

ALI ABDULLAH

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**IRAQI-TURKISH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN 2003 AND 2011**

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by

ALI ABDULLAH

Fatih University

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APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Ali ABDULLAH
Institute: Institute of Social Sciences
Department: International Relations
Thesis Subject: Iraqi-Turkish Economic and Political Relations Between 2003 and 2011
Thesis Date: June, 2012

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assist. Prof Ahmet Arabaci

Head of Department

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof.Dr. Muhammet Lutfullah KARAMAN

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof.Dr. Muhammet Lutfullah KARAMAN

Assoc. Prof. Savaş GENÇ

Prof.Dr. Ömer ÇAHA

It is approved that this thesis has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Graduate Institute of Social Sciences.

Assoc. Prof. Mehmet Karakuyu

Director

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.
2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:
 - i. A Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
 - ii. The examination of several thesis guides of particular universities, both in Turkey and abroad, as well as a professional book on this subject.

ALI ABDULLAH

Istanbul

June, 2012

ABSTRACT

ALI ABDULLAH

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Iraqi-Turkish Economic and Political Relations Between 2003 and 2011

This thesis will try to highlight the relations between Iraq and Turkey in the field of politics and economy after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, with specially-directed reference of Arabic published sources; this indeed being the intended originality to compare with to the already-existing studies on the subject.

The economic relations between the two countries intensified substantially between 2003 and 2011. The most important pillars of development in economic relations have been discussed and analyzed in this thesis, especially in the areas of energy and trade since both countries represent strategic elements in the light of the growing energy demand at the domestic level of the two countries, as well as in the omission of the important issues in global energy supply and its effects on the relationships between them.

As for the political aspect in the relations between Iraq and Turkey, the current thesis may be one of the academic efforts that analyzes the relations between the two countries after 2003 in a realistic way without avoiding the issues that raised sectarian or national sensitivities. Politics in Iraq reflected its security and sectarian reality on relations with Turkey. It was necessary to refer to these things that interacted with the new foreign policy of Turkey, which was built on ending the problems, improving relations with neighboring countries and improving relations between the neighboring countries of Turkey.

Key Words: Iraq, Turkey, Untied States of America, Energy, War, Water issues, Trade, Kurds, Sectarian division.

KISA ÖZET

ALI ABDULLAH

Haziran 2012

Irak – Türkiye İktisadi ve Siyasi Münasebetleri 2003 - 2011

ABD'nin 2003 Irak işgali sonrasında Irak ile Türkiye arasındaki münasebetleri siyasi ve iktisadi sahadaki cihetleriyle ele almayı hedefleyen bu tez, bilhassa Arapça neşriyatı kullanarak mevzu ile alakalı mevcut araştırmalara kıyasla daha farklı bir çalışma olma iddiası taşımaktadır.

İki ülke arasındaki ticari münasebetler 2003 ila 2011 arasında ciddi ölçüde irtifa kazandı. Bu ekonomik ilişkilerin en mühim esasları bu tezde tahlil edilecektir. Bilhassa enerji ve ticaret sahasında, iki ülkenin artan milli enerji talebinden dolayı stratejik unsurlara sahip olmaları ve küresel enerji arzından doğan tezahürün aralarındaki münasebetlere tesirine temas edilecektir.

Mevcut tez, 2003 sonrası Irak ve Türkiye arasındaki siyasi münasebetleri gerçekçi bir yol üzerinde tahlil etme maksadına binaen giderek artan mezhepçilik meselesi ve milli hassasiyetleri de ihtiva etmektedir. Irak'ın mezhep ve güvenlik meselesi Türkiye ile olan siyasi münasebetlerine tesir etmektedir. İhtilafları gidermek, komşu ülkelerle münasebetleri geliştirmek ve Türkiye'nin komşuları arasındaki ilişkileri iyileştirmek gibi hedefleri olan Türkiye'nin yeni dış siyaseti ile etkileşim noktasında tüm bunların ifade edilmesi gerekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Enerji, Savaş, Su sorunları, Ticaret, Kürtler, mezhepsel bölünme.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AK Party	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GAP	Great Anatolia Project
IGC	Iraqi Governing Council
ITF	Iraqi Turkmen front
KRG	Kurdistan Region Government
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MIT	National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı)
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
PJAK	Iranian Kurdistan Free Life Party(Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê)
PKK	The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)
TAPO	Turkey Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı)
TPIC	Turkish Petroleum International Company
TUSKON	Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu)
U.N	United Nations
U.S	United States of America
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

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INTRODUCTION

Iraq and Turkey are two neighboring countries located in one region, and share a border and water resources. The importance of the geographical location of both countries affected the behavior and the policy followed by each of them. Turkey oversees the transportation routes by sea and land linking Europe and the West in general to Asia and the Islamic world. Its location in the heart of the Middle East, its richness in water resources and its proximity to the major heads of oil in the world granted Turkey a geo-strategic importance that has given it a role in the regional and international balances. The importance of Turkey's location was reinforced for the U.S. and the West after the Second Gulf War. Turkey seeks to play a new regional role out of its conscious of the importance of its location through the exploitation of the international and regional variables to achieve its interests and ambitions. For Iraq, the lack of having a sea view and only a small outlet on the north coast of the Arabian Gulf should have to impose on it to follow a foreign policy on the basis of regional cooperation, good neighborliness and mutual interests to ensure security and stability and sustainability of interests¹.

Since the establishment of the two countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the relations between the two countries fluctuated due to the fluctuation of the continual change in conditions in the Middle East. At the beginning, the relations were good between the Monarchy of Iraq and the Turkish Republic, but the military coup led by Abdul Karim Qasim in 1958 harmed the relations between the two countries. Turkey was seriously considering invading Iraq and the restoring the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, and relations remained tense during the subsequent years up to the end of the last century and only evolved through two basic issues. First, is the impulses of separatism of the Kurdish movements deployed in northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey; second is the issue of the export of oil from Iraq to the world via Turkey.

The Iran-Iraq war in the period of 1980-1988 raised fears in most regions of the world of the possibility of cutting the supply of oil in the world and targeting oil facilities and oilers. The Western countries as well as the Arab Gulf states feared that if any of the two countries emerged victorious from the war would pose a greater threat on them. Most of the countries

¹ Wesal najeeb Alazzawi and Rawraa Zaki Younes Altaweel, Ilaqat Turkya Al-Iqlimia(The Regional Relations of Turkey) ,The center of International Studies, The University of Baghdad, 2000, pp. 13-15.

in the world contributed to supporting Iraq for fear of revolution in Iran. Turkey was one of the few countries in the world that had adopted the stance of neutrality before the two countries alike and met their economic needs through trade. As a result, Turkey gained great proceeds of war, as the Turkish exports raised from \$220 million in 1981 to \$2 billion in 1985, which is equivalent to a quarter of the overall Turkish exports. Turkey also got about \$250 million as fees to cross the oil pipelines from Iraq, and Turkey and Iraq agreed on the integration of energy networks they have as part of a wider regional project. Add to that, the total income of the Turkish construction projects in Iraq has reached \$2.5 billion between 1974 and 1990. But when the war ended, the Turkish exports to both countries decreased, and the integrated growth between the economies of Iraq and Turkey suffered a setback because of the folly of invading Kuwait by Saddam Hussein and then Turkey's reaction to that.

Unlike the Iran- Iraq war, the Gulf War in 1991 was a disaster for Turkey in almost all respects. Due to this war, the control of Saddam Hussein on the Kurds of Iraq ended permanently, and half a million Kurds fled north towards the Turkish border as a result of the efforts of Saddam to re-impose absolute control on the Kurdish region which formed the huge problem of refugees for Ankara. This crisis of the Kurdish refugees and the subsequent international efforts to deal with it in the development of the Kurdish question, which has been ignored for a long time, contributed to the International agenda. This development was undesirable from the standpoint of Ankara at the time, as the Iraqi Kurdish region was under the protection of the U.N. and the supervision of the process of providing assistance under the auspices of the U.S., which provided internationally legitimate protection for the Kurds. In addition, it seems that the commitment of the U.S. not to allow the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous entity had lost its practical importance because of the Kurdish humanitarian crisis. As a result of this, the Turkish parties, under U.S. pressure, had to cooperate institutionally with the U.S. at the political 'national' level in Iraq for the first time, which limited the options for Ankara. This has represented a critical juncture in the evolution of the Iraqi Kurdish political history.

The Kurdish region in Iraq soon developed the manifestations of a state that was almost independent, and this reality represented in the presence of the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq to push Ankara to begin to deal with it with much hesitation and reluctance, in the beginning through the Kurdish leaders alone.

As for the economically harmful effects of the second Gulf War in 1991, the economic embargo imposed on Iraq between the years 1991 -2003 had a negative impact on the Turkish economy, which was already suffering from many difficulties, because Iraq was

considered one of the main sources for oil reserves before the blockade as a broad market and in front of the Turkish exports, especially agricultural goods. Turkey gains many benefits by buying Iraqi oil and does not get these from other sources. Turkey gets the profits between 400 to 600 million dollars for the passage of the Iraqi oil pipeline through its territory in addition to other services. The benefits of the transfer of Iraqi oil through the Turkish territory were not limited to these things since oil was given at preferential prices, without the expenses of the workforce in the process of the transfer of the Turkish oil².

In terms of trade, the size of the economic and trade relations between Turkey and Iraq in the early eighties reached more than one billion dollars, while the volume of trade with the U.S. reached 0.57 billion dollars, with Japan 0.15 billion dollars, with Saudi Arabia 0.12 billion dollars, with Italy 0.52 billion dollars and with France 0.54 billion dollars. While this huge figure of the volume of trade between Iraq and Turkey had been affected greatly as a result of the economic embargo imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait until it reached 0.21 billion dollars in 1996, at the time it was expected to reach 10 billion dollars this year if not for the embargo.³

With the arrival of the Justice and Development Party AK Party to power in the fall of 2002, the Turkish scene changed internally and externally. The AK Party held authority all alone as it controlled the government and the parliament for the first time since the beginning of the 1990s. More importantly, the authority of the AK Party was not just a change in the governing body but it brought projects that allowed Turkey during the subsequent years to be a respectful and appreciated country in the region and in the world. The multi-dimensional policy pursued by the party regarding foreign policy has had dramatic effects on the relationship of Turkey with the Arab and Muslim world; then under this policy, Turkey succeeded in establishing a wider network of relationships with all Arab and Islamic countries, without exception: Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States.

The religious factor was employed for the first time within Turkish foreign policy, which allowed closer ties with Islamic countries. Under this policy of multiple dimensions, Turkey moved from being a spectator to an initiator in more than one case such as the initiative for meetings by the countries neighboring Iraq before and after the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003, the mediation in the crisis of Lebanon and participation in the UNIFIL forces

²Wesal najeeb Alazzawi and Rawraa Zaki Younes Altaweel , *Turkya Derast fe Alsayase We Aliqitasad* (Turkey Studies on Politics and Economy), Aldar Aljamieya for Printing, Publishing and Translation, Baghdad, 2002, p. 15.

³ Ibid, p.16.

after 2006, and in the convergence between Hamas and Fatah. This policy of balance put Turkey in a favorable situation for the initiatives and ideas and brought together the views of the litigants.

However, coincidence had a bad effect on Turkey because the arrival of the AK Party to power coincided with the U.S. occupation of Iraq, which was a fatal hit and a changing factor for the Turkish strategy in Iraq. Turkey took great efforts to prevent the outbreak of the war and thus to prevent changing the existing status quo, which was in line with Turkish interests. In this context, and on the first of March 2003, the Turkish parliament refused the motion by the government, which would grant permission for the opening of Turkish territory to U.S. forces. But Turkey's bet on the inability to go to war without Turkey was discharged by the subsequent American occupation of Iraq, thus severely affecting the strategic relations between Ankara and Washington, and specifically between the Turkish military and the Pentagon. With that occupation, the following variables were being clarified: Iraq's transition from the unity formula to the federal formula, the emergence of a Kurdish entity in every sense of the word's meaning, and sectarian conflict in Iraq that affected the region of the Middle East and the national security of Turkey

Turkey developed its strategy towards Iraq to get rid of its security dimension and interfere in new dimensions, especially the economic and the political dimensions. After the year 2007, an explosion occurred in the economic relations between Turkey and Iraq until Turkey became the most important trading partner of Iraq, up to such a point where Iraq became the second largest importer from Turkey after Germany. This has certainly reflected on the political relations with Turkey, as after 2007, Turkey became the only regional and international party, which is relatively acceptable by all of the Iraqi parties. On this basis, Turkey played sensitive roles in the internal affairs of Iraq, such as contributing to the participation of the Sunnis in the Iraqi political process after they were moved away from being a part of the process because of the presence of a foreign occupation. Turkey also contributed to the convergence of views between the various Iraqi parties because of the permanent crisis experienced by Iraq between its basic social components who are Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds Sunni. However, things began to change after 2010 because of the complexity of the internal political situation in Iraq and because of regional and international interventions in Iraq and the region in general, and Turkey started to take the side of a party without the other within the Iraqi political system.

This thesis aims to highlight the central importance of the relations between Iraq and Turkey for both countries politically and economically, especially after the major changes experienced in both countries following the 2003.

The current thesis aims to emphasize that improving relations between Iraq and Turkey will contribute directly to solving the major problems experienced by the two countries, particularly with regard to the issue of terrorism as well as the Kurdish issue.

The current thesis also aims to study the changing Turkish policy toward Iraq through the years of research 2003-2011 and the reflection of this policy to improve the economic relations, thus contributing directly to the Turkish rising economy, as well as reference to the importance of the Turkish Iraqi policy on issues of the supply to global energy and Turkey seeking to be a state crossing of world energy.

What is distinctive and new in the thesis is that it is a new study with a subject that has been written dependant on Arabic and Iraqi resources mixed with Turkish and other resources, which may bring an new vision to the subject. The time period in which the thesis deals with is recent. This led to a reliance on Internet-sober resources such as the official websites of the Ministries of Turkey and Iraq, like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Oil.

The current thesis is also characterized by clarity and field realism as the researcher, and by virtue of his presence in both countries, was an important factor to try to a give a realistic vision for the reality of things, without worrying about obstacles or prohibitions that may push the analysis and academic assessment away from the proper diagnosis, and therefore, not to put correct solutions to the problems between or within the two countries.

The thesis consists of three chapters. The first chapter addresses the history of the relations between Turkey and Iraq since the establishment of the two countries after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire until the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. These relations were discussed on the basis of the two main sections of the thesis: the economic relations and the political relations.

The second chapter discusses the economic relations between Iraq and Turkey in the period 2003-2011 and has been divided into three sections. The first section discusses the relations in the field of energy, especially on issues of oil and natural gas. The second section, however, discusses the trade relations between the two countries and how this relationship evolves significantly and its impact on the economy of both countries. The third section discusses the relations regarding water issues and problems related to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

The third and final chapter, respectively discusses political relations and issues, and consists of three sections. The first section discusses the case of the Turkish position on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the importance of this position on the Iraqi-Turkish relations. The second section discusses the relationship of Turkey with the Kurds of Iraq and its impact on the Kurdish issue in general. The third section, however, discusses Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq and especially its development after 2007 until it became one of the most important affects on the internal politics of Iraq.

CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND OF IRAQI-TURKISH

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS

In this chapter I will try to highlight the most important stations of Iraqi-Turkish relations in both economic and political fields since the establishment of two countries in the begging of last century until 2003 which is the year of American invasion to Iraq.

1.1 Iraqi-Turkish Relations between 1920 -1990

1.1.1 Political Relations

Iraq, being a country that emerged as a state after the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, started its relations with Turkey through the problem of Mosul in 1923, as Turkey has claimed the state of Mosul, which includes the cities of Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and their regions. This claim is regarded as one of the most serious threats faced by the modern Iraqi state in the establishment phase⁴. Turkey has claimed the State of Mosul depending on the legal sense related to the first article of the Turkish National Charter⁵ which stresses on not waiving any part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire which the Allied forces were not able to occupy before conducting the armistice of Mudros⁶. The Turks have considered the completion of the occupation of Mosul by the British forces after the signing of the armistice as an illegal act and as a breach of its terms⁷.

Turkey did not go through any diplomatic relations with the Arab world during the reign of Ataturk 1923-1938, except with two states; Egypt, who it exchanged embassies with in 1925, and Iraq, whose ambassador reached Ankara in 1928, while the Turkish ambassador

⁴ Fadel Hussein, *Derasa fe Aldelomasiah Alturqia Aliraqia we Alrai Alam* (The problem of Mosul, A Study on the Iraqi-Turkish Diplomacy and the Public Opinion), 1st Ed. Baghdad, 1955.

⁵ The terms of the Turkish National Charter has been established in Sivas. The Charter was held by the Conference to establish an interim government in Anatolia and was chaired by Mustafa Kemal on the 23rd of July 1919. The Charter was approved on by the members of last Ottoman parliament in Istanbul on the 17th of February 1920 as the Charter embodied the principles of the independence movement.

⁶ Mudros Armistice has been held between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire on the 30th of October 1918 aboard the battleship anchored near the island of Mdros in Greek, and the Armistice was named after this island.

⁷ Salim Alsoweis, *Ataturk Munqith Turkyia we Bani Nahdata Alhaditha*(Ataturk, the Savior of Turkey and the Builder of its Modern Renaissance) , Hlz Press, Amman, 1970, p. 215.

reached Baghdad in 1929⁸. The Treaty of 1926 between Britain, Turkey and Iraq has paved the way to develop those relationships that were based on good neighborliness, coordination and cooperation for border security and agreement on oil investment and trade. Talks were held on these issues between Nuri al-Saeed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq at the time, and the Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu and the Foreign Minister Tawfiq Rushdi on 20 September 1930, where the Turkish Prime Minister expressed his government's desire for good relations with Iraq after the settlement of the issue of Mosul⁹.

Those relationships have formed an introduction to the 'Charter of the Saad Abad' on the 8th of July, 1937, which included Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan¹⁰. This Charter is regarded as a political event which occurred by the combination of a number of variables witnessed by the world in general and the Middle East in particular, and the most prominent of these variables was the growing strength of the Soviet Union and its threat to Turkey, and the British French competition on the positions of influence and domination, which drove the Charter to the Alliance that was the first of its kind in the region, and those countries sought an understanding and cooperation despite their differences¹¹.

Nuri al-Saeed also accomplished a draft of an agreement between Iraq and Turkey in October 1945 suggesting the inclusion of Turkey to the Arab League, and when submitting this draft to Turkey, the latter stressed on the need for closer bilateral cooperation with Iraq, and the parties agreed on a final version of the grounds, which included cooperation in the following areas:

- Cooperation on foreign policy on the basis of an alliance between Britain and the two countries and their membership in the U.N. And due to Turkey's ability to influence Iran and Afghanistan, the foreign policy of Iran and Afghanistan will be affected by the nature of the relations between Turkey and the Arab League countries, thereby

⁸ Aida Ali Sari, *Alarab we Alforat bein Turkya we Israil (The Arabs and the Euphrates between Turkey and Israel)*, Dar Alafaq Aljadeeda, Beirut, 1997, p. 257.

⁹ Subhi Nazim Tawfiq, *Turkya we Altahalufat Alestratigah, Muhadet Saad Abad (Turkey and the Political Alliances The Charter of Saad Abad. Treaty of the Soviet Friendship in the Documents of the representations of Iraq in Istanbul and Ankara, 1930 - 1958)*, Beit Alhikma, the Documentary Series 4, Baghdad, 2002, pp. 41-44.

¹⁰ Stephen Longrig, *Arba Quroon me Altraih Aliraqi Alhadeeth (Four Centuries of the History of Modern Iraq)*, translated by Jafar Al-Khayyat, 4th Edition, Baghdad, 1968, pp. 431-432.

¹¹ Nadia Mohammed, *Aliraq we Muahdat Saad Abad 1937 (Iraq and the Charter of Saad Abad 1937)*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Arab Research and Studies Historical Research and Studies, Arab League, Baghdad, n. d., p. 208.

achieving coordination between the countries of the Charter of the Saad Abad and the Arab League to achieve common interests.

- Economic cooperation based on the principle of most-favored treatment.
- Cooperation in financial matters.
- Cooperation in the field of transportation between Iraq, Turkey and Iran for closer economic ties and developing these ties, and development of social and political relations.
- Cooperation in the fields of culture¹².

For the purpose of the direct creation of these projects, it was decided to form a committee headed by Nuri al-Saeed, with the power to select the committee members, and the freedom to communicate with the Turkish government, the Arab governments and the governments of the Charter of the Saad Abad¹³. In a letter submitted by him to the Council of Ministers, al-Saeed wrote, “the plan that I would like to go through is that if we finalized a proposed protocol into force, it would pave the way for the states of the Arab League and the states of the Charter of the Saad Abad to join it wholly or partially making it a general charter, as happened in the Charter of the Arab League, which has become a charter after it was protocol.” However, the efforts of Iraq and Turkey to get Turkey accepted into the Arab League failed, but those efforts became the basis of the Treaty of 1946 between the two countries.

In 1954, the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes mentioned that the evolution of the circumstances and the conditions prevailing internationally and regionally required a new charter to replace the Charter of the Saad Abad, which survived in legal terms. Furthermore, the U.S. called for including Pakistan to the new charter, rather than Afghanistan for its strategic importance and human power potential. It also said that the Charter stems from the awareness of the countries that will be a part of it of the common dangers that threaten its interests, and that this bloc has a strategic task in the face of the Soviet threat. The goal of the U.S. was to encircle the Soviet Union by a wall of military alliances in the framework of the conflict that broke out between the two poles during the Cold War. However, the governments of Turkey and Pakistan issued a joint statement on the 19th of February 1954, announcing the exchange of the instruments of conclusion of the agreement between Turkey

¹² Ibid, p. 242.

¹³ Tawfiq Suwaidi, *Nuf Qarn men Tarih AlIraq we Alkadhiah Alarabiah*(My Memoirs, Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Cause), Arab Book House, Beirut, 1969, pp. 436-437.

and Pakistan for the exchange of military missions, information on the issues of defense, and manufacturing of arms and expertise. The agreement was signed on the 2nd of April 1954¹⁴.

Turkey played an active role in the policy of military alliances to create a regional bloc in the Middle East, which was to be an ally to the West. The positions, views and beliefs of the governments of Turkey and Iraq were identical. The Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Saeed said that Iraq's security was linked to the full security of its neighbors aiming at getting military and economic aid from the U.S. to tip Iraq in the region. However, Turkey had been seeking to strengthen its weight and position facing the West, the U.S. in particular, to obtain military and economic aid and support in the face of the Soviet threat¹⁵. As a result, Nuri al-Saeed visited Pakistan and India after the announcement of this agreement. When al-Saeed returned from his visit, he expressed his opinion on Iraq's accession to the Pakistan-Turkish agreement in a report to the Iraqi government, and said that it would serve the interests and security of Iraq¹⁶.

In 1954, Al-Saeed was offered to be the successor of the Minister Arshad Omari in holding the Ministry, which was formed on the 29th of April 1954. However, al-Saeed put pre-conditions for the authorship of the Ministry and submitted via a memorandum to the king including the interest in foreign policy of Iraq and bringing them into line with developments at the international and regional levels, including the Turkish-Pakistan agreement which created the political conditions that Iraq must pay attention to and emphasized the documentation of Iraq's relations with Arab countries, as well as ending the treaty between Iraq and Britain in 1930. Consequently, the King agreed to the conditions of Al-Saeed who was appointed as a minister and the Iraqi-Turkish relations cut a long way from understanding and willingness to sign a joint Charter to ensure the interests of both

¹⁴ Wiam Shakir Ghani, *Mawkiif Alandimah Alarabiah men Muahdet Bagdad 1955-1958*(The Positions of the Arab Countries of the Charter of Baghdad 1955-1958) , Unpublished Master Thesis, Faculty of Education, University of Mustansiriya, 2002, p. 15.

¹⁵ Mahmoud Abdul-Rahman Al-Khalaf al-Zaidi, *Alsuyasah Alturkiyah ma'a douel Aljiwar Iraq we Surya 1980-1993* (Turkey's Foreign Policy with Neighboring Arab Countries Iraq and Syria, 1980 to 1993) , Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Nationalism and Socialism, Mustansiriya University, 2002, p. 25.

¹⁶ Leila Hassan Alameer, *Doer Nuri Alsaheed men Helf Bagdad we Tethirat ala Alitaqat Alarabiah*(The Role of Nuri al-Saeed in the Baghdad Pact and its Effect on the Arab Relations) , Unpublished PhD Thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of Basra, 1992, p. 171.

parties, and to address the common threats to defend the two countries from the viewpoint of their governments¹⁷.

The Iraqi-Turkish relations were close during the monarchy, as the foreign policy of the two countries was characterized by harmony and conformity of views on many international and regional issues. Those relationships were strengthened by the fact that Iraq and Turkey were both linked to the Charter of Baghdad¹⁸. In addition to that, the Democratic Party, which was ruling Turkey at the time, considered the royal political system as one of the foundations of the Turkish-Iraqi friendship. However, the first official Turkish reaction came after the revolution of the 14th of July 1958 by the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who said at a news conference in Ankara on the 17th of July 1958, that Turkey is not prepared to recognize the new regime in Iraq, because it is illegal¹⁹, and sought to push the NATO intervention in Iraq, and asked for the U.S. and British governments' military assistance through intervening and overthrowing the new regime. Nevertheless, the U.S. rejected the request, and was confident of the failure by Turkey to carry out any military action against Iraq without the American support and backing²⁰.

However, Turkey proposed that the countries of the Charter of Baghdad, taking place in August 1958, have to support it through a military action that shall topple the new regime in Baghdad. Adnan Menderes mentioned that his country can create four military contingents for the invasion of Iraq, but Iran and Pakistan rejected the proposal, which led to foiling the idea of a Turkish invasion of Iraq²¹. Consequently, Turkey was forced to recognize the new government in Iraq, fearing that any refraining could lead to the harming of its interests and its relations with Arab countries, and not to make way for the Soviets to strengthen their influence in the region. The Undersecretary of the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that the

¹⁷ Abdul Razzaq al-Hasani, *Tarih Alwizarat Aliraqiah(The History of the Iraqi Ministries)*, House of General Cultural Affairs, 7th Ed., Baghdad, 1988, p. 210.

¹⁸ Laith Abdul Hassan Al-Zubaidi, *Thwerat 14 Temuz fe Aliraq(The Revolution of the 14th of July in Iraq)*, Dar Al-Rashid Press, Baghdad, 1979, p. 80.

¹⁹ Awni Abdulrahman al-Sabawi, *Alilaqat Aliraqia Alturkiah 1923-1958(Iraqi - Turkish Relations 1923-1958)*, Center for Turkish Studies, University of Mosul, 1986, p. 208.

²⁰ Alaa Mousa Kazem Nawras, *Thwerat 14 Temuz fe Alwathiq Aldeblumasin Albiriatin we Alsahafa Algarbiah(The Revolution of the 14th of July in the Reports of the British Diplomats and Western Press)*, Baghdad, 1990, pp. 69-70.

²¹ Walid Mohammad Saeed al-Adhami, *Thwerat 14 Temuz we Abdulkarim Kassem fe Alwathiq Albiritanina The Revolution of the 14th of July and Abdulkarim Kassem in the British Documents)*, Publications of Alnahda Library, Baghdad, 1989, p. 74.

government of his country is willing to continue good relations and sustainability of mutual interests between Turkey and Iraq²² without eliminating the apprehension of Ankara from the fall of the new republican regime until it fell on the 8th of February 1963.

The coup, taking place in Iraq in 1963, caused Turkey to take important decisions, especially after the announcement of the Charter of April 17 for the unity between Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Turkey feared that this Charter would lead Syria to demand the Brigade of Iskenderun²³. However, there was a change in the Turkish foreign policy since the second half of the sixties, and particularly since December 1965, when the Turks re-considered their relations with Iraq in particular and the Arab countries in general, because of the hostile policies received by Turkey from Greece and Europe and the bad economic situation that was experienced by the Turkish economy. Therefore, Turkey wanted to open a wider range on the southern border so as not to increase its political and economic isolation.

Overall, the nature of the relations between Turkey and Iraq in the period between 1965-1980 were stemming from the Turkish heading towards the Arab countries in general, as a trend based on the inter principles which established in its entirety the general characteristics of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab countries at that time. These principles were as follows²⁴:

1. Turkey's reluctance to get involved in disputes in the region.
2. Due sensitivity to Arab interests, especially security ones, so Turkey was keen not to let its alliance with the West cause any damage to the security interests of the Arab countries.
3. Not interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, such as the political advances and changes in their political systems.
4. Giving preference to its bilateral relations with Arab countries, and staying away from collectively dealing with it.

²² Simand Karim Mahmoud, *Turkya we Qadaiah Alarab 1945-1967 (Turkey and the Arab Issues 1945-1967)*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Arab History and Scientific Heritage, Baghdad, 2004, p. 125.

²³ Mahmoud Abdul-Rahman Al-Khalaf al-Zaidi, *op. cit*, p. 31.

²⁴ Nazli Moawad Ahmed, *Aliltiaq Alarabi Altukye fe Thawu Altaturat Alsyasiah we Aliqtisadiyah Alhaditha (Turkish - Arab Convergence in the Light of the Contemporary Political and Economic Development)*, cited in: Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu ed., *Arab – Turkish Relations from both the Arab and Turkish Perspectives, the First Part*, the Institute of Arab Research and Studies, and Research Center for History, Art and Islamic Culture, Istanbul, 1991, p. 329.

5. Removing the conflict between the secular nature of the Turkish state constitutionally, and insuring the active participation of Turkey in the international activities of the Islamic Arab states such as the Islamic Conference.

As an embodiment of that, the years of 1965 and 1966 witnessed a number of contacts and meetings between Turk and Arab officials, including Iraq, which sent many delegations to Turkey, and perhaps the most prominent visit was that of the Iraqi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adnan Pachachi, on the seventh of April 1966 to Turkey. This visit was regarded as the first visit of its kind since the revolution of the fourteenth of July 1958. Upon his arrival to Ankara, Pachachi met the acting President of the Republic of Turkey İbrahim Şevki and delivered to him a message from the Iraqi President Abdul Salam Aref, in which he expressed his hope in the development of friendly relations between Iraq and Turkey, as well as the hope of the Iraqi government that Turkey stands by its position of supporting the Palestinian cause²⁵.

On the third of July of the same year, Abdul Rahman Al-Bazzaz, the Iraqi Prime Minister, paid an official visit to Turkey declaring the Iraqi support to Turkey in the Cyprus issue in return for the Turkish help to the Palestinian cause. Suleiman Demirel, the Turkish prime minister stressed in the joint statement, issued at the end of the visit, of the sympathy of his government with the plight of the Palestinian Arab refugees²⁶.

In October 1967, Suleiman Demirel paid a visit to Iraq where he discussed the issue of the Arab - Israeli Conflict with Iraqi officials at the time. The joint communiqué issued after the talks between the two parties included the Turkish support of the Arab countries, where the statement expressed Turkey's concerns about the unilateral actions of Israel in Jerusalem and its coercive tactics against innocent Arabs. The statement also clarified Turkey's opposition to the use of force to gain the land. Furthermore, the Turkish side supported the need for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the implementation of U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees²⁷.

²⁵ Ibid , p. 330

²⁶ Fakher Rama Ughli, *Alilaqat Alturkya Alarabiah fe Marhalet Almed Alqumey 1945-1975*(Turkish-Arab Relations in the Nationalist Tide Phase 1945-1975), cited in the book of *Arab-Turkish Relations from a Turkish Perspective of a Group of Authors*, the Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Part 2, Cairo 1933, p. 267.

²⁷ Mohammed Issa, *Almuaif Alturkye wa Azmet Alshareq Alawsat*(The Turkish Position and the Middle East Crisis) , *Journal of International Politics*, Issue 17, July 1969, p. 121.

When war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Turkey announced that it stood on the fence with the parties to the conflict, and was keen to maintain good relations with both Iraq and Iran calling for a halt to the fighting and the solving of problems by peaceful means due to its proximity of the battlefield and its sharing of long borders with the two belligerents, the thing that shall affect its security and stability²⁸. Turkey's adoption of a position of neutrality in the war between Iran and Iraq was based on its recognition of the effects of economic, regional and international factors. However, the statements of the former President of Turkey Turgut Ozal, were as follows: "We are pursuing a policy of neutrality about the two warring countries, and this is one of the toughest things, that both countries want for Turkey to be on their side, and this is normal. We have adopted this neutral position so far, and it is not easy, and even if we thought that one of the parties is right, we will not act otherwise. What would Turkey benefit from standing by the side of one of the two warring countries? Despite the pressures and demands of the two warring countries, Turkey will not change the position of neutrality it has adopted"²⁹.

On the other hand, the former President Kenan Evren articulated the principle of the neutrality of Turkey during his official visit to Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. During his speech at the Islamic Summit in Casablanca in 1984, he emphasized that, "the special interest shown by Turkey towards the Middle East is not restricted to its geographical location, Turkey's glorious past in the region is based on religious ties whereas a common heritage relates it to the Islamic countries in the region, Turkey is distressed by the war between Iran and Iraq, and Turkey believes that if the two Islamists keep on dispelling their sources, this would weaken the whole region and makes it open to the external pressures"³⁰.

The outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war were synchronized with the Turkish military coup on the 12th of September 1980, following many political and economic crises. Those reasons, in addition to other factors, made Turkey adopt a policy of neutrality and balance in its relations with the parties of the Iraq-Iran war. The security interests forced Turkey to take a position of neutrality to avoid the increasing violence and instability in Southeast Anatolia, which is close to Iraq and Iran, and which is inhabited by the Kurds of Turkey. Therefore, if

²⁸ Ali Mohammed Saeed, Khyarat Alsyash Alharjiah Alturkyah(The Turkish Foreign Policy Options), Center for Research and Information, Baghdad, 1982, p. 64.

²⁹ Ahmad Nuri Al Nuaimi, "Turkish – Iran Relations" op cit, p. 69.

³⁰ Sabah Mahmoud , Turkya fe Alsahda Aliraqiah we Alarabiah we Alalamiah(Turkey in the Iraqi, Arab, International and Turkish Press) , Journal of Turkish Affairs, Issue 4, Institute of Asian and African Studies, November 1984, p. 81.

Turkey took the side of one party against the other, the Kurdish conflict in it would raise, causing a direct affect to the national security of Turkey, which the Kurdish issue constitutes one of the main challenges it faced.

Turkey invested its standing on the fence to guarantee the cooperation of Iraq and Iran in confrontation with the Kurdish movement³¹.

In 1984, Turkey held a security pact with Iraq gaining the freedom of action of its armed forces and aircraft within the Iraqi territory in pursuit of elements of the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK³².

Another positive effect of the war between Iraq and Iran was that it forced the West to reconsider the importance of the strategic ties with Turkey, which were affected significantly after the Turkish military landing on the island of Cyprus in 1974. As a result, the U.S. re-consolidated its military ties with Turkey, closing in 1980 a renewable military cooperation agreement for five-years under which the U.S. military installations in Turkey increased and the aid given to Turkey was to be increased too. In 1981, another agreement was held between the two sides to update the Turkish Army³³.

1.1.2 Economic Relations

In 1945, Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in the economic field to ensure the following issues:

- Cooperation in foreign policy on the basis of an alliance between Britain and the two countries as well as their membership in the U.N.
- Economic cooperation based on the principle of most-favored treatment.
- Cooperation in financial matters.
- Cooperation in the field of transportation between Iraq, Turkey and Iran for closer economic ties and development, and the development of social and political relations.

³¹ Ziad Aziz Hamid, *Alsyasah Alharjiah Alturkiyag 1973-1983 (Turkey's Foreign Policy 1973-1983)*, Unpublished Master Thesis, Institute of Asian and African Studies, University of Mustansiriya, 1989, p. 162.

³² Ibrahim Aldaqouka, *Kurdistan Aliraq bein Altadahulat Alturkiah we Aliqlimiah (Iraqi Kurdistan between Turkey and the Regional Intersections)*, *International Issues*, Issue 351, Islamabad, September 1996, p. 22.

³³ Nazli Moawad Ahmed, *Turkish - Arab Convergence in the Light of the Contemporary Political and Economic Development* op cit, p. 313-314.

- Cooperation in the areas of water control and investment in the Euphrates and the Tigris.

The commercial relations between the two countries developed after that, especially in the period from 1967 to 1975, which witnessed the war between the Arab countries and Israel. Such a war had the effect of cutting the Arab energy supplies for the European countries and the U.S. in the early seventies. Regarding this difficult situation, the economic relations between Turkey and Iraq were at a high degree of importance for both countries, especially in the area of supplying Turkey with oil after the year 1972, with the signing of the economical protocol reached with the Republic of Iraq in order to broaden the base of economic cooperation, especially in the fields of oil, transit and trade³⁴.

One of the outputs of the implementation of the draft of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline has been guaranteeing the supplying of crude oil to Turkey. Furthermore, it is easy for Iraq to find another port to export crude oil through one of the Turkish ports on the Mediterranean to the Arab countries.

This period witnessed significant progress in the Turkish policy toward Iraq, as Turkey supported the decision to nationalize oil, which was released by Iraq in June 1972³⁵. On the other hand, the value of the Turkish exports to Iraq reached \$44.8 million, and Iraq sought to set up many joint projects with Turkey at the time³⁶.

Whoever watched the commercial relations between Turkey and Iraq in 1980, i.e. before the start of the Iraq – Iran war, found that there was a deficit in the Turkish trade balance with Iraq, which was worth \$1015.2 million, as this deficit decreased to \$1205 million in 1989 due to the Iraq – Iran war.

The relations between Turkey and Iraq increased with the beginning of the war and especially in the economic sphere. For instance, in the area of oil exports, there was one pipeline for the transfer of oil through the Turkish territory introduced in 1977 in an amount of 800,000 barrels per day and ends at the Yumurtalık port. Then came the closure of the ports of Iraq on the Arab Gulf in September of 1980, and the Syrian decision to close the line of Iraqi oil in April of 1982, to open the way for the development of export facilities through Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This procedure increased the export of crude oil through Turkey, increasing the capacity of the first line to one million barrels by the end of 1984, then

³⁴ William Hill, *Alawamel Aliqtisadiyah fe Alilaqat alturkiah alarabiah* (The economic factors in the relations Turkish - Arab),*The Arabic Future Journal*, the fifth year, No. 45, November 1982, p 80.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p 81

³⁶ Wissal Najib al-Azzawi and Roa Zaki Younis, *The Regional Relations of Turkey*, op cit, p. 55.

drawing out a second pipeline in 1987 with a capacity of 500,000 barrels per day. Furthermore, during the period of the war, Iraq exported large amounts of oil through Turkey using land-based carriers³⁷.

Exports continued as the trade between Turkey and Iraq increased dramatically in the early years of the war, but the war caused massive financial destruction to the sources of both Iraq and Iran, and their production of oil diminished and their financial resources decreased. If these resources were used for the progress and the well-being of the two countries, the economic cooperation would have been much stronger than it was.

1.2 Turkish-Iraqi Relations between 1990 -2003

1.2.1 Political Relations

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed huge shifts in international relations beginning with the economic collapse of the Soviet Union and its disintegration into mini-states. This led to a series of international events, which affected the Middle East area through the Iraqi attack on Kuwait on the 2nd of August 1990. During this attack, the Iraqi troops crossed the border with Kuwait to move the case of disagreement between the two countries on the issue of oil prices to an international crisis with tyrannical implications and dimensions by virtue of what the region represents of global importance for the major international powers, especially the U.S.

On the other hand, Turkey witnessed rapid changes that gave the Turkish foreign policy a vital milestone in political relations with the countries of the region in the years of the rule of President Turgut Ozal in the early nineties. After the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the area around Turkey witnessed major shifts, with the independence of the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus region and most of these communities spoke Turkish and had common ties of race, religion, language and culture with Turkey. As a result, Ozal started to talk about the restructuring of the Turkish state through moderate Islamic trends, so that Turkey could take a leading role in the region³⁸. On the other hand, Ozal sustained good relations in foreign policy with the U.S. Because of this policy, which found its horizons open before them, the Turkish

³⁷ Philip Rubens, *Turkya ve Alshareq Alawsat* (Turkey and the Middle East) , Translated by Michael Najm Khoury, Dar Cordoba Press, Cyprus, 1993, p. 76.

³⁸ Kheir Eddin Abdel Rahman, *Alabeen fe Alqern Alhadi we Eshreen*(The Actors in the Twenty-first Century) , Dar Aljaleel Press, Amman, 1996, p. 413

government occupied third place after Israel and Egypt to get U.S. military aid, as well as economic aid and financial support³⁹.

Turkey was not far away from these developments as Ankara and its Western allies believed that Iraq had witnessed a major shift in military terms until it became a large regional power and not just a military force of the Third World⁴⁰, which raised the fears of the Turks regarding the region's stability and the security of their country. In a seminar organized by the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara in November 1989, participants concluded that, "Iraq has missiles that enable it to hit the Turkish capital from Baghdad"⁴¹. "

Ozal also pointed in August 1990 that "Iraq fought a war against Iran and then attacked Kuwait, so who would guarantee that it would not attack Turkey or harass it." However, Ozal already revealed that he had a prior recognition regarding the concerns of Turkey and the Iraqi force when he provided advice to the U.S. Administration eight months before the crisis. Ozal noted that, "Saddam Hussein is the most dangerous man in the region, and Iraq provides weapons to Turkey's Kurds to punish Turkey for its support for the Kurds of Iraq"⁴².

The Secretary General of NATO, on the other hand, pointed out during a lecture he delivered in Ankara to the support given by the NATO to Turkey's request that the Alliance commits to Turkey from the threats of the Middle East, and not threats of the Soviet Union at that time⁴³.

James Baker, the former Secretary of the U.S. notes in his memoirs that President Ozal wished to destroy what Iraq possesses of weapons and chemical installations and to eliminate its political system as Ozal says "are we going to get rid of Saddam Hussein.. We

³⁹ Nadim Alaptkin, *Turkaya Bwabah Istratigiah Llimberyaliah Alalmiah*(Turkey as a Strategic Gateway for Global Imperialism) , Beirut, 1986, p. 127.

⁴⁰ Bob Woodward, "Leaders: The Military Decision-making Methods and the Method of Nomination and Selection of Leaders, Madbouli Library, Cairo, 1992, p. 252.

⁴¹ Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Turkya we Alniam Aliqlimy fe Alshareq Alawsat baed azmet alhaleej*(Turkey and the Regional System in the Middle East after the Arab Gulf Crisis: The Security Side), Arab Affairs, Cairo, Number 67, September 1991, p. 54.

⁴² Ibid. p.55

⁴³ Mahmoud Bakri, *Aljaraem Alamirkiah fe Haerb Alkaleej:Alesrar Alkamilah*(America's Crime in the Gulf War: the Full Secrets), Madbouli Library ,Cairo, 2nd Ed., 1991, p. 150-151.

need to get rid of him as everyone is at risk if he continued existing and we will be in real danger, please tell President Bush to press ahead with it⁴⁴.”

The absence of the Cold War meant to Turkey that it could continue its western policies in the Middle East effectively without any fear of a Russian reaction, and more, the Gulf crisis has made it possible for Ankara to demonstrate its strategic importance to the U.S. and Europe in the post-Cold War environment, as the Ozal regarded the crisis as “a window that has given Turkey the opportunity to emphasize the importance of its EU membership and to rebuild a new strategic partnership with Washington”⁴⁵.

In light of this, Turkey condemned Iraq since the first days of it entering Kuwait, declaring its support for the resolution number 660 Adopted by the Security Council in response to the entrance of the Iraqi troops into the territory of Kuwait⁴⁶. The statement of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned that Ankara, “will not agree on the Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait from the U.N. Principles, against a Member State of the U.N., and in this respect, Turkey supports the decision of the U.N. because it is a threat to international conduct which should not be allowed⁴⁷.” However, the Turkish Minister of State, Aydın Çelebi confirmed his country's rejection of the occupation of Kuwait and that this does not only stem from being a Turkish position, but of being a global position, too⁴⁸.

President Ozal was eager for effective participation in the military action against Iraq, and prevented the implementation of the position of the Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut and the Chief of General Staff Gen. who were in the opposition parties to his idea. In addition, there is the position of the opposition parties rejecting the aspirations of Ozal that forced him to say when the U.S. asked to use some military bases in Turkey that, “Turkey has close relations with the West since the declaration of a republic in 1923, but we maintain the traditional and the historical relations with the Arab and Islamic world.” Ozal also pointed to the failure of Turkey's military role without the consent of the U.N. and North Atlantic

⁴⁴ James Baker, *The Policy of Diplomacy*, Madbouli Library, Cairo, 1999, p. 416-417.

⁴⁵ Stephen F. Larrabee & Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy In An Certainty*, Center For Middle East Public Policy, National Security Reserch Policy - RAND Washington, 2002, P. 134.

⁴⁶ The text of the resolution number 660 of 1990 to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding Iraq withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally to the sites that were present on the 1st of August 1990, and called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediate intensive negotiations to resolve their differences, see: Ahmed Yousef Qarae, “UN Security Council and Managing of the Gulf Crisis, *International Politics*, No. 103, January 1991, p. 99.

⁴⁷ Naziar Ertan, *Turkey will Remain an Important U, S, Ally*, *Turkish Daily News*, No: 3051, 1990.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

Treaty, and stated that U.S. aircraft couldn't use the bases of the alliance without their approval⁴⁹.

Following the declaration of the UN Security Council Resolution 678 which authorized the use of force against Iraq in the absence of its withdrawal from Kuwait no later than the 15th of January 1991, Ozal sought to obtain the consent of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to authorize the government the power to declare war. Ozal was confronted by the opposition of a large number of the members of the "Party of Motherland" and Mesut Yilmaz was at the head of the opposition. Therefore, the motion presented to the Assembly in this regard was withdrawn and a term was added to it authorizing the government the power to declare war when Turkey is subjected to attack, and thus ended the possibility of sending Turkish military forces to the Gulf, or the entry of these forces into Iraq unless Iraq attacks Turkey. The Turkish Grand National Assembly voted on a resolution authorizing the government the power to declare war when necessary and when Turkey is attacked by a majority of 216 votes against 159 votes, whereas 59 members of the Party of Motherland did not vote⁵⁰. The decision also allowed the coalition forces to use military bases of the North Atlantic Treaty in the absence of Iraq's compliance with the above-mentioned Security Council resolution⁵¹.

The Turkish opposition parties expressed their doubts about the motives of the foreign troops on Turkish territory, which were called 'The Poised Hammer Forces.' The U.S. claimed that the purpose of this was providing protection for the Kurds of Iraq and providing humanitarian aid to them. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party stated that the presence of these forces raised the instability in the region, and that the decision of Ozal to allow the existence of these forces was caused by the occurrence under the influence of the West. Ozal also expressed his opposition to his party for the use of Turkish territory in the war against Iraq from Islamic perspective that was focused since the beginning of the crisis

⁴⁹ Ahmad Nuri al-Naimi, *Amliat Sun'e Alqara fe Alsyasa Alkharjia Alturkya Namuthch Alilaaqat Aliraqia Alturkya* (The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy. The Model of Iraqi-Turkish Relations), *Strategic Studies*, No. 39, Center for International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2002, p. 46-47.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 48-49.

⁵¹ Kauthar Taha Yassin al-Dulaimi, *Alilaaqat Aliraqia Alturkya be'en 1990-1998* (The Iraqi-Turkish Relations in the Period between 1990-1998), Unpublished Master Thesis, Faculty of Political Science, University of Baghdad, 2000, pp. 50-51.

on avoiding war⁵². On the other hand, Bulent Ecevit, the leader of the Democratic Left Party pointed to the negative impact of the presence of these forces on the stability of the Middle East, and its threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey. Ecevit also mentioned that the official position of Turkey reflects the position of President Ozal and the Turkish government but not the public opinion in Turkey⁵³. Furthermore, Turkesh, the leader of the National Movement Party called for the exit of the foreign troops from the Turkish territory, and the opposition parties in general stood against the existence of these forces and voted against the extension of the period of its existence, which is being discussed every six months in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. During the discussion of the third extension period, the two parties of the ruling coalition, The Straight Path and the Popular Social Democratic Party, approved the extension, which contrasts with the position of these parties when they were in opposition. However, the Motherland Party voted against the decision after losing power, in contrast to its earlier position in favor of the extension decision during its ruling period. When presenting the topic for discussion for the extension period for a sixth time in June 1994, 193 deputies voted in favor of foreign troops to stay, and 147 deputies opposed that, whereas 101 were absent⁵⁴.

After its meeting on the 26th of October 1995, the Turkish National Security Council raised its recommendation to the Turkish Grand National Assembly requesting to extend the presence of foreign troops every three months instead of six as of January 1996. The decision was the result of the government's desire to please the opposition parties, which were not interested in the presence of these forces on the one hand, and put pressure on the coalition countries to adopt the attitudes and policies toward Iraq to ensure the interests of Turkey on the other hand. With the approach of the date of extension for the thirteenth time, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party became the prime minister of Turkey and announced that he would agree to extend the stay of the foreign troops after the U.S. accepted the following conditions⁵⁵:

⁵² Ahmed Nuri Al Nuaimi, *The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy. The Model of Iraqi-Turkish Relations*, Op cit, p. 89.

⁵³ Kauthar Taha Yassin al-Dulaimi, *The Iraqi-Turkish Relations in the Period between 1990-1998*, Op cit, p. 88.

⁵⁴ Adel Abu Amin, *Erbakan Yutalib Bihkraj Quwat Altahalif min Turkya (Erbakan Demanding the Expulsion of the Western Coalition from Turkey)*, *International Issues*, No. 235, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, July 1994, p. 24.

⁵⁵ Ibrahim Aldaqouki, *Quwat Almiraqa we Muthleth Alunef (Hammer Forces and the Volatile Triangle)*, *International Issues*, No. 345, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, August 1996, p. 18.

1. Not allowing the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
2. Coordination with the Turkish government to act against the military activities of the PKK.
3. Controlling the Iraqi - Turkish border.
4. Speeding up the delivery of U.S. weapons that Turkey paid the price for but had not received yet.
5. Compensating Turkey for the losses and damages suffered by them due to the economic boycott of Iraq, ensuring freedom of trade between Turkey and Iraq, and allowing the flow of Iraqi oil pipeline passing through the territories of Turkey.

The Turkish Grand National Assembly approved on the 26th of August 1996 to extend the stay of the Poised Hammer Forces for three months starting from September 1996 after the U.S. accepted the conditions established by Erbakan. These conditions were aiming at achieving the Turkish interests and gaining the trust of the military and secular parties which felt concerned about the slogans of the Welfare Party and its previous positions before ruling⁵⁶.

In general, the views of Turkey on the official level were matched by the views of the political parties, and all agreed on the need to destroy Iraq's military capability, especially in the field of the non-conventional missiles and weapons, so as to safeguard the Turkish national security from the threat coming from its southern border⁵⁷.

1.2.2 Economic Relations

Turkey started to step up its position on the crisis with the issuance of UN Security Council resolution No.660. In preparation for its participation in any international action against Iraq, the spokesman of the Palace of Çankaya the presidential palace of Turkey stated that, "Turkey is in a position where it can not alone enforce the embargo on Iraq and will not enter at all in any possible military operation. If duty requires the application of economic embargo and if the U.N. shall take such a resolution, we will put into consideration the position of other countries and do what we have to do⁵⁸. But President Ozal wrote to the

⁵⁶ Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Alarab we jiwat belad Alsham(Arabs and Levantine Neighbors)* , The Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Proceedings of the National Conference VII, Group of Researchers, Beirut, 1997, p. 177.

⁵⁷ Ahmad Nuri al-Naimi, *The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy*, op cit, p. 10.

⁵⁸ Kauthar Taha Yassin, *The Iraqi-Turkish Relations in the Period between 1990-1998* ,op cit, p. 43, Quoting: *Cumhuriyet*, 6/8/1990.

Heads of State of NATO saying that Turkey will be involved in any economic embargo, or any military action against Iraq⁵⁹.”

After the issuance of the Resolution number 661, which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, the U.S. intensified its efforts to secure the participation of Turkey in the tightening of the embargo on Iraq due to the importance of the Turkish role in this area by virtue of its proximity to Iraq and for the passage of the oil pipeline through its territory⁶⁰.

The participation of Turkey in the proceedings of the economic embargo against Iraq is not easy at all so that the latter is an important economic partner for Turkey in the field of export and import. Furthermore, Turkey gets about 300 million dollars annually from the proceeds of the passage of the oil pipeline through its territory, and 60% of its oil from Iraq. Concerning this, and because Turkey's non-participation in the implementation of international procedures will reflect negatively on its alliance position with the U.S. and the West in general as well as its relations with the Gulf States; the Turkish decision-maker will be in a very sensitive position.

The Economist magazine of London described the loss incurred by Turkey as a result of the Gulf crisis, saying that, “Turkey as the main way of passage of Iraq's trade has lost much by the imposition of the siege of the U.N. and the participation with the coalition. By the end of 1991 the amount of exports lost and fees for the passage of oil and construction contracts, as well as cash transfers had reached about \$130 billion, especially that 30 thousand Turkish people were laid off in Iraq.” However, Ozal moved quickly in August to close the pipelines which were passing through Turkey close to the border with Iraq⁶¹.”

So, Ozal made sure to use the crisis for the benefit of the country politically and economically. During the visit of James Baker to Ankara on the 8th of August 1990, and after discussing the circumstances and conditions for Turkey to share the U.S.' policy toward Iraq, the Turks received pledges of the U.S. to compensate Turkey's losses resulting from the closure of the Iraqi pipeline estimated at \$6 billion, and the elimination of all the restrictions on the supply of U.S. arms to Turkey and giving it military aid with the value of \$84 million. The U.S. shall convince the World Bank for the launch of loans estimated by \$1.46 billion which were pending because of the inability of Ankara to apply the conditions of indebtedness⁶².

⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 43, Quoting: Sabah, 6/8/1990.

⁶⁰ “Arab Strategic Report 1990, The Center of Political and Strategic Studies in Ahram, Cairo, p. 151.

⁶¹ Sukru, Elekdag, Turkey at Crossroads, Dis Politca, Ankara, 1993, P.31.

⁶² James Baker, The Policy of Diplomacy, Op cit, p. 415.

Kuwait, for its part, granted Turkey the amount of \$320 million in cash to compensate it for the revenue of the passage of the Iraqi oil with the promise of a grant of another \$900 million in installments for a period of nine months, as well as other promises made by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to pay the sum of one billion dollars as compensation for the losses resulting from the application of the prohibitions. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia pledged itself to provide part of the needs of Turkey, which were covered by the Iraqi oil and at a lower price on the international market⁶³.

In light of this, Turkey closed the two Iraqi oil pipelines supplied to the port of Yumurtalik on the 9th of August 1990, froze the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deposits it had, and stopped all the activities of trade and transit to and from Iraq; and that was until it agreed that Saudi Arabia took its decision to close the Iraqi oil pipelines reaching its coastline on the Red Sea as soon as the U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia⁶⁴.

The decision to close the pipeline was taken and made public by the president, Turgut Ozal, without debate in the Council of Ministers. In this context, the Foreign Minister, Ali Hüsrev Bozer, said, “a strange embarrassing coup occurred in Turkey⁶⁵,” in reference to Ozal’s action. However, Necip Torumtay, the former Turkish Chief of General Staff, described the adoption of the resolution in his memoir saying that “strange and unexpected developments happened to the Turkish state with the beginning of the Gulf crisis. Among the first of these developments was the issuance of an immediate decision to close the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline and the declaration of that through the Turkish television without discussing it in the Council of Ministers, and even the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which did not have any information or knowledge of the subject, and to the best of my knowledge, the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has received the news through the Turkish radio,” which was confirmed by Ali Hüsrev Bozer noting that he has heard about the decision by the Turkish Radio as well⁶⁶.

Turkey's decision to close the Iraqi pipeline gained importance in the U.S. plans to tighten the embargo on Iraq. The strategy of the U.S., according to James Baker in the exercise of economic pressure, is represented in his words as he said, “the strategy will definitely fail if Turkey refused to close the oil pipeline coming from Iraq.” Therefore, the U.S. administration sought to push Turkey in this direction to ensure the effectiveness of

⁶³ Ibid , p.416

⁶⁴ Ahmed Al Nuaimi, *The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Op cit, pp. 34-35.

⁶⁵ Necip Torumtay, *Turkey's Defense Strategy*, *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest TRDQ*, Spring 1999, p.7

⁶⁶ Nceip Torumtay, *Orgernal Torumatayin AnilariGen. Torumtay' memories*, *Milliyet Yayinlari*, Istanbul, 1993.

sanctions. James Baker revealed that, “Ozal had ordered the closure of the pipeline in the previous day of his arrival to Ankara to make such an application the closure! And Ozal told him that he had done so despite knowing that the decision will not be gaining popularity, but he would not allow the passage of even one drop of the Iraqi oil⁶⁷.” Baker has also stressed that his government would ask a lot from Turkey, “we need to support Ozal, but perhaps we need its power later on.”⁶⁸

However, Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of Britain, confirmed in her memoirs that, “it would be necessary to close the oil pipeline through Turkey, from which Iraq has exported the bulk of its oil, but it will not be an easy decision.” Thatcher noted that after the diplomatic phone call she has encouraged Turkey on its established opposition to Iraq, despite the fact that the Turkish economy has been affected severely since Turkey, in contrast to Jordan, was applying the U.N. sanctions effectively.”⁶⁹

Ozal also noted, in his justification for the decision, that “it comes in implementation of the resolutions of the U.N. in spite of the fact that the proceeds of the pipe represents important economic sources and Turkey is suffering as a result of that because it will lose the income it will get and the amount of oil supplied by Iraq.”⁷⁰ Ozal estimated the loss of his country from that decision by \$4 billion, while the Turkish Secretariat of the Treasury and Commerce estimated the country’s economic losses suffered by Turkey as a result of the Gulf crisis, in terms of the closure of oil pipelines, and stop of the Turkish exports, transportation and tourism with Iraq and Kuwait for the period from August 2nd, 1990 to April 30th, 1991 at \$6 billion⁷¹.

Turkey's loss as a result of the second Gulf War was much more than that and was not limited to the loss of numerous other financial sources, but also it integrated political, social and security issues, especially in the Southeast Anatolia Region close to Iraq where the predominant population is poor Kurdish people. The people of the region rely on the movement of trade with Iraq and the Gulf States, so the economic sanctions affected them a

⁶⁷ *ibid* , p. 415.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 416

⁶⁹ Margret Thatcher, *The Dawning Street Years*, London,1993, P.818.

⁷⁰ Ahmed Al Nuaimi, *The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Op cit, p. 36.

⁷¹ Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, Aledrak Alturky Lamem Hareb Alkhaleej(The Turkish Perception of the Security of Gulf after War) , in: Mustafa Alawi and others, *Egypt and the Security of the Gulf War*, Center for Research and Political Studies, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1994, p. 208.

lot, and the unemployment rate rose in south-eastern Turkey to range between 30 and 40 percent of the workforce, particularly in this area, as sudden stagnation and deflation in the economy replaced the phase of prosperity and the expectations of economical progress that had risen significantly. Alexis de Tocqueville, however, was the first to suppose that such a phenomenon would be a major cause of social revolution, and therefore, and by the end of 1991, things became mature for a social uprising in south-eastern Turkey⁷².

Concerning this, and because of the lack of the fulfillment of the promises made by the U.S. to Turkey for its participation in the imposition of the embargo on Iraq, where the Turks confirmed a lack of access only to a few of them, and because by the end of the war the expectations of the Turks to obtain not less than 10% of the reconstruction projects in Kuwait and other Arab Gulf countries diminished because of the acquisition of American and Western companies of most of the contracts, Turkey decided to reconsider its position on the economic embargo⁷³. So the Turks, at the official and semi-official levels, started calling for ending the embargo on Iraq because of its negative effects on Turkey. Süleyman Demirel, during his visit to Egypt in May 1994, stated that he hoped to operate an oil pipeline under the oil for food agreement which was threatened with damage due to the accumulation of about 11 million barrels of oil in it, as well as the loss of his country, estimated by \$20 billion, declaring that he is, “against the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, but members of the anti-Iraq coalition are ready to do something about these sanctions⁷⁴.” However, Erdal Inonu, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, noted during his visit to Baghdad in July 1994 that, “the war has caused damage to our country, and our calculations indicate that the damage to Turkey was not a bit.. and our goal is to get rid of the embargo⁷⁵.” On the subject of oil pipelines, Inonu said, “this pipeline has an economic importance to both Iraq and Turkey, and opening it within the resolutions of the U.N. would be a quick step towards the ending of blockade⁷⁶.”

⁷² Arsene Calayas Oglu, *Alsyyasa Alkharjea Alturkya we Alamen we Altawun fe Alshareq Alawsat* (Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Security and Cooperation in the Middle East) , from the Book of the Arabs and Turks, Cooperation and Regional Security, Group of researchers, Translated by: Faten Khalil al-Bustani, edited and represented by Ali Aomlal, Amman, the Arab Thought Forum, 1996. p. 240.

⁷³ Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *The Turkish Perception of the Security of the Gulf after War*, op cit, p. 208.

⁷⁴ Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Decision-making in Turkey*”, op cit, 49.

⁷⁵ Ahmed Al Nuaimi, *The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy*, op cit, p. 75.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 76.

Tansu Çiller, on the other hand, reminded the West that Turkey did everything it had to do as an ally during the war, “but the war is over now, and Turkey is a neighbor of Iraq, and because of the political emptiness in this country as well as the economic embargo, Turkey suffered great losses, and the allies who have demonstrated an understanding during the Gulf War have to pay the price⁷⁷.” Yalın Erez, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Stock Exchanges and advisor to Çiller, supported Çiller in what she had stated in August 1994, “the decision to close the Iraqi pipeline with the beginning of the crisis was correct, but the circumstances have changed now. Iraq is our neighbor, and many Western businessmen have gone with the continuation of the embargo on Iraq, so we see that it is useful for us to go there⁷⁸.”

Furthermore, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the time, has indicated in an interview with the TDN newspaper on October 24th, 1994 that, “Turkey is not with the economic sanctions on Iraq,” calling on the members of the alliance to contain Iraq by promoting its compliance with the resolutions of the U.N., stressing the differing point of view of his country with Washington's hard plans on Iraq. Therefore, at the beginning of the implementation of the oil for food program, Turkey had a large share of the contracts of the program as a Turkish company has won its first oil contract with Iraq, and movement of trade continued across the border between the two countries⁷⁹.

If one watches the amount of the economic and trade dealings between Iraq and Turkey in the beginning of the 1980s they will notice that it reached more than one billion dollars, while the amount of trade exchange reached \$0.57 billion with the U.S., \$0.15 billion with Japan, \$0.12 billion with Saudi Arabia, \$0.52 billion with Italy, and \$0.54 billion with France. While this amount of trade between Iraq and Turkey was affected very significantly as a result of the economic embargo imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait until it reached \$0.21 billion in 1996, it was expected that it would reach \$10 billion this year if not for the embargo⁸⁰.

⁷⁷ Mohammad Nur al-Din, Turkish Foreign Policy: Indicators of the Beginning of a Transformation, Journal of Turkish Affairs, the Center of Strategic Studies and Research and Documentation, Beirut, No. 13, Fall 1994, p. 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 8-9.

⁷⁹ Ahmad Nuri al-Naimi, "The Process of Decision-making in Turkish Foreign Policy", op cit, p. 75.

⁸⁰ Wesal najeeb Alazzawi and Rawraa Zaki Younes Altaweel ,Turkey Studies on Politics and Economy, op cit, p. 15.

CHAPTER II: ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY 2003-2011

Iraq is located at the southwestern tip of the continent of Asia from the area comprising the Arabian Peninsula, which is the midpoint of the three continents Europe, Asia and Africa⁸¹.

The location is regarded as one of the fixed components in geography, but its importance is what changes as it either loses or gains a new importance in accordance with the developments taking place⁸². The importance of the site is studied from several areas such as the astronomical site. Iraq is located between longitudes 45°-38° and 45°-48° east and latitudes 5°-29, 23°-27° north⁸³. The latitudes and longitudes are important in terms of climate and agricultural diversification in addition to the productive industries that depend on particular climates. In the case of Iraq, the nature of this position made it pass diverse climatic seasons which helped in the diversity of cultivation in it as well as it helped in the spread of varied crops in the north rather than the south⁸⁴. As for its marine location, however, it helps in determining the nature of their situations and interests of the economical and political states of the country.

The states bordering the seas or bays have an importance based on their coastal backdrop as these states tower over as not all the seas or bays are of equal importance. Thus, the importance of the marine site for the state comes from the importance of the sea or the gulf. As for Iraq, despite being a semi-confined state, its overlooking the Arab Gulf has earned it the strategic importance which stems from the importance of the Arab Gulf itself that enjoys geo-strategic features such as having the greatest reserve of oil, as well as being a link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, in addition to the nature of its littoral and nearby states and its political, economic and military activities which added further importance to the Arab Gulf in international strategies⁸⁵.

⁸¹Taha Hashemi, *Jugrafia AlIraq(Iraq's Geography)* , Alkashaf Press, Beirut, 2nd ed., 1939, p. 4.

⁸²Mohammed Azhar Saeed, *Geopolitical*, op cit, p. 75.

⁸³Khattab al-Ani, *Jugrafia Ared AlIraq(Iraq's Geography Land, Inhabitants and Economic Resources)*, National Library, Baghdad, 1990, p. 9.

⁸⁴Taha Hashemi, *Iraq's Geography*, op cit, pp. 54-55.

⁸⁵Sabah Mahmoud, *Alsira'a Aljeopolitici fe Alkaleej Alarabi(Geopolitical Conflict in the Arab Gulf)*, Sadoun Pess, Baghdad, 1986, pp. 9-11.

Iraq gained this importance stemming from the importance of the Arab Gulf. In addition, Iraq benefited from overlooking the Arab Gulf which is a center of economic importance as the commercial ports are considered a main source of import in addition to being a major center for the export of oil and raw materials of Iraq⁸⁶.

In terms of the location of Iraq from neighboring countries, the strategic importance which granted Iraq this site stems from the nature of its relationship with the neighboring countries first, and the nature and sensitivity of the region second. In terms of the nature of its relations, Iraq is located within the neighboring countries of Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as Iraq is in the middle of these countries⁸⁷.

Even the distribution of the population and nature of the Iraqi population are characterized by that 68% of them are urban, compared to 32% rural. This means that the proportion of urban development is almost double the rural, which facilitates the process of political, economic and social transition if it occurred, especially as this group is more receptive to the change process⁸⁸.

As for the size of the natural resources and diversity of the area of Iraq, it is noted that there is a wide variety of resources common to the scope of Iraq's geography, which makes almost all regions suitable for investment. This gives the possibility of exploitation of most of the area of Iraq in the activities of different investment, especially since the average surface area of Iraq makes the control and delivery of services to the region in general, easy.

The total nominal GDP was \$91.6 billion in 2009, while the growth rate of GDP is % 5.5%, and per capita GDP is \$4.055. The most prominent sectors of local production are industry 62.8%, services 27.6% and agriculture 9.6%. The most prominent products of the industrial sector are petroleum products, chemical products, textiles, leather, construction materials, fertilizers and metal fabrication.⁸⁹

⁸⁶Taha Hashemi, Iraq's Geography, op cit, pp. 29-31.

⁸⁷Mustafa Alawi, Almuq'e Alstraeji L'Iraq fe Thue'e Altaturat Alhalia(The Strategic Position of Iraq, The Overall Strength of Iraq in Light of the Current Developments), Journal of International Politics, No. 136, 1999, p. 86.

⁸⁸Ibid, p. 86.

⁸⁹EIU Country Report Sept. 10, CIA FactBook., <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>access on January 10 , 2012

Table 1: The Basic Indicators of the Iraqi Economy 2005-2010

Year	Nominal GDP \$	Real Growth %	Population Million	Per capita GDP \$	Inflation %	Exports Billion\$	Imports Billion\$
2005	34,007	3,3	28,2	3,171	37,0	23,697	20,002
2006	42,186	6,2	28,9	3,400	53,2	30,529	18,708
2007	62,338	1,5	29,5	3,477	30,7	39,587	16,623
2008	84,719	7,8	30,1	3,750	2,8	58,806	37,219
2009	74,729	4,5	30,8	3,882	2,8 -	40,857	35,768
2010	91,617	5,5	31,4	4,055	4,2	48,797	42,564

Source: EIU Country Report Sept. 10, CIA Fact Book

As for Turkey, it enjoys a unique geo-strategic location for being a wide country with an area of 780.567 km², of which 24.000 km² is in Europe and is known as Thrace, and 756.567 km² is in Asia and is known as Anatolia. The length of its borders is 2753 km² of which 877 km² with Syria, 610 km² with Russia, 269 km² with Bulgaria, 2627 km² with Greece 268 km² with Armenia 330 km² with Iraq, and 454 km² with Iran⁹⁰.

This is what made Turkey one of the countries of Southeast Europe and the Northwest Asia, as it is the link between Asia and Europe on the one hand and between the three continents Asia, Africa and Europe on the other across Iraq and the Levant. Furthermore, to the east of it are Iran, Armenia and Georgia and to the west of it are Greece and Bulgaria. Its beaches are located on several important seas such as the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, Marmara Sea and the Aegean Sea. In addition, Turkey possesses the most important waterways in the world, namely the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and the Marmara Sea, which gives it a special place in modern and contemporary history at the regional and international levels⁹¹.

⁹⁰Aida Al-Ali, Aldouel Althalatha bein Kmashat Turkya we Israil(The Three Countries between the Jaws of the Turkish-Israeli Pincer), Beirut, 1st ed., Dar Al-Fikr Al-Arabi for Printing and Publishing, 1997, p. 87.

⁹¹Abdel-Wahab Abdel-Sattar bal-Kassab, Tahdidat Aljiwar Aliqilimi Derasat Haltel Alamen Alqumi Alarabi Alturkey(Threats of the Regional Neighbouring Countries to the Arab-Turkish National Security Case Study), a search of a symposium titled Arab – Turkish Relations in the Face of the Twenty First Century, Center of Turkish Studies - University of Mosul ,Mosul ,2002, p. 153.

Therefore, Turkey has accounted for the convergence point of commercial transportation routes through different historical eras, earning the opportunity to control and supervise the marine ports as well as the proximity and embrace of the water sources, which added real strategic privacy and importance to its location.

Turkey has vast natural resources, besides coal, iron ore, copper, mercury and gold; it is a country rich in water resources surface and groundwater as it has been described as the state of satiety water because of its a huge reserves in the water, where there is a 26 aquarium water in it, making it agrarian society where the total arable land in it reaches about 2.4 million hectares⁹².

Turkey's industrial sector is based on the capitalist approach and following the policy of economic adjustment, which in turn reflected in its gross national product, which has witnessed quantum leaps that contributed to the development of gross national product. Turkey has seen a strong economic take-off at the beginning of the 1990s and then enhanced at the beginning of the new century.

Historically, the economic relations between Turkey and Iraq were at a high degree of importance as it has been shown in Chapter One of this Thesis; and now the economic relations between the two countries have developed noticeably in the period between 2003 - 2011 in all economic fields.

2.1 Relations in the Field of Energy

The use of oil and its derivatives is not limited to one state without the other. Advanced industrial states need oil because it continues to be a base of its economic growth and industrial and technological superiority. Developing countries, however, need it for their development and catching up with modern civilization, and it is expected that the need for these countries to oil will increase in the future because its regions are the most vulnerable to population growth on the one hand, and because they do not have the international energy and technological sources on the other hand.

⁹²Osama Jabbar Musleh, Mua'adlet Almiaah we Alnifet Alilaqat Aliqtisadia Alturkya Aliraqiah (The Equation of Water - Oil in the Iraqi-Turkish Economic Relations - Turkey), Journal of Middle East Studies, No. 4, Um al-Maarek Research Center - University of Mustansiriya, Baghdad , 1997, p. 180.

2.1.1 Petrol

It has been estimated for the Arab nation to have huge oil riches that attracted worldwide attention since its discovery. The Arab land is a store for more than half the proven reserves of oil in the globe, and contributes to about one third of global production. It is worth mentioning that about 94% of the Arab oil accumulates in terms of geography, in seven Arab countries, which are Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Libya, Algeria and Qatar; and the rest is divided between five other Arab countries, which are Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Oman and Tunisia. In terms of demography, however, oil is available in a limited proportion of the population of the Arab world that does not exceed 27.8%⁹³.

The oil industry started in Iraq when the Iraq Petroleum Company formerly Turkish Petroleum Company in 1925 got the privilege to search, explore and exploit the oil in the Iraqi territory with the exception of the Basra area, which was not covered by this privilege. This company consisted of the British Petroleum Company, a Group of Dutch Companies Shell, French Oil Company and the American Group, and the contribution of each of these companies was 23.75%⁹⁴.

This company succeeded in the discovery of the great field of Kirkuk in 1927, and then discoveries continued where the most important field was the Zubair field in 1984, the Rumaila field in 1953 and the Majnoon field in 1977. The Iraq Petroleum Company stopped its operations in exploration after the issuance of Law No. 80 on the 11th of December 1961, in which the company lost its concession areas and its activities became limited to the areas of production only. In June 1972, the Iraqi government nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company then set up the National Oil Company which took over the search and production operations in Iraq after that⁹⁵.

Iraq has the third largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran in the spaces discovered. According to recent estimates, the size of Iraq's reserves of crude oil is 143 billion barrels⁹⁶ as shown in Table No. 2.

⁹³Ali Ahmed Atiqa, *Alnafet we Almasaleh Alarabia 1982-1987 (Oil and Arab Interests, 1982-1987) ,* Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Kuwait ,1988, p. 63.

⁹⁴Fahad Masoud Hamoud, *Althrwwe Alsudia we Wsa'el alikifa'a Aliqtsadia(Saudi Wealth and Means of Economic Independence) ,* Dar Al-Farabi, Beirut, 1980, p. 34

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p.35

⁹⁶Anthony H. Cordesman, *Strategic Assessment Csis, The U.S., Japan, Europe and The Gulf - Meeting External Challenges*, March, 1997, P. 7

**Table 2: The Size of Oil Reserves for a Number of Gulf Countries and its Neighbors in 2011
(Billion Barrels)**

Country	Barrels of Crude Oil
Saudi Arabia	264.5
Iran	151.5
Iraq	143
Kuwait	101
United Arab Emirates	97.8
Qatar	25.3
Oman	5.5

Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011, p. 22.

It is clear from this table that Iraq comes after Saudi Arabia and Iran in the size of the world's reserves, followed by Kuwait, UAE, Qatar and Oman. This is what makes Iraq a very important actor in the region. Despite the proven oil reserves, Iraq has a large potential oil reserves estimated at about 214 billion barrels⁹⁷.

Iraq has huge oil capacities. Of its seventy four discovered and evaluated oil fields, only fifteen of them were fields, and Iraq seeks to increase its oil production from 2.3 million barrels per day reached at the end of 2011 to 12 million barrels by 2017 as was stated by Deputy Prime Minister for Energy, Hussain al-Shahristani⁹⁸.

But what distinguishes the Iraqi oil from the oil of other countries in the world is the very low cost of its extraction as shown in table No. 3 since the average cost of producing a barrel of oil in the world is up to 9 dollars/barrel, compared with the Middle East, where up cost of producing a barrel of oil is 2 dollars/barrel, while the cost of production per barrel in Europe is 11.2 dollars/barrel, followed by Russia 10.8 dollars/barrel, and Latin America 9.6 dollars/barrel, and finally the U.S. 9.3 dollars/barrel⁹⁹.

⁹⁷Arab Oil and Gas, Bulletin, vol. XXXII - No. 771-1, November, 2003, p5.

⁹⁸Baghdadia News, Intaj Alnafet Aliraqi Tasel 12 milyon Bermeel fe 2017(Iraq's Production Reaches 12 Million Barrels in 2017), 28-1-2012, <http://www.albaghdadianews.com> access on February 28 , 2012

⁹⁹Noura Al-Youssef, Intaj Alnafet fe Doul Munatamed Opik The Production of Oil Exporting Countries outside OPEC) , Oil and Arab Cooperation, Vol. XXVIII, No. 100, 2002, p. 65.

Table 3: The Cost of Production by Region in the World (USD/Barrel) in 2000

Country/Region	Operating Cost	Capital Cost	Overall Cost
Iraq	1	1	2
Middle East	2.0	2.0	4
Africa	3.6	4.4	8
Asia Pacific	4.6	4.6	9.2
U.S.A	4.2	5.1	9.3
Latin America	2.7	6.9	9.6
Russia	2.2	8.6	10.8
Europe	5.2	6.0	11.2
Caspian Sea	9	6	15

Source: Shamkhi Huweit Faraj, Oil and International Politics, The Iraqi Oil Ministry, Department of Economy and Finance, Department of Economic Studies, unpublished study, November 2002, p. 23

As for the statistics of 2011, Turkey imports 342 thousand barrels of oil a day. This figure refers to a decline in the consumption of oil by Turkey as the rates of importing oil from abroad in Turkey for the past seven years was 450 thousand barrels per day¹⁰⁰.

The strategy of Turkey in energy issues depends on three basic pillars: the first is to provide many and varied energy sources and try as much as possible not to rely on a major source of energy imports, whether it relates to oil or natural gas; while the second strategy is the pursuit of energy market liberalization of monopolies; and the third is very important for Turkey's regional and global relations as Turkey is seeking to be a global conduit of energy. Therefore, the geographical location of Iraq to Turkey, as well as its potential in the field of oil and natural gas is mainly a target of the strategy of Turkey in the field of energy¹⁰¹.

Oil provides nearly 40% of Turkey's energy needs and approximately 90% of the needs of the oil in Turkey is taken from the Middle East, where seven countries are together mainly in the provision of oil to Turkey, and these countries are Iran in the first place as it provides 43% of the oil to Turkey, followed by Russia at 20% and then Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Syria. However, the ratio in Iraq has been increasing starting since 2004¹⁰².

Most of the north Iraqi oil centered mainly in the city of Kirkuk is exported to the world through Ceyhan in Turkey, which has the possibility of exporting 1.6 million barrels

¹⁰⁰OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011, p. 57. http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/publications/202.htm access on January 14, 2012

¹⁰¹Tuncay Babali, Turkey at the Energy Crossroads, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2009, pp. 25-33.

¹⁰²Petroleum Market Sector Report 2010 EMRA, Petroleum Market Department, Ankara, 2011, p. 14.

per day. In 2004, Iraq issued a tender for the sale of oil from Kirkuk through the port of Ceyhan to be the first shipment of oil fields in northern Iraq after the U.S. occupation to Iraq in 2003¹⁰³.

The Turkish Petroleum International Company TPIC signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqi Oil Ministry in 2006 to develop Iraqi oil fields that have been damaged and hurt by previous wars, and have already begun the process of developing the Kassab oil field in 2008¹⁰⁴. Furthermore, TPIC signed a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil worth \$318 million for the purpose of drilling 45 wells in the Rumaila oil field¹⁰⁵.

In 2009, the TPAO Company, allied with another global group of companies led by Gazprom Russian Company, acquired a contract to develop the Badra oil field, which is located in central Iraq and has an estimated oil reserve of 109 million barrels. In the same year, the TPAO also won a bid with a Chinese company to develop the production of the oil field of Maysan in Iraq. The chairman of the company Mohammed Aysal said that the Iraqi Oil Ministry signed with the cluster of his company and Snook National Oil Company of China a contract to increase the production of the field of Maysan, which has an estimated reserve of about 2.5 billion barrels of crude oil. The company will drill dozens of wells in the field in southern Iraq to actually increase the capacity of daily production of crude oil from this field by 100 thousand barrels per day within three years, while the Chinese company will work to raise the total overall capacity to 450 thousand barrels per day¹⁰⁶.

The Turkish companies started with research and exploration of unexplored Iraqi oil, especially in the areas of northern Iraq. In 2010, the Turkish oil company Genel Energy signed an agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government KRG, in coordination with the central government in Baghdad to explore and extract oil from six different regions in order to extract quantities of oil worth \$67 billion; six billion dollars of these proceeds will go to the Turkish company¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰³Nadir Develt, Turkey's Energy Policy in the Next Decade, 2005, p. 3. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Nadir-Devlet.pdf> access on November 24 , 2012

¹⁰⁴Emine Kart, "Iraq oil list disappoints Turks," TODAY'S ZAMAN, April 18, 2008.

¹⁰⁵TPIC Bags \$318 Rumaila Gig," Upstreamonline.com, March 1, 2010, www.upstreamonline.com/live/article207681.ece access on November 5, 2011

¹⁰⁶Hurriyet ,TPAO, Çinli dev ile Irak'ta petrol arayacak,the Chinese Giant well Search Petrol in Iraq, May 18, 2010.

¹⁰⁷Hurriyet Daily News, Turkish investments surpass \$ 620 million in northern Iraq," 25 July 2010, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkish-investments-surpass-620-million-in-n-iraq>access on September 3 ,2011

2.1.2 Natural Gas

There is a relative abundance on the level of international reserves of natural gas. However, the gas industry, production and export, are not commensurate with the size of this abundance. The volume of natural gas reserves in the world is estimated with 187.1 trillion cubic meters in 2010 and the Middle East and parts of the former Soviet Union including Russia which dominate at over about 72% of this reserve¹⁰⁸.

According to the installed indicators of 2010, Russia occupies the first rank in terms of proven reserves of natural gas with 44.8 trillion cubic meters, followed by Iran 29.6 trillion cubic meters, Qatar ranked third place with 25.3 trillion cubic meters, Saudi Arabia ranked fourth with 8 trillion cubic meters, Turkmenistan was in fourth place once more with a reserve equal to the reserves of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. ranked fifth with 7.7 trillion cubic meters, the United Arab Emirates ranked sixth with 6 trillion cubic meters, Venezuela ranked seventh with 5.5 trillion cubic meters, Nigeria ranked eighth with 5.3 trillion cubic meters, Algeria ranked ninth with 4.5 trillion cubic meters, Iraq ranked tenth with 3.1 trillion cubic meters, and Australia ranked eleventh with 3.2 trillion cubic meters¹⁰⁹.

At the level of production, the volume of world production of natural gas reached 3.19 trillion cubic meters in 2010, registering an increase of 7.3% from the year 2009. The production increased by 44% during the period between 1990 and 2010. The natural gas at the present time covers 23% of world consumption of energy¹¹⁰.

At the level of exports, trade in natural gas has seen a growth of 10.1% in 2010, driven by the growth in liquefied natural gas LNG exports, which rose by 22.6%, and exports to the Middle East played the primary role as Qatar achieved a growth in its exports that amounted to 53.2%¹¹¹.

From the strategic point, states always try to have diversity of places of imported energy. In the field of natural gas, Turkey depends on 30% of its imported energy from Russia through the project of Blue Stream, 25% also from Russia but through Bulgaria, 20% from Iran, 13% from Azerbaijan and the rest from Nigeria and Algeria. Under the political conditions in the Turkish investment in the field of the new discoveries for natural gas in Iraq, it seems to a high degree of importance for the Turkish side as it is mainly supported by U.S. support for Turkey to diversify its energy sources and the need not to rely heavily on the

¹⁰⁸BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2011, pp. 6, 20.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Ibid

Russian or Iranian side. It is expected that Turkey needs to build an increasing Strategy of Request of energy, especially in the field of energy as the import of natural gas by Turkey has reached 32.5 million cubic meters in 2011 which is less from the last three years¹¹².

The location of Turkey is one of its most important geo-strategic features in the case of transfer of energy globally, because it is close to places of primary production of gas in the world, such as areas of central Asia, the Caspian Sea and Russia, as well as the gas of the Middle East, which is an alternative route for central Asia's gas. Therefore, Turkey is located in the area of states, which contain 71% of the global gas reserve and 72% of the global oil reserves. On the other side of Turkey is the EU, the largest importer of natural gas in the world and the fastest growing market in the field of natural gas.

There is a competition between Russia and Turkey in the field of gas transport from Central Asia to Europe, and this competition has intensified, especially after the crisis that broke out between Russia and Ukraine in the winter of 2006, which caused a stir in the political media in Europe. The term 'political use of gas' has been popularized widely and Russia has an effective weapon to put pressure on the West. Therefore, Europe needs to reduce its dependence on the Russian fuel. Against the backdrop of this development, the European Commission decided to adopt a project to transfer gas from Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe via Turkey through a pipeline known as 'Nabucco'¹¹³.

In accordance with the approved plans, the Nabucco project imposes to extend the pipeline stemming from three countries in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and then extend westward in the bottom of the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and from there to Georgia, and Turkey. The line then continues its route to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. In the eighth of June 2011, the agreement of Nabucco pipeline crossing the territory of the four European countries mentioned above, as well as Turkey was signed¹¹⁴.

The important thing in this matter is the narratives that talk about the transfer of the Middle East gas to Turkey and then to Europe as a strategic objective to diversify energy sources; especially the transport of gas from Qatar, which is the third largest country in the world in natural gas deposits as well as the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas in the

¹¹²Ibid, p.61.

¹¹³JAMES KANTER, European Natural Gas Pipelines Plagued by Uncertainties, The New York Times, June 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/business/energyenvironment/14pipeline.html?_r=1&ref=naturalgas&gwh=7597D5CB2A99069CF1B467D03C1F52B3 access on December 23 , 2011

¹¹⁴Ibid.

world, but it mainly sells to Asian markets. There are two plans to be discussed: the first is to link the Qatari gas through Saudi Arabia with the Arab gas pipeline that transports gas from Egypt to Turkey via Jordan, while the second is linking Qatar gas through Saudi Arabia to Iraq and then down to Turkey. Thus, Iraq is part of the Turkish and international schemes in securing the future of energy in Turkey and Europe.

Iraq is not only important in the field of natural gas as a potential transporter, but it also contains large amounts of natural gas, as the latest Iraqi statistics indicate that amount of back-up gas has reached about three billion cubic meters in 2011, as shown in Table No. 4.

Table 4: The Size of Gas Reserves for a Number of Gulf Countries and its Neighbors in 2011 (Trillion Cubic Meters)

Country	Reserves
Iran	33
Qatar	25,2
Saudi Arabia	8
United Arab Emirates	6
Iraq	3,15
Kuwait	1,7

Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010/2011 , p. 23.

Is clear from this table that Iraq is ranked fifth in the Middle East after Iran, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia; this means that it is a strong competitor in the region due to the size of its reserves of natural gas.

The Okazz gas field is the largest gas field in Iraq. It was discovered in 1992 north-western Anbar province, 25 km southwest of Kaem Province based on the Euphrates River near the Syrian border with a length of 50 km and a width of 18 km. It includes six drilled wells and a stock of gas about 5.6 trillion standard cubic meters. In 2009 the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki promised the possibility of linking the gas of this field with the project of Nabucco line so as to enhance the competitive potential of Turkey in the field of global energy points¹¹⁵.

¹¹⁵Bülent Aras, Dış Politikada 'gaz' Denklemleri, Foreign Policy 'gas' equations , SETA, Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, February 17, 2010,

In 2011, the Turkish National Petroleum Corporation TPAO signed a contract with the Iraqi Oil Ministry on the development of Mansourieh and Saybah gas fields. Deputy Prime Minister for Energy, Hussein al-Shahristani mentioned that the “coalition of TPAO, Kuwait Energy and Korean Kocaz companies won the right to invest in the field after agreeing on the price of the ministry.” The Mansourieh gas field discovered in 1979 is located 50km northeast of Diyala with a length of 52km and width of 5 to 6km. It includes four drilled wells and its gas proven reserves reaches 4.5 trillion standard cubic meters. The Saybah gas field is located 30km south of Basra. The proportion of TPAO Turkish company from the field reached 50% of the contract value in both fields¹¹⁶.

It is therefore possible to say that the energy situation in Turkey and the world would be better if not for the wars fought by Iraq in the past forty years. Therefore, it is possible to say that Iraq is a future key dimension in energy to Turkey and the world because of the great potential in oil and gas located in it. However, this depends on the major political and security issues represented in the stability, security and political situation in Iraq, the conflict between the central government in Baghdad and the KRG on the energy reserve in northern Iraq, as well as the crisis in Syria which also affect the plans for the transfer of gas and oil of the Middle East to Turkey; the survival of the Assad regime or the arrival of another regime will play a key role in the case of the Arabic project for Turkey.

2.2 Trade Relations

Foreign trade occupies an important place in the Turkish economy, as its trade took many trends and paths, and the process of drawing a foreign policy underwent different considerations at different times, circumstances and political stages, and varied in the extent of their impact on growth, as the form of geographical and strategic location is a key factor in determining the trade routes. No matter how many considerations, the national interest must occupy first place, especially that the trade sector has a significant impact in achieving the balance between productive activity and commercial activity, in particular the imports because they provide local and intermediate goods and raw materials from foreign markets,

<http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=28837&q=dis-politikada-gaz-denklemleriaccess>
December 12 , 2011

¹¹⁶Ugur Ergan, "Mansuriye'nin 171 milyar metreküplük doğalgaz rezervi TPAO ya emanet Mansuriye'nin 171 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves entrusted of TPAO," Hurriyet, June 6, 2011

and has a major role also in the balance and consistency between the production and export activity through the discharge of surplus commodity production¹¹⁷.

In fact, the location of Turkey alone confirms its strategic importance, where Turkey benefits from the freedom of quick access to Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean basin and parts of Central Asia and the Middle East, a region of immense business opportunities and potential where there are participants in international trade¹¹⁸.

However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish economy suffered from severe disorders such as high annual inflation rate, increase in the budget deficit and public domestic debt, the deterioration of the exchange rate of the Turkish lira, trade deficit and increase in foreign debt. The total external debt increased from 64.776 billion dollars in 1994 to 67 billion in 1996 and the number of unemployed increased by 36% in 1996 compared to 1995. Furthermore, the Turkish lira deteriorated from 48.050 thousand liras/dollar on the 21st of September 1995 to 98.385 thousand on the 30th of September 1996. The economic policies of the then coalition governments failed in facing these problems, which was the main reason for its collapse. Turkey tried to get out of these repeated crises which were impeding the efforts of Turkey to develop its relations with the EU, particularly in light of the customs union agreement concluded between the two sides in 1996¹¹⁹.

The Turkish gross national product dropped significantly during 2001 by 10%, accompanied by a significant increase in the rate of job seekers. However, after the advent of the AK Party to power in Turkey in 2002, the Turkish government began to focus on the economic side and placed it at the top of its list of priorities in the reform process that it promised the Turkish electors during its election campaign. The Turkish government did not give up the economic orientation in relations with the European Union, but increased it as an outlet of the economic and political reforms required by the European Union for granting Turkey EU membership.

But the new thing that was brought by the government of the AK PARTY was the opening up of the vital areas old/new for Turkey, the Middle East, Central Asia and the

¹¹⁷Rowaa Zaki Younis, *Mustaqbil Alilaqat Alticharia bein doul wasat Asia Alislamia*(The Future of Trade Relations with the Islamic Republics of Central Asia), *Regional Periodics Studies*, Center of Regional Studies, University of Mosul, No. 1, 2004, p. 29.

¹¹⁸Mahmoud Abdul Wahid Mahmoud and Anis Abdul-Khaliq, *Turkya Qa'ala Istratigia*(Turkey a Geostrategic Castle) , *Center of International Studies*, University of Baghdad, No. 54, 2001, p. 3.

¹¹⁹Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Alarab we Doul Aljwar Alshraqi*(The Arabs and Eastern Neighbours) , *Proceedings of the Arab National Congress VII*, Centre of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, May 1997, p. 167.

Balkans, and began immediately with political and economical openness, where the political and economic conditions were ripe for the establishment of positive relationships on the level of trade. An essential part of Turkey's attempts to join the European Union was to heal the rift that hit the economy at the beginning of the new millennium, as well as a result of political changes, which included the Middle East, including Iraq. Therefore, Turkey's decision is now to look for alternative markets for those that were dealt with through the diversification of the components of its imports and exports to meet the needs of commodity of various goods and services and to stimulate its economy for the better.

Due to economic takeoff of the new Turkish economy, the Turkish economy has recorded a growth rate of 5.9% in 2003, with a gross national income of \$240 billion. With regard to foreign trade, it has reached \$116 billion in the same year. The economic reports in 2003 stated that, "the Turkish economy has achieved a strong recovery thanks to fiscal and monetary policies and good structural economic reforms that have been achieved with support from the IMF and World Bank." The independence of the Central Turkish Bank from the political interference was assured, the exchange system depending on the floating exchange rate has been installed and the total budget deficit in the Turkish government has been decreased significantly. In addition, there have been some reforms in the commercial sector, energy sector, communications and transportation, thanks to the policy of privatization of large public sector companies¹²⁰.

In addition to the new Turkish policy on the economic side, the changes taking place in the region have had a significant impact on the foreign trade of Turkey. One of the most important variables was the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the establishment of a new system in Iraq, has been a positive impact on trade relations between Iraq and neighboring countries, especially Turkey; and in particular, on the issue of ending the economic embargo on Iraq that was imposed on it since 1991, as well as the policy of rebuilding Iraq because of the U.S. war in it.

Iraq is greatly important in terms of trade and its importance stems from the importance of the Arab Gulf, in addition to the fact that Iraq benefited from overlooking the Arab Gulf as an economic strength. The commercial ports are considered a main source of import, and add to that a major center for the export of oil and raw materials in Iraq. Also, Iraq is the second highest country in the Arab world in terms of water resources, which are

¹²⁰ Arabic Strategic Report, Arabic - Turkish Relations , Al-Ahram centre of political & Strategic Studies , June 2003 , p .8

estimated at 44.1 billion m³ per year, according to the statistics of 2002. Iraq is located in terms of air transport on shorter routes that link the countries of Western Europe and the countries of South-East Asia. In light of the expected increase in the level of air transport services and the extent of the investment in it, Iraq could be a center for the passage and landing aircraft, which supports the Iraqi and the global economy¹²¹.

Iraq began the process of economic reforms after 2004, trying to rebuild its destroyed economy; among a set of issues Iraq tried to deal with through an agreement signed with Paris Club to write off 80% of its debts as when this Agreement is implemented in full, it will exempt it from \$100 billion of its debt. Note that Iraq's debt from many countries in the world is one of the most important economic problems suffered by Iraq, and most of this debt came in compensation to the States due to the Iraq wars ever since 1980.

Iraq has a large workforce estimated at eight million people. The proportion of graduates in Iraq is very high, as the indicators of the U.N. in recent years show that there are 24% of the graduates of universities in Iraq in the areas of engineering and human sciences; but at the same time, unemployment remains very high. According to figures released by the official authorities there are 15% of the age groups who able to work are unemployed, though the numbers may actually exceed that figure¹²².

After 2003, Iraq became a great opportunity for Turkey in terms of trade since Iraq is a large and important market for Turkish exports, as well as investments, because it is an oil country with a large amount of cash derived from oil exports for a severe shortage in industries, agriculture and infrastructure because of the wars it went through as well as years of economic blockade imposed on it following the invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s and until the U.S. invasion in 2003¹²³.

The Turkish investors and merchants tried to enter Iraq after 2003 aiming at the volume of trade between Iraq and Turkey before the economic blockade imposed on Iraq in 1991; but the bad security situation did not allow them to work properly, especially after receiving reports of deaths of Turkish truck drivers when transporting goods to Iraq. Therefore, the activity of trade between the two countries had not improved but until after

¹²¹Unified Arab Economic Report , Arab Monetary Fund, Abu Dhabi, 2003, p. 267.

¹²² Ibid, p.280.

¹²³Soran Sükür, "Uluslararası Aliskiler Baglamında Irak ve Ortadogu Petrolünün Jeo-Stratejik ÖnemiGeo-Strategic Importance of the Oil of Iraq and Middle East as a perspective of International Reations in Irak Krizi 2002-2003 Iraq Crisis-2002-2003, Ankara: ASAM, 2003, pp.392-396.

2007 as it began after the security situation became relatively better, as the Turkish exports in this year reached \$2.8 billion¹²⁴.

In 2008, trade activity continued improving between Iraq and Turkey due to improved security in Iraq, as well as a result of improvement in Turkey's industrial production, influenced by the large rise of Turkish exports in general. This year witnessed the signing of the most important agreement between Iraq and Turkey known as the Strategic Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in Baghdad between the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. A large part of this agreement is on issues of trade, where the second point of paragraph B is on the activation of the tourist activity between the two countries and to provide facilities in respect of visa. Also the second and third point of the same paragraph are on the activation of commercial activity between the two countries and the increase of the Turkish investment in Iraq by seeking to establish a free trade agreement between them, as well as providing facilities to the Turkish investor in Iraq¹²⁵. As a result of these agreements, the strategic exchange of a lot of visits between senior officials in the commercial field took place; for example, the meeting which took place between Minister of Foreign Trade of Turkey Kursat Tuzmen and Minister of Development and Planning of Iraq Ali Baban, which was to search for problems in trade between the two countries; especially that Turkey had notes relating to Iraqi government not paying the benefits of the Turkish companies operating in Iraq, while Iraq had notes relating to the failure of the Turkish companies to meet the technical conditions put forth by the Iraqi authorities. In spite of these problems, the volume of trade between the two countries increased to nearly four billion dollars in that year¹²⁶.

The year 2009 witnessed the true start of the trade relations between the two countries, especially after the signing of a Free Trade Agreement FTA, as well as the signing of the Convention of Full Economic Partnership during the visit of Turkish Prime Minister to Baghdad; heading a delegation that included nine Turkish minister and important Turkish economic institutions such as TUSKON, as well as the Association of Independent Businessmen MUSIAD and other Turkish businessmen as several commercial contracts were

¹²⁴ Istanbul Commerce Chamber ,Country report of Iraq , 2007 , p.5.

<http://www.ito.org.tr/Dokuman/Ulke/Irak.pdf> access on December 22 , 2011

¹²⁵Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Council of Strategic Cooperation, 2008,

[http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/ortadogu/irak/Ortak% 20Siyasi% 20Bildirge.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/Bolgeler/ortadogu/irak/Ortak%20Siyasi%20Bildirge.pdf) access on February 13,2012

¹²⁶Ibid.

signed in this visit. Later this year, the Turkish Minister of Commerce also visited Iraq because there are benefits to Turkey from Iraq with respect to exports gasoline and refined oil, and the Trade Minister also opened the ceramics factory in the city of Erbil which was established by Eczacıbaşı Holding Company¹²⁷.

The Khan Alkhalil crossing located between the Iraqi city of Zakho and the Turkish City of Silopi have seen a big increase in the movement of the trucks carrying Turkish goods to Iraq in 2010, until the length of the queue waiting on the Turkish side reached several kilometers, prompting officials of both countries to give serious consideration to increasing the number of border crossings between Turkey and Iraq. In that regard, the Official of Turkey's file at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq Walid Shtak mentioned that Iraq and Turkey are seeking to open a new border crossing between them and that the proposed location for this commercial crossing between the two countries is in the province of Dohuk, in order to accommodate the large volume of Turkish exports to Iraq.¹²⁸

The Minister of the Turkish economy Zafer Çağlayan stated that Turkey aims to open two additional crossings with Iraq to raise the number of the crossings between the two countries to three to get along with the large increase of exports of Turkey. Çağlayan said that the places where the new crossings are to be open are Chino and somewhere near the border with Syria¹²⁹.

In the same year, the Turkish Minister of economy met with the Iraqi Minister of Trade Saffi al-Din al-Safi and posed the idea of establishing a higher council of trade relations between the two countries. The Turkish Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan said that, "Iraq today is one of the most important trading partners of Turkey, and Turkey has investments in construction and all aspects of life in Iraq, in the fields of health and education

¹²⁷Turkish Ministry of Economy, Minister of Economy Assesses his Visit to Iraq, 2009, <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=bakanlikofisi&bolum=detay&haberid=142> access on February 18 , 2012

¹²⁸ Agence France-Presse AFP, Iraqi and Turkish governments agree to open a new commercial crossing, December 27, 2011, <http://www.afp.com/ar/node/543722> access on February 18 , 2012

¹²⁹Turkish Ministry of Economy, Minister of Economy: Turkey will Open a Second Commercial Crossing Border with Iraq, 2010, <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=bakanlikofisi&bolum=detay&haberid=142> access on February 18 , 2012 <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=bakanlikofisi&bolum=detay&haberid=151> access on February 18 , 2012

as well as the field of construction and infrastructure, and therefore Turkey today is the biggest contributing to the so-called reconstruction of Iraq¹³⁰.”

For imports in Iraq, Turkey is the country that comes on top, through the following order: 1- Turkey 24.2%, 2- Syria 18.6%, 3- China 14.4%, 4- U.S. 6.6%. As for exports, Turkey is further down but that is for the best of Turkey, since states at the forefront of Iraqi exports are as follows: 1- U.S. 24.3%, 2- India 16.7%, 3- China 12.1%, 4- South Korea 8.2 %, 5- Italy 6.9%, 6- Japan 6.6%; while Turkey is low-ranked with only 2%, this percentage is rising gradually¹³¹. Table No. 5 shows these facts by showing the volume of trade exchange between Iraq and Turkey in the period 2003-2011.

Table 5: The Volume of Trade Exchange between Iraq and Turkey
(\$ Billions)

Year	Turkish Exports to Iraq	Change %	Iraqi Exports to Turkey	Change %	Volume of Bilateral Change	Trade Balance for Turkey
2003	829	-	112	-	941	716
2004	1,820	119,5	467	316,9	2,288	1,353
2005	2,750	51,1	458	1,9-	3,208	2,291
2006	2,589	5,8-	375	18,1 -	2,965	2,213
2007	2,845	9,8	645	72,0	3,490	2,200
2008	3,917	37,6	1,321	104,7	5,238	2,596
2009	5,124	30,8	925	27,9-	6,078	4,174
2010	6,043	17,94	1,355	42,6	7,398	4,688
2011	8,314		2,505		10,819	5,809

Source: CIA, World Fact Book.

While the focus of the Iraqi exports to Turkey is on oil and oil derivatives, the Turkish exports to Iraq were numerous, and included all aspects of economy particularly with regard to construction and reconstruction, and this can be seen in the tables numbered 6 and 7.

¹³⁰ Ibid .

¹³¹ CIA, World Fact Book, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html> access on January 14 , 2012

**Table 6: Iraqi Exports to Turkey
(U.S. Dollars)**

International Classification	Name of the Material	2009	2010	Change %
33	Crude oil materials and coal tar	928,858,722	1,306,847,462	40,69
97	Gold, silver coated with gold and metal, gold coat waste	5,084,403	35,345,194	595,17
59	Other materials for chemical industry	3,705,008	3,999,079	7,94
21	Leather, suede, raw leather	3,218,351	1,528,447	52,51-
57	Plastic and plastic products	18,633	983,815	5179,96
77	Electronic machines and appliances	1,445,839	699,986	51,59-
67	Iron and steel	280,507	549,808	96,01
53	Colored materials and its supplements used in dyeing and tanning	336,967	461,483	36,95
72	Machinery and equipment used in certain industrial areas	1,572,672	411,828	73,81-
61	Ready-made leather and its products	-	410,564	-

List Total		7,740,602	3,272,366	57,73-
Total Gross		952,261,704	1,354,510,032	42,6

Source: TÜRKİYE İSTATİSTİK KURUMU , Turkish Statistical Institute , www.tuik.gov.tr

**Table 7: Turkish exports to Iraq
(U.S. Dollars)**

International Classification	Name of the Material	2009	2010	Change %
67	Iron and steel	634,602,035	712,120,586	12,22
77	Electronic machines and appliances	454,873,372	508,493,065	11,79
04	Grains and their products	425,687,195	502,118,494	17,95
66	Metal products, non-steel	382,334,250	424,999,404	11,95
69	Mineral products	377,461,767	370,105,921	1,95-
05	Vegetables and fruits and their products	303,319,506	337,225,155	11,18
89	Various products and goods	162,446,592	248,508,064	52,98
82	Furniture	136,931,556	206,803,234	51,03
74	Machinery and equipment used in industry	146,814,476	183,170,110	24,76
64	Paper, cartoons and cartoon products	101,269,492	173,865,562	71,69
Total of List		1,997,762,846	2,375,380,385	18,92

Total Gross		5,123,510,293	6,042,789,976	17,94
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Source: Source: TÜRKİYE İSTATİSTİK KURUMU , Turkish Statistical Institute , www.tuik.gov.tr

2.3 The Issue of Water

Water has multiple uses, as water is one of the basic components of the development of various economic, social and human concepts. Water is also regarded as a biological and health need for all living things, in addition to its contribution to agricultural production, which is considered the first nutritional material in terms of importance to humans. Therefore, logically, there is a clear correlation formula between water and development.

The political, ethnic, security and economic lines of the Iraqi - Turkish relations interfere in the water issue. The Euphrates and the Tigris supply Syria and Iraq with their human and economic needs of water. Syria gets 85% of their supply of water from the Euphrates River, and Iraq gets most of its needs from the Euphrates and the Tigris, while Turkey relies less on these rivers with a ratio of 30% of its total needs¹³².

The Turkish and Syrian water projects affected the quantities of water that Iraq had obtained previously, these amounts totaled 66-75 billion cubic meters annually, and this amount is no longer available and will not be available in the future. Iraq has suffered from a high evaporation rate of water due to high temperatures and the increase in the degree of evaporation increases salinity in the water, and the only way to address this problem lies in sustaining the flow of rivers and water drainage punctures. The annual water need of Iraq is 52 billion cubic meters to irrigate about 40 million acres 14 billion cubic meters from the Euphrates and 38 billion cubic meters of the Tigris. Sustaining the flow of rivers requires an extra 15 billion cubic meters, and thus the annual quantity that Iraq needs becomes 67 billion cubic meters, and these estimates of the amount of water indicate what is likely to happen in the future¹³³.

¹³²Michael Klare, Alhorub Ala Almasder Almiah (Wars over Water Resources) , Dar Al-Kitab AL-Arabi, Beirut, 2002, pp. 26-28.

¹³³Arnon Soffer, Fire Rivers, Alsira'a Ala Almiah fe Alshare'q Alawsat(Conflict over Water in the Middle East) , Translated by Dar Al-Kitab Al-Arabi for Studies, Publishing and Translation, Cairo, 1993, p. 100.

To be more specific, it is necessary to address the important rivers, which form the major part of the relations between Turkey and Iraq, namely the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.

1- The Tigris River:

The Tigris River flows from the heights located in southeastern Turkey and it takes its water resources from two sources; the main stream is at the top of the river and eight tributaries that flow into the river, five of them inside Iraqi territory and three inside Turkish territory.

The area of the Tigris River basin is 235.02 thousand km², distributed as follows: 39.95 thousand km² within the Turkish territory, 67.7 thousand km² within the Iranian territory, 0.47 thousand km² inside the Syrian territory and 126.9 thousand km² inside the Iraqi territory. The length of the river amounts to 1900 km distributed as follows: 1424 km in the territory of Iraq, 441 km in Turkey and 35 km in Syria¹³⁴.

With respect to the discharge of the water from the Tigris River, Iran controls about 6.1 billion m³ whereas Turkey controls about 26.6 billion m³ of the discharge rate of water of the river, because 50% of the basins of the four tributaries of the river are controlled by these two countries, while Iraq dominates 50% of the area of the basin of the four tributaries Great Zab, Little Zab, Atheem, and the Diyala River, except the Khabur which has the proportion of drainage area inside Iraqi territory of 43.5% of the total area of the basin which reaches 6270 km², while Turkey controls the remainder of the area of the basin. The discharge of the water from the Tigris River in Iraq suffers from fluctuations due to the control of Turkey over 56% and Iran over 12% of the sources feeding the river of rain and snow while Iraq contributes to supplying 32% only of the waters of this river. The water of the Tigris River flowing inside Iraqi territory is of an amount of 48 billion m³ in normal circumstances and 28 billion m³ in droughts¹³⁵.

2- Euphrates River:

The Euphrates River flows from the Turkish land of Rum, and consists from the confluence of the rivers North Euphrates Su with a length of 400 km and South Murad Su with a length of 600 km, and then enters the Syrian territory, which in turn supplies the river with three tributaries of the tributary of Assajoor of annual water discharge of 180 million m³

¹³⁴The Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, The General Authority for the Operation of Irrigation Projects, Department of Water Implications. Iraq Rivers, Tigris, Baghdad, 1990, p. 6.

¹³⁵Sabria Ahmed to Lafi, Alishmar fe Almiah Alsatiya fe Aliraq we Athraha ala Ala'emen Alqumei(Investment of Surface Water Resources in Iraq and their Impact on National Security), Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Baghdad, College of Arts, 1994, p. 93.

and Blikh tributary of an average annual discharge of water of 1.5 billion m³, and the tributary of the Khabur. The river enters the territory of Iraq at the city of Qaim, and has no tributary in the Iraqi territory with the exception of some valleys into which the river flows during the rainy season. Therefore, Turkey is a country of the riverhead because they supply the Euphrates with about 88% of the total water while Syria contributes with 9%, and Iraq with 3% only, and the length of the river from upstream to downstream junction with the Tigris River in southern Iraq to form the Shatt al-Arab is 2940km distributed on 1176 km in Turkey, 1160 km in Iraq and 604 km in Syria¹³⁶.

The area of the Euphrates basin is about 444 thousand km² distributed as follows: 40% in the territory of Iraq 15% in Saudi territory 17% in the Syrian territory, and 28% in the Turkish territory. The average annual discharge of water of the Euphrates River is between 28 and 32 billion m³. This ratio varies according to the climate as it increases in wet years for up to 29 billion m³ and decreases in drought years to reach 16 billion m³ annually. The discharge rate also changes throughout the year to make three times with varying percentages on the rate of discharge of natural water which is 29 billion m³ per year, because of the different hydrological nature of the river¹³⁷.

Although 39.5% of the total length of the Euphrates River and 40% of the drainage area is located within the territory of Iraq, Iraq contributes with 3.1% only of the total annual discharge of water of the river. The reason for this is the passage of the Euphrates through rugged land inside Iraq, and this is an area characterized by desert as the rainfall is low and there is no snowfall in it, which affects the annual rate of discharge of water of the river.¹³⁸

2.3.1 The Iraqi Point of View:

Iraq's share of water from the Euphrates was 9 billion cubic meters in the early 1990s, and in the recent past, it reached 14 billion cubic meters out of the 17 billion cubic meters that it used to get in the 1950s. The amount of water reaching the Euphrates River is

¹³⁶Mahmoud Jawad Mubarak, Athr Almayaah fee Al'alaqaat Addawlya Daraasa fee makaamn assaraa' watta'awn bayn dawl almashrq al'arbee wadoul aljawaar(The Impact of Water on the International Relations at the Points of Conflict and Cooperation between the Countries of the Levant and their Neighbouring Countries) , Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Baghdad, College of Political Science, 1994, p. 38.

¹³⁷Ahmed Omar al-Rawi, mashklaat almayaah fee al'araaq fee dhal assayaasa almaa'iyaa attarkya wataatheerhaa fee alaamn alghazhaa'ee(The Water Problems in Iraq in Light of Turkey's Water Policy and its Impact on Food Security) , Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Mustansiriyaa, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics, 1999, p. 99.

¹³⁸ Ibid, p.99.

sufficient to irrigate only 6 million acres of farmland in the basin of this river causing environmental and economic problems. Iraq will be forced to divert water from the Tigris to the Euphrates which will add a new problem to its direct impact on the areas of agricultural land irrigated in the basin of the Tigris, and will increase the area of agricultural land deprived of water with the increase in the need for water and the demand for human and industrial use, noting that most of the Turkish water projects are established over the Euphrates.

As for the Tigris River, the annual amount of water of the Tigris reaching Iraq reaches 38 billion cubic meters. This amount will decrease if Turkey goes through its projects of exploiting 7 billion cubic meters, and if Syria has used the nearly billion cubic meters and put in mind the need to flow water permanently in the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris and facing of the accounts of evaporation these two factors require 15 billion cubic meters per year and lack of water resources to the Euphrates River, the actual waters of the Tigris River used to fill human, agricultural and industrial needs will be 15 billion cubic meters. On the other hand, the Turkish water returned to the Tigris with an amount of 3-4 billion cubic meters of water will cause a qualitative damage to the water going to Iraq¹³⁹.

The needs of Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are essential at all levels, especially from the aspects of food, industry and agriculture. The Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq are considered the main sources of fish production, and Iraq has large water bodies scattered all over Iraq, with an area of 750-950 thousand hectares due to the decline in seasonal marshes which is suitable for the growth and breeding of fish. These surfaces include lakes, rivers, marshes and dams as well as an area of territorial waters of 90 thousand hectares, related to each of the Khawr Abdullah and Shatt al-Arab which alternate the Arab Gulf waters in the cases of the tides¹⁴⁰.

The surface water in Iraq is characterized by high fertility for fish growth that attract fish from the Arab Gulf during the breeding season and these bodies can produce more than 32.9 tons of fish per year. Productivity of these water bodies ranges between 0.6 tons/hectare as a minimum in the upper river and 40 tons/hectare in lakes and marshes¹⁴¹.

¹³⁹ Ibid, pp. 102-104.

¹⁴⁰Thaer Mahmoud al-Tai, azma almayaah al'azhba alhal maa aththamn, almajla al'arbya laadaara mayaah array (Fresh Water Crisis -What is the Price for the Solution), Arab Journal for the Management of Irrigation Water, the fourth issue, January, June, Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, Khartoum, 2001, P.13.

¹⁴¹Ahmed Omar al-Rawi, The Water Problems in Iraq in Light of Turkey's Water Policy and its Impact on Food Security op cit, p. 125.

As to the use of water in industry, the water is a basic and effective material for various industries that cannot be done without the use of water. Water is as an initial material that is used in most industries, as in the food industry, construction industries, the generation of steam needed to run the machines and cooling processes, intermediary solute interactions taking place when cooking, washing raw materials, crude used in industry, as well as in mining and oil extraction. In Iraq, 850 liters/day with an average of 306 m³/capita per year is allocated for industrial use¹⁴².

In the last century, water has become one of the most important and cheapest sources of energy, that energy generated from the stations built on the dam by water falling from the upper dam to the river again, until the power generation becomes one of the most important goals for most of the dams constructed on the Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries by Turkey, Syria and Iraq. Iraq sought to establish a series of dams to regulate water flow and floods that were causing the destruction, but the situation is different because of the low discharge of water and the discovery of the source of the energy generated from the loss of water during its launch from the upper dam, making the power generation an important goal of the construction of dams in Iraq. Iraq has set up fifteen main stations of hydroelectric power generation on the dams on the Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries with a generating capacity of 2504.2 megawatts¹⁴³.

The most important use of water is for personal use, as all water experts agree that the absolute priority of fresh water is given for the purpose of covering the need for drinking and domestic use, "since water is regarded as the second biological need after air for the survival of man" represented in the need for drinking and washing. The amount of water required and consumed by individuals in this sector is impacted by a number of factors, including economic, social and climate factors. An individual who lives in rural areas consumes less than the individual who lives in the city. The quantity consumed is also affected by the level of civilization of the state. For instance, the Canadian individual consumes approximately 350L/day average, while consumption per capita in Africa is 20L/day on average¹⁴⁴. The amount of water needed for domestic purposes also differs depending on the season, the

¹⁴²Ibid, p. 126.

¹⁴³Ahmed Kamel Hussein Al-Naseh, waq' astkhdaam almayaah assathya fee al'araaqoutouq'at almastqbl hataa 'aam 2020(The Reality of the Use of Surface Water in Iraq and Expectations of the Future until 2020) , Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Baghdad, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 2002, p. 86.

¹⁴⁴Thaer Mahmoud al-Tai," Fresh Water Crisis -What is the Price for the Solution", op cit, p. 61.

environment and the climate as the individual consumes in summer times as much as in winter, and the amount of water consumed by the individual varies between 5L/day in the nomadic community and 500 L/day in the urban population in industrialized countries¹⁴⁵.

As for Iraq, the per capita consumption of water has been estimated by about 40 L/day in small towns and villages and 280 L/day in the large cities centers of provinces and districts, while the average was estimated by 310 L/day as for the population of Baghdad¹⁴⁶.

In 1989, the amount of 500 L/day was adopted as an average consumption of the population of Baghdad and 360 L/day as that for the residents of other provinces, as an indicator for planning the completion of projects of filtering drinking water in Iraq approved from the years 1988 to 2000¹⁴⁷. However, this indicator has not been reached because of the failure to complete the required projects to provide water needed by the population, since only 44% of these projects had been established by the year 2000¹⁴⁸.

“The flooding of the Tigris and Euphrates come on suddenly without warning, and carries five times more sediments than those the Nile River carries.” With these words, the English Engineer William Ylockx described the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers, which called for establishing the first barrage in Iraq named Kut in the year 1939¹⁴⁹. The interest in establishing more dams and water development increased after the founding of the Council of Reconstruction to ensure the water supply during times of scarcity, and the Mosul Dam formerly Saddam Dam is considered as one of the dams that most fulfills this purpose.

Over the past five decades of the last century, Iraq has sought to create a development in the field of water on the Tigris and Euphrates and to secure the stability of water in spite of the changes affecting the amount of water, at the same time taking advantage of this dam for tourism or economic purposes, as is the case in fish farming.

Table No. 8 shows the most important dams that have been created in Iraq on the Tigris and Euphrates during the twentieth century and the storage capacity of their reservoirs.

¹⁴⁵The United Nations Environment Programme UNEP, *Haajaat alaansaan fee alwatn al'arbee (Human Needs in the Arab World)*, Translated by Abdul Salam Radwan Knowledge Series 150 Kuwait, June 1990, p. 217.

¹⁴⁶Mahdi al-Sahaf, *Almawaard almaa'iya fee al'araaq wasyaanthaa man attalouth (Iraq's Water Resources and Protecting it from pollution)*, the Ministry of Information, 1980, p. 18.

¹⁴⁷The Ministry of Planning, *haaja al'araaq lamshaaree' almaa' laghaaya 'aam 2000 (Commission of Planning, Construction, Housing and Services, Iraq's Need for Water Projects through the Year 2000)*, Baghdad, 1989, p. 6.

¹⁴⁸Arab Monetary Fund, *Unified Arab Economic Report for 1997*, Table 3-13, p. 247.

¹⁴⁹Ahmed Kamel, *The Reality of the Use of Surface Water*, op cit, p. 40..

This is in addition to the natural lake of Thar Thar that accommodates large amounts of water up to 85 billion m³¹⁵⁰.

**Table 8: Dams on the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq and their Storage Capacity
The Amount of Water in Billion m³**

Name of the Dam	Total Storage Capacity Billion m³	Percentage %	The River on which the Dam is Built
Habaniyah Dam	3.3	2.58	Euphrates
Doukan Dam	7.9	6.19	Tigris
Darbandkhan Dam	4	3.13	Tigris
Hamreen Dam	3.9	3.05	Tigris
Tharthar Dam	85.5	66.95	Euphrates
Mosul Dam	13.3	10.45	Tigris
Hadeethah Dam	9.8	7.67	Euphrates
Total	127.7	%100	-

Source: Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, General Authority for the Operation of Dams and Reservoirs, Dam Projects, unpublished study, 1992, p. 25

2.3.2 The Turkish Point of View:

Turkey is rich in water resources, and even described as being a country with a surfeit of water, since their annual water resources are estimated at about 403 billion m³ per year, while their the use of water does not exceed 15.6 billion m³ per year in various areas of life¹⁵¹. Although Turkey has tried since the middle of the last century to adopt a water policy of creating a network of dams and reservoirs in the length of the course of the Tigris and Euphrates, its position on this is justified with many concepts such as the concept of the definition of a river basin and its sovereignty in the two rivers which originate from its territory and optimal utilization. The Turkish government justifies its policy of water to represent an investment of rivers taking advantage of its geographical location as a source of these rivers.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰Ibid, p 41.

¹⁵¹Food and Agriculture Organization, Investable Agricultural and Rural Development in the Middle East, Netherlands, April 1991, p. 27, cited in Ahmed Omar al-Rawi, Water Problems, op cit, p. 68.

¹⁵² Salah Salem, Haroub almantqa al'arbya. almasree (The Arab Region Wars, The Political Position of Egypt), Cairo, 2001, p. 239.

The water of the Euphrates and the Tigris, in the opinion of the Turkish officials, is a natural wealth subject to the sovereignty of Turkey at the point of the water crossing the borders. They call the Euphrates and Tigris rivers cross-border rivers and international rivers from their point of view as they are the rivers that draw a border point between two states, such as the Shatt al-Arab between Iraq and Iran¹⁵³.

Turkey tried to find a solution in a technical and economic framework that suits them, rejecting the claims of political solutions provided by Iraq and Syria offering them both a solution based on the data on the amount of the needs of each of the water, and determining the size of agricultural land used by each of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, as well as the need to develop the infrastructure for irrigation and improved irrigation practices so as to enhance the lack of water consumption for the development of agricultural products. According to Turkey, in the time Iraq does not require Turkey the provision of larger quantities of water without developing their methods in the field of irrigation, is a waste of water¹⁵⁴.

Turkey started the implementation of a broader and larger project the country ever knew in the modern era, the project known as 'the Great Anatolia Project,' or GAP. The project includes 22 dams of which 17 dams on the Euphrates River and 5 dams on the Tigris River, in addition to 19 hydropower stations and a group of irrigation projects, canals and tunnels such as the Urfa tunnel, which is the longest irrigation tunnel of its kind in the world¹⁵⁵. The Urfa tunnel takes its water from the Ataturk reservoir dam to relieve lands located outside the basin of the Euphrates. The water policy of Turkey can be clarified according to the river on which the water and irrigation project was built.

Turkey considers that this huge project does not harm Iraq and Syria, but on the contrary gives them a great service by controlling the times of pumping water, especially

¹⁵³Ibid, p. 239.

¹⁵⁴ÇETN KAYA, Devran, Türkiye'deki Su Kaynaklarının Gelecekte Türkiye-Suriye ilişkilerini Nasıl Etkileyeceğimize Hakkında How The water sources will impact the future of Turkey-Syria relations, HAK Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2002,p. 33.

¹⁵⁵Mohammed Ahmed al-Samarrai, Nahr al-faraat bayn alaasthwaazh attarkee waala'tmaa' assahyounya(The Euphrates River between the Turkish Acquisition and the Zionist Ambitions), The General House of Cultural Affairs, Baghdad, March, 2001, P. 12.

because of the varying amounts of water on the seasons of the year, as the water in the summer becomes very scant because of the high temperature¹⁵⁶.

Turkey is also surprised by Iraq's objection to the energy projects in the GAP Project as these projects do not diminish the quantity of flowing water, but on the contrary, it gives water a high degree of organization in the flow¹⁵⁷.

A range of projects were implemented in the past on the Euphrates River in a project named the 'Euphrates Basin Development Project.' The project included 14 dams, 4 of them are main and the other 10 are secondary. These projects contributed to the irrigation of farmland estimated at 1091.2 thousand hectares within the territory of the Cape and 556 thousand hectares outside the territory of the Cape, with hydroelectric power dams of 5340 MW generated from these i.e. a yearly production of 20.098 thousand MW/h. The first among these dams was built in Keban in 1974 with a reservoir capacity of 681.9 km², 31 billion m³ storage capacity¹⁵⁸ and it generated energy by 6.2 billion KW/h. Furthermore, Karakaya dam is regarded as one of the most important dams built in 1988. It includes five stations for power generation by 7.5 billion KW/h, and total storage capacity of 10 billion m³¹⁵⁹. In addition to Ataturk dam, which was opened in 1990 as the fourth largest dam in the world in terms of size and estimated reservoir capacity of around 877 km², and a storage capacity of 48.7 billion m³ and it included eight power stations¹⁶⁰. This is in addition to the eight dams that are to be created such as Karkamış dam and Sultan Saw dam, etc. with a total storage capacity of 3.99 billion m³ irrigating an area of 46.925 thousand hectares and an energy of 247 MW/h¹⁶¹. This is in addition to a system of nine projects irrigating an area of 108.43 thousand hectares and requires an amount of water of 10.43 billion m³ annually.

¹⁵⁶, Orhan Teriyaki , Sınır asan Sular ve Ortadogu'da Su Sorunu Transboundary waters and the Middle East Water Question, HAK Yayını, Istanbul, 1994, p. 101.

¹⁵⁷ Yusuf Afat, Güneydogu Anadolu Projesinin, Ortadogu'da Yasanan Su Sorunu Çerçevesinde Bu Soruna Olumlu Ve Olumsuz Etkilerin İnceleyerek Komsularimizla Uzlaşma mkânlarını Belirleyiniz Southeastern Anatolia Project, the water problem in the Middle East within the framework of positive and negative effects of this problem with our neighbors Examining mkânlarını Determine arbitration, Yayınlanmış Akademi Tezi, HAK Yayınları, Istanbul, 2002,p.34.

¹⁵⁸Khalil Ibrahim Al-Nasseri, Attatouraat alma'asra fee al'alaqaat al'arbya attarkya (Contemporary Developments in the Arab-Turkish Relations), Alrayah Printing, Baghdad, 1990, p 173.

¹⁵⁹ibid, p. 174.

¹⁶⁰Sabah Mahmoud and Abdulameer Abbas, assayaasa alma'asra attarkya(The Turkish Contemporary Policy), Mediterranean Press, Beirut, 1998, p. 53.

¹⁶¹Mahmoud Jawad Mubarak, The Impact of Water on Relations, op cit, p. 86.

The issue of water in Iraq did not receive great importance in the period of 2003-2008 as Iraq was living with big problems at the security and political levels, making the issue of water occupy a lesser degree of priority for the Iraqi decision-makers. However, the issue of water has seen a rapid importance in the agendas of the Iraqi relations with Turkey in 2008, to two factors: first, is the relative homeostasis of security in most parts of Iraq, and second, is that this year was a year of drought to Iraq as rain did not fall, but rarely, and the Euphrates and Tigris rivers ebbed largely which led to a serious crisis in agriculture and even home use of water.

In 2008, Iraq lived a severe lack of water due to a lack of rain and snow and thus low water revenue of the Tigris and its tributaries as well as the Euphrates, where the rate of its revenue of water reached 35% of the average, and the total cumulative revenue of the Euphrates is 5 billion m³. This amount of water is not sufficient to meet the water needs for agricultural, municipal, industrial and other purposes. The Fifth Global Forum of Water was held in Istanbul, Turkey in the period of 16-22 March 2009 in the presence of a number of heads of state, a large number of ministers, members of parliaments and heads of international organizations and experts to discuss the problems of water and global warming. President Jalal Talabani headed a high-level government delegation that included the Minister of Water Resources Abdul Latif Jamal and President Jalal Talabani called the Istanbul Forum to grant Iraq a sufficient share of water to initiate the necessary implementation of its projects¹⁶².

Also in 2008, the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid said that this was one of the worst years in terms of shortage of water for more than 70 years due to lack of rain and snow in the main basin-fed rivers of the three riparian countries Turkey, Syria and Iraq. This led Iraq to use a big part of the strategic reserve within dams and reservoirs. Rashid added that the shortage still exists now because of entrapment of rain since the beginning of the current winter season, adding that his country is highly dependent on surface water that comes mostly from the Tigris and Euphrates and their tributaries that benefit also Turkey and Syria, which requires prior coordination between the three riparian countries to determine the share of each one of them¹⁶³.

¹⁶²The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, 2008, <http://www.mowr.gov.iq:81/rafidain-mag/mainview.php?id=112> access on February 18 , 2012

¹⁶³The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, Sana 2008 hay akthr sana shaha lalmyaah fee assab'een al'aama almaadya (2008 is the Most Year in Terms of Scarcity of Water in the Last Seventy Years), 2008 <http://www.mowr.gov.iq:81/rafidain-mag/mainview.php?id=126> access on February 18 , 2012

In 2009, the tripartite ministerial meeting took place between Iraq, Turkey and Syria to discuss the issue of water scarcity and the current poor water situation and fluctuating water revenue hyphen to Iraq, especially in the Euphrates River. The Iraqi delegation was presided by Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid, Minister of Water Resources, the Turkish delegation by the Minister of Environment and Forests, Veysel Eroğlu, and the Syrian delegation by the Minister of Irrigation Nader Bunni and the presence of Mr. Taner Yildiz and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey and the members of the Trilateral Technical Committee. The Iraqi delegation presented the request about the launch of the conduct of 500 m³/s of water in the Euphrates River across the Syrian-Iraqi border during the months of September and October in order to reduce the suffering of Iraqi farmers due to a lack of water in the current irrigation season referring to the low amount of water contained in the Euphrates River in the recent months.¹⁶⁴

While the Turkish delegation said that the discharge of 500 m³/s of water from Syria to Iraq is subject to the receipt of large amounts of water from Turkey, stressing on the difficulty of passing large amounts of water from Turkey through the Turkish-Syrian border, especially in the dry period. For his part, the Syrian delegation noted that in the case when Turkey discharges more than 500 m³/s of water, Syria could pass the excess water directly into Iraq. According to the Turkish side, Turkey understood the negative effects of drought during the last four years in the region, stressing that the impact of this drought was very negative, especially in east and south-east of Turkey. Turkey promised it would do what it could to make efforts for the discharge of more than 500 m³/s of water from the Euphrates River¹⁶⁵.

On the 11th of August the same year, the Iraqi Minister of Water Resources met the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in Baghdad in the presence of Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari to discuss the issues of water scarcity and lack of revenue water in the Tigris and Euphrates. The Iraqi Minister of Water Resources stressed the need for Turkey to take into account the situation in Iraq due to low water revenue, especially in the Euphrates River and the lack of Iraq to sufficient quantities of water during the current planting season. The Iraqi side stressed on the need for the officials in Turkey to fulfill the promises that they

¹⁶⁴ The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, Akhttaam alaaajmaa' aththalaathe bayn al'araaq watrkyaa wasouryaa fee qadya almayaaah (The Conclusion of The Tripartite Meeting between Iraq, Turkey and Syria in The Case of Water), 2009, <http://www.mowr.gov.iq:81/rafidain-mag/mainview.php?id=199> access on February 18 , 2012

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

gave to increase and double the amount of water with the insistence that the minimum amount of water contained to Iraq at the Iraq - Syria border in the Husaybah shall be 500 m³/s at the present time as a first step to secure water for the purposes of agriculture, especially crop rice, provided that in the coming period it is to increase that amount to more than 500 m³/s to provide water for agricultural purposes, and various other uses. However, the Turkish foreign minister promised to go through talks constantly to reach satisfactory agreements between the riparian States and to ensure equitable partnership in the water at the present time and in the future¹⁶⁶.

In 2010, Iraqi Water Resources Minister Abdel Latif Jamal Rashid mentioned that the revenue of water of the Euphrates River was still very low and not more than at its best for 245 m³/s, while Iraq's need of water in the column of the Euphrates River was a minimum of 500 m³/s to meet the requirements of agriculture of 50% of the area allocated to rice crop and provide water for agriculture and drinking water¹⁶⁷.

In 2011 the water issue between Turkey and Iraq passed through a crisis when Iraq announced Turkey's refusal to sign the water convention with it including Ankara's acceptance to provide Iraq with 'limited quantities' of water. The government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said that, "Turkey still refuses to sign the agreement to supply Iraq with specific rates," although they agreed before to supply Iraq with specific amounts of water of more than 500 m³/s¹⁶⁸. As a result, the Iraqi parliament speaker Osama Najafi visited Turkey and met with Turkish President Abdullah Gul and discussed the issue of water and to ensure the quota of water to Iraq, calling on Turkey to, "sign an agreement to ensure water quotas for Iraq in the Tigris and Euphrates in accordance with the Convention held between Turkey and Syria." In return, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul replied that, "the issue of water should not fissure the relations between the two countries", vowing to "take an active and constructive role in solving the problem of water following the completion of the general

¹⁶⁶Turkish Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari and Number of Iraqi Officials, 11 August 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/agustos.tr.mfa> access on February 18 , 2012

¹⁶⁷The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources, Wazeer almawaard almawaard almaa'iyatlb man tarkyaa dakh kamaat akthr man mayaah alfaraat(Minister of Water Resources Asking Turkey to Pump More Water from the Euphrates) , 2010, <http://www.mowr.gov.iq:81/rafidain-mag/mainview.php?id=150> access on February 18 , 2012

¹⁶⁸Al Ittihad Newspaper, Al'araaq yarfd taqneen tarkyaa hath almaa'iyat(Iraq Refuses Turkish Rationing for Its Share of Water) , 25 May 2011, <http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=49988&y=2011&article=full> access on February 23 , 2012

elections in Turkey, through the formation of technical committees and multiple intensify visits to reach understandings in order to prevent aggravation of the situation¹⁶⁹.”

It is possible to say at the end of this section that the issue of water between Iraq and Turkey was and will be one of the most important negative factors in the relations between the two countries, as the importance of water for the two countries is significant. If we take into account the industrial development and trade openness as well as the increase in population in both countries, we find that the water issue will find more space in the relations between the two countries.

The inadequate vision for the issue of water, the lack of proportionality between its increasing needs and limited quantities, and the high rate of population growth and development are factors that created the proper environment for the conflict unless prior solutions are put in place to address them through dialogue and mutual interests. The annual per capita of water in the Middle East was 3340 m³ in 1960; this figure will fall to 667m³ in 2025¹⁷⁰.

Turkey, Syria and Iraq need to seek to use more water for the purposes of agricultural, industrial development and human consumption. It is expected for Turkey's population to reach 98 million, Iraq 56 million, and Syria 35 million people in 2050. The twenty first century will witness the use of water as a strategic tool of coercion and imposition of the will, which adds a new dimension to the conflicts and tensions in the region¹⁷¹.

¹⁶⁹Ibid.

¹⁷⁰Paul Simon, *The Water Crisis, Azma almayaah alqaadma fee al'aalm wamaaymkn an naf'lh basha'nhaa*(The Future Water Crisis in the World, and What Could Do about It) , Translated by Amjad Abdul Razzaq, Tariq Khouri, Al-Ahliya for Publishing and Distribution, Amman, 2001, pp. 11-14.

¹⁷¹Brian Nishiburk, *Alaab'ad alaamnya lal'waaml addaymoughraafya*(The Security Dimensions of Demographic Factors), Translated by Ibrahim Abdul Razzak, Bayt al-Hikma, Baghdad, 2002, p. 8.

CHAPTER III: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY 2003-2011

In this Chapter we will examine the major changes in the relations between Iraq and Turkey after 2003. The changes of government in Turkey in 2002 and then American invasion to Iraq in 2003 and the fall of the Saddam Hussein system brought new dimensions to political relations between two states. The effects of American invasion to Iraq did not just change the relations between Iraq and Turkey but its effects were beyond that. The Turkish relations with the Arab world and the Turkish relations with the U.S. were also developed in the reality that the U.S. invaded and then occupied Iraq.

3.1 Turkish Policy toward the U.S. Occupation of Iraq in 2003

Perhaps what happened in the U.S. on the morning of the 11th of September 2001 was not expected to be so tough, but it was expected that the U.S. interests were under threat at any moment. In 2000, the second Palestinian revolt arose against the Israeli occupation, touching the emotions of sadness and anger by Arab and Muslim peoples against the Israeli occupation, as well as against U.S. support and backing of this occupation in the killing of Palestinians. Al-Qaeda took advantage of these circumstances and began threatening U.S. interests around the world, directing attacks towards certain locations such as what happened to the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, its military base in Khobar in Saudi Arabia, and its Cole destroyer in the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, the attack on the U.S. was expected, but no one imagined this serious event on the U.S. commercial and military giant centers in New York and Washington at this level, given that the military operation is very accurate, confidential and well organized¹⁷².

This was the motive of the U.S. to tighten the war on terrorism, making the senior U.S. officials assert that it would include public and confidential military operations to make the U.S. ready to start operations before being subjected to attacks¹⁷³. In his testimony before

¹⁷² Abdel-Salam Ibrahim al-Baghdadi, *Assayaasa alaaamreekyaa alma'asra tajaah afreeqyaa wan'kaasaathaa 'alaa alwatn al'arbee 1999-2001* (The Contemporary U.S. Policy toward Africa and its Impact on the Arab World 1999-2001), Strategic Studies, Centre for International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 82, 2002, p. 8.

¹⁷³ Ian Anthony, *Annadhaam alaaatsee- alaaawreeb waala'mn al'aalmeey, fee kataab attaslh wanz' assalaah walaamn addawlee* (The Atlantic - European Rules and Global Security), cited in: *Armament, Disarmament and International Security, Yearbook 2003*, the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2004, p. 133.

the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, stated saying, “the asymmetric preference owned by the terrorist is embodied in its ability to attack anywhere, at any time it wants, and mediated by any style imaginable, while it is not possible to defend everywhere all the time. Therefore, the only way possible to deal with these threats is to hunt them wherever they are. So, the war of the President on global terrorism is based on that principle that we find the global terrorists anywhere in the world, and to prevent the nations that give them a safe haven from doing so¹⁷⁴.”

The officials of the U.S. also stressed the possibility of considering owning systems which sponsor terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as a direct threat to the U.S.. In his State of the Union speech in January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush said, “all the nations have to know that America will do all that is necessary to ensure the security of our nation... and the U.S. will not allow the most dangerous regimes in the world to threaten us with the most destructive weapons in the world”. As confirmed by U.S. Vice President, Dick Cheney, “the enemies who seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction will not hesitate to use them against us¹⁷⁵.”

In the view of the U.S., the possession of certain military capabilities can justify the attack of their owners pursuant to the pre-emptive strategy i.e. using force in anticipation of attack. In fact, this new strategy included expanding the concept of traditional preemption to include preventive war under which it is possible to use force even in the absence of evidence of an imminent attack to ensure preventing the growth of any serious threat to the U.S. from weapons of mass destruction with time¹⁷⁶. This is what the Vice U.S. President, Dick Cheney, had made clear stating that, “we cannot let that turn potential threats to definite tragedies¹⁷⁷.”

It did not appear at the time that the American administration's policy was peaceful and acceptable, especially for the period after the 11th of September, as it followed the policy of abandonment of permanent UN friends such as Europe, and also followed the policy of cramming neutral powers in the corner. The adviser to U.S. President for Security Affairs has stated during the Munich conference of global security that, “the U.S. have become more willing than ever to move alone in its war against those it deems as dangerous to it¹⁷⁸.” It

¹⁷⁴Ibid, p. 133.

¹⁷⁵Ian Anthony, op. cit, p. 134.

¹⁷⁶Huda Mahmoud Harb, Alharb alaastbaaqya wamshrou'ya alharb alaamreekyaa 'alaa al'araaq(Pre-emptive War and the Legitimacy of the U.S. War on Iraq) , Journal of International Politics, Cairo, No. 154, 2003, p. 71.

¹⁷⁷Ibid, p.71

¹⁷⁸ Al Jazeera, 11/10/2003, 7.

seems that the U.S. adopted the strategy of taking the war to the enemy; according to U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, who said, “the threats of the twenty-first century had to take the war to the enemy.” Thus, the U.S. worked actively to form a case against Iraq, and was seeking to revive the search for weapons of mass destruction and the application of the principle of smart sanctions, in order to convince friends and enemies that the U.S. exhausted all diplomatic means before direct military action, which should take place under the cover of the issue that must be worked on composing and curing it¹⁷⁹.

The United States started to think-out and prepare for war against Iraq despite the U.S. announcement to stop this military act in Gulf War II and the use of the methods mentioned previously, but with the failure of all economic attempts such as the embargo and the political attempts to weaken the will of the Iraqi leadership by then, and its obedience to the U.S. demands, the American administration started to loom by using the war even if it was outside of the mandate and the adoption of the international style which might be called ‘thinking aloud,’ whether through strategists and informal or formal researchers. Officials as well as experts from outside of the U.S. and Britain, submitted a number of different scenarios for the war of the two countries, and were thinking on the basis of meeting a number of considerations by which to ensure the achievement of victory in war, such as:¹⁸⁰

1. The speed to achieve military and political goals of the war.
2. Minimizing civilian casualties because of the war to the lowest level possible.
3. For the casualties on the side of the U.S. force and the British allied troops in the border to be as low as possible.
4. To avoid the destruction of Iraqi infrastructure, except in cases of necessity.

Of course, and after the end of the war on Iraq, the Americans have failed miserably in achieving all these goals. Even before the war, the war plan was leaked from the Pentagon - the course of action of the central leadership - to The New York Times, and the document developed by the U.S. Central Command in Tampa, the state of Florida, was given details of how it will use well developed military forces in the invasion plan for Iraq. Furthermore, a three-side attack will be used including air, ground and naval forces to crush all Iraqi

¹⁷⁹ Mohammed Jawad Ali, *alaaab'ad alaastraateejya fee adkhaal ayraan fee mahour ashshar wattawjhaat alaaamreekyaa dad al'araaq*(The Strategic Dimensions in of Including Iran in the Axis of Evil and the U.S. Trends against Iraq), Bulletin of Cultural Echoes, The Center of International Studies, University of Baghdad, No. 2, 2002, pp. 2-4.

¹⁸⁰The Arab Strategic Report from 2002 to 2003, The Centre of Political and Strategic Studies, Al Ahram, Cairo, 2003, p 62.

resistance and bring down the regime. In addition to that, the U.S. would spread about 250 thousand soldiers Marine members for this invasion, while hundreds of aircraft would take off from eight countries to attack thousands of targets in Iraq¹⁸¹.

On this basis, the U.S. needed centers for starting a regional war in Iraq and Turkey was one of the most important of these centers according to its geographical location, which is important for Iraq in addition to the old strategic alliance between the U.S. and Turkey. As a result, negotiations started between Turkey and the U.S. for Turkey to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish territory as a starting point for these forces to enter Iraq through its northern border.

The situation was clear to Turkey because of the signs of the U.S. war on Iraq, as the Turkish Prime Minister at the time, Bulent Ecevit in 2001 stated when asked about the possibility that the U.S. launch an attack against Iraq: “Turkey cannot accept this, because such a process may lead to the fragmentation of Turkey and a major imbalance may occur in all the present balances in the Middle East. We do not want any military intervention against Iraq, whatever its kind, and as I said, such an intervention will create many dangers¹⁸².”

Ecevit repeated this opinion after one year in a place much more important than the first one as he stated during the press conference which took place on the seventeenth of January 2002 at the White House after meeting with U.S. President Bush, “any military action against Iraq could be disastrous for Turkey, even if it does not participate directly¹⁸³.” This was not the opinion of the leftist Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit alone at the time, but also the opinion of most of the sectors of the Turkish people representing political parties of various currents and civil society organizations, and even the Turkish General Staff himself did not support the idea of being a part of the possible U.S. war at the time against Iraq¹⁸⁴.

Of course, at the same time, Turkey felt the U.S. rush toward war on Iraq and calculated the large losses to be borne by non-participation in this war, both in terms of relations with the U.S. or at the level of the formation of post-Saddam Iraq. In this regard, the former Turkish President Suleiman Demirel expressed the elite Turkish position from war by

¹⁸¹Jeff Simmons, *Asthdaaf al'araaq al'aqoubaat walghaaraat fee assayaasa alaamreekeeh* (Targeting Iraq:

Sanctions and Raids in the U.S. Policy), the Centre of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2nd Ed., 2004. Pp. 287-288.

¹⁸²In an interview with Star TV, reported in Cengiz Candar, July 2002, www.patrides.com/july02/enregime

¹⁸³Bulent Ali Riza, CSIS Turkey Update, 21 December 2002, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/tu011221.pdf> access on January 3, 2012

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

saying, “the war is inevitable, and Turkey will be affected severely if they were involved in the war, but they will face many losses if they do not become part of it. We are living a tragedy¹⁸⁵.”

These developments coincided with the arrival of the AK Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the newly formed party which won the elections of November 2002. The AK Party represents the voters who are the closest to the Islamic character of Turkey and most of them are part of the Islamic world especially that Iraq is a main part of a common civilization. As a matter of fact, belonging to a Muslim background was not the main reason for the arrival of the AK Party to power, but rather the bad economic situation that prevailed in Turkey at the time, especially after the sharp economic crises faced by Turkey at the beginning of the new millennium. This was due to the promise the Party gave to voters and the Turkish people to go through radical and deep economic reforms based on a comprehensive reform that shall benefit even the Turkish citizens; whereas the party’s view was not limited to the economic reforms as it had reached all the articulations of the life of the Turkish state from the legal, political and administrative fields especially with the availability of standards of developing Turkey to be a member of the European Union.

Consequently, the government of the AK Party faced significant challenges that prevented them from entering into huge actions such as being a part of the war with an Islamic neighbor of economic and security importance such as Iraq. The issue of Iraq and the war spread like wildfire in the whole of Turkish society. At the political level, most of the Congress AK Party members expressed their opposition to the war, especially after the commitments made by the Party during the election campaign which strictly opposed any military action against Iraq. In addition to that, the public opinion polls confirmed that 94% of the Turks were against the war, and that 78% of them refused that their country be a part of the war if it occurred; thus, the leaders of the party didn’t wish to lose this popularity¹⁸⁶.

As for the Republican People's Party CHP (the only opposition) in the Turkish parliament at that time, it seemed like its deputies in the Turkish parliament have expressed their opposition to the principle of participation in the U.S. war on Iraq and saw that the priority was to prevent war. These deputies also expressed a great deal of sensitivity to the

¹⁸⁵Muhammad Abdul Qadir, Al'azma al'araaqya ... qaraa'a fee almawqf attarkee (Iraqi Crisis... A Reading in the Turkish Position), 24/2/2003 , <http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/analysis-opinions/islamic-world/85645-2003-02-24%2017-31-41.html>, 24/2/2003 access on January 3, 2012

¹⁸⁶Ibid, pp. 1-2.

idea of the presence of U.S. troops on Turkish land. Furthermore, the views of Turkish parties outside the parliament were not in favor of the principle of war, too, as well as the views of trade unions and many of the NGOs as statements were issued condemning the U.S. war and calling on the government to stick to non-military cooperation with the U.S.. After that, the most important step in the resolution adopted by the Commission on Human Rights in the Turkish parliament took place to reject the war unanimously, which expressed the predominant trend of the deputies on the one hand, and put great difficulties before any decision that can be issued by the Parliament for participation in the war against Iraq on the other hand and also provides support for the major political position of the government seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with an international regional common perception¹⁸⁷.

There are also other real problems that blocked Turkey from the support of the U.S. in its war against Iraq on the top of which for the Turkish side is the preoccupation with security- as the fear of the Turks from the repercussions of war on the safety of the Turkish political entity is due to the fear that the Iraqi Kurds would establish an independent Kurdish state that increases separatism within its Kurdish population, and is the same fear that restores fears of violence by Kurdish militants that Turkey experienced since 1984 and which is relatively eased after the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK in 1999¹⁸⁸.

This in addition to the experience of Turkey with American promises of rewards and financial compensation after it got out of its participation in the Second Gulf War burdened with economic and financial losses estimated at 40 billion dollars. However, the Turks expected that the losses resulting from their country's participation in a war are estimated by 6-7 billion dollars¹⁸⁹.

In terms of its foreign relations, Turkey also faced obstacles to effective participation in the U.S. war on Iraq, such as the positions of Arab states opposed to the war in Iraq, and especially that Turkey at that time was trying to open a new page with its Islamic depth represented in the Middle East and Central Asia, for economic and political reasons. Furthermore, the Russian and the Chinese position from Turkey, and more important than

¹⁸⁷Mohammed Nur al-Din, Annataa'ij wattadaa'byaat latrkyya, man kataab: nadwa ahtlaal al'araaq watdaa'yaath 'arbyan waqleemyan wadoulyan(The Results Implications of Turkey, cited in: Symposium of the Occupation of Iraq and its Implications on the Arab, Regionally and International Levels) , the Centre of Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 2005, pp. 414-418.

¹⁸⁸Arab Strategic Report of 2003, op cit, pp. 110-111.

¹⁸⁹Ahmed Nouri al-Nuaimi, "The Iraqi-Turkish Relations: The Present and he Future", op. cit, p.40.

their position, the European stance against the U.S. war planned against Iraq, and at that time, the Government of the ruling AK Party considered the issue of acquiring full membership in the European Union as one of the most important objectives of its foreign policy¹⁹⁰.

But if we tried to see it from an opposite corner, it would be clear that the lack of entry of Turkey in the war with the U.S. will cause it to lose a lot of strategic features at the international and regional levels as well as at the security, political and economical sides, especially after the insistence of the U.S. to enforce its military and political plans towards Iraq, as was indicated by the U.S. approach to dealing with the Iraqi crisis and the intensity of military buildup in the region. However, the letter of Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Security Council on February 6th, 2003 was what made the Turks understand that “the region is doomed to be involved in war¹⁹¹.”

Internationally, Turkey needed the U.S. support in case of its being a member of the European Union since its refusal of the U.S. troops entrance to Iraq via Turkey would show this support for the demise, especially in that the former U.S. President George W. Bush had supported Turkey in its quest for EU summit in Copenhagen¹⁹². The U.S. support was not only required in the case of the entry of Turkey in the European Union at the time, but also in the important issues for Turkey on the international stage, such as Cyprus and the issue of the Armenian massacres.

Economically, the U.S. had offered substantial assistance to Turkey, which was trying to get out from the economic crises it has suffered recently. Consequently, several things had been presented during the negotiations between the two sides, such as providing an aid package of up to \$6 billion in addition to providing \$20 billion as grants and loans, as well as reducing the U.S. tax on the Turkish textile exports to the U.S.¹⁹³.

In light of such a complex and difficult situation, which may be regarded as a nightmare for any decision maker in the world, no matter what the result of the Turkish decision of acceptance or non-acceptance to participate in the war was, the results of this decision will inevitably be negative on Turkey and its foreign relations. In such an abnormal situation it was inevitable that the decision would be abnormal, but after Turkey tried to use

¹⁹⁰Arab Strategic Report of 2003, op cit, p. 111.

¹⁹¹Mohamed Abdel-Qader, A Reading in the Turkish Position, op cit, p. 3.

¹⁹²Trials of Europeanization, Turkish Political Culture and the European Union , 2009, p. 3

¹⁹³Yakis Babcan, Turksih Daily News, 17 February 2003.

all the available means to stop the war in the first place, or to confer international legitimacy, or at least to receive a regional acceptance of the war.

Accordingly, Turkey sought in this regard to the formation of a regional joint opinion during a tour of Abdullah Gul, the Prime Minister at that time, to a number of Arab countries to rally support for his government's efforts to prevent war on Iraq in January 2003. Gul began his tour by visiting Syria and meeting with President Bashar al-Assad where convergence of their views on Iraq took place. After that, Gul visited other Arab countries close to the Iraqi issue whereas the speech he had in Syria, Egypt and Jordan was almost one as it aimed at clarifying the idea that “we do not want war.. We do not want to see Iraq divided¹⁹⁴.”

After that, Turkey called on to convene a regional summit of the leaders of Iraq's neighboring countries, but ended up with a ministerial meeting sponsored by Turkey in Istanbul on 3rd of January 2003. The meeting included Iran and Arab countries to discuss ways to resolve the crisis and their position from the crisis as the meeting adopted a project of Turkey which called on Iraq to show maximum commitment to cooperate with the inspectors of weapons of mass destruction, follow a moderate policy and media access with neighboring countries, respect internationally recognized borders, and take serious steps towards true national Iraqi reconciliation. It has been noted then that the proposals of Turkey included the demand of the Iraqi leadership to step down peacefully from power for war prevention, to be followed by fundamental changes in the nature of the regime in Iraq under international auspices¹⁹⁵.

Of course, Iraq refused these recommendations and the U.S determined unequivocally to go to war with or without Turkey. So Turkey had to take the decision to participate in the war or not after the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed on the draft resolution provided to allow the U.S. to use Turkish territory in opening a northern front of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. After the government presented the pertinent motion to the Turkish House of Representatives, the Turkish Representatives refused it on the 1st of March 2003, by which it requested approval on the presence of U.S. troops on its territory and to provide facilities within the framework of its invasion of Iraq, where 264 deputies voted against it and 251

¹⁹⁴Muhammad Jamal Arafa, Tarkyaa taqoud alqaatra al'arbya la'rqla darb al'araaq (Turkey Leading the Arab Tractor to Block the Attack on Iraq), 01/08/2003, <http://www.onislam.net/arabic/newsanalysis/analysis-opinions/islamic-world/85654-2003-01-08%2017-51-31.html> access on January 14, 2012

¹⁹⁵Arab Strategic Report of 2003, op. cit, p. 106.

deputies voted for it, because such a decision requires an absolute majority in accordance with the Constitution of 1982¹⁹⁶.

Thus the U.S. was deprived from entering 30% of its military forces to the battlefield and more importantly, from the plans it had prepared to open two fronts of the fighting north and south which it had now been denied from doing so as well; and among the damage it suffered was having to transport tanks and military equipment and equipments of logistic support which were in Turkey to other places.

The Turkish historical decision created a state of frustration, resentment and anger for the decision-makers in the U.S.. This anger was expressed through a torrent of fiery statements by U.S. officials, as the U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, stated, “the democracy group of the Turkish Parliament has been disgraceful.” The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colin Powell, said, “there is disappointment in the U.S. within the U.S. administration and Congress as well, hence the U.S. reneged on its promise to Turkey to donate one billion dollars as an economical aid to Turkey¹⁹⁷.”

The American waves of anger towards the Turkish continued position by many politicians, researchers and televised channels related to the political trends of the U.S. administration as Marc Grossman, the former U.S. Deputy Foreign Minister stated, “our fault is that we paved the way for Turkey to think itself to be more important than what they actually are. We have told Turkey that we can fight without it, but Turkey’s excess in trust in itself was wrong. At the end of last year and early this year it kept its policy of doing what it wants,” he added saying that, “Turkey has lost two chances: the first in Cyprus and the second by losing the aid, and the concentration of its forces in northern Iraq¹⁹⁸.”

However, the most angry and provocative statement was that by Assistant U.S. Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz who was trying to persuade Ankara to approve the entrance of the U.S. military from its territory as he said that the, “Turkish Parliament vote is bad news because the Turkish army was not as strong as required for the leadership of the government towards a positive outcome for the U.S..” He also said that the so-called, “Islamic solidarity” with the Iraqi people is a general failure of the Turkish trend, and what Turkey has to do is to consider the spirit of democracy, and work with the Americans to

¹⁹⁶Hany Dimitri, Ma'dlaat sayaasa tarkyaa alkhaarjya tajaah al'azma al'araaqya(Dilemmas of Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Iraqi Crisis), International Politics, Cairo, No. 152, April 2003, p. 146.

¹⁹⁷Eddie J. Girdner, Pre-emptive War: The Case of Iraq, PERCEPTIONS ,2005, p12.

¹⁹⁸Mohammed Nur al-Din, Ba'd al'araaq wasouryaa: hal jaa' dawr tarkyaa(After Iraq and Syria: Has the Role of Turkey Come), Al-Sharq Al-Qatari Newspaper, 11/5/2003.

achieve democracy for Muslims and Arabs. Furthermore, the package of U.S. aid, which was submitted to Turkey would have been more useful for the Turks regarding this position a proposing on the Turks to apologize for their decision¹⁹⁹.” In fact, these statements were dangerous for the Turkish side as they were an explicit call by Wolfowitz for the Turkish armed forces to intervene in the political affairs, we do not see any of the spirit of democracy that Wolfowitz was talking about.

These statements provoked a sensation against Turkey in the political corridors in Ankara. The most important response to these statements is that of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who said that, “Turkey did not commit a mistake to apologize for, not in the past and not in the present²⁰⁰.”

Of course, the Turkish decision was totally a historical decision. Researchers were preoccupied with it for a long time, as many of the researchers and the writers at the time claimed that this decision was devastating for the relations of Turkey and the U.S., and it was going to harm the Turkish role in the region and in the future of Iraq's political, economic, and security situation greatly. This would support the Kurds weight in northern Iraq, which would inevitably affect the separatism in the south and south-east of Turkey. Cengiz Çandar, Adviser to the former Turkish President Turgut Ozal, stated that, “the U.S. has already gone through a historic test in Iraq when entering the war without Turkey. The test result of this test was successful and the base of Incirlik, which is the symbol of the strategic value of Turkey and an essential military value was not used by the U.S. In this regard, there was a change in the strategic value of Turkey without saying that it fell.” Çandar said that, “Turkey did not improve the use of such value that must be changed because staying as it is would become a burden on the country, reflect negatively on its great geo-strategic importance for it, and he attributes this confusion in the Turkish positions to the loss of leadership.” Furthermore, Fehmi Kuru agrees with the view that the strategic value of Turkey is the military value, although this value may have already dropped because of the advent of the U.S. to the region, but he stresses on the continuing value of the Turkish secular democratic model in a Muslim country, as Turkey has to fill the gaps which have marred the system²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁹Ibid, p13.

²⁰⁰Nicole Pope, 'Wolfowitz's advice, The Middle East Journal, No.700, 16 May 2003, pp.23-24.

²⁰¹Mohammed Nur al-Din, Turkey: taraaj' alqayma al'askrya wattaqaarb ma' al'arb wayraan dawn amreekaa (Turkey: Retreat of The Military Value, and the Rapprochement with the Arabs and Iran without the U.S.), Al-Sharq Al-Qatari Newspaper, 8/6/2003.

But in fact, the beholder of this decision after a period of time will find that it was of a very positive impact, especially when it interacts with the later events. On one hand, it opened a new page of the Turkish-Arab relations, as the Arabs and I speak here not about the Arab regimes, but of the Arab community see the decision as a step towards solidarity and Joint Islamic Action. Therefore, it is possible to say that Arab sympathy is one of the most important turning points in the Arab-Turkish relations at the level of emotions and people which began with the rejection of the Turks for the entrance of the U.S. troops into Iraqi territory from the north, as this decision became very popular on the channels of the Arab media, led by Al Jazeera, which was watched by most Iraqis and Arabs. This caused subsequent economic benefits and political involvement, and it even may be one of the reasons for the so-called Arab spring of these days, as this decision from my point of view, is the beginning of the marketing of ‘the new Turkish model’ in Arab societies. However, it can be said that this decision is the beginning of the emergence of a Turkish regional strategy in the land of practical application. Bulent Aras has stated in this regard that the Turkish decision not to allow U.S. troops to use Turkish territory was correct in terms of ethic and strategy; yes it negatively impacted on Turkish-U.S. relations, but it elevated the reputation of Turkey at the regional and global level²⁰².

The decision was of a positive effect not only on Turkey's relations with the Arab and Islamic world, but also on its relationship with the European Union. The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, “Abdullah Gul” has mentioned this when he was taking part in a ministerial conference in Brussels, as he expressed his happiness because he felt that Turkey and without prior planning became much closer to the European Union; and naturally, this perception came to light when Turkey confirmed its opposition to the war through the U.S. at the moment regarded as very sensitive to the U.S. to show itself as it is not a Trojan horse to America, and this was a major shift in the Turkish – European relations²⁰³.

Turkish rivalry with the U.S. did not stay long as the developments on the ground in Iraq after the occupation became a new reality for all local, regional and international parties, including Turkey. Subsequent to the American declaration of the end of the main military actions in Iraq, and after it became clear that the armed resistance in it was getting stronger

²⁰²Bulent Aras, Turkey's Rise in the Greater Middle East: Peace-building in the Periphery, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 2009, p. 38.

²⁰³Mohammed Nur al-Din, Addaymqraatya attarkya amaam amthaan jadeed, hal tamr alaaslaahaat raghm a'traad al'askr(Turkish Democracy Facing a New Test, Will the Reforms Pass despite the Objections of the Military Forces?) *Al-Sharq Al-Qatari Newspaper*, 22/6/2003.

and more organized, the U.S. administration started looking for allies who would bear with them the costs of the post-war. The U.S. recognized its mistake at that time as it abandoned the northern front after its military forces faced the largest burden in the southern front. Therefore, a gradual return took place to continue with Turkey through the shuttling visits of the U.S. envoy to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, to find a solution to this crisis. Then the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, clarified during a meeting with his former U.S. counterpart, Colin Powell, saying, “we worked fifty years ago in Korea, and long ago in Afghanistan, and today will continue this cooperation in Iraq.” Gul also added, “this visit removed the doubts and strengthened relations... Turkey is within the alliance and will move together with the allied countries²⁰⁴.”

The same thing was expressed by John AbiZaid, commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East to Turkey in July 2003, who addressed the Turks, saying, “we have been together since the Korean War and now we are still together. We have made mistakes in Iraq. Turkey is a key element in the region, and we need Turkey and cannot succeed without them.. We invite you to sit down and negotiate over Iraq²⁰⁵.” During Abdullah Gul's visit to Washington, the U.S. administration officially asked Turkey to provide 12 thousand soldiers to an international peacekeeping force to control the region with the inflamed Sunni majority in the north of Baghdad, noting that this gave Ankara a final opportunity to prove its credibility²⁰⁶. Especially, that the internal policy of Iraq has been represented in the division of Iraq into three political sections, namely: Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds, who are Sunni too in terms of sectarian notions. The Iraqi Governing Council IGC was established from 25 members of these three sections in addition to a member of the Christians. However, the Sunni Arab areas, which the U.S. wanted to give to the Turkish forces, were the only areas that resisted the U.S. occupation as armed military, which has cost the U.S. forces heavy losses.

As for Turkey, it began to clearly notice the importance of participating in the drafting of the Iraqi scene, especially after the emergence of some factors that showed Turkey the importance of its entry into the Iraqi arena. The most important factor among these factors is Iran's wide-scale intervention into Iraqi affairs and the strong rise of the Kurds in the Iraqi

²⁰⁴Ibid

²⁰⁵Abdel-Azim Mahmoud Hanafi, *Irsaal qawaat tarkya 'ilaa al'araaq watrmeem ashsharaaka al'istraateejya al'amreekya atarkya* (Sending Turkish troops to Iraq and the Restoration of US-Turkish Strategic Partnership), *International Politics*, Cairo, No. 154, October 2003, p. 137.

²⁰⁶Ibid, p. 138.

political equation and extending their political and military hegemony in the north of Iraq, the city of Kirkuk, and a large and important part of the city of Mosul in addition to the emergence of great economic opportunities. Turkey also knows the importance of being a part of the Iraqi issue in order not to create problems for the U.S. and the new Iraq on keeping thousands of the Turkish troops in the northern region to counter the PKK and its members who were entrenched in Iraqi territory. Turkey was seeking for the U.S. support in this region to eliminate this insurgency and work to fill the security vacuum in this region. Furthermore, it is seeking secured zones along the Iraqi - Turkish borders in order to prevent the intruders Kurds from entering Iraqi territory²⁰⁷.

Before the occupation of Iraq, Turkey used to consider that the Kurdish control of Mosul and Kirkuk was a red line, but the Kurdish influence in this region became active and supported by the U.S. administration. Therefore, Turkey saw that there was a need to continue to cooperate with the U.S. in the future to achieve its goals in Iraq for fear of continued support of the Kurds in this region.

With the end of the war, Turkey supported the northern front by allowing logistical terrestrial supplies under the guise of humanitarian aid, which led to the entry of hundreds of military vehicles into Iraq from Turkey in addition to allowing U.S. aircraft to land at Turkish bases to transport the injured as well as replacing more than 60 thousand American troops through Turkey aiming to bypass Turkey's all forms of refusal to open a land front to Iraqi territory²⁰⁸.

After the issuance of Resolution No. 1511 / 2003 by the U.N. i.e. after the U.S. military intervention in Iraq granted its international legitimacy, Turkey announced its willingness to participate in the multinational forces in Iraq to maintain its security by sending ten thousand Turkish soldier that could be increased in Iraq in the future²⁰⁹.

The Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that the aim of sending these troops was to provide assistance to secure security and stability in Iraq, to

²⁰⁷Mohammed Nur al-Din, Anqra-washntn ashsharaaka almatjdda waddawr alaaqleemee latrkyaa(Ankara - Washington Renewed Partnership and the Regional Role of Turkey), Al-Sharq A-Qatari Newspaper, 6/April/2003.

²⁰⁸Nur al-Din Mohammed, Laqaa' bawsh ardoughaan 'alaaqaat shakhsya washraaka dawlyaa(Bush's Meeting With Erdogan, Personal Relationships and International Partnership) , Asharq Al-Qatari Newspaper, 31/January/2004.

²⁰⁹Arab Strategic Report of 2003, op cit, p 42.

provide humanitarian services, and to help the Iraqi people restore their national sovereignty and independence²¹⁰.

Erdogan also stressed the need to strengthen US-Turkish relations despite the estrangement that occurred between the two countries during the war on Iraq as he said, “our government considers it important to act in a manner that fits with the importance of our alliance with the U.S.... and despite the differences between us on the Iraqi issue, the strategic and political truth is the alliance between Turkey and the U.S.²¹¹.”

During the visit of Erdogan to Washington, U.S. President George W. Bush stressed the need for Kirkuk to have a special status and for any federal possibility in Iraq to be geographic, not ethnic. The Turkish prime minister received a pledge from U.S. President Bush not to allow the PKK to move against Turkey out of Iraq and to include the Party on the U.S. terror list²¹².

Accordingly, Abdullah Gul said that, “our forces are not forces of occupation. When we went to Kosovo and Afghanistan have done our job, we want to provide humanitarian services in the fields of water and electricity and we were not supposed to take the role of the gendarmerie in Iraq²¹³.” Gul added that the issue of sending Turkish troops to Iraq is an opportunity that may not be repeated and missing it may lead to a final crisis in the relations with the U.S.. This participation looked for a formula for the legitimacy from the International view, which required either a decision by the U.N., and this was unlikely, or an Atlantic decision, which was also out of the question. Therefore, Abdullah Gul suggested that the participation is to be by the invitation of the IGC at the time in Iraq. Marc Grossman, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State described this proposal as genius, which in case of happening would mean that the Kurdish leaders who were representatives in the IGC were participants in the invitation. This included important implications for Turkey, since it would abolish the presence of its troops in the Iraq as occupational forces²¹⁴.

²¹⁰Jabbar Qadir, Taqaat' almashrou'een attarkee walaamreekee fee al'araaq (The Intersection of the Turkish and U.S. Projects in Iraq), 26/12/2004, p 1. <http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=10787> access on January 23, 2012

²¹¹Ibid , p1 .

²¹²Mohammed Nur al-Din, Bush's Meeting With Erdogan, Personal Relationships and International Partnership, op cit.

²¹³Ahmed Nouri al-Nuaimi, The Iraqi-Turkish Relations: The Present and he Future, op. cit, pp.41-42.

²¹⁴Mohammed Nur al-Din, Turkeyaa ta'oud alaa al'araaq walqaraar khalaal shahreen(Turkey Goes back to Iraq and the Decision is within Two Months), Al-Sharq Al-Qatari, 3/8/2003.

The Turkish parliament approved on the 7th of October 2003 the pertinent motion of the Government on sending troops to Iraq. The motion received almost a consensus of the ruling AK Party by being approved on by 358 votes out of 367 votes whereas the 183 members of the CHP opposed it. However, the statements of the former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and the Minister of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and his former national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, on the difficulties and sensitivities among Iraqis towards sending Turkish troops to Iraq, served as introductions to the U.S. message, which was said at the time that the Turkish government received it from the U.S. administration, which referred to unsuitable conditions to send Turkish troops to Iraq²¹⁵. This matter will be discussed fully in the second section of this chapter.

3.2 The Kurdish Case and Turkey's policy towards Iraq between 2003-2011

Most of the studies confirm that Kurds are the people of Ari who speak the language which goes back in origin to the Indo – European group, and used the Arabic script to write; except for the Kurds in the republics of the former Soviet Union as they use the Russian alphabet, whereas there have been some attempts in Turkey to use the Latin alphabet. In spite of the consensus on the Ari origin of the Kurds, some people tend to say that their origins go back to the Medes and Parthians, or the Nordics or Alkotiens, and no matter how different the opinions about the Kurds are, they were able to maintain their national security entity²¹⁶.

The history of Kurdish nationalism in the northern Middle East is relatively old despite the many changes that accompanied this area due to the Ottoman-Safavid conflict until the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the declaration by former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson of his fourteen principles. These principles included the necessity of granting the peoples under the rule of the Ottoman Empire the right of self-determination and put this desire in the framework of Sevres treaty in 1920. The article numbers 62, 63 and 64 provide for the development of a plan for autonomy in the regions of Turkey, Iraq and Syria, while ensuring the protection of minorities in the region. Nevertheless, this treaty was not carried out as it was replaced in 1923 with the Lausanne

²¹⁵Al-Sabah Journal , Half shamaal alaaltsee sayqr tadreeb alqawaat al'araaqya(NATO will Adopt the Training of Iraqi Forces), No. 295, on 28/6/2004, p. 15.

²¹⁶Bahaa El Badri Hussein, Sukaan iyraan(Iran's Population), Iranian Studies, Institute of Asian and African Studies, University of Mustansiriya, No. 12, Baghdad, 1986, p. 73.

treaty which did not include any reference to a Kurdish state or autonomy²¹⁷ until the establishment of nation-states in the region, namely Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran, and the entry of factions of the Kurds in the long struggle with the ruling regimes in these countries. This struggle has continued to the present day regardless of their names and forms, or even the legitimacy of their goals.

The Kurdish issue constituted an important element in determining the Iraqi - Turkish relations both in the pre- and post-Cold War. Since the founding of the government in Iraq in 1921, and the ruling of King Faisal I, the Kurdish issue has used different approaches, especially after the government adopted a policy based on respect for national Kurds and encouraged them to remain Iraqis, through their participation in varying positions of state in order to have their voices heard and play a recognized role in the ruling elites in the management of affairs of the country²¹⁸.

In the republican era, however, the Kurdish people supported the revolution of 1958, which achieved independence for the country as well as national sovereignty; especially after the government launched a new release of all political prisoners, Arabs and Kurds, ensured the democratic freedoms and enacted a republican constitution, which guaranteed a strong base for solving the Kurdish issue in Iraq²¹⁹.

But on the 11th of September 1961, the Kurdish started a revolution demanding the autonomy of Kurdistan but the government of Abdel Karim Kassem refused to do this. However, when the Baath Party started ruling, its government took some interlocutory decisions cultural and political in the context of the recognition of national – democratic Kurdish rights. However, and under the historical Statement No. 11 in March of 1970, autonomy was granted to the Kurdish people which was aimed at organizing the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan with regards to the Kurdish language and culture.

But this did not prevent the occurrence of strong disturbances from time to time between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, which escalated in the wake of the outbreak of

²¹⁷Albert. Hourani, *Minorities in the Arab World*, Oxford University, New York, 1947, p. 69.

²¹⁸Samar Al-Khuzai, *Alkard walkhayaaraalfeedraalee(The Kurds and the Federal Choice)* , *Journal of the Arabs and the Future*, No. 2, Baghdad: The Center of Studies and Research of the Arab World - Mustansiriya University, June 2004, p. 16.

²¹⁹Salah Saadallah, *Almasaala alkardya fee al'araaq 2003 (The Kurdish Issue in Iraq 2003)*, Baghdad: General Cultural Affairs, 2004, pp. 94-95.

the Iraq - Iran war in 1980. During this war, the Kurds found their chance to declare autonomy based on the status quo and with the support of Iran²²⁰.

But the outbreak of the Second Gulf War in 1991 and the asylum of a large number of Iraqi Kurds into Turkish territory, a number estimated at 460 thousand Kurds at the end of March of 1991, caused the international powers to set up a special status, which is known as the safe haven under the protection of U.S. and British aircrafts. After that, the first legislative elections of the Parliament of Kurdistan occurred and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan won 51% of the votes of these elections whereas the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan won 49% of the votes. The coalition of two parties was formed on the basis of a formula of positions in judgment and the government of KRG was announced in July 1992²²¹.

The security challenge in the Kurdish question for Turkey started to gain greater importance after the announcement of the formation of the PKK in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan, who announced the establishment of this organization on the basis of Marxist-Leninist thoughts that had a doctrine of nationalism at the same time, and calls for the standardization of the Kurdish nation and the independence of the state in the Kurdish regions of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria²²². Soon, the party began its military operations against the Turkish state in 1984 and it started spreading its personnel along the border area between Iraq and Turkey. Most of the party's headquarters were in the areas within Iraq, especially in the areas of the Mount of Qandil.

After negotiations between Turkey and Iraq in the mid-1980s, the two parties held joint agreements that allowed both of them to chase Kurdish people within the territory of each party. After the second Gulf War and after the area of northern Iraq got out of the control of Iraq's central government, Turkey started changing its pattern of dealing with the Iraqi Kurds. For instance, it plunged completely and in detail into the Iraqi Kurdish affairs and were motivated by finding creative political mechanisms through the understanding of Ankara and the Kurdish factions, individually and collectively, to besiege elements of the

²²⁰Talebb Abdul-Jabbar Haider, *Almasaala alkardya fee alwathaa'iq al'araaqya* (The Kurdish Issue in Iraqi Documents), Unpublished Master's Theses, Political Science Faculty, University of Baghdad, 1982, p. 120.

²²¹Samar Al-Khuzaiie, *The Kurds and the Federal Choice*, op cit, p 17.

²²²Under the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, the Ottoman Empire was to have been partitioned but that treaty was superseded by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne which granted independence to a unitary Turkish state.

PKK and prevent their passage over the Turkish border with Iraq after it became an important base in northern Iraq for the presence and the training of the party's fighters²²³.

Therefore, and in the era of Ozal, Turkey had taken a number of initiatives towards the Iraqi Kurds, including Ozal's opening up channels for direct communication with the Kurdish factions of Iraq and proposing a plan to establish safe areas for the Iraqi Kurds in the north, for the return of displaced persons to Turkey after quelling their rebellion in April 1991²²⁴.

After the arrival of Süleyman Demirel to power in Turkey in November of 1991, Turkey strengthened its contacts with the Kurdish factions, but in turn he began to adopt Iraqi Turkmen without stopping the action of chasing the elements of the PKK. On the 18th of January 1991, he threatened to go through direct military intervention against Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi Kurds²²⁵.

In August 1997, Turkey launched military actions against northern Iraq under the name of The Steel Operation which was distinguished from its predecessors in that the Turkish justification for the operation came, as well as to destroy PKK bases, at the request of Massoud Barzani. The operation expanded to include an arc extending from the Zakho mountains, on the far west border with Syria to the mountains of Wulan in the far east on the border with Iran through Iraqi regions and at depths ranging from 100 to 200 kilometers to reach the outskirts of the cities of Erbil and Mosul. Furthermore, this process, as well as for the losses it caused, especially in the ranks of the PKK, meant that there were other objectives that may have included what, in the time was clear, as Turkey's intention to establish a buffer zone²²⁶.

Turkish policy towards northern Iraq continued depending on the basis of security, but with the establishment of channels for communication with Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, especially with the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani, but this did not prevent the existence of

²²³Ibrahim Khalil Al Allaf, *Turkyaa bayn hazb al'amaal alkardstaanee waqwaat almatrqa al'ajnbaya*(Turkey between the PKK and the Hammer Foreign Forces), cited in: group of researchers, "The Kurdish Issue in Turkey and its Impact on Neighbouring Countries", Turkish Studies Center, University of Mosul, 1995, p. 145

²²⁴Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Decision-making in Turkey*, op cit, p. 28.

²²⁵Jalal Abdullah Mouawad, *Turkey and Arab National Security*", op cit, p 102.

²²⁶*Al-Hayat Newspaper London*, No. 12/11/1997, p. 7.

the tide in this relationship according to security challenges, which had its basis in the PKK presence in northern Iraq.

The events of the 11th of September and the U.S. invasion of Iraq after that, as well as the Turkish position that rejected this invasion, had the maximum effect on the Kurdish issue and the relations of Iraq and Turkey. The U.S., after its invasion of Iraq and then the increase in the number of resistance operations and waves of massive popular anger against its presence in Iraq, tried to convince Turkey- as mentioned earlier- to participate by them being present on Iraqi soil, especially in the areas of tension of the Sunnis, who represented the areas of resistance to U.S. occupation. In this regard, Gen. John Abizaid said, “since the Korean War and we are together, let us stay together now also, we have made mistakes in Iraq, and Turkey is a key element in the region, we need Turkey and we cannot succeed without them, so we invite you to sit down and negotiate over Iraq²²⁷.”

Later on, many things prevented the sending of Turkish military forces, the idea of sending Turkish forces was faced with internal interception in Turkey and in Iraq and even by regional powers. For instance, in Turkey the Turks rejected this idea through demonstrations that swept Turkish cities demanding their deputies not approve the sending of Turkish troops to Iraq. The criticism directed against the decision of Turkish military participation is in a different political spectrum. Within Iraq, it was faced with complete rejection starting from the Governing Council, which rejected the resolution altogether, as the Kurds regarded the presence of Turkish troops anywhere in Iraq, even if it is away from their areas, as a consolidation of the minority Turkmen, especially in that the entry of a force will limit the influence of ambition in the Iraqi scene. On the other hand, the Shiite Arabs found that the Turkish intervention will support the Sunni Arabs boycotting the work of politics and who were the enemies of the U.S. that gave all of their shares in the power structure to the Shiite Arabs. Furthermore, even the Sunni Arabs themselves, who were armed factions against U.S. forces, warned Turkey from military intervention in their area since it is true that they see Turkey from a positive corner, but they will resist any forces that carry weapons and enter their areas²²⁸.

²²⁷ Abdel-Azim Mahmoud, *Ersaal qawaat tarkya alaa al'araaq watrseekh ashsharaaka assatraateejya alaamreekyaa attarkya* (Sending Turkish Troops to Iraq and the Consolidation of the Strategic US-Turkish Partnership), *Journal of International Politics*, No. 154, Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2003, p. 137

²²⁸ Center of Political and Strategic Studies in Al-Ahram, “Turkish-Arab Relations”, *A Series of Readings*, No. 4, 7/2005, p.130.

Regionally, Iran rejected the idea of the existence of Turkish troops in Iraq, which meant finding itself a rival party in the political arrangements of this country. The Iranians asked the Turks not to take this step only in consultation with Iraq's neighboring countries in this regard. But Syria rejected any foreign interference in Iraq, whether from Turkey or any other country, as it has asked Turkey to refrain from thinking in such a way because it would exacerbate the problems rather than solve them, and threaten its regional unity and extend the duration of the occupation²²⁹.

As a result of the internal and external pressure faced by Turkey and the U.S., the two parties agreed not to send Turkish military forces to Iraq, but it did not limit the Turkish effective trend against the Iraqi file. So, Turkey worked with its partners in Iraq's neighboring areas to enliven and activate the mechanism of the meetings of Iraq's neighboring countries, where Ankara participated in a meeting in Damascus for the neighboring countries of Iraq with the participation of Egypt in 2003. The meeting came after the reversal of the Turkish government to send troops to Iraq and the escalation of security chaos and political instability in it. With fears that Iraq would become a center for the activities of al-Qaeda and groups close to it, the importance of the role that these countries should take to prevent the entry and exit of infiltrators to and from Iraq became clear, and Turkey was keen to include the final statement for the meeting of Damascus with reference to the PKK by name in the condemnation of the role of some organized terrorist groups in Iraq against neighboring countries²³⁰.

Turkey also participated in the fifth consultative meeting of Iraq's neighbors, held in Kuwait in 2004, to discuss the situation in Iraq. Turkey sought to confirm its commitment to this regional mechanism that allowed it to contribute to setting standards to deal with the Iraqi situation and its developments. The most important issue that dominated the meeting was to find an acceptable and effective mechanism to stop the infiltration across the Iraqi border with neighboring countries.

The Turkish principles in dealing with northern Iraq were based on maintaining the unity of the Iraqi territory. Therefore, any partition of Iraq would open the door to the division of all of its neighbors, including Turkey. Ankara believed that the strength of Iraq and its territorial integrity reduced the risks that may be exposed on its neighbors. The best evidence on that is what was mentioned by one of the Turkish officials in an interview with

²²⁹Ibid, p.135.

²³⁰ibid,p.137

The International Treatment of Crisis, one of the specialized centers concerned with the Middle East on the 27th of October 2004, as he said, “that the biggest concern of Turkey lies in the disintegration of Iraq or its collapse, and that Turkey itself has no aspirations to play the role of balancer even though it may find itself without another alternative”²³¹ and this is based on the fact that the formal establishment of the state will encourage the Kurds of Turkey to do the same.

Turkey began to think seriously about the adoption of new mechanisms to deal with the Kurds in Iraq, and it knew a long time ago the issue of Kurds in Iraq was mainly linked to the Kurdish problem in Turkey's southeast. This problem, which witnessed serious changes carried out by the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was introduced to the Parliament and included the cancellation of one of the terms of the anti-terrorism law and the criminal prosecution of politicians and dissidents on charges of separatism and threatening the territorial integrity of Turkey. This law was directed primarily towards the politicians of the Kurds in Turkey and proposed the approval of the use of Kurdish on the local TV stations and allowing the teaching of Kurdish in a number of schools in the Kurdish areas in Turkey, in addition to issuing signals about the Turkish acceptance of the Kurd's demands in Iraq as long as they preserve the unity of Iraq²³².

At the beginning, the Turkish perspective of the province of Kurdistan was limited to the security aspect and the issue of the Turkmen of Iraq and Kirkuk. Turkey had been pressing toward finding a common solution among the Iraqi parties to ensure national rights and cultural rights of Turkmen as well as to find a solution to the city of Kirkuk to ensure its ancestry and it not being annexed to Kurdistan. This issue was opposed by the Kurds, who considered Kirkuk to be an integral part of Iraqi Kurdistan, and even described it as the Jerusalem of Kurdistan. This was reflected in the Turkish view of the political process in Iraq at that time, although Turkey welcomed the developments of the political process and the participation of political forces in it, in particular in the 2005 Parliamentary elections and the referendum in the constitution on the 15th of November of the same year and its outcome from the adoption of a permanent constitution, it showed what it was prepared oppressively for the human Turkmen and their role in the political process, whether in government or in the drafting of the Constitution; especially the exclusion of Iraqi Turkmen Front ITF

²³¹Ibid, p. 138.

²³²Asoran Giuakian, Ra'a kardya hawl tarkyaa(Comments from the Seminar Entitled About Visions of Kurdish Turkey), East Affairs, No. 116, Center of Political and Strategic Studies, Beirut, 2004, p 14.

supported by it, as well as for the repeated warnings about Kirkuk and the Kurdish attempts to change its demographic reality to appending it to Iraq's Kurdistan region. The Turkish government had also criticized the contents of the new constitution such as the adoption of federalism based on ethnic and sectarian differences rejected by Turkey, as it resembles a consecration of the law which crystallizes the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that upholds the aspirations of the Kurds in Turkey to help them gain their national rights²³³.

With the beginning of 2006, the Kurds put forth the subject of the annexation of Kirkuk to Iraqi Kurdistan on the grounds that it was not only a region rich with oil for the Kurds, but also an important part of their Kurdish history as they claimed. On the other hand, the results of the Iraqi elections resulted in the assuming of the presidency of the Republic of Iraq for the first time by a Kurdish leader represented in Mr. Jalal Talabani, the secretary-general of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. With the break off of the Sunni Arabs from the elections in Iraq before, most of the sovereign positions were divided between Shiite Arabs and Kurds, and this was reflected also on the distribution of members of the security forces of the army and police. Therefore, the Kurds were able to have absolute control over the political and military fields in the areas of Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, half of Mosul, and large areas of the province of Diyala and Salahuddin and became the greatest strength and most important section in the areas of northern Iraq and even outside the Kurdish areas in a time when the people of the Sunni Arabs were busy resisting the U.S. occupation²³⁴.

Turkey was initially an ideal and strong supporter of the ITF, but this matter was not positive for Turkey for several considerations, where the Turkmen themselves were divided into Sunni and Shiite, and were affected by the conflict between the Shiites and Sunni Arabs. However, many of the Turkmen characters played a role in this conflict, such as Abbas al-Bayati of the Dawa Party, headed by Nouri al-Maliki and Muhammad Taqi al-Mawla and the leader of the Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for Shiite Islamic Revolution, in Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Furthermore, the Turkmen Sunni were also divided between secularists and Islamists, whereas the secularists were the ones who formed the ITF and the

²³³Helena Kane Finn, "Turkey's Crisis, Iraq's Future, & The Wolfwits Vist", Policy Watch, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No: 639, July 23, 2002, p.4.

²³⁴Hussein Hafez Ugaili, Mashkla karkouk bayn alhal alwatnee wattadkhlaat alaaqleemya(The Problem of Kirkuk between the National Solution and the Regional Interventions), Bulletin of Mannar Almustaqbal, No. 2, Baghdad: The Future Centre for Studies and Research, 2005, p 56.

Islamists were those who intermixed with the other Islamic Sunni parties such as the Iraqi Islamic Party. Therefore, the Turkmen missed their effect in terms of nationalism as the identity of the Turkmen was not translated into a political project, as was the case with Kurdish identity. Thus, experience has shown that the weak dependence of the Turks on the Turkmen paper may have thrown away a lot of important goals for Turkey in the area to the north of Iraq²³⁵.

This new reality imposed on the Turks to change some of their attitudes towards Iraq, which coincided originally with the change of the general Turkish foreign policy put forward by the Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, at the time and based on the reset of problems and the finding of areas for cooperation with neighboring countries. The strategy of Turkey there was based on setting up initiatives to help in providing security in northern Iraq, adjacent to the Turkish border, through the provision of safety for both the Kurds and Turkmen alike, and the new policy of Turkey was based on extending the good relations with all factions and ethnic groups and communities in northern Iraq, regardless of the preferences and affiliations of these groups²³⁶.

Turkey had recognized that the situation in Iraq was beyond its ability to ensure the unity of this country, which faced the risk of civil war in more than one field. Furthermore, the size of foreign interventions of large regional and international countries made it incumbent on Turkey to develop two approaches to Iraq, not just one. The first belonged to the Kurds in the north and the second concerned Iraq in general. Turkey and the whole world have recognized that the time in which Baghdad was addressed to solve the problems of the KRG had ended and that the Kurds in Iraq today were the only administrators in their areas and the neighboring areas which included the Turkmen and Sunni Arabs.

On the other hand, the KRG realized that the situation which was formed after the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and the establishment of a new political system there was a historic opportunity for them to be utilized to the maximum extent possible, but in a rational way, due to the sensitivities of neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iran and Syria. The KRG also realized that they must keep the bonds of cooperation, especially with Turkey, the country with the biggest influence in the area of northern Iraq, especially since the Kurds in Iraq today have reached a status that they have not reached ever before going back to the establishment of the Republic of Iraq. The Kurds are in a position that everyone envies them

²³⁵ Ibid, p.57

²³⁶ Gökhan Cetin saya, "Irak'ta Yeni Donem", New Era in Iraq, Ortadogu ve Turkiye, SETA, Ankara , June 2006,

for; on the one hand, they now determine the balance of prevalence in the new Iraqi political equation whether towards the Sunni or Shiites Arabs, as both sides were forced to make concessions to the Kurds until they got what they wanted since whoever offered more concessions to the Kurds was the one who possessed what he wanted. However, the most important thing the Kurds gained was 17% of the Iraqi budget, which could reach the equivalent of 100 billion dollars in 2011.²³⁷

On the other hand, the northern part of Iraq had the most important thing not possessed by the rest of Iraq, which was safety and security. Furthermore, the Kurds in their region today were like an independent state as they controlled their affairs in full in addition to what they took of the benefits from the central state as their share in the oil and sovereign positions, on top of which is the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff as well as other ministries; much more than the percentage their population deserves. However, because they represent a balance between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs, who are fighting amongst themselves, the Kurds of Iraq are in the best position possible and even better than being an independent state, as with an independent state, they would be obliged to fight all of the neighboring countries and even surround them in one way or another. As for their internal situation today, they have fully benefited from being a province regarded as an independent state of Iraq as well as being a part of it. On the other hand, and as for their external situation, they have moved away from the negative things that independence may have caused them. Thus, the Kurds desperately need to maintain the current situation. Therefore, the problems between the PKK and Turkey on the one hand and the PJAK party and Iran on the other hand strategically harm the Iraqi Kurds, who are confused between the orientation and the sense of nationalism they and the Kurdish people have in Iraq and between the strategic interests of safety there, which is based on mutual interests with both Iran and Turkey. Thus, Iraq today is as close as possible to the satisfaction of Ankara in this issue than ever before. The President of Iraq Jalal Talabani said, “we do not want to sacrifice our economic and cultural relations with Turkey because of a terrorist organization²³⁸,” and the Kurdish Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari said, “we agreed that the situation between Iraq and Turkey must be united against the fight against terrorism, we will not allow

²³⁷ Fazel Hawramy, Corruption scandals threaten to destabilise Iraqi Kurdistan, The Guardian, May 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/10/corruption-scandals-destabilise-iraqi-kurdistan> (access on February 26 , 2012).

²³⁸ Semih İdiz, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan need each other, Hurriyet Daily News, February 2012, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-and-iraqi-kurdistan-need-each-other-.aspx?pageID=449&nID=12890&NewsCatID=416>(access on February 26 , 2012).

any party, even the PKK, to poison the bilateral relations between the two countries.” In the same direction, the President of KRG stated that, “Iraq should not be a platform or a conduit for terrorist operations against neighboring countries²³⁹.”

In fact, the issue of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq after 2003 haunted the Turkish decision-makers. However, with the passage of time and the intensification of the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in central Iraq, the Turkish study centers, as well as some of those people close to the decision-makers in Turkey began re-considering this case, since the existence of a stable independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq may maintain the non-arrival of unrest and conflict to Turkey. Furthermore, this stable region which is full of oil and at the same time a large market for Turkish goods and investment, will secure the stability of a part of the Turkish economy which threatens from time to time central and southern Iraq because of the political and security unrest there²⁴⁰.

The years from 2006 - 2009 were destructive years for central Iraq, which suffered a civil war between Shiites and Sunnis as well as the war between the U.S. occupational forces and factions of the Sunni resistance. One of the most important forms and models of this war are the events of the city of Fallujah in Anbar province, which saw two U.S. wars that destroyed roughly 70% of the city²⁴¹.

The stability and security in the province of Kurdistan made it easy for it to focus on construction and reconstruction and the Turkish companies played the larger role in this case, where the most goods sold in the stores were from Turkey, most of the shopping centers sold Turkish products and brands and the majority of the contracting work for building roads, bridges and airports are referred to the Turkish companies; even so much as if Iraq's Kurdistan had become as if it were a province of Turkey in economic terms²⁴².

Then, the Turkish relations with the KRG witnessed significant improvement because of the political situation as well as the strong economic relationship created by the state of security in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. This fact led to the exchange of visits by Turkish officials. In 2008 the President and Chairman of the Democratic Union of Kurdistan, Jalal Talabani, visited Turkey for the first time since the U.S. occupation of Iraq. This visit

²³⁹ *ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *ibid.*

²⁴¹ Dahr Jamail, Seven years after sieges- Fallujah struggles, Al-Jazeera , 04 January 2012 , <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/201212102823143370.html> access on January 4, 2012

²⁴² Mohammed A. Salih, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan: From Cold War to Warm Peace, World Politics Review, Mar. 2011, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8088/turkey-and-iraqi-kurdistan-from-cold-war-to-warm-peace> , access on February 25 , 2012

launched a series of mutual visits between officials in Turkey and officials in the Kurdistan region, such as the visit of Murat Özçelik to the Kurdistan region, Özçelik is a Turkish diplomat who was appointed later as Turkish ambassador in Iraq. In the same year, Özçelik also met Nechirvan Barazzani, head of the KRG at that time²⁴³ and Ahmet Davutoglu visited Kurdistan region of Iraq twice in 2009 and 2010 and met the officials of the Kurds there. In turn, Massoud Barazzani visited Turkey many times in the years from 2006 to 2010, and said in one of these visits, “we and Turkey have a lot of common interests and we are willing to cooperate with Turkey in all fields to push our bilateral relations forward. Turkey is our conduit to Europe and the world and we represent its conduit to Iraq and the Arab Gulf countries²⁴⁴.” Many of the Kurdish politicians admitted that their region, which produced oil and which did not overlook the water bodies, was in need of an ally from among its neighbors at a time when the region was going through a state of instability and sectarian conflict that threatened to undermine the delicate balance of politics in Baghdad.

Since Turkey is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, it could be their winning horse in this regard. Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of external relations in the KRG, said that Kurds consider their relationship with Turkey as an important one because of its location and because of the role they play in the international community²⁴⁵.

But for reasons that drove better relationships between Turkey and the KRG there was still a leading cause of disturbing these relations, namely the presence elements of the PKK on the northern territories of the province. In this regard, in late August of 2007, Iraq and Turkey signed a memorandum of security understanding, in which both sides agreed to expand efforts to get the PKK out of the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

The agreement was based on curbing the activities of the party by cutting off supply lines and logistics of the party as well as stopping their media from promoting for them. However, the agreement did not include the key element that was requested by Turkey to allow the Turkish army to enter Iraqi territory to hunt down members of the party, as this matter had been rejected by the Iraqi Kurdish leaders who represented the Iraqi government. Thus, the activity on the Iraqi side was not at the required level for Turkey²⁴⁶.

²⁴³Crisis Group interview, senior Turkish official, Ankara, 3 June 2008.

²⁴⁴ Veysel Ayhan, An Analysis of Massoud Barzani’s Visit to Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN ,July 2010, http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=23AD40E09B5381D287302C4649266082?newsId=215263, access on February 25 , 2012

²⁴⁵Ibid.

²⁴⁶Robert Walter, Terrorist Activities on the Turkey / Iraq Border, REPORT1 submitted on behalf of the Political Committee, Federated Group, United Kingdom, 2007.

In reality, the Kurds in Iraq, especially KRG president Massoud Barzazani, was not satisfied with the terrorist activity carried out by the PKK, as this would certainly undermine the rise of the economic and political status of the territory, of which Turkey was the most important player. However, and at the same time, the nationalist sentiments of Iraqi Kurds were at their highest levels and it was not possible for Barzazani to take a strong stand against the military presence of the PKK in the Qandil Mountain or in the rest of northern Iraq, as the Party did not have the power that enabled it to face them. Therefore, Massoud Barzazani and Kurdish officials of the KRG tried to play a role of mediation between the PKK and the Turkish intelligence service, MIT. Barzazani stated on more than one occasion that the PKK does not practice terrorist activities as a tool to achieve the aspirations of the Kurds in southeast Turkey but on the other hand, Turkey should seriously consider the issue of granting additional rights to the Kurds there, and not resort to the security solution as a means to solve the Kurdish problem in the territory of Iraqi Kurdistan and abroad. Furthermore, he stated at a conference in Erbil saying, “we are with the rights of the Kurdish people, but we are not with them to obtain these rights by war and killing, because this method will not achieve any result²⁴⁷. He added, “we do not support the PJAK Iranian Kurdistan Free Life Party or PKK to obtain these rights by war, but we encourage them to claim their rights with peace.” Barzazani said that the, “PJAK and PKK do not take the development of the Kurdistan region to carry out military operations from the territory of the province into consideration.” He added, “we are in a critical situation, because there are two states that ask us to take control of our borders so as to finish our problems with them while we fear to send troops to the border, because it can break out a Kurdish - Kurdish war. This is why it was not possible to send troops.” Barzazani called on the two parties to abandon the idea of getting their rights by military means, “and to defend their rights under the dome of the parliament in Ankara, as this would be more effective and would achieve greater gains.” He has also dealt with the issue of his mediation between the warring parties by saying, “if we succeed in our endeavor we will greatly serve the inhabitants of the region, Iran and Turkey, and if we do not succeed, we will not be part of this war²⁴⁸.”

From the aforementioned, we can see that the Kurds in Iraq were putting the relations with Turkey at the highest levels of foreign policy as they conceded it was part of the survival

²⁴⁷ Al-Quds Newspaper, Barzazani calls on Kurdish rebels in Turkey and Iran to stop the war , September 2011, <http://www.alquds.com/news/article/view/id/292552> access on January 27 , 2012

²⁴⁸ Ibid

of their policy and economy; therefore, they were serious about understanding the move towards greater activation of these relations.

In 2010, a Turkish consulate was opened in Erbil as well as a commercial attaché. Deniz Kutlu, the Turkish commercial attaché in Erbil, described the Turkish relations with the Kurdistan region of Iraq by saying that, “no one imagined before four or five years to open Turkey commercial attaché in Erbil, but because of the growing trade relations between us and the Kurdistan region of Iraq made the officials on both sides reconsider the mutual political relations.” The Turkish Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan mentioned that 70% of Turkey's exports go to the northern part of Iraq, to the Kurdish region. If the Kurdistan region of Iraq was an independent state it would be the eighth-largest export market for Turkey²⁴⁹.

3.3 Turkey and the New Political Process in Iraq

3.3.1 The Political Image of Iraq after Occupation

Before addressing the Turkish policy towards the new Iraq after the U.S. invasion, it is necessary to explain the new political process in Iraq and the most important political parties and actors involved in this process.

In early June 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer, who was appointed by the U.S. as a civilian governor, gave up on holding onto an Iraqi national conference, and made clear - instead of that- his intention to create an interim administration of Iraq, consisting of the political council that would nominate Iraqis to serve as transitional ministers in an advisory capacity. Therefore, he held a constitutional convention to draft a new constitution. Then, he said that it was an ‘authority’ and not a government and that it was advisory in nature. Later on, Paul Bremer, the U.S. civilian administrator in Iraq, announced the establishment of the ‘IGC,’ which shall entrust the issue of discussing the Constitution to the ‘Constitutional Council²⁵⁰.’

When the Coalition Provisional Authority appointed the IGC, it adopted a project for the ethnic and sectarian proportional representation, rather than political representation. Thus, the Shia had 50% + one, i.e., 13 seats of 25 of the seats of representatives, and the Sunni Arabs and Kurds had 20% or 5 seats for representatives of each, leaving one seat for each of

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Paul Bremer, 'Aam qadeeth fee al'araaq annadaal labnaa' ghad marjou(A Year I Spent in Iraq, “The Struggle to Build the Hoped-tomorrow), Translated by Omar Ayoubi, 1st Ed., Beirut: Dar al-Kitab Alarabi, 2006, p. 133.

the Christians and Turkmen²⁵¹. This ethnic and religious seats distribution was adopted at a meeting of the Iraqi National Congress in the city of Salah al-Din in 1992. In spite of the calls for the establishment of the Iraqi representation on the basis of political affiliation, the ethnic and sectarian distribution was adopted by the administration of the country, which was the main reason for problems and the crises Iraq experienced. When the Coalition Provisional Authority appointed the IGC, it adopted and confirmed this feature of the political process. The ethnic and sectarian division was repeated in the installation of the ministries and the Preparatory Committee for the Constitution²⁵².

However, in order to repeat the quota system in the formation of the IGC, the number of ministries was raised to 25. This also allowed each member of the IGC to appoint one of his close associates to a ministerial position.

Although the Security Council issued its Resolution No. 1500 in which it welcomed the formation of the IGC in Iraq in August, 2003, the foundation had been referred to in Resolution No. 1483 based on the message of occupying powers the U.S. and Britain on the 8th of May 2003, as noted by the preamble of the resolution. Therefore, to define the powers and responsibilities of the ‘authority’ of the occupation on the basis of the provisions of international law and the Hague and Geneva Conventions are the powers of an temporary administrative nature away from the far from the functions of sovereignty.

As for the parties and the important actors that played a role in the formulation of political action in the new Iraq, they were as follows:

1. Shi'ite parties:

- **Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq:**

It was founded in 1980 by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a Shi'ite leader whose family enjoys a wide influence in the Shiite establishment. The Council had underground cells in some parts of Iraq during the Iraq – Iran war, and had mobilized thousands of people for political, media and the military actions against the Iraqi regime, as well as fighting with the Iranian army against the Iraqi army. The Council has an armed militia called Badr, a paramilitary force stationed in Iran and most of its elements are Iraqis

²⁵¹ibid, pp. 119-120.

²⁵²Eric Schmitt, “The Struggle for Iraq: Reconstruction; US Generals Fault Ban on Hussein’s Party,” New York Times, April 21, 2004

who have been deported from Iraq by claiming they are affiliated to Iran, or from Iraqi soldiers who were captured during the Iran-Iraq war during the years 1980-1988²⁵³.

- **Islamic Dawa Party:**

Founded in 1957, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr is a senior intellectual of this Party, Abdul-Sahib Aldakhil is the most prominent leader, and the current official responsible for the Dawa Party, Nouri al-Maliki, after exclusion of former President Ibrahim al-Jaafari and after the resignation of Muwafaq Al-Rubaie. The Dawa party is seeking to establish an Islamic state in Iraq. Among the key theorists of the Party is Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, a cleric and a leading religious thinker who devoted his life to the development of modern Shiite doctrine that can compete with Marxism, which prevailed at the time²⁵⁴.

The Chief of the Party, Ibrahim al-Jaafari, became the prime minister of Iraq at a later stage after the invasion, but he was disqualified from the party presidency and prime minister position and was replaced by Nouri al-Maliki.

- **Sadrist Movement:**

A rally based on loyalty to the emotional synthesis, which is far from the organizational logical sequence. This Movement is lead by Moqtada al-Sadr, the young son of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr who was assassinated in 1999, and the relative of Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr executed by the former Iraqi regime in 1980. Among the most prominent leaders of this Movement are Abdul Hadi al-Darraji, Hazem al-Araji, his brother Bahaa al-Araji and Nassar Rubaie, the current vice president of the parliament. The Sadrist Movement has the Mahdi Army, which is accused of provoking the sectarian violence in Iraq after the Samarra bombings in 2006²⁵⁵.

- **Islamic Virtue Party:**

A party, which was started with the beginning of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Mohammed al-Yacoubi was elected as its Chairman. Yacoubi is one of the most prominent aides to Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr and his supporters. The Party emerged after a dispute

²⁵³Salah al-Nasrawi, Man yakhlf sadaam fee hakm al'araaq? (Who is the Successor to Saddam's Rule in Iraq) ,Journal of International Politics, No. 150, p. 115.

²⁵⁴Juan Cole, "The Iraqi Shiites: On the History of America's Would-Be Allies," Boston Review, October/November 2003, <http://bostonreview.net/BR28.5/cole.html> access on January 15 , 2012

²⁵⁵Ibid.

between him and Moqtada al-Sadr over the succession of his father. One of the most prominent leaders of the party was Nadim Issa al-Jabri a former Baathist who served as secretary-general of the party before being dismissed by the Party for unknown reasons²⁵⁶.

- **Parties and Factions of the Sunnis**
- **The Iraqi Islamic Party:**

The largest Sunni party, was founded in 1960, and has been associated since its inception and even now with the Muslim Brotherhood, as it represents a political face for the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. The Party continued its work in secret and public at home and abroad, and has the highest degrees of the mass base in the Sunni areas at the beginning of the U.S. occupation because of its anti-occupation position. Following this position, the hundreds of the Party's leaders, members and supporters have been exposed to arrest, murder and kidnapping, because the party failed in the last elections held in Iraq due to not being able to put forward solutions to the painful reality of the Sunnis. Separation took place within the party as Tarek al-Hashimi, the current vice president present, Rafie al-Issawi, the current Minister of Finance, and Abdel Karim al-Samarrai, the current Minister of Science, and Ali Baban, the former Minister of Planning, left the Party. However, and despite the fact that the party had lost the previous elections, its dissident leaders formed the largest Sunni political bloc, which represented a coalition of Sunnis The Iraqi List²⁵⁷.

- **Association of Muslim Scholars**

The Association of Muslim Scholars is not a traditional party but a religious institution, which deals with political affairs. It was established immediately after the war and was known as the powers against the foreign presence in Iraq and boycotted the political process and repeated elections. Sheikh Harith al-Dari is the president of this Association, and he is the one who received an arrest warrant by the Iraqi government, but he exercises his activity from Jordan nowadays²⁵⁸.

²⁵⁶Ibid.

²⁵⁷The official website of the Iraqi Islamic Party, www.iraqiparty.org access on January 25 , 2012

²⁵⁸ The official website of The Association of Muslim Scholars ,<http://www.heyetnet.org/eng/> access on January 25 , 2012

- **Political Council of Iraqi Resistance**

The largest front including most of the prominent and moderate Iraqi resistance factions was founded at the end of 2007 from the Islamic Front for Iraqi Resistance Jaami', the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas of Iraq, the Jihad and Reform Front, the Islamic Army, the Mujahideen Army, Ansar al-Sunna and Alfatuheen Army. The Council has presented a political program for the liberation of Iraq alongside the military operations against the American occupation forces and has received the support of most of the Sunni blocks and bodies for the formation of the front²⁵⁹.

- **Al-Qaeda in Iraq**

Was the most powerful Sunni insurgent group in Iraq before the formation of the Awakening Forces, which launched a campaign against it in collaboration with the U.S. and Iraqi forces ever since late 2006. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who announced in 2004 his pledge of allegiance to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, but he was killed by U.S. occupation forces thereafter. Al-Qaeda is regarded as one of the biggest groups in terms of absorbing Arab and foreign fighters coming to Iraq. It rejects political action under occupation and considers everyone who deals with the occupation as a traitor and an apostate who must be fought, and rejects any reconciliation with the Shiites. Its relationship with most of the resistance factions and the Sunni parties has worsened because of the declaration of acceptance of the rule of the Islamic state and has launched a war against these factions and parties that ended in its defeat. However, Al-Qaeda still practices terrorist activities such as car bombings amongst civilians as well as targeting government institutions and enterprises²⁶⁰.

2. Kurdish Parties

- **Democratic Party of Kurdistan DPK:**

Founded in 1946 after the Democratic Party of Kurdistan of Iran and in collaboration with it, one of its most prominent founders is Mullah Mustafa Barazzani. According to its founders, the most prominent objective of the Party is: the development of autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan. The Party entered in an agreement with the former regime in 1970, but it failed

²⁵⁹Council of Foreign Relations, A Political Vision and Strategy for the Transition Process in Iraq, cited in Iraq: The Invasion - Occupation - Resistance, op cit, pp. 258-259.

²⁶⁰Ibid, p. 259.

after the Kurdish rebellion supported by Iran against the regime in 1975²⁶¹. The Party has received a severe blow after the withdrawal of Iran's support for its rebellion after the announcement of the Algiers Agreement in 1975. Later on, the Party had been subjected to internal coups which ended in 1979 with the control of Massoud Barazzani over control of the provinces of Erbil and Dohuk, and entered into a long conflict with Talabani's party, which ended with the signing of the agreement between them in 1998²⁶². The Party played an important role in the invasion of Iraq's operations in 2003, which ended with the fall of Saddam's regime and the announcement of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, led by the Party leader Massoud Barzani²⁶³.

- **Patriotic Union of Kurdistan PUK:**

Founded in 1975 as an organization against the Kurdish Democratic Party of Kurdistan, which was then led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani. The PUK was founded by Jalal Talabani, in collaboration with leftist groups and parties such as the League of Kurdistan Toilers and the Kurdistan Socialist Movement. Fuad Masum and Adel Murad were the most prominent men in this Party, which engaged in an armed conflict against the regime of Saddam Hussein in alliance with Iran. The Party's leader, Jalal Talabani signed an agreement in Washington in 1998 to share in the spheres of influence with Iraq's Kurdistan with the Democratic Party of Kurdistan to stop the fighting between them. The Union controls the province of Sulaimaniya in Iraqi Kurdistan and has a weak presence in Erbil and Dohuk. The party is one of the largest two main parties in Kurdistan of Iraq and Jalal Talabani became president of Iraq after the U.S. invasion²⁶⁴.

3. Secular Parties

In fact there are no strong secular parties in Iraq, except The National Accord Movement, a secular Iraqi movement which was formed during the second Gulf War in 1991 as one of the opposition movements of the former regime, led by Ayad Allawi the former Baathist. The Movement was involved in the political process since its inception after the occupation and was headed by its leader, Ayad Allawi, who was the president of the interim

²⁶¹ Robert Olsn , Turkey –Syria Relation Sina Gulf War : Kurds Water , Middle East Policy , Vol : V, NO : May 1997, p.12.

²⁶² Michael Gunter , The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq. St. Martin's Press, 1999, p.230

²⁶³The official website of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, <http://pukmedia.co.uk/>.

²⁶⁴The official website of the National Accord Movement, www.wifaq.com access on January 25 , 2012

government, which was formed after the end of the IGC. The Movement was one of the leading founders of the Iraqi List before the recent elections, as it brought together the existing parties and movements of secular Shiite and Sunni and has been led by Ayad Allawi. The List witnessed several divisions which led to the withdrawal of a number of members from its ranks, such as Hajm Hassani, Safiya al-Suhail and Wael Abdul Latif. Among the most prominent figures of the List are Adnan Pachachi, former Iraqi foreign minister and Maysoon al-Damlouji, a women's rights activist²⁶⁵.

The political process started in Iraq in the province of the Sunni Arabs and their parties listed above. A lot of Sunni youth started, in cooperation with former officers in the Iraqi army, to resist the U.S. occupation; in this matter the Americans called the areas of the Sunni as the triangle of death²⁶⁶. The summit of this resistance was in the war encountered by the Americans in the city of Fallujah in 2005, during which the Americans used banned weapons such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus. The Sunni parties and institutions, such as the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Association of Muslim Scholars, were supportive in terms of the policy to direct the resistance against the U.S. occupation.

However, the Shiite Arabs, and through religious edict Fatwas of their religious mentors and especially Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, they did not raise up against the U.S. occupation and regarded the U.S. invasion as a project of liberation of Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein. In addition to that, their parties, except the Sadrists, even participated before the invasion in coordinating the U.S. war against Iraq, such as the Islamic Supreme Council and other dignitaries such as Ahmad Chalabi²⁶⁷.

As for the Kurds, they went to Baghdad, and participated actively in the new political process in order to ensure the non-repetition of their earlier mistakes in the province of the Baghdad government, which has long fought them in the past, especially with the presence of a new ally guarantor of their security to achieve their national interests, the U.S.²⁶⁸.

After the historic decision of Paul Bremer, the civil governor of the Provisional Authority in Iraq, to dissolve all state institutions, including the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army,

²⁶⁵Ibid .

²⁶⁶ Anthony Shadid, "Iraq's Forbidding 'Triangle of Death' ", Washington Post , November 23, 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5710-2004Nov22.html> access on January 25 , 2012

²⁶⁷ Julian Borger, "US falls out with Iraqi opposition", The Guardian, Friday 21 February , <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/21/iraq.julianborger> access on February 24 , 2012

²⁶⁸Soran Sükür and Mazin Hasan ,op cit, pp.23-24.

Iraq lived in a state of security lawlessness which is not over yet. The U.S. side has tried to resolve the error by forming a security force of the army and police to fill the security gap experienced by Iraq. Consequently, the Shiites and Kurds entered into these security institutions boycotted by the Sunnis, who argued that these institutions will operate under the command of the U.S. occupier²⁶⁹. This Sunni decision caused the Sunnis major problems as later on it played a major role in the past and present problems of Iraq, all because of the different sectarian balance in the Iraqi security forces, where sectarian oppression by the Iraqi security forces against the Sunnis in Iraq continued from that date until this moment.

More than that, these troops became a part of a policy of governmental intimidation toward Sunni political figures and other forces opposing the Shiite government as the list of targeted politicians and personalities became a long one. For instance, most recently Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi was targeted as the decision to detain him by the Iraqi security authorities has generated problems between the Government of Iraq and Turkey and led to intense debate between the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan²⁷⁰.

3.3.2 Turkey. A New Policy for a New Iraq

At a time when events took place quickly in Iraq, Turkey has also started witnessing a change in many of the concepts and issues, especially in foreign policy-making. Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister, started in the practical application of his theory of a new foreign policy of Turkey which is based on three areas: maintaining the 'reset of problems' with neighboring countries, to work on an active foreign policy based on the improvement of bilateral relations with the far neighborhood, and to look at the legacy of the Ottoman Empire from the geographic and civilization dimensions as a strategic depth and as a basis for Turkish foreign policy²⁷¹.

The main goal that the new Turkish foreign policy aimed at achieving was to become the most important party in the regional areas of the vital Middle East, the Balkans and

²⁶⁹Al-Zaman Journal, Baghdad, No: 1508, May 19, 2003, p. 2.

²⁷⁰Ahmad Taha Khalaf Allah, Saqout al'arb fee alharb 'alaa al'araaq, al'asbaab wannataa'ij(The Fall of the Arabs in the War on Iraq, The Reasons and Results), Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi ,Cairo, 2004, p. 42.

²⁷¹Senem Aydin Düzgit & Nathalie Tocci, Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy: The Quest for Regional Leadership and Europeanization, 2009, p. 1. <http://www.ceps.eu/book/transforming-turkish-foreign-policy-quest-regional-leadership-and-europeanisation> access on February 27 , 2012

Central Asia, in addition to being an influential global party through the application of the so-called 'soft power'²⁷².

The Turkish foreign policy today, without a doubt, is more active and multi-dimensional than ever in the history of the Republic. Turkey today presents itself as a center between the other actors in the region, and is trying to lead its relations with the countries on the basis of peace and regional integration. This has granted the Turkish foreign policy the ability to communicate with all parties in the Middle East.

Turkey is the only country which has good relations with everyone, without exception, which gives it a significant advantage in terms of international relations. If the Turkish role has not reached the level of direct impact in the politics of the Middle East, it is formed through being logistical on one hand, and facilitating, advising, guiding and credible on the other, among the Arabs and Israel, as well as in between the Arabs and Muslims themselves or to the Iraqi issue, the nuclear Iranian issue. I think that in the circumstances of the tensions and sensitivities and complexities of the Middle East, there is a dire need for such a role²⁷³.

This argument applies with the changes in the international and regional transformations taking place in the Arab and Islamic countries, which led to the emergence of a new equation in the Islamic geopolitics implying that the center of these geopolitical moves is Turkey instead of the Arab world and Iran. According to these circles, due to the Arab - Israeli conflict and chaos taking place in Arab countries, the Arab region is moving more and more to take the site of both sides of Islamic and regional levels. Furthermore, Iran, and by virtue of the Shiites as a minority in the Muslim world and the establishment of Iran's foreign policy to adopt the approach of sectarian, it will only occupy a secondary axis in the geography of the Islamic world and specifically in the eastern part of it. At the same time, in the 'new world order,' Turkey has all the necessary elements and strategy that allows for them to occupy the leading central position in the Muslim world, and that the new Islamic geopolitics extends from the threshold of Europe to the plains of Central Asia and plateaus in the alignment of the borders of China. According to this view, Turkey is the only Muslim country which has a European, Eurasian and Islamic dimension²⁷⁴.

²⁷²Altun isik, Meliha, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2005, p.45.

²⁷³Ibid, p. 1.

²⁷⁴Mohammed Nur al-Din, Qab'a wa'maama. madkhl 'ilaa alharkaat al'islaamya fee tarkyaa(A Hat and Turban. Introduction to Islamic movements in Turkey), Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, p. 9, April 1997.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and then the political interactions in Iraq are of the biggest challenges for this new role for Turkey. In Turkey's neighboring Islamic country lies all of the political, cultural and security challenges for Turkey, and the Turkish decision not to enter in the U.S. coalition in Iraq made these challenges more difficult and complicated. It was difficult to talk about the Turkish role in Iraq at the end of 2003, therefore, Turkey had to develop new strategies to deal with the Iraqi file.

At the beginning of the formation of the Iraqi state and the start of the political process there, Turkey focused on issues related to its national security and that by insisting on the issue of the unity of Iraq in order to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and thus influence the desires of secession in the south-eastern Turkey. Turkey's policy towards Iraq in 2004 also focused on the rights of Turkmen and not taking the position they deserve from the Turkish political point of view. They also focused on the city of Kirkuk and the Kurdish attempts for 'Kurdifying' in the city²⁷⁵.

To ensure the subject matter of the territorial integrity of Iraq, Turkey participated in the meeting in Damascus of the neighboring countries of Iraq and with the participation of Egypt in 2004, which came after a reversal by the Turkish government to send troops to Iraq and the escalation of security chaos and political instability in it. With fears that Iraq has become a center for the activities of al-Qaeda and groups near it, the importance of the role that these countries should play to prevent the entry and exit of infiltrators to and from Iraq has emerged. Furthermore, Turkey, and Iran, as for the organization MKO, were keen that the final statement for the meeting of Damascus includes reference to the PKK by name in the condemnation of the role of some organized terrorist groups in Iraq against neighboring countries²⁷⁶.

Turkey also participated in the fifth consultative meeting for Iraq's neighbors held in Kuwait in 2005 to discuss the situation in Iraq. Turkey sought to confirm its commitment to this regional mechanism that allowed it to contribute to setting standards to deal with the Iraqi situation and its developments. This was the most important issue that dominated the meeting in trying to find an acceptable and effective mechanism to stop the infiltration across the Iraqi border²⁷⁷.

²⁷⁵Hasim SÖYLEMEZ, Kerkük 'Düstü, Kerkuk Fallen Down, Aksiyon Magazine , Vol: 576, 19December 2005, <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-12982-kerkuk-dustu.html>,access February 18 , 2012

²⁷⁶The Center of Political and Strategic Studies in Al-Ahram, "Turkish – Arab Relations", op cit.

²⁷⁷Ibid.

Turkey supported the role of international institutions in Iraq, and saw the entry of international organizations rather to ensure balance within Iraq, and of stronger impact to preserve the unity of Iraq. Abdullah Gul, the Foreign Minister at the time, said that, “the U.N. and the Security Council are the essential actors in the effort for peace, when the international stability on the line. For example, the escalating events in the neighbor of Iraq indicate the need for increased intervention of the U.N. to assist the reconstruction and humanitarian aid as well as security and stability²⁷⁸.”

With regards to the Turkmen in Iraq and the issue of Kirkuk, while Turkey welcomed the developments of the political process and the participation of political forces, in particular the 2005 parliamentary elections, and the referendum on the constitution on November 15 and its outcome represented in the adoption of a permanent constitution, it also shed light on what it regarded as a denial of the Turkmen rights and their role in the political process, whether in government or in the drafting of the Constitution; particularly the exclusion of ITF supported by it. This, in addition to the repeated warnings about Kirkuk and the attempts by Kurds to change their demographic reality in preparation for the annexed area of Iraqi Kurdistan, where the Minister of State at the time, Abdullah Gul has stated that, “Kirkuk is a red line for Turkey, and that its stability is the stability of Iraq²⁷⁹.”

Nevertheless, Turkey has lost much of the war, as the most important issue - the Kurdish problem - has doubled after the Kurdish entity became a reality. The Turkmen of Iraq were not allowed to have a major political role in the future of Iraq, as well as the case of Kirkuk, which has become the focus of the interactions between the political forces of Iraq.

Kurds became the owners of the largest influence in this city and that many Kurdish immigrants from the areas of Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk and other areas became citizens of Kirkuk city and this has become a fact that cannot be ignored. This fact may cause the Turkmen to lose their game, and thus many of the red lines that Turkey had announced previously in Iraq did not make the Turkish positions more than a question for political and media protests²⁸⁰.

Turkey knew after these developments that the approach towards Iraq should not be limited to the Kurdish issue security or on the rights of Turkmen national but should evolve

²⁷⁸Abdullah Gul , The Challenges of Peace Operations in the Twenty-first Century, speech in the thirteenth conference of the Centre for Studies in the Turkish Foreign Ministry under the title of, Ankara, 2004.

²⁷⁹Ahmed Nouri al-Nuaimi, “Iraqi – Turkish Relations”, op cit, pp. 53-54.

²⁸⁰CNN Türk , Kerkük Irak'ın Aç Asi Degil Kirkuk is not Iraq's Anterior Affair, Manset Programı, , 15 January 2005.

much more than that. It was certain of this especially after Iran played an influential role in Iraq until it could compete with the U.S. occupiers, but it goes beyond that as Iran is becoming the most powerful regional player in Iraq. With the encouragement of the U.S., Turkey sought to extend its policy from northern Iraq to the middle of it, and even to the south of it. Its first attempt in this regard was the development of its relations with the Sunni Arabs in Iraq who rejected the U.S. occupation and were determined to resist this occupation in all means, and who rejected the idea of engaging in the political process under the shade of a foreign occupier considering this matter as part of a plan designed to legitimize the occupation²⁸¹.

Turkey played an important role in bringing together the leaders of the Sunni Arabs and the U.S., as the Sunnis used to look to Turkey as their vital strategic depth due to what they had from Iran's ultimate support of Iraq's Shiites. Therefore, Turkey gathered Sunni Arab parties in Iraq with representatives from the American side in Istanbul on the 30th of June 2005 in order to reach an agreement with the participation of Sunni Arabs in the government and the new Iraqi state institutions. The reason for this objective was because the boycott of the Sunnis in the beginning of the occupation resulted in a loss of balance in the institutions of State. The Sunni Arabs at the time were represented by Tariq al-Hashimi the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, whereas the U.S. side was represented by Zalmay Khalilzad. Subsequently, the meeting has led to the Sunni participation in the elections of 2005.²⁸² But that election had been marred by fraud, which was not accepted by the Sunni Arabs who accused the authorities of the Shiite and Kurdish with fraud. As a result, the demonstrations in all the Sunni areas broke out against the fraud, which led to an increased sectarian tension that quickly erupted into a civil war after several weeks, Al-Askari shrine, one of the most holy places for Shiites in the world, bombing in Samarra on the 22nd of February 2006. In this bombing, the Shi'ites accused the Sunnis of being responsible for this act. As a result, the Shiite militias destroyed more than 180 Sunni mosques in Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Babil and Salaheddin, where clerics were killed in these mosques as part of the reprisals²⁸³.

²⁸¹Mehmet Demirkaya, Türkiye, ABD lilerle Sünnileri Buluşturdu Turkey Brings Americans with Sunnis, , Milliyet, December 5, 2005 ,<http://www.milliyet.com/2005/12/05/siyaset/siy01.html>. access on February 26 ,2012

²⁸²Ibid.

²⁸³ David A. Patten, Is Iraq in a Civil War?, Middle East Quarterly, VOLUME XIV: NUMBER 3, Summer 2007, pp. 27-32

The sectarian war continued in Iraq from 2006-2008 and in which al-Qaeda emerged in the declaration of the operations targeting government institutions and civilian populations affecting the Shiites. Later on, it targeted the Sunni authorities who entered in the elections, such as Sunni political parties and other characters that did not accept al-Qaeda's actions in Iraq. In contrast, on the Shiite side emerged armed Shiite militias like the Mahdi Army and Hezbollah organization in Iraq and Iran, which were linked to Iran in terms of organization and arming according to U.S. sources²⁸⁴.

Turkey tried to intervene to find reconciliation between the warring parties, especially after the beginning of the indicators of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, as the continuation of the conflict between Sunni Arabs and Shiite Arabs was clear in central Iraq, the thing that will enhance the Turkish concerns in the case of the division of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In 2007, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that, "his country would not stand by and watch the developments taking place in Iraq and that Iraq turned into a special priority for Turkey ahead of a European Union"²⁸⁵.

Turkey began its regional strategy with the principle of 'resetting problems' between Turkey and its neighboring countries but this strategy has evolved into more of that. It has moved from the entry of Turkey in place of the problems between neighboring countries such as Turkey's attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel, leading to a stage deeper which was to solve the internal problems of certain countries such as its interference in the Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah and the Lebanese crisis between the Future Movement led by Saad Hariri and Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah. Furthermore, Turkey played a key role after 2007 in Iraq's internal affairs.

Turkey has been able to attain a leading position in Iraqi affairs during the civil conflict in Iraq. In 2008, Turkey was the only country that could establish channels of communication and dialogue with all actors in the Iraqi interior as well as with all neighboring countries of Iraq. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has clarified this in his speech on the 9th of May 2007 by noting that the Turkish government will be at the

²⁸⁴US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 2009 - Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Retrieved 08-09-10

²⁸⁵Taha Odah, The New Turkish Role in Iraq(Addawr attarkee aljadedee fee al'araaq) , 2007, <http://almoslim.net/node/85887> access on January 25 , 2012

same distance from all parties and the Iraqi authorities in order to help these parties to work for the unity and prosperity of Iraq²⁸⁶.

Therefore, Turkey has not only extended relations with Kurds in the north and the Sunni Arabs in the middle, but it also worked to develop good relations with the Shiite parties and fractions in the center and south. These relations were represented in the several visits made by Iraqi Shiites in senior government positions. The most important of these visits was that of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to Ankara in 2007 and his meeting with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Another important visit was the visit of Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of Sadrist Movement and the Mahdi Army, to Turkey in 2009 and his meeting with both President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan²⁸⁷.

On the 10th of July 2008, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Iraq, and this was a historic visit as he is one of the few regional officials who have visited Iraq. During his visit, Erdogan tried to focus on the issue of Turkey being at levels close to all the Iraqi parties, and that was through his visit to the city of Najaf, and his meeting with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and then his visit to the mosque of Imam Azam Abu Hanifa al-Nuaman in the city of Adhamiya, who is one of the most important symbols of the Sunni Muslims in the world. Erdogan did not lose sight also of visiting Kurdistan Region and meeting with KRG President Masoud Barazzani with whom he opened a the new airport of Erbil, which was established by a Turkish company²⁸⁸.

Politically, Erdogan met, with his accompanying delegation, all those Iraqi politicians and the most important in these meetings is his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and the signing of The Convention on the Strategic Cooperation of High-level, which includes cooperative agreements between Iraq and Turkey in the fields of foreign affairs, energy, trade, agriculture, transport, investment, and security. The agreement also includes that there will be annual meetings between the prime ministers of both countries, there will be

²⁸⁶Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ,Prime Minister's Speech, 9 January 2007, www.basbakanlik.gov.tr access on January 3 , 2012

²⁸⁷Yanatma, Servet and Süleyman Kurt, "Iraq's Sadr meets Erdoğan", TODAY'S ZAMAN, 2009-05-02.
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&link=174120 access on February 23 , 2012

²⁸⁸Turkish Foreign Ministry, The Political Relations between Turkey and Iraq, the State Department Web site
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/irak-ekonomisi.tr.mfa>access on January 15 , 2012

three meetings a year at the ministerial level and there will be meetings every three months at the level of senior officials in both countries²⁸⁹.

This has led to what is known as a diplomatic and wide openness between the two countries where the horizons of diplomatic cooperation were expanded through the re-opening of the Iraqi Consulate General in Istanbul in July 2006 and the opening of other Iraqi consulate in the Turkish city of Gaziantep on the 13th of October, 2011. Also, the Turkish side opened two consulates in Mosul, as well as in Basra in 2009 and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu participated in the opening as he expressed his delight by saying, “the opening of the consulate is further evidence of the security situation in Basra and the advantages of economic and strategy the province enjoys in Iraq²⁹⁰.” The Turkish consulate in Basra has played a role in improving relations between Turkey and the people's Shiite parties there during the presence of the Turkish Consul in many cultural and social activities and events such as his participation in one of the funerals of the Husseiniya in Basra²⁹¹.

The Turkish policy of opening up to all parties in Iraq was very effective in strengthening the political ties between the two countries, but the real interest was in the blast witnessed by the economic relations between the two countries and the strong entrance of the Turkish companies into the Iraqi market; whether it's in the huge government tenders in the field of construction and oil or in the opening up of markets of Iraq to the Turkish goods.

Repercussions of the good Turkish relations with all Iraqi parties were not limited to the Iraqi level, but were also reflected at the regional level, in addition to the positive interventions in Iraq, in Lebanon and the Palestinian reconciliation. Turkey gained acceptability in the Arab region and translated this matter to accept Turkey's membership in the Arab League as a special observer, which was not even possible to imagine in previous decades²⁹².

²⁸⁹Ibid.

²⁹⁰TODAY'S ZAMAN, Shiites in Basra pleased with Turkish diplomat's attendance at religious ritual, , 2010,
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=264934&link=264934
4 access on January 15 , 2012

²⁹¹Ibid.

²⁹²Bülent Aras, Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: peace-building in the periphery, op.cit., P.9.

3.3.3 Turkey in Iraq.. The End of the Mediation Role

The problems in Iraq are so very complex that it is difficult for many analysts to understand them because of the large number of the intersecting parties and the huge interests in Iraq. It is difficult for the States interested in Iraqi affairs to remain neutral all of the time because of the harsh political polarization stemming from the sectarian and ethnic polarization in Iraq. Despite the positive Turkish policy in Iraq between 2007-2009, and because of the Iraqi interior affairs, Turkey had to take critical decisions and positions after this era which made it necessary for them to have to stand closer to some Iraqi parties without the others.

In 2009, Turkey played an important role through acting as a mediator between the Political Council of Iraqi Resistance, which represents the most important Sunni resistance armed fractions and the U.S.. Turkey held meetings between these parties in Istanbul to find a solution designed to stop the armed operations against the U.S. occupation against the declaration of the U.S. side's scheduled withdrawal of its troops from Iraq. After global newspapers published the thrust of these negotiations, the Iraqi government opposed them strongly, and the visit of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to Washington on this matter took place, especially after the newspapers published the possibility of signing a protocol with these factions, which will turn them from being terrorist groups to legitimate groups from a legal view. The Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari Vice-President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party expressed his complete rejection of these communications when he stated that, "how can we expect from Washington as a friend of the Iraqi government and an ally of the political process in Iraq to meet and reach an understanding and negotiate and sign a protocol with the parties hostile to the Iraqi government and the political process, note that Washington itself has accused these parties of terrorism²⁹³."

Apparently the CIA had been running these negotiations without the knowledge of the State Department, which caused embarrassment in the corridors of decision-making in Washington. Concerning this, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that she had been told about the contacts and talks shortly before and added that the Foreign Ministry has not issued any official authorization for the signing of the Protocol and stressed that Baghdad will be officially told about these meetings and their content in the future²⁹⁴.

²⁹³USA TODAY, "Iraq investigates alleged US-Sunni insurgent talks", 2009,

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-07-25-us-sunni-talks_N.htm access on January 21, 2012

²⁹⁴Ibid.

Thus, the Iraqi government sought to undermine the talks and kill any chance of the occurrence of any U.S. - Iraqi Sunni understanding as long as it was a threat for Baghdad against the Shiite - Kurdish alliance controlling the Iraqi government. Indeed, these talks were interrupted later and did not last but for two sessions without signing any protocol. This was the first strike of the relations between the Shiite government of Iraq and the Turkish government, where the Shiite parties in Iraq felt that Turkey was trying to support the Sunnis there at their expense. The Iraqi Prime Minister condemned the role of Turkey on this issue and the Cabinet decided in its meeting held on the 19th of July 2009 to send a memorandum of protest to the Turkish Embassy, after being informed of the protocol that regulates the negotiating sessions between representatives of the Political Council of Iraqi Resistance and the representatives of the U.S. government through the testimony of the representative of the Turkish government, explaining that, “the cause of adoption of this resolution is what carries with it the protocol of intervention in the internal political affairs of Iraq²⁹⁵.”

In the 2010 elections, Turkey supported the Iraqi List consisting of Sunni parties led by the secular Shiite Ayad Allawi. Despite the fact that this list won the elections, the effects of the prime minister Nuri al-Maliki on the Constitutional Court, as well as Iranian influence in the pressure on all the Shiite parties like the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution have prevented the Iraqi List from its right in forming the government, and deliberations continued for several months between the political blocs. Political experts have argued that these are negotiations not only between local authorities in Iraq, but even among the regional parties and especially between Turkey and Iran. Semih Eidiz has stated in this regard that, “Ankara and Washington share concerns about Iranian influence in Iraq, and there is a political competition on the influence in Iraq between Iran and Turkey²⁹⁶.”

After long deliberations and under external pressure, the negotiations led the Iraqi List and its leader, Ayad Allawi, to give up on the formation of the government. Later on, al-Maliki formed what is known as The Erbil Convention, which was sponsored by President of KRG, Massoud Barazzani. However, Nuri al-Maliki has not implemented this Convention after officially becoming Prime Minister, and the problems and political tensions are still present for today.

²⁹⁵Ibid.

²⁹⁶Dorian Jones, " Turkey Playing Increasing Role in Iraq, Voice of America", 2011.

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Turkey-Playing-Increasing-Role-in-Iraq-135749873.html> access on January 8 , 2012

Turkey's support of the Iraqi List was the beginning of tensions with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and even sometimes with the Kurdish parties such as President Jalal Talabani as Turkey tried to get one of the Sunni Arabs Iraqi List become President instead of Talabani. This angered the latter a lot as he stated that, "Turkey did not support my candidacy for a second term to the presidency of Iraq, I do not know who stands behind this policy but its policy towards Iraq is wrong and has failed." Talabani added that, "Allawi, who was supported by Ankara for prime minister did not assume this position, and none of his supporters have become president of the Republic, or even a foreign minister." Talabani has shown that he was surprised to hear some Turkish bodies who refused his country's presidency by saying, "although the Turkish media said about me that I am one of the good people who have made efforts to develop relations with Turkey; however, the objection to some of the names in Turkey on my nomination to the country's presidency for the second term has raised my astonishment²⁹⁷."

From the above, it is clear that Turkey had a strong desire to have an influence on the political process in Iraq, where they tried hard in the beginning to extend relations with all Iraqi parties. However, the issue of the gap caused by the U.S. withdrawal and the regional policy of Iran, the competitor of Turkey, imposed on Turkey to be a part, from time to time, in the crises that beset Iraq.

Therefore, the Turkish - Iraqi relations, like the regional relations in the Middle East, are volatile because of the crises rapidly affecting the region at the moment. It is also important to mention that the Syrian revolution, which started in 2011, played a key role in the relations between Iraq and Turkey, as many researchers believe that the escalation of Iraq with Turkey due to the arrest warrant for Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi is nothing but an Iranian response because of Turkey's policy towards Bashar al-Assad in Syria; likewise, Iran's attempt to pressure Turkey is in order to ease its policy toward the Assad regime, which committed the ugliest crimes against its people and in the sight of the whole world.

²⁹⁷Gulf News ,Turkish role in Iraq (), 19/11/2010, <http://www.alkhaleej.ae/portal/9460c24a-ee77-4e9c-9774-ffb9103821a8.aspx>access on January 8 , 2012

Conclusion

The relations between Iraq and Turkey on the economic and political sides have been important for both countries since their establishment by virtue of location, history, and security and economic factors. The relations were at an advanced level after 1920 until the revolution in Iraq in 1958 by General Abdul Karim Qassim, and relations have worsened a lot since then. But several years later, relations improved again after the second military coup in 1963 led by Abdul Salam Arif.

Turkey was not far from Iraq at the arrival of the Baath Party in the late-1960s, as it looked with suspicion to the new arrivals, especially as they were carrying identity of Arab nationalism, against other nations. However, the economic relations and the establishment of the oil line of Kirkuk - Ceyhan in the mid-seventies made the Turkish decision-makers at the time look at Iraq as an important economic factor, especially in the field of energy in addition to its political and security importance.

The war between Iraq and Iran in the early-eighties until the end of the decade was basic in the relations between Iraq and Turkey as for policy and even economy. Turkey stood neutral in this war, which allowed it to have good relations in political terms with both sides and benefit a lot in economic terms, as the war lasted 8 years during which Turkey was the largest exporter to the two countries and came out from war with a devastated economy.

With the Iraqi wrong decision to invade Kuwait, the Iraqi - Turkish relations entered a new phase after the decision of the former Turkish President Ozal to help the U.S. and coalition forces to strike at Saddam Hussein's regime as Turkey contributed effectively to the second Gulf War, through the provision of facilities for military installations for the U.S. established in Turkish territory. Furthermore, it would follow the plan of the U.S. and the Western alliance against Iraq, especially if we know that the U.S. administration, since the outbreak of the Kuwait crisis, began to emphasize the role of the new strategy of Turkey in the Middle East. This new role came through U.S. military bases in Turkey, the Iraqi oil pipeline passing through Turkish territory to the Mediterranean, and then helping them create a buffer zone and the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

After this war, the U.N. imposed an economic blockade on Iraq, destroying the infrastructure and the vital institutions of the country as well as affecting the Turkish economy in an enormously negative manner, since Iraqi oil was one of the most important sources of energy to it, and the Iraqi market was one of the most important export destinations of different Turkish goods.

After September 11 and then the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey adopted a historical position by not entering the war with the U.S. for many internal and regional factors. Personally, I believe that this position was the door in which it entered to the Arab world again after a lapse of nearly a century of time. However, this attitude reflected negatively on two important things: the first is the relationships with the U.S., a historic strategic ally of Turkey, and the second is the weakness of Turkey in the arrangements for post-occupation Iraq.

After the collapse of the regime of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a new order in Iraq, the Turkish strategy started forming on two aspects: the first is the security aspect related to the file of the PKK and the places of its presence inside Iraqi territory, while the second is the national aspect related to the minority Turkmen and the fate of the city of Kirkuk. Nevertheless, the accelerating political events in Iraq, such as the entrance of the Kurds in politics in the whole of Iraq and holding senior positions such as the presidency and important ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then the Sunni-Shiite conflict in Iraq and its negative impact on the region in general and Turkey in particular, made it necessary for Turkey to extend its policy to the entire political map of Iraq, and extend its relations with all Iraqi political parties.

This coincided with the strong rise of the Turkish economy, which mostly needed markets to send its products as well as sources of energy for the continuation of its lifetime. The new Iraq represents one of the main goals for the Turkish economy as it is a big market that has a considerable liquidity and is free of infrastructure and basic needs of the normal individual. Furthermore, the oil and gas reserves of Iraq represent one of the largest global reserves, and therefore, the economic relations between Iraq and Turkey for the eight subsequent years after the U.S. occupation have seen great spikes reflected certainly in a positive manner on relations between the two countries until Turkey became the most important economic partner for Iraq. In spite of the positive things mentioned in the economic relations between the two countries, the water issue has been and remains one of the most important drawbacks in these relationships, especially since Iraq has seen a harsh drought at the beginning of 2006, which dramatically affected the agricultural production of Iraq. As a result, Iraq is still accusing Turkey of being one of the most important reasons for the suffering of Iraq on the issue of water, based on the Turkish policy in the issue of the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates.

In political terms, things have not been as they have been in economic terms. The successive political and security crises reflected on Iraq's relations with neighboring countries

including Turkey, and this was all in the time of radical changes in Turkey's foreign policy that has made the Turkish side the mediator in a number of conflicts. In the context of public policy, which some call a 'neo-Ottoman' policy, Turkey was expanding the parameters of its influence in areas that were once part of the Ottoman Empire.

The architect of this new foreign policy, the current foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, has an agenda that is far more ambitious, which will make Turkey a world power. This is supposed to be done by taking advantage of Turkey's cultural and historical relations and NATO membership, in addition to a nomination to the European Union, and the creation of rapid economic growth.

As for the Turkmen of Iraq, one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy in Iraq since 2003 was to protect the interests of the Turkmen population, estimated at 3 million people, in the sensitive oil region of Kirkuk and the areas around it. The reality is that the Sunni Turkmen used to represent the ruling elite in Kirkuk during the Ottoman period. But it is almost certain that the Turkmen have suffered since that time, the final loss of their status and influence, especially in the recent race on three sides to control the Kirkuk and its environs.

However, the Turkmen themselves, who are divided between Sunni and Shiite, had represented the main card possible for Ankara in its efforts to keep Kirkuk and its oil out of Kurdish hands; especially since the Kurds have taken steps at 'Kurdifying' Kirkuk. This, and Turkey's influence is almost confined to the Sunni Turkmen, not in the Shiite Turkmen, who share the views of many of the Shiite Arabs in the south. Add to that the ITF sponsored by Turkey, which does not have the support of all Turkmen. Therefore, the Turkmen are very weak in that Ankara cannot build its policies on them in northern Iraq, and therefore, Turkey started to take them out of their considerations as a possible major card account in the years after 2003.

As for Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Kurds, they have seen changes in their quality starting from 2003 to 2011. After the relations were tense and went to the extent of threat of invasion in early 2007 until now, things have turned into a good relationship in many factors, such as the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan has become a fundamental market for the Turkish goods and the adoption of most infrastructure projects by the Turkish companies; this in addition to oil discoveries in the areas of Iraqi Kurdistan and also the importance and vitality of these discoveries to the policy of Turkey in the field of energy. In addition to the economic side, the improvement of political relations with Iraqi Kurds gives Turkey a qualitative edge in the case of Iraq, where the Kurds were and still are the mediators between Sunni and Shiite

Arabs who fight amongst themselves and because they were the third party and an important controller of the political process in Iraq and this is what has emerged in a memorandum of arresting Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi. As for the other side, the geographic location of Iraqi Kurdistan is a buffer to Turkey for the problems of central and southern Iraq in terms of policy and security, and therefore it is healthy for the Turkish side to adopt two policies: one towards Iraq in general and the second towards Iraqi Kurdistan in particular.

As for the economic relations between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, they have increased very significantly, especially with the investment of the security factor prevailing in the province of Kurdistan, as well as the factor of geographical proximity. The Turkish side has invested huge sums of money in Iraqi Kurdistan, and is considered the most dominant economic power there, in addition to the oil revenues, which the Kurds get from Iraqi oil sales. It was expected for the value of Turkish exports to Iraq's Kurdistan, especially food and construction materials, to reach five billion dollars in 2007.

Also the Turkish companies expect to achieve what it has about \$10 to \$15 billion from modern important projects, including the establishment of the 'presidential' Palace in Kurdistan in Erbil, television networks, international airports, universities, bridges, main roads, and infrastructure. In light of these growing links, Turkish Airlines now operates regular flights to cities in Kurdish Iraq.

Despite the strong start in relations between Iraq and Turkey and Turkey's ability to manufacture a strong influence inside the Iraqi arena to establish relations with all Iraqi parties, it did not last because of the regional interventions of Iran in Iraq, the crises between Sunnis and Shiites in Iraq, and Turkey's decision to criticize the actions and style of the Iraqi government in dealing with political actors and components of sectarianism in Iraq. This greatly impacted the Iraqi government, where it placed the issue of marketing its reputation as a national partnership at the top of its priorities in foreign policy.

Those who follow the statements of the Iraqi government's main characters will find repeated statements that Iraq had exceeded the previous phase of turmoil and the loss of security and conflict is over between the components of one people; therefore, the Iraqi government and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki are on a high degree of sensitivity with regards to this aspect.

It is possible to say at the end of this thesis that the relations between Iraq and Turkey are at a high degree of importance to both countries in all areas, especially the areas of security and economy. These relations are always receptive because of the internal conditions of Iraq, which have not seen stability for more than thirty years, and it is not expected

according to the current political variables that Iraq will be stable in the near future, but it is hoped that Turkey and Iraq can pull of economic and social dimension in their relationship outside of the framework of the political dimension, although it involves a great deal of difficulty. It is true from a realistic vision to say that the relations between Iraq and Turkey depends on the political stand of U.S to the parties who hold the control of the decision making in Iraq and It is true also to say that the future of relations between Turkey and Iraq is positive in the case of the stability of the Iraqi domestic arena and the ability of the political parties and the three basic components to find a political formula that brings them together within a political system that gives everyone their rights without excluding or marginalizing anyone.

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