

**The Image of the Undesired Citizens in Turkey: A
Comparative Critical Discourse Analysis of the Hürriyet
and Zaman Newspapers**

Dissertation submitted to the
Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science and International Relations
by
Begüm BURAK

Fatih University

September 2015

© Begüm BURAK

All Rights Reserved, 2015

APPROVAL PAGE

Student : Begüm BURAK
Institute :Institute of Social Sciences
Department :Political Science and International Relations
Dissertation Title :The Image of the Undesired Citizens in Turkey: A Comparative Critical Discourse Analysis of the Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers
Dissertation Date : September,2015

I certify that this dissertation satisfies all the requirements as a dissertation for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. İhsan YILMAZ

Head of Program

This is to certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Şammas SALUR

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr Şammas SALUR

Prof. Dr. Ömer ÇAHA

Prof. Dr. Vildan SERİN

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sinan SARISOY

Assist. Prof. Dr. Ebru ALTINOĞLU

It is approved that this dissertation has been written in compliance with the formatting rules laid down by the Institute of Social Sciences.

Prof. Dr. Mehmet KARAKUYU

Director

DECLARATIONS

I hereby declare that the material included in this thesis has not been submitted fully or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

ABSTRACT

Begüm BURAK

September,2015

The Image of the Undesired Citizens in Turkey: A Comparative Critical Discourse Analysis of the Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers

This thesis aims to analyze the image of the undesired citizens in Turkish print media (Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers) through employing critical discourse analysis. It has been argued that discourse is one of the tools through which dominant ideology is (re)produced. Following this, this thesis attempts to explore how the official discourse through which the undesired citizens are (re)defined and marginalized in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. Another objective of the thesis is to explore the overlapping and contrasting features of the two newspapers besides exploring the change of the discourse of the newspapers in the course of time.

Key words: Discourse, Undesired Citizens, Critical Discourse Analysis, Citizenship

ÖZET

Begüm BURAK

Eylül, 2015

Türkiye’de Makbul Olmayan Vatandaş İmajı: Hürriyet ve Zaman Gazetelerinin Karşılaştırmalı Eleştirel Söylem Analizi

Bu tez çalışması Türk yazılı basınındaki (Hürriyet ve Zaman gazeteleri) makbul olmayan vatandaş imajını eleştirel söylem analizi yöntemiyle incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Söylemin baskın ideolojiyi (yeniden) üreten araçlardan olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Buna bağlı olarak, resmi söylem üstünden makbul olmayan vatandaş imajının Hürriyet ve Zaman gazetelerinde nasıl yeniden tanımlandığı ve marjinalize edildiği de tezin bir diğer amacıdır. Bir diğer amaç ise her iki gazetedeki zamanla değişen söylemin izlerini sürmenin yanında her iki söylemin örtüşen ve çelişen özelliklerini incelemektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Söylem, Makbul olmayan vatandaşlık, Eleştirel söylem analizi, Vatandaşlık

CONTENTS

Approval page	iii
Declarations	iv
Abstract.....	v
Özet.....	vi
Contents.....	vii
List of Figures	xiii
List of Tables.....	xiv
List of Abbreviations.....	xvii
Acknowledgements.....	xviii
CHAPTER 1	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Statement of the Problem	1
1.1.1. Research Questions.....	4
1.2. Objective and Contribution	4
1.3. Literature Review	5
1.4. The Outline of the Thesis	6
CHAPTER 2	9
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	9
NATION-BUILDING: HOMOGENIZATION POLICIES AND DYNAMICS..	9
2.1. A Brief Overview Concerning Approaches to Nationalism.....	10
2.2. Analyzing State Formation from a Cultural Perspective.....	15
2.3. Nation-Building Process: A Never-Ending Attempt?.....	19
2.3.1. Nation-Building and Identity Formation.....	23
2.3.2. Nation-Building and Citizenship.....	25
2.3.3. Nation-Building and the Media.....	27

CHAPTER THREE	33
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND THE STATE, CITIZEN AND MEDIA IN TURKEY.....	33
3.1.The Ottoman Empire	33
3.2.The Formation of the New Nation and Single-Party Rule	40
3.2.1. Homogenization vis-à-vis the Pious Muslim Identity	44
3.2.2.Homogenization vis-à-vis the Alevi Identity.....	47
3.2.3. Homogenization vis-à-vis the Kurdish Identity.....	49
3.2.4.Homogenization vis-à-vis the non-Muslim Identity	52
3.3.The Multi-Party Era and Afterwards (1946-1983).....	55
3.4.The Post-1983 Era: Before and After the February 28 Process	61
3.5.The Justice and Development Party Era.....	66
CHAPTER FOUR.....	70
MEDIA DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY AND TURKISH PRINT MEDIA	70
4.1.Power, Ideology and Media Discourse.....	70
4.2. The Role of the Media in Democratic Countries.....	77
4.3.An Overview of Turkish Print Media.....	79
4.3.1.The Hürriyet Newspaper.....	81
4.3.2.The Zaman Newspaper	85
CHAPTER 5	89
METHODOLOGY: LINKING THEORY, RESEARCH AND CONTEXT	89
5.1.The Terminology: Critique, Text, Genre.....	89
5.2.The Critical Discourse Analysis	92
5.3.The Discourse Historical Approach	94
5.3.1.Analytical Steps of the Research and Data Selection	98
5.3.2.Referential and Predication Strategies.....	104
5.3.3.Metaphor, Metonymy and Synecdoche	105
5.3.4.Argumentation Analysis	106
5.3.5.Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification.....	109
CHAPTER SIX	111

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PIOUS MUSLIM CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS 111

6.1. The 1997-Dated Law Expanding Five-Years Primary Education To Eight Years Of Uninterrupted Compulsory Education 112

6.2.The Representation of the 1997-Dated Law in the Hürriyet Newspaper: 115

6.3. The Representation of the 1997-Dated Law in the Zaman Newspaper: 122

6.4.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses..... 132

6.5.The Merve Kavakçı Affair in 1999 133

6.6.The Representation of the Kavakçı Affair in the Hürriyet Newspaper: 135

6.7. The Representation of the Kavakçı Affair in the Zaman Newspaper: 146

6.8.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses..... 154

6.9.The Constitutional Amendment Allowing Women To Wear Headscarves In Universities Which Passed in February 2008 and annulled by the Constitutional Court in June 2008 155

6.10. The Representation of the Constitutional Amendment in the Hürriyet Newspaper: 156

6.11. The Representation of the Constitutional Amendment in the Zaman Newspaper 162

6.12.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses.... 170

6.13. The Lift of the Headscarf Ban In Public Places On October 8, 2013. 170

6.14. The Representation Of The Lift Of The Headscarf Ban In Public Places In The Hürriyet Newspaper 172

6.15. The Representation of The Lift Of The Headscarf Ban In Public Sector In The Zaman Newspaper: 179

6.16. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses... 187

CHAPTER SEVEN 189

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ALEVI CITIZENS IN THE HURRIYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS..... 189

7.1.The Madımak Affair in 1993..... 190

7.2. The Representation of the Madımak Affair in the Hürriyet Newspaper: 192

7.3.The Representation of the Madımak Affair in the Zaman NewspaperText X- The Zaman Article..... 198

7.4. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses..... 206

7.5.The Gazi Incidents..... 208

7.6.The The Representation of the Gazi Incidents in the Hürriyet Newspaper: ..	209
7.7.The The Representation of the Gazi Incidents in the Zaman Newspaper:	216
7.8. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses.....	226
7.9. The Council Of State’s (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory In Their Current Form in 2008.....	227
7.10. The Representation of the Council Of State’s (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory in the Hürriyet Newspaper	229
7.11. The Representation of the Council Of State’s (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory in the Zaman Newspaper:	237
7.12. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses...	246
7.13.The Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision Declaring That Cem Houses Cannot Be Viewed As The Places Of Worship In 2012	247
7.14.The Representation of the The Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision in the Hürriyet Newspaper	249
7.15. The Representation of the Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision in the Zaman Newspaper	256
7.16.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses....	267
CHAPTER EIGHT	269
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE KURDISH CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS	269
8.1.The Nevruz Day in 1992	270
8.2.The Representation of the 1992 Nevruz in the Hürriyet Newspaper:	272
8.3.The Representation of the 1992 Nevruz in the Zaman Newspaper:.....	279
8.4. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses.....	287
8.5. The Capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999	288
8.6.The Representation of the Capture of Öcalan in the Hürriyet Newspaper:....	290
8.7.The Representation of the Capture of Öcalan in the Zaman Newspaper:	296
8.8. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses.....	304
8.9.The Initiation Of The First Uninterrupted Broadcasting In Kurdish Language Via A State Owned Channel, TRT6	305
8.10.The Representation of the Initiation of TRT 6 in the Hürriyet Newspaper:	307
8.11. The Representation of the Initiation of TRT6 in the Zaman Newspaper: ...	314
8.12. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses...	322

8.13.The Uludere Incident in 2011	323
8.14.The Representation of the Uludere Incident in the Hürriyet Newspaper:	324
8.15. The Representation of the Uludere Incident in the Zaman Newspaper:	331
8.16.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses....	338
CHAPTER NINE	340
THE REPRESENTATION OF THE NON-MUSLIM CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS	340
9.1.The French Parliament’s Passing of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in 1998.....	341
9.2.The Representation Of The Bill Recognizing The Killing Of Armenians In 1915 As Genocide In the Hürriyet Newspaper	343
9.3. The Representation of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in the Zaman newspaper	350
9.4.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers....	356
9.5.The Patriarch Bartholomew’s request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in 2003	357
9.6.The Representation of the Patriarch Bartholomew’s request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in the Hürriyet newspaper	359
9.7.The Representation of the Patriarch Bartholomew’s request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in the Zaman newspaper	365
9.8.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses.....	373
9.9.The Greek Patriarch Bartholomew’s Interview on the CBS Television in 2009 wherein he said he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey	374
9.10.The Representation of the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew’s Interview in the Hürriyet newspaper:	376
9.11. The Representation of the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew’s Interview in the Zaman newspaper:.....	381
9.12.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses....	387
9.13.The Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations Stipulating The Return Of Property Seized From Minorities	388
9.14. The Representation of the Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations in the Hürriyet newspaper:	390
9.15.The Representation of the Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations in the Zaman newspaper:	396

9.16.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers...	402
CHAPTER TEN	404
CONCLUSION	404
BIBLIOGRAPHY	409
APPENDICES	437

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1	Hürriyet Cover Page Of 27 May 1960.....	84
Figure 1.2	The Logo and Slogan of Hürriyet.....	84
Figure 1.3	Zaman layouts change in 2001.....	88
Figure 1.4	Interdiscursive and Intertextual Relationships.....	92

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.0	Strategies of Positive Self-Presentation and Negative Other-Presentation.....	103
Table 1.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text I.....	118
Table 1.2	Argumentation Schemes of Text I.....	121
Table 2.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text II.....	126
Table 2.2	Argumentation Schemes of Text II.....	129
Table 3.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text III.....	139
Table 3.2	Argumentation Schemes of Text III.....	141
Table 4.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text IV.....	148
Table 4.2	Argumentation and Topoi in Text IV.....	151
Table 5.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text V.....	159
Table 5.2	Argumentation and Topoi in Text V.....	161
Table 6.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text VI.....	165
Table 6.2	Argumentation and Topoi in Text VI.....	168
Table 7.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text VII.....	175
Table 7.2	Argumentation and Topoi in Text VII.....	177
Table 8.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text VIII.....	183
Table 8.2	Argumentation and Topoi in Text VIII.....	186
Table 9.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text IX.....	195
Table 9.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text IX.....	197
Table 10.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text X.....	202
Table 10.2	Argumentation Schemes of Text X.....	203
Table 11.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XI.....	213
Table 11.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XI.....	214
Table 12.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XII.....	220
Table 12.2	Argumentation Scheme in Text XII.....	223
Table 13.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XIII.....	232
Table 13.2	Argumentation Scheme in Text XIII.....	235

Table 14.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XIV.....	241
Table 14.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XIV.....	244
Table 15.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XV.....	253
Table 15.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XV.....	255
Table 16.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XVI.....	261
Table 16.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XVI.....	265
Table 17.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XVII.....	275
Table 17.2	Argumentation Schemes inText XVII.....	278
Table 18.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XVIII.....	283
Table 18.2	Argumentation Schemesin Text XVIII.....	285
Table 19.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XIX.....	293
Table 19.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XIX.....	295
Table 20.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XX.....	299
Table 20.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XX.....	300
Table 21.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXI.....	309
Table 21.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XXI.....	311
Table 22.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXII.....	318
Table 22.2	Argumentation Schemesin Text XXII.....	320
Table 23.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXIII.....	327
Table 23.2	Argumentation Schemesin Text XXIII.....	329-330
Table 24.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XIV.....	334
Table 24.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XIV.....	336
Table 25.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXV.....	345
Table 25.2	Argumentation Schemesin Text XXV.....	348
Table 26.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXVI.....	352
Table 26.2	Argumentation Schemesin Text XXVI.....	354
Table 27.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXVII.....	362
Table 27.2	Argumentation Schemes inText XXVII.....	364
Table 28.1	Social Actors and PredicationsinText XXVIII.....	368
Table 28.2	Argumentation SchemesinText XXVIII.....	371-372

Table 29.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXIX.....	378
Table 29.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XXIX.....	380
Table 30.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXX.....	384
Table 30.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XXX.....	386
Table 31.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXXI.....	393
Table 31.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XXXI.....	395
Table 32.1	Social Actors and Predications in Text XXXII.....	399
Table 32.2	Argumentation Schemes in Text XXXII.....	401

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DHA	Discourse Historical Approach
DP	Democrat Party
DTP	Democratic Turkey Party
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EU	European Union
MP	Motherland Party
MÜSİAD Businessmen	The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
NAP	Nationalist Action Party
NSC	National Security Council
PDP	Peace and Democracy Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
RTÜK	Radio and Television Supreme Council
TGNA	Turkish Great National Assembly
TPP	True Path Party
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Authority
TTK	Board of Education and Discipline
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
VP	Virtue Party
WP	Welfare Party
YÖK	The Higher Education Council

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to many people for helping me write this thesis. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Şammas Salur for his invaluable comments and support. Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Ömer Çaha and Assist. Prof. Ebru Altınođlu for their guidance and help. I am also indebted to Assoc Prof. Sinan Sarısoy and Prof. Dr. Vildan Serin.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. İbrahim Efe for his guidance throughout the duration of this research. I am also grateful to A. Turan Ođuzhan for his help in the archieve of the Zaman newspaper besides the librarians in the Press Museum.

Last but not least, I am greatly indebted to my family for their care and support.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Statement of the Problem

This study is an attempt to analyze how the image of the undesired citizenship in Turkey is represented via employing critical discourse analysis of the *Hürriyet* newspaper and the *Zaman* newspaper as the main actors deriving from the Kemalist/statist media outlet and non-Kemalist/conservative media outlet. The data consist of the newspaper articles on noteworthy events¹ of social and political significance related with the issue of undesired citizenship.

Most of the time state-formation process entails producing some kind of an ‘imagined’ good or desired (makbul) citizen profile (Anderson, [1983] 1991). This concept of imagined desired citizen has its significant other(s) too who have influenced the constitution or reconstitution of the national identity. The notion of a significant other may be another ethnic or religious group and significant others have an influence on the in-group’s identity.

While on the one hand the nation-state endeavors to construct a desired citizenship regime; on the other hand and simultaneously, it tries to assimilate or dissimilate the identities of the undesired citizens (out-group) that it sees unfit to its

¹The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how the pious Muslim citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The law expanding five- years primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education in Turkey passed in 1997 (2) Merve Kavakçı Affair in 1999 (3) The constitutional amendment allowing women to wear headscarves in universities which passed on February 7 in 2008 but annulled by the Constitutional Court on June 8, 2008 and (4) The lift of ban on wearing headscarf in public sectors in 2013. The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Alevi citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Madımak Affair in 1993 (2) the Gazi Incidents in 1995 (3) The Council of State’s (Danıştay) ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form in 2008 (4) The decision of Court of Cassation declaring that cem houses cannot be viewed as the places of worship in 2012. The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Kurdish citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The bloody Nevruz day in 1992 (2) The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in 1999 (3) The initiation of the first uninterrupted broadcasting in Kurdish language via a state owned channel in 2009. (4) The military operation on Uludere wherein 35 civilians died in the course of aerial strikes in 2011. The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how non-Muslim citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Armenian Genocide Draft passed in France in 1998 (2) The Patriarch’s request for the re-opening of Halki Seminary School in 2003 (3) The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew’s interview appeared on the CBS Television in 2009 wherein he said he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey (4) The amendment made to Turkey’s law on foundations stipulating the return of property seized from minorities in 2011.

desired citizen profile. The nation-states have used several tools to achieve this. Besides coercive or physical methods such as forced migration or population exchange they have also used several instruments like the state schooling and the mass media to manufacture such desired citizen and negatively represent and even vilify its significant others. It can be said that, the media has been one of the ideological apparatuses(Althusser, 1971) that the nation-states have used.

A research concerning the Turkish case claims that the political authority sees some particular citizens ‘more equal’ than the others. This research argues that the political authority lays down a faith system, patterns of behavior and standards of aesthetics. The political authority sees the citizens who fit to these standards more moral, religious, sacred, reliable and modern in short ‘desired’.² Despite having neither fixed nor static a definition, the ‘undesired citizens’ consist of the pious Muslims³, Alevis, Kurds and the non-Muslims (Greek Orthodox, Jews and Armenians who are recognized as minorities in the Lausanne Peace Treaty) (İnce,2012; Caymaz,2007; İçduygu,1996; Kadıoğlu,2007; Oran,2004; Üstel,2011).The Turkish case is a remarkable example in analyzing how and to what extent some particular sectors of society are treated by the state as the undesired citizens or in other words as secondary-status citizens, maybe not in the black-letter law but in practice.

The definition of the desired citizen for the Republican elites⁴ can be encapsulated by the acronym LAST. LAST stands for Laïcist, Atatürkist, Sunni Muslim, and Turk. Sunni Muslims who are not practicing have been the most

² Yılmaz, Hakan. “Laiklik: Türkiye’deki Uygulamaları, Avrupa ile Kıyaslamalar, Politika Önerileri” <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-180-2014040932rapor9.pdf> (21.01.2015).

³In this study, the term ‘pious Muslim’ has two different meaning extensions. The difference reveals itself in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. The first meaning extension is used to refer to the citizens who are stigmatized as reactionary (mürteci) in the Kemalist state discourse. In the making of modern Turkey, religion has been excluded from the public sphere. Islam in the public sphere has been treated as a threat posed against the secular character of the regime. Hence, the pious citizens like women with headscarf or people praying five times a day have been seen as the undesired citizens who aim to pull Turkey to backwardness. The second meaning extension stands for the observant Muslims and unlike what the official state discourse prescribes, it does not have a pejorative connotation like posing threat to secularism.

⁴In this study, I use the terms ‘Republican elite,’ ‘secularists’ and ‘Kemalists’ interchangeably when referring to the same analytical category of the elite that consists of the military and the bureaucratic elite, the big capital owners, academia, and the leading media outlets. My conceptualization of the power elite for Turkish context follows Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery approach. See Mardin, Şerif. (1973). “Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?” *Daedalus*. Vol: 102. pp. 169–196.

favored citizens by the Kemalist establishment. Turks must be Turkish nationalist to be favored by the state (Yılmaz, 2012: 44-45). Based on the conceptualization of Baskin Oran (2007: 40) a 'desired citizen' can be described as LAHASÜMÜT, that is a secular-Hanefi-Sunni-Muslim-Turk (laik, Hanefi, Sünni Müslüman, Türk). In other words, a secular Muslim Turk, who follows the Hanefi school of jurisprudence of mainstream Sunni Orthodoxy. The citizens who do not fit to this conceptualization are seen as the undesired citizens.

The Turkish nation-building process entails the process of socially engineering the 'desired citizens'. The media has been one of the instruments through which the state ideology is re(produced). The Republican elites used the press as a tool to manufacture the desired citizenship profile through imposing the Kemalist worldview (Yılmaz and Burak, 2011).

For Karl Deutsch (1966), nations are strongly bounded by their socially communicative structures of interaction. In a similar vein, according to Ernest Gellner (1983) national cultures are fed by the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community. In addition, according to Benedict Anderson, the emergence of national consciousness in the European nation-states was produced by a conjunction of print, capitalism and the 'fatality of human linguistic diversity' (Anderson, 1991: 43). Anderson puts a special emphasis on newspapers and novels as important means that provide technical means for 're-presenting' the kind of imagined community that is the nation (Anderson, 1991: 25).

Following the works of Deutsch (1966), Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1991) who sketch how communication and nation are related I argue that media discourse (print media in this study) plays a crucial role in both (re)producing and challenging the desired citizenship profile in Turkey. By employing the discourse historical approach – a variant of critical discourse analysis methodologies – as the methodological framework, I argue that discourse as a text in context is not isolated in space and the coverage of the historical context in which discursive events are embedded plays a key role in revealing how the unequal power relations are imposed and exercised in media discourse. I also argue that power relations lead to

different understandings and reporting of the same events across different newspapers associated with different ideologies and financial basis.

1.1.1. Research Questions

- What are the main discursive practices, linguistic tools and argumentation strategies employed by the Kemalist media discourse (Hürriyet) vis-à-vis the undesired citizens?
- What are the main discursive practices, linguistic tools and argumentation strategies employed by the non-Kemalist media discourse (Zaman) vis-à-vis the undesired citizens?
- What are the contrasting and / or overlapping features of the discourses led by Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers?
- What kind of change and transformation is seen in media discourse under scrutiny in the course of time?

1.2. Objective and Contribution

“The main objective of this study is to make an in-depth analysis of media discourses concerning the notion of undesired citizenship. This study will quest the role of the media in manufacturing consent and forming some sort of ‘common sense’ through reproducing the Kemalist discourse on the one hand and in challenging the Kemalist discourse by denaturalizing the official ideology about citizenship on the other hand.

Rather than merely conducting a linguistic analysis, this study tries to investigate the socio-historical basis of the selected cases mentioned above. By providing new empirical information on how the image of undesired citizens is portrayed in print media, this study aims to present the characteristics of the undesired citizenship attributed by the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers in an elaborate way.

This study will also make a significant contribution to the literature of critical discourse analysis which has not been addressed sufficiently in Turkish academia except some works (Efe, 2012; Tekin, 2010; İnceoğlu & Çomak, 2009) by using a holistic methodology and a relatively lesser-known critical approach (i.e. the

Discourse Historical Approach) to discourse analysis in Turkish. The discourse historical approach emphasizes the significance of historical setting within which texts and utterances are being produced. This is the reason for which I believe this method to be particularly suited for this study. The discourse historical approach has become a major tool for analysis of the discursive construction of collective identities (de Cillia et. al., 1999; Weiss, 2002; Wodak and Weiss, 2004).

Lastly, despite being in an indirect way, this study will also contribute to the democracy-related debates in Turkey. Because it is argued that some actors in Turkish media landscape do not question the undemocratic practices originating from official state ideology, namely Kemalism and thus they play a key role in reproducing the Kemalist ideology which has got an exclusionary citizenship understanding.

1.3.Literature Review

The literature on Turkish modernization, Kemalism, Turkish national identity and citizenship is quite vast. The historical background chapter of this study draws on works of many Turkish as well as foreign academics related with these issues.

The academic works that focus on the role of the media in Turkish nation-building are as follows: Burcu Özkan's master thesis 'Hat and Dress Revolution According to the Press' (2008), E. E. Bilgiç's PhD Thesis titled 'The role of the press in the construction of national identity 1934-1937' (2010), İhsan Yılmaz's article entitled 'The Stand of the Media as a Medium of Modernization in the Early Years of the Republic' (2009) and İhsan Yılmaz and Begüm Burak's (2011) work addressing the instrumentalist use of journalism in imposing the Kemalist worldview in the early years of the Republic and the work of Heper and Demirel (1996).

There is a growing interest on the relationship between politics and the media in Turkey. Ayşe Öncü's *Packaging Islam* (1995), Raşit Kaya and Barış Çakmur's *Politics and the Mass Media in Turkey* (2010), Michael Wuthrich's "Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey during Failed and Successful Interventions" (2010), Fuat Keyman's "Turkey, transformation and the left media" (2010) are important works in this regard.

Gülseren Adaklı (2006) reveals the dynamics of the changes in Turkish media both in structure and ideology. Alpay Kabacalı (2000) concentrates on the development of the Turkish press from a historical perspective. Orhan Koloğlu's work (1994) is similar to that of Kabacalı's work in analyzing the historical dynamics of the development of Turkish press. Accordingly, the work of Hıfzı Topuz (2003) is important too. Also, it should be noted that media discourse has not been covered sufficiently from an academic perspective. However, it must be noted that, Çiler Dursun (2006), İsmet Parlak (2009) and Arus Yumul and Umut Özkırıklı (2000) have got the principal works in this field.

In Turkey, the academic works on critical discourse analysis of the media texts have generally been influenced by Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach. The works of Çiler Dursun (2004) and Yasemin İnceoğlu & N. A. Çomak (2009) and the PhD study of Aysun Akan (2009) titled "Press Discourse In Turkey As An Agent Of Discrimination Towards The Non-Muslims: A Critical Analysis Of The Press Coverage Of The 1934 Thrace Events, 1942 Wealth Tax And 6/7 September 1955 Riots" use Van Dijk's model. A simple research on the Turkish Higher Education Institute's dissertation database reveals that discourse analysis is yet to be developed as a field of study. The discourse historical approach is a rather new method for the scholars in Turkey. İbrahim Efe's PhD study (2012) focusing on Turkish print media with regards to the debates around Islamism and Kemalism and Beyza Ç. Tekin's book (2010) exploring the representation of Turkey's EU membership in French political and media discourse are important works in this regard.

1.4. The Outline of the Thesis

Drawing on many disciplines, namely politics, history, sociology, media studies and linguistics, in this study, I will try to cover the related issues in those areas as much as required. The outline of the study aims to familiarize the readers with all the aforementioned fields drawn on.

Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction to the topic under investigation. The rationale of the study, the literature review, the main objective and contribution of the study will be provided in this chapter.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the theoretical framework of the study. Nation-building as a state-led process and as a way of top-down pursued homogenization will be under investigation. Moreover, theories of nationalism and citizenship models will be covered as they cannot be isolated from the analysis of nation-building process. Chapter 1 will also give us helpful clues for understanding the role of others in the construction of national identities. This chapter will put the focus on the role of the media in serving the objectives of nation-building process.

Chapter 3 outlines the historical background of the study. The historical analysis is useful for understanding the dynamics of the emergence of the citizenship regime and the shifts it experienced in Turkey during the course of time. There will be a special emphasis on the nation-building process of Turkey, the notion of the 'undesired citizenship' and the development of media-politics relations in the course of time. The objective of this chapter is to address the macro-historical context of the selected cases through which the media discourses will be analyzed.

Chapter 4 tries to shed light upon the role of the media discourse in the reproduction of dominant ideologies. The terms 'ideology', 'power' and the role of media in democratic societies will be under scrutiny. This chapter will also provide a historical and ideological overview of Turkish print media in general and the *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* newspapers in particular.

Chapter 5 outlines the methodological framework of the study. This chapter is devoted to exploration of the interdisciplinary nature of the discourse historical approach which goes beyond textual analysis, paying particular attention to the historical setting of discourse.

Chapter 6 is an attempt to trace how the image of the pious citizen is represented in the *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* newspapers⁵. First, a socio-historical context

⁵The analytical steps of the critical discourse analysis have been presented based on the technical features of the analysis of İbrahim Efe's unpublished PhD Thesis defended in Lancaster University.

concerning each case will be provided. Then how each case is represented in the Hürriyet newspaper and Zaman newspaper will be studied respectively. The overall macro topics in each selected text will be scrutinized to see the intertextual and interdiscursive relations across other texts and social events being referred to. After having established the specific contents or topics, I focus on the discursive strategies and the linguistic means of realization. In the final section of each part, a comparison and discussion will be made.

Chapter 7 tries to trace how the image of the Alevi citizens is represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. After providing a socio-historical context concerning each case, the same analytical steps as in the previous analysis will be followed. In the final section of each part, a comparison and discussion will be made.

Chapter 8 tries to trace how the image of the Kurdish citizens is represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers.

Chapter 9 is an attempt to trace how the image of the non-Muslim citizens is represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers.

Chapter 10 is devoted to concluding remarks of the study. I hereby discuss the assumptions of my study and provide answers to my research questions. While doing so, I will try to explore the change and transformation observed in the discourses adopted by the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers in the course of time.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

NATION-BUILDING: HOMOGENIZATION POLICIES AND DYNAMICS

Almost every nation-state since their inception has had some kind of an ‘imagined’ desired citizen profile. This concept of desired citizen has its constitutive others too. Thus, while on the one hand nation-state endeavors to construct desired citizenship; on the other hand and simultaneously, it tries to assimilate or dissimilate the identities of the undesired citizens. In the Turkish case⁶ despite a neither fixed nor static definition and changes with political and socio-economic contexts, the ‘undesired citizens’ consist of the pious Muslims, the Alevis, the Kurds and the non-Muslims – The Greeks, Jews and Armenians who are recognized as minorities in the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

In the light of the research questions considered in this study including the representation of ‘undesired citizens’ in media discourse, the processes and dynamics evident in the nation-building process need to be examined in order to understand how certain segments of society have been treated as secondary-class citizens. There is a particular need for a thorough analysis of the nation-building process in general and homogenization policies in particular, employed with the aim of creating the desired citizenship profile. The instrumentalization of the media by the state in this process plays a significant role. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, this chapter mainly addresses the issue of nation-building and the use of the media in the nation-building process.

The nation-building process cannot be fully analyzed without taking into consideration the issues of nationalism and state-formation. Following this, these concepts will be covered in a relevant degree and scope. A growing academic

⁶For the literature on Turkish citizenship regime, see İnce, 2012; Caymaz, 2007; İçduygu, 1996; Kadioğlu, 2007; Oran, 2004; Üstel, 2011.

interest in the nation-building process dominated the 1960s and 1970s. Generally, earlier works discussed the process of nation-building as a result of modernizing forces while the literature on state-formation to-date has mainly concentrated on the political-military dimensions. As the theoretical basis of this study, the cultural dimension of the state-formation process will also be discussed. While presenting these issues, relevant literature from other disciplines including sociology and philosophy will be lifted. In this regard, some key works and conceptualizations of scholars like Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser will be addressed as well.

2.1. A Brief Overview Concerning Approaches to Nationalism

To explore the nature of the nation-building process, the main theoretical discussions concerning nationalism will be covered. Indeed, there is no general or single theory to explain and or help in understanding the social phenomena of nations, nationhood and nationalism. A nation can be seen as a particular way of thinking of what it means to be a people, and how this definition of people might fit into a broader world system (Calhoun, 1997: 99). According to Özkırımlı, “nationalism is a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us.” (Özkırımlı, 2005: 9). Nationalism can be treated as an ideology produced by the resentment of new elites against older elites or opposing countries. Elites can find challenges and threats which mobilize national sentiments and feelings. In this regard, it can be said that nationalism also gives human beings a sense of belonging, offers rescue from alienation, and anonymity and assures individuals they have the right to equal status (Greenfeld, 1992: 487-488).

Some scholars define nations within the framework of subjectivist terms. For instance, for Connor (1972: 337) “the essence of the nation is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact.” Connor introduces one feature which, according to him, characterizes all nations and constitutes the intangible essence of nationality: the belief in common descent. Connor stresses that the

psychological bond which brings co-nationals together is based on their common conviction that they are ethnically related (Connor, 1978: 377–389).

Ernest Renan, a famous French patriot and an important theorist of nationalism, states that nationalism is a solidarity sustained by a distinctive historical consciousness. The nation for Renan is a daily plebiscite. In the circumstances of late-nineteenth century France, Renan drew attention to the importance of the tensions masked in nationalist sentiments. Renan ([1882] 1990: 11) argues that while it was true that acts of violence like ethnic cleansing helped to form the nation it was also necessary for ordinary people to leave them behind and take the nation as given and not violently created. According to this view, it can be said that forgetting is a crucial factor in the making of a nation.

Categorizing different types of nationalisms has long been a scholarly endeavor. Meinecke's work titled *Cosmopolitan and the National State* was one of the earliest attempts in this direction. Meinecke ([1907] 1970) divided nations into distinct groups as political nations (Staatsnationen) and cultural nations (Kulturnationen). The former are often linguistically defined and ethnically based. In theoretical works the German Kulturnation appears mostly as an antithesis to the French concept of a Staatsnation (cited in Wodak et. al., 2009: 19). In line with this, Kohn (1944) was among the first to elaborate on the distinction between Western and Eastern forms of nationalism. The binary distinction Kohn developed proved to be influential in nationalism studies. In France, England and America, according to Kohn, the nation was regarded as a rational association of common laws; by contrast, an authoritarian nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe emerged.

Accordingly, the ethnic form of nationalism is based on descent, race and kinship. In addition, vernacular culture, especially customs and language are key elements of an ethnic nation (Smith, 1991: 12). This form of nationalism is referred to as the German model and is defined by ancestry not by boundaries of a state. It is a community of birth and native culture where common descent is heavily emphasized. There is a focus on shared history and native language and the concept of religion is maintained. It is important to note here that eighteenth century German Romantics such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried von Herder defined the

linguistic and cultural identity of the German nation. According to them, language plays a key role in the process of reclaiming one's true nature.

In the Western or civic model of nationalism, national unity arises from a historic territory, institutions and laws and the legal-political equality of members which is underpinned by a set of rights and duties. Smith (1991) argues that every type of nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. The contrast in ethnic to civic nationalism is heavily influenced by that of Germany to France. Rogers Brubaker (1992) compared the histories of nationalism in France and Germany as expressions of different principles, the law of the soil versus the law of the blood. Brubaker describes the French model of nationhood as rationalist, universalist, state-centered and assimilationist unlike the German model which has been organic, particularistic and Volk-centered.

The aforementioned contrast has resulted in different understandings of citizenship. If there is a state-led nationalism employed in a top-down fashion which prioritizes ethnic attachments or linguistic uniformity, then the nation-building process would inevitably lead to the exclusion of some certain segments of the population (the 'undesired' citizens). Especially those who do not share these common attachments from practicing all of the rights they have in black letter law. However, if the nation is conceived as a political community wherein community of laws and institutions are significant, then that division would be at a minimum level or would not even come into play. In other words, the manner in which the ideology of nationalism is employed and manifested plays a major role in shaping the hegemonic citizenship regime.

One of the biggest issues in nationalism literature is the divide between 'constructivists' or 'modernists' and 'primordialists'. Geertz is often considered to be the scholar who introduced the primordial sentiments concept of an individual to the world. According to Geertz (1963) primordial attachments stem from the 'givens'. Primordial attachments are natural rather than sociological. Primordialism is not a single theory, but rather an umbrella term which consists of a number of theories. Modernism is not a homogenous tradition either. The common denominator in modernist theories is that, unlike primordialists they assert that nations are modern phenomena. The modernists emphasize the historical and sociological processes by

which nations are created. The modernist scholars see nationalism rooted in industrialization (Gellner, 1983), the rise of communications media (Anderson, 1983; Deutsch, 1966), the development of the modern bureaucratic state (Breuilly, 1982) and regard it as an invention (Hobsbawm, 1990).

Karl Deutsch (1966) a prominent figure working on the relationship between communication and nationalism argues that the objective of nationalist organizations is to strengthen and extend the channels of communication which can ensure a popular compliance with national symbols. The nation-state in Deutsch's understanding plays no role in shaping communicative spaces. This improved with Ernest Gellner's account. Gellner saw the state as a servant to an industrial capitalism. Gellner presents nationalism as a political ideology which argues that modern state should be congruent with the nation. Further, he (1983: 129) claims that nationalism as an ideology was the direct result of the expansion of the administrative scope of the state. For Gellner (1983: 39) a homogenous society should be the salient goal of nationalism and industrial society creates nations by promoting homogenization of national culture. In other words, it is suggested that the cultural homogeneity of modern societies is an 'essential concomitant' of industrial production with its reliance on science, technology and mass education.

Benedict Anderson another scholar who sees the roots of nationalism in the genres of collective imagination and rise of communication describes nations as "imagined political communities, because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear them, yet in minds of each lives the image of their communion." (Anderson, 1991: 6).

In a similar vein, for the Marxist historian Hobsbawm, nations constitute "dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist" (Hobsbawm, 1990: 10). Hobsbawm highlights the role of political transformations in understanding nationalism and goes as far as suggesting it is an invented phenomenon. In addition, he argues that the nation and its associated phenomena are the most pervasive of invented traditions. Hobsbawm

and Ranger (1983) have examined a number of examples in which national traditions have been ‘invented’ by state-building elites. For instance, elites try to inculcate a unifying culture through state-run educational systems and the mass media. The notion of ‘invented tradition’ refers to the way in which an ideology is artificially linked to the past. In line with this, Miroslav Hroch argues that elites can invent nations only where “certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist.” (Hroch, 1993: 4).

For Hobsbawm, nations and nationalism are products of social engineering. The concept of social engineering originates from the late nineteenth-century discussions on the application of scientism (generally social science) in state population policies. It encompasses the exercise of all state policies aimed at changing a society. In the era of nationalism, it became tantamount to the enforced maximization of religious, cultural ethnic and economic homogeneity by any means (Quine, 2013).

In parallel to the modernist understandings of nationalism, nation can also be viewed as a discursive construction. The discursive construction of social groups has to be seen as a macro-strategy to create sameness and difference. Hence, the explicit analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation constitutes the initial step when investigating discourses of nationalism (Wodak, 2006: 105). For De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999: 153) nations are “discursively, by means of language and other semiotic systems, *produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed.*” According to this standpoint, the idea of a national community becomes reality in the realm of beliefs through reifying, figurative discourses performed by political elites and intellectuals and journalists and; is disseminated through the education, communication, militarization as well as through sports meetings (Ibid). Similarly, Calhoun (1997: 3) defines nationalism as a ‘discursive formation’. For Calhoun, the discourse of nationalism plays a fundamental role in providing social solidarity and integration.

On the other hand, Michael Billig (1995) challenges the orthodox conceptualizations of nationalism which tend to focus only on its extreme

manifestations and project it on to others. Billig introduces the term ‘banal nationalism’ to cover beliefs, ideological habits, representations and unnoticed, routine practices which make the daily reproduction of nations in the West possible (cited in Yumul and Özkırmılı, 2000: 788). These practices are not removed from everyday life, as some observers have previously suggested. Daily, the concept of nation is indicated or ‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizens. Billig argues that newspapers nationalize news through the routine use of deictic language and assumptions on the spatial location of both the readers and the news agenda (Billig, 1995: 6).

2.2. Analyzing State Formation from a Cultural Perspective

Though the term ‘state-building’ is at times used synonymously with ‘nation-building’, the latter emphasizes the role of communities and identities within this process while traditional state-building concerns strictly the establishment or strengthening of state institutions and political systems (Fritz and Menocal, 2007: 47-48).

The perspective which underlines the political-military dimensions of state formation, presents the modern state as a military, political, and economic accomplishment. However, it tends to obscure the fact that the modern state is also, and essentially, a symbolic accomplishment (Bourdieu, 1994b). Drawing on Max Weber’s definition of the state (1978: 54) as a compulsory political organization that holds the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within its territory it may be plausible to suggest that works on the rise of modern nation-states have focused on the political-military dimensions of state formation. Norbert Elias critically took up Weber’s core definition and conceptualized European state formation as a ‘civilizing process’. Elias’ approach gives significant clues in exploring how the nation-states shape the identity of the citizens along with state ideals:

The civilizing process, seen from the aspects of standards of conduct and drive control, is the same trend which, when seen from the point of view of human relationships, appears as the process of advancing integration, increased differentiation of social functions and interdependence, and the formation of ever-larger units of integration on whose fortunes and movements the individual depends, whether he knows it or not. (Elias, 1994: 332).

In the theory of the civilizing process, Elias put together the macro-sociological aspects of state formation and the micro-sociological consequences of this process; the ways in which the evolution of the modern state has shaped social practices. At the core of the civilizing process, sometimes a contrary current manifests itself: while the modern state continues to monopolize the legitimate use of violence, and promotes and protects civilized modes of behavior and expression in society, at the same time it perpetrates massive and organized acts of violence towards specific categories of its citizens (De Swaan, 2001: 265). It is important to recognize that, Elias did not say much about the homogenization efforts witnessed during state-building in general and nation-building in particular. However, his work has inspired others in understanding such issues.

Patrick Carroll who studied the use of modern scientific knowledge by British agents in their colonization of Ireland has recommended moving beyond the materialist conceptions of the state. According to Carroll (2006: 2) “states are made of knowledge, just as knowledge is constituted by states.” Carroll develops a concept of culture which includes the interrelated parts of discourse (like symbolic meaning) practice (organized social activities) and materiality (constructed environments). For Carroll, the material world is indisputably cultural. Not simply in the meanings such a world has for social actors, but also because humanly transformed materiality embodies cultural designs, objectives, and structuring discourses and practices (Carroll, 2006: 16).

Philip Gorski explains that the descriptions of nation-states which underline the political-military dimensions of state formation are incomplete because “states are not only administrative, policing and military organizations. They are also

pedagogical, corrective, and ideological organizations.” (Gorski, 2003: 165-166). Ideas, beliefs and rituals serve to legitimize state power. Parallel to this, Bourdieu enriches the study of nation-states by elucidating the role of symbolic violence alongside the legitimate use of force by expanding Weber’s definition to emphasize both symbolic and physical violence. This definition points to Bourdieu’s notion of power; one clearly influenced by Weber in that power must be legitimated in order to be exercised in an enduring and effective way. Symbolic power according to Bourdieu is some kind of hidden structure of power which is applied when coercive power cannot be exercised. His understanding of symbolic power derives from therecognition of authority as legitimate and can be defined as the power to ‘constitute the given’ (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). It is the ability to appear as natural, inevitable, and thus apolitical, that which is a product of human invention and historical struggle. Through practices of classification practices the states not only naturalize certain distinctions over others, but they also help organize groups of people (Loveman, 2005: 1655).

Bourdieu defines the modern state as an institution which “successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population.” (Bourdieu, 1994b: 3). Bourdieu claims that the modern nation-state imposes cognitive, supposed assumptions and classifications of the social world which encourage taken-for-granted acceptance of the social order. To the extent there is consent in modern societies it is largely through ‘state forms of classification’ (Ibid.).

Gramsci’s notion of ‘hegemony’ is significant here as this notion highlights the importance of consent besides coercion while illustrating how state power can be exercised in a stable manner. The theory of hegemony is based on a simple principle: modern man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas (Bates, 1975: 351). Physical domination cannot be enough; there is a need for spiritual supremacy as well. Those who obey must, to some degree, share the values and standards of their superiors and consent to their own subordination. Hegemony therefore signifies the control of social life (by a group or a class) through cultural means, as opposed to physical means (Femia, 1983: 346). For Gramsci, application of power (or the

relation between ruler and ruled) rests on an inverse relationship between force and consent, which in turn depends upon the generation of consent (Fontana, 2005: 99). In this regard, it is possible to view the conception of the modern state as equilibrium between coercive and hegemonic institutions or a unity of both.

The rise of nation-states can also be captured by Foucault's notion of 'governmentality' in which the state becomes an administrative state tasked with encouraging populations to be socially and economically productive (Foucault, 1991). Foucault's conceptualization of power is useful in studying the power of modern nation-state in relation to her surveillance upon the citizens. In contrast to the traditional approaches to power, in Foucauldian understanding, the way in which power is applied plays a key role. By this, it could be argued that, Foucault does not mean 'how does power manifest itself?', but, rather, 'by what means it is exercised?' According to Foucault, power is to be understood in terms of its concrete application in tactics and strategies. It should be viewed as a dense net of omnipresent relations (Foucault, 1982: 217). For Foucault (1982), it is not a good idea to consider the modern state as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence. As known, during state formation and nation-building, the elites pursue not only internal peace and order but also a homogeneous and compliant population. From a Foucauldian perspective, the modern state has a disciplinary power through which the state imposes precise norms (normalization).

Power relations in a society "are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behavior, the general form of the law or government" (Foucault, 1977: 27). Foucault coins the term 'bio-power' to refer to this form of power, which initially emerged in the seventeenth century. He explains that (1981: 143), "bio-power brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life." Generally-speaking, biopower proliferates through the actions of the state in such a way as to regulate populations at the biological level, in the interest of promoting the health and protecting the life of society (Taylor, 2009: 50). The concept of 'biopower' "serves to bring into view a field comprised of more or less

rationalized attempts to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence ...” (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 196-197). This implies that modern biopower rests upon techniques of power embedded within the daily practices of social institutions such as schools or prisons.

Evidence suggests that state formation is never derived solely from physical and material instruments. Therefore, it can be argued that if the homogenizing policies are employed through only coercive means, this would not be exercised in an enduring way. Thus, research detailed in this study sought to analyze the formation of nation-states from a cultural point of view in order to explore clearly the dynamics the existent in the nation-building process.

2.3. Nation-Building Process: A Never-Ending Attempt?

The term ‘nation-building’ can be understood as a state-driven process which evokes a common identity in order to form unity within the state. Nation-building “describes the process whereby the inhabitants of a state’s territory come to be loyal citizens of that state.” (Bloom, 1990: 54-55). It was this nation-building process which gradually transformed “a society from the form of a *Gesellschaft*, or functional existence, to a *Gemeinschaft* organization or a homogeneous community” (Ibid: 55). This section of the study will focus on the homogenization policies led by the state elites during nation-building with the aim of standardizing the masses.

Literature on ‘nation-building’, which was prevalent in the 1960s, tended to explore the self-conscious production and dissemination of national consciousness from the state, denoting the cultural and psychological dimensions of the transition to modernity (Foster, 1997: 3). State-led nation-building models see the formation of national consciousness among the people living within the state’s boundaries and their homogenization is principally a result of a state’s large-scale and coercive nation-building process. Homogenization can be defined as the sociopolitical process of deliberately fostering cultural homogeneity. This is directed by elites who often engage in social engineering. In this context, homogenization can be viewed as an elite-driven attempt to impose socio-cultural changes which eventually lead to or aim to achieve cultural uniformity (Conversi, 2007: 372).

For Anthony Giddens the process of nation-building has a cultural dimension, regarding nationalism as “the cultural sensibility of sovereignty, the concomitant of the coordination of administrative power within the bounded nation-state” (Giddens, 1985: 219). Giddens observes that the unity within the state cannot remain purely administrative because the coordination of activities presumes cultural homogeneity.

Central to the homogenizing policies carried out during nation-building is the creation of a national history. Establishing a common past for a large community requires a degree of social consensus on historical experience. This consensus has been pursued through national history writing. It can be said that, the modern practice of national history writing began side by side with the rise of the nation states. Those who are active in creating and proliferating a common past among other members of the community are referred to as nation builders (Utz, 2005: 631). Generally, they are the members of the elite and there are specific reasons for this. First, they have a political and/or economic interest in nationalism and would be the main beneficiaries of the stabilizing and legitimizing effects of a nationalist political culture based on a common past. Second, they are the only members of their community sufficiently educated to produce literature or art, or engage in historical research. Initially, all forms of nationalisms were created by elites adopting the decisive role in creating the intellectual content of nationalism (Ibid.). This process was also implemented in their attempt to build a level of cohesion among the people through the propagation of unifying symbols. Poggi (1978: 98-99) relates the expression of geographic, linguistic, cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of a community to the attempts of national unification.

One of the institutions through which national unification is sought is the mass conscription. This concept is important for the nationalization of the masses (Hutchinson, 2006). A mass army is formed by citizens enlisted to defend national security from foreign threats under the pretext of protecting a clearly bounded homeland inhabited by intimately, closely related kin (Conversi, 2007: 380). As conscription expanded and the army gained more social prestige, military homogenization became the prototype for the wider organization of society and state–society relations. Thus, obedience and conformism became supreme values for the whole society (Ibid: 382).

In addition to mass conscription, state schooling is also important in the nation-building process. Compulsory education plays a decisive role in developing uniformity among citizens, which is a fundamental aspect in nation-building. Further, Althusser (1971) argues that mass education should be considered as one of the ideological state apparatuses. In support of this, the creation of ‘desired citizens’ has been shown to involve an education process at the mass level. Eugen Weber in his seminal work *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914* argues that most rural and small town dwellers in France did not conceive of themselves as members of a French nation in the 1870s. The French nation-state aimed to turn the peasants into Frenchmen through national education (Weber, 1976: 303).

Bourdieu’s notion of ‘Habitus’ is helpful in analyzing people’s attachment to nation as learned and habituated; being open to modification through educational practices (Pollman, 2009: 538). Bourdieu defines the term ‘Habitus’ as “an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production” (Bourdieu, 1990: 55). Brubaker (1985: 758) explains the term ‘Habitus’ as “the system of internalized dispositions that mediates between social structures and practical activity, being shaped by the former and regulating the latter.” In this sense, the nation-building process entails some kind of ‘Habitus’ which refers to the internalization, habituation and reproduction of national values.

On the other hand, considered purely in terms of the state’s coercive capacity, there are different strategies to homogenization, such as forced assimilation, expulsion and extermination. However, homogenization is not always implemented through violent methods – though ethnic cleansing, compulsory resettlement, and mass murder have indeed been its most extreme instruments – but also through quieter migrations of ethnic mixing (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998).

According to Mylonas (2013) there is a categorical conceptualization of nation-building which posits three possible state policies like accommodation, assimilation or exclusion. The elites can pursue cultural, occupational, educational, demographic, political, and other state policies to push the non-core group into

adopting the core group's culture⁷. This is known as assimilation (Mylonas, 2013: 21), of which the ultimate goal is to integrate. These policies differ from group-specific plans because they do not target particular groups, but may disproportionately affect a specific group (or part of a specific group). Assimilationist policies seek to secure the loyalty of an individual or a community and can be either violent or non-violent. Alternatively, the elites can retain the non-core group in the state, but grant the group special minority rights. Certain differences of the non-core group are respected, and institutions which regulate and perpetuate these differences are put in place. This is called accommodation and refers to non-violent policies (Mylonas, 2013: 22).

There is also scope to physically remove the non-core group which often involves extreme forms of violence for instance population exchange, mass killing or deportation. This reaction is termed exclusion and considered to be one of the most violent policy forms. What distinguishes these policies is the different intention behind each (Ibid.). It is important to note that, despite the numerous literatures on state-led nationalism, and nationalist movements there is no theory which specifies the conditions under which a state is likely to accommodate, assimilate or exclude a non-core group.

In summary, nation-building involves attempts to reconfigure collective identities by adjusting national priorities and morals, as well as through attempts to sentimentalize or even de-sentimentalize these concepts within the national consciousness (Norman, 2006: 41). Linguistic and ethnic standardization, citizenship policies, compulsory education, mass media and mass conscription are the primary tools employed by elites during nation-building. Additional methods may include re-emphasizing or re-defining historical events, adopting new national symbols and traditions, regulating the media and amending various place-names (Ibid: 45). Most nation-building campaigns use a variety of these methods in their attempts to strengthen the national community and/or redefine the nation-consciousness. The

⁷The 'core group' can be defined in two different ways: as a demographic majority that shares a common national type (e.g. common language, religion and culture) and as the ruling elite that claims to represent this demographic majority. The ruling elites of the core group determine the constitutive story of the nation in such a way so that it has (or can easily construct) a significant demographic core group base and at the same time ensures the legitimacy of their hegemony over any competitors (Mylonas, 2007).

following sections will explore the roles of national identity formation, citizenship policies and the mass media in the nation-building process.

2.3.1. Nation-Building and Identity Formation

The nation-building process can be defined as the process whereby elites attempt to overlappolitical and nationalunits. To achieve this overlap, the elites construct and impose a common national identity on the masses. Therefore, construction of a national identity can be regarded as one of the major dimensions of nation-building. It is important to note that, in principle, all nation-building processes can be viewed as cultural interventions as the center establishes a particular identity on the periphery, or, in other words, the elites establish a national identity for the rest of the population (Utz, 2005: 638).

In understanding how national identities are constructed, a brief overview concerning identity and its relation to ‘others’ should be made. Here, Chantal Mouffe’s study on identity formation is significant. Mouffe argues that the constitution of an identity is generally based on exclusion and on establishing a violent hierarchy between the resultant two poles. This neatly illustrates that any social-objectivity is constituted through acts of power and needs to show traces of exclusion (Mouffe, 1993: 141).

As noted, nation-building can be defined as the sum of societal, cultural, and political processes which bring about a collective identity among the population in a given polity. Indeed, the creation of a particular collective identity needs the identification of a sharp distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As Dominique Schnapper puts it: “Collective attachments are always affirmed in opposition to others...” (quoted in Abizadeh, 2005: 45). In this sense, it should be noted that, the formation of national identity is related to the decision to choose a common enemy. The national identity can be defined by highlighting its inner and outer boundaries or its others. Stuart Hall (1996: 5) explains that “it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what

has been called its *constitutive outside*, that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term—and thus its identity—can be constructed.”

In explaining the role of the ‘others’ in building identities, Seyla Benhabib (1996: 3) writes:

Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat; one is a Gush Emmunim settler in the West Bank to the extent that one is not a secular Zionist [. . .]. What is shocking about these developments, is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. The negotiation of identity/difference [. . .] is the political problem facing democracies on a global scale.

Anthony D. Smith describes national identity as “the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that pattern and heritage, and with its cultural elements” (Smith, 2001: 18). National identities can be seen as an outcome of social, cultural and political practices. Thus, national identities are never fixed but subject to changes. Similarly, Hobsbawm states that national identity is not always a major component of the set of identifications that constitute the social being; national identification can change with time (Hobsbawm, 1990: 11). National identity formation is a process of fluid, open, and contentious public debate, wherein the lines separating us and them rest on unexamined prejudices, ancient battles, historical injustices, and sheer administrative fiat (Benhabib, 2001: 28). This process shapes the nature of citizenship regime in this particular nation-state.

2.3.2. Nation-Building and Citizenship

Citizenship is essential for the rise of nation-states. It emerges either as a societal impetus led from below or as a result of initiatives imposed by the elites from above. The Turkish case is an example of elite-led citizenship formation carried out in a top-down fashion.

The concept of citizenship is said to carry legal status, while national identity is thought of as a relational concept, presupposing a dialogical recognition of the 'other'. The 'other' does not necessarily have to be morally evil; it can be recognized as resembling 'us' yet exterior to us. Although such active 'othering' identify actors in a polity yet it tends to simultaneously include and exclude some communities from the nationhood project (Neuman, 1999: 12, 16).

It is also important to note that nationality and citizenship are analytically separate too. David McCrone and Richard Kiely define the difference as follows:

nationality and citizenship actually belong to different spheres of meaning and activity. The former is in essence a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity – in Benedict Anderson's phrase as an 'imagined community' – while citizenship is a political concept deriving from people's relationship to the state. (McCrone and Kiely, 2000: 25).

The modern notion of citizenship is generally regarded as the offspring of the French Revolution, but several other political, social and economic developments, which marked the period of modernity in Western history from the sixteenth century onwards, laid the foundations for "the transition from a monarch-subject relationship to a state-citizen relationship" (Heater, 1999: 4). A citizen is a member of a political community, which is defined by a set of rights and obligations. "Citizenship therefore represents a relationship between the individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations" (Heywood, 1994: 155). Being a citizen is associated with the categorization and identification of self

and others, the building of self-understanding and the construction of feelings of groupness or belonging with others. It is conventional to distinguish processes of categorizing self and others from processes of establishing a sense of common identity or belonging with others (Pearson, 2001: 16-17).

In his classic work on the development of citizenship in England, T. H. Marshall tells us about the conditions under which three different types of citizenship (civil, political and social) evolved over time. Marshall defines the concept of citizenship as follows: “citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.” (Marshall, 1950: 28-29). Marshall identifies three elements responsible for establishing citizenship: political, civil and social rights. Civil rights are comprised of the rights that are necessary for individual freedom. Political rights involve the right to exercise political power, hold political office, or to elect a person to office. Social rights can be described as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.” (Ibid: 10-11).

On the other hand, the type of citizenship regime in a particular nation-state can reveal the character of the nation-building process in that state. Different approaches to citizenship are significant in this regard, and are categorized as classical or civic-republican and liberal or liberal-individualist conception.

Liberal understanding of citizenship is linked to the development of capitalism and the nation-state. It regards citizenship as a concept with legal status and focuses on rights. Consequently, the rights inhere in individuals, because they logically and morally precede society and the state, and one of the primary purposes of the state is to secure and protect these natural rights. In liberal understanding the state is useful to the citizen as a ‘nightwatchman’ (Heater, 1999: 6-7) and it is expected “to render service to individual interests and purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of their rights, and to leave them unhindered in the pursuit of whatever individual and collective interests and purposes they might have.” (Oldfield, 1998: 76).

By contrast, in the civic-republican conception of citizenship, the emphasis is on practice and activity where responsibilities and duties are at the core. This understanding has its roots in the Ancient Greek political philosophy and takes from Aristotle's theories who defined the citizen as 'the individual who shares in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn.' Civic republicanism regards individuals different from that of liberalism: individuals are not considered as being logically prior to society (Oldfield, 1998). It is by performing their duties, by public service of fairly specific kinds, that individuals demonstrate that they are citizens. This emphasis on practice gives rise to a language of duties.

During the nation-building process, the boundaries of citizenship are drawn. Once the citizenship is considered as a means for nation-building and modernization, citizenship is formalized pragmatically according to the needs of modernization and is used as a disciplinary technique. This is one of the reasons Republican elites in Turkey have used the citizenship regime as a tool in social engineering, othering and even demonizing the undesired citizens within the framework of the official state ideology. Mass media has been one of the most effective methods used in social engineering to justify the nation-state's use of the citizenship regime.

2.3.3. Nation-Building and the Media

Much of the existing literature on nation-building explores the processes of negotiation and political instrumentalization through which media institutions, for example newspapers came to be used as instruments of nation-building or national promotion on the international platform. However, there are also a wide range of works that examine the ways in which various mediated cultural forms, for instance editorials, reports, and news coverages have contributed to the reproduction of nationalist discourse, representations, myths or symbols. For example, the press implements a number of discursive strategies in constructing and also empowering national unity by invoking stereotypes, generic references, and military history (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 244).

Accounts of nationalism assume that mass media encourages people to see the world in a nationalist perspective. The media has shown to play a crucial role in (re)producing a sense of nationhood. Yet, as Schlesinger (1991: 156) pointed out, media studies have usually under-conceptualized the nation-state, while nationalism literature has failed to rigorously theorize the mass media.

During the nation-building process, in order to homogenize the masses, there is a need to label certain individuals as the 'undesired citizens', who do not fit the mould of this homogeneous society (nation). So while stigmatizing and excluding particular citizens, the elites need to disseminate the idea of the 'desired' citizen. In this regard, the role of the media is essential. For instance, it is suggested that mass media, through symbols has actively created national consciousness (Schudson, 2002: 482). The media provides rhetorical basis for nationalistic discourse. Therefore, on a worldwide scale it has the power to instigate unity within a nation.

The hegemonic worldview (worldview of the elites) propagates its own values and norms through the media so that these values and norms become the 'common sense' values of all (Patnaik, 1988). The media therefore is important in providing positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. The construction and reproduction of national identity in the media are based on a wide range of representations which support the hatred towards the 'other' by empowering collective will. Taking this into consideration, citizens who do not meet the specific national identity criteria are stigmatized as the 'undesired citizens' throughout media.

The media not only transmits nationalist ideology but also naturalizes and reproduces it. Through agenda-setting and references to national symbols, the media transforms the 'cognitive style' of the masses in addition to underlining the us / them distinction (Bostanci, 1996: 1540). In terms of understanding how the ideology of nationalism works with regards to media, it could be argued that, it is capable of generating the same effects as sacred texts:

In the system of nationalism mass media perform the same functions that sacred and priestly texts perform in other religious systems. They recall central moments of group identity, rehearse ritual and mythic structures for believers, and pull from the flux of daily life what is grist for the mill of religious nationalism...Media are instrumental in reporting blood sacrifice and assembling congregations who acquire knowledge of group threats and sacrificial occasions, and are socialized into the proper execution of ritual forms by media (Marvin and Ingle, 1996: 776-777).

The media presents a consensual model of society which “requires the notion of unity: one nation, one people, one society, often simply translated into ours – our industry, our economy, our nuclear deterrent, police force, balance of payments, etc.” (Hartley, 1993: 82). However, groups and individuals which fall outside this assumed consensus are also mentioned. Such groups are portrayed as deviants and their behavior is delegitimized by specific terms such as unpatriotism, irresponsibility, irrationality, mindlessness etc. (Ibid: 84).

Philip Schlesinger (1991: 173) discusses identity as “a continually constituted and reconstructed category” examining the crucial role of the media in this process of formation and re-formation of identity. Schlesinger (1991: 174) argues:

National cultures are not simple repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions take place ... It may also reproduce distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ at the intra-national level, in line with the internal structure of social divisions and relations of power and domination.

According to Martin-Barbero (1993), national identity was established as a result of media representation. In a similar vein, concerning the role of the mass media in the reproduction of racism in the contemporary European countries, Van Dijk (1993: 241) points out that, “none of the other power elites and especially the

political elites and their discourses could be as influential as they are without the mediating and sometimes reinforcing functions of the press, radio and television.”

Communication, especially mass communication has been seen as a central part of most nation-building processes. According to Rokkan (1971), the media supplies direct communication between the central elite and the parochial masses. Similarly, Hobsbawm explains that “states would use the increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants...to spread the image and the heritage of the ‘nation’ and to inculcate attachment to it and to attach all to country and flag, often ‘inventing traditions’ or even nations for this purpose.” (Hobsbawm, 1990: 91).

According to Deutsch (1966), communication campaigns can be employed to create national identities allowing a nation’s people to think together. Deutsch argues that, when various communication mediums provide a means for people to share common social habits, nations can form. For Deutsch, communication channels transfer information from one group or network to another and build the relations necessary for attaining national goals. Deutsch’s central thesis states: “The essential aspect of the unity of a people ... is the complementarity or relative efficiency of communication among individuals – something that is in some ways similar to mutual rapport, but on a larger scale.” (Deutsch, 1966: 188). For Deutsch, nationality is an objective function of communication and belonging. More specifically, a nation is enacted by the communicative competency of both the state and citizens.

Gellner who treats nationalism as “the organization of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units” (Gellner, 1983: 35) gives his standpoint on the role of communication in promoting nationalism:

The media do not transmit an idea that happens to have been fed into them. It matters precious little what has been fed into them: it is the media themselves, the pervasiveness and importance of abstract, centralized, standardized, one-to-many communication, which automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism, quite irrespective of what...is being put into the specific messages transmitted ... That

core message is that the language and style of the transmissions is important, that only he who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension, is included in a moral and political community, and that he who does not and cannot, is excluded (Gellner, 1983: 127).

Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* ([1983] 1991) provides a significant theoretical account on the role of the media with regards to nationalism. Anderson argues that nationalism is a cultural artifact. Furthermore he suggests that national consciousness in the European nation-states emerged from a conjunction of print, capitalism and the fatality of human linguistic diversity (Anderson, 1991: 43). Making reference to Hegel's aphorism that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute to morning prayers, Anderson places a special emphasis on newspapers and novels as important tools which provide technical means for representing the kind of imagined community - the nation (Anderson, 1991:25). From their inception, newspapers created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers. They reify and cement national form: "the very conception of the newspaper implies the refraction of even 'world events' into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers" (Anderson, 1991: 62-63). With respect to newspapers, Anderson stresses the ceremony of common readership and its role in national consciousness-the idea that everyone is simultaneously reading the same thing or at least aware of it. His work underlines the significance of reading the news. For Anderson, news is not only the raw material for rational public discourse but also the public construction of particular images of nation, community and self (cited in Schudson, 2002: 484). Thus, as noted previously, readers of newspapers could imagine themselves as engaging in an activity which they shared with thousands or even millions of others. This clearly illustrates that communicative (usually linguistic) connectedness through mass media contributes to the sense of belonging to a larger collectivity.

On the other hand, the acknowledgment of the impossibility of a total congruence between the state and the nation presents a serious challenge to most canonical conceptualizations of the relationship between the media and nationalism, including those developed by Karl Deutsch (1966), Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991)

and Ernest Gellner (1983). According to Philip Schlesinger (2000), all these theories are characterized by the overwhelming presence of an ‘internalist line of argument’ which has two main limitations: “a tendency to think in terms of a close functional fit between communication and the nation; and an overwhelming concern with the interior of the national communicative space, whether this be in respect to its formation or its maintenance” (Schlesinger, 2000: 107)

In short, the mass media has a significant role in reproducing collective consciousness by strengthening nationalist discourse among the masses. The media helps the discursive production of nationalism as an ideology that bonds people together thus contributing nation-building efforts in a considerable amount. Through the media, public construction of images of nation and nationalism is drawn. By representing the others as deviants and enemies, the sense of national belonging is heightened. Media discourse not only reproduces nationalist sentiments, but also naturalizes them and establishes them as common-sense among the masses. Therefore, the media serves as a site wherein the discursive hegemony of the nation-builders is exercised with regard to nation-building and citizenship regime. From this standpoint, one of the objectives of the following chapter is to address how the media is used as a tool in the dissemination of the idea of nation-state and (re)production of the hegemonic citizenship regime in the early years of the Turkish Republic.

CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THE STATE, CITIZEN AND MEDIA IN TURKEY

The main objective of this chapter is to explain the historical background of the linguistic and socio-political analysis that will be covered in the following sections. In respect of the research questions, this chapter will mainly focus on the relationship between the state and the undesired citizens, who have been marked and treated as the ‘others’ of the Republic by the Kemalist nation-builders. As noted earlier, the citizenship regime in Turkey has its constitutive others through which it reproduces and naturalizes itself. These constitutive others are referred to as the ‘undesired’ citizens in this study. They consist of the Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims (Greek Orthodox, Jews and Armenians as stated in the Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923) and the pious Muslims who have been demonized by the Kemalist state discourse and seen as ‘reactionary’ (mürteci).

This chapter also aims to shed light on the development of Turkish press and will explore the shift seen in media – politics relations in the course of time. Covering a wide time span with social, political and cultural aspects the historical account will follow a chronological order.

3.1.The Ottoman Empire

The history of modern Turkey cannot be fully understood without making reference to the Ottoman Empire or Devlet-i Ali (The Magnificent State). The Ottoman Empire ruled over a vast area with the peoples from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The ruling elite consisted of two categories: the representatives of the sultan’s power and the guardians of the moral order. The ruling elite, who were designated as themilitary(askeri), consisted completely of servants of the sultan: the military, the clerks of the scribal institutions and the royal household. The religious scholars (ulema), who were entrusted with the keeping of the moral

order and thus with most forms of formal education and justice, also belonged to the ruling elite (Zürcher, 2004: 11).

Despite the fact that Islam had been the dominant religion, the Armenian and Greek Orthodox Churches were actively integrated into the political structure. The Ottoman Jews constituted an important part of the population. Under the Ottoman rule the non-Muslim minorities were free to choose their religion and language. There were various languages that were spoken. Turkish was the language of the majority in Anatolia. However it is important to note that three languages were spoken during the Ottoman Empire, i.e. Turkish, Persian and Arabic (Göksel and Kerslake, 2009).

The Ottoman millet system by which the Ottomans allocated certain rights to minority groups has now been increasingly interpreted as a sign of tolerance and accommodation for difference (Stefanov, 1997). This system is a decisive turning point for minorities' rights and duties. The Ottoman Empire, until the era of Tanzimat administered its non-Muslim communities with the millet system and considered them as *dhimmi*s, people of the book, who were protected by the Muslims.

On the other hand, the treaty of Karlowitz signed in 1699 marked the end of Ottoman expansion in Europe. Military defeats in the late 17th and 18th centuries gave rise to an 'inferiority complex' among the Ottoman rulers (Feroze, 1976: 12). This led the rulers' acceptance of the West's superiority in terms of military and technology and the rulers began first attempts at westernization in these areas. The reforms aimed at strengthening the central state structure through building a modern army.

The common element of all of the reforms from the early 18th century to the foundation of modern Turkey was the fact that they came from the top, they were implemented in a top-down manner resulting in violent reactions among various groups. For Berkes (1964), these first rebellions represented a clash between the reformist rulers and the religiously-oriented anti-western groups such as the Jannisaries and the Ulema who blamed the Porte for the decline of the state.

The drive for change paved the way for the issuance of famous decrees. One of these decrees was the Noble Edict of the Rose Garden (Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi). Tanzimat included the policy of Ottomanism, which was meant to unite various peoples living in Ottoman territories. For this purpose, Islamic law was put aside in favour of secular law (Deringil, 1993: 5).

In another imperial edict (Hatt-ı Hümayun) of 1856, the equality of all subjects in front of the state and their rights and civic duties were reiterated. The 1856 Imperial Edict can be viewed as a continuance of the Tanzimat or an expanded version of the Tanzimat. With regard to citizenship, the 1869 citizenship law (Tabiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunu), for the first time adopted the concept of ‘citizenship’ based on contemporary principles, rather than the religious criteria stipulated for citizenship in the Islamic law (Bozkurt, 1992: 128). The motivation behind this law was largely economic.

In terms of press-politics relations, it should be noted that, it was not until the late 1860s that a systematic criticism against the reform policies was carried out through journalism. In 1860, Tercüman-ı Ahval (Interpreter of Conditions) began to be published. Şinasi was the editor and writer of Tercüman-ı Ahval. Finding his freedom of expression restricted, he published the Tasvir-i Efkâr in 1862 (Lewis, 1968: 148). The Tasvir-i Efkâr (Illustration of Opinion) founded by Şinasi a liberal with European ideas soon became a tool for fairly moderate criticism of the government (Zürcher, 2004: 68). Şinasi left the country leaving the paper at the hands of a young functionary in the Translation Office of the Porte, Namık Kemal. Namık Kemal was a practicing Muslim and an Ottoman patriot. Under Kemal’s editorship, the Tasvir-i Efkâr became more radical. However, still more radical in tone and content was the Muhbir (Informer) which appeared in 1867 and which was published for only two months (Lewis, 1968: 149). Together with Ali Suavi, Ziya Bey, and Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, Namık Kemal formed a group later called as Yeni

Osmanlılar (The Young Ottomans). In 1868, the Young Ottomans⁸ published their own paper *Hürriyet* (Freedom) (Zürcher, 2004: 70).

Undeniably, the emergence and early developments of the Turkish press can be dated back before the *Tasvir-i Efkâr*. For instance, until recently, *Takvim-i Vakayi* (The Time of Events, 1831) was known to be the first Ottoman official gazette to be published, yet Nonetheless, Topuz (2003: 13), with reference to research by Koloğlu (1994), starts the chronology of Turkish Press with *Vaka-i Mısriye* (The Events of Egypt, 1828) which was published and distributed in the Egyptian region of the Empire. Despite the earlier arrival of the first printing machine in 1727 by Ibrahim Muteferrika, the press did not flourish so quickly and proved uninfluential in spreading information for three main reasons according to Jeltyakov, which are; the general cultural backwardness of the Ottomans (he refers to the low level of literacy), economic and political system, and the pressure of the reactionary groups (1979: 53). Representing only one aspect of reality, this approach ignores various other factors in the late development of printing press in Turkey, such as state censorship.

It is important to stress that, the state realized the importance of the press in explaining and spreading the reforms to a wider audience, and later the newly emerging intelligentsia saw the press as crucial in reflecting their reaction onto the public (Adaklı, 2006: 95). Foreign interest in Turkish press peaked to such a high level that the first newspaper, the *Bulletin des Nouvelles*, was actually published in 1795 by a French man with political motivations and later in 1849 an English entrepreneur named William Churchill established *Ceride-i Havadis* (Journal of News), the first non-official periodical which was the second Turkish newspaper to be published in Turkey (Topuz, 2003: 17). The *Ceride-i Havadis* enjoyed a virtual monopoly of journalism in the Turkish language for twenty years (Lewis, 1968: 146).

⁸The Young Ottomans were a small and heterogeneous group but they all believed in the virtues of representative government by which a true feeling of citizenship could be established among all subjects of the empire. Namık Kemal had been the pioneering figure in that group and played a key role in the constitutional revolution in 1876.

In addition, there were also a number of bi-lingual newspapers in Turkish and Arabic, like *Vaka-i Misriye*, and more significantly Armenian and Jewish printing attempts are known to have long preceded the early Turkish journalism. Topuz reports that the Armenians first brought over a printing machine to Istanbul in 1567 (2003: 71) and the Jews when they were expelled from Spain in 1492. As is obvious from the early history of Turkish press, multilingualism did not pose so much of a threat to Ottomans as it does to the Turkish state now. In this sense, the foreign journalists enjoyed further political and economic freedom that caused resentment among their Turkish peers (Tılıç, 2009: 98).

According to Zürcher (2004: 77-79) the press is the one channel that clearly revealed the rule of Abdülhamid to be both a continuation of the Tanzimat and a break from the past. Newspapers, when compared with the pioneering efforts of the 1860s, were now more professional. The press of the period also illustrates the fundamental ideological switch of the regime, which represents a clear break with the preceding era. Not only was the sultan deeply opposed to what he saw as the disruptive forces of liberalism, nationalism and constitutionalism but also he attempted to counter them by placing emphasis on the traditional and Islamic character of his reign. One of the most important journalistic activities at that time-being was the publication of the daily newspaper *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* (The Interpreter of the Truth) which was published by Ahmed Mithat, a journalist, novelist and historian and his friends in 1878. Ahmed Mithat was able to bring some idea of modern European knowledge to the Turkish reader in a simple form (Lewis, 1968: 189-190).

However, it is widely known that journalism received a serious blow during the Hamidian era. This progressed by the the late 19th century when journalism placed itself within the tradition of an opposition that defended republicanism against absolutism. Therefore, the first journalists emerged from the intelligentsia and bureaucratic elite and continued their activities from abroad. A level of freedom in journalism was initiated by Sultan Abdulhamid right after the announcement of Constitutional Monarchy in 1876 but this was curbed later with a total censorship but was quickly restrained with a complete censorship.

A certain degree of opposition against Abdülhamit rule has developed from the opposition party. The opposition group, the Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society) was such a group. The group, founded in 1889 by four students from the Military Medical School, is thought to set the earliest grounds for those who wanted to reinstate the constitution and the parliament (Tunaya, 1952). The Young Turk movement, which included those who aimed to overthrow the Hamidian rule was itself divided. While numerous factions, existed, it is convenient to separate them into two principal groups: Liberals and Unionists (Feroz, 2002: 33).

The period between 1908-1913 can be identified as the direct rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The years under the CUP rule was marked by swift changes in a variety of areas. For example, economic nationalism policies and further secularization of the judicial and educational system have been enforced. As part of the secularization process the Şeyhülislam, the highest religious dignitary, was placed the cabinet in 1916, and the religious law courts were brought under the control of the Ministry of Justice (Zürcher, 2004: 121-122). In terms of economic homogenization, the CUP took drastic measures with the help of the Unionist 'secret army', Teşkilat-i Mahsusa (special organization) (Zürcher, 2004: 141).

On the other hand, Turkish nationalism, as opposed to Ottoman nationalism arrived much later. Chief among the Turkists from Russia were Ağaoğlu Ahmet and the Tatar Yusuf Akçura. Akçura published a long article in the Young Turk émigrépaper *Türk* (The Turk), which appeared in Cairo in 1904. This article, which has been termed the 'Manifesto of Turkism', was titled Three Types of Policy (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset). It compared the relative merits of Islamist, Ottomanist and Turkist policies, advocating the latter. It can be considered as the first coherent statement of pan-Turkist political aims (Zürcher, 2004: 129). Despite the increasing importance of Turks as the most significant numerical group, Islam not nationalism received the most emphasis; only some intellectuals in the capital took Turkish nationalism seriously. But the Committee, prominent Turkists like Ziya Gökalp⁹ in its inner circle, remained tied to Islam. (Feroz, 2002: 39)

⁹Mehmet Ziya (Gökalp) who himself was of Kurdish origin made the most creative and consistent attempt at a synthesis of the various elements of the Ottoman heritage (Islam, Turkish ethnicity, Ottoman state) with European-style modernization. (Zürcher, 2004: 131). For Gökalp, Turkish nation was first and foremost based on a common cultural formation as opposed to being a political community. His contributions to Turkish nationalism

Recent studies have demonstrated that the CUP had a determined approach to Turkification of the masses. Aktar defines Turkification policies as “making Turkish ethnic identity to be dominant and strong in every aspect of life without concessions” and which had an effect on “the language spoken in the street, the history being taught at school, policies regarding state personnel, education, and forced settlement policies” (Aktar, 2004: 101). Thus, the efforts of the CUP to engineer the nation through education and language policies went hand in hand with securing ‘Muslimization’ and ‘Turkification’ of the country’s population through settlement policies already in place to secure the Empire’s shrinking territories (Dündar, 2001: 246).

The policy of population exchange, which was also widely applied by the newly established nation-states of the Balkan region, gave the CUP an opportunity to decrease the non-Muslim population of the country. Thus, the CUP agreed the first international population exchange agreement with Bulgaria in 1913 (Dündar, 2001: 66). A year later, another agreement with Greece regarding the exchange of Greeks from the Aydın region and the Muslims of Eastern Thrace was concluded, but it could not be completed due to the start of World War I (Dündar, 2001: 70). Further, the security concerns of WWI would give legitimacy to the most drastic method for this aim, the Deportation Law (Tehcir Kanunu) of 27 May 1915, which gave the military forces the right to resettle inhabitants of villages and towns on the basis that ‘their espionage and betrayal has been felt’. This law later became permanent with a circular of 30 May 1915. It affected Greeks, Jews, Nestorians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians, who were also subjected to forced resettlement (Dündar, 2001: 64). However, there was a special instruction with respect to the resettlement of Armenians. It could be said that the forced relocation of Armenians was the tragic consequence of the diminishing power of the Empire and a feeling of a loss of superiority.

The late Ottoman times had a significant impact on Kemalist state ideology and the nature of the nation-building process. However, after the War of

included simplification of the language, emphasis on Islam for the mobilization of the masses and a stress on history, literature and culture.

Independence (1919-1923) which sought to form the new nation, the Kemalist elites tried to break all the ties with the past. Moreover, they tried to draw a sharp distinction between religion and state affairs unlike the rhetoric used in the War of Independence.

3.2.The Formation of the New Nation and Single-Party Rule

After ten years of almost continuous warfare¹⁰, the country was depopulated and impoverished but as a result of a remarkable political and military victory, the Republic was founded in 1923.The War of Independence can itself be viewed as an act of state-seeking Muslim nationalism. This kind of nationalism then turned into a state-led ethnic Turkish nationalism which seeks to suppress differences within the national borders (Altınay, 2004: 20).

Following the war, The Peace Treaty of Lausanne was signed as the founding treaty of Turkish Republic. According to the Treaty of Lausanne, all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on Turkish territory (other than Istanbul area) and all Greek nationals of Muslim religion established on Greek territory (other than the newly-acquired region of Western Thrace) were to be exchanged. Thus, the distinguishing criterion for compulsory resettlement was exclusively that of religion. This resulted in approximately 1.3 million Greeks being expelled from Turkey and some 500,000 Muslims were sent to Turkey (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). The Greeks, the Jews and the Armenians who had been acknowledged as ‘Milletts’ previously in the Ottoman period have become the only groups in Turkey recognized as minorities by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty and have been granted special rights accordingly (Toktaş, 2005: 395).

The troubled postwar period was symbolically drew to a close in 1927with Mustafa Kemal’s 36-hour speech (Nutuk). The conception of a shared history is at the core of the collective identity of each community. The Nutuk played a major role in building nationalism as a social construction as it presented the struggle for

¹⁰By the early 1930s, not only had the war been re-defined as a Turkish War of Independence, but the existence of all other ‘Muslim elements’ (the Kurds, the Laz) as distinct ethnic groups had become silenced. (Yeğen, 1999).

independence through descriptions of the internal enemy and national will (Alaranta, 2008: 116). In Nutuk Atatürk argues that the real Turks are those who love their country and nation. They are those who sacrifice themselves for the good of the homeland.

Following 1923, Atatürk and his associates proposed to create a homogeneous nation-state. The concept of state for Atatürk was a reaction to two aspects of the Ottoman state: personal rule of the Sultan and Islamic basis of the Empire. To create this state, they initiated a close control mechanism over the society. This was authoritarian and paternalistic, which can be explained in Foucauldian terminology by the relationship between the network of 'power' and 'its subjects'. The Turkish state employed all of its available powers to erase the multiethnic and multi-religious legacy of the Ottoman Empire in order to build a governable homogenous population.

It can be argued that the Turkish nation-state did not have a fixed ontological status; on the contrary, its identity was performatively constructed. The new state was established by imposing political, economic, and social modernization from above. The Republican elite initiated the reforms to "enlighten the people and help them make progress" (Heper, 1985:1). As Heinz Kramer notes, the Turkish Republic was run by the state bureaucracy supported by a caste of urban intellectuals with European-inspired education who had an organic understanding of state and society. These cadres had hardly any relations with the masses. The masses had to be educated by the Kemalist elites for having Turkish national identity, and in this sense the establishment of the republic was not only a political task which continues even today (Kramer, 2000: 4-5). Within this context, the establishment of the People's Houses (Halk Evleri) was created to educate the new citizens of the Turkish Republic.

Turkish nationalism has influences from both French and German nationalism thus it has a paradoxical nature. During the initial decades of Republican history, the German Romantic construct of a nation bound by linguistic affinity and ethno-religious sentiment has been linked to Turkish nationalism.

Although the official discourse of Turkish nationalism stresses an inclusive conception of nationalism under the banner of Kemalism, there is evidence that it also includes racial components. In this sense, it can be argued that, there are many sides to Kemalist Turkish nationalism (Parla and Davison, 2004: 68). An inclusive version was primarily based on citizenship and ignored particular identities, but an exclusive Kemalist Turkish nationalism version emphasized ethnic and racial traits. Therefore, by employing ethnic and racial concepts to describe the special qualities of the Turkish nation, Kemalist thinking was loaded with restrictive meanings that contradicted more open conceptions of national citizenship (Ibid.: 72).

Accordingly, citizenship was bestowed upon people by the elite in order to maintain national community. Thus, the emergence of Turkish citizenship had preceded the process of urbanization and the emergence of the bourgeoisie (Kadıoğlu, 1999). The desired citizenship regime formulated by state elites can be encapsulated by the acronym LAST, which stands for Laïcist, Atatürkist, Sunni Muslim, and Turk (Yılmaz, 2012: 44). In parallel to that, the ‘desired citizens’ in Turkey can be described in Baskın Oran’s words with the acronym LAHASÜMÜT referring to the secular-Hanefi-Sunni-Muslim-Turk (laik, Hanefi, Sünni Müslüman, Türk) citizens (Oran, 2007: 43). The citizens who do not fit this conceptualization are labelled as the undesired citizens. As noted earlier, the concept of undesired citizens is neither fixed nor static depending on the socio-historical and politico-economic dynamics.

With reference to Wallerstein it can be argued that in order to (re)produce the desired citizenship regime, almost all nation-states have made education compulsory and have attached critical importance to linguistic homogenization (Wallerstein, 1998: 13-131). Andreas Kazamias, in his seminal work on the role of education in the Turkish modernization process writes the following:

In the emerging ideology of Atatürkism, education was inextricably bound up with political, economic, and cultural independence and with breaking the shackles of traditional beliefs and outlooks; it was the means of nourishing national aspirations, creating the consensus necessary to sustain a free

national state, training new Turkish leaders, and paving the way towards a dynamic and modern society (Kazamias, 1966: 115).

Following the foundation of the Turkish Republic, The Code for the Unification of Teaching was passed in 1924 which abolished all forms of religious formal teaching and required that all schools be administered by the Ministry of Education. The civics textbooks published before 1929 contained no definition of the Turkish nation or citizenship (İnce, 2012: 80). An exception was the book *Malumat-ı Vataniyye* (Information about the Fatherland)(Üstel, 2011: 130). Undeniably, the cultural reforms that had a wide spectrum officially started in 1925. The Western calendar was introduced in 1925. The Latin alphabet and the metric system were introduced in 1928 and 1931, respectively.

On the other hand, the mass media in the nation-building process has been effectively used as a tool in promoting the modernization programme of the single-party regime (Heper and Demirel, 1996: 113; Yılmaz and Burak, 2011). During the National struggle, Mustafa Kemal and his associates used the media as a medium of communication to reach out to the masses. During the initial stages of the National Independence War Mustafa Kemal used the press to inform the public on the activities of the National Forces (Kuvayi Milliye) and went on to launch the National Sovereignty newspaper (*Hakimiyet-i Milliye*) and established the Anatolian News Agency in 1920 (Gürkan, 1998: 34). The media during these years was predominantly used in Mustafa Kemal's national tours, which sought to rally support in favor of the National Independence movement.

In the early Republican period, the journalist-deputies had tried to justify the new regime through their publications, while seeing the demand for a second political party as a divisive behavior. (Güvenir,1991: 70,74). However, after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the press received a serious blow with the enactment of the Law on the Maintenance of Order. This law remained in effect until 1929 and was used not only against the Kurdish rebels in the East, but was also used to silence opposition in other regions of Turkey. Major newspapers were closed down and almost all remaining press was placed under government control. In 1931, the new

press law was introduced. Article 40 prohibited any movement or publication sympathizing with the Sultan, caliphate, or with communism and/or anarchism (Kocabaşođlu, 1981: 111-112). The law also made it difficult for the non-Muslim citizens to run publishing houses (cited in Akan, 2009: 34).

The Press Union established in 1938 gave a considerable degree of authority and control to the government over the press until the end of World War II. The Press General Directorate was brought under the control of the premier's office in 1940, to ensure a strict management of press during the war years (Güvenir, 1991: 49, 59, 209). Indeed any alternative opinion defended by the journalists was treated by the governments as a serious opposition and threat to their rule. In this sense, it could be argued that the function of the press was not like a 'fourth estate', or a 'watchdog' against the abuse of power. Rather, the journalists functioned as 'organic intellectuals'¹¹

The mass media in the early Republican period helped the elites shape the nation through representation of the ethnically and culturally diverse nature of Turkish society as a threat to territorial integrity. Ethno-cultural and religious minorities in Turkey have been subject to homogenizing state policies. Throughout the early Republican era, the state considered diversity as the major source of their internal problems. In this context, in order to create a homogeneous society, 'the undesired citizens' have been subject to various oppressive state policies. The pious Muslims are one group among the collective who faced such policies. These citizens have been treated as 'reactionary' (mürteci) individuals who aimed to undermine the secular character of the regime.

3.2.1. Homogenization vis-à-vis the Pious Muslim Identity

Pious citizens including women with headscarf or people praying five times a day have been classified as 'mürteci' (Islamic reactionary) within the framework of the official Kemalist state discourse. After the inception of Turkish Republic,

¹¹Organic intellectuals rather than only having specialized knowledge have particular comprehension and actively engage in politics. Such intellectuals play a key role in the reproduction of the dominant ideology (Gramsci, 1971: 10).

important reforms were carried out to eliminate the role of religion in state affairs. In this context, Islam was demoted not to challenge the state-centric secular national identity. Therefore, the Kemalist reforms not only ameliorated the social status of women, but politicized them in creating a devoted body of female citizenry to elevate Turkey to the level of Western civilization. By identifying women as the transmitters of the national identity, Kemalists placed emphasis on the modernization of women for the benefit of the Republican regime (Çemrek, 2004: 53).

The secularization policies are key in revealing the strict homogenization policies carried out in the early years of the Republic. The actions of the Independence Tribunals are important in this regard. The people who opposed cultural reforms especially the ones related with secularization faced harsh punishments as a result of the decisions taken by the Independence Tribunals.

Despite the above-mentioned points, the incident in Menemen wherein a military official was murdered by extremists had been seen as the most violent reaction directed against the Republic. This incident made it quite clear to the Republican elites that the reforms that were executed had not taken root. As Mardin (1973: 182) explains: "...between 1923 and 1946 the periphery – in the sense of the provinces – was suspect and because it was considered an area of potential disaffection, the political center kept it under close observation."

Institutional regulations were also employed with the aim to shape religion in line with the desired citizenship regime which treated public visibility of the religion as a threat. The abolition of the venerable function of *Şeyhülislam* and of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Practicing Foundations is important in this regard. Two directorates were created in its place, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyânet İşleri Müdürlüğü) and the Directorate-General for Practicing Foundations (Evkaf Umum Müdürlüğü). Both were attached directly to the prime minister's office. The establishment of these directorates clearly illustrates that the Kemalist perception of secularism was not so much separation of state and religion but as state control over religion (Zürcher, 2004: 187).

The Kemalist elites actively started reforming Islam. In 1927 Atatürk founded a committee on religion under the leadership of Mehmet Fuad Köprülü. The goal was

to modernize Islam and so that it was in line with Atatürk's understanding of Westernization. The Islam postulated by the Kemalists was rational and enlightened and tailored toward Turkish nationalism (Karakaş, 2007: 10). The committee proposed that Muslim prayer times should no longer be aligned with the path of the sun but with the rhythm of the work day instead. In addition, calls to prayer and sermons were supposed to be read in Turkish, not in Arabic and prayers at the mosque were no longer to be performed while kneeling but instead – like in Christian churches – while sitting in pews (Ibid.). In 1928, an important step was taken to support the above-stated efforts. The principle of secularism replaced Islam as the official ethos of the state.

On the other hand, the dress code in general and the headscarf in particular has been important in revealing the official stance towards the pious Muslim citizens. With regards to veiling, Atatürk says:

In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their heads to hide their faces, and who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the ground when a man passes by. What are the meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at once (quoted in Karasipahi, 2008: 28-29).

Çınar (2005: 61) argues that the unveiling of Muslim women “reset the boundaries of the public and the private, which in turn served the creation and institutionalization of a sense of secular, modern nationhood.” In the Turkish state philosophy, the Ottoman times were the pre-modern epoch, a time of backwardness where women were unseen and unheard. The modern Turkish nation-state emerged as the savior of so-called ‘historically oppressed’ and ‘invisible’ women by granting them the right to be unveiled and have a vocal public presence (Gürbüz, 2009: 234). It should be noted that access to higher education, daily experience of urban city life, and use of political idiom and action expose new female Islamic actors to modernity; this exposure is problematic for both secular actors and religious ones (Göle, 2002: 180).

Besides demoting Islamic elements such as the headscarf, some of the Republican elites even thought that morality could replace religion (Kadıoğlu, 2010: 494). Besides re-defining the relationship between state and religion and exercising control over religion, the Republican elites also promoted the Sunni sect of Islam and this led to the alienation of the Alevi citizens.

3.2.2. Homogenization vis-à-vis the Alevi Identity

The Alevis originated from the mystical brotherhood of the Persian Safavis during the 13th century. The name Kızılbaş (red head) referring to those who wore a red rag on their heads was used instead of the term Alevi before the sixteenth century (Çaha: 2004: 327). It is difficult to identify exactly who the Alevis are as there is no single element in terms of political and cultural leanings or in a sense of overall consciousness to which Alevis are supposed to subscribe in Turkey (Kaleli, 2000; Melikoff, 1998).

While certain sets of traditions shape the collective space of Alevi communities, the social relations are complex. Different emphases on characteristics Alevis share generally produced competing descriptions of Alevism. These competing definitions often consider Alevism as a heterodox sect within Islam, as Turkish Anatolian Islam, as a philosophy, as Sufi or Shiite in nature or as a syncretic mixture of elements of Islam, Christianity and Shamanism (Koçan and Öncü, 2004: 473).

Contrary to the commonly held belief, Alevis did not receive any specific privileges during the Republican era. The Alevi identity did not fit to the Republican notion of the 'desired citizen' who can be depicted as ethnically Turkish, religiously Sunni Muslim and secular and westernized (Neyzi, 2004: 8-145). The formation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in 1924 is indicative of the exclusionary attitude of the state towards Alevi citizens.

The Alevis as another segment within 'undesired citizens' encountered discrimination in the nation-building process. In the early years of the Republic, within the framework of secularization policies, dervish lodges (tekke),

and shrines (zaviye) were closed down; religious orders were also banned. These measures impacted negatively not only the Sunnis but also the Alevi.

Alevi faced ethnic, religious and sectarian challenges as a result of homogenization policies. Ethnically and linguistically¹² the majority of Alevi are Turkish speaking and of Turk/Turcoman origin and therefore they have not been exposed to the challenges of ethnic homogenization as much as the Kurmanji and Zazaki speaking Kurdish Alevi of Eastern Anatolia (Köse, 2013: 592). Kurmanji and Zazaki speaking, ethnically Kurdish/Zaza Alevi of Tunceli (Dersim) and Eastern Anatolia had a completely different experience during the project of centralization and ethnic homogenization. The Ağrı rebellions (1926), the Koçgiri (1920–21) and Dersim rebellions (1937–38) were the consequences of serious ethnic/sectarian tensions (Ibid.).

Dersim incident is noteworthy in understanding the degree the homogenization policies reached. In 1937, in Dersim, a mountainous region which was almost an autonomous region with no military posts, police stations, schools, or even roads (Altınay, 2004: 42) and almost predominantly Kurdish and Alevi a rebellion broke out against the centralizing policies implemented by the government. Young men of the region resisted military service. Determined to maintain this status, the people of Dersim remained armed and resistant to any form of governing. On 25 December 1935, a special law 'Law Regarding the Administration of the Tunceli Province' was passed in the Grand National Assembly that would change the administrative structure of the Tunceli province. With this law, the governor of Dersim would be the military commander of the province with powers equivalent to that of ministers in the cabinet. When this law was passed, there was no province under the name of Tunceli. It was two weeks later, on 4 January 1936 that another law would establish the Tunceli Province, in place of the Dersim Province¹³ (Altınay, 2004: 42).

¹²In the eastern province of Kars, there are Alevi communities speaking Azerbaijani Turkish. The Arabic speaking Alevi communities of southern Turkey (especially Hatay and Adana) are ethnically part of Syria's Alawi (Nusayri) community and have no historical ties with the other Alevi groups. The large Alevi groups are the Turkish and Kurdish speakers; both appear to be the descendants of rebellious tribal groups that were religiously affiliated with the Safavids (Van Bruinessen, 1996: 7).

¹³Yeğen (2009) evaluates the change from the Kurdish name Dersim to the state-manufactured Turkish name Tunceli as a sign of the deep 'silencing' of 'the Kurdishness of the Kurdish issue'.

By April 1937, fully developed military operations began including the air raids that Sabiha Gökçen participated. In his speech Prime Minister Ismet İnönü referred to the operation as actions of a special reform program that they had designed for the Tunceli Province. This reform program included, besides the military operations, construction of “roads, schools and military/police outposts” (Kalman, 1995: 269).

The state policies for eliminating ethnic differences had also been exercised in terms of discriminatory attitudes towards the Kurdish citizens.

3.2.3. Homogenization vis-à-vis the Kurdish Identity

It should be emphasized that, the Turkish citizenship has, from the beginning of the Republic, oscillated between an ethnic and a political definition of the nation. Accordingly, the Kurds have been subject to both the assimilationist and discriminatory practices of citizenship, which undoubtedly drew legitimacy from the oscillation in question (Yeğen, 2009: 597).

By 1924 the Turkish Republic began to perceive Kurds as an ethnic community with no group rights. In the eyes of the Turkish state, Kurds had become Turks. There were no more Kurds but simply Turkish citizens. From then on, the state establishment began to identify the Kurdish question in Turkey in this light (Yeğen, 2009: 599). Undoubtedly, in 1924 when a new constitution replaced the 1921 constitution¹⁴ the portrayal of Kurds as an ethnic group with the right to self-rule changed. While the 1924 Constitution still recognized the existence of various ethnic groups in Turkey, it also stated that no special rights of any kind would be granted to these communities (Yeğen, 2009: 599). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt who worked as one of the major ideologues of the Kemalist one-party regime used the term, ‘Kanun Türkü’ (Turks-by-law) to refer to the category covered in Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution which stated that “The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship.” (quoted in Cagaptay, 2006: 15).

¹⁴ The 1921 Constitution echoed the idea of having local autonomy in Turkey. According to this Constitution, local provinces in Turkey were to have full autonomy in local affairs. For the 1921 Constitution see Özbudun, Ergun. (1992). *1921 Anayasası*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Arastırma Merkezi. pp. 43-4, 82-3.

The efforts to define Turkishness and Turkish nationalism began in mid-1920s and became intensified after a series of radical reforms initiated by the new regime which abolished the sultanate and the caliphate. The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 was perhaps the most significant step in giving legitimacy to the new Turkish state on the basis of a national identity. By the late 1930s, the new Turkey was formed as a 'Turkish' state. However it is important to note that, the constitution of the Turkish republican citizenship began much earlier than the establishment of the Turkish Republic and was indeed a European project. It is well known that Turkish citizenship was founded on a racialized and ethnicized form of Turkishness that became prevalent in the late Ottoman Empire and in the early years of Turkish Republic (Kadioğlu, 1999).

The non-Turkish Muslims namely Kurds, as part of the 'undesired citizens' were in a state of transition during this period, from being ethnically recognized as co-founders of the state to becoming 'future Turks' (Yeğen, 2006: 73). In this sense, Recep Peker¹⁵ adopted the rejection of ethno-cultural variations and argued that there had been only one ethnic origin in the national community and it had been of Turkish origin (Yıldız, 2004: 202-203). The instruments implemented with the aim to turkify the Kurds included displacement, denial, military violence, and other assimilation measures.

During the mid- 1920s, Kurds who joined the 1925 rebellion were displaced and settled, together with their families, in the west. Law 1204, enacted in 1927 with the title 'law concerning persons being moved from the east to the west' declared that 1,500 persons and 80 families were to be displaced (cited in Yeğen, 2009: 603).

On the other hand, in terms of instrumentalizing history for ideological purposes, the intelligentsia of the early Republican period used two main arguments to determine the position of the non-Turk elements in the new state. Firstly, all the peoples living in Anatolia were Turks, but due to certain differences in language and religion they were deluded into forgetting their Turkish origins (Maksudyan, 2005:

¹⁵Recep Peker (1888-1950) is known as a strict nationalist who had significant duties during the single-party era. Peker had worked as a major ideologue of the Kemalist one-party regime. Peker also worked as the secretary-general of the RPP between years 1931 and 1936 (Zürcher, 2004: 399).

302). The ideological basis for Turkification was developed through a rewriting of Turkish and Ottoman history in the 1930s. At first a history commission was established under the organization Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) which was founded with the aim of spreading Turkish nationalism. After the closure of Turkish Hearths, a new organization under the name The Society for the Study of Turkish History (Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti); later to be named Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu) was founded.

Besides history writing, language policies were also employed to serve homogenization. Language was seen as the new bond of the nation with the mission of creating a new national identity by growing the national, secular culture among the people (Çolak, 2004: 74). Defining the Turkish language as the founding element in nation-building gave it a crucial role in the Turkification of non-Turkish groups. The goal was the “standardization and generalization of that language to assimilate local dialects and local/ethnic languages”(Ibid: 84). In this sense, in 1932, Turkish Linguistic Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) joined the efforts concentrating on the linguistic aspects of history writing. This society along with Turkish History Society concentrated on the intellectual production of Turkish nationalism in the 1930s (Altınay, 2004: 21).

The Surname Law passed in 1934 was another prominent regulation that assisted in state-led social engineering policies. The Surname Law sought to conceal subordinate identities such as religion, class and sect and to internalize the single national identity. With regard to Kurdish citizens, the Surname Law was a means for the creation of Turkish national identity and an ethnically indistinguishable Turkish citizen.(Aslan, 2009: 4). Within the framework of assimilation policies, the Law of Settlement enacted in 1934 is noteworthy. According to this law, all previous recognition of tribes, chiefs and sheikhs were abrogated, with the automatic sequestration of all immovable properties pertaining to tribes or to their leaders, any kind of association in which the majority was non-Turkish speaking was forbidden (McDowall, 1996: 207).

The policies implemented by the single-party government from the second half of the 1920s until the late 1940s shows the shift from the predominance of Islam in the early 1920s as the constituent element in national identity to ethnic Turkishness from the 1930s onward and this is also reflected in the exclusionary approach to the non-Muslim minorities (Köker, 2010: 55-56). Similarly, the non-Muslim citizens-- Greek Orthodox, Armenians and Jews who have been viewed as minorities in the Lausanne Treaty-- have also been subjected to assimilationist and discriminatory state policies.

3.2.4. Homogenization vis-à-vis the non-Muslim Identity

The Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 regulated the non-Muslim minority rights under articles 37 to 44 (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009). Based on the view that Islam is central to Turkish identity, the Kemalists used a number of strategies to homogenize the identity of the non-Muslim citizens.

The non-Muslims faced the vigorous antipathy of Turkish nationalists as evident in the speeches before the TGNA (Çağaptay, 2006: 28). Indeed, the speech made by Izmir deputy, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt during the talks on the 1921 Constitution illustrates clearly how non-Muslims were perceived by the state elites:

Probably it would not have been right to speak against the Christians in the [Ottoman] Meclis-i Mebusan...[however] I speak as a person who believes that the Christian group does not have any rights in this country. They have abdicated from citizenship of this country, and [they] abdicated from it by their betrayal and by pulling out a gun. They are the ungrateful (nankör) children of Ottoman history and they do not have any rights left in this country. In this country, which defends its rights, they are the spies of the imperialisms and they are the traitorous children of this land, they do not have a place/work in this Assembly (quoted in Bayır, 2010: 81-82).

In order to establish unity, Turkification became the main policy in minority-state relations, particularly during the single-party era (Yıldız, 2004; Aktar, 2004; Bali, 1999). The most important way for achieving cultural unification was the Turkification of minority schools, which in the Ottoman Empire taught the language and culture of the specific minority groups. In the Turkish Republic, these schools would start to Turkify their curriculum according to the directives of the Ministry of Education (Bali, 2006).

In connection with linguistic standardization, the ‘Citizens, speak Turkish!’ (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş) campaign is important. This campaign was constituted during the annual congress of the Faculty of Law Student Association, held on January 13, 1928. According to the statement adopted by the congress: ‘Speaking a language other than Turkish in Turkey means violating Turkish law.’ The campaign started off as a reaction to the mother tongues of non-Muslim minorities; over time its scope expanded. Both non-Muslims and Muslim communities whose mother tongue was not Turkish were obliged to speak Turkish in public places (Çağaptay, 2006: 27).

The book *Türkleştirme* (Turkification) by Jewish businessman Moiz Kohen who changed his name to Tekin Alp covered the language problem in the general framework of nation-building. Tekin Alp treated language as one of the main elements in nation-building. He argued that language had been an important element for the Jewish community to become a part of the Turkish nation (1928: 63-65). Alp argued that not only Jews but all minorities had to be Turkified if they wanted to deserve the status of citizenship.

The Surname law passed in 1934 is noteworthy with regard to non-Muslim citizens too. According to the law, the Greeks would Turkify their names by dropping the ‘-dis’ and ‘-pulos’ suffixes. In addition, most of the Jews would Turkify their names and surnames by finding a Turkish equivalent for each Jewish name (Bali, 1999: 287-288).

It is also important to note that nearly six months prior to the implementation of the Settlement Law in 1934 Anatolian Armenians were subject to a new migration. In early 1934, vast numbers of Armenians, deported from various cities

and rural areas to Istanbul, were settled in Armenian churches and schools and in deserted houses in Yeniköy and Ortaköy (cited in Güven, 2011: 3). In addition, the Thrace Events in 1934 are worthy of consideration while analyzing state attitude towards non-Muslim citizens. The Thrace events commenced with a boycotts of the all Jewish businesses which ultimately proceeded into mass attacks on the Jewish houses and shops, intimidating the Jews to leave Thrace (Aktar, 2004). The Prime Ministry intervened in the incidents, and the local authorities suppressed the anti-Jewish violence restoring order. Moreover, the rightist press organs that provoked the incidents were shut down (Toktaş, 2005: 402).

There were other homogenization policies issued to target non-Muslims such as exercising public pressure on minorities through well known journalists who were also members of the parliament. These journalists indirectly conveyed the expectations of the RPP leadership for the Turkification of minorities in their editorials (Bali, 1999: 530). In addition, the minority communities were criticized for dismantling their centrally structured community organization consequently adding further pressure onto these groups. The most important institutions of the minority communities were the non-profit foundations which operated hospitals, churches, synagogues, and schools. After the Law of Foundations which was accepted in 1935, the General Directorate of Non-Profit Foundations had the authority to designate the director of the minority foundations. This law froze the acquisition of new property, thus weakening the structure of the communities (Bali, 1999: 529).

The state also took some legal measures that ensured the economic assimilation of non-Muslims. An important method used in the Turkification of the economy was the interpretation of the term 'to be a Turk', a term which was used in the clauses of different legislations, such as those establishing the qualifications for being a state employee. In its application, the term 'Turk' was interpreted, not as a nationality but as an ethnical and religious identity. Consequently, non-Muslims were de facto discriminated (Yıldız, 2004). Moreover, non-Muslim minorities have also been systematically excluded from high-ranking governmental positions.

Accordingly, another significant measure to the economic assimilation was the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*) Law of 1942 which had been part of the state's economic Turkification policy since the CUP period. The Wealth Tax aimed to

undermine the pioneering role that non-Muslims had previously held in the economy. When the tax was carried out the non-Muslims were forced to pay ten times more than the Muslims (Öktem, 1987: 34-35).

As seen in the case of the non-Muslim citizens, through homogenizing the identity of certain clusters of society, the elites paved the way for the alienation of the masses. This alienation had been one of the stimulating factors that caused the end of the single-party rule and facilitated the inception of multi-party politics.

3.3.The Multi-Party Era and Afterwards (1946-1983)

The transition to democracy in Turkey unlike the Western European experience was not preceded by organized movements demanding citizenship rights. One of the reasons that stood behind the transition to a multi-party system had been the social unrest witnessed under the single-party rule. After 27 years of single-party rule, the Democrat Party (DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes won the elections in 1950 and this marked the start of multi-party politics in Turkey. After remaining in power for ten years, the DP was ousted by the military on 27 May, 1960.

With the inception of multi-party politics, the DP restructured the features of journalism. Press was one of the major, even the first agent to influence politics. The Turkish Journalists' Association¹⁶ as one of the eminent press organizations of contemporary Turkey was founded in 1946. The Turkish Journalists' Association was founded shortly after the abolition of Turkish Press Union. The efforts conducted with the aim of transforming RPP-affiliated Press Union to a union which works for the journalists within the purpose of creating a free and democratic space for journalism played a major role in the establishment of this association (Yılmaz, 2009: 155).

On 15 July 1950, a liberal press law was adopted, soon followed by a law granting journalists social rights. However, after these developments, legal amendments designed to increase government control over the press and universities

¹⁶ For the web page of the association, visit <http://www.tgc.org.tr/> (08.10.2014)

were adopted. Press organs critical of the government were subjected to censorship. By 1955, court cases against the press had increased (Elmas and Kurban, 2011: 21). The press has often been used as a medium of manipulation. During these years, the press became a tool for ‘manufacturing consent’¹⁷ and monitoring the society.

One of the most significant events of this period were the establishment of the Milliyet (The Nation) newspaper in 1950 and the Hürriyet (the Freedom) newspaper in 1948, which marked the shift from ideological journalism (fikir gazeteciliği) to mass journalism (yığın gazeteciliği) in Turkey (Adaklı, 2006:114; Tılıç, 2009: 100; Topuz, 2003: 183). This conceptualization is to be expounded in the sense that ‘mass’ here does not suggest an independent and apolitical journalism, no matter how much the agency might have claimed to be so. In fact such claims are the result of ‘fetishized apoliticism’ of capitalist journalism (Adaklı, 2006: 125).

The press later gained a new dimension with the populist appeal of mass media. Before then journalism was a limited activity. This structural change in the press reflected the transformation of the political and economic scene of the country under the auspices of the DP rule. Whether this development was favorable for the press activities is a matter of perspective. However, this led to the reinforcement of a ‘traditional journalism families’ until the 1980s (Tılıç, 2009: 101). After the 1954 elections, tough punishments against the journalists followed one another. Indeed, state funds and subsidies were used as significant means of state control (Adaklı, 2006: 107).

Besides putting pressure upon the press, the DP leaned towards other authoritarian policies that led to the 1960 military take-over. There were a variety of reasons behind this coup. In terms of the role of the press, the veteran journalist Orhan Birgit argued that news reports which had stated that some anti-government figures were killed and their remains were put through mincing machines before the 1960 military take-over were fabricated. He said the rumors of minced people were

¹⁷Herman, E. S. and Noam Chomsky. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

first put forward by a colonel. “That was a clear example of misinformation. It was later revealed that the report was prepared upon a military order,” Birgit noted.¹⁸

More importantly, there was a growing feeling in the opposition and in the army that the DP was betraying the Kemalist heritage through its non-secularist tendencies. The DP government which became associated with the resurgence of Islam permitted wider grounds for religious practice and education (Saribay, 1991: 129). Indeed, it was true that the DP tried to court voters of certain religious groups, especially the Nur Movement¹⁹, but the DP leaders’ understanding of secularism was not so different from that of the RPP cadre.

In other respects, in terms of the relationship between the state and the Kurdish citizens, according to Bozarslan; as a consequence of the DP rule, repression on the Kurdish rural elite relatively reduced and tribes and religious sects built clientalist relationships with the ‘center’ by integrating into the political system (Bozarslan, 2003: 850). However, the approach of the state towards the Kurdish citizens became more authoritarian over time. On 17 December 1959, 49 Kurdish intellectuals were arrested on charges of ‘favoring separatism and undermining national unity with the help of foreign countries’. This case was known as ‘The Case of the 49’ (İnce, 2012: 107-108).

During the DP rule state discourse mainly remained unchanged except it adopted a perspective that accepts the Kurdish question as a matter of economic integration. In 1950s, as a consequence of the massive agricultural mechanization, hundreds of thousands of Kurds abandoned the land. They migrated to big-cities and, in McDowall’s words, “joining those who had been resettled during the revolts of 1920s and 1930s, and those whose pastoralism had been deliberately disrupted by the state during 1930s” (McDowall, 1996: 403). As McDowall identified, there were three consequences of these migrations. Firstly, “they tended to live in close proximity with each other, which established permanent strongholds of Kurdish identity across the republic” (McDowall, 1996: 404). Secondly, existence of these

¹⁸“Journalist Birgit confesses to active role in 1960 coup d’etat” http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=240167 (10.07.2013)

¹⁹ The Nur movement centers on the writings of Said Nursi, whose work (the Risale-i Nur) numbers around 6,000 pages. Nurcu can be translated into English as ‘lightist’. Said Nursi (also known as Bediüzzaman, Marvel of Times) was a Kurdish Islamic scholar who spent most of his life in prisons and exile not because of his Kurdish identity but because of his Islamic identity.

communities made the Kurdish question a visible reality outside the east. Lastly, those who migrated to big-cities had to learn Turkish in order to find jobs. As a result of migration to big cities during the 1950s, many Kurds became aware of both the cultural differences between eastern and western Turkey and of highly unequal economic development, and found the opportunity to study and became politicized (Van Bruinessen, 1992: 32).

The 1950s marked critical developments with regard to exposing the state attitude towards the non-Muslim citizens, in particular the September 6-7 events. In 1955, the tension and unrest among the people led to an increase in the riots both in Turkey and in Cyprus. On 2 April, the pro-Greek guerilla group EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) staged a riot in Cyprus (İnce, 2012: 103). In the aftermath of these events, minority leaders in Turkey took a neutral stance. However, there was a claim that the Cypriot minority in Turkey provided financial aid to EOKA. After this, some newspapers published the headlines ‘the devils within us.’ (İnce, 2012: 103). On September 6 1955, Turkish state radio announced that a bomb attack had occurred at the house in Thessalonica where Atatürk was born. On the same day, the pro-government paper, İstanbul Ekspres published the news on the front page. Late in the afternoon on the same day, a public demonstration was organized in Taksim Square by various student associations, unions and the Association of Turkish Cyprus. Following this demonstration, groups started stoning the windows of shops that belonged to non-Muslims. In a short while, clusters of people equipped with tools to destroy houses, shops, schools, and churches rushed into neighborhoods around Taksim that was traditionally known as non-Muslim residential and business districts (Güven, 2011: 4). The non-Muslim citizens have never forgotten what happened in the night of 6 – 7 September. Consequently, the notion of constant threat from Turkey’s ‘internal enemies’ still marginalizes the non-Muslim citizens living in the society, while the state is always willing to construct enemies that “challenge the unity and the principles of Turkism” (Altınay, 2004: 161).

The state’s discriminatory attitude towards non-Muslims citizens continued after the 1971 military intervention. The non-Muslim citizens have faced serious

discrimination, particularly in realizing their religious freedoms such as the education of clergy. Perceived as ‘undesired citizens’, their situation has been partly shaped by Turkey’s foreign relations. The state has adopted the principle of reciprocity vis-à-vis its minorities (Ulusoy, 2011: 418). The situation of the Greek and Armenian minorities deteriorated similarly to the Cyprus problem, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Greece and the assassination of Turkish diplomats by the Armenian terrorist group ASALA (Demirler and Kayhan, 2006). Currently, one of the most discussed issues is the re-opening of the Halki seminary school which was closed after the 1971 military intervention. Turkish officials claim that they follow the principle of reciprocity, meaning that the situation of the Greek minority is tied to the situation of the Muslim minority in Greece.

On the other hand, the 1960s saw the politicization of the Alevi identity. Starting from the early 1960s, Alevi citizens began migrating to big cities. Due to rapid urbanization and modernization, the traditional Alevi identity has begun to transform. This period has also witnessed the establishment of an Alevi political party called Union Party of Turkey. Alevi people affiliated themselves with leftist ideologies during these years. According to Rıza Zelyut (1993: 99-103) Alevi youths’ affiliation with the left-wing trends can be defined as a search of identity. Throughout the late 1970s the political violence could not be eliminated via political or security tools. In 1978, in Kahramanmaraş, more than a hundred Alevis who generally supported leftist parties were massacred in a pogrom organized by the right extremists. On 29 May 1980, in Çorum where many Alevis live, a fight between Alevis and Sunnis took place which was similar to that in 1978. The events brought under control when the military intervened. From 12 September 1980 until the elections in 1983 the country was effectively run by a military junta. The public welcomed the coup hoping that it would put an end to instability and political violence (Burak, 2011: 151).

A crucial development that conflated with the leftist-rightist division was the establishment of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in 1978. It is to be noted that, the 1980 military regime set the PKK on the path to becoming the sole representative of the Kurdish people. The systematic repression and assimilation of the Kurds reached its peak after the 1980 coup. The majority of the Turkish army was based in

the Southeastern region following the coup, with responsibility for the administration of a wide-ranging plan of Turkification during which thousands of Kurds were arrested (McDowall, 1996: 414).

The assimilation of the Kurdish citizens has been legalized in the 1982 constitution. As Gunter identified, two articles of the constitution banned the spoken and written usage of the Kurdish language without specifically naming it. Article 26 of the Constitution reads as

follows: “no language prohibited by law shall be used in expression and dissemination of thought.” Article 28 stated that “publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law.” Additionally, Law No. 2932 published in October 1983 reinforced these constitutional provisions regarding Kurdish language by declaring that “it is forbidden to express, diffuse or publish opinions in any language other than the main official language of states recognized by the Turkish state.” (Gunter, 1997: 9-10).

The junta actively sought to fabricate a new ideology, namely the rightist ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, as a force of social cohesion and as a bulwark against communism. In 1983 a new book on Kemalism was prepared by the General Staff and sent to all state schools as a sourcebook for courses on Kemalism. The book²⁰ represented Atatürk as a practicing Muslim who tried to restore religion to its original state which he argued is compatible with science and rationality (Efe, 2012: 62).

In parallel to that, after the 1980 coup, compulsory religious education was introduced. The 1982 Constitution obliged all schoolchildren, from the fourth grade until graduation from high school, to take the ‘Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge’ courses. Compulsory religious education undermines the principle of ‘equality of opportunities’ because the children of Alevi citizens are forced to take courses based on the Sunni interpretation of Islam which seems to be both illiberal and incompatible with democracy (Burak, 2012: 74). Another development that is unwelcomed by the Alevi citizens is the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs. Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution establishes a Department of

²⁰ Atatürkçülük (Ataturkism). 1984. Milli Eğitim Basımevi.

Religious Affairs within the general administration. The employees of the Department are civil servants, and its funds are appropriated from the administration's budget. The Department is responsible for the regulation of the religious life of all Muslims living within the country. Among other things, the Department of Religious Affairs appoints religious officials, including imams, pays the stipends of religious officials, and directs the administration of more than 70,000 mosques (Burak, 2012: 74).

The abolishment of the Alevi/Bektashi²¹ brotherhoods in 1925 shortly after their Sunni counterparts had a significant effect on Alevi citizens who do not use mosques for worship. Accordingly, many Alevis had felt that their cultural practices and interpretation of Islam had been denied by the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Through building such an institution the content of religion was restructured according to the needs of the Kemalist regime (Köse, 2013: 599).

In summary, it can again be said that, the 1980 military take-over strengthened the authoritarian citizenship understanding. The 1982 constitution which prioritized state over the individual and the institutional and legal regulations increased the victimization of the undesired citizens.

3.4. The Post-1983 Era: Before and After the February 28 Process

After the military regime, only three parties were allowed to take part in the 1983 elections. Turgut Özal, the leader of the Motherland Party (MP) was the triumphant of the elections. Özal himself half-Kurdish opened up new possibilities for the roles of Islam and Ottoman heritage. Özal took courageous step to build new bridges between state, society and religion (Karakas, 2007: 19). Despite the reluctance of the European Union, the Özal government applied to the EU for full membership in 1987.

Under Özal rule, the economy which had so far been dominated by the Kemalist bourgeoisie TÜSİAD²² started to transform. The changing economic

²¹The 'Alevi-Bektashi' is a term used for a large number of different heterodox communities, spread in the Anatolia region, the Balkans and other parts of the world. In Turkey alone, where they number at least 15 million, they are divided by ethnicity (Kurdish, Turkic and Arabic Alevis) and language (speaking Turkish, Kurdish, Kurmanji, Zaza and Arabic) (Ignatow, 2008).

²² TÜSİAD (The Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen's Association) was founded in 1971 by a small group of big business people who had continual close relationships with state authorities.

dynamics caused the strengthening of Anatolian bourgeoisie. The state policies in the post-1980 period has encouraged the development of small and medium scale industries. This change had significant consequences with regard to the relationship between the state and the business class. In this context, MÜSİAD (the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was founded in 1990 to unite the small and medium scale enterprises. Following this, the Islamist actors became more powerful political actors in the 1990s and eventually took over power as of 2002. What has been termed as ‘an explosion’ by some people (e.g. Tılıç, 2009) can also be seen as an inevitable surfacing of Islam in the politics of Turkey again.

It is to be noted that, the rise of Anatolian bourgeoisie paved the way for the religious movements to find a solid ground to construct private schools and universities. The Gülen movement in this context has the opportunity to grow both inside and outside Turkey. The Gülen movement, an effective movement affiliated with Said Nursi and his teachings has been inspired by Fethullah Gülen and is classed as the most influential civil society movement in Turkey today. Gülen who had worked as a state preacher received public attention in Turkey in the 1990s. The movement is involved in a wide range of activities, education being the most important. What makes the Gülen movement distinctive vis-a.-vis other religious movements in Turkey is the accent on educational mobilization, interfaith dialogue and tolerance, and the nationalist tone (Koyuncu- Lorasdağı, 2011: 149). The movement in the words of Gülen has produced a link between tradition and modernity. Additionally it has developed its own organizational model (Ergil, 2012: 15).

Özal embraced the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and incorporated this into state discourse that is; he intensified the junta’s attempts to control practices of Islam. He also did not refrain from publicly stating his views on freedom of religious expression, referring to the ban on the headscarf. The military government had already confronted practicing Muslim citizens over the issue by passing laws and regulations that banned the headscarf in all universities and public places (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 525). Various attempts by the MP members and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) to lift the ban failed as President Evren refused to ratify

the new laws and finally the Constitutional Court annulled them. Since then, the headscarf issue has led to one of Turkey's most important political crises related with the issue of undesired citizenship vis-à-vis the practicing Muslim citizens. The ban on the headscarf can be seen as a reflection of the fierce tension between the 'new and Western' and 'old and backward' symbols in Turkey. Women who choose to cover their heads with scarves are usually blamed for pushing Turkey backwards (Kadıoğlu, 2007: 290).

With regards to journalism, the structural and economic transformation following the 1980 military intervention has also paved the way for the emergence of significant changes. The economic liberalization under the Özal era represented a parallel development to the new right policies of Reaganism and Thatcherism (Adaklı, 2006: 147). While political and social factors mainly shaped the media in the 1980s, economically-driven factors have become the main determinant afterwards. Under Özal rule, the state-run monopolies have been broken up, in line with these developments a new class of intellectuals and journalists who supported Turkey's integration into the Western world emerged. Legal obstacles to political freedom were also removed by abolishing Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the 1982 Constitution, which prohibited the free expression of thought (Çaha, 2001: 40).

On the other hand, the accumulation of capital in the hands of big corporations and the incorporation of media as a tool have made the media significant in shaping politics. Furthermore, with the technological developments and shift to an information-based economy, the prominent media owners in Turkey began to be involved in other businesses. This solidified the mutual dependency and debt between the state and media owners (Tılıç, 2009: 110). The media holdings' organic relationship with the state caused a cross-monopolization²³ in the industry. The result of this change had inevitable consequences for both print and broadcast media. On the press front, there was a rapid tabloidization of newspapers in the 1980s.

²³Cross monopolization refers to the situation where economically strong companies investing in other sectors begin to own media organs (Elmas and Kurban, 2011: 23)

As stated earlier, the relaxation of Kemalist ideology, in general, and the neo-liberal economic policies in particular, created conditions conducive to the strengthening of political Islam. It was this milieu of relative liberalization of the political and economic systems that brought the Welfare Party (WP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan to power. The ideological basis of the WP had been established in the 1960s within the framework of National Outlook Movement.²⁴

The WP whose electoral victory in the 1994 local elections had already alarmed the secularist circles became the main coalition partner in WP-True Path Party (TPP) government after the 1995 elections. The secularists' worries were reinforced when Erbakan made his first official foreign visit to Iran. Erbakan's invitation of several leaders of religious orders (*tarikats*)²⁵ to a fast breaking meal in Ramadan strongly alarmed the Kemalist state elites. During these years, 'secularism is under threat' rhetoric was heavily promoted by some particular media organs.

On 28 February 1997, the National Security Council (NSC) held the longest meeting in its history to propose an ultimatum to the Welfare Party. The government was presented with a list of anti-Islamist measures, ranging from bans on private Quran courses to curbs on the donation of sacrificial animal hides to religious organizations. At the top of the list was the demand for the extension of compulsory education to 8 years. This clearly aimed at removing the intermediate sections of the Imam Hatip schools. It could be said that, during the February 28 Process, Islam's social and economic bases as well as its political actors were fully targeted. A military officer evaluates the cooperation between the media, NGOs and the army in the February 28 Process as follows:

In order not to be far from the axis of secularism in the course of life, an attentive stance towards the significance of this principle must be built **via cooperating with the media** in this regard. And uninterrupted consciousness-raising activities must be continued (quoted in Burak, 2010: 109).

²⁴ The National Outlook Movement is a particular synthesis of religious and non-religious themes and represents an attempt to reconcile traditional Islam and modernism at the political level. In WP's discourse, the backward position of the Muslim world and Turkey was associated with the domination of global Western imperialism, which makes anti-Westernism an integral part of that discourse (Yıldız, 2003: 189).

²⁵ *Tarikat* literally means 'way, path'. The word commonly refers to religious orders in Sufism through which a believer finds the truth, (*hakikat*). All *tarikats* and similar religious orders were banned in 1925.

Following the post-modern coup in 1997, the pressure on the public visibility of the headscarf has increased. In the 1999 elections, two women with headscarves—Nesrin Unal, a representative of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) and Merve Kavakçı, an Istanbul deputy from the pro-Islamic Virtue Party (VP)—won seats in the Turkish parliament, a first-time event in modern Turkish history (Gürbüz, 2009: 240). The Kavakçı Affair can be read as a symbolic event with regard to state attitude towards pious Muslim citizens.

During the 1990s, not only the pious citizens witnessed state discrimination. The Alevi citizens experienced direct violence with the Madımak Incident and Gazi Events. In 1993, 37 citizens, most of whom were Alevi artists and intellectuals died when the Madımak hotel was set on fire by a fundamentalist Sunni extremist. Police forces failed to intervene in time to prevent the catastrophe. In 1995, in the Gazi neighbourhood of Istanbul, wherein the residents of which are predominantly Kurdish–Alevi citizens, three unknown assailants executed a drive-by shooting some coffee houses. Many people gathered around the police station to protest the events. The police responded by shooting at them. Riots spread throughout the neighbourhood. Apart from that, as a positive development in 1997, a total of 128 Alevi associations came together in the First Ehlibeyt General Meeting. The then President Süleyman Demirel for the first time invited an Alevi dede²⁶ to the Çankaya Palace. Around the same time, the WP accepted an Alevi dede into its ranks in a ceremony (İnce, 2012: 153).

In 1999, when Turkey became a candidate country for the European Union (EU) the state started to abandon its longstanding assimilationist strategy in terms of Kurdish citizens. It is also true that even before the EU integration process, some statesmen, including Mesut Yılmaz, Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller and Erdal İnönü, had attempted to recognize the Kurdish reality and presented some alternative approaches and projects aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. Nonetheless, it was the EU integration process that forced the Turkish state to change

²⁶ Dede in Alevi tradition is not only a person who manages the religious rituals, but is also the source of knowledge as well as an intellectual leader. Dedes are mainly treated as the ‘legged libraries’. Alevi groups have traditionally been used to organize around the figure of Dedes (Çaha, 2004: 334).

its attitude towards the Kurdish issue. In addition, the capture of Öcalan, the leader of the PKK has also changed the state attitude towards the Kurdish issue.

The 1999 elections in Turkey paved the way for the emergence of an unstable coalition government. The political instability and the outbreak of an economic crisis in 2001 led a large portion of the electorate vote for the newly-founded Justice and Development Party.

3.5.The Justice and Development Party Era

One of the important consequences of the February 28 Process has been the ideological split among the Islamist ranks. The group that called themselves ‘innovationists’ (yenilikçiler) established the Justice and Development Party (JDP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in 2001, while the ‘traditionalists’ (gelenekçiler) organized under the name of the Felicity Party.

After 2002 elections, the JDP came to power. After 2007 elections, the JDP has managed to consolidate her power. The party has taken concrete steps in strengthening Turkish democracy in the early years of office. However, there are doubts about the future of democratic governance among some circles. Şerif Mardin termed the allegedly stated rising conservatism in everyday life as ‘neighborhood pressure’ (Çakır, 2008). The claim that Turkey has been turning into a more conservative country has found its strongest manifestation in a series of explicit crises. The crisis during the presidential elections in 2007 was the most explicit one. The military’s commitment to Kemalist principles and to secularism against the so-called Islamist threat paved the way for the issuance of an e-memorandum²⁷. The presidency in Turkey stands as a symbol of Kemalist legacy and historically the president was elected from among retired Generals until the presidency of Turgut Özal. When the JDP’s candidate Abdullah Gül whose wife wears a headscarf became

²⁷ “In the memorandum the high command issued on 27 April 2007, the expression that the Turkish Armed Forces is a ‘side’ in the debate over secularism is a reiteration of the Army’s wish to be openly involved in choosing a candidate for president as an apolitical duty.” (Cizre, 2008: 152).

a candidate for the presidency, this alarmed the military which issued a mid-night memorandum via internet.

Another challenging factor to JDP rule was the indictment case in 2008. On March 14 2008 the Republican Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya, submitted an indictment case against the JDP, which was charged with attempting to undermine the principle of secularism. In the background of this closure case were the crisis of presidential elections and attempts to lift the ban on veiling in universities. On 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court decided that the JDP would not be banned; however, it got deprived of half of the fund it received from the state.

The JDP government in her early years of office took important steps to liberalize state-society relations which led to a considerable amount of erosion in the authoritarian citizenship practices. The Kurdish opening and the Alevi opening are among these steps. Within the framework of the Alevi opening a number of workshops were held to tackle the Alevi citizens' problems. For instance, the motto of the 2008 Alevi meeting was 'equal citizenship rights under the rule of law'. Many Alevi associations at those meeting formulated their struggle as that for further democratization (Köse, 2010: 149). The Alevi opening initiative can be seen as the first systematic effort dealing with identity-based discontents of the Alevis. This step is also part of the broader policy of 'democratic opening' which intends to address the problems of the undesired citizens in Turkey. Through this process, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, state authorities have acknowledged the traumatic experiences of Alevis (Köse, 2010: 146).

The transformation of state attitude towards Alevi citizens is also obvious in the speeches of political elites. Concerning the killings in Dersim in 1937, Prime Minister Erdoğan, on November 22, 2011 said the following "If there is need for an apology on behalf of the state, if there is such a practice in the books, I would apologise and I do (...) Dersim is the most tragic event in our recent history. It is a disaster that should now be questioned with courage." (Ayata and Hakyemez, 2013).

With regard to the relatively changing state practices towards the Kurdish citizens, one of the most important steps taken is the establishment of a state-run Kurdish television channel, TRT 6 in 2009. Moreover, the Higher Education Council (YÖK) has resolved to establish Kurdish language and literature departments in universities (Yeğen, 2009: 615). It is noteworthy to state that the Ergenekon²⁸ case which refers to a legal process in which high-ranking generals, many retired military officers, university rectors and some public figures were arrested and charged in 2008 with attempting to overthrow the JDP government by a military coup is also very important for paving the way to the implementation of Kurdish opening. According to Yeğen (2009: 604) Ergenekon case had an influence on the decrease in nationalist-militarist methods in dealing with the Kurdish issue.

On the other hand, the non-Muslim minorities who have been commonly perceived as the “abnormal elements endangering the purity of the nation” or “the pre-modern reminiscent of a forgotten past” (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010: 198) have been treated in a more equal manner during the JDP rule through some policies such as granting place of worship status to existing churches and synagogues in 2003. Moreover, the Higher Council of Minorities, monitoring the activities of non-Muslim citizens were abolished in 2004. A Protestant church was opened with legal recognition for the first time in 2006. However, it is to be noted that 2006 and 2007 were not promising years for the non-Muslim citizens. For example, Father Andrea Santoro was murdered in February 2006 inside the church in the Black Sea city of Trabzon. In the same year, Hrant Dink a Turkish citizen of Armenian origin was sentenced to six months in jail for insulting Turkishness, later Dink was assassinated on January 19 2007 (cited in İnce: 2012, 163). Three months after the murder of Dink, another murder took place in Malatya. On April 18 2007, three members of a Protestant church were killed in the office of a company that publishes books on Christianity.

On the other hand, as a positive development, through a parliamentary amendment in 2008, churches and synagogues were allowed to use electricity and

²⁸In consequence of the Ergenekon trial, it was concluded that “there is an ‘Ergenekon’ named organization in Turkey, it has the feature of ‘armed terrorist organization’ and this organization meant ‘deep state.’” (<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/309534--turkey-declares-ergenekon-a-terrorist-organization> , 20.08.2014)

water free of charge as places of worship, in a similar way to mosques (Ulusoy, 2011: 419). Moreover, the JDP government enacted a considerable reform by enacting a new Code of Foundations on February 2008 as part of the EU integration process. Foundations gained rights to buy new property, use their property and register their already-owned property (cited in Karaosmanoğlu, 2010: 201). In addition, in 2010 the government furthered its efforts through two symbolic gestures: the celebration of the Divine Liturgy of the Dormition of Theotokos at the Soumela monastery in the Black Sea province of Trabzon after almost nine decades, and the realization of the first religious service since 1915 at the Armenian Holy Church on the Akhdamar island in Lake Van (cited in Ulusoy, 2011: 419).

As a matter of fact, the democratization package²⁹ announced in September 2013 led to the emergence of a considerable degree of positive development vis-à-vis the undesired citizens. The pious, Kurdish, Alevi and non-Muslim citizens have found the opportunity to raise their voices for equal treatment. However this development was not positive enough to challenge the official ideology and hegemonic media discourse, i.e. that is Kemalist media outlets. From this standpoint, one of the objectives of the next chapter will be an attempt to analyze the Turkish print media landscape.

²⁹“What does Erdoğan’s democratization package offer Kurds, minorities?” <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/democratization-package-kurds-turkey-minorities.html> (16.07.2013)

CHAPTER FOUR

MEDIA DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY AND TURKISH PRINT MEDIA

The objective of this chapter is two-fold. The first is to shed light upon the role of the media discourse in the discursive (re)production of ideologies. Within this framework, the role of the media in democratic countries will also be analyzed. Second, a historical overview of Turkish print media in general and the *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* newspapers in particular will be provided.

Bourdieu argues that, the power of the words lies not in their intrinsic qualities but in the belief that they are uttered by authorized spokespersons (Bourdieu, 1991: 170). The media serve a complex role; their role is believed to be so central in framing issues for the public. They are also, to quote Gurevitch and Levy (1985: 19), “a site on which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the definition and construction of social reality.” In this sense, media discourse plays a key role in shaping power configurations in a society.

4.1. Power, Ideology and Media Discourse

Montgomery (1995: 251) argues that “language informs the way we think, the way we experience, and the way we interact with each other.” Language use cannot be seen as merely reflecting the reality, but as central to creating reality. The words are never neutral, they carry the power that reflects the interests of those who speak or write. “Language is not an isolated phenomenon; language is deeply social, intertwined with social processes and interaction.” (Wodak, 1999: 186). Habermas claims that language is a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power (cited in Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10).

Neil Thompson (2003: 37) argues that “language is not simply the ability to use words”; it “refers to the complex array of interlocking relationships which form the basis of communication and social interaction.” Particularly, the language of the

mass media is scrutinized as a site of struggle and also as a site where language is apparently transparent.

On the other hand, definitions of the term 'discourse' are numerous and generally vague. Most of the time, Foucault is regarded as the point of reference in understanding what discourse is. To him discourse is a specific form of the production of knowledge, especially the knowledge systems that constitute various sciences (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 261). For Foucault (1979) discourses are knowledge systems of the human sciences such as economics or linguistics that ultimately constitute power in modern society. Foucault puts emphasis upon power struggle over the determination of discursive practices. According to Foucault (1984: 110) "Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized." Accordingly, media discourse is interesting because the nature of the power relations enacted in it is generally not clear.

In line to that, discourse is to be seen as a form of social practice, always determined by values and social norms, and social practices, and always delimited and influenced by power structures and historical processes (Wodak, 1995). Discursive practices may have major ideological effects, that they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between for example women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).

An account of ideology is an indispensable part of media studies while exploring how media discourse in general and news discourse in particular both reproduce and contest the existent power relations. Ideology for Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is regarded as an important means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations. CDA takes a particular interest in the ways through which language mediates ideology.

"Nobody," says Terry Eagleton, "has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology." (Eagleton, 1991: 1). However, scholars generally agree on the social nature of ideology, it is about social relations, and power struggle. The term 'ideology' refers to attitudes, set of beliefs, and values with reference to

political, social and economic life, which shape the individual's perception through which reality is constructed. It is mainly in discourse that ideologies are transmitted.

Althusser's conception of ideology is important while analyzing how ideology is reproduced through discourse. Althusser's development of the concept of ideology differs from the traditional Marxist understanding of ideology as false consciousness. Althusser sees ideology as a system of representations that masks our true relations to one another in society by constructing imaginary relationships between people (Althusser, 1971: 162). Thus ideology is a distorted recognition of the real social relations. For Althusser, all aspects of the social are controlled by ideology, which functions through 'the repressive state apparatus' (e.g. the police) and 'the ideological state apparatus' (e.g. the mass media). (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 15). Ideology can also be seen as a channel by which the ruling group tries to deceive and control the ruled. In the words of J.B. Thompson (1984: 4) ideology is "linked to the process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power—to maintain domination... by disguising, legitimating, or distorting those relations."

Van Dijk (2001a: 13) states that ideologies often appear in polarized thought, opinions, or discourses where prejudice is evident through a positive representation of the self (the in-group; 'Us') and a simultaneous negative representation of the other (the out-group; 'Them'). The dominant ideology shapes the production of media discourse and this explains why the media can be expected to function as agents of justification. Concerning media and its role in the reproduction of dominant ideology, reflecting on Gramsci Nuran Yıldız (2007: 67) writes:

In the modern state, the source of submission, obedience and acceptance comes not from the of fear produced by violence and force, but through consent that comes from persuasion. And this consent is produced through oral, visual, and written means.

According to Gramscian perspective, ideology often works through common sense. Gramsci outlines the main characteristics of common sense as the conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is developed.

Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space (Gramsci, 1971: 419). Following this, it can be said that the media play the role of maintaining the dominant ideology through creating some sort of common sense.

The news in the media as a specific type of media discourse does not reflect merely reality, hence, it should be noted that the news discourse is not a means to an end, i.e. delivering information. News reporting is socially created; therefore the events that are reported are not a reflection of their importance but reveal the operation of an artificial set of criteria for selection depending on the ideology of the news reporter (Fowler, 1991).

With the work of Habermas (1989) the emergence of the newspaper has been treated as a central institution of the public sphere and democratic discourse. Nevertheless, the newspapers represent the news often in a way that intends to guide the ideological stance of the reader. Newspapers also contribute to the reproduction or legitimization of power of elites and reproduce the attitudes of the powerful (Fowler, 1991: 23). Fowler notes that all news is inevitably mediated and news medium cannot be completely neutral or unbiased:

Anything that is said or written about the world is articulated from a particular ideological position: Language is not a clear window, but a refracting, structuring medium. If we can acknowledge this as a positive, productive principle, we can show by analysis how it operates in texts (Fowler, 1991: 10).

In order to reproduce the dominant ideology media representations may involve stereotyping, discrimination or exclusion. Media from time to time may enact symbolic violence involving the use of derogatory vocabulary, vilification, dehumanizing phrases, abusive words or marked expressions. Pierre Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as a situation when “one class dominates another by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber’s term to the ‘domestication of the dominated’” (Bourdieu, 1991: 167). Through using particular linguistic devices and discursive strategies, the positive self-representation and negative other-representation are employed in the enactment of symbolic violence.

On the other hand, a brief conceptual analysis of power is essential for understanding the role of news discourse in the reproduction of unequal power relations. Media representations cannot be adequately analyzed without a conception of power. It can be said that language expresses power, indexes power, is involved where there is contention over and a challenge to power (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 10).

Different types of power may be distinguished. The coercive power is based on force, the persuasive power of professors or journalists may be based on knowledge, information or authority. Dominated groups may more or less resist, accept, condone, comply with or legitimate such power, and even find it 'natural' (Van Dijk, 2001b: 355). Indeed, the power of dominant groups may be integrated in rules, norms, laws, habits and even a general consensus, and thus take the form of what Gramsci called 'hegemony' (Gramsci, 1971). Sexism, racism and class domination are characteristic examples of such hegemony. Hegemony depends on a combination of force and consent but it is more effective when consent is obtained through the unquestioned acceptance of ideology by the governed. Hegemony is related with the mechanisms and processes by which knowledge and beliefs are produced, and disseminated in order to maintain the rule of the elite by gaining the consent of the masses (Fontana, 2005: 98).

It is to be noted that, the act of representation through the media cannot be exempt from struggle. The media can be used as an instrument for (re)producing the hegemonic discourse. Torfing (1999: 220) writes that a hegemonic discourse "establishes a truth regime that defines what can be considered true and false and a value regime that provides criteria for judging what is good and bad."

Stuart Hall has analyzed how media institutions fit into the conception of hegemony. According to Hall the mass media are one of the principal sites where the cultural leadership, in other words hegemony is exercised. Media are involved in what Hall calls 'the politics of signification', in which the media produce images of the world that give events particular meanings. These images do not simply reflect the world, they re-present it. As Hall (1982: 64) writes "Representation is a very different notion from that of reflection. It implies the active work of selecting and

presenting, of structuring and shaping; not merely the transmitting of an already existing meaning, but the more active labor of making things mean.” The media representations are intertwined with questions of ideology and power because the process of giving meaning to events reveals that, there are multiple definitions of reality. Media have, as Hall (1982: 69) says, “the power to signify events in a particular way.”

On the other hand, Foucault’s approach to power is useful in analyzing power/knowledge relationship with regard to media discourse. After the publication of *The Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault became interested in the relationship between power and knowledge. For Foucault: “power and knowledge directly imply one another (...) there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” (quoted in Oberhuber, 2008: 277). Power, in Foucault’s view, is inseparable from knowledge:

No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, accumulation and displacement which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is not knowledge on one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the fundamental forms of knowledge/power. (quoted in Sheridan, 1980: 283)

The Foucauldian notion of power argues that ‘power is everywhere’, embodied and diffused in discourse, knowledge and ‘regimes of truth’ (Rabinow, 1991). For Foucault power should not be understood as exclusively oppressive but as productive which constitutes discourse and knowledge along with subjectivities (Jorgensen and Philips, 2002: 13). Foucault sees power as a technique. Foucault argues that power is diffuse rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive (Gaventa, 2003: 1). This form

of power for him categorizes the individual and attaches him to his own identity. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects.

Power in modern societies is persuasive and manipulative rather than coercive such as the explicit issuing of commands, threats or economic sanctions. In this regard, media discourse plays a crucial role in 'manufacturing consent' (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). In their book *Manufacturing Consent - The Political Economy of the Mass Media* Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky introduced their 'propaganda model' of the media. According to the propaganda model, there are five groups of filters which determine what is news-worthy; in other words, what gets printed in newspapers or broadcast by television and radio. Herman and Chomsky's model also explains how dissent from the mainstream is given little, or no coverage, while political elites and the big business circles gain easy access to the public through media coverage.

Media power is generally symbolic and persuasive, in the sense that the media primarily have the potential to control to some extent the minds of the audience (Van Dijk, 1996: 10). An important notion in the analysis of media power is that of access. Access to discourse and communicative events may take a variety of forms. More powerful actors may control discourse by setting or selecting time and place, participants, audiences, agendas, and choice of language (Ibid: 12). In this sense, it could be said in a similar way to the argument of Chomsky and Herman (1988) that the views of the powerful are expressed more frequently in the media and they are represented as the primary sources in many cases (Fairclough, 1995: 2,5,40,55; Fowler, 1991: 105,109). In line to that, Herman and Chomsky (1988: xi) adhere to the view that mass media are instruments of power that "mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity." The misrepresentation and underrepresentation of the economically weak and/ or minority groups can be seen as a threat to democracy and liberties.

4.2. The Role of the Media in Democratic Countries

Democratic countries are defined by a commitment to rule by the people, limited government and representative political institutions. Democracy is a demanding system, not just a mechanical condition like majority rule taken in isolation (Sen, 1999: 7). Democracy requires the active participation of citizens. In this sense, the media should keep citizens engaged in the business of governance by informing, educating and mobilizing the public. In a democratic society, the media aim at informing the citizens about processes of taking decisions and making them conscious to provide their active participation in policy-making processes.

The role of the media for a functioning democracy has been emphasized centuries ago when the 17th century Enlightenment theorists had argued that openness provide the best protection against tyranny. The French political philosopher Montesquieu prescribed openness as the cure for the abuse of power. The English and American thinkers later in that century would agree with Montesquieu, recognizing the importance of the press in making officials aware of the public's discontents (Holmes, 1991: 21-65). According to this understanding, the press has been widely proclaimed as the 'Fourth Estate' as a mechanism that provides the check and balance without which governments cannot be effective. In addition to that, the press has been regarded as an important instrument that educates and informs citizens. The press creates in Habermas' (1989) words, public spheres which not only provide information but which also serves emancipation. On the contrary, Althusser rejects such an emancipatory role of media. Althusser maintains that in capitalist systems, freedom is an ideological creation serving the interests of the elites.

The analysis of the role of communication in a society is key to understand how a free press contributes to democracy. According to Lasswell (1948: 51) communication has the triple role of surveillance of the environment, the correlation of the components of society in providing response to the environment and transmission of the social inheritance.

Related to the role of media in a democratic society John Keane (1991) claims that market liberalism has a negative impact on the quality of democracy. Keane summarized his argument about market liberalism in the mass media sector stating that “time has long passed when it could be assumed credibly that market competition guarantees freedom of communication.” (Keane, 1991: 88-89).

Patrick H. O’Neil who constituted a theoretical framework for the analysis of the relationship between the mass media and the process of political transition and democratization argues that the contribution of the media to democratization depends on “the form of and the function of media in a given society, shaped by cultural, socio-economic and political factors.” (O’Neil, 1998: 7).

Gurevitch and Blumler (1990) present a variety of democratic functions that the media perform. These functions include surveillance of sociopolitical developments, providing a platform for debate across a diverse range of views, identifying the most relevant issues, and providing incentives for citizens to learn and become involved in the political process. In a similar vein, Wilbur Schramm (1964: 42-44) says that the newspapers under a democracy have three fundamental functions. They act as a watchman (guarding the public interest by disseminating news), as a policy shaper (introducing ideas and channeling debates), and as a teacher (providing opinions and information)

The media shapes public opinion through agenda-setting, priming and framing. The news media as an agenda-setter provides information about social problems and thereby channels citizens’ concerns to decision-makers in the government. “Media frames” Gitlin (1980:7) states, “largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports.” Framing refers to the frame of reference within which an issue is described. Apart from that, priming refers to the fact that one piece of media information can influence how we interpret subsequent pieces of information by making us tune in to certain areas of thought (Fog, 2004: 12-13).

There are three potential ways through which media can affect values and political development: by shaping the public values and preferences; by reflecting elite thinking; and by serving as a site for the formation (change or maintenance) of elite thinking (Somer, 2010: 558). Elites in particular can put pressure on the media and control media discourse by using their political power. They may also attempt to restrict freedom of press by using the label ‘reasons of national security’. In addition, they may put financial pressure on media companies. This kind of restriction can be observed in generally democratically-weak countries.

On the other hand, it is argued that the commercial media which operates according to the commercial rules and dependent on the ads for its income (Schiller, 1993: 40) has become an antidemocratic force supporting the status quo as a result of being controlled by a few multinational conglomerates. It has been argued that the mass media via its commercialization has not served public interest as it should do in a democratic society (Curran, 2002: 221). It is emphasized that people’s opinions are always shaped by commercial media institutions, which usually further the interests of the elites.

4.3.An Overview of Turkish Print Media

The establishment of the print media in Turkey goes back to the Ottoman times. In both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, journalists played a crucial role in the introduction of Western values to society.

According to Ragıp Duran, Turkish media lean on the military elites and the big capital owners. In this sense, one of the most important characteristics of the Turkish media has been its reliance on power. It has always been close to the political-ideological-military power holders. It has always been against the weak. This is also the same for the international arena; it has advocated the most powerful state. Turkish media do not represent the Turkish society, the Turkish media represents the Turkish sovereign class. It is the spokesman of the minority. (Duran, 2003: 71).

In the post-1980 era, with the introduction of free-market economy, the private-run media organs have begun to challenge the official discourse. As a result of the liberalization measures which were introduced in the 1980s, Turkey's media scene if not qualitatively, in quantitative terms has greatly expanded (Sezgin and Wall, 2005: 789). Within the context of these changes, the press has become an important tool, not just for political actors but for corporate owners.

The Doğan Group³⁰, which owns important newspapers like the Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, and boulevard daily Posta along with numerous other publications, several publishing houses, and TV channels (CNN Türk, Kanal D, Star TV), and radio stations is the largest group in Turkish media landscape. On 14 February 2002, the Economist introduced Aydın Doğan to its readers as the 'Turkish Rupert Murdoch' (Efe, 2012: 62). Established in 1980, the Doğan Media Group is the only media group achieved fully vertical and horizontal integration in Turkey. Doğan Media Group has a great market share in every area of media sector (Adaklı, 2006: 264).

The Feza Media Group owns the Zaman newspaper. Among the national dailies, according to their average weekly sales³¹ Zaman (643.901), Posta (401.529), Hürriyet (360.150) are the major ones. In 1994, the Feza Group also launched its own news agency, Cihan, and weekly magazine Aksiyon. Feza has a partnership agreement with the Samanyolu Group. Both groups are affiliated with the Gülen movement.

On the other hand, despite the improvements in printing technology and presentation of newspapers, overall readership of newspapers had stagnated until the mid 1980s. In fact, people have never been avid readers in Turkey. Favorable demographic factors such as high population growth, and urbanization rates did not change this situation. Nevertheless, during the second half of the 1980s, a noticeable increase was realized (Kaya and Çakmur, 2011: 525).

³⁰ The Doğan Group runs her activities in a variety of sectors. The trade, tourism, industry, finance, energy and media sectors are among these sectors.

³¹ For the weekly sales for November 17 and 23, 2014 <http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj> (24.12.2013)

It should also be noted that, in Turkish media scene, the pro-government entrepreneurs experienced a certain degree of opportunity under the JDP rule. This caused voicing criticisms against the government among the Doğan Media Group outlets. In September 2009 the Doğan Media Group was accused of tax dodging and charged with a fine of \$2.5 billion. Despite statements from the government that this was only a matter of tax punishment, there were concerns that the government was trying to oppress the press³².

Indeed, generally-speaking, the institutional and legal arrangements in Turkey have not paved the way for the emergence of a plural and liberal environment for journalists. It should also be noted that, through the 1990s Turkey was criticized by several human-rights organizations for imprisoning journalists. With Turkey's official candidacy to the EU in 1999 and with a new legislation in line with the EU requirements, press restrictions have been lifted partly.

4.3.1. The Hürriyet Newspaper

'Hürriyet' literally means freedom. In 1860s, Namık Kemal along with Ziya Paşa published a paper against the monarchy called Hürriyet. In 1948 Sedat Simavi released his last medium patent (imtiyaz) with the same name though there is no institutional relationship with the former newspaper (Özerkan, 2009: 54).

Sedat Simavi stated that the power of Hürriyet derives from her own economic resources that is why they do not have any fear that they can worry someone as well as having no need to please anyone else.³³ In 1994, Aydın Doğan bought Hürriyet newspaper (Tılıç, 2009: 254). In a column titled, 'Hurriyet is Different, Hürriyet is Big' Ertuğrul Özkök declared that Hürriyet will walk her path with the Doğan Group from then on and Hürriyet will keep on being a big and influential newspaper.³⁴

Ertuğrul Özkök who is still working as one of the leading columnists of the newspaper had been the editor-in-chief between the years 1989-2009. After Özkök, Enis Berberoğlu has worked as the chief editor for five years. Currently, Sedat Ergin

³²See for example "Dogan v.s. Erdogan Turkey's biggest media group gets a colossal tax fine" <http://www.economist.com/node/14419403> (27.08.2013)

³³The Hürriyet Newspaper, May 1, 1948.

³⁴ The Hürriyet Newspaper, July, 1, 1994.

is the chief editor. Sedat Ergin became the chief editor of Hürriyet in August 2014. Before, respectively, Nezih Demirkent, Çetin Emeç and Ertuğrul Özkök have been the most influential chief editors of Hürriyet.

Hürriyet is one of the biggest mainstream quality broadsheet newspapers with a circulation near to 500,000 copies per day.³⁵ The conceptualization of ‘admiral ship’ can be seen as a metaphor which emphasizes the pivotal role that the newspaper has in Turkish politics. A book published for the 50th anniversary of the newspaper was named as the ‘log book of the admiral ship’. Taha Akyol who started writing for Hürriyet in 2011 used this metaphor of ‘admiral ship’ in his first column. The title of Akyol’s column was ‘At Admiral Ship’ which revealed how glad Akyol was to write for the admiral ship of Turkish press.³⁶

Hürriyet has developed its own evolution in parallel to the development of the politics and economy of Turkey. Hürriyet³⁷ was also the first newspaper through which technological developments were introduced to Turkish print media. When two correspondents of the newspaper went to the London Olympics in August 1948, it was the first time that Turkish readers saw the news of Olympics so quickly and with so many lively pictures (Özerkan, 2009: 56). As has been mentioned earlier in this study, together with Milliyet which was bought by Aydın Doğan in 1979, Hürriyet marked the shift from ideological journalism to mass journalism in Turkey.

According to Tunç (2010: 646), “Hürriyetas the flagship newspaper of the DMG follows a strongly nationalistic, pro-army, secularist editorial line mostly through the writings of its columnists.” Although the newspaper did not take a clear stance towards any political group within the transition process to multiparty system, it did not compromise from its ‘nationalistic’ flavor during the Cyprus crisis of the time (Efe, 2012: 81).

³⁵The exact number was 353.177 (<http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj>) (circulation between November 3 and November 9 2014, Accessed on 17.11.2014)

³⁶ “Amiral Gemisinde” <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/18903157.asp> (15.10.2014)

³⁷ On the web page of Hürriyet it says : “As part of the globalization and changing journalism approach and Hürriyet’s ‘continuous interaction with readers and stakeholders in every platform’ attitude, Hürriyet is now proud to receive 6.8 million visits every day in 65th year of its history through its newspaper, web, tablet and mobile channels.” <http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/Default.aspx?lg=ENG> (19.08.2013).

It has been argued that Hürriyet is the newspaper of the state establishment. Indeed, Aydın Doğan in an interview has supported such an argument. Related with this, Doğan said that: “Milliyet is a bit left-orientated, whereas Hürriyet is rather a state newspaper”³⁸ Accordingly, Mehmet Ali Birand (1941-2013) a renowned journalist who had worked as a columnist for the Doğan Media Group newspapers for several years had also supported the view that Hürriyet belongs to state establishment. Birand said the following: “While saying that it is a state newspaper, I do not mean that it is bought by the state elites. But it is the State. It does anything for the State. Hürriyet is a newspaper which works for the state. Whatever it takes, it always works for the state.” (quoted in Özkır, 2013: 60).

The argument stating that Hürriyet belongs to state establishment is also vocalized by Dinç Bilgin who had been one of the important media bosses of Turkey. Dinç Bilgin after leaving the media sector has implicitly and explicitly stated that Hürriyet and the military elites have a close relationship (cited in Özkır, 2013: 61). One of the members of the 1960 coup government, Orhan Erkanlı, highlighted that they had in particular followed Ulus newspaper and Akis journal, both of which were known for their opposition to the DP government and for their support of a possible military takeover. Later years, Erkanlı became the chief editor of Hürriyet from 1968 to the early 1970s. This can also be viewed as an indicator of the depth of the relationship between the Hürriyet and the military (Özkır, 2011: 95).

The below figure is the cover page after the 27 May 1960 coup d'état. Despite some exceptional commentaries and columns, the editorial content of the Hürriyet during and after each coup legitimized the army's intervention into politics (Özerkan, 2009: 65). Some of the headlines during the 1971 military rule exemplify this stance: ‘People applauded the commanders’, (Halk Komutanları Alkışladı) ‘The Commanders received news of a counter-communist coup’ (Komutanlar Komünist Darbe İhbarı Almışlardı) (Efe, 2012: 82). However, it should be stated that, Turkish EU membership process has also been supported by the newspaper. The paper announced the 1963 Ankara Agreement from the headline.

³⁸ For the interview, <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/09/10/roportaj/> (19.08.2013).



Figure 1.1 Hürriyet Cover Page Of 27 May 1960

(The Headline Translates: The Turkish Army Is On Duty, Our Armed Forces Took De Facto Control Of The Whole Country)



Figure 1.2 The Logo and Slogan of Hürriyet

The slogan next to the logo of the newspaper which reads ‘Türkiye Türklerindir’ (Turkey belongs to Turks) has been used since 1950. This slogan is seen as racist and is heavily criticized by some circles³⁹. Aydın Doğan as the owner of the newspaper states that the main policy of Hürriyet is to protect the indivisible

³⁹ One of the leading figures Sırrı Sakık in the Peace and Democracy Party argued that the slogan of Hürriyet is rather racist and monist. He recommended that the newspaper should turn her slogan into “Turkey belongs to the peoples of Turkey” <http://www.gazeteciler.com/gundem/bdp-hurriyete-yeni-bir-slogan-onerdi-63269h.html> (15.08.2014)

character of the country as well as protecting the primary principles of the Republic (cited in Özkır, 2013: 59).

The Hürriyet newspaper has played a pioneering role in transmitting the Kemalist worldview to the masses through promoting a Western-oriented life-style. This promotion is evident in both the editorial content and the advertisements of the paper. For example, there are many alcohol beverages in the advertisements. Accordingly, it can be said that the newspaper has strictly defended that the Kemalist revolutions must not be abused by politicians (Topuz, 2003: 214). With its English sister, the Hürriyet Daily News, the Hürriyet newspaper has always played an influential role in setting the agenda on many issues in Turkey.

4.3.2. The Zaman Newspaper

‘Zaman’ means time in Turkish. Previously, there had been other newspapers called Zaman, however none of them were related with the Zaman newspaper which is under scrutiny in this study. Hıfzı Topuz in his seminal book *The History of Turkish Press* puts Zaman newspaper under the category of conservative and Islamist press and defines it as ‘Fethullahçı’ (Topuz, 2003: 411).

The Zaman newspaper is known to be affiliated with the Gülen Movement. However, according to Ekrem Dumanlı, who has been the chief editor of the newspaper since 2001 it cannot be defined as ‘Fethullahçı’ because the columnists writing for Zaman have rather different worldviews and ideological orientations. In an interview⁴⁰ made with Ekrem Dumanlı, Zaman cannot be treated as the press of ‘Fethullahçı’ people just because they have love and respect towards Fethullah Gülen.⁴¹ Yumul and Özkırımlı categorize Zaman together with the Türkiye and

⁴⁰Interview made on July 9, 2006. <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4720687> (03.09.2013)

⁴¹ Fethullah Gülen who lives in the United States where he originally travelled due to health problems in 1999 was born in Erzurum, Turkey in 1938. Before and after mandatory military service he worked as an imam and preacher for a total of four years. From 1969 to 1971 he travelled to different cities and towns giving religious sermons and providing religious education. In his teachings and suggestions he always underlined that the global and the local did not contradict each other. Gülen thinks that a mature society consists of citizens who ask questions and search for answers. Said Nursi and the Risale-i Nur Collection had a great impact on Gülen. The Gülen movement according to Gülen has produced a link between tradition and modernity. A common

Yenişafak newspapers as representing moderate Islam (Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000: 793).

Starting with Turgut Özal's tenure between 1982 and 1991, the religious communities came to realize the power of the media. The emergence of conservative media organs in general and the Zaman newspaper in particular can be seen as a consequence of the strengthening of Islamist actors after the 1980 military intervention and their ascendance to power in the mid-1990s (Özerkan, 2009: 137). The steady increase in the circulation figure of the Zaman newspaper actually bears a parallel to the development of the role of conservative Muslims in the economy of Turkey. In 1986, the circulation number was only 14,650 but had increased to 261,712 by 1997 (Özerkan, 2009: 139-140). With a figure reaching up to almost a million, the Zaman newspaper is now the most circulated newspaper in Turkey.⁴²

The Zaman⁴³ newspaper had begun to be published in November, 3 1986 under the editorial administration of Fehmi Koru. The newspaper has been the first daily to go online in 1995. In addition, Zaman is published in 35 different countries in 10 different languages and 2 different alphabets. After 2001, Zaman underwent significant changes with regard to its cadre and layout. Abdülhamit Bilici who has been one of the prominent authors of the Zaman newspaper writes the following while describing the Stance of Zaman and her English sister, Today's Zaman:

Zaman's relationship with politics is based on principles rather than financial interests. Its strength stems from the power of the ideas it promotes and the support of its readers. It has not hesitated to extend support to diverse political movements when their policies serve the future of the nation. Zaman and Today's Zaman are the most unique newspapers in Turkey in terms of the identities and tendencies of the columnists. All ideas and opinions are expressed freely from these platforms with the precondition that they are bound to democratic principles. The columnists offer their views and opinions even if they contradict

characteristic of the followers of Gülen is that the majority has great upward mobility. For that reason, the Gülen movement does not have any animosity towards other groups. (Ergil, 2012: 1-17).

⁴² Ekrem Dumanlı, the chief editor of Zaman on 18.04.2011 declared that the circulation number was over 1 million in a column expressing gratitude to the readers, http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_ekrem-dumanli-1-milyon-tiraj-icin-canigonulden-tesekkurler_1122927.html (03.09.2013).

⁴³ For the Institutional page of the Zaman newspaper <http://www.zaman.com.tr/kurumsal> (03.09.2013)

the overall stance of these papers. At the end of the day, the papers' positions are reflected by the articles of their editors and their editorial choices in news reporting... Zaman has never wavered in its democratic stance despite all direct and indirect pressures (lawsuits, threats and putting accreditation at risk, etc.). It extended its full support to the AK Party because of the injustices the party had faced and was even accused of being an advocate for the government. Now, relying on the same core principles, the paper criticizes this party's flawed policies and anti-democratic practices. It also encourages the party to return to its former reformist stance. Therefore, it is a friendly, legitimate and constructive approach.⁴⁴

The newspaper has generally sided with right-wing political parties and tried to avoid tension with the military elites, at least until the ruling Justice and Development Party came to power. Previously, the newspaper had given support to Turgut Özal both in his economic policies and Turkish-Islam synthesis (Özerkan, 2009: 147). The Zaman has become an ardent supporter of Turkey's EU membership. The EU has played a major role as a reference point especially for issues concerning democracy, individual rights, freedom and economy. With its English sister, Today's Zaman, Zaman newspaper has an important role in Turkish print media landscape and political life.



⁴⁴<http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-323182-stance-of-zaman-and-todays-zaman.html> (03.09.2013).



Figure 1.3 Zaman layouts change in 2001

This chapter has attempted to provide a relevant degree of information about the newspapers under scrutiny, i.e. the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers along with making a brief overview about the Turkish print media landscape. The role of the media in democratic countries has been taken into consideration as well with the aim to make contribution to the debates concerning Turkey's democratization. This chapter has also attempted to address the key concepts frequently employed in this study. In this regard, the concepts of ideology, discourse, and power have been under scrutiny. These concepts will also be covered in the next chapter together with the methodological underpinnings of this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

METHODOLOGY: LINKING THEORY, RESEARCH AND CONTEXT

This study employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) as a main research tool in analyzing media discourses vis-à-vis the undesired citizens in Turkey. The problem that is seen as the starting point for this research can be summarized as ‘the role of media language with different ideological orientations in representing the image of the undesired citizens in Turkey’.

The methodological framework of this study is based on Michel Foucault’s understanding of discourse. As noted in the previous chapter, for Foucault, discourse constitutes the social, in other words, there is a constitutive nature of discourse. According to Foucault, discourse refers to different ways of structuring areas of social practice and knowledge. Foucault argues that discursive formations direct a writer’s choice of topic, the structure in which the topic may be constituted and the conceptual framework within which the handling of the topic is set (Crawshaw and Tusting, 2000: 25).

It is generally stated that CDA cannot be classified as a single method but is rather viewed as an approach which consists of different perspectives and methods for studying the relationship between the use of language and social context. Wodak (2001) defines CDA as being fundamentally concerned with analyzing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, power, discrimination and control as manifested in language.

5.1.The Terminology: Critique, Text, Genre

The term ‘critical’ has a long history in the West; it is associated with currents of thought whose sources go back to the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment as well as to Ancient Greek philosophy. Indeed, the term ‘critical’ is one that has been largely taken as self-evident. The notion of critique is used to mean the questioning prevailing ideas. Basically, ‘critical’ could be understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social and having a focus on self-

reflection as academics undertaking research. The term ‘critical’ means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism and making opaque structures of power relations and ideologies manifest (Kendall, 2007).

The notion of critique in CDA stems from the Frankfurt School. The Critical Theory developed by Frankfurt School thinkers, means that social theory should be oriented towards critiquing and changing society as a whole in contrast to traditional theory oriented solely towards understanding it. The Frankfurt School refers to a group of German-American theorists who developed analysis of the changes in Western capitalist societies that took place since the classical theory of Marx. Within this tradition, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno are key figures. Moving from Nazi Germany to the United States, the Frankfurt School developed a critical and transdisciplinary approach to cultural and communication studies. The Frankfurt School thinkers believed that bringing different disciplines together would provide insights that were unobtainable by working within narrow academic fields.

In CDA, the concept of ‘social critique’ integrates three related aspects: (1) a text or discourse immanent critique which aims at discovering inconsistencies, paradoxes and dilemmas in the text-internal or discourse-internal structures. (2) a socio-diagnostic critique which is concerned with demystifying the manifest character of discursive practices and (3) a future-related prospective critique which seeks to contribute to the transformation and improvement of communication (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 32-35).

It should be noted that, although the above guidelines imply a certain degree of distance on the part of the critic, critics are often members of the societies they are observing, thus the endeavor to ‘intervene’ (cited in Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 35) for a social change is always there in the critique. The goals of this intervention could be manifold, for example proposals towards more social justice for immigrants, women, homosexuals, i.e. people who faced discrimination (Efe, 2012: 112). In other words it can be said that, the CDA generally chooses the perspective of those who suffer and critically analyzes the language of those in power; those who are responsible for the existence of inequalities (Weiss and Wodak, 2003: 14). Most critical discourse

analysts would thus endorse Habermas' claim that "language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimize relations of organized power. Insofar as the legitimizations of power relations... are not articulated...language is also ideological" (quoted in Wodak, 2002: 11).

Forchtner (2011) argues that the references to the Habermas' language philosophy already provide for the critical discourse analysts a strong tradition of validating its own critical standards. For instance, elaborating on the concept of critique, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 34) say:

[it] is nurtured ethically by a sense of justice based on the normative and universalist conviction of the unrestricted validity of human rights and by the awareness of suffering, which both takes sides against social discrimination, repression, domination, exclusion and exploitation and for emancipation, self-determination and social recognition.

As this study attempts to explore the image of the undesired citizens in media texts, there is a need to define what a 'text' means. A 'text' can be understood as a specific and unique realization of a discourse (Wodak and Kryzanowski, 2008: 6). Following Fairclough (1995: 14) 'genre' can be characterized "as the conventionalized use of language associated with a particular activity and which has a more or less fixed schematic features." Genre is also a means of textual structuring and a set of relatively stable conventions, which are both creative and conservative. Texts belong to genres. Thus, a discourse on exclusion could manifest itself in a huge range of texts and genres, for instance in a TV debate on domestic politics (Wodak, 2008).




Figure 1.4. Interdiscursive and Intertextual Relationships (Wodak, 2001: 69).

In this study, I endorse Lemke’s definition which distinguishes between ‘discourse’ and ‘text’ in the following way (Lemke, 1995: 7ff):

When I speak about discourse in general, I will usually mean the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting... On each occasion when the particular meanings, characteristic of these discourses are being made, a specific text is produced. Discourses, as social actions more or less governed by social habits, produce texts that will in some ways be alike in their meanings... When we want to focus on the specifics of an event or occasion, we speak of the text; when we look at the patterns, commonality, relationships that embrace different texts and occasions, we can speak of discourses.

5.2. The Critical Discourse Analysis

Under the influence of critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School, CDA “sought to combine linguistic and socially grounded approaches to the analysis of discourse” (Crawshaw and Tusting, 2000: 27). Wodak and Meyer (2009: 6) based on the main premises of critical theory argue that social theory should produce knowledge that helps social actors in emancipating themselves from domination and

through self-reflection. In this sense, Critical Discourse Analysts aim to unveil the reproduction of power abuse and discrimination through discursive means.

Within the framework of CDA, Fairclough (1995: 219) writes that “mainly in discourse that consent is achieved, ideologies are transmitted, and practices, meanings, values and identities are taught and learned.” In line to that, a discourse can be seen as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts which manifest themselves within and across social fields of action (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 36). Fields of action are described by Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 36) as the segments of the respective social reality, which contribute to constructing and shaping the frame of discourse.

The CDA has its origins in textual and linguistic analysis. CDA adopts an interdisciplinary approach, as CDA is problem-oriented and problems in society are too complex to be studied from one perspective. Also, if ‘context’ is understood as something that requires a comprehensive theoretical explanation to allow an analysis of texts and discourses, an interdisciplinary approach is almost a logical consequence (Wodak, 2000).

The CDA as a network of scholars emerged in the early 1990s. According to Van Dijk (2008: 821-822) CDA should be thought of more as a heterogeneous movement than a uniform school. Over the last two decades, CDA has emerged as an established academic tradition in discourse analysis (Forchtner, 2011). CDA scholars try to make their own positions explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own research process (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 3).

It should be stated that, with the influence of other scholars like Bourdieu and Giddens, the theoretical framework of CDA is eclectic (Wodak and Weiss, 2003: 5-6). There is no such thing as a uniform, common theory formation determining CDA; indeed there are several approaches. CDA brings a variety of theories into dialogue especially social theories on the one hand and linguistic theories on the other. CDA as a school or paradigm is not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a multi-

methodical approach. CDA is concerned with making connections between socio-cultural processes on the one hand, and properties of texts on the other (Wodak, 2001).

For CDA scholars, the relationship between discourse and society is dialectical. This means that discourse does not only shape society but also it is shaped by society:

The discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relationships between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/ cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258).

Recently, in Turkey, there has been a notable increase in political science studies that use ‘critical’ and ‘discourse’ as analytical tools. In communication studies, the recent shift from content analysis to critical discourse analysis has been influenced by social constructivism and Van-Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach.

5.3. The Discourse Historical Approach

Developed in the field of Discourse Studies, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) provides a solid ground for looking at latent power dynamics in discursive practices. The DHA elaborates and links to the socio-cognitive theory of Van Dijk and sees discourse as a form of knowledge and memory whereas text illustrates concrete oral utterances or written documents (Wodak and Weiss, 2003: 13). Consonant with CDA, DHA defines discourse as context-dependent linguistic practices. The salient distinguishing characteristic of DHA is its endeavor to transcend the purely linguistic dimension and to include the historical, political,

sociological and psychological dimensions in the analysis, theory, and interpretation of a specific discursive event (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 35).

For the Vienna School of CDA which is represented most notably by the DHA of Wodak and her colleagues the concept of 'power' is influenced by Weber's definition of power (1964: 152) as having the ability to carry out one's will despite resistance. DHA attempts to describe those cases where language and other semiotic practices are used by those in power to maintain domination (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: 87-121).

Wodak (2009: 35) underlines different forms of exercising power, i.e. 'power in discourse', 'power over discourse' and 'power of discourse'. The first is defined as social actors' struggles over different interpretations of meaning as they relate to such communicative aspects as the selection of specific linguistic codes. The second, power over discourse, is defined as "general access to the stage in macro and micro contexts", i.e. regulating power. Finally, power of discourse relates to "the influence of historically grown macro-structures of meaning, of the conventions of the language game in which actors find themselves" (quoted in Wodak, 2009: 35-36).

DHA adheres to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory. DHA bases its critique on a foundational notion of emancipation, although not unique to DHA and its core orientation as an interdisciplinary force derives from Frankfurt School (Forchtner, 2011: 2). Although we find references to Horkheimer and Adorno in DHA, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 261) mention their insistence on 'the role of culture' in the reproduction of the capitalist order. It is to be noted that the only detailed comments refer to the work of Habermas. References to Habermas's ideal speech situation (ISS) can be found in DHA scholars' works. Habermas (1971) presented the concept of the 'ideal-speech situation' which consists of four aspects: publicness, equal rights to participate, absence of coercion and truthfulness on the part of the participants. In her detailed account of Habermas, Wodak (1996: 30) mentions the utopia of an ideal speech situation which is characterized by the absence of any constraints.

Initially, DHA was developed to study an anti-Semitic stereotyped image, Feindbild in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim. In the study of the 1986 Waldheim Affair, Wodak (1990) claimed that the context of the discourse has an important impact on the content of prejudice stories. In the Waldheim Affair study, it was shown that the context had to be defined in various ways because of the many layers of discourse that were analyzed. DHA attempts “to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of a spoken or written text.” (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001; Wodak and Meyer, 2009).

Concerning the notion of ‘context’, Wodak states that “utterances are only meaningful if we consider their use in a specific situation; if we recognize their embedding in a certain culture and ideology, and most importantly, if we know what the discourse relates to in the past” (Wodak, 1996: 19). DHA sees discourse as a text in context thus incorporates two central concepts: intertextuality and interdiscursivity. Interdiscursivity means that discourses behave in a similar way, they overlap and interconnect (Wodak and Weiss, 2005: 127). Intertextuality refers to the linkage of all texts to other texts, both in the past and present. Intertextuality means that any text (or utterance) is dialogical, explicitly or implicitly ‘in dialogue with’ other texts and gains its meaning in relation to other texts (Fairclough, 2003: 17).

One of the most salient features of DHA is its endeavor to work multi-methodically as DHA is eclectic and interdisciplinary (Wodak, 2001). In this study, I use the term ‘triangulation’ for mixing different approaches to research. The principle of triangulation paves the way for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of critical baseness and to avoid simply politicizing, instead of accurately analyzing. Triangulation is defined as the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1978: 291). Triangulation is based on the concept of context involving intratextual and intertextual contexts (Wodak, 2001: 67-68).

The triangulatory approach is based on a concept of ‘context’ which takes into account four levels. The first level is descriptive while the other three levels constitute part of our theories on context: (1) the immediate, language or text internal

co-text (2) the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (3) the extralinguistic social/sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ and explained by middle-range theories⁴⁵ (4) the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts in which the discursive practices are embedded and related to grand theories (Wodak and Weiss, 2003: 22).

The analysis inDHA is three-dimensional: Contents or topics, discursive strategies and linguistic means (Wodak, 2001). After having established the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, the discursive strategies including argumentation strategies are investigated. Then the linguistic means are examined. As noted, the systematic qualitative analysis in DHA takes four layers of context into account:

- The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, genres and discourses.
- The extra-linguistic social/sociological variables
- The history of texts
- The institutional frames of the specific context of a situation

Wodak (2001) summarizes the procedures of DHA as follows:

- Gather information about the context of the text.
- Establish the genre and the discourse to which the text belongs, then sample more ethnographic information.
- Formulate precise research questions and explore neighboring fields for explanatory theories.
- Operationalize the research questions into researchable linguistic categories.
- Apply the categories sequentially to the text using theoretical approaches to interpret the findings.

⁴⁵Middle-range theories focus either upon specific social phenomena (e.g. cognition, social networks) or on specific subsystems of society (e.g. economy, politics) (Wodak and Meyer, 2009: 24).

- Make an extensive interpretation of the data, returning to the original research questions and the problem under investigation.

DHA has not been an area of interest for the scholars in Turkey. Nevertheless there are a few works employing DHA. A study by Beyza Ç. Tekin (2010) uses DHA to elaborate on historical dimensions of discursive events in the representation of Turkey's EU membership in French political discourse. İbrahim Efe's PhD study (2012) using critical discourse analysis in order to explore how Kemalism and Islamism have been represented in Turkish newspapers employs DHA as well.

5.3.1. Analytical Steps of the Research and Data Selection

I started off the research with a general problem, i.e. 'the role of media discourse with different ideological orientations in representing the image of the undesired citizens in Turkey'. After the identification of the problem I dwelled on the history of Turkey to understand the socio-political context. After completing the analysis and writing up the results, I revised my methodological and theoretical chapter. Reflecting on the conduct of this research, the following analytical steps are pursued:

- Identification of the social problem
- Reading on the historical context
- Formulating research questions
- Familiarization with the data
- Preliminary corpus⁴⁶ analysis/ reflections on the problem
- Detecting time periods for data collection
- More literature review
- Data collection
- Reading the data
- Corpus formation/analysis

⁴⁶ Corpus is singular for plural Corpora. It can be defined as a collection of texts. In this study 'corpus' is used as a collection of texts designed for linguistic research.

- Re-formulation of the research questions
- CDA Analysis
- Final reflections and discussion

As noted, the present study is based on an in depth-analysis of articles in the Zaman and Hürriyet newspapers. These two newspapers were selected according to the following criteria: level of circulation⁴⁷, ideological stance and format (quality versus tabloid). With regards to representing the two main sectors of society, i.e. the Kemalist and conservative, these newspapers are the most significant actors in the print media landscape. They have an influential role in agenda setting and shaping public opinion.

The cases I have chosen for analysis through which I will try to analyze how the image of the undesired citizens, i.e. the pious Muslims, the Alevis, the Kurds and the non-Muslims, are constructed and represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers are as follows:

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how pious Muslim citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The law expanding five years of primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education in Turkey passed in 1997, (2) Merve Kavakçı Affair in 1999, (3) The constitutional amendment allowing women to wear headscarves in universities, which was passed on February 7 in 2008 but annulled by the Constitutional Court on June 8, 2008, and (4) The lift of the ban on wearing a headscarf in public sectors in 2013.

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Alevi citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Madımak Affair in 1993, (2) the Gazi Incidents in 1995, (3) The Council of State's (Danıştay) ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form in 2008, and (4) The decision of Court of Cassation declaring that cem houses cannot be viewed as places of worship in 2012.

⁴⁷<http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj> (19.09.2014).

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Kurdish citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The bloody Nevruz day in 1992 (2) The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK in 1999 (3) The initiation of the first uninterrupted broadcasting in the Kurdish language via a state owned channel in 2009, and (4) The military operation on Uludere.

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how non-Muslim citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Armenian Genocide Draft passed in France in 1998, (2) The Patriarch's request for the re-opening of the Halki Seminary school in 2003, (3) The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's interview appeared on CBS Television in 2009 wherein he said he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey, and (4) The amendment made to Turkey's law on foundations stipulating the return of property seized from minorities in 2011.

Before the selection of the cases I have determined a time frame and I have tried to cover a large time span from the early 1990s up to October 2013 when a democratization package was introduced. I selected three critical landmarks in Turkish political history with regard to the state-society relationship: when Turkey gained official EU candidacy in 1999; the referendum of 2010 and the democratization package of 2013.

I was careful to select at least one case for each category of citizens before 1999. After 1999 a considerable degree of democratization has been witnessed in state-society relations within the framework of EU reform packages. I selected at least one case for each category of citizens after the 2010 referendum.

For each category of citizen, I selected one case wherein the state attitude and policies do not have a discriminatory feature and three cases wherein the state attitude and policies have a discriminatory feature. The main motivations behind selecting the cases/events which reveal the discriminatory attitude of the state discourse and practices are as follows:

- A serious social trauma whose impact is still valid in today's Turkey.
- The state with all its institutions and reflexes has taken part in those cases.

- The alienation experienced by the undesired citizens has increased to an important degree.
- The social cohesion among each particular group of undesired citizens has increased in the aftermath of these events.

The main method of data collection comprised surveying a series of articles. I used the web search engine of the newspapers for the selected articles which can be found online. For the articles which are not available online, I took pictures from hardcopies of newspapers in the Press Museum and Beyazıt State Library. I also went to the archive office of Zaman newspaper in Yenibosna.

The sample of the selected articles included 32 columns. For each category of citizens, I analyzed 8 articles, one article published in Zaman and one article published in Hürriyet. I first read all the columns concerning the selected cases published one week after each event. then I chose only one article that is most convenient for analyzing how the image of the undesired citizens is represented in Hürriyet and Zaman. With twelve of the articles written by the lead writers and four of them written by the chief editors as they all reflect the general stance of the newspaper. Half of them were written by the prominent columnists who have been ideologically affiliated with the agency as well.

The main reason behind choosing these 32 articles is two-fold. Firstly, the articles of the lead columnists and chief editors and prominent columnists have been surveyed as the articles of these columnists reflect the ideological position of the agency in a considerable degree compared to those of the other columnists. Secondly, I have been careful to analyze the articles which have been published either on the same day or at most two days before or after.

Before beginning the analysis, in order to contextualize each article within its immediate environment some information about the author, the date when the newspaper article is published are incorporated. This is followed by a genre analysis to illustrate which styles are drawn upon and oriented to in each text. Following the DHA, as noted earlier, the qualitative discourse analysis in this study follows three steps: (1) the identification of specific contents or topics of a specific discourse (2)

the investigation of discursive strategies (3) the examination of linguistic means and their realizations.

In order to unravel various discourses and fields of action in a text, discourse topics should be analyzed. Discourse topics are the initial analytic category central to the qualitative analysis. From a theoretical perspective, discourse topics are defined as, what Van Dijk calls (1987) ‘semantic macrostructures’. They are extrapolated from local meanings of words and sentences, by such macro rules as deletion, generalization and construction and they represent what a fragment of a text is about and thus may be considered as the gist or most important information such fragment (Van Dijk, 1987).

After the identification of specific content, the investigation of discursive strategies is employed. Transferred from the military context and influenced by the definition of Bourdieu (1994a: 90) the concept of ‘strategy’ refers to more or less conscious or automated acts which serve certain purposes or help to achieve particular goals (Wodak et. al., 2009: 32). Drawing on Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962) it is obvious that not only sentences but a group of sentences and even a whole text might aim to fulfill some sort of communicative performance, i.e. deeming something good or bad.

Taking the macro semantic categories as a starting point, various discursive strategies employed in a text are examined. My central aim in focusing on the five discursive strategies shown in the table below is to find the answers to the following set of questions:

- 1.How are the persons, objects, actions, processes and phenomena/events associated with undesired citizens referred to linguistically (Referential/Nomination)?
- 2.What are the traits, characteristics, qualities and features that are attributed to the persons, objects, actions, processes and phenomena/events associated with the undesired citizens (Predication)?

3. By means of which arguments do writers try to legitimize and justify their decision to support or oppose the marginalization, discrimination and power abuse directed towards undesired citizens (Argumentation)?

4. From what perspective or point of view are these referential/nomination strategies, positive or negative predications and arguments for or against undesired citizens expressed (Perspectivation)?

5. How is the othering of the undesired citizens mitigated or intensified (Mitigation)?

Table 1.0. Strategies of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation (Tekin, 2010:154 –reproduced from Wodak, 2001:73)

Strategy	Objectives	Devices
Referential/ nomination	Construction of in-groups and out-groups	*Membership categorization *Biological, naturalizing and depersonalizing metaphors and metonymies *Synecdoches
Predication	Labeling social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively	*Stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits *Implicit and explicit predicates
Argumentation	Justification of positive or negative attributions	*Topoi, fallacies, and counterfactuals used to justify inclusion or exclusion, discrimination or preferential treatment
Perspectivation, framing, or discourse representation	Expressing involvement, positioning speaker's point of view	*Reporting, description, narration or quotation of (discriminatory) events and utterances
Intensification, mitigation	Modifying the epistemic status of a proposition	*Intensifying or mitigating the illocutionary force of (discriminatory) utterances

5.3.2. Referential and Predication Strategies

Referential or nomination strategies are employed in discourse to construct and represent social actors in a given context (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 45). Through referential strategies, the construction of in-groups and out-groups is pursued. Membership categorization and lexicalizations along with selective use of possessive pronouns are employed in in-group and out-group construction.

“Pronouns, especially the first person plural (we, us, our), can be used to induce interpreters to conceptualize group identity, coalitions, parties and the like, either as insiders or as outsiders” (Chilton and Schaffner, 2002: 30). In addition, categorization devices including metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches are used as key elements in constructing and representing social actors. Van Leeuwen (2008) offers an insightful work in which social actors can be represented, based on two main categories of inclusion and exclusion and relates these to context.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to distinguish precisely between nomination and predication strategies since both overlap significantly. The social actors as individuals, group members or groups as a whole, are linguistically characterized through predications. Predications refer to traits and characteristics ascribed to social actors. Through predication, persons, animals, events, objects and practices are specified and characterized with respect to quality, quantity, space, time and so on (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 55).

Predication strategies may for example be realized as evaluative attributions of positive and negative traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. This kind of strategy aims to label social actors in a more or less negative or positive manner and is thus closely related to nomination strategies. Attributing positive values to the Self and negative values to the Other are two main strategies of predication.

Stereotypes are one of the elements frequently-employed as predication devices. Quasthoff defines the term stereotype as the verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed toward a social group or an individual as a member of

that social group. The stereotype is typically an element of common knowledge, shared to a high degree in a particular culture (Quasthoff, 1987: 786).

5.3.3. Metaphor, Metonymy and Synecdoche

Rhetorical tropes such as metonymies, synecdoches and metaphors are related both to reference and predication (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 57). The cognitive approach to metaphors founded by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their work *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) has been very influential in pointing to the central role of metaphors in the construction of social reality. Lakoff and Johnson claim that “most of our conceptual system is metaphorically constructed; that is, most concepts are particularly understood in terms of other concepts” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 56).

The research by Semino (2008: 32) shows that “metaphors are seldom neutral: constructing something in terms of something else results in a particular view of the ‘something’ in question, often including specific attitudes and evaluations” It should be emphasized that selective representation drawing upon metaphoric expressions is motivated by intentions. In this sense, it is worth noting Lakoff and Johnson’s statement of “people in power get to impose their metaphors.” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 157). Personification is a special form of metaphor that bring together and link different semantic field, i.e. a concept with the semantic feature (-human), the other bearing the semantic feature (+human) (Wodak et.al., 2009: 44). Personifications are rhetorically used to humanize objects, abstract entities and ideas.

The metonymy (from the Greek for ‘name change’) replaces the name of a referent by the name of an entity which is closely associated with it in either concrete or abstract terms (Wodak et.al., 2009: 43). I will present some of the metonymy types involved in the representation of social actors.

1. Product for cause; for example, ‘The shariatist network is spreading.’
2. Part of a body for person; for example, ‘Cries against terror were heard.’

3.Place for person; for example, 'Istanbul is ready for the final match.'

4.Place for event/act; for example, 'Turkey will not be Iran.'

5.Country for persons; for example, 'Turkey broke the world record in party closures.'

6.Institutions for events/acts; for example, 'We were among the ten biggest countries before WWI.'

7.Institution for (Responsible) Representatives of the institution; for example, 'The Parliament voted against press freedom.'

8.Institutions for acts/events; for example, 'The army as the defender of secularism.'

Synecdoche (from the Greek: 'to take up with something else') replaces the name of a referent by the name of another referent which belongs to the same field of meaning and which is either semantically wider or semantically narrower (Wodak et.al., 2009: 43). Depending on the direction of substitution it is possible to distinguish between (1) generalizing synecdoches and (2) particularizing synecdoches. Some generalizing synecdoches can be listed as totum pro parte (whole for part) 'Austria is world champion', species for genus and 'plural for singular'. Apart from that, the main particularizing synecdoches are part for whole, species for genus and singular for plural (Wodak et.al., 2009: 44).


5.3.4.Argumentation Analysis

Through argumentation strategies, positive or negative attributions are justified. As noted, CDA is concerned with examining "what and how language communicates when it is used purposefully in particular instances and contexts" (Cameron, 2001: 13). Thus, argumentation analysis plays a key role in discourse analysis, especially in the DHA.

Arguments are goal-oriented strategies in the sense that they are used to achieve persuasion, "the means of intentionally influencing a person so that she or he

adopts, fixes or changes her or his ways of perception, attitudes to and views on persons, objects and ideas, and dispositions to behave or act in a specific way” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 69-70). Argumentation strategies in discourse are accomplished through a wide set of linguistic tools that are instrumental in enhancing the persuasiveness of the arguments.

Argumentation can be treated as a linguistic and cognitive action pattern which follows the aim of justifying or challenging validity claims that have become problematic. The DHA integrates formal, functional and content-related dimensions of argumentation with a special focus on the analysis of contents of argumentation schemes. Kienpointner proposes a scheme with three basic elements each of which argumentation includes either implicitly or explicitly (cited in Efe, 2012: 128).



According to this scheme, the argument is the reason put forward for or against a controversial claim and/or thesis, and the claim is the disputed statement which has to be justified or refuted (cited in Efe, 2012: 128). It can be said that, conclusion rules are the central elements, which connect the argument with the claim. The ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’ is a concept in discourse analysis that dates back to the argumentation theory of Aristotle and means literally ‘place’ or ‘seat of arguments’ (cited in Tekin, 2010: 180). “Within argumentation theory, ‘topoi’ or ‘loci’ can be described as parts of argumentation that belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable premises” (Wodak, 2001: 74). More specifically, topoi can be defined as general rules that support an argument without themselves being part of the argument itself (Wodak, 2001: 74-76).

The frequently used topoi can be listed as follows (Žagar, 2010: 6):

1. Usefulness, advantage
2. Uselessness, disadvantage

3. Definition, name-interpretation
4. Danger and threat
5. Humanitarianism
6. Justice
7. Responsibility
8. Burdening, weighting
9. Finances
10. Reality
11. Numbers
12. Law and right
13. History
14. Culture
15. Abuse.

The topos of advantage can be paraphrased by the following conditional: “If an action or decision is useful or bears advantages, then one should perform it.” (Wodak, 2001: 74). Following Wodak (2001: 76), the topos of burden can be reduced to the following conclusion rule: “If a person, an institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish these problems, one should act in order to diminish these burdens.”

The topos of history can be described as follows: because history teaches that specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform a specific action in a specific situation comparable with the historical example referred to (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 80). The topos of responsibility can be summarized by the conditional formula: because a state or a group of persons is responsible for the emergence of specific problems, it or they should act in order to find solutions to these problems. Although this topos is very often employed to argue against discrimination it can also serve the opposite aim, for example in cases where a government is held responsible for unemployment (Wodak, 2001: 75-76).

On the other hand, just like topoi, fallacies are argumentative tools which help speakers emphasize a certain idea to convince the public. Van Dijk defines fallacies as “normative breaches of ‘proper’ argumentation that “may pertain to any element of the argumentative event, namely to the nature of the premises, the relations among the premises and the conclusion, the relation between speaker and recipients” (Van Dijk, 2000: 71).

5.3.5. Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification

In the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality, the strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a significant role. Perspectivation means an author’s /speaker’s expression of his /her agency’s point of view in reporting, narrating and interpreting the event in question (Efe, 2012: 131). By means of intensification or mitigation strategies, the authors /speakers modify their standpoint or take on the issue epistemologically and deontologically, either by mitigating or intensifying the degree of certainty they express in a proposition (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 81).

Intensification and mitigation strategies also relate to the illocutionary force of propositions, that is, their persuasive impact on readers. The illocutionary force relates to the pragmatic force of a proposition beyond its sentence form or meaning (Levinson, 1983: 246). Involvement and detachment of the author are highly dependent on the discourse genre and the field of social action with which the genre is associated (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 83).

In the genre of the data in this research, i.e. news articles, the linguistic means of involvement manifest themselves in adjectives and adverbs especially those that express the author’s emotions and attitudes towards the issue at stake. The metaphors also reflect the author’s involvement but in more abstract terms. In a similar sense, detachment can be expressed with all these linguistic means as well as reported speech when reporting from social actors.

Mitigation and intensification strategies are closely associated with the expression of an author’s opinion and attitude in a text. In this sense, modality, mood

and aspect which combine the analysis of lexical and grammatical features of sentences play a key role (Efe, 2012: 132). Halliday and Mathiessen (2004: 147) define modality as intermediate degrees that fall in between the simple ‘yes’ and ‘no’ polarity. For Fairclough (2003: 166), “modality choices in texts can be seen as part of the process of texturing self-identity as what you commit yourself to is a significant part of what you are”.

The categories used in order to analyze the modality of propositions in this study are epistemic, deontic and volitional modalities. Epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty, while deontic modality has to do with the necessity or obligation expressed by the author. The ‘volitional modality’ is the expression of the author’s will or desire in relation to the situation expressed. For instance ‘He should not have left’ refers to the example of epistemic modality while ‘You can’t leave now’ refers to deontic modality. ‘I would like to tell those people who are happy of that.’ is an example of volitional modality.

On the other hand, ‘mood’ and ‘aspect’ are also significant parts of representation and identification. Mood can be defined as the main sentence types in a grammar, i.e. declarative, interrogative, and imperative. There is a tendential relationship between grammatical mood and speech function (Fairclough, 2003: 117). For instance, when used in nominal sentences the copula –*dırın* Turkish defines or classifies the subject by ascribing permanent qualities or inherent characteristics to it (Göksel and Kerslake, 2009: 341). Aspect, as part of the grammar of a language, expresses the temporal viewpoint from which a situation is presented (Göksel and Kerslake, 2009: 330). All these categories will, of course, be analyzed and exemplified not for the sake of linguistic analysis *per se*, but in relation to their function in text and context.

The DHA offers a viable framework within which texts having an important historical dimension can be analyzed. It is noteworthy to state that, while a simple content analysis is limited to what is said in the text, the DHA can relate the analysis to what is not said in the text through emphasizing intertextual and interdiscursive relationships.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PIOUS MUSLIM CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS

This chapter presents the analyses of the articles related with the image of the pious Muslim citizens. After introducing the selected cases under scrutiny, I will provide the historical and socio-cultural context in which the cases are embedded in.

The articles relate to the following cases: (1) The 1997-dated law expanding five- years primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education (2) Merve Kavakçı Affair in 1999 (3) The constitutional amendment allowing women to wear headscarf in universities which passed on February 7 2008 and annulled by the Constitutional Court on June 8, 2008 and (4) The lift of headscarfban in public places in 2013.

The articles under scrutiny are as follows:

- The articles of Oktay Ekşi and Hüseyin Gülerce published on August 18, 1997
- The articles of Oktay Ekşi and Ali Bulaç published on May 4, 1999
- Oktay Ekşi's article published on February 10, 2008; Ekrem Dumanlı's article published on February 11, 2008
- Mehmet Y. Yılmaz's article published on October 7, 2013; Mustafa Ünal's article published on October 9, 2013.

The main reason behind selecting these articles is two-fold. Firstly, the articles of the lead columnists and chief editors have been surveyed as the articles of these columnists reflect the ideological position of the agency in a considerable degree compared to those of the other columnists. Secondly, I have paid attention to analyze the articles which have been published either on the same day or at most two days before or after.

The analysis will be carried out following the DHA, which combines a plurality of methods and analytical tools, and works through three interwoven dimensions: (1) Contents (2) Strategies and (3) Means and forms of realization. The

contents referred to in each text will be introduced first and this will be done by extracting the topics of each article using a semantically oriented topic analysis, which is sensitive to context (See Methodology Chapter). This step aims to discover what the authors are writing about and to identify which themes and arguments are employed in the articles. Hereby, I concentrate on the manifest discourse, i.e. what has been said on the surface leaving a more detailed linguistic analysis to the next steps.

The analysis of the thematic structure of each text will be used for the analysis of strategies and their linguistic realizations. The thematic analysis is to show the overall thematic structure of each news article and its relation to discourses and topics, as well as fields of social action (politics, religion, law etc.), which produce and are produced by them. The strategies that are used in each text will be elaborated on by looking at the linguistic and/or rhetorical and argumentation tools they are realized in.

The analysis of each text will start with a brief account of the genre, when the article was published, as well as some information about the author. Having elaborated on the contextual and technical details of each article, I will then list topics of each text and relate them to discourses and fields of action they are embedded in. After analyzing representation of social actors and events, the argumentation scheme of each text will be provided. Finally, the perspective of the author will be accounted for in depth at the end of the analysis of each text.

6.1. The 1997-Dated Law Expanding Five-Years Primary Education To Eight Years Of Uninterrupted Compulsory Education

In 1995 general elections, under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan the Welfare Party (WP) became the victorious party. The Islamist rhetoric and policies of the Welfare Party-led coalition government brought it into conflict with the army and the secular establishment. After the National Security Council (NSC) Meeting held on February 28, 1997, the coalition government had to resign. One of the decisions⁴⁸ dictated by the military on February 28, 1997 NSC meeting was about

⁴⁸ For the decisions taken on February 28, 1997 National Security meeting, see <http://t24.com.tr/media/editorials/files/406.pdf> (07.01.2014)

national education system. That decision, the then prime minister Erbakan had to sign was about transition to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education. The related decision read:

With a view toward rendering the tender minds of young generations inclined foremost toward love of the republic, Atatürk, the homeland, and the nation, and toward the ideal and goal of raising the Turkish nation to the level of modern civilization, and to protect them against the influence of various quarters:

- a) An eight-year uninterrupted educational system must be implemented across the country.
- b) The necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that Quran courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the Ministry of National Education (quoted in Günay, 2001: 7).

According to the mainstream media of the time-being, the first and foremost objective of that decision was to combat religious reactionary movements through regulating education in a more central and secular way. It should be stated that, in a country such as Turkey, where there is a strong state tradition, schools play a major role in forging a consensual relationship of state and society and in educating the general population in citizenship.

Indeed, since the early 1970s successive governments have sought to extend the amount of compulsory education to eight years from five years. The breakthrough came with the passage of the law in question that introduced a new eight-year compulsory education system. This law was buttressed by substantial new funding, which financed additional infrastructure and human resources to replace a system consisting of five-year primary schools and three-year lower secondary schools with one consisting of eight-year primary schools (Dulger, 2004: 1). The demand for the extension of compulsory education to 8 years clearly aimed at scrapping the intermediate sections of the İmam Hatip schools.

Following the 1980 coup d'état, the Imam-Hatip schools have been categorized by the Ministry of National Education into *Anadolu* Imam-Hatip schools. At the Anatolian Imam-Hatip schools, found mostly in urban *Imam-Hatip Schools* areas, the same core curriculum for regular secondary schools is used but there is also a heavy emphasis on religious subjects, regarded as vocational courses. The religious subjects that make up roughly 40 percent of the curriculum include Arabic, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic history, and the memorization and interpretation of the Holy Text (Pak, 2004: 326-327). It is to be noted that, the graduates of Imam Hatip schools could theoretically enroll in military academies, like their counterparts from the secular-track Anatolian high schools (cited in Kaplan, 2006: 192). However the military has countered this move by periodically identifying and expelling religious students.

By 1990, there were 389 Imam Hatip Schools with a total enrollment of 300,000 students (Kaplan, 2006: 46). Parallel to the growth of these schools has been that of the Qur'an courses. To stem the growth of the religious-track schools and the political influence of their graduates, in 1997 the law expanding five-years primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education was put into force. It was prepared by a small group of ministry administrators with no public debate. Consequently, there was a strong degree of questioning and even opposition to the law; the Ministry of Education, usually gaining a high score for trustworthiness in public opinion polls, met with looks of contempt (Dulger, 2004: 6). As noted, with the implementation of eight-year compulsory education, the intermediate sections of all vocational secondary schools, including the Imam-Hatip schools⁴⁹, were phased out leaving only three years of vocational training available.

⁴⁹Vocational religious schools known as Imam Hatip Okulları were established with an aim to create religious officials (Shively, 2008). Although the Imam-Hatip schools had a modest beginning as state-run religious vocational schools to keep the training of the religious clergy under state control, after 1980 military coup the number of Imam-Hatip schools had reached 249. In the period between 1983 and 1997, the number grew from 374 to 604. Student enrollment during the same period rapidly swelled from 220,991 to 511,502 (Yavuz, 2003: 127).

6.2.The Representation of the 1997-Dated Law in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text I -The Hürriyet Article

Text I (Appendix 1) is a column written by Oktay Ekşi⁵⁰ who has worked as the lead columnist of Hürriyet for 36 years. Oktay Ekşi in a piece he wrote on October 28, 2010 had criticized the Justice and Development Party government in a harsh way and on October 31, 2010 he wrote his last article for the Hürriyet entitled ‘Goodbye to my readers’. Oktay Ekşi is currently the Istanbul deputy of the Republican People’s Party.

The article to be analyzed is entitled ‘Thank you...’. It was published on August 18, 1997, two days after the enactment of the law of eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education. Given the author’s power position in relation to the newspaper, the article already has significance. It both represents the author’s opinion and the stance of the agency. The article has more of a personal style than genre specificity.

The article criticizes the people who oppose the enactment of the law expanding five years primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education. The article both in general and specific terms deals with the law of eight years of education. At the end of the article, the author reveals his contentment regarding the law at stake.

Thematically, Text I can be divided into three parts. Firstly, the author introduces the topic, namely the law of eight years of education. Secondly, the author writes about the process paving the way for the enactment of the law in question while making references to the politicians who made contribution to the enactment of the law. Finally, the author reveals his contentment besides addressing his predictions about the aftermath of the enactment of the law.

The selected discourse topics below (adopted from Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 100) outline the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which

⁵⁰ For Ekşi’s personal web page, see <http://www.oktayeksi.com.tr/?kkk=OktayEksi&query=About&Name=%20Who%20is%20Oktay%20EKSI%20?> (18.07.2014)

the topics are related to, and the fields of action where each discourse operates discursively and textually. They are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text I

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the functions of the Parliament
- Topic 1: The enactment of the law of 8 years of education
- The discourse of the education reform
- Topic 2: The stance of the political parties since 1973
- Topic 3: The closure of the intermediate sections of religious vocational schools
- Topic 4: Mesut Yılmaz enacted the education law
- Topic 5: Yılmaz deserved the title of ‘statesman’
- Topic 6: The contributions of Ecevit and Baykal
- Topic 7: The efforts of Biltekin Özdemir and Uluç Gürkan
- Topic 8: The roles of Turhan Tayan and Bener Cordan
- Topic 9: The financial burden of the law
- Topic 11: The readiness of the society to bear the burden
- Topic 12: The past attempts hindering the law

The field of history

- The discourse of development
- Topic 10: Özal’s mentality about development, economics and education

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The nomination strategies serve constructing and representing social actors. They are generally employed with the aim of construction of in-groups and out-groups (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 45). The way people, groups of people, concepts

and events are named and referred to linguistically can be analyzed through nomination strategies.

Personal pronouns are the first place to see the ideological stance to the representation of social actors. In line 2, 'our' is inclusive referring to everybody in Turkey. The first person plural pronoun 'we' is used by the author to create a sense of national identity in lines 4 and 7. This rhetorically excludes a group of people. The author excludes the people who stand against the introduction of the eight year of uninterrupted education. In this sense, the author employs an othering discourse towards the people who are also against the stemming of the Imam Hatip schools. In addition, the first person plural pronoun 'we' (line 17) refers to the author and his agency. In the last sentence, the pronoun 'we' refers rhetorically to all the readers as well as the author and the agency and it is used to create a homogeneous in-group.

In line 4, the author creates an anonymous group by saying 'the people who say...'. This is an example of indetermination. Indetermination occurs when social actors are represented as unspecified, anonymous individuals or groups (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). In lines 8-9, the 'political authorities is an example of functionalization. Functionalization occurs when the social actors are referred to in terms of what they do (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

The author by saying '...an education reform... has been enacted by this TGNA.' (lines 8-10) sets the Parliament as the agent of the passive voice. Passive voice shifts the focus to the activity, namely the enactment of the law at stake. The acronym TGNA (lines 7 and 21) stands metonymically for the Parliament of Turkey while in line 10 refers metonymically to the deputies who voted for the law. 'This nation' (line 4) stands metonymically for the people living in Turkey. 'This nation' is treated as one homogeneous group in the text the main characteristic of which is 'having the ability to create miracles'. The author likens the enactment of the law to miracle, this lexical choice reveals the importance he attaches to the law in question. In line 5, 'the success the parliament displayed' is an example of personification. Personification means imputing human qualities to things that are not human, e.g. abstract concepts or theories.

The author through making a distinction between a statesman and a politician underlines the success of Mesut Yılmaz who despite having partly a religious electoral base managed the enactment of the law of eight years of education. ‘Turkey’ (line 39) refers metonymically to the people living in Turkey and ‘that consequence’ (line 18) refers to the enactment of the law in question which the author calls as an ‘education reform’. ‘That burden’ in line 33 refers to ‘2 quadrillions of fund debt’ in line 29. ‘Our children’ in line 34 stands for the children of the people who support the enactment of the law at stake. The author through this lexical choice attempts to create a family-based solidarity between his readers and himself.

Table 1.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
We (The Turkish Nation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all know that this nation creates such miracles • wrote before
We (The author and agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are wondering what will they say about especially the deputies of TPP
We (The Turkish nation)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have to bear that burden all together
We (readers, author, agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • give endless thanks to anyone who has made Turkey gain eight years of uninterrupted education
The people (who say pessimistic words)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • get embarrassed
The Parliament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • displayed
An education reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • which should have been applied since 1973 • brings the necessity to close down the secondary parts of religious vocational schools

Mesut Yılmaz	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • did this • has deserved the title of “statesman”
Bülent Ecevit and Deniz Baykal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have made a big contribution to that consequence
Biltekin Özdemir, Uluç Gürkan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • hold great efforts for this result.
Turhan Tayan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • made the law...pass in an uninterrupted way in the National Education Council
Bener Cordan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has made all of us reach today
This law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will put approximately 2 quadrillions of fund debt onto our society.

Predications refer to traits and characteristics ascribed to social actors. Attributing positive values to the Self and negative values to the Other are the two well-known strategies of predication.

As Table 1.1 shows the appellative denominations in Text I is not considered to be positively or negatively biased if we take them at face value. The author describes the enactment of law expanding five years primary education to eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education as a ‘miracle’. This metaphor conveys the standpoint of the author in an obvious way. The author sees the enactment of the law as a very hard thing to achieve.

The author does not have a neutral stance to all social actors. The people who are pessimistic about Turkey and who hinder the law in question are not evaluated positively. Özal is being criticized for not prioritizing education policies. Although there are no overt depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Özal, we can deduce from these lines that he is being criticized: ‘...during the period of Turgut Özal mentality which for the development of Turkey and for her catching the era brought economics not education to the forefront no enough fund for education had been saved.’

Positive lexicalization occupies a central place in predicating the people who are in favor of the law in question. The author makes a selective use of positive

lexicals to accentuate better the positive traits attributed to them. For example in line 18, Baykal's opposition understanding is referred to with adjectives 'consistent', 'influential'. As a final remark, in the positive representation of the law in question, a remarkable strategy is to demonstrate the law as an education reform which will make the children be able to carry the Turkey of 2000s (lines 34 and 35).

Argumentation Strategies

Arguments are goal-oriented strategies in the sense that they are used to achieve persuasion. Argumentation strategies in discourse are accomplished through a wide set of linguistic tools that are instrumental in enhancing the persuasiveness of the arguments.

The argumentation scheme in Text I as shown in the table below draws on the content-related argumentation approach of Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009). The first column on the left indicates where I detected the claim and topoi in the text. The claims and topoi are shown in the middle column. The last column shows the formulation of each claim and topos.

The first claim stating that 'Being a statesman requires special qualities' is justified by putting forward the distinction between being a statesman and a politician. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: Since Yılmaz showed a good performance, he can be seen as a statesman.

The author as an overt proponent of the law of eight years of education employs the topos/ fallacy of past mistakes for justifying his second claim by writing that Özal did not bring education policies to the forefront, so that no enough fund for education had been saved.

In the final claim, the author uses the topos of advantage in sustaining his position. The topos of advantage can be paraphrased by the following conditional: "if an action or decision is useful or bears advantages, then one should perform it." (Wodak, 2001: 74). By claiming that the law will enhance the level of education in Turkey the author overtly argues that, this law is a must for Turkey.

Table 1.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
12-15 Yılmaz with his performance has deserved the title of “statesman”... A statesman is the man who fights for the long term interests of the country not for near interests.	Claim 1: Being a statesman requires special qualities	Topos of definition	Since Yılmaz showed a good performance, he can be seen as a statesman.
30-31 during the period of Turgut Özal mentality which for the development of Turkey...brought economics not education to the forefront, no enough fund for education had been saved.	Claim 2: For the development of a country, education is as important as economics	Topos or fallacy of past mistakes	If Özal treated education in the same way he treated economics, enough fund for education could be saved
34-35 our children... will get the level of education to carry the Turkey of the 2000s.	Claim 3: The law will enhance the level of education in Turkey	Topos of advantage	Since this law will make our children get the level of education to carry the Turkey of the 2000s, it should be implemented.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The overall tone of the text is positive and the author is happy with the political and social situation. The linguistic means of involvement manifest themselves in adjectives and adverbs especially those, which express the author's emotions towards the issue. 'Big contribution' in line 17 and the adjectives of 'great' (line 21) 'consistent' and 'influential' (line 18) are such examples.

At the beginning of the text, the author uses simple present when he explains things. He then switches to past simple when he tells what happened. For example: 'Bülent Ecevit and Deniz Baykal made a big contribution to that consequence.'

The author by making reference to his previous articles (line 17 'like we wrote before') tries to defend his position regarding the law at stake intertextually. The author also employs a rhetorical question (lines 36 and 37) with the same aim. This question is indicative of the author's critical point of view towards the people who are against the law of eight years of uninterrupted primary education. A rhetorical question is a figure of speech in the form of a question that is asked in order to make a point. A rhetorical question is not posed to elicit a specific answer, but rather to encourage the listener to consider a message (Sadock, 1971).

What the author says in line 33 '...this society is ready to bear that burden gladly' is an example of high epistemic modality. This shows the degree of certainty. As a final remark, it is to be noted that the author is quite hopeful about the future of Turkey and underlines the role of unity and solidarity in achieving the enactment of the law in question.

6.3. The Representation of the 1997-Dated Law in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text II -The Zaman Article

Text II (Appendix 2) is an article authored by Hüseyin Gülerce. Hüseyin Gülerce has been one of the most important figures in the Zaman newspaper and thus has been treated as one of the prominent voices of the agency. However, after the outbreak of the crisis between the JDP government and the Gülen movement at the

end of 2013 Gülerce declared that he resigned from the Zaman newspaper.⁵¹ Gülerce also used to be a member in the Board of Trustees of the Journalist and Writers Foundation⁵².

In terms of genre, the article can be regarded as a column in view of its content however it also bears the qualities of an editorial at the same time. The article entitled ‘Eight years of Education and the stance of Zaman’ was published on 18 August 1997, two days after the enactment of the law of eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education. The name of the ‘corner’ where the article was published is ‘Zaman’dan’ (From Zaman).

The article mainly deals with the law of eight years of uninterrupted education. In addition to this, it gives advice to the readers about what they should do to ask for rights (Lines 48, 49, 50). Thematically, the text can be divided into three parts. In the first part, the author introduces the topic. In the second part, the author presents his interpretation together with the agency’s standpoint. In the last part, the author describes the current situation in Turkey and paints a bleak picture of the country saying ‘In Turkey, unfortunately we could not find the ground for listening to one another, understanding one another and for mutual trust yet. (lines 44 and 45). The author ends the article giving some ‘advice’ to the readers.

The list of the topics below outlines the selected discourse topics and the discourses they are related within the pertinent field of social action.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text II

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the law of eight years of uninterrupted education
- Topic 1: The success of the military and the politicians having the same aim with the military

⁵¹For the interview wherein Gülerce speaks about the background of his resignation see, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/gulerce-zaman-sozcuye-dondu-hocaefendi-gitme-dese-bile-kusura-bakmayin-derim.268993> (03.09.2014).

⁵² The Journalists and Writers Foundation was founded in 1994. Fethullah Gülen is the honorary chairman of the foundation.

The Foundation made its main principle to organize events promoting love, tolerance and dialogue. For the web page of the foundation, visit <http://gyv.org.tr/Hakimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation> (27.03.2014)

- Topic 2: The view that secularism and democracy have been under threat as a factor for the enactment of the law
- Topic 3: The target has been the intermediate sections of the religious vocational high schools.
- Topic 4: The evaluation of the law as a ‘revolution’ and ‘victory’
- Topic 7: The law offended a wide segment who embrace the religious vocational schools
- Topic 8: The law is devoid of the desired consensus
- Topic 9: The law is politically motivated
- Topic 10: The law... should not be made a cause for polarization
- Topic 12: What matters is application
- Topic 14: The PM Yılmaz’s viewpoint concerning the period after the enactment of the law.
- Topic 16: The coalition partners and the RPP have merely stayed under the trench of eight year of education
- The discourse of the problems of education
- Topic 13: The shortcomings in terms of education, teacher...

The field of state institutions

- The discourse of the notion of ‘national will’
- Topic 5: Parliament is the reflection of the national will
- Topic 6: The result (enactment of the law) needs respect

The field of politics of democracy

- The discourse of democracy
- Topic 11: In democracies, the mistakes are rectified through elections

The field of economics

- The discourse of economic distress

- Topic 15: No improvements regarding the economic distress

The field of media

- The discourse of the stance of Zaman
- Topic 17: Zaman has been an advocate of science, common sense and compromise...
- Topic 19: We don't approve to ask for rights in front of mosques clashing with the police of the state.

The field of world politics

- The discourse of freedom of religion
- Topic 18: Clinton's proclamation of the law about the expansion of freedom of religion

Nomination/Referential Strategies

Pronouns are the most frequent linguistic elements that construe social groups in a text. The pronouns 'we' and 'they' can be used to create in and out groups. However, in this text, for the representations of social actors, pronouns are not used frequently. The only pronoun that is used frequently is the plural first person pronoun 'we' which refers to the author and the agency (Lines 26,33,40,48,49). The pronoun 'we' in line 44 refers rhetorically to all the people living in Turkey: 'In Turkey, unfortunately we could not find the ground for listening to one another.'

The acronym WP (line 7) refers metonymically to the politicians in the Welfare Party. The passive structure in lines 9, 10 suppresses the actors. Here, the author shifts the focus on the evaluation of the law in question thereby empowering how the law is treated among the people who are in favor of it. In the following lines (lines 16-18), the passive voice is used to background or hide the agents. The 'wide segment' in line 13 is an example of indetermination. One of the common ways to refer to 'the other(s)' is the use of indeterminate pronouns and adjectives for the actors in question, which is called as indetermination by Van Leeuwen (2008: 39). 'Our point of view' in line 20 refers to the author and the agency.

The ‘Parliament’ (line 11) is a personified institutional name and it stands metonymically for all the deputies and it is also defined as the reflection of the national will. The RPP in line 29 is another example of personified institutional name through which the party politicians are represented by the political party they belong to. An example of personification is seen in lines 46, 47 and 42, 43. The sentence ‘ZAMAN with the belief that these grounds must definitely be prepared makes an effort for not throwing away the bridges between different sectors.’ is such an example. In line 42 ‘The regimes who are not afraid of her people...’ is another example of personification.

The metaphor of ‘exam’ in line 30 conveys the view of the author that the process in the aftermath of the enactment of the law at stake will be tough. ‘Our people’ (line 35) refers metonymically to the people living in Turkey who are sensitive towards the issues of vocational religious high schools and Quran courses. The author here creates a homogeneous in-group characterized with having religious sensitivities. As a final remark, the only people who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized, are the Prime Minister Yılmaz and the President of the US Clinton. Clinton is represented as a reference point in the text. This representation is based on the standpoint that the US symbolizes freedom and Turkey should try to resemble to the US with regard to her free and democratic political system.

Table 2.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been the intermediate sections of the religious vocational high schools
The enactment of the ...law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been evaluated as a ‘revolution’ and a ‘victory’
This law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been enacted by offending a wide segment... • is devoid of the desired consensus
It (this law)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is politically motivated rather than for educational

The law	<p>purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should not be made a cause for polarization
The law (proclaimed by Clinton)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • clearly illustrates the point that a free and democratic America has reached.
The Parliament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is the reflection of the national will
In democracies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the mistakes are rectified through elections
The Prime Minister Yılmaz	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has said that “our essential work has now started”
We (the author and agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can say that the work this government is beginning now • have persistently declared that, the issue should be discussed by the experts... • are of the belief that the river finds the bed of the river • don't approve to ask for rights in front of mosques clashing with the police of the state.
The coalition partners and the RPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have merely stayed under the trench of 8 year of education
Zaman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been an advocate of science, common sense and compromise...
We (people living in Turkey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • could not find the ground for listening to one another...

Table 2.1 outlines the social actors in the article and the way they are predicated. It is noteworthy to state that negative predication is a remarkable strategy in referring to the enactment of the law in question.

Clinton in the text is presented as a point of reference (line 41). Through making reference to a law proclaimed by Clinton, the author also demonstrates his standpoint about the law of eight years of uninterrupted education. Although there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Yılmaz, we can deduce from what the author quotes of him that Yılmaz is aware of the importance and exhaustive character of the upcoming process in the aftermath of the enactment of the law at stake.

The Parliament is presented with almost no attribution. The Parliament is defined as the ‘the reflection of the national will’ in a neutral form. Positive lexicalization occupies a central place in predicating the Zaman newspaper. The author makes a selective use of positive lexicals to predicate the in-group Zaman. The Zaman newspaper is referred to as an ‘advocate of science, common sense and compromise’.

Finally, what we learn about the author and agency (represented by the first person plural pronoun -we) is mostly construed by verbal processes; ‘we can say that the work this government is beginning now, we have persistently declared that, the issue should be discussed by the experts..., we don’t approve to ask for rights in front of mosques clashing with the police of the state.’ all of which are positive. By contrast, some people living in Turkey (line 44, -we) is represented with a negative evaluation; ‘could not find the ground for listening to one another...’.

Table 2.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
5-8 main starting point has been the view that secularism and democracy have been under a serious threat...with this assent, the target has been the secondary parts of the religious vocational high schools and Quran courses.	Claim 1: For military officers and the politicians sharing the same objectives, secularism and democracy have been under a serious threat	Topos of danger Topos of threat	(For the military officers and some politicians), if secularism and democracy are under a serious threat, religious vocational high schools and Quran courses should be targeted.
11-12 Parliament is the reflection of the national will so it is needed to respect this result gentlemanly on behalf of democracy without forgetting what is going on behind the scenes.	Claim 2: It is needed to respect the passing of the law of eight years of uninterrupted education	Topos of definition	Since Parliament is the reflection of the national will, it is needed to respect this result.
13-14 this law which has been enacted by offending a wide segment ... is devoid of the desired consensus	Claim 3: The law lacks the desired consensus	Topos or Fallacy of lawfulness	If a law is enacted by offending a wide segment, it becomes devoid of the desired consensus

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
14-15 this law... is devoid of the desired consensus. Hence, it is politically motivated rather than for educational purposes.	Claim 4: The law is politically motivated.	Topos of lawfulness	If a law lacks consensus, this means that this law is politically motivated.
17-18 In democracies the mistakes are rectified through elections. It is needed to wait for the ballot box	Claim 5: In democracies the mistakes are rectified through elections	Topos of democracy	Since Turkey is a democracy, it is needed to wait for the ballot box (to rectify the mistakes).
42-43 The regimes who are not afraid of her citizens and pious ones can take brave steps in order to empower internal peace.	Claim 6: Internal peace can be empowered by the regimes that are not afraid of her citizens.	Topos of the force of facts	As long as the regimes do not fear from her citizens it can empower internal peace.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim draws on the view of the military officers and the politicians who have a similar mindset with that of the military officers. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: (For the military officers and some politicians), if secularism and democracy are under a serious threat, religious vocational high schools and Quran courses should be targeted. The second claim is supported by the topos of definition. By defining the Parliament as the reflection of the national will, the author argues that the enactment of the law of eight years of education should be respected despite not being the ‘desired’ outcome for some people.

The topos that supports the third claim is the topos of lawfulness. The author claims that the law lacks the desired consensus. The next claim is related with the previous claim. Furthermore by underlining the absence of the desired consensus of the law at stake, the author states that the law is politically motivated rather than being motivated for educational purposes (Line 15). The author resorts to the topos of democracy to sustain his claim. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since Turkey is a democracy, it is needed to wait for the ballot box (to rectify the mistakes). The author here clearly reveals his point of view by referring to the enactment of the law of eight years of education as a mistake.

Finally, the author resorts to the topos of the force of facts. By claiming that internal peace can be empowered by the regimes that are not afraid of her citizens, the author puts forward his view concerning the situation in Turkey. For him, internal peace in Turkey is not strong, this is because of the state attitude towards some particular groups, namely the pious citizens.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author takes a clear position vis-à-vis the enactment of the law in question. By saying that it is early for the presentation of the law as an ‘education reform’ he overtly reveals his point of view regarding the law at stake. The author finds the law at stake as politically-motivated and criticizes it for being devoid of consensus.

The article begins with a rhetorical question. Through such a question, the author tries to attract the readers' attention. The author tries to legitimize his take on the issue by making references to democracy and national will and writes that the law in question was enacted offending a wide segment who embrace the religious vocational schools and the Quran courses. The author tries to adopt an embracing tone rather than an exclusionary tone. By saying that, there is a need to respect the result (the enactment of the law), he clearly shows his approach to the decision taken in the Parliament no matter how much he criticizes.

The author in lines 16 and 17 employs deontic modality. ('The law of 8 years of education with regard to its political appearance should not be made a cause for polarization') Another modality used in the text is epistemic modality which refers to the degree of certainty.

The author through quoting the PM Yılmaz's words puts the stress on the significance of the process in the aftermath of the enactment of the law in question. It should be noted that while quotation marks generally show the detachment of the author, metaphors reflect the author's involvement. For instance, the 'exam' metaphor in line 30 conveys the view of the author that the process in the aftermath of the enactment of the law will be tough.

As a final remark, the author ends the article by giving advice to the readers. The author once again purports the standpoint of his agency and underlines the necessity of dialogue and tolerance for combating societal problems. Needless to say, this standpoint is also obvious in the author's adherence to the rhetoric of democracy and national will.

6.4.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Oktay Ekşi defines the law in question as a reform and miracle while Hüseyin Gülerce criticizes the law as being politically-motivated lacking the desired consensus (line 15). Oktay Ekşi presents the law as a success. By contrast, Hüseyin Gülerce writes that the law was enacted by offending a wide segment of society. In addition, despite not saying it overtly, Gülerce evaluates the law as a mistake and

resorts to the topos of democracy to argue that it is needed to wait for the ballot box to rectify the mistakes. Gülerce underlines the influence of army on the politicians in enacting the law in question.

With regard to the actors who played a role in the enactment of the law, Ekşi praises the PM Mesut Yılmaz and other figures as well; Ekşi puts blame on the Turgut Özal mentality for taking economic development before education. Gülerce does not represent the actors with their proper names and as stated above treats them as actors having the same objectives with the military.

The tone of the Zaman article is formal whereas the tone of the Hürriyet is personal. This difference can be seen as a result of the writing styles of Ekşi and Gülerce. Ekşi generally writes in a more personal and informal way. As the Zaman newspaper is characterized as being a conservative media outlet, it is not a surprise to see that the Zaman article puts emphasis on the feelings of pious citizens. On the contrary, the Hürriyet article puts emphasis on the education quality that will be introduced with the law in question. The emphasis put on education that is provided through secular means reveals the ideological orientation of the agency, i.e. Kemalism.

Finally, it is to be noted that, Ekşi frankly states the economic burden of the law while also arguing for the need of the law. Gülerce draws attention upon the technical shortcomings of the education system. This rhetorical move can be seen as an attempt of Gülerce for the negative presentation of the law in question. The ideological positions of both the newspapers and their audience play a major role in the different representation of the same issue. Through attributing negative traits to the law and the way it is enacted, the Zaman article reflects the attitude of her audience as well.

6.5.The Merve Kavakçı Affair in 1999

On May 2, 1999 when Merve Kavakçı, Istanbul deputy from the Virtue Party attempted to take the oath in the parliament with her headscarf, a crisis broke out. The majority of deputies stood up in line, yelling for several minutes: ‘Out, out, out

... Merve out, ayatollahs to Iran!’ They fiercely protested against her presence and shouted: ‘Turkey is secular, will remain secular!’ (Göle, 2002: 178).

The Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that ‘Here is not a place to challenge the state.’ The President Süleyman Demirel declared that Merve Kavakçı was an ‘agent provocateur’ whose turban was different from the Anatolian headscarf, and symbolized Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ in Iran and Afghanistan (Gürbüz, 2009: 241). Demirel continued to use harsh language against Kavakçı. “If you say, I am a Muslim because I covered my head, and those who do not cover are not Muslim, you are committing the world's greatest sin, and what you do is against Islam, it is separatism. Agent-provocateurs are seen a lot, and she is one of them” (quoted in Shively, 2005: 53).

The Kavakçı Affair takes as its starting point the general elections of April 18, 1999. One particular outcome of the April 18 elections was the fact that two women who wear headscarf had been elected to the parliament. One of these, Nesrin Ünal, was a representative of the Nationalist Action Party, while the other one was Merve Kavakçı (Ibid: 49).

According to Gürbüz (2009: 242) the representation of the ‘ideal’ Turkish woman was an important factor in the secularists’ interpretation of the Kavakçı Affair. For them, Kavakçı had worn a ‘turban’ rather than a ‘headscarf’⁵³ hence she represented the backward Ottoman reactionism (*irtica*), so she was an outsider and an enemy. It can be said that, for the secular elite, Merve Kavakçı despite having a good education and a good career represented Islamist threat and was defined as the ‘other’.

Condemnation from various parties and organizations continued for weeks after the event, and even members of Kavakçı's own party, including party chair Recai Kutan, publicly criticized Kavakçı for exposing the party to condemnation and

⁵³Headscarf does not have the same meaning as the word ‘turban’. The word *türban* is politically loaded with a meaning that hints at the transgressive nature of women in Islamist movements (Göle, 1996: 6). Headscarf is a customary way of covering hair common in Anatolia. As İlyasoğlu (1999) puts, the women donning *türban* are different from the women who are donning *başörtüsü* in that they are active participants of the politics and modern life rather than passive adopters of tradition. They are urban, modern, and well educated. The rural women and elderly women often wear a traditional scarf, known as the ‘*başörtüsü*’ which loosely covers the hair. In the 1980s, ‘turban’, emerged that “reflect[ed] both changing class dynamics and the politicization of Islam in Turkey.” (quoted in Vojdik, 2010: 667)

suspicion. Kavakçı herself defended her actions as legitimate. Within days, Kavakçı had convened a press conference in which she claimed she had broken no rules and had respected the laws also arguing that wearing the headscarf was a personal choice, not a political symbol (Shively, 2005: 52).

After the Kavakçı affair, people took to the streets in protest offending Kavakçı. The Kavakçı Affair did not stop at protests, five days after the oath ceremony it was revealed Kavakçı actually carried dual citizenship, Turkish and American. The secularists took this as a sign of Kavakçı's duplicity and lack of loyalty to the Turkish state, which seemed to confirm that Kavakçı was indeed an agent of 'outside forces.' (Ibid: 60).

Finally the Constitutional Court held Kavakçı and the Virtue Party in violation of Turkish constitutional law, based on the fundamental notion that these rights of religion and expression can exist only when they do not violate the supremacy and integrity of the state. Kavakçı lost her citizenship while the Virtue Party was subject to a case that sought to close the party for anti-secularist activities. The party was, in fact, forced to close in 2001 (Ibid: 64).

6.6. The Representation of the Kavakçı Affair in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text III- The Hürriyet Article

Text III (Appendix 3) was authored by Oktay Ekşi who has worked as the lead writer of Hürriyet for more than three decades.

The genre of the text mainly bears features of a journalistic text. It was published on May 4, 1999 two days after the Kavakçı Affair. The text serves as part of an on-going discussion on the religion-politics relations and the claim of 'how political Islamists harm secularism'. This article is the third of a series of nine articles written by the same author. In this column, the author is trying to tell many things in a few words with the utmost effect. As a result, the author expresses his personal take on the issue in an evaluative way.

The headline 'Merve will learn too' introduces the reader to the context of the article. It intertextually refers to the statements of the political elites and historical

experiences. The author mentions the topic at the very beginning, then provides examples from the past to empower his argument.

The contents of the text revolve mainly around the Kavakçı Affair. Thematically, the article unfolds in four steps. Firstly, the Kavakçı crisis is mentioned. Then in order to reveal the dimension of the crisis, Leyla Zana case is reminded arguing that both Kavakçı and Zana had the same aim. Accordingly, the author says ‘...the paths of the two are different but their objective is the same: the Republic built upon the principles of Atatürk’

The topics in the list below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic is allocated to a discourse and each discourse to a field of social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text III

The field of religion

- The discourse of being covered in Islam
- Topic 1:Rule of being covered

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the oath ceremony
- Topic 2: The oath ceremony in 1991
- Topic 3:Zana has abused the ceremony
- The discourse of state philosophy
- Topic 4:Kavakçı tried to overthrow the philosophy of the state
- Topic 5:The sabotage attempt
- Topic 6:The reaction against the sabotage attempt
- The discourse of leadership
- Topic 11: The Leader / Bureaucrat distinction
- Topic 12: Ecevit’s stance showing his leadership

The field of history

- The discourse of the past events
- Topic 8:İnönü's statement to the DP in 1953

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of challenging the state (philosophy)
- Topic 7:The TGNA, not a place to challenge the state
- Topic 10:Erbakan mind igniting to kick a goal to the secular republic.
- Topic 13: The determination of Turkish Republic not to sacrifice her philosophy

The field of judiciary

- The discourse of the law concerning how one can enter into Parliament
- Topic 9:Coming to parliament with headscarf

Nomination/Referential Strategies

After listing the selected discourse topics and discourses, I analyze how people, groups, events and concepts are named and referred to linguistically (nomination strategies).

In the headline of Text III saying 'Merve will learn too', the author does not mention the surname of the subject. This can be seen as an attempt of the author to degrade the reputability of the person in question, namely Merve Kavakçı. The title purports the peremptory and threatening attitude of the author. This is so, because in Turkish, the future tense sometimes points at a threatening meaning.

In line 1, 'our young lady' (hanım kızımız) is used to refer to Merve Kavakçı. The adjective 'young' is used in a sarcastic way to stress Kavakçı's incompetency in terms of becoming a deputy. The acronym TGNA refers metonymically to Turkish state philosophy besides serving as an abbreviation of Turkish Great National Assembly.

In the first paragraph, the social actors are indeterminate (vague) as in ‘the ones who pump our young lady called Merve Kavakçı up...’ In the following sentence, these people are referred to as ‘they’, a generalized exospheric reference. This linguistic tool is called indetermination through which the social actors are mystified (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). In this way, the author creates an anonymous group who challenge the basic philosophy of the state, namely secularism.

In line 5, the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ refers categorically to the writer and his agency. In line 11 ‘their’ refers to Merve Kavakçı and Leyla Zana who both aim to destroy the Turkish Republic. In lines 5-6, Kavakçı (as the subject) is referred in passive form. In the sentence ‘...Kavakçı has already been conditioned and charged with this objective’ shows that the identity of the actor is suppressed within the framework of an oriental-passive woman image (Göle, 1996). The author through employing passive structure shifts the focus towards the object of the sentence thereby empowering what Kavakçı will do, rather than Kavakçı herself. This can also be seen as a discursive strategy to degrade the personality of the subject (Kavakçı).

In line 13 ‘the recent sabotage attempt’ is used to refer to Kavakçı’s attempt to take oath in the Parliament. The ‘sabotage’ metaphor serves the author’s aim of putting stress on the ‘threat’ that Kavakçı poses to secularism. The acronym DP (line 20) stands metonymically for the party politicians. The title of ‘Pasha’ in line 24 is an example of functionalization in Van Leeuwen’s terms (2008: 42). In line 28, ‘the ones’ refers to the people who support Kavakçı’s appearance in the Parliament with her headscarf.

The third person plural pronoun ‘they’ is a generalized exospheric reference. The indeterminate reference to the people arguing that there is no law saying Kavakçı with her headscarf cannot come into Parliament stands in contrast to the personalized representation of the author and his agency with the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (line 5). In lines 36 and 37 (‘...State of the Turkish Republic that is determined not to make sacrifice of her basic philosophy and identity’) the Turkish Republic is personified. We all know that not the state but the statesmen protect the values of the state.

Table 3.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The ones who pump our young lady called Merve Kavakçı up	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• have created a serious crisis at the expense of her
They (The people supporting Kavakçı)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• wanted show all the world that they made the rule of “being covered” of Islam valid in TGNA too...
We (the author)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• expressed in the piece published in this column
Merve Kavakçı	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• has already been conditioned and charged with this objective.• has tried to do the same thing to overthrow the philosophy of this state• will learn then whom she is dancing with.
Leyla Zana	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• abused the oath ceremony
This recent sabotage attempt	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• has seen the strongest reaction initially in the Parliament
He (Bülent Ecevit)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• brought out another not so-known reality• has revealed that he has perused his years passed with İnönü well• too would coincide with the ones saying “ There is no law rule hindering Merve Kavakçı’s coming to Parliament incompatible with being covered”• would keep silent and make igniting to kick a goal to thesecular republic or to destroy another part of it redound.• is a leader

He (İsmet İnönü)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • said “I cannot even save you”
He (A Leader)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • manifests that character in critical times and keeps as a leader • otherwise turns into a bureaucrat
The State of Turkish Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is determined not to make sacrifice of her basic philosophy and identity. • is the objective of Leyla Zana and Kavakçı
The mindset of Erbakan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • igniting to kick a goal to the secular republic

The table outlines the social actors and how they are predicated. ‘The ones who pump our young lady called Merve Kavakçı up’ (line 1) depicts Kavakçı as a passive actor who cannot take steps on her own. This representation is in harmony with the suppression of her identity through passive voices within the framework of an oriental-passive woman image as seen in lines 5 and 6.

In the text, the ones who do not stand against Kavakçı’s entrance into Parliament are represented as people who aim to destroy the secular Republic. ‘The ones’ in line 28 are treated as a homogeneous group, the main characteristic of which is supporting Kavakçı.

On the other hand, the author describes the viewpoint of Necmettin Erbakan, the overthrown leader of the Welfare Party as ‘laik cumhuriyete gol atma yahut ondan bir parçayı daha yıkma özlemiyle tutuşan Erbakan kafası’ which literally means ‘the mindset of Erbakan igniting to kick a goal to the secular republic or to destroy another part of it’. In this sense, the author portrays supporting headscarf in the Parliament as harming secularism (or state philosophy) as kicking a goal to the secular republic. Both the idiomatic expression and the metaphor convey the standpoint of the author in a condensed form rather than in lengthy argumentative statements. Another metaphoric expression is used in line 38: ‘Merve Kavakçı will

learn then whom she is dancing with' This metaphor explicitly predicates the disadvantaged position attributed to Kavakçı with her headscarf in the Parliament.

Table 3.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
8-9 Leyla Zana has abused the oath ceremony with the aim to separate the state	Claim 1: The abuse of the oath ceremony aims to separate the state	Topos of abuse	Since Kavakçı has abused the oath ceremony similar to Zana she wants to separate the state as well.
15 Turkish Grand National Assembly, not the place to challenge the state	Claim 2: The TGNA is not the place to challenge state philosophy	Topos of the authority of place	Since TGNA is not the place to challenge the state, one has to respect the philosophy of the state there.
19 İnönü to DP:“I am watching your situation in the chair of the history: You are in the rush of the criminals”and “ I cannot even save you” before 27 May	Claim 3: When politicians break the laws, they get into the rush of the criminals	Topos of guiltiness	If politicians break the laws, they get into the psychology of guiltiness.
24-25 The ones who had the chance to work with him have benefited from this opportunity to the extent vis-à-vis their ability.	Claim 4: Working with İsmet İnönü is an opportunity	Topos of advantage	If Ecevit did not have the advantage of working with İnönü, the mindset of Erbakan igniting to kick a goal to the secular republic would redound.

<p>32If a leader does not change his/her character, he/she keeps as a leader, otherwise he/she turns into a bureaucrat</p>	<p>Claim 5:A leader does not change in critical times</p>	<p>Topos of comparison</p>	<p>If Ecevit changed his character in critical times, he would not keep as a leader.</p>
--	--	----------------------------	--

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim draws on the opinion of the author. For the author, taking oath with a headscarf in the parliament is equal to take an oath in the Parliament in Kurdish and both aim to destroy the state philosophy. The topos of abuse supports the view of the author that what Kavakçı attempted to do was as dangerous as what Leyla Zana had attempted to do in 1991. Through comparing Zana and Kavakçı, the author explicitly treats the public visibility of Islam as dangerous as the PKK terror which aims to divide the territorial integrity of Turkey.

The second claim is supported with the topos of the authority of place. By saying ‘TGNA is not the place to challenge the state.’ it enunciates the fact that a person should completely respect the philosophy of the state in TGNA. It should be stated that the second claim is intrinsically related to the first claim. Merve Kavakçı’s appearance in the Parliament with her headscarf means the abuse of the oath ceremony and this for the author is a clear indication showing that, the philosophy of the state has been challenged.

The quotation of İsmet İnönü and the topos of guiltiness aim to stress the irreversibility of the mistake that Kavakçı and her proponents have made. Quotes often serve as topoi of authority. It is precisely this form of argumentation that aims to be ‘objective’ and based on the authority of respectable personalities or institutions (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

In the fourth argumentation formulation, the author stresses the influential role of İsmet İnönü in the past and sees Bülent Ecevit in a similar position. The author resorts to the topos of advantage to sustain his position. The topos of advantage can be paraphrased by the following conditional: “if an action or decision is useful or bears advantages, then one should perform it.” (Wodak, 2001: 74) The argumentation can be formulized as such: If Ecevit did not have the advantage of working with İnönü, the mindset of Erbakan igniting to kick a goal to the secular republic would rebound.

Finally, the conditional clause in lines 32-33 is a discursive appeal to one of the features of leadership, i.e. keeping the same stance both in normal and critical times. Here, the author resorts to the topos of comparison. The argumentation

formulation is as follows: If Ecevit changed his character in critical times, he would not keep as a leader.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

In the previous parts of the analysis I have already mentioned how the choice of certain pronouns and verbs represent the author's standpoint, similarly mitigation and intensification strategies reflect the author's own attitudes towards the social reality. Needless to say, the author is strictly against the public visibility of headscarf in the Parliament and sees this as the main threat to the secular Republic. The author treats Kavakçı's appearance with her headscarf in the Parliament as sabotage. The metaphorical expressions in lines 30 and 38 reflect the standpoint of the author. The author through using the metaphor of 'kicking a goal to the secular republic' (line 30) portrays supporting headscarf freedom in the Parliament as a step taken to destroy the secular character of the Republican regime.

Through comparing Zana and Kavakçı, the author tries to underline the threat Kavakçı posed. In the text, direct quotations from Bülent Ecevit and İsmet İnönü are used to support the claim that the principle of secularism is under danger. The overall tone of the text is negative. The negative tone of the text is reflected by the use of depreciatory statements. At the beginning of the text, 'our young lady called Merve Kavakçı' is such an example. Similarly, at the end of the text 'our girl Merve' is another example. Here, the author depicts Kavakçı as a passive social actor in line with the 'passive-oriental' woman image (Göle, 1996).

The author uses present perfect tense when he writes about what happened, he switches to future tense using '-will' when he relates to the future. ('Our girl Merve will learn then whom she is dancing with') This particular choice also shows that the author adopts a threatening style in his views concerning Merve Kavakçı.

As a final remark, in lines 26 and 27, the author says that 'Ecevit has revealed that he had perused his years passed with İnönü well with his interference into the event in the Parliament.' This sentence is an example of epistemic modality which refers to the degree of certainty.

6.7. The Representation of the Kavakçı Affair in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text IV-The Zaman Article

Text IV (Appendix 4) is an article written by Ali Bulaç. Ali Bulaç took an active role in the foundation of the Zaman newspaper. Bulaç holds a BA degree in Sociology and Theology. Bulaç has published several books on Islam, nation-state, democracy, modernism and civil society. Bulaç also translated Quran into Turkish.

The corner of Ali Bulaç is called as the ‘Background’. The article entitled ‘TBMM ve TBDM’ (the acronym for Turkish Great National Assembly and Turkish Great State Assembly) was published on May 4, 1999, two days after the Kavakçı Affair. The article both in general and specific terms deals with the headscarf issue and how it should be treated under a democratic regime. It reflects the author’s take on the issue, as well as echoing the agency’s attitude. The genre of the text bears features of an academic text as well as a journalistic one. The genre of the article is a mixture of both a column and an op-ed. It bears the qualities of a typical news column and it is relatively short compared to most op-eds.

Thematically, the text can be divided into three parts. In the first part, the author introduces the topic. In the second part, the author explains the two points in Ecevit’s statements that need to be criticized. The author uses concepts like ‘democracy’, ‘political culture’, ‘ballot box’, and ‘political opposition’ which reveals that the text mainly employs topics from the field of politics. In the final part of the text, the author tries to call the readers to critical thinking and recommends Kavakçı to recede and turn to nation.

The list below outlines the selected discourse topics. There are the topics that are referred to in the text as well as the discourses which the topics are intrinsically related to, and the fields of actions where each discourse and discourse topic operate textually and discursively.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text IV

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the recent developments in Turkish politics

- Topic 1:Kavakçı's entrance into the Parliament
- Topic 2:Ecevit's remarks about the Kavakçı Affair
- Topic 13:What Kavakçı should do

The field of state institutions

- The discourse of challenging the state
- Topic 4:The TGNA, not a place to challenge the state
- The discourse of the supremacy of state institutions
- Topic 5: The TGNA is the most supreme institution of the state
- Topic 6: People who work in the TGNA have to obey the rules
- Topic 8: The role of the Parliament

The field of religion

- The discourse of clothing in Islam
- Topic 3: Nobody is concerned with ladies' wearing headscarf in terms of their faith
- Topic7: In Islamic theology headscarf is not an issue concerning only private life

The field of politics of democracy

- The discourse of democracy
- Topic 9: Parliaments can be formed by the people through free elections in certain periods
- Topic 10: The meaning of voting
- Topic 11: The state cannot appoint the person she wishes to the TGNA
- Topic 12: The parliament belongs to the nation not to state in democratic states

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The 'administrative team' (line 21) is an example of collectivization. Collectivization occurs when social actors are referred to as groups which are

realized by plurality, by a mass noun or noun denoting a group of people (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 38). ‘Democracies’ in line 23 stands metonymically for the democratic countries. In the following lines, ‘lots of people like Ecevit’ is an example of indetermination (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). The ‘state’ in line 28 refers metonymically to the state authorities.

The ‘Parliament’ (line 22) is an example of personified institutional name through which the members of the parliament are represented. The ‘TGNA’ (lines 7 and 29) is another example of personified institutional name. The only people who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized are Bülent Ecevit and Merve Kavakçı. Ecevit appears in the article mainly for referencing purposes. The author tries to explain his point of view by making references to Ecevit and making critiques about Ecevit.

The first person plural pronoun in the text (line 39) refers to the author himself while the pronoun ‘we’ stands for the people who have the same point of view as the author with regard to the Kavakçı Affair. Finally, the imperative saying ‘Think once’ purports how sure the author feels about his stance concerning the issue at stake.

Table 4.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Bülent Ecevit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reacted Kavakçı’s entrance into Parliament • made a speech in the Parliament.
TGNA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is not anybody’s private life sphere • is the most supreme institution of the state • is not a place to challenge the state. • would become TGSA if the state...

I (The author)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will try to tell...
Democracies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have brought the provision that...
Merve Kavakçı	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • entered the General Assembly of TGNA with her headscarf • has received from the nation the authority of representation

The representation of social actors constitutes the main ingredient of ‘the reality’ the author purports to represent. The table above outlines what sorts of actions the social actors are involved in. Merve Kavakçı is represented with a positive evaluation. The author describes Kavakçı as the person who has received from the nation the authority of representation with her headscarf. What we learn about Bülent Ecevit is mostly construed by verbal processes in simple past tense. (‘He reacted....; He made a speech)

In line 8, ‘those who work here’ refer to the members of the parliament. They are referred with an anaphoric expression which does not only suppress the identity of them but also subordinates them grammatically to the institution wherein they work. The author in lines 11-14 presents himself as an authority on the issue.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim draws on Ecevit’s elaboration of the TGNA as ‘the most supreme institution of the state’. Therefore, the claim is granted with more authority. The argumentation here can be formulated as such: since TGNA is the most supreme institution of the state, those who work there have to obey the rules, traditions of the state. The next claim consolidates the first claim. Here, again the author resorts to the topos of definition. The author claims states that TGNA is not the place to challenge the state.

The third claim contradicts with the first claim. The first claim is based on Prime Minister Ecevit’s viewpoint, whereas the third claim is based on the author’s

own standpoint. The argumentation here can be formulated as such: If parliament is the most supreme institution of the state, there would be no meaning in millions of people going to ballot box.

The fourth claim draws on the topos of democracy and is related with the third claim. By arguing that ‘If there is democracy, then parliaments can be formed by the people through free elections’ the author intrinsically consolidates the previous argument saying ‘If parliament is the most supreme institution of the state, there would be no meaning in millions of people going to ballot box.’

The last claim is an elaboration of the main determinants of a totalitarian regime. This claim implicitly supports the third argumentation formulation. These two claims support the author’s claim that under democratic regimes, liberties and elections have an irreplaceable role.

Table 4.2: Argumentation and Topoi in Text IV

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
7-8 Here is the most supreme institution of the state. Those who work here (TGNA) have to obey the rules, traditions of the state	Claim 1: People who work in TGNA have to obey the rules, traditions of the state	Topos of Definition	Since TGNA is the most supreme institution of the state, those who work there have to obey the rules, traditions of the state
8-9 This is not a place to challenge the state.	Claim 2: TGNA is not a place to challenge the state		Since TGNA is not a place to challenge the state, people working there should obey the traditions of the state
26-27 If parliament is the most supreme institution of the state, there would be no meaning in millions of people's going to the ballot box...	Claim 3: Parliament isn't the most supreme institution of the state		If parliament is the most supreme institution of the state, there would be no meaning in millions of people going to ballot box.
23-24 Democracies have brought the provision that the parliaments the parliaments equipped with this function and mission can be formed by the people through free elections in certain periods.	Claim 4: Parliaments can be formed through free elections in democratic regimes	Topos of Democracy	If there is democracy, then parliaments can be formed by the people through free elections

<p>35-36-37... there is no free and liberated space for individuals, social groups and for the people who is a sum of these. This is called secret or frank totalitarianism.</p>	<p>Claim 5:In totalitarian regimes, there is no free and liberated space for individuals...</p>	<p>Topos of Totalitarianism</p>	<p>When there is no free and liberated space for individuals this is called secret or frank totalitarianism.</p>
--	--	---------------------------------	--

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author mainly criticizes the way the headscarf issue is handled in a democratic country. Ecevit's words serve as a point for interpreting the Kavakçı Affair. However, the author obviously stands against Ecevit's line. The author through making reference to Ecevit's words tries to unmask the undemocratic practices in the country. After quoting Ecevit's words, the author expresses his claim with deontic modality. This represents the author's belief of what should be done rather than what is done or will be done. The author also employs volitional modality saying 'I will try to tell that constructing a direct relationship between headscarf and private life is a basic mistake with regard to Islamic theology and fiqh' Needless to say, the author is against the headscarf ban in the Parliament. This is evident in his disagreement with Ecevit's ideas about the definition of the TGNA.

The author through addressing Islamic theology and fiqh tries to strengthen his argument about the relationship between headscarf and public life. In line 15, the adjective 'mind-blowing' (akıllara durgunluk veren in Turkish) is an example of the author's attitude towards the issue at stake. This shows that the author strongly disagrees with Ecevit about the issue at stake.

The conditional clause in lines 26 and 27 is a discursive appeal to one of the features of a democratic regime, i.e. the elections. Finally, the recommendation the author gives to Merve Kavakçı in the last paragraph connotes that he is not in favor of keeping this tension alive. In addition, the conditional clause (lines 34-37) is a tool to strengthen the argument of the author about the recent situation in Turkish politics:

Think once, if practically, this Parliament is not the parliament of the nation but is the parliament of the state, under this circumstance, this means that there is no free and liberated space for individuals, social groups and for the people who is a sum of these...

6.8.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The representation of Merve Kavakçı in the Hürriyet newspaper is mostly realized within the framework of depreciatory statements and derogatory discourse. Oktay Ekşi accuses Kavakçı of abusing the oath ceremony and trying to overthrow the philosophy of the state. This accusation is in harmony with the secular ideology of the agency. Kavakçı's attempt to take the oath in the Parliament with her headscarf is represented with the metaphor of sabotage. Through comparing the Kurdish deputy Leyla Zana to Kavakçı, Ekşi constructs a direct relationship with the objectives of the two women and accuse them of being engaged in undermining Turkish Republic.

By contrast, Ali Bulaç evaluates Kavakçı as an actor who has received from the nation the authority of representation with her headscarf. On the contrary, Kavakçı's appearance in the Parliament is represented as a basic democratic right in the Zaman newspaper. In terms of the representation of the Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, there are striking differences in each article. Ekşi attributes positive predicates to Ecevit (such as leadership) while Bulaç attributes negative predicates to Ecevit.

As a final remark, Ekşi reminds the readers of the 1960 coup in order to underline how alarming the Kavakçı Affair was whereas Bulaç adheres to the democracy rhetoric to empower his argument about the Kavakçı affair. It is known that, the 1960 coup symbolizes one of the critical events while debating Turkish democracy. The secular(ist) people salute the coup and define it as a revolution for the Republic while the conservative people condemn it and see it as a serious blow to democratic principles. So, it can be said that Ekşi's rhetorical tactic of referring to the 1960 coup is not a coincidence. It is to be noted that, there is an emphasis put on the notion of democracy in the Zaman article while there is an emphasis put on the notion of state philosophy and Kemalist principles in the Hürriyet article. Bulaç mentions the concept of totalitarianism to imply how Kavakçı was treated was at odds with the democratic norms and procedures whereas Ekşi mentions the concept of secularism to draw attention to the threat Kavakçı posed to the Republic.

6.9.The Constitutional Amendment Allowing Women To Wear Headscarves In Universities Which Passed in February 2008 and annulled by the Constitutional Court in June 2008

On February 9, 2008, Turkey's ruling JDP and one of the opposition parties, the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) introduced two constitutional amendments that would allow headscarf wearing students to get into university campuses. 411 members of the parliament voted for removing the headscarf ban while 103 members voted against it.

Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution which guarantees equality before the law was amended to ensure for citizens equal access to all public services; and Article 42 on the right to education was changed to include a phrase preventing anyone from being denied access to education except for a reason openly stated in law (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 515).The amendment at stake stated that: "Except otherwise stated in the laws of the Republic, no one can be prevented from pursuing the right to university education. The limit to the ways in which this right is pursued is specified by law." (Elver, 2008).

Historically, the first veiling controversy happened in 1968 when Hatice Babacan, a student of the Ankara University Theology Faculty was dismissed for wearing headscarf at school. However, the main controversies emerged with the 1980s when a considerable increase in the number of veiled students attending universities started (Çemrek, 2004: 53). The headscarf ban was softened under the rule of Turgut Özal. However, this changed in 1989 when the Constitutional Court argued that in a secular regime, the religions should be depoliticized and kept in people's consciences (Özdalga, 1998: 39-50).

On the other hand, it should be stated that, a decision taken in 1991 made it clear that it was not illegal to cover one's head in the public sphere (Cindoğlu and Zencirci, 2008: 799). In 1998, the Higher Education Council (YÖK) had reinstated the ban and advised all universities to apply it, warning that university presidents who did not comply would risk dismissal (Cindoğlu and Zencirci, 2008: 799). This regulation was a direct result of the February 28 Process.

When the JDP came to power in 2002, the party officials declared that the party would fight all the bans and non-democratic practices. The 2008 constitutional amendment was a step in such a direction. In the aftermath of the headscarf bill, a considerable amount of discontent arose among the secular circles most notably among the main opposition party (Republican People's Party) circles. The constitutional court annulled the amendment on June 5, 2008 on the basis that it went against the constitution's secular principles. The decision stated that the two amendments were invalid as they violated the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution. Such principles were expressly stated in the Constitution as one of the unchangeable characteristics of the Turkish Republic (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 515).

6.10. The Representation of the Constitutional Amendment in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text V-The Hürriyet Article

Text V (Appendix 5) is an article authored by Oktay Ekşi. The article was published on February 10, 2008, one day after the introduction of the constitutional amendment that would allow headscarf wearing students to get into university campuses. Written by the lead writer of the newspaper, the article already carries a considerable degree of significance. It both reflects the author's position and the position of the agency as well.

The article entitled 'The Lesson' has an informal and personal style. The article both in general and specific terms deals with the revision of the two articles of the constitution that would lift the headscarf ban at universities. Thematically, the article can be divided into two parts. The first part (lines 1-22) introduces the topic and presents the author's interpretation. In the second part (lines 23-43), the article generally criticizes the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the law professor Ergun Özbudun.

The selected discourse topics below outline the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are related to, and the fields of action where each discourse operates.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text V

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the law amendment
- Topic 1: The revision of the two articles of the constitution
- Topic 2: The situation concerning article 10
- Topic 7: For days, we are busy with the discussions about the amendment of the two articles...
- The discourse of pleonasm
- Topic 3: Putting functionless words into a law provision
- The discourse of the situation of the Justice and Development Party
- Topic 4: The JDP needed support to carry out her mission
- Topic 5: They solved it through Devlet Bahçeli's foresight...
- Topic 6: They ignored the suggestion of Prof. Özbudun...

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The headline 'The lesson' is a clear cut title expressing the standpoint of the author concerning the law amendments that would lift the headscarf ban at universities. The title reveals that the author positions himself as an authority in the evaluation of the recent situation in question. Considered within the context, the readers would already know that the author is also disappointed with the stance of some academics and intellectuals about the issue.

In the first sentence, the third person plural pronoun 'they' stands for the deputies of the ruling JDP along with the deputies of the NAP who introduced the constitutional amendment. The author poses rhetorical questions to attract the attention of the readers in lines 12 -13 and 37-39. Here, by using that kind of

question, the author also tries to show the reader the validity of his argument about what he calls ‘pleonasm’.

Pronouns (especially ‘we’ and ‘they’) are important in drawing the boundaries between in-groups and out-groups. The third person pronouns, as it is hidden most of the time in Turkish are generally used for anaphoric reference as in line 15. ‘They’ in line 27 refers to the JDP politicians. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ in lines 31-32 stands for the author and the agency. The author creates a homogeneous in-group by using this pronoun. Another ‘we’ in line 35 refers to all the people living in Turkey.

The JDP (in lines 14, 28, 38-39) is an example of personified institutional names through which the party politicians are represented by the political party they belong to. We all know that, it is not the JDP but the members of the party who need support to carry out the mission written in the party program. The passive voice used in the long sentence (lines 19-22) aim to background or hide the agents. The idiomatic expression in line 29 (‘the truth of the matter is different’, *kazın ayağının öyle olmaması* in Turkish) conveys the personal and informal tone of the text.

One of the common ways to refer to ‘the others’ is the use of indeterminate pronouns and adjectives for the actors in question. ‘Some writers’ (line 33) is an example of indetermination. In such a way, the author tries to make the social actors anonymous.

Table 5.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
They (The JDP and NAP deputies)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• made revision in two articles...• made the phrase “and in taking advantage of all sorts of public service” get added...• solved it through Bahçeli’s foresight

They (The JDP members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ignored the suggestion of Prof. Dr. Özbudun • showed Özbudun... that the truth of the matter is different
The Justice and Development Party	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • needed such a support to carry out her mission...
We (the author and the agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • think that it is enough for him to evaluate the scene better...
We (people in Turkey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are busy with the discussions...

Attributing positive values to the Self and negative values to the Other are the two well-known strategies of predication. As seen in Table 5.1, the appellative denominations in the text would not be considered to be negatively or positively biased if we took them at face value.

From the very beginning of the text, the author presents himself as an authority in the issue and uses technical terms (lines 6-11) to strengthen his standpoint. The author describes what the JDP members did through employing an idiomatic expression in line 29 ('the truth of the matter is different', *kazın ayağının öyle olmaması* in Turkish). What we learn about the political parties that played an active role in the lift of the headscarf ban in universities (JDP and NAP) is construed by verbal processes.

The evaluations pertaining to 'the other' in the text tell us more about the position of the author concerning the constitutional amendment at stake. For instance, the author accuses the JDP of ignoring the suggestion of Prof. Özbudun and thus represents the government as an insincere actor in dealing with the headscarf issue.

Argumentation Strategies

Text V bears the features of an explanatory article rather than of an argumentative article. The table below shows the argumentation structure of the article. The first claim states that it is impossible to revise a law without a majority in the Parliament. The argumentation can be formulated as follows: If a party has the majority of the seats in the parliament, it can revise a law.

The second claim draws on a general rule valid in the field of constitutional law. Therefore the claim is presented in an authoritative manner. The argumentation here can be formulated as such: If you put functionless words into a law provision, you would make verbalism in vain. This depends on the view of the author that the constitutional amendment in question is an example of such an action. The next claim is directly related with the previous claim. The author resorts to the topos of definition to strengthen his argument. This topos enunciates the claim that putting functionless words into a law provision used to be called pleonasm.

Lastly, the author resorts to the topos of support. The argumentation here can be formulated as such: Unless a political party has support, it cannot make some particular policies. Here, the author evaluates the policy-making procedure of the JDP about the law in question.

Table 5.2: Argumentation and Topoi in Text V

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-2 They made revision in two articles of the Constitution depending on their majority in the Parliament.	Claim 1: It is impossible to revise a law without a majority in the Parliament	Topos of the situation in the Parliament	If a party has the majority of the seats in the parliament, it can revise a law.
6-7 if you putfunctionless words into a law provision, you would make verbalism in vain.	Claim 2: Functionless words in a law cause verbalism in vain	Topos of consequence	If you putfunctionless words into a law provision, you would make verbalism in vain.
6 This used to be called“pleonasm”before	Claim 3: Puttingfunctionless words into a law provision used to be called“pleonasm”before	Topos of definition	If you putfunctionless words into a law provision, This used to be called“pleonasm”before
14-15Anyway... The Justice and Development Party needed such a support to carry out her mission....	Claim 4: The JDP needed support to carry out her mission	Topos of support	Unless a political party has support, it cannot make some particular policies.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author questions the sincerity of the ruling JDP about democracy. The author writes in an informal style like he is making a dialogue with his readers. He poses rhetorical questions with the aim to both empower his position and keep the reader vigilant. The author uses another rhetorical question in the last paragraph.

By nominalizing deputies like Ertuğrul Kumcuoğlu, Mithat Melen, Deniz Bölükbaşı, Tunca Toskay, Tuğrul Türkeş, the author attempts to draw a clear picture of how the constitutional amendment in question has been performed. The author tries to describe the situation related with the constitutional amendment in question by referring to imaginary situations. This rhetorical move is called as ‘counterfactuals’. Counterfactual arguments are based on imaginary or false situations. “An imaginary situation is constructed in order to better predict expected negative consequences used to persuade the audience of the necessity of specific policy measures” (Van der Valk, 2003: 320).

The author ends his article with an epistemic modality saying ‘every experience is useful’. This shows that the author treats all the related process as some kind of an experience which is useful.

6.11. The Representation of the Constitutional Amendment in the Zaman Newspaper

Text VI-The Zaman Article

The sixth article (Appendix 6) to be analyzed was authored by the chief editor of the Zaman newspaper Ekrem Dumanlı. Ekrem Dumanlı started working for Zaman in 1993 as a correspondent in Culture and Arts Department of the newspaper. Dumanlı has been working as the chief editor of Zaman since 2001. The article entitled ‘Headscarf or gangs dangerous?’ was published on March 11, 2008, two days after the introduction of the constitutional amendment that would allow headscarf wearing students to get into university campuses. The title of Text VI reading ‘Headscarf or gangs dangerous?’ poses a thought-provoking question and gives idea about the content of the article.

The article both in general and specific terms deals with the headscarf issue along with questioning the role of the media in representing the headscarf issue. The article can be regarded as a column in view of its content, however looking at its structural privileges it bears the qualities of an editorial at the same time.

The article consists of three parts with sub-titles. The first part (lines 1-19) deals with the headscarf issue by making reference to the gang problem of Turkey. The Ergenekon gang is noteworthy to state here. The author claims that headscarf and the gang issues are used as two elements of comparison in Turkey. The second part (lines 21 -28) points to how silence has bolstered the morale of the gangs. The last part (lines 30-51) concentrates on the justification of writing such an article.

The topics in the list below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic is allocated to a discourse and each discourse to a field of social action where it emanates from. It should be noted that, a discourse belonging to a particular field of social action also relates to another and usually overlaps with other discourses from various fields of social action.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text VI

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of improper comparison
- Topic 1: The headscarf and gang should not be used as two elements of comparison

The field of the media

- The discourse of media representation of the headscarf issue
- Topic 2: The headscarf and gang issue hold the character of litmus paper for the media

The field of local politics

- The discourse of gangs
- Topic 3: Getting ganged has reached unbelievable dimensions
- Topic 4: Retired or active military officers and policemen and the people known as the mafia
- Topic 5: The people having the most secret intelligence information of the state
- Topic 6: They are in preparation of numerous issues from organizing assassination to planning irregular warfare
- Topic 7: Sketches, maps, plans,... Heavy guns, bombs, munitions
- Topic 8: The politicization of the people who wear the official dress of police or military officer
- Topic 9: Sauna gang, Bursa gang, Şemdinli gang, Eryaman gang, Ergenekon gang
- Topic 11: The gangs make every kind of dress change for chaos.
- The discourse of being silent
- Topic 10: The silence of some people about the headscarf issue
- The discourse of the constitutional amendment
- Topic 11: The need to have a look at the constitutional amendment bringing freedom for headscarf from the perspective of deep gangs.
- Topic 12: Fethullah Gülen's warning
- Topic 13: Provocation attempts in the aftermath of the amendment

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The passive voice in the first sentence shifts the focus on the activity rather than the actors who do it. Here, the author puts the stress on the improperness of comparing the gangs and the headscarf issue. 'Turkey' in line 9 stands metonymically for the people living in Turkey. The 'people' (lines 5 and 15) are examples of indetermination. In a similar way, the indeterminate pronoun of 'those' in line 49 aims to mystify the excluded social group. The 'ones writing the

horror film script’ in line 50 bears the same aim too. These social groups stand for the people who may provoke the process concerning the headscarf freedom. In lines 21 and 26, there is another example of indetermination through which the identity of the social actor is mystified.

There are two sub-titles in the text. The first one reads ‘Silence has bolstered the morale of the gangs’. The idiomatic and metaphorical expressions used in lines 26-27-28 are examples of tropological uses of language which will be addressed in the following part of the analysis.

The second sub-title reads ‘There is no need to make fear trade’. ‘Fear trade’ is a mental metaphor in which fear is replaced with a commodity. It has a negative connotation and means that some people benefit from some other people’s fears. As noted, the pronoun ‘we’ and ‘they’ are frequently used to construe pertinent in- and out-groups. ‘They’ in lines 32, 34-35-36 refers to the gang members whereas ‘we’ (line 37) refers to all the people living in Turkey.

As a final remark, the only social actor that is named in the text, i.e. nominalized is Fethullah Gülen. The author does this for referencing purposes and treats Gülen as an actor whose ideas matter.

Table 6.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The people who employ any mean for reaching a certain end	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can even use the values the nation respects and attaches importance for their dirty purposes
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has witnessed a rather apparent reality in recent years
These people They	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have the most secret intelligence information of the state • are in preparation of numerous issues from organizing assassination to planning irregular warfare

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been messed with many dirty works from drug trade to weapon trade • provoke the ‘Islamists’ with ‘secularist’ tone • wear the dress of separatist organization • sometimes get mixed with racism vein • sometimes abuse sectarianism • go to church • lick the dust
The gangs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • make every kind of dress change in order to be able to make a chaos environment
Fethullah Gülen He (Gülen)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has made a very important warning during the week • talked about ‘men and women dressed in hijab’

As Table 6.1 shows, some of the social actors are construed by verbal processes. ‘Turkey’ in line 9 refers metonymically to all the people living in Turkey while in line 3 it is a spatio-temporal reference.

The indeterminate ‘these people’ refers to retired or active military officers, policemen and the people known as the mafia (lines 10-11). In parallel to that, ‘they’ refers to the same group of people as well. These people are construed by verbal processes; ‘they provoke, abuse...’ most of which are negative. ‘The ones who become as strong as lion when it comes to the children with eyes full of tears who cannot get university education get stucked in a corner having their tails between their legs.’ (lines 26-28) refers to the people who keep silent about the headscarf ban in universities. In addition, it can be said that, negative lexicalization occupies a central place in predicating the social actors who stand against headscarf freedom.

As a final remark, in the text, Fethullah Gülen is represented as the person offering the only plausible approach to the probable provocations that would

emerge in the aftermath of the constitutional amendment that lifts the headscarf ban in universities.

Argumentation Strategies

The argumentation scheme in Text VI draws on the main claims, topoi and fallacies that make up the warrants and justifications of these. In the first claim stating that headscarf and gang should not be compared with each other, the author criticizes the current situation in Turkey regarding the ongoing debate over the headscarf issue. The argumentation here can be formulized as follows: Since a direct relationship cannot be considered between the headscarf and the gang issues, they are not suitable for comparison. The second claim states that ‘In Turkey unlike other countries, the topics which are disconnected from each other have relationship.’ Here, the author resorts to the topos of specificity of a country. This claim is related with the previous claim.

The author supports the next claim through resorting to the topos of sameness. The argumentation here is as follows: Since nothing concerning the issue of getting ganged in Turkey changes, system is the same. Here, the author makes a general criticism over the current situation in Turkey.

The final claim states that there are provocation attempts. The author employs the topos of threat in order to justify his claim in the following lines: Fethullah Gülen has made a very important warning during the week. ..Not pointless this warning is! [SIC]. It is because before too were made such provocation attempts [SIC].

Table 6.2: Argumentation and Topoi in Text VI

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-2 Normally the headscarf and gang should not be used as two elements of comparison. This is so because, a direct relationship between these cannot be considered	Claim 1: Headscarf and gang should not be compared with each other	Topos of comparison	Since a direct relationship cannot be considered between the headscarf and the gang issues, they are not suitable for comparison.
3-4 Here is Turkey; the topics which are disconnected from each other to the degree that is not seen in any country in the world can have relationship with each other.	Claim 2: In Turkey unlike other countries, the topics which are disconnected from each other have relationship	Topos of specificity of a country	Since Turkey has its own unique character, the topics which are disconnected from each other have relationship.
9-14 Turkey has witnessed a rather apparent reality in recent years that getting ganged has reached unbelievable dimensions. System is always the same...	Claim 3: The system of getting ganged in Turkey never changes in Turkey.	Topos of sameness	Since nothing concerning the issue of getting ganged in Turkey changes, system is the same.
41-43 Fethullah Gülen has made a very important warning during the week. ..Not pointless this warning is! [SIC]. It is because before too were made such provocation attempts [SIC].	Claim 4: There are provocation attempts	Topos of threat	Since there have been provocation attempts, Gülen has made a warning.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

Modality choices are parts of mitigation and intensification strategies. There is an example of deontic modality in line 1: Normally the headscarf and gang should not be used as two elements of comparison. As noted, deontic modality has to do with the necessity or obligation expressed by the author. There is an example of epistemic modality in line 10: System is always the same. Epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty. Other examples of epistemic modality are evident in lines 30, 40 and 48: There is another reason...; There is a need to have a look at the constitutional amendment...; There is a link...

The author criticizes the people whom he calls as ‘ulusalçı⁵⁴’ for supporting illegitimate things like swearing to kill on behalf of ‘regime is under threat’ rhetoric. The author writes that he does not find the masses who protest the headscarf credible because of their linkage with the ulusalçı people. The author also strongly criticizes the columnists and journalists who write plenty of articles about the threat of reactionism (irtica) but prefer to keep silent when it comes to the issue of illegal activities. The author writes that those columnists have not written any single piece about the gangs and sees this as a shame. The author defines them as ‘the ones who become as strong as lion when it comes to the children with eyes full of tears who cannot get university education get stucked in a corner having their tails between their legs.’ (lines 26-28). In line to that, the adjectives of ‘dirty’ (lines 6 and 18) and ‘dark’ (line 48) are linguistic means of involvement, they express the author’s attitude towards the social actors who do not support headscarf freedom or even oppose it.

Quotation marks can be used either as a sign of detachment or as a sign indicating respect for authority. The quotation taken from Fethullah Gülen (line 42) is used for referencing purposes showing respect for authority. This rhetorical choice derives from the identity of the agency as well as the Zaman newspaper is affiliated with the Gülen Movement.

⁵⁴ Three fundamental elements in ulusalçı thought can be distinguished as follows: uncompromising anti-Westernism, externalization of Islam from Turkish nationalism and ethnic exclusion (Uslu, 2008: 76).

Finally, the author uses ‘fear trade’ as a mental metaphor in which fear is replaced with a commodity. As noted above, it has a negative connotation and the author means that some people benefit from some other people’s fears. Here, the author accuses the people who stand against the headscarf freedom.

6.12. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The representation of the headscarf bill in question is presented through the use of technical terms taken from the field of law in the Hürriyet article. Oktay Ekşi describes how the constitutional amendment was made in detail. On the contrary, the Zaman article does not represent the headscarf bill from the perspective of how the bill was made. Unlike Ekşi, Ekrem Dumanlı does not employ topics/contents from the field of law while explaining how the bill was made.

Ekşi criticizes the JDP for being insincere in terms of democracy while lifting the headscarf ban in universities. This criticism stems from the view that the efforts of lifting the ban on headscarf does not contribute to democracy. Ekşi also draws attention to the disappointment of Professor Ergun Özbudun for trusting the JDP with regard to democracy. On the contrary, Dumanlı does not mention the JDP in his article and approaches to the issue from a very different point of view. Dumanlı draws attention to the problem of gangs and says that the people who treat the headscarf issue as a threat keep silent about the problem of gangs. The stress that Dumanlı puts on the gangs can be seen as a direct outcome of the threat perception he has received. Dumanlı also claims that the silence has bolstered the morale of the gangs while heavily criticizing the media coverage of the headscarf issue.

6.13. The Lift of the Headscarf Ban In Public Places On October 8, 2013.

The ban on headscarf in public places was lifted within the framework of wide-ranging reforms driven by the JDP government. This decision entered into force after getting published in the Official Gazette on October 8, 2013. The measure was hailed by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as a ‘step toward normalization’. “We have now abolished an archaic provision which was against the

spirit of the republic. It's a step toward normalization”the PM Erdoğan said in a parliamentary speech to his party members “A dark time eventually comes to an end.” he said.⁵⁵

As noted earlier, the headscarf issue was accepted as a matter of education and underdevelopment in the official discourse and it was believed that the headscarf would disappear as a result of education, urbanization and development which were the objectives of Kemalist modernization project (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008).The rural women and elderly women often wear a traditional scarf, known as the ‘başörtüsü’ which loosely covers the hair. In the 1980s, a different form of covering, called the ‘turban’, emerged that “reflect[ed] both changing class dynamics and the politicization of Islam in Turkey.” (quoted in Vojdik, 2010: 667).

In the 1980s, Turkey’s headscarf-wearing women began to assert their identity. These largely urban women started to pursue university education and employment opportunities however they faced the resistance of the Kemalist-secularist sector. After the 1980 coup, General Kenan Evren banned headscarf by means of a National Security Council (NSC) decree. However when Turgut Özal came to power with center, right and Islamic support, the YÖK lifted the headscarf ban on condition that women wore a headscarf in a ‘modern way’

After the NSC meeting held on 28 February 1997, Turkey entered a new phase of fundamentalist secularism, having radical effects on the headscarf issue. However in 2002, the election victory of the JDP paved the way for the softening of the headscarf problem. In 2008, the party with the support of 411 deputies had introduced a constitutional amendment that would allow headscarf wearing students to get into university campuses. However this step had been hindered by the Constitutional Court annulment. Finally in 2013, the headscarf ban in public places was lifted when a democratization package was introduced.

⁵⁵<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10363821/Turkey-lifts-Islamic-headscarf-ban-in-civil-service.html> (13.05.2014)

6.14. The Representation Of The Lift Of The Headscarf Ban In Public Places In The Hürriyet Newspaper

Text VII-The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 7) is a column authored by Mehmet Y. Yılmaz. Mehmet Y. Yılmaz began his journalism career in 1975. Yılmaz worked as the founder editor-in-chief of many journals. Yılmaz has been currently working as a columnist in Hürriyet. The headline of the article reads ‘For them, the name of the woman has never existed’. The article was published on October 7, 2013 one day before the publishing of the lift of the headscarf ban in public places on the Official Gazette.

The article consists of three parts each of which deals with a different topic presented with a particular sub-title. However it should be noted that although the headline is directly covering the headscarf issue, only the first part which is also the part that is analyzed from a critical discourse perspective deals with the lift of the headscarf ban in public places.

The part to be analyzed (Appendix 7) which is about the headscarf issue is the first part. The second part covers the legal regulations about the police force and criticizes the weakening of the liberties vis-à-vis the democratization package. The third part deals with the case opened against Ömer Faruk Eminağaoğlu, the head of the Syndicate of Judges.

The topics in the list below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text VII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the democratization package
- Topic1: Headscarf freedom in public places as the most important development stemming from the democratization package
- The discourse of the developments under the JDP rule

- Topic 2: Treating the employment policy of JDP government as partisanship
- Topic 3: Political closeness has never got ahead of merit and knowledge that much in any period
- Topic 4: The decrease of the number of women in top-level jobs in public sector
- Topic 5: The mentality which holds the power today can be summarized as the ‘place of woman is home’
- Topic 6: The causes behind the mentality which sees the place of woman as home
- The discourse of the position of women in public and private sector
- Topic 7: The author’s personal view about the regulation paving the way for headscarf freedom
- Topic 8: Green capital did not lean to woman employment
- Topic 9: Even their personal assistants have been chosen from men
- Topic 10: The suffering of the women with headscarf will not come to an end
- Topic 11: The use of headscarf victimhood as a political weapon
- Topic 12: The mentality in power has not cared about woman rights

Nomination/Referential Strategies

Beginning with the headline reading ‘For them, the name of the woman has never existed’, the author draws a sharp distinction between us and them. ‘They’ in the text refers to the politicians in the political party that is in power, i.e. the JDP. There is an example of personification in lines 1 and 5. We all know that not the JDP government but the politicians of it follow some particular policies.

As a common way to construct social groups, pronouns are used to construct opposing social groups in texts. Similarly in this text, the first personal pronouns ‘we’ (lines 4 and 14) refer to all the people living in Turkey. The third person plural

pronoun ‘they’ (lines 21 and 25) stands for the businessmen having close ties with the JDP government who did not prefer to employ headscarf wearing women. Apart from that, ‘they’ in line 3 refers to the women with headscarf who work in public sector. The first person pronoun refers to the author in the text while ‘you’ stands for the readers of the agency.

The metaphor of ‘green capital’ in line 19 is used to refer to the business circles having the same mindset with the JDP politicians. The ‘green capital’ can be seen as an example of euphemism. Euphemism is the use of a mild word instead of one that is offensive or unpleasant. The author uses the term ‘green capital’ to refer to the financial basis of the Islamist actors.

The passive voices used in lines 22, 23 and 29 aim to shift the focus on the activity while backgrounding the social actors. The ‘Prime Minister’ in line 2 is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). The PM is not nominalized by proper names which can be seen as part of an accusation strategy. The ‘mentality which holds the power today’ (‘Bugün iktidarda olan zihniyetin en belirgin düşüncesi’) in lines 9, 16 and 30 refers to the viewpoint of the politicians in JDP concerning the position of women in social life.

Finally, the ‘heads’ in line 23 is an example of somatization. Somatization is the representation of social actors by means of references to a part of their body (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45).

Social Actors and Predications

The author beginning with the headline succinctly sets the scene for his version of events and draws a sharp distinction between us and them. ‘They’ refers rhetorically to the social actors (green capital and JDP) he questions and treats as sincere in the issue of headscarf freedom. We can understand his evaluation of insincerity in line 21: ‘They could employ the women with headscarf, they did not.’ The evaluations pertaining to the ‘other’ in the text shows that the author accuses the social actors, namely the JDP and the green capital for using the ‘headscarf victimhood’ as a political weapon (lines 29-30).

The polarity that is drawn by the conjunction ‘bir /diğer yandan’ (‘on the one hand / on the other hand’) puts emphasis on the causes of the decrease in the number

of women in top level jobs in the public sector. The author uses the phrase ‘the mentality in power’ to refer to the politicians in JDP. In such a way, the author evaluates the politicians in JDP through a pejorative rhetorical framework. Connected with this, it is noteworthy to state that the ‘mentality’ (zihniyet) is a loaded word in Turkish language. The usage of this word attributes a negative value to the social actor.

Table 7.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
We (people in Turkey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will see how much the regulations providing opportunity for the women in public places to wear headscarf will change this.
My personal view	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is in the direction that not too much thing will change.
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • do not like this definition that much but I have to use it... • will say the “suffering” of the women with headscarf will not come to an end.
They (Businessmen close to the government)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • could employ the women with headscarf, but did not.
You (readers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have noticed that even their personal assistants have been chosen from men
The place of woman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is home
The mentality in power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has not cared about woman rights

The mentality

- which have not appointed any woman minister for any executive ministry so far will proceed in the same path

Argumentation Strategies

In Table 7.2, I have outlined the main claims and topoi in the text. The first claim states that political closeness has never got ahead of merit and knowledge that much in any period. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: If a government follows partisanship-based policies in public sector that makes political closeness get ahead of merit and knowledge. Through resorting to the topos of partisanship, the author blames the Justice and Development Party government for following partisanship-based policies.

The next claim stating that there is a decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector is supported by the topos of consequence. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: If executive positions in the public sector are distributed in a partisan way that leads to decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector. Here, the author overtly states that under the JDP government, there has been decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector.

The author resorts to the topos of reality in order to justify his final claim stating that the ‘green capital’ did not lean to woman employment. This claim is directly related with the previous claim.

Table 7.2: Argumentation and Topoi in Text VII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
<p>4-6 4If we are to summarize in a word, the characteristic of the employment policy the 11-year-old JDP government has followed in the public sector that would be “partisanship”. Political closeness has never got ahead of merit and knowledge that much in any period.</p>	<p>Claim 1:Political closeness has never got ahead of merit and knowledge that much in any period.</p>	<p>Topos of partisanship</p>	<p>If a government follows partisanship-based policies in public sector, that makes political closeness get ahead of merit and knowledge.</p>
<p>7-13 ... a significant development has been the decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector... This has been the natural consequence of on the one hand the insistence on distributing the executive positions in the public sector in a partisan way and of the view that “the place of woman is home” on the other hand.</p>	<p>Claim 2:There is a decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector</p>	<p>Topos of consequence</p>	<p>If executive positions in the public sector are distributed in a partisan way that leads to decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector</p>

<p>19-21...“green capital” did not lean to woman employment that much either.They could employ the women with headscarf, they did not.</p>	<p>Claim 3:The “green capital” did not lean to woman employment</p>	<p>Topos of reality</p>	<p>If green capital leaned to woman employment, they could employ the women with headscarf, they did not.</p>
--	--	-------------------------	---

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The analysis of topics, the nomination and predication strategies as well as argumentation schemes have illustrated in detail how the author puts his own perspective into his own representation of reality. In parallel to that, the strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a significant role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality. Mitigation and intensification strategies relate to the illocutionary force of propositions. For instance, ‘...the most important discernable development...’ (line 1) is such an example.

The author thinks that the headscarf freedom in the public places would not ease the suffering of the veiled women. The author finds the JDP who paved the way for headscarf freedom as insincere as stated in the title of the article. The author holds the opinion that the JDP government has abused the headscarf victimhood for political purposes.

In line 18 (‘...there is such a reality...’), there is an example of epistemic modality. Epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty. The evaluations pertaining to the ‘other’ in the text tell us more about the author. ‘The mentality in power’ (line 30) is such an evaluation pertaining to the ‘other’.

As a final remark, the idiomatic expression of ‘beating about the bush’ (line 19) conveys the standpoint of the author in a condensed form, rather than in lengthy statements.

6.15. The Representation of The Lift Of The Headscarf Ban In Public Sector In The Zaman Newspaper:

Text VIII-The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 8) is entitled ‘Revolution in Public’ and was written by Mustafa Ünal. Mustafa Ünal formerly worked as an academic in the department of Law in Uludağ University. Mustafa Ünal is currently occupied as the Ankara Representative of the Zaman newspaper.

The article was published on October 9, 2013 one day after the lift of the ban on wearing headscarf in public places was published on the Official Gazette. The genre of the text bears features of a typical news column. The article both in general and specific terms deals with the issue of the lift of the ban on headscarf. It reflects the author's take on the issue besides echoing the agency's standpoint concerning the issue.

Thematically, the article unfolds in four stages. In the first part (lines 1-10) the author introduces the topic, namely the democratization package which paved the way for lifting the ban on headscarf in public places. In the second part (lines 11-17) the author writes about the background of the democratization package. He also writes about the Indictment Case opened against the JDP. In the third part (lines 18-26), the author presents the role of the government besides the role of the opposition parties in providing a solid ground for the lift of the ban in question. Lastly, the author (lines 27-41) evaluates the roles of the main opposition party and the leader of it Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in the lift of the ban in question. The author treats Kılıçdaroğlu as a conciliatory actor in the process as stated in line 41 ' The atmosphere about the headscarf has been softened by his flexible stance.'

The list of the topics below outlines the selected discourse topics and the discourses they are related within the pertinent field of social action.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text VIII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the democratization package
- Topic 1: Democratization has begun speedy
- Topic 2: The return of the land of Mor Gabriel Monastery
- Topic 3: The abolishment of our Oath
- The discourse of the headscarf freedom in public
- Topic 4: The headscarf freedom in public is realized
- Topic 5: The headscarf freedom in public is not an ordinary development
- Topic 6: Headscarf freedom is like a revolution

- Topic 7: A few years ago, headscarf freedom in public was difficult to even dream of it
- Topic 8: The remarks of Erdoğan in his trip to Spain
- Topic 9: 411 deputies used the vote of acceptance for the law amendment giving a free run to the headscarf only in universities
- Topic 11: The nullification of the law by the Court in 2008
- Topic 12: The opening of an Indictment Case against AK Party
- Topic 13: 411 deputies will be remembered with gratitude
- Topic 14: The architect of a big revolution like headscarf freedom in public is AK Party
- Topic 15: This step will not be forgotten until doomsday
- The discourse of the role of the opposition parties in lifting the ban on headscarf.
- Topic 16: The RPP, NAP and PDP did not make any criticism concerning the headscarf issue
- The discourse of the role of the RPP concerning the headscarf freedom in retrospect
- Topic 10: The RPP has run to the Constitutional Court
- Topic 17: In the past, the RPP has been the biggest hindrance in front of the headscarf.
- Topic 18: The change in the RPP beginning with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
- Topic 19: The attitude of Kılıçdaroğlu about the headscarf issue
- Topic 22: There is no need to remind of how strict and sharp the tongue of the RPP regarding the headscarf issue has been.
- Topic 23: The softening of the atmosphere about the headscarf by Kılıçdaroğlu's flexible stance

The field of political parties

- The discourse of the relationship between party structure and policy change

- Topic 20: In parties like the RPP which are based on tradition, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift
- Topic 21: In parties based on tradition, change is difficult.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The passive voices used in the text (lines 1, 4, 6, 15, 18, 21, 24, 37 and 41) aim to background the agents while putting the stress on the activity itself. For instance, in line 15 ‘An Indictment case against AK Party⁵⁶ was run’ backgrounds the agents and shifts the focus on the activity, i.e. the running of an indictment case against the party. ‘It’ in line 11 stands for the headscarf while ‘It’ in line 15 stands for the JDP. The acronym NAP (lines 12 and 24) refers metonymically to party politicians in the Nationalist Action Party. The ‘NAP’ and ‘AK Party’ (line 12) and the ‘RPP’ (line 14) are personified. The ‘AK Party’ in lines 19 and 22 refer metonymically to party politicians. Similarly, in line 24, the acronym PDP stands metonymically for party politicians in Peace and Democracy Party.

‘Deputies’ (line 12) is an example of functionalization through which the social actors are referred to in terms of what they do (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). The ‘Constitutional Court’ (line 14) is an example of personified institutional name through which the judges are represented by the institution they belong to. It is known that it is not the Court but the judges who decide whether a political party should be closed down or not.

In line 17, there is an example of somatization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45). The ‘411 hands’ refers to the 411 deputies who used vote of acceptance for the law amendment giving a free run to the wearing of headscarf in universities. Other examples of somatization are seen in lines 25 and 39. ‘Voice’ refers to the people who oppose to headscarf freedom in public. This shows how the representation of social actors is reduced to their voice. In line 39, ‘Strict and sharp tongue of RPP’ refers to the party politicians.

⁵⁶In the article taken from Zaman, the ‘AK Party’ is used for the abbreviation of Justice and Development Party. ‘Ak’ in Turkish means ‘white’ or ‘clean’. The JDP politicians, since the inception of the party, have made use of this by using the first two capitals of the party name (AK) separately. Opposition groups have insisted on the traditional way of abbreviating the party name with its initials, and thus used ‘AKP’

Pronouns are frequently used in the construction of in-groups and out-groups. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 34-35) stands for the politicians in the RPP. In line 37, there is an example of indetermination. ‘Parties like RPP’ is such an example.

‘Marginal groups’ (line 26) refers euphemistically to people who were against headscarf freedom in Turkey. This is also an example of indetermination through which social actors are mystified. Lastly, it is to be noted that the only people nominalized by proper names are Erdoğan, the PM and Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party. Both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu are treated as prominent figures in the text.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below shows all the content-related predications. The Constitutional Court is discredited as ‘overstepping her authority’. The PM Erdoğan and the leader of the main opposition party Kılıçdaroğlu are represented positively in the text.

The headscarf freedom is likened to revolution (line 8) while the RPP (lines 14 and 28) has been predicated negatively vis-à-vis her position about the headscarf freedom in the past. The political parties (The AK Party, RPP, NAP and PDP) are mostly construed through personification. What we learn about the politicians in the RPP is construed by verbal processes; ‘they solve the problem’, ‘they are determined’, ‘will provide opportunity’ all of which are positive. These verbal processes are existent in the quotations belonging to Kılıçdaroğlu.

As a final remark, the indetermination of social groups seen in line 37 (‘in parties like RPP’) is represented in a neutral way while the ‘411 deputies’ is treated as a homogeneous group the main characteristic of which is voting in favor of the lift on headscarf ban.

Table 8.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The land of Mor Gabriel Monastery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been returned

Our oath	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been abolished
The headscarf (In public) The headscarf freedom in public It	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is free • is not an ordinary development • is like a revolution
The PM Erdoğan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had declared ten days ago • in his trip to Spain has said that “Even if it is a political symbol”
Some of the articles in the package	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were of legal and were of administrative regulation
The NAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has replied positively to the call of AK Party
411 deputies These deputies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have used vote of acceptance for the law amendment giving a free run to the headscarf only in universities. • will be remembered with gratitude
The RPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has run to the Constitutional Court • has been the biggest hindrance in front of the headscarf.
The Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • through overstepping her authority annulled the regulation.
An Indictment Case (Against AK Party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was run
It (AK Party)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • broke away from getting closed within an ace of vote.
The RPP, NAP and	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have directed harsh critiques to many regulations in the package

PDP	
No voice (concerning the headscarf issue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has risen
He (Kılıçdaroğlu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has replied the questions about headscarf positively • did not pun • gave green light to the headscarf wearing students' getting into university in a probable RPP government
We (The RPP politicians)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • solve that problem • are determined • will provide opportunity to everybody for education
In parties like the RPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim stating that 'headscarf freedom in public is like a revolution' is justified by resorting to the topos of revolution. The first claim is also justified by addressing the past situation regarding the headscarf issue in Turkey (lines 9-10).

The second claim is justified by resorting to the topos of abuse by the following argumentation formulation: 'Since the Court overstepped her authority, the Court has abused her authority' The next topos supports the claim that 'the lift of the headscarf ban will not be forgotten until doomsday.' The last claim prepares a theoretical background on which the author builds his own interpretation of the stance of the main opposition party, RPP towards the headscarf issue. The argumentation is formulized as such: 'if a party is based on tradition like RPP, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift.'

Table 8.2: Argumentation and Topoi in Text VIII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
7-9 Above all, the headscarf freedom in public is not an ordinary development. It is like a revolution. A few years ago, it was difficult to even dream of it.	Claim 1: Headscarf freedom in public is like a revolution	Topos of revolution	If something is not ordinary then it is revolutionary
14-15 The Court through overstepping her authority annulled the regulation.	Claim 2: The Constitutional Court has abused her authority	Topos of abuse	Since the Court overstepped her authority, the Court has abused her authority
20-21 The headscarf is the sacred of these territories. This step will not be forgotten until doomsday.	Claim 3: The lift of the ban will not be forgotten until doomsday.	Topos of sacredness	If something is the sacred of a territory, the steps concerning it will not be forgotten
36-38 In the parties like RPP that are based on tradition, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift.	Claim 4: For the political parties which are based on tradition, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift.	Topos of examples	If a party is based on tradition like RPP, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

Efe (2012: 160) writes that the use of direct quotations in a news article can be interpreted mainly in two ways; the agency is either drawing attention to the authority of the proposition or distancing itself from the source of the quoted information (Efe, 2012: 160). Based on this it could be said that the direct quotations taken from the PM Erdoğan (lines 11 and 12) and the direct quotations taken from Kılıçdaroğlu (lines 32-35) serve the first aim, namely drawing attention on the authority of the proposition.

As for the perspective of the author, the first claim is expressed in epistemic modality (line 8, ‘it is like revolution’) showing that the author is certain on the issue. The evaluative adjectives ‘strict’ and ‘sharp’ (line 39) convey the standpoint of the author towards the attitude of the main opposition party, the RPP about the headscarf issue before Kılıçdaroğlu’s office.

On the other hand, it is to be noted that involvement becomes quite apparent when an honoric title is used for social actors such as ‘big’ and ‘great’ (Efe, 2012: 132). In line with that ‘big revolution’ in line 19 is an example of such an involvement. It is also noteworthy to state that the author takes a position against the Constitutional Court whereas he favors the social actors in the text namely the JDP government and opposition parties that paved the way for headscarf freedom in public.

6.16. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The representation of the lift of the headscarf ban in public places in the Hürriyet newspaper is mostly realized by the use of derogatory discourse with regard to the JDP government. Mehmet Y. Yılmaz accuses the government of abusing the headscarf issue for political purposes. Yılmaz employs the metaphor of ‘political weapon’ for such an aim. Yılmaz defines the lift as ‘partisanship’ while drawing a rather bleak picture about the current developments in Turkey. On the contrary, Mustafa Ünal adopts a rather positive tone. While Yılmaz argues that the suffering of

the women will continue Ünal expresses his gratitude to the deputies who voted for the law amendment lifting the headscarf ban.

Unlike the Hürriyet article, the representation of the lift of the headscarf ban in the Zaman newspaper is mostly realized by the use of appreciatory discourse with regard to the JDP government as the architect of the headscarf freedom. Mustafa Ünal defines the lift of the ban as a revolution and covers the JDP and the opposition parties who contribute to the lift of the ban within the framework of positive lexicalization.

Yılmaz covers the lift of the ban from the perspective of the women's problems. Yılmaz draws attention to the decrease in the number of women in top-level jobs in the public sector. On the contrary, Ünal does not mention such issues and draws attention to the role of the government and the opposition parties in paving the way for headscarf freedom.

Needless to say, the ideological difference between the newspapers leads to the different perspectivals as well. Yılmaz does not make reference to the content of the democratization package. This can be seen as a sign of his skepticism towards the democratization efforts of the ruling JDP. By contrast, Ünal lists every regulation within the democratization package. This shows the support he gives to the headscarf regulation as well.

As a final remark it is noteworthy to say that Ünal's coverage of the details of the democratization package can be seen as a rhetorical tactic with the aim to present the lift of the headscarf ban as an advantage for the democratization of Turkey. While Yılmaz prefers only to mention the term of democratization package, Ünal writes about its content as well. In such a way, Ünal tries to put the stress on the benefits of the lift for Turkey's democracy.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ALEVI CITIZENS IN THE HURRIYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS

In this chapter, I will try to cover how the Alevi citizens are represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. After introducing the selected cases under scrutiny, I will provide the historical and socio-cultural context in which the cases are embedded in.

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Alevi citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Madımak Affair in 1993 (2) The Gazi Incidents in 1995 (3)The Council of State's (Danıştay) ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form in 2008 (4) The Supreme Court of Cassation (Yargıtay)decision declaring that cem houses (literally meaning gathering house used for Alevi prayer houses) cannot be viewed as the places of worship in 2012.

The same analytical steps will be followed as followed in the previous chapter. After making a semantically-oriented topic analysis, the strategies that are used in each text will be elaborated on by looking at the linguistic and/or rhetorical and argumentation tools they are realized in. Applying the same selection criteria explained in the previous chapter, the articles to be analyzed are as the following:

- Oktay Ekşi's article published on July 4, 1993 and Fehmi Kuru's article published on July 3, 1993.
- Oktay Ekşi's article published on March 15, 1995 and Hüseyin Gülerce's article published on March 16, 1995.
- Cüneyt Ülsever's article and Mümtaz'er Türköne's article published on March 9, 2008.
- Taha Akyol's article and Ahmet Turan Alkan's article published on July 28, 2012.

7.1. The Madımak Affair in 1993

Alevis⁵⁷ differ from the Sunni Muslim majority in their practice and interpretation of Islam. Specific rituals and cultural practices play an important role in the maintenance of Alevi identity. Parallel to the Islamist and Kurdish identity movements that resisted the homogenizing policies of the Kemalist identity-building project, the Alevis also initiated efforts to reinvigorate Alevi identity. Many Alevis in urban contexts were active in left-wing political activism until the early 1980s. During the 1970s, Alevis were victims of right-wing ideological violence in Malatya in 1978, Kahramanmaraş in 1978 and Çorum in 1980.

The 1990s signify a turning point in terms of the official stance towards the Alevis. Since the early 1990s, secular cadres in military and civil bureaucracy encouraged the Alevi revival against the rise of political Islam. Since the beginning of 1990s, the Alevis started to appear in the public sphere more compared to the previous years. According to Çaha (2004: 332), “the impact of the Alevis in social and political life became so clear that even the 28 February 1997 was associated with the Alevi-orientated generals in the military”

Turkey in the 1990s witnessed the rise of identity politics and identity-related debates. It can be said that, with the Madımak Affair happened in Sivas, a city in central Turkey Alevi citizens experienced direct violence. Thirty-seven citizens, most of whom were Alevi artists, intellectuals and musicians who had travelled to Sivas to commemorate Pir Sultan Abdal died when the Madımak Hotel was set on fire by a fundamentalist on July 2, 1993. Security forces failed to intervene in time to prevent the catastrophe (Köse, 2012: 579).

The Madımak Affair is different in form and meaning compared to the organized acts of violence carried out at the end of the 1970s. Bruinessen (2001: 125) claims that the difference stems from the selection of Aziz Nesin who had translated

⁵⁷It is impossible to figure out the exact population of Alevi citizens in Turkey because of the lack of census data based on ethnic and sectarian factors. Estimates range from 5 million to 20 million; exaggerations of the size of the population is also a part of identity struggle (Köse, 2012: 593).

Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*⁵⁸ and many other intellectuals as targets, most of whom were the Alevis, instead of a mass assault on the regions populated with Alevi citizens. Nesin in his speech said that he did not believe in the Quran and this was used by the fundamentalists to inflame the outrage of the Sunni community

The passage quoted from the journal *Cuma*, which appeared in *Islamist Milli Gazete Daily* on February 20, 1993, about five months before the massacre, is worth noting. The quoted passage is as follows:

Edict of Death for Aziz Nesin! A scabby-looking dog howls at the innocent people in the neighborhood, attacks them, takes their peace of away. And when he is put to silence by whatsoever means, there comes the hell of a fuss: 'Animal Rights'. Yes gentlemen! Should howling be considered as an animal right, silencing it because of necessity will be an even more sacred human right (*Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Sanat Dergisi*, 6, 1993: 7).

Another crucial point concerning the Madımak Affair was the treatment of the Pir Sultan Abdal statue as a target, since Pir Sultan symbolized the rebellious and leftist tradition within the Alevi faith (Bruinessen, 2001: 125-126). The Madımak Affair is generally perceived as the outcome of an ascending appeal for shari'a and evaluated as a revolt against the secular republic during that period. The Madımak Affair led the Alevi citizens to act with solidarity. The event has been utilized in most Alevi and Kemalist circles as identical with Kerbela, Kahramanmaraş and Çorum massacres.

The Madımak Affair has also greatly affected the Alevi youth. It can be said that, the Madımak affair has contributed to the organization of the Alevis and the acquisition of an identity by the Alevi individual. It accelerated the institutionalization of the associations with the Alevi name. It is observed that after this period, the Alevi youth have begun to assemble and organize in Alevi associations. These meetings which were loosely structured and did not have any

⁵⁸ The book *Satanic Verses* was banned in India within a week of its publication, and within six months had given rise to a virulent international debate over the proper limits on freedom of speech.

organizational ties were carried out through references to the religious elements of Alevism.

7.2. The Representation of the Madımak Affair in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text IX -The Hürriyet Article

Text IX (Appendix 9) is an article authored by Oktay Ekşi who has worked as the lead columnist of Hürriyet for 36 years. The article entitled ‘The Savagery in Sivas...’ was published on July 4, 1993 two days after the outbreak of the Madımak Affair. The genre of the text bears features of both an opinion piece and a column. Written in an informal style, the article tries to combine and give as much information as briefly possible.

The article both in general and specific terms deals with the Madımak Affair despite not mentioning the name of the hotel, i.e. Madımak. Thematically, the author first introduces the topic then interprets it and finally gives some advice to the readers.

The topics listed below are adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 100) and are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic belongs to a discourse and each field of discourse to a social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text IX

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the dangerous situation in Turkey
- Topic 1: Alarm sounds are springing from Sivas
- Topic 2: The position of those who want to divide and collapse Turkey
- Topic 3: The activities of the PKK
- Topic 4: Our need to be more careful and vigilant
- Topic 14: The brutal sabotaging of a hotel in Van

- Topic 15: The “mosque-Friday” dimension should not make the safety-related measures... become ignored.
- The discourse of the Sivas Incidents
- Topic 7: The insufficiency of Aziz Nesin factor to explain the incidents.
- Topic 8: Provocations against Nesin
- Topic 9: The abuse of Friday prayers
- Topic 10: Nobody tries to take the necessary precautions
- Topic 12: The point which those who attacked Aziz Nesin and his friends did not accept.
- Topic 13: The feature of synthetic carpets

The field of history

- The discourse of the violence events in the past
- Topic 5: The Kahramanmaraş Incidents
- Topic 6: The Yozgat and Çorum Incidents

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of how Turkey should be
- Topic 11: The need for religious freedom in Turkey

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The representation of social actors constitutes the main ingredient of the reality the author purports to represent. In the first line, the out-group is an anonymous group who wants to collapse Turkey and create an atmosphere of conflict. This is an example of indetermination through which the identity of the social actor is mystified (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). Another example of indetermination is seen in the following lines as well. ‘Some people’ (line 22) is such an example. Another indeterminate reference is seen in line 32 (‘those who were firstly engaged in protests against Aziz Nesin...’). ‘Those’ (lines 1, 4) is an example of generalized exospheric reference. Here, the author creates an anonymous group, the social actors are indeterminate (vague).

Pronouns construct opposing social groups in texts. Similarly, in this text, the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ in line 5 stands for all the people living in Turkey, while ‘us’ in line 16 refers to the author and the agency.

The passive voice in line 7 backgrounds the social actors and shifts the focus on the activity. The sentence ‘a few awkward sentences that Aziz Nesin uttered in Pir Sultan Abdal celebrations would not lead to such reactions if there was no ‘readiness’ in the public’ is an example of personification. In addition, the ‘Friday Prayers’ are personified too. According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 34) personification is a general category, which includes a variety of metaphors all of which select a different aspect of a person or different ways of looking at a person.

The ‘provocative team’ (line 24) is an example of collectivization. This represents an attempt to collectivize the main agents in the Madımak Affair. Collectivization is an important form of assimilation. It can be realized by making reference to social actors as group entities or by means of deictics like ‘we’ (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 55). The ‘unarmed extensions’ refers to the Kurdish political actors. The acronym PKK (line 2) is a metonymic use and refers to another out-group mentioned in the text, Kurdistan Workers’ Party. ‘Turkey’ in line 29 is another example of metonymic use and stands for the statesmen.

As a final remark, the ‘government’ in line 27 is example of personified institutional name through which the members of the government are represented. The ‘civilian authorities’ in the same line is an example of functionalization. Van Leeuwen explains functionalization as the representation of a social actor in terms of what he / she does (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

Social Actors and Predications

Predications refer to traits and characteristics ascribed to social actors. As Table 9.1 shows, the social actors do not bear negative or positive qualities in an apparent way. Therefore it can be said that, when the author writes the article, he means more than the locution itself. The author puts an anonymous group at the center of his analysis as the main agent causing the Madımak Affair. The author puts

the blame on an indeterminate group calling them as those who try to divide and collapse Turkey. The author does not directly treat Aziz Nesin as the main responsible actor for what happened in Sivas. There are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Aziz Nesin with the exception of his ‘inconsiderateness’ (line 17).

The pronoun ‘we’ is used with two different meaning extensions. The first one is used to refer to the author and his agency while the second one is used as an all-inclusive pronoun referring to all the people living in Turkey.

Table 9.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Those (who want to divide Turkey) Those (who want to create an atmosphere of conflict)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seem to have been set in motion with their full might • are doing their best
We (people in Turkey) We (The author and his agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are going through a process which requires us to be more careful and vigilant • raised hell when Germans burnt the house where a few Turks lived • did not react much when our own people did the same on our own people • think it would be insufficient to explain the fatal events that took place in the previous day, in Sivas by Aziz Nesin’s inconsiderateness.
Some people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • immediately printed leaflets upon Aziz Nesin’s speech he made in Sivas on Thursday and provoked the public against him

Friday prayers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • create a platform which can easily be used by those who are trying to disrupt the social peace.
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should become a country where every Muslim can perform his/her religious worship as they wish and in complete freedom

Argumentation Strategies

The argumentation structure of Text IX as shown in the table below draws on the content-related argumentation approach of Reisigl and Wodak (2001; 2009). The first claim states that ‘We need to be more careful.’ The author resorts to the topos of danger / topos of threat to justify his claim. The argumentation here can be formulized as follows: If something alarming occurs, we need to be more careful and vigilant.

The second argumentation formulation is supported by the topos of history. Similar events to those occurred in Sivas are mentioned to lead the readers to understand the background of the events occurred in Sivas better. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If something similar happened in the past, it can help us understand the recent issue better. In the third claim, the author expresses an overt opinion about the Madimak Affair. According to him, a few awkward sentences that Aziz Nesin uttered in Pir Sultan Abdal celebrations would not lead to such reactions if there were no readiness in the public. The author resorts to the topos of readiness to sustain his position.

In the final claim, the author employs the topos of similarity to support his claim. The author puts forward his ideas about the incidents broke out in Van and Sivas. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Since the incidents in Van and Sivas have similar outcomes, the reasons behind them are supposed to be similar.

Table 9.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text IX

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-5... those, who want to divide and collapse Turkey seem to have been set in motion with their full might... therefore, we are going through a process which requires us to be more careful and vigilant.	Claim 1: We need to be more careful	Topos of danger / topoi of threat	If something alarming occurs, we need to be more careful and vigilant
7-8 What we want to say will be understood better if you refresh your memories	Claim 2: The similar events in the past help us understand the recent issues better	Topos of history	If something similar happened in the past, it can help us understand the recent issue better.
17-18-19 a few awkward sentences that Aziz Nesin uttered in Pir Sultan Abdal celebrations would not lead to such reactions if there were no “readiness” in the public.	Claim 3: Readiness in the public is an important factor that facilitates widespread reactions.	Topos of readiness	If the people were not ready, a few awkward sentences would not lead to such reactions.
43-44 The loss of many lives as a result of brutal sabotaging of a hotel in Van the day before was again due to this reason if we are not mistaken	Claim 4: Events with similar outcomes are supposed to have similar reasons	Topos of similarity	Since the incidents in Van and Sivas have similar outcomes, the reasons behind them are supposed to be similar.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

In the last part of the analysis, I will focus on mitigation and intensification as well as perspectivation strategies, i.e. on those linguistic features that indicate the author's viewpoint. The author uses present continuous tense to explain the things which are happening. He switches to simple present and uses the nominalizing –dır when he puts forward his claims. ('Biraz anılarınızı tazellerseniz, ne demek istediğimiz iyi anlaşılır'). This can be viewed as a sign revealing the author's self-confidence in dealing with the issue.

The author holds the view that regarding Aziz Nesin as the sole actor would be insufficient to see what lies behind the Madımak Affair. The author argues that there have been provocation attempts. The analysis of this article has shown that, the author's involvement is also evident in his use of metaphors. The idiomatic and metaphorical expression of 'raising hell' (kıyameti koparmak) shows author's involvement. The intensification and mitigation strategies are also achieved lexically via adverbs and adjectives which reflect the author's emotions toward the issue at stake. The adverbial pronoun (Bizce 'According to us') in line 16 is a linguistic device showing author's involvement.

Finally, the author puts emphasis on the role of the abuse of religion (i.e. mosque-Friday dimension) in provocative events like that of Sivas Affair. In the last sentence of the article ('Therefore, the "mosque-Friday" dimension should not make the safety-related measures of those who stay at hotels or similar places become ignored. '), the author expresses his view in deontic modality.

7.3.The Representation of the Madımak Affair in the Zaman Newspaper Text X-The Zaman Article

Text X (Appendix 10) is a column written by Fehmi Kuru. Fehmi Kuru started his journalism career in the Islamist Milli Gazete and started working for Zaman newspaper in 1986. Kuru has worked as the chief editor of Zaman for several years. Kuru completed his MA and PhD studies in the US. Kuru has used several aliases, including Bülent Şirin, Taha Kıvanç, Faruk Yeni, and Fehmi

Muzafferoğlu.⁵⁹ Kuru writes for the Habertürk newspaper since the beginning of July in 2014.

The article to be analyzed was published on July 3, 1993, one day after the Madımak Affair. The genre of the article can be regarded as a typical news column. The author starts his article entitled ‘Their Collars Should be Gotten Hold of’ with his perspectivation about Aziz Nesin as the prominent actor in the Madımak Affair and criticizes Nesin in several lines of his article.

Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. First, the author depicts Aziz Nesin as the main responsible actor for what happened in Sivas. The author then provides the background information to support his viewpoint about Nesin. Second, the author gives information about Sivas city and explains his own opinions about the issue in question. Third, the author connects the events in Sivas with the PKK terror and treats them as a part of a big plan aiming to destroy Turkey.

I outlined the selected discourse topics and discourses they are related to within the pertinent field of social action. The topics in the list below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text X

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the events in Sivas
- Topic 1: The role of Aziz Nesin in Sivas
- Topic 2: The need to look behind to understand the recent events
- Topic 3: The impact of Nesin’s decision to publish Satanic verses
- Topic 4: The situation of the British publisher
- Topic 5: In the past, Alevi-Sunni conflicts had happened in Sivas.
- Topic 6: The last bloody scenario was staged
- The discourse of betrayal
- Topic 10: It is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence...

⁵⁹<http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2000/ekim/23/tkivanc.html> (28.05.2014)

- Topic 11: The subsequent events, which occurred after the provocation in Sivas, are part of a bigger plan...
- Topic 12: The wholeness of Turkey and Turkish people are targeted with this event

The field of history

- The discourse of Aziz Nesin and his supporters
- Topic 7: Nesin and his supporters probably took part in similar scenarios in the past
- Topic 8: Nesin and his supporters were caught with blood in their hands
- Topic 9: The victims of Nesin and his supporters

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of what the government should do
- Topic 13: We invite the government to act calmly
- Topic 14: Those, on whose behalf Aziz Nesin and his supports acted must be uncovered.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The title of the article reads ‘Their Collars Should be Gotten Hold of’. Here, the third person plural pronoun stands for the social actors who played an active role in the outbreak of the Madımak Affair. The title is in the form of passive voice. In this way, the author suppresses the actors, if not assimilates them. Another passive structure is used in line 21, ‘... the last bloody scenario was staged...’. Here, the author shifts the focus on the activity rather than the agents.

The author depicts the Madımak event as a bloody scenario. The metaphor of scenario is used to empower the author’s claim that the events had been planned by some particular actors before. The author in line 17 depicts the event with the same metaphor again this time with another adjective ‘devilish scenario’. In line 18, the ‘masses’ is a collectivized indeterminate noun that puts emphasis on the vastness of

the people whom are targeted for mobilization through publishing the book called Satanic Verses.

‘Turkey’ in line 11 stands metonymically for the people living in Turkey. The ‘British publisher’ (line 13) is an example of functionalization in Van Leeuwen’s terms (2008: 42). The ‘newspaper’ in line 15 is an example of metonymy. Here, the ‘newspaper’ stands for the people who determine the editorial policy of the newspaper.

In line 12, the idiomatic expression ‘perdesi altına sığınmak’ which means to hide behind the curtain is a metaphor employed to describe the position of the people who published the book Satanic Verses despite the reactions it caused all over the world. In lines 37 and 38, the idiomatic expression ‘ülkenin birlik ve beraberliğine benzin dökmek’ which means to pour gasoline on the unity and solidarity of the country is a physical metaphor frequently used in Turkish political lexicon. This metaphor refers to the provocations made in Sivas.

Finally, the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ are used to create in-groups and out-groups. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ in line 42 refers to the author and his agency, rhetorically excluding a group of people. The only persons who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized are Aziz Nesin and Pir Sultan Abdal.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the main social actors in Text X and how they are predicated. As Table 10.1 shows, the categorization of social actors as in-groups and out-groups is not value-free. The author does not have a neutral stance to all social actors in Text X. Aziz Nesin as the prominent social actor is discredited as being the main responsible actor for the provocations occurred in Sivas. Nesin and the people who supported him are represented through employing a derogatory discourse (‘They were caught with blood in their hands’).

The government (line 42) is presented with no overt attribution while the work expected from the government is described as ‘not similar to writing funny stories’.

Table 10.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Aziz Nesin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • became the hero of a tragedy whose traces can remain for many years • announced his decision to publish a novel in Turkey called ‘Satanic Verses’ • serialized ‘Satanic Verses’ in the newspaper in which he was a partner
Nesin and his supporters They (Nesin and his supporters)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • probably took part in similar scenarios in the past. • were caught with blood in their hands
Sivas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is one of the leading cities in Turkey with the most colorful sectarian mosaic
We (author and his agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • invite the government to act calmly, deal with the matter with utmost seriousness...

Table 10.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text X

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
6-7 In order to understand the recent events better, it is necessary to notice a preparation which was being matured for six months.	Claim 1: The background of the events should be analyzed for understanding them better.	Topos of history as a teacher	If the background of the events is analyzed, they can be understood better.
19-20 Sivas is one of the leading cities in Turkey with the most colorful sectarian mosaic. In the past, Alevi-Sunni conflicts had happened in this city...	Claim 2: The existence of different sects in a city causes conflicts	Topos of definition/name interpretation	Since Sivas has a multi-sectarian nature, Alevi-Sunni conflicts happen in this city.
27-28-29 The universal rule, known as ‘conditioned reflex’ in psychology and ‘action-reaction law’ in physics, showed itself with unerring accuracy and these events, which cracked the mosaic, had taken place.	Claim 3: Some rules in different fields of science are also valid in explaining societal events	Topos of comparison	If Sivas Affair is analyzed from the perspective of universal rules like ‘conditioned reflex’ in psychology, it will be realized that such rules showed themselves in this case.

<p>31-32 It is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence at a time when Turkey is dealing with developments that weaken its power at home as well as abroad</p>	<p>Claim 4: It is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence when a country is dealing with developments that weaken its power at home as well as abroad</p>	<p>Topos of betrayal</p>	<p>Since Turkey is dealing with developments that weaken its power, it is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence</p>
--	---	--------------------------	--

Argumentation Strategies

In Table 10.2 I have outlined the main claims and topoi in Text X. The first argumentation formulation is as follows: ‘If the background of the events is analyzed, they can be understood better.’ Here, the author resorts to the topos of history as a teacher to support his claim. The author in lines 6 and 7 tells that for six months, preparations were being matured.

In the second claim, the justification is realized by using the topos of definition / name interpretation. This topos can be defined as follows: ‘If an action is named as X, the action should carry / carries the qualities/traits contained in the (literal) meaning of X (Wodak, 2009: 44). The argumentation is formulated as follows: Since Sivas has a multi-sectarian nature, Alevi-Sunni conflicts happen in this city.

In the third claim, the author expresses scientific rules and connects them to the events occurred in Sivas. The argumentation is as follows: If Sivas Affair is analyzed from the perspective of universal rules like ‘conditioned reflex’ in psychology, it will be realized that such rules showed themselves in this case.

The final claim stating that it is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence when a country is dealing with developments that weaken its power at home as well as abroad is supported by the topos of betrayal. The argumentation for the final claim is as follows: Since Turkey is dealing with developments that weaken its power it is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

This part of the analysis sheds light upon the involvement and detachment of the author while also analyzing the linguistic devices. The title of the article ‘Their Collars Should be Gotten Hold of’ presents the viewpoint of the author about the people who are responsible for the Madımak Affair. The strict attitude of the author is also obvious in the last sentence of his article: ‘Those, on whose behalf Aziz Nesin and his supporters acted must be found.’

It is noteworthy to state that, depicting Aziz Nesin as someone ‘who puts his signature in funny stories’ (line 1) and presenting the work of cracking down on the criminals as a thing not similar to writing funny stories (line 44) is not a coincidence. The author in such a way represents Aziz Nesin as the main responsible actor for the Madımak Affair.

In using the metaphor of the ‘devilish scenario’ (line 17), the author underlines his claim that the Madımak Incident is not an event that broke out all of a sudden. The idiomatic expression and the metaphor in lines 37-38 (‘to pour gasoline on the unity and solidarity of the country’) conveys the standpoint of the author in a dense form rather than in lengthy argumentative statements. The evaluations pertaining to ‘the other’ in the text tell more about the author in the following lines:

...Aziz Nesin and his supporters probably took part in similar scenarios in the past, but for the first time they were caught with blood in their hands. 35 people who lost their lives and many wounded people in Sivas are victims of their provocations.

Modality combines the analysis of both lexical and grammatical features of sentences. In lines 6-7 ‘In order to understand the recent events better, it is necessary to notice a preparation which was being matured for six months’ there is an example of epistemic modality which refers to the degree of certainty.

Lastly, it should be noted that, the word ‘yandaş’ which I translate into English as ‘supporter’ has a pejorative denotation in Turkish language. The author puts emphasis on his argument that Nesin and his supporters are the principal actors in the outbreak of the Madımak Affair.

7.4. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Oktaç Ekşi deals with the issue of the Madımak Affair within the framework of Turkey’s enemies both inside and outside Turkey. Ekşi from the very beginning of

the article draws attention to the PKK terror as well. Fehmi Kuru mentions the PKK terror after introducing the Madımak issue and putting forward his claims.

Ekşi makes references to the sectarian and ethnic clashes happened in the past like that of Çorum events while Kuru writes that ‘in order to understand the recent events better, it is necessary to notice a preparation which was being matured for six months’ (lines 6 and 7). According to Ekşi, it is not a good idea to explain the events that broke out in Sivas only through the Aziz Nesin factor. For Ekşi, a few awkward sentences that Aziz Nesin uttered would not lead to such reactions if there were no readiness in the public (line 19). On the contrary, for Kuru Aziz Nesin is the main responsible actor for the Madımak Affair. Kuru writes the following: ‘Festival which was held for Pir Sultan Abdal turned into a mourning because of the unrest Aziz Nesin caused.’ In the Zaman article, Aziz Nesin is evaluated through a pejorative lexicalization, in line 26 Kuru writes that Nesin and his supporters were caught with blood in their hands.

Ekşi shifts the focus on the need of freedom of expression and conscience. According to Ekşi, the protests against Nesin and his friends were carried out by the people who do not accept that Turkey should be a country wherein nobody interferes in others’ different way of worship. It is to be noted that Ekşi underlines that some circles abuse Friday prayers to disrupt social peace. By contrast, Kuru shifts the focus on Aziz Nesin and his supporters as the main responsible actor for the provocations.

As a final remark, in both of the articles, there is an emphasis on the forces inside and outside Turkey that are engaged in undermining social peace and national unity of the country. Ekşi seems more concerned about the abuse of religious sentiments in the outbreak of the events like that of Madımak Affair while Kuru seems to adopt a more ambiguous line in trying to explore the background of the events. Kuru puts almost all the blame on Nesin while Ekşi tries to base his claims on concrete factors like that of provocations that emerge during Friday prayers.

7.5. The Gazi Incidents

On March 12, 1995, upon a firing from a cab to coffee houses in Gazi district in İstanbul, where mostly Alevis live, clashes between the police and citizens ended up with the death of 22 Alevi citizens. Between the police and the people, a wall of smoke poured out of an overturned burning car. On one side, there were dozens of police with automatic weapons. On the other side, hundreds of people stood around burning fires. The shouts of the demonstrators further down the streets: ‘Death to fascism! We want justice!’ Early in the morning the fires between the demonstrators and police were still there, and more than a thousand people had crowded in front of the cem house (Marcus, 1996: 24).

The rise of identity politics during the 1990s created an incentive for the proliferation of Alevi activities. The politicization of the Alevi identity increased the tension between the Alevis and some particular people in right-wing politics. The outbreak of the Gazi Incidents can be seen as one of the outcomes of such an atmosphere. In addition, the outbreak of the events is explained as follows in the Gazi Neighborhood Report of the Human Rights Association (Parlar, 1997: 195-196):

On March 12, 1995, at 20.45, in Gaziosmanpaşa district’s Gazi Neighborhood, 4 cafes and 1 candy store were volleyed by unidentified people. 2 people died in the incident, many were injured... Gazi neighborhood inhabitants... started a march towards the Gazi Police Station... The crowd reaching about 3 000 people turned back to the cemhouse as the police fired to air... In the morning of March 13, Monday, gathering in front of cemhouse and the Association for Promoting the Culture of Hacı Bektaş Veli, the people again started marching towards the Police Station chanting the slogans ‘Katil Polis’ (‘Killer Police’), ‘Katil Devlet’ (‘Killer State’), ‘Katiller Karakolda’ (‘Killers are in the Police Station’)... The crowd including the old and the children did not disperse... police... wanted to disperse the people by besieging them. Noticing this, a group of young people started stoning the police...

During the events that broke out in the Gazi Neighbourhood, Dede Halil Kaya died. Many people gathered around the police station to protest the events, however police responded violently by shooting at the crowd. According to the reports prepared as results of the autopsies, it is seen that most of the dead were targeted to be shot dead (Korkmaz, 1997: 78). Two days after the shooting in Gazi, the bodies were returned to the people. Soldiers were later withdrawn from the streets. Turkish courts have charged more than one hundred people from Gazi with illegally demonstrating, and almost two dozen police officers for shooting at demonstrators (Marcus, 1996: 26). The families took the Gazi case to the European Court of Human Rights and the court ruled that “the domestic authorities did not conduct prompt and adequate investigations into the killings.”⁶⁰

The Gazi incidents produced different reactions among the Alevi citizens. For example, while İzzet Doğan, the head of the Cem Association, claimed that the incident is ‘an intrigue played out against the State’ Abidin Özgünay, the General Publishing Director of the Cem Magazine, argued that those responsible for this incident can be PKK, radical Islamists or the coup-makers who do not favor the democratic system in Turkey (Aksiyon, 18-24 March 1995: 20-21).

7.6. The Representation of the Gazi Incidents in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text XI -The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 11) is a column appeared on March 15, 1995 three days after the outbreak of the Gazi neighborhood events. The article entitled ‘Beware!’ was authored by Oktay Ekşi. Given the author’s power position in relation to the newspaper, the article already carries some significance.

The genre of the text bears features of a journalistic one having a personal and informal style. The article from the very beginning puts emphasis on the role of the Alevi citizens in maintaining national unity and strictly criticizes the people who do not accept such a role. The contents of Text XI revolve mainly around the role the Alevi citizens play in protecting Turkey’s national unity and the plots and traps

⁶⁰ European Court of Human Rights, “Şimşek and others vs. Turkey,” 35072/ 97, 37194/97, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en> (16.01.2014)

prepared against this unity. Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly, the main argument of the article is presented. Secondly, the author tries to justify his argument mainly through rhetorical questions. Finally, the author expresses how to handle the problem at stake, namely the threat directed against the social peace and national structure through creating a tension between the Sunni and Alevi citizens.

The topics below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. The list shows the main fields of action that the text relates to and the various discourses as well as the topics in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XI

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of the national structure
- Topic 1: Whoever does not accept the view that one of the robust factors of our national structure is our Alevi citizens is either a bigot or is a rascal.
- Topic 5: One needs to be either an uncommon fool or a rascal in order not to see that the enemies of our country, our national unity and democracy are behind this plot.

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the events targeting the Alevi citizens
- Topic 2: The purpose behind the events
- Topic 3: The centers of betrayal are doing their best to provoke Alevis
- Topic 4: Our Alevi citizens should not fall into this plot or despicably-prepared trap
- Topic 6: The events today are the products of the seeds which had been sown for many years
- Topic 12: The responsibility that falls onto the Alevis and those who can lead them

- Topic 13: The appearance of the things experienced in Lebanon, the former Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- The discourse of the current era
- Topic 7: The characteristics of the era we live in
- Topic 8: The lack of political cadre that are prudent
- Topic 9: The attitude expected from the people who govern our country
- Topic 10: Turkey does not have the power to bear a “religion” based fight
- Topic 11: The need to refrain from any activity that would disrupt the national unity of our country.
- Topic 14: To stay away from every plot and provocation as the most important requirement of today

Nomination/Referential Strategies

Personal pronouns are the first place to look at and see the ideological stance to the representation of social groups. The ‘we’ vs. ‘they’ dichotomy is generally used for inclusion and exclusion. The plural first person pronoun ‘we’ (lines 1, 12, 18, 22, 23) stands for the author and his agency as well as the readers having the same ideological orientation while another ‘we’ (lines 3, 16, 27) refers to the author and his agency. ‘You’ in line 7 refers to the readers while the plural first person pronoun ‘we’ in the same line is an all-inclusive pronoun for all the people living in Turkey. The author here tries to create a sense of national unity. In a similar sense, ‘we’ (line 18) refers metonymically to all the people living in Turkey. The plural third person pronoun ‘they’ (line 29) refers categorically exclusively to the people who govern the country or aspire to govern it.

In line 8, ‘the centers of betrayal’ is an example of personification. Here, this metaphoric expression can be thought of as euphemism which is an indirect way of labeling people who are against social peace and unity as ‘traitors’. The ‘national unity’ (line 12) stands for the territorial integrity while ‘democracy’ stands

metonymically for the stability of the political and social structure in Turkey. ‘This document’ in line 29 refers to the co-signed statement issued in the Parliament. This is also an example of personification. ‘Turkey’ (lines 30, 32, 42) refers metonymically to all the people living in Turkey.

The ‘political cadre’ in line 19 is an example of collectivization. Another example of collectivization is evident in line 43. The ‘masses’ is a collectivized indeterminate noun that puts emphasis on the victimization of the Alevi people. ‘Those’ in lines 25 and 37 is an example of indetermination. Lastly, the ‘President’ in line 34 is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the main social actors in Text XI and how they are predicated. As Table 11.1 shows, the categorization of social actors as in-groups and out-groups is ideologically-loaded. When the plural first person pronoun ‘we’ refers to himself and his agency some degree of authority is attached in the evaluation. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ which is used as an ‘all-inclusive we’ refers to the author, agency and the readers and it is one of the active agents bearing positive qualities the most. The only exception is as follows: ‘we, unfortunately, do not have the political cadre that are prudent enough to foresee these events that practically shout their arrival’ (lines 18-19). The people who govern the country or aspire to govern it are discredited as not adopting a line that is expected from them.

The evaluations concerning the ‘other’ in the text are realized within a negative lexical field. The author uses insulting expressions like fool, rascal and bigot while he evaluates the people who do not accept that Alevis are one of the robust factors of national structure. The author defines the actors who are against the national unity and democracy of Turkey as ‘the centers of betrayal’. The author accuses these actors of doing their best to provoke Alevis in order to start a fight between brothers (lines 8-9).

Table 11.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
We (the author, agency and the readers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been paying attention for many years... • occasionally witness incidents that target our Alevi citizens • know that the events that we face today are the products of the seeds which had been sown for many years • experience these again • did not know where and at which date these incidents would break out • unfortunately do not have the political cadre that are prudent enough to foresee these events that practically shout their arrival.
We (the author and the agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • talk so frankly.... • have been telling these for many years • do not expect any of them to provide positive response to the questions above
The centers of betrayal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are doing their best to provoke Alevis in order to start a fight between brothers.
Our Alevi citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should not fall into this plot or despicably-prepared trap
They (people who govern or aspire to govern the country)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should know that this document is not a document that will be enough to exonerate them from their responsibilities before the history
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not have the power to bear a “religion” based fight

Table 11.2:Argumentation Schemes in Text XI

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-6 the most important and one of the robust factors of our national structure is our Alevi citizens...We talk so frankly because it is enough to learn the history at primary school level in order to learn the truth...	Claim 1: Primary school level education is enough to know that Alevi citizens are an important part of our national structure...	Topos of sufficiency	Since it is enough to learn the history at primary school level in order to know that Alevi citizens are an important part of our national structure, we talk so frankly.
10-12 one needs to be either an uncommon fool or a rascal in order not to see that the enemies of our country, our national unity and democracy are behind this plot.	Claim 2: One needs to be fool in order not to see that the enemies of our country are behind this plot.	Topos of foolishness	Unless one is fool, he/she can see that the enemies of our country are behind this plot.
18-19-20 however we experience this again. Because we unfortunately, do not have the political cadre that is prudent enough to foresee these events that practically shout their arrival.	Claim 3: There is a need to have a political cadre that is prudent in order not to experience such events again.	Topos of political cadre	Since we do not have a political cadre that is prudent we experience this again.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim states that primary school level education is enough to know that Alevi citizens are an important part of our national structure... Here, the author resorts to the topos of sufficiency in order to justify his claim. By putting forward such a claim, the author tries to stress the important role of the Alevis in preserving national unity and argues that this role is quite obvious.

In the second claim, the author resorts to the topos of foolishness. The argumentation here can be formulized as follows: Unless one is fool, he/she can see that the enemies of our country are behind this plot. Through this argumentation, the author reveals his degree of certainty in evaluating the Gazi Events as a plot organized by the enemies of Turkey.

The final claim states that there is a need to have a political cadre that is prudent in order not to experience such events. The author writes the following: ‘however we experience this again. Because we unfortunately, do not have the political cadre that is prudent enough to foresee these events that practically shout their arrival.’ The argumentation here can be formulized as follows: Since we do not have a political cadre that is prudent we experience this again.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author takes a clear position in terms of the role the Alevi citizens play in maintaining national unity in Turkey. According to the author, ‘the most important and one of the robust factors of our national structure is our Alevi citizens’ (lines 1 and 2).

The epistemic modality refers to the degree of the author’s certainty in lines 3 and 8. The deontic modality has to do with the necessity or obligation expressed by the author. ‘Our Alevi citizens should not fall into this plot...’ (line 10) is an example of deontic modality.

The questions posed in Text XI are rhetorical questions. Rhetorical questions lead to a more interactive reading, they are also indicative of the author’s hedged critical point of view. The rhetorical questions in lines 21 and 22 and 25 and 26

serve such an aim. It should be noted that, mitigation and intensification strategies relate to the illocutionary force of propositions, that is; their persuasive impact on readers. For example, in the text, the author says: ‘The greatest responsibility at this stage possibly falls onto our Alevi citizens and to those who have the power to lead them’ (lines 36-37).

As a final remark, the ‘trap’ metaphor in line 10 is an ideological metaphor and is used to claim that the Gazi Neighborhood events are organized by a certain group of people. In addition, the author uses the idiomatic and metaphoric expression of ‘spreading butter on the bread...’ (ekmeğine yağ sürmek in Turkish) in line 41 to warn people against provocation. Lastly, the idiomatic expression of ‘shooting their arrival’ (line 19) conveys the standpoint of the author. The author presents the Gazi Events as the events whose outbreak was somehow guessed.

7.7. The Representation of the Gazi Incidents in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XII- The Zaman Article

Text XII (Appendix 12) is a column authored by Hüseyin Gülerce. Gülerce was one of the prominent columnists in the Zaman newspaper and had been treated as one of the lead voices of the agency. As noted earlier, Gülerce resigned from Zaman after the outbreak of the crisis between the Gülen movement and the JDP government.

The article to be analyzed was published on March 16, 1995, four days after the outbreak of the events in the Gazi neighborhood. The headline ‘We will succeed this time’ presents the reader the hopeful attitude of the author despite the fact that events in the Gazi neighborhood had caused a major trauma and insecurity throughout the society. The article intertextually refers to other newspaper articles and reports published in the national and foreign media about the Gazi neighborhood events.

As for the genre of the article, it is a mixture of both a column and an op-ed and it has qualities of a typical news column. Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly, the issue in question is introduced and the causes behind the Gazi events are addressed (lines 1-19). Secondly, the article addresses the actors which are not happy with the good image of Islam along with the presentation of how the foreign media represents the events that broke out in the Gazi neighborhood (lines 20-40). Thirdly, the unnoticed background of the events and the author's advice to the media along with his views about the remedy are presented (lines 41-53).

The list below outlines the main fields of action that the text relates to and the various discourses as well as the topics presented in order of their place in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the events in the Gazi neighborhood
- Topic 1: The escalation of the incidents that started in the Gazi neighborhood of Istanbul shows that the danger we are facing is different from the earlier ones.
- Topic 15: The militant groups pushed people on the police while Alevi citizens were trying to examine the events.
- Topic 16: The state should stand firm
- Topic 4: Those, who failed to achieve what they expected from the PKK are preparing a new and potential danger
- The discourse of Turkey and the outside world
- Topic 5: The disturbance of many countries as a result of Turkey's success
- Topic 6: The desire for dialogue and tolerance, longing for brotherhood, and thirst for domestic peace...make the world outside of us nervous.
- Topic 7: The sincere and profound interpretations of Islam in our country ...disturbs many actors inside and abroad

- Topic 8: Those, who realize that the ground that they are sitting on slips under them, lose their temper
- Topic 17: Our worry about the next Nevruz celebrations
- Topic 19: The only remedy is love

The field of media

- The discourse of the media representation
- Topic 2: The role of the major newspapers in the emergence of the events in Gazi neighborhood
- Topic 3: The headlines were as cruel as the bullets that were fired.
- The discourse of the representation of the issue in European newspapers
- Topic 9: The representation of the issue in British newspapers
- Topic 10: The representation of the issue in Italian TV and newspapers
- Topic 11: The representation of the issue in Russian television
- Topic 12: The representation of the issue in Greek press.
- Topic 13: The representation of the issue in German press
- Topic 14: The representation of the issue in French newspapers
- Topic 18: The responsibility of the media on this issue

Nomination/Referential Strategies

As one of the easiest ways of referring to people, pronouns can be exclusive or inclusive. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ in the headline refers inclusively to all the people living in Turkey. In this way, the author constructs a unified and homogeneous national identity that encompasses all groups regardless of their ethnic and sectarian characteristics. The pronoun ‘we’ (lines 3, 50, 51 and 52) serves the same aim while ‘we’ in lines 14 and 48 stands for the author and his agency. The third person plural pronoun ‘they’ in line 49 refers to the journalists working in Turkey while another ‘they’ in line 21 refers to the people who are disturbed by the influence the sincere interpretation that Islam has got all around the world.

The simile used in line 9 reflects the standpoint of the author. Through drawing a parallel between the headlines and the bullets, the author regards the position of some journalists similar to the aggressors who opened fire to people in the Gazi neighborhood. In lines 4 and 5, there is an example of metonymic use. It is known that not the newspapers but the journalists display common sense. ‘Turkey’ in line 10 is another metonymic expression referring to the people living in Turkey. The acronym PKK (line 11) stands for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and it is a functionalized way of referring to social groups. The ‘West’ in line 19 refers metonymically to the Western countries. Moreover, in line 44, the state refers metonymically to the statesmen who should stand firm. The ‘politicians’ (line 45) is an example of functionalization through which the actors are represented by their occupation (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

The passive voice (lines 6-9; 35-36) backgrounds the agents and shifts the focus to the event. A similar example is evident in line 47. The passive voice again shifts the focus on the event namely the escalation of the events in the next Nevruz celebration.

The metaphoric and idiomatic expression of ‘not having a free hand’ (‘at oynatamamak’ in the original text) in line 21 presents the situation of the people disturbed by some developments in an ironic way. Another metaphoric and idiomatic expression saying ‘koyun can derdinde kasap et derdinde’ which literally means ‘sheep cares about its life and the butcher cares about the meat’ is used in the advice the author gives to the journalists. Through employing such an idiomatic expression, the author wants to tell the journalists to be careful while reporting and making news about sensitive issues similar to that of Gazi Events.

The indefinite determiner ‘those’ (line 20) is a linguistic tool of indetermination through which the agents are mystified. ‘Watchful eyes’ in line 41 stands for the careful people who were able to notice what the militant people were trying to do. This is an example of somatization. Somatization occurs when social actors are represented by means of references to a part of their body (Van Leeuwen,

2008: 45). As a final remark, the only person nominalized by proper name is Atatürk who is represented as the actor that Alevis respect and appreciate.

Table 12.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The headlines captioned on the first days	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were as cruel as the bullets that were fired
<p>Those (who failed to achieve what they expected from the PKK)</p> <p>Those (who realize that the ground that they are sitting on slips under them)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are preparing a new and potential danger • lose their temper
Everyone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • agrees that Turkey’s turn of luck with the Turkic Republics, signing of the Customs Union Treaty...disturbed many countries.
We (author and his agency)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are aware that the desire for dialogue and tolerance makes the world outside of us nervous. • would like to remind the responsibility of the media on this issue once more.
<p>British newspapers</p> <p>Russian television</p> <p>Greek press</p> <p>German press</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • wrote the following... • said: “Religious terrorism started in Turkey...Inter-sectarian fight turned into terrorism...” • said: “the danger of fanatical Islam in Turkey... Alevi massacre...” • was the most merciless of all
Alevis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were represented as the archenemy of Islam • have always adopted Ataturk’s principles

Watchful eyes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • in Istanbul and Ankara saw that the militant groups, with placards that inscribed “TKP, Dev-Sol, Dev-Genc, TIKKO” were pushing people on the police while Alevi citizens were trying to examine the events.
The state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should stand firm
The politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should especially refrain from reckless statements which will wear down the police in these environments.
They (media actors)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should not strive to provide beautiful images, bloody corpses
We (the people)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will try to put off the fire where it started if we can. • don't have other remedy more beautiful than love in our hands • should succeed and will succeed this time...

Predications label social actors more or less positively or negatively, deprecatorily or appreciatively. As Table 12.1 shows, the social actors bear various negative and positive qualities throughout the text. The author depicts the headlines captioned in the aftermath of the events that broke out in the Gazi neighborhood as cruel as the bullets that were fired. In such a way, the author puts the blame on the journalists. In describing the journalists who captioned headlines such as ‘Bloody night’ (lines 6-9) the mainstream media is evaluated as ‘cruel’.

The indeterminate noun ‘those’ (line 10) refers to the out-group who are engaged in dangerous activities. What we learn about ‘those’ is construed by verbal

processes; 'they are preparing a new and potential danger', 'they lose temper'. By contrast, the first person plural pronoun 'we' as the in-group refers rhetorically to all the people living in Turkey and is positively predicated.

The European press stands as a reference point in the text in evaluating the stance of the Western world concerning the Gazi Incidents. As a final remark, the 'Alevi' in the text were represented as one homogeneous group (lines 30 and 45) through which some common predicates such as adopting Ataturk's principles are attributed to them.

Table 12.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
4-6 If the three major newspapers, which had the common headline of “we will not fall into this treacherous trap,” displayed the same common sense on the first day, it would be easier to spoil the plot that was put into action.	Claim 1: The common sense of the media makes it easier to spoil plots	Topos of common sense	If the media displayed the same common sense on the first day, it would be easier to spoil the plot
12-14 Everyone agrees that Turkey’s turn of luck with the Turkic Republics, signing of the Customs Union Treaty, and its prominence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan and Chechnya issues disturbed many countries	Claim 2: The success of a country may disturb other countries	Topos of disturbance	If a country becomes successful that disturbs many countries.
17-19 The most important of all, the sincere and profound interpretation of Islam in our country is in the condition of influencing the world despite “fundamentalism” and “Islamic terrorism” accusations of the West and this disturbs many actors inside and abroad.	Claim 3: The influence of the sincere interpretation of Islam disturbs many actors		Since the sincere interpretation of Islam is influencing the world, this disturbs many other countries.

<p>47-48 Our worry is that events will further be wanted to be escalated in the next Nevruz celebration on March 21. We would like to remind the responsibility of the media on this issue once more.</p>	<p>Claim 4: The media has a responsibility</p>	<p>Topos of responsibility</p>	<p>Since the events will further be wanted to be escalated in the next Nevruz, the media should not forget its responsibility</p>
---	---	--------------------------------	---

Argumentation Strategies

It is to be noted that the article is more explanatory than argumentative. The coverage of the events broke out in Gazi neighborhood in the foreign media sheds light upon this explanatory side of the article.

The first claim that ‘The common sense of the media makes it easier to spoil plots’ is an overtly expressed claim that is justified in the following paragraphs (lines 47-50). The author through this claim underlines the important role of the media discourse in providing political stability and societal peace. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: If the media displayed the same common sense on the first day, it would be easier to spoil the plot. Here, the author puts the blame on the media for increasing tension in the aftermath of the Gazi Incidents.

The second and the third claims are related with each other. Here, the author resorts to the topos of disturbance to support his arguments. In the second claim it is stated that the success of a country may disturb other countries. In the third claim it is stated that the influence of the sincere interpretation of Islam disturbs many actors.

The last claim is related with the first claim. The author resorts to the topos of responsibility and puts emphasis on the potential dangers resulting from the misrepresentation of the issues in the media. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Since the events will further be wanted to be escalated in the next Nevruz, the media should not forget its responsibility.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The representation of the Gazi Events in the media stands as a starting point for the author to put forward his arguments and analysis. The author takes a clear position against the actors who are against the success of Turkey. He defines them as the people who realize that the ground that they are sitting on slips under them.

Needless to say, the author is nationalist. This is evident in the emphasis put on Turkey’s turn of luck with the Turkic Republics and signing the Customs Union Treaty. The author sees the Western world as an important factor in the outbreak of the incidents in question. The author makes this clear in lines 22 and 23. ‘The

evaluation style of the recent events in European newspapers is a measure for us. Even these are in the form of clues for those who are eager to know who stand behind these events.’

The conditional clause (lines 4-6) is an expression showing the wish of the author vis-à-vis the stance of the media: If the three major newspapers, which had the common headline of ‘we will not fall into this treacheroustrap’ displayed the same common sense on the first day, it would be easier to spoil the plot that was put into action. In addition to that, the emphasis put on the responsibility of the media in representing the issues can be regarded as part of the degree of importance the author attaches to the media in handling problems and tensions.

The epistemic modality which refers to the degree of author’s certainty is used in lines 17 and 18: ‘...the sincere and profound interpretation of Islam in our country is in the condition of influencing the world...’ The metaphoric and idiomatic expressions used in lines 20-21 convey the standpoint of the author in a condensed form rather than in lengthy argumentative expressions.

The linguistic means of involvement manifest themselves in adjectives and adverbs especially those, which express the author’s emotions and attitudes towards the issue at stake. One of the overt negative references used by the author is ‘treacherous’ (line 5) an adjective that refers to the plots prepared. Lastly, the direct quotations presenting how the European press covered the events in the Gazi neighborhood is an example of the detachment of the author.

7.8. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The representation of the Gazi Incidents in the Hürriyet article largely focuses on the role of Alevi citizens in maintaining national unity. Oktay Ekşi both in the beginning and the final paragraph puts emphasis on the role the Alevi citizens play in the preservation of social peace. Ekşi defines the Alevi citizens as one of the robust factors of the national structure. Ekşi underlines the need for common sense in order to preserve social peace. According to him, the greatest responsibility falls onto the Alevi citizens to stay away from provocation.

Unlike the *Hürriyet* article, the *Zaman* article barely covers the Alevi citizens and their role in maintaining national unity. Hüseyin Gülerce shifts the focus on the media coverage of the Gazi Incidents.

Ekşi accuses the politicians and evaluates the events as a result of ‘intentional or unintentional cooperation between the domestic enemies of our peace and secular Republic and the external enemies of our country’ (line 15). In a similar way, Gülerce puts the blame on the forces inside and outside Turkey. In parallel to the conservative ideology of the newspaper, Gülerce argues that the Gazi Incidents could have been triggered by the actors who are disturbed by the good image of Islam. Finally, in both of the articles, there is a stress on the notion of love to eliminate the probable provocations.

7.9. The Council Of State’s (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory In Their Current Form in 2008

One of the issues that constitute a problem about the equal citizenship for the Alevi citizens is the compulsory religious education through which the state promotes Sunni interpretation of Islam.

The military elites who carried out the 1980 coup were aware that religion is glue for solidarity, so they perceived Islam as the antidote to social and political polarization. This understanding has an important impact on both constitutional and structural organization in the post-1980 era. Article 24 in the 1982 Constitution states that ‘Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools’ (Burak, 2012: 74). Many Alevi citizens are against the content of this compulsory religious education stated in the 1982 constitution.

The historical background of the introduction of religious courses dates back to the Democrat Party era. Under the DP rule, the religion courses were added to the curriculum for both primary and secondary schools. The insertion of elective religious courses to the curriculum of high schools took place in 1967 under the rule of the Justice Party (Grigoriadis and Gürçel, 2014: 305). In the following years, the

governments enhanced religious education. In line with that, in 1974 courses on ethics became compulsory at secondary and high schools (cited in Ibid: 310).

The obligatory religious education at state schools has been criticized among academic circles as well as Alevi intellectuals. According to Köse (2010: 155) there are major criticisms against the compulsory religion courses. The majority of Alevi citizens object to the compulsory nature of the courses. Almost all the Alevi citizens criticize the content of the courses for being biased and discriminatory.

There are European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and court decisions against various aspects of the content of these courses⁶¹. Hasan Zengin, an Alevi citizen, had submitted requests in 2001 to the Directorate of National Education and to administrative courts for his daughter to be exempted from these courses (Massicard, 2013: 387). Zengin claimed that, under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, parents had the right to choose the type of education their children were to receive. He also alleged that the course was incompatible with the principle of secularism.

On appeal to the Turkish Supreme Administrative Court in 2003, all of Zengin's requests were ultimately dismissed. Zengin then resorted to the ECHR, alleging that the course's syllabus lacked objectivity because it was taught from a religious perspective which promoted the Sunni interpretation of Islam. The ECHR found that the syllabus gave greater priority to Islam than to other religions and that pupils received no teaching on the confessional or ritual specificities of the Alevi faith. The Court in 2007 found that religious culture and ethics knowledge courses could not be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and pluralism necessary for education in a democratic country (Massicard, 2013: 387).

In parallel to the decision taken by ECHR, in March 2008, the Turkish Council of State also issued a ruling declaring that religion courses could not be obligatory in their current form.⁶² The background of the decision of Council of State is as follows: A case had been filed by two Alevi families living in Istanbul who

⁶¹ For details, see [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{"itemid":\["001-82580"\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{) (21.01.2014)

⁶²“Danıştay: Zorunlu din dersi hukuksuz [Council of State: Compulsory Religious Education is Unlawful] <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/437852.asp>. (21.01.2014).

objected to their children being forced to take compulsory religion courses. On March 3, 2008, the Court noted that it is unlawful to make the religion courses compulsory for all students (İnce, 2012: 156).

7.10. The Representation of the Council Of State's (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory in the Hürriyet Newspaper

Text XIII- The Hürriyet Article

Text XIII (Appendix 13) to be analyzed was authored by Cüneyt Ülsever. Cüneyt Ülsever completed his PhD study in the field of Human Resources in the US. Ülsever has worked for a variety of media organs in Turkey like the Channel 7, Samanyolu TV, Hürriyet newspaper and Oda TV. Ülsever argues that, he was fired from Hürriyet newspaper as a result of the pressure on media exercised by the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan⁶³. The article entitled 'It did not Work Ali Bardakoğlu' was published on March 9, 2008, six days after the Turkish Council of State issuance of a ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form.

In terms of its content and style, the article bears the qualities of a typical news column. The article deals with the issue of compulsory religious education both in general and specific terms. It reflects the author's view on the issue as well as echoing the attitude of the agency. Thematically, the article unfolds in four steps. The article is separated by the author himself into four sections using triple stars. Firstly, the main issue is presented via mentioning the decision of the Council of State. Secondly, the evident problem vis-à-vis the religion courses is presented. The author in an obvious way puts the blame on the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Ali Bardakoğlu for the inferiority of the clergy and religion courses teachers. Thirdly, the author points to the decision taken by the Council of the State again and criticizes Ali Bardakoğlu. The author also makes references to support his arguments. In the final part, the author asks the people (addressing the readers) to teach Bardakoğlu what law and the decisions of ECHR mean.

⁶³ For Ülsever's dismissal from Hürriyet, see <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=her-sey-ertugrulun-gidisiyle-basladi-2503131200> (10.04.2014)

The list below outlines the main fields of action that the text relates to and the various discourses as well as the topics presented in order of their places in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XIII

The field of judiciary

- The discourse of the decision taken by the Council of the State
- Topic 1: The Council of the State did not find it lawful that renders Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course offered at primary schools mandatory
- Topic 2: The preamble of the Chamber.

The field of state institutions

- The discourse of the mindset of TTK
- Topic 3: Prof. İrfan Erdoğan's statements in an interview appeared in Milliyet newspaper
- The discourse of the responsibility of the Directorate of Religious Affairs
- Topic 7: The Directorate of Religious Affairs is breaking religion away from its philosophy
- Topic 8: President of Directorate of Religious Affairs... knocks the ball out of bounds.
- Topic 9: Bardakoğlu's view about the ECHR decision
- Topic 10: Niyazi Öktem's view about the ECHR decision
- Topic 11: Some people should teach Ali Bardakoglu what law is...

The field of education

- The discourse of the content of Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge Course
- Topic 4: Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course is a course that does not only teach one particular religion

- The discourse of the problems of education in Turkey
- Topic 5: The lack of sufficient numbers of religion course teachers with formal training
- Topic 6: Religion course teachers, who are trained in Turkey do not know philosophy, sociology, culture and science methodology.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

Personification is one of the linguistic tools in representing social actors. The ‘Council of State’ in line 1 is an example of personified institutional name. In line 1, it is not the Council of State which finds something unlawful, the members of the Council are represented through such a personification. ‘The dominant mindset of TTK’ (Line 10) is another form of personification. The acronym TTK (line 9) stands metonymically for the members of the Board of Education and Discipline. Another example of personification is evident in lines 24 and 25: ‘In Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs is the main responsible for breaking religion away from its philosophy.’

The pronoun ‘they’ (line 21) refers to religion course teachers in Turkey in a generalized exospheric reference.

On the other hand, the passive voice in line 3 backgrounds the agents and puts the emphasis on the result. The ‘President of Directorate of Religious Affairs’ in line 27 is an example of functionalization in Van Leeuwen’s terms (2008: 42). Furthermore, he is identified with an institution, i.e., the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

The people who are named in the text are the former President of TTK Prof. Irfan Erdoğan, President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs Professor Ali Bardakoğlu and Faculty member of Bilgi University, Professor Niyazi Öktem. Öktem is presented for referencing purposes while Erdoğan’s words are quoted to provide a background information about the decision taken by the Council of State.

As a final remark, ‘A Committee’ in line 40 is an example of collectivization through which the people in the Committee are referred to. In line 45 there is an

example of indetermination, i.e. ‘Some people’. In both examples, the author mystifies the identity of the social actors.

Social Actors and Predications

Table 13.1 outlines the main social actors in Text XIII and how they are predicated. The author has a negative evaluation regarding the religion course teachers in Turkey. The President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Ali Bardakoğlu is discredited as being uninformed about how the ECHR works (line 37). The words of the author in the last paragraph show his negative evaluation about Bardakoğlu as well. The author describes the attitude of Prof. Bardakoğlu as ‘topu taca atmak’ which literally means ‘knocking the ball out of bounds’. Here, the metaphoric and idiomatic expression conveys the standpoint of the author about Bardakoğlu in a condensed form. With this expression, the author tries to underline Bardakoğlu’s ambiguous attitude towards the decision taken by the Council of the State as wandering off the subject.

The state institution, Turkish Council of State is presented with no attribution, whereas The Directorate of Religious Affairs is presented in an accusing way. The author represents Prof. Niyazi Öktem as an authority through providing direct quotations from him.

Table 13.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Turkish Council of State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • did not find it lawful that renders Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course offered at primary schools mandatory
Prof. İrfan Erdoğan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was explaining the dominant mindset of TTK with an example

<p>Religion course teachers</p> <p>They</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • do not know philosophy, sociology, culture and science methodology. • are not taught religious spirit, but are taught the form of worship. • only teach the practices of worship that they know to the students from all religions since they are in fact ignorant about the understanding the spirit of religion • are in fact ignorant about the understanding the spirit of religion.
<p>The Directorate of Religious Affairs</p> <p>This institution</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is the main responsible for breaking religion away from its philosophy. • is primarily responsible for the quality of religious clergy and religious course teachers in Turkey
<p>The President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs</p> <p>Ali Bardakoğlu</p> <p>He</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • knocks the ball out of bounds. • implies that “ECHR should have consulted to scholars, in other words, to me!” • argues that latest decision on religion culture course is the virtual adaptation of the decision taken by the ECHR in Turkey. • is obviously uninformed about how ECHR Works
<p>Prof. Dr. Niyazi Oktem</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • states the following...
<p>Some people</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should teach Ali Bardakoglu what law is, what Turkey’s signature in European Convention on Human Rights means...

Argumentation Strategies

In the table below, I have outlined the main claims and topoi in Text XIII. The first claim draws on the topos of ignorance/knowledge. The argumentation formulation is as follows: ‘Since the religion course teachers are ignorant about understanding the spirit of religion, they only teach the practices of worship that they know to the students from all religions.’ Here, the author criticizes the religion course teachers in Turkey.

The next claim draws on the topos of definition. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: ‘since Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course is a course that does not only teach one particular religion (Islam), it teaches the historical developments of all religions/beliefs...’

The author resorts to topos of responsibility for his final claim. The last claim is as follows: ‘The Directorate of Religious Affairs is the main responsible actor for breaking religion away from its philosophy.’ Through such an argument, the author blames the Directorate of Religious Affairs for undermining the philosophy of religion.

Table 13.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
17-23 The main problem in Turkey is not the curriculum of this course, but the lack of sufficient numbers of religion course teachers with formal training...They only teach the practices of worship that they know to the students from all religions since they are in fact ignorant about the understanding the spirit of religion.	Claim 1: The religion course teachers are ignorant.	Topos of ignorance/knowledge	Since the religion course teachers are ignorant about understanding the spirit of religion, they only teach the practices of worship that they know.
14-16 Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course is a course that does not only teach one particular religion (Islam), but teaches the historical developments of all religions/beliefs, their philosophical and social dimensions and cultural significance.	Claim 2: Religious Cultureand Ethics Knowledge course teaches the historical developments of all religions/beliefs....	Topos of definition	Since Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course is a course that does not only teach one particular religion (Islam), it teaches the historical developments of all religions/beliefs...
24-26 In Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs is the main responsible for breaking religion away from its philosophy. This institution is primarily responsible for the quality of religious clergy...	Claim 3: The Directorate of Religious Affairs is the main responsible actor for breaking religion away from its philosophy.	Topos of responsibility	If Turkey suffers from the breaking religion away from its philosophy, it is the fault of the Directorate of Religious Affairs.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

Perspectivation, intensification and mitigation strategies express the involvement and / or detachment of the author as well as modifying the epistemic status of a proposition. The title of the article saying ‘It did not work Ali Bardakoğlu!’ shows the standpoint of the author about the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs Bardakoğlu’s attitude towards the decision taken by the Council of the State.

In parallel to that, the assertions pertinent to Bardakoğlu are of high epistemic modality (he is the main responsible...,he knocks the ball out of bounds...,he argues...,is obviously uninformed...) The metaphoric and idiomatic expression (lines 28-29) of ‘topu taca atmak’ which literally means ‘knocking the ball out of bounds’ conveys the standpoint of the author about Bardakoğlu. Through using such an expression, the author draws attention to the ambiguous attitude of Bardakoğlu.

The author heavily criticizes the Directorate of Religious Affairs for breaking religion away from its philosophy (lines 24 and 25). According to the author, the main problem in Turkey is not the curriculum of this course, but the lack of sufficient numbers of teachers with formal training.

The direct quotations belonging to Prof. İrfan Erdoğan can be evaluated as linguistic devices showing author’s detachment. Similarly, making direct quotations from Prof. Niyazi Öktem serves such an aim besides referencing purposes. The epistemic modality in line 17 (‘The main problem in Turkey is not the curriculum of this course...’) refers to the degree of the author’s certainty. The deontic modality in the last paragraph (‘Some people should teachAli Bardakoğlu what law is...’) shows the necessity expressed by the author. The assertions pertinent to the Directorate of Religious Affairs is of high epistemic modality (...is responsible).

7.11. The Representation of the Council Of State's (Danıştay) Ruling Declaring That Religion Courses Cannot Be Obligatory in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XIV-The Zaman Article

Text XIV (Appendix 14) is a column written by Mümtaz'er Türköne, a professor of Political Science. Mümtaz'er Türköne has published many articles and books on Islamism, Turkish modernization and the Kurdish issue. Türköne has been identified with his nationalist views before the 1980 coup. Türköne is currently working as a professor in Fatih University and has been writing for Zaman for more than a decade.

The article entitled 'Is there a religious culture of ours?' was published on March 9, 2008 six days after the Turkish Council of State issuance of a ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form. Written by an academic, the genre of the text bears features of an academic text as well as journalistic ones.

The article starts with the introduction of the issue in question. The author criticizes the content of the course as well as the way it is taught at schools. The author mentions his personal memories besides covering how the European countries deal with the issue of religious education.

The contents of Text XIV revolve mainly around the issue of religious culture and ethics knowledge course. As noted, the author through making comparisons with the practices in European countries criticizes the content on the course as well as the way it is taught in Turkey. Thematically, the article unfolds in four steps. Firstly, the issue at stake is introduced to the reader. The author presents his own personal experiences as well (lines 1-17). Secondly, the author continues to mention his own experiences in addition to introducing how religion is taught and learnt in Turkey (lines 18-40). Thirdly, the author presents comparisons with the practices in Europe concerning the issue of religious education. Christianity and Judaism are also discussed in this part (lines 41-56). Fourthly, the author presents what the religious

culture and ethics knowledge courses present and constitute in terms of religion education (lines 57-60).

The list below outlines the selected topics and discourses in Text XIV. The topics are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic is allocated to a discourse and each discourse to a field of social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XIV

The field of judiciary

- The discourse of the decision taken by the Council of the State
- Topic 1: The decision taken by Council of State has rekindled an unending debate.
- Topic 2: The response of the President of Directorate of Religious Affairs
- Topic 3: It is not true for the court to make a decision about the content of this lesson without the existence of an expert view.
- Topic 4: The happiness of the Alevis with the court decision.

The field of education

- The discourse of the religious culture and ethics knowledge course
- Topic 5: We have all been the students in this course.
- Topic 6: The minds of all of us used to be outside the class
- Topic 7: The teachers who would instruct in the course
- Topic 8: Some teachers made the propaganda of irreligiousness
- Topic 12: In Turkey, only state can teach religion
- Topic 13: To teach religion without state provision is a crime.
- Topic 23: The “religious culture and ethics knowledge” course does not provide religion education.
- Topic 24: It constitutes reference for single faith and single practice in a very solid way.

- Topic 25: As long as the state monopoly on religion education is not lifted, the justifications of the objection to this lesson are not legitimate.

The field of personal experiences

- The discourse of the author's past experiences
- Topic 9: In one of our optional religious courses, our teacher of biology told Darwin's evolution theory
- Topic 10: I have taken my son to Friday prayer.

The field of European practices vis-à-vis the religious education

- The discourse of how Europe manages the issue of religious education
- Topic 11: We skip an important point while making comparisons with other countries about the issue of "religious culture and ethics knowledge".
- Topic 14: While taking different practices as an example, we should not forget that Turkey is the only country in the world where the religion is taught only by the state.
- Topic 15: The religion education in Austria
- Topic 16: The religion education in Germany
- Topic 17: The religion education in France

The field of religion

- The discourse of the specificity of every religion
- Topic 18: Every religion has a specific education program
- Topic 19: The basis of Christianity
- Topic 20: The Catholic Church despite trying hard could not publish a catechism book.
- Topic 21: The fundamental problem of Alevism
- Topic 22: The vital problem of Sunnism

Referential/Nomination Strategies

The passive voices used in lines 1, 4, 15, 40 and 59 background the social actors and shift the focus on the activity. The acronym ECHR (line 2) stands metonymically for the judges working for the European Court of Human Rights. The ‘President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (line 3) is a form of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

In the text, the first person pronoun refers to the author himself in an informal style. The author in the text is one of the active agents. He quotes (lines 2, 3), asks questions (lines 19-20), he explains his personal experience (lines 18-26). The third person plural pronoun ‘they’ (line 2) stands for the judges in the Council of State who took the decision stating that religious courses should not be made obligatory for all students. Another third person plural pronoun ‘they’ (line 8) refers to the Alevi citizens who are happy with the decision at stake. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 9, 10, 20, 32) refers in an anaphoric way to all the readers and the author as well, while ‘we’ in line 27 refers to the people in the mosque.

The ‘people’ (line 16) is an example of indetermination (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). The ‘ones’ (lines 45, 47) is another example of indetermination through which the social actors are constructed as an anonymous group. Another example of indetermination is evident in line 14. (‘A teacher of religious culture and ethics knowledge course’) This is also an example of functionalization, namely referring to social actor with their occupation. The ‘State’ (line 33) refers metonymically to state authorities who carry the task of teaching religion.

In lines 1 and 35, there are examples of personified institutional names. In line 1, the judges of the Council of the State are represented by the institution they belong to. In line 35, teachers and clergy are represented by the institution they belong to. We all know that it is not the schools or Quran courses that teach religion but the teachers and clergy teach religion. Other examples of personification are seen in lines 53 and 57.

Table 14.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The decision taken by the Council of the State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has rekindled an unending debate.
Alevi They (Alevi)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are happy with the court decision. • are insistent on that the content of the courses is very distant to them
We (the readers and the author)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • do not remember our personal experiences. • have all been the students in this course • are in a position to pass judgments • can all answer this question differently • should not forget that Turkey is the only country in the world where the religion is taught only by the state.
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • remember that our teacher of biology told Darwin’s evolution theory. • have done what once my father did to me • have taken my 5 year-old son to Friday prayer.
State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can teach the religion
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is the only in the world where the religion is taught only by the state
In Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • every religious community that is recognized constitutionally provides a teacher
In Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the ones who do not want to take religion courses are imperatively given “ethics” courses

In France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • the ones who want to get religion education go to church schools and get an intensive religion education besides the official curriculum
The Catholic Church	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • despite trying hard could not publish a catechism book.
The religious culture and ethics knowledge course	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not provide religion education. • constitutes reference for single faith and single practice in a very solid way.

The table above outlines the social actors in the article and the way they are predicated. The decision taken by the Council of State is represented in a personified way. In such a way, the author beware of a direct confrontation with the head of the Council. Although there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of the Council of State, the author attaches a considerable degree of significance to the decision taken by the Court as understood from the sentence ‘The decision taken by the Council of the State concerning the religious culture and ethics knowledge courses after ECHR has rekindled an unending debate.’

The ‘Alevi’ in the text is treated as one homogeneous group the main characteristic of which is being happy with the Court decision. The author uses the pronoun ‘we’ as an active agent with both positive and negative evaluations. The author inconspicuously discredits the religious culture and ethics knowledge course.

What we learn about the religious culture and ethics knowledge course is mostly construed by verbal processes; ‘does not provide religion education, constitutes reference for single faith and single practice in a very solid way.’ all which are negative. In the text, despite not making an overt comparison, the European countries like Germany, France and Austria are represented with a positive evaluation vis-à-vis the religion education.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim stating that it is not true for a court to make a decision without an expert view can be seen as a general view of the author about the court decisions. The argumentation here can be formulized as follows: If a court does not ask for expert view then it is not true for the court to make a decision.

The second claim is supported by the fallacy of emotions. The author in lines 7-8 writes the following: ‘Alevi are happy with the court decision; this is because they are insistent on that the content of the courses is very distant to them.’

The fallacy of ‘hasty generalization’ is spotted in the next argumentation formulation. Hasty generalization is a generalization on the basis of a sample that is not representative (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73). The argumentation formulation is as such: If a teacher of religious culture course was not found, the teacher who instructs instead of him /her makes propaganda of irreligiousness in the religious culture course. Here, the author makes a generalization about religious culture courses based on his own personal experiences.

In the fourth and fifth claims, the author resorts to the topos of authority to justify his claims. Claim four states that ‘Only state authorities can teach religion in Turkey’. Claim five states that ‘Only people whom the state has given license can teach religion’ The argumentation formulation here is as follows: If you want to learn your religion you can learn this from the people whom the state has given license to.

The next claim is supported by the topos of crime. The author here states how religion is taught and learnt in Turkey. He also writes that if you teach religion without an official attribute or learn it outside the state institutions it is a crime. The final claim states that ‘Christianity is based on very basic practices’. Here, the author resorts to the topos of originality. The argumentation can be formulized as follows: Since every religion has a specific program, Christianity is based on very basic practices as well.

Table 14.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XIV

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
6-7... it is not true for the court to make a decision about the content of this lesson without the existence of an expert view	Claim 1: It is not true for a court to make a decision without an expert view	Topos of law	If a court does not ask for expert view then it is not true for the court to make a decision
7-8 Alevis are happy with the court decision; this is because they are insistent on that the content of the courses is very distant to them	Claim 2: The Alevi citizens are happy with the Court decision	Fallacy of emotions	Since the content of the course is distant to Alevis, they are happy with the Court decision.
14-17 When a teacher of religious culture course who graduated from Theology or Supreme Islam Institute was not found, the task would be given to the teacher of philosophy ... There absolutely emerged people among these teachers who made propaganda of irreligiousness in the religious culture course.	Claim 3: The propaganda of irreligiousness is inevitable when a teacher of religious culture course was not found	Hasty generalizations	If a teacher of religious culture course was not found, the teacher who instructs instead of him /her makes propaganda of irreligiousness in the religious culture course.

<p>33-34 In our country, only state can teach the religion, even the ones who teach have to be a civil servant.</p> <p>36-37 If you want to learn your religion you can learn this from the people whom the state has given license to.</p>	<p>Claim 4: Only state authorities can teach religion in Turkey</p> <p>Claim 5: Only people whom the state has given license can teach religion</p>	<p>Topos of state authority</p> <p>Topos of state authority</p>	<p>Since only state authorities can teach religion, no other actor can teach it.</p> <p>If you want to learn your religion you can learn this from the people whom the state has given license to.</p>
<p>37-38 to teach the religion without having an official attribute and to learn the religion outside of the state institutions is a crime</p>	<p>Claim 6: To teach religion without an official attribute and to learn it outside the state institutions constitute a crime</p>	<p>Topos of crime</p>	<p>If you teach religion without an official attribute or learn it outside the state institutions it is a crime.</p>
<p>51-52 Every religion has a specific education program. Christianity is based on very basic practices ...</p>	<p>Claim 7: Christianity is based on very basic practices</p>	<p>Topos of specificity</p>	<p>Since every religion has a specific program, Christianity is based on very basic practices as well.</p>

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

Perspectivation, mitigation and intensification strategies help to analyze from what perspective or point of view the referential strategies, negative or positive predications of the Self and the Other, and arguments are expressed.

The author is against the compulsory religion education. This is evident in lines 57-60. For the author, the religious culture and ethics knowledge course does not provide religion education. However, it constitutes reference for single faith and single practice in a very solid way. As long as the state monopoly on religion education is not lifted, the justifications of the objection to this lesson are not legitimate.

Modality analysis is one of the ways to analyze the author's expression in reporting and interpreting the event in question. One of the categories used to analyze the modality of propositions is epistemic modality. 'Epistemic modality' refers to the degree of certainty. In the text, there are examples of epistemic modality in lines 6, 37-36, 39-40 and 54-55.

Finally, rhetorical questions are indicative of the author's hedged critical point of view. The rhetorical questions (lines 11-12, 19-20, 22-24 and 29-30) all serve such an aim.

7.12. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

In the Hürriyet article, the representation of the Council of State's ruling declaring that religion courses cannot be obligatory in their current form is mostly centered on the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu. As the headline reads 'It did not work Ali Bardakoğlu', Cüneyt Ülsever heavily criticizes Bardakoğlu saying that 'In Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs is the main responsible for breaking religion away from its philosophy.' (lines 24 and 25).

Ülsever argues that the main problem is not the curriculum of the course but the lack of sufficient numbers of religion course teachers with formal training. In a similar way, Mümtaz'er Türköne writes the following:

When a teacher of religious culture course who graduated from Theology or Supreme Islam Institute was not found, the task would be given to the teacher of philosophy and even to physical educator. There absolutely emerged people among these teachers who made propaganda of irreligiousness in the religious culture course.

As a professor of political science, Türköne deals with the issue within the framework of an academic perspective. Türköne addresses the European practices vis-à-vis the religion education and argues that Turkey is the only country where religion is taught only by the state.

As a final remark, in both of the articles, the authors criticize the mandatory courses of religious culture and ethics knowledge. Ülsever puts the emphasis on the lack of the teachers and religious clergy who have modern mindset while Türköne finds the state monopoly on religion education as an illegitimate practice. For Türköne as long as the state monopoly on religion education is not lifted, the objections to this lesson are not legitimate.

7.13.The Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision Declaring That Cem Houses Cannot Be Viewed As The Places Of Worship In 2012

The cem houses function not only for spiritual practices but also for a number of different charity and cultural activities. Cem houses also play a significant role in the identity formation for the Alevi citizens. Cem houses provide Alevis a range of services such as lute courses, semah⁶⁴ courses, computer courses for the youth and cem house kitchens providing free food for people in need (Köse, 2010: 163).

The legal status of cem houses as a place of worship is another issue that constitutes a problem between the Alevi citizens and the Turkish state. The demands related to the cem houses include legalization of cem houses as places of worship.

⁶⁴ Semah is a kind of dancing in which both women and men participate in Alevi worship ceremonies.

Alevi associations also want cem houses to benefit from all the privileges that mosques enjoy, including free electricity, free water, and allocation of free building sites (Ibid: 154).

The law 677 known as ‘Law on the Abolition of Religious Lodges, Shrines and Some Religious Titles’ bans the places of worship other than mosques, such as shrines, dervish lodges, gathering places of sects and mystical movements (tarikats). The law is considered as one of the most important pieces of legislation among Kemalist reforms. The Alevi associations and foundations do not openly request the amendment to this law from the Republican era, but they expect the outcome that would pave the way to legalization of cem houses (Ibid).

The decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation declaring that cem houses cannot be viewed as the places of worship in 2012 dates back to the case of Çankaya Cem House Construction Association (Çankaya Cemevi Yapıtırma Derneği). The organizational charter of Çankaya Cem House Construction Association had referred to cem houses as places of worship. On 24 November 2011, upon the application of the Ankara Governorship, the Ankara Chief Prosecutor's Office had filed a suit for the dissolution of the Çankaya Cem House Construction Association. In fact, the origin of the case dates back to 2008, when the Ministry of Interior Affairs, based on the opinion of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) that ‘cem houses are not places of worship’ informed the Ankara Governorship that Article 2 of the Association’s charter should be repealed.⁶⁵ The Governorship had unsuccessfully appealed to the association to amend its charter which refers to cem houses as Alevi houses of worship and aims to build cem houses (Kurban, 2012: 1). In asking for the court to shut down the association, the prosecutor had argued that Alevism is not a religion and cem houses cannot be regarded as places of worship. Ankara 16th Court of First Instance decided (with reference to ECHR decisions and the neutrality obligation of the state regarding the status of cem houses) in a case regarding the

⁶⁵http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/2011%20-TR-%20Country%20Report%20LN_final.pdf (29.08.2014).

closure of Çankaya Cem House Construction Association that the association statute which refers to cem houses as places of worship does not constitute a crime.⁶⁶

The court ruled in favor of the association on the ground that Alevis had for centuries accepted and used cem houses as places of worships. The Court of Cassation reversed this judgment arguing that cem houses cannot be accepted as places of worship on July 25, 2012.⁶⁷ The Court of Cassation based its decision on Article 1 of the Law 677. The court also noted that under Law no. 633 on the establishment and powers of the administration of the religious affairs of members of the Muslim faith, it is in the exclusive power of Diyanet to establish mosques and masjids (Kurban, 2013: 23).

As a positive development, in January 2015, The Didim Alevi-Bektashi Cultural Center and Cem House Association in the city of Aydın applied to the Municipality for the worship status and the Municipality Assembly had accepted the status of worship for the cem house. In February 2015, the Karşıyaka and Konak Municipalities in İzmir and the Avcılar Municipality in İstanbul accepted that the cem houses would be granted the worship status.

7.14. The Representation of the The Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision in the Hürriyet Newspaper

Text XV- The Hürriyet Article

Text XV (Appendix 15) is a column written by Taha Akyol. Taha Akyol began his career in 1977. Taha Akyol published many books on Turkish political history and world politics. The article entitled ‘The Alevis, Sunnis’ was published on July 28, 2012 three days after the decision taken by the Court of Cassation stating that cem houses cannot be regarded as official places of worship.

The genre of the text bears features of an academic text as well as journalistic ones. The article starts with a brief discussion over the issue of ‘true sect’. The article

⁶⁶ Milliyet, “Yargıya göre cemevi ibadethane” [According to the Judiciary Cem Houses are Places of Worship], <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yargiya-gore-cemevi-ibadethane/gundem/gundemdetay/02.11.2011/1458068/default.htm> (29.08.2014)

⁶⁷ http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/2011%20TR-%20Country%20Report%20LN_final.pdf (29.08.2014)

makes references to historical conditions and also emphasizes the significance of the fast-breaking meal organized by the Anatolian-Bektashi Federation in terms of bringing diversities together. Despite being written in an academic style, the article has also a personal and informal tone.

The article is separated by the author himself into five sections using subtitles. Thematically, the author writes about a variety of issues like ‘true sect’, Bektahism, Shah Ismail, Saint Barthelemy massacre⁶⁸ and the status of Alevis in the Ottoman history.

The list below outlines the main fields of action that the text relates to and various discourses as well as the topics presented in order of their place in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XV

The field of religion

- The discourse of ‘true sect’
- Topic 1: The questions regarding which one is ‘true sect’
- The discourse of Sunnism
- Topic 2: Opinions identifying Sunnism with Yazid, tyranny...
- The discourse of Alevism
- Topic 3: The definition of Alevism by the Alevis who do not go to cem houses
- Topic 4: Marginal positivist fabrications, such as “Alevism without Ali” have no serious grounds.
- Topic 5: Those who continue to see cem houses as places of worship, believe Islam’s interpretation of Alevism to be ‘true Islam’
- Topic 6: Rejecting cem houses is to force Alevism get positioned as a separate religion.
- Topic 13: Recognition of cem houses strengthens the unity of Turkey.

⁶⁸The massacre marked a turning point in the French Wars of Religion. Throughout Europe, it “printed on Protestant minds the indelible conviction that Catholicism was a bloody and treacherous religion” (Chadwick and Evans, 1987: 113).

The field of history

- The discourse of the Ottoman times
- Topic 7: During the rule of Yavuz and Kanuni, during the wars with Iran Alevis had been oppressed.
- Topic 8: The inconceivability to treat takfir fatwa of that time as reference today.
- Topic 9: Bektashism was also respected in those difficult times
- Topic 10: The imperial policy of Shah Ismail eliminating Sunnism
- The discourse of the Saint Barthelemy Massacre
- Topic 11: The slaughter of the Protestants
- The discourse of Braudel's ideas
- Topic 12: The instructiveness of the comparison of sociology of the peasant revolt of Munster sect in Central Europe...and our Alevi/Turcoman riots

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Alevi fast-breaking meal
- Topic 14: I welcomed a broadly-participated fast-breaking meal in terms of politics and religion
- Topic 15: Every attempt that brings diversities together is great
- Topic 16: The participation of the President in the meal was very good.
- Topic 17: The participation of the President in the meal put him under a moral responsibility

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The first personal pronoun refers to the author himself in an informal style. The author is one of the active agents in the text. He writes (line 1), shares the happiness of his readers (line 2) and he expresses his own feelings (lines 2, 6). The all-inclusive plural first pronoun 'we' (lines 14 and 21) is used by the author to create a sense of national identity.

The analysis shows that Turkey in line 38 is represented in a in a metonymic way. The JDP, the acronym for the Justice and Development Party refers metonymically to party politicians (line 17). In the same line ('...this sin is on the shoulders of the JDP today'), there is an example of somatization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45).

The 'President' in line 46 is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). There is an example of personification in lines 5 and 6. It is not the opinions but the people having specific opinions that identify Sunnism with Yazid⁶⁹ and tyranny. The vast majority of those' (line 12) 'The majority of Alevis' (line 10) are examples of indeterminateness (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39).

In line 11, 'Marginal positivist fabrications' is an example of euphemism implying a very critical stance towards the viewpoints such as 'Alevism without Ali'. Euphemism is an inoffensive or indirect expression that is substituted for one that is considered offensive. The 'Middle East' (line 15) stands for the Middle Eastern countries. 'Fire' (line 15) is a metaphoric use representing the chaotic situation in terms of sectarian clashes in the Middle East region. The 'wound' metaphor (line 38) stands for the PKK terror that has been threatening Turkey's stability for several years.

The passive structures (lines 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 29, 43) push the actors into background and shift the focus on the social activity. The only people who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized are businessmen Zeynel Abidin Erdem and İbrahim Polat. Erdem having Sunni identity and Polat having Alevi identity are represented in a complimentary way in the text. Through such a way, the author tries to underline the possibility of peaceful co-existence of Alevi and Sunni people.

⁶⁹Yazid is the second caliph of the Umayyad Caliphate. Yazid was appointed by his father Muawiyah. The Battle of Karbala took place in Karbala, situated in present day Iraq. The battle was between Muhammad's grandson Hussein ibn Ali, and Yazid, to whom Hussein had refused to give an oath of allegiance. Hussein and all his supporters were killed in that war.

Table 15.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Nobody	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> adopts a faith system that will make him/her think his/her belief to be wrong.
The majority of Alevis (who do not go to cem houses)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> define Alevism as ‘culture and lifestyle’
The vast majority of those (who continue to see cem houses as places of worship...)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> believe Islam’s interpretation of Alevism to be ‘true Islam’
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> should remember that Bektashism was also respected in those difficult times,
Shah Ismail He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> based his imperial politics on the elimination of Sunnism imposed Shiism on Sunnis by the force of sword.
Protestants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> were slaughtered in Saint Barthelemy massacre which is unprecedented in our history.
Great Historian Braudel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> speaks of population explosion and land insufficiency experienced around the Mediterranean in the 16th century
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> already has a wound that has been bleeding...
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> welcomed a broadly participated fast-breaking meal...

As seen the table above, the author does not have a neutral stance to all social actors in play. The Historian Braudel is presented as an authority in the text. Although there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Shah Ismail, it can be deduced that the author regards Shah Ismail in a negative way. Finally, Turkey (line 38) is evaluated as a victim of the PKK terror despite not stating it overtly.

Argumentation Strategies

As the article bears features of an academic text more than a journalistic one, the article is explanatory rather than argumentative. The first claim draws on a generally-accepted view about the relationship between the individuals and the faith systems. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: Since nobody adopts a faith system that will make him/her think his/her belief to be wrong. Everyone's belief is true for himself/herself.

The next claim that we need to respect one another is intrinsically related to the situation in the Middle East. Here, the author gives advice to the statesmen about the probable instabilities that can splatter to Turkey from the Middle East. The author resorts to the topos of respect to justify his claim.

The last claim that there is a great sin on the shoulders of the JDP draws on the opinion of the author and the agency as well vis-à-vis status of the cem houses as places of worship. Through such a claim, the author puts forward his point of view about the status of cem houses. The author criticizes the JDP government's rejection of cem houses to be accepted as places of worship.

Table 15.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
7-8 nobody adopts a faith system that will make him/her think his/her belief to be wrong. Everyone’s belief is true for himself/herself.	Claim 1: Everyone’s belief is true for himself/herself.	Topos of reality	Since nobody adopts a faith system that will make him/her think his/her belief to be wrong. Everyone’s belief is true for himself/herself
14-15 If we want to abstain from fires in the Middle East, the task that falls on all of us is to respect one another.	Claim 2: We need to respect one another	Topos of respect	If we want to abstain from fires in the Middle East, the task that falls on all of us is to respect one another.
16-17 rejecting cem houses is to force Alevism get positioned as a separate religion. It is a great sin and this sin is on the shoulders of JDP today.	Claim 3: There is a great sin on the shoulders of JDP	Topos of reality	Since the JDP does not accept cem houses as places of worship, this means sin for the party.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author is of the view that the recognition of cem houses as places of worship strengthens the unity of Turkey. The author does not find the JDP right in rejecting cem houses as places of worship.

Metaphors reflect the author's involvement in abstract terms. The author uses the metaphor of 'wound' (line 38) to refer to the threats that the PKK terror posed to Turkey.

As noted, the epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty. The following lines are such examples:

16rejecting cem houses is to force Alevism get positioned as a
separate religion.
...It is a great sin and this sin is on the shoulders of JDP today.
20...the reason is political. It is inconceivable to...
45Every attempt that brings diversities together is great.

As a final remark, 'Marginal positivist fabrications' (line 11) is used in the text to refer to the views like 'Alevism without Ali'.

7.15. The Representation of the Supreme Court Of Cassation Decision in the Zaman Newspaper

Text XVI- The Zaman Article

The article (Appendix 16) to be analyzed is a column authored by Ahmet Turan Alkan, professor of Political Science. Ahmet Turan Alkan's first article was published in a local newspaper in Sivas in 1974. Alkan has written numerous articles for a variety of newspapers and magazines and published several books.

The headline of Text XVI reads 'I am a Sunni but receiving treatment'. 'but' in the headline implies that the Sunni people living in Turkey have some pathological features which need treatment. It should also be noted that the spelling in the original headline reading 'Sünni'yim fakat tedavi *olayrum*' overtly makes a reference to the

accent of the people living in the Black Sea Region who are renowned with their shrewdness. This shows the informal tone of the article.

The text bears features of both a typical news column and an op-ed. It is relatively short compared to most op-ed columns. Despite having been written by an academic, the article does not discuss the matter, i.e. the role of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the status of cem houses from an academic perspective. The article intertextually refers to the statements of public figures (that of Adnan Polat) and other decisions taken by the Constitutional Court such as 367 decision⁷⁰ while trying to cover the issue in question.

The article was published on July 28, 2012 three days after the decision taken by the Court of Cassation stating that cem houses cannot obtain the official status of worship. Thematically, the text can be divided into two parts: in the first part (lines 1-13), the author writes about the fast-breaking meal and describes the meal as a ‘meal of the rich’ while he also describes it as a ‘table of the poor’ from another perspective. He then (lines 14 and onwards) writes about the decision of the Court of Cassation concerning the status of cem houses besides mentioning the issue of Alevi workshops. The author finishes the article with an anecdote which reveals the personal tone of the text.

The topics in the list below outline the main fields of action that the text relates to and various discourses as well as the topics presented in order of their place in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XVI

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the fast-breaking meal
- Topic 1: I was in the fast-breaking meal hosted by Alevi-Bektashi Federation and associations in Turkey

⁷⁰After Abdullah Gül’s candidacy had been declared for the 2007 Presidential Elections, a political lynch campaign against Gül began. The Çankaya Palace has been seen as a symbolic place for the secular character of the Turkish Republic. The main opposition party RPP claimed that the two-thirds majority (367 votes) is the necessary number of votes needed for a decision. The RPP applied the Constitutional Court and the Court annulled the first round of the elections stating that a quorum of two thirds was necessary.

- Topic 2: The President was the guest of honor
- Topic 3: It seemed to be a fast-breaking meal of the rich
- Topic 4: Sunni grind recited Quran
- Topic 5: Alevi grandsire offered a table prayer
- Topic 6: Our hearts became warm
- Topic 17: We could not notice anyone from the Directorate of Religious Affairs in this meaningful fast-breaking meal [SIC].
- Topic 18: The President's contribution to Alevi-Sunni brotherhood by his honorable arrival
- Topic 19: The menu was exceptionally impressive

The field of judiciary

- The discourse of the decision taken by the Court of Cassation
- Topic 7: I cannot go into details of the decision
- Topic 8: It is similar to the 367 decision taken by the Constitutional Court
- Topic 9: It has no chance of being actually in effect.
- Topic 10: It is unique and exceptional in breaking the heart of the Alevis
- Topic 11: Cem houses are not accepted as places of worship due to the justification that it would be an "opposition to the revolution laws"
- Topic 13: This decision cannot even be implemented for a moment
- Topic 20: The decision of the judiciary as "Cem house is not a place of worship"

The field of state-religion relationship

- The discourse of cem houses
- Topic 12: Seeing the idea of handing cem houses in the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a joke

- The discourse of the state's role vis-à-vis Sunni Islam
- Topic 14: The hilariousness and needlessness of state's monopoly in undertaking religious services related to Sunni Islam
- Topic 15: Even though we, most of Sunnis, certainly notice the strangeness of the Directorate of Religious Affairs' official status in religion-state relations ... we become "pro- Directorate of Religious Affairs" ...
- Topic 16: State pleased Sunnis in a sense by offering them the Directorate of Religious Affairs after beating religious people well at one time...
- The discourse of Alevi issue in Turkey
- Topic 21: The definition of Alevism for Sunni people
- Topic 22: Feeling content about Sunni people's definition of Alevism is similar to feeling content about the Vatican's description of Islam.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

In the text, the 'President' is an example of functionalization (line 3). There is an example of abstraction in lines 9 and 47. Abstraction occurs when social actors are represented by means of a quality assigned to them by and in the representation (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 46).

The first personal pronoun refers to the author himself. In the article, the author is one of the active agents: he goes to meals (line 2), he criticizes the judicial decisions (lines 14-16), he criticizes state's monopolistic role in undertaking religious services concerning Sunni Islam (lines 25-27), he asks questions (lines 52-53), he makes quotations (line 61) and makes anecdotes (lines 64-67).

The first person plural pronoun 'we' (lines 7 and 42) stands for the people (including the author too) who were in the fast-breaking meal hosted by Alevi-Bektashi federation and associations. 'It' (lines 14-16) and 'this decision' (line 24)

refers to the decision taken by the Court of Cassation stating that cem houses cannot be regarded as places of worship. 'They' in line 35 stands for the members of the Directorate of Religious Affairs while 'we' in line 37 stands for the Sunni population in Turkey. Another first person plural pronoun 'we' in lines 58 and 65 are in the form of all-inclusive pronouns and refer rhetorically to all the people living in Turkey.

The 'Alevi-Bektashi Federations and associations' (line 2), 'Court of Cassations' (line 12) and 'Supreme Court' (line 15) are all examples of personified institutional names through which the members of and the heads of institutions are represented by the institution they belong to. The 'Directorate of Religious Affairs' in lines 21 and 40 are other examples of personified institutional names. The 'state' (lines 26, 33) refers metonymically to state authorities while the 'judiciary' in line 52 stands for the Court of Cassation in a generalized form.

The passive voices used in lines 1, 9, 58-59 and 60 aim to background the social agent and shift the focus on the action. The only person who is named in the text, i. e. nominalized is the businessman Adnan Polat. Despite not appearing as a prominent person in the article, the quotation taken from Adnan Polat serves referencing purposes.

Table 16.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
I (the author)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was in the fast-breaking meal hosted by Alevi-Bektashi Federation and associations in Turkey • said it was a fast-breaking meal of the rich • ask who is poor in this country, for God’s sake? • cannot go into details of the decision • have no doubt, the hilariousness and needlessness of state’s monopoly in undertaking religious services related to Sunni Islam • do not dare to say but it is called hypocrisy somewhere... • talked about the Directorate of Religious Affairs • want to tell this case with a simile... • do not mean to make a comparison • did not forget it • found it rather meaningful • could understand a little better what it means to be Alevi in Turkey, I suppose [SIC].
The President Our blessed president	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was the guest of honor • greatly contributed to the Alevi-Sunni brotherhood by his honorable arrival
Sunni Grind Alevi grandsire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • recited Quran • offered a table prayer
We (people in the fast-breaking meal)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all responded with ‘Amen’ • could not notice anyone from the Directorate of Religious Affairs in this meaningful fast-breaking meal [SIC].

<p>The fast-breaking meal</p> <p>It (the meal)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seemed to be a fast-breaking meal of the rich • was lovely • could be considered a table of the poor from another perspective
<p>The decision taken by the Court of Cassation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is similar to the to the 367 decision of the Supreme Court • has no chance of being actually in effect, but is unique and exceptional in breaking the heart of Alevi • cannot even be implemented for a moment and is placed among the exemplary documents of our history of law with its strangeness
<p>We (Sunni people)</p> <p>We (all the people)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • notice the strangeness of the Directorate of Religious Affairs' official status in religion-state relations and consider it wrong • learnt that nothing was done to implement it after its final declaration was beautifully wrapped up.
<p>State</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • pleased Sunnis in a sense by offering them the Directorate of Religious Affairs after beating religious people well at one time
<p>They (members in the Directorate of Religious Affairs)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • could appoint officials to their mosques, issue religious fatwa and virtually prevent religious services to be ripped up
<p>The Directorate of Religious Affairs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had already added funds to the budget of next year for conducting sensitive astronomical observations

It (Alevism)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is a religious order or sect within Islam
Alevi workshop	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has been the most comprehensive work until now
The most beautiful sentence of the night It	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was uttered in businessman Adnan Polat’s speech where he said • was a sentence that covered physical distances through the wings of a bird
He (Adnan Polat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • said “Our elders have taught us the need to obtain morals through divine morality.”

The table above outlines the main social actors in the text and how they are predicated. What we learn about the author is mostly construed by verbal processes. As stated earlier, the author is one of the active agents, he asks questions, he evaluates the developments, he quotes and he makes interpretations.

The author uses the first personal pronoun ‘we’ for three purposes. One of them is to refer to the people attended in the fast-breaking meal. The other ‘we’ stands for the Sunni people while the other ‘we’ stands for an all-inclusive pronoun referring to everyone living in Turkey: In line 58, the author writes the following: ‘we learnt that nothing was done to implement it after its final declaration was beautifully wrapped up.’

On the other hand, the author represents the fast-breaking meal in a positive way. In line 8, he writes ‘...it was lovely...’ The decision taken by the Court of Cassation bears negative qualities in the text. The author evaluates it as a decision that ‘is similar to the 367 decision of the Supreme Court and has no chance of being actually in effect...’ He further evaluates it as ‘unique and exceptional in breaking the heart of Alevis and claims that ‘it cannot even be implemented for a moment and is placed among the exemplary documents of our history of law with its strangeness’.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs is not represented in a neutral way in the text. Finally, the state in the text is discredited as having beaten the religious people (line 34). Adnan Polat as the only person who is named in the text, i. e. nominalized despite not appearing as a prominent person in the article is represented for referencing purposes.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim stating that the President's presence in the meal as a guest of honor has great importance is also repeated in the following lines (lines 6 and 46). By repeating this claim, the author tries to emphasize the role of the President of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in contributing to Alevi-Sunni brotherhood.

The second claim is supported by the topos of strangeness. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: if a decision is strange it cannot be implemented. Here, the author puts forward his stance towards the decision at stake. The third claim draws on a general viewpoint dominant in Turkish society. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Even thoughmost Sunni people support the Directorate of Religious Affairs, this necessarily does not mean that they don't notice the strangeness of it. In this example, the fallacy of hasty generalizations (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 73) is used. The fallacy of hasty generalizations is employed whenwe reason that what was true in a weird special case must, therefore, be generally true. It can be said that this fallacy isamong the reasons people develop prejudices. The author employs the fallacy of hasty generalizations and generalizes the support of the Directorate of Religious Affairs for all the Sunni citizens in Turkey.

The final claim stating that the definition of Alevism by the Sunnis is similar to feel content about Vatican's description of Islam is supported by the topos of comparison. Here, the author through seeing the definition of Alevism by the Sunnis as feeling content with Vatican's definition of Islam tries to touch the religious sentiments of Sunni citizens and lead them to feel more sensitive while approaching to the Alevi issue.

Table 16.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
3The President was the guest of honor of the meal and his presence had a great significance	Claim 1: The President’s presence as a guest of honor has great significance	Topos of importance	Since the President was the guest of honor of the meal, his presence had a great significance
24-25 This decision cannot even be implemented for a moment and is placed among the exemplary documents of our history of law with its strangeness...	Claim 2: This decision cannot be implemented	Topos of strangeness	If a decision is strange, it cannot be implemented
28-31Even though we, most of Sunnis, certainly notice the strangeness of the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ official status in religion-state relations and consider it wrong, we become “pro-Directorate of Religious Affairs”	Claim 3: Most Sunni people notice the strangeness of the Directorate of Religious Affairs	Hasty generalizations Fallacy of support to Directorate of Religious Affairs	Even thoughmost Sunni people support the Directorate of Religious Affairs, this necessarily does not mean that they don’t notice the strangeness of it
55-57 isn’t there any injustice for Sunnis to define what Alevism is...I do not mean to make a comparison, but it is similar to feel content about Vatican’s description of Islam.	Claim 4: The definition of Alevism by the Sunnis is similar to feel content about Vatican’s description of Islam	Topos of comparison	If Alevism is defined by Sunni people, this means feeling content about Vatican’s description of Islam

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author, through posing the rhetorical question of “If Alevis, who became the addressee of the decision that does not consider cem houses as places of worship taken by an institution that is the ultimate in Turkey in terms of law facilities such as Court of Cassations, are not poor, I ask; who is poor in this country, for God’s sake?” (lines 10-12) conveys his extreme discontentment with the treatment the Alevi citizens face in Turkey. Other rhetorical questions in lines 52 and 53 serve the same aim, i.e., conveying the same extreme discontentment.

It should be noted that the style of the text is personal and informal although it was written by an academic. The informal style of Text XVI is reflected by the use of words such as ‘joke’ (line 22) and ‘anecdote’ (line 64). ‘It’ in line 32 refers to the attitude of most of the Sunni citizens who notice the strangeness of the status of Directorate of Religious Affairs but somehow support it (as the author says, ‘become pro-Directorate’). As for the perspective of the author, this is expressed in epistemic modality which refers to the degree of certainty.

The adjectives ‘strange’, ‘ridiculous’ and ‘embarrassing’ (lines 27-28) are linguistic means of involvement. Similarly detachment can be expressed through reported speech and quotation marks. However, quotation marks are sometimes used to indicate respect for authority and thus not express detachment necessarily on the side of the quoting agent (Efe, 2012: 132). The direct quotation taken from the businessman Adnan Polat in line 61 indicates respect for authority. Mitigation and intensification strategies also relate to the illocutionary force of propositions, that is; their persuasive impact on readers. For example in lines 57 and 60, the author writes:

57Alevi workshop has been the most comprehensive work...

60 The most beautiful sentence of the night was uttered in
businessman Adnan Polat’s speech

Finally, it should be noted that, the author uses the ‘bird’ metaphor in line 62 which symbolizes peace and freedom. Through using the bird metaphor, the author

evaluates businessman Polat's viewpoint about the fast-breaking meal organized by the Alevi-Bektashi Federation.

7.16. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The representation of the decision taken by the Supreme Court of Cassation declaring that cem houses cannot be viewed as the places of worship in 2012 is mostly made from an academic point of view in the Hürriyet article. Taha Akyol deals with the issue in a more formal tone while Ahmet Turan Alkan deals with the issue in a more informal and personal style.

In both of the articles, the authors are of the view that recognition of the cem houses as places of worship would strengthen the unity of Turkey. Both of the authors express their feelings of discontent about the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation. In this regard, Alkan puts forward his views in an ironic way through posing rhetorical questions as such: Cem house is not a place of worship; what is it then? A folklore association? A musical instrument course? A coffeehouse?... (lines 52 and 53). Akyol puts forward his position in a more rigid style. For Akyol, 'rejecting cem houses is to force Alevism get positioned as a separate religion. It is a great sin and this sin is on the shoulders of the JDP today.' (lines 16 and 17).

Akyol employs examples from the Ottoman and European history to sustain his position about Alevism and cem houses. Alkan approaches to the issue from the perspective of recent political developments. According to Alkan, the decision of the Supreme Court of Cassation is similar to the 367 decision. This comparison can be seen as an attempt of the author to underline the unlawfulness of the decision taken by the Supreme Court of Cassation.

In both of the articles, the fast-breaking meal hosted by the Alevi-Bektashi Federation was mentioned. However, the Zaman article has put more emphasis on it than the Hürriyet article. Finally, it is to be noted that, both Akyol and Alkan mention the debates concerning the definition of Alevism however, Alkan makes it

more clear while putting forward his point of view. Alkan writes the following: ‘Isn’t there any injustice for Sunnis to define what Alevism is...’

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE KURDISH CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS

In this chapter, I will try to cover how the Kurdish citizens are represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. After introducing the selected cases under scrutiny, I will provide the historical and socio-cultural context in which the cases are embedded in.

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how Kurdish citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The Nevruz day in 1992 after which the state perceptions and policies concerning the Kurdish issue began to be shaped through the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) terror (2) The capture of the leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (3) The initiation of the first uninterrupted broadcasting in Kurdish language via a state owned channel, TRT6 in 2009(4) The military operation on Uludere wherein 35 civilians died in the course of aerial strikes in 2011.

The same analytical steps will be followed as followed in the previous chapter. After making a semantically-oriented topic analysis, the strategies that are used in each text will be elaborated on by looking at the linguistic and/or rhetorical and argumentation tools they are realized in. Applying the same selection criteria explained in the previous chapter, the articles to be analyzed are as the following:

- Ertuğrul Özkök's article published on March 22, 1992 and Ahmet Selim's article published on March 23, 1992
- Ertuğrul Özkök's article published on February 17, 1999 and Ali Bulaç's article published on February 18, 1999
- Oktay Ekşi's article and Mustafa Ünal's article published on January 4, 2009
- Sedat Ergin's article and Bülent Korucu's article published on January 3, 2012

8.1. The Nevruz Day in 1992

The ‘Nevruz’⁷¹ literally meaning the New Day is known as the Iranian or the Persian new year marking the coming of the spring around 21 March, the time of the spring equinox (Yanık, 2006: 285). For many years, Nevruz has been an important annual political rally particularly for young Kurd people wanting to assert their ethnic identity. Nevruz day and the rituals of the Nevruz tradition, such as people gathering and jumping over a bonfire, were used as a means to express Kurdish identity in Eastern Turkey where the population is predominantly of Kurdish origin.

The clash on the ideological significance of Nevruz between state ideology and Kurdish nationalism became manifested in a clash about the spelling of the word (Nevruz vs. Newroz). According to Voloshinov (1973: 23) signs serve as an arena for social struggles. Thus it can be said that ‘Newroz’ as a sign became an ideological battlefield. Nevruz serves as a common field beyond all the religious, linguistic and class-based differences among the Kurds. Through its role in creating a homogeneous identity, Nevruz becomes an instrument of ‘identity transfer’ (Armstrong, 1982: 130).

Nevruz was a public holiday during the Ottoman period (cited in Yanık, 2006: 286). However, from the establishment of the Turkish Republic until 1991, Nevruz was not an official celebration day in Turkey. The PKK which succeeded to attain a great mass support especially during the 1990s, declared Nevruz as ‘the symbol of resistance’ and placed it at the center of its discourse. In the early 1990s, the state’s approach to the Kurdish issue and to Nevruz started to change slowly. This began when President Turgut Özal and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel gave the first signals of a possible policy change towards the Kurdish issue (Yanık, 2006: 287).

In 1991, with the ‘order’ issued by the then Minister of Culture Namık Kemal Zeybek, the Turkish state began to celebrate Nevruz (cited in Yanık, 2006: 285). The Minister of Culture, Namık Kemal Zeybek, issued a directive ‘ordering’ the celebration of Nevruz and expressing his hopes that Nevruz would bring “love,

⁷¹For an explanation of Nevruz see Boyce, Mary. (1970). “On the Calendar of Zoroastrian Feasts”. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*. Vol.33. No.3. pp.513–539

brotherhood and tolerance to the Turkish [SIC] world and to human kind.” (quoted in Yanık, 2006: 288).

It should be stated that, throughout the 1990s, there were two types of celebration. The first was ‘state ceremonies’ that usually took place in Ankara when the high ranking officials of the state, the president and the prime minister received, local and foreign delegations usually from the Turkic republics and other neighboring Turkic groups especially from the Balkans and the former Soviet Union in celebration of Nevruz. The second was public celebrations, or celebrations for the ordinary people. People interested in celebrating Nevruz by performing the rituals such as lighting a bonfire had either to get first the approval of the local civilian and security apparatus, or had to celebrate Nevruz at one of the ‘state organized celebrations’ (Yanık, 2006: 294).

The Nevruz of 1992 witnessed a violence escalation. In the Southeastern part of Turkey, namely in the regions of Şırnak, Cizre and Nusaybin, Nevruz celebrations turned into a rebellion. The state forces retaliated with a great deal of violence. Ninety-four civilians died while more than two hundred persons were wounded and hundreds of people were arrested. Houses, workshops, and party centers were destroyed. There are two distinguishing dimensions of Nevruz events of 1992. The first is the degree of participation in celebrations that reflected the size of discontent and the second is the priority given to anti-terror regulations following the events. After the Nevruz of 1992, state’s struggle with terrorism became the primary goal. The state adopted the motto of ‘first terror than reform’ (Cemal, 2005: 163).

8.2.The Representation of the 1992 Nevruz in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text XVII- The Hürriyet Article

Text XVII (Appendix 17) is a column written by Ertuğrul Özkök who has worked as the chief editor in Hürriyet for almost two decades. Özkök has completed his PhD in France in the field of Communication.

The article titled ‘Öcalan was not Sincere’ was published on 22 March 1992 one day after the bloody Nevruz. The genre of the text bears features of a journalistic text. The article has three sub-sections with sub-titles. The article starts with a description of the events occurred during Nevruz celebrations. While making such a description, the article also defends the stance of the Turkish police through comparing Turkish police with its European and American counterparts.

The contents of Text XVII revolve mainly around the incidents occurred on the Nevruz day, the stance of the police, the stance of the PKK and the attitude of the West towards the Armenians and the Kurds. Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly, a general description about the Nevruz events is made. Secondly, the views about the government attitude vis-à-vis the Nevruz events are presented. The author also criticizes the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan. Thirdly, the author compares government’s past and recent policies while presenting his desires about a more stable and democratic Turkey.

The selected discourse topics below outline the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are related to, and the fields of action where each discourse operates discursively and textually. The list of topics below is based on Reisigl and Wodak’s study (2001: 100). The topics are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XVII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Nevruz day
- Topic 1: Some people with Kalashnikov guns in their hands, shoot in the air.
- Topic 2: Comparison of the Turkish police with its European counterparts
- Topic 3: The attitude of the Turkish government
- Topic 4: The statements of the spokesmen regarding Nevruz
- Topic 5: The good wishes expressed by the officials and the media
- Topic 6: The condition required was that this celebration would not turn into an air of political demonstration and a kind of revolt against the government.
- Topic 7: The attitude of the police forces
- Topic 8: The condition should not be considered as a policy implemented only on citizens with Kurdish origin.
- Topic 12: It is not that Turkey has not made any mistakes in the past.
- The discourse of the PKK leader Öcalan's attitude
- Topic 9: The interview made with Öcalan
- Topic 10: The activities of the PKK
- Topic 11: Öcalan says that have no such a policy like separating from Turkey and establishing an independent state.

The field of international politics

- The discourse of the attitude of the West
- Topic 13: The support given to the Armenians and the Kurds by the West

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of the need for a democratic society
- Topic 14: It is essential lay the foundations of beautiful, cultural mosaic and harmonious diversity of a democratic society.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The nomination strategies serve constructing and representing social actors. In line 1, the social actors ‘some people’ are indeterminate (vague). In the following line, these people are referred to as ‘they’, a generalized exospheric reference. In this way, the author creates an anonymous group. The linguistic tool called indetermination tends to anonymize social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). Other examples of indetermination are seen in lines 7 and 21. The examples of ‘some Kurds’ and ‘people regardless of their ethnic origin’ are such examples through which the identities of the social actors are mystified.

The personal pronouns are the first place to see the ideological stance to the representation of social actors. Similarly in this text, the first personal pronouns refer to the author himself. In this article, the author is one of the active agents, he asks questions (line 4), observes events in foreign countries (lines 5-7) and he makes evaluations (line 41).

The ‘Turkish government’ (line 12) and the ‘Turkish police’ (lines 8 and 24) are both examples of personified institutional names through which the government members and the policemen are represented by the institution they belong to. In such examples, the focus is shifted towards the institutions. In a similar way, the acronyms PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) are examples of personified institutional name (lines 29 and 59).

In line 13, the ‘mouths’ refers to the statesmen, a metonymic use as well as a representational strategy called somatization. Somatization is the representation of social actors by means of references to a part of their body (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45). ‘Turkey’ in line 44 stands metonymically for state authorities: ‘It is not that Turkey has not made any mistakes...’ In parallel to that, the ‘West’ (lines 54 and 60) stands metonymically for the Western countries. The ‘Nevruz hysteria’ is an example of metaphoric expression. Through using the metaphor of hysteria, the author attempts to draw the attention on the pathological side of the people who creates a scene every year during Nevruz celebrations.

The people who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized are the PKK leader Öcalan, the PM Demirel and the deputy PM İnönü. They can be regarded as the prominent actors in the text. As a final remark the passive voices used in the text (lines 14, 18, 22, 38, 53 and 59) aim to shift the focus on the activity and thus background the social actors.

Table 17.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Some people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • shoot in the air
They	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • shout slogan with flags in their hands • are marching on security forces of the state.
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • wonder what police would do... • saw what police did when students attempted to protest against education reforms in the center of Paris • also witnessed how French police treated some Kurds... • do not believe that Öcalan has a policy like living together.
The Turkish government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • did the things that needed to be done in a democratic country
Police force of the state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not allow any people regardless of their ethnic origin who behave in such a way.
PKK leader Öcalan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • stated in his interview published

	in Towards Two Thousand magazine last week...
PKK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has distributed leaflets urging people to revolt in the region since the previous day. • has openly declared that its political propaganda is founded on bloodshed
The West	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has amply distributed this kind of support both to Armenians and Kurds in the last century

I have listed all the content-related predications in the table above. As Table 17.1 shows, the appellative denominations in the text would not be considered to be positively or negatively biased if we took them at face value and looked only what was said instead of what was not said or could have been said.

The author describes the people who caused violence and provocation as ‘some people’ in an indeterminate way. So that, the author points to an anonymous group who are responsible for the fatalities during the Nevruz. Finally the Turkish government and the police force are evaluated in a positive way while the West is accused of supporting separatist movements in Turkey.

Argumentation Strategies

The argumentation structure of Text XVII as shown in the table below draws on the content-related argumentation approach of Reisigl and Wodak (2001). The first claim that Turkey is a democratic country is supported by the topos of democracy. The argumentation formulation is as follows: If a country is democratic the government does what needed to be done. Here the author evaluates the stance of the government in the aftermath of the Nevruz events.

The second claim is supported by the topos of history. Following Wodak (2009: 44), the topos of history can be reduced to the following conclusion rule: because history teaches specific actions have specific consequences, one should perform a specific action in a specific situation (allegedly) comparable with the historical example referred to.

The third claim draws on the author's viewpoint about the situation in Turkey. After identifying the main problems evident in Turkey, the author claims that it is essential to provide the basis for a harmonious diversity of a democratic society in order to overcome the problems. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since it is needed to overcome the problems, Turkey needs to provide the basis for a harmonious diversity of a democratic society.

Table 17.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
12-13 The Turkish government did the things that needed to be done in a democratic country since the day Nevruz hysteria began to emerge	Claim 1: Turkey is a democratic country	Topos of democracy	If a country is democratic the government does what needed to be done.
53-56 It should not be forgotten that sympathy messages, coming from the West, might suddenly become obstacles on the smallest realistic assessment. The West has amply distributed this kind of support both to Armenians and Kurds in the last century. But, eventually, these two communities had been the ones who suffered the most from all these.	Claim 2: The Western support in fact makes some communities suffer.	Topos of history	Since the sympathy messages from the West may become obstacles, the support the West has given to some communities make them suffer
57-58 Now, it is needed to overcome all of these. It is essential to lay the foundations of beautiful, cultural mosaic and harmonious diversity of a democratic society.	Claim 3: It is essential to provide the basis for a harmonious diversity of a democratic society	Topos of necessity	Since it is needed to overcome the problems, Turkey needs to provide the basis for a harmonious diversity of a democratic society

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification all play a significant role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality.

The rhetorical questions in lines 4, 24-25 and 37-39 serve to encourage the listener to consider a message. It is to be noted that, the author defends state policies vis-à-vis the Kurdish question and justifies the attitude of the police during the Nevruz Events. This is evident in lines 8 and 9. The author takes a clear position against the Western world. According to the author, the West has amply distributed support both to Armenians and Kurds in the last century. But, eventually, these two communities had been the ones who suffered the most. The author puts emphasis on the need of a strong democracy in order to overcome the problems.

The mitigation and intensification strategies relate to the illocutionary force of propositions that is their persuasive impact on readers. The ‘mouths with the highest authority’ (line 13) and ‘the smallest realistic assessment’ (line 54) are such examples. To explore other mitigation and intensification strategies, I have focused on mood, aspect and modality that combine the analysis of lexical and grammatical features of sentences. Epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty. In lines 20, 44, 48 and 57 there are examples of epistemic modality. Deontic modality has to do with the necessity or obligation expressed by the author. There are examples of deontic modality in lines 22, 25, 49, 53 and 59. Finally, the adjectives of ‘beautiful’ (line 48) and ‘harmonious’ (line 58) are linguistic means of involvement.

8.3. The Representation of the 1992 Nevruz in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XVIII- The Zaman Article

Text XVIII (Appendix 18) to be analyzed was authored by Ahmet Selim. Ahmet Selim is a pen name. The real name of Ahmet Selim is Zeki Önel⁷². Ahmet Selim has written for a variety of different journals and newspapers. Ahmet Selim

⁷²<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/argit2/ssayfa/yazar/biyografi1.htm#AhmetSelim> (15.07.2014)

has been writing for Zaman since 1988. Selim published books on secularism and history as well as publishing novels.

The article entitled ‘Diagnosis is wrong and so is the path’ was published on 23 March, 1992 two days after the outbreak of the events in Nevruz. The genre of the text heavily bears features of a journalistic one. The article starts with a description of what happened in Nevruz celebrations. Thematically, the article has three parts. In the first part (lines 1-9) the article describes the incidents broke out in Nevruz celebrations. In the second part (lines 10-45), the article makes a socio-historical evaluation about Nevruz while making criticisms about the stance of the political actors in Turkey vis-à-vis the Nevruz celebrations. In the third part (lines 46-61) the article evaluates the role of the West in sponsoring terrorism in Turkey. The article ends with a critique of ‘democracy’ that is promoted by the Western world with the aim to ‘install Turkey to the new world order’.

The thematic structure of the text moves from the particular to the general. The author first writes about the incidents occurred during the Nevruz celebrations. In the end, the author mentions the issue of ‘democracy’ and the attempts of the West in shaping Turkey’s political life.

The selected discourse topics below outline the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are related to, and the fields of action where each discourse operates discursively and textually.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XVIII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Nevruz celebrations
- Topic 1: The death of 30 people
- Topic 2: The remarks made by some of the political authorities
- Topic 3: Weapons are being fired
- Topic 7: Demirel’s statement concerning Nevruz
- Topic 8: Fehmi Işıklar’s congratulation
- Topic 9: The response that Demirel was supposed to give Işıklar

- Topic 11: Demirel’s statement to Ecevit
- Topic 12: The accusations directed by Demirel and Ecevit to one other.
- The discourse of the support given to terrorism in Turkey
- Topic 13: It was the West as well as “Marxist-progressive” circles...who were sponsoring terrorism
- Topic 14: The attitude of the West towards Turkey
- Topic 15: The causes and consequences of the 1980 coup
- Topic 16: The current objective of the West
- Topic 17: The biggest agents of weakness before the terror

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of the place of Nevruz in Turkish history
- Topic 4: Neither a religious nor a national holiday of this nation called ‘Nevruz’ is available
- Topic 5: Nevruz is just a folkloric custom, not a holiday.
- Topic 6: Nevruz has only been very nominally and scarcely remembered in the East as well as in the West among Sunnis and Alevis.
- Topic 10: Nowhere “calm and natural commemoration of Nevruz” was carried out

Nomination/Referential Strategies

In lines 3-4 (‘The night scene of Cizre before March 21 had clearly demonstrated the nature of the case.’) there is an example of personification. Personification means imputing human qualities to things that are not human, e.g. abstract concepts or theories.

The ‘political authorities’ (lines 4 and 8) is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). The ‘East’ and ‘West’ (lines 13 and 14) are examples of metonymic use and stand for the Eastern and Western countries. In addition, the

West (lines 49, 55 and 56) refers metonymically to Western countries as well. The ‘nation’ (lines 19-27) stands metonymically for all the people living in Turkey.

The third person plural pronoun ‘they’ (line 17) refers to the people who caused violence and the death of 30 people during the Nevruz celebrations. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 30 and 45) refers rhetorically to all the people living in Turkey.

There is an example of indetermination in line 47 (Marxist-progressive circles). One of the common ways to refer to ‘the other(s)’ is the use of indeterminate pronouns and adjectives for the actors in question, which is called as indetermination by Van Leeuwen (2008: 39). The acronym PKK (line 33) stands metonymically for the members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The metaphor of ‘evil orchestra’ (line 50) refers to the Western countries as well as the Marxist circles which support terrorism in Turkey. As a final remark, the passive voices in the text (lines 2,7,12,13,15,26 and 41) background the social actors and shift the focus to the activity.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the main social actors in Text XVIII and how they are predicated. As seen in the table below, the author uses the metaphor ‘evil orchestra’ to describe the social actors among which the Western world is the pioneering figure that support terrorism in Turkey. It should be stated that, there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Demirel and Ecevit.

Lastly, the author evaluates the 1980 coup as a reference point for understanding the role of the Western world in eroding the stability and social peace of Turkey through ethnic clashes such as the ones that broke out in the Nevruz of 1992.

Table 18.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Nevruz It	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is just a folkloric custom, not a holiday • has never been welcomed with a spectacular interest until this year. • has only been very nominally and scarcely remembered in the East as well as in the West among Sunnis and Alevis.
Mr. Demirel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • could say “They ruined the festival of the nation” even after all the events. • was supposed to respond like this... • had accused Ecevit...
Fehmi Işıklar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • congratulated him with colorful flowers
Ecevit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had accused Demirel of protecting terror in those days [SIC].
The West	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • being the chief of evil orchestra, wanted to carry Turkey into a situation.
September 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is not the cause but the consequence • was not absolute and distinct objective of the West.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim that Nevruz is just a custom not a holiday is an overtly expressed claim that is justified by historical examples and definitions. The second claim is intrinsically related to the first one. Here, the author resorts to the topos of

reality. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Since Nevruz has never been welcomed with a spectacular interest, the sudden prominence of it is a scheme.

The third claim is justified by the topos/fallacy of the past mistakes. Here, the author quotes Demirel's words with the aim to support his argument. According to the author, since Demirel warned the PM of the time 13 years ago, it is not the problem of today.

The fourth claim that the West sponsors terrorism in Turkey is supported by the topos of definition. Following Wodak (2009: 44), the topos of definition can be explained as follows: "a person or thing designated X should carry the qualities/traits/attributes consistent with the meaning of X". The next claim is supported by the topos of sameness. Here, the author criticizes the dominant approach adopted by the state while evaluating the issues that play a key role in shaping Turkish socio-political structure. Based on this, the author makes such a statement: "The approach of 'September 12 arrived, it put pressure and some things emerged as a response' means taking the matter lightly."

The final claim stating that Unfounded Democracy is the biggest enemy of Real Democracy is supported by the topos of democracy. The author once again criticizes the Western world vis-à-vis their 'plans' over Turkey:

The current objective of the West is to install Turkey to the "NewOrder"World in the best place and in the most appropriate way. To walk on the path indicated by the West in blindness, to consider democracy as liberalization that is devoid of national-spiritual content and to hope that this kind of democracy will handle everything are the biggest agents of weakness before the terror.

Table 18.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
11-12 Neither a religious nor a national holiday of this nation called “Nevruz” is available. “Nevruz” is just a folkloric custom, not a holiday.	Claim 1: Nevruz is just a folkloric custom, not a holiday.	Topos of definition	Since Nevruz is just a folkloric custom it is not a holiday
12-14 It has never been welcomed with a spectacular interest until this year. It has only been very nominally and scarcely remembered in the East as well as in the West among Sunnis and Alevis. Its sudden prominence is completely a scheme.	Claim 2: The sudden prominence of Nevruz is a scheme.	Topos of reality	Since Nevruz has never been welcomed with a spectacular interest, the sudden prominence of it is a scheme.
35-44 There is a diagnostic error at the root of this problem. The most important reason for wrong diagnosis is the lack of courage for diagnosis. The problem is not the problem of today. Demirel, 13 years ago in his letter ... said the following	Claim 3: The problem is not the problem of today	Topos /fallacy of the past mistakes	Since Demirel warned the PM of the time 13 years ago, it is not the problem of today.

<p>47-50 It was the West as well as “Marxist-progressive” circles and focus groups (which were alleged to be under its control) who were sponsoring terrorism...The West, being the chief of evil orchestra, wanted to carry Turkey into a situation.</p>	<p>Claim 4: The West sponsors terrorism in Turkey</p>	<p>Topos of definition</p>	<p>Since the West is the chief of evil orchestra, it sponsors terrorism in Turkey.</p>
<p>51 There is no change in the essence of the scenario.</p>	<p>Claim 5: There is no change in the essence of the scenario</p>	<p>Topos of sameness</p>	<p>If something does not change, then it remains the same.</p>
<p>60-61 Unfounded Democracy, which is based on imitation, is the biggest enemy of Real Democracy.</p>	<p>Claim 6: Unfounded Democracy is the biggest enemy of Real Democracy.</p>	<p>Topos of democracy</p>	<p>If democracy is based on imitation, this harms real democracy</p>

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author adopts an anti-Western attitude in his approach to recent developments in Turkey. The author heavily criticizes the Western world and defines the West as the ‘chief of evil orchestra’ (line 49-50). It can be said that the metaphor of ‘evil orchestra’ shows the author’s attitude towards the social actors which support terrorism in Turkey.

The quotation marks (lines 38-44) are used for referencing purposes and emphasize that the problem of ethnic clashes and violence is not a new problem. The rhetorical questions (lines 3, 28, 32-34) are not posed to elicit a specific answer, but rather to encourage the listener to consider a message.

On the other hand, it should be noted that, mitigation and intensification strategies also relate to the illocutionary force of propositions that is their persuasive impact on readers. For example the ‘biggest’ in lines 9, 59 and 61 are such examples.

The ‘scarcely’ (line 13) and ‘seriously’ (line 20) are linguistic means of involvement. As a final remark, the epistemic modalities (lines 8-9, 11, 35, 51 and 60-61) refers to the degree of the author’s certainty.

8.4. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Ahmet Selim covers the Nevruz of 1992 within the framework of the problematic attitudes of the government. Ahmet Selim after pointing out Nevruz as a folkloric custom, not a holiday to celebrate puts the blame on the politicians for the fatalities occurred during the Nevruz Events. Ahmet Selim heavily criticizes the government attitude saying ‘Isn’t it obvious that it would happen in all Nevruz celebrations without preventing terror and without spoiling schemes that mastermind terror? It is. Don’t we have any experiences from former 1 Mays? We do...why were the Nevruz “celebrations” permitted? Which festival’s permission was given even though it was known that PKK was making preparations for major protests through provocation and oppression by mingling with the public?’ (lines 32-34). In posing

such rhetorical questions Ahmet Selim compares the Nevruz celebrations to that of the celebrations of May 1.

Unlike Selim, Ertuğrul Özkök evaluates the policies of the government in a positive way (line 12 and 13). As seen in the title Ertuğrul Özkök places the leader of PKK Öcalan at the center of his analysis and finds him as the responsible actor for the bloody Nevruz. Unlike Ahmet Selim, Ertuğrul Özkök seems to have believed in the possibility of a peaceful Nevruz celebration.

There are two points that both of the authors agree upon: The first is the negative attitude expressed towards the Western world. Both in the *Zaman* and the *Hürriyet* articles the Western world is treated as an active player in the outbreak of the events. The second is that both authors attach a considerable degree of importance to democracy as a factor that would undermine ethnic clashes and terrorism.

8.5. The Capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999

Turkish special forces and members of Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı) captured the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on February 16, 1999 in Kenya. The Kurdish response to Öcalan's capture showed clearly to what extent the Kurdish movement has become a transnational phenomenon. Within hours after the news of Öcalan's capture, the radical PKK activists occupied Greek diplomatic missions all over Europe (Van Bruinessen, 2000: 1).

Öcalan had been forced out of Italy on January 1999 and he had become a man without a country (Gunter, 2000: 850). Before his capture, the Greeks took Öcalan to their embassy in Kenya where the US intelligence agents provided Turkey with the technical intelligence to capture him (Ibid.). When Öcalan was captured, he amazingly declared: "I really love Turkey and the Turkish people. My mother was Turkish. Sincerely, I will do all I can to be of service." (quoted in Ibid: 852).

The PKK in terms of its organizational structure has begun to establish itself in the early 1970s (Özcan, 2006: 73). According to Turkish state officials, the

offensive launched by the PKK in 1984 was the work of a ‘bunch of bandits’ (Özcan, 2006: 73). The shots of PKK caused nearly 44,000 casualties (Varouhakis, 2009: 1). It is to be noted that, the 1980 military regime set the PKK on the path to becoming the sole representative of the Kurdish people. The systematic oppression of the Kurds by the military regime after the 1980 coup helped the PKK sway the Kurdish masses to its ideology (Bacık and Coşkun, 2011: 252).

Öcalan was born in 1948 in southeastern Turkey, Öcalan became politically active during his college years and founded the PKK in 1978. Öcalan’s vision, rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, was to set up an independent Kurdish state by waging an armed struggle against Turkey. In 1971, Öcalan was arrested in Ankara after being found guilty of taking part in an illegal protest in the Political Science Faculty of Ankara. Öcalan was released from Mamak prison in October 1972. In an interview, Öcalan replies to a question about the beginning of his story:

If the ‘Defeat of 71’ had not occurred in the form of Kızılder, I would have remained a good sympathizer or member of the DHKP-C at the very most; I could not have ventured on structuring a new theory... The emergence of myself would have been impossible if Kızılder had not happened (Yüce, 1997: 188).

On the eve of the 1980 coup d’etat, Abdullah Öcalan managed to escape from Turkey, as did many other leading figures in various pro-Kurdish groups. A difference in the escape’s significance and its outcomes began to be revealed after the guerrilla offensive—simultaneously launched against Turkey in the Kurdish towns of Eruh and Şemdinli by the PKK on 15 August 1984 (McDowall, 1996: 40)—and the affairs which followed. David McDowall states that “The Apocular were unlike all other Kurdish groups in Turkey (or else-where) in that they were drawn almost exclusively from Turkey’s growing proletariat” (Ibid: 420).

In Turkey, after the capture of Öcalan, ultra-nationalist parties made a strong showing in general elections held on April 18, 1999. After his capture, Öcalan’s death sentence became an issue of implicit bargaining between the state and the PKK. Öcalan’s death sentence had been declared on 29 June 1999. Nonetheless, the

European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) issued interim measures asking Turkey to suspend the execution until it could rule on his appeal (Gunter, 2000: 862).

The capture of Öcalan has led to a new process to solve Turkey's continuing Kurdish problem. When Abdullah Öcalan declared that he would announce a roadmap for peace in mid-August 2009 the Kurdish Question entered a new phase. This was followed by the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's statements. This resulted in the introduction of the so-called 'Kurdish Opening' by the Turkish government.

8.6.The Representation of the Capture of Öcalan in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text XIX-The Hürriyet Article

Text XIX (Appendix 19) is a column authored by Ertuğrul Özkök. Ertuğrul Özkök is an eminent journalist who has worked for the Doğan Media Group more than two decades. Özkök is known to be a pro-Western and statist writer. In his own words, he believes in God but he is not religious.⁷³ In one of his articles⁷⁴, where Özkök accounts for the Kurdish problem, he accuses Kurdish politicians of being hypocritical. In the same article, he also vehemently criticizes the frequent visits of European politicians to Diyarbakır, who do not pay attention to the 'real problems' of the region. As his own words are concerned, Özkök's ideas represent the historical republican attitude towards Kurds and the resentment against the Europeans.

The article was published on February 17, 1999 one day after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. The genre of the text bears features of a journalistic one the text has a personal and informal tone. The article entitled 'Here is Turkey, here is the big state' starts with a description of the scene that has been witnessed when the author and his friends in the agency learnt the news that Öcalan was captured.

The article is separated by the author himself into five sections using triple stars. These are also markers where the topic of each section moves to another but related topic. In the first section (lines 1-5) the author writes about how his friends in

⁷³<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/15753490.asp?yazarid=10> (17.07.2014)

⁷⁴<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4577393.asp?yazarid=10&gid=61> (17.07.2014)

the agency and himself reacted when they learnt that Öcalan was captured. In the second section (lines 6-21) in addition to addressing how they reacted about the capture of Öcalan, the author also writes about the traumatic process the Turkish people faced before the capture of Öcalan. In the third section (lines 22-27), the author writes about the desperate moments that the Turkish nation has gone through while also putting an emphasis on the fact that the people did not dread. In the fourth section (lines 28-39) the author writes about the process that led to the capture of Öcalan. In the final section, the author describes the operation through which Öcalan is captured as a ‘historic operation’

The list of topics below is adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 100). The topics are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic belongs to a discourse and each field of discourse to a social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XIX

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the capture of Öcalan
- Topic 1: The historic statement made by the PM Ecevit
- Topic 2: The reactions of the author and his friends in the agency
- Topic 13: The actors who carried out the capture operation
- The discourse of the background of the capture
- Topic 6: We have been waiting for this day for 21 years
- Topic 7: The existence of moments when our sadness has reached the top
- Topic 8: We held many funerals
- Topic 9: The existence of the times when we asked ourselves the most damned questions like “does some part of the homeland go away?”
- Topic 10: We did not dread
- Topic 11: We got the initiative in the mountains

- Topic 12: The spirit of the War of Independence has once again become our identity and personality

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of the victory of capturing Öcalan
- Topic 3: This means proving that our country is a big state to both to ourselves and to the whole world
- Topic 4: This is the victory of a loyal people...
- Topic 5: This is the pride a nation has deserved...
- Topic 14: Here is a victory that a big and convinced state can achieve
- Topic 15: This victory belongs to the big state Turkey

Nomination/Referential Strategies

In the headline of Text XIX ‘Turkey’ is a metonymic use. The ‘big state’ (lines 8-9) refers metonymically to state authorities. In line 8, there is an example of personification: ‘Turkey is bringing the biggest head of rebel of the history to probe.’

As a common way to construct social groups, pronouns construct opposing social groups in texts. Similarly, in this text, the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7) refers to the author and his friends working in the same agency while ‘we’ (lines 15, 16, 19-21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 30-33, 34 and 36) stands for all the people living in Turkey. The third person plural pronoun (lines 12 and 13) refers to the people whose children martyrize in the mountains.

The ‘head of separatism’ (lines 32 and 40) stands for the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This term is a frequently-used word in Turkish political lexicon while pointing to Öcalan. The metaphoric expression of the ‘head of separatism’ is also an example of somatization. Somatization occurs when social actors are represented by means of references to a part of their body (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45). Finally, the ‘whole people’ (line 36) stands for the Turkish nation.

Table 19.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
<p>We</p> <p>(The author and his friends in the agency)</p> <p>Everybody</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are all in front of the television screen while the PMBülent Ecevit is making the historic statement. • are plaintative • are all proud • is embracing each other • is congratulating each other
<p>Turkey</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is bringing the biggest head of rebel of the history to probe
<p>We (the Turkish nation)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have been waiting for this day for 21 years • are waiting with patience • worried over the babies most • held many funerals • did not dread • got the initiative in the mountains • recaptured the mountains of the Turkish Republic, of our own, of our own with Kurds and Turks from the terrorists. • said “Either throw it or we will come there.”
<p>Here</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is Turkey • is a legacy that celebrates the 700. year. Here is a tremendous republic of 75 years. • is a tremendous republic of 75 years.
<p>This victory</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • belongs to all of us • belongs to the big state Turkey

As seen in the table above, the appellative denominations in Text XIX would not be considered to be positively or negatively biased if we took them at face value. The author evaluates the operation of the capture of Öcalan as a ‘victory’. The pronoun ‘we’ stands for the Turkish nation and is treated as one homogeneous group in the text. The term ‘here’ refers to Turkey with different meaning extensions: One is evaluated as the Ottoman legacy and the other is evaluated as the Turkish Republic.

Argumentation Strategies

The argumentation structure of Text XIX is shown in the table below. The article is explanatory rather than being argumentative. The author tries to make a descriptive analysis with an informal tone rather than providing long argumentative statements. There are two claims that leap out in the text. These claims are interrelated with one another. Both of them present the capture of Öcalan as a victory. The first claim states that the capture of Öcalan proves that Turkey is a big state. Here, the author resorts to the topos of victory to sustain his position. For the second claim, the author resorts to the fallacy of emotions. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Since this is a victory that a big state can achieve, we should be happy.

Argumentation Scheme in Text XIX

Table 19.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
9-10This is the victory of Turkey. This means proving that our country is a big state to both to ourselves and to the whole world.	Claim 1: The capture of Öcalan proves that Turkey is a big state	Topos of victory	If a country gains a victory-like success, this proves that the country is a big state.
45-46 Let's be happy together. Here is a victory that a big and convinced state can achieve.	Claim 2: We should be happy	Fallacy of emotions	Since this is a victory that a big state can achieve, we should be happy.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

As for the perspective of the author, the assertions pertinent to what the capture of Öcalan means are of high epistemic modality, ('This is the pride...; Here is victory...') The article has a personal and an informal tone that is one of the reasons why there are grammatically incorrect sentences. Needless to say, the author has a nationalist and statist tone. This tone is evident in his praise for the Ottoman past and the Republican regime (line 48).

As a final remark, the author defines the PKK leader Öcalan as the 'head of separatism'. This lexical choice overtly puts forward the nationalist tone of the article. The adjectives 'traitorous' (line 28) and 'historic' (line 43) are linguistic means of involvement.

8.7.The Representation of the Capture of Öcalan in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XX-The Zaman Article

Text XX (Appendix 20) is an article written by Ali Bulaç. The article to be analyzed was published on February 18, 1999 two days after the capture of Öcalan. The article entitled ' A new era' bears features of both an academic text and a journalistic one in terms of genre.

Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly, the topic is introduced (lines 1-14). Secondly (lines 15-28), the author's view about the process that lies in the aftermath of the capture of Öcalan is put forward. Lastly (lines 29-47) the article addresses under which circumstances social peace breaks down. Here, the author also emphasizes democratization as a primary tool to fight instability and enhance political unity.

The topics below are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text. Each topic belongs to a discourse and each field of discourse to a social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XX

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the capture of Öcalan
- Topic 1: The importance of the operation
- Topic 2: The press statement made by the PM Ecevit
- Topic 3: Mesut Yılmaz's declaration
- Topic 4: There is a need to take the explanations of Ecevit and Yılmaz seriously
- The discourse of the Kurdish issue
- Topic 5: The pathological environment of the Southeast
- Topic 6: Unless rooted, realistic and permanent precautions are taken, the region will keep on producing problems
- Topic 7: The insufficiency of the military measures to combat terrorism
- Topic 9: The material resources spent for military measures are far enough to provide the economic demands of the region in the near and medium term.
- Topic 10: The Southeast issue can be confronted through democratization

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of what the state is
- Topic 8: The state as an institution to solve the problems of the citizens
- The discourse of democratization and rule of law
- Topic 11: The outdatedness of the concept of 'father state'
- Topic 12: The need to introduce the concept of 'generous state'

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The Prime Minister (line 10) is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). ‘They’ (line 15) refers to the statements made by the PM Ecevit and the chairman of the Motherland Party Yılmaz. The acronym PKK (lines 1 and 17) stands for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.

The metaphor of ‘father state’ in line 43 refers to the transcendental state understanding wherein civil society is relatively weak and the state is sacralized. Professor of Political Science Metin Heper employs the term ‘strong state tradition’,⁷⁵ to explain the nature of state-society relationship in Turkey. The notion of ‘father state’ can be described within the framework of Heper’s concept of ‘strong state tradition’. The concept of ‘generous state’ (line 44) stands for the state image that meets the needs of the citizens and respects the rights of the citizens. The author uses the concept of the ‘generous state’ to refer to a state understanding that does not have the features of a strong state tradition.

The pronouns are among the important linguistic tools that construe social groups in a text. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 25 and 46) refers rhetorically to all the people living in Turkey. Finally, the passive voices used in the text (lines 18-19, 22, 24, 26, 27, 32, 33 and 37) background the social actors. The author uses the pronoun ‘we’ in an inclusive way to refer to everyone in Turkey. Through using this pronoun the author constructs a unified and homogenous national identity that encompasses all groups regardless of their ideological orientation. Lastly, the ‘Southeast issue’ and the ‘Kurdish issue’ are used interchangeably in the text.

⁷⁵Metin Heper (1985: 117) supposes that the strong state tradition, having its roots in the absence of moderating structures in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, results in an easy shifting of the political regime between extreme transcendentalism and extreme instrumentalism.

Table 20.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The PM Ecevit	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• has ended the last sentence of the press statement like this...
Mesut Yılmaz	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• said like this
They (The statements of Ecevit and Yılmaz)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• give important clues concerning the steps that will be taken next.
The Southeast The region	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• is in the position of a pathological environment that produces problem• will keep on producing problems unless rooted, realistic and permanent precautions are taken.
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• should know well that this cannot be provided through absolute military measures
The state	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• is the “only institution having the right and authority to use legitimate physical violence”
The Southeast issue (or the Kurdish issue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• can be confronted through democratization.

Table 20.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XX

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
4-6 ...this operation being significant in terms of detective has a significance from another angle too. There is a need to stress this dimension.	Claim 1: There is a need to stress the significance of the operation	Topos of emphasis	If an operation has significance in different dimensions, there is a need to stress this.
22-23 Unless rooted, realistic and permanent precautions are taken, the region will keep on producing problems	Claim 2: The Southeastern region will remain unstable	Topos of threat	Unless the precautions are taken, the Southeastern region cannot become stable.
24-28 The matter that should be cared about from now on must be the prevention of the institutionalization of violence and terror within the framework of “negative politics”. We should know well that this cannot be provided through absolute military measures...	Claim 3: Military measures are not enough to combat terrorism	Topos of sufficiency	If the military measures are not supported by economic betterment policies, it is impossible to combat terrorism.

<p>29-31 the state is the “only institution having the right and authority to use legitimate physical violence” but the state is at the same time an institution closely interested in the basic economic, social and cultural problems of the citizens too.</p>	<p>Claim 4: The state should solve the problems of the citizens</p>	<p>Topos of definition</p>	<p>Since state is the only institution having the right and authority to use legitimate physical violence it should solve the problems of the citizens.</p>
<p>31-33 When these problems are not solved, the social peace easily breaks down by the help of other factors, the political unity gets under danger.</p>	<p>Claim 5:Unsolved problems lead to political instability</p>	<p>Topos of danger/threat</p>	<p>If problems are not solved, political unity gets under danger.</p>

Argumentation Strategies

As seen in Table 20.2, the first claim that there is a need to stress the significance of the operation draws on the opinion of the author. The author sees the operation of capture of Öcalan as a very important operation besides the detective importance of it. So he claims that there must be emphasis on this importance as well.

The second claim that the region will remain unstable is supported by the topos of threat. The argumentation is as such: Unless the precautions are taken, the Southeastern region cannot become stable.

The third claim is related with the second claim. The author here states that military measures are not enough to combat terrorism. The fourth claim that the state should solve the problems of the citizens is supported by the topos of definition. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since state is the only institution having the right and authority to use legitimate physical violence it should solve the problems of the citizens

The final claim tells us about what would happen unless the state solves the problems of the citizens. Here, the author resorts to the topos of danger/threat. Following Wodak (2009: 44) the topos of threat can be reduced to the following conclusion rule: “if specific dangers or threats are identified, one should do something about them”.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The analysis of topics, the nomination and predication strategies as well as argumentation schemes have illustrated in detail how the author puts his own perspective into his own representation of reality. In parallel to that, the strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a significant role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality.

The assertions pertinent to the operation of the capture of Öcalan are of high epistemic modality. The author also hedges his opinion with an adverbial pronoun ‘bence’ (‘in my opinion’ in line 15) which indicates a cautious stance taken towards what should be done.

The linguistic means of involvement manifest themselves in adjectives and adverbs especially those, which express the author's emotions towards the issue. 'Doubtlessly' (line 16), 'Pathological' (line 20), 'Systematized' (line 40) and 'freely' (line 43) are such examples.

On the other hand, the quotations belonging to the chairman of Motherland Party Mesut Yılmaz (lines 10-14) serve the aim of drawing attention to the authority of the proposition.

Finally, the author defends the view that democratization is a must for combating terrorism. He argues that, in addition to military means, economic and political betterment policies should be employed in order to combat terrorism.

8.8. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Ertuğrul Özkök deals with the issue at stake from the perspective of nationalist sentiments, emphasizes the significance of territorial integrity and puts the emphasis on the success of military officers. Ekşi makes reference to the spirit of War of Independence. Columns of this style generally appeal more to the existent readers of an agency, and try to win the hearts rather than the minds of the reader.

Ali Bulaç deals with the issue in a more detailed way. Bulaç addresses the capture of Öcalan from a wider perspective, within the framework of the Kurdish question. For Bulaç, the roots of the terror problem are inherent in democracy of Turkey. Bulaç argues that the means to deal with the Kurdish question consist not only of military solutions but also of economic and democratic betterment policies. In the Zaman article, there is an emphasis on the notion of 'state'. Bulaç claims that besides having the monopoly of the legitimate use of force a state should meet the economic, social and cultural problems of the citizens.

In both of the articles, the capture of Öcalan is evaluated as a historic victory. Özkök covers the issue in a more emotional way through nationalist sentiments. Özkök writes the following: 'We have been waiting for this day for 21 years, yes exactly for 21 years. We are waiting with patience...' Bulaç handles the issue in a

more impersonal style and writes as such: ‘We have entered a new era, let us not spoil the historic opportunity that this era has presented to us.’

8.9.The Initiation Of The First Uninterrupted Broadcasting In Kurdish Language Via A State Owned Channel, TRT6

TRT 6 was launched on January 1, 2009. The channel broadcasts twenty-four hours a day in Kurmanji⁷⁶. The preparations concerning the new channel began more than a year before the launch. For TRT (Turkish Television and Radio Authority) to be able to broadcast in Kurdish, the Act on the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) had to be changed. The sentence “the institution can broadcast in languages and dialects other than Turkish” was added to the current act in a vote in parliament on 11 June 2008 (Firat, 2009: 87-88).

TRT was established in 1964 and launched as the country’s first television station on January, 31st. 1968 (Akkor Gül, 2011: 31). TRT functioned as a centralized force for “the creation of national unity, through homogenized official Turkish language, national folkloric music, a shared sense of historic occasion, and loyalty to the nation.” (Öncü, 1995: 55).

With the initiation of TRT 6, a very fundamental change in the 85-year state policy of ignoring the existence of a Kurdish identity was undertaken. For example, in 1991, the Kurdish deputy Leyla Zana was banned from Parliament after she had spoken Kurdish during the oath ceremony (Ayata, 2011: 524). Despite the fact that, earlier even the existence of a Kurdish language was denied, this step is very important in Turkey’s official approach to the Kurdish issue.

The running of TRT 6 stands as one of the most concrete outcomes of the democratic opening started by the Justice and Development Party government although it had started to broadcast before the process of democratic opening was

⁷⁶ There are two major languages spoken by Kurds in Turkey. Most speak Kurmanji and a significant number speak Zaza. The former belongs to the southwestern group of Iranian languages while the latter belongs to the northwestern group (Cemiloğlu, 2009: 6). Kurdish scholar Izady (1992: 17) writes that Kurmanji and Zaza, “like French and Italian,” are utterly distinct languages.

started. The policy known as the ‘opening’⁷⁷ has been rocking Turkey ever since it was launched at the end of summer 2009 (Çandar, 2009: 13).

Indeed, within the framework of the EU reform policies, the JDP government took important steps in regulating the legislative system in compliance with the EU norms. The first important reform came when the government removed the following sentence from Article 26 of the Constitution: “No language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought.” (quoted in Cemiloğlu, 2009: 61). The removal of this sentence paved the way for other changes in the legislation regarding broadcasting in Kurdish.

The most striking incident about the TRT 6 occurred a month after Prime Minister Erdogan’s appearance on the TRT6. During a live broadcasting of the pro-Kurdish party DTP’s meeting in the parliament, Ahmet Turk, the chairman of the party, announced that he would deliver the rest of his speech in Kurdish. The TRT 6 channel immediately cut the broadcast. The announcer stated, “Since no language other than Turkish can be used in the parliament meetings according to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic and the Political Parties Law, we had to stop our broadcast.” (quoted in Cemiloğlu, 2009: 64).

Aytaç (2010: 111) argues that “the language used in TRT-6 is inadequate and the programs are dull content-wise. Showing ancient soap operas and Turkish films that are badly translated (into Kurdish) cannot be counted as professional televising.” The broadcasting of TRT 6 caused different reactions among different actors. The leader of PKK Öcalan stated that Turkey wanted to “create its own Kurds with the Kurdish ‘assimilation’ channel.” The PKK circles launched what can easily be called a smear campaign against the new channel. Murat Karayılan, a PKK commander, called for a boycott against the channel (Güzeldere, 2009: 299).

The politicians’ reactions to TRT6 were also predominantly negative. Deniz Baykal, the then leader of the main opposition party said that Erdoğan betrayed “the fundamental principles of the Turkish state.” The leader of the right-wing Nationalist

⁷⁷The process with the Kurds has several names. One is ‘Kurdish Opening’. The other is ‘Solution Process’. The term ‘negotiation’ (müzakere) has never been a popular one in the official lexicon. The most important law on the process that the Turkish parliament passed in July 16, 2014 defines this process as ‘Law on Ending the Terror and Consolidating the Social Integrity’. (Bacık, 2015: 37).

Action Party Devlet Bahçeli accused Erdogan of striking ‘a mortal blow’ to the national unity (cited in Cemiloğlu, 2009: 65).

8.10.The Representation of the Initiation of TRT 6 in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text XXI-The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 21) was published on January 4, 2009, three days after the initiation of TRT 6. The article entitled ‘The Kurdish Broadcast’ was authored by Oktay Ekşi⁷⁸

Text XXI touches on several related and in fact intertwined issues via intertextual and interdiscursive references. The contents of the text mainly revolve around the Kurdish broadcast with specific references to the statements of some politicians. It should be noted that, the readers are introduced to the topic in the title succinctly. Thematically, the article unfolds in four steps. Firstly, Deniz Baykal’s stance towards the launch of TRT 6 is introduced. Secondly, the situation of RTÜK is described. Thirdly, the issue of removing the barriers in front of the Kurdish citizens is addressed. Lastly, the author gives advice to the state authorities.

Below is a list of the topics in the text. Each topic belongs to a discourse and each field of discourse to a social action where it emanates from.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXI

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Deniz Baykal’s statement
- Topic 1: The reaction we gave when we read Baykal’s statement
- Topic 2: We had accused him wrongly
- Topic 3: The wrong is not that of his but that of the press
- The discourse of Baykal’s take on the Kurdish broadcast
- Topic 4: Baykal’s statements on CNN Turk channel
- Topic 5: The content of Baykal’s criticism

⁷⁸ For Ekşi’s personal web page, see <http://www.oktayeksi.com.tr/?kkk=OktayEksi&query=About&Name=%20Who%20is%20Oktay%20EKSI%20?> (18.07.2014)

- Topic 6: Baykal is against the performance of the Kurdish broadcast by a state channel
- The discourse of removing the barriers for Kurdish citizens to express themselves
- Topic 8: Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Şahin has started a work on abolishing the rule banning the people in prisons to speak other languages than Turkish with their relatives.
- Topic 9: The JDP Istanbul deputy Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat's demand
- Topic 10: The statement of the former Minister of Interior Affairs Abdülkadir Aksu

The field of state institutions

- The discourse of the situation of the Radio and Television Supreme Council
- Topic 7: The impossibility for the RTÜK to watch all the broadcasts in an effective way

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of what the state should do
- Topic 11: The state should not put limits to the citizens' liberties.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

Pronouns, especially the first person plural (we, us, our) can be used to induce interpreters to conceptualize group identity. Following this, the first person plural pronoun 'we' (lines 1, 2, 4, 7, 20, 24) refers to the author and the readers who have a similar mindset with that of the author about the issue of Kurdish broadcast. 'Everyone' in line 13 is an example of indetermination through which the author creates an anonymous group.

The acronym 'RTÜK' (lines 19 and 21) is an example of personified of institutional name through which the members of the Radio and Television Supreme Council are represented. The 'mass' in line 41 is an example of collectivization (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 55). The 'state' in line 44 refers metonymically to state

authorities. Finally, the metaphoric and idiomatic expression of ‘The mother tongue is as halal as our mother’s milk’ is used to legitimize a citizen’s wish to have the right to speak his/her mother tongue and to enjoy other rights related with the mother tongue.

Table 21.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Baykal He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has again talked exactly in the opposite way that has been expected from him. • criticized the practice... • objected against such a broadcast to be performed by “a state institution” like TRT
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had accused him wrongly • found what Baykal said in a program broadcasted in CNN Turk on the web site of this channel. • are also against the demands of “education at schools in Kurdish language”
M.A. Şahin He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has started a work on abolishing the rule banning the people in prisons to speak other languages than Turkish with their relatives • has made right
D.Mir Mehmet Fırat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has demanded the lift of ban on making propaganda in the elections in a language other than Turkish (for example Kurdish) • is right too
RTUK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • does not have the possibility to watch all the broadcasts in an effective way.

The table above outlines the main social actors in Text XXI and how they are predicated. As Table 21.1 shows, the social actors do not bear negative or positive qualities in an apparent way. Therefore it can be said that, when the author writes the article, he means more than the locution itself. RTUK is personified in the text.

Table 21.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
4-6 We had accused him wrongly. More correctly, the wrong is not that of his, but is that of our press that has become famous with writing half of reality and not writing the other half.	Claim 1: The press is responsible for leading to misunderstanding	Topos of responsibility	If the press misrepresents the reality, it leads to misunderstanding
28-30 removing the barriers in front of our human-beings having Kurdish origin for expressing themselves is something completely different. This is after all the need for a democracy based on individual rights and liberties.	Claim 2: Democracies based on individual rights and liberties provide a solid ground for freedom of speech for Kurdish citizens	Topos of democracy	If we want to have a democracy based on individual rights and liberties, we need to provide a solid ground for freedom of speech for Kurdish citizens
40-42 If the mass in front of the candidate understands which language, the candidate of course expresses his views in the language the listeners know [SIC]	Claim 3: The mass should understand what the candidate says	Topos of reality	Unless the mass understands the candidate, this will be a dialogue of the deaf

<p>44-46 What the “state” having the dignity of being a “state” should do is not to prevent people, but to leave them free...</p>	<p>Claim 4: The state should not put barriers in front of the citizens</p>	<p>Topos of state authority</p>	<p>If a state has the dignity of being a state, it should not put barriers in front of the citizens</p>
---	---	---------------------------------	---

Argumentation Strategies

In the table above, I have outlined the main claims and topoi in Text XXI. The first claim states that the press is responsible for leading to misunderstanding. This claim draws on the author's stance towards Deniz Baykal's take on Kurdish broadcast. The author puts the blame on the press for accusing Baykal wrongly about his approach to the issue in question. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If the press misrepresents the reality, it leads to misunderstanding.

The second claim can be seen as an elaboration of democracy. The argumentation formulation is as follows: If we want to have a democracy based on individual rights and liberties, we need to provide a solid ground for freedom of speech for Kurdish citizens

The third claim that the mass should understand what the candidate says is supported by the topos of reality. Here, the author supports the JDP Istanbul deputy Fırat's demand on lifting of the ban on making propaganda in the elections in a language other than Turkish (for example Kurdish). The final claim that the state should not put barriers in front of the citizens is justified by the topos of state authority. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If a state has the dignity of being a state, it should not put barriers in front of the citizens.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author's own attitude toward the Kurdish broadcast is positive. This can be understood through what he wrote in the following lines:

What the "state" having the dignity of being a "state" should do, is not to prevent people, but to leave them free, but to do what is necessary if there is an element of crime in that propaganda through taking the necessary measures. It is as simple as this.

The rhetorical questions (lines 15-17, 34-35) serve the aim of supporting the author's attitude vis-à-vis the state's approach to the Kurdish citizens'

problems/needs like that of Kurdish broadcasting. It should be noted that, the author while defending the protection of individual rights and removing the barriers in front of the rights of the Kurdish citizens, he is against the rights of the ‘Kurdish whole’. He evaluates this as a threat to territorial integrity (line 27). In lines 23- 27 he writes the following:

Likewise, if the issue were “ **the putting into process of a petition written in Kurdish**” we would object too. In the same way, we are also against the demands of “**education at schools in Kurdish language**” or “**the teaching of Kurdish in official schools**”because, then it means that not **individual rights** but “**the rights of the Kurdish whole**” is being mentioned. Moreover, the unitary structure of **Turkey** will not allow this.

The negative reference of ‘non-sense’ (line 34) is an evaluative adjective that refers to the ban on speaking other languages than Turkish in prisons. The negative reference of ‘incorrect’ (line 12) is an adjective that refers to the support given by one of state institutions, i. e. the RTUK to an ethnic effort.

The assertions pertinent to the protection of the individual rights of Kurdish citizens are of high epistemic modality. The evaluations pertaining to the state is of deontic modality. Lastly, through using the metaphoric expression of the ‘dialogue of the deaf’ the author defends the view that the JDP Istanbul deputy Firat put forward. The author supports the view that there is a need to lift the ban on making election propaganda in languages other than Turkish (line 38).

8.11. The Representation of the Initiation of TRT6 in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XXII-The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 22) was authored by Mustafa Ünal. Mustafa Ünal is currently occupied as the Ankara Representative of Zaman newspaper. The article entitled ‘ While a taboo is breaking down...’ was published on January 4, 2009 three days after the launch of the Kurdish broadcast on TRT.

As for the genre of the article, in terms of its content and style it carries features of a typical news column. The author introduces the topic and his argument

at the very beginning, then provides a historical context concerning the Kurdish broadcast then he addresses the attitudes of the political parties as well as the ruling party towards the Kurdish broadcast. After touching on the advantages of the Kurdish channel in Turkey and in the region, he emphasizes Turgut Özal as a ‘taboo-breaker’. The author lastly presents the PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a ‘taboo-breaker’ as well.

The list below draws an overall outline of the contents in order of their appearance in the text and the discourses they resonate with, as well as the fields of action they belong to.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Kurdish broadcast on TRT
- Topic 1: The situation vis-à-vis the Kurdish broadcast 10 years ago
- Topic 6: The Kurdish channel after a test broadcast for one week has officially begun broadcasting...
- Topic 7: It is not the first time that Kurdish has been heard from TRT
- Topic 8: The opening cocktail that the Kurdish channel has started
- Topic 9: The ones who participated in the cocktail
- Topic 10: The absence of the political opposition in the cocktail
- Topic 11: The reactions of the RPP and the DTP
- Topic 12: Deniz Baykal’s reaction
- Topic 13: TRT 6 will broadcast for the Kurds in Northern Iraq as well.
- Topic 14: The mission of the Kurdish channel
- The discourse of the official stance towards the Kurdish issue
- Topic 2: The remarks of the retired pashas
- Topic 3: The words of Kenan Evren
- Topic 4: The victimization of the Kurdish citizens
- Topic 5: The things Ahmet Kaya had to face

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of breaking taboos
- Topic 15: The meaning of the channel is great with regard to 'breaking of a taboo'
- Topic 16: Turgut Özal passed into history as a statesman and politician who broke taboos
- Topic 17: Erdoğan does not beware of advancing upon the taboos.
- Topic 18: Erdoğan broke the taboo of the Kurdish broadcast.

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The first person pronoun ‘I’ refers to the author himself while the second person pronoun refers to the readers. The pronoun ‘they’ (line 19) stand for the state authorities who have denied the existence of Kurds and employed sanctions under the guise of state policies. The ‘pasha’ (line 6) is an example of functionalization. ‘Ministers’ and ‘deputies’ (line 27) are other examples of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

On the other hand, there are examples of indetermination (lines 7-8, 10-11 and 18). Here, the social actors are indeterminate (vague). The linguistic tool called indetermination tends to anonymize social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39).

The acronym DTP, RPP and NAP refers metonymically to party politicians. In line to that, The ‘AK Party’ in the article stands metonymically for the party politicians. The metaphoric and idiomatic expression of ‘losing temper’ (‘gözü karartmak’ in Turkish) presents the author’s standpoint in a condensed form. The passive voices in lines 14, 21 and 44 shift the focus on the activity and background the social actor.

‘Turkey’ appears in the article with different meaning extensions. In lines 17 and 62 it is a spatio-temporal reference while in line 48 it is personified by the author.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the main social actors in Text XXII and how they are predicated. Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan are evaluated in positive terms. Both of them are predicated as a ‘taboo-breaker’. The opposition parties, i.e. the DTP, RPP and NAP are presented with little or no attribution.

Although there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of the leader of the main opposition party, Deniz Baykal it can be deduced from line 43 that the author does not have a positive stance towards him. The Kurdish broadcast in the text is presented as a ‘challenge’ against the state policies that denied and rejected Kurdish reality. Finally, what we learn about the author is mostly construed by verbal processes.

Table 22.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The pasha of Sep. 12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • said ‘the ban on Kurdish was a mistake’.
Ahmet Kaya He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • said ‘ I want to sing Kurdish song’ • lost his life in Paris
The Kurdish channel TRT 6 Kurdish broadcast	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • after a test broadcast for one week has officially begun broadcasting within the body of TRT on the last day of 2008. • will have a mission like transmitting the messages correctly. • will broadcast for the Kurds in Northern Iraq as well • used to be a taboo
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • participated in the opening cocktail that the Kurdish channel has started • don’t know whether you are aware that purifying from the taboos makes Turkey a more livable country for everybody...
The region party DTP It	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • did not take an interest • is afraid of losing position in the local elections...
The RPP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • remained distant
The NAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reacted
Deniz Baykal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • objected the broadcasting on TRT

He	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• also described it as ‘a very dangerous stuff’
Turgut Özal	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• passed into history as a statesman and politician who broke taboos
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• does not beware of advancing upon the taboos.• is a taboo-breaker too.

Table 22.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
9 There is not a luxury of you to become mistaken or go wrong if you use state power.	Claim 1: People who hold state authority should not go wrong	Topos of state authority	If you hold state power/authority, you should not go wrong
18-19 The ones who have gone wrong about the Kurd and Kurdish can well go wrong in other sanctions as well. Hence, they go wrong too.	Claim 2: The people who went wrong in Kurdish issue can go wrong in other issues as well	Topos of making the same mistakes	Since the people made mistakes in approaching the Kurdish issue, they can go wrong in other issues as well.
30-32 The DTP objected saying ‘It is a project of AK Party’. There are political worries on the basis of the objection. It is afraid of losing position in the local elections that it will compete with AK Party because of the channel.	Claim 3: The fear of the DTP of losing power in the local elections makes it stand against TRT 6	Topos of fear	If a political party has a fear of losing elections, it can object to the reforms.
60-61 Kurdish broadcast used to be taboo. It has been Erdoğan who tore down this taboo. Erdoğan is a taboo-breaker too.	Claim 4: Erdoğan is a taboo-breaker	Topos of definition	If a politician changes a policy that used to be a taboo, he becomes a taboo-breaker.

Argumentation Strategies

The table above outlines the main topoi and claims in the text. The first claim that people who hold state authority should not go wrong can be seen as a criticism the author directs towards the statesmen who used to follow a denial policy in Kurdish issue. Here, the author resorts to the topoi of state authority to justify his claim.

The next claim that the people who went wrong in Kurdish issue can go wrong in other issues as well can be seen as an advice given to the statesmen who play a role in decision-making procedures vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue. The argumentation formulation can be formulized as such: Since the people made mistakes in approaching the Kurdish issue, they can go wrong in other issues as well.

The third claim is an elaboration of the standpoint of the DTP towards the Kurdish broadcast. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If a political party has a fear of losing elections, it can object to the reforms. In the final claim, the author expresses an overt opinion on the issue of Kurdish broadcast and the role of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in realizing the lift of the ban on Kurdish. The author resorts to the topoi of definition for sustaining his position.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The final sentence of the article can be seen as an indicator of the author's standpoint towards the issue in question. The author is in favor of the Kurdish broadcast. The author directs overt criticisms towards the statesmen who have turned the sanction of 'There is no Kurd' into a state policy. The rhetorical question in line 10 supports his criticism as well.

Unlike the author's negative attitude towards the actors who banned Kurdish, his treatment of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the architect of TRT 6 is quite positively evaluated. It is also noteworthy to say that the author presents Turgut Özal in quite positive terms as well. While presenting the attitudes of the opposition parties, the author uses epistemic modality. Similar to that, the author presents the Kurdish channel as being a taboo in the past with high epistemic modality (line 52).

Finally, the author by making references to the September 12 military intervention puts the blame of banning Kurdish on the military elites. This can be seen as a clear sign that the author does not adopt a pro-army attitude while evaluating domestic political issues.

8.12. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Mustafa Ünal, the author of the Zaman article evaluates the launch of Kurdish broadcast via a state-run channel as a breaking of a taboo. Ünal resorts to past experiences in order to shed light upon how Kurdish was banned and why it was a mistake. According to Oktay Ekşi, the author of the Hürriyet article, the demands of ‘education at schools in Kurdish language’ or ‘the teaching of Kurdish in official schools’ cannot be accepted. For Ekşi, ‘it means that not individual rights but the rights of the Kurdish whole is being mentioned. For Ekşi, the unitary structure of Turkey will not allow this.’

According to Ünal, ‘...the Kurdish channel will have a mission like transmitting the messages correctly’. For Ünal, the existence of such a channel is inevitable if Turkey wants to have a say in the region. However, Ekşi’s stance seems more critical. Ekşi draws a distinction between the rights of individuals and the rights of the Kurdish whole. As noted above, for him, the rights of the Kurdish whole are related with the unitary structure of Turkey. However, removing the barriers in front of Kurdish citizens for expressing themselves is completely different. For him, this is a need for democracy (line 30).

As a final remark, it is to be noted that, Ünal emphasizes the role of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the launch of the TRT 6. Ünal compares Erdoğan with Turgut Özal and defines Erdoğan as a taboo-breaker. However, there is no emphasis on Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the Hürriyet article. Ekşi makes reference to the leader of the main opposition party Deniz Baykal in the beginning of his article. Ekşi also makes some references to the speeches of some politicians in the Justice and Development Party but not to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This lexical choice can be seen as a sign indicating the ideological orientation of the agency.

8.13.The Uludere Incident in 2011

On December 28, 2011 the Turkish warplanes bombed Kurdish villagers crossing into Turkey from Iraq. The airstrike killed 34 civilians in Uludere (Roboski) in Şırnak, a region having an important majority of Kurdish population. The civilians were mainly teenagers; the youngest was 12 (The Economist, June 9, 2012). The Turkish Armed Forces claimed that they mistook the civilians, who were smuggling goods on donkeys, for the militant of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Members of a parliamentary inquiry who saw footage from Turkish drones say it shows that none of the villagers were armed (The Economist, June 9, 2012).

Several commissions have been held for preliminary research and investigation. A Parliamentary inquiry was established in January, 2012, but, according to media reports, it has been denied access to vital military reports and, the Uludere sub-committee carrying out the investigation has already indicated that it would not attempt to determine individual responsibility for the bombing.⁷⁹In the course of time, since the incident took place, neither the army nor the government have been able, intentionally or unintentionally, to cast away doubts over whether the civilians were killed by accident or on purpose.

The Wall Street Journal claimed that the information leading to the air strikes in Uludere was provided by a U.S. Army drone.Turkish Army denied the WSJ article, saying that the information was provided by a Turkish drone.After PM Erdogan's denial of theallegations, WSJ published a second article denying the denials and saying that its news source was an official from U.S. Secretary of Defense.⁸⁰

On 9 January 2012, the commander of the Gülyazı (near Roboski) military border post, Gendarmerie Colonel Hüseyin Onur Güney, was suspended from duty following a military investigation. 17 active duty army staff were also prosecuted for

⁷⁹<http://blog.amnestyusa.org/europe/the-uludere-bombing-when-will-their-families-get-justice/#more-32499> (11.02.2014)

⁸⁰<http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/143200-timeline-what-happened-in-roboski> (11.02.2014)

allowing border smuggling⁸¹. Hüseyin Çelik, a spokesman for the ruling JDP, said that those killed in the airstrike were not terrorists and that officials were investigating possible intelligence failures which led to the incident.⁸² He expressed regret for the deaths and suggested that the government could compensate the victims.

Following the incident, the government decided to pay TL 123,000 to the families of the victims in compensation. The money was wired to a special account at the Şırnak Governor's Office; however, none of the families took the money. The funds were held in the account for a while, but were eventually returned. The families said that their only consolation would be if the perpetrators were brought to justice.⁸³

On the other hand, in January 2014, the military prosecutors announced decision of non-prosecution in Uludere Incident. The decision outraged relatives and lawyers of the victims as the Diyarbakır Bar Association announced they will appeal to the European Court of Human Rights if their individual complaint to Turkey's Constitutional Court bears no fruit.⁸⁴ The debates concerning the Uludere Incident still continue.

8.14.The Representation of the Uludere Incident in the Hürriyet Newspaper:

Text XXIII-The Hürriyet Article

Text XXIII (Appendix 23) is an article authored by Sedat Ergin. Sedat Ergin previously worked for the Cumhuriyet and Milliyet newspapers. The article entitled 'The lessons we should take from Uludere...' was published on January 3, 2012 five days after the Uludere Incident.

The article both in general and specific terms deals with the Uludere Incident. It reflects the author's take on the issue as well as echoing the agency's attitude. As

⁸¹<http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/135301-komutan-gorevden-alindi-bes-uludereli-tutuklandi> (08.10.2014).

⁸²<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/12/20111229824112567.html> (11.02.2014)

⁸³<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-335134-tl-4-million-returned-to-ankara-as-uludere-victim-families-reject-compensation.html> (11.02.2014)

⁸⁴<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-military-prosecutors-dismiss-investigation-into-uludere-massacre.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60668&NewsCatID=339> (11.02.2014)

for the genre of the article, in terms of its content and style it carries features of a typical news column. The article is separated into four parts with sub-headlines. In the first part, the author introduces the issue. In the second part, the author puts the emphasis on the need to revise the approach to the Kurdish issue. In the third part, the author writes about the deadlock of the military-oriented approach to the Kurdish issue. In the fourth part, the author makes a general overview and gives advice.

The list below draws an overall outline of the contents in order of their appearance in the text and the discourse they resonate with, as well as the fields of action they belong to.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXIII

The field of politics

- The discourse of the military power
- Topic 1: The existence of only a few air forces that have the technological superiority and operational capability to shoot a target given to itself right on nose

The field of local politics

- The discourse of an error in security intelligence analysis
- Topic 2: The superiority of TAF having the most developed systems...can become invalid and meaningless all of a sudden as a result of an error in security intelligence analysis.
- The discourse of the Uludere Incident
- Topic 3: The death of the civilians as a factor creating a huge shock
- Topic 4: The issue would be covered by the media differently if the killed were a terrorist group
- Topic 5: The necessity of developing a new view trying to understand everybody who feels the loss of a life...
- Topic 6: The death of 35 people is a result of the continuing war

- Topic 7: As long as the Kurdish question stays unsolved...the repetition of the similar events in different ways is always conceivable.
- Topic 8: Uludere is the point that security-centered state understanding has come
- Topic 9: The encountering of the Uludere Incident with a term when the Kurdish political movement experiences a siege mentality...
- Topic 10: Turkey has made a very unlucky enter to 2012 because of the Uludere catastrophe.
- Topic 12: The event should be investigated in a detailed way
- Topic 14: The constitution of a means for a new approach to the Kurdish problem may be the only alleviation of this unfortunate event

The field of political rhetoric

- The discourse of providing social peace
- Topic 11: There is a need to prevent the loosening of the heart bridges totally.
- Topic 13: The states which value human life apologize when they go wrong.

Referential/Nomination Strategies

‘Turkey’ (lines 11, 15 and 29) are examples of spatio-temporal reference while ‘Turkey’ (lines 26 and 43) refers metonymically to all of the people living in Turkey. The acronym PDP refers metonymically to party politicians of Peace and Democracy Party.

‘Many observers’ (line 16), ‘some sectors of people’ (line 20) and everybody (line 4) are examples of indetermination through which the author mystifies the social actors. The pronoun ‘we’ (lines 21, 29, 53 and 56) stands for all the people living in Turkey. It is a rhetorically inclusive pronoun. The passive voices in lines 30 and 35 background the social actors. The ‘both sides’ (line 33) refers to the Kurdish

and Turkish groups of people. ‘Uludere’ in the same line refers to the Uludere Incident. Lastly, there is an example of personification in lines 49-50.

Table 23.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Many of them	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were at the age of childhood
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should develop a new view trying to understand everybody... • need to accept the meaninglessness of coming to the same starting point again by turning with a rising cost in this problem lasting for almost 30 years.
Uludere The event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is the point that the state understanding which insists on security policies... has come. • should be investigated in a detailed way with all of its dimensions...
This understanding (state understanding)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has shown the same attitude towards the PDP...
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has made a very unlucky enter to 2012 because of the Uludere catastrophe.

The table above outlines the social actors in the article and the way they are predicated. As seen in the table, what we learn about the social actors are mostly construed by verbal processes. ‘Turkey’ in the article is personified and victimized by the author. ‘State understanding’ refers to the statesmen and can be seen as another example of personification. The author evaluates the Uludere Incident as a catastrophe. The metaphor of catastrophe puts emphasis on the dimension of the fatalities that the incident caused.

Argumentation Strategies

As seen in the table below, the first claim that 'the death of the civilians and children creates a huge shock' is an overtly expressed claim that is justified by the following two claims. The second claim stating that 'the death of the terrorists does not produce an environment of indignation' and the next claim that 'the death of the terrorists is covered in the media in a different way from the way the death of the civilians is covered' both support the first claim.

In the fourth claim, the author expresses an overt opinion that is generally accepted. Here, the author resorts to the topos of reality. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If there is a clash environment that will cause catastrophic events. The fifth claim is intrinsically related to the previous one. The argumentation explicit formulation is as follows: Unless the Kurdish question is solved, the catastrophic events may occur once again.

The final claim can be seen as an advice the author gives to the state authorities. The author resorts to the topos of advantage. The author's argument can be formulated as follows: If a thorough investigation is carried out, that can prevent the things going worse.

Table 23.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXIII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
14-16 The biggest reason about the event's creating a huge shock around Turkey was that the ones died have been the civilians who smuggled. Many of them were at the age of childhood.	Claim 1: The death of the civilians and the children creates a huge shock	Topos of the death of the civilians	If civilians and children die, this creates a huge shock
16-19 Like many observers have stressed, if the killed were a terrorist group trying to get in from the border, probably an environment of indignation would not be born to that degree, the transmission of the event by the newspapers and the headlines would be very different.	Claim 2: The death of the terrorists does not produce an environment of indignation	Topos of indignation	If terrorists are killed, an environment of indignation will not emerge
	Claim 3: The death of the terrorists is covered in the media in a different way from the way the death of the civilians is covered.	Topos of media coverage	If a terrorist is killed, the media coverage of the event will be different

<p>29-30 When we get to the root of the issue, we see that the error made is a derivative of the clash environment.</p>	<p>Claim 4: Clash environments lead to catastrophic events</p>	<p>Topos of reality</p>	<p>If there is a clash environment, that will cause catastrophic events</p>
<p>30-32 As long as the Kurdish question stays unsolved and as long as the clash environments continue, the repetition of the similar events in different ways is always conceivable.</p>	<p>Claim 5: Kurdish question may cause problems in the future</p>	<p>Topos of reality</p>	<p>Unless the Kurdish question is solved, problematic events may occur again.</p>
<p>47-51 ... there is a need to stop this jumping the shark and prevent the loosening of the heart bridges totally. One of the conditions to prevent this is an attitude that every civilized country need to display. The event should be investigated in a detailed way with all of its dimensions and the facts should be shared with the public with full bareness.</p>	<p>Claim 6: A thorough investigation of the event will prevent the things from going worse</p>	<p>Topos of advantage</p>	<p>If a thorough investigation of the event is carried out, things may not go worse.</p>

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The epistemic modality is frequently used in Text XXIII. Here are some examples:

- 3 This situation is not enough to remove a basic truth.
- 4 Everybody is as strong as their weakest point.
- 8 There is a compressed reality between the F-16s' hurling bombs...
31... the repetition of the similar events in different ways...
- 33 Uludere is the point that the state understanding...

Besides epistemic modality, the deontic modality is also employed in the article. The author's decided take on the issue of what should be done for the prevention of catastrophic events like that of Uludere is evident in his use of epistemic modality in lines 50 and 51: 'The event should be investigated in a detailed way with all of its dimensions and the facts should be shared with the public with full bareness.'

The author is against the approach that sees the military as a tool to deal with the Kurdish issue. This is evident in the second sub-title: 'The deadlock of the military solution' It can be said that various linguistic tools analyzed serve to treat the state approach which regards the Kurdish issue as a 'military-oriented issue' inappropriate. The author uses the metaphoric and idiomatic expression of 'preventing the loosening of the heart bridges' to express his opinions for the process in the aftermath of the Uludere Incident. In such a way, the author underlines the importance of social solidarity.

8.15. The Representation of the Uludere Incident in the Zaman Newspaper:

Text XXIV-The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 24) is an article written by Bülent Korucu. Bülent Korucu was born in Erzurum in 1968. Korucu started his journalism career in 1989 for the Zaman newspaper. In addition to writing for Zaman, Korucu

has been occupied as the chief editor for the journal Aksiyon since 2009.⁸⁵ The article entitled 'Neither the Justice nor the Compassion Should be Delayed' appeared on January 3, 2012 five days after the outbreak of the Uludere Incident.

The contents of Text XXIV revolve mainly around the Uludere Incident. Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly, the author introduces the main issue in question. Secondly, the author writes about the situation that has come to the fore after the outbreak of the Uludere Incident. Finally, the author writes about what differentiates Uludere from the others by making references to past events like the Cyprus Operation.

As for the genre of the article, it carries features of a typical news column. Compared to most op-eds, it is relatively short. The list of selected discourse topics in the text outlines the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are intrinsically related to, and the fields of actions where each discourse and discourse topic operates textually and discursively.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXIV

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Uludere Incident
- Topic 1: The killing of our 35 civilian citizens in Uludere...can be the start for a new era.
- Topic 2: The approach of 'your pain is our pain' should not remain as a saying of consolation
- Topic 3: The question of 'Is it an accident, a conspiracy or an evil purpose?' should be answered...
- Topic 4: The judiciary mechanism... is our biggest chance
- Topic 5: The mechanism of material and moral indemnities should be enabled urgently.
- Topic 6: The two situations which have emerged through the desperate event.

⁸⁵ For Bülent Korucu's personal web page, visit <http://bulentkorucu.com.tr/hakkinda> (18.08.2014)

- The discourse of the observation of the change
- Topic 7: 10 years ago, there used to be a 'deep state' which executed in the middle of the streets
- Topic 8: The legal elements of the state were either suppressed or turned into a partner in crime.
- Topic 9: Instead of that arrogant state now stands the shy state.
- Topic 13: What differentiates Uludere from the other attacks.
- The discourse of the KCK/PKK organization⁸⁶
- Topic 10: The martyrization of a village guard
- Topic 11: The timing and the identities of the sufferers weaken the probability of evil purpose.
- Topic 12: The Silvan and Çukurca attacks⁸⁷

Referential/Nomination Strategies

In the headline of Text XXIV 'Neither the Justice nor the Compassion should be delayed' the subjects are the passive infinitive group which suppresses the actors. The first person plural pronoun 'we' (line 2) refers to the people living in Turkey. It is rhetorically an all-inclusive pronoun.

'Every head' (line 5) is an example of somatization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 45). The expression of 'a different voice comes out of every head' in the same line is an idiomatic expression referring to the variety of different opinions held by different people concerning the issue at stake. In line 7 there is an example of personification through which the judges and prosecutors are represented by the 'judiciary mechanism'. The 'prosecutors' in line 9 and the 'security forces' in line 38 are examples of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

The 'remaining ones' (line 12) is an example of indetermination. 'A village guard'

⁸⁶ The PKK adopted a structure called Kurdistan Peoples Community (KCK) in 2007. This new structure was planned to be a model of confederate state on the territories of Turkey-Syria- Iraq-Iran which as a whole represents the so-called 'united independent Kurdistan' http://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/pkk_structure_of_the_terrorist_organization.aspx (18.08.2014).

⁸⁷In 2011, the PKK attacked a military outpost in Silvan. Two years later, the PKK staged a violent attack on a gendarmerie outpost in the Çukurca district of the southeastern Turkey killing one soldier and wounding two others.

(line 28) is both an example of functionalization and indetermination. In this way, the author creates an anonymous social actor. The 'state' (line 21) refers metonymically to the state authorities. In parallel to that, the acronym PKK/KCK (line 26) refers metonymically to the members and the rulers of the organizations.

The only person who is named in the text, i.e. nominalized is Serkan İpek. In such a way, the author emphasizes the trauma of the wife and the children of Serkan İpek who passed away in Uludere Incident. The passive voices in the text (lines 4, 6, 13, 19 and 53) aim to background the social actors and shift the focus on the activity.

Table 24.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can build this new term hand in glove • can produce prosperity from a malignity.
The killing of our 35 civilian citizens in Uludere The event	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can be seen the start for a new era • should be enlightened without being delayed
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • find it useful to record two situations which have emerged through the desperate event.
The legal elements of the state	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • were either suppressed or turned into a partner in crime.
The Silvan and Çukurca attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • aimed to deform the balance of the state and pull it to the years of '90s

As the table shows, the pronoun 'we' is an all-inclusive pronoun referring to all the people living in Turkey. The 'legal elements' stand for the judiciary mechanism of Turkey and represented in a passive form that shifts the focus on the activity.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim that the judiciary mechanism is our biggest chance is an overtly expressed opinion of the author about how the Uludere Incident can be enlightened. The second claim is related with what the title of the article reads. The argumentation can be formulized as such: If the compassion is delayed, it will not produce the expected results.

In the third claim, there is an elaboration of why the Uludere Incident is different from the others. Here, the author resorts to the topos of examples. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Even though Uludere is different from the others, it is not the number of casualties that makes it different

In the final claim, the author gives advice to state authorities through claiming that the probability of conspiracy or evil purpose should be probed and measures that would comfort the people should be taken. It can be said that the second and the final claims are related with each other.

Table 24.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
7-9 The judiciary mechanism which can advance upon unidentified murders and upon the activities preparing conditions for military coups is our biggest chance.	Claim 1: The judiciary mechanism is our biggest chance	Topos of advantage	If the judiciary mechanism is brave, this is a big chance for a country.
14-15 Like the delaying justice, the delaying compassion does not produce the expected results either.	Claim 2: The delaying compassion does not produce the expected results	Topos of reality	If the compassion is delayed, it will not produce the expected results
42-45 The examples like the hitting of Kocatepe informer during Cyprus Operation by our own jet aircrafts or the ambushment of the unions coming from an operation by their associates who get security measures are known. What differentiates Uludere from the others is not the number of the dead people	Claim 3: What differentiates Uludere from the others is not the number of the dead people	Topos of examples	Even though Uludere is different from the others, it is not the number of casualties that makes it different

<p>52-54The probability of the resurgence of the state of the '90s is very terrible. Exactly for that, first the probability of conspiracy or evil purpose should be probed and measures that would comfort the people should be taken.</p>	<p>Claim 4: The measure that would comfort the people should be taken.</p>	<p>Topos of reality</p>	<p>Since the probability of the resurgence of the state of the '90s is very terrible the measures that would comfort the people should be taken.</p>
---	---	-------------------------	--

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author treats the judiciary mechanism which advanced upon unidentified murders and the activities preparing conditions for military coups as the primary institution to answer the question of 'Is Uludere an accident, a conspiracy or an evil purpose?' In parallel to that, the author in his 'advice' at the end of the article puts emphasis on the role of the judiciary in taking measures that would comfort people.

The metaphoric expression of 'the elephant description of the blind people' (line 5) presents how the author evaluates the process in the aftermath of the Uludere Incident. For the author, the process in the aftermath of the Uludere Incident witnessed different voices/opinions regarding how the incident occurred. The rhetorical questions (lines 21-22) serve the aim of attracting the attention of the readers and providing a basis for a more interactive reading.

In the following lines, there are examples of deontic modality; that is they represent the author's belief of what should be done rather than what is done or will be done.

4 event should be enlightened without being delayed.
10...commander and police chief should advance upon this affair...
12concrete steps that can ease the pain of the remaining ones should
be taken.
54...the probability of conspiracy or evil purpose should be probed...

The assertions pertinent to the representation of Uludere is of high epistemic modality. (line 45). Another example of epistemic modality is evident in line 52. Lastly, the emphasis put on the Silvan and Çukurca attacks can be regarded as the author's construction of fear discourse on the probability of the Uludere Incident as an attempt to pull the state to its situation in the 1990s.

8.16.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Sedat Ergin draws attention on the death of civilian citizens while relating its cause to Turkey's security-oriented approach in dealing with the PKK terror. For

Ergin, the military means are not enough to fight the PKK terror. Following this, Bülent Korucu draws attention to the role of the judiciary branch for producing prosperity from a malignity.

Korucu makes reference to the notion of ‘deep state which executed in the middle of the streets and saw this as a source of pride’ (lines 18-19). However, Ergin does not mention such a notion in his article. While Korucu underlines that the probability of the resurgence of the state of the ‘90s characterized by unidentified murders and military coup attempts is very terrible, Ergin underlines the need for developing a new approach to the Kurdish problem.

In both of the articles, it is underlined that there is a need to make the approach of ‘your pain is our pain’ not remain as a saying of consolation. Both Ergin and Korucu state that the event should be investigated in a detailed way. Finally, it is noteworthy to state that both the Zaman and the Hürriyet articles have an optimistic stance; according to Korucu, the killing of 35 civilian citizens can be the start of a new era and we can produce prosperity from a malignity. In line to that, Ergin writes the following: ‘The constitution of a means for a new approach to the Kurdish problem may be the only alleviation of this unfortunate event where we lost 35 young human-beings.’

CHAPTER NINE

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE NON-MUSLIM CITIZENS IN THE HÜRRİYET AND ZAMAN NEWSPAPERS

In this chapter, I will try to cover how the non-Muslim citizens are represented in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. After introducing the selected cases under scrutiny, I will provide the historical and socio-cultural context in which the cases are embedded in.

The selected cases through which I will try to analyze how the non-Muslim citizens are represented in media discourse are (1) The French Parliament's passing of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in 1998 (2) The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's request to re-open Theological School of Halki in 2003 (3) The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's interview appeared on the CBS Television in 2009 wherein he said he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey (4) The amendment made in 2011 to Turkey's law on foundations stipulating the return of property seized from minorities.

The same analytical steps will be followed as followed in the previous chapter. After making a semantically-oriented topic analysis, the strategies that are used in each text will be elaborated on by looking at the linguistic and/or rhetorical and argumentation tools they are realized in. Applying the same selection criteria explained in the previous chapter, the articles to be analyzed are as the following:

- Sedat Ergin's article published on May 31, 1998 and Fehmi Kuru's article published on June 1, 1998
- Oktay Ekşi's article and Ekrem Dumanlı's article published on August 10, 2003
- Oktay Ekşi's article published on December 22, 2009 and Ahmet Turan Alkan's article published on December 23, 2009.
- Mehmet Y. Yılmaz's article and Ali Bulaç's article published on September 3, 2011.

9.1.The French Parliament’s Passing of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in 1998

The French Parliament passed a bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide on May 28, 1998. The debates on whether the killings of Armenians under the late Ottoman times can be regarded as genocide or not still dominate Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy issues.

The term ‘genocide’ refers to a crime, the definition of which has been given in an international convention made after the Second World War: the Convention for the Prevention and the Repression of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution of December 9, 1948 and which went into effect in 1951, a convention which Turkey signed and ratified.⁸⁸

The 1915 Events witnessed the death of Armenians however Turkey rejects the one-sided presentation of this tragedy as a ‘genocide’. According to Akçam (2001), the 1915 killings was not a long-drawn policy of the Unionists. However it is to be noted that the diminishing power of the Empire was an important factor in the outbreak of the events.

The historical background of the 1915 Events dates back to the rise of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. The spread of ethnic nationalism by the end of the nineteenth century paved the way for the manipulation of the demographic characteristics of any given geographical entity, since ethno-demographic restructuring became the major instrument of settling the majority of a certain group of population in a territory or the elimination of ‘undesirables’ from the same territory (Şeker, 2007: 461).

The Armenians who traditionally occupied high positions in the Palace bureaucracy were called as millet-i sadıka (the loyal nation). The difficulties with the Armenian population had begun in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish War and continued intermittently into 1914. The dissident Armenians in the Ottoman Empire formed revolutionary committees, both in secret and in public, a formula that had worked especially well for the Christian peoples in the Balkans (Erickson, 2008: 150).

⁸⁸<http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,32705/views-against-genocide-allegations.html> (03.09.2014).

In May 1913, the representatives of the Dashnakzutioun (The Armenian Revolutionary Federation) had demanded the establishment of a foreign gendarmerie to protect the Armenians. The CUP government signed an agreement about the establishment of two inspectorates with far-reaching powers in eastern Anatolia. The outbreak of war prevented the scheme from being put into operation (Zürcher, 2004: 114). At the outbreak of the war, many Armenians joined the Russian army. By the end of March 1914, the CUP took a decision to relocate the entire Armenian population of the war zone near the Syrian desert, and eventually from there to southern Syria and Mesopotamia. An uprising by the Armenians in Van, heightened the sense of urgency (Ibid.).

In December 1914 the Ottoman army conducted an unsuccessful full-scale operation aimed at the destruction of a major part of the Russian army. The campaign has been singled out by some authors as a critical event for the ‘extermination of the Armenians’ because Ottoman losses gravely weakened the empire’s strategic posture in the east, and Enver Pasha allegedly needed a scapegoat to blame the catastrophe on (Erickson, 2008: 148). Then, in 1915–16, the Armenians were systematically uprooted. Akçam terms this ensemble of developments ‘demographic restructuring’ (Anderson et. al., 2013: 466). An estimated 800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed. As a result, the Armenian minority community that had lived for centuries in Anatolia was destroyed. (Dixon, 2010: 469).

By the summer of 1915 eastern and central Anatolia had been cleared of Armenians. This was followed by the deportation of the Armenians in the west, which took until 1916 to complete (Zürcher, 2004: 115). These deportations (officially called relocation – tehcir) resulted in the deaths of enormous numbers of Armenians.

Western scholarship rejects the Turkish claim that the relocation of the entire Armenian population of eastern Anatolia was necessary for reasons of national security during the WWI (Erickson, 2008: 141). Many Western historians have concluded that the CUP conducted a genocidal policy against Armenians.⁸⁹ The relocation of the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia in 1915 has been studied

⁸⁹ For an example see Balakian, Peter. (2003). *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response*. New York: HarperCollins. p. 209.

intensively and is still the source of controversy. The relocation of Armenians that led to destruction of the Armenian community known as the medz yeghern (great catastrophe) by the Armenians remains to be the main reason for strained relations between Turkey and Armenia.

9.2. The Representation Of The Bill Recognizing The Killing Of Armenians In 1915 As Genocide In the Hürriyet Newspaper

Text XXV -The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 25) was authored by Sedat Ergin. After Enis Berberoğlu's resignation from the office of chief editorship in August 2014 Sedat Ergin has become the chief editor of Hürriyet. The article entitled 'The Requirement for National Recovery' was published on May 31, 1998 two days after the French Parliament passed a bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide.

The genre of the text bears features of a typical news column. The article reflects the author's take on the issue as well as echoing the agency's attitude. The article is separated by the author himself into three sections using triple stars. These are also markers where the topic of each section moves to another but related topic.

The list below which is adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 100) outlines the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are intrinsically related to, and the fields of actions where each discourse and discourse topic operate textually and discursively. The topics are numbered according to the order in which they appear in the text.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXV

The field of international politics

- The discourse of the conference held in Beirut
- Topic 1: The topics of the conference
- Topic 2: The organizers of the conference
- Topic 3: Some academics and politicians were also invited to the

conference

- Topic 4: The list of the countries of the participants

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the current situation in Turkey
- Topic 5: There is no need for conspiracy theories to explain this picture
- Topic 6: The Greek and Armenian lobbies in the Western world... inflicted heavy damages to the interests of Turkey by coming into play.
- Topic 7: The behavior pattern, which confronted Turkey in the second half of the 1970s has been repeated once again.
- Topic 8: It seems as if the operation of getting Turkey into a clamp is progressing step by step.
- Topic 9: Turkey is excluded from the West.
- Topic 10: Turkey's chance to break this circle that surrounds itself requires a national recovery from within

Referential/Nomination Strategies

The analysis of how people, groups of people, events and concepts are named and referred to linguistically is realized through the study of referential strategies.

Some academics and politicians' (line 8) are examples of functionalization and indetermination. Indetermination occurs when social actors are represented as unspecified, anonymous individuals or groups (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). Moreover, 'those' in line 38 is another example of indetermination referring to the politicians in Turkey.

The 'Armenian groups' (line 14) represents an attempt to collectivize the members of that group. Collectivization is an important form of assimilation (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 37). Collectivization occurs when social actors are referred to as groups which are realized by plurality, by a mass noun or a noun denoting a group of

people. In parallel to that, ‘these groups’ (line 21) refers to the actors who are hostile to Turkey in an indeterminate and collectivized way.

The ‘front which is against Turkey’ (line 17) stands for the actors which stand against Turkey’s national interests. Through using the front metaphor, the author likens the situation that Turkey is embedded in to a war situation. In such a way, the author tries to draw attention upon the threats and risks that Turkey has faced. The ‘hostility front’ in line 24 and the clamp metaphor in line 28 serve such an aim as well.

The acronym PKK in lines 14 and 24 stand metonymically for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. ‘Turkey’ in lines 34 and 37 is a metonymic use. ‘Turkey’ in line 41 stands metonymically for the statesmen. The ‘French National Assembly’ in lines 2 and 13 is an example of personified institutional name through which the members of the Assembly are represented. The ‘French Parliament’ (line 32) is another example of personified institutional name.

Personal pronouns are the first place to see the ideological stance to the representation of social actors. Based on this, the first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (line 34) refers to all the people in Turkey. Finally, the passive voices used in the text in lines 27 and 36 shift the focus to the activity while suppressing the actors.

Table 25.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
<p>An important conference which went unnoticed</p> <p>The conference</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • took place in Beirut at a time when the French National Assembly accepted the draft resolution on “France openly recognizes the Armenian genocide of 1915” in Paris the previous day. • was on “Dangers of Turkish State’s Expansionist Policy in the Region.”

The front which is against Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reveals itself openly in the Beirut-Paris axis without any need to hide itself
The Greek and Armenian lobbies in the Western world	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • inflicted heavy damages to the interests of Turkey by coming into play
The PKK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • took its place in this hostility front as a natural ally.
We	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all know that the political instability and general mess that Turkey has fallen into are the things that provoke the enthusiasm of this front of hostility.
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • should wake up from this plight of negligence that its citizens have begun to consider embarrassing.

Predications refer to traits and characteristics ascribed to social actors. ‘The front which is against Turkey’ stands for the actors who are hostile towards Turkey. As noted, the front metaphor characterizes the situation that Turkey is embedded in as a war-like situation. ‘Turkey’ in line 41 stands metonymically for the state authorities.

The author evaluates the PKK as a ‘natural ally’ in the hostility front. The front which is against Turkey is represented in a personified form in the article. Finally, the pronoun ‘we’ in the article is an all-inclusive pronoun.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim that there is no need for conspiracy theories to explain this picture is an overt opinion of the author about the recent situation of Turkey. Here, the author resorts to the topos of openness to sustain his position. The argumentation formulation is as follows: If something reveals itself openly, there is no need for conspiracy theories. The second and the third claims are linked with one another. In both of them, the weak and unstable situation of Turkey is underlined. The second

argumentation formulation is as follows: If a country is put into clamp, it receives intolerance and hostility. Here, the author describes what Turkey faced in the international arena. The final argumentation can be formulized as the following: if a country becomes weak an opportunity is presented for everyone.

Table 25.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXV

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
16-18 There is no need for conspiracy theories to explain this picture. The front, which is against Turkey, reveals itself openly in the Beirut-Paris axis without any need to hide itself.	Claim 1: There is no need for conspiracy theories to explain this picture.	Topos of openness	If something reveals itself openly, there is no need for conspiracy theories.
27-30 It seems as if the operation of getting Turkey into a clamp is progressing step by step. And Turkey, which played the role of further outpost for the Western world during the cold war, receives intolerance and hostility today in all fronts from its allies and is quickly excluded from the West.	Claim 2: Turkey receives intolerance and hostility.	Topos of hostility	If a country is put into clamp, it receives intolerance and hostility
34-37 We all know that the political instability and general mess that Turkey has fallen into are the things that provoke the enthusiasm of this front of hostility. An opportunity was presented for everyone who catches Turkey at its weak moment and has a score to settle with her.	Claim 3: An opportunity was presented for everyone who catches Turkey at its weak moment and has a score to settle with her.	Topos of weakness/instability	If a country becomes weak an opportunity is presented for everyone.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

In the previous parts of the analysis I have already mentioned how the choice of certain pronouns and verbs represent the author's standpoint, similarly mitigation and intensification strategies reflect the author's own attitudes towards the social reality.

The linguistic means of involvement manifest themselves in adjectives and adverbs especially those, which express the author's emotions and attitudes towards the issue in question. The adjective 'striking' in line 22 and 'heavy' in line 21 are such examples.

The metaphor of 'outpost' (line 29) reveals how Turkey's position used to be during the Cold War era. It is noteworthy to say that the author draws a bleak picture about the current situation of Turkey. According to the author, the instability and the political mess that Turkey is going through provoke the enthusiasm of the front of hostility (lines 34 and 35). The author describes the actors hostile to Turkey as the 'front of hostility'.

The author interrelates the PKK terror and fanatical Armenian groups with each other. This can be seen as a sign of the author's evaluation of the Armenian issue as dangerous as the PKK terror for Turkey. The rhetorical questions in lines 31-33 can be seen as a sign of the author's involvement. The questions that author pose indicate the admonitory attitude of the author about the weakness that Turkey is going through.

As a final remark, according to the author, the Greek and Armenian lobbies in the Western world inflicted heavy damages to the interests of Turkey. In addition, the author puts emphasis on the need for Turkey to carry out a national recovery program as stated in the title of the article. The author sustains such a position in lines 34-38: We all know that the political instability and general mess that Turkey has fallen into are the things that provoke the enthusiasm of this front of hostility...Turkey's chance to break this circle that surrounds itself, first of all, requires a national recovery from within.

9.3. The Representation of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in the Zaman newspaper

Text XXVI- The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 26) was written by Fehmi Koru. The article entitled ‘The Real Reason’ was published on June 1, 1998 three days after the French Parliament’s passing the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. As for the genre of the article, in terms of its style and content it carries features of a typical news column.

Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. Firstly the main argument of the article is presented. Secondly, the author presents his own take on the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide. Thirdly, the author alludes to history and writes about what Turkey should do to empower herself both inside and outside.

The list below adopted from Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 100) draws an overall outline of the contents in order of their appearance in the text and the discourses they resonate with as well as the fields of action they belong to.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXVI

The field of international politics

- The discourse of the genocide claims raised in France
- Topic 1: The death of a large number of people in the 1915 Events
- Topic 2: The existence of different approaches to the 1915 Events
- Topic 3: The decision of the French Parliament is a pointless attempt
- Topic 4: The consequences of the decision taken by the Parliament
- Topic 5: The French government announced that it did not approve the initiative taken by the Parliament
- Topic 6: The decision can lead to other unfair decisions
- Topic 9: The government change in Armenia as one of the reasons to introduce the Armenian claims once again.

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Armenian allegations regarding 1915
- Topic 7: Turkey experienced serious problems in its recent history due to Armenian allegations regarding 1915.
- Topic 8: The impact of ASALA terror on Turkey
- Topic 10: The domestic problems of Turkey causing the Armenian allegations
- Topic 11: The reasons behind Turkey's inadequacy in stopping this new move that began in France
- Topic 12: Turkey will find an appropriate method of retaliation for France which launched this improper initiative

Nomination/Referential Strategies

As a common way to construct social groups, pronouns construct opposing social groups in texts. In this text, the first person plural pronoun in line 4 refers to all the people living in Turkey. Similarly, the pronoun 'we' in lines 9, 10, 46 and 59 refers to all the people living in Turkey.

'Those' (lines 5 and 6) stand for the people who approach to the Armenian issue from different perspectives. This is an example of indetermination through which the author makes the identity of the social actors anonymous (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). The 'French Parliament' (line 13), the 'French government (line 21) are examples of personified institutional names through which the members of the parliament and the government are represented. The 'expert' in line 26 and the 'ambassador' in line 21 are examples of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42).

The metaphoric expression of the 'gate of Europe' (line 19) stands for Turkey's EU candidacy. Here, the author sheds light upon the troublesome process of Turkey's EU candidacy. Another metaphoric expression of 'the dusty shelves of history' refers to the author's take on the genocide allegations; the author sees the genocide allegations as outdated.

‘Turkey’ in lines 46 and 53 stands metonymically for the statesmen while ‘Turkey’ in lines 27, 42 and 46 are personified. Personifications are specific forms of metaphors that are rhetorically used to give a human form or to humanize inanimate objects, abstract entities and ideas (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: 58).

Finally the passive voices in lines 56 and 57 background the social actors and shift the focus on the activity. The passive voices here hide the agents subtly.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the social actors in Text XXVI with the predications they are attributed. The author seems to have a neutral stance towards the social actors in the text except the French Parliament. The author evaluates the decision taken by the French Parliament in negative terms. The author evaluates the decision as ‘a pointless attempt from whatever perspective you look at it’ (line 14). The ‘French government’ in the text is also personified by the author.

‘Turkey’ is used in the text with different meaning extensions. ‘Turkey’ in line 32 is a spatio-temporal reference while ‘Turkey’ (lines 27 and 53) refers metonymically to the statesmen.

Table 26.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
<p>The decision of the French Parliament It</p> <p>The decision that France took</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is a pointless attempt from whatever perspective you look at it • will have a binding force for the government if the decision is discussed and supported in the Senate. • invited developments such as undermining traditional Turkish-French relations and channeling of the outrage of the Turkish public who experienced anger due to being declined from the gate of Europe.

Table 26.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
4-5 There is no way for us to know what the ‘reality’ was behind this since so many years elapsed.	Claim 1: There is no way for us to know the reality	Topos of the effect of the years	If so many years elapse over something, it becomes impossible to know the truth
34-42 One of the reasons why the claims, which were thought to be forgotten and remained on the dusty shelves of history, were introduced again nowadays after being re-heated is due to change of government in Armenia...The environments, where the domestic problems are in abundance, also render countries weak abroad	Claim 2: The abundance of domestic problems renders countries weak abroad	Topos of weakness	If there are many problems in a country, this makes the country weak abroad
46-49 The point that interests us most is this: Turkey, which succeeded in driving off similar initiatives before, proved to be inadequate in stopping this new move that began in France; no doubt, this inadequacy will give courage to those who desire to pressurize Turkey in the international arena	Claim 3: The inadequacy of Turkey gives courage to those who desire to pressurize Turkey	Topos of inadequacy	If a country is inadequate this encourages those who desire to pressurize the country.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim that ‘there is no way for us to know the reality’ purports the author’s viewpoint concerning the 1915 Events. Here, the author resorts to the topos of the effect of the years to sustain his position. According to the author, so many years elapsed and this makes it impossible to understand what really lies behind the 1915 Events.

In the second claim, the author makes an elaboration of the current situation in Turkey and argues that if there are many problems in a country, this makes the country weak. The author states that the weakness of Turkey has prepared a solid ground for the 1915 genocide claims break out once again.

The final claim is related with the previous claim. Here the author claims that the inadequacy of Turkey gives courage to those who desire to pressurize Turkey. The argumentation formulation is as the following: If a country is inadequate this encourages those who desire to pressurize the country.

In the second and third claims, the author underlines the weakness of Turkey and argues that this weakness puts Turkey into a disadvantaged position in the international arena.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The analysis of topics, the nomination and predication strategies as well as argumentation schemes have illustrated in detail how the author puts his own perspective into his own representation of reality. In parallel to that, the strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a significant role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality.

The text begins with a rhetorical question; the author tries to attract the readers’ attention through posing such a question at the beginning of the article. The rhetorical questions in lines 9-12 indicate the author’s point of view while they also contribute to a more interactive reading. According to the author, the genocide claims which were thought to be forgotten were introduced again due to the change

of government in Armenia and these claims could not be eliminated as a result of Turkey's inadequacy.

The author's approach to the issue of 1915 Events are of high epistemic modality (lines 4, 14, 15, 17 and 20). As noted, epistemic modality refers to the degree of certainty. Deontic modality shows the necessity or obligation expressed by the author. The author in lines 23, 56 and 57 employs deontic modality.

The adjectives of 'pointless' (line 14) and 'fanatic' (line 37) are linguistic means of involvement. The author uses the metaphor of 'pro-McCarthy witch hunt' to refer to the unlawful practices employed during the February 28 Process. Following this, it can be said that the author stands on the side of democracy and condemns the military's intervention into politics. Such an attitude of the author is also a clear sign of the agency's stance towards the military interventions. Finally, another metaphor of the 'filth revealed in Susurluk' in line 57 stands for the problematic situation which came into being after the outbreak of the Susurluk Affair⁹⁰.

9.4. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers

The representation of the French Parliament's passing of the bill recognizing the killing of Armenians in 1915 as genocide in 1998 in the Hürriyet article is mostly realized within the framework of international developments concerning Turkey's interests. Sedat Ergin mentions a conference organized with the title of 'On the danger of Turkey's expansionist policy in the region' and argues that it must be explanatory enough to see fanatical Armenian groups and Kurdish nationalism in line with the PKK entering into a public display of solidarity. Ergin puts emphasis on the relationship between the PKK and the fanatical Armenian groups and defines them as the 'hostility front'.

⁹⁰ Susurluk Affair refers to a traffic accident. A Mercedes carrying 4 passengers was hit by a truck near the town of Susurluk. Only Sedat Bucak, a member of the TPP survived the accident. Three other passengers, Hüseyin Kocadağ (the director of a police academy), Abdullah Çatlı, a convict wanted by Interpol, and a model named Gonca Us died. The incident raised many questions, which have remained mysterious to date.

The representation of the bill in the Zaman article is mostly realized within the framework of the historical experiences. Fehmi Koru argues that the decision taken by the French Parliament which proposes that ‘Turks carried out a genocide against the Armenians in 1915...’ is a pointless attempt.

In both of the articles, it is underlined that there are some actors inside and outside that are hostile to Turkey. Ergin puts emphasis on the PKK terror and defines it as the following: ‘PKK which appeared subsequently took its place in this hostility front as a natural ally.’ Unlike Ergin, Koru does not mention the issue of the PKK terror in his article.

As a final remark, it is noteworthy to state that, in both of the articles the authors attempt to create a sense of national solidarity through drawing attention to the actors who want to benefit from the weakness of Turkey. Ergin argues that ‘an opportunity was presented for everyone who catches Turkey at its weakest moment.’ In parallel to that, Koru argues that Turkey’s insufficiency will give courage to those who desire to pressurize Turkey in the international arena.

9.5.The Patriarch Bartholomew’s request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in 2003

On August 8, 2003, the Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew had met with the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and requested the re-opening of the Theological School of Halki (Heybeliada). The Halki Seminary which was closed upon the order of the Ministry of National Education after the 1971 military intervention was the only school where Greek minorities educated clergymen; the Greek Community has been unable to educate clergymen in Turkey since the seminary was closed.

The Fener Greek Patriarchate after the division of the Roman Empire became the church of the Byzantine Empire and obtained the status of an ecumenical church. With the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, the Patriarchate became the church of the Greeks living under the Ottoman Empire. Besides its functions as a religious institution, the Patriarchate was also granted the right to act as a ministry of Greek affairs by Mehmet II (Bilge, 1998: 1). During the same period, it was also accepted

that the Patriarch endowed with the title 'ethnarch' and was the religious leader of all Orthodox people within the Ottoman empire (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2009: 8).

In order to better analyze the socio-historical and political context of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew's request about the re-opening of the Halki Seminary first, there is a need to briefly cover the status of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, second to address the evolution of the state approach towards the non-Muslims in the history of modern Turkey.

The situation of the non-Muslims under the Ottoman Empire had been shaped within the framework of the Islamic law. According to generally accepted legal provisions in the Islamic world, non-Muslims are not allowed to establish places of worship in cities founded by Muslims (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2009: 14). As noted in the historical background chapter, the millet system is a legal case which occurs when those holding the statute of dhimmis, i.e. Jews or Christians under Islam are governed under the Islamic State owing to a pact providing laws and protection (cited in Macar and Gökaçtı, 2009: 14).

After 1453, as the Ottoman Empire grew in size, the range of influence of the Patriarch expanded accordingly. However, when the Empire began to loose territory, Orthodox churches affiliated to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate began to be detached in order to become independent national churches (Ntokme, 2010: 37). After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Fener Greek Patriarchate became the church of the Greeks living in Turkey.

During the World War I and the Turkish Independence War the Patriarchate was observed to have been intensely involved in political activities against the Ottoman Government. During the Peace negotiations at the Lausanne Peace Conference, the Turkish delegation though recognizing the age-long status of the Patriarchate, formally demanded its expulsion from Turkey, as a condition for the exemption of Istanbul from the compulsory exchange of population between Turkey and Greece (cited in Nokme, 2010:38-39). The solution concerning the status of the Halki Seminary reached in Lausanne was such as: the Patriarchate would stay in

Istanbul, but its competences would be strictly only in religious affairs (cited in Ntokme, 2010: 39).

After the proclamation of the Republic it was decided to expropriate the two schools in Halki: Halki Seminary and the Greek Commercial School. The Greek Commercial School in Halki was expropriated, but the seminary was left to the Patriarchate in 1946 (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2009: 9-10).

After 1950, with the introduction of the multi-party rule, a new era began for minorities. The seminary had a new statute with three classes at a high school level and four theological grades. This continued until the seminary was closed in 1971 (Macar, 2003: 292-293). The closure of the Halki Seminary on grounds of the law concerning private colleges, contradicts the Lausanne Treaty in legal terms, because the seminary was open when the Lausanne Treaty was signed and it was closed upon cancellation of some provisions in the said law (Macar and Gökaçtı, 2009: 27-28).

Finally, it is to be noted that, the perception of the re-opening of the Halki Seminary within the framework of 'reciprocity' between Turkey and Greece, made this issue as a hotly-debated issue in Turkey both in terms of democratization and foreign relations.

9.6. The Representation of the Patriarch Bartholomew's request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in the Hürriyet newspaper

Text XXVII- The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 27) is an article authored by Oktay Ekşi. The article was published on August 10, 2003 two days after the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's request. Given the author's power position in relation to the newspaper, the article already carries some importance. It is noteworthy to state that since the author is also the lead columnist, I assume it is also the least scrutinized and edited article.

The article entitled 'Ask for it but also know how to give it' can be regarded as a column in view of its content as far as the genre of the article is concerned. The

article both in general and specific terms deals with the issue of the re-opening of the Halki Seminary School. The text can be divided into two parts: In the first part (lines 1-35), the author introduces the topic and presents his interpretation thereof, in the second part (lines 36 onwards) the author gives some 'suggestions' to Patriarch Bartholomew.

As in the previous analyses, I will start the analysis with outlining all the topics that are referred to in Text XXVII and their relation within discourses and the surrounding fields of action they are embedded in.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXVII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Patriarch Bartholomew's visit
- Topic 1: Mr. Bartholomew's request for the re-opening of the Seminary School in Heybeliada
- Topic 2: Abdullah Gül's request from the Patriarch
- The discourse of the Seminary School
- Topic 6: The school was in operation until 1971
- Topic 7: The statement of the actors whom the Patriarch influenced
- Topic 8: The author's advice to Mr. Bartholomew

The field of state affairs

- The discourse of the Lausanne Treaty vis-a-vis the Patriarchate
- Topic 3: The status of the Patriarchate
- Topic 4: Mr. Bartholomew is the head of the Patriarchate
- Topic 5: Mr. Bartholomew is not the representative of an institution outside of Turkey...

Referential/Nomination Strategies

The first person plural pronouns (lines 3, 8 and 39) refer to the author himself and rhetorically to all Hürriyet readers. There are examples of functionalization through which the social actors are represented by their occupation in lines 18, 21 and 31. The 'Lausanne' (line 12) stands metonymically for the Lausanne Treaty. 'Turkey' (lines 20 and 37) is a spatio-temporal reference.

There is an example of personification in lines 9 and 10. The 'Patriarchate' (line 28) is an example of personified institutional name through which the head of the Patriarchate is represented. Other examples of personified institutional name are evident in lines 31-32. Lastly, the only people who are named in the text, i.e. nominalized are Abdullah Gül and Bartholomew. They appear as the prominent persons in the article.

Social Actors and Predications

The table below outlines the main social actors in Text XXVII and how they are predicated. First of all, the author does not have a neutral stance to all social actors in the text. Abdullah Gül is represented as an authority for referencing purposes. Although there are no overt appreciative or depreciative terms pertinent to the representation of Patriarch Bartholomew, the author presents him in an ironical way in the following lines:

36-38 Let us offer solution to Patriarch Bartholomew: Why do you not establish a university and affiliate your school with it? Do you not know that setting up a university in Turkey is easier than setting up a shop?

Table 27.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Patriarch Bartholomew	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • paid a 45-minute visit to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül the previous day. • asked support from Mr. Gül especially for the re-opening of Seminary School in Heybeliada. • is the head of the Patriarchate • at least has no right to use this title in any writing or document that originates from himself. • is not the representative of an institution outside of Turkey... • has 'demands'
We (The author and the readers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • learned from newspapers that Mr. Patriarch asked support from Mr. Gül especially for the re-opening of Seminary School in Heybeliada. • will see in coming days that Mr. Bartholomew will not renounce this title
Abdullah Gül	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • asked Patriarch Bartholomew to avoid correspondence that introduces him as “ecumenical”
The Patriarchate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is an institution affiliated with the laws of Turkish Republic. • must have objected this schools’ affiliation with state universities...

Argumentation Strategies

The text is more explanatory rather than being argumentative. There are two main claims in the text. Both of them are interrelated with one another. The first claim states that Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of 'ecumenical'. For the first claim, the author resorts to the topos of lawfulness to sustain his position. The second claim states that the Patriarchate is an institution affiliated with the laws of Turkish Republic. The second argumentation formulation is as follows: Since the Patriarchate is an institution affiliated with the laws of Turkish Republic Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of 'ecumenical'. In both claims, the author presents an elaboration of the status of the Patriarchate in Turkey.

Table 27.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXVII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
<p>5-7 In response to this, Gül asked Patriarch Bartholomew to avoid correspondence that introduces him as “ecumenical” (a religious authority having universal position), because it was contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne.</p>	<p>Claim 1: Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of ‘ecumenical’</p>	<p>Topos of lawfulness</p>	<p>Since it is contrary to Lausanne, Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of ‘ecumenical’</p>
<p>12-15 According to Lausanne, the Patriarchate is an institution affiliated with the laws of Turkish Republic. Bartholomew is the head of that institution. Therefore, Mr. Bartholomew, at least, has no right to use this title in any writing or document that originates from himself.</p>	<p>Claim 2: Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of ecumenical</p>	<p>Topos of state authority Topos of lawfulness</p>	<p>Since the Patriarchate is an institution affiliated with the laws of Turkish Republic Mr. Bartholomew has no right to use the title of ‘ecumenical’.</p>

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a key role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality. The title of the article reading ‘Ask for it but also know how to give it’ reveals the standpoint of the author about the re-opening of the Halki Seminary. The author defends the reciprocity principle which is also adopted by the official Kemalist discourse. Needless to say, the author is against the re-opening of the Halki Seminary School.

The rhetorical questions (lines 17-19, 35) lead to a more interactive reading they are also indicative of the author’s hedged critical point of view. The final paragraph is an indicator of the author’s involvement in the discussion about the issue at stake. There are examples of epistemic modality in lines 11-14, 20, 39. Epistemic modality refers to the degree of author’s certainty. In addition, there are examples of deontic modality showing that the author expresses an order or a wish that an action be performed:

16 Let's talk about it before moving to the other issue

36 Let's offer solution to Patriarch Bartholomew

Finally, as noted, the use of direct quotations in a news article can be interpreted mainly in two ways; the agency is either drawing attention to the authority of the proposition or distancing itself from the source of the quoted information. The quotations in lines 9-10 and 32-34 indicate that the author is distancing itself from the source of the quoted information.

9.7. The Representation of the Patriarch Bartholomew’s request to re-open the Theological School of Halki in the Zaman newspaper

Text XXVIII- The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 28) is a column authored by Ekrem Dumanlı, the chief editor of the Zaman newspaper. The article was published on

August 10, 2003 two days after the Greek Patriarch's request for the re-opening of the Halki Seminary.

The headline 'The Seminary School' introduces the readers to the topic of the article. Given the author's power position in relation to the newspaper, the article already carries some importance. Since the author is also the chief editor, I assume that it is also the least edited article.

As for the genre of the article, in terms of its content and style it carries features of a typical news column. The text deals with the topic of the Seminary School and it alludes to history in support of the arguments propounded. Thematically, the article unfolds in three steps. In the first part (lines 1-10) the issue is introduced. In the second part (lines 10-33) the historical context is provided concerning the issue in question. In the final part (lines 34-58) besides making references to history, the author puts forward his personal take on the issue.

The list below draws an overall outline of the contents in order of their appearance in the text and the discourses they resonate with, as well as the fields of action they belong to.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXVIII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's meeting with Abdullah Gül
- Topic 1: Patriarch's request about the re-opening of the Seminary School
- Topic 2: PM Erdoğan's tendency to the re-opening of the Seminary School
- Topic 8: Mr. Bartholomew came along to the meeting with the minister in the company of his lawyers.
- The discourse of the re-opening of the Seminary School
- Topic 3: Turkey is confronted by the issue of opening the Halki seminary at every international platform

- Topic 4: The Turkish state has some historical reasons for approaching the issue skeptically.
- Topic 5: Turkey's anxiety about the issue of the Seminary School
- Topic 6: The intermediary formula proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Topic 9: Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias
- Topic 13: The author's personal view about the issue

The field of history

- The discourse of the status of the Seminary School
- Topic 7: The Constitutional Court closed the school in 1971
- Topic 10: Turkey has already left the conditions of 1971 behind
- Topic 11: Many of the schools having foreign status found legal basis for themselves and continued to operate.

The field of international politics

- The discourse of the state-religion relationship
- Topic 12: Stalin's appointment of Sergius to the office of Moscow Patriarchate in 1943

Nomination/Referential Strategies

There are examples of functionalization in lines 1, 3, 20 and 24. The 'government' (lines 8, 27, 31, 55 and 57), the 'Patriarchate' (line 55) and the 'Constitutional Court' (line 23) and the 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs' are all examples of personified institutional names. In addition, the 'Turkish state' (line 10) and the 'state' (lines 19 and 36) refer metonymically to statesmen.

'Turkey' (lines 3, 9, 14, 34 and 35) refers metonymically to the state authorities while 'Turkey' in line 15 is a spatio-temporal reference. The 'people...' in line 58 is an example of indetermination through which the identity of the social

actor is mystified (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). The indeterminate subject 'a religious community' (line 13) refers to the Greek community living in Turkey.

Finally, it should be noted that, the only people nominalized by proper names are Erdoğan, the PM and Gül, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The nominalization of Erdoğan and Gül by proper names can be seen as a lexical choice through which the author tries to shed light upon the role these people can play for the betterment of the issue in question.

Table 28.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
The Fener Greek Patriarch He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • requested the re-opening of the Seminary School in Heybeliada • knows this situation very well. • came along to the meeting with the minister in the company of his lawyers
The PM Erdoğan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • leans towards the re-opening of the Seminary School. • said “studying does not harm anybody”
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is confronted by this issue at every international platform • is anxious that the school model, which is affiliated with religious authority will lead to other requests later on. • should not approach to the matter with phobias • has already left the conditions of 1971 behind • is a more modern, more liberal and more developed country compared to the 1970s
The Turkish State	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • has some historical reasons for approaching the issue skeptically.

Religious Schools in Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • have to be under the control of the state according to the laws.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • proposed an intermediary formula for Seminary School
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • am aware that some people approach to this issue in a provocative manner.

The table outlines the main social actors in Text XXVIII and how they are predicated. 'Turkey' appears in the article a few times with different meaning extensions. In line 15, 'Turkey' is a spatio-temporal reference while 'Turkey' (lines 3, 9, 14, 34 and 35) stand metonymically for the state authorities. What we learn about the Greek Patriarch is construed by verbal processes. The state institutions i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is presented with little or no attribution. The PM Erdoğan is represented as the person who stands as an authority in dealing with the issue of the Seminary School.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim draws on the opinion of the author who sees the government attempts to seek solutions for the issue of the Seminary School quite normal. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: If a problem is international, it is normal for a government to seek solutions for that problem.

The next claim is supported by the topos of state authority. It is claimed that 'It is probable that the school model, which is affiliated with the religious authority, will lead to other requests later on' This can be seen as an elaboration of the laws concerning the religious schools in Turkey. In the third claim, the author has an optimistic stance about the issue in question. The argumentation formulation is as follows: 'Since the government is nonchalant about the issue, it can produce tangible

results.' Here, the author resorts to the topos of consequence to sustain his position.

The fourth claim that 'Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias ' is an overtly expressed claim that is justified by making references to history. Here, the author overtly expresses his 'advice' to the state authorities. According to the author, since Turkey is the Ottoman inheritor, Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias

The fifth claim is supported by the topos/fallacy of the situation of the country. The argumentation formulation is as follows: 'Since Turkey has left the conditions of 1971 behind, Turkey is more modern and liberal '. Here, the author puts forward his own ideas about the recent situation in Turkey.

The final claim that 'Both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to the issue in good faith' is justified by the topos of rightfulness. This claim can be seen as an advice that the author gives to both parties, i.e. the Turkish government and the Patriarchate.

Table 28.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXVIII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
8-10 It is quite normal for the government to seek solutions to the incident; because Turkey is confronted by this issue at every international platform, mainly at European Union.	Claim 1: It is normal for a government to seek solutions for an international problem	Topos of international problems	If a problem is international, it is normal for a government to seek solutions for that problem.
14-16 In fact, Turkey is anxious that the school model, which is affiliated with religious authority, will lead to other requests later on. Because religious schools in Turkey have to be under the control of the state according to the laws.	Claim 2: It is probable that the school model, which is affiliated with religious authority, will lead to other requests later on	Topos of state authority	Since religious schools in Turkey have to be under state control, the school model, which is affiliated with the religious authority, will lead to other requests later on
31-33 Government's nonchalant approach towards this issue and Patriarchate's attempts to find solutions by taking legal problems into consideration may produce a tangible result.	Claim 3: A tangible result can be produced	Topos of consequence	Since the government is nonchalant about the issue, it can produce tangible results.

<p>34-36... Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias. It will not fit to Turkey, who is the Ottoman inheritor to resist religious requests of a minority which has been living in our territories for centuries.</p>	<p>Claim 4: Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias</p>	<p>Topos of history</p>	<p>Since Turkey is the Ottoman inheritor, Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias</p>
<p>41-46 Turkey has already left the conditions of 1971 behind... Today, Turkey is a more modern, more liberal and more developed country compared to the 1970s.</p>	<p>Claim 5: Turkey is more modern and liberal compared to yesterday</p>	<p>Topos/fallacy of the situation of the country</p>	<p>Since Turkey has left the conditions of 1971 behind, Turkey is more modern and liberal</p>
<p>55-58 My personal opinion is that both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to the issue in good faith and have to meet at a common point. It is neither right to force the government into procedure that it cannot overcome nor to turn deaf ear to the religious requests of the people who have been living in this country for centuries.</p>	<p>Claim 6: Both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to the issue in good faith</p>	<p>Topos of rightfulness</p>	<p>Since it is neither right to force the government nor to turn deaf ear to the religious requests of the minorities, both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to the issue in good faith</p>

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The analysis of topics, the nomination and predication strategies as well as argumentation schemes have illustrated in detail how the author puts his own perspective into his own representation of reality. The strategies of perspectivation, mitigation and intensification play a significant role in the representation of varying opinions and discourses over the same social reality.

The author defends the view that Turkey should not approach to the issue of the re-opening of the Halki Seminary with phobias. The author through referring to Turkey as the Ottoman inheritor defends the view that the state should not object to the religious requests of the minorities. There is a rhetorical question in line 54 which can be seen as a question whose purpose is not to get an answer but to blatantly emphasize a point. The author employs deontic modality while writing about the things that each party must do:

34 Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias

54 This should also be thought well.

55 ...both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to the issue in good faith...

The assertions pertaining to Turkey is of high epistemic modality:

9 Turkey is confronted by this issue...

14 Turkey is anxious that the school model

41 Turkey has already left the conditions of 1971 behind

45 Turkey is more modern...

Finally, the author expresses his take on the issue most conspicuously in the final paragraph beginning with 'my personal opinion'. Also, as a positive remark, the author clearly stands on the side of consensus while solving the issue at stake.

9.8. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's request for the re-opening of the Halki Seminary school is covered within the framework of legal and constitutional arrangements in the Hürriyet article. Oktay Ekşi makes references to the Lausanne

Peace Treaty and underlines that the Patriarchate is an institution affiliated with the laws of the Turkish Republic.

Ekrem Dumanlı approaches to the request for the re-opening of the Halki Seminary within the framework of historical experiences. Dumanlı makes comparison between the conditions of 1970s when the Halki Seminary was closed down and the conditions of contemporary Turkey to argue that an intermediary formula satisfying both the Turkish government and the Patriarchate can be found.

Oktay Ekşi evaluates the request of the Patriarch as a privilege not as a normal request. It is to be noted that, Ekrem Dumanlı doesn't approach to the issue as strict as Oktay Ekşi. According to Ekrem Dumanlı, Turkey which approaches to the Seminary school skeptically has some historical reasons. For Dumanlı, Turkey is anxious that the school model which is affiliated with religious authority will lead to other requests later on. Dumanlı adopts a more optimistic stance towards the issue. For Dumanlı, a tangible result can be produced.

In the Hürriyet article, although not stated overtly, the principle of reciprocity is mentioned. According to Ekşi, since Mr. Patriarch has demands he should also agree to give. This can be seen as a sign emphasizing the principle of reciprocity. Finally, it is noteworthy to state that, the Hürriyet article handles the issue in a more personal style while the Zaman article handles it in a more impersonal style. This is obvious in how the authors put an end to their articles. Dumanlı seems to contribute to the issue through giving advice to both parties while Ekşi adopts a less serious tone and poses an ironical rhetorical question at the end of his article.

9.9.The Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's Interview on the CBS Television in 2009 wherein he said he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey

On December 17, 2009, the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew appeared on the CBS Television in an interview and told that the Orthodox Christian people living in Turkey cannot enjoy their full rights as Turkish citizens. The Greek Patriarch Bartholomew who is the spiritual leader of 300 million Orthodox Christians around the world likened his treatment by the Turkish government to crucifixion. The

reporter asked Bartholomew why he does not leave Turkey. Bartholomew answered as such: Because we love our country. We were born here. We want to pass away here.⁹¹

In fact, this interview had been made in the US nearly eight months before it was broadcasted (Ekşigil, 2010). The most striking remark that the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew said was that he sometimes feels as if he is crucified. “We consider the crucifix metaphor an extremely unfortunate metaphor. In our history, there have never been crucifixes and there never will be. I couldn’t really square this metaphor with his mature personality,” the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu told reporters.⁹²

The remarks of the Patriarch covered a variety of issues from the re-opening of the Halki Seminary to the recognition of his ecumenical title. Regarding the Halki Seminary the first official meeting took place on August 8, 2003. At this meeting the Patriarch expressed his request on the re-opening of the Theological School. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül pointed out that their wish is that all Turkish citizens should live, no matter their ethnic origin or religious belief in peace and harmony (Ntokme, 2010: 53). However, there has been no concrete progress about this issue yet.

According to article 40 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty

“Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.”

⁹¹ For the interview, visit <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriarch-bartholomew-feels-crucified-17-12-2009/2/> (27.08.2014)

⁹²<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-196156-101-crucifixion-remarks-lead-to-tension-between-govt-and-bartholomew.html> (27.08.2014)

As stated in this article, establishing and controlling religious institutions, schools or any establishment for education is obviously one of the rights of non-Muslim citizens. In line with this article, there should not be any obstacle for the minorities to enjoy the above-listed rights in various fields.

Another issue that the Patriarch made a statement about has been the recognition of his ecumenical title. Turkey rejects Bartholomew's use of the title ecumenical arguing that the Patriarch is merely the spiritual leader of Istanbul's Orthodox Community. The fear is that, if the Turkish government agrees to call the Patriarchate as 'ecumenical', this will mean as a breach of the laws and regulations that prevent the religious institutions from developing into political actors. This is thought to unleash a series of turmoil within other religious institutions in Turkey, tremendously harming the secular state tradition of Turkey (Ntokme, 2010: 48-49). It should be noted that the Lausanne Peace Treaty terminated the Patriarchate's authorities in non-religious affairs. The existence of the Patriarchate as a religious institution was threatened with the considerable decrease in the number of Greeks living in İstanbul (Bilge, 1998: 1).

There is not a change of policy towards the recognition of the ecumenicity of the Patriarchate and also there is no change at the 'reciprocity' understanding regarding the matter of the re-opening of the Halki Seminary. These two issues brought into question by Bartholomew still dominate the Turkish political agenda.

9.10. The Representation of the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's Interview in the Hürriyet newspaper:

Text XXIX-The Hürriyet Article

The article entitled 'Who is right?' (Appendix 29) was authored by Oktay Ekşi on December 22, 2009, five days after the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's interview appeared on the CBS Television on which he made critical remarks about the minorities in Turkey⁹³ and used the term 'crucifixion' for explaining the situation of non-Muslims living in Turkey. The article has more of a personal style than genre

⁹³<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriarch-bartholomew-feels-crucified-17-12-2009/> (19.08.2014)

specificity. However it can be said that the article can be regarded as a typical news column.

The text serves as part of an on-going discussion of the issues which is vital for the Greek Community living in Turkey like the Halki Seminary School. The article is the first of a series of two articles authored by Oktay Ekşi. The other article is titled 'The Complaint of the Patriarch' published on December 23. The article entitled 'Who is right?' intertextually refers to politicians' statements, news reports and TV discussions about the issue at stake.

The list below outlines the selected discourse topics and the discourses they are related to within the pertinent field of social action.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXIX

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Patriarch Bartholomew's statements
- Topic 1: Mr. Bartholomew's feeling as if 'he was crucified'
- The discourse of Mr. Bartholomew's requests
- Topic 2: Mr. Bartholomew met with the PM for so many times...
- Topic 3: The demands of the Patriarch and how he was answered
- Topic 4: Mr. Bartholomew made all the foreigners with influence on the government repeat these requests.
- Topic 5: Mr. Bartholomew used all kinds of pressure to impose their requests
- Topic 6: Mr. Bartholomew finally exploded when there was not any progress...
- Topic 7: The PM Erdoğan's answer to Mr. Bartholomew
- Topic 8: The remarks of Mr. Bartholomew do not have any basis

Nomination/Referential Strategies

There are examples of indetermination in several lines of the article. The linguistic tool called indetermination tends to anonymize social actors (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39). 'A reporter from CBS television' (line 2) is both an example of

indetermination and functionalization. 'All the foreigners with influence on the government' (lines 21-22) is another example of indetermination. The 'Patriarch' (line 35) is an example of functionalization through which the social actors are represented by their occupation.

As one of the easiest ways of referring to people, pronouns can be inclusive or exclusive. The first person plural pronoun 'we' in the text refers to the author and his agency. However another 'we' (line 32) is used to refer to the Greek community living in Turkey while 'we' in line 36 stands for the Turkish government. Apart from that, 'their' (line 23) and 'they' (lines 33 and 34) refer categorically and exclusively to the Greek community living in Turkey.

Finally, the 'Turkish government' (line 16), 'Patriarchate' (line 17), 'government' (line 22), 'Greek government' (lines 29 and 39) are examples of personified institutional names.

Table 29.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Fener Greek Patriarch He	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • exploded to a reporter from CBS Television • got everything off his chest • met with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan 5 times, or you may say 10 times. • was not unfair at all. • was only right in some of his demands • placed his desires in front of Prime Minister • was put off every time by saying “Inshaallah, Mashallah.” • made all the foreigners with influence on the government repeat these requests • used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • finally exploded when there was not any progress...
We (author, his agency and his readers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • know for sure he repeated the same thing. • are confident that he put up with the situation since he lives in Turkey • learn from Bartholomew's words that appeared at Haber Turk newspaper...

The table outlines the main social actors in Text XXIX and how they are predicated. The Greek Patriarch Mr. Bartholomew (He) in line 22 is discredited as employing all kinds of pressure to impose his demands. 'Turkey' appears in the text for twice and they are both spatio-temporal references. The pronoun 'we' is repeatedly used in the article to stand for the author, his agency and the readers. As a final remark, what we learn about the social actors are mostly construed by verbal processes.

Argumentation Strategies

The argument schema for the text is outlined in the table below. The article is more explanatory than being argumentative. As seen in the table, there are two main claims in the text. The first claim states that 'Mr. Bartholomew used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.' Here, the author resorts to the topos of influence to sustain his position. The argumentation formulation can be summarized as such: Since Mr. Bartholomew made all the foreigners with influence on the government repeat these requests, he used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.

The second claim states that 'The Patriarch is not wrong in his demands in terms of procedure.' The author employs the topos of rightfulness to justify his claim. Here, the argumentation formulation is as follows: Since the Greek citizens in Turkey do what a citizen should do, the Patriarch is not wrong in his demands in terms of procedure.

Argumentation Scheme in Text XXIX

Table 29.2:Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
20-22 He waited and he did not sit idle on the other hand. He made all the foreigners with influence on the government repeat these requests. In other words, he used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.	Claim 1: Mr. Bartholomew used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.	Topos of influence	Since Mr. Bartolomew made all the foreigners with influence on the government repeat these requests, he used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.
33-35 Right... they pay taxes, perform military duties and cast votes here. Of course, they will bring their demands to the attention of Prime Minister of Turkey and ask for solution. It seems that the Patriarch is not wrong at all in terms of “procedure.”	Claim 2: The Patriarch is not wrong in his demands in terms of procedure	Topos of rightfulness	Since the Greek citizens in Turkey do what a citizen should do, the Patriarch is not wrong in his demands in terms of procedure

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author does not want to take a clear position against anyone, neither the Patriarch nor the government. The metaphoric and idiomatic expression of 'getting something off one's chest' (eteğindeki taşları dökmek in Turkish) reveals how the author evaluates Patriarch Bartholomew's demands and statements.

The informal and personal style of the text is evident in the rhetorical questions which aim to provide a basis for a more interactive and critical reading. As noted earlier, the use of direct quotations in a news article serves mainly two aims; the agency is either drawing attention to the authority of the proposition or distancing itself from the source of quoted information. The quotations in lines 15-18 aim to distance the author from the source of quoted information while the quotations in lines 28-31 draw attention to the authority of the proposition.

The assertions pertaining to Mr. Bartholomew are of high epistemic modality (lines 7, 10, 15, 20 and 31). It should also be noted that the author switches to deontic modality, mostly expressing an order or a wish that an action be performed. As a final remark, the religious expression of 'Inshallah, mashallah' is used for indicating an irony about the government's attitude vis-à-vis the request of the Patriarch. This expression implicitly shows the negative stance of the author towards the policies of the government that is known to be religious and conservative.

9.11. The Representation of the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's Interview in the Zaman newspaper:

Text XXX-The Zaman Article

Text XXX (Appendix 30) is an article authored by Ahmet Turan Alkan. The headline of the article reads 'The Crucifix Empathy!' The article was published on December 23, 2009, six days after the Greek Patriarch Bartholomew's interview appeared on the CBS Television on which he made critical remarks about the minorities in Turkey. Written by an academic, the article bears features of both an

academic and a journalistic one. The author puts the emphasis on the notion of ‘crucifixion’ and Mr. Bartholomew’s remarks stating that he sometimes feels as if he is crucified in Turkey.

It should also be noted that the author mentions various topics mostly from the field of local politics like the Ergenekon and the headscarf issue. The article has an informal and personal tone and carries features of a typical news column in terms of genre. The list below outlines the selected discourse topics and the discourses they are related to within the pertinent field of social action.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXX

The field of religion

- The discourse of crucifixion
- Topic 1: The definition of crucifixion
- Topic 2: The explanation rejected by Quran
- Topic 3: Crucifixion was considered a fitting treatment only for despicable crimes such as theft, robbery etc., at that time.
- Topic 12: The author’s own interpretation of crucifixion

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Patriarch Bartholomew’s remarks
- Topic 4: The reaction directed to Mr. Bartholomew
- The discourse of the situation of the country
- Topic 5: We are dealing with all kinds of things extending from inconsiderateness, blindness...to nasty implications...
- Topic 6: If you say “for God’s sake! ...” your name will immediately be written in “to be sacrificed” list in reactionism action plan.
- Topic 7: Criticizing bad-intentions of those who were brought before the court by filing a criminal complaint with legal files as thick as dictionaries is considered to be “negligence, even misguidedness.

- Topic 8: It has become a fault to call the pro-Ergenekons “Ergenekon-fan”...
- Topic 9: For years we have been called to account for all goats stolen in this country!..
- Topic 10: Our sons perform their military service in the most dangerous places of this country
- Topic 11: We have been blacklisted for years

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The first personal pronouns refer to the author himself. The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ (lines 17, 19, 36, 37 and 42) stand for the author and the societal segments whom the author sympathize with.

‘Some conservative milieus’ (line 14), ‘Those who utter statements...’ (line 21), ‘some’ (line 23), ‘others’ (line 23), ‘those...’ (lines 28, 30) and ‘they’ (lines 45 and 47) are examples of indetermination through which the author tends to make the social actors anonymous (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 39).

The author uses the metaphor of ‘sugar-coated poison’ in line 22 for indicating one of the ways of interpretations people employ while dealing with the difference among those who utter different statements. The expression of ‘a fan of Damat Ferit’ is used in a pejorative way as Damat Ferit Pasha has been denounced as a traitor in the Turkish nationalist historiography.

The metaphoric and idiomatic expression ‘to account for all goats stolen...’ in line 36 refers to the victimization that the societal segment who the author is sympathizing with has faced. Through using such an expression, the author emphasizes the degree of the victimization these people faced. Here, the author tries to stress that, some particular people are accused in an unfair way for the things that go wrong.

Table 30.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • do not know what sort of feelings of torment the concept of the crucifixion corresponds in Christian theology • think being crucified is this or something similar to this. • understand Mr. Bartholomew • understand how it is to be crucified a little.
It (the crucifixion)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • is a style of execution that Romans applied as far as it was included in historical narrations • was considered a fitting treatment only for despicable crimes such as theft, robbery etc., at that time.
We (The author and the segment he sympathize with)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • are not capable of at least, feeling empathy on what sort of torment or a long-lasting form of torture this “crucifixion” is? • are dealing with all kinds of things extending from inconsiderateness... • have been to account for all goats stolen in this country!... • have been blacklisted for years
He (Mr. Bartholomew)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • was also misunderstood

As seen in the table above, the appellative denominations in Text XXX would not be considered to be negatively or positively biased if we took them at face value. For example, the representation of Patriarch Bartholomew was realized in passive form. This means that the author puts the emphasis on the activity rather than the subject.

Argumentation Strategies

In the table below, I have outlined the main claims and topoi in Text XXX. The first claim consisting of Patriarch Bartholomew's words were encountered with a pointless reaction in some conservative milieus is supported by the topoi of misunderstanding. The argumentation formulation is as follows: If somebody is misunderstood, his/her words can cause overreaction.

In the next claim, the author resorts to the topoi of comparison. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since we have been called to account for all goats stolen in this country. This is also a kind of crucifix. Here, the author sheds light upon the victimization of some particular citizens in Turkey.

In the final claim, the author overtly expresses the oppressive state policies directed to some particular citizens through the claim of If we ask one day "why do you include us in blacklist?" there will not be any type of scolding that we do not experience. The author here resorts to the topoi of sameness to sustain his position.

Table 30.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXX

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
13-16 Patriarch Bartholomew’s words of “we sometime feel as if we are crucified” were encountered with a pointless reaction in some conservative milieus that are in the habit of approaching all kinds of contrary and opposing opinions with tolerance; perhaps, he was also misunderstood.	Claim 1: Patriarch Bartholomew’s words were encountered with a pointless reaction in some conservative milieus	Topos of misunderstanding	If somebody is misunderstood, his/her words can cause overreaction
36-38 For years, we have been called to account for all goats stolen in this country!... This is also a kind of crucifix; we experienced bitter taste of living as second class citizen in our own country.	Claim 2: For years, we have been treated in a similar way to the crucifixion	Topos of comparison	Since we have been called to account for all goats stolen in this country. This is also a kind of crucifix.
42-44We have been blacklisted for years; If we ask one day “why do you include us in blacklist, my friend, what wrong of mine did you see?” there will not be any type of scolding that we do not experience and any threats that we have not been imposed	Claim 3: If we ask one day “why do you include us in blacklist?” there will not be any type of scolding that we do not experience	Topos of sameness	If something abnormal occurs, the same thing may occur again in the future.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The author though in an indirect and implicit way criticizes the reactions that rose among the conservative circles against Bartholomew's words. According to the author, Bartholomew could have been misunderstood (line 16). The rhetorical question (lines 17 and 18) is used as part of the critical tone of the article. In addition to its contribution to a more interactive reading, that rhetorical question is also indicative of the author's hedged critical point of view.

Through using the crucifixion metaphor, the author attempts to draw attention to the victimization of some particular citizens like that of veiled women. The metaphoric and idiomatic expression of 'accounting for all goats stolen' refers to the victimization of some people like the pious citizens in Turkey (line 36) faced.

The informal style of the text is reflected by the use of depreciatory adjectives. Such examples occur in line 48: the 'JDP arse-licker'. The author suffers from being labeled with depreciatory adjectives and argues that he knows how it feels to be crucified. Finally, the author criticizes the unfair practices occurred in the country. For the author, the coup-defendants are patriot

9.12.The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman Discourses

Oktay Ekşi states that the words of crucifixion did not slip out of Patriarch Bartholomew's mouth. According to Oktay Ekşi, Bartholomew had presented the same demands so many times before however he was put off all the time. For Ekşi, the demands of Bartholomew are not wrong in terms of procedure. Ekşi criticizes the attitude of the government with the following words: 'One way or another, say we will do it and finalize the matter or say we cannot do and put an end to it. Why do you keep on putting off?'

Ahmet Turan Alkan deals with the issue in question mostly from the perspective of domestic political issues in Turkey. Alkan does not put forward any

idea about the intention of the Patriarch, whether the words slipped out of his mouth or not. According to Alkan, Bartholomew could have been misunderstood (line 16).

Written by an academic, the Zaman article deals with the issue from an academic perspective. Alkan first defines the concept of crucifixion while Ekşi directly addresses the issue and puts forward his stance. Alkan regards the reactions that were raised in some conservative circles as a reflection of Bartholomew's being misunderstood. Alkan relates the victimhood of the Patriarch with the victimhood of some particular segments of society like that of veiled women in Turkey. Finally, it is to be noted that, Alkan through addressing the remarks of Bartholomew shifts the focus on other unfair practices witnessed in Turkey. However, Ekşi does not have such a concern.

9.13. The Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations Stipulating The Return Of Property Seized From Minorities

The decree published in Turkey's official gazette on August 27, 2011, contains an article mandating the return of properties, which had been forcibly taken over by the state, to their real non-Muslim religious foundation owners. According to this decree minority foundations will be able to reclaim real property that they had declared back in 1936. Immoveable property currently belonging to third persons will also be paid for.

The Lausanne Peace Treaty adopted the principle that the status granted to Muslim Ottoman citizens in terms of religious rights and liberties should also be granted to non-Muslim citizens as well. The most important articles of the Treaty for non-Muslim foundations are as follows (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 11):

Article 40:

Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Article 41:

As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Muslim nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals belonging to non-Muslim minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes.

...

Article 42(3):

The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations, and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature.

The denial of legal personality to the Patriarchate constitutes the basis for the deprivation of ownership rights to a broad range of properties claimed by the Patriarchate. The Turkish state has prohibited the Greek Orthodox minority from acquiring property in Turkey since 1936 (Prodromou, 2005: 15). Since the execution of the Lausanne Treaty, non-Muslims' rights were violated not only by ignoring the ownership and management rights of foundations with the Law on Foundations, but also through a series of policies adopted since the 1960s (Kurban and Hatemi, 2009: 18).

In 1974, the Court of Cassation ruled that no corporate body consisting of foreigners would be allowed to obtain immovable property. The non-Muslim citizens were put into the category of 'foreigner' and their property was limited to what they

declared on the 1936 listing. Accordingly, properties purchased or donated after 1936 were considered illegal. State authorities returned these properties to the heirs of those who had first donated them, and confiscated the properties if no suitable heir was found (cited in Toktaş and Aras, 2009: 703).

Before 2002, minority foundations were not allowed to acquire, or sell any property. Even the repair of facilities was strictly controlled, if permitted, by the state authorities. The legal foundation of this prohibition was the 1936 Law on Religious Foundations No. 2762, which urged all foundations to prepare a declaration of properties that they owned at the time. (Toktaş and Aras, 2009: 703).

The amendment in question added a new transitional article to the 2008 Foundations Law. That law adopted in 2008 was approved by the Parliament. However, it was subsequently vetoed by the then President Ahmet Necdet Sezer who found the law as incompatible with the Turkish constitution and the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Following the Presidential veto, the Foundations Law has been slightly revised and accepted in February 2008. As noted the new transitional article added to that law in 2011 enables minority foundations to apply for return of their properties that had been expropriated by the state. The decree also provided for the formation of new religious community foundations in order to correct oversights in the 1936 law⁹⁴.

It should be noted that the European Union membership challenges the conventional minority regime of Turkey. Thus it can be said that the amendment made to Turkey's law on Foundations in 2011 can be seen as a sign contributing to Turkey's EU candidacy process.

9.14. The Representation of the Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations in the Hürriyet newspaper:

Text XXXI- The Hürriyet Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 31) is an article written by Mehmet Y. Yılmaz. Yılmaz worked as the founder editor-in-chief of many journals. The

⁹⁴<http://www.osce.org/odihr/105463?download=true> (27.08.2014).

headline reads ‘It is an important step but an incomplete one’. The article was published on September 3, 2011 six days after the decree law about the return of the properties of the non-Muslim religious foundations owners was published on the Official Gazette.

The article is separated into three parts with sub-headlines. As for the genre of the article, in terms of its content and style it carries features of a column. The text deals with the topic of education of the children of minorities and the return of the properties belonging to minority foundations.

In the original Turkish text (Appendix N31), the last section of the article deals with the issue of the imprisoned journalists. As this is not related with the issue in question, i.e. the minorities living in Turkey, I did not to translate this part for discourse analysis.

The list below outlines the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are intrinsically related to, and the fields of actions where each discourse and discourse topic operate discursively and textually.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXXI

The field of local politics

- The discourse of the decision permitting the children of Armenian citizens, who illegally work in Turkey, to study at schools belonging to Armenian community in Turkey
- Topic 1: The importance of the step
- Topic 2: The number of children in İstanbul who are in this situation
- Topic 3: There is one problem that these children will not be able to receive diploma from the schools they graduate.
- Topic 4: The JDP government can sometimes take such important and courageous steps

- Topic 5: The children of those who come from countries such as Romania, Georgia, Moldova, etc., are in the same situation.
- Topic 6: The Ministry of Education had better not leave this important step incomplete...
- The discourse of the decree law on the return of the properties belonging to minority foundations
- Topic 7: The decree law will be able to put an end to the lawsuits that Turkey already loses in European Court of Human Rights
- Topic 11: The return of the properties belonging to minority foundations is an important step...
- Topic 12: The question of ‘will the minorities feel themselves as equal citizens?’

The field of journalism

- The discourse of the representation of the decree law in the partisan media
- Topic 8: The coverage of the issue in the partisan media
- Topic 9: The foul-mouthed writer of the Sabah newspaper
- Topic 10: The coverage of the issue in some commentaries

Nomination/Referential Strategies

‘Some people’ (line 4), ‘Those’ (line 14) ‘A foul-mouthed writer’ in line 31 are examples of indetermination through which the identities of the social actors are mystified. ‘A foul-mouthed writer’ is also an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). ‘Turkey’ is used in the article having different meaning extensions. ‘Turkey’ in line 2 is a spatio-temporal reference while ‘Turkey’ (lines 16 and 22) stands metonymically for the statesmen. The ‘JDP government’ (line 12) and ‘schools’ (line 8) are personified while the ‘Ministry of Education’ (line 19) and the

acronym ECHR (line 28) and the ‘Court of Cassation’ (line 34) are personified institutional names.

The pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ can be used to create in-groups and out-groups. The pronoun ‘we’ in line 45 is an all-inclusive pronoun referring to everyone in Turkey. The pronoun ‘they’ in the same line refers to the minority groups living in Turkey.

Finally, the passive voices used in the text background the social actors and shift the focus on the activity. In addition to that, passive voice can also be used to avoid naming an active subject.

Table 31.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will provide them a document...
A portion of these children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had already beenreceiving education in those schools without getting report cards, diploma, etc.
The JDP government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • can sometimes take such important and courageous decisions
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • overlooks these people these people to come here and work for this or that reason
Ministry of Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • had better not leavethis important step incomplete...
The Decree Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • will be able to put an end to lawsuits that Turkey already loses in European Court of Human Rights.

He (The foul-mouthed writer of Sabah)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • thinks that the properties of minority foundations were confiscated in 1936
I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • also read commentaries in newspapers stating that with this law “minorities in Turkey will feel like equal citizens from now on” • think they are the comments that are made a little early.

As seen in the table above, if we took them at face value, the appellative denominations in Text XXXI would not be considered to be positively or negatively biased. The JDP government is evaluated in positive terms while the Ministry of Education is presented with little or no attribution. The author is one of the active agents in the article. He reads and puts forward his ideas. Finally, ‘Turkey’ stands metonymically for the state authorities.

Argumentation Strategies

The first claim states that it is an important decision to give permission to the children of Armenian citizens, who illegally work in Turkey, to study at schools belonging to Armenian community. Here, the author resorts to the topos of importance to sustain his position. In the second claim, the author resorts to the topos of consequence. The argumentation here can be formulized as such: If Turkey did not overlook these people, this much of people would not be present in our country as illegal immigrant workers. Here, the author implicitly criticizes the state policies.

In the final claim, it is stated that the situation should not be seen as a great success of the government. The argumentation can be formulized as such: Since the government has taken a belated step, it should not be seen as a great success.

Table 31.2: Argumentation Schemes

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-5 It is an important decision to give permission to the children of Armenian citizens, who illegally work in Turkey, to study at schools belonging to Armenian community in Turkey. When it is considered that deporting these people was believed to be the first thing that comes to the minds of some people with regard to any problems with Armenia in recent past, the importance of this step is understood better	Claim 1: It is an important decision to give permission to the children of Armenian citizens, who illegally work in Turkey, to study at schools belonging to Armenian community	Topos of importance	When considered at length, the importance of a thing is understood better.
16-18 Turkey overlooks these people to come here and work for this or that reason. If it were not the case, this much of people would not be present in our country as illegal immigrant workers.	Claim 2: Turkey overlooks these people to come here and work	Topos of consequence	If Turkey did not overlook these people, this much of people would not be present in our country as illegal immigrant workers.
26-29 It is a situation that should already have been made until today, now it has been fulfilled... In other words, the situation should not be seen as a great success of the government like it was presented in the partisan media.	Claim 3: The situation should not be seen as a great success of the government.	Topos of reality	Since the government has taken a belated step, it should not be seen as a great success

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The analysis (of topics, the referential and predication strategies as well as the argumentation schemas) has illustrated in detail how the author puts his own perspective into his own representation of reality. The assertion pertinent to the representation of the decision that gives permission to the children of Armenian citizens to study is of high epistemic modality. On the other hand, there are examples of deontic modality in lines 21 and 28-29. These reveal the obligation expressed by the author.

The sub-headline ‘Will the minorities feel themselves as equal citizens?’ epitomizes one of the critical discussions of the time. The questions at the end of the article are all rhetorical questions. These questions contribute to a more interactive reading. The only depreciatory term used in the article is ‘foul-mouthed’ in line 31. The author uses this term to refer to a columnist who thought that the properties of minority foundations were confiscated in 1936 but was mistaken.

Finally, the emphasis on the inequality and discrimination, the non-Muslim minorities face in Turkey can be regarded as the author’s critical standpoint about the situation the minorities are embedded in Turkey.

9.15.The Representation of the Amendment Made To Turkey's Law On Foundations in the Zaman newspaper:

Text XXXII- The Zaman Article

The article to be analyzed (Appendix 32) is an article written by Ali Bulaç. The article was published on September 3, 2011 six days after the decree law about the return of the properties of the non-Muslim minorities’ foundations was published on the Official Gazette. The article entitled ‘The Rights of non-Muslims’ bears qualities of a typical news column in terms of genre.

The article reflects the author’s profession in the sense that it deals with the issue of the rights of the non-Muslim citizens mainly from a theological perspective. The thematic structure of the text moves from the general to the particular. The

author first mentions Turkey's problems like that of the Kurdish issue and then writes about the issue of non-Muslim citizens living in Turkey.

The list below outlines the topics that are referred to in the text, as well as the discourses which the topics are intrinsically related to, and the fields of actions where each discourse and discourse topic operate textually and discursively.

Selected Topics and Discourses in Text XXXII

The field of local politics

- The discourse of Turkey's need for a mindset revolution
- Topic 1: Turkey needs a mindset revolution that will not prevent us from becoming honorable, safe, free and peaceful on earth.
- Topic 2: The necessary things in order to lay the mental foundations of such a revolution
- Topic 3: The issues to be solved in Turkey
- The discourse of the current situation in Turkey
- Topic 4: As compared with the past it is observed that promising steps are taken
- Topic 5: The return of the landed properties to their real owners
- Topic 11: We are being normalized with heavy but steady steps
- Topic 12: A new citizenship or nationality based on equality before the law taking into consideration the socio-culturally differences should be taken as reference
- The discourse of the decision on community foundations and landed properties of non-Muslim citizens
- Topic 6: Jewish Chief Rabbi's interpretation of the decision on community foundations and landed properties of non-Muslims
- Topic 13: The decision on the return of the properties to community foundations should, at once, be followed by decisions on the re-opening Halki Seminary School...

The field of religion

- The discourse of the philosophical basis of the decision
- Topic 7: Prophet Muhammad's relations with the non-Muslims
- Topic 8: The relations with the non-Muslims in Islamic history

The field of history of the Republic

- The discourse of the status of non-Muslims during the early Republican era
- Topic 9: It has been the period after the foundation of the Republic in Turkey when the non-Muslims suffered severe deprivations.
- Topic 10: The state's oppressive policies against the non-Muslims

Nomination/Referential Strategies

The representation of social actors constitutes the main ingredient of 'the reality' the author purports to represent. 'Turkey' appears in the article a few times with different meaning extensions. 'Turkey' (line 1) stands metonymically for all the people living in Turkey. However, 'Turkey' (lines 7, 27) is a spatio-temporal reference while 'Turkey' (line 28) refers to state authorities.

The first personal pronoun 'we' (lines 2, 13, 35 and 53) refers to all the people living in Turkey. It is an all-inclusive pronoun. The pronoun 'we' in line 37 stand for the author and the agency. The pronoun 'they' (line 12) stands for the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey.

The 'government' (lines 11 and 14) is an example of personified institutional name through which the government members are represented. The 'West' in lines 28, 36 and 38 stand for the political system of the Western countries. It should be noted that, the author attributes the West a pejorative meaning. He states that the Western system which Turkey has been inspired from has made the minorities suffer severe deprivations.

The ‘Prime Minister’ (line 14) is an example of functionalization (Van Leeuwen, 2008: 42). The passive voices between lines 47-52 shift the focus on the activity and background the social actors. Finally, the only people who are represented by proper names are the Prophet Moses and the last prophet (although his name is not mentioned). This can be seen as a sign that the author deals with the issue from a religious point of view.

Table 32.1: Social Actors and Predications

Social Actors	Predications
Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • needs to experience a basic mindset transformation
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • put an end to a practice towards non-Muslims that cannot be expressed in any other words than “persecution”
We (all the people living in Turkey)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • all owe thanks to the Government and the Prime Minister • are being normalized with heavy but steady steps • will of course work for the recognition of the same rights and status to Muslims in Western Thrace • will not see the non-Muslims living with us as hostages anymore.
Jewish Chief Rabbi Halevi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • interpreted this decision as “the continuation of the light dating from the Ottoman Empire.”
He (Prophet Muhammad)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • determined the relations non-Muslims...
Those (who follow this column)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • know that we wrote many times about “absolute equal citizenship, which is a plague of the West” not being solution to clashes that we experience today...

As Table 32.1 shows, what we learn about the social actors is mostly construed by verbal processes. Turkey and the government are personified. The Jewish Chief Rabbi is represented without any positive or negative evaluation. The Prophet Muhammad is represented as a universal point of reference for the treatment of non-Muslims in a Muslim country.

Argumentation Strategies

In the table below, I have outlined the main claims and topoi in Text XXXII. The first claim that Turkey needs to experience a basic mindset revolution is supported by the topos of advantage. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since a mindset revolution will lead us to prosperity, Turkey needs a mindset revolution.

In the second claim, the author resorts to the topos of definition/name interpretation. The argumentation formulation is as follows: Since this decision is interpreted as the decision of the revelation from which the prophet Moses and all other prophets have been fed from, Jewish Chief Rabbi supports it. Here, the author makes an elaboration of how the Jewish Rabbi evaluates the decision in question.

In the final claim, the author presents his own point of view about the issue of the problematic relations between the non-Muslim citizens and the state. The author claims that a new citizenship or nationality based on equality before the law should be taken as reference.

Table 32.2: Argumentation Schemes in Text XXXII

Lines	Argumentation Claims	Argumentation Topoi /Fallacies	Argumentation Explicit formulation of topoi and fallacies
1-3 Turkey needs to experience a basic mindset transformation. A mindset revolution that will lead us to prosperity at a level that will not prevent us from becoming honorable, safe, free and peaceful on earth.	Claim 1: Turkey needs to experience a basic mindset revolution	Topos of advantage	Since a mindset revolution will lead us to prosperity, Turkey needs a mindset revolution.
15-18 Jewish Chief Rabbi Halevi interpreted this decision as “the continuation of the light dating from the Ottoman Empire.” In fact, this decision is the light of the revelation from which the prophet Moses... all other prophets have been fed from.	Claim 2: For the Jewish Chief Rabbi, this decision is the light of the revelation from which the prophet Moses and all other prophets have been fed from.	Topos of definition/name interpretation	Since this decision is interpreted as the decision of the revelation from which the prophet Moses and all other prophets have been fed from, Jewish Chief Rabbi supports it.
40-43 A constitutional citizenship, based on equal citizenship, will serve nothing more than the purpose of producing and continuing the current problems within new forms. “A new citizenship or nationality based on equality before the law...” should be taken as reference.	Claim 3: A new citizenship or nationality based on equality before the law should be taken as reference.	Topos of necessity	Since equal citizenship will serve nothing more than the purpose of producing the current problems within new forms, a new citizenship based on equality before the law should be taken as reference.

Perspectivation, Mitigation and Intensification Strategies

The above analysis reveals that the author is not happy with the current situation in Turkey vis-a-vis the state-non-Muslim minorities relationship. This is obvious in the sentence from the first line: ‘Turkey needs to experience a basic mindset transformation.’ In parallel to that, the author at the end of the article gives advice to the government for the betterment of the status of the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The expression of ‘hostage’ is the only negative expression in the text revealing the author’s tense and critical standpoint about the current situation of the non-Muslims living in Turkey.

The author evaluates the Western world in a negative way and treats taking the West as a reference point as the main cause of the discrimination the non-Muslim minorities face in Turkey today. In this sense, the author seems to have an anti-Western stance.

As for the perspective of the author, his claims about the process in the aftermath of the decision on the return of the properties to community foundations are expressed in deontic modality; that is they represent the author’s belief of what should be done rather than what is done or will be done. The assertions pertinent to what the current situation in Turkey are of high epistemic modality.

9.16. The Comparison and Discussion of the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers

The representation of the amendment made to Turkey's law on foundations in the Hürriyet newspaper is not as detailed as the representation of it in the Zaman newspaper. It could be said that Ali Bulaç draws a more clear picture of his stance and the stance of the agency as well. Mehmet Y. Yılmaz begins his article mentioning the permission given to the children of Armenian citizens who illegally work in Turkey to study at schools belonging to Armenian community in Turkey. Indeed, Yılmaz addresses the issue of the amendment made to Turkey’s law on foundations in the second part of his column with a sub-title of ‘Will the minorities feel themselves as equal citizens?’.

Ali Bulaç evaluates the amendment in question as a promising step and writes that ‘Government put an end to a practice towards non-Muslims that cannot be expressed in any other words than persecution.’ (lines 11-12). However, Yılmaz is not so clear about that. Yılmaz seems impartial and a bit pessimistic in adopting such an attitude. Yılmaz writes the following (lines 35-37): ‘I also read commentaries in newspapers stating that with this law minorities in Turkey will feel like equal citizens from now on. I think they are the comments that are made a little early.’

According to the view presented in the *Hürriyet* article, the return of the properties belonging to minority foundations does not show that all practices that are unlawful will come to an end. For Yılmaz, it is necessary to see whether the bureaucracy will abandon its traditionalized attitude or not. In a similar vein, Bulaç argues that the return of the properties to community foundations should be followed by decisions on the re-opening Halki Seminary and recognizing the ‘ecumenical characteristic’ of the Patriarchate. Such arguments can be treated as an indication revealing the stance of the author towards critical issues concerning the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey.

It is to be noted that Bulaç deals with the issue from a wider perspective. Bulaç makes references to the Hadith of the Prophet and the Quran. Apart from that, it should be noted that Bulaç adopts an anti-Western rhetoric. For Bulaç, the minority status is a plague of the West. As a final remark, it can be said that the stance of the *Zaman* newspaper seems more optimistic than that of the *Hürriyet* newspaper about the future of the rights of the non-Muslim citizens in Turkey.

CHAPTER TEN

CONCLUSION

Discourse according to Foucault is directly related to the way in which power is exercised in society. Critical Discourse Analysis has an explicit concern with the relationship of language to other elements of social processes. In addition, CDA deals with how the unequal power relations are reproduced through discourse. That is why this study employs CDA as a tool to uncover how certain segments of society (i.e. undesired citizens) are demonized through media coverage from time to time.

It should be noted that the identity of the undesired citizens has also been promoted from time to time and the way this promotion is exercised is another point of concern for the study.

Events are reported through a given ideological perspective (Van Dijk, 1985) so CDA is important while analyzing how power is exercised on a discursive level in media discourse as well. This study has demonstrated the importance of context while analyzing the image of the undesired citizens in media discourse. As presented in the Methodology chapter, the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) as a method of CDA underlines the importance of historical setting within which texts and utterances are being produced. So the historical background of each case has been analyzed deeply.

As noted ,in this study, I have investigated how the image of the undesired citizens (i.e. the Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims and Pious citizens) are portrayed in the Hürriyet and Zaman newspapers. Due to this aim, First, I have shed light upon the citizenship formation in Turkey. The citizenship formation entails a formula of who a 'desired citizen' can be, thus firstly I have attempted to explore what kind of policies have been employed in socially engineering the 'desired citizen'. Before doing this, I have presented theories of nationalism and state formation from a cultural perspective with making references to Foucault, Giddens, Gramsci and Althusser in order to analyze the nation-building process in Turkey better. Thus it could be said

that, the theoretical framework of this study is multi-layered and this can be seen as an important contribution for the academic field.

As part of the theoretical background of this study, Benedict Anderson is an important figure as Anderson's *Imagined Communities* ([1983] 1991) provides a significant theoretical account on the role of the media with regards to nationalism. Anderson argues that nationalism is a cultural artifact. Making reference to Hegel's aphorism that newspapers serve modern man as a substitute to morning prayers, Anderson places a special emphasis on newspapers and novels as important tools which provide technical means for representing the kind of imagined community - the nation (Anderson, 1991: 25). From their inception, newspapers created an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers. In addition, following the works of Deutsch (1966) and Gellner (1983) who sketch how communication and nation are related I have argued that media discourse (print media in this study) plays a crucial role in both (re)producing and challenging the desired citizenship profile in Turkey.

A major finding of this study is that the image of the undesired citizens had quite a fluid nature as portrayed in the *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* newspapers. In other words, it can be said that the image of the undesired citizens has been continuously being formed and broken down in the media discourse under scrutiny. However, the promotion of unity and integrity of Turkishness and Muslim identity have been found in almost all articles in both newspapers.

It should be stated that during the 1990s, due to the rise of identity-based politics, the undesired citizens have been othered in an important degree. Especially through emphasizing the territorial unity of Turkey, Kurdish identity has been demonized. Also, the pious Muslim identity has been demonized in the *Hürriyet* newspaper over the issue of veiling.

In almost all of the newspaper articles I have analyzed I have observed that both the *Hürriyet* and *Zaman* newspapers have similar sensitivities such as the importance of territorial integrity vis-à-vis the Kurdish identity. By contrast, there is a major difference in the portrayal of pious citizens. The *Hürriyet* newspaper in

almost all of the articles constructs the pious citizens as a threat to secular character of the regime. This construction is generally performed by argumentative devices such as topoi and fallacies. In these constructions, the topoi of authority plays a major role. However, in the 2000s, with the rise of the JDP, the stance of the Hürriyet towards the pious citizens has become more liberal

One of the empirical claims of this study is that the discursive strategies used in all articles generally overlap. The pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ are generally used in all articles to construe pertinent in and out-groups. Moreover, in forging the in and out groups, nomination strategies are centered on membership categorization and lexicalizations. The indeterminate pronouns like ‘those’ is often used to mystify the excluded social groups. It is to be noted that, the acronym AKP or AK Parti marks the ideological stance of each newspaper. Along with that, ‘turban’ and ‘Headscarf’ also indicate the ideological stance of each newspaper. The Zaman newspaper chooses to use headscarf as evident in the articles.

In this study I have demonstrated that the othering of the undesired citizens plays a key role in the discursive construction of the identity of the ‘desired citizens’. This is the constitutive role of Otherness. Moreover, among the rhetorical figures that are most influential in the discursive formation of the undesired citizens are metaphors. This study has also made it clear that the undesired citizens are not always represented negatively; many neutral evaluations and positive identifications also exist depending on the socio-political context. For instance, the image of the Kurdish citizens is not represented negatively in the articles related with the Uludere Incident. In addition, the non-Muslim other is not always perceived as a dangerous outsider as well. It has also emerged from the qualitative analyses that discourse has a constitutive work and not only constructs identity but also paves the way for political action. This is the dialectical nature of discourse.

Although the representations have always been in motion, the undesired citizens served as a mirror for delineating some elements of the ‘desired citizen’. It is to be noted that in almost all of the historical periods (1990s and 2000s-until 2013) under scrutiny, As noted, I have observed that the Hürriyet newspaper has quite a

different approach from the Zaman newspaper concerning the pious identity. This is quite obvious in the article concerning education (1997). Oktay Ekşi defended the view that the religious vocational schools should be shut down.

Apart from the lexical choice, the discursive representations of each event point to differences as well as similarities. One of the similarities is the construction of a unified and homogeneous national identity. The analysis of most of the Zaman articles has shown that the metonymic use of ‘Turkey’ (Türkiye) together with ‘our country’ (ülkemiz) are used by the author to create this sense of national identity.

In terms of the Alevi identity, first it is noteworthy to state that the ‘otherness’ of the Alevi identity in Turkey is an issue of debate. The Alevi citizens can get high-rank positions in the bureaucracy but when it comes to cultural rights like the issue of compulsory religion courses othering has been witnessed.

Having looked at the articles on the Alevi identity, I can argue that there have been significant similarities in the Hürriyet and Zaman discourses, i.e. the status of cem houses. Having looked at the articles on the non-Muslim identity, I can argue that there have been significant differences, i.e. the situation of Halki Seminary. These similarities and differences have been revealed in detail in the previous chapters. The Hürriyet newspaper defends the principle of reciprocity while the Zaman newspaper does not defend such a view frankly.

As far as the objective of this research is considered, the competing discourses across the newspapers mark the way events are understood. Given the findings of this study, it can also be concluded that the media whether direct or indirect is in interaction with their readers. Another finding is that there are different understandings of desired citizenship. For instance during the Cold War years, the pious Muslim identity had not been under the category of undesired citizens. By contrast this identity had been promoted in Turkey during those years against the communist threat.

This study has also shown that there is a direct relationship with the political authority and the media actors. As noted earlier, no news coverage is neutral. We can

consider the role of media supplementary to Powerful groups in a society. So the media has an influence on the democratic well-being of the country as well. Finally, as one of the most critical recommendation in this study, it could be said that, the Radio and Television Supreme Council should monitor the relevant media to help the print media contribute to democracy in Turkey.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abizadeh, Arash. (2005). "Does Collective Identity Presuppose An Other? On The Alleged Incoherence Of Global Solidarity". *American Political Science Review*. No: 99. Pp. 45-60.

Adaklı, Gülseren. (2006). *Türkiye'de Medya Endüstrisi Neoliberalizm Çağında Mülkiyet Ve Kontrol İlişkileri*. Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi.

Akan, Aysun. (2009). "Press Discourse In Turkey As An Agent Of Discrimination Towards The Non-Muslims: A Critical Analysis Of The Press Coverage Of The 1934 Thrace Events, 1942 Wealth Tax And 6/7 September 1955 Riots" (Doctoral Dissertation, Middle East Technical University).

Akçam, Taner. (2001). *Türk Ulusal Kimliği ve Ermeni Sorunu*. İstanbul: Su Yayınları
Aksiyon Haftalık Haber Dergisi. (1995). March 18-24

Aktar, Ayhan. (2004). *Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Akkor Gül, Ayşe. (2011). "Monopolization of Media Ownership as a Challenge to the Turkish Television Broadcasting System and the European Union". *Ankara Review of European Studies*. Vol:10. No: 2. Pp. 27-46.

Alaranta, Toni. (2008). "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Six-Day Speech of 1927: Defining the Official Historical View of the Foundation of the Turkish Republic". *Turkish Studies*. Vol:9No:1. Pp. 115-129.

Althusser, Louis. (1971). "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses". In Althusser, Louis (ed.). *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Altınay, Ayşe Gül. (2004). *The Myth Of The Military-Nation. Militarism, Gender, And Education in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Anderson, Benedict. (1991 [1983]). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (Revised Ed.). London and New York: Verso.

Anderson, Margaret L., Michael Reynolds, Hans-Lukas Kieser, Peter Balakian, A. Dirk Moses & Taner Akçam. (2013). "Taner Akçam, The Young Turks' crime against humanity: the Armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012)". *Journal of Genocide Research*. Vol: 15. No: 4. Pp.463-509

Armstrong, John Alexander. (1982). *Nations before nationalism*. University of North Carolina Press, 1982.

Aslan, Senem. (2009). "Incoherent State: the controversy over Kurdish naming in Turkey". *European Journal of Turkish Studies. Social Sciences on Contemporary Turkey*. Vol: 10. Pp.1-17

Atatürkçülük (Ataturkism). 1984. Milli Eğitim Basımevi.

Austin, John L. (1962). *How To Do Things With Words: The William James Lectures Delivered At Harvard University In 1955*. Oxford: Clarendon

Ayata, Bilgin. (2011). "Kurdish Transnational Politics and Turkey's Changing Kurdish Policy: The Journey of Kurdish Broadcasting from Europe to Turkey". *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. Vol: 19. No:4. Pp.523-533

Ayata, Bilgin and Serra Hakyemez. (2013). "The AKP's Engagement With Turkey's Past Crimes: An Analysis Of PM Erdogan's "Dersim Apology"" Available at https://www.academia.edu/3098382/The_AKPs_engagement_with_Turkeys_past_crimes_an_analysis_of_PM_Erdog_ans_Dersim_apology (Accessed on 08.10.2014)

Aytaç, Önder. (2010). "The Democratic Initiative and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey Since 2009". *Turkish Policy Quarterly*. Vol: 9. No:1. pp. 101–116.

Bacık, Gokhan, and Şammas Salur. (2007). "Deconstructing the Multiple Readings of a Terrorist Event in Turkey: The Case of the Council of State (Danıştay) Assault of 2006." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol: 19 No:4 pp. 529-544.

Bacık, Gökhan and Bezen B. Coşkun. (2011). "The PKK problem: explaining Turkey's failure to develop a political solution". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. Vol: 34. No:3. Pp. 248-265.

Bacık, Gökhan. (2015). "How the Arab Spring Transformed Turkey's Kurdish Issue" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*.

Balakian, Peter. (2003). *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*. New York: HarperCollins.

Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. (2006). "Migration Between Greece And Turkey: From The 'Exchange Of Populations' To The Non-Recognition Of Borders." *SEER-South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs*. Vol:3 pp. 115-122.

Bali, Rıfat N. (1999). *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni 1923-1945*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Bali, Rıfat N. (2006). "The Politics Of Turkification During The Single Party Period". In Kieser, L. H. (edt.). *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*. London: I. B. Tauris. pp. 43-49.

Barbero, Jesus-Martin. (1993). "Latin America: Cultures in the communication media". *Journal of Communication*. Vol: 43. No: 2. Pp.18-30.

- Bates, Thomas R. (1975). "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony." *Journal of the History of Ideas*. Vol. 36. No. 2. pp. 351-366.
- Bayır, Derya. (2010). "Negating diversity: minorities and nationalism in Turkish law"(Doctoral Dissertation, Queen Mary University of London).
- Benhabib, Seyla. (1996). "The Democratic Movement and the Problem of Difference" in Benhabib, Seyla (edt.) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. pp. 3–18.
- Benhabib, Seyla. (2001). *Transformations of citizenship: dilemmas of the nation state in the era of globalization: two lectures*. Uitgeverij Van Gorcum.
- Berkes, Niyazi. (1964). *The Development Of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
- Bilge, Suat. A. (1998). "The Fener Greek Patriarchate". *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol: 3. No:1. Pp.1-10.
- Bilgiç, E. E. (2010). "The role of the press in the construction of national identity 1934-1937" (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Bosphorus).
- Billig, Michael. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage Publications
- Bishop, Hywel and Adam Jaworski. (2003). "'We beat'em': nationalism and the hegemony of homogeneity in the British press reportage of Germany versus England during Euro 2000". *Discourse & Society*. Vol: 14. No:3. Pp. 243-271.
- Blommaert, Jan, and Chris Bulcaen. (2000). "Critical discourse analysis". *Annual Review of Anthropology*. Vol: 29. Pp. 447-466.
- Bloom, William. (1990). *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bostancı, Naci. (1996). "Medya-Ulus İlişkisi", *Yeni Türkiye (Medya Özel Sayısı)*. Vol: 12. pp.1539-1542.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1994a). *In Other Words: Essays Towards A Reflexive Sociology*: Cambridge.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1994b). "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field". *Sociological Theory*. Vol:12. No: 1. Pp. 1-18.
- Boyce, Mary. (1970). "On the Calendar of Zoroastrian Feasts". *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*. Vol.33, No.3. pp.513–539

- Bozarslan, Hamit. (2003). "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi (1898-2000)" in Bora, Tanıl (edt.) *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik-Cilt 4*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Pp. 841-870.
- Bozkurt, Gülnihal. (1992). "Review of the Ottoman Legal System". *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*. Vol: 3. Pp. 115-128.
- Breuilly, John. (1982). *Nationalism and the State*. New York: St. Martin’s Press
- Brubaker, Rogers. (1985). "Rethinking classical theory". *Theory and society*. Vol.14. No.6. pp. 745-775.
- Brubaker, Rogers. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers and David D. Laitin. (1998). "Ethnic and nationalist violence." *Annual Review of sociology*. Vol: 24. No.1. pp. 423-452.
- Burak, Begüm. (2010). "Türkiye’nin Siyasal ve Yönetmel Yaşamında 28 Şubat Süreci’nin Yeri Üzerine Bir İnceleme" (Master Dissertation, İstanbul University).
- Burak, Begüm. (2011). "The role of the military in Turkish politics: To guard whom and from what?". *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*. Vol: 4. No:1. Pp. 143-169.
- Burak, Begüm. (2012). "Can Secularism Hinder Democracy? The Turkish Experiment". *İnsan ve Toplum*. Vol. 2. No: 4. Pp. 65-82.
- Çagaptay, Soner. (2006). *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?*. London: Routledge.
- Calhoun, Craig. (1997). *Nationalism*. Buckingham: Open University Press
- Cameron, Deborah. (2001). *Working With Spoken Discourse*: London: Sage.
- Carroll, Patrick. (2006). *Science, Culture, and Modern State Formation*. California: Univ of California Press.
- Caymaz, Birol. (2007). *Türkiye’de vatandaşlık: resmî ideoloji ve yansımaları*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Cemiloglu, Dicle. (2009). "Language policy and national unity: The dilemma of the Kurdish language in Turkey." (Senior honors thesis Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania)
- Cemal, Hasan. (2005). *Kürtler*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

- Chadwick, Henry and Gillian Rosemary Evans. (1987). *Atlas of the Christian church*. London: MacMillan
- Chilton, Paul, Hailong Tian and Ruth Wodak. (2010). "Reflections on discourse and critique in China and the West". *Journal of Language and Politics*. Vol: 9. pp. 489–507
- Chilton, Paul and Christina Schäffner. (eds). (2002). *Politics as text and talk: Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
- Cindoğlu, Dilek and Gizem Zencirci. (2008). "The headscarf in Turkey in the public and state spheres". *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 44. No: 5. pp.791-806.
- Cizre, Ümit. (2008). "The Justice and Development Party and the Military: Recreating the Past after Reforming it?" In Cizre, Ümit (ed.) *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party*. London: Routledge. pp.132-171.
- Connor, Walker. (1972). "Nation-building or nation-destroying?". *World Politics*. Vol: 24. No: 3. pp. 319-355.
- Connor, Walker. (1978). "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a...." *Ethnic and racial studies*. Vol: 1. No: 4. pp. 377-400.
- Conversi, Daniele. (2007). "Homogenisation, nationalism and war: should we still read Ernest Gellner?*" *Nations and Nationalism*. Vol:13. No:3. pp. 371-394.
- Crawshaw, Robert H. and Karin Tusting. (2000). "Style, discourse and choice" In Crawshaw, Robert H. and Karin Tusting (eds.). (2000). *Exploring French Text Analysis: Interpretations of national identity*. London: Routledge. Pp. 3-31
- Curran, James. (2002). *Media and Power*. London: Routledge
- Çaha, Ömer. (2001). "The inevitable coexistence of civil society and liberalism: The case of Turkey". *Journal of Economic and Social Research*. Vol: 3. No:2. pp. 35-50.
- Çaha, Ömer. (2004). "The role of the media in the revival of Alevi identity in Turkey". *Social Identities*. Vol: 10. No:3. pp. 325-338.
- Çakır, Ruşen. (2008). *Mahalle baskısı: Prof. Dr. Şerif Mardin'in tezlerinden hareketle Türkiye'de İslam, cumhuriyet, laiklik ve demokrasi*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Çandar, Cengiz. (2009). "The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the 'Opening'". *Insight Turkey*. Vol: 11. No:4. pp. 13-19.
- Çemrek, Murat. (2004). "How Could the Rights to Education and Representation Challenge National Security? The Headscarf Conflict in Turkey Revisited". *Human Security Perspectives*. Vol: 1 No: 2. Pp. 52-58

- Çınar, Alev. (2005). *Modernity, Islam, and secularism in Turkey: Bodies, places, and time*. Univ. of Minnesota Press.
- Çolak, Yılmaz. (2004). "Language policy and official ideology in early Republican Turkey". *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 40. No: 6. Pp. 67-91.
- De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak. (1999). "The discursive construction of national identities". *Discourse & Society*. Vol. 10. No. 2. pp. 149-173.
- De Swaan, Abram. (2001). "Dyscivilization, mass extermination and the state". *Theory, culture & society*. Vol.18. No.2-3. pp. 265-276.
- Demirler, Derya and Mert Kayhan. (eds). (2006). *Türkiye'de Azınlık Hakları Sorunu: Vatandaşlık ve Demokrasi Eksenli Bir Yaklaşım*. İstanbul: TESEV.
- Denzin, Norman. K. (1978). *The Research Act*. New York: Mcgraw-Hill.
- Deutsch, Karl. W. (1966). *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press
- Deringil, Selim. (1993). "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Vol: 35. No:1. Pp. 3-29.
- Dixon, Jennifer M. (2010). "Defending the Nation? Maintaining Turkey's Narrative of the Armenian Genocide". *South European Society and Politics*. Vol:15. No: 3.pp. 467-485
- Dulger, Ilhan. (2004). "Case study on Turkey rapid coverage for compulsory education program" *conference on scaling up poverty reduction, Shanghai, China*. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTURKEY/Resources/361616-1142415001082/Compulsory_Education_by_Dulger.pdf(Accessed on04.09.2014).
- Duran, Ragıp. (2003). *Türk Medyası Neden Savaş Yanlısı. Savaş ve Medya*. Eskişehir: ILAD.
- Dursun, Çiler (edt.). (2004). *Haber Hakikat Ve İktidar İlişkisi*. Ankara: Elips Kitap.
- Dursun, Çiler. (2006). "The Struggle Goes On: The Discursive Strategies Of The Islamist Press In Turkey". *Journal Of Contemporary European Studies*. Vol: 14. No: 2. pp. 161-182.
- Dündar, Fuat. (2001). *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanlar İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Eagleton, Terry. (1991). *Ideology: An Introduction*. London: Verso.

- Efe, İbrahim. (2012). "Critical Discourse Analysis of Kemalism and Islamism in Turkish Newspapers: the 2008 Indictment Case and the 28 February National Security Council Meeting" (Doctoral Dissertation, Lancaster University)
- Ekşigil, Adnan. (2009). "Patrik ve Sabır Taşı". Available at <http://www.acikgazete.com/yazarlar/adnan-eksigil/2009/12/31/patrik-ve-sabir-tasi.htm?aid=32942> (Accessed on 16.09.2014).
- Elias, Norbert. (1994). *The Civilising Process. The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*. Oxford: Blackwell
- Elmas, Esra and Dilek Kurban. (2011). *Communicating Democracy-Democratizing Communication. Media in Turkey: Legislation, Policies, Actors*. TESEV Democratization Program Media Studies Series –1 Imak Ofset.
- Elver, Hilal. (2008). "Lawfare and Wearfare in Turkey". *Middle East Report* (April 2008). Available at <http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/elverINT.html> (Accessed on 04.09.2014).
- Ergil, Doğu. (2012). *FethullahGülen & The Gülen Movement in 100 Questions*. New York: Bluedome Press.
- Erickson, Edward J. (2008). "The Armenians and Ottoman military policy, 1915". *War in History*. Vol:15. No:2. Pp. 141-167.
- Fairclough, Norman L. (1995). *Media Discourse*. London: Arnold
- Fairclough, Norman L. (2003). *Analysing Discourse Textual Analysis For Social Research*. New York: Routledge.
- Fairclough, Norman L. and Ruth Wodak. (1997). "Critical discourse analysis". In Van Dijk, Teun A. (edt.). *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction. Vol. 2. Discourse as Social Interaction*. London: Sage. pp. 258-284.
- Femia, Joseph V. (1983). "Gramsci's patrimony." *British Journal of Political Science*. Vol:13. No: 3 pp. 327-364.
- Feroz, Ahmad. (2002). *The making of modern Turkey*. London: Routledge.
- Feroze, Muhammad R. (1976). *Islam And Secularism In Post-Kemalist Turkey*. Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute.
- Firat, Ümit. (2009). "Kar Kurttan TRT Sese". *Birikim*. February 2009. Pp. 87-88.
- Fog, Agner. (2004). "The supposed and the real role of mass media in modern democracy". *Working paper*. Available at: <http://www.agner.org/cultsel/mediacrisis.pdf> (Accessed on 05.09.2014).
- Fontana, Benedetto. (2005). "The Democratic Philosopher: Rhetoric as Hegemony in Gramsci". *Italian Culture*. Vol: 23. No: 1. pp. 97-123.

- Forchtner, Bernhard. (2011). "Critique, The Discourse–Historical Approach and the Frankfurt School". *Critical Discourse Studies*. Vol: 8 No:1 pp. 1-14.
- Foster, Robert John. (ed.).(1997). *Nation Making: Emergent identities in postcolonial Melanesia*. Ann Harbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Fowler, Roger. (1991). *Language in the News*. London & New York: Routledge
- Foucault, Michel. (1977). *Language Counter – Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews*. (ed.) Donald F. Bouchard. London: Basic Blackwell
- Foucault, Michel. (1979). *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Foucault, Michel. (1981). *History of Sexuality*. Vol:1. Harmondswonh: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, Michel. (1982). "The Subject and Power". in Dreyfus, Hubert and Paul Rabinow (eds.). *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 208-226.
- Foucault, Michel. (1984). "The Order of Discourse". in Shapiro, Martin (ed.). *Language and Politics*. London: Blackwell. Pp. 108-138.
- Foucault, Michel. (1991). "Governmentality". In Burchell, G, C. Gordon and and P. Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. London: Harvester. Pp. 87-104.
- Fritz, Verena and Alina Rocha Menocal. (2007). "Understanding State-Building from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement". London: Overseas Development Institute. pp.1-71 Available at <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1979.pdf> (Accessed on October 5, 2013)
- Gaventa, John. (2003). *Power after Lukes: a review of the literature*. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies
- Geertz, Clifford. (1963). "The integrative revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states". In Geertz, Clifford (ed.) *Old societies and new states: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*. New York: Free Press. Pp. 107-113.
- Gellner, Ernest. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. (1985). *The nation-state and violence*. United States: Univ of California Press.
- Gitlin, Todd. (1980). *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking Of The New Left*. Univ of California Press.
- Gorski, Philip. (2003). *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Göksel, Aslı and Celia Kerslake. (2009). *Turkish: A Comprehensive Grammar* (2nd Ed.). New York: Routledge
- Göle, Nilüfer. (1996). *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization And Veiling*. Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press
- Göle, Nilüfer. (2002). "Islam in public: New visibilities and new imaginaries". *Public Culture*. Vol: 14. pp. 173–190
- Gramsci, Antonio. (1971). *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*. Hoare, Quintin and Geoffrey N. Smith (eds. & trans.). New York: International Publishers.
- Greenfeld, Liah. (1992). *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. and Tugba Gürcel. (2014). "Religious Courses in Turkish Public Education: Explaining Domestic Change with Europeanization Theory". *Journal of Church and State*. Vol: 56. No: 2. pp. 300-322.
- Günay, Niyazi. (2001). "Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations: A Scorecard". *Research Notes*. May, No:10. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Gunter, Michael M. (1997). *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*. USA: St.Martin's Press
- Gunter, Michael M. (2000). "The continuing Kurdish problem in Turkey after Öcalan's capture". *Third World Quarterly*. Vol: 21. No:5. Pp.849-869.
- Gürbüz, Mustafa E. (2009). "Over the bodies of the T-Girls: The headscarf ban as a secular effort to monopolize Islam in Turkey". *Middle East Critique*. Vol: 18. No:3. Pp. 231-249.
- Gurevitch, Michael and Mark R. Levy. (eds). (1985). *Mass communication review yearbook*. Sage Publications Inc.
- Gurevitch, Michael and Jay G. Blumler. (1990). "Political communication systems and democratic values." In Lichtenberg, Judith. (edt.). *Democracy and the mass media*. Cambridge University Press. Pp.269-289.
- Gürkan, Nilgün. (1998). *Türkiye'de demokrasiye geçişte basın (1945-1950)* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları
- Güven, Dilek. (2011). "Riots against the Non-Muslims of Turkey: 6/7 September 1955 in the context of demographic engineering". *European Journal of Turkish Studies*.
- Güvenir, Murat O. (1991). *2. Dünya savaşında Türk basını: siyasal iktidarın basını denetlemesi ve yönlendirmesi*. Erdini Basım ve Yayınevi.

Güzeldere, Ekrem E. (2009). "Turkey: Regional elections and the Kurdish question". *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*. Vol: 3. No:3. Pp 291-306.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1971). Reflections on the Linguistic Foundations of Sociology: The Christian Gauss Lecture. In (2001). *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction. Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Pp. 1-103.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1989). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, Stuart. (1982). "The rediscovery of 'ideology': Return of the repressed in media studies". In Guveritch, M. T. Bennett, J. Curran, & J. Woollacott. (eds.). *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen. pp. 56-90.

Hall, Stuart. (1996). "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" In Hall, Stuart and Paul Du Gay. (eds.). *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London: Sage. Pp. 1-17.

Halliday, Michael A. K. and Christian Matthiessen. (2004). *An Introduction To Functional Grammar*. London: Hoddereducation.

Hartley, John. (1993). *Understanding News*. (2nd. Ed.). London and New York: Routledge

Hayes, C.J. H. (1926). *Essays on Nationalism*. New York: The Macmillan Company

Heater, Derek. (1999). *What is Citizenship?* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press

Heper, Metin. (1985). *The State Tradition in Turkey*. Northgate: The Eothen Press.

Heper, Metin and Tanel Demirel. (1996). "The press and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey". *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 32. No: 2. Pp.109-123.

Herman, E. S. and Noam Chomsky. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Heywood, Andrew. (1994). *Political ideas and concepts: An introduction*. New York: St. Martin's Press

Hobsbawm, Eric. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Holmes, Stephen. (1991). "Liberal constraints on private power?" in Lichtenberg, Judith. (edt.). *Democracy and the Mass Media*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 21-65.

Hroch, Miroslav. (1993). "From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe". *New Left Review*. No:198. No: 1. Pp. 3-20.

Hutchinson, John. (2006). "Hot and banal nationalism: the nationalization of 'the masses'" in Gerard, Delanty and Krishan Kumar. (eds.). *The SAGE handbook of nations and nationalism*. London: Sage. pp. 295-306.

Hürriyet Newspaper, May 1, 1948

Hürriyet Newspaper, July 1, 1994

İçduygu, Ahmet. (1996). *Citizenship at the Crossroads: Immigration and the Nation State. Globalization: Theory and Practice*. New York: Pinter.

Ignatow, Gabriel. (2008). "Transnational environmentalism at Europe's boundaries: identity movements in Lithuania and Turkey". *Current Sociology*. Vol:56. No:6. Pp. 845–864

İlyasoğlu, Aynur. (1999). "Islamist Women in Turkey". In Arat, Zehra F. (ed.) *Deconstructing images of 'The Turkish Woman'* New York: St. Martin's Press. pp.241-261.

İnce, Başak. (2012). *Citizenship and Identity in Turkey: From Atatürk's Republic to the Present Day*. New York: IB Tauris.

İnceoğlu, Yasemin and N. A. Çomak. (2009). *Metin Çözümlemeleri*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları

İzady, Mehrdad. (1992). *The Kurds A Concise History And Fact Book*. Dallas: Taylor& Francis.

Jeltjakov, A. D. (1979). *Türkiye'nin Sosyo-Politik Ve Kültürel Hayatında Basın*. Ankara: Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Müdürlüğü.

Jorgensen, Marianne W. and Louise J. Phillips. (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. London: Sage.

Kabacalı, Alpay. (2000). *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*: İstanbul: Literatür Yayıncılık.

Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. (1999). *Cumhuriyet İdaresi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. (2007). "Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience" *Citizenship studies*. Vol. 74. No. 4. pp. 283-299.

Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. (2010). "The pathologies of Turkish republican laicism". *Philosophy & Social Criticis*. Vol: 36 No:3-4. Pp. 489-504.

Kaleli, Lütfi. (2000). *Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri*. İstanbul: Can Yayınları.

Kalman, Mete. (1995). *Belge ve Tanıklarıyla Dersim Direnişleri*. İstanbul: Nujen Yayınları.

Kaplan, Sam. (2006). *The pedagogical state: Education and the politics of national culture in post-1980 Turkey*. Stanford University Press.

Karakaş, Cemal. (2007). "Turkey: Islam and Laicism Between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society". Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Report. Available at <http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif78.pdf> (Accessed on 20.05.2014).

Karaosmanoğlu, Kerem. (2010). "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and after the AKP". *Insight Turkey*. Vol: 12. No:2. Pp. 193-212.

Karasipahi, Sena. (2008). *Muslims in modern Turkey: Kemalism, modernism and the revolt of the Islamic intellectuals*. New York: IB Tauris.

Kaya, Raşit and Barış Çakmur. (2010). "Politics and the mass media in Turkey". *Turkish Studies*. Vol: 11. No:4. Pp. 521-537.

Kazamias, Andreas M. (1966). *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*. Chicago:University of Chicago Press

Keane, John. (1991). *The Media and Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Kendall, Gavin. (2007). "What Is Critical Discourse Analysis?". In *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* Available at <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/255/561> (Accessed on 08.10.2014).

Keyman, E. Fuat. (2010). "Turkey, transformation and the left media". *Turkish Studies*. Vol:11. No: 4. Pp. 539-553.

Kirişçi, Kemal. (2000). "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices" *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 36. No: 3. pp.1-22.

Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur. (1981). "1919-1938 Dönemi Basınına Toplu Bakış". *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Basın Yayın Yüksek Okulu Yıllığı*. No: VI. pp.95-127.

Koçan, Gürcan and Ahmet Öncü. (2004). "Citizen Alevi in Turkey: beyond confirmation and denial". *Journal of Historical Sociology*. Vol: 17 No:4 pp. 464-489.

Kohn, Hans. (1944). *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New York: Macmillan

Koloğlu, Orhan. (1994). *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Korkmaz, Esat. (1997). *Alevilere Saldırıları*. İstanbul: Pencere Yayınları.

Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, Berrin. (2011). "On the question of Islam and Nationalism in Turkey:

- Sources and Discourses” In Kadoğlu, Ayşe and Fuat Keyman (eds.) *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*. The University of Utah Press. Pp. 133-161
- Köker, Levent. (2010). “A Key to The ‘Democratic Opening’: Rethinking Citizenship, Ethnicity and Turkish Nation-State”. *Insight Turkey*. Vol: 12. No:2 pp.49-69.
- Köse, Talha. (2010). “The AKP and the ‘Alevi Opening’: Understanding the Dynamics of the Rapprochement”. *Insight Turkey*. Vol: 12. No:2. Pp. 143-164.
- Köse, Talha. (2012). “Ideological or religious? Contending visions on the future of Alevi identity”. *Identities*. Vol: 19. No:5. Pp. 576-596.
- Köse, Talha. (2013). “Between Nationalism, Modernism and Secularism: The Ambivalent Place of ‘Alevi Identities’”. *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 49. No: 4. Pp. 590-607.
- Kramer, Heinz. (2000). *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kress, Gunther. (1990). “Critical discourse analysis”. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*. Vol:11. pp. 84-99.
- Kurban, Dilek and Kezban Hatemi. (2009). “The Story of Alien(ation): Real Estate Ownership Problems of Non-Muslim Foundations and Communities in Turkey”. TESEV Democratization Program Report. Istanbul: TESEV.
- Kurban, Dilek. (2012). “Legal recognition of Alevi places of worship” News Report. Migration Policy Group. Available at http://www.non-discrimination.net/content/media/TR-3-Turkish%20Court%20of%20Cassation%20rules%20against%20Alevi%20worship%20houses.docx_.pdf(Accessed on 29.08.2014).
- Kurban, Dilek. (2013). “Report On Measures To Combat Discrimination Directives” Country Report 2013
- Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. *University of Chicago*.
- Lasswell, Harold D. (1948). “The structure and function of communication in society”. in Bryson, L. (ed.). *The Communication of Ideas*. New York: Harper & Co. Pp. 37-51
- Lemke, Jay. (1995). *Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Levinson, Stephen C. (1983). *Pragmatics*: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. (1968). *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. London: Oxford University Press.

Loveman, Mara. (2005). "The Modern State and the Primitive Accumulation of Symbolic Power". *American Journal of Sociology*. Vol: 110. No:6. Pp. 1651-1683.

Macar, Elçin. (2003). *İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Macar, Elçin and Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı. (2009). *Discussions And Recommendations On The Future Of The Halki Seminary*. TESEV.

Maksudyan, Nazan. (2005). "The Turkish review of anthropology and the racist face of Turkish nationalism". *Cultural Dynamics*. Vol: 17. No:3. Pp. 291-322.

Mango, Andrew. (2011). *Ataturk*. UK: Hachette

Marcus, Aliza. (1996). "Should I Shoot You?: An Eyewitness Account of an Alevi Uprising in Gazi". *Middle East Report*. No: 199. Pp. 24-26.

Mardin, Şerif. (1973). "Center-periphery relations: A key to Turkish politics?". *Daedalus*. Vol: 102. No:1. Pp. 169-190.

Marshall, Thomas H. (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marvin, Carolyn and David W. Ingle. (1996). "Blood sacrifice and the nation: Revisiting civil religion". *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*. Vol: 64. No:4. Pp.767-780

Massicard, Elise. (2013). "Democratization on Turkey? Insights from the Alevi issue" in Rodriguez, Carmen. et al. (eds.). *Turkey's Democratization Process*. New York: Routledge. Pp. 376-390

McCrone, David and Richard Kiely. (2000). "Nationalism and citizenship". *Sociology*. Vol: 34. No: 1. pp. 19-34.

McDowall, David. (1996). *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London and New York: I.B.Tauris

Meinecke, Friedrich. (1970) [1907]. *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Melikoff, İrene. (1998). *Hacı Bektaş: Efsaneden Gerçeğe*. (Trans. Turan Alptekin). İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları.

Montgomery, Martin. (1995). *An introduction to language and society*. London: Routledge.

Mouffe, Chantal. (1993). *The Return of the Political*. London: Verso

Mylonas, Harris. (2007). "A Theory of Nation-Building Assimilation and Its Alternatives in Southeastern Europe". Paper prepared for presentation at the 3rd Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece: Structures, Context

and Challenges, LSE (June 14-15 2007). Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/MYLONAS_HARRIS.pdf (Accessed on 29.09.2014).

Mylonas, Harris. (2013). *The Politics Of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities*. Cambridge University Press.

Neumann, Iver B. (1999). *Use of Other: The East in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota.

Neyzi, Leyla. (2004). *Ben Kimim? Türkiye’de Sözlü Tarih, Kimlik, Öznellik*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Norman, Wayne. (2006). *Negotiating Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ntokme, Outkou Kirli. (2010). “The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul and the Heybeliada Theological School (Halki Seminary): History, Discussions and JDP Government’s Policy”. *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*. Vol: 41. Pp. 31-58

Oberhumer, Florian. (2008). “Dissemination and Implementation of Political Concepts”. In Wodak, Ruth and Veronika Koller (eds.). *Handbook of Communication in the Public Sphere*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Pp. 271-290.

Öktem, Faik. (1987). *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*. (Trans. Geoffrey Cox). London: Croom Helm.

Oldfield, Adrian. (1998). “Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World”. In Shafir, Gershon. (ed.). *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. Pp. 75-91.

O’Neil, Patrick H. (1998). “Democratization and Mass Communication: What Is the Link”. in O’Neil, Patrick H. (Ed.). *Communicating Democracy: The Media & Political Transitions*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Oran, Baskın. (2004). *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Oran, Baskın. (2007). *Solun Bağımsız Sesi*. İstanbul: Roll Kitapları

Öncü, Ayşe. (1995). “Packaging Islam: cultural politics on the landscape of Turkish commercial television”. *Public Culture*. Vol: 8. No: 1. Pp.51-71.

Özbudun, Ergun. (1992). *1921 Anayasası*. Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Arastırma Merkezi.

Özcan, Ali K. (2006). *Turkey’s Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*. London and New York: Routledge

Özdalga, Elisabeth. (1998). *The veiling issue, official secularism and popular Islam in modern Turkey*. Surrey: Curzon.

Özerkan, Şengül. (edt.). (2009). *Haber Analizi Ve Arşiv İncelemeleriyle Türkiye'de 9 Gazete*. İstanbul; Ankara: Nobel Yayın

Özkan, Burcu. (2008). "Hat and Dress Revolution According to the Press"

Özkır, Yusuf. (2011). "27 Mayıs'tan 27 Nisan'a Asker-Gazeteci İlişkisi". *Turkish Journal of Business Ethics*. Vol: 4. No: 8.Pp.91-114.

Özkır, Yusuf. (2013). "Hürriyet Gazetesi'nin Kimliği". *Iğdir University Journal of SocialSciences*. Vol:3. Pp.45-70

Özkırımlı, Umut. (2005). *Contemporary debates on nationalism: A critical engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pak, Soon-Yong. (2004). "Articulating the Boundary between Secularism and Islamism: The Imam-Hatip Schools of Turkey". *Anthropology & education quarterly*. Vol: 35. No: 3. Pp. 324-344.

Parla, Taha and Andrew Davison. (2004). *Corporatist ideology in Kemalist Turkey: progress or order?* Syracuse University Press.

Parlak, İsmet. (2009). "Türk Yazılı Basınında Batı Kimliğinin İnşası: Karikatür Krizi Örneği". In Parlak, İsmet (edt.). *Medyada Gerçekliğin İnşası*. Konya: Çizgi.

Parlar, Suat. (1997). *Silahlı Bürokrasinin Ekonomi Politikası*. İstanbul: Bibliotek Yayınları.

Patnaik, Arun. (1988). "Gramsci's Concept of Common Sense: Towards a Theory of Subaltern Consciousness in Hegemony Processes". *Economic and Political Weekly*. Vol. 23. No:1. pp. 12-18

Pearson, David. (2001). *The politics of ethnicity in settler societies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Sanat Dergisi. (1993). No: 6:7

Poggi, Gianfranco. (1978). *The Development of The Modern State: A sociological Introduction*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pöllmann, Andreas. (2009). "Formal education and intercultural capital: towards attachment beyond narrow ethnonational boundaries?". *Educational Studies*. Vol. 35. No:5. pp. 537-545

Prodromou, Elizabeth H. (2005). "Turkey between Secularism and Fundamentalism?: The 'Muslimhood Model' and the Greek Orthodox Minority". *The Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs*. Vol: 3. No:1. Pp. 11-22.

- Quasthoff, Uta. (1987). "Linguistic prejudice/stereotypes". *Sociolinguistics*. Vol:1. Pp. 785-799.
- Quine, Maria-Sophia. (2013). *Population politics in twentieth century europe: fascist dictatorships and liberal democracies*. London: Routledge.
- Rabinow, Paul. (ed.). (1991). *The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault's thought*. London: Penguin
- Rabinow, Paul and Nikolas Rose. (2006). "Biopower today". *BioSocieties*. Vol.1. No:2. Pp.195-217.
- Ranger, Terence and Eric Hobsbawm. (ed.). (1983). *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak. (2001). *Discourse And Discrimination. Rhetorics Of Racism and Anti-Semitism*. London: Routledge.
- Reisigl, Martin and Ruth Wodak. (2009). "The Discourse-Historical Approach". In Wodak, Ruth and M. Meyer (Eds.). *Methods Of Critical Discourse Analysis* (2nd Ed.). London: Sage. Pp. 87-121.
- Reisigl, Martin. (2011). "Argumentation Analysis In Critical Discourse Studies". Paper Presented In The Workshop Of Language, Ideology And Power Research Group. Lancaster University. 20.11.2011.
- Renan, Ernest. (1882). "What is a nation?" Reprinted In Bhabha, HK (ed.). (1990). *Nation and narration*. New York: Routledge. Pp.8-22
- Rokkan, Stein. (1971). "Nation-Building: A review of models and approaches". *Current sociology*. Vol: 19. No: 3. Pp. 7-38.
- Sadock, Jerrold.M. (1971). "Queclaratives". In *Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*. Chicago Linguistics Society. pp. 223-232.
- Saktanber, Ayşe and Gül Çorbacıoğlu. (2008). "Veiling and headscarf-skepticism in Turkey". *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*. Vol: 15. No: 4. Pp. 514-538.
- Sarıbay, Yaşar A. (1991). "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960" in Heper, Metin & J. M. Landau. (eds). *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*. London: Tauris. Pp.119-133.
- Schlesinger, Philip. (1991). *Media, State, and Nation, Political Violence and Collective Identities*. London: Sage
- Schlesinger, Philip. (2000). "Nation and Communicative Space". In Tumber, Howard. (ed.). *Media Power Professionals and Policy*. London and New York: Routledge. Pp. 99-115

- Schiller, Herbert. (1993). *Zihin Yönlendirenler*. (Trans. Cevdet Cerit). İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları
- Schramm, Wilbur Lang. (1964). *Mass Media and National Development: The Role Of Information in The Developing Countries*. Stanford University Press.
- Schudson, Michael. (2002). “News, public, nation”. *The American Historical Review*. Vol: 107. No: 2. Pp. 481-495.
- Scott, James. (1998). *Seeing Like a State*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.
- Semino, Elena. (2008). *Metaphor in Discourse*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sen, Amartya. (1999). “Democracy as a Universal Value”. *Journal of Democracy*. Vol:10. No: 3. Pp. 3-17
- Sezgin, Dilara and Melissa A. Wall. (2005). “Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish press: a case study of Hürriyet newspaper”. *Media, Culture & Society*. Vol: 27. No:5 pp. 787-798.
- Sheridan, Alan. (1980). *Michel Foucault: The Genealogy of Power*. London: Tavistock
- Shively, Kim. (2005). “Religious Bodies and the Secular State: The Merve Kavakçı Affair”. *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*. Vol: 1. No: 3. pp. 46-72
- Shively, Kim. (2008). “Taming Islam: Studying Religion in Secular Turkey”. *Anthropological Quarterly*. Vol: 81. No: 3. Pp. 683-711.
- Smith, Anthony D. (1991). *National Identity*. Reno: University of Nevada Press
- Smith, Anthony D. (2001). *Nationalism. Theory, Ideology, History*. Oxford: Polity Press
- Somer, Murat. (2010). “Media values and democratization: What unites and what divides religious-conservative and pro-secular elites?”. *Turkish Studies*. Vol:11. Pp. 555-577
- Şeker, Nesim. (2007). “Demographic Engineering in the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians”. *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 43. No: 3. Pp.461-474.
- Stefanov, Svetoslav. (1997). “Millet system in the Ottoman empire-example for oppression or for tolerance?” *Bulgarian Historical Review-Revue Bulgare D Histoire*. Vol: 2. No: 3. Pp. 138-142.
- Taylor, Dianna. (2009). “Normativity and normalization”. *Foucault Studies*. Vol: 7. pp. 45-63.
- Tekin, Alp. (1928). *Türkleştirme*. İstanbul:Resimli Ay Matbaası.

Tekin, Beyza Ç. (2010). *Representations And Othering In Discourse: The Construction Of Turkey In The EU Context*. London: John Benjamins Publishing.

The Economist. (2012). June 9.

Thompson, John B. (1984). *Studies in the theory of ideology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Thompson, Neil. (2003). *Communication and language: A Handbook of Theory and Practice*. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Tılıç, Doğan L. (2009). *Utaniyorum Ama Gazeteciyim Türkiye Ve Yunanistan'da Gazetecilik*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları

Toktaş, Şule. (2005). "Citizenship and minorities: A historical overview of Turkey's Jewish minority". *Journal of historical sociology*. Vol: 18 No:4. Pp. 394-429.

Toktaş, Sule and Bülent Aras. (2009). "The EU and minority rights in Turkey". *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol: 124. No: 4. Pp. 697-720.

Topuz, Hıfzı. (2003). *II. Mahmud'tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.

Torring, Jacob. (1999). *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Tunaya, Tarık Z. (1952). *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952*. İstanbul: Doğan Kardeş

Tunç, Aslı. (2010). "Mediated Justice: Turkish Newspapers' Coverage of Controversial Criminal Cases". *Turkish Studies*. Vol: 11 No:4. Pp. 643-661.

Ulusoy, Kıvanç. (2011). "The European Impact on State-Religion Relations in Turkey: Political Islam, Alevis and Non-Muslim Minorities". *Australian Journal of Political Science*. Vol: 46. No:3. Pp.407-423.

Uslu, Emrullah. (2008). "Ulusalçılık: The Neo-nationalist Resurgence in Turkey". *Turkish Studies*. Vol: 9. No: 1. Pp. 73-97.

Utz, Raphael. (2005). "Nations, Nation-Building, and Cultural Intervention: A Social Science Perspective". In Bogdandy, A. Von and R. Wolfrum, (eds.). *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*. Brill N.V. Volume 9, pp. 615-647.

Üngör, Ü. Uğur. (2008). "Seeing like a nation-state: Young Turk social engineering in Eastern Turkey, 1913-50". *Journal of Genocide Research*. Vol. 10. No. 1. pp. 15-39.

Üstel, Füsun. (2011). *'Makbul vatandaş' in peşinde: II. Meşrutiyet'ten bugüne Türkiye'de vatandaş eğitimi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Van Bruinessen, Martin. (1992). *Agha, Shaikh, and State - The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*. USA: Zed Books.
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. (1996). "Kurds, Turks, and the Alevi Revival in Turkey." *Middle East Report*. No: 200. Pp. 7-10.
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. (2000). "Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan." In Van Bruinessen, M. (ed.). *Kurdish Ethnonationalism Versus Nation-Building States*. Istanbul: The ISIS Press.
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. (2001). *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik, Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*. (Trans. Hakan Yurdakul). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Van Der Valk, Ineke. (2003). "Right-wing parliamentary discourse on immigration in France". *Discourse & Society*. Vol: 14. No: 3. Pp. 309-348.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1987). *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. New York: Academic Press.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1993). *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1996). "Power and the news media". In Platz, D. L. (ed.). *Political Communication in Action*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Pp.9-36
- Van Dijk, T.A. (2000). Ideology and discourse. (ed. española en Ariel, 2003). Available at <http://www.discourses.org/UnpublishedArticles/Ideology%20and%20discourse.pdf> (Accessed on 15.08.2014)
- Van Dijk, T.A. (2001a). "Discourse, Ideology and Context". *Folia LinguisticaXXX*. Vol:1-2. (Special issue, ed. R. Wodak.). pp. 11-40.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2001b). "Critical Discourse Analysis". In Schiffrin, D, D. Tannen and H. E. Hamilton (eds.). *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Malden, Mass:Blackwell. pp. 352-71.
- Van Dijk, T. A. (2008). "Critical Discourse Analysis And Nominalization: Problem Or Pseudo-Problem?". *Discourse & Society*. Vol: 19. No: 6. Pp. 821-828.
- Van Leeuwen, Theo. (2008). *Discourse And Practice: New Tools For Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Varouhakis, Miron. (2009). "Greek intelligence and the capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999". *Studies in Intelligence*. Vol: 53.No:1. Pp. 1-7.
- Vojdik, Valorie K. (2010). "Politics of the headscarf in Turkey: masculinities, feminism, and the construction of collective identities". *Harv. JL & Gender*. Vol: 33. Pp.661-685

- Voloshinov, Valentin. N. (1973). *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. New York: Seminar Press.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1998). *Liberalizmden Sonra*. (Trans. Erol Öz). İstanbul: Metis
- Weber, Eugen. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Weber, Max. (1964). *Theory of Social & Economic Organisation*. New York: The Free Press.
- Weber, Max. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. California: Univ. of California Press.
- Weiss, Gilbert. (2002). "Searching for Europe: The Problem of Legitimization and Representation in recent political speeches on Europe". *Journal of Language and Politics*. Vol: 1. No: 1. Pp. 59-83
- Wodak, Ruth and Gilbert Weiss. (2003). "Introduction; Theory, Interdisciplinarity And Critical Discourse Analysis". In Weiss, Gilbert and R.Wodak (eds.). *Critical Discourse Analysis Theory And Interdisciplinarity* London: Palgrave/Macmillan. Pp.1-34.
- Wodak, Ruth and Gilbert Weiss. (2004). "Visions, ideologies and utopias in the discursive construction of European identities: organizing, representing and legitimizing Europe". In Van Aertselaer, J.A Neff and T.A. Van Dijk (eds.). *Communicating Ideologies: Language, Discourse and Social Practice*. Frankfurt am Mein: Peter Lang. Pp. 225-252.
- Wodak, Ruth and Gilbert Weiss. (2005). "Analyzing European Union Discourses: Theories and Applications". In Wodak, Ruth and Paul Chilton (eds.). *A New Agenda In (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology And Interdisciplinarity*. Amstredam/Philedelphia: John Benjamins Publishing. Pp. 121-135.
- Wodak, Ruth. (1990). "The Waldheim Affair And Antisemitic Prejudice In Austrian Public Discourse". *Patterns Of Prejudice*. Vol: 24. No:2-4. pp. 18-33.
- Wodak, Ruth. (1995). "Critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis". In Verschuren, J. J.O. Ostaman and J. Blommaert (eds.). *Handbook of pragmatics*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. pp. 204-210.
- Wodak, Ruth. (1996). *Disorders Of Discourse*. London: Longman.
- Wodak, Ruth. (1999). "Critical discourse analysis at the end of the 20th century." *Research on Language & Social Interaction* Vol: 32. No: 1-2 pp. 185-193.
- Wodak, Ruth. (2000). "Does sociolinguistics need social theory? New perspectives on critical discourse analysis". *Discourse & Society*. Vol: 2. No:3. pp. 123-147.

- Wodak, Ruth. (2001). "The Discourse-Historical Approach". In Wodak, Ruth & M. Meyer (eds.). *Methods Of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage. pp 63-95.
- Wodak, Ruth. (2002). "Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis". *Zeitschrift für Angewandte Linguistik*. Vol: 36. pp. 5-31.
- Wodak, Ruth and Anton Pelinka (edt.). (2002). *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*. Transaction Publishers.
- Wodak, Ruth. (2006). "Discourse Analytic and Socio-linguistic Approaches to the Study of Nation(alism)". In Delanty, Gerard and Krishan Kumar. (eds.). *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Sage. Pp. 104-117
- Wodak, Ruth and Michal Kryzanowski. (eds.). (2008). *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in The Social Sciences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wodak, Ruth. (2008). "'Us' and 'Them': Inclusion/Exclusion – Discrimination via Discourse" in Delanty G, P. Jones & Ruth Wodak (eds.) *Migration, Identity, and Belonging*. Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press. Pp. 54-78
- Wodak, Ruth. (2009). *The Discourse of Politics in Action: Politics As Usual*. London: Palgrave
- Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer. (eds.). (2009). *Methods for critical discourse analysis*. London: Sage.
- Wodak, Ruth and Michael Meyer. (2009). "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology". In Wodak, Ruth and M. Meyer. (eds.). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage. Pp. 1-33.
- Wodak, Ruth, R. D. Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart. (2009). *The Discursive Construction Of National Identity*. (2nd Ed.). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press
- Wuthrich, Michael. (2010). "Commercial Media, the Military, and Society in Turkey during Failed and Successful Interventions". *Turkish Studies*. Vol. 11. No. 2. Pp.217–234.
- Yanik, Lerna K. (2006). "'Nevruz' or 'Newroz'? Deconstructing the 'invention' of a Contested Tradition in Contemporary Turkey". *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol: 42. No:2. Pp. 285-302,
- Yavuz, Hakan M. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press
- Yeğen, Mesut. (1999). *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları
- Yeğen, Mesut. (2006). *Müstakbel-Türk'ten sözde-vatandaşa: Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

- Yeğen, Mesut. (2009). “‘Prospective-Turks’ or ‘Pseudo-Citizens’: Kurds in Turkey”. *The Middle East Journal*. Vol: 63. No:4. Pp. 597-615
- Yıldız, Ahmet. (2003). “Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook” . *The Muslim World*. Vol: 93. No:2. Pp. 187-209.
- Yıldız, Ahmet. (2004). *Ne mutlu Türküm diyebilene: Türk ulusal kimliğinin etno-seküler sınırları. 1919-1938*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Yıldız, Nuran. (2007). *Tanklar ve Sözcükler*. İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları.
- Yılmaz, Hakan. “Laiklik: Türkiye’deki Uygulamaları, Avrupa ile Kıyaslamalar, Politika Önerileri” <http://www.bilgesam.org/Images/Dokumanlar/0-180-2014040932rapor9.pdf> (Accessed on 21.01.2015).
- Yılmaz, İhsan and Begüm Burak. (2011). “Instrumentalist Use of Journalism in Imposing the Kemalist Hegemonic Worldview and Educating the Masses in the Early Republican Period”. *Turkish Journal of Politics*. Vol:2. No:1. Pp. 109-120
- Yılmaz, İhsan. (2009). “Cumhuriyet’in ilk Yıllarında bir Modernleştirme Aracı Olarak Gazetelerin Duruşu”. *Journal of Academic Studies*. Vol: 40. Pp. 183-194.
- Yılmaz, İhsan. (2012). “Towards a Muslim Secularism? An Islamic ‘Twin Tolerations’ Understanding of Religion in the Public Sphere”. *Turkish Journal of Politics*. Vol: 3. No: 2. Pp.41-52
- Yılmaz, Saadet. (2009). “Turkish Journalists as the ‘Chivalry’ of Democracy. The Case of the Co-emergence of Democrat Party and Turkish Journalists’ Association in 1946”. *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*. Vol:2. No:2. Pp.145-160
- Yumul, Arus and Umut Özkırımlı. (2000). “Reproducing The Nation: Banal Nationalism İn The Turkish Press”. *Media, Culture & Society*. Vol. 22. No: 6. pp. 787-804.
- Yüce, Can. (1997). *Doğu’da Yükselen Güneş*. Vol. I, Köln: Weşanên Serxwebun
- Žagar, Igor. (2010). “Topoi in critical discourse analysis”. *Lodz Papers in Pragmatics*. Vol:6.No:1 pp. 3-27.
- Zelyut, Rıza. (1993). *Aleviler Ne Yapmalı?: Şehirlerdeki Alevilerin Sorunları, Çözümleri*. İstanbul: Yön Yayıncılık.
- Zurcher, Erik. J. (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*. London and New York: IB Tauris.

Internet Resources

The circulation table of the newspapers in Turkey <http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj>
(Accessed on 24.12.2013 and 19.09.2014)

The web page of The Turkish Journalists' Association <http://www.tgc.org.tr/>
(Accessed on 08.10.2014)

“Journalist Birgit confesses to active role in 1960 coup d’etat”
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=240167
(Accessed on 10.07.2013)

Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “What does Erdoğan’s democratization package offer Kurds, minorities?” <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/democratization-package-kurds-turkey-minorities.html> (Accessed on 16.07.2013)

“Dogan v.s. Erdogan Turkey’s biggest media group gets a colossal tax fine”
<http://www.economist.com/node/14419403> (Accessed on 27.08.2013)

The circulation table of the newspapers in Turkey between November 3 and November 9 2014 <http://www.medyatava.com/tiraj> (Accessed on 17.11.2014)

The Corporate profile of the Hürriyet newspaper
<http://www.hurriyetkurumsal.com/Default.aspx?lg=ENG> (Accessed on 19.08.2013).

The interview made with Aydın Doğan,
<http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/09/10/roportaj/> (Accessed on 19.08.2013).

“BDP Hürriyet’e yeni bir slogan önerdi” [BDP recommended a new slogan to Hürriyet] <http://www.gazeteciler.com/gundem/bdp-hurriyete-yeni-bir-slogan-onerdi-63269h.html> (Accessed on 15.08.2014)

Interview made with Ekrem Dumanlı
<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4720687> (Accessed on 03.09.2013)

Ekrem Dumanlı, “Bir milyon tiraj için canı gönülden teşekkürler”
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_ekrem-dumanli-1-milyon-tiraj-icin-canigonulden-tesekkurler_1122927.htm (Accessed on 03.09.2013)

Taha Akyol, “Amiral Gemisinde” <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/18903157.asp>
(Accessed on 15.10.2014)

The institutional page of the Zaman newspaper <http://www.zaman.com.tr/kurumsal>
(Accessed on 03.09.2013)

Abdülhamit Bilici, “Stance of Zaman and Today’s Zaman”
<http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-323182-stance-of-zaman-and-todays-zaman.html> (Accessed on 03.09.2013)

The decisions taken on the National Security Council meeting held on February 28, 1997 <http://t24.com.tr/media/editorials/files/406.pdf> (Accessed on 07.01.2014)

Oktay Ekşi’s personal web page
<http://www.oktayeksi.com.tr/?kkk=OktayEksi&query=About&Name=%20Who%20is%20Oktay%20EKSI%20?> (Accessed on 18.07.2014)

The interview made with Hüseyin Gülerce
<http://t24.com.tr/haber/gulerce-zaman-sozcuye-dondu-hocaefendi-gitme-dese-bile-kusura-bakmayin-derim,268993> (Accessed on 03.09.2014)

The web page of Journalists and Writers Foundation
<http://gyv.org.tr/Hakkimizda/Detay/19/About%20the%20Foundation> (Accessed on 27.03.2014)

“Turkey lifts Islamic headscarf ban in civil service”
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10363821/Turkey-lifts-Islamic-headscarf-ban-in-civil-service.html> (Accessed on 13.05.2014)

“Taha Kıvanç, Fehmi Kuru, yani ben...” <http://yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2000/ekim/23/tkivanc.html> (Accessed on 28.05.2014)

European Court of Human Rights, “Şimşek and others vs. Turkey,” 35072/ 97, 37194/97, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en> (Accessed on 16.01.2014)

“The Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin” [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{"itemid":\["001-82580"\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-82580#{) (Accessed on 21.01.2014).

“Danıştay: Zorunlu din dersi hukuksuz [Council of State: Compulsory Religious Education is Unlawful] <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/437852.asp>. (Accessed on 21.01.2014)

About Cüneyt Ülsever’s dismissal from the Hürriyet newspaper <http://www.odatv.com/n.php?n=her-sey-ertugrulun-gidisiyle-basladi-2503131200> (Accessed on 10.04.2014)

“Yargıya göre cemevi ibadethane” [According to the Judiciary Cem Houses are Places of Worship], <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/yargiya-gore-cemevi-ibadethane/gundem/gundemdetay/02.11.2011/1458068/default.htm> (Accessed on 29.08.2014)

The list of the authors in the Zaman newspaper <http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/argit2/ssayfa/yazar/biyografi1.htm#Ahmetselim> (Accessed on 15.07.2014)

Ertuğrul Özkök, “Ah Benim sağ Ayağım” <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/15753490.asp?yazarid=10> (Accessed on 17.07.2014)

Ertuğrul Özkök, “Asıl Kürt Sorunu bu”
<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/4577393.asp?yazarid=10&gid=61> (Accessed on 17.07.2014).

“The Uludere Bombing? When will their families get justice?”
<http://blog.amnestyusa.org/europe/the-uludere-bombing-when-will-their-families-get-justice/#more-32499> (Accessed on 11.02.2014)

“Kurds protest over deadly Turkey air raid”
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/12/20111229824112567.html>
(Accessed on 11.02.2014)

“TL 4 million returned to Ankara as Uludere victim families reject compensation”
<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-335134-tl-4-million-returned-to-ankara-as-uludere-victim-families-reject-compensation.html> (Accessed on 11.02.2014)

“Timeline: What happened in Roboski?” <http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/143200-timeline-what-happened-in-roboski>(Accessed on 11.02.2014)

“Turkish Military Prosecutors Dismiss investigation into Uludere Massacre”
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-military-prosecutors-dismiss-investigation-into-uludere-massacre.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60668&NewsCatID=339> (Accessed on 11.02.2014)

Bülent Korucu’s personal web page <http://bulentkorucu.com.tr/hakkinda> (Accessed on 18.08.2014)

“Structure of the Terrorist Organization”
http://www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/pkk_structure_of_the_terrorist_organization.aspx
(Accessed on 18.08.2014)

“Views against genocide allegations” <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN,32705/views-against-genocide-allegations.html> (Accessed on 03.09.2014)

“Patriarch Bartholomew feels crucified” <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriarch-bartholomew-feels-crucified-17-12-2009/2/> (Accessed on 27.08.2014)

“Patriarch Bartholomew feels crucified” <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/patriarch-bartholomew-feels-crucified-17-12-2009/> (Accessed on 19.08.2014)

“Crucifixion remarks lead to tension between gov’t and Bartholomew”
<http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-196156-101-crucifixion-remarks-lead-to-tension-between-govt-and-bartholomew.html> (Accessed on 27.08.2014)

“Turkey declares Ergenekon a terrorist organization”
<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/309534--turkey-declares-ergenekon-a-terrorist-organization> (Accessed on 20.08.2014)

“The Status and Issues of the Greek-Orthodox Minority in Turkey” Paper presented by Achilles G. Adamantiades, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/105463?download=true> (Accessed on 27.08.2014)

“Komutan Görevden alındı, beş Uludereli tutuklandı” [The Commander has been dismissed and five people from Uludere have been arrested]
<http://www.bianet.org/bianet/toplum/135301-komutan-gorevden-alindi-bes-uludereli-tutuklandi> (Accessed on 08.10.2014).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A- THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE ARTICLES

TEXT I (APPENDIX 1)

Oktay Ekşi

Thank You...

18.08.1997

1From time to time, pessimism surrounds us. The words which our heart does not
2approve come out of our mouth. The simplest of these is the saying “**My brother,**
3**this nation cannot grow into manhood**”

4However, we all know that this nation creates such miracles in sudden times that the
5people who say those pessimistic words get embarrassed like the success, the
6parliament displayed in the law of eight years of uninterrupted compulsory
7education. Here is an example of this kind of miracle we experienced in TGNA
yesterday:

8An **education reform** which should have been applied since 1973 and which the
9political authorities have never wanted to deal with because it brings the necessity
10to close down the secondary parts of religious vocational schools has been enacted
11by this TGNA. Moreover, a party leader some of the electorate of whom has
12originated from religious vocational schools or having such mentality like **Mesut**
13**Yılmaz** did this. Yılmaz with his performance in this case has deserved the title of
14“**statesman**” for the first time since the day he started his political career.
15Because, the “**politician**” fights for what his near interest is. A **stateman** is the
man who fights for the long term interests of the country not for near interests.

17Doubtlessly–like we wrote before – **Bülent Ecevit** and **Deniz Baykal** made a big
18contribution to that consequence. The consistent and influential opposition
19understanding of **Baykal** has been at the level of serving as a model. Likewise,

20 **Biltekin Özdemir** who has managed the talks of Plan and Budget Commission
21 along with **Uluç Gürkan** who has managed the TGNA General Assembly hold
great efforts for this result.

22 Nevertheless, in this consequence, firstly the role of former Minister of Education
23 **Turhan Tayan** who through proposing eight year of compulsory primary
24 education for the agenda last year made the law regarding the implementation of
25 this pass in an “**uninterrupted**” way in the National Education Council and the
26 role of undersecretary of National Education Ministry **Bener Cordan** who
27 beginning before the National Education Council has made all of us reach today
by dealing with everything like handling cross-stitch are bigger than anyone else.

29 Doubtlessly, this law will put approximately 2 quadrillions of fund debt onto our
society. 30 However, during the period of **Turgut Özal** mentality which for the
development of 31 Turkey and for her catching the era brought economics not
education to the forefront no enough fund for education had been saved.

33 Now we have to bear that burden all together. But, let’s express that this society is
ready to 34 bear that burden gladly. Even that is enough that our children whom we
will hand in our 35 future get the level of education to carry the Turkey of the 2000s.

36 If the ones who witness those days turn and have a look at those whom hindered
37 eight years of uninterrupted primary education, we are wondering what will they
say about especially the deputies of TPP [SIC].

39 We nevertheless give endless thanks to anyone who has made Turkey gain eight
years of 40 uninterrupted education.

TEXT II (APPENDIX 2)

Hüseyin Gülerce

Eight-Years of Education and the Stance of Zaman

18.08.1997

1What does the enactment of the “eight years of uninterrupted compulsory education” law mean?

3The military officers who clearly manifest their pressure and determination through
4NSC decisions and various means and the politicians sharing the same objectives
5with them have ultimately become successful. In this segment, the main starting
6point has been the view that secularism and democracy have been under a serious
7threat, the need to say “no” to this going which is under WP leadership. With this
8assent, the target has been the secondary parts of the religious vocational high
schools and Quran courses.

9It is because of this reason that, the enactment of the eight years of uninterrupted
compulsory 10education law in the parliament has been evaluated as a “revolution”
11and “victory”. Parliament is the reflection of the national will, so it is needed to
12respect this result gentlemanly on behalf of democracy without forgetting what is
13going on behind the scenes. Moreover, this law which has been enacted by
14offending a wide segment who embrace the religious vocational schools and the
15Quran courses is devoid of the desired consensus Hence, it is politically motivated
rather than for educational purposes.

16The law of 8 years of education with regard to its political appearance should not
be made 17a cause for polarization. In democracies the mistakes are rectified through
elections. It is 18needed to wait for the ballot box as the general elections would be
held most lately one year later.

20According to our point of view, it is early for the presentation of this law as an
21“education reform”. What matters in an issue as important as education is the
22application. There are outdated shortcomings in terms of classroom, teacher,
orientation, teaching programs and curricula.

24Prime Minister Yılmaz because of being aware of this has said that “Our essential
work has now started.”

26From another angle too, we can say that, the work of this government is beginning
27now. Likewise, the issue of eight year of education has been the only issue of the

28government since it established. There are no improvements regarding economic
29distress yet. The coalition partners and the RPP have merely stayed under the
trench of eight year of education. The real exam begins from now on.

31Your newspaper Zaman has been an advocate of science, common sense and
compromise 32about eight years of education as well as all matters affecting our
33country and our people. We have persistently declared that, the issue should be
34discussed by the experts and the decisions concerning education which have
35been made a tool for politics would not be permanent. Our people's sensitivity
36towards the issues of vocational religious high schools and Quran courses have
37been reminded and a middle way based on consensus has been requested. With
38the rejection of article 4, the issue of religious education in the 24. article of our
constitution has been hung up in the air and this shows that this consensus has not
been pursued.

40We are of the belief that the river finds the bed of the river. The law about the
expansion of 41freedom of religion proclaimed by Clinton himself clearly illustrates
the point that a free 42and democratic America has reached. The regimes who are not
afraid of her citizens and 43pious ones can take brave steps in order to empower
internal peace.

44In Turkey, unfortunately we could not find the ground for listening to one another,
45understanding one another and for mutual trust yet.

46ZAMAN with the belief that these grounds must definitely be prepared makes an
effort for 47not throwing away the bridges between different sectors.

48We don't approve to ask for rights in front of mosques clashing with the police of
49the state. The view that we defend despite all the critiques and accusations is not to
50give up the method of persuasion through insisting on dialogue, tolerance and
consensus.

51The work becomes clear with its result...

TEXT III (APPENDIX 3)

Oktay Ekşi

Merve Will Learn Too...

04.05.1999

1 The ones who **pump** our young lady called Merve Kavakçı up have created a
2 serious crisis at the expense of her in the previous night. They wanted to show all
the world that they

3 made the rule of “**being covered**” of Islam valid in **TGNA** too and the basic
philosophy of 4 this state cannot be regarded valid anymore too [SIC]...

5 As we expressed in the piece published in this column yesterday, **Merve Kavakçı**
has

6 already been conditioned and charged with this objective. Just like **Leyla Zana**
case seen

7 before...

8 It will be remembered: **Leyla Zana** abused the oath ceremony made in the
Parliament

9 of 1991 with the aim to **separate** this state.

10 **Merve Kavakçı** has tried to do the same thing to **overthrow** the philosophy of
this state. 11 As seen, the paths of the two are different but their objective is the
same:

12 The Republic built upon **the principles of Atatürk...** [SIC]

13 Fortunately, this recent sabotage attempt has seen the strongest reaction initially
in the

14 Parliament and from Prime Minister **Bülent Ecevit** himself. He brought out
another not 15 so-known reality while saying “**Turkish Grand National Assembly**
16 is not the place to challenge the state”:

17 The talent to change the direction of the event under such critical circumstances was

18 mostly existent in **İsmet İnönü**. For example, the saying of “**I am watching your**

19**situation in the chair of the history: You are in the rush of the criminals**”he said to

20 DP when it was said in the end of 1953when theRPP goods would be confiscated along 21 with the saying of “ **I cannot even save you**” he said a short while before 27 May are still in memory.

23 Bülent Ecevit perhaps after the first anniversary of İnönü’s death, after commemorating

24İsmet Pasha with respect has in sum said “**The ones who had the chance to work with 25 him have benefited from this opportunity to the extent vis-à-vis their ability.**”

26 In the previous night **Ecevit** has revealed that he had perused his years passed with İnönü 27 well with his interference into the event in the Parliament. Otherwise, he too would

28 coincide with the ones saying “ **There is no law rule hindering Merve Kavakçı’s**

29**coming to Parliament** incompatible with being covered”, would keep silent and make

30**the mindset of Erbakan** igniting to **kick a goalto the secular republic** or to destroy another part of it rebound.

32 If the leader manifests that character in critical times, he keeps as a leader. Otherwise, he 33 turns into a bureaucrat working in a post for some time. **Ecevit’s** stance explains why he is 34 astir for years and why he is a leader.

35 Now **Merve** Affair is waiting for the last round between **an individual rebellion**
attempt 36 against the state and the state of Turkish Republic that is determined not
to make sacrifice 37 of her basic philosophy and identity.

38 Our girl **Merve** will learn then whom she is dancing with.

TEXT IV (APPENDIX 4)

Ali Bulaç

TGNA and TGSA

04.05.1999

1The reaction the DLP chairman (and prime minister) Bülent Ecevit showed as
2Merve Kavakçı entered the General Assembly of TGNA with her headscarf has
3amazed me too much. The point that amazed me has not been his reaction against
4the headscarf, but has been the issues that as much as understood he had prepared
5before and read there. Despite not taking an oath, what Mr. Ecevit who made a
speech in the Parliament bench said is those:

6“Nobody is concerned with ladies’ wearing headscarves in terms of their faith.
7However, TGNA is not anybody’s private life sphere. Here is the most supreme
8institution of the state. Those who work here have to obey the rules, traditions of the
9state. This is not a place to challenge the state. Please put this lady in her place.”

10There are two points in this text that should be stressed. One of them is the
11relationship constructed “between the headscarf and the private life.” In the
12following days, I will try to tell that constructing a direct relationship between
13headscarf and private life is a basic mistake with regard to Islamic theology and
14fiqh. Let’s say that the headscarf is an issue not concerning private life, but
concerning societal and public life directly and in absolute terms.

15Second significant point is the mind-blowing definition of Mr. Ecevit regarding
16the Parliament which is the most superior and determiner institution of a
17democratic regime. According to Mr. Ecevit's definition, "Here" (namely TGNA)
"is the most supreme 18institution of the state". This definition is radically incorrect
19and as is understood from its name here is Turkish Great National Assembly
20(TGNA). The legislation directing the basic political, judicial, administrative,
21economic, social, cultural and etc vital activities is enacted in this parliament and
the executive is formed by the administrative team that this parliament introduces.

23Democracies have brought the provision that the parliaments equipped with this
function and mission can be formed by the people through free elections in certain
periods.

25This is a minimum knowledge with regard to political science and democratic
26culture. Because if parliament is the most supreme institution of the state, there
27would be no meaning in millions of people's going to the ballot box and voting for
28determining a new political authority and opposition. The state would appoint the
29persons she wishes to the institution belonging to herself and thus here would not
30become TGNA, would become TGSA, namely Turkish Great State Assembly.

31Here, on the occasion of this speech, what is important is not that this basic
knowledge is 32unknown, but is the manifestation of the real intention and views of
lots of people like Mr. Ecevit.

34Think once, if practically, this Parliament is not the parliament of the nation but is
the 35parliament of the state, under this circumstance, this means that there is no free
and 36liberated space for individuals, social groups and for the people who is a sum
37of these. This is called secret or frank totalitarianism.

38With respect to Merve Kavakçı who has received from the nation the authority of
39representation with her headscarf but for whom the difficulties we have witnessed
have 40been raised, after this phase the best thing this lady can do to put an end to
this tension is to 41recede and turn to nation.

TEXT V (APPENDIX 5)

Oktay Ekşi

The Lesson

10.02.2008

**1THEY TOOK THEIR OWN WAY. They made revision in two articles of the
2Constitution depending on their majority in the Parliament.**

3One of them, namely the one regarding the **10.article** has constituted an interesting
4example showing that an article can be both revised and drafted without adding or
removing 5anything after the **Nationalist Action Party (NAP)** staff discussed for **12
hours.**

6This used to be called “**pleonasm**” before. In other words,if you putfunctionless
words into 7a law provision, you would make verbalism in vain. As a matter of fact,
they made the 8phrase “**and in taking advantage of all sorts of public service**” get
added after the phrase 9“**in all their activities**” to the the fourth subsection of the
10.10article saying “**state organs and administration offices in all their activities
11have to act in line with the principle of equality before the law**”

12Now, read the article in question again with these phrases added, what has
13changed? What it benefited, you say [SIC]

14Anyway... **The Justice and Development Party (JDP)** needed such a support to
15carry out her mission which is not written in her program. They solved it through
16**Devlet Bahçeli**'s foresight and through the support of the deputies like
**Ertuğrul17Kumcuoğlu, Mithat Melen, Deniz Bölükbaşı, Tunca Toskay, Tuğrul
18Türkeş** who are expected to know what kind of reaction to give in relation to such
a proposal.

19The proposal saying a subsection as “ **Nobody can be blocked from having the
20right to get higher education without any reason that is not frankly
21expressed in the law. The limits of having this right is determined by**

law.”²² should be added to the 42. article which is important with regard to the debated “turban” issue has been enacted.

²³ There too, they ignored the suggestion of Prof. Dr. **Ergun Özbudun** “**who defends 24 headscarf freedom in higher education institutions**” saying “**Add a phrase that will 25 block the oppression of uncovered students, otherwise, problems will occur in 26 universities.**”

²⁷ So that they showed Prof. **Ergun Özbudun** who we are sure that accepted the ²⁸ demand of JDP saying “**Could you prepare a constitution project that is 29 libertarian and civilian for us?**” in good faith that **the truth of the matter is different.**

³⁰ Does dear **Ergun Özbudun** now think that he has gone wrong by thinking that the JDP ³¹ has been sincere in terms of democracy? We don’t know [SIC]

³² Unless he thinks so, we think that it will be enough for him to evaluate the scene better to ³³ take a look at what some writers who compete with each other to seem ³⁴ “libertarian” and regard themselves as “liberal” along with academics say and write in recent days.

³⁵ For days, we are busy with the discussions about “**the amendment of the two articles of 36 the constitution and adding a subsection to the 17. article of the YÖK law**”

³⁷ Don’t **Özbudun** and his colleagues who started out trusting in the words and ³⁸ intention of the **JDP** and who have lived and breathed the new “**Constitution 39 proposal**” since June 2007 ever ask “**What purpose did all such efforts serve? 40 Actually, the JDP in early October 2007 would declare her new constitution 41 proposal to the public? Two or three months long debates would follow this, 42 then under the light of those proposals and critiques, a new draft would emerge. What happened?**”

⁴³ Anyway, every experience is useful. Of course if you know to learn a lesson.

TEXT VI (APPENDIX 6)

Ekrem Dumanlı

Headscarf or Gangs Dangerous?

11.02.2008

1Normally, the headscarf and gang should not be used as two elements of
2comparison. This is so because, a direct relationship between these cannot be
3considered. However, here is Turkey; the topics which are disconnected from each
4other to the degree that is not seen in any country in the world can have relationship
with each other.

5More precisely, the people who employ any mean for reaching a certain end can
even use the 6values the nation respects and attaches importance for their dirty
7purposes. Moreover, the headscarf and gang issue hold the character of litmus paper
8for the media. From this window too there is a need to see the issue [SIC]

9Unfortunately, Turkey has witnessed a rather apparent reality in recent years that
10getting ganged has reached unbelievable dimensions. System is always the same:
11Retired or active military officers and policemen and the people known as the
12mafia. As much as understood, these people have the most secret intelligence
13information of the state. They are in preparation of numerous issues from
14organizing assassination to planning irregular warfare. Sketches, maps, plans,...
15Heavy guns, bombs, munitions... The scene is desperate. The people who wear the
16official dress of police or military officer (or the ones who used to wear this
17honorable official dress at one time) have been politicized until their throat, and like
it is not enough they have been organized illegally with the purpose of psychological
18warfare. Moreover, they have been messed with many dirty works from drug trade
to 19weapon trade. Sauna gang, Bursa gang, Şemdinli gang, Eryaman gang,
Ergenekon gang...

Silence Has Bolstered the Morale of the Gangs

21This is the critical question: Why do those who snort and make a great fuss saying
“the 22regime is under threat.” prefer to keep silent concerning the emerging of
dangerous 23organizations in recent years when the headscarf comes to agenda? So
24much so that, the men roister for months saying “Are you aware of the danger?”
25but do not run after the deep gang that threw bomb upon them.

26The ones who become as strong as a lion when it comes to the children with eyes
27full of tears who cannot get university education get stucked in a corner having
28their tails between their legs. Who believes in their “danger” analysis?!

There is no need to Make Fear Trade

30There is another reason for my writing the article called “Headscarf or gangs
31dangerous?”: The gangs make every kind of dress change in order to be able to
32make a chaos environment. They provoke the “Islamists” with “secularist” tone
33and become Islamist and provoke the people “showing secularism sensitivities” in
turn.

34Sometimes for their purposes, they wear the dress of separatist organization, they
35sometimes get mixed with racism vein; and sometimes they abuse sectarianism.
36They go to church, they lick the dust, and when appropriate, they can talk about
37“Turkish-Islam synthesis”. We are face to face with a tactic of an organization
38having all sorts of faces and unfortunately one pole of these stretches out to some
39persons who walk around with the mask of “secret state task”

40There is a need to have a look at the constitutional amendment bringing freedom
for 41headscarf from the perspective of deep gangs. Fethullah Gülen has made a very
42important warning during the week. He talked about “men and women dressed in
43hijab” Not pointless this warning is! [SIC]. It is because before too were made
44such provocation attempts [SIC]. There are people who make fear trade saying
45“what if this happens, what if that happens” I have nothing to say concerning
46sincere worry, if only they speak carefully for social peace and everybody listens
to them carefully. Even the worry of a single individual is worrisome.

48This issue has also a dark side. There is a link between those who give voice to
49some worries with an incredible exaggeration and those who struggle over creating
50that atmosphere. That is to say, the ones writing the horror film script and those
51playing it are from the same lodge.

TEXT VII (APPENDIX 7)

Mehmet Y. Yilmaz

For Them, the Name Of The Woman Has Never Existed

7.10.2013

**1The most important discernable development stemming from the democracy
2package that the PRIME MINISTER has been working on for months has
3been that the women working in public places can wear headscarf if they
want.**

4If we are to summarize in a word, the characteristic of the employment policy the
511-year-old JDP government has followed in the public sector that would be
6“**partisanship**”. Political closeness has never got ahead of merit and knowledge
7that much in any period. **Besides this, a significant development has been the
decrease in the number of women 8in top-level jobs in the public sector.**

9The most apparent view of the mentality which holds the power today can be
summarized as “**the place of woman is home**”

11This has been the natural consequence of on the one hand the insistence on
12distributing the executive positions in the public sector in a partisan way and of the
13view that “**the place of woman is home**” on the other hand.

14Now, we will see how much the regulations providing opportunity for the women
15in public places to wear headscarf will change this. My personal view is in the

16direction that not too much thing will change. The mentality which have not
17appointed any woman minister for any executive ministry so far will proceed in
the same path.

18On the other hand, there is such a reality: I do not like this definition that much but
19I have to use it for not beating about the bush, **“green capital” did not lean to
20woman employment that much either.**

21They could employ the women with headscarf, they did not.

22You have noticed that even their personal assistants have been chosen from men.
Even 23though the justification has not been said frankly, it has been the same
beyond their heads: 24The place of woman is home!

25Now, it would be naivety to think that they would give their activities up because
“headscarf is free in the public places”.

**27As a conclusion, the thing I will say is that, the “suffering” of the women with
28headscarf will not come to an end.**

29Thereby, the things that the “the headscarf victimhood” has been primarily used as
30a political weapon, the mentality in power has not cared about woman rights, the
31demand of women regarding taking places in social life freely will appear in an
obvious way.

TEXT VIII (APPENDIX 8)

Mustafa Ünal

Revolution in Public

09.10.2013

1 Democratization has begun speedy. The land of the Mor Gabriel Monastery has been returned.

3 Our Oath beginning with “I am Turkish, I am truthful and hard-working” has been
4 abolished. The headscarf in public is free. The Prime Minister Erdoğan had
5 declared ten days ago. Some of the articles in the package were of legal and some
6 were of administrative regulation. The bylaw caught the time before feast. It was
7 published on Official Gazette yesterday. Doubtlessly, each of them is very
8 important. Above all, the headscarf freedom in public is not an ordinary
9 development. It is like a revolution. A few years ago, it was difficult to even dream
10 of it. Let alone university, the headscarf in the street almost turned into a problem.

11 In 2007, the Prime Minister Erdoğan in his trip to Spain has said that “Even if it is
12 a political symbol”. The NAP has replied positively to the call of AK Party. 411
13 deputies have used vote of acceptance for the law amendment giving a free run to
14 the headscarf only in universities. The RPP has run to the Constitutional Court.
15 The Court through overstepping her authority annulled the regulation. An
16 indictment case against AK Party was run. It broke away from getting closed
17 within an ace of vote. Everything happened in a few years and ended. The result of
the process beginning with 411 hands [SIC].

18 Those deputies too will be remembered with gratitude. Doubtlessly, the architect
19 of a big revolution like headscarf freedom in public is AK Party. [SIC] The
20 signature behind it Prime Minister Erdoğan and his associates [SIC]. The
21 headscarf is the sacred of these territories. This step will not be forgotten until
doomsday.

22 The AK Party has taken the step, but it is necessary not to forget the opposition
23 parties who have made this suitable climate. It had been the article of the package
24 that has almost been not objected. The RPP, NAP and PDP have directed harsh
25 critiques to many regulations in the package. However, concerning the headscarf

26issue, no voice has risen. Except the marginal groups a big sector of the society has accepted this too.

27Here there is a need to open separate brackets for the main opposition party RPP especially 28for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu... The RPP has been the biggest hindrance in front of the 29headscarf. Even though its numeral power is weak, it has been skillful in establishing 30psychological barriers. The viewpoint of the RPP regarding the headscarf has changed with 31Kılıçdaroğlu. Since the first day the leader of the RPP 32has sat in the chair, he has replied the questions about headscarf positively. He did 33not pun. “Headscarf or turban does not make difference.” he said. He gave green 34light to the headscarf wearing students’ getting into university in a probable RPP 35government. “We solve that problem. And we are determined. We will provide 36opportunity to everybody for education” he said. Despite heavy criticisms coming 37from the party, he has kept this attitude until today. In the parties like RPP that are 38based on tradition, policy change can be seen as ideological swift, axis shift. These 39come up with resistance. So, it is difficult to change. There is perhaps no need to 40remind of how strict and sharp the tongue of RPP regarding the headscarf issue 41has been. Kılıçdaroğlu succeeded the difficult, indeed [SIC]. There is a need to admit his right. The atmosphere about the headscarf has been softened by his flexible stance.

TEXT IX (APPENDIX 9)

Oktay Ekşi

The Savagery in Sivas...

04.07.1993

1Alarm sounds are springing from Sivas. Because those, who want to divide and
2collapse Turkey, seem to have been set in motion with their full might. On the one
3hand while the PKK and their known unarmed extensions are trying to destroy our
4country and national unity, on the other hand, those, who want to create an

5atmosphere of conflict in our country, are doing their best. Therefore, we are going through a process which requires us to be more careful and vigilant.

7The diagnosis that will be put on the events in Sivas is very important...What we want to say 8will be understood better if you refresh your memories:

9Kahramanmaraş incidents, as can be remembered, took place in December of 1978. The main 10factor in those events, just like in Sivas, was the spread of fabricated news 11by taking advantage of two-sided provocations and of this atmosphere. For 12example, our Alevi citizens were accused of throwing a bomb in one of the mosques 13of Kahramanmaraş and people were made to attack on their next-door neighbors 14who had no other differences than belonging to a separate sect. Events in Kahramanmaraş were followed by those in Yozgat, Çorum and again 15by the events in Sivas, but luckily the rule of September 12 extinguished these provocations.

16According to us, it would be insufficient to explain the fatal events that took place in the 17previous day, in Sivas by **Aziz Nesin**'s inconsiderateness. Because a few 18awkward sentences that **Aziz Nesin** uttered in Pir Sultan Abdal celebrations would 19not lead to such reactions if there were no "readiness" in the public. Finally, it could 20be evaluated as the delusions of someone who gives the impression of "having 21his/her brain vessels calcified" and on the other hand, burning with "greatest greed" and it would end.

22Incoming information suggests that some people immediately printed leaflets upon **Aziz 23Nesin**'s speech he made in Sivas on Thursday and provoked the public against him. The 24next day's being "Friday" obviously facilitated the task of the provocative team. There is no 25point to feel amazed by this. Because "Friday" 26prayers create a platform which can easily be used by those who are trying to 27disrupt the social peace. The worst of all, although these events took place in front 28of the eyes of the government as well as of the civilian authorities, nobody tried to take the necessary precautions.

29However, Turkey should become a country where every Muslim can perform his/her 30religious worship as they wish and in complete freedom. But this freedom should not give 31anyone the right to interfere in others' different way of worship.

32This is the point which those who were firstly engaged in protests against **Aziz Nesin** and his 33friends and then ran wild to try to burn down the hotel in which Aziz Nesin and his friends 34were staying did not accept. But, people, whether they accept it or not, will preserve their 35gains regarding whether to believe or not to believe in different things without falling under 36the pressures of other.

37The tragic thing is that we raised hell when Germans burnt the house where a few Turks 38lived, but we did not react much when our own people did the same on our 39own people. The death of 35 people due to smoke asphyxiation during the incident 40revealed an important truth on the other hand. Because the loss of so many lives in a 41tiny hotel result from not knowing what could be done in a sudden fire and, possibly 42from hotel's being covered by wall-to-wall synthetic carpets. As known, the most 43important feature of synthetic carpets is that they emit poisonous smoke when they 44burn. The loss of many lives as a result of brutal sabotaging of a hotel in Van the 45day before was again due to this reason if we are not mistaken. Therefore, the "mosque-Friday" dimension should not make the safety-related measures of those who 46stay at hotels or similar places become ignored.

TEXT X (APPENDIX 10)

Fehmi Koru

Their Collars Should be Gotten Hold Of

03.07.1993

1Writer**Aziz Nesin**, who put his signature in funny stories, this time became, the 2hero of a tragedy whose traces would remain for many years. An uproar, which in

3the first-hand resulted with the death of 35 people and injury of a large number of
4people, occurred with intense provocations of which he was at the center.
5‘**Festival**’, which was held for Pir Sultan Abdal, turned into a ‘**mourning**’ because
of the unrest Aziz Nesin had caused.

6In order to understand the recent events better, it is necessary to notice a preparation
which 7was being matured for six months. **Aziz Nesin** announced his decision to
8publish a novel in Turkey called “**Satanic Verses**” which appeared in the UK 5
9years ago at that time. The noise, which the first edition of the novel had caused all
10over the world, is known to everyone; A total of 26 people in countries like
11Pakistan and Bangladesh lost their lives because of this book. With the publication
12news of such a book Turkey too was brought into the provocation environment
after a delay of five years. By hiding behind the curtain of ‘Freedom of expression’
[SIC]...

13This event has a side that even made British publisher upset [SIC]; even though
Aziz Nesin 14had taken permission to publish it as a book, he serialized ‘The Satanic
Verses’ in the 15newspaper in which he was a shareholder. Newspaper made a special
16effort, which even attracted the attention of the British, in order to generate the
17reaction in Turkey that the book encountered in the world. It was obvious that a
18**devilish** scenario was to be faced for mobilizing the masses. Now too this [SIC].

19Sivas is one of the leading cities in Turkey with the most colorful sectarian
mosaic. In the 20past, Alevi-Sunni conflicts had happened in this city and incidents,
21which cost the lives of many people, occurred here. One Friday, the last ‘**bloody**
22scenario’ was staged by means of ‘**Pir Sultan Abdal**’ and setting up the local
23press a few days earlier. If looked at the preparations, gas, which would be
24enough to elicit flames from four corners, was supplied in Sivas where a small
spark would suffice to start a sectarian conflict...

25Aziz Nesin and his supporters probably took part in similar scenarios in the past,
26but for the first time they were caught with blood in their hands. **35 people who**
27lost their lives and many wounded people in Sivas are victims of their
28provocations. The universal rule, known as ‘**conditioned reflex**’ in psychology

29and ‘**action-reaction law**’ in physics, showed itself with unerring accuracy and
30these events, which cracked the mosaic, had taken place. People who are
responsible are obvious since the provocation is apparent.

31It is a big betrayal to cause a sectarian violence at a time when Turkey is dealing
32with developments that weaken its power at home as well as abroad, PKK
33terrorism was intensified, the alleged claim from the Adriatic to the Great Wall
34of China received a nasty blow and it is busy with the establishment of a
35government. There is no doubt, the subsequent events, which occurred after the
provocation in Sivas, are part of a bigger plan which aims at dividing Turkey and
never has a place.

37People who lost their lives in Sivas are of course important, but this event, which
intends to 38pour gasoline on the unity and solidarity of this country, targets masses
39individually as well as collectively. **The wholeness of Turkey and Turkish**
40people are targeted with this event. This fact must be well-evaluated and
criminals and ‘**foreign hand**’ behind this incident should absolutely be revealed.

42We invite the government to act calmly, deal with the matter with utmost
43seriousness and crack down on the criminals without ignoring any possibilities and
44with ultimate strictness. This work isn’t similar to writing funny stories. Those, on
45whose behalf Aziz Nesin and his supporters acted must be found.

TEXT XI (APPENDIX 11)

Oktay Ekşi

Beware!

15.03.1995

1First, let us say: we have been paying attention for many years; the most important and
2one of the robust factors of our national structure is our Alevi citizens and whoever
3does not accept this is either a bigot on whom no light falls on, or is a rascal. We talk

4so frankly because it is enough to learn the history at primary school level in order to
5learn the truth, to note at what 5cultural sand the enlightening elements of the
community come to life and to search where love and friendship find support the most.

7Nevertheless, as you see, we occasionally witness incidents that target our Alevi
8citizens. The purpose is obvious: the centers of betrayal are doing their best to
9provoke Alevis in order to start a fight between brothers.

10Our Alevi citizens should not fall into this plot or despicably-prepared trap. Because
11one needs to be either an uncommon fool or a rascal in order not to see that the
enemies of our 12country, our national unity and democracy are behind this plot. We
13know that the events that we face today are the products of the seeds which had been
14sown for many years. These events are the result of the intentional or unintentional
cooperation between the domestic 15enemies of our peace and secular Republic and the
external enemies of our country.

16We have been telling these for many years because we live in an era which provides
the 17ability to measure social heritage and even make it possible to observe in which
of these 18stages these will cause outbursts. However we experience these again.
Because we, 19unfortunately, do not have a political cadre that is prudent enough to
foresee these events that practically shout their arrival.

21Hasn't the need for "a national consensus government" or "a national consensus for
providing 22solutions on key issues" been written for several months? We did not
23know where and at which date these incidents would break out, but haven't we
24known that the coming days are prone to this type of incidents for months – perhaps
for years?

25Can those who govern our country or who aspire to govern it say that they did what
was 26expected from them, they took or suggested precautions?

27Unfortunately, we do not expect any of them to provide positive response to the
questions 28above. Issuing a co-signed statement by coming together in Parliament
29yesterday can only salve their conscious, but they should know that this document is
30not a document that will be enough to exonerate them from their responsibilities

31before the history. Turkey does not have the power to bear a “religion” based fight
32between brothers in addition to terrorism associated with Southeast. Not only
33Turkey, but there is no power in the world to have these two fights. Therefore, it is
34necessary for everyone, but everyone, without exception, from the local grocery
store owner to the President of the country, to refrain from any activity that would
disrupt the national unity of our country.

36The greatest responsibility at this stage possibly falls onto our Alevi citizens and to
37those who have the power to lead them. Because those who intend to create chaos
with the purpose of 38provoking them by using these despicable assassinations and
sabotages are very active in such 39environments. The things experienced in Lebanon,
the former Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan and 40Bangladesh are apparent. It is the most
important requirement of today to stay away from 41every plot and provocation that
will spread butter on the bread of those who intend to ensnare 42Turkey into this trap
and to avoid mistakes that will render our Alevi citizens, who still stand 43as the
masses in the position of **the victim** and **the innocent** to get guilty in the public
44conscience.

45Let us not give any opportunities to rascals. Peace and love are our only way out.

TEXT XII (APPENDIX 12)

We Will Succeed This Time

Hüseyin Gülerce

16.03.1995

1On the anniversary of a military intervention, on the night of March 12, the
2dimension in the escalation of the incidents that started in the Gazi neighborhood of
3Istanbul shows that the danger we are facing is different from the earlier ones.

4If the three major newspapers, which had the common headline of “**we will not fall
5into this treacherous trap,**” displayed the same common sense on the first day, it

6would be easier to spoil the plot that was put into action. The headlines, which were
7captioned on the first day such as “Tracherous attack on Alevis...Bloody
8night...pro-Sharia IBDA-C raked four coffeehouses and one pastry shop last
9night...Thousands of Alevi citizens took to the streets...Folk attacked a police
station.” were as cruel as the bullets that were fired.

10Even though Turkey did not have any Alevi-Sunni problem, those, who failed to
achieve 11what they expected from the PKK are preparing a new and potential
danger. Everyone with 12common sense agrees...again everyone agrees that
13Turkey’s turn of luck with the Turkic Republics, signing of the Customs Union
14Treaty, and its prominence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan and Chechnya
15issues disturbed many countries. We are aware that the desire for dialogue and
16tolerance, longing for brotherhood, and thirst for domestic peace, which have been
increasing every day, make the world outside of us nervous.

17The most important of all, the sincere and profound interpretation of Islam in our
country is 18in the condition of influencing the world despite “**fundamentalism**” and
19“**Islamic terrorism**” accusations of the West and this disturbs many actors inside
and abroad.

**20Those, ho realize that the ground that they are sitting on slips under them, lose
their 21temper because they would not have a free hand just like in the past.**

Look. The 22evaluation style of the recent events in European newspapers is a
measure for us. Even these 23are in the form of clues for those who are eager to know
who’s behind these events.

24British newspapers wrote the following:

25“Street clashes began after Islamists opened fire on coffeehouses...Police killed 12
Turkish 26people in the incidents of religious violence...Islamic militancy began to
spread after the 27Welfare Party’s win of Ankara and Istanbul Municipalities...”

28The following comments appeared in Italian television and newspapers:

“Islamic 29fundamentalism is growing stronger in Turkey...Ataturk’s reforms are in
danger...Because 30Alevis have always adopted Ataturk’s principles...”

31Russian television said: “Religious terrorism started in Turkey...Inter-sectarian fight turned **32**into terrorism...”

33Greek press said: “the danger of fanatical Islam in Turkey... Alevi massacre...Events in **34**Istanbul show the risks for the European Union brought by Turkey’s accession to the **35**Customs Union...” **German press** was the most merciless of all. Alevis were represented **36**as the archenemy of Islam and the headlines like “War from Kurdistan to Istanbul” were **37**captioned. In French press, comments, which openly provoke the Turkish Armed Forces **38**just like provoking soldiers in Algeria, were being made. The headlines of **French 39**newspapers were not so different from these. “Police and fundamentalists in Istanbul are killing Alevis.” was said.

41However, watchful eyes in Istanbul and Ankara saw that the militant groups, with placards **42**that inscribed “**TCP, Dev-Sol, Dev-Genc, TIKKO,**” were pushing people on the police while Alevi citizens were trying to examine the events. Events have nothing to do with neither **44**Alevis nor Sunnis. But, the state should stand firm. **The determination and impartiality 45of the police must be preserved on days like these. The politicians should especially 46refrain from reckless statements which will wear down the police in these environments.**

47Our worry is that events will further be wanted to be escalated in the next Nawruz **48**celebration on March 21. We would like to remind the responsibility of the media on this **49**issue once more. They should not strive to provide beautiful images, bloody corpses. It **50**should not be like **sheep cares about its life and the butcher cares about meat.** We, state **51**and nation hand in hand, will try to put off the fire where it started if we can. And, at this **52**moment we do not have any other remedy more beautiful than love in our hands We should **53**succeed and will succeed this time...

TEXT XIII (APPENDIX 13)

Cüneyt Ülsever

It did not Work Ali Bardakoğlu!

09.03.2008

**1THE TURKISH COUNCIL OF STATE did not find it lawful that renders
2Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge course offered at primary schools
3mandatory. Now, either the course will be removed or curriculum (as already
done or said) will be re-designed.**

4The view of “The State should pay attention to the delivery of knowledge included in
the 5curriculum in an **objective** and **pluralistic** way and respect the **religious** and
philosophical 6convictions of the parents while performing its duty related to education
and training” was 7given place in the preamble of the Chamber.

8In an interview with Milliyet newspaper during the week, the former President of
the9**Board of Education and Discipline (TTK), Prof. Dr. Irfan Erdogan** was
10explaining the dominant **mindset** of TTK with an example “For example, I have
11encountered with an offer similar to the **Quran courses**during the discussion of 12the
program related to **Religious Culture and Ethics Knowledge** course in the board:
Mandatory presence of **the Quran** in the class divided in groups, discussion of concepts
such as justice, tolerance over **the sacred book** [SIC]...” 14**Religious Culture and
Ethics Knowledge** course is a course that does not only teach one particular religion
(Islam), but teaches the historical developments of all religions/beliefs, their
16philosophical and social dimensions and cultural significance.

17The main problem in Turkey is not the **curriculum** of this course, but the lack of
18sufficient numbers of **religion course teachers** with formal **training**. Only prayer
19applications (deeds) in Islam come to mind while thinking about religious knowledge
20in Turkey. Indeed, religion course teachers, who are trained in Turkey, do not
21know **philosophy, sociology, culture** and **science methodology**. They are not
22taught religious spirit, but are taught the form of worship. They only teach the
practices of worship that they know to the students from all religions since they are in
fact ignorant about understanding the spirit of religion.

24**In Turkey, the Directorate of Religious Affairs** is the main responsible for breaking
25**religion** away from its **philosophy**. This institution is primarily responsible for the
quality of 26religious clergy and religious course teachers in Turkey.

27But, unfortunately the **President of Directorate of Religious Affairs**, who is the
main 28responsible person for the decision taken by **the Council of State**, knocks the
ball out of 29bounds. The President of Religious Affairs, **Ali Bardakoğlu** argues that
30latest decision on religion culture course is the virtual adaptation of the decision
31taken by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Turkey. Bardakoğlu
32says the following: “I have serious doubts about which data or opinion of
33university or of which report the decision of the judiciary is based on while
34reaching a decision on what is considered to be religion and what is not and ECHR is
wrong in this. I do not think that opinions on this issue were received from the
35Presidency of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and 23 faculties of theologies.”

36In a nutshell, President implies that “**ECHR should have consulted to scholars, in
other 37words, to me!**” However, he is obviously **uninformed** about how ECHR
works. **Prof. Dr. 38Niyazi Oktem**, one of the faculty members at Bilgi University,
states the following “ECHR 39has no obligation to receive opinion from the Directorate
of Religious Affairs. It only takes the 40studies conducted on the dimensions of
freedom of belief in EU as reference. A committee, 41which is comprised of experts
from the EU member states as well as the candidate countries 42and in which I take part
produced a three-volume study in **1998**. In other words, ECHR is **not 43uninformed** on
the issue of **the freedom of belief**. Scholars were consulted by the phrase of 44the
Prime Minister. Religion courses cannot be mandatory like this.” (Sabah-07.03.08).

45Some people should **teach** Ali Bardakoglu what law is, what Turkey’s signature in
European 46Convention on Human Rights means, how ECHR operates, and what the
sanctions are when 47failed to comply with its decisions. Ali Bardakoğlu should be
concerned about why he failed 48to train religious clergy and course teachers who have
modern mindset!

TEXT XIV (APPENDIX 14)

Mümtaz'er Türköne

Is There a Religious Culture of ours?

09.03.2008

1The decision taken by the Council of the State concerning “the religious culture and ethics 2knowledge”courses after ECHR has rekindled an unending debate. The response “they 3should have asked us” of the president of the Directorate of Religious 4Affairs towards the preamble of the Council of the State saying “one sect is being taught in these courses” is normal.

6This is so because, it is not true for the court to make a decision about the content of 7this lesson without the existence of an expert view. The Alevis are happy with the 8court decision; this is because they are insistent on that the content of the courses is 9very distant to them. While watching the debates with general quality, we do not remember our personal 10experiences. But we have all been the students in this course. That is to say, we are in a 11position to pass judgments. How many of the students like me who chose the “religion 12course” before ‘80 by the demand of the family learned religion in these courses? The 13minds of all of us used to be outside the class with our friends who did not take the course.

14When a teacher of religious culture course who graduated from Theology or Supreme Islam 15Institute was not found, the task would be given to the teacher of philosophy and even to 16physical educator. There absolutely emerged people among these teachers who made 17propaganda of irreligiousness in the religious culture course.

18On behalf of me, in one of the optional religion courses, I remember that our teacher of 19biology told Darwin’s evolution theory. What if I learned my religion 20only from the religion culture courses at schools? We can all answer this question

21differently. Now, do the change of the situation and the finding of very good
22teachers of religious culture and ethics knowledge change the result? Above all,
23is the problem learning the religion? Or loving the religion? To what degree does
24the knowledge you have learned in a course like the other courses you have studied
and taken exam work? It works for something but for what?

26I have done what once my father did to me and for the first time this week I have
27taken my 5 year-old son to Friday prayer. He turned the mosque upside down while
28we were performing the prayer. Nobody got angry nor reprimanded. Nobody had
29got angry at me either. Who makes the children love the religion during their
30socialization process, in other words, during the process through which they
31become a member of the society? Well, who is the one that teaches?

32There is a very important point that we skip while making comparisons with other
countries 33about the issue of “religious culture and ethics knowledge”. In our
34country, only state can teach the religion, even the ones who teach have to be a civil
35servant. Nobody except the religious vocational schools, the religion courses and
36the Quran courses can teach the religion. If you want to learn your religion you can
37learn this from the people whom the state has given license to. To do the opposite
namely, to teach the religion without having 38an official attribute and to learn the
religion outside of the state institutions is a crime.

39While taking the different practices as an example, we should not forget that Turkey
is the 40only country in the world where the religion is taught only by the state.

41Basically, there are 3 different practices. According to the first one, the religion
courses are 42within the curricula and obligatory. Like in Austria, every religious
43community that is recognized constitutionally provides a teacher and in these
44obligatory religion courses the students learn their religion from the teachers
45appointed by the community in separate classes. The second is optional;
46however, the ones who do not want to take religion courses are imperatively
47given “ethics” courses, like in some provinces of Germany. The third is that, no
48place is given to religion course in the official curriculum. The ones who want to
get religion education go to church schools and get an intensive religion education

besides the official curriculum. The proportion of these schools sometimes rises up to 25 % 50in the general education like France.

51Every religion has a specific education program. Christianity is based on very basic 52practices because of believing that His Holliness Jesus removed the burden of Jewish 53shariah through sacrificing himself. The Catholic Church despite trying hard could not 54publish a catechism book. The fundamental problem of Alevism is its 55inability to get connected to a central doctrine. The vital problem of Sunni Islam is the continuance of single faith and common practices.

57The “religious culture and ethics knowledge” course does not provide religion education. 58However, it constitutes reference for single faith and single practice in a very solid way. As 59long as the state monopoly on religion education is not lifted, 60the justifications of the objection to this lesson are not legitimate.

TEXT XV (APPENDIX 15)

The Alevis, Sunnis

Taha Akyol

28.07.2012

1When I write that cem houses become places of worship my Alevi readers feel happy, I 2share their happiness. The matter that I find more interesting is that many of my Sunni 3readers are of the same opinion.

4But there are also problems:

5On the one hand, questions on which of them is a “true sect” ...on the other hand, 6opinions that identify Sunnism with “Yazid,” tyranny and oppression [SIC]...I 7immediately express this: nobody adopts a faith system that will make him/her 8think his/her belief to be wrong. Everyone’s belief is true for himself/herself.

9Which one is ‘true sect’?

10The majority of Alevis, who do not go to cem houses, define Alevism as “culture and 11lifestyle.” Marginal positivist fabrications, such as “Alevism without Ali” have no serious 12grounds. The vast majority of those, who continue to see cem houses as places of worship, 13believe Islam’s interpretation of Alevism to be “true Islam”; Just like “true sect” belief of the Sunnis!

14Which one is correct? What everyone believes is true for himself/herself! If we want to 15abstain from fires in the Middle East, the task that falls on all of us is to respect one 16another. It is clear that rejecting cem houses is to force Alevism get 17positioned as a separate religion. It is a great sin and this sin is on the shoulders of JDP today.

18In the old times

19Unfortunately, during the rule of Yavuz and Kanuni, during the wars with Iran Alevis had 20been oppressed. But the reason is political. It is inconceivable to treat takfir fatwa of that 21time as reference today. We should remember that Bektashism 22was also respected in those difficult times, because they were not seen as an 23extension of the Safavid Empire, Bektashism was an Ottoman institution.

24-Shah Ismail also based his imperial politics on the elimination of Sunnism: “While the 25Safavid forces were walking the length and breath of Iran, he imposed Shiism on Sunnis by 26the force of sword. Sunnis, who refused to accept this, were treated brutally and most of 27them were killed (David Morgan, Medieval Persia, s. 121).

28The slogan of “one king, one faith, one law” was valid in France against the feudal 29and religious divisions, Protestants were slaughtered in Saint Barthelemy massacre 30which is unprecedented in our history. This ‘one’ tradition would continue with 31the “ones” of the secular Jacobin republic, until the establishment of democracy [SIC].

32Not Being carried away with the Past

33Great historian Braudel speaks of population explosion and land insufficiency experienced 34around the Mediterranean in the 16th century. The comparative examination of the 35sociology of the peasant revolt of Munster sect in Central Europe that was seeking 36“equality” and our Alevi/Turcoman riots would be very instructive as an outer manifestation of this deeper reason.

38Let us not allow the past to poison us today. Turkey already has a wound that has been 39bleeding and gradually growing for thirty year, isn't it enough?!

40Recognition of cem houses strengthens the unity of Turkey.

41Alevi fast-breaking meal

42I welcomed a broadly participated fast-breaking meal in terms of politics and religion 43organized by the Anatolian Alevi and Bektashi Federation through attempts of Zeynep Abidin Erdem and Ibrahim Polat. I congratulate it.

45Every attempt that brings diversities together is great. It has been very good that the 46President participated in the meal and delivered a speech and it has put him under a moral 47responsibility in meeting the sensitivities of our Alevi citizens.

TEXT XVI (APPENDIX 16)

Ahmet Turan Alkan

'I am a Sunni, but receiving treatment'

28.07.2012

1When it was looked from the opposite side, it seemed to be a fast-breaking meal of 2the rich ...I was in the fast-breaking meal hosted by Alevi-Bektashi Federation and associations in 3Turkey. The President was the guest of honor of the meal and his presence had a great significance.

4When it was looked from the opposite side, it seemed to be a fast-breaking meal of the rich...

5I was in the fast-breaking meal hosted by Alevi-Bektashi Federation and 6associations in Turkey. The President was the guest of honor of the meal and his 7presence had a great significance. Sunni grind recited Quran, Alevi grandsire 8offered a table prayer, we all responded with “Amen,” it was lovely, and our hearts became warm.

9I said it was a fast-breaking meal of the rich, but it could be considered a table of 10the poor from another perspective. If the Alevis, who became the addressee of the 11decision that does not consider cem houses as places of worship taken by an 12institution that is the ultimate in Turkey in terms of law facilities such as the Court of Cassations, are not poor, I ask; who is poor in this country, for God’s sake?

14I cannot go into details of the decision, there is no place; it is similar to the 367 decision of 15the Supreme Court taken at that time. Practically, it has no chance of being actually in 16effect, but it is unique and exceptional in breaking the heart of Alevis: Conferring the title 17of religious brotherhoods or hermitage to cem houses 18is not accepted due to justification that it would be an “opposition to the revolution laws”; if you insist on the concept of the 19place of worship, then you must deliver its keys to the Directorate of Religious Affairs 20within three months; revolution laws are still existent in the Constitution...

21Handing cem house in the Directorate of Religious Affairs? [SIC] In a sacred day, such 22cold jokes cannot be endured in fact; even if we are fasting, there is a limit for a person’s patience, brother![SIC]

24This decision cannot even be implemented for a moment and is placed among the 25exemplary documents of our history of law with its strangeness, I have no doubt, 26the hilariousness and needlessness of state’s monopoly in undertaking religious 27services related to Sunni Islam, not religious services, became quite visible by

28means of this opportunity. The more strange, ridiculous and embarrassing part of
29the issue is this: Even though we, most of Sunnis, certainly notice the strangeness
30of the Directorate of Religious Affairs' official status in religion-state relations and
31consider it wrong, we become "pro- Directorate of Religious Affairs" in final
analysis due to the fear of causing sedition, what a strange reason! [SIC].

32I do not dare to say but it is called hypocrisy somewhere, I am sure. [SIC].

33State pleased Sunnis in a sense by offering them the Directorate of Religious
Affairs after 34beating religious people well at one time; religious people were
finally content and happy 35with the Directorate of Religious Affairs; they could
appoint officials to their mosques, 36issue religious fatwa and virtually prevent
religious services to be ripped up in the hands of 37this or that; would we not fall
into the situation of divided mosque communities in Europe 38if the directorate is
lost? We would, in that case there was no reason to create trouble on the 39issue of
extra fasting for example, half an hour was not a big deal; as long as there was no
40sedition. The Directorate of Religious Affairs had already added funds to the
budget of next 41year for conducting sensitive astronomical observations...

42I talked about the Directorate of Religious Affairs and it came to my mind, we
could not 43notice anyone from the Directorate of Religious Affairs in this
meaningful fast-breaking meal [SIC].

45Yes, our blessed president greatly contributed to the Alevi-Sunni brotherhood by
his 46honorable arrival, the menu was exceptionally impressive but fast-breaking
meal was still a 47meal of poor in my opinion [SIC]. I could understand a little better
48what it means to be Alevi in Turkey, I suppose [SIC]. I want to tell this case with a
49simile: a wealthy man is taking his poor distant relative to the cinema; he bought a
50ticket for himself, but when the door attendant asks about the ticket to his relative,
51in fact he demonstrates an embarrassing attitude towards his guest by saying "Hey,
he is no stranger, could we handle the situation for this time..."

52Here is the decision of the judiciary: Cem house is not a place of worship; what is it then? 53A folklore association? A musical instrument course? A coffeehouse? A school? What? 54Well, how about Alevism? If you ask us, the Sunnis, it is a religious order or sect within 55Islam; it is so but isn't there any injustice for Sunnis 56to define what Alevism is, according to you?[SIC] I do not mean to make a 57comparison, but it is similar to feel content about Vatican's description of Islam. 58Likewise, Alevi workshop has been the most comprehensive work until now, but we learnt that nothing was done to implement it after its final declaration was beautifully wrapped up.

60The most beautiful sentence of the night was uttered in businessman Adnan 61Polat's speech where he said: "Our elders have taught us the need to obtain morals 62through divine morality." It was a sentence that covered physical distances through the wings of a bird, I did 63not forget it, and I found it rather meaningful.

64Let us finish it with an anecdote: They asked a man "Are you Laz?" He responded as "I am 65a laz but I am receiving treatment." If we accept that being a Sunni in Turkey has some 66defects that can only be treated by high consciousness, empathy and conscience, I think it 67will be much better.

TEXT XVII (APPENDIX 17)

Ertuğrul Özkök

Öcalan was not Sincere

22.03.1992

1**NOW** let's think... Some people, with Kalashnikov guns in their hands, shoot in 2the air. They shout slogan with flags in their hands. Meanwhile, they are marching 3on security forces of the state.

4I wonder what policewould do if such an event occurred in France, USA and in the UK? I 5was in Paris the day before. I saw what police did when students attempted to

protest against 6education reforms in the center of Paris. I also witnessed how French police treated some 7Kurds who wanted to demonstrate during the OSCE meeting in last fall.

8Nobody in the world has any right to expect a more tolerant attitude from Turkish police 9than their French, British or American counterparts. It is necessary to look at events 10happened in Cizre yesterday through these lenses.

The Attitude of the Government

12The Turkish government did the things that needed to be done in a democratic 13country since the day Nevruz hysteria began to emerge. The mouths, with the highest authority in 14the state, stated with official releases that Nevruz holiday could be freely celebrated and 15any citizen would be able to organize celebrations in the way he/she desired.

16In addition, desires, which are directed at passing celebrations in the atmosphere of peace 17was not only expressed by officials, but also of the entire media in the country. The only 18condition required was that this celebration would not turn into an air of political 19demonstration and a kind of revolt against the government.

20In fact, it is not accurate to call it a condition. This is so, because police force of the state 21does not allow any peopleregardless of their ethnic origin who behave in such a way. 22Therefore, this condition should not be considered as a policy implemented only on citizens 23with Kurdish origin.

24Let us remember ... Did Turkish police act more tolerant toward the people who once25wanted to celebrate the 1st of May? Thus, nobody should look at the events in this region 26and consider it as a policy implemented on Kurdish people.

27The PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan stated in his interview published in Towards 28Two Thousand magazine last week that they did not have any policy to start a 29public uprising. But, the same PKK has distributed leaflets urging people to revolt 30in the region since the previous day. Such behaviors cannot be sincere at a time 31when nerves are wrecked and hands are on the trigger.

32Now, the PKK has openly declared that its political propaganda is founded on bloodshed. 33However, how far can this policy go? What would a political propaganda that drive 34unfortunate people, women and children to the front and show Kalashnikov at the back 35bring at the end?

36Öcalan says that they have no such a policy like separating from Turkey and establishing an 37independent state. But let us ask now... how would these people live together in the future 38if seeds of hatred are sown between these two communities through such kind of bloody 39events and the foundations of possible blood feud are laid?

When It Comes to Government's Policies...

41When I look at all these things I do not believe that Öcalan has a policy like living together. 42Because the policies of those who choose to live together concerning the 43future must be smarter.

44It is not that Turkey has not made any mistakes in the past. However, at least an ideal 45platform for humanitarian and democratic solution began to be formed by her policies in 46the last two years. The most concrete expressions of these were the statements made by 47Prime Minister Demirel and Deputy Prime Minister Inonu when they visited the region.

48It is possible to build a very beautiful social mosaic on the basis of this idea. But anyone, 49who want to live within this mosaic, should refrain themselves from attempts that will 50move these communities away from each other.

51It has no meaning to shed this much of blood and to sow seeds of this much of hatred for a 52few photos similar to "Uprising" that will appear in the world press.

53It should not be forgotten that sympathy messages, coming from the West, might suddenly 54become obstacles on the smallest realistic assessment. The West has amply distributed this 55kind of support both to Armenians and Kurds in the last century. But, eventually, these two 56communities had been the ones who suffered the most from all these.

57Now, it is needed to overcome all of these. It is essential to lay the foundations of beautiful, 58cultural mosaic and harmonious diversity of a democratic society. And humanitarian and 59democratic ideals determined within the framework of the OSCE should be put in the 60mortar of these foundations, but not the political machinations of the West aiming to 61destabilize this region.

TEXT XVIII (APPENDIX 18)

Ahmet Selim

Diagnosis is Wrong and so is the Path

23.03.1992

1Incidents in **Cizre** had not stopped until these lines were written. Incoming news reported that 2more than 30 people were killed in the incidents called “Nevruz Celebration.” Was it obvious 3that this would happen, or was it not? It was obvious. The night scene of **Cizre** before March 214 had clearly demonstrated the nature of the case. But some of the political authorities could still 5say “**Celebrations are being made, there is nothing remarkable**” even in the face of that scene

7Weapons are being fired and the sky is being lit by these shots, this scene is evaluated by 8political authorities as “**usual festival celebrations**” [SIC]...It is a big mistake. It is one of the 9biggest one in the chain of mistakes.

10Let’s go earlier than that.

11Neither a religious nor a national holiday of this nation called “Nevruz” is available. “Nevruz” 12is just a folkloric custom, not a holiday. It has never been welcomed with a spectacular interest 13until this year. It has only been very nominally and scarcely remembered in the East as well as 14in the West among Sunnis and Alevis. Its sudden prominence is completely a scheme. But 15“**reality**” was not discovered like this. It was enacted with a thought like “**Let us reimburse it 16widely to everyone so that it should not become a subject of specific abuse.**” Mr. Demirel 17could say “**They ruined the festival of the nation.**” even after all the events. It is like ruining 18a lost festival in terms of meaning. It is like people would

sit and cry “**because of not being 19able to enjoy Nevruz.**” It is like the nation’s main problem is not “terror games” that 20seriously threaten the country’s future [SIC]. Furthermore, **Fehmi Işıklar** congratulated him 21with colorful flowers and he accepted this greeting (even if he seemed reluctant).

22However, Demirel was supposed to respond like this “**This sorrowful sight can only be a 23subject of mourning. There is nothing to congratulate or to celebrate. Flower exchange 24cannot meananything than disturbing people**” and to reject **Fehim Işıklar**’s application 25acknowledgedly.

26...Nowhere “**calm and natural commemoration of Nevruz**” was carried out. The entire 27nation tried to indulge in a questionable waiting on March 21, and stay away from its everyday 28activities as much as possible (like former May 1st). Wasn’t it obvious that this would happen? 29It was. Isn’t it obvious that it would happen in all Nevruz celebrations without preventing 30terror and without spoiling schemes that mastermind terror? It is. Don’t we have any 31experiences from former 1 Mays? We do.

32Now that it is like this; why were the Nevruz “celebrations” permitted? Which festival’s 33permission was given even though it was known that PKK was making preparations for major 34protests through provocation and oppression by mingling with the public?

35There is a diagnostic error at the root of this problem. The most important reason for **wrong** 36diagnosis is the lack of **courage** for diagnosis. The problem is not the problem of today.**37Demirel**, 13 years ago in his letter dated August 23, 1979 addressed to the Prime Minister of 38that time said the following “You admit the presence of a terrorist called ‘Apocu’ in Urfa. You 39do not deny that this bandit extorts, tries people and commits murders... You do not also deny 40that hundreds of armed militants participated in the funeral held in Hilvan in front of the eyes 41of the entire township and government offices were shut down... It cannot be a matter of 42question that state fails to defeat such a bandit after dealing with him for months” and directed 43such an accusation to his addressee, **Bülent Ecevit**(Prime

Minister of that time) “**This bandit 44is honored with a political patronage by your government**” (Arcayürek, vol. 9).

45We are coming from those days.

46Demirel had accused **Ecevit** and **Ecevit** had accused **Demirel** of protecting terror in those 47days [SIC]. However, it was **the West** as well as “Marxist-progressive” circles and focus 48groups (which were alleged to be under its control) who were sponsoring terrorism. These 49were scratching Turkey’s achilles’ heel and were picking at it. The West, being the chief of 50evil orchestra, wanted to carry Turkey into a situation.

51There is no change in the essence of the scenario. The approach of “**September 12 arrived, it 52put pressure and some things emerged as a response**” means taking the matter lightly. 53September 12 is not the cause, but the consequence. The deeper causes of September 12 are 54the causes of the phases after it. September 12 was not absolute and distinct objective of the 55West. The West’s far-reaching goal was the ‘80s! [SIC].

56The current objective of the West is to install Turkey to the “**New World Order**” in the best 57place and in the most appropriate way. To walk on the path indicated by the West in blindness, 58to consider democracy as liberalization that is devoid of national-spiritual content and to hope 59that this kind of democracy will handle everything are the biggest agents of weakness before 60the terror. Let us not forget: **Unfounded Democracy**, which is based on imitation, is the 61biggest enemy of **Real Democracy**.

TEXT XIX (APPENDIX 19)

Ertuğrul Özkök

17.02.1999

Here is Turkey, here is the big state

1We are all in front of the television screen while Prime Minister **Bülent Ecevit**is making the 2historic statement. The sentence we are waiting for is coming.

3 In Turkey, the head of separatism **Abdullah Öcalan**is [SIC]. We are around the television.

4Our chief editors, our department chiefs, our columnists, our correspondents, our office boys...

6Applause breaks all of a sudden. Prime Minister **Ecevit**'s voice is shaking. We are plaintive. 7Everybody is embracing each other. Everybody is congratulating each other. We are all 8proud. Turkey is bringing the biggest head of rebel of the history to probe.

9This is the victory of Turkey. This means proving that our country is a big state to both to 10ourselves and to the whole world. This is the victory of a loyal people, of a nation whose 11consciousness of history has reached the top.

12This is the pride a nation has deserved who refresh their faith, shed tears in front of their 13funerals and sharpen their struggle saying “ **Long live Homeland**”, while their children 14martyrize in the mountains.

15We have been waiting for this day for 21 years, yes exactly for 21 years. We are waiting 16with patience. We are waiting with tears. We are waiting with motivation, motivation of 17struggle.

18There have been moments when our sadness has reached the top. There have been moments 19when we became grieved because of despair in the face of our shot babies.

20We worried over the babies most. Over the Kurdish babies [SIC]. Over the children of our 21citizens [SIC]. We held many funerals.

22As a matter of fact, there have been desperate moments of us. There have even been 23moments when we asked ourselves the most damned questions like “does some part of the 24homeland go away?”

But we did not dread. We shook off.

26We took an oath that we will not fall into the error we have fallen in the Balkans and in the Middle East.

28First, we got the initiative in the mountains. Mehmetçik who used to fall into a traitorous 29ambush every night has become the ruler of the mountains in a minute.

30We recaptured the mountains of the Turkish Republic, of our own, of our own with Kurds 31and Turks from the terrorists. We recaptured centime by centime and cave by cave. Then 32we turned our face to our neighbors who have hidden the head of separatism.

33We said **“Either throw it or we will come there.”**

34We said it not just with our politicians, but with our army, people, civil society organizations.

36The whole people took a stand uprightly in the behind of their state and army. The hands were clamped...

38The spirit of War of Independence has once again become our identity and personality.

39A people...

40Honest statesmen who have removed the head of separatism from Syria with a historic 41decision then who made life unbearable for him [SIC]

42Convinced soldiers.

43Silent intelligence officers. A historic hunt. A historic operation. Eventually a historic victory.

45Let's be happy together. Here is a victory that a big and convinced state can achieve. The 46most honorable answer to those who say **“They do it why cannot we?”**

47Here is Turkey...

48Here is a legacy that celebrates the 700. year. Here is a tremendous republic of 75 years. 49And here is victory...

50Thanks to all of you, to all of us. This victory belongs to all of us

51This victory belongs to the big state Turkey...

TEXT XX (APPENDIX 20)

Ali Bulaç

A New Era

18.02.1999

1The capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and bringing him to Turkey is an important 2development. This operation carried out in a particular plan and 3discipline, no matter what supporting roles and helps of the US, Israel and Greece 4intelligence units in this case have been is as important as it will be discussed over 5years. However, this operation being significant in terms of detective has a 6significance from another angle too. There is a need to stress this dimension.

7Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit who declared the capture of Öcalan has ended the last
8sentence of the press statement like this: “God protects our nation and all humanity
9from 9terror calamity and wars.” The chairman of Motherland Party Mesut Yılmaz
10who made a 10declaration after meeting with Prime Minister said like this: “ So far,
11there have been two 11important objectives. One has been to stop the terror, the
12other has been the capture of 12Öcalan. These two objectives have been reached.
13Now, we have two objectives in front of 13us: One is to make the necessary
14investments to the Southeastern region, the other is to 14speed up democratization.”

15There is a need to take these two explanations seriously. In my opinion, they give
16important 16clues concerning the steps that will be taken next. Doubtlessly, the
17most significant 17dimension of the “Kurdish (or Southeastern) issue” has been the
18PKK and Abdullah 18Öcalan. Whether the terror, external provocation, identity
19politics or economic 19backwardness is called as the cause, as a result the Southeast
20is in the position of a 20pathological environment that produces problems wherein
21the problems from time to time 21turn into crisis easily and this environment has
22maintained the pathological features for 22almost a century. Unless rooted, realistic
23and permanent precautions are taken, the region 23will keep on producing problems.

24The matter that should be cared about from now on must be the prevention of the
25institutionalization of violence and terror within the framework of “negative
26politics”. We should know well that this cannot be provided through absolute
27military measures which are not supported by economic and democratic
28betterment policies or through equivalent violence in return.

29Of course, the state is the “only institution having the right and authority to use
30legitimate 30physical violence” but the state is at the same time an institution closely
31interested in the basic economic, social and cultural problems of the citizens too.
32When these problems are not solved, the social peace easily breaks down by the
33help of other factors, the political unity gets under danger. Yet, an irrational thing
34would be done; because the material resources spent for military measures are far
35enough to provide the economic demands of the region in the near and medium
term.

36At this stage, the point that every clever person allies with is this: From now on, besides 37other measures, the Kurdish issue or Southeast issue can be confronted through 38democratization. If it were said that “above all, the terror ends”, the terror 39would fall to the weakest level. The violence movements which are probable to 40exist because of Apo’s capture indicate not to institutionalized and systematized 41terror but to reactions which will end after a short time.

42The main concept of democratization, rule of law and the feeling of everybody one 43by one “belonging to here, to this country” freely and safely do not depend on “ 44father state” anymore, but it is possible through defining “the concept of generous 45state” with regard to today’s conjuncture and current needs and demands.

46We have entered a new era, let us not spoil the historic opportunity that this era has presented to us.

Text XXI (APPENDIX 21)

Oktay Ekşi

The Kurdish Broadcast

04.01.2009

**1When we read in the newspapers that Deniz Baykal “has opposed to Kurdish
2TV broadcast”, God knows “Okay” we said. “Baykal has again talked exactly
3in the 3opposite way that has been expected from him.”**

**4We had accused him wrongly. More correctly, the wrong is not that of his, but
5is that of our press that has become famous with writing half of reality and not
writing the other half.**

7We found what **Baykal** said in a program broadcasted in **CNN Turk** on the web
8site of thischannel. As far as understood, he criticized the practice but his criticism
has not been against 9the “**essence**” in other words against the “**Kurdish**

10broadcast". He objected against such a broadcast to be performed by "**a state**
11institution" like **TRT**. There are many differences between the two. Hence, he
said so:

12"It is rather incorrect for one of the institutions of a state to support an
13ethnic effort. It is against our state understanding. Everyone can broadcast in
14their own mother tongue. There is the order of RTÜK. It broadcasts within
the body of Turkey's laws."

15Does making Kurdish broadcast start on **TRT** mean "**state's supporting an**
ethnic 16effort" like **Baykal** said? Or is it suitable to see those realities of ethnic
origins and to **17**satisfy the need by protecting the basic values of the state?

18It is possible to defend both arguments in a strong way.

19If the **Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK)** were equipped and strong
enough **20**to carry out their duty rightly, we would say that **Baykal**'s argument is
true. But the truth is **21**that **RTÜK** does not have the possibility to watch all the
22broadcasts in an effective way. That time, wily nilly other argument gains strength.

23Likewise, if the issue were "**the putting into process of a petition written in**
24Kurdish" we would object too. In the same way, we are also against the demands
25"education at schools in Kurdish language" or "**the teaching of Kurdish in**
26official schools" because, then it means that not **individual rights** but "**the rights**
27of the Kurdish whole" is being mentioned. Moreover, the unitary structure of
Turkey will not allow this.

28However, removing the barriers in front of our human-beings having **Kurdish**
origin for **29**expressing themselves is something completely different. This is after
all the need for a **30**democracy based on **individual rights and liberties**.

31For example, **Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Şahin** has started a work on
abolishing the **32**rule banning the people in prisons to speak other languages than
Turkish with their **33**relatives. He has made right.

34Can there really be such a non-sense ban? Is there any defensible side of your
inability to 35want something basic from your family because of your not knowing
36Turkish? Likewise, it has been declared that the **JDP Istanbul deputy Dengir
Mir Mehmet Firathas 37demanded the lift of ban on making propaganda in the
38elections in a language other than Turkish** (for example Kurdish)

39Dengir Mir Mehmet Firat is right too like the **former Minister of Interior
Affairs 40Abdülkadir Aksu** who said **“The mother tongue is as halal as our
mother’s milk”**...If 41the mass in front of the candidate understands which
42language, the candidate of course expresses his views in the language the
43listeners know [SIC]. The opposite is exactly a dialogue of the deaf.

44What the **“state”** having the dignity of being a **“state”** should do, is not to
45prevent people, but to leave them free, but to do what is necessary if there is an
46element of crime in that propaganda through taking the necessary measures. It is
as simple as this.

TEXT XXII (APPENDIX 22)

Mustafa Ünal

While a taboo is breaking down...

04.01.2009

1Not long before, 10 years ago, would you believe when it is said ‘One day will
come, TRT 2will broadcast in Kurdish for 24 hours.’ I do not think, it would not be
3even dreamt of it. The years when the Kurd, the Kurdish were denied got behind.
4Denial and rejection did not bring any solution. They aggravated the problem.

5The retired pashas who are the architects of harsh policies said ‘Yes we went
6wrong’ one day. The pasha of September 12 Kenan Evren said ‘The ban on
7Kurdish was a mistake’. This too is a progress. However, the ones who have turned
8the sanction of ‘There is no Kurd’ into state policy for years must pay a price.

9There is not a luxury of you to become mistaken or go wrong if you use state power. What 10will the pains experienced because of this sanction be? Think about the ones who get into 11trouble just because of saying 'I am Kurd', the ones who cannot harbor in their 12homelands for singing Kurdish folk songs...

13Remember, Ahmet Kaya in a meeting said 'I want to sing Kurdish song', there remained 14nothing that did not happen to him. Scarcely, he would be lynched. When he was in exile in 15Paris, he lost his life. His grave is far from his homeland. Concerning the sanctions 16today, wonder if tomorrow it will be said 'We have gone wrong for not accepting the 17headscarf as a reality of Turkey.'

18The ones who have gone wrong about the Kurd and Kurdish can well go wrong in 19other sanctions as well. Hence, they go wrong too.

20The Kurdish channel after a test broadcast for one week has officially begun 21broadcasting within the body of TRT on the last day of 2008. Kurdish has not been 22heard from TRT for the first time. Short-dated programmes had been made with 23different languages and dialects. Such as Kurdish, Bosnian and Arabic... These 24programs have constituted the basis for the broadcastings to turn into channel. Years ago, the SAP television had been a result 25of a quest as well. The conditions of that day did not let for more.

26I participated in the opening cocktail that the Kurdish channel has started. There were three 27minister and deputies from the ruling party, the absence of the political opposition was 28salient. The region party DTP did not take an interest. The RPP remained distant. The NAP reacted.

30The DTP objected saying 'It is a project of AK Party'. There are political worries 31on the basis of the objection. It is afraid of losing position in the local elections 32that it will compete with AK Party because of the channel. The reaction of the 33NAP which exhibits a strict attitude on this issue is not a surprise. It cannot be said 34that it has turned its objection into a campaign either.

35However, it is hard to understand the RPP. Baykal objected the broadcasting on 36TRT, 'It does not happen on state channel.' he said. He also described it as 'a very

37dangerous stuff' Baykal, nearly a year ago, pointed at the necessity of Kurdish
38broadcasting for delivering the message to the Kurds in Northern Iraq accurately
39and healthily. Although he interpreted the Kurdish broadcasting as a support for
40ethnic identity, the words 'every ethnic identity is the honor of person and pride of
the state' he said last year have not been forgotten yet.

41TRT 6 will broadcast for the Kurds in Northern Iraq as well. Is it true to say that
the Kurds 42outside can watch, but the ones inside cannot? Of course, not. Baykal's
objection about 43TRT is meaningless. By contrast, the ones who have extreme
sensitivity about this say that 44'controlled broadcasting will be made more healthily
through state channel' In the future, 45private channels can step in too.

46Doubtlessly, the Kurdish channel will have a mission like transmitting the
47messages correctly. Not our citizens in the Southeast, the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and
48Syria will follow as well. It is not right to see it as limited inside. If Turkey wants
49to have a say in the region, the existence of such a channel is inevitable. The
50multi-linguistic broadcasting opening of TRT is not composed of only Kurdish,
the channels like the Arabic and Persian channels are on the line.

52The meaning of the Kurdish channel is great with regard to 'breaking of a taboo'
53'Breaking a taboo' sounds nice but there is a need for political courage and
determination 54for this. Even, it is necessary to lose temper and take risk. Turgut
Özal passed into history 55as a statesman and politician who broke taboos. His
56approach to Kurdish question had been radical as well.

57If he lived long enough, we could meet with Kurdish channel along with many
reforms in 58the '90s. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who does not make us long for Özal in
courage and 59determination does not beware of advancing upon the taboos.

60Kurdish broadcast used to be taboo. It has been Erdoğan who tore down this taboo.
61Erdoğan is a taboo-breaker too. It will be seen in this process that, the fears and
worries are 62baseless. I don't know whether you are aware that purifying from the
taboos makes Turkey 63a more livable country for everybody...

TEXT XXIII (APPENDIX 23)

Sedat Ergin

The Lessons We Should Take From Uludere

03.01.2012

1Most probably, today in the world a few air forces have the technological
2superiority and operational capability to shoot a target given to itself right on nose
3to that degree in night circumstances and in a difficult geography. This situation is
4not enough to remove a basic truth. Everybody is as strong as their weakest point.
5Turkish Air Forces' having the most developed weapon systems and the power
6perception created by the usage of the F-16s by the pilots who have a very high
7level of readiness for war can become invalid and meaningless all of a sudden as a
result of an error in security intelligence analysis.

8There is a compressed reality between the F-16s' hurling bombs from the sky in the
darkness 9of the night and the despair the Kurdish children felt at that moment who
have tried to 10protect themselves through hiding under the donkeys that they put
smuggled goods. What 11 squeezed between is the Kurdish question and the
weakest point of Turkey.

The Need to Revise The Perceptions

13Let's try to approach to this weak point through reversing some perceptions
regarding the 14Uludere Incident. The biggest reason about the event's creating a
huge shock around 15Turkey was that the ones died have been the civilians who
smuggled. Many of them were 16at the age of childhood. Like many observers have
stressed, if the killed were a terrorist 17group trying to get in from the border,
probably an environment of indignation would not 18be born to that degree, the
transmission of the event by the newspapers and the headlines 19would be very
different. However, if the people died were the terrorists, the loss of them 20would
injure some sector of the people living in this country in the same degree. Maybe,
21there is a need to start from that dimension of the affair. We should develop a new

view 22trying to understand everybody who feels the loss of a life and mourns for whoever dies 23under shooting whether they are from PKK or not.

The Deadlock Of Military Solution

25You call it either a massacre or an accident, whatever you name, the tragedy experienced 26last week in border in Uludere should have shown a basic reality shaking the whole Turkey.

27The death of 35 young people even as the result of an error with no evil purpose, the big 28catastrophe seen here are the results emerged by the continuing of a war situation in 29Turkey. When we get to the root of the issue, we see that the error made is a derivative of 30the clash environment. As long as the Kurdish question stays unsolved and as long as the 31clash environments continue, the repetition of the similar events in different ways is 32always conceivable. What does not change and what increases in a stable way is the 33number of the dead people in both sides. Uludere is the point that the state understanding 34which insists on security policies and which starts out from the acceptance that a solution 35can be found through dealing heavy blows to the PKK has come.

36This understanding has shown the same attitude towards the PDP that represents the 37Kurdish political movement as the PKK without making any distinction, enclosed this 38movement from every corner through fast arrestment waves, tried to take its breath away. 39The encountering of the Uludere Incident with a term when the Kurdish political movement 40experiences such a siege mentality has triggered an environment where the reactions are 41shaped with the sharpest lines.

Danger Bells For Social Peace

43Let's face this, Turkey has made a very unlucky enter to 2012 because of the 44Uludere catastrophe. All the signs indicate that the incident has caused a very big 45breakpoint. The spiritual climate that appears in an important segment of the Kurds through turning the 46solution process into an inextricable condition and aggrandizing the clash environment in 47the country more is at stake. By hook or by

crook, there is a need to stop this jumping the 48shark and prevent the loosening of the heart bridges totally.

49One of the conditions to prevent this is an attitude that every civilized country need to 50display. The event should be investigated in a detailed way with all of its dimensions and 51the facts should be shared with the public with full bareness. To apologize by admitting the 52error should be a virtue suiting the states which value human life.

53However, one should not feel settled with that. We need to accept the meaninglessness of 54coming to the same starting point again by turning with a rising cost in this problem lasting 55for almost 30 years. The constitution of a means for a new approach to the Kurdish problem 56may be the only alleviation of this unfortunate event where we lost our 35 young human-beings.

TEXT XXIV (APPENDIX 24)

Bülent Korucu

Neither the Justice nor the Compassion Should Be Delayed

03.01.2012

1The killing of our 35 civilian citizens in Uludere by our own jet aircrafts can be the 2start for a new era. And we can build this new term hand in glove. So that, we can 3produce prosperity from a malignity. Above all, the approach of ‘your pain is our 4pain’ should not remain as a saying of consolation. So, the event should be enlightened without being delayed.

5A different voice comes out of every head like the elephant description of the blind people. 6The question of “Is it an accident, a conspiracy or an evil purpose?” should be answered in a 7transparent, quick and satisfying way. The judiciary mechanism which can advance upon 8unidentified murders and upon the activities preparing conditions for military coups is our 9biggest chance. The prosecutors who can probe the security bureaucrats at the level of force 10commander and police chief should advance upon this affair with the same self-confidence too.

11Secondly, despite not bringing back the dead people, concrete steps that can ease the pain 12of the remaining ones should be taken. The mechanism of material and moral indemnities 13should be enabled urgently. These are the processes that have already begun, our demand is 14their finalization without the deepening of the wound [SIC]. Like the delaying justice, the 15delaying compassion does not the produce the expected results either.

16I find it useful to record two situations which have emerged through the desperate event. 17First is the state attitude, more precisely the observation of the change. Not much before, 18yet, 10 years ago, there used to be a ‘deep state’ which executed in the middle of the streets 19and saw this as a source of pride. The legal elements of the state were either suppressed or 20turned into a partner in crime.

21Would you look for the ones who say “The state can sometimes get out of the routine” or 22for the ones who circulate lists of death with NSC headings? Instead of that arrogant state 23now stands the shy state. The politics and bureaucracy which give birth to the hope that the 24blood of 35 human beings would not be left on the ground and which at least do not show 25ripeness are in front of us.

26The second important attitude is the love the KCK/PKK organization feels for the 27village guards whom it used to see as a mortal enemy. Not much before, three 28months ago, the organization which martyred a village guard through jumping 29into a village guard’s house in Ağrı used this affair well.

30Many of the ones who died are the children of the village guards who entrust their life to 31the soldiers and go on operation. The timing and the identities of the

sufferers weaken the 32probability of evil purpose. At a time when psychological superiority in operations has 33been embraced against PKK, there is no rational explanation for this. The Silvan and 34Çukurca attacks aimed to deform the balance of the state and pull it to the years of '90s. 35The last attack with 24 martyrs and 18 casualties was for heating up the war a bit more and 36for making the security forces to 'get out of routine'. Thank God, there was no falling into trap.

38It is hard to believe that the security forces which have not done this in that mood have 39intentionally attacked the civilians while turning the pointer to their advantage. What 40purpose it will serve other than being in a hard position in internal and external public opinion?

42The examples like the hitting of Kocatepe informer during Cyprus Operation by our own 43jet aircrafts or the ambushment of the unions coming from an operation by their associates 44who get security measures are known. What differentiates Uludere from the others is not 45the number of the dead people. Likewise when looked from perspective of the dead and the 46relatives, the pain of one person is the same as well.

47Can it be argued that the trauma of the wife and children of Serkan İpek who became 48martyr in the friend fire of the village guards slighter? The important point is the killing of 49the civilians when there is enough time for the approval of security intelligence. The 50probability of the existence of an error will not bring back the lost lives. It will just help us 51protect our hopes for the future.

52The probability of the resurgence of the state of the '90s is very terrible. Exactly for that, 53first the probability of conspiracy or evil purpose should be probed and measures that 54would comfort the people should be taken.

TEXT XXV (APPENDIX 25)

Sedat Ergin

The Requirement for National Recovery

31.05.1998

1An important conference, which went unnoticed, took place in Beirut at a time when the 2French National Assembly accepted the draft resolution on “**France openly recognizes 3the Armenian genocide of 1915**” in Paris the previous day. The conference was on 4“**Dangers of Turkish State’s Expansionist Policy in the Region.**” One of the 5organizers of the conference was “**Committee for the Defense of the Armenian 6Cause**” which was led by the Armenian Dashnak Party. The second one was “**Kurdish 7Parliament in Exile**” which was in line with the PKK. Besides, the representatives 8from these two organizations, some academics and politicians were also invited to the 9conference. The list of their country of origin is: Iran, Lebanon, the Greek Cypriot 10Administration, Greece, Russia, Syria, Bulgaria and Armenia. **Yasar Kaya**, the 11President of “**Kurdish Parliament in Exile**” and **Konstantin Zadolin**, from the 12Russian Parliament, were among the participants of the conference.

13While the French National Assembly took Turkey on; it must be explanatory enough 14to see fanatical Armenian groups and Kurdish nationalism in line with the PKK 15entering into a public display of solidarity.

* * *

16There is no need for conspiracy theories to explain this picture. The front, which is 17against Turkey, reveals itself openly in the Beirut-Paris axis without any need to hide 18itself. The foundations of this front were firstly laid by the collaboration between 19fanatical Armenian and Greek groups after the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974.

20The Greek and Armenian lobbies in the Western world, which were intertwined with 21these groups inflicted heavy damages to the interests of Turkey by coming into play. 22The most striking example of this was the embargo decision passed by the United States Congress. 24The PKK, which appeared subsequently, took its place in this hostility front as a natural ally.

26The behavior pattern, which confronted Turkey in the second half of the 1970s has 27been repeated once again at the end of the 1990s. It seems as if the operation of 28getting Turkey into a clamp is progressing step by step. And Turkey, which played the 29role of further outpost for the Western world during the cold war, receives intolerance 30and hostility today in all fronts from its allies and is quickly excluded from the West.

31Is Turkey a country which deserves such a treatment like in the latest decision of 32French Parliament? Does Turkey not have any power to deter these kinds of 33treatments? Are the cards in her hands so weak?

* * *

34We all know that the political instability and general mess that Turkey has fallen into 35are the things that provoke the enthusiasm of this front of hostility. An opportunity was 36presented for everyone who catches Turkey at its weak moment and has a score to settle 37with her. Times passes. Turkey's chance to break this circle that surrounds itself, first of 38all, requires a national recovery from within. However, those, who are supposed to 39carry out this recovery, are mostly busy with the struggle of their 38own personal 40political interests.

41Turkey should wake up from this plight of negligence that its citizens have begun to 42consider embarrassing.

TEXT 26 (APPENDIX 26)

Fehmi Koru

The Real Reason

01.06.1998

1“Did the Turks carry out a genocide against the Armenians in 1915?” This is the
2latest issue of debate that was inserted into the world agenda by force. What is
3known is that a large number of people, no matter if they were Turks, Kurds,
4Armenians, Greeks or Arabs, lost their lives... There is no way for us to know
5what the ‘reality’ was behind this since so many years elapsed. There are people
among those who look at it through the lens of the 6‘history’ that needs to be
objective admitted that “there was a holocaust,” there are also those 7who said “such
an event never happened in history”; those, who advocate both point of 8views, are
the ones who are ‘respectable’ people bearing the title of ‘historian’...
9Moreover, even if we suppose that these claims are ‘real’ for a moment, how can
the people 10of today correct the errors of the past? If we assume that it could be
corrected another 11question confronts us: Who can force the people of today to fix
an error committed years 12ago and with what reason?

13The decision of the French Parliament, which proposes that “Turks carried out a
genocide 14against the Armenians in 1915 and thus they should be condemned” is a
pointless attempt15from whatever perspective you look at it. It is not reasonable that
the decision aims at 16satisfying the Armenian minority in France or pro-Dashnaks
who took the possession of the 17government in Yerevan. To top it all, it invited
developments such as undermining 18traditional Turkish-French relations and
channeling of the outrage of the Turkish public 19who experienced anger due to
being declined from the gate of Europe.

20The decision that France took does not carry much significance at this point. The French 21Government announced through its ambassador in Ankara that it did not approve the 22initiative taken by the parliament. However, it will have a binding force for the government 23if the decision is discussed and supported in the Senate. It should not be forgotten that this 24move, which was initiated in France can spread in other countries and the danger of unfair 25and improper decisions, which condemn Turkey can follow one another. There are also 26experts who warn that “ASALA terrorism may revive again.”

27Turkey experienced serious problems in its recent history due to Armenian allegations 28regarding 1915. Accompanied by these claims, the Armenian ASALA organization carried 29out a series of actions within and outside Turkey and many distinguished Turkish diplomats 30lost their lives at the hands of the Armenian terrorism. Claims and supportive decisions 31have a parallel effect on the Turkish national consciousness together with ‘demands for 32land’; Turkey is the land of those who are extraordinarily sensitive on the matter of such 33demands.

34One of the reasons why the claims, which were thought to be forgotten and remained on the 35dusty shelves of history, were introduced again nowadays after being re-heated is due to 36change of government in Armenia; those who captured the government in Yerevan are the 37politicians who are fanatic to the degree to prefer Turkey’s hostility instead of its 38friendship...In addition to this, another important reason is of course the extraordinary 39circumstances that Turkey goes through. State-nation integrity got serious wounds for the 40first time in a long time; the public prefers to stay away from the political system because 41of injuries in democracy. The environments, where the domestic problems are in 42abundance, also render countries weak abroad; Turkey goes through one of the most 43sensitive periods that renders it susceptible for effects from outside today [SIC]. As the 44effects of these were felt in many areas, it also came to surface due to West’s re-adopting 45the Armenian allegations that were forgotten for a while.

46The point that interests us most is this: Turkey, which succeeded in driving off similar 47initiatives before, proved to be inadequate in stopping this new move that

48began in France; no doubt, this inadequacy will give courage to those who desire
49to pressurize Turkey in the international arena. The crack in state-nation unity, the
50tendency of ‘democracy without people’, the madness of ‘pro-McCarthy witch
51hunt,’ obsession that seeks help from ‘final solution’ and the search of ‘state
52without people’ do not only prevent economic initiatives, but also render the
country powerless against external developments.

53Turkey will find an appropriate method of retaliation for France which launched
this 54improper initiative; it will also try to take measures in order to avoid similar
decisions to 55follow one after another. The only measure we can suggest here is
this: the effects of the 56February 28 process should be removed at once,
eliminations that were indicated by the 57filth revealed in Susurluk should be carried
out and reintegration of nation and state should be implemented...

59Otherwise, history will not forgive those who brought these evils to the country
even if we 60forgive them...

TEXT XXVII (APPENDIX 27)

Oktay Ekşi

Ask For It But Also Know How To Give It

10.08.2003

**1THE FENER Greek Patriarch Bartholomew paid a 45-minute visit to Deputy
2Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül the previous
day.**

3We learned from newspapers that Mr. Patriarch asked support from Mr. **Gül**
especially for 4the re-opening of **Seminary School in Heybeliada.**

5In response to this, Gül asked Patriarch **Bartholomew** to avoid correspondence that
6introduces him as “**ecumenical**” (a religious authority having universal position),
because it 7was contrary to the Treaty of Lausanne.

8We will see in coming days that Mr. **Bartholomew** will not renounce this title. He
also has a 9reason for it... He would say “**The Turkish Republic, to which I am
just a citizen, does 10not want to recognize me as ecumenical but the entire
world accepts this**”

What he says is right.

12According to Lausanne, **the Patriarchate** is an institution affiliated with the laws
of 13Turkish Republic. **Bartholomew** is the head of that institution. Therefore,
Mr.14Bartholomew, at least, has no right to use this title in any writing or document
that 15originates from himself.

16Let’s talk about it before moving to the other issue:

17Does it not get attention that Mr. **Bartholomew** prefers to talk these issues
with**Minister 18ofForeignAffairs** but not with, for example, **Minister of Interior
Affairs**or **Minister of 19Education**?

20Mr. **Patriarch** is not the representative of an institution **outside of Turkey**...

21You would say “**Yes, but you are forgetting that Mr. Gul is also the Deputy
Prime Minister.**”

23It is true but how would you respond if someone appears and says “**do you believe
that the 24real reason is this?**”

25Secondly, the “**Seminary School**” issue that the **Patriarch** brings up at every
occasion...

26The above-mentioned school was in operation until 1971, when “**all high schools
with27private status transferred to the public.**” It was compulsory for them to
either affiliate28with other private high schools to state universities or to close down.
Patriarchate must 29have objected this schools’affiliation with state universities, so it
was necessarily closed 30down.

31Now, **Patriarch**, not just the Patriarch, all foreign organizations, clergy and
politician that 32the Patriarchate influenced – says “**Open this school at any case. It**

should not be 33combined with your universities. We do not want it. It should be affiliated with the 34Patriarchate.”

35Is it not this demand for **privilege?**

36Let’s offer solution to **Patriarch Bartholomew**: Why do you not establish a university 37and affiliate your school with it? Do you not know that setting up a university in Turkey is 38easier than setting up a shop?

39Moreover, Mr. **Patriarch** has “**demands,**” but we do not know what he “**agrees to give.**” 40For example, is it not better if Mr. **Bartholomew** says “**I will open the gate which we 41closed in order to protest Mahmoud II’s hanging of the Greek Patriarch of that 42period because of his incitement to revolt? I will use the name of Istanbul instead of 43Constantinople in my correspondence while mentioning Istanbul.**”

TEXT XXVIII (APPENDIX 28)

Ekrem Dumanlı

The Seminary School

10.08.2003

1The Fener Greek Patriarch, who met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül the 2previous day, requested the reopening of the Seminary School in Heybeliada from the 3minister. For Turkey, this meant the re-introduction of an agenda that has long been 4debated. There is not any clear result yet; but it is said that Gül had given warm messages. In 5addition, it is also known that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan leans towards the re-6opening of the Seminary School. Yet more, Mufti of Xanthi reported a negative opinion 7about school in Prime Minister’s Thessaloniki visit, Erdogan said “studying does not harm 8anybody” according to the report of Zaman yesterday. It is quite normal for the government 9to seek solutions to the incident; because Turkey is confronted by this issue at every 10international platform, mainly at European Union. The Turkish state, which approaches to 11Seminary School skeptically, has some historical reasons. But, it is not easy to

explain the 12 reasons of it to the world for not giving permission to open schools for a religious 13 community whose numbers fell below 5 thousand.

14 In fact, Turkey is anxious that the school model, which is affiliated with religious authority, 15 will lead to other requests later on. Because religious schools in Turkey have to be under 16 the control of the state according to the laws. Religious vocational high schools and 17 religious studies are formulas produced by the state for her citizens in order to meet the 18 requirement of religious schools. This formula to be broken for minority groups, the state 19 does not want [SIC].

20 The Minister of Foreign Affairs, according to what was reflected in newspapers, proposed 21 an intermediary formula for Seminary School to function under the body of the Faculty of 22 Theology. This is not a new idea. After all, the school in Heybeliada was closed upon the 23 decision of the Constitutional Court in 1971 on the nationalization of the private religious 24 schools. The Fener Greek Patriarch knows this situation very well. Therefore, he came 25 along to the meeting with the minister in the company of his lawyers. Because it is not 26 enough for Greek citizens, who have difficulties in finding reverends, to overcome this 27 problem if the government leans towards resolving; at the same time, they also have to 28 overcome legal obstacles.

29 The school issue, which came up several times in the past, reminded of showdown between 30 the parties and was put into refrigerator again by obtaining no tangible results. It seems like 31 it is different this time. Government's nonchalant approach towards this issue and 32 Patriarchate's attempts to find solutions by taking legal problems into consideration may 33 produce a tangible result.

34 For one thing, Turkey should not approach to the matter with phobias. It will not fit to 35 Turkey, who is the Ottoman inheritor to resist religious requests of a minority which has 36 been living in our territories for centuries. Since the state has the right to inspect the matter 37 on legal grounds, it will carry out necessary legal investigation if any illegal activities are 38 conducted, and the courts will move into action if a criminal element is being witnessed. 39 Anyhow this country's intelligence

service, police and inspectors – just as in all democratic 40countries – will supervise the process...

41Turkey has already left the conditions of 1971 behind. Many of the schools having 42foreign status that day found legal basis for themselves and continued to operate. For 43example, Robert College was transferred to Bosphorus University in 1971. Then it was 44combined with Albanian Girls College and continued its operations as Private American 45Robert College. Today, Turkey is a more modern, more liberal and more developed country 46compared to the 1970s. Perhaps, an intermediary formula can be found under the umbrella of private universities...

47I am aware that some people approach to this issue in a provocative manner. Even 48Islamic arguments are employed time to time. However, it is quite obvious what sort of 49freedomIslam has introduced to the members of other religions. If the problem is the injury 50of Turkey's national interests, then it is not difficult to take necessary actions and produce 51smart strategies. Stalin, a leader who was completely against religion, appointed Sergius to 52the office of Moscow Patriarchate in 1943. Communism applied such a way in order to 53gain prestige in international world of Orthodoxy. Is it an advantage or disadvantage that 54the center of Orthodoxy world is located in our country? This should also be thought well.

55My personal opinion is that both the government and the Patriarchate should approach to56the issue in good faith and have to meet at a common point. It is neither right to force the 57government into procedure that it cannot overcome nor to turn deaf ear to the religious 58requests of the people who have been living in this country for centuries.

TEXT XXIX (APPENDIX 29)

Oktay Ekşi

Who is Right?

22.12. 2009

1The Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomew, so to speak, exploded to a reporter from 2CBS television in the end and got everything off his chest.

3Let's note without going into details of his words: His most severe words were that in 4Turkey he was feeling as if "he was crucified" from time to time.

5"Well, was he unfair to say that?"

6Even if his words got out of balance, let us note from the beginning:

7No! He was not unfair at all.

8Let's ask one more question without meaning its "cause":

9"Was he right in all of his demands?"

10No! He was only right in some of them.

11When it comes to details:

12First of all, that word did not "slip out of his mouth" or he did not "exceed his intention." 13Let's say Patriarch Bartholomew met with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan 5 times, or you 14may say 10 times. We know for sure he repeated the same thing.

15He placed his desires in front of Prime Minister which can be summarized as such: "Re-16open the Theological School in Heybeliada. Turkish government should also recognize 17that I am Ecumenical Patriarch. Please return foundations owned by Patriarchate or 18Greeks that passed to the Treasury by law to their original owners." Apparently, he was 19put off every time by saying "Inshaallah, Mashallah."

20We are confident that he put up with the situation since he lives in Turkey. He waited and he 21did not sit idle on the other hand. He made all the foreigners with influence on the 22government repeat these requests. In other words, he used all kinds of pressure to impose their demands.

24But, he finally exploded when there was not any progress –except the limited progress on 25the return of properties – in none of their demands.

26We learn from Bartholomew's words that appeared at Haber Turk newspaper on December 2719, 2009 that whenever these issues come up in his meeting with the Prime Minister, 28Erdogan provided him responses that indicated **"You want these from me, but the Greek 29government does not allow the opening of Turkish mosques there. It does not recognize 30the Mufti elected by Turks of Western Thrace. I cannot do anything unless these are 31being made there."** He continues after stating these: **"What is our fault that they are 32not done over there? We perform our military duty, pay taxes and cast votes here."**

33Right... they pay taxes, perform military duties and cast votes here. Of course, they will 34bring their demands to the attention of Prime Minister of Turkey and ask for solution

35It seems that **the Patriarch** is not wrong at all in terms of **"procedure."** One way or 36another, say **"we will do it"** and finalize the matter or say **"we cannot do"** and put an end to 37it. Why do you keep on putting off?

38But, this is the front side of the medallion like we mentioned earlier...Bartholomew's 39remarks stating **"Whatever the Greek government does over there should not affect 40here"** do not have any basis. Let us talk about them tomorrow if nothing interferes.

TEXT XXX (APPENDIX 30)

Ahmet Turan Alkan

The Crucifix Empathy!

23.12.2009

1I do not know what sort of feelings of torment the concept of the crucifixion corresponds in 2Christian theology, but it is a style of execution that Romans applied as far as it was 3included in historical narrations; they leave the offender to death by fastening him/her to two 4diagonal planks of wood with nails from his/her hands and feet, and piercing his/her belly 5with the sword or spear.

6According to the explanation rejected by the Qur'an, a crown, made of thorny plants, was 7placed on Prophet Jesus' forehead; this crown carries a meaning that taunts with the 8prophetic mission of Christ and with the alleged claim that he was "King of the Jews." In 9some portraits, we see a Latin writing "inri" on the wooden plaque that showed the 10indication of this ridicule; it stood for "Jesus of Nazareth, the king of the Jews." It should 11be kept in mind that crucifixion was considered a fitting treatment only for despicable 12crimes such as theft, robbery etc., at that time.

13Patriarch Bartholomew's words of "we sometimes feel as if we are crucified" were 14encountered with a pointless reaction in some conservative milieus that are in the habit of 15approaching all kinds of contrary and opposing opinions with tolerance; perhaps, he was 16also misunderstood. It is beyond my job or authority to explain what or which was 17misunderstood, but are we not capable of, at least, feeling empathy on what sort of torment 18or a long-lasting form of torture this "crucifixion" is?

19We are dealing with all kinds of things extending from inconsiderateness, blindness and 20hatred arising from ignorance, treason to nasty implications of becoming a fan of Damat 21Ferit, and Ceasefire documents. The difference among those who utter statements around 22the issue of initiative is not a diminutive roughness, but a cliff. It is a sugar-coated poison 23for some and a way of wisdom and prudence yet for others. If you say "for God's sake! 24you ruined these students of vocational high schools for the sake of sacrificing students of 25religious vocational high school," your name will immediately be written in "to be 26sacrificed" list in reactionism action plan. Asking the first person, who is supposed to 27cleanse the institution that he/she is in charge of, "why don't you do your job?" is called, 28ironically disrespectfulness in this country. Condemning those who plan to kill secondary 29school children by placing explosives at a submarine in the museum became courage, and 30defending them became patriotism. Criticizing bad-intentions of those who were brought 31before the court by filing a criminal complaint with legal files as thick as dictionaries is 32considered to be "negligence, even misguidedness."

33It has also become a fault to call the pro-Ergenekons “Ergenekon-fan” by filling our 34mouths. Coup-defendants in prison are patriot, we are ceasefire document. Assassins are 35the truest children of the country, our parents became suspicious!...

36For years, we have been called to account for all goats stolen in this country!... This is also 37a kind of crucifix; we experienced bitter taste of living as second class citizen in our own 38country. Our veiled people know this well; Those, who go to Officer’s Club for the first 39time in order to share the happiness of their children and are turned down at the gate, also 40know it well. Our sons perform their military service in the most dangerous places of this 41country; their commanders deem proper to write our names in the first row of the threat list. 42We have been blacklisted for years; If we ask one day “why do you include us in blacklist, 43my friend, what wrong of mine did you see?” there will not be any type of scolding that we 44do not experience and any threats that we have not been imposed.

45I think being crucified is this or something similar to this. They fasten rusty nails in your 46wrists, place a sloppy crown, made of barbed wire on your forehead, and pierce your belly 47with evil words. They write this on the wood over your head in order to degrade you: 48“Religious fanatic, believer, the JDP arse-licker...”I understand Mr. Bartholomew. I 49understand how it is to be crucified a little.

TEXT XXXI (APPENDIX 31)

Mehmet Y. Yilmaz

It Is An Important Step But An Incomplete One

03.09.2011

1It is an important decision to give permission to the children of Armenian citizens, who 2illegally work in Turkey, to study at schools belonging to Armenian community in Turkey.

3When it is considered that deporting these people was believed to be the first thing that 4comes to the minds of some people with regard to any problems with Armenia in recent past, 5the importance of this step is understood better.

6It is known that there are almost 1000 children in this situation in Istanbul, and of course it is 7also possible that number can be higher. But, there is one problem that these children will 8not be able to receive diploma from the schools they graduate. Schools will provide them a 9document, but it is quite uncertain what function this document will play in their future educational life.

10A portion of these children had already been receiving education in those schools without 11getting report cards, diploma, etc. The decision will only legitimize this education. That is 12it. The JDP government can sometimes take such important and courageous decisions, but, 13whatever is happening, this step remains incomplete in the end.

14Moreover, the children of those, who come from countries such as Romania, Georgia, 15Moldova, etc., are in the same situation. Their numbers may not be as much as Armenians, 16but they are also children and they need to receive education. Turkey overlooks these 17people to come here and work for this or that reason. If it were not the case, this much of 18people would not be present in our country as illegal immigrant workers. Ministry of 19Education had better not leave this important step incomplete, but provide these children 20the chance to receive real education and diploma. And the ones to benefit from these rights 21should not only be the children of illegal Armenian immigrant workers. Because these 22children are not the cause of the conflict between Turkey and Armenia, and the results of 23these conflicts should not be the ignorance of the children.

Will the minorities feel themselves “equal citizen”?

24Decree law on the return of the properties belonging to minority foundations will be able to 25put an end to lawsuits that Turkey already loses in European Court of Human Rights.

26It is a situation that should already have been made until today, now it has been fulfilled.

27If it has not been done, either a lot of money would have to be paid with the decision of 28ECHR or their properties would have to be returned. In other words, the situation should 29not be seen as a great success of the government like it was presented in the partisan media. 30This is nothing other than accepting the attitude of an international court. (By the way, let 31me remind you the foul-mouthed writer of Sabah newspaper. He thinks that the properties 32of minority foundations were confiscated in 1936, but truth is not like that. 33The properties of foundations were confiscated in 1974 by a decision of the Court of 34Cassation and it covers properties that were obtained after 1936!).

35I also read commentaries in newspapers stating that with this law “minorities in Turkey will 36feel like equal citizens from now on”

37I think they are the comments that are made a little early.

38Of course the return of properties belonging to minority foundations is an important step, 39but it does not show that all of practices against minorities will completely improve.

40It is necessary to see whether the bureaucracy would abandon its traditionalized attitude 41about these issues or not in order to be able to know this.

42Who will deal with the issues of minorities? Is it Ministry of Interior Affairs as in the case 43of Muslim citizens or Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the “foreign branch”?

44Will the discrimination that they face in the military duty end?

45And, most important of all, will we, as ordinary citizens with our attitudes make them feel as “equal citizens” ?

TEXT XXXII (APPENDIX 32)

Ali Bulaç

The Rights of Non-Muslims

03.09.2011

1 Turkey needs to experience a basic mindset transformation. A mindset revolution that will 2 lead us to prosperity at a level that will not prevent us from becoming honorable, safe, free 3 and peaceful on earth. In order to lay the mental foundation of such a revolution, it is 4 necessary to put the current socio-political issues, whose solutions are primarily quite easy, 5 into the right track. These are the Kurdish problem, fulfilling the rights and demands of the 6 Alevi, and the improvement of the status of non-Muslims. There are also other issues: 7 income inequality, identity crisis, Turkey's role in the establishment of a new regional 8 integration by co-operating on the basis of equality with equivalent countries in the region, etc.

9 As compared with the past, it is observed that promising steps are taken. The decision taken 10 on community foundations and landed properties of non-Muslims are one of them. 11 Government put an end to a practice towards non-Muslims that cannot be expressed in any 12 other words than "persecution": It decided to return landed properties, which they acquired 13 after 1936 and which were transferred to the Treasury in 1974 to their real owners. We all 14 owe thanks to the Government and the Prime Minister.

15 Jewish Chief Rabbi Halevi interpreted this decision as "the continuation of the light dating 16 from the Ottoman Empire." In fact, this decision is the light of the revelation from which 17 the prophet Moses, who said "I have seen a fire (light)" (28/Kasas, 29) on a cold and pitch 18 dark night where was covered by snow and all other prophets have been fed from.

19 The one, who illuminated and warmed the world in coldest winters with the power that he 20 took from this source, was the last Prophet (PBUH). He determined the relations with non-21 Muslims either by "contractor (one of the actors of political partnership)" or "dhimmi 22 who is under the protection of dominant management" and said the following: "I am the 23 adversary of those who persecute the dhimmi in

the doomsday” (Abu Dawood, soup-kitchen, 33). In general terms, the relations with non-Muslims in Islamic history continued in this framework. Sometimes the Muslim rulers persecuted them and they never attempted to destroy their existence.

It has been the period after the foundation of the Republic in Turkey when the non-Muslims suffered severe deprivations. Turkey, taking the West as reference, removed them from being “dhimmi, who are members of nation system,” put them in the status of “minority,” subjected them to compulsory population exchange, regarded even second-class citizenship too much for them, declared them as potential threat, made them object of hatred, introduced unlawful taxes only for them, and fattened “national bourgeoisie” by provocation of the nationalistic units, making the one who stayed behind run, and transferring their properties to Turcified units just like it did after 1910.

We are being normalized with heavy but steady steps. Normalization means primarily removing non-Muslims from the status of “minority which is a plague of the West” and placing them in the position of “citizen” Those, who follow this column, know that we wrote many times about “absolute equal citizenship, which is a plague of the West” not being solution to clashes that we experience today between identities with different ethnic and sectarian units. A constitutional citizenship, based on equal citizenship, will serve nothing more than the purpose of producing and continuing the current problems within new forms. “A new citizenship or nationality based on equality before the law taking into consideration the socio-culturally differences” should be taken as reference. However, until this is achieved, it is their natural right of all non-Muslims (Armenian, Assyrian, Greek and Jewish), who are not in conflict with Muslims within the national borders today, to be treated as “equal citizens” like others.

In this framework, the decision on the return of the properties to community foundations should, at once, be followed by decisions on the re-opening Halki Seminary School, removing restrictions on religion and freedom of worship,

recognizing “the ecumenical 50characteristic” of the Fener Patriarch, and delivering “our non-Muslims from the treatment 51of hostage in exchange of our Muslim brothers living in Western Thrace.” We will, of 52course, work for the recognition of the same rights and status to Muslims in Western 53Thrace, but we will not see the non-Muslims living with us as hostages anymore.

APPENDIX B - ORIGINAL TURKISH TEXTS

APPENDIX P1

Oktay Ekşi

Teşekkürler...

18.08.1997

Zaman zaman hepimizin içini bir karamsarlık sarar. Ağzımızdan aslında gönlümüzün hiç istemediği sözler çıkar. Bunların en kolayı “**Kardeşim, bu millet adam olmaz**”sözüdür. Oysa hepimiz biliriz ki bu millet, olmadık zamanlarda öyle mucizeler yaratır ki, o karamsar lafları söyleyenler mahcup olurlar. TBMM'nin sekiz yıllık kesintisiz zorunlu temel eğitim olayında gösterdiği başarı gibi. İşte bu tür mucizelerin bir örneğini dün TBMM'de yaşadık:

Taa 1973 yılından beri uygulanması gereken ama özellikle imam hatip liselerinin orta kısımlarını kapatma zorunluluğu getirdiği için siyasi iktidarların hiç üstüne varmak istemedikleri bir **eğitim reformu**, bu TBMM tarafından yasalaştırıldı. Hem de bunu **Mesut Yılmaz** gibi, bir kısım seçmenlerinin imam hatip kökenli veya zihniyetli olduğu bilinen bir partinin lideri yaptı. **Yılmaz** bu olaydaki performansı ile siyasi hayata atıldığı günden beri ilk defa “**devlet adamı**” sıfatına hak kazandı. Çünkü “**politikacı**” yakın çıkarı ne ise onun kavgasını verir. **Devlet adamı** ise yakın çıkarların değil, ülkenin uzun vadeli çıkarlarının kavgasını veren adamdır. Kuşkusuz

bu sonuçta -daha önce de yazdığımız gibi- **Bülent Ecevit'in, Deniz Baykal'ın** da büyük payı var. **Baykal'ın** tutarlı ve etkili muhalefet anlayışı, örnek teşkil edecek düzeydeydi. Keza Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu görüşmelerini yöneten **Biltekin Özdemir** ile TBMM Genel Kurul görüşmelerini yöneten **Uluç Gürkan'ın** bu sonuçtaki emekleri büyüktür. Ama bu sonuçta öncelikle, 8 yıllık zorunlu temel eğitimi geçen yıl gündeme getirerek, bunun “**kesintisiz**” şekilde uygulanması kararını Milli Eğitim Şûrası'ndan çıkartan eski Milli Eğitim Bakanı **Turhan Tayan'ın** ve daha Eğitim Şûrası öncesinden başlayarak, bu yasanın çıkmasına kadar her şeyi kanaviçe işler gibi işleyip hepimizi bugüne ulaştıran Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Müsteşarı **Bener Cordan'ın** payı herkesinkinden çoktur.

Kuşkusuz bu yasa, toplumumuza yaklaşık 2 katrilyon liralık bir kaynak borcu yükleyecektir. Ama Türkiye'nin kalkınması ve çağı yakalaması için **eğitimi** değil, **ekonomiyi** ön plana alan **Turgut Özal** zihniyeti döneminde eğitime yeterli kaynak ayrılmadı. Zaten sekiz yıllık zorunlu eğitime geçme meselesi de o yıllarda ihmal edildiği için bugüne kaldı. Şimdi o yükü hep birlikte taşımak zorundayız. Ama hemen belirtelim ki bu toplum o yükü seve seve taşımaya hazırdır. Yeter ki geleceğimizi teslim edeceğimiz evlatlarımız 2000'li yılların Türkiye'si'ni taşıyacak düzeyde eğitim alabilsinler. O günleri yaşayanlar dönüp 1997 yılında kimler 8 yıllık kesintisiz temel eğitim projesini engellemeye kalkmış diye bakarlarsa, merak ediyoruz özellikle DYP'nin milletvekilleri hakkında neler söyleyecekler? Yine de biz, Türkiye'ye 8 yıllık kesintisiz eğitimi kazandıran herkese sonsuz teşekkürler sunuyoruz.

APPENDIX P2

Hüseyin Gülerce

8 yıllık eğitim ve Zaman'ın tavrı...

18.08.1997

“Kesintisiz 8 yıl zorunlu eğitim” yasınının kabulü ne ifade ediyor?Baskı ve kararlılıklarını MGK kararları ve değişik vesilelerle açıkça ortaya koyan askerler ve onlarla aynı hedefleri paylaşan siyasiler sonuçta başarılı olmuşlardır.Bu kesimde temel çıkış noktası; laiklik ve demokrasinin ciddi bir tehdit altında olduğu, RP'nin öncülüğündeki bu gidişe mutlaka dur denilmesi gerektiğidir. Bu kabullenişle hedefe konulan, imam hatip liselerinin orta kısımları ve Kur'an kursları olmuştur. İşte bu

sebeplerdir ki 8 yıllık eğitimle ilgili kanunun Meclis'ten geçmesi bir "devrim" ve "zafer" olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Meclis, milli iradenin tecelligahı olduğu için bu sonuca demokrasi adına perde gerisinde olan biteni unutmadan centilmence saygı duymak gerekir.Kaldı ki bu kanun imam hatip liselerinin ve Kur'an kurslarını bağrına basmış çok geniş bir kesimi rencide ederek çıkartıldığı için arzu edilen uzlaşmadan yoksundur. Böyle olduğu için de eğitim amaçlı olmaktan çok, siyasi amaçlıdır.

8 yıllık eğitimle ilgili kanun siyasi çehresi itibariyle bizce bir kamplaşma sebebi yapılmamalıdır. Çünkü demokrasilerde yanlışın düzeltilmesi seçimle olmaktadır. En geç 1 yıl sonra genel seçimlere gidileceğine göre sandığı beklemek gerekecektir.

Bu kanunun "eğitim reformu" olarak takdimi kanaatimizce erkendir. Eğitim gibi çok önemli bir konuda aslolan uygulamadır. Eğitim sistemimizde; derslik, öğretmen, yönlendirme, öğretim programları ve müfredatlar açısından çağdışı eksiklikler vardır.

Başbakan Yılmaz bunların farkında olduğu için "Asıl işimiz şimdi başlıyor." demiştir.Bir başka açıdan da bu hükümetin işi şimdi başlıyor diyebiliriz. Zira, 8 yıllık eğitim konusu bu hükümetin kurulduğu günden beri tek meselesi olmuştur. Ekonomik sıkıntılarla ilgili iyileştirmeler henüz ortada yoktur. Koalisyon ortakları ve CHP adeta 8 yıllık eğitimin siperinde kalmışlardır. Bundan sonra ise asıl sınav başlamaktadır.

Gazeteniz Zaman, ülkemizi ve halkımızı ilgilendiren her konuda olduğu gibi 8 yıllık eğitim konusunda da ilmin, sağduyunun ve uzlaşmanın savunucusu olmuştur. Konunun uzmanlarınca tartışılması gerektiğini, siyasete malzeme yapılan eğitim kararlarının kalıcı olamayacağını ısrarla ifade etmişizdir.

Halkımızın imam hatip liseleri ve Kur'an kursları konusundaki hassasiyetleri hatırlatılmış, uzlaşma zeminlerinde bir orta yol bulunması istenmiştir. 4. maddenin reddiyle Anayasa'nın 24. maddesinde yer alan din eğitimi konusunun havada kalması da göstermektedir ki, bu uzlaşma aranmamıştır.Biz, nehir yatağını bulur, inancındayız. Bizzat Clinton'ın ilan ettiği son din hürriyetlerini genişletme yasası, hür ve demokrat Amerika'nın vardığı noktayı açıkça göstermektedir.Halkından ve dindarlardan korkmayan yönetimler iç barışı daha da sağlamlanma adına cesur adımlar atabilmektedirler.Türkiye'de maalesef henüz birbirimizi dinleme, anlama ve karşılıklı güven duyma zeminlerini bulamadık.

ZAMAN, bu zeminlerin mutlaka hazırlanması inancından hareketle, farklı kesimler arasındaki köprülerin atılmaması için çaba harcamaktadır. Cami önlerinde ve devletin polisiyle çatışarak hak aranmasını tasvip etmiyoruz.Bizim savunduğumuz fikir; bütün tenkit ve suçlamalara rağmen diyalog, hoşgörü ve uzlaşmada ısrar ederek ikna metodundan vazgeçmemektir. İş, neticesiyle belli olur...

APPENDIX P3

Oktay Ekşi

Merve de öğrenecek...

04.05.1999

Merve Kavakçı isimli hanım kızımıza “gaz” verenler, önceki akşam onun sırtından ciddi bir kriz yarattılar. Akıllarınca İslamiyet'in “tesettür” kuralını nihayet TBMM'de de geçerli kıldıklarını cümle aleme göstermek istiyorlardı. Ve bu devletin temel felsefesinin artık geçerli sayılmayacağını da... Dün bu sütunda yayınlanan yazıda da belirttiğimiz gibi **Merve Kavakçı** işte bu amaçla şartlandırılmış ve görevlendirilmişti. Tıpkı daha önce yaşanan **Leyla Zana** olayı gibi...

Anımsanacaktır: **Leyla Zana** 1991 Meclisi'nde yapılan yemin törenini bu devleti bölmek amacıyla istismar etmişti. **Merve Kavakçı** aynı işi, bu devletin felsefesini yıkmak için yapmaya kalktı. Görüldüğü gibi ikisinin yolları farklı, ama hedefleri aynı: **Atatürk ilkeleri** üzerine inşa edilmiş cumhuriyeti...

Neyse ki bu son sabotaj teşebbüsü en güçlü tepkiyi önce Meclis içinden ve bizzat Başbakan **Bülent Ecevit**'ten gördü. **Ecevit** “**Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, devlete meydan okuma yeri değildir**” derken pek bilinmeyen bir başka gerçeği daha ortaya çıkardı:

Böyle kritik durumlarda çok etkili bir cümle ile olayın yönünü değiştirme yeteneği en çok **İsmet İnönü**'de vardı. Örneğin, Demokrat Partililere 1953 sonunda CHP mallarına el konulacağı zaman söylediği “**Tarih kürsüsünden halinizi seyrediyorum: Suçluların telaşı içindediniz**” sözü ile 27 Mayıs'tan kısa bir süre önce söylediği, “**Sizi ben bile kurtaramam**” sözü hala belleklerdedir.

Bülent Ecevit galiba **İnönü**'nün vefatından sonraki ilk yıldönümünde olacak, **İsmet Paşa**'yı saygı ile andıktan sonra özetle, “**Onunla beraber çalışma şansına sahip olanlar, bu olanaktan ancak kendi yetenekleri ölçüsünde yararlanabilmişlerdir**” demişti.

Önceki akşam **Ecevit**, Meclis'teki olaya müdahalesiyle **İnönü**'nün yanında geçen yıllarını iyi değerlendirdiğini ortaya koydu.

Aksi halde o da, “**Merve Kavakçı'nın Meclis'e tesettüre uygun şekilde gelmesini engelleyecek hiçbir hukuk kuralı yok**” diyenlerle bir olur, sessiz kalır ve **laik cumhuriyete gol atma** yahut ondan bir parçayı daha yıkma özlemiyle tutuşan **Erbakan kafasına** prim kazandırır. Lider, kritik zamanda o niteliğini ortaya koyarsa lider olarak kalır. Yoksa bir süre bir makamda görev yapan bir bürokrata döner.**Ecevit**'in tavrı yıllardır neden ayakta ve lider olduğunu açıklıyor.Şimdi **Merve** olayı, **devlete yönelik bireysel bir başkaldırı** teşebbüsü ile kendi temel felsefesinden ve kimliğinden fedakarlık yapmamaya kararlı olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti arasındaki son raundu bekliyor. **Merve** kızımız kiminle dans ettiğini o zaman öğrenecek.

APPENDIX P4

Ali Bulaç

TBMM ve TBDM

04.05.1999

Merve Kavakçı'nın baş örtüsüyle TBMM Genel Kurulu'na girmesiyle DSP Genel Başkanı (ve Başbakan) Bülent Ecevit'in gösterdiği tepki beni fazlasıyla şaşırttı. Beni şaşırtan nokta, onun baş örtüsüne karşı gösterdiği tepki değil, anlaşıldığı kadarıyla daha önceden hazırlayıp orada okuduğu metinde yer alan hususlar. Yemin etmediği halde Meclis kürsüsünde konuşma yapan Sayın Ecevit'in söyledikleri şunlar:

“Türkiye'de hanımların inançları gereği başını örtmesine hiç kimse karışmıyor. Ama TBMM, kimsenin özel yaşam mekanı değildir. Burası devletin en yüce kurumudur. Burada görev yapanlar devletin kurallarına, geleneklerine uymak zorundadırlar. Burası devlete meydan okunacak yer değildir. Lütfen bu hanıma haddini bildiriniz.”

Bu metinde üzerinde durulması gereken iki ana husus var. Bunlardan biri, "baş örtüsü ile özel hayat" arasında kurulan ilişkidir. Önümüzdeki günlerde baş örtüsü ile özel hayat arasında doğrudan bir ilişki kurmanın İslam kelamı ve fikhî açısından temel bir bilgi yanlışlığı olduğunu anlatmaya çalışacağım. Şu kadarını söyleyelim ki, baş örtüsü özel hayatı değil, doğrudan ve mutlak anlamda toplumsal ve kamusal hayatı ilgilendiren bir konudur.

İkinci önemli nokta, Sayın Ecevit'in demokratik rejimin en üst ve belirleyici kurumu olan Meclis'e getirdiği akıllara durgunluk veren tanımıdır. Sayın Ecevit'in tanımına göre "Burası" (yani TBMM) devletin en yüce kurumudur." Bu tanım kökünden yanlıştır ve isminden de anlaşıldığı üzere burası Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi

(TBMM)'dir. Bir ülkenin temel siyasi, hukuki, idari, iktisadi, sosyal, kültürel vs. hayati faaliyetlerini yönlendiren yasama bu Meclis'te yapılır ve yürütme bu Meclis'in ortaya çıkardığı yönetici ekip tarafından teşekkül eder. Demokrasiler, bu fonksiyon ve misyonlarla donatılmış meclislerin belli periyotlarda halk tarafından ve serbest seçimlerle teşekkül edebileceği hükmünü getirmişlerdir. Bu, siyaset bilimi ve demokratik kültür açısından asgari bir bilgidir. Çünkü eğer Meclis, devletin en yüce kurumuyorsa, milyonlarca insanın yeni bir siyasi iktidar ve muhalefet belirlemek üzere sandık başına gitmelerinin hiçbir anlamı yok. Devlet, kendine ait kuruma dilediği kimseleri tayin eder ve böylelikle burası TBMM olmaz, TBDM, yani Türkiye Büyük Devlet Meclisi olur.

Burada ve bu konuşma vesilesiyle bu temel bilgilerin bilinmemesi değil, Sayın Ecevit gibi çok sayıda insanın bilinç altında yatan gerçek niyet ve düşüncelerin böylelikle açığa çıkmış olması önemlidir. Düşünün bir kere, eğer fiiliyatta Meclis, milletin değil de devletin meclisi ise, bu durumda bireylere, sosyal gruplara ve bunların toplamı olan halka hiçbir özgür ve serbest alan kalmamış demektir. Buna gizli veya açık totalitarizm denir

Baş örtüsüyle milletten temsil yetkisini alan ve fakat önüne şahit olduğumuz zorluklar çıkartılan Merve Kavakçı'ya gelince. Bu hanımefendinin bu aşamadan sonra çekilip sine-i millete dönmesi onun bu gerilime son vermek için yapabileceği en iyi iştir.

APPENDIX P5

Oktay Ekşi

Ders

10.02.2008

BİLDİKLERİNİ okudular. Meclis'teki çoğunluklarına dayanarak Anayasa'nın iki maddesinde değişiklik yaptılar.

Bunlardan biri yani 10'uncu maddeye ilişkin olanı **Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi** (MHP) kurmaylarının 12 saat tartıştıktan sonra bir maddenin hem değiştirilebileceğini hem de o değişikliğin hiçbir şey ilave etmeyip hiçbir şey çıkarmadan yapılabileceğini gösteren ilginç bir örnek oluşturdu.

Buna eskiden “**haşiv**” denirdi. Yani bir yasa hükmüne işlevsiz sözler koyarsanız, boşu boşuna laf kalabalığı yapmış sayılırsınız. Nitekim **10**’uncu maddenin “**Devlet organları ve idare makamları bütün işlemlerinde kanun önünde eşitlik ilkesine uygun olarak hareket etmek zorundadırlar**” şeklindeki dördüncü fıkrasına “**bütün işlemlerinde**” ibaresinden sonra gelmek üzere “**ve her türlü kamu hizmetlerinden yararlanılmasında**” ibaresini eklettirdiler.Şimdi söz konusu maddeyi bu ibareleri eklemiş olarak tekrar okuyun bakalım, ne değişti? Ne yararı oldu, siz söyleyin.

Neyse... **Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi**’nin (AKP) programında yazılı olmayan misyonunu gerçekleştirebilmesi için böyle bir desteğe ihtiyacı vardı. Onu **Devlet Bahçeli**’nin feraseti, **Ertuğrul Kumcuoğlu, Mithat Melen, Deniz Bölükbaşı, Tunca Toskay, Tuğrul Türkeş** gibi bu tür bir öneri karşısında nasıl tepki verecekleri beklenen milletvekillerinin de desteğiyle çözdüler.

Tartışılan “**türban**” konusu yönünden önemli olan **42**’nci maddeye, “**Kanunda açıkça yazılı olmayan herhangi bir sebeple kimse yükseköğrenim hakkını kullanmaktan mahrum edilemez. Bu hakkın kullanımının sınırları kanunla belirlenir**” şeklinde bir fıkra eklenmesini öngören öneri de yasalaştı.

Orada da -**yükseköğrenim kurumlarında türbanın serbest bırakılmasını savunan**- Prof. Dr. **Ergun Özbudun**’un “**Aman bu fıkraya başı açık öğrencilerin baskı altına alınmalarını önleyecek bir ibare ekleyin yoksa yarın üniversitelerde sorun çıkar**” yolundaki önerisini dikkate almadılar.

Böylece **AKP**’nin kendisinden “**Bize özgürlükçü ve sivil nitelikli bir Anayasa projesi hazırlayabilir misiniz?**” türü ricasını iyi niyetle kabul ettiğinden emin olduğumuz Prof. Dr. **Ergun Özbudun**’a, “**kazın ayağının hiç de öyle olmadığını**” gösterdiler.

Bilmiyoruz sevgili **Ergun Özbudun** şimdi **AKP**’nin demokrasi konusunda samimi olduğunu zannetmekle hata ettiğini düşünüyor mu? Eğer düşünmüyorsa, “**özgürlükçü**” görünme adına birbiriyle yarışan ve kendilerini “**liberal**” sayan bir kısım yazarlarla üniversite öğretim üyelerinin son günlerde dediklerine, yazdıklarına bir göz atması sanırız ki tabloyu daha iyi değerlendirmesine yeter.

Öyle ya... Günlerdir “**Anayasa’nın iki maddesinin değiştirilmesi ve YÖK Yasası’nın 17’nci maddesine bir fıkra eklenmesi**” tartışmalarıyla doluyuz.

AKP’nin sözüne ve niyetine güvenerek yola çıkan, Haziran 2007’den beri yeni “**Anayasa önerisi**” ile yatıp onunla kalkan **Özbudun** ve arkadaşları, “**O kadar**

emek ne işe yaradı? Hani AKP Ekim 2007 başında yeni Anayasa önerisini kamuoyuna ilan edecekti? Bunu iki üç ay boyunca yapılacak tartışmalar izleyecek, ardından da o önerilerin ve eleştirilerin ışığında yeni taslak ortaya çıkacaktı. Ne oldu?" diye acaba hiç sormuyorlar mı? Neyse, her tecrübe yararlıdır. Tabii ders almasını bilerseniz.

APPENDIX P6

Ekrem Dumanlı

Başörtüsü mü tehlikeli, çeteler mi?

11.02.2008

Normalde başörtüsü ile çetenin iki mukayese unsuru olarak kullanılmaması gerekir. Çünkü bunlar arasında doğrudan bir ilişki düşünülemez. Ancak burası Türkiye; dünyanın hiçbir ülkesinde olmayacak kadar birbirinden kopuk konuların birbiriyle ilişkisi çıkabilir.

Daha doğrusu, belli bir amaca ulaşmak için her vesileyi kullananlar, milletin kıymet attettiği, saygı duyduğu değerleri bile kirli maksatları için kullanabilir. Üstelik medya için başörtüsü ve çete haberlerinin turnusol özelliği var. Bu pencereden de bakmak gerekiyor meseleye.

Maalesef Türkiye son senelerde çok açık bir gerçeğe şahit oldu ki çeteleşme bu ülkede inanılmaz boyutlara ulaşmış. Sistem hep aynı: Emekli ya da muvazzaf subaylar ve emniyetçiler; bir de mafya diye bilinen insanlar. Öyle anlaşılıyor ki bu kişiler devletin en gizli istihbarat bilgilerine sahip. Suikast yapmaktan gayri nizami harp planlamaya kadar pek çok konuda hazırlık içindeler. Krokiler, haritalar, planlar... Ağır silahlar, bombalar, mühimmatlar... Manzara vahim. Üzerinde polis ya da asker üniforması bulunan (veya bir zamanlar bu şerefli üniformayı taşıyan) insanlar, gırtlaklarına kadar politize olmuşlar; bu yetmiyormuş gibi psikolojik harp yapmak maksadıyla illegal örgütlenmede bulunmuşlar. Dahası, uyuşturucu ticaretinden silah tacirliğine kadar birçok kirli işlere bulaşmışlar. Sauna çetesi, Bursa çetesi, Şemdinli çetesi, Eryaman çetesi, Ergenekon çetesi...

'Sessizlik' çetelere moral verdi

Kritik soru şu: Başörtüsü gündeme geldiğinde burnundan soluyarak "rejim tehlikede" diye kıyameti koparanlar, son yıllarda ortaya çıkan tehlikeli örgütler için neden

suspens olmayı tercih ediyor? O kadar ki adamlar aylarca "Tehlikenin farkında mısınız?" diye yeri göğü inletiyor, kendilerine bomba atan derin çetenin peşinden koşmuyor. Tandoğan Meydanı'nı doldurup insanları üçer beşer sayarak "milyonlar laiklik için yürüdü" demek kolay, aynı topluluğun niçin mafya işbirlikçisi örgütler konusunda ağzını bıçak açmıyor? Daha da kötüsü var: Onca çete soruşturmasında yakalanan, sorgulanan ve tutuklanan kişiler arasında "ulusalcı" diye bilinen bazı insanlar var. Yani, Cumhuriyet mitinglerine can u gönülden destek veren, ulusalcılık adına kitap ve makale yazan, TV programlarında "rejim tehlikede" deyip irtica tellallığı yapan insanlar bulunuyor. Bayrak ve tabanca üzerine yemin ettirip "ölmeye ve öldürmeye" ant içtiren kitle ile başörtüsü konusunda duyarlılık (!) gösteren bazı sivil toplum örgütleri (?) arasında somut bağlar var. O yüzden susmayı tercih ediyorlar ve o yüzden inandırıcı değiller. Başı kapalı olduğu için üniversite okuyamayan gözü yaşlı çocuklara gelince arslan kesilenler, devletin en temel kurumlarını zayıflatacak ve ülkeyi kaos ortamına sürükleyecek çeteler konusunda kuyruklarını kısıp bir kenara sıvışveriyor. Kim inanır bunların "tehlike" analizlerine?!

Ulusalcılık adına bazı örgütlerle çetelerin amaç kesişmesine ve suçüstü yakalanma karşısında mahcubiyetine bir nebze olsun mânâ vermek mümkün; lâkin medyaya ne oluyor ki tuhaf ve utangaç bir tavra bürünüyor? Başörtüsü ile ilgili yapılan yayınlar ortada. İnsanları endişeye, kuşkuya, umutsuzluğa itecek her türlü malzeme medya tarafından kullanılıyor. Bu eğilim, marjinal gruplarla sınırlı kalsa hiçbir önemi yok; fakat kendini "merkez" olarak görenler de her vesileyi değerlendirip "Tehlikenin farkında mısınız?" korosuna iştirak etme hevesinde. Diyelim ki gerçekten endişe taşıyorlar ve olmadık hadiseleri endişe paylaşımı için kullanıyorlar; o zaman şunu sormak gerekiyor: Kaos için her türlü olayı göze almış eli silahlı çeteler hakkında niçin aynı duyarlılık gösterilmiyor?

Lütfen hatırlayınız; o menfur Danıştay saldırısının akabinde Türkiye, laik-antilaik çatışmasıyla karşı karşıya kalmış, bazı gazeteciler öfkelerine mağlup olmuş hatta daha olayın aslını faslını beklemeden sokağa fırlayıp "Türkiye laiktir, laik kalacak" diye bağırarak gruplara iştirak edecek sert beyanlarda bulunmuştu. Ne oldu? Cami avlusuna kadar gelip cenaze namazını provoke edenler, bu saldırının laiklik karşıtları tarafından yapıldığına yürekten inanıyordu. Ne oldu?

Bir de baktık ki katil zanlısı "vatansever" bir örgüt üyesiymiş, "ulusalcı" büyükleriyle (!) ilişkisi varmış. Bu gerçekler ortaya çıktığında da bazı gazete ve televizyonlarımız derin bir sessizliğe gömülmüştü. O gün kuşkuların üzerine gidilseydi Ergenekon denilen örgütün ürpertici boyutlara ulaşması mümkün olmazdı. Aradan geçen zamanın sessizlik ve hatta kimi zaman korumacılık görüntüsü sunması derin çetelerde "Bize kimse dokunamaz" cesaretini kazandırdı. Çünkü namaz söz konusu

olduğunda, kurban söz konusu olduğunda, başörtüsü söz konusu olduğunda, imam hatip söz konusu olduğunda vs., öfkeyle kıpkırmızı kesilenler, kökü bir hayli derinlerde olduğu anlaşılan çeteler söz konusu olduğunda dut yemiş bülbüle dönüyor ve inanılmaz bir emn ü eman içine giriyordu.

Bu manzara karşısında durup düşünmek gerekiyor. "Efendim soruşturmalar sürüyor; o yüzden..." Kimse inanmıyor bu laflara. 28 Şubat sürecinde nice insanı bir lahzada medyatik lincin giyotinine teslim edenlerin (-ki buna kendi meslektaşları da dâhildir) bugün somut suç aletlerini görmezden gelmesi düşündürücüdür. En azından inandırıcı bir mazeret değildir. İrtica diye her gün manşetlerden düşmeyen olayların ne kadar suni, ne kadar sosyal gerçekliğe ters olduğu ortada. Yüzlerce makale yazan zevatın, silahlı, bombalı, krokili, haritalı; uyuşturuculu, silah ticaretinden insan ticaretine kadar bir yığın somut suçlara karşı kulaklarını tıkaması ve tek satır yazı yazmaması tuhaf değil mi? Bazı "laikçi" yazarların başörtüsü yazısı yüzlerce makaleye ulaştı. Bu kişiler Danıştay saldırısından Ergenekon'a kadar devam eden süreçte daha bir kerecik çete yazısı yazamadı. Ayıp olmuyor mu? Bazı yazarlar da hedef saptırmaya, konuyu başka yerlere çekmeye çalıştı; bu daha büyük bir ayıp değil mi?

Korku ticareti yapmaya gerek yok

"Başörtüsü mü, çeteler mi daha tehlikeli?" dememin bir başka nedeni daha var: Çeteler kaos ortamı oluşturabilmek için her türlü kılık-kıyafet değişikliği yapabiliyor. Kâh "laikçi" havalarıyla "İslamcılar"ı kışkırtıyor; kâh "İslamcı" kesilip "laiklik duyarlılığı gösteren" insanları. Bazen amaçları için bölücü örgütün postuna da bürünüyor, bazen ırkçılık damarına karışıyor; bazen de mezhep istismarı yapıyor. Kiliseye gidiyor, el etek öpüyor; yeri geldiğinde de "Türk-İslam sentezi"nden bahsedebiliyor. Böyle bin bir surat bir örgüt taktiği ile karşı karşıyayız ve maalesef bunların bir ucu "gizli devlet görevi" maskesiyle dolaşan bazı kişilere kadar uzanıyor.

Başörtüsüne serbestlik getiren Anayasa değişikliğine bir de derin çeteler üzerinden bakmak gerekiyor. Hafta içinde Fethullah Gülen çok önemli bir uyarıda bulundu. "Çarşaf giydirilmiş erkeklerden, bayanlardan" bahsetti. Boşuna değil bu uyarı! Çünkü daha önce de yapıldı bu tür provokasyon girişimleri. Bu günden "Ya şöyle olursa, ya böyle olursa" diye korku ticareti yapanlar var. Samimi endişeye diyeceğim yok, keşke onlar da sosyal barış için dikkatle konuşsa ve herkes onları dikkatle dinlese. Tek bir ferдин endişesi bile düşündürücüdür.

Meselenin bir de karanlık bir yanı var. Bazı endişeleri inanılmaz bir abartı ile dile getirenler ile bu havayı oluşturmak için çırpınıp duranlar arasında bir bağ bulunuyor. Yani korku filmini yazarlar ile oynayanlar aynı locadan. O yüzden medyaya büyük bir görev düşüyor. Her olayın üstüne hemen atlamak, bilmem kaç kere rezil etti bazı gazete ve televizyonları. Soğukkanlı olmak, sağduyuyu elden bırakmamak şart; yoksa çetelerin tezgâhına gelinmiş olur ki bu ülkeyi kaosa sürüklemek isteyenlere sosyal barışımızı peşkeş çekmenin bir anlamı yoktur!

APPENDIX P7

Mehmet Y. Yılmaz

Onlar İçin Kadının Adı Hiç Olmadı

07.10.2010

BAŞBAKAN'ın üzerinde aylarca çalıştığı demokratikleşme paketinden çıkan elle tutulur en önemli gelişme, kamu kesiminde çalışan kadınların isterlerse türban takabilecekleri oldu.

11 yıllık AKP iktidarının kamu kesiminde izlediği istihdam politikasının özelliği, tek kelimeyle özetleyecek olursak “**partizanlık**” oldu. Siyasal yakınlık kamu kesiminde liyakatin ve bilginin önüne hiçbir dönemde bu kadar geçmemiştir. **Bunun yanı sıra önemli bir gelişme de kamu kesiminde üst düzey görevlerdeki kadın sayısının azalmasıydı.** Bugün iktidarda olan zihniyetin en belirgin düşüncesi zaten “**Kadının yeri evidir**” şeklinde özetlenebilir. Bir yandan kamu kesiminde yönetici pozisyonların partizanca dağıtılmasındaki ısrarın, diğer yandan “Kadının yeri evidir” düşüncesinin doğal sonucu bu oldu.

Şimdi kamu kesiminde kadınların türban takabilmelerine olanak sağlayacak düzenlemeler bunu ne kadar değiştirecek, göreceğiz. Kişisel görüşüm çok şey değişmeyeceği yönündedir. Hiçbir icracı bakanlığa bugüne kadar kadın bakan tayin etmeyen zihniye, aynı yolda ilerleyecektir. Öte yandan şöyle bir gerçek daha var: bu tanımı pek sevmiyorum ama sözü uzatmamak için kullanmak zorundayım, “**yeşil sermaye**” de kadın istihdamına pek sıcak bakmadı. **Türbanlı kadınlara işe verebilirlerdi, vermediler.**

Kişisel asistanlarının bile erkeklerden seçildiğine dikkat etmişsinizdir. Gerekçe açıkça söylenmese bile kafalarının gerisinde hep aynıydı: Kadının yeri evidir! Şimdi “kamuda türban serbest” diye bu eğilimlerinden vazgeçebileceklerini düşünmek saflık olur. **Sonuç olarak diyeceğim şudur ki, türbanlı kadınların “çilesi” bitmeyecek.** Böylece “türban mağduriyetinin” esasen siyasal bir silah olarak

kullanılmış olduğu, iktidardaki zihniyetin kadın haklarını, kadınların özgürce sosyal yaşam içinde yer alma taleplerini umursamadığı da net şekilde ortaya çıkacak.

Polis devleti için bir adım daha

PAKETLER açılıyor-kapanıyor derken, vara vara gelebildiğimiz yer bir kez daha “polis vazife ve yetkileri” oldu! Dün gazetemizde yayımlanan Nuray Babacan’ın haberine göre, AKP, polisin yetkilerini artıran bir paket hazırlıyor. Hükümetin son hazırlığı şu: **Polis eylem yapma ihtimali olduğunu düşündüğü herkesi hakim ve savcı talebine gerek duymadan 24 saate kadar gözaltında tutabilecek.** Bundan sonra polis, tipini beğenmediği **“Eylem yapma hazırlığı içinde olabilir”** dediği herkesi kolayca gözaltına alabilecek. **Bu bir hukuk devletinde değil, ancak polis devletinde söz konusu olabilecek bir uygulamadır.** Gerçi uzun süredir polisin hem savcı hem de yargıç olarak faaliyet gösterdiğini biliyoruz. Polis fezlekesinin iddianame, iddianamenin de yargı kararı olduğunu çok gördük. **Şimdi bir adım daha atılıyor, aradan savcı ve yargıç da çıkarılıyor ki polis, muhaliflere göz açtırmamasın.** Toplantı ve protesto gösterisi yapma hakkı, kaynağını Avrupa sözleşmesinden alan, insan hakları mahkemesi kararıyla da pekiştirilip, güçlendirilen bir haktır. Gösteri barışçı olarak sürdüğü sürece buna yönelik müdahale hak ihlalidir. **Türkiye’de bu hak ihlali meselesi zaten bir kronik sorun halini almıştı, şimdi o hakkın ihlal edildiği yetmiyor olmalı ki bir de “özgürlük hakkının ihlali” bir tür “polis hakkına” dönüştürülüyor.**

Savcılara temel hukuk bilgisi kursu

YARGIÇLAR Sendikası Başkanı Ömer Faruk Eminağaoğlu hakkında 2 yıl 6 aydan 11 yıla kadar hapis cezası istemi ile dava açıldı. Davanın konusu, Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Yasası’na muhalefet ettiği iddiası. Eminağaoğlu’na yöneltilen bir suçlama da onunla aynı eyleme katılan CHP Grup Başkan Vekili Emine Ülker Tarhan ile CHP milletvekilleri Nur Serter, İdris Yıldız ve İzzet Çetin’in varlığından kaynaklanan nüfuzu kullanmak. Bunu nasıl yapmış anlamadım ama hiç anlamadığım asıl konu “yasaya muhalefet” meselesi.

Olay şöyle olmuş: Gezi protestoları sırasında 300 kişilik bir grup Ankara’da Kennedy Caddesi’nde toplanmış. Polis, çevreye herhangi bir saldırganlık içinde bulunmayan topluluğa dağılma emri vermiş, bunun için anons yapılmış. **“Dağılmazsanız zorla dağıtacağız”** anonsu! İddianameye göre bunun üzerine Eminağaoğlu polise şöyle demiş: **“Bu böyle olmaz, anons yapmaya gerek yok, müdahaleye gerek yok, burada hepimizin amacı demokratik eylem yapmak. Burada tek amaç dağıtmak değil, eylemi barışçıl tutmak. Şu sıradan güvenlik çemberi koyacağız, hepimiz birbirimize desteğiz, burada güçlü durabilmemiz için buraya güvenlik çemberi koyacağız”.** Söylediği söz, AİHM kararıyla da çerçevesi iyice kesin olarak çizilen toplantı ve gösteri hakkının korunması ile ilgili.

Bir olay yok, saldırganlık yok, çevreye verilen bir zarar yok!

Ama nasıl olabiliyorsa bu nedenle dava açılıyor, 11 yıla kadar da hapsi isteniyor, yargıçlık görevinden atılması isteği de cabası! Öyle görünüyor ki HSYK'nın vakit geçirmeden savcılar ve yargıçlar için bir kurs düzenlemesi gerekiyor. **Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'nin bir iç hukuk metni olduğunu, AIHM kararlarının iç hukukumuzda da geçerliliği olan içtihatlar olduğunu iyice belletmek için bir kurs!**

APPENDIX P8

Mustafa Ünal

Kamuda devrim

09.10.2013

Demokratikleşme hızlı başladı. Mor Gabriel Manastırı'nın arazisi iade edildi.

'Türk'üm, doğrucuyum, çalışkanım' diye başlayan Andımız kaldırıldı. Kamuda başörtüsü serbest. Başbakan Erdoğan 10 gün önce açıklamıştı. Paketteki maddelerin bazıları yasal, bazıları idarî düzenlemeydi. Yönetmelik bayram öncesine yetişti. Dün Resmî Gazete'de yayımlandı. Şüphesiz her biri çok önemli. Hele kamuda başörtüsü serbestisi sıradan bir gelişme değil. Devrim gibi. Birkaç yıl öncesine kadar hayali bile zordu. Bırakın üniversiteyi, sokaktaki başörtüsü bile neredeyse soruna dönüşüyordu.

2007'de Başbakan Erdoğan, İspanya seyahatinde "Velev ki siyasî simge olsun." demişti. MHP, AK Parti'nin çağrısına olumlu cevap verdi. 411 milletvekili sadece üniversitelerde başörtüsünü serbest bırakan anayasa değişikliğine kabul oyu kullandı. CHP, Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne koştı. Mahkeme, yetkisini aşarak düzenlemeyi iptal etti. AK Parti'ye kapatma davası açıldı. Kapatılmaktan kıl payı bir oyla kurtuldu. Her şey birkaç yılda oldu, bitti. 411 elle başlayan sürecin neticesi. O milletvekilleri de hayırla yâd edilecek. Hiç kuşkusuz kamuda başörtüsü özgürlüğü gibi büyük devrimin mimarı AK Parti. Altındaki imza Başbakan Erdoğan ve arkadaşları. Başörtüsü bu toprakların kutsalıdır. Bu adım kıyamete kadar unutulmayacak.

Adımı AK Parti attı ama bu elverişli iklimi oluşturan muhalefet partilerini unutmamak gerekir. Neredeyse paketin hiç itiraz edilmeyen maddesiydi. CHP, MHP ve BDP paketteki birçok düzenlemeye sert eleştiriler yöneltti. Ama başörtüsü konusunda hiç ters ses çıkmadı. Marjinal gruplar dışında toplumun büyük kesimi de kabullendi.

Burada anamuhalefet partisi CHP'ye ayrı parantez açmak gerekiyor. Özellikle de Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu'na... CHP, başörtüsünün önündeki en büyük engeldi. Rakamsal gücü zayıf olsa da psikolojik bariyer kurmakta mahirdi. Kılıçdaroğlu ile birlikte CHP'nin başörtüsüne bakışı değişti. CHP lideri koltuğa oturduğu ilk günden başörtüsü sorularına olumlu cevap verdi. Kelime oyunlarına girmede. "Başörtüsü veya türban fark etmez." dedi. Olası bir CHP iktidarında başörtülü öğrencilerin üniversiteye girmelerine yeşil ışık yaktı. "O sorunu biz çözeriz. Ve kararlıyız. Herkesin okumasına olanak sağlayacağız." dedi. Parti içinden gelen ağır eleştirilere rağmen bu tutumunu bugüne kadar sürdürdü. CHP gibi geleneğin üzerine oturan partilerde politika değişikliği ideoloji sapması, eksen kayması olarak görülür. Ve dirençle karşılaşır. O yüzden değişim zordur. CHP'nin başörtüsü konusundaki dilinin ne kadar sert ve ne kadar keskin olduğunu hatırlatmaya gerek yok herhalde. Kılıçdaroğlu zoru başardı aslında. Hakkını teslim etmek gerekiyor. Başörtüsü konusundaki hava onun esnek duruşuyla yumuşadı.

Dünkü tablo söylediklerimin özeti gibiydi. Yönetmeliğin Resmî Gazete'de yayımlanmasıyla yasak kalktı. Kamuda başörtülü memurlar hiçbir engelle karşılaşmadan mesaiye gitme hakkına sahip oldu. Ülkenin çeşitli yerlerinden fotoğraflar yansıdı. CHP'nin Meclis'te grup toplantısı vardı. Kılıçdaroğlu, Andımız'ın kaldırılmasına sert tepki gösterdi. Başbakan Erdoğan'a "Türk'üm demekten mi rahatsız oldun, açıkla." diye çıktı. Kamuda başörtüsüne herhangi bir itirazı olmadı.

Tarihî adımı AK Parti attı. Ama burada muhalefetin bilhassa da CHP'nin katkısını unutmamak lazım. Erdoğan devrimin mimarı... Bunun yanında Bahçeli'nin ve Kılıçdaroğlu'nun da hakkını teslim etmek gerekir. Özellikle Kılıçdaroğlu'nun...

APPENDIX A9

Oktay Ekşi

Sivas'taki Vahşet...

04.07.1993

SİVAS'tan alarm sesleri geliyor. Çünkü Türkiye'yi bölmek ve çökertmek isteyenler tüm güçleriyle harekete geçmiş görünüyorlar. Bir yandan PKK ve malum silahsız uzantıları ülkemizi ve ulusal bütünlüğümüzü ortadan kaldırmaya çalışırken, öte yandan da ülkemizde bir mezhep çatışması ortamı yaratmak isteyenler ellerinden

geleni yapıyorlar. O nedenle çok dikkatli ve uyanık olmamız gereken bir süreç içinde yaşıyoruz.

Gerçekten Sivas olaylarına konacak teşhis çok önemli... Biraz anılarınızı tazellerseniz, ne demek istediğimiz iyi anlaşılır:

Kahramanmaraş olayları, anımsanacağı gibi 1978 yılının aralık ayında cereyan etti. O olaylarda da temel etken aynen Sivas'taki gibi iki taraflı tahrikler ve bu ortamdan yararlanıp yalan haber yayılması idi. Örneğin Alevi vatandaşlarımızın Kahramanmaraş'ın camilerinden birine bomba attıkları ileri sürülmüş ve halk, ayrı mezhepte olmaktan başka bir farklılığı bulunmayan kapı komşusu üzerine saldırtılmıştı. Kahramanmaraş'ı Yozgat, Çorum ve yine Sivas olayları izlemiş, neyse ki 12 Eylül yönetimi bu tahrikleri söndürmüştü.

Sivas'ta önceki gün cereyan eden vahim olayları sırf **Aziz Nesin**'in densizliği ile izah etmek bizce yetersizdir. Çünkü halkta bir "hazırlanmışlık" olmasa, **Aziz Nesin**'in Pir Sultan Abdal Şenlikleri'nde söylediği birkaç münasebetsiz cümle bu kadar tepkiye yol açmazdı. Nihayet, "Beyin damarlarının kireçlendiği" izlenimini veren, öte yandan da bir "hırs-ı piri" ile yanıp tutuşan birinin hezeyanları olarak değerlendirilir biterdi.

Gelen bilgiler gösteriyor ki, **Aziz Nesin**'in Sivas'ta Perşembe günü yaptığı konuşma üzerine birileri hemen bildiriler bastırıp, halkı **Aziz Nesin** aleyhine tahrik etmişler. Ertesi günün "Cuma" ya rastlaması, belli ki tahrikçi takımın işini kolaylaştırmış. Bunda hayret edecek bir nokta yok. Çünkü "cuma" namazları toplumsal huzuru bozmaya kalkanların giderek daha kolayca kullanabildiği bir platform oluşturuyor. İşin kötü tarafı, bu gerçek, gerek hükümetin gerekse mülki amirlerin gözleri önünde cereyan ettiği halde kimse gerekli önlemleri almaya kalkışmıyor.

Oysa Türkiye, her Müslüman'ın dini ibadetini istediği gibi ve tam özgürlük ortamında yapabildiği bir ülke olmalıdır. Ama bu özgürlük başkalarının başka şekilde ibadet etmesine veya hiç ibadet etmemesine karışma hakkını kimseye vermemelidir.

Aziz Nesin'e ve arkadaşlarına karşı önce protesto gösterileri yapan daha sonra azıp Nesin ve arkadaşlarının kaldığı oteli yakmaya kalkışanların kabul etmedikleri husus budur. Ama onlar etseler de etmeseler de insanlar, başkalarının baskısı altında kalmadan inanmak ve inanmamak veya başkalarından farklı şeylere inanmak konusundaki kazanımlarını koruyacaklardır.

Hazin olan husus, Almanlar birkaç Türk'ün kaldığı evi yakınca kıyameti kopartan bizlerin, aynı şeyi kendi insanımız yine kendi insanımıza yapınca fazla tepki göstermiyor olmamızdır. Olayda 35 kişinin dumandan boğularak ölmesi, öte yandan önemli bir gerçeği ortaya koymaktadır. Çünkü küçük bir otelde bu kadar can kaybı

verilmesi, ani bir yangında neler yapılacağıının bilinmemesinden ve bir de –çok muhtemelen- otelin sentetik (duvardan duvara) halılarıyla döşenmiş olmasından kaynaklanmıştır. Bilindiği gibi sentetik halıların en önemli özelliği, yanınca zehirli bir duman çıkartmalarıdır. Geçen gün Van’da yine bir otelin hunharca kundaklanması sonucu çok sayıda can kaybı verilmesinin sebebi de yanılmıyorsak budur. O yüzden “cami-cuma” boyutu, otel ve benzeri yerlerde kalanların can güvenliğiyle ilgili önlemlerin alınmasını göz ardı ettirmemelidir.

APPENDIX A10

Fehmi Kuru

Yakalarına Yapışılmalı

03.07.1993

Komik hikayelere imza atan yazar **Aziz Nesin**, bu defa izleri uzun yıllar kalacak bir trajedinin kahramanı oldu. Sivas’ta ilk elde 35 kişinin ölümü, çok sayıda kişinin de yaralanmasıyla sonuçlanan arbede, onun merkezinde bulunduğu yoğun tahriklerle meydana geldi. Pir Sultan Abdal vesilesiyle düzenlenen ‘**şenlik**’Aziz Nesin’in sebep olduğu karışıklıkla ‘**yas**’a dönüştü.

Son olayları daha iyi anlayabilmek için, altı aydır olgunlaştırılan bir hazırlığı fark etmek gerekiyor. **Aziz Nesin**, beş yıl önce İngiltere’de çıkmış ‘**Şeytan Ayetleri**’adlı romanı Türkiye’de yayınlamaya karar verdiğini o zaman açıkladı. İlk yayımından beri romanın bütün dünyada sebep olduğu gürültü cümlelerin malumu; Pakistan ve Bangladeş gibi ülkelerde toplam 26 kişi bu kitap yüzünden hayatını kaybetmişti. Böyle bir kitabın yayın haberi ile, beş yıllık bir gecikmeyle, Türkiye de tahrik ortamına sokuldu. ‘**Fikir özgürlüğü**’ perdesi ardına sığınılarak...

İngiliz yayıncıyı bile kızdıran bir yanı var olayın; Aziz Nesin, kitap halinde yayımlama izni aldığı halde, ‘Şeytan ayetleri’ni, ortağı olduğu gazetede tefrika ettirdi. Gazete, kitabı dünyada karşılaştığı tepkiyi Türkiye’de de sağlamak için – İngilizin de dikkatini çeken-özel bir çaba harcadı. Kitleleri harekete geçirmeye yönelik **şeytanca** bir senaryo ile karşı karşıya olunduğu belliydi. Şimdi de bu.

Sivas, Türkiye’nin mezhep mozayığının en renkli olduğu kentlerin başında geliyor. Geçmişte, bu kentte Alevi-Sünni çatışmaları çıkmış, birçok kişinin hayatına malolan olaylar yaşanmıştı. Bir **cuma** günü, ‘**Pir Sultan Abdal**’ vesile edilerek ve birkaç gün öncesinden yerel basın hazırlanarak son ‘**kanlı senaryo**’sahneye konulmuş oldu.

Mezhep çatışması için küçük bir kıvılcımın yeteceği Sivas'ta, hazırlıklara bakılırsa, dört koldan alevler çıkartacak benzin tedarik edilmiş...

Aziz Nesin ve yandaşları, muhtemelen geçmişte de benzeri senaryolarda rol almışlardı, ama ilk defa ellerindeki kanla yakalandılar. **Sivas'ta hayatlarını kaybeden 35 kişi ile çok** sayıdaki yaralı, onların tahriklerinin kurbanıdır. Psikolojide '**şartlı refleks**' fizikte '**etki-tepki yasası**' olarak bilinen evrensel kural şaşmaz hassasiyetiyle kendini gösterdi ve mozayigi çatlatan bu olaylar meydana geldi. Tahrik ortada olduğu için sorumluları da belli.

Türkiye'nin içte ve dışta gücünü zayıflatan gelişmelere muhatap olduğu, PKK terörünün azdığı, Adriyatik'ten Çin Seddi'ne iddiasına darbe indiği, hükümet kuruluşuyla uğraştığı bir dönemde, mezhep çatışmasına yol açmak, büyük bir hıyanettir. **Hiç kuşku yok, Sivas'taki tahrikle ardından meydana gelen olaylar, Türkiye'yi bölmeyi amaçlayan ve asla yeri olmayan büyük bir planın parçasıdır.**

Sivas'ta canlarını kaybeden insanlar elbette önemlidir, ancak ülkenin birlik ve beraberliğine benzin dökmek anlamını taşıyan bu olay, çok daha geniş yığınları tek tek ve toplu olarak hedef almaktadır. **Bu olayla hedef alınan, Türkiye'nin ve Türk insanının bütünüdür.** Bu gerçek iyi değerlendirilmeli ve olayın suçluları ile arkasındaki '**yabancı el**' mutlaka ortaya çıkartılmalıdır.

Hükümeti serinkanlı olmaya, konuyu bütün ciddiyetiyle ele alıp hiçbir ihtimali göz ardı etmeyen bir titizlikle suçluların üzerine gitmeye davet ediyoruz. Bu iş komik hikayeler yazmaya benzemez. Aziz Nesin ve yandaşlarının kimin namına hareket ettikleri mutlaka ortaya çıkartılmalıdır.

APPENDIX A11

Oktay Ekşi

Aman Dikkat!

15.03.1995

Önce söyleyelim: Uzun yıllardan beri dikkat ederiz; ulusla yapımızın en önemli ve sağlam unsurlarından birinin Alevi yurttaşlarımız olduğunu kabul etmeyen kim varsa o ya üzerine ışık düşmemiş bir yobazdır, yahut da bir alçaktır. Bu kadar açık konuşuyoruz, çünkü bu gerçeği öğrenmek için ilkokul kültürü düzeyinde tarih okumak, toplumun aydınlık unsurlarının genellikle hangi kültür toprağında yeşerdiğine dikkat etmek, sevginin, dostluğun en çok nerelerde destek bulduğunu araştırmak yeter.

Buna rağmen gördüğünüz gibi, zaman zaman Alevi yurttaşlarımızı hedef alan olaylara tanık oluyoruz. Maksat belli: Alevileri kışkırtıp bir kardeş kavgası yaratmak isteyen ihanet merkezleri ellerinden geleni yapıyorlar.

Alevi yurttaşlarımız, bu tertibe, bu alçakça hazırlanmış tuzağa düşmemelidirler. Çünkü bu tertibin gerisinde ülkemizin, ulusal bütünlüğümüzün ve demokrasimizin düşmanlarının bulunduğu görmemek için de, eşi az bulunur bir ahmak veya alçak olmaya ihtiyaç vardır. Biliyoruz, bugün karşılaştığımız olaylar uzun yıllardan beri ekilen tohumların ürünüdür. Bu olaylar huzurumuzun ve laik Cumhuriyetimizin iç düşmanları ile yurdumuzun dış düşmanlarının-bilerek veya bilmeyerek- yaptıkları işbirliğinin sonucudur.

Uzun yıllardan beri, diyoruz çünkü toplumsal birikimi ölçme olanağı veren hatta bunların hangi aşamalarda patlamalara yol açabileceğini görmeyi mümkün kılan bir çağda yaşıyoruz. Ama biz yine de bu olayları yaşıyoruz. Çünkü “geliyorum” diyen bu tür olayları önceden görecektir kadar basiretli bir siyaset kadrosuna maalesef sahip değiliz.

Kaç aydan beri “bir ulusal mutabakat hükümeti” ne ihtiyaç olduğu yahut da “temel sorunlarla ilgili çözümler üzerinde sağlanacak bir ulusal mutabakat” istendiği yazılıp çizilmedi mi? Bugün gördüğümüz olayların hangi tarihte, nerede patlayacağını bilmiyorduk, ama önümüzdeki günlerin bu tür olaylara gebe olduğunu aylardan – belki birkaç yıldan beri-bilmiyor muyduk?

Ülkemizi yönetenler veya yönetmeye talip olanlar kendilerinden bekleneni yaptıklarını, önlemler aldıklarını veya önerdiklerini söyleyebilir mi?

Maalesef yukarıdaki sorulara biz, onların hiçbirinin olumlu yanıt verebileceğini sanmıyoruz. Çünkü Meclis’te bir araya gelip ortak imzalı bir bildiri yayınlamaları, sadece kendi vicdanlarını rahatlatabilir, ama bilsinler ki o belge, tarih huzurundaki sorumluluklarından onları aklamaya yetecek bir belge değildir. Türkiye, Güneydoğu ile bağlantılı teröre ek olarak bir de “din” kökenli kardeş kavgasını kaldırma gücüne sahip değildir. Sadece Türkiye değil, bu iki kavgayı verebilecek bir güç dünyada yoktur. O nedenle bu çok kritik dönemde, istisnasız herkesin ama herkesin, örneğin mahalle bakkalından, ülkenin Cumhurbaşkanı’na kadar herkesin ulusal bütünlüğümüzü bozacak her hareketten kaçınması lazımdır.

İhtimal bu aşamada en büyük sorumluluk, Alevi yurttaşlarımıza ve onları yönlendirme gücüne sahip kişilere düşmektedir. Çünkü onları kışkırtmak amacıyla düzenlenen bu alçakça suikastları, sabotajları kullanıp karışıklık çıkartmak isteyenler böyle ortamlarda çok faal olurlar. Lübnan’da, eski Yugoslavya’da, Hindistan’da, Pakistan’da ve Bangladeş’te yaşananlar ortadadır. Türkiye’yi bu tuzağa düşürmek isteyenlerin ekmeğine yağ sürecek her tertipten, tahrikten uzak durmak, halen

mağdur ve **masum** bir kitle durumunda olan Alevi yurttaşlarımızı toplum vicdanında suçlu konumuna düşürecek hatalardan kaçınmak bugünün en önemli ihtiyacıdır.

Alçaklara fırsat vermeyelim. Barış ve sevgi tek çıkar yolumuzdur.

APPENDIX A12

Hüseyin Gülerce

Bu Defa Başaracağız

16.03.1995

Bir askeri müdahalenin yıldönümünde, geçtiğimiz 12 Mart gecesi İstanbul Gazi Mahallesi'nde başlayan olayların tırmandırılmasındaki boyut, karşı karşıya olduğumuz tehlikenin daha öncekilerden farklı olduğunu gösteriyor.

“Bu hain tuzağa düşmeyeceğiz” ortak manşetini atan üç büyük gazete, aynı sağduyuyu ilk gün gösterebilseydiler oynanan oyunun bozulması kolaylaşacaktı. İlk gün atılan “Aleviler’e hain saldırı... Kanlı gece...Şeriatçı İBDA-C dün gece 4 kahve ile bir pastaneyi silahla taradı... Binlerce alevi yurttaş sokaklara döküldü... Halk karakola saldırdı..” manşetleri, en az sıkılan kurşunlar kadar acımasızdı.

Türkiye'nin bir Alevi-Sünni derdi olmadığı halde, PKK'dan umduklarını bulamayanlar yeni bir potansiyel tehlike hazırlıyorlar. Bunda sağduyulu herkes hemfikir... Yine herkes hemfikir ki, Türkiye'nin Türk cumhuriyetleriyle bahtının yeniden açılması, Gümrük Birliği Antlaşması'nın imzalanması, Bosna-Hersek, Azerbaycan ve Çeçenistan meselelerinde öne çıkması pek çok devleti rahatsız ediyor. Hele her geçen gün artan diyalog ve müsamaha arzusunun, kardeşlik hasretinin, iç barışa susamışlığın dışımızdaki dünyayı tedirgin ettiğini biliyoruz.

Hepsinden önemlisi Müslümanlığın ülkemizdeki samimi ve engin yorumu, Batı'nın **“fundamentalizm”** ve **“İslami terör”** suçlamalarına rağmen bütün dünyada ses getirecek bir keyfiyette olması içte ve dışta pek çok mahfili rahatsız ediyor.

Oturdukları zeminin altlarından kaydığını fark edenler, eskisi gibi at oynatamadıkları için çileden çıkıyorlar. Bakınız son olayların Avrupa gazetelerindeki değerlendiriliş biçimi bizim için bir ölçüdür. Hatta olayların ardında kimin olduğunu merak edenler için de bir ipucu niteliğindedir.

İngiliz gazeteleri şöyle yazdılar:

“İslamcılar’ın kahvelere ateş açmalarından sonra sokak çatışmaları çıktı... Dini şiddet olaylarında polis 12 Türk’ü öldürdü... Refah Partisi’nin Ankara ve İstanbul Belediye Başkanlıkları’nı kazanmasından sonra İslami militanlık yayılmaya başladı...”

İtalyan televizyon ve gazetelerinde şu yorumlar yer aldı:“Türkiye’de İslami köktencilik giderek güçleniyor... Atatürk devrimleri tehlikeye girdi... Çünkü Aleviler daima Atatürk ilkelerine sahip çıktılar...”

Rusya televizyonu“Türkiye’de dini terör başladı... Mezheplerarası kavga teröre dönüştü” dedi.

Yunan basını, “Türkiye’de fanatik İslam tehlikesi... Alevi kıyımı... İstanbul’daki olaylar, Türkiye’nin Gümrük Birliği’ne girmesinin Avrupa Birliği için getirdiği riskleri gösteriyor..” diye yazdı. **Alman basını** ise en acımasız olanıydı. Aleviler İslam’ın başdüşmanı olarak gösteriliyor, “Kürdistan’dan İstanbul’a kadar savaş” manşetleri atılıyordu. Fransız basınında Cezayir’de askerleri tahrik ettiği gibi Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’ni alenen tahrik eden yorumlar yapıyordu. **Fransız gazetelerinin** manşetleri de bunlardan farklı değildi. “İstanbul’da polis ve köktendinciler Aleviler’i öldürüyor.” deniyordu.

Halbuki İstanbul’da ve Ankara’da dikkatli gözler gördü ki Alevi vatandaşlar olayları incelemeye çalışırken, “**TKP, Dev-Sol, Dev-Genç, TİKKO**” yazılı pankartlarla militan gruplar halkı polisin üstüne itiyordu. Olayların Aleviler’le de Sünniler’le de alakası yok. Ama devlet sıkı durmalıdır. **Polisin kararlılığı ve tarafsızlığı böyle günlerde korunmalıdır. Polisi yıpratacak uluorta beyanlardan da siyasiler özellikle bu ortamlarda kaçınmalıdır.**

Bizim endişemiz, önümüzdeki 21 Mart’taki Nevruz kutlamalarında olayların daha da tırmandırılmak isteneceğidir. Bu konuda medyanın sorumluluğunu bir kez daha hatırlatmak istiyoruz. Güzel görüntüler, kanlı cesetler vereceğiz diye gayret edilmesin. **Koyun can derdinde, kasap et derdinde** gibi olmasın. Yangını başladığı yerde devlet – millet elele söndürebilirse söndüreceğiz. Ve şu an elimizde sevğiden daha güzel bir çare yok. Bu defa başaracağız, başaracağız...

APPENDIX A13

Cüneyt Ülsever

Olmadı Ali Bardakoğlu!

09.03.2008

DANIŞTAY, ilköğretimde okutulan Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi dersinin zorunlu kılınmasını hukuka uygun bulmadı. Şimdi ya ders kaldırılacak, ya da müfredat (zaten yapıldığı, söylendiği gibi) yeniden tanzim edilecek.

Dairenin gerekçesinde, "Devletin, eğitim ve öğretimle ilgili olarak üzerine düşen görevleri yerine getirirken, müfredatta yer alan bilgilerin **nesnel** ve **çoğulcu** bir şekilde aktarılmasına dikkat etmesi ve ebeveynlerin **dini** ve **felsefi** kanaatlerine saygı göstermesi gerekmektedir" görüşüne yer verildi.

Hafta içinde Milliyet Gazetesi'ne verdiği röportajda eski **Talim Terbiye Kurulu (TTK)**Başkanı **Prof. Dr. İrfan Erdoğan**, TTK'ya hakim **zihin yapısını** bir örnekle anlatıyordu:

"Mesela **Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi** dersiyle ilgili programın kurulda görüşülmesi sırasında **Kuran kursunu** andıran şöyle bir teklifle karşılaştım: Gruplara ayrılmış bir şekilde düzenlenen sınıfta zorunlu olarak **Kuran-ı Kerim**'in bulunması, adalet, hoşgörü gibi kavramların **kutsal kitap** üzerinden münazara edilmesi..."**Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi** dersi sadece bir dinin (İslam) değil, tüm dinlerin/inançların tarihi gelişmelerini, felsefi ve sosyal boyutlarını, kültürel önemlerini öğreten bir derstir. Türkiye'de de esas sorun bu dersin **müfredatı** değil, dersi verecek **formasyona** sahip yeterli sayıda **din dersi öğretmeninin** bulunmamasıdır. Türkiye'de din bilgisi denince akla sadece İslam dinindeki ibadet uygulamaları (amel) gelir. Zira, Türkiye'de yetiştirilen din dersi öğretmenleri **felsefe, sosyoloji, kültür, bilim metodolojisi** bilmezler. Onlara dinin ruhu değil, ibadetin şekli öğretilir. Onlar da, esasında dinin ruhunu anlama konusunda cahil insanlar olarak, her dinden öğrenciye ancak bildikleri ibadet uygulamalarını öğretirler. Türkiye'de **dinin felsefeden** koparılmasının baş sorumlusu da **Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı**'dır. Türkiye'deki din adamı ve din öğretmenlerinin **kalitesinden**, öncelikle bu kurum sorumludur.

Ama, maalesef **Danıştay**'ın aldığı kararın baş sorumlusu **Diyanet İşleri Başkanı** topu taca atıyor. Diyanet İşleri Başkanı **Ali Bardakoğlu**, Din Kültürü dersiyle ilgili son kararın, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin (AİHM) aldığı kararın adeta Türkiye'ye uyarlaması gibi durduğunu savunuyor. Bardakoğlu, "AİHM'nin yanlışlığı odur ve yargının neyin din olduğu, neyin din olmadığı hakkında karar vermesinin hangi verilere dayandığı, hangi üniversite görüşüne, hangi rapora dayandığı konusunda ciddi kuşkularım var. Bu konuda Diyanet İşleri

Başkanlığı'ndan, 23 ilahiyat fakültesinden görüş alındığını zannetmiyorum" diyor.

Özetle başkan, "**AİHM ulemaya, yani bana sormalıydı**" diyor! Ancak, belli ki AİHM'nin nasıl çalıştığı konusunda oldukça **bilgisiz**. Zira, Bilgi Üniversitesi öğretim üyelerinden **Prof. Dr. Niyazi Öktem** diyor ki, "AİHM'nin Diyanet'ten görüş alma zorunluluğu yok. AİHM, AB'nin **inanç özgürlüğünün** boyutları hakkında hazırladığı çalışmaları referans alır. AB üyesi ve AB'ye girmek için aday olan ülkelerden uzmanların olduğu benim de içinde yer aldığım bir komite, **1998** yılında üç ciltlik bir çalışma hazırlamıştır. Yani AİHM, **inanç özgürlüğü** konusunda **bilgisiz değil**. Başbakan'ın tabiriyle ulemaya sorulmuştur. Din dersleri öyle mecburi olmaz." (Sabah-07.03.08)

Birileri **Ali Bardakoğlu**'na hukuk nedir, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'ndeki Türkiye'nin imzası ne anlama gelir, AİHM nasıl çalışır, kararlarına uymamanın müeyyidesi nedir, bunları **öğretsin**. **Ali Bardakoğlu** da neden çağdaş kafaya sahip din adamları ve öğretmenleri yetiştiremediğini dert edinsin!

APPENDIX A14

Mümtaz'er Türköne

Dinî kültürümüz var mı?

09.03.2008

"Din kültürü ve ahlâk bilgisi" dersleri hakkında AİHM'den sonra Danıştay'ın verdiği karar, hiç bitmeyen bir tartışmayı yeniden alevlendirdi. Diyanet İşleri Başkanı'nın, Danıştay'ın "bu derslerde tek bir mezhep öğretiliyor" gerekçesine, "bize sormaları gerekirdi" karşılığını vermesi normal. Çünkü uzman görüşü olmadan bu dersin içeriği hakkında mahkemenin karar vermesi doğru değil. Alevîler ise, mahkemenin kararından memnun; çünkü dersin içeriğinin kendilerine çok uzak olduğunda ısrarlılar.

Genel nitelikli tartışmaları izlerken bireysel tecrübelerimizi hatırlamıyoruz. Hâlbuki hepimiz bu dersin öğrencileri olduk. Demek ki, hüküm verecek durumdayız. 80 öncesinde benim gibi "din dersi"ni ailenin talebi ile seçen öğrencilerden kaç, bu derslerde din öğrenmiştir? Hepimizin akıllı, o derse girmeyen arkadaşlarımızla birlikte sınıfın dışında kalırdı. İlahiyat veya Yüksek İslâm Enstitüsü mezunu bir din dersi hocası bulunmayınca görev felsefe hocasına, hatta beden eğitimciye verilirdi. Bu hocalardan da din dersinde dinsizlik propagandası yapanlar mutlaka çıkardı. Kendi adıma, isteğe bağlı din derslerinden birinde biyoloji hocamızın Darwin'in Evrim teorisini anlattığını hatırlıyorum. Şayet dinimi, sadece mekteplerdeki din

derslerinden öğrenmiş olsaydım ne olurdu? Bu sorunun cevabını hepimiz ayrı ayrı verebiliriz. Şimdi durumun değişmesi, alanında çok iyi din kültürü ve ahlâk bilgisi hocalarının bulunması, sonucu değiştiriyor mu? Her şeyden önce sorun dini öğrenmek mi? Yoksa sevmek mi? Diğer dersler gibi çalıştığımız ve sınava girdiğiniz bir derste öğrendiğiniz bilgiler ne ölçüde işe yarar? Bir işe yarar ama hangi işe?

Bir zamanlar babamın bana yaptığını yaptım ve beş yaşındaki oğlumu ilk defa bu hafta cuma namazına götürdüm. Farzı kırlarken camiye birbirine kattı. Kimse kızmadı, azarlamadı. Bana da kimse kızmamıştı. "Camiye bir daha gelelim" demesi, cemaatten gördüğü ilgi ve sevgidendi. Dindarlık, dini öğrenmeden önce sevmekle başlar. Çocukların sosyalleşme, yani toplumun bir üyesi haline gelme süreçleri boyunca onlara dini sevdiren kim? Peki öğreten kim?

"Din kültürü ve ahlâk bilgisi" konusunda başka ülkelerle mukayese yaparken atladığımız çok önemli bir nokta var. Ülkemizde dini ancak devlet öğretebilir, hatta öğretenlerin devlet memuru olması bir mecburiyettir. İmam hatipler, din kültürü dersleri ve Kur'an kursları dışında kimse din öğretmez. Siz de dininizi öğrenmek istiyorsanız bunu; ancak devletin ruhsat verdiği kişilerden öğrenebilirsiniz. Aksini yapmak, yani resmî sıfat taşımadan dini öğretmek ve devlet kurumları dışında öğrenmek suçtur. Bu alandaki farklı uygulamaları emsal alırken, dünyada dinin sadece devlet tarafından öğretildiği tek ülkenin Türkiye olduğunu unutmamamız gerekir.

Temel olarak üç farklı uygulama var. Birincisine göre din dersleri müfredat içi ve mecburi. Avusturya'da olduğu gibi, anayasal olarak tanınmış her dinî cemaat öğretmen veriyor ve bu mecburî din dersinde öğrenciler ayrı sınıflarda, cemaatlerin atadığı öğretmenlerden kendi dinlerini öğreniyor. İkincisi, isteğe bağlı; ama din dersi almak istemeyenlere mecburî olarak "etik" dersi veriliyor. Almanya'nın bazı eyaletlerindeki gibi. Üçüncüsü ise, resmî müfredat içinde din dersine yer verilmiyor. Dinî eğitim almak isteyenler, kilise okullarına gidiyorlar ve resmî müfredatın yanında yoğun bir din eğitimi alıyorlar. Genel eğitim sistemi içinde bu okulların oranı bazen % 25'e kadar çıkıyor. Fransa gibi.

Her dinin kendine has bir eğitim programı var. Hıristiyanlık, Hz. İsa'nın Yahudi şeriatının yükünü, kendini feda ederek kaldırdığına inandığı için çok basit pratiklere dayanıyor. Katolik Kilisesi, çok uğraşmasına rağmen bir ilmihal kitabı çıkartamadı. Aleviliğin en temel sorunu, merkezî bir öğretiyeye bağlanamaması. Sünnî İslâm'ın en hayatî sorunu ise, tek inancın ve ortak pratiklerin sürdürülmesi.

"Din kültürü ve ahlâk bilgisi" dersi din eğitimi vermiyor. Ama çok esaslı bir şekilde tek akaid ve tek amel için referans teşkil ediyor. Din eğitimi üzerinde devlet tekeli kalkmadığı sürece, bu derse itiraz etmenin gerekçeleri meşrû değil.

APPENDIX A15

Taha Akyol

Aleviler, Sünniler

28.07.2012

CEMEVLERİNİN ibadethane olduğunu yazdığım da Alevi okurlarım mutlu oluyorlar, mutluluklarını mutluluklarını paylaşıyorum. Daha ilginç bulduğum husus, birçok Sünni okurumun da bu fikirde olmasıdır.

Fakat sorunlar da var.

Bir yandan hangisinin “hak mezhep” olduğu şeklindeki sorular... Öbür yandan Sünniliği “Yezid”le, zulüm ve baskısıyla özdeşleştiren görüşler... Hemen şunu belirteyim: Hiç kimse inancının yanlış olduğunu düşüneceği bir inanç sistemini benimsemez. Herkesin inancı kendisi için haklıdır.

‘Hak mezhep’ hangisi?

Cemevlerine gitmeyen Alevilerin çoğunluğu Aleviliği “kültür ve hayat tarzı” diye tanımlıyorlar. “Ali’siz Alevilik” falan gibi marjinal pozitivist uydurmaların ciddiyeti yoktur. Cemevlerini ibadethane görenlerin devam edenlerin çok büyük çoğunluğu ise İslam’ın Alevi yorumunun “gerçek İslam” olduğuna inanıyorlar; Sünnilerin “hak mezhep” inancı gibi!

Hangisi doğru? Herkesin inandığı kendisine doğrudur! Ortadoğu yangınlarından sakınmak istiyorsak, hepimize düşen görev, diğerimize saygı duymaktır. Açıkça bellidir ki, cemevlerini reddetmek, Aleviliği ayrı bir din gibi konumlanmaya zorlamaktır. Vebali çok büyüktür ve bu vebal bugün AKP’nin omuzlarındadır.

Geçmiş zamanlarda

-16. asırda Yavuz ve Kanuni dönemlerinde, İran savaşları sırasında maalesef Alevilere zulüm yapılmıştır. Fakat sebep siyasidir. O zamanın tekfir fetvalarını bugün referans kabul etmek düşünülemez. O zorlu dönemlerde Bektaşiliğin ise saygı

gördüğünü hatırlamalıyız, çünkü Safevi imparatorluğunun uzantısı gibi görülmüyordu, Bektaşilik Osmanlı kurumuydu.

-Şah İsmail de kendi imparatorluk siyasetini, Sünniliğin tasfiye edilmesine dayandırmıştı: “Safevi kuvvetleri İran’da bir baştan öbür başa yürürken, Sünnilere kılıç zoruyla Şiiliği empoze etmiş, bunu kabul etmeyen Sünnilere karşı gaddarca davranılmış ve çoğu öldürülmüştür (David Morgan, Medieval Persia, s. 121.)

-Fransa’da da feodal ve itikadi yarılımlara karşı “tek kral, tek inanç, tek kanun” sloganı geçerliydi, Protestanlara bizim tarihimizde görülmedik Saint Barthelemy katliamı yapılmıştı. Bu “tek” geleneği sonradan Jakoben cumhuriyetin laik “tek”leriyle devam edecekti, demokrasi yerleşinceye kadar.

Geçmişine kapılmamak

Büyük tarihçi Braudel, 16. yüzyılda Akdeniz çevresinde nüfus patlaması ve toprak yetmezliği yaşandığını anlatır. Bu derin sebebin dışavurumu olarak, Orta Avrupa’daki Münster tarikatının “eşitlik” isteyen köylü isyanlarıyla bizdeki Alevi/Türkmen isyanlarının sosyolojisini mukayeseli olarak incelemek çok öğretici olacaktır.

Geçmişin bugün bizi zehirlemesine izin vermeyelim. Türkiye’nin otuz yıldır kanayan ve gittikçe büyüyen bir yarası var, yetmiyor mu?!

Cemevlerini tanımak Türkiye’nin birliğini güçlendirir.

Alevi iftarı

Zeynep Abidin Erdem ve İbrahim Polat’ın girişimiyle Anadolu Alevi ve Bektaşi Federasyonu tarafından, siyasi ve itikadi bakımdan geniş katılımlı bir iftar düzenlenmesini çok olumlu karşıladım. Kutlarım.

Farklılıkları bir araya getiren her girişim iyidir. Cumhurbaşkanı’nın iftara katılarak güzel bir konuşma yapması çok iyi olmuştur ve Alevi vatandaşlarımızın hassasiyetlerinin karşılanmasında onu daha bir manevi sorumluluk altına sokmuştur

NOT: Ne idüğü meçhul bir adam benim adımı kullanarak Twitter hesabı açtırmış, saçma sapan şeyler yazıyor. Benim hiçbir Twitter hesabım yoktur. Beni uyarın okurlarıma teşekkür ederim. Yasal yollara başvurdum. Bilginize sunarım.

APPENDIX A16

Ahmet Turan Alkan

'Sünnî'yim fakat tedavi olayrum'

28.07.2012

Karşıdan bakınca zengin iftarı gibi görünüyordu...Türkiye'deki Alevî-Bektaşî Federasyonları ve derneklerinin verdiği iftar davetinde idim. Cumhurbaşkanı, iftarın onur misafiri idi ve orada bulunmasının büyük anlamı vardı.Karşıdan bakınca zengin iftarı gibi görünüyordu...

Türkiye'deki Alevî-Bektaşî Federasyonları ve derneklerinin verdiği iftar davetinde idim. Cumhurbaşkanı, iftarın onur misafiri idi ve orada bulunmasının büyük anlamı vardı. Sünnî hâfiz Kur'an okudu, Alevî dedesi sofraya duası etti, hep beraber "Âmin" dedik, güzel oldu, kalbimiz ılıklaştı.Zengin iftarı dedim ama, bir başka cihetten fakara sofrası da sayılırdı. Yargıtay gibi Türkiye'de hukuk imkânlarının müntehâsındaki kuruluşun, cemevlerini ibadet yerinden saymayan kararına muhatap kalan Alevîler fakara değilse, sorarım; bu ülkede kim fakardır Allah aşkına?

Kararın ayrıntılarına giremiyorum, yer yok; vaktiyle AYM'nin aldığı 367 kararının benzeri bir şeydir. Fiilen yürürlük bulma şansı yok ama Alevî kalbi kırmakta yektâ ve müstesnâ: Cemevlerine tarikat, zâviye sıfatı verilmesi, "inkılâp kanunlarına muhalefet" gerekçesiyle kabul edilmiyor; ibadethane kavramında ısrar ederseniz, üç ay içinde anahtarını Diyanet'e teslim etmeniz lazım imiş; e, inkılâp kanunları hâlâ duruyor Anayasa'da...

Cemevini Diyanet'e teslim etmek? Mübarek gün böyle soğuk espriler hiç çekilmiyor doğrusu; oruçluysak, sabrın da bir hudûdu var birader!Bu karar, bir anlığına olsun uygulanmaz ve garipliği ile hukuk tarihimizdeki ibret belgelerinin arasına konular, onda hiç şüphem yok ama bu vesile ile devletin -din işlerini değil- Sünnî İslâm'la ilgili din hizmetlerini üstlenmekteki tekelinin komikliği ve lüzumsuzluğu daha görünür hale geldi. İşin daha da gariplik, gülünç ve utandırıcı faslı şu: Biz Sünnîlerden çoğu, Diyanet'in din-devlet ilişkilerindeki resmî yerinin garipliğini bal gibi fark edip yanlış bulmamıza rağmen sırf fitne çıkar endişesiyle nihai tahlilde "Diyanetçi" takılırız ne hikmetse!Dilim varmıyor ama bir yerlerde buna ikiyüzlülük denildiğinden eminim.

Devlet vaktiyle dindarları iyice dövdükten sonra Sünnîlere Diyanet teşkilatını ikram ederek bir nevi gönül almıştı; dindarlar Diyanet'ten nihai kertede razı ve mutlu idiler; camilerine görevli atıyor, dinî meselelerde fetva veriyor ve din hizmetlerinin şunun-bunun elinde parça-pinçik edilmesini fiilen engelliyordu; eğer diyanet elden giderse Avrupa'da cami cemaatlerine bölünen Türklerin durumuna düşmez miydik?

Düşerdik, öyleyse mesela fazladan oruç tutturma konusunda da ortalığı karıştırmanın pek âlemi yoktu, yarı saatin lâfi mı olurdu; yeter ki fitne çıkmasındı. Diyanet zaten hassas astronomik rasatlarda bulunmak için önümüzdeki yılın bütçesine ödenek bile koymuştu; ee...

Diyanet dedim de aklıma geldi, bu anlamlı iftar davetinde Diyanet'ten kimseleri fark edemedik pek.Evet, sağolsun Cumhurbaşkanı'mız, teşrifiyle Alevî-Sünnî kardeşliğine büyük katkıda bulundu, menü de fevkalade göz doldurucuydu ama iftar yine de fukara iftarıydı bana göre. Türkiye'de Alevî olmanın ne mânâya geldiğini o gün biraz daha anlayabildim galiba. Bu durumu bir teşbihle anlatmak istiyorum: Varlıklı bir adam fukaradan bir uzak akrabasını sinemaya götürüyor; kendisi için bilet almıştır ama kapı görevlisi akrabasından bilet sorunca, "Yahu, yabancı değil, bu seferlik idare ediversek..." gibisinden aslında davetlisini aşağılayıcı bir yaklaşım gösteriyor.

İşte yargı kararı: Cemevi ibadethane değil; ne öyleyse, folklor derneği mi, saz kursu mu, kiraathane mi, okul mu, ne? Peki Alevîlik? Biz Sünnîlere sorarsanız İslâm içi bir tarikat veya mezheptir; öyledir de Aleviliğin ne olduğunu Sünnîlerin tarif etmesinde bir haksızlık yok mu sizce? Lâteşbih, Müslümanlığı Vatikan'ın tarif etmesine rıza göstermek gibi bir şey. Kezâ, Alevî Çalıştayı, şimdiye kadar yapılan en kapsamlı çalışmaydı ama öğrendik ki sonuç bildirgesi güzelce çerçeveselendikten sonra hayata geçirilsin diye bir şey yapılmamış.

Gecenin en güzel cümlesi, işadamı Adnan Polat'ın kısa konuşmasında geçti, dedi ki: "Büyüklerimiz bize ilahi ahlâkla ahlâklanmak gerektiğini öğrettiler." İtikad ve inançlar arasındaki zâhiri mesafeleri kuş kanadıyla kat'eden bir cümleydi, unutmadım, mânidar buldum.Fıkrayla bitirelim: Adama "Lâz mısın?" demişler, "Lâzım fakat tedavi olayrum" diye cevap vermiş. Türkiye'de Sünnî olmanın, ancak yüksek şuur sarfı, empati ve vicdanla tedavi edilebilir bir kısım ârızaları olduğunu kabul etsek, galiba çok iyi olacak.

APPENDIX K17

Ertuğrul Özkök

Öcalan Samimi Değilmiş

22.03.1992

ŞİMDİ bir düşünelim... Birtakım insanlar, ellerinde Kalaşnikof silahlarla havaya ateş ediyorlar. Ellerinde bayraklarla slogan atıyorlar. Bu arada, devletin kuvvetlerinin üzerine yürüyorlar. **BÖYLE** bir olay acaba Fransa'da, Amerika'da, İngiltere'de meydana gelseydi polis ne yapardı? Ben, önceki gün Paris'teydim. Paris'in merkezinde eğitim reformlarını protesto eden öğrenciler, gösteri yapmaya kalktıkları zaman polisin neler yaptığını gördüm. Geçen sonbaharda AGİK toplantısı sırasında gösteri yapmak isteyen bazı Kürtlere, Fransız polisinin nasıl muamele yaptığını da gördüm.

Dünyada kimsenin, Türk polisinden, Fransız, İngiliz veya Amerikalı meslektaşlarının davranışından daha toleranslı bir davranış beklemeye hakkı yoktur. Dün Cizre'deki olaylara biraz da bu optikten bakmak gerekir

HÜKÜMETİN TUTUMU

Türk hükümeti, Nevruz histerisinin ortaya çıkmaya başladığı günden beri, demokrat bir ülkede yapılması gerekenleri yapmıştır. Devletin en yetkili ağızları, Nevruz bayramının serbestçe kutlanabileceğini, isteyen vatandaşın istediği şekilde kutlama törenleri düzenleyebileceğini resmi açıklamalarla ifade etmiştir. Ayrıca kutlamaların huzur içinde geçmesi temennileri, yalnızca resmi yetkililer tarafından değil, aynı zamanda ülkenin bütün medyaları tarafından da bir temenni olarak dile getirilmiştir. Bütün bunlar yapılırken ortaya konan tek şart bu kutlamaların siyasi bir gösteri ve devlete karşı bir başkaldırı havasına dönüşmemesiydi.

Aslında, buna şart demek de doğru değil. Çünkü devletin polis örgütü, etnik orjini ne olursa olsun, böyle davranan kişilere izin vermemektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu şartı sadece Kürt kökenli vatandaşlara karşı uygulanan bir politika olarak görmemek lazım.

Bir hatırlayalım... Türk polisi 1 Mayıs'ı kutlamak isteyen insanlara bir zamanlar daha toleranslı mı davranmıştır? Dolayısıyla kimsenin bu bölgedeki olaylara bakıp, bunu sadece Kürtlere karşı uygulanan bir politika olarak görmemesi lazımdır. PKK lideri **Abdullah Öcalan** geçen hafta İkibine Doğru Dergisi'nde yayımlanan mülakatında, bir halk ayaklanması gibi politikalarının bulunmadığını söylüyordu. Ama aynı PKK, önceki günden itibaren bölgede halkı isyana çağırان bildiriler dağıtmaktadır. Sınırlerin gergin, ellerin tetikte olduğu bir dönemde bu tür davranışlar samimi olamaz.

PKK, artık siyasi propagandasını kan dökme üzerine kurduğunu açıkça ilan etmektedir. Ancak bu politika nereye kadar gidebilir? Zavallı insanları, kadın ve çocukları ön saflara sürerek arkadan Kalaşnikof göstererek yapılan siyasi propaganda, sonunda ne getirir? Öcalan, Türkiye'den ayrılıp bağımsız bir devlet kurmak gibi bir politikalarının bulunmadığını söylüyor. Ama şimdi soralım... Bu tür

kanlı olaylarla iki toplum arasına kin tohumları ekilir, muhtemel kan davalarının temelleri atılırsa bu insanlar ileride nasıl yaşayacaklar?

HÜKÜMETİN POLİTİKALARINA GELİNCE...

Ben, bütün bunlara baktığım zaman, Öcalan'ın artık birlikte yaşamak gibi bir politikasının bulunduğu inanmıyorum. Çünkü birlikte yaşamayı seçen insanların ileriye yönelik politikaları daha akıllıca olmalıdır. Türkiye, geçmişte bazı yanlışlar yapmamış değildir. Ancak son iki yıldaki politikaları ile insani ve demokratik çözümün en azından fikri platformu oluşmaya başlamıştır. Başbakan Demirel ve Başbakan Yardımcısı İnönü'nün bölgeye yaptığı ziyaretlerde söylediği sözler, bunun en somut ifadeleridir.

Bu fikri temeller üzerine artık çok güzel bir toplumsal mozaik kurmak mümkündür. Ama bu mozaik içinde yaşamak isteyen herkes, ileride toplumları birbirinden uzaklaştıracak girişimlerden kaçınmalıdır. Dünya basınında çıkacak “İntifada” benzeri birkaç fotoğraf için bunca kanı akıtmanın, bunca nefret tohumu ekmenin hiçbir anlamı yoktur. Batı'dan gelecek sempati mesajlarının ise en küçük gerçekçi bir değerlendirmede, birden engeller haline gelebileceğini unutmamak gerekir. Batı, son yüzyıl içinde gerek Ermenilere gerek Kürtlere bu tür desteklerini fazlasıyla dağıtmıştır. Ama neticede, bütün bunların acısını en çok çeken, yine bu iki toplum olmuştur.

Artık bütün bunları aşmak gerekiyor. Artık demokratik bir toplumun güzel, kültürel mozağının ve ahenkli çeşitliliğinin temellerini atmak gerekiyor. Ve bu temellerin harcına, Batı'nın bölgeyi stabilize etmeyi amaçlayan siyasi entrikalarını değil, AGİK çerçevesinde oluşan insani ve demokratik ideallerini koymak gerekir.

APPENDIX K18

Ahmet Selim

Teşhis de yol da yanlış

23.03.1992

Şu satırların yazıldığı ana kadar **Cizre**'deki olaylar durmamıştı. Gelen haberler “Nevruz Kutlaması” denilen eylemlerde 30'dan fazla insanın öldüğünü bildiriyordu.

Böyle olacağı belli miydi, değil miydi? Belliydi. 21 Mart öncesindeki **Cizre**'nin gece manzarası ise, işin rengini açıkça ortaya koymuştu. Ama bazı siyasi yetkililer o manzara karşısında bile **“Kutlamalar yapılıyor, kayda değer bir şey yok!”** diyebiliyordu.

Silahlar atılıyor ve gökyüzü bu atışlarla ışıklanıyor, bu manzara siyasi yetkililer tarafından **“normal bayram kutlaması”** olarak değerlendirilebiliyor... Büyük hatadır. Hatalar silsilesinin en büyüklerinden biridir.

Daha öncesine gidelim.

Bu milletin “Nevruz” diye ne dini ne de milli bir bayramı mevcut değildir. “Nevruz” sadece folklorik bir adettir, bayram falan değildir. Bu seneye kadar da çarpıcı bir ilgiyle karşılandığı görülmemiştir. Doğu’da da Batı’da da, Sünniler ve Aleviler arasında da, çok cüz’i olarak ve çok sınırlı biçimde hatırlanagelmiştir. Birdenbire öne çıkması tamamen tertiptir. Lakin **“gerçek”** böyle tespit edilmedi. **“Herkes yaygınlıkla mal edelim ki özel istismarın konusu kalmasın”** gibi bir düşünceyle hareket edildi. Sayın **Demirel**, olayların sonrasında bile **“Milletin bayramını zehir ettiler”** diyebildi. Sanki mana ve kayıp bir bayramın zehir edilmesinden ibaretmiş gibi. Sanki millet, oturup da **“Nevruz bayramının tadını çıkaramamaktan dolayı”** ağlayacakmış gibi. Sanki milletin asıl derdi, ülkenin yarınlarını ciddi surette tehdit eden “terör oyunları” değilmiş gibi. Üstelik **Fehmi Işıklar** kendisini rengarenk çiçekler tebrik etti ve o, bu tebriki (gönülsüz görünerek de olsa) kabul buyurdu.

Halbuki Demirel’in yapması gereken **“Şu elemli manzara ancak matem konusu olabilir. Tebriklik, kutlamalık bir şey yok. Çiçek alışverişinin de milleti rahatsız etmekten başka manası olmaz”** karşılığını vermek ve **Fehim Işıklar**’ın müracaatını usulünce reddetmekti.

...Hiçbir yerde **“sakin ve tabii Nevruz anması”** yapılmamıştır. Bütün millet, 21 Mart günü kuşkulu bir bekleyiş içine girmiş, (eski 1 Mayıslar gibi) her günkü faaliyetinden de mümkün merteye uzak kalmaya çalışmıştır. Böyle olacağı belli değil miydi? Belliydi. Terör önlenmeden, terörü tezgahlayan oyunlar bozulmadan bütün Nevruzlar’ın böyle olacağı belli değil midir? Bellidir. Eski 1 Mayıs’lardan tecrübemiz yok mudur? Vardır.

Madem ki böyledir; Nevruz “kutlama”larına niçin izin verilmiştir? PKK’nın halk arasına karışıp provokasyon ve baskı yoluyla büyük eylemlere hazırlandığı bilindiği halde, hangi bayramın izni verilmiştir?

Meselenin kökünde teşhis yanlışlığı vardır. **Yanlış** Teşhisin en önemli sebebi de **Teşhis Cesareti** yokluğudur. Mesele bugünkü mesele değildir. **Demirel**, bundan 13 sene evvel zamanın başbakanına yazdığı 23 Ağustos 1979 tarihli mektubunda, “Urfa’da ‘Apocular’ diye bir eşkiyanın mevcudiyetini kabul etmektesiniz. Bu

eşkiyanın haraç aldığını, vatandaşı yargıladığını, cinayetler işlediğini inkar etmiyorsunuz... Hilvan'da yapılan cenaze törenine bir kaza halkının gözleri önünde yüzlerce silahlı militanın katıldığını, devlet dairelerinin kapattırıldığını inkar etmiyorsunuz... Devletin böyle bir eşkiyayı aylarca uğraşp haklayamaması sözkonusu olamaz.” Diyor ve muhatabı olan (zamanın başbakanı) **Bülent Ecevit'e** “**Bu eşkiya hükümetinizce siyasi himayeye mazhardır**” ithamını yöneltiyordu. (Arcayürek, cilt 9)

O günlerden geliyoruz

Demirel Ecevit'i, Ecevit de Demirel'i terörü himaye etmekle suçlamıştı o günlerde. Halbuki terörü himaye eden, **Batı'ydı** ve (onun kontrolünde olduğu iddia edilen) “**Marksist-İlerici**” çevreler ve odaklardı. Türkiye'nin yumuşak karnını da bunlar kaşıyıp didikliyordular. Şer orkestrasının şefi olan Batı, Türkiye'yi bir yere götürmek istiyordu.

Senaryo'nun özünde bir değişiklik yoktur. “**12 Eylül gelmiş de, baskı yapmış da tepki olarak bazı şeyler doğmuş**” yaklaşımı meseleyi hafife almaktır. 12 Eylül, sebep değil neticedir. 12 Eylül'ün derindeki sebepleri, 12 Eylül sonrasındaki safahatın da sebepleridir. 12 Eylül, Batı'nın mücerret ve müstakil hedefi değildi. 80'li yıllardı Batı'nın şumüllü hedefi!

Batı'nın şimdiki hedefi ise Türkiye'yi “**Yeni Dünya Düzeni'ne**” en uygun biçimde en uygun yerde monte etmektir. Gaflet içinde Batı'nın gösterdiği yolda yürüyüp, demokrasiyi milli-manevi muhtevadan mahrum bir serbestleştirme sanarak o türlü bir demokrasinin her şeyi halledeceğini ummak, terör karşısındaki en büyük zafiyet amilidir. Şunu unutmayalım: Taklitçiliğe dayanan **Temelsiz Demokrasi, Gerçek Demokrasi'nin** en büyük düşmanıdır.

APPENDIX K19

Ertuğrul Özkök

İşte Türkiye, işte büyük devlet

17.02.1999

Başbakan **Bülent Ecevit** tarihi açıklamayı yaparken, hepimiz televizyon ekranının başındayız. Beklediğimiz cümle geliyor. Bölücübaşı **Abdullah Öcalan**, Türkiye'de. Televizyonun etrafındayız. Yazışleri müdürlerimiz, bölüm şeflerimiz, yazarlarımız, muhabirlerimiz, ofis boylarımız... Bir anda alkış kopuyor. Başbakan **Ecevit**'in sesi titriyor. Bizlerse ağlamaklıyız.

Herkes birbirine sarılıyor. Herkes birbirini tebrik ediyor. Hepimiz gururluyuz. Türkiye, tarihinin en büyük isyancıbaşısını yakalayıp yargılamaya getiriyor. Bu Türkiye'nin zaferidir. Bu ülkemizin, büyük devlet olduğunu hem kendimize, hem bütün dünyaya ispatlamaktır. Bu, vefakâr bir halkın, tarih bilinci doruk noktasına çıkmış bir milletin zaferidir. Evlatları dağlarda şehit düşerken, cenazelerinin başında sadece gözyaşı döküp, “**Vatan sağolsun**” diyerek iman tazeleyen, mücadelesini bileyen bir ulusun hak ettiği gururdur.

21 yıldır, evet tam 21 yıldır bugünü bekliyoruz. Sabırla bekliyoruz. Gözyaşıyla bekliyoruz. Azimle, mücadele azmiyle bekliyoruz. Hüznümüzün doruklara çıktığı anlar oldu. Kurşunlanmış bebeklerimizin fotoğrafları karşısında çaresizlikten kahrolduğumuz anlar oldu. En çok da bebeklere üzüldük. Kürt bebeklerine. Vatandaşlarımızın çocuklarına. Çok cenaze kaldırdık. Hatta umutsuz anlarımız oldu. Vatanın bir bölümü gidiyor mu diye kendi kendimize en kahrolası soruları sorduğumuz anlar bile oldu.

Ama yılmadık. Silkindik. Balkanlar'da, Ortadoğu'da düştüğümüz hataya düşmeyeceğiz diye ant içtik. Önce dağlarda inisiyatifi ele geçirdik. Her gece hain bir pusuya düşen Mehmetçik, bir anda dağların hâkimi oldu. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, hepimizin, Türk'üyle Kürt'üyle hepimizin olan dağları teröristten geri aldık. Santim santim, mağara mağara geri aldık.

Sonra bölücübaşını saklayan komşularımıza döndük. “**Ya atın ya da oraya geliriz**” dedik.

Sadece siyasimiz değil, ordumuz, halkımız, sivil toplum örgütlerimizle dedik. Bütün bir halk, devletin, ordusunun arkasında dimdik saf tuttu.

Eller kenetlendi... Kurtuluş Savaşı ruhu yeniden kimliğimiz, şahsiyetimiz haline geldi. Bir halk... Tarihi bir kararla bölücübaşını önce Suriye'den çıkartıp, sonra dünyayı ona dar eden dürüst devlet adamları. İnanmış askerler. Sessiz istihbaratçılar. Tarihi bir kovalamaca. Tarihi bir operasyon. Sonunda tarihi bir zafer. Hep birlikte sevinelim. Buyrun size ancak büyük ve inanmış bir devletin kazanabileceği bir zafer. Hani, “**Onlar yapıyor da biz niye yapamıyoruz**” diyenlere en şerefli cevap.

İşte Türkiye...İşte 700'üncü yılını kutlayan bir miras.İşte 75 yıllık muazzam bir cumhuriyet.Ve işte zafer...Hepinize, hepimize teşekkürler.Bu zafer hepimizindir.Bu zafer, büyük devlet Türkiye'nindir...

APPENDIX K20

Ali Bulaç

Yeni Bir Dönem

18.02.1999

PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan'ın yakalanıp Türkiye'ye getirilmiş olması önemli bir gelişme. ABD, İsrail veya Yunan istihbarat birimlerinin bu olaydaki destekleyici rolleri ve yardımları ne olursa olsun, belli bir plan ve disiplin içinde gerçekleştirilen operasyon, yıllarca kendisinden söz ettirecek kadar önemli. Ancak polisiye açıdan önemli olan bu operasyonun bir başka açıdan da önemi var. Asıl bu yönü üzerinde durmak gerekir.

Öcalan'ın yakalandığını açıklayan Başbakan Bülent Ecevit, basın açıklamasının son cümlesini şöyle bitirdi: "Allah, milletimizi ve bütün insanlığı terör belasından ve savaşlardan korusun." Başbakanla görüşükten sonra bir açıklama yapan ANAP Genel Başkanı Mesut Yılmaz da şöyle dedi: "Bugüne kadar iki önemli hedef vardı. Biri terörün durdurulması, diğeri Apo'nun yakalanması. Bu iki hedefe ulaşıldı. Şimdi önümüzde iki hedef var: Biri Güneydoğu'ya gerekli yatırımların yapılması, diğeri demokratikleşmeye hız verilmesi." Bu her iki açıklamayı ciddiye almak lazım. Bence bundan sonra atılması gereken adımlar konusunda önemli ipuçları veriyorlar.

Hiç şüphesiz "Kürt (veya Güneydoğu) meselesi"nin en önemli boyutu PKK ve Abdullah Öcalan'dı. Sebep olarak ister terör, ister dış tahrik, ister kimlik siyaseti veya ekonomik geri kalmışlık denilsin, sonuçta Güneydoğu sorun üreten ve zaman zaman sorunların kolayca krize dönüştüğü marazi bir ortam durumundadır ve bu ortam marazi özelliklerini neredeyse yüz yıldır devam ettiriyor. Eğer köklü, sahici ve kalıcı tedbirler alınmayacak olursa, bölge problem üretmeye devam edecektir.

Bundan sonra dikkat edilecek husus, şiddet ve terörün "negatif siyaset" çerçevesinde kurumsallaşmasının önüne geçmek olmalıdır. Bunun da ekonomik ve demokratik iyileştirme programlarıyla desteklenmeyen salt askeri tedbirler veya mukabil şiddetle sağlanamayacağını iyi bilmek lazım. Tabii ki devlet, "meşru fiziki şiddet kullanma hak ve yetkisine sahip olan tek kurum"dur; ama devlet aynı zamanda yurttaşların temel ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel sorunlarıyla yakından ilgilenen bir kurumdur da.

Bu sorunlar çözülemediği zaman, başka faktörlerin de yardımıyla kolayca sosyal barış bozulur, siyasi birlik tehlikeye girer. Hatta irrasyonel bir şey yapılmış olur; çünkü askeri tedbirler için harcanan maddi kaynaklar bölgenin yakın ve orta vadedeki ekonomik taleplerini fazlasıyla karşılamaya yeter.

Bu aşamada akli başında herkesin üzerinde ittifak ettiği nokta şudur: Bundan sonra diğer tedbirler yanında Kürt veya Güneydoğu meselesinin üstüne demokratikleşmeyle gidilebilir. Eğer "Hele önce terör bir bitsin." deniliyor idiyse, terör en zayıf seviyeye inmiş bulunmaktadır. Apo'nun yakalanması dolayısıyla meydana gelmesi muhtemel şiddet hareketleri kurumsallaşmış ve sistemli teröre değil, kısa zaman içinde sona erecek tepkilere işaret eder.

Demokratikleşme, hukukun üstünlüğü ve tek tek her insanın özgür ve güven içinde kendini "buraya, bu ülkeye ait" hissetmesinin ana konsepti artık "baba devlet" değil, "kerim devlet konsepti"nin bugünkü konjonktüre ve aktüel ihtiyaç ve taleplere göre tanımlanmasıyla mümkündür. Yeni bir döneme girdik, bu dönemin bize sunduğu tarihi fırsatı heba etmeyelim.

APPENDIX K21

Oktaç Ekşi

Kürtçe yayın
04.01.2009

GAZETELERDE Deniz Baykal'ın "Kürtçe TV yayınlarına karşı çıktığını" okuyunca Tanrı biliyor, "Tamam" dedik. "Baykal yine kendisinden beklenenin tam tersi bir laf etmiş." Meğer günahını almışız. Daha doğrusu günah onun değil, gerçeğin yarısını yazıp öteki yarısını yazmamak gibi bir şöhreti olan basınıımızınmış. Baykal'ın CNN Türk'te yayınlanan bir programda söylediğini, bu kanalın web sitesinde bulduk. Anlaşılan uygulamayı eleştirmiş ama eleştirisi "esasa" yani "Kürtçe yayın yapılmasına" karşı değilmiş. Bu yayının "TRT" gibi "bir devlet kurumu" tarafından yapılmasına karşı çıkmış. İkisinin arasında çok fark var. Nitekim şöyle demiş:

"Devletin bir kurumunun bir etnik çabaya destek olması çok yanlış. Devlet anlayışımıza ters. Herkes kendi anadilinde yayın yapabilir. RTÜK düzeni vardır. Türkiye'nin yasaları içinde yayın yapar."
Kürtçe yayınının TRT'de başlatılması Baykal'ın dediği gibi "devletin etnik bir

çabayadestek vermesi” anlamına mı gelir? Yoksa o etnik kökenli gerçekleri görmek ve ihtiyacı, devletin temel değerlerini koruyarak karşılamak mı doğrudur? İki tezin de güçlü bir şekilde savunulması mümkün.

Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (RTÜK) görevlerini bihakkın yerine getirecek kadardonanımlı ve güçlü olsaydı, biz de **Baykal**’ın tezi doğrudur derdik. Ama gerçek şu ki **RTÜK**tüm yayınları etkin şekilde izleme olanağına sahip değil. O zaman ister istemez öteki tez güç kazanıyor.

Keza konu eğer **”Kürtçe yazılmış bir dilekçenin işleme konulması”** olsa, biz de karşıçıkırız. Aynı şekilde **”Okullarda Kürtçe diliyle**

eğitim yapılması” veya **”Kürtçe’nin deresmi okullarda öğretilmesi”** isteklerine de karşıyız. Çünkü artık **”bireysel haklar”**dandegil, **”Kürt bütünlüğünün hakları”**ndan söz ediliyor demektir. Kaldı ki **Türkiye**’nin üniter yapısı buna izin vermez. Ama **Kürt** kökenli insanlarımızın kendilerini ifade etmeleri önündeki engelleri kaldırmak tamamen başka bir şeydir. Bu zaten **bireysel hak ve özgürlüklere** dayalı demokrasinin gereğidir.

Örneğin **Adalet Bakanı Mehmet Ali Şahin**, hapishanelerdeki insanların ziyaretçileriyle **Türkçe**’den başka dille konuşmasını yasaklayan kuralı kaldırma çalışması başlatmış. Doğru yapmış. Gerçekten bu kadar saçma bir yasak olabilir mi? Kendi ailenizden isteyeceğiniz en basit bir şeyi, onun **Türkçe** karşılığını bilmediğiniz için isteyememenizin savunulur bir tarafı var mı?

Keza **AKP İstanbul Milletvekili Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat**’ın **”seçimlerde Türkçe dışındabir dille (örneğin Kürtçe) propaganda yapılmasını**

yasaklayan yasa hükmünün dekaldırılmasını talep ettiği” bildiriliyor.

”Anadil, anamızın sütü kadar helaldir” diyen eski **İçişleri Bakanı Abdülkadir Aksu** gibi, **Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat** da haklı...

Eğer adayın karşısındaki kitle hangi dili anlıyorsaaday görüşlerini elbet dinleyicilerin bildiği dille anlatır. Aksi tam bir sağırlar diyalogudur. **”Devlet”** olma haysiyetine sahip **”devlet”**e düşen, insanları engellemek değil, özgürbırakmak ama gerekli önlemleri alarak o propagandada suç varsa gereğini yapmaktır. Bu, bu kadar basit.

APPENDIX K22

Mustafa Ünal

Bir tabu yıkılırken...

04.01.2009

Çok değil 10 yıl önce 'Gün gelecek TRT, 24 saat Kürtçe yayın yapacak' dense inanır mıydınız? Sanmıyorum, hayali bile kurulamazdı. Kürt'ün, Kürtçenin inkar edildiği yıllar geride kaldı. İnkâr ve ret çözüm getirmede, sorunu daha da ağırlaştırdı.

Sert politikanın mimarları emekli paşalar gün geldi 'Evet, biz yanılmışız' dedi. 12 Eylül'ün paşası Kenan Evren, 'Kürtçe yasağı hataydı.' dedi. Bu da bir ilerleme. Ancak yıllar yılı 'Kürt yok' dayatmasını devlet politikasına dönüştürenler de bir bedel ödemeli.

Devletin gücünü kullanıyorsanız böylesine yanılma veya yanlışla düşme lüksünüz yoktur. Bu dayatma yüzünden yaşanan acılar ne olacak? Sırf 'Kürt'üm' dediği için sıkıntıya düşenleri, Kürtçe türkü söylediği için vatanında barınamayanları düşünün... Hatırlayın, Ahmet Kaya bir toplantıda 'Kürtçe şarkı söylemek istiyorum' deyiverdi de başına gelmedik kalmadı. Neredeyse linç ediliyordu. Paris'te sürgünde hayatını kaybetti. Mezarı vatanından uzaklarda. Acaba bugünkü dayatmalar için de yarın 'başörtüsünü bir Türkiye gerçeği olarak kabul etmemekle yanılmışız' denecek mi? Kürt ve Kürtçe konusunda yanılanlar pekala başka dayatmalarda da yanılabilirler. Nitekim yanılıyorlar da.

Kürtçe kanal, bir haftalık test yayının ardından TRT'nin bünyesinde 2008'in son günü resmen yayın hayatına başladı. Kürtçe, TRT'den ilk kez duyuluyor değil. Farklı dil ve lehçelerle kısa süreli programlar yapılmıştı. Kürtçe, Boşnakça ve Arapça gibi... Yayınların kanala dönüşmesinin zeminini bu programlar oluşturdu. Yıllar önce GAP televizyonu da bir arayışın sonucuydu. O günün şartları daha fazlasına imkân vermedi.

Kürtçe kanalın start aldığı açılış kokteyline katıldım. Üç bakan ve iktidar partisinden milletvekilleri vardı, muhalefetin yokluğu dikkat çekiciydi. Bölge partisi DTP ilgi göstermedi. CHP mesafeli durdu. MHP ise tepki koydu. DTP, 'AK Parti projesi' diye karşı çıktı. İtirazın temelinde politik kaygılar var. Kanal yüzünden AK Parti ile yarışacağı yerel seçimlerde mevzi kaybedeceğinden korkuyor. Bu konuda katı bir tutum sergileyen MHP'nin tepkisi sürpriz değil. Karşı çıkışını kampanyaya dönüştürdüğü de söylenemez.

Ancak CHP'yi anlamak zor. Baykal, yayının TRT'den yapılmasına itiraz etti; 'Devlet kanalında olmaz.' dedi. Ayrıca 'Çok tehlikeli bir iş' diye niteledi. Baykal, yaklaşık bir

yıl önce Kuzey Irak'taki Kürtlere mesajın doğru ve sağlıklı ulaştırılması için Kürtçe yayınının lüzumuna işaret etmişti. Kürtçe yayını etnik kimliğe destek diye yorumlasa da geçen yıl söylediği, 'Her etnik kimlik kişinin şerefi, devletin iftiharıdır.' sözü de hâlâ unutulmadı.

TRT 6, aynı zamanda Irak'ın kuzeyindeki Kürtlere de yönelik yayın yapacak. Dışarıdaki Kürtler izlesin, içeridekiler izlemesin demek doğru mu? Değil elbette. Baykal'ın TRT itirazı anlamsız. Bu konuda aşırı hassasiyeti olanlar aksine 'kontrollü yayının devlet kanalından daha sağlıklı yapılacağını' söylüyor. İleride özel kanallar da devreye girebilir.

Şüphesiz Kürtçe kanalın, mesajları doğru iletmek gibi bir misyonu olacak. Sadece Güneydoğu'daki vatandaşlarımız değil İran, Irak ve Suriye'deki Kürtler de takip edecek. Sadece içerisiyle sınırlı görmek doğru değil. Türkiye, bölgede söz sahibi olmak istiyorsa böyle bir kanal kaçınılmazdı. TRT'nin çok dilli yayın açılımı sadece Kürtçeden ibaret değil, sırada Arapça ve Farsça gibi kanallar var.

Kürtçe kanalın 'bir tabunun yıkılması' açısından anlamı büyük. 'Tabu yıkmak' kulağa hoş geliyor ama bunun için siyasî cesaret ve kararlılık gerekiyor. Hatta gözü karartmak, risk almak şart. Turgut Özal, tabu yıkan devlet ve siyaset adamı olarak tarihe geçti. Kürt sorununa yaklaşımı da çok radikaldi. Ömrü vefa etseydi, birçok yenilikle beraber Kürtçe kanalla 90'lı yıllarda tanışabilirdik. Cesaret ve kararlılıkta Özal'ı aratmayan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan da tabuların üzerine gitmekten çekinmiyor.

Kürtçe yayın tabuydu. Bu tabuyu yerle bir eden Erdoğan oldu. Erdoğan da bir tabu yıkıcı. Korku ve endişelerin yersiz olduğu, bu süreçte görünecek. Bilmem farkında mısınız, tabulardan arınmak Türkiye'yi herkes için daha yaşanabilir bir ülke haline getiriyor...

APPENDIX K23

Sedat Ergin

Uludere'den Çıkarmamız Gereken Dersler

03.01.2012

HERHALDE bugün dünyada çok az hava gücü, kendisine verilen bir hedefe gece koşullarında ve bu derece zor bir coğrafyada tam isabet derece tam isabet

derecesiyle vurabilecek bir teknolojik üstünlük ve operasyonel yeteneğe sahiptir.

Bu durum çok temel bir doğruyu ortadan kaldırmaya yetmiyor. Herkes, en zayıf noktası kadar güçlüdür. Türk Hava Kuvvetleri'nin en gelişmiş silah sistemlerine sahip bulunması ve F-16'ları savaşa hazırlık düzeyi çok yüksek pilotların kullanıyor olmasının yarattığı güç algısı, istihbarat analizindeki bir hata sonucu birden geçersiz ve anlamsız hale gelebiliyor. Gecenin karanlığında F-16'ların gökyüzünden bomba yağdırması ile Kuzey Irak dağlarında kaçak malları yükledikleri katırların altına saklanarak kendilerini korumaya çalışan Kürt çocuklarının o an yaşadıkları çaresizlik arasında sıkışmış olan bir realite var. Araya sıkışmış olan Kürt sorunudur ve Türkiye'nin en zayıf noktasıdır.

ALGILARI GÖZDEN GEÇİRME GEREĞİ

Bu zayıf noktaya Uludere olayıyla ilgili bazı algıları tersyüz ederek yaklaşmaya çalışalım: Olayın Türkiye çapında büyük bir şok yaratmasının en büyük nedeni ölenlerin kaçakçılık yapan siviller olmasıdır. Çoğu, çocuk yaşlardadır. Pek çok gözlemcinin de vurguladığı gibi, öldürülenler sınırdan içeri sızmaya çalışan bir terörist kafilesi olsaydı, muhtemelen bu ölçüde bir infial ortamı doğmayacak, gazetelerin olayı aktarışı, atılan başlıklar da çok farklı olacaktı. Ama ölenler terörist olsaydı da, onların kaybı bu ülkede yaşayan insanların bir kesimini yine aynı derecede yaralayacaktı. Belki işe meselenin bu boyutundan başlamak gerekiyor. PKK'lı olsun olmasın, ateş altında kim ölürse ölsün bir insanın hayatını yitirdiğini, bir canın kaybedildiğini hisseden, yas tutan herkesi anlamaya çalışan yeni bir bakış geliştirmeliyiz.

ASKERİ ÇÖZÜMÜN ÇÖZÜMSÜZLÜĞÜ

İster katliam, ister kaza deyin, adını ne koyarsanız koyun, Uludere'de geçen hafta sınırda yaşanan trajedi, 2012 yılına girerken bütün Türkiye'ye çok temel bir gerçeği sarsarak göstermiş olmalıdır.

Toplam 35 gencin ölmesi, hiçbir kastın olmadığı bir hatanın sonucu da olsa, burada yaşanan büyük facia, Türkiye'de bir savaş halinin sürüyor olmasının doğurduğu bir sonuçtur. İşin köküne indiğimizde, yapılan hatanın da çatışma koşullarının bir türevidiğini görüyoruz. Kürt sorunu çözümsüz kaldığı, çatışma koşulları devam ettiği sürece benzer olayların farklı şekillerde tekrarı her zaman ihtimal dahilindedir. Değişmeyen, istikrarlı bir şekilde artan her iki taraftaki ölümlerin sayısıdır.

Uludere, güvenlik politikalarında ısrar eden, PKK'ya askeri yöntemlerle ağır darbeler indirilerek pekala soruna çözüm bulunabileceği kabulünden yola çıkan bir devlet anlayışının geldiği noktadır. Bu anlayış, son dönemde Kürt siyasi hareketini temsil

eden BDP'ye de hiçbir ayırım yapmadan PKK ile aynı muameleyi yapmış, seri tutuklama dalgalarıyla bu hareketi her bir taraftan çevrelemiş, nefesini kesmeye çalışmıştır. Uludere olayının Kürt siyasi hareketinin bu kuşatılmışlığı yaşadığı bir döneme rastlaması, tepkilerin de olabilecek en keskin hatlarda şekillendiği bir ortamı tetiklemiştir.

TOPLUMSAL BARIŞ İÇİN TEHLİKE ÇANLARI

Kabul edelim ki, Türkiye, Uludere faciası nedeniyle 2012'ye çok şanssız bir giriş yapmıştır. Bütün işaretler olayın büyük bir kırılmaya yol açtığına işaret ediyor. Kürtlerin önemli bir kesiminde belirlemekte olan ruh ikliminin, çözüm çabalarını iyice içinden çıkılmaz bir hale getirip ülkedeki mevcut çatışma ortamını daha da büyütmesi söz konusudur. Ne yapıp yapıp bu kötüye gidişin durdurulması, gönül köprülerinin tümüyle atılmasını önlemek gerekiyor.

Bunu önlemenin koşullarından biri, zaten her uygar ülkenin sergilemesi gereken bir davranıştır. Hadise bütün yönleriyle detaylı bir şekilde araştırılıp, gerçekler olanca çıplaklığıyla kamuoyuyla paylaşılmalıdır. Hatayı kabullenip özür dilemek, insan hayatına değer veren devletlere yakışan bir erdem olmalıdır.

Ama bununla da kalmamalıdır. Yaklaşık 30 yıldır süren bu sorunda dönüp dönüp her seferinde yükselen bir maliyetle yine aynı başlangıç noktasına gelmenin anlamsızlığını artık kabul etmemiz gerekiyor. Kürt sorununda yeni bir bakışa vesile oluşturması, 35 genç insanımızı kaybettiğimiz bu talihsiz olayın tek tesellisi olabilir.

APPENDIX K24

Bülent Korucu

Adalet de, şefkat de gecikmesin

03.01. 2012

Uludere'de 35 sivil vatandaşımızın kendi jetlerimiz tarafından öldürülmesi yeni bir dönemin başlangıcı olabilir. Ve o yeni dönemi el birliği ile inşa edebiliriz.

Böylece bir şerden hayır çıkarabiliriz. Her şeyden önce 'acınız acımızdır' yaklaşımının bir teselli cümlesi olarak kalmaması gerekiyor. Bunun için olay gecikmeden aydınlatılmalı. Körlerin fil tarifi gibi her kafadan ayrı ses çıkıyor. "Kaza mı, komplo mu, kasıt mı?" sorusu şeffaf, hızlı ve tatmin edici biçimde cevaplanmalı.

Faili meçhul cinayetlerin, darbelerde şartları olgunlaştırma eylemlerinin üzerine gidebilen yargı mekanizması en büyük şansımız. Kuvvet komutanı ve emniyet müdürü seviyesinde güvenlik bürokratlarını soruşturabilen savcılar, aynı özgüvenle bu işin üzerine de gitmeli. İkinci olarak, ölenleri geri getirmese bile arkada kalanların acısını hafifletecek somut adımlar atılmalı. Maddi-manevi tazminat mekanizması acilen devreye sokulmalı. Bunlar zaten başlamış süreçler, talebimiz, yara derinleşmeden sonuçlandırılması. Geciken adalet gibi geciken şefkat de beklenen neticeleri vermiyor.

Vahim olayla ortaya çıkan iki durumu kayıt altına almakta fayda görüyorum. Birincisi devletin tavrı, daha doğrusu değişimin gözlemlenmesi. Çok değil, 10 yıl önce sokak ortasında infaz yapan ve bunu iftihar vesilesi gören bir 'derin devlet' vardı. Devletin legal unsurları ya sindirilmiş veya suç ortağı haline getirilmişti. 'Devlet bazen rutin dışına çıkabilir' diyeni mi ararsınız; MGK antetli ölüm listeleri dolaştıranları mı? O mütekebbir devletin yerinde bugün mahcup devlet duruyor. 35 insanın kanını yerde bırakmayacağı umudu doğuran, en azından pişkinlik göstermeyen bir siyaset ve bürokrasi var karşımızda.

İkinci önemli tavır ise KCK/PKK örgütünün, daha önce can düşmanı gördüğü koruculara duyduğu muhabbet! Çok değil üç ay önce Ağrı'da bir korucunun evini basarak şehit eden örgüt, bu olayı iyi kullandı. Ölenlerin çoğu, askerle birbirine canını emanet eden ve operasyona çıkan korucuların çocuğu. Zamanlama ve mağdurların kimliği kasıt ihtimalini zayıflatıyor. Operasyonlarda PKK'ya karşı psikolojik üstünlüğün ele alındığı dönemde bunun makul izahı yok. Silvan ve Çukurca saldırıları, devletin dengesini bozmayı ve 90'lı yıllara çekmeyi hedefliyordu. 24 şehit ve 18 yaralının bulunduğu son saldırı, savaşı biraz daha kızıştırmak ve güvenlik güçlerinin tekrar 'rutin dışı'na çıkmasını sağlamak içindi. Çok şükür tuzağa düşülmedi. O psikolojide bunu yapmayan güvenlik güçlerinin ibreyi kendi lehine çevirmişken sivillere kasıtlı saldırdığına inanmak zor. İç ve dış kamuoyunda güç durumunda kalmaktan başka ne işe yarayacak?

Kıbrıs Harekâtı sırasında Kocatepe muhribini kendi jetlerimizin vurduğu veya operasyondan dönen birliklerin emniyet tedbiri alan arkadaşları tarafından pusuya düşürüldüğü gibi örnekler biliniyor. Uludere'yi diğerlerinden ayıran, ölü sayısı da değil. Zira ölen ve yakınları açısından baktığınızda tek kişinin acısı da aynı. Korucuların dost ateşinde şehit olan Uzman Çavuş Serkan İpek'in eşi ve çocuklarının yaşadığı travmanın daha hafif olduğu iddia edilebilir mi? Önemli nokta, istihbarat teyidi için gerekli zaman varken sivillerin öldürülmesi. Hata olma ihtimali, kaybedilen canları geri getirmeyecek. Sadece geleceğe dair umutlarımızı korumamıza yardımcı olacak. 90'lı yıllardaki devletin hortlama ihtimali çok korkunç.

Tam da bunun için önce komplo ya da kasıt ihtimali soruşturulmalı ve milleti rahatlatacak tedbirler alınmalı.

APPENDIX N25

Sedat Ergin
Ulusal Toparlanma Gereği
31.05.1998

Önceki gün Paris'te Fransa Ulusal Meclisi'nin **“Fransa 1915 Ermeni soykırımını açıkça tanımaktadır”** şeklindeki karar tasarısını kabul ettiği saatlerde, Beyrut'ta gözlerden kaçan önemli bir konferans cereyan etmekteydi. Konferans, **“Türk Devletinin Bölgedeki Yayılmacı Politikasının Tehlikeleri”**ni konu almaktaydı. Toplantıyı düzenleyen kuruluşlardan biri, Ermeni Taşnak Partisi güdümündeki **“Ermeni Davasını Savunma Komitesi”**

İkincisi ise PKK çizgisindeki **“Sürgünde Kürt Parlamentosu”**.

Konferansa bu iki kuruluşun temsilcilerinin yanı sıra bazı akademisyen ve politikacılar da davet edilmiş.

Bunların geldikleri ülkelerin dökümü şöyle: İran, Lübnan, Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi, Yunanistan, Rusya, Suriye, Bulgaristan ve Ermenistan.

Konferansa katılanlar arasında **“Sürgünde Kürt Parlamentosu”**nun Başkanı **Yaşar Kaya** ve Rusya Parlamentosu'ndan **Kostantin Zadolin** de var.

Fransa Ulusal Meclisi Türkiye'yi karşısına alırken, eşzamanlı olarak, fanatik Ermeni gruplarıyla PKK çizgisindeki Kürt milliyetçiliğinin ortak bir dayanışma gösterisine girmeleri yeterince açıklayıcı olmalı.

* * *

Tabloyu açıklamak için komplo kuramlarına gerek yok. Türkiye'nin karşısındaki cephe, kendisini saklama ihtiyacı duymadan Beyrut-Paris ekseninde kendisini açıkça ortaya koyuyor.

Bu cephenin temelleri ilk olarak 1974 Kıbrıs Barış Harekâtı sonrasında fanatik Ermeni ve Rum gruplarının işbirliğiyle atılmıştı.

Bu gruplarla iç içe olan Batı dünyasındaki Yunan ve Ermeni lobileri de devreye girerek, Türkiye'nin çıkarlarına ağır zarar vermişlerdi. Bunun en çarpıcı örneği, ABD Kongresi'nden geçen ambargo kararıydı.

Sonradan ortaya çıkan PKK da, doğal müttefik olarak bu husumet cephesinde yerini aldı.

1970'li yılların ikinci yarısında Türkiye'nin karşısına çıkan davranış kalıbı 1990'lı yılların sonunda bir kez daha tekrarlanıyor.

Sanki Türkiye'yi bir kısıkaç içine alma operasyonu adım adım ilerliyor.

Ve soğuk savaş döneminde Batı dünyasının ileri karakolu rolünü oynayan Türkiye bugün bir dönemdeki müttefiklerinden her cephede anlayışsızlık ve husumet görmekte ve süratle Batı'dan dışlanmaktadır.

Türkiye son Fransa Meclisi kararında olduğu gibi bir muameleyi hak eden ülke midir?

Türkiye'nin bu tür davranışları caydıracak gücü yok mudur? Elindeki kartlar bu kadar da zayıf mıdır?

* * *

Hepimiz biliyoruz ki, bu husumet cephenin hevesini kışkırtan, Türkiye'nin içte düşmüş olduğu siyasi istikrarsızlık ve genel dağınıklığıdır.

Türkiye'yi zayıf bir anında yakalayan ve Türkiye ile hesabı olan herkese gün doğmuştur.Zaman geçmektedir. Türkiye'nin kendisini çevreleyen bu çemberi kırıp atması her şeyden önce içte bir ulusal toparlanmayı gerektirmektedir.Ancak içte bu toparlanmayı yapmak durumunda olanlar, daha çok kendi şahsi siyasi çıkarlarının mücadelesiyle meşguldürler.

Türkiye, vatandaşlarının artık utanç verici bulmaya başladıkları bu gaflet halinden uyanmalıdır.

APPENDIX N26

Fehmi Kuru

Gerçek Sebep

01.06.1998

"Türkler, 1915 yılında, Ermenilere karşı soykırım uyguladılar mı?" Dünya gündemine zorlamayla sokulan son tartışma konusu bu. Bilinen, Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sıcak günlerinde, Anadolu topraklarında, Türk, Kurt, Ermeni, Rum, Arap fark atmaksızın, çok sayıda insanın hayatını kaybettiğidir...

Aradan çok uzun yıllar geçtiği için, bunun ötesindeki 'gerçek' nedir bilmemize imkan yok. Nesnel olması gereken 'tarih' merceğinden bakanlar arasında "Soykırım oldu" diyenler de var, "Olmadı, tarihte böyle bir olay yaşanmadı" diyenler de; her iki görüşü savunanlar da 'tarihi' sıfatını taşıyan 'saygın' isimler... Kaldı ki, bir an iddiaların 'gerçek' olduğunu farzetsek bile, bugünün insanları, geçmişin yanlısını nasıl düzeltebilir? Düzeltebileceğini varsaysak, bu defa başka bir soru çıkıyor karşımıza: Bugünün insanını, onca yıl önce yapılan bir yanlısı düzeltmeye, kim, hangigerekçeyle zorlayabilir?

Fransız Parlamentosu'nun "Türklerin 1915'te Ermeni kıyımı yaptıklarını ve bu yüzden kınanmaları gerektiğini" ongören kararı, ne yönden bakarsanız bakınız, anlamsız bir girişim. Kararın, Fransa'daki Ermeni azınlığı veya Erivan'da yönetimi eline geçiren Tasnakçıları tatmin etmeyi amaçlaması bile akla uygun gelmiyor. Geleneksel Türk-Fransız ilişkilerini zedelemesi, Avrupa kapısından döndürülmenin kızgınlığını yasayan Türk kamuoyunun öfkesini Fransa'ya yönelmesi gibi gelişmelere canak tutması da cabası.

Fransa'nın aldığı kararın, şu aşamada, fazla bir önemi bulunmuyor. Fransız Hükümeti, Ankara'daki büyükelçisi aracılığıyla, parlamentonun girişimini tasvip etmediğini açıkladı. Ancak, Senato'da da görüşülüp desteklenmesi halinde, karar, hükümet için de bağlayıcılık kazanacaktır. Fransa'da başlayan bu hamlenin başka ülkelere de sıçraması ve Türkiye'yi ayıplayan, kınayan haksız ve yakınsız kararların birbirini izlemesi tehlikesi de unutulmamalı. "ASALA terörü hortlayabilir" uyarısında bulunan uzmanlar da var.

Türkiye, 1915 yılına ait Ermeni iddiaları yüzünden yakın tarihinde ciddi sıkıntılar yaşadı. İddialar eşliğinde, Ermeni ASALA örgütü, Türkiye içi ve dışında bir dizi eylem gerçekleştirdi, çok sayıda değerli Türk diplomatı hayatını Ermeni teroru elinde kaybetti. İddiaların ve destek kararlarının Türk millî şuurunda, 'toprak talebi' ile paralel bir etkisi oluyor; Türkiye bu tür talepler konusunda olaganustu hassas insanların ülkesidir.

Tam da unutulmuş sanılırken, tarihin tozlu raflarında kalmış iddiaların günümüzde yeniden ısıtılıp piyasaya sürülmesinin bir sebebi Ermenistan'daki yönetim

değişikliği; Erivan'da iktidarı ele geçirenler Türkiye'nin dostluğu yerine düşmanlığını tercih edecek fanatıklıkta sıyasiler... Bunun yanında bir başka önemli sebep de, Türkiye'nin içinden geçtiği olağanüstü şartlar elbette. Uzun zamandan beri ilk kez, devlet-millet bütünlüğü ciddi yaralar aldı; demokrasinin zedelenmesi yüzünden, halk, siyasî sistemden uzak durmayı yeğliyor. İç sorunların fazlaştığı ortamlar, ülkeleri dışta da zayıf hale getirir; Türkiye dışarının etkilerine en acık dönemlerinden birinin içinden geçiyor bugün. Bunun etkisi bir çok alanda hissedildiği gibi, bir süredir unutulmuş Ermeni iddialarına Batı'nın yeniden sahip çıkmasıyla da dışa vurmuş oldu.

Bizi en fazla ilgilendiren nokta şu: Daha önce, benzer girişimleri defetmede başarılı olan Türkiye, Fransa'dan başlayan bu yeni hamleyi durdurmada yetersiz kaldı; bu yetersizlik manzarasının Türkiye'yi uluslararası arenada sıkıştırmak isteyenlere cesaret vereceğine şüphe yok. Devlet-millet bütünlüğündeki çatlak, 'halksız demokrasi' eğilimi, 'McCarthyacı cadı avı' çılgınlığı, 'nihai çözüm'den medet umma saplantısı, 'milletlessiz devlet' arayışı, sadece ekonomik gırışkenliği engellemekle kalmıyor, ülkeyi dış gelişmeler karşısında güçsüz de bırakıyor.

Türkiye, bu yakışksız girişimi başlatan Fransa'ya uygun bir mısılleme yöntemi bulacaktır; aynı tür kararların birbiri peşi sıra gelmesini önleyecek tedbirler almaya da çalışacaktır. Bizim burada onerebileceğimiz tek tedbir şu: 28 Subat sürecinin etkilerinin tez elden bertaraf edilip Susurluk'ta ortaya saçılan pisliklerin işaret ettiği tasfiye yapılarak, milletin devletiyle yeniden bütünlüşmesinin sağlanması...

Aksi halde, ülkenin başına bu rahneleri açanları biz affetsek dahi tarih affetmeyecektir...

APPENDIX N27

Oktay Ekşi

İste ama vermeyi de bil

10.08.2003

FENER Rum Patriği Dimitri Bartholomeos önceki gün Başbakan Yardımcısı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül'e 45 dakikalık bir ziyarette bulunmuş. Gazetelerin yazdığından öğrendik ki Sayın Patrik özellikle Heybeliada'daki Ruhban Okulu'nun tekrar öğrenime açılması için Sayın Gül'den destek istemiş.

Buna karşılık **Gül** de Patrik **Bartholomeos**'tan kendisini “**ekümenik**” (evrensel konumda bir din otoritesi) olarak takdim eden yazışmalardan kaçınmasını, çünkü bunun **Lozan Antlaşması**'na aykırı olduğunu söylemiş.

Önümüzdeki günlerde göreceğiz ki Sayın **Bartholomeos** bu sınıftan vazgeçmeyecektir. Gerekçesi de vardır... “**Beni sadece vatandaşı olduğum Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ekümenik olarak tanımak istemiyor ama tüm dünya bunu kabul ediyor**” diyecektir. Dediği doğrudur.

Ama **Patrikhane** Lozan'a göre Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kanunlarına bağlı bir kurumdur.**Bartholomeos** da o kurumun başındadır. O nedenle Sayın **Bartholomeos** en azından kendisinden kaynaklanan hiçbir yazıda ve belgede bu sıfatı kullanma hakkına sahip değildir.Öteki noktaya geçmeden değinelim:

Sayın **Bartholomeos**'un bu konuları neden örneğin **İçişleri** Bakanı'yla, **Milli Eğitim** Bakanı'yla değil de **Dışişleri** Bakanı'yla konuşmayı tercih ettiği de dikkati çekmiyor mu? Sayın **Patrik**, **Türkiye dışında** bir kurumun temsilcisi değil ki... “**Evet ama Sayın Gül'ün aynı zamanda Başbakan Yardımcısı olduğunu unutuyorsun**” diyeceksiniz.

Doğrudur ama **gerçek sebebin bu olduğuna siz inanıyor musunuz**, diyen biri çıkarsa ne yanıt vereceksiniz? İkincisi **Patriğin** her vesileyle dile getirdiği “**Ruhban Okulu**” meselesi...

Söz konusu okul, “**tüm özel statülü yüksekokulların kamuya devredildiği**” 1971 yılına kadar faal idi. Öteki özel yüksekokullarla birlikte ya devlet üniversitelerine bağlanması veya kapanması zorunlu oldu. Patrikhane bu okulun devlet üniversitelerine bağlanmasına o tarihte karşı çıkmış olmalı ki, okul zorunlu olarak kapatıldı.

Şimdi **Patrik**, -sadece Patrik değil, Patrikhane'nin etkilediği ne kadar yabancı kuruluş, din adamı, politikacı varsa hepsi- “**İlla bu okulu açın. Okul üniversitelerinize bağlı olmasın. Bunu istemiyoruz. Patrikhane'ye bağlı olsun**” diyor.

Bu bir **imtiyaz** talebi değil mi? Biz **Patrik Bartholomeos**'a çareyi söyleyelim: Neden bir üniversite kurup okulunuzu onun içine almıyorsunuz? Türkiye'de üniversite açmanın bakkal dükkânı açmaktan kolay olduğunu siz bilmiyor musunuz?

Kaldı ki Sayın **Patriğin** “**istediği**” var ama “**vermeye yanaştığı**” ne var, onu bilemiyoruz. Örneğin Sayın **Bartholomeos**, “**Ben de İkinci Mahmud'un isyan teşvikçiliği yaptığı için o zamanki Rum Patriğini astırmasını protesto için**

kapattığımız kapıyı açtıracağım. İstanbul'dan söz ederken yazışmalarımnda Constantinople değil İstanbul ismini kullanacağım'' dese daha iyi olmaz mı?

APPENDIX N28

Ekrem Dumanlı

Ruhban Okulu

10.08.2003

Önceki gün Dışişleri Bakanı Abdullah Gül ile bir araya gelen Fener Rum Patriği, bakandan Heybeliada'daki Ruhban Okulu'nun yeniden açılmasını istedi.

Türkiye için bu, öteden beri devam eden bir tartışmanın yeniden gündeme gelmesi demektir. Ortada henüz net bir sonuç yok; yalnız Gül'ün sıcak mesajlar verdiği söyleniyor. Ayrıca Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan'ın da Ruhban Okulu'nun yeniden açılmasına sıcak baktığı biliniyor. Hatta Zaman'ın dünkü haberine göre Başbakan'ın Selanik gezisinde İskeçe Müftüsü, okul hakkında olumsuz kanaat bildirmiş, bunun üzerine Erdoğan 'Okumaktan kimseye zarar gelmez' demiş.

Hükümetin hadiseye çözüm yolları araması normal; çünkü Avrupa Birliği başta olmak üzere her uluslararası platformda bu sorun Türkiye'nin karşısına çıkıyor. Ruhban Okulu'na şüpheyle yaklaşan Türk devletinin tarihî nedenleri var. Ancak sayıları 5 binin altına düşmüş bir topluluğa dinî okul izni verilmemesini dünyaya anlatmak çok da kolay değil.

Aslında Türkiye, dinî otoriteye bağlı çalışan okul modelinin daha sonra başka isteklere yol açacağından endişeli. Çünkü yasalara göre Türkiye'de dinî okullar devletin kontrolünde olmak zorunda. İmam hatipler de, ilahiyatlar da, devletin dinî okul ihtiyacı karşısında vatandaşı için ürettiği formüller. Bu formülün azınlıklar için bozulmasını istemiyor devlet.

Gazetelere aksettiği kadarıyla Dışişleri Bakanı, Ruhban Okulu için İlahiyat Fakültesi bünyesinde faaliyet gösterilecek bir ara formül teklif etmiş. Bu yeni bir düşünce değil. Zaten Heybeliada'daki okul, Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 1971 yılında özel dinî eğitim kurumlarını devletleştirme kararı üzerine kapatılmıştı. Fener Rum Patriği Bartholomeos da bu durumu iyi biliyor. O yüzden bakan ile görüşmeye avukatlarıyla birlikte gelmiş. Çünkü din adamı bulmakta sıkıntı çeken Rum vatandaşlarının bu problemi aşabilmesi için hükümetin hadiseye sıcak bakması yetmiyor; aynı zamanda hukukî engeli aşmak da gerekiyor.

Geçmişte defalarca gündeme gelen okul meselesi, tarafların restleşmesini andırırır ve hiçbir sonuç alınamadan tekrar buzdolabına kaldırılmıştır. Bu sefer durum sanki farklı. Hükümet kanadının hadiseye soğukkanlı yaklaşması ve Patrikhane'nin de hukukî problemleri göz önüne alarak çözüm yolları araması, somut bir sonuç doğurabilir.

Bir kere Türkiye, hadiseye fobilerle yaklaşmamalı. Topraklarımızda yüzyıllardır yaşayan bir azınlığın dinî isteklerine kıyamete kadar direnmek Osmanlı mirasçısı Türkiye'ye yakışmaz. Devlet, yasal zeminde nasıl olsa denetleme hakkına sahip, nasıl olsa illegal faaliyet yürütüldüğü takdirde gereken hukukî tahkikatı yapacak ve suç unsuru bir çalışmaya şahit olduğunda mahkemeler harekete geçecek. Nasıl olsa bu ülkenin –tıpkı bütün demokratik ülkelerde olduğu gibi– istihbaratı, polisi, müfettişi, yürütülen çalışmaları kontrol edecek....

Türkiye 1971 şartlarını çoktan geride bıraktı. O gün yabancı statüsündeki okulların birçoğu kendine yasal bir zemin buldu ve eğitime devam etti. Mesela Robert Koleji, 1971'de Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'ne devredildi. Daha sonra Arnavut Kız Lisesi ile birleşerek Özel Amerikan Robert Lisesi olarak faaliyetlerine devam etti. Bugün Türkiye 70'li yıllara göre daha modern, daha özgürlükçü ve daha gelişmiş bir ülkedir. Vakıf üniversitelerinin çatısı altında ara bir formül de bulunabilir belki....

Bazı insanların bu konuya tahrik edici bir tarzla yaklaştığının farkındayım. Hatta zaman zaman İslamî argümanlara da başvuruluyor. Ancak İslam'ın diğer din mensuplarına tanıdığı özgürlükler ortada. Eğer çekinceler Türkiye'mizin milli çıkarlarının zedelenmesiye, onun için gereken tedbirleri almak ve akıllı stratejiler üretmek hiç de zor değil. Stalin gibi dine temelden ters bakan bir lider bile 1943'te Moskova Patriklik makamına Sergius'u getirmişti. Komünizm, uluslararası Ortodoks dünyasında prestij kazanmak için böyle bir yola başvurmuştu. Dünya Ortodoksluğu merkezinin ülkemizde olması, avantaj mı, dezavantaj mı; bunu da iyi düşünmek gerekiyor.

Şahsi kanaatim şu ki, hem hükümet hem de Patrikhane probleme iyi niyetle yaklaşmak ve ortak bir noktada buluşmak zorunda. Hükümeti, aşamayacağı yollara zorlamak da doğru değil; asırlardır bu ülkede yaşayan insanların dinî isteklerine kulak tıkamak da.

APPENDIX N29

Oktay Ekşi
Kim haklı?

22.12.2009

FENER Rum Patriği Bartholomeos en sonunda CBS televizyonunun bir muhabirine -deyim yerindeyse- patladı ve eteğinde ne kadar taş varsa döktü. Sözlerinin ayrıntılarına girmeden belirtelim: En ağır lafı Türkiye’de kendisini zaman zaman zaman “Çarmıha gerilmiş gibi” hissettiği. “Peki böyle söylemekte haksız mıydı?”

Sözünün ayarı kaçmış olsa bile, baştan belirtelim:

Hayır! Hiç de haksız değildi.

Bunun “**nedenine**” değinmeden bir soru daha soralım:

“Dile getirdiği taleplerin hepsinde haklı mıydı?”

Hayır! Sadece bazılarında haklıydı.

Ayrıntıya gelince:

Bir defa o söz öyle “**ağızdan kaçmış**” yahut “**maksadını aşmış**” filan değil. **Patrik Bartholomeos** bu iktidar işbaşına geleli **Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğanla**’la biz diyelim **5**, siz deyin **10** kere görüştü. Her görüşmede biliyoruz ki **Bartholomeos** aynı şeyleri tekrarladı.

“Heybeliada’daki Ruhban Okulu’nu açın. Benim Ekümenik Patrik olduğumu Türk hükümeti de kabul etsin. Patrikhane’ye veya Rumlara ait vakıflardan mülkiyeti yasayla Hazine’ye geçmiş olanları asıl sahiplerine iade edin” diye özetlenebilecek isteklerini **Başbakan**’ın önüne koydu.

Anlaşılan her defasında “**inşallah, maşallah**” denerek oyalandı.

O **Türkiye**’de yaşadığı için eminiz bunu bir süre sineye çekti. Bir yandan bekledi, bir yandan da boş durmadı. **Hükümet** üzerinde etkili olacağı sanılan tüm yabancılara bu isteklerini tekrar ettirdi. Yani baskının her türünü kullanıp taleplerini kabul ettirmeye çalıştı.

Ama -malların iadesi konusundaki sınırlı ilerleme hariç- hemen hiçbirinde ilerleme sağlayamayınca nihayet patladı.

Bartholomeos’un 19 Aralık 2009 tarihli **Haber Türk** Gazetesi’nde çıkan sözlerinden, **Başbakan**’la arasında ne zaman bu konu açılrsa **Erdoğan**’ın kendisine, “**Benden bunları istiyorsun ama Yunan hükümeti de orada Türk camilerinin açılmasına izin vermiyor. Batı Trakya Türklerinin seçtikleri Müftüyü tanımıyor. Orada bunlar yapılmadıkça ben de burada fazla bir şey yapamam**” anlamında yanıt verdiğini öğreniyoruz. Bunları anlattıktan sonra diyor ki, “**Bunlar yapılmıyorsa bizim günahımız ne? Biz burada askerlik yapıyoruz. Vergi veriyoruz. Oy veriyoruz.**”

Doğru... Burada vergi veriyorlar, askerlik yapıyorlar, oy veriyorlar. Elbet taleplerini de **Türkiye Başbakanı**’na iletip çözüm isteyecekler.

Demek ki “**usul**” açısından **Patrik** hiç de haksız değil. Öyle ya... Ya “**Yapıyoruz**” de ve bitir veya “**Yapamayız**” de, konuyu kapat. Ne oyalayıp duruyorsun?

Ama dediğimiz gibi hem bu, madalyanın ön yüzü... Hem de **Bartholomeos**'un, "**Yunan hükümetinin orada yaptığının burayı etkilememesi gerektiğine**" ilişkin sözlerinin dayanağı yok.Onları da -araya başka bir şey girmezse- yarın konuşalım.

APPENDIX N30

Ahmet Turan Alkan

Çarmıh empatisi!

23.12.2009

Çarmıha gerilme kavramının Hıristiyan teolojisinde hangi mânevi ezâ duygularına tekabül ettiğini bilmiyorum fakat rivayetlerde geçen kadarıyla Romalıların tatbik ettiği bir infaz usulüdür; suçluyu çaprazlama iki kalas üzerine ellerinden ve ayaklarından çivileyip, böğrünü kılıç veya mızrakla delerek ölüme bırakıyorlar.

Kur'an'ın reddettiği anlatıma göre Hz. İsa'nın alnına dikenli bitkiden yapılmış bir taç yerleştirilmiş; bu taç, Hz. İsa'nın peygamberlik misyonu ve onun "Yahudilerin Kralı" olduğu iddiasıyla alay eden bir anlam taşıyor. Bazı tablolarında bu alay imasını gösteren tahta plaketin üstündeki Latince "inri" yazısını görürüz; açılımı, "Yahudilerin kralı Nasaralı İsa" demekmiş. Çarmıha gerilmenin o dönemde sadece hırsızlık, soygunculuk gibi aşağılık suçlara reva görülen bir muamele olduğunu da hatırlamalı.

Patrik Bartholomeos'un, "Kendimizi bazen çarmıha gerilmiş gibi hissediyoruz" sözleri, her türlü muhalif ve aykırı görüşe karşı hoşgörüle yaklaşma itiyadındaki bazı tutucu muhitlerde mânâsız bir tepkiyle karşılaştı; belki de yanlış anlaşıldı. Neyin, niçin yanlış anlaşıldığını izaha kalkışmak benim işim ve yetkim haricindedir fakat şu "çarmıha gerilme"nin, en azından fizikî mânâda nasıl bir ezâ ve uzun süreli bir işkence türü olduğu hakkında empati yapabilecek durumda değil miyiz?

Anlayışsızlığın, cehâletten doğan körlük ve nefretin, karalamanın, ucu vatan hainliğine, Damat Ferit taraftarlığına, Mütareke Matbuatı'na kadar uzanan pis imâların her türlüüne muhatabız. Açılım meselesi etrafında fikir beyan edenlerin arasındaki fark, ufak tefek engebe değil uçurumdur. Bazılarına göre şekerle kaplanmış zehir, bazısına göre aklın ve basiretin yolu. "Yahu şu meslek liselilere, imam-hatipleri harcamak uğruna yazık ettiniz" dersiniz adınız hemen irtica eylem planlarında "harcanacaklar" listesine yazılır. Başında bulunduğu kurumu şaibelerden temizlemesi gereken ilk kişiye "Görevini niçin yapmıyorsun?" diye sormanın adına -gariptir- saygısızlık diyorlar bu ülkede. Ortaokul çocuklarını

müzedeki denizaltıya patlayıcı koyarak öldürmeyi planlayanları kınamak cesaret, savunmak ise yurtseverlik olmuş. Haklarında lügat kalınlığında hukukî dosyalarla suç isnadında bulunarak mahkeme önüne çıkarılmış kişilerin kötü niyetlerini eleştirmek "gaflet, hatta dalâlet" sayılıyor.

Ergenekoncuya şöyle ağzımızı doldura doldura "Ergenekoncu" demek bile kabahat oldu. İçerideki darbe sanıkları vatansever, biz Mütareke Matbuatı. Suikastçılar en hâlisinden memleket evladı, bizim ebeveynimiz meşkûk!..

Yıllardan beri bu memlekette çalınan bütün keçilerin hesabı bizden sorulur!.. Bu da bir nevi çarmıhtır işte; kendi ülkenizde ikinci sınıf biriymiş gibi yaşamamanın buruk tadını birazcık olsun tatmışlığımız vardır. Başörtülülerimiz bu hâleti iyi bilir; evlâtlarının mürüvvetini görmek için ömründe ilk defa orduevi kapısına gidip oradan yüzgeri edilenlerden de iyi bilir.

Bu memleketin ordusunda, en riskli bölgelerde askerliği yine bizim evlatlarımız yapar; komutanları tehdit listesinin ilk sırasına bizleri revâ görürler. Yıllardan beri fişlenip dururuz; günün birinde "Sen niçin fişliyorsun beni arkadaş, ne ayıbımı gördün?" diye sorunca yemediğimiz azar, uğramadığımız tehdit kalmaz.

Çarmıha gerilmek, galiba bu veya buna benzer bir şeydir. Bileklerinize birer paslı çivi çakıp alınınıza dikenli telden ma'mûl uyduruk bir taç geçirerek böğrünüzü kem sözle delerler. Başucunuzdaki tahtaya da şöyle yazarlar aşağılamak için: "Dinci, imancı, AKP yalakası..."

Ben anlıyorum Sayın Bartholomeos, çarmıha gerilmenin az buçuk nasıl bir şey olduğunu biraz anlıyorum.

APPENDIX N31

Mehmet Y. Yılmaz

Önemli ama yarım bir adım

03.09.2011

Çalışmak için kaçak olarak Türkiye'de bulunan Ermenistan vatandaşlarının çocuklarına, Türkiye'deki Ermeni cemaatine ait okullarda okuma izni verilmesi önemli bir karardır.

Yakın geçmişte Ermenistan ile ilgili her sorunda bazılarının ilk aklına gelenin bu insanları sınırdışına atmak olduğu da düşünülürse, atılan adımın önemi daha iyi anlaşılıyor.

İstanbul'da bu durumda 1000'e yakın çocuk olduğu biliniyor, sayının daha yüksek olması da elbette mümkün.

Ancak bir sorun var ki bu çocuklar okudukları okuldan diploma alamayacaklar. Okullar kendilerine bir belge verecekler ama ilerideki tahsil yaşamlarında bu belgenin ne işe yarayacağı da meçhul. Bu çocukların bir bölümü zaten karne, diploma vs. almadan o okullarda eğitim görüyorlardı. Alınan karar şimdi sadece bu eğitimi meşru hale getirecek, hepsi o kadar.

AKP hükümeti bazen böyle önemli ve cesur kararlar alabiliyor ama sonunda ne oluyorsa o adım yarım kalıyor. Üstelik aynı durumda olan Romanya, Gürcistan, Moldavya gibi ülkelerden gelenlerin çocukları da var. Sayıları belki Ermeniler kadar değil ama onlar da çocuk ve eğitim görmeye ihtiyaçları var. Türkiye, şu ya da bu nedenle bu insanların ülkemize gelip, çalışmalarına göz yumuyor.

Böyle olmasaydı bu kadar çok insan kaçak göçmen işçi olarak ülkemizde bulunmazdı zaten.

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın bu önemli adımı yarım bırakmayıp, bu çocuklara gerçek bir eğitim ve diploma olanağı da sağlamasında yarar var. Ve bu haktan yararlanacaklar sadece Ermenistanlı kaçak işçilerin çocukları olmamalı. Çünkü o çocuklar, Türkiye ile Ermenistan arasındaki ihtilafların nedeni değil, eğitimsiz kalmaları bu anlaşmazlıkların sonucu da olmasın.

Azınlıklar kendilerini 'eşit vatandaş' hissedecek mi?
Azınlık vakıflarının mallarının iadesi ile ilgili kanun hükmündeki kararname, Türkiye'nin Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nde zaten kaybetmekte olduğu davaları sona erdirecek. Bugüne kadar çoktan yapılmış olması gereken bir durumdu, o yerine getirildi. Yapılmasaydı AİHM kararlarıyla ya dünyanın tazminatı ödenecekti ya da mallar iade edilecekti.

Yani durum yandaş medyada sunulduğu gibi hükümetin çok büyük başarısı olarak görülmemeli. Uluslararası mahkemenin tutumunun kabulünden başka bir şey değil bu. (Yeri gelmişken Sabah'ın küfürbaz yazarına hatırlatayım. Azınlık vakıflarının mallarına 1936'da el konulduğunu zannediyor, gerçek öyle değil. Vakıf mallarına 1974 yılında Yargıtay'ın verdiği bir kararla el konuldu ve 1936'dan sonra edinilen malları kapsıyor!)

Gazetelerde bu kanun hükmündeki

kararname ile “Türkiye’de azınlıklar artık kendilerini eşit birvatandaş olarak hissedecekler” şeklinde yorumlar da okudum.

Biraz erken yapılmış yorumlar olduğunu düşünüyorum.

Azınlık vakıflarının mallarının iadesi elbette önemli bir adım ama azınlıklara karşı uygulamaların tümüyle iyileşeceğini de göstermiyor.

Bunu bilebilmek için bürokrasinin bu meselelerde gelenekselleşmiş tutumunu terk edip temeyeceğini de görmek gerekiyor.

Azınlıkların meseleleri ile kim ilgilenecek? Müslüman vatandaşlarda olduğu gibi İçişleri Bakanlığını, yoksa Dışişleri Bakanlığı ve “yabancılar şubesi” mi?

Askerlikte karşılaştıkları ayrımcılık bitecek mi?

Ve hepsinden önemlisi, biz sıradan vatandaşlar onlara karşı tutumlarımızla kendilerini “eşit vatandaşlar” gibi hissettirebilecek miyiz?

Listeye sorgu tutanaklarını ekleyin

Türkiye’de tutuklu gazetecilerin, gazetecilik nedeniyle değil, “terör örgütü üyesi oldukları için tutuklu buldukları” açıklandı.

Açıklamayı yapanlar buna kendileri de inandılar mı bilemiyorum. Tutuklu olan gazeteciler içinde silahlı eylemlere

katılmış, terör faaliyeti ve organizasyonu içinde yer almış olanlar da olabilir.

Ama şu anda tutuklu bulunan birçok gazeteci

için bu söylenemez. Ve basın özgürlüğünün tehdit altında olduğu iddialarını yaratan şey de bu gazetecilerin tutuklu olmalarıdır.

Sağ olsunlar İstanbul’da çok sayıda gazetecinin tutuklu yargılanmasına neden olan davaların savcılarının ellerindeki bilgileri ve belgeleri kimseden esirgemediler.

Hazırlık soruşturması evrakını gazetelerde okuduk. Tutuklu gazetecilere savcılarının sorgu sırasındaneler sorduklarını da biliyoruz.

Sorulan sorular “o kitabı niye yazdın, bu haberi nereden buldun, o yazıyı yazmayı nedendüşündün” gibi sorular. Basının özgür olduğu bir

ülkede hiçbir gazeteciye sorulamayacak sorular bunlar.

“Terörist” diye yargılanan bazı gazeteciler ise “propagandan” dolayı suçlanıyor. Bir fikir açıklamaktan başka nedir ki bu?

Adalet Bakanlığı, bu konuda inandırıcı olmak istiyorsa “terörden yargılanan gazeteciler” listesinin ekine, bu gazetecilere savcılıkta hangi soruların sorulduğunu da ekleseydi, herkes ne olduğunu daha iyi görebilirdi.

“Soruşturma gizli” demesin kimse, gizliliğe kimsenin aldıracağı yok bu davalarda!

APPENDIX N32

Ali Bulaç

Gayrimüslim Hakları

03.09.2011

Türkiye'nin temel bir zihniyet dönüşümü yaşamasına ihtiyacı vardır.

Bizi yeryüzünde onurlu, güvenli, özgür ve felaha engel olmayacak düzeyde refaha götürecek bir zihniyet devrimi. Böyle bir devrimin zihin altyapısının oluşması için öncelikle hakikatte çözümü gayet kolay aktüel sosyo-politik sorunların bir hal yoluna konması gerekir. Bunlar da basitçe Kürt sorunu, Alevilerin tabii hak ve taleplerinin karşılanması, gayrimüslimlerin durumlarının düzeltilmesi. Başka konular da var: Gelir adaletsizliği, kimlik krizi, Türkiye'nin bölgesinde kendisiyle eşdeğer ülkelerle eşitlik temelinde işbirliği yapıp yeni bölgesel bir entegrasyonun kurulmasında rol alması vs.

Eskiyle mukayese edildiğinde umut verici adımların atıldığı müşahede edilmektedir. Gayrimüslimlerin cemaat vakıfları, taşınmaz malları konusunda alınan karar bunlardan biridir. Hükümet gayrimüslimlere "zulüm"den başka kelime ile ifadesi mümkün olmayan bir uygulamaya son verdi: 1936'dan sonra edindikleri ve 1974'ten bu yana Hazine'ye devredilen taşınmaz mallarının asli sahiplerine iade edilmesine karar verdi. Hükümete ve Sayın Başbakan'a hepimizin teşekkür borcu var.

Musevi Hahambaşı Haleva bu kararı "Osmanlı'dan kalma bir ışığın devamı" olarak yorumladı. Aslında bu karar, her yerin karla kaplı olduğu soğuk ve kapkaranlık bir gecede Tur Dağı'nda "Ben bir ateş (ışık) gördüm." (28/Kasas, 29) diyen Musa aleyhisselamın ve diğer bütün peygamberlerin beslendiği vahyin ışığıdır.

Bu kaynaktan aldığı güçle dünyayı aydınlatan, zemheri soğukta ısıtan son Peygamber (sas) oldu. Gayrimüslimlerle ilişkileri, ya "muahid/anlaşmalı (siyasî ortaklığın aktörlerinden biri)" veya "zımmi hâkim yönetimin koruması altındaki sözleşmeli" olarak belirledi ve şöyle buyurdu: "Zımmiye zulmedenin kıyamet günü hasmı benim." (Ebu Davut, İmaret, 33) Genel hatlarıyla İslam tarihinde gayrimüslimlerle ilişkiler bu çerçevede sürdü, bazen Müslüman yöneticiler zulmetti, ama hiçbir zaman varlıklarını imha etmeye yönelmedi.

Gayrimüslimlerin ağır mahrumiyetlere uğradığı yer Türkiye'nin cumhuriyet sonrası dönemidir. Batı'yı referans alan Türkiye, gayrimüslimleri "millet sisteminin mensubu zımmiler" olmaktan çıkarıp "azınlık (ekalliyet)" statüsüne soktu, zorunlu mübadeleye tabi tuttu, onlara ikinci sınıf vatandaşlığı bile çok gördü, onları potansiyel tehdit ilan etti, nefret objesi yaptı, onlara mahsus hukuksuz vergiler ihdas etti, milliyetçi unsurları provoke ederek kalanları da kaçırıp 1910'dan sonra yaptığı gibi mallarını mülklerini Türkleştirdiği unsurlara geçirip "milli burjuvazi"yi besleyip semirtti.

Ađır, ama istikrarlı adımlarla normalleřiyoruz. Normalleřme gayrimüslimlerin öncelikle "bir Batı musibeti olan azınlık" statüsünden çıkarılıp "yurttař" konumuna çıkarılmalarıdır. Bu köşeyi takip edenler, yine "Batı musibeti olan mutlak eşit yurttařlık"ın bugün yaşadığımız etnik, mezhebi ve farklı kimlikler arasındaki çatıřmalara çare olmadığını defalarca yazdığımızı bilirler. Eşit yurttařlığı temel alan bir anayasal yurttařlık mevcut sorunları yeni formlar içinde üretip sürdürmekten başka işe yaramayacaktır. Referans alınması gereken "hukuk karşısında eşit, ama sosyo-kültürel olarak farklılığı esas alan yeni bir yurttařlık vgayrimüslimlerin rehin muamelesi" görmekten kurtarılması yönündeki kararlar izlemelidir. Bunu yaparken tabii ki Batı Trakya'daki Müslümanlara da aynı hak ve statünün tanınması için çalışacağız, ama bizdeki gayrimüslimleri artık rehin görmeyeceğiz.