THE BREAKPOINT IN MEDIA DISCOURSE:

APRIL 27

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All information submitted in this work has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical principles. This thesis is the unique work of the author. It has not presented to any other institution or organization. All information and materials not original to this work have been fully cited and referenced in accordance with academic standards and ethics.

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK

May, 2013

To My Mum….

ABSTRACT

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK   June 2013

The Bereakpoint in Media Discourse: April 27

The media are one of the most influential ideological state apparatuses, which provide the survival of the existing hegemonic structure. They use their power of holding informational flow in accordance with their ideological affiliations. In Turkey, the mainstream media have been organically bound to the Kemalist hegemony. They otherize, sometimes stigmatize, but certainly jail the opposition in certain frames. *İrtica* is one of the popular of these frames. In Turkey, *irtica* discourse has existed as an element of fear. It is used in manufacturing consent through production of a perceived threat. The best examples from politics, in which *irtica* was used as fear element, are the process of February 28, 1997, and the 2007 presidential election process. In both examples, the military gave notes to governments. And in both examples the media applied fear appeals in order to legitimize military intervention in politics. However, the difference of the latter from the former is that the latter could not achieve its intended conclusion. This study examines the use of *irtica* discourse as a threat element. It focuses on the mainstream media in general and *Hürriyet* -as the flagship of the mainstream media- in particular. It adopts the discourse analysis method. It aims to show how *irtica* fear is constructed by language under the framework of the hegemonic struggle.

Key Words: Fear politics, *irtica,* discourse, *Hürriyet*, otherization, April 27, Presidential elections.

KISA ÖZET

Ayşe Ayten BAKACAK   **Haziran 2013**

Medya Söylemindeki Kırılma Noktası: 27 Nisan

Medya, mevcut egemen yapının devamını sağlayan devletin ideolojik aygıtlarının en etkililerinden biridir. Medya bilgi akışını elinde tutmasının kendisine sağladığı gücü kendi ideolojik kaygılarını göz önünde bulundurarak kullanır. Türkiye'de ana akım medya ideolojik olarak Kemalist hegemonyaya bağlıdır. Bu nedenle her türlü karşı-hegemonya hareketini ötekileştirir, damgalar ve belli bir çerçeve içine hapseder. İrtica, bu çerçevelerin arasında kullanımı en yaygın olanıdır. Türkiye'de irtica söylemi bir korku unsurudur. Bu söylem, ürettiği tehdit algısı üzerinden rıza imalatına hizmet eder. Siyasette irticanın bir korku unsuru olarak kullanımına en iyi iki örnek 1997'deki 28 Şubat süreci ve 2007'deki cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim sürecidir. On yıl arayla yaşanan her iki süreçte de asker hükümete müdahale etmiş ve medya korku çekiciliğini kullanarak askerin siyasete müdahalesini meşrulaştırmaya çalışmıştır. Fakat iki olay sonuçları bakımından farklıdır, zira 2007'de planlanan neticeye ulaşılamamıştır. Bu tez irtica söyleminin ana akım medyada bir tehdit unsuru olarak kullanımını ana akım medyanın amiral gemisi olarak bilinen Hürriyet gazetesi özelinde inceler. Tezde söylem analizi metodu kullanılarak irtica korkusunun dil üzerinden nasıl inşa edildiği ve bunun hegemonik güç mücadelesinde bir araç olarak nasıl kullanıldığı gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Korku siyaseti, irtica, söylem, Hürriyet gazetesi, ötekileştirme, 27 Nisan, cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimi

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

1.1. Introduction

"Laicism is as vital as the heel of Achilles to the Republic; if it is shot from laicism, it will collapse." (Bila 2008) This statement, made by ex-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, is very remarkable in terms of its indications. Laicism has been one of the most sensitive issues in Turkey. The republic's ideal of 'reaching the level of contemporary civilizations' required freedom from the chains of religion -according to its founders. However, unchaining would not be so easy in a country, viewed as the leader of the Muslim world. First, it was necessary to escape this label. This would happen with the abolishment of the Caliphate, and the adoption of laicism, which was the most important step in cutting ties with its Ottoman past. All Republican revolutions are based on this step. Laicism was reflected in every aspect of the revolutions, from dress to the alphabet. Thus, laicism began to be associated with favorable attitude toward Republican revolutions. When it is taken into account that revolutions were adopted by force, the sensitivity of the issue may be understood better. There was no place for opposition, because opposition meant a return to a theocratic state, in Republicans' eyes. So any opposition was doomed to be considered a religious reaction, in other words "*irtica*".

The discourse of *irtica* has a history that goes back to the pre-Republican age. While the word was used initially to describe opposition to the reformations at the end of the Ottoman State, it is began to be considered opposition to laicism after the foundation of the republic. Similar to the non-existence of the denotative definition of Turkish laicism, there is also not an authoritative definition of *irtica* -which could help define *irticai* actions-. However, the discourse has existed for decades as an element of fear. It is used in manufacturing consent through the production of a perceived threat.

The word *irtica* is placed in direct opposition to the word laicism in Turkey. These two are regarded as opposites of each other. Laicism is fundamental to the Kemalist regime. Like Siamese twins, laicism and Kemalism cannot be separated from each other. The Kemalist regime regards laicism as the lynchpin of

Westernization. Kemalist Westernization does not consist of a mere adoption of Western systems and values, but it encompasses hostility toward what is 'old'. Here, old means traditional and Ottoman-rooted. Kemalism declares war against tradition for the sake of Westernist modernization. Kemalists believe they enlighten people this way, and in that sense, Kemalist Westernization is Orientalism from within. Religion is at the top of the list of otherized, because it is seen as the biggest obstacle to advancement. So, Kemalist Westernist laicism not only means a separation of religion and politics, but it also symbolizes a total suppression of religion. From this aspect, the word *irtica* expresses the situation in which Kemalist hegemony loses control of religion. According to Kemalists, such a situation equals the destruction of laicism, which is why *irtica* is considered the opposite of laicism in Turkey.

From the establishment of the republic, the Kemalist regime has protected itself with voluntary protectors, who are called the state (or bureaucratic) elite. Among them the military is first. Laicism and the Kemalist regime are alongside with the military in Turkey, because the military defines itself as the guardian of the regime, in general, and laicism, in particular. Likewise, the Kemalist state elites see the military as an assurance of Republican revolutions, especially laicism. This presupposition constitutes the basis of the official state view.

The mainstream media defends the official discourse in Turkey. It otherizes what the state otherizes and adopts what the state adopts. This deeply interpenetrates character of mainstream media in Turkey. It is tradition. Media –especially journalism– has always had a mission of imposing a Kemalist hegemonic worldview since the establishment of the republic. (Yılmaz and Burak 2011, 113) In the early years of the republic, it had no chance at survival except to adopt such a mission. The elimination of opposition in journalism led to the pervasion of Kemalist hegemonic nature deep within the media. Although in later years oppositional units began to be established, they were left to the periphery. The center retained its Kemalist hegemonic structure. Although recently balances in center-periphery relations have started to change among media units, the ones considered mainstream are those located in the traditional center. They are pro-Kemalist hegemonic. They still assume the position of the state's spokesman. *Hürriyet* newspaper is the most statist among

the media. It is considered the official paper of the state. Another distinctive characteristic of *Hürriyet* is its area of influence. In spite of the decrease in its circulation (because of the negative effect of digital technology), it still maintains one of the best selling rates. It has been the flagship of mainstream (center) media for years and is the most prestigious paper of the mainstream media. All these factors make its reports worth particular attention.

At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, Islamic conservatism rose economically, socially and politically. *İrtica* discourse rose in parallel. Indeed this is a reflection of Kemalist elites' fear of losing control of the government. The hegemonic media re-shaped this fear as if it was a threat to the regime and then pumped the perception of that threat into society. The military was shown as the rescuer of the regime, by the hegemonic media. The tense atmosphere led the Islamic conservative government to step back and thus the February 28 process occurred.

The same discourse of threat was propelled by the Kemalist hegemonic media just before the e-memorandum of 27 April 2007. The Kemalist media aimed to prevent conservatives from 'taking' *Çankaya* (the presidency). Again, the media tried to create an air of fear in which the military was presented as the rescuer. So, on April 27, when the military thought it possessed the necessary legitimization, the Chief Office of General Staff published a memorandum on its website. However, it did not have the expected effect. The government did not back down, but rather reminded the military that it was dependent on the government. While this stand of the government brings credit to it in the general elections, the discourse of threat and fear are not intermitted at once. Media lasted to pump the fear of *irtica*. New element of fear was the issue of freedom for headscarf. *Hürriyet* interpreted the freedom as "chaos". The word 'chaos' perfectly defined the state that media aimed to create by using a discourse of fear. However, it failed to create a state of chaos. Meanwhile, military lost credit due to a series of developments including the revelation of plans for coups, *Dağlıca* and *Aktütün* attacks, and the *Ergenekon* case. All these led to a turning of the page in mainstream media discourse.

This thesis will examine the process of discourse change in *Hürriyet* newspaper, as the leading paper of mainstream media. It will ask the question was

irtica threat real, or simply a political maneuver. It will focus on how *irtica* discourse was used to affect power relations in Turkey.

1.2. Problematique and Contribution of the Thesis

The purpose of this study is to show how the hegemonic media in Turkey tried to form a perception of threat and fear by using the discourse of *irtica*. The study examines the media leg of the fear politics. The focus of the paper is the usage of *irtica* as a threat object in order to manufacture consent. Here, *Hürriyet* newspaper is taken as the basis, since it has close relationships with the state elites and since it is known as the "flagship" of laicist pro-Kemalist hegemonic mainstream media.

Here the key word is 'laicist'. It is different from the word 'secular' in its connotations. Laicism is an "assertive" kind of secularism in which religion is not only obstructed from establishing dominance but also totally excluded from the public sphere. (Kuru 2007, 571) The Kemalist state hegemony expects its subjects to be not only secular-minded people, but also laicist. Even though the state respects any other religions than Islam, it expects its subjects to be aggressively against public manifestation of Islam. Since Kemalism regards Islam as the main perpetrator behind the in so-called backwardness of Turkey, Kemalists are hostile toward Islam. (Yılmaz 2012, 44-45) They are intolerant of the visibility of Islamic symbols as well as the rise of practicing Muslim in fields ranging from economics to politics, science to medicine. This mentality is promoted by the mainstream media in Turkey and, as stated above, the leader of the mainstream media's journalistic branch is *Hürriyet*.

This thesis will analyze the fear politics executed by *Hürriyet* on behalf of the Kemalist elite targeted at the policy making process. It will focus on threat and fear discourses surrounding *irtica* and will question the reality of *irtica* danger whether or not it was a real threat for the regime.

1.3. Literature Review

The literature on Turkish modernization, Kemalism, secularism and political Islam is vast. Many Turkish as well as foreign researchers have dealt with these issues. However, among these studies, there are few focusing on the role of media. The academic studies on media and modernization include: İhsan Yılmaz's *The Stand of the Media as a Medium of Modernization in the Early Years of the Republic* (2009), İhsan Yılmaz and Begüm Burak's *Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period* (2011), Ayşe Öncü's *Packaging Islam* (1995), Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur's *Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey* (2010), and Burcu Özkan's master thesis *Basına Göre Şapka ve Kılık Kıyafet İnkılabı* (Hat and Dress Revolution According to the Press) (2008).

The analyses the relationship between the media and politics in Turkey are mostly quantitative. The rest are mostly non-academic studies, such as *Silahsız Kuvvetler Medya: Darbelerde Basınının Ayak Sesleri* (Unarmed Forces Media: the Footprints of Press in Coups) (2010), *Kimse Kızmasın, Kendimi Yazdım* (Do Not Get Angry, I Wrote My Own Story) (1999), *Büyük Medyada Ergenekon Haberciliği* (*Ergenekon* Reportage on Grand Media) (2011), and *Arz Ederim* (I Submit) (2010). Among the qualitative academic studies, there are Çile Dursun's *Haber, Hakikat ve İktidar İlişkisi* (The Relationship Between News, Reality and Power) (2004), Yusuf Devran's *Haber, Söylem ve İdeoloji* (News, Discourse and Ideology) (2010), and Nilgün Gürkan's *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın: 1945-1950* (Press in the Process of Passing Through Democracy in Turkey: 1945-1950) (1998).

The studies of fear appealing in Turkey are poor. (Balcı 2007, 76) The non-academic literature is better than the academic research on the issue, and most of the academic studies originate abroad. The rest, which focus on Turkey, are in the field of communication. In this thesis I examine the topic from a political science perspective. In Turkey's case, Yasin Aktay's Fear and Power (2010) comes at the head of the list of the books subjected the usage of fear as a political maneuver. Although they do not notify that they study on fear politics directly, most of the

studies issued politics-military-media triangle mentions this topic indirectly. Likewise the studies issued modernization adventure of the Republic of Turkey cross over the topic. From this aspect, we may say the literature is very comprehensive. However, these studies do not focus on fear politics. The difference of our study is hidden under there. It directly focuses on media's placement itself in politics along with military as an actor by benefitting from fear appeals.

1.4. Methodology & Sources

The media and politics are very closely connected, so much so that the former can be considered the fourth component of the famous triumvirate: legislation, execution and jurisdiction. This is because of the media's line of business. It deals with knowledge, affecting human's minds, opinions and perceptions. The media do not provide solely knowledge, but also perspective, which is concealed in its discourse. How the media projects certain information can be more important than the information itself. As such, this thesis will focus on discourse analysis.

In discourse analysis, style is more important than content. Visual elements are supporters of the discourse and when these two are examined carefully, the bias of a publisher in the case of any particular issue can be easily ascertained.

News is not a mirror; it does not reflect what it sees as it sees. It constructs reality within an institutionalized structure, providing people information about the world. But, since this information is biased, it biases people's mind. (Dursun 2004, 39-40) In time, people start to adopt the same ideologies of the publications that they follow, and the broadcasts they watch. The element that forms this ideology is the discourse, or the unsaid message hidden beneath the words.

There is a sequence of significance among news items. They are not regarded as equally important. In a newspaper, the importance of a news item is associated with the page on which it appears, its placement on that page, and the length of the story. While headlines are for important news, upper headlines are reserved for more important news. The most important news of the day is presented, generally, from

the right side of the upper headline. Besides, the proportion of news on the page and the photographs signal what is important to the newspaper and what is not. (Mora 2008, 4) Through such choices, the newspaper decides which stories are significant. This is one of the indicators of its ideology.

Words are representatives of perspectives. (Erol 1995, 199) Language contains power struggles in itself. It is either a vehicle for continuation of existing order or for an uprising against it. All supportive and opposing behaviors find their meaning in language. (İnal 1999, 27) Within the text of the news, there are clues about the standpoint and worldview of the publication outlet. These are the arrangement of the reports (their pages, page locations, etc.), the tones of the language (affirmative or negative) and otherization practices (segregation of 'us' and 'them') . These indicate the view point of a newspaper. Most of these clues are hidden in discourse. (Mora 2008, 5) Therefore, by reading the interlinear messages of the discourse, the ideological viewpoint behind news items can be gleaned.

Events have no meaning without appearing in a news report. For example, if the altercation between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Sezer was not published, it would not have meant anything. However, when the event was labeled a 'crisis' by the media the economy collapsed. (Kazancı 2002, 79) The effect of an event increases when it becomes the subject of a news report.

In journalism, extraordinary events attract more attention. For instance, a human being's biting a dog is more attention-getting than a dog's biting a human being. Pierre Bourdieu says that if an event is not extraordinary enough, journalists re-construct it to make it attractive by highlighting the tragic elements of the event. According to Bourdieu, journalists look at events with special spectacles "through which they see certain things and not others, and through which they see the things they see in the special way they see them". They pick these events, re-construct them with sensational wording and serve them to the public. Islam, terror, and fundamentalism are the most gripping words. Although their words are dangerous enough to lead to destruction within the society, journalists do not mind; because, if there is such destruction, they are the ones who benefit most. (Bourdieu 1998, 19)

Media texts are produced within the framework of institutional decisions. News is gathered, chosen and written according to this institutional point of view. Thus, the events given do not reflect reality; they are re-produced in such a manner that the lines of reality are redrwn. Here, the aim is to give the notion of a certain viewpoint. News items carry out a certain ideology. It may be obvious or it may be hidden, but it is certainly there. (Mora 2008, 12; Kazancı 2002, 78)

In the relationship between discourse and ideology, the latter is the code of the former. Ideology defines what is to be said and discourse carries its message. Thus, it is true to say that discourse arranges social reality according to an ideology. In this sense, it is one of the most vital tools of politics.

Indeed, news discourse is nothing but a re-statement of the existing hegemonic relationships in a society. Social experiences and power relations reflect to news discourses. (Kazancı 2002, 82) Discourse analysis aims to explain the relationship between ideology and discourse. It examines establishment and re-establishment of power relations within the text by the means of discourse construction.(Mora 2008, 7) Each section determines its discourse according to its stand point in hegemonic struggle. Not the marginal media but the mainstream one, especially, serve the interests of the hegemony. (Cangöz 2008, 2) Here, *Hürriyet*'s stand point is next to the Kemalist state hegemony. Its discourse is shaped accordingly.

In this thesis, I adopt discourse analysis method. I aim to show how fear is constructed using words under the framework of the hegemonic struggle. I analyze text and visual elements appearing front page of newspapers, focusing in particular on headlines and upper headlines. In doing so I uncover the ways in which fear elements were used to manipulate politics.

1.5. Contents of the Thesis

This study consists of five main chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. If we make a comparison to anatomy, chapter two is the spine of our study, as it contains theoretical background information and key concepts. Theories

of the study are also defined in the chapter. Chapter three is the skeleton. It contains the brief political history of the Republic of Turkey around modernization adventure. Secularism/laicism and the fear from reactionary movements are the emphases of the chapter. It takes the history of modernization from Ottoman times, and brings it to the early AKP years. Chapter four is the head. It focuses on the history of Turkish media. The media-power relationship from the end of Ottoman State is the main focus of the chapter. Chapter five is the arterial. It leans on one of the most debated military interventions, the February 28 post-modern coup. The media's role is focused on particularly. Lastly, chapter six is the heart. It focuses on the before and after of the April 27 event. Media's attitude during the process is examined in detail. Then the conclusion follows, which is the gene of the study.

Chapter two is the window of this study. It shows the aspects from which the thesis will examine the issue. There are five main concepts, around which the thesis will be shaped: hegemony, otherization, fear appealing, agenda setting and framing. Chapter two introduces the general meanings and usages of these concepts and examines them from a theoretical perspective. It gives the general tenets and characteristics of the concepts by citing scientific studies in relevant fields. It does not engage specific areas and issues, but rather provides a general oversight about the direction of the study.

Chapter three is the bridge between present day and the past. It presents information about ancient roots of daily problems. Root is the most significant word here, because no social problem can be properly diagnosed without its historical background information. Just as a plant needs a strong root to keep it grounded, a thesis needs a basis in proper background information in order to correctly place the issue in context. Otherwise, it does not manage to depict its problem consistently. Even doctors take anamnesis for making a correct diagnosis. Similarly, chapter three aims to explain the history of the problems that constitute the basis of this thesis in order to place the thesis on substantial ground.

Chapter four is similar to chapter three in that it also gives historical background information. However, it is more specific. It presents the Turkish media case, and interrogates past and current profit relations. It also examines the position

of the Turkish press in power balances. It emphasizes the desire of the media to shape politics like a political actor. Chapter four is important from the aspect of understanding the benefit-seeker habits of Turkish media at the expense of damaging democracy.

Chapter five is a case study. It examines the February 28, 1997 process, in which the relationship between the media and politics reached its peak. It focuses on how media turned an artificial crisis into a real one step by step. It interrogates the media's position as a supra-political actor and presents how problematic this position is.

Chapter six is the main topic of this thesis. It examines the 2007 presidential elections from the aspect of the reflections on *Hürriyet* newspaper. It focuses on the Kemalist hegemonic media's practice of fear politics in order to shape the political arena, *Hürriyet* in particular. Chapter six uses the theories outlined in chapter two, the historical background information presented in chapter three, the media's anamnesis taken in chapter four, and the February 28 example in chapter six in order to reach a consistent and accurate conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will clarify the theories I use in the thesis. First to be addressed is fear appealing. The questions I will focus on surrounding fear appealing are: what is fear appealing, for what reasons is it used, and what is the relationship between fear appealing and politics and media. Secondly, I will examine 'otherization' as a tool of fear appealing. Then I will move to the aim of political usage of fear appealing: hegemonic struggle. After examining hegemony in Gramscian terms, I will look at the relationship between hegemony and media. In this part, I will examine how media is integral to both social and political life. I will focus on the agenda setting function of media and politics-media relationship.

Although this chapter focuses on theoretical information, it is very important for understanding present events. It is the scientific background that this thesis will be based on in that it provides the analytical perspective. It is the eye glass from which I look.

2.2.   Fear Appealing

"Is fear able to be a source of power?" Yasin Aktay starts his book, *Fear and Power*, with this challenging question. The fear he mentions is that which is experienced. He questions how a frightened individual can have power over the source of fear via his own fear. Indeed, it is very puzzling that fear can beget power against the feared object, although it is a sense that catches people at their weakest point. To explain this contradiction, Aktay uses insects as examples. The fear we have of insets manifests itself as the will or deed to kill them.(Aktay 2010, 9-10) This is an action intended to eliminate the source of fear. The scared party seeks the problem not out of a sense of fear, but in the insect that they see as the source of fear. In this way, people legitimize killing insects.

At the top of the list of those who were persecuted out of fear, we can place the new born boys of Israelites killed in Egypt the year that Moses was born. They were put to death by the Pharaoh because of his fear of losing authority. According to the oracles, the loss of power would happen soon at the hand of a boy born in current year. Thus, the cost of the Pharaoh's power was dead babies. The second spot on the list may belong to those accused of being witches and tortured to death during medieval times. They are also victims of fear injected into society. The campaigns of the 'Red Scare' in USA, the 'Great Purge' of the Soviet Union, the genocide in Nazi Germany, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and many other oppressions are all the result of fear from an inner threat. In each case, the fear was shaped, exaggerated, and even -if it did not exist- created by power holders. Against all the diversities among the examples above, they have something in common, which is that they are the production of a massive conspiracy. (Oplinger, Talbot and Aktay 2010, 20-21)

Psychologically, fear is a sense that prompts a defense mechanism in human psychology. The emotion of fear alerts humans psychologically. The result of this is the "perceived threat" which "is an external stimulus that creates a perception in message receivers that they are susceptible to some negative situation or outcome". Under such conditions, those who feel the pressure of a threat are open to solution offers that can constitute "perceived efficacy", which "is a […] belief that message recommendations can be implemented and will effectively reduce the threat" (Stiff and Mongeau 2003, 148) Therefore, a person who is exposed to a threat will try to avoid it. He clings to any possible solution, which is both as feasible as he can do, and as effective as could exterminate the threat.

A message of fear geared at the weak spots of a specific target can be as effective as a persuasion strategy. This is called 'fear appeal'. "The Protection Motivation Theory" (Rogers 1975) deals with the role of the fear in the persuasion and tries to explain fear appeals. According to the theory, there are four main factors that affect the possibility of adoption to the action that is proposed to take (recommended response). These are: *severity* of the risk (how serious, harmful or horrible the event is), *vulnerability* (probability of occurrence), *efficacy* of recommended response, and *self-efficacy*. (Seydel and Boer 1996, 99) For example,

think of the spots about cigarette smoking telecasted on visual and audial media by the Ministry of Health. The ministry is using fear appeal. The spots aim to make people quit smoking. They try to build a fear of illness by using images such as smokers' lungs, or by showing very ill people, or by describing the illness. After showing these sorts of images, quitting smoking is presented as a solution. Production of these commercials by the Ministry of Health rather than any other institution increases the persuasiveness of the advertisements, because the ministry is an authority on health affairs. So, these advertisements show firstly the *severity* of the risk of being ill. Then they claim smokers are fairly *vulnerable* to this risk. They offer the *efficient* solution of quitting smoking. Lastly, they encourage smokers by telling that they are able to quit. The Ministry also promises to help smokers during the quitting process. The spots meet all the requirements of fear appeal.

As laid out above, fear appeal is basically composed of convincing someone to act in a certain way by using components of fear and threat. When fear is presented, the defense mechanism steps in and the protection instinct appears. This pushes those exposed to fear to act in accordance with what is wanted from them. However, fear appeal is different from blackmail. While the latter includes use of force, the former is based on consent. Namely, fear appeal does not apply violence; rather, it aims to convince someone to do something.

There are two main components of fear appeals: *structure* and *style*. The structural component consists of a threat, possibility of its occurrence and recommendations on how to avoid this threat. As mentioned above, the structural component is the base of fear appeal. However, the stylistic component is as vital as the structural. It is based on words and audial and/or visual elements. The intensity of their usage is related to the impact of the message. If the message is strong and combined with a high level of fear, then the language and voices used are more severe. If the message is weak, then the stylistic elements are of a softer tone. Also, the visual objects that are chosen differ in accordance with the severity of the message. (Balcı 2007, 77) We can again give the example of the Ministry of Health's spots about smoking. The stylistic components are strong in these spots; because, the

message contains a high level of risk. Visually, the worst illnesses are shown. Strong words are chosen and thus the severity of the message is emphasized throughout.

In addition to the above, fear appeal messages can appear in two ways. The first are messages about the future. Future messages are based on the consequences that can occur in the future. To give an example, in politics, future fear appeals emphasize the expected corruption of a party or candidate when they take power. The second are messages related to the past. What was said or done in the past is referred to in a current context. The fear message is established on past attitudes. (Balcı 2007, 79-80) Most of the times, these two types of messages –future and past- are used together. The idea that 'past fears are guarantees of future ones' is put forth. With reference to the past, the future is depicted in such a way that makes people hesitant and afraid.

In politics, fear appeals are frequently used during the time of elections. They are applied as a strategy to discredit the rival party. The past and present actions or discourses of a party are presented as threats to the future, so that people will become afraid and decide against voting for that particular party. Fear appeal is widely used in Turkey, and one of the most popular charges is *irtica*. The media play an active role in using fear appeals, because they have the ability to show an ordinary situation as an extraordinary one by playing with language and tone. This very characteristic can be used to set fear in motion. In this way, fear-rooted anger, such as hatred, xenophobia or fundamentalism, is born. The media create all of these either intentionally, or unintentionally. In neither situation do the media worry about the potential for destruction, because the destruction, which the media create, serves its own purposes, since the media feed on sensation and 'oddness'. (Bourdieu 2000, 24) Herein, the media get into close relationships with power and wielders of power. Since, where there is sensation there those benefiting from it, or vice versa, someone may intentionally create sensations for their own benefit. Chomsky (1997) says that power-owners either exaggerate existing situations or produce fear in order to gain people's consent. Instead of truth, they put distorted things in front of their audience. In this way, they manipulate the masses (11) and make people them behave in whatever the way they desire.

However, the use of fear elements may have a counter effect on people. The study by Calantone and Warshaw (1985) indicates such an undesired effect. They claim that "fear-inducing charges [from] a credible source reduce the attacked candidate's vote." Yet, if another "credible source denie[s] the charges, […] the attacked candidate's vote loss [is] fully offset." The study also shows that when the attacked candidate both refuses the accusations via a credible source and attacks, he/she receives an increase in votes. (627)

2.3. Otherization & Stigmatization

Individuals or groups identify themselves not only by specifying what they themselves are, but also by emphasizing what they are not. The definition of 'us' is made according to the definition of 'them'. In other words, 'us' is what 'they' are not. This is called *negative identification* in literature. (Bezirgan Arar and Bilgin 2010, 3) In order to have an accurate definition, the negative identification is as important as the positive one. The cliché that 'everything is known by its opposite' expresses this essential characteristic. Namely, contrasts define each other. They are essential to one another.

However, there is a risk in negative identification, which is the creation of a notion of 'other'. This is called otherization, othering, or constitutive other. Although, it is used as a tool for solidification of belonging to a group, it may lead to wrong judgments about other group. The danger in holding this attitude is the tendency to see the inner group as ontologically good, while assuming the outer one is ontologically bad. Goodness and badness can be seen as essential, i.e. constitutive. In such a case, the owners of this approach attribute two things to coincidence: the undesired behavior in the inner group and the desired behavior in the outer group. The faulty behavior of an inner group member or the decent behavior of an outer group member is qualified as exception. (Bezirgan Arar and Bilgin 2010, 4) Indeed, otherization sharpens the boundaries between groups and leads to hostility. When one of the groups has an advantageous position in terms of power holding, it is able to legitimize its unjust actions against the other via 'otherization'. These actions are

not questioned by group members, since the other is seen as bad, dangerous and harmful. Even they have a tendency to think that others deserve it.

There are many types of otherization, some of which are:

- Attribution of negative features,
- Social exclusion,
- Political labeling,
- Indicating something as the source of a threat
- Making one of the members of a group disparage his own group
- Otherization through victimization of the inner group. (Bezirgan Arar and Bilgin 2010, 11)

These are the most commonly applied types. The process of fear production, which has been explained in the previous section, is based on such kinds of otherization. Namely, fear production and otherization go hand in hand.

Otherization leads to segregation and exclusion. Initially, it vulgarizes the outer group. It excludes outer group members by emphasizing their differences. Indeed, the motive beneath otherization is fear: fear of losing the status quo, fear of harm, etc. As a consequence of fear, an unconscious desire for extermination is aimed at the 'others'. Suddenly one finds himself favoring the other's demise. More explicitly, the implementers of otherization emphasize their fear of the outer groups by inventing the belief that the other group is plotting against their inner group, even though in reality the inner group intends to destroy the outer group. In this way, they project their own fear onto the outer group. (Çelenk 2009, 214)

Otherization does not appear in absence; rather, there are group interests beneath the surface. There exists a power struggle, because the power-holder has the ability to cut off all sources, and reallocate them for its own benefit. In addition, the power holder can legitimize such an action. (Bezirgan Arar and Bilgin 2010, 4) Thus, groups use otherization to promote their self-interests. Basically, if you want to eliminate someone, you otherize him. There are many ways, including slander, to denigrate someone; and if you manage to make people believe your message, he will no longer be able to oppose you. You do not need to worry about then.

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One of the peak points of otherization is stigmatization. Stigmatization is a kind of labeling that categorizes "people who are pejoratively regarded by the broader society and who are devalued, shunned or otherwise lessened (…) in access to the humanizing benefit of free and unfettered social intercourse". (Alonzo and Reynolds 1995, 304) The word 'stigma' has its origins in Greek. It refers to a sign on the body that is "cut or burnt into the body and advertise[s] that the bearer [is] a slave, a criminal or a traitor". It is also used to refer to "bodily signs of physical disorder". Although the original meaning of stigma indicates physical problems or scars, it is used mostly to define a psychological condition in academic circles today. (Goffman 2009, 1-2) The contemporary conceptualization of stigma belongs to Erving Goffman. He wrote a book about stigma in 1963. According to him stigmatization is used to disgrace an individual or a group by marking them abnormal. (Major and O'Brien 2005, 394-5) He argues that stigma is "a socially constructed deviance label". (Green 2009, 14) A stigma is a mark that someone puts on to others. It is not natural but rather 'constructed'.

Stigmas are used for highlighting differences between the 'normal' and 'other'. They are used as a way of making an 'us versus them' distinction. Stigmatization is the name of the process of otherization "by which the differential attribute is devaluated and discredited and becomes synonymous with deviance". (Green 2009, 15) At the end of the stigmatization process, we are expected to "believe the person with a stigma is not quite human". (Goffman 2009, 5)

Goffman discussed three types of stigma, in his book. They include physical stigma, psychological stigma and tribal stigma. Physical stigma indicates a visible scar or deformation of the body such as obesity. Psychological stigmas are characteristic deviations such as mental disorders, drug addiction or homosexuality. Lastly, tribal stigma is one "of race, nation, and religion". (Goffman 2009, 4) In all three types, there is a social labeling of deviance. But stigmatization is more than a mere labeling. It occurs when labeling, negative stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination and low status co-occur in a power situation that allows these processes to unfold" (Major and O'Brien 2005, 395) In other words, stigmatization is

the devaluation of a social identity with all means possible in a certain social context. (Crocker, Major and Steele 1998, 505)

Stigmatization is founded in prejudice. It causes discrimination in which the stigmatized individuals or groups are deprived of some basic rights and benefits. (Bilge and Çam 2010, 71) In order not to be discriminated against and disregarded or ignored, stigmatized people may try to eliminate their stigmatic symbols (meaning anything that encourages discrimination). In this way, they attempt to separate themselves from the stigmatized group and enter the ranks of the 'normal'. (Goffman 2009, 43-46) For example, Michael Jackson tried to change his skin color to become more prestigious in white men's world. Some Armenians changed their names, surnames and even religion allegedly, in order to live more easily on Turkey's lands. Most recently, Ara Güler, who is the most famous photographer in Turkey, declared that he was hiding his Armenian nationality to avoid possible discrimination practices. (Güler 25.04.2013) All these examples show the struggle to avoid the negative effects of stigmatization.

In summary, otherization is a tendency to regard oneself as superior and the 'other' as inferior. It creates the illusion that the superior has the right to insult, oppress and exploit the inferior. Otherization is a practice that solidifies group belonging, and increases hostility toward those labeled as 'others'. Stigmatization is the peak point of this labeling. It deepens the gap between the stigmatizers and the stigmatized.

2.4. Hegemony

The concept of hegemony brings mind the name Antonio Gramsci. This is not because he was the first to use the term, but because he was the first to conceptualize it as a component of political struggle.(Devran 2010, 21) Gramsci (1971) observes that the thing keeping Western society together is not fear. Western societies' adherence to their states cannot come from fear of the state. (Femia 1983, 347) Then he develops a theory of hegemony which proposes that force and violence are not

enough to rule people. (Bates 1975, 351) Gramsci defines two types of political control. The first is based on coercion and violence, which are carried out through the means of military and police. The second is based on consent, which encompasses cultural domination and control over society. He says that mere violence cannot bring legitimacy and stability to a regime. In order to achieve these two in the long run, the regime should provide consent. Only in this way, can a state become hegemony. "Hegemony in this sense is identified with the formation of a new ideological 'terrain', with consent". (Cangöz 2008, 3)

Hegemony, in Gramscian terms, is a multi-dimensional and complex structure that encompasses economic dominance, political power and ideological superiority. Gramsci calls the coherence among all these elements a "historical block". According to him, to be a hegemon a group needs to control the economy firstly. Then, it should develop political alliances. Lastly, it has to make people have a claim on it. When the other groups and society as a whole recognize its hegemony, the group becomes a historical block. The first thing that a historical block should achieve is to bring the economy (structure) and ideology (superstructure) together.(Kurtbağ 2010)

Economic factors are the crux of a classical Marxist approach. Classical Marxist thought claims that economic dominance is the source of political dominance, because it shapes its own ideology, culture and values. (Altheide 1984, 477) However, Gramsci asserts that it is not sufficient to keep power in the long run. His diverseness starts at this point. Classical Marxist class struggle theory remains insufficient in explaining how capitalist societies legitimize their rule. In politics, Gramsci believes that the relationship between rulers and the ruled is the lynchpin. Rulers should govern people in such a way that they can obey themselves voluntarily. In politics, the 'obligation of obedience' idea leads to severe lapses. (Gramsci 2003, 230-2) Because of this, obedience should depend on consent. So, the Gramscian concept of hegemony becomes is differentiated here. For Gramsci, hegemony cannot be achieved through violence or tyranny. Rather, it represents rulers' cultural and ideological control over society, since they are in a dominant position both economically and culturally. (Devran 2010, 21-22) However, Gramsci

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does not mean coercive control, when he says cultural and ideological control. His definition of hegemony encompasses only moral and intellectual control. (Femia 1979, 482) Hegemonic power should provide for its subjects and share the same values and standards as them. In this way, it can easily control society without violence. (Femia 1983, 346)

For Gramsci, a hegemon creates voluntarily obedient humans by the means of culture. In this way, it gains the consent of the masses. (Gramsci 1971, 254) At this point, the responsibility of producing consent belongs to the "ideological state apparatuses"(ISAs). This phrase, which belongs to Althusser (1994), is used to define the ideological means of the state in constructing consent among the masses. They are different from state forces, because they do not use oppression and violence. Rather, they use ideology to make people obey rulers. (33) The *Sociology* book of Giddens (1997) qualifies ideology as "shared ideas or beliefs which serve to justify the interests of dominant groups". (583) This is exactly the intended meaning of Gramsci, Althusser and others from the same school. With the help of shared ideologies, hegemony keeps its power stable.

The word "state" in the word composition of the term ISA does not mean the necessity of these institutions' belonging to the state. According to Althusser (1994), it is not necessary for ISAs to be public institutions. They may be private enterprises as long as they adopt state ideology.(33-35) Their primary function is to constitute consent of the people. Their role is so vital that, according to Althusser, no group can achieve hegemony unless it can control ISAs. (36)

Althusser (1994) counts the media –with school, church, etc- under ISAs. (33) All ISAs serve to make hegemony more admissible. (Mattei 2003, 5) The media have a very distinctive place among ISAs. The dominant ideology of the hegemon is spread and reproduced via media. The term 'reproduction of the ideology' means constant legitimization of the hegemony. (Doğru Arsan 2004, 156) However, media is not innocent all the time. It helps to bring "the overwhelming majority of citizenry into line and to marginalize the dissenters through a campaign of vilification". (Buttigieg 2005, 46) It is hegemonic power's medium for the execution of dirty jobs.

Ideology reproduction is achieved by updating the ideology, in accordance with the requirements of the contemporary age. According to Gramsci (1971) this mission belongs to the "organic intellectuals". (192-3) Organic intellectuals "are constantly engaged in interpreting current events and debates so as to fit dominant conceptions and categories (not always conspiratorially)". (Harris 2007, 2101) Organic intellectuals are the ones who have organic binds with a social circle. They are given, by the hegemon, the function to find necessary support for the hegemon's action. They are expected serve the group to which they belong by using their influence on society. They need to make people believe that a benefit to their group is a benefit to the whole society. (Kurtbağ 2010).

Although "all men (of course all women) are intellectuals, in that all have intellectual and rational faculties, […] not all men/women have the social function of intellectuals." (Cangöz 2008, 3) Organic intellectuals are like the glue of their group; they keep alive, re-shape and maintain everlasting the mind codes of the group, which keep them together and unified. While doing this, they keep emphasizing the ideological concepts constantly in order to solidify group belonging.[1] Organic intellectuals provide not only the development of the ideology and hegemony, but also the establishment of them. Without intellectual support, a group cannot be the hegemon.(Kurtbağ 2010)

Organic intellectuals are different from traditional ones, according to Gramsci. While the latter remain in the same occupation throughout the ages –e.g. teachers or priests (Said 1995, 22)– the former undertake the mission of forming and sustaining hegemony through the means of ISAs, such as media. They resemble a bridge between the rulers and ruled. They ideologically bind them to each other. (Cangöz 2008,3) So, they are like the vectors of a hegemonic order.

Gramsci states that organic intellectuals constantly manipulate human minds. They are always active and in motion. From this perspective, everyone working in information production and distribution is intellectual in Gramscian sense. (Said

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[1] For example: Kemalist intellectuals establish group solidarity on laicism.

1995, 22-25) Namely, the media are full of organic intellectuals. Thus, the process of news production cannot be thought of separately from the concept of hegemony.

Edward Said(1995) consistently emphasizes that intellectuals are not the ones who attend only to their own business. Rather, they have the authority to represent a certain idea and philosophy (27), which is exactly what journalists do. Neo-Marxist school of thought asserts that journalists "propagate" and "celebrate" the "dominant political ideology"; they "interpret the world in its terms, and, at times, alter it to adapt to the demands of the legitimation in a changing world".(Cangöz 2008, 3)

As it is stated above, media is one of the most vital tools of ideological hegemony. Gramsci claims that power owners uses media to impose their world view, lifestyle and moral code. In this way, they strengthen their hands and provide the survival of their order. (Mora 2009) From this perspective, media objectivity and neutrality, which are the guiding principles of media, are impossible to practice. Even the supposed role of media of 'informing people' is a sort of romantic lie, when it is considered that the basic role of the media is to serve the interest of the hegemony. (Cangöz 2008, 1)

2.5. Agenda Setting & Framing

"Media is the main story telling machine to tell us how we understand what's happening, who we are and who they are."(Cangöz 2008, 3) The information coming from the media is composed of fiction containing some items of truth. The extent, to which the truth appears, changes in each report. While some reports are very close to the point of truth, some are almost completely fictional. The common denominator is that all stories are subjective to at least some extent.

It is a fact that the media have a vital role in shaping public agenda. According to McChesney(1997), "no institution is more important [in] the public sphere" than media (16); because,

" [t]he news media are a primary source of those pictures in our heads about the larger world of public affairs. [...] What we know

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about the world is largely based on what the media decide to tell us. More specifically, the result of this mediated view of the world is that the priorities of the media strongly influence the priorities of the public. Elements prominent on the media agenda become prominent in the public mind." (McCombs 2012, 2)

This shows the undoubted power of the media.

Indeed, the media's power comes from their line of business. Firstly, they play with knowledge. Foucault equates knowledge with power. (Aktay 2010, 10) Knowledge establishes dominance over people. It regulates, disciplines, and controls them. (Olgun 2007, 9) In doing so it benefits from its ability to affect minds. Through knowledge, the mind thinks, explains, interprets, and concludes. Specifically, knowledge shapes minds. Concerning the external world beyond the scope of experience and observation, the mind requires some sources in order to obtain knowledge. It is at this point that the media step in. As a source of knowledge -although not the one and only source- the media have an impact on minds. It can be said that since knowledge is power and media controls knowledge, media plays with power.

Secondly, the media is the most common tools of communication. The flow of information between the state and society is controlled by the media. Normally, what is expected from the liable media is their undertaking of a "watchdog function"; that is, "reporting on government activity, providing analysis of government policy, and uncovering waste and fraud." (Balkır, et al. 2008, 199) However, in practice, the media are not mere messenger, because it has an exclusive chance that no messenger ever had, which is the opportunity to use their own style and words while publishing their message. Only this opportunity is enough for manipulation, even if the information is completely true. The key element here is language, which "is not neutral, but a highly constructive mediator". (Cangöz 2008, 1) According to Bourdieu (1991), "the act of institution", which he uses instead of 'ideology', is based on language. Language is a source of power. (119) The media, as a language sphere, establish a world of words. They use wordsas a tool for constructing social reality. Thus, reality is re-shaped within the hands of media under such factors as the

image creating, item employing, word using, and style of presenting. Specifically, "reality is not given to us", and when it is the media in question, "meaning is always constructed". (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, 967)

Long-term studies on the writing of news reports show that the information are not presented to people directly as they are. Instead, journalists edit the information in accordance with some definite routines of news production. Journalists socialize in an environment controlled by with the dominant ideology. Because of this, they –intentionally or unintentionally- have a tendency toward presenting the news in a way that falls in line with the dominant school of thought – i.e. status quo-. (Altheide 1984, 478-480) In the media's world, there is a self-censor mechanism. The media's cadres are filled with those who have similar points of view. Therefore, there are internalized biases that employees must adopt. As a result, bias naturally follow in the news. (Mora 2009) Hence, how and in what way something appears in media reports is not coincidental.

"What is the most important problem facing this country today?" (McCombs, 2012, 2) This is the basic question to set the day's agenda. Today, this question is answered by the media. With plenty of information at their fingertips, the media pick, weed, and shape the news that will be brought to the public. In this way, the media have the ability to define political agenda.

The agenda setting function of the media was studied for the first time by McCombs and Shaw, in 1972. They define "the agenda setting function of mass media" as such:

In choosing and displaying news, editors, newsroom staff, and broadcasters play an important part in shaping political reality. Readers learn not only about a given issue, but also how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position.(…) [T]he mass media may well determine the important issues—that is, the media may set the "agenda". (176)

Their thesis is based on the premise that there is a direct relationship between the topics the media publish and public's attention to those topics. Although the

media "may not be successful in telling people what to think", they are "stunningly successful in telling [their] readers what to think about". (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 177) Namely, the issues emphasized by the media attract the attention of people even if those people never previously cared about those issues.

The media's agenda is composed of conscious preferences. Each organization chooses from the day's events, attributes different levels of significance, and puts stories in order according to those levels of significance. Each organization determines headlines, upper-headlines, placement, the amount of space given to other news stories, photographs, word selections, and so on. All these elements are decided upon according to the importance attributed to the issue. In this way, people "learn" to think about what the media wants them to think about. More explicitly, "the priorities of media become the priorities of people". (Alemdar and Erdoğan 2002, 212)

The agenda-setting model does not explain to what extent the media control attitude changes. Rather, it focuses on the relationship between the media's agenda and the social agenda.(McQuail and Windahl 1993, 91) It examines the position of an event in real life and the appearance of the same event in the media. Thusly, it analyses how the media influence people's thought about a given issue and about social reality in general. (Gökçe 2002, 207) Briefly, the priority and significance that is attribute to an issue by people is dependent on its place within the media's agenda.

As explained above, "agenda-setting is concerned mainly with the salience of issues and attributes", at the outset. (Weaver, McCombs and Shaw 2004, 265) However, it is not restricted by "this initial step of focusing public attention on a particular topic". On the next level, "[t]he media influence (…) our understanding and perspective on the topics in the news". (McCombs 2012, 5) This level is called "framing". It is based on the assumption that selective coverage by the media affects people's perceptions. Framing "make[s] salient certain features of a news event, and depress[es] others". Since the salient parts "prime mental associations in the receiver" (Capella and Jamieson 1997, 58), "issues that are most salient or accessible in a person's memory will most strongly influence perceptions of (…) actors and figures". (Scheufele 2000, 300) Namely, by framing, "not only do media outlets tell

[people] what to think about, they also tell [them] what parts of what they're thinking about they should be thinking about". (Omri 2011, 1)

In brief, the media set the agenda by defining the prominent topics of the day. They put the topics in order according to the significance they attribute to them. In addition, they determine how a topic will appear; i.e. the media frame the topic. All these affect people's attention to those topics. In a sense, the events on the media agenda become the events on people's agenda.

'How?' and 'in accompany with what?': When these two questions are answered, the media's code can be decoded. This decoding reveals how the media use, or intend to use, their power. Through this, the media are able to affect politics, since politics cannot be separated from the network of communication. This very position of media makes it to be called as the fourth of the famous triumvirate: legislation, execution and jurisdiction.

Another dimension of the media-power relationship is the latter's need for the former in establishing and re-establishing its legitimacy. As stated above, the media are of the most important components of "consent production" among masses. In this way, power owners control authority. (Althusser 1994, 33-35) During the process of legitimization, the media frequently appeal to certain public fears. For instance, Islamophobic discourse following 9/11 help to legitimize the Iraq War, both in the eyes of the American public and the western world. Similarly, during the era of February 28, the *irtica* discourse was used to legitimize the military's interference with politics. In both situations, the media aimed to convince people that what was being done was righteous. They did so by creating a horrible world of 'otherwise'. According to media discourse, if the USA did not invade to Iraq, Saddam Hussein would have destroyed the US with weapons of mass destruction or a nuclear bomb. Or, if the military did not pull the strings of politics, Turkey would have been an Islamic state ruled by Shari'a law, just as Iran is. These were the pictures that the media painted. Indeed, it is very hard to measure what percentage of the population put stock in this picture. However, it is a fact that the media's support gave the actors of that said situations the necessary ground to take action. By leaning on this ground, they acted more easily.

The examples above bring us to the deductions of Chomsky and Herman (1988) about the media. They say the idea that the media is an independent source of unadulterated truth is nothing but a myth. Rather, the media "serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate state … activity".(xi) Indeed, "the media are seen by the political authorities to have no useful or legitimate function unless as accessories to the armory of the state". (Keane 1991, 96) This is the case in both of the examples from the USA and Turkey.

Indeed, what the media do, in Chomsky's (1999) terms, is construct "consent without consent". He explains this by citing the work of Edward Bernays. According to Bernays, the process of producing "consent without consent" starts with "the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses". The ones who implement this task are "the intelligent minorities" who "make use of propaganda continuously and systematically". Propaganda is a vital tool that allows entities "to mold the mind of the masses". By its means, the production of "consent without consent" occurs. (53) Namely, the media are a tool of propaganda controlled by a certain entity in order to manipulate minds and create a fake notion of consent. For example, "especially in times of (alleged) crisis, […] [the media] ensure that a latent crisis becomes manifest by rendering a collective feeling of crisis among citizens, and by amplifying the claim of state officials that drastic action is required to remedy the crisis, which they have defined as such through the media." (Keane 1991, 96-97) In other words, the media create, shape, direct, and spread crises.

The media is used to lay groundwork for the manipulation of politics. "When media increases its emphasis on some problems or some events, individuals starts to pay more attention on them". (Iyengar 1997, 248) This opens up the opportunity to shape public opinion. Thereby, the media want to use this crucial position to gain power in policy making. The most-preferred method of manipulation is the use of fear. In Turkey, as well as elsewhere around the world, the media are the lynchpin of fear politics.

2.6. Conclusion

Today the hegemonic power struggle advances over images. By the means of the media, people have ideas about other people they have never seen, places they have never visited, and events they have never witnessed. The regulators of this flow of information have the opportunity to shape minds, because they can interfere the flow, and present it however they please. If they are able to make people believe what they say of print, they can win the hegemonic power struggle. Since they do not want to risk losing that power, they apply all the means possible to gain the consent of the people. They frighten people, otherize some for the sake of the rest, deceive via constructed information, and so on. When they are able to design the information as the desired, they win; they get the power. And when they fail, they alter their appearance (change shell) to enter the rank of the new-hegemon.

The media are one of the most (or may be the most) influential state apparatus, which provides the survival of the existing hegemonic structure. They use their power of holding informational flow in accordance with their ideological affiliations. They set the agenda and decide the rank of importance of informations. They also play with the construction of information. They re-shape and frame information before presenting it to society. All these constructions occur within a certain ideological concern and hegemonic power struggle. Thus dissenters are doomed to be otherized, sometimes stigmatized, but certainly jailed in certain social frames.

In Turkey, the Kemalist minority have had hegemony over the majority for years. The mainstream media have been organically bound to this minor Kemalist elite section. All opposition has been otherized, precluded, insulted, ignored, marginalized and vilified via media. The Kemalist minority's fear from losing its hegemony was reflected as turning majority into threat objects. Kurds, practicing Muslims or leftists were labeled dangerous. This labeling practice has successfully been executed by mainstream media. In the next chapter, I will focus on the history of this fear politics in Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

İRTİCA – AS THE "REPELLENT OTHER" OF KEMALIST HEGEMONY

3.1. Introduction

Threat production in Turkey is carried out by the state. There have been three main threats, since the establishment of the republic: divisiveness, communism and reactionary Islam. People have reacted differently to each type of threat. For example, they have very actively opposed divisive actions, and have been ready to support state in any way to prevent such action. Similarly, up to the collapse of the Soviet Union the state was able to instill in people a fear that the threat of communism was imminent, and obtained their support in opposing it. However, people have not been as ready to accept the threat of what the state called reactionary Islam. (Oplinger, Talbot and Aktay 2010, 63-64) The public has not accepted that such a threat exists. The greatest indicator that this is the case is the fact that that they have brought the parties with religious affiliations to power at every opportunity..

The political history of Turkey starts and lasts with *irtica* debates,. It is a history of laicist elite versus Muslim people. When the latter group found an opportunity to have a voice in politics through the means of elections, they have never put their choices to the side of the laicist elite. Each time they have been punished by the military. However, they have waited patiently, and at the first opportunity they re-annoyed laic circle. The punishment was not late. This cycle has continued like this. Because of this, Turkey has faced with military interventions once per decade and Turkey's history has been shaped by those interventions.

This chapter reviews the concept of *irtica*. It examines Turkish political history from the aspect of *irtica* debates. It looks at the deep roots of the word *irtica*, and it scrutinizes the conceptualization of the word. Then the chapter examines the political usages of *irtica*. It attempts to show how *irtica*'s current meaning has been developed and how it has been used as a tool of political manipulation.

3.2. The Origin and the Usage of the Word '*İrtica*' as a Historical Case

The word *irtica* comes from the Arabic origin of *racea*. It means "turning back to a job, an idea, a place… etc." M. Said Hatiboğlu (2007) says that the word originally had a positive meaning, such as 'obtaining something that you have lost'. (9-10) However, it has developed a negative meaning over time. Mithat Pasha was the first to use the word in a negative context. He labeled the uprising that broke out after the declaration of the Ottoman Basic Law (*Kanun-i Esasî*). However, the word *irtica* did not come into force in the strict sense until the era of Union and Progress. Thus, from this time forward, *irtica* shed all its positive connotations, and became wrapped up in a political identity. (Demir 2011, 38-9) It began to be used as the synonym of obscurantism. This new usage was similar to the French word '*réactionnaire*' (reactionary). Historically, the word reactionary was used to describe those who opposed the French Revolution "by insisting upon a restoration of clerical privilege and bourgeois rule and by clamoring for a restoration of monarchy itself". (Ogg 1913) The Oxford English Dictionary gives a similar definition: opposing political or social progress or reform. (Oxford Dictionary's Website) So, the word 'reactionary' in English and the word '*mürteci*' -which is derived from *irtica*- in Turkish indicate the same negative and political meaning.

In Turkey, "the concept of *irtica* has always been on agenda; it has been used as a means of political blaming. However, there has not been any written definition of the word in any official texts." (Çiçek 2010) This detection is significant in showing a state tradition coming from the age of CUP. As we mentioned above, Unionists first used *irtica* in politics, and then this became a tradition. It was also a very useful vehicle to remove Islamists from politics. So, the founders of the republic also clung to *irtica* discourse tightly.

Indeed, the Republic of Turkey created a very indistinct definition of *irtica*, within a very indistinct framework of laicism. (Demir 2011) In order to understand the word in the republican context, the comments of the Head of the State Council following the Council attack is quite significant. She said: "*İrtica* is any movement that is against Atatürk's tenets and revolutions." (Milliyet 10.05.2007) This is a very enlightening definition as it reveals the perception of *irtica* in laicist circles. To gain

a more comprehensive understanding of *irtica*, we should look at the deep roots of the modernization and Westernization adventure, which began with the Ottoman State.

3.3. Emergence and Spread of İrtica Discourse in the Ottoman Era

Modernization adventure of the Ottoman State started with the military defeats that it experienced against Western states. It is not possible that the deep effects of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and at least the Industrial Revolution would not have had any impact on Ottomans. Modernization wave spread through Ottoman lands, especially after the state experienced land-loss at the hands of Europe. Because of this, Ottoman modernization took the form of Westernization, and occurred as a result of a defensive instinct. Ottoman rulers saw the danger of corruption of the state's integrity, so they imposed modernizing reforms in an effort to save the state. Briefly, modernization was introduced to the Ottoman state's agenda not because of the demands of the people, but because of external factors that forced the State to change. As a natural consequence, the initial reforms aimed to transform military and state structure to save the State. However, the modernizing reforms gained a social dimension via *Tanzimat*. From that point forward, the reforms were aimed at the people and the transformation of society. (Gencer 2008, 356-7) [2]

The emergence of *irtica* discourse coincides with the secularism adventure; and secularism adventure which begins with modernization and Westernization. Indeed, secularism was not Republican idea. Rather it was a continuation of the Ottoman past. Secularism began with *Tanzimat*, declared in 1839, and has spread ever since. The word *Tanzimat* can be translated as 'regulations' (Mardin 2000, 3), but we prefer to use the non-translated version; because it also identifies a separate era.

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[2] For detailed information about modernization and Westernization process in the late Ottoman era from a historical perspective, see: Ahmad 2008; Karpat 2012; Karpat 2006; McCarthy 1997.

Tanzimat equated non-Muslims with Muslims before the law, at the outset. During the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1871), the domain of the Shari'a was restricted. The family law was the only field remained in which Shari'a was in effect. For the first time, Shari'a was coded, like European law codes. *Tanzimat* brought a secular monolithic law system instead of the binary system, in which Shari'a existed hand in hand with the decrees of the sultan. Although the traditional courts were not abolished, secular *Nizamiye* courts were established nearby. Thus, the cases of both Muslims and non-Muslims were held in the same courts. The death penalty as an automatic punishment for apostasy under Shari'a was abolished. People were set free under the law to change their religion. The newly introduced penal code, commercial code and maritime trade code were also rearranged to give some rights to non-Muslims. For the first time in Ottoman history, foreigners were allowed, by law, to own land within the State. (Zürcher 2004, 61)

The secularization attempts of *Tanzimat* were seen not only in the legal system, but also in education. Plenty of primary (*rüşdiye*) and secondary (*idadiye*) schools and a few *lycée*s (*sultaniye*) were established under the new Regulation for Public Education in 1869, which was ordered on the recommendations of the French Ministry of Education. Those who completed this process of education could then proceed with professional training. There were three main colleges similar to today's universities: *Mekteb-i Harbiye* (military school), *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (civil service school), and *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye* (medical school). Students of these schools received a secular education. After graduation, they became the intellectual elites of the Ottoman State. (Zürcher 2004, 62-63) The intellectuals educated in those schools, especially in *Tıbbiye*, tended to follow materialist and Darwinist schools of thought, and rejected religion. They believed materialism was the path to development. Underdevelopment was regarded as the most notable problem of the Ottoman State, and intellectuals considered materialism to be its solution. (Doğan 2005, 397) Under the influence of these thoughts, they became secular-minded and anti-religion. In the

following years, they prepared the philosophical background for Kemalist revolutions. [3]

In addition to the changes mentioned above, *Tanzimat* regulations also impacted clothing. Fezzes and suits, which were the uniform of officers a decade before Tanzimat, began to spread. Clothes obscure which religious affiliation people held. The *Tanzimat* law equated subjects in clothing too, irrespective of religious position. (Quataert 1997, 403) This was an inception in secularization and Westernization of dressing. Of note is the fact that men, not women, were the first who had to embrace secular styles of dress.

Before the *Tanzimat* era, professions such as magistracy, historiography, government agency, astrology, school-mastering and religious mastership were held by *ulema* (Islamic scholars). During *Tanzimat*, this changed, and "most of the positions normally staffed by the *ulema* were gradually filled by secular employees of the state" What's more to the point "was the fact that the structure and function of many of the slots filled by the secular employees had also changed." (Mardin 2006, 261) It would have been awkward to appoint those who trained in secular schools under secular curriculum to traditional institutions and positions. So, the institutions also became secularized. For instance, Islamic courts were replaced with secular ones and k*adı* became judge. Islamic *medrese* were replaced with secular schools, and *hoca* became teacher. Thus, the literate class changed in form. The old literate class of *ulema* left its place to new literates who educated in newly-established *Tanzimat* schools. They would become the pioneer Young Turks, and forefathers of the laic republic.[4]

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[3] The graduates of Hamidian secular schools brought the end of Hamidian regime. Their mentality moved to state administration during CUP era. They also affected M. Kemal. He followed the same with them in modernization, Westernization and secularization.

[4] Young Turks and their political era has been examined in detail by notable scholars. Erik J. Zürcher got his PhD with a study on Young Turks' effects on National Independence Movement. (1984). In this study Zürcher focuses on the difference between young Ottomans and Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal's position in CUP, Unionists' role in national independence war, separation of M. Kemal's road from Unionists', and abolition of Unionists. Zürcher then makes another study on Young Turks. This time he focuses on Young Turk heritages to Republic; how M. Kemal was affected from them ideologically. He emphasizes on positivism, militarism, nationalism, state centrism, social engineering and other concepts identified with Young Turks. (Zürcher 2010)

Zürcher (2004) notes that "the reform policies of *Tanzimat* had never been based on popular demand. They were imposed on Ottoman society because the leading bureaucrats deemed them necessary, or because they were forced to act by the representatives of great powers. […] Support for the reforms was therefore never broadly based". (66-67) He also mentions Muslim reactions against reforms, especially after *Islahat Fermanı*. He states that they saw the reforms as being carried out by Westernists for the benefit of Christians.

Young Ottomans were at the top of the list of critics of *Tanzimat*. However, their criticism was different from that of ordinary subjects. Young Ottomans have a notable place in Turkish modernization history. As Şerif Mardin puts it, "there is hardly a single area of modernization in Turkey today, from the simplification of the written language to the idea of fundamental civil liberties, that does not take its roots in the pioneering work of the Young Ottomans". (Mardin 2000, 4) They appeared in the 1860s. Although they are sometimes confused with Young Turks, they have a different mentality that is based on the idea of modernism merged with Islam.

Young Ottomans supported modernizing regulations of *Tanzimat*, but they did not find *Tanzimat* regulations enough. They demanded more freedom for the people and more limitations for the sultan. Besides, a constitutional parliament was among their demands. (Mardin 1991, 87; Berkes 1978)

According to Young Ottomans, *Tanzimat* was a mean Western mimicry restricted to the area of culture. They claimed that *Tanzimat* was deprived of a philosophical ground. Because of this, *Tanzimat* regulations were not able to come to a conclusion. Young Ottomans wanted to fill this gap with Islamic philosophy, forging a synthesis between Islam and the West. (Mardin 1991, 88-89) Again with Mardin's (2000) words, "any serious attempt to re-inject Islam into the foundations of the Turkish state, were it to appear today, would also have to look back their time". (4)

Feroz Ahmad is another name who studied Young Turks' political formation, Comittee of Union and Progress, and its effects on Turkish political life for his doctorate degree. (2010)
Besides see: Karpat 2010b; Ramsaur 2011; Mardin 2012; Ahmad 1999.

Looking back to the Young Ottomans to trace the history of not only modernization but also the re-injection of Islam may seem contradictory. However, Mardin (2000) says it was not a contradiction. He states that "the Young Ottomans were at one and the same time the first men to make the ideas of the Enlightenment part of the intellectual equipment of the Turkish reading public and the first thinkers to try to work out a synthesis between these ideas and Islam." (4) Young Ottomans believed the fundamentals of democracy appeared in Islamic politics. Because of this, they used the terms and expressions of Islamic politics in their writings. (Mardin 1991, 89)

Tanzimat did not succeed in closing the gap between the centre and the periphery. On the contrary, the gap widened. The ex-separation between the rulers and the ruled turned into a new separation of 'polite' *A la France* statesmen and 'rude' countrymen. At the basis of this new separation was a difference in cultures. On the one hand, there was French culture; and on the other, there was Islamic culture. The Young Ottomans wanted to eradicate this distinction and to remove cultural separation. They used modern-journalism toward this aim. They supported countrymen against snobbish French epigones. They refused elitism and adopted the idea of 'for the people'. Thus, they became the pioneers of the promulgation of the *Meşrutiyet* (Constitutional Revolution). (Zürcher 2004, 72; Mardin 1990)

Despite the struggles of Young Ottomans to merge Islam and the West[5] in order to make modernization suitable for the Ottoman state, positivism became the rising ideology of the *Tanzimat* era. Materialist thought found many supporters in intellectual circles. *Tanzimat* schools became the source of positivism and materialism. This formed the basis of Young Turks and the founders of the republic. (Hanioğlu 2008a, 100-101)

Examining *Tanzimat,* it is evident that the primary goal was to bind non-Muslims, who were partial to separatism by remaining under the influence of the nationalism movement, to the Ottoman state. To achieve this goal, the state provided

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[5]For detailed information about Young Turks and their struggle to merge Islam with Western values, see Mümtaz'er Türköne's book "*Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*" (The Birth of Islamism as a Political Ideology). (1994)

legal equality to Muslim and non-Muslim subjects through the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber (*Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu)*. However, this attempt remained insufficient as separatist movements did not lose steam. Then a constitutional system was put forth as a solution, but the First Constitutional Revolution, which provided an assembly of nearly fifty percent non-Muslim representatives, could not meet demands. As a result, Sultan Abdulhamid II prorogued the assembly indefinitely, after only eleven months in operation. (Zürcher 2004; Gencer 2008, 357) This was the beginning of the Hamidian Era.

The reign of the Hamidian regime lasted thirty years. During this time, Sultan Abdulhamid changed the state's policy. He favored Muslim subjects over non-Muslim ones. To protect the unity of the state, he used his position as Caliph to try to keep people under the framework of the caliphate. Muslim Anatolian and Arabic territories had been ignored until this point, but Abdulhamid bestowed importance upon these lands and tried to establish loyalty to the unity of the Ottoman state by using Islam as the binding element. (Gencer 2008, 357-8) [6]

Up until nineteenth century in the Ottoman state, the folks were expected to act as obedient subjects, but, because of the new conjuncture, the ruling elite needed to transform the previously obedient passive subjects into active citizens who would support them. During the Hamidian reign, this need intensified, because, European lands were lost. The remaining lands belonged to Muslim folks, such as Turks, Arabs and Kurds. If they fell into the wind of nationalism, the 'sick man' would die soon. Abdulhamid understood this, and saw caliphate as the last remedy. (Deringil 2007, 65-71; Zürcher 2004, 79) He struggled for keeping Muslim folks together around the caliphate. In this way, he aimed to protect territorial unity of the state.

In order to reach the most remote districts of the Ottoman lands, Abdulhamid used all available means. He established a network of communication via telegraph, a network of transportation via railroad, and a network of education by increasing the number of schools. While the telegraph provided him a way of knowing what was

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[6] For detailed information about the transformation of Islam and modernity from the times of Abdülhamit onward, see: Karpat 2001. The book mentions about Islamic revivalism, Pan-Islamist movements, press's role in identity transformation, etc.

For Islamism ideology and most effective Islamist intellectuals, see: Kara 2011.

going on in the periphery, railroads provided faster transportation in cases of emergency. At the same time, schools were trying to create Ottoman identity and loyalty. Thus, nearly every corner of the state became 'reachable' both physically and mentally. (Deringil 2007; Zürcher 2004, 77-78)

In the reign of Abdulhamid II, while modernization proceeded at full speed in technical matters, there was a return to Islam in culture. The Sultan believed in both "religion and science" (Osmanoğlu 1986, 25), so he tried to provide both in the schools he initiated. However, he could not prevent the rise of opponents to the Hamidian regime in those schools. Zürcher (2004) explains this as such:

Abdulhamid's major weakness was his failure to instill loyalty in the new generations of bureaucrats and officers, the Ottoman intelligentsia, which his own expanded educational institutions were producing. […] The new generations being trained in schools like *Mülkiye* and *Harbiye* (War Academy) continued to be attracted by the liberal and constitutional ideas, as well as Ottoman patriotism, of the Young Ottomans…(85-6)

In the year 1889, four Military Medical School students established a secret society, called *İttahad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti*. (Zürcher 2004, 86) They wanted to bring constitutional parliament back. They defended the brotherhood of peoples under the framework of a liberal federative state system. (Gencer 2008, 359) This ideal was reflected in the name of the society: *İttihad-I Osmanî*, which meant unification of Ottomans. One of the leaders of the Young Turks, Enver Pasha explained this ideal as such: "we cured the Sick Man. Hereafter there are no Bulgarians, no Greeks, no Wallachians and neither Jews nor Muslims. We are brothers, who equally proud of being Ottomans" (Gencer 2008, 359)

The *İttihad-ı Osmanî* society grew secretly. Some of its members were exiled in Europe, where they printed publications that spoke against the Sultan. Then the society changed its name to *İttihat ve Terakkî Cemiyeti* (Committee of Progress and Union –CUP). (Zürcher 2004, 87) The committee sheltered many different people from many different nationalities with many different jobs and many different ideals,

from Islamism to nationalism and unity to decentralization. They coalesced around one main idea: opposition to Sultan Abdulhamid II, and one main target, re-promulgation of *Meşrutiyet*.[7]

From its establishment onward, CUP did not -and could not- remain bound to its initial ideals, because of both its polyphonic nature and several external reasons. Through separation of liberals and elimination of Islamists[8], CUP came under the effect of its positivist leaders, especially Ahmet Rıza, who was an ex-statesman in exile. (Mardin 2006, 165)

In due course, CUP evolved, and wrapped up in a nationalist identity. Here, there was an undeniable effect of the slide of society's center from Paris to Salonika, where military officers and some law-rank civil servants gathered. The enthusiasm for action was at the top level in the Salonika group. Thus, the second Constitutional Revolution was caused by this military group.

In July 1908, *Meşrutiyet* was re-promulgated by the Sultan, who was forced to do so. The new government comprised of CUP members, however, they did not run in the elections under as the CUP party. Rather, CUP was operating surreptitiously.

From Tanzimat forward, we observe a social engineering project that aimed to transform society. Westernized statesmen struggled for a total Westernization of society under the mask of meeting the requirements of the age. However, Westernization began in the shape; and could not go beyond. Republic lasted this tradition more sharply. It stocked with the shape. Although the republic rejected the total Ottoman past, it followed the same path with the last-age Ottoman statesman, who came from especially CUP tradition.

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[7] (Zürcher 2004), (Aydın 2009)
[8] (Kuran 2000), (Mardin 2012), (Petrosyan 1974), (Ramsaur 2011), (Hanioğlu 1995), (Aydın 2009)

3.3.1. Adopted Part of a Rejected History: March 31 Event (April 13, 1909)

Although researchers today begin studying Republican history from the last age of the Ottoman state, the republic rejected the entire Ottoman past at the outset. The things that were taught as history were only negative examples and events that strengthened Republican discourse. One –the best known– of them was the March 31 event.

Soon after the promulgation of the 2nd *Meşrutiyet*, in early 1909, things became unstable once again. The instability began with the murder of Hasan Fehmi, who held one of the sharpest pens opposing CUP. The event grew and spread. The disturbed circles, who were not content with the policies of CUP, organized movements. On the night of April 12, 1909, the 4th hunter battalion, which was in charge of protecting *Meşrutiyet*, rebelled. This initiated large scale events, known as March 31. [9]

March 31 is like a brand in Turkish political history. Its name is identified with *irtica*. Indeed, the word *irtica* was used in a political context for the first time in this event. (Koçak 09.11.2009) D. Mehmet Doğan, who is the writer of the Grand Turkish Dictionary, attracts attention to the selection of the word *irtica* in order to describe the event. According to him, it was a deliberate choice. CUP supporters might have called the event as the Turkish equivalent of the word 'reaction'; but they did not. Instead, they chose to call it *irtica*, which was a word in force in Islamic history that had been used to define the return from Islam to the pre-Islamic age of ignorance. Namely, *irtica*'s negative meaning had been engraved in people's minds. So, CUP capitalized on the associations of the word. In other words, opposing CUP policies was equated with the biggest sin of all turning back from Islam, terminologically. (Doğan 2007, 34)

Choosing a word from Islamic terminology (*irtica*) provided CUP two adventages. First, the Unionists increased their verbal effect by using a word from Islamic terminology for an event which they qualified as Islamic reaction. Thus, this

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[9] (Zürcher 2004, 95-99), (Demir 2011), (Aslan 2010)

expression entered daily life with all its negative connotations. Second, they shot religion by its own gun; they dominated over their Islamic counterparts by keeping control of their language. Thus, the Unionists gained physiological dominance as well. In addition, they blamed Islamists for being supporters of obscurantism and backwardness. In this way, they sidelined Islamists by default, without any intellectual argument. They did not view Islamists as 'progressives'; so, the label *irtica* assured them of an easy elimination of Islamists. (Demir 2011, 60)

Despite the turning of the century, and despite all the research on this era, there is no single accepted view of the March 31 event. It was recorded in educational as a 'Shariatist' and 'obscurantist' movement held against *II. Meşrutiyet*. (Alkan 2009, 395) There are some scholars who share this official historical view, however many studies show that there are many reasons ranging from economical to social, from political to militaristic motivating the event. Particularly of the late, some scholars have assrted that Marc 31 was a direct consequence of the separation within the army. (Koçak 09.11.2009) By hook or crook, the important thing here is that association of March 31 with *irtica* in minds. In this way, it would not be incorrect to begin the history of *irtica* discourse in the Republican age with the March 31 event.

Taking a brief look at what was going on just prior to the event, CUP policies were frustrating many different parts of society, among whom were both socialists and liberals. (Alkan 14.11.2011) Among the reasons for this frustration were CUP's regarding itself as the one and only owner of *Meşrutiyet*, and its describing itself as a 'sacred' society. (Aslan 2010, 3)

Although CUP was not part of the government as a political party, it had its hand in government dealings constantly interfering in the government's work. Its influence increased as CUP gained staff positions at each level of the state. This even disturbed those within CUP society. So, there became an opposition from within also. (Aslan 2010, 3-4)

Soldiers also complained about the irresponsible attitudes of CUP. They blamed CUP officers for refusing to allow them to pray. (Aslan 2010, 5) Soldiers

were also frustrated at being separated based on whether or not they graduated from military school. CUP decided to remove non-graduates from the military. This was the most significantevent behind the triggering of the March 31 rebellion. (Özgürel 2009, 172)

Then as it is now, the press was the most effective channel of expression for ideas. When CUP disagreed with the stories being run, it oppressed oppositional newspapers and magazines. In such a tense environment, political assassinations–for example, the murder of Hasan Fehmi–were the last straw. First, his funeral "turn[ed] into a mass demonstration against the Committee". (Zürcher 2004, 96) Then came the rebellion of the 4th troop, which was brought from Rumelia to guard *Meşrutiyet*. In fact, the 4th troop was considered loyal to CUP. The Committee brought the troop to protect its position within the government, but it turned out that the rebellion was fueled by this troop. With the support of other troops, *medrese* students, the association of *İttihad-ı Muhammedî*–which was established by the famous Dervish Vahdeti–the supporter of *Ahrar Fırkası*–which was the party of Prens Sabahattin– and ordinary citizens, the rebellion grew. Basically, the goal was to intimidate the society leaders and replace some CUP officers, and including the grand vizier and several other ministers. In this way, they aimed to end CUP's power over both the military and politics.[10]

The rebellion grew in days. The crowd plundered *Tanin* newspaper–known as the publication agency of CUP–and killed some military school graduates and CUP members. A fear of death gripped unionists and they hid underground or fled Istanbul. The government resigned and a new cabinet was formed. These events combined made CUP leadership wary. It mobilized in the provinces to convince people that *Meşrutiyet* was in danger and equipped an army called the Action Army (*Hareket Ordusu*). Sultan Abdulhamid did not allow his commanders to fight the Action Army on account of the fact that he did not want more bloodshed among Muslims. As a result, the Action Army marched into Istanbul on April 24. Zürcher (2004) defines this event as "occupation" (97). Özgürel (2009) adds that it was similar to foreign occupation.(173) There were severe clashes between the Action

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[10](Zürcher 2004, 96), (Aslan 2010, 10-1), (Demir 2011, 77-80), (Sarıca 1983, 232)

Army and the rebels. Many people died on both sides. A witch-hunt, particularly for turbaned *medrese* students, ensued. Abdulhamid was dethroned and exiled in Salonika. *Yıldız* Palace was looted; hundreds of boxes of official documents were burned. In the end, the army took control of the city. Martial law was proclaimed. The courts of martial law decided to hang many people associated with the opposition. There were also hundreds of banishments and imprisonments. Opposing newspapers and magazines were closed and their writers were punished. In the end, CUP re-captured power, this time more strongly than before. [11]

In fact, the *Ahrar Fırkası*, and *ulema*, both of which were accused of provoking the events, tried to ease tensions from day one, but to no avail. Zürcher (2004) notes that "the leaders of *Ahrar* tried without success to turn the rebellion into a purely anti-CUP affair and to prevent it from moving into a reactionary, anti-constitutionalist and pro-Abdulhamid direction." Similarly, but going further, "the higher ranking *ulema* […] never supported the insurrection and, from 16 April onwards, openly denounced it"(97).*Ulema* issued various declarations in which they demanded that soldiers give up occupation and return to their barracks, where they could carry on in their normal roles as soldiers. They sent representatives to troops in an attempt to dissuade them. These representatives warned the soldiers that they might be used by provocation competents (*erbab-ı fitne ve fesad*). In other words, *ulema* acted prudently to prevent the situation from worsening. (Demir 2012, 316)

March 31officially became an event of *irtica* at the demands of the masses. The crowd shouted, "We want Shari'a!". Consider that Shari'a rule was still in operation, some claim that the request for Shari'a was really a request for justice. (Özgürel 2009, 172) Some other scholars say that March 31 was a showdown within the army. (Koçak 09.11.2009; Demir 2011, 78-9) Another group asserts that rebels, disturbed by *Meşrutiyet*, wanted the establishment of Shari'a law. Others claim that it was provocation from foreigners.(Avcıoğlu 1969)

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[11](Zürcher 2004, 96-97), (Aslan 2010, 19-21), (Demir 2011, 80), (Yıldız 2006), (Özgürel 2009, 172-173)

As stated, diverse research was done and could still be done. Every perspective may be true in a sense. Indeed, comments on March 31 change in accordance with the worldview of the commenter. However, it is a fact that the event is inscribed in the minds of the people alongside the tem *irtica* beginning primary school. The appearance of March 31as an event of *irtica* in school books occurred right after the dethronement of Abdulhamid. Similarly, in schoolbooks, Hamidian reign was considered the era of *istibdat*. This kind of history-telling inherited to Republic also. (Alkan 2009, 395-6)

The slogan "we want Shari'a" is a significant element of March 31. Here, D. Cenk Demir (2011) makes a very notable comment:

> Why the Republic annunciates us the demand or the shouting of "we want Shari'a!", which it want to hear from its 'other'? … Was the demand "we want Shari'a!" the only voice of March 31 event? … Why not other voices of other demands, but only "we want Shari'a!" were heard? … Indeed Republic approaches its other with the voice that it wants to hear. … From the aspect of power relations, this voice does not belong only to 'other', but also to itself. (81-2)

In other words, the writer tries to explain that since the republic is the writer of history, it is dubbing its 'other' by itself. In this way, it introduces its "other" however it sees fit and is able to shape its other with its own hands. Here, the "other" is deprived of a voice of its own. We hear its story only from the Republican mouth. This shows us the importance of history and how otherization is achieved.

3.3.2. The Father of Coups D'état: Sublime Port Raid

March 31 provided CUP with more power in government after the dethronement of Abdulhamid. However, the opposition was also getting stronger. During the 1912 elections (known as the "election with sticks"), CUP won with

violence. Now, the whole chamber was obedient to CUP. This increased disturbance among the military. The opposition group was organized under the name *Halâskâr Zabitan* (Rescuer Officers). They submitted a memorandum to the CUP-adherent government. As a result, the CUP cabinet resigned and a new cabinet was formed. This new cabinet held CUP accountable for the political chaos in the state. In order to end its control of the government, it dissolved the assembly.

After the eruption of Balkan War, the government ran into difficulty. On the one hand, there enemies came very close to Istanbul; on the other, CUP propagated that this was the fault of the incapable government. By the means of CUP-adherent press, it was spread that the government left Rumelia including Edirne, one of the ex-capitals of Ottoman State, to the hands of enemies. At the beginning of January 1913, Unionists started to talk about taking down the government. They decided to take action on 23th of January; because they supposed that the government declared the lost of *Edirne* on that day. They planned to provoke people against government by using the lost of *Edirne*. However, government did not left *Edirne* to Bulgarians. Yet, this did not affect the previous plan. (Hür, 24.01.2010) On January 23, 1913, CUP staged a coup, which was called Sublime Port Raid (*Bâb-ı Âli Baskını*). A Unionist officer, Yakup Cemil, shot the minister of war. Unionists ordered the rest's imprisonment and forced the grand vizier Kamil Pasha to resign. (Zürcher 2004, 99-108) He signed his resignation under a gun leaned on his head. He wrote that he resigned because of the the demand of military. However, coup makers did not contended with this statement. They force Kamil Pasha to add 'the demand of people' to his letter. Hence, the action of taking power by gunforce was presented as a popular revolution. (Hür 24.01.2010)

Unionists informed provinces by telegraph that Kamil Pasha government left Edirne to Bulgarians, and because of this, it was taken down by the people. Coup makers appointed to vital positions in the new government. They declared martial law immediately. Many dissenters were hanged. A reign of oppress and terror started under the leadership of Unionists. One interesting point about Sublime Port Raid was this: although the coup was held by leaning on the alleged reason of loosing Edirne, the Unionist government truly left Edirne to Bulgarians. (Hür 24.01.2010)

Sublime Port Raid entered in books and articles as the pinnacle of coups. It was the takeover of an elected government via military force. It came from military's over-involvement in politics. This would become one of the main obstacles to democracy that also existed in the Republican Era. Military has regarded itself the right to control elected governments. In other words, similar to the all other distinctive characteristics of Turkish politics, the base of the coup tradition, too, has its roots in CUP era.

3.3.3. CUP Heritage to the Republic

Although CUP was in power from 1908 to 1918, the Young Turk mentality lasted for decades afterwards. In order to highlight this fact, Zürcher (2004) names the era 1908-1950 as the Young Turk Era. (92)

Mustafa Kemal joint Unionist ranks in 1907. He attended the Unionist meeting in 1909 as the delegate of Tripoli. He was at the head of Salonika brunch of the committee. However, he had an unending controversy with Enver Pasha, who is one of the most effective leaders of CUP. (Hür, 12.05.2013) He could not rise as much as he wanted in the committee. Once he got the power after the declaration of Republic, he purged all Unionists from state administration step by step. Although this is the case, it cannot be denied that Mustafa Kemal acted with Unionist mentality when he was making Kemalist revolutions.

The founders of CUP called themselves Young Turks (*Jöntürkler*). The phrase 'Young' in the name represented innovativeness. This phrase was passed down from Young Ottomans, who took inspiration from German and French innovators. The 'young' movements in all states at stake were the defenders of 'new' against old. (Bulut 2011) Although the Young Turk movement started in the wake of the Young Ottoman movement, it evolved into a new form within a few years. The Young Ottoman's religious thoughts and ideas about making a synthesis of Islam and West left their place to materialist and positivist ideas of Young Turks. Şerif Mardin notes that this mentality embodied by two intellectual figures: Namık Kemal and Ahmet Rıza. He states that "the fundamental substructure of the political thought of

[…] Namık Kemal had been the belief of natural law as an emanation of God". However, Ahmet Rıza thought that everything, including politics, was bound by the laws of nature, and "without 'nature's assistance' nothing [could] be accomplished". Namely, the "natural law" in Namık Kemal's thoughts was "displaced by a concept of an invariable relation between 'things'" in Ahmet Rıza's. This positivism and "the inclination to positive sciences" became "an important aspect of the fundamental ideology of Republic" then. Besides, Ahmet Rıza's positivistic ideas shaped the intellectual background of Kemalism. (Mardin 2006, 166-7)

Another point where in the Young Turks differed from the Young Ottomans was the insufficiency of the previous in intellectuality. Their philosophical background was not substantial. Mainly they were formed of students of Military Medical School. Although they were publishing newspapers and political magazines, they were not truly intellectuals. They were men of action, not of thought. (Aydın 2009, 124) Their use of Islamic themes also lacked an intellectual point of view. Rather, they used Islam as a vehicle for propaganda. Similarly, the motivating factor behind their opposition to Abdulhamid was not their intellectual stand. Rather, it was "more closely related to their work world than to their intellectual world". According to Şerif Mardin (2006), there was "a more persuasive and long-lasting cause of their [the Young Turks'] discontent –linked, of course, to the pervasive ideology of the preservation of the state but prior to it in terms of sequencing – was their attempt to construct the set of desirable institutions and values that would enable them to achieve their major goal of building a strong state." He states that "the dissonance created between models that they [Young Turks] considered anachronistic and new strategies made possible by modernity seems to have been major propellant of their frustration that led them to organize against the Sultan." (183)

In his article called "The two CUPs: Two Separate Mentalities, Two Separate Policies", Suavi Aydın makes a determination similar to Mardin's. According to Aydın, what is known today as the Young Turk Revolution was not made by -what he called as- the first CUP, which was formed by pen-competent intellectuals. Rather, it was made by the second CUP, members of which were military activists.

Although the first CUP members also related to military -they were trained mostly in Military School and Military Medical School, attached to positivism, materialism and social Darwinism, and were supporters of secularism-, they were different from the second CUP members in intellect. Suavi Aydın claims that there was, indeed, no organic bind between the two CUPs. The only reason they shared a name was because of the second CUP's desire to bind itself to the constitutionalism. Through that, it expected to gain legitimacy among the people. Even the core of their organizations was different. While the first CUP was organized in Paris, the second one was located in Salonika. The second group was organized spontaneously and lacked intellectual leaders. The group in Paris wanted to benefit from their enthusiasm, and so invited them in. However they were unable to lead the Salonika group. Action began to precede thought. "From now on", says Aydın, "Salonika would act and Paris would watch.[…] This group of military officials would give a direction to CUP". He adds that "the change in the [Young Turk] movement in such a direction determined the main frame dominated to the trend of Turkish political history in 20th century" (Aydın 2009, 123-124)

The second CUP represented a new understanding, the republic would inherit. The ideals of 'liberty, equality and solidarity', which together formed the mantra of the Young Turk Revolution, remained as romantic slogans. Parliament turned out to be dysfunctional. Namely, the tradition of making parliament unable to work properly inherited from the times of CUP. Similarly, the mechanisms, such as the military, that could eliminate parliament 'for the survival of the state' when 'necessary' were of other heritages. Turkish nationalism also developed from those times. In Aydın's words (2009), "the republic was a fruit of a military modernization movement under nationalism's assistance". (128) Therefore, it is very important to understand the CUP movement, and its ideas and actions in order to properly assess the republic.

Although there was no strong intellectual background to CUP's actions, there were certain motives, one of which was positivism. Understanding positivism is a significant step in comprehending not only CUP, but also the Republican understanding of politics and the Republican revolution's base. Positivism, which

was founded by Auguste Comte, rejects religion and metaphysics. Accordingly, understanding nature is only possible through reason. There are no supernatural explanations for natural events. Rather, there are laws of nature, which are understood through empirical experiments. The simplest example to demonstrate this is probably the formation of rain. According to positivism, rain isn't formed with the intention to vitalize the earth. Rain materializes when clouds encounter a cold wave of air. In positivism, there are 'how's, not 'why's. Untested information has no value, even in the social sciences. Auguste Comte is regarded as the father of sociology. He applied positivist rules to social life. According to him, like all sciences, social sciences should be based on observation. Data should lead to a certain conclusion. Therefore, it is possible to make scientific deductions about social events by examining history. Here, induction is at stake. Positivism adopts induction as its method for reaching conclusions. [12]

The introduction of Ottoman intellectuals to positivism corresponded with the era of *Tanzimat*. During this time, the concern of science concentrated on the thought that civilization would be possible through clinging to positive sciences. Indeed, positivism was initially considered equal to positive science. It was like being pro-science. Over time, positivism turned into an ideology. Science was equated with religion, which was seen as the source of underdevelopment in the state. Such a love of science wrapped up in a transcendent identity. Science and scientists were blessed. Still, religion was not completely given up. There was a complex understanding about science and religion. Science's presence expanded despite religion, but not without religion; not instead of religion, but together with religion. Since modernization was not a bottom-up project, but instead top-down, and since religion constituted the institutionalized infrastructure of the Ottoman State, a break from religion was not in question until the republic was founded. Republican laicism was more a concrete result of positivist ideology than a politico-philosophical tenet. (Nişancı 2009, 33) In other words, the difference between Turkish laicism and European secularism was in their philosophical substructure. Since the republic

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[12]For detailed information about positivism, see: (Comte 1952), (Comte 1988), (Işın 1985); For detailed information about positivism's place in late the Ottoman-early Republican age, see:(Karaca 2008), (Subaşı 1996), (Hanioğlu 2006).

adopted positivism without placing it on substantial philosophical ground, and since it put more emphasis on 'what was done' rather than 'under which framework it was done,' it applied positivism very roughly, and in a way that was beneficial for the Republican revolution.

The one and most effective positivist science, which deeply impacted CUP, was biological materialism. It was in general equated to positivism. According to this understanding, substance was the basis of life. It rejected metaphysics and tried to explain everything including social events by referring to biological theorems and models. For instance, biology shows us that cells are the building blocks of living organisms. They collaborate –and have to collaborate– in solidarity for the organism to survive. Similarly, according to biological materialists, society is made up of individuals, and what provides the survival of a healthy social life is the collaboration and solidarity among individuals. Namely, life and health –in an organism as well as a society– are dependent on biological balance, not supernatural forces. The CUP members, seized with this new line of thinking mostly in the School of Political Science and the Military Medical School, cut ties with their spiritual roots. They started to consider both nature and politics from a secular point of view. (Nişancı 2009, 35)

Science was never considered a solely scientifically relevant. Rather, intellectuals of the era after *Tanzimat* used science to solve political problems. Similarly, the adaptation of positivism among CUP members was based on their political thought. Since positivism suited their political preferences, they chose to follow it. One of the best examples of this fact is the way that positivism entered to Ottoman state. It entered not via scientific studies, but by way of literature. When it is taken into account that literature was the most effective area of opposition to the regime in the environment of censorship of in the Hamidian era, the political identity of positivism can be better understood. Namely, for Ottoman intellectuals, positivism was a vehicle for neither a scientific study, nor a philosophical occupation. Instead, it was a vehicle of opposition. It was seen as a rescuer that would save the state. By replacing religion with science, positivist intellectuals believed that they could make

the state strong and modern. This understanding was reflected in the Republican period as well. [13]

Şükrü Hanioğlu (2008) says that for CUP intellectuals, all streams of thoughts that gave science priority and that denigrated religion were like fellows. Positivism, social Darwinism, biological materialism, and vulgar-materialism were the most effective streams. Even though among these streams of thoughts, some fed enmity to some other, or at least some contrasted to some other, they were equal in the eyes of CUP. Among these streams, the most effective, according to Hanioğlu, was vulgar-materialism, which was a very rude and populist kind of materialism that was despised by Marxists. Similar to the other streams, it entered the Ottoman state via literature. Journals especially, such as Abdullah Cevdet's *İctihad*, played a huge role in the spread of vulgar-materialism. *Kraft und Stoff*, which was regarded as the "holy book" of vulgar-materialism, was translated into Turkish and sold notably well. The popularity of vulgar-materialism came from its comprehensibility. It was based on scientism, empiricism, and medical innovations. It rejected religion and mysticism. This attracted the intellectuals, who deeply believed that religion was the root of underdevelopment in the Ottoman state. They saw no problem with adopting vulgar-materialism alongside positivism, which was strongly criticized and considered the new religion by vulgar-materialists. (Hanioğlu 2011, 48-56)

Hanioğlu attracts attention to the absence of censorship over vulgar-materialism during the era of Abdulhamid. This was because vulgar-materialism was regarded as a scientific activity. It was presented as the powerhouse, philosophy, and ideology of Western development. This estimation also affected the founding cadre of the republic. After the CUP revolution, vulgar-materialism had greater effect on official policies. However, it was not the one and only determinant. Rather, some vulgar-materialists were removed from government for political reasons. Contrarily, the founding cadre of the republic laid its claim to vulgar-materialism. Mustafa Kemal in particular had a special interest in this stream. He translated vulgar-materialist works. Because of this, vulgar-materialist ideas were easily adopted and

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[13]For detailed information about positivism and its effects on Turkish intellectual life, see also: (Doğan 2006), (Hanioğlu 1981), (Hanioğlu 1985), (Korlaelçi 2002).

permeated school textbooks. Because of this 'achievement' of Mustafa Kemal, some vulgar-materialist thinkers from the Young Turks described him as a "redeemer authority" who bravely applied the ideas that they had been advocating for decades. (Hanioğlu 2008)

Indeed, when adopting this or that ideology or stream of thought, the basic question in the minds of the founders of the republic was not about scientific arguments, but about the position of religion in the newly-established state. They struggled to make science supplant religion. The superiority of science was stressed at every turn (to the point that the "religion of science" became a commonly adopted phrase). We will return to this issue with the discussion of Kemalism. But first, we will have a look at the Republican history of modernization and Westernization.

3.4. Systematization of *İrtica* Threat Discourse in the Republican Era

Modernization was a top-down project imposed by Kemalists on the people of the new Republic of Turkey. The executers of this project did not use the term modernization in its philosophical context, but rather they ascribe it the meaning of Westernization. Namely, modernization is used as the same thing as Westernization and 'reaching the level of contemporary civilizations'. As above, Western world was seen as superior in all respects, so 'contemporary civilization' was actually meant 'Western civilization'.

After World War I, during the War of Independence, Istanbul and the Caliph-Sultan were unofficial captives. This was already the reason for the organization of the National Struggle in a distant place from Istanbul. The Ankara government achieved legitimacy first by capturing Istanbul. It set out aiming to save the Caliph, but ended up completely removing the Caliphate. First, the sultanate was separated from the caliphate; and then the former was abolished on November 1, 1922. Then, on October 29, 1923, the regime was set as republic. Finally, on March 3, 1924, the Caliphate was abolished. Thus, the new republic broke off all ties with the Ottoman State. The founders of the republic began to shape the new state immediately. On the same day of the caliphate's abolition, the education system was taken under state

control by the Unification of Schooling law. Religious schools were its first targets, and were closed down. Scripture classes were also gradually repealed. Again on March 3, the department of Shari'a affairs and pious foundations was resolved. These three important steps, having been undertaken on the same day were the greatest indication of the direction the new state was going. In April 1924, religious courts were withdrawn. In 1925, tariqahs were banned. All large and small dervish lodges and tombs were shut down. In the same year, Hat Law was enacted. (It would not be limited to hats, indeed. Later on, all dressing would be controlled by the law.) In 1926, Swiss civil code was adopted, and there remained no place for religious law. In 1928, the phrase "The religion of the state is Islam" was removed from the constitution. In the same year, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet. In February 1937, the six tenets of the Republic of Turkey, including laicism, were added to the constitution. Briefly, Islam was scratched, step by step, from each level of state and every aspect of social life.[14]

Indeed, the integrative aspects of religion, i.e. Islam, were used during the National Struggle. From organization to action, the National struggle was embellished with Islamic emphasis. The Grand National Assembly was opened with prayers on a Friday. The ceremony was more pious than any other held within an institution in the Ottoman state. Sheikhs and religious pioneers were the ones of whom Mustafa Kemal and his friends asked for support. They attempted to gather those pioneers under the framework of the ideal to save the Caliph. Even Mustafa Kemal himself used Islam at every turn. (Akyol 2008, 137-214; Özgürel 2009, 209-12) This pretentious piety lasted until the military victory. Mustafa Kemal refused to give thanks to God by praying in *Hacı Bayram*, and said that he did not owe such a debt. The phrase '*millet*' was adopted to define Turkishness after the victory, whereas it had been used to define Islamic community previously. Still, according to Mete Tunçay (2010), the real breaking point was the Law on the Maintenance Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). There was a tremendous difference between Turkey-before-the-law and Turkey-after-the-law. The Law of Maintenance Order created a totally different environment from that of the inception of the republic. Tunçay says

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[14] (Zürcher 2004), (Ahmad 2008), (Hanioğlu 2008a), (Shaw and Shaw 2002)

that the law determined the real identity of the republic. All opposition –whether it was within the assembly, outside of the assembly, or in far corner of the country- was quieted. The Republican revolutions came to pass in this era of dictatorship. The obligation to wear a hat, the alphabet switch, the change in calendar, the surname obligation and so on… These changes were all made because of the tyrannical atmosphere of the *Takrir-i Sükun* era. Only a few men dared to oppose this tyranny, and they paid the bill with their lives.

The closure of *medrese, tekke* and *zaviye,* the unification of all schools (later to include *İmam-Hatip*s) under the Ministry of Education, the abolishment of Shari'a law, the enactment of Dress and Hat Laws, the change of alphabet, the establishment of *Diyanet* (the Department of Religious Affairs) under the authority of the Prime Ministry; all of these regulations were carried out with the intention of erasing every trace of Islam from every aspect of life. Religion was also not let free in private realm. On the contrary, it is taken under the total control of the state. (Gülalp 2005, 357) Even the Department of Religious Affairs is established for exactly this reason: to control religion.

Eyüp Sabri Çarmıklı emphasizes an important point about the Department of Religious Affairs in his PhD thesis (2011) on "Secularism in the Kemalist Discourse": "The *Diyanet* is an anomaly in the secular Turkish regime, because it entails paying for the expenses of a certain religion with the taxpayers' money, in exchange for keeping a strict control over that said religion." (14) Although such an institution contradicts with the essence of secularism, Kemalist regime did not regard establishing *Diyanet* inconvenient, because Kemalist laicism was a movement against religion. Thus, Kemalist regime re-drew its own boarders for its own style of secularism.[15]

The role of the *Diyanet* institution was to strike balance between religion and modernity, and prevent the former from contradicting the latter. It was given the mission to "create a tailor-made national modern Turkish-Islam, definitely suppressing the transnational links and role, cut off from all international and

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[15] For deatailed information about Kemalist modernization with its all dimensions, see: Köker 1990; Karpat 1973; Mardin 2008; Zürcher and Atabaki 2004.

transnational ties, specific and limited to the nation-state's official borders that were drawn with the Lausanne Treaty of 1924". (Yılmaz 2005, 388) Yılmaz calls this state-approved version of Islam "Lausannian Islam" (*Lozan İslamı*). (386) Lausannian Islam was a kind of Islam that helped the state in maintaining modernizing reforms, and jailed religion under the supervision of the state. Any attempt of Islam to live outside the borders of Lausannian Islam was regarded harmful. The state did not allow them to survive legally, and label them as illegal. In other words Lausannian Islam under the supervision of the bureaucratic *Diyanet* institution was the only permissible kind of Islam in the new Republic of Turkey.[16]

3.4.1. Kemalism versus Religion

The modernization reforms were aimed at "suppressing religion's political role and regulating its public appearance via state fiat". (Gülalp 2005, 357) After religion was removed from public life, the Republican leaders filled the remaining gap with Kemalism. Kemalism was the foundational philosophy of Republic of Turkey. It was a general name of the total orientations and actions of the new Republican regime.

Haldun Gülalp (2005) explains the role of Kemalism in the new Turkey as such:

> Kemalism aimed to move directly into the space originally occupied by Islam. […]The sacred and unquestionable truths of Islam were replaced by the nationalist (that is, the Kemalist) ones. […] Although Kemalists are accustomed to using 'secularism' as a stick with which to beat the Islamists, Kemalism itself functions as the quasi-religion of 'modern' Turkey. (357)

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[16] *Diyanet* institution was a part of the Kemalist social engineering project. For detailed information, see Yılmaz 2005, Yılmaz 2012 and Yılmaz 2013.

In the modern Turkey, those who are educated are like missionaries[17], according to Gülalp:

> An educated person is burdened with a mission: as an intellectual, s/he feels her/himself duty bound to further the cause of Kemalism, which is described as taking Turkey to the level of modern civilization. This mission consists of spreading 'enlightenment' and fighting 'obscurantism', which is associated with religion in general and Islam in particular. But, because Kemalism is the official version of enlightenment in Turkey, the mission is restricted to the propagation of Kemalist truths. (361)

As seen above, a completely new identity was created. The executers of the Republican revolutions created a notion of 'self'. The Kemalist self identity was constructed as modern, secular, civilized, adherent to the principles of science, supportive of the nation and based on rational thought. (Zeydanlıoğlu and Demir 2010) Religious identity –including Islamic Ottoman past- was located just the opposite of 'Kemalist self'. It was seen as the 'other'. It was characterized as ancient (out of date, in need of transformation, and lacking), spiritual and mystical, uncivilized, dogmatic, in favor of community (*ümmet*) and romantic. Namely, Islamic 'others' were what the Kemalist 'self' was not. They were considered the dark side representing what was old, out of date and backward. The aim of Kemalist modernization project was to 'enlighten' those so-called 'others'. The Republican founders adopted this mission of enlightenment as a necessity for the survival of the state. As such, any member of the 'others' refusing enlightenment needed to be eliminated. To do so, they created a language of fear first. This was not a difficult task because of the existing 'threat of *irtica*' discourse from the Ottoman past. The significance of the creation of such a fear discourse was the power it provided to its creators. The notion of fear provided the Republican founders the opportunity to legitimize their oppressive actions against what they labeled 'reactionary movements '(*irticai faaliyetler*).

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[17] For detailed information about the relationship between Kemalist educated elites and religion, and the Ottoman roots of this relation, see: Karpat 2009.

Kemalists claimed that they rescued people from being subjects of a despotic Sultan, and provided them the honor of becoming equal citizens of a modern state. Now, "the people under the Republican regime were no longer servile subjects, but proud citizens". This bold claim aimed to conceal another Kemalist apprehension, which "regard[ed] people as always needing the Kemalist guidance". Without that guidance, "they would fall for the false propaganda of the reactionary forces (*irtica*), who ceaselessly tr[ied] to destroy Kemalism and take the country back to the Shari'a" (Çarmıklı 2011, 13) The famous Kemalist motto 'for the people, against the people' was the concrete expression of this understanding. Indeed, this motto carried the smell of Orientalism. In this expression, there was disdain. It meant that the 'ignorant' folk would always be in need of Kemalist leadership. It also meant that Kemalists did all they did for the folk to enlighten them, even if the folk was not aware of this yet. The folk's ignorance was the reason of their being against Kemalist revolutions. If they knew, they would not have opposed. Therefore, Kemalists felt it was their duty to educate the folk and to modernize them.

In a sense, "Kemalism is an 'Orientalism from within'". (Çarmıklı 2011, 7) Similar to the white men's burden in Orientalist approach[18], Kemalists overtook the mission of enlightening people by releasing them from the chains of religion.[19]

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[18] The White Man's Burden is a poem written by Rudyard Kipling in 1899 after the Spanish-American War. It becomes the symbol of colonialism and colonialist-mind later on. The poem was as such:

> Take up the White Man's burden--
> Send forth the best ye breed--
> Go bind your sons to exile
> To serve your captives' need;
> To wait in heavy harness,
> On fluttered folk and wild--
> Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
> Half-devil and half-child.
>
> Take up the White Man's burden--
> In patience to abide,
> To veil the threat of terror
> And check the show of pride;
> By open speech and simple,
> An hundred times made plain
> To seek another's profit,
> And work another's gain.
>
> Take up the White Man's burden--

Orientalism, according to Edward Said, whose name is associated with this subject, is "a system of knowledge about the Orient", which is like "an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into West consciousness". (Said 2001, 6) In other words, Orientalism is the tool of the West to see the East as it wants to see. However,

The savage wars of peace--
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hopes to nought.

Take up the White Man's burden--
No tawdry rule of kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper--
The tale of common things.
The ports ye shall not enter,
The roads ye shall not tread,
Go mark them with your living,
And mark them with your dead.

Take up the White Man's burden--
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard--
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:--
"Why brought he us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"

Take up the White Man's burden--
Ye dare not stoop to less--
Nor call too loud on Freedom
To cloke your weariness;
By all ye cry or whisper,
By all ye leave or do,
The silent, sullen peoples
Shall weigh your gods and you.

Take up the White Man's burden--
Have done with childish days--
The lightly proferred laurel,
The easy, ungrudged praise.
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers! (Halsall 1997)

[19] Welat Zeydanlıoğlu studies this topic in detail in his article called "The 'White Turkish Man's Burden: Orientalism, Kemalism and the Kurds in Turkey". (2008)

Orientalism is not used only for seeing the East but also for depicting it. For a further understanding of this issue, the following paragraph may help:

> Orientalism portrayed the East, in our case meaning the Ottoman Turkey, as irrational, ignorant, superstitious, fanatical, barbarous, backward, traditional, fatalistic, lazy, corrupt, inefficient, and ruled by an 'Oriental Despot'. This description of the East was in sharp contrast with that of the West, which was rational, enlightened, scientific, sensible, civilized, progressive, modern, determined to keep its destiny at its hands, hardworking, honest, efficient, and a place where the rule of law reigned supreme.(Çarmıklı 2011, 8)

In other words, Orientalism is a "cultural hegemony" of the West over the East. (Said 2001, 7) [20]

The relationship between Kemalism and Orientalism begins right at this point of 'cultural hegemony'. It appears initially in discourse. Similar to Orientalism, Kemalism also asserts the superiority of not only Western technology but also Western culture. According to Kemalism, Islam is the main factor that leaves 'us' (read it as nation) backward. This perfectly corresponds with Orientalist discourse, which describes Islam as responsible for all that is wrong with the East. Both Orientalism and Kemalism claim that development and progress are dependent on

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[20] Bobby Sayyid (2003) makes a broad analysis and criticism of Edwad Said's Orientalism. He says that Said "illustrates the hostility of orientalism to Islam, his 'counter-writing' is directed towards negating orientalism, but 'the negotiation of orientalism is not the affirmation of Islam'. This has the effect of turning Saidd's negation of orientalism into a negotiation of Islam itself. There is nothing to suggest that he believes that Islam can exist outside the discourse of orientalism." (35) Sayyid separates orientalism into two: weak orientalism, and strong orientalism. According to him, The kind of orientalism that Said deals with is "weak orientalism", which finds its exact definition in another book's name of Said: *Covering Islam: How media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world.* In other words, weak orientalism is about the "representation of the other". (32) However, strong orientalism is about "how orientalism constitutes the Orient". (32) Here orientalism removes from being a mere distortion of Orient's reality, but it turns out to re-creation of Orient. (33) Sayyid highlights the inadequacy of reducing criticisms about orientalism to textual problems. He states that "what is at stake is not whether particular scholars are bad or dishonest, it is not a question of bias; the problem of orientalism is the problem of what space exists for the 'other'." (34) Briefly, Sayyid proposes that what he calls 'strong orientalism' is a matter of imperialism, and it constitutes a power over 'other'. It "is an attempt to write the history of the West", not the East, "through the history of 'other'." (33) West defines what it is, by telling what it is not. West establishes its essence on being non-Eastern, non-Islamic.

getting rid of Islam. (Çarmıklı 2011, 8) The Kemalist modernization process is based on this premise.[21]

Since Kemalism was in support of the Orientalist discourse that claimed Islam was the reason for the state's faults, the first revolution became the elimination of religious identity and the adoptation of laicism as the core tenet. Laicism was seen as the most notable component of modernization because of the belief that contemporary civilizations got their positions by discarding the burden of religion first. Kemalists decided to follow the same path. The Caliphate was one of the first structures to be abolished. Laicism's becoming a tenet came four years later. However, all the other revolutions before laicism -from dress to the unification of schooling- were more or less secular.

The resemblance between Kemalism and Orientalism was no coincidence. It was because of the nature of 'secularization'. As Gülalp described it (2005), "the secularization problematic … arose out of a specific geography and a specific historical period, only to be then generalized to the whole world as if it was a universal problem." (351) In other words, secularization was a historical necessity in a certain location. Western states needed it, so they developed it. The problems began when they wanted to export it because, despite the fact that even Western states experience secularization differently, non-Westerns were not permitted to do so. Instead, "non-Western (post-colonial) societies have been … forced to conform to an imaginary standard of secularization". More frankly, "like the modernization theory of development, the theory of secularization is not only a Eurocentric way of knowing, but also a Eurocentric mode of exerting power globally". (Gülalp 2005, 351) By standardizing in knowledge, Europe declared its power in a sense. From now on, non-Western societies would gain value according to their ability to meet those standards. This is exactly the main view underlying Orientalism. The West is superior; the East is inferior. The East can increase its value only by achieving what

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[21] Bobby Salman Sayyid (2003) describes not only the regime of Turrkey, but also "various Muslim regimes that emerged following decolonization" as Kemalism. He uses the word 'Kemalism' as a total name for describing all secular, modernist, nationalist, Westernist political movements, that aimed to change their society in accordance with Western norms and values. (52-53)

the West requires it to achieve. This nature of secularization is the common factor between Orientalism and Kemalism.

In the newly-established republic, laicism became a sacred belief. This was because of Islam's being "the 'central problem' Kemalism had to deal with. As a rallying point and as a source o f inspiration, Islam was simply too powerful as a potential source of opposition for Kemalism to ignore."(Çarmıklı 2011, 13) As a result, any kind of opposition was labeled pro-Shari'a and *irticacı*. Laicism ate some of the Republic's full children. There were those who were among the founders of the republic and had no problem with laicism but were punished in the name of laicism. For instance, neither *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (TCF), nor *Sebest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (SCF) had any quarrel with laicism. The former was established by liberals, who declared their respect for religion in their party program. This phrase in the party program brought TCF's end. It considered the reason behind the Sheikh Said rebellion. It was closed down, and its members were put on trial. [22] The latter party, SCF, was established at the self-command of Mustafa Kemal. It received unexpectedly enthusiastic support from people within a few days. This was interpreted as people's opposition Kemalist reforms. On account to the prejudice that the party could be the center of *irtica*, it had to abolish itself, again at the self-command of Atatürk.[23]

Laicism was becoming more taboo day after day. It did not resemble European secularisms. Here, Kemalism "underst[ood] that its secularism must [have] be[en] different than either the French laicism or the Anglo-Saxon secularism, because the religion it confront[ed] (Islam) … [did] not present itself an institutional religion with a church, which would help delineate its boundaries." (Çarmıklı 2011, 1) Because of this, Turkish laicism was "assertive" in "exclud[ing] religion from the

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[22] The closure issue of *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* was described in *Nutuk* as such: "How could good-will expected from the ones who hold the tenet of 'the party is respectful against religious opinions and beliefs' as a flag on their hands? Was not this flag the one which had been carried by benefit seekers who deceived ignorant, bigoted and superstitious people? Did not Turkish nation drift into the huge swamps of eternal disasters because of this flag? Did not the aim of the ones who made us believe their being reformists and Republicans provoke nation against innovation by inflaming religious obscurantism?" (Atatürk, atam.gov.tr)
    Besides see: (Zürcher 2003)
[23] For details: (Emrence 2006), (Çavdar 2008)

public sphere and play[ing] an 'assertive' role as the agent of a social engineering project that confine[d] religion to the private domain." (Kuru 2007, 571) However, it went beyond assertiveness. It forbade religion not only in the public realm, but the private realm as well. It took total control of religion, needless to say Islam, through the *Diyanet* institution.[24] It allowed the state to control Islam in order to prevent dispersion of 'dangerous' ideas against Kemalist revolutions, especially laicism. (Çarmıklı 2011, 182)

In Europe, the idea of nationalism was generated to fill the gap left by religion. Like secularism, nationalism was also a standard-packaged imported product. When it entered Ottoman lands, Islam was still in force. Some of the Ottoman intellectuals, who were the admirers of the Western development, did not want to refuse nationalism at first, because it was sourced from the 'admirable' West. So, the first attempts of them were to merge nationalism with Islam. However, after the promulgation of the Republic, Kemalism cut nationalism's ties with religion. Kemalist nationalism was a secularist version of nationalism, as it was in Europe. Here, the paradox was that Kemalist modern nationalism became a religion in itself. (Gülalp 2005, 356)

When it is taken to account that Kemalist leaders were attached to positivism, Kemalism's becoming a quasi-religion was not odd. As stated above, positivism was aiming to form a religion of humanity, with humanity as the God, scientists as prophets, and scientific innovations as miracles. It encountered much criticism because of this attitude.

Kemalism had religious characteristics from the outset. Kemal Atatürk has been described as a half man half God, prophet-like figure. Kemalists thought that it was he who determined the destiny of Turks; he created the nation state. "Just as every religion has a sacred book, so does Kemalism": *Nutuk*.[25] The question "if Atatürk met such a problem, what would have he done?" has become the guiding

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[24] For detailed infromation about the aim of the establihment of *Diyanet,* see: Yılmaz 2005,2012 and 2013.
[25] The same mentality is still valid. For instance, a theatre actress, Gülriz Sururi declared that for her *Nutuk* is the last book that is sent to the Earth. (http://www.haber7.com/guncel/haber/992062-sururi-dunyaya-inmis-son-kitap-nutuk)

light of Kemalists. His words and actions have been emulated like those of a Prophet. His mausoleum "[was] referred even by taxi drivers as 'our *Kâbe*'". Loving Atatürk has been an obligation protected by law. There has always been "a volunteer cadre of Kemalist followers, constantly reminding citizens of what is right and what is wrong in terms of Kemalist truths". There were no intellectual debates and no well-developed ideas. Kemalism became a dogmatic belief system. (Gülalp 2005, 364) Atatürk was at the core of this belief. He was given a very special place. Çarmıklı (2011) explains this as such:

> The image of Atatürk has been so strong in Turkey that he has become an icon, a larger than life figure, a super-human, an exalted figure, a god-like creature. There are ample grounds to argue that reverence of Atatürk has become a modern religion. His mausoleum (*Anıtkabir*) in Ankara is a holy pilgrimage site, visited by hundreds of thousands of hard-liner Kemalists, to seek inspiration from his spiritual presence, to ask for guidance, and as a show of strength. High ranking government officials visit the mausoleum en masse on national days in the morning and sign the visitor's book, always addressing Atatürk in first person, as if he is still alive. When high judges, university professors, or intellectuals, who consider themselves as the heirs to Atatürk's legacy, would like to criticize the government, which is usually from the right and seen as not sincerely and sufficiently Kemalist, they gather, don their official and academic robes, and visit Atatürk's mausoleum, to 'complain' to Atatürk! (3)

Kemalists tried to fill the gap left by religion with Kemalism. Just as Prophet's life had been taught in schools before the Republic, Atatürk's life was taught after that point. Pupils had to memorize Atatürk's Address to Youth, and had to learn his words about almost every issue, instead of Prophet's hadiths. The consequence of such an attitude was described best by an education inspector:

> Our prophet is our Ghazi. We terminated our relationship with that Arabic man. The religion of Muhammad suited to

Arabia; but not to us. [I have a faith, and my faith] is in Ghazi, science, future of my country and myself. (Hanioğlu 22.11.2008)

Behçet Kemal Çağlar re-wrote *mevlüt* (the poem telling the story of the birth of the Prophet) in the name of Atatürk. However, Kemalists did not think it went far enough. According to them, he was equal only to God, not the Prophet. They wrote poems that deified Atatürk. One even wrote an *ezan* in his name. *Çankaya* was compared to *Kâbe*. The six arrows were considered as the six principles of the Kemalist religion. Taken together, there is nothing odd in Kemalists' animosity against Islam. Kemalism was shaped like a religion, not an ideology. So, Kemalists saw Islam as the biggest rival of Kemalism. Hence the reason Kemalists tried to get rid of Islam by force.

Kemalism is not an ideology. An ideology is a system of thought. It is formed of consistent ideas that are shaped around universal premises. They are not limited to any particular community or time. They concern every society, because they deal with universal problems. Kemalism does not meet any of these qualifications. It is not a systemic philosophy. Rather, Kemalism is an "interpretation" of existing ideologies of its time. It is based on the pragmatic choices of Atatürk. So much so that it is still uncertain if Kemalism belongs to the right of left. (Hanioğlu 31.07.2011) Today CHP, seen as the castle of Kemalism, is a member of Socialist International, although it was blamed for being fascist and having fascist-oriented practices.

The most visible point at which Kemalism and Islamism clashed is dress. The Hat Law led to lot of bloodshed. There were at least 20-30 executions in each corner of the state.(Tunçay 03.03.2010) Under the law, everyone was forced to wear a hat. Such a tyrannical application of Hat Law broke the resistance substantially. In the environment of *Takrir-i Sükun* Law oppression, people could not spek against the other Kemalist revolutions, such as the change in alphabet.

Kemalism did not target dressing for dressing's sake; it was a symbol of modernization. The Dress Code aimed to remove Islam from clothes –as it did with many other fields- and to force people into a secular appearance. It is actually "the

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tip of the iceberg of not only gender norms but also broader cultural and political orientations." (Gülalp 2005, 365) Kemalist modernization project also targeted women but not for their sake. The women issue was taken under the framework of nation's perpetuity. Here the main motive behind Kemalist thought about women was this general premise: women raise children and, children form the future of nation. Kemalism was aware of the fact that the way to raise Republican generations was to instill in women the Republican ideals. In other words, Kemalism was primarily concerned with women's maternity. It tried to transform women into secular-minded, secular-sighted, nationalist, Kemalist Republicans who would raise generations with the same ideal. From this aspect, the aim of the ban of veiling and the whole Dress Code in general was "not to free women from social control, but to transform Turkey into a 'civilized nation' acceptable to the West" (Arat 1994, 58)

Kemalism imitated the French in many fields. Kemalist revolutions resembled French Jacbins', who ruled France for a year after the French Revolution. They tried to apply the principles of the revolution to all aspects of life. They created a calendar, re-arranged special days, re-named streets and people. They brought with them a distinguished style of dress, which would become the symbol of a revolutionary. (Kasaba 1997, 24) Likewise, Kemalism altered the calendar with newly-formed Republican special days. Street names were changed to things like Republican Street or Atatürk Avenue. Schools and state institutions too had their share of this name-change. Despite all these, dressing became the most overt battleground of the Republic.

Because of the importance placed on clothing and life style, Kemalist modernization was called 'wardrobe modernization' or 'cosmetic Westernism'. According to Kemalism, "not only what people wore but also where and how they lived, what kind of music they listened to, and even what they ate had to conform to modern norms." (Kasaba 1997, 25) Otherwise, people were not regarded completely modernized and Westernized.

3.4.2. Kemalist Hegemony's Construction of the Best Citizen

As mentioned above, the new state of the Republic of Turkey tried to cut all ties with the past. A new governmental style, new alphabet, new code of dress, new measures, new calendar, new educational system, new religious understanding and so on… All these "new"s aimed to manufacture a new type of citizen who would wrap up Kemalist consciousness. First, let us follow the trail of Kemalist acceptable citizen from civics book, then search for its prints in practice.

Atatürk placed a special importance on education, especially history and civics classes.(Gürses 2010, 234) During the early years of the republic, Turkish history was disconnected from its Ottoman past and was directly connected to Central Asian history. Besides, Atatürk himself made arrangements in the most recent World War and the War of Independence histories, by writing *Nutuk*.

Civics was among the special interest fields of Atatürk. He made Afet İnan – his foster daughter– write a book called Civilized Information for Citizens. He also contributed to the book by writing some parts himself. The book was first published in 1931. It was taught in schools as a compulsory lesson. The book was "the cult text of official citizenship". (Üstel 2004, 218-20) It aimed to imbue students with Kemalist ideas. According to the book, the nation was a community with a common history that believed in the necessity of living together. Religion was not important to be a nation. The book put national consciousness at the fore front of everything. It introduced morality as a consequence of national consciousness. It removed morality from religious sources and bound it to secular nationalism. This meant the establishment of a new sacredness, in which religious consciousness was replaced by national consciousness. According to the book, the military, family and school were responsible for instilling in society national consciousness. (Gürses 2010, 240-42) Here, the idea was that one could and should have moral feelings without needing religion. The nation was to be the source of morality.

In another book called Fatherland Information (*Yurt Bilgisi*), the "acceptable" citizen of the Republic was defined as "civilized" and "patriotic". Such citizenship, according to Republican norms, required a secular morality. (Üstel 2004, 127,175)

This new citizen was very intolerant of diversity, from religious to ethnic diversity, because of an entrenched fear of division. Thus, all types of diversity were deemed "potential enemies threatening the unity and integrity of the state". The Republic constituted its "others" this way; (Alankuş Kural 1995, 87) and, at the top of the list were Islamists and Kurds.

Both of the books mentioned above aimed to create a notion of 'us' within the framework of nationalism. If there is an 'us', then there are 'others'. Republican 'others' or internal enemies were defined as enemies of revolutions and, representatives of the past and its supporters.(Üstel 2004, 209) They were called *mürteci* and introduced as objects of fear and threats to the regime. Religious gathering places (*tekke, zaviye,türbe*) were labeled sources of *irtica*, and religious pioneers (the Caliph, sheikhs, etc.) were considered the reasons for people's ignorance. Hence, a positivist and laicist comprehension of citizenship was manufactured. (Gürses 2010, 244-5)

The republic was building a nation composed of nationalist, Kemalist, Westernized and laic individuals. They should have been pro-republic, supporters of the Republican revolutions. They should have removed religion from being a determiner in each aspect of life; even morality should have been based on secular norms. Not only religious people but also *Alevi*s, non-Muslims and converts were unwelcomed. Racism was not a state policy, but the official language indicated an intolerance of ethnic diversity. Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, and such kind of ethnicity-based words were used, when necessary, as insults. (Sakal 2009, 134) The republic wanted to create a homogenous society loyal through and through to the state.

Füsun Üstel says the ideal Republican 'acceptable citizen' based on two factors: "*civilité*" (civilization) and "*civisme*" (patriotism). The motive behind the behaviors of a civilized, patriotic citizen should be laic morality. The rules of Kemalist laic morality were the keys to reach the level of contemporary civilizations. The "acceptable citizens" of the republic were not civil; instead, they were "militant". The understanding that "there are no rights but duties" applied to each citizen. Being hardworking and honorable, obeying the rules of etiquette, having clean and proper dress, knowing table manners, and such other things were

demanded of an acceptable citizen. These things were introduced as the requirements of being civilized and Western.(Üstel 2004, 174-8, 323) In other words, Westernization is not a matter of free choice, but a duty. One must be modernized and Westernized in order to rank among the 'good guys'. Otherwise, s/he is otherized by the system. To live in peace with the state required obeying its rules; and in the republic, modernization and laicism were rules the same as taxation was.

Kemalist civics books, fatherland information books and other similar books were full of Kemalist norms of morality and the Kemalist way of life. From this aspect, it could be said that Kemalism tended towards a religious-like establishment. Just like Prophet's hadiths, which laid out a proper way of life for Muslims, Kemalist doctrines under Mustafa Kemal's ordered explain the proper life-style of the citizens of the Republic of Turkey. A proper acceptable citizen should have been a Turk in nationality, a non-practicing Sunni Muslim, deist or atheist in religion, laic in spirit and Westernist in ideology. S/he should have also been a supporter of CHP in the political arena. (Sakal 2009, 134) Without this last characteristic, the others listed above did not mean much. For instance, Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes possessed all the qualities above except being pro-CHP, but they could not escaped from being declared as the enemies of the regime.

Such was the case that there was no chance for non-Turks, Alevis, the pious or supporters of opposing ideologies to be accepted by the state. Since these groups constituted the majority, it is not wrong to say that the single party government sided against most of the people. It consciously isolated itself from them. (Sakal 2009, 139-153) The statements like 'people flocked into beaches, citizens cannot go swimming'[26] were the products of such a mentality.

İhsan Yılmaz (2012) formulizes the Kemalist best citizen as LAST. In this formulization, each one of the letters represents a feature of the best citizen: **L -** Laicist, **A** – Ataturkist, **S** – Sunni, **T** – Turk. Laicist means more than mere secularist; rather, it stands for those who were hard liner ultra secularists and who could not bear "public manifestation of Islam even though [they] do not care much

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[26] The statement is attributed to ex-mayor of İstanbul, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay. He was in charge between 1949-1957.

about other religions' public visibility". This is because Kemalist tradition did not regard religions other than Islam a threat for itself. Ataturkism is a softer form of Kemalism. The ones who "love Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, deeply respect him and perceive him as almost infallible" are called Atatürkists. They are not as hard-liners as the way Kemalists are in terms of religion. While Kemalists struggle to erase religion from all aspects of life with a hatred for religion, Ataturkists can be practicing Muslims in their private lives. However, they are also against political visibility of Islam. They love religion as long as it remains traditional with no demands of political life. The Sunni condition of the best citizenry calls for the elimination of Alevis especially. Specifically, it is not a religious necessity; the Kemalist state does not pleased with religious citizens. Because of this, an acceptable Sunni Muslim should be non-practicing; s/he can even be a nonbeliever. Actually, "being a Sunni Muslim only refers to a sort of secular cultural and socio-political identity, not piety". Being a Turk is a necessity in the eyes of the Kemalist nation-state. The state applied assimilation policies to make all subjects of the state Turks. (44-5)

Kemalist regime otherizes non-LAST citizens. Among them, the practicing Muslims are labeled as *mürteci* or *irticacı*, and they are considered the most critical threat for the regime. Because of this, there is only a little place (and only in the private realm) if none for religion in the lives of Kemalist acceptable and best citizens. The Kemalist state is harshly against religious public demands of any kind, including the basic rights and freedoms. *İrtica* discourse is kept at the ready to put in circulation at every possible turn.

There are three events that have their names identified with *irtica*, in Kemalist discourse: March 31, the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the *Menemen* incident. Although the first happened in Ottoman times, which Republic denied totally, it found a distinctive place in official Republican history, as it was very conductive to the Kemalist discourse. Specifically, it did not fall among the rejected past, because Kemalists were able to use it to support their claims that there had always existed a danger of *irtica*. These three incidents are still used as proofs of religious people's reactionary nature against the regime.

3.4.3. A Movement of Double-Otherized Ones: Sheikh Sait Rebellion

When the Republic of Turkey broke its ties with the Ottoman State, it also broke the ties that had been keeping Ottomans together. The abolition of the Caliphate and adoption of nationalism disturbed various ethnic and Muslim groups. When common ground disappeared, disturbance's morphing into action was inevitable.

After the abolition of the Caliphate, the government began to worry about religious reactions. İnönü tried to declare martial law, but could not get it approved by the assembly. He resigned. Fethi Bey (Okyar) then formed a new government that was more moderate. (Tunçay 1982)The Sheikh Said Rebellion occurred in just such an environment. It was a two-dimensional event, which could be labeled as both a Kurdish upheaval and an Islamic reaction (*irtica*). The rebels wanted to establish an independent Kurdish state, "where Islamic principles … were to be respected," since they believed that those principles were "violated in modern Turkey". (Küçük 2007, 129) The rebels were Kurds, whom the republic otherized. They demanded Islamic law, against which the republic waged war. This led to double-otherization of the Sheikh Sait incident.

The Sheikh Said Rebellion started in Elazığ-Piran, on February 13, 1925, and spread through a wide area, from Erzurum to Diyarbakır. It lasted two months. Although it was claimed that Britain initiated and backed the rebellion secretly in order to take control of this oil-rich region, it could not be proven. On March 2, the Fethi Bey government resigned. He declared the reason of his resignation as 'not wanting to smear blood on his hands via unnecessary violence'.Thus, the harsh wing of the assembly took power under the leadership of İnönü. *Takrir-i Sükun* law was enacted. It gave the government the widespread power to take any kind of measure against institutions, individuals, or groups that might destroy law and order. After *Takrir-i Sükun*, the rebellion was repressed quickly and violently. Sheikh Said was executed and all opposition was quieted. *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (TCF)

was closed down. According to Ahmet Emin Yalman, the era of *Takrir-i Sükun* was a reign of horror.[27]

Takrir-i Sükun law was in force for four years. It was a great umbrella under which Kemalist revolutions were held. There was no place for opposition. Each dissentient voice was doomed to be regarded as *irtica*. For instance, TCF was closed down in spite of the fact that it did not have an organization in the Eastern provinces, and there was no evidence that proved the relationship between the rebellion and the party. The only reason for the closure was an article in the party guidelines: 'TCF is respectful against opinions and religious beliefs.' This was regarded sufficient enough reason to encourage Sheikh Said to react against the state. Moreover, in those years, the state's religion was Islam; it was written in the constitution. However, being respectful of religion could lead to the downfall of a political organization. During this era, the press fell under state control. It was forbidden to publish anything without it being censored. Many journalists who came before Independence Courts were charged with severe offenses. Zekeriya Sertel said about this era that journalists had to obey orders given on telephones. Even the smallest mistakes were not tolerated. People were about to suffocate because of the absence of freedom. (Ertunç 2011, 99-105)

3.4.4. "Martyr of Laicism" Kubilay and *Menemen* Incident

The *Menemen* incident is the last one of the famous triple of the so-called *irtica* events. There is a wide range of rumors about the incident, some of which contradict each other. The same condition is valid for all three events, which were presented as the historical steps of *irtica*. However, *Menemen* is the most indefinite among them. Although the official documents published by the General Staff clarified some, elements, it's still uncertain who the players behind the scenes were. While official history introduces the incident as civil unrest, many other sources claim that it was the product of junkies and people who did not support them. By hook or crook, the indisputable reality is that many religious men were accused

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[27](Akyol 2008, 470; Ertunç 2011, 97; Zürcher 2003, 171)

because of this event, and some of them–including a Nakhsi leader, Sheikh Esad Efendi–were sentenced to death. In other words, the *Menemen* incident was used as a stick to beat a brunch of Sufi order: Nakshibendiyya. Another reality is *Menemen*'s being the onset of the single-party era. From that time onward, opposition would not be allowed for sixteen years.

Official history labels the *Menemen* incident a clash between reactionary Islamists and secular Kemalists. In this narration, lieutenant Kubilay is introduced as an icon of the Republican revolutions–especially secularism. He is called a martyr of the revolution, who was killed by obscurantist Nakhshibendi members. The political elite "transformed [the *Menemen* incident] into a national issue" and used it as "a tool of official propaganda." (Azak 2007, 152)

Briefly, the details of the *Menemen* incident were such: On December 23, 1930, a man called *Mehmed*, who claimed to be Mahdi, and a group of his friends came to *Menemen* from Manisa. They were drug addicts. They denested the green flag of a mosque and started to yell that they demanded Shari'a. A company of soldiers under the leadership of Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay came to break up the event but rebels decapitated Kubilay. Soon after, gendarmerie came and suppressed the event by killing three of the rebels and apprehending the rest. The *Menemen* incident was written about in the day's newspapers as a vulgar event. However, according to Atatürk, it could not be considered the mere murder of drug addicts. He regarded the event as a revolt against the Republican revolutions. Furthermore, it was claimed that he was so furious that he ordered to put on fire all *Menemen*. [28]

*Menemen*was not put on fire; however the inquiry of the event was like a fire. First, martial law was put in place in a vast area. More than two thousand people from Yozgat to Istanbul were arrested, and 28 of them were executed. There were "hundreds of persons from *Menemen* and nearby villages [who] were arrested not only because of their alleged collaboration with the rebels but also because of their participation in tariqah activities banned by the state". (Azak 2007, 153) Besides, many religious people from Kayseri, Adana, İzmit, Yozgat, Konya, İzmir, and

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[28](Zürcher 2004, 179), (Küçük 2007, 131), (Arşiv Belgeleriyle Menemen Olayı, TSK Website), (Kılıç 1975)

İstanbul were blamed for being against secularist Kemalist revolutions. Among all the suspects, Sheikh Esad Efendi was declared the leader responsible for the incident. He and his son were sentenced to death. Although Esat Efendi could not be executed because of his age and illness, he died after a short time in prison.

Similar to Sheikh Said, Esad Efendi affiliated to the Nakhshibendi order. This order was regarded as the source of evil in the early era of the republic. Nakhshi *tekke*s "were always the assumed culprits, labeled as 'guilty' openly or in an allusive way." Atatürk gave his opinion of the order: "This order is a snake. It should be wiped out." (Küçük 2007, 131-2) Hence, the *Menemen* incident turned into a "tool for ending Nakhshibendi activity and eliminating its still vibrant social network". (Azak 2007, 154)

Although the *Menemen* incident is associated with Nakhshibendi order and Sufi circles, they allegedly refused to allow Mahdi Mehmed's to be a member of their circle. They claimed that Mehmed and his friends were "ignorant and unstable (*cahil ve muvazenesiz*) miserables (*zavallılar*)."(Küçük 2007, 132) The official documents published by the General Staff confirmed that they were drug addicts. (Arşiv Belgeleriyle Menemen Olayı) They were not actually dervishes or even strictly religious.

The *Menemen* incident became an official semi-legend in which there was blood, a mosque, bearded dervishes, and decapitated head on a postand so on. It was the stuff of nightmares. (Azak 2007, 155) This kind of story aimed to make people frightened of dervishes. In this way, the large-scale arrests were legitimized.

The victim of *Menemen*, Kubilay, was labeled a martyr and became a symbol of the revolutions. Here, we see that Kemalism adopted another characteristic of religion and created its own martyrs, who died for the sake of Kemalist values. Kubilay's martyrdom was used to turn *Menemen* into a 'strategic advantage', which had the potential to increase support for the state. A monument of Kubilay and the two men who died during the event was erected in *Menemen*. Under the monument it was written: "They believed, fought and died; we are the guardians of the trust they left behind." (Azak 2007, 234) This inscription creates a sense that an entire war was

fought. It is a perfect example of the Kemalist mentality, which dedicated itself to fighting *irtica*.

With *Menemen,* the single-party era began. The incident went down in history as a keystone in the politics of fear.

3.5. The Strict Control Over People in the Single-Party Era

Kemalist discourse adopted the idiom 'if you free your daughter, she will run away with either a drummer or a flutist'. Here, the daughter who should not be let free represents ordinary people. The drummer and the flutist represent the alternative regimes to Kemalism. Conditionally it could be the ancient order, Shari'a, or communism. Because of this, Kemalist regime was greatly determined to strictly control its 'daughter'.

The single-party era[29] started right after the frustrated end of *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*[30]. The name of the era does not come from the existence of only one party within the system, since the establishment of republic there was a single party system –except the trials of TCF and SCF– in terms of political structure. However, the single party era of 1930-1946 differs from the previous in its being completely totalitarian. (Ertunç 2011, 261) This is why the era received its own distinctive name.

During the single-party era, people were otherized. CHP did not trust people; instead it was afraid of them. It oppressively controlled them with soldiers and gendarme. The Kemalist elite of CHP regarded and introduced themselves as founders, educators and leaders of the state. Party elites saw themselves as first-class individuals. They considered pandering to the people a shameful experience, even if the purpose was to win elections. Instead, they preferred to oppress people, make

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[29] Mete Tunçay studied Single Party Era in detail in his book called The Establishment of Single Party Regime in the Republic of Turkey (1982)

[30] SCF was a total disappointment for Atatürk and CHF. The rush toward the new party, the huge orientation to it scared them. This meant that people did not internalize the revolutions. They were ready to convert at the first opportunity. They were so willing to escape from the ones who save them that they could have scarify even their most valuables. The trial of SCF showed that people were not satisfied with the "militant laicism" of CHF government. (Ertunç 2011, 209)

frauds, and use jurisdiction for political desires.(Sakal 2009) Thus, the gap between CHP -and the state it represented- and the people was getting wider.

Otherization appeared in CHP members' discourse. They labeled the people (other than CHP members) as 'masses', '*Haso-Memo*', 'sillies', 'barelegged', 'scum of the earth', and so on. Religious people were blamed for being *irticacı*. Expressions such as 'imam-disguised' or 'sheikh-disguised' were used to insult individuals. (Sakal 2009, 158) Otherization appeared at every turn against every part of society in the single-party discourse.

The single-party regime banned Arabic azan, teaching and learning Qur'an and religion. Some of the mosques were used as haylofts, arsenal or storage. Beside the psychological demolition that this attitude of the party created, people were feeling uneasy about the arsenals among their living places. (Sakal 2009, 146-7) Among the closed-mosques, some were even used as jails. Moreover, prisoners met the toilet necessity inside the mosque, in front of the altar (*mihrap*) by means of a large jar.(Köker 2001, 12) The regime was that out of touch with and that disrespectful of the people's values.

During the early years of the republic, the Kemalist regime had not been pleased with university, because it had not spoken from the mouth of Kemalists. In the single party era, it was decided to reform the university. The aim was to "create a university which would advocate revolutionary tenets and support political authority". There were 151 associates in Istanbul University at that time. Ninety-two of them were fired and the gap was filled with foreign professors and Turks from European universities. The press supported the reform, and started to praise the new structure of the university. "The university in Ghazi's Turkey" would spread revolutionary tenets. Science would not be a luxury, but a service to the state. The university reform was seen as a branch of the civilization war. It was not a mere change of cadre, but a total change of mentality.(Ertunç 2011, 289-93) So, the involvement of the university with the ranks of Kemalist elite was correspondent to the single- party era. It would support, from now on, the state mentality against elected governments, and would be an undaunted guardian of the regime along with the military and judiciary.

The Kemalist regime wanted to raise loyal citizens not only at the center, but also at the periphery. To reach this goal, it established village institutes (*köy enstitüleri*) and people's houses (*halkevleri*). Village institutes provided secondary education to village children and then employed some of them in different villages as teachers. The education in these institutes was two dimensional. On the one hand, students were taught modern science and citizenship; on the other hand, they learned efficient agriculture. Western art, dances, music, and other life-style classes also existed in village institute programs. Students were raised to be secular-minded advocates of the Republican revolutions. (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 57) Urban Republican teachers did not go to villages; they preferred resigning over relocation. Because of this, the government decided to raise village teachers among village children. However, it did not provide them the same facilities as urban students. First of all, while urban schools were built using a state budget, peasants had to build village institutes with their own money and physical labor, but they received no tax breaks in exchange. Peasants were obliged to finance both urban schools with their taxes and village schools with their own facilities. This double-standard created resentment among peasants. (Koçak 07.04.2012) The village students also had to struggle with poor conditions in both their classes and their dormitory lives. Cold air, hunger, long study hours, and an insufficient number of beds were among these hardships. Some of them even died as a result of these conditions. (Goloğlu 1982, 179) Finally, the graduates of village institutes began work as teachers with very small salaries and owed twenty years of compulsory service. They could not resign before that. (Koçak 07.04.2012) Obviously, the effects of the otherization policy, which CHP executed against ordinary people, was felt here also. The state was unfair to the periphery even when it was trying to bring education to them.

The National Chief era lasted until 1950. Otherized people chose to move away from the otherizer CHP, and turned instead toward the DP. This was the zero line of democratic life in Turkey. From then, there would be a multi-party system, except the eras of coups.[31]

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[31] For detailed information about Turkey's democracy adventure, see: Karpat 2010a; Ahmad 1993; Ahmad 1977.

3.6. Media-Supported Military Interventions of '60, '71, and '80

The coup of 1960 came right after chaos in the university. First, the universities rose up. The press instigated protests. Then, the opposition party, CHP, began to provoke many other incidents. The government did not think there was any solution other than forcing them into silence via force. On May 27, 1960, a group within the military took power. First they promised to give back to the government to civilians by holding elections. During the first couple days, some DP members were released. Then jurists hijacked soldiers' moderate attitudes, and convinced them that this would jeopardize the legitimacy of coup. Their inculcations were very effective. Attitudes hardened and, in September of 1961, Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged. (Özgürel 2009, 245-288)

The executers of the coup declared all criticisms illegal. The date was made a national festival of Independence and Constitution. May 27 became a tradition in Turkey. With the help of the new constitution of 1961, the military saw intervention in politics as a right, even a duty.

The National Security Council (MGK) was founded after the coup of 60. Its aim was declared as protecting the republic against any degeneration caused by political parties coming to power with a majority of votes. MGK was defined as the most significant institution of the 1961 constitution. According to its founders, it was like a third unit of the assembly right beside legislation and execution. (Ertunç 2011, 425) By the means of MGK, the military could involve politics at every turn. Thus, the military's non-interference to politics remained as an imaginary tenet.[32]

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[32] Military was the 'cleanest' insitution of the Kemalist hegemony. It was composed of those who set their heart on Kemalism. It was systematiclally 'claened' from others by the means of MGK decisions. There was no chance to have a place in military for those who were not approved by the Kemalist state. This is why military was regarded as the most trustful institution by the Kemalist state elite. İhsan Yılmaz (2013) defines the approved and non-approved types of citizens of the Kemalist hegemony as such: "The most trusted Turkish citizens, members of Homo LASTus, deeply respect and even almost 'worship' the state and do anything they can to help promoting its ideology and power." (9). According to him, "[t]he state has used the Homo LASTus individuals for surveillance purposes to check and even spy on other members of society to ensure that they are under control and 'do not do anything wrong'. While ordinary members of society are not always diligently monitored by the Homo LASTus, the same cannot be said for the bureaucrats, especially the ones who are

Not only MGK but also Constitutional Court (CC) and Senate were the two other institutions that were established for checking the National Assembly to protect the Republican regime. (Köker 2010, 339) All these three provided an institutionalized control over elected governments. They are the custodians of the regime. Political decisions were passing under the supervision of military. They were checked by Senate and President. If they were still seen as 'problematic' for the 'survival' of the regime, Constitutional Court was stepping in, and paralyze the decision making process. In other words, there are three vital obstacles in front of the substantiation of national will. Mümtaz Soysal (1968) explained this system by calling it the "fear from majority". According to him, this fear was based on the assumption of people's ignorance, their incapability of making beneficial choices, and the risk of their being deceived. (220) State trusted neither its people nor the ones they elected. Because of this, military and civilian republican state elites were given the mission to guard the regime by the means of the state institutions established after 1960 coup. This was the settlement of the tutelage regime in Turkey's state structure.

Constitutional Court, according to İhsan Yılmaz (2013), "has been the second most important repressive and ideological state apparatus" after the military. It is a repressive organ against the demands of non-LAST majority. It functions within the borders of Kemalist ideological frame. It favors Kemalist elites and is loyal to Kemalism's benefits. In this sense, Yılmaz compares the Turkish Constitutional Court to Iranian Ayatollahs. Ayatollahs have a place above parliament in Iranian state system. They have the right to intervene decision making, when they think it

working for sensitive and strategic state institutions that were protected as impregnable Homo LASTus fortresses. (...) [T]he Kemalist Panopticon may even be extended to private homes if they belong to suspected bureaucrats' families. As a result, if a military officer is detected thanks to an uninvited surprise visit to his home of having a headscarved wife, or if he rejects to drink alcoholic beverages, or if he is 'caught' 'red-handed' when praying; he would be expelled from the military without a court case and with no right of appeal against the decision." (10) Under this framework, Yılmaz exemplifies İskender Pala, who is a professor in literature and an ex-member of military. Pala was expelled from the military "just because he was 'caught' when praying in his room". (10) He was not the one and only one who expelled from the military because of religious reasons. The expulsions were "justified by the Kemalists on the basis that 'dangerous people are trying to infiltrate the army'. Until the AKP's rise to power, every year, hundreds of military officers were expelled from the military with a broad-brush accusation of disciplinary misconduct. Most of these were practicing Muslims." (10-11) The 'clean' Kemalist military has taken the mission to 'keep the state clean' from non-LAST citizens. MGK was the concrete result of this.

necessary. Namely, both Constitutional Court and Iranian Ayatollahs "are protectors of their 'sacred' but undemocratic regimes and swiftly repeal the democratic legislation of parliament when they evaluate it as being against their 'religions'." (Here, it is beneficial to remember the religion-like nature of Kemalism, which has been mentioned above.) Since the mission of Constitutional Court is to protect regime against 'others'[33], i.e. non-LAST citizens, a member of 'others' should not 'leak' into the ranks of court members. And, since the court members are not elected but appointed by the President, it is crucially important for Kemalists to prevent 'others' from being President. The authority of appointing not only the Constitutional Court members but also the key points of state bureaucracy is the thing that makes Presidency is regarded as the 'castle of laicism'. In order to protect this castle, "Kemalists have always preferred a retired general to be elected President". (Yılmaz 2013) This is why, Kemalists were highly disturbed from the possibility of seeing someone, whom they regard as the 'other' of Kemalist self, as the President.

It is a fact that the putschist officials of 1960 were influenced by the press. They admitted as much after they took power. They said that they had been inspired by the press to make such an intervention. The press gave them the necessary ideas and courage to mobilize. One of the members of the coup government, Orhan Erkanlı, highlighted that they had in particular followed *Ulus* newspaper and *Akis* journal, both of which were known for their opposition to DP government and their support of a possible military takeover. Later years, Erkanlı staffed as the chief editor of *Hürriyet* from 1968 to the beginning of 1970s. Out and out this is an indicator of the depth of the relationship between the media and the military. (Özkır 2011, 95)

The '60s and '70s passed in a deep darkness. Student upheavals marked the era. At the end of the 1960s, communist revolutionary youth escalated their actions in order to provoke the military for holding a coup. They believed that the first step toward revolution was the closure of the assembly. Only a military coup could achieve this. Had revolutionaries gotten rid of the democratic assembly, they would have easily achieved their goal of making a communist revolution. They believed in the collaboration of the military and youth. They did not hesitate to engage in

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[33] Kemalist self and Kemalist others has explained in detail above.

violence. According to them, everything was licit on the way to revolution. Moreover, violence was seen as necessary. Through violence, inflammatory slogans and provocative articles, revolutionaries tried to incite the military. (Cemal 1999) They were about to achieve their goal as the pro-revolutionary section of the military was about to stage a coup on March 9, 1971, but it could not. On March 12, the Chief of the General Staff submitted a memorandum and the government resigned. In spite of the pro-socialist stance of the unsuccessful March 9 coup, the executers of March 12 coup were pro-American. This led to a much more controversial conclusion than the revolutionaries imagined. Leftists remained under suspicion and many arrests were made. Deniz Gezmiş and his friends were hanged. (Özgürel 2009, 300-323)

The environment in Turkey right before the coup of 1980 was no different. Student upheavals reached a peak high. It was unclear who killed whom and for what reason. Even walking on the street became very dangerous. Universities could not operate. There were strikes in many workplaces. Behind all the chaos was the deep state, but it was not known at that time. The military again fulfilled its 'duty' when 'the conditions ripened', and took the power de facto. The bloodshed ended immediately within a single day. The question of 'how' occupied minds for years.

After the coup of 1980, Kenan Evren visited the Journalist Association. Its then chairman Burhan Felek, in spite of his advanced age of 90, doubled up for kissing hand of Evren. This demonstrates the kind of relationship that existed between the media and the military in those days. The media united with the military. Evren and his friends assigned generals to the management of the branches of the media as well as other institutions, from education to commerce. (Özkır 2011, 96) However, they did not need to do so in the case of the media, because even the head of the media could lean easily in front of the military.

3.7. New Conjuncture, Old Enemy: February 28

At the end of the '80s and beginning of the '90s, the Islamists began experiencing improvements in both the economic and social spheres. They were like the new bourgeoisie. Their visibility also increased in both political life and the

public realm. Practicing Muslims took some significant positions in politics. Then, an Islamist party won the biggest share in the elections. *Imam-Hatip* schools' graduates and girls with headscarves gradually began attending universities. During this era, the discourse of *irtica* as a threat to the secular system intensified in the media. This was indeed an indication of the Kemalist elites' discomfort and fear of losing power. At this point, the media pumped the fear of elites to the society in order to create the apprehension that a threat existed. According to the picture that the media drew, the secular regime was in an intimate danger of collapse. The source of that danger was the rise of the Islamic wing, and the rescuer was to be the military. Within this atmosphere of fear, the military found the necessary legitimization to intervene in politics. So followed the process of February 28, 1997. The Islamist government buckled and, thus, the fear politics as created by the media reached their target.

The February 28 intervention differed from the coups mentioned above. Its reasons, motives, direction and results were different. The international conjuncture had also changed dramatically. The bipolar world of the Cold War had collapsed and returned to a US-centric world. The US had selected Islam as its new enemy, which resisted its policies on third world countries. The 'clash of civilizations' idea had been suggested recently. War arrows directed towards Islam and Muslims. In such an environment, an Islamist party came to power in Turkey. Its business would not be easy.

Because of the global situation things were not stable or comfortable in Turkey. 1993 was the darkest year because of the deep state's actions. The era was full of assassinations, unsolved murders, secret political operations, and so on. The *Refah Partisi* (RP) was elected following all the chaos, and would become a spark of a huge fire of a new chaos. The public was no stranger to the term *irtica* and from then on, it was heard frequently.

The RP came from a background of closed parties. Necmettin Erbakan first established the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* -MNP), which was closed after the 1971 memorandum. Then he founded the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* - MSP), but the September 12 military intervention of 1980 resulted

the end of that party. RP was Erbakan's third party. From the onset of his governance, *irtica* thread became the indispensable discourse of the media. Together with university members, business and the media, the secular circle spread the fear that laicism would change. Within the first year of the government, the military submitted a memorandum, and took harsh measures against the danger of *irtica*. The process of February 28 will be discussed in a separate chapter (ch. 5) below. Because of this, it is taken very briefly in here.

3.8. Resurgence of *İrtica* Discourse in the Early AKP Era

The AKP came from the same line as the RP, but separated its way from RP's. When the RP was closed by the constitutional court, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was jailed. After his release, he founded the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - AKP). The party came to power with 34% of the vote. Initially Erdoğan could not enter parliament because of his political ban, so, Abdullah Gül became the Prime Minister instead. In 2003, the AKP removed Erdoğan's ban and ever since he has been executing the duty of the Prime Ministry.

The early AKP era could be characterized by developing relationship with the European Union. Western secularist state elites, who were primed for criticizing the government, were confused. Up to 2006, there was not any harsh conflict between the laic circle and the AKP, because of the policies the AKP followed. The AKP not follow the way of the RP, avoiding radical discourses. It instead always promoted the message that the party founders had changed, thus attempting to block past-referenced criticisms.

In the year 2006, just one year before the 2007 Presidential election, there was an attack against the State Council. This triggered *irtica* fear discourse from the media immediately. A process similar to February 28 was manufactured and the same discourse of threat was perpetuated by the media. The aim was to prevent conservatives from 'occupying' *Çankaya* (Presidency). Again, the media tried to create an air of fear in which the military was presented as the savior. The process gave its fruit: the electronic memorandum of April 27. The Chief Office of General

Staff published a memorandum on its website; however, it did not make the expected effect. The government did not back down; rather, it reminded the military of its dependence on the government. The government's stand resulted in more votes in the general elections. In addition, the government's reputation improved in the eyes of the people. On April 27, for the first time in Turkey's history, a memorandum could not achieve its intended conclusion. The policy of fear appealing, executed the by media, did not work. Since we will examine in detail the media's use of fear appeals during the April 27 process below in chapter 6, here we passed over briefly.

3.9. Conclusion

The contemporary definition of *irtica* goes back to the end of Ottoman times, i.e. the CUP era. March 31 is the first specific event whose name is identified with *irtica*. Although the Republican founders claim to reject the total Ottoman past, they adopt March 31 and CUP discourse about the event eagerly; because, it exactly fit Republican *irtica* discourse. So, *irtica* becomes the adopted discourse of a rejected history. CUP heritage appears on many issues about Republican ideological ground including military tutelage, modernization and Westernization policies. The republic creates Kemalist self identity, and otherizes the rest systematically. Practicing Muslims are of the otherized group. Their political demands are discounted by Kemalist state elites. They are labeled *irticacı* and regarded the sources of threat for the regime.

From the onset of the Republican era, *irtica* has always been more or less part of the agenda. The *irtica* threat discourse has been carried by the Turkish mainstream –or pro-Kemalist hegemonic– media. From time to time, they overtook a mission of shaping political arena like political actors. In the next chapter, I will examine the role of the media in the growth and spread of *irtica* fear.

CHAPTER 4

THE LEAD ACTOR IN THE SPREAD OF *İRTİCA* FEAR: TURKISH HEGEMONIC MAİNSTREAM MEDIA

4.1. Introduction

The media is called the fourth power after legislation, execution and jurisdiction. However, the pro-Kemalist hegemonic media units in Turkey consider themselves a greater power than this. For instance, the ex-boss of *Hürriyet* newspaper, Erol Simavi, writes an open letter to the then Prime Minister, Turgut Özal. He writes: "Sir, do you know what is written on 'my separation of powers book' as the first power in Turkey? PRESS…" (Simavi 19.04.1988) This is an obvious indicator of the position in which the media see themselves.

Erol Simavi also writes in his letter that "we are hosts, you are guests". Then he implicitly threatens Özal with military action: "What is the second (power in my book after press)? Here, you take the pen and write down what comes to your mind". (Simavi 19.04.1988) Irem Barutçu, who wrote a book on Simavi family, says that in the first draft of the letter a statement along these lines was included: "If you do not behave amenably, the military will come and settle your account". (Barutçu 18.10.2010) Namely, according to the ex-boss of the 'flagship of media', the first power in Turkey is the press, and the second is the military. Not only *Hürriyet* but also other branches of the Turkish pro-Kemalist hegemonic media have the same mentality.[34]

The Özal years of economic liberalization and privatization resulted in the inevitable commercialization of the media. Several newspapers and magazines were bought and owned by the same person. Individual media outlets became units of much larger companies dealing in more than just journalism. This led to doubts about their freedom and objectiveness. (Balkır, et al. 2008, 200) However, doubts about the

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[34] (Erdin 2010), (Görmüş 2011a-b), (Cemal 1999), (Alankuş Kural 1995), (Gökmen 1996), (Talu 2000), (Temiztürk 2009)

freedom of mainstream media did not come about because of conglomeration; instead, it was always a question. The Kemalist hegemonic media have always been the "voice of the master and together with the powerful".(Erdin 2010, 5) Historically this has been the essence of the laicist hegemonic media.

On these lands, the media have always been a vehicle of modernization. From Ottoman times onward, the media have been a side of the hegemonic struggle. (Alankuş Kural 1995, 77) First, it was the Sultan's ideology, then it was CUP's, and lastly it was the Kemalists'. Since the establishment of the republic, the mainstream media have always favored Kemalist state elites –including the military- against elected governments.

In the Ottoman state, the birth of the written press occurred in tandem with the modernization and Westernization campaigns. The first newspaper was established by state initiative funder Sultan Mahmut II, in the nineteenth century. Its mission was to promote innovations to society. (Gürkan 1998, 25-26) The palace's aim was to make people accept the modernizing reforms. In other words, "the first newspaper wasn't a commercial product but an ideological apparatus in terms of Gramsci's hegemony theory". (Cangöz 2008, 7)

Both the first newspaper and its successors were formed by pro-Western intellectuals. They contributed to the spread of Western thought among elites. The military and civil bureaucratic cadres, which would carry out the reforms during later eras, were raised as being modernists and Westernists, thanks to these newspapers. (Gürkan 1998, 26) Later on, it was discovered that the press was the most effective way of spreading ideas. Different circles with different ideologies started to publish newspapers and magazines; however, those who were modernist and Westernist maintained their dominance of the mainstream media.

4.2. The Mission of Journalism in the Early Republican Period

At the beginning of the Republican period, the Turkish press lasted the mission of enlightening people. This mission was coming from the Ottoman legacy

of top-down tradition in reforms. The Turkish modernization project aimed to establish a secular nation-state compatible with Western norms. (Alankuş Kural 1995, 76) The aim was "reaching the contemporary level of civilization". It is obvious that the coordinators of this modernization project –i.e. Kemalist elites– "accepted the universal validity of Western modernity as the way of building a modern Turkey". (Cangöz 2008, 8) Under this framework, schools and the press were the most-used ideological apparatuses, in Althusser's words, for constructing the modernization project. Both were used to define the characteristics of the modern citizen, which the state intended to mold. Media outlets and journalists were charged with the mission of legitimizing the regime and making people loyal to it. In this sense, journalists were acting as state officials. (Yılmaz 2009, 183) They met the duty given to them by the state. [35]

Within the confines of Kemalist modernization, the press was expected to propagate the ideal citizen type, and promote the Republican revolutions. It was given the role of "establishing a steely castle around the Republic" by Atatürk. He stated that this castle had to be made of "thought and mentality". It was the "Republic's right to demand [such a mission]". (Gürkan 1998, 38; Topuz 2003, 146) From the birth of the Republic of Turkey, members of the press "undertook the duty of preparing public" for the Republican revolutions. (Gürkan 1998, 35) Essentially, the press was not unfamiliar with such a mission. It had supported the founders of the republic during the War of Independence. However, things were not the same afterwards. The Republican environment was too strict for a free press. The Republican elites obligatorily demanded the same support that the press had freely given during wartime in years past.

Atatürk took the issue of the press very seriously. He went as far as to make his friend Yunus Nadi publish a newspaper called *Cumhuriyet*. The duty of this newspaper was to publish propaganda in support of the Republican revolutions. (Topuz 2003, 162) Among all the regime-supporting papers, Cumhuriyet held a special place. It was like the official state paper, keenly supporting all the state's

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[35] Also see Yılmaz and Burak 2011. It mentions about the mission of jourmalism to impose hegemonic woldview to the masses.

initiatives. (Yılmaz 2009, 189) The Kemalist elite struggled to re-create the people's priorities and even moral standards by the means of Cumhuriyet. On September 2, 1929, the newspaper arranged a beauty contest, on Mustafa Kemal's orders. According to the Muslim people, such a contest, in which the contestants would have appeared in bathing suits, was highly immoral. However, destroying such a religious-based morality was the primary aim of the contest. It was organized "to make a Muslim girl open and supply her figure -which she had hided meticulously- in front of a community through the means of the intensive support of press". (Ertunç 2011, 161) It was not merely a commercial phenomenon; rather, it was highly political. It was seen as a way to imitate the West. In addition, its purpose was to weaken the traditional (read as religious) "chastity perception". It was a step toward cutting the ties with one of the Islamic moral values of covering up one's body. *Cumhuriyet* was only a tool of such a political project. It was like a screen saver, through which the negative reactions to the contest were directed at *Cumhuriyet* instead of the regime. In this way, the real executers of this social project were not blamed or held responsible. (Ertunç 2011, 161-2)

As stated above, the press was not free in the early years of the republic. Especially after the establishment of TCF, the relationship between CHP and the press started to change for the worse. Any critical comment against the revolutions was severely punished. (Cangöz 2008, 8) The oppositional journalists were taken to trial in the Independence Courts. (Gürkan 1998, 35-36) By force and violence, the press was taken under the state's control. All different voices -Islamists, socialists, liberals and leftists- were silenced and their journals and newspapers were closed down. (Yılmaz 2009, 183) For instance, following the enactment of the Law for Motion of Tranquility (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) thirteen newspapers were closed and dozens of journalists were put on trial. Interestingly, most of those journalists were not opposed to the revolutions. Their only 'crime' was criticizing some practices. One of these journalists, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, defended himself in front of the court with these words:

Am I not a Republican? Am I not laic? Am I not in love with modernization? Am I not a defender of democracy? How can you complain from me? (Topuz 2003, 150)

The qualities that he listed –being Republican, laic, in love with modernization and a defender of democracy- were those that the state expected from any 'acceptable' citizen. This was the exact portrait of a true citizen as molded by the Republican modernization project. Despite this fact, the reason of Yalçın's stand on trial was considerable from the aspect of understanding the extent of oppression and censorship in those days. He was prosecuted because he had announced to his readers that he would remain quiet after the Law for Motion of Tranquility was put into effect, since it restricted freedom of expression. (Topuz 2003, 149-150) So, according to the regime, even mentioning restriction was restricted. Obviously, the new regime was very intolerant of any semblance of opposition.

During the single-party era, the media had to advocate for the government. In the year 1935, for example, 116 newspapers and 127 magazines were in print and each of them had to act as a mouthpiece for the regime. It was not enough to be pro-modernity or pro-Western. In order to survive in the market, a print publication had to use the official language of the regime. A state-sanctioned publication needed to: promote the propaganda of the revolutionary tenets, be an effective gun against *irtica*, help the revolutionary government in its actions, and take on the mission of educating people in each field of social, economic and political life. (Yılmaz 2009, 191-2) These characteristics were emphasized in the Congress of Press by Republican leaders. The Republic intended to form a 'militant press' based on duty – not freedom– and, likewise, the 'militant citizen'.

After Atatürk's death, cracked voices who demanded permission for parties other than the CHP, were blamed for being separatists because, according to the CHP and its supporters, even a second party would have led to reactionary movements. So, until the multi-party regime was allowed into existence at the end of the 1940s, whole media units were at the regime's disposal. (Yılmaz 2009, 183) As a heritage from those days, "[Turkish] press has never got away from the boundaries drawn by bureaucratic and military elites", in other words 'the state'. (Duran 2003, 71)

In addition to the political oppression over the press, the media depended on the state from an economic standpoint. In 1928, when alphabet was changed, publishers were faced with either upgrading their printing equipment or closing down their business. They needed state support to survive by upgrading. The state did support the press in this era, but not without payoff. Once forced to depend on the state for economic support, the media was easily controlled by the state.(Bilgiç 2010) Thus, with the elimination of opposition and the economic domination over the rest, the Republic created a totally loyal press. In other words, "there has been a mutual benefit relationship between media and political power centers" since the early years of the republic.(Talu 2000, 11) Once state initiative stepped in, neutral watchdog media stepped out; media turned into a state agent.

4.3. General Picture of Today's Media Units from the Aspect of Hegemonic Struggle

As "members of a particular culture, journalists do share some basic values, ideals, and preferences". (Altheide 1984, 479) In this respect, Turkish journalists tend to accept the basic premises of Kemalism; because, they are members of Kemalist culture. This is a settled tradition in press. The reason is that the press comes from a Kemalist background. Journalists are the 'organic intellectuals' of the regime. They favor the 'state' over elected governments.

Ragıp Duran defines Turkish media as such: "Turkish commercial media lean on Turkish Armed Forces and great Turkish capitals. In this regard, one of the most important characteristics of Turkish media, since its start publication, has been its reliance on power. It has always been fond of political-ideological-military government, power and powerful. It has always been against the weak. This is also the same for international arena; it has advocated the most powerful state. Turkish media do not represent the Turkish society but the Turkish sovereign class. It is the spokesman of minority." (Duran 2003, 71)

What Duran refers to as 'minority' can be better understood through Birand's words. In his article called "The laic circle has always provoked the military", he lists those who Duran called 'minority':

I want to complete the picture today. (…) The group who provoked military for coup has always been the laic circle. The laic circle is separated as such:

- Generally CHP; social democrat politicians; the ones who knows that they cannot be anything with normal elections, and wants to guarantee a position by means of military.

- Middle and large sized capital groups.

- Retired and running judiciary bureaucracy.

- Retired and incumbent military officers.

- Media.

All of us had a common target: 'not to share the system formed by us'. (…) The laic Republic of Turkey has had two enemies for years.

1. *İRTİCA* was the most popular, most confronted enemy. There have been men with beards on newspapers. Veiled women were called as 'cockroach'. (…) This section of the society was seen as the biggest enemy of our system. We could not have borne their joint to us. We did not even try to understand them anyway.

2. KURDISH ISSUE was the unspoken but terrifying other enemy. (…)

From the establishment of Republic, we approach in equally harshly against these two traditional enemies. (…) We shared neither political system of the Republic, nor the economic cake, which laic circle dominated. We said 'always for me,

always for me…' (…) We made military fine-tune with coups in

the name of democracy. (…) "(Birand 2011)

As an eye from the inside, Birand's evaluations are worth notice. He considers the media as among the ranks of the laic circle. This eveluation sums up the argument of this thesis. The media are neither free nor objective. A monolithic voice dominates the media and the media make sure to support that voice.

Within such a media environment, cracked counter voices could not find a way to join mainstream ranks. Chomsky (1989) defines this situation as such,

The major media –particularly the elite media that set the agenda others generally follow– are corporations 'selling' privileged audiences to other businesses. (…) Concentration of ownership of the media is high and increasing. Furthermore, those who occupy managerial positions in the media, or gain status within them as commentators, belong the same privileged elites, and might be expected to share the perceptions, aspirations, and attitudes of their associates, reflecting their own class interests as well. Journalists entering the system are unlikely to make their way unless they conform to these ideological pressures, generally by internalizing the values. (8)

Because of this, the mainstream media are comprises those who have similar tendencies. Cracked voices have a very little chance if none to bleed into it.

Mainstream media publications coalesce under the framework of being state-adherents despite their conflicting interests sourced from the different alliances with different political parties. (Elmas ve Kurban 2011, 51,58) When the state and government separated from each other by adopting the multi-party system, the media took the side of the state in opposition to governments. Governments were regarded as the sources of corruption. The media was always looking for the help of the military against them. By taking the support of the media behind, the military did not hesitate to intervene in politics once per decade.

In Turkey, the second half of the 1980s was a time of liberalization in both politics and the economy. This led to new parts of society escalating their participation in these fields. There was a positive correlation between activity and visibility; when these new parts of society began to have a voice in the economy and politics, they became more visible, and they found the opportunity to voice their demands. The creation of such a bourgeoisie caused a new problem for the state elite. They had to shape minds and manufacture consent from then on. Chomsky (1999) defines this problem as rising demands of a subdued portion of society. In his words:

> The importance of 'controlling the public mind' has been recognized with increasing clarity as popular struggles succeeded in extending the modalities of democracy, thus giving rise to what liberal elites call 'the crisis of democracy' as when normally passive and apathetic populations become organized and seek to enter the political arena to pursue their interests and demands, threatening stability and order. (53)

In this paragraph, when the statement "what liberal elites call 'the crisis of democracy'" is replaced with "what secular elites call 'the crisis of laicism'", the paragraph above exactly defines the situation in Turkey, especially after the second half of the 1980s. When Islamic conservatives, one of the subdued sections of the republic, started to gain more visibility in both economic and public life, and when they started to have a voice through democratic means, secular elites started to feel under threat. So, the media became a source for legitimizing the feeling of threat.

With the conglomeration of media, the ordinary disputes between media outlets and governments developed a commercial identity. Media outlets were aware of their power of manipulation over the masses. So, they used this power to threaten politicians, or enter into dirty relationships in return for support. The bosses of the media holdings began to struggle for *political engineering*. They tried to interfere in politics and shape it as they desire. The years between 1991 through 2002 witnessed particularly weak coalition governments. During this era, powerful media bosses, such as Aydın Doğan, used their media outlets to direct politics. For instance, Doğan group was known for the elimination of Sadettin Tantan, the arrangement of the

hospital coup against Ecevit, and painting Kemal Derviş as the rescuer of the state. (Özcan 2010, 46) Together with the military, February 28 was considered the 'achievement' of this powerful media group.

There was a special relationship between the military and the media since the coup of 1960. Gökmen (1996) says that the media was ready to publish military-sourced reports, even when they ran counter to the spirit of democratic regime. According to the media, the military was among the natural actors of politics. This was not odd, because the military was the real savior of the Turkish state. Civil politicians were just poor puppets to play with and mock. (719)

A general evaluation of the Turkish media shows that they attribute the role of ideologists. Since, in Turkey, modernization was held by "modernizer" intellectuals instead of ideologists, social roles have cluttered. Under normal circumstances, intellectuals would be analysts. They should be the ones portraying the existing problems. However, things were not as such, in Turkey. Intellectuals pursued the role of ideologists. They were attempted to transform society, educate it and enlighten it. (Yılmaz 2009, 186) Specifically, intellectuals were not only men of thought but were also men of action. They actively involve politics in their writings. It could be regarded as normal for them to be enthusiastic about spreading their ideas and transforming society, because of their desire to save a state on the verge of collapse. Such reasoning may justify their willingness to transform society, but it does not justify the results.

Initially the press was the most effective medium for intellectuals. When a couple of intellectuals gathered around an idea, the first thing they did was to publish a new newspaper or magazine. However, over time, journalism has become an occupation but its intellectual statue has not changed. In other words, journalists are no longer intellectuals –with few exceptions– but, they are still regarded as intellectuals. Both society and themselves consider this as such. Because of this, journalists still try to keep the role of ideologists. When intellectuals' overtaking ideologists' roles was problematic enough even during nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is unacceptable today. In addition, journalists are not even intellectuals. In spite of this, they have act like ideologists.

4.2. The Distinctive Position of *Hürriyet* among the Press

Hürriyet was founded on May 1, 1948. It was the era of harsh debates between the CHP and DP. The newspaper claimed to be objective, and published both Inönü's and Bayar's articles. *Hürriyet* differed from all other newspapers with its publishing technology. Sedat Simavi brought printing machines from the US. *Hürriyet* also differed with its style. There were more photographs on its pages. The reports are written with a daily language, so that everybody can understand easily. From the outset of its publishing life, *Hürriyet* prompted people's feelings by publishing news about Cyprus issue and champion Turkish wrestlers at the London Olympics. It utilized every opportunity -from the Korean War to traffic accidents to murders- to excite people. Thus, in the 1950s, it became the best-selling newspaper in Turkey. (Topuz 2003, 186-187)

Hürriyet did not publishing in accordance with its claim of objectivity for long. On May 27, 1960 its main headline appeared as such: "Turkish army is on duty". That partiality toward the military continued from that point forward. It supported military in each intervention thus, abandoning its objectivity in terms of dealing with governments.

Hürriyet is, according to its boss, the "state's newspaper". (Doğan 10.09.2002; Bayramoğlu 19.09.2008) Here, the state means Kemalist hegemonic bureaucratic oligarchy. In an article called "the logo of *Hürriyet*", Taha Kıvanç (27.01.2009) refers to this issue. He writes a brief history of *Hürriyet*'s ownership, in which he mentions the secret relationships between the newspaper and the state. According to the columnist, these relationships prevented the newspaper from being sold to a Jewish entrepreneur, even when he offered to buy it for quite a large sum of money. Then the columnist addresses the phrase on the newspaper's logo: "Turkey belongs to Turks". He states that according to the chief editor of the newspaper, the logo cannot be changed. Even the boss does not have the power to change it. Kıvanç's article gives the impression that *Hürriyet* is beyond a commercial newspaper and more like an apparatus of the state. This is why this thesis focuses on

Hürriyet over all other pro-Kemalist hegemonic publications. *Hürriyet* reflects not only the preferences of its boss, but also the ideas of the 'state'.

In the Özal years, *Hürriyet* had accumulated many debts so, Erol Simavi, the boss of the paper, was strapped for cash. The main reason of the economic difficulty of Simavi was the involvement of great capitals in journalism. They bought the ancient rooted newspapers, and establish new ones. They invested in technological equipments. In addition, they start to give promotion products to increase their sales amount. Journalism became a commercial competition. When paper prices started to rise continuously, Simavi decided to sell his paper. The media giant of the era, Robert Maxwell, offered 270 million pounds to buy the paper. The price excited Simavi but, the night of the offer something unknown happened, and Simavi changed his mind. Several years later, he sold the newspaper to Aydın Doğan for a much lower price. The writer of a book on the Simavi family, İrem Barutçu, claims that Simavi declined to sell *Hürriyet* to a foreign boss because of the deep state. The day after the sale , the Simavi family made a donation of three million dollars to the Foundation for Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerimi Güçlendirme Vakfı*). (Barutçu 18.10.2010)

During Simavi times, *Hürriyet* reporters in Greece were declared unwanted. Greek intelligence service followed their every move. One of them was even expelled. Following that it appeared as though the *Hürriyet*'s reporters, including the expelled one, cooperated with the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). (Barutçu 18.10.2010) This shows another dimension of the relationship between *Hürriyet* and the state.

It has been observed that, for decades, *Hürriyet* has followed the same path in promoting otherization. It has been very consistent in this; because, it has been located at center, in favor of state order, and nationalist. Although it has not changed its position, it has selected different targets from different circles as victims of otherization. Thus, the newspaper has given consistent results in otherization practices. (Bezirgan Arar and Bilgin 2010, 13) Although the newspaper has at times been against everyone from socialists to Kurds and Islamists, it defends one idea and one group: Kemalist hegemony and Kemalists.

4.3. Conclusion

We, as people, shape our views about the world according to the news items presented to us - not only what the information is, but also how it is presented affects our opinions. Since the media are the main source providing information, they steer our minds through with their prioritization and discourses. According to Bourdieu (1998), in politics, journalists are "very influential actors but not full-fledged members". (4) They "project onto the public their own inclinations and their own views". (3) In Turkey, the mainstream media project secular circle's views onto the society. This is an innate action; because the Turkish mainstream media were founded to be the mouthpieces of the Kemalist regime. Today, *Hürriyet* newspaper is the most successful representative of this tradition. It is the state's paper. It reflects the ideas, anxieties and demands of the Kemalist state elite. It has been in close connection with the military and other state elites, which are regarded as the guardians of laic regime. This relationship reached its peak in the February 28 process. Laicist media acted as a political actor and tried to shape politics. It backed military's intervention to politics; and took the mission of legitimizing military's actions before public opinion. In February 28, the Kemalist hegemonic mainstream media lost all its credibility in terms of objectivity, independency, and justice.

CHAPTER 5

THE "STRUGGLE WITH *İRTİCA*" IN THE FEBRUARY 28 PROCESS

5.1. Introduction

On February 28, 1997, in the era of the *Refah-Yol* government, odd decisions were made from at the usual meeting of the National Security Council (MGK). The military by-passed the government and established its authority without taking physical governance. It was described in the studies as 'the post-modern coup'. The media were the biggest ally of the military in February 28 process so much so that a general would later comment that the military and the media staged the intervention together. This chapter will analyze the media's support for the military's actions against the elected government. It will be shown how the media frequently pushed the threat and fear discourses in order to legitimize military intervention.

5.2. The Military – Media Relationship in the February 28 Process

In the post-1980 era, Turkey witnessed many changes both politically and economically. Turgut Özal opened a new age of liberalism and economic capitalism. After executing the duty of Prime Ministrer for two terms, he was elected to the presidency, as the first civilian president. He died in 1993, when Turkey was experiencing one of the most complicated bouts of unsolved murders, terrorist movements, massacres, and many dark events. It was the year of deep state organizations. 1993 was a "coup without name", and was described as being "worse than September 12". The Chief of General Staff of the era, Doğan Güreş, did not hesitate to proclaim that the military acted arbitrarily without a need of a coup, in 1993. (Öztürk 2011, 189) Weak coalition governments had little choice but to obey the military and state, or face removal from power.

Indeed, February 28 was a crop of the process started in 1993. The *Refah-Yol* government did not come to power in a stable time. It had been a very dark time and when they took power, they became targets. Dirty relationships among the military, deep state, businessmen and the media brought their end, and with it a new terms was coined: 'post-modern coup'.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, "the military always showed a concern for legitimizing their decision to intervene to society at large". (Wuthrich 2010, 218) Kenan Evren's waiting for conditions to ripen could be the best example of this. However, that time the military altered its tactic. It worked in close contact with the media in order to gain legitimacy.

Newly-advanced commercial media solidified their monopolization of information flow. This made traditional intervention nearly impossible. So, the military turned a different way: it became just as a political actor, and declared its view at every opportunity. By supporting the branches of the media, there was no problem in the military's attitudes; they were right, and necessary. The military was depicted as the one, true arbiter of the state. From this perspective, the government was an agent abusing its power continuously, and the military was constantly trying to fight this abuse. Specifically, while the government was the 'bad guy' who wanted to destroy the state, the military was the 'good guy' who wanted to protect it. Such a picture, drawn by media, served the illegal actions of the February 28 process.

The close relationship between the media and the military did not have a long history. It began with the commercialization of the media. Although the mainstream media always supported the military in each intervention, their relationship had never been so explicitly close. When the ancient monolithic media were replaced with the commercial version, the military needed to alter its relationship with the media. It invited journalists to the military schools and militaristic facilities on many occasions. The media was informed of every one of the military's social service activities. It "intensified its public relations". In this way, it sought to "enhance its image". (Demirel 2004, 142-3)

Since the media was not a monolithic instrument of the state anymore, it became the arena in which each diverse section could utter its views. This caused a change in society as well. They became aware of their role as consumers. (Wuthrich 2010, 219) They were suddenly exposed to diverse ideas from the rightmost side to the leftmost side; then they could make a choice, which seemed most appropriate. This forced policy-makers to convince people that their policies were the most appropriate choice.

Conside this as such: especially during an alleged crisis, 'consumers' must be convinced that there is a crisis. The job of convincing them falls to the media. They "ensures that a latent crisis becomes manifest by rendering collective feeling of crisis among citizens, and by amplifying the claim of state officials that drastic action is required to remedy the crisis, which they have defined as such through the media." (Keane 1991, 96-97) In other words, the crisis is created by the media. People are convinced that there is need of intervention to the crisis, by the media. In this way, intervention is legitimized by the media. In such a situation, military is the user of the media tool to reach consumer folk.

Here, it is beneficial to re-state the Gramscian argument that modern states prefer to persuade people rather than forcibly make them obey. This is exactly what the commercial media try to do: manufacture consent through persuasion. They slowly force people to become used to an idea or attitude. By doing so, they eliminate the possibility of overreaction. Besides, by justifying a certain action at every turn, they make people accept that action. During the era of *Refah-yol*, the media kept emphasizing the threat of *irtica*, and the possibility of military intervention. In that way, they achieved their footing and the military built upon it.

On June 28, 1996, the *Refah-yol* government was formed. When President Demirel assigned the formation of the government to RP (*Refah Partisi*), he felt it necessary to state that Turkey would never give an inch from laicism. (Karalı 08.02.2001) The thing that forces Demirel to make such a statement was the over-sensibility around laicism. In Turkey, the laic reflex was always staying on its toes when a party with religious roots came to power. *Refah* was one of those parties. Hence, its taking power was perceived as a threat to the regime. It was thought that

the system was in danger. As a result, each attitude and action of the party and its members was seen as anti-laic. However, this led to some odd apprehensions. For instance, at the beginning of the *Refah-yol* government's term, one newspaper printed this headline: "Fruit juice for Pashas". In the article, it was revealed that the government offered fruit juice at a dinner with General Staff, but one of the generals asked for arrack. (Sabah 04.08.1996) The story was written in such a way as if to suggest that drinking arrack went hand in hand with laicism, while drinking fruit juice was anti-laic. Even Bekir Coşkun, the eternal advocate of laicism, made fun of the article. He wrote, under the title of "A Draught Laicism", that drinking arrack ,too, took its place among laicism's tenets. (Ertunç 2011, 180) This may be the clearest example of the era's mentality. It was clear that the road of *Refah-yol* would be very rough in an environment in which even beverages were considered as laic or anti-laic.

During its governance, *Refah-yol* suffered at the hands of the mainstream media and military's collaboration. The military used journalists 'for the sake of fatherland'. (Yükselir 07.07.2010) Indeed, the *Refah-yol* government and February 28 process were the best examples of the media's manipulation. (Erdin 2010, 193) *İrtica* was the leading actor of the mainstream newspapers at that time. The tension never ceased.

5.3. The Reflection of February 28 Process to *Hürriyet*'s Headlines

In Turkish news, "sovereign discourses are represented and text closes around these"(İnal 1996, 99) In the case of Turkey, the sovereign discourse has been that of Kemalists. From the first moment the *Refah-yol* government took power, the tendency of newspapers was to escalate stress between the government and the military through their reporting. They exaggerated existing conflicts, creating new, previously nonexistent ones via their words. On every issue, the military expressed its opinions; and on the rare occasion it neglected to comment, the media reminded it to do so. In spite of the fact that the military was hierarchically under prime ministry in theory, it acted as if it was the 'real owner' of the state. The media brightened this

image. When a controversy erupted between the military and the government, it took the side of the former; and justified it with an attitude as if government must balk to the military's opinions.

Since *Hürriyet* is the main subject of this study, we will trace the military-media collaboration among its headlines first. The "admiral ship" of the press, *Hürriyet* chose to back the military and the possibility of a coup against the government. Let us have a look at some captions and follow the process in their context:

August 8, 1996: Do not demoralize military (*Ordunun moralini bozma*)

August 14, 1996: Our image of 70 years is flopping (*70 yıllık imajımız güme gidiyor*) – During the short time of his Prime Ministry, Erbakan has started to discredit the modern-Western image of the Republic.

November 22, 1996: Civil society is afoot (*Sivil toplum ayakta*) – The government's insufficiency in dealing with political scandals and its attempt to silence media leaded huge reactions among civil society.

In The Day's Article, Oktay Ekşi (head-writer of *Hürriyet*) wrote about civil society's reaction by saying 'eventually'.

December 20, 1996: This time unarmed forces do it (*Bu defa işi silahsız kuvvetler halletsin*) – A high rank general replied the question if military would held a coup d'état by saying "this time unarmed forces do it".

Directly underneath, there was a photograph of veiled ministers' wives. The bottom statement of the photo was as such: "Laicism difference between Iran and Turkey: Nazmiye Demirel attracted attentions with her modern look among the veiled women of Iranian President's cortege".

February 4, 1997: Provocations do not end (*Tahrikler bitmiyor*) – One of *Refah*'s municipalities set up a tent-Aqsa Mosque on a square right across from the sculpture of Atatürk "just to spite him".

February 5, 1997: Tank voices (*Tank sesleri*) – 15 tanks were passed through the scandalous municipality Sincan.

February 13, 1997: Exactly the same (*Tıpatıp Aynısı*) – "Terror-blower in Middle East" Hamas celebrated Kudus day just as *Refah* did.

February 17, 1997: Not minister but militant (*Bakan değil militan*) – The Minister of Justice visited the arrested ex-mayor of Sincan.

February 22, 1997: Memorandum for cadre (*Kadro Muhtırası*) – Demirel (the President) demanded from government to investigate the fundamentalist staffing in municipalities.

February 24, 1997: There is rage on the streets (*Sokakta hiddet var*) – Demirel said "If it is talked on the streets that whoever comes will be better than this government, this is an indication of rage".

March 3, 1997: Hodja is resisting (*Hoca direniyor*) – Erbakan is resisting signing MGK decisions.

March 4, 1997: Obey or resign (*Ya uy, ya çekil*) – Ecevit and Baykal said Erbakan that, "either be satisfied with laic regime, or go".

March 5, 1997: Six million signatures (*Altı milyon imza*) – For government to resign, six million signatures were collected.

March 6, 1997: He signed exactly as directed (*Aynen imzaladı*) – Erbakan gave up his resistance, which he lasted for five days, and signed the MGK decisions.

March 11, 1997: Like 2 different states (*2 ayrı devlet gibi*) – While President Demirel gave the message 'do not interfere in our internal affairs' to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Erbakan speak apologetically.

March 26, 1997: These decisions will be followed exactly (*Bu kararlara tam uyulacak*) – The Head of General Armed Staff strictly reacted against RP's resistance.

April 1, 1997: TOBB: Government should cease immediately (*TOBB: Hükümet hemen bitmeli*)

April 18, 1997: You could not handle it, quit now (*Beceremediniz, artık bırakın*) – Fetullah Gülen called the government to return the governance back.

April 26, 1997: Ready to go (*Gitti gidiyor*) – A minister said government will cease soon.

April 30, 1997: Shocking briefing (*Şok brifing*) – The General Staff declared that struggle against *irtica* became much more important than external enemies.

May 9, 1997: The alternative is ready (*Alternatif Hazır*) – DYP, ANAP and DSP agreed on a coalition government.

May 9, 1997: Criminal complaint on briefing (*Brifing'de suç duyurusu*) – The General Staff called for republican prosecutors from many cities. The issue of the briefing was 'the financial and educational strategies of the Islamic capital'.

May 11, 1997: Shocking offenses from military to RP (*Askerden RP'ye şok suçlamalar*) – The report mentioned about General Staff's briefing to Republican prosecutors.

The spots were as such: "Ramadan dinner for tariqahs", "Sincan visit", "Collecting male turban", "Supporter countries", "*İmam-Hatip*s", "Hand in hand with PKK", "*İrtica* increased via *Refah-yol*", and "They are preparing for jihad".

May 20, 1997: They left alone (*Yapayalnız kaldılar*) – Neither the President, nor the Head of General Staff, or the Head of Assembly shook hands with Erbakan at May 19 ritual.

May 27, 1997: He did not make trouble (*Zorluk çıkarmadı*) – Erbakan signed all of the decisions without any rejection in the extraordinary YAŞ meeting.

June 1, 1997: Our stress is at its peak (*Stresimiz dorukta*) – Generals said everything to say. They are waiting in full of stress.

June 12, 1997: We can use arm if necessary (*Gerekirse silah bile kullanırız*) – The General Staff declared that it will use arms against *irtica*, when necessary.

Directly under, there was a report called "Photo of the plan for demolishing the republic" (*Cumhuriyeti yıkma planının fotoğrafı*). The

newspaper gave the number of registered students in Qur'an classes. Then it made an exaggerated guess that the number will increase to 7 million by 2001. It made a similar estimation regarding the number of *İmam-Hatip* students. It took an attitude as if these are the numbers of enemy soldiers. At the bottom of the report, there were the names of Islamic patrons, who supported Qur'an classes and *İmam-Hatip*s. According to the newspaper, this table demonstrated that there was a triumvirate made up of politics-commerce-tariqah.

As demonstrated, the main thing these reports show is that there was bi-dimensional agitation. First, the newspaper agitated the military by printing something along the lines of 'Look what RP has done'. Second, it agitated people by using the military's counter-position as a justifier. The newspaper (like other branches of the mainstream presss of the era) used an insulting language toward the government. According to it, the government secretly aimed to demolish the republic. This secret plan involved the organization of an underground army, of which *İmam-Hatip* graduates and Qur'an Classes' students were the soldiers. According to the depiction of *Hürriyet*, the military noticed this secret aim, and situated against a possibility of "war" with its arms; because, it is the one and most trusted guardian of the regime. Knowing that, business circles, universities and the jurists supported military in their "rightful" action. This table, drawn by *Hürriyet*, was actually a summary of the February 28 process.

Not only *Hürriyet* but also the other branches of the mainstream media concentrated on a few topics during February 28. Their aim was to direct people's apprehension. Indeed, this is a strategy called 'prominence'. When the media emphasizes certain things, they become problems. And, when it keeps emphasizing them, the importance of the problem intensifies among public opinion. In addition, people start to remember outdated information that has remained in depths of their minds about those particular issues. It is a psychological process. In a survey, it is observed that the ones who witness too much violence on television believe that there is actually that much violence in society. They then become slaves to their fear of becoming victims of this violence. They regard life as very frightening.

(McCombs and Bell 1996, 106-7) Similarly, the ones who are exposed to fear and threat propaganda regard it as real. Labeling certain things as problems and repeating it over and over helps people to accept them as problems. By those means, fear spreads through society.

During February 28, most of the newspapers were full of negative reports about the turban[36], Qur'an classes[37], the RP's relationship with Iran[38], and opposing declarations of different circles[39]. Emphasis on laicism and Shari'a were undoubtedly appeared most.[40] In the hands of the media everything, from covered wives' attendance at receptions to the beards of bodyguards, became issues of laicism.

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[36]"Sağ Basın'da Türban Tahriki" (Provocation of Turban in Rightist Press), *Sabah*, 30.08.1996

"2 Hassas Konu" (2 Sensitive Issues), *Sabah*, 26.01.1997 [About Turban and the authorization of THY to collect sacrificial animal hide]

"Refah'a 3 Uyarı" (3 Warnings for *Refah*), *Sabah*, 01.02.1997

[37] "Ürperten Yemin" (Creepy Oath), *Sabah*, 05.03.1997 [It was written that students were made swear for fighting untill the establishment of a religious state, in the Qur'an classes opened by "reactionary" organizations]

"Çankaya'ya da Cami" (Mosque in Çankaya), *Milliyet*, 31.01.1997

"Kur'an Kursunda Ürküten Yemin" (Scary Oath in Qur'an Class), *Milliyet*, 05.03.1997 [Swear for Shari'a];

[38] "Karadayı'dan Humeyni Dersi" (Khomeini Lesson from Karadayı), *Sabah*, 01.09.1996 [He said that when Iranian generals noticed Khomeini movement's reactionary character, it was too late]

"Bu Ne Rezalet" (What a Disgrace/Scandal), *Sabah*, 02.02.1997

[39] "Elçilerden Muhtıra" (Memorandum of Ambassadors), *Sabah*, 16.10.1996 [7 European ambassadors said that "we are breaking off from Europe"]

"Paket Depremi" (Plaquette Quake), *Milliyet*, 21.09.1996 [Business world criticized *Refah-Yol*'s funds]

"Gidin Başkaları Gelsin" (You Go, Others Come), *Milliyet*, 14.11.1996 [Business world rose up and gave this message to politicans: "stop corruption"]

"Köşk'e 5 Görüş" (5 Opinions Presented to the Mansion), *Milliyet*, 31.01.1997 [Military officials uttered their sensitivities]

"Laiklik Uyarısı" (Warning for Laicism), *Milliyet*, 13.02.1997 [USA: "Turkey's laic character is very important for us"]

"Sivil Dayanışma" (Civilian Solidarity), *Milliyet,* 26.02.1997 [Labors and artisans unified their forces to put their claim on laicism and democracy]

[40] "Laiklik Konusu Kötüye Gidiyor" (Laicism Issue is Getting Worse), *Sabah*, 31.08.

"Harp Okullarına Sızma Planı" (Plan for Leaking Military Schools), *Sabah*, 12. 11. 1996

"Ordu Rahatsız" (Military is Disturbed), *Sabah*, 13.12.1996

"Muhtıra Gibi" (Like a Memorandum), *Sabah*, 23.02.1997

"Cuma'da Tahrik" (Provocation in Friday Prayer), *Milliyet*, 03.10.1996

"Laiklik Uyarısı" (Laicism Notice), *Milliyet*, 17.10.1996

"İrtica PKK'dan Tehlikeli" (Religious Reaction is More Dangerous than PKK), *Milliyet,* 25.02.1997

Headscarf, beard, men turban, gown, sheikh, *İmam-Hatip*, Qur'an classes, mosque, Kudus, Iran, Khomeini, Shari'a, politization of Islam, plumbing the depths of darkness… These were the words and statements that the media used as elements of threat and objects of fear. The aim was to provoke the masses against the government, and justify the existing politization of the military and a probable intervention. Military was behaving like the main opposition party, which is very odd for a democratic state. What was more odd was that the media supported this very position of the military at every turn. For instance, on the anniversary of September 12, TRT broadcasted a program, in which the existing *Refah-yol* era was compared to the era before the coup of September 12. The producer of the program said at the end that no one desired a new coup, but armed forces would never hesitate to exercise the authority that was guaranteed by the constitution. He stated that the military had to use this authority when the unification of the state and Kemalist revolutions were endangered. (Karalı 2005, 204) This was obviously threat directed at the government from the state's television channel. Despite the debates it sparked, the program was broadcasted twice.

During the era of February 28, the media were not only a medium, but also actors of politics. On May 14, 1997, *Sabah* newspaper published an open call to the DYP. The headline read: "A Historical Mission is Waiting for You". In the report, the paper demanded (in the name of the Turkish people) that the DYP withdraw from the coalition government. According to the newspaper, everyone could see the handicaps of *Refah* government. In order to prevent the laic regime, the DYP must break with the government. *Sabah* portrayed this as the nation's demand.

5.4. The Effects of the February 28 Decisions on Society

February 28 affected hundreds of thousands of people. Hundreds of officers were expelled from military, on account of their relationship with *irtica*. (Pala 2010, 221) The secondary school divisions of *İmam-Hatip*s were closed down. Their high school graduates were prevented from entering universities, except for theology departments. The ban on headscarves began to be applied in the public sphere. It

affected every level of school and university students, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, and so on. Neither education, nor working were permitted while wearing a headscarf. Most of the Qur'an classes were closed. Qur'an education was banned under the age of twelve. The fear-mongering newspapers of the *Refah-yol* era did not reacted any of these illegal restrictions on freedom.

The General Staff formed an organization called the Western Working Group (BÇG) right after the National Security Council meeting of February 28, with the aim of verifying that the decisions were properly applied. The duty of the BÇG was to prepare a record for those whom it regarded as *irticacı*. By doing so, the military hoped to keep people under control. (Çelen 10.06.2008) The BÇG was secretly checking mosques, counted people related to tariqahs, Qur'an classes, and *İmam-Hatip*s. Their identities were then secretly recorded and kept on file. (Mercan 19.06.2009) Although it was totally illegal, Mesut Yılmaz government, which came after *Refah-yol*, legalized it. (Akşener 15.09.2003)

It appeared afterwards that the February 28 was a psychological campaign staged by the military, with the support of capitalists, the media and some civil society associations.(Akşener 15.09.2003) The military also confessed that the process was a crisis management, in which it made the government accepted the military's demands without fighting. (Özkasnak 12.02.2006)

The military – media relationship during February 28 have been the subject of many academic and non-academic studies. The most meaningful of them were criticisms from within. On this topic, Mehmet Ali Birand's these words are very significant:

> For our generation, the state has always been primary and right. And the military represented the state. A politician was a fiddler, liar person who did not worry for his country but only for his pocket. However, an officer was an honest, selfless hero who devoted everything to his country. Moreover, our Father (*Atamız*) left the duty of guarding this country and the laic-democratic republic to him. The military had the right to check out

politicians. When politicians messed up, the military had the right to intervene. Besides, when we noticed reluctance, we wrote articles saying, "Oh the general, where are you, the state is about to be lost". For us (namely for most of the members of the laic mainstream media) the priority was not democracy or parliament. The General Staff was much more important. There was nothing more ordinary than this… We were raised as such. Coup-adherence was installed to our genes without noticing. (…) We tolerated each coup. We backed them. (…) I am ashamed of this today. (Birand 2011)

The words of Birand are a perfect summary of media-military-economy relations. The kind of understanding Birand mentioned has been dominant especially until April 27 process. When a government dared oppose the military, things started to turn upside down, not suddenly, but slowly. Still, "the military notion has not been erased from the media's mind" completely. With even a slight change, a signal of a return back, the media have the potential to turn back to old days and "do not hesitate" to welcome the military. (Birand 06.12.2011) Today, power balances do not allow for this, but such was not the case five to ten years ago.

5.5. Traces of February 28 at the Initial Times of the AKP Government

At the start of the AKP government's term, the media did not give up their old habit of fear mongering. First, they tried to create an 'us' versus 'them' division through such feuilletons as "Turban File". (Milliyet 27.05.2003) Then they took every opportunity to remind th public of the February 28 fears.

The age-old discourse of the existence of the *irtica* threat re-arose with the AKP's taking power in the 2002 general elections. The source of the anxiety was not only the vote rate of the party, but also its chair share. It was only five years after the February 28 process, which was intended to last "a thousand year".(Sabah 13.04.2012) Right after the elections, Ertuğrul Özkök, the chief publishing editor of

Hürriyet, voiced his discomfort with humor: "Yesterday, during the preparation of headlines, one of my friends made a joke. First, he asked that, 'Do you want us to carry on headlines the words that all of us are thinking in our minds?' When we said, 'yes', he blew up this humoristic headline: 'Don't worry, there is Military…'''. (Özkök 04.11.2002) This was simply a threat aimed at the newly-elected party at beginning of the road. In the article, Özkök reminded readers of the fate of the RP and warned the AKP not to follow in its footsteps. Otherwise, he implied that the AKP's destiny would resemble that of the RP. The military would perform its duty. Here, he not only threatened the AKP, but also expressed his expectations from the military, by reminding the military of its duty to be seen as the protector of the status-quo.

From the 2002 elections to the 2006 State Council Attack a bias anxiety appeared occasionally on the pages of *Hürriyet*. The AKP's unexpected vote rate turnout alarmed the state elite, as well as *Hürriyet* (as the state paper). It made its anxiety known at every turn. The number of speculative reports in the newspaper rose. Among them, most were disproved and the rest were exaggerated. For example, "Doctor's Insistence on Turban" turned out to be false. In this denunciative article, *Hürriyet* called out a female doctor for covering herself with a headscarf during working hours. There was a photo showing a woman in a white apron wearing her headscarf. (*Hürriyet* 02.01.2006) In fact, the photo did not belong to the doctor in question and no such event had occurred. (*Hürriyet* 13.05.2006)

"March 31 Event in University" was an example of an exaggerate article. As we mentioned in previous sections, the March 31 event is a cliché in terms of *irtica*. *Hürriyet* chose to use that cliché. According to the newspaper, the case was such: A group of students forcibly made others listen to the Qur'an being read at the canteen, and girls were forced to cover their heads. The newspaper labeled it as "a reactionary (*irticai*) event, just like March 31". (*Hürriyet* 17.04.2006) However, the rector of the university denied the claims and said that the group had read the Qur'an quietly for five minutes, and then had departed without need for an intervention.(Yeter 18.04.2006)

Moreover, sometimes the newspaper published irrelevant reports as if they were relevant to *irtica,* just to keep the tension at a high level. For example Özdemir İnce wrote an article called "They set a girl with mini skirt on fire". It was written in such a way that it made people think the girl was a victim of religious bigotry. (İnce 20.12.2003) In fact, the girl was burned by hoodlums in France for an unknown reason.(Zaman 21.12.2003)

From 2002 to 2006, *irtica* debates intensified mostly because of the change in the adultery code. On this issue, *Hürriyet* took the duty upon itself to lead the AKP government down the 'right' path by using fear appealing. In the year 2004,the AKP government wanted to re-instate the penalty for adultery to the Turkish Criminal Code (TCK). Indeed, it had been appeared in TCK until 1999, so it would not have been a completely new change. It would have been like a restoration. However, the mainstream media in general, *Hürriyet* in particular, acted as if the AKP wanted to instate Shari 'a law. (*Hürriyet* 27.08.2004) The newspaper applied all possible clichés to arouse fear. First, it asserted that women's organizations reacted to the change. Although there was no information about which organizations reacted, how, where, or when, the usage of the phrase 'women's organizations' was not purposeless. Here, it was expected that the expression 'reaction of women' together with the word adultery would recall '*recm'*. On the Turkish agenda this word has always been accompanied by an image of a lapidated woman. It is used to demonstrate 'the cruelty of Shari'a'. In this respect, *Hürriyet*'s attitude was not innocent. Rather, it had deeper meanings than were seen on the surface. Through such an article, it associated the adultery code with Shari'a's coming. (*Hürriyet* 28.08.2004)

Second, it reminded people of the *recm* penalty applied in Iran and Saudi Arabia. It also heavily emphasized that there was no penalty for adultery in Western countries. (*Hürriyet* 28.08.2004) Two things attracted attention in this report. One was that although the stipulated penalty for adultery had nothing to do with *recm*, *Hürriyet* kept remarking on it continuously. Here the usage of an age-old fear factor emerged: resemblance to Iran -and/or Saudi Arabia-. The other is that the newspaper was using the most clichéd symbol of development, Western countries. By making a

comparison between Iran and the West, *Hürriyet* was explicitly laying out the path to follow. It was also giving the message to the government: 'do not go to the way of Iran; turn your face toward the Western countries'. More or less, *Hürriyet* spun all the reports related to adultery in this manner. It dispersed fear to its readers, and influenced the government until the draft law on the punishment of adultery was withdrawn. [41]

As stated above, Iran is one of the most commonly used fear inducers in the media. Even a simple event can be converted to a scandal by referencing Iran. For example, *Hürriyet*'s story "Morality Police in Samsun" did exactly that. The original event was as such: the municipality police had been patrolling beaches, and giving warnings to couples hugging each other. The municipality belonged to the AKP. This gave the newspaper the opportunity to call the municipality police as "morality police"; and compare it to Iran's morality police. The article read: "Three months after police took the uncovered women in the Iranian capital of Tehran, municipal employees in Samsun embark upon becoming morality police." (*Hürriyet* 23.09.2004) Although there was no relationship between the two events, *Hürriyet* aimed to keep alive the question of whether Turkey could become Iran, by continuing to draw the comparison.

5.6. Conclusion

Fear appeals were used during the first two terms of the AKP government. Headscarf (and/or turban), Iran (and then Malaysia), neighborhood pressure (the alcohol ban, advertisements for bikinis, etc.) and such issues never fell from the agenda. In the hands of *Hürriyet*, these subjects were displayed as a turn toward

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[41] "Zina Suç Oluyor" (Adultery is Becoming a Crime), *Hürriyet*, 31.08.2004.
"Zinaya İmam Nikahı Rötuşu" (Imam-Wedding Retouch for Adultery), *Hürriyet*, 02.09.2004
"Zina Kriptoları" (Adultery Cryptos), *Hürriyet*, 07.09.2004
"Zina Referanduma Gitmeli" (Adultery should Go to Referendum), *Hürriyet*, 13.09.2004
"Zinaya Formül Bulundu" (Formula is Found for Adultery), *Hürriyet*, 15.09.2004
"TCK'da Devrime Zina Molası" (Adultery Break for the Revolution in Penal Code), *Hürriyet*, 17.09.2004
"İkna Günü" (Persuasion Day), *Hürriyet*, 23.09.2004.

Shari'a. Laicism was associated with drinking alcohol, using interest, or wearing bikinis, when necessary. When this was the case, prohibition of alcohol in certain public places, for example, could be labeled as 'a deed against laicism'. This was exactly what *Hürriyet* and the other mainstream media branches did. This process of prompting fear intensified especially after the State Council attack. Republican meetings, the e-memorandum and the closure case against the AKP were the concrete results of this policy.

CHAPTER 6

İRTİCA DISCOURSE BEFORE AND AFTER 27 APRIL 2007

6.1. Introduction

Established by the victims of the February 28 process, the AKP took power only five years later. This disturbed a certain Kemalist circle of society. Although it appeared that some military officials planned to stage a coup, they could not have managed it, because of inadequate conditions. By 2006, things had changed. The presidential election was approaching, and the laic circle was decided not to let the AKP government choose who would move to the laic castle *Çankaya*. The Kemalist mainstream media again voiced this circle's demands –in tandem with exaggerated fear discourses– in order to legitimize these demands in the eyes of the people. The same movie was again put on the scene. *İrtica* discourse again intensified. The agenda was constructed around fear and threat, but this time gun would backfire.

6.2. *Hürriyet*'s Perversion of the Target in the Attack against State Council

On May 17, 2006, an attack was made against the State Council. A lawyer, called Alparslan Aslan, shot five members of the 2nd department. The name of the department at stake had come to the agenda three months prior with a decision about headscarf. The decision dated February 8th prevented a kindergartner, who had her headscarf out of school, from being the manager of her school. (Yeni Şafak 15.04.2010) However, the government reacted to this; the Prime Minister told that it was the job of the Department of Religious Affairs to address the issue, not of the judiciary. He explained his concern that if the judicial brunch could intervene here, then it could intervene in the domestic sphere as well. (*Hürriyet* 12.02.2006) Following Erdoğan's comment, *Hürriyet* published an interview made with the head

of the State Council. It revealed its position on the debate between the government and the State Council by asking a challenging question to its readers at the beginning of the interview: "whose job is it to made decision about the basic principles of the laic republic: Religious Affairs, or the State Council?" In addition, the emphasis in the news was given to the sentiments about laicism: "if you push the limits, laicism becomes endangered". (*Hürriyet* 13.02.2006) Thus, *Hürriyet* was drudging up the age-old fear of the destruction of the laic regime. Headscarf had been the soft spot in the laicism debates. It was considered one of the most explicit, main symbols of *irtica*, like alcohol's being a symbol –moreover, an assurance- of laicism. The news dated February 16 showed this explicitly. Its title was "100 turban applications will be refused all", on published version of the newspaper; while it was "ECHR closed its door against turban" on internet version. It consisted of an interview with a Turkish judge from the ECHR under regarding the turban issue and the decision that the State Council had made. Staging such interviews with those who had anxieties about laicism and emphasizing their sentiments in a confirmative manner were the indicators of *Hürriyet*'s perspective. Like the head official of the State Council, the judge from the ECHR underlined the protection of laicism. According to him, "turban is a religious symbol" that "the state can restrict in order to protect the constitution". Here, the important thing, from the judge's perspective, is "to protect the ones with no headscarves." He explained that this also protects laicism. (*Hürriyet* 16.02.2006) The implication was that the turban threatened laicism. Thus, laicism needed to be protected. The hidden message given to the government was the necessity to stand down on the turban issue.

The day after the attack on the State Council, *Hürriyet* published this headline: "By Scratching & Scratching". The article read: "the turban was brought to the agenda at every turn. The State Council was targeted after a decision about the turban. And the groveling attack was invited." (*Hürriyet* 18.05.2006) Explicitly, *Hürriyet* blamed the government for this attack. It was reminiscent of the debates about the headscarf. It acted as if it had not gone on at Prime Minister's words by exaggerating with using interviews with some experts, and as if it had not meticulously grown the fear. In fact, the fear of laicism's being under threat was

expressed in the newspaper's pages many times. However, *Hürriyet* did not accept that it had provoked anxiety among society through its news. Instead, it claimed that those reports were a kind of warnings. It gave the government the message that 'we warned you'. So, it assumed the attitude as if it had warned the government, but the government had not heeded; this was the reason of the attack against the State Council. In other words, according to the newspaper, the feared befell.

Still on the cover page it was stated that the attacker had been yelling "Allah-u Akbar" and "I am the warrior of God". This information was provided by a "surprise witness", who was the wife of one of the *Hürriyet*'s most radically laicist pens, Emin Çölaşan. Appearing near this news, there were a few lines from the article by Ertuğrul Özkök, called "The September 11 of the Regime". For him, "the judiciary, which is one of the most basic branches of the laic regime, was hit in its heart." (Özkök 18.05.2006) Later on, he supported this comparison by writing that "if one of a country's most critical courts is attacked, resulting in death of a judge at that court who had signed off a decision involving religion, this is an event of historical importance." According to the columnist, "the Council of State attack was the affair of rightist militants" who targeted the secular regime. (Balcı 2010, 83)

The head-writer of *Hürriyet*, Oktay Ekşi, blamed directly the Prime Minister for the attack. He wrote that the Prime Minister encouraged the attacker with his condemnatory words aimed at the State Council because of the Council's decision about turban. In his article, Ekşi did not only criticize but also insulted the Prime Minister. He wrote that the Prime Minister was lack of the ability to perceive the seriousness of the situation, and anticipate the potential dangers. (Ekşi, 18.05.2006) Ekşi was harsh against the Prime Minister. According to him, the attacker definitely yelled as "Allah-u Akbar", and he was a part of an organized action which intended to take the revenge of the turban decision.

The cover of *Hürriyet* on May 18 contained, in addition to the news above, the same interpretation of separate individuals and institutions, which claimed the attack was against the laic regime. The newspaper featured declarations about laicism. The common points in all of the emphasized comments –those of President Sezer, senior officials of the judiciary, and the committee of rectors- regarded laicism

and the basic qualifications of the republic, meaning the Kemalist revolutions. The report stated that all of them claimed the attack had targeted the laic Republic of Turkey. It was a challenge to the laicism. In the newspaper, the comments were compared to a memorandum. The anger against government, according to *Hürriyet*, was obvious during the funeral of the dead member of the State Council. It also wrote that the crowd, which called on the government to resign, applauded the army generals. (*Hürriyet* 18.05.2006)

When all these news items were examined together, the general picture that the newspaper drew depicted a major crisis in the regime. Despite the fact that the investigation was not yet completed, *Hürriyet* acted as if it had been decided who the responsible ones were. According to paper, the attacker was a religionist who had shouted "Allah-u Akbar"; the attack was a reactionary movement aimed at destroying laic regime; and the government put the country in disorder through its religious identity and comments on the headscarf issue. The way in which the news items were presented implied that the government was responsible for such a vital crisis that the state needed to take extraordinary measures. The September 11 comparison was very notable here; because this comparison indicated exactly what kind of an environment that *Hürriyet* tried to create.

Briefly, after September 11, it was claimed that the attacks were aimed not only at the buildings, but also at the whole civilization that those buildings represented. The Islamic identity of the attackers was used to depict all Muslims as supportive of the attacks. The media adopted this discourse of negative identification. Westerners, on behalf of Americans, were defined as 'us', while Muslims, on behalf of hijackers, were labeled as 'them'. In the eyes of media and the state, "this [was] a religious war"; this was "about Islam". "Muslim rage" led "the real cultural wars". So, in order to understand "the deep intellectual roots of Islamic terror", one needs to take the class "Jihad 101", taught by the media. (Abrahamian 2002, 62) The statements within the quotation marks are some of the headlines the New York Times used after the attacks. According to the media, obviously, there was a direct association between the attacks and Islam. They demonstrated the way that public opinion was steered. They were directed toward a perception of a prospective threat,

and a sense of fear. During this era, officials' comments, which were often portrayed in the media, were encouraging this fear; because, they did not speak in an appeasing manner. Rather, they instigated the polarization by saying that the attackers were "enemies of freedom". They were "threatening civilization because [Westerners] believe in progress, pluralism and tolerance". (Abrahamian 2002, 62-63) Here, the salient point was word choice. The words used, 'enemies' and 'threaten', meant 'war'. As such, the war soon showed its face. In the end, all the intentions behind the fear discourse appeared as legitimizing US interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq.

After the attack against the State Council, *Hürriyet*'s chief editor's selection of a title about 9/11 was very meaningful. It showed that the columnist considered the two events equal. He identified the attack with religion; similar to how 9/11 was identified. In addition, just as the US considered that the attacks to be aimed at Western civilization and values, Özkök thought that the attack against the State Council was aimed at the laic Republic and its values. When Özkök's article was read together with the prominent lines of the other storied on the cover page, it was obvious that *Hürriyet* put laicism on the side of the victims, and religion on the side of the attacker. It located the Islamist government at the position of encourager. Thus, it created an air of fear, even war, in which the government itself was the source of the threat. This was exactly the same discourse of the military and bureaucratic elite. *Hürriyet* upheld them; and played the role of mediator to spread the fear among society.

During the proceeding days, *Hürriyet* lasted to pump fear. On May 19th, at the day of Youth and Sport Festival, the newspaper published an upper headline, "We Are on Guard Duty", and the following text:

> Dear Atatürk
>
> As sentries of the revolution and your principles, we are celebrating today the May 19th Commemoration of Atatürk, Youth and Sport Festival with a greater enthusiasm and faith than always. Grand Leader, be at ease, the democratic laic Republic will survive forever. (*Hürriyet* 19.05.2006)

Through these sentiments, *Hürriyet* acknowledged its own standpoint as the guardian of laicism. It chose "Women Raised Their Voice: Turkey is Secular" as the day's headline. The news was about judiciary members' visit to Ataturk's mausoleum for as to declare their loyalty to him and his tenets. There were thousands of people as well. Although there was not much about women in the rest of the news, the emphasis on women in the headline was not a coincidence. Here, *Hürriyet* referred to the case of the headscarf and the laic belief that religion oppressed women. By emphasizing the attendance of women only with their free will, the newspaper was indicating both the emancipatory nature of secularism, and women's claim on it. In the details of the story, it was written that tens of thousands of people went to Atatürk's mausoleum just of their own volition, without any kind of organization; and they complained about the government to Atatürk. They were "one voice, one heart" in stating that "Turkey would not resemble Iran". They also called on the government to resign, and the Prime Minister to go to Iran. The newspaper emphasized that the protest showed the determination of the Republican people to protect the order against the real threat of religious reaction. (*Hürriyet* 19.05.2006) In doing so, it escalated the hostility in society.

The day after, *Hürriyet* portrayed Bülent Ecevit's attendance at the funeral of the attack victim as though it was a demonstration of heroism. In the story under the headline "25 steps at the Expense of Death", it was written that Ecevit "fulfilled his last duty for the martyr of laicism". (*Hürriyet* 20.05.2006) This 'heroic' action of the ex-prime minister was held up an example for readers. The term 'martyr' evoked a situation of a war. Thus, people were asked to take their places in this 'war', just as Ecevit did.

As the investigation went deeper, it appeared that the attack had been a part of a huge plan. The crime folder of the Council attack unified with of *Ergenekon*, which was an illegal, deep-state organization. Indeed, *Hürriyet* pointed out the "*Ergenekon* Structure" behind the attack, just one week after. (Atilla 24.05.2006) It portrayed the *Ergenekon* as an armed gang organized within the state. According to the paper's claims, it was involved in the *Susurluk* incident. While preparing the report, the newspaper was inspired by the book "*Ergenekon: Devlet içinde Devlet*" (*Ergenekon*:

A State within the State), because "the book depicted *Ergenekon* as an extension of rightist and nationalist counter guerilla movements in the 1970s".(Balcı 2010, 82) However, the following periods showed that *Ergenekon* did not consist of only rightist movements. Rather, the *Ergenekon* indictment defined the organization as a terrorist group that provoked the people into an armed rebellion against the government using some media units and civil society institutions. Additionally, according to the indictment, the council attack was an assassination designed by *Ergenekon* to achieve its goal. (*Ergenekon* İndicaments, Milliyet Website)

When it was appeared that *Ergenekon* was a multi-dimensional terrorist organization, which even had members within the media, *Hürriyet* quit emphasizing it. The *Ergenekon* fact behind the attack made *Hürriyet* get remove from the council attack issue. The topic was more attractive in the eyes of *Hürriyet,* when the turban was considered the reason; however, when it became obvious that the turban reason was fake, and the real reason was to collapse the government, *Hürriyet* quit mentioning the topic.

The turban (of the headscarf) had already been the number one topic in fear appealing campaigns since the end of 1980s. It was featured prominently during the presidential election process, as well.

6.3. 2007 Presidential Elections as a Laicism Issue

On the year 2007, there was presidential election. It was deemed more significant than any other presidential election before it. The reason was candidate's Islamist identity. For the first time, a non-LAST practicing Muslim, whose wife was wearing a headscarf, was about to be the President. From the Kemalist aspect, this would have been a total defeat of laicism. So, Kemalists were decided not to allow a non-LAST candidate to become the President.

It was thought that Tayyip Erdoğan, whose wife was covered, would be the candidate for presidency, but he was not. Instead, Abdullah Gül was chosen by the AKP as the candidate. Gül's candidacy made no difference; because he had the same

mentality as Erdoğan; besides, his wife was also covered. This, indeed, was the basis of the crisis; because Kemalists did not want to see someone with a covered wife in *Çankaya ,* which was an important stronghold of Kemalism. In order to prevent the existing assembly from electing the president, meetings were held, senior courts stepped in, and the military gave notice. During this process, the mainstream media provided logistic support. By spreading fear, the media created a perception of threat and mobilized Kemalist circles. So, they played a major role in the crisis.

During the process of presidential elections, the media took a February-28-like duty. As stated previously, the media played an undeniably integral role so that "throughout the history of Turkey, no such direct participation of the media in a military coup had been experienced until then. The media had never involved such directly to a military coup in the history of Turkey". (Ünsaldı 2008, 183-184) Indeed, the words of Dinç Bilgin, who was one of the powerful media bosses, were remarkable here. He portrayed the position of the media in February 28 days as such:

> During that era, the media became more powerful than they
> had ever been before in this country. Both the military and the
> media strengthened. But, the governments were very weak.
> During this era, the media allied with both the military and
> judiciary. This alignment gave the press an enormous power that
> it should not have had." (Bilgin 08.03.2010)

The "enormous power" of the media gave them an enormous self-confidence. They assumed their power would be eternal. Because of this, they did not hesitate to over-involve in politics. They pursued this habit after February 28 era as well.

As the presidential election of 2007 approached, an increase in reports with topics about religion was observed in mainstream media in general, *Hürriyet* in particular. As stated above, these reports resembled those published during the process of February 28. For instance, the demand of a professor to pray on a train was published as "*Hürriyet*'s special". The title of the report was "He wanted to stand for prayer on the train". (Çetin 04.12.2006) It mentioned an e-mail written by a professor to the TCDD, requesting the allocation of a special place for prayer and

ablution. In another report, which was published as the headline, it was written that there were direction arrows in the prayer room of fast ferryboats. The title was "The fast ferryboat found the kiblah". (*Hürriyet* 05.12.2006) Neither of the reports was distinctive nor newsworthy, but *Hürriyet* published them on headline. In addition, the chosen titles exaggerated the events. In doing so, the newspaper made people accustomed to the religion-based news. In the following days, the issues started to become more serious and provocative. Similar to the process of February 28, but less intensively, such topics like love and murder in tariqahs, false prophets, and doctors with headscarves who refused to examine male patients became the agenda of *Hürriyet*. [42] Indeed, some of these reports were false. The paper even admitted this. [43] True or false, *Hürriyet* framed those reports instead of others. None of them were so notable that could worth to be on headline, but *Hürriyet* chose to spare its headlines and upper headlines to those inferior news reports. These reports created an air of distrust about religious people. By picking negative examples and using false information, *Hürriyet* instigated distrust against religious people. With elections on the horizon, this was a deliberate action.

When the presidential election was at stake, the issue taking the limelight was the turban. Indeed, it did not fall from the agenda since the attack against the State Council. Soon after the attack, there was an assassination attempt against the Higher Education Council (YOK). *Hürriyet* printed the report on the upper headline. It introduced the assailant as "sensitive about the turban" and "aggressive". The article claimed that his sister was struggling with the problem of turban, and he was so aggressive he attempted the assassination. (*Hürriyet* 26.04.2007) When citing this information, the newspaper did not base it on any reliable source. Even a couple days later, it appeared that the attack against YÖK was related Erganekon, similar to the State Council Attack. . (*Ergenekon* İndictments, Milliyet Website) However,

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[42] "Tarikatta Aşk, Şiş ve Cinayet" (Love, Skewer and Murder in Tariqah), *Hürriyet*, 12.12.2006

"Doçentin Eşine 'Peygamberim' Davası" (Trial against the Wife of Associated Professor), *Hürriyet*, 15.12.2006;

"Bir Şarlatanın Mürit Sohbeti" (A Humbug's Disciple Chat), *Hürriyet*, 23.12.2006;

"Testis diye Çekmediler" (They did not X-rayed because it was testicle), *Hürriyet*, 17.12.2006;

[43] "Peruklu Yüzleşme" (Wigged Face Off), *Hürriyet*, 21.12.2006.

Hürriyet wrote about the relationship between the assassination attempt and the turban as if it was the truth. Namely, the newspaper tried to present the attempt as if it was an action for the turban. Indeed, it took the same stand as in the Council attack. The turban defenders, on behalf of the attackers, were represented as very dangerous people who could do anything. In addition, the turban was portrayed as the triggering source of bloody attacks. This message aimed to create a fear of the turban. Here, timing was very remarkable; it was just a couple of days before the election, in which the candidate's covered wife was the biggest problem.

Hürriyet's real opinion about the turban was conveyed via the mouth of someone else. In a report called "Why I do not make headscarves", a famous Tunisian fashion designer was interviewed. In the interview, he discussed everything from his life story to the kinds of dresses he was designing, but his words on the headscarf were chosen for the front page. He thought that "contemporary women want[ed] freedom"; this was the reason for him "not to design headscarf in [his] collections". Besides, he was "shocked when [he] saw a woman in black from head to foot". According to him, "no religion deserve[d] it". (*Hürriyet* 05.05.2007) The way the interview was presented demonstrated that the newspaper agreed with the designer in his shock. In this report, and in many others, some of which were mentioned in this thesis, *Hürriyet* revealed its feelings in the debates around covering as the opponent.

During the process of presidential elections, *Hürriyet* "converted the issue of laicism into the fear of Islam's coming". (Özkır 2011, 101) Although the 'turban' was the outward face, the real fear injected into society was a prospective collapse of laicism, and the establishment of a theocratic state. In this way, the military's hand was strengthened; because, the valid thought was that "we revert only twenty years via a coup d'état, but one hundred years via *irtica*."(Görmüş 2011, 33)

Aside from the turban, prayer was presented as an element of threat. "Prayer in High School" was one of such reports. In the text, *Hürriyet* took the attitude as if it was exposing a crime:

A family, who suspected from their daughter's covering her head and praying, investigated the event. They made it appear as though the students were being performed collective prayer during lesson time. The mother, who followed her daughter, figured out that a room in the basement of the school had been turned into a prayer room. She saw that after male students performed their prayers, female students did the same also. She secretly recorded these scenes to her video recorder." (*Hürriyet* 31.05.2007)

As demonstrated, the news had an appalling style. The chosen words pushed readers into thinking that the students were diong something illegal or something immoral or at least something very bad. In the detail of the story, the Holy Birth activities were mentioned, and the Minister of National Education's declaration after these activities was recalled. From the declaration, *Hürriyet* picked the sentences which promise to deal with the case, "if there [was] a contradiction with the basic qualifications of the republic". (*Hürriyet* 31.05.2007) Here, 'basic qualification' meant laicism. The newspaper was trying to introduce praying in school as an action counter to laicism. Its style of discourse was intended to mobilize the sense of anxiety in its readers. Thus, in the hands of *Hürriyet*, praying in school turned into a dreadful action against the laic regime.

There was one more factor used mostly as intimidation: Iran. For the Turkish mainstream media, opposition to the regime meant Shari'a and Shari'a was equated with Iran. More explicitly, it was assumed that if laicism was disrupted, Shari'a would be applied, and Turkey would resemble Iran. Except the political developments, Iran came to the agenda of *Hürriyet* only when there was news issued covering or lapidation. The selected reports were always of negative examples. In this way, Iran and Iranian applications imputed to religion were reduced to elements of fear. For instance, on May 15, 2007, *Hürriyet* brought the Iranian government's ban on non-covering to its cover page. It was written that seventeen thousand women received a warning, because their covering was not as tight as it should have been. (*Hürriyet* 15.05.2007) There was nothing so unusually important about this that it

would be placed on the cover page. However, again, its timing was notable. The report was printed at the time of the turban debates held around the presidential elections. So, the function of the report was to push people into fearing they might end up resembling Iran.

The use of fear appealing was executed hand in hand with the assistance of some NGOs, the military and the judiciary. The NGOs arranged the Republican Demonstrations, the military attempted to give a note and the judiciary prosecuted the AKP. In each instance, *Hürriyet* was there for support. It invited people to Republican Demonstrations and presented the demonstrations as the national struggle against *irtica*. It supported the electronic memorandum, and tried legitimize the military's anxiety. It also tried to justify the attitude of the judiciary. In all cases, it printed huge-sized headlines, or upper headlines. In all cases, both the discourse and visual objects were intended to trigger fear and the perception of threat.

6.4. Movements of Organized "Unarmed Forces"[44]: Republican Demonstrations

The Republican Demonstrations were the most significant events after the State Council attack. While the latter indirectly aimed to sabotage the presidential election, the former were directly aimed at preventing the existing assembly to elect the president. Although the Republican Demonstrations were seen as civil actions, the military was behind the curtain.[45] Indeed, the organizers of these meetings were the ones who M. Ali Birand included in the laic circle: the CHP, capital owners, the judiciary's bureaucracy, military officers and the media. (Birand 24.05.2011) Pro-Kemalist hegemonic and ultra-nationalist media gave huge support to the meetings.

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[44] Posta newspaper announced Republican Demonstrations with such a headline: "Unarmed Forces". (15.04.2007) This was an ascription to the famous headline of February 28 Process: "Let it be managed by unarmed forces this time". (Hürriyet, 20.12.1996)

[45] Alper Görmüş wrote, right after the appearance of Coup Journals, that "It will gullibility to think that organized mass movements, including Republican meetings, were totally 'civil'" (Görmüş 2011, 260) This detection came true. Republican Demonstrations entered the *Ergenekon* Indictments as an activity of the terrorist organization.

Even *Hürriyet*, which defines itself as objective (Hürriyet Yayın İlkeleri 2012), did not hesitate to call on people to attend the demonstrations.

The discourse around the threat of *irtica* had a potential to bring about a change in attitude, from "invoking societal indifference and fear to producing consent and support." The public were called for action instead of remaining inert. They were invited to get into the "arena of contestation", so as to legitimize undemocratic involvement of the military into the politics, and to support consent manufacturing. (Cizre and Çınar 2003, 322) The Republican Demonstrations were satisfying this mission. They were supporting military instruction over politics, and gaining more support by giving off the notion that 'if you are anxious about the regime, you are not alone'. The demonstrations were like a showdown.

The organizers of the Republican Demonstrations were the Ataturkist Thought Association (ADD), the Association to Promote Contemporary Life (ÇYDD), the Republican Women's Association, the Turkish Union of Women, the Modern Education Association, and five hundred more organizations. (Yüksel, et al. 2009) Among them, one of the leading organizations was the ÇYDD. The association was founded in 1989 "to fight the Islamists" by the "Kemalist women" who "perceived the Islamic upsurge more as a threat". (Arat 1997, 108) Aysel Ekşi, one of its founders, defines their motivation as such:

> For some time now, we have been confronted by a serious
> and surreptitious reactionary movement that hides behind the
> curtain of "freedom of woman to dress as she wishes" but in
> reality struggles to return our society to the darkness of the
> Middle Ages. We do not doubt that this reactionary movement,
> led by a handful of dogmatic, diehard Islamists who have roots
> outside [the country] and who deceive many of our well-meaning,
> innocent people, sees the destruction of the secular republic as its
> first goal and pursues the establishment of a Shari'a order. We
> came together with the awareness of this danger and the authority
> that Atatürk's reforms have given us in order to protect Atatürk
> reforms, the secular republic, and our rights, which are an

inalienable part of these [reforms and the secular republic] (Arat 1997, 108-9)

Obviously, these words are the brief and essential expression of the secular-minded point of view, which we frequently point out in this study. From this perspective, the headscarf is a symbol of the desire to destroy the secular republic. Covered Muslim women and supportive men have their roots outside; they get aid from Iran. Indeed, Ekşi's words are very important in that they give us the opportunity to perfectly comprehend laic mentality. Like Kemalist men, also "[Kemalist] women identify themselves and their power with the state. … they –the educated elite- know the good of the other, they comment on 'their' innocent people being deceived by reactionary Islamists." (Arat 1997, 109) Here, the Republican Demonstrations were held by this mentality. Both their organizers and supporters aimed to fight with Islam under the name of *irtica*, and prevent a possible destruction of laicism by attracting people's attention to such a 'threat'. They tried to frighten people in order to gain their support in the struggle of hegemony. It was, indeed, a struggle for hegemony between Kemalist 'owners' of the state, and Islamist 'bourgeoisie'.

In a collective work with a couple of doctorate students, Professor Erkan Yüksel (2009) says that the Republican meetings were defined as "movements of rejection of seeing the Prime Minister Erdoğan or someone with the same mentality on *Çankaya*". Actually the slogans epitomize the entire situation: "The ways of *Çankaya* are closed against Shari'a", "*Çankaya* is laic, it will remain laic", "Hey Imam of USA, in exchange for how much did you sell the fatherland?", "The chairman of the assembly is an enemy of the Republic", "Turkey is ashamed of you!". The ones who spoke on the platform emphasized that their aim was to defend laicism. (46) At the Republican meetings, the Prime Minister and the whole cabinet were blamed for being against 'republican values' (read: laicism), and for advocating Shari'a. Rather than the candidate's name, the Islamic identity of the name was unaccepted. Here also, the turban became the symbol of laic fears. The laic circle uttered that they did not want to have the "castle of laicism" snatched by the turban. (Birand 07.06.2006)

In the reports about the Republican demonstrations, quantitatively the word 'meeting' appeared the most in *Hürriyet*. It used this word even more than *Cumhuriyet* newspaper. Similarly, 'laicism' appeared more often in *Hürriyet* than any other papers. *Hürriyet* was also the first in usage of the word 'Shari'a'. It shared the same positive attitude toward the demonstrations as *Cumhuriyet* and *Milliyet*.(Yüksel, et al. 2009) It supported the demonstrations with both its headlines and columnists.

Republican demonstrations began in Ankara with a march to Atatürk's Mausoleum. The laic circle voiced their complaints about the AKP government to the Father. Then came other demonstrations in İstanbul, İzmir and some other Aegean cities. Below, we will examine each of them separately.

The first of the Republican demonstrations was organized in Ankara, in opposition to the possibility of Erdoğan's candidacy for presidency. *Hürriyet* wrote about the movement on the upper headline. The title was as such: "The Strongest Objection". It was defining the demonstration as "the biggest one in Turkey's history". In the spot, it was written that "hundreds of thousands uttered their objections against Tayyip Erdoğan's presidency". The report was accompanied by a photo of Atatürk's Mausoleum, the crowd, and women with the Turkish flag. The photo was covering half of the first page. (*Hürriyet* 15.04.2007)

In the online version of *Hürriyet*, the title was "hundreds of thousands of 65%". Here, the newspaper referred to the 35% of votes that the AKP had taken in the 2002 elections, and introduced all opposition as a unified block that completely supported the Republican demonstration in *Tandoğan*. It was stated that the demonstration was the most magnificent in the history of Ankara. According to the newspaper, the meeting "had turned into a show of strength of who put a claim on the republic". It highlighted the slogans shouted, and the banners carried: "Get unified for the republic", "Tomorrow will be too late", "Turkey is laic, will remain as laic", "Tayyip look at us, count how many of us", "We do not want to see an *imam* on *Çankaya*", "Ways of *Çankaya* are closed against Shari'a", "Don't be silent, if you remain silent then Tayyip Erdoğan will come", "Bulb Tayyip", "Here is the square, here is *Tandoğan*, where are you Erdoğan?", "We are aware of the danger". The

newspaper also emphasized university professors. It stated that they wrote in Mausoleum special notebook that they would protect the laic republic forever.

On April 15, many columnists of *Hürriyet* spared their columns to address the meeting in *Tandoğan*. They mentioned the *Tandoğan* demonstration enthusiastically. They re-warned Erdoğan not to be a candidate, and to lend an ear to the people's voice.

Indeed the AKP had not yet declared the name of its candidate. However, for a while, the media had insisted on making news issued 'what would happen if Erdoğan became the President?'. *Hürriyet*'s columnists had been warning Erdoğan not to run. They eagerly supported the *Tandoğan* demonstration. The initial aim was to prevent Erdoğan from being a candidate for Presidency. When it appeared that Abdullah Gül, instead of Erdoğan, would be the AKP's candidate, the focus of Republican meetings shifted from Erdoğan, and intensified on the issues including Hayrünnisa Gül's headscarf, laicism-Shari'a diversity, and the fear discourses aimed at destroying the feared.

The second demonstration, which was announced by *Hürriyet* one day before the April 27 declaration, was held in Istanbul, *Çağlayan* Square. The title of the news was "Women are against turban on *Çankaya*". The featured photo was the one of Hayrünnisa Gül. (*Hürriyet* 26.04.2007) The word choice was very significant; it is not Kemalists, or Republicans, or Turkish people, but women. Women were pitted against woman. The word "women" in the title was used as a proof of the righteousness of the demonstrators. By emphasizing women especially, *Hürriyet* meant that women saw the turban as a threat to themselves. They did not regard it as a part of freedom of religion, but they loaded it with a symbolic meaning of Shari'a threat. Because of this, they were against Hayrunnisa Gül. Here, all covered women were otherized in the name of Hayrünnisa Gül.

The Republican demonstration on *Çağlayan* square was held in the stressful environment of the e-memorandum. *Hürriyet* re-announced it the same day as meeting with these words: "On *Çağlayan*, at 13 o'clock: The most important slogan of the meeting will be 'No Shari'a, Long live laic republic!'". (*Hürriyet* 29.04.2007)

This time *Hürriyet* devoted its entire cover page to the *Çağlayan* report. A huge photograph of the crowd covered half of the front page; and a woman, who was carrying a portrait of Atatürk on her body and a flag in her hand, was located upon the photograph. The red spot of the report said that there was a "Woman Revolution in *Çağlayan*". The detail of the report read: "over a million people swore an oath to laic and democratic Turkey in order to stake their claim on the Republic." Here, the words implied that the republic was in danger, and that by protecting laicism, the danger could be staved off. In the report, it was also mentioned that the people in the square called on both the rightist and the leftist parties to come together and attend the elections under one roof. (*Hürriyet* 30.04.2007) This was presented as the solution to the threat. If all parties could come together against the AKP, they would win the elections and, therefore, the republic could eliminate the danger of an AKP government, as well as the danger of a non-LAST, practicing Muslim president. An air of enthusiasm pervaded the report. *Hürriyet* shared the enthusiasm of the people in attendance. It emphasized the role of women and published the mottos, such as "the roads of *Çankaya* are close to Shari'a", in an approving manner. In this way, it tried to show the existence of the threat of *irtica*; and underlined the public's power to remove this threat through their votes; and declared the unification of the other parties against the AKP as the solution offer. Namely, each step of fear appealing theory was implemented by the newspaper: the threat was exhibited, the message that 'you are strong enough to get rid of the threat' was given, and the solution was offered.

After the *Çağlayan* demonstration, *Hürriyet* announced eagerly the proceeding demonstrations in Manisa, Çanakkale, Marmaris and especially İzmir. It visited a flag factory and wrote that "flags [were] not sufficient for demonstrations". (*Hürriyet* 12.05.2007) Among the first three demonstrations, the newspaper emphasized that the highest attendance was in Manisa, which was "the hometown of Bülent Arınç". (*Hürriyet* 06.05.2007) The meaning of this emphasis laid behind a news report dated April 16. In a speech, Bülent Arınç stated that the government wanted to elect a religious president. (*Hürriyet* 16.04.2007) After this statement was made, *Hürriyet* took a stand against him and made a number of reports against

Arınç.[46] Here, by highlighting Manisa's being his hometown, and by stating the high attendance in Manisa, the newspaper meant that Arınç's hometown was against him. According to *Hürriyet*, the people in his hometown wanted to secure the laic nature of presidency. Thus, the newspaper again created a separation of laic and religious as if the latter was the opposite of the former.

In the report about the Aegean demonstrations, there was a subtitle that read: "a piece of cloth on the head can take down the government". Interestingly, it was a statement taken from Time magazine. However, the style in which the report was written meant much about the debates around the headscarf. First of all, the report was written as a subtitle of the story about the Republican demonstrations. (*Hürriyet* 06.05.2007) This made it apprehend as if the demonstrators threaten the government. If the government insisted on the turban, the laic circle had the power to overthrow it. Fear turned to a gun pointed at the feared, and it was used to shape politics. In all demonstration reports published in *Hürriyet*, this case greeted the eye.

Hürriyet's greatest enthusiasm was for the İzmir demonstration. It announced the demonstration from the upper headline with the qualification "the greatest of all demonstrations". According to the newspaper, "Turkey's heart [would] beat in İzmir today". (*Hürriyet* 13.05.2007) The next day, *Hürriyet* spared the whole page to the demonstration. The title was "Here My Father, İzmir" (*İşte Atam İzmir*). By speaking directly to Atatürk, the newspaper boasted about crowd. It was proud of the demonstration. On the page, again a woman with a flag appeared on the front. Behind her there was a huge photo of the crowd. According to *Hürriyet*, 1.5 million people came together on the square. The paper emphasized "laicism slogans" and flags. (*Hürriyet* 14.05.2007) *Hürriyet* maintained its position as a supporter of the *İzmir* demonstration. One of the columnists in that day's edition reprehended the leftist parties because they could not unify as a single block against the AKP.

A week later, *Hürriyet* published the "expected" news. The leftist parties would enter the election under one roof. The newspaper highlighted party leaders' call for unification. According to the paper, the leaders said "we unified, now you

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[46] "Fiyakası Bozuldu" (His Blazon is Spoiled), *Hürriyet*, 01.05.2007
"Köşk'te Arınç Gölgesi" (The Shadow of *Arınç* on *Çankaya*), *Hürriyet*, 03.05.2007

unify". (*Hürriyet* 21.05.2007) From the mouths of the leftist leaders, *Hürriyet* demanded from people to come together and vote for the unified parties against the AKP.

6.5. General Evaluation of *Hürriyet*'s News Items about the Republican Demonstrations

Hürriyet took a similar attitude against all of the Republican demonstrations. The newspaper supported demonstrations via its headlines, upper headlines, its more prominent columns, the chief editor, and of many other columnists. In *Hürriyet*'s news items, there are three important things to focus on: distortion, otherization and double-sided fear appealing.

The newspaper portrayed the demonstrators as representatives of all the people of Turkey. This is the most oft-applied distortion by politicians. They generally tend to qualify what they do as the people's demands. *Hürriyet*, as a newspaper, took this attitude, and qualified the demonstrations as people's voice. In reality, they were a certain circle's voice, which was already discontented with Erdoğan's Prime Ministry. Besides, the newspaper tried to exaggerate the size of the crowd. It was an undeniably large crowd, but the newspaper wanted to show that it was even larger. By inflating the size of the crowd and presenting it as the spokesman of the whole Turkish society, *Hürriyet* aimed to frighten the government into revising its decisions about the presidential elections and conceding the 'people's demands. The government was forced to make one of two choices: if it turned a deaf ear to such large opposition, it would lose legitimacy; and if it resisted, the military would bring it into line. This is the meaning of the discourse of *Hürriyet*'s news reports.

The newspaper also included otherization in the news about the Republican demonstrations. The headscarf and women in headscarves were the main targets of this otherization. *Hürriyet* kept emphasizing modern, contemporary, laic, Republican women who did not cover. In each story, it highlighted the number of female participants. Again, each news item was presented alongside a photograph of a

woman with a flag on which appeared Atatürk's portrait. It emphasized at every turn that the participants did not want to see the turban on *Çankaya*. Again it stated at every turn that the meetings were held in order to prevent Erdoğan's mentality from occupying Atatürk's chair. Specifically, not only the headscarf, but also its total worldview was condemned to otherization. The newspaper stated that meeting participants were there to put their claim on the Republic against destruction. This meant there were some who intended to destroy the republic. These people were somehow related to the headscarf and possessed the same mentality as Erdoğan, according to *Hürriyet*. In this way, the paper otherized all practicing Muslims.

There was also a double-sided fear appealing greeting eyes from the newspaper's first pages. On the one hand, it threatened the government with the size of the crowd, as mentioned above. On the other hand, it frightened people with *irtica*. *Hürriyet* used all four factors of fear appealing that affect the possibility of the adoption of recommended response. As stated above, the response recommended to the government by the media-supported laic circle was withdrawal of the government and arrangement of early elections so that a new assembly could elect the president. It was hoped that the new assembly would not resemble the old one in terms of nominal vote rates. Thus, a non-AKP member could be elected president. After stating what recommended response is for this certain case, we can move to state how *Hürriyet* used the four factors of fear appealing, which are the severity of risk, vulnerability, efficacy of the recommended response, and self-efficacy. First the newspaper emphasized before and during the Republican meetings that the laic regime was at a severe risk of collapse. Arınç's words about 'the wish to elect a religious president' were introduced as the hidden intentions of the AKP. Arınç was stigmatized and crucified. The newspaper started and executed a campaign against him during the election process. Additionally, when publishing reports about the Republican demonstrations, the newspaper highlighted all declarations and slogans claiming that 'our republic is under threat'. Thus, it continuously repeated the severity of the risk. According to the newspaper the threat was too imminent. If the AKP could take the presidency, laicism would become endangered. Specifically, vulnerability was high. In order to make the recommended response efficient, in

other words in order to prevent AKP from re-taking power in the early election, the solution offer was unification of rightist and leftist parties under a single roof of each so that people would not be divided among many diverse parties. The CHP was chosen as the roof of the leftist parties, while a new party, the Democrat Party was established as the roof of the rightist parties. The name of the Democrat Party had very strong connotations in terms of the past, because of this, it was planned that people would feel close to this new party, and vote for it. *Hürriyet* praised these two unifications at every opportunity. It gave people the notion that if they voted for one of these parties, the AKP would lose and the danger would disappear. It explicitly called on people to attend both demonstrations and the elections in order to protect the Republican values. According to the newspaper, the threat was too real and too near, to the point that people needed to forgo vacation if necessary, and to go to the ballot boxes.

In general, Abdullah Gül's candidacy did not irritate the laic circle as much as Erdoğan possibility. This was because of Gül's relationship to the EU process, to some extent. (Balkır, et al. 2008, 197) However, the laic circle was still concerned about 'losing' one of the 'castles of laicism', *Çankaya*. *Hürriyet* also heightened this anxiety of the laic circle and tried to extend it to all of society.

Although the Republican deemonstrations were introduced by mainstream media as totally civil organizations in which people use their democratic rights, in reality the *Ergenekon* Terrorist Organization was behind the demonstrations. It made the decisions, organized some non-governmental associations, and hosted the demonstrations. The organization also had close relationships with the media. The organization instructed some media units about the nature of the Republican demonstrations and directed them in accordance with the *Ergenekon*'s aims. In this way, the organization tried to form and shape public opinion in order to get the support of the people. (Second Indictment, NTVMSNBC) One of the chief organizers of the Republican demonstrations was the ADD. Its then chairman was Şener Eruygur, a retired military general. There were many military officers who supported the meetings. After the first demonstration, when the General Staff published a warning note (later called the e-memorandum) on its website, the support

began to be mutual: the military backed the demonstrations, and the demonstrators backed the military's memorandum.

6.6. Virtual Attempt for a Military Intervention on April 27

On April 24, Abdullah Gül was declared as the AKP's candidate for presidency. The first tour of presidential election was held on April 27. Gül could not secure a sufficient number of votes. That night, The General Staff produced a written declaration emphasizing the sensibility of the military regarding laicism. Some publications units qualified the military's note as a memorandum, from the beginning. (Yüksel, et al. 2009) The military note was as such:

> It is observed that some circles who have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently.

> Those activities include requests for redefinition of fundamental values and attempts to organize alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals symbolizing unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the mentioned activities which have turned into an open challenge against the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real aims under the guise of religion.

> An important part of these activities were done with the permission and within the knowledge of administrative authorities, who were supposed to intervene and prevent such incidents, a fact which intensifies the gravity of the issue.

> This fundamentalist understanding, which is anti-republic and harbors no aim other than eroding the basic characteristics of the state, finds courage in recent developments and discourses and extends the scope of its activities.

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Developments in our region give numerous examples that playing on religion and manipulating the faith into a political discourse can cause disasters. There are accounts in our country and abroad that a political discourse or an ideology can destroy the faith itself and turn it into something else when it is imposed on faith... Doubtlessly, the sole condition for the Republic of Turkey to live in peace and stability as a contemporary democracy is through defending the basic characteristics of our state which are defined in the Constitution.

The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary.

Those who are opposed to Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute. (BBC 2007) [47]

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[47] http://journal-archieves26.webs.com/727-737.pdf
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detay&newsId=255269&link=255269
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-278651-april-27-e-memo-expected-to-be-next-step-in-coup-probe.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E-memorandum

The e-memorandum[48] had influences not only within the boundaries of Turkey, but also outside. The secretary-general of the Council of Europe interpreted the situation as such: "It looks like a deliberate attempt by the armed forces to influence the election of a new president in Turkey. They should stay in their barracks and keep out of politics." (Balkır, et al. 2008, 198) However, the Turkish mainstream media did not agree with the European secretary-general. The media units blamed the government as if it deserved this. They used a more approving language in discussing the military.

Hürriyet announced the military's note in a more neutral manner than its reports about the Republican meetings. It chose the title "Mid-night instruction". The report was on the upper headline, and it summarized the content of the note. (*Hürriyet* 28.04.2007) However, the newspaper could not maintain its neutrality for a long time. The next day its fist page was very confusing. A report about the military note was again on the upper headline, but, the confusing news was below, on the headline. There was an explicit reference to February 28. In the text of the report called "The Same Connection Appeared Again", it was written that the ones who organized the Qur'an contest on April 23, 2007, were the same ones who had organized Kudus Night at Sincan in 1997. The newspaper stated that the Kudus Night led the march of tanks on Sincan. This was the onset of the February 28 process in 1997. *Hürriyet* wrote that the same association organized the Qur'an contest, which had been mentioned in the General Staff instruction as a matter of disturbance. (*Hürriyet* 29.04.2007) By making such a comparison between February 28 and April 27, *Hürriyet* gave the message to the AKP politicians, who experienced the days of the post-modern coup, that their end would resemble Erbakan's. It implicitly threatened the government.

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[48] Right after the electronic instruction of military, CHP spokesman Mustafa Özyürek said on NTV channel that: "This is of course a memorandum. Government should do the necessary." CHP co-head Onur Öymen Said: "The detections of General Staff is not different from our detections. (…) We will not hand over Turkey to the enemies of Atatürk." Deniz Baykal said: "Squares has already showed that the picture will change soon." Önder Sav said: "Congratulations to us, congratulations to Turkey!" Chairman of TUSIAD Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ: "AKP is not taking the concern of protecting laic regime into consideration enough. (…) For protecting both laicism and democracy, elections should be held as soon as possible." (Oğur 29.07.2010)

From the beginning of the presidential election process, *Hürriyet* was against the chairman of the assembly, Bülent Arınç; because, he stated that the government would elect a religious president. The newspaper had written that because of Arınç the AKP could not nominate someone with a non-covered wife. After the e-memorandum, *Hürriyet* named Arınç the only guilty. The newspaper bound the General Staff's instruction to Arınç's words. (*Hürriyet* 29.04.2007) Thus, Arınç was again otherized. He was declared the scapegoat, and labeled responsible for the military's disturbance. He was stigmatized and crucified by the newspaper. Although he made a written declaration that he had not insisted on a candidate whose wife was covered, and although he disputed *Hürriyet*'s claims, the newspaper insisted its claims were factual even though it could not provide any reliable sources. Still, it did not hesitate to claim that Arınç's disavowal was because of the e-memorandum. (*Hürriyet* 01.05.2007) The newspaper again showed its opposition to Arınç by using his disavow text as an evidence in favor of its claims. In other words, it otherized Arınç again and again over a statement taken out of context and disregarded of the rest of his words.

Meanwhile, the *Çağlayan* demonstration was held. *Hürriyet* took the opportunity to threaten the government. Some the columns' titles on the front page were as such: "What is AKP waiting for to sober up?" (Tufan Türenç), "Patience stone has cracked, silent giant has awoken" (Emin Çölaşan), and "If [the AKP] could have understood *Tandoğan* as a public declaration" (Mehmet Yılmaz). On the same page, *Hürriyet* published a collage of the words of Baykal, Mumcu and Ağar in such a way that gave a meaningful message: "The republic is passing to the hands of its owners from now on. Hundreds of thousands say 'neither Shari'a nor coup'. There is distrust [in the country]. The state can never be governed via stubbornness". (*Hürriyet* 30.04.2007) The total picture shows that *Hürriyet* supported e-memorandum. By stretching the already stretched air, it aimed to force AKP to step back.

In spite of the expectations, the AKP government showed from the first day determination not to step back. The AKP group decided to resist as much as they could rather than leave political arena to the military. (*Hürriyet* 08.05.2010) In the

government declaration following submission of the military memorandum, it was said that the General Staff was dependent upon the Prime Minister and under the command of the government; therefore, it could not speak against the government. (*Hürriyet* 29.04.2007) Thus, the government warned the military that had warned it. *Hürriyet* did not stake its claim on government declaration. Rather it kept emphasizing the military's anxiety about laicism. It tried not to let laicism fall from the agenda. *Hürriyet* was acting as a platform on which fears regarding the collapse of the regime were uttered at every turn. In this way it gave the notion that the threat of *irtica* was a real danger to Turkey.

Hürriyet was trying to justify the military's note of April 27. According to the newspaper, a survey was conducted by CNN International to find out people's opinions about the e-memo. The result was surprising, in that 76% of participants said that the note did not harm democracy in Turkey. (*Hürriyet* 05.05.2007) Thus, *Hürriyet* found the base that it had been searching for to justify the military's action. It placed the e-memo on the legitimate ground created by the Republican demonstrations and the media, in spite of the fact that democracy does not support any kind of military interventions.

Rain or shine, the assembly could not elect the president. When the opposition prosecuted the election, government decided to hold early elections. This was actually the short-term aim of both Republican demonstrators and their supportive media outlets, including *Hürriyet*. They did not want the current assembly to elect the president. Both Republican meetings and April 27 occurred for such a concern. The election process, the aim of laic circle appeared as such: firstly, assembly would have been dissolved because of inability to elect the president; second, a general election would have been held, and some other parties except the AKP (either the rightist unification or the leftist one) would have supplied the majority to establish the new government; finally, the new government would have elected the president. In this way, the regime would have gotten rid of both the AKP government and the 'danger' of 'occupation' of the 'laic castle' *Çankaya*. The opposition parties were ready to take people from their summer houses by bus, if

necessary. [49] However, the election results were not as they expected. The AKP won the general election with an increase in votes.

April 27 was not turned into February 28. For the first time in Turkey's history, a government did not step back from the military; rather the military had to step back from the government. This was reflected in the ballot boxes by more votes for the AKP. It won the early elections on June 22, 2007, taking 47% of the votes. The June 22 elections changed the fate of not only the AKP, but also Turkey. The AKP demonstrated that it had the support of the majority of people. Thus, the laic circle understood that their fear appealing strategy had not worked at all. In the proceeding times, junta-adherents in the military were removed by means of the *Ergenekon* case. The Military began to work in accordance with the government.

6.7. Unending Debate: The Turban

Head-cover has been on the agenda since the 1980s. The separation began with its name. While conservatives prefer to call the head cover a *başörtüsü* (headscarf), the laic circle calls it a *türban* (turban). This is beyond a mere word difference; it is a reflection of worldview. The turban is considered a political

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[49] "Çatı DYP'de Başkan Ağar" (DYP is the Roof, Ağar is the Chairman), *Hürriyet,* 20.04.2007

"Ya Uzlaşma, Ya Erken Seçim" (Compromise or Early Elections), *Hürriyet*, 28.04.2007

"Baykal: Siyaset Bir Uzlaşmadır, Ağar: Sandık Her Sorunu Çözer, Mumcu: Derhal Seçime Gidilsin" (Baykal: Politics is a Compromise, Ağar: Ballot Box will Solve each Problem, Mumcu: Go elections Now), *Hürriyet*, 29.04.2007

Enis Berberoğlu, "Anayol'un Amblemi Bile Belli Oldu" (Emblem of *Anayol* is Ready), *Hürriyet,* 05.05.2007

" Yazlıktan Otobüslerle Taşıyacağız" (We will Carry People with Bus from Summer Houses), *Hürriyet*, 05.05.2007

"CHP ve DSP'nin Birleşme Mesajı İzmir Mitinginde" (CHP and DSP will Give the Unification Message in *İzmir* Demonstration), *Hürriyet*, 07.05.2007

"*Çankaya*'yı Millet Seçerse Egemenlik Parçalanır" (Sovereignty will be Destroyed if Nation Elect the President), *Hürriyet,* 12.05.2007

"Yasemin'i Hatırlatan Spiker DP Adayı" (The Speaker will be Candidate from DP), *Hürriyet,* 16.05.2007

"El Ele Seçim Startı" (Election Process Started Hand in Hand), *Hürriyet*, 15.05.2007

"Solda Özlenen Beraberlik: CHP-DSP İttifakı Tamam" (Expected Unification in Left: CHP-DSP Alliance is Completed), *Hürriyet*, 18.05.2007

"Samsun'daki Coşkuya Birleşik Sol Damgası" (Unified Left Stamped in *Samsun* Enthusiasm), *Hürriyet*, 21.05.2007

Oktay Ekşi, "DP Konulu Dersler" (Lessons Issued DP), *Hürriyet,* 29.05.2007.

symbol. It is equated with being anti-laic and adherent to Shari'a. In a study of newspaper's use of the words 'turban' and 'headscarf', it was detected that *Hürriyet* prefers to use 'turban' over 'headscarf'. In its reports about the 'turban', the newspaper chooses to use a negative language. According to the study, *Hürriyet* uses 'turban' as "an object or predicate of *conflict, struggle, abuse, chaos* and *problem*, particularly in legal contexts". The word "is also used in connection with Shari'a and the ruling party, [the AKP]". (Efe 2011, 7) The word turban has a negative connotation in *Hürriyet*'s pages, because of the ideological stand of the newspaper.

While mentioning covered women, *Hürriyet* objectifies them. They are not mentioned as rational individuals who can make their own decisions, but rather women whose lives are controlled by others. In reports related to themselves, covered women do not speak as subjects; rather, someone speaks on their behalf. *Hürriyet* and other laic papers push the covered women background and doom them to silence. (Efe 2011, 8) Those women are only allowed to speak for themselves in laic newspapers like *Hürriyet* when they remove their headscarves.

Hürriyet's stance can be better understood by revising some of its news reports, like the one related to Reyhan Gürtuna, who is the wife of then-mayor Ali Müfit Gürtuna. Her removal of her headscarf was given on the headline for two days. In these reports, *Hürriyet* assumed the attitude of presenting an affirmative example to women with headscarves. It qualified Mrs. Gürtuna, who "removed her turban and had a blowout" (*Hürriyet* 13.06.2007), as "cool and modern" (*Hürriyet* 14.06.2007). While the newspaper stated that this was the self choice of Mrs. Gürtuna, it emphasized the necessity that "everybody should respect it". (*Hürriyet* 14.06.2007)After those two days, the chief publishing editor Ertuğrul Özkök wrote an article about Mrs. Gürtuna. The piece suggested that all women with headscarves should have reconsider uncovering their heads:

> If I were a woman with a headscarf, I would put a
> photograph of Reyhan Gürtuna in front of myself, and think
> carefully. First, I would disregard the 'neighborhood pressures'. I
> would think freely. Why? For, the woman that I saw in this photo

was rejuvenated at least ten years. For, that woman was

apparently beautiful! (15.06.2007)

Thusly, Özkök comprehensibly summarized the main theme of all reports about this issue, namely that the solution offer of *Hürriyet*'s chief editor was to remove headscarves.

The dominant idea of *Hürriyet* was that the headscarf must be modernized at least, if it could not be removed completely. After the general elections of July 22, the number of deputies with wives who wore headscarves decreased. (*Hürriyet* 13.08.2007) *Hürriyet* gave this as the day's headline. The way in which the news was presented was very affirmative. Since *Hürriyet* attributed as if the headscarf was one of the most explicit threat factors, the decrease in the number of headscarf was considered the decrease in the element of threat. Meanwhile, the newspaper brought the headscarf of Hayrunnisa Gül to the agenda again, writing that she will modernize her turban when her husband becomes the president. The source of the information was presented as her husband himself. (*Hürriyet* 29.05.2007) According to the newspaper, she would employ to a stylist for this. (*Hürriyet* 16.08.2007) The newspaper did not hesitate to lead Hayrünnisa Gül. It wrote the image of the actress Sophia Loren was suitable for Mrs. Gül. The news was presented with a photo of the actress, in which she was wearing a coiled up a scarf on the top her head, leaving her neck and earrings visible. (*Hürriyet* 21.08.2007) According to the newspaper, through this modern image, Hayrünnisa Gül would remove a little from being an element of threat for the presidency. However, this report about the image change was denied by Mrs. Gül himself. He stated that there was neither a stylist nor an intent of making a change the style. (*Hürriyet* 22.08.2007)

After the 2007 elections, *Hürriyet* struggled for reconcile its views with those of the new government and its higher percentage of votes. The newspaper tried to relax its reads by giving the message that AKP was not as dangerous as before. The news reports about the "decreasing number of wives with headscarves", or "the new image of Hayrünnisa Gül" was serving such a purpose. Indeed, this is a very contradictory attitude for the newspaper because, had there been a real threat of

religious reaction before the elections, it should have been strengthened afterwards. However, the discourse of threat and fear gradually decreased.

The time in which the fear discourse re-emerged overlapped with the amendments in the constitution in favor of the headscarf. So, we see the discourse was used as a political maneuver to affect decision-making.

While *Hürriyet* was trying to get used to the new first lady's headscarf on the one hand, it maintained its position of being against the turban on the other. The article about freedom to wear the headscarf in universities attracted the attention of the newspaper from the outset. (*Hürriyet* 25.08.2007) It continuously produced an air of tension to keep alive the fear of *irtica*. For instance, on August 30, it chose the topic "There were no wives in the first demonstration". The report notified that both the President and the Prime Minister accepted military's invitation, and, as the military demanded, their wives did not attend the graduate ceremony of the military school. First, the newspaper referenced the President's promise for laicism. However, within the same report, it then emphasized the anxiety of the foreign press regarding the new President's Islamic identity. It picked the news items of different foreign press units which were asking the same question "if Turkey would have an Islamic future". (*Hürriyet* 30.08.2007) Thus, the general picture was this: *Hürriyet* took precautions against those who might indulge in the positive air created by the first part of the report and think the President and the Prime Minister were 'good guys' who obey the military and defend laicism. Because of this, it destroyed the positive air in the second part by imbuing the people with suspicions. In this way, it established a controlled tension.

The tension level could not be kept under control in each instance. One of the best examples was the issue of the headscarf in universities. The law draft, which proposed freedom to wear headscarves in universities, was on the headlines of *Hürriyet* for a couple of months. It pushed the idea that such a freedom would be against laicism and would bring disturbance to society. To support this claim, it cited three things; expert testimony, a comparison with Malaysia, and intimidation.

The first expert *Hürriyet* cited was Mustafa Bumin, who "had his twenty-seven years in State Council with turban decisions". The report, which was presented as the headline of the day, included an interview with Bumin. He said if the turban became free in universities, girls with the turban would not allow girls with uncovered heads to enter lectures. In addition, not just the turban but also the hijab would become free soon. Then, according to him, the problem would escalate and escalate. (*Hürriyet* 17.09.2007) Another expert, theology professor Beyza Bilgin, supported Bumin's claims. She mentioned about an old memory and said that "no girls with uncovered heads remained" after freedom for scarf in 1988. (*Hürriyet* 21.09.2007) This interview was also the headline of the day. This demonstrated the significance attributed to the issue by *Hürriyet*. It chose views that would trigger anxiety among society. The aim of the reports was to put a question in the public's minds: 'if the headscarf were to became free, would I have to cover my hair?'.

There was one more emphasis in Beyza Bilgin's interview, which was the comparison to Malaysia. She compared the predicted suppression in Turkey with the existent supression in Malaysia. Three days later, *Hürriyet* prepared a feuilleton about Malaysia and published it from the upper headline. The chosen title was "Malaysia under Cover". (*Hürriyet* 24.09.2007) The pervading message of the feuilleton was "there was suppression in Malaysia" and "Turkey would resemble it". According to the report, ten years before, even Malays could not predict their current situation. Everything had changed unpredictably. The report emphasized 7-year-old covered girls, separate areas for girls and boys in universities, and the style of Malay's headscarves. (*Hürriyet* 25.09.2007) The newspaper tried to propagate the fear from resembling Malaysia. Although it noted that both covered and uncovered women could walk the streets of the city hand in hand, it added a comment from a laic Malay lawyer, stating that this picture was about to change. Then the lawyer fleshed out his predictions saying that Malaysia would soon resemble Iran and Turkey would resemble Malaysia. (*Hürriyet* 25.09.2007) Thus, *Hürriyet* spread the message that if the headscarf became accepted in universities, the consequences would follow, and Turkey would become Malaysia and then Iran.

The last element *Hürriyet* applied under the framework of fear appeals was intimidation. It did not intimidate explicitly; however, by using the words of some state officials, it implicitly intimidated the government. First, it published the discomfort of some NGOs under the headline "Civil Petition". According to the report, the chairmen of these organizations warned the government about amendments in the constitution. They emphasized that "no one had the power to erase Atatürk". The laic structure of the state was indispensable. (*Hürriyet* 26.09.2007) Indeed, *Hürriyet* had announced as "the day's report" that the government no such intention. In the report, the Prime Minister promised to protect the right of uncovered women. He also acknowledged that the government was aware of the indispensable sections of the constitution and added that they "[did] not want to lose time with unnecessary suspicions". (*Hürriyet* 20.09.2007) In spite of this, *Hürriyet* brought such suspicions to agenda at every opportunity. In this way, it kept the threat of *irtica* alive.

Military action was among the elements *Hürriyet* used for intimidation. In the report called "Do Not Worry, They Cannot Afford", military's guarding role was emphasized. The words of the Head of General Staff were qualified as a warning. "No one can change the laic structure of the republic". This statement was on the spot with bold and big letters under the headline. Thus, it was portrayed as though there was an intention to change the "laic structure of the republic". (*Hürriyet* 02.11.2007) Indeed, the thing that strengthened the meaning of these word was the identity of the speaker. He was the head military official. Since military had a history of 3 coups and one post-modern coup against the threat of *irtica*, the words of the Head of General Staff was a kind of intimidation.

The words of the attorney-general of the Supreme Court, who "implied closure" for AKP were another of the elements of intimidation. After emphasizing issues like "the basic tenets of the republic", "modernization" and "the laic social law state", the attorney-general stated that, if the AKP enacted the law allowing for the headscarf in universities, "even Europe could not save it" from closure. (*Hürriyet* 18.01.2008) This explicit intimidation was totally adopted by *Hürriyet*. All headlines, storied and spots indicated this fact. The same sense was conveyed in the

next day's report: The State Council agreed with the Supreme Court. It also written that "freedom for the turban would harm social peace". The report stated that the Supreme Court "pushed the button" for closure, and instituted an inquiry. (*Hürriyet* 19.01.2008)

In the days following, *Hürriyet* kept the issue on its agenda. According to the newspaper, the AKP and MHP "compromised for the turban". (*Hürriyet* 25.01.2008) The precaution for women in hijab was "under-chin formula". (*Hürriyet* 29.01.2008) Under-chin meant there should be a knot instead of a pin to tie the two parts of the head-cover under the chin. More explicitly, the two political parties compromised on that the freedom would be valid in "only universities", and for "only under-chin" coverage. (*Hürriyet* 30.01.2008) The Head of General Staff had "one sentence about under-chin" formula (*Hürriyet* 31.01.2008); but, this one sentence was nothing but an expression of the fact that that there was no new opinion from the TSK. Meanwhile, *Hürriyet* was debating whether women should a pin to their scarves, or tie a knot. It even tried to explain the way to cover using photographs. Why? Because, according to the newspaper, there was not only a difference of style, but also a difference of mentality. While tying a knot was seen as the traditional way of covering, using a pin was political. *Hürriyet* was defining the latter as "classical turban", which symbolized political orientations, and wrote that this kind of covering would not be allowed. (*Hürriyet* 30.01.2008) However, refutation soon followed. The AKP declared that they could not interfere with women's style of covering. (*Hürriyet* 31.01.2008)

Hürriyet was voiced its opposition at every turn. For instance, in a report about the reaction in universities against the draft law, it used a supportive language. According to the report, some university teachers refused to give lessons in a class where girls wearing turbans. (*Hürriyet* 01.02.2008) The report made people think that it was the legal right of teachers to boycott lessons, although in fact it was illegal. In addition, it made people afraid that there would be a very strong conflict in universities. The idea of a conflict was supported the following day. If the draft law were enacted, Turkey would be a theocratic state. Laic order would collapse and education would fall into chaos. This report's headline read: "Universities said

'NO'" (*Hürriyet* 02.02.2008) The word "no" was printed in red quotes. Both the headline and the content were meant to intimidate. The newspaper presented an imaginary fear as if it was real and applauded the university professors' resistance targeted at feared.

Similar to the era after the State Council attack, *Hürriyet* approached the demonstration against freedom for covering by emphasizing women. In the report called "Women on Squares", women's reactions were stressed. (*Hürriyet* 03.02.2008) In this way, *Hürriyet* promoted the message that women without scarves were afraid of remaining under oppression. However, the slogans showed anger more than fear. It was the anger of the change in status-quo. Still, the newspaper tried to portray it as a fear. Thus, it wanted to influence the government's actions, through creating perceptions of fear and threat.

Up to this point, the total picture, according to *Hürriyet*, was as such: Some university professors said "no" (*Hürriyet* 02.02.2008) to the turban by refusing to attend classes in which girls had covered their heads. On the other hand, the government "hectored" (*Hürriyet* 03.02.2008) them by stating that they could resign if they wished. Meanwhile, women were organizing demonstrations in the squares. They objected to the law by equating the freedom of covering with the collapse of laicism. (*Hürriyet* 03.02.2008) When this was the case, *Hürriyet* presented the demand of the opposition party, CHP, from the government aimed at stopping the law process as a wish for compromise. When the government refused this demand, it was portrayed as anti-compromise. (*Hürriyet* 05.02.2008) In fact, compromise, in *Hürriyet*'s eyes, was nothing but the fulfillment of the laic circle's demands. Compromise was not actually an option. When one party was insisting on freedom of headscarf, the other party was insisting on anti-freedom. At this point, *Hürriyet* published the news called the "duel for the turban" (*Hürriyet* 06.02.2008), as if it had been an objective side. Indeed, its true opinions appeared in the little-sized report below of the huge-sized news. According to the report, a woman, who had a job interview with a man was arrested in Saudi Arabia. The report accompanied a photograph of a woman in a hijab. (*Hürriyet* 06.02.2008) The report was not a coincidence; it was part of the message of fear appeals. It represented the future of

Turkey, if the turban law were to be enacted, in that the law, would harm laicism and then Shari'a would find a voice in the judiciary. As a result, Turkey would resemble Arabia, and women would lose all their freedom. This was the picture that *Hürriyet* attempted to paint. By imbuing such a fear, it revealed that it was in favor of the oppositional party which supported anti-freedom of turban.

After "the turban passed the first round except 14 outage" (*Hürriyet* 07.02.2008) the members of the Supreme Court visited Ataturk's mausoleum. They promised Atatürk that "Turkey [would] never return to the darkness of the Middle Age". *Hürriyet* devoted half of its front page to the report, which it chose to entitle as "Trust Turkish Judges… Oh Father!". (*Hürriyet* 08.02.2008) Since the Supreme Court had the authority to cancel laws, this report was intended to intimidate the government. On one hand, it intensified the fear of the possibility for Turkey to return to the Middle Ages -i.e. it referred to the return of Shari'a and the theocratic state-; on the other hand, it threatened government by stating that the judges were ready to cancel the arrangement regarding the headscarf issue. In this way, *Hürriyet* aimed to make the government abandon the law.

Meanwhile, *Hürriyet* covered a protest, held in Iran. At the first sight, it was supposed that origin of the protest was Turkey; because, for a while, the newspaper was dealing with the law draft issued the freedom of the headscarf in universities. However, it was an intended illusion. The reason of this laid behind the details of the report. The report was about covering. Some Iranian female students had taken a walk in order to re-remind people of the value of covering. The students had praised covering. *Hürriyet* chose the title "Scarf is not enough, we want hijab". (*Hürriyet* 09.02.2008) By choosing this title, the newspaper resurrect the age-old laic fear that 'if the headscarf became allowed, hijab-freedom would follow, and then Turkish regime would turn into a theocracy'. A reader who saw the headline and did not read the rest of the story could easily suppose that this age-old fear became real. On the same page, there was also an invitation to the "laicism demonstration in Ankara". Those people, who did not want to be subjected to a scene like that in Iran, were invited to the "laicism and independence" demonstration. (*Hürriyet* 09.02.2008) The newspaper invited people to protect Turkey's independence; however, there was no

explanation as to how freedom of headscarf could harm the state's independence. It was actually used to strengthen the perception of fear.

The day on which the constitutional amendment for the turban passed in parliament, *Hürriyet* was full of anger. On headline read: "411 Hands Rose for Chaos". When 367 affirmative votes were enough for the amendment, 411 delegates out of 550 voted in favor. This majority disturbed *Hürriyet*. For the newspaper, the turban was the door to chaos within the state. According to the report, the turban "separated Turkey" and "even opened a gap between siblings". Such "polarization create[d] anxiety". (*Hürriyet* 10.02.2008) The newspaper located a huge portrait of a woman in a headscarf, whose face was closed by a text spot, as if she were a criminal. Right at the cross of the covered woman, there was a photograph of a couple of women from the Ankara demonstration against the turban. Their faces were open and plainly visible, in spite of the invisible face of the covered woman. At the other cross of the report, there were "the stories about how the AKP supporters put their wives in cover". (*Hürriyet* 10.02.2008) "Putting in" implied force. The report presented the women at stake as though they were so weak that they could not act according to their own will, and as though their husbands decided in the names of them, and forced them to obey. The report presented all covered women -on behalf of the AKP supporters' wives- as though they lacked the ability to use their will. There was another underlying message, which was that 'these men, who had forced their own wives to cover, would do the same thing to all other women in the state'. In this way, the newspaper pushed again the perception of the threat.

According to *Hürriyet*, not only secularist circle, but also "world [was] surprised" (*Hürriyet* 11.02.2008) at the amendment. In the newspaper's eyes, this was a blow to laicism, and the base of the secular Turkish state was damaged. According to the paper, the AKP "made laic Atatürk wore a turban". (*Hürriyet* 11.02.2008) Placing the reactions of the Western media as negative on the one side, *Hürriyet* wrote on the other side that Iran had praised Turkey for its step regarding the freedom of headscarf. In this way, *Hürriyet* implied that Turkey was getting closer to Iran, while it was moving farther away from the Western world.

As it has been demonstrated, there is a general opposition to the headscarf in *Hürriyet*'s reports. Within this opposition, there is otherization, fear appealing and the struggle to establish an authority over the government. By presenting the headscarf as the motivator behind the chaos, division, and the collapse of laicism, the newspaper otherized the headscarf. Women in headscarves were presented as frauds, abusers, lack of will, or some negative thing. It created a fear from the covered women among its readers, and then used this fear as a weapon against the government. *Hürriyet* gave the message at every turn that: 'we (the laic circle) are afraid of being covered; so, give up this freedom for the headscarf'. By uttering this constantly, the newspaper tried to use fear appeals to affect government policy.

6.8. Closure Case

The April 27 process did not achieve its intended goal. The president was elected by a more-powerful AKP government. When one of the first actions of the new government was amending the constitution regarding the headscarf freedom, the laic reflex stepped in again. This time judiciary -instead of military- was on the stage.

The Republican attorney-general of the Supreme Court, who had threatened the AKP with closure right before the constitutional amendment -in order to obstruct the amendment- (*Hürriyet* 18.01.2008), initiated a closure case against the AKP. (*Hürriyet* 15.03.2008) In the indictment, the attorney-general claimed that "the AKP aimed to bring Shari'a order by using democracy as a tool". (*Hürriyet* 16.03.2008) However, his supportive claims did not have a substantial ground that could indicate the existence of such an aim. The attorney-general put some sentences uttered by the Prime Minister and some other AKP authorities in different areas and in different contexts as the evidences of AKP's Shari'a demands. Some of the word of the Prime Minister were as such:

— A respectful understanding to the religion has been developed around world including the West and Turkey. We also struggled to achieve this.

— Laicism is a system. States can be laic, but individuals cannot.

— [In Turkey] there is an significant religious tie that binds
different ethnic elements to each other. Religion is cement, and
it is the most important binding component.

— Any democratic state should provide freedom of religion.

— We want to solve the headscarf problem by [establishing]
social consensus.

— Discrimination against women is an example of ignorance. The
oppressive attitudes that are based on sexual discrimination,
and that jail women into the private realm by excluding them
from the public realm cannot be called "civilized".

— All we are created by Allah. So, there is no need for separation.
(Kapatma Davası İddinamesi 2008)

The attorney-general demanded a political ban against seventy-one members among which was Bülent Arınç, to whom *Hürriyet* had taken a stand against during the presidential election. It printed his photo at the top of the list of possibly-banned. (*Hürriyet* 16.03.2008) The newspaper as much supported the attorney-general as it denigrated Arınç. When the AKP planned to amend the constitution in order to take the attorney-general's authority of initiating closure cases against governments, and transfer it to a council of judges, *Hürriyet* declared it as a "plan for by-passing the attorney-general". (*Hürriyet* 17.03.2008) The newspaper called on government "not to touch the attorney-general" (*Hürriyet* 21.03.2008). Since "protecting the judiciary mean[t] protecting the rule of law", *Hürriyet* eagerly defended the necessity to protect the existing position of the attorney-general. (*Hürriyet* 21.03.2008) Its publication made its readers believe that the government was destroying the judiciary. However, in the detail of the news, it was obvious that the only thing the government intended to do was to prevent one-man arbitrariness in juridical matters. By making such tricky news, *Hürriyet* re-promote its age-old message that the AKP desired to destroy the laic rule of law.

During the process of the closure case, *Hürriyet* made its readers think that there was a real crisis of laicism. It put declarations from different circles about

laicism crisis in headlines. [50] The trial, which began on March 14, came to a conclusion on July 30, 2008. The Constitutional Court decided not to close the party, but to cut the half of the aid that it was taking from the national treasury. *Hürriyet* wrote about the decision under the following headlines: "Not Closure but Severe Reprehension", "Call for Compromise", and "We Should Be More Responsible". (*Hürriyet* 31.07.2008) The newspaper drew a general picture that portrayed the AKP as being at fault, and it did so knowingly. According to the newspaper, the AKP's fault was as big as a reprehension was necessary. In the eyes of the newspaper, the punishment that was given to the AKP was the evidence of that the party had committed at least some of the crimes listed in the indictment. In other words, according to the newspaper, the AKP acted against laicism. The newspaper wrote that the party should have compromised with laic circle, and relieved them about their fears regarding the laic regime. According to it, even the Prime Minister was aware of this fact, because of this he called upon everyone to behave more sensitively and responsibly.

Hürriyet took the same approach in the closure case issue as it took during the presidential elections. It regarded the case as a justification of the existence of the *irtica* threat. Until the end of the lawsuit, the newspaper's articles contained mostly conditional ("but") sentences. For example: 'closure case is not appropriate for a democratic state in this age; BUT, the government deserved it by pushing people (read: the laic circle) to a fear of *irtica*.' Indeed, the propagator of *irtica* fear was no one but the newspaper itself.

6.9. Metamorphosis in Media Discourse after April 27

The AKP strengthened its hand in the general elections of June 22, 2007. All the ancient rooted parties, except the CHP, remain under the threshold. Thus, the

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[50] "İtidal Çağrısı" (Moderation Call), *Hürriyet*, 18.03.2008
"MHP: Ateşle Oynamayın" (MHP: Do not Play With Fire), *Hürriyet*, 19.03.2008
"81 İlden Çağrı" (Call from 81 Cities), *Hürriyet*, 26.03.2008
"Ortak Akıl Ayakta"(Public Reason is on Foot), *Hürriyet*, 27.03.2008
"Oybirliğiyle" (With Unanimity), *Hürriyet*, 01.04.2008
"Keşke Yüzde 47 Almasaydık" (If only We did not Get 47%), *Hürriyet*, 25.04.2008
"İçe Dışa Uyarı" (Warning against both Inside and Outside), *Hürriyet*, 22.05.2008

assembly is composed of two parties: the AKP and the CHP. Through presidential elections, constitutional amendments and coup investigations, the AKP continues to consolidate its power. Initially, the mainstream media including *Hürriyet* did not leave the discourse of *irtica*. However, as time passed, they softened their language. By 2010, the discourse of *irtica* was kept only by a few marginal newspapers. This is a very significant observation because it shows explicitly the artificiality of the perception of the *irtica* threat. If it had been real, the threat should have intensified when the source of the threat –the AKP- strengthened. Yet, it was just the opposite. When the AKP became stronger, the threat discourse lessened. This means that the discourse of *irtica* was no more than a toll for manipulating politics. When it no longer met its need, the media slowly abandoned it.

As presented above the constitutional amendment for the freedom of headscarf led hot discussions in *Hürriyet*. However, the newspaper did not react such harshly when the Higher Education Council enacted a circular order which de facto released headscarf in universities on October 2010. Similarly, the newspaper did not use a negative tone in giving the news about the decision of State Council in favor of a covered lawyer who demanded to enter the courtroom with her headscarf, in 2013. The attitude change of *Hürriyet* did not only about the headscarf issue. Despite, this change encompassed a wide area of issues including those about military and judiciary. Besides, the newspaper did not bring *irtica* threat on the agenda during 2011 election process, although the issue had been the top one topic of *Hürriyet* during 2002 and 2007 general elections. There was no difference in terms of the winner of all the three elections; it was the AKP. The only difference was the vote rates. The AKP stably raised its votes since 2002 and reached 50% at last. Contrarily, *Hürriyet* softened its language regarding the AKP since then.

During the April 27 process, *Hürriyet* was executed a battle against the *irtica* threat in both its news reports and its columns. There were many sharp pens that strongly criticized the government and blamed it for being *irticacı*. They otherized the government members because of their ideals or their wives' headscarves. One of them was Bekir Coşkun. Right after Adullah Gül was elected to presidency, he wrote an article called "He Won't Be My President". In the article, he mentioned the rise of

political Islam and the collapse of the laic state structure. He showed the number of parliament members with head-covered wives as evidence for his claim. But the strongest evidence, according to him, was the turban's step up to *Çankaya*. A covered woman became the representative of the state, which was the biggest step in capturing the country at all. He said that Gül's presidency was the achievement of the "belly-scratching man". He concluded his remarks by stating that Gül would never be his president. (Coşkun 15.08.2007)

Five days after Coşkun's statement, Prime Minister Erdoğan replied to Coşkun on a television program. He said those who would not recognize the president should expatriate themselves. According to him, everyone should understand that Gül was the President of all the people. The day after, *Hürriyet* published the debate between Erdoğan and Coşkun on the headline. (*Hürriyet* 21.08.2007) It backed its columnist. The day after, it reserved its upper headline for Coşkun's reply to Erdoğan: "We are not going anywhere, we are staying here". (*Hürriyet* 22.08.2007) The next day, the debate appeared in the upper headline again. According to the newspaper, "Turkey put claim on its writer". Not only citizens, media, politicians and civil society organizations but also AB circles censured the Prime Minister for his words. (*Hürriyet* 23.08.2007) *Hürriyet* protected its columnist not only against Erdoğan, but also against alternative media units. It claimed that "government-adherent" newspapers started a lynch campaign against Coşkun. (*Hürriyet* 25.08.2007) It supported the columnist every step of the way.

Within a couple of years, *Hürriyet*, which had eagerly advocated for Bekir Coşkun, even against politicians, turned its back on Coşkun. It parted ways with him on September 9, 2009. The newspaper had already fired another sharp pen, Emin Çölaşan, right after Gül had become President. Coşkun was the second one who left *Hürriyet*. On October 30, 2010, one other opposing pen, Oktay Ekşi, had to resign after receiving a huge reaction to one of his pieces about the Prime Minister. In spite of his apology, people did not calm down. *Hürriyet* did not back him the way it had for Bekir Coşkun, thus, he had to resign immediately. The remaining writers softened their discourse about religion and the AKP. Over the next couple of years, *Hürriyet* gradually gave up its *irtica* discourse.

The attitude change in *Hürriyet* news reports attracted attentions. On July 31, 2011, an analysis called "Eventually We Saw This in Hürriyet" was published on a news-website. The analysis mentioned about the shift in both the news reports and articles of *Hürriyet*. It qualified this shift as "shocking". The website quoted one of *Hürriyet's* columnists, by warning the readers "not to tamper with the settings of [their] computer; what [they] will read below was published really on *Hürriyet*." The quotation was from an article which criticized military. The internet page emphasized that *Hürriyet* had never let a critique about military appeared on its pages. Then it asked the question: "What is happening to *Hürriyet*?" (Aktif Haber 31.06.2011) The website did not the only one that noticed the change in *Hürriyet*. A columnist of *Akşam* newspaper, Oray Eğin, noticed it before. He wrote that *Hürriyet* softened its tone against the government. (17.09.2010) Kurtuluş Tayiz from *Taraf* was another name who called attentions to the softening of *Hürriyet*'s language. (30.12.2012) The common point of all these reports was the attitude change of *Hürriyet* in favor of the government.

The shift of *Hürriyet* can be explained by the newspaper's love of power and powerful. After April 27, 2007, Turkish political life experienced a vital change. Military lost its authority on politics. In an environment in which even the military obeyed political authority, *Hürriyet* did not want to stand against it. The newspaper hided its oppositional ideas to interlinear spaces. It experienced a cyclical softening. In other words, *Hürriyet* did not totally give up the discourse of *irtica* threat. It only chose not to utter it until the conjuncture changes.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The Republic of Turkey was established on the ground of assertive secularism, in other words laicism. The founders of the republic denied the Ottoman past, and created a 'contemporary' state. However, there was no free place for religion in this newly established state. Laicism was applied in its most harsh sense. All republican revolutions were built on laicism ground. Because of this, laicism was associated with favorable attitudes toward the new regime. Any opposition to republican style of assertive laicism was equated to the opposition to the new regime. In other words, people had to accept state's intervention in the religion under the framework of laicism. Otherwise, they were labeled religious reactionaries.

In Turkish context the opposite of laicism was also the opposite of the Kemalist regime. It defined as religious reaction, i.e. *irtica*. The Kemalist state hegemony expected its subjects to be not only secular-minded people, but also laicist. They were expected to be intolerant against any kind of public manifestation of religion, because the public manifestation of religion was regarded *irtica* threat which aimed at the destruction of laic Kemalist regime. Although the best citizen type of the Kemalist regime (LAST) remained in minority, they were employed in the core institutions of the system. Since, they were the ruling elites, they had a power over non-LAST majority. They otherized non-LASTs at every turn.

The duty of spreading Kemalist understanding among masses was given to the media. As a heritage, the mainstream media have kept the duty of being the spokesman of the Kemalist state hegemony. They tried to oppress elected governments by using the discourse of *irtica* threat as a stick to beat the governments, and shape the politics in accordance with the Kemalist hegemonic demands. They jailed each kind of opposition into certain frames. This thesis analyzed the fear politics executed by *Hürriyet* on behalf of the Kemalist elite targeted at the policy making process. It focused on threat and fear discourses surrounding *irtica* and questioned the reality of *irtica* danger whether or not it was a real threat for the regime. It found out that the discourse of *irtica* threat was artificial,

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and aimed at the legitimization of undemocratic interventions in politics under the name of protecting the laic regime.

In this age the hegemonic power struggle advances over images. Image shaping games can present a tyrant like a democrat, and a democrat like a tyrant. Because of this, image management is as much important as holding the power, since the images are used for legitimizing the power. The word 'image' brings the media to the minds, because the media are the biggest formation that deals with images. The media create images about people, places and events. Individuals have ideas about other people they have never seen, places they have never visited, and events they have never witnessed by the means of the media. This image creation gives the media the opportunity to shape minds. They can make people believe what they want them to believe. This makes the media an important actor in the area of hegemonic power struggle.

The media use their power in accordance with their ideological affiliations. Under a certain ideological framework, they set the agenda and rank the importance of information. They also re-construct, re-shape and frame information by ideological biases. They otherize, sometimes stigmatize the dissenters. The media jail those who have different ideological backgrounds in certain frames. They see and present them in an arbitrarily distorted way.

In Turkey, the mainstream media have an ontological link with Kemalist hegemonic worldview. Until recent times, all counter-hegemonic struggles were precluded, insulted, ignored, marginalized and vilified by the media. The mainstream media were one of the most effective tools which legitimized Kemalist hegemony. They backed Kemalist laic elite minority by otherizing the majority including Kurds, practicing Muslims, and socialists. All those groups were labeled 'dangerous' by the Kemalist hegemonic media. Any political demand of those groups was regarded as suspicious. Military was presented as the guardian of the regime, and military interventions were legitimized on this basis.

The coup of 1960 was a turning point in political history of Turkey. It is the inception of a tradition: the tradition of the military's being the most privileged actor

in political life. Social engineering, which was executed by the CHP (equaled to 'the state') up until to the coup, began to be controlled by the military then. The coup of 1960, for example, changed the constitution. Thus, it re-shaped all political and social life. The constitution's basis on the military and civil bureaucratic control over elected governments. In this way, Kemalist elites, who were the minority in number but dominant in effect, kept their hegemony over the state. The MGK and Constitutional Court were two vital institutions through which they interfered in politics, and rendered governments dysfunctional. In some, the coup of 1960 gave Kemalist bureaucracy the authority of tutelage, by making the military the guarantor of the regime via constitutional means. (Özkır 2011, 93)

One other tradition that the coup of 1960 started was the close relationship between the military and media. The military used its power in having hegemony not only over politics, but also over the media. It even founded a newspaper of its own. Through operations aimed at the media phenomenon, the coup remained a permanent mark on branches of the media. It re-designed them so that they became the undeterred advocates of the military in each coup. From that time onward, the media reflected military discourse as if it was the one and only truth. (Özkır 2011, 94-95)

Until the 1990s the military was the dominant half of the military media relationship, but going forward that balance changed in favor of media. The turning point was the media's unification with the capital. The members of the media were also aware of their power, a power that the ex-owner of *Hürriyet* did not hesitate to utter such statements in an interview: "…but does the first power in Turkey military? No. It is the press. The second one is the military, because the press prepares the military for coups" he said. (Özkır 2011, 97) The person who said these words was the one who witnessed all military interventions from May 27, 1960. (Özkır 2011, 97)

Hürriyet has a special place among other mainstream media units. It has been like the spokesman of the Kemalist state elite. It reflected Kemalist bureaucracy's ideas, anxieties and demands. It was one of the most influential means in contributing the spread of *irtica* discourse among masses. It tried to shape politics in accordance with Kemalist demands by using fear appealing around the discourse of

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irtica. The newspaper's relationship with military was so good that any minor critical comment appeared on its pages made people ask the question "What is happening to *Hürriyet*?" The newspaper was one of the head actors of February 28 process in which the media-military relationship reached its peak. During this time, the mainstream media was cleaned out from all cracked voices, who were against the military's intervention into politics.[51] *Hürriyet* worked as an official paper of the state. It reflected the state elite's concerns, anxieties, opinions, and so on. It prepared the public for a military intervention by instilling the fear of *irtica* at every turn. Consequently, the military and the Kemalist mainstream media (*Hürriyet* at the head) together brought about February 28.

İrtica based fear appealing was used at the initial years of AKP government. *Hürriyet* did not miss any opportunity to pump *irtica* fear to society. In the news reports, laicism was associated with drinking alcohol, using interest and wearing bikinis. Any attempt related with alcohol, interest or dressing labeled as anti-laic and pro-Shari'a.

On 2006, after the attack against the State Council, media tended towards making news issued *irtica,* again. In this way, the security comprehension was destroyed. Similar to February 28, images related to Islam (at the head of which was the headscarf) were introduced as matter of security's getting in danger. The military was again on the stage like a political actor.

The April 27 electronic memorandum was a total disappointment for the Kemalist mainstream media. Although they supported the military in those days, they blame the military for acting in collaboration with the AKP afterwards. The leader of the CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu discussed this blame on a television program. He

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[51] "*Andıç*": On the year 1998, Hürriyet published a serial of reports with a claim that they were parts of the testimony of Şemdin Sakık, the second man of *PKK*. In the testimony, there were the names of some newspapers, journalists, politicians, commercial companies, and businessmen, all of which were blamed for giving support to PKK. Allegations made many journalists lost their job. One of the names mentioned in testimony, Akın Birdal was killed. On the year 2000, Nazlı Ilıcak published a document that shows the testimony was fake. It was fabrication of General Staff planned under the framework of psychological war to get rid of unwanted names.

"Dehşet İtiraflar" (Dread Confessions), *Hürriyet*, 25.04.1998

"İfadedeki İsimler" (Names on the Testimony), *Hürriyet*, 26.04.1998

Nazlı Ilıcak, "Çevik Bir'in Güçlü Eylem Planı", *Yenişafak*, 21.10.2000

claimed that the e-memorandum was submitted to provide the AKP the opportunity to make phrase-mongering. Kılıçdaroğlu claimed that the AKP declared itself as the victim of the memorandum, and got more votes from the people. He claimed that it was a deliberate collaboration between the military and the AKP. According to him, the military helped the AKP to win the elctions. (NTVMSNBC 27.07.2010) It was true that the e-memorandum helped the AKP to increase its vote rate. However, it was not the intended conclusion of the memo. Rather, the AKP's rise was because of the failure of the e-memorandum. The words of Kııçdaroğlu were nothing but the expression of the resentment toward the military, because of its failure to debunk the AKP.

Since 2002, when the AKP took power, rumors about the possibility of a coup circulated underground. In 2007, it was proven that those rumors were right. Two secret coup attempts were made. The plans were found, and published by *Nokta* journal. The State Council attack and the secret coup attempts were unified under the framework of trial, the trial of *Ergenekon*. Military officers stood on trial with some media members. During the case, underhanded side of the military-media relationship was displayed. (Özkır 2011, 104-5)

The *Ergenekon* investigation, showed that from the attack against the State Council to the Republican meetings, the movements aimed to at sabotaging the presidential election were organized by the deep-state, which aimed to overthrow the AKP government via illegal means including assassinations and a coup d'état. (Second Indictment, NTVMSNBC) Through the *Ergenekon* investigation, "the civil-military relations went into a new direction". The coup plans to depose the AKP included the initiation "of civil unrest by receiving support from the key figures of the media, business world, trade unions, and rectors of the universities, as well as civil associations". They also set forth "starting psychological warfare unit to weaken Islamic reactionaries and to create a political atmosphere suitable for a military takeover in Turkey by carrying out provocative acts in the country". (Aknur 2012, 238) When the dark sides of the military-media relationship were revealed, they both lost credibility.

The mainstream media were very reluctant to provide news about the *Ergenekon* case. Alper Görmüş, who was the chief editor of *Nokta* journal, says that this reluctance is the age-old habit of *Hürriyet* especially. It prefers to remain silent for a while, when there is a negative report about the military. This silence, according to Görmüs, lasts until the military submits a reply about the issue at stake. The newspaper gives military's declaration immediately. (Görmüş 2011, 51-52) The same attitude appears again with the issue of *Ergenekon*. First, *Hürriyet* remained silent. When there was nothing to absolve the military officials who were included in the investigation, the newspaper tends to dilute the case.

Since 2007, "the military's power in both domestic and foreign policies has been showing a decline". There are two reasons for this: one is the "military's loss of credibility as a result of the *Ergenekon* investigations", as stated above. The other is the "'desecuritization' policies followed by the AKP government". (Aknur 2012, 238) The "desecuritization" occurred in two particular fields, which were considered within the military's scope of duty: the Kurdish issue and the *irtica* threat. Müge Aknur (2012) explains the "desecuritization" process as such:

> The Turkish military by taking advantage of its self-
> assigned task of guarding Kemalist principles, particularly
> protecting the secularity characteristic of the republic and
> territorial integrity of the country exerted its power in politics
> since the establishment of the Republic. (…)For the military these
> issues were too critical to leave to civilian authorities. The AKP
> sought to assure the military that the party itself was not a threat
> to secularity by supporting the quest the join the EU and
> disassociating itself from Islamist policies. (…) Moreover, in
> 2010 MGSB AKP leadership convinced the military members of
> the MGK to exclude religious reactionarism as a domestic threat
> from the document. By doing so, AKP attempted to desecuritize
> the issue of 'the rise of political Islam' in the eyes of military.
> (239)

What the writer calls MGSB is the Document of National Security Politics. It is also known as "the Red Book", or "the Secret Constitution". It was re-written in 2010.The word *irtica* was erased from the document. In the new version, there was a more concrete definition of internal threats, instead of '*irtica* threat'. (Zaman 09.11.2010; CNNTurk 22.11.2010)

In addition, the AKP tended toward solving the Kurdish issue via peaceful methods. Military operations have decreased. Mutual negotiations have done between the state and the PKK. Lastly, "wise men" process has started. Thus, the role of the military in the fight with the PKK has been demoted to a minimum level.

When the relationship between the military and the politics has changed, the media-military relationship changed as well. All these developments affected the fear discourse in the mainstream media. *İrtica* fell from the agenda. The residue is the years that passed full of fictitious fears.

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