

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

**EXTENDED EMERGENCIES AND
SPATIALIZATION OF RESISTANCE IN
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS:
THE CASE OF AL WIHDAT**

Master's Thesis

SABA AL MUHTASEB

ISTANBUL, 2017

**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES

MASTER OF ARCHITECTURE

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Supervisor: ASS. PROF DR. NILAY ÜNSAL GÜLMEZ

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Istanbul,2017

Saba al MUHTASEB

ABSTRACT

EXTENDED EMERGENCIES AND SPATIALIZATIONS OF RESISTANCE IN PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS

THE CASE OF WIHDAT

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Refugee camps are becoming more visible in the landscapes of the Middle East in the current period of time. What supposed to be muted, de-voided and neutral humanitarian spaces are turning into vibrant opinionated city-like urban squatters, not just shaping its own socio-spatial orders, but also extending to influence the dynamics of interaction and integration within the larger space of its surrounding. In this thesis, the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, are analyzed according to several theoretical frameworks, discussing the nature of their exclusion, lives as refugees, and their lives as refugees/citizens, proving their ability to resist and defy the imposed planning policies. Later on, Al Wihdat camp in Amman-Jordan is discussed in specific from different angles, to highlight the hidden transcripts and tactics, the camp dwellers have created to operate under the forces of marginalization. The findings of this thesis are categorized to discuss the particularity of the case of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan. After 70 years of exile, where most of the refugees have Jordanian citizenships, and most camps are fully integrated, this calls to rethink the limits of the state of emergency accompanied with the concept of the “refugee camp”, and the reasons behind this extension. Over the years the failure of previous strategies to contain and manage the rapid transformation of refugee camps, calls for an urgent need to rethink camp spaces, not only as places of exception but also as spaces of potentials, to be considered and utilized, for history not to repeat itself.

Keywords: Emergency, Refugee Camps, Resistance, Marginalization, Urbanization.

ÖZET

FILİSTİN MÜLTECİ KAMPLARINDA GENİŞLETİLMİŞ OLAĞANÜSTÜ HAL VE DİRENİŞİN MEKANSALLAŞMASI: AL WIHDAT KAMPI ÖRNEĞİ

Saba el Muhtaseb

Mimarlık Yüksek Lisansı

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Orta Doğu coğrafyasında mülteci kampları, mevcut zaman diliminde daha görünür bir hal almıştır. Sessizleştirilmiş, içi boşaltılmış ve tarafsızlaştırılmış insani alanlar olması beklenen bölgeler, önyargılı şehirvari kentsel gecekondulara dönüşmekte; yalnızca sosyo-mekansal düzen ve sınırlarını yeniden şekillendirmek değil, aynı zamanda çevrelerindeki daha büyük bir alanda etkileşim ve entegrasyonun üzerindeki etkilerini artırmak için genişlemektedir.

Bu tezde, (Filistin) mülteci kampları çeşitli teorik çerçeveler içinden irdelenmiş; Filistinli mültecilerin ihraç edilmelerinin doğası tartışılmış, Ürdün'de mülteci/vatandaş hayatlar ele alınmış ve dayatılan planlama politikalarına karşı gelme ve bunlara dayanma kabiliyetleri tartışmaya açılmıştır. Devamında Amman-Ürdün'deki Al Wihdat kampı'na odaklanılmış; kamp sakinlerinin ötekileştirmeye yönelik güçlerin etkisi altında işleyiş gösterebilmek için yarattıkları alt metin ve mekansal taktikleri ortaya koymak amacıyla bir alan çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir.

70 yıllık sürgünden sonra, çoğu mültecinin Ürdün vatandaşlığına sahip olduğu ve çoğu kampın kentle tamamen bütünleştiği bir durumda; olağanüstü hal durumunun sınırlarını, "mülteci kampı" konseptini ve bu uzatımın ardında yatan nedenleri yeniden değerlendirmek gerekmektedir. Geçmiş yıllar boyunca başarısızlığa uğramış olan mülteci kamplarının hızlı değişimini zaptetmek ve idare etmek için kullanılmış politikalar; kamp alanlarının yalnızca istisnai mekanlar olarak değil aynı zamanda çok çeşitli potansiyellerin oluşabileceği alanlar olarak yeniden ele alınması gerekliliğini ortaya koyar.

Anahtar kelimeler: Olağanüstü Hal, Mülteci Kampları, Direniş, Ötekileştirme, Kentleşme.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CD	:	Camp dweller
CO	:	Camp official
CIP	:	Community Infrastructure Program
DFLP	:	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DPA	:	Department of Palestinian Affairs
ESPP	:	Economic and Social Productivity Program
GAM	:	Greater Amman Municipality
HPP	:	Housing Projects for the Poor
IDPs	:	Internally Displaced Persons
JOD	:	Jordanian dinar
PFLP	:	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	:	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	:	Palestinian National Authority
HUDC	:	The Housing and Urban Development Cooperation
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	:	United Nations Relief and Work Agency

1. INTRODUCTION

“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” - George Santayana

We are living in a world now where one in every 122 humans is either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum. If this was the population of a country, it would be the world's 24th biggest. Although in most cases, displacement initially starts as a temporary action, it doesn't last this way, as people are not able to go back home or afraid to.

Since the eruption of the war in 2011, Syria became the world's biggest producer of both internally displaced people, 6 million, and refugees, 4.8 million (UN 2016), 628,427 of which, are in Jordan, where 84% live in refugee camps. Jordan till now is demonstrating hospitality, despite the substantial strain on national systems and infrastructure, as it is hosting Palestinian refugees since 1948, and hosted Iraqi refugees during the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

However, the government and aid agencies are still dealing with this matter in the same way it started 70 years ago, right after the Second World War. Camps are built as temporary storage facilities for people, as a practical solution for gathering for those fleeing war, to ease the process of providing aid and to maintain control. They perform as designated waiting areas till the war ends and eventually refugees are expected to go back home. However, if one could learn something from the past, it is that the state of refugee could extend to a lifetime, or more, to generations. Although one cannot turn a blind eye to the injustice and unfairness carried along with this situation, as architects and city planners, we sometimes need to accept the present statuses as they are, and go with the current, as the acceptance of certain realities does not preclude idealism, but rather enforces common sense into the present.

It is understandable, that in the case of emergency and massive waves of expulsion, food and aid are a top priority to provide for those in need. But it has been constantly proven that current paradigms of humanitarian works in camps have failed to cope with prolonged exile periods and uncontrolled camp's growth. While we are providing camps, refugees are building cities, starting from arranging their physical structures and clusters according to their social order, ending with self-distinction, identity creation and a culture of their own, a human need perhaps just as important as basic needs for survival. Therefore planning is becoming a necessity rather than a privilege for sustainable solutions.

Exile, is a direct outcome of a political event due to which each person's life has changed dramatically. Nonetheless, it seems to be expected of them to put out any socio-political burden on the border before entering the host country and start striving to life's most basic need: survival. Though, it is always noticed how a group of foreigners either refugees or not, always find a way to distinct themselves, and to define themselves as productive members, defying the general characterization of being fragile and vulnerable.

I remember while reading Julie Peteet's book (*Landscapes of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps.*) she referred to refugee camps as places that "aimed at the subjective transformation of the displaced from angry, potentially volatile refugees to docile recipients of food aid". If the humanitarian policies and interventions are aiming towards this "neutralization" of the displaced, it is proved that the results are quite different.

As a Jordanian from Palestinian descent, who had grown up in the city of Amman in the nineties, I was always aware of the presence of Palestinian refugee camps in the city, especially al Wihdat camp, as a strong symbol of national struggle, as places with an extreme distinctive Palestinian identity and social cohesion, although most of the refugees were given Jordanian citizenships. The refugees used the camps as a platform to resist and reject the "normalization" of their exile and to preserve their right of return. In a way, it was their contribution to the ongoing struggle in Palestine. The camps grew

to be crucial reference points upon which Palestinians everywhere have anchored and constructed their identity, belonging, and cultural, social and political views. In fact, the attempt of silencing the political voice of these refugees have provoked a culture of resistance that has been translated into many aspects of their lives. All in all, refugee camps have proved to be strong places; as for those marginalized, it became a necessity to show wit and courage to go beyond the drawn limits of their lives to prove themselves as active, vibrant entities.

During the 70 years of exile, Palestinian refugee camps have grown uncontrollably into city-like urban squatters, where many of them are completely integrated into the urban fabric of the nearby city such as al Wihdat and al Hussein camp. Yet, the lack of attention towards those urbanizing camps have resulted into very poor built environments. Many factors have influenced the development of the camp and its relation to the city, among them the most dominant factor is people's political attitude and views. As a national symbol, the camp, a place with high density already, with people sticking to living in it, or moving to its circumferences, acted as a centralized circle of empowerment. This ideology, if one might call it, have influenced people's behaviors, dwelling patterns and their social products in the camp spaces.

The duality between the exclusion and inclusion, integration and distinction, resistance and resilience is intrinsic to the lives of Palestinians refugees in Jordan. This duality is mostly experienced by the residents of al Wihdat camp where although now it became an integrated part of the city of Amman's urban fabric, its history and reputation vibrates with a strong political stance.

1.1 AIM OF THE STUDY

We should deal with the fact that the refugees' stay around the world could be unpredictable in terms of duration and behavior, and regardless of our prefabricated scenarios for the crisis, the camp phenomena will evolve and function differently. We need a more realistic and flexible approach to embrace and mitigate the outcomes of its

existence both on itself and its surrounding, in order to avoid the drastic consequences accompanied with the arbitrary camp's growth. Through the case of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, and specifically Al Wihdat camp, as an urbanized, fully integrated camp, this thesis aims to discuss the ambiguous phenomenon of Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, 70 years after their establishment.

It aims at first to determine the role of resistance in a mobilized nation's narrative and the ability of this resistance to turning the camp into a true active political space, then reviewing the impact of such an ideology on the urban development of the camp and its socio-spatial products. Moreover, the study calls into question the limits of an emergency state in a refugee camp, and the reasons why it is still recognized as a "refugee camp" even though some is fully integrated, and the refugees have become citizens.

1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

In order to achieve the aims of this study and establish a solid discussion for its answers, this thesis is divided into the following sections:

As the camp and the refugee is a direct outcome of a political conflict, it was important at first to illustrate the background of the Palestinian exile. Therefore in chapter two a historical overview regarding the Israeli aggression is presented, describing the circumstances of the exile, facts, and figures about the refugee crisis, their numbers, the hosting countries and their legal status. Afterward, the focus shifts towards Jordan as a host country in specific, discussing in more details the different perspectives and challenges of both the refugees and the hosting government, as well as the transformation of the Palestinian refugee camps in the country. These socio-political circumstances are important because they bring a closer understanding for the refugee's opinions and actions and explain their choices towards their new life in exile.

The third chapter aims to construct first a legal framework and secondly a theoretical framework, for the refugee status and the refugee camps. The first part of this chapter

discusses the definition of a refugee, her/his legal status and rights according to the 1951 Convention, relating to the status of refugees by the United Nations, and points the short comes in the refugee laws, through the case of Palestinian refugees. Afterward, Foucault's and Agamben's understandings of the camp spaces, have been discussed through the Palestinian refugee camps and their idiosyncratic characteristics. The power relations in the camp and the availability of agency and resistance are proved to exist within the space of the camps in different forms and images. Then the duality of homelessness and homecoming in the camp is discussed to define the nature of relationship refugees have towards the camp and towards their homelands.

Chapter four represents the core of this study, where the previous models and constructs are tested within the context of Al Wihdat camp in Amman-Jordan. Al Wihdat camp was chosen as a case study for this research because of its integrated urban nature, rich context, and its resistive political history. The chapter starts with an extensive analysis of al Wihdat built environment, demographics and its relationship to the city. Then different strategies and attempts to manage its built environment by different authorities are examined through several projects undertaken in the area, highlighting the factors of success and failure of each. Afterward, the tactics undertaken by the camp dwellers in response to such strategies are discussed based on participant observation and the interviews conducted with camp dwellers and authorities in the camp. In relation to the earlier established theoretical construct, specializations of resistance are traced in al Wihdat camp, discussing the spatial products refugees have anchored their identity and resistance upon, even in a non-political context.

The fifth chapter orchestrates the whole findings of each section of this research in order to answer the research objectives. It first discusses the limits of an emergency state of a refugee camp and the reasons behind its extension, through the case of al Wihdat, questioning why it is still a refugee camp, 70 years after its establishment. Also, upon the previous discussion about the keys of success and failure for undertaken projects in the camp, recommendations have been listed for managing the camp's built environment.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

To reach an understanding of the dynamics of interaction and integration for Palestinian refugees in Amman, one should move beyond the traditional discussion of contrasting the city to the camp, or assigning a certain definition to the camp in terms of openness and closeness, as they both seem to grow parallel and overlap in different dimensions.

Therefore, this dissertation firstly draws on the historical background of the Palestinian exile case, the events and milestones that occurred during the period of the first Israeli aggression in 1948 till our recent days, depending on data collection, statistics and surveys to portray a realistic image of the situation and be able to understand the factors that played a major role in its process of transformation.

Secondly it reflects the writings of Foucault, Agamben and Agair and other literature works that discussed refugee camps as spaces of liminality and extraordinary, and spaces that are governed by relations of power, in addition to Henry Lefebvre's and Michel de Certeau's writings on the practices of everyday life, strategies and tactics that contribute to the social production of spaces to be able to construct a theoretical framework for this discussion.

Lastly, a qualitative survey was conducted at Al Wihdat Camp. Apart from participant observation on-site, semi-structured interviews were made with residents of the camp, men, and women from different age groups and fields, to be able to measure differences and similarities between each category. Interviews with various stakeholders were made as well, including urban planners, officials from the municipality and the UNRWA. Later the data was analyzed via content analysis. The findings were discussed in the case study part in chapter 4. However, from time to time the theoretical background has been supported with quotes extracted from the interviews.

1.4 LIMITATIONS

When I first started conducting this study I was concerned about data collection, in terms of statistics and maps, to establish a solid understanding of the Palestinian camp

dynamics in the past, as well as the current period. Indeed, due to the fact that the early camps in Jordan were established 70 years ago, I had some difficulties in obtaining comprehensive data about each camp. In an age where nothing was computerized, many archival documents were lost or stored in a place hard to access, not to mention the political sensitivity of certain topics that did not allow me to retrieve further information.

Also, I should add that the dispersion of authority for the projects and services in the camp have made the data collection task rather confusing, as, in many occasions, statistics and maps from one source didn't match the ones from another source. I was able to understand later that the UNRWA's criteria for registered refugees differs from the governments, therefore I had different censuses from each. Also, the Joined Authority of the Department of Palestinian Affairs and the UNRWA in the camp did not function harmoniously, where I had to go back and forth in between them many times for certain information.

As the Palestinian refugee camps are open camps, they are easily accessed by any visitor, however, in order to conduct a study one should obtain an approval from the Department of Palestinian Affairs. After submitting my papers to the DPA's headquarters, I had to wait two weeks for a background check by Jordanian intelligence and then my request was approved. Once I handed my approved paper to the DPA local office in the camp, I was allowed to conduct my research.

The first thing the employer at the DPA told me when we were getting out of the office to the camp was "Why did you come alone?", confused and not knowing what to answer, I remained silent. But I realized that although I was considered a native and I didn't have any language barrier, I was still not part of the camp's everyday community. For a relatively conservative community who knows each other very well a foreigner in the street would attract attention.

For my first interviews, I was escorted by the camp's "Mukhtar" (in Arabic it means chosen, which is a position given to the leader of a village in the old days, and to some districts currently). Abu al Ra'ed, the mukhtar, took me to a few houses to conduct interviews with, and he introduced me to them as "she is from Hebron/Palestine, she's

one of us”, something he made sure to ask me about when we first met. After introducing me, he excused us to leave to continue his work and I continued conducting my interviews in the camp’s houses. I had to admit that the DPA employer’s words “why did you come alone” made me slightly uncomfortable when entering the camps’ houses, but the warmth I was welcomed with by the camp families made it all go away.

Having known that I am originally Palestinian and I am not conducting this research for governmental purposes, I was able to sense people’s comfort in expressing their opinions about the camp and the policies. However, after visiting almost 15 households, answers started repeating. I realized that during formal interviews when there are recording and notes being taken, people feel compelled to answer in a particular way or address certain topics. Thus I took the decision to settle for fifteen formal interviews, and continue with my research through active observation and engaging with an informal conversation with people in the street, where sometimes the absence of the interview pressure leads to more sincere and spontaneous answers.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

In this chapter, a historical brief of the political events that had occurred and lead to the exile of Palestinians out of their homes and villages, and their journey as refugees afterward is presented. It is important to develop an understanding of what refugees have gone through, and the nature of the political conflict that leads to their expulsion, in order to reach a better understanding of their political stances and reactions towards their new lives as refugees in an unfamiliar political system. As well as the different burdens and challenges that became associated with their decisions of integration or exclusion.

2.1 PALESTINE IN MODERN HISTORY

The political history of the Palestinian case goes back in time when it was part of the Ottoman Empire that reigned during the period of 1516-1923. In the few decades before its collapse. The Empire had lost sovereignty over many of its territories to the powers of colonial countries as France took control of Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, Italy took control of Libya in 1911, while Britain took over Aden protectorate in 1939, Oman in 1861, Arabian Gulf chiefdoms in 1820 and Kuwait in 1899 (Al Jazeera 2016). On the other side, Muhammad Ali a powerful Ottoman leader unilaterally ruled Egypt, and his sons succeeded him until the country fell into British custody in 1882 and Sudan fell under their control as well in 1899 (Dror 1996).

Meanwhile, Ottoman's strongholds in the Levant (referring to countries of the Eastern Mediterranean: Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Cyprus and areas of southern Turkey) and Iraq, during the Empire's latter years, included the provinces of Damascus, Aleppo, Raqqa and Baghdad. When the World War 1 erupted in 1914, the Ottoman Empire Allied with Germany and Austro-Hungarian Empire, opposing Britain and France. It was at that time when the political regimes and region's maps started its transformation (Rogan 2015).

Following the defeat, secret meetings and memos of understanding were held between foreign ministries of France, Britain, Russia and Italy to negotiate each country's share of the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. Britain was the most powerful among those countries, mainly presented by Mark Sykes. France was mainly represented by Francois Georges-Picot (Al Jazeera 2015). On May 16, 1916, these two diplomats secretly signed an agreement, later was known to be the "Sykes-Picot" agreement that was approved by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov. Signed a century ago, the Middle East continues to bear the consequences of this agreement. Many Arabs across the region still suffer from it and blame the subsequent violence occurring and the occupation of Palestine on this treaty (Al Jazeera 2016).

The deal between Sykes and Picot (1916) called into dividing the Levant area into 5 entities:

- a. The first entity includes Baghdad and Kuwait, extending to reach the Gulf coast. This was under direct control of Britain.
- b. Second entity combines northern Iraq, Jordan and the Negev desert, extending to Sinai. This part was under British influence.
- c. Third entity included a coastal area, extending from southern Lebanon to the north, towards Mersin, Iskenderun, and Adana. This part was under direct French control.
- d. Fourth Entity was the Syrian Desert and was under French influence.
- e. The Fifth entity consisted of the Ottoman Jerusalem sanjak, which is the northern part of historical Palestine. This part remained an International zone due to its religious significance. However, the ancient cities of Acre and Haifa were allocated under British control (Barr 2012).

Regarding Russia, that approved this deal, the agreement stated that the Russia's tsar keeps his stake in Istanbul, the areas adjacent to Bosphorus strait and four provinces near the Russian border in east Anatolia. Greece was given control of Turkey's western coast. Italy was given Turkey's southwest (Barr 2012).

This agreement remained a secret until the Russian Tsar Nicholas II was removed from authority in a revolution in 1917. The Bolshevik communists, led by Vladimir Lenin, found a copy of the Sykes-Picot agreement in the governmental archives. Leon Trotsky, a colleague of Lenin exposed the great powers plans by publishing a copy of the agreement in the Izvestia newspaper on Nov 24th, 1917. This exposure formed a political scandal for Britain and France. Linen called the treaty “the agreement of the colonial thieves” (Al Jazeera 2016).

2.2 THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION

On Nov 2nd, 1917, a letter was issued by Arthur Balfour, the British foreign secretary then, to Baron Walter Rothschild, a close friend to the Zionist movement leader Chaim Weizmann. In this letter, Britain took up the responsibility of establishing a “National home for Jews” in Palestine. This came to be known as “The Balfour promise”. A promise widely hated by Arabs and Palestinians described as “the promise of who he doesn’t own to who he doesn’t deserve”. This commitment was endorsed in 1920, when Herbert Samuel, a British Jewish Zionist, arrived in Palestine as Britain’s first high commissioner to the country and the British Mandate was formalized that year (Neil 2011).

Many events and agreements took place afterward. The Sykes-Picot agreement was replaced by the San Remo conference in 1920 that approved a mandate system, defining the destiny of the occupied Arab provinces. The confrontations erupting in the Arab peninsula, and the World War II, have shaped the modern boundaries of the Arab world, and countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria gained their independence. Meanwhile, Palestine was under the rule of British General Edmund Allen since the day he entered Jerusalem in 1917 (Al Jazeera 2016).

In the following years, the British have called for the migration of Europe’s Jews to Palestine, offering them houses, jobs, and money, paving the way for their occupancy. Ships were carrying Jews to the lands of Palestine in huge numbers and that created a widespread alarm within the Palestinians and Arab community. In 1963, local Arab

resistance committee declared general strike to protest against the British policies and the Zionist movement. Later in the same year, a resistance movement swept through Palestine as a spontaneous popular reaction against Zionism, British imperialism, and entrenched Arab leadership, which came to be known as the Arab Revolt, that extended till 1939 until violently suppressed by the British. An estimated 5000 Arabs were killed in the revolt, 15000 got wounded and another 5600 were imprisoned. Meanwhile, a transfer of cultivated land from Arab to Jewish ownership has had a devastating effect on the Palestinian peasantry which still makes up 2/3 of the Arab population of the mandate (Wolfe 2012).

In 1948, Britain announced the end of its mandate in Palestine. A couple of hours later, Jewish leadership, led by future Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, declared the establishment of the Jewish State, to be known as the State of Israel (Neil 2011).

Right after, Jewish military advances and armed Zionist militias started attacking Palestinian cities and villages, performing massacres, destructing houses and terrorizing people. Almost 400-600 Palestinian villages were sacked, while cities of Palestine were almost entirely extinguished. This in equivalent war resulted in the exodus of almost 700,000 of Palestinians out of their houses and denied their right of return (Figure 2.1). This came to be known as “Al Nakba” which literally means: disaster or catastrophe (Al Jazeera 2013).

Palestinian refugees’ right to return to the homes from which they were displaced is well established in international law. The first source of support for Palestinian refugees’ claims to a right of return is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) Of December 1948, paragraph 11, in which the U.N. General Assembly, *“Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible...”*

However, The Israeli government does not recognize Palestinian refugees’ right to return and continues to say that Palestinian refugees and their descendants cannot be

allowed to return to the homes and communities from which they were displaced because their return would be a threat to the maintenance of a continued Jewish demographic majority in Israel.

Figure 2.1 : The Palestinian exile in 1948



Source: <https://www.unrwa.org/galleries/photos/>

2.2.1 The exile and its consequences


In May 1948, the Israeli-Arab conflict (al Nakba) resulted in the exodus of thousands of Palestinians permanently. In September 1949, the UN General Assembly conducted a survey that aims to find a durable solution for the issue of Palestinian refugees. The survey estimated the number of the displaced population to be around 774,000, which is over than 80 percent of the population that had been living in the territories now under Israeli control. The rest of the population who managed to stay in their lands were estimated to be 48,000 (31,000 Arab and 17,000 Jews) (Al Hussein 2013). Those still live under the rule of The State of Israel and were given Israeli passports.

2.2.2 Refugee crisis and the host countries

As for the displaced majority, their tenth, which is approximately 70,000 refugees fled to Jordan. At that time, Jordan's territory was described as the land on the east side of Jordan's river. 280,000 refugees moved to the Palestinian territories known as "West Bank", on the west bank of Jordan's river. The rest of refugees moved to other neighboring regions. 200,000 refugee fled to Gaza Strip, 97,000 to Lebanon, 75,000 to Syria and 4,000 to Iraq (ESM 1949). Later in 1950, when the west bank was annexed to Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it became the largest host for Palestinian refugees among the neighboring countries (Al Hussein 2013) (Figure 2.2).

According to the latest figures of the UNRWA in 2011, there are 5,149,742 registered refugees in 68 camps. There are 12 camps in Syria with a total number of 526,000 refugees, 12 in Lebanon hosting 426,000 refugees, 19 camps in the West Bank hosting 762,000, 12 camps in Gaza strip hosting 426,000 and 13 camps in Jordan hosting 2.1 million refugees (UNRWA 2016). However, these figures only state the refugees registered to the UNRWA, the actual numbers are quite larger, as it is estimated that Jordan hosts around 4.5 million Palestinian refugees (Palcamps 2017).

Figure 2.2: The host countries



Source: <https://www.unrwa.org/galleries/photos/>

2.2.3 Refugees legal status

Camps were set in the host regions to receive the refugees and provide them with the necessary aid. In Syria and Lebanon, each refugee was given a document that certifies his state as a refugee and allows him to benefit from the UNRWA's aid and services. However, this has limited their integration into the host community, as their legal status does not grant them access to governmental services, such as schools and jobs, or any permanent travel documents (UNRWA 2016).

In Jordan, the case was different. In December 1948, a conference was held in Jericho, bringing the trans-Jordanian authorities and Palestinian notables together and announced the unification of Transjordan and Palestine, the west bank and the east bank came together as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As a consequence of this unification, in 1949 the Kingdom took the decision to "naturalize" all Arabs of Palestine through giving them Jordanian nationalities and passports. In 1954 the law that regulates the status of the Palestinian refugees living in Jordan was finalized, according

to Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Nationality Act: *“Any person of Palestinian nationality prior to 15 May 1948, with the exception of Jews, residing in the Kingdom between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954 shall be considered as a Jordanian national.”* (Law No.6 of 1954 on Nationality).

This act contributed to the integration of the both sides. It allowed refugees from both sides to vote in the parliamentary elections in Jordan of 1950, which comprised of 40 seats: 20 seats were assigned for elected deputies from East Bank and 20 for elected deputies from the West Bank. Not that only, members of the West Bank intelligentsia were regularly appointed to ministerial posts and prestige’s positions in the government. The Jordanian “Dinar” was proclaimed the sole official currency in the country (Al Hussein 2011).

Several institutional measures were added later on to ensure the process of integration, and to accommodate the re-occurring eviction waves, that continued over the years. First one was following the Six Days War in 1967, which resulted in the displacement of 440,000 people from the West Bank and Gaza Strip to Jordan, 240,000 of which were original West Bankers and displaced for the first time, the rest were ones who had been already displaced in 1948. This wave of exodus resulted into the creation of 9 new emergency camps in Jordan. The second wave of refugees Jordan received was during the Gulf conflict in 1990-1991 when 250,000 Palestinian who have been living in Kuwait for decades were expelled to Jordan as a counter attack for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) policy in supporting Iraq during its invasion of Kuwait in 1989 (Ghabra 1991).

According to Jalal al-Husseini, this normalization, presented in giving citizenships to the Palestinian refugees was intended to be a temporary measure, until the Arab armies regain the lost land and defeat the Israelis, where then Palestinian refugees can go back to their homes if they wished (Al Hussein 2013). Nevertheless, the burden and the complicated process of granting citizenship to this huge number of refugees one year after their exodus doesn’t really imply an intention of temporality.

2.3 JORDAN AS A HOST COUNTRY

The first census conducted by the Red Cross in Transjordan before 1950, showed that the majority of the Palestinian refugees came from Palestinian towns of Jerusalem (approximately 25 percent), Jaffa (15 percent), Bisan (14 percent) and the twin towns of Lydda and Ramleh. 99.5 percent of them were of Palestinian nationality, and 84 percent were Muslims. Coming from Palestine, almost half of those able to work were farmers and tenant farmers (47 percent), as the income of Palestinian villages mainly depended on corps. There were also employees (9 percent) and traders (9 percent) (Al Hussein 2013).

Most of the refugees in Jordan settled in the main Jordanian towns (Amman, Irbid, Zarqa and Salt) and in the Jordan valley. Those who were able to support themselves or received assistance were able to settle in relatively stable living quarters. However, those less fortunate were forced to sleep outdoors or in caves, until they were gathered in temporary camps managed jointly by the Red Cross and the Jordanian authorities, and provided with necessary food, aid, and temporary housing (Al Hussein 2013).

As mentioned before, in 1950 the West Bank was annexed to the Kingdom of Jordan, in total Jordan had 36 refugee camps administrated by the UNRWA (UNRWA 1951). One thing strongly observed, was the high proportion of refugees living outside the camps. In the West Bank, the residents of the camps compromised 35 percent of the total refugees in the region, and in the East Bank about 25 percent according to a census in 1954 (Al Hussein 2013). This proportion increased further after the 1967 war, which resulted in even more refugees. In 2010, only 25 percent of the refugees resided in camps in the West Bank and almost 17 percent in Jordan. This proportion kept almost consistent along the exile duration, even with the increase in the number of camps. In 1950, the residents of the 5 camps in Jordan were consisting about 19 percent of the refugees, similar to the recent proportion of residents of the 10 official refugee camps which is 17 percent in 2010 (UNRWA 2016).

Ending in camps was not the preferred option for the mobilized nation, it was the retreat for those who have lost everything because of war, and had no place else to go. Despite

being a minority, those residents have managed to make the camp a significant symbol for the ongoing Palestinian struggle, not only for the humanitarian problems they endured but also for their strong claim of their right to return to their homes and lands.

2.3.1 The demographic challenge

The unification of the two banks not only had its administrative and political challenges but also its economic issues. The Kingdom of Jordan grew in size with the addition of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, a territory although much smaller in size (almost 16 times smaller: 5,640 km²), yet with almost twice the population of Jordan. Within the period between 1949-1950, Jordan became home for over 1.2 million inhabitants. The West Bank had approximately 740,000 inhabitants (460,000 original West Bankers and 280,000 refugees) and on the other bank 470,000 inhabitants including 70,000 refugees. This population in total was three times more than its original population before the war (Al Hussein 2013).

This expansion in the population has naturally resulted into demographic pressure on agricultural land. The population density per unit of cultivated land rose from 80 to 107 in the East Bank and from 200 to 580 in the West Bank according to UNRWA records in 1951. This issue, however, was naturally evened by the positive outcome of the annexation. The unification of the both sides have accelerated the economic development of the Kingdom, whose industry, services and transportation system significantly developed through the years of 1950 and 1960, making it preferable for public investments. With freedom of passage between the two banks, many people migrated from the West to the East for better opportunities, thus reversing the demographics and balancing the two banks. At the early times of the unification, the West Bank population compromised 60 percent of the whole Kingdom's. However, according to a census in 1961, the West Bank population rose to compromise 47 percent of the total population (Al Hussein 2013).

The capital Amman was receiving the most waves of this migration as it became the heart of this booming economy. Amman have witnessed a rapid demographic growth through the years following the exodus of Palestinians, from 60,000 person in May

1948 to 330,000 in May 1967 experiencing an annual growth rate of 14.4 percent during that period, and continuing to reach 624,000 in 1979 and 2.3 million in 2009, reaching 4 million according to the last census in 2016 (GAM 2016).

2.3.2 The political challenge

Dealing with the outcomes of war and refugees were inevitably challenging on too many levels. Even the unification between the two banks came along with its own difficulties such as integrating two quite different legal systems: one of an Ottoman legacy (Jordan) and one inherited from the British system (West Bank) on the administrative level (Al Hussein 2014).

Another challenge was to guarantee allegiance to the hosting government (The Hashemite Crown) from the population of Palestinian origin who have become Jordanian citizens (Al Hussein 2014). On the other hand, the government was expected to hold guarantee to support their claims of “Right to return” to their original homes. This duality between rooting the refugees to their new homes and holding promises to fight for returning them back was quite problematic and probably wasn’t convincing enough for several Palestinian parties. This raised a tensed political atmosphere between the population, as they were left between anticipation and disappointments (Hertsog 1982 , p.205).

Refugees considered the integration approach as a “Normalization” for their exile and resisted that strongly. The camps have become the embodiment of the "right of return" and the anchor of Palestinian identity and place (Petti 2015). It was through the camp, people felt closer to home and at home. Camps became the symbol of national struggle and the host of many organized resistant movements, the strongest among them was the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization). In 1965 they started organizing attacks against Israel across the borders, and as a result Israel performed counter attacks causing casualties in the Jordanian army and the PLO’s armed forces, the tension and division between the government and people, and between the armed forces and Jordanian army themselves had mounted (Shlaim 2008, p. 276).

With the defeat in the Six days’ war in 1967 which resulted in the loss of the West Bank

to the Israeli's, refugees sensed a no going back sign and lost their faith in the official systems. Young Palestinians, men and women in exile steamed into the resistance movements. It was their opportunity to defeat their label as the miserable and the weakened and embrace Palestinian heroism. They called the Palestinian refugee camps: liberated zones, and the "Sons of the camp" the "Fedaiyyin" in Arabic which is roughly translated into (militants/guerrillas) (Achilli 2015 , p.4) but more implies the meaning: ready to sacrifice his life. They were no longer in fear of losing anything after their first exile.

Uniformed PLO militants were openly carrying weapons in streets, setting up checkpoints and launching military training and additional schooling programs for children and adults from both genders (Figure 2.3). Although there were several attempts by the government to ban such activities and reach for agreements with the Palestinian groups, most of them didn't draw into the agreement. Palestinian militias' lack of discipline and the absence of a central power to control the different group's actions led to the spontaneous formation and merge of new groups. Refugee camps were the focal points for the nationalist activities among them Al Wihdat camp, that I have chosen as a case study for this thesis. Al Wihdat camp had a significant role during these events, as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) renamed it "The Republic" and established it as its headquarters (Achilli 2015 , p.4).

These movements came to be seen more and more as a state within a state, in an overt challenge to the Jordanian monarchy. Between the years 1968 – 1969 hundreds of violent conflicts occurred between the Palestinian militias and the Jordanian armed forces. The PLO continued to carry attacks against Israel with little consideration to the Jordanian government. It was a state of chaos (Figure 2.4).

It was on Sep 15th 1970 when Jordan declared martial law and heavy attacks on the PLO headquarters starting from Amman. The Jordanian army also attacked the refugee camps in Irbid, Baq'aa, and Zarqa in a cleansing process for all the armed resistance. Both sides got engaged in an urban warfare for days, that resulted in the expulsion of the PLO to neighboring countries, and the death of thousands mostly Palestinians (BBC 1970), which came to be known as the events of Black September (Figure 2.5 , 2.6).

Figure 2.4 : Parade of PLO militants in Amman



<https://birdinflight.com/world/black-september-how-palestinian-terrorism-was-born.html>

Figure 2.3: Jordanian army in al Wihdat camp



Source: <http://adst.org/2015/07/jordans-black-september-1970/>

Figure 2.6: al Wihdat camp during Black September



Source : <http://palestine.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=164>

Figure 2.5 : Palestinian children playing in the ruins of the Wihdat camp Sep 1970




Source : <https://birdinflight.com/world/black-september-how-palestinian-terrorism-was-born.html>

2.3.3 Present condition: facts and figures

According to UNRWA, Palestine refugees are defined as “*persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.*” (UNRWA 2016). A Palestine refugee camp is defined as a “*plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs. Areas not designated as such and are not recognized as camps.*” (UNRWA 2016). The last sentence probably refers to the unofficial Palestinian refugee camps. In Jordan, there are 3 camps for Palestinian refugees (Madaba, Prince al-Hassan, and Al Sukhneh) that are unrecognized by the UNRWA but recognized by the Jordanian government as refugee camps (Palcamps 2017).

Jordan is now the host of 13 refugee camps, 10 of which are officially acknowledged and administrated by the UNRWA. 370,000 registered refugees reside in camps, which is almost 18 percent of the total 2 million refugees in the country (UNRWA, 2015). Most of these refugees have full Jordanian citizenship. Jordan is the host of the larger number of Palestinian refugees in all UNRWA fields (Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7 : The Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan




Source: <http://www.neveragaincanada.ca/why-jordan-doesnt-want-more-palestinians/>

These camps started as a temporary solution for the crisis, a grid of tents was spread above piece of land to organize the aid process. However, due to the prolonged condition, the camp phenomena created its transformation towards permanence in terms of materiality, in order to survive (Petti 2015). Tents were replaced with concrete walls roofed with corrugated sheets, later on, concrete slabs to add a second roof or third (Figure 2.8) Economic and social factors led to the dynamic sprawl between the camp and neighboring areas, eventually becoming fully integrated within the city's urban fabric.

People adapted their struggle strategy and used the camp to preserve their identity. A lot of them refused to leave the camp even if they could because, for them, the camp was their Palestine. This ideology impacted the urban development of the camp; as a place with high density already with people sticking to living in it, or moving to the circumferences, camp acted as a centralized circle of empowerment. All the surrounding areas functioned as appendices to the camp (Achilli 2015 , p.4). This physical and ideological transformation inevitably affected the image and pattern of the city, visually,

socially, and scale wise, and perhaps last but not the least, its collective memory.

Figure 2.8: The transformation of Palestinian refugee camps



Source: <https://www.unrwa.org/galleries/photos/>

3. THE CAMP PHENOMENON

Given the historical overview of the socio-political context of Palestine and the exile, I believe it is critical to explore the concept of a refugee and the refugee camp before proceeding with al Wihdat case. The discussion of the refugee and refugee camp's definition, legal matters, and rights, is a continuation of the previous chapter's aim to portray a realistic image of the Palestinian refugees' stance and circumstances in Jordan. Also, in order to portray a conceptual understanding, later in this chapter the concept of the refugee and the camp will be discussed within a theoretical framework. Where the camp as a space of empowerment and its ability to resist will be the main point of discussion on the ground of its relevance with Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan.

3.1 THE REFUGEE

The term Refugee and the formulation of its legal status is a product of recent western history, prior to this century there wasn't a real concern regarding a precise definition of a refugee (Hyndman 2000). The main standard of the modern refugee status is derived from the 1951 convention, which was relating to the status of the refugees by the United Nation Refugee Agency. Basically, before that, there wasn't any universally acknowledged definition for those who fled persecution. People who fled their countries were simply referred to as migrants, stateless people or refugees, and as a result host governments treated these people differently. It was just until the mass migration waves after the Second World War when it became obvious that it is crucial to establish a common understanding that those people needed protection and the means of their protection.

The main sources of refugee law are treaty law defined particularly in the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol and customary international law. All states are required to abide by the international law, regardless of being signatory or part of relevant treaties or not.

1951 Refugee Convention defines the criteria for refugee status. Under the article 1(A) 2, term “Refugee” applies to any person who:

“...owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (Refugee Convention 1951).

The definition by the refugee convention is the main tool to determine if a country has protection obligations towards those coming to its borders seeking asylum. If asylum seekers were provided to be refugees according to the “refugee” definition standards, that country is obliged under international law to provide protection and guarantee not sending them back to their country of origin against their will (UNHCR 1979). If they don’t fall under the refugee criteria, they remain called asylum seekers until the hosting country decides the appropriate action towards them. Some get deported directly from the country while other’s status remains undecided for a while.

The Internally displaced persons (IDPs) is another category that was defined later in the 1998 Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement as:

“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998).

These Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were aiming to restate and gather existing international human rights related to the internally displaced in an attempt to clarify gray areas and short comes in the numerous instruments and criteria with regard to cases of particular interest to the internally displaced (Nimri 2014 , p.52).

The status of the internally displaced is not quite resolved till now, as there are still many problematic aspects and uncovered legal matters regarding their situation. These short comes will be highlighted and discussed later in this chapter.

3.1.1 Rights of refugees and the principle of non-refoulement

The Refugee Convention set out a list of rights guaranteed for refugees where all states are obliged to respect and provide. The main right among all is the principle of nonrefoulement. This principle is considered a part of the customary international law, and therefore obligatory on all states as well. Under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is obligatory not to return a refugee to a country or territory where they could be at risk of persecution:

“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (Refugee Convention 1951).

This principle is common in many other international human rights treaties, like the 1984 Convention against torture, that bans any forced removal of persons to a country or a territory where they are exposed to the risk of being tortured.

It is worth mentioning that this principle itself was a reason to anger Palestinian refugees, who were not allowed to go back to their countries after the war, even if they wanted to. Many of the Palestinian refugees felt they were being “trapped” in the host countries, while they only wish to go back home.

Besides shortcomings in the Refugees laws and regulations set by the 1951 Convention, one could immediately notice the violation of many of its principles in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and those who were in Syria. 70 years after being recognized as refugees, camp inhabitants are still disconnected from the civic life in their host countries, have no access to their basic rights, such as employment and proper education. In the next part of this section, problems with the refugee law will be discussed further.

3.1.2 Problems with the refugee law

As mentioned earlier, the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the status of refugees was the first attempt to create a clear guideline for providing protection for those at risk of persecution in their countries. However, nowadays many scholars and social activists working on the field with refugees have a critical opinion about it (Nimri 2014 , p.54). They're basing their argument on the fact that this system was developed for a different era. The convention's focus was the resulting problems that were identified since the late 1980's (Millbank 2000). Apparently, the officials are still dealing with refugees the same way since the Second World War. However, in this era of communication and rapid transformation on so many levels, one could foresee the need for policies and guidelines that are able to keep up with and cover the occurring matters and the complexity of refugee's circumstances and needs.

One of the most important short comes in the refugee law is its differentiation between refugees and the internally displaced, without providing attention to the similarities. Refugees and internally displaced persons belong to a similar set of circumstances. However, there are a couple of differences that consequently makes them treated differently. Although the mentioned above guidelines and principles obligatory to all states, IDPs are not included in any treat applied at a universal level (Nimri 2014 , p.53).

The term refugee is restricted to those fleeing persecution on –at least- one of five grounds, yet being an IDP is a result of a broader set of circumstances, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts, and human rights violations (Refugee Convention 1951).

The major difference is that although refugees and IDPs may have fled for the same reasons, IDPs have not crossed any international border, remaining within their territory, hence still subject to the laws of their state. That's is the main reason IDPs were not specifically covered in the 1951 Convention, as it is considered the state's government primary responsibility to provide assistance and protection, and the International community's role is secondary (Nimri 2014 , p.53).

This differentiation is very problematic, as in many cases internal borders can be unseen and unconsidered to local people until certain instability takes place and this borderline becomes a decisive factor for the safety of their lives. This could be reflected on the

recent conflict in Syria, where different ethnic and religious groups were residing each other peacefully till war erupted and the imaginary local boundary lines between them turned to war zones.

Also, another case that can debate this law, is the Palestinian refugees who resided in West Bank. In their case of occupation, the original state government didn't exist anymore or was weakened to the extent of not being able to protect itself.

Till now, there is no single agency or institution on an international level, designated for the assistance and protection of the internally displaced persons. (Nimri 2014, p.53) One could say that now there is a widespread debate on how this uprooted group could be further assisted and by whom.

Adrienne Millbank (2013), discusses further inadequacies of the outcomes of the convention, below is some of the most relevant critics in regard to the Palestinian refugees:

The Convention's definition of a refugee is outdated, as is its notion of exile as a solution to refugee problems.

- a. *It confers no right of assistance on refugees unless and until they reach a signatory country, it imposes no obligation on countries not to persecute or expel their citizens, and it imposes no requirement for burden sharing between states.*
- b. *The Convention takes no account of the impact (political, financial, and social) of large numbers of asylum seekers in receiving countries.*
- c. *There is an inequity of outcomes between 'camp' and 'convention' refugees. Priority is given to those present, on the basis of their mobility, rather than to those with the greatest need. (Millbank 2013)*

Millbank (2013) argues that the convention's system may have operated fine during and until the Cold War, but it does not fit for today's mass refugees' outflow, as it offers neither the flexibility nor the diversity needed to contain the situation. The outcomes of this law currently are holding more negative impact rather than a positive one, as its distorting and diverting the resources and the response of the receiving countries, rather than driving for a coherent and ethical development.

Mentioned reasons above make it understandable why it is very doubtful that many countries would sign the 1951 Refugee Convention in modern times (Nimri 2014 , p.56). Many uncovered issues make it hard for governments to fully commit to the convention outcomes, as sometimes refugee matters and circumstances are way more complicated. Although the humanitarian side is the first to come up in someone's mind regarding refugees matters, unfortunately, this is not the case in real life, as it is usually surrounded with more political and legal matters. For example, the government of Lebanon still keeps the Palestinian refugees isolated from society legally, due to the fear that their large number would cause demographic instability, and initiate tension between different parties in the country (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.6).

This discussion leads to opening up the topic of reform. The whole refugee regime that is in practice today, needs to be enhanced in a time where refugee number have hit its highest. UNHCR and the supporters of the asylum seekers acknowledge the problems of the convention, however, they express their doubts and fears, that opening the laws to the discussion might end up leading to "*restriction, rather than expansion*" of the refugee's rights (Millbank 2013).

3.1.3 Legal framework for refugees in Jordan

Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However the protection it provided for refugees and asylum seekers is favorable as for example, it was the only hosting country that provided Palestinian refugees with citizenship, most of the remaining groups in other hosting countries are living in an intolerable situation (UNHCR, IPU 2001).

In fact, Jordan has been a destination for refugees since the eruption of war in 1948, not just from Palestine, but from many other countries in the Mena region. This is mainly due to its location, sharing the longest border line with Palestine from one side, Iraq and Syria from another. Despite the limited sources, Jordan offered a relatively good hospitality for refugees and asylum seekers. Although the contexts of each refugee wave were very different, they all had a common impact on the social economics, politics and humanitarian issues in Jordan in micro and macro scale. Of course, such implications affected Jordan's emergency response, as minor changes have been made in the refugee

migration policies regulating refugee's politics and their legal systems, such as responsible institutes and administration systems (Nimri 2014 , p.60). Yet it may be due to Jordan's limited resources or the indecisive political situation, the approach in dealing with the refugees is still described as unsustainable.

It is specified in the Jordanian constitution that "*Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political belief, or for their defense of liberty*" (The Constitution of The Hashemite Kingdom, Chapter 2, Article 21). Yet Jordan does not have any national legislation that discusses how to deal with refugees and their status. It only accepts all foreigners, as it is subject to the general rule of international law not to return refugees to a place where their lives might be at risk.

There are two aid agencies now in Jordan working with the refugees, both work under the United Nations umbrella, but each holds different responsibilities. The Syrian refugees now are Under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The Palestinian refugees, not only in Jordan, but those who are in Lebanon, Syria and the West Bank, are under the responsibility of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East known as UNRWA, or locally known as the "Agency", which was created in 1948 to assist those who were displaced after the Israeli aggression. UNRWA was not given the mandate to provide protection to the Palestinian refugees. This responsibility was implicitly left to the governments. Again, as the UNRWA was already under the aegis of the UN, Palestinian refugees were effectively excluded from the UNHCR's mandate, when it was created in 1950. However, Palestinians who are outside of UNRWA's operating zones, do fall under UNHCR responsibility. (UNHCR IPU 2001)

Apart from the international aid agencies, there is the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), which is a development of a series of governmental institutions that have been concerned with the Palestinian refugees' matters since 1948. The first governmental institute concerning the Palestinian refugees was established in 1950 under the name "The ministry of refugees". Then after the West Bank was annexed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it became known as "The ministry of building and reconstruction" that worked on organizing the locations of refugees in cooperation with the UNRWA

after signing an agreement in 1951. Later after the 1967 War, the Jordanian government formed a High Ministerial Committee, that deals with the financial, educational, social, administrative and health matters in the West Bank. In 1972, an executive office was assigned to manage the research and information that concerns the West Bank, followed by the establishment of The Occupied Territory Ministry, which basically got over the tasks of the building and reconstruction committee. It remained active until the disengagement decision between Jordan and the West Bank. Therefore the Department of Palestinian Affairs was created under the domain of the ministry of foreign affairs (Palcamps 2017).

The DPA acts as a link between the UNRWA and other governmental institutes. Furthermore, it is involved in administrative issues of the camp such as regulating the process of buying and selling properties and giving permissions to build or open shops. In addition to organizing social activities in the camps, and providing aid to those in need. Basically, it forms a governmental presence in the camps, through a local office in each camp, to defy the notion of being an extra-territorial piece of land, run by international jurisdiction (Palcamps 2017).

3.1.4 The Palestinian refugees in Jordan

The Palestinian exile didn't happen once, the consequences of the Israeli aggression and the following conflicts resulted in many waves of expulsion for Palestinians, some were expelled twice or more until they reached their final refuge. This ongoing national mobilization and reoccurring political conflicts, and the uniqueness of the Palestinians case in Jordan, where the majority obtained citizenships, made it complicated to define what a refugee is. Within this context, UNRWA defines Palestinian refugees as: *"persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict."* UNRWA aids all *"those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance"* (UNRWA 2012). This definition by UNRWA includes the patrilineal descendants of the original Palestinian refugees who endured the exile, but only limited to those still residing in UNRWA's areas of operation in the host countries: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the West Bank (Akram 2011 , p.19). Later on, after the 1967 war which resulted in new

waves of refugees, some who were exiled for the first time and some were already refugees from the first aggression, ten new camps were established by UNRWA to accommodate them (UNRWA 2016).

In 2012, it was estimated that there were almost 4,950,000 registered patrilineal descendants of what is called “original” Palestinian refugees. According to UNRWA now, nearly one-third of those, which is more than 1.5 million refugee, are living in 58 recognized Palestine refugee camp in the host countries mentioned earlier (UNRWA 2016).

A couple of distinctions were made by Palestinians themselves in defining the refugees. Those who were exiled in the 1948 war, which was called “al Nakba” (catastrophe) and their descendants are broadly defined as “Laji’uon” which means: refugees. However, the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) people, especially the ones who returned to West Bank and formed the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and the residents of the camps in Lebanon, refuse to accept this term. This repudiation of the term “Refugee” is derived from its indication of being passive victims, a label they reject to be described by and prefer the autonym “a’idun” which means: Returnees (Schulz and Hammer 2003 , p.130). Those who were exiled in 1967 (which was called “al Naksa” (The setback or the relapse) and their descendants are defined as “Nazehoon” which means: the displaced, although many of them originally belonged to the 1948 group (Chiller-Glaus 2007 , p.82).

Another wave of exodus occurred during the Gulf war in 1990, where almost more than 200,000 Palestinians voluntarily left Kuwait due to harassment and intimidation during the Invasion of Iraq to Kuwait. After the war ended in 1991 Kuwaiti government forcibly pressured another 200,000 Palestinians to leave Kuwait (Ghabra 1991), to get back at the PLO who was supporting Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq back then. Those who were expelled by the Gulf War were mostly holders of Jordanian citizenship, with relatively good financial status, and were able to manage living outside refugee camps, but that was described as the “Third Exodus” the Palestinians went through (Le Troquer and al-Oudat 1999 , p.37).

Yet, the refugee concept and understanding is mostly associated with the camp that

represents the spatialization of this phenomena. Therefore in the next section camp spaces will be further discussed for a better understanding.

3.2 THE CAMP

Human existence has been tracked along history through traces of their settlements that emerged through times of peace as well as conflicts. Although the very origin of refugee camps is hard to trace, earliest known refugee camps are those for the displaced in post-war Europe (Malkki 1995).

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the refugee laws applied currently were established in response to the Second World War, and although “displacement” camps already existed before that, it was just until the end of the war when any legal definition of a “refugee” was recognized. Consequently, a legitimate space to host this category was established. Of course, under the circumstances of having populations scattered everywhere across Europe, the matter of the refugees was perceived as a security threat rather than a humanitarian issue and their responsibility was passed to militaries. (Nimri 2014 , p.64) Therefore militaries took the direct action of using the prisoner-of-war (POW) camps and military barracks, to contain and order to proceed with the process of redistribution of the displaced population. Such military camps, their planning, and design actually go back to the Roman era, where the main aim of those structures was based on the need of efficiency, not humanity. In fact, today’s camps are designed and planned using the same spatial structure. Refugee camps now are set as functional spaces that its only aim is to gather, process and secure individuals. It is not a space that offers the expression of refugee rights (Sipus 2014).

In my interview with Dr. Mohammad al-Asad, a Jordanian Architect and Historian, this issue was brought up under the question of why not providing better planning solutions in refugee camps? He explained that in war times, the main concern for any aid agency is to supply refugees with life’s basic needs. It is always perceived that planning is a luxury no one can afford during hard times. Dr. al-Asad had also explained that refugee camps are always regarded as temporary, and any attempt to insert urban planning

dimension would be understood as an attempt to permanentize the camp. Such acts would scare the refugees and raise political questions.

As a result of this agency mindset, according to Kleinschmidt (2015) 70 years later after the Second World War, we're still constructing camps as storage facilities for people, while the refugees are building cities.

The refugee camps are firstly defined as temporary settlements, established to receive refugees who fled their homes and countries in fear for their lives. Usually, refugees seek asylum after leaving their homes due to political incidents such as war and conflicts, other times it could be due to environmental or economic situations. Refugee camps hold the burdens of whatever caused this mobilization, they have been described as "politics turning into space", a spatial ramification of political proceeding (Herz 2011).

In 2012, according to UNHCR, the average-sized camp is a home for 11,400 persons (UNHCR 2012 , p.35) although it is common to see camps with over a hundred thousand people. These camps are run by local governments, The United Nations, NGOs and International organizations such as the Red Cross. Such camps are provided with a certain level of support, however, there are many unofficial camps across the world that are left with no aid and support what so ever, such as the Calais jungle in France and Idomeni in Greece (Smith 2016).

In Jordan now, there are 10 official Palestinian refugee camps, and three unofficial refugee camps, these are Madaba camp, which was established in 1956, Prince al-Hassan established in 1967 and Al Sukneh, established in 1967. These camps suffer from even worse life conditions than other official camps, as they don't receive any structured aid or support. According to UNRWA (2016):

"A Palestine refugee camp is defined as a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host government to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs. Areas not designated as such and are not recognized as camps."

3.2.1 Palestinian refugees inside/outside the camp

According to the UNHCR, the majority of the refugees in the world today, do not live in refugee camps. According to a survey done at the end of 2015, almost 67 percent of refugees around the world, live individually in private accommodations (UNHCR 2015, p.58), and almost just a quarter of them lived in planned and officially managed camps. In Jordan, numbers are very similar, where almost 19 percent of the registered refugees live in camps, and the rest chose to reside outside of it (Al Husseini 2014). As Jordan was the only hosting country that gave citizenship to most of its Palestinian refugees, living in the camp was a matter of choice, if we excluded all other factors. There are no checkpoints, no fences and no actual security measures that one imagines to be surrounding the camps usually. Although it is very important here to note that the concept of choice is quite problematic, as they are making “choices” under a lot of constraints, financially and socially.

One thing I noticed locally, was the tendency of many to call certain areas with particular qualities a camp, although it is not and never was. Generally, poor areas, with a distinguished Palestinian identity fall under this category. For example, a 62 years old man (Camp Dweller #15) I was talking to in Wihdat camp, was referring to “Jabal al Natheef”, an area in south-east Amman, close to Al Wihdat camp, as “Al Natheef Camp”, and when I questioned that he explained “*Yes, yes it’s not a camp, but after all they’re all the same*”. This incident occurred many times, that it got me realize that people actually use the term “camp”, to define their status as refugees, regardless of their location (in camp or outside the camp). That old man said laughing: “*The one of us (referring to Palestinian refugees) will set his house wherever he wants and call it a camp*”. It is possible to claim that this insistence on calling themselves refugees, and their place of accommodation a camp, is derived from their attachment to their right of return, and their fear of being detached from their place of origin, it is a way to define their identity.

The old man explained that earlier in time, being from the camp was a sort of a bond that empowered them altogether. Now, due to many people shifting out of the camp, and many others moving in due to cheap living expenses, living in the camp became accompanied with many problematic social labels that some people try to avoid. The old

man's following words addresses the transformation of meaning about living/being in the camp *"But now everything changed, people now are ashamed to say they're from the camp! In our days we were all alike, now everyone changed."*

Many of the refugees who once lived in camps, moved to other neighboring areas when they were able to afford it. Some others moved back to it. One of the ladies I interviewed in al Wihdat camp (CD #6), was born and raised there, and then moved out of it when she got married. Later on, she moved back with her husband and family for two reasons: *"living here is much cheaper than outside, and I needed the help of my family in raising the kids as we both (she and her husband) work for long hours."*

So how does living in the camp differs from living outside of it? As mentioned earlier, in Jordan there is the unique case of refugees' citizens' status, that doesn't exist anywhere else. So aside from being official citizens, they are registered with UNRWA as refugees, who are entitled to the right of return once it is possible. According to my Interview with the director of the DPA office in al Wihdat camp, the difference between those who still live in the camp and those who live outside of it is basically the ability to benefit from the UNRWA's services and aid.

UNRWA distributes supplies and aid to families living in the camp on a regular basis, through distributing an official "supplies card". Residents of the camp, can in exchange get certain amounts of domestic supplies such as flour and sugar, from accredited shops. Those who move outside remain registered to the UNRWA as refugees, yet stop receiving such kind of aid. That was considered a huge plus for living in the camp, as people in its early days were struggling for their living. According to Muhammad Omar, who published an article in "al Mastoor" newspaper, this was elaborated to a unique kind of business, where some people started buying these supplies from families who were more in need of cash, and resell them again in the market, especially in early days of the camp, when UNRWA was providing them with generous amounts. People who moved out of the camp contributed to this business, by renting their cards for other families to keep benefiting from the supplies (Omar 2005 , p.2). Nowadays, people still find it a plus for living in camps, yet through my interviews, there was somehow an agreement, that the decrease in the amount of aid and supplies, made living in the camp harder. Most of them attributed this decrease to the Syrian crisis, where thousands of

Syrian refugees are “sharing” with them UN funds.

People who live in camps can benefit from UNRWA’s services, such as schools, health centers, and other programs. Although such services are open for refugees in the neighboring areas, from my interviews I was able to notice that, most of the people choose to stay in the camp to benefit from them. The reason behind that is the ability to reach these services within a walking distance, a preferable option for those who can’t afford transportation.

Others who opened businesses and shops in the camp, like camp dweller #15, find it unnecessary to leave it. A lot of them prefer to move to a larger house in the camp or improve their own, and stay the camp, near their businesses, family, and friends.

In the early exile years, living in the camp was considered a contribution to the struggle going on in the camp. Many of the families refused to leave the camp as a statement of rejection to their “normalization” in the hosting country. Not just that, but social ties as well made it very unpleasant to live outside the camp, residents of the camp didn’t know much about outside of it, in addition to “unofficial” discrimination they were subjected to, so they always preferred to stay in it. If they did move, they would inhabit the nearest immediate vacant space near the camp, to stay as connected as possible. However, with time moving outside became easier, especially for the younger generations, who were more eager to improve their life conditions. From my interviews in the camp, it is possible to conclude that two main factors influence the decision of staying in the camp, first is the financial status of the refugees, and secondly, their social ties inside the camp, yet it remains obvious that finances are the main drive to this decision.

3.3 CAMP AS A SPACE OF EMPOWERMENT AND RESISTANCE

The observations and the interviews conducted at al Wihdat camp aimed at revealing how resistance had been spatialized in relation to power relations in the camp. Hence, before sharing the findings of the research, this section reviews the existing literature on the camp theory and sheds light on the contextual/conceptual framework of the study.

In the literature of the refugee camps, many of the influential writings of Foucault and Agamben portrayed the camps as exceptional spaces, emphasizing on its liminality and inability to grow (Achilli 2015, p.10). Camps were presented as spaces for hardened nations and speechless victims. In this section, several theoretical approaches will be discussed in relation to the Palestinian refugee camps, aiming to bring attention to the success and failure of camp conceptualizations such as Agamben's *bare life* and Foucault's *Heterotopia*.

In ancient Greek law, the society was compromised out of *Bios*, which is the political life, the thinkers, decision makers of the society. And *Zoes*, which are in the bare life or animal life, those who do not contribute to the politics, women, and children were considered a *Zoe*. A *Homo sacer* is a citizen whose punishment was to be exiled from the society, forced out of the *Bios* and reduced into a *Zoe*. In the age of monarchies, the king was sovereign, and his sovereignty was legitimized by God. The sovereign is who decides who can be legally killed and expelled, where he is the only subject, and everyone else is an object (Soro 2014). A *Homo sacer* is a man who lost all his civil rights from the society, including the right of protection from the sovereign and might be killed by anybody, but might not be sacrificed in a religious ritual (Agamben 1998 , p.72). According to Agamben, the inclusion of the *homo sacer* in the juridical order of Roman society is "Solely in the form of its exclusion", or in its capacity to be excluded by violent death (Agamben 1998 , p.18).

Agamben in his analysis of German Nazi determined such criteria as a tool to eliminate juridical protections of those targeted by the sovereign. He described the concentration camps as a bare life (*a zoe*), where Jews were stripped out of their citizenship and therefore expelled from the political life into a bare life that cannot develop or function (Soro 2014); and transformed into "*Homo sacer*", "reduced to both a subordinate non-political juridico-political status and its physical and locational mirroring in a space that is equally in/between- residing both inside and outside the sovereign state" (Agamben 1998, p.72).

As a result of sovereign classification, political actions are no longer possible in the camp (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.1). Therefore, the residents of the camp are incapable of defining the value of their actions, nor the values of their life neither does the

sovereign authority. The “zone of indistinction” as he described the camp, implies that camps are devoided from any potential to grow or develop into a true urban or political space. Agamben puts this into words as such: “(w)hoever entered the camp moved in a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any sense” (Agamben 1998, 170).

Others such as Michiel Agier’s writings were influenced by Agamben’s bare life conceptualization and described refugee camps as “Naked Cities”, a deserted place that can never develop or function (Agier 2002 , p. 336).

Focusing on the case of Palestinian refugee camps, especially in Lebanon, many scenes somehow supports Agamben's conceptualization of the camp. Palestinian refugees, there have no citizenship or any legal rights, as they exist outside the juridical reach of local law enforcement and the government, yet constantly disciplined and controlled through the threat of violence (Hanafi 2008), which basically makes the camp exist in a zone of indistinction.

Although from the Palestinian perspective, not integrating into the host community and remaining in the camp, is a political choice that serves for the continual resistance and demand for their right to return, it is also an active marginalization policy serving the Lebanese government, whose goal is to keep demographic “balance” and internal political stability (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.6). It is a necessity for the Lebanese government to advocate the right of return, as the alternative of integration is not desirable for the current political agenda (Ramadan 2009). Sadly the practical result of such dynamic is discriminative policies and practices regarding the social the economic and civil rights, dehumanizing Palestinian refugees in order not to upset the political balance (Hanafi 2008 , p.89). Even with the Palestinian refugees holding on to their right of return, and therefore the temporality of the camp, this doesn’t seem to be totally their choice. Whenever Palestinian refugees begin to establish a routine or set up infrastructure as a peruse of survival practices, these camps (Sabra, Shatila, Nahr el barid ...etc.) were often disturbed or come under attack (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.7), such events against Palestinians were not persecuted by the government, maintaining the exceptionality of the camp.

Such acts of discrimination and aggression, are strongly protected by the Lebanese government (the sovereign) to the point of numerical construction. According to Zureik, no official national census has been conducted since 1930's, and that's in order to maintain the percentages of religious affiliation anonymous as its associated with political power (Zureik 2001 , p.212). Also, the negation of spaces of camps in Lebanon was found in the 1996 Elyssar project, that aimed to redevelop the southern suburbs of Beirut. According to Habib (2012), all areas affected by the project were described in the land use plan and master plan. But in the center, Shatila camp was identified either with white space labeled as "special status" or by colors that didn't correspond to any areas defined in the master plan.

In contrast, most of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan were given citizenship. And several attempts were made to engage originally Palestinians in political life, such as appointing some in the parliament and in prestigious positions. Yet, such attempts didn't come popular to Palestinian refugees (Al Hussein 2013), and in their early exodus stages, they chose not to engage in the "Bios" of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It is possible to claim in this case that they have willingly entered the bare life as a temporary solution till they get back to their homeland.

The Palestinian refugees went through two cycles of elimination to bare life. First the expulsion by the Israeli sovereign, where they were forced to be cast out and moved around to relieve pressure, while the Israeli occupation took control over the political life in Palestine. Second by the hosting governments who as in the case of Lebanon, governmental policies marginalized the refugees and isolated them. Or on the contrary, in the case of Jordan, it was the refugee's choice to marginalize themselves, and refuse to enter the "Bios" of another system, as a statement of rejection to their exodus and resettlement.

However, a commonly criticized point in Agamben's conceptualization of the refugee camps is its lack of any possibility for agency or resistance. As the bare life is devoided from the political, and it is not possible for its residents to challenge the authority of the sovereign. Sarah Jamal and Adam Sandor (2010) argue that the refugee camp is never unpolitical, as its very existence assumes an interplay with the politics. (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.12) Of course, how the agency and resistance are expressed is another

thing to discuss, and will be mentioned later.

Moving to Foucault's understanding of the application of power and resistance in such sites that were described earlier by Agamben to be both inside and outside, an equivalent description was used in defining the Foucauldian term: Heterotopia. Micheal Foucault introduced the concept of Heterotopia that describes spaces in the third dimension which functions in non-hegemonic conditions; spaces that are not here, not there physically or mentally and where learning takes place (Faucault 1971). Foucault has described heterotopia as a result of deviation, time or crisis, the exclusion of certain people whose behaviors are outside the norm, to allow others to live in a certain space normally. Foucault used prisons and barracks as an example of heteretopian places (Johnson 2012 , p.8), places that are both isolated yet penetrable, not freely accessible as public spaces. According to this description, we can add the refugee camp to the list. Foucault asserts that these spaces, that are in between, are an indication of sovereign power, and also demonstrate and produce sites of resistance to that power. (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.1) In contrast to Agamben, Foucault acknowledges that every point of power allows for a possibility of resistance. He connects them strongly together in stating that understanding the mechanisms and expression of power cannot be performed without the evaluation of resistance (Jamal and Sandor 2010 , p.6).

Although Foucault's conceptualization acknowledges the possibility of resistance in such sites, it refuses its possibility to emerge from or within a relationship of violence (Faucaults 1971). Edkins and Pinfat argue that both Agamben's and Foucault's conceptualizations were insufficient (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004 , p.13). They argue that Agamben's concept of bare life, or in other words the acceptance of the bare life is a statement of resistance itself. They use the example of U.K. asylum seekers, who are involved in a hunger strike through sewing their lips and eyelids shut to prove their statement (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004, p.17). This symbolic act of "Bare life" was a political voice by itself, and could be particularly effective in the case of Palestinian refugee camps. Edkins and Pinfat (2004) discuss whether camps can be seen as a rejection of the continual existence of the State of Israel. Sarah Jamal and Adam Sander adopt Edkins and PinFat opinions but adding a key dynamic that seemed to be missed, that is time (Jamal and Sandor 2010, p.5). Resisting the denial of their right to return

was not translated into not settling at all, but rather it was an existence between two dimensions, the temporary and the permanent. They state that the state of permanent temporality was the resistance strategy adopted by the camp dwellers.

Also, Edkins and PinFat (2004) argue with Foucault's conceptualization of resistance, that even in the most violent situations, individuals have exercised agency and resistance, considering that a short come in Foucault's theory.

The previous discussion aims to prove the possibility of the political and resistance in a refugee camp. However, the way resistance is conceptualized seems to have some deficiencies in the literature. Resistance can be recognized in different forms and strategies through history, and people have always found different methods to express messages of resistance. Edkins and PinFat's theoretical framework that added the factor of time portrays a fair image for resistance in refugee camps, however, I believe that an important key was left out in the discussion which is that resistance is always dynamic.

Depicting the history of the Palestinian refugee camps, one could realize that it is not possible to label a certain form of resistance along the duration of exile. The tactics and strategies adopted by the refugees to deliver their message to the international community varied along the process and were adapted to different political atmospheres. Time is not only a factor that manipulates the temporality or permanence of the camp. Time means passing first or second-hand experience of exile and memories of home to younger generations and therefore inevitably producing different patterns and behaviors of resistance.

4 . AL WIHDAT: SPATIALIZATIONS OF IDENTITY, RESISTANCE, AND EMPOWERMENT.

The previous sections of this research were mainly concerned about illustrating the nature of the conflict and the exile of the Palestinian nation, besides constructing a theoretical background for the Palestinian refugee camps and refugees live away from home. The following part discusses the previous constructs through the Case of Al Wihdat Camp, depicting the influence of the previous constructs on the refugees' daily life in the camp.

The selection of Al Wihdat camp as a case study was due to its location within the city of Amman, as a fully integrated urban squatter. Also due to its political history and its economic and cultural presence. Al Wihdat camp's complex and rich nature presents a fertile environment to explore different aspects of camp's life, in relation to the aim of this study that is to determine the role of resistance in extending the emergency state in a camp's life and the spatial tools produced to support this extension.

4.1 METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

From this chapter onwards, the research aims at first positioning Al Wihdat Camp within Amman City among the other incity camps and revealing its peculiarities. Al Wihdat Camp has been introduced and investigated from various aspects. For understanding the historical and political context, the research relies on mostly published and unpublished reports, surveys and documents regarding the Palestinian refugee camps mainly conducted by the UNRWA and the DPA. In addition to them, reports and surveys concerned about the living conditions of Palestinian refugee camps conducted by Jordan's DPA funded by the Government of Norway and implemented by Fafo, in collaboration with Jordan's Department of Statistics were also useful. The built environment in various scale has been examined to understand how camp negotiates with the city and how camp dwellers negotiate with the (physical) camp space. For that satellite images taken for Al Wihdat camp through the years, 1953 till 2016, obtained

from the Royal Jordanian Geographic Center have been graphically (re)presented to be able to understand the urban sprawl of the city. The maps examined were mostly provided by Amman's Greater Municipality, DPA, and the UNRWA. In neighborhood scale, I relied on my observations and photos. Authorities in charge of the camp have also been examined to be able to gain an insight into the management of the built environment and the communication dynamics between various actors.

In addition to the written and graphic sources; reports, surveys, maps this research is depended mostly on qualitative research methods for collecting its data, namely participant observation, and interviews. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with various stakeholders; camp dwellers, camp officials and urban planners/architects who were in charge of the management or design of the camp (See Appendix 2 for interview questions). I have interviewed with 15 camp dwellers; four camp officials from Amman Greater Municipality, UNRWA local office, DPA, and Wihdat Community Zakat Institute; three architects/urban planners who have worked in the camp or adjacent projects including the head of the design team for East Wihdat upgrade project. To be able to make the interviews I got official permission from Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) headquarters and an official DPA employee accompanied me in the camp during the interviews (See Appendix 3 for the letter of permission).

The Interviewees (camp dwellers) varied in age, sex, and educational level to generate a broader understanding of camp issues. Among 15 camp dwellers, there were seven female, eight male participants, and their age varied between 17-62. To give a more detailed profile, six were between 17-25 years old, five were between 26-45 years old, and four were between 46-62 years old. Their education ranged from mid-school to university, and they were of various professions such as students, housewives, shopowners, teacher, etc. (See Appendix 4 for Interviewee profile). The semi-structured interviews were conducted in refugee's houses in Al-Wihdat camp, where they were able to open up and talk more comfortably. The durations of the Interviews ranged between 30-40 minutes, in addition to time spent in casual conversations over a cup of tea they insisted on serving. Aside from the semi-structured interviews, I had informal conversations with some camp dwellers to overcome the stress and leery answers. I was also engaged in participant observation in the camp, through constant visits in varying

periods of time of the day and the week, along the months September and November 2016 and February, March and April 2017. The interviews have been transcribed and coded via content analysis. Consequently, findings unfolded how camp dwellers reacted to the projects undertaken in and around the camp so far and their placemaking tactics. The place making tactics that paved the way for understanding the spatialization of resistance in the camp have been discussed under three main themes: homelessness and homecoming, the camp as a familiar space and camp as a space of empowerment. Throughout the thesis, quotes from the interviews (with all three groups) have been used to explain, epitomize or strengthen the related discussions.

4.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW ABOUT CAMPS IN JORDAN

As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the Kingdom of Jordan is a host now to 13 Palestinian refugee camps. Those camps were established in two periods, the first one was the following years after 1948 War (Al Nakba) when UNRWA set up 4 official emergency camps. The second phase was in the years following the 1967 War (Al Naksa), when UNRWA set another 6 emergency camps to host the new waves of refugees. There are 3 more camps identified as “unofficial”, by UNRWA, but recognized as refugee camps by the government. The UNRWA provide certain aid services to these unofficial camps like schools and some occasional programs, but the administrative responsibility of the camp is solely entrusted to the government (Department of Palestinian Affairs 2013).

Now, due to the circumstances accompanied the exile, where forced and unorganized mobilization for large numbers of people occurred unexpectedly, the selection of camp locations was sort of arbitrary. Locations were selected quickly, without a sufficient study and a structured framework for their establishment. Some camps were set up in the exact locations where refugees already settled when they arrived at the Kingdom of Jordan, others were set up years after the exile and gathered refugees scattered around (Palcamps 2017). Another case were the ones set up in certain locations and then relocated for different reasons. For example, Souf camp was initially located in the city of Jerash, in 1967, but due to terrible weather conditions, refugees were relocated to

another camp in Jordan Valley in the same year. Then in the course of time, because of the military operations in that area, refugees were relocated again in 1968 to Souf camp, where UNRWA provided better housing conditions (UNRWA 2016). Another example of this trial and error process for locating the camps is Amman new camp, which was a substitute to the refugee's settlements that took place in Jabal al Natheef in 1953. Due to conflicts occurring between refugees and locals, Amman's new camp was established in a more distant place from the center, and UNRWA refused to acknowledge any refugee settlements established in Jordan after 1952 except Amman's new camp (Palcamps 2017) until the 1967 war erupted and the UNRWA established 6 more camps. (See Appendix 1 for detailed information about the 13 camps in Jordan, in addition to Aerial images that demonstrates their location in relation to the city)

It could be noticed that the four official camps set after 1948 (Zarqa, Irbid, Al-Husseini, Amman new camp), were located on the exact peripheries of the neighboring cities, that decision was purely function in order to ease the process of transporting the goods and services to the camp (Al Hussein 2011, p.30). This naturally facilitated their integration in the urban fabric. In time, those camps became contained within the urban fabric of the city that their actual boundaries became hard to distinguish from the surrounding neighborhoods.

However, in the years following the 1967 war, what generally characterize the 6 emergency camps, is their distant location from any neighboring city. Even till now most of them seem to be isolated from any urban context, in the shape of small colonies in the middle of nowhere, except for "Prince al-Hassan" camp, which is not recognized by the UNRWA. It seems that the general intention at that period was to minimize the interaction between the refugees and the locals.

The reason behind this assumption is derived from the tensed political atmosphere that governed that period. With the large numbers of Palestinian refugees exiled to Jordan, in addition to the Palestinians who have willingly moved to the east bank since 1948, the general acknowledgment was that roughly more than half of the Jordanian population is of a Palestinian origin. Of course, such numbers are extremely politicized and therefore extremely challenged. Some Israeli leaders repeatedly argue that "Jordan is Palestine", what is known as the "concept of replacement state" (Human rights watch 2010). As a consequence to that, the Jordanian administrative authority always made

sure to control and maintain an independent expression of their political assertion within the country. Aside of that, on the social level, a state of anticipation was created between locals of originally Jordanians descends, which led in some occasions to clashes with the camp's residents. Naturally, latter camps were located differently than the earlier ones, more distant and more disconnected.

Another indicator of the differences between the two sets of camps and their relationship to the city is the amount of commercial exchange in the camps and between its surroundings. Most of the 1948 emergency camps have a high number of commercial shops, and their services transcend the demands of camps' residents. Al Wihdat Camp with the highest number of commercial shops (2500 shop) became in time a shopping destination for all the surrounding neighborhoods (Omar 2005 , p.1). In the camp, many shops selling all types of goods; vegetables, meat, groceries...etc. for cheaper prices became an attraction point for many citizens and merchandisers, who started opening new shops there. I observed that the camp hosts not only commercial shops but also technicians that can almost fix anything from a broken watch to high-end cars.


On the other hand, 1967 camps seem to be still introverted in matters of commercial exchange, the numbers of commercial shops there seem to only cover the demand of the local residents and nothing else. The Baqa'a camp is an exception in this case. Naturally, due to being the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan, a larger number of shops is needed to cover the demand, but it is somehow also a destination for shopping and other workshops. The main difference between al Baqa'a camp and other camps integrated into urban contexts such as al Wihdat and al-Hussein is that al Baqa camp is still strongly holding to its Palestinian identity and political symbols, making its interaction with its surrounding described to be cautious, and that can be explained by its relatively distant location from the city.

4.2.1 Camps within Amman city

As seen in the table above, Amman city has the largest share of Palestinian refugees, with five refugee camps taking place within its boundaries (Figure 4.1). Four of them are official UNRWA camps (Al Hussien, Al Wihdat, Al Baqa'a, Hitteen) and one is acknowledged as a camp only by the government (Prince al-Hassan).

Although when established they were set on what considered to be the periphery of the city, Al-Hussein Camp and Al Wihdat camp are the ones closest to the city center, in fact, yet they are in the very center of the City of Amman. Hitteen camp and Prince al-Hassan are second in proximity, and then comes Al Baqa'a camp which is the most distant.

Figure 4.1: The Palestinian refugee camps in the city of Amman




Source: <https://www.unrwa.org/galleries/photos/>

It is important to mention here, that during the events of 1970-1971 which is commonly referred to as “Black September”, when fighting erupted between the Jordanian armed forces and the PLO guerrillas, Al Wihdat Camp and the Baqa’a camp were the most targeted camps by the Jordanian military operations. Political resistance was very strong in those camps, and PLO operations were very popular. Residents of those camps were very enthusiastic about joining this resistance movement, whenever there was a national Palestinian occasion or a PLO accomplishment, it was a heyday in the camp. Mohammad Omar (2005), in his article about al-Hussein camp, attributes that to the demographic composition of the camp residents. Most of the refugees in al Wihdat and al Baqa’a were residing in Palestinian villages before being exiled, unlike for example al-Hussein camp, most of whose residents came from Palestinian cities, where they were mostly in administrative jobs and not used to fighting.

Those two camps who were once the most resistant towards normalization, are now thriving economic districts, and in the case of al Wihdat, a fully integrated urban squatter. This duality of contradictory concepts makes Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan exceptional spaces.

In the following parts, I will discuss the case of al Wihdat Camp, how this transformation took place in the camp space and its implications on the camp itself and its surroundings.

4.3 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF AL WIHDAT CAMP



Al Wihdat camp, known officially as "Amman new camp" was established in 1955, as one of four camps that were set up after 1948, to accommodate the waves of exiled Palestinians as a result of the Israeli aggression in the 1948 war.

The reason why it was called "Wihdat" (translated as Units), is because unlike other refugee camps, it was established as a grid of residential units out of corrugated sheets, and not tents from its early start (Figure 4.2). That year did not witness any wars, which made it possible to establish this camp, substituting the units UNRWA has initially set up in "Jabal al Natheef" and gather homeless refugees or ones scattered in other camps. (Palcamps 2015) According to Ibrahim Nasrallah, a famous poet and novelist that was born and raised in al Wihdat camp, known for his novels that documents the Palestinians exile, some Palestinians initially inhabited caves in the mountains for years, until they were able to move to "Al Wihdat" (Nasralla 2009).

Figure 4.2 : Al Wihdat camp 1970



Source: <https://birdinflight.com/world/black-september-how-palestinian-terrorism-was-born.html>

The camp was established on an area of 0.48 square kilometers to accommodate 5000 refugees that were registered to UNRWA. 1400 units were established initially, and two years later in 1975, the UNRWA set up 1260 additional units to host more refugees (UNRWA 2016). Over the years refugees improved their housing units and added rooms and facilities to accommodate their needs. The camp has grown in population and structure into an Urban-like quarter nowadays, surrounded as well by areas of high population density (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Al Wihdat refugee camp



Source: <http://wikimapia.org/29711095/ar/>

The camp is located in southeast Amman, connected closely to its downtown through Prince al-Hassan Street. The main street extends from the bottom of the valley where the downtown is, up to the hill where the camp is located, 10 minutes away by car. Prince al-Hassan street (Known as Madaba st.) was the main access to the camp when it was initially established, and later on with the urban sprawl, the camp became defined with Prince Hassan street, that is adjacent to its west side, Usama bin Zaid Street on its northern side, and al Yarmouk street diagonally from its south side, connecting the other two streets end, defining the camp in a triangular shape (Figure 4.4). In its early establishment years al Wihdat camp was surrounded by nothing but empty lands, nowadays it's surrounded by high-density neighborhoods that as one of the camp's residents claims, all generated from al Wihdat. From the north, it's bounded by "Al Ashrafeyyah" Neighborhood and "Al Musdar street", "Al Quwaismeh" and "Al Nahareyyah" from its south, "Hay um teeneh" from its east and "Hay al Dabaybeh" from its west (Palcamps 2015). As the Wihdat camp is located within the Amman Municipality's boundaries, it follows it administratively, but its services as schools and health care centers and social programs are provided by the UNRWA.

Figure 4.4: Surrounding streets of al Wihdat camp



Source: <http://wikimapia.org/29711095/ar/>

As the case of many Palestinian refugee camps, the lands were assigned by the government to be used for this purpose, some were owned by the government itself already, and some were owned by individuals, whom the government bought the land from, but none of them is owned by the UNRWA (Palcamps 2015). However, as these camps were intended to be temporary, in some cases such as Al-Hussein camp, the government rented the land from its owners for 5 or 10 years. Due to the prolonged situation, landowners started to claim their lands back and went to court for it. Finding a solution was not easy, as it was not just about relocating a few houses or families, it was a matter of relocating a whole community established on that land, and the matter was left unresolved.

Laws were overtaken by time allowing the dwellers to own their residential units, but not the land. And through the years, people moved, sold or rented their houses and real

estate market in al Wihdat was a significant marker for its development and nourishment. According to Fafo reports published in 2013, 69.3 percent of the refugees own their houses without any debt, 2.3 percent own it with debt, 22.3 percent are renting their houses and 6.2 percent are occupying their houses for free. (Fafo reports 2013 part 1 , p.28)

Al Wihdat camp was a refuge for 5000 people when first established. According to a most recent census by the UNRWA 57,000 registered refugee lives in al Wihdat camp making it the second largest Palestinian refugee camp in Jordan after al Baqa'a camp (UNRWA 2016). Overcrowding is a major issue in al Wihdat camp. Kiosks and haphazard stalls are the first things to notice when entering the camp, all yelling and shouting advertising their product. Many attempts were made by the government to remove these stalls, but a state of chaos and vandalism occurs whenever they try to. These sellers protest that this is their income source and the government should leave them alone. Earning living is not easy in al Wihdat, it holds second place in poverty among Palestinian refugee camps, with 34 percent of the Palestinian refugees having an income below the national poverty line of 814 Jordanian dinars (UNRWA 2016) and 19 percent unemployed (Palcamps 2015). What contributes as well to that problem is that families' main income depends on the "man of the family", as 24 percent of females in the camp are unemployed. The demographic pressure and crowding naturally lead to poor health conditions, highest incidents of severe chronic health problems are exhibited in al Wihdat camp standing at 8 percent, where also 66 percent of the Palestinian refugees don't have a health insurance. (UNRWA 2016)

A total of 13 UNRWA schools exists in the camp, running on 2 shifts to accommodate a large number of camp's children. Although most of the residents have Jordanian citizenship that allows them to register their children into governmental public school, none of them does. UNRWA schools provide education till the 10th grade, and later on, they move to public schools in the surrounding areas of the camp. Aside of that, there is a health care center, a community-based rehabilitation center, a women's program center, an environmental health office and a service office for the camp. All facilities are funded and administrated by the UNRWA (UNRWA 2016).

People initiated their own social programs in the camp as well. This was an attempt to maintain ties with their origins through establishing small centers or institutes in the name of their original village or town. Such gatherings made the camp more familiar and empowered the sense of belonging to the refugees. The first one to be established was in 1974 (Palcamps 2015), and the rest were in the years following. After the 1967 war between Arab armies and Israel, and the 1970 conflicts between Palestinian militias and the Jordanian government, people seemed to lose hope to return to their homeland, and such small gestures were their way to maintain their connection to it. These very local institutes served for more than gathering and bonding purposes. Despite its spontaneous establishment and poor capabilities, these local centers, provided training for women for some crafts work, such sewing and wool knitting, cultural events, and sometimes medical services. I was able to understand that these initiatives enhanced the familiar ambiance in the camp, made its people more keen to stay living in it despite its hardship.

4.3.1 Political context of al Wihdat

In the previous chapters, it was mentioned that the al Wihdat camp was one of the most politically resistant camps towards its hosting government. In the early rise of the PLO in 1960's until their expulsion from Jordan by the Jordanian army forces, Al Wihdat camp was a focal point for Palestinian nationalist activity. Through this decade, the Palestinian refugee camps were used as militant basis for Palestinian nationalism, but al Wihdat camp was a veritable military and command center (Achilli 2015 , p. 4). As mentioned before, the demographics of the camp dwellers and their origins made its people very enthusiastic about the PLO operations, as well as its location very close to the center. These factors were probably why it held that significant role for the PLO. Al Wihdat camp had attained a quasi-complete political autonomy from the Jordanian state, a situation perfectly described as being a city within a city. This assumption was affirmed when the Palestinian liberation movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) established their headquarters in the camp and declared the camp as a "Republic" in a direct challenge to Jordanian royal family and monarchy (Achilli 2015).

This very politically heated period came to an end when the Jordanian government decided to terminate the PLO existence in Jordan, and that's when the unfortunate events of September 1970 took place, which became known as the "Black September". Jordanian army attacked the Palestinian camps, and bloody clashes occurred between Jordanian forces, and the Palestinian guerrillas "Al feda'ayeen". Thousands of civilians were killed mostly Palestinians, and the PLO were expelled outside Jordan (BBC 1970).

This incident is rarely talked about or mentioned in the Jordanian media. Indeed its implications extend beyond the politics, affecting the social fabric between these two entities. For many years after, although politically silenced, it was always "Us" vs. "Them" kind of dialogue in the Jordanian community which became progressively more polarized since then. General discrimination and intolerance could be seen obviously in public sectors such as education and employment, especially towards those who are socially and economically less privileged (Al Abed 2004). The attitude of pressuring persons to identify themselves either as Palestinians or Jordanians became explicit regardless of their place of birth. They were asked to express their political loyalty in order to access the public resources and employment (Chatelard 2010).

In my personal opinion, the temporality that residents of the camp are hanging on to is not only derived from the right of return but as well because of the insecurity, they are sensing while residing in the host country. Holding Jordanian citizenships was not an enough guarantee, neither the 70 years of exile in Jordan. Especially that in the past few years, many Jordanian citizens with Palestinian origins were deprived arbitrarily and without previous notice, making them stateless again (Human rights watch, 2010).

In my reading to some interviews with camp dwellers in the past, many people especially of the older generations were using phrases such as: "*But this land is not ours*" and "*what if they decide to kick us out?*". This brought attention to my mind, that refugees in their early exile years, were not just anticipating going back to their land, but also an another expulsion. Their life in the camp is hesitant between temporality and permanence due to the unresolved matter of Israeli occupation, but also cautious, and that is due to lack of trust towards their hosting government. Perhaps this could be explained through Carl Schmitt's understanding of the political. The German political philosopher explains that "*at the very core of "the political" lies the distinction between*

friend and enemy” (Achilli 2013). The distinction between “enemy/friend” is perceived as intrinsic to Palestinian refugee’s status in Jordan. This creates tension between the contradictory sides of their lives, the citizenship and refugeeness, Palestinianness and Jordanianness, the need to pursue an ordinary and decent living and the national duty to guard the right of return, trusting the authority and keeping their eyes wide open in anticipation. These contradictions according to Achilli (2015), if the political exacerbate the ambiguities of the status of a Palestinian refugee in Jordan, are mostly experienced by the residents of al Wihdat; a place whose history and reputation vibrate with a strong political stance.

Back to the social implications of the 1970 events (Black September), the discrimination and the intolerant behaviors were strong markers for the division in the Jordanian community. One could easily see such acts in the public sector, I myself have experienced that several times when being asked about my family name and its origin. Each side seems to be intimidated by the other translating that into mean behaviors, especially towards those who are residing in the camp. Their poverty, social confinement, and political estrangement are the mean factors that lead some observers to question their allegiance to the Jordanian polity especially that with such conditions they are contributing to the strength of any opposition, whether it was the leftist parties, the Islamist or the PLO (Khazendar 1997 , p. 35-36).

This alarming division in the Jordanian community has made the authorities seek a strategy that counteracts these stances. It started by developing unifying narratives of reform agendas under the names of “Jordan first” and “we are all Jordan”. In these agendas the camp refugees status was repeatedly confirmed through public statements as being fully fledged citizens and “part and parcel of the Jordanian people with the same rights and duties as any other Jordanians” (In the words of Abdel-Karim Abul Heija, then the director of the Jordanian Department of Palestinian Affairs in Arab al Yawm 2004 , p.2) and “a dear part of Jordan ... that should be given the same attention and services as other parts of the country such as the countryside and the semi-desert areas.” (Ma’rouf al Bakhit , then prime minister, in Arab al Yawm 2006 , p.5)

Such strategies were attempting to decrease the congestion between the different parties in the community and to reassure the camp dwellers about their status in Jordan. Now

decades after co-living it is observed that the Jordanian community is relatively integrated enough, as being already from a shared culture and background, the division was more of a political nature rather than a difference of origins (Nimri 2014 , p.27). This assimilation could be perceived to flourish when new waves of refugees started coming to Jordan, such as Iraqi refugees and Syrian refugees, where both Palestinians and Jordanians are sharing the burden of being a host community.

Idealistic visions aside, enforcing the notion that Palestinian refugees are fully fledged citizens is not as smooth as it sounds. For even if the Palestinian refugees decided to take their role in the Jordanian community as full citizens with equal rights and duties, this would create a huge pressure on the limited governmental resources. An example of such case was when the UNRWA schools decided to cut its budget and decrease the number of its students, leaving the residents of the camps with no option but to register their children in governmental schools. But this was rejected by the minister of education Muhammad al thneibat back then stating that governmental schools have no capacity to accommodate UNRWA students (Alhayat news , 2015). This again leaves the residents of the camp in between inclusion and exclusion.

Nonetheless, since the incidents of 1970, refugee camps became relatively calm, until the year 2000, when demonstrations erupted in support for “Intifada al-Aksa” in Palestine and against Jordan’s normalization policy with Israel. However later in 2001 when unauthorized rallies took place in al Baqa’a camp, scores of people got arrested, and that silenced the people somehow, that “virtually” no demonstrations took place with only a few breaches of this ban (Al Hussein 2011 , p.7).

The case in al Wihdat camp is a bit different, frankly when I first visited the camp I was expecting to enter a highly politicized zone and was eager to track the traces of the Palestinian nationalism and resistance in the everyday life, it was shocking to me that everything seemed normal, and the absence of the political was quite obvious. People were busy with the daily life matters and their engagement with any political discussion was an option they were willing to pass on. My first visit coincided with the “good mood” of the camp, as my friend from the camp explained to me. In later visits, I was able to witness a whole different side of the camp that got me shocked more than the first visit. “It seems like we’re in Afghanistan!” this is how Luigi Achilli (2013)

described al Wihdat camp when clashes erupted between the locals and the “Darak” (a special kind of policemen) and I couldn’t find a better way to describe it.

Demonstrations do take place in al Wihdat camp almost regularly for different reasons. The ones that coincided with my research period was in May 2016, when there was a campaign to remove all the unauthorized kiosks in al Wihdat camp. The kiosks to be removed were crowded in the main entrance of the camp and extended till the main market area. People were burning tires and breaking the cars parked in the streets, fire was breaking out everywhere. Darak policemen whose kiosk is located directly at the main entrance of the camp entered the camp with tear gas bombs and violent clashes occurred between the two parties. A young man in the camp was explaining to me that this whole campaign thing was just a way to clear the paths out for police to be able to access the camp easily when necessary. This conspiracy theory was in the mindset of most of the camp dwellers, mostly the people who were harmed by such a decision. I was able to understand that this kind of demonstrations occurred many times before and people of the camp are used to it.

Figure 4.5: Confrontations with the police in al Wihdat camp



Source: <http://wikimapia.org/29711095/ar/>

Whenever there is an act of aggression in Palestine, Al Wihdat camp turns into a boiling zone, where everyone is anticipating and expressing his support in one way or another. While checking newspaper archives looking for news about such demonstrations in the

camps, many of the headlines were using the term “Al Wihdat Yantafid” this could be roughly translated as recoiling or pulsing. This terminology directly brought the image of an actual heartbeat pulsing within the urban fabric of the city. The heat and anger in such demonstrations make the camp really act as a centralized generator that affects the spaces around it even virtually.

Whenever the government took an action that camp dwellers found unfair, just as the case above anger is all over the place. Whenever the camp’s main football team won a game against the “Faisali” team; the most popular team that represents East Jordanians, celebrations and demonstrations at the same time take place in front of the police kiosks, in a challenging attitude to their authority. “Any victory is translated as a comeback here” this is how my friend from the camp at that time explained. From what I have heard from merchants there, it became a very casual habit to close their shops early at any day a “Wihdat / Faisali” game is scheduled in, as they know that if al Wihdat wins, crowds will be celebrating in the camp, and marching towards the police kiosks in a provocative slogans and cheers ending with a direct clash between the two parties, and their shops and goods will be damaged.

I was fascinated by the ability of this space to flip to the exact another side of the “normal” and turn into this exceptional angry space, where riots are violently breaking out and the next day, everything is back to normal again. People have found their way to adapt to the situation, and seemed to be a little bothered by it. Although the reasons behind each incident vary, they all hold in common the channeling of buried anger that doesn’t necessarily equal its cause.

Al Wihdat camp, although extremely integrated into the urban fabric, is absolutely not normalized yet and that is not only due to its dweller's attitude, but as well as the government’s. When asking camp dwellers to list the main landmarks in the camp they depend on for directions, for example for an outsider visiting, they anchored their descriptions on two main landmarks: first the centre of “shortet al badeyah” which is a special kind of police that is prepared for immediate intervention, which is located very close to the camp, and the police kiosk that is placed exactly at the main entrance of the camp, on the street that leads to the “Nadi” which is al Wihdat’s famous sports club and the main market. The very existence of “shortet el badeyah” that close to the camp

always emphasized its exceptionality and proves that the cautious attitude in this friend/enemy relationship is mutual. Interestingly when visiting the site I realized that “shortet el badeya” didn’t exist anymore, and the building was reused to function as a traffic department. Yet people still refer to that location in its old function, some because they got used to it, and some don’t even know it doesn’t exist anymore.

The existence of the police station directly at the main entrance of the camp states firmly that the people of al Wihdat are constantly monitored and under control. The four storey building, with four surveillance cabins at each corner, brought to my mind Foucault’s utopian vision of social control through Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon model of surveillance, in his book *Discipline and Punish* (Figure 4.5).

The panopticon model, which was suggested to improve the monitoring of prison inmates, proposes that building architecture should maximize the visibility of the prisoners while minimizing the labor of the wardens. Ideally, the prison would be circular and the watching tower would be centralized to maximize visibility. Moreover, the model suggests that the openings of this watching tower are covered with smoke glass windows, so that the prisoner are not able to know if they are watched or not, and as a result, the prisoners will monitor themselves. In Al Wihdat camp, I was able to understand from many narrated stories that during demonstrations or celebrations after a game is won by al Wihdat team, the existence of policemen watching from the observation balconies acts like a catalyst for things to escalate and people get more hostile. I here argue that the existence of this “surveillance” paranoid architecture at the entrance of the camp had a provocative impact on the camp dwellers rather than a disciplinary one. The emphasis on their exceptionality made people more aware of their abnormal situation and consequently made them more tense.

Figure 4.6: Police station as it appears from the camp



Source: The author, March 2017.


4.3.2 The camp within the city

Al Wihdat camp is the closest camp to Amman's earliest urban settlements, the Downtown. And since Amman was relatively a new city when it had to deal with the influx of thousands of refugees after 1948, it was certainly shaped by the existence of the refugee camps in its center. At the early years of its establishment, most of the people inhabited the valley in the center of Amman, and the earliest urban activities took place in the East / West linear strip created between two mountains. Later on, with due to the advancement of building technology and the availability of cars to locals, people started inhabiting the mountains, and the linear urban strip started sprawling into perpendicular directions along the mountains towards the north and south of the city center (Daher 2015).

It is possible to say that another force that dragged this expansion into these directions is probably the existence of two Palestinian refugee camps Al Hussein (at the north) and Al Wihdat (at the south). When people started moving outside of the camp due to the rapid demographic growth in the camp, they chose to inhabit the next open space beside the camp, but also the one closer to the city the center. The expansion of the city can be followed during the years 1953-2016 (Figure 4.7), and it could be noticed that the city started growing in the directions of south and north in response to the demographic forces in those directions, and after "filling the gap" it started extending beyond those camps and in the East/West access as well.

The integration within the city was facilitated through the close distance of existing urban development, as well as forces of commercial exchange between the downtown market, and the camp's market (Omar 2005). Also, due to the fact that Palestinian refugee camps were not closed camps, or fenced or marked by any means, I noticed that the adjacent new housing units acted like a fluid continuation of the camp towards the city, especially with having the same architectural characteristics.


Figure 4.7 : Amman city urban sprawl



Source: The author, based on satellite images from Royal Jordanian Geographic Center.

It is worth mentioning as well, that the existence of the refugee camps, and the neighborhoods generated around them on the east side of the city of Amman, have contributed to the labeling of this side of the city as a poor and uncivilized side, with its poor housing typology and high density. Where on the other hand, the west side of the city, is where more financially privileged people chose to reside in, either in modern apartments or villas (Figure 4.8). This leads to establishing troubling social criteria through the terms Western-Amman and Eastern-Amman. Although this division is purely notional, as there isn't even an actual definition of what is east and what is west, its consequence is quite realistic. It is undeniable that the Society in Amman is divided into two groups that live separately with minimum or no interaction (Abu thiab 2012).

Figure 4.8: Housing types in Amman city




Source: Department of statistics and Great Amman Municipality

4.3.3 Built environment in al Wihdat camp

The architecture of al Wihdat camp is indistinguishable from any other relatively poor neighborhoods in East Amman. However, the orthogonal grid dominating its layout, and the high density of the buildings within the camp borders strongly identifies its camp nature (Figure 4.9). As mentioned earlier, the camp started with single housing units provided for families, and later on, the development of these units was undertaken by the refugees themselves to adapt their housing units to their growing lives needs. The expansion of the houses was sometimes done at the expense of the allies between the housing units, and without consideration to open space, ventilation and other environmental issues. This resulted in very dense clusters with very narrow alleys that sometimes can only allow one person to pass at a time (Figure 4.10). Most of the houses have added a second floor after and sometimes a third after the consumption of the horizontal space, and these were allowed by the DPA as long as the building height does not exceed 15m.

Figure 4.9: Al Wihdat camp housing cluster (Aerial image)



Source: Google earth 2004.

Figure 4.10: Alleys in al Wihdat camp



Source: The Author, November 2015.

In 2011, a comprehensive survey was conducted in the 13 Palestinian refugee camps that resulted into descriptive statistics about the living conditions of the Palestinian refugees in the camp. This study was initiated by the Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA) and funded by the government of Norway and implemented by Fafo with the collaboration of the Department of Statistics in the Government of Jordan. A section of this study was dedicated to analyzing the camps' built environment and buildings typology (Tiltness and Zhang 2011). As this study reveals, most the Palestinian refugee camps share the same building characteristics: architecture that serves their needs with the available building resources and skills. Al Wihdat camp seemed to be one of the most developed Palestinian refugee camps, in terms of the building types and materials used. Regarding al Wihdat camp, the findings of the survey as shown in figure 4.11 indicate the development of its built environment to a permanent settlement. Most of the houses have developed to apartment buildings (Amara) or tradition houses (Dar) with durable materials. The average number of rooms in these houses are 2-3 rooms with minimal cases of larger houses, due to limitations on horizontal and vertical expansion.

The existence of the barracks and old houses that once characterized the temporary camp became insignificant.


Figure 4.11: Buildings types and materials in al Wihdat camp



Source: *Living conditions of Palestinian refugee camps 2011*, Charts by the Author.


The most common used material in the Wihdat camp is concrete blocks, covered with plaster only (Figure 4.12). Occasionally some houses cover their front elevation with a stone in a sign of good financial status. The openings in the houses are relatively small, in order to maintain a sense of privacy in the very crowded camp (Figure 4.12). And as most of the upper floors were added on different periods of time, the stairs usually is an independent structural element extruded from the main building space (Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.12: Typical building materials and openings



Source: The Author.

Figure 4.13: Typical construction method




Source: The Author

For gatherings and occasions, people usually use the relatively “wide” allies to celebrate, or the rooftops of their houses. Rooftops also serve as a substitute for the non-existent open space in the camp especially in summer time, where people spend more time on their rooftops at night to escape the heat. Also, refugees who most of them are originally farmers used the rooftops to plant their own vegetables and keep their goats.

In the survey conducted by Fafo, it shows that most of the houses are owned by their residents, and the rest are mostly rented. This shows that most of the camp dwellers pay or had to pay for their accommodation. Also, it shows that most of the residents didn’t receive any help in upgrading or renovating their houses from any source (Figure 4.14). Most of the initiatives undertaken were by the refugees themselves.

Figure 4.14: Tenure of dwellings and assistance received



Source: Living conditions of Palestinian refugee camps 2011, Charts by the Author.

This analysis of the physical environment of the camp indicates that Palestinian refugee camps, and al Wihdat camp in specific, have turned into actual urban squatters with permanent structures and durable materials, unlike any of the temporary characteristics associated with a refugee camp. And most importantly, that refugees were able to carry on with this development without any assistance.

4.4 MANAGEMENT OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT, BETWEEN PLANNING AND PRACTICE

When analyzing al Wihdat camp's built environment and its spatializations of resistance, it is important to approach the different stakeholders that contributed to the management of the camp space. The camp's current built environment is a result of the management strategies and policies adapted by different governmental and official institutes, with different political agendas, from one side. On the other hand, camp dwellers have created their own tactics and spatial behaviours to adapt and mitigate the imposed policies to their own needs and benefits.

4.4.1 Official and governmental strategies for managing the built environment

It was quite challenging at the early stages of this research to access a reliable database about Palestinian refugee camps, projects taking place in there, and find officials that would answer my questions. It took me almost two months back and forth between different institutes to get permissions and other information.

My requests were not problematic of any kind, what really prolonged the process was the uncertainty of each institute about its responsibilities and capabilities in the camp. Bouncing between the UNRWA, DPA (Department of Palestinian Affairs) and the Great Amman Municipality, several times, lead me to ask the question: Who actually runs the camp? Or as Al Hussein described it "The institutional management of temporariness" (Al Hussein 2011 , p.8).

Along the 70 years of the exile period, the key stakeholders in the camps have varied and the camp responsibilities shifted between the institutes. Each institute's operational and political underpinnings have influenced the development of the refugee camps in Jordan differently in the past, and probably that is the reason for the vagueness of authority in the present.

4.4.1.1 The UNRWA

Right after the Nakba in 1948, the UNRWA was established in 1949, and its temporary mandate by the UN General Assembly was extended on a three to five years basis.

UNRWA's services included housing, education, healthcare, as well as additional responsibilities, such as garbage collection, maintenance and the rehabilitation of the shelters. In addition to that it was UNRWA's responsibility to update refugee's families' records, and channel their needs and requests to UNRWA's central administration. The maintenance of the shelters aimed to maintain its temporary character, by constantly checking any improvements the refugees have brought to their houses and verify their conformity to the housing regulations decided by the UNRWA and the host authority. For example, these regulations prevented the addition of an extra floor initially, except for exceptional circumstances (Al Hussein 2011).

Although the Agency's facilities are concerned to cover registered refugees inside and outside the camp, only camps host the full range of services. Dependency on the UNRWA's services by the camp dwellers was significantly higher than non-camp dwellers, especially in the first years of the exile, where refugees were fully dependent on the Agency's aid and still is. For example according to a poll carried out by the Institute of Development Studies of the Geneva University and the Catholic University of Leuven in cooperation with the UNRWA in 2005, 85 percent of the camp children attended the agency's primary schools, in comparison to 36 percent of non-camp refugee children. This dependency has contributed to the attachment of the UNRWA to the camp (Al Hussein 2011).

Another key contributor to the enforcement of the Agency's identification of the refugee camp cause is that the vast majority of the Agency's staff come from the camp refugee community. Namely, in 2009, the staff of the UNRWA in Jordan included 119 international employees vs. 29,629 local employees (UNRWA 2009). It is fair to say these factors explain the political significance the refugees and the host authorities have ascribed to the UNRWA, where its existence in the camp is an associated marker to the refugee issue and its cause as well as a comforting sign to the refugees, about their exceptionality as un-normalised refugees in a host country.

This label ascribed to UNRWA, as well as the presence of the UNRWA camp services office, with the UNRWA's blue flag adorning all its facilities, have contributed to the conferring to the Agency the informal status of an "Alien governmental body holding extra-territorial sway over the camp communities" (Al Hussein 2009).

It is worth mentioning here, that even though people depend on UNRWA financially and morally, they criticize its reliance on the United States in its methods and action and reflecting its ideals, a country they consider the other face of the same coin of Israel. Some of them suspect that UNRWA is incorporated in a conspiracy against them through the falsification of statistics about the refugees (Palcamps 2017)

In the 1970's, 20 years after the exile, the Agency was compelled to gradually reduce its services due to mounting budget constraints. Educational acquisitions and medical equipment were delayed, as well as putting a limit for any additional employee's recruitment. For example, the UNRWA's average annual spending per refugee had fallen from 200\$ in 1975 to almost 110\$ today (UNRWA 1972). Now, this naturally lead to a deterioration in its social infrastructure, and its staff lost the authority and capacity required to maintain the enforcement of housing-related regulations.

This decline in the UNRWA's control over the camps in Jordan have led its headquarters to redefine their role as a "mere service provider". That was cleared by the statement of its Commissioner-General in 1972:

"In this statement there was an emphasis on "UNRWA camps" and on "relief", while correctly conveying an impression of the refugees' displacement from their traditional homes and of their continuing need for help, has also contributed to certain misconceptions. UNRWA provides services rather than administers "camps" [...] the "camps" are not extra-territorial areas under United Nations jurisdiction." (UNRWA 1972 , par. 2 ; 1975 , par. 22).

According to Jalal al-Husseini, this decline in UNRWA's role can also be attributed to more positive reasons. In the course of time, a new educated generation of camp refugees have managed to access local and Middle East market (Al Husseini 2011, p.11). These have left the camp for better living opportunities, thus reducing their material independence on UNRWA. Of course, many of those who left the camp were replaced by newcomers in need, and in conjunction with the reduction of UNRWA's services, this created a state of empowerment between the camp dwellers. They started engaging in self-help activities to develop their own built environment by improving their shelters and amenities. (UNRWA 1973, p.21) For example, Al Wihdat camp

dwellers took the initiative to establish “residents association” in 1969, to channel the camp needs efficiently to the stakeholders and undertake different community-based activities (Palcamps 2017).


4.4.1.2 A shared custody of the integrated extraterritoriality

As the UNRWA was handling the managerial tasks of the camp since its establishment till the 1970’s, the hosting government’s role was limited to maintaining law and order and providing UNRWA assistance when needed in conducting humanitarian missions. Therefore, the camps were left out from Jordan’s urban development policies at both national and municipal levels. Of course, camp residents themselves during that period were refusing any infrastructural improvement, as any of these would be interpreted into a permanent settlement in the host country (Al Hussein 2011, p.12). It took a whole ten years, from 1951 to 1961 of convincing and persuasion to replace tents with more durable shelters (UNRWA 1961), but not connected to municipal services.

Later in the early-mid 1960’s camps started to get integrated with municipalities public services (water, sewage, and electricity). And during the same period, main alleys were asphalted in the camp, giving it a mere image of a developed urban space (Destremau 1994 , p.93). Today, most of the shelters in Palestinian refugee camps are connected to municipal services, but camps are completely excluded from any municipal development plan (Al Hussein 2011). Al Wihdat camp, for example, falls under the boundaries of Great Amman municipality and is served by it, yet I was not able to find any information about the camp there.

Even when I was looking at detailed maps for the city of Amman, there was no significant marker for the existence of the camp. Land use plans extended on the camp area showing three types of buildings: Residential Housing type D, light industries and educational, completely un-matching the reality of the camp (Figure 4.16). I had to head to the Department of the Palestinian affairs to obtain an accurate map of the camp, yet the maps there only include the camp itself and nothing of the surroundings (Figure 4.15).

Figure 4.16 : Al Wihdat master plan Figure 4.15 : Al Wihdat DPA's plan



Source: Amman Great Municipality, Sep 2015.

Source: DPA, Sep 2015.

This exclusion of any local development has subsequently entailed a lack of any decent urban planning. UNRWA’s regulations were specifically designed to maintain the temporariness of the camp by keeping the boundaries of the camp un-extendable and plot size controlled and banning any vertical expansion. Such a strategy could not possibly work for prolonged periods of time. The explosion in the camp population naturally challenged these camps regulations. Neither the UNRWA nor the host authorities have ever endorsed the responsibility to develop a decent urban management policy for the camps (Al Hussein 2011, p.13). The hosting authority implicitly pointed out that its UNRWA’s responsibility to “build shelters and hand them to the Palestinian refugees” (DPA 2015). On the other side, UNRWA blamed the host countries’ neglect by stating that “*The host governments have not enforced adherence to urban planning and architectural guidelines in camps nor have they brought camp infrastructure to standard adhered to in non-camp areas. UNRWA has no mandate for and cannot enforce such adherence.*” (UNRWA 2004).

Meanwhile, the camp was left unguided with short-sighted strict building regulations and explosive demographic rates. This resulted in extreme high rates of density and

overcrowding (Al Hussein 2011). In order to portray a closer image, UNRWA numbers states that densities in the early camps in 1950's varied between 70,000 to 103,000 person per sq.km while in the emergency camps after 1967 the densities ranged from 34,000 to 69,000 persons per sq.km which are excessive in comparison to most overpopulated cities in the world such as Mumbai and Kolkata, where overcrowding figures claim fewer than 30,000 persons per sq.km (UNRWA 1955 ;1973).

These numbers directly indicate substandard environmental conditions and acute social problems. According to a survey carried out in Jordan camps in 2000, overcrowding is responsible for the transmission of many respiratory diseases, as well as forcing children to the streets, which consequently lead to many domestic problems and schools drop outs (UNRWA 2016).

Another result of this neglect was the refugee's unguided adaptation. People did whatever they had to for sheltering themselves without full awareness to their surroundings. Now some alleys in the camps literally allow one person to walk through. The absence of proper ventilation, sunlight and green spaces have put the camp and its residents into terrible environmental conditions. And once the horizontal space was "exhausted", people turned to vertical expansion, benefiting from UNRWA's inability to control the situation after having its authority declined (Al Hussein 2011).

4.4.1.3 The host authority

In comparison with the status of Palestinian refugee camps in other host countries, Jordan is by far the most involved hosting government in the refugee camps. This is understandable once the citizenship of the refugees is added to the equation. Moreover, with the need to establish a clear authority over the refugee camps' citizens, in 1975 the government took over many tasks that in other countries were stricken to UNRWA. It became directly in charge of maintenance and rehabilitation of camp facilities, expansion of the shelters, and other infrastructural works. It was an important phase not just to spread authority through the traditional way of forcing it, but to gain people's trust as well. The government publicly stated in 2004 that "They have come to accomplish – for humanitarian reasons - what UNRWA cannot do or what exceeds its financial capability." (DPA 2004 , p.77).

The management of the DPA to the camp built environment and structure could be described as flexible. It adapted the building regulations according to the refugees' evolving needs. Also adding an extra floor got allowed under several conditions, but one needs to go through a legal process to get approvals. Commercial buildings were even allowed to build extra two floors, as long as the extension doesn't exceed 6 meters. This flexibility could be somewhat a successful strategy to accustom camp residents to governmental work and process. The camp's political sensitivity influenced the method of management used. The DPA have not even taken any legal action to demolish illegal constructions unless it's a public safety hazard (Al Hussein 2011).

This relatively liberal attitude made the residents of the camps more comfortable and gave them a space to develop it, furthermore accelerated the urban development of the camps that are located within city boundaries such as al Wihdat and al-Hussein camps. Different types of shops opened and many family businesses nourished, turning the camp into affluent commercial areas (Hamarnah 2002 , p.180 ; Jaber 2002 , p.252). The camps that are out of the cities' urban sprawl were deprived of such development, still appearing isolated, poor and with little work opportunities.

This governmental flexibility made the refugees in the Palestinian refugee camps, despite its temporality, develop a sense of ownership to their shelters. This was seen first in the desire to improve their houses, then by selling and renting their shelters to newcomers, when the government allowed the land transaction. Also renting commercial spaces and shops, became a regular feature of the camp's dynamics. These informal transactions became officially registered in real estate offices located in the camps and require the approval of the DPA (Al-Hamarnah 2002 , p.182).

This commercial movement, with the city's booming real estate market, resulted in an increase of the actual value of the land. Al Wihdat camp became one of the most expensive places to rent a shop, as people from all over the city goes there to shop. The smallest kiosk in a main street in the camp generates a lot of money to its owner just by the amount of the passing buyers (Omar 2005 , p.2). The housing units' value in al Wihdat camp increased dramatically from an average of 3,000 in 1970 to 19,000 in 2007 (Al Hussein 2011 , p.17).

The prices of the housing units vary depending on its location and proximity from the main street. This played a key role in when the government decided to open a main street in the middle of al Wihdat camp around 2000. Once a little alley, it got expanded by demolishing parallel rows of houses and became a proper main street. This action required the persuasion and conviction of house owners by the camp's local committee. Those whose houses got demolished were paid a certain amount of money to substitute their loss, and those whose houses got exposed to the main street were content with such a decision, as that meant a direct increase in their house value.

Many of the people in Wihdat insist that the government opened this street to be able to access the camp easily, as a part of the conspiracy many are convinced in. However, they all seemed fine with it, unlike their reaction when the government decided to remove the unauthorized kiosks, where riots took place all over al Wihdat since this main street created new commercial opportunities for the camp.

In the 1980's the government of Jordan started a series of upgrade programs on several sites, however, none of them involved refugee camps. One of these sites was exactly the adjacent area of al Wihdat camp. A lot of refugees who had no place anymore in the camp, settled in empty lands near the camp, as it was considered a familiar space for them. These were in a very deteriorated living conditions, and the upgrade program which included infrastructural and housing development, have highly improved their conditions. This project will be discussed in further details later in this thesis.

The first time Jordan included the refugee camps in any national development program was after Jordan's Wadi Araba peace treaty that normalized the relations with the government of Israel in 1994 and many consider this treaty as the first official agreement to deny Palestinian refugees' right of return (El Khairy 2012). Jordan then announced an increase in its involvement in the camp affairs through article 8 in the treaty titled "Refugees and displaced persons". This section of the treaty acknowledged the *"massive human problems caused to both parties by the conflict in the Middle east"* and recommended to decrease this suffering *"through the implementation of agreed United Nations Programs and other agreed international economic programs concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement"*

(par.1 ; par.2.c Treaty of peace between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel 1994). In the years following the development programs to upgrade the living conditions, Jordan targeted the camps and the impoverished areas such as informal squatters and remote villages. The development program was named Economic and Social Productivity Program (ESPP) and it was concerned about the refugee camps' infrastructural conditions, with the involvement of a governmental agency: The Housing and Urban Development Cooperation (HUDC), that has been always alienated to camp issues. This program was applied through two sub-programs, the first was the Community Infrastructure Program (CIP), which was targeting to upgrade the camp's physical infrastructure by providing proper water systems, drainage, sewerage, footpaths and retaining walls when needed. The other sub-program was more concerned about the housing issue, Housing Projects for the Poor (HPP), by upgrading refugee's shelters that are in terrible conditions (Al Hussein 2011).

However, due to the camp's political sensitivity, the modalities of the intervention were widely affected. The scope of the upgrade was quite restricted due to the critical status of the camp and its residents, for example, no houses were demolished at all, and the house rehabilitation was just about adding an extra room or a kitchen. Social infrastructure was untouched. This method of addressing the problems, however, was not able to bring fundamental solutions to the camps' major problems such as the matter of overcrowding (Al Hussein 2011 , p.18).

One can assert that large-scale development projects might gain camp refugees' acceptance as long as they don't affect their right of return, and this consequently contributes to the policy shift. However, the political sensitivity of such sites, plus the financial burden could be reasons for holding this process back.


In a statement by the Greater Amman Municipality it was slightly hinted that Refugee camps will always hold a special significance that imply their distinction: "Although these camps are now permanent and well-established communities within Amman, they retain a distinct identity based on their origins, socio-economic conditions, land tenure status (land rental) and political organization (UNRWA administration)" (Greater Amman Municipality 2008 , Appendix 4).

4.4.1.4 Projects undertaken in al Wihdat area

In the section above, it is stated that different strategies have been adopted by different authorities in managing the built environment of the camps. Between strictness and flexibility, both authorities (UNRWA and DPA) had a common character, they didn't carry out any visible intervention in the camps. No buildings were demolished, no new buildings got built. Any update on the camps' built environment was undertaken by the people of the camp themselves, authority's role was limited to organize the process.

The same strategies were also adapted in al Wihdat camp, however, the government initiated a couple of projects in or in the adjacent areas of the camp. Below I will discuss three projects that were undertaken very close to al Wihdat camp and one in it. The projects are listed chronologically starting from East Wihdat development project in 1980, then Al Tayyibat shopping center in 1999, followed by the opening of Sumayya street in 2003 and the establishment of Ras al Ein bus station in 2016 (Figure 4.17).

Figure 4.17: Locations of the upgrade projects and their boundaries in al Wihdat



Source: Author, 2017.

And although these projects quite vary in scale and function, their significance lies under the camp dwellers contrasting response to each and the patterns of interaction with it. The following section represents the main keys towards the dweller's acceptance or rejection to such projects.


a. East Wihdat development project.

In 1980, the area adjacent to al Wihdat camp from the east side, separated only by an alley then, was occupied by around 500 refugee families, who were living in the worst conditions possible. The owner of the land was Circassian and had prohibited these families from any construction. This left no option for those families but to live in corrugated sheet barracks. Their shelters were overcrowded, 4 out of 5 families lived in only one room or two. There weren't any kind of services on the site. Water was brought by trucks to the people and for sanitation, families relied on pit latrines. The rates of poverty unemployment and infant mortality were alarming (East Wihdat upgrading programme 1984) (Figure 4.18).

This informal and illegal settlement was not the only one in the city. Such squatters compromised almost quarter of all new housing development across the city of Amman in those years of 1980's. That is when the Urban Development Department (UDD) set a plan to upgrade several sites and according to thorough assessment, east Wihdat was a priority (East Wihdat upgrading programme 1984).

The project was funded by the World Bank, the Jordanian government, and the Housing Bank. The land was bought from its original owner and was divided to allow the creation of 524 serviced plots, as well as a service land for 24 workshops and 58 shops (Figure 4.19). According to assessment surveys before the implementation, the residents showed a willingness to participate in paying to upgrade their site and that was an important factor in the success of the project (East Wihdat upgrading programme 1984).

Figure 4.18 : East Wihdat area before the upgrade



Source: East Wihdat upgrading program, Agha Khan Award report 1992.

Figure 4.19 : East Wihdat land use plan



Source: Source: East Wihdat upgrading program, Agha Khan Award report 1992.

In my interview with the head of the planning team, Arch. Khalid al Jayyousi (2017), he explained that the main challenge of this project was to gain the trust of the people, especially that the period when the project was initiated in 1980 was preceded by politically charged events. Jayyousi depicts how people felt and reacted in the beginning as such: *“People were thinking that they’ve been here for 20 years and no one cared, and now we are coming with surveys and talking about the big project in the area, it was hard at first”*.

But later on, when the UDD set its office in the area and started explaining the intentions of the project and negotiating different layouts with people, they became more excited about it. *“People were exhausted from their life’s circumstances and were eager to this opportunity”* (Al Jayyousi 2017).

Al Jayyousi (2017) said that the key component of this upgrade project's success was the public participation. The layout focused on keeping most of the families on the same plot where they survive/shelter. The main aims of this project were to demonstrate replicable measures to meet the growing demands of affordable housing and to keep the lowest cost possible. However, this didn't restrict the flexibility of meeting people's different needs and financial abilities. Plots varied in size and houses varied in types of construction and finishes. Payments were scheduled to suit each family's income in a way not to exceed 30 percent of their monthly income, with special consideration to the cases of hardships (East Wihdat upgrading programme 1984).

The people were engaged in self-help construction as well, most of the refugees were skilled labors before the exile and could work in different fields, and the UDD encouraged their participation. This project was a success by the standards of urban upgrade, and that could be told by the people's satisfaction after the implementation. They ended up with results they could never imagine after 20 years of miserable conditions (East Wihdat upgrading programme 1984). The transformation of the East Wihdat area can be depicted through the Figures 4.20, 4.21 and 4.22.


Figure 4.20: Aerial images before and after the upgrade



Source: Royal Jordanian geographical center, 2015

What's interesting about this project, isn't just being a successful urban upgrade project, it is how people response towards it. In my early visits to camp, I wasn't aware of this project at all. I would cross the street that marks the camp boundaries to the development area without sensing any difference. *"This is the camp, and this is the camp too"* one of the young men answered me once when I asked where does crossing this street leads to. People have acclaimed their ownership to their properties and announced it the camp as well. This became obvious during the interviews when I asked people to mark the boundaries of the camp as they perceive it. All the interviewees (From both Wihdat camp and development area) have agreed on the triangular shape that bounds the Wihdat camp with the development area. Not just the residents, many of the workers in both Greater Amman Municipality and the DPA got it that way. All the development area residents have introduced themselves as Wihdat camp dwellers as well. When I asked one of the young men about it, he explained that its "ayb" – a disgrace to say that. *"We are all one, it's like saying that you are not proud to be from al Wihdat"* (CD#7).

Figure 4.21: East Wihdat before and after the upgrade



Source: East Wihdat upgrading program, Agha Khan Award report 1992.

As the residents of the east Wihdat area are also registered refugees, they benefit from UNRWA's services such as schools and health care. However, UNRWA has nothing to do with the management of the development area in matters of services, cleaning and garbage collection. The development area is purely administrated by the Greater Amman Municipality. People are aware of this division but seem to drop it, as an unimportant information that doesn't change a thing.

In my interview with Architect Khalid al Jayyousi, I asked about the response of the camp dwellers themselves towards this neighboring upgrade project. My expectations were heading towards a state of rejection or complaint, as the camp dwellers don't own their plots. But on the contrary, Al Jayyousi explained that development project sparked a wave of self-improvement by the camp residents to their shelters. Also, the upgrade of the east side of al Wihdat defied its label as a slum area and encouraged people's interaction with it. The project had a positive return on the area as a whole and improved its interaction with the city.

Figure 4.22: East Wihdat after the upgrade



Source: East Wihdat upgrading program, Agha Khan Award report 1992.

b. Al Tayyibat Village

In 1999, the government built a project directly on the opposite street of al Wihdat camp from its west side. The project was called “Qaryet al tayyibat”, and was meant to function as a shopping center. The word “Qaryeh” means village, where al “Tayyibat” means the good things. This project was designed to imitate the cultural markets, with its shops and kiosks, but with a more organized shopping experience (CO#1 2016) (Figure 4.23). “*The project was one of the most beautiful projects I’ve seen*” one of the municipality workers described it. “*I don’t know why it didn’t work*” he added (CO#1).

Figure 4.23: Al Tayyibat Village



Source: Author, March 2017.

In the camp, the impressions about this project were quite the opposite. During my visits I had the chance to ask about the people’s opinions about this project, which helped me to gain an insight into that fact that the project’s location used to be a “Hesbeh” that means the main vegetable market, and the government had to relocate it to a more distant location to build the village. This seemed to be the first thing to anger the residents of the camp who were working in the “Hesbeh”. Others had the impression that this project is an attempt to replace the main “souq” market in al Wihdat, and that it would cause their incomes to decline. Those who had no business to worry on simply

explained that it was too expensive for them to shop from. *“This place is very fancy, it must have cost a lot, and to rent a shop there you must pay a lot, so what will the merchant do then? He will sell with higher prices! I’d rather shop at the market here, everything is cheap.”* One of the ladies explained (CD #5). Other women complained that it was too far away for them to go for shopping. *“My mothers and aunts refused to go there, as it is too far for them to walk”* one of the young men explained (CD #10), then he smiled and added, *“Though we all know it is not far at all...”*. The location was not only criticized in terms of distance, many explained that for those who work outside the camp, the bus drops them directly in front of the camp, they shop from the camp’s market and head home. As for the village being on the opposite side of the camp, heading there for their needs, then heading back to the camp just doesn’t make any sense as told by a young man *“My bus drops here... why go all the way there?”* (CD #11).

It seems to be agreed upon between all the camp dwellers to reject this project, each for his own reason. Some shops opened for three months and closed, others lasted until the end of the year. Furthermore, rumors started targeting this place as a drug addict’s hub, or that many immoral activities take place there, making people more reluctant to visit it. Eventually, that place got completely abandoned and did turn into a hub for suspicious activities (Figure 4.24). Nowadays it's locally called “Qaryet al Khabeethat” that means the village of the bad things.

Figure 4.24: Al Tayyibat village market



Source: Author, March 2017.

c. Sumayya Street

Another significant project undertaken in the Wihdat camp was in 2003 when the government took the decision to widen one of the narrowest and longest allies in al Wihdat camp. “Sumayya” street was an eight meters wide alley, behind the school's zone, that extends all the way from the northern camp edge till its end in the south. The government took the decision to extend the width of this alley to 20 meters and turn it into a main street to solve the traffic problems in the area and enhance the pedestrian’s movement (Addustour 2004) (Figure 4.25).

One of the interviewees (CD #11) explained how the project was initiated and how the camp dwellers reacted to it. *“I remember when the government wanted to undertake this project, official people were accompanied with camp representatives to convince people whose housing units will be demolished”*. Then he added: *“First we were very suspicious about this project because as you see it cuts the camp into halves, we all know that the government opened this street to be able to access the camp easily when*

needed, the narrow streets before didn't allow them to...". Those affected by this project were compensated financially, each according to his housing unit value (CO#1 2016).

Figure 4.25: Aerial Images before and after opening Sumayya St.



Source: Royal Jordanian geographical center, Sep 2016.


What is interesting, In my interviews almost all people I interviewed shared the same belief about the government's hidden intentions behind opening Sumayya Street, yet no one seemed to mind. On the contrary, people showed a good deal of satisfaction with this step and stated their support to similar upcoming projects. They affirmed how the camp became more accessible for services which made things easier for them, as many services provided refused to serve the camp earlier due to parking and accessibility issues (CD #11). Also, having a main street in the middle of the camp called for many commercial shops to open. Sumayya Street became a vibrant economic artery in the middle of the camp, with good traffic flow and consequently a good purchasing power (Addustour 2004). Those who were compensated were satisfied by moving to a new place. Those whose houses became exposed to the new main streets were satisfied with the rise of their dwelling value (CD #3). I was able to understand that al Wihdat people in general felt that this initiative was a step forward in the development of their camp.

When I asked one of the interviewees how did he feel about a new market developing just a few blocks away from the Wihdat's main market he answered: *"But it is all camp."*(CD #15). He explained to me how maybe ten years ago, this project would've been strongly opposed by the people of Wihdat, but by the time people started caring less about the government's intention and are *"searching for their own benefits."*

d. Ras al Ein Bus station

Directly in front of Al Tayyibat village, the project that got completely abandoned for its unsuitable location beside other reasons, Amman's Greater Municipality (GAM) established a new terminal bus station. On an area of 6 dunums, with a cost of 280,000 Jordanian Dinar, the mayor of Amman inaugurated this project in December 2016. Buses usually stop in the main streets or residential neighborhoods to carry or drop passengers. This project was designed to be a gathering spot for all these buses, where they line in specific locations, with signs that indicate their destination. By this, the GAM aimed to organize the traffic in the area and maintain the safety. In addition to eight bus lines, the project contains six kiosks for passenger's service, two health units and shaded areas for those waiting (Royanews 2016) (Figure 4.26).

Figure 4.26: Ras al Ein Bus station



Source: Author, March 2017.

When I was visiting the camp frequently, I used to either take a cab to get there or drive by myself. The main struggle with driving there is finding a parking spot. Most of the shop owners won't let anyone park in front of their shops unless s/he's a customer. One time, one of the locals gave me the directions to a place where I can park in easily because it is "empty". When I went there I realized that he gave me the directions to the new bus station, but he wasn't completely wrong about his information, it was empty (Figure 4.27).

Figure 4.27: Empty busses waiting at Ras al Ein Bus station



Source: Author, March 2017.

Although it has been months since the station was opened, none of the locals goes there to get on a bus, instead, all the buses remained picking and dropping passengers from the points they used to do so before. *“For (Jawwa), the buses wait in that alley besides that governmental high school, for (Al Kherbeh) you can take any bus stopping at the traffic light, for (Ras al ein) you can take the one on the traffic light but in the opposite direction, for (al Jeezeh) it's the next alley to the right but these only start coming after two o'clock ... “* (CD #2). This is how the whole traffic system in the area was

explained to me by one of the locals. They only use the station space for resting or waiting for other buses on the street to get full. Although there are no signs or any physical indications for their stops or destinations, the bus stops are commonly known to the people of Wihdat.

During my subsequent visits, I was determined into understanding the local's stance towards this project. However what was challenging about it in specific, is people's indifferent attitude towards it. Not that the people don't mind it, it is more like it didn't exist for them. *"Yes, they opened a station there... No, it didn't work"* one of the shop owners said indifferently (CD #2). Buses still stop at their exact old spots in the alleys or at the traffic light, Cabs line on street sides waiting for passengers, and the station is empty.

"The problem with the government is that they don't ask us when they initiate a project, we just wake up and find them working on something." One of the locals said (CD #2). But I heard from other camp dwellers who I interviewed, that there have been some attempts to discuss several projects with the locals. One man among the interviewees told that *"Many time the Mukhtar (the camp representative) came to us with some layouts, and we liked them, but we never heard about them after that."* (CD #11). According to GAM employee, the main challenge in development projects in that area is the compensations they have to pay for people whose property got damaged (CO #1). Furthermore, people are not only concerned about their shelters, in fact, many admit that they don't want to stay in their shelters anymore, but those whose main source of income is from the –jobs in the- camp, prefer staying in it regardless of its terrible conditions, and therefore refuse these projects as stated by a camp dweller: *"I live here in this shabby house, but I work on a kiosk here in al Wihdat, if I moved somewhere else I would lose my source of income."* (CD #11).

When the market project was imposed on the refugees and gave the impression that it would compete with their market, they were very hostile towards it and rejected it. However, when the upgrade took place in the east of al Wihdat, this enhancement was welcomed and promoted self-empowerment among the camp refugees. They also went to extend their "boundaries" to include this development area. As for the Bus station, people chose to simply ignore it. This manipulation of space and boundaries shows the

camp residents' very flexible yet very selective attitude towards what to include and what to exclude. In a very unusual situation, the camp itself who lies between the inclusion and the exclusion of the city practices the same selective behavior towards its surroundings.

4.4.2 Camp dwellers' place making tactics

In parallel to all governmental strategies to manage and control the built environment, refugees were creating their own relationships with the camp. Their bond and perception of the camp extended beyond any imposed character different authorities tried to create. Their attitude towards the camp is spontaneous and seized momentarily within its space that served as a tool of thought and action. In the following section, the camp dwellers relationship with the camp and their place making tactics are analyzed under three themes: Homelessness and Homecoming, camp as a familiar space and camp as a space of empowerment, based on the interviews conducted with them in al Wihdat camp.

4.4.2.1 Homelessness and homecoming

In my first visit to the camp, I went there with google maps and images to develop a sense of orientation while being on site. I memorized the names of the main surrounding streets, the subset streets, and main neighborhoods. That first time I was accompanied by a friend's acquaintance, who volunteered to take me through the camp. Mo'men were in his mid-twenties (CD #7), born and raised in the Wihdat camp, seemed to be able to navigate through the camp's alleys and narrow passages blindfolded. Yet whenever I asked him about a certain street he would pause a little and then apologize for not knowing the answer. I believe he had noticed the confusion on my face when this reoccurred couple of times, so he took the initiative to explain, *"look, we don't know the official names of the streets here, I once tried to send my location to my friend on Google and that was the first time I knew what my street was officially called"* he further went on explaining how do they map the camp *"this place we are in now is called Hay el sa'eqa (could be translated as: stun) because it was mainly occupied by the Fatah organization men, other neighbourhoods are named after the villages they came from, their occupation when they were in Palestine, this is how I know the camp"*.

He also continued to say “*this is al Wihdat camp, the government insists on calling it Amman new camp, why would they do that? no one calls it that*” he went on explaining that he felt that there’s a move to neutralize the area, stripping it away slowly from any national symbols or strong Palestinian labels.

Even in the streets many drawings and graffiti constantly drawn to hold memories to Palestine, he said that a lot of artists who were raised in the camp come back regularly and arrange initiatives to draw these graffiti after being washed out (Figure 4.28).

Gregory (2004) explains that Palestinians have retained memories from their old homes in all forms possible, from poetry to politics, and these retentions were profoundly spatialized not only in the sense of space of Palestine itself but in the most intimate micro-topographies of their homes, fields, and cemeteries (Gregory 2004 , p.88). According to Auge (1995), this framework of spatial resistance maintained with similar structures, names, and landmarks of Palestinian territories is a form of denying the appropriation of their lands and collective memories. Camps became places on which Palestinian refugees have reconstructed their Palestinian identity upon and made it a piece of home away from their origin.

Palestinians re-creation of their socio-spatial identity in the camps is derived from their desire to return, however, this as Farah discusses have negotiated a type of permanence. The camp became not only a place linked to an identity in the sense of origin but also a form of identity on the most micro-political level. This is where the dichotomy exists, between the home of marginalization (The camp) and the real home of empowerment (Palestine). This also where Drapac argues that the camps envelopment by the city hastens spatial blur while also amplifies the separation from the homeland (Drapac 2010 , p.1).

This assumption could be supported by the first impression taken when visiting al Wihdat camp. Its locations very close to Amman’s city center contributed to its integration within the city. Proximity facilitated economic and social interaction, which made its residence engage in daily life matters. From an outsider’s perspective, this camp would seem to be neutralized. That is why it could be noticed that for camps enveloped by the city, the definition of what home is, is blurring by time and

reproduced from generation to generation.

Figure 4.28 : Graffiti on the walls of al Wihdat



Source: The Author , September 2015.

Based on my observations in al-Wihdat camp and interviews, I can say that the old people who live in the camp, who have experienced living in Palestine and then in exile, insist on the notion that camp is temporary. They proudly embrace symbolic life choices to maintain their struggle and identity, such as traditional wear, meals, accent...etc. as a sign of their determination to return. However, the younger generations, who were born and raised in the camp have a harder time to maintain that connection to their homeland. Most of them hold on to memories that their grandparents passed to them, but their life experience revolves around the camp. They are still attached to their right to return, yet

they seem to have separated political ideology from the desire for a better living condition. The young people don't see a contradiction between choices they make for their daily lives, and their ideological attachment to Palestine and their right to return. One of the young camp dwellers (CD #10) answered when he was asked about his home renovation in the camp *"we need to stop lying to ourselves, I need to provide for my family decent living, till the matter is solved"*. Young generations now see that political movement as the route to change rather than the symbolic choices, in a way that guarantees the continuity of their life in the camp.

Parents still prefer to put their children in UNRWA schools, *"They know us, they know our culture, and they consider that"*, one of the moms explained (CD #5). Every morning there is a segment/ritual in UNRWA schools that students prepare talks about a certain village in Palestine. Mo'men (CD#7) told me that families living near the school always make sure to hear that segment/ritual, *"it is like their national anthem"* he explained. He told me that couple of times the school was in a hurry, so they send students to their classes without doing this segment/ritual and parents went crazy by that. The school received many complaints of what was considered a *"conspiracy"* against their identity and history.

Mo'men (CD #7) have just recently moved out of the camp with his family. He explained to me that he went through a lot of fights with his parents to convince them about moving. *"I love the camp, but for me, it was just not healthy anymore for a living."* He explained that he doesn't see that act as abandoning his right of return, but he does not find it relevant. He explained that his parents refused to leave the camp totally at first, *"people who live in the camp, don't know anyone outside"* he explained that all his parent's friends and family are very close to each other in the camp, and now in their new home, even in a close neighborhood, they feel lonely. His grandmother refused to leave with them, and that gave them an excuse to go visit the camp almost daily.

For a guy like Mo'men, he is both a Jordanian citizen and a Palestinian refugee, he is within the camp within the city, he is in the home he knows as the camp, and not in the home he belongs to, Palestine. Drapac explained this situation as hesitant (Drapac 2010 , p.3). He attests that permanent housing and better living conditions do not equate the

denial of the right of return. Social and infrastructural permanence could coexist with ideological temporality, therefore new generations reconfigure the identity in a dual approach rather than integral (Drapac 2010 , p. 3).

Even for older generations, Farah (2003) discussed that the Palestinian refugees nowadays are doubly isolated, firstly by being prohibited to go back to their lands and homes due to the Israeli occupation. And secondly, that most of their homelands are completely destroyed (Farah 2003 , p.192). Tragically, for older generations, the object of desire exists only in their memories, for them home is everything, yet it is now only an unrecognizable occupied territory. Sari Hanafi emphasizes the importance of knowing the desire of the camp dwellers to go back home to their villages after 50 years of exile (Hanafi 2007 , p.49). A questionnaire was conducted in 2003 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and found out that 40 percent of the refugees will not return if the family home in their original lands no longer exists. 50 percent believe that after the creation of the Palestinian state the right of return will be unforeseeably postponed (Hanafi 2007 , p.50).

National identity and the definition of home were re-described and nourished by the three generations that followed Al Nakba, while spatial permanence generated a sense of place to its occupants (Drapac 2010 , p.7). The flexibility in adjusting resistance strategies demonstrated in the post-emergency refugee camps made it possible to maintain the identity of the place in different forms.

4.4.2.2 Camp as a familiar space

Earlier in this section, it was discussed how the “temporary” status of the camp is derived from the desire of exiles to return to their homes. Accompanied with that desire, was their need to construct daily life routines in order to survive. This, however, negotiated a type of permanence to the camp. For those born in the camp and their children next, the camp was the only “physical” home they know. And although all of them agree on the fact that Palestine is their homeland, they most struggle with connecting themselves to its physical context, as all what they have about Palestine is merely memories or stories narrated by their families.

In my interviews with the camp dwellers and even in random conversations, it was easy to sense the emotional attachment people have affiliated with the camp. And this is not necessarily in a positive way only. Even people who went on criticizing the camp, or wanted to leave it, were still expressing their attachment to it. In fact, a sense of bitterness was accompanying their complaints, as if they were sad to do it, *“Al Wihdat is very beautiful, but the people ruined it ...”* a middle-aged woman from the camp explained in grief (CD #6).

This attachment to the camp could be classified into two categories, or sets of reasons, a pragmatic one concerned with their daily life practices, and another one more concerned about conceptual values. Although very interrelated and always connected to each other in the local narratives, each is derived from a different desire. The first reason of attachment is of a pragmatic character. People and the camp have been shaping each other for the past 70 years and naturally, their daily lives patterns have been shaped accordingly.

“My husband leaves for work every day, I go to buy groceries and sometimes visit my sister who lives nearby, my kids go to school, and we all come back for at lunch time, we do everything walking here, my husband doesn’t worry about us, and I don’t worry about my kids, everyone knows his way.” Basma, a mother of three kids in the camp explained (CD #5). Walkability is a very important aspect in the camp, and it’s what made it favorable for many to live in. Due to the poor financial conditions for most of the camp residents, a car is not an option. Even public transportation fees could create an added financial burden on some families, not to mention the anxiety accompanied with the notion of women and children taking public transportation alone, in a relatively conservative community.

The main market, which is almost in the middle of the camp, the UNRWA schools, the “Awda” health care center and the Bashir Hospital, represent all what camp dwellers need in their daily life activities. Having them all within a walking distance is an advantage no one easily would give up. *“My husband was offered a house by the ministry he is working in a couple of months ago, we had to think a lot about it, moving out would mean more expenses, after a lot of thinking we decided to decline the offer”* one of the housewives in the camp explained (CD #5).

Besides the proximity of services, the close ties between the camp residents have created this warm ambiance between them. Camp residents know their neighbors by name, they can easily tell who is from the camp and who is an intruder. Basma was explaining how it is never a problem for her to go shopping in the market *“Everyone there is known by name, no one dares to disrespect me, I don’t like shopping from outside al Wihdat, I don’t feel comfortable”* (CD #9). Everyone in al Wihdat has at least one relative there, and this seems to make life easier for them. There were many stories about how they always gather for food or tea, and how it is always easy to find someone to keep an eye on the children when needed. Whenever a problem happened the elders gathered and solved it. One of the young ladies in the camp added: *“family here is what keeps us going in this camp”* (CD #13). The refugees in al Wihdat re-arranged their spaces according to their previous social construct, families from the same original villages occupied same districts, which made life pattern in the camp similar to their previous lives in Palestine. However, there was a general agreement that things now are not that same, and this bond has weekend by time.

Many of the stories narrated were addressing the hardships people faced when they left the camp. *“Who lived in the camp, knows nothing outside the camp.”* one of the young men told me (CD #11). The camp is very familiar for its residents, they know it step by step, and for them, the city too big to absorb.

The other reason for this attachment holds a more conceptual value. For people who had suffered so much with the exile and its consequences, I was expecting a negative perspective for the camp’s history by its dwellers, but this was not the case. *“The camp represents many beautiful memories for me, everything was pretty in the past, even the food we made, of course, there were problems, but there were always solved by the elders. I spent all my childhood playing between the allies of this camp and now that I’m married and have children, they’re doing the same, we had good times you know...”* Basma added (CD #5). Most of the interviewees have described their history in the camp as beautiful days, occasionally they would speak about the hard times they encountered, but they return to emphasize on their good memories. The older generation who lived in Palestine before 1948 and witnessed the exile have a well-constructed image about their lives before and after, memories about their lands and villages remain

present in their narrative and therefore have a space for comparison. But those who were born exiled have seen nothing but the camp. All their memories about their homelands are second-hand experiences narrated to them by the elders. For them, the camp is where their own experiences were made. Naturally, people develop such an attachment to the only place they knew, regardless of its positives or negatives, because this is what makes them who they are. When I asked people to narrate their favorite memories about living in the camp, I was aiming for personal experiences they encountered, but instead many of them narrated stories about how trucks used to come to the camp and all people donated food and blankets from their own houses and shipped it to the west bank. Others narrated how during the Gulf war they auctioned some stuff and used the money to send power generators to Iraq. There was a sense of determination among the people to prove that the camp is a “giver” rather than a poor recipient. The camp’s collective memory made people proud, and that contributes to their continual attachment to the camp.

4.4.2.3 Camp as a space of empowerment

The Palestinian refugees in camps are persistent on their attachment to the camp, even after they leave it. The camp identity allowed them to express their cultural identity the way they imagined it. *“We used to feel strong in the camp, when we said we’re from Wihdat it rings a bell!”* a 35 years old camp dweller explained (CD #5), while he went on repeating the story of how they sent aid to the west bank. *“When we used to introduce someone as mukhayyamji (son of the camp), this immediately draws respect to him, he is a man who went through a lot and remained strong!”* he added.

After the Palestinian diaspora, where many villages and families got scattered across different host countries, it was an urge to those sharing this catastrophe to come together and unite under one identity, and it was the camp. It was their imagined community that can be defined as identification to a certain national identity (Anderson 2006 , p.3) that they took their place in, not as stateless fragile recipients, but as strong resistive entity. Anderson argues that this is what persuades the individuals to sacrifice their lives and fight for conceptual causes, such as pride or borders (Anderson 2006 , p.3). That is why many of the camp residents, especially the new generation express their nationalism in

attachment to Palestine, through the camp... and sometimes unintentionally to the camp even more.

Also, Anderson stressed on another crucial element regarding the nation, and that is that they “should exhibit historical continuity in terms of affinity with dead generations one has never met.” (Mackenzie 2010 , p.9). In the context of the camp, heroic stories are always told proudly and are passed from generation to generation.

The announcement of Al Wihdat camp as a republic earlier by the PLO demonstrates the creation of this nation within the Jordanian state. However, in this case, where the nation did not equal the state, it leads to the political conflict known as the Black September. The PLO were deported from Jordan and the “nation” was conceptually dismantled. However, James C. Scott’s *Hidden transcripts* (1990) he discusses the assertion that those left in no power are then forced to maintain a defensive stance of subservience, showing humility and respect in the presence of the powerful. On the other side, the hegemonic state is expected to emphasize its power in the public sphere, to continue its statement as being in control of the subordinate (and that is represented in the existence of the Badeyah police and the police station in the camp). He described these contrasting behaviors and languages as “hidden transcripts” where “*every subordinate group creates ... a hidden transcript that represents a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant*” (1990 , p. xii). These hidden transcripts represent the different forms of resistance that takes place in the refugee camps. However, it is important to mention here, that for Palestinian refugees, the resistance wasn’t only towards their exile, but also an attempt to defend their “imagined” nation in al Wihdat.

These hidden transcripts are the tactics demonstrated by the people of the camp in the practices of everyday life. As Michelle de Certeau (1984) states, they are in their daily productive and consumptive activities that they do repetitively and unconsciously. Such practices were not planned or studied but rather spontaneously improvised by individuals and implicitly approved among them. As described by Andrew Blauvelt (2003): “*Tactics are defensive and opportunistic and seized momentarily within space*”.

Such tactics were needed to preserve their space and draw energy to uphold their national displacement. That was achieved through challenging camps' socio-economic marginality and foster its integration into the larger space of the city Amman. After being politically marginalized as a result of the 1970 events, instead of shrinking on itself, Al Wihdat camp opened the doors of interactions with the city in many fields, establishing itself as a strong economic district that is targeted by many, the real estate market is a conclusive evidence to that.

These everyday practices contribute to the establishment of social spaces that are social products of the people's culture and ideologies. According to Henri Lefebvre's theory of "social production of space" (1991), these spaces serves as a tool of thought and action, where people can redefine their "nations" in different narratives and scripts.

In al Wihdat camp, it is apparent through people's narrations that, they hang on to two spatial products for their pride and empowerment. The camp's main market (the souq) and the Wihdat sports club (al nadi) are the two landmarks in the camp that everyone constructs their spatial perception of the camp upon. Their landmark feature does not only originate from the central location, it was evident that people express pride when they mention them. These two facilities existed since the establishment of the camp but took a whole different dimension later on. They became more than spaces that serve the pragmatic function designated to but extended to become markers of the Palestinian identity and play a key role in the social, economic and political dynamics of the camp.

A. Al Wihdat's main market.

"Of course you visited the market here in the camp, if you didn't you should!", a middle age woman I was interviewing said (CD #44), and when I asked her about the goods they sell there she proudly stated: *"Everything you need is here, just like Amman's market... even better!"*. This is how most of the camp residents describe the camp's market, besides the endless stories about how people searched for a certain product in many markets and was able to find it only in al Wihdat. The freshest vegetables, the latest fashions, best quality, and prices, is what made the market so popular not only with the camp's residents but also for the neighboring areas.

When entering the camp for the first time, I only felt like entering a huge urban market, and this made me wonder if anyone actually lived here. Directly after the police station on the main entrances, shops align on both sides of the streets, with another row of kiosks lining in front of them making the street even narrower. Merchants are shouting to advertise their goods and try to persuade you to buy. At each intersection, shops continue to spread through the allies endlessly and the features of the building are impossible to recognize as they are all covered with shops signs that mostly carry names affiliated with Palestinian nationalism (Figure 4.29).

Figure 4.29 : Al Wihdat camp shopping allies



Source: Author, February 2017.

At the third intersection, the street seems to widen up introducing the main Wihdat market (souq) and the yard in front of it. The market used to be just like the yard, an open space where kiosks line and sell goods, but later on, part of it got covered in corrugated sheets, for durability, and the kiosks in it took a more permanent condition. When stepping into the covered market all the hassle outside seem to even more concentrate due to dimmed lighting and poor ventilation (Figure 4.30). When the market space meets with the housing units aligned at the edge of the yard, it continues to sprawl

between its allies, with its corrugated sheet roofing. As main market space branches into other sub allies, in a maze-like layout, people seem to know their way just fine.

Figure 4.30 : Al Wihdat main market's plaza




Source: Author, February 2017.

The UNRWA's land use plan of the camp still shows the market as the central yard space only, yet in reality, the market has spread to cover almost the first half of the camp. Most of the residential housing units are turned into shops and workshops by its owners, and only some of the second-floor houses are occupied. *“But it is very inconvenient to live in this part of the camp, as you see it is very noisy here, and on holidays it is even worse, it is very expensive to rent a shop here, but very cheap to live in, because no one wants to live here”*. Most of the families left this part of the camp, leaving it for the poorer group of the camp or foreign newcomers.

It is important to distinguish here, the Wihdat market (Figure 4.31), and the Wihdat area in general. As the market kept sprawling between the allies of the camp, it extended to the opposite side of it and to its adjacent area (Figure 4.32). As one of the middle aged


men in the camp explained: “we consider it all al Wihdat because it originated from it, this whole area is active because of the main market, and these shops are just a continuation of it... therefore it’s Wihdat.”(CD #2).

Figure 4.31: Al Wihdat camp land use map



Source: DPA, Sep 2016.

Figure 4.32: Al Wihdat camp land use as perceived by the author



Source: The author, April 2017.

As mentioned earlier, the political marginalization the camp suffered was actually resisted by integrating the camp in the city space in different fields. This integration was not aiming into blurring the camp into the city, instead, it worked on strengthening the camp economically, enabling it to uphold to its national identity. Being powerful economically pressured the authorities to negotiate rules and decisions with merchants

instead of just opposing them. The market gave the chance for the subordinate to challenge the authority in a non-political context.

Also, the market, although being a space for commercial exchange, was used as a space for expression as well. An example of that is “Souq al Deffatein” which can be translated as “the market of the two banks”. This popular market is located in front of the main market space in the camp, a three storey building that people can go inside and shop mainly for clothing. The story behind this name goes back to King Hussein’s decision to disengage the West Bank from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan sovereignty in 1988. A time where camp residents were suppressed politically but were able to state their rejection of this disengagement by naming one of the largest shopping buildings in the market “The two banks”, in an attempt to express the unity between the Palestinians on both sides of the river.

The market, allowed the residents of the camp to defeat the typical stereotyped refugee camp image, and empower their Palestinian identity through it. It enhanced their pride with their “Imagined Nation” and allowed them to continue expressing their political thoughts through different languages of communication.

A. Al Wihdat sports club (Al Nadi)

During my interviews with camp residents, I was asking them to give directions to their houses, and state the main landmarks they use to introduce a newcomer to the camp. Al Wihdat sports club, or “Al nadi” was directly brought up in such context, “*directly after the Nadi*” or “*once you passed the Nadi you go...*” are sentences constantly repeated by the residents. It seemed through their descriptions that all the directions are given after locating the “Nadi”, and the Nadi’s location is known by default.

The interesting thing about this is that the Nadi's building isn't much of a landmark, nor an apparent one in the camp. In fact, in my first visit to the camp, I wouldn't have noticed it without my friend pointing out to it saying: "This is the Nadi". As mentioned earlier, directly after the police station at the entrance of the camp, commercial shops align on both sides with many kiosks in front them, between these crowded shops, the green gates of Al Wihdat sports club stands open, with a sign at the top holding the name of Al Wihdat Club, In Arabic and in English, and its logo. Although from the top view of the camp, the club space is very present with its large scale among the small housing plots, from street view doesn't reflect this presence, making it hard for a newcomer to distinguish the camp's sports club (4.33).

Figure 4.33: Al Wihdat club entrance (Left) and top view (Right)



Source: Author, Sep 2016.

Source: Google earth, 2017.

From what I understood from people in the camp, that the club space used to be directly opening to the street, but years later it shifted to the back, allowing some space for shops. The dominant image of the club in the street elevation years ago is still present in their memories and could be one of the reasons why they still consider it an obvious landmark in the camp space.

Another reason for this consideration is due to its moral value, and to what it represents to people of al Wihdat. Al Wihdat sports club is extremely popular between the camp residents, and between Palestinians in general, and among all the things camp dwellers would disagree on, Al Wihdat club is the only exception.

During my field work in the camp, I was trying to schedule my visits in various times and parts of the week, in order to witness as much camp activities as possible. My very first visit was on a Friday morning, where in Jordan, just like the rest of Arab countries is a weekly holiday. The schools were closed that day, so many children were out on the streets, either playing or buying groceries with their fathers and making breakfast before heading to the Friday's prayers. The scene was quite amusing as it was almost impossible to see a kid not wearing the official Wihdat club t-shirt. Green was all over the place and the excitement was apparent on these children's faces. *"These children just like us before were waiting for the whole week to wear this on Friday, and on game days, children and adults are wearing them. If it was socially acceptable my mom would've worn one too."* Momen, a young man from the camp explained to me laughing (CD #11).

The Wihdat football club was established in 1956, as a by-product of the UNRWA's youth centers that promoted physical activities. It had a very modest start, as a space for cultural, social and sports-related activities. The headquarters were functioning as a day care and a restaurant in the morning, and a football club in the afternoon. It was also culturally active through a magazine called "The Wall", and this magazine was displayed in other refugee camps, including some in the West Bank. Also, Al Wihdat club was responsible for organizing Al-Quds (Jerusalem) festival that celebrated Palestinian culture within the camp every year. The club continued to run these activities until the Black September events, where most of these activities were banned and many other Palestinian institutions were closed as well. While very few of them got re-opened in the last years, Al Wihdat club was the only consistent institution that remained opened through these years. The camp had endured a lot along these years and given that many institutions in it were exiled or destroyed, the Wihdat Club's perpetual presence became a symbol of Palestinian nationalism and resistance to the marginalization policies.

It was common that other refugee camps have football teams as well, and they used to play against each other, in semi-official games. In 1975 al Wihdat team got promoted to the Jordanian Premier League and began to gain huge success and popularity. This success was seen in sold out tickets when other teams had struggled with drawing attendance. In 1980 al-Wihdat team won its first championship against its rival team “Al Faisali”, a team known to represent Jordanians from the East Bank side, and it was legendary. Al Wihdat team gained interest from Palestinians inside and outside Jordan. With the absence of proper management to Palestine’s national football team and the discriminative policies, they get subjected to by the Israeli government, it was not able to reach its full potential. Nevertheless, with the constant heroic winning of al Wihdat team, it gradually became the team of Palestine, and supporting al Wihdat was a sign of one’s Palestinian-ness.

Al Wihdat team symbolism

“Al Wihdat watan” is a constantly repeated sentence by the Wihdat team fans, which means: Wihdat is a homeland. This perfectly describes the affection, residents have created towards their sports club, and how they project their imagined nation on it. Through al Wihdat team, people of the camp created a collective experience of national sentiments and emotions that allow the creation and the enhancement of their identities. The Wihdat team represents a unifying force that all parties and age groups agree on, and that was important to have in the camp to constantly restore the Palestinian Identity and culture that is perceived as being demolished by the Jordanian authority.

Al Wihdat team holds many symbolic values to its people, it was this story that kept on being repeated by the Wihdat fans that illustrate what the team meant to them. After the Oslo agreement, the peace process allowed the Wihdat team to cross the borders and play against West Bank and Gaza team, in the West Bank. Tuasted’s book (1997), the vice director of al Wihdat team Sobhi Ibrahim narrates his experience:

“When we arrived to play in Hebron, it was a magic moment. There were people everywhere; 40,000 must have been around, ten time’s capacity of the ground. When our players entered the pitch, they gathered around the central circle. Then they kneeled. As they kissed the earth, people cried.” (Tuasted 1997 p. 114)

This moment is very significant because it was a team of refugees from a refugee camp going back home. This gave all others the hope that maybe one day they will go as well. This symbolic “Awda” or homecoming made people get more attached to the Wihdat team because it made them feel more connected to their homelands. This has also strengthened the pride people held for their Palestinian nationality. Whenever they go, al Wihdat team is given a very warm welcome because of what they represent, and that helped to raise more awareness for the Palestinian cause.

“Do you think my mom knows any of the players? Do you think she knows who Ra’fat Ali is? She is a very simple woman, she knows nothing about football! Yet she celebrates whenever they win, and when they lose I find her at home crying!” a young man told me (CD #14), and he was specifically referring to games against al Faisali team. This old woman just like many others in the camp associate the winning against al Faisali as a payback to the Black September events, and the loss to the many defeats they have endured as Palestinians. For them, it is more than football. This could be fairly noticed by comparing the camp residents’ reaction when the Wihdat team wins against Faisali, and when it wins against any other team. The celebrations are incomparable (Figure 4.34). I mentioned earlier in this thesis the type of celebrations accompanied with such an event, were marching towards the police station has become a ritual to parade the victory and claim part of their lost nation back. I asked one of the young men in the camp jokingly if the police station didn’t exist, where would they march to? And my question seemed to worry him, he paused for a while and then tried to answer jokingly as well *“we will not march then”*(CD #14).

The Wihdat team that was originally defined by the camp became an essential marker in the camp space, and people use it to define their camp space upon it. This is evident by the camp administration’s insistence on keeping the club’s headquarters in their same original location in the camp, even if financially they can afford moving out to a more modern or prestigious building.

Figure 4.34: Al Wihdat club fans



Source: <http://wikimapia.org/29711095/ar/>

Al Wihdat team's role in politics

“One day when we had no voice, al Wihdat was our voice” (Tuastad 1997 , p.105), a statement for Yasser Arafat, the former leader of the PLO and the president of the state of Palestine later, recognizes al Wihdat club as a political voice through the hard times of the camp. Dag Tuastad in his book *“The Political Role of Football for Palestinians in Jordan”* (1997) claims that now Palestinians have integrated into the Jordanian community and Al Wihdat as a political arena became redundant. However, it is constantly proven that camp residents remained using the club as a platform to channel their political ideologies through, especially after being the only outlet available.

Many stories narrated by the camp dwellers on the political role the club played during critical times. During the Gulf war, for example, the club adapted the available space and turned its offices into a field hospital to aid wounded soldiers, they also started raising money from the refugees to send electrical generators to Iraq. This not only shows the social responsibility and the influences the club has on its members, but also

a continuation of the political ideology the PLO adapted in support for Saddam-al Hussein, the president of Iraq.

Also, the club was used to transfer political expressions and rejections against Jordan's normalization policies with Israel. After the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel was signed, al Wihdat refused to play against an Israeli team during their visit to Jordan on a goodwill tour. This bold statement was to deliver the message of displeasure both towards the Israeli team and the Jordanian government because when a team under the Jordanian football association refuses to play against an international team, this is often seen as an embarrassment to the government (Mackenzie 2010 , p. 40).

The club stands firmly for its political principle and refuses to negotiate. Directly after entering the club, the flag of Israel is drawn on the floor, allowing everyone passing to step on, as a statement of rejection and insult to the state of Israel that got them to camp in the first place. Although this is a considered a crime by the Jordanian law, and whoever does it gets charged of insulting a neighboring country, club members didn't seem to hesitate to draw it over and over again, whenever it gets worn out (Figure 4.35).

Figure 4.35: Al Wihdat club interior



Source: <http://wikimapia.org/29711095/ar/>

Till now, with Palestinian symbols being banned from the public, the matches work as a vehicle for the political ideology of camp residence and its resistance. This becomes apparent in the chants they use to speak their minds and say what they are not allowed to say in the everyday life and express forbidden attitudes without being persecuted. That's because football stadiums present perfect platform for such expressions with a level of anonymity for the messenger, while the message is publicly delivered.

Such acts demonstrate the different forms of resistance that could take place in a refugee camp, through different spatial representations. These methods are quite effective in the cases where power is used to maintain the status of subordination, as claimed by Scott (1990 , p.137) “ *a veiled discourse of dignity and self-assertion within the public space transcripts ... in which ideological resistance is disguised, muted and veiled for safety's sake*”. The Wihdat uniform worn by the camp residents is a perfect example of this muted, open resistance.

However, it is very important here to state another point of view regarding the political aspect of Al Wihdat football team. Luigi Achilli (2013) argues that the representation of the camp residents lives solely framed in terms of the political resistance against authorities, reduces everything in their lives into the one-dimensional depiction of Palestinian refugees living in camps. (Achilli 2013 , p.2) Where politics actually shape many aspects of their daily lives, football, with its lucid dimension and fun side, allows the camp residents to navigate the ambiguities of their lives as normal citizens. He proposes that football provides the flexibility they need to live in the duality of being both a Jordanian citizen and a Palestinian refugee.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this thesis, the issue of the exile and refugee's lives away from home was discussed through several theoretical frameworks, in order to develop an insight/understanding into the camp and refugees behavior. Later on, al Wihdat camp was taken as a case study and analyzed from different angles, to evaluate the life in the camp with all its implications, according to established understanding, almost 70 years after its creation. The no longer temporary settlement have surpassed the imposed planning policies and created its own integrated socio-economic in-city urban squatter, challenging the marginalization forces it was subjected to, and establishing itself as an active partner in the economics and the culture of the larger space of the city. Along with this thesis, it was shown how refugees learned to operate within the restrictions of their context and how to express resistance in non-political contexts, in preservation of their identity, and dignity. Al Wihdat, the once humanitarian space for those weak and in need, have defied many preconceptions about how a refugee camp operates and represented itself as a resistive and strong entity.

In this chapter, the findings of the research on AL Wihdat Camp are discussed in reference to the main objective of the thesis: discussing the role of resistance in camp's narrative and its impact on camp's spatial development after 70 years. It might be possible to reflect on current urban planning policies for Palestinian refugee camps and to make future prospects for Syrian refugee camps. Within that scope first I will discuss why 70 years later, al Wihdat is still to be a refugee camp. Then the thesis concludes with recommendations for managing the built environment in al Wihdat and future prospects.

5.1 70 YEARS LATER, WHY IS IT STILL A CAMP AND WHAT IS THE LIMIT OF AN EMERGENCY STATE?

If most of the Palestinian refugees have been given Jordanian citizenship, and at least in principle, have equal rights and duties to Jordanians; if most of the refugee camps have turned into permanent urban squatters and are totally integrated, then why 70 years later, al Wihdat, is still a refugee camp?

This question is not only peculiar to Palestinian refugee camps, it relates to the concept of “temporary” refugee settlements as a solution and opens the discussion to define the limits of an emergency state, in a hosting country. According to the UNHCR, out of the 65.3 million displaced person, only 201,400 have managed to go back home. (UNHCR , 2015 , p.3) As architects, planners and policy makers, we should be aware of such facts and enforce common sense to the present and provide sustainable solutions that satisfy all stakeholders.

To be able to discuss new approaches, one should realize and understand the factors that extend the state emergency in a refugee camp. I will discuss these factors through the findings of Al Wihdat refugee camp analysis.

5.1.1 Politics

Of course, the topic is highly political and probably politics is the main drive behind refugee hosting policies. Previously in this thesis, it was discussed why having Palestinian refugee camps is favorable for both the government and the refugees. As after the 1948 war when many Israeli politicians started explicitly calling for the solution of “alternative state”, that suggested Jordan becoming a state for exiled Palestinians, this proposition caused chaos between the native Jordanians, and the Jordanian government stated many times its rejection to such a solution.

Keeping the camps as temporary institutions is a constant evident for the rejection of this solution from the Jordanian government side. From the Palestinian refugee’s side, giving up the idea of the refugee camps symbolizes giving up their right to return home. And although 70 years later they are still residing in camps in Jordan, and their villages

and homes are becoming more distant, the idea of giving up on their right to return is a taboo.

When refugee camp becomes associated with such a political decision, its life span and people's attitude towards it become completely different. The camp concept extends beyond the humanitarian and the choice to reside or leave the camp becomes more of a political choice rather than a pragmatic one. This perfectly explains why during my interviews, most of the Palestinian refugees preferred the camp solutions for exiled refugees. This behaviour contradicts with for example the Syrian refugee case where according to various studies their integration doesn't imply such a political burden. Therefore, the nature of the conflict should be taken highly into consideration when proposing durable solutions for refugees, instead of standardized ones.

5.1.2 Economics

UNRWA's existence in the Palestinian refugee camps now, although serves for the political reason mentioned above, also assures the financial responsibilities it holds towards the camp and the refugees. Although the UNRWA's role has declined from an administrative one to a mere service provider due to political issues, its role as a service provider was constantly emphasized by the Jordanian government due to huge strain on national sources. For Jordan, that is relatively a poor country, the existence of an outsider institution to provide services for these refugees is essential.

UNRWA is not only responsible for public services such as healthcare and schools, it also offers thousands of Jobs for Palestinian refugees in its varied institutions. Without UNRWA's services in the camps, public schools will have to deal with the influx of thousands of students into its system, the government will be responsible for providing jobs for thousands of young men and women and not to mention the expenses accompanied with managing the built environment of these urban squatters. Because the existence of an aid agency is attached to the existence of the camp, refugee camps' emergency duration get extended, even when the emergency doesn't exist anymore. According to my study in the camp, people were not opposing the transfer of UNRWA's responsibilities to the government as long as it provides the same standards. This shows that refugees stopped attaching political significances to the UNRWA, and

its existence now is purely serving to the government's political and economic agenda. Hence, it is possible to claim that the economics of the hosting country plays a key role in the extension of emergency state in refugee camps.

5.1.3 Identity

If hypothetically, the Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan held neither a political statement nor an economic burden, would people still urge to keep their space as a refugee camp? Many scholars agree on the fact that Nakba can be defined as *“the shared trauma of 1948, which all still had to come to terms with, cemented and universalized a common identity as Palestinians”* (Khalidi 2010 , p. 194). This definition could extend and cover the identity cemented in refugee camps as camp dwellers.

It was discussed earlier how individuals of al Wihdat who shared common circumstances of exile and then marginalization were enticed to conceptualize themselves as part of a broader community and to take their roles in an “Imagined” nation of their creation. The identity they created through the camp was translated into daily practices, activities, and spaces that serve as a tool of thought and action/practice. Therefore the defensive stance refugees exhibit when it comes to their camps, is, in fact, an act of preserving and empowering their identities, their “imagined” nation in al Wihdat. The market and the Wihdat sports club serve as an example for these social productions, and the rejection of projects that seems to compete with them is an example of their resistance.

So in answer to the question above, it is most probable that people will still consider themselves part of the refugee camp, even if all the operational and administrative aid agencies stopped existing. The camp's collective memory have not just influenced the social and spatial aspects of their lives, but also became a part of who they are, something cannot be easily stripped off from those who endured a lot already. The past 70 years have proved the failure of the attempts to suspend identities and ideologies behind the border, and that people will always create their tactics and hidden transcripts to reconstruct their identity.

However, I strongly believe that this won't be problematic if approached in the right manner. The camp, with its strength and resilience, can be seen as an economic and

socio-cultural drive if utilized rather than excluded. Al Wihdat is a place with high potential, skilled labour, and thriving economy and would offer a lot if approached as a site of opportunities and partnership. Empowering refugees creates trust and a feeling of worthiness that is much more sustainable and fruitful than excluding and marginalizing them.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON MANAGING THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT IN AL WIHDAT

It is clear now that refugees of al Wihdat are more open minded for large scales upgrade projects, as long as it maintain the camp's identity and main landmarks, However the camp's demographics and infrastructural defects that accumulated over the decades make a total reconstruction of the camp highly unlikely, but probably the only solution that ensures a durable improvement in the camp conditions. However, with the pending status of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement, it is expected that refugee camps, in general, will continue to be sidelined from any major modernization trends that will affect Jordan cities in the future.

Regarding al Wihdat, it is highly recommended that a proper documentation and mapping of the existing setting to be undertaken, in coordination with all institutes responsible for the camp and its surrounding context. The gap between the official documents and real life will be misleading for any upcoming planning attempts and consequently lead to the possibility of the project to fail.

Aside of that, in order to guarantee the success of any undertaken project in Al Wihdat or targeting its people, it should consider individual cases and promote public participation in the community, a real active one, not a one-sided feedback system that is only done to perform empty rituals of participation. People of the camp have constantly proven their ability to challenge any project they're not satisfied with, or doesn't enhance their daily lives activities. The people are a key role in the success or failure of any project.

5.3 FUTURE PROSPECTS

It is time to reconsider the general perception of a “refugee camp”, as a site of marginalization and exclusion. Firstly because as discussed in this thesis, refugees will constantly defy this notion and invent new methods to prove their illegibility as productive residents, even in the very act of resistance. The boundaries of their marginalization, either political, social or economic are constantly rendered porous by the people of the camp, through developing innovative tools of interactions with the wider context.

Secondly, because of the potentials of development, the host country is missing upon due to the current perception of refugee camps. If camps were considered as sites of opportunities, where skills and labor forces in the camp are utilized and organized, host governments might end up in a win-win situation, where they benefit from the growth of these urbanizing sites and refugees will feel more empowered and productive.

Al Wihdat camp suffers from major environmental and social problems and that is due to the lack of attention to planning in its early development. However, despite that, it proved itself as a powerful vibrant site within the context of the city. Its spatial products that translated their resistance and resilience surpassed the boundaries of the camp and became key factors in the dynamics of the city. One would imagine the potentials of such site if given better opportunities in terms of planning.

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APPENDICES




Appendix-1: Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan

CAMP	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION	INITIAL POP.	POP. 2007	POP. 2016	AREA (Sq Km)	No. of commercial shops	Aerial image
Zarqa	1949	Zarqa	8,000	18,528	20,000	0.18	325	
Irbid	1950	Irbid	4,000	24,833	28,000	0.24	320	
Al Hussein	1952	Amman	8,000	29,529	32,000	0.42	850	
Al Wihdat	1955	Amman	5,000	50,061	57,000	0.48	2500	

CAMP	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION	INITIAL POP.	POP. 2007	POP. 2016	AREA (Sq Km)	No. of commercial shops	Aerial image
Emergency camps after 1948								
Madaba	1956	Madaba	-	-	5,500	0.58	100	
Emergency camps after 1967								
Souf	1967	Jerash	-	20,530 21,500 unreg.	19,000	0.5	96	
Al Talbieh	1968	Amman	5,000	6,107 9,000 unreg.	8,000	0.13	120	
Al Baqa'a	1968	Amman	26,000	90,953	119,000	1.4	1705	

CAMP	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION	INITIAL POP.	POP. 2007	POP. 2016	AREA (Sq Km)	No. of commercial shops	Aerial image
Emergency camps after 1967								
Azmi al Muftai (Al Husun)	1968	Irbid	12,500	20,988 26,965 unreg.	25,000	0.77	210	
Jerash (Gaza)	1968	Jerash	11,500	22,000 27,600 unreg.	29,000	0.75	291	
Marka (Hitteen)	1968	Zarqa	11,500	44,879 62,379 unreg.	53,000	0.92	700	
Prince al Hassan <small>*Not recognized by UNRWA</small>	1967	Amman	-	-	10,000	0.096	200	

CAMP	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	LOCATION	INITIAL POP.	POP. 2007	POP. 2016	AREA (Sq Km)	No. of commercial shops	Aerial image
Emergency camps after 1967								
Al Sukhneh *Not recognized by UNRWA	1969	Zarqa	-	-	6,000	0.07	40	

Source: Unrwa 2017, DPA 2007, PALCAMPS 2017, The author.

Appendix-2: Camp Dwellers Interview Questions

Wihdat camp dwellers questionnaire

Name:

Date:

Age:

Education:

Occupation:

Date of Arrival to Jordan:

Contact Info:

1. How long have you living in this camp?
2. Is this the same place you settled in from the start, or is this a new one?
3. If you had the chance to reside outside the camp, would you leave?
If yes why? If no why?
4. Which area do you choose to reside in and why?
5. What are the main complaints about living in this camp?
6. What are the advantages of living in the camp?
7. How do you feel about minimizing the UNRWA's responsibilities in the camp and handing their tasks to the government? (Ex: a lot of health care units were operated by the UNRWA, now they're operated by Jordanian government.)
8. What does the history of the camp represents to you?
9. Do you perceive the camp as a symbol of national struggle or a strong economic area or something else?
10. How do you evaluate the solidarity among the camp inhabitants?
11. What are the main landmarks in the camp?
12. What are the landmarks you depend on in order to mark the camp boundaries?
13. Can you describe the boundaries of al Wihdat as you perceive them? (Using Satellite Images)
14. How do you feel about other non-Palestinian expats moving into al Wihdat lately?
15. How do you evaluate the decisions taken by the government for developing the camp?
16. What would be your suggestions for the development of the camp's built environment for a better living?
17. How do you envision your future in al Wihdat camp and in Amman?
18. What would be your suggestion to provide a decent life for refugees in Jordan other than provision of the camps?

Appendix-3: Official permit to conduct the study in Wihdat camp by DPA


نهضة


دولة فلسطين

الرقم ٨٦٤٦ / ١٩ / ١
التاريخ ٢٠١٦ / ١٠ / ٣
الموافق

عطوفة محافظ العاصمة

الموضوع: الزيارات

أود اعلام عطوفتكم بأن الطالبة صبا المحتسب من جامعة Bahcesehir التركية ستقوم بزيارة لمخيم الوحدات وذلك لإجراء بحث حول التنمية الحضرية في مخيمات اللاجئين الفلسطينيين خلال الفترة ٢٠١٦/١٠/٣ ولغاية ٢٠١٦/١٠/٣١ . أرجو من عطوفتكم التفضل بالاطلاع والايعاز لمن يلزم بإتخاذ الاجراءات اللازمة.

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق الاحترام ،،،

المدير العلم بالوكالة
المهندس ياسين أبو عواد
مدير الدراسات والاعلام
احمد الرواشده

الملكة الاردنية الهاشمية
هاتف : ٥٦٦٦١١٧٢ +٩٦٢٢ ٦ فاكس : ٥٦٦٨٢٦٤ +٩٦٢٢ ٦ ص.ب : ٢٤٦٩ عمان ١١١٨١ الأردن. الموقع الإلكتروني : www.dpa.gov.jo - E-mail:dpa@dpa.gov.jo

Appendix-4: Interviewees profile

Interviewees	Gender	Age	Education	Occupation	Date	Location
CD : Camp dweller						
CD #1	Female	25	High school dropout	house wife	5/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #2	Male	55	diploma	shop owner	5/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #3	Male	27	University	school teacher	5/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #4	Female	19	high school	student	5/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #5	Female	44	Mid school	house wife	5/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #6	Female	57	Mid school	owns a small supermarket	6/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #7	Male	28	Bachelor	teacher	6/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #8	Female	18	high school	student	6/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #9	Female	56	high school	house wife	9/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #10	Male	22	college student	student	9/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #11	Male	35	high school	kiosk seller	9/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #12	Male	28	college	employee in DPA	12/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #13	Female	20	high school	not working currently	12/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #14	Male	17	High school	Student	12/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CD #15	Male	62	College	retired employee	12/10/2016	Interviewee's residence
CO : Camp officials						
CO #1	Amman Greater Municipality employee				3/10/2016	Amman Greater Municipality
CO #2	UNRWA local office employee				3/10/2016	UNRWA's local office
CO #3	Director of the Department of Palestinian affairs office in Wihdat camp				4/10/2016	DPA's office
CO #4	Head of Wihdat community zakat institue				5/10/2016	Wihdat camp
Other Interviews						
Mohammad al Asad	Jordanian architect and historian				28/9/2016	Architect's office
Rami al daher	Jordanian architect and scholar				4/10/2016	Architect's office
Khalid al Jayyousi	Jordanian architect and head of design team for the East Wihdat upgrade project				4/3/2017	Architect's office

Appendix-5: East Wihdat upgrade project planning team interview Questions

East Wihdat upgrade project planning Team Interview

Name:

Age:

Education:

Occupation:

Contact Info:

Date:

1. What were the main objectives of the project?
2. What were the main challenges in the process?
3. How did you evaluate the success of the project in terms of resident's satisfaction after the implementation?
4. How do u evaluate the project now, almost 25 years of its implementation?
5. How do you describe the east Wihdat dwellers attitude toward the upgrade program?
6. How do you describe the Wihdat camp dwellers attitude towards the upgrade program very close to them?
7. The period preceded the upgrade project could be described as a politically charged period, how do you describe people's interaction with such a project afterwards?
8. Do you believe people's political ideology influenced their dwelling pattern and urban behaviors? If so, in what matters?
9. How do you describe the changes in their dwelling pattern and behaviors along time?
10. How do describe Al Wihdat relationship to the city, since it was established till now?