

Ismail Pasha's Governorship in Egypt, 1863-1879

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ABSTRACT

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Ismail Pasha's governorship in Egypt, 1863-1879

Ismail Pasha's reign in Egypt has a prominent significance for Egypt's history. He was one of the most important figures in the region during the 19th century. He was educated in Europe and was admired by the French. His personal ambition to bring Egypt onto the world stage gave birth to an absolute decline at the end of his rule. Just as his predecessor, Muhammed Ali, he wanted to have closer relations with the European Powers. For this sake, he tried to obtain extra privileges above those his counterparts enjoyed during the same period. The Great Powers' (Britain and France) were as influential over Egypt's internal domestic affairs as they were over her foreign affairs. Great Britain and France were the two strongest sides with self-interests in Egypt's fate. During his 16 year period of governorship, Ismail Pasha mostly behaved as if he were an independent ruler. Sometimes he was hindered while taking actions partly by the Sublime Porte (administrative body of the sultan of the Ottoman Empire) and partly by the Great Powers. As a governor of the sultan, nobody in the empire was stronger when compared with him in connection with his independent rights to execute death sentences, taking loans from Europeans, having his own, from time to time, unlimited army. He was the most powerful merchant and entrepreneur in Egypt. He could generously use the treasury's assets as if they were his own. No law or limitation could restrain him from making extravagant expenditures for his own pleasure. As a result, he reflects the characteristics of a Middle-Eastern ruler in every respect.

The period of 1875-79 was marked by an unequal struggle between Europe and the khedive (governor of Egypt appointed by the sultan) for the control of Egypt. Europe began to use the debts to destroy Khedive Ismail's economic and political power. When Ismail was not able to cope with the debt payments, international bodies were imposed upon Egypt. International control was exercised through the *Caisse de la dette publique* (Public Debt Commission) and British-French Dual Control. Two years later he lost control of his family's estates and a cabinet of ministers headed by Nubar Pasha was established. Ismail was separated from the cabinet by the creation of the council of ministers. In 1879, Ismail drew up a national program. Britain and France agreed to join with Germany in demanding the deposition of Ismail by the sultan. On 26th June, 1879 Ismail was deposed and succeeded by his son, Tevfik. It was possible for me to find archival documents in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* giving information about the khedive's years in exile. I used these as the basic sources of Chapter 3.

Key words:

Khedive Ismail Pasha, Great Powers, cotton boom, Africa, Suez Canal, Dual Control, Muhammed Ali Pasha.

KISA ÖZET

Fatih DAL

Mart 2012

Mısır'da İsmail Paşa'nın Valiliği, 1863-1879

İsmail Paşa dönemi, Mısır tarihi açısından son derece öneme haizdir. O, 19. yüzyıl Mısır'ının iki önemli şahsiyetinden biriydi. Avrupa'da eğitim gördü ve Fransız hayranı olarak yetişti. O'nun, Mısır'ı dünya arenasında temayüz ettirme hırsı, yönetiminin nihayete erdiği 1879 yılına gelindiğinde bir çöküşle sonuçlandı. Tıpkı Muhammed Ali gibi, O da Avrupalı Güçler tarafından bilinir bir devlet adamı olmak istemişti. Bu uğurda, çeşitli vesilelerle sultandan kendi muadillerinin o dönemde sahip olmadığı ayrıcalıklar elde etmeye çalıştı. Büyük Güçlerin Mısır üzerindeki dengeleri de Mısır'ın dış işlerinde olduğu kadar iç işlerinde de belirleyici bir etki meydana getirdi. Büyük Britanya ve Fransa, kendi menfaatleri doğrultusunda Mısır'a ilgi duyan iki büyük taraftı. 16 yıl boyunca süren idaresinde, İsmail Paşa çoğunlukla bağımsız bir yönetici gibi davrandı. Bazen eylemleri, Bab-ı Âli tarafından bazen de Büyük Güçler tarafından engellendi. Sultan'ın bir temsilcisi olarak, imparatorlukta hiç kimse O'nun kadar güçlü değildi. Ölüm cezalarını kendi onaylayabiliyor, Avrupalılardan borç temin edebiliyor ve zaman zaman sınırlandırmalar getirilse de, kendine ait bir orduya sahip olabiliyordu. O; Mısır'daki en güçlü çiftçi ve tüccardı. Hazinesinin mal varlığını istediği gibi cömertçe kendi malıymış gibi harcayabiliyordu. Hiçbir kanun ve sınırlandırma O'nu kendi zevki namına müsrifçe harcamalar yapmaktan alıkoyamıyordu. Sonuç olarak, O her açıdan, Ortadoğulu bir yöneticinin özelliklerini yansıtıyordu.

1875-1879 yılları, Avrupa ile hidiv arasında Mısır'ın kontrolü adına güç dengesi açısından eşit olmayan bir dönemi ihtiva eder. Avrupa, İsmail'in ekonomik ve siyasi gücünü yok etmek için Mısır'ın borçlarını kullanmaya başladı. İsmail borç ödemeleriyle baş edemeyince, uluslararası kurullar Mısır'a dayatıldı. Uluslararası kontrol; kamu borç komisyonu ve Fransız ve İngiliz eşbaşkanlarından oluşan İkili Kontrol adındaki yapılarla kendini gösterdi. İki yıl sonra, İsmail kendisi ve ailesine ait mülkleri ve gayrimenkulleri kaybetti ve Nubar Paşa'nın başkanlığında bakanlar kurulu oluşturuldu. Bakanlar kurulunun oluşturulmasıyla İsmail kabinenin dışında bırakıldı. 1879'da İsmail milli programı açıkladı. İngiltere ve Fransa Almanya ile anlaşarak sultandan Hidiv İsmail'i azletmesi talebinde uzlaştı. 26 Temmuz 1879'da İsmail azledildi ve yerine oğlu Tevfik geçirildi. Arşiv belgelerine dayanarak Hidiv hakkında özellikle O'nun sürgün yılları üzerine Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi'nde değerli bilgiler bulmak benim için mümkün oldu ve bunlar 3. Bölümün temel kaynağını teşkil etti.

Anahtar Kelimeler:

Hidiv İsmail Paşa, Büyük Güçler, Pamuk, Afrika, Suveyş Kanalı, İkili Kontrol, Mehmed Ali Paşa.

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INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman administration in Egypt began with the conquest of Selim I in 1517 and continued through the following four centuries. However, the first three quarters of this period did not bring any remarkable consequences to Egypt. In contrast with the classical period, Egypt in the 19th century was not strongly tied to the Ottoman central administration due to her semi-autonomous position after the reign of Muhammed Ali Pasha.

It is normally expected from a thesis to fill a gap in the existing literature. After I decided to write about this period of the 19th century in Egypt, I noticed that there was not a specific study about Ismail Pasha's term of governorate. Many books can be found about the long century of Egypt, in which the events that occurred during Ismail's reign are just briefly mentioned.¹ As to primary sources I have relied on both Ottoman Archival documents and eyewitnesses' books such as Lord Cromer's '*Modern Egypt*', Wilfrid Scawen Blunt's '*Secret History*', and Edward de Leon's '*Khedive's Egypt*'. It is not difficult to find out about just one issue of the related period, i.e. articles on the Suez Canal or the Arabi Revolt. But there is not a comprehensive documented history of this period in Egypt. Sources generally focus on a complete history of Egypt or the Middle East. Or, they only dedicate one

¹ The basic secondary sources are as following: P. J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publication, 1985), P.M Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922*, (London, Longmans, 1966), Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives from Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, (Universtiy of Petesburgh Press), Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914*, (London: I. B Tauris, 1981), William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); as well as Süleyman Kızıltoprak, "Mısır'da Vezirlik Payesine Sahip Nubar Paşa (1824-1899)", *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Ulusal Kongresi*, Ankara, 21-23 Nisan 2002, Selim Deringil, 'The Ottomans, The Turks and World Power Politics' collected studies, *Analecta Isisana* Vol. XLIX, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), Cengiz Orhonlu, '*Osmanlı imparatorluğunun Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti*', (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996).

chapter of their studies to Ismail Pasha's governorship, or just briefly mention this period in a few pages. An important point of this thesis is that it reflects the point of view of not only the British or Europeans, but also the Turks.

In this thesis, I have purposed to emphasise Ismail Pasha's term of governorate from an overall perspective. For this reason, I have first tried to give an outline of what happened before he came to power. Some basic points are given in the introduction to better understand the events in Ismail's period. The process from the French occupation in 1798 up to 1863 is described to show the conditions at the time Ismail was appointed as governor of Egypt according to the primogeniture law of 1841. To this end, the French Occupation (as a pre-example for the British occupation of 1882), Muhammed Ali Pasha's long reign of Egypt (as a founder of Modern Egypt and as an ideal leader for Ismail Pasha with some differences in the way of administration), two insignificant rulers between 1848-1863 (the predecessors of Ismail Pasha: Abbas Pasha and Said Pasha), are briefly explained later in the introduction. Even though Ismail brought about the conditions for the British to finally occupy the country, he endeavoured to make the country a center of excellence in education, agriculture, transportation, etc. Because Ismail Pasha's main purpose to do so was to become a well-known ruler in history, his efforts were especially concentrated on enlarging his rights for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire. For this reason I have given some details about the Penal Code, the application of Tanzimat in Egypt, the primogeniture law, the public works and the Egyptian invasion of Africa in the period of his predecessors. By doing so, I aim to make the separate subtitles in the first chapter more meaningful.

The main parts of the thesis are the first two chapters that cover the whole period of Ismail Pasha's governorate (1863-1879 in chronological order). I have started the second chapter with the events in 1875 because this period coincided with the foreign intervention, (first the economic and then the political), that started with the selling of the shares of the Suez Canal to the British. The first chapter deals with Ismail's semi-autonomous administration, clear examples of which were, the inauguration ceremony of the Suez Canal, (Ismail invited the royalty of European kingdoms as if he was an independent ruler), and the new primogeniture law of 1866. A description of his succession and details of his personality are given prior to information about the penal code, the primogeniture law and relations with the Ottoman sultan. Education, public works, and intellectual life in Egypt in the related period have been outlined, followed by the constitutional regime, agricultural developments, the cotton boom relevant to the American Civil War, and the Suez Canal. This completes the first chapter.

In the second chapter, I give a detailed history of the Egyptian invasion of Africa and the direct administration of European representatives before the British occupation. Because Khedive Ismail, like Muhammed Ali, was also desirous to expand the southern borders of the country towards Sudan and Ethiopia, African affairs and the slave trade are also mentioned in this part. The Europeans' use of debts to destroy Ismail's economic and political power is also a major consideration of this chapter. Cave, Joubert-Goschen Missions, Public Debt Administration, Dual Control, the international cabinet and the deposition of Khedive Ismail are the subtitles in which these subjects are expanded upon.

In the third Chapter, I explain the efforts of Khedive Ismail to return to Egypt from exile following his deposition. I strongly relied on the Ottoman Archival documents (in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*) in this chapter. His life in Europe and his political struggle against the Caliph of Islam, Abdulhamid II is my focus in this part.

a-) The French Occupation of Egypt

Within less than a century, Egypt experienced two occupations; the first by the French in 1798 and the second by the British in 1882. Egypt's important strategic location in the Mediterranean, in addition to the rivalry between France and Britain to gain superiority in the region, both played a significant role in determining her future. Egypt's importance for Britain on her route to her colonials in India was inarguable. This was one of the key reasons for the French occupation of Egypt.

In August 1797, the French military leader, Napoleon Bonaparte, was advised to capture the Ionian Islands followed by an occupation of Egypt to extend French influence over the Ottoman Empire. An advantage of the occupation of Egypt would be to threaten Britain's economic power and its trade with India. On 12th April, 1798, Bonaparte was commissioned with this project.². In addition to the military personnel, Bonaparte was accompanied on this campaign by a cadre of civilian experts; engineers, surveyors, translators and scientists. For this project, France had to be prepared to fight three wars; against Britain, against the Ottoman Empire and against the Muslims in Egypt.

The French fleet should have dealt with the British forces in the Mediterranean. Even if the Ottoman authority in Egypt was nominal, Egypt was still an Ottoman

Province. However, the French estimated that the Ottoman Empire would not risk her friendship with France, and finally the Muslims in Egypt must be persuaded that the French were not the foe of Muslims. Instead, the argument would be that they had come as friends of the sultan to free Egypt from Mamluk (a powerful Muslim military caste) tyranny, and that they regarded any enemy of the sultan as an enemy of France. The French expoused that they were not infidels: they were believers of one God, they were respecting to the prophet of Islam and they accepted Islam as a true religion. All these issues were raised in order to win over the Muslims with proclamations prepared in both Arabic and Turkish.³ The proclamations stated to the Egyptian population that firstly, the French would eradicate oppression, tyranny, exploitation and maladministration. Secondly, they argued France was not hostile to Islam. France's intention was to occupy and administer the entire country in such a way that Egypt would compensate its expenditures with its own revenues. A French occupation of Egypt would also halt British commerce.⁴

The British government had in April 1798, ordered the deployment of a naval force in the Mediterranean. Nelson's naval force anchored off Toulon to challenge the departure of the main French convoy. On 22nd June, 1798, Bonaparte informed his army that their destination was Egypt. The British were uncoordinated in their response to the French advance and only took small steps and measures against it. One of these steps was to order a fleet under Admiral Blankett, and another

² Egypt, *Encyclopedia of Britannica*, vol. 8, p. 65

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65

⁴ Darrell Dykstra, 'The French occupation in Egypt', *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century*, ed. by M. W. Daly Vol. 2, pp. 118-119

precaution was to bring Britain and the Ottoman Empire into closer cooperation. The Ottomans formally allied with both Britain and Russia.⁵

The French land forces suffered from inadequate provision of fresh water and other shortcomings. The destruction of the French naval fleet at Abuqir meant isolation from France and from any hope of reinforcement. The presence of the Anglo-Ottoman fleet also meant a sharp reduction in the trade at Mediterranean ports.⁶ The French realized that their own propaganda about the friendship of France with the Muslims was only an illusion.

The first step in the Ottoman military response was to order Jezzar Ahmed Pasha, the governor of Acre, to attack the French force. Bonaparte had planned to advance rapidly to capture Acre, a strategically important port on the route between Egypt and Syria. By 18th March, 1799, the French had reached Acre, however, they failed to seize her and withdrew back into Egypt. In August 1799, Bonaparte left Egypt for France. The French general, Jean Baptiste Kléber inherited the responsibility of the military campaign after Napoleon's departure. Firstly, Kléber wanted to evacuate the entire French garrison from Egypt. In September, 1799, Kléber invited the Ottoman grand-vizier to negotiate the evacuation. According to the Treaty of al-Arish, all French forces would evacuate Egypt; the Ottoman Empire would provide additional ships to transport the army to France.⁷

However, on 20th March, 1800, at the battle of Heliopolis, after defeating the Ottoman army, Kléber decided to re-conquer Egypt. He also reached an agreement with Murad Bey, the Mamluk leader. Kléber's ambitions ended on 14th June, 1800

⁵ Dykstra, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-131

when he was assassinated.⁸ As commander-in-chief, General Jacques Menou was commissioned for Kléber's position and he sought ways to make the French occupation permanent.

At the same time, Britain decided to drive the French out of Egypt. An army under General Abercromby was sent to the Mediterranean. His plan was to first seize Alexandria. The second part of the strategy was a new Ottoman invasion from Syria. The third attack would be carried out from the Red Sea. The British force landed at Abuqir Bay in March 1801. General Menou withdrew his forces to Alexandria. The British advanced towards Cairo. The end came quickly with a victory for the British. The remaining French forces were evacuated according to the al-Arish Convention.

According to the treaty in March 1802 between France and Britain, it was agreed that Egypt should be restored to her original status as a province of the Ottoman Empire.⁹

Following the evacuation of the French in 1801, Egypt suffered a complete breakdown in law and order. The lack of effective government in Cairo allowed soldiers of various factions to disobey. The resulting political instability enabled others to launch opportunistic attacks. The Mamluk faction reappeared throwing Egypt into anarchy and beginning a two year period of civil war.¹⁰ The French occupation had seriously weakened the power of the Mamluks. Napoleon had defeated two Mamluk leaders: Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey. The French had

⁸ Egypt, *Encyclopedia of Britain*, p.65.

⁹ George A. Haddad, 'A Project for the Independence of Egypt, 1801', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol: 90/2, 1970, pp. 169-179.

¹⁰ Egypt, *Encyclopedia of Britain*, p. 65.

excluded the Mamluks from the various *divans*.¹¹ But Mamluk power had not been completely destroyed. They clashed with Ottoman forces for control in Egypt. In 1801, the small Albanian contingent of which Muhammed Ali was second-in-command was sent to reestablish the sultan's authority in Egypt. The arrival of Muhammed Ali to Egypt was on 8th March, 1801.¹²

b-) The Period of Muhammed Ali Pasha (1805-1848)

The events of the period between 1802 and 1805 signified the preparation of Muhammed Ali for the governorship of Egypt. His Albanian forces were small in number but effective fighters. He used them to play both sides gaining power and prestige for himself. The policies of the Mamluks were openly opposed by the merchants and ulema of Cairo. The urban uprising of March 1804 helped to drive the Mamluks out of Cairo and in March 1805 Muhammed Ali came to power. The sultan finally approved his appointment as the governor of Egypt on 3rd July, 1805.¹³

The period of Muhammed Ali's rule of Egypt, which ended in 1848 with his deposition as the result of his psychological problems, marks the most significant era in Egyptian history under Ottoman administration. He governed Egypt for a long period in an effective manner as a quasi-independent ruler. The fact that Muhammed Ali's dynasty continued until the year 1952 makes this period even more critical.

Muhammed Ali brought the era of Mamluk power to an end in Egypt and created a loyal elite class composed of members of his own family from his hometown. He has been regarded as the founder of Egypt. He took various radical measures that

¹¹ Khaled Fahmy, 'The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha: 1805-1848', *The Cambridge history of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century*, ed. by M. W. Daly vol. 2, p. 141.

¹² Muhammed Hanefi Kutluoğlu, 'Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Pasha', *DIA*, p. 62.

changed Egypt's position within the Ottoman Empire. He strengthened Egypt's economic ties with Europe. He expanded his control not only over the province of Egypt, but also beyond its borders including Sudan, Crete, Morea, Hijaz, Yemen, Syria, and even Anatolia.

After Muhammed Ali had strengthened his position against potential internal enemies, by request of the sultan, he sent an army under the command of Tusun, one of his sons, against the Wahhabi threat in Arabia. Muhammed Ali's positive response to the sultan's order to restore authority in Arabian Peninsula was not because of his loyalty and submission to his suzerain. He calculated that if he was able to destroy the Wahhabi revolt and take control of the two holy cities of Islam, (Mecca and Medina), it would give him unparalleled prestige in the eyes of Muslims. The campaign succeeded in 1811 with the capture of Hejaz.¹⁴

As a direct challenge to the sultan, in 1820 Muhammed Ali dared to expand his authority towards Sudan. His main objective was to obtain as many slaves as possible to form a modern and disciplined army, *Nizam al-Jedid*. He also needed more Sudanese for agricultural and industrial enterprises in Egypt and for sale in the slave markets. One of the objectives of Muhammed Ali from his Sudan campaign was to obtain minerals, especially gold, to fund his expensive domestic and foreign adventures. After facing a fierce resistance, he eventually conquered Sudan in 1821.

In 1821, a widespread revolt had broken out among the Greeks and Moreans. The revolt spread to the Aegean islands and European powers pressed the sultan to grant the Greeks their independence. The sultan rejected the European Powers'

¹³ Fahmy, *op. cit.*, p.143, see also Kutluoğlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65.

¹⁴ Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim, 'The Egyptian Empire', *The Cambridge history of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century* ed. by M. W. Daly vol. 2, p. 200.

intervention and determined to suppress the revolt. The sultan ordered Muhammed Ali to send troops to assist him in subduing the revolt. Muhammed Ali was weary of the cost that transporting the troops would involve. However, he sent 17.000 trained and disciplined troops with food and equipment. The force was headed by his son, Ibrahim Pasha whose efforts climaxed in June 1827 with the conquest of Athens. At this time, he reported his anxiety about the presence of a combined French-British-Russian fleet against an Egyptian-Ottoman fleet located in Navarino Bay. On 20th October, 1827 the entire Ottoman and Egyptian navies were burnt and sunk in Navarino Bay. According to Ibrahim and his father, this disaster was the result of the refusal of the Sublime Porte to accept European mediation over Greek independence. As a reward for his considerable efforts in subduing the revolt, the sultan gave Muhammed Ali the island of Crete to govern, but he found the prize unsatisfactory.¹⁵

The Greek campaign made it obvious to Muhammed Ali that although his troops were well-trained and reliable, they had serious deficiencies compared to more modern armies. A cavalry school was opened at Giza and to complement it a veterinary school and hospital were opened at Rosetta. The most impressive new institutions were the arsenal of Alexandria and the new medical school at Abu Za'bal near Cairo. Following the destruction of his fleet at Navarino Bay, Muhammed Ali was determined to have a new fleet. For this, he did not have to buy ships from foreigners; he would construct his own fleet. Numerous factories were built to supply essential war products. By abolishing the *iltizam* (a form of taxation) in the early

¹⁵ Fahmy, *op. cit.*, pp 157-160.

years of his reign and expanding monopolies, he was able to increase his revenues and use them to invest, especially for military purposes.¹⁶

After completing his military preparations, Muhammed Ali was ready for the final confrontation with the sultan. He began a power struggle against his ruler in Istanbul and administered the land which he took under his control without the intervention of the Ottoman sultan. Indeed, in all parts of the empire, it was regarded that if a governor paid the taxes regularly and there was no security deficiency, of course there was no need for intervention.

Throughout the Greek war in 1821, Muhammed Ali had asked for Syria as compensation for his costly efforts in helping the sultan. He finally decided to go ahead an attack Syria. The Ottoman forces were not comparable with Ibrahim's new army. Ibrahim captured Tarsus and Adana in southern Anatolia. The Ottoman and Egyptian armies met on the plain of Konya. Ibrahim defeated the Ottoman army under the command of the grand-vizier and had the opportunity to attack the capital, Istanbul. He marched until Kütahya where he stopped and waited for his father's permission. However, his father took into account the inevitable European intervention and prevented his son advancing any further. According to the peace treaty of Kütahya, the sultan's earlier declaration of Muhammed Ali as a rebel was canceled and he granted him the governorate of Hijaz and Crete. Ibrahim was given the governorship of Syria, Tripoli and Aleppo. Ibrahim was also appointed as tax-collector of the province of Adana, and Muhammed Ali pasha would continue to pay his annual tribute to Istanbul.¹⁷ On 24th June, 1839 at Nezib, Ibrahim once again

¹⁶ Fahmy, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-162.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp 165-168.

confronted and defeated the Ottoman army. Before the news of the defeat reached Istanbul, the sultan, Mahmud II, died. The Ottomans had consecutively lost their army, navy and sultan. Muhammed Ali emerged as the most powerful man in the empire.

On the other hand, the Europeans were directly interfering in the struggle between Muhammed Ali and the sultan. His efforts against the sultan were ceased by British intervention at a conference in London in July 1840. Muhammed Ali's son, Ibrahim, was forced to withdraw his army to Egypt. On 1st June, 1841, the sultan issued an edict that granted Muhammed Ali the governorship of Egypt for life. His male descendants were also granted the right to govern Egypt after him. In spite of the fact that he was the winner in the battlefield, he was the loser in the international arena. The Treaty of London in 1841 was the end of Muhammed Ali's career and dreams for independence. The new state order established by Muhammed Ali was ceased by the Great Powers rather than the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

c-) Muhammed Ali Pasha's Successors (1848-1863)

Due to mental weakness, Muhammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ibrahim Pasha in July, 1848. The reign was short with Ibrahim dying before his father in November 1848. Abbas Hilmi, grandson of Muhammed Ali and the son of Tosun Pasha became the new governor of Egypt. The political history of Egypt between 1848 and 1863 is insignificant period of a dynastic state. For the reign of Abbas, there is little to be mentioned. Abbas had no intention to resume the reform program of Muhammed Ali. He was suspicious not only of Europeans but also of his grandfather's servants. Despite his antagonism towards others and his opposition to

new developments, Abbas authorized the construction of Egypt's first railway between Cairo and Alexandria. The project was supported by the British who needed the line to communicate with India. It is worthy of note that the railway was the first example of its kind throughout the Ottoman Empire. Charles Issawi also gives unusual information that Egypt had her own railway lines before Sweden or Japan.¹⁸ Its chief reason was, of course, Britain's desire to develop her communication routes with India. However, the cost of financing the railway project, coupled with the need to send money and troops to support the Ottomans in the Crimean War, put Abbas in a difficult position. When he died in 1854 (according to the rumors he was killed by his own servants), he left no remarkable fingerprint on Egyptian history.

He was succeeded by the fourth son of Muhammed Ali, Said Pasha. During Said's reign (1854 – 1863) the penetration of the European powers into Egypt became more obvious. Educated in Paris, he, unlike his predecessor, admired Europe. He intended to continue the works begun during the period of Muhammed Ali in the fields of agriculture, education and commerce. In November 1854 he granted a concession to a Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps, to start digging the Suez Canal. He abolished the monopoly system that was set up to control the economy by his father, Muhammed Ali. The monopoly system was disadvantageous for European traders because Muhammed Ali had forced the peasants to sell the productions directly to him at a fixed price and he could re-sell at higher prices to Europeans.¹⁹ Said limited to the duration of military service to only one year. He extended the railroads and

¹⁸ Charles Issawi, 'Middle East Economic Development 1815-1914: The General and the Specific', *The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, p. 401

¹⁹ William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 69.

telegraph lines. Egypt took her first loan from Europe under his administration. When he died in 1863 he left a public debt of 3,000,000 pounds.

As known, after the declaration of the *Tanzimat* Edict in 1839 (imperial edict of reorganization) by the Ottoman State, it was accepted to implement the *firman* (decree) in all parts of the empire including Egypt. However, in Egypt it was not implemented as quickly as it was in the other provinces. The *Tanzimat* was applied in Egypt in 1855 (*qanun name al-sultani* consists of *hatt-ı serif* of *Gülhane* and some additional parts by Said after some long negotiations),²⁰ *Tanzimat* institutions began to be introduced under similar titles: for instance, *Meclis al Ahkam al Misriye* was founded instead of *Meclis al Ahkam-ı Adliye* (Council of Courtial Principles); the *divan of Vali* (governor) of Egypt instead of the *müşir* (highest military rank) and so on. Some points were different from the Ottoman code in which if a farmer concealed his revenue or crop, he was punished with double payment but in the Egyptian version of the penal code he was to be punished with imprisonment. It showed that agricultural punishments were more seriously considered among Egyptians than the Ottomans.²¹

After Muhammed Ali's great struggle with the Ottoman army, international powers mediated the relationship between the two. Even though Muhammed Ali's army had displayed an excellence against the sultan's, the European powers did not approve of the superiority of a governor over his sultan. This threat had been expelled in favor of the latter with some privileges conceded in favor of the former. The governorate of Egypt had been given to the eldest prince of Muhammed Ali's

²⁰ Gabriel Baer, 'Tanzimat in Egypt- The Penal Code', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1963, p. 38

²¹ Baer, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

dynasty unlike the other provinces of the Empire. The expansion of authority was one of the main objectives of Muhammed Ali's successors.

The Ottoman central administration demanded that the Ottoman penal code (1851) be applied in Egypt just as it was in the other provinces of the Empire. In accordance with this issue, death sentences were now to be approved by the sultan. The law prevented the execution of murderers without the approval of the sultan. The sultan's main purpose for this limitation was to weaken and destroy the effectiveness of the viceroy's administration and to make the control of Egyptian affairs easier.

In return for the construction of railway from Alexandria to Cairo which was to provide communication and transport facilities to India, British support came to be important for the mediation of the relationship between the sultan and the viceroy (in October 1851 Abbas was given the authority of railway construction). Abbas fought to re-gain the right to execute death sentences without imperial confirmation, because he thought that this was an important constraint on his authority in Egypt. Thanks to British help, he received the fruits of his struggle and re-established his authority in legal affairs. However, the right to execute death penalties without the sultan's consent was granted with a restriction period of seven years.²²

²² F. Robert Hunter, 'Egypt under the successors of Muhammed Ali', *The Cambridge history of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century* ed. by M. W. Daly vol. 2, p. 184. See also P. M. Holt, *Egypt and Fertile Crescent 1516-1922* (London: Longmans, 1966) p. 185, and also Baer, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39

CHAPTER 1

ISMAIL PASHA'S GOVERNORSHIP: THE FIRST PHASE, 1863 -1875

Ismail's governorship has two main parts; the first covers the period showing Ismail's efforts to become a prominent actor on the world stage, marked by the inauguration of the Suez Canal, and the second includes the emergence of foreign influence over Egyptian internal affairs because of Ismail's personal mistakes.

In this chapter, I will explain the early years of Ismail Pasha's governorship as an extraordinary ruler exemplified through his modernization efforts. His succession and his personality will be given prior to information about the penal code, the primogeniture law and relations with the Ottoman sultan. I will focus on Ismail's quasi-autonomous administration here. Education, public works, and intellectual life in Egypt in the related period will be mentioned, followed by agricultural developments, the cotton boom relevant to the American Civil War, the constitutional regime and the Suez Canal.

With the desire to transform Egypt into a European-style country, Ismail focused on obtaining greater independence from Ottoman central administration, continuing to apply his grandfather's modernization efforts and conquering lands in Africa to create an Egyptian Empire. He exhibited his objective to make his country a part of Europe with these words: 'My country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe'.²³

In the nineteenth century, Egypt had two dominant figures: Muhammed Ali and Ismail. The reign of Muhammed Ali was denoted by the steps for freedom,

²³ P. J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Publication, 1985), p. 73.

independence and superiority against his suzerain, whereas the reign of Ismail Pasha was remarkable due to the extent of European economic and political penetration which ended with the international control over Egyptian finance and politics. The first phase of Ismail's career as a governor signifies the laying of the groundwork for the conditions which finally gave birth to the European Powers' control over Egyptian affairs.

1.1. His Succession

Ismail was the second son of Ibrahim Pasha and, until the year of 1858, was not the heir apparent. The succession of Ismail to the governorship was due to an accident. It was a complete surprise for him to become the viceroy of Egypt. Ahmet, the eldest son of Ibrahim, was older than Ismail, and in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, he had the priority to be the viceroy of Egypt. However, an extraordinary event changed the plans. In 1858 Said Pasha arranged a celebration party at Alexandria. He sent invitations to all family members. All the family members went to the party except Ismail who was ill. On their way back to Cairo, there was an accident at a drawbridge midway between Alexandria and Cairo; the British engineer saw the danger too late to avoid it. Only Prince Halim was able to save his life in the accident while Ahmet, the real candidate for the viceroyalty after Said, died with his companions.²⁴ On his accession, besides his own properties, Ismail confiscated the properties of his brothers and cousins in his own favor.

²⁴ Edwin de Leon, *Khedive's Egypt*, (New York: 1877), pp. 154-157. See also Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, *A Short History of Modern Egypt*, (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.67, and John Marlowe, *A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1953*, (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 84

1.2. His Personality



Ismail Pasha was born in 1830 and died when he was 65. 18th January, 1863 was the date when Ismail acceded to the viceroyalty. His concept of government was the same as that of Louis XIV and can be summarized with the statement, 'I am the State'.²⁵ He had adequate intelligence to exploit all opportunities in order to realize his own interests. As Holt expressed, Ismail was an extravagant megalomaniac.²⁶ He was excessively fond of pleasure. He spent money which did not actually belong to him on his own pleasure in the construction of palaces and on royal entertainment. As regard to his physical appearance;

He was a man under the middle height but heavily and well-built with broad shoulders. His face was round, covered by a dark brown beard and

²⁵ Edward Dickey, *The Story of the Khedivate*, (Rivingtons: London, 1902), pp. 47-55.

²⁶ Holt, *op.cit.*, p. 293

short moustache of the same color. His complexion was dark and his eyes were half-closed. His face was usually expressionless and his voice was very typical.²⁷

He spoke succinctly and honestly. He used a diplomatic turn of expression. He had the ability to convince even the most angered objector. The most talented diplomatists and statesmen were insufficient before him and could not resist against his demands.²⁸

Ismail's three passions were stated by Vatikiotis as 'passions for real estate, ambitious for public works projects and the more visible accoutrements of sovereignty'.²⁹

Ismail was keen on talking about his European travel experiences in French.³⁰ Since he had lived for some time in France, he could speak French fluently. He was a prince who adapted easily to a western style of life. He had been educated in France and had graduated from the French Staff College. During his uncle's reign and his predecessor Said Pasha, he had lived abroad, traveling on missions to the Papacy, to the Sultan and to Napoleon III. He was a steadfast friend and admirer of the French Emperor. He even sent a detachment consisting of 1200 Nubian troops for the French expedition against Mexico in 1863.³¹

Ismail held the right and power to arrange and to control the properties and the lives of his subjects. He viewed everyone in the country as his own property. Freedom of thought was not allowed. He was the largest land-owner in Egypt and he

²⁷ Leon, *op.cit.*, pp. 164-165.

²⁸ Arthur E. P. Brome Weigall, *History of Events in Egypt between 1798-1914*, (William Blackwood and Sons: Edinburg and London, 1915), pp. 79-84

²⁹ Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 86

³⁰ Leon, *op. cit.*, p. 158

³¹ Czeslaw Jesman, 'Egyptian Invasion of Ethiopia', *African Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 230. (Jan., 1959), pp. 77, see also Weigall, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

was the unique sugar manufacturer. Under Ismail, Egypt became a paradise for people who had money to lend at excessive.³² He was impressed by Baron Haussmann's (famous for his rebuilding of Paris in the 19th century) efforts in Paris under Napoleon III and carried out the same changes in Cairo, most likely with the intention of extending his power and glorifying his personal pride.

As to comments about his personality there were two different views. The first is that he was one of the greatest rulers that Egypt had ever seen in her history with his fondness of independence, as a merchant prince, and as an entrepreneur. The other view, mainly supported by British administrators, was of Ismail as the despotic ruler of Egypt.

1.3. Penal Code in the Reign of Ismail

After his appointment, Ismail decided to apply *al-qanun al-humayun* in all parts of Egypt. When he returned to Egypt after his visit to the sultan in Istanbul, he took a copy of *Düstur*, the Turkish collection of laws. On 5th July, 1863, he gave an order that the new code would be applied from now on and the previous one, the *Tanzimat* code, would be abolished. But with the declaration dated on 15th September, 1863, a new order came out that some articles specific to Egypt would remain intact and would be published together with the new *Düstur*. In 1875, the new Egyptian penal code appeared and it was basically dependent on the Ottoman Code of 1858. The greater part of the code was identical to the Ottoman code but there were some significant differences. For instance; in the Ottoman Empire (except Egypt) the death sentence must be approved by the sultan before execution but in the Egyptian

³² Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol.1, (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916), p. 56-60

version, it was expressed that the death penalty should be sent to the viceroy for the final decision. It shows the success of Ismail's effort to gain a privileged position in the empire when compared with his counterparts.

1.4. The Law of Succession and Relations with the Ottoman Sultan

In order to obtain greater independence, Ismail had to do something to change the Imperial Decrees of 1840 and 1841. The great change in the law of succession came out shortly after Ismail's ascendance to governorship. While his grandfather Muhammed Ali Pasha preferred a position based on military power against the Ottoman sultan, Ismail's method was economical. He went to Istanbul with lots of gifts to flatter his sultan. In 1863 Abdulaziz himself visited Egypt, the first sultan to visit since the conquest of Egypt by Selim I in 1517. The personal contact between Ismail and the sultan had started in the 1850's when Ismail had been appointed to judicial offices in Istanbul. Their mutual affection encouraged the viceroy to acquire new privileges. In 1866 and 1867, two Ottoman imperial decrees expanded the rights of the viceroy and gave him the right to make appointments for different bureaucratic positions and to increase the number of soldiers in the Egyptian army. The most significant change in the law of succession was, of course, the introduction of the primogeniture principle in favor of Ismail's own line, not among all Muhammed Ali's dynasty. Before this change, the succession to the governorate was the right of the eldest member of Muhammed Ali's dynasty. He also gained the right to borrow new loans whenever he needed no matter how big the interests were to be paid and no matter what kind of problems Egypt might encounter in the near future. As long as the viceroy paid the annual taxation to the empire and, if he was able to increase

the money double, there would not be a crisis among the sides. One of the rights that Ismail obtained in these *firman*s was the official use of the title *khedive*, which means *al-Aziz*/king in Persian language. It had been used unofficially from the time of Muhammed Ali. At first, Ismail had demanded use of the title of *al-Aziz al- Misriyye* (the King of Egypt) but it was not accepted by the Sublime Porte because this title was reminiscent of Prophet Joseph and it could give Ismail extra superiority over the sultan himself.³³ Obviously, Ismail's main purpose was, not only to declare his superiority over other governors of the empire and obtain a status above other governors, but also to increase his position in the eyes of the emperors of the world and his own ruler. The meaningfulness of the title of khedive is made clearer when we think who the Ottoman sultan was at that time: Sultan Abdulaziz, the slave of God - *al-Aziz*. Shortly, we can say that obtaining all these rights required the payment of lots of money and sending his troops to suppress the revolt in Crete in the name of the sultan.³⁴ It is also interesting to note that Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, (Minister of Education in 1862, the Minister of Economy in 1864 and the president of treasury council in 1865 in central administration), was the brother and heir of the khedive Ismail until the *firman* of 1866. He was dismissed from his post in February 1866 and was forced to leave the country in April before Ismail was able to change the primogeniture law in May 1866.³⁵ As we understand, Mustafa Fazıl had been appointed to the important posts by the Sublime Porte. When we think that Mustafa Fazıl would be the khedive of Egypt in normal procedure before 1866, it is really

³³ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. VII, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1995), p. 43

³⁴ Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 193. see also Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 196

³⁵ Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 37-40, see also Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 75. See also, JC. B. Richmond, *Egypt 1798-1952 Her advance towards a modern identity*, (Mathuen & CO. Ltd, 1977), p.75.

doubtful if Ismail played a role in the dismissal of Mustafa Fazıl by using his usual method of bribery. Even though Mustafa Fazıl had re-established his relationship with the sultan during the latter's visit to Paris in 1867, it was not possible for Fazıl Pasha to get an opportunity for the khedivate. Ismail had made some really serious mistakes in 1869 and caused the resentment of the Sublime Porte; Ismail had personally invited to the kings and princesses of European countries to the inauguration ceremony of the Suez Canal without the consent of the Ottoman sultan. He behaved as if he was an independent king of a free country. It caused the resentment of the sultan and the Sublime Porte. A new opportunity to be the khedive for Mustafa Fazıl Pasha and the abolition of the firman of 1866/67 appeared on the table, but never came about due to Ismail's close relationship with the sultan's circles.³⁶

The right to confirm death sentences was used as a power struggle between the sultan and the khedive. Similarly, the appointment of the *qadi* (judge) of Cairo was regarded as another sign of power. During the first half of the 19th century, the *qadi* of Cairo was appointed by edict of the sultan. The tenure of *qadi* was limited for a period of one year. It was a prestigious duty as he performed the appointments of other *qadis* of the country with the exception of *qadi* of Alexandria, whose appointment was the responsibility of the previous holder of the post. During the warfare between Muhammed Ali and the sultan in the 1830's, the sultan could not preserve his right to appoint the *qadi* of Cairo. The first change in this system of appointment came during the governorship of Said (1854-1863). He obtained the right to appoint the *qadi* of Alexandria for a period of three years with a certain

³⁶ Mardin, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-66.

salary. Shortly after this development, he obtained the privilege of appointing the other *qadis* of the country except the *qadi* of Cairo, whose appointment would be carried out by the issue of the sultan for the next two decades. At the beginning of the 1870's, Ismail gained the right to appoint a *naib* (judge-substitute) for Cairo instead of a *qadi*. The *naibs* would be selected by the khedive himself and appointed by the Sublime Porte. The salary of the *qadi* of Cairo would be paid by the khedive and the *qadi* would remain in Istanbul. In 1876, the khedive appointed Abd al-Rahman Nafidh as *qadi* of Cairo (not *naib*) for a period of five years.³⁷ All these efforts to appoint the *qadi* of Cairo were the part of power struggle between the governor and the Sultan.

Ismail always considered the sultan as his major rival. It was for this reason that he arranged a voyage to Europe in the summer of 1869 and personally gave special invitations to the royalty of European countries for the opening ceremony of the Suez Canal without the permission and approval of the Sultan. He always wished to be seen as an independent ruler; that is why he didn't seek the permission of his sovereign. However, it caused the resentment of the sultan. Grand vizier Ali Pasha sent letters to the relevant states to complain about their treatment towards the sultan's suzerain and, with the imperial decree of 1869, to the khedive himself. The sultan demanded a decrease in the number of the khedive's troops and war-ships. The most important demand was about the restrictions on financial matters: the khedive would not contract any new loans without the sultan's consent.³⁸ Ismail, who had to mend the relations with the sultan, planned a visit to Istanbul with his

³⁷ Baer, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-49.

³⁸ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.76.

financial adviser Ismail Sıddık, the mufettish, and his foreign minister Nubar Pasha. By presenting the sultan with lavish gifts, good relations were restored and he was granted all his previous privileges in a *firman* dated 8th June, 1873-(12 Rebi-ul Akhir 1290).³⁹ In this *firman* it was declared that the khedivate would pass to the eldest son of the khedive. In case the khedive died without male descendent, the khedivate would pass to his younger brother, or if needed, to the elder son of his younger brother. This *firman* identified the boundless authority of the khedive to make internal legislations, and his right to grant military grades as high as colonel and civil grades as high as *bey*. Superior grades must be sent out from the Sublime Porte at his request. This *firman* empowered the khedive to create a formal agreement to borrow new loans without permission from the sultan, and to enter into commercial or political treaties with foreign powers unless such arrangements were incompatible with the political treaties of the Sublime Porte. It also authorized him to enlarge his army. However, the sultan wished to take Ismail under his control, and as a result of his jealousy, Ismail wasn't allowed to have a navy. He only had some vessels for commercial purposes, some of which were armed in order to protect the trade in the Red Sea and to prevent the slave trade. The annual tribute to Istanbul was determined at 150,000 purses of gold, equivalent to about 680,000 pounds.

1.5. Education, Public Works and Intellectual Life in Egypt

Although Muhammed Ali's reign had witnessed some progress in educational life in Egypt, it was not until the reign of Ismail that the acceleration in the field of

³⁹ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, (hereafter referred to BOA), YEE, Dosya No: 117, Gömlek No: 10. See also Appendix to see the Turkish transliteration of the document.

education in Egypt really began. There was a fifteen-year interregnum period in education between the years of 1848-1863. In Muhammed Ali's reign, only 6,000 children were receiving public education. During the first six years of the reign of Ismail Pasha the number of students had reached 60,000. Ismail's reign marked a radical change in the opening of schools for girls, the first in 1873 being founded by a wife of the khedive, Jashem Afet Hanım. Its curriculum consisted of fundamental subjects including geography, history, arithmetic, and religious knowledge, as well as practical household crafts like sewing and weaving.⁴⁰ In 1873, there were 90,000 pupils, 3,000 of which were (mostly Christian) girls. The first school for female education in the Ottoman Empire was that of the khedive. Children from the peasant classes were allowed to attend public schools. In 1862, Said had allocated 6,000 pounds for public education whereas Khedive Ismail spent 80,000 pounds for the same purpose. It is calculated that the number of children who were old enough to attend school was approximately 350,000. Only 23 percent of this potential number was receiving education. It can be regarded that it was too low for the development of a country but it was two and a half fold greater when compared with the imperial center, Istanbul. Only 10 percent of school-boys in the Ottoman Empire were attending schools during the same period.⁴¹

Ismail reconstituted the Council of Schools which later turned into the Ministry of Education. During the ministry of Ali Mubarak, the law of 1868, which established the state system of education in Egypt, was passed. Furthermore, Ismail established new schools for the training of his army. In this school, personnel and officials were

⁴⁰ Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-105

⁴¹ Leon, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-163

trained in modern military techniques and served the Egyptians with Ismail's foreign commanders. Ismail entrusted two intellectuals, Ali Mubarak Pasha and Ibrahim Ethem Pasha, in the field of education. Under their instructions, primary and secondary schools became widespread around the country. To train teachers for these schools, Ismail founded *Dar al-Ulum* in 1872. Ismail re-opened the School of Languages in 1868, founded in 1835 by Muhammed Ali for the purpose of translating and preparing Arabic coursebooks for state schools⁴², and closed by Abbas in 1850. He opened specialist schools for professional occupations such as lawyers, administrators, technicians, and engineers. The Europeans' population in Egypt was rapidly increasing especially in the 1860's and 70's. This was accompanied by the opening of large numbers of religious schools. At that time, there were approximately 80,000 foreigners in Egypt including 35,000 Greeks, 17,000 Frenchmen and 19,000 Italians.⁴³

The *Jamiyyat al-Maarif* (Society of Education) was formed in 1868 to spread intellectual life by the publication of Arabic Islamic classical texts. For the first time in Ismail's period, cultural activities such as opera, theatre and other related arts appeared in Egypt. Among the Syrians, Salim al-Naqqash and Yusuf Khayyat performed dramatic plays on the stage. Othman Galal, a student of Tahtawi, translated Saint Pierre's *Paul et Virginie* and the fables of La Fontaine. Another well-known person in the field of journalism and theatre was James Sanua. Of Jewish origin, he used the pen-name Shaykh Abu Naddara. He organized the first local popular theatre group in Egypt in 1869-71. His satires indicating political

⁴² Cleveland, *op.cit.*, p.67 and 92.

⁴³ Z. Y. Hershlag, *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East*, (Leiden, E. J. Brill Publications, 1980), p. 111.

tyranny in Egypt led to the dissolution of his theatre group. He also wrote against increasing foreign political control in Egypt. This time, it led to his exile to Paris where he published many anti-khedival publications.

At the opening of the Suez Canal, an Opera House was built. *Rigoletto* was performed in the opera in 1869. Verdi's *Aida*, planned to be performed at the inauguration of the Suez Canal, appeared on the stage after a delay, said by Cleveland to be two years.⁴⁴ Band music in the army was encouraged and performed in the parks of the city.

Among the most prominent of the new intellectual cadre, who were educated in Europe in an educational mission and transmitted western style knowledge to Egypt, were Shaykh Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi and Ali Mubarak Pasha. While the former wrote and translated more than twenty five books in different topics, the latter's contribution was in the fields of education, public works and foundations. Tahtawi and the School of Languages had an enormous effect on the justice system. The translations of European legal codes such as the Napoleonic Code were of great importance. Tahtawi's patriotism was Egyptian not Arabic or Islamic.⁴⁵ His contribution to national feelings and modern education was remarkable. His students were also famous intellectuals: Abdullah Abu's Suud Efendi in history, Othman Galal in literature –especially the translation of the best European plays and Salih Magdi Bey in poetry and journalism.

The khedival library, now known as the Egyptian National Library, was founded in 1870.⁴⁶ The opening of the Egyptian Museum in 1863 contributed to the

⁴⁴ Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 94

⁴⁵ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.114.

⁴⁶ Holt, *op.cit.*, p. 205.

development of Egyptology and the growing consciousness among westernized Egyptians of their country's pre-Islamic past. Maybe it was at that time that the non-Islamic character of Arab nationalism, which is explained in a detailed way by Sylvia G. Haim⁴⁷, established its foundations. Ismail founded the Geographical Society in 1875 which made many contributions to the field of geography, history and ethnography. Egypt participated in the Paris World Exhibition for the first time in 1867. The Nile Navigation Company, called *Mecidiye* Company, founded by Said Pasha, was re-organized under the name of *Aziziye al-Misriyye* and renamed as Khedival Company by Ismail Pasha.

The Bank of Egypt, founded by Sinadino and Jules Pastre in 1856, became the Anglo-Egyptian Bank in 1864. The Ottoman Bank was founded in Egypt in 1867 and Credit Lyonnais in 1875. The Commercial and Trading Company, the major activity of which was to give loans at very high interest to Egyptian peasants, was founded in 1863 with the sponsorship of Dervieu and Oppenheim. When the economy declined in the years following the end of the cotton boom in 1865, the Egyptian Treasury took over the debts.⁴⁸

The first Arabic newspaper was the official Egyptian newspaper *al-Waqai al-Misriyya* which began to appear with Muhammed Ali's orders in 1828. It did not become a daily until the reign of Ismail. *Le Moniteur*, which was published in French to defend Muhammed Ali's policies in 1832-1834, was revived by Ismail in 1874.⁴⁹ An important period in the development of the Egyptian press was reached towards the end of Ismail's reign when journalists of Lebanese and Syrian origin, escaping

⁴⁷ Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism, an Anthology*, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962).

⁴⁸ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

from Ottoman autocracy, found greater freedom of expression under the khedive's reign.⁵⁰

Hasan al-Attar's *Al-Rasail*, a collection of essays on many topics including different field of sciences, was first published in 1866. Shaykh al Sharqawi's *Tuhfat al-nazirin fiman waliya misr min al-wulat wa al-salatin* was first published in Cairo in 1865. Muhammed Murtada al-Zabidi's dictionary *Taj al-arus min sharh jawahir al-qamus* was published in 1870.⁵¹

1.6. Constitutional Regime

As we see, from the beginning of the century, Egypt showed more enthusiasm in the fields of education, politics, agriculture, military, and economy than the Ottoman center. It was also Egypt which inspired the idea of a constitutional regime to the authors and politicians of the empire. There was no constitutional movement in the Ottoman Empire before the khedive's attempt. But as an idea, it was not completely new in Egypt. The Council of Napoleon and Muhammed Ali's advisory council (*Mejlis al Mashwara*) were previous examples of such a formation.

The creation of a quasi-parliamentary body, established in November 1866, strengthened the prestige and political importance of the notables. It was a remarkable constitutional development launched by Ismail. It consisted of seventy-five members, whose powers were seriously restricted by the Constitutional Law of November 1866 which gave the khedive control over the assembly. It did not have any real power to check the khedive and his policies. A comment about the goal of

⁴⁹ Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p.99

⁵⁰ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.116

⁵¹ Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93

establishing such an assembly was given in Vatikiotis' book: 'Khedive endeavored to be regarded as a constitutional monarch and avoided to be charged of absolutism'.⁵²

The incentive for establishing a constitutional order coincided with the need to raise more funds for the khedive, both by means of taxation and public debts. Ismail issued two decrees on 22nd October, 1866. The first was for a Consultative Assembly (*Majlis shura al-nuwwab*), the deputies of which would be selected for a three-year period. The second decree was for describing the internal structure of the assembly. The assembly was first held on 25th November, 1866 and held its last session in 1879.⁵³ The European ministers, who were commissioned under the presidency of Tevfik on 10th March, 1879, insisted on the abolition of the *Muqabala* Law with a khedival decree on 27th March. Abdusselim al-Muwailihi, the head of the assembly, declared that the delegates would not obey a khedive who was under the influence and pressure of foreign powers. The *Muqabala* Law was to the advantage of notables (*umdas*) and *ulema* and disadvantaged foreigners. Whether the reaction of the pro-nationalist notables was motivated from real national sentiment or to avoid the loss of advantage is difficult to answer.⁵⁴

After the abolition of the assembly, some of the delegates, who formed a secret National Society under the leadership of Sharif Pasha, refused the dissolution and continued to meet to oppose the ministers and abolition of the *Muqabala* Law.

⁵² Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-127

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.133-134

1.7. Agricultural Life

At the end of Said's reign, Egypt had become one of the most prosperous and progressive agricultural provinces in the eastern world. Between the years 1850-1882, the cultivated land in Egypt increased from 4,200,000 to 4,800,000 *feddans*. The population of Egypt was about 7,000,000 and 90 percent of it was rural.⁵⁵ The great part of the growth came under the reign of Khedive Ismail as a result of the construction of a fresh-water canal between the Nile and Ismailia. The agricultural population increased approximately two fold from 1846 to 1882, as did the crop yield.⁵⁶ The annual import increased from 2,000,000 to 5,500,000 pounds and export from 4,500,000 to 15,000,000 pounds.⁵⁷ The Muslim population worked in agriculture whereas Jews and Armenians were money-lenders and the Greek were village shop-keepers. The balance in the society between the native and foreigners was in favor of the latter as a result of the capitulations and consular protection of the foreign consuls.⁵⁸

When Ismail came into power, he was a wealthy land owner, managing his large estates in Upper Egypt with the most modern methods. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt described the situation as follows: 'He was praised by nearly all European travelers for the machinery he had introduced and the expenditure he had turned to profit'.⁵⁹ By way of confiscation he was able to get a fifth of the whole area of cultivable land

⁵⁵ G. N. Sanderson, 'The Nile Basin and Eastern Horn 1870-1908', *The Cambridge History of Africa*, ed. By Roland Oliver and G. N. Sanderson, vol. 6, p. 592.

⁵⁶ Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800-1914*, (London: I. B Tauris, 1981), p. 135.

⁵⁷ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

⁵⁸ Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁵⁹ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1922), p. 12.

of Egypt. Ismail and his family had 900,000 *feddans* of land called *Daira Saniya* and *Daira Khassa*.⁶⁰

At the time of Ismail, the Law of *Muqabala*, (introduced on 30th August, 1871, due to his need to finance his limitless desires) required peasants to pay six years advance payment to gain the rights of proprietorship and for the reduction of half of the tax. On 10th May, 1874 this became compulsory, resulting in the majority of the land coming under private ownership. The law of *Muqabala* was abolished on 7th May, 1876 for a temporary period and was re-acted on 18th November of that year until its final abolition on 17th July, 1880. It seemed that for a temporary relief in economy, half of the revenues were sacrificed.⁶¹ This measure became more advantageous to the wealthiest landowners than to the government.⁶² However, it brought 12 to 15 million pounds revenue to the treasury during the nine years from 1871 to 1880.⁶³

The land was separated into two categories in Egypt as *öşrî* and *haracî* at that time. The former demands one tenth of taxation of crops from its owners. According to the report of Commission of Inquiry, in the last quarter of the 19th century, the *öşrî* lands were 1,323,000 acres whereas the *haracî* lands were 3,487,000 acres. But the taxes gained from these different lands were not comparable to their size. In 1877, the amount of tax collected from the *haracî* lands was 3,143,000 pounds whereas the

⁶⁰ Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

⁶¹ Gabriel Baer, *A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt 1800-1950*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1962) pp. 10-11.

⁶² Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.103

⁶³ Hershlag, *op. cit.*, p. 100..

tax from the *öşrî* lands were only a tenth of the former, 333,000 pounds.⁶⁴ The best lands of course belonged to the khedival family. The rest of the *öşrî* lands were in the hands of people who were wealthy and esteemed. The law of 14th March, 1899 abolished the difference between the two kinds of *öşrî* and *haracî* lands after two decades of Ismail's deposition. The property rights for the *öşrî* lands were granted by a *firman*, dated in 1858. By a decree of 10th January, 1866, the *haraciye* owners were allowed to bequeath their lands.

The *corvee* (unpaid labour) was a method to pay the tax. It was mainly used to meet the labour need for public works such as digging the canals, improvement of the irrigation system, and construction of the railways. The labourers were forced to work away from their homes. It is interesting that according to Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marst, 100,000 Egyptians died during the digging of the canal because they used only their bare hands.⁶⁵ The *corvee* was also used by the khedive and his family despite the fact that he put certain limitations at the outset of his reign.

Khedive Ismail was entitled as a merchant ruler. He was the greatest producer and exporter in Egypt at that time. He was the man who regulated the production, price and transportation, therefore it can be said that he held a monopoly over trade and agricultural life. He had the opportunity to use state facilities to his own advantage. For instance, he used the labourers for his own projects without paying them.

⁶⁴ Moritz Schanz, *Cotton in Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, (Manchester: Taylor, Garnett, Evans, & Co., Ltd., Blackfriars Street also Reddish and London), submitted to the 9th International Cotton Congress Scheveningen, June 9th to 11th, 1913. p. 38.

1.8. Cotton Boom

In 1860, the United States was providing 80 percent of Europe's cotton requirements. This dependence of the British textile industry on American cotton caused a crisis during the secession years. As far as Egyptian economic affairs in the second half of the 19th century are concerned, it should be borne in mind that the secession in America in 1860's had a great impact in realizing Ismail's dreams. Ismail's accession coincided with the abolition of slavery and the secession period in the U.S. during the civil war. Owing to the instability in the U.S., the price of Egyptian cotton increased very sharply. It was a unique opportunity for the khedive who had ambitions to be one of the most significant figures of Egyptian and world history. Perhaps, this kind of economic independence could give him the opportunity of political independence from the Sublime Porte. The lands for cotton cultivation were increased rapidly all around the country. In 1861, 596.000 *kantars* (one *kantar* =56,4kg) of cotton were exported from Egypt to European markets, whereas in 1865 the export was nearly fivefold with two and a half million *kantars*. The four-year civil war in America offered Egypt a chance to denote herself as an outstanding actor on the world economy stage.⁶⁶

Edward Mead Earle says that it is impossible to understand the British occupation 'without feeling that the resulting increase in cotton exports from the Nile Valley to Lancashire'.⁶⁷ One of the main interests of Britain in her occupation of Egypt was of course its cotton.

⁶⁵ Al-Sayyid Marst, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁶⁶ Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p.79

⁶⁷ Edward Mead Earle, 'Egyptian Cotton and American Civil War', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 41, (Dec., 1926), pp. 520-545.

Among the cotton-producing countries, Egypt held an invaluable place due to the quality of the product. With the support of khedival authority, machines for planting, irrigation, seeding, cleaning and packing were imported from England and America. The land which was cultivated with cotton was largely expanded. Egyptian cotton production grew so rapidly that cotton exports rose from 918,000 sterling in the early 1850's to 10 million in the late 1860's.⁶⁸ All other agricultural products were so limited when compared with the cotton cultivation that the country was dependent on the outside world to provide their basic needs. Egypt has not been a self-sufficient country since then. Therefore it was difficult to revert to the old situation after peace had been restored in America.

In Manchester, the Cotton Supply Association was established in 1857 by the British in order to find non-American sources of cotton. They mostly relied on Indian cotton but it was not enough to meet their demands. India's deficiency in supplying the British need for raw materials provided an opportunity for Egypt. The distance between India and Britain and the transportation cost of getting raw material from such a long distance were not preferable when compared with Egypt's geographical advantages. The quality of Egyptian cotton was very high. The weather conditions in Egypt were unique for cotton cultivation. The low cost of labour was efficient to enable growth in the area allocated to cotton plantation. Doubtless, the major reason for this growth was the rapid increase of the prices. Between the years 1860 to 1865 the production of cotton increased four or five times and the value of the Egyptian crop increased fourteen hundred percent. The proportion of cotton in the total Egyptian export grew from thirty-six percent to ninety-two percent. The average


⁶⁸ Cleveland, *op. cit.*, p. 94

price was more than four times than before the secession. It was unfortunate for Ismail that the crisis in the USA did not last long and the price of cotton fell to its old and real value.⁶⁹ In the second half of the following decade there was a sharp decrease in price. The loss was of course great but it did not at any time decrease under its previous level of 1860.⁷⁰ It was certainly because of the world-wide reputation of Egyptian cotton. In 1850, the cotton production was only 350,000 *kantars* but by 1865 it was 2,000,000 *kantars* and the price per *kantar* during the American Civil War increased fourfold.⁷¹ It shows what great contributions the secession made to Egyptian economic and cotton cultivation. However, the amount of money which was earned by means of cotton production in 1876 was greater than it was in 1865.

⁶⁹ Dicey, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-55

⁷⁰ Earle, *op. cit.*, pp. 524-535.

⁷¹ Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 203.



A map showing the importance of Suez Canal

1.9. Suez Canal / International Transit Road

Ferdinand de Lesseps's dream to realize the construction of a canal was not a new idea. Muhammed Ali had also been petitioned to concede to such a project but he knew that it would not bring Egypt any profit. During the French occupation, a survey had been conducted for a canal that connected the Red Sea with the Mediterranean. However, the French evacuation in 1801 made no substantial progress or contribution rather than leaving its roots for a future attempt in France. Twelve years after Fournel's application to Muhammed Ali in 1834 for the concession to build a canal, another Frenchman, Infantin, formed a *Societe d'Estudes pour le Canal de Suez*, of which De Lesseps was a member. However, it was not until Said's term that a concession for construction could be realized (November 1854).⁷²

An Egyptian overland route was of prominent importance to British interests as a connection with India. The transit time from London to Bombay through Egypt was 31 days, whereas it took three months to reach by sea by way of the Cape of Good Hope. For this reason, the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo and then from Cairo to the Isthmus of Suez was planned. The crisis between the viceroy and the Ottoman sultan on the construction of a railway had already been mentioned but I can shortly say that the final decision for the construction was given in July 1851.

The completion of the Cairo-Alexandria railway in 1858 helped open Egypt up to European penetration in a dramatic fashion. The trains shortened the length of a journey from the cosmopolitan port city of Alexandria to the previously more isolated capital of Cairo in the interior from four days to eight hours... From about 10,000 in 1848, the number of Europeans in Egypt grew nearly ten times by 1882.⁷³

⁷² Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

⁷³ Juan R. I. Cole, 'Of Crowds and Empires: Afro-Asian Riots and European Expansion, 1857-1882',

The first phase of the railway was completed in 1856 during the reign of Said but for the second phase there was a new project that halted the overland route, the Suez Canal Project under Ferdinand de Lesseps who was a former friend and teacher of Said. It coincided with the Crimean War in which Britain and France were the allies of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The French Emperor Napoleon III did not give direct support to de Lesseps. At first, de Lesseps carried out the project under his own efforts. In 1858, he formed the company *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez* with a capital of 200 million francs. Constructing and managing the canal was the major duty of the company. The financial situation of the company during the first years of operation was hopeless. It was only after 1875 that the company began to obtain net revenues. Until that time the main financier of the canal was the Egyptian government.⁷⁴

The Suez Canal Project was a French idea but the railway project was British, who felt under threat from the French on her way to India. Therefore, there were some diplomatic conflicts between French and British ambassadors in Istanbul before the sultan's ratification of the Suez Canal Project. British opposition to the project meant de Lesseps could not obtain a concession from the Sublime Porte. It was proposed by Henry Bulwer, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, that the sultan should purchase the French company and the required loan should be provided by

Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 31, No. 1. (Jan., 1989), pp. 110-111. Süleyman Kızıloprak also gives the number of foreigners living in Alexandria in 1798 as 8,000, whereas it was 76,000 when the British occupied Egypt in 1882. Süleyman Kızıloprak, "Mısır'da Vezirlik Payesine Sahip Nubar Paşa (1824-1899)", *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Ulusal Kongresi*, Ankara, 21-23 Nisan 2002).

⁷⁴ Bent Hansen and Khairy Tourk, 'The Profitability of the Suez Canal as a Private Enterprise, 1859-1956', *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1978), pp. 938-958.

British government, but the proposal was not accepted.⁷⁵ Ismail sent Nubar to Istanbul and Nubar persuaded the Sublime Porte to support de Lesseps' scheme. De Lesseps finally appeared victorious in this harsh diplomatic struggle.

Work began on the canal on 25th April, 1859, before the sultan's *firman* that ratified the project.⁷⁶ In 1862, 25,000 labourers were in regular employment. They completed the freshwater canal in 1863. It relieved the company from the expense of transferring water.⁷⁷ The canal did, of course, provide some advantages to the native Egyptians. One of these benefits was the opportunity of employment in canal towns. It closed the gap between Mediterranean and Sudanese ports thereby accelerating the export of Sudanese products to European bazaars.

During Ismail's reign, he withdrew 20,000 labourers from working on the canal. Digging activities took a great number of peasants from the land at a time when the country's need of agricultural labours was at its highest due to the cotton boom.⁷⁸ He also quickly understood the improbability of the terms of the concession that Said granted to de Lesseps about the forced labour and the Valley Tumulat lands. De Lesseps, who had strong relations with the influential shareholder the Empress of France, complained about the withdrawal of the workers to Napoleon III who mediated the disagreement. He came up with the financial solution that levied 1,520,000 pounds payment to the Canal Company on Ismail's back as compensation.⁷⁹ As to the Tumulat Valley lands, he had to pay 1,840,00 pounds to

⁷⁵ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁷⁶ Magali Morsy, *North Africa 1800-1900: A survey from the Nile Valley to the Atlantic*, (London, Longman, 1984), p.174

⁷⁷ Arnold Wilson, *The Suez Canal*, (London, Oxford University press, 1939), pp.31-32.

⁷⁸ R.L. Tignor, 'New Directions in Egyptian Modernisation: Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, 1863-1879, *Tarikh*, vol.2, No.3, 1968, p. 70

⁷⁹ Morsy, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175

the company because he reportedly considered the terms of concession damaging for Egyptian independence contrary to his following administrative and financial mistakes.⁸⁰

Ismail, an enthusiast of this project, managed to obtain a *firman*⁸¹ from the sultan dated on 19th March, 1866, which gave permission for cutting the canal. The project had been in the planning stages for 10 years, since 5th January, 1856. Three years after the *firman*, the canal was completed for the splendid inauguration.⁸²

The invitations for the opening ceremony were made personally by the khedive himself. Among the people who participated in the ceremony were the Grand Duke Michael of Russia, the Prince and Princess of Holland, Mr. Henry Elliott from Britain, the British ambassador of Istanbul, and the Bishop of Jerusalem. He did not invite the sultan, the presence of whom would diminish Ismail's standing to only a nominal level.⁸³ Sources on the amount of money spent on the lavish ceremony give different accounts varying from 1,000,000 pounds to 5,000,000. The most expensive furniture was brought from Paris and pictures from Paris were hung on the walls.⁸⁴

During the first four days, vessels were allowed to pass free of charge. On the sixteenth of November, a fireworks demonstration appeared in the sky of Alexandria. The next morning, all the vessels had entered to parade. The depth and the width of the canal were more than 26 and 72 feet respectively. It was 92 miles long.⁸⁵ Docking, fuel and water supplies were set up at the either edge of the canal.


⁸⁰ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁸¹ Sarkis Karakoçyan, *Külliyat-ı Kavanin*, No: 3397, C. XIII, (2 Zilkade 1282). See also appendix-1.

⁸² Holt, *op. cit.*, pp.199-201.

⁸³ M. Sloane, 'Egypt and England' in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 19. No. 3 (Sep., 1904), p.460

⁸⁴ Weigall, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104.



– A map showing the route of the Suez Canal

Arnold Wilson cited a valuable description of the ceremony:

The little harbor at Port Said was alive with the ships of many nations, bearing the most eminent representatives of art and science, commerce and industry, Sovereigns, Princes and Ambassadors. Already on November 13th, His Highness the Khedive had anchored his yacht *Mahrussa* outside Port Said to receive his guests: the Emperor of Austria, the Crown Prince of Prussia, members of other reigning families and finally Empress Eugenie on board the *Aigle*. It was a gorgeous and glittering scene at the doorway of the desert. ... in the greatest festival that Egypt had seen since the days of the Ptolemies.⁸⁵

Egypt had been taking significant revenues from the passenger traffic and the transit of British mail by river, caravan and rail. After the opening of the Suez Canal, the commercial traffic which had passed through the overland route turned to the water route. The rest houses, hotels and the Cairo-Suez railway line, which was completed in 1858, were deserted. Contrary to expectation, the revenue of the

⁸⁵ Morsy, *op. cit.*, p. 175

⁸⁶ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 39

vicerojalty decreased because the transition through the canal was free of any payment to Egypt. The Suez Canal Company collected all the fares.⁸⁷

It is certain that the accomplishment of the canal project brought Egypt onto the world scene. It was the situation that the khedive had so desired. However, for an Egyptian, the country's national security, independence and living free from the outside world were more important than Ismail's desires to be a prominent part of world affairs. Dicey explained that 'after the opening of the Canal, Egypt was a heavy loser instead of a gainer by the construction of water-route between the Red Sea and Mediterranean'.⁸⁸

The cost of the construction was calculated as more than double the estimated 200,000,000 francs: the exact cost was 453,645,000 francs. The price of the bond fell to 208 francs from 500 francs in 1871. A million net tons of shipping traffic were expected, but the real tonnage was 436,000 tons in 1870, 761,000 tons in 1871 and 1,161,000 tons in 1872. Expenses were more than revenues.⁸⁹

The heavy burden that the construction of the Suez Canal brought to Egypt was not the only reason of the bankruptcy in 1870's, but the most noteworthy one. It was true that Ismail Pasha wasted huge amounts of the country's money in order to satisfy his personal ambitions and to meet his personal expenditures. But it should be kept in mind that 90 million pounds was spent on the construction of the Suez Canal, on Sudan railway as a way of administrative centralization, on the enormous sugar factories, and on the extension of Egyptian sovereignty to the outside of Egypt's natural borders towards Africa. The Suez Canal bill ran to 16 million. Of this,

⁸⁷ Halford L. Hoskins, 'The Suez Canal and the Outlook for Egypt', in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Feb., 1944), pp. 110-119

⁸⁸ Dicey, *op. cit.*, p. 55

11,500,000 pounds was paid by the Egyptian government. Although promoters and shareholders paid only one-fourth of the total cost, they had 85 percent of the profit.⁹⁰ It was finally sold to the British government for only four million pounds as compensation, just a quarter of the real cost. 10 or 13 million pounds were spent on the 1200 miles of the new railway between the years of 1863-1875. Around 13 million pounds were spent in the digging of new canals, re-organizing the old ones, and on the construction of 9,500 miles of telegraph lines as well as the building of new bridges across the Nile.⁹¹ Lord Cromer expressed that only 16,000,000 pounds of the 91,000,000 in loans were used for useful projects for the country, the rest was spent on the extravagance of the khedive. It seems clear that it is not completely true as we understand from looking at the expenditure on public works.⁹² However, it also seems obvious that the contract price for Alexandria port and for the railways was at least twice what it should have been.⁹³

When the economic burdens could not be repaid, the khedive had to decide whether he should sell his 176,062 shares in the world market. Although the greatest constructor of the canal was the Egyptian government in financial terms, it was not the real gainer with only 15 percent of net revenue, so the outcome was inevitable. On the other hand, it would be reasonable for the British to buy the shares because de Lesseps was delaying and preventing British ships from passing through the canal. Most of the ships passing through the canal belonged to the British (about 80 percent

⁸⁹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

⁹⁰ David Fellman, *Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th century*, (Dodd, Mead & Company Inc., 1970), p. 111.

⁹¹ Owen, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129. See also Hershlag, *op. cit.*, p.104.

⁹² Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.74.

⁹³ Morsy, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

of the tonnage).⁹⁴ In 1875, 1,492 ships passed through the canal and 1061 of these had the British flag.⁹⁵ As principal users, British suffered from the high canal dues and inefficiency of the service. Maybe de Lesseps thought the British deserved this because they remained disinterested in the purchasing process of the shares. However, according to the contract that the sultan confirmed in 1866, the canal should remain open to all ships from different nations and the administration of the canal company should behave equally to all.⁹⁶

Disraeli, who was desirous to have a chance to intervene Egyptian affairs to secure communications with Far East colonies, found the opportunity to eliminate the French superiority in Egypt by means of purchasing Ismail's shares for a payment of four million pounds, which only gave Ismail a year-postponement of the final bankruptcy. In this purchasing process, there were two opposite opinions: one was represented by Lord Derby, the other one by Disraeli. Disraeli's persistence to buy the shares resulted from the desire in order not to give a second chance to French entrepreneurs and to end French superiority over the canal. It was not a commercial attack but political and strategic because the economic importance of the canal was still at insignificant level due to the growth of trade with America. The Atlantic became the highway of world trade and the importance of Eastern trade reduced.⁹⁷

At first, Disraeli had no money to purchase the shares. He secured the money with the help of Baron Rothschild. It was pretended that Rothschild purchased the shares in order to deceive the House of Commons. After the assembly sanctioned the

⁹⁴ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p. 75

⁹⁵ Lowell Joseph Ragatz, *The Question of Egypt in Anglo-French Relations 1875-1904*, (Edinburgh, Fletcher Rembroke Publications), p. 17.

⁹⁶ Karakoçyan, *op. cit.*, see appendix-1, Article 13.

purchasing, the shares were resold to the British government. Despite the fact that Disraeli bought 44 percent of the total share, he only had 10 votes in the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders because of the related article (Article 51). The article said that one shareholder who had 25 shares had one vote but there was no right to have more than 10 votes, no matter how many shares he had.⁹⁸ So, Sir John Stokes proposed to divide the shares into 706 different shareholders in order to increase the British influence on the executive board of the company, but the proposal was refused.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ D. A. Farne, *East and West of Suez: The Suez Canal in History*, (Oxford, Clarendon Pres, 1969), p. 238.

⁹⁸ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁹⁹ Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp.

CHAPTER 2

THE REIGN OF ISMAIL PASHA IN THE PERIOD 1875-1879

In this part of the thesis I would like to shed light on the events of the late period of Ismail's reign. Two main concerns will be given here. First, the Egyptian invasion of Africa and the slave trade will mostly be dealt with in this section. Second, I will also take into consideration the political and economic affairs in Egypt in the aforementioned period. The Europeans' use of debts to destroy Ismail's economic and political power will be major topics of this chapter. Cave, Joubert-Goschen Missions, Public Debt Administration, Dual Control, the international cabinet and the deposition of Khedive Ismail will be covered.


2.1. The Slave Trade and Expansion in Africa

2.1.1. Slave Trade

It is impossible to consider the Egyptian efforts of expansion in Africa without considering the slave trade. The slave trade was a major activity in both Ethiopia and Sudan during the second half of the 19th century. Attempts were made by the rulers of Ethiopia and Sudan to suppress the slave trade without abolishing slavery. In Egyptian Sudan, the khedive's reign relied on British support. For the British government, the struggle against the slave trade should be undertaken by the khedive in return for the continuation of Egyptian sovereignty in Africa. A measure taken by the khedive to prevent the slave trade was the establishment of a river police unit, which was supplied with four steamships and six sailing ships. After the first

achievements, the khedive's good will was terminated by the existence of powerful and wealthy merchants, and the absence of honest and highly-paid officials.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ P. M Holt and M. W. Dally, *A history of Sudan from the coming of Islam to the Present Day*, (London, Longman, 1988), p. 75.



Mısır Sudan Haritası
(Collins 1967)

During one of the visits of the khedive to Europe, he was invited to the deputation of the Anti-Slavery Societies of Britain and France. In this conference, he was accompanied by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nubar Pasha as his interpreter. In his address, he expressed his pleasure at being a participant at the conference and said he was discontent about the steps that had been taken to halt the slave trade until that time. Nubar reported Ismail's words as following:

The Egyptian authorities could not do anything under these circumstances, as they were prevented from the right of search. If he were free to act against European slave-traders, the slave-trade would soon disappear. The European Powers should give him the necessary authority to exercise the right of search as regards boats sailing under European colors.¹⁰¹

The rulers of Egypt and Ethiopia owned large number of slaves. In Ethiopia, the king was estimated to be the biggest slave owner. In Egypt, Ismail's family had 2,000 or 3,000 slaves in his various palaces as well as thousands of slaves working in his agricultural lands.¹⁰² Several factors contributed to the growth of the slave trade in Africa. These factors were both political and economic. The recruitment of black slaves for armies in both the Egyptian and Ottoman's armies, the need for labours in the construction of overland and sea routes, especially in the Suez Canal Project, can be given as examples of these factors. The rulers themselves were in the business of the slave trade. In Egypt, the khedive was the most prominent purchaser. He was in connection with the most powerful slave trader. In Bahr al-Ghazal, he recognized

¹⁰¹ Leon, *op.cit.*, p. 168

¹⁰² Alice Moore-Harell, 'Economic and Political Aspects of the Slave Trade in Ethiopia and Sudan in the Second Half of the 19th century', *The International Journal of Historical Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2/3 (1999), pp. 407-409

Abu Bakr as the most powerful slave trader of the region and gave him a sub-governorate in the region in order to take control of the area in 1873.¹⁰³

As I mentioned above, there was strong pressure on the khedive to suppress the slave trade and to give it priority unlike other rulers in the region such as Emperor Yohannes (1872-1889). In 1856 Said had issued a decree forbidding the slave trade. Khedive Ismail continued to carry out some more serious measures when compared with Said's. He was well aware that nothing could be done without the annexation of the lands which were abundant for the slave trade. He also took a further measure with his appointments of foreigners to suppress the slave trade. But all these efforts brought no success. Under pressure from the British government and the British Anti-Slavery Society, in August 1877 some new steps were taken; a new agreement was signed. This convention was published in Egypt and Sudan in three languages: Arabic, English, and French. People who were involved in slave trading would be punished with the death penalty according to the treaty. The responsibility of executing this convention was given to Charles Gordon who was appointed governor-general of Sudan by Khedive Ismail in February 1877. He had previously been appointed for the Equator region in 1873-76. Gordon's most significant deficiency was that he did not have talented and trustworthy administrators and officers because they accepted bribes in return for ignoring what was going on. In 1878, his authority was efficiently set up. Gordon started a fight against the slave trade. He suppressed a revolt of slave traders led by Süleyman al-Zubayr a year after it broke out.

¹⁰³ Moore-Harell, *op.cit.*, pp. 410-413.

The Egyptian government played an active role in the Red Sea in the suppression of the slave trade due to the fact that the khedive wished to reinforce his authority in the area. Ismail also required British support in spreading his domination outside Egypt and in internal affairs especially in the field of the economy. On the Somali coast, no remarkable measures were taken to struggle against the slave trade. Gordon's authority was very limited in that region and the local governors were against his hopeless struggles. For instance, Abu Bakr, the governor of Zaila continued his slave trade without any fear.¹⁰⁴

2.1.2. Sudan

The African adventure of Egypt began in the reign of Muhammed Ali with the invasion of Nubia in 1820. His two successors (Abbas and Said) were not interested in following their predecessor's dream and expansionist policy. A major problem confronting Muhammed Ali after the conquest of Sudan in 1820-1821 was to set up a military force there. It would mean an extra heavy burden for the Egyptian treasury. The viceroy's solution was to conscript black slaves in the regular army placed in Sudan just as he recruited *fellahins* and Egyptian natives to the army, therefore he could diminish the number of Turco-Egyptian soldiers in Africa. No chief restoration of the military forces located in Sudan was carried out by the Turco-Egyptians until Ismail came to power in 1863. It was Ismail who had the same desire and passion to establish an Afro-Egyptian Empire like his grandfather. Especially after economic disaster, the khedive needed fields of expansion nearer to his authority. The apparent direction was towards Africa along the Red Sea because of the geographical

¹⁰⁴ Moore-Harell, *op.cit.*, pp. 413-420.

advantage of these areas. An Egyptian garrison had already been established at Fashoda in 1865. In 1872, Munziger Pasha, a Swiss adventurer and Egyptian governor of Massawa captured Keren, the capital of the Ethiopian province of Bogos, and turned it into an Egyptian stronghold. In July 1875, Ismail bought the port of Zeila from the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, its nominal sovereign, in return for 15,000 pounds annual tribute.¹⁰⁵

In 1864, the revolt of Sudanese soldiers stationed in Kassala erupted because of the postponement of the payment. The khedive had to take some steps to restore discipline. A major reform was to decrease the number of the black soldiers stationed in Sudan by sending some of them to Egypt and substituting them with Egyptian and northern Sudanese soldiers. The only radical change came in 1877 when governor-general Charles Gordon was appointed to Sudan and the command of the army was put under his control. This appointment was of course because of the necessity to establish good relationships with the British to get their support on the eve of financial bankruptcy. On the other hand, it was not an unusual appointment in Egyptian history. Since Muhammed Ali's reign, the viceroys had commissioned many foreigners from different nationalities in different posts. All the other military officers from foreign countries were under the command of the minister of war, whereas Gordon was granted a duty that subordinated directly to the khedive, not to the minister of war.¹⁰⁶ The military ranks remained the same and Turco-Egyptian officers and native Egyptian soldiers continued to serve under the command of Gordon.

¹⁰⁵ Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı imparatorluğunun Güney siyaseti, Habeş Eyaleti*, (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996) p. 155.

Gordon needed a strong army to overcome Sudanese rebellions and to subdue the slave trade. For this reason, Gordon would reconstitute his army, establish discipline and instruct the soldiers under his new commandership. He went to Khartoum on 5th May to suppress the revolt in Darfur. The fundamental reason for this revolt was the constant opposition of the local people to the Turco-Egyptian subjugation. The armed forces were disliked by local people because they were the representatives of the Turco-Egyptian conquest and government; its immediate stimulus was the heavy burdens levied by the authorities and the cruel behaviors of irregular soldiers while collecting taxes. The Egyptian idea of administration of a province in Africa was the same as her position against the sultan in Istanbul. The system should be self-supported and an attractive tribute to Cairo should be sent no matter how the annual tribute was collected.¹⁰⁷ At the end, the soldiers failed to suppress the rebels. Therefore, Gordon formed a new formation and went to Darfur to subdue the revolt himself. With his 3,500 soldiers, he defeated the main body of rebels. His first experience in Darfur persuaded him on the urgency of the need to make reform in the army. In connection with the reforms, he appointed Othman Rıfqi Pasha as the governor-general of the Red Sea and the commander of the army in the eastern Sudan. But a year later, Othman was dismissed due to disloyalty to Gordon. Othman Rıfqi returned to Cairo where he was controversially commissioned as the minister of war. Even though Gordon was dependent directly to the khedive in name, the new

¹⁰⁶ Alice Moore-Harell, 'The Turco-Egyptian Army in Sudan on the Eve of the Mahdiyya, 1877-80', *International Journal of the Middle East Studies*, vol. 31, No. 1. (Feb., 1999), pp. 21-23.

¹⁰⁷ Lieut. Colonel F. W. Moffitt, 'Some Despatches from Khedive Ismail to Major General Charles Gordon', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol.34, No. 135. (Apr., 1935), p. 109

minister found himself in a position to affect the directives of the khedive on military issues in Sudan.¹⁰⁸

The duties of the army were tax collection, providing the security of telegraph lines, defending borders and the main overland and sea routes, and escorting different commercial and scientific expeditions. Another important task of the army was the suppression of the slave trade which many officers and soldiers were involved in. There were four revolts during the period under discussion: in Kordofan which was led by a slave trader Sabahi with 400 followers. It was suppressed by Turco-Egyptian army after the order of his detention; at the Somali coast some of the local tribes refused to pay taxes or obey the authorities. This revolt was suppressed by a Turco-Egyptian officer Muhammed Rıdwan Pasha with the help of forces sent from Egypt; in Darfur a Sudanese officer, al-Nur Muhammed Ankara suppressed a revolt in the summer of 1879, murdering its head Harun b. Sayf al-Din; and the last and most serious insurrection was in Bahr al-Ghazal where a slave trader, Suleyman al-Zübeyr disobeyed the authorities in the summer of 1878. It finally became a power struggle between the slave trader and the government in Khartoum for sovereignty over Sudan. The task of suppressing this revolt was given to an Italian officer Romolo Gessi, who was appointed by Gordon specifically for this mission together with a Sudanese officer, Yusuf Hasan Pasha. It was finally overcome with 4,000 soldiers against a well-equipped 9,000 soldiers. All these revolts were suppressed in spite of difficulties. However, it was clearly understood that no major change had been realized in modernization and reorganization of Egyptian army in Africa when

¹⁰⁸ Moore-Harell, 'The Turco-Egyptian Army in Sudan on the Eve of the Mahdiyya, 1877-80', pp. 24-25

we compare the situation before the appointment of governor-general Gordon and after his resignation in 1880.¹⁰⁹

By the time that Ismail succeeded to the viceroyalty, the domination of the European traders on the Upper Nile was at an end. Both there and in the Bahr al-Ghazal, the ivory and slave trade was controlled by merchant-princes of Egyptian, Sudanese or Syrian origin. The idea of bringing these vast southern regions under his control appealed to Ismail. Since the suppression of the African slave trade was a dominant aim of Britain, there wouldn't be any objections from the Great Powers. The establishment of a new southern province marked the beginning of the expansion of khedival rule. In order to expand Egyptian administration throughout Equatorial Nile and to destroy the slave trade, an expedition commanded by Sir Samuel Baker was carried out, and he left a scattering garrison to represent khedival authority on the Upper Nile. Although Baker managed to establish khedival authority at Gondokor and Masindi, he could not carry out a permanent annexation. The Bahr-al-Ghazal also was nominally attached to the khedive's dominions in 1873 and Ismail appointed Sudanese merchant-prince, al-Zübeyr Mansur, as governor of the region. Zübeyr was a northern Sudanese who came to the Bahr al-Ghazal in 1856. In a ten-year period he gained a great fortune. After he had defeated a government expedition, the khedive accepted his authority in the region and recognized him as governor. As Zübeyr wanted to expand his superiority over Darfur, he prepared an expeditionary force and killed Sultan Ibrahim of Fur at the battle of Manawashi in 1874. The khedive wished to capitalize on this conquest in his own favor and

¹⁰⁹ Moore-Harell, 'The Turco-Egyptian Army in Sudan on the Eve of the Mahdiyya, 1877-80', pp. 32-33

annexed Darfur. Zubayr did not accept this betrayal and went to Egypt to protest the governor-general in Khartoum, Ismail Ayyub. The khedive did not allow him to leave Cairo and detained him as a captive¹¹⁰. 'He was too dangerous and powerful to be allowed to return'¹¹¹ and remained in Cairo until 1899 under house arrest. The immense task of organizing the territories of the Upper Nile was given to Charles Gordon, shortly after Zübeyr was imprisoned in Cairo. Gordon was appointed to govern the whole Sudan as *hükümdar*. But the task to overcome the administrative problems and to suppress slave trade required money and personnel which the khedive no longer possessed and in January 1880, shortly after Ismail's deposition, Gordon resigned.¹¹²

As to the mission of Gordon in the Lakes, a letter dated 17th September, 1875 gave some valuable information: 'the object of your mission to the Lakes was to effect the establishment of security, the suppression of slave trading and the opening of these vast countries to the trade of Europe'.¹¹³ Neither Baker nor Gordon was able to extend Egyptian domination in Equator. It should be kept in mind that the slave trade was the most valuable part of the economy of African societies. It shouldn't be forgotten that some officers and soldiers were active in the slave trade. They took bribes from traders in the caravans passing through the territories under their control. It should also be remembered that the main reason for the failure of Baker and Gordon was their unawareness about how important the slave trade was for Africa.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Ibrahim, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-212, see also Holt and Dally, *A history of Sudan from the coming of Islam to the Present Day*, p. 78

¹¹¹ P. M. Holt, 'Egypt and Nile Valley' *The Cambridge History of Africa*, vol. 5. ed. by J. D. Fage and Roland Oliver, p. 44.

¹¹² Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922*, p. 207.

¹¹³ Stanton, *op.cit.*, p. 276.

¹¹⁴ Ibrahim, *op.cit.*, pp. 213-213.

Slaves who were liberated as a result of the suppression of the slave trade, and who did not want to be sent to their homes, were transferred to Upper Egypt to work on the land. The khedive and his nephew were the largest cultivators of sugar-cane. He wished the former-slaves to be enrolled and sent to Egypt for military training and then employed on agricultural and public works.¹¹⁵

2.1.3. Ethiopia

The obtaining of Suakin and Massawa in 1865 in return for the increase of the annual tribute to the Sublime Porte opened a new door to Abyssinia for the Egyptians.¹¹⁶ In 1875, the port of Zaila and the Red Sea Coast line were given to the khedive's authority by an edict from the sultan in return for the payment of 15,000 pounds extra annual tribute. The khedive appointed a Swiss called J. A. W. Munziger as governor of Massawa and broadened his domination over the whole Red Sea and Somali coasts including Eastern Abyssinia in 1875. The obtaining of Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur stirred up the imagination of the khedive about the probability of the establishment of an African Empire free from the Sublime Porte. In 1874, a 1200-troop-force under the command of Munziger was sent to and occupied Keren.¹¹⁷

1875 was the year when the khedive's authority was clearly extended towards the whole northern Somali coastline. The khedive wanted to expand his field of influence towards East Africa and to bring the whole of Somalia under Egyptian control. Under the command of Rauf Pasha, 100,000 troops left Zeila and occupied Harrar. Ismail ordered the army to capture southern Ethiopia and the river Juba. Later

¹¹⁵ Moffitt, *op. cit.*, p. 112-113.

¹¹⁶ Orhonlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-9

on, it was planned to annex Ethiopia from the north. For this purpose he sent two expeditionary forces in 1875 and 1876.¹¹⁸

The commanders of the Egyptian army at that time were mostly foreigners who were appointed with exceptional salaries and granted higher ranks. Among them, Munziger was Swiss but he had a strong sympathy with Germany. After he carried out the task of Massawa governorate he was promoted to the rank of governor-general of the Red Sea and Kassala provinces, later called the Division of the Eastern Sudan. Colonel Chaillie Long, who was an ex-officer of Confederate army of the Southern States of America, was sent to East Africa but when he encountered the protests by the Sultan of Zanzibar who was under the protection of Great Britain, he had to return to Cairo.¹¹⁹ The khedive agreed on 5th December to retreat and Colonel Chaillie was duly dismissed. Until that time, Egyptian progress in Africa was not interrupted by British forces due to the fact that the British government preferred the control of Africa under Egypt rather than the control under a much more powerful authority. But the land of Zanzibar was the wrong address for the khedive's expansion in Africa because of British protection.¹²⁰

In October, Colonel Arendrup, a Danish officer in the khedive's service, with an Egyptian force, occupied Ginda without encountering any resistance. A month later in November 1875, an over-confident Colonel Arendrup was unprepared for an assault by the Abyssinians. The outcome was destructive for the khedive. The

¹¹⁷ Arthur E. Robinson, 'The Egyptian-Abyssinian War of 1874-1876', *Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. 26, No. 103. (Apr., 1927), p. 268

¹¹⁸ E. R. Turton, 'Kirk and the Egyptian Invasion of East Africa in 1875: A Reassessment', *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 11, No. 3. (1970), p. 358, see also. Orhonlu, *op. cit.*, p. 150

¹¹⁹ Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-271.

¹²⁰ Orhonlu, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150

Abyssinians were the victors after that unexpected attack.¹²¹ Approximately two thousand Egyptians died with Colonel Arendrup and Arakel Bey, the young nephew of Nubar Pasha, and his two six gun batteries and six rocket-stands fell to the hands of the foe. Only a small detachment under the command of Major Dennison, an American situated at Adi Quala, was able to escape and withdraw to Massawa on the coast and then to Keren.¹²²

After these unsuccessful attempts, the khedive had to restore his lost prestige by way of invading Abyssinia. An expedition under the command of Ratib Pasha and General Stone as second in command and several other American and European officers was prepared. Besides them, Prince Hassan, the son of the khedive, joined the expedition.¹²³ The new army, which was sent against the Ethiopians, sailed from Suez on 31st January, 1876. The official aim of the expedition was to defeat the Ethiopians in battle and to turn back to Massawa. But the real intention of the khedive was to occupy and administrate the country permanently. The number of soldiers in the army was 11,120, not enough to achieve such a purpose. There was no unity of command in the Egyptian army. The harmony among the staff itself was a complex affair. Apart from General Loring, there were five more Americans, a number of Turks and some Egyptians. Disagreement between Turco-Egyptian officers and American and European officers took place. Eight days later, the army was at Massawa, Colonel Kirkham, who was an officer of Abyssinian forces, and two Englishmen were detained and sent to Suez. On November 6th and 7th, the Egyptians were assaulted by the Abyssinian army with 60,000 soldiers. The result

¹²¹ Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

¹²² Jesman, 'Egyptian Invasion of Ethiopia', pp. 75.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 79.

was inevitable and disastrous.¹²⁴ The defeat of the Egyptian army by the Ethiopians marked the end of the khedive's hope to expand his rule and restore his lost prestige. Towards the end of March, Yohannes asked for peace. His offer was accepted so desirously by the Egyptians. Prince Hassan had come out of Ethiopia on the khedival yacht and proceeded to Egypt. There would, of course, be scapegoats for such a costly expedition. It was not difficult to find guilty parties for this failure in a multi-national army: foreigners. According to Chezlaw Jesman they should have been honored because some of the officers had died in the service of the khedive, No efforts, at least a certain amount of respect to their memoirs, had been shown while the survivors left the country.¹²⁵ But when we consider that they received a much higher salary than their native counterparts, the expectation of victory was understandable, and a failure would not have been tolerated.

2.1.4. Political Figures under Ismail and His Foreign Officers

In his reforms, Ismail had been supported by his native ministers. Most renowned of them are Nubar and Ismail Siddik Pasha. Nubar was popular in Europe, even more so than the khedive himself. The fact that he was a Christian-Armenian should not be disregarded in his popularity. In his long career as statesman, his most remarkable work was to establish the Mixed Courts, which soon became a tool of control for the Great Powers over the khedive.

One of the best examples of the Armenians' position in the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century was Nubar Pasha. They could be promoted to ministerial posts like

¹²⁴ Robinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-280.

¹²⁵ Jesman, 'American Officers of Khedive Ismail', p.307

Nubar Pasha, who was the prime minister of the Egyptian government. Nubar participated in the official contact between Istanbul and Europe as an advisor of Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammed Ali Pasha. During the governorship of Abbas Pasha (1848-1854), Nubar's career was halted because Abbas was not in favor of French-based politics. The Ottoman State granted the rank of vizierate to Nubar on 5th September, 1873 (12 Recep 1290). It was Nubar who was Ismail's partner in bringing the country into an economic crisis. The bribes he accepted under the name of commission/provision had amassed him a great fortune. In Ismail's term of governorate a 96 million pound debt had been gotten but only 54 million of it was really obtained.¹²⁶

After Khedive Ismail had put Nubar Pasha in a marginalized position in the eyes of the Egyptian people and the British Embassy, he gave his resignation on 5th January, 1876 and left Egypt for Europe on 21st March. After he gained the British sympathy, he tried to compromise Ismail's position. After the foundation of Public Debt Administration, and the establishment of Dual Control on 18th November, 1876, the British and French demanded the formation of a cabinet under the presidency of Nubar Pasha. On 27th August, 1878, the cabinet, of which Nubar was the president, was established. Sir Rivers Wilson was appointed Minister of the Economy minister on 26th September and Andre de Bligniers was appointed Minister of Public Works on 16th November. It was a victory of Nubar against Khedive Ismail. Despite the fact that he had to share responsibility for the failures of Ismail in the maladministration of the country, which caused the British occupation in 1882,

¹²⁶ Süleyman Kızıltoprak, "Mısır'da Vezirlik Payesine Sahip Nubar Paşa (1824-1899)", *Ermeni Araştırmaları I. Ulusal Kongresi*, Ankara, 21-23 Nisan 2002.

coupled with his unpopularity with the Egyptian people, Nubar was twice appointed as the prime minister, first in 1884 to 1888 and second in 1894 to November 1895. He subsequently resigned because he refused Evelyn Baring's pressures.¹²⁷ He began to live in Europe and died in 1899.

I also would like to mention about Ismail Siddık Pasha (the *Müfettish*). He was an Algerian but he had come to Egypt at an early age. According to John Marlowe, he was 'Ismail's chief instrument for extraction of money from his people.'¹²⁸ He started his career as the manager of one of Ismail's small estates and was gradually promoted until he became the Minister of Finance. In parallel to the economic decline, Khedive Ismail had to invite European Commissioners in order for them to inquire into his financial matters. Ismail Siddık, a nationalist at heart, always opposed the intervention of foreigners into Egyptian affairs. When the commissioners increased the pressure on Khedive Ismail, he decided to find a scapegoat in order to relieve it. Ismail Siddık, who was well-known for his antipathy towards foreigners, was the perfect man for this purpose. After the appearance of Messrs. Cave, Gochen and Joubert's proposals, Ismail Siddık Pasha hopelessly fought against them and rendered easier his removal from the post by the khedive. After his dismissal, he wanted to organize a plot against the khedive by using the religious sensitivity of the Egyptians against foreigners. To this end he opposed the khedive for selling the country to foreigners in return for the subvention of his debts. *Müfettish* Ismail Siddık was judged by the khedive's Privy Council and was sent to exile. The khedive used his power in a cruel way. Whenever he wished, he could

¹²⁷ Kızıltoprak, *op. cit.*

¹²⁸ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p.110

exile or assassinate anyone who disobeyed him. Shortly after Ismail Siddik was sent into exile, it was declared that the ex-minister died in Dongola where he had been exiled. But it was not acceptable for Egyptians to believe that *Müfettish* had died from natural causes.¹²⁹ Blunt explains the mystery in Müfettish's death as following:

It was his (Khedive's) custom with his minister (Mouffetich) to call sometimes for the old man in the afternoon at the Finance Office and take him for a drive with him to Shubra or to one or another of his palaces. No sooner were they inside than Ismail on some pretext left him alone in one of the saloons and immediately sent to him his two younger sons Husseyn and Hassan and his aide-de-camp, Mustafa Fehmi Bey. Though not without vigorous resistance, the old man was dispatched. According to Wilson, the actual doer of the deed was Mustafa Bey. I have reason, however, to believe that as far as Mustafa's personal act went this was a mistake, though the rest of the facts have been fully confirmed to me.¹³⁰

It is undeniably important for a prominent statesman on the world scene to require experienced officers and staff. To this purpose, Ismail had hired many foreign senior officers to be able to achieve his objective of expanding the borders of his country, especially in Africa. For this reason, it is useful to write about the foreign officers of the khedive, some of whom had been repelled by their own countries, and who all received inflated salaries.¹³¹

One of the foreign officers of the khedive was a Russian named General Fadeev. He had been commander in chief of the Russian army under Vannosk's ministry of war, but resigned from his post due to a disagreement with Vannosk. From 1875 Fadeev began to live in Cairo and played an active role in the Egyptian army. His

¹²⁹ Leon, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-189. See also, Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, see also F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives from Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, (University of Petesburgh Press), pp. 185-186

¹³⁰ Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 31

¹³¹ Czeslaw Jesman, 'American Officers of Khedive Ismail', *African Affairs*, Vol. 57. No. 229. (Oct., 1958), pp. 302-307

main task was to prepare the army for the expansionist campaigns. However, he refused to serve for the Egyptian army against Christian Ethiopia.

Between the years 1869 and 1878, 48 officers from the United States of America served in Egypt in different periods, 20 of whom were on duty at the same time. General W. T. Sherman undertook the mission of determining American officers for the khedive's army. The economic appeal of the service offered by the khedive was enough to persuade foreigners. The contract was valid for a five-year period and it was under the consent of the khedive to renew the contract for another five years. If they had to give up taking part in the military service because of obligatory reasons such as illness, two months' payment would be paid, but if they were dismissed, six months' salaries would be paid in advance. If they died while they were on duty, their family would be paid one-year's salary.

American officers were generally appointed to the uppermost ranks of the Egyptian army. It provoked the Egyptians' jealousy towards foreigners. It was obvious in the Ethiopian expedition that their efforts were useless in many instances. Khedive Ismail had organized a ceremony in order to indicate the brotherhood between the Egyptians and foreign officers before the Egyptian forces left Cairo. As a symbol of this brotherhood, the khedive joined the hands of Chief of Staff, General Loring and Commander Ratib Pasha. But this friendship did not last the length of the expedition.

In the naval service too, there were ex-confederate officers in charge. They were appointed as engineers in geographical and military explorations of targeted countries to expand the khedive's authority in Africa. They also performed cartographic studies, and mapped some unexplored areas in Egypt and Sudan. A

letter dated 17th September, 1875 gives the orders of the khedive to MacKillop

Pasha:

‘You are to explore the country in the direction of Lakes and have maps made of its physical features ... I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the formalities you will be carrying out are not an act of taking possession, as the Juba already belongs to us, but simply an affirmation and confirmation of my rights and possession of these territories which are part of the country of Somalis’¹³²

Making geographical and cartographic explorations was of course for military aims.

2.2. Relations with European Powers

Khedive Ismail’s great wish to be a reknowned historical figure made European intervention into Egyptian affairs inevitable. At the start of Ismail’s reign, Egypt was self-sufficient and had a national debt of just three million pounds. By the end of the khedive’s reign, with a debt of 100 million pounds, it was impossible to overcome the fiscal problems of Egypt. Of course, the khedive’s extravagance contributed to the replacement of the Egyptian government with European representatives of creditors. The extravagance of Ismail Pasha was also expressed in the Ottoman archival document (*‘Meclis-i Mahsus Vukela Mazbatası Sureti’* - A copy of the Assembly Meeting’s minutes).¹³³ In this section, I would like to mention the process of European intervention in Egypt.

2.2.1. A Short Brief on European Penetration into Egyptian Affairs

The European penetration came about in three phases as follows:

¹³² E. A. Stanton, ‘Secret Letters from the Khedive Ismail in connection with an Occupation of the East Coast of Africa’, *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 34, No. 136. (Jul., 1935), p. 272.

¹³³ BOA, Yıldız Esas Evrakı, dosya no: 121, gömlek no: 37.

a-) The European takeover began when Egypt began obtaining loans from European powers, first in Said's time. It became irreversible with the selling of the shares of the Suez Canal in 1875 to Disraeli, the British prime minister.

b-) The appointment of Mr. Goschen on behalf of Britain and M. Joubert as the representative of French creditors with an instruction to investigate the financial situation in Egypt. The establishment of the Public Debt Administration (*Duyun-u Ummumiye İdaresi*) and dual control by a decree dated 18th November, 1876.

c-) The establishment of international courts to deal with certain legal problems between Egyptians and Europeans.

The right to contract any economic and political conventions in the name of the Egyptian government unless it was not contrary to the Sublime Porte's treaties in international arena had already been granted to the khedive in the *firman* of 1873. However, it was restricted with a new *firman* in 1879, forbidding the provision of new loans without the approval of existing creditors. After that time the situation went from bad to worse. Later on, the establishment of the *Caisse de la Dette* came into existence. Herr von Kremer, Signor Baravelli, M. de Balignieres were appointed as the commissioners of the debt as representatives of Austria, Italy and France respectively. Without British representation, it began its activities on 10th June, 1876.¹³⁴ Its main objective was to protect the interests of European creditors. Its missions were described in the decree of 2nd May, 1876 as follows:

a-) To collect the fund, which is necessary for the payment of the debt

¹³⁴ Ragatz, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

b-) In case the revenues were not enough to meet the debt, the rest would be arranged by the Treasury through the intermediary of the Finance Minister with the demand of Public Debt.

c-) Disagreements between the government and *Caisse* would be tried in the Mixed Courts.

The next step was the establishment of Dual Control by the Decree of 15th December, 1878, and appointment of Controllers-General by both governments. Major Baring represented England and de Blignieres represented France. Shortly before his deposition, Ismail followed a policy of opposition to the foreign controllers and European Powers. For this reason, the last intervention was the dismissal of the khedive himself by the Sublime Porte by the demand of the European Powers.¹³⁵

2.2.2. Debts

When Ismail started his career as a viceroy, Egypt already had a three million pound debt. The experience of Said's borrowing convinced Ismail that European banks and creditors were ready to give him unlimited credit. There were lots of native and foreign creditors around him. They were eager to lend therefore it wouldn't be difficult to find new loans.¹³⁶ European creditors began to understand that they could obtain money for 3 or 4 percent at home and lend in the Near East and India for interest rate of 12 to 30 percent. Because the risks were more limited in Egypt due to the close relationship with Ismail and their judicial power in Egypt, the interest rate

could be reduced to 7 to 10 percent.¹³⁷ It is also interesting to say that the loans reflected the rivalry between Britain and France and personally between Dervieu (French) and Oppenheim (British). It had political significance rather than economic. Insufficiency of local money sources in Egypt led to the exploitation of foreign debtors, who released the borrowings at high rates of interest despite obtaining various guarantees for the credits. Similar to de Lesseps' friendship with Said, Dervieu's personal relation with the khedive affected the borrowings of Ismail during his first years. But it was too limited to meet Ismail's endless need. For this reason, Ismail mostly appealed to British bankers Goschen and Oppenheim¹³⁸

Egypt's foreign loans (1862-1873)¹³⁹

	Amount of loan	Amount received	Debtor ¹⁴⁰
1862	3,293,000	2,500,000	Fruhling & Goschen & Oppenheim & Erlanger
1864	5,704,000	4,864,000	Fruhling & Goschen & Oppenheim & Bischoffsheim & Goldsmidt
1865	3,387,000	2,750,000	Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and M. pastre of Paris and Marseilles
1866	3,000,000	2,640,000	for Egyptian State Railways
1867	2,080,000	1,700,000	Ottoman Bank, Oppenheim,
1868	11,890,000	7,193,000	Ottoman Bank, Oppenheim
1870	7,143,000	5,000,000	Bischoffsheim & Goldsmidt and Anglo-Egyptian Bank
1873	32,000,000	19,974,000	Ottoman Bank, Bischoffsheim & Goldsmidt.

Another source of money for the khedive was that which belonged to the *Vakfs* (Foundations). The director-manager of the *Beyt-ul-Mal*, which had the estates of

¹³⁵ E. W. Kemmerer, 'The fiscal System of Egypt', *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3rd Series, Vol. 1, No. 3, Essays in Colonial Finance by Members of the American Economic Association. (Aug., 1900), pp. 189-195.

¹³⁶ Dicey, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-55 see also Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

¹³⁷ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.88.

¹³⁸ Hershlag, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99

¹³⁹ Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 127, quoted from Hamza, *Public Debt*, 256-7

¹⁴⁰ Richmond, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101

orphans, granted the money to the government at ten percent interest. It was a high interest which had never been paid.¹⁴¹

The end of the cotton boom related to the end of American Civil War, and the great amount of expenditures concerning with the construction of the Suez Canal and other public works (telegraph and railway lines, postal service, schools, etc.), combined with Ismail's own his personal outlays as well as the gifts over 10 million pounds in order to obtain greater autonomy, were the chief reasons for taking loans from the Europeans. It would be incorrect to say that Ismail spent all the money that he borrowed in his extravagance. Telegraph lines reached to a distance of five thousand miles. He managed to increase the railway mileage from five hundred to eight hundred miles. He established a postal service which made him capable of revoking all foreign postal services in the country.¹⁴² 9,450,000 pounds were spent on the khedive's private estates and sugar factories.¹⁴³ A great amount of money was spent on railway construction and port development, the majority of which were on the way to Ismail's private estates.

When we add the cost of unsuccessful campaigns in Ethiopia and military expedition in Crete to the total balance sheet, it would be clear how the fiscal situation of the country deteriorated. After the purchasing of the Suez Canal shares, Britain appeared on the scene of Egyptian internal and economic affairs. But 1875 to 1879 refers to the years of unequal struggle between the borrower and the lenders. The debts were used by Britain and France as a tool to destroy Ismail's power, to take

¹⁴¹ Cromer, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁴² Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, 82-83.

¹⁴³ Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

control of the state and to guarantee only their own advantages in respect of defending the rights of creditors who were their own citizens.

2.2.3. Mixed Courts

In parallel with the growth in the population from different nations, disputes between Egyptians and Europeans increased considerably. Before the establishment of Mixed Courts, the matters between the natives and foreigners were negotiated according to the Capitulations which gave the right of immunity from the jurisdiction in Egyptian courts. Debates between foreigners of the same nationality were decided by the consul concerned but those of different nationalities were reached a decision by the consul of the defendants. When an Egyptian appealed to a foreign consul to grant permission for a consular interpreter in order to take part in the hearing, it was normally and usually refused. In these circumstances, it was not usual for foreigners to be convicted. It made the Egyptian government powerless in its relations with the foreigners. Under these circumstances, a solution was required. In fact, the origin of the mixed courts was the work of Muhammed Ali as he encouraged the migration of Europeans into Egypt. As time passed, the foreigners composed different communities in different scales. The communities needed jurisdiction as a result of living in a cosmopolitan society. It was essential not only for foreigners but also for the native people of Egypt. Nubar, a well known Christian-Armenian minister, prepared a report in 1867, in which he forcibly outlined the failures of the existing system and proposed the abolition of the Capitulations. In 1869 an international meeting was held in Cairo at which Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Austria and the

USA were represented. In Nubar's proposal, it was proposed to unify different civil and criminal cases into a single court, staffed by both Egyptian and foreign judges. The British government was ready to accept the proposal but the French and Italian authorities were anxious for the reactions of their citizens living in Egypt. A second conference was held in Istanbul despite the French opposition. The establishment of the international tribunals was accepted for trial period of five years. Before the mixed courts, the khedive and his ministers had been immune from the jurisdiction but from that time, they were all subject to the jurisdiction with their estates.¹⁴⁴

During the following years, Nubar's plan was interrupted by the opening of the Suez Canal and then the period continued 'with stage of moving in turn from Cairo to Sublime Porte, from the Porte to Paris and from Paris to London and throughout the concerned capitals of Europe'.¹⁴⁵ Under rising pressure, old forms of capitulatory protection, in which foreigners of the same nationality could resolve disagreements before their consul, or foreigners of different nationalities could come before local authorities with an interpreter, was no longer feasible. After the cessation of the negotiations, because of the Franco-Prussian War, a conclusion was finally reached with the ratifications of relevant governments. It was an institution which was established with international concern under the protection of the Great Powers.

In January, 1876, four international courts were established in Alexandria, Cairo and Mansurah and an appeals court in Alexandria. Nubar adopted the codes of French law, which were unknown not only by Egyptians, but also by many of the judges who were sent by the fourteen capitulatory signatories (including London, Paris, the

¹⁴⁴ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89.

Hague, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg, Brussels, Madrid, Lisbon, Athens, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Washington). The judges were composed of both Egyptians and Europeans. The courts would soon become a source of embarrassment to Ismail's regime.¹⁴⁶

The international tribunals carried out the jurisdiction on civil and commercial matters between Egyptians and foreigners and between foreigners of different nationalities. Later on, Nubar expanded the scope of the jurisdiction for all cases including the matters among Egyptians and the members of the government. The mixed courts, replaced with the consular jurisdiction, had an extraordinary power to sue cases against the Egyptian government.¹⁴⁷ 'If a fellah signed on a paper to borrow some money he could be sued before foreign judges according to foreign procedure and he might be deprived of his land'.¹⁴⁸

It was an institution with sixty-five judges, sixteen of whom (ten Europeans and six Egyptians) were in Court of Appeals. With fifteen hundred employees and a million pound annual expenditure, it was a heavy burden on the government's shoulders.¹⁴⁹ There were three judges, two of whom should be foreigners, in the Trial Courts. The decisions of the Court of Appeals were given by seven judges, three of whom were foreigners. The commercial courts had six judges and three of whom were foreigners.¹⁵⁰ Judicial appointments were for life and executed by the khedive.

¹⁴⁵ Jasper Y. Brinton, 'The Mixed Court', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October, 1926), p. 674.

¹⁴⁶ Byron D. Cannon, 'A Reassessment of Judicial Reform in Egypt, 1876-1891', *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1972), pp. 51-55.

¹⁴⁷ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, p. 185

¹⁴⁸ Blunt, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36

¹⁴⁹ Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 670.

¹⁵⁰ Richmond, *op. cit.*, p.82-83.

In a quotation and translation of a native jurist in the Mixed Courts expresses the significance of the courts with these words:

In guaranteeing to all the inhabitants of Egyptian territory a law of universal application and in treating all parties as equal before that law, the Mixed Courts recalled Egypt to the true ideal of justice...In a country whose commercial activities attract all races, finding herself thenceforth the better protected against those who had hitherto mercilessly exploited her, Egypt commenced to lose suspicion of the foreigner the door was open to western civilization and the dream of Nubar Pasha began to find itself realized.¹⁵¹

In normal jurisdiction of a foreigner, his case will be heard first by a trained judge in *Judge d'instruction*, and then by a *chamber de conseil* composed of three judges. In case of a false decision, after an appeal to a court of cassation with five judges, a new trial is ordered.¹⁵²

After the establishment of the Mixed Court in 1876, these courts became the field of movement of the capitulatory parties to put an international check on Egyptian legislation and administration. As the representatives of the capitulatory governments, judges from different nationalities could not be expected to be objective and impartial, especially in an atmosphere in which political interests were growing day by day.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 686.

¹⁵² Jasper Y. Brinton, 'The Egyptian Mixed Courts and Foreign Armed Forces', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 40, No. 4. (Oct., 1946), p. 737.

¹⁵³ Byron David Cannon, 'Nubar Pasha, Evelyn Baring and a Suppressed Article in the Drummond-Wolff Convention' *International of Middle East Studies*, vol. 5, No.4. (Sep., 1974), pp. 468-483.

2.2.4. Relations with Britain

Before the opening of the Suez Canal, the British government didn't show any great interests in Egyptian affairs. Britain opposed the construction of such a canal under the sponsorship of a Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps and in support of French courtiers. In Britain's opinion, the best way to guarantee her way to India was the absolute independence of the Ottoman Empire. However, at the time of the inauguration of the Suez Canal, French superiority over Egyptian Affairs was absolutely inarguable. French was the language of bureaucracy in Cairo. The administrative and military offices, the railroad company, the steam-boat services in Egypt were all filled with Frenchmen as the continuation of the usual attitude for the modernization of country after the founder of modern Egypt, Muhammed Ali. It should also be not forgotten that in the 1870's, Ismail had replaced the ex-officials of the United States and Britain with Frenchmen.

The significance of the Suez Canal project for Britain in her quest to establish easy routes to India meant that Egypt became more of a priority in British foreign affairs. For this reason, after that time, it had been essential to take an important and influential part in Egyptian affairs to strengthen her position in the Far East. That was the reason why Disraeli, the British Prime Minister at that time, did not hesitate to purchase a great amount of shares (177.000) of the Suez Canal and paid 4,000,000 pounds in response.¹⁵⁴ By the way, in the same archival document, it was also stated

¹⁵⁴ BOA, HR. TO, Dosya No: 58 Gömlek No: 79 dated 1875.

that there was no possibility to sell the shares directly to the British but it was only possible to transfer the shares for the following 19 years until 1894.¹⁵⁵

In one article Edward Dicey published in *Nineteenth Century* in 1877, he said:

The more possibility Russia may obtain the command of the Bosphorus renders it a matter of urgent necessity to us to secure the command of Isthmus route to India. In order to affect this we must have the power of keeping the Suez Canal open to our ships at all times and under all circumstances.... No strategic knowledge is required to appreciate the importance of the control of the Canal to England. The command of the Suez Canal involves of necessity the virtual occupation of Lower Egypt.¹⁵⁶

Khedive Ismail turned to the British government for financial assistance. His reason for choosing Britain rather than France was that the French government was struggling in a war against Germany in the 1870's. For the French government, it would be difficult to assist Ismail in an effective way. Instead, the British had a good friendship with the Ottoman Empire especially against common enemy, Russia. It would be preferable to establish a relationship with the British government. In order to obtain British support both financially and politically to support his campaigns in Africa, Ismail reached an agreement with Britain about the struggle against the slave trade in the regions he controlled.

Britain's main concern in dealing with Egypt was to protect her route to India. It was important that influence over Egypt did not pass to another power. For Britain, the ideal situation would be for Egypt to remain an annexe of the Ottoman Empire. The only threat to British interest was France who had considerable influence in

¹⁵⁵ BOA, HR. TO, Dosya No: 58 Gömlek No: 79 dated 1875

¹⁵⁶ Edward Dicey, *The Egypt of the Future*, (London: William Heineman, 1907), p. 14

Egypt. This worked in the khedive's favour and he used the rivalry between the two powers to his benefit. The solution was a system of cooperation in the establishment of an administration which had representatives from both Britain and France. Sometimes disagreements did appear between the two powers.

One of the ways for the British to take control of the country without annexation was to settle cadres with British sympathy into the governing organs. Lord Dufferin said concerning with the prime ministry of Nubar Pasha that 'we should administer Egypt as we administer the native States of India, not directly by British officials, but indirectly by native officials'.¹⁵⁷ The second way for English hegemony on a foreign country was the Protectorate that was carried into execution in Egypt by Lord Cromer after British Occupation.

2.2.5. Mr. Cave Mission and the Goschen-Joubert Arrangement (November 1876)

Stephen Cave, the Paymaster-General of the British Government, was sent to Cairo for a mission whose purpose was to examine the financial situation of Egypt. Mr. Cave's mission followed immediately after the purchase of the canal shares. Ismail's aim was to obtain British assistance by giving permission to such an investigation that can be considered intervention into a country's economic affairs.

According to Blunt, Mr. Cave was a man of ability and his disinterested personality for all sides in this inquiry was another of his advantages. But he lacked

¹⁵⁷ Dicey, *The Egypt of the Future*, p. 4

experience of the East and so he was not difficult to mislead, thus Cave's report gave only a partial truth when it was declared.¹⁵⁸

The Budget of Egypt, 1876 (Pounds sterling)¹⁵⁹

Revenues	Amount	Expenditures	Amount
Land Tax	4,700,000	Tribute to Constantinople	680,000
Date trees	160,000	Civil List of Khedive	300,000
Patents (licences)	420,000	Allowances to Princes	90,000
Duties on sheep etc.	500,000	Ministries and administration	430,000
Muqabale	1,570,00	Pensions and allowances	270,000
Railways-net	900,000	Appointments and expenses	180,000
Municipalities etc.	700,000	App. And exp. for Public Works	400,000
Salt revenues	250,000	Ministry of War and marines	850,000
Mah. Canal, ports, bridges	150,000	Public Works, Institutions, charity	250,000
Salt fish, various duties	550,000	Works in Sudan railway, Canal of Ismailia	200,000
Revenues from Sudan	150,000	Miscellaneous	400,000
Tobacco duties	250,000	Annuities and interests	5,050,000
Miscellaneous	600,000		
	+_____		+_____,
	10,900,000		9,100,000

As we see the surplus, about 1,800,000 pounds, it was devised for the repayment of the debt. Most of Ismail's investments are not included in this table.

Ismail prevented the publication of the Cave mission fearing that it could negatively affect his ability to take new loans. It was not well received by the creditors. Cave's mission had been followed by another financial mission that had resulted with the Goschen-Joubert Arrangement for the debts. Under these circumstances either the khedive must go bankrupt or a reduction should be made on the interest of his debts because the interest of the debts was unbearable for a country whose budget was not enough to compensate their basic needs. After Egypt's debt

¹⁵⁸ Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁵⁹ Hershlag, *op. cit.*, This table was Cave's budget of 1876 and quoted from *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. LXXXIII, p.113.

increased from 3,293,000 pounds in 1863 to 68,110,000 pounds in 1876, an almost 7,000,000 pound addition to the national debt of Egypt every year; the ultimate end came on 8th April, 1876. Khedive Ismail postponed the payment of the Treasury bills which led to panic among the creditors. The *Caisse de la Dette* was established. M. de Blignieres, Herr von Kremer, M. Bravelli were nominated for French, Austrian and Italian governments respectively. Evelyn Baring was the representative of the British creditors. This financial arrangement was found unsatisfactory especially by Britain, and resulted in the commissioning of Goschen, a member of the Anglo-German Banking house which had contracted many of the Egyptian loans, with the association of M. Joubert. A decree was issued on 18th November, 1876. It was decided to appoint two Controllers-General, Mr. Romaine was responsible for the revenues, and Baron de Malaret was for the expenditures.

The result of the Goschen-Joubert Arrangement was that the khedive had to deal with a European board. It was estimated that the annual revenue was 11,000,000 pounds whereas the minimum expenditure 4,000,000 pounds and remaining 7,000,000 pounds sterling would be left for the debts.¹⁶⁰ But there was something wrong about the annual revenue of Egypt. It was impossible to truly estimate the revenue of Egypt. The inquiries of Messrs. Gochen and Joubert were false. For instance, the net revenue of the railway was estimated at 900,000 pounds in a year but at the end of the year the money collected by the Railway Administration was about only 300,000 pounds. Lord Cromer explains this difference with a distinguishable

¹⁶⁰ Marlowe, *op. cit.*, p.95

example: the khedive usually ordered special trains but paid nothing. The money was never paid to the Railway Administration.¹⁶¹

The major feature of the Goschen-Joubert Arrangement was the division of the debts into four different categories: first one was Ismail's debts that were granted after showing his large private estate –*Daira Sania* and *Diara Hassa* totally 485,000 feddans of land as a guarantee. It should be considered separately for the payment of total debt of 8,815,000. The management of Daira lands was given to the responsibility of an international commission, presided by an Egyptian, one British and one Frenchmen. The second category was formed for the loans of 1864, 1866 and 1867; the revenues coming from *Muqabala* were assigned as guarantee for a 5,134,110 pound debt. The third category was formed for the loans of 1862, 1868 and 1873, a total amount of 17,000,000 pounds debt, giving the revenues of Alexandria harbor and the railways as guarantee. This was called the Privileged Debt and for the management of the port and railway an international board was established. The remaining of the debt of 59,000,000 pounds was combined under the title of unified debt.¹⁶²

2.2.6. The Commission of Inquiry

The financial situation of Egypt after the Goschen Mission was disgraceful. One-fifth of the cultivable lands of the state were in the hands of the khedive. By the law of *Muqabale* of 1872, the landowners could pay half of the land tax in one sum. In addition to the land tax, which was the major source of revenue of the country, there

¹⁶¹ Cromer, *op. cit.*, p.27.

were thirty-seven types of taxes which were levied on the poor Egyptian people. The extremely low Nile in 1877, the worst of the century, sending 25,000 soldiers to Russo-Turkish war made the situation worse. Its bad effect was increasingly felt in the following year: there was a famine in Upper Egypt. As to the collecting of taxes, harsh methods were being used against the peasantry to make them pay but it was an ineffective effort. As to the famine in 1878, the American consul of that time, Farman, described the situation as following:

Pitiable accounts are given by many travelers, though its real extent has been concealed as much as possible. One American told me that at one place he saw three bodies of those who died of starvation and a hundred persons who were mere skeletons, many of whom when given bread had not the strength to raise it to their mouths.¹⁶³

The financial crisis reached its zenith in the second half of 1878. There was a coupon to be paid on 1st May, 1878, a total sum about 2,000,000 pounds. The money was raised after bullying the peasant to pay. But this payment did not in any way mean an end to the fiscal problems. The only outcome of this payment was the delay of the crisis for a short time.

In this disastrous position, European creditors of the Egyptian government were also discontent. So Lord Vivian cautioned the government that the creditors would definitely apply to the Mixed Courts and the government would find itself in a position that had to confront many legal sentences. The Egyptian government neither had money to prevent the occurrence of Vivian's warnings nor esteem to find new

¹⁶² Owen, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131. See also Hershlag, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104. See also Ragatz, *op. cit.*, p. 31

¹⁶³ Morsy, *op. cit.*, p.79.

loans to borrow. Many of the creditors were found rightful in their cases against the government.

Khedive Ismail hoped for a reduction in the rate of interest without the need to establish an extra commission. He felt that the situation was so clear that there was no need to have an inquiry. But Commissioners of the Debt decided to set up an inquiry commission. The miscalculation of the revenues of Egypt by Goschen and Cave and the need to find new sources of revenues in order to meet creditor's interests led them to take such a decision. Negotiations had been made between the khedive and the commissioners. The point of view of the commissioners was not to be a part of a partial inquiry because it was not possible to overcome such a difficult situation without a full inquiry.

Khedive Ismail's insistence for an inquiry that only covers the revenues of the state was only because he wished to feel free himself in his expenditures. In January 1878, a decree was issued by the khedive in order to give authority to the Commission of Inquiry concerning only with the revenues. Because it was a partial commissioning, it was not accepted in the eyes of the Europeans. When he understood that there was no choice except a full inquiry, a khedival decree was issued on 4th April, 1878. M. Ferdinand de Lesseps was appointed as the President of the Commission, but before he took an active part, he left Egypt on 9th May. Riyaz Pasha and Sir Rivers Wilson were the Vice-Presidents of the Commission, M. Baravelli as Italian Commissioner, M. Bligniers as French Commissioner, Captain Baring as British Commissioner, Herr von Kremer as Austrian Commissioner. A Frenchman called M. Liron d'Airolles was the Secretary. The nomination of an

Egyptian was criticized especially by the French because he could not express himself in an unbiased manner in Egyptian affairs and because the khedive could put pressure on him. Riyaz was the khedive's choice because he believed he would stay loyal to him. However, the outcome was not so because Riyaz was loyal to the orders of the commission.¹⁶⁴

At the beginning of the inquiry, the chief actor of Egyptian affairs was Sharif Pasha, a leading person after Khedive Ismail. He was the Minister of Justice at that time. As to the khedival decree, establishing the commission of inquiry, it was ordered to his ministers that where financial matters were concerned; ministries including the Ministry of Justice had to provide information to the commission. Sharif was a man of pride and refused to appear in person in front of the commissioners. After the insistence of the commissioners, there was no option except resignation.¹⁶⁵

The commissioners numbered the reforms that should be seriously taken as following:¹⁶⁶

- a-) the collection of taxes should be the task of the Finance Minister and a system of annual budget should be adjusted.
- b-) forced labour should merely employed on public works.
- c-) the condition of military service should be confined.
- d-) a number of insignificant taxes should be abolished

¹⁶⁴ Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 190-192.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-199

¹⁶⁶ Cromer, *op. cit.*, p.55.

The khedive had 916,000 acres of land in Egypt and half the lands were mortgaged to the *Diara* creditors. He offered to grant half of the rest lands to the authority of the Commissioners of Inquiry. Its annual revenue was estimated at 167,000 pounds. 142,000 acres of land which were the best lands of the country remained his and the estimated revenue was 224,000 pounds a year. But this proposal was not acceptable for the commissioners because their target was the whole private land of the khedive. Nubar tried to persuade the khedive to accept the final decision of the Commission. There was no choice for the khedive and at last he surrendered all his personally owned lands to the service of the Commission.¹⁶⁷

2.2.7. Nubar-Wilson Ministry

Because the expected Nile flood did not occur, the system of irrigation was affected badly. Furthermore, the country was at the brink of bankruptcy because of the endless debts. The sinking fund of the Unified Debt was delayed with the approval of the Commissioners. One payment followed another and the Egyptian government had to show great efforts to pay the coupons. Under these circumstances, Ismail established a ministerial government in Egypt by appointing an International Ministry, the Prime Minister of which was Nubar Pasha. Mr. Rivers Wilson, the Controller of the British National Debt was Minister of Finance and M. de Blignieres, a well-known French official was the Minister of Public Works. It was the first ministerial executive cabinet in modern Egyptian history.

¹⁶⁷ Cromer, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61. see also Vatikiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 130, and Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 188-189 and 199.

There were two choices as regards the khedive's position in the country for the ministries. They would either ignore the power of the khedive and exclude him from the meetings of the Council of Ministers or put the khedive on one side and invite his co-operation. The former was supported by Nubar Pasha and encouraged by Sir Rivers Wilson, and the latter was advocated by Lord Vivian. Nubar's and Wilson's thesis on their claim was that the presence of the khedive in the meetings would affect the objectivity and free discussion of the council in a negative way because all the responsibility of the failure at past in the administration of the country belonged directly to the khedive himself. Lord Vivian's point of view about the governing of the country with the help of the khedive was that without the coordination and harmony with the khedive, it was impossible to overcome some certain difficulties in Egypt. The khedive was the only person whose authority was accepted and obeyed by all people in Egypt. Lord Cromer expressed his own ideas about the discussion as following:

The transition from a purely personal government by the Khedive to a government by an executive council whose leading members are aliens and Christians has been too rapid. For some time to come, it will be impossible not to take into account the personal authority of the Khedive as an element in the government of the country; he will always possess a large influence, which if it be not used for good, will almost certainly be used for bad; I therefore think it desirable to consider the best method of giving the Khedive some practical share in the government of the country.¹⁶⁸

In the struggle between the khedive and Nubar, the latter was the disadvantageous because the khedive was the one who could turn the discontent of his people to the direction of the ministers.

Under these circumstances, everything became worse after the establishment of the international ministry because of the restrictions on the power of the khedive himself. He never accepted such limitations especially to his personal expenditures. The attitudes of the ministers towards the khedive, as if he was not the leader of the country, were unacceptable to Ismail. The ministerial experience ended with the dismissal of the government after just three months.

Nubar's reforms directly provoked the army officials and the notables. There were some rumors that the khedive provoked them to oppose to the administration, which completely consisted of foreigners. With the canceling of the *Mukabala* Law, land under the control of landowners was confiscated. It caused an increase in the resentment of the notables against the ministers. Army officers were also greatly discontented. Under the ministry of Rivers Wilson, many British officials were hired into administrative positions on inflated salaries (it was stated that five administrators of the railway executive board were given 12,000 pounds per year¹⁶⁹, and twenty-four highly paid Europeans were employed under the department of accounting during Wilson's finance ministry¹⁷⁰) At the same time, army officers were not being paid their salaries. The government decided to pay part of the arrears and they also hired many army officers on half-pay. Finally, due to the burden on the budget, they decided to demobilize 2,500 native army officers causing huge resentment. It was a unique chance for Khedive Ismail to reaffirm his authority.¹⁷¹ From the outset, it was Ismail who provoked national resentment against the ministerial government.

¹⁶⁸ Cromer, *op. cit.*, 71

¹⁶⁹ Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, p. 187.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 208

¹⁷¹ Blunt, *op. cit.*, p. 34, see also Cromer *op. cit.*, pp. 73-74 and Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

On 18th February, Nubar and Wilson were about to be surrounded by discontented officers. The khedive took Lord Vivian to the Ministry of Finance most probably knowing what was going on there and they found the ministers surrounded by many people. The khedive, the only person the crowd would trust, ensured the security of the ministers and ordered the mutineers to leave with the promise that their demands would be granted. Grumbling ‘death to dogs of Christians’, the crowd obeyed the khedive’s order. They scattered and returned to their homes after the soldiers had fired in the air. Then, the khedive turned back to the palace. The next morning, a meeting was organized in Lord Vivian’s house to evaluate the final situation. The participating members were M. Godeaux, Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres, and Lord Cromer. Khedive Ismail’s declaration about the modification and re-establishment of his position was the main topic of the meeting. After Lord Vivian and Godeaux’s private meeting upstairs, the khedive threatened that he would not be responsible for the resulting anarchy in the society unless his old position was reinstated. The khedive also asked for the resignation of Nubar from the ministry. The quarrel between the khedive and Nubar was about to end in favor of the former. It was clearly understood that without the participation of the khedive, it was impossible to restore the order and Nubar’s fall was unavoidable. There were two different results from these events. The first was the dismissal of the European ministers from the office, the other, and maybe the most important one, was that officers in the army had certainly understood that they had the power to affect significant change in the country.¹⁷² Although the head of the rebels were, at first, punished with

¹⁷² Cromer, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77. see also Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, pp. 216-217, and also Ragatz, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.

imprisonment, they were quickly released. The discipline of the army was significantly damaged. This uprising was the herald of the Arabi revolt, which finally caused to British occupation of Egypt.

2.2.8. National Opposition against European Controllers

I would also like to mention about the secretly formed groups whose aim was to oppose European control over Egyptian internal affairs. They, among whom notables, ministers and journalists were participant, came into existence in the country after 1876, with the knowledge and probably with the support of the khedive. First was a Turco-Circassian group. They were dominant in the administration and army. These Turco-Circassians called *dhewat* (grandees) were also supreme as the largest landowners.¹⁷³ They spoke Ottoman Turkish; they wore the same clothes as their counterparts in Istanbul. The loss of their support led to the deposition of Ismail in 1879.¹⁷⁴ Even in the establishment of the national government under Sharif, there were no native Egyptian elements in the cabinet. Apart from military officers, the most significant Egyptian groups were the *ulema*, provincial notables, whose political influence was very limited in the Chamber of Deputies, (which was set up in 1866 and never opposed Ismail's demands until 1879). Ismail skillfully used these two dominant groups of the society in opposition to foreigners.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ I strongly relied on chapter seven of Vatikiotis' *The History of Egypt* pp. 124-140

¹⁷⁴ Ehud R. Toledano, 'Social and economic change in the long nineteenth century', *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century*, ed. by. M. W. Daly, pp. 264-265

¹⁷⁵ Sanderson, *op.cit.*, pp. 594-597.

Among the chief members of the secret Masonic lodge (Eastern Star Lodge) were Jamal al-din al-Afghani, who came to Egypt in 1871 and stayed until his exile to Paris in 1879; Abdusselam al Muwailihi, the president of the Assembly; Shaykh Muhammed Abduh, a prominent nationalist; James Sanua, a Jewish journalist; Edib Ishak whose journal *Misr* was actively used for the publication of Afghani's views by support of Riyaz;¹⁷⁶ Ibrahim al-Laqqani; Selim al-Naqqash; Latif Selim Bey; Muhammed Sami Pasha al-Barudi; Halim Pasha, the last surviving son of Muhammed Ali. Briefly, all these members were from the army, assembly and journalist circles and tried to eliminate European controllers with the common purpose of Khedive Ismail. For this reason, it is quite normal to think about the personal support of Ismail behind these secret organizations. In the press, Ismail's hand could be felt strongly because in 1878, a sum of 10,869 pounds of expenditure for publication of newspapers appeared in the budget of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Against the khedive, the apparent influence of Abdul Halim, the natural heir of the khedivate before the change of primogeniture law, could also be seen behind the publication of Abu Nazzara by Yaqub Sanu, who had previously been supported by Ismail himself.¹⁷⁷

The National Society, which was formed after the abolition of the assembly, demanded a national government excluding the participation of any Europeans in the cabinet. Sharif Pasha was the natural leader of the movement. When we think of the reason why he resigned from the cabinet under Khedive Ismail, it is clear that this was the decision of the National Society. A national reform package called *Lai'ha*

¹⁷⁶ Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, p. 193.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 192-193.

wataniyya which offered national remedies for the financial crisis, in opposition to the scheme proposed by Rivers Wilson, was prepared. The national project advised the continuation of the cabinet system, members of which would be responsible to the Assembly. Khedive Ismail rejected the Wilson's proposal to declare bankruptcy and ordered Tevfik Pasha, the president of the cabinet, to resign. He replaced him with Sharif Pasha, ex-minister and the leader of National Society. Nubar fled to Europe. Riyaz Pasha was in Paris. The apparent result was in favor of the nationalist movement although it did not last very long. The national project (*Laiha wataniyya*), which required no increase in the tax of *öşür* and insisted on the continuation of *Muqabala* law, was accepted with the khedival decree dated 22nd April, 1879. It had the support of 331 of the leading personalities in society; among whom were ninety-three military officers, forty-one merchants and notables, seventy-three higher civil officials, and sixty members of the Consultative Chamber of Delegates.¹⁷⁸

2.2.9. The Deposition of Khedive Ismail

The Great Powers were anxious about the situation in Egypt. They contacted their representatives in Cairo and instructed them what should be done in this situation. Sir Rivers Wilson, M. de Blignieres and Sir Evelyn Baring were meeting with the purpose of reaching some agreements. Two significant questions to be answered were on the discussion table: who would be the next prime minister and what would the khedive's position be in the new cabinet. Sir Rivers Wilson's preference was the restoration of the government under the leadership of Nubar Pasha once again. Lord

¹⁷⁸ Hunter, *Egypt under the khedives*, pp. 221-222.

Vivian's point of view was quite different. As long as Ismail remained in power as the khedive, the reinstatement of Nubar Pasha would not be a good idea for the stability of the country. The khedive also stated his own position that he would not be responsible if the order broke down once again if they reappointed Nubar.

Consequently, the European governments reached final decisions as following:

The khedive would not be a part of the cabinet. Prince Tevfik, son of the khedive and apparent heir for the khedivate, would be the president of the new cabinet, (it was Ismail's proposal at the same time). The British and French ministers in the cabinet would have the right to veto.

On 10th March, 1879, Prince Tevfik was appointed as the president of the council. There was another desire of the khedive to provide the nomination of Riyaz Pasha to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Justice. But foreign ministers were opposed to this idea as they understood it was the effort of the khedive to reinforce his authority in the cabinet. However, finally the appointment of Riyaz Pasha to the Ministry of Interior and Justice was accepted.

In the eyes of the foreign ministers, the only reason for anarchy in the country was due to the maladministration of Khedive Ismail. So the solution was to diminish his authority to a symbol. Lord Vivian, unlike Sir Rivers Wilson, was on the side of the khedive, not for his own personality but because Lord Vivian understood his personal power over the nation. London was not in agreement with this opinion and summoned Lord Vivian to London on 15th March. Sir Frank Lascelles was appointed in his place

but this time with the order to give his full support to Sir Rivers Wilson concerning relations with the khedive.¹⁷⁹

The khedive carried on his opposition and intrigues whenever he found an opportunity. On 1st April, Sheikh al-Bekri, Nakib al-Ashraf, organized meetings to increase the religious anger of the community against foreigners and non-Muslim ministers. Whenever a conspiracy occurred in the country, it was suspected that it was the work of Khedive Ismail. As I mentioned at the beginning of the thesis, even the accession of Ismail to the viceroyalty after a train accident was claimed that it was as a result of a conspiracy. On 9th April, the khedive made a speech in the presence of the notables expressing the necessity of establishing a purely Egyptian ministry which was planned to be responsible to the Chamber of Deputies, and rejecting the acceptance of national bankruptcy because it would be dishonorable.

Khedive Ismail wrote some letters to Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignieres ensuring them the profitability of the formation a fully national ministry under the presidency of Sharif Pasha. The ministers were all puppets under the control of the khedive. Omar Lutfi Pasha was Inspector-General in the Cabinet and Shahin Pasha was the Minister of War, Ali Dhulfikar was the director of justice, Muhammed Sabit became the director of Education and Charitable Endowments. Muhammed Zeki Pasha was commissioned as the director of Public Works and Interior and Foreign Affairs were under the directorate of Sharif Pasha.¹⁸⁰

Germany had become involved in the internal affairs of Egypt through the International Courts (mixed courts), The khedive openly rejected to apply for

¹⁷⁹ Cromer, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-96

judgment by the International Courts and undermined its decisions. The situation became very problematic and the Great Powers, under pressure from Germany, decided it needed to be addressed once and for all.¹⁸¹

It was very strange that despite the Great Powers self-interested actions in the way Egypt was ruled, they always applied to the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Empire for a solution to Egypt's internal problems. This, of course, did not change this time.

There were two groups among the nationalists: one was supporting Khedive Ismail, the other one was encouraging Tevfik's khedivate. On 6th June, Sharif determined his position that he would not oppose Ismail's removal, fearing Ottoman intervention. Jamal al-din al-Afghani's position was in favor of Tevfik feeling the support of Masonic organization. Ismail was still hopeful to obtain the Sublime Porte's support through bribes and his personal relationships with the courtiers. The Great Powers appealed to the authority of Sultan to depose Ismail. But as I mentioned above, the starting step for this action came from Germany instead of France and Britain. In June, Britain and France played an active role in order to put pressure on the sultan for the replacement of Khedive Ismail with his son Tevfik. The sultan himself had already been discontent about the khedive's position which was quite different from his other governors. He was already in favour of the idea of replacing Ismail and, at the same time, was desirous of keeping the support of the Great Powers. He willingly capitulated to their demands and deposed Ismail from the viceroyalty.

¹⁸⁰ Cromer, *op.cit.*, pp. 101-105. See also Hunter, *Egypt under the Khedives*, p.223

¹⁸¹ Dicey, *The Egypt of the Future*, p. 167-170

On 26th June, 1879, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire issued a decree calling Ismail as khedive-i sabik (ex-khedive). He left Egypt for Naples on his yacht Mahrusa, taking all the precious and portable property of the palaces. He never saw Egypt again, and died in Istanbul in 1895. In September 1879, Tevfik commissioned Mustafa Riyad to form a government. Riyad kept control for two full years.¹⁸² The next step was the appointment of the Commission of Liquidation. The khedive (Tevfik) appointed the Commission of Liquidation with his own will in theory. The members of the commission were nominated by the khedival decree, but they were selected by the governments of Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy.¹⁸³

2.2.10. Arabi Revolt

The disastrous Ethiopian war hurt the treasury and the loss of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78; in which Egyptian troops took part, destroyed the military morale. The debt crisis and the Anglo-French dual control led to the resentment.¹⁸⁴ On the eve of the Egyptian troops' preparation to embark for Istanbul, with the purpose of supporting the sultan's army against Russia, a group of people, mostly students of Egypt's local schools, were making a protest demonstration crying out 'death to all Christians'. The demonstrations mostly took place in Lower Egypt, in which central

¹⁸² Donald Malcolm Reid, 'The Urabi revolution and the British conquest, 1879-1882', *The Cambridge history of Egypt: Modern Egypt from 1517 to the end of the 20th century*, ed. by M. W. Daly vol. 2, p. 221.

¹⁸³ Dicey, '*The Story of the Khedivate*', p. 233. Holt does not mention about German among the controller states in his *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 211.

¹⁸⁴ Juan R. I. Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Structural Origins of Egypt's Urabi Movement*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 275.

administration was strong and, following the opening of the Mixed Courts, Europeans were more visible and powerful.¹⁸⁵

Resentment was rapidly growing in three areas of society: the resentment of less-privileged Egyptians, the resentment of the Egyptians against any form of international control, and the resentment of the Muslims against domination by Christians. Army officers and their men had some complaints about the decrease of soldiers in number from 94,000 in 1874 to 18,000 and then 12,000 in 1879.

Military protests in the first half of 1879 were the response to the dismissal of a great number of officers and the replacement by new ones on half pay. They demanded the end of the international cabinet and had the secret support of Khedive Ismail whose authority was strongly shaken by international bodies in the country. Ismail's efforts to manipulate military discontent were successful in the first stage, although the rest of the play was Ismail's disappearance from the historical scene. This successful effort encouraged the military officers to carry out the following insurrections and showed how powerful they were.

Between September of 1881 and 1882, the Arabi revolt in Egypt occurred as a reaction both to Anglo-French financial and political intervention in the country and to the reduction of the armed forces. It was a terrible time for the Ottoman Empire because of the results of Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-78. Ottoman finances were relinquished to Debt Administration (*Duyun-u Umumiye*) and the outcome of the Berlin Congress forced the Ottoman Empire to leave almost half of its territories.¹⁸⁶ In this political atmosphere, Abdulhamid II used the power of the Caliphate as

¹⁸⁵ Cole, 'Of Crowds and Empires', p. 117.

equilibrium against the Great Powers. However, the Arabi revolt was especially sensitive because the Ottoman Empire consisted of different nationalities and it could provoke nationalist movements all around the empire. Even though British intervention was not acceptable to Abdulhamid II, Arabi could not be supported against a legitimate governor and representative of the sultan.¹⁸⁷

In January 1881, colonels Arabi, Abdul al-Hilmi and Ali Fehmi asked for the dismissal of Rıfkı, the minister of war. They were summoned to the military headquarters and arrested. When the supporters of Arabi demonstrated themselves in front of the palace, Tevfik and Riyad had to release the rebels and replace Rıfkı with Mahmud Sami al-Barudi whose sympathies were with Arabi.¹⁸⁸ The troops returned to their barracks. In August, Tevfik's brother-in-law, Davud Yakam, was commissioned as minister of war in place of Mahmud Sami. It was a signal for insurrection. Arabi demanded the dismissal of Riyad's cabinet, the election of a new chamber, and the raising of the army to its legal limit which was determined in the sultan's firman as 18,000.¹⁸⁹ The military demonstration at Abdin palace on 9th September, 1881 forced the khedive to dismiss Mustafa Riyad's cabinet. The slogan was 'Egypt for the Egyptians'. The revolt entered its second stage with Mahmud Sami's leadership of the cabinet in which Arabi was minister of war.¹⁹⁰

In mutual correspondence between Tevfik and Istanbul, the former demanded a commission of inspection and the sending of a military force with the order of the sultan to prevent the foreign intervention. Abdulhamid II finally sent Dervish Pasha

¹⁸⁶ Selim Deringil, 'The Ottomans, The Turks and World Power Politics' collected studies, *Analecta Isisiana* Vol. XLIX, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2000), p. 9.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁸⁸ Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, 213.

¹⁸⁹ Reid, *op.cit.*, p. 226. See also Dicey, *The Story of the Khedivate*, pp. 250-257.

to Cairo '1-to prevent by any means the military entanglement of Ottoman forces in Egypt; 2- to remove Urabi from the scene by inviting him to Istanbul; 3- to give support to the Khedive Tevfik Pasha'.¹⁹¹ Because the military power of the Ottoman state was very limited and the army of the Caliphate would not fight against a Muslim group, Abdulhamid II was not on the side of a military solution and was strongly working on the 'soft option'.¹⁹²

British and French warships were on their way to Alexandria. On 25th May, the British and French demanded the resignation of Mahmud Sami al-Barudi's cabinet,¹⁹³ sending Urabi into exile, and the retirement of colonels Ali Fehmi and Abd al Al from Cairo. A riot erupted in Alexandria. 50,000 Europeans immediately left the country.¹⁹⁴ European Consuls increased the tension by spreading fear among the Christian population and encouraging them to leave the country.¹⁹⁵

In Istanbul, a conference on Egypt was held on 3 June 1882 to find a solution. Abdulhamid II was not in favour of such a conference because European Powers were not the part of a revolt in Egypt, a province of the Ottoman state. For this reason, the Ottoman delegation did not join the session until 26 July.¹⁹⁶

The Alexandrai revolt led to a war between Egypt and Great Britain.

The extensive influence of Christians and of Christianity in Alexandria, and Muslim sensitivity to domination by Europeans, also must have played a part. The wave of anti-Europeanism during the Russo-Turkish war had come only four or five years earlier. The French had established a protectorate over nearby Tunisia only the year before. 'Urabi appealed to the masses partially because he stood up to the Europeans as a Muslim (and though the Ottoman sultan actually opposed him, this did not stop 'Urabi from successfully posing in Egypt as his defender).¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁰ Reid, *op.cit.*, p. 229.

¹⁹¹ Deringil, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁹² Deringil, *op.cit.*, pp. 20-22.

¹⁹³ Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East*, p. 276.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 279.

¹⁹⁵ Deringil, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26

¹⁹⁷ Cole, 'Of Crowds and Empires', p. 127.

With the British bombardment, the revolution entered its third step.¹⁹⁸ The sultan, Abulhamid II, had, incidentally, declared Arabi a rebel on 2nd September, the week prior to the battle of Tall al-Kebir. In this battle Arabi was defeated. The British restored Tevfik's authority, and sent Arabi to prison. Thus the British occupation of Egypt began whilst Egypt was still a province of the Ottoman Empire. Britain's promise to evacuate Egypt as soon as possible was not kept.¹⁹⁹

British occupation continued until 1914 through its representative under the title consul-general. Sir Evelyn Wood (Sir Evelyn Baring or Lord Cromer), agent and consul general of Egypt from 1883 to 1907, was appointed. Dual control with France was abolished. The khedival system continued in a nominal form. The annual tribute to the Ottoman sultan continued to be paid. Sir Baring cooperated with the khedive in political affairs. An Egyptian council of ministers remained responsible to the khedive in theory. In practice, British advisors were appointed. Nubar Pasha was prime minister from 1884 to 1888. His successor was Riyaz Pasha resigned in 1891. Riyaz was succeeded by Mustafa Fehmi Pasha who served as prime minister until 1908.²⁰⁰

The death of Tevfik in 1892 remarked the end of an era, and the beginning of a period of opposition to the British. The new khedive was Tevfik's son, Abbas II. In the first years of his khedivate, he behaved as if he opposed British supervision.²⁰¹ It

¹⁹⁸ Reid, *op.cit.*, pp. 230-231.

¹⁹⁹ David Steele, Britain and Egypt 1882-1914: The Containment of Islamic Nationalism, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Middle East, The Anglo-Egyptian Experience*, ed. by Keith M. Wilson, p. 8

²⁰⁰ Dally, *op.cit.*, p. 241.

²⁰¹ İlhan Şahin, Abbas Hilmi II, *DIA*, pp. 25-26.

appeared especially when he wanted to change Mustafa Fehmi.²⁰² He remained in the office until the World War I. On 19th December, 1914, Britain took Egypt as her domain and nominated Huseyin Kamil as viceroy. Thus, Ottoman influence on the administration of Egypt was at an end after four hundred years.

²⁰² Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent*, p. 221.

CHAPTER III

ISMAIL IN EXILE

In this chapter, I will explain the efforts of Khedive Ismail to return to Egypt from exile following his deposition. I strongly relied on the Ottoman archival documents (in *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*) in this section. Ismail's life in Europe and his political struggle against the Caliph of Islam, Abdulhamid II will be my main focus in this part.

The deposition of Ismail was desired by Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who was against any of his governors having rights above their counterparts. It was also a chance for the sultan to dismiss the khedive and appoint a new ruler as opposed to primogeniture right obtained in 1867. Being aware of the sultan's effort to re-establish his power over Egypt, the Great Powers refused the appointment of new khedive instead of Tevfik in accordance with the primogeniture right.²⁰³

After his deposition by Sultan Abdulhamid II, Ismail was exiled to Italy, his favoured location being ruled by his close friend, King Vittorio Emanuele II. He carried out propaganda opposing the caliphate being an Ottoman sultan who deposed him from the khedivate and refused his persistent demands to reside in Istanbul. Ismail had some articles written abroad under his sponsorship questioning whether an Ottoman sultan deserved to be the caliph and proposing the need to shift the caliphate to the Khedive of Egypt. The articles focused on the Caliph's despotic and tyrannical policies. All these claims were published in *Al-Ittihad* under the editorship of Ibrahim Muwalliha, the private secretary of Khedive Ismail. It can be obviously said that the

attitude of *al-Ittihad* and its anti-Abdulhamid language was the result of personal antagonism of the ex-khedive, not for religious or ideological purposes. Doubtless, this was part of an effort to regain the khedivate which would give him a position that was superior to being in exile.²⁰⁴

Among the archival documents, there were, of course, some which give information about the British help to the khedive's conspiracy for returning to the khedivate after he was exiled. According to one of these documents, the ex-khedive sent a man called Baran to Egypt to make propaganda in connection with the declaration of caliphate in his own name. At the same time, The British government would arrange the murder of some of the British citizens, or even of the British ambassador in Hijaz, in order to provoke tension. Then they would send British armed-ships to Cidde harbor.²⁰⁵ These were most likely rumors and conspiracy theories and could not be proven.

Edward Dicey, who was personally acquainted with the ex-khedive, commented the desire of ex-rulers to obtain power once again as following:

It has been my fortune in life to have seen a good deal of many exiled kings, princes, potentates and statesman. However they might differ in other respects, they all shared one hope and one delusion. The hope was to return to the country where they had ruled in the days of their glory; the delusion was an unshakable belief that their country was longing for their return.²⁰⁶

When Ismail was in exile, the most common gossip in Egypt was about his efforts to return to Egypt as the khedive once again. According to a telegram sent

²⁰³ Ragatz, *op.cit.*, p. 75

²⁰⁴ Ş. Tufan Buzpınar, Buzpınar, 'Opposition to the Ottoman Caliphate in the Early Years of Abdulhamid II: 1877-1882', *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol. 36, (March 1996), pp. 73-77.

²⁰⁵ BOA, Y. P. RK. MK, Dosya No. 1, Gömlek no. 50.

from the Paris Embassy, the newspaper, Galoa, issued a series of telegrams concerning Ismail's return to power. As a response to this news, the Parisian embassy said that France agreed with the deposition of Khedive Ismail on 26th June, 1879 so there would be no possibility of coordination and mediation between the French government and the ex-khedive. This viewpoint was also confirmed by the embassies of Berlin, Vienna, London and Moscow.²⁰⁷

Ismail resided at the Favorita Palace near Portici in Naples until the first half of the 1880's but he was wandering around all the capitals of the European countries. He was very keen on seeing people who had previously known him as ruler of Egypt. For a long time, he passed through European cities from one to another. His previous European counterparts no longer accepted him as guest of honor. In these desperate days, he fruitlessly gave enormous bribes for his return to power.

In 1887, the sultan granted him permission to reside in Istanbul. Against the advice of his friends, Ismail hoped that if he stayed near the Ottoman administration, he could ensure his return to Egypt. The reality was a position like a state prisoner. He was cut off from society during the eight years until his death in 1895, sharing the same fate of Zubeyr Rahma al-Mansur living under house-arrest in Cairo until 1899. Ismail was never allowed to leave the country fearing the likelihood that he would conspire against the caliph.

Ex-khedive Ismail finally gave up his insistence on returning to the viceroyalty: his only intention was to overcome the obstacles in front of the

²⁰⁶ Dicey, *The Story of the Khedivate*, p. 220.

5,000,000 lira case that he demanded persistently. He endeavored to influence public opinion in his own favor to reach this goal.²⁰⁸

When Ismail publicly traveled to foreign capitals under the title of ex-khedive, news spread quickly and it was common for an investigation to take place to establish whether there was a risk to the caliphate. One example was the arrival of Midhat Pasha's secretary and political official of Syria Isak Vasıf Efendi (known also as Galiçyan), to London. It was also suspected that the ex-khedive was dealing with arms trafficking via Egyptian ports by means of British officials in the customs bureau. The Sublime Porte requested an immediate investigation by Khedive Tevfik. It also asked the Embassy of Rome if the ex-khedive was in Rome or Naples; if he was there, who he was there together with. Khedive Tevfik's return telegram to the Sublime Porte stated that Khedive Tevfik was not informed who Vasif was or why he went to London. He also expressed that the view of the British government on Ismail's return to power was certain and there was no need to doubt it.²⁰⁹ Tevfik also stated that he did not know the person called Baran but if the Sublime Porte meant Dranat (Pavlos Pasha), he was living in Europe as a retired person and sometimes he came back to Egypt for a visit. There would not be any logical explanation of arms-trafficking of the ex-khedive except the inventions of gossipers.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷ BOA, Y. A. Hus dated 1301, dosya no: 179 gömlek no: 122

²⁰⁸ BOA, Y. A. Hus, dosya no: 195, gömlek no: 105.

²⁰⁹ For British opposition to ex-Khedive's returning to power see also. BOA, Y. PRK. MK. Dosya no. 2 gömlek no. 31.

²¹⁰ BOA, Y. A. Hus. Dated 1299, dosya no. 169, gömlek no. 9

CONCLUSION

Khedive Ismail, with his desires to enlarge his autonomy, was not an ordinary governor in the Ottoman Empire when compared with his counterparts. The title of '*khedive*' in front of his name is enough to show his unusual characteristics of governorate. In order to obtain official use of this title and in order to change the primogeniture law, which would not directly affect his lifetime, he spent vast sums of money under the name of '*kapıyoldaşı hediyesi*'.²¹¹ To say he sought independence from the sultan like his grandfather would be so assertive. However, in light of his behaviors during his European tour, when he invited heads of state to the inauguration of the Suez Canal without the permission of (and without inviting) the Ottoman sultan, we can easily understand that he would never be satisfied as just a classical governor of a province of the empire. He partly achieved his goal because history would remember him as 'Magnificent'. His personality and way of life was so open to extravagance. A great amount of the loans taken for public works (i.e. the improvement of railway and telegraph lines, the Suez Canal project) were spent on the personal expenditures of Khedive Ismail.

The khedive's expansion into Africa also displayed his real intention. His efforts to extend his authority out of the natural borders of Egypt were indications of his unlimited desires to be remembered as much more than a simple governor. The reign of Khedive Ismail marked the zenith of Turkish power in Sudan. During two decades, Ismail not only ruled the territories in Africa but also struggled against the slave-trade.

During his reign, Egypt was in a better situation than the central administration in Istanbul in the fields of education, agriculture, transportation and communication. The first railway line was in Egypt in the Ottoman Empire, which was earlier than those of both Sweden and Japan. Railway lines and telegraph systems were set up in Sudan as a result of the centralization efforts of the Egyptian government. 23 percent of school-children were going to school in Egypt, compared with 10 percent in Istanbul. In the field of agriculture, modern techniques were applied in order to increase cotton production due to the American Civil War in the 1860's. Because of the secession in America, Egyptian cotton became one of the most important sources of raw-material for British textile industry. It was a great opportunity, not to be missed by Khedive Ismail.

Although, the aims of modernization of both the outstanding rulers of Egypt, (Muhammed Ali and Ismail), in the 19th century was similar, there were also significant differences between the two reformers. Both Muhammed Ali and Ismail regarded the Ottoman sultan as their rival but Muhammed Ali relied on opposing him through military force whereas Ismail trusted diplomacy, his money and bribes.

Ismail was less successful than his grandfather in managing the Europeans and their intervention finally brought about his deposition in 1879. European penetration into Egyptian affairs came in three economical phases. The first phase was the establishment of *Caisse de la Dette* (Public Debt Administration); the second phase was the Goschen-Joubert arrangement: the appointment of two controllers one for expenditures (the British), the other one for revenues (the French), the establishment

²¹¹ Karal, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Enver Ziya Karal also expressed this gift as bribe in his footnote (bir nevi

of another executing board to manage the revenues of the railway, post office, ports; the third phase of economic penetration occurred with the ministry of foreigners in the cabinet of Nubar: Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance, and Ernest-Gabriel de Bligniers as Minister of Public Works. In almost half a year, the ministerial government formed a short but remarkable chapter in Egyptian history as to the disassembling of khedival absolutism.

The economic position during two decades of Egypt's history in the sixties and seventies, coinciding with Ismail's reign, was the mixture of profit-hunting of foreign capital with Ismail's desire to enlarge his private enterprises. The deposition of Ismail marks not only end of an age but also the end of an absolute and despotic reign in the period of 1805 to 79 that Egypt would not witness again until the Mubarek regime.

While Lord Cromer explains Nubar's position against the khedive, he endeavors to indicate the difficulty of a Christian who did not know the native language of the country.²¹² But I personally disagree with the point of view of Cromer. Over the centuries, societies whose citizens were both Christians and Muslims had lived peacefully without any discrimination, with the exception of Lebanon crisis in the 1860's, among the Druzes with the support of Muslims and Maronites with the support of Christian Europe.²¹³ Indeed, whenever foreigners found the opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, they always corrupted the purity of the community and order, as shown in the example of the Arabi revolt.


rüşvet: a kind of bribery).

²¹² Cromer, *op.cit.*, pp. 71-72

²¹³ Engin Deniz Akarlı, *The Long Peace*, (London, University of California Press, 1993)

Despite all his insufficiencies, it was Ismail who was the real founder of Modern Egypt with his contribution in the fields of public works, economy and population. It was Ismail who brought Egypt into close touch with Europe in connection with modernization. But it is most likely that if it weren't for Ismail's financial failure, there would not have been the British Occupation in Egyptian history.

APPENDICES



Appendix 1. It is the edict that confirmed the conditions of the contract between the Khedivate and Ferdinand de Lesseps. 2 Zilkade 1282 (19 March 1866), Sarkis Karakoçyan, Külliyyât-ı Kavânîn, No: 3397, C. XIII.

تصديقاته انه ارضه المظنه استعماله ... تانياً لما كان هو جردونه وبلا مشعه اوله المي ايد الاماوت هضمه
 وانتم نك واشبه جردون حبه مظلوسه حبه حاجته تعريم اداه صره لفظه بلكه درعهه ارضه وانما نك
 ماديه بولانه جفقات اوله بيده فلفه بولايه مع وفودته ... ايباً نكده تصديقاته مطلق اوله مبدلت تايه بولايه
 تقاسيم معينه تعين حضوره توكيد اوله ... بين كذبه الله ان سبي كاذبه تايهه لمقوي تايهه
 صرح استبان مويج نكده جردون حفره دار اوله استبان تصديه استه ارضه اوله بايقه بين مكيه
 الله اوج سبه نيكات الله تايهه مويج به قطع تقديره اشبه تصديه مفرغه موقوفه اوله سلكه بينه
 ايقه اوله بولايه اوله ارضه كاذبه موافقاته تصديه والى سايه اوله نكده تصديقاته بينه بين اوله
 اتفاقه اوله مويج سوا آيه مقصده اشبه مقادير تعليم اوله ... بيقينه

بقيه ماده - سويده جردون الاماوته فوجيه استبان دار بين كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه تعليم اوله نكده
 كاذبه فخر بولايه وبيده كذبه الله ان سبي كاذبه تايهه بكنه عقد اوله استبان نامك ايكه بكنه
 لفظه نكده جردون الاماوته استعماله كاذبه نكده دري صرك اوله جفده وبيده اوله مبدلت تصديه
 كاذبه لم بكنه كاذبه طوكه قره ويركده اداه صره بيه كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه بكنه تعليم اوله
 فقه سايه نكده طوكه جردون اوله فواشه مقاب تصديه اوله ورنه قويايه اوله نكده كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه بكنه
 ومذكوره قويايه جردون الاماوته مقصده اوله محدي بولايه بولايه بولايه استبان وما نكده موقوفه سكره اوله عاريه
 اوله بولايه وتارك اليه بكنه

ايكه ماله - مذكوره تصديقاته بيه كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه بكنه عقد اوله استبان نامك بكنه
 وبيده كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه بكنه عقد اوله استبان نامك بكنه
 فواشه وصا عبادته فراغت تصديه بيه كذبه الله ان سبي تويهه كويه بكنه تعليم اوله استبان نامك بكنه
 اعطاه لفظه مويج اداه صره اعاده اوله قابل استا ايقه مقاب الله اوج بيه لفظه وده عبادته اوله بولايه اتفاقه
 قبوله وتصديه وانتم اوله بولايه مقاب مذكوره وده سايه سايه جردونك ايكه ايقه مقصده اوله بولايه مقصده
 معد واوله بولايه بولايه لفظه تزل اوله جفده

او حی ماره - اینک ماره در اولین و دومین که کنیز الا دره سه آسیا نام است که در کتب و کتب و کتب
 ایمان سه مینامند که او کج و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب
 فرانسه هاید و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب
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 عدولت ایستادگی هر دو در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب و او در کتب
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اولاً وبعده كذا ليس لانهم كلفوا... ثانياً مذکور قویاً جدول مذکور باینه اولاً وبعده...
 آنچه مقتضای اولیّه که اداره مصره و غیره است جدول مذکور اعماله که در این وقت...
 اقد و غیره... و قویاً... جدول مذکور...
 و تمام کسبیه... قویاً...
 صورتی...
 همه حافظه...
 اعمالی...
 طوری...
 و به...
 باری...
 حاله...
 جدول...
 و حال...
 میانه...
 به...
 کسب...
 پس...
 پس...

نیز ماره

سالیانه در تمبرهای مملکت متر و صوبه ای افزایش داده است و این امر را در صورتیکه اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
در متعلقه آنجا در حد

نیز ماره

مارا ذکر این صوبه و در این زمینها که در مملکت تحت تصرف بوده که در صورتیکه دیگر جدولی از اجزای اداره مذکوره که در حد
اولی و در صورتیکه در این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
سازسی نماید و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
است و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
آنچه محمول سفایف مخصوصه است و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
اینکه در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
همچون برکتی در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
اولی و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
بیک سکتور از این زمینها که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
کننده در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
سفایف مملکت و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
بوده این طرفه زمینها که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
از این مذکور است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
اولی و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
اعمال و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
تعیین یافته اند

نیز ماره

فرمانیه و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
بولنامه هر دو در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
است و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت

نیز ماره

سرفایف مملکت و در حد این صوبه که در مملکت است و اینها را در حد اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت
موضوعات اجناس ایدیه از زمین و زمینهای مملکت

وکن جبار واهلیت سبب کشت ونداری بچو نه مقفی اولاده موافقه بر سفایه جد و زجر مرواربتک معلومه نظر ادره ره قویانه بونزه طولانی چی بر پانته
کیسه و یا خود ساز برکونه عولته مه به ابرج به کله

اوجنانه

سیر سفایه جد و طر سفایه نه معدود اولاده ارضی و خنده مکتلت محافظه سز مقفی حد ابرجین طاق کمال و موافق حربه ارض مهربه نک تخه تفریق فدیجه و لا شیو
تفریق لیقین سیر سفایه مانع اولده جود و جدولک کناری حق اولاده مساعلف اخلاک اینه جلد

اوجنانه

ارض مهربه خود مذکوره اینه قویانه نک جود استقنی اشیا جانه ثابت ایدرک بوسترون و قد مشلو اشیا جانه مکتبه بچو نه صاحب کوره کی طاق نونق ظایر
استمال ابرج به کله و بومالک اشغال ایتک استدی اراضیک معلوم و یا خود نسوی بچو نه حرفه ایشو اولده منی مالقی لدی ایجاب قویانه تا ابرج به کله

اوجنانه

بخایه و عرف و صایعلک منافی و جدولک عموم مالک استقنی بچو نه افراد ناسده هرک اولاده ارض مهربه دم خصص اشغال ایتک و کلت سید نک
نقش مات مکتبه و بچو نه و عادات مرجس نه منافع ایتک و مکتلت و کونو و تکلیف سازه سی ایضا ایتک شرطیکرک سیر سفایه جدولک ابرج طریق
وزن جدول مذکور بونه احوالت ارض سترزم مکتبه ابرج به کله ابرج جدول کناره و سدری و دیک بولدی مستقنا هر قدر بولکل صورت اشغال خنده
اعلام ارض مهربه نقومات اعظمه توفیقاً عمومک مرو و بچو نه سکتف ابرج جلد فقط افراد ناسک بودجه مکتبه و نوطه ایمی یا کله جدولک ارض مکتبه
اولاده فرمان قویانه بهدستوه اینه لازم اولیا به موافق جانان الله علیه استو موافق حصول و یا خود نسوی بچو نه قویانه طرفه حرف اولده اولده جود
مالق موافق مذکوره در استفاده ابرج مکتبه طرفه نه نادیر اولده لازم کلم کله

در سترزم ابرج به کله و درون بر صبح اولده ره بلا طرفه و استثنا طاق دول سفایه اینه جدول نه کله کله ترانیت ایستک کرک نظر اولده منی معانی کله احوالت
و تأسیسه اخلاک اولده منی مقرر در

اوجنانه

اوجنانه ارض مهربه نک کندوس قویانه نین مسقط مقادلات اعطاک عاداته اجرائیه تا اید بچو نه مفاخره کدوسه عاقل اولده اولده قویانه نونق
اعماله اجز اولده منی موافقه بونفرد اوزج مخصوص بر قویس تغییر اینه صلاحیت ابرج جلد

اوجنانه

ارض مهربه ابرج قویانه نین جود ابر مقادلات عمده اولده سوسه جدولک طفا رطوفه سز دست ایشو اینه سیک انفصانه شرایط ایتک
بالطبع سبب طرفه منی صورت تغییر بر کله درج اولده

اوجنانه

مذکور سفایه جود عموم قویانه سی مهربه قویانه نونق معدود بولدی قویانه و عادات مکتبه تابع اولده سوز کله شرکت مفیله صورت ترکیب
و تکلی و عه دار نک بد بکینه اولاده مناسبات حضور صدر مقادلات مخصوص بویج فرانس اونیج شرکتی حق جاره اولاده قویانه تابع
هم جود و حضورانه مذکوره هم ظهور ابرج به کله اولاده طاق منایع و اختلاط و لاسمه هکله معرفیه رؤیت و شوبه هکله و هکله و بوه
فرارده و استیفاف بار سه بونامه دیوانه استیاف عوالم اولده جلد مهربه قویانه اینه هر مقفی دولت به سز او بود اینه رسوم افراد نین سکوم
ابج به کله رعای قویانه و عادات مکتله اقتضای جاری اولده و معا هرت اینه نیمه ارض صورتی کلم مکتله طرفه فصل و رؤیت اولده جود
داره مهربه اینه قویانه نین ظهور ابرج به کله اولاده اختلافات کذلک مکتبه به مولد اینه ره قویانه مکتله اعطامه توفیقاً فصل و رسم اولده جود
و طرفینه بری بولده بولده جود منی و منایع قویانه اینه سز شعله سز اینه و عمده و اشخاص سز قویانه مکتله و معا هرت بویج کلم مکتله طرفه

مکاره بود. کون معی دکن مع علیک تا ذی شنبه در او روزی صالح عقدی اصول جاریه توفیقاً معامله او بود. خط نظیر به ده بر خورد
طولید مذکور قیامت به ایرجه یک بیضات اسکندریه ده بونامه از در مرکز به سجا اجرا یله معتبر طویله بود.

ادب و تجار ط ذننات سابقه و امتیازات و مقادلات و نظامانک شوق و لذت نام برخلاف اولیام بالجمعا کون معی کجرا او بود. شوق و لذت نام یک کذیون زنده ای
سزیدری سبالمک بلوی آبکی با بخیله قاهه و تخیل و فقه سلفه الذکر جدولک ا شوق و لذت نام بود و در سزیدری سبالمک مذکور ه موضیله امکانه
و شفقات سلسله هم کون تا دکن اجزای شومسهم او یعنی در وقت سطور و معیه بعضی سزیدری و مقادلات سابقه توفیقاً شومسهم حضرت همایون
صادر اول یعنی مضمون دیوانهها بود هم استوار ملیل القدر هم اهدار و نسبا قندی مجرباً و کیم کتایه مهر و دلاغوه کریم سنای و کتایه و مانیه و انک

۱۲ ریح الاخری تا پنج خدیوت عیدیه صبه به نصیر بیگم اولاد ارغلاک صوبه

(۷)

- ۱- صدارت به جوسیم خدیو صوبه ریح عثمانی نامه هیونیم بیچی ربه تحدی نامه و نیشانی هنر و هلال اولاد
- ۲- وزیر ملکیم ایچین تا اولامه تقا اجدوله و ضاعف بالقیبه اندازه اوقالی حکم
- ۳- معلوم نطقه ندرتک اولین اوزره مصر خدیوت عیدیه نورت طریقته دلی اسبه محرعی تا یوشیم
- ۴- قوشین و نده بولنه قدرکن اصول نورتک تعیین و کول موقع خدیوت اسم ازجه اهالیات اجابانه
- ۵- کوره بعضه میازانه اعنه داره سردور اولاد خطوط هیونیم و اولاد شریفه تعیینوت و تقصیوت
- ۶- ایچایه سید بزرگمندی رزمانه عالیسا نده جمع اولاد ربه اعظام سدر صبی ستر معلول به درعی اولاد جرا
- ۷- وجهه زمان عالیسا ندرتک بدنه قائم و دائم هیونیم اوزره بزمان عالیسا ندرتک اصاری حقش و توغولونه
- ۸- استعلاک مقدونه رعیت هیونیم اولمنه بر درجه آنه ذکر و بانه اولاد سوزیم که خدیویه صبه نه باسط
- ۹- نورت اهالیات عادی به ایچی بوز اولاد بری سسی بیچ اولاد که ایچی تا یوشیم موزا اولاد سی خط هیونیم
- ۱۰- کهایه ایچوتک صدار اولمنه اولاد زمان عالیسا ندرتک تعیین اولاد اصول نورت خدیوتک تعیین بعد از نه
- ۱۱- خدیوتک سبعلیات اولاد و کوریه بولنه و ایچورم اولاد اکبر اولادینه تقصیوت و توجه اولمنی یعنی خدیو
- ۱۲- بولنه نامه طوغریده طوغریه اولاد و کوریه اکبریه نوسه بولنی با اوزره خدیویه صبه نه همه اولاد
- ۱۳- رسنه نامه استمالک عادیته موجهه اولمنی ندرتک هیونیم سا هانده کعبه بولنه و عظم صبه نه هر صورت
- ۱۴- و کال اولاد درجه اهیت و حیاتیاته بزرگمندی معصیت و در خافنه صردن اولاد رعیت همه دعایات
- ۱۵- رسنه سینه سینه ایشک بولنیفک آثار صداقت و خدیوت ندرتک سا هانده کلام تقیه اولاد صبه حسیوت
- ۱۶- و در توفه و اعتماد ملوکاتیم رسنه حدیک اولدیفند منی بولنه دلی علیسی اولمنه اوزره معلول عیب روتک اولاد
- ۱۷- خدیوت صبه و معقبات اولاد رعیت بولنه جلاسه معلومیم موزا اولاد تقصیوت سواکه و صوبه خانم تقصیوت
- ۱۸- و معقبات بولنه بولیم بر درجه حرست اولاد و کوریه اکبریه و نده نه صده و من بوقاعده به نطقاً خدیو ندرتک
- ۱۹- بولک اولمنه توجهیه و خدیو بولنه نامه من توغوش اولاد و کوریه بولنیفک عیدیه بولک قرآتیه و قرآتیه
- ۲۰- اولدیفن جمله بولک قرآتیه اولمنه اکبریه استفا اصول ستر بولنه بولنه نورت خدیوت عیدیه

Appendix 2: A copy of the sultan's edict showing the most privileged version of the primogeniture law.

- 21 - قائم اولی دادلا اناسنه متولد اوله کوره عدم اتفاق فاعده سنت دهم دهنه ودره اوله نرکت
- 22 - هر صدمه ناسن همگ معذرته معذرته من وقوعه وقت وارث اوله اکبر اوله ددکور صفت دهنه بولینیه حاله
- 23 - اداره امور هدیه بولینه لازم حکم هفت دهانیت هموره تسکلی بر وجه آنه ذک اوله هدیه بولینه من اوله
- 24 - وارث اوله اکبر اوله ددکور صفت دهنه بولینیه یعنی اوله سنز یا سنده انجن اولینیه حاله بده استغاده وارث
- 25 - بالفق هدیه بولینه درهک و درهکیشانه اهدار اولینیه در کار ابرام کدوسی اوله سنز یا سنه داخل اولیم بر قدر
- 26 - اداره امور هدیه بولینه هدیه سلف طرفنده اکریم اوله بر دهنه بقیه بر هفت دهانیت ترکیب و ترتیب
- 27 - اوله زنده دهانیت نام سی گیر دگر اولینیه در مویزش بولنده امرای معیه دهنه بجه ذمه دهنه علی علیه السلام
- 28 - در لجه بیدرک دهانیت اجهانیه بولینه اوله بولینه هفت دهانیت درهک تمام اداره با الم ابرام
- 29 - امور هدیه بولینه اداره سنه بتره ایدریم بر با عاظمه عوض و بانه کیفیت ایدر حکم زنده دهنه و هفت
- 30 - نگرده طرف اوله بولینه مده با زمانه عاظمه قضیه و با بقا اولی و اگر هدیه سلف طرفنده اویم بر دهنه و هفت
- 31 - دهانیت ترتیب اوله بولینه من وقوعه بولینه هفت دهانیت داخیه و عاظمه و عاظمه و عاظمه و عاظمه عاظمه
- 32 - و عاظمه سر دهنی و اقامت قضیه مویزش بولنده وارثه ترکیب اوله بولنده بولنده بولنده
- 33 - بر وجه آنه بر دهانیت در حال انتخاب نفس سولیم که انبو مویزش بولنده و در بولینه دهنه بولنده بولنده اول
- 34 - یعنی مدلوله و نکر اوله بولنده سنه بقیه وجود الترتیب آرا ایدر ایدر بولنده بقیه ذمه انتخاب اوله بولنده
- 35 - اول ذمه دهنی بقیه و اگر ما بولیم مویزش بولنده بقیه بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
- 36 - انتخاب اوله بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
- 37 - ترتیب اوله بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
- 38 - منتقله دهانیت اولینیه حاله اداره امور هدیه بولینه بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده
- 39 - هفت دهانیت ترتیب تسکلی اولینیه طرف اشرف سلطه سنه طرفنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده بولنده

- 40- ترفیحه نصیر دولتی و مدبوسالف طرفندہ دھا اولہ برومی درہیت و صابت تریب و ترکیب اولیہ دولتیہ
- 41- صورت مدہ و صابت ہنار اول و صیابہ ہیت و صیابہ اعصابک تریب و تفریح باطبع ہنار اولیہ
- 42- کمی شدہ تازہ یعنی و صیابہ ہنار، مایوسہ نگارہ ایمہ اولیہ تفریح دھ اول مدترہ دھی و کون ہ
- 43- اعصابک تریب و تفریح ہنار اولیہ دستور مدہ تریب ہنار مدہ برینہ و فانا و تفریح باطبع ہنار
- 44- افتادہ و انجمنہ مایوسہ مدہ برینک تریب و تفریح تفریح واک و صی ہنار مدہ اول مدت انجمنہ و فانا
- 45- ایدار برومگر ہیت و صیابہ ہنار اولیہ انجمنہ اندرینہ دھی مایوسہ مدہ برینک انجمنہ و فانا
- 46- الحادہ ایلی وزارت ہنار مدہ نکورک اولہ سنا پائندہ و اول اولدندہ مدہ کدوسی ریشہ و فانا
- 47- مختار اولیہ و صیابہ ہنار اولیہ اسلحا کی ادارہ امور خدیوینہ بالنفہ مہترہ ایسی ترکیب اولیہ و اولیہ
- 48- سنا شاہانم دھی برومگر مدہ و صیابہ ہنار اولیہ و خدیوینہ مدہ نہ تازید عمارہ و سعادت و باطنہ اھا
- 49- و سکنت رفاه و تازیدہ آسیہ و اسلحا کی ادارہ امور خدیوینہ بالنفہ مہترہ ایسی ترکیب اولیہ و اولیہ
- 50- مہر مدہ اولیہ ہنار تاسیسی و اسلحا اسباب و وسائلک تفریح خدیوینہ و مملکت ادارہ مملکت
- 51- و مالک و ضایع مادہ و سدرہ سی مدہ حکومتہ عامہ اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 52- حکومتہ مدہ تفریح و ضایع مادہ و سدرہ سی مدہ حکومتہ عامہ اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 53- تفریح و ضایع مادہ و سدرہ سی مدہ حکومتہ عامہ اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 54- ضایع مادہ و سدرہ سی مدہ حکومتہ عامہ و سقاہ اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 55- انتظامی و اھا و سکنت تازیدہ تفریح و معمری انجمنہ مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 56- و تفریح و اھا و سکنت تازیدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 57- تفریح و تفریح و اھا و سکنت تازیدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 58- حکومت و کون اھا، ایمہ اھا و سکنت تازیدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 59- معاہدہ تفریح و اھا و سکنت تازیدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 60- و سدرہ سی ضایع مادہ و سقاہ اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ
- 61- و ضایع مادہ و سدرہ سی ضایع مادہ، ہنار اولیہ ہنار مدہ تفریح و تفریح طرف دولتیہ مدہ

- 62- لزوم کتب و غیره از حکومه و غیره نامه ای که اداره به استناد استقاض عقیده مازوفت نامه بر لایحه و غیره
- 63- زیاده مهم و معنای اولی که مکتب محافظت و حیانت ماسی خدیو به برداشته اند که اقدام و نقلی اولی بنده
- 64- بود لزوم اولی که باقی اسباب می نماند که اجازت زمانه و موقتی نیستند تدارک و تاسیس و نظیر اینه ایجاب
- 65- در لزوم کتبه مفاد علیه مصلحت شاهانه ملک و غیره به تقدیم نقیض و کتبی ایجاب بر خصیصه با معنی عقیده خدیو
- 66- به برداشته اند مراتب علیه مصلحت در مرتبه و در مرتبه و در مرتبه و در مرتبه و در مرتبه و در مرتبه و در مرتبه
- 67- باقی دستور اولی که در مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت نام نه یادش که از اولی که در مصلحت مصلحت و مصلحت
- 68- مصلحت مصلحت علیه مصلحت و مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 69- به استناد باقی از مصلحت مصلحت است اولی که در مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 70- مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 71- اصناف و بالاسی خطای مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 72- و ایجاب حاله مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
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- 75- نامه و باقی مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 76- استقامت و غیره و از طرف مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 77- هر حاله مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
- 78- و مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت مصلحت
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