

**THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS REFLECTED TO THE RELAZIONE OF THE
BAILO GIORGIO GIUSTINIAN: 1620-1627**

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by

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- 1) The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
- 2) The program of advanced study of which this is part has consisted of:
 - i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
 - ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

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ABSTRACT

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS REFLECTED TO THE RELAZIONE OF THE BAILO GIORGIO GIUSTINIAN: 1620-1627

The relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice were started officially by the first un-residential ambassador of Venice to the Ottoman in 1360, and towards 17th century these relations both economically and politically intertwined.

In the addition to the *dispacci*, every Venetian ambassador had to present an oral or written report to the Venetian Senate end of their missions by the decree of the Venetian Senate in 1425. The Venetians were among the first European countries to start the system of residential ambassadors and the first bailo to Istanbul was appointed when Mehmed II gave the permission by an *ahd-name* in 1454 to Venice. The *Bailo* was one the most important diplomatic position in the history of Republic of Venice, and their *relazioni* were praised both in their time by the European diplomats and in our time by the historians.

Giorgio Giustinian was appointed to the Ottoman Empire as a *bailo* by the Venetian Senate in 1620, after he served successfully to his country in the courts of the England, the France and the Austria as an ambassador. He witnessed one of the most chaotic periods of the Ottoman Empire. After he repatriated, he presented almost all important events between 1620 and 1627, occurred in the Ottoman Empire with details to the Venetian Senate by his famous *Relazione*, including very important information on the high rank dignitaries and the structure of government which were very crucial for Venice. We tried to present the situation of the Ottoman Empire between 1620 and 1627 and the image of the Ottoman Empire according to the *Relazione* of the *Bailo* Giorgio Giustinian. Without no doubt that the most important and the longest part of the Giustinian's *Relazione* was the regicide of Osman II in 1622 by a rebellion.

Key words: Ottoman Empire, Republic of Venice, Venetians, Relazioni of Baili,
Bailo, Bailate, Giorgio Giustinian

KISA ÖZET

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Şubat, 2012

BALYOS GIORGIO GIUSTINIAN RAPORUNA GÖRE OSMANLI DEVLETİ : 1620-1627

Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik Cumhuriyeti arasındaki münasebetler resmi olarak 1360 yılında Venedik tarafından Osmanlı'ya gönderilen ilk geçici elçi ile başladı, 17. yüzyıla doğru bu münasebetler hem ekonomik hem de politik olarak iç içe geçmişti.

1425 yılında Venedik Senato'su tarafından konulan kanuna göre, mektupların dışında, her Venedik elçisi vazifesini tamamladıktan sonra Senato'ya yazılı ya da sözlü bir rapor sunmak zorunda idi. Venedikliler, Avrupalı devletler içerisinde daimi elçilik sistemini ilk kez başlatanlardan biridir ve İstanbul'a ilk balyos Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in 1454 yılında Venedik'e verdiği bir ahidname ile atandı. Balyos, Venedik Cumhuriyeti tarihi içinde en önemli diplomatik pozisyonlardan biridir ve raporları hem kendi çağlarındaki diplomatlar hem de bizim çağımızda tarihçiler tarafından takdir edilmiştir.

Giorgio Giustinian, İngiltere, Fransa ve Avusturya saraylarında başarılı bir şekilde elçi olarak ülkesine hizmet ettikten sonra, Venedik Cumhuriyeti tarafından Osmanlı Devleti'ne balyos olarak atandı. Osmanlı Devleti'nin en karışık zamanlarından birine tanıklık yaptı. Ülkesine döndükten sonra, 1620 ve 1627 yılları arasında Osmanlı Devleti içerisinde vuku bulan neredeyse bütün önemli olayları, Osmanlı devlet yapısı ve ricali hakkında Venedik için hayati önem taşıyan bilgileri de içeren meşhur raporunu Venedik Senatosu'na sundu. Biz 1620 ve 1627 yılları arasında devletin içinde olduğu durumu, Osmanlı Devleti imajını balyos Giorgio Giustinian raporuna göre sunmaya çalıştık. Şüphesiz raporun en önemli ve en uzun kısmı II. Osman'ın bir ayaklanması ile katledilmesi vaka'sıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı Devleti, Venedik Cumhuriyeti, Venedikliler, Venedik Elçi

Raporları, Balyos, Balyosluk, Giorgio Giustinian

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INTRODUCTION:

The Republic of Venice did not cease to keep in touch with the East after the first Crusades and kept on Mediterranean trade, by the time this trade became vital for her. The Republic of Venice is called as “*Porta d’Oriente*” by Maria Pia Pedani and we know that *Oriente* meant the Ottoman Empire for European states and the Republic of Venice in the early modern era, so the Ottoman Empire was the door of the Levant, if Venice would like to enter to the Levant that her economy depended on it, had to knock to this door and had to be welcomed by it.

The first chapter of this thesis comprises what was the image of the Turk in the early modern era Venice and Europe? What was the main effect creating this image? What did evoke the terms of “Ottoman and Turk” to Europe and to Venice? The image of the Turk and the Ottoman were correlated to each other, since this image was correlated to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire to the west. How the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice did start and what were the peculiarities of these relations? We told briefly the main economic, diplomatic and military events lived between them from 1360 until the date of the *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian’s presentation of his *Relazione* to the Venetian Senate, in 1627, thus seeing the previous history of two states, contributed to understand Giustinian’s *Relazione* and his ideas. The Ottoman Empire conquered the Republic of Venice’s dominions in the Aegean and Mediterranean one by one, and throughout 1627 Venice lost almost all her dominions.

The second chapter focusses on who were *baili*? What was their historical background, their functions and importance in the Venetian diplomacy? The *bailo* was one

of the most important posts in the politic of Venice, and the success of the Levant trade of Venice highly depended on *baili*'s success. The *baili* had many tasks on politic and economic matters in Istanbul's diplomatic life. And the famous *relazioni*, what were *relazioni*? Why the Venetian *Senato* ordered to the *baili*, submit a written or oral report, *relazione*, end of their missions? To be successful in the politic and the economic affairs, Venice wanted to have more information about her rivals, since the most important rival was the Ottoman Empire, the information from the *baili*, the accurate ones, was crucial for the Republic. What were the common points of the *relazioni* in the early modern era? And the *Relazione* of Giorgio Giustinian was conformed these criterias? Giustinian's *Relazione* had the common themes with 1500s' and 1600s' *relazioni*, except the tyranny of the sultans was replaced with the Janissaries. Who was Giorgio Giustinian? Why was he elected as a *bailo* to Istanbul? He was a Venetian patriciate as the other *baili*, and before his appointment to Istanbul, served his patria in the other courts of Europe, as the most *baili*.

In the third chapter we started to examine the *Relazione* of the *bailo* Giorgio Giustinian, and we compared the information of Giustinian by footnotes which mostly based on the Ottoman chronicles. Since he started to his bailate in 1620, under Osman II's reign, and submitted his *Relazione* to the Venetian Senate in 1627, his *Relazione* cover one of the most critical terms of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman dynasty. We rather not do any replacement in the *Relazione*, but we had to do some, through chronological order to make it more understandable, and we put the page number in order of the book of "(A Cura di) Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, *Relazioni Di Ambasciatori Veneti Al Senato, Volume XIV, Costantinopoli Relazioni Inedite (1512 – 1789), Padova 1996, Bottega D'erasmo-Aldo Ausilio Editore In Padova*", and we continued as "Relazione, ...", also we utilized this

transcription version of Giorgio Giustinian's *Relazione* while we were translating in to English. At first we examined the "vastness, power and wealth" of the Ottoman Empire by Giustinian's point of view in the part of "3.1". According to Giustinian the source of the Ottoman power based on land forces, arsenal and treasury. He told the conditions of these sources with details. He gave a wide place to the Janissaries, since they were the main actors of his *Relazione*.

In the part of "3.2." we presented the "structure of the government" by Giustinian's point of view and compared this part by footnotes. Giustinian told the basic principles' of the Ottoman government such as Islamic law, *kanun* and the most important officials starting from the sultan, and then grand vizier, nishanci, defterdar, kapudan pasha ect. with their power and duties. Giustinian classified all these officials if their friendship might be useful to Venice or not. The *baili* were one of the most influential foreign diplomats in the Sublime Porte. Beyond their seniority they had many friends, "*amici*" in the Ottoman Palace. They were able to reach the dignitaries and to penetrate much important information about the Ottoman Empire.

In the part of "3.3." we rather examined the personalities one by one in chronological order, and the events related to these personalities. Giustinian conveyed that; "*during my bailate three kings, two queen mothers, and seventeen grand viziers*", were in administration, but according to the Ottoman sources, thirteen grand viziers were in charge between 1620 and 1627. Giustinian mentioned about these Ottoman Sultans, Valide Sultans, Grand Viziers and the other dignitaries, so we shared the third chapter to these important personalities. He conveyed that the confusing and chaotic years during his bailate were started by Osman II's regicide in 1622. Bailo Giustinian could manage really well,

and solved all diplomatic and economic problems of the Venetians and the Venetian government successfully and tried to maintain good relations between two countries. He both recommended his patria being loyal to her antique friendship with the Ottoman, and always should have been ready for any attack, if the Ottoman might have recuperated its antique power.

The last part of third chapter is about the relations between the Ottoman Empire and European countries. Giustinian started to define relations from at the beginning, and according to him, the relations' past were still a big impact on the Ottoman government. For example, still the Ottomans remember the Francis I and Süleyman I's agreement, and they respect to the French, and still they have a fear about whether the Pope could organize a crusade; even 56 years had passed after the last crusade of 1571, Lepanto. He also mentioned the relations between the residential ambassadors at the Sublime Porte; English, French and Dutch. And the important information is how the ambassadors at the Sublime Porte could play a great role on the Ottoman diplomacy, for example when the Spanish Viceroy's ambassador Montalbano visited the Sublime Porte. As seen in the footnotes, except few details Giustinian's information were true, in addition his *Relazione* is very valuable for the Ottoman history, otherwise great Ottomanist Josef von Hammer-Purgstall would not use his *Relazione* in his monumental *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, especially for the part of Osman II's regicide.

We saw that in the 1990s' and 2000s' eminent historian's rose who studied on the history of Venice and the Ottoman. They looked from different point of view to the diplomatic, economic and social relations between two countries. *Archivo Stato di Venezia* and *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* are the most important sources for them. Cemal Kafadar

suggests that while *Archivio Stato di Venezia* is the most important archive for Ottoman history among the all European ones, even for some matters more important than *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*. Now we can say that this is a special area for historians to specialize in and writing the history of Venice without Ottoman or writing history of Ottoman without Venice would be uncompleted.

The importance of the *relazioni* of the *baili* in the history of Venice is undeniable, and the importance of the *relazioni* in the history of Ottoman by most scholars, is unquestionable. To wonder how exactly the Venetian *baili* saw the Ottomans and the Ottoman Empire, and how they transferred it to the Republic of Venice and to Europe by their famous *relazioni*, turned into a thesis to examine one of the famous *relazioni* of one the famous Venetian *baili*. While we were doing the research for this thesis, we realized that both the relations between two countries affected the *baili*'s point of view while they were writing their *relazioni* and the *relazioni* of the *baili* affected politic and economic affairs of the Republic of Venice mutually.

CHAPTER I: A GENERAL LOOK to the RELATIONS BETWEEN the OTTOMAN EMPIRE and the REPUBLIC of VENICE

1.1. The Image of the Turks in the Early Modern Europe and Venice

Since religion was more important than political status and there were no national states in the early modern era, it used to classify people.¹ But the definition of people by religion, created the notions of “us” and “other” by European writers since 11th century. Actually from the European point of view the “other” has existed since classical times and used to describe rival civilizations between the relations of East and West. By the time the notion of “other” evolved to refer to Islam, after Europeans created their own identity and started to see Islam as a danger who threat themselves. Indeed almost one thousand years lasting crusades were effective to form European world perspective and identity and at the end the Muslim became the “other”. By the time the Muslim “other” took a negative meaning, according to Blanks and Frassetto the reason why Western civilization is inferior to Islam almost in all fields such as “architecture, law, literature, philosophy” in the middle age, and some of these negatives still exist nowadays. Of course endless military activities between them nourished this negative image.² Dursteler suggests that, the conflict between Islam and Christianity did not diffuse people’s life constantly; indeed they could manage to live together. Not only politics but also ordinary people allied with infidels, the frontiers between them were not as sharp as what it looked like. In spite of Cardini defined the relation between two cultures; the dialogue between the two deaf, the fact that by the increase of commercial and military activities in the Mediterranean, two cultures became

¹ Eric R Dursteler, *Venetians in Istanbul: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, pp. 10-1

² Edited by: Michael Frassetto and David R. Blanks, *Western Views of Islâm in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999, pp. 1-3

closer and the tendencies against Islam became more tolerant from the middle age through to the modern era.³ There were popular expressions of Europeans that show us they were not against Islam totally, for example; “*better the turban of the Turk than tiara of the Pope*” said in the Balkan in the 16th century and “*A smart Turk makes a better ruler than a dumb Christian*” said by Luther. Even in the Balkan territories, the people helped the Ottoman sovereigns, as they suggested a better life and rule for them.⁴

When the Ottoman Empire covered an extensive area from Hungary frontiers to the North African coast and included many Muslim nations, from the Christian Europeans point of view the term of “Turk” consisted to all Muslim nations and the expression of “*Mi faccio turco*” (I became a Turk) meant “*I became a Muslim*” for them.⁵ Preto suggested that since all Muslim nations mostly assimilated and unified, the communities of Islam often made confusion about their race, consequently the term of “Turk” was used frequently like a synonym of “*orientale*”.⁶

Image of the Turks and crusade were so tangled with each other in the Europeans mind and the Ottoman expansion to Europe played an important role to construct of this image among Europeans. Approach to Turks was mostly affected by conquest of Istanbul and crusaders states. The Humanists -especially of Italians, were complaining about the

³ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.11; Franco Cardini, *Noi e L’Islam, Un Incontro Possibile?*, Laterza, 1994, p. 85; Edited by: Frassetto and Blanks, *Western Views of Islâm in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, p. 2

⁴ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 12

⁵ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 11; Halil İnalcık, *The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State*, In: *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1985, p. 71; Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, *Facilities for Ottoman Merchants in the Rialto Market (1534-1621)*, In: XIV. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 2005, p. 1005; Idem, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, p. 257

⁶ Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, G. C. Sansoni Editore, Firenze, 1975, p. 119

advancing of Turks and suggesting converting them to Christianity as a solution. Europeans were aware that Ottomans built a high culture of their time, when comparing with their government, education and economic system, still it was chosen to describe the Turks as “uncivilized and barbarous monster”.⁷

Dursteler states that many important 19th century history books on Ottomans, - including Zinkeisen’s and Iorga’s, emphasized the relation between the Ottoman and Europe as an endless “*clash of civilizations*”. Some scholars worked on image of the “Turk” in European culture and showed up that European literature “demonized and dismissed” Islam within their common history. Some of them enlarged their searching of the image of the “Turk” and analyzed the evolution from the Middle Ages into the early modern era, but at the end the “hostility and misunderstanding” always existed.⁸

But some contemporary scholars, especially some Ottomanists made a new view to the history between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary to the traditional literature, these scholars, such as Cemal Kafadar, Suraiya Faroqhi, Palmira Brummet and Molly Greene emphasized that Christendom and Islam were so interlaced politically, economically and even culturally in the Mediterranean that it created an “*Islamo-Christian*” civilization. Durstler suggests that, these scholars visualized these cultures not adversary to the death but interacted with each other.

⁷ Kemal Karpat and Contributors, *The Ottoman State and its Place in World History*, Leiden: Brill, 1974, p. 3; On conversion activities in Venice, see: E. Natalie Rothman, *Becoming Venetians: Conversion and Transformation in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean*, *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. 21, No: 1, 2006; Edited by: Frassetto and Blanks, *Western Views of Islâm in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, pp. 186-94

⁸ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 7-8; Edited by: Frassetto and Blanks, *Western Views of Islâm in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Perception of Other*, p. 3

The fact that fear of the Turks nourished by continuous wars between the Ottoman and Venice, and the numerous Venetians defeats against them, including very rich popular public affairs and an immediate danger of invasion through Friuli by the Ottomans. Those were, without doubt, largely diffused to the Venetian society within the years of 1500s and 1600s, surely both with nuance and different manifestation according to the historical, social conditions, and additionally political and religious hatred. The custom of Turks were also very strange for the Venetians, for example in 1573, Costantino Garzoni wrote to the Venetian Senate: “*Hanno i Turchi costumi molto differenti dai nostri, anzi molti, bisogna dire, in tutto contrarij, come ... portare li morti a seppellire senza luminari ... vestirsi con la camicia fuori del calzone, e tante altre cose che sarebbe troppo lungo a narrarle*”, “The Turks’ costumes are very different from ours, even too much, need to say, all contrary, like ... to carry the deaths to burry without luminary ... to dress up with the shirt outside of the trousers, and the other many things that may be too long to tell.”⁹

Peculiar nature the political relations between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire made difficult and rare the influx of Ottoman citizens in Venice, because the Sultan had not the custom to keep a diplomatic representative in the foreign countries. For the exceptional circumstances, like a declaration of a war, to deliver an ultimatum, negotiation or signing a peace were used to send an extraordinary ambassador by the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Venice who once completed the mission immediately

⁹ Fabio Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, In: Venezia Altrove, Almanac of the Venetian Presence in the World, Fondazione Venezia, Marsiglia, 2000, p. 48; Marie Viallon, *Venezia Ottomana nel Cinquecento*, http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/56/26/66/PDF/Venezia_ottomana_nel_Cinquecento.2007.pdf, p. 2; On Ottoman attack in to Friuli -northeastern area in Italy, by the famous akıncı families such as Turahanoğlu, Mihaloğlu, and Malkoçoğlu see: Pedani-Fabris, *Turkish Raids in Friuli at the End of the Fifteenth Century*, In: Acta Viennensia Ottomanica, Wien, 1999, pp. 287-91 and Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 55-60; Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, pp. 117-8

returned to the Ottoman capital. Preto argues that, arriving of a Turk Çavuş as an ambassador in Venice with his followers was an exceptional event for the government and for all Venetians, particularly in the beginning of 1500 when the public opinion was still under the shock of clamorous Ottoman victories in the orient and a manifest impatient desire to see someone from this nation. When Ali Beg was passing through in the Piazza San Marco in February 1514, “*ognun correva a vederlo*”, “everyone was running to see him” and his public walk with one of his followers that “*era bel vedere*”, “was nice to see”, wrote Marino Sanudo in his famous Diarii. They described his splendid and exotic dress with admiration.¹⁰

1.2.The Character of the Relations

Great historian Fernand Braudel described the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice as “*both are crossroads*” and “*both are doorways*”, first one opened towards the West and second one to the East. To write the history of Ottoman Empire without the Republic of Venice or the history of the Republic of Venice without the Ottoman Empire will be uncompleted, since they shared almost five hundred years deep political and economic relations in the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire had these relations with all great European powers, but none of them could have a closer relation as the Venetians. As a proof on this opinion; 198 ambassadors (some of them baili and some of them non-residential-ambassadors) were sent to the Ottoman Empire from 1360 until 1797 by the Republic of Venice, and 176 non-residential ambassadors were sent to the Republic of Venice from 1384 until 1762 by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire’s not to have

¹⁰ Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, pp. 121-2; For the Venetians who wanted to visit the Ottoman Empire or to work with Ottomans, a spelling-book and world-map with information in Ottoman Turkish were published in Venice by Venetian merchants. Pedani-Fabris, *Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman Merchants in Venice*, p. 19

the residential ambassadors policy until the end of the 17th has debated by the contemporary historians. According to Pedani the reason why the Ottomans did not feel a necessity to do so, since “they were sure about their own superiority”. But still they sent a large number of un-residential ambassadors which show us both the importance of Venice for Ottoman governors and their will to trade with Venice.¹¹ The Ottoman ambassadors’ tasks were generally to conclude or declare a war, to bring a *Fethname*, to find a solution about commercial or frontier matters, to free slaves, to notify about the succession of a new sultan, to purchase the good for Palace or high-rank governors. Generally the Venetian luxury goods such as fabrics, cheese, Murano glassware -especially for mosque lamps were bought by the Ottomans. Another popular Venetian products were printed books which purchased by non-Muslim Ottomans. The Venetians touched at Damascus, Alexandria, Cairo, Istanbul and Cyprus ports generally to buy cotton, silk, spices and Iznik ceramics. In spite of the Popes forbade extracting the alum from the Ottoman Phocaea, Venice was the only Christian power that did not mind doing it both directly and by Jewish intermediaries, but also sold to the Christian powers. The Venetian sources recorded that Süleyman I’s famous Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha mentioned the words of *bailo* Bernardo Navagero in 1553; “*As we are merchants, we can not live without the Ottomans*”.¹²

¹¹ Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p.3; Pedani-Fabris, *Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman Merchants in Venice*, In: Edi. by Suraia Faroqhi and G. Veinstein, *Merchants in the Ottoman Empire*, Paris-Louvain-Dudley (Peeters), (Collection Turcica, XV), 2008, p. 4; Idem, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, pp. 4-54; Idem, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, 1994; pp. 203-9; Idem, *Ottoman Diplomats in the West: the Sultan’s Ambassadors to the Republic of Venice*, In: *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 11, 1996, p. 187.

¹² For examples of the Jews merchants who involved the alum trade in the Ottoman Empire see: Benjamin Arbel, *Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean*, E.J. Brill, 1995; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 3-5; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople*

When Ottomans showed up in the Mediterranean as a politic power, Venice had already controlled all Levant commerce by her great colonial empire. Thus, from the beginning commerce became the base of their relations. The Ottomans were aware of Venice's economic power as a threat for themselves and struggled with it by other trading nations, such as Ragusa and French. While Venice found herself in a big political and economic fight in the 16th century, still she was one of the Ottomans' most important trading partners, even when they fought, and this kept on through the 17th century.¹³

Voltaire remarked that Venice could have induced any one to believe that the Turk was not the defeated one. Inalcık argues that since the Ottomans reckoned the zone of Balkans south to the Danube as their territory, to secure it they had to eliminate the Venetians around it, and this policy made Venice militarily more aggressive, since she did

was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee), p. 33, 45; Monique O'Connell, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State*, p. 2; In 1606 Bailo Ottaviano Bon complained about the Jews intermediaries usurped the dominion of Venetian merchants in the commerce and remained few Venetian merchants in Istanbul and they had to work with Jewish intermediaries. "... *et quello che è peggio per vendere è stato introdotto dare a tempo, et a Hebrei, che si hanno hoggidì usurpato il dominio di tutti li negotii, li quali poco stimano il fallire et mancar di fede, come si è veduto in molti questi anni passati, da che il negotio è ridotto in pochissimi mercanti de' nostri, et quelli anco restano con pochissime faccende di quelle che corrono nel paese, perché li nostri mercanti di Venetia, che doveriano favorirli et tener li negotii che fanno in loro mano per loro interessi et compagnie che hanno con Hebrei, aiutano a' rovinare il tutto, mandano et redrecciano le cose loro in mano delli detti Hebrei, li quali con le loro ordinarie fraudi levano in parte quel poco che deve capitar in cottimo; et come riesce facilissimo il riscuoter dalli mercanti venetiani...*" A Cura Di Pedani-Fabris, *Relazioni Di Ambasciatori Veneti Al Senato*, Volume XIV, Costantinopoli Relazioni Inedite (1512 – 1789), Padova 1996, Bottega D'erasmo - Aldo Ausilio Editore In Padova, pp. 520-1; On Venetian printing industry and the books published on the Turks in Venice see: Peter Burke, *Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication*, In: Edited by John Jeffries Martin, Dennis Romano, *Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797*, pp. 389-419; Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004, p. 141; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, p. 204; *Venezia e i Turchi*, p. 10.

¹³ Halil Inalcık, *An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations*, <http://www.inalcik.com/images/pdfs/24916665-OTTOMANVENETIANRELATIONS.pdf>, p. 83,88; Idem, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 133; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 33; Pedani-Fabris, *La "grande guerra" ottomana (1683-1699)*, In: *Venezia e la guerra di Morea, Guerra, politica e cultura alla fine del '600*, A cura di M. Infelise, A. Stouraiti, Milano 2005, p. 60; Idem, *Venetians Consuls in Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Age*, p. 14

not intend to quit easily. First she aimed by her all diplomatic and military power to smash the Ottomans by smash her fleet with other crusader copartners. But, since the Ottomans knew very well that the Levant trade was vital for Venice. They tried to persuade the Venetians to “*conceding and relaxing their effort,*” by granting commercial privileges to other nations, and renewing hers after peaces and accessions, and giving permission to wheat trade, and protecting Levant trade against the Portuguese which Venice could not achieve it alone. But, Venice took her lesson that fight was not solution to keep her ex-status in the Mediterranean after calamitous wars with the Ottoman and with the league of Cambrai in the 15th century, and her commercial wealth and her fleet could not protect her, she changed her policy against great powers, which were French, Austria, and extremely important one, the Ottomans. This policy based on neutrality and balance between Christian West and Ottomans, and always has peace with all of them. Venice raised her most dexterous diplomats to save herself and consolidate her position in the Levant which were related mostly to the Ottoman goals. She taught them not favor one prince over another, saying: “*everyone who was born in Venice, city of great concord and of great neutrality.*” Neither after the conquest of Istanbul or Lepanto she did not tie up herself with any power and kept herself and her trade in safe. In spite of after Lepanto and Candia were published many adversary works, generally the Venetians followed the same policy in the literature, as Dionisotti called, it was sort of “*neutralità letteraria*”. When Venice could not do without Ottoman support, was criticized and contempt by Western Christian powers, for example Pius II’ famous words explain this attitude very well: “*too much intercourse with the Turks has made you the friends of the Mohemmedans and you care no more for religion.*” But, Tenenti has stressed that the Venetians never had a deep and sincere relation

with the other European countries; still she did not treat to the Ottomans as she treated to them.¹⁴

Finally when the all diplomatic attempts were failed, the crusade was inevitable, but it took a new meaning in the Venetian diplomacy too; it meant to defend herself and her commercial interests against Ottomans. Venice always could find partners when she wished a war against Ottoman. As we said above, by the Ottoman expansion, crusade started to carry an anti-Turkish mantle, and this made her initiatives against the Ottomans made easier. With her influence or without, the Popes made the crusade appeals over and over again, against the Ottomans. Pedani argues that from the Ottoman point of view, since they shared the same borders with Safavide Empire, hesitated from internal radicalism more than crusades.

While the Christian Europeans were the “infidels” for the Ottomans, the Ottomans were “infidels” for the Christian Europeans. But still all Italian and European states, primarily Venice made agreements with the Ottomans. She did it so often that, when she did not any, always she was accused by Western powers that she already did. Because she provoked the Popes and the other European powers against the Ottoman, always appealed for a crusade when she needed, but at the end whatever result was she made peace with the “infidel” ignoring her crusade partners as after Lepanto, knowing that war only takes from her not gives anymore. Even, a French ambassador to the Holy Roman Empire; blamed the Venetians that she was machinating with the Ottomans to divide and share the world, in

¹⁴Alberto Tenenti, *Venezia e i Corsari: 1580-1615*, Bari: Laterza, 1961, p. 30; Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 35; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 4-6; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 134; idem, *An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations*, p. 83-4; Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, pp. 234-5; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, pp. 198-9; Preto, *Il Mito Turco nella Letteratura Veneziana*, Venezia e Turchi, pp. 28-59, 134.

1510. If we mention Clement VII' words in 1532, when she rejected to enter an ally against the Ottomans: “*These Venetians, in short, are men without faith or law, except when they find their profit and advantage.*” But she did not pay any attention to all those critics or accusation saying: “*Prima semo veneziani, poi christiani*”, “*We are first Venetians, then Christians!*”¹⁵

1.3. Between War and Peace: The Republic of Venice and The Ottoman Empire

When Osman (1299?-1324?) founded his emirate on the residue of Seljukid Empire, it was just one of the many small Turkish principalities in Anatolia. But surprisingly, Ottomans so quickly expanded that at the end of the century, its power was all over others. When the Ottoman expansion started to threaten the Venetians' interests; Venice's anti-Byzantium ally turned to an anti-Turkish ally, and did not hesitate to invite the Byzantine to join it. Byzantine historians Kantakuzenos conveyed that the Venetians had no any information about Ottomans until 1352. Andrea Dandolo evoked the presence of the Turk to the Venetian world, in his *Chronica per Extensum Descripta* in 1342, and adorned their origin like a fabulous myth: “*Est enim Turcorum patria secus Caspium montem, ducens originem a Turcho, filio Troily, filii Priami regis Troiani, qui post excidium urbis in illis partibus cum sequela maxima fugam arripuit*”. He thought that the Turks' fatherland was the Caspian Mountains, and they were the sons of Priam and the Trojans, actually this was

¹⁵ Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, pp. 234-5; Pedani-Fabris, *La “Grande Guerra” Ottomana (1683-1699)*, p. 51-2; Robert Finlay, *The Immortal Republic: The Myth of Venice during the Italian Wars (1494- 1530)*, In: *Sixteenth Century Journal*, vol. 30, No. 4., 1999, p. 937, 944; Şerafettin Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, Metis, 1990, p.204, 268; Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 18

the common idea in Europe in his time. The fact that Venice was concerned with Ottomans only after Ottomans conquered Gallipoli.¹⁶

When Murad I (1362?-1389) conquered Adrianople, the Republic of Venice sent her first ambassadors to congratulate him in 1360. The Venetian diplomacy entered to Ottoman Palace by the Venetian *bailo*'s correspondence, and he wrote to the *Senato* in his *dispaccio* that: “*When Byzantine Emperor treated badly against the Venetian subjects in the Istanbul, the Turk Sultan had good feelings about the Venetians, and they should be glad about that.*” Offering an alliance to Sultan Murad I against the Genoese by an ambassador in 1377, shows us Venetians dependence on Ottoman support had already started. The first Ottoman ambassador to the Republic of Venice was sent by Sultan Murad I in 1384, and almost every year at least one was sent. How the friendship could develop between two countries and the Venetians’ alliance offer against Genoa were the discussing matter in the Ducal Palace between the Ottoman *Çavuş* and the Venetian Senate.¹⁷

¹⁶ Hans Peter Alexander Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The ‘Ahdnames*, The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents, EJOS, I, 1998, no. 2, pp. 104-5; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 9; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp.109-24; Pedani-Fabris, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, p. 257; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona Erişine*, p. 203; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 133-58; Viallon, *Venezia Ottomana nel Cinquecento*, p. 2

¹⁷ Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 194; Pedani-Fabris, *Between Diplomacy and Trade: Ottoman Merchants in Venice*, p. 4; idem, *Dalla Frontiera al Confine*, Roma : Herder, 2002, pp. 99-103; idem, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, pp. 4-5; A manuscripts was written end of ‘700, contain the list of Venetian diplomatic representatives, and informed that two Venetian noblemen visited Murad I to congratulate the conquest of Adrianople in March 1360. But today this manuscript is not available anymore. Idem, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2010, p. 48; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 16; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The ‘Ahdnames*, p. 107-8; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 205-8

The Ottomans began to attack on Venetian colonies for the first time in 1387. The Venetian ambassador Daniele Corner did not stop these raids, but still they were friends that the Venetians stayed out from the anti-Ottoman league of 1388 and 1389.

Venetians sent Francesco Quirini to congratulate Sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402) and to demand the free grain commerce on the Ottoman territories. Bayezid gave the first Ottoman *Ahid-name* to Venice and assured Venetian trade in his empire, but one month later forbade the corn export, since wanted to limit and control their commercial activities.¹⁸ In spite of Venice's fear to lose her commercial privileges and peace with Bayezid, accepted a Byzantine-Hungarian alliance against the Ottomans in 1396. When crusaders were defeated to Bayezid in Nicopolis (1396), Venice rescued who could survive from the Christian army. Pedani suggests that, Venice did not participate to the anti-Turk crusade, whereas their action was limited to provide only transportation. Consequently she was in a difficult position, both decided to send her fleet to protect her dominions in the Aegean, but at the same time sent Benedetto Soranzo and Paolo Zane, to make Bayezid accept the 1390s' privileges. When Soranzo could not achieve his mission, Venetian trade was damaged. Venice remained between war and peace. Actually she wanted to make peace but Bayezid didn't let her do so.¹⁹ Venice tried to form an ally against the Ottomans,

¹⁸ When Ottomans granting an *ahdname*, considered (1) at first respect to *fikh*; (2) then to have political (3) and economical advantageous from the granted state for the Empire. Generally *ahdnames* were used to detach Christendom or to have a political ally among them. Not only *ahdname* granted state thought financial interests, but also Ottomans considered to have cash and to acquire scarce goods in their empire such as cloth, tin, and steel. İnalçık, *İmtiyazat*, EI, vol. III, p. 1179; Lane, *Venice, a Maritime Republic*, p.198; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p. 5; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, p. 109; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 210-12; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 171-264

¹⁹ Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 15; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 16; Lane, *Venice, a Maritime Republic*, p.19; Pedani-Fabris, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 49; The popes had started to preach for crusaders almost three hundred years before they did it for the first time for the Ottomans. Prior to the 11th century the "pilgrimage" (*peregrinatio*) was a dangerous

appealed to the Genoan, and the Aegean Lords, and the Duchy of Naxos, and the Hospitallers, and the Kingdom of Cyprus, and even to the Muslim dynasties; the Memlucs and the Celayirs in Baghdad, but all of them refused her offers.

When Ottomans continued to attack on Venetians' dominions, Venice both sent an ambassador to Sultan Mehmed I (1413- 1421) to discuss the renewal of privileges and appealed an ally against the Ottomans, and ordered to attack on the Ottoman fleet in Gallipoli. Diplomacy failed and the first serious battle between the Venetians and the Ottomans occurred in 1416. Since Mehmed I had not completed to construct his fleet yet, - after internal confusion, Venice destroyed Ottoman fleet by her better armed fleet. The Ottoman ambassador Hamza hosted with a ceremony by the Venetians in 1417, was given a nice suit and presented worthy presents to sultan and his dignitaries, but still there was no agreement. Mehmed I and the Venetian *bailo* Bertucci Diedo reached an agreement, and third *Ahd-name* was given to Venice in 1419.²⁰

journey to the Holy Land in such piousness but after that it turned to fight and smash infidels by the well organized and armed armies. They were called "crusaders" (*cruce signati*) who were devoted themselves to Holy War. First crusaders aimed to take back Jerusalem but then their aims changed to save Byzantium and the Balkans, Hungary, Rhodes, the Morea from the Turks and swept them away. Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1978, pp. 1-2; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 33; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 110-1; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 268-74; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 220-5

²⁰ Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 20; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 17; Norwich, *Venice: The Rise to Empire*, Penguin, pp. 37-8; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, pp. 6, 9; idem, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, p. 25; idem, *Ottoman Merchants in the Adriatic. Trade and smuggling*, Acta Histriae, 16, 1-2, 2008, p. 157; idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 51; Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, pp. 2, 7; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 42; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 111, 116; Ottoman Empire gave the twenty three Ahd-names to the Republic of Venice, from 1403 until 1641, see for the list: Theunissen pp. 115, 191; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 228, 272-5; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 293-95, 347-59c

Until Murad II (1421-1451) succeeded his father, the Ottoman and Venice could maintain their friendship in the most cases, for example to not jeopardize her commercial interests did not join Crusade of Kosovo in 1440. But when the Byzantines ceded Salonica to Venice in 1423 which was besieged by Ottomans since 1422, Murad II did not accept that and ordered to attack to Salonica. Venice neither could form an ally nor could overcome on her own, finally Silvestro Morosini instructed to discuss peace and keep fighting to force the Sultan to peace. This time diplomacy was overcome and Murad II gave the fourth *Ahd-name* to Venice (peace of Edirne in 1430). According to this *Ahid-name*, Ottoman and Venetian merchants had the same rights.²¹

Ottomans were defeated by Hungarians and an attempt to conquer Byzantine island of Lemnos was failed in 1442. Venice wanted to be mediator between the Byzantines and the Ottomans at the beginning, but when she heard the Ottoman failures joined the crusade with Pope, Byzantine, Serbia, Transylvania and the Hungary. But, Murad II defeated this crusade alliance in Varna in 1444. While Venice sent her *bailo* Andrea Foscolo to Murad II, sultan sent Yahşi Beg as an envoy and the Greek secretary Dimitri to Istanbul, and the peace treaty concluded in 1446, and the fifth *Ahd-name* was given to the Republic. While Babinger commented Venice's peace incline as an "*immature*" behavior, since it was apart

²¹Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, pp. 22-3; Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 194; İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 19; Greene, *Merchant of Venice, Merchant of Istanbul*, p. 5; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p. 12; Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, p. 19, 28; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 47; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, p.117-9; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular'dan Bizans'ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 296-7; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 375-411

from her allies, but according to Turan it was an “intelligent diplomacy”, she made it by the aim of not lose her commercial privileges of the Levant when she was defeated at war.²²

With a subtle and double-play diplomacy, Venice both sent armed ships to help the Byzantine when Mehmed II (1451-1481) besieged Istanbul, and intentionally delayed it, since she wanted to be ready for whatever may result. But when Ottoman conquered Istanbul, the Venetian *bailo* was executed and most of Venetian subjects enslaved, since they helped to the Byzantine forces under the command of the *bailo* during the war. As soon as she heard the news, she sent Bartolomeo Marcello with the richest presents ever to ratify her commercial privileges and make sure to Sultan that her fleet came to Istanbul only to protect her subjects. As the other sultans Mehmed II used the trade privileges to separate Italian republics. Mehmed II confirmed the Venetians’ old privileges by seventh *Ahd-name*, and let to live Venetian subjects in Istanbul and granted to have a residential ambassador to Venice in 1454 which was called *bailo* as in Byzantine times. Mehmed II sent Ulufecibaşı Ahmed and secretary Demetrio Crisovergi to Doge to confirm the treaty in 1454, on this treaty there is the most antique *tuğra* of Mehmed Conqueror.²³

²² Giacomo E. Carretto, *I turchi del Mediterraneo, dall’ultimo Impero Islamico alla Nuova Turchia*, Editori Riuniti, Roma, 1989, p. 41; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p.13; Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, p. 12; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 52; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The ‘Ahdnames*, pp. 120-3; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 419-52; Turan, *Türkiye İtalya İlişkileri I, Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona Erişine*, pp. 303-9

²³ Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 30; İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 23; Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 194; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 42; Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, pp.235; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p.74; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p.13; idem, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, pp. 24-5; By the capitulation of 1454 Venetians had many privileges, some of them: 1) to trade in the all Ottoman territories, 2) to pay the same amount of import-export taxes as Ottoman subjects, 3) the appointment of the first bailo and determine his jurisdiction, («*el qual habia libertà in civil reger et governar, et iustitia administrar infra suo venetiani de ogni condition*»). Idem,

The Ottoman Empire had not only a powerful land force but a large naval force and without a doubt this policy damaged Venetian colonial empire in the Levant most of all. When Ottoman conquest of the Peloponnesus and Argos, Venice let the diplomacy and accepted Hungarians' military alliance offer against the Ottomans. Both the Venetian Senate decided to a war and the Pope started a Crusade commanding in person against Ottomans at this time. But with Pius II's sudden death the Crusade could not begin and the Doge cruised back with his fleet to Venice.²⁴

Venice attacked to Peloponnesus and by sending embassies mutually made an alliance with the Karamanids in Anatolia and the Ak Koyunlus against the Ottomans in 1463, by the way Venice negotiated even with the Crimean Tatars. But Karamanids ruler died in 1464. She appealed to Christian powers but except for Hungary no one accepted the alliance offer, even the Pope. Venice lost Negroponte, her most strategic colony and a Crusade under the pope Paul II was unsuccessful. Mehmed II sent her stepmother Mara (Maria Brankovic) and her sister Catherine of Cilly to discuss the peace in 1470, and Venice sent two ambassadors to Istanbul, too, but the Senate refused Ottomans peace terms. Venice tried to let the Ottoman between two alliances both in the west -Venice and

Venetian Consuls in Egypt and Syria in the Ottoman Age, In: *Mediterranean World* [University Hitosubashi – Tokio], 18, 2006, p. 8, idem *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 53; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 62; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, p.123-5; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. I, pp. 452-93

²⁴ Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 32; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p.28; József Beenyei, *Venezia, Il Regno di Giovanni Zápolya e l'Impero Osmanico*, In: A cura di Gizella Nemeth e Adriano Papo, I Turchi, gli Asburgo, e L'Adriatico, Associazione culturale Italoungherese "Pier Paolo Vergerio", 2007, pp. 94-5; Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, pp. 235; On the crusade against Ottoman between 1453 and 1468, and the Venice's and the pope's role see: Riccardo Fubini, *The Italian League and the Policy of the Balance of Power at the Accession of Lorenzo de' Medici*, In: Julius Kirshner, *The Origins of the Italian State in Italy 1300-1600*, pp. 177-192; On Pius II and the Crusade see: Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, pp. 231-70; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, p. 127, Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p. 90; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. II, pp. 87-8

Hungary-, and in the east -Ak Koyunlu. The Pope, Naples and Rhodes joined to the Venetian fleet and plundered Antalya, İzmir and many ports on the coast of Asia Minor. The Republic sent guns of fire together with men to Ak-Koyunlu. Somehow Uzun Hasan could not receive those guns and when Conqueror crashed him in 1473 all Venice's hopes came unstuck. Mehmed II's another attempted to make the peace was rejected by the Venetians and Sultan conquered the Scutari, the Aegean island of Lemnos and Mani in person. Finally Venice accepted Ottomans' less favorable terms before had offered. The Ottoman ambassador Lütfi Beg brought the peace treaty and the Venetian Senate confirmed it in 1479. This was the longest and hardest Venetian-Ottoman war thus far, and by this treaty the Venetians became a tribute of the Ottomans. İnalcık states that, the Conquerors' main aim was to conquer the Venetian colonies on the Ottoman frontiers; as a result she could not control Morea anymore. Mehmed II's conquests had an economic significance that at the end Venice was not more important or powerful than any other Italian states.²⁵

²⁵ Carretto, *I turchi del Mediterraneo, dall'ultimo Impero Islamico alla Nuova Turchia*, p. 44; Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, In: *The Ottoman Empire and World Economy*, Edi. by Huri İslamoğlu, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 318-9; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, pp. 32, 36-7; İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, pp. 28-9, 36; When Negroponte fell in 1470, an eye witness, Girolamo Longo, estimated the Turkish fleet at 400 vessels, stating that "the sea seemed a forest." Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 33; The Venetian admiral explained the loss of Negroponte to the Ottomans as "his fear of the big Turkish guns on shore." Lane, *Naval Actions and Fleet Organization, 1499-1502*, Edi. By. J. R. Hale, In: *Studies in Venetian Social and Economic History*, Variorum Reprints, London, 1987, (VIII), p. 146; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, pp. 91-7, 101; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p. 15; Idem, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, pp. 8, 24, 53, 106-7; Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 55; Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, pp. 287, 335, 349; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, pp. 65, 69-70; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 128, 129- 130, 131-5; See for the details about the alliance between the Ak-Koyunlu, Karamanoğlu, and the Venice against Fatih Sultan Mehmed, Turan, *Fatih Mehmet-Uzun Hasan Mücadelesi ve Venedik*, Ankara Üniv, D. T. C. Fak. Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, v. III, 1966, p. 138; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. II, pp. 133-44

Bayezid II (1481-1512) made an advantageous treaty with the Venetians after his succession. During the time Cem was kept down by the Papacy, Bayezid had to be cautious against Christian states including Venice and she relieved until Cem's death in 1495. When Cem died, the Venetians allied with France and piracy on both side caused a war from 1499 to 1503. During this war Venice lost her most important fortress' which were Modon, Coron, Lepanto and Navarino. She searched alliances and sent envoys to the Sultan; Bayezid dispatched his Çavuş Alessio to Venice, but all reached no result. Lane argues that since she concerned too much with the wars in Italy between 1496 and 1498, she could not concentrate on the Ottoman threat. Also Venice understood that the Ottoman fleet could now challenge Venice in the open seas. Sultan Bayezid II removed the Venetian power with his conquest in Greece. At the end by Bayezid's demand a peace treaty was made and he dispatched Zaccaria di Freschi and Subaşı Ali Beg to Venice and in the Ottoman ambassadors' presence the Doge ratified it. By this treaty both trade and normal relations between them started again. The reality was the war devastated Venice politically, militarily and economically: *“la conclusione d'una pace era [...] per la Repubblica il migliore rimedio a tanti mali”*, “the conclusion of a peace was [...] for the Republic the best remedy in the such troubles”. Since her remnant small colonies in the Adriatic, Ionian, Aegean and Mediterranean were surrounded by a superior naval power than her, she opened a new page that she could not direct international policy any more.

Since Venice feared of stopping her Levant trade that already depended on the Ottomans and was at war in Europe with the League of Cambrai, and could not ally with Shah İsmail as she wished; when France entered to Venetian territories, Venice surprisingly

asked to Bayezid II for mercenaries from Bosnia in 1511, but since the sultan had internal problems in Anatolia, refused.²⁶

Although Venice refused Ottomans' demand to use the Venetian ports in Cyprus during the Egypt campaign under Selim I (1512-1520), the tension between them did not last too long and the peace renewed in 1513. Selim I gained a great victory over Safavids at Çaldıran in 1514 and Mamluks in 1516-1517, possessed Syria and Egypt. The Republic, congratulated Selim I made him confirm the privileges which were given by Mamluks, and accepted paying the tribute of Cyprus (8000 ducats) once a year. Since Selim I did not campaign to Venice and she understood that only the Ottomans could challenge with Portuguese, and needed a powerful ruler to keep peace for her trade in Syria and Egypt, she preferred to maintain friendly relations.

During his reign Süleyman I (1520-1566) made numerous campaigns, but only one of them was against Venice's Corfu in 1537. Especially during Süleyman's reign Venice recognized that she could protect herself from powerful Ottoman only protecting her friendship with Ottoman: "*Tanta potenza del Turco spaventava Venezia e nell' impossibilità di tenerle fronte colle armi, ricorreva al partito di conservarsela amica colle umiliazioni: tanto erano cambiati i tempi!*", "Venice had been frightened by so much power of the Turk

²⁶ Beenyei, *Venezia, Il Regno di Giovanni Zápolya e l'Impero Osmanico*, p. 102; On the piracy in the Mediterranean see: İdris Bostan, *Adriyatik'te korsanlık: Osmanlılar, Uskoklar, Venedikliler 1575-1620*, İstanbul: Timaş, 2009; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, pp. 40-4; See about the conflict between Cem and Bayezid; İnalçık, *Djém*, In: EI, vol. II, 1983, pp. 529-31 and Setton, *Innocent VIII, Jem Sultan, and the Crusade (1484-1490)*, In: *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, pp. 381-416 ; İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600*, p. 31; Lane, *Naval Actions and Fleet Organization, 1499-1502*, pp. 148, 164; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, pp. 102, 144, 129; See about the ambassadors sent by Bayezid during the Cem's hostages in Europe; Pedani-Fabris, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, pp. 112-5; Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 61; Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, pp. 41-50; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, pp. 75-6, Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 137, 140-9, 150-1; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. II, pp. 202-6, 214-20, 225-31

and in the impossibility to keep it in front by the armies, had occurred to keep it as a friend with humiliation: so much had been changed the times!” Venice showed her new policy declining Hungarian alliance offer against the Ottomans. By this time, to keep their friendly relations alive, mutual several embassies were dispatched.²⁷

But how much did Venice want to keep peace, the mishaps were happening unceasingly, the Ottomans led raids into Venetian possession in Dalmatia and Albania, Ottoman pirates were active in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and Venetian merchants could trade hardly since the *Ahd-name* did not observe well by Ottoman officials. Grand Vizier İbrahim Pasha’s execution in 1536 Venice lost her most important support and made worsen the relations, since Pasha was an “*amico*” of her. Süleyman I made the famous treaty with France and gave commercial privileges to the French, Venetians had a new rival now. The Republic started to attack to Ottoman ships as reply, now peace was ended and Sultan made a failure siege to Corfu, still new Ottoman Pasha Barbaros achieved to conquer all Venetian islands in the Aegean, in 1537 and 1538 but Tinos.

Venice could not resist alone against her enemies, she needed France’s alliance against Spain, but Spain’s alliance against the Ottoman. Venice’s alliance request replied by the Pope and he formed a Holy League - Spain, Venice and Papacy. Pedani argues that Andrea Gritti wanted to stop the war but he could not do it and he died two days after it

²⁷ Carretto, *I turchi del Mediterraneo, dall’ultimo Impero Islamico alla Nuova Turchia*, p. 51, Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, pp. 184, 191-2; On the relations between The Venice and the Ottoman during Süleyman I’s reign: M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, *Venedik Devlet Arişivindeki Türkçe Belgeler Koleksiyonu ve Bizimle İlgili Diğer Belgeler*, Belgeler, Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 5-8, 1968-71; Since Mediterranean and Aegean were invaded by Muslim and Christian privateers and pirates, merchants and ambassadors preferred to journey over Balkans to reach wherever they wanted. Pedani-Fabris, *Beyond the Frontier: The Ottoman-Venetian Border in the Adriatic Context from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries*, In Almut Bues (ed.) *Zones of Fracture in Modern Europe: the Baltic Countries, the Balkans and Northern Italy*, Wiesbaden, 2005, p. 52; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 87; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The ‘Ahdnames*, pp.152-7, 159, 160-1; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, v. II, pp. 253-306, 310-2, 335-75

started. Holy League made an unsuccessful attack on the Ottoman port of Preveze. The Ottoman fleet defeated Holy League in 1538, under Barbaros Pasha. As a Venetian, after the battle tradition, Venice made Lorenzo Gritti a mediator and informed to the sultan that she wanted to send an ambassador by the aim of make peace, Süleyman I's reply was: "*her kim gelmek isterse kimesnenin gelmesine ve gitmesine asla redd ve men yokdur*", "whoever do you want to come, there is never rejection and prohibition to anyone". By the time she tried to show her friendship, congratulated his victories against European powers, gave secret information about them, and sent rich presents to the sultan. Meanwhile Süleyman I asked Malvasia and Nauplia, in addition a tribute as his peace terms. The Venetian Senate's answer to the Venetian ambassador in Istanbul in 1540 was: "*poiché non si ha potuto far meglio restiamo contenti della conclusione di essa*", "since can not be done better, we [have to] stay content about conclusion of it". By this peace treaty Venice lost her last trading posts in the Peloponnese. She had to struggle her financial and political losses. İnalçık stressed that since Venice, Poland and the Habsburg Empire were paying tribute to the Ottomans, they claimed sovereignty over them in the 16th century, even over the France. Now Venice only gave importance to commercial practices and her precious neutrality.²⁸

When Venice's informed Kubad Çavuş that she refused to cede the Cyprus to Selim II (1566-1574) in 1570, a new war started. In spite of the Pope and Spain making an

²⁸ Beenyei, *Venezia, Il Regno di Giovanni Zápolya e l'Impero Osmanico*, p. 103; The practical activities of Uskoks finally came to an end, Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 317; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 52; Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 107, 194; Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, p. 246; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p.195; The Uskoks, the Muslim and the Christian pirates were unifying and harassing the merchant navies in the Adriatic, Mediterranean, Aegean sea in the early modern era, so this situation was creating the problem between the Ottoman and the Venice. See for the pirate activities in those areas in the early modern era: Pedani-Fabris, *Dalla Frontiera al Confine*; Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 64; Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, p. 53; On Uskoks problem between Ottoman and Venice see: Tenenti, *Venezia e i corsari : 1580-1615*, pp. 13-28; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 162-8

alliance with Venice, the Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571. While the Venetian *bailo* was negotiating the peace treaty with the Ottoman, Venice was also negotiating to form a Holy League with the Pope. Venice had no result by the diplomacy and the Holy League fleet consisting Spain, Naples, Sicily, Genoa, Savoy, Malta, Venice, and the Pope defeated the Ottomans in the naval battle of Lepanto in 1571. This was for the first time to break Ottoman naval supremacy, and Venice was the most beneficiary of the situation. Venice abandoned her alliances' with Holy League, as always thinking about her commercial privileges and made a peace treaty by her *bailo* Marcantonio Barbaro, accepting to pay the annual 300.000 ducats tribute.²⁹

The Ottoman Empire was defeated at the battle but won in the diplomacy by the peace treaty. Nicolò Contarini wrote that “*The Republic had contracted a huge debt to private persons in the three years of that all-consuming war with the Turks in 1570 and the two years which followed.*” Generally the Ottoman-Venetian wars were disastrous for the Venetian economy, but Cyprus war became a turning point for Venetian commerce, and it was never be the same again. After Previous wars she always could recover her economy

²⁹ Venice always tried to form an alliance against Ottomans, being Muslim or Christian was not matter for her. Taking Cyprus in 1473 by Venice, from at the beginning was linked her conflict with the Ottomans. She used Cyprus to communicate with her alliances and make military aid to them. For example Venetian envoy Giosafat Barbaro carried ammunition and military experts to Ak Koyunlu ruler, to use his war with Mehmed II. So Venice gave many reasons to the Ottomans conquest Cyprus. Benjamin Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th-16th Centuries*, Variorum Collected Studies Series, 2000, p. 161 (XII); Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was a former Kapudan-ı Derya. Due to the centralization of the Ottoman administration Sokullu Mehmed Pasha supervised and reconstructed Ottoman fleet after the defeat at Lepanto. Imber, *The reconstruction of the Ottoman fleet after the battle of Lepanto, 1571-2*, In: *Studies in Ottoman History and Law*, Istanbul, 1996, pp. 86-101; Setton, *Venice Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1991, p.1; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p.207-22; Kubad Çavuş stayed only two days in Venice in 1570, since his task was only to declare the war to the Doge. Pedani-Fabris, *Sultans and Voivodas in the 16th c. Gifts and Insignia*, In: *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, The Journal Of International Social Research*, Volume 1/1, 2007, p. 205; R..C. Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant (1559-1853)*, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp. 27-38; Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 315; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 172-4;

and position in the Levant, thus her superiority, but afterwards Ottomans had all supremacy. But not only with Ottoman, but she had to challenge with new merchant rivals; France, English and the Dutch, and their technical and industrial superiority, but she could not overcome all over these and Tenenti has argued that the Ottomans did not intervene particularly in the favour of commercial enterprise of Venice, either.³⁰

Murad III (1574-1595) informed his accession to Venice by Çavuş Mustafa and confirmed the existing peace. In 1575 Giacomo Soranzo was instructed by the Venetian Senate to congratulate Murad III. In spite of many small disputes occurring by both sides, Ottoman-Venetian relations were friendly until the Candian War in 1645. The main reason of maintaining good relations was Safiye Sultan, was of Murad III's wife and of Mehmed III's mother. According to many scholars -including Uzunçarşılı, was of Venetian origin from Bafa family, and she played an important role in the Ottoman politics end of the 15th century until her grandson Ahmed I sent her to the *Old Palace*.³¹

The Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice had no war during reigns of Mehmed III (1595-1603), Ahmed I (1603-1617), Mustafa I (1617-1618), Osman II (1618-1622), Mustafa I (1622-1623) and Murad IV (1623-1640). Of course the number of

³⁰ Edited by David Chambers and Brian Pullan, with Jennifer Fletcher, *Venice: a Documentary History, 1450-1630*, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, Blackwell, 1992, p. 162; Greene, *Merchant of Venice, Merchant of Istanbul*, pp. 5-6; On Venice's debt because of the war with the Ottoman Empire see: Anthony Molho, *The State and Public Finance: A Hypothesis Based on the History of Late Medieval Florence*, In: Edi. by Julius Kirshner, *The Origins of the Italian State in Italy 1300-1600*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp. 127-35; Kenneth, *Venice Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 1-4; Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic*, p. 243; See the details about the new spice route to the India and the Venice's challenges with the new western merchant powers: Lane, *Venice a Maritime Republic, (The Oceanic Challenge II)*, pp. 286-94; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp.175; *Venezia e i Turchi*, pp. 10, 38

³¹ Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p. 32; idem, *In Nome del Gran Signore: Inviati Ottomani a Venezia dalla Caduta di Costantinopoli alla Guerra di Candia*, 17, 207; Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 179; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 176-7; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi: XVI. yüzyıl Ortalarından XVII. yüzyıl Sonuna Kadar*, Ankara, TTK, 1988, 3/2, p. 138

problems occurred such as maltreatment of Venetian merchants by Ottoman officials, the endless frontier problems, and endless Uskok piracy but the friendly relations kept by both sides' effort, and the ambassadors were dispatched mutually. Bailo Nani could obtain a new *nishan* in 1615 which was very important for Venetian Levant commerce since she could not compete with more favorable French, English and Dutch capitulations. The interesting letter of Osman II to the Venetian Senate, also related to the third chapter of this thesis, to inform his accession and his uncle's dethronement or abdication: "... *acquistato la gratia della divina contemplatione ha di sua spontanea volonta abbandonato i pensieri del grangoverno imperiale et eletto di novo il luoco della solitaria quiete ...*", "grace of divine contemplation was acquired, abandoned the thoughts of great imperial governor by his spontaneous willing and elected his solitary quite place again".³²

According to Faroqhi, Venice could protect her great share in the Levant in the last quarter of 16th century and she was still one of the most important trading nation in the early beginning of the 17th century, the Venetian presence in the Ottoman ports around 1620-30 was still visible in spite she had many conflicts with the Ottoman. First of all Dutch entry almost finished spice trade via the Red Sea after 1600 then she could not compete with cheaper English wool, and Ottoman dignitaries lessened their purchasing

³² When Ottomans conquered Bosnia and Dalmatia, some Christian refugees became pirates and were called as Uskoks. For Uskoks see Lane: pp. 386-7; The Uskoks were pirates and bothered both Venetians and the Ottomans in the Adriatic and Mediterranean nearly a century. Kenneth, *Venice Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 2; Theunissen, *Ottoman-Venetian Diplomats: The 'Ahdnames*, pp. 179-182; The Uskoks were made confusion in people's mind by their history, ethnic, and politic. Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p. 202; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, p. 32; The people who used to privateer in the most barbarity and impious manner." Preto, *Venezia e i Turchi*, p. 57; Not only Austria but also Venice supported Uskok sea raids to the Ottoman shores in the Adriatic, since baili used to give bribes to the Ottoman dignitaries and Safiye Sultan always protected Venetians interests, only Austria was the one who accused of. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, p. 184; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi: XVI. yüzyıl Ortalarından XVII. yüzyıl Sonuna Kadar*, p. 139

since the economic crises, and the Thirty Years' Wars with European powers, and consistently challenged by Spanish dominance in Italy were some crisis caused her decline. But still, she could resist very well maybe no power could be done. Inalcık stressed that Ottomans' objective was not to eliminate Venice from the Levant trade but to switch to weaker the rivals, first to the Genoese, and then to the Florentines and Ragusans. But, in spite of all wars and granting commercial privileges, *la Serenissima Republica* could maintain her position both by her better naval power and subtle diplomacy until new masters of the Levant showed up.³³

³³ Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 520-1; Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 311-5; İnalcık, *An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations*, pp. 85-7

CHAPTER II: AS a DIPLOMATIC CORP: *BAILATE*

2.1. Who were the Baili?

The title *bailos* dated to the 11th century and many European officials were called as *bailos* in the Middle Ages. There are different opinions between scholars about the term of *bailo*'s derivation. For example according to Dursteler it was derived from the Basileus, the Byzantine emperor, since the Byzantine emperor was responsible for protecting his nation, as the *bailo* was responsible for protecting Venetian subjects, but according to Pedani, it was derived from the Latin word *baiulus* while it originally meant “porter”, and by the time its meaning had changed. Term of *bailo* had a special place in the Venetian diplomatic literature, since among all the other ambassadors of Venice's in the European Courts, only one was started to call as *bailo* in 1265. The *bailo* was the first residential ambassador of Venice, and while he was charged with only commercial matters of Venetian subjects in the Byzantine Empire, but by the time was entrusted with diplomatic missions, finally became an ambassador. Until 1454 Venice dispatched only extra-ordinary ambassadors and envoys to the Ottoman Empire, by the *Ahd-name* of Mehmed II in 1454, the *bailo* both maintained the old name and the position, as well.³⁴

All the Venetian noble families had a characteristic family tradition. While one son used to chosen to carry out the financial interests of the house, the other was appointed for

³⁴ Brown, H.F., *Studies in the History of Venice*, vol. II, London, 1907, pp. 1-38; Bruno Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, In: Venezia e i Turchi, Banca Cattolica del Veneto, Milano: Electa, 1985, p. 56; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.28; Idem, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 22; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 30; Pedani-Fabris, *Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, In: Mediterraneo in Armi (sec. XV-XVIII) A cura di R. Cancila, Mediterranea, Ricerche Storiche, Quaderni 4, Palermo 2007, t. I, p. 176; Idem, *Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, p. 7; Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, pp. 78-9; The *bailo* is singular form in Italian and the *baili* is plural form.

the public service. Who was chosen for the public service, was not married, as most of *baili*. Why were the wealthiest and influential families wanted to commit their prestigious son for a hazardous charge and vocation? Because by those embassies the illustrious houses were acquired the prestige and power while the son gained to make a rapid advancements in his career. Electing as a *bailo*, certainly was one of the most important achievements to carry a Venetian patrician to the highest point in his career, in addition brought much honor to his noble family name among Venetian nobles. The advantages being a *bailo* consisted financial profits as well, for instance while the *bailo* Marino Cavalli's salary was 180 ducats in 1560, his other colleagues who were in charge in the other European courts did not gain even 150 ducats.³⁵

There was certainty that all the *baili* had a good education based on classic and humanistic studies. Most of them took their education in Padua and acquired very effective linguistic and rhetorical abilities and empirical observation to use during their mission in the courts of Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Before they were dispatched to those courts they served in the Venetian diplomatic corps to live political action and to have experience. Because of the exceptional position of the Ottoman Empire, Venice preferred the *baili*, among the patricians who acquired the experiences on the navy, especially who experienced the eastern Mediterranean ports, rather than those who had only school education. The *baili* were not who has already started their career, but had already had career that gained in the European courts with such influence and experience, so who were

³⁵ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 2; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 9-4; Pedani-Fabris, *Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, p. 178; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, p. 51; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, p. 16; Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, pp. 113, 115-6

already proved themselves to the post of the bailate. So, the *baili* were generally elected when they were fifty, sixty or even older.³⁶

Until the intervention of Andrea Gritti in 1503, the *baili* used to serve one year, then the Ottoman Empire allowed it being two years, but by spending time during journey and waiting for a replacement, the average duration was around three years. But towards the 17th century their terms became more prolonged, for example Giorgio Giustinian and Almorò Nani were most famous *baili* by their seven years bailate.³⁷

2.2. The Bailos' Position

There was a large Venetian community in Istanbul since the Byzantine time; and its center was the embassy both geographically and diplomatically, and it was called the bailate by their contemporaries. Since *bailo* was the chief of the bailate he was the chief of the Venetian community as well. The *baili* moved from Galata to the *Vigne di Pera* with “*casa bailaggia*” after the Cyprus war, and by this time the other European embassies followed them.³⁸

As we understood from the first chapter, Venice had not her antique splendor and power through the end of 16th century, but still had many advantages among the diplomatic

³⁶ Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 9-10; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, Cornell University Press, p. 10; Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, pp. 118, 122-3

³⁷ Carla Coco, Flora Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell'Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, Università degli Studi di Venezia, Dipartimento di Studi Euroasiatici, Venezia, 1985, p. 24; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 17; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 33; Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 116

³⁸ Coco, Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell'Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, p. 24; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 25-8; Norwich, *Venice: The Greatness and the Fall*, p.71

corps of Istanbul. The Most important one; her diplomatic body, the bailate had more antique relations than any other nations' ambassadors with the Sublime Porte's dignitaries. The *Baili*'s diplomatic service was superior to other embassies, and the other ambassadors at the Porte –English, Dutch and even French, asked to the *baili* for help, seeing them as a “doyen”. Venice's popular neutrality policy contributed to the *baili*'s position among the other diplomatic corps. Even the English ambassador himself appealed to the jurisdiction of the *bailo* several times. Venice was not closer to Istanbul only diplomatically but also geographically closer than the other resident ambassadors' capitals. The other ambassadors depended on *baili* about communication, since they were the best on the postal system in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries.³⁹

From the Venetian diplomatic point of view the diplomatic role of the *baili* during 16th and even 17th century was very critic for the weakened Venetian state. They had to struggle more than before to protect and strengthen their countries' interests in the Porte. The *baili* had a dangerous significance for Venice that the strategy of the Republic was directly affected by them. In spite of some scholars stated that importance of the *baili* declined together with Venice's Levant trade, according to Dursteler because of the fragile character of the Venice's relationship with Ottoman and her economy was depended on Levant trade, still it was one of the most important positions in the Venetian diplomatic corps.⁴⁰

³⁹ Berridge, *Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s*, p. 17; Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 5, 35; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli Venezia e i Turchi*, p. 59

⁴⁰ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 3; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.28; Idem, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 1-2; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, p. 56; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, p. 10

The Ottoman Empire had an advanced diplomatic tradition and this made the *baili* possible to serve their country. The Ottomans were respected with diplomatic immunity, compared to European governments. Even during the war sometimes *baili* imprisoned in the Seven Towers or in their palace but always were respected and protected, while Ottoman merchants and officials were imprisoned frequently by several commitments in the Republic of Venice.⁴¹

2.3. The Bailos' Tasks

As a *bailo* Simone Contarini stated the figure of *bailo* in Istanbul was combining the functions of residential-ambassador and the consul which was remained as reliquary from the past of Republic. Beyond being the diplomatic representatives of the Republic, the *baili* were charge with many duties. First of all they had to protect and promote Venetian commercial interests and privileges, starting from commercial interests of the Venetian trading community in Istanbul and then in the all Ottoman Empire. The Senate instructed to all *baili* that “*not to fail in any of their necessities to give these merchants and our subjects very help and favor possible, as this principal reason for which you are sent there by us.*” All *baili* tried to carry out this order with their best, as in the same way Ottaviano Bon wrote in his *Relazione* in 1609;

“Io per me nel mio bailaggio ho fatto la parte mia, et ho superato molte difficoltà, et spianato molte vie alli negotii che s'erano fatte impraticabili, et ho voluto in particolare che per sicurtà della navigatione le navi obbediscano alli commandamenti pubblici; et ho ritrovato che ciò ha partorito buon effetto.”

⁴¹ See for an example on the practices of the Ottoman merchants in Venice, Cemal Kafadar, “*Kim Var İmiş Biz Burada Yoğ Yken: Dört Osmanlı: Yeniçeri, Tüccar, Derviş ve Hatun*,” İstanbul: Metis Yayınları ; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 18; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, p. 67

“During my bailate, I did my own part, and I accomplished too many difficulties, and I leveled many ways in the negotiations which were impractical, and in particular I wanted for the security of navigation that the navies to obey the public commandments; and I found that it produced a good effect.” If a Venetian merchant died in the Ottoman territories, the *baili* had to deliver the merchandise to the heir, before the Ottoman officials take it. Not only for the commercial responsible but also to accomplish to the others *baili* made influential and important friends in the Palace and at the Porte by precious presents, bribes, and very popular banquets in their bailate.⁴²

Venice was the most important economic and politic information source in Europe about the Levant. The *baili* were responsible to get all precious information in Istanbul for Venice’s interests, and to deliver to Venice successfully. They had a wide channel to acquire the information about the Ottomans and the Levant. From all “*casa bailaggia*”, to the Venetian community in Istanbul, and Venetians or other nations’ merchants, and the Ottoman officials, “*amici*” in the Palace and many others were the information sources of the *baili*. But sometimes exaggeration of this duty caused diplomatic crises between two states, for example Bayezid II blamed for spying the *bailo* Girolamo Marcello and expelled him in 1491. Venice sent Domenico Trevisan in 1493 and Andrea Gritti in 1503 to convince the Sultan to accommodate a *bailo* again. Until the appointment of Andera Foscolo as a *bailo* in 1507, Andrea Gritti stood in the breach and helped the Venetian

⁴² Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 6; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 4-5; Idem, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 29-30; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 41; Ottoman Empire granted and guaranteed to protect the non-muslim nations and their merchandize by the ahd-names, this was a principle of *fikh* as well. İnalçık, *İmtiyazat*, pp. 1178-9, 1181-2; Mehmet İpşirli, *Eman, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, 1995, vol. XI, pp. 77-9; Pedani-Fabris, *Consoli Veneziani Nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, In: p. 176; Idem, *Relazioni Di Ambasciatori Veneti Al Senato*, p. 522

community and the Republic, since he had strong and close relations with the Porte's dignitaries.⁴³

Baili's other important and difficult task was to control Venice's regular postal courier between Europe and the Levant. Since it was the only regular and reliable courier in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries, it provided a very special and important position to Venice, consequently to the *baili*. Not only all European nations and their ambassadors depended on Venice' courier, but also except for some exceptional cases all Ottoman officials did as well. For example Sir Thomas Roe, English ambassador at the Porte, expressed this dependence on the Venetian *bailo* and courier in 1627: "*There are come two ordinaries [regular postal deliveries] from Venice, without any letters from England, so that I borrow of the bailo (a worthy man) all I know of my own country.*" No necessary to say that the *baili* and the Venetian Senate used the information in the letters that carried by their courier, for their political and economic interests.⁴⁴

By the Ottoman *ahd-names* were granted to *bailo* being the judge on Venetian community of Istanbul, also the other European nations -even the French, asked to the *baili* for jurisdiction in the 16th and 17th centuries.

⁴³ Burke, *Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication*, p. 392-3; Coco, Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell'Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, p. 26; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 3; Idem, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.29-30, Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, pp. 18-20; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, In: Venezia e Turchi, p. 58

⁴⁴ Berridge, *Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s*, pp.15-7; Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, pp. 32-5; Burke, *Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication*, p. 406; Dursteler, *Power and Information: The Venetian Postal System in the Mediterranean, 1573-1645*, In: From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in Honor of Anthony Molho, Florence: Olschki, 2009, p. 602-23; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 3; Pedani-Fabris, *Beyond the Frontier: The Ottoman-Venetian Border in the Adriatic Context from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 58; Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 128

There were many Venetian consuls in the Levant, and the *baili* were the chief Venetian consul, consequently all of them collaborated to each other. The Senate gave the authority to the *baili* to appoint and to replace the consuls, and if they have any problem, *bailo* the one who had to solve it, as Giorgio Giustinian solved the problem of Venetian Consul of Aleppo, -Civran, when he had problem with Ottoman Pasha of Aleppo.⁴⁵

Including the commercial and diplomatic privileges the Venetians had a religious one as well, which was being protectorate of Latin-rite Christians and churches of the Ottoman Empire and Holy Land. The *Baili* were very active in the Catholic religious affairs in Istanbul. Sometimes the *baili* mediated between the Catholics and the Ottomans, consequently enjoyed a “liturgical precedence”, and this became one of the biggest problem between France and Venice, since French protected and supported Jesuits, even though the *baili* were oppose and tried to impede their settlement to the Ottoman Empire, but at the end could not to do so.⁴⁶

By the *ahd-names*, the *bailo* had to right and was responsible to free any Venetians enslaved by the Ottomans, only if the slaves did not convert to Islam. But this mission of the *baili* could be problem between the Ottoman and Venice, since the Ottomans did not

⁴⁵ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 28; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 5; Idem, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.30; Pedani-Fabris, *Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, p. 7; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli*, p. 58; Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 128;

⁴⁶ Dursteler, *Education and identity in Constantinople's Latin Rite community, c. 1600*, Renaissance Studies Vol.8, No.2, pp. 296-7; Idem, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 7; Idem, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp.30-1; Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 41

want to release the slaves and the *baili* showed extreme eager, even sultans complained to Doge about those practices of the *baili*.⁴⁷

As we see above, to accomplish all those difficult and important responsibilities the *bailo* needed to have wide range employees at his residential *palazzo* “(today the Italian embassy in Istanbul)”. When we look at the 17th century “*famiglia*” of him, we see the “secretary, several dragomans, more or less fifteen servants, doctor, a chaplain, a priest, an accountant and many other less important officials”. To provide officials and interpreters Venice founded the *Scuola dei giovani di lingua* in Istanbul in the 16th century, to direct school was one of the duties of the *bailo*.⁴⁸

The European envoys could not talk to the sovereign directly, no matter if it was about politics or important affairs. The *baili* were accepted by the sultan only when they started to their charge, when presented the “*credenziale*”, and at their leaving. They generally treated the affairs with the Grand Vizier, and when it necessary with the other dignitaries, particularly the Viziers and the Kapudan Pasha. They had to wait a couple of days to participate a new meeting with the Grand Vizier. Neither during the official lunch which was placed at the Sublime Porte when there was an audience to the European sovereigns’ representative, did not used to make the politic discourses, since to speak while eating was considered a rude habit. “*Evvel taam, ba’deza kelam*”, first food and then

⁴⁷ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 28; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 7-8; Idem, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 31

⁴⁸ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 7, 22, 34; Coco, Manzonetto, *Baili veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell’Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, p. 63; Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.28; Giuseppina Minchella, *Alterità e Vicinanza Cristiani, Turchi, Rinneati, Ebrei a Venezia e nella Frontiera Orientale*, In: *Giornale di storia*, n° 4/2010 – Mediterraneo / Mediterranei, http://www.giornaledistoria.net/public/file/Content20101121_MinchellaArticolo_GdsDEF.pdf, p. 2, Isman, *Liaisons Dangereuses: Venice and the Sublime Porte, When Constantinople was part of the Venetian family (art for coffee)*, p. 41 Zannini, *Economic and Social Aspects of the Crisis of Venetian Diplomacy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, p.128

words, was saying one of Ottoman proverb. The ambassador was made seat in front of the Grand Vizier, while the most remarkable members of his followers were accommodated together with *defterdar*, *nishancı*, or *kapudanpasha*. Although was given little value to the Ottomans' banquets by who used to have the banquets of European courts. When the banquet was finished, the Sultan was informed that the *bailo* was waiting to be received. The *bailo* and his suit were to be admitted to kiss the sultan's skirts. When the *bailo* was standing opposite to the sultan, his discourse translated by the grand dragoman, because the *baili* refused to learn the Ottoman Turkish. The sultans generally did not speak, but sometimes, surprisingly said, "Güzel" –that is, "Very well" or "Pek İyi" –that is "Very good". End of this audience *bailo* was gone out of the presence of the sultan hastily. In fact it was saying that only the birds could talk while Sultan was receiving an ambassador.⁴⁹

Protecting and representing the Venetian political and commercial interests and Venetian community, and having jurisdiction over it, collecting *cottimos*, keeping in touch and having good relations with Ottoman officials, delivering information to the Venetian Senate, freeing slaves, and negotiating at the Sublime Porte; the Venetian *baili* had to cope with all those duties with his all power and energy. There was another important thing to protect for *baili* as well, which was the peace! But while the *baili* guaranteed and mentioned about Venice's wishes to keep the peace with the Porte, still, did not quit provoking a Christian alliance against it. As we shall see in the *Relazione* of Giorgio Giustinian, the *baili* had to follow a tricky and delicate policy against the Ottomans,

⁴⁹ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 19-21; Pedani-Fabris, *Il Silenzio del Sultano*, In: A cura di Anthonella Ghersetti, *Il Potere della Parola la Parola del Potere*, Filippi Editore Venezia, 2008, pp. 106-7; Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 95; Pedani-Fabris, *Il cerimoniale di corte ottoman: il ricevimento degli ambasciatori stranieri* (secoli XVI-XVIII), In: Venezia e Istanbul. Incontri, confronti e scambi, A cura di Ennio Concina, Udine, 2006, pp. 25-8; Simon, *I Rappresentanti Diplomatici Veneziani a Costantinopoli Venezia e i Turchi*, p. 58

provoking it against Europe, hoping to have the support of Europe, but also they had not to allow the sultans had an idea that Venice would form or join to a Christian league against the Ottomans, but also imply Venice could do if she wants to do so. Actually the *baili* had not much support in sustaining this policy, and the worst thing was that the Ottomans thought the same, as well. Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha said to secretary Ragozzoni in 1571 that he “*knew quite well how little Venice was loved by the rest of Europe, and how little ground she had for relying on assistance from the powers.*” So, it was clear that why the Senate commissioned the most successful and dexterous Venetian patricians for this charge to Istanbul.⁵⁰

2.4.The Relazioni

The Republic of Venice had a wide diplomatic network in Europe and Levant from the early middle age, while geographically she was a very small country, the patriots who served to their country by this network, made Venice’s diplomatic and economic powers increase through the modern era. As well as the *baili*, those diplomats were commissioned by the Venetian Senate to dispatch information about the economic and diplomatic situation of the government by the end of the 14th century wherever they were charge to serve the Republic. The earliest dispatches of the diplomats in the Venetian archives belonged to 1477, and after the 16th century the Venetian government gave more importance to keep these dispatches. In addition to these dispatches by a decree of the Venetian Senate dated in 1425, every diplomat commissioned to present a written or oral report at the end of their missions. The objective of the Senate was to have more political, military, and economic information about the rivals of the Republic. To know the strengths

⁵⁰ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 36-7; Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p.8; Pedani-Fabris, *Consoli Veneziani nei Porti del Mediterraneo In Età Moderna*, p. 7; Pedani-Fabris, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, p. 79

and weaknesses of the other states by these dispatches and reports –*relazioni*, was very important for Venice, little wonder she always used it to manipulate international politics or to beat her rivals in the diplomatic or in the battle arena. This is how “the famous *relazioni* of the Venetian ambassadors” emerged.

Venice dispatched her diplomatic agents to Russia, Austria, Ottoman, Italy, Spain, France, England, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, so to the every European court, consequently she could receive precious information by these precious reports from all Europe and the Levant. Since not only the Venetian government would like to have the confidential information within the *relazioni*, but also the other European governments as well, even though there was a strict prohibition by the Senate the copies of the *relazioni* were bought by the bribes such as the ones belonged to Lenoardo Donà in 1600 and Lorenzo Tiepolo in 1713 when they were in charge in Rome. Beyond the economic and political significance, the *relazioni* enjoyed a fame on political writings too, being an example for European statesmen.⁵¹

Presenting the *relazioni* was the final point of the mission for a Venetian patriciate diplomat. So, it was kind of evidence to show accomplishments of their services, for their patria. So, they had to be prepared for this final step carefully, writing down the notes along their embassies with the help of their secretaries. When they returned to their patria, to the Republic of Venice, they had to read their *relazioni* aloud in the *Palazzo Ducale*, by a

⁵¹ Brown, *Studies in the History of Venice*, p. 1; Burke, *Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication*, pp. 392-3, 397; Dursteler, *Describing or Distorting the “Turk”, The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source*, In: *Actae Histriae*, 19, 1-2, 2011, pp. 233, 237; For example the Senate forbade printing and selling Lazzaro Soranzo’s 1598 *L’Ottomanno* in Venice, since the author used many *relazioni* on the Ottoman Empire and written too much important state affairs. See: G. Sforza, *Un Libro Sfortunato Contro I Turchi*, In: *Scritti Storici in Memoria di Giovanni Monticolo*, A Cura di C. Cipolla... [et al.], Carlo Ferrari, Venezia, 1922, pp. 207 – 19; Pedani-Fabris, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, p. 78; The *relazione* is singular form in Italian and the *relazioni* is plural form.

decree of the Venetian Senate in 1524, and then these *relazioni* were sent to Venetian archive by the same decree. This performance was not a big event only for the ambassadors but also for the all Venetians. This great event once caused to pull some part of the *Palazzo Ducale*'s roof off by some Venetian noblemen, when they wanted to listen in such excitement a *bailo*'s *relazione* from Istanbul.⁵²

The first *relazione* of a Venetian *bailo* to the Ottoman Empire was presented by Andrea Foscolo in 1512, following Foscolo's *relazione*, twenty seven *relazioni* presented by the *baili* and three *relazioni* by the *vice-baili* –except for other extra-ordinary ambassadors, between 1454 and 1627. If we compare the *relazioni* of the *baili* to the other Venetian ambassadors to the European courts, we find out that the *baili* presented to the Venetian Senate the maximum number.

We can examine the significance of the *relazioni* by point of view of the contemporaries of *la Serenissima* and by our contemporaries. We told how much important the Ottomans were for Venice both politically and economically in the previous chapter, and as a result the position of the *baili* was as well, so we can deduce how much importante the *relazioni* of the *baili* for Venice. If we would like to answer, what were the main objectives of the *baili* while they were writing their *relazioni*, the answer will be to serve the interests of the Republic, as always. Through their bailate the *baili* were trying to find all weaknesses of the Ottoman government and dignitaries, and the cracks where Venice and her alliances might take advantage and to consolidate Venice's weakened position against the Ottomans. But as we shall see in Giustinian's *relazione*, the prejudgments, cultural biases and anti-Muslim point of view could be exist. But, still the Republic had

⁵² Burke, *Early Modern Venice as a Center of Information and Communication*, pp. 392-3; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, pp. 13, 16

been living very critical time against the Ottomans; she needed the correct information which serve her survive, not fake or false information. Since the *relazioni* of the *baili* provided first hand information and European powers needed this information against the Ottoman advancement as well as Venice, *relazioni* contributed to create the Ottoman image in Europe.⁵³

Historians are using the *relazioni* as historical sources since the 19th century. Famous historians such as Leopold von Ranke and Josef von Hammer-Purgstall considered *relazioni* precise since the *baili* were in contact with high-ranking officials or their households, as well. But still by the late 1960s some historians started to criticize the objectivity of the *baili* and to question their accesses to the real and accurate sources. These historians, such as C. H. Carter, and the Venetianists Paolo Preto and Gino Benzoni, blamed the *baili* for relying on their information based on hearsay evidences and they could reach to the first-hand sources, their Veneto-centric and “*civilization cannot be anything but Western European and Christian*” approaches prevented to analyze and to dispatch true information about the Ottomans to Venice, consequently they did not tell the Ottomans but only Venetian (pre)-judgments on the Ottomans. These historians also criticized the *baili* about did not socialize with the Ottomans or did not learn the Ottoman Turkish.⁵⁴

⁵³ Coco, Manzonetto, *Baili Veneziani alla Sublime Porta: Storia e Caratteristiche dell’Ambasciata Veneta a Costantinopoli*, p. 40; Dursteler, *Describing or Distorting the “Turk”?*, “*The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source*”, pp. 233, 236, 240; Pedani-Fabris, *Elenco degli Inviati Diplomatici Veneziani Presso i Sovrani Ottomani*, pp. 13-41; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, pp. 15-6, 21

⁵⁴ Dursteler, *Describing or Distorting the “Turk”*, *The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source*, p. 233-6; Pedani that the famous historian Josef von Hammer-Purgstall, used the *Relazioni* of Venetian *baili* in his monumental *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, such as the *relazione* of Giorgio Giustinian, especially in the part of killing Osman II.; Pedani-Fabris, *Venezia Porta d’Oriente*, p. 78; Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, pp. 24-5

These critics did not change the importance and value of the *relazioni* of the Venetian *baili*. The contemporary Ottomanists such as Cemal Kafadar, Suraiya Faroqhi and Robert Mantran stated that the *relazioni* and the documents in the *Archivio di Stato di Venezia* are unequal and one of the richest sources for the Ottoman history. These scholars, including Durstler agree on that the *relazioni* completed and contributed to the Ottoman history by their different viewpoints, perspectives, and of course much original information. Yet they observed the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans and its institutions by a Veneto-centric angle at the end the *baili* could penetrate to the Ottoman administrative and daily life and reflected these by their *relazioni* to serve and to save their patria.⁵⁵

2.5. Some Examples from the Relazioni's Structures

In this part we would like to compare the themes of the 1500's and 1600's *baili*'s *relazioni* with the Giustinian's *Relazione*, to show the similarities or the differences between them by giving the examples from Giustinian's original *Relazione*. The *baili* of 1500's and 1600's used the titles of Grand Signor or Grand Turk often. They emphasized that the sultans' powers' source was the territorial extensiveness of their country. The *baili* required to give the list of the provinces of the empire. They preferred to use superlatives to express their admiration, here an example from Giustinian's *Relazione*:

*“Abbraccia tutto questo vasto et “amplissimo” Imperio, se si vuol creder
alla computation de cosmografi ...”* [Relazione, 527]

Some *baili* stated that how many kingdoms and provinces were conquered by the sultans as Giustinian, as follow:

⁵⁵ Durstler, *Describing or Distorting the “Turk”, The Relazioni of the Venetian Ambassadors in Constantinople as Historical Source*, pp. 243-4

“L’ampiezza dell’Imperio Otthomano si stende et spiega in tutte le “tre” parti della terra, nelle quali possiede “trentacinque” regni, o provintie, sotto nome di beglierbegati, aquistati tutti non per diritto d’heredità ma per forza della spada, su la quale fondano gl’Otthomani ogni loro ragione.” [Relazione, 527]

Many of them described the magnificent farness from north to south and east to west as Giustinian:

*“... et di qua et di là dal Danubbio molto allargandosi si riduce in Ongaria terminando finalmente nella Crovatia, verso li nostri confini del Friuli da quali, sino a quelli di Persia, ch’è la maggior sua lunghezza, si contano tre mille miglia, et dalli ultimi confini dell’Egitto al Tanai, nella sua maggior larghezza, [***] confinando in così lungo tratto di paese con Persiani, Africani, Georgiani, Tartari, Polacchi, Ongari, Alemanni e con Vostra Serenità.” [Relazione, 527]*

Sometimes they tried to guess how much powerful the Grand Signore comparing with European states: ⁵⁶

“... da che si può molto ben comprender quanto saria facile a un corpo di 25 o 30 buone et forbite galee christiane”. [Relazione, 536]

The Ottoman revenues always attracted their attention. They tried to guess exact number of the Ottoman state revenues by the way of taxes, tributes and compensations, by the aim of learning how rich the sultans were, here Giustinian’s guesses:

⁵⁶ Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot, Venice and the Sublime Porte*, p. 25

“Hora passo all’entrate, le quali sono di due sorti: ordinarie et straordinarie. Le prime, a creder mio, per quanto ho potuto saper da chi maneggia li libri dove sono descritte, ascendono a sei milliona di cecchini, et si cavano da quattro capi: da carazzi, che è una gravezza di doi cecchini per testa che paga ogn’uno non mussulmano da 16 anni in su, et rende un million et ducento mille; da terratici, per li fondi delle case et possessioni, pagate indifferentemente da tutti, un million et trecento mille; da datii d’entrata et uscita dalla città di Costantinopoli, un million e settecento mille; dalla speditione d’offici, che noi dicemo la cancelleria o la bola, quattrocento mille. A questi si aggiunge quanto li bassà dele provintie mandano ogn’anno alla Porta, netto dalle spese che convengono far in esse.”
[Relazione, 537]

By the confiscation of the wealth of the pashas or by their deaths, the sultan’s were getting richer, as during Giustinian’s bailate:

“... tutto che per la morte di Giorgi Mehemet, Saimen Bassi et altre principal teste siano per via di confiscatione devolute a Sua Maestà di grosse somme, la quale herede oltre ciò delle facultà di tutti li suoi stipendiati, che sono un immenso numero,... ” [Relazione, 539]

They praised the *timar* system, since they saw it was a great and genius solution to maintain a great army:⁵⁷

“Oltre il beneficio che sente il re dal mantenimento di tanto numero di cavalleria senza alcuna sua spesa, mantenendosi ella nella guerra a suo proprio

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 26

soldo, et essendo in essa il suo principal nervo, ne riceve nella pace un altro importantissimo che, sparsi li timari in ogni parte del suo Imperio, et particolarmente a confini, viene a restar difeso et sicuro, così dalle sollevationi interne de sudditi christiani, mori, arabi, ...” [Relazione; 530,31]

Even though the existences of the deficiency in the Arsenal or in the land forces, and these made them inferior than Christian powers, still by an “abundance of men and raw materials” in their empire, could be recovered themselves easily, as Giustinian warned the Venetian Senate about this possibility, as follow: ⁵⁸

“Non è alcun dubbio che la professione del mare si trova al presente appresso i Turchi molto declinata, o per esser parati a resistere quando tornassero Turchi a ristorarle, il che non gli saria (a creder mio) con qualche commodità di tempo molto difficile per l’abbondanza che hanno nei proprii paesi di tutte le cose necessarie.”, “... legnami per l’ampiezza et immensità de boschi in tutti li predetti luochi, ma particolarmente nelle rive d’Asia sul Mar Maggiore ve n’hanno così gran copia ...” [Relazione; 532, 3]

All the *baili* emphasized on “obedience” or “disobedience”, since these words related to the sultans’s all slaves; their soldiers, officials, and subjects. Also Giustinian referred about the antique “obedience” of the all Ottoman subjects for the sultans, but during his bailate he mentioned about only their “disobedience”, as below: ⁵⁹

“...riuscivano soldati bravi et indrizati obedientissimi et fedelissimi al prencipe...”, “...così hoggidì li avanzano di disobediencia et di contumacia.”,

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 27

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 28

“...tuttavia mancando anco in essi la disciplina et obediencia di prima...”, “...et grandemente declinati dall’antica devotione et obediencia verso la casa otthomana,...”, “...convertita hoggidì negl’uni di dapocagine,...”, “...et ben chiaro si vede esser per tutto l’Imperio l’obediencia perduta.”, “...hanno perduto et in queste di obediencia,...”, “...l’Imperio l’obediencia perduta. etto et l’obediencia a Sua Maestà,...”, “...l’obediencia da per tutto perduta;...”, “...et perduto del tutto il rispetto et l’obediencia ai commandanti et ai ministri del Gran Signore,...”.
[Relazione; 528, 529, 530, 532, 544, 558, 630]

They described the *devshirme* system, as Giustinian:

“Quelle da piedi sono de giannizzeri quali, raccolti da piccioli fanciuli dalle decime de Christiani della Grecia, condotti ogni tre anni a Costantinopoli et fatti mussulmani venivano posti nei serragli dove, educati sono con sommo rigor e disciplina nelle fatiche e nei disagi, riuscivano soldati bravi et indrizzati obedientissimi et fedelissimi al prencipe, il quale solo riconoscevano per padre e signore.” [Relazione, 528]

They mentioned about the absence of an aristocratic class in the empire, as a result the sultans were absolute powers and the others were only the slaves of them. According to Giustinian this tradition very advantageous for the Ottoman Empire, while might be dangerous for the other governments: ⁶⁰

“Questa tanto assoluta potestà impartita in un sol soggetto, che in altra forma di governo saria pericolosa, in quella dell’Imperio Otthomano riesce non solo utile, ma necessaria, nella quale né la mole degl’affari admette consulte, né la

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 35

violenza del principe scusa gl'errori, né la schiavitù del ministro apporta la gloria che faria altrove." [Relazione, 545]

The *baili* conveyed that they could not ask anything to the dignitaries' of the Sublime Porte without presents or money, or could not have their "*amicizia*", friendship either:

"Non dico già che il donar in certi tempi et casi non sia necessario, essendo tale il costume et l'uso di quel governo, che alcuno, o publico o privato soggetto non ne può andar esente, né senza ciò stabilirsi alcuna amicitia o appoggio,..."
[Relazione, 603]

Since all of them were the slaves of the sultans and in any time one could promote or dismiss in the Ottoman government system, the job of *baili* was very difficult. Since the disorderliness during Giustinian's bailate these sudden promotions or depositions were more often than before, here his words as below:⁶¹

"... tutto che al presente masul nutrir et coltivar con ogni ufficioso termine, certi, se ben presto sarà reintegrato nel carico,..." [Relazione, 598]

As we mentioned about the tendency to describe the Ottomans as a barbarous monster in the first chapter, we see the *baili* had the same tendency, and they reflected these in their *relazioni* as Giustinian, as follow:⁶²

"L'altra ch'essendo solita la virtù negl'animi barbari rendersi superba et insolente,...", *"...senza auctorità alcuna; anzi con perpetui timori et pericoli dall'impeti et barbarie loro nelle persone proprie."* [Relazione, 527]

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 43

⁶² Ibid, p. 57

The *baili* of the 16th and 17th centuries observed the corruption in the government, law and military system, as Giustinian did. The empire was still great but the governors had no virtue, the army was not brave and bellicose, the people were not religious and the justice did not exist anymore:⁶³

“...non solo ella non corrisponde hoggidì in parte alcuna all’antica sua lode et riputatione nell’imprese militari, ma datasi del tutto all’agi et alle commodità..., come per il passato s’è attribuito alla lor virtù la grandezza dell’Imperio, così dalla presente loro corruttella ongun vede la declinatione et pronostica la rovina.” [Relazione, 528]

“Per il passato, quando Turchi solevano mandar fuori potente armata, ... o per la destruttione delle provintie dalla guerra o per avaritia de ministr...,
[Relazione, 535]

Especially by the 17th century the *baili* started to examine the reasons of the empire’s decline. The Ottomans had no quick and profitable victory any more, but expensive defeats, such as Persian wars. The sultans used to spend their lives on the horse before, they were not victorious and bellicose any more, but they were the men who spent their lives in the palace by their mothers and wives side, moreover shared their sultanate with these women. As seen often in the *Relazione* of Giorgio Giustinian, the *baili* described the Ottomans; “*fierce, perfidious, temerous, pernicious, avaricious, rapacious, ignorant, arrogant, and barbarous*” and Sultan Osman II, “*...di natura molto avida..., ... con manifesta tirannide estorceva da tutti in ogni peggior et violento modo...*” [Relazione; 538, 548], and Sultan

⁶³ Ibid, pp. 69-70

Mustafa I “*Regnò Mustaffà tre mesi perché, scopertasi ben presto la imbecilità del suo ingegno stolido et inhabile...*” [Relazione, 548]⁶⁴

Valensi stressed that, the *baili* created a negative image of the Ottoman and the sultans since the Ottoman government system was based on absolute and unique power of the sultan. The Grand Vizier had power only if the sultan wanted to do so. The justice and law only depended on the sultan’s wishes.⁶⁵

“*Ho detto che tutto il peso del governo di tanto Imperio è riposto sopra le spalle del primo visir il quale, esercitandolo con suprema auctorità, e dopo il re il solo et assoluto arbitro et direttor di tutte le cose, vicegerente di Sua Maestà, a cui sola et non ad altri ha da render conto.*” [Relazione, 567]

According to the *baili* the Ottoman Empire was founded by the force of sword not by inheritance, consequently to maintain its existence still use this force. Force was influenced on law and legal institutions as well, by the power of the sultans.⁶⁶

“*...dell’Imperio Otthomano ..., aquistati tutti non per diritto d’heredità ma per forza della spada, su la quale fondano gl’Otthomani ogni loro ragione.*”
[Relazione, 527]

While the former *baili* called the sultans’ government as tyranny; -as the other Venetian ambassador called the other European states, and they used the words; “*paura*” - that is fear, “*spavento*” -that is scare, “*timore*” -that is dread, to describe it. But the in the *Relazione* of Giorgio Giustinian the tyranny belonged to the army especially to the

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 71

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 72

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 74

Janissaries, -not to the government or to the sultans, and even including the sultan, whole empire was full of “*paura, spavento and timore*” because of the Janissaries.⁶⁷

“...nella quale Osman nel principio della sollevatione l’havea nascosto, trattolo fuori semivivo per la paura...”, “...popolo pien di terror et di spavento; voti li mercati publici; ...”, *Consideravano non esserci re per la violenta morte di sultan Osman et per l’insensagine di Mustaffà; non governo, per l’uccisione dei maggiori ministri, fuga et spavento degl’altri; non difesa per la sollevatione et corrottella delle militie;...*. [Relazione; 555, 558, 606]

But still the *baili* described the Ottoman regime by the words of “*governo, dominio, regno, imperio*”, as the Venetian ambassadors described the European regimes, showed us the Ottoman Empire was a legitimate system for the Republic of Venice, as the European regimes.⁶⁸

2.6. Giorgio GIUSTINIAN: The *Nobil’Uomo*

He was the firstborn boy of Leonardo of Lorenzo and Elisabetta Corner. He was born in Venice on 21 November 1572. He was rich and prestigious from both families. The young Giustinian participated the events of Venice: he was among the academicians’ assembly for the recital of *Almida* of Troilo Savorgnan in 1593. In the rest of his life, he occupied entirely to the politics: in fact, to support the family strategy Giustinian did not married, he let his brother Girolamo carry on the family name and Giustinian served his patria all his life in the important political positions. It was very dangerous to serve abroad, if we consider the long journeys, the plague, the pirates etc., in the early modern era,

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 73-4, 89-91

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 55

consequently the noble Venetian families did not want to risk their son who was responsible for carrying on the continuity of the family name. Giustinian was charged in his family as a son who not to marry, and to serve the patria and the noble family name.

Giustinian became a member in the Collegio in 1600, and after that immediately refused the election to the *camerlengo di Comun*. After that, of a Venetian patriciate, Giustinian stayed away from the active politic life for a short period. When he was readmitted, on 27 September 1603, a charge was given to him outside Venice, being as an ambassador nearby the Duke of Savoy. Giustinian was elected for the embassy to England on 18 March 1605. He arrived to London on 5 January 1606, with his secretary Peitro Vico.

In a dispatch of 11 October 1606, Giustinian was informing the Collegio that James IV of England had renewed “*generosa offerta [...] di unire, se venirà l’occorrenza in queste presenti controversie col papa, tutti li suoi amici, li suoi consigli et le sue forze terrestre et maritime con la Serenissima Repubblica*”, “the generous offer [...] to unify, if will come an occurrence in these present controversies with the Pope, all of his friends, his advices, and his land and maritime forces with the Most Serene Republic”. Together with English, also the Turks offered support to Venice, since one and other power were far away from the heart of an eventual conflict, the unique war between the Republic and the Vatican was “*some writing*”. But in his *dispacci* he was writing that in the country still were taking the measures against Catholics, one of his first letters: “*Si continua tuttavia nel Parlamento a inventare et formare nuove leggi contra la religione cattolica [...], che tenderanno tutte alla totale estintione di essa in questo Regno*”, “Still, in the Parliament continue to invent and to form new laws against the Catholic religion [...], which will tent to the total extinction of it in this Reign”, (10 March 1606).

Giustinian left England on 23 November 1608, and crossed to Holland and to Germany, finally reached Venice. Did not delivered a *Relazione* (at least, there is no trace on it), but his secretary composed a description of the travel.

Giustinian repatriated with the title of “*cavaliere*”, in 1609, then immediately elected as an ambassador to France. The opinions about him which were written to Francesco Castrino by Sarpi on 16 March 1610: “*L’ambasciatore nuovo per costì è uomo di molta capacità, prudente e savio, ma papista; e non già per ignoranza, ma per elezione: onde merita tanto più esser guardato*”, “The new ambassador there, is a man with much capacity, prudence and wise, but papist; and already for ignorance, but for election: whence merit to pay much more attention”.

The long and complex negotiations between France and Spain which were timorous for a possible negative reflection on Italy were followed carefully by Giustinian. As a result he wrote in the one of his dispatches on 24 January 1612: “*È nato sospetto che tra le condizioni di questi matrimoni ve ne sia una di lega et unione non solo tra le due Corone, ma anco col pontefice e granduca, il più apparente fine della quale per la parte della Spagna credono sia di levar agli Stati la protezione della Francia per rinnovar qui la guerra con loro, colla speranza di soggiogarli*”, “[It] was born a suspect between the conditions of these marriages (between the King of Spain’s daughter Princess Anna and the Louis XIII of France), there might be a league and union not only between two Cronas, but also with the Pope and Grand Duke, at the end of this, for the part of Spain more apparent one, they believe that might be removed the protection of France in the States to renew the war with them, with the hope of dominate to them”.

Giustinian was elected as an ambassador to Emperor Matthias of Austria on 11 January 1614 and did not return to Venice. He arrived in Augsburg on 29 January 1614 and two days later sent his first dispatch. From Augsburg he moved to Linz, since he received a private audience from the Emperor, together with his predecessor Girolamo Soranzo on 17 March 1614. The problem was urgent, and was made by Uskok pirates, formally subjects of Archduke Ferdinand.

In his last dispatches (left the Hapsburg's capital city at the beginning of the November 1619), Giustinian presented a disastrous portrayed the conditions of Austria. And, we did not possess any *relazione* after long embassy of Giustinian.

Giustinian had to assume a very important charge: the *bailo* to Istanbul. He was already accused about his health problems (in Vienna had a long replaced with the secretary Antonio Padavino). He stayed "sestiere di S. Croce" in Venice, for a while. But he needed the high salary of the bailate, because of the expenditure during his three legations. So, after several months, Giustinian embarked this time to the Bosphorus.

He stayed away from Venice seven years; his first dispatch was dated on 10 May 1620 and the last one on 4 July 1627. His mission was easier from the political point of view compared of former *baili*, if we consider the existence of good relations between the Republic and the Ottoman, but as we shall see in the thir chapter he had to deal with the continuous turbulence in the empire and the intrigues in the Ottoman court.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p. 13, Giuseppe Gullino, *Giorgio GIUSTINIAN*, In: *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, Volume 57, Istituto dell' Enciclopedia Italiana Fondato da Giovanni Treccani, Roma, 2001, pp. 229-232

The Senate forbade involving to all the *baili* any commercial practices of his own or representing individuals. Since they could be neglect their mission. But there are evidences that the *baili* involved in commercial practices. According to Dursteler's searches in the Biblioteca Marciana, maybe Giorgio Giustinian was one of these *baili*, since his defence he denied the charges on using funds illegally and involved in trade. Giustinian claimed that even though he did not gain but lost economically in 20 years of his service to the Republic of Venice, even he used his own money when he needed for official bailate matters. His words about his accusation that: "*My thoughts have always been, not only in public duties but also in my private life, very far (lontanissimi) from such commercial and business intrigues, to the point that if I had wanted to I would not have known how to do it.*" Still, we do not know if Giustinian was really involved in commercial practices or not, but again according to Dursteler's searches we know that he bought the food for his "*casa di bailaggia*", with his own money when the famine occurred after the plague in Istanbul during his bailate.⁷⁰

As seen above Giustinian's career path to the bailate was representative of most *baili*. He was a Venetian noble man, belonged to a Venetian patriciate family. He was not married as most *baili*. He served his patria in the most important courts of Europe after he completed his education as most *baili*, aged 33 to England, 37 to France, 42 to Holy Roman Emperor, and generally the Ottoman Empire kept as the last one, after be ready to cope with all the difficulty, aged 48 to the Sublime Porte, and now the time to return to home. The interesting thing is after his embassies in the courts of England, France, and Holy Roman Emperor he did not present any *relazione* to the Venetian Senate, but only after the

⁷⁰ Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 6, 20

Ottoman Empire. As we shall see; Giustinian presented a long, detailed and prudentially prepared *relazione*.

Giustinian repatriated at the end of July of 1627, on 1° October he assumed finally the charge of ducal councilor. But Giustinian was very ill, and he died on 4 February 1629 in his palace on Grand Canal, leaving a great richness to his nephews and nieces as his heirs. As descendent of s. Lorenzo Giustiniani,⁷¹ Giustinian was buried in the patriarchal church of S. Pietro di Castello.⁷²

⁷¹ Lorenzo Giustiniani (Venice 1381 - ivi 1456), saint, was the first patriarch of Venice.

⁷² Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 9, 12; Gullino, *Giorgio GIUSTINIAN*, *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, Volume 57, p. 232

CHAPTER III: The OTTOMAN EMPIRE as REFLECTED

To The RELAZIONE of the BAILO GIORGIO GIUSTINIAN: 1620 – 1627

The Most Serene Prince,⁷³

3.1.The VASTNESS and POWER and WEALTH of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE

All the vastness of the Ottoman Empire disperses into three parts on land; they have 25 kingdoms or states here called Grand Signore's land. All these were not gain by succession but by power of sword, thus the Ottomans establish every right of theirs over this sword.

This immense empire, providing that computation and cosmography are believed to be true, with borders more than 16.000 miles, it starts from our border with Dalmatia, reaches Albania, proceeds until Istanbul with Mora and Greece, one surrounds another with the Grand Sea and encloses all the shores of the Grand Sea. It passes through Egypt over Karaman and Syria and extends up to the Straits of Gibraltar from African shores. Another line which goes back whence conveys its boundaries to the Sea of Southern Ocean on land, from Red Sea to the Euphrates, from the Euphrates to the Tigris. It goes until Arabian Gulf and returns to Europe after reaching the Sea of Azov, from here on it gets rather broad to the Danube and gets to Hungary including the Danube also, it eventually ends in Croatia. Their boundary from our borders in Friuli till Iran is the largest situation of the empire, calculated as 3.000 miles. From the very last borders of Egypt to the Sea of Azov, with its

⁷³ Doge Giovanni I Corner, (1551-1629) his parents were Marcantonio and Cecilia Contarini. He was the descendant of Doge Marco and Quinn Caterina of Cyprus. He was elected as a Doge on 4 January 1625 and until his death on 23 December 1629, carried on his duty. Andrea Mosto, *I Dogi di Venezia, Nella Vita Pubblica e Privata*, Giunti Editore, 1977, pp. 353-62

largest situation, a country with this length [***] flanks with Persians, Africans, Georgians, Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, Germans, and Your Serenity.

Indeed, this country is an empire with its extension and largeness, permanence and unity, variety of its people, fertility and abundance of everything, convenience of its major seas and rivers providing the communication with itself and the others. [Relazione, 527]

3.1.1. The Janissaries⁷⁴

⁷⁴The Janissaries troop was the infantrymen of the Ottoman Empire from the XIV until XIX. century. The Ottomans recruited the corps by the *penajik resmi* or one-fifth treasury tax on war captives. The most Janissaries began their education at the age of 14 or 15. Janissaries had very important tasks both in the Ottoman court and battle, and from at the beginning wanted to protect their independence and jurisdictional autonomy. But their payment was not so high, in the early 17th century, the maximum one not more than 12 *akces* per day.

As seen in the Giustinian's report, by the early 17th century, the Janissaries former role had changed and the troop evolved into as an elite troop. As a result, the Ottoman court chronicles started to give a negative role to the Janissaries and to emphasize their contribution and participation in riots, especially after the regicide of Sultan Osman II. Also Ottoman chronicles mentioned about loyalty and obedience of the Janissaries to the sultans, in the normal conditions. It was necessary that the sultan must have provided not punctual payment but also, when they merited, the other sultanic presents, as well. But when these traditions were neglected as in the War of Chotin by Osman II, the relationship between the Sultan and Janissaries which should have based on mutual trust was collapsed and the natural disposition of the Janissaries to rebelliousness was seduced. Osman II's willing to to replace them with a plan contrived by the chief of the Harem, Süleyman Agha and the unsuccessful Polish campaign gave rise to a serious crisis all Empire. The contemporary Ottoman accounts agree with Giustinian that in the deposition and regicide of Osman II, becoming effective that the sultan's persistent to neglect them award.

For example, Ottoman chronicles approved Giustinian information about the excessive and *non-devshirme* recruitments, and its harms to the Janissaries' corps, as in Lutfi Pasha wrote in 1560s. Also Âli saw the same problems as Giustinian, harassing the Janissary corps by *non-devshirme* recruitments, referred to in the documents as *ecnebi* (outsiders) ruining the purity of the corps. They also mentioned about the seriousness of admitting Turks and other Muslims to Janissary membership. In the table I, we showed the number of the *kapikulu soldiery* (Janissary, sipahi, cebeci, artillerymen, artillery carriers) as above;

TABLE I

1451-1481	10 - 12 thousand
1481-1520	12 - 16 thousand
1520-1590	16 - 30 thousand
1630-1670	60 - 50 thousand

Many empires made available a particular deal of military power, both horsemen and pedestrians, Grand Signore also continues doing that. The Janissaries, who are pedestrians, are made Muslims by being collected tithe of little Christian children from Greece and brought to Istanbul every three years. Upon being brought into palace, they get a strict and disciplined education within trouble and difficulties. Henceforward, they become good soldiers who are bound to obedience and loyalty for their Prince whom they solely regard as their father and lord.⁷⁵ They did not exceed 12.000 in number in time of

In the Table II, I gave the estimated numbers which were given by an Ottoman chronicle *Kitab-ı Mustetâb*. When we compare the numbers with Giustinain's we find the big differences.

TABLE II
Under Süleyman I Under Osman II

Janissaries	12 thousand	35–40 thousand
Sipâhis	7-8 thousand	19–20 thousand

According to the Ottoman chronicles, of the 40,000 Janissaries under Osman II only 10,000 participated in the Chotin campaign. On the *Janissaries* see: İnalçık, *Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700*, In: *Archivum Ottomanicum* 7, 1980, pp. 288-90; *Osmanlı Kanunnâmeleri*, MTM, 1/2, 1913, p. 325; Tayfun Tosuner, *Kavanin-i Yeniçeriyân* (Yeniçeri Kanunları), İş Bankası Yayınları, 2011; AşıkPashazade Derviş Ahmed Aşiki, *Aşık Pashazade Tarihi*, Edi. by Cemil Çiftçi, İstanbul: Mostar, 2008; Tuğî Çelebi (Hüseyin bin Sefer), Edi. by Mithat Sertoğlu, *Tuğî Tarihi - İbretüma*, Belleten 43, 1947, pp. 489-514; *Osmanlı Devlet Düzenine Ait Metinler I: Kitab-ı Müstetab*; R. Murphey, *Yeni Ceri*, In: EI, vol. XI, pp. 322-3; Edi. by Yaşar Yücel, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974, p. 7; *Lütfî Pasha Asafnamesi = Âsafnâme*, Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1991, p. 35; *Tevarih-i Âl-i Osman: VII. and II Defter*, İbn Kemal Ahmed Şemseddin KemalPashazade, Edi. by Şerafettin Turan, TTK, Ankara, 1957; *The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Bey, Translated by Inalcik and R. Murphey*, Minneapolis and Chicago, 1978; Ali, *Nushat al-salâtin*, (1581), Edi. and Eng. tr. A. Tietze, *Mustafa Ali's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, 2 pts. Vienna 1979-82; *XVII. asırda Osmanlı Devletinde Islahat İhtiyac ve Temayülleri ve Katib Çelebi*, In: S. Unver et al. (eds.), *Katib Çelebi, Hayati ve Eserleri Hakkında İncelemeler*, Ankara, 1957, pp. 197-218; *Bozuklukların Düzeltilmesinde Tutulacak Yollar* (Düsturu'l-amel li-islahi'l-halel), Hacı Halife Mustafa b. Abdullah Katib Çelebi, Edi. by Ali Can, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1982; İnalçık, *Expenditure for the Ottoman army*, In: Inalcik and Quataert (eds.), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, Cambridge 1994, 88-93; idem, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, Ankara, 1954

⁷⁵ Devshirme was used for the periodical tax of Christian children for the Janissary corps. The earliest document that we had on devshirme was in 1395. In the Ottoman chronicles we find that all the Christian population of the European territories of the Ottoman, and later on the Asiatic territories likewise, was legally obliged to the *devshirme*. But still, there were some certain exceptions for Christians, and the Muslims of Bosnia were in a privileged position.

Sultan Süleyman; however they reached a total of 60.000 at the present time. As the number increased, their discipline and value decreased, because by being collected the tithe that I have just mentioned, their fertile fruits were being raised in a disciplined way and they were maturing excellently, the army in prudent number was forming amplification within a splendid structure and they were protecting the empire. Firstly, by allowing also Turkish children they bastardized their races gradually; they asserted it to be on account of the above-mentioned order. In my time, all corrupt numerous adults of Turkish race were allowed into the mentioned army by bribing little money to greedy ministers.

Not only did they lose their previous praised conditions and prestige at the present day but also they indulged into luxury and laze. They have preferred laze over service and struggle for Grand Signore. They either leave fighting out or get completely bad results, as seen in Poland and Baghdad in my time. Their multitude somehow does not serve anything except destroying Prince's treasure and rebellion against Prince's life; just like they contributed to the greatness and virtue of the empire in the past. At present their deterioration is regarded as downfall and prognosticated as destruction by everyone.

Institution of this Janissary army resembles a lot that of the legions of Ancient Romans. They are divided into 161 Begs administered by Aga, the supreme person among them who has great authority. Some of them live in different rooms within alliance and order in Istanbul, and privileged at what they need for aliment with many advantageous.

For *Devshirme* see: Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, *Mür'i't- tevarih*, 1779, Edi. by Münir Aktepe, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, İstanbul, 1976; V. L. Menage, *Some Notes on the Devshirme*, In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, vol. XVIII, 1956, pp. 181-3; idem, *Devshirme*, In: EI, vol. II, pp. 210-13; P. Wittek, *Devshirme and Shari'a*, In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XVII, 1955, pp. 271-8; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapukulu Ocakları*, TTK, Ankara, 1984, J. A. B. Palmer, *The Origin of the Janissaries*, In: *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, XXXV, 1953, pp. 448-481; Murphey, *Yeni Ceri*, In: EI, vol. XI, pp. 322-3

Their daily payments range from 3 akças⁷⁶ to 10 and one akça coin is of value to one [Relazione, 528] gazetta. Every year a garment, 2 zecchini⁷⁷ for each in the wars, yearly money to be spent for all their expenses are given to each of them by their Lord. Another thing from which they benefit is the remainder from the dead and ones who are exempted from wars among them. Their weapons are “arquebus” and “scimitar”. They perform the mission of defending and protecting the Sultan, they maintained this mission with exclusive faith and merit worthily for themselves in the past, and presently they dishonored this mission foully with Sultan’s own blood.

The lowermost group of these Janissaries is the Acemioglanis that are land troops. They are constituted out of the tithe I mentioned and get education in the Palace like the others, later they do the lowermost duties under Bostancıbashi who is their master at ships, in gardens of Hanim Sultans and Pashas. Their number is 16.000 and they serve also in wars accordingly. They arm like the Janissaries; however the relation between them is bad as they are paid minimally.

Among pedestrian soldiers are 5.000 armourers and 6.000 bombardiers whose salaries are incessantly provided by the King. They are armed, yet not educated or disciplined like the others.

⁷⁶ “Akça; the Ottoman silver coin. Asper in English”, Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 247

⁷⁷ Archaic: cecchino, zechino; Numismatics, Venetian gold Ducat, was suppressed during the last years of (1539-1545) Doge P. Lando. The value of money rose to 12 from 7, at the end of the 1800 has been removed from circulation. It had the same value in the Italian states and many European countries. Salvatore Battaglia, *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana*, XXI: Toi-Z, Torino: Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 2002, p. 1064

Among them are many lağımcıs and 10.000 azaps in Greece; sleazy, uneducated people are in charge of building up the military camps and doing the other inferior duties of troops.⁷⁸

3.1.2. The Timarli Sipahıs⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Azabs had permanent salaried status, and they were infantryman as the Janissaries. They envied the Janissaries' privileged position. On azabs see: Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapukulu Ocakları*, 1984

⁷⁹ Timar was not only a salary to maintain the cavalry army and military-administrative hierarchy in the some provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but also a taxation system. In the Ottoman administrative system, a province under a *beglerbegi* was divided into *sancak* under a *sancak-begi*.

As Giustinian noted that the *timar* system was very important for the Ottoman economy, and almost half of the public revenues was the *timars*. Again as Giustinian said that it is difficult to figure out the certain amount of the *Timarli Sipahıs*, since the *timars* were divided into three fundamental categories. The two of them imperial revenues, were the richest and most reliable sources, were belonging to the sultan and members of the government and provincial governors. To have an idea about the value of the *timar* for the Ottoman Empire:

“Toward 1609, the lowest *hass* of a *sancak-begi* was that of the Kurdish beg of Egil, 96,750, and the highest that of Kilis in Bosnia, 642,500. The highest *hass* for a *beglerbegi* was that of Diyarbekir, 1,200,660, and the lowest, that of Cyprus, 600,000 *akces*.”

TABLE III

<i>Timariot sipahıs in seventeenth-century campaigns</i>		
<i>Beglerbegilik/ Eyâlet</i>	<i>The campaign of 1616</i>	<i>The campaign of 1621</i>
Anadolu	3,864	3,447
Karaman	814	974
Sivas	1,250	1,558
Rumeli	4,633	4,157
Others	4,306	4,922
Total	15,058	6,052

On Timar see: İnalçık, *Timar*, In: EI, vol. X, pp 502-6; Edi. by Inalçık, *Hicri 835 Tarihi Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid*, Ankara, 1954; P.M. Emecan, *XVI asırda Manisa Kazası*, Ankara, 1989, pp. 288-97, 326-90; Edicts and Laws on *Timar* in the *Sancak Kanunnameis*, collected by Barkan, *XV ve XVIinci Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları, I. Kanunlar*, İstanbul 1943, esp. the *Kanunname* of Nigebolu, pp. 267-71; A. Akgündüz, *Osmanlı Kanunnameleri ve Hukuki Tahlilleri*, 8 vols., İstanbul 1990-4; Howard, *The Ottoman Timar System and its Transformation, 1536-1656*, unpubl. Ph.D. diss. Indiana University 1987; idem, *The historical Development of the Ottoman Imperial Registry Defter-i Hakani*, In: *ArchivumOttomanicum*, XI 1988, 213-30; Gökbilgin, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman'ın Timar ve Ze'amet Tevcihi ile İlgili Fermanları*, in *TD*, XXII, 1968, pp. 37-43; Zeki Arıkan, *Hamid Sancağındaki Timar Düzenine İlişkin Araştırmalar*, in *TED*, XII, 1982, pp. 101-11; M. Akdag, *Timar Sisteminin Bozuluşu*, In: *AUDTCFD, III*, 1945, pp. 419-29; For reforms in the *timar* system, see *Nizamname*, In *Târih-i Cevdet*, II, pp. 61-251; İnalçık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, I, Ankara, 1954, pp. 137-84; idem, *Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700*, In: *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VI, 1980, pp. 283-337; idem et alii, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*.

The mounted soldiers, namely Sipahis have two arrangements, one is “the salaried” and the other is “holders of the timar”. Though the first was used to be 18.000 in number, it reached 30.000 by degradation in my time, and the identical and major disorderliness taking place among the Janissaries has taken place among them, also. This valuable troop, which is emulated within service of the King, is proceeding at disobedience and defaults today. They are divided into 6 squads under the direction of 6 Beks.

They get a salary from the King ranging from 12 to 40 akças per day and paid every three months like Janissaries who mostly live in the Sublime Porte, yet they neither are in the form of troops in chambers like them nor possess any advantages or privileges. [Relazione, 529] They do not have a supreme Bek as the Janissaries do, however they are directly committed to the General Pasha.

Why Timarli Sipahis are called like this is that their salaries are paid by territories dispensed. Being in excessive number of horsemen, who are bound to take part in wars and serve, is quite significant for revenues of their timars. In a way, they have to take a horseman for revenue of each 5.000 akcas.

These territories have been gained with victories by the Ottomans, destroyer of the others' dignity and propagator of the soldiers; they have spread all around the empire, and have been allocated to its soldiers for life, they are the fruits of the mentioned lands by the mentioned obligation. The timar system relieve the National Treasury to a great extent, otherwise it could be impossible for them to maintain the salaries of so many soldiers.

It is rather hard to know the exact number of these timars, as well as the number of mounted soldiers accordingly, because most have been property of Hanim Sultans and the

Dignitaries; they are exempted from the mentioned obligation; as Asian territories have depopulated, most of them are not processed; and Persia boundaries have been devastated due to warfare. Commonly 80.000 Timarli Sipahis from Europe, 60.000 from Asia, 12.000 from Egypt and Africa are constituted.

The Timars are present in 340 Sanjaks all over the empire, these Sanjaks are under 34 Beglerbeyis and they all are under the direction of two supreme Beglerbeyis: Anatolian and Rumelian Beglerbeyis.⁸⁰ They are made to proceed towards the flag by being the commands of the King dispatched in case of war. They used to fulfill this in a fascinating quickness and ability. Though the Timarli Sipahis used to be approved as one of the most stable forces of the empire, they expose to corruption, lack in discipline and obedience, and no longer act quickly or skillfully as they did in the past.

One of the two profits the King obtains is having so many Timarli Sipahis without making any expense; [Relazione, 530] the other is dispatching the timars everywhere in the empire, especially to the borders. Just like defending the borders against outer enemies' invasions, they also ensure security among Christian, Maghreb, and Arabian citizens who may be about to revolt due to religious diversity and intolerable oppression in their countries. The Timarli Sipahis, while protecting the borders, are like protecting their own property. For the Turks, the timars are like castles assuring the real security of the empire.

Position of the Timarli Sipahis in this tax structure is that it is more important than 15.000.000 golden coins annually in respect of the consensus from past to present. Yet, the immediate new thought is doubling this quantity and the number of soldiers accordingly.

⁸⁰ In the Imperial council, *Divan* the governor (beglerbegi) of Rumelia and Anatolia were originally the commander of the empire's provincial cavalry troops (timarli sipahis). Gábor Ágoston, *Central Administration*, In: Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 10-2

However, who can dare this and carry this thought out while so much corruption and their predomination exist?

The number of these Timarli Sipahis increases more pursuing *Grand Signore* by Ministers trying to acquire high ranks, their attendants, and the Dignitaries of Sublime Porte, hence Turkish army is always very crowded. Sultan Osman II has continued increasing the number of soldiers of Turks in this way, they were predominated the Polish with a total of 600.000 in my time, and this attempt has resulted in failure.

All their necessary equipments in an immense number which accompany these forces from pedestrians to horsemen not only render them crowded but also formidable.

Nice and powerful weapons abound which they have acquired out of many victories in the past, they fabricate them today. Iron and copper come from their own country, and tin from Christianity. They fabricate firearms like musket and arquebus excellently in Berberistan and Istanbul; scimitar, sword [Relazione, 531] and other faceted weapons are fabricated everywhere, yet the best in Damascus and Baghdad; bows and arrows are fabricated in Gallipoli and everywhere just like gunpowder, still the finest gunpowder in Cairo.

They extract excellent horses as many as they like from Arabia and Egypt. The greater and nobler they are the stronger and more energetic; therefore they are more capable in the attacks.

Utilizing the occasion, I easily watched the wars of Poland and Baghdad which took place in my time and I observed the movement of these troops. Sultan Osman participated in person first of them with 600.000 soldiers and his appearance was stupendous indeed.

Nonetheless, it was a bad attempt against the Polish who were fewer than 100.000, they were not able to pass even the Chotin's trenches at all; finally they expended their own multitude and had to abandon this undertaking. The same failure occurring in Baghdad seems to me it is in the most excellent Senate's behalf. Turks' power has always been suspected during the relations as to same boundaries for so long, two entirely true results could be inferred from this: The first is multiplicity of soldiers does not yield victories all the time, yet they often cause disorder and disaster; and the other is at present the Ottomans are not in a condition to be dreaded as much as what the case was in the past. Experimentations clearly show that they have indulged in luxury and comfort, pre-existing dedication and obedience for Ottoman Dynasty have declined to a great extent. I will say at the same time they had won many glorious victories even with half of them, thanks to help of fortune. The Ottoman Dynasty neither educates these Princes to whom the soldiers devote themselves marvelously nor propagates them with great merits from now on. While the soldiers used to emulate this nobility and obey so excessively, today these features of theirs have turned into ineptitude and uselessness in one, and an extraordinary default in another.

3.1.3. The Maritime Power ⁸¹

⁸¹ In the Ottoman Empire the ship buildings and their maintenance were fulfilled in shipyards belonged by the state. The first shipyard was the Imperial Shipyard (Tersane-i Amire). As Giustinian said the Imperial Shipyard was not only shipyard of the Empire, after the Empire's expansion new ones constructed; Gallipoli, Sinop, Izmit, Suez, Basra, Kefken, Samsun, and Ruscuk Shipyards. For example in the Imperial Shipyard in the 16th century 62 ships were constructed and 243 repaired. While the Republic of Venice started to use the sailing galleons instead oar driven galleys early beginning of the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire insisted to use of oars. **TABLE IV:** Number of People Working In the Imperial Shipyard in the 17th century:

Year	Employees
1601	3,524
1608	2,761
1635	2,337

After narrating land forces of Signor Turk, now I will narrate naval forces which concerns the Excellence Senate more compared to the others and which is necessary. Without doubt, Turks are relatively [Relazione, 532] in decline at marine now. They have realized it is due to defect of navy; on the other hand such a decline does not emanate from lack of what is necessary, but from a bad government only. The Excellence Senate, [what is necessary to do] is duplicating pursuit and diligence during decline, increasing provisions while the navy is regressing; and when God wishes to create an opportunity, using this power for Christians and your service or when Turks are back to restore their naval forces, in resisting to parry this. (In my private opinion) this may hardly come true due to abundance of everything they need in their country.

Firstly, they are not deprived of a shipyard, they have one with 144 sections in Istanbul, and most of them are crumbling more and more. Finally, the King, granting some of them, has provided the Pashas and each other Statesmen to restore them on their means before the His Majesty by emulating among them. He is considering the same thing in also construction of galleys, namely allocating them without making any expenditure on his means. There is one in Camarre with 19 sections, 7 in Black Sea, 2 in İzmit Gulf, and some

At the beginning of 17th century, in all types of employees' of the Imperial Shipyard numbers started to decrease, since the other shipyards constructed. As Giustinian remarked that the Ottomans had a big advantage that could provide numerous and all kind of shipbuilding materials in its territories for shipyards. Most part of these raw materials was obtained from Anatolia. For example the materials acquired from outside Anatolia, the records showed that iron and nails were acquired from Bulgaria, pitch from Thrace, resin from Aegean islands and string from Egypt. On the Ottoman fleet see: Uzunçarşılı, *Bahriyye*, In: EI, vol. X, pp. 947-8; idem, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı* and *Osmanlı Tarihi*, I and II, 1949-54; Hacı Halife, *Tuhfat al-kibar fi asfar al-bihar*; İdris Bostan, "Ottoman Maritime Arsenals and Shipbuilding Technology in the 16th and 17th Centuries" *Foundation for, Science Technology and Civilisation*, January, (2007), p. 2; idem, *Ottoman Navy Organisation: Grand Shipyard in XVII. Century*. Ankara, 1992, pp. 14-25, 50, 83-93, 99; Cengiz Toraman, Batuhan Güvemli and Fatih Bayramoğlu, *Imperial shipyard (Tersane-i amire) in the Ottoman Empire in 17th century: management and accounting*, In: *Revista Española de Historia de la Contabilidad*, Spanish Journal of Accounting History, No. 13, 2010, pp. 191-202

in [Aegean] Archipelagoes. As far as I detected, while one side of them is close to sea, the other side is close to forest to provide ease at carrying wood during construction of galleys. All the mentioned places have vast forests for wood; in particular they cut down and carry them extremely easily along Asian rivers over Black Sea. And many villagers are exempt from these obligations from one to another, it can say that the forests walk and render the services on their own. Maybe as they are natural enemies of industry or because of their chiefs, they do imperfect works, leave many fissures in a short time, and they open out and shatter, and become useless within their third year. They get 500 [Venetian] ducats and some ironwork [Relazione, 533] from the King in return for obligation to construct galleys. They curtail the expenses as much as possible, the work proceeds weakly. Prepotency of greediness and ambition of Ministers originate the same defect in manufacture on the King's account. They have plenty of great craftsmen, Greeks in particular are far better than Turks in this job. In emergencies, they work at their own shops non-compulsorily, they abound travelling at galleys and caramoussals in Istanbul, and they are also forced to work in return for too few *akcas*.

They have no experts in their galleys, people who converted to Islam service how many they have; this situation brings about those results: Their [galleys] are not as qualified as ours; both front and back sides are very high, almost like a crescent; this situation causes two defects, the first is the rowers get very tired while rowing high above and they lose speed in a short time, the other is shooting cannons; they pass through air without making any damage, however they expose cannon shooting vulnerably when they encounter enemy ships. They are thinking of gaining two benefits out of it. The first is being more in safety

against storms in impetuous waters of the Black Sea, the other is the crew's being safe and sheltered.

2000 caulkers, whose money is paid by the King, work in Istanbul shipyard perpetually, and the other many travel in caramoussals on serving circumstantially.

Rope is supplied from Azov, iron from Salonika, canvas from Gallipoli, Izmir, and Cyprus, rusk from Euboea, Volo, and Santa Maura, pulses and rice from Egypt.

Apparently they have some problems with oars; they have few places to extract them and disturbance from Cossacks⁸² which is not little at all from the Black Sea.

Two sorts of Christian slaves serve in galleons and rowers; not only Grand Signore's, Begs and Reis', but the ones rented for His Majesty in return for 15 or 20 Venetian Ducats, and [Relazione, 534] the other sort is called avariz, and was imposed in Pera and Rumelia.

In the past, Turks used to send powerful navies abroad, those days they used to collect effective men who were overabundant as avariz,⁸³ not real money as tax. Later poverty began to be felt as the states were destroyed as a result of wars or due to greediness of Ministers; this situation proceeded increasingly more and more, and requesting money instead of men commenced. In a way, this poverty must be the major reason why the navy is weak today. Kaptan Pashas have converted avarizs into their own money or other profits. In a way, they have come to a point not being able to supply 25 or 30 armed galleys which they were in the habit of extracting from Istanbul for years; and combining them with

⁸² Cossacks were Polish subjects and made raids into Ottoman territories. Kenneth M. Setton, *Venice Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century*, p.9

⁸³ The Ottoman government imposed *avariz* as the extraordinary taxes in emergency situations.

escort forces, they form their navies which are too smaller than standard ones. They add Christian ships and sailboats to them which Berber pirates plunder. They capture all the slaves on them, they have adjusted to being Great Lord's and others' vessels stuffed with them, they are now stuffed with Frank slaves. They were the fundamental force of rowers; Turks and Russians, who are being used at rowing and sea and who are actually of little value, are of value at present. [Relazione, 535]

3.1.4. The Ordinary Revenues⁸⁴

Now I am passing in the revenues; they are two sorts as ordinary and extraordinary. The first ones are exceeding 6.000.000 Venetian ducats and being extracted from four sections in my opinion and as far as I have learnt from who manage the books as described. Places where extortions are accumulated and their amounts: 2 ducats received from each non-Muslim male who is above 16, and total 1.200.000, as for land taxes the ones they pay alike for house and their other property total 1.300.000, the ones paid at entrance and exit in Istanbul total 1.700.000, the ones sent by officials we call chancery total 400.000. Besides, the certain amount, which the Pashas in states send to the Sublime Porte annually after paying their expenses off, is added to them.

⁸⁴ By the expansion of the Ottoman Empire needed two treasuries, an inner and an outer treasury. The inner treasury was a reserve treasury and the outer treasury was for the expenditure of the State. In fact the inner treasury was placed for the surplus income from the outer treasury; and the annual income of the Egypt treasury. To open the Treasury, the sultan's permission was necessary. As Giustinian touched upon from the end of the 16th century onwards if there was a necessity, used to make transfer from inner treasury to the outer treasury, but while it must have replaced it, could not be done since there was no money in the both. On *hazine* see: Barkan, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esasları*, I, *Kanunlar*, Istanbul 1943, pp. 370, 235; Ahmed Refik, *Fatih Devrine Aid Vesikalar*, In: TOEM; Orhonlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine Ait Belgeler; Telhisler (1597-1607)*, Istanbul, 1970, pp. 33-4, 109; Shaw, *The Budget of Ottoman Egypt 1005-1006, 1596-1597*, 1968, pp. 13-14; Fındıklılı Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*, Edi. by Ahmed Refik, Istanbul, 1928, II vol. , p. 306; Halil Sahillioglu, *Şivîş year Crises in the Ottoman Empire*, In: *Studies in the economic history of the Middle East*, Edi. by M. A. Cook, London, 1970, p. 242

In this way, Europe sends: 50.000 from Wallachia, 30.000 from Moldova, 10.000 from Transylvania, 90.000 from cities of Danube, 250.000 out of wheat trading from different territories under the administration of the King, 16.000 from Ragusa's people, and 40.000 from [Aegean] Archipelagoes.

Likewise, all coming from Asia; Happy Arabia send 50.000, Damascus 60.000, Aleppo 170.000, Tripoli of Syria 50.000, Cyprus 40.000, Rhodes 16.000, Anatolia 90.000, Trabzon 12.000.

However for Africa, Cairo which can be said to be the real ore of the Empire, sends the largest quantity. It sends a revenue of 1.800.000 ducats which is divided into three; [Relazione, 537] 600.000 of it is paid to soldiers, maintenance of the Pasha and his other needs, gunpowder supply of Ministers and the army is satisfied; sugar, spices and the other are dispatched for the Palace in Istanbul. Even more of it is dispatched to Mecca in order to meet their expenses. The remaining 600.000 is dispatched via land to Istanbul every year to be delivered to the Ic Hazine which is the secure treasury of Grand Signore, and their metal proportion is the best.⁸⁵

Kings of Tunis, Tripoli and Algeria send nothing to the Sublime Porte, yet all is being spent for the Pasha and soldiers' needs no matter when they can extract. They have made a habit of sending expensive gifts to Grand Signore annually; however as they flourished in navigation, power and wealth, they lost respect and obedience for His Majesty; they cease their symbols of the respect and devotion at the same time.

⁸⁵ Cairo was an important and famous trade center throughout the 17th century. The merchants used to trade of coffee, drugs, dyestuffs and Indian textiles. Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.507

As understood from my words, ordinary revenues which are conveyed annually into the Treasury of Grand Signore in Istanbul exceed 6.000.000 Venetian ducats. 600.000 are in the Ic Hazine whose seal and keys incessantly exist at His Majesty, the others are in the Dis Hazine whose seal exists at the Grand Vizier. Its spending has been allocated, and it would last long to tell them; it is enough to say only that the soldiers, increasing and multiplying too excessively today, not only consumed the mentioned amount in their revolts in the past, but also extorted money in large quantities from the Defterdars and the Emins indirectly and by violence. Several years have not been convenient ones to evaluate the 600.000 in Treasury well, not only has it been returned as much as spent, but also the King has frequently made payments abroad called loan therewithal with payments which have never been paid back, some Defterdars have lost their heads and properties from time to time, just like Gazanfer in my time.

3.1.5. The Extraordinary Revenues⁸⁶

Extraordinary revenues, which are called by the way they continue at present, such as donations, confiscation and the ones which are as inheritance [Relazione, 538] unknowable precisely flow into Grand Signore's treasury incessantly. In my point of view, Sultan Osman has exceeded the ordinary amount due to greediness in his nature; he has been aiming nothing except amassing treasure through any means. All the dignitaries were aware of this character of His, hence they were giving in to Him with enormous gifts; these were not jewels, horses, or garments like their predecessors did as usual, but by spot cash only.

⁸⁶ The confiscation was turned to become almost arbitrary in the 17th century in the Ottoman Empire and became an important source for the Treasury in this century. To compensate fortunes of the executed peoples' households' became a habit too. On confiscation see: Baysun, *Musadere*, IA, vol. XIII, p. 671; Hammer, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*.

Without corrupting Him, they could neither obtain a duty or dignity nor dispatch anyone to intercede; everything had turned out to be rendered through bribe. In a way, the extraordinary revenues have exceeded quite significant amount, they have almost doubled the ordinary revenues under Mustafa [I]. Like confusion and disorder in the amount of everything, there were no standard and limitation in this, too; still everything was under looting of the Ministers with their greediness and rapacity. The taxes were inexplicable in this disparity; everything under Osman had been flowing into his treasury and he had been extorting from everyone simply for himself, yet under Mustafa everything had been given to soldiers and he himself had been growing poor to satiate them.

This condition has taken a better shape in the Empire of Sultan Murad IV at present. He has held up Osman's sad event as an example, he does not take all the taxes for himself like him and let no others take them as Mustafa did, also. He has been moderate in process of tax collection and extraordinary revenues, he has reduced especially the dignitaries' donation and gifts; to me they do not exceed the ordinary ones at present. Death of Gürcü Mehmed and Seymen Pasha, and the other principal heads are a way for confiscation of remarkable property and salaries for His Majesty, and a right in obtaining great profit as they passed away without progeny, as he is the heir of all his salaried men. It is a fact that King [Murad IV] has constituted a circulation which flows perpetually from most of the one which has been donated, namely extraordinary revenues in order to get required backup for his ordinary needs by tradition and perforce, that is to say he does not allow gold to remain in his own treasury as usual.

3.1.6. The Increase in the Expenditures

Among all the difficulties of penetrating the news based on a decent ground concerning the Ottoman Empire is [Relazione, 539] the amount of money, which is kept in their treasury called the *İc Hazine* and not used for a particular expenditure, to be uncertain. Because it is not hard to infer a result as to how much exists in their treasury from inputs and outputs of the other Kings and Princes; yet this cannot be estimated due to abundance and uncertainty of extraordinary revenues of the Turks' King. Why I hark back to this subject is what has happened during my bailate. I can speak for sure, because what has happened has certified them definitely. During the accession of the present King, not a little or meager money existed in this Treasury. In his time, golden coins which have been put back, kept and found do not exceed 2.000.000. When I quit, he had been keeping on like this, increasing the amount I mentioned is harder than decreasing it. Ordinary revenues have rather dropped off due to confusion originating from revolts and salaries of soldiers who increase exceedingly in number. Excessive quantities do not come from the ordinary salaries as it used to be, 600.000 ducats do not come from Cairo any more for several years, only half of the revenues come from Asia due to war with Persia, the ones taken through confiscations which are the third part do not suffice, this 2.000.000 diminishes more and more, definitely His Majesty's money decreases. It may not be easy for Him to do this within such deficiencies of his while his predecessors have conducted happy endings in many significant attempts. It is a consensus there used to be 6.000.000 Venetian ducats in Treasury of Sultan Ahmed, his father who is dead. 3[.000.000] of it has been spent as a result of granting 25 Venetian ducats to Janissaries and 1.000 silver coins to Sipahis per capita during accessions of Sultan Mustafa and Sultan Osman. Not only was this amount

replaced by Osman, but also it was increased even more. Nonetheless, he did a lot of spending in the mentioned war, even if it did not seem plausible for them to make the same donation before they departed for the War of Poland. When he passed away, [Relazione, 540] he left more than 4.000.000. Sultan Mustafa made a new donation when he acceded to the throne again. One of the major reasons consuming the Treasury was disorderliness of the government during plunders of his mother, his brother-in-law Davud and finally Grand Vizier Mer[e] Hüseyin. They were keeping the soldiers' devotion for Him by the power of gold to maintain His reign, and they used up the large quantity of remaining money in this way. On accession of the present King, they had to set up a slaughterhouse of silverware in the Palace in order to strike Venetian ducats of low worth on account of favors done in general, and besides they had to implore to the ambassadors of Christian Princes for 30.000 Venetian ducats on loan in an undignified manner which had never occurred before.

I am concluding the matter of money. Your Most Excellent Gentlemen, monetary trouble of this government is rather large-scale today, such that the Viziers and Defterdars do not engage in any other thing. They can reimburse neither the ordinary expenditures nor the payment which used to be ready definitely every 3 months, actually it occasionally lasts 6 months, or even longer currently, and while grumbling their jeopardy of uprising is proceeding all the time. The same deprivation causes declination of land and naval forces, their attempts to result in failure, discontent of people, and scarcity to occur in everything at shops. Because the King applies considerable reduction on everything's spending, the Dignitaries also do the same thing. The Sublime Porte and Istanbul no longer seem as in old times when it was splendid with flowing money, its predecessors obtained the devotion of

citizens, the shops bloomed like flowers, and each accompanied this by their own munificence.

I have submitted the Ottoman Empire's vastness, power, based its authority on its wealth up to here as concisely as possible to Your Serenity and Your Most Excellent Gentlemen. I have indicated to what extent its present condition is on declination with my own logical arguments in the first chapter.

3.2. The STRUCTURE of the GOVERNMENT

I am passing to the structure of government in the second chapter. It is necessary to make mention of this as they principally base on their own laws.

3.2.1. The Fikh: The Islamic Law⁸⁷

Indeed great architect, pseudo-prophet Mohammed erected a monarchy; he knew quite well that [Relazione, 541] how much strong the respect for religion in men's spirits is, formed His mosaic, the Christians and the pagans, to embrace this religion elated each; he made a mixture not only for the religion but also the policy still serves.

I have realized that Turks regulate the religion, state, and justice in short everything of them merely by law and that is Quran. Its (Quran) decrees are kept within great veneration by them. Despite this, the Emperor's will is said to be more superior to Islamic

⁸⁷ In a narrow sense religious law in Islâm comprises all public, private, religious and political life, and contains orders and prohibitions about these fields. Also includes criminal and constitutional law, and finally laws adjusting the administration of the state and the conduct of war. Sometimes there is tension between theory and practice, the Ottoman Empire was the most successful one which tried to adjust the Islamic jurisprudence. According to the Ottoman officials and writers, the Ottoman sultan was the sovereign of Islam who he had to maintain and govern the state. On fikh see: Schacht, J, *Fikh*, In: EI, II. vol., pp. 886, 891; M. Fuad Köprülü, *İslâm ve Türk Hukuk Tarihi*, İstanbul 1983, pp. 16, 18, 276-277; Barkan, *Kanun nâme*, İA, VI, 185-196; Mehrdad Kia, *Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*, Greenwood Press, 2011, p. 133

law. It is apparent the Emperors oppose it; on the contrary they cannot dare make decisions before receiving advisory fetva of the Mufti who is the head of their sect in case of any war, peace, or important event. It is appeared that it is not taken into account that probably no other thing which is greater than this caused Sultan Osman (II) to be destroyed, Hodjas stirred up the soldiers and people to rebellion against Him benefiting from It (Islamic law), they got his Reign and life removed.

The Ottoman Emperors have another codex called “kanun” (law).⁸⁸ The provisions, which do not exist in Islamic Law in cases when needed for their state’s customs, are present in it; therefore they execute what Islamic Law does not execute for them (Ottomans) and what they are not able to execute for Islamic law, in the name of kanun.

The Mufti is the King’s slave just like the others; he frequently speaks as he wishes on Islamic law, within the manner of an oracle he gives fetva which mean answering in short words by confirming in respect of his own gusto.⁸⁹

[Fatih Sultan] Mehmed has directed everything towards war with his own law; he has not fulfilled defense and expansion with dispute, but with swords. In the end, until all nations became Muslim or at least his citizens, he constrained all the people to belt swords

⁸⁸ As I said above the Islamic law regulates the whole public and private life of the Muslims, but since Islamic law hardly deal with the content of common law, and some part of the Muslim penal system could not be applied, the governors regulated the issue into two branches, Islamic law and kanun, although they had no such legislative authority. The Ottoman sultans applied kanun principally in the fields of financial and penal law and it started by Mehmed II, but they could made it ever coming into conflict with one another. On Ottoman *Kanuns* see: Y. Linant De Bellefonds, *Kanun*, In: EI, IV. vol., pp. 556-7; Barkan, *Kanunlar*,

⁸⁹ Fetva is the opinion on Islamic law for all matters. Mufti gives the fetvas. By the expansion of Islâm territories it was felt that a qualified person who could control that practice. Murad II was the first Ottoman sultan who granted the right to give fetvas in an individual person known as the *Sheyh al-Islâm*. On fetva see: Paul Rychaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, London, 1670, p. 109; J. R. Walsh, *Fatwa*, In: EI, II, pp. 866-7

with himself never ceasing his army and by commanding all the people with the sword.⁹⁰ Therefore, the Emperors of Turks are unable to make peace or friends with Christian Princes through Islamic law, they execute this by kanun.

Islamic law permits each of them to marry 4 wives and use as many odalisques as they nourish as well so that what the Empire has gained will increase through propagation and growing in number.⁹¹ Another prohibition is neither drinking wine, nor staring at covered women walking in the streets, and nor accompanying them. The women are enclosed at home and in a rather inferior condition. Since men can take neither the former (wine) nor the other (women) [Relazione, 542] to war, they become ready and free for the war accordingly. They have instituted a pure and concise structure of justice, the unique valid guide is proof, this system is ultimately appropriate for warfare as it is very swift.

⁹⁰ According to Islamic law, *cihad* consists of military action by the intention of the expansion of Islâm and its defense. Based on fundamental principle of Islam, ought to embrace to whole universe, and if it is necessary by force. The *cihad* is a religious duty for believers to carry them to the gates of Paradise if they devote themselves. *Cihad* can be by a peaceful persuasion or by fighting. For example the Holy Prophet Muhammad only did moral and religious teaching during the Meccan period, in the Medina period He became a religious and political leader and sometimes he was engaged with fight against infidels. On *cihad* see: Halim Sabit Şibay, *Cihad*, In: IA; E. Tayn, *Djihâd*, In: EI, II., pp. 538-40;

⁹¹ The most popular Orientalist image of the Ottoman women's was segregation in the harem and isolation from the social and economic life. But over time, as Peirce has showed the reality is more complex than these thoughts. Especially we can say many things on the royal women, as Giustinian told with such details, they were very active in the political life; also it was a tradition to establish charitable foundations by their own money.

The situation for the lower class women, was a little bit different from the royal ones, they were freer to involve in economic activities. During religious fests or the other festivities, women could appear in public much more relaxed. They could be landholders, as Giustinian touched upon, even some held *timars*, too. Islamic law and tradition granted them specific legal rights, and they could defend those rights in the *kadis* court freely, even from early in the 17th century, could petition the Imperial Divan directly.

On the contrary to the general opinion polygamy was rare, almost 95 percent of all men had only one wife, generally polygamy was common in the juridical and religious elites.

Jennie R. Ebeling, Lynda Garland, Guity Nashat, Dursteler "West Asia" The Oxford Encyclopedia of Women in World History. Ed Bonnie G. Smith. Oxford University Press, 2008, Brigham Young University, 2010, <http://www.oxfordreference.com.eri.lib.byu.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t248.e1144-s4>; Ottoman women could control their property after they married, and became the subjects when they reached puberty. Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire*, London; New York: Tauris, 2000, p. 101

He established in the spirits of His followers the definiteness of eternal wellbeing who dies in respect of it, and the belief of predestination. He asked them to exhibit great reliance and resignation towards God in everything, and become ready against dangers.

3.2.2. The Religious Life

Judging by appearances, Turks seem to be so pious and prayerful; they always make mention of God, they invoke God at every action of theirs. They worship 5 times a day, they render the Friday prayer, which is their religious festival day and the sixth one, in mosques, which are relatively more in number and many of their constructions are superb, in Istanbul.

They abstain from every kind of food and drink on these days of full moon which they call Ramadan resembling our Lent; however, they sate very well indifferently at night meals; then they celebrate the Bayram, Festival, which resembles our Easter, joyfully and exultantly for 3 days. In the past, Turks used to practice their religion a lot; good luck accompanied them in their undertaking through it. And as a reward they obtained prosperity. For a while, religion has degraded to a large extent, they give less importance to it. It is said that they experience ill fortune out of the good one exactly contrarily depending on the change occurring at present. Above all, drinking wine has destroyed them extremely, they drink in taverns, public places quite freely; soldiers have usurped the revenues of mosques, converted them into their own property, a large number of them are closed and remain without prayer leaders. Manifest unjustness and venality of the kadis and ulemas who were previously holy and sacrosanct have constituted insult and hatred against each of them. As an example of which has never been heard, they were attacked and murdered by

Acemioğlanis upon the Grand Vizier [Mere] Hüseyin's command within the administration of Sultan Mustafa I in my time, the mosques got covered in their blood, no one moved to defend them. Many other operations carried out by the Dignitaries and soldiers of the Sublime Porte [Relazione, 543] despised their religion, especially they are in a condition they have placed their hands over the life and blood of their own King, who has been respected by them as God's and Prophet's caliph on earth; makes clear to know the declination which I mentioned above. At the same time, well-known ones of the same sect of the same Islamic law are Turks, Arabians, and Tatars; while Islamic law is still kept with much more respect and observance by them, this is not executed by the Sublime Porte, therefore it has had an awful reputation in the eye of them just like a scorned religion which has been abandoned by God. The Pasha of Erzurum, Abaza, has easily got Asian people to revolt on the grounds of destroying religion, and he has penetrated up to Ankara with his troops. The Tatars, as it is only just, has been inhospitably machinating the Ottoman Dynasty to draw the power on themselves.

3.2.3. The Sultan ⁹²

⁹² Actually, the Ottoman sultan's power was not absolute as Giustinian defined; he had an Imperial Divan whose members had a good deal of authority. By Mehmed II and onwards the sultans started to appoint his grand viziers among their slaves, who were generally Christian origin. For example, out of the 14 grand viziers who held the post between 1619 and 1632, three were 3 freeborn Muslim Turks. Their purpose was to strengthen their position, but sometimes it did not reach its purpose, as during Giustinian's bailate.

We saw that Giustinian cited often "Sublime Porte" (*Divan-ı Humayun*), it was an Imperial Council and supreme organ of government which was formed to assist the Ottoman Sultans from earliest times. Generally Sublime Porte had meeting twice a week, after that the members, personally reported to the sultan their decisions and asked for his approval.

In the Ottoman government concept, the members of the Divan were belonged to the three major groups which were formed Ottoman ruling elite class: the "*men of the sword*" or the military, "*the men of the religious sciences*" known as the *ulema*, and "*the men of the pen*" or bureaucrats.

As seen clearly in the report of Giustinian there were other realities about the sultan's power, these were queen mothers, valide sultans, and the wives of the sultans, they were in power especially from the late 16th and through the mid 17th century. It was undeniable that their powers had negative impact in the Ottoman

The absolute successor of this Empire's government and absolute lord of each one's property and lives is the King solely. He freely commands the Empire in accordance with His own thought, used to be obeyed perfectly to his commands starting from the past, yet today are paid little attention as Your Excellency knows. Hatt-i hûmayun's, the King wrote in his own cursive writing, have never punished transgressors and clearly all the Empire has lost the obedience. Even if they still keep the respect and veneration to a large extent, the King lives in a growing regressive manner in his Palace almost all the time. He has surrendered all the burden of the State on the shoulders of Grand Vizier, his deputy, who orders and commands in accordance with his own thought and does not communicate the other Viziers if anything does not suit Him. [Relazione, 544]

Above Him (Sheyh al-Islam) and everybody else, the King, for whom everybody is the slave of life and everything, caliph of God and the Prophet on earth, successor of every temporal and spiritual thing. [Relazione, 547]

3.2.4. The Grand Vizier⁹³

history, since they backed and often used by court and the military factions. On the Ottoman Sultans see: Ágoston, *Central Administration*, In: Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 10-2; Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, Princeton Univ. Press, 1988; Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650; The Structure of Power*, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*; Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*.

⁹³ When the number of viziers in the *Divan* was increased, it became necessary to distinguish the chief vizier from the others and called the Grand Vizier, he was appointed directly by the sultan as his absolute deputy. The sultan's golden seal was given only to him. When sultan did not participate to the "*Divan*", the grand vizier was charge of the council. Following the *Divan*, Grand Vizier reported in person to the sultan by reading a *telhis* (precis) of the most important matters discussed.

In the Ottoman government system there were "checks and balances" which were limited the power of the grand vizier and were impeded to act him independently of the other members of the council. This Ottoman tradition derived from an old Islamic principle of governance to make necessity of consultation by the aim of to prevent the chief executives of the empire monopolizing power.

As Giustinian told in his report, in the first half of the 17th century, the independence of the vizier became under the influence of persons who close to the ruler, such as the sultans' mother, -like Kösem Sultan,

He attends the King's audience with the other Viziers and major officials to express his own thoughts regularly every two days of the week, Wednesday and Sunday. He presents supplications and memorials in which he has written his own thoughts, and called "telhîs" by compendium, which are almost always approved by His Majesty; if any request is not made by Him as he rarely does, the others do not speak even a word. He frequently sends telhîs' to the King at the same time without going himself, depending on the necessity; the King sends them back with a quite short caption of two or three words expressing his own demand in his cursive script. [Relazione, 544]

At every turn, he attends or is frequently called for by the King for extraordinary audiences when required. He always has great horror when he goes to the mosque or he is received by the King in a different way as to whether there is any memorial against Him, or else whether He has called for him to castigate. The Grand Vizier is great, almost the absolute authority in this state, because; although there is a council, which gathers 4 days a week in the King's Palace, called Divan, in which the Viziers and another major officials of the State, whose number is from time to time few or many, nearly X, attend; [but] the Dignitaries do nothing that the Grand Vizier would dislike at advisory meetings and the special petition and negotiations are presented to the Kazasker for justice by Him. However, important and serious matters are only negotiated with Him in His house. Letters from Beglerbeyis and Pashas of outside are addressed to Him. He is the head of what all the officials in the Sublime Porte execute, monetary matters, justice, supplies and every other

and this became one of the most important political matters of the empire. On *Grand Vizier* see: *Kanun-nameyi al-i Osman*, Edi. by Mehmed Arif, in *TOEM*, Suppl. 1330 A.H., 10; Cengiz Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, Istanbul, 1970; M. Kunt, *Sadr-ı A'zam*, In: *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, Vol. VIII, Leiden EJ.Brill, 1995, pp. 751-2 (Hereafter: EI, ...); Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, Ankara 1948, pp. 111-79; Danişmend, *İzahli Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 4 vol.; Ağoston, *Central Administration*, In: *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 10-2

thing. Distribution of all interior and exterior duties of the Empire depends on Him. Ambassadors of Princes negotiate their matters with Him and work them out. In time of war He commands the troops, and he is obeyed as if He were the King himself. Governments have been formed within great authority by Him many times no matter at which location of the Empire He likes. The Kaymakam who will represent Him has been postulated on His proposal, whereas another one would be postulated by the King himself.

This absolute power at a single person, which may be hazardous in other states, is not only beneficial but also necessary in the Ottoman Empire. Neither negotiations last long nor the Princes' violence is excused, or nor Ministers, who are slaves, achieve glory like the case is in other places. [Relazione, 545]

As I said before, entire burden of Imperial governments has settled on the Grand Vizier's shoulders, mostly. Through the highest authority, he only makes explanations to Him (the Majesty) as the absolute judge, administrator of everything after the King and the Majesty's vicegerent, but not to anyone else. Ambassadors of Princes' are directed to Him to negotiate their matters, good or bad results depend on His positive or opposite disposition to a large extent. The baili of Your Serenity have to exert much effort to gain this positive disposition of His, because I really had to do that more than enough due to the soldiers' rebellions and subversion in everything, which occurred during my bailate. During 7 years, the Grand Viziers have frequently changed, with the inclusion of seventeen,⁹⁴

^L **LIST I:** The Ottoman Grand Viziers during Giorgio Giustinian's bailate:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|---|----------------|
| 1) Güzelce Ali Pasha | → | (1619–1621) |
| 2) Ohrili Hüseyin Pasha | → | (1621) |
| 3) Dilaver Pasha | → | (1621–1622) |
| 4) Kara Davud Pasha | → | 1622) |
| 5) Mere Hüseyin Pasha | → | 1622), I. time |
| 6) Lefkeli Mustafa Pasha | → | (1622) |

perhaps there used to be more than 50 in the past. They were being deposed and became masul, and whenever I found myself to have acquired their (the Grand Viziers') goodwill and good disposition in negotiations. Later, a new (one) of them, who was in a more different temperament and contrary to the other's thoughts, were being appointed in his place; I had to exert double effort and again; it is not hard at all superseding of another in place of Him later within this perpetual turmoil of the state. I adapted myself to service for Your Serenity by all my soul and brain; and resisted up to the ultimate point although they all correspond each other a lot in terms of haughtiness, avarice, and ignorance. Thank God; despite all these, very hard negotiations have been achieved in favor of Your Serenity by his enormous reputation. [Relazione, 567]

3.2.5. The Kadi⁹⁵

Management of civil justice and crimes are still in the direction of Kadis who are Hodjas of Islamic law. They are dispatched all over the Empire by the Grand Vizier for

7) Gürcü Hadım Pasha	→	(1622)
8) Mere Hüseyin Pasha	→	(1622), II. time
9) Kemankeş Kara Ali Pasha	→	(1622–1624)
10) Çerkes Mehmed Pasha	→	(1624–1625)
11) Hafız Ahmed Pasha	→	(1625–1626)
12) Kayserili Damat Halil Pasha	→	(1626–1627)
13) Gazi Ekrem Hüsrev Pasha	→	(1627–1631)

Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi: M. 1574-1703: H. 987-1115*, III, İstanbul: Türkiye Yaynevi, 1972, pp. 653-56

⁹⁵ *Kadis* had jurisdiction and were sent to the whole *Empire*. In the Ottoman institution they were not only judge. For example they issued different kinds of certificates and documents, and as Giustinian mentioned they had to control that foodstuffs were sold at officially fixed prices.

On *kadi* see: Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, I, pp. 83-145; H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I/2, Oxford 1957, pp. 121-33; Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi*, II, 1453-1559, pp. 63-81; İnalcık, *Adaletnameler*, In: *Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, II, Ankara, 1967, pp. 75-791; Gökbilgin, *XVI Asırda Mukataa ve İltizam İşlerinde Kadılık Müessesesinin Rolü*, In: IV. Turk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 1952, pp. 433-44; Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, Oxford, 1973; İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kadi*, Ankara, 1994; *Koci Bey Risalesi*, p. 108; Gv. Kaldv Nagy, *Kadi*, In: EI New Edition, IV, p. 375

three years. They conduct trials which are concise, include only speeches of witnesses, non-deferred, unwritten, or which lawyers do not dispute; and what They lack is overabundant at us; [Relazione, 545] it is such that it is hard to find out which of these brings about the worst disorder. It is certain this state has no unruined and uncorrupted corpuses. Kadis get bribes greedily, most witnessing is untrue, and many sorts of them are done from public bazaar. While Christians' witnessing is valueless for Turks, but theirs is good to Them. Hence, the Christians' burden is excessive and ought to stay oppressed.

Provisions, victuals and abundance have been consigned to Kadis in each city, every Wednesday they go around entire Istanbul on horse with the Grand Vizier to prevent tricks through pleasant commands by restricting price of everything. When they inspect the tricks, corruption does not arise from their avarice.⁹⁶

What is more, Kadis dispatched to each city in Sanjaks pursue in military affairs and security of state also, Pasha is the title of the greatest of them. The Pashas are under administration of Rumelian and Anatolian Kazaskers. One of the Grand Signore's commands all European soldiers and the other does all Asian ones. Today, this position does not sustain the reputation it used to have in the past.

Above Kadis administrating justice are Rumelian and Anatolian Kazaskers equally; although they are judges of the armies, they do not participate in wars if the Sultan does not

⁹⁶ "The keystone of official control was legislated price (*narh*) which the İstanbul kadi determined after consultation with merchants and shipmasters." Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 496

do so, but they stay in Istanbul. Verdicts of the Kadis cannot be appealed by the highest level of judgment or great authority.⁹⁷

3.2.6. The Sheyh al-Islam⁹⁸

The Mufti, the uppermost person leading Islamic law is identically like the Pope of Christians. The King cannot resolve substantial matters for certain without His consent; however appointing or deposing him depends on His Majesty's consent and he is His slave just like the others. The Mufti conform his wishes to His (the Sultan) sake most of the time and serves to legitimate the Sultan's wishes [Relazione, 546] in the eye of people to a large extent. His authority is extremely valuable in all negotiations. He sends out the concise and absolute resolutions of Islamic law, which are demanded or proposed according to general circumstances, always in conformity with his fetva, and they rewrote in manner of ancient oracles. [Relazione, 547]

3.2.7. The Nishanci⁹⁹

⁹⁷ By the expansion of the Ottoman Empire the number of the *kadis* increased and to supervise them the first *kadiasker* was appointed by Murad I. *Kazasker* was in charge also military jurisdiction and assisted the sultan and the grand vizier in this matter. Ágoston, *Central Administration*, In: Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 10-2; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*, pp. 228-41; idem, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, pp. 151-60; Gv. Kaldy Nagy, *Kadi*, In: EI, IV. vol., p. 376

⁹⁸ The *Mufti* was a religious figure in the government with low salary and was not a member of the *Divan*. Maybe his most important charge was giving the fetvas on matters of public or state policy, but according to the Ottoman sources these fetvas were not regulated through the sultans' wishes as Justinian mentioned, but only according to the Islamic law.

On *Shaih al-Islâm* see: R.W. Bulliet, *The Shaih al-Islâm and the Evolution of Islamic Society*, In: *SI*, XXXV, 1972, pp. 53-67; M. Akdag, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi*, II, Ankara 1971, p. 62, n. 1; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilatı*, p. 174; On the difficult question of the status of the *Muftis' fatvas*, see: R.C. Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul*, London, 1986, pp. 113-16, 120, 137, 192-6, 212-21, 279-90, 293-5, 299-300; idem, *Shayh al-Islam*, In: EI New Edition, IX, pp. 399, 401; Colin Imber, *Studies in Ottoman history and law*, İstanbul: The İsis Press, 1996; idem, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997

⁹⁹ In the Ottoman government system *nishanci* was the chancellor. Within his charges there were to approve the contents of documents put before them for the imperial *tugra* and to supervise the preparation of the law

As it is in all the states, office of Nishanci is of great importance in also governments of Turks; He is the one who is responsible for signatures on all the commandments and posts. He incessantly talks to the Grand Vizier and he is by Him. It is a must for Your Serenity to gain His friendship. Due to subversion in the meantime, they are also quite frequently superseded, some were deposed, some were castigated, and some were freed by escaping from impetus of soldiers or being exiled. The last one set off towards Iran with the Grand Vizier Halil shortly before I left. It was rather uneasy to induce Him to stop the King's letters he had been writing to Your Serenity about Derviş's matter of galley. I do not think that He is on this duty now. Still, it is good for Mehmed Efendi, who is much liked by the Ka'im makam, stays by Him in Istanbul, and whom I left within a very good disposition towards our matters, to replace with Him.

3.2.8. The Defterdar ¹⁰⁰

Likewise, good disposition of the Defterdars, who are in charge of taxes which are the state's money, also becomes useful. The significance of their duty is that they are able to talk to the Grand Vizier perpetually. Although the bailo has no other relations with Them except the rent of Zante which had been being paid 1.500 Venetian ducats annually, the

texts. On *Nishanci* see: Franz Babinger, *Nishandji*, In: EI, VIII. vol., p. 62; *Gökbilgin, Nişancı*, In: *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, vol. IX, 1978, pp. 299-302; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*; Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, II vol., Ankara: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1983, pp. 694-7

¹⁰⁰ In the Ottoman administration concept *defterdar* was the chief finance officer and responsible for the sultan's whole finance issues. He had right to access in person to the sultan and to issue ferman on matters within his jurisdiction. As Giustinian said and we find the same words in the letters of the Sir Thomas Roe, the defterdars were in trouble to find cash and had to ask to the ambassadors in the Sublime Porte for 30.000 Venetian ducats debt. As Giustinian mentioned the *defterdars* accused of corruption. On *defterdar* see: *Kanunname-i Al-i Osman, TOEM suppl.* Istanbul, 1330, pp. 10-11, 16-17, 23-5; Mehmed Zeki, *Teşkilat-I Atıkada Defterdar, TTEM*, 1926, pp. 96-102, 234-244; Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri*, Istanbul, 2004; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*; Bernard Lewis, *Daftardar*, In: EI, II., p. 83

Defterdars were in need of every kind of unusual and coercive extortion since Grand Signore's Treasury ran out completely in my time, and the need for urgent money which broke out continually. I had to defend our merchants against their violence. As I also mentioned above, there was not even one day on which they implored me and the other ambassadors shamelessly to borrow 30.000 Venetian ducats by disgrace which was not little at all during the administration of Mustafa. Moreover, as they are doing right now, while they are gathering taxes because of the unbelievable anxiety that the Empire was in and exceeding need, either the lives or properties of almost all of them were castigated in my time. Although, I want to believe [Relazione 599] that they will put an end to such violence on necessity to the Defterdars and to the bailo, by the present change occurring in matters and times.

3.2.9. The Agha of Janissaries¹⁰¹

The Agha of Janissaries' is the head of these soldiers (janissaries). He had remarkable dignity in all times of the Empire, yet it used to be more than ever compared to the past and superior to everyone during my (bailate). Because, was shook the curb of obedience and respect of the mentioned soldiers against their head, who proved their rage and insanity towards their own King's life, shook, although it seems that some of shadow of that curb was still exist; (in this case) He can be said to be the only and unique refuge against their violence. Although the Agha had been shivering also and not been venturing

¹⁰¹ In the Ottoman protocol, the *agha* of the Janissaries' was the high ranking officials. He was selected for palace guard and was close to the sultan. And gained a powerful influence on the government, especially in the time when the Janisseries were out of control. On *Agha* of the Janissaries' see: Tevki'i Abdurrahman Pasha, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde teşrifat ve törenler, Tevki'i Abdurrahman Pasha Kanunnamesi*, Edi. by Sadık Müfit Bilge, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2011; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatında Kapukulu Ocakları*, TTK, Ankara, 1984

to step in the events like the others, he had occasionally been moderating them through requests and struggles in several times. I felt intervention and support of the Aghas during the attacks of the Janissaries about which I mentioned above, also; and both profitable and necessary for me to have intelligence with them. However, really tragic events had been occurring to Their personalities by daily changes, they had always been exposed to unstable and serious hazards. Whoever had frequently been getting angry against the Janissaries, had been rushed to ask for help to the mentioned Agha. At the moment, they are together in the War of Iran, (therefore) their respect is not needed any longer, and likewise that of Seymen Bashi who remained in the Sublime Porte as deputy in His place.

3.2.10. The Kapi Aghasi and The Kizlar Aghasi ¹⁰²

In time of previous Kings, matters of this government were in a marvelous condition and scale. The baili had been obtaining too many benefits from their friends inside the Palace. These were both Kapi Aghasi who were aware of His Majesty's dispositions, and Kizlar Aghasi, and the others. Because the fame of this friendship had been serving to keep the Grand Vizier respectful and moderate towards Them, for fear that they might yield to any complaint to reach the ears of His Majesty. At the good beginning

¹⁰² In the Ottoman Palace Kapi Aghasi had the rank of vizier and was selected by the sultan among the eunuchs. As Giustinian observed very well, his authority and power was very high in the Ottoman government system and tradition, he had right to petition the Sultan for the appointment, promotion and transfer of Palace servants and he had a role being an only mediator between the Sultan and the outside world and also being close adviser of the sovereigns. But through end of the 16th century this power and influence decreased since by the power of *valide sultans*, however the *kizlar aghasi* took their position of senior Palace officer. On Kapi Aghasi see: Inalcik, *Kapu Aghasi*, In: EI, IV. vol., pp. 570-1; *Kanunname of Mehmed the Conqueror*, TOEM, suppl. 1912, 23; Edi. by Yaşar Yücel, *Osmanlı Devlet Düzenine Ait Metinler I: Kitab-i Müstetab*; Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gılmani*; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*.

In the Ottoman Palace system *kizlar aghasi*, was the chief of the black eunuchs. He was in charge of the sultan's harem, and was principal officer of the whole palace as we said above. He had vizierial rank, coming in order of precedence only after the Grand Vizier and Sheyh al-Islâm, as *kapu aghasi*. On *kizlar aghasi* see: C. E. Bosworth, *Kizlar Aghasi*, In: EI, IV. vol., p. 243; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*.

of my bailate, the Grand Vizier Ali induced to send away the previous Kizlar Aghasi and Hodja around him who had great authority over the young Sultan, as he wanted to obtain Sultan Osman's wish and get everything for himself only. Later, the King became haughty and pertinacious; he believed merely in himself; and had not been listening to any of them much. In this case, what the friendships inside had been accomplishing were not too beneficial and valid. Under the administration of Mustafa (however), her mother's friendship could have been quite beneficial, [Relazione 600] if he had really been the King; yet everything was under the soldiers' reign due to his stupidity. Although her mother's authority was valid, it became useful for none that of the others, on the other hand was even less compared to the others.

As I said before, the Kapi Aghasi, who is among the prominent Ministers inside, is the greatest majordomo. The Kizlar Aghasi is the supreme manservant; while they are both eunuchs, the first is white and the latter is negro. Both of their duties are esteemed substantially. [Relazione 601] Since they are allowed to take place easily in the presence of the King and talk to Him, they have great authority, thus everybody aims to obtain their support. As they abused this authority of theirs in my time, many of them were slaughtered by soldiers; it set a good example to the others, and they used this authority gradually and by pondering. While I was leaving, the people in charge of this duty were dealing too little with the matters outside and their friendship was not fruitful. On account of the King's young age at the moment, it might be very easy to devote him to women and have him become by them more frequently. The Kizlar Aghasi can accomplish this job within great ease and by priority of his authority; in this case, his friendship will become fairly beneficial, just like that of the Kapi Aghasi, he was assumed as sincere and pious and was

rendered the King's musahib [-of the close companion of the sultan] by confirmation of Valide and Gürcü. This is a grace which is bestowed on too few people, the most distinguished beneficence or virtue. They have privilege not only to reply to the King but also to have a talk with him.

3.2.11. The Bostancibashi ¹⁰³

Likewise the position, which provides the opportunity to talk to His Majesty and which is esteemed in the Sublime Porte to a great extent, is the Bostancibashi. This position is still the supreme responsible for royal gardens, skiffs, and hunting. Procuring the support of whoever is at this position has always been tradition for Your Serenity's baili; proceeding this is better. The closest phase (for Them) is Kapudan Pashalik; his friendship is maintained quite easily and by a very small expense. To communicate with them is not expensive and hard as it is with the ones inside the Palace. [Relazione 602]

3.2.12. The Kapudan Pasha ¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ In the Ottoman Palace protocol *bostancibashi* was the senior officer and was responsible for the maintenance of order on the shores of the Istanbul. As we read in Giustinian's report and according to Ottoman chronicles, he had authority of speaking to the Sultan in private and of passing on to him such information, true or false, just the *Bostanchibashi* of Osman II gave information to the sultan about English on his order. On *Bostancibashi* see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilatı*; Fındıklılı Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*; I, pp. 1278-9; Uzunçarşılı, *Bostancibashi*; In: EI, I. vol., pp. 1278-9

¹⁰⁴ Kapudan Pasha was the commander-in-chief of the Ottoman fleet and had a great prestige with high revenue. His main tasks were to protect merchant ships against to the pirates in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea, and to inspect the Arsenal, and to supervise all matters about the fleet, and to administer the *eyalet* of the *kapudan* which consisted of twelve *sancaks* during Giustinian's bailate and as Giustinian observed to make all the necessary appointments in it. On Kapudan Pasha see: Salih Özbaran, *Kapudan Pasha*, In: EI, IV. vol., pp. 571-2; C. Orhunlu, *Osmanlı Tarihine Aid Belgeler: Telhisler*, Istanbul; 1970; Evliya Çelebi, *Günümüz Türkçesiyle Evliya Çelebi seyahatnamesi: Viyana, Eflak-Boğdan, Bükreş, Ukrayna, Kırım, Bahçesaray, Çerkezistan, Dağıstan, Kalmukistan, Saray, Moskova*, Edi. by Seyit Ali Kahraman, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*; Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*; Mehmed Ağa, *Silahdar Tarihi*; Hacı Halife, *Tuhfetü'l-kibar fî esfari'l-bihar: (deniz seferleri hakkında büyüklere armağan)*; Haluk Y. Şehsuvaroğlu, *Deniz Tarihimize Ait Makaleler*, Istanbul, 1965

Everything is up to the Kaptan Pasha who is the commander of the fleet, and the Arsenal; the best places of the islands of [Aegean] Archipelagoes which return revenue of 50.000 scudis¹⁰⁵ per year have been granted as salaries by the King. However, he has been collecting too much extortion extraordinarily and at the same time had been enjoying to collect also taxes of Galata nowadays; Sultan Ahmed abolished and transferred it to his own mosque. He is the commander of all the rivers and shores at seas. When he is away with the fleet, he confers and takes the [administration] of Sanjaks from one to another, whoever and however seem appropriate for him. In the past, their charges were only dependant on the King, independent from the Grand Vizier; they had a great and absolute authority. At present, the provisions of the money and the other things have to be convenient to pass from his hand and depended from his willing.

I will talk about the exercise of the charge [***] of the conditions in its place.

For some years, any Turkish navies in 70 galleys, mostly of 60, including patrols have not been seen in the sea. During my bailate such a quantity has never arrived in the Mediterranean, it was dispatched to some regions of Black Sea against Cossacks every year. The Kaptan Pasha has almost been the same person lately. Bearing the title as His Deputy, Pasha of Rhodes stays in the Mediterranean with only 15 or 20 galleys under his command, with the title of his deputy. During my 7 years' bailate, I have never witnessed that they sailed to the Mediterranean from Istanbul by no more than 24 armed galleys; they were also too weak as being deprived of oars, men with swords, and many more necessary

¹⁰⁵ “Scudo (pl. scudi) Acrown (unit of money): often fairly close in value to a ducat, but sometimes worth rather more.” Edited by David Chambers and Brian Pullan, with Jennifer Fletcher, *Venice : a Documentary History, 1450-1630*, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA, Blackwell, 1992, p. 463

preparations.¹⁰⁶ After leaving here, they go to the Aegean Archipelagoes, and especially to Euboea which is just like a warehouse of the fleet to be reinforced. It could be easily comprehended from this point how easy one thing may be for 25 or 30 excellently equipped Christian galleys: If Christian galleys pass beyond [Aegean] Archipelagoes before Turks leave there, if they allow them to appear on the edge of Gallipoli, if they keep the mentioned fleet (the Turkish fleet) in, cover it up, and sequester, and if they prevent them from allying with patrols and getting the provisions they supply from the Aegean Archipelagoes mostly, we will have two kinds of profit for ourselves; the first is inclination of the islanders for Christianity's fame and their hostility for the Turks, the other is that prevention of Mediterranean navigations executed for Istanbul, particularly the navigations executed from Cairo, receives a great portion out of the [Relazione, 536] rather crowded city's [Istanbul] nourishment. This plan is something well-known by the Spanish fleet which sails around the [Aegean] Archipelagoes, and they have intended to build castles on some of these islands more than once, especially at Milos Harbor which is safe and convenient. The Spanish may cause minor and major annoyances against the Turks and Your Serenity by staking out a claim on the islands through a well-formed fleet by galleys.¹⁰⁷ However, it is apparent when time and condition necessitate, this project may

¹⁰⁶ Between 1590 and 1620 the Ottoman fleet could not do even the annual convoys from Alexandria, and was attacked many times. Groot, *The Ottoman Threat to Europe, 1571-1800: Historical Fact or Fancy?* In: V. Mallia-Milanes, *Venice and Hospitaller Malta 1530-1798. Aspects of a Relationship*, Publishers Enterprise Group, Malta, 1992, p. 200

¹⁰⁷ The Spanish ambassador Don Alonso della Cueva of Republic of Venice in 1618 noted the same information about the Ottoman fleet as Giustinian, here the report of della Cueva is above:

“To seaward it has extensive and far-flung possessions, from Venice itself to the island of Crete, and in that stretch of sea called the Adriatic it has, first of all, the kingdom of Crete, and if this were in the hands of mighty prince there is no doubt that it alone would be a sufficient curb to arrogance of our common enemy the Turk. For if a goodly squadron of swift and well-equipped galleys were raised in that kingdom they could, by constantly patrolling the Archipelago, plunder and disrupt the shipping which passes from the much-frequented port of the Morea to

yield advantages to Your Serenity more than to anyone else, then easily reclines upon Kingdom of Candia and recedes, and the islanders' inclination in the [Aegean] Archipelagoes for The Most Serene Republic becomes more compared to the others.¹⁰⁸
[Relazione, 537]

3.2.13. The Friends of Venice in the Ottoman Palace¹⁰⁹

Constantinople. Since the Turks draw from the Morea a vast quantity of grain, munitions and other things essential to that most populous city, it would soon be in deep trouble, suffering a great dearth of victuals, and that would be the surest way of inflicting upon it the worst fate that anyone could contrive.

Further to the east the Republic possesses three other small islands, which are not fertile, but are the greatest importance for their strength and security, for they serve as protecting walls to the kingdom of Crete. Apart from this, Venice possesses the islands of Zante, Cefalonia and Corfu, as well as many others scattered through the Gulf, some of them close to the mainland and to the fortresses which are, as they call them the limbs of Dalmatia, Albania and Schiavonia. But, to tell Your Majesty the truth, they are all for the most part uninhabited and barren, and put it bluntly, they are more of a wild beasts' lair or a robbers' roost than places of great importance. Hence they are inhabited by sailors, fishermen and great number of brigands, who having committed a thousand acts of plunder, take refuge in the dominions of the Turks, or on the shores close Trieste, in Segna, Fiume."

Edi. by Chambers and Pullan, with Fletcher, *Venice : a Documentary History, 1450-1630*, pp. 31-32

¹⁰⁸ There was dissatisfaction against the Venetian officials because of the misgovernment and arrogance through the conquered territories of the Republic, and they were to be seen as an "occupying force". Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006, p.17;

A Petition of Greek soldiers to the Council of Ten, 4 October 1511:

"Impelled, therefore, by these hardship, discomforts and grievances, and having nowhere else to turn, we apply to your lordships, knowing you to be most Christian, devout and merciful, and beg you humbly upon our knees to permit us to purchase a site in this city and there at our own expense to build a church in praise of Our Lord. Otherwise we shall know that your lordships treat us worse than the Turks and Moors do their Christian subjects, for they let them have churches and conduct their ceremonies and services in public."

Edited by David Chambers and Brian Pullan, with Jennifer Fletcher, *Venice: a Documentary History, 1450-1630*, p. 335;

Venice's officials always supported the Unionist clergy in their territories and had a restrictive religious policy toward the Orthodox clergy all these efforts made Greek subjects to fell anger to them. Monique O'Connell, *Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State*, p.10

¹⁰⁹ "Certainly this use of term *amico* [friend] must be qualified and understood in its historical context. In Venetian diplomatic sources, *amico* was used to signify someone to whom a person was attached by affection, and someone who favored Venice and its representatives. The evidence suggests that the term *amico* was commonly used by Venetian and Ottoman representatives to describe relationship that went beyond official duties and pure, political interests. Both pragmatic and the personal elements of *amicizia* [friendship] are

The present Sultan Murad's mother Kösem's (friendship) has been very beneficial and valid up to now. As she (Kösem Sultan) fears bad events the other women have been undergoing rather in placid times, it (this friendship) is effectuated and concealed through too much moderation and sagacity by Her. (Because of these reasons) we are able to use it (this friendship) within difficulties and enormous courage. During the administration of Gürcü, she (Kösem) obtained allowance to see Him personally through the privilege by the Eunuchs; (in this way) she (Kösem) had been supporting His recommendations and the King supporting those of her mother, too. (Accordingly) it was sufficient to leave a good impression on Gürcü. After his death, Valide Sultan's authority caused the government without any doubt to be fallen into rather powerful Receb's hands, who is the present Ka'im makam and her son-in-law. Obtaining the good disposition of Kösem becomes very beneficial in Your Serenity's negotiations, on condition that her son-in-law Kapudan Pasha does not oppose and obstruct. He (Kapudan Pasha) is arrogant to Kösem and Receb and everyone else, as we all the ambassadors experienced this situation of His in the event of Hüseyin who was elected the Pasha of Tunis by Him. We presented an arz to the King and objected to this with all the Ministers by striving hard, these efforts were supported by the Ka'im makam, also. As he was a public pirate, had no doubt about the King would have canceled (the election), if she (Kösem) had not tied her hands with (those of) Receb and (those of) the King when Valide's mind was suborned by Kaptan Pasha's pursuits. Her (Kösem Sultan) natural genius and instinct are coming out and it seems that I may believe

clearly present in the experiences of numerous baili and Ottoman grandees. Ottoman officials similarly refer to Venetians as their *amici* [friends], despite the belief of some observers that "Turks" were "not capable of real friendship toward a Christian." A *bostancıbaşı* who several times assisted Alvise Contarini, and indeed was reprimanded for being too favorable to the bailo, told the Venetian diplomat "you are my *buon amico*." Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 174-5

authority of Valide will never decline by a few mishaps. As I mentioned, the woman who has prudence and sagacity will always have great power by her son. Therefore, Your Serenity and your baili have to exert every kind of effort to obtain Her partiality. [Relazione 601]

According to me, these friendships in the Sublime Porte are quite necessary and profitable in terms of public service for Your Serenity's baili; because the other Aghas, the dumb, dwarfs, and some prominent women not ordinary and not necessary to speak with them. Just like it is known well, also by Your Serenity, it is not possible to gain and keep friendship of Turks without making expense, insomuch that it is the unique aliment of friendship of Turks, without this they forget within a short time. [Relazione 602] At the same time, greediness and arrogance are developing inside them. However, as soon as they realize that they are not to be feared of, they behave respectfully and moderately. Consequently, the negotiations are triumphed without expense and by increasing reputation. I do not say that donation not may be necessary in the certain times and cases, (since) being a such costum and tradition, it does not exempt from this government or public or private people; and without it neither can make friendship or can have their support. But I say that it is good to do it with such moderation, and by gentleness and spontaneousness with the affectionate, and in the correspondence of the friendship that without letting any tiny shadow or suspect [to make them feel that we] do it by the aim of to free from the difficulties of the negotiations. The Ministers who have been made responsible ought to be continued to negotiate and giving presents; because they may rise easily again, they may manage their business upon their return after the commotions have ended. [Relazione 603] During my 7 years of bailate, these changes, made at all the

significant positions of the Sublime Porte, and expenses made for them had been upsetting me. In a way, supersession of 3 Kings and 2 Queen Mothers is celebrated by lavish spending not only by Turks but also by Christians, which is what Your Serenity has never heard from me.

Now, it seems to me I may conclude this conversation which I mentioned about the fact the most prominent Ministers. Today, this government is busy with two truths and envisagement peculiar to themselves in the name of service for public benefits. The first of them, today the Ottoman Dynasty definitely does not raise great and estimable Princes who manage both war and peace as usual. More of it could be said for the Ministers; that this virtue, which constitutes his renowned victories echoing all around and was customary in the past, is declining and weakening explicitly, indicates that the same condition is valid in them, also. Select predecessors (of Dignitaries) had been superseding weakness and inertia of Princes with their own values many times. This is not being fulfilled today due to deficiency of this reputation and greatness to back up and sustain the Empire both at the ones (Princes) and the others (Ministers), too. [Relazione 604] And the other is the habitual virtue in their barbarous spirits is haughtiness, arrogance, inertia, and cowardice. This condition causes Your Serenity's baili's to be obliged to manage the negotiations with our present-day Ministers by great force and fervor. As I said before, I left Them at quite good attitude towards The Most Serene Republic at my departure. [Relazione 605]

3. 3. The PERSONALITIES and The EVENTS

You dispatched me to Sultan Osman as Your bailo of whose death I informed Your Serenity. His uncle Sultan Mustafa, who was dethroned twice and is still alive, and

present Sultan Murad succeeded him; therefore I was under the administration of these three Kings as long as my bailate. Perhaps the first of the preceding two seem as if it did not have life, and the latter may be regarded as if it did not have reign. I might be jolted while narrating these events which were the major ones among the events occurred in the Ottoman Dynasty in the past, the most unforgettable mishaps occurring in Their administration, and whose consequences are of primary importance for Them. I have informed You about the most precious and necessary news, which comes to fruition through a good government, and within true knowledge for the Excellence Senate. Despite by my continuing letters and the others' relazione, I have been allowed to talk to Them in some places about those; indeed they had been very expensive and satisfactory to hear what is not told to others from actual voices. However, not only have I learnt the knowledge profitable for our matters, but also penetrated in their causes and results.

3.3.1. Sultan Ahmed I ¹¹⁰

When Sultan Ahmed passed away in the ear of [***], he left 4 sons behind; Sultan Osman, being the eldest of them, heir of the Empire, he was still not a father as he did not reach yet the age of 14 in the meantime. [Relazione, 547] His brother Mustafa was young, only 27 years old. Sultan Ahmed let Him survive, and instituted Him as heir of the Empire by opposing His predecessors' customs. Doing the same thing, Mustafa also entrusted his son Osman to Him with the hope of His (Osman) reaching the most mature age.

¹¹⁰ Ahmed I was the fourteenth Ottoman sultan (1590-1617), succeeded his father in 1603 and according to the Ottoman chroniclers as Giustinian said, he did not put to death his brother Mustafa, as oppose to established custom. On Ahmed I's life see: İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Târihi*, I: pp. 311-3; II: pp. 261-347; Solakzâde, *Solakzade Târihi*, pp. 683-98; Naîmâ, *Naima Târihi*, I: 404-15; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*, pp. 221-386; Mantran, *Ahmad I*, In: EI, vol. I, pp. 267-8; Anthony Dolphin Alderson, *The structure of the Ottoman dynasty*, Oxford, 1956

3.3.2. Sultan Mustafa I, I. Time¹¹¹

He (Sultan Mustafa I) was reluctant and deprived of rapacity for administrating and power all his life. (Sultan I) Mustafa reigned 3 months, because it was discovered too soon that he had mental deficiency, he was imbecile and maladroit; he was easily deposed due to his stupidity on account of the rivalry among some Viziers, the Dignitaries and Mufti [Hocasaadeddinzade Mehmed Es'ad Efendi] ¹¹² in the Sublime Porte by being exploited tricks.

3.3.3. Sultan Osman II¹¹³

¹¹¹ Mustafa I reigned between 1617-18 and 1622-3. He succeeded his elder brother Ahmed I. But in a little while it was understood that he was incapable of ruling because of his weakmindedness. Ahmed's first born son Osman, claimed that had right to the succession, and had the support of the *Kizlar Aghasi*, the *Sheyh al-Islâm* Es'ad Efendi and the *ka'im-makam*, by a meeting of the Imperial *Divan*, derthroned his uncle easily in 1618 and seized throne. As we shall see the details, Osman II was murdered and was throned forcibly on 19 May 1622, even though he was reluctant to reing. But as Giustinian commented that his brother-in-law Grand Vizier Davud Pasha gained the power, this was the reason of all the chaos and disorder of the Empire, at the end the new grand vizier, Kemankeş Ali Pasha, with the *Sheyh al-Islâm*, deposed him on 10 September 1623 and Ahmed's son Murad was throned as Murad IV, as we shall see below Giustinian gave the exact date of his dethronement. On Mustafa I see: Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*; Hacı Halife Mustafa, *Fezleketü't-Tevarih*; İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*; Hasan Beyzade Ahmed Pasha, *Hasan Bey-Zade Tarihi*; Hüseyin Tuğı, *Tuğı Tarihi*; J. H. Kramers, *Mustafa I*, In: EI, vol. VII, p. 707; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*; Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*; Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarihi*, İstanbul, Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005; Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*.

¹¹² Hocasaadeddinzade Mehmed Es'ad Efendi (1570-1625) was an Ottoman *Sheyh al-Islâm*, and was the second son of the famous Sadeddin. He was appointed to *Sheyh al-Islâm* post in 1615 and served this position seven years and had an important role in the tumultuous events of his time. Since he obtained the accession of Mustafa I, and refused to give a *fetva* Osman II wanted to kill his younger brother Mehmed, got the hostility of Osman II. As Giustinian told us, in spite of at the beginning he did not sanction to marry Osman II with his daughter, bu he had to do so, and even this marriage did not relieve their relations. Giustinian got the fact very well that, *ulema* did not approve Osman II's pilgrimage intention, Es'ad Efendi either, declared that it was not obligatory for the sultans. But he did not accept the accession of Mustafa I either, while Osman was still alive. On Es'ad Efendi see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Solakzade, *Solakzade Tarihi*; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*; Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*; Kara Çelebi-zade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli*; Münir Aktepe, Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, vol. II, Edi. by Mehmet İpşirli, Ankara, TTK, 1999, pp. 85-845, *Es'ad Efendi, Mehmed*, In: EI, vol. II, p. 713

¹¹³ Osman II was the sixteenth sultan of the Ottoman Empire, was born in 1603 and reigned between 1618 and 1622. He was skillful as a horseman, a poet, he was intelligent. When he appointed very influential Güzelce Ali Pasha as his grand vizier in January 1620, Pasha removed all his rivals from the government. As

The people had been said that He might have left the throne to Osman, and He acceded to the Empire in such young age. A short while later, he bestowed the Grand Vizierate to perfidious and very rapacious Ali who is one of the causers of those responsible for doing much harm to the Republic, his uncle's dethronement, and His accession. He instituted greediness, entertaining passion towards bright and great things in the Young Prince's character. He began flattering him through his recommendations and adulations, by indicating how much it is necessary to reach glory as his elders acquired, particularly Sultan Süleyman. By his natural instinct, Sultan Osman emulated to confiscate and increase His treasury under the influence of recommendations as the Emperors in the past extorted to a large extent. The King began to seize on quite large amounts from time to time, He was extorting in a manifest tyranny by every kind of bad and harsh method. When ambition and desire for accumulating attracted Osman's spirit, he diminished not only the donations for his people and soldiers, but also readiness of the payments and expenses within ultimate freedom, contrary to his elders' customs. Unlike the previous Kings, he was

Giustinian touched on fairly well, that Ali Pasha provoked the hostility of Austria and Venice, even though the capitulations were renewed and the peace was kept. He always satisfied the greedy of young sultan and, he made Osman II declare the war against Poland and Osman II participated in person. Since Ali Pasha died, sultan went to the campaign with Ohrili Hüseyin Pasha and the war ended with great losses. The peace was made and Dilaverzade Hüseyin Pasha was appointed to the grand vizierate by sultan during the war.

When we look to the Ottoman chronicles we find that Giustinian was right about Osman II's prestige among his subjects and ulema and Janissaries, because of his avarice and he treated badly to his soldiers, moreover against to the established custom married a free woman. Katip Çelebi said that Osman II favoured the black eunuchs and the bostanchis during his reign, against the Janissaries. But the last point of his unpopularity was his intention to fight Fakhr al-Din Ma'n, the Druze Amir, and to make the pilgrimage going to Mecca. The chronicles agree on that he influenced by Kizlar Agasi and his Hodja. On *Osman II's life and regicide* see: Katip Çelebi, *Fezleketü Akvali'l-Ahyar fi İlmi't-Tarih ve'l-Ahbar*; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*; Hüseyin Tuğî, *Tuğî Tarihi*, edi. by Mithat Sertoğlu, Belleten 11, 1947, 489–514, Hüseyin Tûgî, *Vak'a-i Sultan Osman Han*, Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı, Belleten, 1967, 119–64; Tuğî Çelebi (Hüseyin bin Sefer); Kara Çelebi-zade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli*; J. H. Kramers, *Othman II*, In: EI, VIII, p. 182; Orhan Şahin Gökyay, *Katib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, c.I, Istanbul, MEB, 1997, pp. 122-131; Erdal K. Yalcin, *Who Killed Sultan Osman? Remembering What Tuğî Forgot*, <http://forumtauri.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/the-assassination-of-sultan-osman.pdf>, pp. 1-20; İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, Edi. by Murat Uraz, Istanbul, Neşriyat Yurdu, 1968, p. 464; Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*.

using a very harsh style and was not exhibiting affection and benevolence towards his people and soldiers. An extraordinary scarcity of provisions and poverty reached the shops; even if they arise from another reason, they were attributed to the Prince and His bad state as a public tradition.

Although the matters were in such condition and his soldiers' disposition is in little wellness, [Relazione, 548] Osman himself moved to war leading his army against Poles opposing his Viziers' recommendations and by resolving a greedy glory impatiently. He also wished by the others' adulation to take revenge from the Cossacks, who infested the Black Sea and did harm, eradicate them easily and make them tax givers dependent on His throne, by relying on His innate merits completely. As he believed the victory consisted of multitude, he called for His soldiers from all over His Empire, gathered 700.000 soldiers, more than His predecessors did; most of them were useless and vagabond men, many Janissaries and Sipahis were remained useless for Him, or indulged in laziness and luxury at homes.

3.3.4. Grand Vizier Güzelce Ali Pasha¹¹⁴

These days, the Grand Vizier Ali was not opportunely alive, he was averse to the mentioned war, and he had done everything to keep Him away from this war. He was

¹¹⁴ Güzelce Ali Pasha was born at Istanokoy (Cos), was of a Turk origin. According to the Ottoman chronicles by the help of gifts and intrigues he was appointed to Grand Vizierate by Osman II and became the confidant of Osman II. During his grand vizierate, as Giustinian very well observed, Ali Pasha was notorious for his confiscation of property and extortion of money of all subjects, Muslims and Christians. As we read that Giustinian mentioned about Venetian dragoman Borissi, was strangled by Ali Pasha, since the Dragoman was not able to pay the 100,000 thalers that was asked by the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha. Ali Pasha provoked the young sultan to a war against Poland, he did but he could not participate since he died (8 March 1621). On Güzelce Ali Pasha see: Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*; Peçevî, *Târih-i Peçevi*, v. II, pp. 371-5; Hacı Halife Mustafa b. Abdullah Katib Çelebi, *Tuhfetü'l-Kibar fî Esfari'l-Bihar*: (Deniz Seferleri Hakkında Büyüklere Armağan), Edi. by İdris Bostan, Ankara: Başbakanlık Denizcilik Müsteşarlığı, 2008; Mantran, *Ali Pasha Güzeldje*, In: EI, I. vol., p. 395; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*.

feeling hatred against the Republic, he had no experience on land, but much on maritime, he promised wealth, progress in dignity, and prosperous consequences.

3.3.5. Grand Vizier Ohrili Hüseyin Pasha

It was seen that Hüseyin was elected instead of Him, he could not prevent the war. He did everything to prevent it even when the King was almost to move out. However, Osman considered none of the difficulties, dispatched the navy to the Black Sea, and moved towards Edirne where troops gathered to minimize delay. [Relazione, 549]

Hüseyin departed (from Istanbul) with Sultan Osman (II) for the War of Poland, before the departure I reminded him of my recommendations concerning my request about our benefits; Ka'im makam Ahmed who was born in Istanbul remained in place of him. Not only I accomplished all my works without making any expense but also I did not pay him the monthly rent of Zante which he asked me to do within enormous requests some days beforehand due to his urgent need. Most of the time, I concentrated on vigor and authority with my entire spirit, not the power of gold to abolish prejudices and to accomplish the negotiations; just like it is the public reputation what is exalted essentially. [Relazione, 575]

3.3.6. The Poland Campaign

The Ottoman Emperors' bestowing to soldiers at the time of their first campaigning is a tradition; 1.500.000 golden coins are exported for that. The King was displeased of this spending; he used his intelligence to avoid it though his tenacious nature, and a good invention, because he was not obliged to do so. Outside of Edirne, they were insisting on not passing the bridge [***] of the river, if bestowal was not fulfilled according to the

tradition. Osman arrived in the city and disgusted their delay. Making use of the mentioned bestowal advantage, he just gave them whatever he found and neglected the others arriving afterwards, just like they are not obliged to. This reciprocal displeasure between the King and soldiers almost turned out to be the major reason of every evil He underwent, failure of campaign, [Relazione, 549] the other bad consequences, and dethronement and death of His Majesty in the end. He arrived at the border of Poland, and made the first attack; He realized His troops were in an awful disposition and reluctant against the Poles who did not reach 80.000 in number and resisted excellently. Turks could never approach Chotin trenches. They were revealing all their bad inclination against their King at every occasion. In return, the King grew exacerbated; He could not dissemble His displeasure towards His soldiers. He did not remunerate some of them as His ancestors did in general. He did this not because of deprivation, but as He despised bestowing. The soldiers were aware that they were identified so terribly, too few wanted to undertake risks, most abstained from work and they were all murmuring against the King. He was wandering incognito among the soldiers at nights so as to learn what their feelings were towards to Him. He heard the soldiers were talking against Him, but in favor of His uncle Mustafa. In Istanbul, a piece of certain news circulated concerning the people dispatched His uncle to the Palace and enthroned him. They say this news, which is credible and has disturbed Osman's spirit a lot, is the major reason for regression. Deficiency in supplies was added to this, some other mishaps were also forcing Him. He decided to negotiate with the Poles to gloze over dishonor of regression. Within displeasure and bad wishes for the soldiers, he returned to Edirne. [Relazione, 550]

3.3.7. Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha

The King returned from the war with Dilaver, of Croatian origin, and appointed him as the Grand Vizier. A fierce and avid person bought this position by power of gold and he had been procuring every way for confiscation. [Relazione, 575]

3.3.8. Tension between Sultan and Janissaries after the Poland Campaign

He dismissed almost all of them, arrived in Istanbul with so few of them. It was understood by his face he was full of dolor and scorn. Its impressions were being appeared even on numerous people accompanying the soldiers; while they used to celebrate by applauding His ancestors in such circumstances, His return was not celebrated, instead of applause people preferred hard and obstinate silence. This chafed Osman's spirit to a large extent, he was too weak to dissemble his emotions from them. As soon as He arrived, He ordered the payments of all the Janissaries who did not participate in war to be ceased, namely be confiscated; and He diminished the old and [Relazione, 550] weak soldiers who are called "Oturaklar" and exempt. As He was trying to palliate the pretexts, ordered that the ones remaining at the headquarters in Istanbul were being castigated so severely. They were making a tumult against the Ka'im makam for their payments, this and the other things were uncovering being provoked in His spirit against the soldiers. Moreover originating from suspicion and a rumor as to He has a mind to get rid of them and institute a new one, circulated among them. His intention was, just as in the example of Christian Princes, to keep a small number regularly in Anatolia, and increase them within time in respect of necessity so as to shake expenses and tumult off. With this suspicion, the form of His avarice easily captured the faith in the spirits of the Janisseris who were already irritated. They demanded for themselves and his merit for the Ottoman Dynasty acquired and conserved by its own values the great Empire, which the previous Emperors had kept

through enormous benevolence and esteem, greatly. They could no longer tolerate being despised by the present sultan Osman. Because of His arrogance and bad recommendations, the soldiers' disgust was improving too little; what is more, the people also began hating Him. Inspiring from their ancient traditions, using tobacco and wine was castigated by harsh penalty; he had been wandering and going to their taverns day and night by disguising with His own armed acemioglanis, and castigating the transgressors in His presence. Indeed, such similar indecent operations, which are blamed by everyone, in which most cannot lead their lives without any danger, they are not offended at homes or their work places for even one day, and which were done against many Princes. Yet, it seemed to its young ferocious spirit as if he were doing well, and he was almost considering the criticism against his inspecting the people's traditions severely provided fame to him. Since they knew His obstinate and pertinacious spirit, none of His Viziers dared to tell Him the opposite. A general disgust was growing against Him as He abandoned his ancestors' traditions, particularly as He married free women outside the Palace. The Ottoman Princes had been marrying slave women only from allied countries so that they would not have other allies. However, He desired to marry the Mufti's [Hocasaadeddinzade Mehmed Es'ad Efendi] daughter owing to her fame for beauty; although [Relazione, 551] His father was quite reluctant, He admitted her as His wife. Perhaps, his giving too little importance to protecting this law and the ulemâs' authority, which His ancestors had always done, was another major reason for His ruin.

3.3.9. Sultan Osman II's Intention to the Hajj

Your Serenity, as I inform you immediately, He adopted the idea of going to Mecca as soon as he came back from the War of Poland so as to do pilgrimage duty as He

either intuited it, or devoted His Spirit, or else because of another thing. They can each execute this worship, which is one of the obligations of the Islamic law that Mohammed left to his followers, without doing harm to himself or his family; they have to visit here once in their lives for pilgrimage; besides they visit Mohammed's tomb which is very close to Mecca. It is the first temple on earth which was built by the hands of angels, in which Prophet Abraham lived and worshipped God. Such a decision, which had never been made before by any King, and there was no one neither among the government nor among the ulemas would have damned. The ones who foresaw its bad consequences began daring to dissuade, because their concern for both the state and religion was the same. Islamic law ulemâs were making Him think of the other Muslim Princes like Persians and Tatars within His own instance; the Ottomans who might have probability to do the same of it may lose their privileges because of that; today they enjoy sending a quite opulent frontal to this temple annually as a symbol of domination. The Ottomans are making too much expense for the temple's maintenance due superstitions in their religion, to which the entire world linked by dominion of it.¹¹⁵

The Viziers were putting forward how much it would do harm to Him to go far away from the Empire capital, while the peace with Poland did not settle well, the Emperor armed, Transylvania pacified, Cossacks infested the Black Sea, and the Christian Princes had significant plans on the Mediterranean. They were making Him think of the suspicions that Persians could arm in this chaos, Arabians were strong and daring even if they were not dangerous. Above all, the soldiers and people had too little tendency for Him,

¹¹⁵ When Selim I defeated Mamluks in 1516 and 1517, the Ottomans took the possession and protection of the Holy cities Mecca and Medina, and the pilgrimage, as well. Edited by İnalcık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 610-2

[Relazione, 552] He could have caused a large-scale revolt by staying so far away from Istanbul. They had been putting forward all the occasions to dissuade Him from His decision. At the same time the Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha attempted this as well, notifying two vessels loaded with grain to Istanbul were arrested by our galleasses and were taken to Canea. What is more, they had been using G. Omer's report of galley and the other mishaps occurring on the border of Dalmatia meanwhile in order to arouse suspicion in the King's spirit against Your Serenity, and had been making tremendous rumor in accordance with I learnt at that time. His Majesty wanted to learn the event from me by means of His bostancibashi; I convinced Him completely. He dispatched some part of the fleet to the Black Sea immediately, commanded the Kapudan Pasha to set out to the Mediterranean with the rest without deferring. He announced His movement, neither wanted, to become it the reason of devotion, many of followed, but only X thousand all of, nor the other soldiers which 2.000 Janissaries, as much Sipahis, rest of His Palace and the court some of His Viziers were commanded to accompany Him. He prepared everything, declared the ka'im makam and other officials to remain at the government in Istanbul. The Kapudan Pasha left with the fleet on the first day, on the 19th of May [***] while they were burdening their property and pavilions on galleys to pass through Uskudar, the tremendous tumult provoked by sipahis and janissaries in the city started to be heard; getting together they went to Sultan Mehmed Mosque where the Islamic law ulemâs, who were both the instigators and the actors of the movement; and from here to Hipodrom which is the largest square of the city. The ulemâs as they realized each way was vain, dripped suspicion into the soldiers' spirits, right or wrong. The King wanted to take His entire treasury with Him, and form a more powerful new army bearing affection towards Him in Asia; in order to return to Europe, intended to assail the former one by this and made at sword's edge. He

had been suffering from the hate against Himself and not been thinking to be safe in the Empire; and this is the real and unique reason for His movement. The soldiers, who are already in the mood for believing any kind of bad impression easily, cried out bellows of revolt. [Relazione, 553] As found out later on, they had no other purposes except preventing Him to leave and acquiring the Grand Vizier's and the others' head who participated to his intention.

3.3.10. Hâile-i Osmaniyye: The Regicide of Sultan Osman II¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ The murdering of Osman II is called as *Hâile-i Osmaniyye* in the Ottoman History. As it seen, this case was the most sensitive point and the beginning of the other mishaps during Giustinian's bailate, we would like to tell briefly this case by utilizing the Ottoman chronicles, to compare with Giustinian's *Relazione*. On 18 May 1622, in the morning while all the equipments of the sultan and his attendants were embarked on the galleons, was heard that Janissaries' and Sipahis' rebellion was broke out, since they did not want to let him go to Mecca. They amassed at the Sultan Mehmed Mosque and walked to At Meydanı. The rebels did not listen neither their Agha nor any other committee and stoned them. They assaulted to Hodja Omer Efendi's and Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha's house, since they were blamed to convince the sultan to hajj.

The second day, May 19, they gave a list to *Sheyh al-Islâm* and the *ulema* elite containing the names of they thought were responsible to convince sultan and wanted to be executed. The *ulemas* submitted the list, but Osman II refused to do so. The soldiers assaulted to the palace. They passed the first and second doors easily and without any resist that in normal conditions they were protected by a garrison, even third and final gate where the sultan lived was open, passed it as well.

We saw that at the beginning the rebels' aim was only to impede the sultan to go to hajj and to be beheaded some governors, but when they entered to the private place of sultan, they started to shout "*We want Sultan Mustafa!*" The pages did not tell where Mustafa was, but one of them, and then some sipahis and janissaries mounted upwards of the roof of Harem, -including Tuği. When the soldiers went down, Mustafa was found there. Tuği conveyed that Mustafa said:

"Please water!" Mustafa drunk and siad: "*Thank God! They have not given me water for two days. They want to kill me with hunger and thirst. They are not capable of killing me by sword. That's not the will of God.*"

This part the is totally different from the *Relazione* of Giustinian, while Giustinian has noted that Osman II was the one who in hunger and thirst for two days and asked water when was found by the Janissaries (*Relazione*, 555). Osman II's two close men, Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha and Süleyman Agha were killed by rebels without hesitate. Mustafa was seated to the throne by rebels. Next they *ulema* made him obey by sword. Since they were suspicious that Osman II would attack the Old Palace with his *bostanchis*, they carried Mustafa where they felt themselves in safe most, the Janissaries' New Barracks.

As a solution to rescue himself, Osman II thought as Giustinian; to take the treasury, and to go to Bursa, and when the rebels understood his uncle incapable of reigning, he could be returned to his throne again. But, Osman was convinced by former Grand Vizier Ohrili Hüseyin Pasha and Bostancibashi to go to the office-residence of Agha of Janissaries, with money, by leaving the Topkapı Palace where he was safe.

In fact, I may not affirm exactly to Your Serenity, it may be true; everyone who was likely to be guilty in this revolt died; and remained the people's opinions which do not have ultimate certainty and are spreading at present. The King had noticed the terrible attitude of soldiers and terrible inclination against Himself in the War of Poland, he might have suffered pertinaciously with the Grand Vizier Dilaver, who recommended Him to constitute a valuable and obedient army from Mesopotamia that had been dependent on the state for a long time, Anatolian soldiers would service better, he could take revenge on them by moving to Europe when he returned, and could get rid of them. Being incited by this recommendation, Osman followed Him to work the problem out; he kept this intention of Him occult by using the mentioned Mecca journey, however the Vizier got to know this intention; and considering its importance, he might have forced Him to dissuade from His decision later on. However, to go back to the events, while the King was sojourning in His

But Bostancibashi said to Osman II, he did not find any boat, a short while ago there were a lot to carry out his orders.

In the morning of May 20, Aga of Janissaries went to the New Barracks, saluted Sultan Mustafa I in the Mid Mosque, and in the main entrance wanted to declare Osman promised to give "*generous rewards and valuable clothes to the janissaries and an increase in the salaries of the sipahi*", but unexpectedly someone pulled the Agha down and he was murdered. A crowd came to Agha's Gate, Osman was taken captive, money was sacked of, and Hüseyin Pasha was murdered, but, Bostancibashi, was not saved only but also was appointed to Beglerbegi of Egypt, after Osman II was murdered.

Of May 21, Osman was being totally lonely, the former sultan was put on a mule, to carry him from Agha's Gate to the New Barracks, and made him half-naked, exposed to such humiliation that the historians of the day hesitate to write. Davud Pasha was appointed as Grand Vizier and at first took Osman II to Mid Mosque, then put a on a market-cart to carry to Yedikule Dungeons with a crowd. Osman II was murdered by Davud Pasha and his fellows. He was the first of three sultans to lose his life in a rebellion and the first regicide in the Ottoman history. On *Osman II's regicide* see: Katib Çelebi, *Fezleketü Akvali'l-Ahyar fi İlmi't-Tarih ve'l-Ahbar*; Hasan Beyzade, *Hasan Bey-Zade Tarihi*; Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Hüseyin Tuği, Tuği Tarihi, edi. by Mithat Sertoğlu, *Belleten* 11, 1947, 489–514, Hüseyin Tügî, *Vak'a-i Sultan Osman Han*, Türk Dili Araştırmaları Yıllığı, *Belleten*, 1967, 119–64; Tuği Çelebi, Edi. by Sertoğlu, *Tuği Tarihi - İbretnüma*, *Belleten* 43, 1947, pp. 489-514; Kara Çelebi-zade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli*; Baki Tezcan, *The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: A Historiographical Journey*, *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, No. 1&2, 2002, pp. 25-43; Gökyay, *Katib Çelebi'den Seçmeler*, c.I, Istanbul, MEB, 1997, pp. 122-131; Erdal K. Yalcin, *Who Killed Sultan Osman? Remembering What Tuği Forgot*, <http://forumtauri.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/the-assasination-of-sultan-osman.pdf>, pp. 1-20; Katip Çelebi, *Fezleke-i Katip Çelebi*, c.II, Istanbul, Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası, 1870, p. 22; İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, Edi. by Murat Uraz, Istanbul, Neşriyat Yurdu, 1968, p. 464.

Palace, He learnt the soldiers brought about a tumult so that He would give up the idea of journey and as they wanted the Vizier and the others convincing Him to be beheaded. Just like great spirits, he wanted to settle with nobody, yet the Kizlar [Aghasi] and the others around Him were hoping to get rid of the danger, at first they induced Him to reach an agreement. He sent word to inform them that He would not leave. The soldiers were not pleased with this, they had been insisting on the heads they had demanded, they proceeded towards the Palace, the people followed them in streets, the displeasure I mentioned had easily united them, they got even more crowded soon. They occupied and plundered the houses of the Vizier, Hodja, and the others, and they got away by escaping. They were spending the rest of the day by mutual delegates' going to the King from them and to them from the King; when it reached the night it rained heavily. When they were in the place of agreement in the morning, the news that the King talked to many acemioglanis in the garden, the locations of ramparts and artillery at the doors outside the Palace at night spread among them; this provoked them more than any others had done; [Relazione, 554] and they swiftly proceeded towards the Palace stimulating the people, whoever true Muslims were, to unite with them. For a moment they might have been thought they were more than [***] and forced the doors of the Palace; following a slight resistance made, they entered inside; at first they swore an oath among themselves they would not touch or steal anyone's property. They firstly encountered counteraction by the Kizlar Aghasi and they cut Him to pieces, they had been searching the King who had been saved in a villa, they were not able to find Him. His uncle Mustafa's name began to be heard among them, they started searching Him, and killed the eunuchs who had been denying knowing where He was. In the end, they found Osman in some kind of cistern or well-like place underground where he hid at the beginning of the revolt through someone's definition; they extracted Him out

semi-dead due to fear and hunger for two days' long; one of them took off the turban on His head and His clothes and left Him semi-nude, and they brought Him to life again by a little water He had asked for. Upon shouldering Him [Mustafa] some sipahis started to shout "Long live our Emperor Mustafa"; the others witnessing this barracked rapidly in the same way. Within this tumult they took Him out, put into the first skiff they obtained, and took to the Old Palace where His mother was living. At night, the bostancibashi and acemioglanis were preventing Osman's escape by imposing the punishment of His life.

What is certain is that when the soldiers entered the Palace, if He might have been allowed to be seen, and they might have been gratified by the heads they had been searching they would have calmed down before passing any other, in this way they have not had the idea of removing neither His reign nor His life. However, He did not make the best choice; maybe the indignity of force and getting Him to move by His own slaves, or risking His life and his more beloveds, or else if it is licit to say, by His fate's force. It has been verified very well at Him whenever a great danger exists, logic disappears. As has been said, at the same time He also tried to make away with as much of His treasure as He could carry to Asia; yet He was prevented from escaping by the bostancibashi who was the soldiers' side, and he could have been dissuaded from his decision, also. The Kapudan Pasha Halil could have been dispatched to the fleet which was at a short distance, he could have returned, and not only could His life been saved but also provided Him to recuperate the Empire easily. [Relazione, 555] His fortune and bad recommendations had made Him to embrace even the worse. He left the Palace with His two or three men at night and went to the Agha of Janissaries' house; he summoned [Grand Vizier Ohrili] Hüseyin Pasha whose obedience he trusted a lot. He did everything he could determinedly to obtain them;

not only did he propose the heads they had been searching but also 50 Venetian ducats per person and increase in their salaries and every considerable satisfaction. However, just like a malignant infirmity, remedy for such unfortunate people would not be beneficial much anymore while it would have been quite beneficial if it had been applied on time; or else it is like the previous opportunities serving as poison more which of [***].

The Janissaries had passed most of the other extremisms of theirs, any condition to encourage Him was not being appeared from then on, or they were in extreme badness. The Janissaries did not want to hear the word “negotiating” again with Him while they were pretending to do a very good and valuable duty for them, however within a provoked manner towards the Agha; they put an end to His life furiously calling him traitor. Within such an insolent rage incited by indignation and impetus, they realized that Osman was in [Grand Vizier Ohrili] Hüseyin’s house and headed towards it; they pulled the door down and massacred Hüseyin while he was trying to escape. They had been searching Osman, some voices as to he had been hiding in the attic were heard; they found Him there, and without respecting His greatness as a Prince, offending their own King a lot, they took Mustafa to the former place, their own room, as they did not assume the Old Palace safe to which they had took Him with His mother. In the place where they had been taken previously, Osman told Him “Mustafa, I want my life from you the one I have kept as yours”, Mustafa gave an unbelievable -looking reply because of His foolishness: “You have not kept mine with your own wish, but with the wish of God who does not allow you to put an end of mine” and commanded His being taken to Yedikule dungeons. In this way he was put on a coach, they were being followed by a quite crowded group of soldiers and people and going by being reproached with despicable words aloud during His transition. He was

locked up there; indeed it is an important example and memorable instability relating to humanity, when they become more eminent, the precipices of the most get even more enormous, they frequently cannot find where to stop, from the top to the lowermost and from the lowermost to the top. Osman from the Empire throne to a destitute prison, Mustafa from a destitute prison to the Empire throne. He completely consigned [Relazione, 556] the administration to His mother and His brother-in-law Davud whom he declared the Grand Vizier immediately. He did not delay taking this decision which was always thought to be the best in such extreme events. It was committed by a hatt-i humayûn of the King who was incapable of administrating and the murder of Osman was fulfilled in the same dungeon, in the presence of Davud; six kapici bashis strangled Him. They extinguished a strong Prince in the first flush of his youth, had an excellent character, who had just begun troubling the world with His army, whose glory was manifestly emulated by His predecessors.

Actually, this is one of the greatest and most unforgettable mishaps which was heard in the long-term reign of the Ottoman Dynasty. The other many occurring every day have also derived from this, they dragged the Empire into an enormous disorder, and in an unbelievable way they may be able to cause it to collapse by a convulsion shaking its fundamental discipline and greatness in the end, too. [Relazione, 557]

3.3.11. Grand Vizier Ali Pasha and the Bosnian Merchants

Upon my arrival to the Sublime Porte, I found Ali in this position (grand vizierate) who was born in one of the (Aegean) Archipelago islands Istankoy; there was a tension as his galley have already been defeated by ours in the Paxo and had always professed a deep-rooted hatred against the Republic; he revealed this at Dragoman Borisi's death, just like he

revealed against my illustrious predecessor but in favor of Bosnians at the Kazasker's sentence [Relazione, 567] and all the other very serious prejudices of his, too. They had been urging Venetians to give all the money, which was more than a hundred thousand in total and they got from Spanish merchant galleys, as indemnity to the Bosnians. He had been thinking actually numerous Bosnians emerged suddenly for another almost 300.000 thalers for which they staked out a claim, and Your Serenity would run every kind of hazard rather than indulging so much spending. At first, he (Ali) commanded few people to be seen and them to demand 100.000 thalers only; as I said before, if we carry through this decision definitely, Your Serenity will have to do the same to the others, too; with its entire quantity, (also). Undoubtedly he could have accomplished, or else the Republic could have incurred a deep ravine and a great risk due to this rather ill-disposed man and the war-longing King who was ruling (the country) on His recommendations. If I had not fulfilled Your quite prudent orders, I could not have estranged the one and the other to their decisions so diligently. Because when I arrived in the Sublime Porte, I came across errors and detriments which were already perpetrated before. The Kazasker had imposed the death sentence for Borisi; the first Bosnians had been paid to the last penny no matter how much they asked. The other Bosnians, who demanded 200.000 thalers, assailed me more severely; in this condition they were both more crowded and there was a previous resolution setting a precedent and which had been standing security for them. I have let Your Serenity know this unexpected innovation, however in your reply, you have told me to get rid of these troubles in every way and to please Them, that I will be able to get the advantage in this way to a large extent, and to end all these events. I have carried out my duties in such a way that I negotiated the matters with Ali, despite all His bad intentions, and the sentence given against my predecessor, and the fact that my predecessor has

rendered all the payments to the first ones. Ali had also been forcing me to render the same payment because the Bosnians' excuse and right were the same. Ali wanted both the bill and the policy of the goods, and my witnesses from me; because decisions of Turks are only made by them. Apparently, Bosnians would be able to demand 186.000 thalers thanks to these documents. I tried in such a way that [Relazione, 568] I gratified Them with 70.000 despite the prejudices and oppositions I mentioned. I could not obtain this deal from our merchants whose money had run out; I had one more advantage for Your Serenity out of this difficulty. I received large quantities of silk and wool instead of ready cash from our merchants, gave them to Bosnians in exchange for paying later back; I have made a lot of profit from one to another. While I undercharged the merchants, I sold them at a much higher price than the real value to Bosnians, as seen explicitly in my accounts. I have provided a profit of 5.000 and more thalers to Your Serenity just by this, as it is explicit by receiving 65.000 with this I gratified the second Bosnian creditors with 186.000. The creditors who are their companions had received the 100.000 ducats, which was all their credit, before I arrived. A huge, namely 121.000 thalers of profit has been supplied for Your Serenity and it converted the course of a negotiation which had been dragging the Republic into trouble. The Republic has just got rid of this trouble with all its dignity. [Relazione, 569]

I have never wanted neither Your Serenity's nor the Venetian bailo's name to be seen in order to abolish the proofs which could cause the worst consequences; I have used the names of our three merchants by taking only your dignity and expenses into consideration. As forecasted, all necessary things were executed within a short while following that time for restitution of the galleys and merchandises which had been

kidnapped by the Spanish. On account of the reasons I mentioned, the necessary trick was hid from Bosnians, I provided Them to form a hucet between themselves and the merchants I mentioned. In this (hucet) all the galleys and merchandises, which had been demanded in return for 70.000 thalers from Bosnians, appeared to have been bought. In this way, everything the Bosnians had conveyed to our merchants was completely recuperated. The settlement and contract devised by me reached an excellent triumph at last. [Relazione, 570] I am repeating and I am not saying this to boast; it has been experienced that all these rather uneasy and strained negotiations were soothed within remarkable public dignity and without making any slight expense during [my] long-lasting bailate in the most turbulent and hazardous period. I am saying them all, this has relieved me to a large extent; not only during [my] bailate but also during all [my] other embassies of England, France, and Germany I did not make any slightest expense, I aimed at saving public money in services I did for you throughout 23 years. Kardinal Gliselio helped me during my Germany embassy and seems that He had done quite good works at the wars and in the conclusion of the peace that happened between Your Serenity and Austrian Dynasty. You provided me to realize that I could succeed in the uneasy negotiations made with Turks without making any expense; You provided me with various chances to do this; while making rather much spending according to circumstances, I succeeded without making any. [Relazione, 571]

In my negotiations with all the Viziers within such many changes of them, I obtained relief and consequences from Ali to a large extent during the Bosnians' negotiation; because the Kazasker's verdict culminated in a very significant way for the Republic's benefit and dignity by reflecting prudence of The Most Excellent Senate. As Turks traditionally constitute the kanun to set a precedent for the others following a case

immediately out of the payment rendered to Bosnians by virtue of You, they had been thinking of implicating your baili's into public affairs at the Kazasker's lawsuit. They had been jeopardizing not only the Republic's dignity but also its freedom which has never been recognized on earth throughout centuries in this way by any judges and the large-scale corrupted Turk judges. Due to plenty of demands on which your baili are made to promise every day, it was necessary to succumb the interminable spending in this case. In behalf of remaining nothing with which they could prejudice public in Turks' memories you asked me to try with my entire spirit and strength not only the King to damn, abolish and tear up merely the mentioned sentence in his books and records, but also the huccets and the other consequential ones in time of my illustrious predecessor. It was impossible to expect obtaining anything from the King without the assent of the Grand Vizier Ali; he was ruling (the state) within His manner. I am leaving it to prudence of Your excellency to think about the difficulty of inducing this man, who is the most ill-disposed one and has the worst wishes against the Republic, to be damned and abolished the injustices which were done a short time ago by Him. His head was manifestly in danger with this as He was telling me. In the end, I accomplished every difficulty, induced Him to get (this) done, managed to receive an imperial commandment written in His Majesty's own cursive script, exerted the same effort for the capitulation, also. On recommendations of the Mufti and His Imperial Divan, the mentioned sentence and huccets were declared to be valid and non-existent by Him; [Relazione, 572] they were abolished from the public books to eliminate every example and memory. In this way, the Republic and Her baili were not allowed to be exposed to any cost of indemnity neither at sea nor on land; they participated neither in the Kazasker's lawsuit nor in someone else's. They just made negotiations with the Grand Vizier, just like in the tradition between two Princes. Also, many other clauses of advantage

and dignity, which were not expressed in capitulations, have been obtained for our public benefits. This imperial commandment prevailed just like a strong shield for me as long as my bailate, it repaired many annoying negotiations and strains without requiring one penny; and not only was I absent in the Kazasker's lawsuit but also I even did not see their faces. Now, everyone's spirit settled and soothed; not only did they stop attempting to apply violence as they used to do but also they confess explicitly that they do not demand me to attest, including also the Rumelian Kazasker who is the major authority in this condition. At my arrival to the Sublime Porte as bailo, I never wanted to do that, which the Kazasker gave in favor of Bosnias, just like independent and great Princes who do not submit to judgments of anyone, while executing the very rigorous order of the Republic. Sultan Osman had legitimized and declared this situation by imperial commandment and it was reconfirmed and sworn by His Majesty, also. From sustenance from those things, were settled with so much vigor in my so long bailate, for those the dignity and the interests of the Republic with the sentence of Kazasker, death of Borisi and his consequences were been so much endangered, not only was replaced in the first level, but in those the reputation and [Relazione, 573] the establishment of the friendship which always was achieved with the reputation. In this way, lots of uneasy events were culminated in favor of dignity and benefits of the Republic; friendship was maintained through decent peace. On account of the mentioned matters occurring in the Sublime Porte, which were accomplished by me, the delegate of (Austrian) Empire offered Cesare Gallo 100.000 Venetian ducats on behalf of Spaniards so that they would recede the war with the Poles, start it against the Republic, and favor the Spaniards in every way by a potent incentive. I also coped with this condition confirming the Grand Vizier's inclination, and kept the agreement I mentioned.

Upon his death after a short time, the Christianity got rid of such a plotter. ¹¹⁷ [Relazione, 574]

3.3.12. Grand Vizier Ohrili Hüseyin Pasha

Hüseyin Albanian, who was even more rigorous for the Republic's benefits, succeeded Him [Grand Vizier Güzelce Ali Pasha]. I did not know why so many troubles existed when I arrived at the Sublime Porte, just like my illustrious predecessor informed us now. I had been obtaining his good disposition for Your Serenity's benefits day by day; he turned up to be supporting our benefits explicitly (within time). He acridly rejected the petition of the Kadi of Kilis which was swiftly sent to the Sublime Porte by people at all the boundaries for pretensions of Trauirine estates, [Relazione, 574] I tried with enormous effort meanwhile and later on and never let them win, and the pretensions of the ambassadors from Ragusa for a great deal of indemnity on account of the damage to our

¹¹⁷“Certain traders, about whom nothing is said in the available documents but who must have been the Ottoman subjects, had purchased woolen cloth and other fabrics in Venice, insured their goods, and then loaded them onto a state galley bound for the Venetian port of Split (Spalato). This convoy was attacked by a Spanish flotilla, and the goods were lost. Thereupon the merchants lodged a complaint in Istanbul. In their opinion, because of the insurance contract concluded in Venice, the Venetian government had stood surety for the safe delivery of the goods. As a result, the merchants demanded compensation from the Venetian bailo [Giorgio Giustinian] in Istanbul, whom they regarded as the legal representative (vekil) of the government in Venice.

The bailo denied both points: neither had the Venetian government accepted responsibility for the safe delivery of the goods, nor had he himself been sent to Istanbul to represent the Venetian government in what he must have regarded as a civil matter. Apparently the case went through a number of phases, but finally the Ottoman government accepted the *bailo*'s position. After the administration had decided against the *bailo*'s responsibility in cases involving Venetian insurance policies, merchants with complaints involving such matters were probably forced to take their cases to Venice, although the Grand Vizier's intervention might also solicited. In sense, the sultan's decision was in conformity with the *ahidname*, which stated that the bailo could not be held responsible for the other people's debts.

From the bailo's point of view, the decision of the Ottoman administration meant that the Ottoman government is in harmony with the hypothesis that the latter viewed Ottoman-Venetian relations as primarily a matter between states, and regarded the commercial aspects as something of a side-issue. On the other hand, the Ottoman merchants involved in the affair seem to have taken the opposite position, and at one point they apparently came quite close to having their interpretation officially accepted.” Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 330

fleet in Ossuna and the exemption from taxes in the Gulf, they supported by the officials enthusiastically and the donations in order to render (the Ottoman Empire) distant during the War of Poland and to take up the hatchet against the Republic. To tell the truth, reputation of Your Serenity in the Sublime Porte had been in large-scale decline due to matters occurring before my arrival. [Relazione, 575]

3.3.13. Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha ¹¹⁸

Under his [Grand Vizier Dilaver Pasha] administration, quarrels arising from many obtrusive mishaps a short time ago had been prevailing at sea and on land. Two of these discomforts, which occur at the same time almost everywhere of our borders, are in particular significant. One of them is capture of G. Omer's galley in Inebahtı Sanjak. [Relazione, 575] Candia security Captain the most illustrious Tiepolo in Santa Maura Channel brought the Padishah Beacon and Symbols to Zante by the galley by liberating many slaves who were the citizens of the Republic and other Princes within great ardor and diligence. The Beg and all the Turks escaped onto land. The other was arrested soon in the same way by the most illustrious Girolamo Morosini, took two grand Tunisian grain-loaded vessels, which were cruising for the large-scale famine prevailing also in Istanbul in the same way, to this city (Chania) and unloaded them in order to convey aid for the devastating famine which emerged in Chania by most illustrious Your Signoria. One and the other reached the Grand Vizier and other major Ministers by vehement quarrels and

¹¹⁸ Dilaver Pasha was of Croat origin. When he served as Beglerbeg of Diyarbekir he fought in the Chotin campaign. Sultan Osman II appointed Dilaver Pasha as his Grand Vizier during the war. As we mentioned above, he was slain by the Janissaries during the rebellion in 1622. On Dilaver Pasha see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*; Solakzâde, *Solakzade Tarihi*, pp. 702-14; Karacelebizade, *Ravzat ül-Ebrar*, pp. 544-549; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*; Parry, *Dilavar Pasha*, In: EI, II. vol., pp. 176-7; Sertoglu, *Tugi tarihi; The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte from the Year 1621 to 1628 inclusive*, pp. 42-51; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*; Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*; Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanli tarihi*, III/2, p. 375.

rumors aiming at my death and declaration of war against Your Serenity. Howsoever another mishap is unwanted, it had been being seemed like an enormous insult for Them to lay a trap to Their galleys and seize one of them by their beacon and symbol of Their own King, not only in their seas but also in the beaches, not enough to free merely our own citizens but also the ones of those of associate Princes who are clearly hostile to the Sublime Porte in the same way, and to transport the same galley to our own islands without giving it back while we were sailing in their own seas by our galleys. The Mufti had been exaggerating his good intention towards You Serenity within great ardor; the Beg certainly had been calling such seizure of two vessels gathering way towards the city of Empire which needed to a high extent with harshness that was not little at all and what I mentioned above hostile and unacceptable. The feelings which conjoined the hardness of the influence these words brought about were so great; not also did they reach the conclusion of commanding Kapudan Pasha and the others to seize no matter how many vessels we had they encountered as a resolution but also these two important events seemed the Vizier and the others till then an effective occasion to attempt at detaining the King from his travel to Mecca. They had been trying to leave the impression that he might override the peace on Him (the Sultan) by agreeing with the other Christian Princes in a short time with this and other serious harms the Republic did; [Relazione, 576] in such a case it would be appropriate for His Majesty's dignity to take revenge from It (the Republic) through war. Not only the Vizier and the ones with bad dispositions but also friends and the ones with good dispositions had been contributing to these incitements and provocations; it was not for enkindling the King's anima against Your Serenity, but for reversing him in the mentioned travel. In a way, I had been considering all their anima and ears were off to justice in such a plot. An underground and secret way appeared to me to make clarify it to

the King whom I knew to be quite ardent for this travel. They had been trying to interrupt this endeavor of His by all their artifices and what they found out. Obviously, I would like to let Him know that the Republic had a wish to keep the strong friendship and peace with Him, if I had reached to His Majesty with the truthfulness of events occurring. These insinuations forced the King's spirit a lot which suspected from artifices, and He immediately dispatched the Bostancibashi, who was the person he trusted most, to me secretly so that he would confirm the truths through me because of his confidence on these recommendations. In this way, I was able to purge and convince His Majesty's spirit which was machinated by the ministers with bad impressions as I mentioned in the end. I got a young Prince, who had bellicose and profound thoughts, to withdraw his commandment concerning seizure which might cause some enormous storms for Your Serenity without making any spending; and all the (black) clouds gathered by the ministers, disappeared. Yet, it has not terminated my troubles; accomplishing You Serenity in having peace has become thanks to my own troubles and hazards and the King liberated from such suspicion. His decision of travel to Mecca was followed by the soldiers' revolt; it continued by His Majesty's death, and massacre of many Viziers and prominent Ministers.

Formerly, the bailo and Your Serenity used to appeal to the Vizier and Divan to seek justice for pretensions they claimed in resultant events yet, now they were appealing to Sipahis' and Janissaries' power and violence which their hope for gaining and barbarian fury pushed. There did not use to be even one day on which they did not take me from my house furiously and in an armed way due to these endless pretensions. [Relazione 577] When it (their barbarian fury) had just calmed, it used to be renewed and they had been forcing me to immediate confiscation; they had been menacing as to while they did not

pardon their own King's life, they would certainly not pardon mine. A rather crowded group of Janissaries rose in rebellion attempting at violence and attack for returning the vessels taken to Chania. Thereupon, G. Omer transferred me into a house one of their man and with the promise to give 20.000 Venetian ducats, while was demanding 1000. He provoked a dangerous riot against me, by the grace of the Sublime God; I was liberated without exerting anything. I always resisted by a constant and vigorous mood without succumbing necessary expenses as it used to be; and making any sign of fear even for once when the soldiers, who were rather very avid and indecent against their own King's blood, rose in rebellion for their pretensions.

3.3.14. Sultan Mustafa I; II. Time

Most of them might have derived under the administration of Sultan Mustafâ (I) due to His stupidity, and as he was directed by his mother and brother-in-law Davud who were weak in terms of their advice and spirits. All had been aiming to blandish the soldiers, which was the unique way they knew to protect the King and themselves. Davud had been warning me, himself, and all the others by giving examples to protect me from the hazards that I mentioned; he had been saying that I could obtain liberation in return for money relying on time and needs. The most warm-hearted Ministers were afraid of some mishaps which might emerge in my life out of this violence; yet they had been comforting me at the same time. Since I seemed very strange to Kaptan Halil Pasha, he acted by his natural good

disposition he had for Your Serenity, offered G. Omer a Sanjak in Cyprus to protect me from the hazard and recuperate his losses.¹¹⁹ [Relazione, 578]

3.3.15. Grand Vizier Kara Davud Pasha¹²⁰

Mustafa did not have the ability to repair them due to His stupidity, yet he was being regarded as goodness and a sacred person by people on the other hand. He was not strong enough neither to administrate nor to take such hard burden on, yet He entrusted it to shoulders of His mother who was identically weak and little clever, and entrusted empty-headed and slight-minded Davud as His deputy on his chair, too. The Empire's administration was broken up on one hand by the soldiers' fury, on the other hand by the King's and Ministers' imbecility with tremendous agitation. It is impossible to present the confusion and disorder occurring 10 months' long during Mustafa's reign. While the soldiers were perpetrating excessive crime furiously and proudly, everyone was trembling because of their names only; they had no limits as the absolute boss of everything. The mother and Davud consented them all, and then they declared the Emperors not to demand the usual benevolence distributed when they accede to the throne when they demanded

¹¹⁹ Bailo Contarini maintained a good and lasting friendship with Halil Pasha. Even Contarini left Istanbul in 1612, kept to correspond. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 177

¹²⁰ According to the Relazione of Venetian Bailo Simone Contarini, Kara Davud Pasha was of Croat, but the Ottoman sources wrote that was of Bosnian origin. He participated to the war of Chotin with Osman II. He was married with the sister german of Sultan Mustafa I. As Giustinian wrote that he was carried Osman II to the Yedikule Dungeon and made his execution in there. Davud Pasha was deposed from the Grand Vizierate by the power of Kösem Sultan in 1622, and in a short while he accused about the execution of Osman II and was killed in 1623. On Kara Davud Pasha see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima; The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte from the Year 1621 to 1628 inclusive*, ed. S. Richardson, London, 1740, pp. 42, 47, 51, 125-6; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*, v. I, pp. 252-347; Hüseyin Tüği Çelebi, *Musibetname*, v. II, pp. 19-34; Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*; Parry, *Davud Pasha, Kara*, In: EI, II. vol., p. 183; *Relazione of Simon Contarini, 1612*, In: *Le Relazioni degli Stati Europei Lette al Senato dagli Ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo Decimosettimo*, Edi. by Barozzi and Berchet, p. 142; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, III/2, Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*; Zinkeisen, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*; Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*.

more and wanted to take again the others that Mustafa had taken (when he had acceded to the throne). From time to time it became necessary to keep them in a good affection in order to support only Mustafa in many extraordinary conditions. Since the mother and Davud had been entering into Treasury for their approval, [Relazione, 557] all came to an end in a short time. Incessant crime was being committed excessively in major cities; people were not secure in streets and their houses; everything was exposed to their violence and avarice; they despised the religion, the sipahis occupied the mosques' incomes, many of them were remaining closed; justice was always corrupt in this government, now it has been violated completely. Islamic law ulemâs recommended Osman's death with a general hatred and disparagement like instigators. The wisest and most innocent Ministers receded because of fear. All begs of the soldiers intended to blandish them (the soldiers); there was enormous mistrust and suspicion among them (the soldiers). People were filled with terror and fear. Extraordinary poverty in provisions and shops; forgery in gold and silver standard; excessive rise in price of silver coins existed. Plague was at the top point, and everything we had turned out to be tremendous tumult and chaos in the end.

Spirits of the people were impressed extremely by Osman's event; they began feeling deep hatred for the soldiers due to this and disorderliness of the government. Orders of the King and Sublime Porte were influencing nobody; everybody lost their obedience; the Pashas dispatched from the Sublime Porte to the administration of states were not the ones assented by people or their predecessors; Treasuries of the provinces were either not being sent to the Sublime Porte at all or only a minor part of were being sent. Revolts and uprisings were being heard in many places; in a way appearance of the Empire changed inside and outside. The public voice and confession of Turks, the collapse of the Empire,

which was founded by ancient predestination and news of prodigies, was approaching from then on. Even though the soldiers seem to have settled down fairly in order to protect Mustafa's Empire, which is the fundamental reason of such troubles. However, they leaned washing the stain of Osman's blood against Davud which was being abhorred by everybody. Davud machinated against the life of his [Mustafa I] nephew Murad, the present Emperor, when he acquired the opportunity to guarantee the Reign and Mustafa. By a deceit, as if his uncle invited Him to Uskudar, where the kiddy came across an acemioglan's pity there; the kapi aghasi who took Him by negotiating with Davud was killed since the soldiers' fury was feared and due to dread of Mere Hüseyin who returned from the Cairo government those days.

3.3.16. Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha

Astute, [Relazione, 558] and daring Hüseyin was proclaimed the Grand Vizier by the King so that he would resolve the problems of the state. He had a mind to gain quite large amounts of gold with his imperious nature and his letting more license for the soldiers' wills was making them more indomitable. The greatest disorder occurred by their uprising towards Him as He had been machinating with the intention of putting an end to the Agha of Janissary's life one day; he was able to get rid of the punishment only by escaping.

3.3.17. Grand Vizier Lefkeli Mustafa Pasha¹²¹

It was not worth for remedy that substituted him with Lefkeli Mustafa Pasha, who is the opposite of the other with his calm nature, worth to be acceded instead. Its biggest

¹²¹ According to the Ottoman sources, he could not control the soldiers since he was too mild and gentle, and was deposed. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi: M. 1574-1703: H. 987-1115*, III, p. 503

damage was being emptied the Treasure of Grand Signore because of the money spent for increasing janissaries. As he exposed to rather much insolence of them, he was also expelled.

3.3.18. Grand Vizier Gürcü Mehmed Pasha¹²²

As the final remedy, the government was given to Mehmed Gürcü; the general hope was in the direction for his obtaining some peace through his old prudence; however it was well-known no brain was efficient to stop something which had gone off the rails so much. Later, they all, He, the wisest ones of the state, the Mufti [Zekeriyyazade Yahya Efendi], Rumelian Kazasker Hüseyin Efendi and Halil Pasha tried to procure this by uniting.

3.3.19. Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha; II. Time¹²³

¹²² Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was of Georgian origin. He fought against Poles in the Chotin campaign. When the Janissaries revolted against Osman II, he was military governor of Edirne. Mustafa I appointed Gürcü Mehmed Pasha to the grand vizierate in 1622. As Giustinian said that he castigated some officials and soldiers who involved to the regicide of Osman II, including Kara Davud Pasha, but Mere Hüseyin Pasha exiled him in 1623. When Cerkes Mehmed Pasha held the post of grand vizierate in 1624, appointed him as *ka-im makam*. But as Giustinian pointed out that Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was executed after a rebel of the Janissary and Sipahi soldiery in 1626 when he was 90 years old. According to some Ottoman sources Receb Pasha provoked the soldiers, since he wanted to hold the post of *ka-im makamlik*. The Ottoman sources defined Gürcü Mehmed Pasha as dignified, intelligent and a prudent statesman.

On Gürcü Mehmed Pasha see: Mahmut Ak, *Mehmed Pasha, Gürcü*, In: DIA, vol. XVIII, pp. 510-1; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, III/2, Istanbul, 1954, pp. 402-4; Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Groot, *Mehmed Pasha Gürdjü*, In: EI, VI. vol., pp. 994-5; Karaçelebizade, *Rav-zatü 'l-ebrâr*, 1248, s. 500-563; Müneccimbaşı, *Sahâifü 'l-Ahbâr*, III, pp. 621-660; İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Târîhi*, II, pp. 310-400

¹²³ Mere Hüseyin Pasha, was of Albanian origin. He was called as “*Mere!*”, “*Take it!*” in Albanian (Imber wrote that was meant “Come here!”), (Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 78); he was the only grand vizier who did not speak Ottoman Turkish, and was named after the oft-repeated order he gave on the subject of opponents’ heads. Hüseyin Pasha came to Istanbul from Egypt *beglerbeglik*, after Osman II’s regicide. He guaranteed Sheyh al-Islâm Yahya Efendi that he would take control of the soldiers. By *Sheyh al-Islâm*’s offer to Valide Sultan had the grand vizierate, it was mentioned that, by the money that was acquired in Egypt. He calmed down the *Janissaries* and *Sipahis* by dispensing them money. He could not prevent the consumption of the Treasury. In the meantime, falsified news about his ordering of the killing the *agha of janissaires*, which resulted with his dismissal. A day later, Lefkeli Mustafa Pasha was appointed to

Mufti, Gürcü and Halil were brought down and expelled soon by an uprising which was corrupted by aforesaid Hüseyin, and he returned in the highest rank. Very short time before, they made Him pay the retribution of his fault he committed by killing Osman, through killing Davud. Valuable consideration of this event is the celestial retribution against the regicides although they are infidels. Davud was brought to the courtyard where Divan existed within torment; during the execution of his sentence, one voice I didn't know among the soldiers prevented this; (from there) he was taken to Yedikule dungeons and the next day his life was extinguished in the same dungeon he extinguished the life of his own King.

Within these endless agitations, yet when the Empire was in the administration of Hüseyin's government, which set to work again, that is the beginning of the end above all, it was being dragged into danger manifestly. In his first administration, he reclined upon soldiers for the same purposes, and within profusion and freedom; assured the Empire of grand vizierate.

During Gürcü Mehmed Pasha's vizierate he embarked upon machinating against him to get the grand vizierate again. He acquired the *Janissaries* and *Sipahis* by dispending money to them who already were not glad about Gürcü Mehmed Pasha's behaviors' against them. During the divan Janissaries rioted in accordance with the plan and asked for the dismissal of the grand vizier and the appointment of Mere Hüseyin Pasha to this charge. Gürcü Mehmed Pasha returned the seal and left. He was appointed as Grand Vizier, this time he tried to get the *Janissaries* and *Sipahis* support.

He expelled the former Grand Vizer Gürcü Mehmed Pasha, and Kayserili Halil Pasha (1623), and appointed Mehmed Giray as Khan of Crimean Tatar. He agreed with Valide Sultan to carry the mint to the Palace to solve the money problem and melted down the gold and a silver thing to pay the salaries of the soldiers, as Giustinian defined it was a great humiliation for the Empire. When he ordered to beat a hodja and a *kadi*, at the end both those caused a big reaction of the members of *ulemas*. They gathered to Fâtiḥ mosque and asked for his dismissal. He tried to establish the authority again but when his plan to eliminate the *sipahis* was revealed Hüseyin Pasha took refuge to *agha kapisi*. Janissaries quitted supporting him not to the enmity of the *Sipahis*. Thereupon while he was insisting not to submit the seal of grand vizierate, he had to do so. However, after the accession of Murad IV, Kemankeş Ali Pasha made him find and kill Mere Hüseyin Pasha on 24 July 1624, since he thought he could machinate again. *Hüseyin Pasha, Mere*, In: Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. XIX, pp. 8-9; Hüseyin Tûgî Çelebi, *Musibetname*, Edi. by Aykut, pp. 43-95; Kâtib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, II, 25-46; Solakzâde, *Târiḥ*, pp. 721-738; Naîmâ, *Târiḥ*, II, 176-292.

Mustafa, he [Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha] could reign absolutely in this way. It could be said he has changed the usual form of the government by reducing the number of the Divan to 2 or 3 Viziers, in this way he has been the absolute authority in all negotiations. He deposed the old Mufti, exiled Gürcü and Halil, took the sovereignty from Canıbek Giray, the King of Tatars, and [Relazione, 559] handed it over to his nephew Mehmed; he dismissed the Cretan Patriarch of Greek Church who was a good citizen of the Republic and exiled him to Rhodes. He was oppressing minds of each by violence and not forgiving even the Islamic law ulemâs who were always inviolable. One day, he beat one of them severely on account of a slight reason, they all revolted; they got the Sacred Banner of their Prophet Mehmed [Mohammed] that had been being kept in the Mosque and on their way to the city they incited whoever was a good Muslim for an enormous revolt against the Vizier telling them aloud to follow it (the Sacred Banner); his ending was not to be deposed at all compared to the King's. However, the Vizier dispatched a considerable troop of acemioglanis against Them immediately, dispersed the revolt; and obtained their begs through money. The others passed on Asia, they had been proceeding by provoking the people against the government through their authority by demonstrating the entire disorder originated from the King's stupidity; and collapse had been arising in the end. They had been saying neither prayers, nor contracts, nor lawsuits, and nor any other things were valid in His administration that was influencing the spirits of Asian peoples who were ready to revolt. The real reason for Mustafa's dethronement and Murad's accession, who is the present Sultan, was the great disaster which the revolts Abbas in Erzurum and Bekir in Baghdad brought about. Because, the reputation of Abbas's severe torments had reached Istanbul and he had moved towards Istanbul with very good 30.000 soldiers following him by the name of taking revenge for Sultan Osman (II)'s death. The Janissaries were going

towards the Sublime Porte by causing uproar; they were standing upon within enormous excitement for Abaza to be attacked. Their wise Agha and the others were coveting change for security of the Empire. When he found an opportunity, he convinced the Janissaries that he could not be satiating their wishes without the order of the King who was incapable of doing this. The power of benefit and vengeance inside the Janissaries was more compared to any other people; although Hüseyin tried as hard as he could contrary to what the Janissaries were doing, tried to dispatch Them back within daring adulation, and by refusing to give the seal to the King he offered it to give Them, he (Hüseyin Pasha) was immediately deposed there.

3.3.20. Grand Vizier Kemankeş Ali Pasha ¹²⁴

Ali was instantly elected in place of him, and with the operation of Him and the Agha of Janissaries' Bayram, and by the authority of the Mufti and Kazasker [Relazione, 560] a short while later Mustafa was dethroned on 10th September 1623 and his nephew Murad acceded to the throne in place of him.¹²⁵ [Relazione, 561]

I mentioned above Davud's death, Hüseyin's subrogation and getaway, Mustafa's election and deposition, Gürcü, Hüseyin's being reappointed and being exiled again, and another Ali. They all happened within 15 months under Mustafa's reign. It was real chaos

¹²⁴ Kemankeş Ali Pasha was born in Anatolia, and was trained in the palace. According to the Ottoman chronicles he was very effective on the second deposition of Mustafa I. Ali Pasha was defined in the Ottoman sources as he became very wealth since he took bribery. As Giustinian told that he was dismissed since he concealed the falling of Baghdad from Murad IV, and his large amounts of possessions were confiscated. On Kemankeş Ali Pasha see: Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*, II, pp. 260-298; Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, II, pp. 397- 401; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*, II, pp. 38-9, 52; R. C. Repp, *Kemankeş (Archer) Ali Pasha*, In: EI, VI. vol., p. 884; Edi. by Richardson, *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the year 1621 to 1628 inclusive*, pp. 173-4, 179, 230

¹²⁵ "New Grand Vizier Kemankeş Ali Pasha, the Mufti Yahya and the other ulema, was to depose the Sultan and brought the twelve-year-old Murad IV to the throne." Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 112

of disorder and confusion whose memories may bother me and Your Serenity extremely.

[Relazione 578]

3.3.21. Venetian Captain Tine Plundered the Merchandise of a Janissary

Every hour I am living with the memories each of what that Janissary did, like I am presenting also Your Serenity at the moment. He was treated badly and his properties were stolen by one of our captain Tine, and he came to Istanbul and demanded from me the compensation of a large amount what plunder. He run to Janissaries, who were his friends and told them it in a quarrelsome manner, returned with them and flaunted by asserting they were going to shackle and imprison the mentioned captain. They provoked a very hazardous affray against me, harassed me in streets, and the janissaries came at me by guns many times. He understood that he could not take his compensation through me, got angry with Kaptan Pasha who was trying to comfort him, and by accompanying many Janissaries attacked to Him (Kaptan Pasha) on the street. As he realized that he could not convince me for what he desired by these fears and pressures, he went to Chios to obtain it from the Consul Balsarini. [Relazione 579]

3.3.22. Sultan Murad IV ¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Murad IV was seventeenth Ottoman sultan, (1612 - 1640), reigned between 1623 and 1640. His father was Ahmed I and mother was Kösem. He had three full brothers and two sisters. Grand Vizier Kemankeş Ali Pasha and *Sheyh al-Islâm* Yahya Efendi and his very influential mother agreed on dethroning Mustafa I and to throne young Murad, and they did to do so in 1623. As Giustinian conveyed that, the day after the accession, Murad IV was begirded with the sword at Eyyub by the respected religious, *Sheyh Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi*, in the presence of *Sheyh 'al-Islâm*, on 11 September 1623. And as Giustinian told with details, since he was too young, Kösem Sultan ruled the empire until 1632. He was conscious of all disorders and commotions that the Empire fallen in to, because of that he was restless and to follow the events, as Giustinian conveyed that he disguised with his *kızlar aghasi* to tour and observe the city.

All the Ottoman and Venetian contemporary sources were agreed on Giustinian's words about appearances of Murad IV. They defined him as tall, well-built, broad shouldered, magnificent, gorgeous and

3.3.21.1.The Accession

Without coming Mustafa into court and by the intervention of all the soldiers, the Kazasker bore the assent and the word in His name, and hucet to formalize it, since Mustafa was incapable of doing it, so as to pave the way for a spontaneous transfer and renunciation. Meanwhile Murad was brought outside, into the courtyard where the Divan, in which the soldiers were present, existed; he was applauded by them and everybody else. As his mother Kösem, who is a very clever and logical woman, did not want to let any mishap or tumult, the very following day they inaugurated; and the Emperor was crowned. A huge ceremony or solemnity was not executed on the road to sea with a caique to the Mosque in Ayvansaray, a suburb of Istanbul, where a Saint [Eyyub Sultan] was sepulchered so that the Mufti [Zekeriyazade Yahya Efendi] preached and girded Him with a sword. He entered the city on a horse, and was followed by all the Dignitaries and soldiers up to Edirne gate on his way to the Palace; demonstrations and the same solemnity were executed within people's ovations and cannon shootings accompanied by fires three nights long; it was plainer and more positive than what was made for a young Prince on Christianity in the same occasion.

very strong man and had a light black beard and hazel eyes. He was good at on several sport fields, such as horse riding, and was of a good swordsman, archer and cerid-thrower. Had some talent on literary too, like his descents. On Murad IV and his life see: İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, III vol., İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972; Solakzade, *Solakzade Tarihi*, vol. II; *Mufassal Osmanlı Tarihi*, IV. vol., İstanbul: İskit Yayını, 1960; Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gulmani*, Edi. by Kamil Su, Kültür Bakanlığı, Ankara, 1976; Groot, *Murad IV*, In: EI, vol. VII, pp. 597-9; Vahid Çabuk, *Yasakların Sultanı IV. Murat*, İstanbul: Emre Y., 2005; Rhoads Murphey, *The Functioning of the Ottoman Army Under Murad IV (1623-1639) key to the Understanding of the Relationship Between Renter and Reriphery in Seventeenth-century Turkey*, II vol. Phd thesis; Alderson, *The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty*; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, I/1, pp. 148-208; İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Târihi*; Topçular Katibi Abdülkadir Efendi, *Topçular Katibi Abdülkadir Efendi Tarihi*, II. vol., Edi. by Ziya Yılmaz, Ankara: TTK, 2003, pp. 783-1134

I must not keep quiet as to a solemnity march like this in which I observed the preparations and horses of Royal people. It was not affluent and superb as its predecessors were in general. The evident sign of depletion in jewels in treasury like money. In this condition, it seemed rather hard to make the benevolence for soldiers. These circumstances were forcing hard to diminish the standards of gold. They had been establishing silverware inside the Palace, selling the long reserved copper for emergencies, and searching 30.000 Venetian ducats on loan from the ambassadors of Christian Princes within great requests in the end.¹²⁷

Change in the Prince raised an enormous hope for the change in government affairs; however it was understood fairly well in a short time that age of Murad was not adequate to correct the disorder caused by Mustafa's stupidity. They each had their eyes on His mother, yet She also could not have been serving so many purposes due to the imbecility of woman gender although she was logical. Nevertheless, [Relazione, 561] confusion and insolence of soldiers were continued.

3.3.21.2.The Character and the Activities of Sultan Murad IV

Neither affairs in the Sublime Porte were proceeding well and calmly nor the soldiers were being able to controlled without letting -any- tumult. They had been trying to get the Grand Vizier Ali Pasha deposed by machinating through Pasha of Buda (Budin) Mehmed's money, and to excite a revolt in order to have Him elected in place of him.

¹²⁷ If we would like to confirm this claim of Giustinian, we can look at one the letter of the temporary English ambassador of Porte, Sir Thomas Roe, dated in September 1623, he conveyed that: *"every other order of men and officers that are not of the sword. The vizier, sent solemnly to the four resident ambassadors to borrow 30.000 chequins, as the friends and allies of this Porte, to whom in confidence they dare open their secrets."* Roe added that since the ambassadors were in poverty, too, the debt was refused, and some experienced Ottoman officials thought that this was a dishonorable attitude, as Giustinian did. Berridge, p.19

Thanks to the recommendation of his mother, whom the father of His Majesty, Sultan Ahmed had (as a wife), the harsh recommendations he made for the royal people in the first years of His kingship extricated Him from these kinds of machinations. He got Him (Pasha of Buda Mehmed) beheaded; and soon also that of mentioned Ali as he concealed and palliated the news of Baghdad. He instantly [Relazione, 562] appointed the previous Mufti to his old position again, had Gürcü and Halil in exile brought back, summoned back from Cairo the Kizlar Aghasi who was deposed by Osman, selected mature and honest Çerkes Mehmed Pasha as the Grand Vizier and Gürcü as the Ka'im makam; he had been forming all his character as a severe and logical Prince within an enormous success.

[***]-year-old Sultan Murad has formed his character and nature thanks to respectable scholars. His face is so beautiful and smart that it does not resemble at all the portraits of his ancestors Ottoman Emperors, whose faces had rigor and proud. He has affability and benignity in his eyes and luster at his appearance. When He goes out courteously and humanely with this face and body, affected the people to a great extent, whose memory filled with Osman's pride and Mustafa's stupidity. His body also corresponds to these excellent gifts; it seemed appropriate for his soul, which is inclined to clemency and mansuetude rather than harshness, because of this He conceded his mother's sensible recommendations for the sake of his own intuitions occasionally; he particularly proves to be a long way off pride, pertinacity, avarice, and the other faults Sultan Osman had. Gifts and expenses are not being preceded as much and freely as His predecessors used to do. He had been gaining prudence that will correspond to his age more, not avarice. Since he received the treasury at an ended condition, and expenses of her mother, who made a habit of this in time of her husband Sultan Ahmed (I), have increased quite a lot,

She (Valide Sultan) prefers to diminish (the expenditures) at the moment. He had been executing the entire administration through his Viziers' recommendations and by consulting not only the Grand Vizier as it was in the tradition of his predecessors but also the principals, not in accordance with his own mind like Osman did; by embracing their resolutions; undoubtedly it will serve very well to His Majesty who keeps on this method. That he was afraid of what had happened to his sibling and prudence of his mother had been sending Him to a different way among the Ottoman Princes; all he wanted was true and lofty Islamic law, in the previous years he had shivered because of fear and respect for his mother; at the same time, He (Sultan Murad IV) may have only be dependent on himself, too.

He seemed quite ingenious and diligent at meetings in respect of his age; he attends in arz which are made twice a week assiduously [Relazione, 563] and in which all the Viziers and prominent Ministers gather, and were admitted in the presence of the Prince. They reply Him according to their duties and he administers by his own will in accordance with them. His Majesty comes within an unusual readiness; he does the same for also for the telhis' when they need His hatt-i humayûn restricted with very short a few words which he wrote in his own cursive script on previous days, and which the Vizier has been sending inside. It is much appreciated by everyone that he immediately sends them, which his predecessors defer many days either as it is a grand exertion or as they are a long way off enjoying, to the same place where they had been written traditionally. This brings about the result he likes discussions very much contrary to melancholic and regressive situations of the other. He often goes out, goes to mosque almost every Friday which is their holiday, observes people and admits their petitions, and brings them to the Sublime Porte.

Occasionally, he goes out suddenly without assistance of the Viziers to follow the condition of city in abundance and to keep the administration within his control on extraordinary days, too.

His practices are convenient to His greatness and age; he is quite moderate and successful in horse-riding, gun shooting, hunting, gardening, literate studies, briefly in all of them; dissipation of him for women has not emerged up to now. Two things have revealed His emotions to a great extent compared to the others; the loss of Baghdad and occasional obligation to give in the soldiers' unfair demands, particularly at Gürcü's death. Just as it was proved in recuperation of this city within eternal ardor, it can be believed that also he might have done the same things for state affairs in this way and the example of his brother not might be detained him. However, after applying harshness to the aktors of the mentioned death, he made the Janissaries of fleet pass Istanbul by inducing them on the Kapudan Pasha's recommendation and work in order to pursue punishing them severely. Due to them, increased affectionate and faith for Kapudan while decreased for the other Ministers, [since] they involved in the revolt against Gürcü and in the others persuaded to please the soldiers like in the example of his brother, with no doubt using such a fear is a curb to manage Him by their style.

The situation of this young prince I mentioned about might not have been settled on a logical resolution, he reached a mature age, [Relazione, 564] provided tranquility for the army to a great extent after his intelligence and character, which seem quite good and moderate at present, settled; he has never set out seed of a war after another as Osman

would do, yet what is harder is to maintain friendship and peace with his old friends; especially with The Most Serene Republic; as I will say to the point.

3.3.21.3. Valide Sultan: Kösem ¹²⁸

His Majesty has three siblings, all from his Circassian mother Kösem who was bought from a Janissary. When she was a little kid, she grew up with her beauty and virtues; was bestowed to Sultan Ahmed; she acquired to become His wife and the mother of all his many children by benevolence, grace, and her prudence; at the same time she was participating in major affairs with her recommendations. After Ahmed's death, through the same prudence she could abstain from harassing Osman, who is Ahmed's first child to be born from another mother and the successor of the Empire, yet the last command of his father was accession of his brother Mustafa to the throne. He throned and dethroned. Was known less grateful to the soldiers for [***] of mother Kösem. He [Sultan Osman II] was

¹²⁸ Kösem Valide Sultan (1589 - 1651) was wife of the Ahmed I and mother of the sultans Murad IV and İbrahim I, had four sons and three daughters. She was Greek origin, and according to both Ottoman and Venetian contemporary sources she was very gorgeous and intelligent. Bailo Simone Contarini conveyed that Kösem had persuaded Ahmed I not to kill his brother Mustafa, since he would not killed Kösem's sons and some day one her son would be a sultan. Interesting point that before Osman II left for Chotin campaign only executed his brother Mehmed, but he was not Kösem's son. As Gisutinian mentioned in his *Relazione*, Kösem arranged the marriages between her daughters and the Ottoman viziers, to make secure her political influence. He supported the accession of Mustafa I, since under his reign she could stay active in the political matters, but under Osman II, she was kind of exiled to Old Palace until his son Murad IV throned in 1623. As we saw in the Giustinian's *Relazione*, Murad IV really greatly respected and took into account his mother's opinions. On Kösem Valide Sultan and her life see: Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi; Viaggi di Pietro Della Valle il Pellegrino, Descritti da Lui Medesimo in Lettere Familiari all'Eerudito Suo Amico Mario Schipano, Divisi in Tre Parti cioè: la Turchia, la Persia e l'India. colla Vita e Ritratto dell'Rutore*. Torino, 1843; M. Cavid Baysun, *Kösem Valide or Kösem Sultan*, In: EI New Edition, V. vol, p. 272-3; Hüseyin Kâzım Kadri, *Türk Lügatı: Türk Dillerinin İştikaki ve Edebi Lugatları*, vol. IV, Ankara: TDK, 1943; *Relazione of bailo Giacomo Quirini in 1676*, In: *Le Relazioni degli Stati Europei Lette al Senato dagli Ambasciatori Veneti nel Secolo Decimosettimo*, Raccolte ed Rannotate da Barozzi e Berchet, Venezia: Società Editrice, 1871, p. 140; Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, v. III.; Hacı Halife, *Fezleketü't-Tevarih*; M. Çağatay Uluçay, *Padişahların Kadınları Ve Kızları*, TTK, Ankara, 1992, pp. 47-62; Leslie Penn Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, NY, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 102, 111, 112, 117, 123, 128, 260

afraid of his second born brother Mehmed who had a noble character; in order to make sure he removed his life before going for the War of Poland. He was still thinking of doing the same thing to him, too, even if the reputation of execution spread among people. Although the present Sultan Murad was too young, since his mother's sagacity, it did not seem to Him [Sultan Osman II] that was safe and wanted to assure himself, from Him, as well. She (Kösem) could approach Osman by the power of gold accompanying her prudence; she managed to protect herself and her son from an enormous danger; she raised Him to the Empire by her recommendations about dethronement of Mustafa later; therefore her son feels great respect for Her and every other one feels veneration for her prudence. According to Ottoman institution, nothing but violent death used to encounter the 3. child; this is an expression of God's favor for Him. Lives of the two elder siblings of his ended when they were very young; he reached the Empire thanks to grand luck at which his mother's prudence have remarkable contributions; it is obviously realized that She (Kösem) is in management herself. [Relazione, 565] Although Her son is attached to Her (Kösem) recommendations and She has great authority on him, She conceals this on account of the soldiers' respect (for Her son); therefore She speaks as if She had no authority on Him (Sultan Murad IV); She keeps Her authority by forbearing apparently. Nonetheless, the King assured his four brothers-in-law major duties for gratification of Her (Kösem Sultan) and his sisters. The Kapudan Pasha is also Her (Kösem Sultan's) puppet; everybody and all important decisions depend on Her will.

It will be an excellent recommendation to keep Her (Kösem Sultan) contented; it is not hard to maintain Her old and famous friendship with The Most Serene Republic which has existed since her husband's time. The respect shown to Her (Kösem Sultan) at different

occasions has been renewed by Your own letters, which have been presented by me in accordance with my duty, during her son's accession. The gifts used in identical previous conditions before did not accompany them (letters) so as to abstain from expenses. They (letters) were approved by Her (Kösem Sultan) and she exhibited her good intention; later on the gift he brought on behalf of Your Serenity by the Most Excellency ambassador Contarini and his prudence works confirmed this good intention.

3.3.21.4. Prince Mustafa under Sultan Murad IV

The King's other three siblings and uncle Mustafa are still maintaining their lives. Mustafa lives inside a few rooms of the Palace enclosed, without talking to anyone, solitarily and by his first temper. As I mentioned His well-known past above, it is needless to go over it (this subject) much, saying that will be sufficient solely; many bad things have emerged in Turks' Empire because of His protection. It seems that the opinion adopted by Them (Turks) is that it is an expression of God's wish of castigating Them. So that, Sultan Ahmed might have deliberated this many times; although it opposes all the rules of nature and state, they resolved the matter by ending His life, which was confirmed by the Ottoman institution, yet He could not do this to His brother. He took his place after his death before his son Osman. He could have kept his life and reign upon His (His uncle's) death during the rebellion of the soldiers against him; however it (the matter) would not have been resolved like this. Present Sultan Murad has not taken even a lesson from His danger, even if the people convinced him that it was the God's will, attempted many times a horrible view by death of the mentioned Princes, [Relazione, 566] and extinguished Them frightfully. Mustafa has rejected the Kingship twice, and is maintaining his life calmly.

According to Turks' opinions, insane and half-witted men resemble saints as they do not cherish the world and despise it. [Relazione, 567]

3.3.21.5. The Uprisings of Abaza Pasha and Subashi Bekir ¹²⁹

The King wanted to transfer the janissaries to Baghdad so that they would protect it from the Persians moving to occupy Baghdad with 60.000 soldiers on becoming hopeful after Bekir's revolt. On the contrary, the janissaries wanted to move against Abaza (Mehmed Pasha) proclaiming Him enemy of their order, who occupied Ankara which is at a distance of 10 days from Istanbul, got its fortress under siege, and who was about to reach Istanbul to pursue sleuthing on the revenge against them. They had got the impression the King and Ministers had agreed to destroy them (the Janissaries), just like the aim of Osman; voices regarding to their aiming at their mishaps with this intention were being heard. If their fear had not been suppressed by the Abaza's army nearby, the soldiers might not have courage to move on. In the end, he (Abaza) did great services for the King. It was well-known by the Mother and the Ministers those provisions were reaching Abaza very slowly; neither to Cigala, who dispatched rather ostensibly with very few soldiers, and remained in Bursa to meet his needs, too. The message of Baghdad besieged by Persians was forming tremendous oppression, there Bekir was trying to return it, saw the weakness

¹²⁹ When Abaza Pasha was governor of Erzurum, the people's complaints about him reached to the Porte, he was deposed in 1623, but following the murderer of Osman II, he did not obey the orders only, but he levied taxes illegally and marched to Ankara and Siwas, too, by the aim of revenge from the Janissaries, since they murdered Osman II. As Giustinan told that maybe Abaza Pasha's revolt was the toughest one to solve for the Empire's, and three grand viziers had to fight with him. On Abaza Pasha see: Naïmâ, *Târih-i Naima*; CL. Huart, *Abaza*, In: In: EI, I. vol., p. 4; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*; Mustafa Nuri Pasha, *Netâyicü'l-Vukuât*, İstanbul 1296; Peçevî. *Târih*, İstanbul 1283; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*; When Bekir Subashi was an Ottoman official, rebelled and held Baghdad, and Hafız Ahmed Pasha could not take Baghdad from him. Since Bekir Subashi though that could not defeat another Ottoman army, preferred to sent the keys of Baghdad to Persian Shah. The Cossacks assaulted to Yeniköy, during Bekir's rebellion. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 78

of Hafız who Hafız left for aid there from Diyarbekir with little preparation and for keeping Bekir on faith that could neither do the one nor the other. Within a short time, the message that it (Baghdad) fallen into the hands of the Persians. This enormous loss constituted great oppression on Murad by being of great importance and a bad presage at the beginning of the Empire; he devoted his entire spirit to gain there again and was proclaimed war against Persians in Istanbul. [Relazione, 562]

3.3.21.6. Grand Vizier Çerkes Mehmed Pasha¹³⁰

As I told above, Sultan Murad got the Grand Vizier Ali beheaded thanks to whom he had acceded to the throne soon after he acceded and elected Çerkes Mehmed Pasha for his charge, whom he dispatched to Asia with the army, instead. Gürcü Mehmed remained in Istanbul as the Ka'im makam instead (of Mehmed Pasha).

3.3.21.7. Grand Vizier Filibeli Hafız Ahmed Pasha

Çerkes passed away in Asia, Pasha of Diyarbakır Hafız was elected instead; according to the news at that time I received His effort of getting back Baghdad was vain and did a lot of harm to the troop.

3.3.21.8. Grand Vizier Kayserili Halil Pasha¹³¹

¹³⁰ When Grand Vizier Kemankeş Ali Pasha was executed in 1624, Murad IV appointed Çerkes Mehmed Pasha to the grand vizierate even though he did not want to do so, and sent to put an end the revolt of Abaza Pasha. As we said above Çerkes Mehmed Pasha defeated Abaza Pasha. After the war, he withdrew his army to Tokat where became ill and died, in 1625. On Çerkes Mehmed Pasha see: Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*, Istanbul, 1287, II, p. 54; İbrahim Pecevi, *Tarih-i Pecevi*, Istanbul, 1283, II, p. 401, Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, II, p. 296; Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic*, pp. 76, 286; idem, *Mehmed Pasha, Cerkes*, In: EI, VI. vol., p. 993.

¹³¹ Kayserili Halil Pasha was born in an Armenian village, and was recruited by the *Devshirme*. With Halil Pasha's help, was granted to the Dutch have an ambassador at Porte. Under Osman II, Halil Pasha was Kapudan Pasha, and had a strong anti-Spanish policy, through this he made a raid on Manfredonia in July

Therefore, he became masul and instead Halil, who was well-known by his virtue by Your Serenity, was elected; and he was dispatched for war immediately. Gürcü passed away violently because of a rebellion of sipahis in Istanbul, instead Receb was elected who is still continuing his duty. I have won through the negotiations with all and great difficulties. [Relazione 580]

As I was leaving the Sublime Porte, I left Halil Pasha in position of Grand Vizier, he was elected by the King for the War of Baghdad against Persians a short time ago, just like he directed (the war) by praise in the same position some other times. He captured and plundered the Taurus Mountains against the same King, got excited within a tremendous hope that all these gave; his virtues, help of his fortune, his attempts in the past should have brought Him a happy accomplishment. Although he almost immediately set off towards the mentioned war, [Relazione, 590] I obtained a few opportunities on account of his authority in this eminent position and very excellent disposition towards Your Serenity. These are; the matter of galley became useful to a large extent and hardness of Kapudan Pasha was overcome just like I mentioned above; at the same time; during my effective struggle against Bedih, Emin of Aleppo, who had perpetually been extorting our merchants, as He was reported by the most illustrious Consul Pesaro upon his arrival in this city, and He was

1620, as Giustinian referred, Pasha supported to maintain the peace with Venice, and we wrote above, Mere Hüseyin Pasha, expelled him as being his rival, but with the willing of Kösem Sultan, Murad IV appointed him as a vizier in 1623 and as a grand vizier in 1626. Since the bad weather conditions of the winter and lack of artillery, he could put an end neither the war against Persia nor the revolt of Abaza Mehmed Pasha, and these failures of him made the reasons of his dismissal in 1628. He died in 1629. On Kayserili Halil Pasha see: Peçevi, *Târih-i Peçevi*, II, pp. 343-408; Naîmâ, *Târih-i Naima*, II, pp. 77- 421; Hacı Halife, *Tuhfetü'l-kibâr fi esfâri'l-bihar*; Groot, *Khalil Pasha Kaysariyyeli*, EI, IV. vol., pp. 970-2; Giovanni Sagredo, *Memorie Storiche de Monarchi Ottomani*, cavaliere, e procuratore di S. Marco, Venice, Presso Combi, & La Noù, 1677; Hammer Purgstall, Uzuncarsili, *Kapukulu Ocaklari*, I; Danismend, *İzahli Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, III, pp. 264-339; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, III/2; Anderson, *Naval Wars in the Levant 1559-1853*; Groot, *Khalil Pasha and Cornelis Haga, The beginning of Turco-Dutch relations 1610-30*, Leiden 1977

castigated severely. Everything became in favor of our valuable gentlemen and merchants. Before I left upon the Franciscan's priests wish in Jerusalem, I made petitions suggesting Him the Pashas troubling the priests be deposed and Mehmed who had a good disposition be appointed in his place. Without any doubt, if he returns to the Sublime Porte in the same position again, he would use his authority for Your benefits with all his readiness and compassion as it is noticed in my valuable predecessors' letters and relazioni not only did during my bailate merely but also did during predecessor bailates. It seems to me by the way the Most Excellent Bailo's letters that his ranks is at the second position in Divan; just as wished; credit and value of old age will always have great authority in this state, and maintenance of its excellent disposition will turn to good purpose to a large extent. [Relazione, 591]

3.3.21.9. Murad Pasha of Aleppo and Venetian Consul Civran of Aleppo

I was assigned by the Most Excellence Senate to do my best as to the Murad Pasha of Aleppo to be deposed and castigated because of his insolence to the most illustrious Consul Civran, and you Your Serenity wrote this (also) to the King with great efficacy; you ordered me to spend the amount of [***] to be able to accomplish this. I talked to Gürcü by this ardor, intended to provide Your Excellency to be the solitary authority, and not to make any spending; and I rendered (them), too. He was deprived of his duty immediately, within a short time as well as his life soon.¹³²

¹³² The baili always used their influence and power to save the consuls who might be punished by the Porte or Ottoman governors. Dursteler, *The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps*, p.5

3.3.21.10. Bostancibashi Ali and Venetian Merchant

With the same authority, and without any expense, I had dismissed Bostancibashi Ali from his charge, present Pasha of Bosnia, who extorted [Relazione 582] 40.000 thalers of our merchant Bracchi by force and imprisoned Him and Dragoman as well, compelled a hucet in respect of himself. From the King, I obtained duplicate hatt-i humayûn compelling Him to return what He had taken. They all indicate deficiency in the mentioned authority and duty, but the authority of Your Serenity. He was elected the Pasha of Bosnia by obtaining the fellowship of Your bailo in the Sublime Port, namely mine, and he reassured and promised me he would behave the most warmly throughout his duty, and he is doing this as seen at the moment.

Despite all the troubles experienced at the state and army as I mentioned above, by this action against a great Minister, who has such power and authority, our merchants obtained so much dignity and relief by noticing the vigorous and powerful protection of Your Serenity during my bailate.

3.3.21.11. Ithaki Islanders and A Beg of the Janissaries of Lepanto

Your Serenity, quarrel and exclamation reports had been coming incessantly from Mora Turks and other adjacent territories to the Sublime Porte due to the harm of Ithaki people had continuously been doing and his invasions these times. They had started behaving so insolently that they had not been obeying You the Most Excellent Senate's commands and Your representatives on this island and rendering depredation against Turks on land and at sea invariably. Failing in restituting their detriments' there, the Turks had been coming to want from me as I was the bailo of Your Serenity by utilizing power and

violence of the soldiers which was usual then, from there they had been coming to Istanbul. A Beg of the Janissaries of Lepanto, who was enslaved by Ithaki people and paid 1000 and more thalers to be freed from the pledge, also arrived on account of the same reason, and machinated me by a rebellion of janissaries to compel me for indemnity. [Relazione 583] By writing letters, I told very valuable Provveditore¹³³ of Zanta and Kefalonya to administer justice for criminals, without trying another tack and rendering payment of indemnity or money to anyone, just like in the cases of the other losers. When the Beg under discussion could not gain anything with petitions on these islands for months, he came to Istanbul. He incited a riot by gathering many soldiers not only against me but also against the Ka'im makam Gürcü, and He was in a shaken manner by the danger, sent me the Dragomans to say as regards I had to gratify Him (the Beg) by any means, and told that neither He, nor I, and nor They could keep up unless I did it. Soon after the rebellion of janissaries caused by the reason I mentioned, he (Ka'im makam Gürcü Mehmed Pasha) certified these words of his by his own death. [Relazione 584]

3.3.21.12. Andıra Beg'S Kâhya Attacked by Venetian

Disorders of Barcalonga vessel was added to this.¹³⁴ Scouts of Kapudan Pasha found out a young Muslim whom ours were stealing and various contrabands they were taking to the city. All the officials were arrested by him, the prominent ones were

¹³³ Provveditore was a Venetian commissioner. *The Provveditore all' (dell') Armata*, was used for the fleet, and the *Provveditore Generale* was used for the land forces. They had very extensive powers as being the government's principal representatives in naval and military affairs. Edited by Chambers and Pullan, with Fletcher, *Venice : a Documentary History, 1450-1630*, p. 462

¹³⁴ "The *barca longa* was the Spanish version of a pinnace and was widely used as a fishing craft in the waters of the Caribbean during the 17th and early 18th centuries." (Stratford Archives) Angus Konstam, *Scourge of the Seas: Buccaneers, Pirates and Privateers*, Oxford, 2007, p. 126

imprisoned, and everything was confiscated by His and the Ka'im makam's firm resolution. [Relazione 587]

I must not stop thinking how important it is to serve Your Serenity; towards the end of my bailate very important, very hazardous, and simultaneous two events happened related to the Beg of Andira (Andros – Andre)'s galley and their activities in Dalmatia. As the Ka'im makam Gürcü, who was superior to everyone [Relazione 584] within his own class by his age above 90, made a habit of saying, what the galley and the ones accompanying it had been doing was definitely something troublesome. Nonetheless, they had been evoking Him the events that ours defeated Turks' galleys in a quite provoking manner and words as in the example of Ramazan and Ali Pashas who although might be said to be at our seas away from Istanbul. Our three galleys taking refuge in (Andira) seaport were welcomed and were honored by refreshing warmly by the Kâhya of the Beg (of Andira), who sheltered where he had to be in complete security, his own home after escaping from three Malta galleasses while he was setting out towards Euboea from Chios with his galley upon the command of Kapudan Pasha; and they were attacked (by these galleys of ours later). Being attacked and defeated on a beautiful day where he commands, in Andira seaport, which is the Beg's own Beglik, seigniory, representing Grand Signore's personality when he is very close to Istanbul and His Majesty's eyes are on him. The Republic had to spend as much blood and gold as it could as if it almost had been an emergent necessity in order to confiscate what had happened. Kaptan Pasha, other major Ministers and numerous Turks had gathered within tremendous whoops and clamors, and they were exacerbating the gravity of the event within outburst of anger. Derviş, who was included in the event, was telling and confirming the event (in the following way): that the

entry of our three galleys into the seaport was discovered by Him first of all, they made all the friendship signs to them by sound and flags, they fired all the cannons against Him instead of corresponding this, infestation was executed by enormous violence at the same time, the galley was defeated and seized, 43 levents and 67 slaves were killed, many injured were left behind that among them was a pregnant woman with her little daughter, particularly a Kapici Bashi of Kapudan Pasha who was a close relative of him, was murdered; Grand Signore's 30.000 thalers, which had been gathered from the [Aegean] Archipelagoes as avariz, and added to what others' took away, those were doing an exorbitant amount, and lots of galley cannons with many other things were taken from Him. Above all, what infuriated Them most was being Grand Signore's beacon razed and trampled by entirely hostile attitudes and actions. They had been exaggerating about Derviş did not do any slightest harm to ours in return for this. [Relazione 585] What was happening and about what else I was informed by Gürcü, Kaptan Pasha, and all the other Ministers had been protesting unbelievably vehemently by the Begg, who had gathered in the Sublime Porte for a voyage in the Black Sea and who did not want to move before Derviş's detriment was compensated also. I reminded them what G. Omer, who died in despair a short time ago without obtaining any indemnity from me, underwent. The mentioned Ministers wanted these from me urgently within great ardor: the first is being people at the head of our galleys castigated violently for indemnity of the action executed against Grand Signore, and given 200.000 Venetian ducats in return for damages made to Him and the Begg. They were compelling me with all their strength to (be included in) the Kazasker's lawsuit and (pay) indemnity by their verdicts. Finally, Gürcü had been evoking '37 and '71 wars which occurred as a result of something smaller than this, and Albania and Kingdoms of Cyprus were lost despite defeat of their fleet, and spent 300.000 golden

zecchini to obtain the peace. In a way, his spirit was catching fire due to this tumult. Despite his good intention towards the Most Serene Republic with his experience and prudence, many times he [Gürcü Mehmed Pasha] protested me so that the indemnity would be completely fulfilled by an austere and harsh castigation promptly or insisting on war; and he concluded (the matter). The difficulty increased even more upon Gürcü's death, in his place, Receb was elected who is relative of the Kapici Bashi who was murdered and robbed, and the other mishaps occurring at seas under his captaincy. The Present Kapudan Pasha Ahmed had great authority by the King with his pertinacious nature; like Derviş's words, all the Beks had been provoking Him vehemently and compelling me to make Your Serenity give perfect instruction of indemnity. Almost all the Beks were in Istanbul and by compromising they all used to surround the King imploring for justice while He was going out. His Majesty's effective commands and replies [Relazione 586] in his own cursive script to Kaptan Pasha served to resolve this in every way. [Relazione 587]

Agreements on boundary matters, subsequent reputation, and restitution the matter of galley have become useful to a large extent; because Kapudan Pasha, who is more ardent than everyone else, noticed at this example that I would not like to have disposition to get along with excessive pretensions of no one. He embarked upon a new style to obtain fussily what he wanted and called for Dragomans of the other ambassadors' to serve as witnesses, and in the presence of Them and many Turks; was paid 6.000 Venetian ducats to Derviş and formed a hucet from a Kadi regarding his properties were taken. He had also been using this artifice so that I would defer to his excessive desires which were known very well by me at the same time. In the pretensions of the compensations, the principal ministers of the Porte showing that they disbursed their own money and (wanted) to put

Your Serenity in necessity to compensate its. I made myself very clear to illustrious gentlemen that all of these efforts were useless. [Relazione, 588] Kapudan Pasha annulled the huccet I mentioned within Derviş's continuing arrangement. By Your Serenity's dignity and reputation, not only the indemnity of Barcalogna vessel was drawn back but also (the command) of castigating the officials. Yet, they had been insisting on a point, not agreeing to deliver the vessel unless the resolution of negotiating with Derviş is not followed first. I did not want to compromise before witnessing not only was it delivered but also it departed during the negotiation for the sake of Your Serenity's esteem.

Finally, this matter, which had been all over every uneasy matter, was terminated by the Sublime God's grace. It was a consensus that it was the most dangerous situation shaking the peace of so many years between the Sublime Porte and Republic. Being only 3.000 paid to Derviş although he demanded 200.000 soothed the situation. Being the local representatives castigated violently, which was the indemnity of the King's dignity, in which a quite enormous clamor raised and on which they had been insisting greatly brought silence with it, and provided Them to calm down. That the as of Christian Princes residing in the Sublime Porte intervened also had influence to a large extent in restituting the entire dignity of The Most Serene Republic and soothing the ardor of Grand Ministers. I was dexterously diverting, desired Your Serenity to remain as the unique authority at the end of the whole matter. Above all, my aim has always been the serious matters occurring during both that time and other times to end within perpetual quietness. Derviş Beg has a huccet which the Kadi wrote in his cursive script and gave him upon his request; he may do any harm he likes with this and demand what he wants. The letter of the King, Ka'im makam, and Kapudan Pasha to Your Serenity confirms the mentioned huccet. No matter how much

they stake out a claim because their money was stolen and many citizens of theirs were killed by insults against Grand Signore's dignity, they declare clearly, definitely, [Relazione 589] and by words of great importance that the His Majesty is completely sure and contented with the relations of Your Serenity's bailo and all what has been said. I sent the mentioned hucet and the authentic one of the letter to Your Serenity. Large-scale two important points, which had incessantly been being supported by also me, were confirmed by His Majesty and Ministers: bailo of the Republic is not accused. He is neither compelled to compensate the detriment nor seemed in the Kazasker's lawsuit in any way; as it is clear, do not talk (about this) any longer.

The Most Excellent Senate, You can comprehend to what extent esteem and reputation I left in the Sublime Porte concerning your matters after these rather serious two matters in particular. On the other hand, it should be taken into consideration how much necessary it is to maintain using a measured and moderate way, which had also been used by our predecessors all the time, without evoking (the feeling of) slightest suspicion or scorn in spirits of Turks regarding They are valued too little; and nowadays doing this is much more needed than ever before. It is easy to impress someone who is in decline. It (valuing less and scorn) hurts the spirits of great people more austere and stimulates the wish for taking revenge from anyone. [Relazione, 590]

3.3.21.13. Murtaza Pasha Sent Ali Biçenoğlu to the Sublime Porte

Above them all, however, what embittered the matter more was the movements of Murtaza Pasha in Sibenik region who rather avidly intended to disturb peace on boundaries by making use of the pre-existing enormous commotion owing to the matters of galley in

the Sublime Porte. Through great diligence, Ali Biçenoğlu was dispatched with huccets and certificates of Kadi, and adjacent Sanjaks presenting these movements and innovations to Grand Signore and Divan within every worse state.¹³⁵ He had been trying to convince that these movements and innovations were an agreement of the Republic and other Christian Princes to destroy peace by making use of Their turbulence, and been urging within great fervor as to these innovations ought to be suppressed. At last, these words were conveyed by Murtaza and the ones having bad intentions to disturb peace. Upon the grace of the Sublime God contrariwise, Biçenoğlu had been witnessing that I supported and managed Your Serenity's honor too vigorously in matters of galleys, He did not imagine that. A different condition emanated from Murtaza's and His thoughts. I provided Their fault and jeopardy to be noticed before the Pasha through the same vigor. (Moreover) as the Pasha was so prudent, he did not writhe under the oppression of bad thoughts, daring, and turbulent men of Murtaza who disturbed peace on boundaries. Gürcü concluded (the matter); since he was aware of Murtaza's anxiety and significance of my thoughts, some manner against Biçenoğlu came into being; he reproached Biçenoğlu due to the mood he constituted in his Beg and Him on account of his wrong opinions; menaced him to strike off his head in the presence of me from time to time; they were all horrified and despaired because of this; he threw himself at my feet begging my help in the presence of the Pasha. He used the same impetus against Murtaza to His Kâhya, also. [Relazione 587] He expelled them both from His presence. They mortified in a way they did not expect, and coming to my house they assured me that they would exert all the effort for smoothing the boundaries down; said they volunteered (for this). And all of them were fulfilled all upon Biçenoğlu's

¹³⁵ The Sublime Porte was informed by an Ottoman Beg who was responsible of frontier region that the Venetians had invaded nearly thirty villages in the Adriatic cities Zara and Sebeniko or Şebeniko. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi: XVI. yüzyıl Ortalarından XVII. yüzyıl Sonuna Kadar*, p. 141

arrival in Bosnia, by virtue of his reports which He gave to Murtaza, and with effective commandments that I recommended Him, and the Ka'im makam also expressed in his letters he had to conserve peace on boundaries strictly in every way and abstain from a new case, and prohibited any attempts especially against Giubla and Verpoglie whom he had been machinating. Condition on boundaries was restituted by me within a short time upon Your Serenity's command. At the same time, the dismissal which the Ka'im makam had promised me was executed soon, and Murtaza was appointed to Buda from the Bosnian government within double service for Your Serenity, a huge turbulent spirit was removed from your borders and transferred to the (border of) (Austrian) Emperor. Later, movements of His and Gabriel Bethlen's armies headed towards matters of Valtellina and Germany which secured remarkable profits for Your Serenity's benefits and the public.¹³⁶ The entire dignity of Your Serenity and his people has been extricated without making any spending through the Sublime God's grace. [Relazione 588]

3.3.21.14. Grand Vizier Hüsrev Pasha¹³⁷

¹³⁶ When Catholic Habsburgs occupied some parts of Hungary and Transylvania, and wanted to remove the Protestantism, a native opposition against Habsburgs was borned under the leadership of Gabriel Bethlen (1613-1629), and both Ottoman Empire supported this movement and they leaned on Ottoman. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. I, pp. 187-8

¹³⁷ While Giustinian said that Hüsrev Pasha was of Albanian origin, according to Ottoman chronicles was of Bosnian origin. And Ottoman chronicles confirmed Giustinian's words that he educated in the palace and became *silâhdar*, and under the command of Grand Vizier Çerkes Mehmed Pasha he participated the war against Abaza Pasha, being the agha of Janissaries, and both this war and the one against Baghdad, under Grand Vizier Hafiz Ahmed, he defined that as he fought bravely. When he returned to Istanbul, was appointed as a vizier by Murad IV. Murad IV appointed him to the grand vizierate, and sent against Abaza Pasha. After Giustinian returned to his patria, Hüsrev Pasha defeated Abaza Pasha and Persians in 1628. On Hüsrev Pasha see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; İbrahim Peçevi, *Târih-i Peçevi, II*, 401-425; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*, I, pp. 52-94, 101-142; Solakzâde, *Solakzade Tarihi*, pp. 742-750. Biyografisini veren kaynaklarda Bosnalı olduğu ve Enderun'dan yetiştiği belirtilir, Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. XIX; For an imperial decree sent to Hüsrev during the siege, see Feridun Bey, *Münsha'at al- Salâtin*, İstanbul, 1264-5, II vol., pp. 89-95; İnalçık, *Khosrew Pasha, Bosniak*, In: EI, vol. V, pp. 32-3

After I left, Hüsrev was elected for the Grad Vizier's position instead Halil by the King and he was dispatched against Persians. He is Albanian, a little above 50 years of age; he educated in the Palace. He was in the position of Silahdar in my time that carries His Majesty's sword. He dispatched Him upon the attempt of taking Baghdad back under Hafiz's Grand Vizierate as Agha of Janissaries. Although it resulted badly, he performed great courage and merit. When Halil was deposed, he was elected as the Grand Vizier in his place, and dispatched to the same war again. What has been written to us at the moment He is present at the Erzurum fortress, which is the most principal for Iran, with his troop in order to take it back from Abaza who has revolted against Grand [Relazione, 591] Signore. The Persian King was at a little distance from there with his troop consisting of 50.000 sipahis. It was quite simple for him to understand that Abaza can not keep there on his own, just like what Bedih did in Baghdad. In case of accomplishing this, credit and dignity of Hüsrev will increase to a great extent and he will fix his place at the first position. While dwelling in these regions, it will be prudent of the most illustrious gentleman Consul of Aleppo to cultivate His spirit towards The Most Serene Republic, just like I did not neglect doing this when He had dwelled in Istanbul. In spite of his secluded and grave nature, he hinders negotiations out of the Palace a little, at the same time respect and grace of the King for Him increased.

3.3.21.15. Ka'im makam Receb Pasha¹³⁸

¹³⁸ Receb Pasha was of Bosnian origin. He was appointed to the vizierate since 1622, and Kapudan Pasha between 1623 and 1626. The Ottoman chronicles confirmed Giutinian's information that he defeated a Cossack fleet in the Black Sea twice. Ka'im-makam Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was deposed by a Janissaries' riot which was organized by Receb Pasha, and Receb Pasha got the Ka'im-makam post after that. He was married to sister of Murad IV. On Receb Pasha see: Solakzade, *Solakzade Tarihi*, v.II., pp. 479-530; Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*; Danismend, *Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, v. III, pp. 329-54; Groot, *Redjeb*

I left Receb Pasha who is still in charge (of this duty) in the position of Ka'im makam that is deputy of the Grand Vizier. He is 55, was born in Bosnia. He also educated in the Palace, reached this position from Bostancibashi which is principally in charge of the gardens of the King; later Sultan Osman rendered Him the Pasha of the Sublime Porte, and gave him his eldest sister in marriage, he obtained the Kapudan Pashalik, (by also his wife's assistance), then he promoted to the deputy of Vizier I mentioned above, he kept on this for about 3 years; he is the one who has continued his duty for the longest time compared to the others after the commotion within government. In this way, he acquired these by the King and Valide Sultan on account of the great authority his wife. Sagacious and industrious Pasha is aware of himself that he is not efficient enough to bear the excessive burden which he had promised the King to bear, and he would not be able to resolve any important thing on his own, within the new structure of the government, he will only be able to bear the burden to receive confirmation of the King after consulting very logical and experienced Ministers. Everything used to be dependent on the person who was at that position only, not on getting into communication with the others as usual. In this way, He made jealousy diminished; grace and benevolence of the prominent Ministers were acquired. Being by the King, prestige of His recommendations matured through the opinions and consultation of the most experienced ones of them; it has managed to continue until now, and this situation may last [Relazione, 592] some more because of the same reasons. As I said to Your Serenity and You Excellency Gentlemen, you do not have to fear the improper and precipitous resolutions of this state since he not only administers the state by himself but also with the ones who seem the most mature and logical. When he was

Pasha, In: EI, vol. VIII, p. 480; idem, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic*, Leiden-Istanbul 1978, pp. 172, 176; Hammer-Purgstall, *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*.

Kapudan Pasha, he used to administer only in accordance with his own opinions, he used to show no little tendency. Therefore, He was always in an excellent disposition, like I have just left him, at the most uneasy mishaps occurring during my bailate under His administration, I used to him vigor and dexterity, and in this way he behaved in a friendly manner towards the Sublime Porte and The Most Serene Republic all the time.

3.3.21.16. Kapudan Pasha Hasan ¹³⁹

The present Kapudan, Hasan Pasha is 44, was born in a simple family around Istanbul. Yet, he is more distinguished and magnificent compared to the others in the government and fairly devoted to Grand Signore at the same time. An extraordinary partiality rose at Valide Sultan towards Him because of the memories indicating His service in Her time, once Sultan Osman had been machinating to remove the life of (the Prince) Mehmed. At that time, she (Kösem) protected Him through the service of Hasan who was the Kâhya of the Kizlar Aghasi, and spent enormous amount of golden coins due to His (Sultan Osman II) order to that purpose, just like I mentioned above. She (Kösem Sultan) protects and favors Him quite diligently (for this reason), promoted Him to the position of Sipahi Aghasi (cavallerizzo maggior), of Kapudan Pasha, of the King's brother-in-law, and through her most confidential recommendations, His Majesty had depended on those until then. In a sense, the Mayor and Vizier depend on Him. Without any doubt, result the happy attempt made against Tatars in success and that he demanded specific amount of "fuste" construction to restrain courage of Cossacks increased His power and credit. This is exactly

¹³⁹ Catalcali Hasan Pasha was the son of a Janissary from Catalca. He was appointed to the Kapudan Pasha post between 1625 and 1626, and married Murad IV's sister. As Giustinain conveyed that he defeated a Cossack fleet which sacked the Black Sea coasts. On *Catalcali Hasan Pasha* see: Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*; İbrahim Peçevi, *Tarih-i Peçevi*;; Hacı Halife, *Fezleke*; Cengiz Orhonlu, *Hasan Pasha, Cataldjali*, In: EI, vol. III, p. 252

why (Valide) Sultan favors him, but he may lose this within a short time, (because) it is realized that the King's respect and affection, which he has showed towards his mother until now, is clearly on decline. [Relazione, 593] People who have bad will in the Sublime Porte suffer from His hauteur and arrogance. He wants to bring in the previous vigor and prestige to the Arsenal and Shipyard. When he first sailed in the Mediterranean, he proceeded so forcefully that he left everybody behind; it may be sufficient to regain their previous predominance and consolidate it. The army of His Majesty has lost its prestige at this sea remarkably, as I mentioned above the fleet and Shipyard are on decline. His job will not be so easy, yet he has concentrated greatly on this, believing that he would go beyond what his recent predecessors could do. He can accomplish the difficulties and mishaps through such great authority.

He had been planning to increase the ordinary patrols from 36 to 50 galleys in Cyprus, Mora, and the other naval locations and to keep them outside incessantly for policing against the naval campaigns of Berber Pirates in respect to what he told me. Moreover, he added that he would head towards Their nests, (namely) Tunis and Algeria, at his first departure with his fleet and he would capture their large deal of gold within hope, fervor, or force. He told me he was doing that rather to soothe my requests and complaints I consistently made Him against the pirates. On account of the natural relation of Kaptan Pasha's duty with benefits of Your Serenity, his trust and good disposition had been being fostered. Even if Kaptan Pasha performed every kind of harshness and struggle against me in Derviş's matter, he has changed in the moderate and temperate direction as I also mentioned above. [Relazione, 594]

3.3.21.17. Grand Vizier Filibeli Hafız Mehmed Pasha¹⁴⁰

Shortly before I left, Hafız Mehmed Pasha returned to the Sublime Porte from siege of Baghdad which was the unhappy augury of his duty of Grand Vizierate. According to the news of the Most Excellent Gentleman Bailo, he ranks at the second position in Divan at the moment. At the same time, he is the brother-in-law of Grand Signore. He could abstain from shame and detriments of this siege, which had been threatening him, by favor of his wife who was liked by His Majesty very much, yet rather by power of gold and quite expensive gifts he presented to the King and his mother (Valide). He is above 60, richer than everyone else, and he lives within extraordinary magnificence and splendor. When I visited Him with the Excellence Gentleman Bailo upon his arrival (in Istanbul), he offered us sherbet in golden vases, and other gifts used by Turks; they were all in a superior workmanship which was unusual to be owned by the others, and were put inside rather precious jewels. He evaluated the matters in his speech, and showed Your Serenity his good disposition, we tried to insinuate Him on this during these evaluations of his as I could not find any opportunities to do and not contact him for long due to his absence in the Sublime Porte. They would like Him to be perspicacious, however He lacks intelligence and constancy; what is more He presumes to be like that. He is not content with his position at the second rank. He is doing his best to have the Ka'im makam's position; the sisters who are his wives were born as the Grand Countesses, still Receb was admitted (to the

¹⁴⁰ As we said above and Giustinian wrote that he did not reconquer Baghdad and deposed from Grand Vizierate, but still at the same time married one of the sister of Sultan Murad IV. On Hafız Ahmed Pasha see: Peçevi, Peçevi Tarihi, II, pp. 391, 402-7, 419-21; Naima Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Naima*; Kara Çelebi-zade Abdülaziz Efendi, *Ravzatü'l-Ebrar Zeyli*, pp. 512-74; Solakzade, *Solakzade Tarihi*, pp. 746-50; Hacı Halife, *Tuhfetü'l-kibar fi esfari'l-bihar*; Parry, *Hafız Ahmed Pasha*, EI, vol. III, pp. 58-9; Barozzi and Berchet, *Le Relazioni degli stati Europei Utte al Senato dagli ambasciatori Veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo*; Orhan F. Koprülü, *Hafız Ahmed Pasha*.

position of Ka'im makam). But the way of governance of Receb was accepted by the dignitaries, everyone is contrary the governance of Hafiz, who is severe and arrogant, it will be beneficial for Them to keep his present place.

3.3.21.18. Cigala Pasha

I spent a good and lovely time with Cigala Pasha. He maintains his previous good intention towards the Republic; although his Kapudan Pashalik has just lapsed, these emotions must be cultivated within the memory pertaining to his predecessors, the Sublime Porte and oldest Viziers of the state.

3.3.21.19. Nishanci Hüseyin Pasha

Bosnian Nishanci Hüseyin Pasha, of Bosnain origin, who had been recording the King's commandments, is also having the same good wishes and longing for peace on boundaries. The commotions [Relazione 595] emerging in my time were soothed thanks to Him. As he was their patriot, they had been associating with Him naturally. He had been moderating the rumors and boisterousness sent by the Pasha of Bosnia and Begs on boundaries according to circumstances, and accredited with the present Ka-im makam (Bosnian Receb Pasha) of the same nationality. The works he did in these rather uneasy matters have been very fruitful for me.

3.3.21.20. Sinan Pasha and Mustafa Pasha

Lastly, two brothers-in-law of the King as one of them is Sinan and the other is Mustafa had been residing in Divan. They both were dispatched, one to Rumelian provinces and the other to Anatolian ones, by the highest authority under the title of

inspector for people who were charged with truculence and tyranny shortly before I left. However, their actual aim was to gather large amount of money (to be spent at warfare) against Persians.

Sinan visited the (Rumelian) province, extorted enormous amount of gold under many various pretensions; he handed it over Grand Signore upon his return, therefore the grace of Padishah for Him increased.

Mustafa did the same thing in Asia and extorted large deals, yet allocated a large part of this for himself. He exposed to the attempt to behead His Majesty and his insult. [Relazione 596]

3.3.21.21. Bayram Pasha of Cairo

I mentioned about Bayram above (the Agha of Janissaries' Bayram) who is the Vizier in the Sublime Porte and brother-in-law of the King. He was the Pasha of Cairo during my departure. There is no need to say any other thing; the prudence equipping Him, his gravity, energetic spirit and body had been directing Him. His spirit and body has not been corrupted by avarice, dissipation, and stealing in order to spend. Perhaps he might have been more capable and valuable than everyone else. And he had very good influences in our matters when I was in the Sublime Porte; and I obtained efficiency in many matters which are still important and necessary.

3.3.21.22. Seyh'al Islam Yahya Efendi ¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ Zekeriyazade Yahya Efendi's father was a former chief mufti, since he could claim a dynastic background, as Es'as Efendi. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 The Structure of Power*, p. 112

I expressed above how great the authority and dignity of the Mufti is in this Empire. Two of them served in my time, one of them is called [***] [Es'ad Efendi], he supported The Most Serene Republic in all matters; You have lost great support in the Sublime Porte upon His death. The other, Yahya Efendi who is above 60, took His place and he still continues (this duty). He is exclusive and unique among so many great Ministers with his majestic presence, with his great perspicacious in their law and honesty in their customs. He is great authority of jurisdiction in their Islamic law and someone of high morality. I had opportunities to talk to them lots of times, (during these talks) after taking some of the garments and other precious gifts presented by me as a sign of his good wish and disposition only, he rejected the others. Many intricate negotiations and matters would not come to a conclusion without His final judgments and authority which he remained favorable till the end; as the case was in the matter of Derviş's galley. within such confidence He told to me that he did not want to be interrupted a long friendship and peace like between the Porte and the Republic, and awared that the worst consequences happened between them by the war, and whatever he did; to advice these to Grand Signore by his conscience and faith. Maintaining His good intentions will be some remarkable service for Your Serenity. [Relazione 597]

3.3.21.23. Kazasker Hüseyin Pasha

I happened to know that Hüseyin was deposed from the position of his at which I had left Him, and got rather upset. You Excellency Gentlemen, I may declare constantly that there is neither any other one who is in such a sincere and cordial disposition towards you nor one striving so hard for your benefits and getting exhausted of this, and nor one serving so much in accomplishing intricate conditions, nowadays in the Sublime Porte. He

has influence, sincerity, esteem, and authority to a large extent in the government. The King had almost always been supporting His recommendations. The present masul (might have) nourish(ed) and cultivate(d) with every kind of effort, certainly would return his charge, soon; and must have keep the perfect disposition to the Republic.

I do not know who was superseded in His place; however nothing will be fine except providing His good disposition whoever he is. This state's arrangements of its matters are rather in accordance with religious resolutions, and Kazasker of Rumelia has great power with his authority as the supreme position of this. [Relazione 598]

3.4. The RELATIONS with EUROPEAN STATES

Now I must pass to final but the most important part of this Relazione which includes uncovering the interests and intelligence between the King of Turks and the others in Their religion, and the ones in our religion. At that rate, I may base the speech on public advantage as the subject is very serious. I will explain starting from Christian Princes:

3.4.1. The Pope

The Pope is not regarded by greatness of his state or capacity of his forces by Turks, but by the authority (above Them) as the chief of Christian Princes. Just like it used to be at other times, make the Christian Princes unite against Them. At the same time the Ottomans know very well that such a union is almost impossible without the Pope's authority on account of difference between their aims and benefits, and this authority constitutes fear only at Christian Princes; and each of them get insolent when they encounter.¹⁴² They had been thinking deeply on (interior) revolts and tumults occurring recently; the Pope had a great opportunity (at this case), the Christian Princes might have been proposing to unite against this Empire for long and he could have convinced Them about this by his authority in the end, therefore being also the (exterior) war added to misdeeds at interior affairs might

¹⁴² As Giustinian pointed out that, the Popes only were authorized to declare a military crusade and could commission preachers to collect people and crusading imposts. Setton, *The Papacy and The Levant (1204-1571)*, vol. II, p. 1

have caused disasters. It had rather been existing as an impression based on an ancient augury in people's spirits; this impression was certified by time and calamities (caused) by themselves that it had been alluding to them some kind of massacre. They could not desist from suspecting because of what had been occurring between the Pope, the other Christian Princes and the Persian King some other times in the past. Perhaps His (the Persian King's) movement to Baghdad was an arrangement of Them, too. The most prudent and sensible ones had been trying to curb to some extent the violence of soldiers by influencing them with such suspicion. Yet, it was realized afterwards that not only the Princes fulfilled the mentioned union but also they were all in a provoked condition by manifest discords and dissensions among them at the same time. [Relazione, 605] Most of their territories and states were under fire due to war. They (the Ottomans) attributed this to the Sublime God's grace only which blinded the minds of (Christian) Princes by dissensions and which did not notify them of discerning neither so many opportunities nor embracing them. I turned this opportunity into an advantage for our benefits by influencing the spirits of great Ministers. I maintained the sincere and inviolable friendship with the Ottoman Dynasty by a constant and resolute will without letting it be heard neither by their ears nor souls the rather grievous provocation and proposals of the others (the Pope and Christian Princes) on no account even at the most turbulent times. They (the Pope and Christian Princes) know the naval forces' power and the states' opportunity of the Republic very well; every kind of Their attempts might be wasted without contribution of those, also. You do not want to agree with these plans of theirs as it is at this unique reason. I have been exaggerating these and the other opinions. What merits the Republic with this Empire is constancy in your ancient friendship which not only despises the emergent and uneasy negotiations but also works out the desired aim in the end and which has a great impression on you by power of your dignity and (naval) forces, and sincerity; and loyalty to this friendship.¹⁴³

You, the Most Excellent Gentlemen, I am not having the intention to dilate my speech about this occasion here (as to) how and which effects could it have caused if this occasion had been embraced with naval and land forces by the Christian Princes and who

¹⁴³ As it seen in the first chapter, even though Venice and the Ottoman Empire fought several times and the corsair activities were always a problem, the fact that, from 1500 to the fall of the Venetian republic 1797, both sides could maintain the peace. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 6-12

could have undertaken it with the greatest base and greatest hope. The opportunity has (already) gone; it may be too little fruitful to speak about this. It is no good that I have to keep quiet at this. The Sublime Porte had been living within such fear that they have been building up the imagination (of this fear) in their spirits. The major Ministers had frequently been negotiating how they could defend Istanbul in case of a land or naval attack while so much confusion and disorder existed.

3.4.2. The Christian Slaves in Istanbul

They had been assuming the King did not exist due to Sultan Osman's violent death and Mustafa's foolishness; the government did not exist due to the most prominent Ministers were murdered, escaped, and the others were horrified; and defense did not exist due to rebellions and corruption of soldiers. And the fleet was busy in the Black Sea with Cossacks who arrived with 500 saiches and penetrated through the villages of the city (Istanbul) by iron and fire.¹⁴⁴ The people, whose population is quite crowded, were discontented with the worst case of the matters and [Relazione 606] continuing tyranny, and they desired for innovation. A substantial part of these people belong to Christianity and Judaism; they always had weapons ready to use in their houses. Every year, numerous Russian slaves, who are arrested in Poland and relatives to Cossacks in terms of patria, blood, and religion, are dispatched to Istanbul to be sold by Tatars; they are bought by Turks; and are made to embrace their own religion, which is in appearance rather than their own will. Young and old People in every condition have been distributed to all the Palaces and houses indifferently. They are relative with Cossacks both by country and by blood and by religion, and those create a secret intelligence between them, or at least such disposition during so much confusion and revolt, they may be ready to revolt against Them in the Turkish bosses' own patria and to remove their lives as well when each of the Cossacks is in the Black Sea and the Christian fleet is in the Mediterranean through howl. They may

¹⁴⁴ If we look to the contemporary sources, confirm Giustinian's information about the origin of Cossacks, who were usually Ukrainians and Russians and were always the enemies of the Tatars. And as we saw in the Giustinian's *Relazione*, being the subjects of Poland, used to attack to the southern coasts of the Black Sea, even to the villages of Istanbul in 1624 and 1626 by the support of Poland. These attacks were effected the two countries relations in to the negative way, as effected the decision of Sultan Osman II for the War of Chotin. Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p.426-7

predominate by defeating rather many vast cities and their citadels or fortresses where no one exist by uniting with quite many Greeks who belong to the same religion after capturing wealth and weapons of their bosses, just like I said. On account of fleets at both seas that I mentioned above, it seems that an enormous confusion and destruction may occur, it may be a manifest risk (for Them). Just like I said, this consideration had been torturing the spirits of Ministers for a while; (however) since the message of quarrel and disagreement reached Them among Christians, they were filled with hope to correct the shaking condition of theirs, and the suspects about the movements of Persian with the Princes, and the one of Emir of Sayda against Pasha of Tripoli and Damascus, vanished as well. That the news a congregation called Propaganda Fide was constituted by the Pope brought many interpretations including some suspicion to the Sublime Porte. When it was realized to be a congregation in order to expand the religion rather than a political goal, it (the problem) was resolved; and they took it into account less. [Relazione 607]

3.4.3. Austria ¹⁴⁵

I may say that it is not secure to become at all neither at war nor peace between the two Emperors, (namely) the Ottoman and Austria, yet there was incessant jealousy on the borders and inconclusive negotiations during my bailate in the Sublime Porte. The Austrians were in trouble because of the civil war in Germany and they had been aspiring to make peace. Sultan Osman was inclined for war with his ferocious and agitated spirit. Probably, he would have moved his army immediately against the Empire (of Austria) even before he returned to Istanbul with no doubt if his attempt against the Poles had brought the best consequences on account of the impression that Cesare (the Emperor of Austria) might have assisted the King (of Poland) with men in plenty number, after his bad attempt in the War of Poland rather. He (the Empire of Austria) did everything he could to detain the Sublime Porte from this war by dispatching his ambassador Cesare Gallo and other Spanish adherents both before and after the mentioned war. He provoked the Grand Vizier Ali's spirit by setting it on fire to a large extent against the Republic by pursuits and words; these

¹⁴⁵ When the Ottoman and the Habsburg were in peace, the missions of the Habsburg ambassadors were to deliver the yearly tribute and after 1606, and to ratify a treaty or to congratulate throning of a new sultan. M. Kochbach, *Nemce*, In: EI, vol. VIII, p. 4; See general Ottoman history by: Hammer, Zinkeisen, Iorga, Uzunçarşılı, Shaw.

well-known things went through mine and did not make influence. Meanwhile a solemn ambassador sent by the King of Hungary and of the other Princes' and of the States of the Germany Confederation against the Emperor of (Austria) arrived at the Sublime Porte with expensive gifts they carried and their own letters promising great assistances (to be presented) each to Sultan Osman; (maybe) they (these words) would have been carried out by Him if it were not for His death and rebellions.¹⁴⁶ The enormous mishaps which the (Ottoman) Empire was in, had been unlocking His luck and Cesare had been making use of this great luck. He dispatched a great ambassador at once so as to establish a very advantageous peace with the Sublime Porte. Although he did not abstain from any spending or pursuit to obtain this peace, proper precautions were followed by his pursuits upon the orders they were given to the residential ambassadors of the England and the [Lower] Countries in the Sublime Porte by their Princes'; and by mine upon the most prudent orders of the Most Excellent Senate. Despite the remarkable richness of Austrians, hostility of Turks and their troubles both inside and outside, interior commotions, the fact that they have got into desperation to a large extent due to loss of Baghdad, it was insisted within great pursuits by Emperor of Spain and Austria who are more disposed than the others to (make) casualties in the Valtellina Wars, we should never let Them accept the peace. [Relazione 608] They (Spain and Austria) had been supporting the clear opinions and actions of Gabriel Bethlen on Hungary border to render him more distant by cautious pursuits. We ought to induce the Sublime Porte to help his (Gabriel Bethlen's) diversion towards the direction which Valestein set out with all the German troops and proceeded to Hungary. As known very well by everyone, the King of France and the others felt relieved (in this way). (As for) the matters of them and the Emperor, if the words promised to the Prince Gabriel by two great Kings had been kept, the conditions experienced today would clearly have been different. Because these words were not kept, his (Gabriel's) spirit got so furious that it could be so hard to regain his lost trust when an occasion arises to use it in very important actions for Him and rather for Turks from my point of view. Nonetheless, as I mentioned our officials strove to prevent every kind of consequence of peace between the

¹⁴⁶ While the European powers used to blame Venice for her double-game relation between Europe and Ottoman, and declared "Turks" as infidels, but the reality was almost all -including the papacy, as far as their interests were concerns, tempted to ally with Ottoman or utilize from relations of sultans. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 12.

Emperors as long as I was in the Sublime Porte; and I had been doing this so dexterously and cautiously without arousing the slightest suspicion or its shade in Austrians that the Majesty (of Austria)'s ambassador Lustrier has thanked me more than once on behalf of Him (the Majesty) as I did not intervene in these affairs. Now, (I mean) after I left the Sublime Porte, the mentioned peace was settled by being ratified upon dispatching ambassadors reciprocal. With no doubt, It (the Sublime Porte) obtains a huge advantage in the matters of Cesare and Spaniards through it. How much damage were being felt at the continuation of the war? As can be seen, it would not be surprising that one would advance his army in Germany, and the other would do his armies in Italy violently. In such a case, the Republic had to get involved (the war) for her own safety. She should be afraid of those of Cesare's in the borders, when might have continued those of Turks, and of Prince Gabriel to such diversion, or at least, a clause for Your Serenity's benefits and security could have been put into the contract, which You ordered me and I could get a promise (about) by these Ministers. Resulting this in peace became by too much insistence and fervor of Cesare and his major Ministers. [Relazione 609] Proposals made to Your Serenity against Turks by the league (Austria, Poland, and Spain) are rather filled with fallacies and artifices which might cause suspicion and mistrust against the sincere friendship of the Republic in Turks' spirits no matter how much advantageous for You (Your Serenity); and another one is it (the Republic) will be deprived at least of these assistances, provisions, and men that it could have received from this Empire (The Ottoman Empire) during the present anguish.¹⁴⁷ [Relazione 610]

3.4.4. Spain

Jealousy and mistrust exist among Princes of Catholic circuit, of Baviera particularly; invidia of Princes against growing the Emperor exceedingly strong, applying violence of the (Emperor's) troop incessantly, reducing relationships among them caused the King of Hungary's son by (the support of) Cesare and him by the Archduke Leopold to pretend (to the throne) in the election of the King of Rome suppressing them all in the end. These all required the Emperor to become perpetually armed in Germany as it is now; some

¹⁴⁷ Venice used her diplomatic weapons to solidate her weakened position against the relations between Habsburgs and the Ottomans, since the peace between two Empires' might be dangerous for her. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.5

doubts in the Turks' matters are added to this, also. Since, the other concluded agreements between them are too little steady and quite variable now because of Cesare's violence, and the advantageous conditions that Turks' adversity He extorted, and in the latest events which occurred in Abaza's defeat and change of Tatars; they still may make the agreement turbid. [Relazione 611]

The Emperor had been obtaining the Sublime Porte the peace to be renewed within great ardor and to cease fire from the Catholic King (of Spain) in the same way; they are not confidential as they used to be, but explicit. The apparent reason of Spaniards induced the Turks, who are in so much tumult, through such requests is that they would like to be free for Italy in the matters of Germany and Valtellina without any doubt. Now, for the interest and negotiations of Your Serenity, great expenses and troubles are required. However, another recondite thing would emerge. They (Spaniards) had been thinking the occasion of making profit (for themselves) by trap and machination could be rising while there was so much turbidity and corruption in this Empire (the Ottoman). They had been trying to establish an embassy in the Sublime Porte during this truce. Notwithstanding Turks seem to be in decline, I must let the usual prudence know and warn the Excellence Senate that may he found the navy and naval forces on consolidated and good bases today like never before so that they (navies) will be ready for opportunities which might arise from the territories and seas of this Empire which is related to Your Serenity, and belongs to You more than everyone. Yet, a trap was set by Spaniards, they may do all they can to obstruct You hereabouts and take You for themselves; with no doubt they are more powerful at sea. Every achievement of Spaniards may be large detriment for our matters.

Thanks to Your Excellency Gentlemen's remarkable vigilance, Their (Spaniards) activities and connections in Albania, Mora, Bosnia, most parts of Rumelia, [Relazione 612] and Istanbul are known very well by means of Jews, people of Raguza, and their other supporters. They buy grain from the city of Raguza; these connections are of value to various islands of Aegean islands, especially to Chios; (therefore) they are rather devoted to Their names. When they appear with their galleys, they acquire credit at all the others by their good behaviors, too. The intention of building a fortress at Milos harbor, their activities with the Emir of Sayda emerged in the Cyprus Kingdom, their attempts in the

Holy Lands and the other similar things certify well the Spaniards' thoughts about the (Ottoman) Empire's present condition. They managed to conceal their intentions so shrewdly; they had been demanding truce from Turks in an unworthy and unusual manner, which They (the Ottomans) are in decline period. They do not desire an opportune position to emerge any longer to infest Them by his army. (While) his perpetual and irreconcilable hostility and war against Turks is the greatest expertise of the Catholic King. It has been observed that Spaniards certainly provoked the Turks perhaps more than ever before by their fleet and the harm (they did) through the right and superiority they demanded, and high emolument they acquired from Vatican by such pretexts. They forgot the damage from sacking of Manfredonia that they received, a short while before by their (the Ottoman) fleet, in the heart of Italian states.

During my bailate, such artifices made to Turks by Spaniards is now serving the armies to be provoked in this region more than ever before; [Relazione 613] with no doubt they continue the activities of refreshing the mentioned truces with the Sublime Porte. They dispatched their ambassador to the Sublime Porte to this purpose, like in other similar cases. Receb Pasha, the Mufti and the others were on power at the government at that rate, the mentioned truces have just been interrupted by us through the authority of Them. Also, the Excellence Gentleman Bailo Venier's prudent and sensible activities, which are collateral, manifestly proceed in the direction of Your Serenity's and Italy's benefits. If the Turkish fleet goes forth in the Mediterranean upon Kapudan Pasha's will, Spaniards will shift a large deal of their forces to other places. [Relazione, 614]

3.4.5. The Offer of Alliance by Spain to the Ottoman Empire

As Your Excellency Gentlemen knows well, during my bailate how much insistence and effort were implemented towards the [Relazione 580] Sublime Porte at truces with Spaniards (emerging) in the Valtelina Wars declared by Spaniards, which did enormous harm to the Republic and her needs and for which our expenses still continue. No more confidential way at all as used to do in general, but well-known and revealed. Montalbano, who is the viceroy of Naples, was dispatched to the Sublime Porte by propositions which will provide remarkable benefits for the King and a great deal of gifts for Pashas. Kings of France and England and the Lord of [Lower] Countries who were interested also

contradicted mentioned truce, were informed about this situation by their ambassadors who had residence in the Sublime Porte. They (the ambassadors) had committed together with bailo of Your Serenity to do every effort and expenses to interrupt those (truce), and by You was committed the same to me, therefore, 4.000 Venetian ducats were accrued to you. Due to precedence and many other disagreements I had great difficulty in uniting demands and endeavors of the two King's (England and France) ambassadors. They had been exhibiting over eagerness terms of their Majesties' orders and other things. Then to make them detain from the expense, since the order of their Majesties' and the others' respects, I had been proving them by strong evidence that it was needless to vent they had been exerting so much effort on the strength of service for our Princes, but as much their own as, to impel Turkish Ministers into suspicion and make the matter more expensive and difficult by becoming so generous. We set out with this recommendation; and the gifts were given to the Ka'im makam Gürcü on a basis of accruing five or six garments to each, therefore not only the negotiation was interrupted but also Montalbano was sent away from Istanbul before he was admitted to his presence. By declaring the whole world that Grand Signore wanted neither a truce nor an agreement with the King of Spain, and proposals were not listened. People from Ragusa, who had accepted Him to Ragusa and oriented towards Istanbul, were given a harsh command concerning not to admit anyone, anymore. When the message that the Viceroy of Naples dispatched someone else to the Sublime Porte reached, the same command was repeated harshly by Kapici (Bashi) and He was sent back to Puglia by people from Ragusa. The matter was culminated in being [Relazione, 581] Spaniards humiliated considerably, and in dignity of Your Serenity and the other "amici", "friends" Princes' in the Sublime Porte. At the same time I obtained another enormous advantage for Your Serenity's exclusive service: just like You commanded me. I acquired the extensive and free permission to gather soldiers among the land and naval forces of Grand Signore's country. Not only did I acquire this out of Ka-im makam Gürcü's authority but also that of (the authority) of the entire Imperial Divan that deals with timars of all the countries at our boundary. Imperial Ministers and the others with bad disposition put forward that this gathering would diminish the population of the timars and bring about tremendous detriment and the worst consequences for Grand Signore's service. Pasha of Bosnia Murtaza also opposed this permission of gathering men by various reasons by rewriting to

Divan. He had been telling who had brought the commandment to Him that it was wrong and such a decision had not been adopted in Divan before. The Divan reconfirmed these commandments and He was ordered to execute them within enormous oppression. At that rate, He had to obey and permit it. I had it recorded in Divan's book for Your Serenity's dignity and its consequences, therefore this will serve as an example and a Kanun to the future cases.¹⁴⁸ [Relazione 582]

3.4.6. The Residential Ambassadors in the Sublime Porte

Christian Princes normally have four ambassadors in the Sublime Porte as representatives of decent peace and friendship they maintain: The France, England, Venice, and [Lower] Countries.¹⁴⁹

3.4.6.1. France¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ We saw above that while the Protestants of Hungary and Transylvania revolted against Catholic Habsburgs, in 1618 the Catholics Valtelline revolted against the authority of Protestant Graubünden. As Giustinian conveyed that Spaniard's movements in Italy against the Venetian interests, just as the Spanish viceroy of Milan took Valtelline and formed the garrisons to control the Spanish possessions in northern Italy. Since Venice allied with France, and of course the allies did not approve the Spain dominance in Italy, their communications could be cut by these garrisons, and the most dangerous one, Spain could attack to Venice. Venice asked for help to Murad IV, to recruit mercenaries on the Ottoman territory, and the Sultan gave the permission as being ally of Venice, but by the subjects own free will. As Giustinian defined that in the Sublime Porte occurred some conflicts on this recruitment. Since we consider European un-steady political balance, even for an Ottoman Sultan seemed possible to act out of traditions. As Giustinian wrote that, Spanish viceroy of Naples sent two embassies to negotiate the alliance with Ottoman, first one was Montalbano as Giustinian said, while the first negotiation seemed to go well, the Sultan ordered to send back the second one with a letter by *Nishanci* to Ragusa in 1626, stating that "Spanish crown was the ancient enemy of the sultan" and by this peace, the Sultan did not want to permit an ally against Ottoman's un-named allies. But reading the words of Giustinian and, together with his and the other ambassadors' efforts we guess that maybe the allies were the countries who had residential-ambassadors at the Porte; England, France and Dutch. As we said above, it was clear that Venice did not want or approve that Ottoman had the peace with Spain or Habsburgs. Faroqhi, *The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 321-3; From 1624 till 1630 came after the orders of Sultan to agree the same enlistment not only in Bosnia but also in Morea, Greece and Albania. Idem, *Venezia Porta d'Oriente*, p. 71

¹⁴⁹ It was clear that the members of 1620s small diplomatic body in Istanbul had some shared interests to protect those were "defending the capitulations, exchanging information, and preserving their communications with the outside world". It was kind of a tradition for all ambassadors of the Sublime Porte – the Venetians, French, English, and Dutch- used to live close to each other, in Pera. Berridge, pp. 19-20; The ambassadors of Venice, France, England and Holland had to control the ships of their nation, and were judges for them according to their countries' laws and customs. The Ottoman Empire provided for them and their household an extent immune. *İnalçık*, *İmtiyazat*, p. 1180

France and Turks have very good relations; they do not have hatred or controversies because of boundary matters. They still conceive this Kingdom within the memory of merits they had at their valuable early attempts in the Holy Lands and Istanbul, therefore they call all the western nations as “Franks”.¹⁵¹ At the same time, they assume France as counterbalance against the power of Spain more; during the rivalry between these kingdoms, the first union of their navy against Spain and moreover some marriages between France and Ottoman Dynasties which have rendered Them relatives under Sultan Süleyman I and Francis I’s reign, is (still) remembered. They only call this King “Padishah” which means emperor, among all the other Christian Princes. A lot of hatred between the French and the Turkish occurred because continuing commercial activities in various regions of the Ottoman Empire is concealed; they are oppressed on account of the avarice of Ministers just like the others. Yet, it rather arises from the Berber pirates’ plundering the vessels and saicches abounding in money and cloth, which is the common and violent reason. (Accordingly) the King’s ambassador [Relazione 614] in the Sublime Porte incessantly makes grave discussions, yet they turn out to be ineffective just like all the others. Upon the Turks’ too little appreciating, Monsignor (Achille de Harlay de) Sancy was given affront enormously. Instead of resenting, the King sent his present predecessor Césy; he took his wife and children with himself, this made the Turks more arrogant; and caused them to believe the French gave priority to the continuity of commerce and friendship despite any insult (made to them).¹⁵² The ambassador felt humiliated remarkably in the Sublime Porte with his other too little prudent works on many occasions. It is a fact that the benefits of Your Serenity with Turks are quite different from those of the King of

¹⁵⁰ The Ottoman Empire supported France against Venice and gave privileged capitulations, consequently French trade in Levant rapidly developed. By the time several European states preferred to trade under the French flag, since they wanted to take advantages from those privileges. İnalçık, *İmtiyazat*, pp. 1183-4

¹⁵¹ Giustinian is right that “while Ottomans referred to Europeans generically as Franks (*Ifrandj* or *Firandj*), thus they describe their own Latin-rite Christian subjects as “*tatlisu frengi*”, sweat-water Franks,” while other European Christians were designated “salt-water Franks,” and were further differentiated into cultural and linguistic groups: “*taife-ya Efrenk-I İngiliz* or *taife-yi Efrenk-I Filemenk* (English Franks or Dutch Franks).” Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p.14.

¹⁵² The contemporary sources show that again Giustinian is right about “French merchants could not be as successful as English and Dutch, and could not organized the network consuls for the merchants as Venetians could”, for details: Edi. by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 521-2

France; therefore the bailo is not always able to make conferences in accordance with the ambassador's temper. This situation confirms even more the specialty of this (French) nation that is cruel and violent. They do not cause agreement, but ruin of the general negotiations; hence the bailo frequently feels the necessity to avoid from uniting with Him and acts alone; almost always united with the ambassador who was in the best condition (solely). The ambassador demands to take protection of the holy places in Jerusalem, churches and holy places in Pera, and the other (holy) places in the Empire himself. They are not tolerated to capture the service of them by the baili's authority; and he cannot capture them by his own authority. These proposals made to Rome which are the sources of many innovations, that he attempted to elect a priest for Pera, and new religious regulations were effectuated are a manifest hazard of great scandal and damage for the Catholic religion. However, what caused the greatest surprise was that in the situations touching the common benefits, he did not notice it seemed appropriate to render Them distant from conclusion of peace with the Emperor, or in Spaniards' activities about truces, which tried to interrupt by the ambassadors of England and [Lower] Countries with such ardor that I saw. [Relazione 615] I notified to Your Serenity on the good sources that He advised to Ka-im makam conclude the peace, and not listen the others who dissuade Him for their own interests. It is certain that all the spies and supporters of Spaniards and the Empire who are active in Istanbul utilize the trust of the France ambassador; and their letters pass through by His assents and as an expense for Your Serenity. Moreover, the news of all the letters of Theirs harms Your benefits first. With no doubt, the ambassador of France wants to keep Jesuities in Pera and in the other regions of the Empire; they protect them ardently. The bad nature of these people will always cause disgust.

The ambassador provided his King to obtain a bellicose and good prestige in the Sublime Porte and in the mind of Turks through the victory he accomplished against Huguenots, but this calling did not bring fame in the internal wars, but usually in the external. Turks have always maintained the friendship with them all within this reign; at

present they feel the necessity to maintain this old friendship and intelligence rather since they are in decline.¹⁵³

3.4.6.2.England¹⁵⁴

If it were not for the occasion of commerce, fame of the English would be esteemed too little by Turks because of the distance. The Empire's harbors are frequently utilized by Them; particularly they abound in number in Istanbul, perhaps they are (more) successful in commerce compared to each foreign nation.¹⁵⁵ When they frequently appear with their powerful vessels equipped with their good armed men and cannons, and adorned in navigator materials, they attract the eyes and spirits of Turks, and occasionally that of Grand Signore watches them enter and exit within more pomp and ceremony compared to other nations, from His Palace. One day, Sultan Osman (II) was asking to Bostancibashi, the ambassador's friend, [Relazione, 616] who was with him in the garden, about Them; he (Bostancibashi) informed Him at that rate by exalting the naval forces and power of this nation on plenty of subjects. Whereupon, the ambassador received much disgust from the Ministers when he arrived at the Sublime Porte. The former one was treated much better.¹⁵⁶ Credentials had been being given for the King's merchants without any spending of

¹⁵³ Giustinian is right about that French always supported and protected the Jesuits in Istanbul. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 146; Through the opposition between Venice and France to have the dominance in the Sublime Porte, at the beginning of 17th century, Venetian *baili* always against the presence of Jesuiti in Istanbul, by the help of English ambassador. Idem, *Education and identity in Constantinople's Latin Rite community*, c. 160, *Renaissance Studies* Vol.8 No.2, p:287-289

¹⁵⁴ England had right to have an ambassador in Istanbul since 1583. Berridge, *Notes on the Origins of the Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople in the 1620s*, p.7

¹⁵⁵ The biggest advantage of the England in the 17th century, was never had a war with the Ottoman, consequently it reflected in a positive way both English politic and her Mediterranean trade as well. But still, their competence with French merchants and ambassadors brought "political embarrassments and financial losses." Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 523-4

¹⁵⁶ Sir Thomas Roe represented his patria in Istanbul from 1621 until 1628. Berridge, p.4; Roe's letters confirmed Giustinian that, at the beginning Roe disregard and refused the "usual courtesies" by the Porte; consequently according to him, the other ambassadors condition was not different from his, since the diplomatic corps in the Porte seemed to him were dispirited, he wrote one of his letter in 1621:

"I have found here little respect to the quality of a Christian prince's ambassador: I have had some speech thereof with those that reside here, and I find that the interest of the Venetian, by his neighborhood, to bear anything and the errors that the French have fallen into, and the sufferance of my predecessors, have by little and little brought them into contempt. I have undertaken to begin a

Him. I have been helped more than once by the King James who is the father of the present one (Charles I); he told me an ambassador had been being kept in the Sublime Porte against his own will and that was only for his citizens who were trading in Levant. He also added the confirmation of this friendship's instability, in case of a Union of Christian Princes against Turks; He may be the first one with his entire power in his Kingdom. Contrarily, I have heard the Turkish Ministers talking among themselves concerning the Christian Princes could not constitute a union against Them without the Pope's authority, and this Kingdom grew distant from obedience, and they will never join the mentioned union. Perhaps their friendship with the English is more consolidated and reliable compared to others based on this.¹⁵⁷ Above all, large deals of tin, gunpowder, weapons, and many other things to use at wars, which had been rejected by other Christian Princes and which are produced on this island, are supplied for Turks by the English. There is no discussion because of distance, commerce fosters this friendship; they believe among themselves that it will continue.¹⁵⁸ It is a fact that the English also feel great detriment at the same time due to the harm that Berber pirates do and extortions of Turkish Ministers at harbors. Yet, the harm the pirates do is remarkable little compared to the others on account of two reasons; one of them is the contract made with pirates for security of naval voyages without paying much attention by them. The contract has been under the name of commerce until now,

reformation; and because O would not run alone, and be left single, I have required articles of all the rest to stand with me, which they have promised."

But Roe stated that the problem is not politeness, it was to become "*the representatives of Christian princes in a Muslim world,*" with his words: "*[W]e lived among enemies, where questions ought to be avoided*". Berridge, p.11

¹⁵⁷ Actually Giustinian was not only diplomat in the Europe who lamented on the disunity of Christendom against Ottoman; it was very popular and common worry in his time. One of his letters to Doncaster in 1622, Roe clarified the situation with happiness, implying that the main points of *Relazione* of Giustinian which are the unstoppable corruption and disobedient of the janissaries, and useless galleys:

"this mighty monarchy [the Ottoman sultanate] has no other walls to defend it, but the uncivil dissensions of Christian princes". Berridge, p. 19;

"At this time, the Ottoman nightmare was the cooperation of Venetian and English naval forces in the Mediterranean. It was feared that there might be a crusade under the Pope and Spanish king." Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p.376

¹⁵⁸ Since the England was Protestants and adversary to the Catholic Hapsburgs, the English navies were carrying to the Ottomans the necessary materials for their armies. Carretto, *I turchi del Mediterraneo, dall'ultimo Impero Islamico alla Nuova Turchia*, p. 60; "English traders provided the Ottoman rulers with valuable war materials, such as tin." Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p.523

now it was meant to publish under the administration of the same King in England; without caring about appositeness of a powerful and great King's dignity, which was signed with affiliated pirates and required manifestly to obey another King. And the other is powerful English vessels which are able to protect themselves very well against pirate attacks at sea and repress their violence by great valor many times. They dare not [Relazione 617] attack them; therefore they sail more safely than the others, especially than ours.¹⁵⁹

3.4.6.3. The Problem of Precedence between England and France in the Sublime

Porte¹⁶⁰

Some usual emulation and enormous mistrust among ambassadors of France and England exists in the Sublime Porte on account of competence; this is being fulfilled within great ardor by the English, in a way I have never witnessed it to be done in the other courts. The ambassador of England (Sir Thomas) Roe has expressed to me many times that he received an absolute order from his former and present Kings regarding not to give the priority to the ambassador of France. Contrary to this, the ambassador of France (Harlay de) Césy had been trying to possess this priority in every way in a self-styled manner.¹⁶¹ Due to this sort of rivalry, four ambassadors cannot reach an agreement on general benefits and matters concerning the (Ottoman) Ministers; and some of them lose their ardor about establishing such kind of a union.¹⁶² As can be seen, this union will be too hard to be

¹⁵⁹ Not the religious aspiration but the piracy damaged to Venice, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire's national trade, by the 16th and through the 17th centuries, it was indistinguishable that who was merchant or corsair, since every kind of person and nation involved to these activities. It was true that during Giustinian's bailate, not only the Ottoman but also Venice were totally eclipsed by English and Dutch interlopers. Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p.376-7

¹⁶⁰ England had economically superiority in the Levant, and the other European nations started to seek the English protection, such as preferring to sail under the flag of England between 1620 and 1683, instead of France. Consequently the competence between French and English ambassadors at the Porte heated, pursuing to be "most favoured nation", as Giustinian pointed out that French King was the only Western power that enjoyed the title of Padishah, since 1603, even though English ambassador tried to obtain that. İnalçık, *İmtiyazat*, pp. 1184-5

¹⁶¹ The French ambassador Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy represented his country at the Sublime Porte from 1620 until 1639. Comte de Césy was scorned by Sir Roe, because of both sides were too stubborn to gain the precedence and struggled to have it. According to Sir Roe, Comte de Césy was "*impetuous and malicious*" about this competence in the Porte, in the addition of that he had no "*credit or reputation in court or city*" since he had too much debt. As Giustinian did, Sir Roe defined Comte de Césy in 1626 "*he is not worth a good feather*". Berridge, p.7-11

¹⁶² Indeed all four ambassadors tussled to protect their nations' trade facilities at the Sublime Porte in early beginning of the 17th century. But sometimes all cooperated and sometimes became rivals when they had to

established as the present ambassador of France treats each ambassador severely during his duty. The ambassadors of England in my time were quite different from Him. They treated with the baili of Your Serenity with every confidence, on a precise order; he received from his King, which is executed fairly well by Them.¹⁶³ Sir Roe did not want to quarrel with me in the Sublime Porte on account of the dispute between our Consul of Aleppo and that (the Consul) of Him. (Moreover) quite unlike the vigilance of the French, he showed warm-heartedness and sincerity during the attempts of Spain to make truce and peace with the Emperor. In particular, he had been contributing to the actions on the boundary of Hungary with the Pasha of Bosnia of Prince Gabriel by his effective activities.¹⁶⁴

3.4.7. The Lower Countries: Netherlands

With the introduction of their resident ambassador, it has been approximately twenty years since the friendship between Lower Countries (Dutch) and the Sublime Porte was settled, who is called Signore of Agha, and it still continues.¹⁶⁵ He (the ambassador)¹⁶⁶

do so. The thing which made the mutual hostility more intense and impeded unifying between them was, as Giustinian told, the problem of precedence. The fact that the precedence was granted to France by the “*authority of the papal class list of 1504*”, on all ambassadors at the Porte. as Giustinian conveyed that nevertheless, James I of England ordered to Roe not to permit this practise anymore and Roe had to obey his King’s order. Roe wrote about this matter, in 1622, as below:

“In our public business, when we should join, we are all hindered by the matter of precedence between the French and myself.”

The competition was getting more complex, at the end both ambassadors complained about their rivalries’ activities to their courts, but since there was no any positive solution, still in 1623 they could not act together at the Porte, in the addition of Giustinian’s words, Roe wrote that:

*“going together [to protest some matter with the Ottoman officials], or by signing some writing, in both which he [the French ambassador] will have superiority; but can get none of me”.*Berridge, p. 8-9

¹⁶³ According to Roe’s letters, on the contrary of Comte de Césy, Roe always had respected and cooperated with Giustinian very well, defining him as “*wise*”, “*discreet*”, “*wary*” person. Berridge, p.7

¹⁶⁴ In the Roe’s letters we understood that he took order from his King to stir up Austria against Gabriel Bethlen. Berridge, p.5; Gabriel Bethlen informed Roe that with a decision which took a conference placed at The Hague that, he must “*nourish the Tartars against the King of Polands*” and help against Austria to both Bethlen and Pasha of Buda. This was true but Roe had no order from his King, until he got, he had to trust to Giustinian’s words. Berridge, p.15

¹⁶⁵ Netherlands were under occupation of Spain, and Dutch tried to get rid of this occupation since the 1560s, the truth is, this riots caused a lot of tiring efforts by Spaniards, since they could not struggle for the Mediterranean trade. We wrote above, about Kapudan Pasha Halil’s hostility against Spain and friendliness towards Dutch. These feelings were relevant to the politics and Mediterranean trade, consequently the Ottomans granted a capitulation (ahd-name) to the Netherlands in 1612. We can say that Halil Pasha supported political relations with Dutch, actually to make an advanced military activity against Spain. Dutch government made responsible the ambassador to protect and promote their countrymen’s trade, utilizing from

proceeded remarkably the dignity of these Countries with his diligence and skilful work in such long-lasting experience, [Relazione 618] advanced the respect through him by Turks. At first, they improved their power in wars they incessantly made against Spaniards for years. The Spaniards have grown distant from troubling the (Ottoman) Empire by their army on account of this war. They had been exalting his Lords in the Sublime Porte in the latest (occurring) turbulences above all, and trying frequently to provoke the Sublime Porte against Spaniards or at least to get them to provide their powerful armies in the Mediterranean again by their efforts. Not only had the ambassador been contradicting clearly the Spaniards' benefits but also the benefits of the Emperor (of Austria), King of Poland, and Princes of this party with his efforts when he was with the (Ottoman) Ministers; and on the contrary he had been taking a stand in a quite friendly manner and in favor of Their enemies. As he is good at the language (of Ottoman Turkish) rather, he is able to express himself when he is with Them; and he has acquired trust and credit of Turks through this advantage. In the Prince Gabriel's relations, in their uniting with the others in Germany against the Emperor (of Austria), to recline upon Turks, each of them has always been a chief on their own. He (the ambassador) gave the prominent incentive among the actions of the Pasha of Bosnia and the mentioned Prince (Gabriel). Besides, he exerted every kind of effort for me to induce Your Serenity to assist the Prince (Gabriel) by money or at least to deliver what you had promised in accordance with the contract You (Venice) signed concerning you would contribute to his Lord so that they could be pleased with the general consequences of his (Gabriel's) actions. I have received the news that the agreement between the Republic and Countries caused different feelings in the Sublime

the capitulation. Edited by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, pp. 522-3

¹⁶⁶ Cornelis van Haga was the first Dutch ambassador and was appointed by the States General to the Porte in 1583 and stayed until 1639. Sir Roe cooperated with van Haga well, and he confirmed Giustinian's words about him one of his letter:

“He has bought his house in fee, trimmed it, adorned it, and planted it about, as if he meant to make it his mansion and tomb, and had”, he added presciently, “no fear of removal”.

But Roe also criticized his love through Istanbul and the Ottomans in his letter to Sir Isaac in Venice in 1626:

“ He has lived long in Turkey, and is so corrupted with their manners, that he is the shame of ambassadors.... and if necessity of business, wherein he has not much authority, did not hold us together, for my part I would not converse with him.” Berridge, p.7

Porte. Before all else, they (the Ottomans) had been agreeing the credit of both (Venice and the Dutch States) against Spaniards' power; and appreciating it (this agreement) substantially. Another one is that they rather had been speculating they would be able to use it (this agreement) against them one day. The consideration that their rather dangerous fleets consisting of heavy vessels and galleys would be able to make for the open sea within such a union had been puzzling them (the Ottomans) to a large extent. Without the jealousies and traps prevailing at others, these sincere actions and aims which exist between us had been disturbing the Ottomans by constituting quite outstanding influence (on them). There is a fighting consideration inside Turks today (and it is): So many jealousies and mistrusts between the Catholic King (Spain) and the Republic came off that there is not a possibility for them to get together by more of their will and power as they used to do; consequently [Relazione 619] there is no (element of) powerful counterbalance against Turks. Since excellent correspondence has been experienced between the mentioned ambassador and baili of the Republic in any event, they have been appreciated by Turks very well.¹⁶⁷

At the same time, the Dutch also expose to extortion of Ministers at the (Ottoman) Empire's harbors and harms of the Berber Pirates more than the others at sea. Though various agreements were made between them, their commerce with Turkey continues to decrease more and more on account of this reason. Above all, their war was continuing with Spaniards, and the Ministers in the Sublime Porte incited Them to continue it, I cannot see any reason to interrupt this friendship for a while. At the same time, They (the Dutch) also convey their vessels to Turkey with lots of military materials by the same permission like the English. The thought of being distant to a union (constituted) by the Pope and Christian States, and their independence from His (the Pope's) authority render the friendship of the (Dutch) States and the Sublime Porte more acceptable and durable. [Relazione 619]¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁷ Sir Roe confirmed the good relations between *bailo* and van Haga with those words:

"The Dutch ambassador has so good a correspondence [relationship] with the Venetian, that he is ever full [of letters], and we starve". Berridge, p.17

¹⁶⁸ As we said above that from the Ottoman's point of view, Dutch capitulations were more political than economic, but by the time the Ottoman governors understood that Dutch had no intention to enter a common war with the Ottoman against the Spain, and on the contrary of baili the Dutch ambassador had no power or

CONCLUSION:

My graduate master thesis is “The *Ottoman Empire as reflected to the relazione of the bailo Giorgio Giustinian between 1620 and 1627*”. The first chapter of this thesis consists the image of Turk in the early modern era Europe and Venice, and the character of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice; also we gave a brief history of this relation. Almost in three hundred years, the Ottoman Empire conquered all the dominions of the Republic of Venice; and at the end the Republic depended on the Ottoman Empire for Levant trade.

We shared the second chapter to the *baili* and to their *relazioni*. The *bailo* was one of the most important diplomatic figures in the diplomatic history of Venice, and among the all ambassadors of the Republic, that she had in every European court in the early modern era, only the residential-ambassador to the Ottoman Empire had this title. The *baili*'s responsibilities were so many that representing and protecting the Venetian political and commercial interests and also the Venetian community, and being judge for them, collecting the *cottimos*, having good relations with the Ottoman officials, delivering information to the Venetian Senate, freeing slaves, and negotiating in the Sublime Porte. Historically and politically famous *relazioni* were emerged by a decree of the Venetian Senate in 1425. By this decree all the Venetian ambassadors started to submit an oral or written report to the Venetian Senate, since Venice needed the accurate information about

influence in his patria. Besides, again on the contrary of Venetians, Levant had very small importance for Dutch people and government. As Giustinian said above, yes, they used to trade in the Ottoman ports, but not as much as English or Venetians. Edi. by İnalçık with Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, p. 523; See: “Links to the capital of 17th century world economy: the Dutch case”; Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*, pp. 150-1

her rivals. We examined one of the *relazione* of one of the *baili*, the *bailo*'s name is Giorgio Giustinian. He wrote in his *Relazione* that; "...*havendo non solo nel bailaggio ma in tutte le altre ambascerie d'Inghilterra, Francia et Germania, nelle quali nel corso di 23 anni l'ho servita...*", he served the Republic 23 years; as an ambassador in the courts of England, France and Austria, and at last as a *bailo* in Istanbul. He did *bailate* between 1620 and 1627 in Istanbul. He did not submit any *relazione* to the Venetian Senate after his ambassadorships, but after his *bailate* in 1627.

We understood from Giustinian's *Relazione* that he could penetrate to the events of the Ottoman Empire very well during his *bailate*, he negotiated with important dignitaries of the Sublime Porte, also he could understand and tell the principals of the Ottoman government but at some point he was chained by Veneto-centric point of view. The *bailo* made comparisons the past and present situation of the Empire, almost in all matter. Giustinian mentioned about the *devshirme* system and its corruption during his *bailate* by allowing the adult Turkish boys in to the Janissary troop by bribing little money to the Ottoman ministers, also the Ottoman chronicles recorded the same problem, by saying "city boys" started to recruit in to the Janissary troop. He is right about the undisciplined behavior of the *Sipahis*, and especially of the Janissaries, and they were not war-like any more, but he exaggerated their total number by saying; Osman II "*adunò numerosissimo esercito di settecento mille persone*", "*gathered 700.000 soldiers*" before Polish campaign in Edirne, and 600.000 in the Polish campaign against 80.000 Poles. As we gave in the Table II, according to Ottoman sources, under Osman II number of the Janissaries was between 35.000 and 40.000, and the *Sipahis*' number was between 19.000 and 20.000.

Giustinian observed the Ottoman fleet carefully, probably by the help of his spies in the Arsenal, since the Republic of Venice was a maritime power the condition of the Ottoman fleet was the most important one for her. He was right about the declining of the Ottoman's fleet and abundance of raw material in the Empire, because of that he urged the Venetian Senate on being carefully and strengthening the Venetian fleet, if Ottoman fleet might be gained its antique power again.

Giustinian described very well the outer and inner Treasury and their functions during his bailate. Since end of the 16th century the Ottoman government started to transfer money from the inner treasury to the outer one, but the economic crises did not let to replace that money, and this situation continued during Giustinian's bailate, as well. Also the Ottoman chronicles mentioned about the increasing the confiscation among the Sublime Porte's high-ranking officials by the sultans in the 17th century, as Giustinian mentioned about these practices under Osman II. The fact that Ottoman government's expenditures were increased in the 17th century, as Giustinian wrote that, the main reasons were the Palace women and un-qualified grand viziers, as Mere Hüseyin Pasha and Kara Davud Pasha, and the corruption among the other high-ranking officials.

Giustinian conveyed that Ottoman Empire's constitution was based on Islamic law and the Ottoman politics based on Islamic doctrines, as well. He commented that since the Holy Prophet of Islam's political point of view based on militarist doctrines, consequently Ottoman Empire's politics based on militarist principalities, even this principalities shaped the daily life of the ordinary people, not only of the elite ruling class. For example, the men did not used to look to the women on the streets and did not used to drink alcohol; this was the perfect life style which served to the Ottoman Empire's ideological foundation, since

“...they have 25 kingdoms or states here called Grand Signore’s land. They did not gain them all by succession but by power of sword, thus the Ottomans establish every right of theirs over this sword”, so; “...men can take neither the former (wine) nor the other (women) to war, they become ready and free for the war accordingly”.

As we said in the third chapter, the Ottoman Empire’s ruling class came from the three major groups, and being one of them; the men of religious sciences belonged to the *ulema* class. Giustinian pointed out that not only the Janissaries but also power of the *ulema* class rose during his bailate, even he noted that not the Janissaries but the *ulema* class, -the *hodjas*, were the main reason of breaking out a rebellion against Osman II, since they provoked the Janissaries by using the Islamic law, and at the end; Osman II was murdered and an endless chaos was started covering all the Empire.

Giustinian generalized the Ottoman women’s condition by saying they were enclosed at home. But according to Ottoman chronicles, the Ottoman women were engaged to the trade and agricultural practices, they could appeal to the *kadis’* courts freely, and established many charity institutions, moreover Palace women engaged to the administration with their household by strong power. The polygamy was only common among the ruling-elite class, and their number in the total Ottoman subject was more or less 5 per cent.

Giustinian emphasized that the sultans’ power absolute and superior than everyone else without question. But he overlooked the Islamic law, the *kanun* and the imperial court, -the Sublime Porte. The sultans had to obey to the Islamic law and to the *kanun* as everyone else, and were assisted by the Sublime Porte from the earliest time of the Empire. Giustinian noticed the increasing power of the grand viziers, even though the other

members of the Sublime Porte should have prevented that acting the grand viziers freely with more authority than required, the weak sultans led them override their authority and mostly by the help of the Quinn mothers, such as Mustafa I's and Murad IV's mothers.

Giustinian wrote that the *kadis'* avarice did not allow corruption and made the goods sell with the legal fixed prices (*narh*). Even though the bribe was occurred among the *kadis* in the 17th century, the *narh* system was one of the oldest laws of the Ottoman Empire, so the *kadis* executed their duties when they were controlling the *narh* not because of their avarice. That was true that even the sheyh al-Islâm was one of the *kul*, slave of the sultans but sheyh al-Islâm's could issue the decrees neither on the wishes of the sultans nor on their wishes, they could regulate according to the Islamic law, and even the *kanuns* must have not conflict with Islamic law.

In the 17th century Ottoman Empire was in the financial crisis, since the *defterdar* was the chief finance officer, this crisis affected this official most. Giustinian wrote that “...*there was not even one day on which they [defterdars] implored me and the other ambassadors shamelessly to borrow 30.000 Venetian ducats by disgrace which was not little at all during the administration of Mustafa*”, and English ambassador at the Sublime Porte, Sir Thomas Roe, confirmed the bailo Giustinian, writing one of his letters dated in September 1623 that; “*The vizier, sent solemnly to the four resident ambassadors to borrow 30.000 chequins, as the friends and allies of this Porte, to whom in confidence they dare open their secrets*”, Roe added that all ambassadors refused to give the debt to the *defterdars* and even the dignified Ottoman officials thought that this attitude was dishonorable. If we consider Mustafa I reigned between 19 May 1622 and 10 September 1623, and Giustinian said “*they [defterdars] implored me*” so more than one *defterdars*

were in charge in the sixteen months, we can conclude that the government considered the changing of the chief finance officer as a solution to solve the financial problems.

The *agha of janissaries* was an important figure in the Ottoman military system since the foundation of this post. But when the Janissaries evolved to an elite and disobedient troop, their *agha's* importance was raised. Giustinian explained the reason why “... *who proved their rage and insanity towards their own King's life, shook, it seems that some of shadow of that curb was still exist; (in this case) He [Agha of Janissaries] can be said to be the only and unique refuge against their violence.*” But as we saw that when the *Agha of Janissaries* tried to convince the Janissaries in the Mid Mosque that Osman II will grant “...*generous rewards and valuable clothes to the janissaries and an increase in the salaries of the sipahi...*” they did not only listen to him but also killed immediately.

The truth is, the Ottoman fleet was in decline during Giustinian's bailate, it was visible even for the patrol force. But not only Giustinian but also Spanish ambassador Don Alonso della Cueva to the Republic of Venice were aware of this situation. While Giustinian stated that some part of the Ottoman fleet dispatched to the Black Sea against the Cossack attacks every year, and Kapudan Pasha used to do patrols to the Mediterranean not more than 24 galleys, and the Ottoman fleet could stop easily, before reached the Aegean Archipelagoes to supply the aliments and munitions. Alonso della Cueva wrote to his King that “...*of Crete, and if this were in the hands of mighty prince there is no doubt that it alone would be a sufficient curb to arrogance of our common enemy the Turk*” and since the “*Turks draw from the Morea a vast quantity of grain, munitions and other things essential to that most populous city...*” if Morea would be plundered, Ottomans; “*would soon be in deep trouble, suffering a great dearth of victuals, and that would be the surest way of inflicting upon it the worst fate that anyone could contrive*”. And both ambassadors

agreed on della Cueva's words: *"For if a goodly squadron of swift and well-equipped galleys were raised in that kingdom they could, by constantly patrolling the Archipelago..."* and *"It could be easily comprehended from this point how easy one thing may be for 25 or 30 excellently equipped Christian galleys"*, and Giustinian wrote that at the end, *"we will have two kinds of profit for ourselves; the first is inclination of the islanders for Christianity's fame and their hostility for the Turks, the other is that prevention of Mediterranean navigations executed for Istanbul, particularly the navigations executed from Cairo, receives a great portion out of the rather crowded city's [Istanbul] nourishment."*

And the last topic of the second part of the third chapter is about Venice's *"having friend custom"* in the Ottoman Palace and among the high-rank Ottoman officials. Since, the Republic intended to have friends, *"amicī"*, who favour and protect Venice and her *baili*, and of course consequently the Venice's interests. And Giustinian did not forget to add that; *"Just like it is known well by also Your Serenity, it is not possible to gain and keep friendship of Turks without making expense, insomuch that it is the unique aliment of friendship of Turks, without this they forget within a short time"*, but Giustinian expressed to the Venetian Senate that; *"...without making any slight expense during [my] long-lasting bailate in the most turbulent and hazardous period..."*. Giustinian evaluate the friendship of the *kizlar aghasi* and the *kapi aghasi*, too. But according to the *bailo* their friendship was not fruitful as used to be, since they were not dealing with the outside matters, but also He added that, *"On account of the King's young age at the moment, it might be very easy to devote him to women and have him become by them more frequently. The Kizlar Aghasi can accomplish this job within great ease and by priority of his authority. In this case, his friendship will become fairly beneficial, just like that of the Kapi Aghasi."*

We dedicated the third part of the third chapter to the personalities and the events related to these personalities that Giustinian narrated to us. As we said in the second chapter that Giustinian's bailate was among the longest bailate with seven years, in the Venetian diplomatic history. But not because of his long bailate but because of disorder and chaos in almost all corps of the Ottoman institutions and government; three sultans, two Queen mothers and thirteen grand viziers came to the administration. He wrote that Sultan Ahmed I chose his brother Mustafa, as his heir opposing to the established custom, and his brother succeeded him, as Mustafa I, but soon Mustafa I dethroned; as Giustinian's words: "...regnò Mustaffà tre mesi perché, scopertasi ben presto la imbecilità del suo ingegno stolido et inhabile...", "*Mustafa reigned 3 months, because it was discovered too soon that he had mental deficiency, he was imbecile and maladroit*". The Ottoman sources confirmed Giustinian that Sheyh al-Islâm Es'ad Efendi and some dignitaries at the Porte supported Ahmed I's eldest son Osman, when he wanted to capture the throne from his uncle, and he could do it by their help. Giustinian criticized Osman II being avaricious and extorting, confiscating money from his subjects and from the high-rank officials. According to Giustinian "...he [Güzelce Ali Pasha] instituted greediness, entertaining passion towards bright and great things in the Young Prince's [Osman II] character." The Ottoman sources confirm that Grand Vizier Güzelce Ali Pasha was notorious for confiscating among all subjects, and as was written in the many sources and as Giustinian lamented that, he order to be strangled Venetian dragoman Borissi, since the Dragoman could not pay 100.000 thalers that Grand Vizier Ali Pasha demanded. Giustinian commented on Grand Vizier Ali Pasha' death that; "*Upon his death after a short time, the Christianity got rid of such a plotter*" and after his death; "*Hüseyin Albanian, who was even more rigorous for the Republic's benefits, succeeded Him.*"

Maybe the most important part of the *relazione* is where Giustinian mentioned about Osman II, and his Chotin Campaign, and the military rebellion against him which was resulted with his regicide; and according to Giustinian the all chaos started came afterwards, saying; “*The other many occurring every day have also derived from this, they dragged the Empire into an enormous disorder, and in an unbelievable way they may be able to cause it to collapse by a convulsion shaking its fundamental discipline and greatness in the end, too*”, and he was aware of the gravity of the situation saying; “*Actually, this is one of the greatest and most unforgettable mishaps which was heard in the long-term reign of the Ottoman Dynasty*”. Giustinian emphasized that Osman II wanted to go to the hajj since he was suffering from the hate of his *kuls*, -slaves, against himself and he did not feel himself safe in Istanbul; and this was the real and unique reason for his intention to the hajj. He wanted to form a more powerful new army in Asia, and to return to Europe, then to assail the former one by the new one. Giustinian described the situation of the Empire after Osman II’s regicide very lively. He said because of the Janissaries’ tyranny people were not secure in streets and their houses and the crime was being committed incessantly excessively in major cities and all the subjects were filled with terror and fear. They even despised the religion, the Sipahis occupied the mosques’ incomes, and many of them were closed. The wisest and most innocent Ministers were full of fear and they had to recede. An extraordinary poverty in provisions and shops occurred, and the plague was at the top point, and everything had turned out to be tremendous tumult and chaos at the end.

As we said above Giustinian could penetrate to the real events very well and true information, but there is a detail in the case of Osman II’s regicide which contrast with the

Ottoman Janissary Tuđi's narration, as we said in the chapter third Tuđi was eye-witness involving in the rebellion. If we look at this with detail, while Tuđi conveyed that Mustafa I said "*They [Osman II's officials] have not given me water for two days. They want to kill me with hunger and thirst*" to the Janissaries when they found him in the Harem, but Giustinian conveyed that when Janissaries found Osman II in a cistern he said "... *they extracted Him out semi-dead due to fear and hunger for two days' long one of them took off the turban on His head and His clothes and left Him semi-nude, and they brought Him to life again by a little water He asked*". The interesting point while Giustinian criticized Osman II sultanate and his character but clearly he was touched by his regicide, saying; "... *la morte di Osman, la quale fu subito nell'istessa prigione, alla presenza di Daut, da sei capigì bassì che lo strozzarno eseguita, et estinto nel fior dell'età un potentissimo precipe et di eccellentissime indole, il qual con manifesta emulatione della gloria de suoi maggiori, haveva già dato principio a travagliar il mondo con le sue armi*", "... *and murder of Osman was fulfilled in the same dungeon, in the presence of Davud; six kapici bashis strangled Him. They extinguished a strong Prince, who had just begun troubling the world with His army, whose glory was manifestly emulated by His predecessors, and had an excellent character in the first flush of his youth.*" Maybe Giustinian said the most interesting words for this event that existing of justice even for the infidels, on Grand Vizier Kara Davud Pasha's execution, saying "*Valuable consideration of this event is the celestial retribution against the regicides although they are infidels... he was taken to Yedikule Dungeons and the next day his life was extinguished in the same dungeon he extinguished the life of his own King.*"

Giustinian conveyed that Kösem Valide Sultan was of Circassian origin, but according to the many Ottoman sources she was of Greek origin. Giustinian observed Kösem Sultan since the reign of Osman II, according to bailo he could save her children's life "... *through the same prudence she could abstain from harassing Osman...*". and by the power of gold. Giustinian understood very well the power of Kösem Valide Sultan, her authority and influence on her son, Murad IV and on all Porte's dignitaries. Since, Murad IV was eleven years old, first years of his reign controlled by her mother but also according to Giustinian nothing but only violent death used to wait the third Ottoman prince, but both by "*tanta fortuna*", great luck, and by "*come la prudenza della madre ha havuto gran parte*", "*his mother's prudence have remarkable contributions*", he reached the sultanate. Giustinian praised Kösem Valide Sultan by saying; "*la sagacità della madre*" and "*della sua prudenza*", but also adding "*ciascuno havea l'occhio alla madre, ma la imbecillità del sesso in donna, benché savia, non suppliva a tanto bisogno*", "*They each had their eyes on their mother, yet She also could not have been serving so many purposes due to the imbecility of woman gender although she was logical.*" But interesting part Giustinian stressed that Kösem Valide Sultan concealed that she had authority on his son Murad IV, she acted and spoke as she did not any since she did not want the soldiers lose their respect to his son, and of course not to lose her authority. Of course this authority and power attracted the bailo's attention, and emphasized her friendship, -"*amicizia*", is very important for Venice, "...*Your Serenity and your baili have to exert every kind of effort to obtain Her partiality*", and already "...*né difficile da conseguir essendogli sin dal tempo del marito nota l'antica amicitia di questa Serenissima Repubblica...*", "...*it is not hard to maintain Her old and famous friendship with The Most Serene Republic which has existed since her husband's time...*". Bailo Giustinian affirmed that "*Mentre governò Giorgi, al*

quale per il privilegio degl'eunuchi era permesso trattar personalmente con lei...”, Kösem Valide Sultan met with Grand Vizier Gürcü Mehmed Pasha in person by the privilege of eunuchs, but even they could be met, there must be a curtain between them, since Islamic law forbade to talk them without it. Another interesting information from Giustinian; *“...che adheriva ai suoi [Gürcü Mehmed Pasha] consigli, et il re a quei della madre...”*, bailo discovered an administration circle that; Gürcü Mehmed Pasha used to effect Kösem Valide Sultan by his advices when they met, and Queen Mother used to give those advices to her son, Murad IV, so bailo concluded that *“...bastava haver il medesimo Giorgi ben impresso...”*, accordingly; *“...it was sufficient to leave a good impression on Gürcü...”*. His son-in-law Kapudan Pasha was also Kösem Sultan’s puppet; as *“everybody and all important decisions depend on Her will”*. But the bailo added that Sultan Murad IV’s respect and affection, which he had showed towards his mother was started to decline end of Giustinian’s bailate.

Giustinian described Murad IV’s physical appearance and his character, wrote that he was more beautiful than his ancestors, and did not have neither *“Osman II’s pride”* nor *“Mustafa’s stupidity”* and affected His subjects to a great extent. As we wrote in the second chapter that ambassadors meet with the sultans only twice, and could not look to the sovereigns directly, so we do not know how many times Giustinian met with the sultan, but gave pretty much detail about him, as he saw many times. The bailo noted that the Sultan was quite moderate and successful in horse-riding, gun shooting, hunting, gardening, literate studies, briefly in all of them; and had no weakness against women. Murad IV used to attend in arz and Imperial Divan diligently, and wrote telhis’ on His hatt-i humayûns on previous days, during Giustinian’s bailate, and everyone appreciated to these behaviors of

Him. He used to go to mosque almost every Friday, observed the city and the people, and admitted their petitions. Murad IV, used to go out suddenly without assistance of the Viziers, also at night, since He wanted to follow the condition of city in abundance.

Giustinian said that “...*perché essendo nel corso del mio bailaggio per le continue sollevationi delle militie et sovversione di tutte le cose...*”, because of the incessant rebellions of the soldiers; “...*seguite frequentissime mutationi de’ primi visiri, che nel spatio di sette anni dicisette se ne son fatti...*”, seventeen grand viziers came to the administration, but both according to the Ottoman sources only thirteen grand viziers came to the administration and also Giustinian mentioned about only thirteen grand viziers in his relazione. Giustinian wrote this argument on the fiftieth page of his Relazione and we put this page in the appendices. Bailo continued that “...*molto studio devono poner i baili della Serenità Vostra in guadagnarselo, in che ho io convenuto poner grandissimo...*”, the baili of *la Serenissima* had to make too much effort to gain these grand viziers’ positive disposition, since the baili and the other ambassadors negotiated the matters with them not with sovereigns, “*buono o cattivo esito*”, “*good or bad results*” depended on to get grand viziers’ “*buona o contraria dispositione*”, “*positive or opposite disposition*”. And only in 1622 five grand viziers were being deposed so, “*fatto masul*”, one was executed and seventh one was charged for grand vizierate, Giustinian added that, “*nova et duplicata industria mi voleva per ben disporlo*”, he had to make again and double effort to gain positive disposition of new grand vizier. But still the grand viziers had great horror, when they accompanied to the Sultan when he was going to the mosque, or when they were called by the Sultan as to whether there was any memorial against them, or the Sultans called for them to castigate.

Giustinian conveyed that in the all disorder, confusion and chaos *“Fu per ultimo rimedio dato il governo a Mehemet Giorgi, con universale speranza che nella sua invecchiata prudenza dovesse trovar qualche quiete...”*, Gürcü Mehmed Pasha was considered as the last remedy with common hope, since he was the oldest, and experienced high-rank official with his prudence in the Sublime Porte, and was appointed to the grand vizierate, but the bailo added that, *“...ma ben tosto si conobbe che niuna prudenza era bastante a fermar le cose tanto trascorse...”* it was understood soon that no prudence was enough to stop the things which went off the rails so much. And according to Giustinian the old Ka-im makam Gürcü Mehmed Pasha’s death was one of the things that sultan Murad IV affected most and the other one was loss of Baghdad, *“...nella perdita di Babilonia et nell’haver alle volte convenuto ceder all’ingiuste voglie delle militie, particolarmente nella morte di Giorgi...”*.

As Giustinian wrote that when Mere Hüseyin Pasha returned from Cairo, was appointed to the grand vizierate by Mustafa I. According to Giustinian Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha had *“...di natura violentissima..., ...uomo astuto et ardito...”* very violent nature, astute and daring, also he *“...tutto intento a guadagnar, con gran profusion d’oro...”* only aimed to gain large amounts of gold. Giustinian conveyed that He was assaulted by Janissaries threatening, *“...minacciando che non havendo perdonato alla vita del proprio re, meno perdonerino...”*, they did not even forgive their own King’s life, not forgive the bailo’s life. According to the bailo *“...soliti prima ricorrer al visir e in Divano per ricercar giustizia nelle lor pretensioni col bailo della Serenità Vostra per li occorrenti successi...”* the bailo of *la Serenissima* used to appeal to the Sublime Porte, -Divan or to the Viziers for justice before but at that time *“...ricorrevano alla forza et violenza de sphai et giannizzeri...”* they had to appeal to the violence and force of the Sipahis and the

Janissaries who “...*spinti dalla speranza del guadagno et dalla infuria barbarie...*”, pushed by the barbarian fury and the hope of gaining money. But, maybe because of these reasons Giustinian criticized that Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha’s behavior that gave more freedom to the soldiers and did whatever they asked, and this caused only acting the soldiers more untamed and brought more disorder. The Ottoman sources confirm Giustinian’s other narration about Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha’s, such as expelling his rivals Gürcü Mehmed Pasha and Damat Halil Pasha, and then his deposition, but interesting part is, “...*di ricusar di render il sigillo al re et offerirlo a loro*” when Grand Vizier Mere Hüseyin Pasha was deposed, he refused to submit the seal to the Sultan but offered to the soldiers who rebelled against Pasha.

Giustinian completed his mission in 1627, when Damat Halil Pasha was Grand Vizier. Halil Pasha was sent to Baghdad by Murad IV, and before he left Istanbul Giustinian visited him and complained about Emin of Aleppo who had been extorting Venetian merchants, and this complain repeated by Venetian Consul Pesaro when Grand Vizier Damat Halil Pasha arrived in Aleppo, and “...*lo punì col capital castigo...*”, “...*he was castigated severely...*” by Grand Vizier. Again before Damat Halil Pasha left Istanbul, Giustinian presented the request of Franciscan’s priests in Jerusalem that “...*levò da quel governo il bassà che li travagliava...*”, be deposed Pasha of Aleppo who was troubling the priests and “...*lo conferì a Mehemet...*”, be conferred Mehmed on Pasha of Aleppo’s position who had good disposition for Venice. We mentioned in the second chapter that one of baili’s mission was to protect Venetian consuls in the Levant, it was seen that Giustinian did his duty very well. And Giustinian was sure about Halil Pasha’s good disposition for the Republic, and if “*se egli fosse ritornato alla Porta nel grado medesimo havrebbe esercitata la sua auctorità negl’interessi di lei*” he could be kept his rank after he returned

to Istanbul, he would use his authority for interests of Venice, as he did during the former baili's time. Since, Damat Halil Pasha had hostility against Spain, and always supported that Ottoman Empire's keeping the peace with Venice.

Since, Damat Halil Pasha failed against Persian and rebellious Abaza Mehmed Pasha, could not keep his grand vizierate position when he returned to Istanbul, and Hüsrev Pasha was appointed to the grand vizierate after Giustinian left. According to the Ottoman sources Hüsrev Pasha was of Bosnian origin, but Giustinian conveyed that was of "*...È egli di nazione albanese...*", "*was of Albanian origin*". But both sources agreed on his bravery while he was fighting against Abaza Pasha as Agha of Janissaries under Grand Vizier Damat Halil Pasha. Giustinian thought that Abaza Mehmed Pasha could not keep Baghdad alone against Hüsrev Pasha, but if Hüsrev could be taken back Baghdad from Abaza "*...cresceria grandemente di credito et di riputatione, et si stabiliria per gran pezzo nel primo grado...*" his credit and dignity will increase so much and he will secure his first-rank position in the Sublime Porte. And if Giustinian would be right in his guess, Hüsrev Pasha's friendship will be so worthy for The Most Serene Republic, and the bailo did not forget to recommend that "*...sarà officio della prudenza dell'illustrissimo signor console in Aleppo coltivar il suo animo verso la Serenissima Republica...*", "*...it will be prudent of the most illustrated gentleman Consul of Aleppo to cultivate His spirit towards The Most Serene Republic...*", when Hüsrev Pasha was in Venetian Consul's area, as Giustinian did when Hüsrev Pasha was in Istanbul.

On the contrary of the Ottoman sources, Giustinian mentioned about Ka'im makam Receb Pasha very positive, such as sagacious, industrious and cooperated with other Ottoman officials, since "*...che molto bene conscio di sé stesso di non esser per sé solo bastante a tanto peso promise al re di non resolver cosa alcuna importante da sé solo ...*",

he was aware of he could not carry on his own all the responsibilities. But bailo added that he acquired his *ka-im makamlık* position by the help of his wife, who was sister of Murad IV, and was loved by Valide Sultan and Sultan very much. Since Receb Pasha cooperated with the most mature and logical dignitaries, Giustinian said that the Republic, “... *non è da temersi nel suo governo d'improprie et precipitose resolutioni...*”, “... *not have to fear the improper and precipitous resolutions of this state...*”

As well as important events and people, Giustinian also discussed several specific issues about Venetian merchants or officials that he had to negotiate at the Sublime Porte, for example the Bosnian merchants who asked their loss from the bailo Giustinian; when Venetian Captain Tine plundered a Janissaries' merchandise, he came to Istanbul to ask his losses the bailo Giustinian, since he was responsible from all Venetian subjects in Levant; when the Venetians attacked to an Ottoman official's galley Giustinian had to solve the problem at the Porte; and when any problem occurred at the Ottoman-Venetian frontiers again Giustinian had to deal with it. But, unfortunately Giustinian did not provide lot information about daily life of Ottomans or Ottoman cultural; but only politic, economic and military situation with important figures during his bailate, probably the aim of the *relazioni* was to serve the political interests of the Republic.

Giustinian expressed in his *Relazione* several times that the reputation the Republic of Venice in the Sublime Porte had been declining, and many errors and detriments were perpetrated before Him, and He had been obtained good disposition to the Republic of Venice's benefits day by day. But Giustinian asserted that, the baili and the officials of the Republic should have used “*a measured and moderate way, without evoking (the feeling of) slightest suspicion or scorn in spirits of Turks regarding They are valued too little; and*

nowadays doing this is much more needed than ever before. It is easy to impress someone who is in decline. It (valuing less and scorn) hurts the spirits of great people more austere and stimulates the wish for taking revenge from anyone.”

The last part of the last chapter was about Ottoman Empire's relations with the Papacy, Spain, Austria, and the three countries had residential ambassadors at the Sublime Porte other than Venice, which were England, France and Dutch. According to Giustinian, the Ottoman Empire remembered the Popes only with crusades and being the head of all the Christian Princes not with their power or force, and the Ottomans knew very well that only the Popes could organize a crusade against them. But Giustinian added that at that time a crusade seemed impossible since, “...*ma suscitarsi manifeste discordie et dissensioni tra di loro...*” there was a manifest discord and dissension among the Christian states. Since, the Ottoman Empire was in a real trouble it could be easier to attack to Istanbul, and Giustinian included even the Christian slaves in Istanbul to his attacking plan. But he lamented that this occasion had not been embraced with naval and land forces by the Christian Princes, and the opportunity had already gone. And the bailo stated that the dignitaries of the Sublime Porte recognized this danger and had been living within such fear.

Between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans neither peace nor war was long lasting, besides since Emperor had a civil war in Germany, wanted to make peace with the Ottoman but according to the bailo this peace could be dangerous for Venice, and Giustinian did whatever he could to make it not come true with the help of the residential ambassador at the Porte; England and Dutch, but without France. When Spain offered to the Ottoman Empire an alliance in the Valtellina War against Venice, Giustinian and the other

ambassadors at the Porte impeded it by bribes and presents, “... non solo restò interrotta la trattazione, ma anche fatto partir da Costantinopoli il Montalbano senza haver voluto admetterlo alla sua presenza...” and the negotiation between the embassy and the Porte not only interrupted but also he sent back from Istanbul, even Gürcü Mehmed Pasha did not accepted him in his presence. Giustinian stressed that he warned the England and Dutch ambassadors about not to make too much expense and not to exert too much effort, but as much their own as, since not to impel Turkish Ministers into suspicion and make the matter more expensive and difficult for Them. According to Giustinian jealousy and disagreement between Spain and the Ottomans never finished but the bailo could not understand how they wanted to make peace with the Ottomans and to have a residential ambassador at the Porte as Habsburgs.

The relations of the Ottoman Empire with England and France were very different from the Spain and Austria, since they had never a war by that time and had good commercial relations. Also Ottoman officials thought that England never accept a crusade alliance against the Ottomans and the most important thing England was still selling to the Ottomans war material which was refused by the other Christian states, but Dutch and England. For France, even though the French ambassador's failures at the Porte, still Ottomans remembered the antique agreement between Süleyman I and Francis I, and still “...et chiamano quel solo re tra gl'altri christiani col nome di padisa, che vuol dir imperator...” only the King of France was called as Padishah which was meant Emperor, all among Christian states. Giustinian confessed that in the all European countries the England was the most successful one in the Levant trade with their marvelous and powerful galleys. Maybe the most interesting discussion of Giustinian in this part was where he talked about the precedence problem between the ambassadors of England and France. The

bailo said that both of them were instructed by their Kings that never let the precedence to another ambassador. And this problem between two ambassadors, “*Da che nasce che non potendosi per tali competenze unir insieme tutti quattro li ambasciatori per trattar li affari et interessi communi con quei ministri...*”, impeded to unify all four residential-ambassadors with the common interests and negotiate at the Sublime Porte. Giustinian praised the activities of the ambassador of Dutch. Only twenty years passed on starting diplomatic relations with the first residential ambassador of *Paesi Bassi*, but he gained a lot of dignity at the Porte with his diligence, learnt Ottoman Turkish, had many important friends at the Porte, and by the help of these, Cornelis van Haga provoked the Ottoman Empire against Spain.

Giustinian presented in his *Relazione*, economic, politic, military and internal situation of the Ottoman Empire very well, and much important information about important figures and high-ranking officials of the Empire, its relations with European countries including the activities and position of the residential ambassadors at the Sublime Porte. We tried to reflect one of the most critical years of the Ottoman Empire by a Venetian bailo’s point of view, and how a bailo could penetrate to the Ottoman Empire’s internal and external affairs very well.

Soglia fino in
clusivo 224-

Minute di relazione di
Zorzi Giustinian, bailo
1627

(L'attribuzione si appoggia ad indizi interni -
Ad es. :

il bailaggio durato 7 anni (1620-1627);
iniziato sotto Osman (1618-1622) e
continuato sotto Mustafa (1622-1623), riassunto, da
Amurad (1623-1640); gli anni alle
guerre di Valtellina.) -

Ritrovate in un pezzo di atti restituiti
dall'Austria con inventari dell'Archivio
del Bailaggio del 1630-1631

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20

Zorzi
Justinian,
bailo
1627

L'ampietta dell'Imperio Romano si stende, et spazia in tutta
tutte le tre parti della terra, nelle quali possiede ben se
cinque Regni, o Prouincie sotto nome di Begherbegati, i quali
aquistati tutti, non per dritto d'eredità, ma per forza
della spada, in la quale fondano gli Romani ogni loro
ragione.

Abbraccia tutto questo vasto, et ampio Imperio, se si vuol
credere alla computatione de' Geographi, più di sedeci
mille miglia con una linea, che cominciando dai nostri
confini di Dalmatia camina per l'Albania, Morea,
et Grecia, sino à Costantinopoli; et circondando l'uno, et
l'altro lido del Mar Magg: ritorna allo stretto della med
Città, et per la Capamania, et Siria passa nell'Egitto, et nelle
Marene d'Africa sino allo stretto di Gibilterra, di donde tor
a dietro con un'altra linea per li suoi confini tenenti si
giunge sin al Mar Oceano meridionale, et dal Mar Rosso
si va à ritrouar l'Eufrate, et di là il Tigris nel seno Persico,
et giunto al Tanai, si ritorna nell'Europa; et di qua, et
di là dal Danubio molto allargandosi, si riduce in Italia,
terminando finalmt. nella Croazia verso li nostri confini
del Friuli, da quali, sino à quelli di Persia, et è la magg

5. 3
deuota della religione, et per le intollerabili oppressioni sarian
pronti a ribellarsi, come dalle inuasioni dei nemici esterni
per l'obbligo de Tamarotti di difender li confini: tanto piu
potenti in loro, quanto con essi uengono a conseruar li riu
beni proprii, et queste sono appo Turchi le ueri Piatte,
et forse per la sicurezza del loro Imp^{rio}, onde uale,
che in tanta ampiezza ne se siano possistime.

è comune opinione che il trattamento delle dette milizie
di Tamarro alla turca, che fanno in dell'ora ualuta
importi piu di quindici milioni d'oro all'anno, et che
se si deuenisse al presente a un nuovo estimo, si adde
pierebbe quasi la D.^a somma, et per consequenza il r^{do}
di esse milizie; ma chi arbitra, in tanta committella, et
predominio d'esse, applicarui il pensiero.

Que la prim^a Cavalteria di Sp^{ra}i di paga, et di Tamarro,
militano anco a cavallo nell'occasioni di guerra douente
Ciampi, alreocanti Lapigi, et cinquacento Madoferaji, cioè
sante guerriere, et assistono sempr alla persona Reale, et
tutti questi uengono anco in tempo che quei trattenuti

il carico con maggi. et assoluta libertà, et indipendenza
dal Primo Tesor, ma solo dal Re: Hora, per la provvision
del denaro, et altre convengono passar glie me mani,
et dipender della sua volontà.

Spesita al presente la carica
delle conditioni del g^o partito a suo luogo.

D'altri anni in qua non s'è veduta in Mare Armata

Turkesca maggi. di 60. in 70. galee in tutto comprese
le guardie, et del tempo del mio Bailaggio non è mai
nel Bianco arrivata a tal numero, essendo ogni anno

stati costretti a mandarne nel Nero contra Crauh. g^o de
parte, et in questi ultimi quasi tutta con l'istessa gestione
del Cap: Pasa, restando nel Bianco sole 15 o 20
galee sotto il Pasa di Rodi con titolo di suo luogo.

In tutti anni del mio Bailaggio, non ho veduto mai
uscir di Cost. per il Mar Bianco Armata maggi. di
20 galee, et queste anno molto deboli, sformite d'uomini
da remo, et da spada, et di molti appartenenti.

delle milizie, et delle paghe guardate, e aumentate, è costretto
 il Re ben spesso supplire coi denari del t.º Casia, nel qual
 non entrando più d'alcuni anni in qua li 600 scellini
 del Casia del Casio applicati con altri dell'Alia alle guerre
 di Persia, ma solo la metropoli e la bestia povera, ne
 potendo bastar li proventi straordinarij in loro
 ricambio, conviene la D.ª soma de' doi milioni per
 necessità andar scemando; onde certa cosa è, che man-
 cando alla M.ª sua il denaro, con la copia del quale
 loro potremo li tuoi maggiori condur a felice fine tante
 importanti imprese, non sarà a ci arca per tal
 mancamento facile il farlo. È comune
 opinione d'alla morte di Sultan Somet suo Padre si
 trouar nel t.º Casia la soma di Sei milioni di scellini,
 de quali tre ne firon spesi nell'assuntioni di Sultan
 Mustafa, et di Sultan Osman per li soliti donatini alle
 milizie di Gianni Meir di 20 scellini per uno, et all'
 spai di mille asini; la qual soma, se ben fu molto presto

per tutti ^{l'imp.} & amministrano con tanta sicurezza, consistendo
ogni prova di qual si voglia controversia nel solo detto de
testimoni; senza sentenze, o dispute d'Avocati, et senza
dilationi, & termini; nelle quali, come sopra ricordiamo noi,
con Turchi marcano tanto, et è difficile a terminar qual
sia magg. discordia. Questo è certo, non esservi loggia
parte alc. di tutto il corpo di quel governo più questa, et
cornata di questa, per l'assidia di essi Sadi, che la rendono
veratissima, et per la copia de testimoni falsi, de quali
si fa publico mercato, donde nascono le tante rancie con
loro aggravio de Christiani, il testimonio de quali non
valendo contra Turchi, ma ben il loro contra Christiani
convergono esser oppressi.

Alli med. Sadi è anco raccomandata in ciascuna Città la cura
delle vitouaglie, et dell'abbondanza con la limitation del
prello à quasi tutte le cose, et quello di Costantino poli in
compagnia del Primo Visir caualca ogni Mercanti per la
Città per ouciar all'inganni con altri buoni ordini, quando

finco

Per ciò vedendosi le milizie così mal riconosciute, molte volentieri
mettersi à rischio, molti si astenevano dalle facioni, et tutti
mormoravano contra il Re; il quale curioso di girar li
loro senti, uagando la notte incognito per l'esercito, ebbe
à sentir discorsi sediziosi, che facevano le milizie contra la
sua persona à favor di Muscaffa hio Tio, sopra certo aiuto
sparsi nel Campo che il Popolo di Cost. li Planesi levato di
senaglio, et riportato nella Sede Regal; dicono che questa con-
turbasse, come è credibile, somando l'animo di Anon, et
fue principal cagione di ritirarsi da quella impresa, et
di aquartarsi il manca^{do} di viveri, et molte altre
contrarietà, che la rendono difficile, gli faua pensar
l'oculiva all'accordo, che per esperienza il disordine della
ritirata si sparsi, esser seguito con gran suo vantaggio; et
ricorrevano in Andrinopoli pieno di mal talento, e uolano
contra le milizie, li contristate quasi tutte, giunse con
pochi à Cost. et come ben del suo uolto, et portan^{to} si

delle milizie di tralasciar dal viaggio, et darli le teste del
Vitor, et altri, che l'aucauro persuaso, come era d'animo grande,
non uoleua consentirli alcuna, ma il Cicalan, et altri, che
gl'era attorno, et spemmano con cio' acquistarsi, et essersi
dal pericolo, lo inducessero a consentir la prima; et mandò a
farli saper, che non si saua più partito; le milizie non
contente di questo, et persistendo in uoler le teste richieste,
si spinsero più oltre verso il Semaglio, sequitate del Popolo
per le strade, che per la uia detta, ma l'olulato, fuilm.
l'uni con esse, uide molto pusto, la moltitudine si fece grande;
non deuenendo però quel giorno ad altra uolenta, che
all'inuasion, et salvaggio della Casa del Vitor, loro, et alcuni
altri, che si salvarono con la fuga, consumando il rimanente
di quel giorno in reciproche ambasciate da loro al Re, et del
Re a loro, et sopraggiunte dalla notte, et da una gran pioggia
si dispersirono, et ridussero alle lor stalle. La mattina grassa
tra era la notte, che il Re in tuoco di assatir alla richiesta

farlo furono molto presto illustri; egli, et Calil da
una solitudine di milizie conose dal pres. Cassin
abanti; et espulsi, et egli ritornato nel 7.^{mo} grado; et
poco prima fatte esser med.^{ne} pagar il fio con la morte
à Daut, di quella di Osman, nella quale successe cosa
degnà di consideratione della Divina vendetta contra
li Regicidij hinde infedeli; che condotto Daut nel
cortile del Ducato al supplicio, nel punto dell' executione;
fù da non so che uoci tra le milizie impedito, et condotto
alle sette torri; dove poi il giorno appo gli fù levata la citta
nell' istessa prigione d' egli l' haueua levata al suo Re.
Con queste fluctuationi di perpetui moti et agitationi
andavano manifestam^{te} penitendo le cos di quell
Imp.^{nia}, et magg.^{te} sotto il reauato gouerno di Cassin; il
quale col med.^{ne} fine del primo, di tenersi con la professione
et con la licenza ben affese le milizie, et assicurato Mastalla

nell' Imp.^{nia}

è stato più per li suoi consigli della Madre, che per instinto suo proprio si dimostra particolarmente lontano dall'orgoglio, pertinacia, avaritia, et altri vizi di Soltan Osman, che se ben nei domi, et nelle spese non procede con quella larghezza, et liberalità, che fu propria de suoi Magg.^{ri}, et convenia alla tua età, viene attribuito à prudenza, et non ad avaritia per haver trovato li Casati esanti, et le spese tanto accresciute, che la Madre, la quale in tempo di Soltan Ahmet suo marito solea esser profeta.^m, hora nè anch'essa sopra modo riservata: Professa sopra tutto governarsi non di tua testa, come faceva Osman, ma col Cons. de suoi Ministri, et non del solo Primo Vizir, come era l'uso de suoi Magg.^{ri}, ma per via di consulta tra li più principali, abbruciando le loro risolute.^m; et non è dubbio che continuando in questo instituto, sarà la M.^{te} tua molto meglio consigliata, e servita; si tiene però et il timor del caso del fiasello, et la prudenza della Madre lo facino caminor

Ho dato che tutto il peso del governo di questo Imperio è riposto
sopra le spalle del Primo Vice, il quale esercitandolo con
suprema autorità, è, dopo il Re, il solo et assoluto arbitro
et director di tutte le cose, Vicegerente di S. M.^{ta} a cui sola,
et non ad altri s'ha da renderne conto. A lui s'indirizzano
l'Amb.^{re} de Principi nei lor negotij, il cui buono, o cattivo
esito dipendendo in gran parte dalla sua buona o contraria
dispositione, molto studio devono poner i Prati della
Sext.^{ta} Vice in guadagnarcelo. in che ho io convenuto poter
grandissimo, perche essendo nel corso del mio Pratiaggio per
le continue Mutationi delle militia, et conversione di tutte
le cose seguite frequent^{me} mutationi de Primi Vice, che
nel spatio di sette anni, dicessero se ne son fatti, forte piu,
che in so per l'adictio, quando mi trovauoauer fatto acquisto
della sua uolontà, restò informato dei negotij, et sen disparto,
ueniva deporto, et fatto Masul, et auantone an nouo, per il
piu di genio, et pensieri contrari all'altro; Hora, et
duplicata industria mi uoleua per sen disparto, et non

Quoniam cum Sultan Osman, et resto Caesarea in suo loco
Semet patrio di esse, à cui saucendo egli prima del partito
raccomodato a esse: ma li nostri interessi, et sollecitudine
da tali operatoⁿⁱ di giorno in giorno la dignità della
Reg. alla Porta, governandoci anco seio u. stile med.^{no}
superai molti litigi, et pretesioni, et se ben gran.
importanti, per non dar tedio tralascio, non uolo sentu
alcuna pena, ma ne anco con l'anticipato e bene di pochi
giorni della pensione del Conte da lui p' urgenti
bisogni con qualche int.^o richiedem, tanto che l' tempo
fino nell' animo di abster li preiudizij, et di spuntar
li negotij, non con la forza dell' oro, ma con quella del
uigor, et dell' autorità come principal alleuam.^{to} della
publica reputatione.

Tornò dalla guerra il Re et seio Diakuest ~~creato~~ creato
in Campo Primo Uic, di natione Croato, fero, et uicidit

poter indurmi al suo intento, ti condotti a Licio per ottenerlo
dal Conte Barbarini Padre del presente; al quale tutto d
il mio esempio, et per i miei conforti non mancò la costanza,
non suffi però l'animo a resistere alle tue minacce et alle
minacce del Capitano Ratta & iui ti trovava tutto con l'
Armata, et s'indusse di soddisfare con l'ebbero tra denaro e
robbe gl'ultima di come appar per
conto all' tua buona moderazione, et io a tua richiesta a V. S.
presso la quale tuo figlio Conte presente al mio partire mi
ha più volte instato di intercedere gl' sua reintegrazione. Come
ha fatto or ora con tue lettere. Il Cav. S. Paolo Venier; postato
con Conte l'estrema necessità, & a ciò costretto tuo Padre s'
evitar l'evidente pericolo della vita, che della fortuna de
Jeaninleni costant^{te} gli soprastava, et la rovina della tua
Casa gl' dalla istessa benignità della S. M. non resistettero.
Et invero, da quello prouai io dall'impeto, et uolente de
Jeaninleni gl' miei or^{ma de}; m'assicuro che da estrema necessità
il Conte sia stato sforzato a quell' estremo; et se non ha
potuto seguir il mio esempio, non merita però d' essere

in coperto

Seuendo il sud. capo doppo molti mesi, et instante in
quell'Isola potuto ottener cosa alca, tornato à Cost. li,
et ricorso à Eiarinelli, sollecio buon n.º di loro col solito
favor, et impeto, non solo contra di me, ma contra il (Amiran
meo, il quale commosso dal pericolo, mi mandò pi. drag.
à dire, che io donetti: per ogni modo dar sodisfat.º à costui,
poiche non facendolo; ne egli, ne io, ne loro sette uano in piedi;
che furono apunto le formalità tue parole, uenificate poco
doppo nella sua persona con la sua morte, causata per
per sollecito de Eiarinelli per la causa ^{namata} ~~de~~ di
sopra. Da che puoi ben comprender la legg.º Ma
la grandezza dei pericoli che ti correua dalle sol. sollecito,
la quali però non hebbe in me tanta forza di farmi deuenir
dal mio fermo proponim.º effettuato in tutto il corso del
mio Bailaggio di abolir l'uso de' fatti rifacim.º, et
la precezione stabilita in Turchi, che il Bailo fac.º con.º
della legg.º Ma, et obligato à risarcirti: cosa di simi
preiudici et dipendi; onde, à qua ragione io nel

L'accomodato del rege de castilia fu reputato con la
quale si seguì, giorno grandemte all'aggiustamto di
quello della galia, ^{da tal ultimo} ~~perche~~ auedendosi il Cap.º Panni più
ardente d'ogni altro, che io non laueri in maniera alla condessato
alle sue immoderate pretensioni, tentò con forma rona, e
captiosa di occien il suo intento, et chiamati a se i Dragomani
degl'altre Corti. auo venuti de settimoni; fece alla
presenla loro et di molti Turchi storsani Bernis la soma di
seimille ceurini ~~de suoi proprii~~ ^{et} da un Cadi formon
Coetto, che gli e li storsani de suoi proprii, usando a suo questo
artificio per recatarm per questa via à coninciar à
piegar ^{uolendo} et à suoi disegni, i quali molto bene da me conosciuti
et li giudicati grandi, che ne risulteriano alli interessi publi;
quando nelle pntension di si fuimto i Ministri grandi della
Porta, notando esser del lor proprio denaro, ne uenno la
Sept. 1700 in recata di ritirarsi, feci con luiarmi molto
chiaro intender à **S. M.** riuscir uani; et all'accomodamto
seguito poi con Bernis, annallar dal mes. 1700. Panni il
D. suo Coetto, come con la med. reputacion, et dignità della

Sept. 1700

à mi tempo
~~da loro~~, et dalla Porta con tanto ~~fermo~~ arden di giudicar
~~quelli~~, che nascono coi Bailli della Rep^{ta}; ma
veire sempre ~~mi~~ da me, et tornai abolita nel modo
st^o sopra detto; poiche stato sempre in così lungo
corso d'anni et dei negotij fermo, et costante ~~sempre~~
contra gl' ^{crimini} ~~vizi~~ i fonti dei Vizi, et ~~esse~~ in ^{adibitione} nel compier
mai alla lor p^{re}nta conforme al segno ^{imp^{re}} della me
operato, sono final^{te} à poco à poco delirati, et unosi
da tal p^{re}ensione intanto che Canein offendi (Adibitione
della Grecia, nel fatto della Salea fero al Re sopra questo
punto la risposta in scritto, che la ~~sesta~~ ^{sesta} ~~ma~~ ^{ha} ~~inter~~ con
la quale, vedendo dalla propria confessione dell' istesso
Adibitione di aron^{te} deciso, è del tutto posta in bilancia
Al mio partir lasciai il d^o Canein in quel carico; doppo,
intendo esser stato deposto, et me ne duole; potendo io
costantem^{te} affermar che S^o W^o Ca^o, non trovarsi soggiti^o
soggetti à quella Porta di più sincera, et cordale disposit^o
nesso di esse, ne che più si stracci, et viscerato nei suoi interes
si, ne che nell'oc^o ^{mi} ardua et difficile si riuscito di mag^o
servizio, et frutto; poiche congiunta all'affetto, et alla sincerità
he ^{me} ~~chiamato~~

^{di quelle}
et della dote favorita ancora, non emendo tanto onice
l'occasione di parlarne, non si possono, come è ben
noto alla Ser.^{ta} P.^a, conseguir, ne conservar senza
dispendio; principal, anzi unico alimento delle
amicizie. ~~Tutore~~ : Et senza il quale presto calano,
et si scordano. tutto è mio, che i Banchi della Ser.^{ta} P.^a,
temperando con prudente adeguata misura il solo del
servizio con quello del risparmio del denaro pub.^{co},
procedano in una tanto importante con quella misura
et misura, et è conveniente; et sopra tutto stabi-
liscano nel loro animo ~~la~~ dignità, et reputat.^{one}
della Ser.^{ta} P.^a, et il merito di lor med.^{esime} ~~si~~ consiste
in superar le difficoltà, et sguantarli negotij senza
spesa con la forza dell'ingegno, ed con quella dell'oro;
la qual anzi usata dai Banchi con ~~pericolosa~~ ^{lavorosità}, et lubrità,
preiudica alla dignità, infrahit la ragione, snema
e indebita il regno, che ~~si~~ si deve princi-
palmente sostenere con la forza di essa, col ~~recorso~~
uigor della trattation, et con la costanza dell'animo

30. n
servizi di Russia, che presidiavano da Tartari nelle
Polonia, mandati a venderà Cost. ^{la}, comprati da Turchi,
et abbracciata la loro setta, più con l'apparenza, et con la
volontà, quasi indifferentemente per tutti li donagli,
et cose d'ogni condition di persone, piccioli, et
grandi, et la maggior parte, per il buon servizio et
prestano ai Patroni Turchi, alieni per natura dai
braccagli, et curi familiari, con tutto il maneggio
nelle lor mani; et quindi più impedita, congiunti con
Cosachi, per Patria, per sangue, et per religione
nutriversi ~~con~~ secreta intelligenza con loro, d'almeno
disposizione tale che in tanta confusione, et moto, a
ogni ~~partito~~ ^{strepito} dei med. Cosachi in Mar nero, et ~~in~~
~~strepito~~ d'Armata Christiana nel bianco, fossero pronti
a sollevarsi contra i Patroni Turchi delle crocchie
de' habitazioni, et le guardie di vita, et fatti princi-
pali nelle vicine M^{te}, et dell'armi, uniti con li Greci della
med. lor religione, come ho detto a numero 10. in
quella città, la quale uassiti ^{ma}, et senza altro ^{comanda}
o forte, et a loro, et predomina, ~~concederli~~ ^{appartenere}

L'Imp^o di continuar armato nell' Alemagna, come
 si erano, et distornato dall' implicarsi in ^{nuov³} guerre
 di essa: Conuendou pur anco l'ordinassi^o qual^o
 sospetto delle cose de Turchi per la poca fermezza
 et stabilita dell' altr² capitali: concludi tra loro,
 piu alterabili nella parte piu uolentia de Cesari
 nell' auanzaggio delle conditioni estorte dalle armate
 de Turchi le quali s'auanti assai con gl' ultimi
 successi della debellato^{ne} d' Abassia, et mutato
 del Tartaro potrebbano ancora interbidarla, de
 paria poi il ~~uoto~~ totale, et sicuro ritegno d' ogni
 mouim^{to} d' Imp^o contra questa Prouincia.

Si meliori rispetti, et fini, che era moss^o l' Imp^o alle vicinate
 della pace con Turchi, massero anco in tempo che mio Paragista
 il Pre^o C^o: a ricercan non per uie dissimulate a secrete
 come per l'abitato, ma espresse et patenti le creque con loro
 venisse dall' sp^o dell' Amb^o: jaghem. e qui miei nel mese
 con precipitacioni prima del Montalbano inuiato dal
 ho di papa sapu^o xeno^o. =
 Vie de ~~Montalbano~~, et doppo di da altro Personaggio ambi
 sei per li uffici dei med^o. Amb^o: et miei, et di quello di Francia
 che a ~~l'interuente~~ di al pratica l'adagio per ordinar

110.
vi spedisci quel Re per decreto della Dieta un' Ambasciata,
con titolo di Grande, con molta pompa, come a mio
sempre feci il Duca di Savoia per la pace di Costin.
quella guerra, seguita nel principio del mio Règno,
come quando grandem^{te} appo Turchi la reputatione
delle forze di quel Regno, con feci chiaram^{te} conoscer
la sua potenza più atta d'ogn'altra a resistere, et
venturara la Turchica, non lauedo un' nemico
numeror^{no}: di più 600, ~~però~~ con la propria poss
si Sultan Osman potuto non spantar le sincere
di Costin diffidat Polacco, non maggior di 100, onde
si recitatosi Osman abbracciar la pace, et partir
con quella indignatione contra le sue milizie, prima, et
precipua cagione della sua rovina. Euto il punto
della qual^{pa} considerato, nel contener, l'uno li Cosachi,
et l'altro li Tartari dall'infestationi, ambi doi diffidat^{no}.
L'esperienza di tant'anni ha dimostrato, il poter
tra Polacchi, e Turchi promettermi mai lunga, et
sicura pace, e tanto meno al presente che prima et successa

Principi di Christianità in ^{pace è almeno in} una quasi sicura quiete; ^{115.}
Ma da questo enderò rappresenta addo i Principi Mussal-
mani et della loro terra, ne derà tutto il Contrario; Et una
quali fatal ~~convenzione~~ delle cose; che dove per ogni
ragione Divina et Humana, sanebbono i Principi ^{più} Cristiani
nella presente debolezza de Turchi, esser uniti alla loro
oppressione et i Mussalmani a sostentant^o; ogni una
delle parti ^{da ciò} altera, ~~essendo~~ et in se stessa divisa esser
a perturbar e lacerar se med^{esime}; ma con tanto maggior ^{più}
l^{oro}, et nota lei più quanto l'opportunità se gli
offeriva più grande al vantaggio della fede, et di lor
^{di} med^{esime}.
Nellaq^{ue} et più potente Principe tra Mussalmani sopra il Re-
de Turchi, è quello di Persia; colui gl'a potenza delle sue
forze, benche non parangonate a quelle dell'altro, come
per il reator de Abbas Sofi; che regna al presente, e nell'
arte della guerra et della paci, tra i più legni et celebri
del suo secolo, stimato et amato da Turchi sopra ogni
altro, possiede risolutiva nel principio del suo Regno con
generosità più altror, di ~~comparar~~ ciraver per
folla d'arme dalle mani degli ^{Uomini} tutto ciò, de

partorito alcun buon effetto per esser da per tutto
 l'indiretta perdita; cosa, et non so ben conosciuta
 nella stessa p^{re} di questi C^o. Senato s'è indotto
 à procurar qualche rimedio da se med^o. con quelle
 institutio^{ne} di navigazione con Eleoni, et Eubel
 Grossi p^{re} l'ipso, et Siria, et non si pratica, et che, è g^o.
 si potesse anco gl'altro scali del Levante, partorisse
 senza dubbio il med^o buon effetto. Ho li antio
 per un p^{re}to, come molti altri qualche dubbio, et uenim^{te}
 dalla Porta non li procedem^o in questo affar^e con
 la debita sincerità, et che anzi si godem^o dei nostri danni
 dai pred^{ti} Barbanschi, et che però più per d^o uster,
 che per non poterli permettem^o; ma in proposito di
 qualche tempo ho da molte parti chissam^{te} conosciuto
 il contrario; et che il Gran^o et i Ministri toccando
 comandano i danni, et preiudicij proprij, et risulzano
 ai Casi della M^{te} da questi Corsi, et alla reputa^o
 anco, che temano per ogni ~~modo~~ di Bonaria
 qualche compenso, e ritardarano l'ordine et
 insolentia di coloro à Turchi med^o: diuenuta insopportabile.

potendo con gran facilità uscir in campagna con venti
e più mille cavalli, et penetrar nei Stati di S. M.^{ta}
come per quelli de Turchi confinanti, prova sempre
ad unirsi seco, et non è dubbio, che lo nouo d'esso
Principe sariano propiamente per far à quelli dell'
Imp.^o contra l'Italia gagliarda diuersione, quando però
il Re Christiano. ^{no} gli con darne tocchi di sopra non
lo uellet perduto seco ogni fede, et ~~questo~~ ^{patrimonio} da
quei pensien, di conuenir anco esso contra la Casa
d'Austria insieme con gli altri, nei quali si mostraua
ardenti. ^{no} Ad ogni modo è seruitio della Ser.^{ta} V.^{ta}
conservarlo ben affetto, si per il predetto rispetto,
come per l'auuto, et fede, che tiene con la Porta, et
per l'inclinazione, che dimostra à questa Ser.^{ta} Imp.^o
la quale con auarellar i suoi detti, che qui capitano
y ouer di rege Merantide o y altro, et col uolere
al suo ualio di far alà Cost.^{ta} il med.^o sarà facile
il conservarlo. Soleua egli pagar alla Porta
40 toleri di tributo annuo, ma d'alcuni anni in qua
in riguardo delle grax da lui fatte nelle sue motte
d'arme contra l'Imp.^o ^{è stato} ~~non uellet~~ esentato: Nando

egli peio de j^o in j^o suoi Abbi con presento al
Re, et à Ministri, et vi tiene anco un suo Agente
Ord^{no}, et con uffⁱ et aiuti fatti portar da lui con
una finella, et artificio, nelle quali è peritissimo
si mantien^e come lo detto, puto Turchi in molta
reputato^{ne} et stima; havendo anco poco prima del
mio partir spuntato, quon più con gelosie, et invidia,
et con donatui o peghi, l'innestura di quel stato
dopo la sua morte, nella prima pessa sua moglie.
Sà egli molto bene l'odio, et gli portar l'Imp^o, et di
non poter mai arricarsi, ne; perciò è costretto
star ben con Turchi, et dipender da loro; et mandò in
via al presente con uffⁱ et dimostrato^{ne} travenendosi
con l'altro; col qual^e havendo già due anni confer-
mato le capitulationi, si può veder^e le mantien^e
senza gli torar il conto.

Picture 1. The Letter of Mehmed the Conqueror, in the dialect of the Venetian, on 24 April 1480.


Handwritten flourish or signature at the top of the page.

Large handwritten flourish or signature in the middle of the page.

Large handwritten flourish or initial at the start of the text.

Ich Michemet von dem geslochten Osman der
 Kayser der heiligen römischen kaiserlichen kaiserlichen
 zu Constanten ich ruffen die der Adel und ist
 kaiserliche von der unterwerdung hat die die die
 Slay Belgrin zu fünd gelogt mit sonder
 zehnung von der durchhandten feierliche
 freude kaiserliche griffen zu Ciel und
 und kaiserliche und fünf Thausend und
 freyhandet und fünf gilden Danten der
 und so hat mir die brief der kaiserliche frey
 von dem selber wegen der kaiserliche Belgrin
 stand geschicket Ayastay insonderlichen
 frey zu kaiserliche so die von kaiserliche kaiserliche
 die abgegraben fünf Thausend und freyhandet
 Danten das hat der kaiserliche und gilde und die
 meiste zehnt wegen der kaiserliche also von aller
 zehnt der abgegraben kaiserliche und kaiserliche
 hat auch so hat mir die kaiserliche zu
 kaiserliche geschicket zu kaiserliche die selber
 kaiserliche und alle geschicket die die kaiserliche
 und kaiserliche frey zu kaiserliche zehnt die kaiserliche
 kaiserliche zu Constantinopel nach kaiserliche so gild
 die kaiserliche von kaiserliche kaiserliche und kaiserliche


Picture 2. The "Ferman" was given to the Venetian ambassador Contarini by Murad IV. Venice, State Archive.



Picture 3. Ottoman ambassador, by G. Grevembroch, Costumi dei Venetiani..., XVIII century.




Picture 4. Turk on horse, Museo Civico Correr.




Picture 5. Anonym, The view of Istanbul, particular. Venice, Palazzo Mocenigo.



Picture 6. Anonym, The procession of the Holy League in Venice, in the year of 1570. Venice, Museo Civico Correr.




Picture 7. Giacomo Franco, "The order which take by the Most Serene Republic to give the *bastone* to the Excellency General of the Sea", Venice, Museo Correr.




Picture 8. Paolo Veronese, the battle of Lepanto, Venice, Galleria dell'Accademia.



Picture 11. The Aegean Archipelago, by T. Porcacci, famous in the world, In Venice, 1576.




Picture 12. The Crete Island, by Atlante of Battista Agnese, XVI, Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana.



Picture 13. The glorification of the admiral Lorenzo Marcello, 1600. Venice, Museo Civico Correr.




Picture 14. The Seven Towers of Istanbul.



Picture 15. A young female Christian slave is in sale to a Muslim by the corsairs, XVIII century.



Picture 16. The embarkation of the prisoners on a navv. XVII century.




Picture 17. Filosi, "The first office. The solemn entrance which is made by the Venetian bailo from Galata in the Pera of Istanbul". Venice, Museo Civico Correr.



PRIMA FUNZIONE
Ingresso Solenne, che si fa dal Bailo Veneto da Gallata in Pera di
Costantinopoli.

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| a. il Bailo | d. Secretary Reggi del Bailo |
| b. il Chieus Bassi | e. Cortegio |
| c. Pelafrenicri | f. fanciulla |
| | g. Maritata Turcha |
| | h. Sepolto |
- Filosi Sc*



QUARTA FUNZIONE
Audienza Solenne, che dal Gran Signore si da al Bailo Veneto
a Il Gran Signor de Turchi *c. Primo Visir* *e. Drogoiman*
b. il Bailo *d. Secretary Reggi del Bailo*


Filosi sc

Picture 18. Filosi, "The fourth office. The solemn audience which is given by the Sultan to the Venetian bailo". Venice, Museo Civico Correr.




LE GRAND SEIGNEUR.

Il est représenté ici en habit de cérémonie. C'est le portrait de sa Hautesse à présent regnante, aussi ressemblant qu'on la vu faire & après un portrait qui en a été tiré d'idée seulement par un Peintre qui l'a seulement vu en allant à la chasse ou à la Mosquée.



Picture 20. Fondaco dei Turchi, before the restoration, Venice, 1858-1859.



Picture 21. A portray of the Fondaco dei Turchi, by G. Casoni, *Memorie*.

Delli Spahi

Vn Spahi


SEPTIMO 1672



Picture 22. Sipahi, "Istoria dello stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano",
by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.

Il Bostangi Basci, ouero Sopraintendente delli Giardini,
e Fontane del Gran Signore

S. I. P. F. M. I. N. S. C. di V.



Picture 23. Bostancibashi, by Isabella Piccini,
"Istoria dello stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano",
Venice, 1672.

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Habiti de Turchi



Il Mufti e quello che ministra, e maneggia tutte le cose spirituali, e massimamente sopra religiosi Turchi, Veste continuamente di ciambelotto verde, con mariggi.

Dell'Appartamento delle Donne ,

I. -abito delle Dame del Seraglio ~~~~~




Picture 25. The dress of the Queen of the Palace,
“*Istoria dello stato presente dell’Impero Ottomano*”,
by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.

*Paggio de l’Hasoda, ouero di
Camera del Gran Signor.*

Scuol. Isabella Piccini Monaca in S. Croce di Venetia. F.

*Tulbentar Aga, ouero quello che
porta il Turbante del Gran Signor*



Picture 26. Page of the *Has Oda*,
“*Istoria dello stato presente dell’Impero Ottomano*”,
by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.

Abito delle Femine di Costantinopoli



Picture 27. The dress of the Ottoman woman, "Istoria dello stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano", by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.


Delli Agiam-Oglani.

Monta ouero ufficiale che portagli ordini del Gran Signore
 Holuagi ouero Con fetteire del Serraglio in Agiamoglano



Picture 28. Acemioghlanis, "Istoria dello stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano", by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.

Picture 29. Ottoman woman on horse under a canopy. by C. Vecellio, "Habiti antichi et moderni di tutto il mondo, libro VII, Habiti de Turchi, Venetia, 1589".



Possano i Turchi tener più mogli, ma una
è la principale, con la quale dormano il Ve-
nerdi giorno della lor festa, questa nel an-
dar per la Città cavalca un cavallo sotto
un baldacchino come sopra vedi.

Picture 33. Janissary in a miniature of the Ottoman, XVI century.

Picture 30. The tents and carriages of the Tartars.



310 Habiti de' Turchi

308 Habiti de' Turchi



Azappi, cioè arcieri di G. ste. è soldati salariati dal gran Signore: Vestano un duliniano curto fino à mez. a. e. a. m. b. a. con le maniche lunghe fin il gomito, portans arco, scimitarra, e faretra.



Belgerbey, cioè huomini d'arme, il lor Vestire, & l'armatura la vedi nella immagine, portano alcune lance con certi fili colorati, per i quali riconoscono i Capitani.



Picture 31. Azabs of the galleys, by C. Vecellio, "Habiti antichi et moderni di tutto il mondo, libro VII, Habiti de Turchi, Venetia, 1589".

Picture 32. Beylerbeyi, by C. Vecellio, "Habiti antichi et moderni di tutto il mondo, libro VII, Habiti de Turchi, Venetia, 1589".

Picture 34. Ottoman soldiers. Vienna, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Codex Vindobonensis 8626, c.5.



Edlich wächte die maßlach getrüben haben

Picture 35. Sultan Murad IV, by I. Grasso, *Elogi di capitano illustri...*, Venice, 1683.




*Amorat Quarto Gran Signor
de Turchi.*

Picture 36. The frontispiece of the "Compendio dell' "historie generali de Turchi..."", 1662.



Picture 37. The frontispiece of "*Istoria dello stato presente dell'Impero Ottomano*", by Isabella Piccini, Venice, 1672.



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