankara: SBF Dergisi*, Vol. 54/ 3 (1999), p.165.

Arab conflicts.¹⁰⁷ However, this attempt ended in failure, when the intervention became inevitable, France changed her attitude. As a matter of fact, the interest of France was also the same as that of America: Petroleum.

France, whose military power was ready at the Gulf with America, sent Clemenceau's Carrier Ship with 3.500 soldiers and many war ships in the second half of August. After the attack on 15 September to French Embassy in Kuwait city, the French troops which were equipped with 48 helicopters, 6.000 soldiers and approximately 30 war plane in Cibus base before, increased to 10.000 soldiers, 40 war planes and 120 helicopters. France did not accept that the soldier capacity should be taken and annihilated as a target, and on the other hand insisted on organizing an international conference for the solution of Arab-Israel disputes. The French Defense Minister Jean Pierre Chevenement, who was at the region of Crisis then, compared the international force to "orchestrate in which everyone has a different role".¹⁰⁸

Germany and Japan were among the leading countries that worried about the occupation of Kuwait. As a matter of fact, both the countries were importing their entire petroleum needs and they were purchasing completely from the Gulf region. Germany and Japan had to act with the USA during the crisis for the fact that both Germany and Japan are two great powers deprived of petroleum. They were dependent on the USA during the Cold War period due to the threats of the Soviet Union, and now they have to act in accordance with the wishes of the USA, who possessed petroleum hegemony.¹⁰⁹

The policy that the Soviet Union followed during the Crisis was completely different from the one that it had during the Cold War period. The first target of the Soviets diplomacy was to develop a dialogue with Iraq. Moscow accepted first Prime Minister of Iraq Sadun Hammadi then Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz twice and the private advisor to the president went to Baghdad twice. The second target was to find a solution within the Arabs themselves; the Soviet Union wanted to act like a bridge between the Arabs who were enemies to each other. The third and the final target of

¹⁰⁶ Uğur Urhan, *1. Körfez Krizi ve Türkiye*, Van: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisans Tezi, (2007), p.65.

¹⁰⁷ Laurent, p.59.

¹⁰⁸ Alain Gresh - Dominique Vidal, *Ortadoğu Mezapotamya'dan Körfez Savaşı'na*, translate by Hamdi Türel, İstanbul: Türel Yayınları, 1991, p.49.

the Soviet Union was to pay attention to the issues that were important to the Arabs. As a result, Moscow would receive her price of four billion dollars from the Emirates of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates for having diplomatic communications with the Gulf countries.¹¹⁰

2.5. Attitude of the Middle East Countries During the Crisis and War

The Arab world was divided into three camps during the crisis. The first group of these camps, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which followed a foreign policy in line with the international alliance and were in the control of the USA; the second group was the PLO, which followed Iraq biased foreign policy; and the third group was consisted of Iran, Yemen and Jordan, which followed an independent policy.¹¹¹

Although Saudi Arabia at the beginning tried hard to prevent the emergence of a war in the region and the involvement of the Western States, it could not resist to the pressure of the USA. The President phoned King Fahd almost every day pressuring on the use of bases. One of the reasons why Saudi Arabia followed a hesitant policy was the issue of Israel. Since Saudi Arabia knew that Israel somehow would be in alliance with the USA, Saudi Arabia did not want to be at the same line with Israel. Moreover, entrance of foreign soldiers to Saudi Arabia, which is the protector of sacred lands, would increase the sensitivity of the world of Islam. However, as a result Saudi Arabia could not resist the pressures of the USA and had to invite American soldiers to her country.¹¹²

Egypt had the most rigid policy in the Arab world. At the beginning of the crisis, Egyptian State President Hosni Mubarak, who took the initiatives on behalf of the Arab world, was the most significant applier of the decision taken by the UN Security Council; in addition he gave full support to the American administration in military intervention. The attitude of Egypt proved to be very fruitful when the USA erased military debt of Egypt, which was as much as 7 billion dollars. As usual,

¹⁰⁹ Bozgeyik, p.112-114.

¹¹⁰ Gresh-Vidal, p.134.

¹¹¹ Ertan Efeğil, *Körfez Krizi ve Türk Dış Politikası Karar Verme Modeli*, Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 2002, p.88.

¹¹² Efeğil, p.89.

America did not put herself to difficulties while giving this money. Because this money was supplied by Germany and Japan, who did not send soldiers to the Gulf but had to give financial supports. Egypt, which had highest number of soldiers (35000 soldiers) in the region after the American and English soldiers, had reward with the financial supports given by Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, while Egypt removed the ban on the pass of the ships with nuclear weapons from the Suez Canal, and gave landing permits to the freight carrier planes of the USA, and provided information it obtained from the collaborations that it had with Iraq regarding the missiles.¹¹³

On the other hand, the policy of Syria was in parallel to that of the USA and the Western allies since the beginning of the crisis. After the crisis, Syria would be either right across the USA or beside her. However, when the effect and the existence of the USA were kept in mind, there was no other alternative than reducing the probable threats. While strengthening her relationships with Egypt and receiving financial help from Saudi Arabia, Syria succeeded in being at the same line with the Soviet Union that provides weapons to Syria. On the other hand, although the USA declared Syria as a terrorist state just a year ago, Syria started to have close ties with the USA. While giving a full support to the international allies on the one hand, it supported that the problem must be solved within the Arab world itself on the other hand.

Palestine Liberation Organization and its leader Yasser Arafat were the only Arab organization and leader that supported Saddam Husain firmly. According to the Palestinians the challenge of Iraq would also change the condition of the Arab world, and would make them more sensible to the resolution of the Palestine issue.¹¹⁴ The PLO, which had been in combat with Israel in military and diplomatic fields for years, believed that it could only solve the problems it face by putting on an agenda in an international meeting. The fact that Saddam Husain related the occupation of Kuwait to the Palestine issue benefitted the Palestinians most.

¹¹³ İsmet Giritli, *Körfez Bunalımının Boyutları*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1991, p.33.

¹¹⁴ Yevgeni Primakov, *Bu Savaş Olmayabilirdi - Bir Gizli Pazarlığın Öyküsü*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 1991, p. 35.

In addition to its desire to have a peaceful solution, PLO stated that it would stay with Iraq in case of a war; and threatened the USA with terrorist attacks. Moreover, Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu Abbas explained in case the USA attacks Iraq, all the American targets would be open to attacks, and gave example to probably retaliation: “American plane against an Iraqi plane”.

By the firm resolution of the international coalition and the effects of the more moderate leaders of the PLO, the reactions of the PLO in the Kuwait crisis altered slowly. PLO administrators or at least some of them were expecting to gain some benefits from the roles of negotiating. However, in a short time it was understood to be just a dream, despite it the Palestinian leaders did not try to increase the tension. Even more, in their statement to the public, they invited Iraq to be more flexible and did not give up their full support to Saddam Husain.

Jordan was among the countries, which was punished with the crisis. At the beginning of the crisis Jordan was of the opinion that there had to be a compromise. However, the efforts to have negotiations proved to be futile, and zero tolerance of America paved the way for the kingdom family to alter her policies. While Jordanian people’s support to Iraq in attacking Saudi Arabia and Israel was continuing, King Husain stepped “cautiously” by offending neither America nor Iraq.

Desiring Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait immediately during the crisis, Iran obeyed the UN Security Council decisions by applying economic sanctions to Iraq carefully; and this behavior of Iran gave an impression that Iran was having collaboration with the USA. As a matter of fact, the assessment of Iran was completely different. According to Iran, if Iraq is given to Kuwait, “there would be an excuse in the hands of the foreign powers to remain in the region permanently”. Hence, Iran insisted on solving the crisis within the countries in the region.

CHAPTER III

TURKEY AND HER POLICY DURING THE GULF CRISIS AND WAR

3.1 Historical Backdrop: Turkey in the Middle East Till the End of the Cold War

The tendency of loneliness was dominant in Turkey's policy of the Middle East during the period from the foundation of the Turkish Republic to the outbreak of the WW II. This tendency can be explained as Turkey's oblivious attitudes towards the developments in the Middle East apart from some exceptions and not playing direct role in the regional developments. While the region was reshaped after the First World War and many great alterations were taking place, there were no significant impacts of Turkey on the region, which stayed in the region for hundreds of years. Unfortunately, except few events, Turkey was excluded from the happenings in the region. These few events are: Mosul issue dated 1925-1926, Turkey-Iran agreement in 1926, Sadabat Pact in 1937 and Hatay problem in 1939.¹¹⁵ In addition to being the issues of the Middle East, these events concerned Turkey more. Turkey could not develop any policies towards the events and reshaping the Middle East except those incidents that concerned Turkey directly.

The reasons that led Turkey to have policy of loneliness were individual, national and international factors. After the end of the First World War, which ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, England and France occupied the region and connected these regions to their administrations with mandatory regimes. When such conditions as Turkey's experiences of war against these occupying states, and their continuing effects on the Turkish internal and external policies are considered, it was impossible for Turkey to have right to say something on the regional initiatives of the Middle East issues, which did not concern it directly.

The internal factors, which affected the policies of loneliness, are the works of reconstructing newly founded Turkish Republic and ideological priorities. Turkey

was in construction of the new state that it founded after the struggle with the occupying countries. The fact that Turkey was passing through a period of economic, social, cultural, institutional and political transformation prevented Turkey from concerning with the external world especially the Middle East. The Republic of Turkey, which tried to establish its own internal orders first, was reluctant to have “adventure” with the international problems that did not concern her directly.¹¹⁶

As an individual factor in the policy of loneliness, the decision makers of the Turkish policy of the period were against having an adventure in foreign policy in the region. The nationalism and religious aspects that kept distances between Turkey and the Arab states was still fresh in the 20th century.¹¹⁷ Under no circumstances and conditions the Republic of Turkey was eager to involve in the affairs of the Arab countries, and intervene their problems, and contribute to their combats against the West.

There was a radical alteration in the Middle East policy of Turkey after the Second World War. This alteration was a period, in which Turkey formed and applied her Middle East policies according to the Cold War conditions; and had steps and initiatives at the edges in accordance with the Western interests.¹¹⁸ Turkey, led by Adnan Menderes government, played a quite active role in the Middle East along the 1950s, and was at the forefront in all types of developments in the region. In the essence of this tendency lie reflections of the alterations in Turkey’s foreign policies biased of the USA and the Western states. Turkey’s Cold War Warrior tendency is most probably originated from the role that Turkey-the USA closeness put on Turkey. Turkey’s effort to enter the Western world especially to the Western Bloc rapidly, affected Turkey’s tendency with the other regions especially towards the Middle East.

Turkey in 1950s followed an American biased foreign policy openly in the problems, which were extensions of the Cold War disputes. The belief of Menderes,

¹¹⁵ Gözen, p.4.

¹¹⁶ William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London: Croom Helm, 1981, p.35.

¹¹⁷ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Arab and Turkish Public Opinion Towards the Questions of the Two Nations”, *Foreign Policy*, Vol.12, (1985), p.22-43.

¹¹⁸ M.Gönlübol - H.Ulman, “Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı: 1945-65”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, (1966), p.143.

which was American biased and against the Soviets, was so strong that it led the government to play a role with the Western alliance in every problem related to the East-West disputes. Turkey actively participated in all the projects of “The Northern Tier” plan, which the USA developed to surround the Soviet Union. Turkey tried to establish ties between the NATO and the Middle East in order to effectuate these collaborative projects.¹¹⁹ The reactions of Turkey in all the crisis and wars in the Middle East region, no matter what was the nature of the problem were Western biased. Turkey supported the policies of the Western states, especially those of the Americans. In addition, Turkey tried to pull the Middle Eastern countries to the Western bloc by inviting them to be the members of the Baghdad Pact.¹²⁰

Turkey has developed her diplomatic and political relationships with Israel compared to the periods when there were Arab-Israel conflicts. In addition to being the first Islamic country to recognize Israel, it developed close dialogues with Israel. Turkey tried to attract the Jewish Lobby in the world towards herself through Israel in order to get financial helps from the world finance organizations. Trilateral intelligence union developed with the participation of Turkey, Iran and Israel combated in collaboration against the radical countries and the groups in the region.¹²¹ By the beginning of the 1960s, this approach of Turkey, paved the way for Turkey to be alienated in the region. Turkey became lonely and had a negative image in the region. Nationalist Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq had a frontier against Turkey. Yet, what is more interesting was that the Arab countries, which Turkey tried to pull to the Western camp, acted in contradiction and approached to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the close relationship that Turkey developed with Israel contributed to Turkey’s divergence from the Arab-Islam world on account of the fact that Arab-Israel relations were quite contrary to each other. This time the Arab countries opposed Turkey’s closeness to Israel for religious bases, Turkey had adapted western biased military and political policies before.

¹¹⁹ Gözen, p.8.

¹²⁰ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türkiye’nin Arap Orta Doğusuna Karşı Politikası, 1945-1970* Ankara: A.Ü.S.B.F. Yayınları 340, (1972); p.2-4.

¹²¹ George E. Gruen, “Turkey’s Relation with Israel and its Arab Neighbours: The Impact of Basic Interest and Changing Circumstances”, *Middle East Review*, Vol.17, No.3, (1985)

The Middle East policy of Turkey after 1960 was different from the policy that was conducted by the Menderes government, until the World Petroleum Crisis that took place between the years 1973-1974. In this period, it was paid attention that the mistakes made in the earlier periods must not be made again, and a new atmosphere with a new image was tried to be made. More attentions were paid to the developments in the region. Turkey tried to escape from being seen as a western player. Turkey avoided Arab biased policy, and paid attention to the relationships with the USA. Turkey did not permit the USA to use Incirlik air base in the Arab-Israel war between the years 1967-1973; and Turkey also stated that she opposed the invasion of Arab territories by Israel.

In the period between the years 1970-1990, the diplomatic and economic-commercial relationships with the Arab countries developed rapidly, accordingly Turkey followed more Arab biased policies in the regional problems. A new era in Turkey-Arab relationships began by the mid 1970s. By developing economic relationships with all the countries in the region, a period of getting close to the region began. To get close, which began with a petroleum crisis before, increased in parallel to aspects of the multi dimensional import and economic activities of the Arab world. Hence, the petroleum crisis in 1973-1974, played an important role in reciprocal approach of Turkey-Arab countries. The most concrete step regarding the issue, as a result of the Iraq-Turkey affiliation, a petroleum pipeline was decided to be constructed between Turkey and Iraq. In accordance with the treaty signed in 1973, the petroleum pipeline was completed and was activated in 1977. The petroleum pipeline which began to be constructed in 1984 was completed and opened to service in 1987.¹²²

The most striking example to this affiliation was the official recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1976 and the organization was given permission to open a representative office in Ankara in 1979. On the contrary, the relationships with Israel were reduced day by day. The representation level in the Organization of Islamic Conference was increased from the Foreign Ministry to the Presidency. Furthermore, the balance policy between the Arabs and Israel also

¹²² Gözen, p.16.

continued in this period. Turkey applied neither the decisions demanding OIC member countries to cut their ties with Israel, nor did it apply OIC decisions that were against the concept of a secular state. Turkey tried to main a balance between them since there were polarization between Arabs and Israel as well as secular and Islamic principles. Due to this sensitivity, some called the Middle East policy of Turkey in the period as “neutral foreign policy” whereas some other called “multi dimensional foreign policy”.¹²³

It was seen that Turkey’s approach to the Middle East until the 1980s originated as a reaction to the negative approaches of the Western states towards Turkey. Turkey-Middle East relationships after the 1980 military coup had more striking characteristics than all the former periods. The essence of this striking policy is that for the first time Turkey played an active role in the region by using her own initiatives as a both a Western and an Eastern country. The Turkey of the 1980 developed intimate economic, commercial, communal and political relationships with the Middle East countries on the one hand, and had very close relationships with the USA in regard to military, finance, and politics on the other hand. One of the reasons for the increase of Turkey’s influence in the Middle East in 1980s is the alterations in the internal policies. After the 1980 military coup, the applied economic arrangements were as important for Turkey as to be the third revolution of Turkey that is a “Liberal Revolution”.¹²⁴ In the decisions taken on 24 January 1980, it was stated that in order to realize liberalization targets in the domestic and external economy, the external markets were needed. Turkey’s relationship with the European Community, the most important economic Bazaar of Turkey, has not been well since the beginning of the 1970s. The relationships, which deteriorated after the military coup, increased the need for economic market. Hence, the Foreign Minister of the period İlder Türkmen went on to say:

“The export of Turkey towards the western markets does not give any hope due to the economic recession. Therefore, it seems that the only way to have 24 January 1980 decisions as success is to enter the Middle East market. In

¹²³ Kemal H.Karpat, “Introduction”, K.H.Karpat (Ed.), *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-74* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974, p.130.

¹²⁴ Dankward A.Rustow, “Turkey’s Liberal Revolution”, *Middle East Review*, Vol, 17. No.3, (1985)

other words, in order to apply export based economic growth strategies, the Middle East market is an opportunity.”¹²⁵

In the final period before the Gulf crisis, Turgut Özal was the most important name to affect the internal policies of Turkey. Acting around liberal understandings, Turkey led by Özal, in parallel to active political participation within OIC in 1980s, ran after large economic and commercial opportunities in the region. The trade with the Islamic countries in the region exceeded 40 percent of Turkey’s total export in the mid 1980s.¹²⁶ By adapting a “neutral” policy in Iran-Iraq war, which happened in this period, Turkey increased her image in the eyes of the countries that supported Iraq as well as in those that supported Iran. By the mid 1980s, the economic relationships that Turkey established with these two countries at war were the most affirmative so far.

By the beginning of 1990s, the unexpected occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and the ensuing Gulf War affected the Middle East policies of Turkey deeply.

3.2 Turkey’s Situation During the Crisis and War

Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait confronted Turkey with two alternatives that contradicted with each other. There was a mutual dependence system between Turkey and Iraq based on issues such as economic, commercial, financial, socio-cultural relationships, petroleum pipelines system, common ethnic problems, and energy. The end of this dependence would not be in favor of Turkey, as it would cost a lot. However, on the other hand, the occupation of Iraq could not be justified by any means. If Iraq is not driven back, it would probably cause more serious problems. Therefore, it was necessary to participate in the coalition formed against Iraq. The fact that Turkey joined the coalition meant Turkey’s abandonment of the principle of “neutrality”. Due to this dilemma, Turkey had hard times in the internal and external policies during and after the occupation.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ İlder Türkmen, *Dış Politika ve Ekonomi*, İstanbul: İKV Yayınları, 1982, p.11.

¹²⁶ Gözen, p.22.

¹²⁷ Gözen, p.27.

Turkey favored the second option against this dilemma, Turkey broke her relationships with Iraq, which had been the most important partner in the region within the frame of United Nations “common security” led by the USA, by leaving the “neutrality” policy that it had been maintaining in the Middle East since the beginning of the 1960s. Hence, Turkey, which tried to avoid the conflicts in the Middle East and also avoided being at any side, found herself this time right at the center of the crisis and supported the coalition of the Western countries against Iraq , to which other Arab countries also joined.¹²⁸

In this period, there were two important factors in Turkey’s policies formed against Iraq. First one is the application of economic sanction which would also cover the close down of the petroleum pipelines and the second is to participate the military operation indirectly by opening the Incirlik air base to the use of American planes. In short, both in economic and military respects Turkey joined the war against Iraq.¹²⁹

In this operation named as the Desert Storm, Turkey opened her territory to the use of the USA and joined the sanction decision of the UN against Iraq, with which Turkey had commercial volume of as much as 2,5 billion dollars, and accordingly stopped the activities of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. Moreover, Turkey allocated her bases and facilities for the use of the USA and NATO troops. The reason of such attitudes of Turkey was that by the occupation of Kuwait, Iraq had a dominant power in the region and there was a probability that Iraq would have solved the other problems by using force. Such a probable situation might have affected the condition of Turkey in the region. Right before the crisis the relationships between Turkey and Iraq were tightened due to water problem, Iraq had given signals to solve the problems by force. Even more, Yıldırım Akbulut, who visited Baghdad in May 1990, gave threat inclusive statements saying that the NATO could not protect Turkey anymore. This emerged doubts in Turkey. As a result, no matter what, during the crisis Turkey approached the initiatives that aim at territorial integrity of Iraq quite hesitantly. The approach of Turkey to crisis and afterwards was towards preventing any situation that may occur in Iraq or Turkey against her

¹²⁸ Arı, *Irak İnan ABD ve Petrol*, p.454.

favor. Moreover, Turkey put a politic attitude forward against the change of balance that may stand as a threat to the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey; and did not avoid having collaboration with the UN accordingly.¹³⁰ In this respect, Turkey also objected the complete devastation of Iraq and thus capsizes of the balance in the region. Turkey also opened her land to the Kurdish people, who were left to their own fate and faced the probability of genocide by Saddam after the crisis. This event formed the basis for the UN decision no 668 for establishing a secure region.

The foreign policy of Turkey in crisis and especially during the war began and continued differing from her traditional policies towards the region. Turkey stated that she would obey all the sanction decisions of the United Nations carefully and did not change her policy during the war as well as the in the post war period. The most striking point in Turkey's new policy was that right after a day of the UN Security Council decision no 661 on 6 August, which is the decision of economic sanction, Turkey closed petroleum pipelines without waiting the reactions of the international community.¹³¹ This decision was perhaps one of the most, if not the most, important options that Turkish foreign policy had towards the Middle East in the last fifty years on account of the fact that by this decision Turkey broke her policy of "neutrality", which she had been maintaining in the region since the 1960s, and stayed with the West actively. Following it, Turgut Özal transferred the authorities in the Constitutional article to the government by passing the law from the Turkish Grand National Assembly as "Parliamentary decision" no 107 on "giving rights to the government in accordance with the Constitutional law no 92" on 12 August.¹³² Again on 5 September 1990 due to the Gulf Crisis, the TBMM issued a Parliamentary decision with a secret session "about Sending Turkish Armed Forces abroad and letting foreign armed forces in the country" and thus extended the authorities of the government in this matter. Upon the acceptance of the UN Security Council decisions numbered 665 and 670 in September 1990, Turkey continued her

¹²⁹ Gözen, p.24.

¹³⁰ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's New Security Environment, Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation" *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.14, No.2, (1995), p.162.

¹³¹ Efeğil, p.179.

¹³² Ergil, p.59.

rigid attitude applying sea and air blockade to Iraq and Kuwait. With the increase of the probability that the ongoing crisis may turn into a hot conflict, deployment of a Flying Squad under NATO at Iraqi border was permitted. Turgut Özal had the Assembly issue another decision on 17 January 1991. In accordance with this decision, 42 American war planes were permitted to take off from Incirlik Air Base.

The most important gain of Turkey in this war was that without using her weapons, the military power of Iraq was eliminated. Many circles in Turkey considered the collaboration with America during the crisis as the intersection of the interests of these two countries.

Consequently, Turkey adapted some new policies with some expectations within the war, her traditional Middle East policies deviated dramatically. Yet, the developments after the war showed that this political preference of Turkey was wrong. The commercial and economic relationships that Turkey had developed since the beginning of the 1980s terminated to a great extent. North Iraq problem, which broke out with the weakening of Iraq's power affected Turkey closely; and the PKK problems increased more. One of the most significant results was that while it was expected that the relationships with the Western states would increase, the opposite took place and more criticisms especially on human rights and democratization began to be made.¹³³

3.3 Changing Turkish Foreign Policy in Relation with the Crisis and War

There are three important factors interrelated with each other and played role in the formation of Turkish policies about the Gulf War. The first is Iraq's occupation and annexation of Kuwait and the results originated from it. By occupying and annexing the Kuwait, Iraq violated one of the basic principles of the international law, which is "respect to the territorial integrity and the independence of the states". Iraq tried to annihilate the existence of Kuwait by using force.¹³⁴ When we see the event in respect to Turkish Foreign policy, rather than having a strict

¹³³ Gözen, p.384.

¹³⁴ Ken Matthews, *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, 5.Chapter.

reaction to Iraq, a policy of “neutrality”, which would preserve the relationships with this country and not contradict to the policies that the western states had, was followed.

In terms of the national interests of Turkey, it could not be an easy choice for Turkey to opt taking reactions and fighting against Iraq because the relationships between Turkey and Iraq was so intensified and comprehensive that there was a “reciprocal dependence of security” between the two countries. Accordingly, there was a system based on economic, commercial, financial and petroleum relationships; collaboration against the separatist Kurdish movement; and some opportunities created by geography and history between the two countries. Not to destroy the system was to the advantages of both the countries.

One of the factors which also affected the policies Turkey applied was the international developments emerged in the international system upon the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait paved the way for the emergence of unprecedented international coalition. Many countries in the world reacted strongly to this situation. As a result, political-military sanctioning power and legal abidingness of the decisions of the United Nations Security Council against the occupation of Iraq were very influential in Turkey’s policy towards Iraq. The main factor that increased the importance of the UN decisions taken during the Gulf War and played a determining role in the formation of Gulf War policies of Turkey was the significant political, economic and military sanctioning power behind these decisions. For the first time in the history of the UN, the vetoing countries of the UN were taking such rapid decisions against an aggressive country and were applying them. The reason behind that was not the respect to the international law but the worries that risk of the super and the great powers to lose their interests originated by the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Another secret lying behind this success was the end of bipolar system after the Cold War in the international system.

The NATO was the most important factor that designated the Gulf War policies of Turkey. The fact that the NATO took precautions against Iraq with consensus and put them into effect, limited the options of Turkey. Owing to the fact that the USA, England and France, which had a vetoing authority in the UN Security Council, are also NATO members at the same time, the unity of power formed in

NATO naturally affected Turkey. Apart from the legal conditions originating from NATO, Turkey's act together with the USA and the other NATO countries is a "political" result. This is not a surprise, because it is a known fact that Turkey had so far sided with NATO countries in the Middle East events. Turkey not only played a strategic role in the Cold War period in the security of the Europe against the Soviet Union, but also played an effective role in the security of the Middle East region.¹³⁵

Turgut Özal's foreign policy vision and the existence of an internal political system that provided a chance for the application of this system was another factor in the formation of Turkish policy in the Gulf War. The fact that Özal on the one hand had American biased policies and having sympathy towards the Arab and the Muslim countries on the other hand was the indication that he would have a reaction against Iraq staying with the USA.¹³⁶ However, Özal did not have only American biased policies against Iraq. He followed a policy called as "active" in the history of Turkish politics. A powerful international coalition formed against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, as it was a wrong and unsupportable attitude, facilitated Özal to take rigid and active reactions against Iraq.

During the Gulf War, the decision making mechanism of Turkish foreign policy was open to Özal and the Motherland Party led by him. The available political structure and the power balance among the authorized people paved the way for Özal to be at the forefront in Turkey's making of Gulf War policies actively. The factors causing it can be summarized as;¹³⁷

- The position of Özal and the constitutional and political power that he held,
- The existence of a docile Prime Minister and inexperienced foreign minister in terms of the foreign policies,
- That the majority of the Parliamentary members continued their loyalty to their previous leaders,

¹³⁵ Ramazan Gözen, "Türkiye'nin II. Körfez Savaşı Politikası: Aktif Politika ve Sonuçları", *21. Yüzyıl Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: Ankara Global Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2000, p.757.

¹³⁶ Ramazan Gözen, "Turgut Özal and Turkish Foreign Policy: Style and Vision", *Foreign Policy*, Vol.XX, No.3-4, (1996), p.69-101.

¹³⁷ Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Alma Mekanizması, Turgut Özal ve Körfez Krizi", *Yeni Türkiye, Turkish Politics Special Volume*, Vol.9, (1996), p.286.

- That none of the aforesaid opposed Özal but respected him.

3.4 Characteristics of Turkey's New Policy

There have been different opinions emerged about the characteristics of the Gulf War policy. Some assesses it as a “single man (Özal) policy”;¹³⁸ and some see it as a “traditional foreign policy”¹³⁹ and yet in general it was considered as “Western biased foreign policy”. The common characteristic of all these opinions, it was thought that it is better for Turkey to stay in line with general neutrality policy.

Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East had been evaluated as “in neutrality state” until the war. Turkey had never taken an active role in the events that occurred in the Middle East, and remained as neutral. There were some barriers ahead of Turkey's neutrality in the Gulf War. To begin with, Turkey's geopolitics and geostrategic position hardened her neutrality. Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the war caused by it, out of a blue made Turkey as a center. Hence, in order for the UN and the USA to surrender Iraq, they needed to take supports from Turkey, which was at the center with its increasing strategic importance. For a sanction applied to Iraq be a success, the petroleum sales, which was the most important source of income, had to be stopped. To do that, Turkey, one of the biggest customers of Iraq, had to close the petroleum pipelines.

Another factor that gave a key role to Turkey was the fact that economic and commercial relationships with Iraq were at high level. If Turkey had not cut down her relationships with Iraq, the UN would have a lot of difficulties in applying economic sanctions to Iraq. Moreover, Turkey had a status of a bridge for all the commodities that Iraq had to import from the other countries. When all these conditions are kept in mind, Turkey either had to “support the war started by the USA” or “support Iraq”, or stay “neutral”. Yet there had been a fourth alternative asserted that “Turkey could sustain her relationships with Iraq in a way not to harm her interests and prevent Iraq's trade with the third countries”, in other words “partial

¹³⁸ Semih Günver, “Tek Kişilik Oyun”, *Milliyet*, 18 January 1991.

¹³⁹ Süha Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Orta Doğu*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, (n.d.)

neutrality”.¹⁴⁰ The power balance in international system and the policies of the USA and the other Western countries, who play an effective role in the formation of power balance, made Turkey’s “neutrality” or “partial neutrality” difficult. These countries did not take precautions themselves alone but also forced UN Security Council to lead other countries to take cautions. Moreover, by using bilateral diplomatic relationships, they tried to convince other countries to join the international coalition forces. Especially the USA did not find the neutrality of Turkey appropriate, she explicitly demanded Turkey to join the Gulf coalition by applying sanction to Iraq. As a result, it had been difficult for Turkey to continue her “traditional neutrality” policy towards the Middle East. Among the alternatives mentioned above, Turkey “would support the war opened by the USA”, and thus would be against Iraq; accordingly applied economic sanctions and used the methods of diplomatic pressures. Consequently, Turkey has been one of the countries who played a role in this war.¹⁴¹

Turkey did not only remain in a position to support the war, but also stayed at a position to follow “active foreign policy”.¹⁴² As a part of the coalition established for the war, Turkey stayed in line with the decisions of the UN quickly, applied them and even spent efforts for other countries to apply them. By following the developments from the very beginning to the end, Turkey took decisions appropriate for the developments, had sudden applications; hence became an important centre of the international diplomacy traffic.¹⁴³

The most important reason of the active foreign policy of Turkey is Turgut Özal and his perception of foreign policy.¹⁴⁴ Özal explained the reason of joining the Gulf War as; “Turkey had to abandon former passive and hesitant policies and follow an active foreign policy”. Participation of Turgut Özal to the formation of the Gulf War policy went through various phases and ways. Among the most important ones is the fact that he took the authorities of the people in authority in the government

¹⁴⁰ Tuğrul Çubukçu - Erol Manisalı, *Turkish Daily News*, 4-5 August 1990.

¹⁴¹ Gözen, p.246.

¹⁴² Kemal Kirişçi, “Uluslararası Sistemdeki Değişmeler ve Türk Dış Politikasının Yeni Yöntemleri”, Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Der.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, İstanbul; Der Yayınları, 1994, p.395.

¹⁴³ Kâmrân İnan, *Dış Politika*, İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 1993, p.72.

¹⁴⁴ William Hale, “Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis”, *International Affairs*, Vol.68, No.4 (1992), p.679.

mechanism, and acted on behalf of them. The most striking examples of it are the closing Turkey-Iraq petroleum pipelines and having decisions to let Incirlik airbase for the use of the USA soldiers.¹⁴⁵ Both were put into effect with the instructions of Turgut Özal. Here there are two characteristics emerged about Özal's participation to the active policy. The first is to explain the foreign policy decisions. The second is that he had discussions with the representatives of the other countries. All the important meetings held in the Gulf War diplomacy were conducted by Özal.

In addition, message and telephone diplomacy that Özal carried out with the countries in the region and those in the west played an important role in the formation of Turkish Foreign Policy during the Gulf War. Özal's telephone talks with the leaders of Germany, the Soviet Union, England, France, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states made Turkey's Gulf War policies dynamic. The position that Özal had, his impact and his active policy went down on the history of Turkish foreign policy as the active policy.

One of the other reasons of Turkey's application of active policy were the conditions emerged by the Gulf War. Turkey's neighborhood to Iraq, in other words her geopolitical position and her strategic position in terms of economy were adequate enough for the formation of these conditions. One of the salient characteristics of international crisis is the limitation of time. In addition, the interests of the concerned countries are under threat. Therefore, foreign policy makers have to decide swiftly in a short time.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the limitation of time and the probability of threat to national interests require the countries concerned with the crisis establish a very busy and multidimensional quick network of communication. Therefore, one of the reasons of Turkey's active foreign policy is her need and desire for the establishment of busy relationships. In fact, Turkey had no direct connection with the Gulf War. However, as stated above, due to her geopolitic position and international insistences, Turkey had no chance of following a passive policy. Hence, Turkey found herself in a busy diplomacy after the occupation. After the UN Security Council's decisions, the pressures on Turkey were intensified. This pressure continued in the course of the occupation, in accordance

¹⁴⁵ *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Western Europe (WEU)*, 17 January 1991, p.38.

with the progress of the crisis and the war, and in parallel to the decisions of the western countries and the UN.¹⁴⁷ Turkey not only put the decisions into effect but also used initiatives to continue bilateral diplomatic relationships with the countries in the region. Consequently, Turkey's Gulf War policies emerged as a result of the attitudes of the other countries.

The existence of the Soviet Union had earlier been one of the important factors that affected Turkey's policies towards the crisis and conflicts in the Middle East during the Cold War period. The Soviet Union had then generally supported one of the fighting parties, which naturally affected the attitude of Turkey. When it comes to the Gulf Crisis and War, Turkey had no more Soviet threats this time, owing to the fact that the emergent USA-Soviet approach during the process facilitated Turkey and many other countries to support the USA policies against Iraq.

Turgut Özal had also paid attention to the relationships with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War diplomacy. In the first days of the crisis, Özal phoned Saudi Arabian authorities and together they closed the petroleum pipelines in accordance with the UN decisions. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's statement that she would support the USA against Iraq, and that she would allow the USA soldiers to use the bases in her country, paved the way for the other Gulf countries to act in the same way. Such condition, removed the probability of the negative effects that may be caused from Turkey's sanction to Iraq in the world of the Arabs. By this way Turkey ended up her neutrality policy for the conflict that had taken places between the Arab world and the Western world.

One of the most important sides of multi dimensional Gulf War policies of Turkey had been Iran. The attitude of Iran was uncertain as it was both an anti-American country and also she had been in war with Iraq for years. Özal wanted to influence Iran policy by solving the uncertainty by having frequent communications with the President of Iran. Özal, who also had frequent meetings with Ali Rıza

¹⁴⁶ Gözen, p.249.

¹⁴⁷ The United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996*, The U.N. Blue Book Series, Vol.IX, New York, 1996.

Muayyeri, the special representative of Iran President Rafsanjani to Ankara, received the following response from Muayyeri;¹⁴⁸

“Iran supports all the initiatives of the UN against all the attacks; hence, they are not against UN sanction imposed on Iraq”

However, Muayyeri further stated that there should be no foreign intervention to the region and the problem must be solved among the countries in the region; thus also showed that they were not in the same opinion with Turkey. This idea of Iran and their policies accordingly continued throughout the course of the war.

3.5 Main Goals of Turkey’s Active Foreign Policy

Due to the characteristics of a war as well as a consequence of the foreign pressures on Turkey, the policy of Turkey in the Gulf War was not formed by her own will, and did not include the planned targets for a long time. The most important target of Turkey, like all the other countries, was to protect and develop her national interests. National interests can be classified in two groups. The first group includes preventing the change of the political map in the region and protecting the status quo; in other words, her interests related to national security and territorial integrity. The second group includes preventing economic, commercial and financial losses that Turkey may face. The articles in the second group are not “vital” interests, but they are important for the compensations of the losses of Turkey because of the sanctions.¹⁴⁹

The fact that Iraq army was in a powerful state and as a result it occupied Kuwait was a circumstance that worried Turkey. Thus, the main aim of Turkey’s active role in the Gulf War was to preserve the security of the country. On the other hand, a probable disintegration of Iraq as a result of war would also threaten the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Kurdish issue, one of the most important ties between Iraq and Turkey, had always made these two countries close to each other and naturally led them to collaboration. Due to the weakening of the ties between these two countries in the Gulf War, this issue would have turned into a big problem

¹⁴⁸ *FBIS, WEU*, 7 August 1990, p.45-46; 8 August 1990, p.26.

and threaten both the countries. It was important to prevent this problem. For this reason, Turkey believed that her national interests will increase when she act with the western countries, thus she acted accordingly.

Another aim of Turkey in this war was to increase her prestige against the western world and solve her security problems in this way. By the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of Turkey decreased and thus the value of Turkey for the westerners was declined. All these happenings dragged Turkey to worries to a great extent. The West considered Turkey as a country that lost her significance. Thus, the Gulf crisis emerged in such a crucial period when Turkey could re-establish her value. Turkish policy makers, politicians especially those in the power vindicated the idea that Turkey must act with the West in order to prove that her significance for the West was not diminished. This event was interpreted as a “test” for Turkey by the Western world. For the westerners, if Turkey could come out of this war with a success, she would have made important steps on the way to being a western country. A western biased policy would be important in the aspect that it may show Turkey’s respect to law;

- It would be important for Turkey to join European Union.
- It would pave the way for a stronger economic and military cooperation with the USA.
- Negative image of Turkey in the West would be removed.
- Finally, Turkey’s obedience to the UN decision would be an important step to show Turkey’s respect to law.

Another target was to affect the course of the war. Turgut Özal frequently emphasized: “Not to stay out of the events; and to have chance of affecting the events during and after the war by involving in the war actively”.¹⁵⁰ Özal also focused on the fact that “Turkey had no chance of affecting the developments” in the past owing to her “neutrality policy”, thus could not have her place on the table of peace formed after the war, and therefore came out of the war with losses. There are two aspects of Turkey’s idea of “affecting the developments”. Turkey had to

¹⁴⁹ Gözen, p.254.

¹⁵⁰ *FBIS, WEU*, 27 August 1990, p.28.

preserve her interests for these two aspects. The first one was the “dilemma of war-peace”, and the second one was no matter how Iraq’s occupation ends up, Turkey faced crucial economic losses and the security risks were increased. The interests of Turkey in these two matters had to be protected.

Turkey had two different opinions in the period progressed with the beginning of the Gulf Crisis. The idea of Turkey, which was clearly explained that it was not in favor of the war and that the solution must be found in peaceful ways, changed by the time and Turkey thought that the method of war could also bring some results. There were two factors that caused this alteration. By the fact that the soldiers of Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait in the course of the occupation and that they did not obey the UN Security Council decisions designated the attitudes of the USA during the war. It is the impact of this attitude on Turkey and Özal, who had been talking to the US President frequently then.

Turkish foreign policy makers classified the options about the solution of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait under three periods. The first period is between 02 August and 30 September 1990. 02 August is the date when Iraq occupied Kuwait and 30 September is the date of meetings held when President Turgut Özal had an official visit to the USA. In this period, Turkey thought that the crisis could be solved with peaceful means without requiring any war. That is why, without any intervention to Iraq, the economic sanctions were thought to have power to make Iraq weaker and thus she would step backward. Özal, who realized at the beginning of the events that the crisis would turn into war, thought that there must be no outbreak of war. However, he also did not neglect to take all types of precautions.¹⁵¹ The second period is between 2 October 1990 and 17 January 1991. In this period, Turgut Özal insisted that the solution must be found with peaceful ways but he also thought that the UN intervention might also be a solution. This period was also an important turning point for Turkey. This is the period when there were divisions of opinions between Özal, who had thought that war was approaching and started preparations accordingly, and the Turkish civil and the military authorities. The most important division was the idea of sending Turkish soldiers to the Gulf. Özal, in

¹⁵¹ *FBIS, WEU*, 5 September 1990, p.28.

order to “affect the developments” as mentioned above, believed that it would be beneficial to send Turkish soldiers as well. For him, deployment of Turkish soldiers to the Gulf would provide a chance to learn modern war technologies and vehicle, so it was important for Turkish Armed Forces.¹⁵² This attitude of Özal did not have adequate support from the society, government and the military wing. The third period is between 17 January and 3 March 1991. 7 August is the date when Turkey closed the petroleum pipelines. Here, Turkey knew that the war would be unfavorable for her; however, Turkey could not prevent the outbreak of the war and thus acted together with the coalition.

Although Turkey supported the war against Iraq, she never played an active role during the course of the war. The support to war took place in several steps. First, soldiers were deployed to the border of Iraq. Here the aims were;¹⁵³

- To respond a probable military reaction caused as a result of sanctions to Iraq,
- Taking cautions for the probable insurgencies of separatist Kurdish groups as a result of Iraq’s pressure on them,
- Being a deterrent power against Iran and Syria, which had a probability of having imperialist policies against the territorial integrity of Iraq,
- To behave appropriately to the Gulf War strategy. In order for coalition forces to be successful in the probable land operation, the attention of the Iraq’s military power must be diverted.

One of the dimensions of Turkey’s participation to war was to open Incirlik airbase to the use of the USA, and thus have Iraq bombed through air from the north. This crucial movement was shown as a support throughout the war; as a matter of fact this support had proved to be vital in being victorious.

Turgut Özal had the following condition for the support he provided to the USA;¹⁵⁴ the territorial integrity of Iraq would be protected and the Kurdish people would be supported. Hence, the factor that determined the policy of Turkey throughout the war and led Turkey play an active role was the aim of “the protection

¹⁵² “Özal’s News Conference from Washington”, *FBIS, WEU*, 26 September 1990, p.37.

¹⁵³ Hale, p.679.

of the territorial integrity of Iraq”. There are two aspects in this aim. To protect the territorial integrity of Iraq by collaborating with the USA and the coalition forces and to control the imperialist aims of the countries in the region.

There were also two probabilities for the foundation of a Kurdish state during the course of the Gulf War. The first probability was the use of Kurdish people inside by the USA in order to weaken the power of Iraq, and to found them an independent state as reward to their help. The second probability was that by the defeat Iraq would be weakened and collapsed and disintegrated; so with a Kurdish revolt, a Kurdish state would be established. In this period, Özal warned the USA in the following lines;¹⁵⁵

“We are against the foundation of a new state in Iraq... We always support the protection of the territorial integrity of Iraq. This is the basic spirit of our policies and efforts. The outcome that we do not want must not be formed. There must be no foundation of a Kurdish state.”

Özal, in order to stop this menace, on the one hand tried to talk with the USA and the Western countries by calling them and trying to prevent them; on the other hand, he had meetings with the authorities of the neighboring countries and had collaboration with them to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.

3.6 Results of Turkey’s Policy with Special Reference to Turkey’s Economic Losses

There are three important results of Turkey’s Gulf War policy for her: security, economic, and political. First of all, due to war policies Turkey faced great economic losses. As a result of the sanction against Iraq, Turkey’s important source of income was closed because Turkey had been having incomes from Iraq. In particular, the shutdown of the petroleum pipelines caused troubles related to petroleum in the country. Many people employed in this sector lost their jobs in Iraq. In order to compensate this type of losses of Turkey, rich Arab countries by the help of coalition forces gave some financial helps, but these supports were not sufficient.

¹⁵⁴ “Özal’s interview with Altemur Kılıç”, *Tercüman*, 8 December 1990.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

If we analyze it through a broader perspective, the economic and commercial relationships that Turkey had been having with the Middle East countries since the 1980s were terminated to a great extent. The Arab-Israel peace process, and Iraq centered political and military events affected Turkish Foreign Policy. As a result, Turkey's base for economic and commercial relationships with the countries in the region was diminished.

As a security-related outcome of the Gulf War policy of Turkey, there emerged the North Iraq problems. While on the one hand Turkey had an "advantage" as a consequence of the weakening of the increasing power of Iraq, on the other hand Turkey got into a "disadvantageous" situation as there was a "lack of power" and thus the growth of PKK terror organization, which settled there. Therefore, the southern border of Turkey faced a distress of security. On the issue, Hasan Kni wrote;

Such that, Turkey went on to struggle for the protection of a serious "national and territorial integrity" after the Gulf War. It is not an exaggerated opinion that the foreign policy that Turkey has been having for the last seven years was for the solution to the problems emerged by the Gulf War. As a matter of fact, PKK problem as well as the military operations conducted in the North Iraq and the military activities carried out in the Southeast Turkey; and the crisis that Turkey has had with the western countries originating from all these problems are all caused by Turkey's Gulf War policies.¹⁵⁶

The third result was the political condition of Turkey's relationship with the West. In the post war period, while Turkey's prestige was expected to be increased in the West, exactly the opposite happened; and Turkey received severe criticisms especially in regard to the human rights and the democratization. Unfortunately, most of the criticisms of the Western countries were centered on the operations carried out against the PKK terror. In addition, there were military and economic sanctions applied against Turkey.

In drawing to a conclusion, it can be said that all these developments illustrate that the problems emerged as results of the Gulf War policies of Turkey cost her too

much. There are also some opinions that if Turkey had followed a “different policy” in the critical period of the war, there would have been more affirmative results.

Consequently, the Gulf War policy of Turkey was a circumstance with no alternative when the national and international prevalent conditions are considered. Perhaps this policy was a little bit more “active” form of Turkey’s traditional western biased policies. Rather than “active”, Turkey could follow a “moderate” policy, if Özal had not been the leader of Turkey. Therefore, it was emerged by Özal making of different policy. The aims expected from active policies could not be fulfilled despite all the efforts and struggles.

The military operation named as the First Gulf War made great losses for Turkish economy because of its negative affects as increasing petroleum prices, land transportation, construction services, and the effects on exports. The impact of the First Gulf War on the petroleum prices was felt more in the second half of the 1990s, when Iraq occupied Kuwait and the first months of 1991. The price of raw petroleum was about 16 dollars a barrel before the occupation of Kuwait, however, it increased to 37.4 dollars in October 1990. Although the prices of the petroleum became stable after the intervention, the petroleum bill of Turkey during the mentioned period swelled quite high.

Owing to the end of the transit land transportation and the exportation activities to a great extent after the Gulf Crisis, the trade between the Southeast region of Turkey and the North Iraq sank to the bottom. The businessmen and the tradesmen of the region who earned their life mainly from border trade and petroleum transfer by tankers had to close their shutters. Iraq had been the second largest commercial partner of Turkey after Germany and was Turkey’s door to the Middle East region in the pre war period. Iraq lost this position after the war.¹⁵⁷

While the shutdown of Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Petroleum Pipeline hardened the exportation of petroleum on the one hand, it also removed the incomes of the petroleum pipeline on the other hand. Due to the economic sanction after the war, Turkey’s income level was at the low levels. Because of the economic sanction, the

¹⁵⁶ Hasan Köni, “Körfez Savaşı Sonrası Türkiye ve Orta Doğu”, *Avrasya Dosyası, Kuzey Irak Özel Sayısı*, Vol.3, No.1, (1996), p.135.

¹⁵⁷ Gözen, 277.

expenditures of Iraq's public was limited very much, which therefore paved the way for the Turkish contractors, who had been doing construction and contracting business in Iraq, to lose their market.

In addition to these problems, the authority gap formed in the North of Iraq increased the risk and threat at the Southeast border of Turkey. The precautions of Turkey for the security at the border raised the military expenses of Turkey.

The war, which was reflected on the Southeast economy with its negative effects such as migration, shut down of businesses, and unemployment triggered a number of problems in commerce and social issues. Industry and trade in the region fell to the level of zero; the exportation became hard to conduct.

The investments ceased in the Southeast increased the depth of the underdevelopment of the region, accelerated the migration to the West, and became a factor to feed terror. In a macro sense, the Turkish economy was dramatically affected from the war, the growth rate which was 9,4 % in 1990 fell to as little as 0.3 % in 1991; budget deficit increased; the inflation increased 11 points despite the recessed economy. Despite the fact that Turkey supported the multinational force formed during the course of the Gulf War and stayed in line with the USA, she did not find enough compensation to rectify the war losses. Although it is not possible to assess the losses caused by the war accurately, the accumulative results are still felt in economic and social aspects.

3.7 The Salience of Turgut Özal in Relation with the New Policy During the Crisis and War

Turgut Özal was a person who had top positions in the state of Turkey. Although he had been working at the different institutions of the government as bureaucrat until the mid 1950s, his excellence as politician took place in the 1970s, a period when Turkey faced great economic crisis and distresses. As an experienced bureaucrat who had worked in the State Planning Organization and the World Bank, he was appointed to the position of undersecretary in the office of the Prime Minister for the government of Demirel, which continued from 1979 to 1980 military coup.

He played the main role in the preparation of famous Stability program on 24 January 1980, which was a great step on the way to the liberalization of Turkish economy and was the base for an important turning point for the Turkish economic and political history.¹⁵⁸ Özal, who was appointed as the vice Prime Minister in order to continue the 24 January liberal economic program for the government established by the 12 September military coup, stayed in this position until his resignation in 1982. His resignation was not for withdrawing from the politics; rather it was for participating to politics more actively by founding a new party. Hence, with the Motherland Party that he found, Özal became victorious in the elections of 1983 and 1987 and thus served as the Prime Minister of Turkey for 7 years until 1989. During his Presidency from this year until his death in 1993, he played a key role in defining Turkey's Gulf War foreign policy. This war was one of the crucial wars in the 20th century. Özal, who sealed a period Turkish politics as an undersecretary, vice Prime Minister, Prime Minister and the President, no doubt was "an important leader" with positive and negative salient features.¹⁵⁹

Turkey was trying to adapt herself to the New World Order before the Gulf War. It was emphasized that, by the removal of the Soviets threats after the Cold War, Turkey was thought to be a country that was no more important and had no role anymore. It is understood that Özal worried about this type of claims and developments.¹⁶⁰

Özal had seen the Gulf War, which broke out in the mid of such uncertainties, as a golden opportunity to prove that Turkey was still having vital importance in the security issues for the West as well as the Middle East. He was of the opinion that the alterations that the Gulf War would bring and the effects of these changes on Turkey would be a historical turning point in Turkey. Perhaps the shape of the Middle East after the war would be dramatically different from what it used to be and there could be great problems that might not have been possible to easily solve.¹⁶¹

Özal thought that in order to get rid of such a critical period without any loss, it was important to join in the alliance formed against Iraq. Özal, who evaluated the

¹⁵⁸ Gözen, p.113.

¹⁵⁹ Gözen, p.113-114.

¹⁶⁰Turgut Özal, "Turkey in the Southern Flank", *Rusi and Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, (1989), p.3-9.

conjuncture and the condition in the Gulf War according to his vision, preferred to stay in line with the West and the USA. Thus, he planned to prove his loyalty to the West and strengthened his position.¹⁶² Hence, during the crisis and the war he repeated that the importance of Turkey's position reemerged, and that he was determined in continuing the relationship and the collaboration with the USA.

According to Özal, Turkey had been a bridge in regard to Gulf War in three aspects. First, Turkey is a country with a strategic importance in the Southeast wing of NATO, and plays a role of a bridge between the NATO and the Middle East.¹⁶³ The role of Turkey in this frame would never end as long as the interests of the Western countries, in terms of energy, sea transportation and economic market, in the region continued.¹⁶⁴

Özal put his thoughts into effect actively throughout the course of the war. He personally directed the process of decision taking in the shutdown of the Turkey-Iraq petroleum pipeline. He had a close collaboration with the USA President George Bush in conducting military operation to Iraq. He never hesitated to permit the USA planes to hit Iraq by using the Incirlik Military Airbase. The participation of the Turkish Armed Forces to the region was also among his aims. Özal could not achieve his desire due to the fact that Necip Torumtay, Chief of the Armed Forces opposed it and accordingly resigned, and then the opposition party also interfered in it. This is an event that demonstrated the limitations of Özal's active foreign policy and the difficulty of the fulfillments of his vision in military and security issues.¹⁶⁵

The second bridge is military thematic. Turkey, which played her military and strategic role in the Gulf War, could play a political role in the region in the post war period. The state system that Turkey has, is the only one in the Islamic world, and thus could be presented to the world as a model. The democratic, multi-party, parliamentary political system and the liberal economy policies of Turkey were important for the Islamic world. Turkey, which is both a Muslim and a secular society, could give important messages to the other Islamic countries. In addition, in

¹⁶¹ "Özal's interview with N.Witchell", *Newspot*, 23 August 1990; *Newspot*, 7 February 1991.

¹⁶² Gözen, p.135.

¹⁶³ "Özal's interview with W.H.Reub", *Dış Basın ve Türkiye*, 24 August 1990.

¹⁶⁴ "Özal", *Turkey in Europe, Europe in Turkey*, p.315.

¹⁶⁵ Gözen, p.136.

the period, in which according to Özal the disputes between the communism and the capitalism were diminished, there was a probability of conflict between Islam and Christianity. In order to prevent such a probable conflict, first the democratization, market economy and secularism in the Islamic world would have been developed. As a response, the western countries would have ended their prejudices against the Muslims. The first thing for the attainment of it was that the European Union had to show the Islamic world that it had no prejudices against the Muslims; and for that it had to integrate Turkey with the EU.¹⁶⁶ For this, if Turkey became a full member to EU, it may play the role of a source for the stability against the instabilities originated by potential religious fundamentalism. With the moderate understanding of Islam and the Western economic and political system, Turkey could be the antithesis of radicalism. For this reason, if the Western world had desired to put an end to the radicalism in the region, it would have gone collaboration with Turkey.¹⁶⁷

The third dimension of the role of the bridge was about economic, financial and commercial areas. Turkey, attributed as the Japan of the Middle East,¹⁶⁸ could be main central base for the economic, commercial and financial activities of the firms, such as American, European and Asian firms, concerning with the region, where Turkey is located.¹⁶⁹ With the role Turkey played in the Gulf War, the confidence it received from the East as well as the West, believable and stable image could have more foreign capital and investment flow.¹⁷⁰

Özal was trying to pick the fruits of active economic, political, military role up in these ways. He was planning to make Turkey an effective center of the two worlds in the post war era. However, he could not have any results of his projects due to partially for the lack of supports from the concerned countries and partially for the inadequacy of his life time.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ “Özal’s interview with J.Bodgener”, *The Financial Times*, 21 August 1990.

¹⁶⁷ “Özal’s interview with X.Guatier and K.Terjung”, *Dış Basın ve Türkiye*, 31 August 1990.

¹⁶⁸ David Lawday, “Turkey aims to be a Middle Eastern Japan”, *U.S. News&Word Report*, (1991), p.36.37.

¹⁶⁹ “Özal’s speech”, *Middle East Business&Banking*, 1985, p.22.

¹⁷⁰ “Özal’s interview with M.Legris”, *Sabah*, 22 February 1991.

¹⁷¹ Gözen, p.139.

Özal rightly deserved the attribution of “a revolutionary statesmen at the top of the state” by exceeding the traditional foreign policy through his vision in Turkish foreign policy and pioneering and agile attitudes in putting them into effect.¹⁷²

3.8 Özal’s Distinctive Place in the Changing Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Turgut Özal entered the Turkish political life with great ambitious aims and was distinguished from the other politicians with his conducts and performances. The Turkish foreign policy of the Özal period show many differences from those of the earlier one. This difference reached at its climax during the Gulf War. Özal, who became the boss of the politics by the 12 September military coup, this time carried the coup himself and changed the Middle East policy of Turkey fundamentally which had been in effect throughout the history of the Republic. The involvement of Özal to the making of foreign policy, in fact, meant to be abandonment of decision making process in the foreign policy in Turkey. As a matter of fact, taking foreign policy decisions by the government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs by consulting to the experienced bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry could prevent the occurrences of mistakes in the areas of sensitive national interests in Turkey, which has a democratic political system. The criticisms regarding this point for Özal were so much that the intimacy between Özal and Foreign Ministry diplomats broke away, and thus there were some tensions.¹⁷³ In fact, the bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry believed that Turkey had to act cautiously and warned Özal accordingly since the occupation of Kuwait. However, there was no word “to be cautious” in the dictionary of Özal’s foreign policy. On the contrary, he believed that having “active”, “pragmatic” and “acting rapidly” would not harm Turkey rather they would bring advantages to Turkey. What the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived as “it was required to be cautious”, Özal understood it as “it was required to be benefitted from the opportunity and the advantage”.¹⁷⁴ There are many accusations at the base of

¹⁷² E. Özkök, “Elveda Büyük İhtilalci”, *Hürriyet*, 18 April 1993; H. Uluergin, “Özal Devrimi”, *Hürriyet*, 20-21 April 1993; Editorial, “Özal Gerçek Bir Devrimcidir”, *Milliyet*, 20 April 1993.

¹⁷³ Gözen, p.153.

¹⁷⁴ Haluk Ulman, “Dışişleri ve Özal”, *Günaydın*, 15 October 1990.

claims against Özal. The most important of the criticism was that in the course of the Gulf War Turkey was dragged towards a non democratic system, and the violation of the Constitutional Law. According to the same assertion, Özal tried to effectuate the system of Presidency, which he had been planning for a long time; he even got the advantage of the Gulf Crisis and desired to bring semi-dictatorship system to Turkey. There are also scenarios of Özal ambitions to be “the single man” and govern Turkey from Çankaya, and hence become the eighth president of Turkey.¹⁷⁵ According to this scenario, the occupation of Kuwait was a historical opportunity for turning Turkey’s interior affairs dominated policy towards the foreign affairs. Hence, Özal would end the Presidency debates and govern the country from Çankaya by benefitting from the weaknesses of the Akbulut government, which he himself appointed.¹⁷⁶ Günver, a retired diplomat, compared Turkey’s Gulf Crisis foreign policy method to a play where Özal was the only player in the “single player play”, whose scenario was also written by Özal.¹⁷⁷

Özal did not pay attention to the task distribution and work share as specified in the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish political system during his term in the Prime Ministry as well as the Presidency; as a politician emerged from the bureaucracy, he tried not to stick to the bulky and slow functioning system of the bureaucracy. Özal preferred to reach the result by externalizing the authorities when needed in the foreign policy.¹⁷⁸ Özal appointed inexperienced officials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during his both the terms in the office of the Prime Ministry as well as in his Presidency in order to control the making of foreign policy. The fact that he did not meet an effective opposition in his party, and that he had a dominant personality among his friends and colleagues reduced the impact of the Foreign Ministers and made him the final person to have the right to say final words in taking the decisions. The opponents of Özal were only opposition parties, media, some press groups and military.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ Derya Sazak, “Özal Neyi Başarmayı Çalışıyor?”, *Milliyet*, 6 December 1990.

¹⁷⁶ Derya Sazak, *11 Eylül Gölgesine Saddam*, İstanbul: Doğan Yayınları, 2001, p.44.

¹⁷⁷ Semih Günver, “Tek Kişilik Oyun”, *Milliyet*, 18 January 1991.

¹⁷⁸ Gözen, p.115.

¹⁷⁹ Gözen, p.116-177.

Another factor that explains Özal's active foreign policy was Özal's choice about the structuring of the state. His understanding of politics was closer to the USA-like presidential system rather than a parliamentary government. Although his idea of a Presidential system was not welcomed in the society as well as the state, and it was not effectuated officially or named so, in fact Özal acted like a President (in a Presidential system) in his actions.¹⁸⁰ Particularly this issue caused debates and differences of opinions about the current system of rule in Turkey. The question of whether the system in Turkey was a Presidential system or a Parliamentary system was carried to the press.¹⁸¹ In addition, there were immense criticisms in the media and press that the parliamentary system was dead,¹⁸² and that Özal had been directing the foreign policy decisions alone especially in the telephone talks, and the Cabinet was just meeting to sign the decisions which were taken before.

Özal put his active policy idea into effect from the very beginning of the Gulf Crisis and continued in the same way throughout the crisis. With experience gained in years, Özal observed the things from a broader window, and interpreted the balances in the world in the same perspective when the Gulf Crisis emerged. To him, the equations altered by the end of the Cold War. The states had to act quickly in the new world conditions and the decision making mechanisms of the world had to have the ability to cope with the pace of the events.¹⁸³ Moreover, the active Middle East policy of Turkey had to be forward looking, away from hesitations, and active in accordance with circumstances the new world. Furthermore, Turkey had to be in a position to bridge the East with West in the new balances to be made.¹⁸⁴ To Özal, the prestige of Turkey was reduced in the eyes of the West. This negative condition could be turned to the opposite, and the significance of Turkey could again be increased for the Westerners and thus the Crisis was a crucial opportunity for it. Owing to the Crisis, the West would understand that Turkey is an indispensable country. Furthermore, by being within the happenings, Turkey could have her

¹⁸⁰ Gözen, p.118.

¹⁸¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 8 August 1990.

¹⁸² Ali Sirmen, "Nerede", *Cumhuriyet*, 8 August 1990.

¹⁸³ *President Turgut Özal Press Conference on the Gulf Crisis*, Ankara: Dış İşleri Basım Evi, 1992, p.4-5.

¹⁸⁴ *President Turgut Özal*, p.19.

position in the table to be formed after the crisis.¹⁸⁵ Active politics understanding of Özal paved the way for the arguments regarding Turkish Constitutional Law; there even some reactions resulted in resignations within and out of the government. The ruling system of Turkish state is Parliamentary system according to the 1982 Constitutional Law. A balance was established between the legislative and executive; while the executive force was given to the President and the Cabinet, they were limited with the Constitution and laws.¹⁸⁶ According to 1982 Constitution, the President is the head of the state and the most obvious duty of the President is to approve the laws and decisions taken by the government, and send back to the parliament for revision if there is anything he considers inappropriate or filling a case in the Constitutional Court. As it is seen, the President is responsible for controlling the government. The real center of the politics is the government wing, in other words it is the Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister.

Under the circumstances, how did Turgut Özal come to govern the foreign policy of the state so easily and did everything he wanted during the course of the Gulf Crisis? In fact the most important factor was passive Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut and his handing over all the authorities to Özal, and also the reason that the ANAP majority in the TBMM did not show any opposition to the policies of Özal.¹⁸⁷ After his election as a President, Özal's intervention to the executive directly as if he was still heading the government raised many claims in the political arena. According to these claims, he offered the Prime Minister Office to Yıldırım Akbulut, whose political authority was quite weak and had little political experience in the Prime Minister office, as a "gift" and thus did not think of losing his impact on the government. According to the same assertions, the Ministers to be appointed in the cabinet were also selected by Özal. Therefore, the most basic institutions of the current system, i.e. Presidential office, Government and Parliament were entered under tight control of Özal during the Gulf War period. Moreover, the appointment of the Chief of Armed Forces Necip Torumtay also took place with an operation that Özal conducted during his term in the Prime Minister office. This was openly

¹⁸⁵ *President Turgut Özal*, p.11-12.

¹⁸⁶ Efeğil, p.147.

¹⁸⁷ Gözen, p.223.

discussed in the political backstage.¹⁸⁸ Although the Foreign Ministry was also designated with the initiatives of Özal, the disconnection between the Foreign Minister and Çankaya attracted attention. The fact that there were three different Foreign Ministers in 1990 was another interesting thing that went down on history. The resignation of Former Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz by indirectly stating on 20 February that “Özal’s approaches hardened the execution of foreign policy” was interpreted as a concrete example of disconnection between the Foreign Ministry and Çankaya. Despite all his coherent approaches, Ali Bozer, who was brought to the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not give open support to the attitudes of the President towards the Gulf War. He was in fact among the effective names of the opposition within the ANAP in deployment of soldiers to the Gulf War. Ali Bozer was pushed to the secondary plan by the outbreak of the Crisis. One of the most concrete examples of it was that Ali Bozer learnt the decision of closing the Iraq petroleum pipelines on 7 August from the Press.¹⁸⁹ Then, the greatest crisis within the government was that despite the fact that his colleague Baker attended the Özal-Bush meetings, he was excluded from the meetings, and his decision of resignation following the USA trip.¹⁹⁰ Kurtçebe Alptemoçin, who was the Foreign Affairs Minister following Mesut Yılmaz and Ali Bozer, responded some questions about the Crisis in the following line: “Do not ask me, but ask Mr. Özal”, and thus stated that Çankaya did not change its attitude. TBMM and the office of the Chief Armed Forces were also being excluded just like the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. The fact that Turgut Özal was selected as “interlocutor” in the foreign contacts, and his designation of policies by the telephone diplomacy he started with the foreign diplomats, paved the way for the result of the TBMM exclusion with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These attitudes of Turgut Özal also received reactions in the Turkish Armed Forces. In particular, Turgut Özal’s being indifferent to the oppositions of the military authorities in making a military logistics in the South East caused the resignation of General Necip Toruntay, the Chief of Armed Forces. Then the “authority of war” given to the Government worried the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

¹⁸⁸ Gözen, p.162.

¹⁸⁹ Efegil, p.193.

¹⁹⁰ Sazak, p.48-49.

and warned that if Turkey, which had to act more cautiously, plays active role against Iraq in the war, it will prepare foundation for serious problems related to future. As stated above, beyond this fact, two Foreign Affairs Ministers had already resigned due to personal policies that the President followed in the pre and post crisis period. These developments, which emerged beyond the traditional applications in Turkey, are indications of concrete examples of the impacts of the differences of the opinions between the Presidency and the government on the policies over the staff in the Ministry.

One of the points that attract attentions during the Gulf Crisis was intimate dialogue between Özal and Bush. Especially the telephone diplomacy between these two formed one of the articles on the agenda of Crisis from Turkey's perspective. Bush-Özal relationship showed themselves in the very early days of the Presidency of Bush. Bush, who welcomed Özal to Washington in 1989, addressed to the journalists: "This Mr. (Özal) vindicates American interests better than we do."¹⁹¹ In addition to his explicit statements regarding his relationships with Özal during the Gulf War, he stated the followings during the period when there was busy telephone diplomacy;

*"The United States of America paid high telephone bills on account of talks with Turgut Özal. I used to call him often, because I was receiving good ideas from him. He is the first person to say me, 'you will defeat Saddam with little casualty'. He wanted me to be rigid; he used to say; 'he will run away finally'. What Özal and I mistook about was that we both thought that this victory would collapse Saddam."*¹⁹²

As it is demonstrated in the examples provided above, Özal had always spent efforts to get closer to the USA and never gave up his expectations. According to Özal, the USA is the greatest power of the world and that Turkey must not challenge this power, and avoid having conflicts with the USA. Moreover, Özal always had expectations from the USA in respect to economy, politics, technology and military. If collaboration was maintained in every respect with the USA and close

¹⁹¹ Sazak, p.41-42.

¹⁹² Mehmet Ali Birand-Soner Yalçın, *The Özal*, İstanbul: Doğan Yayınları, 2001, p.427.

relationships were built up, to Özal, the USA will not leave Turkey stay alone.¹⁹³ Özal's relationships, as a "single man", with the leaders especially with the American leader was followed with an anxiety; although it was seen as inconvenient for the future of Turkey; as he himself stated Özal tried to keep away from being an adventurer. Özal's doctor Cengiz Aslan, one of the people close to Özal, received the following answer when he asked him whether he had a plan about Mosul and Kirkuk in his mind;

*"Turkey has no more endurance for Enver Pashas. Do you think that I would take my country to such an adventure?"*¹⁹⁴

Consequently, Özal destroyed the "neutrality" principle of Turkey towards the Middle East completely and provided a chance for the follow up of an active policy. Özal's politics of challenge to the Turkish foreign policies originated from his vision. Özal added traditional occidental tendency to Turkish foreign policy and paid attention to the Middle East and the Islamic world closely. He thought to have Turkey to a position of leadership between these two worlds. Hence, the perspective of this vision made Özal's perception, decisions and general approach to the Gulf War distinct from the others.¹⁹⁵ Özal applied this policy himself without leaving it to the organs of executive, and this event caused many disputes in the political arena. In addition to criticizing the approaches of Turkey in terms of the content, the opposition parties in the Parliamentary sessions emphasized that the foreign policy of Turkey was formed with the personal assessments of the President rather beyond the supervision of the Parliament. SHP and DYP leaders accused Turgut Özal of putting Turkey into war because of his self interests. Whereas the SHP wing said "National Unity and solidarity take place when there are common interests of the country, and that there is no such condition here, it is rather a gambling desire of a single man", DYP General Director Süleyman Demirel stated that Özal had war biased attitudes from the very beginning of the Crisis and went on to summarize, "Özal's politics is not the politics of Turkey. It is the policy of dragging Turkey into an adventure"; then he vindicated the idea that Turkish Foreign Ministry was vanished. There were

¹⁹³ Gözen, p.122-123.

¹⁹⁴ Birand-Yalçın, p.433.

¹⁹⁵ Gözen, p.224.

also reactions at the DSP wing of the Parliament. DSP tried to show its reactions with the meetings it arranged one after another. DSP General Director Bülent Ecevit accused Tugut Özal for “his statements in American press and media, instigating the USA administration and congress to take decision of war, and dragging Turkey to undertake an effective role in a probable war.” As a result, democratic mass organizations, which are parts of extra Parliamentary oppositions, had reactions, these establishments especially opposed Turkey’s policies in line with the western states especially with the USA and in accordance with the global interests of them; and they focused on the fact that Turkey must have stayed away with the military commitments that may cause Turkey’s military intervention to the war. Labor syndicates, the public opinion of the professional establishments formed a communal opposition in order to have Turkey stay away from hot clashes in the Gulf at the expense of straining the legal frame, which was in effect then. During the Gulf Crisis, there were also oppositions formed with in the body of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs as examples to extra-Parliamentary oppositions. The reactions that these institutions showed received responses commensurate with the limits that these institutions had. The President of the period and the ANAP government received a lot of oppositions from the wings within and out of the Parliament.

Özal’s role of “single man” in active foreign policy and intervention to the occurrences drew as much attention from abroad as it drew in the country. Especially the reactions from the Islamic world were in hard and accusative forms. The people of Jordan also showed strong reactions to Özal.¹⁹⁶ Former President of Iran Beni Sadr said the followings in criticizing the policies of Özal: “Turkey is on the wrong way. How much will it benefit her to chase the foreign power? The duty of Turkey is not to open her bases to the use of the USA, rather to facilitate the USA to withdraw from the region. Özal must not submit himself to the provocations of the West, or else there would be disastrous results in the region. Because of the policy Turkey followed, Turkey will not take her place again in the Islamic world, and she will

¹⁹⁶ *Milliyet*, 5 September 1990.

remain alone.”¹⁹⁷ Özal, who subjected to harsh criticisms from the Islamic world, was received with contradictory appreciations in the Western press. In an interpretation published in the English Guardian newspaper, “Being the lover of the west again, Özal is gambling the future of Turkey by the presumption that there would be no more war.” Özal did not only receive the love of the West but also that of the Jews. The Jewish media boss Robert Maxwell, in a statement he made during his meeting with Özal said that the Westerners and the Jews also love Özal, but America loves the most.¹⁹⁸ According to an interpretation, Özal was the dearest eye of America. For Americans, Özal had achieved a success which had not been achieved since the period of Atatürk. Özal was “just like an American” for the fact that rather than staying passive, he followed an active politics.¹⁹⁹ The following statement expressed by Amiral Stansfield Turner, former CIA chief, about Özal justifies the oppositions against Özal in Turkey. Turner went on to say:

*“I watched Özal on TV, he spoke very well. When did you transfer to the Presidential system? Today, I am proud of Turkey for contributing in this way. The decisions of Ankara would facilitate Saddam’s fall on his knees.”*²⁰⁰

In the new period of Turkey following the September 12 military coup, Özal played a role with a different and distinct vision at the highest level. He also continued this understanding in the years of the Gulf Crisis when he was the President and became the most prominent figure. Despite his election as the President, his star, which hit the bottom with the defeat of ANAP in the 1989 election, shone again with the Gulf Crisis after a year²⁰¹ and with his understanding of an active politics, he removed the traditional Middle East policy which Turkey had been maintaining since her foundation and became very prominent in the Gulf Crisis. He had problems with his own party as well as the opposition, and even with the military, but he never conceded his perception of politics. It is the topics of debates whether what he had done were right or wrong. However, there is a fact that in respect to the Gulf War for Turkey, Özal was the “single man”.

¹⁹⁷ Bozgeyik, p.158.

¹⁹⁸ Bozgeyik, p.159.

¹⁹⁹ *Milliyet*, 3 March 1991.

²⁰⁰ *Milliyet*, 28 August 1990.

²⁰¹ Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal’ın Anıları*, İstanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1996,

CONCLUSION

The Middle East policy of Turkey is the derivative of her general foreign policy tendency. The desire to be westernized, which was her choice and designated the foreign policy of the Republic of Turkey, and the condition of the collaboration with the West determined the tendency and situation of her Middle East policy. Turkey has not developed any distinctive policy towards the Middle East, except for some short periods, and looked at the region as the secondary and even lower degrees recently. Even at the moments when she developed very intimate relationships with the Middle East, the Western factor was always on the agenda. The only exception is the Middle East policy developed at the leadership of Turgut Özal in 1980s. If this period, which was to a degree different from the previous ones, had been followed for a longer term successfully, both Turkey and the region could reach to a different position. The dynamics of the global politics and national politics in the region where Turkey is also situated prevented Turkey to achieve her goals in the Middle East policies. The existence of dictatorships like that of Iraq in the region, Arab-Israel disputes, Islam-Secularism divide were hindrances in front of the stability in the region and Turkey's policies towards the region. On the other hand, the global powers would not hesitate to cause regional and international clashes between the countries or support them as long as they keep their interests above everything else.

The Gulf War is important in the sense that it ended bipolar world order and it was the first experiment after the end of the Cold War. The Western states stopped Iraq, which had already been fed with their own hands and which had an aim of being the "super power" of the Middle East. It was also observed that the international law was applied in this war in the most effective way. The number of Security Council decisions had reached to a certain amount about a specific event since the establishment of the United Nations. This showed that the solution of Crisis could be within the frameworks of the legal rules.

Iraq has been one of the most significant neighbors of Turkey with her unity and integrity, and with her historical and social closeness, under the umbrella of the Ottoman for 384 years. Even today Iraq is very important for Turkey for also the fact

that there is about 10 % population of the Turkmen. Iraq has been a Middle East country, through which Turkey can develop her Middle East policy with the common background and cultural accumulations. Unfortunately, the relationships between Turkey and Iraq did not go on in the way expected owing to the unrestrained and unbalanced policies of Saddam Hussein. As a result of this war, the idea of the Arab League received a great stroke.

It is observed that today many advanced countries, which have developed industry and advanced technology, do investments in the Middle East. The USA had this great cake herself in the post Cold War era. However, today Russia, France and China in particular, many great states have ambitions related to the region, and they want to have their share of the cake. This is an indication that in the near future the balances in the Middle East may change again.

As contradictory to the expectations, Turkey came out of the Gulf War with big wounds. The Poised Hammer, which had been settled in Turkey, had a position of discomforting Turkey after a certain period. Turkey tried to define the 688 numbered United Nations Security Council decision in her own favor, but in this decision, in addition to the protection of the civil people in Iraq, there is also protection of the regions where there are Kurdish people. For the first time with this decision, the Kurdish people were addressed with their names. The issue was carried to the international law and their status was increased. Moreover, with this decision, the UN had insistent attitude to intervene the interior affairs of Turkey. Increasing PKK problem, turned into an issue which would divert Turkish foreign policy for a long time.

The foreign policy of Turkey in the Gulf War, if the prevalent conditions of the period are kept in mind, was a choice with no alternative. Perhaps this policy was the more active application of the Western biased foreign policy of Turkey. If there had been no leadership of Özal, Turkey could have followed a more moderate policy rather than the active one. Thus, the difference of Özal was reflected in his being active. However, the targets aimed at by such active policies could never be achieved despite all the efforts of Özal. On the other hand, the policy of neutrality based on presumptions and can be asserted as an alternative was a policy which could not have

any chance of application; also the results of it could not be better than those of the active policies.

Turkey could not obtain the things she desired from the Middle East after the end of the war despite the foreign policy, which was followed as “single man” by Turgut Özal. In other words, it was unfortunately understood that a policy “customized to a person” could not be successful. The positive policy that Turkey tried to follow could not reach to its target. The existence of a dictator like Saddam Hussein, the Arab-Israel dispute, and the increasing power of Iran were the barriers ahead of Turkey. As long as the powerful states do not abandon their policies regarding this region, there will no stability in the region, nor will Turkey have peace and welfare environment in the region.

Before all, Turgut Özal possessed an important power given by the Constitutional law. In the process of decision making in the foreign policy of the 1982 Constitution, the President, one of the wings of the executive was given great authorities. Although the use of these authorities has a value itself, in fact, they were also closely related to the balances in the current political system. In other words, the composition of the Parliament, formation of the government, and the severity of the communal reactions are the determining factors of the process. Moreover, individual traits of the authorities participating to the process of decision making are also important issues. Active role of Özal in the decision making process played the most crucial role in the Gulf Crisis.

It is not appropriate to say that Özal had not faced any problem. A majority of the opposition to Özal was directed to the over activity of Özal in the determination and the applications of these policies rather than to his policies regarding the Gulf War. The majority of Turkey condemned the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, supported most of the UN decisions; however, they did not have a common idea about the limitations and degrees of Özal’s role in the formation of the policy.

Özal, who could not find any solution to the ‘South East problem during the 1980s asserted that by the attack of Saddam Hussein to Kuwait, a great opportunity emerged for Turkey, and thus he tried to integrate the Kurdish policies with those of the internal and external ones. Trying to establish more room for liberty within the country, Özal wanted to undertake the responsibility of being bearer for the Kurdish

out of the country. Turgut Özal, who in addition to all these policies tried to make them coherent with those of the USA, expected that he would receive supports of the West for all his policies regarding the Middle East on account of his active policies in the Gulf War. Hence, from the very beginning of the Gulf War, Özal wanted to involve into the war. However, this desire of Özal faced harsh resistance from the bureaucracy those circles that support traditional approach in the foreign policy. As a result of these disputes, Özal did not step in the way he wanted, but the classical Turkish foreign policy faced significant alterations: by this war Turkey gave her unchanging principle of vindicating the status, but did not give any ‘tolerance’ to keep away from the conflicts in the Middle East. Another innovation for Turkish foreign policy was the fact that the President and the Parliamentary bureaucracy vindicated such diverse opinions. Özal had by-passed all other foreign policy actors including the government. According to Özal, Turkey had always been at the sides, which were defeated, because of her hesitant policy, and now it was time to be at the winning side. The resignation of Chief of Armed Force Necip Torumtay upon his anger to Özal explicitly showed conflicts between the traditional foreign policy and the approaches of Özal-like foreign policy. However, this time it was not the civil wing but the military wing that withdrew. It is in this sense that the resignation of Necip Torumtay was an indication of the maturity in the civil regime, and was a turning point for Turkey. If we remember how hesitant were Menderes and Demirel against oppositions from the military and how they stepped backward, Özal’s self confidence against all the institutions and actors was quite surprising.

Under the circumstances, Özal represented a serious alteration in Turkish Foreign Policy as he himself stated it in the following lines. By saying that “many things altered in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Özal claimed that hesitant and passive structure in the system of Turkish foreign policy ended, and that from now on Turkey would follow active policies depending on the conditions. To Özal, accusations against him for having “adventurous foreign policy” were due to his “more dynamic and active foreign policy”. In short, Özal supported a new perspective for foreign policy, and tried to put it into effect during the Gulf crisis. Özal’s success despite the other actors was also partly because of the ideological gaps and the fact that his rivals did not produce any policies. If we remember the period of the Gulf Crisis, Iraq

occupied another country and did not accept to withdraw. No political party from left to right was able to produce a political solution to this problem. Moreover, Bülent Ecevit visited Saddam Hussein in Baghdad despite his being an invader whereas Necmettin Erbakan could not display a consistent attitude regarding the ‘conflict of the two Muslim states’. While swallowing a country completely, Iraq also became a great rival for Turkey as the neighbor of Turkey; the enmity between the allies of Turkey and Iraq reached at the climax, and Russia, China and even the Arab world supported the USA in the prevailing environment. However, apart from the Presidency, the institutions including security and foreign policy bureaucracy did not show any clear attitude. In an environment when the politics and bureaucracy did not find a solution, the determined policies of Özal paved the way for him to be a step forward, and thus for the first time in the Turkish foreign policy, the President was in conflict with the other actors and became the basic determiner of the decisions.

It can be said that Özal’s policy of “putting one and taking three” was not clearly met in the post war period. However, Özal expected to get the benefits of his Gulf war policies in the long run, although his regional and Kurdish policies were inseparable from each other. In general, it can be stated that Özal’s expectations from the war were Mosul petroleum and the North Iraq. However, when the general foreign policy of Özal is scrutinized, it is understood that these aims were just a part of the general aims. According to Özal, who thought that the Southern borders of Turkey were artificial, this war gave chance to Turkey to dominate the southern part of Turkey. Due to weakening Iraq, Turkey could be effective on the region using her economic and cultural means and the political supports of the West. Özal, who especially wanted to play an active role in the new plans of the USA, was of the opinion that Turkey had to return to the Ottoman borders in respect to economic and cultural effectiveness.

The benefits of these policies to Turkey could be:

- To solve Kurdish problem in a way to strengthen Turkey in the region,
- To pull the security line of Turkey backwards in the south,
- To increase Turkey’s area of effect,
- To find new economic resources and markets,

- To benefit from Turkey's growing significance in the eyes of the West.

Although these extremely debatable aims are very clear, the question, on condition that the Özal's policies had been followed, whether these results would have been obtained or not, has not been answered yet. However, there was also probability of having the counter effect of these aims which in fact carried great risks; and the fact that PKK became stronger right after the Gulf War proved it. Despite it, the real great loss was that there has been no conceptually framed foreign policy after Özal. Turkey left the policies of Özal incomplete on account of the protection of her prevalent condition. However, Turkey did not make any new policies against them afterwards.

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