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# THE MODERNIZATION OF ISLAM FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO MODERN TURKEY

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*to abandoned past of this country...*

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## **AUTHOR DECLARATIONS**

1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

- i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
- ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

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## **ABSTRACT**

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### **THE MODERNIZATION OF ISLAM FROM OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO MODERN TURKEY**

The main objective of the thesis is to show the transformation of Orthodox Islam, in the process of transition from the empire to the nation state, from a religion as the legitimacy source of a traditional world into a new form in which Islam has no conflict with the modernism.

Ottoman elites accepted the scientific and the technological superiority of the Western world and, in order to survive, they tried to synthesis their world view with the modern paradigm through a dialectic conflict. But the scientific method that Ottoman scholars had been used for centuries was useless against to modern paradigm and led to Ottoman scholars to the ideological defeat.

The ideological defeat was inherited by the Republican elites and forced them to shift from traditional paradigm to modern paradigm through secularism and nationalism. This shift inevitably brought the modernization of Islam as an element of nation state process called the project of nationalization of Islam.

#### **Key words**

Modernization, Islam, Secularization, Rationalization, Paradigm

## KISA ÖZET

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Haziran 2013

### OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU'NDAN MODERN TÜRKİYE'YE İSLAM'DA MODERNLEŞME

Tezin en temel amacı, imparatorluktan ulus devlete geçiş sürecinde, geleneksel dünyanın meşruiyet kaynağı olan Ortodoks İslam anlayışının, modernizm ile çatışmayacak şekilde nasıl dönüştürüldüğünü göstermektir.

Osmanlı elitleri Batı dünyasının teknolojik ve bilimsel üstünlüğünü kabul etmiş ve devletin bekası için, onunla diyalektik bir çatışmaya girerek kendi dünya görüşüyle Batı'nın ki arasında bir sentez oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. Fakat, Ormanlı âlimlerinin ellerinde tuttıkları ve yüzyıllardır kullandıkları bilimsel metotlar modern paradigma karşısında çözülmüş ve onları ideolojik yenilgiye götürmüştür.

İdeolojik yenilgi Cumhuriyetin kurucu kadrolarınca miras alınmış ve onları, sekülerlik ve milletçilik üzerinden, geleneksel paradigmadan modern paradigmaya sıçramaya zorlamıştır. Bu sıçrama, kaçınılmaz olarak, ulus devlet sürecinde bir eleman olarak İslam'da modernleşme olgusunu ortaya çıkarmıştır.

#### **Anahtar Kelimeler**

Modernleşme, İslam, Sekülerleşme, Rasyonelleşme, Paradigma

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

JDP	Justice and Development Party
PRA	Presidency of Religious Affairs
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
UPP	Union and Progress Party
RPP	Republican Peoples Party
GNAT	Grant National Assembly of Turkey

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## **PREFACE**

What makes nations greater than others is not related to economic superiority but related to their world views that they have built throughout centuries. World views, as determiners of all social, political and economical institutions, depend on the continuity that those nations inherit. When the founders of Republic of Turkey defined their world view free from Ottoman-Islamic past, they broke the feeling of continuity of Turkish society.

Modern paradigm, which has been formulated since the time of Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution in Europe, became sovereign and imposed its world view, secularism, on other nations by destructing their world views. In order to survive, Ottoman elites started the modernization process at the beginning of nineteenth century. Islam, as a legitimacy source of Ottoman society, was forced to adapt to modern paradigm by both Ottoman and Republican elites. This adaptation process, in other words, modernization of Islam was discussed in the thesis.

## INTRODUCTION

There is an old saying that Turkey is a bridge between Europe and Asia not only geographically but also culturally. Huntington says that "a bridge is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey's leaders term their country a bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn."<sup>1</sup> After the ideological sovereignty of Cold War period, conflict is not between socialism and capitalism anymore, but rather, Huntington claims, between civilizations. His theory or model for global politics and international relations is questionable as a whole but there is something he perceives that Turkey is a torn country because there is a dichotomy, and therefore conflict between Islamic (or traditionalist) and modernist faces of it. The communities in Turkey don't share the same value system; therefore they don't perceive each other in the same way. The communities, in Turkey, obtain their value systems through their perception of history. In other words, the communities, therefore the political parties don't see the history in the same way in Turkey. The dialectic relation among the communities is not in their present world view but in their perception of history. Therefore, only way of making peace among those communities or only way of interpenetrating each other and having connections with each other and, hence, forming the democracy is to construct common perception of history that everybody is ok with.

Turkey started to experience a new period with J.D.P. in last ten years. We think that the success of J.D.P. resulted from its ability to synthesis the modernist values (especially in economy) with traditionalist (and religious) ones. This process is the last step of a long process called rationalization of Islam and rooted in nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 149.

Religious practices and beliefs are established through Islamic principles and “the process of rationalization of Islam means abstraction of those principles from social life.”<sup>2</sup> In other words, rationalization of Islam is a process in which Islam becomes the part of modernization, not against to it.<sup>3</sup> In this thesis, the main themes and prominent dimensions of this process was outlined. Therefore, by modernization of Islam, the rationalization of Islam is meant. In this regard, in descriptive sense, modernization means a radical social transformation which causes legitimacy crisis. Modernization of Islam, in normative sense, means a counter legitimation process against to negative change.<sup>4</sup>

According to Murat Yel, there is no agreed upon definition of “ideal Islam”, there are many “local Islams” in the context of different circumstances, different geographies, different culture and different societies. Turkish Islam can be called one of the local Islams.”<sup>5</sup> Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, on the other hand, says that Islam is singular and unique but Mohammedanisms (*Müslümanlıklar*) are plural.<sup>6</sup> Thus, the term “Islam” is used in this thesis as the meaning of Ottoman-Turkish Mohammedanism or Ottoman-Turkish orthodox<sup>7</sup> Islamic experience not “Islam” as the religion based on Quran and Hadith.

There have been many studies recently on the emergence and transformation of Islamism and its effects on contemporary Turkish politics. In those studies, the concepts like Islam, orthodox Islam, heterodox (or public) Islam and Islamism were not separated very well. This approach that

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<sup>2</sup> Elisabeth Özdalga, *İslamcılığın Türkiye Seyri, Sosyolojik Bir Perspektif* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 65.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>4</sup> Bedri Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939* (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2012), 210.

<sup>5</sup> Ali Murat Yel, “Türk İslamı”, *İslamiyat*, vol. 5, no. 4, (Ekim-Aralık 2002): 170.

<sup>6</sup> Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam* (İstanbul; İletişim Yayınları, 1999/2000), 152.

<sup>7</sup> Islam which is under the control of state.



recent studies use provides one dimensional view in which complex structure of relationship between the state and the religion cannot be understood correctly. Islamism, as a modern ideology, is one dimension of the transformation of Islam in Turkey. Islamists attempt to show that Islam is not an obstacle to modernization process and they tried to translate Quran according to the current scientific improvements. They used technological innovations to confirm validity of Quran verses.

Şerif Mardin claims that there are two more dimensions need to be separated: first one is the transformation of Islam through heterodox Islamic movement such as Mujaddidi-Khalidi-Nakşibendi movements, and second dimension is the discursive change of official (orthodox) Islam through Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy by eliminating *Ulema*<sup>8</sup>, Caliphate and Madrasahs and establishing Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA)<sup>9</sup>

Republic of Turkey was founded as a modern nation state therefore, the ruling elites tried to create necessary elements of nation state process which were one language, one nation and one religion. First one was performed by the elimination of “foreign” elements of Turkish language like Arabic-Persian words and Arabic scripture. Second one requested a definition of a citizenship in which no one is excluded. However, the concept of citizenship is a controversial topic in today’s Turkey. Third one required to transform the religion into a new form in which the religion doesn’t conflict with the modernism. In this thesis, third dimension of nation state process, i.e., the modernization of orthodox Islam was discussed.

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<sup>8</sup> Muslim theologians and scholars. In Ottoman Empire, *Ulema* class was responsible for the education system and the judicial system.

<sup>9</sup> The Presidency of Religious Affairs is charged under the control of Prime Ministry and responsible for the religious institutions in Turkey.

The main objective of the thesis is to explain the circumstances which prepared the ground for the project of modernization of orthodox Islam by Republican elite. The transformation from Empire to Republic was resulted from the shift from traditional paradigm to modern paradigm. Therefore, another objective of the thesis is to explain the emergence of the modern paradigm and the impacts of it on Ottoman world.

One of the targets of the thesis is to explain the concepts like modern paradigm, secularism and traditional paradigm, and the transformation of social structure from traditional one to modern one through secularism. This transformation occurs especially in conscious and, lesser degree, in practices.

Secondly, it was aimed to show that the rationalization of Islam means the abstraction of Islamic principles, which conflict with the modern paradigm, from social, economical and political fields and the privatization of Islam by putting it in individual's conscious. The role of the rationalization of orthodox Islam by Republican elites in the name of the project of national religion in this social transformation was examined.

The scope of the thesis focuses on the period of Renaissance in Europe and its impacts on late period of Ottoman Empire and the early period of Republic of Turkey. Thesis consists of three chapters: Theoretical Framework, Ottoman Period and Republican Period.

In the theoretical framework, the meaning and the emergence of modern paradigm and its relationship with secularism and religion was discussed to clarify the objectives. Modern paradigm emerged with the scientific revolution in the West. Western philosophers, scientists and intellectuals, by the effects of Newton, created a new mechanical vision instead of traditional way of understanding of the universe. Bacon produced

inductive method by abandoning Aristotle's deductive method and led to scientific revolution.<sup>10</sup> Starting with Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton provided new modern foundations for the science by changing essence of the way of thinking and method of ancient science. Adam Smith applied this heritage on economy to get the "natural economy" and Comte tried to obtain "social physics" by applying the same method.<sup>11</sup> Darwin in Biology, Smith in economy and Comte in Sociology transformed this vision into a new paradigm called, in this thesis, *modern paradigm*.

The emergence of the social sciences in the West started with transformation of the traditional paradigm. There was physics behind this world view and there was methodological transformation started with Bacon behind this physics.

This paradigm shift inevitably created a legitimacy crisis and the problem of theodicy. According to this new vision, nature had some iron laws therefore; natural world can be controlled by human being. Beyond this assumption, ideologies like Positivism and Marxism claimed that, like natural world, social world also had some laws. Once they are discovered and applied, cruelty can be abolished from the social world. In this point of view, the problem of theodicy which was used to be solved by Christianity started to be solved by the secular and scientific ways. This approach brought the elimination of religion from the social, economical and political institutions. Therefore, the secularization theories, in twentieth century, claimed that the effect of religion is going to decline in people's life.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 197.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 192.

<sup>12</sup> Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Noris, *Sacred and Secular* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 25.

The main difference between the traditional paradigm and the modern paradigm is their legitimacy sources. The legitimacy is compliance of the means with the purposes; on the other hand, the rational is compliance of the purposes with the means. According to Weber, the *legitimacy* was replaced with the *rational* in modern period. Durkheim conceptualized the fragmentation, which is characteristic of modernization, as social differentiation. He used the term "anomy" in the meaning of legitimacy crisis that modernization revealed. In Bible, anomy is used as a sin which was resulted from disobedience to the *nomos* (the holy law). Durkheim used the term in the meaning of secular sin which is resulted from absence of norms that reconciles the growing targets with limited tools.<sup>13</sup>

In traditional world, actions were being legitimized through divine revelation, i.e., *holy* part of the religion and the tradition (or the culture). In modern period, the transformation of legitimacy source from *holy* to *reason* changed the perception of religion from religion to ideology.<sup>14</sup> In Ottoman Empire, this process started in nineteenth century through modern schools and generalization of press after realizing superiority of the Western world over Ottoman Empire not only economically and politically but also ideologically. Actually, the process of rationalization of Islam in Turkey can be interpreted as a counter legitimation process against to the crisis emerged with the modernization process.

Turkey is the only country in which Islam was rationalized through modernization process among other Muslim countries. We benefited from Ernest Gellner's theoretical frame through one of his articles to explain why Turkey is an exception. He thinks that modern societies, through economic growth, occupational mobility, rationale of production, and so on, have a

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<sup>13</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 121.

<sup>14</sup> Inglehart and Norris, *Sacred and Secular*, 8.

tendency to move toward the "Protestant" features of religion. According to him, Islam had already has Protestant characteristics therefore; it was not vanished in the society through modernization. Gellner's paper explains the effects of Republican elites on modernization of Islam in Turkey and provides a historical background for nationalization of Islam by Republican elite.

In the second chapter, after drawing this theoretical map, the transformation of the world view of ruling elites through modernization process of Ottoman Empire was discussed. In order to understand the transformation of Islam from Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey and the rationalization of religion, it was important to analyze the ideological transformation of Ottoman elites. Therefore, the modernization process of Ottoman Empire was examined to show differences between the traditional world view and the modern world view among ruling elites and the way how they see the religion. The importance of this process is to search what shaped the world view of Republican elites. Important breakpoints like *Tanzimat Fermanı*, *Islahat Fermanı*, 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War etc... were explained as the most important ones. This difference between the traditional world view and modern world view is crucial to understand the rationalization of Islam in Turkey. Without explaining this transformation, the perception of Islam in modern Turkey cannot be understood correctly.

Another important effect on the transformation of the world view of Republican elites was the modern schools emerged after *Tanzimat*. Education was the most important aspect of Westernization process of Ottoman Empire. The transformation of society from traditional one to modern one was planned and performed through the modern schools. This transformation created the legitimacy and the identity crisis as a result of acculturation. The elimination of *Ulema* was one of the most important aspects of this acculturation. The world view of *Ulema* was built upon

deductive method of Aristotelian understanding of nature. However, modern paradigm emerged by destructing the traditional way of understanding, therefore, *Ulema* couldn't create an alternative way of modernism, because the duty of *Ulema* was to maintain existing world order not to change it.

Apart from the legitimacy crisis and the identity crisis inside of the Ottoman society because of the sovereignty of modern paradigm, the attacks from the Westernist-Orientalist intellectuals to Islam and Islamic world view started with French writer Ernest Renan in 1883 by his lecture called "Islam and Science". His basic claim was that Islam is the obstacle to scientific progress and modernization. But his real intention to show Muslims that the science is the new religion of modern period; therefore those who resists accepting this reality is going to disappear. Ottoman intellectuals took this claim very seriously and published refusals to Renan. They took it very seriously because what Renan claimed was true. Those refusals provided necessary materials for modern apologetic perception of Islamic discourse. According to this discourse, Islam is not the obstacle to modernization and scientific progression.<sup>15</sup> The discourse is important for rationalization of Islam through Republican ideology. On the other hand, British Orientalists condemned Turkic Islam with regression but praise Arabic Islam with science, philosophy and art. Those claims prepared the philosophical ground for abolition of caliphate.<sup>16</sup>

In the third chapter, the Republican reforms were described in the context of transformation of Islam. Nation building process and the process of adaptation to modern paradigm required abolition of the religious institutions. The abolition of *Sultanate* was the first step of secularization of the source of political sovereignty and it continued by the abolition of

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<sup>15</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 31.

<sup>16</sup> Dücane Cündioğlu, "Ernest Renan ve Reddiyeler Bağlamında İslam-Bilim Tartışmalarına Bibliyografik Bir Katkı", *Divan*, vol. 2, (1996): 7.

caliphate. The elimination of *Ulema* through Madrasahs and the abolition of Arabic scripture were the second steps of the secularization of education system through the law of unification of education. By those radical transformations, Republican elites tried to transform society from *umma* to nation. Instead of religion, nationalism was defined as a main element of political sovereignty. Therefore, secularism and nationalism were main driving forces behind the Republican reforms.

The universalization of secularism requires privatization of religions as a dialectic process. Therefore, the religions turned out to be modern (protestant) religions by joining to modernization process or they turned out to be ideologies to survive in secular age.<sup>17</sup> The process of nationalization of religion in Turkey at the beginning of Republican period was an attempt of privatization of Islam.<sup>18</sup> Republican elites tried to imitate German experience for nation state process, because Germany was born after the translation of Bible from Latin to German. This translation eliminated the privileged position of clergy class and therefore the political power of the Catholic Church in Germany. The elimination of *Ulema*, the abolition of caliphate and the translation of Quran were the steps that Republican elites decided to follow at the beginning of the Republic. This process was continued by the project called nationalization of Islam.<sup>19</sup>

In order to explain this process of nationalization of Islam correctly, steps of Turkification of Prayers, rationalization of khutbahs and the translation of Quran were discussed in order to figure out how modern Turkish state perceives the religion. Those steps are important to explain the today's political discussions and current debates on Secularism, Islamism and Islam. The examples quoted from khutbahs written by the officers of the

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<sup>17</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 219-222.

<sup>18</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınlar, 2002), 442-443.

<sup>19</sup> Dücane Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair* (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2005), 35.

Presidency of Religious Affairs shows that the perception of Islam in modern Turkey was rationalized.



# CHAPTER I

## CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to make the concepts clear, it is necessary to explain brief history and the emergence of the modernism in the West. Without comprehending the transformation of world view in Western world from traditional to modern, it is impossible to comprehend the transformation of world view from Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey. Therefore, the emergence of modern world view in the Western world is going to be discussed first.

The technical era came into focus in seventeenth to nineteenth centuries in the West made certain of criteria of political power: technical superiority.<sup>20</sup> The country which is superior in the technology would be superior in the politics. Then it gets power to determine binding norms among the other countries. This dominant country forces the other countries accept the determined norms and change.<sup>21</sup>

In the traditional age, the holy law (*nomos*) was the reflection of universe (*kosmos*) on human being, in other words, the holy law (*nomos*) was the root of the social culture (*ethos*).<sup>22</sup> Both in the Islamic world and the Christian world, the scholars (especially Averroes) reconciled understanding of Aristotle's physics and Ptolemy's astronomy with their theology and formed a paradigm to perceive the matter and world. According to this

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<sup>20</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme, 1839-1939*, 43.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 394.

organic paradigm<sup>23</sup>, human being was at the center of universe because of the order on *kosmos* at which earth was at the center.

Renaissance actually is a process in which the organic paradigm was transformed to modern paradigm of the new ages. First step of this transformation was revolution of Copernicus. He destroyed the Ptolemy's geocentric universe view and created the new vision in which not the earth (therefore human being) but the sun was at the center.<sup>24</sup> From this point of view, Kepler (1571-1630), Galilei (1564-1642) and finally Newton (1642-1726) discovered mathematical laws of the universe and destroyed both the Aristotle's physics, and therefore, the theology which was built upon Aristotelian understanding of the universe.<sup>25</sup> Depending on the harmony between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the traditional world formed animistic and organic ontology and epistemology.<sup>26</sup> However, starting with Copernicus, a mechanical world vision was clarified by Newton. It designed the universe as a self-employed machine which was independent of value and will. This process changed the perception of ontology and premises of epistemology and created impersonal subjects like "state", "society" and "nation".<sup>27</sup>

Descartes reversed the relationship between the *nomos* and the *kosmos* in this organic paradigm with *cogito ergo sum* and he aimed to establish an order of world based on human mind. In other words, what Copernicus and Newton did in physics and astronomy is done by Descartes in philosophy. Russell says that

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<sup>23</sup> Robin George Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), 3.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>25</sup> Osman Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma* (Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 1997), 22.

<sup>26</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 8.

<sup>27</sup> Bedri Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", *Toplum ve Bilim*, vol. 84, (Bahar 2000), 160.

“I think, therefore I am” makes mind more certain than matter and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others. There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known of mind. (...) The soul, therefore, is wholly distinct from the body and easier to know than the body; it would be what is even if there were no body.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, the *nomos* was going to be derived from human mind by this way, and therefore modernism was going to emerge as a secular messiah because of the characteristic of historical heritage that Western world obtained.

### **1.1. Messianism**

With all its deep philosophical dimensions, at the center of almost all society's world views involve messianic perception. Basically this perception came from Zoroastrianism and affected Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This perception not only shaped theology of those religions but also became the driving force behind emergence of religions, political revolutions and intellectual movements in human history. In Middle Eastern religions, the concepts of beginning and end are powerful because it functions strategically to solve the problem of theodicy. Since the beginning, the war between good and evil has existed and it is going to end with the victory of good. This idea predicts the establishment of the country of goodies at the end of the history which was established at the beginning. There are two veins of messianic perception: first represents the line of Zoroastrianism-Judaism-Greek and Christianity and called Mediterranean-western school, second represents the line of Hindu-Buddhist-Taoist and Confucian called East-Asia school. Between

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<sup>28</sup>Bertrand Russell, *The History of Western Philosophy* (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), 564-565.

those two schools, Islam and Manichaeism take place.<sup>29</sup> But Christian West secularized the *nomos* and religious messianic understanding through scientific revolution and Descartes. Those differences reflected itself on politics. Politics has different meanings for modern West and traditional East that in East, politics is a technical realm abstracted from ruled masses, on the other hand, in modern West, politics is a field in which economical and political struggles reign.<sup>30</sup>

The *nomos* is at the center of all Abrahamic religions but the problem of theodicy made Judaism and Christianity messianic religions by the effect of Zoroastrianism. On the other hand, Al-Ghazali solved the problem of theodicy in Islam by transforming religion from teocentric to nomocentric. The eschatology is a messianic psychology which refers to an expectation of heaven on earth which is going to be established by a savior.<sup>31</sup> Christians believe that Jesus is going to come at the end of time to complete his mission. Thus, the secularization of messianic perception started with unrealized eschatological perception in the Renaissance. According to Danonists belief, existing world order (*ordo seclorum*) is the corrupted order, therefore the new world order (*novus ordo seclorum*) is going to open a white page for all humanity. Until this time, church is going to be the sacred place in which people can refuge from corruption.<sup>32</sup> This psychology denies the history as a test area against to the problem of theodicy. This psychology was described implicitly in a play called "Waiting for Godot" written by Samuel Beckett. Thus, the nomism and the messianism emerged as two different ways of reactions against to the problem of theodicy.<sup>33</sup> All the modernist movements seen in both East and West from Zoroastrianism to Postmodernism are based on the legitimacy crisis. How could all the cruelty

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<sup>29</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 433-434.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 211-212.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 434-435.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 211-212.

seen on the surface of earth be explained?<sup>34</sup> Instead of the eschatological dualism of church and world, secularism moves from the slogan of “here and now” by accepting that the end of time begun. Therefore, the relationship between the history and the end of time become main discussion topic in the modern philosophy of history.<sup>35</sup>

### **1.1.1. Transformation of Traditional Ideologies**

During the process of secularization, nomism turned out to be traditionalism and conservatism; however messianism turned out to be fundamentalism and modernism. Conservatism is a reaction to modern way of life, and traditionalism is a reaction to modern way of thinking. Therefore, conservatism is the opposite of revolutionism and traditionalism is the opposite of modernism.<sup>36</sup>

Both the traditional and modern form of messianism wants to establish a heavenly world order in which cruelty is abolished.

Traditional messianism (fundamentalism) suspend the history through the expectation of a savior, on the other hand, secular messianism (modernism) is the separation from nomism by accelerating the history.<sup>37</sup> Both fundamentalism and modernism deny the nomos but in different directions, in the first, direction towards to the golden age of the past, and in the second, direction toward the golden age of the future. Therefore, romanticism lies behind the fundamentalism and rationalism lies behind the modernism.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 309.


<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 435.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 212-213.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 216.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 217.

As it is showed in the Figure 1



### 1.1.2. Secularization of Messianism

Enlightenment means to establish the heaven on the surface of earth.<sup>39</sup> The messianic expectation was expressed with religious terms in traditional world, but it became a utopian hope for people to establish the heavenly order on earth and lead to the revolutions and political movements, instead of messianic savior, revolutionary savior was taken place.<sup>40</sup>

By the effects of ancient cosmogonies, diachronic change and progress was denied by the ancient Greeks and Eastern world. In the words of Islamic terminology, universal and social progress was like a spiral line, not like a linear line. With Collingwood's words,

"Greek, Renaissance, and modern thinkers have all agreed that everything in the world of nature, as we perceive it, is in a state of continues change. But Greek, and therefore Muslims, regarded these natural changes as at the bottom always cyclical. A change from s state A to a state B, they thought, is always one part of a process which completes itself by return from state B to state A."<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Crane Brinton, *Ideas and Men: The Story of Western Thoughts* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 136

<sup>40</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 435.

<sup>41</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 13.

Therefore, there were no a starting point or an end point in this perception of time. On the other hand, Western world was separated from this understanding of time by accepting linear historicism.

Modern thought reversed this state of things. A new perception of history which claims that human progress moves to better and more beautiful time and spaces all the time was proposed by Hegel in nineteenth century. He claimed that the history moves linearly and universally.<sup>42</sup> "This vision "regards the world of nature as a second world in which nothing repeated no less than that of history, by the constant emergence of new things. Change is at bottom progressive."<sup>43</sup>

"Modern cosmologies are in general based on the idea of evolution, and represent the development not only of one natural species or order as a development in time, but also the development of mind from nature as a development in time."<sup>44</sup>

By secularization of messianic understanding, acceptance of linear historicism and lastly scientific revolution started by Bacon and formulated by Newton created potential for a new paradigm.

Adam Smith applied this heritage on economy to get the "natural economy" and Comte tried to obtain "social physics" by applying the same method.<sup>45</sup> Darwin in Biology, Smith in economy and Comte in Sociology transformed this vision into a new paradigm called modern paradigm.

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<sup>42</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 117-118.

<sup>43</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 14.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>45</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 192.

## 1.2. Legitimacy of Religion

The change in paradigm started with scientific developments which gained great acceleration in seventeenth and eighteenth century, by taking technological improvements to its side which accumulated with industrial revolution claimed and declared, by depending second law of Thermodynamics, that the real world was made up of only material and all the events occurs according to some iron laws on earth. Influenced by Newtonian mechanics, this determinist vision marked nineteenth century by establishing the basic principles of modern paradigm. Religions were placed in consciousness (*vicdan*) in this process because modern science and mentality had no need of religions. By eliminating religions from all fields of life and locating it to the conscious, rationalism transformed the concept of God into a new form. This new God resembles Plato's *Demiourgos* (Architect) or Aristotle's *Proto Kinoun* (first mover) that he set the watch and left it self-functioning.<sup>46</sup> In nineteenth century, in Europe, with the name of science, religion was eliminated from all fields of life, from now on, science belonged to reason, and religion belonged to conscious. After that time, religions begun to obtain its legitimacy from being compatible with scientific thoughts and improvements, because if a divine word conflict to a scientific theory or improvements then it cannot be claimed that this word is divine.<sup>47</sup> "In this perspective, the era of the Enlightenment generated a rational view of the world based on empirical standards of proof, scientific knowledge of natural phenomena, and technological mastery of the universe".<sup>48</sup>

In the West, especially in France, eighteenth century was considered as the age of the Enlightenment, the followers of Descartes' rationalism like

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<sup>46</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 9.

<sup>47</sup> Cündioğlu, "Ernest Renan ve Reddiyeler Bağlamında İslam-Bilim Tartışmalarına Bibliyografik bir Katkı", 3.

<sup>48</sup> Inglehart and Noris, *Sacred and Secular*, 7.



Voltaire, D'Alembert, Diderot, and Condorcet, known as encyclopedists, on one hand, tried to bury religious in history while accepting science only guide for life, on the other hand, English philosophers like Hume, Locke and Berkeley tried to improve Bacon's empiricist philosophy. While Diderot was saying "Everything that exists cannot be against or out of nature", Pierre Simon Laplace, being busy by developing Newton's theory, answered Napoleon's question: "They say that God doesn't exist in your books" as "I don't need a special intervention like Newton". Thus, the idea that there is no any other way to obtain knowledge except science was so popular in nineteenth century, so that it affected not only Christianity but also all the belief systems and religions around the world. The elimination of metaphysics and religious thought from philosophy is a process which begun with the Enlightenment in eighteenth century and culminated in Positivism in twentieth century by destroying the idea of Holy. <sup>49</sup>

### **1.3. Scientific Revolution**

The emergence of the social sciences in the West started with transformation of the traditional paradigm. There was physics behind this world view and there was methodological transformation started with Bacon behind this physics. Bacon produced inductive method by abandoning Aristotle's deductive method and led to scientific revolution.<sup>50</sup> Collingwood explains the Bacon's criticism to Aristotelian method:

"Typical of the whole movement is Bacon's celebrated gibe to the effect that theology, like a virgin consecrated to God, produces no offspring. He meant that when an Aristotelian scientist accounted for the production of a certain effect by a certain cause by saying that the

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<sup>49</sup> Cündioğlu, "Ernest Renan ve Reddiyeler Bağlamında İslam-Bilim Tartışmalarına Bibliyografik bir Katkı", 2.

<sup>50</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 197.

cause had a natural tendency to produce that effect, he was really telling you nothing at all, and was only distracting your mind from the proper task of science, namely the discovery of the pricewise structure of the cause in question."<sup>51</sup>

Starting with Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton provided new modern foundations for the science by changing essence of the way of thinking and method of ancient science.

Höffe explains four characteristics of Bacon's method:

- Knowledge is power
- Natural philosophy (Science) must work independently from theology.
- Knowledge must be obtained by inductive method
- Science is not a static but a dynamic, cooperative and cumulative field in which different people shares their experiments and knowledge.<sup>52</sup>

When the foundations, rooted in the way of thinking, changed, it reflected not only on science but also on politics, economy and social life by restructuring them in new forms. Thus, the relationship between science and religion or philosophy and religion turned to a new different direction.

At the beginning, the knowledge which had emerged since Renaissance belonged to very limited group of people; however, by the efforts of encyclopedists, it pervaded through all layers of the society, on the other hand, the pervasion of political and social crisis begun with the Industrial Revolution which devastated the norms of established orders in societies.<sup>53</sup> The previous unequal societies had been legitimized through religious doctrines, but the revolutions both in the fields of knowledge and

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<sup>51</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 93.

<sup>52</sup> Otfried Höffe, *Felsefenin Kısa Tarihi*, trans. Okşan Aytolu (İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınları, 2008), 174-175.

<sup>53</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 25-27.

the economy changed the legitimacy sources of the norms in societies and led to social crisis. Obviously, the revolution of science begun in astronomy and psychics with Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei and Newton affected to field of philosophy. The paradigm shift occurs in that way through science and philosophy and then new paradigm shapes all the social, economical and political institutions.<sup>54</sup>

#### **1.4. Modern Paradigm**

In order to clarify what paradigm is, a representation that Descartes uses for philosophy is going to be used. Descartes says for philosophy;

“Thus, all Philosophy is like a tree, of which Metaphysics is the root, Physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the branches that grow out of this trunk, which are reduced to three principal, namely, Medicine, Mechanics, and Ethics. By the science of Morals, I understand the highest and most perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the other sciences is the last degree of wisdom.”<sup>55</sup>

If this picture is considered as a paradigm tree then the roots (metaphysics) become theoretical physics and mathematics, the trunk remains as physics and the branches become other sciences and social, political and economical institutions. Roots are considered as theoretical physics and mathematics because all the scientific innovations are performed theoretically in these abstract sciences first. Then, experimental physics confirms the theoretical frame and affects all other sciences and social, economical and political institutions. At here, our assumption is all elements


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<sup>54</sup> Anthony Kenny, *A New History of Western Philosophy / Rise of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 37.

<sup>55</sup> René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings Vol 1*, eds. and trans. John Cottingham & Robert Stoothorf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 186.

of “superstructure” in Marxist sense, including economy, are started to be determined by theoretical physics and mathematics if it can be confirmed by experimental sciences. Therefore, if a paradigm shift occurs in a society, then it affects all other institutions of real life and the way of thinking of individuals. In this point of view, modernism is a new paradigm emerged with the scientific revolution and affected all other institutions. Therefore, modernization can be defined as a process in which a society tries to adapt itself to the modern paradigm by abandoning the previous traditional paradigm. The relationship is described in the Figure 2,

**Figure 2: Construction of Paradigm**



Modernism is a new design of life, modernization is the process of establishing a new way of life, and modernity is a new way of life.<sup>56</sup> According to P.L. Berger, the five characteristics of modernity are

<sup>56</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 116-117.

- Abstraction (especially confrontation of life with bureaucracy and technology, rationalization of life)
- Futurism (life is arranged according to time)
- Individualism (separation of the individual from society and emergence of alienation)
- Freedom (not the fate but the choices reigned the life)
- Secularization (Reasonableness of religious belief is under threat of mass)<sup>57</sup>

All the characteristics that Berger states are related with the religion, therefore the religion is a key concept at which definitions of modernity have been formulated. In many countries, religion is central to discussions and debates about what it means to be modern.<sup>58</sup>

#### **1.4.1. Rationalism and Positivism**

The Western thought, with the Enlightenment, gave excessive importance to rationalism that it created modern mentality by not only denying everything which cannot be explained by reasoning but also accepting this assumption as a scientific truth through positivism, scientism and materialism. At this point, the effect of Kant must be added to process that, he discussed the facilities and limits of reasoning in his "Critics" by criticizing the reasoning philosophically.

What he succeeded in philosophy done by Copernicus in astronomy. The core of philosophy was object until Kant but he put reasoning with its all facilities and limits, i.e. subject instead of object.<sup>59</sup> Kant prepared the

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<sup>57</sup> Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (New York: Doubleday & Anchor, 1977), 70-82.

<sup>58</sup> Brain Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 10.

<sup>59</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 24.

necessary ground for positivism by his distinctions *nomen – fenomen*. According to him, the knowledge about the *fenomens* is the production of human reason, therefore, it impossible to know *nomens*.

This way of thinking created Positivism. According to Comte, there was nothing beyond the *fenomens*; therefore it was useless to investigate *nomens* beyond human senses like the essence of the existence, God, absolute truth etc... The main objective was to find laws of nature rather than finding the teleological purpose of phenomena in the nature.<sup>60</sup> The idea of "natural law" which developed by ancient Stoics, this time, was accepted by Voltaire and it provided necessary foundation for his deism. Voltaire's deism was transformed to atheism by La Matries through his book, "*L'homme Machine*" (Machine Man).<sup>61</sup>

As stated above, Descartes, Bacon and Newton established a new mechanical world vision which depends on causality, determinism and universal laws. According to Weber, magic of world was destroyed and basis of the ultimate meaning of world was transformed from religious one to secular one by this process.

The basis of the modernization was the transformation of religions through secularism and basis of secularism was drifting apart the holy from the religion.<sup>62</sup> Therefore, "the central claim in the Weberian argument is that the spread of scientific knowledge and rising levels of education will bring a universal trend toward an increasingly rational worldview, in all industrial societies."<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 565.

<sup>61</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 23.

<sup>62</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 119-120.


<sup>63</sup> Inglehart and Noris, *Sacred and Secular*, 27.

The result of modernism is the decline in religiosity. Inglehart and Norris explain the consequences of paradigm shift in societies of modern period. "(...) Modernization greatly weakens the influence of religious institutions in modern societies, bringing lower rates of attendance at religious services, and making religion subjectively less important in people's lives."<sup>64</sup>

### 1.5. Legitimacy Crisis

Religion means link between God and people or world and hereafter. Holy is the basis of religion and therefore, religion is the shell of the holy; tradition is the shell of the religion. The relation is showed in the Figure 3,

Figure 3: The Relationship among the concepts of Holy, Religion and Tradition



Legitimacy means giving meaning to human behaviors and life through holy.<sup>65</sup> In traditional period, not only human behaviors, and social structures but also the political organizations were legitimized through the *holy*, as the source of culture or the tradition. But it was lost and replaced with *reason* in modern age.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>65</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 121.

This change created a crisis; a crisis of *Legitimacy*. Weber explains the concept of social change by saying “the social change is crisis which results from the changes in the belief and the value system occurred in the fields of culture and causes the changes in social institutions.” The most typical example of the social change is French revolution that based on the cultural movement of the Enlightenment, encyclopedists, and their positivist idea of “natural law.”<sup>66</sup>

“Ever since the age of the Enlightenment, leading figure in philosophy, anthropology and psychology have postulated that theological superstitions, symbolic liturgical ritual, and sacred practices are the product of the past that will be outgrown in the modern era.”<sup>67</sup>

But our claim is that, not the theology, but the role of it changes through social crisis. The law came with the revelation is corrupted by the time and it loses its ability to make of people’s actions, therefore, instead of legitimation, rationalism is taken place. In modern era, people had to produce ideologies to make of their actions.<sup>68</sup>

The basis which provided legitimacy for people and social institutions in the traditional age was coming from the divine revelation, but in the modern age, this basis was replaced with the *reason* and now it is coming from human mind.

Therefore, the shell of the *holy* was transformed from *religion* to *ideology* in order to overcome legitimacy crisis in modern age. So the key

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<sup>66</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye’de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 14.

<sup>67</sup> Inglehart and Norris, *Sacred and Secular*, 3.


<sup>68</sup> Gencer, *İslam’da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 122-123.



concept which separates the traditional age from the modern age is *secularism*.

The change is indicated in the Figure 4,

Figure 4: Transformation of Legitimacy Source and its consequences



The relation between the *sacred* and *secular* can be understood from these figures drawn above. Inglehart and Noris summarize the process,

“Science and religion could confront each other directly where scientific explanations undermined the religious interpretations, exemplified by Darwinian theory of evolution that challenged ideas of special creation by God. Even more importantly, scientific knowledge, its applications through technology and engineering, and the expansion of mass education could have a broader and more diffuse social impact ushering a new cultural era. The idea of mysterious (holy) was regarded by Weber as something to be conquered by human reason and mastered by the products of technology, subject to logical explanations found in physics, biology and chemistry rather than to divine forces outside this world. Personal catastrophes, contagious diseases, disastrous floods, and international wars, once

attributed to supernatural forces, primitive magic, and divine intervention, or to blind fate, came to be regarded as the outcome of predictable and preventable causes.”<sup>69</sup>

This frame provides a model for conceptualizing the transformation of source of legitimacy from traditional society to modern society. Kehrer says that “Without the religious justification, social attitudes would not emerge in the history.”<sup>70</sup>

By depending on this explanation, we claim that the religions are being rationalized and therefore they are transformed to ideologies in modern period. This brings elimination of religious mythology and replacement of it with secular mythology instead. By secular mythology, we mean the sanctity of the *reason*.

### **1.5.1. Consequences of Legitimacy Crisis**

Secularization is reflected in the lessening importance of religion in people’s lives, and growing indifference to spiritual matters among the public. In this regard, secularization refers to the erosion of faith in the core beliefs held by different world theologies. Skepticism about matters of faith is greatest among agnostics, while atheists express outright the waning ability of religious authorities to shape mass views on such issues as abortion, divorce and homosexuality, as well as by growing ethical relativism and individualism.<sup>71</sup> In other words, the shift from holy to reason changes people’s daily life and the way of perceiving themselves. For example, Silverstien explains the nature of time for modern paradigm: “Modernity

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<sup>69</sup> Inglehart and Noris, *Sacred and Secular*, 8.

<sup>70</sup> Günter Kehrer, “Din Sosyolojisi”, trans. M. Emin Köktaş, *Din Sosyolojisi*, eds. Yasin Aktay, M. Emin Köktaş (Anakara: Vadi Yayınları, 1998): 8

<sup>71</sup> Inglehart & Noris, *Sacred and Secular*, 40-41.

involves certain experiences of oneself, most importantly a relation to time (implying a relation to death): time, for moderns, is largely an empty context, with no inherent significance. This essentially secular experience of time is central to a characteristically modern temporality as a mode of being in and relating to time.”<sup>72</sup>

## **1.6. Position of Religion in Modern Paradigm**

The idea of reduction in the importance of religion in industrial and modern societies, formed by Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, Marx and Freud, was taken as an assumption in many academic works of twentieth century.<sup>73</sup> For instance, Durkheim claims that the idea of God was symbolization of society. Marx thinks that the religion was determined by the way of life. Positivism of Comte claims that all the philosophical and scientific investigations must be carried out through experiments, experiences and reasoning.<sup>74</sup> Positivist explanation is a concept which requires establishing a cause-effect relationship in social world like in physical world.<sup>75</sup> “According to these theories, there are universally defined variables and casual sequences between variables that create modernization quite independently of time and space”<sup>76</sup> Thus, secularization, in this context, means that the religious symbols and institutions are going to lose its importance in social life once the society is modernized.

C. Wright Mills summarized this process from this sovereign point of view:

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<sup>72</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 4.

<sup>73</sup> İřtar Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Dinin Tanzimi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 267.

<sup>74</sup> Ercüment Kuran, *Türk İslam Kültürüne Dair* (Ankara: Ocak Yayınları, 2000), 3-5.

<sup>75</sup> Gencer, *İslam’da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 119.

<sup>76</sup> Nilüfer Göle, “The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity”, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997): 69.

“Once the world was filled with the sacred in thought, practice and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization a corollary historical process loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.”<sup>77</sup>

Mills’ claim is supported by Inglehart and Norris that religion doesn’t disappear in modern society but the relationship between people and the religion is changing. “Much of the recent literature disputing secularization has argued that rather than simple decline in religiosity, there has been an evolution with a shift from collective forms of engagement via traditional religious institutions toward individual or personal spirituality exercised in the private sphere.”<sup>78</sup>

### **1.6.1. Consequences of Transformation from Holy to Reason**

As stated above, religion is pushed away from its social position to private life of individuals, i.e. conscious. Ernest Gellner explains this transformation through the change occurred in the function of culture to show what has filled the gap that religion left behind:

“In agrarian society, work is physical. With us, work is semantic. In order to be employable, but also in order to be an effective citizen, two conditions are required. First, you have to be competent in the idiom employed by the surrounding educational, economic, and administrative bureaucracies. Second, your personal characteristics must be compatible with the self-image of the culture in question. And this dilemma, this basic situation of modern humans, forces people to

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<sup>77</sup> Cited in Inglehart and Norris, *Sacred and Secular*, 3.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

be nationalists, because either they are in the satisfactory condition, having mastered the high culture of the institutions surrounding them, or they are not. If not, then they have a number of options: to assimilate, to migrate, or to become irredentist nationalists and try to change the situation. The society has similar options toward those who do not fit its local dominant characteristics: to assimilate them, to expel them, or to "ethnically cleanse" them, whether by murder, by forcible expulsion, or by intimidation. The basic underlying pattern of nationalism exists between state and culture. It is a completely new situation. It was absent in the past in the agrarian world, where, on the contrary, culture was required to be highly differentiated because its main function was to underwrite nuances of status in societies that had complex hierarchies. Vertical differences in culture were encouraged in order to mark the different statuses, and lateral differences were encouraged by the sheer fact that the majority of the people were agricultural producers living in closed communities that tended to differentiate themselves from each other by a kind of automatic cultural dialectal drift. By contrast, in the modern world, culture does not mark status; it marks the boundaries of political units and the kinds of pools within which individuals can move freely in what is inherently an unstable occupational structure."<sup>79</sup>

In other words, the culture (or tradition based on the holy) used to determine classes of a society and it used to provide necessary legitimacy for these different statuses of people. After the transformation of source of legitimacy from *holy* to *reason*, function of culture changed from providing legitimacy to determining boundaries of political units (or imposing legitimacy<sup>80</sup>). Collective behaviors are determined by the perception of divine

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<sup>79</sup> Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997), 195.

<sup>80</sup> We used this term by taking into account of Turkish experience that Republican elites tried to define nationalism and science as a new source of legitimacy in the place of religion at the beginning

justice based on the belief of destiny. The perception of justice depends on the “holy law” in traditional societies, but the societies like European societies in which “holy law” lost its legitimacy, basic determiners of perception of divine justice is the experience. This perception gave birth to perception of freedom in Europe.<sup>81</sup> According to Mardin, in Ottoman Empire, “the process of learning on the road to modernization was more than simply an accumulation of facts and comprises the carving of a new qualitative sphere, i.e., that of the legitimation of knowledge produced in the Western post-Cartesian style.”<sup>82</sup> In the modern world, therefore, the concept of religion turned into<sup>83</sup> the concept of ideology. Gellner explains this transformation through the ideology of Industrial societies; nationalism. Modern people are being forced to be nationalists, because either they are having dominant culture of the institutions (therefore they are satisfied) or they are not. If they are not, then they have few options; to assimilate, to migrate or to be irredentist nationalists to exist.

### **1.7. Impacts of Modern Paradigm on Ottoman-Turkish Islam**

What did happen to Islam in Turkey after this transformation? In Ottoman Empire, Islam provided not only necessary legitimacy for existence of empire but also the tools and the principles for organization of society and relationship among communities and individuals. However, at early period of Turkish Republic, Islam was taken outside of the social, economical and political areas and pushed away from the public sphere to private life by the

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of the Republic. They were successful in centers of the big cities but they were not in the small towns and villages. This explains one dimension of the rise of the Islamism after the immigration of mass from small towns to big cities after 1960s. For more information, see, Kemal Karpat, *Türkiye’de Toplumsal Dönüşüm: Kırsal Göç, Gecekondu ve Kentleşme*, tr. Abdülkerim Sönmez (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2003).

<sup>81</sup> Gencer, *İslam’da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 754.

<sup>82</sup> Şerif Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rapture and Reconstruction in Operatinal Codes”, *Turkish Studies*, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2005): 147.

<sup>83</sup> We mean by that not the existential and the individual sides, but the political and the social sides of the religions turned into ideology.

Republican elites. All the functions of religion were transformed to other elements of new republic.

Instead of Islam, the regime was source of legitimacy, Kemalism provided political principles and lastly nationalism and secularism were the tools to organize the relationships. Also, the positivism and the scientism were the main theme of the principles and tools.

There was no need Islam as a political instrument. Our claim is that Islam was rationalized or it was forced to be rationalized by the sovereign (modern) paradigm through the Turkish state. Because, Turkey is only Muslim country accepted secularism as the main principle in its political system. This difference makes Turkey unique in its relationship with Islam.

### **1.7.1. Turkish Exceptionalism**

Why is Turkey an exception among other Muslim countries? Ernest Gellner, in his article, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective" 1997, tries to compare Turkish modernization with other Muslim Countries' modernization process. He says that the modernization brings secularization in broad sense like socially, politically and economically etc... But this rule is not valid for Islam, only exception for this case is Turkish modernization experience. In his point of view, Turkey is only country which has been secularized through modernization among all Muslim countries. In order to analyze the reasons behind the uniqueness of Turkey, he uses the relationship between Modernization and Protestantism that Weber exhibited. According to this relationship, modern societies tend to move towards Protestant characteristics by economic growth, rationality and similar improvements. Gellner thinks that Islam has already had these Protestant characteristics therefore it was not vanished by secularism through

modernization. "In Islam, there was no clergy class, Islam was Puritan and Unitarian and also Islam depends on religious sources (books, not individuals, at least in theory)."<sup>84</sup> These were protestant characteristic of Islam.

Firstly, Gellner emphasis the choices stand in front of Muslim societies in modern era that they either could have imitated the western culture or they could have exalted the traditional culture. First choice depends on insulting traditional culture and the second one depends on idealizing traditional culture. Islamic societies have chosen second one because Islam has already had local tradition which provides tools (because Islam has Protestant characteristics) to those societies in order to create alternative modernization which didn't deny Islam as a religion. In this point of view, the reasons behind the economic, politic and scientific decline of Muslim societies in modern era resulted from the misinterpretation of Islam. (This is also main argument of Islamists).

Secondly, Gellner tries to explain why Turkey is an exception in this process by saying that "Turkey was only country which headed toward Laic tradition."<sup>85</sup> In order to explain the reason why Turkey was an exception, he compares Arab culture with Ottoman culture by using Ibn Khaldun and some historical datum.

"The corollary of Ibn Khaldun's position is that political power is unstable; rulers are supplied from the reservoir of virtue and political talent in the countryside, but this virtue is destroyed by its very political success, so that every few generations it has to be replaced. Thus there is a kind of permanent rotation of elites, and political instability. But if that is so, then how does one explain an

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<sup>84</sup> Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", 191.

<sup>85</sup> Op. Cit., 193.



empire that dominated the eastern Mediterranean, or most of it, for four or five centuries and was markedly stable?"<sup>86</sup>

The most parts of the Ottoman lands were governed in a tacit and varying degree of incorporation with the center. As an alternative, Ottoman used the Platonic recipe. We can stabilize society and maintain order by virtuous rulers and the only way of making them virtuous is by producing a kind of meritocratic elite free from the temptation of kin and property. In other words, "Ottomans discovered a solution which managed the tribal problems. They chose governors from one place and appointed them to another distant place. Therefore, the problem of tribalism was destroyed."<sup>87</sup> Such communistic elite owes its virtue both to its training and to its social position. This Durkheimian society based on local kin groups can be governed only by "axial religions." Axial religions are scriptural and puritanical, and they also externalize authority. All this seems to have together in the Ottoman Empire, which combined sustained training with the Memluk principle of selecting rulers individually rather than tribally. That was not Ibn Khaldunian model any more.<sup>88</sup>

Then Gellner reaches a conclusion that in the western culture, at the beginning of nineteenth century, there was a homogenous culture (by effects of Luther in Prussia and by effects of Dante in Italy) but there was no complete political will, but Bismarck and Cavour established it. This process created a superior culture which transformed religious culture to nationalism. Gellner states that this picture doesn't fit the Muslim societies. In Muslim societies, this superior culture was created by using Islam, therefore, instead of nationalism, we encounters fundamental Islamism. Then he says that Turkey is completely out of this picture. In Turkey, there were political elites

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<sup>86</sup> Op. Cit., 193.

<sup>87</sup> Ahmet S. Ekber, *İslam Antropolojisi*, trans. Bedri Gencer (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995), 110.

<sup>88</sup> Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", 194.

and establishment but there was no homogenous culture. And also, the tension between official Islam (orthodoxy) and public Islam (heterodoxy) in Ottoman period prevented to create a common culture between public and political elites in the past. Lewis says that state bureaucrats, in both Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, looked public Islam suspiciously and therefore heterodox movements were suppressed or at least kept under the control all the time.<sup>89</sup> Because,

"All the dervish orders were to some extent unorthodox and their teachings and practices were the subject of repeated criticism and denunciations by the custodians of the law. This did not prevent the brotherhoods from retaining and extending influence over Muslim masses, who found in the dervishes their real religious guides. While the Ulema were becoming a wealthy, hereditary caste, the dervishes remained part of the people, with immense influence and prestige among them"<sup>90</sup>

Therefore, Gellner continues, the political elites had feelings to depend on an ethnic group in order to modernize the society instead of religion. Because religion was related to the past and recession according to those elites, but they also knew that Islam was main characteristic of potential ethnic group. Hence, the political elites, Kemalists, did not imitate the western culture as it exists; instead, they tried to westernize Islamic culture according to the western principles. Kasaba says that

"Turkish modernizers had readily identified modernization with Westernization – with taking a place in the civilization of Europe. Modernity, in their conception, was a total project: one of embracing and internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Europe

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<sup>89</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 15.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 406.

modern. They were not satisfied simply with increasing rationality, bureaucratization and organizational efficiency; they also professed a need for social transformation in order to achieve secularization, autonomy for the individual, and the equality of men and women."<sup>91</sup>

Westernization of (Islamic) culture according to the Western principle means creating a national religion in order to build a nation state. This will be explained in the third chapter of the thesis.

Up to this point, Islam lost its function as the source of legitimacy but it didn't turn into the ideology like Gellner expected. First reason for it, this transformation occurred in very limited elite community and it did not spread to lower layers of society in Ottoman period. Therefore, in Republican period, this transformation became fact from top to down by forcing society to accept new position of orthodox Islam. Second reason was rigid suppression which prevented any possible opposition against to Republican applications. In 1925, Law for the Maintenance of Order was declared by the *G.N.A.T* against to ethnic-religious uprising in southeast Turkey. "Secularism was the excuse for prohibition exposed against to enemy of the republic. Enemy was religion."<sup>92</sup> Kemalist reforms were legitimized and accelerated by the Law for the Maintenance of Order after this point by censoring oppositions. Third reason was that Islam that Republican elite tried to transform was orthodox Islam. The attempts of reformation in religion, from U.P.P. to republican elites, were considered that there was unique Islam in Turkey. Elites didn't want to see the differences between public Islam and orthodox Islam.<sup>93</sup> Heterodox Islamic movements such as Mujaddidi-Khalidi-Nakşibendi movements and Islamist intellectuals were silenced but not affected by

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<sup>91</sup> Çağlar Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in 1990s", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997): 34.

<sup>92</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), 58.

<sup>93</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 146.

Republican applications. Since, "Turkish Islam had always functioned on two levels; the formal legal, dogmatic religion of the state, the schools and the hierarchy; and the popular, mystical, intuitive faith of the masses, which found its chief expression in the great dervish orders."<sup>94</sup> Gökalp and Günaltay emphasized transformation of orthodox Islam into a new modern form.<sup>95</sup> In other words, republican elites and Islamists ignored the public Islam during the reformation process. To sum up with Mardin's words,

"The three social forces that enter this narrative are the discourse of the Ottoman and Turkish state officials, the rise of the Mujaddidi-Khalidi-Nakşibendi order, and the voice of Ottoman and Turkish intellectuals trying to extract a meaning from Islam in an attempt to synchronize it with the European intellectual construction known as "civilization."<sup>96</sup>

The project of national religion was the first step of rationalization of religion. Second step was use of the strongly secular educational institutions of the Republic. But this process worked in two directions. The process of adaptation of secularism had gradually changed the cognitive frame of the conservatives. At the same time, both the Nakşibendi and Islamic conservatives of all descriptions were introduced into market relations that promoted economic-rationalistic strategies. The rise of market relations led to new structural, class-like developments: the "*bazari*" (*esnaf*) became a business man. Later, this group was to be part of the creation of an Anatolian business class.<sup>97</sup> This class will be the main supporter of JDP government at the beginning of 2000s. As stated in the introduction that the success of JDP resulted from its ability to synthesis the modernist values

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<sup>94</sup>Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 404-405.

<sup>95</sup>Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, 146.

<sup>96</sup> Mardin, "Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism Yesterday and Today: Continuity, Rapture and Reconstruction in Operatinal Codes", 148.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 154.

(especially in economy) with traditionalist ones in a process of the last step of a long process called rationalization of Islam and rooted in nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.

There are three theories about the relationship between the state and the religion in Ottoman Empire. First, in Ottoman Empire, the religion and the state are two separate structures, second the religion and the state cannot be separated each other, and therefore Ottoman Empire was a theocracy and the state was shaped by the religion. Third, in Ottoman Empire, the religion was under the control of the state and therefore its duty to legitimize the state actions.<sup>98</sup> Our assumption is the third relationship that the religion legitimized the state in Ottoman Empire politically, and sociologically.

It was the main cultural core of the Ottoman society. Huntington claims that the cultural core of American national identity based on White Anglo Saxon Protestant characteristics<sup>99</sup>, similarly we believe that the cultural core of the Turkish identity depends on Ottoman-Turkish-Islamic heritage and characteristics, therefore, when it contacts with the parameters of sovereign paradigm (modern paradigm), -and JDP has succeeded this goal partially- Turkey can be the first example of modern Muslim country.

The step of rationalization of religion is the process of forming the national religion. This step was carried out by the Republican elites at the early period of Republic. Before giving concrete examples how Islam has been rationalized, the brief history of Ottoman modernization is going to be discussed as a preparatory of Republican applications. Since, it would be impossible to analyze the relationship between the state and the religion in

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<sup>98</sup>Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 13-15.

<sup>99</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *Who are we? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 59-80.

the period of Republic without comparing it in the period of Ottoman Empire in the context of continuity and changes.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup>Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 15.

## CHAPTER II

### MODERNIZATION OF ISLAM IN OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Modernization of Ottoman Empire started in military field first, and then continued in political field. In order to survive against to the threat of Western power, ruling elites tried to adapt modern paradigm without taking into account of philosophical importance of the process at first. However, they understood that military and political modernization was not enough to save Ottoman Empire from destruction. This led them to open modern schools. The conflict between the traditional paradigm and modern paradigm was revealed through modern schools.

The impact of modern schools on Ottoman society was shocking and created a legitimacy crisis. This crisis inevitably brought the new interpretation of old legitimacy source, i.e., Quran. But modernism destructed the roots of traditional paradigm and deepened the legitimacy crisis. After the victory of modern paradigm, ideological defeat was going to be inherited by Republican elites and forced them to radical shift from traditional paradigm to modern paradigm by denying Ottoman Islamic past.

#### 2.1. First Warnings

İbrahim Müteferrika (1670-1745), first founder of print house, wrote a book named *Usulü'l-hikem fin nizamü'l-ümem* and he presented this book to Mahmut I in 1731. In the book, Müteferrika tells that trade in Europe is developing with Geographic discovers and Ottoman Empire looks like a ship without a compass in the hands of state officers who are ignorant about the geopolitics knowledge. He also says that Ottoman and Islamic world is in danger because of this ignorance. If Empire goes like that, one day it is going to lose its sovereignty upon Islamic lands. He emphasizes the Great

Peter in Russia and his actions. He finally says that if the empire doesn't follow the same path that Great Peter follows, one day the empire is going to be powerless against to Russia.<sup>101</sup>

Another warning came from Akif Efendi in 1822, later *Reis'ül Küttab*, wrote a memorandum setting forth the dangers that menaced the Empire and the three possible choices that lay before it.

After examining the attitudes of the Christian nations towards Islam, and their dealings with Turkey, still the most powerful of Muslim states, Akif Efendi tried to show how the Ottoman Empire, and Muslims generally, could preserve their independence against Europe, and more especially against the encroachments of Russia which he regarded as the major enemy. In conclusion, he says

"Muslim must choose between three resolutions: either, faithful to the command of God and the law of Muhammad, we must, regardless of our property and our lives, defend to the last what provinces we still retain; or we must leave them and withdraw to Anatolia; or finally -which God forbid- we shall follow the example of the people of Crime, India and Kazan and be reduced to slavery. In fine, what I have to say can be reduced to this; in the name of the faith of Muhammad and the law of Ahmed, let us proclaim the Holy War and let us not cede an inch of our territory."<sup>102</sup>

As it is seen, technological power of the Western world and its possible consequences were seen by Ottomans since the beginning of eighteenth century.

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<sup>101</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınlar, 2002), 52-54.

<sup>102</sup> Cited in Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 325.



## 2.2. Effects of Nationalism and Capitalism

The process that Akif Efendi and Müteferrika predicted for the future of Ottoman Empire started actually with two important events; French Revolution and Industrial Revolution. Nationalism and Capitalism are two key concepts resulted from French Revolution and Industrial Revolution affected Ottoman socio-economic structure and triggered the Ottoman modernization process at the beginning of nineteenth century. The effect of capitalism, in Lewis words: "The general decay of Ottoman industry dates from the early nineteenth century, when Turkey, along with many other countries, underwent the shattering impact of the expanding industrial capitalism of Europe, and a flood of cheap manufactured goods flowed the Turkish market."<sup>103</sup> The other important effect was nationalism, Lewis says that:

"The old dynastic allegiance was indeed being undermined by the new ideas of nationality coming from Europe, and affecting the first instance, the Christian peoples of the Empire. But when the national idea conquered them, they began to think of themselves, not as Ottomans, but as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars and Armenians. Against those heady visions the pallid doctrine of Ottomanism, so dubiously supported even by the Turks themselves, had little chance of success. The struggle of the Christian peoples for national independence and the Turkish reaction against it – armed insurrection and armed repression – created a new bitterness between Muslims and Christians. The Bulgarian rising of 1876, the Armenian revolutionary movement of the revolutionary committees, the famous *komitadjis*, in the Balkans, all helped to create in the Turks a profound mistrust of their Christian compatriots and of the European great powers looming which the Turks responded reinforced the determination of the Christian peoples in the Empire

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 457.

to seek their salvation, not in citizenship, but in separation. In the end, the nationalist ideas that were destroying the Empire would reach even its Imperial masters. But in the meantime an older claim on their loyalty was again asserted.”<sup>104</sup>

The impact of nationalism and capitalism on Ottoman society was destructive because of the social order depended on Platonic understanding. Sabine explains this order,

“The analysis of the state shows that there are three necessary functions to be performed. The underlying physical needs must be supplied and the state must be protected and governed. The principle of specialization demands that essential services should be distinguished, and it follows that there are three classes: the workers who produce and the “guardians” who in turn are divided, though not so sharply, not the soldiers and the rulers, or the philosophers-king... three classes depends on the fact that there are three kinds of men, those who are fitted by nature to work but not to rule, those who are fit to rule but only under the control and direction of others, and finally those who fit for the highest duties of statesmanship such as the final choice of means and ends”.<sup>105</sup>

According to this picture, Muslims placed themselves as the “guardians” of the society and therefore they stayed away from the trade and left it to non-Muslims. The legitimacy, according to traditional paradigm, came from one of the Quran verse: “...you will be superior if you are believers”<sup>106</sup> Ottomans accepted the believing as a precondition to be superior. When they confronted capitalism, first it mainly affected to non-

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 340.

<sup>105</sup> George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc, 1964), 52.

<sup>106</sup> Quran (3, 139).

Muslims and made them richer than Muslims. It is one of the most important aspects that Muslims suspected their world view for the first time when they lost their "superior" position in the society. The second effect of Capitalism was the destruction of *Timar* system. *Timar* system was the axis of all economical, political and social orders<sup>107</sup> and therefore when the capitalism destroyed this system, it reflected itself in all economical, political and social fields. Thus, Ottoman Muslims lost their military and political superiority in modern age depended on capitalism and technology.<sup>108</sup>

### **2.3. First Modernization Attempts**

First attempts of modernization occurred in military because Ottoman elites thought that losses in battle grounds resulted from corruption in military system. "The basic fact in their conception of the need for reform was the continued military defeats they endured."<sup>109</sup> The idea of joining to Europe balance started in the same period with establishment of embassies in European Capitals with III Selim first in London, then in Berlin, Madrid and Vienna. Among those ambassadors, Ebubekir Ragıp's report was interesting that he emphasize the educated and disciplined army, coordinated economy, honest officers and wealth in Vienna.<sup>110</sup> By the effects of such reports, ruling elites concluded that the janissaries must be abolished to modernize military system. After unsuccessful attempt of Selim III, Mahmud II finally abolished Janissaries in 1826. The two events showed that the problems were not only in military system but also in socio-political areas; first, in 1831, Ottoman Khedive of Egypt, Muhammed Ali Pasha, invaded Akka to occupy Syria and second, in 1832, Greece declared its independence by the help of Russia and Austria. The necessity of political centered modernization emerged with

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<sup>107</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 61.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>109</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 38.

<sup>110</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 99.

these events; therefore, it led Ottoman elites to the declaration of *Tanzimat Fermanı* in 1839. "The aim of the reforms was to create a stronger through which to govern the empire, principally through centralization and modernization. The Tanzimat also marks a shift in the center of Ottoman power from the sultan to the bureaucracy, which had been prepared by Sultan Mahmud II."<sup>111</sup>

### **2.3.1. *Tanzimat* Reforms**

The most important psychological change that led to *Tanzimat* was the replacement of feeling of absolute superiority with feeling of relative superiority and competition. Instead of the mission of spreading Islam, a defensive position against to the Western attack was accepted. Ottomans started to understand the world their ancestors had lived was different than the world they lived, and the Europe that their ancestors had fought was different than the Europe they confronted.<sup>112</sup>

Basic change that *Tanzimat* caused was transformation of power from Palace to *Bab-ı Ali*.<sup>113</sup> This was the emergence of Bureaucratic Monarchy and therefore Civil Service School, *Mülkiye Mektebi* was founded in 1859 to fulfill this purpose. This was the inevitable consequence of effects of Western power on Ottoman elites through economy. Since, "the capitalism – and all it implies, including colonialism and technological innovation connected to science- rationalized administrative bureaucracy, and the normalization of the objects of the governance are clearly to modernity."<sup>114</sup> What was targeted with this modern school is to bring up secular-pragmatic bureaucracy instead of traditional Sultan-Servant system. These changes reduced the effect of

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<sup>111</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 40.

<sup>112</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 58.

<sup>113</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 288.

<sup>114</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 4.

*Ulema* on power. Silverstein explains this process that “the *Tanzimat* reforms had a major impact on Islamic institutions, discourses and practices. Through two important process: transformations in the Islamic scholarly establishment, *Ulema*, and the emergence and rise in importance of noncleric Islamist intellectuals.”<sup>115</sup>

Abolition of janissaries, the seizure of incomes of Waqfs and lastly by putting *Şeyhülislam* into a state administration, Mahmud II took the religious authority under the state control. As a result of those actions, *Ulema* lost not only its economic and administrative autonomy in addition to janissary support but also its strength and ability to resist forthcoming reforms. Afterwards, schools were going to be transformed to Ministry of Education, assignment of judges was going to be transformed to Ministry of Justice, responsibility of writing fatwa was going to be transformed to a committee under the administration of Ministry of Justice and consequently *Ulema* was going to lose all its economic, social and political power.<sup>116</sup>

### **2.3.2. *Islahat* Reforms**

European Countries claimed that the decisions of *Tanzimat* were not applied on society, so that they enforced Ottoman government to declare *Islahat Fermanı* in 1856. “The main points of the edict were that the Ottomans would guarantee the life, honor and property of all the sultan’s subjects; inaugurate a more efficient and just system of taxation and the abolition of tax farming; begin regular recruitment into the armed forces (implying that this would be regardless of recruit’s religion); and uphold equality before the law regardless of subjects’ religion.”<sup>117</sup> *Islahat Fermanı* increased the rights of minorities given in Balta Limanı Treaty in 1838.

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>116</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 79- 98.

<sup>117</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 40.

Ottomanism emerged as a concept and politics after the declaration of *Islahat Fermanı* in 1856. Ottomanism was an attempt to create political unity through state citizenship rather than subject of Sultan by forming equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. It was the first milestone of transformation of religion into a new form in which religion was individual problem.<sup>118</sup>

#### **2.4. From Ottomanism to Islamism**

An uprising started in Bosnia Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875 was suppressed by Ottoman troops bloodily. This cruelty left Ottoman Empire alone in the European public sphere for forthcoming Russian war.<sup>119</sup> The mental change, or in other words the paradigm shift among Ottoman elites, was deepened in Berlin Treaty in 1878 after the Russian war in 1877-78. "From now on, destiny of Empire doesn't belong to divine will but rather it belongs to concrete political, cultural, social and demographic powers."<sup>120</sup> Besides being a disaster, 1877-78 war politicized Muslim feeling of solidarity. Ottomanism took steps on homogenization of population, centralization of authority, reorganization of law, economy and government etc... But it could not provide psychological power to unite Muslims to form a Muslim nation. Orthodox Slav cruelty in 1877-78 war provided a consciousness of unity to the Ottoman Muslims for the first time that they started to be aware of the fact that Ottoman Empire was in danger of fragmentation.<sup>121</sup> Silverstein summarize the process,

"One of the features of Balkans most destructive to Ottoman efforts at self-preservation was nationalism. Clearly, by the time of

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<sup>118</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), 16.

<sup>119</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 158.

<sup>120</sup> Karpat, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*, 279.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 229.

the Balkan war, nationalism was the only game in town; it was being used most effectively by former subject populations in the series of rebellions and disasters by which Ottomans effectively lost their former heartlands in the Balkans. The officer prominent in the environment, and it has clearly marked the character of Turkish political culture ever since."<sup>122</sup>

The feeling of unity was created by the attitudes of British Empire during the war. Russian army and the Bulgarian gangs fired the Turkish villages and killed 300.000 Muslims according to the reports of British embassy in 1877-78.<sup>123</sup> Russian army reached to the gate of Istanbul and then Britain Empire intervened to the war and stopped Russian army in order not to risk its interests. All these events were followed by ordinary Muslims in Istanbul and other cities of Ottoman Empire from journals. This event showed to the Muslims that only way of rescuing Ottoman Empire from fragmentation was not depending on "universal principles" of European Civilization but depending on unity of Muslims.

This was the emergence of Islamism as an ideology led by Abdülhamit II to keep Muslims of Empire together. The shift from Ottomanism to Islamism was inevitable because of the world view of Muslim society in Ottoman Empire. Lewis examines the background of this shift;

"The word "freedom" before the 17<sup>th</sup> century in Islamic language meant non-slave as a legal term but after the effects of French Revolution, "freedom" got political meanings and became legitimizing concept of fighting against to tyrannies and imperialism. In Ottoman, economical and social inequality was not a big issue. Muslim societies didn't experience the pre-revolutionary European rigid social struggles or class privileges. There was no remarkable inequality

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<sup>122</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 45.

<sup>123</sup> Karpaz, *İslam'ın Siyasallaşması*, 270.

between rich and poor because of the economic system in which people was not allowed to be so rich. In addition to economic system, the morality of Islam and traditions of mercy became a bridge between two groups. Therefore, the idea of "equality" did not have a great impact on individuals but it had a great impact on nations in Ottoman Empire. Hence, "freedom" in Ottoman Empire means freedom of nations rather than freedom of individuals. Race, land or language were not the main determiner of a nation in Ottomans, national unity depended on brotherhood of religion or faith."<sup>124</sup>

In other words, because of the world view of Muslims, they could not see the race based unity, and therefore they formed a unity around the religion. In the Empire, there was a Muslim nation, but no Turkish or Arab or Kurdish nations; there were Greek and Armenian and Jewish nations, but as religious communities, not as ethnic nations.<sup>125</sup> The formation of Greek and Slavs nations were the parts of Greek Orthodox feeling of unity. Gregorian Armenians, on the other hand, formed a separate nation based on Catholic Christianity. It is not until a comparatively late date that one encounters the idea of national entities transcending religious distinctions.

The rise of Islamism was consolidated by European invasion of Ottoman Lands; first, France occupied Tunisia in 1881 and then Britain Empire occupied Egypt in 1882. These events provided necessary antagonism for Muslim solidarity. In addition to those invasions, 1877-78 disaster and 1875 economic crisis gave opportunity to Abdülhamit II to make the state more centralized. Ottoman economic circumstances provided necessary loyalty of public to the throne of Abdülhamit II. All the development projects of *Tanzimat*, planned to proceed by borrowing money from foreign countries bankrupted with the 1875 economic crisis. The slogan

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<sup>124</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 55-56.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.



of “*terakki*” (development) was transformed to a new slogan “*ittihat*” (unity) in Ottoman policy.<sup>126</sup>

#### **2.4.1. Transformation of Relationship between State and Religion**

Abdülhamit II knew that only way of rescuing the empire from the forthcoming end that Akif Efendi warned half a century ago was to modernize it and therefore he wanted to modernize country not only by taking science and technology from the West but also by strengthening Islam inside of the country. Abdülhamit II inevitably used Islam for the social mobilization inside of the empire and as the strategic element of real political circumstances. By the way he continued modernization program to save the state. Silverstein explains that,

“Thus modern techniques of governance and modalities of power were not incorporated into Ottoman governmental technologies with the goal to “Westernize” or abandon Islamic norms in favor of non-Western ones. Rather the aim was the strengthening of the Muslim polity, as a Muslim polity, vis-à-vis military, economic, and cultural onslaught from powerful, non-Muslim polities to the north and west.”<sup>127</sup>

In this regard, the “state” perception and program of Mustafa Kemal was the next step of the historical continuity.<sup>128</sup> The relationship between the religion and the state in modern Turkey can only be understood at institutional level by analyzing continuity and differences of it with Ottoman Empire.

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<sup>126</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 342.

<sup>127</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 32.

<sup>128</sup> Gencer, “Türkiye’de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri”, 162.

Therefore Abdülhamit II founded modern schools, but the generation who were graduated from those schools started to see their own society through western eyes. According to them, the religious values were important as long as they increase national feelings. This point of view was maintained by CUP, after the announcement of *II Meşrutiyet* in 1908.<sup>129</sup>

The attitudes of CUP towards to the religion can be understood from Ziya Gökalp's writing on a journal *İslam Mecmuası*. According to Gökalp, Islam consists of two dimensions called *Tradition* and *Orders*. *Orders* can never be changed but *Tradition* can be changed.<sup>130</sup> Same attitude was valid for Islamist logic that "Islamists thought that the reason of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was tradition that made Muslims lazy."<sup>131</sup> So that, both Islamists and modernists blamed the tradition for decline of Ottoman Empire.

The effects of modern schools on the world view of new rising ruling elites during the period of Abdülhamit II must be examined to understand the applications of Republican elites during the Republican period. Therefore, the effects of modern schools are going to be explained.

## 2.5. Modern Schools

School experiences play important roles in socialization of individuals. Socialization is a process which shapes individuals according to certain world view. Therefore, the process of socialization is the ideological process in which all individual are requested to accept a certain ideology.<sup>132</sup> This was the case for the students who were graduated from modern schools in nineteenth century for their acceptance of modern paradigm in Ottoman

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<sup>129</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), 15.

<sup>130</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset Makaleler 3*, eds. Mümtaz'er Türköne & Tuncay Önder (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 20.

<sup>131</sup> Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 20.

<sup>132</sup> İsmail Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 12-13.

Empire. In other words, the most important aspect of modernization in Turkish society was education.<sup>133</sup>

### **2.5.1. Inefficiency of Madrasahs**

Modernization of education was started at the beginning of nineteenth century with the modern schools; *Tıbbiye*-1828, *Harbiye*-1849 and *Mülkiye*-1859 because of the “inefficiency” of Madrasahs. Galatasaray High school was established in 1868. Those schools not only caused Westernization of Ottomans but also caused the emergence of new elite community who separated themselves from ordinary, ignorant public.<sup>134</sup>

Unat says that at the beginning, the philosophy classes had important places in Madrasahs, but later, because of the bigotry, they were corrupted. As time went by, respectively investigation, research and experimental activities were abandoned in Madrasahs.<sup>135</sup> Mardin points out another problem in Madrasahs that the education system of Madrasahs that they stayed away from the science and especially with the development of modern schools, conflicts and contradictions emerged between secular education and Madrasahs. On the other hand, the pervasion of abuse and intervention in hierarchy destroyed the meritocratic order in Madrasahs which reigned for centuries.<sup>136</sup>

Another problem of decline of the education level in Madrasahs was about the paradigm differences that Madrasahs and modernism have. According to traditional paradigm, human being was the reflection i.e., the

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<sup>133</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye’de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 63.

<sup>134</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 243-244.

<sup>135</sup> Faik R. Unat, *Türkiye’de Eğitim Sisteminin Gelişmesine Tarihi Bir Bakış* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Yayınları, 1964), 6.

<sup>136</sup> Şerif Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, trans. M. Türköne, F. Unan & İ. Erdoğan (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 138-150, 243-253.

microcosm, of the macrocosm; therefore, all the philosophers from Aristotle to Hume formed their theories based on nature of fixed human. For the traditional world "it had been an axiom that nothing is knowable unless it is unchanging."<sup>137</sup> In this regard, knowledge which is suitable to the nature of fixed human cannot fit abnormal nature of changing human. Therefore, it is impossible to develop norms which are suitable to the nature of changing human being.<sup>138</sup> In other words, the traditional paradigm cannot reconcile with the modern paradigm. Because of that the Madrasahs had no capability of creating an alternative way of understanding against to modern paradigm.

Gencer explains that in traditional world, the books written about the Islamic law, politics and morality depended on Plato and Aristotle that created a meta-language and a way of life, therefore, without the traditional paradigm, they would be meaningless. How in traditional Western world, authentic knowledge (*logos*) and law (*nomos*) retreated, it is valid for Islamic traditional world with modernization. This can be seen in the example of *Mecelle* that Ahmet Cevdet Paşa wrote. It was an attempt to meet the necessities of the state according to Islamic law against to modernism, but it was futile and unsuccessful.<sup>139</sup>

### **2.5.2. Resolution of *Ulema***

In traditional world, *Ulema* was used to solving problems according to Aristotelian deductive method by applying universal principles on particular cases. But modern conscious doesn't work like that; it obtains general principles from particular events by using inductive method because of the

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<sup>137</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 11.

<sup>138</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 498.

<sup>139</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 167.

fragmented nature of phenomena of modern era which can't be perceived through deduction.<sup>140</sup>

The education in Ottoman Empire was based on religion, and the process of modernization was going to bring secularization in the education system. Ruling elites, during the period of *Tanzimat*, didn't give up on religion because of the problem of legitimacy and therefore they opened the modern (secular) schools without abolishing Madrasahs. Transformation from religious education to secular education was going to be done slowly until the Republic.<sup>141</sup> This was necessary for the position of *Ulema* as the tool of legitimation.

Muslim scholars (*Ulema*) had four characteristics that first, *Şer-I İczaet* (scholars used to get their diploma from a committee, not an institution); second, *Külli Bilgi* (universal knowledge); third, memorization of Quran; and lastly writing book in Arabic. Their duty was not to establish a new world but to maintain existing one by transforming the absolute knowledge to the relative knowledge. In other words, Scholars' job was legitimation by updating the law according to the developments.<sup>142</sup>

*De facto* secular laws and decisions were legitimized through *de jure* religious laws by *Şeyhülislam*. On the other hand, *Ulema* was responsible to legitimize the pragmatic bureaucratic decisions according to religious laws.<sup>143</sup>

In the process of modernization of Ottoman Empire, new bureaucracy gained autonomous and rational features by revealing a legitimacy crisis.

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<sup>140</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 181-182.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 84-85.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 166-167.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

Professional knowledge of *Ulema* became unrequited on the ground of real politics, thus *Ulema* alienated to the politics.<sup>144</sup>

### 2.5.3. Identity Crisis

Fortna says that "the core of the educational change is the problem of identity."<sup>145</sup> Each alternative way of searching an identity is the result of a legitimacy crisis.<sup>146</sup> Because of the ideological sovereignty of modern paradigm coming from outside world made Madrasahs "inefficient" or illegitimate. This was inevitable result that the scholars of Madrasahs never had and would have the capability to create an alternative way of understanding against to modernism. Because the modernism was built upon the understanding of new physics by destructing old one at which traditional paradigm would work, as explained in previous chapter. The period of Mahmud II was the period of conflicts which deepened the identity crisis in reformation process. It was between traditional education system in which religion reigned and higher education system in which worldly change reigned. Education of individuals had two phases that firstly they had religious education and secondly they had secular education. Because of this two headed education system, people had two headed culture and two different personalities, and therefore, an identity crisis.<sup>147</sup>

The gap between the improved secondary education and primitive primary education created shocking impact upon educated generation in the period of Sultan Abdülhamit. After the traditional and religious atmosphere of primary education, students confronted the opposite atmosphere in secondary education. Inevitably this picture created contradictions and

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 173-174.

<sup>145</sup> Benjamin C. Fortna, *Mekteb-i Humayun*, trans. Pelin Siral, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 47.

<sup>146</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 273.

<sup>147</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 203.

conflicts in this generation's world view. When students went to higher education, those contradictions and conflicts deepened. Therefore first reactions to regime came from *Harbiye* and *Tibbiye*. The problem of those schools was not that the regime didn't give the requested ethic to students but the problem was about the unforeseeable effects of modern sciences like mathematics, psychics, biology, economy and history.<sup>148</sup>

This conflicting atmosphere created identity crisis for those students. Main characteristic of the crisis that intellectuals confronted was alienation. This rootless group of people tried to overcome their identity crisis by ignoring and even denying the traditional values.<sup>149</sup> This identity crisis reflected itself through the gap between *Ulema* and intellectuals, intellectuals and public, religion and public and those who wanted reforms on field of religion succeeded it by separating themselves from religion.<sup>150</sup>

In order to analyze the identity crisis that Ottoman intellectuals confronted, Gencer uses the concepts of Ibn Khaldun and his concept of *asabiyet* (Communal spirit) which is the basic dynamic of social mobilization in Ibn Khaldun philosophy. In this regard, *asabiyet* is the solidarity based on the primary commitment like blood and family. There is another kind of functional *asabiyet* exists apart from organic meaning: *sebeb asabiyeti* (zeal). It means the evolutionary consequence of *asabiyet* and most importantly religion. In Ibn Khaldun, religion is not the reason but the consequence of *sebeb asabiyeti*. The social and political unity constructed by *sebeb asabiyet* looks like replaced with belief and religion.<sup>151</sup> In other words, the religion is not the reason for establishment of the state or establishment of the *sebeb asabiyet* but its legitimacy source. Religion becomes the social and political

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 367-368

<sup>149</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 117.

<sup>150</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 204.

<sup>151</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 154.

glue by replacing itself with *sebeb asabiyet*. Therefore *asabiyet*, in order to be functional, must be abstracted from upper identity. During the period of *Tanzimat* and *Islahat*, religion was abstracted from *sebeb asabiyet*, in other words, when religion and national myth conflicted, religion was restrained. Because of the position of the state as a protector of religion, state comes first. Findley says that the space that *Ulema* left behind filled by Young Ottomans to re-establish the legitimacy of the state by depending on Islamic heritage that *Tanzimat* reformers lost.<sup>152</sup> Young Ottomans and Young Turks accepted constitutionalism from the European movements to transform the society. Middle Eastern scholars, on the other hand, accepted messianic perception, i.e., revolutionary politics. Constitutionalism and revolutionary politics are right and left versions of messianic perception.<sup>153</sup>

For instance, Young Ottomans published a newspaper called *Hürriyet* in 1868. The title of an article that Namık Kemal wrote in the newspaper was coming from a Quran Verse that "consult them in the conduct of affairs". By this way, Kemal used a Quran verse as the base of an idea of Parliamentary Representative Government. Another article that Kemal wrote for newspaper was named as "Love of Homeland is the Part of Faith".<sup>154</sup> The main members of Young Ottomans were born in the first years of *Tanzimat* and almost all of them were graduated from the modern schools that *Tanzimat* opened. They were educated by reading eighteenth century French books and they saw the world behind new principles that they learnt from those books. The sources of those principles were Law of Montesque, Politics of Rousseau and Economy of Smith-Ricardo.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup> Cited in Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 156.

<sup>153</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 436.

<sup>154</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 153-154.

<sup>155</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 106.



Acculturation explains the process of cultural and psychological change (especially in technologically weaker culture) that results following meeting between cultures. Dissolution of religious institutions and identities (both in orthodox and heterodox) lead society to the legitimacy crisis. Intellectuals of sovereign groups fail to build a new identity based on a new universal doctrine because it is impossible to shift from old universalism to a new universalism; therefore intellectuals of sovereign groups abandon their position to intellectuals of new rising groups. In Ottoman Empire, *Ulema* abandoned their positions to the new rising intellectuals like Young Ottomans. Those intellectuals tried to create a universal political identity which transcends singular identities by using ideologies and the concepts like "class" and "civilization" as the alternative of religion.<sup>156</sup>

Namık Kemal and his friends tried to hold crumbling Ottoman society together by defining *sebeb asabiyet* again. The concept of traditional *vatan* (homeland) and *hürriyet* (freedom) that Young Ottoman updated suggested and partially formed a supra identity axis to keep Muslims and non-Muslims of the Empire together. The meaning of *hürriyet* (freedom) in Islamic law was non-slave. In mysticism, *hürriyet* meant controlling the bad feelings in human by becoming true believers to God. Shortly, *hürriyet* means being non-slave both to bad feelings and to other people. Therefore, *hürriyet* was the derivation of justice and it had no extra meanings in Islamic world. Unlike traditional world and Islamic world, Western world had power devices like "church" and "state". Therefore, In Islamic world, there were no voluntary or legal freedoms. After the process of *Tanzimat*, Ottoman state started to become a westernist state, i.e., leviathan, free from the personality of *Sultan*. There were no brutal governors anymore to criticize in order to bring justice to the Ottoman Empire; therefore Young Ottomans

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<sup>156</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 464.

supported their struggle for justice by the concept of freedom for the first time in 1868.<sup>157</sup>

The direct political aim of freedom is to mobilize individuals and to protect individuals from totalitarian state. Whereas, in the traditional societies like Ottoman society, the obedience to *Sultan* was the absolute norm, therefore it was difficult to mobilize people against to the state. State was the source of justice in traditional world, however with Young Ottomans; state became the target to war of freedom.<sup>158</sup>

The process, it can be called Ottomanism, was transformed to Islamism in the period of Abdülhamit II. However, Islamism was not a supra identity but rather an international ideology. Therefore it could not prevent the spread of religious nationalism throughout the Empire. Balkan wars, lost lands accelerated the emergence of Turkish nationalism during the period of 1908 and 1918. On the ideological map of Young Turks, Islam was thrust aside and therefore instead of the concept of *millet* (religious community); the concept of *ulus* (national community) was used.<sup>159</sup>

#### **2.5.4. Paradigm Shift**

There are two functions of education; first function is to transfer the desired elements of culture to the next generations to preserve the cultural heritage, second function is provide continuity of society to help people for adaptation of changing circumstances. Thus, education is a tool for transferring culture, adapting to new circumstances, creating new personalities requested by social changes.<sup>160</sup> The main objective in

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 758-759.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 759-760.

<sup>159</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 156-157.

<sup>160</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılaşma*, 14.

nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was to educate generations who could accommodate to the modern paradigm. In one hand, modernist elites that the state needed in the fields of law, engineering, press and governance, on the other hand, the masses that the society needed to be a modern were going to be educated by both formal (state schools) and non-formal (press) ways. From now on, the main objective of the education system was not to create a stable society composed of morally qualitative individuals but to create a modern society composed of politically conscious and loyal individuals. The education was perceived as the tool of social engineering by the Ottoman elites who were affected by Positivism.<sup>161</sup>

The purpose the *Sultan* Abdülhamit was to realize the adaptation of Ottoman society to the new modern circumstances. In spite of good intentions, *Sultan* missed something very important that like everything, "education was secularized as a consequence of the rationalization of life"<sup>162</sup> in modern period through the transformation from teocentric perception to anthropocentric perception.<sup>163</sup>

The institution of education has deeper influences on mentality, identity and way of life than it seems to have.<sup>164</sup> Ottoman education was not only a defense to competition of the foreign schools but also the copy of them. According to the census conducted in 1897, there was 14.212.000 Muslims, 4.838.000 Non-Muslims in Ottoman Empire. Whereas, the number of Muslim students who attended to the middle schools was 41.716 but that of non-Muslim students were 82.916.<sup>165</sup> Numbers shows that why education was emphasized after the period of *Tanzimat* in Ottoman Empire.

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<sup>161</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 728.

<sup>162</sup> Fortna, *Mekteb-i Humayun*, 53.

<sup>163</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 31.

<sup>164</sup> Fortna, *Mekteb-i Humayun*, 81.

<sup>165</sup> Rifat Okçabol, *Türk Eğitim Sistemi* (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınları, 2005), 27-28.

Students of those modern schools were coming from land lord families. "If we have chance to investigate the families of students who were studying in modern school, we would see that those families were provincial land lords named *Ayan* who emerged with the law of land (*Arazi Kanunnamesi*)."<sup>166</sup> In Karpat's words, in those schools, students were introduced modern science and Western ideas for the first time. Especially Newton physics and Darwin theory influenced students extensively and caused conflicts.<sup>167</sup> Newton physics was an alternative way of explaining the order of the world to traditional way of explaining. In this system, a new system, called mechanical world vision, was proposed; according to this vision, universe was created by God with some constant (unchanging) natural laws. By figuring out the formulas of those laws, human being could control the nature. What was important in this new mechanical world vision is the elimination of philosophic questions from area of science. According to Aristotle, knowing something means knowing four answers about this thing that "What is it?" (*causa materialis*), "How it works?" (*causa formalis*), "Why it works?" (*causa finalis*), and lastly "Who (or what) makes it work?" (*causa efficiens*).<sup>168</sup> Collingwood explains that

"Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of orders of cause: material, formal, efficient and final. (...) If then we ask why there is a world of nature (...) there is certainly one way of explaining this question according to relationship between orders of cause; but there is another kind of explanation which is equally necessary, namely explaining why facts of the kind we call natural should exist at all: this is what metaphysics of nature."<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Ortadoğu'da Millet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011), 116.

<sup>167</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Elitler ve Din* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 244-260.

<sup>168</sup> Gunnar Skirbekk & Nils Gilije, *Felsefe Tarihi*, trans. Emrah Akbaş, Şule Mutlu, (İstanbul: Kesit Yayınları, 2006), 98-99

<sup>169</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 75-76.

First two questions were included in the Newton's mechanical world vision, but last two questions can be answered only by philosophy or religion. Science can explain and describe the natural events but it cannot explain why they happen.<sup>170</sup> Collinwood explains this elimination by saying that,

"How are we to find a changeless and therefore knowable something in, or behind, or somehow belonging to, the flux of nature as we perceive it? In modern or evolutionary natural science, this question does not arise, and the controversy between materialism and idealism, as two answers to it, no longer has any meaning."<sup>171</sup>

*Tıbbiye* was the school in which first modern intellectuals, scientists and governors were educated. For example Fuat Paşa learnt French in *Tıbbiye* then he became doctor in there. Then he was appointed to the *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Office) and *Hariciye* (Ministry of Foreign Relations) respectively. After this experience, Fuad Paşa became *Hariciye Nazırı* (Minister of Foreign Relations) and *Sadrazam* (Prime Minister). Most of the influential figures of *Tanzimat* period were grown up in *Tercüme Odası*.<sup>172</sup> Another important figure was Münif Efendi who was graduated from *Tıbbiye* in the period of *Tanzimat*. He learnt German, French and English in *Tercüme Odası* (Translation Office) and he was interested in materialist philosophy. He published first science journal named *Mecmua-ı Fünun* under the administration of *Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman Science Community) which was established by Fuat Paşa. This journal consisted of articles about science, philosophy, economy and law to illuminate public. The idea of establishing first Western university of Ottoman

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<sup>170</sup> Skirbekk & Gilije, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 13-15.

<sup>171</sup> Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature*, 12.

<sup>172</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 234.

Empire named *Darü'l Fünun* was born around this journal. *Darü'l Fünun* was established in 1871 but it was closed at the beginning of 1872.<sup>173</sup>

The observation of Professor Bernard Macfarlane about the new rising schools when he visited Üsküdar Military Hospital in 1847 shows that how materialism and positivism were expanding among the students who were from *Tıbbiye*. He says "I was invited to a very well decorated lounge arranged for doctors and Turkish assistants. There was a book on the couch. When I took it, I realized it was the last edition of d'Holbach's *Systeme de la Nature*. The book was read a lot, because it was obvious from its pages. The underlined sentences were about mathematical proof of impossibility of existence of God. Then one of the Turkish doctors came by me and said "*C'est un Grand ouvrage! C'est in Grand philosophe Il a toujours raison*"<sup>174</sup> in French."<sup>175</sup> In *Tıbbiye*, the books of revolutionary writers like Holbach, Diderot, Voltaire, Cabanis and Fenelon were used as the text books.<sup>176</sup>

This radical change from traditional psychics to Newton psychics, with the help of Darwin theory, reflected on those students as elimination of religion in the area of science and society. This brought rationalism to Ottoman lands. The nature of rationalism consists of controlling not only the physical world by science and technology but also the social world through bureaucracy and other anonymous subjects. The main characteristic of rationalism is to make delicate calculations of means, ends and consequences by using universal laws, rules and regulations obtained from scientific and technological means. This system with all its scientific, technological, economical and political tools is called technocracy. A technocratic society (or iron cage as Weber called) calculates details of life

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 236-238.

<sup>174</sup> What a great book. He is a great philosopher. He is right what he says.

<sup>175</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 233.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 267.

by a bureaucratic mechanism to control the individuals.<sup>177</sup> Those new Western ideas made students suspect where they stand and how they perceive the world for the first time. After the economical and political (military) defeat, this was the last and most important defeat of Ottoman Empire; ideological defeat. The students who were graduated from modern schools started to see their society through western eyes and they concluded inevitable result; "Islam is the obstacle to scientific progress". This mentality showed itself in Atatürk's words in Republican Era; "Science is the most genuine guide in life"<sup>178</sup> New secular modern intellectuals were the people who only believed in path of science to catch up with the Western civilization. Alienation to their society was the next step for those students, they were "affected by western ideas and started to insult Ottoman society and traditionalist culture."<sup>179</sup>

## 2.6. Cultural War

The idea "Islam is the obstacle to scientific progress" which affected Ottoman intellectuals came from French Orientalist Ernest Renan. The regression of Muslim and Eastern societies was resulted from lack of education according to J. S. Mill or economic structure according to Marx. However, Ernest Renan claimed that the main reason of this regression was the religion and race differences. The lecture named *Islam and Science* that he delivered in Sorbonne in 1883 was about the main argument of Renan and it created lots of reactions from Muslim countries. Renan, in this lecture, claimed that Islam was enemy of science and philosophy because Islam was a religion which was produced by Arabs. Even if there was some developments in science and philosophy in Islam, it was because of Aryans (Iranians) not because of Arabs. Like Christianity, Islam was against to free

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<sup>177</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 316-317.

<sup>178</sup> "Hayatta en hakiki mürşit ilimdir"

<sup>179</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), 26.

thinking, science and philosophy because both of them established a unity with state. Unity of religion and state was the biggest obstacle before free thinking. According to Renan, Arabs and Turks were responsible for this unity.<sup>180</sup> Guida explains the characteristics of Renan by saying,

“The French Orientalist Joseph Ernest Renan (1823-1892) spent most of his academic career attempting to show how positive science was in conflict with religion. Renan thought that science would eventually supplant religion in developed societies and he understood religion as an enquiry that exhibits a comparative, skeptical, and non-judgmental attitude toward its subject.”<sup>181</sup>

According to Renan, approximately from the year of 775 to middle of thirteenth century, in Islamic world, there were many distinguished scholars. Especially in twelfth century, İbni Baçe, İbni Tufeyl, İbni Rüşd (Averroes) developed the philosophy that Islamic world became superior to Christian world culturally and intellectually. Even if those philosophical thoughts were expressed in Arabic, essence of them depended on Persian-Greek heritage not Islam itself. Guida explains Renan’s claim that “scientific achievements in Muslim societies were due to either Aryans or Christian Arabs... The Semitic and Turkic elements were incapable of recognizing the relevance of the natural sciences and philosophy. This implicitly meant that Muslims needed colonial tutelage to overcome their backwardness, and any attempt to modernize their societies was destined to fail.”<sup>182</sup> Islam, according to Renan, actually, has no relations with rationalism and science; it tortured science and philosophy all the time and finally killed them. The history of Islam can be divided into two periods; first period can be started from birth of Islam

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<sup>180</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 352.

<sup>181</sup> Michelangelo Guida, “Al Afgani and Namık Kemal’s Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought”, *Turkish Journal of Politics*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 2011) 59.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, 61-62



and proceeded to twelfth century, second period can be started from thirteenth century continued until today. In the first period, because of the *tarikatlara* (Heretic movements), and a kind of Protestant Islam (*Mutezile*), the scientific atmosphere was created, in other words, those scholars existed not because of Islam but in spite of Islam. The second period, Islamic world was conquered by barbarian Tartar and Berber races, which "are heavy, brutal and without intelligence" and therefore, all the philosophical and scientific thoughts were persecuted and destroyed.<sup>183</sup>

Renan's attack to the history of Islamic science was actually directed to Turkic Muslims who had political leadership of Islamic world, i.e. institution of Caliphate. He says that in the second period, science and philosophy were destroyed in history of Islam. The thirteenth century is the time when Turks gained the political leadership of Islamic world. Therefore, after the Renan's lecture in Sorbonne, lots of Ottoman and non-Ottoman intellectuals from the Islamic world published refusals to Renan's claims. "Muslims took these arguments seriously because Renan's thesis about the history of Islamic science was seen as a symbol of a larger European justification for Europe's racial superiority over Semitic and Turkic Muslims as a way to justify its imperialistic civilizing mission in the Muslim world"<sup>184</sup>

"(..) The most notable of those refusals is the one of Afgani first published after the publication of the text of Renan's lecture. Ottoman intellectual Namık Kemal also prepared a refusal of Renan's lecture but it was published only posthumously in 1908."<sup>185</sup> Frame of the main theme of the *reddiyeler* (refusals) to Renan's claims written by Afgani and Ali Ferruh in

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<sup>183</sup> Ernest Renan, "İslam ve Bilim", *Nutuklar ve Konferanslar*, trans. Ziya İhsan, (Ankara: Sakarya Yayınevi, 1946), 183-198.

<sup>184</sup> Guida, "Al Afgani and Namık Kemal's Replies to Ernest Renan: Two Anti-Westernist Works in the Formative Stage of Islamist Thought", 61.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

Paris, Namık Kemal in Midilli, Beyazidos in Petersburg, Emir Ali in India, Celal Nuri in Istanbul, Reşid Rıza in Cairo can be drawn with four items;

- a) Islamic world is in a process of decline but the reason of this decline was not Islam.
- b) Until recent centuries, Muslims established great civilizations based on Islam.
- c) Therefore, it is a slander that Islam is an obstacle before the scientific progress and developments.
- d) In this regard, Islam is not the reason but the solution of this decline.<sup>186</sup>

Those responses provided the foundations for modern perception of Islam, in other words an apologetic, a defensive religion. The cultural war against to Islamic world started with Renan and continued with English intellectuals. After the period of Westphalia in Western world, religion had been transformed to civilization.<sup>187</sup> English intellectuals had identified Protestantism with progression and condemned Catholic Christianity as obstacle to progress by putting imperialism in another disguise called secular cosmopolitanism. English intellectuals reflected this picture to the Islamic world and identified Arap Islam as the civilization of Islam which tends to progression, on the other hand, Turkic Islam was condemned as an obstacle to progress. Thus, like Catholic modernization, Islamic modernization was born from the antithesis that "Islam is not obstacle to progression"<sup>188</sup> The effect of Renan's insult to Turkic Islamic history can be seen even in the Republican era. For instance, before the establishment of the Republic, during the negotiations and discussions about the changing the law of

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<sup>186</sup> Cündioğlu, "Ernest Renan ve Reddiyeler Bağlamında İslam-Bilim Tartışmalarına Bibliyografik Bir Katkı", 7.

<sup>187</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 30.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye*<sup>189</sup> in Assembly, it was offered to change the religion of the state from Islam to Christianity by changing second item of the Constitution.<sup>190</sup>

## **2.7. New Individual**

In addition to the social and political reforms, foundation of the printing press, sending students to the Europe, establishment of modern schools, bringing foreign teachers for those schools from the West and the pervasion of newspapers created a new type of individual in Ottoman society. He was reading foreign newspapers, magazines, books and wanted to import those new ideas into his society. However he got stuck between the legacy that he inherited from his culture and the new ideas that he learnt from foreign sources.

Because of the censure on political issues in the period of Abdülhamit, Press concentrated on popular science which was going to influence public more in the long term. Journals and newspapers, at that time, had interesting titles like "The life of Professor Helmboltz", "The Origin of Vertebrates", "The way of keeping feet warm", "What is colored photograph?", "Contributions of Arabs to Civilization", "Journey, under the water and up to sky", "Intelligence of Cats", "Life of Eskimos", "Discovery of America by Christopher Columbus", "Strange Food of Chinese", "Discoveries of Voyager Livingstone" etc. Those writings generated a new type of reader who wanted to read entertaining and interesting things and have fun. People, up to that time, had only chance to read orders of *Sultan* or *Ulema*, but the pervasion of Press and censure on politics caused revolutionary impact on secularization of life. Increment of number of printing houses,

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<sup>189</sup> Constitution of 1921

<sup>190</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 141-142.

publishment of books, translators increased the number of popular adventures books rather than high philosophy or literature books. Effects of novels like Jules Verne's novels, *Three Musketeers*, *Count of Monte Cristo* etc... had more secularizing and modernizing impacts on people's mentality rather than less published and less read high philosophy and literature books of *Tanzimat* period. Those popular books led readers to the gate of a new world of imaginations, inventions, discoveries and adventures. The people who used to listen to the fairy tales or stories about hell and heaven were affected by detective or crime novels differently: there is a reason behind all the mysteries; every mystery has a solution; all the solutions can be reached by reasoning; every event can be explained by reason.<sup>191</sup>

Haeckel, Schopenhauer, Bücher, Darwin, Draper, Renan, Taine, Spencer, Le Bon, Poincare, Ribot, Richet, Flammarion, J. S. Mill, Flaubert, Balzac and Zola are some of the writers whose books were published in the period of Abdülhamit II. This shows that all the naturalists and materialists thoughts reached to the Ottoman society and new rising elites at that time.<sup>192</sup>

Turkish intellectuals who had suggestions on political, economical and social life of Ottoman Empire were affected by nineteenth century French thinkers in the period of *II Meşrutiyet*. First effect was Comte's sociology of positivism on Ahmet Rıza that by positivist inspirations he established intellectual background of CUP This radical laicism is going to be inherited by Republican elites later on. Another effect was Le Play's thoughts on Prince Sebahattin that he established his main claims about private enterprise and *adem-i merkeziyetçilik* (decentralization). Lastly, Ziya Gökalp created the theoretical framework of Turkish nationalism by using sociology of Emile

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<sup>191</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 368-370.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, 378.

Durkheim.<sup>193</sup> Even if the dominant actor in political relations was England, the dominant cultural actor was France. Nineteenth century was the time when French culture occupied the Ottoman Empire. For example, Hoca İshak Efendi as the second head teacher of *Mühendishane* applied the French curriculum in the school.<sup>194</sup> There were about two hundred students who were sent to France for education during the period of 1839-1876. Those students occupied the very high positions after they came back to Ottoman Empire like *Sadrizam* (Grand vizier), *Vezir* (Vizier), *Sefir* (Ambassador) and *Subay* (military officer). For instance, the most influential figure of *Tanzimat* period, Şinasi studied Finance and Literature in France. He became pioneer of the new movements in Turkish literature and thoughts. Those students were very important for cultural Westernization in Ottoman Empire.<sup>195</sup>

### **2.7.1. Women Issue**

The radical changes that society confronted brought the women issues into the public sphere. Inglehart and Norris says that

“The shift from traditional religious values to secular-rational values brings a cultural shift from an emphasis on a traditional role for women, whose lives are largely limited to producing and rising many children, first under the authority of their fathers and then their husbands, with little autonomy and few options outside the home, to a world in which women have an increasingly broad range of life choices, and most women have careers and interest outside the home.”<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 230.

<sup>194</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye’de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 99.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., 99-100.

<sup>196</sup> Inglehart & Norris, *Sacred and Secular*, 25-26.

For example, according to Mehmet Esat, polygamy was not an order but a permission of Şeriah. Daughter of Cevdet Paşa, Aliye Hanım claimed that polygamy couldn't be advocated anymore.<sup>197</sup>

### 2.7.2. Objections to Old Regime

First objections to the regime of Abdülhamit II came from high schools like *Tıbbiye* and *Harbiye*, second objection came from secret comities formed by military officers and third objection came from intellectuals who lived in centers like Paris, Cairo and Geneva.

All those people can be called Young Turks.<sup>198</sup> The students, who graduated from the modern schools, founded Union and Progress Party in order to "free" and "modernize" Ottoman society and its institutions under the governance of Abdülhamit II.

Those schools were the places where the students had their political socialization process. Political socialization is a process in which individuals gain their political orientation, attitude and behaviors. By this way, individuals are integrated into political groups.<sup>199</sup>

The mental picture of U.P.P. members showed itself after the declaration of 1876 Constitution *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye* with *II. Meşrutiyet*. "Pluralistic and comparatively free atmosphere continued until 1913 and it was replaced with radical secularist modernization program between 1913 and 1918."<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 373-374.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., 389-390.

<sup>199</sup> Kaplan, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi*, 14.

<sup>200</sup> Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner Gönen (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 252.

## 2.8. Victory of Modern Paradigm

First World War was a destructive experience for Ottoman Empire. Close relationships with European countries brought important changes in social, economical and political life to this Muslim country. Call for war took millions of Muslims from their homeland to new and different places and made them a part of modern army. In order to fill the spaces that those Muslims left behind, women entered to the work or the business life. First World War created new opportunity and necessities like profiteering, theft, industrial and commercial attempt. Relationships with Austria and Germany brought educational, technical and administrative guidance in addition to financial and military support. War not only changed the environment but also changed the people's conscious about themselves.<sup>201</sup>

GNAT was divided into two parts in 1920; first group was military and bureaucratic elites, they believed that the obstacles standing in front of progress were the traditionalist institutions and culture. In order to change those "corrupt" institutions, they claimed top down change. Second group was traditionalist provincial leaders; they believed that the government had to remove obstacles standing in front of economical progress while keeping traditionalist culture. First group, affected by western ideas, was insulting society and traditionalist culture.<sup>202</sup>

Although it has its roots in the Ottoman era, secularism in Turkey, both as an ideology and a political project, is basically an issue of the Republican period. Betin says that

"Republican reforms inspired from the Westernization

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<sup>201</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 237.

<sup>202</sup> Karpaz, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi*, 26.

movements emerged during the period of *II Meşrutiyet*. For example, abolishment of the Madrasahs, the acceptances of the Latin alphabet, prohibition of the *Fes* (Ottoman Hat), abolishment of the religious courts, acceptance of the civil code, reforms on women rights were thoughts previously advocated by the journal of *İctihat*.<sup>203</sup>

In a memorandum, Gökalp wrote that religious people must be restrained by a field called *Diyanet*, *Şeyhülislam* must be taken out of politics and lastly the religious courts and the education system must be taken from religious authority. According to this memorandum, in 1916, *Şeyhülislam* was taken out of cabinet; religious courts were connected to the Ministry of Justice; administration of all the religious institutions was transferred from religious authority to Ministry of Waqfs; all the Madrasahs were connected to the Ministry of Education. This last step was a milestone of abolishment of Madrasahs in the period of Republic.<sup>204</sup>

As it is seen the republican applications were formulated during late Ottoman period around the religion because, as it is mentioned above, "Islam was an obstacle to the scientific progress and Western civilization", therefore secularism turned out to be a positivist ideology to abolish religion not only in society but also in Turkish conscious. Especially in educated section of society, an environment was created against to religion and materialism was offered.<sup>205</sup> Göle describes the republican period that,

"The Turkish mode of modernization is an unusual example of how indigenous ruling elites have imposed their notions of a Western cultural model, resulting in conversion almost on a

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<sup>203</sup> Cited in Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılılaşma*, 143.

<sup>204</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 458-459.

<sup>205</sup> Karpaz, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi*, 39.



civilizational scale. By building up a strong tradition of ideological positivism, Turkish modernist elites have aimed toward secularization, rationalization and nation building. The premises of positivist ideology are crucial in the realization of this project. First, positivism holds universalistic claims for the Western model. By not considering Western modernity an outcome of particular Christian religious culture, positivism focuses on scientific rationality. It represents this model of change as universal rational and applicable everywhere at any time. It is Comte's ultimate positivist stage, which all societies will one day achieve."<sup>206</sup>

The positivist assumptions of Republican elites and modern paradigm led them to form a political sovereignty free from caliphate, an education system free from *Ulema* and a language free from Arabic-Persian impacts.

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<sup>206</sup>Nilüfer Göle, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997): 71.

## CHAPTER III

### MODERNIZATION OF ISLAM IN MODERN TURKEY

Casanova, in his book "Public Religions in the Modern World", points out that the core of secularization is the conceptualization of social structure through process of modernization and then he explains three elements of secularization. First element of secularization is the separation of religion from politics, economy etc... through the structural differences in social fields. Second one is the privatization of religion in its field. Third one is reduction in importance of the religious institutions and faiths in society.<sup>207</sup> First element of secularization was performed by abolition of the religious institutions inherited from Ottoman Empire during the Republican period. Second element of secularization was inevitable consequence of nation state process and called nationalization of religion and is going to be explained in this chapter.

#### 3.1. Character of Republican Reforms

The modality of governance of the Republic, often known as modernization from above, is one of the habits inherited from Ottoman Empire. Those elites, highly trained technocratic experts, applied the positive sciences to engineer and implement the reforms, and that these might involve public institutions as well as the details of personal life were features of Ottoman governance.<sup>208</sup> After *Tanzimat*, the traditional patrimonial characteristic of the political structure was pushed into the back and bureaucracy gained political power. It solidified with Republic and instead of governance, the domination was taken place.<sup>209</sup> "The French positivists'

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<sup>207</sup> Cited in Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 269-270.

<sup>208</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 18.

<sup>209</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 166.

motto, "order and progress" gives Turkish nationalists powerful encouragement in their attempts at social control"<sup>210</sup> Therefore, in 1925, Law for the Maintenance of Order was declared by the Assembly against to ethnic-religious uprising in southeast Turkey. Kemalist reforms were legitimized and accelerated by the Law for the Maintenance of Order by censoring oppositions.

### 3.2. Secularism and Laicism

There were two dimensions in Mustafa Kemal's laicism that first is to finish two headedness and second abandonment of Islam as a legitimacy source of political institution.<sup>211</sup> Secularism is a philosophical concept about the world view but laicism is a constitutional concept.

In other words, laicism is about the source of the sovereignty not the source of *nomos*. Therefore, laicism concerns about whether the source of sovereignty depends on God or not. If the source of sovereignty is God, then it is called theocracy; if it is public, then it is called laicism.<sup>212</sup>

In the circumstances of Turkey, laicism could not be defined as a scientific concept therefore it has been a political and ideological means of struggle since the establishment of Republic.<sup>213</sup>

Therefore the purpose of the Turkish secularization is to transform not only the structure of the state but also the society.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> Göle, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity", 71.

<sup>211</sup> Gencay Şaylan, *Din ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: V Yayınları, 1986), 44.

<sup>212</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 152.

<sup>213</sup> İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 2008), 53.

<sup>214</sup> Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 26.

### 3.3. Secularization of Political Sovereignty

Abolition of *Sultanate* in 1922 was the first development for secularization of political sovereignty that Republican elites performed. It was completed with the establishment of Republic in 1923. The perception of secularism emerged in the discourse of Kemalism is that the state must take its legitimacy from nonreligious institution or ideas.<sup>215</sup> Therefore this process was continued with the abolition of caliphate, religious authority, in 1924. In 1 March 1924 Mustafa Kemal in the Assembly said that Islam has been used as a mean of politics for centuries but it is compulsory to exclude Islam from politics for the sake of the nation both worldly and spiritually.<sup>216</sup> The name of the bill to abolish the caliphate was "Proposed legislation abolishing the caliphate and expelling the Ottoman dynasty from Turkey". In the introductory part, text says that:

"The existence of the caliphate in the Republic of Turkey has not allowed Turkey to free itself in its domestic politics a double headedness. Turkey, which in its independence and national life accepts no partnership (to its sovereignty), has no patience for an explicit or even implicit dual nature. It has been absolute constant that this dynasty –which for centuries has brought calamity on the Turkish nation and now, through deeds and promises, has caused the demise of Turkish empire- under the cloak of the caliphate will be an even more effective threat to the existence of Turkey. This dynasty is a pure danger for everything having to do with the situation and strength of existence of the Turkish nation. Fundamentally, the caliphate in early Islam was created as having the meaning and function of government which is charged with performing all worldly and spiritual duties, there is simply no reason for the existence of a

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<sup>215</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>216</sup> TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:2, C. VII, s.6, quoted from Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 57.

separate caliphate. This is the reality. In order for the Turkish nation to preserve its security it cannot choose and course of action other than conforming to the truth."<sup>217</sup>

In Ottoman Empire, traditional formula was *Din-ü devlet, mülk-ü millet* which means approximately the unification of religion, state, sovereignty and nation. Modern version of it is the indivisible integrity of the nation and the state which came from Hegelian philosophy that civil society must be dissolved in the state.<sup>218</sup> The text shows that the political potential of caliphate is dangerous for the sovereignty of Turkish state and the existence of Turkey. All secular and spiritual duties of caliphate were transformed to Turkish state. In other words, the religious authority is not Caliphate anymore, but Turkish state. First item of the law no. 429, accepted in 3 March 1924, says that "The Grand National Assembly and its government is only institution which is responsible for the practice and the theology of Islam, therefore the PRA was established to carry out this duty."<sup>219</sup> Text also shows that the transformation of political power from caliphate to state was justified by Islamic reasoning. Islam is used as the source of legitimacy for the existence of new state and its sovereignty. With Deringil's words: "the sublime irony was that the self-same Hanefi *fikh* which had for centuries used to legitimate the Ottoman caliphate was now used to de-legitimize it."<sup>220</sup>

The abolition of caliphate was one of the most radical of all simply because it openly pointed to a radical separation from the Islamic past. "Sovereign ideologies define established order as a rightful, a legitimate and

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<sup>217</sup> Cited in Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 58-59.

<sup>218</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 165.

<sup>219</sup> İsmail Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi / Metinler-Kişiler II* (İstanbul: Kitapevi Yayınları, 1997), 366.

<sup>220</sup> Selim Deringil, *Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 174.

an ethic order that must last forever. Revolutionary ideologies, on the other hand, declare the established order as illegitimate.”<sup>221</sup> Kasaba says that,

“The core policy makers and ideologues who gathered around Atatürk after the purges of 1925 repeatedly stated that Turkey’s social, economic, and social problems were caused by the continuing influence of pre-republican political, economical, and social institutions and attitudes. In order to be a serious competitor in the modern world, Turks had to free themselves from this burden and make a clean start by cutting their ties to their recent (i.e., Ottoman) history”. According to them, anything that was newly attained, acquired, adopted or built was naturally desirable and superior to everything that was inherited from the past hence “old”<sup>222</sup>

As the text says, dynasty under the cloak of the caliphate will be an even more effective threat to the existence of Turkey, therefore it was illegitimate. The cultural and historical meaning of the abolition of caliphate had greater significance than its visible political aim. It meant the victory of a secularist-modernist group against a religious-conservative one in the nineteenth century.

This struggle that had been continuing since the beginning of the nineteenth century, victory could be possible only in the appropriate political situation led by the secularist-modernist group between the years 1920-1924, a period which would never repeat again.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> İsmail Kaplan, *Türkiye’de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 13.

<sup>222</sup> Reşat Kasaba, “Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities”, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997): 17.

<sup>223</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Türk Demokrasi Tarihi* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011a), 43.

### 3.4. Secularization of Religious Institutions

Weber defines two types of rationality; first one is called substantive rationality in which actions (means) are appropriate to values (ends), and second one is characteristic of modern paradigm and called instrumental rationality in which values (ends) are appropriate to actions (means). Instrumental rationality implied that experimental scientific findings must be suitable to religious values and provisions.<sup>224</sup> The *reasonable* means the legitimate point that *norm* and *reason* can meet. Therefore, once the *reasonable* ground is lost, then it would inevitably end up with the victory of *reason* upon *norm*. Once the normative structure of religion dispersed, then the binding values would be replaced with the pragmatism, i.e., the instrumental rationalism.<sup>225</sup>

In nineteenth century, modernization process, in Islamic world, was carried out pragmatically and autocratically by political elites without depending on Islamic world view and making preparations. Ottoman imperial bureaucracy tried to transform *de facto* decisions into *de jure* ones by using old formula that "a priori reform, a posteriori legitimation" through *Ulema*. However, in traditional world, there was a reasonable gap between *de jure* and *de facto* decisions, now bureaucracy exceeded this *reasonable* gap by bypassing *Ulema*. Thus, *Ulema* lost its ability to resolve this legitimacy gap.<sup>226</sup>

Two additional reforms, which were related to the *Ulema*, complementing the abolition of caliphate were issued in 1924: abolition of the Ministry of Sheriah and Waqfs and unification of education under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The first one included the dissolution

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<sup>224</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 313-314.

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, 315.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

of the office of *Şeyhülislam* to be replaced by the PRA It was located under the control of state. "This shows that the transformation of Islamic political perception from Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey changed the source of Power from *Caliphate* to *State*."<sup>227</sup>

The institution of *Şeyhülislam* was responsible for all schools, courts, waqfs and municipal activities until the middle of nineteenth century. The Ministry of Sheriah and Waqfs in the period of 1920-1924 was responsible for religious services, Madrasahs, dervish lodges, and waqfs and even if it had less power when it was compared with the previous religious institution, *Şeyhülislam*.<sup>228</sup>

### **3.4.1. Presidency of Religious Affairs**

The mission of PRA which was replaced with previous religious institution can be summarized that it is not the highest spiritual institution; the President of Religious Affairs is not a spiritual leader. This institution has no right to accept a certain doctrine, sect, dogma or cult and to force people to fallow them. It cannot interpret the Islam, it cannot interpret the state laws in terms of religion, its duty to provide Muslims free atmosphere for their rituals. The Presidency cannot accept donation from anyone or any other institutions, it can publish correct religious books. This institution arranges Ramadan, Sacrifice and other activities according to scientific data taken from meteorological station. It cannot make any interpretation in the field of law.<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair*, 35.

<sup>228</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 62.

<sup>229</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 535.



PRA is not divine authority but a representative of orthodox interpretation of Islam for people who lives in Turkey.<sup>230</sup> According to 1924 constitution, responsibility of PRA is to carry out the affairs about faith and worship and manage the mosques. In 1931, management of mosques and temples was transferred to directorate of Waqfs and therefore the PRA was restrained in this field.<sup>231</sup> "The bureaucratization of the *Ulema*, started by Mahmud II, had reached its logical conclusion. Islam had been made a department of state; the *Ulema* had become minor civil servants."<sup>232</sup>

### 3.4.2. Secularization of Education

The second reform that republican elite accepted in the Assembly in 3 March 1924 was the unification of all the schools under the secular homogenous administration of the Ministry of Education. Before the establishment of Republic, the need for religious officers was provided by Madrasahs in Ottoman society and it went on until the law of unification of education. In 3 March 1924, all the schools were united under the roof of the Ministry of Education and in 16 March, Minister of Education, Vası Çınar, declared the abolition of all Madrasahs.<sup>233</sup> However, the state made some attempt to provide for further training of religious personnel by establishing schools for imams and preachers and old Süleymaniye Madrasah was reconstituted as a Faculty of Divinity in the University of Istanbul. Lewis says that the new Faculty of Divinity was intended to serve as the center of a new, modernized, and scientific form of religious instruction, more appropriate to a secular, Westernized Republic.<sup>234</sup> In 1928, a committee was established to examine the problem of modernization of Islam and reform

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<sup>230</sup>Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 100-108.

<sup>231</sup>Ibid., 108-109.

<sup>232</sup>Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 413.

<sup>233</sup>İrfan Bozan, *Devlet ile Toplum Arasın Bir Okul İmam Hatip Liseleri, Bir Kurum Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2007), 11-12.

<sup>234</sup>Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 413.

issues. The report that the committee published in June 1928 says that the religion is a social institution; like other social institutions, it must meet the necessities of social life. The report continues by saying that

"It is almost impossible with the modern views of society, to expect such a reform, however much ground may be ready for it, from the working of mystic and irrational elements. Religious life, like moral and economic life, must be reformed on scientific lines that it may be in harmony with other institutions."<sup>235</sup>

The Faculty of Divinity was replaced with the Institute of Oriental Studies in 1933 after some unsuccessful attempt of reform on the Faculty of Divinity. By this way, the religious education was replaced with the religious research.<sup>236</sup> During the nine years that the Faculty of Divinity, the number of its students dropped from 284 to 20 parallel to the schools for imams and preachers that last school was closed in 1932. Because "the creation of new institutions to train experts and technicians for the military and government led to incremental shifts in the prestige of various institutions, kind of knowledge, and types of practitioners."<sup>237</sup>

Only one recommendation that 1928 committee proposed had a practical result that of the Turkification of worship. Translation of Quran and Tradition of the Prophet into Turkish were decided in the Assembly in 1932.<sup>238</sup> After the discussions about the budget of PRA, the Assembly decided to give task of the interpretation of Quran to Ahmet Hamdi Yazır, translation of Quran to Mehmed Akif Ersoy and the translation of Buhari Hadith to Ahmet Naim. But Akif rejected this responsibility after awhile

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid., 414.

<sup>236</sup> Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 25.

<sup>237</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 32.

<sup>238</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 415.

because of some reasons by leaving the translation to Ahmet Hamdi Yazır.”<sup>239</sup>

This education reform was something which would directly influence the social and cultural setting of the future Turkish society. Berkes explains the significance of this reform by saying that among the various aspects of social life that felt, with particular intensity the impact of the secularization of government, of the family institution and certain cultural practices, was education. Kemalist secularization of education followed a course diametrically opposed to that favored by the *Tanzimat* and, to the lesser degree, *Meşrutiyet* reforms. The guiding principle was, as in law, unification and consolidation throughout the entire educational structure. This meant the elimination of the dichotomy between the religious and the secular educational institutions and of the multiplicity in educational authority among the Muslim, non-Muslims, and foreigners. It meant, above all, the inclusion of primary education within the scope of public concern and authority and the focalization upon universal secular primary education as the basic education policy.<sup>240</sup>

#### **3.4.2.1. Secularization of Society**

In 1926, using religion as a tool of politics, opening religious school, criticizing of praising state or state institutions in the context of religion were forbidden. *Fes* (Ottoman hat) was a symbol through which people connected themselves with the society, history and their ancestors. *Fes* and the clothes were the signs of connection to Muslim society and its moral values. Atatürk, in 1926, declared the new way of clothing in Kastamonu and İnebolu by

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<sup>239</sup>Dücanecüendioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: Kitapevi Yayınları, 1998), 53-65.

<sup>240</sup>Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 476.

forbidding old way of religious clothing.<sup>241</sup> "Sufi orders were prominent and widespread in the Ottoman Empire but were officially banned by the new republican state in 1925, and it has since been a punishable crime in Turkey to be involved with *Sufi* order as sheikh or as a disciple."<sup>242</sup> "The brotherhoods were dissolved and banned, their assets impounded, their convents and sanctuaries closed, their prayer meetings and ceremonies prohibited"<sup>243</sup> The reason is this radical change that "the great secularizing reforms of 1924 were directed against the *Ulema*, not the dervishes; but it soon became that it was from the dervishes, not the *Ulema*, that the most dangerous resistance to laicism would come"<sup>244</sup>

Second article of the 1924 constitution started with the "The religion of Turkish State is the religion of Islam". In 1928, RPP decided to abolish this article from constitution to make Turkey laic and modern state in constitutional and legal sense. This was the last step of separation of Islam as a religion from the state. Republican elites defined and more importantly imposed Islam as a private life phenomenon which doesn't determine the social institutions, relations and public sphere.

#### **3.4.2.2. Abolition of Arabic Scripture**

Islam was defined as private life phenomena, however, society still connected to east and its history with scripture. After a few month that second article of 1924 constitution was abolished, Arabic scripture was abolished and Latin scripture was accepted.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>241</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 266-269.

<sup>242</sup> Cited in Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 65.

<sup>243</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 411.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, 409.

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.*, 275-276.

But the basic purpose of the change was not so much practical and pedagogical, as social and cultural and Mustafa Kemal, in forcing his people to accept it, was slamming a door on the past as well as opening a door to the future.

The way was not now incorporation of Turkey into the civilization of the modern West.<sup>246</sup> In Lewis words:

“The new script was officially adopted in November 1928, and the old Arabic script outlawed from the New Year. The erection of this great barrier against to past obviously created a new and unprecedented opportunity for linguistic reform and from the first there seems to have been a clear intention of exploiting it. (...) In 1932, on a directive from Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Linguistic Society was founded. (...) In September 1932 the first Turkish Language Congress assembled in the Dolmabahçe palace. (...) The society’s main task was the simplification and purification of the Turkish language. (...) The first task was the completion of a process already begun by earlier literary reformers- the reduction and eventual elimination of the Arabic and Persian grammatical and syntactical forms, many of which still remained embedded in Turkish literary usage. This was followed by the assault on the Arabic and Persian vocabulary itself. For more than 1000 years the Turks had been a Muslim people, sharing in the common Islamic civilization of the Middle East. Arabic and Persian had been their classical languages, and had made a contribution to their vocabulary. The radicals of the Linguistic Society were opposed to Arabic and Persian words as such, even those that formed an essential part of the basic vocabulary of everyday spoken Turkish. On the one hand, the Society prepared and published an index of alien words, condemned

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<sup>246</sup> Ibid., 279.

to deportation; on the other search parties collected and examined purely Turkish words, from dialect, from other Turkic languages, and from ancient texts, to serve as replacements. When no suitable words could be discovered, resuscitated, or imported, new ones were invented... The attempt of the reformers to strip away the accretions of 1000 years of cultural growth seemed at times to bring impoverishment rather than purity."<sup>247</sup>

A new world requires a new discourse, and a new discourse requires a new language. Therefore, Republican elites aimed to simplify the current language to generalize the press.<sup>248</sup> Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, who is the poet of Turkism in the period of II *Meşrutiyet*, said in his one of the articles published in the journal of *Türk Yurdu* that "without nationalism, nation cannot exist, without nation, happiness cannot exist, without language, nation cannot exist".<sup>249</sup>

### **3.5. Nationalism**

The main characteristic of Turkish nationalism which gave direction to modernization of Ottoman Empire and Republic of Turkey was the survival of the state. In this point of view, unlike West, the state was emphasized more than the nation in Turkish secularization. The thing that differentiates the Westernist nations from the historical ones, as Benedict Anderson states, was that the Westernist nations were imagined.<sup>250</sup> Therefore, the focus of Turkish modernization was not the imagined nation but the state as a legal entity.<sup>251</sup> Gökalp defines the nation in 1923 as

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<sup>247</sup> Ibid., 433-434.

<sup>248</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 354.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid., 483-484.

<sup>250</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London & New York: Verso, 2006).

<sup>251</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 789.

“Nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political or voluntary group or association. Nation is a group composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in language, religion, morality, and aesthetics.”<sup>252</sup>

Panturkist movements, as the root of Turkish nationalism, at first, mainly cultural, then more and more political, came to Turkey from Russia with the leadership of Tatar intellectuals, led by Crimean Ismail Gasprinski.<sup>253</sup> However, after the Treaty of Lausanne, Mustafa Kemal gave up all the foreign hopes like panturkism or panislamism purposefully and restrained his acts in the borders defined as *Misak-ı Milli* (National Borders).<sup>254</sup> Therefore, Turkish nationalism was not cross-border concept in Republican period. The ruling elites planned to use the Turkish nationalism in transition of society from *ummah* to the *nation* or from *subject of the Sultan* to *citizens*. “By the help of secularism, the nationalism was re-defined free from Ottoman-Islamic past.”<sup>255</sup> In order to define the concept of nationalism free from Islamic past, Turkish intellectuals and ruling elites, especially Ziya Gökalp, who was affected by Westernist-Orientalist sources written about pre-Islamic history of Turks, tried to construct an understanding of Turkish nationalism.

Lewis summarizes the characteristics of Turkish nationalism which is free from Islamic past and the source of these characteristics by saying that

“One of the most important sources of the Turkish nationalism was the new European science of Turcology. From the eighteenth century onwards series of Orientalists, working from Chinese and Islamic sources, had studied the history and language

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<sup>252</sup> Cited in Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 323.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, 348-349.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 255.

<sup>255</sup> Karpaz, *Ortadoğu’da Milliyet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik*, 15.

of the eastern and pre-Islamic Turks. As a result of their work, a new picture emerged of the role of the Turkish peoples in the history of Asia and Europe, and the new light was thrown on the hitherto obscure history of the Turks before they entered Islam. In time this new knowledge of a forgotten and rejected chapter in their history reached the Turks themselves, and helped to accomplish a great change in the way they conceived their corporate identity, their relations with other groups past and present, and their place in the two fundamental visions of the human predicament, the historical and the philosophical."<sup>256</sup>

In order to realize it, Kemalist secular elites tried to nationalize Islam in 1932. Quran was translated and published from French to Turkish in 1924 by Cemil Said, and "even if this translation was criticized and denied by Presidency for Religious Affairs"<sup>257</sup> it was read in mosques in 1932's Ramadan with the Turkish sermon and call of prayer. In Lewis words,

"On 30 January 1932 the cry "God is great" resounded from the minarets of Santa Sophia, for the first time, in Turkish, and shortly afterwards a version of the call, in "pure" Turkish, was prepared by the Linguistic Society and published by the Presidency of Religious Affairs. A Turkish melody was ordered from the Conservatory in Ankara. Muezzins all over Turkey were instructed in the new version, and an order issued early in 1933 superseded, though without actually banning, the call to prayer in Arabic. It seems that this one act of government interference in the ritual caused more widespread popular resentment than any of the other secularist measures."<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>256</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 345.

<sup>257</sup> Düccane Cündiođlu, *Sözlü Kültürden Yazılı Kültüre Anlamın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları, 2011), 258.

<sup>258</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 416.



Republican elites attempted to transform Islam and change the Islamic way of life by depending on secularist way of life and this attempt contained until the multiparty period of Turkey. Republican elites couldn't understand the function of Islam in Turkish society therefore they thought that they could easily transform the society into a new form without taking Islam into account.<sup>259</sup>

The effects of religion on personal behaviors are the subject of ethics; on the other hand effects of religion on social institution are the subject of politics.<sup>260</sup> Sovereignty of Islam in political, social and cultural fields throughout the centuries in Ottoman Empire was changed with the positivist ideology called Kemalism. As the official ideology of the state, Kemalism excluded Islam from social, political and cultural life.<sup>261</sup>

Modern nation state building process requests three elements: one language, one nation and one religion. By taking into account of German experience, Republican elites tried to form a national religion as well as a language and a nation.

### **3.6. National Religion**

Scientific results are determined by the conceptual and the methodological assumptions. A text is shaped by its society, and the society is shaped by its text, therefore, that text must be evaluated in the context of history.<sup>262</sup> The theology, as the legitimacy tool of traditional world, became the ideology as the transformation tool of modern world. In Marxist sense, ideologies are the intellectual tools entailing the super structural change. In

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<sup>259</sup> Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, 145.

<sup>260</sup> Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 235.

<sup>261</sup> Ocak, *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam*, 104.

<sup>262</sup> Skirbekk & Gilije, *Felsefe Tarihi*, 14.

nineteenth century, two ways of transformation method emerged: ideologies for rigid transformation and sociology for smooth one. The target of sociology is to explain dynamics of super structure to realize the smooth transformation.<sup>263</sup> Republican elites tried to implement sociological transformation through nationalization of religion by the effects of Comte's positivism instead of rigid revolutionary transformation.

Nationalization of Islam was an attempt to imitate German experience at the beginning of the Republic. There were two steps of nationalization of Islam; first, Turkification of Prayers and second, the translation of Quran from Arabic to Turkish. Because, Martin Luther wanted to pray in German and he translated Bible from Latin to German. This translation, later, became most important factor of nation building process of Germany. After breaking down of the sovereignty of Latin and the sovereignty of Clergy class, political and religious power of Rome (Catholic Church) was abolished. In Islamic world, each step for this process was equal to Arabic language, *Ulema* and caliphate. As a matter of fact, these steps were followed by Republican elites, before nationalization of Islam, Arabic language and *Ulema* were eliminated and then caliphate was abolished.<sup>264</sup>

The theologians like Luther and Calvin tried to reform Christianity from inside to overcome the problem of theodicy that emerged with the scientific revolution as stated in the first chapter. This was insufficient and therefore was completed by the philosophers of the Enlightenment through interpreting Christianity from the outside. Hume destroyed the last ground between the philosophy and the theology.<sup>265</sup> Therefore the Renaissance was the process of transformation of secular philosophy to secular ideology to overcome the problem of theodicy emerged with the lost of divine wisdom in

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<sup>263</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 179-180.

<sup>264</sup> Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair*, 35.

<sup>265</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 218.

Christianity. Secularism is a meta-ideology and the ideologies like socialism as a project of society are para-ideologies which depend on secularism. Universalization of secularism requires privatization of religions as a dialectic process. Therefore, the religions turned out to be modern (protestant) religions by joining to modernization process or they turned out to be ideologies to survive in secular age.<sup>266</sup> The process of nationalization of religion in Turkey at the beginning of Republican period was an attempt of privatization of Islam. According to Gökalp, the reform in religion means that religion must be located in conscious by eliminating it in social life at first and then secondly religion laws must be separated from worldly laws. First job belongs to the PRA and second job belongs to politics. Only by this way, religion can be a synthesizer of social culture.<sup>267</sup>

### **3.6.1. Attitudes of New Rising Elites toward Religion**

At the beginning of 1920s, political center needed to stand Islam's side, but later on, the political center changed its attitudes toward Islam and decided to weaken Islam's weight in the Turkish society.<sup>268</sup> First action was reasonable that if a society has an outside threat, the conflicts within the society would be postponed until this threat is gone. Mustafa Kemal and his nationalist friends repudiated the Treat of Sevres, declaring it null and void, whereupon the sultan had the *Şeyhülislam* promulgate a fatwa, declaring the nationalists rebels and that it was *fardh* (religiously incumbent) for Muslims to kill them. The nationalists countered by having the mufti of Ankara, Rifat Börekçi- subsequently the first minister of religious affairs in the republic – issue a fatwa declaring the sultan to be under the occupation that was distancing him from his duties, and that it was *fardh* for the faithful to rescue

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<sup>266</sup> Ibid., 219-222.

<sup>267</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 442-443.

<sup>268</sup> Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair*, 15.

the caliphate.<sup>269</sup> Therefore, during the war, both Mustafa Kemal and his friends hid their real thought about the religion. For instance, in 1923, a journalist Kılıçzade Hakkı and Mustafa Kemal had a conversation:

**“Kılıçzade:** Excellency, is new government going to have a religion?

**Mustafa Kemal:** Yes there is, it is Islam. Islam has no conflict with freedom.

**Kılıçzade:** Is new government going to choose a religion?

**Mustafa Kemal:** I don't know whether it will or not. There is nothing against to today's law. Nation has a religion which is Islam and nation is religionist. I mean there is no reason to deny religion in Turkey, like Communism does.”<sup>270</sup>

But Mustafa Kemal mentions about this conversation in *Nutuk* and says:

“(…) in İzmit, during the conversations with journalists, one of them asked me whether new government will have a religion or not. I have to admit that I would not want to receive this kind of question at that time because I thought that the circumstances were not ready to hear my answer yet. Therefore, I could not say: “a government can't have a religion.” Instead I said: “yes there is, it is Islam.” But I explained my answer with: “Islam has no conflict with freedom.” I meant at that time the government is bounded by freedom and only by this way it can be successful.”<sup>271</sup>

In 1912, Kılıçzade Hakkı who was representative in Parliament at third and seventh terms published an article with eighteen items in the journal of *İctihat* called “*Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku*” In this article, Kılıçzade mentioned

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<sup>269</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 57-58.

<sup>270</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kur'an ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 34.

<sup>271</sup> Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk* (İstanbul: 1934), 204-205.

forthcoming reforms which will be implemented in Republican period. For examples, "4) Women will wear whatever they want to wear and they won't be disturbed (...), 6) *Tekkes* and *Zaviyes* (Dervish lodges) which became places of unemployment and laziness will be abolished (...), 7) Madrasahs will be abolished and instead new modern colleges like Collage De France or Echol Polytechnic will be founded (...) 8) Visiting to the Tombs of Saints will be prohibited (...) 12) Khutbahs will be in Turkish language (...)"<sup>272</sup> are some items from the article that reflect the world view of new rising elites in 1912.

### **3.6.2. Discursive Change**

In Islam, legitimate authority is the authority of God, therefore the Republican perception of authority conflicts with this idea. Republican discourse on the issue of religion was a problem between God and individual, in other words, religion is a matter of conscious.<sup>273</sup> This discursive change depends on the choices that modern paradigm imposed on Republican elites. As it is stated above, universalization of secularism requires privatization of religions as a dialectic process. Therefore, the religions turned out to be modern (protestant) religions by joining to modernization process or they turned out to be ideologies to survive in secular age.

This process weakened the weight of Islam in society inevitably. Since the process of reformation in Europe, it is known that the religions have not lost its foundations but they changed their structures.<sup>274</sup>

"Much of the recent literature disputing secularization has argued that rather than simple decline in religiosity, there has been an evolution, (...) with a shift from collective forms of engagement via traditional religious

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<sup>272</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 25.

<sup>273</sup> Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 235-237.

<sup>274</sup> Özdalga, *İslamcılığın Türkiye Seyri, Sosyolojik Bir Perspektif*, 61.

institutions toward individual or personal spirituality exercised in the private sphere.<sup>275</sup>

### **3.6.3. Nation State Process**

Ekber explains that the Anthropologists differentiate two types of social changes. There are conflicts which prepare grounds for social change at first. If this change doesn't affect the social order and its value system, then it doesn't affect the social institutions either, therefore the structure of social system remains same after a short period of ambiguity. Emergence of conflicts and ambiguity after a death of king is an example of this type of social change. In this type, people in the social positions change but the social institutions remain same. Second type of social change is more radical. It changes the essence of social system and its institutions. In this type of change, social value system cannot legitimize the new structure and therefore the new circumstances force society to accommodate or adjust its value system to the new circumstances to overcome the legitimacy crisis and the identity crisis emerged with it.<sup>276</sup> The process of emergence of nation state is the second type of change occurred in Turkey; therefore the nationalization of Islam was inevitable result of this process. The Republican elites had to transform Islam from a religion which was a legitimizing tool of an empire to a religion which can fit to the nation state, because, nation building process entails a national language and a national religion.

As Gencer says that the secularization in Turkey was realized as an inevitable consequence of historical process toward nation state. The concepts of nation and state are the main dynamics of universal secularization. Throughout the history, ethnic communities like tribes, clans

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<sup>275</sup> Inglehart & Norris, *Sacred and Secular*, 40.

<sup>276</sup> Ekber, *İslam Antropolojisi*, 88-89.

or nations were established by sense of commitment, or Ibn Khaldunian term, by *nesep asabiyet*. However, higher societies like empires or federations were established around the secondary terms like religion or civilization, or Ibn Khaldunian term, *sebeb asabiyet*. Secularization means the transformation of *sebeb asabiyet* (religious commitment) to *nesep asabiyet* (ethnic commitment) by destruction of *sebeb asabiyet*.<sup>277</sup>

Therefore, Republican elite thought only way of modernization is to imitate the Western modernization process. Civilization for independency, modernization for civilization, nationalization for modernization and lastly secularization for nationalization are the steps that Republican elites designed for this transformation from *sebeb asabiyet* to *nesep asabiyet*.<sup>278</sup> In order to build a nation, they decided to transform Islam into a national religion. By this way, the legitimacy source of behaviors would be transformed from *holy* to *reason*. Ziya Gökalp was aware of this transformation. This awareness can be understood from his interpretation of moral depression in the society. He claims that the reason of moral depression is the reduction of the effects of religion in society.

But the solution is not to increase religious education. The society which takes its morality from religious commandments and prohibitions depends on asceticism but modern society is different. In modern period, the source of morality is not the religion. Turkish society is in the process of transformation from empire to nation state. Old moral values can't legitimize the new condition any more.<sup>279</sup> Therefore, as Gökalp says, old moral values must be transformed into a new form in which modernism can be legitimized.

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<sup>277</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 786.

<sup>278</sup> Gencer, "Türkiye'de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri", 159.

<sup>279</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 455-456.

### 3.6.4. New Perception of Islam

Berkes says that the starting point of Mustafa Kemal was *Mesrutiyet* perception of Islam that "Islam is a rational religion". This assumption resulted from the reactions of Muslim intellectuals after the Renan's insult in 1883. This cultural attack to Turkic Islam by Western intellectuals, as stated above, revealed two types of reaction in Ottoman Empire. Firstly, Muslims scholars and intellectuals published refusals by undertaking a defensive, an apologetic attitude. Secondly, Muslim scholars, in long term, re-interpreted Islamic sources to show that Islam is not an obstacle to scientific progress but Islam is a rational religion.<sup>280</sup>

Human subject cannot see the historical sources objectively by jumping beyond the history in the context of the period of time in which he lives. The proposition that Islam is a rational religion is problematic. Evaluation of dogmatic text objectively by reasoning is impossible. If Quran is interpreted by reasoning as a text which is independent of time, then human reasoning is going to be transformed to a myth through entering to the field of Logos. Therefore, religion is going to lose its validity. In this regard, the problem of theodicy is going to be seen as the problem of belief and faith.<sup>281</sup>

This paradigm shift can be understood from the transformation of meaning of *reform* from traditional world to modern world. *Reform*, in traditional period, meant the restorations of religious rules which lost their originalities. In other words, reform meant re-establishment of traditional order which was corrupted by innovations. However, with modernization process, the concept of reform changed by obtaining opposite meaning. After

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<sup>280</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 360-361.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, 495-497.



the *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* period, *reform* started to mean establishment of innovations in social, economical and political institutions.<sup>282</sup> Therefore, reforms on Islam meant modernization of Islam in nineteenth century to show that Islam is a rational religion. In other words, reformist Islam was an ideological attempt to reconcile Islamic principles with modernization.<sup>283</sup>

In this regard, Mustafa Kemal reached two conclusions from this assumption that Islam can be a rational religion but it can be transformed a political tool of exploitation. Second, if Islam is a rational religion, how come its believers cannot understand its holy book?

Problem is the problem of language, history and culture. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal discussed the language issue and requested the translation of Quran.<sup>284</sup> What was aimed with the translation of Quran was to imitate the reformation process occurred in Europe. As stated above, Luther wanted to worship in German and therefore he translated Bible from Latin to German. After this translation, a German literature and a German nation were born.

The sovereignty of Latin and sovereignty of Clergy class were broken, therefore religious and political authority of Pope was abolished. Those improvements were equal to Arabic, *Ulema* and Caliphate in Islamic world.<sup>285</sup>

Therefore, Arabic, *Ulema* and Caliphate were abolished before the declaration of discourse on the nationalization of Islam released.

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<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 378.

<sup>283</sup> Haldun Güllalp, "Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997): 47.

<sup>284</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 541-542

<sup>285</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kur'an ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 67.

### 3.6.4.1. New Perception of Political Power

The transformation of religion began with the change in source of political power. A parliamentarian Ahmet Mahir made a speech in 1925 about the translation of Quran by saying

“I want you to accept the proposal given about the translation of Quran. Because we have the verse written above all and it justifies this is Muslim Parliament. Nobody can act against to Parliament. The meaning of the verse is that “Their affairs are (determined) by shura among them.” Thanks God, we gathered here as Araps, Kurts, Georgians, Albanians...”<sup>286</sup>

“It is significant that prominently displayed at the front of the room during the first Chamber of Deputies was a large framed inscription reading: “*Ve emruhum şura beynehum*” (Their affairs are (determined) by shura among them).”<sup>287</sup> This example shows that the transformation from Empire to nation state, Islamic way of thinking about political power was transformed from caliphate to state. Because the bill of abolition of caliphate stated above also shows that new republican state is justifying is abolition of the caliphate is not that religion is not important or that the new republican state wishes to distance itself from Islam.

On the contrary, the republican state is justifying its abolition of the caliphate on grounds that functions of the caliphate are now carried out by the new government itself.<sup>288</sup> “It is crucial that the abolition of the caliphate

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<sup>286</sup> Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair*, 43.

<sup>287</sup> Silverstein, *Islam and Modernity in Turkey*, 63.

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

and the situating of sovereignty solely in the hands of the Grand National Assembly were done internally to Islamic reasoning”<sup>289</sup>

### **3.6.4.2. Turkification of Prayer and Translation of Quran**

Turkification of prayers, as a second step of the transformation of the religious perception, was an uncompleted project that was planned and implemented by Mustafa Kemal and the political government. Mustafa Kemal, in 1933, in Bursa, said that “The characteristic of Turkish language is going to be sovereign in all fields of life.”<sup>290</sup>

The project emerged as a result of the process of becoming a nation that Turkish nation needed to read its own holy book in its own language and therefore, it needed a national religion. The essence of Turkification of prayers and translation of Quran was to create a new form of Islam which was convenient to new Turkish nation state and to the new modern paradigm. Basic logic behind the all attempts of Turkification of prayers and the translation of Quran was to create unique Turkish form of Islam. As a matter of fact that İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu’s answer given to *Milli Mecmua* in 15 May 1928 shows this logic. “As a result, Turkification of Islam is necessary”<sup>291</sup>

“The demands for translation of Quran from Arabic to Turkish begun with that Turkism occupied the public sphere after the *II Meşrutiyet*.”<sup>292</sup> It can be understood from the Ziya Gökalp’s poetry, *Vatan* (Homeland), that the religion reforms in the period of Republic was rooted in the period of *II Meşrutiyet*.

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<sup>289</sup> Ibid., 62-63.

<sup>290</sup> Gothard Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye’de İslamlik*, trans. Hayrullah Örs (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1972), 43.

<sup>291</sup> Cited in Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 33-35.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid., 22.

"A land where the call to prayer from the mosques is recited in Turkish

Where the peasant understands the meaning of the prayer in his worship,

A land where in the schools the Quran is read in Turkish,

Where, big and little, everyone knows the command of God

This, O son of the Turks, is your fatherland."<sup>293</sup>

First attempt came from a writer, Ibrahim Hilmi, that he hired a Syrian-Christian named Zeki Mağnemiz to translate Quran from Arabic to Turkish. In 1914, five forms<sup>294</sup> of the book were published. Whole book was published in 1926 by İbrahim Hilmi.<sup>295</sup> As it is seen the translations of Quran emerged as direct consequence of nationalization process and after awhile the state wanted to implement the thesis of national religion.<sup>296</sup>

Application of nationalization of Religion started with "the year of 1928, it was the first year of constructing new republican ideology and culture; the abolishment of the statement: "The religion of Turkish State is Islam" from the 1924 Constitution, the replacement of Arabic alphabet with Latin one, the foundation of the Independence courts, the suppression of oppositions etc... are the preparatory steps for nationalization of Religion. In 1932, the process of Turkification of Prayers, as the most important step of nationalization of religion, was started and then Turkish Language Association and Turkish History Association were founded to shape language and history according to necessities of new Republic."<sup>297</sup> As stated above after the Treaty of Lausanne, Mustafa Kemal gave up all the foreign hopes

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<sup>293</sup> Cited in Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 415.

<sup>294</sup> 16x5 pages

<sup>295</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 27-28.

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>297</sup> Cündioğlu, *Tarih ve Siyasete Dair*, 34.

like panturkism or panislamism purposefully and restrained his acts in the borders defined as *Misak-I Milli* (National Borders).<sup>298</sup> Therefore the emergence of Turkism coincides with the period of the emergence of discussions about the Turkification of prayers.<sup>299</sup>

### 3.6.5 Manifesto on Reformation of Religion

In 1928, a journal named *Son Posta* published an explanatory document named Manifesto on Reformation of Religion written by the committee formed by Professors of the Faculty of Divinity led by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu. The recommendations of the committee were grouped under four headings. The first, "the form of worship", speaks of the need for clean and orderly mosques, with pews and cloakrooms. "People must be urged to enter into them with clean shoes." The second, on "the language of worship", insists that this must be Turkish, and that all prayers and sermons should not be in Arabic but in the national language. The third, on "the character of worship", seeks to make worship beautiful, inspiring, and spiritual. For this the mosque needs trained musicians and also musical instruments. "The need is urgent for modern and sacred instrumental music." The fourth, sermons must be replaced by real religious guidance, which only preachers with the necessary philosophic training would be competent to give."<sup>300</sup>

Prof. Mehmed Fuat Köprülü, head of the commission, said about the Manifesto on Reformation of Religion that "the purpose of the religious reforms is to harmonize religion with all other parts of the development process."<sup>301</sup> This document shows obvious separation from traditional

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<sup>298</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 255.

<sup>299</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 22.

<sup>300</sup> Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 413-414.

<sup>301</sup> Cited in Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık*, 42.

perception of Ottoman Islam. Existence of music, benches and necessity of entering the temples with clean shoes shows that new form of Islam is going to have Christianic features. Kara says that the perception of laicism in Republican ideology is not just separation of religion from politics and state issues but rather it is secularization of religion.<sup>302</sup> This also shows that the world view of new Republican elites had an assumption that (as Renan claimed) Islam and the old tradition inherited from Ottoman and shaped by Ottoman perception of religion was the reason which prevented scientific improvements and formation of nation state. Therefore, Ziya Gökalp, in this perspective, says that Muslims disregarded modern innovations and therefore they were not able to interpret Islam under the necessities of the modern era. Secondly, Muslim societies were established based on religious law and culture. When this ground was destructed by modern rational thoughts, Muslims could not form their national culture and identity.<sup>303</sup>

### **3.6.6. National Muslimism**

After Manifesto on Reformation of Religion, Republican elites continued to form a national religion. Reşit Galip<sup>304</sup> proposed a thesis in 1932 named National Muslimism in which he tried to prove Prophet Muhammad was Turk. Main claim of the thesis was to justify Turkification Process is that people have to understand what their holy book says to them. Ziya Gökalp's ideas on national religion, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu's Turkification of İslam and Reşit Galip's National Muslimism are the steps for the project of Turkification of Prayers. In 24<sup>th</sup> January 1932 Turkish Quran reading rehearsals began with Hafız Burhan at 12:00 in Beyoğlu Aynalı Çeşme Kamer Hatun Moaque, Hafız Kemal at 14:00 in Suleymaniye Mosque, Hafız Yaşar at 15:00 Aksaray Taşkapı Selçuk Sultan Mosque. In those reading sessions,

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<sup>302</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 80.

<sup>303</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 414-415.

<sup>304</sup> Minister of Education in 1932.

Cemil Said's Quran translations was used. Cemil Said translated Quran from French to Turkish in 1924.<sup>305</sup>

### **3.6.7. Turkification of Khutbahs**

Ataturk made a speech in *Balıkesir Paşa Camii* in 7 February 1923 and said "(...) Khutbahs must and will be compatible with Turkish language and necessities of our time."<sup>306</sup> Khutbahs started to be read in the name of Government of Republic and nation of Islam after the last caliphate Abdülmecit Efendi was expelled from the country. In 23 February 1925, some members of parliament requested for acceptance of Turkish Khutbahs.<sup>307</sup> Turkification of Khutbahs was discussed for a long time in the Assembly during the negotiation of the budget about the Presidency of Religious Affairs and as a result, the Assembly agreed to fund it. In 17 February 1927, the Presidency of Religious affairs published the requested book named *Türkçe Hutbe*.<sup>308</sup> First Turkish Khutbah was read in Suleymaniye Mosque in 5<sup>th</sup> February 1932 by Hafız Saadettin. Three days later, in celebration (*Bayram*) Prayer, all *tekbirs* were in Turkish in all mosques of Turkey.<sup>309</sup>

#### **3.6.7.1. Rationalization in Khutbahs**

Islam in Ottoman Empire was not only the source of political principles and legitimacy but also the source of tools for governors to organize the relationships in those lands. This doesn't mean that Ottoman Empire was a theocracy. Berkes explains that Ottoman Empire was not a Caliph-Sultan reign. In contrast to theocracy, in Ottoman Empire, the state issues come

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<sup>305</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 83-84.

<sup>306</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 48.

<sup>307</sup> Jaschke, *Yeni Türkiye'de İslamlık*, 44.

<sup>308</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 64.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid.*, 92-94.

first before the religion issues. *Ulema* was servant of the state as jurist, teacher and propagandist. *Ulema* was not a clergy class (at least theologically not socially). At the top of *Ulema*, there are two important positions named *Kazasker* and *Şeyülislam*. First one is responsible for justice and second one is responsible for legitimizing state issues according to religion. Ottoman Empire was not an Islamic State and it never became in its history.<sup>310</sup> In Islamic world, there has been an autonomous political field all the time. The autonomy of this field was affirmed by traditionalists but denied by Islamists.<sup>311</sup>

The perception of Islam in modern Turkey was completely different that Islam was pushed away from the public sphere to private life. Instead of Islam, the regime was source of legitimacy, Kemalism was providing political principles and lastly nationalism and secularism were the tools to organize the relationships in Turkey. There was no need Islam as a political instrument, but Atatürk was well aware of the fact that human being cannot live without believing in a religion. Therefore he tried to create a new form of Islam in which Islam was rationalized. This was actually an inevitable action that Ruling elites had to take. Behaviors of individuals depend on the way of thinking and the way of thinking depends on the paradigm determined by the belief system and sovereign scientific understanding of that age. The belief system implies the principles of faith and the way of perceiving those principles. All the basic principles are same in all Abrahamic religions but the applications of those principles, i.e., laws, differ from religion to religion. The periods of the fast social transformations like modern period make imitative faith insufficient for continuity of communal identity; therefore the belief system is revised for the emergence of substantive faith. The

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<sup>310</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma*, 26-27.

<sup>311</sup> Oliver Roy, *Siyasal İslam’ın İflası*, trans. Cünet Akalın, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995), 33.



substantiative faith became necessary for everybody in modern period.<sup>312</sup> Therefore, the rationalization or modernization of Islam was necessary because of the paradigm shift.

This rationalization can be seen in the titles of Khutbahs prepared by the Presidency of Religious Affairs in 1927 by the directive of Atatürk: "Working Hard, Defense of Homeland, Health and Hygiene, Help for Turkish Air Lines, Everybody is consented with his own income, Importance of Effort, Importance of Action, Commerce, Art, Agriculture, Honor of Military, Relationships Between Man and Wife... etc"<sup>313</sup> In the introduction part of the book, Rıfat Börekçi says that "There will be homily part of khutbah and in this part people will be told about the secular or the divine necessities of the day in addition to morality and orders of Islam. Then, in which language those khutbahs must be read to fulfill those tasks?" After asking this question, Börekçi gives an answer: "The Muslims who don't know Arabic cannot understand the homily part of it. Therefore, although pray part of khutbahs is going to be in Arabic, homily part is going to be in Turkish. Also the Hadith and Quran verses are going to be explained in Turkish."<sup>314</sup>

The more examples for the rationalization of the religion can be seen in another book named *Yeni Hutbelerim* written by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki<sup>315</sup> in 1936. In his book, Akseki focused on the social issues through khutbahs in accordance with humanistic point of view. Some of the titles of the khutbahs were like; "Help for Orphans, Respect to Each Other, Drinking as the Head of Evils, Social Harms of Drinking, Benefits of Planting Tree, Brotherhood, Bad Habits, Suicide, Equality and Justice, Love of Homeland, Military as a

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<sup>312</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 753.

<sup>313</sup> Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kuran ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi*, 64.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 52-53.

<sup>315</sup> The Third President of Religious Affairs between 1947-1951 and Vice President between 1939-1947.

Honorable Duty, The Virtue of Martyrdom, The Virtue of Courage, Defense of Homeland, Family, Marriage, Diseases, Abortion... etc.”

And the content of the khutbahs showed that the religious advices are important as long as they have social benefits. For instance, in a khutbah about the “Drinking”, Akseki says that “Drink is not a food or medicine. It is a disaster which leads drinkers to mental hospitals, prisons or graves.”<sup>316</sup> Then he explains how drinking is harmful to health. Another example of khutbah is about the “The Morality of the Prophet”; Akseki says that “Our prophet’s words and behaviors were *reasonable*. He never lied in his entire life; he never made fun of anybody; he was not jealous at all; he never spied on people; he never made empty talk; never sulked to people and he always forgave guilty people... etc. Our prophet said that the biggest prayer was reconciling people and helping someone is an action which is superior to two moth’s prayer<sup>317</sup>. Then Akseki explains how the prophet worked in his business (trade) so hard without being rude to his wife and his children.

According to Şemsenttin Günaltay, Mysticism which made Muslims lazy and therefore problem is not in Islam but mystic teachings. Those teachings came from Hinduism, Buddhism and Brahmanism to Islam. Islam is reasonable religion and there is nothing against to rationalism in Islam.<sup>318</sup>

Those examples shows that the new republican ideology wanted the religion to be the rational and therefore the ideology put forward the rational side of Islam in order to re-define Islam according to its social benefits.

The elimination of religious institution inherited from Ottoman Empire, the translations of Quran from Arabic to Turkish, the process of

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<sup>316</sup> Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, *Yeni Hutbelerim* (Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınevi, 1936), 54.

<sup>317</sup> Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 72.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, 429.

nationalization of religion stated above are related to the emergence of Protestantism in Europe, especially in Germany. The context of Islam that Republican ideology re-defined can be associated with the characteristics of Protestantism that Weber exhibited.

In the Protestant ethic, as Weber explains, money and property are disconfirmed because they make man forget about God. "Wealth as such is a great danger; its temptations never end, and its pursuit is not only senseless as compared with the dominating importance of the Kingdom of God, but is morally suspect."<sup>319</sup> Wasting time is the greatest sin; therefore a Christian must be more diligent than a secular. "Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins."<sup>320</sup> The purpose of having sex is to have children not pleasure. "For sexual intercourse, even within marriage, is permitted only as the means willed by God for the increase of His Glory according to the commandment, "Be fruitful and multiply."<sup>321</sup> If a Christian is reluctant to work then he must be suspicious that God blessed him. "Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack the glory of God."<sup>322</sup> Working is like worship to God; Christians praise the name of God with working hard. "Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God."<sup>323</sup> "(...) a fate to which he must submit and which he must make the best of, but God's commandment to the individual to work for divine glory."<sup>324</sup> "You may labour to be rich for God, through not for the flesh and sin (...) Wealth is thus bad ethically only in so far it is a temptation to idleness and sinful enjoyment of life, and its acquisition is bad "<sup>325</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and The Sprit of Capitalism* (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), 103.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

Wasting time, laziness, entertainment, importance of effort, importance of diligence and actions, saving money are some of the titles that both Protestantism and rational Islam emphasised as stated above. Protestantism is the product of a rational design of life; a different world view<sup>326</sup> so does new Islam in Turkey. It was necessary, according to Weber's main thesis, to create a suitable atmosphere for contemporary economical relations. What was important was adaptation of social ethos to this new economical circumstance. This was the main reason behind all applications upon institutions of religion since *Tanzimat*. "The change between the present and the past is not primarily in greater love of money in the present. (...) The difference is psychological or more precisely formulated, it is found in a new "ethos" of money-making."<sup>327</sup>

### **3.7. Islamist Contribution to Rational Islam**

Quran was perceived by Islamists and Republican elites in similar way. The importance of Islamist interpretation is that they affected the contemporary scholars and the officers of PRA in modern Turkey. For examples, İsmail Fenni Ertuğrul tried to associate Quran verses with the scientific improvements.<sup>328</sup> Ahmet Hamdi Akseki thought that first principle of Islam was *reason*, this was compulsory for having strong faith.<sup>329</sup> İsmail Hakkı İzmirli thought that forming a national religion was necessary for being a modern state. In order to make modern state possible, religion must be formed in a way that capitalism can be possible. This means that Islam must have Protestant features in Weberian means. He tried to justify this

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<sup>326</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>327</sup> Robert W. Green, *Protestantism and Capitalism* (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1959), 5-6.

<sup>328</sup> Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 174.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid., 216.

transformation from the old Islamic scholar's works. He supported Turkification of prayer in that sense.<sup>330</sup>

Weber thinks that the world view takes its real axis from religions and it is shaped by the politics, economy, geography and culture. When the world view confronts a radical change then it reflects this change on the way of interpretation of religion. Not the holy, but the interpretation of holy, and therefore the religious practices change.<sup>331</sup>

Legitimacy means the optimal gap between text and context, divine and human, universal and historical, absolute and relative, and in the history of Islam this gap was kept in optimal degree with *Müceddit* (Regenerative). In this point of view, the problem was not the text itself but the context, in other words, problem was not the religion but the ethics of human beings. Therefore, in traditional period of time, the duty of intellectuals was to interpret the text and fix the context, but in modernist intellectuals (Islamists) in modern time interpreted the context to fix the text.<sup>332</sup>

Al Ghazali had solved the problem of theodicy by conceptualizing philosophy of Shariah from the nomo-centric perspective. Same problem in contemporary world was transformed into the efforts that try to show the validity of Islam through scientific improvements.<sup>333</sup> In traditional age, Muslim scholars reconciled the Islam and the philosophy to form the traditional paradigm. However, modern Muslim scholars like Abduh and Afgani tried to harmonize Islam with modern paradigm. In this regard, religion in modern era lost its specific organic structure and turned out to be

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<sup>330</sup> Ibid., 132-135.

<sup>331</sup> Max Weber, *Sosyoloji Yazıları*, trans. Taha Parla (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004) 338-342

<sup>332</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 499.

<sup>333</sup> Ibid., 238-239.

an ideology.<sup>334</sup> Islamists, after the 1908, started to discover theories of Kant, Darwin or Laplace or knowledge of atom, electricity and germs in Quran.<sup>335</sup> For instance, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi interpreted Quran verses that verses inspire human being to improve science and technology. For an instance, the scientific improvements in medicine were inspired from the verses about the Jesus: "I cure blind people from birth; I give life to dead people with the permission of God" (Alu İmran 3/49)<sup>336</sup>

The interpretation of Quran demanded by GNAT and issued to Ahmet Hamdi Yazır followed the same path. The program which was designed by PRA for Yazır demanded scientific explanations for Quran verses.<sup>337</sup> In this regard, Yazır says that Rad/2 implies the gravity; Ala/4-5 implies the construction of coral, Yasin/80 implies the electricity, Hud/40 implies to the ferry. And also, in many other verses, he derived automobile, train and other automatic tools from Quran.<sup>338</sup>

Islamist movements emerged as modern movements in the context of sociological and political perspectives. Members were students who studied positive sciences. They found not only a religion but also an ideology in these movements. Unlike past, they wanted to reshape the society through technology.<sup>339</sup> People don't adopt or deny the religions according to intellectual reasoning but rather they adopt or deny them whether they are suitable to meet the necessities or overcome to the anxieties of daily life or not.<sup>340</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Ibid., 242.

<sup>335</sup> Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, 421.

<sup>336</sup> Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 325.

<sup>337</sup> Düccane Cündioğlu, "Tefsirde Helenizm: Bilimsel Tefsir Zaafı ve Eleştirisi", *Bilim ve Hikmet*, no. 4 (Güz, 1993): 167

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., 167.

<sup>339</sup> Roy, *Siyasal İslam'ın İflası*, 17-18.

<sup>340</sup> Brayn S. Turner, *Postmodernism, Globalism and Religion*, (London: Routledge, 1994) 9-10.

Re-interpretation of Islam depends on Muslim's perception of the Western civilization. This perception changes from degree to degree at which whether Muslims feel themselves under the attack of Western civilization or not. Therefore the historical experiences that Muslims had reflected upon their interpretation of Islam.<sup>341</sup> Islamists, in the countries under the thread of imperialism, re-read the concepts taken from Marxism and Western politics by using the terminology of Quran. Council is *Shura*, Party becomes *Hizp*, Unity is Tawhid, Proletariats is Muslim society, ignorance is *cahiliyye*, ideology is *mefkure* etc...<sup>342</sup> One of the important indications of secularization in Islamic world was the transformation of traditional ethics concepts into political ones: *Meşveret*, *Şura*, *Ulu'l emr*, *Ehlü'l-halli ve'l-akd*, *i'dad-ı kuvvet* etc. For instance, three different terms were used for the term deputy: While Abduh took the term of *Ulu'l emr* from the Quran (Nisa/59), Islamists of *II Meşrutiyet* used the term *ehlül vel akd*, Şeyülislam Mehmed Sahib used the group of words *emr-i bi'l-maruf*, *neyh-i ani'l-münker* for the term "deputy".<sup>343</sup>

Modernization of Islam is the whole intellectual quests to deal with sovereignty of West in all fields of life. The purpose of these quests is to try to re-interpret Islam as a world view and transform Islam into an ideology which is suitable to contemporary world.<sup>344</sup> "Reformist Islam was an ideological attempt to reconcile Islamic principles with Westernization."<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 306.

<sup>342</sup> Roy, *Siyasal İslam'ın İflası*, 61-62.

<sup>343</sup> İsmail Kara, *İslamcıların Siyasi Görüşleri* (İstanbul: İz yayınları, 1994), p. 39, 149, 167, 171.

<sup>344</sup> Gencer, *İslam'da Modernleşme 1839-1939*, 222.

<sup>345</sup> Gülalp, "Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey", 47.

## CONCLUSION

It is possible to evaluate the points which separate Republic of Turkey from Ottoman Empire in the context of religion. The important points that underline the relationship between the state and the religion can be summarized as: in the first period of Ottoman Westernization process; the re-interpretation of religion and the transformation of religious culture was not a primary purpose. In other words, Ottomans started the process of modernization not to reach a new contemporary interpretation of Islam but in order to save the state from destruction. At this stage in question is to find the religious explanations to mobilize the society and to establish a ground for taking Western science and technology. The transfer of institutions from Europe like assembly, constitution, constitutional government etc... and the transfer of important political and cultural concepts like freedom, equality, social justice, development, nation, homeland etc... had to be legitimized through religion. The reason of necessity to modernize the traditional interpretation of Islam was to provide legitimate explanations for each step of Westernization, because, "the future of Islam depends on the future of the state" caused this frame.<sup>346</sup>

The principle of laicism was put into the constitution in 1937. The re-arrangement of religion was officially completed in 1937. The council meetings in the Assembly, Minister of Foreign Relations, Şükrü Kaya's words show it. He said that "since we are deterministic in history, pragmatic materialist in practices then we need to legislation by ourselves... We do not interfere in freedom of consciousness and people's choice of religion at any level. Everybody has freedom of consciousness. Laicism means keeping religion away from the state affairs and our purpose is to prevent it happens. The frame of laicism is this for us. We say that, religion must stay in

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<sup>346</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 27.



consciousness and temples. We do not and will not let the religion intervene the state affairs."<sup>347</sup>

The history of modern Turkey is not that of a conflict between republicanism and Sultanism, nor is it a history of the strife framed by Islam and secularism. It is a complex, many-tiered encounter between "traditional" forces and modernity that have interpenetrated and been transformed over time due to their propinquity.<sup>348</sup> The modernization process brings rationalism and secularism in all layers of the society including religion. Kasaba defines modernization that it "entails, above all, the freeing of individual and communities from some of their traditional obligations."<sup>349</sup> The transformation of source of legitimacy from *holy* to *reason* at the base of societies was being called secularism or modernization in this thesis. This assumption was applied Ottoman society to explain transformation of Islam from Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey. Turkey is an exception among all other Muslim countries in which Islam and secularism has been a dialectic relationship. Therefore, the brief history of Ottoman modernization process was stated and important breakpoints which shaped the world view of Republican Elites were discussed in order to explain the reasons of Turkish Exceptionalism that "Turkey is only country which headed toward Laic tradition."<sup>350</sup> *Diyanet Aylık Dergi* (Monthly Journal of Religious Affairs), number fifty-fifth in 1995 obviously shows that the perception of religion that the PRA has comes from nineteenth and twentieth century intellectuals who struggled with and fight against to public Islam. The root of this struggle is that both the Presidency and the intellectuals think public Islam is an obstacle for modernization, therefore, the perception of Islam must be

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<sup>347</sup> Cited in Gözaydın, *Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Dinin Tanzimi*, 22.

<sup>348</sup> Kara, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi*, 160.

<sup>349</sup> Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities", 20.

<sup>350</sup> Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba, (Washington, D.C.: University of Washington Press, 1997), 193.

transformed into a new form “the real Islam” which is not an obstacle for modernization. *Hurafe* (Myth) is everything that must be abandoned. The emphasis on myth which is a matter of creed is used as a tool to weaken the cultural effects of Islam. PRA and the Faculties of Divinity haven’t dealt with the philosophical background of the conflict between religion-science, but rather they have tried to protect the religion by rationalism.<sup>351</sup>

The architects of Ottoman modernization process were Muslims and they were aware of the fact that they were responsible for the future of Islamic world. On the other hand, the ideology of Republican elites tired to modernize Turkey by excluding Islam as an important element. Republican ideologies created an identity by conflicting with Islam in the context of secularism.<sup>352</sup>

In one hand, oppositional discourse of Muslims says that the secularism is a hit to Islam by Mustafa Kemal; on the other hand, the official romantic discourse of Kemalism says that the secularism is a gift of civilization. However the truth is out of this picture, in other words, secularization of Turkey is the result of an objective historical development.<sup>353</sup> Mardin explains this truth by saying that

“Western, foreign source of republican reforms –that is, imitation- impeded deeper cultural moorings for the new methodology, a foundation that, in the past, had been provided by Islam as ideation. The reform movement had no identifiable philosophical foundation. Its Jacobinism, possibly its deepest root, was pragmatic and practical that is, fleshed out as a “project”. The republic took over educational institutions and cultural practices

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<sup>351</sup> Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde Bir Mesele Olarak İslam*, 79.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>353</sup> Gencer, “Türkiye’de Laikliğin Tarihi Dinamikleri”, 151.

(museums, paintings and sculpture, secularism) from the West without realizing that these were just the tip of an iceberg of meaning, perceptions, and ontological positions.<sup>354</sup>

The flow of Ottoman reforms from Mustafa Reşid to Mustafa Kemal followed the convolutions of the Western European concept of the science of society from Auguste Comte's positivism to the late nineteenth century European disillusionment with parliamentary government, and from there to Emile Durkheim's solidarism.<sup>355</sup> With Göle's words,

"The transforming impact of Western modernity is studied at the level of state structures, political institutions, and the industrial economy. Its less tangible but more penetrating effects, however, are on the cultural level, in lifestyles, gender identities and self-definition of identity. The history of modernization in Turkey can be considered the most radical example of a voluntary cultural shift. Kemalist reformers' effort went far beyond modernizing the state apparatus as the country changed from multiethnic Ottoman empire to a secular republican nation-state; they also attempted to penetrate into the lifestyles, manners, behaviors and daily customs of the people."<sup>356</sup>

It is not possible sociologically and psychologically to be a Western society by denying existing history and culture. Application of revolutionary social reforms on society was against to natural existence of human being and inevitably led to cultural crisis. Because of this unnatural feeling, society lost power of movement.<sup>357</sup>

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<sup>354</sup> Şerif Mardin, "Projects as Methodolgy: Some Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science", *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdoğan & Reşat Kasaba (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997), 57.

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>356</sup> Göle, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context of Modernity", 70-71.

<sup>357</sup> Kafadar, *Türkiye'de Eğitim Sisteminde Batılaşma*, 106.

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