

**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES IN
TWO LATIN AMERICAN STATES:
BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

Thesis submitted to the

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Master of Arts

in

International Relations

by

Süleyman GÜDER

Fatih University

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To my Parents

APPROVAL PAGE

Student : Süleyman GÜDER
Institute : Institute of Social Sciences
Department : International Relations
Thesis Subject : A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Policy
Perspectives in two Latin American States: Brazil and
Venezuela in the Twenty-First Century
Thesis Date : June 2011

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Savaş GENÇ

Head of Department

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Berdal ARAL

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Berdal ARAL

Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgüç ORHAN

Assist. Prof. Dr. Sami EL MUSHTAWI

It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

Assoc. Prof. Mehmet KARAKUYU

Director

AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study

ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

Süleyman GÜDER

June 2011

ABSTRACT

Süleyman GÜDER

June 2011

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES IN TWO LATIN AMERICAN STATES: BRAZIL AND VENEZUELA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The purpose of this study is to make a thorough inquiry into the foreign policy strategies being pursued by Brazil and Venezuela during the twenty-first century. The two different approaches to Latin American foreign policy understanding will set out through the most known comparative foreign policy method, ‘the three levels of analysis’ (individual, state and international system). This is explored specifically through an analysis of the discourse of Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1999-) in Venezuela and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002- 2010) in Brazil. This study particularly concentrates on both Latin American leaders’ foreign policy discourses and their implementations to see how they are/were pursuing the foreign policy compatible with their leftist/socialist ideology. This work will indicate that foreign policy implementations could change in accordance with the different historical and structural motivations of both countries.

Key words:

Foreign policy, Latin America, Left, Ideology, Brazil, Venezuela.

KISA ÖZET

Süleyman GÜDER

Haziran 2011

İKİ LATİN AMERİKA ÜLKESİNİN DIŞ POLİTİKA PERSPEKTİFLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ: YİRMİ BİRİNCİ YÜZYILDA BREZİLYA VE VENEZUELA

Bu tez, 21. yüzyılda dünya siyasetinde etkileri artan iki Latin Amerika ülkesi Brezilya ve Venezuela'nın dış politika perspektiflerini karşılaştırmalı olarak ele almayı hedeflemektedir. Dönem olarak, Brezilya için Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2002- 2010); Venezuela için Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías (1999-) başkanlık dönemleri incelenecektir. Kendilerini solcu/sosyalist olarak niteleyen iki başkanın, bu ideolojik tutumlarının dış politika söylemleri ve eylemleri ile ne kadar tutarlı olduğu, karşılaştırmalı dış politika incelemelerinde en çok kullanılan 'üçlü analiz düzeyi' (birey, devlet ve uluslararası sistem) yöntemi ile tartışılacaktır. Bunun tespiti için çalışmada, özellikle Chávez'in ve Lula'nın dış politika söylemleri analiz edilecektir ve bu söylemlerin dış politika uygulamaları ile ne kadar örtüştüğü gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Nihayetinde, Brezilya ve Venezuela devletlerinin tarihsel ve yapısal farklılıklarından ötürü, dış politika söylemlerinde önemli farklılıklar olduğu somut veriler ile iddia edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dış politika, Latin Amerika, Sol, İdeoloji, Brezilya, Venezuela.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Democratic Action Party (<i>Acción Democrática</i>)
ALBA	The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (<i>Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América</i>)
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BFP	Brazilian Foreign Policy
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
COPEI	Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization: Social Christian Party (<i>Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente: Partido Social Cristiano</i>)
ELN	National Liberation Army (Colombia)
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i>)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FHC	Fernando Henrique Cardoso
FIESP	São Paulo State Federation of Industries
FTAA	The Free Trade Area of the Americas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
LDCs	Less Developed Countries
MDGs	UN Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUL	Southern Common Market (<i>Mercado Comum do Sul</i>)
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MST	Brazil's Landless Workers Movement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NNPT	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS	Organization of American States
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
P5+1	Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council and Germany
PSDB	Brazilian Social Democracy Party
PT	Worker Party
UN	United Nations
UNASUL	Union of South American Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the course of the twentieth century, Latin America had a significant impact on international affairs and began eagerly to contribute to the global issues when came to the end of it. In general, it is possible to say that the collapse of USSR (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 1922-1991) and change in the nature of the international system (bi-polar to multi-polar) has given all actors much more capability for playing key roles in the new world order. Though too much has already been written on post-Cold War period and scholars have offered different approaches in the field of International Relations about it, they do not provide satisfactory answers about the Latin American countries. Thus, a more pertinent approach that takes the specific context of Latin America into consideration is needed. This is the starting point of the thesis. A diagnosis of the rise of the left is one of the most salient phenomena in the region. Without any doubt, it is increasingly becoming popular to focus on the 'left' issue in the academia of social sciences when the current development at issue is Latin America.

New leftist leaders' social, cultural, political and economic projects have been discussed in an effort to see their original contributions. This study attempts to look at the issue from broader/macro perspective/level (international perspective/reflections). In doing so, I choose the foreign policy as a focal point of the work. To permit a clearer understanding of the foreign policy issue, it is, on occasions, imperative to touch on the internal affairs. Since, as Klaveren and Hook refer, there is no clear-cut differentiation between foreign and domestic policies.¹ In this regard, specifically I do handle the foreign policy of the two prominent Latin

¹ Van Klaveren states, "Although the distinction between the internal and external is largely false conceptually it remains useful". A. Van Klaveren, "Understanding Latin American Foreign Policies," in *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph s. Tulchin. (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 37. Cited in Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A. K. Hey, "Introduction: Theoretical Challenge to Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy Studies" in *Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy*, Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A. K. Hey. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 4; Steven Hook, "Introduction: A reader's Guide to Foreign-Policy Adaptation," in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers*, Steven W. Hook. (Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 2.

American countries: Brazil and Venezuela. There is a strong justification for the selection of the two countries among other Latin American states.

Certainly, the term 'Left' occupies the central role in this work. It aims to provide a new approach to the question of the rise of the Left in Latin America. As it is going to be examined in the next chapter, there are many Lefts (at least more than two) in Latin America. In this study, it is accepted that Brazil and Venezuela are two of them; but both also have representative capacity among the other Left. They are also most effective two countries in South America in the sense that having an original posture in the international arena. Due to their important critical posture, not only in the Latin world, but also in the world system, I decided to study these two countries as a case study. Thus, I intentionally prefer the two different fractions of the Latin American Left to see a vivid/rich characteristic of the Left in the region. Beyond that, despite both leaders are well known as leftist leaders, as it will be extensively examined in the comparison chapter, their foreign policy practices have manifested many differences. The main differences have been highlighted separately at state and individual levels.

In the area of global issues, Brazil was considered as a prominent country in the world because of its economic capacity, population, and territorial size. Yet, its influence over the global affairs was not a true projection of its real potential. There is no doubt that Brazilians became more and more aware of their actual state potential in the process of Lula's presidency. Immediately after the election of leftist Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002, Brazil's presence on the international arena became more visible. Brazil, as the biggest Latin American country, began to demand a more active role in global affairs. Furthermore, the main contribution of Lula's government to the Brazilian foreign policy vision was upgrading the scale of its foreign policy from regional to global level.

Until Lt. Colonel Hugo Chávez Frias came to power, Latin America's biggest petrol supplier country, Venezuela, kept a low profile as a member of the international community. After Chávez assumed presidency, Venezuela has been creating a high profile foreign policy-making in comparison to its real capacity. Hugo Chavez's populist course of action on the international arena has been

marked by a series of events that paved the way for significant changes in Venezuela's foreign policy perceptions. Beyond the populist discourse, Chávez's alternative options, such as economic and political initiatives, and strategic partnerships throughout the world against western hegemony, particularly the US, brought about dramatic changes in the vision of this state's diplomacy.

My purpose in this thesis is to put the rise of the Left into the proper context of the international system. There are various reasons that can account for the rise of the leftist governments at the regional/local level; but beyond the regional/local scale, it was crucial to concentrate on how it could be defined according to the dynamics of the international system. Because of today's complex world order, it is difficult to understand a problematic area without its international aspects. That seems to me as a very appropriate way of understanding the actual dynamics of the Latin American Left. For instance, when we ask in the coming pages, "what's going on in Latin America?" and "is Latin America shifting toward the Left?", we implicitly need to think also about the question of what has changed in the current international system during those years. To some extent, it is true that, failed neo-liberal prescriptions and their direct result of the structural adjustment reforms, economic crises and prevailing corruption scandal throughout the region, have been the principal triggering factors for the rise of the Left. Significantly, the most striking point here is that the rise of the Left is not the natural result of unsuccessful neo-liberal policies (Washington Consensus). That is because although many states in the world (chiefly developing and underdeveloped countries) have been hit by negative consequences of the Washington Consensus reforms, they have not brought the Leftwing parties to power. It leads us to argue that Latin America's historical realities/roots/circumstances have paved the way for the rise of the leftist leaders in the region. Since the region's destructive colonial experience, leftist ideologies have remained valid and relevant up until today. Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy cases provide important clues that help us to understand the rise of the Left from a broader perspective. In order to examine the effects of the leftist leaders on the structural problems, the thesis particularly concentrates on their foreign policy discourses and practices to see how they pursue a foreign policy that is coherent with their ideological (leftist) principles. To make a tangible analysis, the period I have chosen for the study of

Brazilian foreign policy begins in 2003 and extends to 2008; and from 1999 to the present for the Venezuelan foreign policy.

Due to the dominance of the USA academia in Latin American studies, it is almost impossible to encounter unbiased books and articles on the subject. Much of the written works about Latin American studies are composed either of the USA-centric perspective or by anti-American viewpoints. This approach is especially prevalent in the case of the Chávez government. By seeking to be ‘objective’, as far as this is possible with regard to the analysis made on the subject matter, this study relies extensively on primary resources, which are Portuguese and Spanish in order to minimize distortions. Additionally, regional and local perspectives, having Latin American origins, are paid due attention.

1.1. The Level of Analysis Problem

After an examination of the region’s general situation, it is necessary to discuss the method I have pursued in this study. As a method of inquiry, comparison seems to me a very appropriate way of understanding for a clearer comprehension of these issues. Boardman defined the comparison method as “a valuable form of intellectual therapy” and an inquiry that can be employed to provide “valid cross-cultural measurement and explanations”.² In this work, I have applied the comparison method in order to comment on the empirical findings of the Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy subjects. One of the obvious purposes of comparative foreign policy is defining the foreign goals, decisions, and state initiatives by means of compare-and-contrast method. For Lijphart, although there is no agreement on *what is comparative political analysis method*, the method of comparative analysis is considered “as a method of discovering empirical relationships among variables”.³ Thus, I need to articulate the finding systematically. Significantly, as a result of long research period and critical questioning (according to the way in which I have interpreted/measured the

² Cited in Walter Carlsnaes, *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization*, 1st ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 71.

³ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” *The American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971): p. 683.

findings), I came to rely on three levels of analysis as the most applicable/appropriate method for my study.

In social sciences, compared to physical sciences, it is impossible to deal properly with any subject or phenomenon together with all the factors that affect it due to its complicated subject (human being).⁴ However, it became evident that intellectual endeavor has been spent through intellectual accumulation of humanity, in order to develop a coherent and logical method to understand social sciences. When it comes to International Relations (IR) discipline, as a new branch of modern social sciences, the question of *how will the subjects, foreign policy in our case, be systematically analyzed?* has occupied a central role in the IR literature. It was after thorough investigation of the question that the level of analysis problem has brought about contentious discussions in the field of International Relations, notably in foreign policy studies.

Though the multiple level approaches can be traced back to Waltz who was the first neo-realist theoretician who discussed the three levels (*images*) to indicate the causes of the war,⁵ primarily J. D. Singer systematically applied the level-of-analysis problem into the IR discipline.⁶ Singer explained the difficulty of ‘reliable prediction’ in his seminal article on the International Relations discipline with a map metaphor. As Singer puts in simpler terms, “...the oblate spheroid which the planet Earth most closely represents is not transferable to the two-dimensional surface of a map without some distortion”.⁷ Therefore, this method may contribute to revealing a correlation between the objective reality of the Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy with my findings.

Significantly, immediately after Singer’s review and article, a very large literature on the level of analysis has come about. Whilst Rosenau and Yalem examine the international issues through the national, regional and global lenses,

⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, 3rd ed. (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2000), p. 69.

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, 4th ed. (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1965). See the critical review of the book, J. David Singer, “International Conflict: Three Levels of Analysis Review of Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis,” *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 3 (1960): 453-461.

⁶ See J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 78- 79.

Frankel and Holsti define international politics through the three levels of analysis: individual, state and system.⁸ This study uses an analytic model of three levels of analysis for foreign policy comparison. In addition to that, according to International Relations discipline, other levels of analysis classifications such as individual/group, state, international organizations, sub-system and global levels have become increasingly prevalent in the foreign policy analysis. Indeed, researcher could decide on appropriate model (three or five levels; geographical levels) with regard to its purpose.⁹

Before turning to a discussion, I need to clarify what is understood by the three levels of analysis. It could be roughly defined in terms of the system and actors (the national state and the individual). First, the structure of the international system represents a macro level analysis. The term international system is meant to refer to the location of international power structure, which comprises economics, institutions, financial realities and military balance. In comparison to the state level, however, the systemic level analysis was not prevalent until the end of the Second World War. It has come to the fore only after the globalization of current international system. For common understanding, the system determines/constrains (by external realities and restrains) nation states' spheres of influence and permits to see the international relations from the broader perspective.¹⁰ In this third *image*, there has been a contentious debate on the 'state of the international system' (anarchic by itself or socially constructed) among the IR scholars. In brief, only this level investigates how the structural characteristics of the international system influence the nation-states' foreign policy-making processes.

The state is another explanatory level in the foreign policy analysis. The state level of analysis is the fundamental and determinant one among other units of

⁸ James Rosenau, "Perspectives on World Politics," in *World Politics : An Introduction*, James N Rosenau; Kenneth W Thompson; Gavin Boyd. (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 8; Ronald J. Yalem, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem Reconsidered," *The Yearbook of World Affairs* (1977): p. 307; Joseph Frankel, *International Politics: Conflict and Harmony*. (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p. 21; Kalevi Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, 2nd ed. (London: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 17. Cited in Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, pp. 70- 71.

⁹ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," p. 90.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

analysis,¹¹ although the supremacy of the nation-state has diminished in the last sixty years. By focusing on the state level, I draw attention on the type of government, political institutions, executive branches, bureaucracy, legislatures, media etc. But it does not ignore the importance of public opinion, the internal pressure/interest groups, social classes, elites, and public figures during the foreign policy-making process. They indirectly influence the state when the state decides to make one or another critical foreign policy decision.¹²

Finally, the third level analyzes the individual (man himself) level of analysis. In our day, international analysts prefer to see foreign policy strategies mostly through the state and the international system perspectives. It is easier to acquire necessary materials about the system and the state, whereas due to the scarcity of the reference works, it is not an easy task to investigate the individual dimension of international relations. Beyond the problem of sources, an emphasis on the importance of the individuals, notably after the Second World War, in comparison to *Ancient Régime* (e.g. Metternich's Austria-Hungary, Otto von Bismarck's Prussia and Napoléon Bonaparte's France) has dramatically decreased. In this level of analysis, the question is posed about the impact of the idiosyncrasies¹³ of the human being (head of state or President) on the state's foreign policy. The current study, comprehensively investigates Chávez's and Lula's particular choices of foreign policy. The ideology of the Left, which is common for both leaders, is a benchmark for illustrating it. With respect to my interest, it is appropriate to look into the two Latin American countries' foreign policy based on three levels of analysis (individual, state and system) method. I do concentrate more on individual level among the others due to my research question. If this study can make an idiosyncratic foreign policy contribution to the understanding of the Chávez and Lula governments, then it is imperative to address the issue through the individual (man himself) level of analysis.

¹¹ Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): p. 6; Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," p. 82.

¹² Singer, "International Conflict," p. 453.

¹³ Such as President's personal traits, ideology, ideas, perceptions, intentions, values, cognitive factors *etc.*

1.2. Structure of the thesis

This study is composed of six chapters. The present chapter, Introduction, provides the reader necessary background information in order to put the following chapters into a proper context. For our purposes, it is important to underscore the fact that the upcoming three chapters roughly correspond to the sections of empirical part of the thesis. The second chapter highlights the rise of what is called the leftist governments in Latin America, spelling out the details of the Left and specifically the Latin American Left. Here my intent is to establish a ground for the discussion points of the next two chapters' (three and four), tracing the rise of the leftist governments in Latin America after the second half of 1990s. I argue that the meaning of the 'Left' in the region has changed through the years and absorbed the local sentiments (e.g. culture, religion, ethnicity *etc.*). Therefore, throughout the chapter, the issue of the 'new Left' in Latin America has been revealed in detail. Also, despite their different ideological motivations, I have juxtaposed Chávez and Lula in terms of the Left.

The focus of the third chapter is the Brazilian foreign policy. After the expression of traditional guidelines of the Brazilian foreign policy and discussion of the evolution of Brazil's foreign policy through the twentieth century (a savoir post-Second World War period), it draws out Lula's foreign policy parameters and his administration's original contribution to foreign policy area with examination of concrete foreign policy subjects. Due to Lula's critical contribution to the international community and Brazil's request for a room for maneuvering to expand the spheres of its presence in the regional and international arena during his office, we preferred to call that period as "Brasilization of foreign policy" (*Brasilização da política externa*). Prior to discussing the Lula administration's international posture, in order to come up with an idea about the Lula government's performance and policies, the vertical comparison method has been employed. This method suggests that Lula's foreign policy behavior will be compared with previous (FH Cardoso) government's practices. The leftist identity of Lula will be discussed with reference to a variety of issues (e.g. bilateral relations with Latin America, the USA, the Third World, the United Nations and global problems).

The subject of the fourth chapter is Venezuela's foreign policy. It discusses the Venezuelan foreign policy made by current President Hugo Chávez. In this chapter, I largely apply the same method (vertical comparison) and analyze the similar subjects that I essentially problematized in the Brazilian section of this thesis. What we have in the Venezuelan section that sets it apart from the Brazilian case is the particular period, which this chapter takes as the starting point for analysis. Due to Venezuela's long-lasting political regime, which is called *Punto Fijo Pact* (1958-1998), I begin with *Punto Fijo* to discuss the period immediately before Chávez administration's term in office. It stands to the reason that international relations and political science studies labeled those years (1958-1998) as *Punto Fijo*. Moreover, Hugo Chávez promised to Venezuelan electorates in the course of his first Presidential campaign, the 'termination of old punto fijismo' (i.e. the ancient regime). Thus, the reason why pre-Chávez period can be traced back to the beginning of the Pact becomes evident. Surely, the study asserts that the foreign policy being pursued by Chávez administration has brought about big changes to Venezuela's international diplomacy.

The fifth chapter of this work presents the critical foreign policy comparison (also known as horizontal) between Lula and Chávez administrations. My target in this chapter is to set the stage for an examination of already discussed foreign policy issues and most significantly for an understanding of the causes behind the Chávez's and Lula's different political paths, while finding out the idiosyncratic features of the Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy traditions. In order to get a clear picture of the main motivations behind the different foreign policy implementations, the subject will be separated into two levels: state and individual. The last chapter aims to provide a holistic approach to draw the findings and make general statements about the previous chapters. It also comments on the empirical findings by stressing the possible contribution of the Latin American Left to the alteration in the international system.

CHAPTER 2

THE RISE OF THE LEFT IN LATIN AMERICA

For two decades, we have heard different news from Latin America. Across the region, the militarist and right wing authorities, especially, in the second half of the 1990s, have been replaced with leftist and socialist authorities. Latin America has experienced an unprecedented political situation of numerous electoral successes by the leftist or center-leftist governments. This unprecedented development initially began with Venezuelan Fifth Republic Movement (*Movimiento Quinta República*) leader Hugo Chávez's coming to power in 1998 (re-elected in 2000 and 2006). The process continued with the Brazilian Labor Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*) leader, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's victories (2002 and 2006). Because of Brazil's position in the Latin American continent, the presidency of Lula is extremely important for the triumph of the Left in the continent. In Argentina, firstly, Néstor Kirchner (2003) and currently, his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007) have been trying to follow leftist policies (together with social democracy and Peronism). The electoral victory of the President of Bolivia Evo Morales (popularly known as Evo) is also meaningful for Latin American history. He has been declared as the country's first fully indigenous head of state in the 470 years since the Spanish 'Conquista'. These election outcomes, also, have brought Michelle Bachelet to power in Chile (2006); Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua (2007); Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007); Álvaro Colom in Guatemala (2008); Fernando Lugo in Paraguay (2008); José Alberto Mujica Cordano in Uruguay (2010); and Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso in Perú (2011).

After all, question marks flashed in mind, *what's going on in Latin America? And is Latin America shifting toward the Left?* Apparently, it is true that there is a shift toward the Left, but we also know features of all these newly elected governments are not the same. Unlike general perceptions, the different types of Left (including nationalist, Christian, moderate, Peronist, populist and pragmatist elements) should not be put in a pan of balance.

In this part, my attempt here is an examination of that tremendous transformation in the continent and trying to understand the main motives behind the changes. To do that, this part of the thesis assesses the meaning of the Left in Latin America and traces the rise of leftist governments in the region during the last decade. Although it seems that the subject concerns the political science discipline at first sight, this discussion inevitably concerns International Relations discipline as well. That means that to discuss Lula's and Chávez's behaviors in foreign policy, there is a need for *a priori* proposition to make a coherent argument. Doubtlessly, the topic is going to be discussed from a broader perspective (not detailed) and within the borders of International Relations field.

2.1. The Meaning of the Left in Latin America

There is a substantial body of literature about the meaning of the Left, especially after 'the leftist governments' have come to power in Latin America. The meaning of the Left (in Latin American context), different perceptions and fractions of the Left, and 'new' Left in Latin America constitute this section's main subjects.

In the social sciences literature or lexicon, the very term of 'Left' is one of the hard to define concepts about which there exists no consensus. The term is used according to the user's worldview and purposes. Yet, in what follows, I am going to explore the meaning of the Left from a different point of view by handling the meaning of the Left in Latin America today. Because of the region's highly dynamic conditions, the meaning of the Left has always changed depending on time and the economic and political situation of a country. As Leslie Bethell discusses, being on the Left in Latin America today, means something different than earlier historical periods (1930s and the years of the Cuban revolution).¹⁴

¹⁴ Kenneth Robert, Leslie Bethell, and René Antonio Mayorga, "Conceptual and Historical Perspectives," in *New Left Democratic Governance*, Cynthia J. Arnson and Jose Raul Perales. (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2007), p. 4, <http://wilsoncenter.net/topics/pubs/NewLeftDemocraticGovernance.pdf>.

Immediately after the Cold War, the interpretation of J.G. Castañeda, a Mexican politician and academic who served as Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2000–2003) and the author of “Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War” and contributor to Foreign Affairs, has become one of the most cited figures by the academics and political circles.¹⁵ The Left is defined in his article “...as that current of thought, politics, and policy that stresses social improvements over macroeconomic orthodoxy, egalitarian distribution of wealth over its creation, sovereignty over international cooperation, democracy (at least when in opposition, if not necessarily once in power) over governmental effectiveness”.¹⁶ Ideologically and politically, the Latin American Left, he identifies, consists of the following groups: traditional communist parties, the national-popular or populist Left; the politico-military organizations; and the reformist Left. Although the former principle implies an ideological and political classification, the latter is functional. He adds two groups to the latter classification to differentiate functional principle: the grass roots and the intellectual Left.¹⁷ Castañeda expresses these views immediately after the end of the Cold War, which means that the intellectual Left and the grass roots cannot grasp the contemporary posture adopted by the Left wing political movement in Latin America today. As I formulate in the following pages, organized social movements constitute the main groups of the Latin American Left, together with political parties. It displays that the main components of Latin American Left are not static, but dynamic. With regard to this development, of course, the meaning of the Left has changed. The definition of the Left, he puts it, mostly depend on the principal agency of emerging actors during and in the wake of the Cold War.

¹⁵ Francisco Panizza, “Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in Latin America,” *Political Studies* 53, no. 4 (December 1, 2005): 716-734; Claudio Lomnitz, “Latin America’s Rebellion: Will the New Left Set a New Agenda?,” *Boston Review* 31, no. 5 (September 2006): 7-10; Jorge Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” *Foreign affairs*, 85, no. 3 (2006): 28; Robert, Bethell, and Mayorga, “Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,” p. 4; Patrick Barrett, A. Rodríguez Garavito, and Daniel Chavez, *The new Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*, Patrick S. Barrett, Daniel Chavez, César A. Rodríguez Garavito. (London: Pluto, 2008); Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi, “The End of the Embrace? Neoliberalism and Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Latin America,” in *Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America*, Juan Grugel. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Maxwell Cameron, “Latin America’s Left Turns: Beyond Good and Bad,” *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 331-348.

¹⁶ Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn”.

¹⁷ Jorge Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: the Latin American Left after the Cold War*. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1993), pp. 18-19.

When Harnecker, for instance, currently mentioned the Left, she refers to the “... array of forces that oppose the capitalist system and its profit motive and which are fighting for an alternative humanist, solidarity-filled society, a socialist society, the building blocks of which are the interests of the working classes”. That kind of society would also be “free from material poverty and the spiritual wretchedness engendered by capitalism.”¹⁸ The Left is not simply Left in which Left-wing parties and organizations coordinate, but also include social actors and movements who are trying to create autonomous spaces.¹⁹ Although she has an ideological bias to socialism,²⁰ the Left definition she suggests is more overlapped than what Castañeda offered.²¹

Robert, Bethell and Mayorga’s definition of Left includes three different elements. The Left is, for his understanding, a willingness to use state power to stimulate economic growth and to correct market failures, a willingness to use state power and/or social organizations to reduce social inequalities and address social deficits; and a commitment to deepen democracy through various forms of popular mobilization and participation in the political process.²² After confessing the problems in describing the Left, S. Ellner discusses that the principal difference between the Left and center Left is “between those who advocate far-reaching structural change (...) and those who are mainly concerned with policy reforms”. Furthermore, he believes that the Left is no more defined as pro-socialist and pro-populist wings that would make socialist forces the ultimate representatives of the Left, despite the fading out of radical populism in much of

¹⁸ Marta Harnecker, *Rebuilding the Left* (London; New York: Zed Books; Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 32.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁰ Marta Harnecker is Chilean sociologist, political scientist, and activist. She is defender of Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. She was sent to exile after the military coup against Salvador Allende’s government.

Marta Harnecker, *Venezuela: Una Revolución Sui Géneris* (Editorial El Viejo Topo, 2004); Hugo Chávez Frías and Marta Harnecker, *Hugo Chávez Frías: Un Hombre, Un Pueblo* (Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2002), are her recent books.

²¹ Maxwell’s definition also well-summarizes the Latin American left. For Maxwell, Latin American left refers to “...the leaders, parties and movements that seek to ameliorate inequality in its diverse manifestations, and promote social inclusion, either through bottom-up mobilization by grassroots organizations, top-down policy initiatives by personalist leaders, or legislation by parliamentary parties...” See Maxwell Cameron, “Latin America’s Left Turns: Beyond Good and Bad,” *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): p. 333.

²² Robert, Bethell, and Mayorga, “Conceptual and Historical Perspectives,” p. 10.

Latin America.²³ Without a doubt, Bobbio's classic distinction between Right and Left gives a clue about the nature of the Left. According to him, there is a positive view of social hierarchies in order to defend the economic and political virtues of inequality for right, whereas the Left promotes equality between individuals and groups (whether classes, genders, racial/ethnic groups, etc.), inspired by a horizontal vision of society.²⁴

After all, although there is no clear-cut definition of Latin American Left, due to its complexity, the definition of the Left must include, at least, the following values and norms: equality between individuals and groups (reducing inequality), ideological affiliations (such as Marxism and socialism), international solidarity, anti-imperialism or colonialism, advancing social justice, re-distributing wealth, achieving social integration, "stand against the existing social order, the right, in its favor..."²⁵ and; expanding political participation (minimizing state interference) and deepening democracy.

What's more, the Latin American Left is not monolithic and uniform. Those who dichotomize the Latin American Left, justify this action on different grounds. As has been discussed in Castañeda's already mentioned seminal book, there are two Latin American Lefts today. One is quite aware of its past mistakes (as well as those of its previous role models in Cuba and the Soviet Union) and has changed accordingly. These are roughly: modern, open-minded, reformist, and internationalist, and they spring, paradoxically, from the hard-core Left of the past. On the other hand, the other product of great tradition of Latin American populism is nationalist, strident, and close-minded. The second model is not aware of its past mistakes and favors *status quo*. For his 'two Lefts' thesis, the Worker

²³ Steve Ellner, "The Changing Status of the Latin American Left in the Recent Past," in *The Latin American Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika* (Boulder; London: Westview Press; Latin American Bureau, 1993), p. 15.

²⁴ Norberto Bobbio, *Derecha e izquierda: razones y significados de una distinción política* (Madrid: Taurus, 1995). Cited in Patrick Barrett, Daniel Chavez, and A. Rodríguez Garavito, "Utopia Reborn? Introduction to the Study of the New Latin American Left," in *The New Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*, Patrick S. Barrett, Daniel Chavez, César A. Rodríguez Garavito. (London: Pluto, 2008), p. 5.

²⁵ Fernando Henrique Cardoso defines the left as "being against the existing social order..." ["...Se esquerda significa ser contra a ordem social existente, e direita a favor, a social-democracia é sem dúvida uma corrente de esquerda"]. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *A Social-democracia: o que é, o que propõe para o Brasil*. Documento elaborado pelo escritório político do senador Fernando Henrique Cardoso sob a coordenação de Eduardo Graeff, São Paulo, 1990, p. 12, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/28054601/A-Social-Democracia-o-Que-e-o-Que>.

Party (PT) in Brazil, the Socialist Party in Chile and the Broad Front in Uruguay may suppose more “pragmatic, sensible, and realistic paths”, while Chávez in Venezuela, Kirchner in Argentina, and López Obrador in Mexico may be considered as nationalist, populist examples with few ideological foundations.²⁶ At this point, I must state that Castañeda is not the only academic who dichotomizes the Latin American Left.²⁷ According to Armony, for instance, there are two Lefts as well: radical (with populist and nationalistic tendencies) and pragmatic (more liberal and friendlier to globalization).²⁸ There is a distinction between ‘bad’ populist and ‘good’ social democrat Lefts. The major difference between these ‘species’ is the rejection of the free markets and representative democracy by the populists, whereas social democrats only strive to regulate markets and advance the interests of the popular sectors within the representative institutions.²⁹

From the viewpoint of Armony, Castañeda obviously adopts a ‘normative perspective’ and makes a distinction between a ‘right Left’ and a ‘wrong Left’. This sort of approach is very problematical for the understanding of Latin American Left. This explanation “entails an idealized view of politics, which liberal and progressive values and principles don’t mix with collectivist appeals”.³⁰ It is possible to mention the existence of critical approaches to understanding of the Left in such manner.³¹ For A. Cameron, dividing the Left, as social democrats and populists will only cause disappointment with the ‘pervasiveness of populism’ and dismay at the performance of social democracy,

²⁶ Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn”.

²⁷ See Franklin Gallegos, “Mucho mas que dos izquierdas,” *Nueva sociedad*. 205 (2006): 30; Javier Corrales, “The Many Lefts of Latin America,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 157 (2006): 44; Victor Armony, “The ‘Civic Left’ and the Demand for Social Citizenship”, 2007, http://weblogs.elearning.ubc.ca/leftturns/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Victor_Armony_Paper.pdf; Robert Kaufman, “Political Economy and the New Left’,” in *New Left Democratic Governance*, Cynthia J. Arnson and Jose Raul Perales. (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Latin American Program, 2007), 24- 30; Ellner, “The Changing Status of the Latin American Left in the Recent Past”.

²⁸ Armony, “The ‘Civic Left’ and the Demand for Social Citizenship,” p. 3.

²⁹ Cameron, “Latin America’s Left Turns,” p. 338.

³⁰ Armony, “The ‘Civic Left’ and the Demand for Social Citizenship,” p. 3.

³¹ See Jon Beasley-Murray, Maxwell Cameron, and Eric Hershberg, “Latin America’s Left Turns: An Introduction,” *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 319-330; Barrett, Chavez, and Rodríguez Garavito, “Utopia Reborn? Introduction to the Study of the New Latin American Left,” pp. 18- 19.

obscuring the continued salience of other more radical options by establishing liberalism as the covert norm.³²

Actually, this dichotomic distinction seems to be a problematic one, since it systematically ignores the fact that Latin American Lefts reflect the subjective or unique conditions of the societies, in which they emerged. In a certain extent, it is true that monolithic explanation of the Latin American Left always excludes some features that Latin American societies have. Therefore, unlike the ‘normative’ approach (good or bad), as I already have emphasized in the previous paragraphs, the expression, ‘multi-dimensional’ Left, would be more functional to examine what happened in Latin America. It means that, the understandings of the Latin American Lefts might differ from what non-Latin Americans think.³³

Finally, like the ‘Left’, the concept of the ‘new Left’ is also an important discussion point for the Latin American literature on the Left. Before the examination of the meaning of the new Left, a brief discussion of the three principal types of actors will be examined. When actors are mentioned in the context of Latin American Left, I mostly mean the social movements, parties and governments. They are the principal representatives of the Left in Latin America.

It is better here to mention Rodríguez-Garavito’s ‘new Left’ argument. Sometimes the adjective ‘new’ is used, like him, in a descriptive rather than evaluative sense. As Garavito put it, “the qualification ‘new’ is used here in a descriptive –rather than a normative– sense”. The leftist currents that he discusses are new as they are recent. This is not, however, to consider the Left as being superior or inferior to the Left alternatives of the past. As I have already stressed in the introductory section, the recent experiences of the Left differ from the previous ones. It is today beyond the specific issues of economic equality and democracy. They contain, according to some authors, “the radical grassroots mobilization of campesinos [a farmer or farm worker], indigenous peoples, women, students, environmentalists, unemployed and landless rural workers and,

³² Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg, “Latin America’s Left Turns,” p. 327.

³³ Till now, the meaning of the left has been discussed with two different variations: left and Latin American left. Because of the dual use, one might as well say that there is confusion of mind. But, indeed, both have been discussed (by the authors) within the Latin American context. I did not prefer any change of vocabulary in order to respect the original sources.

trade unions and communist parties that continue to mobilize and integrate themselves into the new cycles of protest and various newly formed party coalitions”.³⁴ In order to classify the new Left, it is somewhat necessary to recognize the characteristic elements (those elements that make it possible to describe both as the Left) of continuity with the old/traditional leftist patterns and the distinctive features that differentiate it from the old (classical) Left.³⁵ There are some characteristics, which distinguish it from the classical Left. Subsequently, certain common characteristics of the new Left are described:

1. “Plurality of strategies and articulation of decentralized forms of organization”;
2. “Multiplicity of social bases and political agendas” (is the broadening of the social bases and political agendas of the Left);
3. “Prominence of civil society”;
4. “Reformism” (fundamental dichotomy of the Left: revolution or reform);
5. “Deepening democracy” (the generalized disaffection with existing democracy).³⁶

Arditi called the new Left rather post-liberal than being anti-liberal. The prefix does not indicate the end of liberal politics and its replacement with something other, but it is obvious that the ‘post of post liberal’ implies something beyond liberalism.³⁷ The bulk of the new Left is now less antagonistic toward private property and the free market. Moreover, ironically, for the Left, the state still plays crucial role for regulating markets and pursuing redistribution policies (even if some strands advocate a politics of exodus from the state), although the Left has an ideology of the minimal state and a zero-sum game between a big, wasteful, incompetent state, and a vital and efficient private sector.³⁸ One aspect of post-liberal era, for Arditi, is involving actions, demands, proposals of social

³⁴ Barrett, Chavez, and Rodríguez Garavito, “Utopia Reborn? Introduction to the Study of the New Latin American Left,” p. 12.

³⁵ Barrett, Rodríguez Garavito, and Chavez, *The New Latin American Left*, p. 5.

³⁶ Barrett *et al.*, pp. 12-17.

³⁷ Benjamin Arditi, “Arguments about the Left Turn(s) in Latin America: A Post Liberal Politics?,” *Latin American Research Review* 43, no. 3 (July 2008): p. 73.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

recruitment as a way to be political and democratic, while focusing on redistribution instead of participation in the selection of public authorities.

Indeed, the way followed by ‘progressive’ government considers that the reconstitution of the Latin American Left is the implementation of social reforms, instead of radical changes in institutional politics and macroeconomic policies. This salient new Left ‘agenda’ promotes the implementation of welfare programs for the poorest members of society (*Fome Zero* and *Bolsa Família*³⁹ in Brazil), confining a more active role to the state as a regulator and mediator between the capital and labor, the expansion and improvement of public services, and the introduction of a more progressive tax regime, whereas it accepts the basic principles of market economics.⁴⁰

2.2. Tracing the Rise of Leftist Governments in Latin America in the Last Decade

Throughout the Latin American continent, an overwhelming majority agrees that Latin America has politically swerved toward the Left. I accept this ‘given fact’ as *a priori* proposition, and thus my arguments mostly rely on this matter of fact. I put forward the assertion that there are differences about ‘perception of the Left’ among the leftist governments, on account of historical conditions, culture, each country’s own socio-economic/political experiences (social reality), ‘style, language and discourse’⁴¹ and ‘different social base’⁴² in the sub-continent. It claims that the historical conditions of Latin American Left and leftist governments, because of their own conditions, do not necessarily overlap on the basis of the same political agenda.

According to Claudio, each country has specific rectified national histories and imaginary pillars of foundation reenacted from country to country. Evo Morales,

³⁹ “Zero Hunger” and “Family Grant”.

⁴⁰ Barrett, Rodríguez Garavito, and Chavez, *The New Latin American Left*, p. 22.

⁴¹ Grugel and Riggirozzi, “The End of the Embrace? Neoliberalism and Alternatives to Neoliberalism in Latin America,” p. 16.

⁴² Roberts Kenneth, “Latin America’s Populist Revival,” *SAIS Review* 27, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2007): 3- 15.

in Bolivia, has become the country's first fully indigenous head of state in the 470 years since the Spanish Conquest. By contrast, Chávez found its victory in the foundation of nation-state under Venezuelan political leader, Simón Bolívar, who played a key role in Latin America's struggle for independence from colonialist Spain⁴³. First time in the history of Brazil, a metallurgical worker was elected as head of state (2002). Because of the country's strategic position in the region, the electoral victory of Lula was a milestone for Latin American history, after the Cuban revolution in January, 1959 and that of Salvador Allende in the elections of September, 1970 in Chile.

In the following pages, I will try to find out the main impetuses that lead to the re-emergence of the Left in Latin America and, more importantly, the factors behind the new rebellious political and social forces that have appeared in the last decade. Even though, there are a couple of reasons for that and the prevalence of each country's unique conditions, the salient factor for the shifting towards the Left is the manifestation of Latin American people's discontent. This tendency reveals that the people of Latin America had had enough of former Latin American governments and their unsuccessful policies. Because of the complexity of factors, it is not possible to relate the rise of Latin American Left to only one factor. To avoid reductionist explanations, it is necessary to assess the issue from a multi-layered perspective. I think Castañeda is right while defining the Latin American Left. "... This reaction [rise of the Left in Latin America] is more politics than policy, and more nuanced than it may appear. But it is real".⁴⁴ Thus, the following pages trace the particular global (or international) causes behind the emergence of the leftist governments in Latin America. I outline the common features shared by the rise of the Left in Latin America. In what follows, I will concentrate on the task of examining the exhaustion of neo-liberal policies, changing modes of the USA-Latin American relations, as global (or international) factors; and rising effects of social movements, dissatisfaction with previous governments, and a relatively democratic environment as some internal (domestic) causes.

⁴³ Claudio Lomnitz, "Foundations of the Latin American Left," *Public Culture* 19, no. 1 (Winter 2007): p. 23.

⁴⁴ Castañeda, "Latin America's Left Turn".

2.2.1. Neo-Liberal Policies and Avoidance of Critical Perspectives

“The only consensus in the Latin America is the consensus about the Washington Consensus. It didn’t solve the problems and we need to search other alternatives to it” registered the *Latinobarómetro*, Chilean Research Corporation about the development of democracy and economies as well as societies, using indicators of opinion, attitudes, behavior and values, to reflect the Latin American public’s opinion.⁴⁵ Even though stressing differences among Latin American countries, as I have already emphasized in the beginning, one factor overlapping/concurring for all the Latin American countries in that report is the issue of inequality in the electoral agenda. Those surveyed spoke of the market and believed that only the state could find a lasting solution to their problems.⁴⁶ The report published in 1998 indicated that two-thirds of the public believed that “the market economy is best for the country” in most of the countries of the region. However, that level of support fell to only one half in 2007, with a decline of 14%.⁴⁷ That is the legacy of previous authoritarian right wing (or militarist) as well as democratic regimes that had been convinced that ‘Washington Consensus’ policies were the only option in the face of increasing economic globalization.⁴⁸ They applied neo-liberal policies -especially after 1980s- for almost three decades to recover their damaged economies. Since then, many intellectuals and politicians who had a pessimistic view about the future of the Left had declared the death of the Left in that political atmosphere. Political scientist Jorge Castañeda, for example, brilliantly portrays the political environment of the 1990s in the region in his well-known work on the Latin American Left:

“The Cold War is over and Communism and the socialist bloc have collapsed. The United States and capitalism have won, and in few areas of the world is that victory as clear-cut, sweet, and spectacular as in Latin America. Democracy, free-market economics, and pro-American outpourings of sentiment and policy dot the landscape of a

⁴⁵ Original text version “El único consenso que se levanta en la región es el consenso sobre el Consenso de Washington, en el sentido que no sirvió para solucionar los problemas y que hay que buscar otras alternativas”. *Informe latinobarómetro 2007* (Santiago de Chile: Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2007), pp. 6-7.

⁴⁶ Arditi, “Arguments about the Left Turn(s) in Latin America: A Post liberal Politics?,” p. 71.

⁴⁷ *Informe latinobarómetro 2007*, pp. 27-30.

⁴⁸ Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, “Latin America: The End of the Washington Consensus, the State of Democracy and the Two Lefts,” *Journal of Developing Societies* 24, no. 3 (2008): p. 400.

region where until recently Left-right confrontation and the potential for social revolution and progressive reform were widespread. Today conservative, pro-business, often democratically elected and pro-U.S. technocrats hold office around the hemisphere”.⁴⁹

Previous governments strongly believed that their economic problems will only be solved by ‘Washington Consensus’ recommendation which basically suggested the following principles: the fiscal policy discipline, tax reform, redirection of public spending from subsidies, interest rates that are market-determined and positive in real terms, competitive exchange rates, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, privatization of state enterprises, legal security for property rights, deregulation, and trade liberalization. The USA administration, the technocrats who belong to international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, etc.), the USA government’s economic agencies and think tanks policy specialists based in Washington DC produced the term ‘Washington Consensus’. The consensus refers to ‘collective positive view’ about the interests of ‘prudent macroeconomic’ implementation of free-market capitalism.⁵⁰

Castañeda evaluates the issue from a different perspective. If there were a combination of inequality and democracy, it would lead to a movement towards the Left everywhere (not only in Latin America), he says. Irrespective of the successes or failures of economic reforms in the 1990s (he implies neo-liberal policies) and failures of Latin American traditional economic reforms, extreme inequality, poverty, and concentration of wealth, income, power and opportunity, the center Left would throughout control the Latin American societies.⁵¹

Neo-liberal policies failed to solve the needs of broad majorities and never produced the sense of a collective project. This was because the pillars of the consensus mostly were based on some general policy instruments (prescriptions) about the specific policies and recommendation of same/similar programs irrespective of a state’s special conditions and local dynamics, whilst protecting the free market-orientation vision. The institutions of consensus (such as IMF and the World Bank) have been accused of recommending policies that established the

⁴⁹ Castañeda, *Utopia unarmed*, p. 3.

⁵⁰ John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in *Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened?*, John Williamson. (Institute for International Economics, 1990), <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486>.

⁵¹ Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn,” pp. 28– 43.

market-oriented perspective in a doctrinaire way, imposing strict austerity measures on debtor countries.⁵² As a result of the neo-liberal institutions' prescriptions, many of the Latin American countries took the 'bitter pill' and endured the 'shock therapy'.⁵³

As a direct consequence of the structural adjustment reforms, economic crises and corruption scandals have multiplied throughout the region. Thus, most of the leftist movements and parties criticized neo-liberalism and found support from the public. When the President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, gave a decision to privatize Brazil's public services and state-owned enterprises, this move have brought general complaints about the neo-liberal applications and paved the way for Worker Party's (PT) well-known victory in the election, which brought Lula da Silva to the Brazilian Presidency in 2002.⁵⁴ As we see in the instance of the victory of Lula, the main criteria for the evaluation of the political parties in Latin America today is their stances towards neo-liberal policies.

Moreno-Brid and Paunovic have argued that Washington consensus (neo-liberal model) has been replaced by a search for alternatives. The people of Latin America were in pursuit of alternatives to neo-liberalism. Yeğin expresses the peoples' search for new policies (economic and political) in the following words:

...Another life is possible. Another economic model, another agricultural model... We are struggling for another society...We want another society in which there is life has priority...⁵⁵ The principal reason that caused the rise of the Left is the previous governments' unsuccessful- economic reforms (the consensus inspired). In reality, after almost two decades of neo-liberal macroeconomic reforms, Latin America failed to achieve high and sustained economic expansion.⁵⁶

⁵² Ana Margheritis, "The Cycle of Ideas and the Search for an Alternative," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 3 (May 1, 2007): pp. 40, 44.

⁵³ Williamson, "What Washington Means by Policy Reform".

⁵⁴ Barrett, Rodríguez Garavito, and Chavez, *The New Latin American Left*, p. 9- 10.

⁵⁵ Metin Yeğin, *Topraksızlar: Brezilya'da Topraksız Köylü Hareketi: MST* (İletişim, 2006), p. 52.

⁵⁶ Juan Moreno-Brid, "What Is New and What Is Left of the Economic Policies of the New Left Governments of Latin America?," *International Journal of Political Economy* 37, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): p. 84; Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and Igor Paunovic, "The Future of Economic Policy Making by Left-of-Center Governments in Latin America: Old Wine in New Bottles?," *Post-Autistic Economics Review* 39, no. 1 (October 2006): p. 2.

At the other side of the coin, there are people who disagree with the view that the growth of the Left in Latin America is the product of neo-liberal policies in Latin America. Some argue that, the Left is not the counter position against neo-liberal policies. As we saw earlier, the Left does not necessarily oppose the market principles and neo-liberal policies. The rise of the Left in Latin America should be called as a 'post-liberal era' instead of an anti-liberal era.⁵⁷ Burges draws attention on the case of Brazil. In noting that Lula preferred the retrenching and deepening of the supposedly neoliberal policy agenda, which had been adopted during Cardoso's tenure and has been implemented since then, he claims that neo-liberalism was not in crisis in Brazil.⁵⁸ He explains Lula's position by the latter's desire to continue economic stability and to meet the major concerns of the international community, in order to realize his goals of ensuring inclusion and social justice.⁵⁹ To guarantee the market confidence, Lula declared in 2002, his strategies on how to deal with Brazil's most serious problems in the carefully written document, *Carta aos Brasileiros* (A Letter to the Brazilian People), in which he reaffirmed that shifting from the existing model will not be realized just overnight. There will be careful transition between what we have today and what society is demanding, the document said. The principal campaign promises of Lula could be summarized as follows: abandonment of the neo-liberal economic model of the H Cardoso government, the implementation of a developmentalist model, the establishment of a government for society as a whole, with special concern for the poorest, which would seek to reduce social inequalities.⁶⁰ Any change would be the 'product of a broad national negotiation' and 'respect for business contracts' guaranteed, whereas at the same time, there would be changes that Brazilian population desired.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Arditi, p. 73.

⁵⁸ Sean W. Burges, "Brazil: Toward a (Neo) Liberal Democracy?," in *Governance After Neoliberalism in Latin America*, Jean Grugel. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 213.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 207.

⁶⁰ Felix Sanchez, J. Machado Borges Neto, and Rosa Maria Marques, "Brazil. Lula's Government: A Critical Appraisal," in *The new Latin American Left: Utopia Reborn*, Patrick S. Barrett, Daniel Chavez, César A. Rodríguez Garavito. (London: Pluto, 2008), p. 48.

⁶¹ For more details about the letter, see, Luiz Silva, "Carta ao povo brasileiro", 2002; Sanchez, Borges Neto, and Marques, "Brazil. Lula's Government: A Critical Appraisal," pp. 42-68; Joaquina Pires-O'Brien, "Brazil Under A Labour Government: Part One," *The Contemporary Review* 285, no. 1664 (2004): p. 151.

The electoral victory of the Left in Latin America is the result of both the successes and failures of the democratic and free-market agendas of former governments that prevailed in the region during their terms in office in the last two decades of the twentieth century.⁶² Lastly, it is therefore necessary to consider that when discussing the exhaustion of neo-liberal policies, I do not only draw focus on the economic side of neo-liberal policies, but also on their political appearance. The economic results of neo-liberal policies were more effective on people's choices for supporting the leftist leaders; therefore, I just bring the economic dimensions of neo-liberal policies to the fore.

2.2.2. Changing Nature of the USA-Latin American Relations

The second external (global) reason for the rise of the Left is the changing modes of the United States relations (hereafter the USA) with Latin American countries. The United States has always had a peculiar relationship with Latin American nations. Indeed, for a long-time, South America was called the 'Backyard' of the USA because of the latter's dominance there. As it is well known, since the beginning of the end of the Second World War, the United States has had enormous amount of political, economic, and military leverage in South America. The USA, at any moment, has penetrated into every issue of South American countries with the help of local *compradors* (in Marxist term). With the support of obedient 'elites' and 'armies' of the region, the USA has enjoyed a secure flow of natural resources from the South and preserved its vital interests there. There is no doubt that the USA was the only supporter of the *coup d'état* attempts and plots in Latin America. The USA brought down the democratically elected socialist Chilean President, Salvador Allende thanks to the military coup in Chile (in 1973). Besides, most people believe that the Venezuelan failed coup attempt on 11 April 2002 that lasted 47 hours owed a great deal to the Bush administration's support. The United States quickly acknowledged the de facto pro-USA Pedro Carmona government.⁶³ Former USA President Jimmy

⁶² Panizza, "Unarmed Utopia Revisited," p. 729.

⁶³ See Ed Vulliamy, "Venezuela Coup Linked to Bush Team," *Observer International*, April 21, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/apr/21/usa.venezuela>; "US 'Likely Behind' Chavez

Carter, when interviewed in *El Tiempo* (Colombian newspaper) in 2009, said that he believed that “Washington knew about the abortive coup, and may have been involved”.⁶⁴

The first big challenge to USA’s presence in the region came in 1998, when, surprisingly, Hugo Chávez won Venezuela’s presidential election. At the same time, the electoral victories of Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Lula de Silva in Brazil, and Tabaré Vázquez in Uruguay changed the political map of Latin America obviously. Recently, South America, in the words of Kozloff, “seems to have turned a critical page in its political history”. Although Washington has still been benefiting from most of its previously established interests, currently many South American states deliver an independent course free from Washington’s hegemony.⁶⁵ For the reason G. Castañeda explained in previous pages, after 1990s the political interest of Washington in Latin America decreased and the United States did not concern itself about the state of Latin American democracies,⁶⁶ since, we are not living anymore under the cold war circumstances that Soviet Union (communism) was a threat.⁶⁷ The national interests of the USA, has shifted to the Middle East (so called ‘war on terror’). The invasions of Iraq (Gulf Wars-1991 and 2003) and invasion of Afghanistan (2001) have been the significant indicators of the USA’s national interest perceptions. This does not mean that the USA totally ignored Latin America during this period; however, due to its shifting priorities, the USA did not concern itself with Latin America as much as it did in the 1970s-1980s. This was a new opportunity for the Latin American Left. Finally, as Çelik Wiltse puts it, “the USA ‘war on terror’ and its intense engagement in the Middle East seem to have been a great blessing for Latin America”.⁶⁸

Until the end of the Cold War, the United States struggled against nationalist Marxist revolutionaries there for nearly 30 years to eradicate the influence and

Coup,” *Al Jazeera*, September 21, 2009, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/09/200992116049879437.html>.

⁶⁴ Vulliamy, “Venezuela Coup Linked to Bush Team”.

⁶⁵ Nikolas Kozloff, *Revolution!: South America and the Rise of the New Left*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 1.

⁶⁶ Lomnitz, “Latin America’s Rebellion”.

⁶⁷ Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed*, p. 3.

⁶⁸ Evren Ç. Wiltse, “Declining USA Influence and Rise of Latin America’s Regional Power: Some Lessons for The Middle East,” *The Turkish Yearbook Xxxix* (2008): p. 115.

control of the Left.⁶⁹ During the Cold War, the USA, in some cases, overthrew democratically elected governments because of its 'fear of socialism'. If Latin America has come closer to the Left, this has almost meant the undermining of the USA interests. During the election of the Secretary General of Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, the candidates of Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay and most of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) won the election, whereas the USA endorsed Luis Ernesto Derbez, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico failed for nomination. For the first time in the history of the OAS (established in 1948), a candidate whom the USA did not support was elected as secretary-general of OAS. In addition to that defeat, while the Security Council members were discussing whether to authorize the USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Chile and Mexico, which are the supposed American allies, voted against the invasion of Iraq.

In the economic front, with left-leaning governments in charge of power, the United States has lost its privileges that had been allocated for American businessman. Throughout the region, the leftist governments began to exert greater control of the USA oil companies; and some of them have been nationalized or been forced to enter into joint ventures with national governments.⁷⁰ In a phrase, the USA corporations' (not only the USA but also all multi-national companies) share of profits has shrunk during this process.

Particularly, diminished control over the Latin American military is no-doubt the most flamboyant manifestation of the decline in the USA influence in the region. On December 2, 2008, the Venezuelan and Russian navies operated joint exercises in the Caribbean Sea, close to the USA territorial waters. Although Condoleezza Rice, the USA Secretary of State, dismissed the existence of the Russian naval deployment in the region by saying that "A few Russian ships [are] not going to change the balance of power",⁷¹ the issue was not so simple, as Rice pretended it was. It is apt to remind that the USA declared its hegemony over the Latin American continent against the European countries with the introduction of

⁶⁹ Richard A. Dello Buono and José Bell Lara, "Introduction - Neoliberal Crises and the Resurgent Left in Latin America," *Critical Sociology* 32, no. 1 (2006): p. 11.

⁷⁰ Kozloff, *Revolution!*, p. 2.

⁷¹ "Russia-Venezuela Exercises Begin," *BBC News*, December 2, 2008.

the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which warned the European powers against further land colonization and interference in the Americas. This move, would, if needed, be a call for the USA intervention.⁷² American President Theodore Roosevelt uttered this more loudly in 1904:

Any country whose people conduct them well can count upon our hearty friendship... Chronic wrongdoing, however, . . . ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States ... to the exercise of an international police power.⁷³

It appears to me that the newly elected governments can bring limited changes under the conditions, which are subject to negative effects of the regional and global capitalist arrangements. It requires more effort to surmount because these arrangements have been expanded through the established institutional channels. However, one thing the leftists can achieve is to constrain the maneuver room for the USA dominance. They all commonly share antipathy towards the USA military, economic, and political dominance in the region, despite the fact that their point of departure differ in many respects from country to country and sometimes their bilateral relations may have different features. These are mostly the result of the USA's Cold War policies against the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.). The USA policies, Dominguez claims, towards Latin America during the Cold war era, were mostly ideological rather than reflecting the USA national interests.⁷⁴ Overall, these indications show that there is no more 'American exceptionalism' in the region. To summarize, the relative decline of the USA power in Latin America, could provide opportunity for left-leaning regimes in this region.

⁷² Full text available at <http://www.ushistory.org/documents/monroe.htm>, (Retrieved 25 January 2010).

⁷³ Ç. Wiltse, "Declining USA Influence and Rise of Latin America's Regional Power: Some Lessons for The Middle East," p. 105.

⁷⁴ Jorge Dominguez, "US-Latin American Relations during the Cold War and Its Aftermath," in *The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda*, James Dunkerley and V. Bulmer-Thomas (ed.). (Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 1999), 33- 55. Cited in Wiltse, p.105.

2.2.3. Local (Internal) Dynamics

Up to now, I have examined the trajectory of main impetuses that is behind the rise of the leftist governments. As all careful readers can observe, those I have highlighted mostly seem as a global or external cause of the rise of the Left. Then, one might properly ask whether there are any internal reasons for the shift towards the Left. Naturally, there are. However, for the reasons mentioned and explained before, I mostly will focus on the topic through the broader international lenses. In reality, no political issue, national or international, can exist unless there is certain interconnectivity. The external factors are not independent from internal causes. Therefore, some internal effects will be very briefly examined thereafter.

One of the most significant aspects of political change is related to the failures of previous governments. In general, almost all the people of Latin America were discontent about former governments' national and international policies. They have thought that predecessors of Left-leaning politicians did not defend the interest of the people during their term. On the other hand, for some, the leftist political parties and leaders, whether they are socialists, social democrats or radical populists, have been representing the interests and desires of the vast masses of the people. Therefore, the Left must keep its promises and bring tangible changes because it is primarily the historic injustices, which brought the Left to power to end injustices.⁷⁵ The elected governments' resentment against performances are not crucial for this study, however, it is suffice to note that there will be an inevitable fall from the power, like previous governments, if they cannot manage to erase all poverty and inequality in the region. This is because the new leftist governments came to power by accusing parties of 'diminished legitimacy' in the eyes of Latin American peoples and traditional parties' internal crises.⁷⁶ It explains that traditional parties or governments failed to reflect the popular will into governmental policies. Civil unrest and rioting in Argentine (December 2001) was the peak of this discontent about neoliberal polices. When violent popular rebellion appeared in Argentine (2001), not only Argentineans kicked out Fernando de la Rúa, President of Argentine from December 10, 1999

⁷⁵ Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg, "Latin America's Left Turns," p. 320.

⁷⁶ Barrett, Rodríguez Garavito, and Chavez, *The New Latin American Left*, p. 11.

to December 21, 2001 and his team by chanting *¡que se vayan todos!*;⁷⁷ but also other leaders of Latin America, except Chávez, in the name of all Latin American people. According to Castañeda, Latin American Left responses accurately reflects what is necessary for good governance in the region that is beset by numerous problems, such as: “inequality, poverty, still-weak democratic tradition, and unfinished nation building”. Because of these expectations, Latin American nations have had some radical decisions and assumed the leftist governments to power. Here we should bear in mind that, as Osava stresses, there is no doubt that current governments have been elected by the people thanks to the consequences of the transition to the existence of adequate systems and structures, rules, parties and a “profound process of democratization”.⁷⁸ The leftist leaders, whether radical populists, socialists, liberals and social democrats *etc.* or not, all strongly believe that the fundamental source of legitimacy in the contemporary era is popular sovereignty, as manifested through general elections. One way or another, due to “the social, demographic, and ethnic configuration” of Latin America, people of the region have a tendency to elect for the leftist leaders.⁷⁹ Democratic progress achieved by most Latin American nations has given people the opportunity to participate in the free and fair elections, which had been manipulated before by some internal and external powers. So far, I have discussed the common features shared by the Left in Latin America. The upcoming two chapters cover the foreign policy perspectives of two Latin American states in the twenty-first century. Because of the reason stated in the introductory part, these two countries are Brazil and Venezuela. The thesis briefly provides the reader with the general picture of both countries’ foreign policy impetuses and fundamental principles. Then, two leftist governments’ (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (better known as Lula) and Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías- hereafter Chávez) foreign policy visions and their practical implementation will be discussed. Their leftist foreign policy understanding is tested by reference to the following:

⁷⁷ Famous Spanish phrase, used during rebellion, means “Let them go!”

⁷⁸ Mario Osava, “Challenges 2006-2007: Defining Latin America’s Leftist Governments,” *Inter Press Service*, December 2006.

⁷⁹ Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg, “Latin America’s Left Turns,” p. 325 . Castañeda, “Latin America’s Left Turn”.

- i. Their bilateral relations (with the Latin American countries, the USA and with non-aligned Nations/the Third World);
- ii. Their posture in international organizations (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Organization of American States (OAS) and Southern Common Market (Mercosul);
- iii. Their posture with regard to the global problems that sustain an unjust international system (Poverty, international aggression, nuclear weapons and excessive military spending).

To evaluate the Lula and Chávez governments' performance and policies, comparison appears to be the best research method. This method has the advantage of enhancing the objectivity of the researcher, as it allows an opportunity to see the powerful or weak sides of subjects. In the following two chapters, although my principal aim is to examine the foreign policy of Lula and Chávez governments, while doing that, I also need to discuss the foreign policies implemented by the previous governments, (Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil (January 1, 1995– January 1, 2003) and Rafael Caldera in Venezuela (February 2, 1994– February 2, 1999)). It provides some clues to us about where both countries' foreign policies come from and what directions they have taken. That is to say, in order to observe the 'change and continuity' in Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policy, it cannot be done without looking at two former governments' policy discourses and implementations. That is why I have decided to look at the premises and practices of the two states' foreign policy implementations immediately before Lula and Chávez in a separate section. The use of 'immediately before Lula and Chávez' mostly refers to the years when Cardoso and Punto Fijo regime were in office as presidents. By doing so, we can find an opportunity to easily compare and contrast Lula's and Chávez's foreign policies with their predecessor (s) beyond the simple Lula-Chávez comparison. I refer this as 'vertical' and 'horizontal' foreign policy comparison.

CHAPTER 3

BRAZIL'S FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. A View about the Brazilian External Relations

From post-cold war period to today, Brazil, because of its prominent political and economic power- not only in Latin America, but also in the world stage, has been considered as a leading player in the international arena.⁸⁰ This is mostly the result of the changing nature of the international system. The structure of international order turned from a bi-polar system into a multi-polar system after the collapse of USSR (Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 1922-1991). The 'new world order' (*Nova ordem mundial*) even provides a little room for maneuver for other rising powers (like Brazil, China, India, *etc.*), aside from the United States of America (USA) and Soviet Union (USSR).⁸¹ As a result of the new composition of international agents, in the last two decades, Brazil has carried out active foreign policy which resulted with the extension of the country's economic and political role/presence in international/global institutions (e.g. and IMF) and regional institutions (e.g. Mercosul, OAS and Rio Group).⁸² In addition to that, Brazil has been able to host the UN conference on 'environment and development' (Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro (1992), and in 1993 was an active participant in the Vienna conference on 'Human Rights'. There is little doubt that these global institutions pave the way for political coalitions that determine the

⁸⁰ Jeffrey Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era," *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): 117-140; Mônica Hirst, "Strategic Posture Review: Brazil," *World Politics Review*, September 29, 2009; Ricardo Sennes and Alexandre Barbosa, "The Brazilian Foreign Policy: Another Route or a New Step Forward?", November 18, 2004, p. 10; "Brazil's International Relations," *Foreign & Commonwealth Office*, n.d., <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/south-america/brazil?profile=intRelations&pg=4>.

⁸¹ Hélio Jaguaribe, "Brazil and the 21st Century," *Estudos Avançados*, no. 38 (April 2000): p. 17; Daniel W. Drezner, "The New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2 (March 2007): 34-46.

⁸² Different from my argument, some authors, like Souto Maior, initiates the Brazil pro-active presence after Second World War See Luiz Souto Maior, "O Brasil e o regionalismo continental frente a uma ordem mundial em transição," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 49, no. 2 (2006): 42- 59; José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque Guilhon Albuquerque, "Brazil: From Dependency to Globalization," in *Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy*, Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A. K. Hey. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 287.

‘emerging international norms’ that pertain directly to their members’ national interest.⁸³

Together with Brazil’s rising influence in international issues, its foreign policy has been adapted to the country’s new role in the world. The structure of Brazil’s foreign policy (hereafter BFP) has been re-formulated in accordance with the country’s national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic welfare. Apart from that, Ministry of External Relations (also known as an *Itamaraty*)⁸⁴ has become a more democratic and transparent institution in this process. Shortly, as discussed in following pages, while Lula was in office a ‘paradigm shift’ about Brazil’s foreign policy perception has been observed. Brazil attempted to draw sketch a new global foreign policy profile and diversified its foreign policy scope in the last decade of the twentieth century.⁸⁵ Of course, while analyzing Brazil’s position in the world system, we do pay special attention to Robert Dahl’s vital question, which is:

When you hear that Brazil is an emerging and increasingly influential power, the proper question is: Influential over which actors, during which period, and with respect to which issues?⁸⁶

⁸³ Andrew Hurrell, “The Foreign Policy of Modern Brazil,” in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers*, Steven W. Hook. (Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 147, 161.

⁸⁴ ‘Itamaraty’ is a palace, which hosted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Brazilian media and the public call the Ministry of External Relations (MRE - *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*) with that name. Hereafter, Itamaraty could be used when the Ministry of External Relations is (as an institution) implied.

⁸⁵ Sean Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), p. 1; Jaime Pinsky, *O Brasil no contexto, 1987-2007* (São Paulo SP: Editora Contexto, 2007), p. 54.

⁸⁶ Cited in Hurrell, “The Foreign Policy of Modern Brazil,” p. 153.

3.2. General Features of Brazil's Foreign Policy

3.2.1. Actors and Decision-Making Process in Brazil's Foreign Policy

There occurred many changes in the Federal Republic of Brazil in terms of the relevant actors who created Brazil's national foreign policy; and the structure of ministry of foreign affairs. At present, according to the country's constitution, President and his cabinet including 23 ministries and 7 other cabinet level offices, *de jure* hold the decision-making power on most of Brazil's foreign policy; whereas *de facto*, President and the ministry of foreign affairs, which has the responsibility of "advising the president of the republic of Brazil on the formulation and execution of Brazilian foreign policy",⁸⁷ shape the Brazil's external policies. *Itamaraty* (Brazilian foreign ministry) due to practical reasons,⁸⁸ shares some foreign policy information and responsibilities with the ministry of finance and ministry of defense.⁸⁹ Due to the ministry of foreign affairs' monopoly over foreign relations, the effects of the public opinion over making of foreign policy is very limited, while some private and public interest groups (the São Paulo State Federation of Industries (FIESP), powerful business federation) have an influential role over the articulation of foreign policy.⁹⁰ It does not mean that *Itamaraty* does not care about the voices of domestic attention; however, the ministry has launched the series of attempts aimed to improve communication and dialogue with the Brazilian society, like *Seções Nacionais de Coordenação* (National Coordination Departments).⁹¹ Moreover, Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim declared the ceasing of the monopoly of foreign policy (by

⁸⁷ "Conheça o Ministério," *Ministério das Relações Exteriores- Itamaty*, n.d., <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/o-ministerio/conheca-o-ministerio/view>.

⁸⁸ This is the result of Brazil's new type of foreign diplomacy, which covers economic and security issues, alongside its political missions.

⁸⁹ The importance of Ministry of Finance, in foreign affairs, has emerged with FHC government. Indeed, this gives some clues about the orientation of FHC's foreign policy directions. See Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy From Sarney to Lula* (Lexington Books, 2009), p. 55.

⁹⁰ Guilhon Albuquerque, "Brazil: From Dependency to Globalization," p. 269; Nathan Gill, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Actors and Institutions," *Southern Affairs*, April 14, 2008, <http://www.southernaffairs.org/2008/04/brazilian-foreign-policy.html>.

⁹¹ Jeffrey Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era," *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2009): p. 120.

diplomats), as he puts: “I feel that foreign policy making is no longer the monopoly of a small group of people, which I have been a part”.⁹² (Table 3.1)

Table 3.1 *Elite Perceptions of MRE Insulation, 2001*

Q. How much attention do you think Itamaraty gives to the opinions and proposals of the following actors with regard to foreign policy and foreign trade?

Interest groups	A lot of attention	Little or no attention	DK/NA
Other government ministries	57	36	7
Business associations	49	45	6
Media outlets	46	50	4
Congress	30	62	8
Public opinion	28	67	5
NGOs	18	76	6
Universities and research centers	14	81	5
Labor unions	6	88	6

N = 149.

Source: Souza (2001: 87).⁹³

3.2.2. Main Characteristics

It was in 1988 that Brazil not only made a transition from a military constitution to civil constitution; but it also began entertaining a new foreign policy understanding.⁹⁴ Current Brazilian constitution (1988) stated the following principles regarding the country’s external relations: national independence; prevalence of human rights; self-determination of the peoples; non-intervention; equality among States; defense of peace; peaceful settlement of conflicts; repudiation of terrorism and racism; cooperation among peoples for the progress

⁹² “...Sinto que a política externa está deixando de ser monopólio de um pequeno grupo de pessoas, do qual eu inclusive fazia parte...” See Expedito Filho, “Nossa atitude é pragmática e não há antiamericanismo,” *O Estado de São Paulo*, February 11, 2007, <http://www.fafich.ufmg.br/cobrefil/textos/CI.entrevista.celso.amorim.pdf.filho>.

⁹³ Cited in Cason, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty,” p. 120.

⁹⁴ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. viii.

of mankind; granting of political asylum.⁹⁵ In fact, like most of the nation-states, Brazil often does not follow exactly those principles. That is to say, as Albuquerque implies in his article and existing foreign policy prove, these words are solely expressions of ‘wishful’ thinking.⁹⁶ In the light of these principles, it is possible to discuss the foreign policy parameters of Brazil based on two different periods (1945-1991, 1991-present). Since we will discuss in the coming pages, there was a paradigmatic change in Brazil’s foreign policy throughout the last quarter of twentieth century. In the literature, the first period is well known as the Americanization of Brazilian foreign policy.⁹⁷ However, because of the tremendous changes in Brazil’s foreign policy strategies, the latter period could be called as “Brasilization of foreign policy” (*Brasilização da política externa*).⁹⁸

3.3. A Historical Review of Brazilian Foreign Policy

3.3.1. The Evolution of Brazil’s Foreign Policy after the Second World War

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the structure of international regimes forced most of the states (aside from the USA and USSR) to be a satellite of the communist or the capitalist bloc. In that bipolar world, Soviet Russia represented the communist/socialist bloc, whereas the USA represented the capitalist bloc. It is true that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), consisting of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power (USSR-USA) bloc, was established against the major powers as an alternative bloc, even if they were not so influential in world politics. However, Brazil has never been a member of this establishment although it shares some

⁹⁵ “The Constitution of Brazil, Article 4”, 1988.

⁹⁶ Guilhon Albuquerque, “Brazil: From Dependency to Globalization,” p. 268.

⁹⁷ Rubens Ricupero, *José Maria da Silva Paranhos, Barão do Rio Branco: uma biografia fotográfica, 1984-1995*. Organização, iconografia e legendas de José Hermes Pereira de Araújo (Rio de Janeiro: Funag, 1995). Cited in Norma Breda Dos Santos, “A dimensão multilateral da política externa brasileira: perfil da produção bibliográfica. (Portuguese),” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (December 2002): 26-45.

⁹⁸ Apart from my classification, Burges divides Brazil’s foreign policy into three periods: i. *approximation to the USA* (starting with R.Branco, from 1910s); ii. *Quest for autonomy* (from 1960s-70s); iii. *The articulation of regionally based, cooperatively independent foreign policy*, (after 1980s). See, for more details, Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*.

principles of NAM and has sometimes held an observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement's summits. It means that, after the Second World War, Brazilian foreign policy mostly overlapped with the USA interests in the region. Indeed, the approximation to USA was not solely because of the structure of the international system; the issue cannot fully be understood without reference to Barão do Rio Branco and his legacy.⁹⁹

From the early years of 1910s till 1970s, Brazil's foreign policy was largely managed by Rio Branco's long-lasting heritage.¹⁰⁰ According to Storrs, he directed Brazilian foreign policy towards Europe, England and the USA. Besides that, he was the founder of foreign policy tradition of 'Special Relations' with the USA. This USA-centered foreign policy lasted until the 'globalist paradigm'. During the tenures of President Jânio da Silva Quadros (1961) and Left wing President João Goulart (1961-64), Brazil began pursuing a relatively independent foreign policy, due to its globalist view.¹⁰¹ 'Globalist paradigm' insisted on the need for Brazil to establish links and partnerships with countries at larger-scale (especially neighboring and Third World countries).¹⁰² Unlike the Branco

⁹⁹ José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior (R.Branco) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brazil (1902-1912) and one of the most important persons who was/is the patron/father of Brazil's diplomacy ('pai' da diplomacia brasileira). He had an effect on the modernization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Chancelaria brasileira*). See more details, Pinsky, *O Brasil no contexto, 1987-2007*, p. 47; "Barão do Rio Branco," *Ministério das Relações Exteriores- Itamaraty*, n.d., [http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/divulg/p2/personalidades-e-diplomatas-historicos/barao-do-rio-branco/?searchterm=Rio Branco](http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/divulg/p2/personalidades-e-diplomatas-historicos/barao-do-rio-branco/?searchterm=Rio+Branco); "Barão do Rio Branco' (José Maria da Silva Paranhos Júnior)," *A Biblioteca Virtual de Literatura*, February 4, 2010, <http://www.biblio.com.br/defaultz.asp?link=http://www.biblio.com.br/conteudo/biografias/barao-do-riobranco.htm>.

¹⁰⁰ During his tenure, for C.Lafer, Rio Branco solved the principal foreign policy disputes with his neighbors (e.g. delimitation of national borders). See Celso Lafer, "Dilemmas and Challenges in Brazil's Foreign Policy," *Estudos Avançados*, no. 38 (2000): pp. 64- 65.

¹⁰¹ Eiti Sato, "40 anos de política externa brasileira, 1958-1998: três inflexões," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (December 15, 1998): 8-28; Keith Larry Storrs, "Brazil's Independent Foreign Policy, 1961-1964: Background, Tenets, Linkage to Domestic Politics, and Aftermath" (PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Latin American Program, 1973), pp. 102- 69; William Perry, *Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy: The International Strategy of an Emerging Power* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 50; Some authors, like P.Fagundes Vizontini, argued that Independent Brazilian Foreign Policy has developed in the years of 1951-64. See Paulo Vizontini, "Nacionalistas x entreguistas: Do Desenvolvimentismo a Política Externa Independente (1951-1964)," in *Relações internacionais e desenvolvimento: o nacionalismo e a política externa independente, 1951-1964*, Paulo Vizontini. (São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2003).

¹⁰² Maria Regina Soares de Lima, 'Ejes Analíticos y Conflicto de Paradigmas en la Política Exterior Brasileña,' *América Latina/Internacional* 1: 2 (1994), 27-46. Cited in Marcus Farot Castro and Maria Izabel Valladão De Carvalho, "Globalization and Recent Political Transitions in Brazil," *International Political Science Review* 24, no. 4 (2003): p. 475.

paradigm that envisioned Brazil as the faithful ally of the USA, globalist view supported the national and independent foreign policy.

According to Sato, the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985 sought to diversify the Brazilian foreign affairs and lead dramatic developments about the Brazilian economic structure.¹⁰³ Especially during Geisel's militarist regime (1974-1979), Brazilian foreign policy was known as following 'responsible pragmatism' (*pragmatismo responsável*),¹⁰⁴ which came to be characterized by stability, pragmatism, and cautious neutralism.¹⁰⁵ In these years of military rule, we can say that a military regime was followed by a relatively independent foreign policy. That's because, military regimes in the world -not only in Brazil-, try to preserve their national stance in every aspect of administration throughout the country.

After the military regimes, beginning from the 1990s, Brazil has experienced transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This transition process is defined as the period of 'Lost Decade' (*Década perdida*).¹⁰⁶ For Lafer, former minister of foreign affairs of Brazil, the transition to civil regimes was politically impressive; whereas, economically, the country has witnessed the collapse of the economy, particularly, the failure of (nationalist) import-substitution model, being unable to manage its foreign debt and inflation crisis, and shrinkage in the GNP.¹⁰⁷ Necessarily, as mentioned in previous pages, the late 1980s witnessed profound changes in Brazilian foreign policy (structural adjustment). This is also true of the international system. Yet, we have briefly raised the main parameters of Brazilian

¹⁰³ Sato, "40 anos de política externa brasileira, 1958-1998," p. 28.

¹⁰⁴ Andrea Ribeiro, "Qual O Lugar Do Brasil?: Interpretações Dos Formuladores De Política Externa Sobre Os Anos 80 E 90", in November 16- 18, 2009, p.11, (Symposium presented at the II Simpósio de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais do Programa, UNESP, UNICAMP e PUC/SP, São Paulo, November 16, 2009), p. 11, http://www.santiagodantassp.locaweb.com.br/br/simp/artigos2009/andrea_ribeiro.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Carlos Santiso, "The Gordian Knot of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Promoting democracy while respecting sovereignty," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): p. 356.

¹⁰⁶ Cristina Soreanu Pecequilo, "A Política Externa do Brasil no Século XXI: Os Eixos Combinados de Cooperação Horizontal e Vertical [Brazil's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: The Combining Axis of Horizontal and Vertical Multilateral Cooperation]," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 51, no. 2 (December 2008): p. 137; Thomaz Guedes da Costa, "Strategies for Global Insertion: Brazil and Its Regional Partners," in *Latin America in the New International System*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 97.

¹⁰⁷ Lafer, "Dilemmas and Challenges in Brazil's Foreign Policy," p. 67; Hurrell, "The Foreign Policy of Modern Brazil," p. 149.

foreign policy after the Second World War.¹⁰⁸ I intentionally preferred to use the term *emerging power* instead of great power. Brazil (apart from India, Indonesia, and South Africa) has emerged as an important global- particularly regional- player, immediately in the post-cold war period. On the other hand, China, European Union, Japan, Russia and the USA may be considered, for Hurrell, *great powers* because of “their possession of formidable array of political, economic, social and military resources”.¹⁰⁹

3.3.2. Brazil’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War

Beginning from the termination of the Cold War up to now, the Brazilian foreign affairs has been changing in favor of Brazil’s interests. Thanks to its unique position as a regional power (in Latin America), an emerging world power and a leading powerful actor among the developing countries, the country has a comprehensive and productive foreign policy.¹¹⁰ When we analyze the performance of Brazilian foreign policy, it is not difficult to say that the reality of the passing of the Cold War era is the biggest driving force for that change.¹¹¹ It is not difficult to claim that internal dynamics has had any effects on this dramatic change. Of course, we should remind that, there is no clear-cut distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy, since if you are powerful inside the country; you will be more powerful in the international arena.

The importance of domestic issues/problems should not be missed when we analyze Brazil’s foreign policy. Although the Lula government has solved a considerable amount of the problems, Brazil still has the problem of poverty,

¹⁰⁸ For more information about the BFP during Branco to FHC, See Ibid., pp. 146- 169; Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 17-42, 146-169.

¹⁰⁹ See more details about the idea that Brazil has become a emerging power Steven W. Hook, “Introduction: A reader’s Guide to Foreign-Policy Adaptation,” in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Adaptation Strategies of the Great and Emerging Powers*, Steven W. Hook. (Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 2; Ronald M. Schneider, *Brazil, The Foreign Policy of Future World Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

¹¹⁰ Georges D. Landau, *The Decision-Making Process in Foreign Policy: The Case of Brazil*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2003). Cited in Clare M. Ribando and Peter J. Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, CRS Report for Congress (Congressional research service, February 28, 2007); Jerry Harris, “Emerging Third World Powers: China, India and Brazil,” *Race & Class* 46, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 7-27.

¹¹¹ Hurrell, “The Foreign Policy of Modern Brazil,” p. 148.

income inequality *etc...* Former foreign minister Celso Lafer noted, “Brazil’s foreign policy tries to match domestic demand with external windows of opportunity. That is why the challenge of national development is at the core of foreign priorities”.¹¹² In addition, as Hurrell has noted, paradigm shift came after a combination of domestic forces that includes political changes (military dictatorship to civil regime) and modernization of Brazil in the twentieth century and economic development); and international political and financial pressures led to important changes in the country’s foreign policy principles.¹¹³ However, for Brazil (such a gigantic state),¹¹⁴ it is more compulsory to involve in the shaping of a *new world order*.¹¹⁵ For the result of Amaury de Souza’s field-study, a majority of (Brazilian) participants want to see Brazil as global player on the international system. 99% of participants believe that the country should have greater involvement in the international arena.¹¹⁶ For Lafer, at the beginning of the new millennium, due to its advantage as a continental country (like, China, India, and the USA), Brazil “has a unique identity in the international system”. This is not only because of the country’s geographic and demographic size, but also of Brazil’s courageous economic and political initiatives that the Lula governments have undertaken.¹¹⁷

The multilateralism principle is one of the most known features of Brazilian foreign policy in the post-cold war era.¹¹⁸ Brazil involves in the multilateral

¹¹² Cited in Rosana Nunes and Glendon College, *Brazil: The Emergence of a World Power = Le Brésil: l'émergence d'une puissance mondiale* (Toronto: Glendon College York University, 2002), p.13.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.147- 150.

¹¹⁴ G. F. Kennan describes the Brazil (alongside China, Russia, India and USA) as a ‘monster country’ in his book. See George Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 143.

¹¹⁵ FHC’s foreign minister, C.Lafer, stressed this reality with saying that ‘1990s Brazil’s foreign policy, has followed the participation and not by keeping a distance – with the global issues that were reinserted in new terms in the post-Cold War international agenda’. Lafer, “Dilemmas and Challenges in Brazil’s Foreign Policy,” p. 68.

¹¹⁶ Amaury de Souza, *Um Estudo Sobre A Comunidade Brasileira de Política Externa: An Agenda Internacional do Brasil, [A Study about the Brazilian Community Foreign Policy: The International Agenda of Brazil]* (Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, 2009), p. 3, http://www.cebri.org.br/09_visualizapdf.cfm?nrSecao=3.

¹¹⁷ Celso Lafer, “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” *Daedalus* 129, no. 2 (2000): p. 208. For more information, see also Celso Lafer, *A identidade internacional do Brasil e a política externa brasileira : passado, presente e futuro*, 2nd ed. (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 2007), pp. 23- 50.

¹¹⁸ Soreanu Pecequillo, “A Política Externa do Brasil no Século XXI”; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 56; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy In Changing Times*, p.56; Ribeiro, “Qual O Lugar Do Brasil?: Interpretações Dos

diplomacy through the Organization of American States (OAS), Mercosul and United Nations and has stimulated ties with developing countries and the “Third World” countries in Africa and Asia. The economic growth and involvement in international matters have paved the way for Brazil to play a leading role in some global institutions (e.g. UN stabilization mission in Haiti). For Cason & Power, that situation (leading role) has come about as a result of the two major points: pluralization of actors and the rise of the president’s effect on diplomacy.

Before the 1990s, while the president of the country and his government were officially responsible for external relations, actually they were mostly dependent on the ministry of foreign affairs and its bureaucrat’s practices. However, since the mid-1990s, the effect of president on the *Itamaraty* issues has increased gradually.¹¹⁹ Owing to Brazil’s multilateral policy, its active participation in the international affairs is inescapable.¹²⁰ Yet, for some, it is necessary to remember how much the Brazilian state has the capacity to cope with the international challenges. Clovis Brigagdio puts it:

(S)ince the 1990s there has been an increase in the number of international relations courses being offered in Brazil . . . but the number of Brazilian international negotiators (*negociadores internacionais brasileiros*) is still relatively too small to deal with the complexity of the post-Cold War international system and Brazil’s problems.¹²¹

Formuladores De Política Externa Sobre Os Anos 80 E 90”, in November 16- 18, 2009, p.11. Unlike the majority of academics, Pinheiro sees multilateralism as a long-standing principle in Brazilian foreign policy. ‘The emphasis on multilateralism as a diplomatic tool is not a novelty in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. As Amorim himself reminds us in ‘A Diplomacia Multilateral -- um tributo a Rui Barbosa,’ since the early 20th century, the multilateral strategy has been included among the range of options for advancing the country’s interests in the international system. What is new, however, is the addition of a new conception of alliances and a very strong emphasis on the question of development’. See Leticia Pinheiro, “Celso Amorim: Right Man, Right Place, Right Time,” in *Three to Watch: Davutoglu, Okada, Amorim*, Yigal Schleifer, Jason Miks and Takehiko Kambayashi, Leticia Pinheiro. (World Politics Review, 2010), p. 10.

¹¹⁹ Cason, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty,” pp. 117, 121.

¹²⁰ For Celso Amorim, minister of foreign affairs, multilateralism as a diplomatic tool is not a novelty in the history of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazilian writer, jurist, and politician, Rui Barbosa (1849-1923) was a pioneer of multilateral diplomacy in Brazil and started a tradition of multilateralism that still is a source of inspiration for Brazilian foreign policy. See Celso Amorim, “Brazil’s Multilateral Diplomacy” (presented at the II. National Conference on Foreign Policy and International Politics, A Tribute to Rui Barbosa, Brasília, 2007).

¹²¹ Clóvis Brigagão and Adriano Proença, *Estratégias de negociações internacionais: uma visão brasileira* (Aeroplano, 2001). Cited in A José, “Brazil’s International Relations at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 47, no. 1 (2005): p. 116.

Up to now, we have examined some general features of Brazilian foreign policy. Now we will move on to the second step of our discussions, before looking at Lula's foreign policy, how was the foreign policy immediately before Lula like.

3.4. Brazil's Foreign Policy Immediately before Lula

For the eight years of Cardoso government, it is possible to draw a few principles that determined the country's foreign policy direction. First of all, the 'economic development and cooperation' was the center of Cardoso's foreign policy strategy. Almost all the diplomatic initiatives were executed to realize this goal. Even presidential diplomacy was explicitly implemented for the sake of economic development.¹²² In his office, he stressed the need for changes (discourse and action) in the world system that allows Brazil's active participation in global matters. He therefore said: "... It is (therefore) time to update our discourse and our foreign action, taking changes into considerations in the international system and the new internal consensus in relation to our goals".¹²³ For Cervo, unlike his previous statements, Cardoso government's international relations were marked by hesitation of involvement in international issues.¹²⁴ In fact, as some authors argue, the guidelines of Cardoso's foreign policy were mainly to respect the traditional international parameters:¹²⁵ "pacifism, respect for international law, defense of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention, pragmatism as a necessary instrument and effective defense of the

¹²² See more information Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty"; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 62.

¹²³ [...É tempo, portanto, de atualizar nosso discurso e nossa ação externa, levando em conta as mudanças no sistema internacional e o novo consenso interno em relação aos nossos objetivos?]. More details on foreign affairs statements of Cardoso available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/publi_04/COLECAO/PRON9528.HTM; Similar statements delivered by president at Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Pronouncement of president republic- 1995* (Brasília, 1996), p. 137.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Pronouncement of president republic- 1995*, (Brasília, 1996), p.137.
¹²⁴ Amado Luiz Cervo, "Relações internacionais do Brasil: um balanço da era Cardoso," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (July 2002): p. 35.

¹²⁵Nina Fernandes Dos Santos, "Duas Perspectivas de Mundo: Relações Exteriores do Brasil Entre 1999 e 2006" (Bahia: Universidade Federal da Bahia Faculdade de Comunicação Disciplina: Comunicação e Atualidade, 2007), p. 18.

interests of the country”.¹²⁶ Consequently, FHC’s foreign policy thought may be defined as *autonomy through the integration/participation*¹²⁷ into international issues, whilst Burges called it *regionally based approach* that results in leadership and coalition builder in Latin America.¹²⁸

As mentioned before, Brazilian external policies were diversified after the Cold War, especially immediately after Cardoso’s presidency. Multilateralism, as a foreign policy strategy of the government of Cardoso,¹²⁹ was mostly applied because of ‘Kantian idealism’ (perpetual peace) and contribution to the establishment of possible ‘global governance’. For Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) perpetual peace in the world will be realized, with the “construction of global order made of *transparent rules, fair and respected by all*”.¹³⁰ Therefore, his ‘moderate multilateralism’ emphasized the acceptance of a more egalitarian international law, while Lula had a ‘heavy multilateralism’, which stipulates the sovereignty and equality for all states.¹³¹ Cardoso’s main goal was to strengthen the multilateral position of Brazil in global affairs on the area of economic stability and credibility rather than political,¹³² whereas Lula’s government highlighted its actions in the area of politics without ignoring the economic presence. He pursued a successful economic policy with a strong international course implication.¹³³

¹²⁶ Tullo Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliviera, “A Política Externa Brasileira na Era FHC: Um Exercício de Autonomia Pela Integração” [The Brazilian Foreign Politics in the Cardoso Government: An Exercise Of Autonomy for the Integration],” *Tempo Social* 15, no. 2 (2004): p. 35.

¹²⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni give the term autonomy through the integration /participation, to demonstrate the FHC understands. See more details, Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 7.

¹²⁸ Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 4, 11.

¹²⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 57.

¹³⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (New York: Cosimo, 2005), pp. 13-20; Cervo, “Relações internacionais do Brasil,” p. 5.

¹³¹ Paulo Roberto De Almeida, “Um exercício comparativo de política externa: FHC e Lula em perspectiva,” *Meridiano 47 - Boletim de Análise de Conjuntura em Relações Internacionais*, no. 42/43 (January 2004): p. 12; Paulo Roberto de Almeida, “Uma política externa engajada: a diplomacia do governo Lula,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (July 2004): 162-184.

¹³² Raúl Bernal-Meza, “A política exterior do Brasil: 1990-2002,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (July 2002): p. 58; Maria Regina Soares De Lima, “A política externa brasileira e os desafios da cooperação Sul-Sul,” *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (July 2005): p. 36.

¹³³ Dos Santos, “Duas Perspectivas de Mundo: Relações Exteriores do Brasil Entre 1999 e 2006,” p. 18.

In view of Brazil's leading role, the presidents had a quite different outlook in terms of the country's weight in the world. Cardoso viewed Brazil as a regional (South America) leader that could be compared with Argentina; he also was always aware of the limits of the strategic and economic capacity of Brazil (constrained by reality). Even sometimes Brazilian diplomats avoided the statements about the Brazilian role in South America. Lampeira, foreign minister of Cardoso, for instance, said: "Brazil has no wish to assume regional leadership nor does it want to be a candidate for the position of South American leader".¹³⁴ Perhaps this statement could be conceived as a diplomatic tactic, because the same also remarked "Brazil is not a country exactly equal to the others" and that Brazil had no "intention (of using) South America to build up its leadership but only of using its critical mass to strengthen the idea of South American integration".¹³⁵ In addition to that, in a more obvious statement delivered by *Itamaraty* Secretary-General Chohfi, it was said: "when we say that we don't want to be the leader, we don't want to impose; it depends on what the concept of leadership is. We are very well prepared to give momentum . . . and to present ideas".¹³⁶ At the end, we can easily draw the conclusion that, at the optimum level, Cardoso and his team only focused on regional leadership. Burges calls this type of leadership as 'idea of consensual leadership'¹³⁷; and if it happened, that would be the result of Brazil's economic leadership. For Lula, a leading role of Brazil both regionally and globally was one of the principal goals of the country. This could only be achieved with the help of diplomatic tools and strategic alliances and by leaving aside 'realistic' arguments.¹³⁸ Throughout his office, insistence for a United Nation Security Council (UNSC) permanent membership of Brazil proved to be one of Lula's strongest desires in international affairs. During Cardoso's term in

¹³⁴ Cited in Sean W. Burges, "Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the Cardoso Era, 1992–2003," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 25, no. 1 (January 2006): p. 27.

¹³⁵ Luiz Felipe Lampreia, "Brazil Leads Continent Without Imposing," *Correio Braziliense*, August 24, 2000.

¹³⁶ Cited in Burges, "Without Sticks or Carrots," p. 28. The timidity and softness in the expression of Brazil about the leadership in Latin America, is because Itamaraty refrained from startling the Latin American countries. See Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 62.

¹³⁷ Burges, "Without Sticks or Carrots," pp. 26-28; More details about the Leadership in Brazilian foreign policy, See Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 43- 63.

¹³⁸ De Almeida, "Um exercício comparativo de política externa," p. 15; Dos Santos, "Duas Perspectivas de Mundo: Relações Exteriores do Brasil Entre 1999 e 2006," p. 15.

office, there was such a demand, but taking a permanent seat in the UNSC was not a high priority issue of foreign policy as was the case with Lula.¹³⁹

Another important aspect of Cardoso government was Brazil–USA relations. The relationship with the USA always gives some hints about the ideological motivation of any political leader (not only in Brazil, also in all the Latin American states). For about a century, the USA was the essential historical partner of Brazil.¹⁴⁰ When we look at the relations with the USA during Cardoso’s incumbency, it is mostly seen that relations between the parties were not at all strained. Cardoso’s goal of improving relations with the United States forced him to follow affirmative actions, which required paying more attention to relations with the USA during his terms of office.¹⁴¹ The policy, which Cardoso followed, was the *policy of cooperation*.¹⁴² FHC defined the meaning of this approach with the expression that reads, “The USA is our fundamental partner, because of the central position of the country”.¹⁴³ According to Almeida, academic and diplomat, Cardoso’s USA policy was mostly cooperative, while disagreements were essentially limited to trade matters (e.g. intellectual property rights) and reciprocity principles.¹⁴⁴ Except for the limited problems which were mostly because of Cardoso’s ‘moderate multilateralism’ policies (i.e. Mercosul project), Brazil refrained from the attempts that irritated the USA.¹⁴⁵ Lula’s policies towards the USA emphasize reciprocal interests. Relations with the USA were considered important, but not thought of as a *sine qua non* partnership. The amount of disagreements between Brazil and the USA during Lula presidency has been very high.

¹³⁹ Sennes and Barbosa, “The Brazilian Foreign Policy: Another Route or a New Step Forward?,” p. 2; Dos Santos, “Duas Perspectivas de Mundo: Relações Exteriores do Brasil Entre 1999 e 2006,” p. 7; Cervo, “Relações internacionais do Brasil,” p. 9; De Almeida, “Um exercício comparativo de política externa,” p. 12.

¹⁴⁰ Cervo, “Relações internacionais do Brasil,” p. 6.

¹⁴¹ Bernal-Meza, “A política exterior do Brasil,” p. 58.

¹⁴² Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, pp. 64- 65.

¹⁴³ “EUA são o parceiro fundamental, diz Fernando Henrique Cardoso”, September 24, 1995.

¹⁴⁴ Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, “Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy Through Diversification,” *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (October 1, 2007): p. 1319; De Almeida, “Um exercício comparativo de política externa,” pp. 14-15.

¹⁴⁵ Cervo, “Relações internacionais do Brasil,” p. 11; Bernal-Meza, “A política exterior do Brasil,” p. 60.

There is no doubt that after the Cold War, the last three Brazilian leaders paid a special attention to South American countries in order to complete Brazil's own development. This was due to the idea that Brazil would only be a powerful actor and maintain its interests if it has good and stable relations with its neighbors.¹⁴⁶ Vigevani and Oliveira argue that, although it is not adequate, there were two substantial concerns that marked Cardoso's tenure: "strong pro-Mercosul rhetoric" and extending relations with South America. In general, Cardoso government retained the centrality of South American relations: it was always an element specified in the foreign policy discourse while he was in charge.¹⁴⁷ South America was "our historical-geographic space" and therefore "Mercosul is our strategic pawn, but it is not enough: we need this broader integration" said Cardoso.¹⁴⁸ Especially, during the second Cardoso administration (1999–2002), Brazil played a more active role in South America and spent more effort towards leadership in the region.¹⁴⁹ I think the interest of Cardoso in Southern neighbors was mostly based on economic considerations, not political ones. The brilliant potential market of South America stimulated the Cardoso government into implementing more active policies.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, his foreign minister Lafer proclaimed, "Mercosul is destiny, the FTAA (The Free Trade Area of the Americas)¹⁵¹ is an option"¹⁵²

¹⁴⁶ Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," pp. 125-26.

¹⁴⁷ He aware of that Brazil's future lie behind the good relations with its south American neighbors. See Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After Cold War*, p.38; Tullo Vigevani and Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira, 'Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era: The Search for Autonomy Through Integration', trans. by Timothy Thompson, *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 156, Vol. 34 No. 5 (2007), 58- 80 (pp. 64,69,71,77); Carlos Santiso, 'The Gordian Knot of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Promoting Democracy While Respecting Sovereignty', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 16, Number 2(2003), 343-58.

¹⁴⁸ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Estamos reorganizando o capitalismo brasileiro (Interview with FHC) [We are reorganizing Brazilian capitalism]," interview by Brasílio Sallum Jr., 1997, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0102-64451997000100003&script=sci_arttext; "Fernando Henrique Cardoso propõe eixos estratégicos para o país," *O Estado de São Paulo*, May 30, 2000, http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S0103-20702003000200003&script=sci_arttext. Cited in Tullo Vigevani and M Fernandes de Oliveira, "Brazilian Foreign Policy in the Cardoso Era," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 5 (September 1, 2007): p. 61.

¹⁴⁹ Maria Soares de Lima and Mônica Hirst, "Brazil As an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities," *International Affairs* 82, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): p. 30.

¹⁵⁰ Cerro, "Relações internacionais do Brasil," p. 6.

¹⁵¹ 'The effort to unite the economies of the Americas into a single free trade area began at the Summit of the Americas, which was held in December 1994 in Miami, U.S.A'. For more details see: http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp.

¹⁵² Amaury de Souza, "América do Sul: tão perto, tão longe [South America: very near, very far]," in *Desafios da política externa brasileira*, Luiz Cerro et al. (Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, 2008), p. 13.

With respect to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) like institutions, once influential economic and political actors in the region, it is possible to say that there are mainly two sorts of approaches: Ideologist and Pragmatist. We can easily say that Cardoso government did not ever see the IMF as an ideological agency. During his incumbency, his administration had a cooperative relation with the IMF while Brazil was in financial turbulence.¹⁵³ Lula's party (PT) opposed any agreement with the IMF in the beginning of his term in office; but later he tolerated limited financial package programs, if necessary.¹⁵⁴

To see the main paradigmatic changes in Brazil's foreign policy, three different periods can be discerned: from 1910s up until 1960s which were mostly dominated by Branco's 'special relations' doctrine; from 1960s up to 1990s, which were led by military dictatorship as a 'relatively independent' period; and from 1990s to the present, which have been determined by 'multilateralist' tenets. Besides other factors, it is important to underline that Brazilian external relations have changed significantly since the Cold War as a result of a set of structural changes in the international system. As a result of the new composition in the international system (multi-polar), Brazil found an opportunity to prove that it is an indispensable member of the international system and can play a critical role over world affairs. It was only after the Cold War that Brazilian foreign policy agenda has made enormous institutionalist changes to adapt to new developments in world affairs. It is important to state that during the period of transition, the determinant role of President was much more apparent on the fate of the country. Although the effects of a leader (as an actor) are limited, a leader who seizes the opportunities that the international system permits can achieve a great job. Yet, almost all the countries in the world (like Brazil) were caught unprepared to the post-cold war order. When it comes to the Brazilian case, I think that the presidency of Cardoso coincided precisely with such a period. Although this study has focused on Lula's foreign policy motivations, the study has also looked into the period, which witnessed President Cardoso's two terms in office. Thus, in this

¹⁵³ Three assistance packages provided in 1998, 2001 and 2002 are respectively as follows: \$ 41.5 billion, \$ 15 billion, and \$ 30 billion.

¹⁵⁴ De Almeida, "Um exercício comparativo de política externa," pp. 13-14; Dos Santos, "Duas Perspectivas de Mundo: Relações Exteriores do Brasil Entre 1999 e 2006," p. 13.

section the common foreign policy behavior the Cardoso governments have been briefly examined. For the sake of multilateral diplomacy, Cardoso's Brazil tried to diversify its foreign policy through greater cooperation with Latin American countries and the USA. One should not disregard the fact that the Cardoso government had little room for maneuver because of the structural domestic problems that had accumulated over the years. Besides, Cardoso spent most of his energy to bring about the economic development of Brazil. Nevertheless, nothing justifies Cardoso's failure to play a prominent role in world politics. Therefore, Lula administration created an opportunity to see other sides of Brazil's external relations. In order to assess the current foreign policy posture of Brazil and the political situation in the world, the following pages deal with several important issues associated with the Lula government(s).

3.5. The Lula Era and Brazil's Foreign Policy

*“The demand for President Lula’s message is greater than the
“supply” of Lula” (Celso Amorim)*

It was the end of 2002; most people in the Americas had been waiting with anxious suspense about the result of Brazil’s presidential race, which was realized on October 27, 2002. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, was a favorite candidate against the Brazilian Social Democracy Party’s (*Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira*) candidate, José Serra. During the election campaign, the market feared¹⁵⁵ that possible Lula government would cause harm on the economic and financial system, which was established by FHC’s *Plano Real* (Real Plan).¹⁵⁶ This negative atmosphere paved the way for rumors regarding ‘Brazil Risk’ in the market. In other words, as Almeida states, the fear was an “increase in interest rates, inflation and exchange rate parity, and the decline in the value of the Brazilian foreign debt bonds negotiated in the financial markets”.¹⁵⁷ Then, Lula assured the market by sending *Carta ao povo brasileiro* (*A Letter to the Brazilian People*), in which he stated that he would respect the previous government’s agreements/commitments -domestic and international- and would maintain the principle lines of the Cardoso program. (*Plano Real*).¹⁵⁸ He said that what had happened (implying to FHC’s structural reforms about economics) in eight years should not be sacrificed in eight days. Finally, Lula had an opportunity to celebrate his Presidential victory on his fourth trial when he obtained 61.3% of

¹⁵⁵ That fear did not only exist inside Brazil, but also at the level of the international public opinion. This is what Vizontini called as the fear of “sudden change and an ideologically militant stance”. See Paulo Vizontini, “O G-3 e o G-20: o Brasil e as novas coalizões internacionais,” in *Relações internacionais do Brasil: temas e agendas*, Henrique Altemani de Oliveira, Antonio Carlos Lessa. (Editora Saraiva, 2006), p. 166; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 94.

¹⁵⁶ *Plano Real*: fiscal responsibility (that is, budgetary surplus in order to pay public debt), the inflation target regime, and the floating exchange.

¹⁵⁷ Mônica A. Haddad, “A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy?,” in *Brazil Under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society Under the Worker-President* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 168.

¹⁵⁸ Richard Bourne, *Lula of Brazil: The Story so Far* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 168.

valid votes.¹⁵⁹ After all, looking at Lula's tenure, we can say that all the anxieties about him proved baseless, at least in the context of foreign policy.

In this part, I am going to discuss the main foreign policy premises of Lula, and then examine several important issues associated with the Lula governments (2003-2006/ 2006-2010). While reviewing those issues, this study will focus on the main foreign policy principles pursued by Lula. Moreover, the principal problematical area in all the subjects reviewed here is the degree to which his policies overlapped with his Left beliefs or discourses.

3.5.1. Foreign Policy Premises of the Lula Government(s)

Since the swearing-in of Lula, there have been significant changes in Brazilian foreign policy.¹⁶⁰ Of course, this is not just because Lula came to power; also some changes have occurred in Brazil and international arena. As it is mentioned in the introductory part, individuals, as an agent actor, have limited influence on international politics. This is not to try to reduce the importance of Lula and his successes, but to portray the limits of Lula as human being. Thus, it is necessary to distinct exaggerated expectations of the Brazilian people from the reality of Brazil's capacity, while we examine the Lula government's successes and failures.

It appears that Lula's foreign policy was guided by three considerations: Lula ideology -PT, Workers Party- (*individual level*), traditional guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy (*state level*), and the prevailing international context (*international level*). None of these considerations can lead to claim that Brazil's foreign policy determined only according to Lula's (or PT) ideology, free from country's traditional foreign policy (leadership in South America, Mercosul policy, search for permanent seat in the UN Security Council *etc.*) implementations and

¹⁵⁹ Lula ran for presidency for four times. He participated in the Presidential election in 1989 for the first time, which he lost, and then he lost again 1994 and 1998 elections against Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

¹⁶⁰ Rafael Duarte Villa, "Política Externa do Governo Lula: Continuidades e Rupturas," *Revista Adusp* (May 2005): 12- 19.

international system realities.¹⁶¹ It is the art of foreign policy, which combines all these motivations correctly in the right time and appropriate place/platform.

In most of his remarks (during election campaign and after coming office), Lula pointed out the necessity of change in the foreign policy directions. The clearest expression of this can be found in his inauguration speech saying that “Change: this is the key word; this was the great message from Brazilian society in the October elections”.¹⁶² For Burges, Lula accelerated the quick ‘psychological tenor’ in Brazil’s foreign policy changing, whereas he preserved the main guidelines of country’s foreign objectives (*psychologically transformed*).¹⁶³

On the other hand, as for some, Pires-O’Brien argues that setting aside some members of Lula government’s accidental speeches, nothing really changed in Brazil’s foreign policy. The only differences are “the tactics of persuasion, as Lula da Silva appears to believe that he can make things happen much more quickly than his predecessors can”.¹⁶⁴

Although the supporters of this idea are inconsiderable, to certain extent, it is true but Cardoso have not been palpable to revive the need for change or to voice a critical discourse what Lula has done during his mandate.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, every careful researcher may find apprehend, at least in discourse, some salient changes and priorities, after Lula holding an office:

¹⁶¹ A small number of authors, as Bourne, regarded the foreign policy of Lula administration mostly has indicated the PT’s ideology. See Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 153.

¹⁶² Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília,” in *A política externa do Brasil*, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; Celso Amorim; Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Coleção países e regiões. (Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, 2003), 27.

¹⁶³ Sean Burges, “Auto-Estima in Brazil: The Logic of Lula’s South-South Foreign Policy,” *International Journal* 60, no. 4 (2005): p. 1134.

¹⁶⁴ Joaquina Pires-O’Brien, “Brazil under a Labour Government: Part Two,” *The Contemporary Review* 285, no. 1665 (2004): p. 216.

¹⁶⁵ Fagundes Vizentini, “Um ano de política externa do governo Lula,” *A Nova Ordem Global* (December 22, 2003), http://educaterra.terra.com.br/vizentini/artigos/artigo_142.htm.

- i. Struggling with the US unilateralism and seeking to balance it and emphasizing the principle of reciprocity (in particular, the relations with the USA);¹⁶⁶
- ii. Trying to reinforce the multilateral and bilateral relations for the purpose of being powerful- in economic and political terms- in the international organizations and dealings (e.g. Doha Round in World Trade Organizations); and being a global actor;
- iii. Refraining from the agreements, which may harm Brazil's long term interest;
- iv. Strengthening the relations with the rising powers (e.g. BRICS)¹⁶⁷ and African and Middle Eastern countries;
- v. Establishing the solidarity among the developing nations, emphasizing the values and principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM);¹⁶⁸
- vi. Sustaining and ameliorating the existing good relations with developed countries, including the USA and European Union (EU) to a better state;
- vii. Lobbying for the reform in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly for a permanent seat for Brazil;
- viii. Repelling the defensive posture of the previous governments;
- ix. Emphasizing the national sovereignty and defending Brazil's interest at international arena;
- x. Paying a special attention to foreign trade and economic development in order to diminish external vulnerabilities of the country;¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ Ricardo Seitenfus, "O Brasil e suas relações internacionais," in *Brasil contemporâneo: crônicas de um país incógnito* (Artes e Ofícios, 2006), 129- 150.

¹⁶⁷ BRIC is the acronym of four big countries. These are Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The word was first used by Jim O'Neill in 2001 in his paper. They have declared, in general, the goal of establishing a new democratic and multi-polar world order. For more details, see Lael Brainard and Leandro Martinez-Diaz, "Brazil: The 'B' Belongs in the BRICS," in *Brazil As an Economic Superpower?: Understanding Brazil's Changing Role in the global economy*, Lael Brainard. (Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 1- 13; José Eduardo Cassiolato and Virgínia Vitorino, *BRICS and Development Alternatives: Innovation Systems and Policies* (Anthem Press, 2009); Jim O'Neill, "The World Needs Better Economic BRICs," *GS Global Economic*, 2001, <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/building-better-doc.pdf>; Tony Halpin, "Brazil, Russia, India and China Form Bloc to Challenge US Dominance," *The Times*, June 17, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_am.

¹⁶⁸ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 153.

¹⁶⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 87; Lídia Domingues Peixoto Prado, "A Política Externa Do Primeiro Governo Lula (2003-2006)" (Master Thesis,

- xi. Accomplishment of national development of the country (desenvolvimento nacional);¹⁷⁰
- xii. Improvement of the living conditions/standards in Brazil, and;¹⁷¹
- xiii. Bringing a ‘humanist perspective’ (uma perspectiva humanista) to foreign policy (diplomatic action).¹⁷²

It is better to understand these changes after we discuss some main principles that Lula’s foreign policy perception is based on.¹⁷³ Especially, four of them are very prominent to comprehend Lula’s foreign policy implementations: active foreign policy; autonomy through diversification; multilateralism; and bringing endemic domestic problems to global agenda and emphasizing the presidential diplomacy.

Lula took responsibility in a difficult time and inherited a great amount of challenges/problems in the foreign policy area. His predecessor FHC followed the foreign policy that was not indicative of Brazil’s potential. He strictly believed in the non-intervention policy with regard to the promotion of national sovereignty.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, FHC hesitated in engaging in international issues in order to respect the non-intervention principle. Since Lula came to power, in order to implement an active foreign policy, he to some degree put aside the non-intervention principle by encouraging greater political involvement in South America (i.e. logistic support for the UN operation to Haiti).¹⁷⁵ It is useful to

Campinas: Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2007), p. 97, <http://www.santiagodantassp.locaweb.com.br/br/arquivos/defesas/LidiaPrado.pdf>; Alcides Costa Vaz, “O Governo Lula: uma nova política exterior?,” *Fórum de Diálogo IBAS*, n.d., p. 8, http://www.forumibsa.org/publicacoes/O_Governo_Lula_uma_nova_pol%C3%ADtica_exterior.pdf; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília,” 31.

¹⁷⁰ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília”; “Remarks Following Discussions with President Luiz I. da Silva of Brazil in Brasilia,” *Office of the Press Secretary*, November 6, 2005, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2005-11-14/pdf/WCPD-2005-11-14-Pg1661.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ José de Arimatéia Cruz, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva: An Early Assessment of a Leftist President,” *Politics & Policy* 33, no. 1 (March 1, 2005): p. 16; William Barr, “Brazil Alert: Brazilian Foreign Policy under Lula: Early Days, Early Signs,” *Hemisphere Focus* 6, no. 1 (2003): 1-3.

¹⁷² Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília”.

¹⁷³ Of course, the foreign policy principles of Lula’s governments are more than what we defined above; but these are the more common ones.

¹⁷⁴ Santiso, “The Gordian Knot of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” p. 357.

¹⁷⁵ Hirst, “Strategic Posture Review: Brazil,” p. 1.

remember that all the active participations, in my understanding, inevitably require an intervention as well. Yet, it does not imply that states have a right to breach/by-pass the sovereignty of other states.

The perception of weaknesses (to intervene in (to raise voice or to have words on global issues) the global policies) was replaced with a ‘high-profile diplomacy’ suited to Brazil’s needs and capacities during Lula term.¹⁷⁶ In Lula’s foreign minister Celso Amorim’s statements, the Lula administration was aware of Brazil’s values and interests in the world. It is not a small country; therefore, Brazil cannot have a foreign policy of a small country.¹⁷⁷ The foreign policy chief also described the Brazil’s foreign policy as ‘active and proud’ (*ativa e altiva*) and also ‘creative’.¹⁷⁸ Lula government’s ‘active and proud’ foreign policy has been implemented thanks to the resolution of previous doubts/fears related to his ideological positions and gaining the confidence of global markets, successful diplomatic activities, and strong symbolic figure of Lula.¹⁷⁹ Lula believed that Brazil was not precisely aware of its power. “The days of recognizing Brazil’s ‘unfulfilled potential’ have passed”, he said.¹⁸⁰ We can say that during Lula’s term, Brazil tried to establish a balance between its regional and global role and in the world politics and economics continued to take place as South America’s rising power,¹⁸¹ and hence to a great extent achieved ‘fulfilling its potential’. I am not arguing that Cardoso’s foreign policy has been entirely passive, I just try to stress that during his tenure Brazil could not actualize its real potential power in the international arena.

Second influential external policy tenet of Lula is ‘autonomy through diversification’. It is a fact that almost every nation on the planet makes an effort

¹⁷⁶ Celso Amorim, *A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil: um tributo a Rui Barbosa*. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais, 2007, p. 7;

Soreanu Pecequilo, “A Política Externa do Brasil no Século XXI,” p. 143.

¹⁷⁷ Amorim, “A diplomacia multilateral do Brasil – um tributo a Rui Barbosa,” p. 7.

¹⁷⁸ Celso Amorim, “Política externa é uma política pública como as demais. Está sujeita à expressão das urnas,” interview by Douglas Portari and João Cláudio Garcia, O Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, August 4, 2010, http://www.ipea.gov.br/003/00301009.jsp?ttCD_CHAVE=14709.

¹⁷⁹ Villa, “Política Externa do Governo Lula: Continuidades e Rupturas,” p. 15.

¹⁸⁰ Antonio Barros de Castro, “The Challenges of Modernization: The Domestic Debate on the Future of Brazilian Foreign Policy” (presented at the New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Policy, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution and Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2007), p. 19.

¹⁸¹ Hirst, “Strategic Posture Review: Brazil,” p. 7.

to diminish its dependency on others and preserve its national sovereignty (*soberania nacional*) over domestic and international affairs. At the same time, ironically, they try to subjugate other states to establish hegemony over them. It is related to the nature of power. In my opinion, Lula's policy of 'autonomy through the diversification' would possibly facilitate Brazil's stature as an independent global actor. What I mean by 'quest autonomy through diversification' term is what Vigevani and Cepaluni defined very clearly in their book. When they refer to the concept, they mostly attribute the meaning that attempting to transform the international norms and principles via South-South cooperation (involving China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East *etc.*) against unilateral acts of powerful states (e.g. EU and the USA). Thanks to that policy view/vision, countries (like Brazil) not only have broken the asymmetric power relations between the states, but have also increased their bargaining capacity on international issues.¹⁸² We may say that this is another form of multilateralism. Lula's autonomy through diversification is an extended form of FHC's multilateralist policies. That is to say, it is possible to interpret this notion of diversification as the diversity of friends (hips) and of partners in the diplomatic arena. In order to endure its ability to negotiate with big powers (in particular the USA), Brazil insisted on its multilateralist attitude. Lula said: "[Brazil's] clear choice of multilateralism", the prioritizing of the 'ties with the Southern world' and the "excellent and trade relations [maintained] with the great world powers".¹⁸³ What is the most important point here is that his multilateralist understanding is quite different from his predecessor's. Lula had a 'heavy multilateralism', which stipulates the sovereignty and equality for all states, while on the contrary Cardoso had applied 'moderate multilateralism' emphasized the acceptance of a more egalitarian international law and recognized the reality of strong power asymmetries in the international system.¹⁸⁴ That is because, in my opinion, Lula -as leftist and socialist leader- has had a notion that claimed the opportunity of "another better and alternative world" was possible.

¹⁸² Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, pp. 7, 86; Vigevani and Cepaluni, "Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy Through Diversification," p. 1313.

¹⁸³ Haddad, "A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy?," p. 173.

¹⁸⁴ De Almeida, "Um exercício comparativo de política externa," pp. 162- 184; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 91.

One of the most important innovations of Lula's foreign policy objective, *inter alia*, is globalizing the domestic issues/problems that had accumulated over the years and internalizing the global issues. Among the others, there is no doubt that Lula's main proposal for international cooperation was the creation of a "world fund against hunger".¹⁸⁵ Although Brazil is/has the largest economy in Latin America, it has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth on the planet. Lula knew that Brazil could not solve such enormous problems by itself but needed to collaborate with international organizations (i.e. UNDP, World Bank). On domestic level, the engagement of internal debate on foreign policy was encouraged throughout Lula's term in office¹⁸⁶ in order to lessen the monopoly of *Itamaraty* over foreign policy. It 'created a polarization among the 'attentive public' of Brazil's foreign affairs'. For the first time in the history of Brazil, international decisions have become an agenda in the country's domestic press.¹⁸⁷

As Cason and Power formulated in their article, for the first time Presidential diplomacy¹⁸⁸ in Brazil's foreign affairs started with the Cardoso's term (mid-1990s),¹⁸⁹ yet the rise of the president's effect on diplomacy reached the peak after Lula assumed the presidency in 2003. The presidential diplomacy makes a real sense when we evaluate it with Lula's active foreign policy approach/thought. Lula used the presidential diplomacy as a medium for improving bilateral relations, most frequently with Latin American neighbors during the time of crisis and with African and Arab countries to establish new relations.¹⁹⁰ With the help of

¹⁸⁵ Sennes and Barbosa, "The Brazilian Foreign Policy: Another Route or a New Step Forward?," pp.12-14.

¹⁸⁶ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 93.

¹⁸⁷ Paulo Roberto De Almeida, "Uma nova 'arquitetura' diplomática? -- Interpretações divergentes sobre a política externa do governo Lula (2003-2006). (Portuguese)," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 49, no. 1 (July 2006): pp. 95- 116; Hirst, "Strategic Posture Review: Brazil," p. 4; Haddad, "A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy?," p. 175.

¹⁸⁸ "The logic of presidentialism is one of electoral calendars and fixed terms in office, meaning that the time horizons of presidents do not always coincide with those of MRE's professional diplomats, who are trained to think in terms of long-term national interests and strategies'. See, Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," p. 135.

¹⁸⁹ Actually, the engagement of President in foreign policy personally may have seen at Castello Branco's *automatic alignment policy* (1964-7) and Geisel's *terceiro-mundismo policy* very limited sense. Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," pp. 117, 121, 122.

¹⁹⁰ The Brazilian president, in something over two years in office, visited more countries than those who visited President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) in his eight years in command of the Brazilian government. Villa, "Política Externa do Governo Lula: Continuidades e Rupturas," p. 16. According to a recent journalistic account, between January 2003 and December

presidential diplomacy, president could interfere easily in the foreign policy process directly, when it's needed.

Surely, I have just examined some of the most important principles of Lula's foreign policy. Although, there are more premises that guided Lula's government, I have chosen the ones that I deem as significant. Now, in the upcoming parts, I discuss some foreign policy subjects one by one.

2005, Lula visited no fewer than 48 countries, spending 159 days abroad (approximately 14 percent of his time in his first three years as president). During this period, Lula visited 18 countries in Africa, cementing his reputation as a champion of developing countries, but also kept one foot in the First World; he was the only chief of state invited to address both the World Economic Forum in Davos and the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. Eduardo Scolese and Leonencio Nossa, *Viagens com o Presidente* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2006), pp. 74-77. Cited in Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," pp. 122, 124.

3.5.2. Brazil's Bilateral Relations

3.5.2.1. The Relations with Latin America

The history of states has rarely witnessed faithful relations among the neighboring countries. Most of them have fought because of border disputes over the years. There are just a couple of countries on the planet, which have had peaceful relation with their neighbors; others are vice versa. Since Brazil's diplomacy father, Rio Branco's foreign policy approach (bringing union and friendship to South American nations), Brazil has been pursuing a 'good neighbor policy'. As a result of that policy understanding, Brazil solved many problems, chiefly border disputes with its neighboring countries. As Lafer, former foreign minister of Brazil, put it correctly, a peaceful climate is essential not because of Kantian motivations (perpetual peace), but to create an environment for 'development of national space'.¹⁹¹ After the end of 1970s and mostly beginning from the 1980s (the era for democratization process of Brazil) up to the end of 1990s, Brazil has attributed a special importance to Latin American countries in its foreign policy agenda.¹⁹² The mutual relations with Latin American countries have become one of the priorities of the last two governments' foreign policy program. Either Cardoso or Lula gave a special place to Latin America in their foreign policy. While previously economic issues had been emphasized the latter two figures gave due weight to political objectives.

The importance given to the relations with Latin America may be seen easily in the speeches of Lula. Whilst addressing the nation in one of his keynote speeches, he stressed Latin America as the prior objective of Brazil's foreign policy.¹⁹³ In one of his momentous speeches, he said, "during my government, the great

¹⁹¹ Lafer, "Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy," p. 215.

¹⁹² Lindolpho de Carvalho Dias, "Perspectivas das Relações do Brasil com os Países da América do Sul," in *Seminário Política Externa do Brasil para o Século XXI*, Aldo Rebelo, Luis Fernandes and Carlos Henrique Cardim. (Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Coordenação de Publicações, 2003), 235-242; Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, p.30.

¹⁹³ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília," 27-46; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "Message to the Brazilian Congress From the President of Brazil," *Embassy Publisher*, February 22, 2008,

http://www.brasilemb.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=286&Itemid=133.

foreign policy priority will be building a South America politically stable, prosperous and united, based on democratic ideals and social justice”.¹⁹⁴ I think this is not something that has been randomly said but agreed on after some long-running debates. It should also be noted that emphasis of the relations cannot be freely comprehended from Brazil’s regional, continental and global goals (e.g. politics, economics, strategy and culture). Thus, foreign minister Amorim stated that “Even a country as big as Brazil is a small country in a world like this ... we do not have the capacity to speak alone ... I believe that Brazil does not have full existence without being united [with South America]”.¹⁹⁵

If Brazil is perceived by international community as an active country, there is little doubt that it is due to Brazil’s presence in South America and its representation of hemispheric power in the international stage.¹⁹⁶ The main objective of Brazil is to realize the regional integration of South America. ‘Regional integration’, this is the key word to conceive Brazil’s relations towards its neighbors. The Brazilian diplomats strongly believe that Latin America’s, especially Brazil’s, participation in the world politics would only be possible through peaceful coexistence with its neighbors.¹⁹⁷ Brazil could achieve its global and regional-scale projects if it only pursues a ‘zero problem policy’ in reciprocal relations with Latin American countries. As Branco reminds us, “Brazil’s relationships with its neighbors are not an option but a necessity of its geographical circumstances”.¹⁹⁸

On the other hand, there are a few countries (markedly Argentine, Bolivia and Chile), whose dissatisfaction had been heard explicitly from time to time (the use

¹⁹⁴ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília,” p. 40.

¹⁹⁵ Celso Amorim, speech at the *III. Meeting of South American Foreign Ministers*, Santiago, Chile, 24 November 2006. Cited in Matias Spektor, “Ideas Driving Brazil’s Regional Policy” (presented at the First Regional Powers Network (RPN) Conference, Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2008), p. 11, <http://www.giga-hamburg.de/english/content/rpn/conferences/spektor.pdf>.

¹⁹⁶ Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, pp. 29-30.

¹⁹⁷ Celso Amorim, ‘Brazil’s Multilateral Diplomacy’ *II. National Conference on Foreign Policy and International Politics- A Tribute to Rui Barbosa*, Brasília, 11 May, 2007.

¹⁹⁸ Fernando Reis, “O Brasil e a América Latina,” in *Temas de Política Externa Brasileira II*, vol. II, Gelson Fonseca Jr. and Sergio Henrique Nabuco de Castro. (São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1994), 9-42; Celso Lafer, *Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy*, p.215.

of ‘elephant metaphor’ in the neighborhood’).¹⁹⁹ The principal suspicion of the neighbors is an asymmetric power relation between Brazil and the rest of Latin American countries.²⁰⁰ Indeed, The Lula administrations were aware of these challenges and proposed acting as a more cautious and responsible actor.²⁰¹ One possible reason for that anxiety is that *Itamaraty* began to express its enthusiastic leadership in South American region much more apparently, since Lula came to power.²⁰²

For our purposes, it is meaningful to note that the primary task of this part is looking at the relations of Lula’s government(s) through his leftist perspective. Beyond giving a general picture of Latin America-Brazil relations, I would like to, before all else, focus more on three critical events, which Lula faced during his government(s). These are the nationalization of Bolivian gas, and in spite of provocations of the USA amicable relations with Cuba and Venezuela. On the grounds of the bilateral relations with Latin America, I shall inquire how much Lula’s reactions in relation to Latin American countries, particularly Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, overlapped with his leftist ideology.

3.5.2.1.1. Reaction to Bolivia’s Gas Nationalization

After Bolivia’s first indigenous leader Evo Morales came to power, the government of Bolivia issued a Supreme Decree on first of May 2006. The first article of decree announced the nationalization of Bolivia’s hydrocarbon resources. The article affirmed that “[t]he State regains ownership, possession and total and absolute control of [the hydrocarbon] resources”.²⁰³ According to the

¹⁹⁹ For instance, Bolivia Considers Brazil an Imperial Power and Perceives it as the “Elephant in the Neighborhood”; Budny Daniel, “Brazil’s Foreign Relations with South America,” *Brazil Institute*, October 24, 2006.

²⁰⁰ Martin Mullins, *In the Shadow of the Generals: Foreign Policy Making in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), p. 97.

²⁰¹ “Discurso proferido pelo Secretário-Geral das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, proferido durante a cerimônia em homenagem ao Dia do Diplomata,” *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*, May 7, 2009, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/embaixador-samuel-pinheiro-guimaraes-neto/discurso-proferido-pelo-secretario-geral-das>.

²⁰² Daniel, *Brazil’s Foreign Relations with South America*, p.30

²⁰³ Supreme Decree No. 28701, 1 May 2006 (Nationalization of Hydrocarbons). For detailed evaluation about the nationalization, see Bernardo Pestana M. C. Duarte, Thiago Carvalho Saraiva, and Rosemarie Bröker Bone, in *Impacto na Relação Brasil-Bolívia Com a Nacionalização dos Hidrocarbonetos Bolivianos* (presented at the IV. Congresso Brasileiro de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento em Petróleo e Gás (PDPETRO), Campinas- SP: ABPG, UNICAMP, 2007).

decree, Bolivian government warned all foreign investors, including Brazil's state-led petrol company *Petrobrás* that would make a new contract with YPFB (*Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos*), within the six months and share its profit at a limited ratio/amount of 18%.²⁰⁴ In addition to the dramatic decline of the profits of foreign companies, the control of foreign-led gas fields and refineries transferred to state-owned enterprise, YPFB as well.²⁰⁵ Symbolically, more esteemed than nationalization decision,²⁰⁶ Morales chose a *Petrobrás* installation as a stage and surrounded it by Bolivian army troops. In fact, the Brazilian government expected nationalization, because it was one of the election promises of Morales', but he surprised the Brazilian government with the manner and place of manifestation of nationalization.²⁰⁷ As it was expected, immediately after Morales' provocative announcement, the Brazilian media and opposition accused Lula of being too passive. Bolivia's attitude Left Lula in the lurch ahead of opposition parties and media, who wanted to develop strategic relations with the indigenous leader.

Since the arrival of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to power, the Brazilian press had already criticized the Lula's friendly relations with the Left leaning leaders. Despite Morales calling Lula as *compañero*²⁰⁸ and 'my oldest friend', his behavior triggered Lula's harsh response, saying, "Obviously, if Bolivia insists on taking these unilateral actions, Brazil has to think of doing something tougher to Bolivia".²⁰⁹ Probably, Lula had to make a very critical decision soon after the

²⁰⁴ Alan Clendenning, "Brazil-Bolivia Relations Continue South," *Washington Post*, May 12, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/12/AR2006051201659.html>; "Bolivia Gas under State Control," *BBC News*, May 2, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4963348.stm>.

²⁰⁵ Sarah-Lea John de Sousa, 'Brasil y Bolivia: 'Conflicto' sobre hidrocarburos,' *FRIDE Comentario*, (Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior,), November, 2006. Cited in Cason and Power, *Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy*, p.133.

²⁰⁶ According to Joseph Stiglitz, the Bolivia's main argument about the nationalization of oil and gas reserves is fair and was done in order to repeal the unfair and probably illegal contracts signed under previous administrations, and to get fair value for their country's natural wealth. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Who Owns Bolivia?," *Project-Syndicate*, June 6, 2006, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz71/English>.

²⁰⁷ Priscilla Mazonotti, "Celso Amorim diz no Senado que Bolívia é país estratégico para o Brasil," *A Câmara de Comércio Brasileira no Japão*, May 9, 2006, http://www.ccbj.jp/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=83.

²⁰⁸ Comrade, in Spanish.

²⁰⁹ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p.157; Seitenfus, "O Brasil e suas relações internacionais," p. 140. With regard to the UN General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, on Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, "Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as

announcement. On the one hand, Brazil's national interests stemming from dependence of its industry mostly on Bolivian Gas; on the other hand, there stood the universal 'brotherhood' notion, shared with Bolivia and for which he struggled for many years. We can definitely say that national interests prevailed upon both leaders' leftist ideology. Bolivia had to 'smooth out' its problems with Brazil and later forced a resignation of the minister of hydrocarbons (Andrés Soliz Rada).²¹⁰ It is worth mentioning that where there is a national interest (or national development); there are reduced/dismissible effects of ideological approaches. For the United States, because of its nature, national interests come before anything else; this is despite the disagreement about the definition of 'national interest' itself. Morales has stated it most clearly: "as Bolivians we recognize that Brazil is the leader of the region, and that's why its businesses are so important to our country. We are obliged to live with Brazil in a marriage without divorce, because we both need each other".²¹¹ In this process, one of the points that irked Brazil is the technical and moral aid/support of Venezuela to Bolivia.²¹² Consequently, the relations between Brazil and Bolivia have normalized quickly with the help of Brazil's master diplomacy (more importantly Lula's), and prevented the emergence of big problems between two neighbor states.

3.5.2.1.2. Friendly relations with the Communist Cuba

Even though Cuba is one of the smallest among the Latin American countries, Brazil's bilateral relation with the socialist Cuba provides a significant topic to the observer in the sense of understanding the Lula administration's Leftwing posture. When Lula was appointed as head of state, he had two options in terms of Cuban relations. Either Lula or his members of the governments would behave according

overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law" (Art. 4). In that event, Lula's response to Bolivia was not only based on national interest, but also had a legal ground according to international law. For details, see UN General Assembly resolutions 626, 1314, 1803, 3201 and 3281.

²¹⁰ "Soliz Rada Says That Oil Companies Impose Conditions," *Monthly Review*, June 6, 2006, <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2006/razon190906.html>; "Amorim: Preço do gás deve ser discutido com Petrobras," *Parana- Online*, May 23, 2005, <http://www.parana-online.com.br/editoria/policia/news/178852/>, 23/05/2006; Amorim, "Política externa é uma política pública como as demais. Está sujeita à expressão das urnas".

²¹¹ Dan Keane, "Morales Gas Nationalization Complete," *Washington Post*, October 29, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/29/AR2006102900036.html>.

²¹² Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy after Cold War*, p.165.

to the principles they have built their own ideologies on, the relations with Cuba would be limited, as it is the case with the United States. According to the understanding of the bipolar Cold War world system the friends of Cuba have always been enemies to the USA, Furthermore, Brazil's relations with communist Cuba not only represent the bilateral relations but also effect the 'Triple relations' including the USA in the equation. Actually, my main purpose of choosing Cuba, as a unit of analyses, is to discuss that if Lula would establish ties that satisfy the US rather than conducting a policy appropriate for Brazil's national interest and PT's ideological principles.

Brazil's relations with Cuba have become a new agenda between Brazil and the USA during the Lula administration. Beyond the Brazil's political relations towards Castro's Cuba, it had a very close economic cooperation with Cuban state.²¹³ That was a more meaningful and considerable initiative for Cuba, which has been imposed the US embargo since the Cuban Revolution, 1959.²¹⁴ In terms of politics, Brazil attempted to integrate Havana into Latin American community (e.g. Rio Group, 2008) and continental organizations (Organization of American States-OAS).²¹⁵ Economically, there is an initiative for a big bio-fuels project between the countries.²¹⁶

Despite the pressure from the USA and opposition at home, compared to the traditional Brazilian foreign policy path, Lula made an enormous effort to build strong relations with Cuba. Some senior diplomats accused Lula of prioritizing the ideology to the national interests. This may not be explained, only by ideological similarities that both Lula and Castro's Cuba have shared; there is also Brazil's desire as a regional power to implement a foreign policy independent from the USA influence.²¹⁷ Occasionally the USA warned the Brazilian government over

²¹³ Marina Menéndez Quintero, "Cuba-Brazil Relations Get New Impulse," *Juventud Rebelde*, May 31, 2008, <http://www.juventudrebelde.co.cu/cuba/2008-05-31/cuba-brazil-relations-get-new-impulse/>.

²¹⁴ Mullins, *In the Shadow of the Generals*, p. 96.

²¹⁵ 'Cuba being absent from the inter-American system, including the OAS, is an anomaly and needs to be corrected. See "Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim Told Reporters in Rio de Janeiro," *Reuters*, April 13, 2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53C3QB20090413>.

²¹⁶ Hirst, *Strategic Posture Review*, p.6.

²¹⁷ "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Lula and His Squabbling Friends," *The Economist* 392, no. 8644 (2009): 38. Marcelo Ballve, "Brazilian Leader under Pressure for Cuba, Iran Policy," *True Slant*, February 26, 2010, <http://trueslant.com/marceloballve/2010/02/26/brazilian-leader-under-pressure-for-cuba-iran-policy/>; Mullins, *In the Shadow of the Generals*, p. 96.

relations with Cuba. Amorim found Lula's stance against the Cuba as an unjust critique and says that "If someone is interested in creating political evolution in Cuba, I have a quick prescription: End the embargo".²¹⁸

From the political point of view, being a regional leader establishing amicable relations with Cuba, undoubtedly is valuable to Brazil's national interests (But I think besides the national interests, Lula's personal endeavor (or PT ideology) on intimate relations is more determinant than the above-mentioned points. It does not mean that Lula totally agrees with the Castro brothers, but he thinks that an internationally isolated Cuba is not a solution for Cuban democracy, and regional stability. More open and globally integrated Cuba will overcome such problems automatically.

Therefore, his main policy that followed up on the bilateral relations was combining Cuba to international arena and lifting the embargo by persuading the USA for softening the coercive policies against Cuba.

3.5.2.1.3. Compulsory Alliance with Venezuela

The relationship with Venezuela has been a key component of the Brazilian diplomacy among the other Latin American states. By common consent, the relations have been considered as some of the most complex foreign policy issues comparing with rest of Latin American countries. In his tenure of office, Lula followed very careful diplomacy, in virtue of Venezuela's so-called populist leader Hugo Chávez and his antagonist behavior against the USA.²¹⁹ Here I briefly explain Lula's behavior in relation to Chávez's radical language against the USA and political crisis that occurred in Venezuela in 2003.

Firstly, even if political language that Chávez addressed against the USA government appears to be a cogitation problem for Brazil's bilateral relations with the Washington, however, Chávez's antagonist course toward the USA could provide an opportunity to Brazil's national interest in the long run pragmatically

²¹⁸ "Brazil's Lula Criticized for Cuba Dissidents Comment", March 11, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8561718.stm>.

²¹⁹ Lula's Perspective on Chávez Government, see Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p.94.

behaving against the USA.²²⁰ President Lula clearly expressed his attitude during one of his interviews against the fight between the USA and Venezuela. As Lula puts it, “Venezuela was a partner of Brazil. Chávez has his own reasons to fight with the USA. Moreover, the USA has its own reasons to fight with Venezuela. Brazil has no reason to fight with the USA and no reason to fight with Venezuela”.²²¹ Hence, Lula government never criticized Chávez explicitly, on the account of Venezuela’s non-democratic bias, as the USA always condemns it. In fact, his approach to Venezuela may be classified as quite normal. When Amorim, the creator of Brazil’s current foreign policy, was asked about endangering democracy in Venezuela, he said, “It is not the way we work” and “It’s not by being a loudspeaker that you change things”.²²² That is principal policy that Lula followed throughout his office years.

In this respect, it has advantage to remind that whilst Venezuela struggled with the political crisis in 2003, ‘group of friends of Venezuela’²²³ (Brazil, one of them), played intermediary role between government and opposition groups.²²⁴ Supposing that some members of the *Group of Friends of Venezuela* insisted on new ‘free and fair election’, Lula did not believe that a new election would solve the disputes of Venezuela. For Lula, before the election, the so-called ‘group of friends’ needs to provide peaceful climate for the parties involved. The Brazilian president also pointed out that Chávez, as a President of the country, has a constitutional mandate that must be respected by opposition.²²⁵ To some extent, Brazil managed successful relations with Venezuela in that process (political crisis in Venezuela and radical language adopted by Chávez in his speeches relating the USA). The Lula administration, not caring about the domestic and

²²⁰ Mullins, *In the Shadows of Generals*, pp.96,130.

²²¹ “Lula Calls for Ethanol Investment,” *BBC News*, June 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6718155.stm>.

²²² “Brazil’s Foreign Policy”.

²²³ Group of Friends of Venezuela was created by Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the USA to be mediators in the Venezuelan political crisis in 2003, which tried to eliminate the misunderstanding of Venezuelan government and opposition groups and create a democratic and peaceful solution. See more details “Venezuela’s ‘Friends’ Unveil Crisis Plan,” *BBC News*, January 25, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2693183.stm>.]; Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, pp. 21- 40.

²²⁴ Juan Forero, “Friends of Venezuela Are There to Help,” *The New York Times* (31 Jan. 2003, n.d.), <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/world/friends-of-venezuela-are-there-to-help.html>; Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, pp. 21- 40.

²²⁵ Valquíria Rey, “Lula defende EUA no ‘grupo de amigos’ da Venezuela,” *BBC Brasil*, January 16, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/2003/030116_lulabg.shtml.

international pressure, decided to get along with Venezuela. This is something difficult to achieve.

It is true, Lula's government was not comfortable with the course that Chávez was going through and his non-democratic actions, but they had little desire to oppose him.²²⁶ Above all, the Brazilian government knows that without the consent/ participation of Chávez (as the president of Venezuela), the integration of Latin America and its independent (from the American influence) hemispheric space will not be possible.

Ultimately, Brazil's bilateral relations with its neighboring countries cannot be viewed without looking at the country's regional and global projects and the Workers Party's (PT) ideology. Neither Brazil's desire to elevate itself to a leadership position in South America, nor is Lula's personal ideology the only reason for creation of a peaceful climate in the region. Nevertheless, the doubts regarding Brazil's disproportionate power among Latin American countries remain, and probably it is the one key issue that Lula's Brazil had to contemplate upon. Since Brazil is perceived as an imperialist power by some of its neighbors, it cannot represent the Southern America on the global stage. I agree with Bourne when he formulated Lula's foreign policy approach to Latin American countries in his book: "Ideological friendship could go only so far; it was an influence on, but not determinant of, his (Lula's) foreign policy with neighboring countries".²²⁷ In the hemispheric relations, I think Lula, despite all the shortcomings, had established equilibrium between national interests and his leftist ideology.

3.5.2.2. The Relations with the United States of America

Since the United States has actively joined the world scene after the First World War (notably after the Second World War) the leftist/socialist groups took the most critical and ruthless stance against it. Mostly because, they believe that the USA represents the 'imperial power' that they dedicate themselves to struggle

²²⁶ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy*, p. 1320.

²²⁷ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 158.

against it. There is no doubt that, at least for the last sixty- seventy years, it was only the USA that has been the most discussed subject in socialist agenda. Although there are many reasons for that critical stance, probably the most important one is the USA's illegitimate support of the right-wing governments, and its secretly provided military weapons and economic assistance when it is 'needed' (coups d'états against the legitimate governments).²²⁸ When we talk about 'providing support' of Washington to military regimes, the first place on the planet that comes to mind is Latin America during the Cold War years. Between 1960s-1990s, the USA explicitly supported the military coups in order to oppose the socialist/nationalist governments for creating a space for its capitalist hegemony over the entire world.

Accidentally, most of the political career of Lula coincides with that era. Through the years of his syndical and political life, he criticized the 'automatic alignment' attitude of previous governments with the White House. Now we will discuss the story of Lula who had a critical position toward the USA in his life before his incumbency to the office. In general, Lula stated in his inauguration speech that he would continue the relations with the USA that were based on reciprocal interest and respect.²²⁹ Nevertheless, it is fruitful to remember that likewise other democratic countries; Brazil also has a 'checks and balances' system. Due to this reason, I am not elaborating the relations ignoring the Brazilian traditional foreign policy guidelines.

Although Lula's government had prioritized relations with the neighboring countries and newly emerged powers in his foreign affairs agenda, the bilateral relations with the USA may be called positive even if not exactly described as calm.²³⁰ In particular, the level of bilateral relations moved forward during the President Lula's second term.²³¹ To better understand, the bilateral relations

²²⁸ Today we have freely access the document of President Johnson's instruction about the attempting for a military coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. He explicitly ordered that 'I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do'; Peter Kornbluh, ed., "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup" (The National Security Archive, n.d.), Declassified Documents Shed Light On U.S. Role, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm>.

²²⁹ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília," 41.

²³⁰ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p.160.

²³¹ Ribando and Meyer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations*, p. 28.

certainly would be more functional if we concentrate on the most significant three dimensions of the relations, which are economic, political, and security issues. Otherwise, without separating the issues, it is difficult to understand and generalize the relations. That is because the level of economic relations, for instance, can be more important comparing to the level of politics and security. In fact, it usually and really is.

3.5.2.2.1. Economics

The bilateral relations with Washington have been more focused on the economic and commercial matters. Naturally, therefore, economic sides of the relations have occupied more space than any other issues. At the same time, more hot debates took place between two giant American states mostly under the shadows of economic and commercial disputes. In relation to our focus, I will illustrate two prominent elements: the future of Free Trade Area of the Americas (hereafter, FTAA)²³² and the strategic partnership on ethanol.

Since the creation of the FTAA, there are contentious views on the future of the FTAA between Brazil and the USA; intensified substantially due to Lula's coming into office.²³³ Brazil, for its part, has more serious economic and political concerns about the USA's free trade proposal.²³⁴ For example, in the election campaign, Lula expressed the signals of his opinion about the trade area stating that, "under present conditions, the FTAA will not be a free trade agreement but a process of the economic annexation of continent by the USA; with extremely serious consequences for productive structures of our countries".²³⁵ Lula believed that the US has a specific purpose of extending its sphere of influence (regarding the trade area) and subordinates to America.²³⁶

It is important to note that before Lula came into power, the FTAA discussions have been mostly politicized under the Workers Party (PT) opposition with a

²³² FTAA is free trade area agreement. It is proposed (December 11, 1994) agreement to eliminate the trade barriers (customs, quotas *etc.*) for all American continent countries (Alasca to Argentine), except Cuba.

²³³ Cruz, "Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio 'Lula' da Silva," p. 22.

²³⁴ Luiz Bandeira, "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States," *Latin American Perspectives* 33, no. 3 (May 1, 2006): p. 24.

²³⁵ Cited in Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, p.87.

²³⁶ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 158.

critical approach, in spite of its relation to the economy. After Lula's becoming of president, the matter shifted to an economic stance. Lula indicated, "he would seriously engage in the final phase of the FTAA".²³⁷

Despite its creation in 1994, The Summit of Americas in Miami came to the public's attention only after the 2001 Quebec City Summit of the Americas.²³⁸ Afterwards, the legislation in Washington supported rapid progress into the FTAA due to intellectual property rights and agricultural subsidies, treatment of foreign direct investments, environmental standards, and competition policy.²³⁹ Brazil, however, supported a more leisurely approach instead of reaching to an agreement too quickly. Postponing the progress of the FTAA would lead Brazil to seek and develop other options (i.e. Mercosul) and would ultimately save the Brazilian domestic market from the States' unequal competitors. Another important reason to Brazil's reluctant attitude was Brazil's lack of estimating its role in the FTAA and its leadership (*a liderança do Brasil*) in the hemispheric trade. If the USA began to dominate the hemisphere, particularly in South America, Brazil could not realize its regional leadership goal.²⁴⁰ Hence, Brazil was pending the FTAA process in the Lula term.

The FTAA is more complex than just an economic agreement. It has become less easy to compete with the already treated US market, which is the only possible competitor of the Brazilian market.²⁴¹ In this direction, Amorim continuously criticized the US for having to give subsidies on agriculture and

²³⁷ Mônica Hirst and Andrew Hurrell, *The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 104.

²³⁸ In that time Latin American countries has more desire than the USA to join in free trade area, probably because of newly established NAFTA, the USA preferred the slow progress. See Alfred P. Montero, *Brazilian Politics: Reforming a Democratic State in a Changing World* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2005), p. 128.

²³⁹ Roberto Bouzas, "Mercosul's External Trade Negotiations: Dealing with a Congested Agenda," in *Mercosur Regional Integration, World Markets*, ed. Riordan Roett (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 81–93.

²⁴⁰ Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, pp. 83, 97; Montero, *Brazilian politics*, p.128; Maria Regina Soares de Lima, "Brazil's Alternative Vision," in *The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism*, ed. Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger, and Contributors (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 139- 143; Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, *Latin America in the New International System* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 110; Hélio Jaguaribe and Alvaro Vasconcelos, *The European Union, MERCOSUL, and the New World Order* (Routledge, 2003), p. 176.

²⁴¹ Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, *The European Union*, p.176; Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, p. 89.

exports, as well as their anti-dumping measures.²⁴² Ultimately, there was no vital interest for Brazil's participation in the FTAA's economic integration project. This created a risk for the US's economic and trade unilateralism since the US has always considered Latin America as an economic area of influence.²⁴³

The Brazilian government has been very cautious with regard to their use of language. This can be clearly deduced from their statement, "this (FTAA) should not be seen as an issue or ideological position for or against the United States, but as an instrument that may or may not serve the strategic interests of Brazil".²⁴⁴ Although Lula's position about the FTAA, defined by Vigevani and Cepaluni as "FTAA negotiation would only move forward if Brazilian demands were met",²⁴⁵ he has been in fact reluctant to integrate with the project and would much rather prefer Mercosul; which brings a more locomotive position instead of US's dominant influence concerning the FTAA.

Another critical economic issue in the bilateral relations is the production and marketing of Ethanol oil. In 2009, Brazil and the United States of America made up 89% of the world's ethanol fuel production.²⁴⁶ However, Brazil has an advantage about the ethanol production against the USA. Brazil has been developing bio-fuel industry since the 1980s and has been producing much more than its consumption. Additionally, Brazil's sugarcane-based ethanol production has a comparative advantage over the US's corn-based ethanol production, in terms of productivity.

In the area of Ethanol cooperation, Brazil had an affirmative partnership with the USA.²⁴⁷ In this direction, at the end of March 2007, an economic bilateral

²⁴² 'Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim Dispels FTAA Myths' *Financial Times*, 24 August, 2003. Cited in Russell Crandall and Britta Crandall, "Brazil: Ally or Rival," in *The United States and Latin America After the Cold War*, ed. Russell Crandall (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 154.

²⁴³ Jaguaribe and Vasconcelos, *The European Union*, p.197.

²⁴⁴ Cited in Paulo Roberto de Almeida, "A Política Externa do novo Governo do Presidente Luís Inácio Lula da Silva -- retrospecto histórico e avaliação programática. (Portuguese)," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* (December 2002): p. 234.

²⁴⁵ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, pp.96- 97.

²⁴⁶ "2010 Ethanol Industry Outlook: Climate of Opportunity," *Renewable Fuels Association*, February 16, 2010, http://www.ethanolrfa.org/page/-/objects/pdf/outlook/RFAoutlook2010_fin.pdf?nocdn=1.

²⁴⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy*, p.1320; Crandall, *Brazil: Ally or Rival*, pp.157-8.

relationship between Brazil and the USA witnessed a signed bio-fuels cooperation agreement called Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Ethanol was one of the central topics that determined two countries would make a bilateral and global strategic partnership to develop bio-fuels cooperation and related technologies in ethanol production.²⁴⁸ This was mainly a sort of request for the USA to reduce their dependency on the oil-rich Venezuela and to ‘decrease its addiction to oil’ in general.²⁴⁹ Under these circumstances, the CFR Task Force’s proposal is quite meaningful. It proposes that the United States build on its existing collaboration with Brazil regarding ethanol in order to develop a more consistent plan and broader partnership, which would evidentially incorporate a wide range of bilateral, regional and global issues.²⁵⁰ Currently, Barack Obama’s renewable energy priority (i.e. the clean energy law) proves that the energy collaboration between Washington and Brasília, which began with MOU, will go further in the short run.²⁵¹

3.5.2.2.2. Politics

The subject of politics is the only area that the president can easily display his/her individual effects among the other bilateral topics. Supposing Lula’s having different political approaches from the USA government, he tried to create a closer and deeper relationship with the White House. Such a close relationship, according to Matias Spekto, would solely be based on bargaining rather than a serious relationship. The project would be motivated by political ambitions and would be treated objectively such that it would vary throughout the bilateral

²⁴⁸ “Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels”, March 9, 2007,

<http://www.fundemun.org/biofuels%20Washington%20DC-Presidencia%20FUNDEMUN.pdf>.

²⁴⁹ Edmund Andrews and Larry Rohter, “U.S. and Brazil Seek to Promote Ethanol in West,” *The New York Times*, March 3, 2007,

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/03/business/worldbusiness/03ethanol.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=Bush%20Brazil%20ethanol&st=nyt&scp=1; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 95

²⁵⁰ Stephanie Hanson, “Brazil on the International Stage,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, July 21, 2009, p. 69, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19883/brazil_on_the_international_stage.html;

Immanuel Wallerstein, “The United States Misreads Brazil’s World Policy,” *Commentary*,

February 1, 2010, <http://www.iwallerstein.com/the-united-states-misreads-brazils-world-policy/>.

²⁵⁰ Will Petrik, “The Future of U.S.-Brazil Energy Relations: An Opportunity for Change, or More of the Same?,” *COHA Research Associate*, February 11, 2009, <http://www.coha.org/the-future-of-us-brazil-energy-relations-an-opportunity-for-change-or-more-of-the-same/>.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*

interaction.²⁵² Politically, the US has a clear agenda in Latin America. There are huge efforts exerted by the US to relive its heydays in South America, as during the Cold War years. Due to the focus of the US on the Middle East, particularly since the end of the Cold War, its influence on Latin America has relatively decreased. As a result, Brazil found a great occasion in the continent as a consequence of the US's Middle East priority. In such an environmental power gap, Brazil took advantage of the regional leadership and is ambitiously determined to preserve it. Furthermore, Brazil's active presence, particularly during Lula's tenure at presidency, would inevitably frustrate the US's supremacy in Latin America.²⁵³

Because of this rough and tumble competition, the Lula administration and Washington had different opinions about the issue of Venezuela's Chávez, as well as Colombia and Cuba.²⁵⁴ For instance, in regards to Columbia's civil conflict, Brazil encouraged negotiated resolutions, whereas the US promoted military intervention.²⁵⁵

It is certainly meaningful to state that from the beginning of Lula's office, an affirmative language has been observed as a medium of instructions between the bilateral relations.²⁵⁶ Yet "this is not course correction in foreign policy...exactly for having an autonomous and sovereign foreign policy", as Amorim claimed.²⁵⁷ Even so, two countries have kept themselves away from open clashes, as far as possible. Whilst Lula requesting the alternative partnership (south-south), simultaneously the Lula administration maintained the supposed 'good political relations' with the great powers.²⁵⁸ Politically, deepening relations with the developing countries and the European Union would increase the bargaining

²⁵² Cited in Carlos Haag, "An Alliance Without Progress: Research Shows the Difficulties of US-Brazil Relations," *Pesquisa*, June 2008, <http://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/?art=2228&bd=1&pg=1&lg=en>.

²⁵³ Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, p.98; Abraham Lowenthal, "Renewing Cooperation in the Americas," in *Shifting the Balance : Obama and the Americas*, ed. Abraham Lowenthal, Theodore J. Piccone, and Laurence Whitehead (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), pp. 3-5.

²⁵⁴ Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, p.34.

²⁵⁵ Pinheiro, "Celso Amorim: Right Man, Right Place, Right Time," p. 11; Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p. 104.

²⁵⁶ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p.xviii.

²⁵⁷ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy*, p.1320.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.1321.

power for Brazil, such that the asymmetric relations of the US would be in favor of Brazil.²⁵⁹

In my opinion, Lula and his foreign policy team will have a moderate claim on the place where the USA currently occupies within the regional and global context. In order to better comprehend Lula's stance toward the USA, the explanation of Lula's foreign policy adviser gives us some significant clues. He briefly expressed the standpoint of the Brazilian government stating, "those who do not accept it (the USA) are placed in the following position: either they submit or they remain in a position of virtual confrontation with the United States".²⁶⁰ In terms of ideological principles, the approximation between Brasília and Washington did not contradict with the leftist Brazilian government. Pinheiro Guimarães, former Secretary-General of foreign relations of ministry of foreign affairs (2003-2009), puts forward the assertion that the United States of America is and will be a country whose economic, social, cultural, technological and political influence in Brazil will be much more than in any other region.²⁶¹ Likewise, the White House cannot achieve its goals easily in South America, disregarding Brazil's regional weight. Consequently, according to Nick Burns, Washington "would like to develop a strategic political dialogue with Brazil; this is something we only have with four or five countries".²⁶²

At the end, the most determinant element regarding political relations between the two American states is an 'asymmetric power structure'.²⁶³ Brazil and the USA have a tendency to continue their relations under these circumstances, simply for the sake of their own regional and global strategic priorities.

3.5.2.2.3. Security Issues

²⁵⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p.98.

²⁶⁰ Cited in Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p.106.

²⁶¹ "Interview with Secretary- General of Foreign Relations, Ambassador, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães," *Valor Econômico*, July 14, 2008, <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/embaixador-samuel-pinheiro-guimaraes-neto/196885415555-entrevista-concedida-pelo-secretario-geral-das/print-nota.>]; David R. Mares, "Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: The Burden of the Past, the Hope for the Future," *Latin American Research Review* 29, no. 1 (January 1994): p. 233.

²⁶² Antonio de Aguiar, "Proceedings," in *New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations = Novos rumos nas relações exteriores brasileiras* ([Washington D.C.]: Brookings Institution; Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2007), p. 11.

²⁶³ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p.40.

Another critical subject for the bilateral relations is pertaining to the security issues. In general, neither Lula's term, nor Cardoso's taking of office; Brasília and Washington have not compromised on the same security concerns. Even so, it is quite difficult to classify the relations as bad, because of its complicated structure. In some area, for example, two American countries have cooperated successfully (eradication of narcotic drug, war on terrorism *etc.*); whereas they came eye to eye in some matters (The war in Iraq and possible military intervention in Colombia).

Thus, Brazil has always had suspicions about the USA's unilateral actions about the security issues. Particularly, Brazil had some doubts about the U.S. 'preemption doctrine'. The principle of "preemption seems to create as many problems as it seeks to resolve". To acquire international legitimacy it is necessary to agree with 'multilaterally negotiated approach' (the United Nations Security Council), according to Brazil's foreign policy tradition and customary international law.²⁶⁴ Therefore, the Lula government stayed away, or at the least kept a critical distance, from the unconditional full-scale support of security cooperation with the United States.²⁶⁵

Even with substantial disagreements about the Iraqi War (because of unilateral action), in general Brazil wanted to cooperate on combating the drug war and war against the terrorism (global security threats) during the Lula administrations.²⁶⁶ When we take into consideration the problem of using drugs in Brazilian-American society, exemplarily, the cooperation on combating drugs may have a reciprocal interest.²⁶⁷ Two American countries share the similar security concerns in this regard. Therefore, they have more reason to cooperate rather than clash on security issues.

²⁶⁴ "The Foreign Policy of the Lula Government , Lecture by Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil" (London School of Economics, 2004),

<http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/embaixador-celso-luiz-nunes-amorim/palestra-proferida-pelo-ministro-celso-amorim-na-Armatia-da-Cruz>, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva*, p. 22

²⁶⁵ Almeida, *A Política Externa do novo Governo do Presidente*, pp. 229- 239; Hirst, *Strategic Posture Review*, p.5.

²⁶⁶ Montero, *Brazilian politics*, pp. 131,133); Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p.103; Almeida, *A Política Externa do novo Governo do Presidente*, p.11; Armatia da Cruz, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva*, p.22; Hirst, *Strategic Posture Review*, p.5.

²⁶⁷ Lowenthal, *Renewing Cooperation in the Americas*, p.15.

One may rightfully ask that in the eyes of Washington, the strategic value of Brazil in international security is less when compared with the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries.²⁶⁸ It is true to some extent, yet Brasília's participation in the fight against combating narcotic drug trafficking and contribution to security issues could be valuable cooperation for the White House's regional policies, but on the other hand, the US's security initiatives have in turn, promoted stability in the region, which is one of the main purposes of Brazilian governments as well.

To conclude, according to the Lula administration, the USA was still the world's richest and biggest power. They believed that Washington needed to request new roles in South America with respect to Brazil's regional and global priorities and presence in South America. As President Lula comprehended clearly that, we are living in a world of interdependency. When the question for the US's role in Latin America was addressed to Lula, he responded saying, "I think that the US often looks at Latin America as it did in the 1970s, when it only saw armed struggle. It's over!"²⁶⁹ By virtue, a of new multi-polar world order, with states, such as Lula's Brazil), may create an alternative balance of power to diversify their relations, without alarming the other powerful states. During Lula's office, Brazil-US bilateral relations may provide some clues about his attitude toward the White House. The Lula administration, known as a leftist government, mostly pursued a 'pragmatic' type of foreign policy toward the United States of America, instead of an ideological one. Nevertheless, this (approximation) may not entitle the 'course correction' in Brazil's foreign policy, as Amorim stated before.²⁷⁰ Lastly, what Lula brought to Brazil's foreign policy (namely the relations with the USA) is institutionalizing the 'reciprocal respect and interest' principle into the bilateral relations.

²⁶⁸ Hirst, *The United States and Brazil*, p. 40

²⁶⁹ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "Interview with Brazil's President, Lula on His Legacy," *The Economist*, September 30, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17173762>. Also, see Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Barack Obama: El Tamaño de su desafío," *Colombia Internacional*, no. 69 (January 2009): pp. 215- 17.

²⁷⁰ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy*, p.1320.

3.5.2.3. The Relations with the Third World

If someone wants to describe the main axes of Lula's new foreign policy understanding, the relations with the so-called 'Third World'²⁷¹ should be highlighted as innovative elements in Brazil's foreign policy during his term.²⁷² Obviously, Brazil's relation with the 'Third World' countries had not started with President Lula, rather with FHC. However, there is an apparent distinction such that Cardoso's foreign policy was focused mainly on developed and industrialized countries, while Lula concentrated more on those that are called underdeveloped states.²⁷³ We can see the emphasis on the relations in the official oversea journeys (*deslocamentos*) for less developed countries (LDCs). For, because the official visits are significant in terms of reflection of their worldviews and national interest perceptions. FHC, during his two terms from 1995 to 2002 traveled 39 times to industrialized countries and 13 times to underdeveloped countries (*países menos desenvolvidos*); whereas Lula between 2003 and 2006 traveled to 30 developed countries as well as 34 times to developing or less developed countries.²⁷⁴

Here we shall make clear of the often-used concept of the 'Third World'. As it is well known, the concept came into existence during the Cold War,²⁷⁵ which was thought to have a pejorative meaning. However, I use the 'Third World' concept free from its historical usage. With that in mind, I much rather prefer using these terms: 'South-South relations', 'less-developed' and 'underdeveloped' countries, 'periphery', 'non-aligned nations', as euphemisms interchangeable to the 'Third World' concept.

²⁷¹ There are some debates about the Brazil's position whether it is Third World country or not. Because, though Brazil has a developed economy according to macro-economic indicators, it has, at the same, big problems (like poverty and income inequality), which mostly such problems observed in the Third World countries. Nevertheless, majority of academics does not call Brazil as Third World country.

²⁷² Elodie Bruni, "Why Brazilian Foreign Policy Towards the South May Continue After Lula?", November 2010, Mundorama edition, <http://mundorama.net/2010/11/13/why-brazilian-foreign-policy-towards-the-south-may-continue-after-lula-elodie-brun/>.

²⁷³ Alcides, *O Governo Lula: uma nova política exterior?*, p.15; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, pp. 89-90.

²⁷⁴ Seitenfus, *O Brasil e suas relações internacionais*, pp.143, 144.

²⁷⁵ Bernardo Kocher, "O Brasil no Terceiro Mundo- Análise da política externa brasileira entre 1955 e 1964" (presented at the annual meeting of the ISA - ABRI Joint international meeting, Pontifical Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro Campus (PUC-Rio), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 22, 2009), p. 2.

After the Lula administration came into office, Brazil expressed a very strong desire on the expansion of South-South relations.²⁷⁶ Firstly, I shall make it clear that Lula's *Terceiro Mundista*²⁷⁷ approach, regarding the Third World, is not only due to his leftist ideology it is also related to more practical concerns such as Brazil's two vital national interest priorities: Procedures such as the economic and trade policy, and multilateralism, with its economic, political and strategic aspects.²⁷⁸ Therefore, in order to realize some of his goals Lula undertook to be a spokesperson of the Third World.²⁷⁹ Different from the past, Lula's government created an alternative alliance with partners in the South-South relations.²⁸⁰

In order to understand the bilateral relations, it is essential to look at the international structure after the Cold War. Together with Brazil, there are a few emerging powers (BRICs or IBSA) who want to be more effective in world politics. Today's multi-polar world is different from the Cold War atmosphere. Therefore, there is a huge difference between the Cold War's (1960s) non-aligned movements (Bandung spirit), which existed as an alternative to the capitalist and socialist world (shift the clash of 'East-West' with 'North-South' conflict); and the strategic cooperation between the Third World states.²⁸¹ There is no doubt that the latter stages have had more effects on the international affairs than the first. This South-South relation forces to take a place in the global system in the areas of economic, political, and strategic affairs. I am not going to discuss the details, and advantages and disadvantages of multilateralism, but it is worthy to explore

²⁷⁶ Soares de Lima and Hirst, *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power*, p.35.

²⁷⁷ Surely, Lula's foreign policy understanding about the Third World countries definitely different from the 1960s 'Third Worldist' (*Terceiro Mundista*) approach and Third World mentality as opposition parties PSDB or Liberal Front party t) have accused of Lula. See for details Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p.88.

²⁷⁸ 'The PT had, over many years, the solidarity of developing nations, the values on non-aligned movements and looked for ties with Africa, middle east, east Asia'. Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 153; It also important to note that Lula's party (PT) 'defends autonomist vision of international relations' which FP independent from big powers. Cited in Bruni, "Why Brazilian Foreign Policy Towards the South May Continue After Lula?"; Almeida, *Lula's Foreign Policy*, p.172; Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy*, p.1316.

²⁷⁹ Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, p. 97; Gill, "Brazil's Foreign Policy: Actors and Institutions".

²⁸⁰ Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini and Analúcia Danilevicz Pereira, "The African Policy of Lula's Government", n.d., <http://www6.ufrgs.br/nerint/folder/artigos/artigo61.pdf>; Almeida, *Lula's Foreign Policy*, p.172.

²⁸¹ Mark Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (2004): p. 9.

Lula's direction in developing ties with the global south and coincidentally, it is one of the multilateral pillars in Brazil's foreign policy.

The basis of existence regarding Lula's Third World emphasis can be realized through diminishing foreign vulnerabilities (becoming not dependent on/less dependence to the North-the USA and the European countries) and by diversification of areas of interests in a broader sense. From the beginning of his taking of office, he attempted to accomplish some strategic changes in world issues by establishing southern alliances (alternative to developed North) in order to become equal -at least stronger- interlocutors with the powerful North.²⁸² The important contribution of Lula's Brazil for developing strategic cooperation with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and IBSA Forum (India, Brazil, South Africa) countries can be clearly understood from his quest to discover new alternatives to "construction of a new international architecture".²⁸³ In the context of a new quest in the world system composition, Brazil's permanent seat effort for UNSC, especially during the Lula administration, has forced Brazil to develop new strategic alliances; not only from the permanent members of UNSC and developed states, but also from less-developed, Third World countries.

In the economic realm, strong relations with the Third World countries that would help Brazil's foreign policy goals in areas such as foreign trade and economic development, will in turn diminish external vulnerabilities, and at the same time, improve living conditions.²⁸⁴ The Lula administration believed that the amount of southern countries (or Third World countries) trading, signifies an important role in world trade. Both the president and the foreign minister, made clear in their speeches that their intent is to create southern economic strategic allies in order to constitute the 'new world trade geography', which is based on South-South commodity exchanges versus unequal and dependent transactions

²⁸² Harris, "Emerging Third World Powers," p. 21.

²⁸³ "About IBSA," *IBSA Trilateral Official Website*, n.d., <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/>; "BRIC wants more influence," *Euronews*, June 16, 2009, <http://www.euronews.net/2009/06/16/bric-wants-more-influence/>.

²⁸⁴ Cited in Arimatia da Cruz, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio 'Lula' da Silva*, p.16; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília"; "Remarks Following Discussions with President Luiz I. da Silva of Brazil in Brasilia".

with the Northern industrialized states.²⁸⁵ In spite of the industrialized economies, Brazil acquires a ‘potential leverage’ with a flexible negotiation environment.²⁸⁶ Additionally, Third World countries offer an open market for Brazil’s good and services. We can easily say that Brazil’s efforts to develop ties with the southern world resulted in a change of direction for the Brazilian exports. In 2009, 56% of the Brazilian commodities were exported to developing countries, while in 2002 only 20% went to developing countries.²⁸⁷ Brazil, like other economically developing countries such as China, India, and South Africa, began to export technology, and other services to underdeveloped countries.²⁸⁸

The attitudes of Lula about the ‘Third World’ dramatically changed during his office. When he was in opposition, he was emphasizing, in the PT’s structure, the relations based more on solidarity and ideological notions. But it was not easy to defend such solidarity and ideological arguments in the government. As a government, you are responsible to support all citizens (without any political, social and ideological discrimination) and national interests. Coincidentally, Lula took such a path in his term advocating that each nation has its own interests and its own way of doing things and that particular state. What Lula did wisely in his tenure is describing the relations with the Third World countries. Brazil’s national interests and priorities, contrary to the previous governments, have not been neglected and preferred to developing strong relations with developed countries instead.²⁸⁹ This is not less significant or important than the policies that were based just on solidarity and ideology. In this regard, it is worthy to remember that Brazil’s President Lula made a final visit to Africa.²⁹⁰ As a matter of fact, the diplomats in the ministry of foreign affairs were not familiar with such a foreign policy perception, that enabled Lula and his team to carry out diplomacy with non-traditional partners. On Brazil’s account for putting more emphasis on the institutionalization of its political, economic, and trade, as well as its security

²⁸⁵ Almeida, *Lula’s Foreign Policy*, p.172; Amorim, *Brazil’s Multilateral Diplomacy*; Peixoto Prado, *A Política Externa do Primeiro Governo Lula*, p. 60.

²⁸⁶ Mullins, *In the Shadows of General*, p.97.

²⁸⁷ Cited in Bruni, “Why Brazilian Foreign Policy Towards the South May Continue After Lula?”.

²⁸⁸ Visentini and Pereira, *The African Policy of Lula*, p.7.

²⁸⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 95; Almeida, *Lula’s Foreign Policy*, p.173.

²⁹⁰ Pablo Uchoa, “Brazil’s President Lula Makes Final Visit to Africa,” *BBC News*, November 9, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11717757>.

relations with less developed countries, it has indeed succeeded about bringing the reduction of economic and power asymmetries.

To sum up then, the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2002 heralded the beginning of Brazil's new foreign policy in the sense of the bilateral relations. After Lula assumed presidency, he made serious efforts to improve the relations between the Latin American states, the US, and the Third World countries. Here I have discussed some efforts by Lula in the context of bilateral relations. Apart from my previous evaluation, it is necessary to put the findings together in order to get a summative assessment about the relations. Initially, Brazil's attitude about Latin America has contained in itself some differences. Yet, Latin America was and still is defined as *lebensraum* for Brazil. Brazil therefore pursued South America's regional integration as *sine qua non* objective of its foreign policy. Specifically, in spite of Lula's bilateral relations with Latin American states, he paved the way for new opportunities (at a global level) in the country's external objectives. His friendly attitude toward some Left leaning leaders including, Bolivia's Evo Morales, Cuba's Fidel Castro, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, was criticized by media and opposition parties. Together with the continuity of Brazil's traditional foreign policy, there were also some elements that had brought the foreign policy in accordance with the 'Lula effect'. Virtually in each of the three countries' case, we can readily see the implementation of Lula's personal dedication over the relations. Otherwise, for example, we cannot exactly understand the Lula administration's amicable relations with Cuba despite the considerable controversy among the domestic, inclusive of media and opposition, and international groups, with Lula's governments. Also, the complex (in comparison to other Latin American states) relations with Venezuela (Chávez) may need to be explained from a different perspective. The study then turns its focus on the relations with the United States of America. Lula's foreign policy is roughly divided into three topics: economics, politics and security considerations. The Brasília-Washington bilateral relations have escalated the tensions between them, particularly those issued regarding economic (FTAA), political and security priorities. Significantly, all of the main disagreements between the parties were discussed within the borders of mutual respect, without the presence of an oppositional discourse.

We can conclude this section with a brief reminder of Lula's Third World politics. Brazil's foreign policy with the Third World states cannot be understood unless the comprehension of Brazil's international ambitions is taken into account. The role of President Lula, speaking as the voice of the Third World, was a possible reference to reducing economic and power asymmetries in the western-centered global system alongside the country's search for a permanent seat in the Security Council. If we take all these items together, we can conclude that the Lula administration tried to develop the bilateral relations with some states as an individual will and attempt. Lula sometimes stressed the historical close ties and solidarity in all his relations, although he more often highlighted the national interests of his country.

3.5.3. Brazil's Posture in the United Nations with regard to the Global Problems Sustaining an Unjust International System

No international norms or institutions can easily create a strong shift in power unless a big world event, such as a war, takes place. It is the fact that international norms and institutions have been adopted in modern times by the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, the League of Nations, in 1919, the United Nations, in 1945 *etc.*, except the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It means, we are still living in a world where its norms and global institutional structures are constituted (by the victors of war) under the circumstances of the Second World War,²⁹¹ (though in today's world realities are quite different compared to the 1940s and has changed significantly since post-Second World War). Ironically, the new reality of the post-cold war issue has been intentionally ignored by the 'great powers', especially by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. There has practically not been any notable attempt to quest for a new order that would bring about peace and stability throughout the world, as the *raison d'être* of the United Nations.

Indeed, a few countries have truly expressed their dissatisfaction about the current international system. With Brazil being one of them, they consider the

²⁹¹ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p.161.

reason for the currently emerging problems, is without a doubt related to the unjust world system. Lula, being the President of Brazil, believed that states could not resolve newly arisen issues with outdated structures.²⁹² The Brazilian government also argued that the unjust global world should only be changed by the UN initiative. This is because the UN is the only global platform that has 192 member states and supposedly represents the common sense of the humanity in the world. Nevertheless, there are many deficiencies regarding its structure and function. President Lula stated, “The United Nations General Assembly has been and must continue to be the great forum for general debate on humankind’s major problems”.²⁹³ It is for this reason that I have preferred to elaborate the case of the UN rather than other international or intergovernmental organizations. In this last section I will highlight some standpoints of Brazil’s foreign policy (Lula’s government), toward the United Nations. I will primarily be focusing on Lula’s discourses, or his representatives, at the UN General Assembly as well as Brazil’s course of actions at the UN Security Council. Moreover, I also concentrate on Brazil’s posture in the UN with regard to global problems sustaining an unjust international system and western hegemony over the organization. I anticipate, in so doing, that Brazil’s posture against the global problems may provide us with a concrete detail about Lula governments’ ideological pattern analysis. To accomplish that, I have discussed several global challenges that Lula emphasized more during his term. These are international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapon, in addition to poverty and hunger. It is worth highlighting, however, that I have given particular importance to primary sources, such as Lula’s speeches delivered in the United Nations General Assembly Debates (UNGA) in New York between 2003-2011 years. In addition to the Assembly discourses, my focus also covers the UN Security Council meeting records throughout 2004, 2005 and 2010. Also noteworthy, Brazil was given a non-permanent seat under the Lula administration during those respective years.

²⁹² “Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, September 19, 2006. <http://www.un.org>.

²⁹³ “Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, President of The Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, September 23, 2009.

3.5.3.1. The United Nations General Assembly

The debates in the UN General Assembly are very crucial to analyze any particular state's position in the international arena since the Assembly is considered a great forum for general debate regarding the people. The states have an equal opportunity to discuss the considerable amount of global and regional problems. The state leaders discuss the issues that they consider to be vital, and share their opinions amongst international leaders regarding global issues. For Brazil, being the world's largest multilateral podium, the UN General Assembly, is the best tool to overcome current international challenges in addition to promoting peace and social justice throughout the member states.²⁹⁴ Without a doubt, this belief originates from Brazil's respect to multilateralism in world politics.²⁹⁵

Although the UN, according to Lula, is the "highest expression of an international order based on the independence of nations",²⁹⁶ there are many drawbacks in the organization. In this direction, the UN reform has been talked about for years and its members, including administrative reform and establishment of both Peace Building Commission and the Human Rights Council, took some initial steps.²⁹⁷ Nevertheless, according to Lula, more reforms have become an urgent necessity for the UN in order to be more active regarding global challenges. Otherwise, such restricted reform tasks will be incomplete without having any structural changes implemented, nor the strengthening of the General Assembly's leverage.²⁹⁸ Since the forming of governing states in Brazil, it no longer has a distinguished representation as it did sixty-five years ago.

²⁹⁴ "Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations", September 23, 2008; "Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the General Debate of the 62th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations", September 25, 2007; "Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations", 23 September 2008.

²⁹⁵ Seitenfus, *O Brasil e suas relações internacionais*, p.130.

²⁹⁶ "Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

²⁹⁷ Seitenfus, *O Brasil e suas relações internacionais*, pp. 130-136.

²⁹⁸ "Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

3.5.3.2. The United Nations Security Council

*Today's structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today's world.*²⁹⁹

In the aftermath of the Cold War, many states in the world, especially newly emerged middle powers, have questioned the structure and the future of the UN Security Council. Accordingly, there have been hot debates on the UNSC reform among the members of the UN. Since the UNSC is, still the only organ on the Planet that has been authorized to permit the use of force.³⁰⁰ Nevertheless, I have no interest in discussing the reform discussions, because of my priorities, which try to reveal the main approach of the Lula government(s) toward the UNSC composition.³⁰¹

I think the question of “why the Brazilian (Lula) government made the issue one of the priorities of its foreign policy agenda?” is more important in trying to understand the Brazil’s main perception on the UNSC. Despite the many reasons, for me, Brazil’s desire for being a global actor is the most salient one among the others; and current composition of the UNSC conflicts with Brazil’s main foreign policy principle, which is multilateralism. According to President Lula, ‘multilateralism is the international face of democracy’.³⁰² It means that Brazil had an opinion of ‘new institutions of global governance’ model in the UN (notably the Council) to deal with international disputes.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

³⁰⁰ ‘The Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out. Under the Charter, all Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to Governments, the Council alone has the power to take decisions which Member States are obligated under the Charter to carry out’. See more details, “About the Council,” Official, *UNSC Home Page*, n.d., <http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp>.

³⁰¹ Demétrio Magnoli, “Política externa,” in *O Brasil no contexto, 1987-2007*, ed. Jaime Pinsky (São Paulo SP: Editora Contexto, 2007), pp. 53, 59.

³⁰² Cited in “Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the Opening of the General Debates of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”, September 17, 2005.

³⁰³ Celso Amorim, “The Soft-Power Power,” interview by Susan Glasser, *Foreign Policy*, n.d., http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_soft_power_power?page=full.

Democratization of the UNSC is the main discussion point among the reform advocates, including Brazil.³⁰⁴ In the eyes of the Brazilian government, the Council that is the most important executive power in the world has been determining the global decisions according to the interest of a handful of traditional powers (China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States).

Of course, there are some obstacles towards realizing Brazil's (and others) project of the reformation in the UN since permanent members can resist the reform project, which might be harmful to their interests.³⁰⁵ Lula's foreign minister expressed Brazil's suffering point clearly in his statement: "In the economic and environmental areas, the wealthiest nations have already understood that they cannot do without the cooperation of emerging countries, when it comes to war and peace, however, the traditional players are reluctant to share power", he said.³⁰⁶ That Brazil has a critical position about the Council's decision-making process is obvious.

Secondly, there is a problem of representation in the UNSC in Brazil's view. It does not represent the reality of recent World composition. Brazil calls reform in the UNSC permanent membership for representation of developing countries. The clearest expression of that (representation) problem can be found in the interview made with the Brazilian foreign minister. He says, "developing countries must be there (the UNSC), India must be there, an African country must be there, and I think a South American country or a Latin American country must be there. And the name of Brazil occurs naturally..."³⁰⁷ Brazil argues that it is not possible to resume the council; its working methods have a problem of 'transparency'; and it allows the traditional powers to bargain 'behind closed doors issues that concern

³⁰⁴ "The Permanence of the Permanent Seat," *Revista Pesquisa FAPES*, no. 160 (June 2009), <http://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/?art=2477&bd=1&pg=1&lg=en>.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁶ "Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the Opening of the General Debates of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

³⁰⁷ "Entrevista concedida pelo Ministro das Relações Exteriores, Embaixador Celso Amorim, ao programa de rádio "The Interview", da BBC", Davos, Switzerland, 23 January, 2007. Cited in <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br>.

all mankind for as long as they wish'.³⁰⁸ Instead, according to the Brazilian argument, having a permanent seat at the table (or active presence there) obviously provides a considerable opportunity for developing countries to express their ideas and problems.³⁰⁹

In order to better see Brazil's position in the UN and gather concrete findings, I now move the discussion into the global challenges debates.

3.5.3.3. Global Problems

No political agents, national or international, can properly be understood unless we trace the certain rules of conduct that agents go through. When we take the states (as global agents) into consideration, however, we might say that it is crucial to understand the state leaders' political opinion. A close look at their behavior regarding the global questions would provide us with some very significant information to discuss. On which issues do they bring or call the attention of the global agenda, and how do they react, when it comes to practice? These are some of the questions that I will investigate the Brazilian posture in order to analyze the country's role against the international challenges.

There have been some global disputes that Brazil has emphasized on the global platform (not limited by the UN) throughout the eight years of the Lula

³⁰⁸ "Brazil Affirms UN's Primacy in International Politics," *UN News Center*, September 23, 2010, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36084&Cr=brazil&Cr1=.Amorim>, "The Soft-Power Power".

³⁰⁹ Without doubt, there are many other problems about the Security Council structure, but I just focus on two most significant of them (decision-making process and representation). For more details, see Edward Luck, "Blue Ribbon Power: Independent Commissions and UN Reform," *International Studies Perspectives* 1, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 89-104; Kevin Clements, *The Center Holds: UN Reform for 21st Century Challenges* (New Brunswick N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2008); Thomas Weiss, "The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform," *Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (September 9, 2003): 147-161; *The UN in Transition: Change and Reform Over the First 60 Years and Beyond: A Speech by the Deputy-Secretary-General of the United Nations, 9 November 2005*. (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 2005); Hong Nguyen, *Reform of The United Nations Security Council - A Requirement of The Times* (Lunds universitet/Juridiska institutionen, 2004); Anna-Linn Persson, *Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Communitarianism versus Cosmopolitanism* (Lunds universitet/Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2005); Yehuda Blum, "Proposals for UN Security Council Reform," *American Journal of International Law* 99, no. 3 (2005): p. 632; Dimitris Bourantonis, *The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform: The Case for Adjustment in the Post-Cold War Era* (Milton Park Abingdon Oxfordshire; New York: Routledge, 2005).

governments. International military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons, poverty and hunger, social inclusion, human rights, global warming, terrorism and unilateralism are some of these major problems. However, in this work, there is no attempt to list all of these problems. Instead I have just studied the first three mentioned, which are more significant to see Lula's leftist view than others.

3.5.3.4. International Military Aggression

A close look at the record of the Left reveals that leftist ideology has a non-affirmative stance against the military aggression. This is also valid for Brazil. For the last 140 years,³¹⁰ Brazil has not been involved in any military aggression (war) with its ten neighbors and other areas of the world. The non-aggression principle is considered as one of the main resign of Brazil's state tradition. Instead of implementing 'hard power', Brazil has used the 'soft power' instruments (e.g. diplomacy and persuasion) as a medium of conflict resolution.

During the two Lula governments, Brazil had a strong opposition to any kind of military aggression. When it comes to military invasion, however, the USA instance is a good indicator to evaluate Brazil's attitude on military aggression. It is discussed in a comprehensive way in the previous pages (in Brazil-USA bilateral relations) that Brazil has not approved the USA's unilateral military aggressions (invasion) to Iraq and abstained from the unconditional support of military alignment with the USA- government;³¹¹ and lessened its backing of the USA in the UN General Assembly about the military aggression proposals.³¹² The Lula government certainly advocated that without 'multilaterally negotiated approach' (referring the United Nations Security Council) all the aggressions would be illegitimate according to customary international law.³¹³ That is the

³¹⁰ The last Brazil's war (against Uruguay) existed in the years of 1864- 1870. Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. xv.

³¹¹ Brazil has guardedly supported the war of Afghanistan in 2001, due to its legal basis. Although, in reality, it is the USA- led war (invasion), the UNSC authorized (more than two months after) the establishment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to take all necessary measures. See more details about the UNSC, S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001).

³¹² Stephanie Kage, "New Powers for Global Change: Brazil at the UN," *FES Fact Sheet*, October 2006.

³¹³ Almeida, *A Política Externa do novo Governo do Presidente*, pp. 229- 239; Hirst, *Strategic Posture Review*, p.5; "The Foreign Policy of the Lula Government", Lecture by Ambassador Celso

clearest evidence (to understand Lula's posture) that he did not approve the international military aggression while he was in office. It is also crucially important to note that he argued the necessity of the UNSC resolution for the possible intervention, even though he had a critical position against the composition of the UNSC. This is because such unilateral actions have a negative effect due to the weakening of the United Nations and the principle of multilateralism.³¹⁴ For example, immediately after the start of military action in Iraq, the UNSC held debates on Iraq (by the requests of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement), where speakers called for a halt to the aggression and an immediate withdrawal of the USA troops, and the Brazilian representative, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, stated that Brazil very much deplored the military action in Iraq having occurred without the express authorization (permission) of the Council.³¹⁵

Brazil's foreign policy towards Middle East issues have already begun to change and much attention has dramatically been drawn to the region in the late 1990s. As a natural consequence of this interest, Brazil had to be involved in the Palestine-Israel disputes, which has been an unsolved case since the establishment of the Israeli state. In this respect, the Lula administration believed that there has been a military aggression to Palestine since the establishment of Israeli state. Therefore, Brazil, as non-permanent member of the UNSC, voted in favor of the draft that "demands the immediate cessation of all military operations in the area of Northern Gaza (Palestine) and the withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces from that area",³¹⁶ despite the USA vote against demanding an end to Israeli military offensive in Gaza in the Council debates. Brazil has always defined the Israeli act of aggression as illegal, and from time to time, according to official documents, strongly urged Israel to suspend its unlawful military actions against

Amorim, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil"; Arimatia da Cruz, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inácio "Lula" da Silva*, p. 22.

³¹⁴ Alcides Costa Vaz, *O Governo Lula: uma nova política*, p.14; Arimatia da Cruz, *Brazil's Foreign Policy under Luis Inacio "Lula" da Silva*, p.23.

³¹⁵ "Secretary-General Says Council Must Rediscover Its Unity of Purpose", Security Council 4726th Meeting (PM), Press Release SC/7705, 2003; "The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait Letter dated 24 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council", Security Council, 4726th Meeting, 26 March 2003, pp. 7-8.

³¹⁶ "Security Council Fails To Adopt Text Demanding End To Israeli Military Offensive In Gaza" Security Council, 5051st Meeting (PM), Press Release SC/8207, 05/10/2004.

the Palestinian people,³¹⁷ despite the significant economic relations Brazil has with Israel and the protecting power role of the USA to the Israeli state. With respect to Lula proposal for solution, like many, the Middle East crisis (as a long-lasting international crisis) should be resolved only by peaceful means and negotiations.³¹⁸

Palestine issue has been brought prominently into the foreign policy agenda by Lula, because it has been a lasting and chronic international dispute for nearly sixty years at least, and serving the interests of ‘some’ states. The large number of Middle Eastern people lives in Brazil. Moreover, the Lula government is keenly aware of the fact that, you cannot be a politically and strategically big power, if you do not engage in Middle East questions. After all, we can partially interpret Lula’s non-aggression foreign policy by remembering his leftist background (Lula effect) and considering Brazil’s foreign policy legacy.

3.5.3.5. Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons

There are number of contentious issues that Lula undertook after being elected. One of the most important issues is disarmament and³¹⁹ nuclear weapon matters. Brazil, under Lula presidency, committed to avoiding possession and developing nuclear weapons and spending too much money for military purposes.³²⁰ Lula did not develop nuclear weapons and was less admired for it. He always supported the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty while in tenure.³²¹ Actually, this had been the case during all previous governments. Since Brazil’s current constitution clearly prohibits the “development of nuclear arms and their presence on Brazilian territory”, it commits the use of nuclear power only for peaceful ends.³²²

³¹⁷ “Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting In Civilian Deaths During Israeli Operation Against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls For Investigation, In Presidential Statement” Security Council 6325th & 6326th Meetings, SC/9940, 31 May 2010.

³¹⁸ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Discurso do Senhor Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão de posse, no Congresso Nacional, em Brasília”, 42- 43.

³¹⁹ For more details about disarmament, see Melissa Gillis, *Disarmament: A Basic Guide* (New York: United Nations, 2009).

³²⁰ Stephanie Kage, *New Powers for Global Change*; William Barr, *Brazil Alert*, (no page); Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States”; Sennes, *The Brazilian Foreign Policy*.

³²¹ “Latin America’s New Alliances: Whose side is Brazil On?,” *The Economist*, August 13, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/14214011>.

³²² Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (1988), Article 21 Paragraph XXIII/a.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970) has three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (to which Brazil became a signatory in 1995).³²³ It is a fundamental legal document that the Brazilian state's policy adhered to through limiting its proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It must be made clear that disarmament regarding the Brazilian case does not mean a removal of all weaponry it owns or eliminating it totally (it is not a realistic idea granting the nature of states),³²⁴ including conventional arms; it means that the state has some military power that is “essential for any state as long as the nation-state exists”. Nonetheless Lula's foreign policy administration believed that “military power will be less and less usable in a way that these other abilities” (e.g. negotiations) will be more functional.³²⁵

Lula and his diplomats, for Amorim, did influential work on the risk of weapons of mass destruction and dismantling existing arsenals of all such weapons, in order to achieve a truly secured world.³²⁶ Lula's diplomatic efforts on disarmament lasted until the last days of his office. For instance, in the Conference on Disarmament (19 January 2010), the Brazilian delegation argued that their country committed to maintain the process of the Conference on

³²³ Ironically, Lula criticized the government (FHC) for signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1998), whereas he repeatedly uttered that Brazil has no intention to produce nuclear weapons. When he came to power, he supported the treaty conditionally. This is because the treaty divides, for Amorim, the world between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ is unfair. For more details, See “Statement by Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim” (presented at the 8th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), New York: United Nations, 2010); Russe and Britta Crandall, *Brazil: Ally or Rival*, p.159.

³²⁴ Gillis, *Disarmament*, p. 8.

³²⁵ Azambuja, *A Brazilian Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament*, p. 13; Glasser, *The Soft-Power Power*.

³²⁶ “Discurso de Sua Excelência Embaixador Celso Amorim, Ministro Das Relações Exteriores da República Federativa do Brasil, na Abertura do Debate Geral da 65 A Sessão da Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas”, September 23, 2010; “Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, President of The Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”; “Statement by His Excellency Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the Opening of the General Debates of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”.

Disarmament, which has an “ultimate goal of nuclear and general disarmament through negotiations”.³²⁷

The point that Lula brought to our attention, in the Brazilian context, is that Brazil has no such luxury (armament), despite her vital problems such as poverty and unequal income distribution. Of course, this was not the only point. Alongside its crucial problems, Brazil’s relations with her neighbors determine its disarmament policy, since Brazil is a country that has no actual or potential rivals and adversaries in South American continent.³²⁸ Admittedly, it is usually an imminent threat that triggers states to develop nuclear weapons and spend a huge amount of money on armaments. That is why Brazil is one of the exceptional states, which has the lowest per capita spending on the military expenditures both in the region and in the world.³²⁹ Thereby, we should clarify that the Lula government was committed to disarmament, not only because he was pacifist and had a leftist ideology, which opposes the military aggression, but also because Brazil’s traditional foreign policy had a mission of world disarmament.

Before we end our disarmament and nuclear weapons discussion, I should note one complaint regarding Brazil and disarmament, which is more related to the hegemony of some western states above international organizations. For instance, on 17 May 2010, Brazil, as non-permanent member, made serious effort to convince Iran about the nuclear fuel exchange with the *Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil*.³³⁰ On the other hand, there are a growing number of states beyond Brazil argue that Iran has a legal right to the realization of her nuclear

³²⁷ To see more details about Lula governments’ disarmament policies see, “Statement By His Excellency Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil,” in *1185th Plenary Meeting* (presented at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 2010); Celso Amorim, “Menaces and Promises – Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament and the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy”, n.d., http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/nppcon2009/2009npc_amorim.pdf; “Statement by head of the delegation of Brazil, Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares” (presented at the Second session of the Preparatory Committee 8th Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, 2008), [http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/Brazil%20\(modified\).pdf](http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/Brazil%20(modified).pdf).

³²⁸ Azambuja, *A Brazilian Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament*, p.5.

³²⁹ According to official SIPRI’s 2010 data, Brazil’s military expenditure is \$27.1 billion. See for more details at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford University Press, 2010); Almeida, *Lula’s Foreign Policy*, p.177.

³³⁰ The Declaration of Text Available at <http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/32479.pdf>.

rights (enrich uranium) for peaceful purposes under the NPT.³³¹ In fact, this argument irritated the Security Council permanent members (including, the USA and Russia). What Lula actually claimed was that “it is more difficult for those who have nuclear weapons to ask others not to develop them”.³³² He implied the double-standard reactions of the traditional powers. They (the SC members), according to the Brazilian claim, see the world just through the lens of their interests and therefore, the permanent members of the Council proved (with their various statements) that they have no intention to negotiate with Iran.³³³ Moreover, in this process, the Brazilian authorities accused the permanent members with ‘zero transparency at the technical level’. Indeed, non-permanent members (including Brazil and Turkey) found an opportunity to follow up the matter of the new draft on sanctions against Iran through the media.³³⁴ At the end, when Iran accepted the terms of the agreement, the US and allies were surprised with the decision of Iran, said Amorim.³³⁵ Here, in this case, it is obvious that P5+1 (Five Permanent members and Germany) countries have the strong belief that they are only ‘legitimate’ powers to control and decide about (monopoly) the nuclear matters without considering any affirmative initiatives of non-permanent members. Therefore, the Brazilian and Turkish initiative was unexpected by P5+1 countries and they were caught unprepared by Brazil’s and Turkey’s move.

Indeed, the issue of western (mostly developed countries) hegemony over international organizations, notably in the UNSC, mostly keeps Brazil from its contributive efforts that aimed at dealing with the global problems. It is well-known that global challenges should only be eradicated by powerful authorities.

³³¹ Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, “Brazil’s Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns,” *WMD Insights*, March 2008,

http://www.wmdinsights.com/I18/I18_LA1_BrazilFundsNavy.htm; “Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran,” *WMD Insights*, August 2006, http://www.wmdinsights.com/I7/I7_LA1_BraziliznNuclear.htm.

³³² ‘Al Jazeera Interview with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’, Al Jazeera YouTube channel, 18 May 2010. Available at www.youtube.com. Cited in Eduardo Fujii and Sarah Diehl, “Brazil Challenges International Order by Backing Iran Fuel Swap,” *NTI*, July 15, 2010.

³³³ Sergio Leo, “EUA Ameaçam Brasil Por Ação Contra Sanção Ao Irã,” *Valor Econômico*, June 10, 2010; Assis Moreira, “Nem os Aliados de Ahmadinejad Confiam Nele, Reconhece Lula,” *Valor Econômico*, May 21, 2010.

³³⁴ “UN Security Council Outdated,” *The News*, June 22, 2010, http://www.thenews.com.pk/blog/blog_details.asp?id=678.

³³⁵ “Vitória da Conversa Amistosa,” *Jornal do Brasil*, May 23, 2010.

Nonetheless, none of the permanent Security Council members, according to Lula, gives a signal for extending the Council structure.³³⁶

³³⁶ Fujii and Diehl, “Brazil Challenges International Order by Backing Iran Fuel Swap”.

3.5.3.6. Poverty and Hunger

If, at the end of my term of office, all Brazilians can have three meals a day, I will have fulfilled my mission in life” (Fragment of the first speech of the President-elect delivered on 20/10/2002)³³⁷

While campaigning in 2002, Lula brought special attention to poverty in Brazil. In fact, this is not usual for traditional election campaigning in Brazil. Though previous governments had taken some initiatives, this was the first time in the country that poverty was the only critical and central theme during election process and the term of Lula’s office. During Lula’s tenure as president of Brazil, he made poverty one of the priorities of his governments’ agenda.

As Meiman and Rothkopf stated, “Brazil’s endemic poverty and inequality have, until recently, not been significantly affected by the government’s social programs”.³³⁸ And Lula was one of the people who strongly believed that Brazil was not a poor country, but it had many poor people.³³⁹ This diagnosis is important (but not enough) to cut the Gordian knot of poverty in Brazil. Then, however, as Bourne asked “If the country is so rich in resources, why are so many of Brazilian (sic) poor?”³⁴⁰ Is there a dilemma or incompatibility here? No, it is not. I think this belief has a strong justification in the case of Brazil. For majority of analysts, poverty question (notably in the Northeast of the country), is the outcome of the longstanding issue, that is, profound social inequalities.

It should also be noted that the existence of the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome -MDS*) itself exhibits the gravity of the problem in Brazil. For some, Brazil is obviously one of the countries in the globe that has the greatest inequality in the sharing of income and wealth.³⁴¹

³³⁷ “The Brazilian Fome Zero Strategy,” *Coleccion Regional- FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean*, October 2009, <http://www.rlc.fao.org/es/paises/pdf/fomezero.pdf>.

³³⁸ Peter J. Mayer, *Brazil-U.S. Relations* (Congressional Research Service, September 7, 2010), p.8.

³³⁹ Haddad, “A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy?”, p. 192.

³⁴⁰ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p.170

³⁴¹ In addition to that, according to former president, Cardoso, Brazil ‘is not an underdeveloped country, it is an unfair country’. See more details, Aldo Ferrer, “Globalisation, Argentina and

The Lula governments' combating poverty and hunger policy may roughly be divided into two parts: projects for eradicating poverty at national and international levels. According to this structure, Lula governments pursued the different roads to overcome hunger and poverty. The Lula governments developed some welfare programs and, applied them inside the country in order to reduce poverty (e.g. *Fome Zero and Bolsa Família*).³⁴² However, I pay much attention to his efforts on combating poverty and hunger primarily as global problems, in the international arena. In this regard, the General Assembly is the most prominent stage in the world to discuss a poverty problem with his counterparts. Whenever Lula addressed to the Assembly, without exception, he always stressed the poverty problem together with hunger in the globe.

While Lula addressed the world leaders in General Assembly, he also pointed out the importance of balanced distribution of wealth (internationally and domestically) for salvation of humanity's common heritage. His main idea about the issue was there is no perpetual peace, without progressively decreasing inequality.³⁴³

The first time Lula took the floor at General Assembly rostrum (2003), he stressed the challenges of hunger and poverty in the world. He said, "The eradication of hunger in the world is a moral and political imperative. And we all

Mercosul," in *Mercosur Regional Integration, World Markets*, ed. Riordan Roett, trans. Mrs. Alicia Semino (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 140.

³⁴² *Fome Zero (Zero Hunger* in English,) was launched by the president Silva (in 2003) in order to exterminate hunger and extreme poverty. *Bolsa Família (Family Grant*, in English), is a part of the Brazilian governmental "welfare state" program. It provides cash assistance grant (vary according to poverty level and number of children) to poor and indigenous Brazilian families providing that the children must go school. According to, Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome -MDS*) data, currently (September, 2010) 12.718.608 Brazilian Families have benefited from the Family Grant. See more details, Edmund Amann and Werner Baer, "The Macroeconomic Record of the Lula Administration, the Roots of Brazil's Inequality, and Attempts to Overcome Them," in *Brazil Under Lula: Economy, Politics, and Society Under the Worker-President*, ed. Werner Baer and Joseph Love (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 42; Haddad, "A Spatial Analysis of Bolsa Família: Is Allocation Targeting the Needy?," pp. 187-203; Monte Reel, "Cash Aid Program Bolsters Lula's Reelection Prospects: Incentives for Families To Help Themselves Spread Beyond Brazil," *Washington Post*, October 29, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/28/AR2006102800823.html?nav=rss_world/southamerica.

³⁴³ "Statement by H.E. Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly"; "Statement by H.E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the General Debate of the 62st Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

know that it is possible. What is truly required is political will”.³⁴⁴ In the remarks of Amorim in the Assembly, it is stated that more than “twenty million Brazilians rose out of poverty and many others out of extreme poverty” and about thirty million people participated the middle class under the rule of their government.³⁴⁵

At the global platform, while Lula was in office, the Brazilian governments, established close cooperation with Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which is the initiative of the United Nations (UN) to reduce and finally end poverty in the World. According to this project, there are eight international development goals. All of the UN member states and many international organizations have committed themselves to fulfilling these goals until the year 2015. Interestingly, the first goal of MDGs is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.³⁴⁶ It also proves that global poverty and hunger problem is the biggest disaster not only for Brazil but also for humanity.

To put it briefly, the steps taken by the Lula administration(s) in effort to defeat endemic hunger and poverty disputes in Brazil, did not terminate the problems but brought the fundamental structural solutions to the problem. That is the tricky point that distinguishes the Lula administrations from previous governments.

To sum up then, focusing on global challenges we have elaborated Brazil’s attitude (2003-2010) at the United Nations organization. Like many others, Brazil does not accept the world organization (like UN) that was established according to the interests of the Second World War winners and demands a central (alongside with newly emerged powers) participation to decision-making processes of international matters.³⁴⁷ In this direction, Brazil strongly advocated strengthening

³⁴⁴ “Statement by H. E. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva President of the Federative Republic of Brazil at the General Debate of the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations”.

³⁴⁵ “Statement By His Excellency Ambassador Celso Amorim, Minister of External Relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the Opening of the General Debates of the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”.

³⁴⁶ Others are to achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria & other diseases, develop a global partnership for development, ensure environmental sustainability. See details “United Nations General Assembly Resolution” *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, (A/RES/55/2) 18 September 2000.

³⁴⁷ Here we might note that Lula government did not question the ontological purpose of the UN. Brazil opposed the current operation of the system of the UN. On the contrary, Lula of Brazil strongly believed that the UN was the only podium which world leaders had an opportunity to debate the global issues.

the General Assembly's power and increasing its scope of authority over global issues as well as democratizing the Security Council structure. The main argument of Lula was that the Council should represent the geographical composition of different parts of the world and Brazil is the only country in the Latin America, which has a representative right to the region, due to its geographical and strong political position.³⁴⁸ However, as has been underlined in the preceding pages, Mexico and Argentine approach this argument cautiously. In this part, Brazil also mentioned the undesirability of the maintenance of an unfair international system (referring to the western hegemony over international organizations), and how this opened the way for most of the global problems faced by poor countries. Those global problems are intentionally selected, and are perceived as an important indicator of any government's political view. As a leftist leader, the kind of policy Lula implemented about international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons, and poverty and hunger throughout his mandate may serve to find out whether he was consistent on his political ideology or not. After all, the conclusion I can draw from the previous findings is that Lula's personal experience becomes a driving force behind his governments' strategy on the UN reform discussions and global problems.

Surely, demand for reform at the UN and expressing the possible grave effects of the international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons (except poverty and hunger) represent -more or less- the continuity of traditional guidelines of Brazil's foreign policy, but what was new is more emphasized by Lula governments. After the accession of Lula to presidency in 2003, Brazil made strong criticisms about the structure of the UN and highlighted the already mentioned problems at international platforms with a strong voice. More important than this is his leading role (active participation) against grave problems (e.g. Action against Hunger and Poverty, 2004) and his attempts that increased awareness of the international community against poverty and hunger.

3.6. Conclusion

³⁴⁸ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*; Mullins, *In the Shadows of Generals*, p. 79.

In this chapter, I traced back the Brazil's foreign policy from the Lula administrations (2003-2010) to Cardoso governments (1995-2002). However, I also necessarily discussed the evolution of Brazil's foreign policy through the twentieth-century (overwhelmingly post-Second World War period) in order to determine the change and continuity, especially for the post-Cold War period, with which we can easily assert that Brazil has requested the room for maneuver to extend the spheres of its influence over regional and international arena. As we have already emphasized at the beginning of the chapter, the degree of the level of autonomy has shown an alteration from FHC time to Lula office. By the term of Cardoso, if we talk Vigevani and Cepaluni terminology, Brazil began a quest for autonomy through participation in the international system (moderate multilateralism); whereas the Lula administration sought the autonomy through diversification (heavy multilateralism) of foreign policy subjects. Just because of this reason, I put forward the assertion and conceptualize the latter period as 'Brasilization of foreign policy' (*Brasilização da política externa*). There is little doubt that Cardoso's hesitant attitudes in the matters of external relations had strong connection with the natural consequences of the Cold War reflexes.

This entire historical journey of Brazil's external relations is the only way to put the leftist Lula's foreign policy implementations into proper context. My main objective in this part of thesis is to take up some of Lula's cardinal foreign policy principles and practices and see how much they are compatible with his political ideology. To do that, some major differences of opinion with FHC about the critical foreign policy issues like multilateralism and leading regional/global role in the foreign policy, the relations with the USA, Latin America, the Third World, and the country's position in the United Nations concerning with global challenges were scrutinized throughout the preceding pages. After considering my study of the Brazilian foreign policy, I will make some comparative remarks on FHC's and Lula's foreign policy making strategies.

First, Cardoso's national interest priorities were a little bit different from Lula's. In some aspects, it is understandable, because conditions had changed through the eight years of Lula's government and, more importantly, foreign policy architecture was constructed mostly by Cardoso's legacy. Yet, it is worthy

to recall that there were no considerable differences between Lula and the FHC governments in terms of the structure of international system,³⁴⁹ given that both mostly managed the country's foreign policy under equal conditions. Nevertheless, there were prominent differences between foreign policy impulses of Cardoso and his successor. As a result of different policy perception, foreign policy direction shifted from being 'economics-grounded' to 'politics-grounded'. That was the main difference between Cardoso and his successor. Because, for instance, Lula paid special attention to Mercosul and his Latin neighbors (Lula's highest foreign policy priority), not only to the economic interests of the country, but also to the political aspects, which fortified the country's position in the international arena.³⁵⁰

Secondly, we witnessed the very critical point in the Brazilian economic history with the Lula administration's term. The leftist and working class of his party members found the opportunity to govern the Ministry of External Relations alongside with traditional elitist representatives (the urbane, center-right) and govern the state into political spectrum.³⁵¹

Thirdly, in broader sense, Cardoso more greatly stressed the theoretical structure and idealist vision on foreign policy, whereas Lula focused on more practical issues and immediate results. He was also more pragmatic (not ideologist) in foreign affairs. In comparison with Cardoso, Lula had an expectation that foreign policy "must contribute to the improvement" of living standards of the Brazilian citizens.

When it comes to Brazil's bilateral relations during the Lula tenure, however, there are no common points in his approach towards the bilateral relations with Latin American states, the USA, and the Third World with which we can generalize. The modes of bilateral relations depend on who is the interlocutor. For example, Brazil's bilateral relations with its neighboring countries were much more important in the sense of enjoying the country's regional (leadership) and global (active presence) goals. Both leaders emphasized how much Latin America

³⁴⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p.87.

³⁵⁰ Almeida, *Um exercicio comparativo de politica externa*, p.13.

³⁵¹ Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After Cold War*, pp. 15, 182.

was important for Brazil's both short and long-term interests. They thus prioritized the foreign policy agenda among other foreign policy objectives. They, like other Latin American states, had no hesitation about the Brazil's position as 'natural leader' in the continent. The main difference is how Brazil played its role in the continent. Cardoso gave utterance to it implicitly, behaved more meticulously by virtue of not being exposed to accusations of neighbors (imperialist power) and avoided taking full responsibility of the regional initiatives.

On the other hand, Lula stressed Brazil's central role in the region to a high volume and was willing to pay the cost of its leadership in both the world and Latin America. The 'Lula effect' (individual level) was clearly discerned in the relations with Latin American countries. Without Lula's individual experience/effect, the country's friendly relations with communist Cuba and Chávez, 'troublemaker' cannot properly be understood. Actually, Brazil's traditional foreign policy, including the Cardoso administration, would require limited relations with Cuba and Venezuela because of their own situations (negative) in the international arena. In the last resort, even if their perception was unfavorable in the global arena, Lula predominantly developed relations with Cuba and Venezuela for the sake of Brazil's long-term national interest.

Relations with Washington are always of paramount importance for Brazil. This was also the case for the Lula era. During Cardoso tenure in office, Brazil's relations with the USA may be mostly defined as 'cooperative and constructive' and tensions rarely escalated due to economic matters (FTAA). In comparison to FHC, Lula pursued a 'pragmatic' foreign policy against the United States of America, instead of ideological relations. Lula attempted to steer Brazil's foreign policy out of Washington's orbit. All through his eight years in office, what Lula brought to Brasília's external policy is institutionalizing the 'reciprocal respect and interest' principle into relations with Washington. Brazil's good neighbor policy was taken into consideration by the US administration and gained considerable leverage with respect to the bilateral relations with Washington. In so doing, Lula contemplated the search for greater equilibrium versus the USA's unilateralism. It is acknowledged that during his office, Lula never applied anti-

American rhetoric or antagonism toward the USA, unlike the prevalent leftist rhetoric, though there are many discrepancies in what might have occurred between Lula's (individual) opinion and the USA priorities over time. In this regard, he proved that being a leftist/socialist does not necessarily mean rigid anti-Americanism.

One of the most salient issues in Brazil's foreign relations, which have been considered as a novelty by many scholars, was Lula's attitude against the relations with the Third World. Brazil's relation with the Third World countries started long before FHC. Cardoso developed partial dialogue, though he did not institutionalize it. He devoted himself to establishing close ties with the developed states. Since Lula's coming to office, however, strategic alliances with 'less developed' countries were developed via strengthening the country's relations with developing countries, which had never before been experienced in Brazil's diplomatic history. This is not to say that Brazil did harm or ignored the relations with developed countries. Lula followed more moderate/balanced relations between the industrialized/developed world and the Third World. The Lula administration made it clear that creating alternative or the 'South-South' relations with the Third World (e.g. BASIC, BRICs, IBSA, Group of 77, G-77 *etc.*), would diminish foreign capital or investment vulnerabilities toward the 'North' states (notably from the USA and European Union) regarding with decreasing the economic and power asymmetries (the UN) among the unequal parts.

By the end of this chapter, I discussed one of the issues that Lula made the keystone of his administration, which was Brazil's posture in the United Nations in the context of the global problems sustaining an unjust international system that concern the future of all humanity. Primarily, like many other states, Cardoso's governments felt uncomfortable with the situation of the international system, which was/is outdated. In this respect, he wanted some reform in the United Nations, mostly in the United Nations Security Council's composition. Yet, on the other hand, he had no formative initiatives against the possible reform in the UN, as Lula did. Whenever Lula assumed the presidency, Brazil not only advocated that more power be attributed to the General Assembly and its weight over the global issues, and democratizing the Security Council's decision-making

processes, but also took concrete steps with contributing troops to UN peacekeeping missions (MINUSTAH in Haiti) and made some lobbying activities for the Security Council. On the other hand, Brazil of Lula had more interest in resolving the global problems unlike his predecessor. As has been underlined previously, Lula's main approach to global challenges was attaining a more integrating and a leading role towards overcoming the problems. He mostly preserved Brazil's traditional posture about the international military aggression and military spending.

CHAPTER 4

VENEZUELA'S FOREIGN POLICY

4.1. A Brief Note on the Venezuelan External Relations

There is a widespread assumption in international relations discipline that changing international system has opened political space for all states in the world. As a natural outcome of states' geo-politics/strategic depth, geographic and demographic size, some states have benefited less from this space while others have taken more advantages.³⁵² The states that have obtained more advantages are called 'emerging powers' and have been more involved in world politics. Others are only slightly better than their previous situation and constantly strive to improve their local conditions. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,³⁵³ affected by this profound change, can be included in the latter type of state.

Apart from this observation, currently, there is an undeniable fact that Venezuela's name has been instantly coming to the world's agenda. Previously, Venezuela had a place in the global politics like any other marginalized small nations. One may wonder what happened to Venezuela for accelerating such enormous awareness in the global agenda while it was considered as a marginal state. Though Venezuela officially nationalized its oil industry (1976), it had not caught world's attention before. This is a critical question, which I keep in my mind throughout this chapter. Certainly, the Venezuelan state embarked on pursuing an active foreign policy. As Corrales argues, international relations experts who study Venezuela, agree with this argument.³⁵⁴ No matter who identifies (including Corrales) the Venezuelan foreign policy transition;

³⁵² I already discussed the change of international system (from bi-polar to multi-polar) in the introductory part of Brazil's foreign policy. Therefore, I do not need to re-discuss the international system's structure. The conditions more or less are the same (in terms of state system) for Venezuela too.

³⁵³ The country officially called the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (*República Bolivariana de Venezuela*). Hereafter, Venezuela.

³⁵⁴ Andrés Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy," in *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, Louis Wolf Goodman; et al. (Washington D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 369.

either as a shift from active to super active;³⁵⁵ or from semi-active to active; Venezuelan foreign policy is needed to be thoroughly studied to get objective conclusions due to the reasons mentioned earlier.

4.2. General Features of Venezuela's Foreign Policy

4.2.1. Actors and Decision-Making Process in Venezuela's Foreign Policy

After a close look at South America's political history, it is possible to say that presidential system has been of great importance to the continent's administrative system. Similar to its neighbors, Venezuela has presidential system, in which Presidents are responsible to perform the foreign policy. When we talk about the Latin American and Caribbean basin, if there is a solid corporate foundation in the state like Brazil, the continuity of the country's traditional foreign policy principles can be ensured; otherwise, inevitably each incoming president can make tremendous changes on foreign policy directions. In Venezuela, however, even it is difficult to claim that the Venezuelan ministry of foreign affairs has so far been institutionalized.³⁵⁶ Therefore, the Presidents can easily determine the direction of the country's international affairs among American states, except in institutionally strong Brazil. When it comes to Venezuela, however, according to the current constitution (1999), it is the authority/duty of the President of the republic to appoint and dismiss the cabinet ministers (including Foreign Minister, but not specified in the constitution) and conduct the external relations of the Republic and, sign and ratify international treaties, conventions or agreements.³⁵⁷ Also for Bolivarian constitution, the National Assembly before the ratification by the President of the Republic must approve the agreed treaties in order for treaties

Javier Corrales, "Changes in Regime Type and Venezuela's New Foreign Policy Paper prepared", July 2009, p. 3,

http://strategicculture.fiu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=YzVSI_f433E%3D&tabid=84.

³⁵⁶ For details about the history of Venezuela foreign Policy's Organization, See Douglas Carlisle, *Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Beginning* (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), pp.128-29.

³⁵⁷ Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Article 236/3,4.

to come into force.³⁵⁸ In reality, by reason of the institutional weakness of the Foreign Ministry, Presidents in office decide the destiny of Venezuelan foreign policy.³⁵⁹

4.2.2. Main Characteristics

When one studies Venezuelan foreign policy, s/he can see some foreign policy principles that are compatible with the constitution. The essence of the constitution in terms of foreign policy lays in the expectation of the country's international relations that stipulate unconditional sovereignty over foreign affairs and advocates the interests of the Venezuelan people in foreign affairs. The following are some core principles that outline the motivations of the Venezuela's international relations: the principles of independence; equality between states; self-determination and nonintervention in their internal affairs; the peaceful resolution of international conflicts; cooperation; active presence in international organizations; stability at the nation's oil price and production; greater integration into Latin America and the Caribbean; stable relations with the United States; collective security of their inhabitants; respect for human rights; support for democratic governments; solidarity among peoples in the struggle for their liberation and for the welfare of humanity.³⁶⁰

Beyond the constitutional commitments, there have been foreign policy practices in Venezuela like many other states. These can roughly be characterized by two periods: 1958-1998 and 1999-today. As we are going to discuss in detail, these two periods may represent the major paradigmatic changes in the country's international relations history.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., Article 154.

³⁵⁹ Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores, "Objetivos de Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Relaciones Exteriores", n.d., http://www.mre.gob.ve/index.php?view=article&id=2112%3Aobjetivoas-de-ministerio-del-poder-popular-para-la-relaciones-exteriores&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=150.

³⁶⁰ Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela', Article, 152, 153; Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", pp. 368-369; Roland Ebel, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America: Case Studies from the Circum-Caribbean* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 124.

After a brief introduction to Venezuelan foreign policy, I will discuss Venezuela's foreign policy in the pre-Chávez period. Before all, here I should make it clear that, different from the previous chapter, I will begin to discuss the country's pre-Chávez foreign policy from 1958 due to Venezuela's special condition.³⁶¹ According to international relations and political science literature, this period (1958-1998) is called as a Punto Fijo Pact.³⁶² It means, there had been a continuity about the country's political regime throughout the four decades until the Chávez government came to office.³⁶³ In order to understand Chávez's rise, it is necessary to give a picture of pre-Chávez period, which coincides with Punto Fijo administration.³⁶⁴ Punto Fijo regime provides much prominent ground to put current Chávez administration into a proper context. Indeed, one of the centerpieces of Hugo Chávez's Presidential campaign (1998) was the 'termination of old Punto Fijo Pact', which opened up political space to other political parties re-defining the Venezuelan political system.³⁶⁵ While we are discussing the governments of Punto Fijo Pact's foreign policy understanding, we also review Venezuela's historical evolution, especially after the Second World War and the Cold War.

³⁶¹ Anibal Romero, "Rearranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Agony of Democracy in Venezuela," *Latin American Research Review* 32, no. 1 (1997): p. 9.

³⁶² To have an idea about the main political events between 1958 and 1999, see "La política exterior de Venezuela desde 1958 hasta la actualidad," *RENA- Cuarta etapa*, 2008; Carlos A. Romero, "Dos etapas en la política exterior de Venezuela. Politeia," *Politeia* 26, no. 30 (January 2003): 169-182.

³⁶³ Guido Groscors, "1958-1998," *Analítica*, January 1, 1998, <http://www.analitica.com/va/politica/opinion/8876164.asp>.

³⁶⁴ Tom Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy", 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~uwp/fyw/euonymous/2004-2005/Gottheil.pdf>.

³⁶⁵ Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela," *Third World Quarterly - Journal of Emerging Areas* 24, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 63-76; Judith Levin, *Hugo Chávez* (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), p. 79; Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy"; Michael Reid, *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul* (New Haven [Conn.]: London: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 176; Jennifer McCoy, "The Demise of a Regime: the Transition from Punto Fijo to the Fifth Republic in Venezuela" (presented at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Miami, Florida, 2000), pp. 2-3, <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2000/McCoy.PDF>.

4.3. Venezuela's Foreign Policy Immediately before Chávez

4.3.1. Punto Fijo Pact

From 1958 onwards, following seven years of dictatorial rule in Venezuela (under General Marcos Pérez Jiménez), a period of political alliances (regime) began that Latin American and Caribbean countries had never witnessed previously: Punto Fijo Pact. Immediately after the Venezuelan military forces had overthrown the dictatorship from power,³⁶⁶ Venezuela's three major parties formally compromised over the points that envisioned country's peaceful transition to democratic regime and the preservation of democracy by the 1958 presidential elections, and prevented possible military coup d'état (like 1948) against undemocratic Junta government no matter which party would win the Presidential elections.³⁶⁷ These parties were the moderate-left -*Acción Democrática* (AD- Democratic Action), the moderate-right -*the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente: Partido Social Cristiano* (COPEI- Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization: Social Christian Party) and center-left, *Unión Republicana Democrática* (URD- Democratic Republican Union).

For one side, despite its imperfections, the pact provided stability in the country and the best option would be a transition of power to civil regime by peaceful means with a 'stable, civilian-dominated political system' and relatively free media together with democracy.³⁶⁸ On the other side, they were the majority

³⁶⁶ For more details about the role of military during the transition period see, Winfield J. Burggraaff, *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935-1959* (University of Missouri Press, 1972).

³⁶⁷ Daniel Hellinger, "Political Overview: The Breakdown of Puntofijismo and the Rise of Chavismo," in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 29; Louis Goodman, et al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience* (Washington D.C; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.7; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela," *Third World Quarterly - Journal of Emerging Areas* 24, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 63-76. See full text of the pact at http://www.analitica.com/bitbliblioteca/venezuela/punto_fijo.asp

³⁶⁸ Romero Aníbal, "El sistema político venezolano", 1989, p. 4, <http://anibalromero.net/El.sistema.politico.venezolano.pdf>; Deborah L.Norden, "Democracy in Uniform: Chávez and the Venezuelan Armed Forces," in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 99; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez phenomenon," pp. 64-5.

believed that it effectively assured that those remained outside of the ‘cynical agreement’ or did not accept the new political order, like communist party, would be excluded from accession to power.³⁶⁹ Moreover, each party shared the country’s resources among the party members, while ignoring others.³⁷⁰ By doing so, Punto Fijo (national unity governments) elites undermined post-1958 democracy hope. In the course of time, the Punto Fijo brought about ‘limited pluralist polyarchy’ system and blurred/merged the lines/interests between the state and governing parties,³⁷¹ and thus became a political distributor of authority between the two political parties (*Acción Democrática* and *COPEI*). Because of these reasons, in the view of many political scientists, Punto Fijo Pact could be characterized as ‘Partyocracia’,³⁷² ‘partyarchy’,³⁷³ ‘polyarchy’,³⁷⁴ and ‘pacted democracy’.³⁷⁵

³⁶⁹ President Betancourt said, in one of his statements, “...the communist political philosophy is not in accord with the democratic structure of the Venezuelan state”; Robert Jackson Alexander, *Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela* (Transaction Publishers, 1982), p. 447.

³⁷⁰ Richard Gott, *In the shadow of the liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela* (London; New York: Verso, 2000), p. 17; Hellinger, “Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era,” p.29; David J. Myers, “The Normalization of Punto Fijo Democracy,” in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 28.

³⁷¹ Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers, “Introduction,” in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 3; Carlos A. Romero, “Exporting Peace by Other Means,” in *International Security and Democracy: Latin America and the Caribbean in the Post-Cold War Era*, Jorge I. Domínguez. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), p. 153.

³⁷² Angel E. Alvarez, “State Reform Before and After Chavez’s Election,” in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp.150-51; Deborah L. Norden, “Democracy in Uniform: Chavez and the Venezuelan Armed Forces,” in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp.98- 99; Louis Goodman and al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience* (Washington D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p.13; Michael Coppedge, “Partidocracia comparative,” in *Democracia Bajo Presión*, ed. Andrés Serbin and Andrés Stambouli (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1993), 139-160.

³⁷³ Hellinger, “Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era,” p.12; Michael Coppedge, “The Rise and Fall of Partyarchy in Venezuela,” in *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*, ed. Jorge Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal (Maryland: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996), p 13; Jennifer McCoy, “Chavez and the End of Partyarchy in Venezuela,” *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 64-77.

³⁷⁴ McCoy and J. Myers, “Introduction,” p. 3. See more details, William I. Robinson, *Promoting Poliarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

³⁷⁵ Judy Meltzer, “Hugo Chávez and the Search for Post-Neoliberal Policy Alternatives in Venezuela,” in *Post-neoliberalism in the Americas*, Laura Macdonald and Arne Rückert. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 93; Richard Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” *The Center For Preventive Action*, no. 20 (2006): p.14; Steve Ellner and

In this period (Punto Fijo), there was an assumption (especially by pro-Punto Fijo supporters) about Venezuela's uniqueness in the Latin America. It is good to remember that, while the rest of Latin American and Caribbean states (in 1960s-1980s) had been governed by military dictatorships, Venezuela had a civil regime despite its shortcomings. This is the common point drawn by scholars about the term before Chávez. What they do not agree about the period is, whether it really was an 'exception' and if the arrival of the Chávez administration put an end to this 'exceptionalist' position? The 'exceptionalism thesis' does not apply only for analyzing the country's domestic politics; it is also used to explain Venezuela's foreign policy attitude because of its external dimensions.

The Venezuelan exceptionalism thesis claims that Venezuela's democracy has featured stability, uniqueness, and superiority unlike the rest of Latin American states.³⁷⁶ Specifically, after the overthrow of the military dictatorship (1958), Venezuela entered a new era. Whatever the outcome of this political change was, some scholars viewed Venezuela's system as perfect in many ways because it promoted a peaceful solution to international conflicts and cooperation, preventing the use of force as a means of the state's foreign policy, and delivered democratic stability, whereas the rest of Latin American countries had struggled with military regimes.³⁷⁷ That's why democracy, after the 1958 period, became an important asset of Venezuela's foreign policy conduct.³⁷⁸ For Ellner, prior to 1989, Venezuelan democracy had been 'near perfect', at least in terms of respecting for "regular election alternation of parties in powers and respect for civic rights".³⁷⁹

Daniel Hellinger, *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict* (London; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 225.

³⁷⁶ Steve Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*. (Boulder Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2008), p. 6.

³⁷⁷ Serbin, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy," p. 378; Goodman, et al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, p. 24; Janet Kelly de Escobar and Carlos A. Romero, *The United States and Venezuela: Rethinking a Relationship* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 2; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez phenomenon," p. 64; Steve Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," in *Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 2003), 7-26.

³⁷⁸ Serbin, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", p. 378;

³⁷⁹ Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," pp.7, 8.

As regards critics of Venezuelan exceptionalism, some argue that Venezuela's image was reflected as a 'model democracy' (close to the Washington circles) to the rest of the Latin America and Caribbean basin; yet the Venezuelan society had deep social polarization (acute class conflicts) and Venezuelan political system was not responsive to the legitimate demands of society due to Punto Fijo system.³⁸⁰ They were not able to separate the myth from reality and flunked to get involved with corruption, clientalism, and electoral fraud.³⁸¹ Presumably, latter opinion contains elements of truth. That kind of democracy may only be called *Venedemocracia*³⁸² and it paved the way for vicious cycle in politics and political oligarchy.

4.3.2. The Evolution of Venezuela's Foreign Policy after the Second World War

Even though I argued that Venezuela's external relations have exhibited more or less similar features in pre-Chávez periods, naturally, there were some nuances and facets of the country's pre-Chávez foreign policy stages that let us to trace the evolution of Venezuela's foreign policy. Prior to 1999, the period can roughly be divided into four timescales: 1959-69, 1969-79, 1979-88, and 1988-99.³⁸³

Immediately after the civil regime came to power (Betancourt Bello, 1959-64; Raúl Leoni Otero, 1964-69), Venezuela kept a low profile on foreign policy. The leaders have pragmatically combined the internal political affairs and external relations imposed by the conditions of the Cold War period. Beyond the country's

³⁸⁰ Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, p.2; Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"* (Lanham Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Pub., 2007), p. xiii; McCoy and J. Myers, "Introduction," p. 6.

³⁸¹ Steve Ellner, "Trade Union Autonomy and the Emergence of a New Labor Movement in Venezuela," in *Venezuela: Hugo Chávez and the Decline of an "Exceptional Democracy"*, Steve Ellner and Daniel Hellinger. (Maryland: Rowman& Littlefield Publishing, 2007), p.97.

³⁸² For more details on 'Venedemocracia', Venezuelan type of Democracy, see Alexander, *Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela*.

³⁸³ In literature, there is no clear reference to the end of Punto Fijo agreement. Some scholars trace the end of this period in the beginning of Pérez's second term (1989), while others bring this date closer to Chávez taking office. Actually, for me, there were no qualitative mentality changes in Venezuela's foreign policy direction until Chávez came to power. Therefore, I prefer the latter argument.

role as a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s,³⁸⁴ the main emphasis was on developing the relations with the USA and having fewer relations with socialist Cuba.³⁸⁵ As a natural result of that demand, Betancourt's Venezuela with the Betancourt Doctrine declared its antipathy towards non-democratic regimes and severed relations with non-democratically elected governments (military governments), and defended democratic values and principles in Latin America.³⁸⁶ Therefore, Venezuela's relations with its neighbors were gradually severed until the doctrine was reviewed at the end of 1960s and early 1970s. President Rafael Caldera announced (1974) the beginning of a new era between Venezuela and communist Cuba.³⁸⁷

The following process directed by Rafael Caldera Rodríguez (1969-74) and Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez (1974-79) governments. The first thing we must realize in this stage is that oil began to occupy a considerable part of Venezuelan foreign policy agenda following Venezuela's active presence in the OPEC.³⁸⁸ Caldera and Pérez embarked upon a relatively independent foreign policy compared with the previous term, promoted relations with developing world (Third World), stressed common interests (e.g. The New International Economic Order, NIEO, 1974) and diversified relations.³⁸⁹ The Venezuelan governments, in particular during Pérez's terms of office, had focused on a pioneering role over the Third World countries in order to increase Venezuela's influence and popularity in the South American continent and international stage. The

³⁸⁴ Venezuela was one of the five founder members that participated in the first OPEC meeting in September 1960, Baghdad.

³⁸⁵ Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy," p.367; Richard Haggerty and Library of Congress, *Venezuela: A Country Study*, 4th ed. ([Washington D.C.]: The Division; For sale by the Supt. of Docs. U.S. G.P.O., 1993).

³⁸⁶ Guido Groscors, "La política internacional de Rómulo Betancourt y la defensa de la democracia en América," *Análítica Mensual*, 1999, at <http://www.analitica.com/vam/1999.07/documentos/03.htm>; Haggerty, *Venezuela*; Alexander, *Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela*, pp. 345, 583, 670.

³⁸⁷ Haggerty and Library of Congress, *Venezuela*.

³⁸⁸ Judith Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), p. 201; Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", p. 367; For more information on Venezuela's effect on OPEC, see Robert Bond, *Contemporary Venezuela and Its Role in International Affairs* (New York: New York University Press, 1977).

³⁸⁹ Elsa Cardozo and Richard S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs," in *Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Policy*, Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A. K. Hey. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 152; A. Romero, "Exporting Peace by Other Means," p. 158.

government headed by Caldera pursued less regionalist (global) foreign policy.³⁹⁰ For some scholars, diversification of Venezuela's foreign policy peaked during Pérez's office, with the high oil prices in 1970s and 'OPEC protagonism'.³⁹¹

The third stage (Luis Herrera Campins, 1979-1984; Jaime Lusinchi, 1984–1989 administrations) is mostly known for Venezuela's economic crisis and external debts. External debts began to determine the country's foreign policy and domestic affairs direction.³⁹² With the 'national accord' initiative, Campins aimed at participation of "important social and political sectors in combating corruption" and making necessary reforms on finance and taxes.³⁹³ One of the clearest consequences of focusing on domestic corruptions and acute foreign debts (issues for regime stability) was diminishing the importance of Venezuela in international arena.³⁹⁴ Regional conflict crisis such as Grenada (1983) and Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (1982) diminished the attention to continental security and alliances.³⁹⁵ Venezuela then started to act once again as a democratic country and a western nation in Latin America, and exhibited an 'anti-communist stance' (especially, under Lusinchi government) for the sake of strengthening relations with the USA without seeking an absolute equality.³⁹⁶

The last stage in Venezuela's international relations prior to Chávez administration coincided with the end of the Cold War and, the second term of presidency of both Carlos Andrés Pérez Rodríguez (1989-93) and R. Caldera (1994-1999). When Pérez and Caldera came to presidency, they were well known by Venezuelan people; but they brought a different (but inauthentic) political

³⁹⁰ Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p.207; A. Romero, "Exporting Peace by Other Means," p.153.

³⁹¹ Cardozo and S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs", p.152; A. Romero, "Exporting Peace by Other Means", p.154.

³⁹² Cardozo and S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs", p.153.

³⁹³ Winfield J. Burggraaff and Richard Millet, "More than Failed Coups: The Crisis in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations," in *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, Louis W. Goodman et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 46.

³⁹⁴ Cardozo and S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs", pp.153-155; Ebel, *Political Culture and Foreign Policy in Latin America*, pp. 123-124.

³⁹⁵ Cardozo and S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs", p.153.

³⁹⁶ Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", p.368;

Barry Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and Democracy in a Globalised Age* (Manchester UK; New York: Manchester University Press; Distributed exclusively in USA by Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 179.

vision to the Venezuelan foreign and domestic policy. They supported Venezuela's integration into the new world order, by necessarily accepting the new rules of old political game, which forced a more fluid, extensive, diversified, and complicated foreign policy agenda, instead of just 'petro-centric' agenda.³⁹⁷

The second term of Pérez government has brought domestic crisis and external pressures due to its dramatic shift regarding economic and political reforms, which is known as *el Gran Viraje*³⁹⁸ (The Great Turnaround) and *Shock Therapy*.³⁹⁹ With this turnout, Pérez administration believed that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, world order evolved from bipolarity to multipolarity and the USA, as the unique strategic and military hegemonic power, become the sole superpower in the new economic order. The consequences of the increasing economic problems of Venezuela caused a change in the leaders' world perception.⁴⁰⁰

The government, like many Latin American countries, anticipated the consolidated market economy (economic liberalization and defense of free trade) that suggested the need to review domestic economic policies on the account of the impact of external debt crisis, including the signing of new agreement with IMF, declining oil prices and revenues, adjust the political system to the new economic packet (*el paquete economico*) and political conditions. At the end, it

³⁹⁷ Prior to early 1990s oil (together with democracy) monopolized and at the top of the Venezuelan foreign policy agenda; Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", p.371; Carlos A. Romero, "The United States and Venezuela: From a Special Relationship to Wary Neighbors," in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, ed. Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 141.

³⁹⁸ *El Gran Viraje* (The Great Turnaround): It was Pérez government's (1989-93) economic and political reform attempt to consolidate free market economy, in order to create appropriate environment for Washington Consensus principles. Jennifer L. McCoy, "From Representative to Participatory Democracy? Regime Transformation in Venezuela'," in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 274; A. Romero, "Exporting Peace by Other Means", p.163.

³⁹⁹ In fact, although he accused the IMF as "a neutron bomb that killed people, but left buildings standing" and used the anti-neoliberal rhetoric in his 1988 presidential election campaign, his agreement with the IMF came after a few weeks of his presidency victory. That is one of the reasons why that situation came to be known as 'Shock Therapy'. Quotations cited in Tariq Ali, "A beacon of hope for the rebirth of Bolívar's dream," *The Guardian*, November 9, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/nov/09/1>. For more details about the Shock Therapy discussions, see Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," p. 7; Hellinger, "Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era," p.31; Goodman and al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, p.5.

⁴⁰⁰ Escobar and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, p. 24.

was necessary to adjust the foreign policy to the new global and hemispheric challenges/trends and integrate economy and foreign policy.⁴⁰¹ We can easily say that this term witnessed the appearance of Venezuela's new foreign policy priorities. However, various sectors of society responded harshly to these radical changes and these reactions triggered street riots of the 1989 (after a while Pérez came to the Presidency) that was registered as 'Caracazo' (massive popular protests in Caracas) in Venezuelan political history. In the 1989 riot, government called the military to quell the riot, which it did cruelly. Many of the military officers (like a Lt. Colonel of Hugo Chávez Frias) disobeyed the order.⁴⁰²

Simply stated, the Caracazo became a common symbol of the anti-neoliberal reform supporters, and provided space for new political actors and parties to establish an alternative to traditional parties.⁴⁰³ At the same time, for many, the 'Caracazo' incidence was a preview of a new era towards country's domestic and foreign policy direction. It accelerated people's anger and prompted some low-ranking officers to prepare timetable for a military coup d'état.⁴⁰⁴ Although the two military coup attempts failed (1992), his own party saw President Pérez weak. Shortly after, public officials discovered that more than \$8 billion disappeared through a variety of channels, while the Supreme Court considered corruption accusations valid. Venezuelan Senate decided the impeachment of Pérez from office on 20 March 1993. As a result, the February 1989 neo-liberal economic packet and his bribe scandal destroyed Pérez's presidency.⁴⁰⁵

Finally, president Caldera like his predecessor dealt with domestic problems, understanding Venezuelans' discontent (mostly economics) but without tangible alternative plans. In terms of foreign policy implementations, his term lasted in a

⁴⁰¹ President Pérez stated that "we must understand that these are [new economic package] unavoidable. There was no other way out". Cited in Gott, *In the Shadow of the Liberator*, p.151. Serbin, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", pp. 369- 372; Cardozo and S. Hillman, "Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs", p.155.

⁴⁰² Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez Phenomenon," p. 65.

⁴⁰³ Ellner, "Introduction: The Search for Explanations," p. 63; Meltzer, "Hugo Chávez and the Search for Post-Neoliberal Policy Alternatives in Venezuela", p. 91.

⁴⁰⁴ Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez phenomenon," p. 65.

⁴⁰⁵ Levin, *Hugo Chávez*, p.74; Goodman, *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, p.5; L.Norden, "Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era," pp.96-97.

less intensive atmosphere.⁴⁰⁶ Among all of his (1993-election campaign promise) political decisions, one of them determined (since 1999) the Venezuelan political life: Remission of coup leaders, including current Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez. His government began to re-define the country's strategic integration (Latin America and Caribbean basin), as a revision of his international relations perception.⁴⁰⁷

After all, we can figure out some foreign policy principles of Venezuela foreign policy before Chávez era. Of course, these are not premeditated principles. However; I reached this opinion after attentive observations to previous foreign policy implementations. In this period (also currently), two central phenomena are/were representing the core of Venezuela's foreign affairs: petroleum and democracy.⁴⁰⁸

Firstly, when we glance at the Venezuelan external relations, we see that petroleum irrefutably stands out there as an international subject. This is the magic word to trace Venezuela's external relations. Since the first Venezuelan petroleum exploration, it has been playing a leading and central role over foreign policy affairs. It means that Venezuela has pursued 'petro-centric' (economic) approach about the country's international affairs and it has shaped Venezuela's national identity (alongside with geography and history).⁴⁰⁹ In addition, Venezuela has always used oil to realize its political goals,⁴¹⁰ although petroleum is an economic material.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁶ Levin, *Hugo Chávez*, p.74; McCoy, "From Representative to Participatory Democracy? Regime Transformation in Venezuela", p. 274.

⁴⁰⁷ Miriam Gomes Saraiva and José Briceño Ruiz, "Argentina, Brasil e Venezuela: as diferentes percepções sobre a construção do Mercosul" [Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela: different perceptions about the construction of Mercosul]," *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional* 52, no. 1 (2009): p. 157.

⁴⁰⁸ Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", pp. 367, 368, 379.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.367-68; Carlisle, *Venezuelan Foreign Policy*, p.3; Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p.2.

⁴¹⁰ *El petróleo como instrumento de política exterior en el gobierno del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías* (Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2005), P. 85 .

⁴¹¹ Cited in Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 179; Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy", p.7; Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p. 213.

Secondly, as I argued in the previous pages in greater detail, democracy was the second most discussed issue in the center of Venezuelan foreign policy in the pre-Chávez period. This has provided privileges and prioritized Venezuelan position in Latin America among other states of the South American continent and Caribbean Basin. Accompanied by huge oil reserves, the country's 'democratic credentials' have allowed the government to exhibit more moderate foreign policy attitude⁴¹² and paved the way for the country to take a significant position in the international arena, which is far greater than its economic and demographic size would permit.⁴¹³ Actually, although many of academics were emphasizing the importance of democratic regime in the Venezuelan political spectrum, for me, emphasis on 'democratic regime' should be understood as 'civil administration'. It might be true that there was an election in the country but the governments, in those years, did not pay enough attention to the demands of citizens.

The relations with Washington were the hallmark of pre-Chávez Venezuelan foreign policy. Venezuela, historically, enjoyed mostly warm and extremely positive bilateral relations with the USA, although it showed a certain degree of disagreement on specific issues, related to Cuba's Castro and different priorities. For example, particularly in the 1970s (oil boom years), Venezuela trailed a relatively independent foreign policy.⁴¹⁴ This was the case due to Washington's high oil demand (dependency), Caracas's high production and Venezuela's extra stable position compared with the rest of Latin American states.⁴¹⁵ Simply, the oil weapon has provided Caracas with the autonomy and bargaining power against the USA. As a result of this position, Venezuela often tried to implement an active foreign policy to challenge the international hegemony of the USA, especially with Pérez's 'two-hand policy'.⁴¹⁶ During this period, Venezuela tried to play a

⁴¹² Serbín, "A New Approach to the World? The Gran Viraje and Venezuelan Foreign Policy", pp. 381, 382; Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p. 213.

⁴¹³ Goodman and al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan experience*, p.5.

⁴¹⁴ For Ewell, Venezuelan authorities sometimes has used the '*obedezco pero no cumpro* (I obey, but I will not execute)' tactics against the USA governments. See Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p.7.

⁴¹⁵ Russell Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.121; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.190; Escobar and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, pp. 1-2.

⁴¹⁶ Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p. 213; Romero, "The United States and Venezuela: From a Special Relationship to Wary Neighbors", p. 135.

central/leading role in the ‘third-world’,⁴¹⁷ while his foreign policy also promoted free trade, democracy, regionalism, and close ties with the USA.

Finally, Venezuela’s relations with Latin American countries have not been stable in this period and changed from time to time. Sometimes, for the sake of its relations with the USA, Venezuela’s attitude towards Latin America was antagonistic, particularly towards the communist Cuba and military governments.⁴¹⁸ Yet occasionally, it improved friendly bilateral relations with them to export democracy (due to its long democratic tradition) and assumed to play leading role in the continent, mostly with the USA’s indoctrination.

The principal pre-Chávez Venezuelan foreign policy parameters and actors have been stressed throughout the preceding pages. It is necessary to explain that when we use ‘immediate’ adjective, due to Venezuela’s special conditions, Punto Fijo regime has been taken into account in this sense. Besides the foreign policy affairs, I stressed some internal dynamics that have directed the country’s foreign policy. My special focus on the country’s political regimes (Punto Fijo Pact, democracy discussions and petrol), is based on two tangible justifications. Initially, significant majority of international relations scholars who study Venezuela’s foreign policy stressed those issues to establish a base for their analysis. The section concludes, however, with the second observation that it was the historical Venezuelan fact that domestic political system and discussions, which has defined Venezuelan foreign policy parameters and process in the second half of the twentieth century.⁴¹⁹ Otherwise, we cannot fully understand the rise of Lt. Colonel of Hugo Chávez Frias. No doubt, failed neo-liberal policies, during the office of Carlos Pérez and R. Caldera resulted in the election of Chávez as the Venezuelan President. Now, the section will continue to discuss several important issues regarding Venezuela’s foreign policy during Chávez era with the purpose of assessing the current foreign policy posture of Venezuela and its political place in the world.

⁴¹⁷ Escobar and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, p. 23.

⁴¹⁸ Harold Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela a Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), p.115.

⁴¹⁹ Aníbal Romero, “La situación estratégica de Venezuela,” *Política Internacional* 1 (March 1986): p. 10; Cardozo and S. Hillman, “Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization, and International Affairs”, p.145.

4.4. The Chávez era and Venezuela's Foreign Policy

Beginning from 1999, following Hugo Chávez's assumption of presidency, Venezuelan international relations entered a period of time that raised tensions in Venezuela's diplomacy. The President has become a much-discussed leader because of the way he came to power (democratically elected, following failed coup d'état attempt) and his alternative (to previous implementations) foreign policy initiatives (Bolivarianism). Also during current government's office, the foreign policy of Venezuela has gained extra momentum and dynamism compared with its previous international relations record.⁴²⁰

In the literature, much of academic studies/political analysts are not objective because they positioned themselves either pro-Chávez (Chavista) or anti-Chávez. It means, they focus on Chávez's personality and discourses instead of his concrete foreign policy implementations.⁴²¹ Therefore, it is quite difficult to properly determine Chávez's foreign policy perspectives. However, we make an effort to look at Chávez's international policies without taking a side to distinguish reality from fiction and 'rational policy from outrageous' discourses.⁴²² To what extent do Chávez's presidency and its personal impact on Venezuela's international policy reflect a fundamental shift from ancient regime? In general, despite some continuity, in many ways there are important structural changes in Venezuelan foreign policy. Yet, another critical question needs to be studied, in order to comprehend the continuity in Chávez's policies: what are the principal motives behind Chávez's foreign policy premises?

4.4.1. Foreign Policy Premises of the Chávez government(s)

⁴²⁰ Lemaire Romero, "Hacia un Paradigma Bolivariano de la Política Exterior de Venezuela," *El Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales*, 2007, <http://www.isri.cu/publicaciones/articulos/2007/0907.pdf>.

⁴²¹ Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, p.195.

⁴²² Gregory Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government* (London: Verso, 2007), p. 151.

With the government of the President Hugo Chávez, basic outlines and principles have shaped the new foreign policy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In this introductory part, we outline several key foreign policy pillars that are the chief points to comprehend Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy.

Despite the fact that Chávez is not the only Venezuelan leader who advocate multi-polar world vigorously, he is the President of Venezuela that already applied multilateral policies on external relations since his assuming office (not only because of his personal effects; also due to changed international context).⁴²³ Without doubt, this multilateralist approach has prompted Venezuela to undertake an active role in international affairs and significant presence in the international scene. As a result of Venezuela's promoting active presence in international arena and multipolar world (versus single-polar world), during Chávez administration, this state has found the opportunity to display sovereign and independent foreign policy.⁴²⁴ The logical objective of this policy has been to reduce Venezuelan political, economic and military dependence on the United States. In fact, the establishment of some regional initiatives (i.e. ALBA) and new relations with the Third World countries are the 'corrective act' to unipolar world system.⁴²⁵

Challenging the USA has been among the main pillars of Chávez's outspoken foreign policy not only after he came to power; also during the 1998 election campaign. However, the degree of criticism increased, especially immediately after 2002 the USA supported military coup d'état against the Chávez government.⁴²⁶ He strongly opposes the USA's sole hegemony over the global issues and intervention to the domestic affairs of other states, primarily of Venezuela. Chávez has been outspoken about USA's unilateral actions, while

⁴²³ Steve Ellner, "La política exterior del gobierno de Chavez: la retórica chavista y los asuntos sustanciales," *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales* 15, no. 1 (2009): p. 121.

⁴²⁴ Steve Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon* (Lynne Rienner, 2008), p. 202; Hugo Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chávez talks to Marta Harnecker* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005), pp. 119,120; Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p. 153; Steve Ellner, "The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela," *Latin American Perspectives* 28, no. 5 (2001): p. 26.

⁴²⁵ Herbert Koenecke y and Francisco Toro, "La coherencia de la política exterior de Chávez," *VenEconomía-Hemeroteca*, October 29, 2010, p. 1; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p.121.

⁴²⁶ Ellner, "The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela", p. 21; Tom Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chavez and American Foreign Policy", 2004, <http://www.gwu.edu/~uwp/fyw/euonymous/2004-2005/Gottheil.pdf>.

other states think about or utter this in a lower tone. The anti-Americanism discourse is the only reason why Venezuela's President Chávez is the most famous Latin American leader throughout the world. Here we should remind that Chávez's antagonistic stance toward the USA is mostly relevant at political level. Besides, as it discussed in incoming pages, Venezuela's economic and security relations with the USA do not represent the real animosity.

The oil has been the only centerpiece of both previous governments and current government in Venezuela. As the most valuable (unique) resource of the country and economic commodity, oil has played the central role in international relations. Surely, petroleum has also been used for foreign policy instrument during the history of Venezuela but it has never been applied before as an instrument of foreign policy as happened during Chávez's term. He uses oil for the sponsorship of most of his regional and international projects. Once Chávez came to office, his oil policies began to bring money to Venezuela and international popularity especially after Venezuela's leading role in OPEC's oil production strategies.⁴²⁷ Also, the influence of Venezuela's petro-politics in Latin America provides the active role for Hugo Chávez on Latin American affairs (i.e. energy issues) and affects the relations with other southern states.⁴²⁸ Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the Organization of American States, puts forward the assertion saying that 'Oil can be, as our government realizes, a powerful lever to drive development, integration, cooperation, solidarity, and the economic complementarities of our countries'.⁴²⁹

The leadership issue in Venezuelan case is roughly divided into two parts: leadership in Latin America and the Third World. Venezuela's demanding of Latin American leadership has not been proclaimed by the Chávez administration, but most of the international scholars ascribe his foreign policy attempt (with

⁴²⁷ Ellner, "La política exterior del gobierno de Chavez: la retórica chavista y los asuntos sustanciales," p. 125; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez phenomenon," pp. 68, 71.

⁴²⁸ Genaro Arriagada, "Petropolitics in Latin America Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations," *Inter-American Dialogue*, December 2006, p. 1.

⁴²⁹ Jorge Valero, "Oil, Democracy, and Hemispheric Cooperation," Speech to the OAS Permanent Council (Washington D.C., 29 September 2005): OEA/Ser. G CP/INF. 5252/05.

leftist language) at leadership argument.⁴³⁰ It does not mean Chávez ignores Brazil's determinant effect in the Latin American region, but Chávez's Bolivarian foreign policy seeks to play sovereign and autonomous position of leadership in Latin America competing with Brazil.⁴³¹

Significantly, although Hugo Chávez has become a much-discussed figure for the reasons of ideological differences, Venezuela's aggressive foreign policy and critical stance toward the United States as well as some of his regional initiatives (canceling debts of some countries) have been well received among the Latin American leaders.⁴³² When it comes to the leading role in the Third World, however, Chávez's Venezuela seeks to establish an alternative pole to the USA hegemony. Venezuela's Third World oriented foreign policy structures envision building up new political and economic alliances with underdeveloped countries to bypass the USA hegemony. The Chávez regime is assuming leadership position in the Third World, mostly realized by Caracas' role at OPEC. It must never be forgotten that Chávez's populist/radical discourses accompanying his personal charisma have made an important contribution to the actualization of his purposes.

One of the new aspects of Chávez's foreign policy vision, however, is Bolivarian ideology. Chávez has made Bolivarianism the keystone of his foreign policy. He describes himself as a Bolivarian, instead of socialist and Marxist, but it cannot be said that he is not influenced from Marxism and socialism.⁴³³ What is most striking is that the personality of Simon Bolívar⁴³⁴ has never been highlighted in the Chávez era in the South American political history. He rooted himself in the name of Bolívar and changed the name of the country (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and the constitution (The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela). Indeed today, Bolivarian ideology represents more than

⁴³⁰ Sean Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition: the Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (October 1, 2007): p. 1344.

⁴³¹ Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela a Comparative Perspective*.

⁴³² Michael Dodson and Manochehr Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 9 (2008): p. 72.

⁴³³ Aníbal Romero, "La situación de Venezuela y sus perspectivas", October 2005, pp. 1-2, <http://www.anibalromero.net/La.situacion.de.Venezuela.y.sus.perspectivas.pdf>; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p. 12; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez Phenomenon," p. 71.

⁴³⁴ Simon Bolívar (1783 – 1830) is the Latin America's very important figure who proposed the unification of South and Central America (Greater Colombia/ Gran Colombia).

the individual story of Simon Bolivar. Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy or Bolivar's dream speaks Latin American integration (South-Central America), anti colonialism/imperialism and, what is called today, multi-polar world system.⁴³⁵ He has focused on the Venezuelan foreign policy on a kind of 'true integration' (economics and integration) that goes beyond the 'poetry words' with accompanying bilateral trade and reciprocal aid agreements (solidarity), as well as the principle of interdependency among the Latin American countries.⁴³⁶ In fact, some of his regional initiatives (e.g. ALBA) have proved how much he paid significance to Bolivarianism.

By stressing some principles, it does not mean that these are the only objectives that guided Venezuela's foreign policy direction. Apart from these, there are also some principles stressed by the Chávez administration: promotion of multipolarity and Latin American integration, consolidation and diversification of Venezuela's international political, economic and cultural relations fortifying the South-South cooperation and establishing the new relations with other regions, entrenching Venezuela's position in the international economy in order to increase its oil exports and advancing the democracy in international society.⁴³⁷

Up to this point, I have shortly discussed the international relations principles of the Chávez government(s). Incoming section covers the foreign policy subjects one by one.

4.4.2. Venezuela's Bilateral Relations

4.4.2.1. Relations with Latin America

⁴³⁵Hugo Chávez Frías, *Chávez: un hombre que anda por ahí: una entrevista con Hugo Chávez* (Melbourne; Nueva York: Ocean, 2005), p. 11; Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, p. 202.

⁴³⁶Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p. 122.

⁴³⁷Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, "Las dos etapas de la política exterior de Chavez," *Nueva sociedad*. 205 (2006): p. 161; Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p. 152; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 177; "Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends, 1992 – 2002," *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 15, 2003; Diego B. Urbaneja, "La Política Exterior de Venezuela," *ARI Real Instituto Elcano*, 2005, p. 4.

Prior to millennium, at least until the Chávez government, political leaders in Venezuela viewed the country's relations with Latin American neighboring states as an important and necessary dimension of a country's strategic purposes. However, with the current president, the relations with Latin American states have been considered as *sine qua non*. Therefore, Chávez has set a premium on Latin America and prioritized the development of relations with those countries in his foreign policy agenda. Importantly, his hemispheric cooperation and integration emphasis, as a foreign policy pillar, is not an unfulfilled theory; it has been successfully put into practice. He took concrete steps in this direction.⁴³⁸

Venezuela's mutual relations in the region can only be understood (as is discussed following pages) within the state's rational and prominent expectations. Otherwise, Chávez's financing some projects in many areas, particularly oil subsidies to Cuba, medical help to Nicaragua, financial contribution to Argentine to pay the IMF debts (buying Argentine bonds)⁴³⁹ and other foreign aid to Latin American neighbors⁴⁴⁰ can be explained by factors other than international relations. For some predictions, Venezuela's large amount of aid for (social) development projects to the region have aggregated more than the amount USA spent on the Marshall Plan in Europe (\$ 43 billion in 2007).⁴⁴¹ For Corrales, this 'social power' has provided Chávez an important political benefit and 'shield' to possible arrows of international criticism.⁴⁴²

In addition to that, I think Latin American (Central and South America) integration is a very crucial phenomenon to make sense of Venezuela's bilateral relations in the continent. In numerous occasions, however, Hugo Chávez has stressed his alternative projects of Latin American integration via proposing Petro-Caribe,⁴⁴³ South American Community of Nations (UNASUL),⁴⁴⁴ and

⁴³⁸ Rodrigo Herrero Lopes, "A política externa de Chávez e Lula na América do Sul: integração regional ou consolidação de liderança?," *Revista Achegas* 40 (December 2008): p. 56.

⁴³⁹ "The Chavez play," *The Economist*. 381, no. 8501 (2006): 108.

⁴⁴⁰ The Domestic and Foreign Policies; Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p. 77.

⁴⁴¹ Also according to the Venezuelan daily newspaper (El Nacional), "during the second half of 2005 and the first month of 2006 Venezuela agreed to spend \$25.9 billion in economic aid to its hemispheric partners, with the three largest amounts going to Brazil (\$4.38 billion), Cuba (\$4.34 billion), and Argentina (\$3.95 billion)". Quoted in Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 15.

⁴⁴² Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p. 77.

⁴⁴³ Petro-Caribe is a Caribbean oil alliance.

creation of the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA). Although most of the Latin American leaders have felt disturbed because of his anti-hegemonic and populist rhetoric, and his ‘leadership dream’, Chávez’s influence in South America and the Caribbean basin currently has augmented because of the financial supports he provides.⁴⁴⁵ He devotes most of his time and energy to spread his political philosophy (regional integration) throughout the South & Central America.⁴⁴⁶

The following section will begin, by questioning briefly three specific countries in the Latin America and Caribbean in the context of their bilateral relations with Venezuela. This section also looks at Chávez’s (as a leftist leader) stance about the bilateral relations. These are socialist Cuba, giant Brazil and the USA-backed Colombia.

4.4.2.1.1. Fraternal relations with Socialist Cuba

Immediately after Hugo Chávez assumed Presidency, the long-standing close diplomatic and trade ties between Venezuela and Cuba further improved. The cordial relations between the two countries continued to intensify day by day.⁴⁴⁷ Previously, if we ignore Rómulo Betancourt’s harsh line to the non-elected Castro regime,⁴⁴⁸ relations between Venezuela and Cuba have continued as other Latin American countries.⁴⁴⁹ However, in the last decade, Chávez and Castro regimes have formed powerful economic and diplomatic alliances against their opponents. Surely, this was ‘kiss of life’ to communist Cuba, upon which the USA-led international sanctions have been imposed for forty years. Venezuela however has

⁴⁴⁴ UNASUL is acronym of União de Nações Sul-Americanas (Union of South American Nations) This intergovernmental organization (2008), which aims two existing Latin American customs unions (Mercosul and the Andean Community of Nations). This model is mostly inspired by the European Union.

⁴⁴⁵ Cited in Lopes, “A política externa de Chávez e Lula na América do Sul: integração regional ou consolidação de liderança?,” p. 55; “Venezuela and Latin America - Using Oil to Spread Revolution,” *The Economist*. 376, no. 8437 (2005): 47.

⁴⁴⁶ Gottheil, “Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy”, p. 8; Max Azicri, “The Castro-Chávez Alliance,” *Latin American Perspectives* 36, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): p. 105.

⁴⁴⁷ Javier Corrales, *Dragon in the Tropics : Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 122; Abdul Ruff Colachal, “Cuba-Venezuela Relations,” *Dr. Abdul Ruff Colachal*, December 17, 2009, <http://abdulruff.wordpress.com/2009/12/17/cuba-venezuela-relations-dr-abdul-ruff-colachal/>.

⁴⁴⁸ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.178.

⁴⁴⁹ Marifeli Pérez-Stable, “What Awaits the Cuba-Venezuela Alliance?,” *The Miami Herald*, April 9, 2009.

been the greatest supporter (mostly by military and economic subsidies) of Cuba in the period following the collapse of the Soviet bloc.⁴⁵⁰ Currently, bilateral relations between the two countries are more strengthened than any other countries in the hemisphere. Ongoing relations between Havana and Caracas have roughly been based on economic, political and ideological pillars.

At the economic level, after Chávez came to power, apart from Venezuela's selling petroleum to Cuba at discounted prices,⁴⁵¹ Caracas has become also a major financial source for Cuba with the 'oil-for-doctors' formula. Venezuela subsidizes large amount of oil (100,000 barrels per day), while many skilled Cuban doctors offer (Operación Milagro) medical service to poor Venezuelan people.⁴⁵² More important than this, Caracas (with neighboring countries) tries to end Cuba's US-imposed international embargo and isolation.⁴⁵³

Politically, Washington has expressed its concern on bilateral co-operation with Havana.⁴⁵⁴ Both countries' anti-imperialist stance strengthens their close relations. I think we should not miss Chávez's personal relations with Fidel Castro in order to prove the bilateral relations directed at Cuba useful. Despite their ideological differences of nuance, (Castro is communist and Chávez is Bolivarianist, neither communist nor anticommunist), as Chávez admitted on many occasions, he was personally affected/inspired by Fidel Castro and both were united in strong opposition against the US 'imperialism'.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁰ Arriagada, "Petropolitics in Latin America Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations," p. 7; Cory Fischer-Hoffman and Greg Rosenthal, "Cuba and Venezuela: A Bolivarian Partnership," *Venezuelanalysis*, January 13, 2006, <http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/1567>.

⁴⁵¹ Scott N. Cole, "Hugo Chavez and President Bush's Credibility Gap: The Struggle Against US Democracy Promotion," *International Political Science Review* 28, no. 4 (September 1, 2007): p. 498.

⁴⁵² Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.163; Daniel P. Erikson and Paul J. Wander, "Obama and Chávez: Energy Partners," *Journal of Energy Security* (April 23, 2009); Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy," p. 8; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p.15; Arriagada, "Petropolitics in Latin America Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations," p. 7; Christina Hoag, "Venezuela to Cuba: Oil Isn't Free," *The Miami Herald*, May 25, 2002.

⁴⁵³ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.195.

⁴⁵⁴ Erikson and Wander, "Obama and Chávez: Energy Partners"; Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers, *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 142.

⁴⁵⁵ Azicri, "The Castro-Chávez Alliance," p. 103; Genaro Arriagada, "Petropolitics in Latin America Review of Energy Policy and Regional Relations," p. 7.

Previously, I explained some aspects of Cuban-Venezuelan relations, but one has to be aware of the fact that Caracas's strategic cooperation with Cuba cannot be defined just as a matter of both states' commercial and political interests and "a simple gesture of political sympathy".⁴⁵⁶ The significance of Venezuela for Cuba is more than Cuba's for Venezuela.⁴⁵⁷ Although commercial and political interests occupied much space in the cordial relations, solidarity and friendship are more decisive in both states' interaction, which is a rare occurrence among countries in the world. Hence, Chávez's leftist (Bolivarianist) background has more determinant effects on those special fraternal relations than other factors.⁴⁵⁸

4.4.2.1.2. Rivalry with Latin America's Giant

Relations with Brazil are always of paramount importance for Venezuela; despite the foreign policy perspectives of the Chávez government, Venezuela has substantial differences with Brazil.⁴⁵⁹ In spite of that, however, both states have repeatedly addressed the strategic importance of being neighboring countries and made a serious effort to develop the bilateral relations.

In Latin America, Chávez has attached priority to relations with Mercosul states, (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay), Brazil being cardinal among them. These close relations are mostly based on their large-scale regional projects, despite the small ideological nuances between the two leaders. On many occasions, Chávez clearly said that he liked Lula and appreciated him as he opened the path towards the dream of a United Latin America.⁴⁶⁰ I can easily say that the only consensus between the parties are the common idea about the necessity of Latin American unity and desire for a fairer international system. The membership applications of Venezuela to Mercosul and Brazil's participation to UNASUL were indicators of strong belief in Latin American integration.

⁴⁵⁶ Hernán Yane, "The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: 'Emancipatory Neo-Bolivarismo' or Totalitarian Expansion?," *Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies*, December 2005.

⁴⁵⁷ Azicri, "The Castro-Chávez Alliance," p. 101.

⁴⁵⁸ Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.162.

⁴⁵⁹ I should remind that when I use Brazil's foreign policy, in this section, I mostly intent to Lula's term, since we do not have so much material to evaluate newly elected Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff.

⁴⁶⁰ Hugo Chavez, *The South Also Exists* (Left Word Books, 2005), p. 64.

However, three things have escalated the tensions between the Lula and Chávez administrations. Initially, Chávez's regional leadership initiatives (he spent billions of dollars for it) implicitly caused the aversion of Brazil, even though Brazil never expressed it. Indeed, Venezuela of Chávez, for my reading, is conscious of what he is doing about leadership. Chávez knows (like many of his counterpart) that Brazil is the natural leader in Latin America on account of its population and economic size, as well as geo-political importance.⁴⁶¹ The only reason for this competition is related to the Venezuela administration's 'come off second-best' demand, after Brazil. Secondly, Chávez's ingrained anti-American course paved the way for disagreement between Caracas and Brasília. Because Brazil has thought that Chávez's antagonistic attitude would provoke a possible US intervention. Meanwhile, American authorities have warned the Brazilian government about its close ties with Hugo Chávez.⁴⁶² Nonetheless, Brazil officially has maintained positive attitude toward the Venezuelan government.⁴⁶³ Lastly, Caracas's inflammatory attitude (alongside technical and moral support) regarding the nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbon resources against Brazil's state-led oil company (*Petrobrás*) has irked the Brazilian government.⁴⁶⁴

On the other hand, bilateral trade relations between countries have also played a central role in their foreign policy agenda. After all, Brazil sold the military supplies to Venezuela despite criticism by the US.⁴⁶⁵ Also, Brasília and Caracas pledged to a bilateral energy infrastructure construction, including a petrol refinery in Pernambuco, the Northeast region of Brazil.

As we can see, relations between Venezuela and Brazil have oscillated between rivalry/compulsory and comradeship; but despite the USA's repression to Brazil, it has never reached the point of clash. This is mostly due to the leadership claims between the parties. Normally, Venezuela submits to Brazil's natural leadership in the region, yet Brazil's dominant role and presence in Latin America have

⁴⁶¹ Chávez Frías, *Chávez*, p.103.

⁴⁶² Martín Sanchez, "US Warns Brazilian Govt. Over Relations with Venezuela & Cuba," *RENSE*, October 3, 2004, <http://www.rense.com/general50/vra.htm>.

⁴⁶³ Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 157.

⁴⁶⁴ Burges, *Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, p. 165; Douglas H. Carlisle, *Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Its Organization and Beginning* (University Press of America, 1979); Bourne, *Lula of Brazil*, p. 157; Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition," p. 1348.

⁴⁶⁵ Ward Adam and (ed.), "Venezuela under Chávez," *Strategic Comments*, March 2, 2005, p. 2.

constrained Venezuela's sphere of influence. On the other hand, without Brazil's active support and consent, most of the Venezuelan Bolivarianist projects regarding Latin Union and regional free trade agreements will become meaningless.

4.4.2.1.3. Up-and-Down Relations with Colombia

Modern Colombian-Venezuelan bilateral relations have been fraught with zigzags between cooperation and struggle. The course of bilateral relations mostly has been determined by who the Colombian President is, since the new President's relations with Hugo Chávez mostly depend on the USA-Colombian relations. It means Venezuela's relations with Colombia are not only bilateral, but also trilateral relations, together with the USA attendance in equation. For example, bilateral relations with Colombia of Álvaro Uribe, since 2002, have fluctuated and reached crisis point because of his ideological differences with Venezuela and close economic and politic ties with the USA government.⁴⁶⁶

On the other hand, with the inauguration of new/current President Juan Manuel Santos Calderó, the relations entered (a new turn) into a period of bilateral cooperation with Chávez's Venezuela along with Bolivia.⁴⁶⁷ He undertook the Presidency in August 2010 in the middle of a diplomatic crisis with Venezuela and then he rapidly ended the crisis by peaceful means. After broken relations with Venezuela, "We have decided that the countries (will) reestablish their diplomatic relations and re-launch a roadmap so that all aspects of the relationship may progress, advance and deepen", said Caldero.⁴⁶⁸

In addition, the border disputes and FARC (Guerilla movements) are two main pending issues that shape the direction of bilateral relations. Bilateral relations entered the new epoch on 10 August 2010, after the inauguration of Colombia's new president Calderó. Previously Chávez and Uribe, previous President of

⁴⁶⁶ "Venezuela 'To Break off Diplomatic Relations with Colombia', *The Telegraph*, August 26, 2009; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, pp.188-189; Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p.76; "Venezuela under Chávez," p. 2.

⁴⁶⁷ Gregory Wilpert, "A New Turn in Colombia-Venezuela Relations," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 43, no. 5 (September 2010): 3; "Colombia and Venezuela Restore Diplomatic Relations," *The BBC*, August 11, 2010.

⁴⁶⁸ "Venezuela Resumes Relations It Severed with Colombia," *The Latin American Herald Tribune*, n.d., <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=362587&CategoryId=10717>.

Colombia, had enormous opinion differences about the FARC and demarcation of longstanding boundary disputes.⁴⁶⁹

Existence of armed conflict between historically brother Colombian state (*país hermano*) and insurgent groups (FARC, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and ELN, National Liberation Army) has increased tensions between the two countries. Colombian government, notably Uribe government, has accused the Chávez government's suspected connections and harboring of the guerrillas (FARC and ELN) on the Venezuelan side of the border and support for them. Colombian governments have described them as terrorist organizations and wanted to dismantle them.⁴⁷⁰ Though there has been no proven evidence of support made by Venezuela,⁴⁷¹ Chávez has supported FARC since the USA supported Uribe government. Thus, Chávez gave assurance to his Colombian counterpart, Santos that he would not permit the guerrilla groups to shelter in the territory of Venezuela.⁴⁷²

Another topic that has produced friction between the Caracas-Bogotá is border disputes. As a matter of fact, Bogotá's relations with Venezuela have been more deep-rooted than any Latin American states. Although border disputes between the two neighboring nations have caused the rise and fall of tensions, but still history has never registered real armed conflict or war between Venezuela and Colombia.⁴⁷³

With discussions outlined in the preceding pages, it has become clear that Venezuela's developing of relations with those South American countries has occupied a significant place in Chávez's foreign policy agenda. This is mostly due to Venezuela's new foreign policy understanding: Venezuela, which demands a prestigious role in Latin America, can only play a prominent role in the World

⁴⁶⁹ Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy", p.8; Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, and John McBrewster, *Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government: Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government. Colombia-Venezuela Relations, United States - Venezuela Relations, Russia-Venezuela Relations, Holy See, Iran-Venezuela Relations* (Alphascript Publishing, 2009), p. 14.

⁴⁷⁰ Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.161.

⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.166.

⁴⁷² "Colombia and Venezuela Restore Diplomatic Relations"; Simon Romero, "Leaders Repair Colombia-Venezuela Ties," *The New York Times*, August 10, 2010.

⁴⁷³ Dennis Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, *Colombia: A Country Study* ([Washington D.C.]: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988).

with the help of its close relations in Latin America. I think this is one of the main distinctive foreign policy principles that have never been observed in Venezuela before. Beyond Venezuela's traditional foreign policy, Chávez's individual contribution/ideology to developing new relations with Latin America cannot be ignored. The central ideal for bilateral/multilateral relations in Latin America is the prospect of a united Latin America idea (also called union of Latin American republics in Bolivarianism).⁴⁷⁴ Relations with those chosen countries are also important because all of them represent the different aspects of Venezuela's regional policy. A relation with Cuba, solidarity of two nations, has frequently attracted attention, whereas the regional competition is generally discussed in the context of Brazil. Lastly, we also note that Chávez's strong position to the US hegemony is over international affairs, most notably in Latin America. Multi-polar international vision of Venezuela has caused a strengthening of relations between Venezuela and neighbor countries.

4.4.2.2. The Relations with the United States of America

For most of the Cold War period and after, at least until 1999, Venezuela had longstanding close relations with the USA, which could be characterized as positive.⁴⁷⁵ Relations between Caracas and Washington dramatically have reached a peak point during the Cold War years and the USA has held up Venezuela among the others as exemplary for the rest of militarily governed Latin American countries.⁴⁷⁶ In this period, ironically the USA governments secretly provided financial and military support for military regimes (against legitimate governments) in one sense. The USA also promoted the Venezuelan 'exceptional' democracy (pacted democracy) in the region without being subject to the USA's political, economic and military pressures.⁴⁷⁷ Despite the Venezuela's pro-

⁴⁷⁴ Bolívar's motto is "either we unite or we are ruined". See more details, Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.182.

⁴⁷⁵ Escobar and Romero, *The United States and Venezuela*, p.138.

⁴⁷⁶ For more details about the USA–Venezuela relations in the twentieth century, see Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*.

⁴⁷⁷ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.190.

American posture, however, for Romero, in the eyes of Washington, Venezuela has never been considered as a 'special partner'.⁴⁷⁸

One could wonder why the bilateral relations have been reversed between the two allied nations after Chávez assumed power. We can obviously claim that the inauguration of Hugo Chávez was the only reason for that sudden shift in the bilateral relations. Hence, Chávez believes that the USA governments (especially after the election of George W. Bush) "only wanted to control Venezuela's oil".⁴⁷⁹ This part of the thesis seeks to uncover the direction of the relations after Chávez came to power and the factors, which have influenced the worsening of bilateral relations. To do that, we elaborate the issue in terms of economics, politics and security. At the end of this section, even if not our central focus, we also get opportunity to find an answer for the question which we asked before: "what happened to Venezuela for accelerating such enormous awareness in the global agenda while Venezuela had in the past been considered as a marginal state". To what extent does Venezuela's Bolivarian foreign policy represent a historical break with the past? But how can relatively weak states such as Venezuela or Iran hope to resist the foreign policy objectives of a superpower like the United States?

4.4.2.2.1. Politics

It is obvious that Caracas-Washington political relations have been deteriorated since Chávez rose to the Venezuelan presidency in 1999. Under Chávez's leadership, Venezuela's outspoken foreign policy has exhibited a challenge to the United States of America. Indeed, frictions in relations escalated notably after April, 2002. One may wonder if this is just because Chávez and Bush's "paths did not cross", as Bush's national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, said⁴⁸⁰ or there are other elements we need to put into equation to see the changing dynamics of bilateral relations.⁴⁸¹ I believe it is deeper than that. Here, in political relations, I

⁴⁷⁸ Romero, "The United States and Venezuela: From a Special Relationship to Wary Neighbors," p. 146; Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p. 73.

⁴⁷⁹ Cole, "Hugo Chavez and President Bush's Credibility Gap," p. 496.

⁴⁸⁰ Alessandro Parma, "Chávez Claims Victory Over Bush in Argentina Summit," *Venezuelanalysis*, November 7, 2005.

⁴⁸¹ Eva Golinger, *Bush versus Chávez: Washington's War on Venezuela* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008), p. 14.

have focused on some critical issues that determine the Venezuelan government's and the US administration's political course.

Initially, Bolivarian foreign policy, which constitutes the ideological pillars of Chávez's international perspective, envisages a 'multipolar' international system. It means, when we rephrase it, Venezuela opposes the USA's dominant role both in the regional and international affairs. Although this idea does not belong to Venezuela, since almost all states in the world claim it, (or it is not the only country that supports it), Chávez expresses his anti-American discourse loudly. Along with the main ideological differences on the international system with the USA, the government of Chávez has a concrete reason for its anti-American posture: role of the USA in April 2002 failed military coup d'état attempt.

4.4.2.2.1.1. April 2002 Military Coup d'état and Allegations of the USA

Until the Chávez government assumed the presidency in 2002, Hugo Chávez has used a 'cautious language' or made some 'indirect attacks' on the United States of America and its leaders like many other leftist leaders.⁴⁸² In a certain limited sense, it can be understood, yet in the aftermath of the failed military coup d'état attempt to Hugo Chávez government, the tone of the USA criticism shifted from simple opposition to direct radical antagonism.⁴⁸³

On the day of April 11, 2002, the President of Venezuela, Chávez, was ousted from Office by a military coup d'état and detained for 47 hours. He was, however, re-installed after pro-Chávez popular support and some military official's insubordination.⁴⁸⁴ Although it was not precisely proven that Bush administration was behind the coup d'état, the Venezuelan government has raised strong allegations regarding the USA government about its involvement in the military

⁴⁸² Ellner, "La política exterior del gobierno de Chavez: la retórica chavista y los asuntos sustanciales," p. 127.15; Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics*, p.196.

⁴⁸³ Julian Brooks, "Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution," *Mother Jones*, October 4, 2005, p. 2; Parma, "Chávez Claims Victory Over Bush in Argentina Summit".

⁴⁸⁴ "Cronología de un vacío de poder," *BBC Mundo*, April 5, 2007; Valentín Arenas Amigó, "Chávez, un Presidente de facto," *Analítica*, July 19, 2002, <http://www.analitica.com/va/politica/opinion/4117749.asp>; Tom Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy", 2004, p.9, <http://www.gwu.edu/~uwp/fyw/euonymous/2004-2005/Gottheil.pdf>.

coup d'état.⁴⁸⁵ For example, Chávez himself (like former President of the USA, Carter) claimed numerous times that Washington officials knew about the coup and approved it.⁴⁸⁶ He forwards the ascertain saying that "I have written proof of the entries and exits of two military officers from the United States into the headquarters of the coup plotters and I have their names, whom they met with, what they said, proof on video and on still photographs".⁴⁸⁷ During the time when Chávez was in a military base, as a detained ousted leader, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer explained that they were looking forward to working with the interim government and accused Chávez of provocation of the crisis,⁴⁸⁸ whereas almost every other western hemispheric government condemned vehemently.⁴⁸⁹

In response to the Venezuelan assertions, Washington claimed that President Bush prevented Venezuela, under Chávez leadership, to shift to authoritarian state.⁴⁹⁰ In my opinion, unlike the USA official reports,⁴⁹¹ a primary objective in this failed coup d'état was not about democracy but to drag the Chávez government from the office through undemocratic means. Ellner and Salas clearly exhibited the issue in their article: "the United States has talked about democracy

⁴⁸⁵ Miller, Vandome, and McBrewster, *Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government*, p.31; Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, pp.119,127; Romero, "The United States and Venezuela: From a Special Relationship to Wary Neighbors," p.145; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 3; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p.134; Golinger, *Bush versus Chávez*, p.24.

⁴⁸⁶ An interview with Colombian *El Tiempo* newspaper "I think there is no doubt that in 2002, the United States had at the very least full knowledge about the coup, and could even have been directly involved," said Carter. "US 'likely behind' Chavez coup".

⁴⁸⁷ Greg Palast, "Warning to Venezuelan Leader," *BBC News*, May 6, 2002; Gottheil, "Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy," p. 12.

⁴⁸⁸ Ellner, "La política exterior del gobierno de Chavez: la retórica chavista y los asuntos sustanciales," p. 118; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p.22.

⁴⁸⁹ According to one Washington official, "our message was very clear: there are constitutional processes. We did not even wink anyone. We were not discouraging people... We were sending informal, subtle signals that we don't like this guy. We didn't say, 'No, don't you dare,' and we weren't advocate saying, 'Here's some arms, we'll help you overthrowing this guy'. We were not doing that". Cited in Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, p.120; Judith Levin, *Hugo Chávez* (New York: Chelsea House, 2007), p.16; Hellinger, "Venezuelan politics in the Chávez Era," p. 51.

⁴⁹⁰ Scott Cole, "Hugo Chávez and President Bush's Credibility Gap," p. 496.

⁴⁹¹ After the incidence, the USA senate sent special inspector in order to report the failed coup. The inspector (s) reported the USA position in the military coup. To see USA arguments, look at the full text of report, *A Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela* (Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), July 2002), <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13682.pdf>.

promotion while funding⁴⁹² efforts to undermine the elected Chávez presidency”.⁴⁹³ Whether the USA government was linked to the coup attempt or not, the USA’s Latin American past record (proven support for overthrowing Allende’s socialist government in Chile, 1973) has deepened doubts about the USA support.⁴⁹⁴ It means that because of Washington’s credibility problem, the allegations of the USA involvement in the coup and its strong desire for undermining the Chávez government, was a proof that White House’s ‘pro-democracy rhetoric’ in Venezuela was no more than an excuse.⁴⁹⁵

Another aspect of relations between Caracas and Washington has been Chávez’s close political linkages with the states which had adversarial relations with the USA. White House does not approve the Chávez’s international friends, like Fidel Castro, Iranian President Ahmadinejad *etc.*; his country’s international partnership with Russia and China.⁴⁹⁶ Washington isolates the Venezuelan government from Latin American continent in order to prevent Venezuela from challenging the USA influence in the Latin America and becoming a ‘second Cuba’ or a ‘negative force’, as US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said. Chávez has created new alliances with the aim of achieving internationalization of his goals.⁴⁹⁷

Naturally, there are other aspects of the bilateral relations between the USA-Venezuela, and we do not claim that the coup d’état was the only prime issue on its opposition to the USA; yet, without hesitation, Venezuela’s main path towards the USA has been pursued immediately after *April 2002 military coup d’état*.

4.4.2.2.2. Trade Affairs

⁴⁹² Most of the democracy funding in Venezuela came through the National Endowment for Democracy, which was funded by the U.S. Congress. See Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.170.

⁴⁹³ Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, “Introduction: New Perspectives on Politics and Society,” *Latin American Perspectives* 32, no. 3 (2005): p. 7; Gottheil, “Antagonism and Intervention: Hugo Chávez and American Foreign Policy,” p. 16.

⁴⁹⁴ Duncan Campbell, “American navy ‘helped Venezuelan coup’,” *The Guardian*, April 29, 2002; Vulliamy, “Venezuela coup linked to Bush team”; Golinger, *Bush versus Chávez*, p.16.

⁴⁹⁵ Cole, “Hugo Chavez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap,” p. 496; Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” p.26; Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.168.

⁴⁹⁶ Levin, *Hugo Chávez*, p. 16.

⁴⁹⁷ Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” p.3; Cole, “Hugo Chávez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap,” p. 498; “Venezuela under Chávez,” p. 2.

The economic aspect of the two countries is the most stable area in comparison to other elements of bilateral relations. Because of its nature, its base during decision-making process has been constituted mostly by rational choices, which is economic interdependency (mutual interest) between Venezuela and the United States. It (economic interdependence) prevents the profound break in Caracas-Washington relations. Because of this, today (in the light of the already completed nationalization process in Venezuela), it causes no radical changes (or little impact) whomever is in the charge or howsoever great ideological differences exist between leaders of both nations.⁴⁹⁸ Therefore, for some, energy policies and economic realities give shape to the current government of Venezuela instead of ‘ideology and principles’.⁴⁹⁹ Here two central topics have come to the forefront in the economic relations with the others: oil and FTAA

4.4.2.2.1. Oil Dependency on / of Venezuela/ the USA

Since the drilling of oil in Venezuela (early 1910s), the economic aspects of bilateral relations have had more effect on the determination of relations with the USA. It also remains valid today. Venezuela’s high oil supply and the USA’s high oil demand (*addicted oil*)⁵⁰⁰ force the two adverse parties to cooperate over the petroleum. Albeit the United States has been an important trading partner of Venezuela, which is one of the prominent suppliers of foreign oil to Washington,⁵⁰¹ Caracas is the third-largest market in Latin America where the US exports machinery-industrial products, computers, and agricultural commodities.⁵⁰² With the help of the high petroleum exports and the rise in world oil prices, and trade surplus stemming from this export, Chávez funds his Bolivarianist project and Venezuela’s economic well-being.⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁸ Miller, Vandome, and McBrewster, *Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government*, p. 29.

⁴⁹⁹ Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan revolution*, pp.135-36; Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” p.17.

⁵⁰⁰ The president of the United States of America, Bush’s famous acknowledgement. For more details, see Douglas Schoen, *The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chávez and the War against America*, Free Press hardcover ed. (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 66.

⁵⁰¹ *Venezuela Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013* (European Union External Action, November 4, 2007), p. 10, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/sp/index_en.htm.

⁵⁰² Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, 167.

⁵⁰³ Erikson and Wander, “Obama and Chávez: Energy Partners”; Dodson and Dorraj, “Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran,” p. 43.

In an effort to reduce reliance on the Chávez government, the USA government already has raised a question of American national energy security or energy dependence. Venezuela, under Chávez administration, also wants to expand its markets and diversify Venezuela's trade partners, including Venezuela's membership in Mercosul and economic partnership with China and Russia, in order to avoid heavy dependence to the USA oil purchasing.⁵⁰⁴ In effect, Hugo Chávez has threatened/warned many times that he will/would indeed cut off oil, if the USA invades Venezuela or tries to kill him.⁵⁰⁵

4.4.2.2.2. FTAA vs. ALBA

Another significant aspect of bilateral trade relations is the subject of FTAA. Chávez is the sole Latin American leader who undertakes a vocal role against the USA-led free trade proposal and entitled it as 'annexation plan' and a 'tool of imperialism'.⁵⁰⁶ Beyond that, some serious economic and political concerns that are mentioned in the Brazilian part about the FTAA (a risk for the USA's economic and trade unilateralism, for the issue of agricultural subsidies, and for the USA's rapid progress pressure *etc.*),⁵⁰⁷ have also been expressed by the Chávez governments. During the Summit of the Americas meeting in 2005, Venezuela, along with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay buried the FTAA, which was the United States' top economic policy priority in Latin America, with avoiding to schedule the next FTAA meeting.⁵⁰⁸

Regarding the FTAA, Chávez plays not only the persuader role to other Latin American states to resist the agreement, he also proposes them a new "model of

⁵⁰⁴ Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 24.

⁵⁰⁵ Levin, *Hugo Chávez*, p.17; Adam and (ed.), "Venezuela under Chávez," p. 2.

⁵⁰⁶ For more details about the posture of Chávez against the FTAA, see José Briceño Ruiz, "The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in the Foreign Policy of Hugo Chavez Frias," *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association (Annual Meeting 2006 2006)*: p. 1; Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela a Comparative Perspective*; Harold A. Trinkunas, "What is Really New about Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy?," *Strategic Insights* 5, no. 2 (February 2006): 1-8; Aleida Guevara, *Chavez, Venezuela and the new Latin America : an Interview with Hugo Chavez* (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2005), p. 10.

⁵⁰⁷ Miller, Vandome, and McBrewster, *Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government*, p.29.

⁵⁰⁸ Parma, "Chávez Claims Victory over Bush in Argentina Summit"; Hellinger, "Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era," p.46; Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p.75; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p.30; Parma, "Chávez Claims Victory Over Bush in Argentina Summit".

hemispheric integration”⁵⁰⁹ (promotes socialist and protectionist trade agreement),⁵¹⁰ which is called the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (*Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas*, ALBA). It was mostly inspired by the model of the European Union.⁵¹¹ Precisely, beyond the classical regional trade integration, it also supports a social oriented regional trade block that makes an effort in the areas of poverty combating, health, education, and culture, apart from investment, and finance.⁵¹² Yet in practice, we can hardly say that Venezuela can fulfill the mentioned claims because as most of Latin American leaders think, this initiative may confront major ideological obstacles as it is endorsed by Chávez and Fidel Castro.⁵¹³ Although Chávez’s regional trade bloc represents the country’s critical stance, it has never been a real alternative to FTAA in the region.

4.4.2.2.3. Security and Military

By contrast to previous times/regimes, since the election of President Chávez, Venezuela has not sought a close bilateral security and military partnership with the United States of America and has been critical of the US military and security policies both in the region and in the world. Parties, especially after the beginning of 2000, have accused each other with destabilizing actions in the region⁵¹⁴ and in

⁵⁰⁹ Julia Buxton, “Venezuela’s Contemporary Political Crisis in Historical Context,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): p. 340; Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, p. 205; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p.121.

⁵¹⁰ Stephen M. Siptroth, “Welcoming all to a Table of Plenty: The Free Trade Area and The Bolivarian Alternative as Competing Means of Economic Integration in The Americas,” *UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs* 12, no. 2 (Fall2007 2007): 359-391; “Leftist Trio Seals Americas Pact,” *BBC News*, April 29, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4959008.stm>; Cole, “Hugo Chávez and President Bush’s Credibility Gap,” p. 498.

⁵¹¹ ALBA, Spanish acronym of Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, also means “dawn”. “Formally it was introduced at the Third Summit of the Heads of State and the Government of the Association of Caribbean States (December, 2001). See Dodson and Dorraj, “Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran,” p.75; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, Golinger, *Bush versus Chávez*, p.184.

⁵¹² Mark P. Sullivan, *Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy* (U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2006), p. 50; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, pp.182-88.

⁵¹³ Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” p. 30.

⁵¹⁴ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p.191.

the world due to disagreements in a range of areas, including arm purchasing, combating terrorism and military invasions (in Iraq and Afghanistan).⁵¹⁵

An excessive military spending of the Venezuelan administration is considered as the mostly criticized point for the bilateral relations. After Venezuela suspended all military purchasing and cooperation with the USA, and Washington's policy based on not selling military equipment to 'authoritarian Chávez regime', Venezuela began to seek alternative sources of arms supply from the 'network of allies', which are Brazil, China, and Russia.⁵¹⁶ Doing this Venezuela tried to decrease its military expertise and equipment dependency on Washington and continued to procure Venezuela's military needs in order to prepare itself against a possible attack by the US.⁵¹⁷ Taken all these into consideration together, the White House has verbalized several times its concerns about the Venezuelan military spending.⁵¹⁸

Though disagreements on counterterrorism efforts or terror cooperation occupy a secondary status in the bilateral security relations, relevant tensions have increased the existing crisis in the relations. Chávez expressed Venezuela's skepticism about the USA's methods of combating terrorism and declared his opinion, implying the war in Afghanistan, in the words: "you cannot fight terror with terror".⁵¹⁹

In other respects, the USA governments have frequently articulated their strong opposition to Venezuela's ideological sympathetic statements and support for Colombian insurgent groups (the FARC and the National Liberation Army), its

⁵¹⁵ Miller, Vandome, and McBrewster, *Foreign Policy of the Hugo Chávez Government*, p.30.

⁵¹⁶ Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, pp. 200-201.

⁵¹⁷ Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, p.122; A. Trinkunas, "What is Really New about Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy?"; P. Sullivan, *Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy*, p. 49.

⁵¹⁸ P. Sullivan, *Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy*, p. 134.

⁵¹⁹ Sami Kent, "How Hugo Chávez Broke My Heart," *The Guardian*, May 15, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/15/hugo-chavez-broke-my-heart>; Golinger, *Bush versus Chávez*, p.15; Nikolas Kozloff, *Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S.* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 3; James Petras, "U.S. Venezuelan Relations: Imperialism and Revolution," *Petras.lahaine.org*, May 1, 2010, <http://lahaine.org/petras/articulo.php?p=1796&more=1&c=1>; A. Trinkunas, "What is Really New about Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy?"; Crandall, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War*, p.129; Hellinger, "Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era," p. 46; Adam, (ed.), "Venezuela under Chávez," p. 2.

reluctant struggle against terrorism and unwillingness about its obligations in accordance with international narcotic agreements.⁵²⁰

Taken all these into consideration together, it is clear that comprehending Venezuela's relations with the USA, particularly under the presidency of Chávez, needs decoding the complex web of the relations. Other than sophisticated bilateral relations, as stated at the outset, one more thing is important in describing the exact size of bilateral relations: academic materials either contain passionate protagonist ideas or focus on the matter through the antagonist lenses. It is necessary to go beyond such pre-established judgments. Indeed, reality is more than this. In order to avoid that, I prefer to see Venezuela-USA relations through the multidimensional point of view, including politics, economics, security, and military relations. In the political area, the Chávez government has a confrontational attitude toward Washington. Additionally, the Chávez government has implemented a high profile foreign policy to steer Washington's sphere of influence in Latin America. This could partially explain Chávez government's multi-polar world vision, and more importantly, the USA's sympathetic reactions to the interim government. It is mostly at the political level that Hugo Chávez has had an opportunity to project his personal 'decisive impact' on the foreign policy issues.

In comparison to political and partly military and security relations, however, the economic relations exhibit stable progress, despite occasional troubles (e.g. cutting oil threat or using oil as a political weapon).⁵²¹ On economic relations, Venezuela's long-term state interests matter more than Chávez's Bolivarianist vision. The parties have never suspended their economic relations, even in the most troubled times. Chávez regime's excessive dependency on petroleum production and revenues to realize his political projects and the US administration's high oil demand (dependency) constrain possible clashes in economic relations.⁵²² Without doubt, this has also paved the way for the US side

⁵²⁰ Ellner, "La política exterior del gobierno de Chavez: la retórica chavista y los asuntos sustanciales," p. 119; Ellner, *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*, p. 200; P. Sullivan, *Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy*, p. 53.

⁵²¹ *El petróleo como instrumento de política exterior en el gobierno del presidente Hugo Chávez Frías*, p. 85; Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez Phenomenon," p. 70.

⁵²² Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p.178.

to seek alternative oil resources considering the reduction of the consumption/buying of Venezuelan oil. At this point, it is worth saying, regarding the bilateral relations, that not only the USA get annoyed of the changing nature of economic conditions in Venezuela, but also, more than the others, the White House's paramount interest for demanding the overthrowing of Chávez administration arises from political concerns. Although Chávez's pejorative discourse toward the US has not been taken seriously by many world leaders, it damages the USA's prestige/respectability in the international arena, and the US government seems helpless due to the high popularity of Chávez around the world.

4.4.2.3. Relations with the Third World

Apart from the Latin American countries, President Chávez has established strong ties with the governments from the different regions of the world. At first glance, it seems not a new issue in the Venezuelan foreign policy; yet President Andrés Pérez Rodríguez in his first term (1974-79) followed the 'Third Worldist' foreign policy in order to adopt independent foreign policy (e.g. two hand policy) in the Cold War environment, as a 'non-aligned' (neither Soviet Union nor the USA) member. Initially, Pérez's alternative initiative was searching the mutual economic interests with the Third World⁵²³ countries and claiming leadership to underdeveloped nations. The failure of Pérez's extreme assertion on the leadership of southern nations was a proof that leadership claims remained illusory until sufficient conditions are fully completed.

As regards the Chávez government, it seeks to create new strong political, economic and cultural alliances with the multi-polar world system. If we look at the matter from this point of view, we see that relations with Third World countries constitute the main pillars of the Venezuelan international relations. In order to realize this purpose, Venezuela has tested various methods/ways. For example, its significant position in OPEC and collaboration with the nations that

⁵²³ Commentary about the concept of "Third World" and its derivatives that we have annotated previously in the Brazilian chapter could also apply for this section.

are not satisfied with current world system and the USA's ultimate 'imperial' power, have already proven to be useful in the Chávez era for achieving this purpose.⁵²⁴ It briefly means that those countries either adversary or rival to the White House constitute the main axis of Chávez's Third World policy.

We should also note that there are some parallel goals between the Venezuelan administration and its strategic allies in the age of globalization. In this section, I think it will be more useful to elaborate some of the common goals with the Third World states. Thus, after general overview of the Venezuelan bilateral relations with the Third World, I will focus on (OPEC) Venezuela-Iran relations, with particular reference to political issues and on the relations with the People's Republic of China as manifestations of South-South relations.

4.4.2.3.1. Islamic Republic of Iran

The expanding diplomatic relations with Iran clearly gives Venezuela a significant degree of influence/awareness both in the World and in Venezuela. This is mostly because, since the Islamic revolution in 1979, the White House has kept Iran, as an Islamic state at a close watch. Therefore, Iran's cordial bilateral relations with any states may define the latter's position in the relations with the USA. The deteriorating relations between the USA and Iran were the major reason for Venezuela under the Chávez government to build strong relations with Iran. This 'common enemy' friendship started during the end of Mohamed Khatami's term in office (1997–2005). Immediately after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power, the existing relations between Iran and Venezuela began to deepen. It is thus clear in the light of previous discussions, that nothing other than hatred of the United States could bring together these two different ideologically motivated nations.⁵²⁵

⁵²⁴ Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p. 216.

⁵²⁵ Otherwise none can explain the Chávez's following statement: "we [Venezuela] stand by Iran at every moment, in any situation". For more details, see Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 31; Douglas Farah, "Iran in Latin America: An Overview," in *Iran in Latin America: Threat or "axis of annoyance"?*, Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari and Adam Stubits. (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010), p. 16; Dodson and Dorraj, "Populism and Foreign Policy in Venezuela and Iran," p. 81.

Indeed, as a political goal, both countries share the desire to establish ‘an alternative power structure’ (axis of unity, emphasis on humanity and justice) independent of the USA hegemony, which continues to broaden the relations.⁵²⁶ On the other hand, Iran’s close diplomatic, trade and military influence in Latin America has posed a particular threat, and the developments is followed with deep concerns by the USA, Europe and some Latin American nations.⁵²⁷

Another important aspect of the bilateral relations is Hugo Chávez government’s complete support for Iran’s nuclear research and its right to get nuclear energy with peaceful purposes.⁵²⁸ In response to the Venezuelan gesture, Iran provides technical support to Venezuela to develop (enriched uranium) its nuclear energy program.⁵²⁹

Setting aside Venezuela’s political and diplomatic relations, there are huge amounts of trade agreements and energy cooperation with Iran. For instance, both countries’ respectful position in the OPEC facilitates amity ties between the two petroleum-producing countries. Although economic issues are vital to Caracas and Tehran, the direction and the future of relations have been marked by political will, mostly by Hugo Chávez’s close personal affinities with Ahmadinejad until present time.⁵³⁰

4.4.2.3.2. People’s Republic of China

A few countries have truly emerged in the international system after the dissolution of the Soviet Russia. China is one of them. Its sustainable economic boost is an indisputable fact for China’s increased role. Though the relations

⁵²⁶Robert M. Morgenthau, “The Iran-Venezuela Axis of Scam,” *American Interest* 5, no. 3 (January 2010): 50-54; Parisa Hafezi, “Iran, Venezuela in ‘Axis of Unity’ Against U.S.,” *Reuters*, July 2, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/07/02/us-iran-venezuela-idUSDAH23660020070702>; Susanne Gratius and Henner Fürtig, “Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” *Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior*, April 2009, p. 1.

⁵²⁷ Geoff LeGrand, “Bienvenido Señor Ahmadinejad: Tehran’s Expanding Latin American Grid,” *The Council on Hemispheric Affairs* (December 2, 2010); Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Overview,” p.13.

⁵²⁸ “Chavez Backs Iran in Nuke Dispute,” *USA TODAY*, April 15, 2007; Ariel Farrar-Wellman, “Venezuela-Iran Foreign Relations,” *Iran Tracker*, May 12, 2010.

⁵²⁹ Simon Romero, “Venezuela Says Iran Is Helping It Look for Uranium,” *New York Times* (2009): 8.

⁵³⁰ Gratius and Fürtig, “Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral Alliance and Global Power Projections,” p.3.

between China and Venezuela officially began in 1944, these nations had no worthwhile relations until a decade ago. It is a widely agreed point that Chávez government has made the rise of China a keystone of his administration's foreign policy in the days following his first election.⁵³¹

It is possible to say that Chávez has not followed the strategic partnership with Beijing in a similar vein with Iran. Even though it is said of Chávez that "...the growing ties with Beijing are part of his stated aim to build a new multi-polar model of international relations 'to break' US hegemony"⁵³² Venezuela's quest for close relations with China is more related to economic concerns (oil) than politics.⁵³³ Caracas's interest in such cooperation provided Venezuela an important opportunity for diversifying its import markets. China, with its growing market, has pleased the Chávez's Bolivarian regime, which wanted to sell them oil and provided them with alternative market for technology.⁵³⁴ Major economic and technology transfer/guarantee agreements doubtlessly prevent the US market's bluff (dependence)⁵³⁵ on not buying oil, which is the lifeblood of Bolivarian Venezuela's regime.⁵³⁶ Hence, Washington is now the largest single recipient of Venezuela's crude oil. With the Sino-Venezuelan agreements, they also envisaging the development of oil fields/refineries (e.g. Faja del Orinoco) and technology transfer to Caracas, Venezuela has achieved a self-sufficiency in various sectors.⁵³⁷ Indeed, Beijing's political and economic presence in Latin America, particularly when it comes to Venezuela, caused the USA policy-makers to be alarmed immediately, due to the White House's 'energy security' problem.⁵³⁸

⁵³¹ Joseph Cheng J.S. and Huango Shi, "Sino-Venezuelan Relations: Beyond oil," *Issues and Studies* 44, no. 3 (2008): p. 99.

⁵³² Dima Khatib, "Chavez's 'Historic' China Strategy," *Al Jazeera*, August 15, 2009.

⁵³³ Daniel Shih, "China's Doctrine of Mutual Benefit: a Case Study of Sino-Venezuelan Relations" (Undergraduate Honors Thesis, Stanford University, 2011), p. 47, <http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/honorsthesis/DanielShih.pdf>; W Ratliff, "Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chavez," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12, no. 2 (2006): pp. 80-1.

⁵³⁴ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 181.

⁵³⁵ Erikson, "A Dragon in the Andes?," p.84.

⁵³⁶ Cheng J.S. and Shi, "Sino-Venezuelan relations," p. 111.

⁵³⁷ Khatib, "Chávez's 'Historic' China Strategy"; Ratliff, "Beijing's Pragmatism Meets Hugo Chávez," p.80.

⁵³⁸ François Lafargue, "China's Strategies in Latin America," *Military Review* 86, no. 3 (May 2006): pp. 80- 3; Erikson, "A Dragon in the Andes?," p.84. For detail analysis on the USA factor in Sino-Venezuelan Relations, see Cheng J.S. and Shi, "Sino-Venezuelan Relations," pp. 133- 40.

To sum up, then, what this section briefly provides us is the Chávez administration's relation with the Third World nations and his Third World perspective. Mainly, what inference we can draw from this section is the existence of respectable correlation between Chávez's Third World politics and the mood of relations with the USA. Venezuela's Third World strategy, beyond the multi-polar vision, comes from more practical reasons. It is no surprise then that Venezuela's growing close ties with Iran and China, and its emphasis on 'South-South' relations, different from his predecessor, is more related to Venezuela's posture toward the USA than other reasons. If one takes note of the discussion points in the section, s/he can realize that we underlined the three major sides of the relations: political, economic, and military. In spite of their huge ideological differences, close political relations with Iran is a sign of the Venezuelan administration's search for political alliance in the international stage against the USA hegemony. In addition, Venezuela's key role at OPEC (together with Iran), allows the Venezuelan state to develop new relations with the Third World countries, especially with Arab nations.⁵³⁹ In the meantime, Venezuela's excessive dependence on crude oil-oriented economy and the USA's purchasing country role (as a major customer) in that fragile economy, certainly prodded Chávez into building economic partnership with China. Most probably, Washington will remain Venezuela's principal crude oil customer, at least a decade more; Chinese 'insatiable appetite' (due to its high consumption) for the Venezuelan petroleum will strengthen Chávez's hand in the long run.⁵⁴⁰ When Chávez's trade cooperation demand and Chinese state's high oil demand converged to the same direction (win-win strategy), both countries have made an unprecedented collaboration not seen before. Bilateral relations with China and Iran are not only based on specific area/point (i.e. political and economic), but this paper focused on the most salient issues in the mutual relations. Lastly, the section concludes, however, with the observation that Chávez's effective role in the development of relations with the Third World countries is mostly because of his individual efforts. We should also stress that Chávez's priority in these relations

⁵³⁹ Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p. 158.

⁵⁴⁰ Lafargue, "China's Strategies in Latin America," pp.80-1; Shih, "China's Doctrine of Mutual Benefit: A Case Study of Sino-Venezuelan Relations," p. 51.

have more practical (economic, political and military) than ideological (solidarity) motivations.

4.4.3. Venezuela's Posture in the United Nations with regard to the Global Problems Sustaining an Unjust International System

Following the years of assuming presidency, the Chávez administration, like many of his counterparts, has staunchly been criticizing international system's structure and dominant position of small number of western powers there. To express his criticisms of world order, President Chávez used international platforms, as United Nations. In this regard, it is not altogether wrong to say that the Venezuelan President was one of the first leaders who began to question the principles that accommodate the international system. In addition to that, he claims that the new reality of post-Cold War (particularly, 11 September 2001) has not been completely considered by powerful states.

Chávez's position at the United Nations (UN), as a global platform, provides substantial information to the reader about Chávez administration's reaction on international matters. To that end, I attempt to examine the Venezuelan foreign policy posture during the term of the Chávez government vis-à-vis the UN. I mostly focus on Chávez's statements (and Venezuelan representatives at the UN bodies) at the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Since critical stance towards the global problems may offer concrete details about Chávez's ideological pattern, I also elaborate Venezuela's posture in the UN with regard to global problems sustaining an unjust international system and western hegemony over the organization. In order to accomplish that end, I focus particularly on several global challenges that Chávez has been emphasizing on. These are international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons; and, poverty and hunger. It is worth to note that Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had never been placed as a non-permanent member in the years of Chávez's term of office. Therefore, we only discuss the Chávez government's thoughts and ideas on the Council.

4.4.3.1. The United Nations General Assembly

It is tempting to say that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the second most discussed intergovernmental organization, after UNSC (or SC). Though most of the nations have crucial suspicions about the UN, there is strong motivation that triggers states for any initiative: multilateralism and multi-polar world expectations. International organizations are the most favorite actors that make possible to implement those ends. In this sense, Chávez thinks that the UNGA has to be given a central role in efforts to establish a multilateral world system.⁵⁴¹ Although there are numerous institutionalist disputes within the UNGA, it is not my purpose to make literature review. This is because enormous and valuable academic works already exist in this field of study some of which were briefly discussed in the Brazilian part. Even so, in an effort to elicit the Venezuela's political stance at the Assembly, the following main points are the Assembly's most well known expostulated points.

Firstly, for the Chávez government, at the roots of the UNGA problems laid the structural questions. This point was made during his statement at the General Debate at the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly and Chávez addressed at the UN podium: "The United Nations has exhausted its model. And it is not simply a matter of proceeding with reform, the twenty-first century".⁵⁴² The emergence of the UN coincides with the Second World War, and in today's international global system, it has collapsed.⁵⁴³

⁵⁴¹ "Statement by Jesús Arnaldo Perez, Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", September 24, 2004; Steven Mather, "UN General Assembly President Praises Venezuela for Development Goals Progress," *Venezuelanalysis*, June 24, 2010.

⁵⁴² "Intervención del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ali Rodríguez Araque, Debate General de la Sexagésima Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas", September 19, 2005; "Statement by Ambassador Jorge Valero Deputy-Minister For North America and Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations at the 65th Session of the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly", September 29, 2010.

⁵⁴³ "Statement by Jesús Arnaldo Perez, Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly"; "Intervención del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ali Rodríguez Araque, Debate General de la Sexagésima Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas".

Second critical point that Chávez's Venezuela points out in the UN General Assembly is related to the future of the organization. Chávez criticized the worthless situation of the Assembly, and he stated that the UNGA is 'deliberative organ', where the political leaders come every year to listen to the leaders' speeches there, while it has no substantial authority.⁵⁴⁴ As a solution to this grave situation, Chávez administration has a concrete proposal. According to Chávez administration, there should be some structural changes in the Assembly. Immediately after criticizing the UN system, Chávez called on the leaders of nations to re-establish or strengthen the General Assembly's weight in world politics and take into account the opinion of majority of states leaders. For Chávez, the current UN system is worthless and anti-democratic.⁵⁴⁵ Since the UN is the only universal organization that includes almost all countries in the world, it is inevitable that it manifests real power structures.⁵⁴⁶

Beyond stressing the UN role in international relations, Chávez also makes use of the UN chair as an opportunity to share his Bolivarian ideology with other statesmen and to attack the great hegemonic powers, notably the USA imperialism.⁵⁴⁷ In this regard, during the UNGA speech in 2006, he condemned capitalism and US imperialism. He put forward the assertion, in reference to President Bush, that "The devil came right here [referring to the UNGA rostrum]... And it still smells of sulfur today". Presumably, he intended to play his Bolivarianist role in order to damage the USA's hegemonic prestige with this pejorative statement.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁴ Mather, "UN General Assembly President Praises Venezuela for Development Goals Progress"; "Intervención del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ali Rodríguez Araque, Debate General de la Sexagésima Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas".

⁵⁴⁵ "Chavez's Megalomania," *Washington Times*, September 24, 2006; Mather, "UN General Assembly President Praises Venezuela for Development Goals Progress"; "Statement by Ambassador Jorge Valero Deputy-Minister For North America and Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations at the 65th Session of the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly"; "Statement by Jesús Arnaldo Pérez, Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

⁵⁴⁶ Mathias Poertner, "Venezuelan Oil Diplomacy and Voting in the U.N. General Assembly," *Journal of International Service* Spring (2011): p. 107.

⁵⁴⁷ Ewell, *Venezuela and the United States*, p. 208.

⁵⁴⁸ "Intervencion del Presidentede la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chavez,en la 64ª Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas", September 24, 2009; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 19; "Chávez's megalomania"; "Statement by His

After all, it is safe to say that Venezuela's main methodological approach to the UNGA can be divided into the two parts. Almost in all of speeches, he has given much emphasis to expressing structural and institutional criticism and, then, talking about the international global problems, as following pages will mention. While drawing on its shortcomings and problems, Venezuela never ignored the potential power of the UNGA.

4.4.3.2. The United Nations Security Council

Although Venezuela pays attention to the scope and authority of the Security Council discussions, it was mostly interested in the Council because of multilateralism principle. For Chávez, for the transition of the unipolar world system to the multipolar system, global institutions should be strengthened, particularly the UN bodies. Due to Venezuela's low profile capacity, Chávez administration has not made the SC as one of the priorities of its foreign policy. Instead, Chávez has sympathized with expanding the UNSC to include emerging powers; thus, he supported Brazil's permanent membership in the Security Council.⁵⁴⁹

Since the Council was created, great number of books and articles has been written on the structure of the Security Council, but especially after the end of the Cold War, the dimension and size of discussions have increased. At the beginning of the discussions, without doubt, non-democratic structure of the Council and problems of representation in the Council came to table as a matter of debate. This is the main issue of conflict among the Council's five permanent members -China, France, and Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States- and

Excellency Hugo Chávez Frias, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 61th Session of the United Nations General Assembly", September 24, 2006.

⁵⁴⁹ Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p. 152; "Statement by Ambassador Jorge Valero Deputy-Minister For North America and Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations at the 65th Session of the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly"; "Intervencion del Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Roy Chaderton Matos Enviado Especial del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela para el 63th Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones de la Asamblea General de las Unidas Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas", September 29, 2008; "Intervencion del Presidentede la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, en la 64º Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas".

other member states of the United Nations, including ten non-permanent members. To cure the problem, member states have proposed many ways of solution, but the permanent members are reluctant to share their ‘great power unanimity’, sometimes called as a ‘veto’ power. In this sense, like other members, Venezuela participates in the reform supporters that demand the enlargement of the Council according to geographical representation.⁵⁵⁰ Also, they argue that Venezuela’s presence in the Security Council will resist “a model based on preventive war [implying the USA’s war of Afghanistan and Iraq] and situation of permanent interventionism” and would bring in independent voices, which represent human dignity, most importantly the voices of Third World.⁵⁵¹

In an effort to realize that end, Venezuela actively attempted to conduct lobbying activities about candidacy of non-permanent UNSC seat in 2006. After Chávez’s world tours, Venezuela received the support of Africa, Russia and southern hemispheric organizations (Mercosul, Caricom, the African Union and Arab League). Yet, at the end, to Venezuela’s disappointment, Guatemala, backed by the USA⁵⁵² government was announced as a non-permanent winner of the United Nations Security Council election.⁵⁵³ It is not hard to know that Venezuela’s strained relations with Washington and Chávez’s aggressive

⁵⁵⁰ For further discussion on the geographical representation argument, see Martin Binder, “The politicization of International Security Institutions: The Case of the UN Security Council” (presented at the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, 2008).

⁵⁵¹ “Intervención del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, Ali Rodríguez Araque, Debate General de la Sexagésima Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas”; Lapper, “Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela,” p. 19.

⁵⁵² In this process, Washington obviously expressed its support for Guatemala. The USA Ambassador John Bolton said: “We don’t normally get involved in regional group decisions,” Bolton went on; “We did only because of the threat that we thought Venezuelan obstructionism posed to the good operation of the Security Council, and I think that the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly members understood that”. He also said: “Today that the U.S. government’s “objective” of preventing Venezuela from taking the UN Security Council’s seat had been “accomplished”. For further information on the process, see “Diplomats Hope to End U.N. Division on Guatemala, Venezuela Candidacies,” *USA TODAY*, October 31, 2006; Karl R. DeRouen and Paul Bellamy, *International Security and the United States: An Encyclopedia* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), pp. 29, 913; Bill Varner, “Chavez’s Push for UN Council Seat Sets Up a Showdown With U.S.,” *Bloomberg*, October 11, 2006, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aHbR19zyxptU&refer=italy>.

⁵⁵³ Greg Morsbach, “Chavez Tour Piques US Interest,” *BBC News*, July 24, 2006; Stephen Lendman, “Venezuela Leading the Race for the UN Security Council Seat,” *Z Net*, August 22, 2006.

speeches (anti-American rhetoric) in the UN General Assembly caused Venezuela's failure to get enough votes to win the Council seat.⁵⁵⁴

In order to obtain a full picture about Venezuela's posture in the United Nations and towards an unjust international system, it is necessary to go beyond the discourses at the UNGA and the UNSC. Now, I keep my comments on matters and especially issues of global problems, as scrutinized below.

4.4.3.3. Global Problems

Though there are some significant parallels between domestic and global problems, Venezuela in the Chávez era has not only changed its domestic problems strategy; but also re-evaluated the country's global questions. Whatever the results are of these radical changes, however, Venezuela's policies could made a remarkable contribution to the efforts for getting concrete details on the Chávez administration's political ideology and, more importantly its global stance. For instance, how effective is Chávez's political view (Bolivarianism) over the country's approaches towards global problems. I underlined three specific themes reflecting global problems: Venezuela's posture towards international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons, poverty and hunger.

4.4.3.3.1. International Military Aggression

Principally, according to his statements, we can easily infer that Chávez has a critical stance to any kind of military aggression. In theory, at first sight, his statements on aggression are very easy on the ear, but in practice, we need to check for Venezuela's late history record in effort to see how much Chávez's speeches are compatible with his practices. When it comes to practice, however, the USA and Israel cases are the two clearest indicators to take the measure of Venezuela's attitude on international military aggression. In the last fifty years, the international community has seen these two countries as the most aggressive

⁵⁵⁴ Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p.22.

states on the earth. Apart from these two countries, I also discuss Venezuela's reaction to current military intervention in Libya, 2011.

Firstly, starting with the USA military aggression/invasion, Venezuela not just abstained (like Brazil and most of other nations) regarding the American unilateral military attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq; the Chávez government also took part among the states that openly condemned the occupations. Given this fact, it may seem interesting that Chávez's open criticism of the illegal invasion by US-led coalition forces of Afghanistan (2001) and Washington's *Preemptive attack* doctrine are two preliminary reasons for the birth of 'Cold War' between Chávez and G.W. Bush administrations.⁵⁵⁵ The Chávez government's main argument on military aggression is summarized in his well-known quotation. Referring to the American attack against Afghanistan, he said, "You can't fight terror with terror".⁵⁵⁶

Secondly, comes Chávez's posture vis-à-vis another aggressor state Israel. Indeed, Venezuela's interest in the Middle East is totally different from other Latin American and Caribbean states. As an OPEC founding member and signatory country of the Movement for Non-aligned Countries (NAM), Venezuela has close historical ties with Arab and Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, Venezuelan attitude towards the Palestine-Israel question covers more elements beyond Chávez administration's special involvement to the case. In the case of Israeli occupation, Venezuela draws on the Tel Aviv administration's disproportionate military aggression and on the "political genocide of the Palestinian people and crime against humanity". Moreover, he said that Israeli government planned to implement an "ethnic cleansing of the Arab people" in the Palestinian territory.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁵ Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 190; "Statement by Jesús Arnaldo Pérez, Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly".

⁵⁵⁶ "Security in Venezuela," *The Economist*. 366, no. 8315 (2003): 57; Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, p. 169; Hugo Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution: Hugo Chávez talks to Marta Harnecker* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005), p. 128.

⁵⁵⁷ Statement by the Vice Minister for North America and Multilateral Affairs and Permanent representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ambassador Jorge Valero, Tenth Emergency Special Session of General Assembly, *Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East*

Alongside with the USA and, Israeli case, it is beneficial to remind that Venezuela, under Chávez's authority, recently has drawn greater international attention in the line with multi-state coalition that began launching military intervention in Libya (19 March 2011).⁵⁵⁸ Before military operation started, Venezuelan Ambassador, Jorge Valero, called on the United Nations "to stop invasion plans against Libya", and rejected a decision to suspend the North African country from the UN Human Rights Council due to Muammar al-Gaddafi's crackdown on popular protests, as 'hasty'. The only reason why Venezuela opposed the operation was its view regarding Libyan people to determine their own destiny.⁵⁵⁹ Hugo Chávez claimed that this operation does not care about the lives of the Libyan people; it is war of oil. The main concern of western powers in this operation is obtaining the North African country's (Libya) huge oil reserves.⁵⁶⁰

Significantly, it is clear that Venezuela's critical stance over the three military aggression cases (Washington's unconcerned attack against Iraqi and Afghani people, Israeli aggression in Palestine and presence of coalition forces in Libya) proves that Chávez's socialist government does not hesitate to raise a vocal criticism of international military attacks. These lead us to believe that Chávez administration criticizes the military aggression not because of its physical damages that appeared after the military attacks; it also condemns it due to normative reasons. For his Bolivarian understanding, a military attack means ignoring the self-determination right of nations (national sovereignty), human rights and international law. In addition to that, it is likely that Venezuela's close ties with the NAM, OPEC and Arab nations may cause it to take a tougher attitude against the aggressor states.

Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (New York: UN General Assembly, January 16, 2009); "Statement by Ambassador Jorge Valero Deputy-Minister For North America and Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations at the 65th Session of the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly".

⁵⁵⁸ Military interventions began with the USA, British and French forces' attacked Libya on grounds that the using military force to quash when Libyan uprising in early 2011. Later NATO took over the commandment of the operation.

⁵⁵⁹ "Venezuela Asks the UN to Prevent a Military Invasion of Libya," *El Universal*, March 1, 2011.

⁵⁶⁰ Daniel Wallis, "Venezuela's Chavez Denounces Military Action in Libya," *Reuters*, March 19, 2011.

4.4.3.3.2. Disarmament and Nuclear Weapons

There is a contentious issue over recent military acquisitions of Latin American nations at huge amounts. Despite disagreements over the amount of the expenditures, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, the reality of increased military spending, which increased 50% during 1999-2008,⁵⁶¹ maintains relevance. Among the Latin American countries, however, international society recently continues to agitate for the Venezuela's spending on military equipments and its nuclear weapon strategy under Chávez presidency. Before we draw any conclusions, we need to explain properly, what are the main arguments behind Chávez's disarmament and nuclear policies.

For the critics (including American officials) of the Chávez government's military spending, Venezuela intends, with rapid increase in the state's GDP, increase in its military capacity. Obviously, it destabilizes the region (Condoleezza Rice's, former US Secretary of State, 'negative force' imputation in the region) and prompts the regional arms race.⁵⁶² Chávez utilizes Venezuela's 'petro-dollar' resources to modernize its military, Venezuelan Armed Forces (FAN), through military purchases from Russia.⁵⁶³ For S. Romero, Venezuela agreed with Russia about buying 24 Sukhoi fighter jets, 50 transport and attack helicopters, and 100,000 assault rifles.⁵⁶⁴ Also, Real Instituto Elcano's research shows that Chávez engages in military spending for maintaining his Bolivarianist projects.⁵⁶⁵ When we put it all together, it has been interpreted by some analysts that Venezuela's increased arms purchases are due to hegemonic purposes in the relations with South American and Caribbean states and in international affairs.⁵⁶⁶

⁵⁶¹ Carina Solmirano and Sam Perlo-Freeman, "Is South America on the Brink of an Arms Race?," *SIPRI*, January 10, 2010.

⁵⁶² Jeff Colgan, "Venezuela and Military Expenditure Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (January 2011): p. 1, http://nw08.american.edu/~colgan/index_files/Venezuela%20and%20Military%20Expenditure%20Data.full.2011Jan.pdf; Solmirano and Perlo-Freeman, "Is South America on the Brink of an Arms Race?"

⁵⁶³ Urbaneja, "La Política Exterior de Venezuela," pp. 2, 5.

⁵⁶⁴ Simon Romero, "Venezuela Spending on Arms Soars to World's Top Ranks," *New York Times* (February 25, 2007): 3; Alex Sanchez, "Venezuela's Military in the Hugo Chávez Era," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, 2008.

⁵⁶⁵ Cited in Luis Nava Molero, "Factors Affecting Increasing Military Expenditures in Latin America, 1996-2006," *Indiana Journal of Political Science* (Winter, 2009/2008): p. 55.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

On the other hand, Chávez government's justification for recent arms acquisitions is absolutely different from what the accusers claim. Venezuela, however, accepts that Venezuela made large military purchases during the Chávez tenure,⁵⁶⁷ but claims that very small percentage of national expenditures goes to military acquisitions.⁵⁶⁸ The aim of Venezuela is not creating hegemony over the region; instead, National Armed Forces tries to upgrade their old weapons, communications, and surveillance system in an effort to defend Venezuela's sovereignty and security.⁵⁶⁹ In addition to that, there are two prominent justifications for the Chávez administration's military spending: possible invasion of the USA is one of the justifications for the military acquisition of the Chávez regime; and the border problem is another.

In case of an attack against Venezuela (by the USA), the country needs resistance against invasion. Chávez says, "... the Venezuelan revolution is vulnerable to attack from the U.S". This means that "Venezuela thus must be prepared to defend itself [against *asymmetrical war*], just as Cuba defended itself in the Bay of Pigs in 1961".⁵⁷⁰

Alongside with the USA threat, Venezuela's relations with its neighbors also determine its disarmament policy. Colombia, backed by the USA, escalates tension in the borders and accuses Venezuela for arming the insurgent group, FARC. Occasionally, particularly during the office of President Álvaro Uribe who had strong ties with Washington, Venezuela and Colombia came close to military conflicts due to the scrambles for border disputes. In one of his speeches, Chávez said, "Lamentably in Colombia, the oligarchy governs [...] It is possible that the

⁵⁶⁷ In order to estimate Venezuelan military spending, it is better to compare its expenditures with its neighboring countries. According to SIPRI Database, this indicates the 2010 military expenditure, including its percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009. Argentine military expenditure, 3,179,000,000 \$ (1.0% of GDP); Brazil, 28,096,000,000 \$ (1.6% of GDP); Colombia, 9,191,000,000 \$ (3.7% of GDP) and Venezuela, 3,106,000,000 \$ (1.3% of GDP). For more details on the years of 2000- 2008, see Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook 2010*, p. 227.

⁵⁶⁸ Colgan, "Venezuela and Military Expenditure Data," p.1.

⁵⁶⁹ Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 15; Solmirano and Perlo-Freeman, "Is South America on the Brink of an Arms Race?"

⁵⁷⁰ Cited in Nava Molero, "Factors Affecting Increasing Military Expenditures in Latin America, 1996-2006," p. 55.

Colombian government could lend itself to a military action against Venezuela”.⁵⁷¹

On the issue of nuclear weapon, Venezuela, as signatory member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970), campaigns for nuclear disarmament⁵⁷² and supports various resolutions, which hold that nuclear weapons must be eliminated through “simultaneous multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts”.⁵⁷³ But this is only on the basis of reciprocal commitment. For example, Chávez opposes western countries’ demand for sanctions against Iran, which intend to punish Tehran’s nuclear energy program. Venezuela strongly advocates Iranian nuclear projects and peaceful use of the program.⁵⁷⁴ Chávez criticizes P5+1 (Five Permanent members and Germany) countries’ hegemony and double standards over the nuclear weapons.

I would thus conclude that, firstly, Chávez administration’s armament agreements (mostly with Russia) and Venezuela’s military acquisitions and modernization are for defensive purposes (Washington’s military attack possibility and border disputes with Colombia). Venezuela is no exception in this regard. Up until Chávez’s twelve years in Presidency, we have never witnessed any Venezuelan military aggression against its neighbors and other nations. Normally, it is expected that Chávez, as a socialist leader, should oppose any kind of military spending, but under conditions that one may confront imminent attack and has long-standing border problem with a neighbor, which has a military cooperation agreement with Washington, no rational leader can opt for disarmament policies. It is also important to note that Venezuela always supports disarmament and advocates the elimination of nuclear weapons in the global platforms (i.e. the UNGA). In my opinion, the only reason why Chávez government’s military purchases create a tremendous opposition in the USA is its close links with Russia. It is not possible to understand Washington’s defamatory

⁵⁷¹ “Venezuela ‘On Alert’ for Threats From Colombia,” *China Post*, February 4, 2008, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/2008/02/04/141892/Venezuela-'on.htm>.

⁵⁷² James Sugget, “Venezuela’s Chávez Declares Support for Obama’s Nuclear Disarmament Pledge,” *Political Affairs*, April 11, 2009.

⁵⁷³ United Nations, *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. (New York: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2007), pp. 39- 40.

⁵⁷⁴ Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran, Venezuela Leaders Seek ‘New World Order’,” *The Associated Press*, October 21, 2010; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 182.

campaign about Venezuela without considering close relations between Caracas-Moscow. The existence of Russia- for any purpose, even for peaceful goal- in Latin America and Caribbean basin irritates the White House.

4.4.3.3.3. Poverty and Hunger

“My order was: “Go house to house combing the terrain”.
The enemy. Who is the enemy? Hunger”.⁵⁷⁵

An examination of Venezuela’s current foreign policy provides the researcher considerable perspective about the nation’s domestic events as well as international affairs. Clearly, poverty and hunger are two of them. Historically speaking, during the Presidential election campaign in 1998, Chávez made pledge to eliminate poverty and corruption if he was elected. As one of three election campaign promises (resolving ossified two-party system and fight against corruption were two others), the Venezuelan leader’s stress to end poverty indicates how poverty was a big problem in the Venezuelan society. A similar case has been valid for other Latin American people. In this section, I shall briefly discuss Chávez government’s poverty and hunger strategies. According to Chávez’s own diagnosis, Venezuela is not a poor country, if majority of the Venezuelan were still poor, it was that previous regime made benefits available only to the country’s wealth (oil) to ‘rotten elites’ (from politics, business and labor unions).⁵⁷⁶

As mentioned in the first chapter (neo-liberal policies and avoidance from critical perspectives), the determinant factor in the election of Hugo Chávez was the weariness of the Venezuelan people of previous governments’ failed orthodox neo-liberal policies (particularly Pérez’s shock therapy)⁵⁷⁷ and increased poverty and hunger, and extreme inequality in income distribution among the sectors of societies etc. as a natural result of those implemented policies.⁵⁷⁸ Chávez also refers to liberal economic policies and then claims that Venezuela’s poverty has been affected by the White House’s inspiration (Washington Consensus) which

⁵⁷⁵ Chávez ordered the military to assist in the social and economic development for the poor and in rural areas. Marta Harnacker’s interview with Hugo Chávez. See Hugo Chávez Frías, “The Military in the Revolution and the Counterrevolution,” Marta Harnacker, October 2002, <http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/cuba/mepla/venezu/ilib2.pdf>.

⁵⁷⁶ Phil Gunson, “Chávez’s Venezuela,” *Current History* 105, no. 688 (February 2006): p. 61; Wilpert, *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power*, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁷⁷ Goodman and al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, p. 5.

⁵⁷⁸ Julia Buxton, “Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez,” in *Venezuelan politics in the Chávez Era: Class, Polarization, and Conflict*, Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger. (London; Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 113; Goodman and al., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience*, p. 6; Meltzer, “Hugo Chávez and the Search for Post-Neoliberal Policy Alternatives in Venezuela,” pp. 89-104; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p. 128.

persuaded the oligarchic Venezuelan political leaders to reduced oil prices and to allocating a small amount of the country's resources to social expenditures.⁵⁷⁹

Internal and external figures unequivocally prove that poverty percentages decreased dramatically in Venezuela after Chávez's election. Indeed, for many analysts, there is a direct link between Chávez's successes on combating inequality, poverty and social justice along with other social reforms, with his popularity in the eyes of Venezuelan citizens. He put the poverty and hunger at the top of his Bolivarian agenda.⁵⁸⁰ He said, "By 2021, whatever its cost, there will be zero poverty in Venezuela".⁵⁸¹ In this direction, it must be born in mind that in spite of strong pressure of the Venezuelan business elites and middle classes to discharge him from office, his recurrent electoral victories and re-election for Presidency, after being ousted from office for 47 hours, could only be comprehensible by a consideration of Chávez's successes on social reforms, like poverty, education, health, unemployment *etc.*, and support of poor from the peripheral barrios.⁵⁸²

For Chávez, poverty and hunger is a sort of terrorism; in order to combat with them one has to deal with poverty terrorism since these social problems (hunger, unemployment, and poverty) destabilize the democratic regimes. He thus establishes a direct link between democracy and poverty. To that end, the Chávez government has been seeking various ways to combat poverty trouble.⁵⁸³ In order to combat poverty, hunger and social exclusion, he has used instruments such as providing credit to small enterprises, for those who want to work with "People's

⁵⁷⁹ Cole, "Hugo Chávez and President Bush's Credibility Gap," p.50.

⁵⁸⁰ Ronald Sylvia and Constantine Danopoulos, "The Chávez Phenomenon," p. 75; Lapper, "Living with Hugo U.S. Policy Towards Hugo Chávez's Venezuela," p. 39; Ashley Wagner, "A Decade in Power: An Assessment of Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, February 13, 2009; Romero, "Hacia un Paradigma Bolivariano de la Política Exteriorde Venezuela".

⁵⁸¹ Gunson, "Chávez's Venezuela," p. 61; Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, p. 252.

⁵⁸² Barry Cannon, "Venezuela, April 2002: Coup or Popular Rebellion? The Myth of a United Venezuela," *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2004): p. 295; Julia Buxton, "Economic Policy and the Rise of Hugo Chávez," 114.

⁵⁸³ José Antonio Gil Yepes, "Public Opinion, Political Socialization, and Regime Stabilization," in *The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, Jennifer L. McCoy and David J. Myers. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 224.

Bank” (Banco del Pueblo Soberano), National Development Bank, Venezuelan Investment Fund and Women’s Bank besides deepening democracy.⁵⁸⁴

Beyond the domestic strategies, Chávez brings poverty and hunger problems into global agenda via international and regional organizations (i.e. the UN and ALBA). While speaking in the Assembly as President of Venezuela, he clearly stressed structural aspects of poverty and its natural consequence, hunger. Apart from Venezuela’s leading role (a major contributor state) about fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goals- MDG,⁵⁸⁵ his government encourages international community for structural changes and the necessity of international organizations to go a step further in the international development aid funds in an effort to overcome poverty. “We are not limiting ourselves to help feed the poor; rather, we are committed to helping the poor feed themselves”. he said.⁵⁸⁶

Finally, concerning Chávez’s poverty and hunger policies, it is possible to infer that poverty and hunger question is one of the striking issues among the global problems. Making sense of his ideological elements, the Chávez government’s poverty and hunger policy, as a social dimension of its international policy provides an indicator of it. Chávez’s poverty-ending initiatives amply lead anyone to make a statement that the principal driving force for Chávez administration is ideology rather than simple national interest. It is otherwise not possible to make a comprehensive explanation of Venezuela’s global scale initiative/contribution to combating the inequality, poverty and hunger. In my reading, his particular emphasis on global issues originates from ethical responsibility, which is stemming from Chávez’s socialist vision of the world.

⁵⁸⁴ Chávez Frías, *Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution*, pp.131- 133. After all, it can be said that Chávez administration has internalized the Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen’s famous argument that democracy is the best recipe against hunger.

⁵⁸⁵ Sarah Wagner, “Venezuela to Fulfill Millennium Goals Three Years Early,” *Venezuelanalysis*, March 16, 2005; James Sugget, “Venezuela On Track to Achieve Millennium Development Goals in Education,” *Venezuelanalysis*, November 14, 2008; Mather, “UN General Assembly President Praises Venezuela for Development Goals Progress”.

⁵⁸⁶ “Intervencion del Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Roy Chaderton Matos Enviado Especial del Presidente de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela para el 63th Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones de la Asamblea General de las Unidas Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas”; “Intervencion del Presidentede la Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, en la 64° Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas”; Cannon, *Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution*, p. 184. It might also define Venezuelan argument as “shift from 'food aid' to “food sovereignty”; “Statement by Jesús Arnaldo Pérez, Foreign Minister of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela at the Opening of the General Debates of the 59th Session of the United Nations General Assembly”.

This section has thus far been mainly concerned with the Venezuelan standpoint regarding the United Nations in the sense of some global problems, which leads us to make several concluding remarks. The role of Venezuela in the United Nations has been discussed through the years that Chávez has been in office (1999). Beyond the well known demands for structural changes (reform in the Assembly and democratization of the Council) in the General Assembly and the Security Council, Venezuela is one of the exceptional states that vocally stressed in the United Nations rostrum its opposition to western hegemony over the organization and Washington's 'imperialist' purposes. The UN platform also provides the socialist President to promote his political ideology (Bolivarianism). Concerning global problems such as international military aggression, disarmament and nuclear weapons, and poverty and hunger, however, Chávez's individual experience becomes an inspiring power to engage the problems. It reflects drastic changes in traditional guidelines of Caracas's foreign policy understanding.

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, starting from post-Second World War till today, historical evolution of the Venezuelan foreign policy has been discussed; but I have mostly concentrated on *Punto Fijo regime* (1958-1998) and Chávez's presidency (1999-con't). After brief note on recent Venezuelan external relations and its place in the wider world, I have examined the general peculiarities of Venezuela's foreign policy. Like many other American states in Venezuela, presidential system and the President's role in decision-making process in foreign policy is cardinal, meanwhile institutional structures of ministry of foreign affairs and traditional foreign policy guidelines normally provide counterbalance against the President of the country during decision-making process. Due to institutional weaknesses of *Ministry of Popular Power for the Foreign Affairs*, the Venezuelan President's effect is very high. It is important to keep in mind that, since the exploration of oil, even if its weight has partially diminished in the Chávez era; the ministry has

been increasingly putting its imprint on the agenda of the Venezuelan foreign affairs.

Although the primary goal of the present chapter is presenting Chávez administration's central foreign policy principles and the degree of its harmony with his political ideology, pre-Chávez era has also been discussed. The main reason for studying pre-Chávez period is to understand changes and continuities in the Venezuelan foreign affairs and to differentiate the Chávez government's own contribution to foreign policy.

To see differential features between Chávez administration and previous Venezuelan regime (refers to pre-Chávez period) in changing times, some major foreign policy issues have been compared and contrasted (horizontal comparison) throughout the preceding pages.

First of all, the principle of multilateral diplomacy is one of the rare common characteristics of Chávez era and his predecessors. Attempting to develop close ties with developing countries and the NAM countries was the main result of the Venezuelan leader's multilateral vision. To a certain extent former Venezuelan presidents achieved that goal, but their limited capacity prevented them from building economic cooperation with the Third World states. At the same time, the Venezuelan authorities wanted to remain as the White House's main ally (remember Pérez's two-hand policy). This achieved only a very limited 'independent foreign policy' and presence in the international arena. In the case of Chávez's terms in office, assisted by Venezuela's confrontation with the USA and existing of newly emerging powers (as China, India, Brazil and Russia), the Venezuelan authorities have been creating more room for maneuvering for implementing their own agenda after 2000s. Chávez's attempts to acquire new allies for Venezuela have served to realize Venezuela's multilateralist vision.

Secondly, relations with neighboring states are primary subject in the Chávez's foreign affairs agenda. His main goal is to ensure Venezuela zero problems with South American and Caribbean basin nations. In order to establish strong relations with them, the Chávez government has taken concrete steps to improve ties with neighbors. Chávez's desire to turn Venezuela into the 'second best' country (after

Brazil's undisputed leadership position) has forced him to deliver some foreign aid, oil subsidies (Cuba), and undertake the financial liability of some nations (Argentina). Above all, the idea of 'Latin American Union' (Bolívar's dream in itself) is the main motivation of Chávez's Latin politics. Actually, there had been no similar initiative or agenda item in the Venezuelan foreign policy tradition. Due to the reason for getting along with Washington, sometimes the Venezuelan leaders in the past disregarded their neighbors (remember Betancourt doctrine and Cuba). Lastly, we can easily claim that Chávez's Bolivarian worldview is the most pressing element for the visible changes in the country's relations with Latin nations. When, then, looked at from the glance of the level of analysis, one is compelled to focus on the idiosyncratic personality of the Venezuelan President (individual level of analysis).

Third, Washington–Caracas relation is the most decisive touchstone to gauge Venezuelan foreign policy direction. In Venezuelan international relations (like all states in the world), most of the debates are in one way or another are associated with the USA. This is because, even though the international system is evolving to a multi-polar order, the USA still is the superpower in the planet. Therefore, by putting aside the White House's significance with respect to global issues, one cannot put matters into proper context. When it comes to Punto Fijo's Washington policy, however, sometimes Venezuela regime has become distanced from the USA orbit; particularly while Pérez in tenure(s), but bilateral relations have never been deteriorated during/post-cold war times. The destructive influence on the bilateral relations began to dominate shortly after Hugo Chávez assumed presidency. As one would expect, such drastic shifts in the relations (from special relations to antagonism) must be based on strong justifications. Although there are various factors and aspects (politics, economics and security) behind the Chávez administration's daring posture, it could be appropriate to acknowledge that the April 2002 Venezuelan military coup d'état against Chávez and allegations of the USA involvement and Venezuela's special relations with Iran are leading motives behind that matter.

Fourthly, Venezuela's policy in the relations with the Third World countries have to be interpreted in the light of the country's petro-centric foreign policy

tradition and through Chávez's anti-systemic socialist vision. Since the creation of the OPEC, Venezuela has had close partnership with Middle Eastern countries and Arab nations because of common interest. On the other hand, Venezuela's resistance to western hegemonic world order paved the way for the strategic partnerships with actors in other regions of the world. In this direction, Chávez's Venezuela is ready to promote relations with the states whose leader or people complain about the current international system (Iran) and who can set up a kind of alternative economic relations to prevalent capitalist economic system.

This chapter, finally, looked at how Venezuela has adopted a particular attitude towards the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly and Security Council. These attitudes affect the country's stance about the global problems and unfair international system. In this context, the Venezuelan leader underlines some critical points. Alongside with the organization's undemocratic/unrepresentative and deliberative problems (structural), Chávez is also very persistent about inevitable future changes of western hegemony over the UN bodies (notably Security Council) and the USA's irreverent attitude for the rest of the nations. Hugo Chávez interprets most of the global problems as an outcome of unfairly structured international organizations. Venezuelan government's recent stance in the UN and its pro-active initiatives intending to overcome its deficiencies in comparison to the attitude of previous governments could be considered as novelty in Caracas's international relations strategy.

CHAPTER 5

A CRITICAL COMPARISON BETWEEN LULA AND CHÁVEZ REGIMES IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY

5.1. An Examination of the Main Issues

In the two preceding chapters, foreign policy practices of the leftist leaders of Brazil and Venezuela were discussed by horizontal comparison method (e.g. Lula-FHC; Chávez-Punto Fijo regime). In this chapter, I will apply a compare and contrast technique for understanding the international politics of Latin America's two leftist leaders (horizontal comparison). To give a clearer explanation of substantive foreign policy differences pursued by Chávez and Lula, the chapter elaborates Chávez's and Lula's main foreign affairs by comparison. There are a number of parallel goals between Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policies about Latin American nations. Significantly, in a similar vein, both Latin countries put the South American states as a prime agenda in their foreign policy. As discussed earlier, Brazil (global) and Venezuela (regional) have their own reasons for such a posture. In this context, leadership in the continent and Latin American integration process need to be discussed.

Firstly, on the battle of regional leadership, Brazil and Venezuela adopted different strategies. Brazil under Lula administration shaped its leadership claim according to the understanding of dependency (particularly economic and trade dependency). After close economic transactions with South American nations, due to its economic magnitude, they voluntarily consented to Brazil's leadership. Differently from Latin America's giant, Venezuela has adopted a particular attitude about leadership competition. Chávez government has been spending billions of dollars as economic aid packages and provisions of subsidized oil for funding Latin American nations. In fact, this sort of initiative has more advantages for Venezuela's influential role in the region in the short-run, even though some

criticize it as Cold War strategy/reflex (e.g. redolent of the USA's Cold War development assistance).⁵⁸⁷

After all, officially, they are not struggling for leadership⁵⁸⁸ and Venezuela's demand for having active presence in the continent and Chávez's populist behaviors, should be understood in connection with other influential Latin American states (e.g. Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Mexico *etc.*), instead of focusing only on Brazil. Therefore, I call the Venezuelan active initiatives as a battle for 'second-best' position and demand for respective role in regional matters. However, in my opinion, on the way of leadership, because of the reasons mentioned before, Chávez's Venezuela, is the only Latin American country that could exhibit an annoying attitude towards Brazil, but even so, Chávez's unexpected move could not cause serious damage to Brazil's leadership.

Leaving aside the leadership debate, the hemispheric integration is another common ground between Brazil and Venezuela. The region's two leading statesmen have played a key role in establishing the Union of South American Nations in 2008 (UNASUL). Like its leadership strategy, Brazil has pursued an economy-centered integration policy. Lula governments envisioned a large-scale regional economic integration. By contrast, Chávez's socialist regional integration project is largely driven by ideological (Bolivarian) motives. To do that, Chávez spent huge amounts of money familiarizing the Latin American states with Bolivarian ideology. Finally, what needs to come to the fore is that, despite their different points of view about the integration and countless uncertainties about its realization, the idea of integration (Latin Union) has been considered an innovation that never came to the Latin American agenda before the leftist governments.

Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policy towards the USA also remain a key concern for comprehending Chávez and Lula governments. In the eyes of the two leftist South American leaders, the USA has remained as the biggest representative of world imperialism. In theory, both have had negative opinions

⁵⁸⁷ Sean W. Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil's Lula and Venezuela's Chávez," *Third World Quarterly* 28, no. 7 (2007): pp. 1345, 1353.

⁵⁸⁸ Burges, "Building a Global Southern Coalition," p. 1343.

about the USA because of their ideological stance, but in practice; the leaders, as on many issues, exhibited two different approaches towards the White House. Although Washington was also dissatisfied with the Lula and Chávez presidency, it preferred the Lula government to the Chávez administration. There are a few reasons for that choice.

Primarily, while Lula was in opposition, he was rather critical of the USA. Immediately after he assumed Presidency, he emphasized (with affirmative language) the ‘reciprocal interest and respect’ in the relations between Brazil and the USA. Significantly, Lula never vocally criticized the USA nor cut relations no matter how many disagreements (namely economic and security issues) had arisen between the two important countries. Here Lula’s affirmative posture vis-à-vis the USA, unlike the Chávez government, derived mostly from pragmatic considerations. This has not been the case in the relations between the US and Venezuela. While Chávez government used ‘cautious language’ and made some ‘indirect attacks’ to the ‘Imperialist’ power, not long after the 2002 military coup d’état, he began pursuing more antagonistic policies towards the USA. Nevertheless, in spite of deteriorated bilateral relations, the parties refrained from breaking off relations totally.

Third World states tend to manifest complicated structures that need to be unraveled. It allows researcher a different perspective that generates an alternative analysis. While ‘idea of the Third World’ produced different ways of understanding of international system (i.e. Non-aligned movement) in the Cold War epoch, today many statesmen (like Chávez and Lula) call for alternative models to the current international system. Interestingly, anti-systemic demands naturally direct the leaders to the Third World sphere; therefore, Chávez and Lula administrations saw the Third World states as an opportunity for anti-systemic initiatives. What clearly distinguishes Chávez and Lula governments is the latter’s approach towards the Third World. Lula’s dependency approach, which envisioned diminishing foreign vulnerabilities by developing relations with the Third World countries, dominated the direction of the bilateral relations, unlike Chávez’s solidarity emphasis. Although Lula’s Brazil was more powerful and effective on global issues, because of Chávez’s populist rhetoric (anti-American)

and his growing familiarity among the people of the Third World countries made Venezuela more salient and popular in the non-western world.

Finally, a map of Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy cannot be fully drawn without getting an idea about the state's attitude towards intergovernmental organizations (namely the UN), global problems, and most importantly, the (currently unfair) international system. Due to the fact that the UN and its institutions (the UNGA and UNSC) represent recent changes in the international system, on this account, touching upon Chávez's and Lula's own point of view regarding the UN may give one satisfactory answer compared to other foreign policy issues. However, returning to the primary discussion point, it should be outlined that both leaders' vision about the international system are different from each other. As Vigevani and Cepaluni highlighted in their book, Brazil, under the Lula presidency, had the desire "to search for deep changes *within the system*, whilst Venezuela wants to change the *system itself* [emphases added]".⁵⁸⁹

Up to now, the main issues of Brazil and Venezuela have been briefly discussed. The next section investigates the move from the states' foreign policy implementation to the onset of some principal motivations that lie behind their differences. Spending an effort to see the main divergences could help in estimating other issues of discord.

⁵⁸⁹ Vigevani and Cepaluni, *Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times*, p. 127.

5.2. Understanding the Causes behind their Differences

Throughout this thesis, various foreign policy subjects regarding Brazil and Venezuela have been discussed. After the examination of these main foreign policy issues, one can readily observe that despite both leaders being considered (by academics and politicians) as leftist/socialist, Brazil under the Lula presidency and Venezuela under the Chávez reign exhibited big differences in their respective foreign policy behavior. In actuality, such inferences could be estimated because, as noted in detail within the first chapter, there is more than one Left in the Latin American region. A much more striking aspect is that little has been written about actual differences between Brazil and Venezuela, irrespective of the two leftist leaders' foreign policy understanding. In this comparison section, two of the leading 'new' leftist leaders in the South America will be discussed: the distinct presidents Lula da Silva of Brazil and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. This, as presented in the introductory part, 'horizontal comparison,' can serve as an analytical approach to studying foreign policy implementations, not merely to categorize the Brazilian and Venezuelan experience as 'good' or 'bad'.

Methodologically, for analytical compliance, the following section will be separated into two main units of analysis: the state level and individual level. In what sense the dynamics of divergences were caused by having different state or individual backgrounds will also be analyzed. To be able to clarify this issue and find a satisfactory answer to the previously stated question, it is crucial to go beyond general statements about the Latin American 'Left'. Despite the fact that there are some shortcomings of applying this type of method, just like there is no clear-cut difference in reality between the individual and the state level of analysis. Yet, this method provides useful means about avoidance of generalizations. Here, in this section of thesis, different from other parts, I do not apply 'systemic level of analysis' approach because both Latin American leaders have pursued a foreign policy in the same international system environment, which is called multipolar system. Instead, I suggest that understanding the causes behind their differences need to be contemplated apart from the systemic analysis. Therefore, I would only prefer to use the state and individual levels rather than applying all three levels of analysis.

5.2.1. State Level Analysis

If anyone demands to rank state and individual levels of analysis, undoubtedly, the precedence must be given to the state level in the hierarchical order.⁵⁹⁰ In this regard, the determinative differences between the two Latin American states lie in the fact that both Venezuela and Brazil have their own specific conditions. For this section, the essential differences will be briefly compared and contrasted.

Firstly, since Brazil's declaring independence from Portugal on September 7th 1822, despite the military regimes, Brazil's institutionalist structure developed day by day. Particularly after Barão do Rio Branco's (known also as 'Brazil's diplomacy father') influential effect on modernization of the Ministry of Brazilian Foreign Affairs (*Chancelaria*), Brazil has been establishing traditional guidelines in foreign affairs, as well as in other institutions of the country. Through the years, a 'check and balance system' has been formed as the building block of domestic and international political affairs. When it comes to diplomacy, however, the pluralisation of actors in the policy-making process is the main principle of modern foreign relations of Brazil.⁵⁹¹ In an unguarded moment, when Lula pointedly said, "Brazil is not Venezuela, and has traditional institutions",⁵⁹² he most probably referred to the two basic aspects of Brazilian foreign policy. One of the important points that Lula stressed is how the effectiveness of institutions is rooted in Brazilian political life, or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Itamaraty* in this context). More importantly, Lula wanted to draw the line regarding his capabilities as President of Brazil. Though Lula increased the role of the President in international matters during his presidency, nevertheless, *Itamaraty* professionalism forces Brazilian presidents to respect the country's traditional diplomatic legacies and its established principles. It is important to realize that the Ministry proudly argues that continuity and predictability are the most important dynamics behind Brazil's foreign policy successes regarding foreign policy

⁵⁹⁰ Or 'state level' takes precedence over individual level when putting into hierarchical order.

⁵⁹¹ Cason, "Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty," p. 130 .

⁵⁹² "Lula says he is not like Chávez," *El Universal*, August 22, 2006, http://english.eluniversal.com/2006/08/22/en_pol_art_22A769509.shtml.

implementation. Dramatic and sudden changes could destroy the degree of Brazilian credibility throughout the international community.⁵⁹³

Conversely, (revolutionary) change has been occupying more space at the core of the current Venezuelan foreign policy tenets. The concept of change was the main reason for elevating Chávez to Presidency. Ironically, although the Venezuelan people did not witness any military regimes between 1958-1998, in comparison to Brazil, the Venezuelan people accepted to give the office of presidency to a military officer, Lt. Colonel of Hugo Chávez Frias, not only because of the failed neo-liberal policies immediately before Chávez's presidency, but also because the Venezuelan people were tired of the *Punto Fijo Pact* regime. As previously explained, the institutionally inadequate structure of Venezuela's Ministry of Popular Power for Foreign Affairs paved the way for dramatic changes in foreign policy and prevented continuity and predictability in Venezuela's diplomatic legacy. Therefore, Venezuelan foreign policy since 1999 has been formulated and executed by Chávez himself. This is, *inter alia*, what Lula implied in his previous statement. This does not suggest, however, that the Venezuelan state has no institutions.

Secondly, in politics, different from President Lula of Brazil, the oligarchic structure of *Punto Fijo* regime prevented the opposition parties to enter the political arena freely, while civil society (pressure groups) groups were deprived of involving in the decision-making process. For about 40 years (1958-1998), the government of Venezuela largely rotated between two Venezuelan parties (*COPEI* and *AD*). This is one of the reasons why today there are no real opposition parties against Chávez's party and no civil society to monitor the Chávez government's political projects. By contrast, despite its shortcomings, opposition parties and civil society (including social movements) have played an active role in Brazil's political life. For instance, Brazil's Landless Workers Movement (MST) is the biggest social movement in the world.

The third reason behind both countries' differences is related to their economic structure. Brazil's economy has mostly adhered to market economy. Brazil has the

⁵⁹³ Hugueney and Vasconcelos, "Brazilian Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the Twenty-first Century," pp. 186-7.

largest economy in Latin America, especially thanks to Cardoso's economic plans and has been promoting the principle of lesser-imposed restrictions over the private sector participation into the market, foreign trade, flow of foreign currency, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Currently, due to its complex market-based economic model, Brazil's economy is mostly based on a sophisticated process of competition and is vulnerable to market economy. Contrary to Brazil, Venezuela's economy has adhered to a quasi-statist approach. The Venezuelan government imposed limitations on private sector's participation in Venezuelan market, flow of foreign currency, and foreign direct investment, which are mostly directed towards oil, oil refinery, petroleum products and other resources. Despite Caracas's 'petro-centric' economic structure (roughly a third of the country's GDP), it has increased its dependence on imported goods which is considered as a disadvantage in the long-run. Its economy usually posts a trade surplus in the country's budget. The huge amounts of revenue from oil transactions provide revenue to Venezuela in the market, and oil sometimes can be used as a major instrument in Venezuelan foreign relations. When the world's limited oil and natural gas reserves are considered, Venezuela, as one of the world's leading exporters of oil and natural gas, has a little risk for competition about oil. Petroleum protects the Venezuelan economy from financial shocks in the world market and enables the economy to be less sensitive to aggregate fluctuations. It is therefore necessary to consider that, at the root of attitude differences between the two Latin American nations, lay the economic orientation of the countries. This is another reason why Brazil has pursued more moderate foreign policy strategy and language, whereas Chávez's government has followed a more 'radical' foreign policy method. Importantly, in comparison to Venezuela, the economic aspect in the Brazilian foreign policy has been prioritized as a foreign policy goal after the 1980s and has been translated into a trade-centered policy. Today, in Brazil, unlike Venezuela, *Itamaraty* holds control over Brazil's trade policy.

Fourthly, in an effort to find a sufficient answer to the question that 'why' both leaders have pursued different paths in international relations throughout their presidencies requires a comprehension of their regional/global strategic national plan. After Lula assumed presidency, there was a paradigmatic change in the

vision of Brazilian foreign policy. Until that time, Brazil was considered as an important regional power in South America, but after Lula's Brazil (partially started by FHC), with its rising (primarily economic) presence on the international stage, it has been aspiring to have a much more assertive role in the global arena. This means that Brazil decided to join the ranks of emerging powerful states. To do that, Brazil needed to extend its foreign relations scope and develop ties with both developed and underdeveloped countries. Significantly, as a country whose international importance increases, Brazil would do anything to further its positive relations with developed countries and alliances, mostly the US and the European Union. In brief, for Brazil, the goal of becoming a global actor requires the country to behave/act in a more moderate fashion. No state that wants to play active role in global issues can ignore the established power structures (e.g. USA and EU). In opposition to Brazil's globalist vision, however, Venezuela has another vision. Due to its modest political, economic and demographic capacity, Venezuela has no opportunity to play an assertive role on the global stage. Presumably, because of that reason, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was encouraged to deliver his 2006 pejorative speech at the United Nations General Assembly rostrum. Without a doubt, this speech increased his popularity in the world, especially among less developed countries, but it has also done damage to Venezuela's respectability. Thus, although statesmen can have a different opinion about world politics, it never allows them to insult other leaders in front of world media. Beyond their individual position, head of states, as a major figure of nations, are highest representative of nation states in world politics.

Fifth point in state level analysis is pertaining to the accessibility of international system and of regional opportunities. The point that need to be underlined is international system mostly provides facilities to countries in terms of their economic, political and military capacities. In the case of Brazilian and Venezuelan state, they have had the benefits of international politics different from each other. Due to its high potential capacity, Brazil, as an emerging power, during Lula's term of office, has had more advantages than Venezuela. This is inevitably indicated in the foreign policy behaviors, which they pursued. For instance, Brazil's non-permanent seat in the Security Council and conciliation (together with Turkey) role during the time of nuclear crisis between Iran and

P5+1 countries, came about thanks to its relatively powerful structure. Although it has been supposed that, there are also significant differences in regional benefits between Brazil and Venezuela, Chávez's critical efforts (populist rhetoric, financial subsidiaries etc.) minimized huge gap about Brazil's absolute hegemony in the region. Hence, having both countries' different capacities and opportunities, paved the way for pursuing different path on their making of foreign policy.

In this chapter, I have traced the roots of different foreign policy implementations of Chávez and Lula. Apart from the listed five points, there are, of course, other reasons that affected the differences, but these are more or less the most salient and determinative ones. In order to draw a full picture about the divergences, now the discussion will also extend to the individual level of analysis.

5.2.2. Individual Level of Analysis

An individual, as an agent, and its determining effect on the state policies, is one of the most discussed topics in the international relations discipline. Despite the IR scholars being split in their opinion about the individual agent, they mostly accept the importance of the individual in the decision-making process. When one looks at Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policy from this point of view, one has more opportunity to get idea about their leftist perspectives. As previously explained, the Brazilian political system opens a little maneuvering space for President, in comparison with Venezuela. Nevertheless, it does not ignore Lula's individual leftist contributions. Under these circumstances, Lula had a different way of understanding on foreign policy compared to the Venezuelan leader.

Firstly, after a careful analysis of Brazilian leader's statements and discourses, one can realize that Brazil's dream under the Lula presidency is more based on the country's vital problems: poverty, hunger, income, inequality, etc. Though these are the primary problems that every Brazilian president needs to consider, Brazil dealt more with the matter while Lula was in office. There was no such effort in the FH Cardoso presidency. Presumably, his leftist background is rooted in his impoverished upbringing. While he was the President of Brazil, Lula's

foreign/domestic policy implementations were mostly based on more pragmatic justifications than ideological motivations. However, Chávez's practice of Bolivarian foreign policy vision includes a more idealist rhetoric. An idealistic appearance of Venezuelan foreign policy does not naturally mean that the Venezuelan President does not pursue realistic foreign policy. This Bolivarianist project has made the Venezuelan foreign policy more sophisticated, despite its shortcomings. Chávez has a project to guide Venezuela's foreign policy. Therefore, the Venezuelan leader uses an authentic (sophisticated) language in his international relations politics.

Another key individual difference between the two leaders derives from their intellectual accumulation/background. Despite little being known about the actual intellectual aspect/depth of Chávez, its impact on his foreign/domestic policy vision is quite influential. There is little doubt that Chávez is one of the unusual statesmen whose intellectual interest is quite diversified and effective on his policy implementations. He knows a great deal about world history (especially Latin American history), and the philosophy of leftist intellectual heritage. Interestingly, after interviewing the Venezuelan President, despite having different points of view, most journalists were amazed at the depth of his knowledge. Probably due to this cultural background, literary critic Y. Salas identified his language talent as being the "most potent weapon of Chávez" and she says "... I call him the great storyteller of Venezuelan politics. He's always got a great narrative, a great story, something great to say, something that seduces . . . and if anyone knows the popular imaginary, it's Chávez,' who has stolen it [sic] 'from us, because he uses it, he controls it, he manipulates it".⁵⁹⁴ On the other hand, Lula has had more practical experience as a metal automotive worker union organizer and as an active member of the Workers Party's (PT).⁵⁹⁵ This experience, in practical terms, is one of the major reasons behind Lula's pragmatic attitude in policymaking.

⁵⁹⁴ Raquel Rojas, "On Chavismo: Interview with Yolanda Salas (Caracas, 7 September 2004)," *Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies* 14, no. 3 (December 1, 2005): p. 328. Cited in J French, "Understanding the politics of Latin America's Plural Lefts (Chávez Lula): Social Democracy, Populism and Convergence on the Path to a Post-neoliberal World," *Third World Quarterly* 30, no. 2 (2009): p. 365.

⁵⁹⁵ Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva left to school when he was at fourth grade for the contribution to his family budget.

Another critical difference is directly linked to the social atmosphere in which they grew up. Quite a number of scholars have drawn on the authoritarian tendency of the Chávez administration. Apart from Venezuela's institutionalist structure shortcomings (e.g. a weak check and balance system, fragile opposition parties and civil society groups) that were discussed above (state level), Chávez's military career might be a trigger for his semi-authoritarian presidency. In the case of Lula, at the center of the Brazilian leader's attitude differences lies his professional career. As a trade union leader (member of pressure group), he used to compromise with Brazilian state institutions. In contrast, Chávez, after Lula assumed Brazil's presidency, paid attention in reaching governmental decisions with his government by more effective use of the consultation mechanism. In short, Chávez's way of communication might be called 'command,' while Lula applies a persuasion method.⁵⁹⁶ However, this different communication style does not suggest that Lula was less effective than Chávez.

⁵⁹⁶ French, "Understanding the Politics of Latin America's Plural Lefts (Chávez Lula)," p. 367.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1. Findings

Up to this point, we have related and focused on Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policy implementations in the twenty-first century. The main purpose of what was analyzed throughout the thesis is an attempt for determining the effects of Chávez and Lula's personal ideology on both countries' foreign policy direction. To do this, the most appropriate foreign policy subjects have been mentioned earlier as a unit of analysis. Certain foreign policy issues have been made the object of inquiry in this thesis: both leaders' foreign policy premises, their bilateral relations (with Latin American states, the USA, and the Third World), their critical stance at the most important global organization in the World, the UN, global issues, and their posture about the present unfair international system. This required the identification of 'change and continuity' in Brazil's and Venezuela's foreign policy traditions. There is no other reason for the study of the said leaders beyond an attempt to identify the continuity and changes in the ministry of foreign affairs. Otherwise, the intentions of respective governments may not be easily deduced without taking into account the former governments' discourses and implementations. The basis of my conclusion is not to revisit what was previously discussed; rather I will raise a few key points that require special attention.

Based upon my thorough evaluations, I have attained various conclusions. The first element is what we will call 'the limits of individuals' (e.g. presidents) on the foreign policy process. For the reasons explained in the previous chapters, the international system and state institutions restrict the overall influences of the leaders. This does not necessarily imply that the contributions of the leaders are not significant or that I am despising their actions and reforms. This thesis in fact draws crucial lines for the capacity of the leaders involved. The point here is that when the political leaders (including Chávez and Lula) were in opposition, generally they freely talked about the radical changes that were taking place.

However, after coming into power, they needed to consider demands that they themselves were criticizing regarding the previous governments. Venezuela's Chávez and Brazil's Lula also corroborate that argument throughout their governments. As discussed before, the difference between Lula in opposition and Lula in government in terms of radical discourse was quite obvious. That is to say, despite their backgrounds, personalities and capacities make contribution to their decision making and policy building processes; they are bound up with the institutional, structural, systemic restraints and other individual actors already participated and have a stake in this game. The phenomenon what we call foreign policy is the very composite of all these diverse variables and actors.

Another conclusion drawn from the account of foreign policy analysis is the significant impact is the ideology of state, rather than solely the leaders' ideology, which can mostly play a decisive role in the conduct of foreign policy. Under the constrained circumstances organized by the leaders, it is a difficult task to mention the determinacy of the ideology on the foreign policy issues at hand. From the perspective of modern states, 'national interest' is the only reason behind the significance of a foreign policy. It may not, at first sight, seem to fit in with Venezuelan pattern; but indeed, it is also case for Chávez's Venezuela. Apart from Lula, Chávez introduces his Bolivarianist ideology to Venezuelan people as a medium to serve the interests of Venezuela. Obviously, a particular ideology can be a trigger for mobilizing the people of a country, but it certainly cannot be an element for the people constantly flocking to it. If Chávez and Lula are still popular in the eyes of their citizens, it is not just because of their leftist ideologies, but also due to people's expectations from the leftist leaders concerning high standards of living.

Moreover, looking at the Brazilian and Venezuelan international relations strategies through the leftists' point of view (i.e. ignoring the country's national interest), it may not provide an explanatory answer in regard to their foreign policy implementations. Although many shortcomings can be pointed out regarding the leftists, the attention given to the people's demands can relatively define them as being successful. Actually, the indicators of social, economic and

political matters prove that the leftist leaders have been pursuing a more successful policy than that of their predecessors.

6.2. Possible Contribution of this Analyses to a Left Wing Reading of the International System

Ever since the rise of the Left; there have been many written works regarding the Latin America's Left turn. However, the works undertaken on this issue have not been satisfactory at all. The key point here is that, most studies that elaborate on the Latin American Left have disregarded their fundamental differences. The principal contribution of this dissertation is emphasizing the diversity of the Latin American Left. In this regard, studying the two leftist governments, which have a different ideological orientation, are the result of revealing the fractions in Latin American Left. Instead of simply arguing about different leftist fractions' general statements, I have specifically tried to highlight their differences through an examination of concrete foreign policy issues.

Most prominently, in terms of the dissertation's goal, what the study actually provides for the reader is seeing the rise of the Latin American leftist movement from a macro perspective. In other words, the thesis, apart from showing local/regional factors, has focused more on how to see the rise of the Left according to an international systemic analysis. Furthermore, the focus was also on the undeniable impact of the international system and global dynamics, which primarily triggered the rise of the leftist governments in the continent. This global perspective, however, enables us to use a language that is more cautious on the matter of scrutinizing the foreign policy affairs. We all acknowledge that, it is a dynamic and dialectical process through which the local, national or international phenomena have influence upon each other and even the relationship among them is reciprocal but mostly defining/determining the direction, the dimension and the intensity of this relationality is not an easy task. Analysis of such phenomena is likely to remain as a hen vs egg paradox to a larger extent, however, it is crucial to keep in mind that the fuzzy characters of variables and abundance of them leads us to come up with cautious, open-ended conclusions.

6.3. Future Prospects

In this last section, I will try to predict the future direction of the Brazilian and Venezuelan foreign policy based on the findings in previous pages. Since at least ten years have passed since the rise of the Left in Latin America, it is difficult to measure the degree of institutionalization of the Left in the region. To be able to make such an assumption requires much more time. A ten year scope/range of time may not be enough to make global/regional-scale predictions. However, I would nonetheless argue that citizens and decision-makers of both countries are unlikely to aspire for emulating the example set by socialist Cuba.

Clearly, without touching upon the 'Latin Union' discussions, presumably the future prospect of Latin America (namely Brazil and Venezuela) will be incomplete. Since the rise of the leftist governments, certain states and some regional-scale organizations (e.g. UNASUL, MERCASUL, CAN), have been constantly striving for regional integration in Latin America, which has produced an optimistic atmosphere concerning the union of Latin America. Those demands, with the help of the successful European Union model, resulted in the formation in 2004 of the 'Union of South American Nations' (UNASUL). The states that are parties to this organization have common interests (i.e. to be taken into consideration about the global issues) and grounds (i.e. Latin identity) whose keyword is the 'United Latin America'. On the other hand, the USA's obstructionist measures towards regional unity and some short-term 'national interest' calculations and political expectations (i.e. leadership) will be the biggest challenge facing the idea of the 'Latin American Union' in practice.

Due to the constitutional constraints in Brazil, Lula could not attend the presidential election in 2010, although Lula's PT party and its presidential candidate, Dilma Rousseff, assumed presidency. In Dilma Rousseff's inaugural speech, she promised to consolidate the transformations that were initiated by Lula. The moderate posture in the government, which was started by the Lula administration, is still in effect with Dilma Rousseff's current government. The new government's heavily technocrat Ministers are the best indicator of the

direction of the Brazilian future prospects. Despite Dilma Rousseff's new technocrat government, the leftist emphasis will be seen in the foreign policy discourse, but, lacking popular sympathy enjoyed by Lula, it is less likely for her to reach Lula's charismatic personality.

To make a prediction about the Chávez government, unlike the case of Brazil, is not so easy. Obviously, Chávez's idiosyncratic personality and the country's less institutionalized structure make it difficult to make predictions. Nonetheless, due to the lack of any constitutional obstacle, Chávez's presidency is likely to continue for quite a while until a powerful opposition emerges. Chávez's tendency for authoritarian attitudes and some sort of military discipline has paved the way for diminishing the democratic standards in Venezuela. Despite Chávez's demand for remaining office until 2030 (the 200th anniversary of Simón Bolívar's death), which is constitutionally possible thanks to his amendments in 1999 giving the president the right to be elected for six years but for renewable terms, he may have to leave the office due to his serious health problems.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁷ On July 1, 2011, after days of intense speculation about Chávez's health, he made statement that doctors had diagnosed him with cancer. For more details, see Phillips and Lopez, "Hugo Chávez Tells of Cancer Diagnosis", *The Guardian*, 1 July 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/01/hugo-chavez-cancer-diagnosis>.

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