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**CIVILIZATION AS AN UNDERRATED REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

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by

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To my Rose and to my Hope...

APPROVAL PAGE

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1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:
 - i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
 - ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

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ABSTRACT

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CIVILIZATION AS AN UNDERRATED REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Despite the fact that the state still remains as the most definitive actor in international politics in the post Cold War period, and at least for a couple of decades it will stay so, the need for a new outlook in the field is inevitable. Samuel Huntington might be mistaken because of his excessive stress on the idea of *clash* instead of mere *interaction*, but students of IR must still be thankful to him for his (re)invention of a fresh lens for us: the civilization. The main argument of this thesis is that the concept of civilization must be positively conceptualized in the discipline and it must be utilized as a new subsystem level of analysis, as a new dependent variable in analyzing international phenomena. Thus, we can achieve to overcome the simplicity and single-mindedness of state level analysis and develop a more explanatory and predictive approach to the behaviors of actors in post Cold War, and especially post 9/11, era. In the long run, we can expect to see the concept of civilization as a unit of analysis instead of a level of analysis if nation-states can emancipate themselves from being excessively interest-oriented in every occasion and if they allow the civilizations to develop their own politically effective institutions.

Key words:

Civilization, Western Civilization, Islamic Civilization, Clash of Civilizations, Alliance of Civilizations, Level of Analysis, Samuel Huntington

KISA ÖZET

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Haziran 2011

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLERİN ÖNEMSENMEMİŞ BİR OLGUSU OLARAK MEDENİYET

Devlet, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde de uluslararası siyasetin en belirleyici aktörü olarak kaldı ve bu durum birkaç on yıl daha böyle devam edecektir. Yine de bu alanda yeni bir bakış açısına duyulan ihtiyaç reddedilemez. Etkileşim yerine çatışmaya yaptığı vurgu ile Samuel Huntington yanılmış olabilir ancak yeniden icat ettiği medeniyet teorik lenslerinden ötürü kendisine Uluslararası İlişkiler öğrencileri olarak minnettar olmalıyız. Bu tezin temel argümanı şudur: Medeniyet kavramı Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplini çerçevesinde olumlu bir kavramsal yapıya kavuşturulmalıdır ve uluslar arası olguların incelenmesinde yeni bir sistem-altı analiz düzeyi, yeni bir bağımlı değişken olarak faydalanılmalıdır. Böylece devleti tek analiz düzeyi olarak alan yaklaşımların aşırı basitliğinin ve tek fikirliliğinin üstesinden gelinir ve uluslar arası arenada aktörlerin Soğuk Savaş ve özellikle 9 Eylül sonrası davranışlarına daha açıklayıcı ve öngörü değeri yüksek yaklaşımlar sağlanabilir. Uzun vadede, medeniyet kavramının bir analiz düzeyi değil bir analiz birimi olarak incelenmesi gereken bir olgu olacağına şahit olabiliriz. Yeter ki devletler kendilerini her fırsatta çıkar merkezli hareket etme alışkanlıklarından azat edebilsinler ve bağlı oldukları medeniyetlere siyasi açıdan etkili kurumlar oluşturma şansını tanısinlar.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Medeniyet, Batı Medeniyeti, İslam Medeniyeti, Medeniyetler Çatışması, Medeniyetler İttifakı, Analiz Düzeyi, Samuel Huntington

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AoC	Alliance of Civilizations
D8	Developed Eight
EU	European Union
HLG	High-level Group (for the AoC)
IR	International Relations (as a scientific field)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
WWI	First World Word
WWII	Second World Word

INTRODUCTION

Many great thinkers of history and sociology, i.e. Ibn Khaldun, Toynbee, McNeill, had studied on civilizations for their life time and deserved to be called as *civilogs*. The scholarly attention of the discipline of IR to the concept is relatively new, but rapidly increasing. Especially after Samuel Huntington's article in 1993, scholars from the East and the West exert their effort and time to discuss the place of civilization under the frame of relevancy of the clash of civilizations thesis. The members of various disciplines, such as theology, philosophy, literature, have joined the discussion. The 9/11 doubled this attention. While opportunist policy makers enjoy Huntington's glasses, many scholars, logically or quantitatively, disproved his ideas and developed counter arguments. For instance, Robert W. Cox, the great thinker of critical theory, allocated a great deal of his latest work to understand the role civilizations in international relations. Ali Mazrui dedicated his studies to disprove Huntington's thesis. Nuri Yurdusev showed the importance of civilization in studying IR.

Although I had to briefly show the irrelevancy of the clash of civilizations thesis, I do not intend to discuss Huntington again in this study. I believe the contribution of Huntington to the IR theory is priceless since he triggered a new theoretical discussion. He is among the first theorists who try to explain post-Cold War global politics through different approaches than classical theories. After his article, students of IR are encouraged to ponder upon, study and write about the possibility of new concepts. For example, Jeffrey Haynes, Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart are some of those who announced the return of religion in international relations. Huntington was right to bring civilization into the analysis of global politics. Where he failed is he envisaged civilization as an independent variable in IR. Contrarily, civilization has to be taken into account as a dependent variable of international phenomenon, namely as a new level of analysis. This is what I try to achieve in this study.

In order to be and able to stay on the same page with the readers, I think the most crucial part of a study is defining the related concepts concretely. Especially, if the core concept is a vague one like civilization, the writer must double his effort to be firm. To this end, I allocate a whole chapter solely to the definition of civilization. The first chapter starts with the historical journey of the concept. I try to clarify two issues: when the term of civilization started to be used and whether a civilizational international system is a modern phenomenon. The best nominee for the founding father of the concept is Ibn Khaldun. Therefore, the emergence of the concept goes back to the fourteenth century but the modern meaning of the term was employed in eighteenth century by European writers. On the other hand, following Yurdusev, it is clear that a civilizational international system precedes the nation-state system since civilizational interactions are going all the way back to the emergence of the first civilizations.

After the history of the concept, I try to define what civilization is. For this purpose, I lay down a theoretical background, its foundations, and delineating elements. Davutoğlu's approach to the concept as a reflection of people's self-perception provides me an invaluable theoretical base. For different thinkers, there are different elements of civilizations, but the most common ones are religion, city, and style. I, then, mention about other reflections of massive human groupings, which are usually confused with civilization, before proceeding to define the concept. First, I show that barbarism is not a previous stage of civilization, but a parallel phenomenon. Namely, while the positive reflections of massive human grouping are named as civilization, I label negative representations as barbarism. The mind that use nuclear bomb is not the Western Civilization, but the Western barbarism. Secondly, I try to differentiate between culture and civilization. For practical purposes, I regard civilization as a collection of different but related cultures.

Next, I define the concept by presenting negative connotations of civilization and positive approaches to it. Particularly, German tradition loads a negative meaning to the concept of civilization. It differentiates culture from civilization and

regards the latter as an insincere ostentation. For the positive formulation, which is the common treatment, I utilized the Yurdusev's classification of the civilization as quality, as a condition and process, and as a collectivity. I finish the first chapter with the Turkish approach to the term. As prominent intellectuals of modern Turkey, I examine the works of Ziya Gökalp, Nurettin Topçu and Cemil Meriç on civilization. Although there are some doubts and confusion about what civilization really refers to, because of the trauma that WWI caused, the general attitude of Turkish thinkers towards civilization is it is a positive phenomenon.

The second chapter investigates the elements of Western and Islamic Civilizations. First, I define the Western Civilization, concentrating on three constituents of it: Christianity, secularism, and technology. Because I believe the visibility of its influence on Western daily life is diminished, I disregard the other commonly accepted element of the Western Civilization, the Greek-Roman heritage. The first part of the passages on Islamic Civilization deals with the non-Islamic, namely Western, elements of this civilization. Then, I explain three key elements of the religion of Islam which shape the Islamic Civilization: Allah, ethics, and spirituality.

In the third chapter, I focus on the types of interaction between civilizations, through the relations between Islam and the West. There are three possible types of relations between civilizations: neglect, conflict, and dialogue/cooperation. Since neglect is almost an impossible type of interaction between any social groupings, I neglect it and I investigate the conflictual relations and dialogue efforts between these two civilizations. After I put foundations and historical roots of the conflict, I inevitably allocate some pages to the Huntington's theory. Here, after summarizing the criticism to the clash of civilizations approach, I try to show the inadequate and unelaborated formulation of the thesis in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* very briefly. Even the inception of the book provided me a number of clues which prove that the Huntington's clash thesis is an inattentive theory building endeavor.

In the dialogue part, the reader is going to see the dialogic relation between Islam and the West is as old as the history of Islam; of course depending on what I define as the West. Even the modern dialogue endeavor has a history as old as the modern conflictual relations. It dates back to the nineteenth century. Then, I take a closer look into the Alliance of Civilizations initiative, cosponsored by Spain and Turkey. I briefly mention about the previous *official* initiatives, especially the most outstanding one, the Khatami's Dialogue among Civilizations, and after that I depict the structure and the objectives of the AoC. There are two important points in this project. First, it is the most serious dialogue effort initiated by nation-states; and second, in the future it may have a potential to evolve into an organization which transforms civilizations into a unit of analysis.

Thus, I have prepared the background for my thesis, which is presented in the fourth and the last chapter: civilization as a new level of analysis in the discipline of IR. In this chapter, I start with distinguishing between the unit and the level of analysis. The former one refers to the independent variable of international relations, either actor, mostly nation-states, or the international system. The latter one, on the other hand, refers to the dependent variable through which analysts of IR study, describe, explain and predict independent variables and international scene. What I essentially propose here is civilizations can be employed as levels of analysis in IR for both they allow us to make predictions which can include more actors and through them we can make more convenient explanations for actor (both individual and state) behavior. Since civilizations do not have proper representative agents, it is, at least in the near future, not possible to investigate them as units of analysis. This is actually the main fallacy of Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis, but I do not find it odd if one praises Huntington's theory as prophetic in this sense.

Throughout this study, I extremely benefitted from the works of Ahmet Davutođlu¹, Recep Őentürk², Arnold Toynbee³, and especially A. Nuri Yurdusev⁴ for

¹ "Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki.", *Divan* 3(1), 1997; "Tarih İdraki Oluşumunda Metodolojinin Rolü: Medeniyetlerarası Etkileşim Açısından Dünya Tarihi ve Osmanlı.", *Divan* 7(2), 1999; "Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti ve Hıristiyanlık.", *Divan* 9(2), 2003; and *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, Küre Yayıncılık, 2009.

the definitions and the interactions among civilizations. I must also emphasize that the J. David Singer's⁵ classical article and the books of Tayyar Arı⁶ and James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff⁷ had been my critical references for the last chapter.

² "Açık Medeniyet: Bir Fıkıh Medeniyeti Olarak İslam." Ayvakti 7(82-83-84), 2007; Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya ve Topluma Doğru, İstanbul, Timaş Yayınları, 2010.

³ Toynbee, Arnold J., Medeniyet Yargılanıyor, Ağaç Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1991; Toynbee, Arnold J., Tarihçi Açısından Din, Kayihan Yayınları, İstanbul, 1978.

⁴ "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction." Millennium: Journal of International Studies 22(1), 1993; International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; "Batı Medeniyetini Nasıl Tanımlayabiliriz?" Avrasya Dosyası 13(2), 2007.

⁵ "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." World Politics 14(1), 1961.

⁶ Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği. İstanbul, Alfa Yayınları, 2006.

⁷ Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York, Longman, 1997.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION

1.1. Definition

Democracy is one of the mostly discussed terms in social sciences and it has a common meaning accepted by many segments of the public opinion. Nevertheless, in 2011, United Nations still has many member states which attach “democratic” to their titles and do not see any contradiction with to be ruled in a sort of tyranny. This reminds us Braudel saying “the repertoire of social sciences hardly let us make definitions as simple and clear as a line or a triangle.”⁸ Thus, one of the most innocent words of the world is wasted to veil the cruelest atrocities. Despite the fact that this difficulty of making limpid definitions provides a great appliance for the populist daily political discourse, it does not mean that the social scientist has a right to be recondite. On the contrary, as being the hardest part of a study, the students of social sciences must be crystal clear in what s/he means with the term under investigation. The scope and the limits of the concept must be defined without any blank point. If this is an unfeasible effort for a particular concept of a phenomenon, misunderstandings must be prevented at least by underlining whose definition is being applied.⁹

The concept of civilization is a perfect example to this question. The definition of civilization has been changing from time to time, country to country, writer to writer. West has not achieved to fix its meaning for more than two centuries.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the legendary works of Arnold Toynbee, William McNeill, Fernand Braudel, etc. and the boom of academic articles on civilization after Samuel Huntington published “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs

⁸ Şener Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," *Doğu Batı* Summer, no. 41 (2007): 147.

⁹ Recep Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), 173.

in 1993, the definition of the concept has remained obscure.¹¹ The controversial approach of 21st century to the term, represented by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, presents civilizations as the contemporary arena of the next, and probably the last, quarrel of world powers. Huntington starts and ends his, we appreciate it or not, very influential book with a paradoxical statement and a righteous designation: “In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war.”¹² This chapter aims to present a concrete definition of the concept which is necessarily going to take us to the conclusion that the clash of civilizations is by definition an unlikely phenomenon and a fair interpretation of the term innately proposes “the surest safeguard against world war”.

1.1.1. The Historical Journey of the Concept

There are two issues supposed to be briefly clarified before a detailed examination of what civilization is. First question is whether a civilizational international system is a modern phenomenon or not. Many thinkers disagree with Huntington who claims that a multi-civilizational and multi-polar global system is all about post-cold war politics. One can hardly propound a reason for not taking the Kadesh Treaty between Egypt and Hittites as an early example of a civilizational interactions. As seen in following pages, members of different civilization have always been in contact with each other. The other question is when the term of civilization started to be used. Western scholars, more or less, agreed upon mid-1700s. On the other hand, for Muslim thinkers, the concept emerged in the fourteenth century Islamic World. First of three parts of the most renown work of Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, is devoted to the discovery of the elements of the concept of civilization.¹³

¹⁰ Cemil Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 16th ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), 81.

¹¹ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları."

¹² Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 2002), 13, 321.

¹³ Ibn Haldun, *Mukaddime*, trans. Süleyman Uludağ, 6 ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (İstanbul: Dergah, 2009).

Civilization is not a modern phenomenon. There are two approaches about its emergence: civilization as a stage in human history and civilization as an inborn quality of man. As most anthropologists agree upon, linear progress approach accepts that there are respectively uncivilized and civilized eras in human history. While defining civilization, it is a very common strategy to differentiate it from primitive stages, that is, barbarism or savagery. As discussed in detail below, the civilization in this understanding began with the inventions of metal tools, writing, cities and settlement which take us at least five thousand years ago. On the other hand, man is civilized by birth according to the religious and theological approach.¹⁴ Therefore, the existence of civilizations at least from Sumer on is indisputable.

What is disputable is the degree of interactions within and among these civilizations and whether these relations are enough to talk about a “system”, that is a “grouping of multiple socio-political units in order to have smooth interaction with each other”.¹⁵ Şentürk stresses that the multi-civilizational global society that we live today is not unique to our ages while he examines Ibn Khaldun’s conceptualization of civilization.¹⁶ For Yurdusev inter and inner interactions of civilizations are obvious. Many examples of states system (like Hellenistic, Western, Chinese, etc.) are associated with civilizations.¹⁷ Moreover a multi and inter-civilizational international system is not modern scenery. Talking about differences means that there are commonalities between civilizations which are the results of interactions among them. These interactions increased and become worldwide especially after AD 1000.¹⁸ Therefore, the central axis of the last millennium of the history is the relations among Western, Islamic, Hindu, Chinese, and Japanese civilizations.¹⁹ Yurdusev names the international system before the modern one as “Afro-Eurasian international system”. This was a multi-civilizational and inter-civilizational system, included at least Europe (Christians), Middle East (Muslims), India and China.

¹⁴ A. Nuri Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 68.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁶ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 170.

¹⁷ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 99.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 148.

Crusades paved the way for the contacts and exchanges, and as a result, the concept of a “world community” emerged. Very similar to our modern international system today, the members of Afro-Eurasian system were interdependent to each other with the system’s own customs and traditions, moral code, code of conduct, and merchant law.²⁰ The example of the interaction between Ottomans and European powers is a great proof of this reality. They were not in a never-ending state of war. Their relations were intertwined and not always antagonistic. Both were the parts of the greater Afro-Eurasian system. The Ottoman-Europe case also falsifies the common view of regarding relations between Ottomans and Europe was a clash between the Christendom and non-Christendom.²¹

Consequently, although he accepts the undeniable role of the European self-transformation and expansion in the transformation of Afro-European system, Yurdusev asserts that the modern international system was not just the expansion of European system to the rest of the world but it was the transformation of existing Afro-Eurasian system with the inclusion of Americas and Australasia. Therefore, only tracing the origins of Europe is not a proper method to fully comprehend the contemporary global international system.²²

While the civilizational character of the relations among different peoples of the world is an old feature of world politics, the use of the concept of civilization is comparatively newer, especially for Western scholars. Yurdusev provides us a summary of how the concept of civilization first appeared in the West. The Latin root of the term is *civis* (citizen) or *civitas* (city). This basically refers to belonging to or to be related with a collectivity of people or a political body, such as a state or a commonwealth.²³ *Civilized* had already been in use for a long time and it was a very common term in the sixteenth century. Ironically, in his first preach “On the Fight against Turks” published in 1529, Martin Luther tells that some of his friends had forced him to write against Turks since some people had been demanding Turkish

²⁰ Ibid., 132-34.

²¹ Ibid., 138.

²² Ibid., 138-39.

²³ Ibid., 56.

rule because Germans were *savage* and *uncivilized*.²⁴ Thus, Turks had been appointed to a task of “civilizing savage people” by the sixteenth century Germans. On the other hand, classically the concept of “civilizing mission” is known as a product of defenders of colonialism who regards it necessary to bring liberal institutions and self-administration to the “uncivilized societies”.²⁵

The modern meaning of civilization as “the state or process of becoming civilized” emerged in the eighteenth century. There is a consensus on this meaning of civilization was started to be used in mid-1700. For Braudel, the civilization produced from the old words of *civil* and *civilized* as a neologism. It was first used by R. J. Turgot in 1752 but first printed four years later in Victor Riqueti’s *A Treatise on Population*.²⁶ The word entered the Academy’s Dictionary and Oxford Dictionary in 1700s. According to Wundt, on the other hand, the first user of the concept is Bodin in the sixteenth century.²⁷ Voltaire did not use the concept of civilization but many regard him as the first historian of culture. He examined the lives of societies as a whole, not partially their battles, dynasties, etc.

In his reading of the emergence of the concept of civilization, Cemil Meriç gives us new insights about the reflection of a world perception on a new concept. *Police* was the forerunner of the civilization until the seventeenth century. The new dimension of civilization was that it symbolized the faith for progress where the Westerner was the guide. It was an objective rather than a reality. For Meriç, the definition that the third edition of the Academy Lexicon adopted in 1798 proves the greediness of a continent: “the action of making civilized or the condition of the civilized”. However, the modern meaning of the term was first seen in 1890: “the progress of humanity ethically, socially and intellectually”.²⁸

Yet, the best candidate to be the father in the field of history of civilizations is supposed to be Ibn Khaldun. Before it emerged in French and other European

²⁴ Hakan Olgun, *Teolojik Uyum Sorunu: Luther Ve Islam*, 1 ed. (Istanbul: Aaç Kitapevi, 2008), 21.

²⁵ Margaret Kohn, "Colonialism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*(2010), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/colonialism/>.

²⁶ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a “Medeniyet” Kavramının Kullanımları," 166.

²⁷ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 56-58.

languages, he had already studied the concept it in the fourteenth century.²⁹ Following previous philosophers' motto, "Man is civilized by nature", Ibn Khaldun aimed to reveal the constituents of civilization (*medeniyet*) in his book *Muqaddimah*.³⁰ *Medeniyet*, the counterpart of the concept of civilization in Turkish, stems from the Arabic base *m-d-n*. In such a way that the word civilization relates to the word *city* etymologically, *medeniyet* is derived from Medina³¹ and means "the state of being from a city". Ibn Khaldun employed the concepts of *umran* and *tamaddun* to explain the different aspects of civilization. While the former covers both nomadic and sedentary life, the latter refers only to city civilization.³² Therefore, the counterparts of civilization in Islamic world are not mere translations which emerged in the nineteenth century, but they had been used by Muslims at least since Ibn Khaldun³³.

After this brief genealogy, we can move on to define our concept.

1.1.2. What is a Civilization?

The efforts of defining the concept of civilization follow commonly two methods. Some define it in terms of time and geography. Toynbee and Huntington classify civilizations based on this criterion. Some other thinkers, on the other hand, define our concept in terms of the foundations which a civilization lies on. Regarding the foundations, there are civilizations based on revelations and there are civilizations based on revelation-free knowledge. Sönmez classifies Eastern civilizations under the first category and he asserts that the Western civilizations depend on human genius.³⁴

In this chapter, I will follow the second track and I will try to define civilization starting from its philosophical foundations as put forward by Ahmet

²⁸ Cemil Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, Third ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), 81-82.

²⁹ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 59.

³⁰ Haldun, *Mukaddime*, 214.

³¹ In 622, Prophet Muhammad was forced to move out of Mecca. He migrated to Yesrib and changed the name of the city as el-Medina l'Munawwarah (Medina: City, Munavvarah: Radiant).

³² Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 86.

³³ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 170-71.

Davutođlu. Next, I will determine the elements that differentiate civilizations from other human groupings, differentiate a civilization from other civilizations and guarantee its existence. And then, for the purposes of this study, I will introduce the Western and Islamic civilizations.

1.1.2.1. Theoretical Background

According to Davutođlu, the core of a civilization is an existential consciousness. Civilization is a transformation of this consciousness into a social form.³⁵ Therefore, individual has a central position in a civilization. If a civilization does not trust in individual, it cannot reproduce itself, because it cannot penetrate into the mind of that individual.³⁶ To understand what constitutes the core of a civilization and what differentiates civilizations, one needs to determine how non-Western civilization revive by the last quarter of the twentieth century while they were regarded as dead civilizations in the first quarter. Davutođlu's answer to this question is the self-perception (*Selbverstandnis, ben-idraki*) of the reviving civilizations. Self-perception provides a civilization to be established, to rise, and to defend itself against the attacks of other civilizations. What constitutes a self-perception is not the institutional and formal structure (external factors) but the worldview of an individual (internal motives) which formulates the existential problematic in a logical framework. For this reason, by surmising that an institutional importation is enough to change the self-perception, modernists are failed in explaining the non-Western, especially Islamic, civilizational defense to Western assault.³⁷ This explains how civilizational boundaries have been formed in a long period of time and cannot be altered by short-term tools.³⁸

So, what is self-perception? Davutođlu counts four fundamental elements which constitute the self-perception of an individual: (1) his self (ego), (2) the

³⁴ Selim Sönmez, "Medeniyet, Kur'an Medeniyeti Ve Evrensellik İmkanları," *Köprü*, no. Winter (2003): 10-11.

³⁵ Ahmet Davutođlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 13 ed. (Küre Yayıncılık, 2009), 230.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 107.

³⁷ ———, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki," *Divan* 3, no. 1 (1997): 10-11.

³⁸ Talha Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 78.

lifeworld (*Lebenswelt*) in which the individual perceives the existence of his self, (3) the perception of existence between these two, and (4) the *Ultimate Being* as the source of these three elements. Ultimate Being is either God or God in form of pantheism and materialism.³⁹

A complete clarification of this question requires differentiating it from the concept of identity. There are two fundamental differences between self-perception and identity which reflect two different levels of consciousness: First, identity requires an ‘other’. With the words of Yurdusev “Nothing gives anything its meaning, everything gets its meaning in interactions with others”.⁴⁰ For him, the history of a social collectivity cannot be considered by itself, but its relations with others.⁴¹ On the other hand, self-perception is an individual consciousness. Second, while identity can be defined by a social, economical or a political authority, self-perception is a matter of the subject and it cannot be defined or destroyed by another. A self-perception can transform into an identity, but an identity may not convert to a self-perception. Only a complete psychological and mental transformation which emerges from internal consciousness can achieve this transformation of an identity into a self-perception.⁴² As remarkably creating administrative cadres by recruiting young Christian subjects⁴³ Ottoman Empire is one of the few examples which had realized first shifting the identity of these people and then the transformation of their identity into self-perception. On the other hand, Davutoğlu does not think identity is completely negative. The shocks that the members of a civilization experience when they meet the “other” have a constructive role on the formation of their own civilization. The crusaders and the late Ottoman elites had these shocks when they meet the East and the West, respectively.⁴⁴

I think the need for “other” in an identification process can be attributed both negative and positive connotations. On the one hand, it may be blamed to facilitate

³⁹ Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki," 13.

⁴⁰ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 50.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁴² Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki," 11.

⁴³ William H. McNeill, *A World History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 243-44.

⁴⁴ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 231.

the process of conflict if a particular human grouping chooses its “other” among other human groupings. On the other hand, if this “other” is a collection of concepts, principles, traditions, etc. which represent “evilness”, then having a perception of “other” becomes a positive condition. Therefore, if an Easterner determines his other as “Westerner”, he falls into the negative category, but if he defines his other as, for instance, “crusader”, he is regarded in the positive category.

The question of civilizational identity has been a center of attraction for many scholars. Following Toynbee, Huntington defines civilization as the “broadest level of cultural identity” that differentiates human-being from other species.⁴⁵ Yurdusev, also, notes the top-down relationship between civilization and individual’s identification. The ontological foundation of civilization (self-perception) is more psychological in Yurdusev and man overcomes his psychological existential problem through identification. Man identifies himself with something else (i.e. family, nation, sex) to become what he is. At the most fundamental level, identification is a result of human vulnerability. To achieve psychological security, man possesses an “inherent drive to internalize” values and norms of his social milieu. Thus, the need of identification may be the result of the need for security (and perhaps survival) and civilization as a large scale collective identification, which is larger than nation, ethnic group, tribe, etc., serves this objective. Yurdusev agrees with Davutoğlu while stating that the identification is a process that includes inclusion and exclusion. Identifying something logically ends up with differentiating and distancing it from the like.⁴⁶ The example of the effect of Ottoman power in shaping modern European identity, which is ignored by Huntington, can be counted as a clear proof of this influence. Another great proof is that many units of identity mostly are named by the others. “English” is a Latin world, Turks are named by Chinese, Kurds by Turks, Swedish gave the name Finns, etc. Therefore, as Davutoğlu, Yurdusev accepts that “the identity of something depends upon the existence of something else.”⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 83.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 74-77.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 76.

The strength of a resistance of a civilization is understood by its strength of the resistance of self-perception. Institutional transfer from other civilizations, such as transferring their political systems, styles of social organizations, or adopting their economic approach, can only induce short-term changes. The spirit of a civilization cannot be destroyed without establishing a new self-perception.⁴⁸ A new civilizational self-perception can only emerge when three factors coalesce: a broader consciousness of being, a foundation of knowledge, and a collection of behavioral norms.⁴⁹ A civilization can be a viable civilizational form only if its existential self-perception has an effect on its lifeworld. The civilizations which can establish an effective and direct relationship between self-perception and lifeworld have a chance to accomplish a revival. When this relation weakens or tears apart, crises emerge in that civilization and it declines.⁵⁰

1.1.2.2. Its Foundations and Delineating Elements

In this part, I will introduce how some selected scholars define the basis and distinctive factors which form a civilization and differentiate it from other social groupings. As will be seen in following pages, there is not a complete consensus on these elements although there are some intersecting points. Among those common causes, city and religion (actually the attitude towards religion; either accepting one or disapproving them all) are the featured ones.

Braudel defines civilizations in four aspects: civilizations according to geography, civilizations as societies, civilizations as economies, and civilizations as mentality. Communication has a central influence on the formation of a civilization. All civilizations survive with the dynamic interaction through trade and stimulating influence of the foreigners. On the other hand, he thinks geographical and economical unities are semi-objective features of civilizations and states that “religion is the most powerful feature of a civilization and it is in the hearth of both

⁴⁸ Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-İdraki," 11.

⁴⁹ Ibid.: 12.

⁵⁰ Ibid.: 14.

past and the future.” Thus, he lays the foundations of the Huntington’s religion-centered classification of civilizations.⁵¹

For Ibn Khaldun, politics, science, economics, and law are the necessary qualities, fundamental features (*araz, ilinek*) which are same for all civilizations. Civilizations occur through them and they occur through civilizations. The distinction between *bedevi* and *hadari* is actually economical, not about where they live.⁵² He distinguishes himself not only from many Western intellectuals but also from many Muslim scholars by contending that a civilization is not supposed to be based on revelation. For him, people can establish a civilization without being a member of an Abrahamic religion. He thinks that science (*ilim*) is one of the fundamental features of civilizations, not religion.⁵³

According to Aktürk, civilization is a dynamic process which is observed among cities, empires and religions and realized through epistemic societies. City, empire and religion constitute the conceptual family of civilization⁵⁴ and the epistemic societies are the main factors in reproducing and sustain civilizational identities.⁵⁵ As being the common etymological root of the word civilization in many different languages⁵⁶, *city* has a central place for the meaning the concept. Hilmi Yavuz differentiates the “civilized city” from the “city of civilization”. While the former refers to the structure of a city, the latter refers to the individual of that city. The art could differentiate itself from craftsmanship only in civilized cities. Thus, civilized cities are the subjects of sociological and anthropological studies. On the other hand, city of civilization is a subject of philosophy because it is the one that reproduces civilization. Contrary to “ignorant city” of Farabi, city of civilization degrades wealth, carnal lust, health, state of being respected, etc.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 158.

⁵² Sönmez, "Medeniyet, Kur'an Medeniyeti Ve Evrensellik İmkanları," 9.

⁵³ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 143-45, 67, 78.

⁵⁴ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 153.

⁵⁵ Ibid.: 169.

⁵⁶ Ibid.: 166.

⁵⁷ Hilmi Yavuz, İstanbul: Cahil Şehir, Zaman Daily, 4 May. 11, p. 15.

Religion is another term which often associated with civilization and it is commonly presumed that the religion is the source of a civilization. Many civilizations borrow their names from the dominant religion, or a sect of a religion, on their territories.⁵⁸ On the other hand, for Lewis, only two civilizations, Islamic and Western, define themselves with a religion while others definitions are based on ethnicity and region.⁵⁹

Civilizations, on the other hand, are mostly studied through *empires*. For almost all empires, there is a civilization. Their multi-lingual, multi-ethnic demography, continental dimensions and desire to become the world hegemon differentiate them from other state structures and attract the students of civilizations as a research phenomenon. Imperial ideologies can be substitutes for religions. The large territory of an empire amasses different human communities in a common melting pot and this togetherness along with differences can serve as what Braudel calls “the stimulant of the alien”.⁶⁰

Similar to Toynbee’s creative minority⁶¹, Aktürk thinks identity and existence of a civilization depends on an *epistemic society* that travels around the centers of that civilization. This society consists of scientists and artists who reproduce and expand higher education and culture. In this sense, university (universal city) is a perfect example of the fundamental institutions which constitute a civilization.⁶² The survival of a civilization depends on the existence of a creative minority.

Yurdusev takes self-identification as the subjective delineating element of civilizations and he summarizes six objective elements among many others⁶³:

(1) *Common descent*: Yurdusev does not agree with the idea that blood can be a basis for civilization. Historical evidence show that people of a descent produce different

⁵⁸ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a “Medeniyet” Kavramının Kullanımları," 153.

⁵⁹ Bernard Lewis, "'I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell'," *The Atlantic Online*(2003).

⁶⁰ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a “Medeniyet” Kavramının Kullanımları," 163-64.

⁶¹ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 102.

⁶² Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a “Medeniyet” Kavramının Kullanımları," 169, 71.

⁶³ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 85-90.

civilizations (such as Indo-Europeans) and different peoples could unite under a civilization (such as Islamic).

(2) *Language*: Language also can hardly be regarded as an element of civilization. Civilizations are mostly bilingual if they are not multilingual. Nevertheless, there may be a dominant civilizational supra-language.

(3) *History*: A common historical experience has a remarkable effect on the formation of identity. The reciprocal threats of the Western and Islamic civilizations ensured the constitution of a civilizational consciousness.

(4) *Religion*: Some defined civilizations in the basis of religions. Toynbee, in his early writings, regards religion as the most distinctive element of a civilization. According to Dowson, great civilizations rest upon great religions. Huntington agrees with him and Eliot radically claims that any civilization can come into being without a religion. Many Islamic scholars are in the same opinion, except Ibn Khaldun.⁶⁴

(5) *Territory and geography*: Geographical features of the homeland of a society have substantial effects on its life style and thus on their civilization that they constitute. On the other hand, in the course of time territorial limits remove for civilizations and they lose their influence on the particular civilization. Davutoğlu goes further and asserts that the concept of civilization is not a geographical term anymore. It is more about culture and demography. One cannot restrict any civilization in any territory. New York, London, and Berlin are parts of Chinese or Islamic civilizations as well as Western civilization.⁶⁵

(6) *Style*: For Kroeber and McNeill, style is a very distinctive feature of civilizations and it can be traced at fine arts, dress and cuisine of civilizations. It refers to the manner and form, not to content and substance.

⁶⁴ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 177.

⁶⁵ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 169.

1.1.2.3. What is Not a Civilization?

Defining a concept through its antonym(s) and related terms is an effective way to comprehend the concept under investigation. From this perspective, to understand what civilization is not or to apprehend what barbarism and culture are will provide us to a better perception of civilization.

1.1.2.3.1. Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde

For Braudel, civilization used to mean just the opposite of barbarism. There were civilized people in one hand, and primitive savages and barbarians in the other.⁶⁶ Çaha makes his differentiation from a liberal standpoint and implicitly reaches a conclusion that civilized society is a liberal society. He draws a line between barbarism and civilization through contract and oppression. These two attitudes determine a family, a clan, a village, a community or a society either civilized or barbarian. Needless to say, the government styles of civilized societies depend on contract. The contract is not required to be an open one. Traditions, moral values and de facto principles perform it. As John Rawls underlines, in a civilized society which was realized through a contract, everybody knows that all are bind with the same principles of justice.⁶⁷

William H. McNeill lists four landmarks of human history from hunting and gathering to more developed civilizations. First, between 8500 and 7000 B.C. in the Middle East, food production laid the base for the rise of civilizations; second, civilized as a “complex and skilled society” emerged in about 3500 B.C.; third, rain-watered lands and plow transformed the course of civilization about a thousand year after; and fourth after 1700 B.C., chariots conduce to the last great transition in the civilizing process.⁶⁸ For him, discussing universal history requires “organizing concepts of world history” to determine the patterns of interacting groups and he

⁶⁶ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 166.

⁶⁷ Ömer Çaha, *Bitmeyen Beraberlik: Modern Dünya'da Din Ve Devlet* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008), 151.

⁶⁸ McNeill, *A World History*, 3-6.

classifies these concepts as hunting-gathering (for some it is savagery), barbarism, and civilization.⁶⁹

This three-stage evolutionary course of human development is a very common perception of man's historical progress. The nineteenth century understanding of civilization is these social phenomena emerged and developed on a linear historical progress. What are in transition are not only the society but also the individual's sentiments and ideas.⁷⁰ Therefore, it is a process from inferior to superior. According to Hobbes, more one travels back in history he finds it more brutish, more nasty and incomplete. It is more acceptable when this "good-bad" distinction is made through the socialization process with the accumulation of knowledge, but frequently it means an ethical superiority of the "exalted civilized" over "degraded uncivilized". Savage man is considered as naked both in body and in mind. By all means, civilization is an approximation to the ideal state. For orientalist thinkers of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, the ultimate end of this improvement was achieved in Europe and this last stage was taken as an export material to the non-European, uncivilized world.⁷¹ As will be seen more in detail, "civilization as a condition and process" requires a distinction between civilization and previous stages. In this perspective, civilization is understood in a singular form. There are no multiple civilizations. Civilization is a limitless process that develops itself in time through society. In this process, the human aggregate is progressing towards a better condition, from "primitive uncivilized" to "developed civilized". The eighteenth and nineteenth century historians and anthropologists had taken this progress almost as a presumption.⁷² To distinguish civilization from non-civilization, a number of criteria have been proposed, such as industrial techniques (emergence of metal tools), writing, urban revolution, city, and settlement.⁷³ The emergences of these criteria are the landmarks of upgrading to the next level in the civilizing process.

⁶⁹ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 51.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 59-60.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 64-68.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 63-65.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 69-71.

Yurdusev is uncomfortable with these types of distinctions. For him, it is almost impossible to make absolute distinctions between “so-called primitive and civilized communities”.⁷⁴ While it is true that there is a technical advancement of mankind from savagery to civilization, it is not true that the former one is crueler.⁷⁵ Many Muslim thinkers also reject the evolutionary approach to the human progress in history. In Islamic understanding, from Adam and Eve on, human history is a history of ups and downs but it started with “a two-man civilization”. Ibn Khaldun also rejects evolutionist social scientists and does not classify societies hierarchically and historically from primitive to the most developed.⁷⁶

Although the vast majority of literature approached the vertical emergences of the baneful and the favorable, the immediate concern is supposed to be the question of whether parallel existence of civilizations and barbarisms is a possible posture. In other words, do large scale social groupings accommodate both civilized and uncivilized attitudes together in themselves? I think the process of being more civilized is not a linear progress because being more civilized is not just an issue of technological and material advancement or knowledge accumulation. *Civilization is the reflections of a group of people’s self-perception and world view through their products; and their attitudes towards the (both internal and external) “other” and the nature. The substance of these reflections is respect.* The products of a human grouping are fruits of these reflections. In some societies, these fruits are industrial products, in some societies they are buildings, and in some societies it is artistic work. Therefore, the perfectness of their material progress (the magnitude of their budget, the height of their buildings, the maximum speed of their cars, etc.) is not a measure of being civilized. If the reflection (the attitude and product) is disrespectful to the being of other living (and sometimes inanimate) things, the phenomenon cannot be called as a civilization but as barbarism.

Despite the fact that it is an anathema, a benefit of war is we can test the power of a civilization through it. If members of a civilization are able to secure their

⁷⁴ Ibid., 72.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 69.

⁷⁶ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 144.

respect to the “other” even in a war (they must not be the attacker not to mention), then we can rate it as a strong civilization. If members of a social group attack the civilians, for example, then we entitle it as barbarism, not as a civilization. If the fruit of the technological advancement of a social group is nuclear weapons, then we have a right to be doubtful about whether this grouping is a civilization or barbarism. If the dominant motive of a social group in its relations with other social groups is their interests and everything else is sacrificed for these interests, then again calling it a civilization would be contestable. Consequently, the civilized and uncivilized is inherent in any social grouping independent of time and space. It is the success or failure of its members if they are deserved to be named as a civilization or cursed as barbarians.

1.1.2.3.2. Culture is not a Civilization

In civilization studies, the concept of culture is usually confused with the concept of civilization. Yet, culture and civilization are not synonymous; they are used interchangeably. Yurdusev thinks both civilization and culture refer to what man produces himself and inherits from the previous generations. Therefore, the efforts to distinguish these concepts are useless.⁷⁷ He says “The distinction as such could be useful for pragmatic purposes, but no more.” I think these practical advantages of separating the concepts are worthy to be studied on.

Majority of 164 meanings of culture are associated with the word cultivation. In nineteenth century, culture gained a meaning as “the intellectual side of civilization”.⁷⁸ To distinguish culture and civilization, Oxford Dictionary also adopted this definition.⁷⁹ For Meriç, the difference between culture and civilization is in a manner of tidal flow. Sometimes they refer to the same meaning in different ways, sometimes culture is the effort that human exert to maturate and civilization is

⁷⁷ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 63.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 62.

the action that he undertakes to change the world. One is end, the other is tool. And sometimes there is only a quantity difference between the two.⁸⁰

Some other attempts to differentiate these concepts regarded civilization as the collection of multiple cultures and thus culture becomes a constitutive of civilization. For instance, Melko says “civilization incorporates multiplicity of cultures”. For Elias, *kultur* delimits national differences but civilization slights them. According to Hodgson, civilization is a compound culture. Interrelated cultures share cumulative traditions in the form of high (urban) culture.⁸¹ On the other hand, Toynbee adopts an exactly opposite position. His definition is that civilization is a species or a stage of a culture seen in a certain point of time.⁸² Thus he takes culture as a broader term that includes civilization. Braudel differentiates culture and civilization in spatial terms. He thinks the most visible difference between civilization and culture is the town.⁸³ Bagby agrees with him by stating that the civilization is a kind of culture which is found in cities.⁸⁴

For Muslim thinkers civilization is broader than culture, it is an upper level structure which includes all sciences, education types, arts, and technology.⁸⁵ Ziya Gokalp’s distinction is while culture is national, civilization is an international reality. For him, while civilization comes into being with human will, culture is not.⁸⁶ His approach is a pragmatic one. He passionately defends the view that Turkey must adopt Western civilization. To legitimize this, he separates culture from civilization and asserts adopting Western civilization does not mean to give up Turkish-Islamic culture. His views on civilization will be seen detail in following pages.

German intellectuals decamp from other European thinkers with their approach to culture and civilization. In mid-19th century, *kultur* meant both culture and civilization since there was no separate word for the latter. Then, German duality

⁸⁰ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 82-83.

⁸¹ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 62.

⁸² Sönmez, "Medeniyet, Kur'an Medeniyeti Ve Evrensellik İmkanları," 10.

⁸³ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 158-59.

⁸⁴ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 62.

⁸⁵ Mustafa Aydın, "Medeniyet Olgusu Ve Medeniyetler Arası İlişkiler," *Ayvakti* 7, no. 82-83-84 (2007): 22.

of nature and spirit makes the distinction as civilization refers to material improvement and culture refers to intellectual development. While French and English conceptualization of civilization can refer to political or economic, religious or technical, moral or social facts, German *kultur* refers essentially to intellectual, artistic and religious facts, separated from political, economic and social ones. Culture in German is “a scientific and intellectual progress freely removed from any social context”. It refers to a set of values, principles and ideas. Civilization, on the other hand, is only the material aspects of the existence of man.⁸⁷ For Oswald Spengler, while culture is the fresh and creative beginning of all civilizations, civilization is the era of ostentation and senility, it is a dead culture. So, while civilization is devalued, culture is exalted in German conception.⁸⁸

Elias examined the sociogenesis of the difference between *Kultur* and *Zivilization* in German. For him, civilization is directly related with the aristocratic palace members’ high culture and attitudes. In France and UK, the rising middle class was associated themselves with the aristocrats and it was easy for them to adopt their “civilization”. On the other hand, in Germany, the weak middle class clearly differentiated from the aristocrats and thus the concepts of culture and civilization also separated and gained contrary meanings. Civilization was regarded as an insincere chivalry in Germany.⁸⁹

1.1.2.4. Negative Connotations of Civilization

Ibn Khaldun and later Tylor are among those who define civilization free from values. They interpreted civilization technically and dissociated it from any values as much as possible. For Ibn Khaldun it is “what man as a member of society has done and has been doing”. Nomadic (Bedouin) life is the basis of settled life, which is the ground of civilization.⁹⁰ For Tylor, who introduced the concept to the USA, civilization or culture is “a complex whole of knowledge, belief, art, morals,

⁸⁶ Sönmez, "Medeniyet, Kur'an Medeniyeti Ve Evrensellik İmkanları," 10.

⁸⁷ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 59-61.

⁸⁸ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 96-100.

⁸⁹ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 168.

⁹⁰ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 61.

law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”.⁹¹

On the other hand majority of intellectuals take civilization as a value-laden concept, of course in positive terms. Before continuing on these formulations, this chapter summarizes the views of Marx and Engels and Sigmund Freud whose approach to the concept of civilization is very negative.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, unlike their French and English counterparts, the raising German middle classes conceptualized culture and civilization under the influence of German duality of material and spiritual. While the scientific and intellectual former is praised, the latter is denigrated as being related to the material aspects of mankind and as being associated with the hypocritical aristocracy. Analyzing the early readings of Marx and Engels through this dichotomy may be more explanatory in order to understand their negative approach to the concept of civilization. In *The Manifesto for Communist Party*, they classified civilization under the same category of capitalist evils: commerce, industry, and all means of substance. Therefore, it is completely disparaged. For Engels, “naked greed” is the “moving spirit” of civilization from its very inception. Civilization is based on exploitation for an insatiable desire of wealth. Yurdusev comments that these views are the expression of likely side-effects of technical progress.⁹²

Together with his views on religion, Sigmund Freud is another intellectual whose approach to civilization is generally negative. In his *Civilization and Its Discontents*, he defines civilization as the entire regulations which constitute the essence of our relations that we established with other human-beings and with the nature. Civilization distinguishes us from the animals and it tries to accomplish two objectives: to protect mankind against nature and to adjust relations among themselves. Freud accepts that religion intellectually inspires individuals in arts and science. On the other hand, civilization, which rises upon religion, restricts

⁹¹ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 82.

⁹² Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 60.

instinctive demands of human-beings and causes psychological disorder. He thinks that “what we call civilization is responsible for our misery” and seriously suggests that “renouncing it and returning back to savagery would make us happier”. For him, civilization also curbs our instincts and sexual desires. Thus, religion as being the foundation of civilization is the main reason of human-being’s infelicity and poverty.⁹³

Freud’s thoughts on aesthetic activities and tastes are very negative. For him, one of the main indicators of civilization is that people deal with useless things which have no practical aim such as decorating gardens and windows with flowers. What people expect from civilization is beauty and beauty is good-for-nothing. Other two things that Freud relates with civilization and civilized life are cleanness and order. Freud knows well about cleanness which is emphasized in Judaism as an Abrahamic principle. Aktürk thinks that his critics of cleanness come from his critics of Judaism. This is important because he most probably regards Judaism as the fundamental of Christianity, the dominant religion of the Western Civilization.⁹⁴

I would like to conclude with probably one of the most powerful and the worst depictions of civilization. Cemil Meriç launches the second part of his book *Umrandan Uygarlığa* citing the following passage from Fourier:

Civilization rises upon two pillars: bayonet and hunger. An order very suitable to the expectations of crook and scoundrels. The ultimate sovereign: money.

The regulations of civilization are written by blood, relations are constructed upon lie: lie, hatred and treachery. Civilized man is a social snake; he must be a liar due to the courtesy and good manners requirements.

Civilization is fed by stories. Poetry and prose sing virtue and happiness. However, the custom in a civilization is killing each other. Killing for the sake of a law item, understanding neither the meaning nor what it is for. Do you want a proof? The atrocities performed for

⁹³ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 154-56.

⁹⁴ Ibid.: 155.

human rights and freedoms are out there. Civilization makes flimflammers built palaces, and makes geniuses built coops.⁹⁵

1.1.2.5. Civilization as a Positive Phenomenon

Although there are technical interpretations and negative approaches to the concept as aforementioned, the major understanding of civilization is it is a positive phenomenon. The positive conceptualizations of the term are classified under three categories by Yurdusev: civilization as quality, civilization as a condition and process, and civilization as a collectivity.

Civilization as quality is the original meaning of the term when it was formulated in eighteenth century. In this definition the key point is the distinction between ‘civilized’ (good) and ‘uncivilized’ (bad). Both individuals and social groups can possess these qualities or attributes. An attitude or a behavior can be labeled as either civilized or uncivilized. This type of formulation of civilization is probably the most positively value laden approach to the term. Needless to say, being civilized is exalted while being uncivilized is belittled.⁹⁶

I have already talked about *civilization as a condition and process* above in the chapter on barbarism and stated that this a singular form where there is only one civilization which is the result of previous uncivilized conditions, that is savagery or barbarism. This meaning of civilization is interrelated with the previous approach, because the condition of a society develops and allows its members to attain a quality of being civilized through the process. It is a quality which a particular social group had not already possessed and the process of being more civilized lasts forever. Thus, it requires the existence of less civilized periods or conditions. A difference of this type of meaning from the “civilization as quality” is this process is a feature of communities, not individuals. Here, civilization is taken as the property of all human societies and a general destiny of humanity becomes possible. Thus, a universal

⁹⁵ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 79.

⁹⁶ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 63.

history of civilization can be written.⁹⁷ Toynbee deprecates this type of approach to civilization. For him, there is no single civilization and progress is a myth.⁹⁸

Civilization as a collectivity refers to the plurality of civilizations. Comparatively speaking, it is a less value laden approach. For Meriç, this meaning was appeared after 1850⁹⁹ and according to Braudel in early nineteenth century, but Yurdusev finds the plural understanding of civilizations earlier in Herder's thoughts. For Herder, there were diverse groups of peoples who had unique lifestyles. The plurality allows the perspective that there is no ideal state of civilization. There are different civilizations of different societies and these societies have a right to attribute different meanings to the concept of civilization that we cannot judge its truthfulness. Separate civilizations (Egyptian, Chinese, Islamic, Western, etc.) have separate characteristics, processes, and backgrounds.¹⁰⁰ Thus, plural civilization partially ignores the universality, ethicality, sociality and intellectuality, which are accentuated by the singular civilization.¹⁰¹

1.1.3. Turkish Approach: Is Civilization “Güzel Ahlak”¹⁰² or a “Tek dişli canavar”¹⁰³?

Although the Turkish National Anthem introduces a very negative connotation of the *word* civilization¹⁰⁴ to Turkish children in their very early ages, the common perception of civilization in Turkish intellectuals is it is a positive phenomenon and an ideal state for a society. The colonial mindset and the effects of the WWI induced conservative Turkish thinkers approach to the word dubiously. Especially Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the composer of Turkish National Anthem who is

⁹⁷ Ibid., 63-64.

⁹⁸ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 101.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 96.

¹⁰⁰ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 64-65.

¹⁰¹ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 96.

¹⁰² “Social ethics”

¹⁰³ “Single-fanged monster”

¹⁰⁴ The related lines from the Turkish National Anthem, actually refers to the invading European powers: “Ulusun, korkma! Nasıl böyle bir imanı boğar/ "Medeniyet!" dediğin tek dişi kalmış canavar?": “Recognize your innate strength, my friend! And think: how can this fiery faith ever be killed/ By that battered, single-fanged monster you call "civilization"?”

highly respected by Turkish conservatives, had severely lashed the civilization. He called it a “single-fanged monster” and a “rascal creature”. On the other hand, the degraded civilization in his poems is only the Western Civilization whose members invaded his country.¹⁰⁵ As stated earlier, when it comes to the pure meaning of the concept, it is already in Turkish-Islamic lexicon with a positive meaning in different forms (*ümran*, *tamaddun*, *medeniyet*). Civilization is regarded as “social ethics” which is highly exalted by the Prophet of Islam.¹⁰⁶ From the local neighborhood to international relations and the whole globe, civilization in essence is the assurance of a humane and peaceful life.¹⁰⁷ In this section the views of three modern Turkish intellectuals, who deeply influenced their followers, are going to be presented: Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), Nurettin Topçu (1909-1975), and Cemil Meriç (1916-1987).

1.1.3.1. Ziya Gökalp

Civilization cannot be taken by itself in Gökalp’s understanding. He devotes his research on civilization along with culture and he tries to define distinctive characteristics of these sister concepts. By doing this, his ultimate objective is to separate civilization from culture and provide an indisputable basis for the adoption of Western Civilization. He tries to prove that adopting Western Civilization does not mean to abandon Turkish culture and Islam. He defines himself as: “I am a part of Turkish nation, I am a part of Muslim ummah, I am a part of Western Civilization”¹⁰⁸.

Gökalp classifies three stages in the history of nations. In tribal stage, the essential elements are language and race; in ummah stage, it is religion; and in nation stage they are culture and civilization.¹⁰⁹ Civilization is the consciousness and culture is the character of a society.¹¹⁰ While the latter is shaped independent from human

¹⁰⁵ Ahmet Dursun, "Mehmet Akif'te "Medeniyet"," *Köprü*, no. 81 (2003): 92-94.

¹⁰⁶ Yunus A. Çengel, "Medeniyet: Nedir, Ne Değildir?," *Köprü*, no. 81 (2003): 110.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*: 114-16.

¹⁰⁸ Ziya Gökalp, *Kültür Ve Medeniyet/ Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, 1st ed. (Konya: Gençlik Kitabevi, 2010), 72.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

will, the former one is realized by human methods and personal power.¹¹¹ Culture is the total of the institutions which unify *people of a society* together. On the other hand, civilization is the aggregate of institutions which connect the *superstructures of different societies*. He cites the poems of Yunus Emre and Rumi as examples of being cultural and civilizational. For Gökalp, Yunus is cultural since his poems connected Turks together while Rumi is civilizational since his poems agglomerated Turkish, Arabian and Persian societies under the same umbrella.¹¹² Culture is a national phenomenon. It never changes. It is a sum of religious and moral feelings. Civilization, on the other hand, is international, it is the aggregate of common institutions or opinions on economics, law, etc., and it can be transferred to other societies or can be altered. Civilization is a fruit of all humanity but culture is a local product.¹¹³

Subjective qualities such as faith, moral duties, and perception of beauty belong to a society of culture, while objective qualities such as scientific truths, rules and means of health, economics, agriculture, commerce and concepts of mathematics and logic belong to a society of civilization.¹¹⁴ Gökalp thinks *religion* was the cultural and *magic* was the civilizational element in early societies, because each society had its exclusive religion, but magic was a common property of different societies. It is highly possible that all cultural elements of modern times are derived from religion (aesthetics, ethics, law, etc.) and all civilizational elements are offset of magic (astronomy, medical sciences, chemistry, etc.).¹¹⁵

Since religion is confined to the sacred, civilization is free from it. There can be different religions under the same civilization. What constitutes a civilization is a conglomeration of secular institutions. Therefore, the real elements of a civilization are positive sciences, technology and arts. The European Civilization is at the zenith in all respects. Adopting it will help Turks to destruct the Persian philosophical, aesthetic and ethical pleasures which have influence on Turkish science and art. But,

¹¹¹ Ibid., 26-27.

¹¹² Ibid., 17-18.

¹¹³ Ibid., 10.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 51.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 40-41.

what Gökalp demands is not that European joy supersedes Persian relish. Pleasures are supposed to be unique to a nation. What must be transferred from Europe are the methods and techniques, not the feelings and pleasures.¹¹⁶

For Gökalp, there is not an Islamic Civilization as there is not a Christian Civilization. Instead, there is an Eastern Civilization which has the same roots with the Western Civilization at the final analysis. The Mediterranean Civilization of early ages was developed by first Greeks and then Romans and separated into two when Roman Empire divided as eastern and western empires. The Western Civilization is rooted in Western Roman Empire and the Eastern Civilization was flourished upon Eastern Roman Empire. The footprints of Byzantium can be traced in the music, architecture, logic, etc. of so-called Islamic civilization.¹¹⁷ Also, for him, the Western Civilization could not arise without the emergence of Islam.¹¹⁸ These analyses serve as another base for his final goal: Since Turkish Civilization is an offspring of Byzantium, no one can object to the adoption of the Western Civilization.¹¹⁹ Additionally, in the higher stages of its development, a nation should change its civilization, as Japan did once. Turks were a part of Far Eastern Civilization when they had a tribal life; under the rule of sultan they adopted Eastern Civilization; and with the nation state, they must be a part of Western Civilization.¹²⁰

1.1.3.2. Nurettin Topçu

Topçu is one of the thinkers who ruminated over the concept of civilization throughout his life. For him, the most significant issue that Turkey has to deal with is the question of civilization.¹²¹ His conceptualization of civilization and culture is a decomposition endeavor, but not a complete separation. Following Gökalp, his definition of civilization is also about the material aspects of human life, but he does not liberalize it and asserts that it is supposed to be subordinate to the culture. He defines civilization as the technological products and life styles which a social

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 22.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 62-64.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 73.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 71.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 60-61.

grouping puts forward in a certain period of time.¹²² He employs technology (*teknik*) almost as a synonym of civilization. Technology is the application of sciences, not their goal. For Topçu, it is an unwanted fruit, an unwanted award.¹²³

Culture, on the other hand, is the sum of religious, ethical, scientific and artistic values which have been created in the history of a community. It is a spiritual property of that certain community.¹²⁴ Therefore, the elements of culture are science, philosophy, fine arts, architecture, and religion. Through culture, man dominates nature and the world acquires a spirit.¹²⁵ For instance, Gothic architecture is the masterwork which is a reflection of Christian penitent eyes looking up to the sky and Seljuk architecture is the image of Muslim kowtow on the ground.¹²⁶

The relation between culture and civilization/technology is the latter is a necessary result of culture. While culture is the soul, technology is the body. If it is directed by culture, then the world becomes a home of serenity and eudemonia. If it contradicts with culture, then problems of soul-body conflict emerge. Hence, Topçu determines the foundations of modern civilizational crisis. For him, the problem of the European Civilization is that it could not achieve to administer the body-soul balance. The main reason of the crisis of modernity is that the winner of the battle between spirit/human and material/product is the latter. The power of technology, which was living its heyday in Europe with the abundant raw material supplied from the colonies, has dehumanized the world.¹²⁷ This consequence had been prepared by Europe for more than a century and was realized by the United States. The cure of the European crisis will be a cultural pounce.¹²⁸

The character of identity crisis in Turkey is different than that of the West. Turks presumed that technology was just self-satisfaction of a child passion, so they did not create their own. They have been transferring it from the West drop by drop.

¹²¹ Nurettin Topçu, *Kültür Ve Medeniyet*, 5th ed. (İstanbul: Dergah, 2010), 11.

¹²² Umit apaydin, p. 276.

¹²³ Topçu, *Kültür Ve Medeniyet*, 15.

¹²⁴ Umit apaydin, p. 276.

¹²⁵ Topçu, *Kültür Ve Medeniyet*, 16-18.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

They assumed that the civilization is something buyable. They thought that they could buy the dress, but they did not see the man wearing it. They enjoyed picking fruits but not growing a tree. For this reason, the human side of the technology is missing in Turkish imported culture: Doctors were belittled when they cared patient free of charge, politics was regarded as routine oration, and universities preferred construct buildings to human resources.¹²⁹ To surmount her crisis, Turkey must exceed the European material civilization by an extraordinary drive of a divine soul, just as Christian culture exceeded Greek realism through its celestial idealism.¹³⁰

1.1.3.3. Cemil Meriç

Meriç's understanding of civilization is a well-composition of the views of diverse intellectuals, from Cevdet Pasha to Danilevsky. He prudently approaches to the term. He adopts the culture/civilization dichotomy and he is suspicious of "being civilized" which was superficially regarded just as westernization and modernization. For Meriç, these mean nothing but Europeanization at the final analysis, and Europeanization means extinction. He sees "us" as the children of a different and hostile civilization which has different standards, much older, much nobler and much more humane.¹³¹ He highly agrees with Atilla İlhan's summary of the last century: "We had mistaken being servant for being civilized".¹³²

Meriç sometimes adopts the views which present civilization as a degenerated form, as the last stage of culture. It is a period of stoning. The communities which are in this phase had achieved their ideals of freedom, justice, and wealth and they are consoled with old achievements.¹³³ Each civilization accomplishes a value of humanity and they are destined to decease. Greek created beauty, Rome created law, Sami religion, Europe science, Indian dream and mysticism, and China created

¹²⁸ Ibid., 18-19.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 20-21.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 12.

¹³¹ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 25.

¹³² Ibid., 30.

¹³³ Ibid., 109.

beneficial. Any civilization can assert that it surpasses other civilizations in all these fields. When they achieve their duty, they start dying.¹³⁴

Meriç admires Cevdet Pasha because of his efforts to define the concept of civilization, and follows Toynbee in his views on the rise and fall of civilizations. Meriç thinks Cevdet Pasha is the only Turkish intellectual who scientifically studied the concept. His definition was not an imitation of the Western counterparts. As a student of Ibn Khaldun, he was the voice of the Orient.¹³⁵ In the conceptualization of Cevdet Pasha, peoples first constitute their states and then start to be civilized. Being civilized requires two elements: providing material needs and maturing in terms of ethics and intellect. Civilizational superiority is not exclusive to any human grouping, it circulates among them.¹³⁶

Meriç agrees with Toynbee in many perspectives. He thinks Toynbee is the first historian who defined civilization clearly.¹³⁷ Civilization is the product of a creative minority and geography. It survives as long as this minority answers the riddles that the time and space pose and the public willingly follows them. Therefore, the accuracy of their answers determines the destiny of the civilization. Technological advancement, new conquests, or power over material are not the reasons that develop a civilization. Rather, a civilization improves when its self-determination and self-articulation abilities wax, social values immaterialize, and technology and tools become less complicated. A growing civilization refreshes itself, differs and becomes more unified. On the other hand, in declining civilizations creative minority cannot lead the public, and society dissolves. Relative values are regarded as absolute rules. The administrators try to respond new questions with old answers and use unnecessary force. Inner fights grow. Inferiority affects art, philosophy, language, religion, etc.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Ibid., 110.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 86.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 85.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 98.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 112-13.

Because of the discussions on westernization of his time, Meriç had mulled over the transplantation of civilizations. He claims that a conversion of a civilization into another is out of question. Therefore, westernization is a myth.¹³⁹ A civilization cannot adopt another by all its elements. On the other hand, transferring a civilization is possible. There are three forms of it: colonization, instillation, and utilization. Each original civilization is a filter; it absorbs only the properties which are adaptable to its body.¹⁴⁰ These properties are supposed to be the inventions of humanity, not the futility of a civilization (The West in this context). For Meriç, progress cannot be achieved through relinquishing the sacred and the past should be preserved by selecting and the new will be accepted after a thorough election.¹⁴¹ Contrary to Gökalp and Huntington, Meriç believes that civilization has a company while it passes through one country to another: culture¹⁴², and following Toynbee, he thinks that the transfer of technology, opinions, or abilities is not important. What is important is the surge of religions among civilizations.¹⁴³

¹³⁹ Ibid., 26.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 109.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 84.

¹⁴² Ibid., 95.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 101.

CHAPTER II

FOREVER YOUNG VERSUS INBORN MATURE

In April 2010, International Foundation for Technology, Economic and Social Research organized the second round table discussion on Civilization and Values. One of the discussants presented a corruption in the US as an indicator of the ethical crisis that the Western civilization passes through. He cited that according to the statistics 90% of the gas stations in the New York City and neighbor cities are adding water into the gas they sell.¹⁴⁴ The discussant was unaware that more than half of the owners of these gas stations were not originally Americans. Most of them were Indian, African, and Turkish Muslims.¹⁴⁵

2.1. Forever Young: The Western Civilization

2.1.1. Geographical Limits

Davutoğlu asserts that every civilization rises upon a perception of time and space. He adduces the parallelism between the development of cartography and the emergence of civilizations. Cartographers of each civilization place their own civilization in the center of their maps. Cosmas (Indicopleustes), for instance, was a clear example that shows us the change of space perception and geographical sensation with Christianity. The main aim of the author of *Topographia Christiana* was to express the space understanding of sacred texts and church authorities through geographical models. While Cosmas puts Christian world at the center, the others did the same for their own civilizations: Persians (before Islam) divided the world into seven circles, Persia in the center and the other six are surrounding it, touching each

¹⁴⁴ I could not confirm this information. Yet, my point is not the truthiness of it, but the mentality.

¹⁴⁵ In Washington D.C. nearly half of the gas stations belong to Eyob Mamo, an Ethiopian immigrant. (<http://ethiopiaforums.com/meet-the-guy-who-owns-half-of-d-c-s-gas-stations-joe-eyob-mamo-d-c-s-gas-station-master>); 300 of 1800 gas stations of Long Island, NY are owned by Turks. 140 of these 300 were investigated for tax evasion and 57 people were arrested in 2005. (<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE6D8163BF933A05752C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted=all>).

other. For Greeks, world was Aegean-centered; and for Roman Empire all roads were ended up at Rome.¹⁴⁶ It is highly probable that the political engineers of the modern era applaud the same understanding. The regions (West, Middle East, Far East, etc.) were named with this archaic centerical perception of space. At the end of the nineteenth century, the East (Middle or Near) started from Bosnia in British newspapers. But now it starts from Edirne. For Davutoğlu, it is most likely that if Turks had lost its land up to Bursa, the East would have started from there.¹⁴⁷ Although I accept that these tags were invented for otherization, I find it useful for pragmatic aims. Otherwise, it is not easy to be clear on the discussed issue in geographical terms.

As a geographical area, the definition of the West changes country to country comparatively. While for Turkey, Greece is a Western country, for Italy she is Eastern. On the other hand, culturally the West is fixed,¹⁴⁸ and for practical purposes there is nothing wrong to define its boundaries. Europe was the name of the central Greece and Asia was the name of inland Turkey from the Aegean Sea. Roman and Greek explorers extended the territories of Europe and Asia¹⁴⁹ and today they are the names of two continents representing the West and the East. If the first civilizations really emerged on and around Mesopotamia and Asia Minor and then spread to the west, the border between the east and the west has to be drawn somewhere on or around the Aegean Sea. It is very reasonable that if the peoples of west to the Aegean Sea named the visitors, traders, and enemies coming from the east of the sea as Easterners; and the peoples of east to the Aegean Sea named the visitors, traders, and enemies coming from the west of the Aegean Sea as Westerners. Using the titles of the West and the East as a heritage of those days does not mean that there is a concrete boundary that can be observed from the outer space. It is just a salutary tradition unless to be used for any segregation. Thus, it is instrumental to define the

¹⁴⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Tarih İdraki Oluşumunda Metodolojinin Rolü: Medeniyetlerarası Etkileşim Açısından Dünya Tarihi Ve Osmanlı," *Divan* 7, no. 2 (1999): 39-42.

¹⁴⁷ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 118.

¹⁴⁸ A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Batı Medeniyetini Nasıl Tanımlayabiliriz?," *Avrasya Dosyası* 13, no. 2 (2007): 32.

¹⁴⁹ Patrick Geary Mark Kishlansky, Patricia O'brien, *Civilization in the West*, 3 ed., 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Longman, 1998), 2-3.

boundaries of the Western Civilization as: between 30th East and 125th West meridians (from the Aegean Sea to California), and the north of the 35th North latitude (north to the Mediterranean Sea) plus Oceania. This map gives us a collectivity of the reflections of similar self-perceptions and world views (not of economical development from my perspective), which is called the Western Civilization.

On the other hand, there is a significant question remained to be answered: To what extent we can take the Western Civilization as a monolithic bloc in this territory? In other words, are there different civilizations or other cultural sub-groups on this huge land? It is absolutely not possible to take Western or any other civilization as a monolithic structure. There may be veering reflections and manifestations in a civilization. On the other hand, just like a forest is a forest with many different trees, there is supposed to be no obtrusive disparity in the overall picture of a civilization. In this sense the map drawn above is giving us a complete picture of a civilization in modern context.

Here, for the case of the Western Civilization -at least pragmatically- I do not agree with Davutoğlu who rejects the idea which accepts the concept of civilization as a geographical term. To recall, he asserts that any civilization cannot be restricted in any territory and the representative cities of the United States, France, Germany, etc. are parts of the Chinese or Islamic Civilizations as well as the Western Civilization.¹⁵⁰ Since the city is a commonly accepted compound of civilization, we can examine the largest cities of the Western Civilization in this territory to check the validity of his claim. It is true that these and other big cities of the West have a multi-cultural structure where representatives of almost all civilizations are living. The national soccer teams of European countries are clear proofs of this situation. Perhaps, our world is evolving towards an “amorphous city” where a single global civilization is going to emerge, but for today these cities are not reflections of different civilizations. The buildings are the same, the attitudes are identical. Except a few examples, even an observant Muslim is not able to recognize a mosque from

¹⁵⁰ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 169.

outside in Paris or Berlin if there is no minaret. A driver, either a WASP American or a Turk, fastens his seatbelt in the New York City. For at least another fifty years the cultural differences that we face in Western cities will remain as different species of trees in a forest.

The cities of the previous “super civilization” also approves that multicultural city does not mean that it is a “civilizationless” or a “multicivilizational” city. Davutoğlu himself gives us the example. He quotes a French historian of population: In 1596, the largest city of the world was Istanbul with a population of seven or eight hundred thousand. The second was Cairo which was another Ottoman city and the third was Beijing.¹⁵¹ In late the sixteenth century, the Islamic Civilization was at the peak and Istanbul and Cairo were as multicultural as today’s New York and London with their Turkish, Greek, Copt, Orthodox, Balkanian, Arabic populations. Nevertheless, today they are regarded as pure symbols of Islamic Civilization.

To some extent, Davutoğlu’s assertion may be proper for the cities of other civilizations which used to be either ruled by the super powers of the West or adopted Western ideologies. In the colonial period of more than three centuries, France, UK, Spain, and Portugal were even successful to have the indigenous peoples of Africa and India to adopt their languages. Bombay, Abuja, Johannesburg carries many features of the Western Civilization. Capitalist Tokyo and Marxist Beijing are also hardly be differentiated from a Western city when one takes a helicopter tour over the city. Nevertheless, it still would not be accepted by many if one asserts that these cities belong to the Western Civilization. Discussing nuances in the Western civilizational territory confuses minds and does not serve any practical account. As a result, keeping the civilization/culture dichotomy in mind, a culturally diverse Western city does not necessarily mean that it is also a property of the other civilizations. The complete portrait of the given borders of the West is eligible to be named as an unblended civilization.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 111.

2.1.2. Elements of the Western Civilization

Yurdusev traced back the first usage of the word west in the tenth century when the Eastern (Orthodoxy) and Western (Catholicism) Christianity were legally separated. Additionally, the rise of Holy Roman Empire under the rule of Charlemagne in Europe deepened this division. The West gained its cultural meaning in the thirteenth century, but the modern understanding of the Western Civilization was emerged along with the development of the concept of civilization. What we understand from the concepts of the East and the West was shaped in the nineteenth century because the domination of the West over the “rest” became clear in this era and the Westerners claimed their superiority and uniqueness. Another reason of the East-West conceptual division was that their knowledge about the other peoples of the World had enhanced. Although they did not forgo their “superiority” over the rest of the world, Europeans took to accept the reality of the existence of other civilizations, such as Indian, Chinese, and Islam.¹⁵²

The easiness and the difficulty of defining what provides the foundations for Islamic and Western civilizations are latent in their names. For Islamic Civilization, it is of course the religion of Islam, but what about the Western Civilization? Looking deep into a religion or a nation, as in Chinese or Indian civilizations, will not be enough to determine the fundamentals of the Western Civilization today with its multi-national, multi-religious (or multi-sectarian), and multi-lingual structure. On the other hand, there is a consensus on that the Greek-Roman tradition and Christianity (with reactions to it) have great influences on the formation of the Western Civilization. For Toynbee, the Western Civilization is the offspring of Greek-Roman Civilization¹⁵³ and for Lewis, Christianity lays its foundations.¹⁵⁴

Attas’ keen observation of the Western Civilization and Islamic Civilization is admirable: while the former one is a ‘becoming’, the latter is a ‘being’. The

¹⁵² Yurdusev, "Batı Medeniyetini Nasıl Tanımlayabiliriz?," 33-37.

¹⁵³ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din* (İstanbul: Kayhan Yayınları, 1978), 286-87.

¹⁵⁴ Lewis, ""I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell"."

Western Civilization is still a process which makes it lively.¹⁵⁵ Davutoğlu explains this process of becoming in detail. There are three main cornerstones of the history of the Western civilizational transformation. First stage was the shift from imperial Pax Romana to feudal order of Holy Roman Empire; second stage was the change of pre-modern feudal order into mercantilist/nation-state; and the last stage was the alteration of modernity and the Christianity. In the first stage of the transformation, the organizational and theological creation of the Catholic Church was completed in four centuries and thus the ethical and spiritual base for the second stage was provided. In the second step, the transformation had realized in three levels. In intellectual and philosophical level, scholastically thinking abandons its place for the Renaissance. In economy-political level, feudalism and aristocratic fragmentation were replaced by mercantilism and nation-state. And, in religious sphere Catholicism was started to be challenged by Protestantism. The third stage has two periods. The first one was started by Newton's physics, the enlightenment, and Kant's critics. For Davutoğlu, we are still in the second period of the third stage which is going through an internal crisis. This crisis has been deepening increasingly especially after the WWII. A significant feature of this crisis is that the worldwide religious consciousness and the Western interest in Christianity have been increasing. Thus, while the landmark and the symbol of the first period of the third transformation were the death of God and the end of religion, those of the second period were the resurgence of the religion and the restriction on secularism.¹⁵⁶ Therefore, it can be concluded that Christianity, secularization/modernization, and science/technology are three distinguishing elements of the modern Western Civilization and its transformation. Following passages are having a closer look into these elements. Although the Greek-Roman heritage had given the European Civilization an implicit

¹⁵⁵ Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: An Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1995), 81.

¹⁵⁶ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti Ve Hıristiyanlık," *Divan* 9, no. 2 (2003): 35-37.

superiority in its conceptualization process¹⁵⁷, I exclude it from my analysis since the visibility of its influence on Western daily life is diminished.

2.1.2.1. Christianity

Christianity has always been at the center of the formation and evolution of the Western Civilization. Almost all scholars who study the Western Civilization concede the crucial position of Christianity for it. It is not an exaggeration if one claims that the history of the Western Civilization is the history of the –positive or negative- relations of the Western peoples with this religion. The developments in the other two elements have always been the consequences of these relations. For Toynbee, as a continuation of Western Roman Empire, Christianity has a central importance for the definition of the Western Civilization. In his evaluation of westernization movements, he takes our attention to the point that it is not possible to be a Westerner without being a Christian.¹⁵⁸

Ömer Çaha traces the role of religion in the Western Civilization comparing Europe and the United States. In Europe, it is clear to see the central role of Christianity in building European civilization in the Middle Ages. Europe set the foundations of today's civilization by harmonizing Christianity with the thoughts and institutions of Greek, Hellene, Roman, and the Enlightenment. The experiences of religious and sectarian wars enormously contributed to the process of building a civilization. Americans, on the other hand, were destitute of this reservoir. To fill the gap of history, philosophy, practical experience and even ideology, they put forward religion.¹⁵⁹ Since intellectual circles have not interrupted the process, religion could deeply influence the network of social values, institutions and relations. Hence, the American model is a perfect example which clearly demonstrates the role of religion in the construction of a civilization.¹⁶⁰ Çaha quotes Tocqueville who compares the US with France as a representative of Europe: "I saw that in France, the soul of the

¹⁵⁷ Simon Murden, "Culture in World Affairs," in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 541.

¹⁵⁸ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 29-30.

¹⁵⁹ Çaha, *Bitmeyen Beraberlik: Modern Dünya'da Din Ve Devlet*, 142-43.

freedom and the soul of the religion move opposite directions. But, in the States these two get along well and rule the country". The Enlightenment in France and the rest of the continental Europe developed as a challenge to God this challenge had continued until the end of the WWII. Whereas, Americans had appeared in history with a religion and established a system which combines secular and religious values together. This system both opened the doors for secular freedoms and created a religious pluralism that one cannot observe elsewhere.¹⁶¹

In the fifteenth century, the Western Civilization had the same conditions with other civilizations: living under a spiritual and traditional roof constructed by a religion. The only difference of the Western civilization was its liveliness.¹⁶² Starting with the Enlightenment, the religious understanding in Europe started to be evolved. Davutoğlu observes that the transformation of the Western Civilization intersects with the transformation of the understanding of Christianity. For him, the religion perception of the West had been under a great revolution in the Post-Kantian era. He determines three cornerstones of the Western transformation of religion in general and Christianity in particular. First one is the Vatican Council I (1869-1870), second one is the speech of Pope Pius X in 1907, and third one is the Vatican Council II (1962-1965). This transformation had changed the meanings and perceptions of the key concepts of Christianity, such as revelation, dogma, consciousness, reality, church, etc. and these changes had direct effect on the religion understanding itself especially in two aspects. First, the general belief system that the believers must follow was replaced by a privatized experience; and secondly the religious epistemology turned into a positivist research field. Consequently, Catholicism approved the legitimacy of other religions. One of the most important decisions of the Vatican Council II was to show effort to establish contacts with the "others":¹⁶³

The Church, therefore, exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of other religions, carried out with

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 147.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 105. Recep Şentürk most likely does not agree with the last sentence above, because for him the epitome of religious pluralism and freedoms is Muslim states in history.

¹⁶² Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din*, 204-05.

¹⁶³ Davutoğlu, "Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti Ve Hristiyanlık," 38-40.

prudence and love and in witness to the Christian faith and life, they recognize, preserve and promote the good things, spiritual and moral, as well as the socio-cultural values found among these men.¹⁶⁴

Elizabeth Shakman Hurd refers many intellectuals who envisage Christianity as a source of the Western Civilization in the context of the United States. Among them, Frederick Mark Gedicks considers that the worship notion of Protestantism laid the foundations for a civilization in the States. For liberals, like John Stuart Mill, Judeo-Christian tradition is the moral basis of their civilizational identity. According to Alessandro Pizzorno, the symbols of a common identity of the Western Civilization which defines who is in and who is out are set by the church. And lastly, Tocqueville regards religion as the first institution of American government although it never directly intervenes administrative affairs.¹⁶⁵ Religion is a component of the ethical foundations of a civilization.”¹⁶⁶

2.1.2.2. Secularization

While Western technological advancement was a material reaction to the Christian dogmatism and unbearable fanaticism, secularization was an ideological response and an attempt to find a way to live together with (not without) religion. For some, “secularization is the realization of a Western religious tradition.”¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless, for some European countries, especially France after the 1798 Revolution, secularization was formulated as an antithesis of religion which was supposed to be suppressed. This is probably because some had even considered that if the Christian theology was right then god was supposed to be a freak.¹⁶⁸ According to Şentürk, before the modern era, the Western Civilization would adopt a closed civilizational approach. This means that it was not able to develop a theology, law and political understanding for tolerance. Therefore, the history of the West is full of

¹⁶⁴ Vatican Council II, *Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions* 1965.

¹⁶⁵ Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 2008), 40-42.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 91.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

religious and sectarian wars in which parties aimed at destroying each other. For him, the rationalism and secularism were successfully employed as tools to overcome this predicament.¹⁶⁹

In the *Politics of Secularism in International Relations*, Hurd separates between the two powerful traditions of privatization of the religion in Western societies and in international relations: laicism, represented by France, and Judeo-Christian secularism, represented by the United States. The former assumes that all varieties of metaphysical understandings have vanished from the public space.¹⁷⁰ It aims to create an independent public sphere where the “religious” does not assert any political challenge. Religion is totally a private affair which is sometimes stubbed to be so. For instance, the Church-State relations in France after the 1789 Revolution was labeled with enmity and oppression.¹⁷¹

On the other hand, Judeo-Christian secularism does not mean a complete rejection of religion in public and political life. Rather, the separation of church and state was a success of Judeo-Christianity.¹⁷² The meaning of secularism in American context, which is similar to the nineteenth century British evangelism and utilitarianism, was one interpretation of the religion is not superior to another.¹⁷³ The political contour that Judeo-Christian secularism attempts to create actually refers to the concept of civil religion of Rousseau who introduced the term in *The Social Contract*, published in 1762. He defined it as the religious dimension of a polity.¹⁷⁴ In summary, “While laicism seeks to define and confine religion to the private sphere, Judeo-Christian secularism connects contemporary Western secular formations to a legacy of *Western* (Christian, later Judeo-Christian) values, cultural and religious beliefs, historical practices, legal traditions, governing institutions, and forms of identification.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁶⁸ Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din*, 248.

¹⁶⁹ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 24.

¹⁷⁰ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 29.

¹⁷¹ Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics* (Harlow: Longman, 1998), 62.

¹⁷² Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 148.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷⁴ Haynes, *Religion in Global Politics*, 22.

¹⁷⁵ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 38.

Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington, as representatives of Judeo-Christian secularism, consider that the Western Civilization owes the separation of the religious and the secular to Christianity. For Huntington, secular democracy has its foundations in Protestantism and it is not only emerged within the Western Civilization but also it is an exclusive character that the other civilizations can never have. Secular and Christian nature define the West.¹⁷⁶

2.1.2.3. Technology

The ideals and aims of a civilization are represented by a symbolic hero. Toynbee portrays a saint at the front and a cavalier behind him as the symbol of the West during the Middle Ages and at the beginning of the New Era. At the end of the New Era, the successful technician substituted for these two.¹⁷⁷ As mother Judaism and sister Islam, Christianity had also claimed that there is no god but God and it hindered the deification of nature up until seventeenth century. After God excluded from the Western Christianity, the man with his power of manipulation over nature (this is the exact meaning of technology in Greek) replaced God,¹⁷⁸ and by the beginning of eighteenth century, the Western society was labeled as the aspiration of technology and secularization. This replacement had been the very first objective of the Western intellectuals because religious wars among the Western peoples over-multiplied and Christian bigotry covered throughout Europe had been untenable at the beginning of seventeenth century. It is worth to notice that how quickly a very few people had realized this aim and tagged the rest of the society along with themselves.¹⁷⁹

Although Francis Bacon summaries the significance of technological developments as “The true and legitimate objective of the science is to beautify the man’s life through inventions and richness.”¹⁸⁰, the remarkable consequences of the Western developments had not always brought beauty for the “rest”. Horse was the

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 140-41.

¹⁷⁷ Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din*, 298.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 313.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 251.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 299.

vehicle which made the spread of nomadic Mongols possible before fifteenth century and they reached all possible places on the ground. But, fifteenth century onwards, the Westerners acquired the dominancy on the oceans and had a chance to reach to the gates of the Old World with the advancement of sailing technology. Thus, the Western Civilization achieved a pervasion covering each single place of the World¹⁸¹ and their superiority over the “other” had been proved. Davutoğlu agrees with Toynbee in taking note of technological advancement for its crucial role in the formation of the Western Civilization. In centuries, technological developments were restricted by the Hellenistic-Christian tradition, but technology had finally achieved significant developments in agricultural (plough), military (arch and armor), and sailing (vessel) technologies. After seventeenth century, the technological advancements boomed and changed Westerner’s life forever.¹⁸² As a result, technology became the idol that replaced the expelled God after this century¹⁸³ and sailboat started to symbolize the Western superiority after mid 1800s.¹⁸⁴

Davutoğlu criticizes the philosophical background of the Western material advancement in his different writings. The existential consciousness of the modern Western Civilization was established on the superiority of science which is supposed to take humanity to better places.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the mechanism-dependent character of the Western Civilization has removed the humanist normativism. Science and technology as the dependent variables of market mechanism shaped the value systems of Western societies. Normative economics is blamed to be unscientific and thus the weapon industry, with its nuclear and chemical deathly hardware, legitimized itself in a scientific framework. The relative success of mechanism-dependent structures paved the way for legitimating modernism as an inescapable way for a better life. Thus, mechanism creates its own value structure and decides which value is valid.¹⁸⁶ The philosophy of the Enlightenment was that the mankind will reach the absolute emancipation and equality under the trio of

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 203.

¹⁸² Ibid., 300-10.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 310.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 203.

¹⁸⁵ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 232, 50.

¹⁸⁶ ———, "Bunalımdan Dönüşüme Batı Medeniyeti Ve Hristiyanlık," 25.

mind, science, and progress. Nevertheless, the validity of this philosophy has been harshly chastised and the prophecy of “the West would stay as the only civilization in the future” seems to be falsified.¹⁸⁷ Toynbee adds another criticism to the replacement of spiritual by material regarding civilizational relations. For him, the replacement of religion by technology had two very important consequences which transformed the Western perception of other civilizations. First, they consider that the increase in the wealth and power of the West was a consequence of this replacement; and secondly the traditional Western religious intolerance smoothed in time with the alienation of the West from its religion.¹⁸⁸

2.2. Inborn Mature: The Islamic Civilization

While the boundaries of the Western Civilization had been still drawn in the eighteenth century, the borders of the Islamic World had been almost determined only within a century after the emergence of Islam. The passionate early Muslims, many were the friends of the Prophet of Islam, were able to conquer all the way from the North-Western coasts of Africa to the steppes of inner Asia. Today, boundaries of the Islamic Civilization are more or less the same. There are only two outstanding differences from the past: the Andalusia, which was conquered by the early Muslims, and the Balkans, which was added to the map later by Turks. The common characteristic of these regions were while the ruling classes were Muslims, the majority of their populations were not. Today’s Spain had been ruled by Arab Muslims more than seven centuries. Muslims, Christians and Jews were living together as the members of Abrahamic religions.¹⁸⁹ Balkans, on the other hand, had a central importance for Ottomans while even for Rome it was excluded as “the East of the West”. The dominancy of Christian population in the Balkan cities had stayed

¹⁸⁷ ———, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 242-43.

¹⁸⁸ Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din*, 267.

¹⁸⁹ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 31.

stable for centuries.¹⁹⁰ Davutoğlu stresses the interconnectedness of the global world of twenty-first century. When Ottomans collapsed, there was a homogenous World. The Islamic World was assumed to start from Edirne. With the expansion of nation-states, it became the totality of all countries who are members of the OIC. Now, Islam is just at the center of Europe and the US. Davutoğlu asserts that both Muslims and the West must accept this fact.¹⁹¹

Although societies are intertwined in our global world, the boundaries are still visible. Keeping this inevitable coexistence in mind, today's map of the Muslim World, even though it does not include South-Western and Eastern Europe anymore, demonstrates us a unique feature of the Islamic Civilization: it is neighboring almost all commonly accepted civilizations. This endows it a central position in the political and sociological analyses on peace and conflict. In this sense, Huntington has to be appreciated since he took social scientist's attention to this civilization. Whether or not one agrees with the opinion that the upcoming clashes will be cultural, he has to take the Islamic Civilization into consideration in his studies. The crucial issue here, I believe, is the place of the dominant religion of the Islamic Civilization in civilization-building. The role of Islam in the formation of the Islamic Civilization is unquestionable, but the elements and the real characteristics –beyond (mis)perceptions- of Islam must be clarified. The taken for granted features and superficial observations both lead some analyses which draws “bloody borders” and pave the way for killing innocent people in the name of jihad.

2.2.1. Non-Islamic Elements

Before tracing the characteristics of the religion of Islam, I must underline the significance of external influences over the establishment of Islamic Civilization. Ramazan el-Buti counts nine causes that this civilization owes its improvement. All these factors are about scientific endeavor and freedom of thought. Islam even

¹⁹⁰ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 118.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 127.

compels learning and explaining the truthiness of Greek and Indian cultural heritage.¹⁹² These research studies enormously contributed to the formation of the Islamic Civilization. The works of el-Gazzali, a very influential Muslim thinker, as responses to Greek philosophy are supposed to be mentioned in this sense.

Richard Bulliet goes a step further. To demonstrate the significance of the positive mutual interactions between Islam and the West, and how these interactions created a civilization, he invented the concept of Islamo-Christian Civilization. He envisages that if we can talk about a Judeo-Christian civilization, it is supposed to be much easier to assert the existence of an Islamo-Christian civilization. Because while the relations between Judaism and Christianity had always been clash-based until the WWII. On the other hand, between Islam and Christianity, one not only cannot show a sign of conflict to that extent but also the positive relations and mutual influences makes them sisters.¹⁹³ Indeed, as McNeill tells us, some Christians would sometimes prefer Muslim rule to Christian rule.¹⁹⁴ The tolerance of Muslim rulers over Christians and Jews paved the way for the survival of Judeo-Christian tradition on the one hand and on the other Muslims were influenced by this tradition. An interesting example that proves how Judaism and Christianity had affected Islamic styles is the tomb visits. Even today, there are some sacred places which are visited by both Jews and Muslims in the Middle East.¹⁹⁵

In his earlier analysis, Lewis envisages the Islamic Civilization as not a simple system established by an Arabic prophet over faith and cult. Rather, it is a civilization which unites state, society, law, system of thought and art with religious factors.¹⁹⁶ Although it sounds purely Islamic, the Islamic Civilization was actually created by different peoples, such as Arabs, Persians, Egyptians, etc. and by the members of different religions, such as Christians, Jews, and Zarathustras.¹⁹⁷ Indeed,

¹⁹² Ramazan el-Buti, *Kur'an'da İnsan Ve Medeniyet* (İstanbul: Risale, 2007), 134-35.

¹⁹³ Richard W. Bulliet, *Çatışmadan İttifaka: İslam-Hristiyan Medeniyet İlişkileri*, trans. Zehra Savan (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2007), 19.

¹⁹⁴ McNeill, *A World History*, 250.

¹⁹⁵ Bulliet, *Çatışmadan İttifaka: İslam-Hristiyan Medeniyet İlişkileri*, 33.

¹⁹⁶ Bernard Lewis, *Uygurluk Tarihinde Araplar* trans. H. Dursun Yıldız (İstanbul: Pegasus Yayınları, 2006), 194.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 191.

the Islamic society of classical age was a complex scenery: a fine mixture the mysticism of Jews, Christians and Zarathustras plus the administration applications of the Romans and the Persians. Moreover, perhaps the most significant influence was that of Hellenism on Islamic science, philosophy, art, architecture, and to a certain extent on Islamic literature. The Hellenistic influence was so deep that the Islamic Civilization has been regarded as the third inheritor of Hellenism, other than Christian Greek and Latin worlds. Although its roots are different, the Islamic Civilization was not a simple mechanic synthesis of the previous civilizations, but it was an original civilization which re-created these elements in an Arab-Islamic melting pot.¹⁹⁸

Parallel to Lewis' views, Davutoğlu asserts that the transformation of Islamic faith as a civilization was a result of the very first expansions of early Muslim state under the rule of second Caliph Omar through the lands of Alexander the Great. This era was the most dynamic period of Muslims in terms of inter-civilizational interactions. The cities of Harun Resid's Bagdad, Cordoba and Granada of Andalusia and Samarkand, Delhi and Agra after Mongol occupations are carrying the signs of these interactions¹⁹⁹ which shaped the Islamic Civilization. Consequently, ignoring the effects of Greek philosophy and Western values paves the way for both misunderstanding the roots of Islamic Civilization and forgetting how Islamic and Western civilizations had coexisted and mutually interacted²⁰⁰ which most probably lead to clash.

2.2.2. The Elements of the Religion of Islam

While the non-Islamic elements of the Islamic Civilization are indisputable, after all, the central actor in the formation of the Islamic Civilization is certainly the religion of Islam. Ibn Khaldun observes that while rational sciences are common in

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 196.

¹⁹⁹ Davutoğlu, "Tarih İdraki Oluşumunda Metodolojinin Rolü: Medeniyetlerarası Etkileşim Açısından Dünya Tarihi Ve Osmanlı," 46-47.

every civilization, the difference of the Islamic civilization is that it depends on sciences based on revelation (*nakli ilimler*). As aforementioned, Bernard Lewis also claims that, as Western Civilization,²⁰¹ the Islamic Civilization is one of the civilizations in which the religion is the main element. So, what are the “elements” of the religion of Islam? Following Tarik Ramadan, the following passage is on three elements of Islam which shape the Islamic Civilization: Allah (the God), spirituality, and ethics.

2.2.2.1. Allah

Since its inception, Islamic Civilization has been fed by a sacred dimension which is totally away from any type of dogmatism. Rather, this dimension provides a secular space which offers freedom and rationality. In the final analysis this is humanity (*beşeriyet*, the condition of being human). What constitutes sacred is remembering the God in mind. Therefore, every human activity within the ethical frame, i.e. walking, sleeping, eating, is good deed as soon as it makes one remember Him. Thus, the sacred lives inside the profane due to an inspired mind. The God rendered man sacred as He did life, nevertheless man is supposed to be humble since he is going to be questioned from all his deeds in the hereafter.²⁰² This direct relationship between man and the God proves the idea that Islam is actually an individual-centric religion although it is regarded as a religion of community. An individual is an addressee of revelation without any liaison in between him and the God. Davutoğlu supposes that by this way Islam proves that it trusts in a “layman” unlike Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism. This type of the realization of existence is the number one distinguishing mark of Islam with any other civilization or ideology.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Tarik Ramazan, *İslam Medeniyetlerin Yüzleşmesi Hangi Modernite İçin Hangi Proje*, trans. Ayşe Meral (İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2003), 265.

²⁰¹ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 182.

²⁰² Ramazan, *İslam Medeniyetlerin Yüzleşmesi Hangi Modernite İçin Hangi Proje*, 277-82.

2.2.2.2. Ethics

The Islamic precondition of a perfect society is that it fights against evil in the name of goodness. This fight is at the top of ethical responsibilities of Muslims. Modesty and ethical wisdom is considered as key of “salvation in both worlds”.²⁰⁴ Standardized moral teachings let Muslim to behave accordingly even when he is alone. A society where everybody feels safe and secure about others is aimed to be established.²⁰⁵ Thus, ethics becomes the fundamental element of the Islamic Civilization. It is the first objective of revelation and revelation sets the principles of existence through moral codes. Ethics and other rules and regulations confirm the freedom of each individual. Man is free to obey the ethical codes, but he is supposed to be aware of the responsibility that this freedom brings forth. A Muslim believes that he is also going to be questioned from his relations with the God, with other people, with nature, and with all other living things and shall be asked if he considered morality in these relations. Ethical regulations determine the limits of all types of relations of a Muslim that he is going to be asked and they define the Muslim’s world view of science and art. This is not a confinement but showing direction. Respect to values has to precede any material gain in a Muslim’s life.²⁰⁶

2.2.2.3. Spirituality

In their analyses of the new interpretation of Islam, the books published in the West focus on different concepts, such as social dynamics, power struggle, suppressed feeling of identity. Thus, they lack the most fundamental dimension the revival: the reference to the God and the spirituality stems from it. This spirituality invites individual to live in harmony considering all factors of humanity. A Muslim is called to feed his soul as he feeds his body, live while keeping death in mind, mediate favor and justice, and demand balance in life. Monotheism and Quran energize the Muslim spirituality and through this energy a Muslim prefers faith over

²⁰³ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 106-08.

²⁰⁴ Ali Akyüz, *Hz. Peygamber'in Medeniyet Projesi: Saygı Medeniyeti*, 5. ed. (İstanbul: Ensar, 2010), 11.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 225.

²⁰⁶ Ramazan, *İslam Medeniyetlerin Yüzleşmesi Hangi Modernite İçin Hangi Proje*, 286-89.

forgetfulness, existence over ownership, solidarity over individualism, and quality over quantity.²⁰⁷ These “preferences” can be observed in the works and life of the most renowned Muslim sufi Mawlana Jalal ad-Din Rumi who can be regarded as an animated spirituality of Islamic Civilization. He has been an epitome for the members of the Islamic Civilization not only with his spiritual dimension but also through his obedience to Islamic ethics and his respect to mankind.²⁰⁸

2.2.3. An Open Civilization

Even though in today’s Western societies, is almost impossible to regard Islam as a friend of the Western Civilization²⁰⁹ and the picture of Islam drawn in the World today is it is a civilization which is excluded by all others, excludes all others and clashes with all others, the historical record of the Islamic Civilization is contradictory. Davutoğlu thinks that this picture was drawn by Samuel Huntington. He compares European Machiavelli and Muslim Kınalızade to prove the inclusive and tolerant character of the Islamic Civilization. Kınalızade was a political thinker who lived in the same period with Machiavelli and published a political treatise called *Ahlak-i Alai* (Exalted Ethics). While the references of Machiavelli is only to the Rome and the Church, in *Ahlak-i Alai* Kınalızade referred to all great philosophers of the ancient Greek to the traditions of Persia and India. The general belief is that the human history had been shaped in the West but actually Islam had actively contributed to it until the nineteenth century. With its inclusive character Islam has passed the test of globalization which is taken by the West in our age.²¹⁰

Additionally, despite he is regarded as the inventor of the “clash of civilizations” thesis, early works of Bernard Lewis agrees with Davutoğlu’s observation on the Islamic tolerance. According to him, as other civilizations, the Islamic Civilization in the Middle Ages was also sure that it was the only complete

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 282-84.

²⁰⁸ Sezai Küçük, "Anadolu’da Bir Cemal Tecellisi: Mevlana," *Ayvakti* 7, no. 82-83-84 (2007): 404-08.

²⁰⁹ Ramazan, *İslam Medeniyetlerin Yüzleşmesi Hangi Modernite İçin Hangi Proje*, 245.

²¹⁰ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 111.

and self sufficient civilization. On the other hand, it was not an emulative civilization, but an original and assimilating one which is composed of many cultures. It is more tolerant than its counterparts as many European researchers noticed. Unlike their Western coetaneous, Middle Age Muslims invoked force very rarely.²¹¹ Thus, the factors mentioned above constituted an open civilization which deserves a closer look.

One of the prominent advocates of the term “open civilization” is Recep Şentürk. He distinguishes between open and closed civilizations. While open civilizations are tolerant against the others and has an inclusive character, closed civilizations exclude others and differences both within and outside. He offers the former as a model for today’s global world where living together skills are substantial requirements to survive. For him, the experience of Muslim states and societies provides us an intricate example of an open civilization.

An open civilization can solely be established through open institutions, particularly through open science and open law system. Their multiplex structures provide a theoretical base for an open civilization. Knowledge, methodology, norms, etc. of an open science have multiplexed forms. There are no given truths in an open science and it does not confine intellectual endeavor within a single level. Rather, it provides a space for different approaches within various levels.²¹² For example, alternative medicine is not excluded as a heresy in this structure. While orthodox treatment methods are “true” in one level of knowledge, alternative medicine is also “true” in another level. On the other hand, the law system of an open civilization operates through the logic of multiplexed norms. In a closed system of law, there are two levels in justice: legal and illegal. On the other hand, in an open law there are multiple levels of norms. As an open law system, Şentürk counts nine levels in the Islamic law. There is also no single truth in an open law, but multiple levels of truths.

²¹¹ Lewis, *Uygarlık Tarihinde Araçlar* 203-04.

²¹² Recep Şentürk, "Açık Medeniyet: Bir Fıkıh Medeniyeti Olarak İslam," *Ayvakti* 7, no. 82-83-84 (2007): 43-45.

This understanding paved the way for the emergence of diverse sects in Islamic tradition which have different judicial decisions on an issue, but all are legal.²¹³

Şentürk considers the Islamic civilization as an open civilization which embraces other civilization which had been able to administer different civilizations under the same umbrella.²¹⁴ Şentürk takes a monolithic picture of Islamic history and asserts that beginning from Medina Paper and the final ceremony of the Prophet, Umayyad and Abbasid administrations, Andalusia, Babur Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, all Muslim ruling experiences prove that the history of Islam is a history of tolerance. The non-Muslims in the Muslim geographies had always been treated well and in a tolerant way.²¹⁵

For Şentürk, the fundamentals of this civilization were declared in the last pilgrimage of the Prophet. In his final ceremony, the Prophet extended the “untouchable” (*haram*) time to whole year and untouchable space to whole earth. By his commands in that speech, he declared that each human being (his life, his family, his honor and his property) is untouchable in all times in everywhere. Thus, an early form a universal understanding of human rights was established.²¹⁶ In Muslim geography, the key term of the pluralist and open society is *fikq*²¹⁷. Therefore, Şentürk suggests investigating this concept carefully as an effort to create a tolerant global society. A multi-civilizational world order is very risky in terms of possible conflicts and for this reason it must be established upon very solid cultural, ethical, political and judiciary fundamentals.²¹⁸ Serahsi is one of those who Muslim intellectuals who established the legal support for a multicultural society. The Hannifin scholar adopts the God-human relations approach instead of the state-citizen relation based approach to provide a base for individual rights which were not given by a worldly authority but by God. Thus, these rights against any authority,

²¹³ Ibid.: 39-40.

²¹⁴ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 259.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 28-34.

²¹⁶ Ibid., 150-51.

²¹⁷ Şentürk differentiates between *fikq* and Islamic law. While the first one is the aggregate of society perception and normative order (both ethical and judicial) of the Islamic Civilization; the latter one is actually the result of *fikq* which reach to laymen. See Recep Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Bir Fıkıh Medeniyeti Olarak İslam*, *Ayvakti*, V. 7, No: 82-83-84, pp. 31, 38, 2007.

even Muslim ones, are taken under protection.²¹⁹ Consequently two fundamental institutions of Islamic Civilization are its law system and science. Islamic law, as a pluralist system, procreated different sects inside Islamic tradition and allowed non-Muslims to produce and apply their law even partially.²²⁰ And as another fundamental of the Islamic Civilization, the open Islamic science, through its multiplexed methodology and knowledge, paved the way for diverse interpretations of both traditional and natural sciences and provided the base for an open civilization.²²¹

²¹⁸ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 143.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 152.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 157.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 264.

CHAPTER III

CIVILIZATIONAL INTERACTIONS: THE CASE OF ISLAM AND THE WEST

Civilizations have an autonomous and homogenous character. As human-beings, they contact with other civilizations which may be friendly or hostile. Reasonable, lasting and viable interactions depend on if the civilizations internalize what they learn from the other civilizations.²²² In this perspective, the Western and Islamic civilizations provide an excellent foundation for this study in two aspects. First, the terms of Western and Islamic civilizations are commonly used in the media but not only their definitions but also their existence is still vague in academia. Probably, it will require decades of discussions to reach a consensus among scholars. Additionally, the diverse structures of the Western and Islamic civilization are precursors to exceed beyond the utmost claim of this thesis. Unlike, Chinese, Indian, and Japanese civilizations which are almost represented by one single nation and one single state, these civilizations' multinational structure with different countries is a lofty basis for future analyses which will not only benefit from civilizations as dependent variables but also investigate them as independent variables in International Relations.

3.1. Types of Interactions

A brief examination of the history of the relations between these two civilizations puts forward two problems. First, when did the modern Western civilization emerge? Following Attas' classification of the West as a *becoming* and

Islamic civilization as a *being*, a very concrete date can be given for Islamic civilization. I find it very acceptable to take 621 AD, the year of '*hicret*' and the settlement of the Muslims in the city of Medina as the launch of Islamic Civilization. On the other hand, the becoming process of the Western Civilization confuses minds about a certain date of its inception. The candidate dates for the launch of the Western civilization varies from the emergence of the first civilizations in the Middle East to the European Enlightenment. For instance, Toynbee marks 770 as the starting date of Western Civilization, and for Meriç the French Revolution and Napoleon are the harbingers of it.²²³ For different purposes, different dates can be accepted.

Another problem is about the question of religious-civilizational dichotomy. Can one regard all inter-religious interactions as inter-civilizational? To take religious organizations, civil society or the community leaders as the representatives of a particular civilization, do we need the approval of all members of that civilization? To make it concrete, to what extent, for example, the meeting of *Necran* Christians with Prophet Muhammad can be regarded as an interaction between Islamic and the Western civilizations?

Both issues offer appealing materials which deserve to be handled in separate studies. For the objectives of this thesis, I draw my frame as follows: As a student of IR, I prefer to take mid-seventeenth century as the date of the emergence of modern Western civilization. About the possible disagreements on who and what actually represent these civilizations, I will disregard the discussion and take any interaction between any component of Western civilization (Christianity, Judaism, Roman Empire, etc.) and any component of Islamic civilization (Islamic states, Muslim scholars, civil society leaders, etc.) since this chapter aims to show the *roots* of the dialogue and conflict which undeniably affect the broader picture. Moreover, I agree with Bernard Lewis' claim that Islam and Christianity are two religions that define

²²² Aydın, "Medeniyet Olgusu Ve Medeniyetler Arası İlişkiler," 23.

²²³ Meriç, *Umrandan Uygarlığa*, 100.

their civilizations.²²⁴ Therefore, the interfaith encounters can easily be regarded as inter-civilizational in the case of Islam and the West.

Lewis resembles the modern encounter of Islamic and the Western civilizations with the early contacts of Arab soldiers and the Hellenes. The modern rival for Islam, namely the West, is much more dangerous than the Hellenes. It is not conquered but conquers, it has deeper roots, and it is more aggressive. It attacks with its railroads, media, aviation, university, petroleum engineers, thoughts, etc., and affects each Muslim²²⁵ in his daily life and demands him to transform his cultural, political and social heritage. Thus, the Muslim's traditional style was destroyed irrevocably. For Lewis, there are three options for Muslims. They either accept one of the different forms of this new civilization by melting their own identities in the whole; or turn its back to the West and its products; or cooperate with the West in equal terms and take its science and world view *with all aspects* and try to renew their inherited traditions within their society.²²⁶

Therefore, the relations between two civilizations, religions, cultures, or ideologies can be in the form of oblivion, in the form of dialogue and cooperation, or in the form of clash. Neglect is almost impossible to be observed in the world history if there had been a contact between two groups, such as through travelers or traders. Clash is not demanded by the parties and the only justification for a temporary conflictual situation may be the search for a perpetual peace, justice and freedom. The world is a global home and the efforts must be towards creating the rules and the institutions of a humane life while preserving differences which cannot be permanently attained by the means of conflict. Then, the desired form of relationship between two social entities is dialogue and cooperation.²²⁷

²²⁴ Lewis, "'I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell'."

²²⁵ He prefers *Arab* instead of Muslim.

²²⁶ Lewis, *Uygarlık Tarihinde Araplar* 257.

²²⁷ Hayrettin Karaman, *Diyalog Ve Kurtuluş Tartışmaları*, 1 ed. (Istanbul: Mavi Ufuklar, 2011), 14.

3.1.1. Conflict

Any destruction is easier than any construction. From the growing of a tree to the development of the mindset of a writer, a book needs decades to be published but it can be burned in seconds. Destructions give immediate pleasure and self-esteem which hinder people to be aware of the upcoming feeling of guiltiness and future devastations. As a type of destruction, conflict is usually not found odd as a *default* type of relationship between any social groupings which belong to the same civilization or different civilizations. Thus, it can be claimed that the conflictual relations among civilizations are as old as the history of civilizations. Therefore, what we are supposed to ask is whether these social groupings represent their civilizations, whether they clash in the name of their own civilization, and whether the conflict is immaterial, namely, there is no economical or political interest as an incentive in a particular conflictual situation. Huntington claims that material motives are losing their influence in the post-Cold War period and conflicts will be cultural in this era. *Haunting Huntington*, I will first try to show the foundations and the historical roots of negative interactions among civilizations and then I will look into the today's situation with Huntington's thesis and its critics.

Before starting, I should emphasize that Samuel Huntington is not the founding father of the idea and the concept of the clash of civilizations. For Şentürk, the historical base of this approach can be traced back to Ibn Khaldun whose name has not even been mentioned in the related discussions. Ibn Khaldun accepts that the clash of civilizations is possible but unlike Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, civilizations may clash only for hegemony (*mecd*) not because they have different cultural values.²²⁸ Ibn Khaldun's approach, then, can be evaluated as realistic in a broader level of analysis above states.

As we will see in the next section, there were dialogue efforts in mid 1800s which implicitly shows us that people have been aware of the conflictual situation for a long time. On the other hand, in modern sense of the concept of civilization, the idea of clash is first seen in early twentieth century. Sönmez takes Huntington's

thesis as a continuation of Toynbee's theory of "action and reaction": Islamic civilization is crushed by the Western civilization and it is ready to react which causes the clash.²²⁹ In mid-1920s, Toynbee published the *Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*, but the exact same phrase of the "clash of civilizations" was emerged just after Toynbee's book. In 1926, Basil Mathews, who was a missionary, named his book as *Young Islam on Trek: A Study in the Clash of Civilizations*.²³⁰ For Mathews, barbarian and warlike Islam could never reconcile with rationality and science.²³¹

During the Cold War era, there were many others, including writers of the English School, who were dealing with civilizational differences. According to them, modern international system comprised many civilizational differences despite the fact that it emerged within a particular civilization. For example, Gong predicts that the next struggle for influence might be the realm of cultural differences. 1970s onwards, two decades before Huntington, students of International Relations were pondering upon the Islamic revival, which is regarded not only as resurgence but also as an anti-Western fundamentalism by Huntington²³². In 1979, *Congressional Quarterly* published an article named "A Clash of Civilizations". The concept had not drawn attention since 90s, because first the Muslim world was the silent other waiting to be conquered and secondly because of the overshadowing ideological clash of the time.²³³

In early 90s after the Cold War, Lewis and Gilpin were talking about the conflict among civilizations.²³⁴ It is commonly accepted that the basics of Huntington's clash of civilizations were included in an article of Bernard Lewis, who is the *official* inventor of the concept²³⁵, published in *Atlantic Monthly* in 1990: The

²²⁸ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 184.

²²⁹ Sönmez, "Medeniyet, Kur'an Medeniyeti Ve Evrensellik İmkanları," 11.

²³⁰ Bulliet, *Çatışmadan İttifaka: İslam-Hristiyan Medeniyet İlişkileri*, 10.

²³¹ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 185.

²³² Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 145.

²³³ Ali Balcı, "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy," *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 96.

²³⁴ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 150-51.

²³⁵ According to the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Yearbook JANUS, 2009.

Roots of Moslem Rage.²³⁶ Lewis asserts that although the Islamic world is not monolithic, there has been a growing hatred against the West (especially against the USA) and Western values (especially modernity and secularism). This mood “is no less than a clash of civilizations”.²³⁷ Finally, Huntington published his highly controversial article in *Foreign Affairs* in Summer 1993. He tells us that the thoughts under his article were first appeared at Bradley Conference at Washington in October 1992 (less than a year after the collapse of Soviet Union) and then discussed in many countries.²³⁸

3.1.1.1. Foundations of the Conflict

I have already mentioned about the Davutoğlu’s separation of self-perception and identity. As stated, a crucial point between these two is while self-perception is a matter *within* the individual’s consciousness, self-identification of an individual or a social group requires an *other*. “Turks exist because the English exist.”²³⁹ Ottomans, as rivals, played a crucial role in the European identification process. Actually, the self-image of one civilization is being defined by its opposition to another civilization does not mean that they are in a perpetual conflictual state. For Toynbee, the tolerant milieu of 13th century Uiguria where Nestorianism and Buddhism were living together can be regarded as an example to this peaceful coexistence.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, the discussion on the clash of civilizations is a clear evidence of the negative influence of civilizational identity.²⁴¹ Therefore, it is reasonable to interfere that adopting Davutoğlu’s self-perception approach to the formation of civilizations can provide both academicians and policy makers a more peaceful ground in their analysis and conduct of civilizational interactions.

Marx and Engels, for whom civilization itself is evil, would have agreed with Ibn Khaldun’s approach to conflict among civilizations if they had read him. For the

²³⁶ Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 151.

²³⁷ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Moslem Rage," *Atlantic Monthly* September 1990.

²³⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 10-11. He counts 17 countries, including only one Muslim country which is Saudi Arabia.

²³⁹ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 75.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

Muslim scholar, property (*mülk*) has a significant role in conflictual relations within and among civilizations. In his conceptualization of civilization, property is an important fundamental quality (*araz*). Property requires hegemony over itself, and the quest for hegemony necessarily paves the way for both internal and external conflict. For internal conflicts, elites are in a constant state of clash to maintain the authority, but it continuously changes hands. On the other hand, external conflict is not a regular state of relationship between civilizations but a possible practice of interaction. All types of relations are required for the continuity of civilizations. While strong civilizations try to keep their superiority, weaker civilizations imitate them, especially in style. The superiority is not exclusive to one civilization. In time, it relays among civilizations. Ibn Khaldun was able to objectively evaluate the civilizational ups and downs. For him, Islamic civilization is also subject to the same social and historical rules with the other civilizations.²⁴²

Another original perspective is of Toynbee. He counts several reasons that pave the way for conflict among civilizations. Some of these reasons also create internal crisis inside a civilization. For Toynbee a foreign civilization can not be taken partially. It consists of many elements which are intertwined each other although they seem unrelated at first sight.²⁴³ Until seventeenth century, the cultural differences between civilizations prevent them to adopt each other's civilization, but the materialization of the Western civilization in the seventeenth century removed the obstacles that hinder other civilizations to accept it. In about three centuries almost all other civilizations adopted the secularized Western civilization. Nevertheless, the unexpected spiritual depression that the Western civilization has gone through caused a great shock and trauma over the rest of the world.²⁴⁴ This trauma contributed to the inner and external conflicts that Ibn Khaldun classifies. On the other hand, "buying a civilization in one go" would have causes less harm. The damage exposes to those who wants to take the Western civilization partially instead of adopting it with all aspects of it. These consumers of the Western civilization have not tried to buy or understand the immaterial aspects of the Western civilization.

²⁴² Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 180-81.

²⁴³ Toynbee, *Tarihçi Açısından Din*, 274.

They just tried to own the material products of the West, especially its military force. Nevertheless, progressively they had to continue this “shopping” and buy the rest of it. This step-by-step shopping event makes buyer community drift away from their self-culture and thus there have been huge cleavages in society which wounded in the soul.²⁴⁵ For Turkish case of Westernization, Toynbee’s evaluation reminds us Ziya Gökalp and his followers who assert that Turkey have to involve Western civilization without leaving Turkish culture.

Secondly, Toynbee blames technological developments of the modern age as the reason of conflict. Before the industrial revolution, the communities were living apart in lack of communication tools and had developed diverse customs and life styles. With the technological advancements of the Western civilization, they suddenly had a contact with each other. Nevertheless, “the rapprochement of the souls takes generations pass and the coalescence of hearts takes centuries. Physical proximity brings hatred instead of love unless there is tolerance and sympathy.” The subconscious of the states, which had fallen into sudden convergence of physical distance, obstructed the combination of hearts. As a result, these states surmised that they had to take some measures to prevent communications between peoples.²⁴⁶ If Toynbee had had a chance to see internet, he would have demanded it to be banned as a preemptive solution to the clash.

Lastly, although Toynbee does not explicitly counts “the arrogance of the Westerner” as a reason of conflict, it both categorizes the ‘other’ negatively and disturbs the members of non-Western civilizations and thus causes hatred against the West. The exaggerated self-esteem of the modern Westerner is the idiosyncrasy of the modern civilization of the West. This self-esteem regards its civilization as the only true and complete form of civilization. Its unsecularized middle age version was outmoded and other civilizations were just half-civilizations. “According to the Western comedian, the Western civilization is perfect and eternal”²⁴⁷ and “the end of

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 206.

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 225-26.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 293-94.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 206-07.

history” finally comes. Indeed, Fukuyama sees Islam as an adversary for the rationality that West possess does not embedded in Islam.²⁴⁸

In the writings of Ahmet Davutoğlu, four concepts show up as the foundations of conflict. First of all, contrary to Fukuyama, Davutoğlu rejects the idea that the *rationality* is not enough for the world order. With the same tools of Western rationality and similar technological means, some non-Westerners, who do not have any ethical hesitation, challenge the ruling powers of the world order. It is very difficult to define and to draw the limits of these actions. In this sense, 9/11 is neither a classical terrorist action nor a war. So, there is a need for some new definitions in IR.²⁴⁹

Secondly, while from Toynbee’s thoughts, it can be interfered that the discourse of super self-esteem is disturbing the other; Davutoğlu differentiates *the feeling of self-esteem* from its discourse. He thinks that a civilization must have a high level of self-confidence. According to him, if the members of a civilization have doubts about the perfectness of their civilization, they start excluding the ‘other’. Huntington’s differentiation of the East and the West is a reflection of this lack of confidence.²⁵⁰ This is one of the aspects of the crisis of the Western civilization which prevents to create a foundation of values for the globalization. Thus, a new situation emerges against universalization which is a new form of localization. This new form is a process of otherization which even normalizes cruelties to the different.²⁵¹

Following Toynbee, third and fourth concepts of Davutoğlu are *modernity and nation-state* which are the reasons of the disconnection syndrome that we face today despite the process of globalization (!). This disconnection had never been observed between Antep and Halep during Byzantine, Abbasid, and Ottoman periods. Both social and intellectual schisms bring a conservative reflex to protect whatever people have in their hands and this reflex makes people to hate the

²⁴⁸ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 43.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 62-63.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 116.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 215-16.

challenger. Indian and Chinese civilizations do not have this psychology because they have not ruled over today's leading civilization of the West.²⁵²

Şentürk also approaches the phenomenon from a different angle. For him, Western social science usually behaves as a “closed science” which means it hardly accepts alternative approaches. A closed science offers a theoretical foundation for a closed civilization, which means it hardly accepts the existence of other civilizations. Unless we change our understanding of closed science, it is not possible to overcome the civilizational problems of the modern age. Closed society and civilization can only be destroyed in the presence of an open science.²⁵³

Not only the structure of Western social science but also its transfer to Muslim countries also prepared a foundation for civilizational conflicts. Şentürk says that the social sciences are not universal. Each civilization has its own type of social science. To understand cultural tensions in our society and in the world better, we need to consider the relations between social thought and civilization, and then we are supposed to look at the social sciences dimension of the clash of civilizations. To understand the reaction against the West in Muslim countries more concretely, we need to remember the tension during the efforts of transferring social science of the Western civilization for the social science of Islamic civilization, which is *fiqh*. That endeavor was not a paradigm shift led by intellectuals but an authoritarian project launched by political elites and suppression over society.²⁵⁴

3.1.1.2. An Outline of Historical Roots of the Conflict

For Bernard Lewis, the conflictual relations between Western and Islamic civilizations were almost continuous and started with the emergence of Islam. He takes the attitudes of sixth century *Yesribian* Arabs, who were going to accept Islam and the name of the city would be changed to Medina, against Jews in the region as a clash. He asserts that they disliked Jews of the city for they were culturally and economically more advanced. After Arabs achieved their unity under *the Prophet*,

²⁵² Ibid., 122.

²⁵³ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., 50-51.

Arabs attack on the Jews and destroy them.²⁵⁵ A few decades after the Prophet, Muslims conquered the Christian lands of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and North Africa and then the Southern Europe.²⁵⁶

Islam has always been at the frontiers of the Western civilization and it reckoned with the Western civilization inside its own territories.²⁵⁷ Since the emergence of Islam as a world religion and a system of society, it had been in a vehement competition with Christianity.²⁵⁸ With the caliphate of Omer, who took over Jerusalem from Christians, the period of conquests of Muslims started and lasted for about three centuries. In this period, the real expansion of the Muslim states was mostly through the lands of Asian and Northern African idolaters but they also encountered with Christians in Andalusia and Byzantium.

Of course one of the two most significant incidents of this period was the Crusades whose logic and side effects transcended centuries and find a place in modern political discourse. Between 1095 and 1270, there had been eight crusades. The central motivator of the crusades was to take up the cross against infidels, namely Muslims, who remained as a threat to Holy Land. On the other hand, the crusades were not the only holy wars. There were also others which were directed against Slavs in the Eastern Europe and even against political adversaries inside Europe. These wars were taken as a model by the imperialists of the nineteenth century for their expansion towards the East.²⁵⁹ Yurdusev finds the seeds of this expansion, which was a “missionary zeal for civilization”, in Christianity and the in the soul of Crusades.²⁶⁰ Even today, there may be found some evidence in the rhetoric of some conservative politicians that the logic of crusades has a place in their mindset.

Secondly, from the end of the crusades to their collapse in early twentieth century, the dominant Muslim actor of the conflictual relations with the West was

²⁵⁵ Lewis, *Uygarlık Tarihinde Araplar* 59.

²⁵⁶ ———, "I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell".

²⁵⁷ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 122.

²⁵⁸ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 118.

²⁵⁹ Mark Kishlansky, *Civilization in the West*, 276-78.

Ottomans. From their emergence in 1302, they headed towards the West and remained as the main challenger of Western powers until the end of seventeenth century. The “perfect barbarian” Turk was regarded as a great tool for the affirmation of “civilized European” identity. Although geographically and demographically Ottoman State was supposed to be European when the modern states system was emerging, Ottoman was not accepted as an equal actor in Europe until the Paris Peace Treaty 1856. The religious divide was a main motivator behind this refusal. Martin Luther sees Islam in serve of Anti-Christ; Voltaire depicted the Prophet of Islam as a ‘theocratic tyrant’; Ernest Renan regards Muslim as incapable of learning anything. While these and many other pejorative examples are religious, Rousseau approaches Turks as barbarians who conquered the civilized Arab.²⁶¹ Marriage patterns between the royal families of European empires may also help us to draw the lines between Western and Islamic civilizations. The inter-marriages between Christian royal families of Europe were so common just before the WWI. For example, UK was related to both German Kaiser and Russian czar. On the other hand, none of these families made any marriage with Ottoman Sultans.²⁶²

3.1.1.3. Huntington’s Thesis and Civilizational Conflict Today

We have already seen that the Huntington is not the creator of the idea of the clash of civilizations. There were many others who talked about it before him. Additionally, although his opinions were not liked by civil society (especially in Muslim countries) and by many academicians as serving as a justification for US foreign policy rather than being a scientific theory to explain world politics, the *clash* phenomenon was accepted and was scientifically approached by many scholars.

Yurdusev is one of those who approach post-Cold War developments from this perspective. He takes the examples in which the Western civilization had been against Islam and Turks as a proof of civilizational differences and identity, but he does not think that there would be a clash between these two because of two reasons.

²⁶⁰ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 140.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 141-43.

²⁶² Aktürk, "Braudel'den Elias'a Ve Huntington'a "Medeniyet" Kavramının Kullanımları," 172-73.

First, Islam and Christianity as historical rivals, have much more commonalities than differences. These commonalities may also be regarded as the reasons of conflict, as well. Secondly, civilizations are not organized entities as nations and thus are not able to cause permanent and worldwide disputes.²⁶³

Lewis also emphasizes the similarities rather than the differences between Islam and Christianity. He takes the former as the only comparable religion to the latter with its features of “worldwide distribution, continuing vitality, and universalist aspirations”.²⁶⁴ While accepting the existence of some differences, he thinks that they have much more understandings and approaches in common and these similarities give birth to a conflict between the two civilizations that they define.²⁶⁵

Of course, the role of civilizational differences cannot be disregarded completely in discussing today’s conflicts. In the modern international system, these differences were subdued by its state-system and the dominance of the Western civilization. Additionally, the Cold War veiled regional conflicts and the division between the East and the West. Cold War also reduced civilizational conflicts to conflicts between barbarism and civilization. Nevertheless, by the end of the Cold War, the real character of the conflict unleashed which was supported by the emergence of new states, especially in Eastern Europe.²⁶⁶

Şentürk thinks the conflict between Islamic and the Western civilizations is because of neither one is completely superior to the other. While the former is superior to the latter in terms of religious and cultural values; the latter is superior to the former economically, militarily and technologically. Islamic world imitates the Western civilization’s technology, and the Western civilization imitates Islam’s strong value system. This situation reproduces a tension between the two.²⁶⁷ For him, Huntington and Fukuyama revived orientalist understanding of civilization. Their

²⁶³ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 154.

²⁶⁴ Lewis, "The Roots of Moslem Rage," 56.

²⁶⁵ ———, "'I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell'."

²⁶⁶ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 149-50.

reading of the post-Cold War politics is an interesting example that demonstrates how closed civilizations approach to the other. Both writers degrade other civilizations and erect thick walls between the West and the other civilizations.²⁶⁸

Davutoğlu harshly criticizes two promoters of the related theories of “the end of history” and “the clash of civilizations”. He thinks Fukuyama narrates Hegel and Huntington narrates Toynbee distortedly. For Davutoğlu, contrary to Huntington, the main reason of the clash is completely material. He takes our attention to some historical and geographic realities. Geographically, nine of the eighteen main straits of world trade are controlled by Muslim countries, the most significant oil and natural gas reserves are on Muslim geographies, and the most strategic routes that connect the lands that super powers compete on are at Afghanistan and Caucasus. Historically, while there are some truths in Huntington’s thesis, it lacks a great deal of data. When we look at the history, from 1492 to 1992, five great wars happened in which any member of Islamic civilization had not involved, except Ottomans in World War I.²⁶⁹ To some extent, World War II may be taken as inter-civilizational with its Western, Russian, and Japanese parties but the main motive of the war cannot be regarded as civilizational. The main incentive in all those wars was the Westerner’s ideologies, Westerner’s clash of interests, and Westerner’s passions. Therefore, the historical roots of the clash in Huntington’s understanding are problematic.

Ali Bulaç is closer to Huntington’s views on the importance of culture in the modern relations of Islam and the West. For him, while Indian, Chinese and Japanese civilizations do not challenge the West culturally and do not put forward an alternative paradigm, Islamic response to modernity is presented as a cultural challenge.²⁷⁰ Nevertheless, naming this challenge as a ‘clash’ would be an exaggerated attitude. For Bernard Lewis, a crucial impact of the 9/11 was that it changed self understanding of the Western people. Before the 9/11, Westerners were

²⁶⁷ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 188.

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 206.

²⁶⁹ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 31-32,84.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

defining themselves with nationality and for a long time they had thought that they were separated into different religious and ideological subdivisions under a nation. The 9/11 made them realize that they are actually a part of a larger religious identity which is divided into nations. Thus, the confrontation with Islam had the theme of the clash of civilizations gain urgent attention.²⁷¹

Huntington evaluates the clash of civilizations as the most important danger against world peace and achieving a world order dependent on civilization is the most significant preemptive number one security for against a world war.²⁷² He differentiates himself from the others who take into account the civilizational interactions into account by drawing a clear line between the cultural and material aspects of the conflicts we face today and bluntly asserts that the main motivator of the clash is going to be the cultural:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.²⁷³

He even goes further and prophetically deepens his prediction: "Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evolution of conflict in the modern world."²⁷⁴

He continues his formulation of the idea of clash as a paradigm contending to be the most explanatory theory for post-Cold War world politics:

In the emerging world, the relations between states and groups from different civilizations will not be close and will often be antagonistic. Yet some inter-civilization relations are more conflict-prone than others. At the micro level, the

²⁷¹ Lewis, "'I'm Right, You're Wrong, Go to Hell'."

²⁷² Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 10.

²⁷³ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 2 (1993).

most violent fault lines are between Islam and its Orthodox, Hindu, African, and Western Christian neighbors. At the macro level, the dominant division is between “the West and the rest,” with the most intense conflicts occurring between Muslim and Asian societies on the one hand, and the West on the other. The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness.²⁷⁵

This quote is the first paragraph of the chapter “The West and the Rest: Inter-civilizational Issues” which is also a section in his article. There are two very interesting dilemmas here. First, while this is clearly a division of the world, Huntington claims, in his words, “I am very careful in the book not to divide the world in two.” in an interview in 2004.²⁷⁶ Secondly, from the title, reader would think he is going to read about the *Western* interactions with the other civilizations. On the other hand, it is very clear in the quoted text that the unchanging actor in these conflictual interactions is Islam. It is the one whose borders are bloody²⁷⁷ in micro level and it is the one whose relations with the other civilizations are the most conflictual²⁷⁸ in macro level. Moreover, the notion of “Islamic intolerance” is highly debatable. Davutoğlu asks “If Islam has problems with plurality, how could Istanbul be a city that Muslims, Christians and Jews lived together for 400-500 years?” For him, the real problem is about the strategic plans that all actors have on the Muslim territories.²⁷⁹

3.1.1.4 Critics of Huntington’s Theory

Davutoğlu warns the US policy makers that in a world war milieu, what they need are a philosophical stance instead of strategists’ opinions. Philosophical thinking requires the hegemon to consider her legitimacy in the eyes of other civilizations. If the US demands harmony in the world, she is supposed to take the

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 183.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., 8.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., 233.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 254.

²⁷⁹ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 171.

principles of the cosmos into account, but by excluding China and the Islamic world, which is almost half of the world population, she both loses its legitimacy and she fails to establish an order. In the States, there are many conscious voices in this regard. For instance, Thomas Michel, the former director of Vatican Interfaith Department, thinks that clash of civilizations is a product of the US foreign policy and most of the Christian theologians do not agree with it.²⁸⁰ Richard Falk asserts that existing excluding policies have many negative effects and Islam must be inclusively elaborated regarding its geopolitical importance. Richard Bulliet and John Esposito are some other prominent academicians who are against the clash theories. On the other hand, the voice which is heard is of Huntington.²⁸¹

Davutoğlu blames Huntington to misinterpret a real situation for (American) interests. The resurgence of world civilization by the end of the twentieth century was the return of accumulation of all humanity back to the history and it could have incited a great positive improvement both for “the West and the rest”. Nevertheless, instead of a philosophical and historical search for truth, Huntington’s thesis sacrificed the rebirth of civilization for a strategic pragmatism.²⁸² He advises US decision makers to improve the cooperation among Western countries, obstruct the possible coalitions among other civilizations, provoke the tension inside them, and stop seducing and using Muslims against each other for strategic objectives. Etyen Mahcupyan adds they have to transform this perpetual war to perpetual peace with a global coalition which even includes Iran.²⁸³

Huntington provocatively uncovers the civilizational elements in world politics. He counts six basics of the clash of civilizations: (1) The civilizational differences are more fundamental than those of political ideologies and regimes, (2) The shrinking of the world enhances communications between the members of different civilization which leads to more self-awareness and consciousness, (3) Economic modernization and social change exchanges local identity with religious

²⁸⁰ Selim Sönmez and Hakan Yalman, "Thomas Michel ile Soyleşi," *Köprü* (2003): 18.

²⁸¹ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 82-85.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 198, 222-23, 50.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 81-82, 171.

identity which is fundamental for civilizational consciousness, (4) The confrontation of the West and the non-Western makes the latter to return its roots, (5) Cultural characteristics are not easily changed and resolved compared to the political and economic characteristics, and (6) Rising economic regionalism reinforces civilization-consciousness.²⁸⁴

These elements of the clash of civilizations are highly criticizable. First of all, Huntington's premise is civilizational differences *must* lead to clash. He puts civilizational consciousness and political ideologies in the same pot by comparing civilizational and political differences. Although there are some 'differences' that may lead to some reservations, when it comes to civilization and culture, the inherent elements in the definition of these concepts let alone leading clash, they lead dialogue and understanding. If a social grouping which is called civilization does not allow understanding the other, it cannot be named as civilization but barbarism or savagery. This is same for the rising self-consciousness. If one is able to truly understand his own identity, it is less likely that he is going to clash with the 'other' unless his identity says so.

Secondly, Huntington sees religion and economic blocs as the core that pave the way for civilizational consciousness which leads to clash. There can hardly be found any theologian, any pure believer of any faith that promotes conflict with the other. As Ali Bulaç asks how this conflicts provide legitimacy since while the clash of civilizations is supposed to be supported by religions and cultures, all representatives of world religions are highly against war.²⁸⁵ The promoters of the clash are few marginal whose voices are not echoed in the masses. Their target addressee is mostly passionate youth, cruel interest groups, and immigrants. Forth reason implicitly shows us that the clash demand comes from the non-Western which reminds us Muslims first. Considering the other factors together, we can reach the conclusion that the roots of Islamic civilization are the basis of the clash. Muslims

²⁸⁴ Jr. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 4 ed. (New York: Longman, 1997), 167.

²⁸⁵ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 114-15.

return to their roots because of the economic suppresses of the West and this leads them to clash.

Huntington has the economic rise of East Asian countries in mind while he regards economic regionalism as a stimulus of civilizational identity.²⁸⁶ He asserts that the countries that have cultural proximity cooperate economically and politically.²⁸⁷ Indeed, there was a civilizational awareness in 1980s Asian economic activities. Nevertheless, especially 1997 Asian economic crisis completely refused all expectations of a closed regional economy in Asia which was actually dead by birth because of the Western values inherent in Asian economy. He tries to find cultural factors in every cooperation and disagreement, and thus fails to predict the growing cooperation between the members of different civilizations, such as energy politics in general, Turkey and Africa, China and the rest of the world in particular. Also for the time today, what kind of a *business' man* excludes a civilization which is a potential market consists of billions of consumers? For private business level, the global picture of world leading companies clearly falsifies Huntington: many Japanese companies owned or managed by Americans, Coca-Cola is run by a Turk, Microsoft employs hundreds of computer engineers from India, etc. On the other hand, for state level, energy lines intertwined Europe and Asia with each other, and for economic regional and international organizations, there is no way to exclude even the smallest social grouping of the world both because of the values and the rules of global economy and because of the human rights issues.

Moreover, findings of some systematic empirical studies are contrary to the Huntington's thesis. Henderson and Tucker analyzed the relation between civilization membership and arm conflicts in pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. The only data approves Huntington is that of Cold War for which he says civilizational identity is not significant in interstate wars. The findings of pre and post Cold War periods contradict with the clash thesis.²⁸⁸ Chiozza concludes that

²⁸⁶ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 104-09.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁸⁸ Errol A. Henderson and Richard Tucker, "Clear and Present Strangers: The Clash of Civilizations and International Conflict," *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 2 (2001): 317.

there is no empirical data that supports the theory of clash of civilizations in the first eight years of the post-Cold war era.²⁸⁹ In both Cold War and post-Cold War period, inter-civilizational dyads are not more likely in international conflicts. At most, the possibility of inter-civilizational conflict is same as a conflict within the members of a same civilization.²⁹⁰ Russett, Oneal and Cox reached similar results in their study and assert that classical realist concepts, such as alliances, relative power, contiguity, etc. are more successful in explaining the conflict among states.²⁹¹ The results of Sean Bolks and Richard Stoll are, on the other hand, are neither support Huntington's thesis strongly nor completely rejects it. They started their analysis with the question of "Is there is a civilizational factor in militarized interstate disputes and the probability of the conflict turning into a war?" What they have found is in the pre-Cold War era there was a greater possibility that an Islamic-Western confrontation might escalate to war. Therefore, clash of civilizations is not unique to the post-Cold War era as Huntington claims. On the other hand, there is a shortage of empirical data for the post-Cold War. Dispute between Islamic-Western pairs is likely but not escalate to war.²⁹²

3.1.1.4.1. "The Clash of Civilizations" on Trial

Criticizing Prof. Huntington's, perhaps most influential, work in a master thesis may be regarded as an unnecessary. Nor, it is an objective of this study. On the other hand, with all due respect to his great legacy in academia, any careful reader would be greatly surprised when he reads his book, *The Clash of Civilizations*. Examining his theory and whole book requires a separate study. However, it is inevitable to show some examples of his contradictions which are so deep. Just to

²⁸⁹ Giacomo Chiozza, "Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International Conflict Involvement, 1946-97," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 6 (2002): 711.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*: 730-32.

²⁹¹ John R. Oneal Bruce M. Russett, Michaelene Cox, "Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Liberalism Deja Vu? Some Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5 (2000): 583. For Huntington's response to the authors, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Try Again: A Reply to Russett, Oneal & Cox," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5 (2000): 609-610, and their response back to Huntington, see John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "A Response to Huntington", *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 5 (2000): 611-612.

²⁹² Sean Bolks Richard Stoll, "Examining Conflict Escalation within the Civilizations Context," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 20, no. 1 (2003): 85, 107.

give reader an idea, I will take a closer look at the preface and the first chapter of his book, entitled “The New Era in World Politics”.

3.1.1.4.1.1. The Indicators of Clash for Huntington are Irrelevant

While they are expected to be very shocking and be a base for broader generalizations, the examples Professor Huntington prefers to take in the introduction of the chapter are very problematic. They are even weaker than the examples from Pakistan that Bernard Lewis concedes to be indicators of a clash of civilizations in his article *The Roots of Moslem Rage*.²⁹³ He takes his examples from Bosnia and California where people had chosen symbols to show their attitude. For the Bosnian example these questions should be answered: how can two thousand people who waved Saudi Arabian and Turkish flags instead of UN, NATO and USA’s flags represent all members of the Islamic Civilization? Did UN, NATO and USA really deserve to be praised with their attitude during the war? What would have Huntington thought when he had seen American flags in Kosovo’s hands when they declared their independence? Is a Bosnian’s life style closer to an Islamic way of life or a Western? The second example is even harder to grasp especially considering this book is going to present a world waiting for a clash between Islam and west. In 1994 autumn, 70000 people, probably huge percentage was underprivileged Latin-Americans, marched to protest Proposition 187, which denies some state benefits to illegal immigrants, under Mexican flags. The protest was repeated two weeks later under an (upside down) American flag perhaps upon the objection of some observers and the proposition approved by 59% of the voters. Can this 1.87 earthquake created by marching some thousands people cause a tsunami going to hit Japan, China and all the way through Balkans and the rest of Europe and hit back California?²⁹⁴

3.1.1.4.1.2. Is the Clash of Civilizations a Scientific Book or Not?

In the preface, Huntington says “This book is not intended to be a work of social science.”²⁹⁵ and at the next paragraph of the aforementioned examples of

²⁹³ Lewis, "The Roots of Moslem Rage."

²⁹⁴ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 19-20.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

Bosnia and California he quotes from a *novel* of a “nationalist demagogue’s hatred statements: “...Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are ...” and makes a comment on it: “...The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars ...”²⁹⁶ On the other hand, it seems that he abandons his non-scientific stance quickly and adopts a scientific aim. Huntington defines the objective of the book as to determine the evolution of global politics after cold war and present a framework or paradigm to scientists and policy makers²⁹⁷ and the first chapter is an introduction to “his” paradigm in global politics: the civilizational approach. After mentioning four existing paradigms which try to explain the post cold war phenomenon²⁹⁸, he presents to his preference, the civilizational paradigm.

Huntington starts his theoretical background with Kuhn’s description of paradigms and stresses on the point that paradigms are not supposed to explain all details of a phenomenon.²⁹⁹ In his summary of other four paradigms of post cold war era, he states that these paradigms, “184 States” may be excluded, are failed beyond acceptable limits. On the other hand, his civilizational approach is more successful in explaining broader picture. If he means a civilizational approach taking all interactions of civilizations into account, he is right. On the other hand if he only takes the clash-based relations of civilizations, then I have to recall Popper and his falsification. Clash of civilizations is *really a theory* in this sense because it can be falsified immediately.

3.1.1.4.1.3. Its Central Theme and the Main Parts of His Book

My other objections are to the first, second and the last parts of the book which would arouse doubts about at least half of it:

²⁹⁶ It seems that Huntington loves this literature of “otherization” In page 21, he says “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often when we know whom we are against.” In page 28, he quotes from Vaclav Havel and Jacques Delors whose observations confirm cultural conflicts.

²⁹⁷ There have already been some “old truths” that scientists and policy makers cannot ignore!

²⁹⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 31-35.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.

Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.³⁰⁰

Huntington asserts that for the first time global politics is both multipolar and multi-civilizational and a world order based on civilization is emerging. At the next page Huntington goes further and adds “During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent.”³⁰¹ This is another statement that is disapproved not only by many scholars but also unbelievably by himself, just at the following couple of sentences. He continues:

Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West—Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others—constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization.³⁰²

While mentioning inner relations of European states, it is mysterious not mentioning about their relations with Ottomans who established all types of relationships with these states: wars, capitulations, diplomatic missionaries, etc. Yurdusev takes Ottomans as a crucial actor in the first stages of the emergence of the European balance system that Huntington mentions in the above quote. It is the

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 20.

³⁰¹ Ibid., 21.

³⁰² Ibid.

Ottoman Sultans who were pursuing a balance policy towards European powers and thus the rise of nation states was facilitated.³⁰³

Besides Şentürk, Yurdusev and Aktürk, Ali Mazrui also disagrees with this statement of Huntington. For Mazrui, before ours, history witnessed three other waves of clashes from the sixteenth century onwards. The first stage of this clash was started with a genocidal one when Westerners smashed the indigenous people of Americas and Australasia. Second stage was the slavery clash of civilizations when they enslaved Africa, and the third stage was the clash based on imperialism. In this stage, the rest of the world became under the invasion on the West. These three stages are more or less, in favor of the mistreated or not, ended up but the last stage is so active: the hegemonic stage. Today, the US' unofficial imperialism keeps the rest of the world under pressure and she easily stays away from the supervision of international organizations and regulations. This attitude transforms the existing seeds of *Americafobia* into a deep hatred.³⁰⁴

Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.³⁰⁵

Second part of the book is also problematic. Huntington accepts that the West is losing power and inter-civilizational power balance is changing. Asian civilizations are economically, militarily and politically expanding. Islamic Civilization is demographically getting bigger. Just after proposing that the dominant character of the post-Cold war that shapes any type of relationship is culture, counting increasing political, economic, and military power of rival civilizations sounds contradictory. If these powers are that important in relations between

³⁰³ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 136.

³⁰⁴ Ali A. Mazrui, "Dördüncü Medeniyetler Çatışması: Abd'nin Hegemonik Emperyalizmi," *Anlayış* 2007.

³⁰⁵ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 20.

civilizations, the clash is supposed to be between Western Civilization and Chinese and Indian civilizations, not between Islamic Civilization and Western Civilization. Moreover, at the following page contradiction continues. Huntington thinks that with the collapse of bi-polar international system, the distinctions among people shall be cultural, not ideological, political or economic.³⁰⁶ Even it is possible to think about the disappearance of ideological differences, how can we expect that the economic ones would disappear in one night?

Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.³⁰⁷

It is impossible correlate these two sentences. While calling Western people to unite “to preserve Western civilization against challenges³⁰⁸ from non-Western societies” one is clearly an exclusivist idea which may provide a legitimating base for hawkish policies, especially considering the possibility of a “civilizational war”³⁰⁹, the latter statement presents us a recipe to prevent the later stages of the clash which can be approved by any dialogue defender.

3.1.1.4.1.4. Is He Sure that the Clash of Civilizations is Really about Culture?

A very fundamental problem with Huntington’s formulation is the vagueness of what his theory really is. The title is the Clash of Civilizations but what we can derive from the first chapter is it is not really so. If Huntington had named his article and then his book as “Civilizational Approach” as he started his evaluation in this chapter³¹⁰, he might have been objected much less and his theory might have been

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 21.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 20.

³⁰⁸ The word “challenge” in this paragraph is translated into Turkish as “tehdit” which means “threat” and may take us to different conclusions.

³⁰⁹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 313.

³¹⁰ Ibid., 36-39.

more objective. Moreover, his too much emphasis on the religious aspect of civilization makes his theory more a *clash of religions*.

Although one can question that what changed too much from the cold war era, Huntington's observation that the central axis of the post cold war world politics will be the interaction between western power and culture and non-western power and culture³¹¹ is acceptable since he takes the relations as "interaction" not just as clash and he includes power relations besides culture. Huntington also quotes from Henry Kissinger: "the international system of the twenty-first century at least includes US, Europe, China, Japan, and India and some other medium-sized and smaller countries." and notes that these belong to five different civilization, all non-Islamic (!), and he *adds* some Muslim countries because of their strategically important place, demography, and oil resources (no cultural element) from the quota of 'medium-sized and smaller countries'. There have always been these features of Muslim countries and many scholars, such as Ahmet Davutoğlu, accept them as a source of conflict. Huntington reaches the conclusion that the global politics becomes the politics of civilizations and the rivalry of super powers becomes clash of civilizations.³¹² This clash is going to occur not between super powers of 5 different civilizations but between superpowers of the Western Civilization and "medium-sized and smaller countries" of the Islamic Civilization!

Then Huntington remembers the central theme of his theory and gives all account to cultural elements in the fights in Bosnia, Kashmir, Central Asia, and Caucasia which could give birth to bigger wars. In Yugoslavia, while Russians provide diplomatic support to Serbians, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libya and Iran provided Bosnians fund and arms. The help of these states is not because of ideology, gaining power or economic interests but because they feel close to culturally. Cultural differences and similarities determine the cooperation, interests and adversity of states and international organization's like EU which have cultural commonalities are more successful than the international organization's which try to

³¹¹ Ibid., 29.

³¹² Ibid., 28.

transcend culture. And finally a very influential fact is that the most important states are coming from different civilizations.³¹³

These observations of Huntington bring some questions forward: If these “most important” countries clash to the extent that Huntington predicts why they gather under the organizations such as D8? Is there Islamic countries? So, where the clash between Islamic and Western civilizations happen? Why the OIC is widely criticized because of being ineffective while it completely covers with Huntington’s definition but OPEC is successful? Moreover, Huntington was supposed to explain the support of Muslim countries to the US in the first Gulf War, but he did not. NATO intervention in Kosovo would be another blank point that drops his theory into the category of previously mentioned four paradigms.

3.1.2. Dialogue

I have observed two interesting points in examining conflict and dialogue in civilizational interactions. First, while the company of the term “conflict” is usually “phenomenon”, most prefer to use “effort” with dialogue. Therefore, there is an implicit acceptance that while “conflictual phenomenon” of the world politics is a reality, “dialogue efforts” are still just some idealist wishes. There cannot be a “conflict effort” not only for it is not something tried to be reached (!) but also it emerges very smoothly and naturally. On the other hand, dialogue is something requires endeavor both to supply and to sustain.

Secondly, as we see in the conflictual relations of social groupings, the disputes among cultures are usually tried to be explained by political thinkers. On the other hand, with some exceptions, the dialogue and cooperation (not in terms of economics and military) are mostly discussed by theologians and philosophers. This is perhaps because of the realist mindset of political scientists and idealist approach

³¹³ Ibid., 28-29.

of philosophers and religious thinkers. Therefore, although I will try to set my views on a political plane the frame of this section may be seen as a theological approach.

Considering Indian and Chinese civilization, Davutoğlu thinks, non-Western civilization can live together.³¹⁴ On the other hand, Europeans have much more extensive relations with the Ottomans compared to their civilizational sisters, namely Americas and Australasia, such as treaties, ambassador exchanges, trade, conferences, and most importantly capitulations. Globalization can lead to opposite of clash as well. Thus, the modern international system is a clear indication that civilizations can coexist.³¹⁵ Although he does not loudly advocate dialogue, there are a few clues that even Huntington is in favor of dialogue. For example, the last sentence of his article was “For the relevant future, there will be no universal civilization, but instead a world of different civilizations, each of which will have to learn to coexist with the others.”³¹⁶

3.1.2.1. Definition

The ideal dialogue is a “process of genuine interaction through which human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn”. Three categories of dialogue can be counted: genuine dialogue, technical dialogue, and monologue. The real purposive one is the genuine dialogue in which verbal communication is not a matter. The significant point is that parties are ready to accept each other and establish mutual relations. Dialogue is not just an exchange of ideas but a complete openness to the sensitivities of others. Both parties are expected to modify and alter their stance and minds. Sometimes, parties are expected to give up their defense issues. Some agreements, alliances, and negotiations can be achieved in political level; but, the real target of a dialogue process is the public opinion.³¹⁷

³¹⁴ Davutoğlu, *Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları*, 225.

³¹⁵ Yurdusev, *International Relations and the Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach*, 141-43.

³¹⁶ Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 50.

³¹⁷ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 79-80.

The expectations of parties from a dialogic relation can be either to know and have accountable knowledge about each other, or convince and convert the other, or to find solution for the problem among the groups in dialogue or worldwide, to cooperate in activities which are for the benefit of both groups.³¹⁸ On the other hand, the prime focus of true dialogue is the foundations of problems, not these problems themselves. An inevitable premise of a dialogue process is the solution of serious problems is not practical agreements in long term but the transformation of misperceptions and prejudices. What is expected from a dialogue process is “to create new human and political capabilities to understand and solve complicated problems” and by this way the existing problematic relations can be changed through an understanding of respect and cooperation. The properly actualized dialogic projects can help to reduce hostilities and increase mutual understanding. Thus, dialogue becomes a conflict resolution technique whose advantage is it is not vertical but a sum of parallel level activities.³¹⁹

3.1.2.2. Some Historical Examples

The first dialogic interaction between Muslims and Christians can be traced back to the emergence of Islam. Jewish scholars visited and discussed with the Prophet in late Makah period and the Prophet directed some Muslims to Abyssinia for the first hegira. The reason of choosing Abyssinia was that it was being ruled by King Necasi who was portrayed as a “just Christian sultan” by the Prophet. Moreover, Necran Christians met with the Prophet Muhammad to discuss some theological issues, but since it is out of my scope in this study, I skip to the modern era.

In June 1842, a British citizen organized a twenty-two session meeting on dialogue in London. He selected one atheist and nine representatives from different religions and sects. With the own words of the organizer, his objective is

³¹⁸ Karaman, *Diyalog Ve Kurtuluş Tartışmaları*, 14.

³¹⁹ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 79-80.

The very first good deed for humanity would be to overcome conflict and open channels for living in peace and cooperation for humans who are coming from the same origin. People separated into groups of different ideologies, religions and sects and hate each other. Why this is happening and what is the solution? I think the first reason is these groups do not have a desire to understand the other and their opinions about the other are self-originated. They are determined to see contrary information to their prejudices as wrong. This method is supported by some influential interest groups. This situation is not impossible to be removed by some wise men that let the others know about themselves. After a close examination and corrections, a unity of humanity will be created and a trust towards the solution for the separation among humanity and different groups will emerge.³²⁰

In the last session of the meetings, Shihabuddin, an Indian Sunni scholar stated that “the number one duty of humanity is to reach a general peace. This can be achieved through a unity of opinions and thoughts. Let alone religions, the sects in Christianity have many different views on a particular question. Therefore, we are supposed to demand public leaders of these groups to take action.”³²¹ In early 1900s, the text of this dialogue effort was published in Istanbul. This endeavor demonstrates us three significant points. First, there have been dialogue meetings at least for one and a half century; second, the objective of this meeting can be summarized as enhance mutual knowledge, rightly understand each other and find common points to live together; and thirdly, the clash among different religions and cultures are ignited by some interest groups.³²²

Another outstanding dialogue effort was performed by the Vatican. Exclusive approach, which means the only salvation is through Jesus, was the classical approach of the Catholic Church to other religions, but the II Vatican Council had been a turning point in the Catholic understanding of the other. They adopted in “inclusive approach”, which means although there are some deficiencies in them,

³²⁰ Şihabüddin Mirza and Burhanüddin Mirza, *Dinleri Tartışmak: Dinlerin Hakikat Anlayışı Üzerine Oturumlar*, trans. Ulvi Murat Klavuz (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005), 35.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 402.

other religions also save people from the hellfire. Thus the interfaith dialogue efforts in modern sense were established by Vatican in the first half of 1960s. Although this understanding of dialogue is restricted to the missionary goals, it is an acceptable attitude for Karaman. Sometimes similar approach adopted by the Muslims as well.³²³

3.1.2.3. “State Support” to Dialogue before the Alliance of Civilizations

As seen in the previous chapter on dialogue, the efforts on eliminating prejudices and misperceptions, preventing misunderstandings and reducing the tension among the West and the Muslim world has a long history. Nevertheless, these endeavors had limited to civil society members, particularly academicians and religious groups. The attention of policy makers had been attracted after Huntington’s article and its critics, such as the works of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Fouad Ajami, Ali Mazrui, etc. Therefore, it is *redde caesari quae sunt caesaris* if one claims that the “official” support to dialogue efforts was a gift of Huntington to humanity. The possibility of the realization of Huntington’s prophecy that the next possible world war would have cultural motives forced policy makers to take action. Thus state and international organization-centered initiatives on cultural dialogue and cooperation intensified after mid-90s.

There had been some academic organizations sponsored by some state institutions both in the Western and the Eastern countries after Huntington’s article. For example, a panel entitled “The Dialogue between Civilizations” was organized in 1995 in Amman, Jordan, where the existence of different civilizations was accepted. An international conference on a similar topic was held in London thereafter,³²⁴ and in 1999, Pakistan hosted another conference on “Dialogue between Islam and the West”. Another type of response to clash based analyses has been to take civilization as a singular body. For example, a report of Commission on Global Governance titled “Our Global Neighborhood” defined civilization as “the sum of values and

³²² Karaman, *Diyalog Ve Kurtuluş Tartışmaları*, 19.

³²³ *Ibid.*, 11-13.

³²⁴ Balci, "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy," 101.

practices that is shared with other groups of people” and underlined the opportunity to rise human civilization to higher levels. In 1995, German President Roman Herzog claimed that humanity is supposed to develop a common civilization raised upon mutual trust. The natural consequence of these responses was that the clash/dialogue dichotomy does not exist; therefore the endeavor of humanity was to be directed towards establishing the essence of this single civilization, not towards dialogue.³²⁵

On the other hand, the most significant action before the AoC was the proposal of Muhammad Khatami, who was the Iranian president at the time, in the fifty-third session of the UN General Assembly on September 21st of 1998. In accordance with the new generation of intellectuals of Iran, such as non-religious thinker Dariush Shayegan, Khatami defends close cultural relations and living in harmony with the Western countries.³²⁶ With the proposal, he called UN to declare 2001 as *the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations* hoping “through such a dialogue the realization of universal justice and liberty may be initiated.” Khatami regards the elimination of misunderstandings among societies and civilizations and the institutionalization of dialogue efforts would be “the worthiest achievements” and “an invaluable legacy for the benefit of future generations.”³²⁷ On November 4th, the UNGA positively responded the call of Khatami.

For Köse, Iran’s secret agenda was to soften the anti-western discourse of the revolution and to reconstruct the country’s image in the West through this project. Indeed, Shayegan has an impact on Iran with his views that a religion which disregards cultural heterogeneity is questionable and an Iran with a monolithic perception of Islam is destined to be alienated from the global system.³²⁸ Additionally, Mirbagheri thinks that the objectives of the project were not clearly defined. He asks whether the aim was to reestablish the broken US-Iranian diplomatic relations after the 1979 hostage crisis. He also thinks that Iran is not

³²⁵ Ibid.: 100-01.

³²⁶ Farhad Khosrokhavar, "The New Intellectuals in Iran," *Social Compass* 51, no. 2 (2004): 193.

³²⁷ "Official Record of 8. Plenary Session of 53. General Assembly," in *A/53/PV.8*, ed. UNGA (1998), 6.

³²⁸ Khosrokhavar, "The New Intellectuals in Iran," 197.

qualified to represent the Islamic Civilization since it is the only Shiite country which is considered by majority Sunnis as a deviation from Islam, if not heresy.³²⁹

Yet, the UN accepted and promoted Iran's proposal through several resolutions, and almost all countries supported the initiative.³³⁰ These resolutions state that the Dialogue among Civilizations is a process between and within civilizations³³¹ which is going to be carried out under the framework of UNESCO³³². It is also regarded as an "attempt to humanize globalization".³³³ The speeches of Khatami himself were clearly pro-dialogue. He differentiates between religion and civilization and states that the civilizational interactions and transformations do not damage religions. He confines violent demonstrations to some radical groups and tries to mitigate the Western fear against Islam through his proposal. He constantly refers to the Western liberal intellectuals, such as Kant and Goethe.³³⁴ Carter also observes that the discourse of Khatami and Christopher Dawson very similar. Both employed same concepts to the dialogic interaction between civilizations, such as secularism, mysticism, metahistory, art as dialogue, etc.³³⁵

Nevertheless, the ironic terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the year of Dialogue among Civilizations proved that sympathy is not enough and some concrete actions had to be taken. On November 21, 2001 a resolution entitled "Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations" declared the details of the initiative and called all international actors to take action. To this end, the OIC and the EU established a joint

³²⁹ Farid Mirbagheri, "Narrowing the Gap or Camouflaging the Divide: An Analysis of Mohammad Khatami's 'Dialogue of Civilisations'," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 34, no. 3 (2007): 314-15.

³³⁰ Ali Balcı and Nebi Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," *Turkish Studies* 9, no. 3 (2008): 390.

³³¹ Resolutions 53/22, 54/113 and 55/23.

³³² Fernando Amorim, "Unesco and the Cultural Primacy of Dialogue of Civilizations," *Janus, Foreign Relations Yearbook*, no. 12 (2009): 25.

³³³ Stephen G. Carter, "Christopher Dawson and Ayatollah Khatami and 'the Dialogue of Civilizations': A Christian-Muslim Conversation," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 18, no. 3 (2007): 405.

³³⁴ Mirbagheri, "Narrowing the Gap or Camouflaging the Divide: An Analysis of Mohammad Khatami's 'Dialogue of Civilisations'," 312-13.

³³⁵ Carter, "Christopher Dawson and Ayatollah Khatami and 'the Dialogue of Civilizations': A Christian-Muslim Conversation," 410-14.

forum in February 2002 in Istanbul³³⁶ which was the starting point of Turkish active foreign policy engagement in inter-civilizational dialogue.³³⁷ This was a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the EU member countries and candidates, the OIC members, and the observer countries. Turkish President of the time Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem had stressed the unique role of Turkey in bringing the West and the East together, both as an OIC member and an EU candidate state.³³⁸ Nevertheless, the project of Dialogue among Civilizations was not able to “break the back of” irresistible devolution of political discourse. In the post-9/11 era, “war on terror” approach substituted for the ideal concepts of democracy, human rights, and conflict prevention.³³⁹

3.1.2.4. The Alliance of Civilizations

The idea of the AoC emerged in an era in which security issues deeply damaged the relations between the West and Islam; while xenophobia and islamophobia had been creating a reaction against Muslim immigrants in Western countries.³⁴⁰ On January 29, 2004, Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan mentioned about the “harmony of civilizations” and “getting together in meetings and conferences” in a speech at American Enterprise Institute.³⁴¹ In the autumn of the same year, on another September 21st, exactly six years after the Khatami’s proposal of the Dialogue among Civilizations, Zapatero made a similar call in his first speech to the General Assembly. After a brief summary of the conflictual zones on earth, he declared the Spanish offer: “before this Assembly I want to propose an Alliance of

³³⁶ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 390-91.

³³⁷ Ramazan Kılınç, "Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adaption as a Survival Strategy," *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 59.

³³⁸ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 391.

³³⁹ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 86-87.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*: 87.

³⁴¹ Umut Uzer, "Turkey as a Catalyst for the Alliance of Civilizations," *Journal of Global Initiatives* 4, no. 2 (2009): 140.

Civilizations between the Western and the Arab and Muslim worlds.³⁴² Thus, it was clearly stated that the AoC is an organization concentrated on the interactions between the Western and Islamic civilizations, with a particular attention to the Arab world. For Köse, the main difference between the AoC and the Dialogue among Civilizations is that the former is much more open to diverse levels of societies including youth, immigrants, women, etc. and it utilizes more practical, action-oriented tools.³⁴³

3.1.2.4.1. Establishment

Even though a new outlook to the fight against terrorism is an important item of Zapatero's electoral program, the intellectual preparation of the Alliance was completed in a pretty short time. The new Spanish government had formulated the idea since April 2004.³⁴⁴ On the other hand, it is even said that the AoC proposal does not have a previous preparation. It was conceived on the airplane while Spanish Prime Minister J. L. R. Zapatero and his crew were flying for the 59th UNGA.³⁴⁵ Indeed, many theoretical and technical questions were vague after the proposal, such as how the activities of the initiative would be financed, how its program would be realized, how many civilizations are considered. To clarify these issues the Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed his Chief of Cabinet Iqbal Riza.³⁴⁶ Annan also insisted that an Islamic country must cooperate with Spain³⁴⁷ and finally Turkey joined Spain in sponsoring the Initiative. Upon the invitation of cosponsors on 15th of

³⁴² Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, "Speech before 59. Unga," ed. United Nations General Assembly (New York 2004), 6. Unofficial translation.

³⁴³ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 88-89.

³⁴⁴ Patricia Galvao Teles, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Its Establishment," *Janus, Foreign Relations Yearbook*, no. 12 (2009): 28.

³⁴⁵ Isaias Barrenada, "Alliance of Civilizations, Spanish Public Diplomacy and Cosmopolitan Proposal," *Mediterranean Politics* 11, no. 1 (2006): 99.

³⁴⁶ Teles, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Its Establishment," 28.

³⁴⁷ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 392.

June 2005, Annan formally announced the AoC on 14th of July and on September 2nd; he designated the High Level Group to guide the initiative.³⁴⁸

3.1.2.4.2. Structure

The Alliance of Civilizations is not included in the organizational chart of the United Nations as a formal unit.³⁴⁹ It is rather an initiative of the UN Secretary General, proposed by Spain and supported by Turkey.³⁵⁰ The Implementation Plan prepared by the Secretariat of High Representative presents the initiative's institutional structure as composed of High Representative, group of friends, and AoC ambassadors.³⁵¹ Nevertheless, I think the High-level Group and the Secretariat have to be included in this structure.

3.1.2.4.2.1. High-level Group

The HLG is designated to guide the activities of the AoC. It is composed of twenty renowned experts on intercultural and intercivilizational issues. They are academicians, retired politicians, journalists, and theologians from ten different regions of the world. It is co-chaired by Mehmet Aydın from Turkey and Federico Mayor from Spain.³⁵² Erdoğan stated his expectations from the HLG as not just describing the current situation, as the similar initiative has been doing, but the Groups should analytically evaluate the factors of conflict and put forward practical measures for collaboration of societies.³⁵³ To this end, they had met five times between November 2005 and November 2006 and published a final report which determined the fundamental activity fields and how the program of the AoC is going to be implemented.

³⁴⁸ Maximo Cajal, "The Security Dimension in the Alliance of Civilizations," *Janus, Foreign Relations Yearbook*, no. 12 (2009): 32.

³⁴⁹ "Un System Chart,"

http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/structure/pdfs/un_system_chart_colour_sm.pdf.

³⁵⁰ Teles, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Its Establishment," 29.

³⁵¹ "Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan 2007-2009," (United Nations, 2007), 9-10.

³⁵² Fernando Amorim, "The Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group Report," *Janus, Foreign Relations Yearbook*, no. 12 (2009): 31.

³⁵³ Maximo Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," *Insight Turkey* 11, no. 3 (2009): 51.

The report consists of two parts and three annexes. With five chapters of the first part, the experts set the theoretical and historical background of the conflictual world affairs and reconciliation recommendations. The focus is Muslim-West relations in general and the Middle East in particular. In the second chapter, the report defines four areas of concentration, i.e. education, the media, migration, youth, and put their recommendations forward. It is stated in the seventh chapter that the addressees are “the UN system, states, including their parliaments and all levels of government (national, regional, local, and municipal), intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and society at large.”³⁵⁴

3.1.2.4.2.2. The High Representative, His Secretariat, and Ambassadors

The HLG Report recommended that the UN Secretary General should appoint a High Representative and an office should be established to support the HR. The duty of the HR is to oversee the actualization of the AoC program and help the Secretary General in relieving the cultural and religious crises.³⁵⁵ On April 26th 2007, Ban Ki-moon appointed Jorge Sampaio, former president of Portuguese, as the HR for the AoC and to assist him, his secretariat was immediately established. The task of his office is to cooperate with the addressee institutions to promote dialogic relations among different communities.³⁵⁶ HLG suggested that the Secretariat had to prepare and implementation plan to this end.³⁵⁷ An implementation plan covering from May 2007 to May 2009 was published accordingly. It set the strategic and structural framework of the Alliance.³⁵⁸ In addition to the Secretariat, the HLG Report recommended that “a roster of eminent persons would assist the HR in fulfilling his duties”.³⁵⁹ Later, the Implementation Plan referred to these “eminent persons” as the AoC Ambassadors³⁶⁰, but there is no mention of this structure in the official website of the AoC as of August 2, 2011.

³⁵⁴ "Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group Report," (New York: United Nations, 2006), 33.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

³⁵⁶ Teles, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Its Establishment," 29.

³⁵⁷ "Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group Report," 43.

³⁵⁸ "Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan 2007-2009," 5.

³⁵⁹ "Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group Report," 43.

³⁶⁰ "Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan 2007-2009," 5-10.

3.1.2.4.2.3. Group of Friends

This is a community composed of states and international organizations. As of June 15 2011, there are one hundred and three member states and twenty one international organizations.³⁶¹ For the implementation of the AoC program, this circle is vital.³⁶² A crucial contribution to the Group of Friends was the subscription of the US in May 2010.³⁶³ The member states are invited to prepare national (strategic) plans, and international organizations are asked to develop partnership agreements with the Alliance in order to achieve the measures and recommendations put forward by the implementation plans. In Sampaio's words, the purpose of national plans is to "de-globalize the Alliance converting it into a domestic affair".³⁶⁴ In September 2007 Ministerial Meeting, Jorge Sampaio repeated the call to accelerate the realization of High-level Group recommendations in national, regional and local levels.³⁶⁵ By August 2011, 25 countries³⁶⁶ had developed and published their -mostly annual- national strategies regarding the four concentration areas of the AoC. Nevertheless, most of these documents not only "miss the point"³⁶⁷ but also have not been updated.

³⁶¹ , <http://www.unaoc.org/about/group-of-friends/members/>.

³⁶² "Alliance of Civilizations Implementation Plan 2007-2009," 9.

³⁶³ It is worth to mention about the States and the AoC is the Obama's visit to Turkey. That visit intersected with the Second Annual Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations in May 2009, but the US President completely ignored the organization. He preferred to "chitchat" with some young Turkish people a few kilometers away from the Ciragan Palace where hundreds of heads of states and international organizations, ministers, and civil society leaders met, although he was expected to, at least, send a message the Forum.

³⁶⁴ Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," 52.

³⁶⁵ , <http://www.unaoc.org/content/view/228/218/lang,english/>.

³⁶⁶ Including Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, New Zealand, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. Korea and Morocco were the last countries added to this list. Kazakhstan was announced that she had been currently preparing her national plan, but it was removed later on. The United Kingdom – enigmatically- preferred to give a link to her counter-terrorism webpage (<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/>) which is also removed in the newer version of the AoC website.

³⁶⁷ For example Balkan countries mostly accentuate how they have been successful in integrating Roma society.

3.1.2.4.3. Objectives

One can easily deduce that we owe the existence of the AoC to Huntington from the speeches and reports of high level officials of the Initiative. For instance, the High Representative Jorge Sampaio tells us that the premise of the AoC is “if nothing is done – in political terms on the global, national and local fronts – the problems we face today could degenerate into a conflict between cultures or, even worse, a clash of civilizations”.³⁶⁸

Therefore, overall aim of the AoC is to impede the possibility of the realization of a culture-based clash. “The need to build bridges between societies, to promote dialogue and understanding and to forge the collective political will to address the world’s imbalances has never been greater. This urgent task constitutes the *raison d’être* of the Alliance of Civilizations.”³⁶⁹ An important document, *Terms of Reference of the High-level Group* (25 August 2005) gathered the objectives of the Initiative in two folders. First one is to improve the relations between multicultural societies, and secondly to prevent extremism by “establishing a paradigm of mutual respect between civilizations and cultures”.³⁷⁰

To this end, the High-level Group defined four main fields of action which are mostly regarded as national political issues: education, youth, the media, and migration. The AoC pulls these issues into the international arena and emphasizes that only through a common approach which comprises all these fields can deal with the difficulties of a global, culturally and economically diverse world.³⁷¹

3.1.2.4.4. Why Sponsors Invest on the AoC?

The emergence of the AoC is a response to the clash-based theories of international relations and a result of the fear of the realization of Huntington’s prophecy. Without doubt, all state representatives, either of cosponsors or of any

³⁶⁸ Jorge Sampaio, "The Alliance of Civilizations, a Un Initiative for the Promotion of Good Governance of Cultural Diversity," *Janus, Foreign Relations Yearbook*, no. 12 (2009): 10.

³⁶⁹ "Alliance of Civilizations High-Level Group Report," 3.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

member of Group of Friends circle, would assert that their support to the AoC is their responsibility for global peace. Indeed, the official documents, especially the national plans, of these countries are very strong good-will declarations in this sense. For instance, in his letters to the world leaders, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that the aim of Turkey's participation to the AoC is to achieve "unity in diversity",³⁷² and Maximo Cajal, who is the special representative to the Spanish President in charge of the AoC, summarizes the objectives of the Spanish national plan as to achieve mutual understanding among diverse groups, to promote peace culture and civic values, to integrate immigrants and to spread AoC.³⁷³

İbrahim Kalın claims that the expectation under all real alliances is the search for new markets. For him, civilization both meant being civilized and finding new customers to the European products in the nineteenth century Europe.³⁷⁴ Although I do not think this is the case for the AoC initiative, one can easily detect the pragmatist objectives at the AoC sponsorship when he reads Spanish and Turkish approach along with their national and foreign policy goals. Moreover, it is a common attitude that in their national plans, the Group of Friends states *love* to stress how they are important in a multicultural global milieu. This absolutely damages the sincerity of their discourse and the hopes of civil society activists who are seeking for state-level support to dialogue efforts. The following passage is searching for the stance of Turkey and Spain and if they have secret agendas in supporting the AoC.

3.1.2.4.4.1. Turkey

The aforementioned 2002 Istanbul EU-OIC Forum can be regarded as the first Turkish state level dialogue initiative. That time, Turkey as a member of the OIC stressed her bridge country mission. Bacik reformulates this "bridge country mission" as being an "operational corridor" between the East and the West, which

³⁷¹ Sampaio, "The Alliance of Civilizations, a Un Initiative for the Promotion of Good Governance of Cultural Diversity," 11.

³⁷² Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 396.

³⁷³ Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," 53.

³⁷⁴ İbrahim Kalın, "İttifak İçin Önce Medeniyet Lazım," *Anlayış* 2009, 44-46.

are two new poles of the international system.³⁷⁵ This is the same role that Poland had played between the capitalist and communists blocs during the Cold War.³⁷⁶ Additionally, the pivotal position of Turkey has an economic aspect. Almost 80% of Turkish export and 65% of Turkish imports are with the European, Middle Eastern and CIS countries.³⁷⁷ Kösebalaban takes the position of Turkey a step further. He thinks that under the AKP ruling, especially with the (first academic as the chief foreign policy advisor and then as a political as the minister of foreign affairs) contributions of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey had left her bridge country role and started to assert to be a central state.³⁷⁸ Tolay also considers that the Turkish engagement in the civilizational dialogue activities is “critical for the future of Europe, the future of Muslim world, as well as the future of the broader West/Islam relationships”³⁷⁹ which means that she also regards Turkey more than a bridge country. In this sense, the AoC has been serving as a valuable tool for three issues in Turkish national and international politics which had been redefined by AKP. Firstly, in this effort of reconstructing Turkish foreign policy, the AoC emerged as an opportunity for Turkey to prove herself as a global actor. Secondly, the Alliance helped AKP to develop a discourse against the EU member countries in order to force them for full membership. And thirdly, active AoC sponsorship has been utilized as a message both to the Turkish and the Western audience who have doubts about AKP’s position against the West. Now, I will look into these three items closer.

Kılınç approaches the Turkish engagement in the AoC through three IR theories: normative approach, realism, and national politics. The realist approach suggests that the main motive of adopting international norms is the state interests. The essence of the interest is the enhancement and protection of relative power in the international arena. Thus, states also increase their credibility. Therefore, the major

³⁷⁵ Gökhan Bacık, "The Turkish Thesis: Dialogue among Civilizations and Linguistic-Operational Corridors," *Journal of Global Initiatives* 4, no. 2 (2009): 3. (unpublished version)

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*: 8.

³⁷⁷ Murat Doral, "From the Alliance of Economics to the Alliance of Civilizations: Turkey's Strategic Role and Importance," *Journal of Global Initiatives* 4, no. 2 (2009): 172.

³⁷⁸ Hasan Kösebalaban, "Türkiye'nin Yeni Dış Politika Doktrini: Medeniyetler İttifaki," *Anlayış* 2009, 53-55.

reason of adopting an international norm is related with whether this norm serves to increase state's power and credibility. Turkish credibility in international arena has increased through its appearance in the AoC activities. For example, Obama praised Turkish contribution to the AoC in his 2009 Cairo speech.³⁸⁰ In terms of power politics, on the other hand, Turkey had an opportunity to claim a regional power position through her leading role in this initiative.³⁸¹ The AoC endows her in a position of spokesman of Muslim world which makes the claim of being a regional power meaningful. Along with her OIC membership and her EU candidacy, the AoC Project strengthens the position of Turkey among Muslim countries, especially in the Middle East.³⁸² The AoC is the first organization that Turkey plays first chair independently from super powers which helps Turkey to unleash herself from the West and to define herself a central mission in international relations.³⁸³ The West is nomore a target to be reached but an addressee in a dialogue.³⁸⁴ In the second AoC Forum in Istanbul, R. T. Erdoğan repeatedly stressed the importance of Turkey as a "symbol country of the Alliance". The role that Turkey assumes can clearly be observed in the continuous statements of the Turkish Prime Minister regarding the Alliance as the most significant peace project and a global response to a global threat.³⁸⁵

Secondly, the grand strategy of Turkish states in history has always been towards the West.³⁸⁶ The Ottomans mainly expanded through the West, and the constitutive ideology of its successor, Kemalism, determined being a member of the Western Civilization as a main objective. Although the Turkish foreign policy is clearly alienated from the established Kemalist pro-Western approach by AKP³⁸⁷, the

³⁷⁹ Juliette Tolay, "The Missed Dialogues of the Euro-Turkish Relationships," *Journal of Global Initiatives* 4, no. 2 (2009): 193.

³⁸⁰ Kılınç, "Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adaption as a Survival Strategy," 62.

³⁸¹ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 89.

³⁸² Kılınç, "Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adaption as a Survival Strategy," 64.

³⁸³ Kösebalaban, "Türkiye'nin Yeni Dış Politika Doktrini: Medeniyetler İttifaki," 53-55.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 399.

³⁸⁶ Kösebalaban, "Türkiye'nin Yeni Dış Politika Doktrini: Medeniyetler İttifaki," 53-55.

³⁸⁷ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 400.

ruling party of the last nine years has not abandoned the objective of EU membership, rather put it in the first place in its foreign policy agenda. Turkish passion to be a member of the EU has a share in AKP's positive approach to dialogue projects³⁸⁸ and in this perspective the AKP government utilized the AoC initiative.³⁸⁹ On every occasion, Erdoğan keeps stating that if the EU is not a Christian club, then they should admit Turkey in the Union and an EU without Turkey would be an anti-thesis of the Alliance of Civilizations.³⁹⁰ Spain, as the cosponsor of the AoC, also agrees with Erdoğan on the issue that the EU membership of Turkey is closely linked to the AoC.³⁹¹ Erdoğan takes a step further and provokes the EU by saying that Europe can only be a world power through the AoC and Turkey's membership to the EU is an opportunity for Europe to this end.³⁹² Indeed, this strategy has been effective to some extent and the support of some European liberal thinkers has been gained. They consider the Turkish endeavor in dialogue activities as a sign of the reconciliation between Islam and the West.³⁹³

Kılınç also argues that Turkish participation in the AoC can only be thoroughly grasped through domestic politics approach. For him, the influence of national politics on foreign policy escalates when the ruling party presumes that its power is under threat by other national political entities. In the case of AKP, winning elections does not solely mean to hold power. AKP, as a party whose founders are coming from religious movements, is also supposed to eliminate the pressure of secularist establishment in Turkish civilian and military bureaucracy.³⁹⁴ The AoC project emerged as an opportunity for AKP to show its reconciliatory rhetoric³⁹⁵ and it is doubtless to say that this discourse helped the party's survival.³⁹⁶ How the AoC has been supporting AKP's political maintenance has two aspects. First, it provides a

³⁸⁸ Ibid.: 389.

³⁸⁹ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 89.

³⁹⁰ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 389.

³⁹¹ Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," 53-54.

³⁹² Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 393.

³⁹³ Kılınç, "Turkey and the Alliance of Civilizations: Norm Adaption as a Survival Strategy," 62-64.

³⁹⁴ Ibid.: 64.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.: 66.

ground against this secularist establishment; and secondly it provides a public support against Kemalist-secularist bureaucratic rivals. In the absence of these benefits, AKP would have supported the AoC less, if not at all.³⁹⁷ Additionally, AKP has been able to give a message to the global community that Turkey, with a hybrid and multifaceted identity, is ready to contribute to the globalization process. Thus, the party defeats the argument that AKP is a reaction to the secular-democratic order of the country.³⁹⁸ Balcı & Miş also stress on the same factor that facilitated the AKP's support to the AoC. For them, attuning to the Kemalist regime is an unavoidable requirement for Turkish political parties and AKP as the leading party of Turkey has followed a consensus seeking policy to this end in the domestic and international realms. They also add that the "post-modern" coup d'état of February 28, 1997 had demonstrated the limitations of Islamism and the necessity of developing a new perception of the West. With regard to this new formulation, Balcı & Miş also underline the individual effects of the academics Mehmet Aydın and especially Ahmet Davutoğlu on AKP policy making.³⁹⁹

3.1.2.4.4.2. Spain

It is not a surprise to see that the Spanish national plan for the AoC aims to achieve mutual understanding among diverse groups, to promote peace culture and civic values, to integrate immigrants (especially youth) and to spread the AoC principles⁴⁰⁰ as any other documents of other Group of Friend countries and the speeches, statements, and declarations of their representatives. On the other hand, Spain is also criticized to utilize the AoC initiative for pragmatic political purposes. As Turkey, Spain also has pragmatic international and national expectations from the AoC. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the expected positive effect of the AoC on domestic politics seems more significant for the Zapatero government than its effects on the Spanish foreign policy, unlike Turkish case.

³⁹⁶ Ibid.: 69.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.: 65.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.: 68.

³⁹⁹ Balcı and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 387-88.

⁴⁰⁰ Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," 53.

When the objectives of Spain are read through the domestic politics approach, the Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero has been benefitting from the initiative by separating his political stance from the previous conservative government, led by Jose Maria Anzar, and thus giving a message to the Spanish voters that Spain is not supposed to pay for the global war on terror through the lives of Spanish soldiers. The main motive of Zapatero is to find a place for Spain in the center of dialogue camp and keep his country out of the invasion of Iraq.⁴⁰¹ Through the AoC, he legitimized this withdrawal and proposed an alternative way of combat against terrorism and thus realized his number one promise in 2004 presidential election campaign.⁴⁰² From this perspective, Balci blames Zapatero as being motivated by his country's interests rather than global peace commitments. For him, the real reason of why Zapatero supported the AoC was the Madrid terrorist attack. He observes that three years after the Madrid bombing, the AoC has been gradually losing its significance in Zapatero's foreign policy agenda.⁴⁰³

In the international arena, Spain utilized the AoC as a soft power tool in two aspects, as a new definition of public diplomacy and an alternative paradigm for global security. The return of Social Democrats after eight years raised the expectations on a new formulation of Spanish public diplomacy. During their eight year incumbency, Anzar's conservative People's Party had diverged from the traditional foreign policy approach of Spain after 1970s. Unlike the majority of European countries, Anzar preferred to actively participate in Iraqi invasion besides the US. The Spanish citizens demonstrated a powerful negative response to this decision and 2004 Madrid attacks had strengthened the opposition. The withdrawal from Iraq dramatically increased Spain's positive image in international realm, especially among Muslim countries and the proposal for the AoC has to be evaluated as an additional effort for the reconstruction of Spanish public diplomacy. The AoC presented Spain an "operational corridor" between her natural boundaries between

⁴⁰¹ Köse, "The Alliance of Civilizations: Possibilities of Conflict Resolution at the Civilizational Level," 88-89.

⁴⁰² Balci and Miş, "Turkey's Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?," 402.

⁴⁰³ Balci, "The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy," 103.

Europe and Muslim countries; and between her historically diverse cultural composition and multicultural global community.⁴⁰⁴

Cajal emphasizes the security dimension of the AoC initiative which is another expectation of Spain in terms of international politics. Agreeing with Tony Blair, he thinks military means are inevitable, it is not enough to secure peace and the AoC provides us an alternative soft security approach whose primary fighting ground is the minds and hearts of people. Despite its “backbone is a moral one: a clear commitment to multilateralism, which is the UN’s legitimacy”, the substance of the Alliance lies upon political and security reasons. Cajal also takes our attention to the international environment and the Spanish domestic contour one year prior to the Zapatero’s proposal of the AoC to understand the nature of “this highly political endeavor”. There were four crucial developments: the Azeros Summit, invasion of Iraq, the Madrid terrorist attack, and the victory of Zapatero’s Socialist Party in Spanish elections just after this attack. These developments provide us a background to understand why the AoC initiative has a security dimension since its very beginning and why it is not a result of academic speculations.⁴⁰⁵ On the other hand, the AoC is “a consequence of the awareness that something new had to be done to prevent a potential confrontation between two worlds, two mindsets”. 12 months prior to the proposal proved that there is a necessity of a new outlook for a possible conflict between Islam and the West. Thus, from the Spanish perspective, the AoC is not a simple good will platform but a serious security project, which is more meaningful from a realist approach.

⁴⁰⁴ Barrenada, "Alliance of Civilizations, Spanish Public Diplomacy and Cosmopolitan Proposal," 99-101.

⁴⁰⁵ Cajal, "The Alliance of Civilizations: A Spanish View," 48-49. This explanation contradicts with the analysis of Balcı & Miş. They regard the AoC as a consequence of academic responses to the Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory.

CHAPTER IV

CIVILIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

4.1. The Right Viewpoint

The domain of the research study is up to the scientist himself but “the first prerequisite of a successful observation in any science is a definite understanding about what size of unit one is going to observe at a given time”.⁴⁰⁶ In social sciences, the questions such as where to begin, where to focus attention are crucial starting points. Some claimed that the most crucial issue in the analysis of international politics is the selection of the right perspective, which is the right level of analysis.⁴⁰⁷ The level of analysis stresses three ideas: First, *interactive capacity* determines that which unit is capable of interacting with the others in the system. Secondly, *structure* helps us to answer questions such as what is the arrangement of the units and what differentiates them. And third, *process* means to what extent the units interact with each other in a recurrent pattern.⁴⁰⁸

As I will discuss shortly, the students of International Relations have determined different classifications of levels of analysis. Yet in the broadest sense, there are two fundamental ways of explaining international phenomenon: reductionist (unit level) and holistic (system level) approaches. In agreement with Singer, Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff summarize the advantages and disadvantages of these two levels of analysis. The first problem with the system analysis is that it is overwhelmingly deterministic. While explaining an international phenomenon, it

⁴⁰⁶ David J. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics* 14, no. 1 (1961): 77. Singer cites from Kurt Lewin.

⁴⁰⁷ Tayyar Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 4 ed. (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2006), 143.

⁴⁰⁸ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 26.

exaggerates the role of the system although it provides manageable models and general patterns for prediction.⁴⁰⁹ Secondly, system level analysis underestimates the differences of units. With its emphasis on the whole, it obstructs us to see divergence among the parts.⁴¹⁰ For reductionist approach the most obvious advantage is that it permits us to see details among states and situational circumstances. Nonetheless, it can be a disadvantage if it is exaggerated for excessive differentiations obscure generalizations.⁴¹¹ Singer reprehends “the ethnocentrism of the researcher” because of this exaggeration. For him, the American researchers who perceive the world only through American national interests since 1945 are clear proofs of his analysis. “We-they” orientation -reminds us the discourse of *Bush the Second* after 9/11- has scientific problems and is a danger for the usage of the nation-state model.⁴¹² Casanova finds deeper roots of this “scientific problem” emerged from ethnocentrism in secularization. For him, a bias for the state as a systemic unit of analysis is an ethnocentric prejudice of secularization theory.⁴¹³

Kenneth Waltz introduced the three level account of analysis in International Relations in 1959. In the *Man, the State and War*, he lays aside the micro level analysis (the individual) and takes the unit (state) and system under investigation. He claimed that single one is not sufficient to explain the reasons of war, therefore unit and system are supposed to be examined together for a thorough explanation. While Morgenthau dealt with the unit (individual and state) to explain why similar states adopt different policies, Waltz tried to demonstrate the effects of the system to explain why the states, who have different ideologies and structures, adopt similar policies.⁴¹⁴ He attached great significance to the structural characteristics of the international system in defining the patterns of the units which compose the system. According to structural theory, behavioral patterns of individuals (individual units) to an incident may be totally different from those of the group, because of the impact of

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., 30-31.

⁴¹⁰ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 80-81.

⁴¹¹ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 30-31.

⁴¹² Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 83-84.

⁴¹³ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 24.

⁴¹⁴ Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 145-46.

the structure over the group.⁴¹⁵ Adopting the system as the level of analysis enabled Waltz to ask questions such as “What is the effect of systemic structure on the behavior of states?”⁴¹⁶

Thereby, structural ontology is composed of agents, systems, and structures. In the frame of structure, agents establish a relation with each other, and within these structures, systems are groups of agents (actors) that interact. To understand a change in systemic level, e.g., the establishment of the United Nations, it is important to determine the relationship among the agents and between the structure and the agents. The interaction among actors influences the characteristics of the structure which in turn influence the behavioral patterns of the agents.⁴¹⁷

Interdependence and *interaction* are crucial concepts which help us to understand system transformation. Interdependence is a result of the interaction among the actors of a system. It has two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability. The former is about to what extent changes in a country causes costly changes in another one. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is defined as the agent’s responsibility to bear costs which are imposed by external events. Interdependence with both dimensions can be social, political, military, economic or ideological in nature and it is sometimes asymmetric. Asymmetric interdependence means that one party in the system utilizes the opportunities more than the others. This can also be named as dependency.⁴¹⁸

More interdependency means more interaction, and more interaction means a more complex system. Interaction consists of actions (demands and responses) of nation-states, international organizations, and other actors. It also requires transactions, such as trade, tourism, flow of ideas, etc., across national boundaries. One problem with interaction is the overload of a system. The more interactions

⁴¹⁵ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 100-01.

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 102-03.

grow, the more inputs involve in the system; and the more inputs involve, the more problems emerge which cannot be solved at the same pace.⁴¹⁹

In late twentieth century, the technology brought about unpredicted types of interactions and the Eurocentric system transformed into a global international system. There have been two effects of modernization: particular forms of interdependence among a larger set of states have been emerging and the international system earned a transnational character. Greater interdependency brings about greater possibility of crisis which can easily be maintained by a party for its own interests.⁴²⁰

Steadiness is another concept to understand systemic structure. Systems try to achieve equilibrium. The degree of the equilibrium determines the stability of a system which is either tightly or loosely tied, either stable or unstable. Strongly tied systems with stable equilibriums can easily accept new components in it, they concur with the changes, and they preen themselves upon negative feedback. Every system has boundaries and a communication network which helps self-adjusting.⁴²¹

While Waltz triggered the discussion on which level of analysis is more applicable in international relations, J. D. Singer is the unavoidable reference of these discussions with his review of the Man, the State, and War, published in 1960 his classical article, published in 1961. Although Singer criticizes Morgenthau's power oriented analysis for being insubstantially simplistic and single minded,⁴²² he prefers lower level analysis over systemic approach, because of its superiority in details, depth, and intensiveness. According to Singer, while predictions do not require sophisticated models, explanations demand much more elegance⁴²³ and for this reason, despite he accepts that holistic approach is better for broader generalizations; reductionist analysis is more feasible in description and casual explanation.⁴²⁴

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., 103.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., 103-04.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 102.

⁴²² Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 81.

⁴²³ Ibid.: 80.

⁴²⁴ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 29-30.

Systems level offers us mere correlations while actor orientation offers causations which are more significant in a research study.⁴²⁵

For Singer, a researcher can change his mind and shift to another level of analysis in separate studies. Nevertheless, for a given research study, the conceptual framework in terms of level of analysis is supposed to be completed in the inception. For cumulative gathering of data in the field, sticking with one level of analysis is crucial.⁴²⁶

While triple account is the classical treatment of level of analysis discussions, some scholars mention other levels. Hollis & Smith⁴²⁷ and Viotti & Kauppi add bureaucracy as the fourth level. For them, mostly state is under inspection as the unit of analysis, but the level of analysis differs. In bureaucratic level, they investigate the bureaucratic and political structure of a country as the explanatory cause of state relations.⁴²⁸ For Goldstein, fourth level is the world system. Its difference from international level is the parts of the world system are inseparable. They are mutually constitutive.⁴²⁹

Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff classify six different levels from single individuals to the international system. For them, first level of analysis is the individuals. The prominent leaders have prominent roles in voters' behavior; nevertheless, most theorists subsume individuals into other higher level units, like states. Second level is sub-national groups, such as media, interest groups, and political parties. Although they do not attract central attention in international relations, the role of domestic politics in global phenomena is undeniable. Third, nation-states are the principle actors for realists and other units are recognized in this inventory. Non-state actors are subordinate to the state and their importance arises from to what extent they can influence the state policies. Next level is transnational groups and organizations not made up of states which are politically, religiously, commercially, etc. acting

⁴²⁵ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 89-90.

⁴²⁶ Ibid.: 90-91.

⁴²⁷ A. Nuri Yurdusev, "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1993): 82.

⁴²⁸ Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 148.

transnational entities, NGOs and international NGOs, such as Catholic Church, Hezbollah, communist parties, and guerilla movements. Since mid-1970 Multi-national cooperations are raising star in this category. International groups and organizations with states or their representatives as members form the fifth category. Despite the fact that some of their activities attract the scholarly attention, IR theorists do not very much interested in them because what ten thousands of representatives do in more than two thousands international organizations is just routine administrative duties. And the sixth and the last level of analysis is the international system. Here, the attention of the researcher is not reductionist or atomist, which means not towards the constituent parts of the whole system. The macrocosmic, global scheme defines the behaviors of the parts and these parts are blurred in the system. While realists take the nation-state as the main determiner of the international politics, the pluralists contend that many decisions are taken outside the frame of the state. Marxists are among the pluralists who adopt holistic-systemic approach.⁴³⁰

4.2. Distinguishing between the Level and the Unit of Analysis

As there are multiple levels of observation from micro to macro, i.e., from a single man to the empires, there are also multiple research subjects that researchers study on in global politics which are usually confused with the level of analysis. Therefore, it is particularly significant to distinguish between the sources of explanations (levels) and the objects of analysis (units), in the field of International Relations before determining the right level of analysis. A. Nuri Yurdusev and Tayyar Arı are among those who take our attention to this question. Both distinguished between the level and the unit of analysis. Nevertheless, although they

⁴²⁹ Yurdusev, "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction," 82.

⁴³⁰ James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 26-30.

agree upon the definition of unit of analysis, what they understand from the level of analysis is completely different.

According to Arı, while level of analysis refers to the independent variable (explainer), unit of analysis is the dependent variable (explained). From an individual to the system, all levels of analysis are the units of explanation at the same time. The subject determines which level is going to be chosen as an explanation tool. For Waltz, unit (state) and system (structure) are both unit and level of analysis, but, similar to Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff to some extent, Arı prefers actor and system as two main levels and he classifies eight sub-levels: individual, sub-national groups, bureaucratic structure, nation-state, and international/transnational organizations are the sub-levels of the actor level; and functional sub-system, regional sub-system, and global system are the sub-levels of the system level. All of them can be a unit or a level according to the researcher's preference.⁴³¹ For instance, when one analyzes the Turkish endeavor to access EU, his unit of analysis will be the Turkish state. The attitude of deputies in Turkish Parliament is an individual level of analysis, which is a sub-level of actor; and taking the dynamics of EU as the level of analysis is sub-level of system. Also, the EU dynamics can either be regarded as system level in general or regional sub-system level in particular, following Sönmezoğlu's classification.⁴³² Similarly, if the same person tries to explain AKP's endeavor in EU accession process, his unit of analysis will be a political party, which is a sub-national group in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff's classification. If he takes, for example, R. T. Erdoğan's efforts as the dependent variable, the researcher's level of analysis then will be the individual. Therefore, tens of different combinations of unit and level of analysis can be matched according to aims and needs of the researcher.

In his article published in 1991, Yurdusev agrees with Singer for what the unit of analysis is, but criticizes him in three terms. First, contrary to the Singer's conceptualization, for Yurdusev, "the selection of micro or macro level of analysis and sorting and arranging of the phenomena under study" are not the same. Secondly, the level of analysis and unit of analysis do not refer to the same

⁴³¹ Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri: Çatışma, Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, 152-56.

phenomenon. And thirdly, Singer is too simplistic by taking only two levels of analysis.⁴³³ For the purpose of this section, I will only introduce his second objection to Singer.

Yurdusev follows the classical approach in the definition and the classification of the units of analysis. He defines unit of analysis as a question of the actor or the entity to be studied, and shares the view that although there are infinite numbers of units in an analysis, the common triple-account classification of the individual, the society or group of individuals, and whole universe (all inclusive) is useful to study. On the other hand, the level of analysis is the framework of an analysis which gives a perspective to the analyst. Completely unrelated to Ari's understanding, it is a methodological problem about the "context and level". There are also three levels in his formulation. First one is the least abstract one: the philosophical level. It is the aggregate of "assumptions, postulates, general beliefs, principles and premises" which define the background of the subject and identify it. This level provides the foundation for the other two levels. Second one, the theoretical level, defines the problem more concretely; draws the limits, puts propositions and replaces the principles. The last level of analysis is the practical (phenomenological) level. In this level, the concrete practices of reality are out there and researcher considers only this tangible essence. Yurdusev claims that a study is not supposed to involve all these three levels and it can be a combination of two or all, or it is composed of just one level.⁴³⁴

For the question of which unit a student should investigate, Yurdusev thinks, in social sciences, it is hardly, if not impossible, to focus on a subject without taking different units into consideration,⁴³⁵ but "one needs to be clear about both the level and the unit of analysis before undertaking a particular study in order for the context of the subject and the premises under which one is operating to be known."⁴³⁶

⁴³² Ibid., 150-51.

⁴³³ Yurdusev, "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction," 77.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.: 78-80.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.: 83.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.: 88.

Different units⁴³⁷ can be utilized in the same analysis and thus the analysis becomes more “intelligible”. “However, due to the close association of the idea of the whole as a perspective and as a unit, and the intricate unity and complexity of human phenomena, the two (*the part and the whole*) **may well exist together** in the same analysis”⁴³⁸ and he goes further “Whatever level or unit the student takes for his analysis, he **needs to consider the others** if his analysis to be comprehensive and precise”⁴³⁹.

4.3. Utilizing Civilizations in International Relations

Earth comprises lands and water. Lands include forests, deserts, and mountains; and water consists of rivers, lakes, seas, and oceans. One who tries to understand the eco-system may prefer investigating different segments of this phenomenon. He may focus on a particular, small size river to examine the life of a particular species of fish, or he may try to take a holistic picture of the moving water from oceans to the mountains and mountains to the oceans if he is after an explanation of the water-cycle. I think this earth and its constituent parts metaphor is useful to understand the whole picture of our political life. While forests, mountains, rivers and seas stand for nation-states and other entities which are able to exert political power over people, such as local governments, city states, empires, etc., lands and water represents larger units: the civilizations. Our world today consists of civilizations which consist of nation-states.

A very crucial impact of Judeo-Christian secularism on International Relations was that it led Westerners to exclude the non-Western, especially Islamic, civilizations from the international order. Because, secularism, which is an inherent feature of modern international system, is both restricted to a particular geography

⁴³⁷ Here, it sounds like what Yurdusev means by “unit” is same with what Arı means by “level”.

⁴³⁸ Yurdusev, "'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction," 85.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.: 87. Stresses are mine.

(the West) and to particular people (Europeans and their descendents).⁴⁴⁰ In this milieu, the default result would be that there is any civilizational interaction(!) and therefore any political analysis regarding civilizational characteristics. Robert Cox asserts that the strengthening the stress on ethnic, religious and cultural identities and the rise of terrorism are among the reasons which force political scientists to formulate a new ontology.⁴⁴¹ I repeat the same suggestion for the methodology of International Relations.

Under the light of the discussions on unit and level of analysis, I agree with Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, who accept the possibility of the existence of smaller sub-systems within a larger system,⁴⁴² and Singer, who accepts that there can be better choices of analysis than state and system level and observes indications of new institutional forms in the international system.⁴⁴³ Keeping the historical relations and mutual interactions between the Western and Islamic civilizations in mind and employing my conceptualization of the term, I argue that civilization can be regarded as a very beneficial dependent variable, a level of analysis in examining international politics. Thus, civilization becomes the broadest level of analysis just under the international/global system. Remembering Tayyar Arı's categorization briefly discussed above, it can be classified as a sub-system level of analysis provides us a significant advantage in analyzing a great deal of regional political activities and interactions, such as in the Middle East, in Africa, or in Scandinavia, where states belong to the same civilization.

Indeed, this proposal follows the footsteps of Ibn Khaldun, for whom macro level completes the micro level social analysis. More than six centuries ago, he employed civilizations as a level of analysis in his sociological investigations.⁴⁴⁴ Ibn Khaldun was a unique intellectual since he was a scholar of *fiqh* and an administrator

⁴⁴⁰ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 6.

⁴⁴¹ Burcu Bostanoğlu and Mehmet Akif Okur, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Eleştirel Kuram: Hegemonya - Medeniyetler Ve Robert W. Cox*, 2 ed. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2009), 82-83.

⁴⁴² James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 102.

⁴⁴³ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 90.

in a multi-cultural society and a multi-civilizational world. Şentürk claims that he should be revisited to adequately evaluate today's global world since he established a theory which explains civilizations, their relations with each other, and their internal and external dynamics based on transformation and conflict. This conceptualization of civilization procreated a new single discipline and a new macro level analysis.⁴⁴⁵

Although he does not explicitly state that he utilized civilization as a level of analysis, the method of Huntington's reading of the international phenomenon is also what I am trying to formulate. He applied civilizational characteristics and attachments to understand the existing and potential disagreements and needless to say it is very reasonable and valid from my perspective. Nevertheless, his selective reading of cultures and civilizations, and analyzing the interactions through conflicting issues among them pushed him into the same vicious circle that many realists spin in: the more realists observe the international relations through the moral-free interest and power based lenses, the more the international relations become moral-free interest and power based system. Therefore, my proposal differs from Huntington's application in terms of its holistic view of civilization as a dependent variable.

Another reason of my proposal for a new level of analysis in international relations is the need for non-Western contributions to the field. While Singer shows that state level analysis helps us to take into account the national goals and motivations, he admits that in political analysis, "goal-seeking approach" is mostly a Western way of thinking.⁴⁴⁶ That is, nation-state is the dominant actor of global politics for English speaking students of International Relations.⁴⁴⁷

Civilization as a level of analysis allows us to take a picture of the units under investigation more clearly. Between holistic and reductionist approaches, it is a moderate way of evaluating a political phenomenon. Practicing upon one level of

⁴⁴⁴ Recep Şentürk, in (ed. R. Şentürk), İz Yayıncılık 2009, pp. 227-268., "Medeniyetler Sosyolojisi: Neden Çok Medeniyetli Bir Dünya Düzeni İçin Yeniden İbn Haldun?," in *İbn Haldun: Güncel Okumalar* ed. Recep Şentürk (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2009), 246.

⁴⁴⁵ Şentürk, *Açık Medeniyet: Çok Medeniyetli Dünya Ve Topluma Doğru*, 167.

⁴⁴⁶ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 84.

analysis may result in failing to explain why states have different reactions to similar events, but taking into account civilizational affiliations elicits a picturesque analysis. As David Singer criticizes system-level analysis, national actors may be reduced to “billiard balls” or “black boxes” when the research concentrates only on the global system.⁴⁴⁸ For this reason, through subsystem analysis, the civilization in this case, helps us to notice variations which are necessary for precise descriptions; we can practically categorize nations for sagacious predictions. Moreover, another advantage of taking civilization as a level of analysis is its attachment with the mindset of the individual. Thus, the researcher also has a chance to look closer to the details; the individual is included in the analysis as a matter of course. Beyond doubt, it does not make our research “unintelligible” if we do not view the interactions among the actors from a civilizational point of view. Nevertheless, the interdependency among the members of a civilization, more specifically the degree of their sensitivity and vulnerability in their relationship with each other, will be more meaningful within a civilizational system. Thus, an analysis at civilizational level gives us the opportunity to overcome the explanation/prediction dichotomy. As aforementioned, while prediction does not require complex models, explanation involves subtlety which may hinder both/either the researcher (in the generation of a useful model) and/or the reader (in the apprehension of the model). Civilization provides us a simple frame which both paves the way for prophetic predictions and explains the behavior of states, especially their attitudes towards similar incidents. For instance, the recent events in the Middle East deserve to be analyzed from this perspective. “The Arab Spring” was launched in Tunisia in December 2010 and quickly spread all over the Arab world.⁴⁴⁹ The sensitivity of Arabic countries towards each other can only be thoroughly grasped within a civilizational context. Taking civilization as a dependent variable in the IR analyses, in other words defining properly the characteristics of the civilization which the Arabic actors belong to and determining to what extent they share these features, will help us to comprehend how and why the discontent of the people of a country could sprawl with a meteoric pace.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid.: 82.

⁴⁴⁸ Ibid.: 81.

⁴⁴⁹ “Arab Spring,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring.

A dissimilarity of civilization is while other levels of analysis can also be studied as subjects of investigation, namely units of analysis, civilization can only be benefitted as a level of analysis in international relations. This is probably the justification of why civilizations are overlooked in this field. Indeed, in order to be utilized as an independent variable, a unit of analysis, a social entity requires having political institutions - also civil society with the power of political influence can be regarded in this category - which are relevant for scientific analysis. Civilizations lack these institutions and probably they will not possess them in the near future.

Is there any institution which can be evaluated from a civilizational perspective? If not, do civilizations have a potential to constitute these institutions and thus become units of analysis? There is no institutionalized civilization but in the long run, there may be. The EU for Western Civilization, the OIC for Islamic Civilization, the African Union, and the Union of South American Nations represent civilizations at least for some, but for now, the realist logic and the political and economical motives behind their formation impede us to regard them as civilizational institutions. The Alliance of Civilizations initiative claims to establish contact and cooperation between -especially Western and Islamic- civilizations and thus can be seen as a future nominee for a unit of analysis, but it is just a “show off” and a “good will” platform for today. Many staff members have been working deliberately and peace and dialogue activists are exerting full effort to the AoC organizations in order to contribute perpetual peace. Nevertheless, so far it has been both far away from being an institution having a power of political sanctions and it serves, wittingly or unwittingly, to the national interests of its cosponsors instead of pure dialogic civilizational relations. The Realist mindset of the foreign policy makers of the Turkey and Spain restricts the Initiative just being a “tool” in international power struggle. On the other hand, if for example, the EU institutionally declares her civilizational boundaries; or if Islamic countries either renew and redefine the OIC or create another institution with both spiritual and material powers, similar to once caliphate mechanism, the students of IR have an opportunity to examine a civilization as a unit of analysis. Indeed, this is not a weak possibility. Some

members of the EU, especially German⁴⁵⁰ and France⁴⁵¹, explicitly stresses on the cultural and religious uniformity of the Union, especially in their attitude towards the membership of Turkey, and they are supported by the Pope. On the other side of the coin, the transformation of Islamic revival is another signal. When it started in 70s, it was a laymen reaction to the immediate wealth of petroleum restricted to a privileged minority, but the grandsons and granddaughters of these laymen seem to change the course of transformation. Third and fourth generation Muslim resurgence will evolve into an intellectual and “fundamental” revival which will probably give birth to the institutionalization of Islamic Civilization. Consequently, civilization has potential to be a subject for scientific investigation in International Relations for the future. On the other hand, not being a unit of analysis does not impair civilization’s being a great tool to understand and explain the attitude and behavior of the political actors, both individuals and states, and to enable the analyst to construe the reactions of states towards similar incidents.

⁴⁵⁰ Hurd, *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations* 89. Former West Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt asserted that Turkey should be excluded from EU because of the unsuitable civilization it belongs to. For Hurd, This may be a result of Bernard Lewis’ prophecy that Europe is going to be a Muslim continent in a century.

⁴⁵¹ French President Nicolas Sarkozy: “I do not support Turkey’s integration to Europe. Turkey is Asia Minor... Turkey is a great civilization, but she is not European”. (Mustafa Kutlay, 11.01.2010, <http://www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=1280>, accessed 10.07.2011).

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study is to offer civilization to the IR analysts as a new level of analysis. With its definitive character, civilizations contribute to the constitution of individual mindsets and state structure. Therefore, investigating international phenomenon through this new glasses can provide new horizons to the students of IR both in understanding why states with similar material (economic, military) structure react differently and in predicting the state (or any other actor) behavior.

In addition to this theoretical contribution, I have two other objectives in studying civilizations. Firstly, I try to redefine civilization to make it compatible with a normative analysis in IR. To this end, I separated the concept from negative connotations and especially from barbarism, and attributed it a constructive meaning. My conceptualization of the civilization is it is a reflection of world view and lifestyle of a social grouping and by definition it mirrors the positive aspects. This civilization legitimates the application of power temporarily and only in order to remove violence. If a social grouping condones atrocity, this reflection is called barbarism. Therefore, we cannot talk about a clash of civilizations but a clash of barbarisms.

My second secondary aim, which can also be labeled as my “secret agenda”, in this study is my belief that talking about studying value-laden civilizations in IR necessarily accompanies a discussion of morality in international relations that policy makers ignore. Implementing power and interest in every occasion in the international realm procreates a vicious circle: First, analyst approaches the relations among international actors through these two concepts and then the policy maker treats the assumptions of the analyst as reality and formulates his policies and relations power and interest oriented. In this sense, I completely agree with the conscience of the West:

After all, if we teach world politics to generations of students and tell them that people are selfish, then doesn't that become common sense and don't they, when they go off into the media or to work for government departments or the military or even when they talk to their children over the dinner table, simply repeat what they have been taught and, if in positions of power, act accordingly? ... and simply point out that we are not convinced that Realism is as objective or non-normative as it is portrayed as being.⁴⁵²

For these purposes, after defining the concept of civilization, I took a closer look into the Western and Islamic civilizations and the types of interaction among them. Their umbrella structures which cover different nations provide a splendid foundation for the aims of this study, because these structures can be clearly distinguished from nation-states. In these sense, it would be more difficult to apply civilizational approach to analyze, for example, the interaction between the Chinese and Indian civilizations. Additionally, the centuries of close relations between Islam and the West, which are erroneously alleged of antagonism between them, intertwined these two civilizations. Thus, I obtained abundant material to observe a civilizational interactive relationship.

Before concluding, I would like to note a point on the United Nations' Alliance of Civilizations initiative. I planned to investigate the Alliance both as a level and a unit of analysis, namely as a dependent and an independent variable of international relations before I began my research. More concretely, I presumed that the Initiative would be a fine example of civilizational interactions and this structure can be explained through civilizations. Nevertheless, my findings invalidated my predictions: a Realist reading is more explanatory about the AoC. Although the staff of the Initiative and the experts who formulated the agenda of it are motivated with idealist objectives, for most supporting states, especially Turkey, Spain and some countries who prepared national strategies, it is merely another interest-oriented platform and a show off stage.

⁴⁵²John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of the World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 4.

Consequently, this thesis is a non-Western contribution attempt to the IR theory. It is an implicit criticism of the current International Relations dominated by realism. As Singer points out, nation-state is the dominant actor for English speaking students of IR.⁴⁵³ As a non-English speaking student, I believe that the unquestionable authority of the nation-state and other concepts of Realism, most importantly power, and interest, has another damage on the development of IR theory and the practice of the field, other than the ethical question. Excessive concentration on the nation-state both as a unit and level analysis impedes scholars of IR. Absolutely, nation-state is the legendary unit of modern international relations and it deserves and will deserve very close concern in almost all analyses. On the other hand, ascribing it an exaggerated role and disregarding all other dependent variables hinders IR analysts from more adequate explanations and especially from broader predictions.

⁴⁵³ Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," 82.

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