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**PERIOD OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN  
SELECTED MEMBER STATES OF THE  
ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA  
ECONOMIC COOPERATION – RUSSIA, TURKEY  
AND UKRAINE**

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*To those witnesses of reforms who never had time to write...*

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**Valeria KOLOS**

**January 2012**

## **ABSTRACT**

**Valeria KOLOS**

**January 2012**

### **PERIOD OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN SELECTED MEMBER STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BLACK SEA ECONOMIC COOPERATION – RUSSIA, TURKEY AND UKRAINE**

The present Thesis is aimed at presenting basic information on the period of mid-1980-s, which was marked by administrative reforms and preparatory period to the reforms in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Brief information on common features in the three states' historical experience will be outlined. Besides, data on the structure, decision-making mechanism and subsidiary organs of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, will be accessible. The Organization brings together Russia, Turkey and Ukraine as Founding Member States. Selected data gives a general idea on the preconditions, course and outcomes of reforms in the three countries.

The Thesis consists of five Chapters apart from the Introduction. Chapter I is dedicated to the Perestroika reforms in the Soviet Union, Chapter II deals with economic liberalization and democratization in Turkey, Chapter III gives information on the institutionalization processes in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Chapter IV comprises results and discussion. Chapter V contains conclusions.

#### **Key Words**

Administrative reform, economic liberalization, system changes, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Communist Party, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Justice and Development Party, identity, modernity, institutionalization, independence, Perestroika, Glasnost

## KISA ÖZET

Valeria KOLOS

Ocak 2012

### KARADENİZ EKONOMİK İŞBİRLİĞİ ÖRGÜTÜ SEÇİLİ ÜYE ÜLKELERİ OLAN RUSYA, TÜRKİYE VE UKRAYNA'DA İDARİ REFORMLAR DÖNEMİ

İşbu Tezin amacı, Rusya, Türkiye ve Ukrayna'da reform çağı olarak geçen 1980li yıllar hakkında temel bilgi vermektir. Aynı zamanda, her üç ülkeyi bir araya getiren Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü karar verme mekanizması ve çalışma organları hakkında bilgi verilecek. Seçilen bilgiler, Rusya, Türkiye ve Ukrayna'da reformlara sebebiyet veren faktörler, reform süreçleri ve sonuçları hakkında genel bir fikir oluşturmaktadır.

Belirtilen amaçla hazırlanan Tez, giriş bölümü hariç beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. I. Bölüm Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği'ndeki Perestroika sürecini ele almakta, II. Bölüm Türkiye'de ekonomik liberalizasyon ve özgürleşmeyle alakalı. III. Bölüm, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği yıkıldıktan sonra Ukrayna'da yer alan müessese sürecinden bahsetmektedir. Genel görüşler IV. Bölüm'de yer almakta, araştırma sonuçları ise V. Bölüm'de bulunmaktadır.

#### **Anahtar Kelimeler**

İdari reform, ekonomik liberalizasyon, sistem değişim, Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği, Komünist Partisi, Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği, Rusya, Türkiye, Ukrayna, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, kimlik, modernite, bağımsızlık, Perestroika, Glasnost

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACS	Administrative Command System
AKP	Justice and Development Party of Turkey (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
APU	Agrarian Party of Ukraine
ARC	Autonomous Republic of Crimea
ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSEC HDF	BSEC Hellenic Development Fund
CC	Central Committee
CDPU	Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine
CM	(BSEC) Coordination Meeting
CMFA	Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
CNU	Congress of Nationalists of Ukraine
CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSO	Committee of Senior Officials
EU	European Union
FC	Federation Council
GA	General Assembly
GB	Great Britain

GDR	German Democratic Republic
IFI	International Financial Institution
KGB	Committee of State Security of the Soviet Union
KPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
KPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
LDPR	Liberal Demoratic Party of Russia
LDPU	Liberal Demoratic Party of Ukraine
LPU	Liberal Party of Ukraine
NIS	New Independent States / New Industrial States
OUN	Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PB	Political Bureau
PD	Pravoye Delo
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PP	Peasant Party
PPP	Public-private partnership
PR	Patrioti Rossii
PSPU	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SC PDF	Steering Committee of the BSEC Project Development Fund
SDPU(U)	Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United)
SPU	Socialist Party of Ukraine
SR	Spravedlivaya Rossiya
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
UN	United Nations
UNA	Ukrainian National Assembly

USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WGAAI	Working Group on Agriculture and Agro-Industry
WGBF	Working Group on Banking and Finance
WGBFI	Working Group on Budgetary and Financial Issues
WGBSEC-EU	Working Group on BSEC-EU Interaction
WGCC	Working Group on Combating Crime
WGCT	Working Group on Cooperation in Tourism
WGE	Working Group on Education
WGEA	Working Group on Emergency Assistance
WGEP	Working Group on Environmental Protection
WGICT	Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies
WGHP	Working Group on Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals
WGIRGG	Working Group on Institutional Renewal and Good Governance
WGOM	Working Group on Organizational Matters
WGT	Working Group on Transport
WGTED	Working Group on Trade and Economic Development
YR	Yedinaya Rossiya

# INTRODUCTION

## I. Background

In this thesis, basic information on the period of mid-1980-s, which was marked by administrative reforms and preparatory period in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine will be presented along with its primary systematization and analysis. As the Republic of Turkey continues its course of democratization, reviewing processes, which are in some aspects similar to what was going on in Russia in 1986-1988, presented data will be of practical interest for researchers. Steps taken towards democratization and the very intent of them could be similar, but their combination with liberalization of economy and their share in the reforms are doubtlessly different. While proceeding with further analysis we will admit that the country which had started with liberalization of economy, turned out to be more successful in every type of reforms – administrative, economic, social, democratic.

At the same time, this complex data could be of use for Russian and Ukrainian researchers who are still not so familiar with Turkish experience of liberalization and democratization. Soviet, post-Soviet and then Russian and Ukrainian political scientists traditionally have been oriented much more to the experience of Europe and the United States of America. Lack of proper economic and sociological data resulted in disproportional research of definite political and economic systems. Less attention was finally paid to a country having very similar post-revolution experience.

1980-s which were the era of reforms for all the Black Sea littoral states brought many changes into the existence model of hundreds of millions of people. While none of the schemes researched could be called ideal, there is scenarios with more or less damages in political, economic and social spheres. Subsequently, this research shows the necessity of timely accumulating relevant data on the processes going on in different parts of the world, especially in the states which, in this or that sense, could have some developmental similarities. This kind of data should be duly analyzed and presented for further analysis as a part of possible scenario.

As the world grows globalized, exchange of experience gets easier. Sharing success stories gains more significance day after day. Researches on new and newest history do not just help to realize what really happened some 30 years ago. They will clearly indicate the most effective development scheme elements of which could be used by other countries which just start their way towards liberalization and democratization.

Speaking of the course of reforms, we should have the clear picture of preconditions for such actions. In this research, attention will also be paid to the situation the countries' political and economic systems were in before the reforms had started. Again, there is only one state out of three whose start can be called a successful one. Huge changes in Turkish economy triggered liberalization and democratization in political and social life, thus preparing the ground for moderate political Islam, democratic changes and reforms of the Justice and Development Party to come later.

As for Russia and Ukraine, economic modernization would not have brought too much for one simple reason. There was almost nothing to modernize. While numbers in statistic reports were nothing but a result of a chain of bureaucratic correspondences, considerable sums of money pumped in shifting Soviet economy resulted in nothing but another row of numbers generated by bureaucrats. Political reforms went in vane because of the lack of personnel able to decide and take responsibility. As the Iron Curtain started leaking, people got more and more information about the freedoms and living standards of the West. Finally, there was no painless way of getting then-154-million population of the USSR to the point where political, economic, intellectual and cultural needs of the people would be met.

Ukraine followed Russia as its 'Big Brother' and experienced the outcomes of reforms. Liberalization of political life and decriminalization of national social movements resulted in enhancing of national identity. Special attention started being paid to preservation of languages of Soviet Republics. On October 28, 1989, the Supreme Council of Ukraine adopted the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR.

The Law was aimed at securing the functioning and all-aspect development of Ukrainian language<sup>1</sup>.

At the same time, Ukraine is the only former Soviet Republic which managed to make its way to independence without acute ethnic conflicts and blood-spill. The country underwent all the hardships of reforms and post-reform period together with the rest of collapsed Soviet Union.

In this study a brief information on withdrawal of Ukraine from the Soviet Union will be presented along with the preconditions of this process. Here it is necessary to admit that the collapse of the USSR and withdrawal of Ukraine can be studied as a pattern of precondition-consequence. Declaration by Ukraine of its independence fastened the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In its turn, enhancing of national identity and conscience in Ukraine was triggered by democratization processes which had signed the end of USSR. To sum up, we can say that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and withdrawal of Ukraine from the USSR can be considered interconnected political processes.

## **II. Purpose of Study**

### **II.I. Brief Information on Specific Social Developments**

Significance of the issue of administrative reform increases every year since mid-1980-s when crucial changes in Europe triggered the process of further democratization and globalization. In the USSR, the Perestroika process started. Together with democratization and giving the former Soviet Republics the right for self-determination, it has brought about the new vision of economy and administrative system. Economy and bureaucracy as they used to be no longer existed. Chronologically it coincided with the Özalite era in Turkey, which had started with liberalization of economy.

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<sup>1</sup> Zakon Ukrayinskoyi Socialistichnoyi Respubliki 'Pro Movy v Ukrayinskiy RSR'; Verkhovna Rada URSR, Zakon vid 28.10.1989 N: 8312-XI, <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/annot/8312-11>

This study is aimed at presenting the aspects and course of administrative reforms in the subject states. There is no single administrative reform formula that can be applied everywhere. Each country makes its own way towards changes. In Turkey with its long tradition of civil society, liberalization in economic life meant the start for further democratic steps. As for Turkey, this is the case when economic reforms are followed by several waves of democratization with the newest one on September, 12, 2010. In this research I am planning to prove that a reform inside a political system calling itself a party, as well as economic reforms and forming the elite can be considered parts of complex changes under the administrative reform.

Speaking of civil society in Turkey, it is necessary to mention that there are different opinions on 'starting point' for civil society in Turkey in the aspect of time. According to Gorhalmaz İbrahimli<sup>2</sup>, 'existence of relatively free organizations having no strict margins defined by the state, is a one and a half centuries' civil society experience of a country, and it has to be approached with respect.'<sup>3</sup>

Here we have to briefly mention another dimension of Turkish civil society. Ottoman foundations (*vakıflar*) dating back to XVI century,<sup>4</sup> and providing aid, healthcare services and education, were important points of philanthropy and consolidation. Foundations were established by means of cash<sup>5</sup> or immovable property<sup>6</sup> and provided aid throughout the Empire.

E. Fuat Keyman, also mentioning the civil society experience of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>7</sup> pointed out the difference in development of civil society structures after 1923. In the process of making the new Turkey, Kemalist elite was aiming to establish a new, modernized nation-state. "One type countryman' concept demanded

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<sup>2</sup> Chairman of Democratic Elections Center of the Republic of Azerbaijan, First Deputy Head of the *Aydınlar* Party

<sup>3</sup> Gorhalmaz İbrahimli, 'Grazhdanskoye Obschestvo v Turcii', 10.09.2009, <http://www.zerkalo.az/2009-09-10/world/2642-turciya-tretyi-sektor>

<sup>4</sup> Murat Çizakça, *Osmanlı Dönemi Vakıflarının Tarihsel ve Ekonomik Boyutları*, Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi, İstanbul, <http://www.tusev.org.tr/userfiles/image/ford/Osmanli%20Donemi%20Vakiflarinin%20Ekonomik%20Boyutlari.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, page 24.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, page 26.

<sup>7</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, 'Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum Serüveni: İmkansızlıklar İçinde Bir Vaha', *SGTM*, Kasım 2006, Ankara, p. 22.



neither individual (liberal) nor class-based (Marxist) social views.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the very category of civil society had weakened a lot in the period between 1923 and 1980.<sup>9</sup> Turkish civil society underwent a significant transformation in 1980-s and especially in 1990-s when Turkish modernity and the notion of state-centered directing the society from above came across a representation crisis.<sup>10</sup> Further liberalization in economy and the country's entering globalization schemes boosted significant transformation of civil society in Turkey.

As for Russia, the processes of Perestroika (reforms) and Glasnost (transparency) were nearly simultaneous. Economy, administrative system and the Communist ideology collapsed together. The greatest reform from all the course launched by Mikhail Gorbachev did not concern economy. Perestroika reforms have overthrown the monolith of Communist Party. After some 70 years of reign and suppressing a slightest sign of opposition, it was deprived of its monopoly for ruling the country. Communist Party reform turned *ideocracy* into real political party and introduced opposition and elections with more than one candidate. For the first time since 1918, persons who are not members of the Communist Party should have the right to be nominated for directorial posts. Attention was planned to be paid to enhancing intra-party transparency.

Another objective of this thesis is to study the processes initiated by administrative reform in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Every of these three Member States of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) has its own experience. In this study, I am aiming to present the similarities and differences of their administrative reforms.

At the same time, I am planning to present the outcomes of the changes in administrative systems – in our globalized world they cannot be studied apart from politics and economy. Impact of reforms has to be compared to the ones of other states – subjects of this study. At a later stage, a deeper research dedicated to

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 27.

shares of simplification of bureaucratic procedures, democratization of society and liberalization of economy in each state could be undertaken.

## **II.II. Common Features in the Subject States' Development**

The common features of the processes taking place in the administrative spheres of the three states can be identified after the inception of the BSEC. The main objective of the Organization, the idea of which belongs to Turgut Özal, is to promote democracy in the region by means of liberalization of economy, simplification of procedures having negative effect on international trade, and ensuring well-being in the region through economic development. As the latter cannot be imagined without proper administrative backing, reforms in this field become even more important.

The reason for choosing Russia, Turkey and Ukraine is my intention to collect brief data on the measures taken in order to modernize the administrative system, economy and society, as well as to match and compare the outcomes of reforms. Every state has a similarity to the others in its history. The USSR and the Republic of Turkey faced the urgent need for reforms in mid-1980-s. Ukraine, then a Soviet Socialist Republic, experienced the same problem. Taking a brief look at the history of the states-subjects of the research, we can say that the similarities are not limited by the second half of XX century.

The Russian Empire faced the October Revolution in 1917 and lost a lot of its territories, which it managed to gather again by early 1920-s. Ottoman Empire lost its territories in the Balkans and in the Middle East starting from 1910-s. At a later stage, Turkey started its way towards a nation-state. Ukraine, being a part of the Russian Empire, struggled hardly for its independence during and after the October Revolution. Clashes between the Communists and the White Movement (*Beloye*

*Dvizheniye*) continued till late 1922<sup>11</sup>. In Central Asia, *Basmach* movement continued last till 1942.<sup>12</sup>

Every state took a step into a new modernity after the collapse of empires and World War I. Transformation of society and establishing a new elite came to the agenda; national and ethnic identity issues in newly created states demanded elaboration of brand new concepts. Approaches towards religion changed dramatically after the revolutions.

Finally, the aim of this study is to put together the data on administrative reform in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine and analyze them in general in order to figure out the effectiveness of each of them. As it has been stated above, the three states shared a lot of similar dramatic processes in XX century. At the same time, all of them had their specific ways of solving them. By this thesis I intend to study which ones were the closest to solution.

### **III. Study Area**

As this research is dedicated to the administrative reform, the preconditions, course and consequences of changes will be studied. Administrative reform means a complex of measures aimed at establishing an effective system of executive organs on the basis of clear mandate for their activities. If the needs of the public (living standards including accessible education and healthcare services, security and safety of all levels etc.) can be categorized in a similar way, the means of establishing a system that would secure these achievements will differ from country to country. This is determined by many factors from religious background and civil society tradition in a state to the already-formed methods of reforming the levels of administrative system.

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<sup>11</sup> Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Encyclopedia, Moscow, Nauchnoye Izdatelstvo 'Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Encyclopedia', 2007, v. 7, pp. 595—596.

<sup>12</sup> Vadim Damier, *Basmacheskoye Dvizheniye, Rossiya i SSSR v Voynah XX veka*, M., 2001, [http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/istoriya/BASMACHESKOE\\_DVIZHENIE.html?page=0,2](http://www.krugosvet.ru/enc/istoriya/BASMACHESKOE_DVIZHENIE.html?page=0,2)

The study area of the research is presented by written materials on the period of administrative reforms in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Together with sources in English, translation from Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish will be used and combined in order to formulate a wider prospect of the issue. Some topics, especially in Ukrainian new history, still lack written sources and need a more detailed research.

Closer to the end of XX century, Ukraine found itself in a situation which, to some extent, can be compared to early history of Slavic peoples. Insufficiency of written sources experienced with regard to the end of 1980-s – beginning of 1990-s. This phenomenon can be explained by three basic factors. First is the conservativeness of Ukrainian top officials. There was a saying developed about Ukrainian Communist administration: “When Moscow trims the nails, Kiev cuts down the fingers”. The other is purely economic. It was not profitable to record the processes taking place in Ukraine. Rapid collapse of economy, introduction of a new unit of payment every couple of months, hyperinflation made hundreds of academicians start primary trade systems. As scientific and research institutes were rented by newly established business companies, scientists and academicians whose works gained international recognition were forced to migrate to Great Britain, Israel and the United States. Others found themselves on a labor market unable to present something saleable. For the same reason archives were not duly kept; libraries often got closed. Finally, reforming processes in Ukraine stayed in the shadow of Russian Perestroika, and this is the third reason why the events in Ukraine were not documented in all aspects.

As for then-Soviet Russia and Turkey, they were luckier in the sense of documenting what was going on. As the collapse of the Soviet Union was predicted and much awaited in the West, a lot of ‘Kremlinologist’ sources were published along with Russian recipes of the cure for a country which was about to become history.

The changes in Turkey were not so painful, but this does not make them less important. Nowadays, when the world gets out of one wave of crisis and immediately gets into another one, the success story of Turkish democracy and economy should be carefully studied. To my opinion, the secret here is not only starting with economic

liberalization. A long tradition of civil society gave the people this opportunity to overcome the hardships and act as a single front towards freedom and development.

#### **IV. Main Contributions of the Study**

In this sub-item I would like to briefly describe the main contributions of the study. This research brings together the basic information on reforming processes in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Combining this data will be useful for completion of a unified database for three states. At the same time, general retrospective and preconditions for the reform processes in all three states will be outlined. It is necessary to admit that, taking into consideration the local specifics in every country, economic component and need for a new political and social strategy and thinking are the core factors triggering reforming processes. Together with putting on paper the preconditions and course of reforms, outcomes of the processes will be presented together with their primary comparison. Finally, I will present short information on further developments for Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. Moreover, translated materials of Russian and Ukrainian sources could be of practical use for future studies in the field.

The present study is focused on proving that mid-1980-s and the beginning of 1990-s were the period of crucial system changes for many states, irrespectively of their relations with the Soviet Camp. As it has been said above, the need for changes in the era chronologically coinciding with Perestroika was not the only common feature in three states' history. In the first half of XX century, the Republic of Turkey, which had chosen the Western way of development, had also undergone a very traumatic period similar to that in the young Soviet Union. This period had greatly influenced home policies of Turkey. Decades resulting in large human losses had a very different impact on the three states of this research.

Events which took place in Russia and Ukraine after the October Revolution in the beginning of XX century did not just have a huge impact on every aspect of life in what was left of the Russian Empire. Waves of violence greatly changed the mentality of people. Lenin and Stalin were extremely successful in creating a 'single-

type citizen'. Whoever remained unexecuted during many campaigns contributed greatly to the development of the newborn USSR in early 1920-ies.

## **V. Black Sea Economic Cooperation**

### **V.I. General Information**

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation brings together 12 Member States, including subjects of this study. These are: Republic of Albania, Republic of Armenia, Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, Hellenic Republic, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Turkey and Ukraine. The BSEC was founded on 25 June 1992.<sup>13</sup> Its founding documents are the Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement signed on that day by Heads of State and Government of 11 Member States (the Republic of Serbia joined the BSEC in April 2004).

The BSEC Headquarters - the Permanent International Secretariat of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation ( BSEC PERMIS) - was established in March 1994 in Istanbul.<sup>14</sup> With the entry into force of its Charter on 1 May 1999,<sup>15</sup> BSEC acquired international legal identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization.

The main objective of the Organization is promoting democratization by means of economic cooperation. For this reason, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States which is the highest decision-making body of the Organization, gave the mandate to the BSEC Working Groups to carry out their activities towards liberalization of intra-regional trade, simplification of visa

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<sup>13</sup> Summit Declaration of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, June 25, 1992, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Reports/Istanbul1992.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Headquarters Agreement between the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Republic of Turkey, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/statutory/head/Download/HeadQuartersAgreement071115.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/statutory/charter/Download/CHARTER%20web%20080630.pdf>.

procedures for businessmen, harmonization of trade and business legislation, promotion of public-private partnership, combating crime etc.

The BSEC Related Bodies are: Parliamentary Assembly of the BSEC (PABCES), the BSEC Business Council (the BSEC BC), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (the BSTDB) and the International Center for Black Sea Studies (the ICBSS). BSEC Related Bodies participate in all BSEC events they deem necessary, except in-camera discussions attended by Member States only.

The BSEC Observers are: Arab Republic of Egypt, Republic of Austria, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Croatia, Czech Republic, French Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, State of Israel, Republic of Italy, Republic of Poland, Slovak Republic, Republic of Tunisia, United States of America, International Black Sea Club, Energy Charter Secretariat, Black Sea Commission and the European Union. BSEC Observers have a renewable two-year mandate. Their Observer status is renewed every two years by the decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs upon an official request by an Observer state. BSEC Observers participate in all BSEC events they deem necessary, except in-camera discussions attended by Member States only.<sup>16</sup>

The BSEC Sectoral Dialogue Partners (SDP) are: Republic of Hungary, Islamic Republic of Iran, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Japan, Republic of Korea, Montenegro, Republic of Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Black Sea International Shipowners Association (BINSAs), Black & Azov Seas Ports Association (BASPA), Union of Road Transport Association in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSEC-URTA), Black Sea Region Association of Shipbuilders and Shiprepairers (BRASS), Black Sea Universities Network (BSUN), Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR), Danube Commission, International Network for SMEs (INSME), Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications (RCC). BSEC Sectoral Dialogue Partners have a renewable two-year mandate. Their SDP status is renewed every two years by the decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs upon an official request by a SDP state or

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<sup>16</sup> BSEC Tenth Anniversary Almanac, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 2002, p. 139.

organization. Sectoral Dialogue Partners define the fields of cooperation they would like to focus on within the BSEC Meetings. BSEC SDPs participate in all BSEC events they deem necessary, except in-camera discussions attended by Member States only.<sup>17</sup>

In order to understand the *modus operandi* of the Organization, one should take a look at its structure.

## **V.II. Structure of the Organization**

**Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States (CMFA)** is the highest decision-making body of the BSEC. As the Chairmanship in the organization is set on six-month basis, the CMFA gathers every six months in the capital of a state which is about to conclude its Chairmanship period. Ministers of Foreign Affairs are the Members of the CMFA. Foreign Minister of the Chairman state assumes the duties of the Chairman-in-Office. The Council takes decisions pertaining to the functioning of the Organization, makes commitments on Membership and Observer Status, and establishes subsidiary organs. The CMFA final document is the Report of the Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Along with CMFA Declaration which is traditionally signed at the Ministerial Meeting, Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations of the Council are adopted.<sup>18</sup>

**BSEC Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)** brings together high-rank officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the BSEC Member States. This Committee gathers at least twice during one chairmanship period. One SCO Meeting takes place before the CMFA Meeting. The CSO prepares documents to be considered and adopted during the CMFA Meetings. Senior officials review the Organization's activities, evaluate implementation of decisions and recommendations of the previous Council, discuss the issue of coordination with subsidiary organs and prepare the Budget of the Organization. Decisions on appointment of directorial and professional staff are concluded during the CSO Meetings and then presented to the Council of Ministers for approval. Senior Officials assess the work done so far by the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 138.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 14.



BSEC Working Groups and consider the information on the activities of the BSEC Related Bodies.<sup>19</sup>

**Coordination Meeting (CM)** is traditionally held at the beginning of each chairmanship. The Chairman-in-Office attends this event and presents the basic priorities of the Organization for the next six-month period. At the same time, the Calendar of BSEC Events is discussed and amended. Representatives of the Member States (as usual, CSO members) present information on the events their respective states would like to organize in their capacity as Country-Coordinator. BSEC Related Bodies also make brief presentations of the events they would like to organize during the new chairmanship period. As a rule, Coordination Meeting is followed by a press-conference given by the Chairman-in-Office to the representatives of local and foreign media.

**BSEC Troika Meeting** brings together the senior officials from three Member States – the outgoing, the present and the incoming BSEC Chairmanship-in-Office. During this Meeting attention is paid to the Organization's dynamics during eighteen months.<sup>20</sup>

**Steering Committee of the BSEC Project Development Fund (SC PDF)** considers the project proposals put on the paper by the organizations and institutions from the Member States. In order to be eligible for consideration, a project proposal should comprise at least three BSEC Member States, be aimed at sustainable development and create a synergy with a view to enhancing cooperation and increasing living standards of the people in the region. For the time-being, projects in the following fields were considered: agriculture and agro-industry, culture, education, energy, environmental protection, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, tourism, information and communication technologies, science and technology, small and medium enterprises.<sup>21</sup>

**BSEC Hellenic Development Fund (BSEC HDF)** was established on April 17, 2007, by decision of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Kyiv,

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup> BSEC PDF website,  
[http://www.bsecprojects.com/index.aspx?pageName=basic\\_information&id=3&parentId=2](http://www.bsecprojects.com/index.aspx?pageName=basic_information&id=3&parentId=2)

Ukraine. The Fund considers project proposals in such fields of cooperation as renewable energy sources, environmental protection, transport, tourism, culture, business cooperation and trade facilitation.<sup>22</sup>

### **BSEC Working Groups**

BSEC comprises the following Working Groups: BSEC Working Group on Agriculture and Agro-Industry (WGAAI), BSEC Working Group on Banking and Finance (WGBF), BSEC Working Group on Budgetary and Financial Issues (WGBFI), BSEC Working Group on BSEC-EU Interaction (WGBSEC-EU), BSEC Working Group on Combating Crime (WGCC), BSEC Working Group on Cooperation in Tourism (WGCT), BSEC Working Group on Culture ( WGC), BSEC Working Group on Customs Matters ( WGCM), BSEC Working Group on Education (WGE), BSEC Working Group on Emergency Assistance (WGEA), BSEC Working Group on Energy ( WGE), BSEC Working Group on Environmental Protection (WGEP), BSEC Working Group on Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals (WGHP), BSEC Working Group on Information and Communication Technologies (WGICT), BSEC Working Group on Institutional Renewal and Good Governance (WGIRGG), BSEC Working Group on Organizational Matters (WGOM), BSEC Working Group on Science and Technology (WGST), BSEC Working Group on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (WG SMEs), BSEC Working Group on Cooperation in Tourism (WGCT), BSEC Working Group on Transport (WGT), BSEC Working Group on Trade and Economic Development (WGTED).<sup>23</sup>

At the same time, Ad Hoc Working Groups and Steering Committees have been established under the BSEC auspices.

As we see, only Greece and Turkey were not a part of the Soviet Camp – whether as a ‘brotherly state’ or a Republic of the USSR. Till January 1, 2007, Hellenic Republic was the only European Union member in the BSEC family, but with

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<sup>22</sup> BSEC HDF website,  
[http://www.bsecprojects.com/index.aspx?pageName=statutory\\_documents\\_%28bsec\\_hdf%29&id=21&parentId=10](http://www.bsecprojects.com/index.aspx?pageName=statutory_documents_%28bsec_hdf%29&id=21&parentId=10)

<sup>23</sup> BSEC Tenth Anniversary Almanac, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, 2002, p. 13.

the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, the number of EU members in the BSEC Organization reached one fourth.

Economic cooperation able to promote democratization cannot be imagined without proper state support, harmonization of economic and trade legislation and combating corruption. Nowadays exchange of information and best practices is of great significance for the Organization. BSEC Working Group on Institutional Renewal and Good Governance plays an important role in this process.

BSEC is the only platform on which Russia, Turkey and Ukraine interact so closely. All three states are not members of the EU, and each of them has its specific format of relations with the European Union. Moreover, structure of the BSEC Organization was taken as reference in the establishment process of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States in 2009.<sup>24</sup> The Council which brings together the Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the Republic of Turkey, also has such organs as Council of Ministers, Committee of Senior Officials, and related institutions like Turkic Business Council, International Organization of Turkic Culture, Turkic Academy and Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic Speaking Counties<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkeler İşbirliği Konseyi'nin Kurulmasına Dair Nahçıvan Anlaşması, 3 Ekim 2009, [http://www.turkkon.org/docs/02\\_a\\_NahcivanAnlasmasi\\_Turkce.pdf](http://www.turkkon.org/docs/02_a_NahcivanAnlasmasi_Turkce.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> Türk Dili Konuşan Ülkelerin Parlamenter Asemblisi (TÜRKPA) Hakkında İstanbul Anlaşması, 25 Ekim 2011, <http://www.turk-pa.org/huquqisenedler>

## CHAPTER I

### RETROSPECTIVE AND TRADITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM; PERESTROIKA AND GLASNOST PROCESS IN RUSSIA

This Chapter will present basic information on reforming and democratization processes in the Soviet Union known under the general name of *Perestroika*. It is necessary to clarify that the latter was not the only policy initiated in order to rebuild the shifting Soviet Union. A wide range of renovation-oriented measures bear the name of *Perestroika*.

Preconditions for this complex of reforms were mainly economic. By mid-1980-s Soviet economy proved to be ineffective. As a result, hundreds of millions of citizens were dissatisfied with administrative-command ruling style. Ideology and economy, both Marxist, had finally come to a dead-end. War in Afghanistan and Chernobyl disaster triggered disintegration processes in Soviet society. Urgent reforming of management methods, modernization of economy and relief for the people were needed.

Number of measures referred to as *Perestroika* included the following components: *Uskoreniye* (speeding-up modernization of economy), *Perestroika* (restructuring of and social life), *Glasnost* (introducing transparency in political and social life and ensuring freedom of thought and speech), and *Demokratizatsiya* (reducing the role of Communist Party in political life of the country).

Policies aimed at economic modernization resulted in nothing because there were no effective mechanisms of introducing improvements to worn-out heavy industry together with enhancing production of common usage commodities. As modernization turned out to be impossible, restructuring of the whole system was announced under the definition of *Perestroika*. Communist organs started being composed of younger and more dynamic personnel. Introduction of multi-candidate election system was a real step towards liberalization of Soviet society.

Liberalization of economy legally decriminalized private initiative. The notion of private property came to the agenda. A new wave of criminalization of businesses started during the era of primary capital accumulation. Production level decreased dramatically, and the economy was import-oriented. Working schemes of young enterprises were kept simple and consisted of operations on reselling commodities from abroad. Here it is necessary to admit that a lot of Soviet citizens were used to mark this kind of business activity as '*spekulyatsiya*'<sup>26</sup>. Cooperative movement became a part of Soviet life in the late 1980-s.

*Glasnost* campaign can be named most successful among Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. Censorship was lifted, private newspapers were established. After that a lot of works by such dissident authors as Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Yuli Daniel, Vasily Aksyonov, Evgenia Ginzburg were published. As archives got unsealed crimes of Stalin's regime had been unveiled; discussions had started on the number of millions of Soviet citizens who were executed or vanished in the camps. *Glasnost* process had boosted public discussions on the development scenarios of the country. Facing the bitter truth of suppression process starting with the October Revolution was not very easy, especially for the senior generation.

*Demokratizatsiya* was meant to reduce political weight of the Communist Party. Political will of Gorbachev and his team was not enough to reform the Party because there were no relevant mechanisms established. As a result, the Party ordered itself to reform itself.

Speaking of the outcomes of the Perestroika process, we have to say that the desired results were not achieved for many reasons. Economy demanded immediate re-establishment, effective contemporary management and a streamlining of the whole system; modernization would never be enough. Political changes deepened ambivalent feelings of the Soviet citizens who were tired of living a Soviet life but could not accept another mode of living. Discussions of the Communist Party's role, its experience of suppression and future place in the country's life deepened the gap between supporters and opponents. Every republic started seeking independence. At

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<sup>26</sup> The Russian word for 'speculation', re-selling goods at much higher price.

the same time, local conflicts hit the country. A huge country passed away, and was reborn as a commonwealth of states each having its President, national flag and currency. *Perestroika* processes continued after the Soviet Republics established their statehood. New types of governing, managing and thinking were required but key positions in governments were occupied by the same Communist senior officials. Era of split of large political parties and distribution of authority had begun.

There are a lot of questions in historical context which still need to be answered. These mainly deal with the nature of the USSR's dissolution process, military component in the Soviet economy, and the starting point of ethnic-based conflicts. At the same time, disintegration of the state shall need discussions in terms of constitutional law. Dissolution of the USSR can be treated as natural process of an empire coming to an end. Still, many post-Soviet citizens refer to it as to a result of some mysterious conspiracy theory. Whatever this dramatic process was, it needs further research and adequate conclusions to be done by experts. *Perestroika* reforms were not just a story of new Russia's emerging from the remains of the Soviet Union. They had become the starting point for re-gaining of independence by fifteen republics. Communist Party ceased to be a state within a state and had taken its place in the range of other political parties with their objectives and programs. As economic reforms coincided with liberalization of border-crossing policies, Soviet market started being saturated in common usage commodities, but purchase power of the population decreased largely. This gave another boost to development of business activities in the former USSR. Practically, the reforms were meant to bring the country closer to Western living standards. Westernization attempt resulted in emerging of fifteen third-world countries, some of them having nuclear weapons. Status of many autonomous regions, like Crimea and Nagorno-Karabakh was to be properly defined. Dissolution of the Soviet Union left many things unfinished, and it would not be realistic to expect more from a country's decline. Reforms in the Soviet Union were inevitable, and their consequences are to be deeply studied by relevant experts.

## 1.1. Preconditions for the Perestroika Process

Speaking of the Perestroika process, we should bear in mind that this term is generally used as a definition for a number of reforms and renovations launched by Mikhail Gorbachev. The set of measures elaborated by his team would not leave a single field of life in the USSR untouched. The whole reform era took the name of one component meaning *restructuring*. For this reason, 1985 is referred to as the starting point of Perestroika. In fact, that year was the beginning of Uskoreniye, meaning *acceleration*. Gorbachev planned to overcome deep stagnation in Soviet economy by means of fastening technical, economic and social development. Gorbachev's administration had an assignment of unbelievable significance. The whole society was to be reformed. Reforms started with the economy. As the military complex was the economic priority, the Soviet Union had been importing grain from the USA since 1970-ies.

In his article<sup>27</sup> M. Gorbachev stated the following: 'Perestroika is not an invention of Gorbachev. It is not even an invention of a group of people. Strives to reform the country were made for several times after Stalin's death. The first one, being the most courageous and bearing danger to be overthrown for two or three times, was undertaken by Khrushchev. Then stabilization occurred, but it was followed by conservation and rebirth, reanimation of Stalin-style norms of living, and in some aspects was even worse. But, at the same time there were intentions to attain changes, such as 1965 reform by Kosygin. As much as this, there were fragmentary endeavors to reform our agriculture, capital constructions and other spheres. An understanding was strengthening – of the fact that we lose speed – our main advantage; that we start to give up our positions from one pyatiletka<sup>28</sup> to another; that we lose in labor productivity: 5 times in agriculture productivity, 2,5-3 times in industrial productivity. Wasteful, spendthrift economy was killing us. We patched the holes with oil; the oil boom coincided with the rule of Brezhnev, and with vodka, getting our people drunk... Besides, we started taking credits in deposit banks and cover budget deficit which had already been existing but no one had ever

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<sup>27</sup> M.S. Gorbachev, "Novaya politika v novoy Rossii", Svobodnaya Mysl. 1992. № 13, p. 22.

<sup>28</sup> 5-year industry/agriculture/economy plan in the Soviet Union.

reported that. Salaries were paid; people saved their money and invested it again. In other words, whichever sphere we speak about, we were pushed to a dead end. That is why Perestroika and reforms were needed.<sup>29</sup>

The first half of 1980-s was a period of extreme tension between the USSR and the USA. Military spending under President Reagan increased up to 7 % of the GDP. In return, the Soviet Union increased its military spending which resulted in freezing in production of civilian commodities. That caused a sharp decline in a frail Soviet economy.

Deep crisis of the Soviet society on every level was the main factor drawing necessity for crucial changes in the USSR. Managing scheme of the country called Administrative Command System ( ACS), which proved to be ineffective with regard to economy, was coming to its end. Along with officially recorded absence of inflation, there were large speculations in commodities of common usage. While statistics showed increase in industrial production, stagnation in economy was common knowledge.

In 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev was elected Secretary General of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The new leader who was younger than the rest of the Central Committee, brought about the concept of a “new thinking’. This was followed by emerging of a new generation of Soviet bureaucrats, who started their careers during de-Stalinization launched by Nikita Khrushchev. The newcomers successfully integrated into the Central Committee and were ready to act towards initiating a new era in the relations with the Western world. The new policy was aimed at coming closer to the developed states and developing deeper economic relations the United States of America and Europe.

Before we speak about commonly known Gorbachev reforms, there is a need to mention the very start of his political career. The starting point of reforming activities is characterized by an attempt to modernize Socialism by keeping the system alive but abandoning its ridiculous and cruel features. Fostering social and economic development of the country was on the agenda. This was the time when

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<sup>29</sup> M.S. Gorbachev, "Novaya politika v novoy Rossii", Svobodnaya Mysl. 1992. № 13, p. 23.



elaboration of a concept of management restructuring had started. Commercial rights of enterprises were to be extended as well as their autonomy, the workers were supposed to be more result-oriented. State quality control was introduced in order to ensure high quality of produced commodities. Elections of high level executive officials of the enterprises were held. On May 7, 1985 the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR issued a Decree on the Measures on Overcoming Hard Drinking and Alcoholism and Combating Moonshining'.<sup>30</sup> The main idea of the reform – to reduce consuming alcohol irresponsibly and start fighting heavy drinking - was in fact logic and positive. But, as it always happened in case of applying a not very thoroughly elaborated reform concept, the measures did not serve the goal. Huge grape plantations of rear sorts, many of them hybrid were irreversibly cut down in Crimea and Georgia. Alcoholism combating campaign first affected elite wine grape plantations destroying the decades' work of selectionists and other scientists instead of attempting to reduce consumption of depressive heavy liquors. Later on, when the state abandoned its monopoly of spirits sale, a great deal of income immediately got criminalized. In early 1990-s a big deal of initial capitals were made on spirits while the state treasury was emptying day after day. Cutting down grape plantations resulted in stagnation of whole industry sectors. Finally, the campaign started in order to increase the quality of life in the USSR ended up with increase in number of drug and toxic substances addicts, increase of moonshining and smuggling business, and billions of Roubles of budget losses.

Gorbachev introduced the policy of *Uskoreniye* – speeding-up of social and economic development. It resulted in a number of administrative campaigns, such as measures on combating alcoholism and struggle with unrecorded income. The said measures led to nothing but constantly increasing shortage in the most important consumer goods and food products.

In 1987, *Uskoreniye* was recognized insufficient in the struggle with harsh economy and poor living conditions<sup>31</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> Postanovleniye CK KPSS i Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR 'Ob usilenii borby s pyanstvom i alkogolizmom', M., 1985.

<sup>31</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 442.

## 1.2. 'Uskoreniye', 'Perestroika', 'Glasnost', 'Demokratizatsiya'

### 1.2.1. Uskoreniye

Though the very term of '*Uskoreniye*' meaning *acceleration, speeding-up* is not as popular in the world as '*Perestroika*' and '*Glasnost*', it is actually the starting point of Gorbachev's reforms aimed at modernization, democratization and combating corruption in the Soviet Union which showed signs of close catastrophe. On April 20, 1985, during a Communist Party Plenum, Mikhail Gorbachev had announced a new course of reforms needed for fastening economic and social development of the country. In his speech in Leningrad in May of the same year, the Secretary General emphasized stagnation in economy and production and low living standards. This was the first time in Soviet history when the head of state pronounced facts of this kind. Economic and social situation in the Soviet Union was no secret to anyone but expressing it in public had been a taboo strictly observed by the Political Bureau during the whole existence of the USSR.

The concept was further developed during the 27<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR (February 25, 1986—March 6, 1986). In his statement, Gorbachev elaborated on such new notions like 'Perestroika', 'Glasnost', and 'introduction of commercialization'. Technical and scientific progress and innovations were planned to be the core of acceleration<sup>32</sup>. As it is traditional for economies based on Karl Marx theory, priority again would have been given to heavy industry and military complex. In 1970-s and early 1980-s, '70 kopecks of each Rouble were reserved for military needs'<sup>33</sup>. Special attention was to be focused on enhancing responsibility and productivity of administrative officials.

Anticipation of progress and innovations resulted in pumping monetary masses into the heavy industry. This had aggravated the economic situation even more, deepening the gap between cash and virtual sums engaged in cashless clearings. Acceleration policy did not last long. During the Communist Party Plenum

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<sup>32</sup> Materiali XXVII Syezda Communisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Moskva, aprel 1986, p.3-4.

<sup>33</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 447.

of 1987, the failure of *Uskoreniye* was pronounced, and the concept of *Perestroika* took its turn<sup>34</sup>.

### **1.2.2. Perestroika**

*Perestroika* stands for rebuilding and restructuring. It was thought to be a range of measures ensuring democratization and transparency in the Soviet society, securely isolated with well-known Iron Curtain. Mikhail Gorbachev was of the opinion that the people would no longer carry the burden of worn-out Communist elite with average age over 70. Complex changes were urgently needed for the reorganization of the whole system, which in Russian sources is referred to as Administrative Command System. Soviet ideocracy<sup>35</sup> sooner or later had to include an economic component. Personnel issues also demanded renovating solutions.

The complex of reforms under *Perestroika* did not end with nothing like the *Uskoreniye* did. The whole process had a lot of unexpected results and, in fact, was the first stage of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Though the urgent need for reforms went without saying, there were quite a few state enterprises that could be eventually reformed. Heavy industry consumed more investment than ever but was outdated, agricultural sector was in terrible condition caused by lack of state support, corruption and ineffective management. Consumer goods and constant shortages in the most necessary commodities were widely resembled in literature and famous Soviet anecdotes. Absence of personnel able to make correct system decisions and take responsibility aggravated the situation<sup>36</sup>.

#### **1.2.2.1. Transformation in the Government and Communist Party**

First of all, changes were made in the government. The Secretary General had to form his team, so during 1985-1988 Gorbachev's opponents (Aliyev, Demichev, Dolgikh, Grishin, Kunayev, Romanov, Solomentsev, Tikhonov) were dismissed from Political Bureau. At the same time, the pro-Gorbachev majority was formed. It

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 449.

<sup>35</sup> Definition used for description of Soviet style of ruling the country by means of Communist ideology and demagogy.

<sup>36</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 449.

included such names as Lukyanov, Yakovlev, Yeltsin. As we see, the very process of reforms aimed at modernization and liberalization was initiated by good old Soviet administrative methods. By 1986, Gorbachev had renovated the two-thirds of the Political Bureau's personnel, up to 60 % of secretaries in regional committees and up to 40 % of the Central Committee members were replaced<sup>37</sup>.

It was obvious that any restructuring in economic and social life of the country could not be successfully implemented without respective changes in the political system. In early 1987, Gorbachev made a real step towards democratization of Soviet society by introducing such elements as multi-candidate elections. In June 1988, radical reforms were initiated at the Nineteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party. Gorbachev decided to reduce the Communist Party control over of the government. It was the time of real struggle for power. Members of the Political Bureau opposing changes got consolidated and more active. Articles and slogans calling the people back to the principles of Lenin and Stalin, started appearing in magazines and newspapers. Conservative bureaucrats tried to convince the majority to turn back but did not succeed.<sup>38</sup>

On December 1, 1988, the establishment of the Congress of People's Deputies was approved by the Supreme Soviet. The Laws 'On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the USSR' and 'On Election of People's Deputies of the USSR' were adopted. The first Law provided that the Conference of the People's Deputies of the USSR consisting of 2250 deputies, was now the highest organ of power. Its session was to be held once a year. The Supreme Council of the USSR was to be elected during this session. The second Law regulated the election procedure of People's Deputies of the USSR. Both laws became a significant step towards liberation from totalitarianism and single party system.<sup>39</sup>

Several months later, on March 26, 1989, the elections to the newly established Congress of People's Deputies were held. The First Conference of the People's Deputies of the USSR held its session in May-June 1989. Along with

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, p. 450.

<sup>38</sup> Materiali XIX Vsesoyuznoy konferencii KPSS 28 iunya - 1 iulya 1988 goda, M., 1988.

<sup>39</sup> Materiali Syezda Narodnih Deputatov Sovetskogo Soyuza, M., 1989.

Communist such well-known activists of democratization as Sakharov, Sobchak, Popov, Starovoytova received their mandates.

Consequently, Gorbachev found himself in a risky position. He could have been forced to resign from the post of the Secretary General should the Communist Party demand his resignation. Keeping in mind that his reforms were greatly opposed by a large number of Central Committee Members, Gorbachev had to consolidate power in a new capacity as the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The post itself was completely autonomous from the Communist Party, as well as soviets (councils) and could be subject to impeachment only if the direct violation of the valid legislation took place. Finally, on March 15, 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected the first (and the last) President of the USSR<sup>40</sup>. At the same time, some amendments to the Constitution of the USSR were introduced. President of the USSR was to be elected by all USSR citizens eligible to vote, but for the first time an exception was made, and the President was elected by the Congress of the Peoples' Deputies<sup>41</sup>. The elections were synchronized with amending the Article 6 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union aimed at deprivation of the Communist Party of a great deal of its political power. Thus the monopoly to power of the Party was lifted. It is necessary to admit that no referendum took place in order to vote in the amendments to the Constitution.

#### **1.2.2.2. Economic Policies during the Perestroika**

As for the economic component of democratization, the following acts towards liberalization in economy could be named, In 1986, the Law on Individual Working Activities was passed<sup>42</sup>. The next year, the Decree of the Council of Ministers on the Objectives of the Party in Full Reorganization of Managing the Economy was adopted. And in 1988, the Law on the Cooperative Business Activities was passed bringing into existence hundreds of small private businesses<sup>43</sup>. It was the first time since Lenin's New Economic Policy when private business was not outlawed. The

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<sup>40</sup> Materiali III Syezda narodnih deputatov SSSR, 12-14 marta 1990, Moskva, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>42</sup> Zakon Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR ob individualnoy trudovoy deyatel'nosti ot 19 noyabrya 1986 g., [http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow\\_DocumID\\_33680.html](http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_33680.html).

<sup>43</sup> Zakon SSSR ot 26 Maya 1988 g. N 8998-XI 'O Kooperacii v SSSR', Moskva, 1988.

majority of those were based on re-selling the goods brought from abroad. Mentioned developments in business sphere were a major step forward for a country where currency operations were monopolized by the state and keeping foreign currency even for collection could result in serious sanctions. The state submitted its monopoly for trade and services to private sector, which had no proper infrastructure, or educational background. This situation explains why the time of 'primary capital accumulation' was characterized by poor economic schemes in the majority of enterprises and businesses, as well as immediate criminalization of business.

By mid-1990-s, Soviet politicians finally decided to introduce private property notion for the means of production. It was one of the sheerest signs of dismantling of the very core of Socialist ideology. The President considered a number of economic programs envisaging transition to market economy. Economic program titled '500 Days' elaborated by a team headed by Stanislav Shatalin and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, gained popularity. Government of the USSR also submitted its program for consideration. The programs differed mostly in radicalization level. While '500 Days' defended a fast transition to market economy and introduction of different forms of property<sup>44</sup>, the governmental one tried to have the process lasting much longer. Government did not deny the necessity of transition to market relations but was eager to preserve a significant state sector in economy together with total control by state bureaucracy.

Mikhail Gorbachev preferred the governmental program on transition to market economy. It started in January 1991 with exchange of 50 and 100 Roubles bills. This measure was aimed at expropriation of money, which was received (according to the Government's view) illegally. At the same time, such an action would decrease the pressure of money masses on a frail consumer market. The time given for exchange of bills was limited. People were waiting in kilometers of queues in the bank. Moreover, they had to prove that they had received their money by legal ways.<sup>45</sup>

From this operation, the Government had received some 10 billion Roubles instead of 20 billion planned. On April 2, 1991 the prices of food products,

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<sup>44</sup> 500 dney, Moskva, 30 avgusta 1990 goda, perviye 100 dney, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 454.

transportation and utility services increased by 2-4 times<sup>46</sup>. Living standards of the Soviet citizens were successfully brought to a new low.

Official decision of Soviet Government on transition to market economy enabled the most energetic people to establish their own businesses which were to become first legal private enter price companies, trade and commodity stock exchanges. In spite of the fact that existing laws did not permit production of goods, a new class of entrepreneurs started to develop in the country. A great deal of private capitals worked in the sphere of trade. Privatization processes were too slow. Moreover, unemployment, crime and extortion emerged quickly.<sup>47</sup>

By the end of 1991, the era of financial pyramids began. The scheme invented in early 1920-ies in the USA, was successfully implemented on post-Soviet territories. A lot of companies aiming to attract as many investors as possible in order to accumulate money were established and widely advertized. Doubtlessly, no investments of other economic activities were carried out by these companies. Dividends to those who invested earlier were paid from the sums invested by those who joined the scheme later. The most famous pyramids were: MMM (10 to 15 million investors), Russkiy Dom Selenga (2,4 million investors), Tibet (150 thousand investors), and Vlastilina (16,5 thousand investors).<sup>48</sup>

### **1.2.3. Glasnost**

*Glasnost* meaning *transparency* and *openness* was introduced as a policy of publicity and full openness of the activities carried out by the government institutions in the USSR. The concept also included freedom of information. According to Gorbachev, this policy would help to combat corruption in the Communist Party and government. Though the main objective of Glasnost was to fight abuse of power by the state officials, it is more known for decreasing and then lifting censorship and introduction of the freedom of information and speech. The latter had a great impact on the whole system built on suppression of informational freedom. Political

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 455.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 455.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p. 456.

persecutions stopped. Academician Andrey Sakharov and his spouse, human rights activist Elena Bonner returned from exile.<sup>49</sup> Glasnost policies initiated by the new Soviet leader deeply changed the intellectual and spiritual aspects of the citizens' life. People's interest towards mass media increased dramatically. For 1986 alone, newspapers and magazines acquired more than 14 million readers.<sup>50</sup> Glasnost policy itself meant the end of Communist regime which could exist only on condition of strict information isolation.

Weakening of censorship led the Communist Party towards the loss of control in the field of mass media. Freedom of speech together with new truth and realities revealed while the archives got unsealed, turned the population of the Soviet Union against the government. In its turn, this became one of the main preconditions for dissolution of the USSR. Dramatic experience of all the peoples living in the USSR was being revealed. More and more attention was focused on social and economic problems of the country, and the debates on the models of further development involved every member of Soviet society. Severe suppression under Lenin and Stalin regimes, obvious underdevelopment, shortage in consumer goods, Chernobyl disaster and its possible consequences, wide-spread alcoholism, collapse of economy were opened for discussion.

Information on what was done by Lenin and Stalin administrations was the biggest shock for the whole country. Misdeeds of Khrushchev and Brezhnev were seen as aftershocks of the tragedy which had taken place in the first half of XX century. The people no longer had faith in the Soviet style of governing. As a result, nationalists and those who had experienced suppression by Soviet system, had won all kinds of elections. As the mechanisms of internal political control and repression lost their functionality, the central government no longer was able to impose its instructions in the Soviet Republics. It resulted in their even stronger motivation to gain independence from Moscow. The Baltic Republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, annexed to the USSR in 1940, were the first to start the process of

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 458.

<sup>50</sup> Mikhail Geller, 'Sedmoy Sekretar: 1985-1990', M., 2001, p. 79.



declaring independence. Singing Revolution which started in these three states, became one more motivating example for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.<sup>51</sup>

Another important outcome of Glasnost was the increase in contacts of Soviet citizens with foreigners. Development of business and cultural contacts contributed to strengthening of freedom of information.

#### **1.2.4. Demokratizatsiya**

The Russian translation of 'democratization' had been introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in early 1987. If we speak about liberalization processes in Russia, we have to say that every step with regard to this issue was closely related to the intraparty movements in the Communist Party. It was the authority deciding how much freedom – if any- is needed in a certain period of life of the country. In order to prepare the ground for future changes, Gorbachev had to gather his own team of younger politicians who would properly understand and carry out the course of reforms. The Secretary General was well aware of the fact that the country would no longer carry the burden of the government with average age over 70. So, in October 1985 N. Ryzhkov was appointed Head of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In December of that year Boris Yeltsin was appointed Secretary of the Moscow City Communist Party Committee. Eduard Shevardnadze assumed the duties of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A. Yakovlev and A. Lukyanov were moved to the highest Communist Party hierarchy. As a result of a new team policy, up to 90 % of high rank bureaucrats who served since the Brezhnev time, were replaced by younger personnel.<sup>52</sup>

In his numerous speeches on TV and addresses to Soviet citizens Gorbachev stressed that democratization was the model of introduction of multi-candidate and multi-party elections on every level. Younger and more effective personnel would be engaged in the activities of the Communist Party, which, according to Gorbachev's plan, was to become the locomotive of reforms. CPSU got deeply discredited in the

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<sup>51</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 450.

<sup>52</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 461.

course of Glasnost. The Party needed a new image to be elaborated through political liberalization and popularization of the whole renovated structure.

On January 27, 1987, the Communist Party Plenum gathered. Gorbachev made a statement 'On Reorganization and the Party's Personnel Policy'. The statement outlined the urgent need for transformation of the CPSU into a real political party; the Communist Party was recommended to stop acting like a state structure. Consequently, persons who are not members of the Communist Party should have the right to be nominated for directorial posts. Intra-party democracy should be enhanced; Soviets (Councils) of all levels should undergo serious changes in their role and functions, so they could be a real authority organs of their respective territories. Finally, Council elections should be carried out on the basis of options (since 1918, one single nomination was voted for each seat).<sup>53</sup>

By the end of 1980-s it was obvious that the Gorbachev reforms came with breaking unforeseen consequences which turned out to be anything but what Gorbachev expected. Finally, the Secretary General was criticized by conservative Communists opposing reforms, and by supporters of the new course who insisted in speeding-up the reformation process. Moreover, elements of future multiparty structure were emerging. Due to his democratization policies, Gorbachev gained great popularity and admiration in the West. In mid-1988, he initiated reduction of the Communist Party control over the government. Another call for more-than-one candidate elections was made, as well as for separation of the government apparatus from the party bodies. Conservative majority followed the instructions from above thus accepting reforms. It was the case when the Communist Party actually ordered itself to reform itself.

In December 1988, the Congress of People's Deputies was established with the approval by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Afterwards the Supreme Soviet had dissolved itself. Smaller size of this new national legislative body (around 2250 seats) was believed to make it more mobile. Still, one-third of seats was

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<sup>53</sup> Materiali yanvarskogo Plenuma CC KPSS. M., Politizdat, 1987.

reserved for the Communist Party.<sup>54</sup> The results of Congress election in March 1989 shocked the old-style elite. Communist candidatures having no alternative had been crossed-out from the voting ballots. Despite of that, the Communist Party still managed to get the majority of seats in the Congress.<sup>55</sup>

May 1989 became the moment of truth for millions of then-Soviet citizens. For two weeks, the deputies had debates on the experiences of the past and the state of affairs with regard to stagnation in economy, extremely low living standards and the urgent need for further reforms. The debates were broadcast live on the television. Gorbachev had also met criticism, but the most impact was made on the KGB and the military. Again, control of the congress was ensured due to conservative majority. Gorbachev was again elected as the Chairman of the new Supreme Soviet. The First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR was the last moment of Gorbachev's control over the Soviet Union.

Establishing opposition would be impossible without repeal of Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution. That article stipulated the leading and directing role of the Communist Party in Soviet society and its control over all state and social institutions<sup>56</sup> Gorbachev who realized the need for support against the old-style elite, had got Article 6 null and void by February 6, 1990. Later that month, the post of the President of the Soviet Union was proposed by Gorbachev to be introduced. He did not want to put the issue at risk so the election would be carried out by the Congress. By the middle of 1990 the Communist Party had obtained the image of a structure unable to rule the country and too worn-out to renovate itself. In the republics, Communist Party branches started their fragmentation as pro-sovereignty and pro-union fractions. Control by the central organs of CPSU weakened, regional branches were split. Nevertheless, the majority of Communist Party officials found their way in the newly established democratic structures. In order to achieve full control of their respective republics, they pulled harder towards sovereignty.

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<sup>54</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 463.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, pp. 466-467.

<sup>56</sup> Konstitutsiya (Osnovniy zakon) SRSR, p. 4.

### 1.3. Outcomes of Perestroika

As it has been stated above, the whole restructuring process in the USSR was nothing but an attempt to correct one huge mistake with another. Complex of political, economic, social and humanitarian reforms deeply affected respective spheres of life and came up with a number of consequences lasting till the present day throughout all the former Soviet Union.

Glasnost process can be commended for depriving the Communist Party of its absolute power over mass media. Range of problems from crimes of Stalinist regime, war in Afghanistan, Chernobyl disaster, to low living standards, environmental pollution, alcoholism and corruption on every level were vividly described but still a solution scenario was quite rare to see. Any positive image of the Soviet Union was no longer on the agenda. In return, Soviet symbols together with Perestroika items started being very popular in the West. Without Glasnost, Perestroika reforms would have resulted in silent death of the whole political and economic system. Freedom of speech made Soviet agony colorful and outspoken. At the same time, integrity of the Soviet Union was jeopardized.<sup>57</sup>

During the years of Perestroika, very few things were really done for effective reforming of economy and managing mechanisms. Laws on the issue, adopted by the Union government, extended the rights of enterprises, allowed small private and cooperative entrepreneurship, but left the principles of command-distribution economy untouched. Paralysis in central power resulted in weakening of state control over economy; progressing dissolution of industrial relations among enterprises located in different republics, policy of artificial increase in citizens' income in complex with other populist measures resulted in deepening of economic crisis in 1990-1991. Collapse of old economic system was not followed by development of a new one. It was an assignment all republics had to face on their own.<sup>58</sup>

First of all, the process of forming a democratic society triggered by Perestroika, had to be continued. Glasnost gave birth to the freedom of speech;

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<sup>57</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 468.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 470

multiparty system was forming, elections were held on the basis of alternative, independent press came into existence.

At the same time, one party still kept its positions in spite of all measures taken against it. It was the CPSU, which had in fact merged with state government. Soviet-style organization of state power did not ensure its division into legislative, executive and judicial branches. There was a need to reform all the state and political system of the country.

### **1.3.1. Nominations for Presidential Posts**

In 1990, Gorbachev, who was elected President of the USSR, had to carry out an immediate reorganization of the state power organs. Executive organs were now in his jurisdiction. A new consultative organ – the Federation Council (FC), the member of which were the heads of Union Republics, was established. At the same time, a complicated work on elaboration of a new Union Treaty, had been already launched. In March 1991, the first in the USSR history Referendum on Preserving the Soviet Union as a renovated Federation of equal and sovereign republics.<sup>59</sup> 6 out of 15 Union Republics (Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldavia) did not participate in the Referendum. 76 % of citizens participating in the Referendum voted for keeping the Union in a new format. An All-Russian Referendum was held in parallel with the Union one. The majority of voters supported introduction of the post of the President of Russia. People's election of the President were held on June 12, 1990. Boris Yeltsin was elected President.<sup>60</sup> After both events were over, Moscow turned out to be a capital of two Presidents – the Union one and the Russian one. It was not an easy job to properly coordinate positions of these two leaders, and their personal relations were whatever but friendly.

Both Presidents were in favor of reforms, but their approached with regard to methods and goals of changes were different. Gorbachev relied on the Communist Party, and Yeltsin was supported by forces opposing the CPSU. In June 1991, Yeltsin signed a Decree prohibiting activities of party organizations in state

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<sup>59</sup> SSSR-Rossiia: rezultati viborov i referendumov, M., Politizdat, 1992, p. 14.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, pp. 14-18.

enterprises and institutions.<sup>61</sup> Events developing in the country were clearly showing the fact that weakening of the CPSU and dissolution process of the USSR already were of an inevitable nature.

### **1.3.2. Economic Situation in the Country and Military Coup Attempt**

By the end of 1991 Soviet economy was in a catastrophic situation. Increase in money masses put the state control over the financial system at risk. Hyperinflation which could paralyze economy, was not a far perspective. Economic failures gradually jeopardized the positions of Communist reform leaders headed by Gorbachev. Increase in salaries and allowances which had started in 1991, increased an unsatisfied commodity demand, and by the end of the year a great deal of consumer goods disappeared from state trade thus emerging on the black market and commercial shops for prices raised in times. Retail prices tripled between 1985 and 1991, state control over prices could not stop inflation. Unexpected delays in supply of basic food products and consumer goods resulted in multiple crises (tobacco, sugar, vodka) and kilometers of queues. Limited distribution of food products was introduced. People were talking of a possibility of hunger.<sup>62</sup>

Western financial institutions started having serious doubts about the USSR's creditability. By the end of 1991, total foreign debt of the Soviet Union constituted more than 100 billion US Dollars, and taking into account mutual debt obligation, this sum was about 60 billion Dollars. Till 1989, servicing foreign debt cost up to 25-30 % of overall Soviet export in hard currency, but later on, in connection with rough decrease of oil export, Soviet Union had to sell gold from its treasury stock. Finally, by the end of 1991, the USSR found itself unable to carry out its international obligations with regard to servicing its foreign debt. Economic reform became inevitable and so much necessary.<sup>63</sup>

In the course of Perestroika, economic and inter-ethnicity problems that had developed and accumulated during decades, had become obvious. These were

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<sup>61</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 471.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, pp. 473-474.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 476.

aggravated by mistakes and miscounts made in the process of reforming. Political opposition sharpened; parties supporting socialist way of development, and parties and movements defending organizing economic development on the basis of capitalist principles, fought one another not only over economic issues, but also regarding the future form of the Soviet Union, relations of Union and Republic-level organs of state power.

Finally, by the beginning of 1990-s Perestroika led to deepening of crisis in all the spheres of country's life, attempt of military coup and dissolution of the USSR.

High-level party and state officials were of the opinion that only immediate and rough actions could save their political positions and stop dissolution of the USSR. Finally, they decided to use force and benefit from absence of Gorbachev in Moscow. At that time President was in Crimea for his annual leave.<sup>64</sup>

Early in the morning of August 19, 1991, announcements on radio and television were made that Gorbachev was sick and Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev was in charge of carrying out effective ruling the country and introducing the regime of the state of emergency. For this purpose, the State Committee on Extraordinary Situation – the so-called GKCHP, consisting of 8 people, was established. Gorbachev was isolated in his state *dacha* (summer house) in Fhoros, Crimea. Troops were brought to Moscow, and curfew was imposed.<sup>65</sup>

The RSFSR Council House became the center of resistance. In their address to the citizens of Russia, President Yeltsin and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council Ruslan Hasbulatov urged the people not to follow illegitimate decisions of the Committee, qualifying its actions as an anti-constitutional coup. Tens of thousands of Moscovites expressed their support to Yeltsin.<sup>66</sup>

Being aware of a possibility of starting a civil war, Yanayev and his fellow committee members did not seize the Council House. They started withdrawal of

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 478.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 479.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 481.

troops from Moscow and went to Crimea in order to make a deal with Gorbachev, but the President had returned to Moscow. Committee members were arrested. Yeltsin signed decrees on Current termination of CPSU activities and publishing newspapers of Communist orientation. Gorbachev announced his resignation from the post of the Secretary General of the CC CPSU, and then issued decrees actually terminating CPSU activity and transferring its property to the state possession.<sup>67</sup>

### **1.3.3. Disintegration of the Soviet Union**

Disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics can be named hardly expectable but, nevertheless, predictable. At the present time there is no clear official version of the basic reason of the USSR's dissolution. Consequently, there is no a 'would-be' scenario defining whether this crucial change in the world's history could have been prevented or at least smoothened. Among possible preconditions the experts name growing nationalist tendencies together with plans by each Soviet republic to develop its own economy and culture, authoritarian nature of the Soviet society proved by persecution of the church, pressure on dissidents by KGB, obligatory collectivism, single ideology prevalence, prohibition of contacts with foreigners, strict censorship, absence of alternatives or even any discussion on them. While the above factors were extremely important for intellectuals, such economic features of Soviet daily life as growing shortage in the most necessary food products and other commodities especially during the Perestroika period, prohibition and limitation measures brought into the regulations of land usage and deep underdevelopment in comparison with the West were more than enough to get millions of Soviet citizens dissatisfied with the present regime. *Uskoreniye* program launched in 1987 was impossible to implement because of the need for expensive modernization technologies. Extensive economy focused on defense industry did not meet any requirements of the people's daily life. In 1960-1970-s, state-controlled mass production was the only solution for shortage in commodities, unavoidable under the plan economy. The goods had to be artless and cheap. Nevertheless, poor quality and not-so-cheap price of the commodities produced resulted in loss of trust in the Soviet economic system.

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 483.



It is not by chance a number of man-made disasters is believed to break the Soviet Union's backbone. Several airplane crashes coming one after another, the Chernobyl disaster, natural gas explosions and Admiral Nakhimov shipwreck got a huge number of Soviet citizens de-motivated.<sup>68</sup>

Mathias Rust landing on the Red Square on May 28, 1987, could be to some extent called a foreshock of 911 events in the USA. Soviet Air Force turned out to be ineffective and highly vulnerable to attacks.<sup>69</sup>

Concealing the facts and figures related to these tragic events resulted in nothing but numerous rumors about what had really happened, and the growing dissatisfaction of the people with the government who turned out to be absolutely incapable of any response to an emergency situation.

Attempts to reform the Soviet economy system were in fact a try to correct one mistake with another one. Reform-like measures implemented improperly, or never implemented at all, ended up with stagnation in economy, which, in its turn, speeded up the demise of the whole political system.

Soviet economy, especially during the Brezhnev era, to a large extent depended on oil. Worldwide decrease in oil prices was another factor which had greatly affected frail Soviet economy. Monocentric decision-making mechanism based on the instructions from Moscow was ineffective and resulted in nothing but loss of time.

Briefly naming the basic factors of the dissolution of the Soviet Union one should not forget the two wars exhausting human and economic resources of the country. Afghanistan War and the Cold War, accompanying non-stop aid to the Socialist Camp States, were emptying the budget.

Moreover, there was one more significant event in the political life of shifting USSR. Here we should speak about the concepts of restructuring of the whole country. Concluding a new Union Treaty was a real danger to the country. The first

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 483.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid, p. 484.

Union Treaty (*Soyuzniy Dogovor*) bringing together the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Caucasus Republics, at that time united in one Zakavkazskaya Republic, was concluded in 1922. It was also used as the base for the first Soviet Constitution of 1924.<sup>70</sup> In 1936, the second Constitution was adopted, and the third one, the so-called Brezhnev Constitution, followed in 1977.<sup>71</sup> A new treaty would make all previous constitutions invalid, and the USSR – non-legitimate. This was the real starting point for disintegration.

The end of 1991 became the time when the USSR was irreversibly dissolving. Conference of the People's Deputies was dissolved, the Supreme Council was radically terminated, a number of Union ministries also got dismissed. State Council of the USSR headed by the President of the USSR and consisting of Heads of Union Republics, became the highest power organ. Its first Decisions were recognition of independence of Lithuania<sup>72</sup>, Latvia<sup>73</sup> and Estonia.<sup>74</sup>

On March 11, 1991, Lithuania became the first Union Republic which had declared its withdrawal from the Soviet Union. On December 1, 1991, a referendum was held in Ukraine, and the majority of voters supported the Republic's independence.<sup>75</sup>

On December 7-8, 1991, Presidents of Russia Boris Yeltsin, President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk and the President of the Supreme Council of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich met in Belovezhskaya Poushcha and announced the seizure to exist of the USSR and creation the Commonwealth of Independent States of three

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<sup>70</sup> Lukyanov A.I. *Razrabotka i prinyatiye Konstitutsii SSSR 1977 goda* Разработка и принятие Конституции СССР 1977 года (1962-1977 гг.) *Chronologicheskiy perechen meropriyatiy, svyazannih s razrabotkoy i prinyatiyem Konstitutsii SSSR 1977 g.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17.

<sup>72</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: ГС-1 'On Recognition of Independence of the Lithuanian Republic'

<sup>73</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: ГС-2 'On Recognition of Independence of the Latvian Republic'

<sup>74</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: ГС-3 'On Recognition of Independence of the Estonian Republic'

<sup>75</sup> Official Table of Results of all-Ukrainian Referendum, documents of the State Archive Service of Ukraine

republics. Later on all former Union Republics except the Baltic ones accessed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)<sup>76</sup>.

Consequently, Perestroika came to a dead end. This led the power to a deep crisis. As a result, the USSR fell into pieces and Gorbachev, facing the possibility of being held responsible for this, had withdrawn from the post of Soviet President, because the USSR no longer existed.<sup>77</sup>

Speaking of the scale of changes caused in the world, Perestroika can be compared to Great French Revolution or October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. Mikhail Gorbachev spoke out the necessity of exiting stagnation and started Perestroika process. The said process resulted in significant changes in the country's life, affecting the whole world. Such notions as Glasnost, political pluralism, end of Cold War came on the agenda. At the time of Perestroika, a lot of facts on the crimes of Stalin regime became known. In April 1986, a blast at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant led to a huge environmental disaster.

Gorbachev was the first to comprehend the necessity of global changes, but he did not have a clear plan of measures that would successfully bring the huge country to a new level of development with minor losses, and this is why many of his ideas were doomed. After political dissolution of the Red Empire, a then-single economic space started falling apart.<sup>78</sup>

From one point of view Perestroika can be assessed as an operation on capturing of Soviet property objects by Communist Party elite, and that the latter was interested in this kind of privatization than in keeping the country going. Soviet elite did not have much privileges in comparison with those of banana republics and Western elites. Soviet elite wanted to possess what the country had, so no one was planning to introduce any market economy.

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<sup>76</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 484.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 488.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, p. 493.

From the other hand, it was not Communist elite, but the mafia clan of Soviet secret service and national elites.<sup>79</sup>

Perestroika ideologists themselves have already retired. Many of them state in their memoirs and interviews that Perestroika did not have any ideological background. Yet, some measures being implemented since 1987, leave the room for doubt. A definition of 'more Socialism' was used by masses, but some changes in economic legislation were threatening the functioning of an old plan economy system: actual lifting of state monopoly for international economic activities, reconsideration of approach to relations between state organs and production industry. One of the turning points was the Decree on Cooperation of May 26, 1986, stating that currency earnings received by cooperatives, shall not be expropriated and can be accumulated with a view to be used in the future years.<sup>80</sup> That was a sign of fundamental breakup with previous Soviet practice. The notion of 'radical economic reform' comes into existence the same year.

It is difficult to name a number of changes in economic legislative base, going in one direction, random or coincidental. At the same time, it was difficult to announce the real plan to the people, because the psychology of all-equality was prevailing. Later on, a mass media campaign on revealing the Soviet past, had started. Constructive criticism was put aside. Alongside with serious researches, articles headed like 'We Cannot Live this Way' and irrational and absurdist materials could take place in one edition. Trust of people in Soviet institutions lessened a lot. To a great extent these materials owed their success to the names of editions giving floor to them. Soviet people were brought up to believe what was written in a paper.

No matter what were the real goals of Perestroika ideologists, changes in the USSR were inevitable: the sooner the better. Generation of Russians, Ukrainians and other nationalities who had grown up in post-Gorbachev time, assesses Perestroika in a more positive way than their parents and grandparents. The younger a

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 494.

<sup>80</sup> Zakon SSSR «O kooperativah», M., 1986.

respondent is, the more he/she is convinced that it would be wrong to assess Perestroika as a political mistake.

Deeds by Mikhail Gorbachev as the first and the only President of the USSR will still need a very deep research. Whatever the consequences were, he initiated a huge era of changes in every field of life in the Soviet Union. Speaking of his activities in the world community, we have to mention that Gorbachev was the first one to start a dialogue with the United States pronouncing a need to improve bilateral relations. During their meeting in November 1985, Gorbachev and Reagan acknowledged the expediency of bringing Soviet-American relations to a new level. In his statement of January 15, 1986, Gorbachev put forward a number of extremely important initiatives with regard to foreign policy of the USSR. These were full liquidation of nuclear and chemical weapons by the year of 2000, total control over the process of conservation and disassembling of warheads, and – the most important - ending the Cold War. Troops were withdrawing from Afghanistan. At the same time it could seem that M. Gorbachev exported all peace processes abroad leaving his own land torn away by ethnic conflicts from Caucasus and Moldova to Central Asia.<sup>81</sup>

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the newly emerging countries faced serious hardships in political, economic and social spheres. GDP dropped down dramatically, so did citizens' incomes, overall debts of industrial enterprises was growing. Privatization processes were slowing down; attempts to increase living standards failed. Actually, everyone was in favor of market economy. According to a common opinion, the sooner former USSR switches on market economy the better. No one thought of a price to be paid for this transition, like no one admitted the fact that there are a lot of countries in the world exercising market economy, but only few of them enjoy high living standards.

Socio-economic and political atmosphere of early 1990-s were characterized by increase in crime, both economic and violent, corruption, bribery. Russia had always had corruption – from Tsarist regime to the Soviet one. At present, its scales

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<sup>81</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, p. 495.

are beyond any calculations. Corruption had a good combination of circumstances to develop under: emerging market, substantial privatization for nothing, easy earning starting capitals.<sup>82</sup>

During the years of Perestroika it seemed to the people that the country is starting a new era of modernization of social relations aimed at developing democracy, de-monopolization of economy, freeing private initiative, emerging of labor motivation. These changes were to increase living standards and create all the conditions necessary for realization of a personality's potential. The state got a role of guarantor of social status and rights of citizens. The miracle did not happen.

Firstly, industrial economy was nearly destroyed by early 1990-s. It was utterly unable to adapt to the new conditions and challenges of market economy, new production conditions and competitive marketing.<sup>83</sup>

Secondly, productive labor had also been discredited together with industry and production. Producing material values was no longer prestigious. Old value system faded away, but the new one was still forming.

Thirdly, managing system in economy was totally disintegrated. Corporate interests of state officials resulted in establishment of close structures replacing economic goals with their own plans with regard to whatever had been privatized hitherto.

Fourthly, reforms were not the worst covering for escalating power struggle the results of which were devastating.

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 498.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, p. 499.

## CHAPTER II

### CRUCIAL CHANGES OF ÖZALITE ERA IN TURKEY

This part of the present research will be dedicated to one of the former Soviet Union's neighbors – the Republic of Turkey. This state had avoided selecting a Soviet way of development with a Communist Party as a decision-making machine, and Marxist economy. Alas, it did not help the state to stay away from violence on political basis which had exploded in Turkey in late 1970s. Military coup of 12 September 1980 could not solve political, economic and social problems in the country overnight. Chaotic violence was *vectorized* by the ruling junta. Further on, economic and political reforms were needed as the world had started showing the first signs of globalization. Turkey had to make its way to the world market introducing its goods and services. It was the time to decide whether the country will be a bridge or a buffer between Europe and Asia. So, a number of decisions with regard to economic liberalization was taken in late 1980. Western economists welcomed positive changes; era of volatile Lira rate and boost in joint ventures' establishment had begun.

The attempts to bring about a single-type citizen could not be called successful, and the multiple structure of the Republic continued comprising secular, religious, nationalist and other identities. There was a need for bringing together the society. At the same time, every identity should be properly presented in order to prepare the ground for further changes. When the Turkish economy took its place in the global system the issue of Turkey's EU membership came on the agenda. This matter comprised EU views of industrial unions which were helpful in getting every identity presented in business life of the country. Here we also see how the approaches of pro-Islamic parties changed with regard to the membership of Turkey in the European Union.

Speaking of a *coup-liberalization* pattern, we could come across an attempt of comparison between the military coup of 1980 in Turkey and the GKCHP attempt in the USSR in 1991. No matter how different these two processes are they can serve as another proof of the fact that an order brought into the country by force would not

last. Sooner or later it will face the need for democratic changes and economic liberalization. Turkey implemented a scenario which can be named successful. Economic liberalization prepared the country and society for the democratization process in store. Up to the contrary, a coup attempt in Moscow was not even a strive to keep together a country which was falling apart. It was a struggle for preserving authority and privileges possessed by a group of high-level Communist bureaucrats. Finally, no clique could stop the changes in the system. Moreover, GKCHP fastened the already-triggered dissolution process of the Soviet Union.

Economic liberalization scheme implemented in Turkey was way more logic than the changes in the USSR. First of all, Turkey had an economy which, on condition of liberalization, would prove its viability. As for Gorbachev's reforms, every new campaign is likely to be launched to create a new agenda in order not to accept failure of a previous campaign. Continuity, logic structure and gradual course of reforms in the Republic of Turkey were main components of their success.

To summarize, we should admit that reforms in Turkey have become the core of dynamic changes aimed at liberalization of economic, political and social life. They have got nearly every type of identity represented on the level of significant business communities. Özalite Reforms were the starting point of bringing moderate political Islam on the agenda and ensuring continuity in political parties' activities. Doubtlessly, there is no reform course which would not have faced problems. Inflation and growing foreign debt were the underwater stones in Turkey. Nevertheless, they were overcome and the country continued its route towards democratic values.



## 2.1. Preconditions for Özalite Reforms

It is nothing new that strategic geographical position of Turkey in complex with conditions suitable for economic growth after WWII, contributed to dynamic development of Turkish economy throughout the second half of XX century. Such factors as developed market mechanisms and institutions which the Republic of Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire, helped Turkey's inclusion into the number of states receiving economical aid in the framework of the Marshall Plan. Major trade corridors, North-South and East-West passing through the territory of Turkey constituted a solid base for a boost in economic development of the state in the post-war period.

In spite of a number of crises emerging in Turkish economy, there is a notion of 'Turkish economic miracle' coming into existence in the researches carried out in connection with distinctive features of development of Turkish economy. This notion was used to mark the developments similar to those of new industrial states (NIS).<sup>84</sup>

After WWII, Turkish economy was exhausted just like the economies of the states which had directly participated in the war. During the first post-war decade Turkey, traditionally considered an agricultural state, had in practice revealed its intention to develop industrial production. Sharp increase of the share of industry and sector of services combined with decrease of agriculture's share in the state's gross domestic product (GDP), as well as high dynamics of economic growth in 1980-1990s had become the most known and well-researched characteristics of the Turkish economic miracle.

Average growth in Turkish economy constituted 7.5 % in 1981-85 and 6 % in 1986-92. Extremely high growth dynamics were recorded in 1995 and 1997 – 8 and 8.3 % respectively.<sup>85</sup>

Stable economic growth in 1980s was a result of liberalization in economy that followed after the military coup of 1980. A set of stabilization measures adopted in

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<sup>84</sup> N.Y. Ulchenko, 'Economic Relations of Republican Turkey and Russia: History and Modern State', p. 37.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 40.

January same year, included structure reforming of national economy alongside with liberalization of foreign trade sector. The main emphasis was made on development of production sector, thus providing basis for transition from import-replacing to export-oriented economy. Among other significant reforms in the foreign economy in early 1980s we should also name liberalization of currency operations' mode as well as harmonizing national investment legislation with international norms.

In 1980s Turkey took her place in the system of world economic relations. Her position is characterized by extreme openness of national economy towards foreign capital flows, investment-friendly business atmosphere, and active economic and trade relations with a lot of states alongside with integration groupings. Ankara's modern foreign economic policy is developed in several vectors, such as Turkey-European Union (EU), Turkey-Central Asian and Caucasus states, Turkey-Middle East, Turkey-United States of America (USA).

Turkey is an important trade and economy partner for the EU Member States, majority of the Member Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States ( CIS), USA and the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey which is an importer of raw materials and energy, has developed a good image of exporter of textile, food, home supplies, construction materials, products of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, as well as services in construction and tourism sector.

In 1990-s the significance of Turkey and her economy increased drastically in connection with new geopolitical processes in Eurasia and the Middle East. Turkey had become a bridge for Western capital flows heading for the markets of Central Asia and Caucasus states.

General destabilization in the world conjuncture at the end of 1990s once again stressed the existence of common specifics in economic development of Turkey and a number of NIS of South-East Asia and Latin America, as well as Russia. Crises of 1998 in South-East Asia and Russia caused decrease in economic growth index of Turkey by 4.4 % (in two). In 1999, when a devastating earthquake took place, GDP growth had a negative index constituting – 6.4 %. Domestic financial

and economic crises of November 2000 and February 2001 led to shortening of production in all the branches of national industry. Decrease of production activities was aggravated by a crisis of banking system and shortening of all kinds of investment. Turkish economy, having wonderful perspectives up to mid-1990s, started regressing by the beginning of XXI century, showing a major dependence on international financial institutions (IFI), mainly on International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In the first half of 2000s Turkey managed to cope with inflation to a large extent. Partial stabilization in the stock market was interrupted by disputes in the government<sup>86</sup>, which had negative consequences for politico-social sphere. Society again lost its faith in stabilization policy, the exchange rate of Turkish Lira started decreasing.

In 2001 the volume of credit aid by the IMF exceeded 10 billion US Dollars, and this had been an important factor in countering the consequences of the last currency-financial crisis. During 2002-2004 Turkey received 16 billion US Dollars from the IMF in the framework of stabilization credit agreement.<sup>87</sup> The stabilization program was aimed at communicating more accountability and transparency to the state financial system which enabled control on the state spending. A tax reform was planned in order to stop taxation discounts. Moreover, the state was striving to avoid deficit in the primary budget.<sup>88</sup>

## **2.2. Views on Turkey's EU Membership**

Speaking of the coalition case in 2002, we should also mention an important issue which had been a subject of bargain in many political campaigns. Since the beginning of liberalization era, perception of Turkey's membership in the European Union (EU), in the sense of denial, could cost a political party dearly, especially if the negative attitude towards the EU was combined with pro-Islamic orientation of a party (it is not the case of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition).

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 41.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 43.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

“In order to fully assess the politico-economic context of the November 2002 elections we need to consider two historical developments that took shape simultaneously. One is the economic crisis and ruling coalition’s ineptitude that created impatience and anger towards the Ankara establishment. The other is the surprising initiative taken by the outgoing Parliament to pass the legal adjustment package for EU membership candidacy before the elections. The outgoing government’s willingness to bring the EU adjustments to the election agenda reflected a need to reshape the debate with an eye toward meeting the challenges of becoming a viable EU candidate.”<sup>89</sup>

### **2.2.1. Industrial Associations from EU Prospects**

Speaking of the EU perspectives, we should also mention that the issue of Turkey’s full membership in the EU had been researched with regard to the modernity visions of industrial pressure groups, such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSİAD), Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD) and Associations of Industrialists and Businessmen (SİADs).

Shortly outlining the identity of these associations, we have to say that they represent liberal, Islamic and conservative modernity visions. Existence of these structures in the Turkish economy as well as politics ensures continuity of globalization and cooperation processes in Turkey.

TÜSİAD is the oldest association established in 1971. Consisting of 469 members representing nearly 1500 companies, TÜSİAD is seen as the most powerful pressure group in Turkish economy. According to TÜSİAD, globalization brings about a new international cooperation culture, opens new horizons for sustainable project leading to success, acquires new economic rationality, urges the economic players to take decisions beyond the usual stereotypes.

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 45.

TÜSİAD is one of the most active supporter of Turkey's full EU Membership. The association is deeply engaged in lobbying the Turkish interests in Europe.

“For Turkey, the process of integration to the EU constitutes the most important supra-national relations, insofar as, according to TÜSİAD, it will determine the future of Turkey by contributing and advancing the level of both political modernization and economic development of Turkish society.”<sup>90</sup>

Let us proceed to a younger association. Established in 1990, MÜSİAD represents an Islamic modernity vision. The association's objective is development of friendly economic and commercial environment. Nevertheless, this objective shall not be achieved by means of denying traditional values and morality.<sup>91</sup>

MÜSİAD's globalization vision is similar to that of TÜSİAD. MÜSİAD is in favour of establishment of links among business communities, as well as cultures. Great minds think alike, so MÜSİAD's attitude towards EU membership of Turkey hardly differs from TÜSİAD's position on the issue.<sup>92</sup>

In spite of their communalistic and region-based specifics, SİADs “...appear similar to TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD in terms of their positive attitude to economic globalization, their support for Turkey's full EU membership, their adherence to free trade ideology...”<sup>93</sup>

Associations' welcoming the full membership of Turkey in the EU, together with revealing the unity of major business and industrial associations on this important issue in spite of their differences in identities and modernity visions, is an important factor influencing Turkish politics.

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<sup>90</sup>E. Fuat Keyman, Berrin Koyuncu, 'Globalization, alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey', *Review of International Political Economy* 12:1 February 2005, p. 114.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid*, p. 117.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, p. 119.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121.

### **2.2.2. Anti-EU Sentiments of Turkish Nationalism**

Modernity vision of nationalist parties had always countered intentions by Turkey to become a full member of the EU, as well as the country's dialogue with it.

"Issues of Europe and Europeanness have long been contentious subjects among Turkish intellectuals, ideologues, revolutionaries, academics, bureaucrats and, of course, politicians. However, the current political climate, pre- or post-November 2002 elections, almost unilaterally point to Radical Turkish nationalism and its parliamentary representative MHP as the prime protagonist of anti-European attitudes and discourse. This is particularly true in the aftermath of the recent legislative reforms in Parliament. The MHP and its leaders indeed appear to be the only group to oppose Turkish efforts to fulfill the legal criteria regarding full membership in the European Union."<sup>94</sup>

Nowadays MHP, with its political rhetoric, originating from Turkish deep political culture, is the engine of anti-European attitudes in the country. Political vision of the party is based on self-sufficiency of the Turkish nation. The party, like the other European ones of extreme right-wing, accept cooperation with the EU only on the issues of economy and national security.

### **2.2.3. Religious Identity**

A part of the issue of religious identity could have been described under the Anti-EU Sentiments sub-title. Here we should admit that till the beginning of 2000s the Islamist parties were traditionally opposing integration of Turkey into the EU claiming that this would severely damage traditional values. As a result of nearly thirty years of opposition, we see their political agendas become more civic and democratic after November 2002 elections.

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<sup>94</sup>Nergis Canefe, Tanıl Bora, Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: the Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism, p. 127.

“Similar to other Islamists, Turkish Islamists have also used intolerant and exclusivist rhetoric. They have used religion in a heavy-handed manner as the dominating parameter of their political ideology and have confined religious concepts and values to a certain group, nationalizing, modernizing, secularizing and politicizing them. Turkish Islamists have also envisaged taking over the state and using it to socially engineer a top-down Islamist transformation in society through state centralism. Political science literature argues that via electoral participation, radical, extremist and even anti-systemic parties may moderate their agendas in order to benefit from opportunities created by a pluralist democracy. (...) Thanks to pluralist experience Turkish Islamists have not only participated in elections, competed for median voters, and even democratically come to power but have also discursively and physically interacted with various Muslim groups, intellectuals, scholars, businessmen, communities and so on, in a pluralist setting. As a result, Turkish Islamists have been able to modify their ideology in tune with pluralist and democratic ideals.”<sup>95</sup>

#### **2.2.4. Defragmentation of the Turkish Right**

As we will see below, collapse of the centrist parties led to emerging and strengthening of Cem Uzan’s party. Speaking of the AKP’s electoral behaviour in 2002, we should admit that it made most use of the centre-right parties’ weakness “by filling the political vacuum which liberal-pragmatic parties and traditional-Islamic tradition created. AKP’s dissociation from the traditional Islamic stance of Necmettin Erbakan and the party leaders in post-28 February conditions further contributed to this process.”<sup>96</sup>

Islamic parties with their traditional rhetoric of Euro-scepticism and pan-Islamism were left behind by AKP’s success in 2002. Crises leading to collapse in centrist parties, need for new vision by the centre-right parties brought on top the

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<sup>95</sup> İhsan Yılmaz, ‘*Influence of Pluralism and Electoral Participation on the Transformation of Turkish Islamism*’, *Journal of Economic and Social Research*, 10 (2) 2008, p. 43.

<sup>96</sup> Fethi Açıkel, *Mapping the Turkish Political Landscape through November 2002 Elections*, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, p. 188.

party which, coming from Islamic tradition, tried to incorporate the elements of different currents into its concept.

“The defeat of Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) meant, therefore, not only the retirement of the old generation of conservative-Islamists, but also of their ideological repertoire.”<sup>97</sup>

There was also another factor revealing the real state of affairs in the Turkish politics. The left-wing could be considered in no better position.

“The second important result of the November 2002 elections, perhaps as significant as the fragmentation of right-wing politics, is the confirmation of the chronic weakness of the Turkish left in Turkish politics. These elections also reveal the fact that total left-wing votes reached the ultimate low of the last 50 years. The Turkish left’s failure to develop a nation-wide social and political strategy to address the problems of the country seems to be one of the reasons behind that defeat. CHP, the largest party of the left, could only get less than 20 per cent of the vote.”<sup>98</sup>

A leader’s chair should never be empty, so the AKP coming out of traditionally Islamic rhetoric was able to say a new word in the politics, combining centre-right orientation with positive assessment of Turkey’s EU membership.

“Erdoğan managed to free the AKP from the stubborn challenges of the old guards for the secularist establishment. He adopted a softer tone in portraying the AKP’s conservative outlook, which rendered the party more palatable for a larger and centrist electoral constituency. A key question in this context concerns the nature of AKP constituency: to what extent are they a continuation of the pro-Islamists of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and to what degree do they include a more centrist group of voters who had voted for other traditionally more centrist parties in earlier elections?”<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 189.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 189.

<sup>99</sup> Ali Çarkoğlu, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society, p. 2.



For sure the question of traditional pro-Islamic identity of the AKP is disputable. After November 2002, it won also 2007 elections on July, 22. For the time-being the party shows a stable course aimed at democratization of society, transparency of judicial system and further steps towards developing civil society.

### **2.2.5. Institutionalization of Business Structures**

Speaking of present-day Turkey, we always hear of this or that vision of modernity favored by this or that group be it secular, pro-Islamic, Kurdish or nationalist. The times when the Goodies Parties<sup>100</sup> were closed one after another (National Order Party went down in 1971, National Salvation – in 1980, Welfare Party - in 1998, and the Virtue one in 2001) has gone, and society goes on with Felicity party (Saadet Partisi, hereinafter – SP). Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi, hereinafter DSP) had been 'buried in the bulletin box' in November 3, 2002, and the AKP had won parliament elections for the first time.

But let us go back to the processes starting in 1983. Turkey successfully developed its national model of economy liberalization. Together with this, 1980s became a breakdown point after which the Turkish modernity took its nowadays form. The country developed rapidly, encountered a number of economic crises, and witnessed coming into existence of powerful economic actors each having its own vision of modernity and Turkey's perspectives, especially with regard to the latter's full membership in the EU. Studying the influence of economic development on Turkish politics in the liberalization era, we should further focus on these major players.

According to Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, '...the economic actors...represent the liberal, the Islamic and the conservative articulations of culture and capital, from within which their own models of Turkish modernity are institutionally and materially constructed.'<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> My invention in order to name National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party and Felicity Party collectively

<sup>101</sup> Fuat Keyman, Berrin Koyuncu, 'Globalization, alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey, p. 110.

### 2.2.5.1. Liberal Model of Modernity

The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen ( TUSIAD) is the oldest association established in April 1971 and embracing 469 members related to about 1500 companies functioning in all the spheres of Turkish economy. TÜSİAD's political approach is referred to as liberal. The association is one of the most active supporters of the Turkish membership in the EU.

'... TÜSİAD has perceived the 1961 Constitution as too democratic for Turkey and also supported the 1980 military-coup (Özkan and Tozan, 2000:32). But now, TÜSİAD acts as the strong voice in the call for the democratization of Turkey in accordance with the standards of democracy in Europe and argues for the need to protect civil rights and liberalization. It presents itself as an organization that 'has changed over time.'<sup>102</sup>

#### a) TÜSİAD on globalization

TÜSİAD perceives globalization first of all as globalization of the world market. Going beyond the borders by means of interconnectedness and interdependence of national economies will contribute to establishment of a new culture of globalized world.

'According to TÜSİAD, as opposed to the import-substitution industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey, in which the nation-state was the major actor of national development, the globalization of market relations, taking place beyond the reach of the national-states, has been the main point of reference for the economic life and its actors since the 1980s. In this sense, globalization brings about a set of new and novel relations, involving also the increasing importance of supra-national relations that create new regulations beyond the border of the nation-state.'<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 113.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 114.

## b) TÜSİAD on EU

'For Turkey, the process of integration to the EU constitutes the most important supra-national relations, insofar as, according to TÜSİAD, it will determine the future of Turkey by contributing to advancing the level of both political modernization and economic development of Turkish society. For this reason, TÜSİAD acts as the strongest and the most effective supporter of Turkey's full EU membership...'<sup>104</sup>

### 2.2.5.2. Islamic Model of Modernity

The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSİAD) was established in 1990 by a group of young businessmen. Being younger than TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD is considered to be as powerful as its liberal elder brother. The members of MÜSİAD made their commitment to promote development of the country's economy by industrialization in production. At the same time they pledged to preserve traditional ethic values such as honesty and fairness in trade.

## a) MÜSİAD on globalization as the path to democracy and EU

'Like TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD too views globalization as a process whereby exchange activities go beyond the borders of the nation-state and operate within a global market. Globalization creates interconnectedness among societies, economies and cultures...'<sup>105</sup>

'However, unlike TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD is founded on Islamic principles, such as the feeling of trust and solidarity, the primacy of community over the individual, the discourse of the just-self over the self-interested actor... Thus, MÜSİAD argues that Islamic discourse is far more compatible with globalized market relations than the existing state-supported bourgeois class in Turkey, insofar as it creates the relation of trust and solidarity in economy.'<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p. 114.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, p. 118.

'... globalization is seen in relation to the integration process in Europe, where Turkey wants to be a full-member of the EU. Here, globalization functions as both a conditioning and enabling factor: (a) conditioning in the sense that it requires, even forces in Turkish state to be open to democracy, which creates a legitimate ground for Islamic discourse as an element of pluralism and multiculturalism, and (b) enabling in the sense that it enables economic Islam to operate beyond the borders of nation-state.'<sup>107</sup>

### **2.2.5.3. Conservative Model of Modernity**

The significance of the Associations of Industrialists and Businessmen (SIADs) is constantly increasing. These embrace industrial and business organizations in Turkish province. They cannot be said to have impact as powerful as those of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, but still they contribute a lot to economic development of Anatolian industrial cities called Anatolian Tigers. The SIADs also have played an important role in transformation of perception of Anatolian province from rural-like underdeveloped areas to centers of industrial production and business.

#### **a) SIADs on globalization and EU**

'In many ways, SIADs appear similar to TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, in terms of their positive attribute to economic globalization, their support for Turkey's full EU membership, their adherence of free trade ideology...'<sup>108</sup>

Summarizing all the above, we can state that together with principal differences, the mentioned associations are unanimous on the issues of globalization and membership of Turkey in the European Union. Moreover, they see globalization not only as an economic process, but also as a means of further democratization which itself is a key condition of Turkey's full membership in the EU. Establishment of such industrial and business associations resulted in multi-vector economic development and contributed to liberalization of economy. Economic courses and

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 119.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, p. 121.

political visions of the said associations now fully correspond to strategic objectives of the acting government.

### **2.3. A Brief Overview of PPP in Turkey**

Speaking of public-private partnership ( PPP) institutionalization in Turkey, we should set March 1984 as our starting point. The era of significant changes started in Turkey, and the Directorate for Public Partnership was established by Decree No: 2983. Now it is continuing its activities in the capacity of Directorate for Privatization. At that period the scope of its activities was purely financial.

The Directorate for Public Partnership was responsible for classic tenders on infrastructure and airport facilities, carried out with financing accumulated by the Directorate and allocated in non-budgetary funds.

Another date to be remembered is December, 31, 2007. It was the day when the International PPP Platform Turkey ( the Platform) was established as a civil society organization. During the period of establishment technical support and sharing know-how and experience with UK Trade & Investment are not to be underestimated. This process was characterized by numerous promoting activities by Great Britain, including visits, trainings and workshops.

At the same time, we need to mention that PPPs in Turkey had been preceded by BOTs (Build-Operate-Transfer) since 1983. The said BOT projects were implemented mostly in the field of infrastructure. For instance, there is a municipality tender for a supplier to construct and and operate a water treatment plant at a predetermined profit level for 10 years before the asset is transferred back to the municipality. When Turkey started its way towards becoming a popular touristic destination, this scheme had been transferred also to the field of touristic infrastructure.

The advantage of PPP is the possibility to reform the provision of services by the authorities. Schools and hospitals have been built and renovated under PPP applications with taking into consideration the service level agreements for continued

maintainance and operation of all the assets for a term of 25 years. It goes without saying that remarkable results were achieved.

Turkey also went this way, gaining experience from the United Kingdom, like Ireland, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Singapore South Africa, South Korea and many other countries did. The very core of PPP in Turkey, the International PPP Platform, had been established with support from the International Financial Services of London ( IFSL). The Head of International Group in IFSL also acts in his capacity of the Chairman of of the United Kingdom Trade and Industry's PPP Export Advisory Group, which was established in order to assist willing parties to access Great Britain's experience.

Establishment of the Internaltional PPP Platform Turkey contributed greatly to the promotion of PPP models both in the country and abroad. Now Turkey is ready to share its most developed schemes with interested parties.

A country's dynamics are best shown by figures. In 2001, the project pool consisted of 5047 projects. These were in process till 2006, sure, with the element of elimination. So, by 2004 the overall expenditure for the implementation of projects is 5,4 billion US Dollars. For example, in Spain this sum is about 4,1 billion Euros.<sup>109</sup>

To wrap up, we have to say that the United Kingdom, a known world think-tank for PPP models, was not the initial source for public-private partnership in Turkey. For sure, at a later stage its experience and developed schemes were of great importance for Turkish economy taking its crucial turn to liberalization and globalization. The point is to understand that the roots of PPP in Turkey do not date back to British experience alone. Özal era brought about an initiative enabling public sphere to achieve new records and gain characteristics closer to European standards.

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<sup>109</sup> 'Derzhava ta Privatniy Sektor: Pochatok Shlyahu', Chastina. 3. Visnik Ministerstva Zakordonnih Sprav, 9/2009, p. 139.

## **2.4. Outcomes of Reforms**

The objective of this chapter was to briefly present the main political and economic factors that had effect on the political life in the Republic of Turkey after 1983. 1980s had become the breakdown point for Turkey. Liberalization era started, redrawing economic and political life of the country forever. Such key processes never go smooth, so the Özal government had to counter a lot of problems, one of them hyperinflation turning national currency into dust.

1980s-1990s were crucial for Turkey, economic liberalization leading to democratization was on the agenda. Country took its place in the system of international economic and trade relations. Boosting increase in export resulted in establishing closer links in many areas of cooperation.

Economic change greatly influenced Turkish politics at that time. Reshaping of the whole system led to emerging of new business giants associations as well as strengthening of already-established ones. Islamic capital underwent another stage of institutionalization in 1990s, thus bringing about its own vision of modernity – also very dynamic and globalization-oriented one. As liberalization era went on, pro-Islamic parties traditionally opposing the full-membership of Turkey in the EU seemed to have moderated their political agenda.

The AKP has won its second parliamentary elections in 2007. It was a rare case when the time itself played to the benefit of the party. Should the elections be held in 2008 or 2009, the loss of votes by AKP would have occurred in comparison with 2007.

The era of liberalization starting in early 1980-s and its effect on Turkish economy and politics should also be studied in complex with the cases of earlier liberalization attempts.

## CHAPTER III

### INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN UKRAINE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

It is difficult to predict for how many years more Ukrainian studies will remain in the shadow of researches on Russia and the former Soviet Union. A lot of post-Soviet states share the same problem, but Ukraine and Belarus found themselves in a more shadowed position due to closeness in Eastern Slavonic national identity. Dissolution process of the Soviet Union has already become the subject for major researches. Post-USSR history of the republics establishing or re-establishing their statehood needs deeper study.

It goes without saying that the scenario was nearly the same for the majority of former Soviet Socialist Republics. New elite was formed of old personnel who had successfully got out of *Perestroika* and privatization and had acquired significant primary capital. Younger –and more idealistic- politicians involved in political and social processes at that time quickly found themselves engaged in struggle for privileges and property. Moreover, politicians who can be in this or that way associated with Ukrainian national identity constituted a minority but their voices were better heard after the monotonous Soviet years.

Logically, the needs for further economic, political and social changes were growing year after year. Declaration of state independence of Ukraine could not solve all the issues of political and everyday life of the country at once. Period of legislative chaos began. Soviet laws were no longer valid but there were no provisions to replace them with. This specific development deeply affected legislation in many post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation. Not surprisingly, corruption issues came to the agenda.

Administrative and judicial reforms were urgently needed in order to ensure transparency and effective functioning of the state system. Viability of a young state was the core matter. The Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform in Ukraine had been



elaborated in 1992 by the Ukrainian Parliament. The Concept drew the framework for implementing a range of measures with a view of establishing an independent court system. The Codes remaining from the Soviet times were to be amended. Legal procedure needed further improvements and speeding-up of document turnover. Besides, introduction of courts' specialization was approved. At the same time, there was a long way to go with regard to the material situation of judges and detectives because the material base of courts had not been renewed for a quite a long time.

A three-stage gradual reform comprised establishment of a respective Commission under the auspices of the Ukrainian Parliament. A relevant Department was to be incorporated into the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. Appeal Board was planned to be introduced under the auspices of the Supreme Court of Ukraine.

Effectiveness of judicial and administrative reforms in Ukraine and continuity of their course are disputable. Yet, actions aimed at eliminating judicial and legislative chaos and establishing permanence in observing and applying different provisions were urgently needed in the situation where Soviet laws lost their validity and courts did not know how to act.

To conclude, Ukraine continues its course of institutionalization. Measures aimed at ensuring effectiveness of state service were elaborated and applied by every Ukrainian government. Concepts and implementation patterns were different. The objective was to strengthen institutional memory and establish democratic and transparent mechanisms which would bring people's life to a new, higher level.

### 3.1. Preconditions for Withdrawal of Ukraine from the USSR

The preconditions of Ukraine's withdrawal from the USSR were nearly the same as the preconditions showing the necessity of the Perestroika process. Democratization had its impact on political life of then-Soviet Ukraine. Growing media openness brought vivid footage of poor economy and harsh living standards. Withdrawal of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic from the USSR which was falling apart, was a kind of mutual process. Gaining state sovereignty by Ukraine accelerated the dissolution of the USSR. End of 1980-s - early 1990-s in the former USSR were called 'the Parade of Sovereignties'. Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic was the first to declare its sovereignty (November 16, 1988). On August 20, 1991, it proclaimed its state independence and became independent *de- jure* on September 6, 1991. For Latvian SSR these dates were July 28, 1989, August 21, 1991, and September 6, 1991 respectively. Lithuanian SSR made the same way on April 18, 1989 – March 11, 1990 and September 6, 1991. Georgian SSR (May 26, 1990 – April 9, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Russian SFSR (June 12, 1990 – December 26, 1991), Moldovan SSR (June 23, 1990 – August 27, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Ukrainian SSR (July 16, 1990 – August 24, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Byelorussian SSR (July 27, 1990 – December 26, 1991), Turkmen SSR (August 22, 1990 – October 27, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Armenian SSR (August 24, 1990 – September 23, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Tajik SSR (August 24, 1990 – September 9, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Kyrgyz SSR (December 15, 1990 – August 31, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Kazakh SSR (October 25, 1990 – December 16, 1991 – December 26, 1991), Uzbek SSR (June 20, 1990 – August 31, 1991 – December 26, 1991) and Azerbaijan SSR (October 18, 1991 – August 30, 1991 – December 26, 1991) followed the same procedure.<sup>110</sup>

Dissolution process of the Soviet Union had many preconditions, which should be studied in complex. Economic and political factors, aggravated by bitter consequences of Afghanistan war and Chernobyl disaster, triggered one another. Administrative actions, which had weakened Soviet economy were pronounced during the Glasnost period. Dissatisfaction of the peoples of the country with the

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<sup>110</sup> V.M. Picha, 'Politologiya' navchalniy posibnyk, K., p. 43.

existing regime grew stronger every year. From the other hand, Communist elite in every then-Soviet Republic changed its image into democratic and continued occupying its high positions. Dissolution of the Soviet Union would be a successful ending which would ensure their full control of the Republic.

1989 was the year of crucial changes for the whole Socialist system. But unlike the Eastern European countries who had their revolutions finished within several weeks, the Soviet Union was undergoing a state-regulated 'revolution from above'. Later on, the role of political movements demanding radical changes, grew stronger. At the same time, economic situation in the country worsened, and regional conflicts showed up.

### **3.1.1. Social Developments by Late 1980-s**

Speaking of 1989, Kievites assessed it as a year which was economically and socially harder than 1988.<sup>111</sup> As for the state the country was in, citizens referred to it as even more pessimistic than their own. Such an assessment was showing that the people were observing a very wide range of political and economic issues. While summarizing their views with regard to the previous year, Kievites named the following factors successful: enhancing of Glasnost principles in mass media, the first experience of democratic elections, public activities of the Verkhovna Rada together with its commissions and committees, increase in the number of political movements, strengthening of the country's image in international policies and shortening of the military budget. Public opinion polls carried out in 1989 revealed that the following factors and events were assessed as negative for the country's development: economic disorder, decrease in living standards, ethnic conflicts, psychological pressure of the present living conditions, absence of trust in the future, and absence of trust in the possibility of serious changes.<sup>112</sup>

As for Ukrainians, sharp decrease in economy was connected mainly to shortage in consumer commodities. 76 % of Kievites considered that food products

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<sup>111</sup> General Editing by V.P. Chornovolenko, Kiev and Kievites: Sociological Chronicles of Independence, Kiev, 2000, p. 88.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, p. 91.

supply got worse in 1989, and 85 % of recipients told that supply of non-food consumer products worsened.<sup>113</sup> Stagnation in social sphere was more than obvious: 60 % of recipients noted worsening in functioning of hospitals, pharmacies and polyclinics (in 1988, only 30 % percent of recipients marked such a decrease in service quality). People's dissatisfaction with functioning of police (*milicija*) and courts was growing: while in 1988 only 12 % of recipients marked malfunctioning of police and courts, in 1989 this number increased more than two times.<sup>114</sup>

Another social factor not to be forgotten is the people's assessment of Glasnost and democratization. A huge conglomerate was about do pass away but the changes aimed at introducing more transparency was referred to as the most important and successful reforms ever. Increase in number of civil society and political organizations and movements, enhancing of Glasnost, positive developments in the sphere of human rights were more than welcome in Ukraine. During a poll carried out in Kyiv, respondents were requested to name three most important events in the countries life. 30 % named the First Congress of People's Deputies, 29 % referred to the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev with George Bush, 28 % of respondents marked the elections of USSR People's deputies, and another 28 % referred to the speech of Andrei Sakharov on Afghanistan War.<sup>115</sup>

Disintegration in the peoples' unity in the USSR was a matter of deep concern of the citizens. Ukraine was in fact the only former Soviet Republic which had made its way out of the USSR without obvious pressure on population belonging to Russian or any other ethnicity. 36 % of the polls' respondents in 1988 marked the worsening of inter-ethnic relations in the Soviet Union. In 1989, this number reached 71 %. The Russian population in Ukraine referred to worsening of relations among the Soviet ethnicities more often (77 %), 68 % of Ukrainians were of the same thought, and 64 % of respondents of other nationalities considered that the inter-ethnic relations in the USSR got worse.<sup>116</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid, p. 92.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 94.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 98.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 101.

### 3.1.2. Rise of National Identity

To summarize the above factors, we should state that Ukraine was going through the same economic and social processes as Russia did. As for the vectors of political life, the difference was more than obvious. Independence tendencies in Ukraine were on the agenda and developed rapidly. In 1989, a civil society movement called *Narodniy Rukh* was established. Later it was transformed into a political party. Its Founding Congress took place on September 8-10, 1989 in Kyiv. The official name of the civil society movement was 'Narodniy Rukh Ukraini za Perebudovu' – People's Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika. This movement brought together members with various political views – from liberal communist to integral nationalism. Its democratic concept was the reason why a part of communists and members of radical nationalistic views left the movement. During its first year, the Rukh organized a range of large-scale events aimed at gaining state independence and statehood, spiritual renaissance of Ukrainian nation and introducing of the proper version of Ukrainian history.

The movement was officially registered by the Council of Ministers on February 9, 1990. During the same year it was quite successful in election campaign; this enabled the *Rukh* to found a fraction named *Narodna Rada* (People's Council) and secure the majority in several local councils in Western Ukraine.

Members of the *Rukh* participated in the parliamentary elections which were held on March 30, 1990. They still were the minority while the majority still consisted of the members of the Communist Party of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine adopted the State Sovereignty Declaration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on July 16, 1990.

The work done by the *Rukh* deputies in different regions of Ukraine, as well as in the Supreme Council, mass events organized by the *Rukh* and its active position during referendums and other political actions bore great significance in the process of forming of independent Ukrainian state and contributed a lot to the victory of the independence concept in the referendum held on December 1, 1991.

During the IV All-Ukrainian Congress of the *Rukh* in December 1992 the movement in fact transformed into a political party. Participants of the congress voted for the movement in its capacity of an independent civil and political organization. The movement's capacity was voted by the absolute majority. In 1993, the *Rukh* was proclaimed a political party during the V All-Ukrainian Congress of the *Rukh*.

### **3.2. Declaration of Independence**

The process of gaining state independence by Ukraine took part in several phases. In fact, none of the Soviet Republics completed all the necessary procedures stipulated in the USSR Law No: 1409-I (BBCC 90-15) adopted by the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on April 3, 1990 'On the Procedure of Settlement of Issues Related to Withdrawal of a Union Republic from the USSR'.<sup>117</sup> According to Article 4 of the said Law, the Supreme Council of a Union republic shall establish a commission including members from all parties concerned (meaning autonomous regions and districts, as well as representatives of minorities living in a republic), in order to organize a referendum on withdrawal from the USSR, determine its date and summarize its outcome. Article 5 stipulates that authorized observers from the USSR, Union and autonomous republics should be appointed in order to ensure transparent and democratic referendum. According to Article 6, the decision on withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR can be considered adopted on condition that not less than two-third of the USSR citizens residing on the territory of a Union republic, voted for withdrawal during the referendum. Article 7 reads that the Supreme Council of a Union republic presents the outcomes of referendum to the Supreme Council of the USSR. If the referendum is considered held in accordance with the law, the Supreme Council of the USSR puts this issue on the agenda of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In case of violation of law in the course of referendum, the Supreme Council of the USSR shall appoint a repeat referendum within three months in a republic or its part, or any autonomous district. According to Article 8, the results of referendum and proposals by interested parties

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<sup>117</sup> Vedomosti Syezda Narodnih Deputatov SSSR i Verhovnogo Soveta SSSR, M., 1990, №15, pp. 303-308.

from the Supreme Council of the USSR shall be communicated within one month to the highest organs of state power of all the Union and autonomous republics, as well as to the organs of state power of the autonomous formations for consideration and assessment of consequences for every Union and autonomous republic, arising from possible withdrawal of a respective Union republic from the USSR. Article 9 stipulates that a transition period not exceeding five years, shall be appointed in order to settle the issues related to withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR.<sup>118</sup> According to Article 12, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the government of a withdrawing republic shall elaborate proposals concerning the state boundary of the USSR, as well as its armed force, and shall present them for consideration by the President of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the USSR. After that the said proposals shall be presented for consideration by the Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR.

Article 14 of the said Law is totally dedicated to settlement of the property and financial issues between a withdrawing republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the transition period. Such matters as managing the objects of Union property located on the territory of a withdrawing republic (e.g. complex enterprises belonging to basic sectors of industry, such as energy, communication, space research, sea, rail and air transportation, main pipelines, property of the USSR Army etc.) are mentioned in this Article. At the same time, attention was paid to settlement of banking and financial issues and payment procedures to be carried out by enterprises. Besides, the status of territories not belonging to the withdrawing republic before entering the USSR, shall be duly considered.

Article 15 guaranteed the citizens of the withdrawing republic the freedom of choosing their citizenship as well as place of residence and work. The withdrawing republic was obliged to cover all the costs related to citizens' moving out of this republic. According to Article 16, the withdrawing republic ensured civil, political, economic, cultural and other rights and freedoms of the USSR citizens residing on its territory, without any discrimination on any base.

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 305.

Article 19 stipulates the procedure of holding a repeat referendum during the last year of a transition period. The repeat referendum on withdrawing of a Union republic from the USSR shall be appointed on the initiative of the highest state power authority of the withdrawing republic. Holding a repeat referendum was mandatory if demanded by one-tenth of the USSR citizens who are permanent residents of the republic and are eligible to vote according to the USSR legislation. In case less than two-thirds of the USSR citizens who are permanent residents of the republic and are eligible to vote according to the USSR legislation, voted for reiteration of decision on withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR, the decision on withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR shall be considered null and void, and all the procedures stipulated in the said Law, shall be terminated.<sup>119</sup>

Article 20 deals with legal procedures designed to take place at the end of a transition period. The Supreme Council of the USSR shall call the Congress of the People's Deputies of the USSR with a view to consider and approve the decision on completion of the settlement of issues among the withdrawing republic, from one side, and the USSR, Union republics, autonomous republics and formations, as well as national minorities, from the other side. From the moment of adoption of this decision by the Congress of the Deputies of the USSR the withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR shall be considered completed, and the people's deputies elected in a republic which had withdrawn, shall no longer have any authority. The Congress of the Deputies of the USSR shall amend the Constitution of the USSR accordingly.<sup>120</sup>

It is obvious that during the dissolution period in the Soviet Union, none of the Soviet Republics obeyed Articles 12 and 14, providing for consideration of proposals with regard to the withdrawal, and settlements of banking, financial and property issues among the withdrawing republic and the USSR and other Union and autonomous republics and formations. Article 15 of the Law, guaranteeing rights and freedoms of the USSR citizens, residing on a territory of a withdrawing state, cannot be considered observed due to local conflicts, mostly in the Caucasus and Central

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid, p. 306.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, p. 306



Asia. Article 9, applying to the establishment of transition period, was partially observed only in Latvia and Estonia.

The State Council of the USSR, established on September 5, 1991, and consisting of the heads of Soviet Republics and chaired by the President of the USSR, had officially recognized the state independence only of three Baltic States: Lithuania<sup>121</sup>, Latvia<sup>122</sup> and Estonia<sup>123</sup> at its first session. The State Council undertook to instruct the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to declare its support for the Baltic Republics in their accession to the Organization of the United Nations.

As it is stated above, the State Sovereignty Declaration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was adopted on July 16, 1990. After the military coup attempt in August 1991 failed, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic adopted the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. This decision was once more confirmed by the results of the referendum held on December 1, 1991.

### **3.2.1. Nuclear-free status of Ukraine**

Here it is necessary to mention the nuclear-free status of the young Ukrainian state. At the time of dissolution of the USSR there were three military districts counting up to 780.000 armed force personnel in total. On August 24, 1991 the *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine adopted the decision on subordination to Ukraine of all the armed force of the USSR located on the territory of Ukraine. This decision also concerned 1272 intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads and significant stocks of enriched uranium.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the number of states having nuclear weapons increased. At the time of signing the Belovezhsk Agreements, nuclear weapons formerly belonging to the Soviet Union, were located in four republics – Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. After Russia and the United States joined they diplomatic efforts Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had renounced their nuclear

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<sup>121</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: FC-1 'On Recognition of Independence of the Lithuanian Republic'

<sup>122</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: FC-2 'On Recognition of Independence of the Latvian Republic'

<sup>123</sup> Decree of the State Council of the USSR of September 6, 1991, No: FC-3 'On Recognition of Independence of the Estonian Republic'

state status. They transferred all their military nuclear potential to Russia. On October 24, 1991 *Verkhovna Rada* of Ukraine adopted the Declaration on Nuclear-Free Status of Ukraine. On January 14, 1992 a three-party agreement among Russia, United States and Ukraine. All nuclear payloads shall be disassembled and transported to Russia. Strategic bombers and missile launching undergrounds shall be destroyed. the United States of America shall cover all the necessary costs. In return, Russia and the United States guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine.<sup>124</sup>

Along with transferring the nuclear warheads to the Russian Federation, there was one more issue to be solved. Legal status of Crimea had to be properly defined. On October 29, 1948 the city of Sebastopol became a city of republican jurisdiction in the RSFSR. Administrative relations of the city to the Crimean Oblast were not defined or regulated by any law. The Crimean Oblast was officially transferred under the jurisdiction of Ukraine in 1954. The USSR Law 'On Transferring the Crimean Oblast from the subordination of the RSFSR to the subordination of Ukrainian SSR' was adopted on April 26, 1954 by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.<sup>125</sup> This Law actually adopted the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on transferring the Crimean Oblast from RSFSR to Ukrainian SSR dated February 19, 1954. The official reason for transferring the region was the 300th anniversary of the *Pereyaslavska Rada* which had resulted in the union treaty between Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, unofficial versions say that this act was needed for immediate restoration and reconstruction of Crimea which still was in a very hard situation from the point of view of economy and infrastructure.

### **3.2.2. Status of Crimea**

After the dissolution of the USSR At the same period a referendum was held in Crimea on February 12, 1991. The Oblast became Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Crimean ASSR) within Ukraine. The results of referendum in Crimea were recognized by the central government in Kyiv. The Declaration of

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<sup>124</sup> Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Encyclopedia, Moscow, Nauchnoye Izdatelstvo 'Bolshaya Rossiyskaya Encyclopedia', 2007, v. 7, pp. 309-310.

<sup>125</sup> The USSR Law 'On Transferring the Crimean Oblast from the subordination of the RSFSR to the subordination of Ukrainian SSR' was adopted on April 26, 1954 by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR

Crimea's Sovereignty was adopted on September 4, 1991, and the Constitution of Crimea – on May 6, 1992.

Crimea remained under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. A significant part of population in the Crimean Oblast is of Russian ethnicity. Despite some periods of political and social tension in early 1990-s, territorial integrity of Ukraine was the priority. In 1992, when some separatist strives were overcome, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) was established in 1992.

As it is stated above, the State Sovereignty Declaration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was adopted on July 16, 1990. After the military coup attempt in August 1991 failed, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic adopted the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine. This decision was once more confirmed by the results of all-Ukrainian Referendum held on December 1, 1991. Over 28 million people (90,32 % of citizens eligible to vote)<sup>126</sup> supported state independence.

Leonid D. Kravchuk (1934-...) was elected first President of Ukraine on December 1, 1991. Having lectured in Chernivtsi Financial College between 1958 and 1960, he had started working as a consultant, then lecturer, assistant secretary, and finally Head of Propaganda section in Chernivtsi Region Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU). In 1967-1970 he continued his post-graduate education in the Social Sciences Academy under the auspices of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU). In 1988-1990, Kravchuk worked as Head of Ideology section, Secretary of CC KPU, and in 1990 – as Second Secretary of CC KPU. In 1989-1990 his candidacy was nominated for membership in the Political Bureau (PB), and in 1990-1991 Leonid Kravchuk was the acting member of the PB CC KPU. According to unofficial data, in 1989, Kravchuk supported the adoption of PB CC KPU Decree on Prohibition of Activities of the *Narodnyy Rukh* of Ukraine, but this Decree was never adopted. Having served as people's deputy of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk had finally been elected Head of *Verkhovna Rada*.

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<sup>126</sup> Official Table of Results of all-Ukrainian Referendum, documents of the State Archive Service of Ukraine. Web-site: [www.archive.gov.ua](http://www.archive.gov.ua)

In August 1991 Kravchuk resigned from the Communist Party of Ukraine and started his presidential campaign as an unaffiliated candidate. At the same time he was greatly supported by the Communist Party which had already been prohibited in Ukraine by that time (KPU candidate Olexandr Tkachenko withdrew from the campaign in favor of Kravchuk), and a part of national democrats who tried to position Kravchuk as the father of Ukrainian independence. Leonid Kravchuk had won the campaign in the first round of elections.

After completion of his 4-year Presidential term and losing his second campaign to Leonid Kuchma, Leonid Kravchuk was elected deputy of *Verkhovna Rada*. In 1998 Kravchuk, being officially unaffiliated, headed the election list of Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine (United) (SDPU(U)). He joined that party before the elections and led it to the parliament. Since October 1998 Kravchuk was member of PB and Political Council of SDPU(U). In 2002-2006, he had chaired the SDPU(U) fraction in the *Verkhovna Rada*. Since 1994 Leonid Kravchuk is the Head of Ukrainian Foundation for Contribution to International Socialization 'Ukrainian People's Embassy'.

During presidential term of Leonid Kravchuk Ukraine was recognized by the world community, its territorial integrity was ensured. At the same time, President and his team worked towards preventing local conflicts which had become one of distinctive features of changes in post-Soviet countries. Political activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine was terminated by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine 'On Prohibition of Political Activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine' No: 1468-XII of August 30, 1991.<sup>127</sup> It is necessary to admit that this decree was found unconstitutional by the Decision No: 20-pn/2001 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on December 27, 2001.<sup>128</sup> This was the beginning of establishment of multiparty political system in Ukraine. Development of this system was aggravated by decades of single party tradition. CPSU was rather a political

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<sup>127</sup> Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Ukraine 'On Prohibition of Political Activity of the Communist Party of Ukraine' No: 1468-XII of August 30, 1991, [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

<sup>128</sup> Decision No: 20-pn/2001 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on December 27, 2001, [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

body than a party, that is why the process of introducing new parties was quite slow. Citizens were not eager to enter newly established parties, because their mistrust and dissatisfaction with the Communist Party was automatically transferred onto the new ones. Struggle for privileges and authority inside the new parties resulted in nothing but their fragmentation. Communist-Socialist and National-Democratic political forces enjoyed more support than the rest of the parties which were not large in number and did not have numerous members.

These changes were initiated by lifting in March 1990 of Articles 6 and 7 of the Constitution of the USSR on the directing and coordinating role of the Communist Party. Later on these articles were lifted from Republican constitutions. This enhanced the development of democracy and stimulated emerging of new political parties, organizations and movements. In spite of a long-term single party tradition, mistrust of the people and poor economic situation in the country, the beginning of 1990-s was the period of founding political parties. Liberal, Socialist and Peasant Parties of Ukraine were established in 1991<sup>129</sup>. In total there were 4 political parties in Ukraine before the adoption of the Declaration of State Independence. After independence was declared there had been 27 more parties established.<sup>130</sup> By May 20, 1996, 39 political parties were registered in Ukraine, and by early 2001 their number increased to 113.<sup>131</sup>

Multiparty structure of political life was a must for proper establishment of democratic process. Political life headed by a hegemony party can be characterized as such having no adequate opposition and thus bears a large risk of stagnation. Multiparty system with a dominant one means that one party wins more than two consecutive parliamentary elections and forms the government. Two-party system is characterized by two influent political parties, one bearing authority and the other being the opposition. Moderate pluralism system is the most common one. It foresees existence of three-five parties, none of them able to ensure majority or create a coalition on its own. Under these conditions the parties are forced to seek

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<sup>129</sup> Litvin V.M., Slusarenko A.G. Na politichniy areni Ukraini (90-ti rr.). Rozdumi istorikiv / UGJ - 1994 - berezen-cherven, №2-3, pp..28 – 50.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>131</sup> Ukraina v suchasnomu geopolitichnomu protori: teoretichniy i praktichniy aspekti / za red. F.M. Rudicha, p. 17.

compromise and form the government proportionally to the number of mandates gained in elections. Polarized party system with six and more parties struggling with each other, is also applicable. If small parties are numerous, they create blocks or coalitions before their election campaigns start. Autonomized party system deals with existence of a large number of political parties with quite a few members and even less influence. This system often emerges in societies in their transition towards democracy. As a rule, the government is formed on a proportion basis. On condition of democratic changes taking place this system transforms into a more consolidated and influent system of moderate pluralism. By today parties from the left to the right are present on the 'political market' of Ukraine. The most significant are CPU, Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU), Peasant Party (PP), Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), Agrarian Party of Ukraine (APU), Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU), Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine (LDPU), Liberal Party of Ukraine (LPU), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Civil Union '*Nova Ukrayina*', Christian Democratic Party of Ukraine (CDPU), Congress of Nationalists of Ukraine (CNU), Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and others. While political views of the parties with regard to statehood of the country differed a lot, economic chapters in their programs remained vague and were of rather declarative nature.

To sum up, multiparty system in Ukraine was established at the beginning of 1990-s. Political parties were numerous themselves but had few supporters. Social base in the program of the majority of political players remained undefined. Most parties could be said to be more like clubs uniting members around an idea which itself was not very successfully and completely formed and declared. At the same time, territorial factor was not to be underestimated. A party's influence remained extremely local, party activities were concentrated in the capital; organs of a party were not spread in province.

Establishing Ukrainian statehood, defining status of ARC, gaining by Ukraine a nuclear-free status and ensuring the state's territorial integrity, introducing a multiparty system clearly showed the viability of a young state. In spite of severe problems in economy, citizens had always supported independence no matter what

their political views were (Eastern Ukraine is traditionally Communist/Socialist, and Western Ukraine always votes for Democratic/Nationalist parties). In early 1990-s there was still a long way to go. Parties remained too local and had poorly elaborated programs. Forming of elite at that stage was mostly change in color of Communist bureaucrats who were well-off during the Soviet times.

Gradually the need for administrative reform started to show its signs in line with economic, social and cultural processes taking place in the country. As it comprises deep changes in organization and practical carrying out of assignments for the state and society, its concept had to be thoroughly elaborated. Administrative reform had to take place right after the introduction of the post of the President of Ukraine and establishment of Presidential Administration. Lack of specialists on the issue together with absence of proper research on what was done to that end by other states and what could have been done taking into account the local specific and interrupted statehood experience resulted in miscoordination of state power bodies. This brought about a misbalance in elaborating, continuity and obeying laws and other legal documents elaborated by different organs and often contradicting each other.

Nevertheless, all the hardships Ukraine went through in the beginning of 1990-s did not affect political will of the nation to live in its own state and to contribute to its development.

On August 24, 2011 Ukraine celebrated 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of its independence. Throughout all these years of transition, transformation, crises and chronic reforming process, society had supported state independence. Results of polls completed by Razumkov Centre<sup>132</sup> of Ukraine clearly show that in spite of difficult economic situation citizens have always been in favor of independence.

On August 10-17, 2011, a poll was carried out in order to learn the assessment of independence of Ukraine on its 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Research was

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<sup>132</sup> Razumkov Centre is a non-governmental think tank founded in 1994. It carries out research of public policy in the spheres of domestic policy, state administration, economic policy, energy, land relations, foreign policy, social policy, international and regional security, national security and defence. Web-site: [www.razumkov.org.ua](http://www.razumkov.org.ua)

completed by the Sociology Service of the Centre. 2007 respondents aged above 18 were interviewed in all the regions of Ukraine, Kyiv and ARC. Sampling represented of the population of Ukraine with regard to basic social and demographic dynamics. Poll was carried out in 74 towns and 58 villages. Respondents were allowed to mark as many answer options as they wished. The distribution of answers in a sociological poll titled 'Who Gained Most Due to State Independence of Ukraine?', was the following: 19,3 % were of the opinion that the people of Ukraine won most from a country's gaining independence. 37,7 % of respondents believed that political leaders of Ukraine won most, and 15,3 % said that political leaders of the USSR got out of this process with best results. 6,2 % answered that top politicians of Russia gained most from Ukrainian independence. 16,3 % believed that international financial institutions ( IFIs) had most profit. While 31,0 % of respondents said that the people having business skills, gained most, 18,0 % marked the answer stating that the future generations of Ukrainians will benefit most. 9,1 % said that no one gained anything in the process of statehood establishment, and 10,7 % of respondents found it difficult to answer.<sup>133</sup>

### **3.3. Forming of Elite**

Issue of forming the elite in Ukraine is to a large extent a repetition of experience of Russia which underwent the same transformation. A powerful Communist clique made a relatively smooth transition to the new administrative system. This change in color had a serious impact on all the reorganizations to follow. Communist desk officers, brought up by the administrative command system, did not know any other pattern of managing than issuing a directive and a plan to be followed. The old system was already dead, but nothing new had been invented. Soviet-type planning had been outdated for decades, but there were no applicable managing systems to follow.

As it is known, the role of society in the process of forming the elite should be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, the image of a state is formed by high-level professionals in political and social spheres. This image, as well as a country's policies, is formed in direct relation to the development level of the humanitarian

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid



sphere. Here we face the problem of ever-secondary significance attributed to the humanitarian sphere: economy had been proclaimed the priority for all post-Soviet states.

The processes of transformation and, consecutively, of forming of national elite in the countries which have just withdrawn from the Soviet Union, had always been aggravated by many factors. Many of ex-republics whether did not have a statehood tradition, or had it interrupted for centuries. The era of crucial changes coincided with the process of statehood establishing. It means that the forming of elite is taking place under specific conditions. In general, only a couple of thousands of active social and political leaders could be called Ukrainian political elite at that time. Along with the elite elements which were active during the Soviet period, national elite elements were formed. Individuals belonging to the latter part of Ukrainian elite had more difficulties in finding their way through Ukrainian political and administrative process. These were the political leaders elected by the people while the struggle for independence continued. That is why they were capable of solving problems and seeking consensus. The period itself was demanding more from political elite: younger, more mobile and energetic people were needed in order to continue the process of statehood establishment in Ukraine.

As it is common for many states emerging from the USSR experience, forming of elite was – and still is – an issue of getting more privileges time after time. Young Ukrainian elite, elected by the people without being nominated by any Communist Party body, gained popularity by severe criticism of bureaucracy, formalism and too large number of employees in state power organs. Nevertheless, not a single change to the better had been observed as years passed. A significant number of people who entered Ukrainian political and statehood process at that time, had got even more privileges than their predecessors.

In this research we are not going to speak about individual and social features a leader should develop in order to duly meet the challenges of ever-changing political situation. Such virtues as negotiation abilities, media efficiency, being a quick and easy learner, together with individual, professional and communicational features

and skills are common knowledge. Distribution of power and existence of real political pluralism come onto the agenda. Competition of political elites should take place with the aim of solving the problems of statehood, and not for the sake of serving one's ambitions. In Ukraine, proper interpretation in mass media of this competition resulted in enhancing of interest to politics expressed by the people. At the same time, it contributed to development of political and electoral culture in the country. Moreover, that period was the right time for distribution of property which had recently been Soviet. Political and industrial elite made fortunes thus leaving intellectual elite behind. This is what happens when one individual has too much power concentrated in his/her hands. Only appropriate distribution of authority among all the branches of power can ensure development of democracy. Here it is necessary to admit that this distribution shall not be carried out in accordance with political ambitions of a definite individual. The more authority political leader has, the more risky this situation becomes for democracy and civil conscience. Consequently, politicians should be more open towards constructive criticism. Unfortunately, the very notion of making suggestions aimed at improving any kind of productive or managing process had not been properly used for decades. Optimization proposals were made only by instruction of administrative command system. Criticism could never be met properly. At the time of USSR it was common knowledge that stagnation in the country was beyond imagination. Nevertheless, speaking it out loud had always been accessed as 'blackening of reality'.

Consequently, a major part of Ukrainian elite in early 1990-s had an experience of administrative command managing, were not open towards new challenges and criticism and were busy mainly with distribution of property and privileges. Eventually, political leaders coming from the Rukh experience were also deeply engaged in these processes. Share of Communist bureaucrats appointed for significant posts between 1991 and 2003, constitutes 73 %. As for officials appointed heads of region state administrations, this figure is even higher – 80 %. <sup>134</sup> The multiparty system was established but political leaders had no motivation to protect the citizens' interests. The necessity to take into account the needs of ordinary people can be determined by three factors; the first comprises moral principles of the

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<sup>134</sup> Razumkov Centre Recurr. Research, 1991-2003

elite, the second is adequate and active mechanisms of political responsibility, and the third factor is pressure by civil society. During the period of statehood establishment none of those factors could be considered effective. Political parties of that time which were believed to be the environment in which political elite got formed, did not bother to get their slogans corresponding to their activities. Parliament was still the place for distribution of privileges among club members. There was not a single mechanism of social responsibility of political elite to the people. Besides, it took time to work out a civilized perception of opposition which, in its turn, did not yet have a detailed program of actions in its capacity as political power.

Taking into account all the above, it is easy to see that the process of elite forming in Ukraine after the country had declared its independence was consequent in the sense of transition of Soviet political elite to respective administrative posts in Ukraine, but chaotic in terms of establishing political parties and elaborating and following laws and regulations. Under those circumstances the necessity for administrative reform was more than urgent. A new approach towards state service which would be stipulated in a new edition of the respective Law, elaboration of contemporary methods of educating new elite, competition basis of entering state service, observing gender balance in state organs, enhancing patriotic feelings of political leaders together immediately appeared on the agenda. Such categories as morality, spirituality, motivation, patriotism and responsibility might sound pathetic and worn-out to a reader, especially from the former Soviet Union. Yet, their absence in a notion apparatus might result in deepening of the already existing gap between people and elite, linkup between politics and business. If the situation with regard to law-abidingness of elite remains poor, this linkup will lead to criminalization of business, which, in its turn, will have a negative effect on the economic situation in the country. Corruption will keep foreign investment away, and will block the development of local small and medium business. Problem of absence of statehood-based psychology started neither in 1986, nor in 1991. It can be traced back to 1917 when a huge empire collapsed but the viability of its official corpse was proportional to its aggressiveness. Taking into consideration the system integrity of society, it is necessary to point out the following priorities of reforming the political system: de-

installation of old political system and immediate establishment of a brand new one, harmonization of coordination among all the components of the political system, such as political parties, organs of local administration and society, well-defined scope of assignments of branches of power and ensuring their proper coordination, ensuring transparency in activities of all the organs of state power and local administration, guaranteeing political and spiritual consolidation of society, developing political and law culture of the population. The last but not least is the change of communication mode between the organs of power and the people. This dialogue should take place on the basis of democracy and humanitarian values. Political reforms in a state recovering from Soviet experience are a complicated and multiaspect process which should lead to establishment of democracy and forming a decent and trust-worthy image of politicians. The longer it lasts the stronger will be the people's political apathy. All the branches of power critically lose society's trust. For instance, trust of the people in power, political parties and government never reached 10 % between 1994 and 2003.<sup>135</sup> As it has been said before, ruling elite of early 1990-s was composed mainly of post-Communist bureaucrats who preserved their authority in the years of establishment of Ukrainian statehood. It was not interested in emerging of really democratic institutions and carrying-out of constructive reforms aimed at economic, political and administrative improvements in the country.

Again, when the changes in the country became inevitable, the Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform in Ukraine had been elaborated in 1992 by the Verkhovna Rada. The relevant Decree was issued by the Parliament on April 28, 1992.<sup>136</sup> The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Commission of the Verkhovna Rada on the Issues of Legislation and Lawfulness, Supreme Court of Ukraine were instructed to elaborate and submit for consideration the draft laws on legal procedure and advocacy, during the year of 1992. At the same time, existing Criminal Procedure and Civil Procedure Codes were to be amended. The work on drafting the new Criminal Procedure Code, Civil Procedure Code, Criminal and Civil Codes, Code on Administrative Breakings, Labor Code, Trade Code of Ukraine was to be continued. Moreover, the Institute of

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<sup>135</sup> Razumkov Centre Recurr. Research, 1994-2003

<sup>136</sup> О Концепції судебно-правової реформи в Україні  
Postanovleniye Verhovnoy Radi ot 28.04.1992 № 2296-XII

Legislation and Judicial Reform was planned to be established under the auspices of the Verkhovna Rada.<sup>137</sup>

The Concept itself defined the factors drawing the urgent need for such reform. Declaration of State Independence of Ukraine, necessity for ensuring rights and freedoms of the citizens and securing the prevalence of law were named. Expediency of the judicial and legislation reform was conditioned by the fact that courts, judicial system and legislation regulating activities of law enforcement organs were in a deep crisis caused by many factors having negative impact on the functioning of the whole system. The courts, being unable to fully protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens, were rather an instrument of ACS. Courts which had no authority were used by the power itself. Judicial reform had to put the judicial system and all the branches of law in full correspondence with economic and political changes which had taken place in the country. The situation was aggravated by poor material situation of judges and detectives. Moreover, the facts of interference in the work of the courts still took place.<sup>138</sup>

Basic principles of the judicial reform were also highlighted in the said Concept. As the main objective of the reform was to establish an independent judicial power and restructuring of the judicial system, elaboration of a new legislation and improving the course of legal procedure. In order to achieve these goals it was necessary to guarantee autonomy and independence of judicial organs from the influence of legislative and executive power. Measures to be further planned were the following: gradual introduction of courts' specialization, getting courts closer to citizens, clearly define competence of different links of the judicial system, guarantee the citizens' right for having their cases duly studied and heard by an independent court.<sup>139</sup>

Basic principles of judicial reform were drawn as follows: creating a judicial system fully guaranteeing the citizens' rights for judicial protection and their equality before the law, accordance of normative documents on the issues of court activities

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

and judicial organs to the standards of international agreements ratified by Ukraine, radical reforming of material and procedure legislation, introducing democratic content instead of ideological one, exclusion from the Criminal Code of the actions which cannot be classified as crime under the present conditions, reforming of penitentiary system, differentiation of legal procedure accordingly to the heaviness of a committed crime, clear definition of the conditions under which evidence is acceptable, and control of lawfulness and logic of the court decisions in the order of appeal and cassation in accordance with newly emerging circumstances.<sup>140</sup>

The reform itself was planned to be carried-out gradually, in three phases. The first phase envisaged elaboration and approval of the Reform Concept by the Verkhovna Rada, establishment of the Commission of the Verkhovna Rada on the Issues of Legislation Reform together with incorporation of a respective Department into the administrative structure of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine. Criminal and Procedure Codes were to be amended, Laws on the Constitution Court of Ukraine, advocacy, status of judges, notaries system acts of civil status and court expertise were to be duly elaborated and considered. Items on elaboration of qualification criteria, material and lodging base of courts, working out of work load to be properly met by courts, putting on paper and adoption of legislation acts on establishing an Investigation Committee, establishing interregional / district courts, introduction of Appeal Board under the auspices of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, Supreme Court of the Republic of Crimea, regional courts and Kyiv City Court were also pointed-out.<sup>141</sup>

The second phase was dedicated to development and institutionalization of established organs and structures. Administrative courts, courts on civil and family issues, and the courts on affairs of minors were planned to be developed based on already existing system. One of the most important – and sensitive priorities – material base and equipment of courts – was noted.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, p. 10.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

The third phase of the reform was planned to 'polish' what had been done to this end. Researches on effectiveness of the reform were to be carried out, legislation had to be amended in order to create a room for further constructive developments of the legislative power's activities. At the same time, scientific programs on best practices and improvements of the reform had to be launched.<sup>143</sup>

As it was stated above, Ukraine reiterated its willingness to maintain independence. Forming of elite was a long process which did not always develop in a right direction. Nevertheless, steps towards reforming the legislative system were taken. At the same time, lack of thorough research on continuity and consecutiveness of lifting previous laws, by-laws and other legislative documents which have remained from the Soviet period with immediate introduction of the new ones still creates a lot of problems for citizens, especially in civil cases. Such a disorder in legislation is caused by such factors as lack of educated personnel possessing institutional memory and properly following a specific sort of issues; inability of bureaucrats quite experienced in the old system, to take new decisions and elaborate logic and creative solutions; legislative chaos with regard to questioning validity of a legislative act remaining from the Soviet period. Judicially an old law, decree, statement or resolution was no longer valid. At the same time, there was nothing new to replace it with.

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 14.

## CHAPTER IV

### STATE OF AFFAIRS WITH REGARD TO ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

#### 4.1. State bureaucracy in Russia

Speaking of the state of affairs with regard to administrative reform in the Russian Federation in December 2011, after parliamentary elections in Russia had taken place, should, to my opinion, start with a search of a new term for what had happened. The whole world was watching elections in a huge country, where the number of citizens eligible to vote in some regions could equal 146 %. This news is not of a magazine type. In the evening of December 5, 2011 a Russian TV channel 'Rossiya 24'<sup>144</sup> broadcasted the results of election region by region. Some figures were stunning, especially for those familiar with calculus.

In Sverdlovsk Region, results were displayed as follows: *Yedinaya Rossiya* (YR) – 39,61 %, *Spravedlivaya Rossiya* (SR) – 30,59 %, Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) – 18,54 %, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) – 17,67 %, *Yabloko* – 3,82 %, *Pravoye Delo* (PD) – 2,75 %, and *Patrioti Rossii* (PR) – 2,27 %. That makes 115,25 % of voters.

Voronezh Region: YR – 62,32 %, CPRF – 31,11 %, SR – 17,22 %, LDPR – 11,72 %, *Yabloko* – 4,55 %, PR – 1,38 %, and PD – 0,66 %. In total, 128,96 % of citizens eligible to vote came to reiterate their political will.

And, last but not least: Rostov Region: YR – 58,99 %, CPRF – 32,96 %, LDPR – 23,74 %, SR – 19,41 %, *Yabloko* – 9,32 %, PR -1,46 %, and PD – 0,59 %. The Oscar goes to Rostov Oblast where 146,47 % of citizens over 18 used their voting right.

If by December 19, 2011 the regime in the North Korean People's Democratic Republic can be called *kimocracy*<sup>145</sup>, could this concept of thinking be called

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<sup>144</sup> www.rutv.ru

<sup>145</sup> My invention to name the transition of power in the Kim family in North Korea



*falsizm*<sup>146</sup>? Nevertheless, *Yedinaya Rossiya* got some 49 % of votes of those 50 % of voters who could make it to the voting points.

As preparations for Presidential elections (and *second advent* of Mr. Putin) are on the way, let us have a look at the assessment of Putin era and see whether a short interruption for Mr. Medvedev's term of office really counts.

Controlled democracy, or closed hegemony, can be considered an existing model now applied in the Russian Federation. The basic distinctive features of this system are bureaucratic regulation of political life. This process comprises isolation of political institutions from the society. Country is ruled by Putin through his confident persons; governors are included into presidential vertical, the barrier for political parties during parliamentary elections is increased to 7 %, consolidation of elite and power is taking place with the signs of prevalence of bureaucratic elite over business and political elite. State capitalism policies are carried out by means of returning to the state of leading positions in strategic fields of economy (oil and gas industry, electric energy, military production complex). At the same time, state deeply influences social policies. Rationalist foreign policy foresees Russia's participation in international economic life. As for home policies, they can be called pragmatic. Its strategic goal is modernization of Russian economy. Nevertheless, it still depends on hydrocarbon-based energy.

A definite consensus of the Russian around controlled democracy was proved by results of parliamentary and presidential elections. This enables a researcher to put forward a question of implementation in Russia of a consolidational (or stabilizational) model of development. From one side, it has been legalized by the Russian elite, and, from the other hand, it has been supported by the majority of Russians. As a political personality, Putin totally corresponds to the above model because he is both inventor and product of this system. Many Russian researchers are of the opinion that Vladimir Putin is the answer to the Russian's inquiry for a stabilization model in the country.

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<sup>146</sup> My invention to name the style of presenting information through official media channels

At the same time, there is a clear understanding that every group having supported the development plan, proposed by Putin, had its own motives. Elite assessed controlled democracy as a way of keeping the *status-quo* in its relations with power. This situation would enable it to go on with its business on condition it did not interfere in politics. Paternalist-oriented population, especially generations brought up at the Soviet times, were convinced that it was state capitalism that would ensure a high level of stability and social guarantees. This kind of stabilizational model, in case it is really implemented, would be quite comfortable for a *socium's* existing. Elites would feel most comfortable because some sort of non-interfering into power's affairs is in the very core of the concept.

It is still to be questioned to which extent such stabilizational model could correspond to modern geopolitical challenges Russia has to face. Researchers emphasize that a state capitalism under conditions of a closed hegemony (dominance of one elite group in forming state policies) will not allow self-development, innovation search, and thus is doomed for stagnation. Most radical experts, analyzing Russia's future under state capitalism, even introduce the definition of 'peripheral capitalism'.

A decisive role in search of a country's development model should belong to elite which analyses the complex of possible way of further development, chooses the most effective scenario with regard to state and social interests and provides it to all the levels of state policies.

From this prospect, it is not possible to state that the stabilizational model implemented now in Russia, corresponds to the country's strategic interests, and Russian elite carries out its historical mission on forming the national strategy. Up to the contrary, it occupies a very conformist position on a wide range of issues outlining the future of Russia. Yet, there is a need to recognize the full correspondence of the Russian elite to the modern algorithm of political and socio-economic development of the Russian Federation. Moreover, it is necessary to admit that elite was one of political actors which formed this specific model of existence of the Russian state.

Speaking of the administrative reform itself, we have to admit that it had been launched in 2003. President Putin put forward a clear objective to limit interference of the state into economic activities, exclude excessive regulatory policies and limit the functions of state organs. For this reason, a complete inventarization of functions carried out by ministries and institutions took place. It was determined that more than two-thirds of functions and activities of different state institutions were not in fact necessary. Besides, there was a great duplication of work done by these institutions. Consequently, a reform with serious changes in the Government structure was needed. Functions of managing state property, providing state services, regulation of economic activities, taking political decisions, carrying out control functions – all these were concentrated in one point. Results were unexpected. A complaint with regard to actions of a state official was often considered by the person reported in the complaint. Control over providing state services can be accomplished by means of eliminating of duplication of functions and establishing structures responsible for a clearly defined scope of activities. Criteria of services should be outlined in accordance with the citizen's interests.

In 2005, the Government adopted the Concept of Administrative Reform in the Russian Federation. Work was done on reglamentation of activities of the state organs of executive power, establishing a network of multifunctional centers on providing state and municipal services, as well as digitalization of state services.

As a result of Concept implementation, legislative base of enhancing the quality of providing state services, was successfully established. Adoption of the Federal Law of June 27, 2010 No: 210-ФЗ 'On Organization of Providing State and Municipal Services' became an important step, establishing the background for implementation of basic measures with regard to administrative reform.

In the framework of the Concept, the work in the following fields was done: reglamentation and standardization of state and municipal services, digitalization of information on provided services, organization of state and municipal services on the

basis of 'single window' practice, optimization of functioning of executive power organs, combating corruption<sup>147</sup>.

The work done so far allows broadening the number of issues with regard to state regulation (licensing, accreditation, municipal control) in order to carry out a complex analysis of definite branches of Russian economy. In order to continue the changes and improvements, the Concept of Decreasing Administrative Barriers and Enhancing Accessibility of State and Municipal Services for 2011-2013 had been elaborated.<sup>148</sup>

#### **4.2. Administrative policies in Ukraine**

Necessity for administrative reform in Ukraine did not come out of the blue recently. It has been existing since the introduction of presidential position and respective administration in the state. Governments changed, and the changes made to state governing, were made irrespectively of any system or scientific background. As a result, organs of state power turned out to be unstable.

In June 1995, Presidium of the *Verkhovna Rada* instructed the Commission on the Issue of Legislative Policy and Judicial Reform to elaborate a Project of the Concept of administrative reform. The said concept was elaborated but never adopted because of the absence of the new Constitution of Ukraine. On October 2, 1997 the provision on the State Commission on Administrative Reform in Ukraine was adopted by the Decree of the President of Ukraine.<sup>149</sup> Among basic assignments of the Commission were elaboration of the concept of administrative reform, clarification of organizational and legislative background, as well as strategic and

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<sup>147</sup> Federalniy zakon ot 25 dekabrya 2008 g. № 273-ФЗ "O protivodeystvii corrupcii"; Federalniy zakon ot 25 dekabrya 2008 g. № 274-ФЗ "O vnesenii izmeneniy otdelniye zakonodatelniye acti Rossiyskoy Federacii v svyazi s prinyatiyem Federalnogo zakona "O protivodeystvii corrupcii"; Federalniy zakon ot 17 iunya 2009 g. № 172-ФЗ "Ob anticrupcionnoy expertise normativnih pravovih actov i proektov normativnih pravovih actov "; postanovleniye Pravitelstva Rossiyskoy Federacii ot 26 fevralya 2010 g. № 96 "Ob anticrupcionnoy expertise normativnih pravovih actov i proektov normativnih pravovih actov"

<sup>148</sup>Koncepciya snizheniya administrativnih barrierov i povisheniya dostupnosti gosudarstvennih i municipalnih uslug na 2011-2013 godi,

[http://www.ar.gov.ru/authority/documents/index.php?id\\_19=132&id\\_13=132](http://www.ar.gov.ru/authority/documents/index.php?id_19=132&id_13=132)

<sup>149</sup> Ukaz Prezidenta Ukraini shchodo zatverdzhennya Polozhennya pro Derzhavnu komissiyu z provedennya v Ukraini administrativnoi reformi vid 2 zhovtnya 1997, [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

tactics of its implementation, working-out of mechanisms and terms of carrying out the reform, and elaboration of proposals on radical changes in state governing.

On July 22, 1998 President of Ukraine signed the Decree 'On Measures on Implementation of the Concept of Administrative Reform in Ukraine'<sup>150</sup> It is obvious that the reform which is meant to redraw society's life, will be implemented in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine. For that reason, a legislative base, envisaged by Constitution, has to be established. In general, establishment of an adequate legislative base is a complex issue. Laws and other acts, adopted in Ukraine to this end, hardly can be called effective or stable. They are changed and amended often enough to get an experienced lawyer confused. Moreover, they sometimes contradict the Constitution and, as a result, do not work. It would be logic to unite the efforts of lawyers of the Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers and *Verkhovna Rada* in elaboration and consideration of law projects before their discussion in the Parliament. This would greatly reduce the possibility of presidential veto. The Law on Laws could solve the issue of collision. A lot of problems are to be considered during reforms in the system and structure of executive power. It is obvious that executive power has to be strong, but at the same time it has to be effective in ensuring citizens' well-being and integrity. Functioning of executive power has to be directed towards implementing the above principles.

On February 11, 2000 President of Ukraine issued a Decree 'On Improving Functioning of State Organs, Work of State Organs Personnel and Enhancing Efficiency of Using Budget Costs'.<sup>151</sup> According to this document, heads of central and local organs of executive power were obliged to implement definite measures with regard to improving structures and networks of their respective organs within the year of 2000.

A number of matters is still waiting to be resolved. One of the most important is eradication of double power in executive sphere. In fact, there are two governments in Ukraine: Presidential Administration and Cabinet of Ministers.

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<sup>150</sup> Ukaz Presidenta Ukraini "Pro zahodi shchodo vprovadzhennya Konceptii administrativnoi reformi v Ukraini" vid 22 lipnya 1998 roku, [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

<sup>151</sup> Ukaz Presidenta Ukraini "Pro vdoskonalennya roboti derzhavnih organiv, roboti derzhavnih sluzhbovtiv ta pidvishchenyia effektivnosti vikoristannya budgetnih koshtiv" vid 11 lyutogo 2000 roku, [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

Administration adopts decisions, and the responsibility for their realization is to be borne by the Cabinet of Ministers. It is more than clear that such a *modus operandi* does not allow normal functioning of executive power.

the process of reforming the organs of executive power, attention is to be paid to defining legislative position of ministries, committees and institutions, because each of them has its specifics. Moreover, the names of respective legal acts have to be unified.

The issue of defining the scope of activities of local state organs of executive power, their administration and coordination of their functions stay on the agenda. Personnel policies have to foresee the division of institutions of state service and political activities.<sup>152</sup> Adoption of legislative base on state service, classifying personnel on state service and clearly defining status of all categories of state officials is a demand of time. As a matter of fact, the issue of state officials was not defined in the law.<sup>153</sup>

In order to enhance efficiency of state service and its reforming, Coordination Council on the Issues of State Service under Jurisdiction of the President of Ukraine was established by a respective Decree of the President.<sup>154</sup> General Department of State Service of Ukraine gained a special status of a central organ of executive power under presidential jurisdiction.<sup>155</sup>

Another proposal for the concept was the establishment of an institution of administrative responsibility. Elaboration and adoption of the new Code of Ukraine on Administrative Violations and the Code on Administrative Provisions in Cases on Administrative Misconduct are meant to ensure the necessary systematization of legislation in the sphere of administrative responsibility.

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<sup>152</sup> Nijnik N., Bykov L., Kovalenko C. Organizatsiyno-kadrovi pytannja kadrovoho zabezpechennja aparatu vykonavchyh organiv // Komandor. - 1999. - № 3-4. - p. 3.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>154</sup> Ukaz Presidenta Ukraini vid 11 lyutogo 2000 roku "Pro pidvishchenyia effektivnosti sistemi derzhavnoi sluzhbi" vid 11 lyutogo 2000 roku [www.ligazakon.ua](http://www.ligazakon.ua)

<sup>155</sup> Ibid

Consequently, it is quite hard to follow the vector of reform but it is easy to understand its mechanism. A concept is elaborated by a presidential decree, and then a number of institutions are established. They also produce their specific proposals which on a later stage get the shape of projects of laws or other legal documents. There is no clear research whether these proposals contradict the Constitution or not. In case the said proposals are adopted no one is sure which law or by-law is to be applied. This chaotic structure in legislation lasts since early 1990-s and needs a generation of experts to bring the system in order.

As it can be seen from the above, further development of Ukrainian state demands enhancing of democratic processes in all the spheres of social life. Especially democratization is needed in adjusting the functions of state administration, local administration and all the state administrative system.

#### **4.3. Towards Further Democratization and a Civil Constitution: Turkey**

The role of economic crises in the history of Turkey is not to be underestimated. In mid-1950-ies, stagnation in the world economy led to great loss of votes by Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi, hereinafter DP). A series of crises in early 2000s voted out the coalition of Democrat Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi, hereinafter DSP), National Action(Movement) Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, hereinafter MHP), and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, hereinafter ANAP).

‘The impact of the financial crisis that hit the country first in November 2000 and next in February 2001 was much more severe on the political front. Political manipulations of fiscal policies leading to an unsustainable public debt were commonly diagnosed as the underlying reasons for these crises, which resulted in unprecedented urban unemployment and a record depreciation of the Turkish Lira against all foreign currencies.’<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Ali Çarkoğlu, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Turkish Democracy Today, Chapter 3, p. 44.

It is nothing new that the crises of 2000-2001 were triggered by financial manipulations of the coalition government. And it was fair that the coalition became outgoing in November 2002. Populist promises remained at the time of campaign.

“Before the November 2002 elections, the incumbent DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition seemed unable to deliver any significant amelioration in the economic conditions facing large electoral masses.”<sup>157</sup>

As for the advent of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, hereinafter AKP), such political factors as defragmentation of political right-wing parties and collapse in the centrist ones, contributed to it.

Pre-electoral period of 2002 can be named interesting from the point of view of capital-based campaigns. Picturesque Uzan campaign looked like a Hollywood shooting. Big money spoke and the masses listened chewing what had been were given for free. Cem Uzan, leader of the Young Party (Genç Parti, hereinafter GP), who is in fact the only one still remembered out of the whole campaign, made populist promises that won him some percentage of the votes, planning to make most use of the collapse in centrist parties.<sup>158</sup> The Cem Uzan show proved how capital supported by TV and radio channels (owned by the same man) can get a number of votes for the party which just came out of nowhere. So did it once again prove the vulnerability of Turkish electoral processes towards well-planned campaigns with media-backing and great financial support.<sup>159</sup>

#### **4.4. Outcomes of Reforms**

As the present study was planned as a comparative one, there is a need to put together the results of reforming processes in the three states.

At the same time, we are going to summarize the information of the above chapters. A great deal of discussions on the outcomes of reforms are in fact attempts to assess

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid, p. 44.

<sup>158</sup> Fethi Açıkel, Mapping the Turkish Political Landscape through November 2002 Elections, *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, p. 188.

<sup>159</sup> Ali Çarkoğlu, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest and Stability in an Islamic Society*, pp. 20-21.



and duly explain the difference between what was planned and what had really happened.

Every reform is elaborated and then launched with a view to improve governing the country, increasing living standards of the citizens, enhance economy and foster democracy in a state.

Doubtlessly, circumstances preceding the reform differ country by country; timing of initial decision means a lot. It is obvious that the Soviet Union in mid-1980-s was too late with reforming the leftovers of economy by means of the Communist Party and the ACS. Turkey was much more on time with economic liberalization, which had successfully prepared the ground for further democratization and getting all the sides of this process at the table. Ukraine started its way to administrative reform starting with establishing its statehood. When the concept of administrative reform was ready, a number of respective institutions was created.

As for Russia, it was the main scene for Perestroika and post-Perestroika events.<sup>160</sup> Course of reforms initiated by Gorbachev was a way of reforming economy which already did not exist, by ways and means which were not properly elaborated. First Soviet President belonged to a generation of younger Communist ideology gurus, but the concept of 'new thinking' he had introduced was rather a decision from above. As it has been said before, the Central Committee was a closed system so reform in the Party was possible only by an order of the Party to itself to reform itself. Nevertheless, Gorbachev succeeded depriving the Communist Party of its monopoly for political power. This was a very significant beginning. To my opinion, this was the point real changes started. Even if the economy were healthier, even if the CC patriarchs were younger and could apply some new thinking, the system would go round after round making the same mistakes again. In order to get more democracy, reforms were needed. To be able to make reforms, USSR needed more democracy.

No matter how Gorbachev's reforms get blamed, they already were inevitable. A huge system was falling apart. Dissolution of the Soviet Union can be named the one of the century's dramas, but it no longer could bear the burden of militarized

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<sup>160</sup> For the chronological order of Perestroika events, see Table 1

economy and state planning in 'civil' economy, consisting of sending papers from one department to another. Collapse of the Empire was natural, but there had to be a model of maintaining political, economic, social and cultural relations between yesterday's prisoners of the Iron Curtain. At the same time, newly emerging national elites did not want to cut-off links with Russia which announced all enterprises located on its territory the property of the Russian Federation. Gorbachev became the victim of the democratization he had declared. He was the first and the last Soviet President. By the end of 1991, he lost his position, and the Commonwealth of Independent States came into existence.

Ukrainian newly emerging elite did not miss the opportunity to concentrate the power in ex-Soviet republic in its hands. Multiparty system was established within a couple of years since the Declaration of Independence was adopted. From left to right, parties were much of clubs where distribution of authority and privileges was carried out. Struggle for power became more and more severe. At the same time, chaos in legislative system of a young state was on the agenda. The old legislation seized to exist together with the Soviet Union, but the new legal documents were still under elaboration. Laws which could be considered ready often contradicted to one another.

Forming of elite was a long process which did not always develop in a right direction. Nevertheless, steps towards reforming the legislative system were taken. At the same time, lack of thorough research on continuity and consecutiveness of lifting previous laws, by-laws and other legislative documents which have remained from the Soviet period with immediate introduction of the new ones still creates a lot of problems for citizens, especially in civil cases. Such a disorder in legislation is caused by such factors as lack of educated personnel possessing institutional memory and properly following a specific sort of issues; inability of bureaucrats quite experienced in the old system, to take new decisions and elaborate logic and creative solutions; legislative chaos with regard to questioning validity of a legislative act remaining from the Soviet period. Judicially an old law, decree, statement or resolution was no longer valid. At the same time, there was nothing new to replace it with.

After the work on the Constitution of Ukraine was over, there came a time for preparing a concept for administrative/judicial reform. And this was the point where the reform got into a trap into which, probably, the Russian reformists could also get in the years to come. Over-institutionalization. Too much bureaucracy at a time. To carry out a reform, commission is needed. Commission requires regulations and, in some cases, a sort of charter. To get the regulations elaborated, a committee is established. Bureaucratization of every legislative move made is a legacy of administrative command system. In such a situation, duplication of functions and establishing absolutely unnecessary commissions and sub-committees are inevitable.

Consequently, it is quite hard to follow the vector of reform but it is easy to understand its mechanism. A concept is elaborated by a presidential decree, and then a number of institutions are established. They also produce their specific proposals which on a later stage get the shape of projects of laws or other legal documents. There is no clear research whether these proposals contradict the Constitution or not. In case the said proposals are adopted no one is sure which law or by-law is to be applied. This chaotic structure in legislation lasts since early 1990-s and needs a generation of experts to bring the system in order.

In order to avoid bureaucratic traps, further democratization, exchange of experience, studying and applying best practices would be the right solution. At the same time, the concept of administrative responsibility should not be put aside in order to ensure applicability and continuity of legislation.

Speaking of the outcomes of reforms in both post-Soviet states, we can say that they share the same dramatic experience of collapse of a state, hardships of establishing their own statehood, rather difficult constitutional processes. Both countries witnessed emerging of new parties and their fragmentation. Russia and Ukraine have the same problems to overcome on their way towards transparency and democratization to be achieved by means of administrative reform.

As for Turkey, 1980-s had become the breakdown point for it. Liberalization was launched, redrawing economic and political life in the country. Such processes never went smooth, so the Özal government had to counter a lot of problems, such as hyperinflation and growing foreign debt.

1980-s-1990-s were crucial for Turkey, economic liberalization leading to democratization was on the agenda. Country took its place in the system of international economic and trade relations. Boosting increase in export resulted in establishing closer links in many areas of cooperation.

Economic change greatly influenced Turkish politics at that time. Reshaping of the whole system led to emerging of new business giants associations as well as strengthening of already-established ones. Islamic capital emerged in 1990-s, bringing about its own vision of modernity – also very dynamic and globalization-oriented one. As liberalization era went on, pro-Islamic parties traditionally opposing the full-membership of Turkey in the EU seemed to have moderated their political agenda.

It is obvious that the course of reforms carried out in Turkey was gradual and more successful. Overcoming hyperinflation had never been painless, but this process was necessary in order to bring the country to a stage at which the work on preparation of the ground for further democratization could take place. After liberalization had become reality, government took effort in order to have all the models of modernity duly represented in the country. Political parties and business communities representing all identity types have their specific place in the pattern.

High and stable economic growth in 1980-s was a result of liberalization in economy that followed after the military coup of 1980. A set of stabilization measures adopted in January same year, included structure reforming of national economy alongside with liberalization of foreign trade sector. The main emphasis was made on development of production of production sector, thus providing basis for transition from import-replacing to export-oriented economy. Among other significant reforms in the foreign economy in early 1980-s we should also name liberalization of currency

operations' mode as well as harmonizing national investment legislation with international norms.

In 1980-s Turkey took her place in the system of world economic relations. Her position is characterized by extreme openness of national economy towards foreign capital flows, investment-friendly business atmosphere, and active economic and trade relations with a lot of states alongside with integration groupings. Ankara's modern foreign economic policy is developed in several vectors, such as Turkey-European Union, Turkey-Central Asian and Caucasus states, Turkey-Middle East, Turkey-United States of America.

## RESULTS AND CONCLUSION

Administrative reform is a broad notion researched in connection with the process of making state governing and citizens' life easier. Together with some classical definitions, it has a lot of aspects, which are yet to be properly studied, especially with regard to such issues as collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders of 15 republics were caught in a situation with no clean exit. Any attempt of reforming one aspect of life would have knocked-out the whole system. Reforms starting with prohibition of hard drinking continued with a latest strive to modernize and foster what was called economy; when this attempt failed a new distraction for the people was needed urgently not to get de-motivated and tired Soviet people angry. Democratization and Glasnost were run together. A series of ethnic conflicts blasted all over the shifting country. As a result, all then-Soviet Republics declared their independence after the August coup attempt of 1991. M. Gorbachev was no longer President.

Country was no longer Soviet Union, money was no longer valuable. Economic and cultural relations among the new states were falling apart. The advent of CIS resulted in escalation of struggle for power and privileges among the members of national elites. Parties were established, new laws and regulations started to be elaborated in order to ensure new elites' well-being.

These passages are not written in order to show how hopeless things were. Local elites which were in fact ex-Communist elites, did not know any other way of introducing any changes. Nor did they know how carry out a more or less painless transition from totalitarian economy to the market one. Elites privatized whatever they could; plants were reorganized as warehouses. Facilitation of trade and extensive export with no replacing production came on the agenda. No recipe was in store for renovation of economy. Every country was busy with institutionalization of its renewed statehood. For this, a thoroughly elaborated administrative reform was a must. Yet, political leaders, efficient in Communist scholastics, did not have any idea on how this reform should be implemented.

This is why I stated at the beginning of this research that the experience of Turkey should have been studied more deeply. At the times when Ukraine was making its first steps into the world community as an independent state, there was an urgent need for a scheme that would enable development of small and medium enterprises, enhance municipal services and make citizens' life easier. There are a lot of PPP schemes. Doubtlessly, some of them would have fit Russia and Ukraine.

Today Turkey has even more experience to share than Great Britain. A good start of 1984 resulted in great accomplishments, such as infrastructure of Istanbul Atatürk and Sabiha Gökçen Airports. Now the Infrastructure and Services Department of the State Planning Organization of Turkey, Privatization Administration and the Turkish Republic Undersecretariat of Treasury are among the major government bodies involved in PPPs. In 2008, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality assigned 25 % of its budget, namely 1 billion US Dollars from its own sources of financing for implementation of subway projects. As of 2008, Istanbul had a total of 70 km. of metro lines. The total need pronounced by the Metropolitan Municipality, is at least 400 km. An approximate price of 1 km. of metro line is 50 million US Dollars, so 20 billion is needed to meet the city's needs. One solution is to built the subway in 20 years assigning 1 billion US Dollars per year. Anooother one is to apply a PPP or BOT scheme and have the lines constructed in 5 years.<sup>161</sup>

Initiative of 1980-s merged with experience of European Countries. It goes without saying that every state has its own specifics. Finally, Turkey has become a PPP leader in the Black Sea region, and it is very sincere and generous in sharing its experience.

Recent developments clearly show the growing confidence between state and private sector. It may sound pathetic again but mutual trust and reduction of corruption on both sides make PPP possible. PPP models play an important role in forming of sustainable development where one change opens new perspectives.

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<sup>161</sup> International PPP Platform Turkey, '01.05.2008 Hilton-Ankara, 02.05.2008 Conrad-İstanbul Açılış Töreni Konuşma Metinleri', pp. 90-92

Turkey, with its strong and dynamic economy, is able to make best use of public-private partnership thus contributing to development of all the economic spheres, especially infrastructure, energy and environmental protection, education, healthcare, tourism. Implementing PPP projects in these fields will enable research and development of new technologies without which further development will be hardly possible.

PPP Workshop held in Istanbul on 29-30 April 2010 with the participation of UN ECE, once again proved that Turkey has completed a successful transition from theoretical phase to the practical one. Finally, within 25 years Turkey has recorded an outstanding economic development, and the role of cooperation of public and private sector is not to be underestimated.

At the same time, there is a need to question whether Turkish scenario would have become a 100 % remedy for Russia and Ukraine. For sure, a legislative base is needed for every PPP model. Moreover, trust of a private entrepreneur in a state must be developed. A culture of cooperation between the state and private business would not come out of the blue after the respective decision is adopted. For sure, such a scheme would not fit Russia and Ukraine, but it would to a large extent ease the work of utility services which are still preserving the Soviet style of working attitude.

It is still to be researched how economic liberalization would have influenced then-Soviet Union. Democratization in economy in the USSR was planned by Communist Party elite in order to seize possession of the property the functioning of which they were controlling during the Soviet period. All decrees issued by Gorbachev with respect to bringing Soviet economy closer to the world's standards, resulted in seizure of control in respective fields of individual labor activities by Communist Party elite and their family members, personnel of secret services and other state officials.

To be honest, not a scheme would efficiently work within a system where political elite, or state officials, or civil servants, or judges and lawyers are not



motivated to protect the safety, human and civil rights of the citizens. After Communism-oriented system had collapsed, instant money-oriented system had emerged and developed in no time at all. As it was not quite possible to make money with money in ex-SSRs due to poor development of banking sphere, large money masses were transferred to the West through off-shore zones.

Cooperation among citizens, private business and all the branches of power is possible only on a condition of trustworthiness of state. A real administrative reform is never aimed at getting more privileges than the others. Reforming is a permanent process with a view to make the state more transparent in order to encourage the citizens to contribute to its development.

In this thesis, basic information on the period of mid-1980-s, which was marked by administrative reforms and preparatory period in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine was presented along with its primary analysis. Every state is on its way continuing changes aimed at democratization of social life and reducing unnecessary bureaucratic work. A brief data on the state of affairs with regard to administrative reform in Russia, Turkey and Ukraine was also presented. Steps taken towards democratization and the very intent of them could be similar, but their combination with liberalization of economy and their share in the reforms are doubtlessly different. While proceeding with further analysis we will admit that the country which had started with liberalization of economy, turned out to be more successful in every type of reforms – administrative, economic, social, democratic.

Attention was paid to the concept of reforms. Russia and Ukraine followed a similar way of an institutionalized networking. To some extent it can be called logic because both states were in need of their own Constitutions and legislations after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, this complex data could be of use for Russian and Ukrainian researchers who are still not so familiar with Turkish experience of liberalization and democratization. Soviet, post-Soviet and then Russian and Ukrainian political scientists traditionally have been oriented much more to the experience of Europe and the United States of America. Lack of proper economic and sociological data

resulted in disproportional research of definite political and economic systems. Less attention was finally paid to a country having very similar post-revolution experience.

1980-s which were the era of reforms for all the Black Sea littoral states brought many changes into the existence model of hundreds of millions of people. While none of the schemes researched could be called ideal, there is scenarios with more or less damages in political, economic and social spheres. The Republic of Turkey made its way among the world's most significant economies through economic liberalization followed by democratization of Turkish society.

As it has been stated above, none of the modernization models can be called ideal. Still, there is a success story which needs thorough research in Russia and Ukraine. The world grows globalized, and exchange of experience gets easier. Best practices can be adjusted to local specifics on condition there is political will to do so.

Information on the preconditions of reforms was presented in order to obtain the full picture of circumstances under which reforms were elaborated. Once again, there is only one state out of three whose start can be called a successful one. Significant changes in Turkish economy triggered liberalization and democratization in political and social life, thus preparing the ground for moderate political Islam, democratic changes and reforms of the Justice and Development Party to come later.

Information on Ukraine's withdrawal from the Soviet Union was presented along with the preconditions of this process in order to show that all Soviet political leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev were right when they said that there will be no Soviet Union without Ukraine.

The purpose of this study was to present the aspects and course of administrative reforms in the subject states. There is no single administrative reform formula that can be applied everywhere. Each country makes its own way towards changes. In Turkey with its long tradition of civil society, liberalization in economic life meant the start for further democratic steps. It was the case when economic reforms

were followed by several waves of democratization with the newest one on September, 12, 2010.

In Russia, economy, administrative command system and the Communist ideology collapsed together. The greatest reform from the whole complex of changes launched by Mikhail Gorbachev did not concern economy. Perestroika reforms have overthrown the monolith of Communist Party.

Common features of the processes taking place in the administrative spheres of the three states can be identified after the inception of BSEC. The main objective of the Organization, the idea of which belongs to Turgut Özal, is to promote democracy in the region by means of liberalization of economy, simplification of procedures having negative effect on international trade, and ensuring well-being in the region through economic development. As the latter cannot be imagined without proper administrative backing, reforms in this field become even more important.

Speaking of the possible contributions of the present study, I would like to mention that information collected from different sources and translated from Russian, Turkish and Ukrainian could be used for further completion of a unified database on the issue of administrative reform. Outlining preconditions of reforming process allows to get a complex picture of social life before reform started. It is necessary to admit that, taking into consideration the local specifics in every country, economic component and need for a new political and social strategy and thinking are the core factors triggering reforming processes.

After presenting the developments with regard to reforming process, a brief information on the state of affairs was put on paper. Translated materials of Russian and Ukrainian sources could be of practical use for future studies in the field.

The present study is focused on proving that mid-1980-s and the beginning of 1990-s were the period of crucial system changes for many states, irrespectively of their relations with the Soviet Camp. In the first half of XX century, the Republic of Turkey, which had chosen the Western way of development, had also undergone a very traumatic period similar to that in the young Soviet Union. This period had

greatly influenced home policies of Turkey. Dramatic decades resulting in large human losses had a very different impact on the three states of this research.

## Appendix 1

### Main Perestroika Events in Chronological Order<sup>162</sup>

- 1985.03.11 Gorbachev elected Secretary General by the Plenum of CC CPSU
- 1985.04.23 Plenum of CC CPSU put forward an idea of fastening social and economic development
- 1985.05.07 Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 'On Measures on Overcoming Hard Drinking and Alcoholism, Combating Moonshining'
- 1985.05.16 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR 'On Strengthening of Combating Hard Drinking' launched anti-alcohol campaign which lasted till 1988
- 1985.07.30 Gorbachev's statement on unilateral moratorium for nuclear blasts
- 1985.10.17 Gorbachev proposed withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
- 1985.10.26 New CPSU Program published
- 1986.01.15 M. Gorbachev's statement on the program of total destruction of nuclear weapons in the world
- 1986.02.25 XXVII Congress of CPSU. New edition of the Program on 'Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period till 2000'
- 1986.04.21 M. Gorbachev declared readiness for simultaneous dismissal of the Warsaw Pat and NATO
- 1986.04.26 Chernobyl disaster
- 1986.05.23 Resolution of the CM of the USSR 'On the Measures on Combating Non-labor Incomes'
- 1986.08.31 'Admiral Nakhimov' vessel catastrophe
- 1986.10.11 M. Gorbachev meets President Reagan in Reikjavik
- 1986.10.31 Withdrawal of 6 Soviet regiments from Afghanistan as a demonstration of readiness to gradually withdraw

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<sup>162</sup> Istoriya Rossii, Red. A. Orlov, 3-e izd., pererab. i dop., M. Prospekt, 2009, Appendix I, pp. 597-605.

- 1986.11.19 SC of the USSR adopted the Law 'On Individual Labor Activities' aimed to get state official controlling already existing clandestine businesses
- 1986.12.23 Return of A. Sakharov from exile
- 1987.01.13 Resolution of the CM of the USSR 'On Procedure of Establishment on the Territory of the USSR of Joint Ventures with Participation of Soviet Organizations and Companies from Capitalist and Developing Countries'
- 1987.01.27 Plenum of the CC CPSU considered the issue of 'Perestroika and CPSU Personnel Policies'. Gorbachev put forward the concept of Perestroika, political reforms, alternative elections and secret voting
- 1987.06.21 First elections to Local councils on alternative basis
- 1987.06.25 CC CPSU Plenum considered the issue 'On Assignments of the Party on Profound Perestroika of Economic Management'. Failure of Uskoreniye officially recognized
- 1987.07.17 CC CPSU and CM of the USSR adopted 10 joint resolutions on Perestroika in managing the economy
- 1987.07.23 Sitting riots of Crimean Tatars in Moscow
- 1987.07.30 Start of deportation of Crimean Tatars from Moscow
- 1987.08.10 Strike of bus drivers in Chekhovkiy District of Moscow
- 1987.08. Limitless subscription for newspapers and magazines allowed for the first time in Soviet history
- 1987.09.12 Yeltsin sent Gorbachev his letter of resignation
- 1987.09.28 PB Commission on Additional Research of Repressions of 1930-ies-1940-ies established
- 1987.10.21 CC CPSU Plenum: Perestroika criticized by Yeltsin
- 1987.10.17 Huge environmental riot in Yerevan
- 1987.10.21 Speech by Yeltsin during the CC CPSU Plenum and his request for resignation

- 1987.10.24 First meeting of editors of so-called informal publications in Leningrad
- 1987.11.14 Collection of signatures in order to ensure Yeltsin's return
- 1988.02.12 Beginning of riots in Stepanakert. Armenian population criticized Azerbaijani government
- 1988.02.20 Regional Council requested the Supreme Council of two republics to transfer the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to Armenian SSR
- 1988.02.25 Troops are brought in Yerevan. Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit
- 1988.02.26 Address by Gorbachev to the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan
- 1988.02.27 Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit. Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR adopted a resolution related to addresses of both republics with regard to Karabakh
- 1988.02.28 Armenian pogroms in Sumgayit in response to attempts of changing the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, death toll 23
- 1988.03.17 Armenian riots in Stepanakert with a demand for Karabakh's accession to Armenia
- 1988.05.15 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan started
- 1988.05.26 SC USSR adopted the USSR Law 'On Cooperative System in the USSR'
- 1988.05.29 Gorbachev meets President Reagan in Moscow on the side of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
- 1988.06.04 Beginning of riots in Moscow
- 1988.06.15 Supreme Council of the Armenian SSR agreed to accession of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region into the Republic of Armenia. June, 17 – Decision of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijanian SSR on impossibility of transferring the Region under the jurisdiction of Armenia. Refugee movements started
- 1988.06.28 XIX All-Union Party Conference adopted Resolutions 'On Some Immediate Measures on Practical Implementation of the Reform of Political System of the Country', 'On the Course of Implementation of

- the XXVII CPSU Conference and Issues on Enhancing Perestroika', 'On Democratization of Soviet Society and Reform of Political System', 'On Combating Bureaucratism', 'On Interethnic Relations', 'On Glasnost'
- 1988.07.01 Speech by Yeltsin during the XIX All-Union Party Conference with request on his political rehabilitation
- 1988.07.09 First riot of the Moscow People's Front
- 1988.07.18 Meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Decision on impossibility of changing the borders adopted
- 1988.07.20 Order of the Ministry of Communications of the USSR renewing limitation for media subscription
- 1988.07.28 Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR 'On the Procedure of Organization and Holding Meetings and Demonstrations in the USSR'
- 1988.09.18 Aggravation of situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Emergency situation since 21 September
- 1988.10.01 Gorbachev elected Head of Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR
- 1988.10.20 PB CC CPSU announced the Decree of August 14, 1946 'On Magazines "Zvezda" and "Leningrad"'. Limitless subscription for magazines and newspapers renewed
- 1988.11. 700 000-meeting in Baku on Nahichevan events
- 1988.11.16 Supreme Council of Estonian SSR adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty and Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Estonian SSR thus putting forward priority of republic laws
- 1988.11.22 Students' hunger strike in Tbilisi started
- 1988.11.23 Decree of the Presidium of Supreme Council of the USSR 'On Immediate Measures regarding Bringing Public Order to Azerbaijanian SSR and Armenian SSR'



- 1988.12.01 Supreme Council of the USSR adopted the Laws 'On Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the USSR', On Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR', Decree on Appointment of Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR
- 1988.12.02 Meeting of Gorbachev and Bush in Malta signed the end of cold war
- 1988.12.05 Statements of the CC CPSU and Council of Ministers of the USSR 'On Roughest Violation of Constitutional Rights of Citizens in Azerbaijanian SSR and Armenian SSR' and 'On Unacceptable Actions of Local Organs Officials in Azerbaijanian SSR and Armenian SSR, Forcing Citizens to Leave their Places of Permanent Residence'
- 1988.12.06 Speech of Gorbachev during the GA UN. Plans on decreasing the number of general weapons
- 1988.12.07 Devastating earthquake in Armenia. Spitak, Kirovokan, Leninakan mostly destroyed. Death toll more than 24 000 people
- 1989.01. Nomination of candidates to be elected People's Deputies of the USSR started
- 1989.01.12 Decree of the Presidium of Supreme Council of the USSR on introducing a special form of governing the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
- 1989.02.15 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan completed
- 1989.03.02 Miners' strike in Vorkuta
- 1989.03.12 250-thousand riot in Riga, riots in Leningrad and Kharkov
- 1989.03.26 First relatively democratic Supreme Council elections in the USSR
- 1989.04. 50 thousand Soviet soldiers withdrawn from GDR and Czechoslovakia
- 1989.04.09 Bloody Sunday in Tbilisi: 16 people died in operation on in the square near the House of Government
- 1989.04.25 Political course of Gorbachev criticized during the CC CPSU Plenum
- 1989.05.21 A 150 000 Luzhniki Meeting in Moscow with participation of Sakharov and Yeltsin
- 1989.05.23- Clashes on ethnic background in Fergana, Uzbekistan, Meskhetian

- 24 Turks slaughtered
- 1989.05.25 Opening of the I Congress of Deputies of the USSR. Gorbachev elected President of the Supreme Council of the USSR. Interregional Deputy Group formed (B. Yeltsin, A. Sakharov, G. Popov and others)
- 1989.06.03 Catastrophes on Ufa railway and on a gas pipe. Death toll equals hundreds
- 1989.06.03 National conflict in Uzbekistan, more than 100 Meskhetian Turks died
- 1989.07.11 Strike of 140 thousand workers in Kuzbass. City strike committee established
- 1989.07.15 Armed conflicts in Abkhazia
- 1989.07.16 Strike of miners in Donetsk
- 1989.09.23 Supreme Council of Azerbaijanian SSR adopted the Law on Sovereignty of the Republic
- 1989.09.25 Supreme Council of Lithuania announced annexation of the Republic to the USSR in 1940 illegitimate
- 1989.11.26 Supreme Council of the USSR adopted the Law on Economic Independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia
- 1989.11.27 Communist government of Czechoslovakia resigned
- 1989.12.01 Gorbachev met Pope John Paul II in Vatican
- 1989.12.02 Unofficial meeting of President Bush and the Head of Supreme Council of the USSR Gorbachev in Malta signed the end of Cold War
- 1989.12.09 Russian CC CPSU, headed by Gorbachev, established
- 1989.12.12 Opening of the II Conference of the People's Deputies of the USSR. Military operation in Afghanistan and applying military force in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989 condemned
- 1989.12.31 Mass riots in Nahichevan, hundreds of kilometers of Soviet-Iranian border destroyed
- 1990.01.19 Soviet troops in Baku, death toll 125.
- 1990.02.12- Mass riots in Dushanbe resulted in human losses

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- 1990.02.25 Anti-Communist riot in Moscow
- 1990.03.11 Plenum of the CC CPSU decided to discard the CPSU monopoly for political power and proposed to introduce the position of the President of the USSR. Gorbachev was nominated for this post
- 1990.03.11 Supreme Council of Lithuania adopted the Decree 'On Restoration of Independence of Lithuanian State' and announced Constitution of the USSR void
- 1990.03.12 Extraordinary III Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR established the post of the President of the USSR. M. Gorbachev elected USSR President
- 1990.03.23 Soviet troops and tanks in Vilnius
- 1990.04.18 Moscow started economic blockade of Lithuania
- 1990.05.30 B. Yeltsin elected Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR in the third round of voting
- 1990.06.12 The First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Russia
- 1990.06.19 Opening of the Russian Party Conference later on renamed as Founding Conference. Russian Communist Party established
- 1990.06.20 Supreme Council of Uzbekistan adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR
- 1990.06.23 Supreme Council of Moldavia adopted the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Moldavian SSR
- 1990.07.02 Opening of the last, XXVII, Conference of CPSU. The Conference failed to adopt a new Program which resulted in a split in CPSU
- 1990.07.16 Gorbachev and Chancellor of the Federative Republic of Germany H. Kohl made an agreement on unification of Germany and full membership of a new state in NATO
- 1990.07.20 Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Republic of North Osetia-Alania adopted

- 1990.07.21 Supreme Council of Latvia announced the Declaration of Seim of June 21, 1940 invalid since the day of adoption
- 1990.07.27 Supreme Council of the Belorussian SSR adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Belarus
- 1990.08.01 USSR Law on Mass Media – censorship lifted
- 1990.08. Parliament of Armenia adopted the Declaration of State Independence
- 1990.08. Declaration of Sovereignty of Turkmenistan, Armenia, Tajikistan
- 1990.08.30 '500 Days' economic plan sent for consideration by the government
- 1990.09.20 Supreme Council of the RSFSR expressed its inconfidence to the Government of the USSR
- 1990.10.02 GDR ceased to exist. Black-red-yellow flag over Berlin
- 1990.10.16 M. Gorbachev receives Nobel Peace Prize
- 1990.10.24 RSFSR Law 'On Validity of Acts of the Union of SSR on the Territory of the RSFSR' Decrees by the President of the USSR became subject to ratification
- 1990.10.26 Declaration of Sovereignty of Kazakhstan
- 1990.10.31 Budget Law adopted by the Supreme Council of the RSFSR. All the enterprises located in the RSFSR had to pay taxes to RSFSR only
- 1990.11.30 Humanitarian aid sent to Russia (mostly from Germany)
- 1990.12.12 State of emergency in South Osetia
- 1990.12.12 US credit (US\$ 1 000 000 000) aimed at purchasing food products
- 1990.12.20 E. Shevardnadze resigned from the post of Foreign Minister
- 1990.12.27 G. Yanayev elected Vice President
- 1991.01.14 V. Pavlov appointed Prime Minister
- 1991.01.22 Prime Minister Pavlov's decree on immobilization of 50 and 100 Roubles bills in a limited period of time
- 1991.01.26 KGB mandate with regard to combating economic crimes extended

- 1991.02.09 Independence referendum in Lithuania (90,5% votes in favor of independence)
- 1991.02.19 RSFSR President B. Yeltsin demanded resignation of M. Gorbachev
- 1991.03.01 Beginning of miners' strike with a demand for Gorbachev's resignation
- 1991.03.07 Presidential Council of the USSR dismissed, Security Council formed
- 1991.03.17 All-Union Referendum on keeping the Soviet Union. 80 % of citizens eligible to vote participated, 76 % of them voted for keeping the Union (6 republics boycotted the referendum).
- 1991.03.31 Independence referendum in Georgia (independence as of 09.04)
- 1991.04.02 Pricing reform in the USSR, prices of many groups of goods increased largely
- 1991.04.09 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland started
- 1991.04.10 Ministry of Justice of the USSR registered CPSU as a public organization
- 1991.04.23 A new Union Treaty preliminarily signed in Novo-Ogaryovo by 9 republics
- 1991.04.24 An attempt to move Gorbachev from his post of the Secretary General during the Plenum of SC CPSU
- 1991.05.06 Coal mines in Siberia went under the jurisdiction of RSFSR. Strikes were over.
- 1991.05.20 A new, more liberal law on emigration from the USSR
- 1991.06.11 A new US credit (US\$ 1 500 000 000) aimed at purchasing food products
- 1991.06.12 Elections in the USSR: Yeltsin elected President of the RSFSR, G. Popov elected Mayor of Moscow, A. Sobchak elected Mayor of Leningrad
- 1991.06.28 COMECON dismissed
- 1991.06.17 Novo-Ogaryovo: Heads of 9 republics come to an agreement with regard to a new Union Treaty

- 1991.07.01 USSR Vice President G. Yanayev in Warsaw signed the protocol on termination of validity of the Warsaw Treaty. Soviet troops withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Warsaw Treaty dismissed
- 1991.07.03 E. Shevardnadze sent to SC CPSU his statement on resignation from the CPSU
- 1991.07.20 RSFSR President Yeltsin issues a Decree 'On Terminating of Activities of Organizational Structures of [Political Parties and Mass Society Movements in State Organs, Institutions and Organizations of the RSFSR'
- 1991.07.30 B. Yeltsin accepted President Bush in his residence. President Bush was the first foreign guest accepted by Yeltsin in his new capacity
- 1991.08.04 Mikhail Gorbachev went to Phoros, Crimea, for vacation
- 1991.08.19 GKCHP Coup
- 1991.08.21 Control over force and security structures transferred to the President of Russia. The USSR actually lost its supreme executive power
- 1991.12.08 Belovezhsk Agreement by three ex-Soviet Republic leaders terminated existence of the USSR

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