

T.C.
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY

**EUROPEAN UNION COMMON FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY AND POTENTIAL
CONTRIBUTIONS OF TURKEY**

Master's Thesis

Pelin İsmailođlu

İSTANBUL, 2007

T. C.
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW AND INTEGRATION

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ABSTRACT

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Europe chose to unite after the Second World War and it took many steps to this end. However, the merger had focused on the economic matters for years. Following the end of Cold War, the view point about security has changed in the world. In this context, the European Union (EU) preferred to follow a common foreign policy in order to act in harmony with the global changes and to become an important actor on the global scale. Its first big step to this end is the Maastricht Treaty. In this study, first of all, founding years and evolution of the EU will be mentioned briefly. Then, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is one of the most important policies of the European Union, will be examined. There will be an effort to illuminate the question of why the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which has been constantly revised by the developments and establishing treaties within the European Union, couldn't move from the intergovernmental level to the supra-governmental level. The issue will be supported with explanations about the approaches of European Union countries and about the experienced cases. In the final chapter, there will be reflection upon the future contributions of Turkey to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy in the case of being a member of the EU.

Key Words: European Union (EU), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Strategic Importance of Turkey.

ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ORTAK DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN OLASI KATKILARI

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Avrupa, 2. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra birleşme yolunu seçmiş ve bu amaçla birçok adım atmıştır. Ancak, birleşme yıllar boyunca ekonomik konulara odaklanmıştır. Dünya’da Soğuk Savaş’ın bitimini takip eden sürede güvenliğe bakış açısı büyük ölçüde değişmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Avrupa Birliği (AB) küresel değişikliklere uyum sağlamak ve küresel boyutta önemli bir aktör olmak için dış ilişkilerinde ortak bir politika takip etmeyi seçmiştir ve bu konuda ilk önemli adımını Maastricht Anlaşması’yla atmıştır. Bu çalışmada, öncelikle Avrupa Birliğinin kuruluş yılları ve geçirdiği evrime kısa bir şekilde değinildikten sonra Avrupa Birliğinin en önemli politikalarından birini oluşturan Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası incelenecektir. Avrupa Birliği bünyesindeki gelişmelere ve kurucu antlaşmalarda sürekli revize edilen Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası’nın neden hükümetler arası boyuttan hükümetler üstü boyuta geçemediği anlatılmaya çalışılacaktır. Konu anlatılırken Avrupa Birliği ülkelerinin konuya yaklaşımları ve bu konuda yaşanan örnekler açıklanarak konu desteklenmeye çalışılacaktır. Son bölümde ise Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olduğu takdirde Türkiye’nin AB Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası’na sağlayacağı katkılar anlatılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliđi (AB),Ortak Dıř ve Gvenlik Politikası (ODGP), Avrupa Gvenlik ve Savunma Politikası(AGSP), NATO, Trkiye'nin Stratejik nemi.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	i
ABSTARCT IN TURKISH	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. FOUNDING OF THE EU	3
3. FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP	9
3.1. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE COLD WAR.....	10
3.1.1. West European Union.....	10
3.1.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	12
3.1.3. European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (1950-1954).....	12
3.1.4. The “Fouchet Plan” (1961-1962).....	13
3.1.5. European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970-1993).....	13
3.1.6. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).....	15
3.1.7. Single European Act (SEA).....	17
3.2. DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING THE POST-COLD WAR.....	20
3.2.1. Common Foreign and Security Policy in Founding Agreements	21
3.2.1.1. Maastricht treaty and the CFSP	21
3.2.1.2. Amsterdam Treaty and the CFSP	23
3.2.1.3. Treaty of Nice and the CFSP	25
3.2.1.4. Amendments Made in the Draft Constitution Regarding the CFSP.....	25
3.2.1.5. Lizbon Treaty and the CFSP	31

3.2.2. Establishments and Approaches Related to Security and Defense	31
3.2.2.1. European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)	31
3.2.2.2. European Security and Defense Policy and European Security Strategy	32
3.2.2.3. The Idea of Foundation the European Army	35
3.2.2.4. The EU and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	38
3.2.2.4.1. Out of State Actors Acquiring WMDs	42
3.2.2.4.2. The EU and the wmdthreat	43
3.2.2.4.3. Limits of the EU as a strategic actor	43
3.2.2.5. The EU and Terrorism	44
3.2.2.5.1. European Union's Fight Against Terrorism	46
3.2.2.5.2. The CFSP of the EU and the Struggle Against Terrorism	46
4. DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENTS AND ACTORS IN THE CFSP	49
4.1. DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENTS	49
4.1.1. Common Strategies	51
4.1.2. Common Positions	51
4.1.3. Joint Actions	51
4.1.4. Declaratos	52
4.1.5. International Agreements	52
4.1.6. Contacts with Third Countries	52
4.2. Actors of the CFSP	53
4.2.1. The European Council	53
4.2.2. The Council of the European Union	54
4.2.3. The Presidency	55
4.2.4. European Parliament	56

4.2.5. The European Commission	56
4.2.6. The High Representative for the CFSP, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.....	57
4.2.7. Assistant Secretary General and the Council Secretary General.....	57
4.2.8. The Member States.....	58
4.2.9. Special Representatives	58
5. THE APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE CFSP.....	59
5.1. GERMANY AND THE CFSP	59
5.2. FRANCE AND THE CFSP.....	60
5.3. UK AND THE CFSP.....	61
6. THE EXAMPLES FOR THE FAILURES OF THE CFSP'S	64
6.1. "YUGOSLAVIA POLICY" OF THE EU.....	65
6.1.1. The "Territorial Integrity" and "Recognizing" Dilemma of the EU.....	67
6.1.2. The Inactivity of the EU and the CFSP.....	68
6.2. THE CFSP TEST OF THE EUROPIAN UNION: CRISIS IN IRAQ.....	71
7.THE EXAMPLE FOR THE SUCCESFUL OF THE CFSP'S (OPERATION CONCORDIA).....	74
8. TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.....	77
8.1. EVOLUTION OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY.....	78
8.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU.....	81
9. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP ON THE CFSP.....	885
9.1. GEOSTRATEGICAL DIMENSION OF TURKE.....	87
9.2. GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF TURKEY	89
9.2.1. Economic Dimension of Turkey.....	90

9.2.2. Political-Cultural Dimension of Turkey	90
9.3. TURKEY’S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY	91
9.4. TURKEY’S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS WITH ITS MILITARY POWER	96
9.5. TURKEY’S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU IN THE FIELD OF STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM AND STRUGGLE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION	99
9.5.1. Contributions of Turkey to the International Operations in the Field of Struggle Against Terrorism	100
9.5.2. Contributions of Turkey to the International Operations in the Field of Struggle Against Weapons of Mass Destruction	102
9.6. TURKEY’S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU, RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOUR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS	105
9.6.1. The Middle East	105
9.6.2. Iraq	109
9.6.3. Palestinian.....	111
9.6.4. Iran	112
9.6.5. Syria.....	113
9.6.6. Central asia	114
9.6.7. Caucasus	116
9.6.8. Greece.....	120
9.6.9. Balkans	121
9.6.10. Afghanistan.....	122
9.7. TURKEY’S OTHER POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS	123

10. TURKEY’S DIFFUCULTIES REGARDING THE EU’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY	126
11. CONCLUSION.....	128
12. PROGRESS REPORT OF TURKEY ON “CHAPTER 31: FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY”	133
BIBLIOGRAPHY	137
REFERENCES.....	143

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan	: BTC
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum	: BTE
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars	: BTK
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization	: BECO
Black Sea Task Force	: BLACKSEAFOR
Common Defense and Security Policy	: CDSP
Common Foreign and Security Policy	: CFSP
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	: CTBT
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe	: CSCE
Economic Cooperation Organization	: ECO
European Atom Energy Community	: EURATOM
European Coal and Steel Community	: ECSC
European Defence Community	: EDC
European Economic Community	: EEC
European Parliament	: EP
European Police Office	: EUROPOL
European Political Cooperation	: EPC
European Security and Cooperation Organization	: ESCO
European Security and Defence Identity	: ESDI
European Security and Defence Policy	: ESDP
European Security and Defense Policy	: ESDP

European Security Strategy	: ESS
European Union	: EU
European Union Convention	: EUC
European Union Force	: EUFOR
European Union Police Mission	: EUPM
European Union Police Mission	: EUPOL
General Director of Foreign Affairs	: GDFA
Gross Domestic Product	: GDP
Illicit Trafficking Database	: ITDB
Integrated Police Unit and the EU Police Mission	: EUPM
International Atomic Energy Agency	: IAEA
International Security Assistance Force	: ISAF
Islam Conference Organization	: ICO
Multilateral Peace Force for Southern Europe	: MPFSEE
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	: NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	: NATO
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe	: OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	: OSCE
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development	: OECD
Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation	: BSEC
Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials	: PPSNM
Proliferation Security Initiative	: PSI
Single European Act	: SEA
South Eastern Europe Brigade	: SEEBGRIG
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative	: SECI

Southern European Cooperation Process	: SEEC
Stockholm Peace Researches Institute	: SIPRI
The European Union Military Staff	: EUMS
The United States of America	: USA
Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	: NPT
UN Institute of Disarmament Researches	: UNIDIR
UN Police Mission	: UNMIK
UN Security Council	: UNSC
United Nations	: UN
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	: UNODC
Weapons of Mass Destruction	: WMD
West European Union	: WEU
World Trade Organization	: WTO
World War I	: WW I
World War II	: WW II

1. INTRODUCTION

Europe has preferred to unite after the World War II and has taken many steps with this purpose. However, we observe that a union uniting focused on economic issues throughout long years. Since the views on security in the post-Cold War period in the World have changed a great deal, European Union (EU) preferred to adapt itself to the global changes and to pursue a common policy in foreign relations in order to be a major actor on the global scale, and the first significant step in this issue was taken with the Maastricht Treaty.

We can say that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which we witness the legalization with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, is in fact not a product of a new understanding. In the first years of the European uniting movement, the ideas of cooperation in the international policy were among current issues. European States have attempted to act commonly on defense issues and with this purpose, six States, which founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), have signed the Treaty Establishing the European Defense Community. At that period in which the nation state perception protected itself more this attempt could not be passed from the French Senate and has lost its meaning.

The European uniting movement rather focused on economic integration after that period. Approximately 40 years following the start of the uniting movement, the relations in the field of common foreign policy were formalized for the first time and the European Political Cooperation mechanism which was placed under a legal frame with the Single European Act was born. With this mechanism, it was aimed that the Community Member States should be promoted on acting commonly in formulating and implementing the Europe's foreign policy.

The legal basis of a common foreign policy could only be established following the Cold War. Disintegration of the Soviet Union and ending of the Cold War caused significant changes in the security perceptions in Europe. With the threat of communism

right beside it being removed, Europe took significant steps in order to prove that it is a power which is capable of providing its own security in its region. The first important step in this issue is the Maastricht Treaty which was enacted in 1993. The name European Union (EU) was first used in this Treaty and the concept of the CFSP was first suggested with this Treaty.

We can say that establishing a common foreign policy is the least successful area of the uniting movement which was started years ago by EU. EU has entered the end of 20th century seeing how important it is to adopt a common attitude in the field of foreign politics. Especially the hardships experienced in the disintegration period of Yugoslavia challenged EU in the foreign policy. After that we see that the CFSP has been revised continuously in the founding agreements.

Has EU reached the intended result on the CFSP which is currently revised with the founding agreements? As a result of my research, I am of the opinion that despite all the developments within the EU, the CFSP still has a lot of important gaps and that the EU has failed at reaching the result it desired with regard to the CFSP. Within the framework of this opinion, in the first section of my thesis I will provide brief information on the founding of the EU and the developments till the introduction of the CFSP in an attempt to first of all make a historical connection, for the purpose of enabling an evaluation of the point achieved by the EU with regard to the CFSP. Furthermore, I will analyze the development of the CFSP within the scope of founding treaties, and I will try to demonstrate with real life examples that the EU and the CFSP are both inadequate. In the second part of my thesis, I will give information on the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey and Turkey's foreign and security policy. In these sections I will also attempt to demonstrate that in the case of Turkey's accession to the EU, the EU will have positive contributions for the CFSP.

2. FOUNDING OF THE EU

The idea of establishing the European Union, or in other words reaching the idea of a united Europe, before turning into a political project, was reflected on first by the European philosophers and the idea of forming a “union” in the European continent has been suggested frequently by the politicians, lawyers and philosophers since 14th century.

Although significant ideas were produced for forming a “Union” in Europe after the WW I, conflicts which arose in the first half of the twentieth century and scarred the continent deeply blew away this dream completely. Only after the WW II an organization having the capacity to overcome the national disagreements took place in Europe. We can say that two trends, one of them being the federation supporter and the other being functional, accelerated the process of uniting. The defenders of these trends are Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli and Jean Monnet. The federation advocate approach is based on the dialogue between the regional, national and Europe-wide focuses of power and on establishing a relationship. On the other hand, the functionalist approach suggests that the sovereignty should be transferred from the national level to the Union level. When we examine the year 1950, we see the Schuman Plan laying the foundations of a united Europe based on the project of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. The Schuman Plan claimed that the French-German friendship was a prerequisite for establishing peace in Europe and defended the view that that Europe should unite around this core. According to this plan, the method for abolishing the centuries long French-German conflict in Europe was to ensure the French-German joint coal and steel production under a higher authority and to open this organization to the participation of the entire European states.

In 1951 the Federal Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, with a convention they signed in Paris, established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Thus, thanks to the ECSC, the states, for the first time in history,

transferred a part of their national sovereignties to a supra-national institution, with their free will.

“The Community enterprise began on 18 April 1951 when the six original Member States – three large countries and three small- met in Paris to sign the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).”¹ The Treaty of Rome (1957) establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atom Energy Community (EURATOM), Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht-European Union Treaty (1993) form the legal foundations of the EU.

The operations of the community in the beginning were limited with establishing a coal and steel joint market between the six founder members (Germany, Belgium, France, Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg). The main aim of the community was to “secure peace.”

Following the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, attempts were made in order to establish European Defense Community and European Political Community; however, these efforts were futile. On one hand the foundation of NATO and on the other hand the idea that realizing the integration of Europe first on the economic field would be more realistic, focused the efforts on the economic field and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) was signed in Rome in 1957. Likewise the EEC, the European Atom Energy Community (EUROATOM) was established with the Treaty of Rome put in effect in 1958.

In 1957, three years following the French National Assembly refused the European Defense Community project, the ‘six’ decided to establish an economic community based on the free circulation of goods and services together with the labor force. Customs duties were planned on the manufactured goods; however, these were abolished in 1968. Policies on agriculture and commerce being on the top, the policies were settled totally by the end of 60s.

In 1972, we see that the number of the Member States increased to nine with the participation of England, Ireland and Denmark. However, although the Union, which was strong in economic terms, was the largest commercial power in the world, was a bit slow in developing the structures that would increase its diplomatic activity. We can say

that the objective of the European political cooperation was to enable a deeper coordination between the governments in the fields of foreign and security policies.

The inactivity in the world led to the rise of a “European pessimism” in the beginning of the 1980, nevertheless hopeful expectations on resuscitating the Community substituted this pessimism since 1984. The Community expanded in 1981 with the accession of Greece and in 1986 with the accession of Spain and Portugal. The Community determined to form a single market until January 1, 1993 as an objective for itself. The Single European Act was signed and was in force in 1987. New common policies were determined with the Single European Act enacted in 1987 and the existing ones were developed. Within this context, new items were appended to the Treaty of Rome on the topics such as social policy, economic and social status, environment, etc. With the Single Act it was first decided that unanimity was necessary and changes should be made in the Common Customs Duty, but then it was decided that decisions reached on the free circulation of services and capital, common transportation policies should be based on qualitative majority. Cooperating on the foreign policy through the “European Political Cooperation” between the Member States was decided with the Single Act.

The significant developments experienced in the world at that period also caused significant developments in the policies of the Union. Following are the major developments: joining of the two Germanys in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and Eastern European states freeing themselves from the Soviet control and getting democratic, disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. We can say that such important developments changed the political structure of Europe.

In 1991, the Member States commenced the negotiations of a new Convention in the ‘European Summit’ convoked in Maastricht. The European Union Treaty (EUT) establishing the European Union or in other words the Maastricht Treaty, which foresaw establishing an “economic and monetary union” based on a single currency and on a common central bank system and a “political union” based on the common foreign policy and defense policy perspective, was signed in 1992 and was put in force in 1993.

The following issues were covered under this Convention:

- Establishing an economic and monetary union which will enable using a single currency;
- Forming a European citizenship which grants the right to elect and to be elected to the EU citizens in the municipalities of the State they are residing in;
- Creating a common foreign and security policy which will ensure the security of Europe and will defend the common values such as democracy and human rights;
- Cooperating in the fields of law and internal affairs in order to ensure the internal security of the Union.

As a result of these developments, the European Communities (ECSC, EEC, EURATOM) were included in the EU structure. With this Treaty establishing the European Union, the “three fundamental columns” of the EU were formed. The first column consists of the European Economic Community, European Atom Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community. The second column contains the Common Foreign Affairs Security Policy the CFSP and aims to commence a Europe-wide defense policy. And the third column covers the Justice and the Internal Affairs. Within this context, the Member States, which wanted to increase cooperation in migration and political refugee issues, established a European Police Office (EUROPOL).

The Union was called as the “European Union” since January 1, 1995 and the number of its members reached to 15 with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

The Intergovernmental Conference commenced in 1996 for determining the process of the EU’s expansion was completed with the Amsterdam Summit in 1997. Starting the 5th expansion period of the EU and passing to the Euro, the single currency, on January 1, 1999 was confirmed in the summit and Euro was accepted as the official currency in 11 Member States (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal). In addition, the Treaty of Amsterdam that contains certain amendments on the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in May 1999,

the Common Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Justice and Security Policy were signed.

One of the most important outcomes of the Treaty of Amsterdam is that it includes the major part of the issues of justice and internal affairs under the First Column and creates an area of freedom, security and justice. In addition, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, “the police, penalty and customs cooperation” was left to the Third Column; however, “other policies on visas, refuge, migration and free circulation of individuals” are included in the First Column. Also the Schengen Agreement was included in the scope of the Treaty.

In the Luxembourg Summit carried out in 1997, a classification was made among the 11 candidate states for the first time. States which commenced the negotiations by fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and NCGG) were called as the “first wave” and the other states which did not fulfill the said political criteria and not ready for negotiations yet (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) were called as the “second wave.” While the expansion process continued, the EU also continued its efforts to deepen.

The Treaty of Nice was enacted in 2003. The major purpose of the Treaty was to prepare the Union to expansion by taking new members. With the accession of 10 States, namely Czech Republic, Estonia, NCGG, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, in 2004, the union realized the fifth and the largest expansion ever.

“General Assembly on the Future of Europe” was convoked in 2002 in order to draft the EU Constitution. The Draft Agreement creating a Constitution for Europe was accepted. The EU Constitution was signed by the leaders of the member and candidate states in Rome and was finalized in 2004. The EU Constitution forms the most significant step of the European Union Member States towards establishing a political union and unites in a single and new text the founding agreements which lay the foundation of the EU and the entire treaty which amended them.

We can say that the Community approach based on respecting the diversity of the national traditions and reinforcing the diverse identities is valid today as it had been always. This approach designed to overcome the radical hostilities and bellicose trends

between the States is the triumph of a European spirit in terms of eradicating the East-West disagreement and uniting the continent in political and economic terms.

3. FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CFSP

As it is known, when we examine the EU, we see that the integration efforts in Europe are not limited only to economic integration. Political integration is a target desired by all European leaders. Wars between Germany and France that were fought between the years 1871 and 1945 have also been influential in the formation of this idea. In the aftermath of the Second World War, United States and the Soviet Union have gained a superior role in the European security. Prime movers of the European Union have had the perception that, creating an international influence was only possible via cooperation. “Their idea for supra-national European Community in which states would share their sovereignty was thus a major contribution to creating a genuine security community between the participating states.”²

When we look at the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union;

“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security *policy* covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter,
- To strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders,
- To promote international cooperation
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”³

We can say that the Common Foreign and Security Policy started with the establishment of the West European Union (WEU) and the development of the European Political Cooperation mechanism. When we examine the roots of the CFSP, we see the following respectively.

3.1. DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE THE COLD WAR

3.1.1. West European Union

Following the Second World War, cooperation efforts in the field of security had picked up speed in Europe. The strained relationship between the West and East due to the 1948 communist coup d'état in Prague and to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin and the start of the Cold War period accelerated the military alliance searches in the Western Europe. With this purpose in mind, France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands founded the West European Union (Treaty of Brussels Organization) with a treaty signed in Brussels in 1948. With the participation of Germany and Italy in 1954, name of the Union was changed to Western European Union (WEU). However, this institution did not form a basis for security and defense cooperation and therefore could play a very important role. We can say that the first strong institutional response to the Cold War was the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1951. With the establishment of NATO, Europe's efforts of cooperation in the field of security have not only been limited to the WEU. The NATO has still been an influential organization of security cooperation in the region.

3.1.2. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Post-Cold War circumstances necessitated NATO to engage itself in an adaptation process given the changing security requirements. In deed NATO was at the forefront in adapting to the than evolving European security architecture at the beginning of the last decade. NATO, in the light of these requirements focused its attention on non-Article 5 operations as well. It did not take too long for NATO to be forced by the crises that erupted in the Balkans to be involved in two major crisis management and peace support operations – first in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later in Kosovo.

“Strengthening the ESDI also became an integral part of NATO’s adaptation process. At its Brussels Summit in 1994, NATO stressed the importance of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. At that summit meeting, NATO heads of state and government decided to make NATO’s structures more flexible and responsive to the new security environment in Europe. The concept of Combined and Joint Task Forces (CJTF) was introduced at that time to provide the Alliance with an improved capability for responding to the full range of its tasks and missions, ranging from collective defence to crisis management and peacekeeping. This concept is designed, inter alia, to provide separable but not separate capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. In this context, at the WEU and NATO ministerial meetings held in 1996, ministers decided to develop the ESDI within NATO. Following this decision, NATO took important steps, especially in the context of NATO’s relations with the WEU.”⁴

“While NATO was trying to develop the ESDI, the EU initiated a process to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy (THE CFSP) separately, with a view to putting in place a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Although the emphasis initially seemed to be on Petersberg-type conflict prevention and crisis management operations, the results of the EU’s Cologne, Helsinki and Feira summits indicate that the EU’s long-term objective is to acquire a larger domain in the security field, possibly leading to defence, thus reinforcing the stature of the EU.”⁵

The fundamental principles that should guide endeavours to develop the ESDI and the CESDP should be inclusiveness, transparency and the indivisibility of security in Europe. It should not be forgotten that NATO and the EU share common strategic interests and face the same challenges.

At the first crises of the new period, such as at Bosnia, the WEU stayed very passive and its connection and cooperation with the EU proved to be still a weak one. While NATO was actively involving in the crises, the WEU that was planned to replaced the NATO role in Europe as the security institution of the EU did only state that ‘we are in favour of NATO.’

This issue of the place of the WEU, the CFSP and EU have been developed and being complicated throughout the 1990s. Contemporary ESDI scenarios are still based on the

dimension of NATO's EU wing but it is too complicated issue and not the topic as a part of the Maastricht but of the later scenarios.

3.1.3. European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community (1950-1954)

The European Defense Community was a Europe-wide attempt to be developed with the logic of integration. "At the beginning of the 1950s, the Western powers, led by the United States, envisaged the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany to meet the growing Soviet threat. But the prospect of a German army five years after the end of the Second World War worried European public opinion. In order to permit the rearmament of West Germany without restoring the spectre of an armed Germany, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands invented the project for a European Defence Community (EDC): They envisaged the creation of a common European army whose numbers they would supply. Such a military Europe in formation would have to be accompanied by political guidance. In 1953 the project for a European Political Community supplemented the EDC by the establishment of federal-type political institutions. After four years' lively debate the EDC and the European Political Community came to nought, rejected by the French Parliament on 30 August 1954."⁶ However, due to the refusal of the French National Assembly, this attempt was failed. As a result of this, instead of integration in political issues right from the beginning, an integration process policy covering the most possible and ready economic cooperation fields was pursued. It is possible to see that the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atom Energy Community and the European Economic Community are products of such approach.

3.1.4. The "Fouchet Plan" (1961-1962)

"Three years after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, which were essentially economic, the desire to begin the political construction of Europe was reborn under impetus from General de Gaulle. The Frenchman Christian Fouchet then prepared three proposals between 1961 and 1962, known as the "Fouchet Plan." A "Treaty on the Union of States" was outlined: inter-State cooperation was to lead to a unified foreign policy, the strengthening of Member States' security from any aggression and the coordination of defence policies. In the long term the Treaty on the

Union of States was to encompass the European Communities. France's initiatives were rejected by its partners for two main reasons: the desire to preserve the European Communities from a form of cooperation deemed excessively inter-State and the desire to preserve the defence link with the United States and NATO.”⁶

3.1.5. European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970-1993)

The presidents of the six EEC States, in the La Haye Summit of 1969, decided to develop a European Political Cooperation mechanism which foresaw mutual exchange of views and coordination between the foreign policies of the Member States. A declaration was made in order to debate the membership of Britain, Denmark and Ireland for the purpose of European integration. “A united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and mission.”⁷

In this report, known as Davignon Report, it was brought up that political unification is a step required for the European Political Co-operation. The question of how to provide cooperation in the area of foreign policy in the year 1970 was debated and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was formed on 27 October 1970.

EPC was designed to coordinate national foreign policies. Though the concept ‘intergovernmentalism’ was clashing with this supranationalist foreign policy concept and the definition of national and Community interests could not be made, the EPC did not work in a purely intergovernmentalist manner and sometimes even surprised its hard-line proponents and outside world with its success.

EPC had been continued twenty-three years up to Maastricht Treaty of 1 November 1993 and throughout this time sometimes successfully, sometimes not it had served as a primitive way to political union.

The fact that EPC did not take place in the constitutional treaties and it was independent was proved to be problematic. EPC's incapacity to lay out a common policy in the petroleum crisis of 1973 pointed out how fruitless was the political activity compared to the economic integration. It is possible to multiply the cases. For example, during the very radical changes occurred in world politics (Eastern Block collapsed; Central and Eastern European Countries became independent; and two Germany unified)

reveal the requirement for the inclusion of the EPC by the constitutional treaties even more clearly. EPC with its loosely unified structure did not take a unified position against these developments and one more time member states' own interests hold a dominant position on interests of Europe as a whole. Actually the main response to the new European states became mainly an economic one due to the fact that political situation was too complex to take a unified position in such a cooperative system. This weakness of the EPC has been clearly seen in the first issues of Post-Cold War Era.

During the Gulf Crises, member states could not reach a common position. Moreover, though the US's military existence was discussing, the US's withdrawal from Europe was feared the Europeans who did not have their common defense capability. This came to existence as a unique issue in the intergovernmental conference before the Maastricht.

EPC traditionally did not deal with the security and defence dimensions of the foreign policy for a variety of reasons that unsuccessful attempt of European Defense Community; strengthening of the camp against the autonomous European defense structure that was seen as being in opposition the NATO as a result of the first enlargement.

One of the biggest factors would be the existence of NATO that was founded as the defence organization of the Western Camp and any other attempts was seen as a threat to it. However, actually the most important deficiency in creation of such a structure was the incapability of the EPC that was only a platform for coordination between the politically loosely aligned member states. Even to reach a common point proved to be so difficult within the EPC about some complicated political issues. The national interest was still over the common interest and any critics to this had been seen as a threat to national sovereignty right of the nation state.

The European NATO members' position, however, had been developed and turned to be an effective one in some important case, such as in CSCE. Especially this new way of European policy had started to be seen in transatlantic relations. In most of the case the pressure of the United States had recoiled and resulted with opposite way of action by the European states. Nevertheless, the EPC without defense

dimension had never gone further from to be a loosely aligned cooperation on foreign policy issues.

As I stated before, “two deficiencies of EPC appeared in this period. Firstly, it had been constructed as unconnected from the EU’s own structure. This made the economics prevailing object over political cooperation. Secondly, due to its intergovernmental structure and lack of definition of Community and national interests, when an issue arised, member states had chosen their way of interest rather than to seek common interest of the Community. However, a very important development in the history of European common foreign policy has come into being: the London Report of October 1981. Foreign ministers agreed to associate Commission with the EPC at all levels and more than that ‘joint action’ replaces cooperation as main EPC goal.”⁸ The political aspects of security did also come under the umbrella of the EPC. Moreover, a troika Secretariat and a crisis procedure had been created to activate the EPC’s policies.

EPC was covered in a constitutional treaty for the first time, with the Single European Act (SEA) under the Title III. SEA is significant for proving more effective in the foreign policy following the enlargement and deepening of the Union. A relationship between the EPC and institutions of the Union was formed through the terms of the Title III. We can say that the EPC forms the core of Common Foreign and Security Policy (THE CFSP) of the European Union.

3.1.6. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

“The OSCE traces its origins to the détente phase of the early 1970s, when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. Meeting over two years in Helsinki and Geneva, the CSCE reached agreement on the Helsinki Final Act, which was signed on 1 August 1975. This document contained a number of key commitments on politico-military, economic and environmental and human rights issues that became central to the so-called 'Helsinki process'. It also established ten fundamental principles (the 'Decalogue') governing the behaviour of States towards their citizens, as well as towards each other.”⁹

The OSCE's approach to security is comprehensive and co-operative. Through its numerous field missions and operational activities, as well as through its specialised institutions, the OSCE addresses a wide range of security-related issues, including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence and security building measures, human and minority rights, election monitoring and economic and environmental security. It provides a forum for the participating States to pursue a permanent political dialogue and to seek solutions together, on the basis of sovereign equality. It has become a more operational institution, focussing on the processes of political and economic reform necessary for consolidating democratic stability, as well as on the effective implementation of OSCE principles and commitments.

The European Community - and now the European Union - and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE - the forerunner of the OSCE - and also known as "the Helsinki Process") were both born out of a similar desire - to establish forms of co-operation in Europe which would defuse the tensions between former enemies and prevent further conflict on the Continent. While the EU was designed to make war impossible again in Europe, by integrating the economies of the member States and by developing supranational institutions, the purpose of CSCE was to reduce tensions between the West and the Soviet bloc by facilitating dialogue and mutual contacts. It is therefore natural that a degree of co-operation should have grown up since the founding of the CSCE.

“The changes in Europe after 1989 brought a clear recognition of the role of the EU in the new Europe of democratic values and a market economy. In recognition of this, the then President of the European Commission signed “The Charter of Paris” alongside the then President of the European Council, the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, representing the EU institutions. Continuing this close involvement of the EU and the Commission in co-operation with OSCE, the Commission President also signed the document agreed at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999, entitled “A Charter for European Security” alongside the then President of the European Council, Finnish President.”¹⁰

This co-operation has developed more closely since the establishment of the European Union, by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The

development of the CSCE into OSCE in Europe in 1995 and the growth of its operational activities and capabilities in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management, democratisation (including election observation and monitoring) and post-conflict re-habilitation have also contributed to the need to promote synergies and avoid duplication.

The interaction between the EU and the OSCE underlines the significant contribution which the EU can bring to the achievement of OSCE objectives. Indeed, because of the important role already played by the EU in many OSCE countries, through its Association, Stabilisation and Association, and Partnership and Co-operation Agreements and through the PHARE, TACIS, CARDS and MEDA assistance programmes and through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, the OSCE has come to recognise the significant "added-value" which the EU brings to sustaining political stability and institution building throughout the OSCE region. The EU Agreements are based, inter alia on the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe "acquis".

There is no doubt that, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU develops in importance and effectiveness, particularly with the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty and the development of a European Security and Defence Policy and civilian crisis management capacity, the interaction between the EU and the OSCE will increase. This and the call for increased EU support for OSCE-led activities will inevitably expose the need to reassess the current role of the EU in the OSCE context. The success of the EU demonstrates that, in this world of increasing globalisation, States are not the only significant actors on the international stage, especially when it comes to early warning and conflict prevention.

3.1.7. Single European Act (SEA)

The turning point for the Community's foreign policy cooperation efforts and security policy came in December 1985 with the agreement on the Single European Act. The "single" in Single European Act refers to the fact that one and the same agreement contains the changes necessary for the establishment of internal market and an intergovernmental accord on the EPC. Title III of the SEA, Treaty provisions on European Cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, establishes a legal basis for the EPC. Article 30 provides member states that the joint formulation and the

implementation of a European foreign policy, of course under an intergovernmental structure. The association between the EPC and the Commission is one more time stated and Commission is given the role to ensure that there are no inconsistencies between the Community policies and the EPC policies in foreign policy. Though the European Parliament is also associated the foreign policy process, generally the EPC has shown the willingness to listen the views of the EP due to the fact that the intergovernmentalist nature of the foreign policy. Hence, though the structural changes had been made, the nature of the political cooperation remained the intergovernmental.

“The practical application of the SEA was set out by the foreign ministers in a decision they adopted on the occasion of the signing of the SEA in February 1986 and this decision included “details on how the European Parliament was to be associated...”¹¹ The EP would be kept informed about the EPC activities regularly. Moreover, the cooperation procedure was created by the Single European Act and that gave the EP greater legislative influence in term of creating European policies that also partly consisted in the foreign policy aspect. Thus, though ineffectively, the supranationalist nature have been started to adapt to the European foreign policy and the basis of ‘the institutionalization of the EU foreign policy making’ had been structured.

Beyond such progress, the security aspect of the SEA is undeniably important for ‘the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in Maastricht. “The first incursion of the EU into security policy came with the SEA of 1987 which opened up discussions on the political and economic aspects of security to the EPC”. In this respect, even though the SEA had been concluded during the EPC years, it is more meaningful to take it as a beginning of the CFSP process that has created a base for political union.

“The SEA also gave a new impetus to European Political Cooperation (EPC). For the first time in its history, political co-operation received a legal basis. The SEA provided the EC with a legal basis for the internal market, rules for majority voting, an outspoken commitment to further social and economic cohesion, a new role for the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure and, not least of all, a framework for further development of concerted action in the area of foreign policy.”¹²

In the early and mid-1980s, to strengthen the political cooperation and to establish the basis of the common foreign policy were in the agenda of the EU. However, there were not yet radical developments in international relations to force the EU to make it fast in this respect. Though the place and power of Europe in international arena had been changed, there was still the bipolar world and its own issues.

“When the SEA entered into force in 1987, changes had already started in world order. Especially after the Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies, the first signals of the disintegration at Eastern block had started and this was a radical change in the composition of the Europe. The collapse of communism led to the emergence of democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe that looked to the Community with great expectations and the institutional model of Western Europe was seen as a model for their success.”¹³ “Thus, when we come to late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the EU was barely scratched the surface of the foreign and security policy problematic. “Two elements were crucial in challenge confronting the EU: first, national security remained a central part of national identity and a central rationale for state policies; and second primary institutional channels for collective action in security were still those of the Cold War system, particularly NATO”.¹⁴ Therefore, the preliminary debates during the second half of the 1990 made it possible to clarify the problems that had to be mentioned. The main discussions and the questions that had to be reached a conclusion can be summarized under different groups. The main debates were about security: ‘What does the term common security policy mean?’ and ‘What would be the positions and relations of the Union, NATO and the WEU?’ The vital common interests were the other obscure element and the main questions were ‘how should they be identified?’ and ‘what would be the relations between it and the national interests?’ Another concern was the graduality and the issues were that ‘how should it be achieved?’ and ‘how would be the process and timetable?’ Lastly, the institutional structure was one of the main points being discussed: ‘how would be the framework of the Union established?’, ‘how would the decision making procedure be?’ and ‘what would be the positions and effectiveness of the Community institutions?’

3.2. DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING POST- COLD WAR

The Cold War period, ended following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, caused certain radical changes in the international arena. “None, perhaps, was so greatly welcomed as the end of Cold War. As the Berlin Wall crumbled, the Eastern Europeans took their future into their own hands and the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Cold War was declared over and the World anticipated the dawn of an unprecedented era of peace, stability and democracy. The initial optimism and euphoria have been silenced by extremely grave problems that have subsequently developed. The community of nations was either ill prepared to recognize such problems or simply too slow in preventing them. However, if one thing is certain today, it is the “change” that the international system has experienced and continues to be influenced by.”¹⁵ In the post-Cold War period the enemy was not a single State (USSR) or a single ideology (communism), but was seen rather a structure in which many ideologies or many States can be a threat. It is possible to see many examples to this from the ethnic cleaning operations in Balkans to the 9/11 attacks. After the massacre which took place in Bosnia for four years thousands of individuals were killed and millions of them were forced to leave their homes. The defense mechanism to be established against such new areas of threat cannot only have a military content but also requires political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. When we look from this perspective, with the end of the Cold War which influenced the period from the WW II to the 1990s, the necessity of making radical amendments in the security system was started to be discussed in Europe as well as in the whole World. In the new emerging European security structure, the structures such as the concept change and expansion process of NATO, European Security and Defense Identity and the ‘European Army’ were brought in the foreground. From then on, the elements threatening Europe were the elements which threaten the world peace in many fields such as ethnic conflicts which arose after the disintegration of the Soviets, international terrorism, spreading of mass destruction weapons, organized crimes, and extreme nationalism. The armies, rather being high in number, were developed to be capable of intervening immediately in a more effective manner and were tried to be modernized in order to cope with these new threats. The most organized and experienced formation against such threats was NATO at that time and NATO still has its influence on the security of Europe. However, preferred to ensure the security of its own region after the

Cold War and has shown the CFSP by adding it to the columns of Maastricht Treaty. A sensitive manner was adopted in the relations with NATO; nevertheless, the longing for an independent European defense was expressed in every occasion. The significance of NATO on the European security until the end of Cold War is undeniable. Therefore, since Europe establishing its own defense system will bring a great bother, certain hesitations emerged in the approaches of the Member States to this issue. However, in a formation like EU, an independent, common foreign and security policy has a vital importance.

During the Cold War period the foreign policy balances were established on the dual pole world axis. Europe also approached to such balance elements with the wait-and-see policy for a long time and could not be the active element of the foreign policy. By the end of Cold War, the future of the Union and its role to be adopted in the new order was started to be discussed. Who will ensure the security of Europe in the new order and what kind of a role the Union will adopt in the world scene formed the foci of the discussions as problems waiting for solutions. Creating a common security policy in a Unity consisting of many different nations does not seem to be a realistic idea nevertheless it is true that the three major forces in EU, namely Germany, France and UK will be able to establish a common foreign and security policy. Therefore I will try to explain the approach of these three developed forces to the CFSP in the later sections.

3.2.1. Common Foreign and Security Policy in Founding Agreements

3.2.1.1. Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP

The EU wishes to extend the success it accomplished also to cover the foreign policy. And this brings the necessity of EU having a single foreign policy identity.

With the European Union Treaty (EUT) which was ratified in Maastricht in December 1992 and was enacted on November 1, 1993, the CFSP gained its first official presence. The CFSP is regulated in the second column of fifth section of EUT.

The objectives of the EU regarding the CFSP are stated in Article J.1 (2) of the EUT:

- to protect the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to fortify the security of the Union and Member States in every aspect;

- to maintain peace and to strengthen international cooperation;
- to develop and reinforce the democracy and rule of law and human rights and freedoms.

In order to implement these objectives, it is decided ‘to establish a systematic cooperation between the Member States and joint action should be taken in order to reserve the common interests of the Member States’ (Article J. 1(3) of the EUT). Communication channels were developed within the CFSP provisions in order to enhance cooperation. The provision on information which states that member states will be informed via the Council in cases where they have common interests in matters of foreign and security policies is an example of how communication is ensured.

The CFSP replaced the European Political Cooperation (EPC) with the European Union Treaty’s entry into the force. Arrangements were made within the EUT in the areas of both foreign policy and common security policy. This is specified clearly in the EUT as follows: “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security objectives” (Article J.1 (1) of the EUT).

It is possible to say that the EUT does not bring any innovations beyond the intergovernmental status on the CFSP. Rather a course of action which comes out in the form of solidarity of the members is observed. Due to the convention, the EU Member States, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity, actively and sincerely, commit to support the foreign and security policies of the Union and to avoid from any kind of action which divergent from the interest of EU and is likely to damage its activity as a uniting power in international relations (Article J.1 (4) of the EUT). As it is seen in this Article, the spirit of mutual solidarity is important; however, how this spirit will rise behind the curtain of nationalistic perceptions of the Member States after the Cold War is another discussion.

EUT is a convention which brings the character and aims of the CFSP under the light. For this reason, two new foreign policy instruments, so-called ‘common attitude’ and ‘joint action’, are established. However, the principle of ‘unanimity’ renders the partnership in such issues disputatious. Only on the issue of joint action, the principle of ‘qualified majority’ is adopted. Thus, establishing a common defense policy which will finally in the long run lead to a common defense system that covers the entire issues

related with the EU's security, is adopted (Article J.4(1) of the EUT). Deliberate steps are taken in this issue and it is emphasized that this is not an independent defense identity. However, the function of implementing the decisions and actions related with the EU's defense is laid on the Western Europe Union (WEU). Thus, it is foreseen that WEU will be developed as the defense wing of EU and the European Side of NATO (Article J. (4) of the EUT). In 1992 WEU confirmed the responsibility of NATO and limited its operations with the Petersberg Tasks.

However, the Member States not being ready to leave their nationalistic identities puts a great deal of pressure on the EU in terms of having a single voice in a supra-national issue. And this causes the EU to fall into a hard position in terms of a more effective foreign policy role. The CFSP, arising from the Maastricht Treaty, has been criticised because of its performance in the international conflicts taking place in Europe. For example, it was not able to form a common policy in the cases like, the EU's overlooking the genocide in Bosnia, which took place in former Yugoslavia, its attitude in Kosovo, and its attitude in the Gulf War. In these crises, the EU failed both in foreign policies and defense policies. Member states have continued their own foreign policy since combining the foreign and security policies under a supranational framework is not as easy as the economic integration. And this turned the EU into an implementor of decisions taken, rather than a decision-maker.

3.2.1.2. Amsterdam Treaty and the CFSP

“One of the main purposes of the inter-Governmental Conference which led to the signature of the draft Amsterdam Treaty was to make common foreign and security policy (CFSP) more effective and to equip the Union better for its role in international politics.”¹⁶ Saying farewell to the crises experienced in the Eastern Europe in the 20th century and the EU being inadequate for this situation right next to it rendered it indispensable to make reformist amendments in foreign policy. In the face of the EU's weakness during the Yugoslavia Crisis, the image of NATO holding the EU's security, the recognition of the US as the only super power in the world following the end of the cold war, and the EU's failure to produce policies alternative to those of the US, caused the EU to revise its position in terms of foreign policy. Within this framework, amending the relevant articles of the Maastricht Treaty and making legal regulations

which will enable the EU to intervene more actively to the international events became an absolute necessity.

The Foreign Ministers of the EU Member States have signed the Amsterdam Treaty on October 2, 1997. This Treaty was enacted on May 1, 1999. Articles between 11 and 28 of the EUT are allocated to the issue of the CFSP. We see that the decision making structure of the CFSP is formed as follows:

- The decisions will again be taken on the basis of unanimity; however, abstaining parties will not hinder reaching the decisions.
- Where the rate of votes of the abstaining parties is greater than one thirds the decision will be invalid.
- The Council shall be able to reach decision with the qualified majority regarding implementing the decisions taken on the CFSP.

As can be understood from these articles, although various important developments were gained by the Amsterdam Treaty, the reluctance of member states in elevating the CFSP from the intergovernmental level to the supragovernmental level has limited the changes brought about by the Amsterdam Treaty. The leading change that was made by the Amsterdam Treaty, is the ability to make a decision with the qualified majority. The Council was formerly making decisions in the field of the CFSP on the basis of consensus.

In spite of these innovations, we can say that it is impossible to block the Member States carrying their nation-state identities to the foreground. In such a case, it is possible to say that canceling the unanimity principle in decision making is the best solution because the principle of unanimity in a Union which reached to the member number of 25 hinders establishing an active foreign policy.

The most significant innovation brought to the CFSP by the Amsterdam Treaty is establishing the High Representative Office. In October 1999, former Spanish Foreign Minister and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana Madariaga were brought to this position for a term of five years. We can say that this is a significant development in terms of increasing the activity of the EU's foreign policy. Amsterdam Treaty stipulates close institutional relationships should be developed between EU and WEU. Again with

the same Treaty it is concluded that WEU is an integral part of EU (Article 17). Thus, it is signaled that significant steps will be taken in the defense issues. However, WEU did not have an active defense organization identity since the date it was established because not all of the EU Member States are included in WEU and this causes the EU's inability to put an active attitude in the security policy. Within this framework, the EU forming an active defense policy turned out to be an important issue.

UK and France joined in the Saint-Malo Summit on December 4, 1998 and published a joint declaration on implementing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) principles of the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997. Here 'the necessity the Union to form an operational unit supported with an effective military power having the capacity of autonomous action in order to respond to the international crises' was emphasized. It is possible to say that the foundation of ESDP is laid thus. However, it is also stated that the unit to be formed should be in harmony with NATO.

Forming a joint defense unit seems to be compulsory for an active the CFSP. However, it is undeniable that NATO is still the single power in the security of Europe. In this context it is hard for the EU to establish a common defense policy independent from NATO. In addition, most of the EU members being also a member of NATO causes the EU to form an independent common defense policy nearly impossible in the medium term.

The main aim in the innovations brought by the Amsterdam Treaty is "to establish a common strategic frame on foreign policy, security and defense issues and to establish an active ESDP independent from NATO which is under control of the USA." However, the innovations were inadequate for an active ESDP as seen in the Yugoslavia Crisis.

3.2.1.3. Treaty of Nice and the CFSP

We can say that the EU is determined for establishing a common foreign and security policy. However, the EU could not yet form a system to which the entire members participate actively in the institutionalized field of the CFSP. Especially as I stated before, the unanimity principle in decision-making casts the greatest hindrance before this system. The EU, being aware of realizing a common attitude on foreign policy and of the necessity to make a legal revision in this issue, took new decisions on the CFSP

in the EU Council Summit carried out in Nice. The implementation area thus reinforced with these decisions was then enlarged to include the CFSP.

With the provisions laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty, I stated that the WEU is an integral part of the EU and thus the EU integration was tried to be ensured. The integration to EU of the WEU could only be realized with the Nice Summit. With the Treaty of Nice signed on February 26, 2001, the crisis management functions of the WEU are included in the EU. Thus the provisions between the EU and the WEU are cancelled and Article 17 of the EUT was amended. Innovations such as improving the military capacity of EU or establishing a permanent political and military structure are among the positive developments for the CFSP of the EU.

The Treaty of Nice brought the provision stating that in cases where it is hard for the Union to realize all of the aims, the Member States (minimum eight Member States) can establish an ‘increased cooperation’ between themselves (Article 27).

“Article 27a:

1. Enhanced cooperation in any of the areas referred to in this Title shall be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene. It shall respect:

- the principles, objectives, general guidelines and consistency of the common foreign and security policy and the decisions taken within the framework of that policy;
- the powers of the European Community, and
- consistency between all the Union's policies and its external activities.

2. Articles 11 to 27 and Articles 27b to 28 shall apply to the enhanced cooperation provided for in this Article, save as otherwise provided in Article 27c and Articles 43 to 45.

Article 27b

Enhanced cooperation pursuant to this Title shall relate to implementation of a joint action or a common position. It shall not relate to matters having military or defence implications.

Article 27c

Member States which intend to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves under Article 27b shall address a request to the Council to that effect.”¹⁷

However, the limitation that this cooperation can only be related with implementing joint action or position, or with the security and defense initiatives which contribute to obtaining weapon initiatives or crisis management capabilities, fortifies the belief that this is a restricted provision in practical terms.

3.2.1.4. Amendments Made in the Draft Constitution Regarding the CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) and the duties and responsibilities of the EU institutions within the context of these policies are laid down in general in the “Special Provisions – Implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy” under Chapter IV and V of Section of the EU’s Draft Constitution and in Chapter V, the Foreign Relations of the Union, under Section III of the Agreement.

Assigning a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs found in Article I-28 is the first one among these regulations. High Representative of the CFSP is known as “Mr. the CFSP.” The Constitution pulls this representation to an institutional level. In Article I-28 of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs will pursue the common foreign policy and the security policy of the Union. In Article III-296 it is stated that the Minister of Foreign Affairs will represent the Union in the CFSP issues. Assigning the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be performed by the European Council in agreement with the Commission. An important point here is the fact that assignment is not made by unanimity but by qualified majority. In addition, another important amendment in terms of the duty of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who will first take over the duty of the High Representative of the CFSP, which is a position occupied previously by the Council Secretary General,

will take place in the body of Commission, not the body of the Council in the Draft Constitution. Minister of Foreign Affairs at the same time will be the Vice Chairmen of the Commission. This amendment bears a grave importance in giving the position a strong communication means between the Council and the Commission in the functioning of the CFSP.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the position of vice chairmanship of the Commission, is responsible from pursuing the foreign relations and carrying out the other issues of the foreign affairs of the Union in coordination. Union Minister of Foreign Affairs will work in close contact with the Member States in foreign policy issues. The diplomat representatives of the Union in foreign countries and in international organizations will strive to implement the joint actions adopted by the Union (Article III-301).

In Article III-294 it is laid down that the foreign policy and security policy of the Union will define and pursue a common foreign policy and security policy in the context of the targets and principles of the foreign actions. The Member States will support the common foreign policy and security policy actively and unconditionally, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. In paragraph 3 of the same article the following instruments to be used by the Union in order to reach these aims are stated:

- Defining the general outlines;
- Accepting the European decisions in the following issues:
 - Actions of the Union;
 - Attitudes of the Union;
 - Ensuring that the actions and attitudes are implemented;
- Fortifying the systematic cooperation between the Member States in pursuing the policy.

In Article III-297 et seq. adopting the European decisions is stated. The definition of the European decisions is given in Article I-33. Accordingly, the European Decisions are "actions out of legislation, which are binding within their wholeness. A decision in which the addressee is stated shall be binding only on the addressee(s)".

In Article III-300, stipulates that the European Decision mentioned in this section (THE CFSP) shall be adopted by unanimity by the Council.

When the abovementioned provisions are considered as a whole, it is clearly evident that at international cooperation is not abandoned in the CFSP in the Draft Constitution and that the operations to be carried out will not be subject the adjudication of the International Court of Justice. Truly, besides areas in which the decisions will be taken by qualified majority in the foreign policy field, there will also be many issues on which decision will be taken by unanimity (Article I-40/6 and Section III, Article I-300/1). Taking decisions by qualified majority is only possible in the following 4 situations laid down in Article III-300/2:

- When adopting the European decisions on the Union actions and attitudes based on a decision of the European Council on the strategic interests and targets of the Union;
- When adopting a decision on the Union's actions and attitudes based on a request from the Minister of Foreign Affairs with own initiative of the European Council or on a suggestion submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on his or her own initiative;
- When adopting a European decision on implementing a Union action or attitude;
- When adopting a European decision by assigning a special representative in accordance with Article III-302.

When the decisions taken by the qualified majority are examined, pursuant to the abovementioned EUT, it is evident that a serious expansion is not observed in the decisions to be taken by qualified majority. And this is an indication of not passing from the desired level of unanimity to the qualified majority with the Draft Constitution.

Draft does not contain radical amendments in terms of defense policy also. Issues such as competing with NATO or ending the impartiality of certain States are not under consideration (I-41). In addition, establishing a European Defense Agency on the defense issues takes place in the Draft (I-41 and III-311). Thus, more than one State allocating time and money to the same issue will be prevented. Possibility of the Union to intervene in cases of terrorist attack or natural disaster takes place in the Draft (I-41).

The EU Council determines the strategic interests and aims of the Union in implementing the CFSP (I-40/2), prepares the general frame of the policies under the directive given by the Council of Ministers, the State or Government Presidents, and the EU Council and the Council of Ministers takes the necessary decisions. The Union Minister of Foreign Affairs will implement the CFSP by utilizing the Union's resources or the national resources (I-40/4). The Parliament will be consulted regularly on the basic orientations of the CFSP and the Parliament will be informed on the development of the CFSP (I-40/8).

On the Foreign Relations section of the Union a wider area is granted to the Parliament. However, in this section which inspires from the abovementioned the CFSP and CDSP provisions the Parliament's intervention to the process on taking and implementing decisions on the Union's foreign relations are held limited.

Under this context, the Minister of Foreign Affairs will consult to the Parliament on the basic orientations of the CFSP as well as CDSP and will ensure that the opinion of the Parliament is considered duly (III-304). The Minister of Foreign Affairs on the development of the CFSP, including CDSP, will inform the Parliament regularly.

Pursuant to the current Conventions in effect, the Council is superior to Parliament in terms of sharing authorities between the EU institutions. It is observed that this approach is not changed in the Draft Constitutional Convention. The decision makers on the CFSP are the States and the implementing party is the Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. The role of the Parliament in this process is more limited with producing ideas on documents and making negotiations on the implementation of the CFSP.

Consequently, it is possible to say that the Draft Constitution does not form a turning point in starting an active cooperation process on the CFSP. In this sense, it is not possible to mention a "Union" on the common foreign and defense policy in Europe. The reluctance in the Member States in forming common foreign and defense policies hinders mentioning a real integration in this sense. As it is seen in the attacks commenced under the leadership of the USA in 2003, the EU cannot act as a "Union" in the international conflicts, on the contrary the national foreign policies pursued in the traditional sense are sensed totally.

3.2.1.5. Lizbon Treaty and the CFSP

Disapproving the European Constitution by referendum in France and in the Netherlands in 2005 was an important crisis of identity for EU. Therefore, It was thought that Lizbon Treaty would be survival for EU. Lizbon Treaty was signed in 2007. Its contents are broadly similar with European Constitution. The purpose of this Treaty is to bring in dynamic and to put a new face to EU that has 27 members. Lizbon Treaty would supersede Nice Treaty, which entered into force and would be a main document for corporate identity.

One of the most important change which Treaty brought in was single representation in foreign policy. This Treaty joined the duties of High Representative who is responsible from CFSP and the duties of Commissioner who is responsible for foreign relations. The duty of High Representative is to represent the CFSP of EU internationally. European External Action Service which is consisted of Council, Commission and other authorized officials from national diplomatic services is a new establishment for being of assistance to High Representative. High Representative responsible from CFSP is Vice President of Commission at the same time and is appointed for renewable 2,5 years. So, this situation brings consistent foriegn relations and foreign policy to EU.

To launch an appeal to the Union and to other member countries by a member state within the terms of "solidarity clause", which is being target for terrorist attacks is the other important development in CFSP.

Lizbon Treaty signed by European Leaders in December, 2007 is expected to enter into force in 2009.

3.2.2. Establishments and Approaches Related to Security and Defense

3.2.2.1. European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)

In the post-Cold War era, tendencies that were already recognisable but not well defined at the end of the Cold War have become clearer. New opportunities have emerged to strengthen security, stability and peace. However, new risks to security have also become evident, necessitating a comprehensive definition of security. The main

emphasis of such a comprehensive definition should no doubt be security through co-operation.

“There is no an overwhelming consensus that in the post-Cold War era, the risk of a massive military confrontation in Europe is almost entirely non-existent and that the ideological division of Europe is brought to an end. On the other hand, the relative but uneasy stability during the bipolar system has given way to a vacuum. Europe faces new security risks and uncertainties mainly due to this vacuum. The series of crises that engulfed former Yugoslavia are concrete examples of such risks and uncertainties. On the other hand, the greater Mediterranean basin continues to be of strategic importance to Europe and a hot bed of military and non-military challenges.”¹⁸ European powers should be co-ordinated in an overarching co-operation and a wide institutional consensus.

“Since the declaration from the British-French Summit in St. Malo that new chapter has opened – a chapter entitled ESDP. It should be possible for this to finally rectify the deficiencies that have plagued both NATO and the EU for years: the asymmetry in the military capabilities between the US and Europe and the lack of an effective and workable European crisis management role in cases where NATO as a whole was not engaged.”¹⁹

At the EU’s Helsinki Summit, ambitious goals were set. First one was the establishment of a Political and Security Committee to provide advice to EU leaders on security issues, as well as day-to-day political leadership of EU-led operations. Second goal was the creation of a Military Committee and staff to provide military advice to the Political and Security Committee and to carry out their directions during potential operations.

3.2.2.2. European Security and Defense Policy and European Security Strategy

As I mentioned above paragraph, following the end of the WW II, the Europeans have been in an effort to create a mechanism which will ensure their security. NATO played the leading role in ensuring the security and defense of Europe during the Cold War period. After the end of the Cold War period and the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty, the form and dimension of the threats to Europe were changed and consequently the efforts to form a more independent security structure gained acceleration. The desire to be more active in foreign and security policies out of economy played a significant

role in the acceleration and deepening of the integration process of the EU. “In this context, EU tried to “develop a common security policy, covering all questions relating to its security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. This policy could lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide, subject to a decision adopted by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

In addition to appointing Javier Solana as the first "High Representative for the CFSP", the Cologne European Council meeting in June 1999 placed crisis management tasks (known as the “Petersberg tasks”) at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP. These crisis management tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat-force in crisis management, including peacemaking.

European Council decided that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”.²⁰

The document drafted by Javier Solana, the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, under the title “Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy” was ratified in defense and security issues.

“European Security Strategy identifies the global challenges and key threats to the security of the Union and clarifies its strategic objectives in dealing with them, such as building security in the EU's neighbourhood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. It also assesses the policy implications that these objectives have for Europe.

In this document it is emphasized that the possibility of any EU Member State being target to an attack is abolished, however Europe faces more varied and less predictable threats and the threats which Europe is subject to, namely terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, regional conflicts, disintegrating states and organized crime, are listed as key threats.

- Terrorism: Concerted European action against terrorism is indispensable. Terrorism puts lives at risk and seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies. It arises out of complex causes, including the pressures of

modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.

- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): This is potentially the greatest threat to our security. International treaty régimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD, but we are entering a new and dangerous period. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.
- Regional conflicts: These can have a direct or indirect impact on European interests, regardless of their geographical location. They pose a threat to minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. They can lead to extremism and terrorism and provoke state failure.
- State failure: Civil conflict and bad governance - corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - corrode States from within. This can lead to a collapse of state institutions. Afghanistan under the Taliban is a well-known example. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability.
- Organised crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime, which has an important external dimension, namely trafficking in drugs, women, children and arms, which does not stop at the Union's borders. Such criminal activity is often associated with weak or failing states. For example, revenues from drugs have helped to undermine state structures in several drug-producing countries. Organised crime can have links with terrorism. In extreme cases, it can come to dominate the State.²¹

Furthermore, the EU document, by stating that phenomena such as good government, democracy, human rights, support to social and political reforms, rule of law, etc. in order to fortify the international order, indicates the role that civilian measures can play a role beside the military precautions and brings clarity to how the EU positions itself in the security issues.

“In May 2002, the EU conducted its first Crisis Management Exercise (CME 02) in the framework of the ESDP. In November 2003, the EU and NATO conducted a joint Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03). A third Crisis Management Exercise (CME 04) was conducted by the EU in May 2004. The first Military Exercise (MILEX 05) was conducted in November 2005.

The EU will conduct its second military exercise (MILEX 07) from 7 June to 15 June 2007 in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Milex 07 is a Command Post Exercise (CPX) and will focus on the key military aspects of crisis management. No troops will be deployed. During the conduct of the exercise the EU Operations Centre (EU OpsCentre), composed of military and civilian elements, will be activated for the first time.”²²

3.2.2.3. The idea of foundation the European army

In the Washington Summit of 1999, an independent defense force for EU under the title of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which would be accepted both by the EU and the USA, was decided to be formed through decisions of which institutional side was influencing. The USA tried to relate the attempt of “European Army”, which it new that it could not prevent the foundation of, with NATO. With the article “NATO grants the autonomous intervention right to the EU to the crises which NATO does not participate in as a whole”, the area of intervention of the “European Army” was limited with the areas in which NATO would not be present. Having the USA to accept an independent “European Army” was important for the EU, however, determining the areas by NATO was important for the USA.

We can explain the motive of the EU to create an independent armed force while there is an organization such as NATO and while almost all of the EU Member States are NATO members at the same time as follows: every State (or union of States), opening to the world for economic and financial competition, should have a political and military power equal to its level of opening. Armed struggle is “one step beyond” of economic struggle and a State (or union of States) which does not have its own armed force means that it lost the race right at the beginning.

WEU was substituted with the ESDI with a decision reached in the 50th anniversary meeting of NATO. 15 EU Member States, France being the first, started to express that

they would ensure their own security and will create an EU armed force separate from NATO and would realize this definitely. As a matter of fact, France in the EU is famous with the importance it places on the military power, armament and weapon industry, and harsh attitude towards NATO.

ESDI orienting towards concrete issues by substituting the WEU, started a complex discussion period between the EU Member States just as the case between the EU and the USA. Former Defense Deputy Secretary of State Richard Perle, one of the former foreign policy consultants of George Bush stated that “Some States of the EU recourse to certain methods for a time in order to marginalize NATO by decreasing its importance and substituting it with a new decision structure based on the EU Membership. This attempt excludes the USA and Turkey. In other words, Turkey and the USA are tried to be left out of the issue just because of the burning ambition of France and other certain States.” The response of Jacques Chirac, the former President of France, for such approaches was very evident: “The European Defense Force will operate in coordination with the NATO Alliance; however, it will definitely be independent.”

As it is known, France was the pioneer in the idea of an independent European Defense. Starting from the middle of 1950s, France was opposing the military superiority of the USA on Europe. President Charles de Gaulle suggested that many headquarters created and activities carried out by NATO on the international level meant trampling on the France sovereignty. France officially withdrew from the military side of NATO in 1966 and expelled forces under NATO from its territories.

As a result of these developments, France made great investments in the weapon industry and therefore became one of the largest weapon producers in the world. ESDI developing in an independent medium separate from the USA meant that France would have a large weapon market.

Another view on the issue came from General Sir Charles Guthrie, former General Staff of the UK. Charles Guthrie suggested that the idea of the French for forming the command level of the European Army totally out of NATO could cause separation in the alliance and this could be the beginning of a way which may lead up to the USA withdrawing from NATO. Moreover Guthrie said that in the case of such a separation,

the UK could withdraw its forces from the European force and that there were significant conflicts of opinion between France and the UK on the active role of the USA in the skirmishes in the world.

In the EU Summit held in Nice in December 2000, following intense discussions between the UK and France, an average decision was reached on the ESDI which also satisfied the USA. Pursuant to the decisions taken in Nice, the ESDI would not be formed independent from NATO and would benefit from the NATO's opportunities in the operations.

One year later, in the Laeken Summit held in December 2001, important decisions were taken on the "EU Army" – which took the name European Security and Defense Policy – ESDP from then on) and on NATO. The EU took one step further in Laeken and decided that "the European Intervention Force would be operations before settling an agreement with NATO." In the explanation made by Guy Verhofstadt, the Belgium Prime Minister and the Term Chairman of the EU accepted that the opportunities of a European Army without NATO would be restricted, however, he did not refrain from explaining their true aims: "We decided to render the ESDP operational. In the beginning we have restricted opportunities. We will wait to come to an understanding with NATO."

The Ministers of Defense of the EU Member States met in Brussels in 2000 and declared that they decided to establish an Emergency Intervention Force consisting of 100 thousand soldiers, 400 war aircrafts, and 100 war ships, and that this formation would be at a level to ensure the political and strategic control of the operations to be carried out by the EU up to 2003. Presidents of the States and governments of the EU Member States, following the meeting in Brussels, met again in Helsinki in 2000 and declared that they reached to an agreement on the draft report on ESDI and ratified the document.

In the declared document it was stated that "the EU would form political – military organs in the ESDI context and would play roles in the operations of crisis management and preserving peace within the framework of cooperation with NATO" and that "Cooperation, consultation and dialogue warranty would be given to the NATO allies

which are non-EU Member States, however, the decision mechanism would be structured totally within the institutional frame of the EU.”

In the Helsinki Summit, held in December 1999, on year after Saint-Malo, the EU decided to make the “European Army”, which was entitled as ESDI then, to intervene to the conflicts which may arise in Europe and surroundings and to establish an emergency force of 60 thousand men until 2003.

Long meetings and high tension discussions were led on the ESDI issue in the Nice Summit of December 2000. In Nice, the main argument on the European Emergency Intervention Force was experienced between the UK – on behalf of the USA – and France, and as a result of the persistent attitude of the UK, the USA was successful in postponing the formation of an independent military force out of NATO to a future date. We can say that the tension is still hot between the EU and the USA on the ESDI issue. The EU is definitely resolute on establishing an “European Army” by having a pure initiative on the decision making processes. However the USA wishes that the European Defense Force is established in connection with itself through NATO and that it has a voice on this force.

3.2.2.4. The EU and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In this section my thesis, I would like mention about the view of EU to WMD and terrorism and examine the behaviours of EU and EU member states on these subjects. I would like to find what EU and member states did about WMD and terrorism related to CFSP. Also, I would like to find whether EU had a joint position or not and whether member states proceed the joint position.

Upon the inevitability of the European Community acting as a global political power in the post-Cold War period and the abolishment of the strategic structure regulating the international system for long years, as I mentioned before, with the Maastricht Agreement the European leaders defined the CFSP as one of the three bases of the EU, being aware that these conditions constitute new threats and therefore new responsibilities. However, as a result of the bulkiness of the decision making mechanisms of the EU and a union environment based heavily on economy being left at an insufficient position in establishing political / military partnership, the CFSP was left on paper for a while.

With the attacks which took place on September 11, 2001 in New York and right after that in Madrid, Istanbul and London, the threat faced by the EU started to be more tangible and the possible position for the EU in response to this began to become clear. Upon this, with the purpose of the union expressing what is understood from the concept of security, a strategy document entitled “European Security Strategy (ESS)” was drafted and this document was accepted at the end of 2003. This document bears the quality of a response for the doctrine created by the USA regarding the concepts “new world order” and “war on terrorism.” The EU aims to find the ways which will resolve the issues out of its sovereignty, out of its borders, by positive actions. The methods aimed to be followed for this renders the sovereignty understanding of the EU to be different from that of the USA. We can explain this understanding with the “good governance” (governmentality) concept of Foucault: “The factors ruining the stability should be imprisoned at the place they emerge by disciplining that place.” Thus, it is aimed that the factors spoiling the stability does not affect the peace and security of the EU.

This rather different understanding shows itself in handling the WMD threat which was defined as a fundamental element of the CFSP. In the report entitled “The Outline of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of the WMD” presented by the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana in April 2003, the significance of the WMD was stated as follows:

- WMD are different from other weapons due to the reason that they give an instability to the international relations system instead of giving only physical damage when they are used.
- Actors out of State being in endeavor to possess these weapons present a special danger.

In this document it was also stated that the strategy will be based on a general assessment of the global proliferation threats and a global area of responsibility was determined for the EU and it is suggested that the EU’s security will be dependent on the security and stability of especially the Mediterranean region. Besides, the “Declaration on Preventing the Proliferation of the WMD” was published in the Thessalonica Summit of June 2003 and in December 2003 the “Strategy against the

Proliferation of the WMD” (the WMD Strategy) was accepted. The grounds for the fight to be made against WMD were explained with the interests of the EU and the new sovereignty understanding of the EU was mentioned in these documents. In the documents, different from the usual in international relations, a different definition is made for threat with the idea that the threat “may not be assessed only based on the intentions and competences of the enemy and the vulnerabilities of the EU, but also with the incompetence of the existing control and administration regimes”, and the policy options were formed over this definition.

In order to research by which methods can the EU instruments support the CFSP actions against the proliferation of WMD, drafting a Pilot Project by the end of 2003 was proposed by the European Parliament. This project requested by the Commission from the UN Institute of Disarmament Researches (UNIDIR) was assigned to the Stockholm Peace Researches Institute (SIPRI). In the report presented by SIPRI in a conference held in Brussels, two points were emphasized in order to explain the specific threat caused by the WMD and the strategy it requires. These points were the materials required for producing such weapons having double use and the weapons being possessed by the out of state organizations.

Now the foundations of SIPRI on these two components should be discussed in more detail under the light of the intellectual possibilities which the international relations theory grants us.

Dual use means that the materials required for the production of the weapons can also be used in producing the civil-peaceful technologies having economic purposes as well as military technologies. As an example, we can say that enriched uranium can be used both in the nuclear power plants as fuel, in other words in producing electricity, and in the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives. Likewise, Iran wishing to produce its own enriched uranium as a part of its own nuclear energy program caused a crisis because Iran was suspected to aim producing nuclear weapons. However, similar crises on nuclear weapons are rather caused by political perception problem.

As known, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are meant with the Weapons of Mass Destruction. In order to prevent the proliferation of these weapons great international efforts are shown. And in order to prevent the proliferation, one of the

greatest factors is the regulations which bind the signatory countries such as international treaties or conventions. The nuclear weapons occupy the first line to the magnitude of the effect they create. For this reason, holding nuclear technologies subject to security priorities and establishing an international regime for the control of nuclear weapons made it possible to control the operations. Besides the agreements on limiting various strategic weapons signed by the USA and the Soviet Union, the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 regulate the nuclear weapons regime. Pursuant to NPT, the signatory parties are obliged to sign a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Within the context of such agreements, the IAEA has the right to carry out audits on the nuclear materials used in peaceful nuclear activities of the signatory states. In addition, as a result of the work started in 1993, the Additional Protocol for expanding the authorities and scope of audits of the IAEA was presented for the ratification of the states in 2000s. However, current examples show that establishing such an effective mechanism does not allow an effective implementation (such as examples of North Korea, Iraq and Iran). Other these agreements, there is the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which pursue the aim of protecting the nuclear materials physically, and there are Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group, which were created in 1974 and 1978 by the nuclear supplier countries on the international level and which aims to control the export of such materials in order to prevent them being used in nuclear weapon production.

Radiological weapons which are occasionally evaluated with the nuclear weapons damages living organisms not with a nuclear explosion but with radioactive radiation and require much simpler technology than the nuclear weapons. For instance, radiological radiation devices, known as “dirty bomb” radiates radioactive materials in the surroundings with conventional explosions.

Nuclear materials and radiological materials are registered and kept in accordance with special standards and every kind of trade and use of such materials require permission. However, the illegal trafficking of the unregistered materials came on the agenda especially in the years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and The Data Base on Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and other Radioactive Sources (ITDB)

was established under the IAEA for fighting with illicit trafficking. Illicit materials caught at the customs controls carried out at the borders of the States or by other methods are reported to this database system.

The definition, possible uses, and the threats of the biological weapons have always been vague compared to nuclear weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention does not have the power to supervise and apply sanctions. Since microorganism can copy themselves in short times, it is possible to produce biological weapons at dangerous levels with very small amounts and this makes it hard to classify and supervise the biological weapons.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is the WMD convention which contains the most effective obligations. However, if the efforts of the States which are not signatories of this convention (Israel, Egypt, Syria, and North Korea) and the out of State actors are considered, it can be seen that this is not a satisfactory guarantee. Blocking these actors access to the materials used for producing chemical weapons is very hard.

Besides the abovementioned points for preventing the proliferation of the WMD, many international regulations such as Control Regime for Rocket Technologies, Wassenaar Arrangement, Australia Group are present.

In these regulations one of the commitments of the signatory states is to make regulations in a manner to ensure that their national legislations to fulfill these commitments.

3.2.2.4.1. Out of state actors acquiring WMDs

Mechanisms foreseen by the doctrine for government based dissuasiveness which was developed under the Cold War conditions do not have the same binding effect on the terrorist organizations. Monitoring the activities, determining the aims of such organizations and applying counter-sanctions is very hard; for instance, terrorist organizations are exempt to hindrances such as international law or blockade.

However, the terrorist organizations should follow a theory. Terrorist attacks generally aim to create an effect on the observer than the target and thus aims to create a mass sensitivity according to a pre-determined program. Therefore, the organizations to avoid from mass destruction actions which will bring them opposite to the society can be

expected. Nevertheless, all of the possible measures should be taken to prevent terrorist organizations to obtain the materials used in WMD production.

3.2.2.4.2. The EU and the WMD threat

The EU's perception of threat is revealed as a result of comparing the intentions and capabilities of the attacker with the vulnerabilities in the defense. In other words, when it comes to the EU and WMD, easiness of accessing weapons is a factor fortifying the sufficiency for attack. Generally it is not possible to determine intentions. And the vulnerability is found in the structure of the EU communities. This perception expresses that the attackers have many suitable targets and many channels to reach their aims and that it is very hard for the community to defend itself in such a situation. The drinking water, energy distribution, transportation and communication networks can be targeted in crowded cities. The London attack showed that there is not much to do to stop an attacker having an intention.

If we consider these conditions, it will be much more appropriate for the EU to approach the WMD not with the frame of a threat concept focusing on the intentions of the enemy but with the understanding of risk management and to determine the measures to be taken as a result of assessing the possible threat and the potential damages.

The fact that a threat coming directly from the states sharing borders with the EU does not seem to be possible does not cancel the risk totally. WMD programs being present in any part of the world will be a potential threat to the EU and its interests. For this reason, the EU has interests in preventing the production, proliferation, and use of the WMD in the world.

In the action plan presented for the foreseen action in the pilot project report of SIPRI, issues such as fortifying the multilateral agreements and auditing mechanisms, implementing export controls coordinated nationally and internationally, preventing illicit supply efforts, and to assist cooperative threat reduction programs.

3.2.2.4.3. Limits of the EU as a strategic actor

When we examine the recent Iran nuclear crisis in order to evaluate whether the CFSP and WMD strategies supported the EU in its route to be a strategic actor, we find out

that the EU itself is not yet one of the actors which come to the mind in the first place. It is not possible to say that the CFSP High Representative, which was given as a response to former USA National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger's question "Who should I call if I want to talk with Europe?" gained this function. In fact, the addressees of the ones who wish to talk with Europe are three States having the authority, namely Germany, France and the UK. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of these three States held negotiations with Iran in order to stop its uranium enrichment works and to cooperate more closely with the IAEA.

Although this development is considered as an initiative in which the EU's vision appeared, it is also an indication that the EU could not reach to an activity in which it can represent juristic personality with its own institutions in international security issues. Two reasons may be suggested regarding the status of the EU during the Iran crisis. The first one is the lack of a program on this region although it is stated that the EU's security depends on the security of the Mediterranean region on the WMD issues, and the second one is the issue of structural problems of the EU.

3.2.2.5. The EU and terrorism

Terrorism is a criminal act against the humanity. Terrorist actions pose a serious threat against international peace and security. Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which were directed to the United States of America, revealed the gravity of threat that is posed against humanity by terrorism. These attacks also showed the fact that, for the international society, it is required to act together and in cooperation in the global war against the trouble of terrorism.

These terrorist actions also marked that terrorism doesn't have boundaries and thus, no country is exempted from the threat of terrorism. Because terrorism can not be associated with any religion, culture, geographical area, or ethnicity. War on terrorism is the world's common struggle.

3.2.2.5.1. European Union's fight against terrorism

Besides the USA that was directly affected by the attacks, a lot of changes have been experienced in both national and international security policies after September 11. We can say that the European Union, following the USA, has experienced the foremost change in this issue. Before the September 11 attacks, security problems in the EU had

been assessed under the sovereign rights of the member states and handled on an intergovernmental level. However, due to the increasing security concerns after September 11, the EU has aimed to streamline the third column, which includes the police and judicial cooperation; and therefore it has made a great deal of modifications in its own legislation in this framework. Through its issued decisions and declarations, the EU has endeavoured to close up the legislations of member states in the field of the war on terrorism. In this process, cooperation among the member states has become stronger; besides this, a close cooperation among Europol, police and judicial units of the member states, and the units of USA has been constructed with the strengthening of the transatlantic connections of the Union's police and judicial units. We can mention an Americanisation in the security perception of the EU, which was unable to make a definition of terrorism within the Union itself and was trying to form a common concept out of the acts of crime. Following the London attacks and the Madrid attacks, the attitudes and policies envisaging the use of military methods along with the police methods, point out the influence of USA policies on the Union.

In the European Council of September 21, 2001, which was held after September 11, the fight against terrorism was declared to be the primary aim by the Council of the EU, and consequently, legal and political progress was gained within the Union in terms of the definition of terrorism and its funding. Member states are called to enforce a strengthened cooperation in the war on terrorism; and the Action Plan and the Framework Decisions, which were prepared to build up a strategy against terrorism, formed a legal ground for the Union's policies on this issue.

The EU met the fact of global terrorism directly by the 11 March, 2004 attacks. In the aftermath of 11 March attacks, 2001 Action Plan had been overruled. However, the moderate attitude that the EU has previously had, was changed after these attacks. The most important consequence of this approach is the constitution of the legal background for the use of military tools in the struggle against terrorism through including it in the EU Legislation and in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (THE CFSP) of the EU. The struggle against terrorism has been included in the area of the CFSP, in other words, it is included within the issues of second column.

The steps and the measures taken by the EU in the field of struggle against terrorism are actually quite important as to strengthen the idea of 'union' and as to raise the intergovernmental cooperation to the supranational level so as to be in better harmony with the union spirit. Moreover, these steps and measures of the EU are also critically fundamental in terms of the fact that they will set a precedent for the struggle against international terrorism.

3.2.2.5.2. The CFSP of the EU and the struggle against terrorism

As mentioned above, in the aftermath of September 11, while fight against terrorism has become the most important goal in the field of domestic safety, it has also become a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (THE CFSP) of the European Union. In the unusual summit in September, 21, 2001, it was already emphasized that the EU would introduce a very coordinated and disciplined attitude against terrorism with all its policies, including the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Upon this, in the declaration delivered after the Seville Summit of June 2002, it was denoted that the CFSP should play an important role within the general policies, including the ESDP, in the fight against terrorism. In other words, the struggle against terrorism would continue beyond the Union's boundaries and the tools of the Second Column would be open to use henceforth. The inclusion of the struggle against terrorism in the area of the CFSP aims an international cooperation and information sharing in the fight against the problem of terrorism. That is why the Council of the EU highlighted the importance of providing the integration of the struggle against terrorism into the EU's foreign policy. Accession of the fight against terrorism in the Second Column gave rise to the ideas on the possibility of use of military methods in this fight. The matter of EU's having military forces, which had actually started with the Petersberg tasks, has been placed on the agenda with the placement of the struggle against terrorism in the EU Treaty in the aftermath of the September 11, under the Spanish Presidency. At this juncture, the debates evolving around Spanish Government's concerns about providing an international cooperation against terrorism, about the EU's display of its decisiveness even if it is symbolical, and about supporting the USA, have not convinced the other member states. However, the problem found a resolution with the declaration of the Seville Summit. The issue has finally come to clarity with the Constitutional Treaty.

According to the EU Constitution, Article I-41 (1); “The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter....”

With this article, the EU military forces were redefined together with the ESDP. How to act in the framework of these aims was described in the Article III-309:

“The tasks referred to in Article I-41(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”

This article, mentioning the war on terrorism, enables the use of military tools along with the civilian tools.

If we get back to the ESDP, it determined four important targets in terms of the strategy of fight against terrorism. The first is the prevention of terrorist threat; the second is the protection after the terrorist threat or terrorist attack; the third is the responding with military and civilian mechanisms after the attack, and the management; the fourth and the last is the help to the third countries with their fight against terrorism. The aid to the third countries has started with the supports provided for the Central and Eastern European Countries, however, financial aid has been extended to many countries alongside this.

On the other hand, the European Security Strategy is both the most important step the EU has taken as to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and also the document to explain ESDP. The document, which was adopted by the Summit in December 12, 2003, has also the speciality to be the first instrument by which the EU member states shared a common vision on how to form a better and safer world. There are several factors in the arising of the document, namely, the developments in the international

policy in the aftermath of the September 11 events, the threats arising from international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the EDSP growing out of the reaction to Europe's ineffectiveness on the crisis in the Balkans, and finally the schism among the EU countries related to the Iraqi War. As a matter of fact, lack of a clear strategy like this troubled the Union countries in their foreign relations. Therefore, the document has a vital importance in this context.

According to the European Security Strategy of the Union, which is declared to be accountable in providing the global security, terrorism is the foremost threat against the European security. Other threats that are related to terrorism are the governing failures, the regional conflicts, and the organized crimes. The danger of terrorist group's having weapons of massive destruction was struck, and the fact that criminal organizations have connections with terrorism was spotlighted on the document, while the Europe was connoted as both the target and the source. Meanwhile, three goals to provide the European security were designated in the document. The first one is to state the threat precisely and to respond it. The second goal is providing the security of surrounding countries in order to provide the security of the EU itself. The resolution of Arabian – Israeli conflict has a strategic priority for the Union because the Arabian – Israeli conflict is the actual source of problems in the Middle East. In addition to this, the establishment of stability in the Balkans, which neighbour the EU borders, and activating the cooperation with Mediterranean countries, starting with the Barcelona Process, in the fields of economics, security, and culture, compose the general framework in the EU's security conception. The third goal is the regular operation of the international system. The Union approaches the problems with a global perspective and it considers the importance of collaboration with other regional and international establishments as well as collaboration with the NATO in terms of providing the security.

4. DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENTS AND ACTORS IN THE CFSP

4.1. DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENTS

The most important feature which distinguishes Column II and III of the EUT containing the CFSP from Column I is the differences in the decision making mechanisms. These two columns, contrary to Column I, show an inter-governmental structure instead of a supra-governmental structure. For this reason, the position of other institutions except the Council in the decision-making mechanisms is restricted. Also there are differences in decision-making instruments. Instead of basic instruments such as regulations, directives, etc., different legal instruments such as joint action, joint attitude, etc. are present for the CFSP.

As a rule, the decisions on issues related with the CFSP are taken unanimously instead of the majority of the votes due to the fact that the decisions are taken on an inter-governmental level. Thus it is not possible to adopt any proposal conflicting with the national interests of any of the Member States in the decisions reached by the Council unanimously. In paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the EUT it is stated that the decisions will be taken unanimously in the Council. The abstaining votes of the members who participate in the voting in person or by proxy shall not hinder applying the decisions reached.

Certain exceptions are brought to the unanimity, which is a general rule in the CFSP context. Qualified majority principle shall be applied instead of unanimity in;

- accepting joint actions and joint attitudes or taking other decisions which are reached on the basis of common strategies;
- implementing the decisions reached on implementing the joint action and joint attitudes;
- assigning special representative.

It can be seen that the principle of qualified majority is applied not on issues which may influence the foreign policies and national interests of the Member States, but on issues having second-degree importance. Nevertheless, if any Member State expresses that it will object in terms of its national interests to a certain decision to be reached by qualified majority, and then the voting shall not take place. In such cases the Council, with a decision based on qualified majority, may apply to the European Union Council. In decisions on military and defense issues the qualified majority principle is not applied because these issues are very important for the national interests of the Member States.

The Standing Representatives Committee on the level of Ambassadors prepares the works of the Council related with the CFSP. In addition, the Policy and Security Committee observes the international situation in this field and contributes to completing the policies by stating its opinion (EUT Article 25)

In addition, pursuant to Article 22 of the EUT, each Member State or the Commission may present proposals to the Committee within the framework of the CFSP. Besides, the Council, in order to implement the joint action, may request appropriate proposals from the Commission (EUT Article 14/4). In paragraph 2 of Article 22, emergency decision making procedure is regulated separately. Accordingly, in cases where rapid decision is required, the Chairmanship, by its own initiative or upon request of a Member State or the Commission, convokes the Council to extraordinary meeting within 48 hours or in a shorter period of time in urgent cases.

The CFSP does not have legal instruments such as “directives” or “regulations” which are used for community policies. Certain specific instruments are used. These are laid down in the EUT as “common positions, joint actions, decisions and international treaties.” In addition common strategies consist of utilizing the CFSP instruments and facilitate this. Declarations, cooperation which includes regular mutual information exchange and consultation mechanisms in the field of foreign policy between member states, and contacts with the third countries are significant diplomatic instruments for the CFSP.

4.1.1. Common Strategies

According to the Article 13 of TEU, in areas where the Member States have important common interests, the European Council decides on common strategies. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will be provided by the Union and the Member States.

4.1.2. Common Positions

The Council can adopt common positions setting out the Union's position on particular issues (Article J2). According to the Article 15 of TEU, the objectives of Common Positions are to improve the cooperation and coordination in the scope of the CFSP.

The Member States are obliged to observe joint attitudes reached unanimously in the Council and to support such joint attitudes. The Member States should support the joint attitude and should ensure that their national policies are in harmony with the joint attitude.

The four areas determined by the Council of the European Union before the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty during the Lisbon Summit of 1992 in consideration of the need to develop a common attitude within the Union in the field of security are as follows;

- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
- Non-proliferation of arms, disarmament and arms control policy in Europe
- The issue of proliferation of nuclear arms
- The economic aspects of the security policy (technology transfers, arms trade etc).

4.1.3. Joint Actions

According to the Article 14 of EUT, the Council adopts joint actions in certain situations requiring operational action by the European Union. Furthermore, with the Maastricht Treaty, it is stated that within the framework of the CFSP, the Union is given the right to joint action in order to reach the targeted international political effectiveness.

Where important changes occur in the conditions influencing the decision in the incident, which is related with the subject matter of the joint action, the Council shall take necessary decisions considering the principles and objectives of the joint action. The joint action shall be valid until the Council reaches to a decision on this issue.

4.1.4. Declarations

Declarations specify a position, request or expectation of the European Union related to a third country or an international issue.

This instrument enables showing rapid reaction to an incident occurring anywhere in the world and the Union to state its opinion on this incident. When the Council fixes a position on an international issue, this declaration bears the title “European Union Declaration.”

4.1.5. International Agreements

If an agreement is required among the states or international organisations in the scope of the CFSP, the Council could authorize the Presidency to participate in the negotiations. During the negotiations, General Secretariat and Commission help the Presidency. The Council, acting unanimously, on a recommendation from the Presidency, concludes the agreements.

4.1.6. Contacts with Third Countries

Contacts with third countries take place mainly through ‘political dialogue’ meetings – on questions of international policy- and demarches –on matters relating to human rights, democracy or humanitarian action-.

The European Union carries out political negotiations with many states or state groups on international policy issues. The European Union may be represented by the Chairmanship or by a High Representative or by the delegations of the Member States and the Commission representative upon request of the Chairmanship. Diplomatic initiatives are confidential. The purpose of such contacts is in general to resolve issues related with human rights, democracy or humanitarian action, together with the concerned state.

4.2. ACTORS OF THE CFSP

There is no new institutional structuring on the CFSP. This is a part of the institutional framework found under the roof of the EU. However, the balance of powers between the Council, the Parliament and the Commission are different. From this point of view, applying the CFSP differs significantly from applying Community policies. For instance, the Commission is directly related with the CFSP yet it is not the single institution authorized to submit proposals. Initiatives in this area are basically received from the Chairmanship, from a Member State or from the High Representative. The Chairmanship consults to the European Parliament on fundamental preferences on the CFSP and provides with information on how this policy is developing. The Court of Justice has no authority on the CFSP.

4.2.1. The European Council

Article 13 of the EUT lays down the authorized organ on the CFSP. The European Council (“Summit”), consisting of State or Government presidents, has the authority to establish the general orientations and principles on the common security and foreign policy, including the fields which influences defense.

- “The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.
- The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implement by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interest in common.
- The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines defined by the European Council.”²³

The European Council brings together the President of the European Commission and the Heads of State or Government of Member States. The European Commissioner responsible for external relations and the ministers of foreign affairs accompany the members of the European Council. The European Council hosted by the member state holding the Presidency of the Council, takes decisions relevant the political life and development of the European Union by meeting at least twice a year.

Since it determines the policy's principles and general guidelines, including those relating to matters with defence implications, it occupies a position of the highest rank in the common foreign and security policy.

“The Amsterdam Treaty now stipulates that the European Council shall decide on the common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important common interests. The European Council meeting in Cologne on 3 and 4 June 1999 decided on a common strategy for bilateral relations between the European Union and Russia.”²⁴ Of the basis of these common strategies, the Council can adopt decisions, actions or common positions by a qualified majority. If a member of the council wishes to oppose one of these decisions for reasons of important national policy, the Council can appeal to the European Council, which then reverts to its function as a ‘court of appeal’ and resolves the issue on the basis of unanimity.

4.2.2. The Council of the European Union

As it is clearly stated in Article 13 of EUT, the Council, basing on the general guidelines defined by the European Council, takes the necessary decisions in order to define and implement the common foreign and security policy (EUT Article 13(3)). The Council especially adopts the joint actions and joint attitudes, recommends common strategies to the European Council and implements these strategies (EUT Article 13(3) (1)).

The Council of the European Union is composed of ministerial representatives of each Member State. Foreign affairs ministers in the General Affairs Council deal with the CFSP matters. The Council takes necessary decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of the CFSP on the basis of general guidelines laid down by the European Council. The Council is responsible for ensuring that the Union's action is unified, consistent and effective.

The Amsterdam Treaty also entrusts the Council of the European Union with the task of recommending common strategies to the European Council and of implementing them, notably through the adoption of common positions and joint actions.

The Standing Representatives Committee prepares the negotiations of the General Affairs Council. The Standing Representatives (Ambassadors) act in this field as they act in the other Community policies.

Pursuant to Article 25 (2) of the EUT, the Policy and Security Committee carries out its works under the responsibility of the Council. The Policy and Security Committee monitors the international status and helps determining the policies by sharing opinions with the Council. In addition, it supervises the implementation of the decided policies. In a case of crisis, plays a central role in defining the response to be given by the EU to the crisis.

4.2.3. The Presidency

A Member State of the Union takes the Presidency of the European Council every six months and leads the Council of the European Union and the subordinate bodies responsible for preparing proceedings.

The Presidency represents the Union in the CFSP matters. It is responsible for the implementation of the CFSP decisions. It declares the position of the Union in international organisations and at international conferences. (EUT Art.18)

- “The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.
- The Presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of decisions taken under this title; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.
- The Presidency shall be assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council who shall exercise the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security policy.
- The Commission shall be fully associated in the tasks referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 The Presidency shall be assisted in those tasks if need be by the next Member State to hold the Presidency.”²⁵

In this duty the Term Chairman is assisted by the European Council and the Council Secretary General /the CFSP High Representative. The Member State, which will undertake the next Term Chairmanship, may assist the Chairmanship. These four actors, namely the term chairman, the next term chairman, Commission and the CFSP High Representative, are called as Troika. The commission assists Troika in its works. Troika represents the Union in issues in the field of the CFSP.

4.2.4. European Parliament

Pursuant to Article 21 of the EUT, the Chairmanship is liable to consult the European Parliament (EP) on the fundamental preferences on the CFSP and to ensure the views of the EP are considered in the best possible way. The Chairmanship and the Commission regularly inform the Parliament. The Parliament can also ask questions to the Council, can suggest recommendations, and holds the annual discussion meetings on the progress of the implementation of the CFSP.

The Committee of the Parliament on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense issues holds a special quarterly conference series together with the Chairmanship. The members of the EP can participate in the EU delegation in the international conferences.

The Parliament performs active works especially on protecting human rights, fundamental rights and freedoms, democracy and rule of law in the third countries.

However, the authorities of the EP regarding the CFSP are fairly restricted. Although it has the obligation to be consulted in the EUT, not basing this on a legal method weakens the effectiveness of this consultation.

4.2.5. The European Commission

The Treaty on European Union (EUT Art.27) stipulates that the European Commission is to be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field. Such association is needed to ensure the consistency of the CFSP with external economic relations and development cooperation, which are Community policies in which the Commission plays a leading role.

The Chairman of the Commission joins the state and government presidents in the EU Summit. The Commission takes place in the meetings of the Council and its preparing organs and in the political dialogues with third countries. It can bring up foreign and security policy issues to the Council agenda, like the Member States or High Representatives, and can submit proposals to the Council for decision (ECU Article 22). Likewise the Chairmanship, the Commission also informs the European Parliament on the developments concerning the CFSP.

4.2.6. The High Representative for the CFSP, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

The High Representative will assist the Council by contributing in particular to the formulation, drawing-up and implementation of political decisions and where necessary, by acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency and conducting political dialogue with third parties.

4.2.7. Assistant Secretary General and the Council Secretary General

Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General assist the Chairmanship. They are responsible from the General Secretariat of the Council, which carries out the preparation works of the Council and ensures that such works are performed suitably.

General Director of Foreign Affairs (GDFA), under the management of the General Director, covers three significant subjects: foreign economic relations, geographical works of the CFSP, and the “political-military structure” for the Security and Defense Policy. Besides supporting the Council and its organs in all of their works, the GDFA is responsible from preparing, performing and monitoring the political dialogues and working relationship between the European Union and the international organizations in fields under its area of authority. Currently the relationships with especially the United Nations, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO and Council of Europe are being reinforced.

The title of the “policy planning and early warning unit” which was established based on a declaration attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam is amended as the Policy and Security Committee. This Committee is under the responsibility of High Representative.

The Council Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU provide the personnel of the Policy and Security Committee.

The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), consisting of the military experts of the Member States charged with duty before the Council General Secretariat, is directly under the High Representative. The duty of EUMS is to determine the national and multinational European forces, to enable early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for crisis management operations, and to implement the policies and decisions in accordance with the instructions given by the Military Committee to which it assists.

4.2.8. The Member States

The Member States have undertaken to give active and unconditional support to the implementation of the common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Each Member State can lie before the Council any foreign and security policy issue and submit proposals to it.

The Member States support the joint attitudes claimed by the Chairmanship in the international forums. They provide the other Member States which do not participate in the negotiations of the international organizations with information on all of the issues concerning common interests. They commit to support the joint actions.

The Council Secretariat, the Commission and the capital cities of the Member States are in continuous connection through an encrypted communication system. The candidate states connect to the Council Secretariat through an encrypted computer network.

4.2.9. Special Representatives

The Convention gives the Council the opportunity to charge authorized special representatives with duty on certain policy issues. Special representatives are responsible directly to the CFSP High Representative.

5. THE APPROACH OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO THE CFSP

5.1. GERMANY AND THE CFSP

I would like to explain the opinion of three important states(Germany, France and UK) establish EU about foreign policy to understand CFSP of EU clearly. Thus, we can understand the different approaches of the states in the field of CFSP and we can analyse at which subject the state separate from each other.

Following the WW II, Germany was dragged to vagueness especially in terms of defining its national interests. To clear away the fear it spread in the European continent due to historical reasons and to get its image right was not easy for Germany, which experienced difficulties in defining national interests. For this reason, for the Europeans besides Germany, which has a very significant place for the European continent, being powerful enough to rule on the entire continent, it is also important that it should not be very weak due to its historical experience and potential.

After the union of two German states, the ‘national wheels’ and ‘the great power’ concepts were started to be re-pronounced in Germany. However, due to its fear of being understood wrongly, Germany reduced its perception of interest to European integration and NATO targets between 1945 and 1990 because, up to that period, NATO has been pictured as the ‘backbone’ and ‘cornerstone’ of the German defense. Although it shows attitudes in this direction, especially after the union it was expected that the international role of Germany would rise. Today Germany, as if proving this idea, is on the way to gradually be a significant actor in international relations. The German former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s stating that Germany would not be subject to a limited interest perception also confirms this. However, indispensability has risen for Germany to free itself from its former image and to behave persuasive in the steps it will take in terms of foreign policy. In this context, the German foreign policy being in harmony with the Integration can decrease the ‘historical fear’ felt for it. The

CFSP view of Germany will be a factor determining the direction of its national foreign policy in this frame.

There was a need for taking steps in order to develop the political wing which seemed to be insufficient compared to the economic and cultural structure of EU. The most essential requirement of the Union in determining its role in the new order of the world was certainly lying in establishing an effective and common foreign policy. The most eager and hardworking States to establish this were Germany and France. The general 'French Approach', which suggests that the security of Europe should be ensured by Europeans, gains more supporters by the time. The common foreign policy, which came back to life with the columns of Maastricht Treaty, is in fact considered together with the independent security policy and these to complement each other. On October 11, 1990, during the presidency term of Italy, in their joint letters Germany and France suggested that the CFSP to be formed should cover the entire fields including security. One year after in October 1991 German and French ministries of foreign affairs, Kohl and Mitterrand, in another letter supported the establishment of a European army. All these developments and the Maastricht Treaty show that EU is eager in improving the political wing of the Union. However, we can say that some disagreements can be seen between Germany and France in the relationship of the Union with NATO, therefore USA.

Germany deems that NATO is the backbone of the security of Europe and a European defense system should be developed in joint work with NATO. Growing after the Union, Germany will be the most significant financial resource for the EU defense system. Germany, which is not willing to bear this burden, wishes to benefit from the NATO's existing advantages for a long time.

5.2. FRANCE AND THE CFSP

France has been against USA throughout the history. The idea of former President of France, Jacques Chirac, which suggest that European Defense Force will operate in coordination with NATO however will definitely be independent, proves this. French is the first among the States, which defend the idea that Europe should have an independent defense system and this should be freed from the monopoly of the USA. In

the end, France officially receded from the military wing of NATO on July 1, 1966 and has expelled forces under NATO from its territories.

It is known that France is among the most important weapon producers of Europe. In this context, we can say that its wish to use this weapon industry has a great influence on the negative attitude of France towards the USA. European security system being independent from NATO means that France will have a much larger weapon market. The foreign policy objectives and aims of France are to increase the general military capacity of Europe; to develop a European army (Euro corps) out of NATO; to establish a consistent and effective security and defense policy apart from the NATO structure; and to develop a new the CFSP Politics and Security Committee, Military Committee and Military Planning Committee.

With this attitude, France takes a separate route than Germany. Germany supports the idea that NATO should carry on its activities by adapting to the changes. For Germany, NATO does not have an alternative for the post-Cold War security of Europe. However France is insisting on the idea that EU Striking Force should be independent from NATO and should have its own planning staff.

We can say that the CFSP has a separate significance for France. France wishes to realize its own desires, i.e. to play a global role, with its weight behind a united Europe. As it is seen, at this point a common foreign policy which is free from the national interests and where the Union is taken as basis seems far away. Germany and France, the fundamental driving forces of EU, while taking their national policies to a supra-national structure, do not neglect considering their national interests. Common foreign and security policy will continue for a long time to exist under the shadow of many Member States' national independence.

5.3. UK AND THE CFSP

UK has always showed an image, which holds its national interests in the foreground. UK occupies the position of the State leading other States, which are closed, to the USA in EU. In the recent years it is showing an attitude close to the attitude of France in security issues. In the Saint-Malo Summit of 1998 it has established the foundations of the European Security and Defense Policy together with France. Here the point, which

UK departs from France, focuses again on the relationships with the USA and NATO. UK emphasizes in every occasion that the Union should work in coordination with the USA in security policies. We can say that UK has a three fundamental strategic purpose in establishing the security and defense policy of the 21st century: to continue the leader role of UK in defense, to realize the operational independence of NATO's European side and to improve NATO's abilities for a security management, and to enable Europe standing on its own feet, even acting by itself.

It seems very hard for UK to display a position in harmony with EU and without offending the USA on the idea of Union having a common foreign and security policy. We can say that Blair's government tried to be beside both Europe and the USA since 1997. As it is seen, especially the largest States of EU, although they hold their national interests in the foreground, are willing to establish a working common foreign and security policy, in order to enable the Union to play a more active role in the international level. However, their own interests and the whirlpool which they are dragged by the USA due to their need them seems to cause vertigo for long times.

When we examine the view of the USA on the CFSP we see the following. The USA has been one of the two 'super powers' of the world from the end of WW II up to the '90s during which the Cold War period has ended, and after this period continued to adopt the 'global acting' at the position of the single super power in a single pole structure. It charged itself the duty to resolve the problems in many places in the world and used its authority of intervention granted to it by itself.

Being the insurance of the European security during the Cold War, the USA had the tendency to carry on this characteristic after the Cold War. When EU brought the ideas on the independent defense policy to light, the statements of the relevant security departments of the USA took their places in the defense reports immediately. According to the USA the idea 'European allies can gain from the NATO common values and capacities, through a common security policy, as a mechanism operating under NATO' was influential. When we consider the security relationship between Europe and the USA, seemingly the sole super power the USA has to have its power be accepted by the whole world both in fields of politics and military in order to continue holding its position. Although the military presence in Europe brings a heavy burden to its budget,

the USA has the opportunity to continue its hegemony position. Similarly the EU States have the opportunity to ensure their security without making excess expenses thanks to the American military presence on their territories.

The USA implied that the USA will also have its share in a powerful, united Europe grabbing its own security and military capacity, however, that it does not want a European Defense and Security Identity which is first formed in the structure of NATO, then grew up out of NATO and finally developed far from NATO. However, Europe overlooking the USA to be this much influential in its own security is related with the financing of its own security. While not making excessive expenses for their security, European states can ensure it. IF EU will allocate more shares to its security under the leadership of NATO, just like the USA wants, it is beyond doubt that it will wish to do it in an independent manner. And this is not a situation desired by the USA. As it is seen, EU has the tendency to solidify its place in the global power play and to be a significant candidate of the leading role. In this context, the absolute necessity to gain activity and singularity to the foreign policy, which is highly significant in terms of the future of the Union, forces the Member States to reach more radical decisions. The members of the Union which give an image showing the national policies are put in the foreground however act due the fact that it is impossible to neglect a common foreign policy, which has an indispensable significance, have implemented their intellectual tendencies and by taking some, say important, decisions and have included the common foreign and security policy into their founding agreements.

6. THE EXAMPLES FOR THE FAILURES OF THE CFSP'S

In this section of my thesis, I would like to analyse the issues which I mention about from two perspectives; the firstly I want to explain from regional point of view. As it is known EU is near to Balkan region therefore the events in Balkan region and find the whether CFSP of EU became successful or not. In addition I would like to analyse Irak case. Secondly I want to explain the subject of terrorism and (WMD) of EU. I would mention CFSP of EU on these subjects and again to find whether CFSP of EU became successful or not.

When we examine the foreign and security policy, we see that the Community had to face problems: during the crisis started with Iraq invading Kuwait in 1990 and the war, the UK and France being the first, the Member States acted with the national policy logic. In this period the sole joint action of the Community members was limited with carrying out the besieging operations from sea within the framework of WEU. During this process the EU could not adopt an active role in resolving the problem. The other important problem emerged with the disintegration of the Yugoslavia Federation right at the heart of Europe, which was the area for the Community to ensure political stability. The Community could not be active beyond mediation and sending humanitarian aids before the wars both in Croatia and in Bosnia. The attitude of the EU in Iraq Crisis can be another example.

These situations show that the integration in Europe could not reach to a maturity to cover the field of foreign policy and security yet. After that, efforts to improve the CFSP were shown. I will take the disintegration process of Yugoslavia and Iraq Crisis as examples, which I can evaluate whether the CFSP became successful in practical, or not.

6.1. “YUGOSLAVIA POLICY” OF THE EU

As known, at the end of WW I, following the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom was established and its name was changed to Yugoslavia in 1918. Yugoslavia means the homeland of the Southern Slavs (Serbians, Croats, Slovenians and Bulgarians). In addition, Polish, Czechs and the Slovaks are known as the Western Slavs and Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians are known as the Eastern Slavs. Bosnians living in Bosnia-Herzegovina are Slavs in ethnic origin.

Before the disintegration, Yugoslavia was among the most complex parts of the world in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, and culture. The people living in this country were using different national languages and were from different religions/sects. The Slav-origin people have been the majority in this country since centuries. Among the nations which received the right to establish Federal Republic in Yugoslavia, the Serbians, Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and the Bosnians are Slav origin in terms of their ethnicity.

The minorities, which were recognized as “nationality” by the Tito government, were Albanians, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Rutenians, Slovaks, and Turks. The remaining ethnic groups were Austrians, Greeks, Jews, Germans, Polish, Ukrainians, and the Wallachians.

After the death of Tito in 1980, the “ethnic harmony” in Yugoslavia was damaged. Following the Serbians and the Croats, the operations started by the Albanians, who constitute the most crowded nation in Yugoslavia, in Kosovo spread to all of Yugoslavia.

Among the reasons, which lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, comes the ruining of the balance reached with the Constitution of 1974. First of all in 1989 the Serbian Parliament cancelled the autonomous statuses of Kosovo and Voivodina and made it impossible for a decision not supported by Serbia to pass from the Council. In September 1989 the Slovenian Assembly made an amendment in its own constitution and one year later reached to the decision to make multi-party elections. The Croatian Parliament accepted a similar decision after a short while.

In 1990, with the decision of the Yugoslavian Communist Party that convoked in order to discuss the problems between the Republics and the Federation, the “pioneer role and the power monopoly” of the Yugoslavian Communist Party was cancelled. Thus the activities of the nationalistic parties were accelerated in the Republics. Besides, independence decisions were reached in the Parliaments of the Republics and the fact that the Republics have the right to act independent from the Federation was emphasized. Thus, the activity of the local organizations of the Communist Party, which was the representative of both the State and the Government in the Republics, was blocked. The power of the Federal Army was affected negatively due to such developments.

Another factor influencing the disintegration of Yugoslavia is the elections made in 1990. As a result of the elections the former Communists were in power in Montenegro and Serbia, whereas newly established nationalistic parties won the elections in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the nationalistic parties of the Serbians, Croatians and Bosnians formed a coalition.

Then, Serbia objecting to the idea of Croatia and Macedonia for making a reform in the Federal system of Yugoslavia due to the reason that reforms would lead to disintegration fortified the separatist inclinations in Croatia and Slovenia. Especially the intervention attempt of the Federal Army to the Serbian and Slovenian elections forced the said Republics to new searches. In the April of 1991, Croatia and Slovenia suggested to establish a new frame under the name of “union of sovereign states” instead of the Yugoslavia Federation and in return to this Milosevic proposed the union of equal republics and nations in a centralized structure. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an effort to compromise two suggestions, put forth the idea of establishing a new union among the Republics provided that their rights of sovereignty were granted. However, taking behind the support of the Federal Army, the Serbians declared that the Serbians would live under a single state and were against any solution that would render them to be minority.

This rigid attitude of the Serbians accelerated the disintegration process of Yugoslavia. In 1991 the constitutional crisis started with Serbia vetoing the assignment of Croatian representative to the Collective Presidency.

6.1.1. The “Territorial Integrity” and “Recognizing” Dilemma of the EU

The EU displayed an undecided attitude in the first stage of the Yugoslavia crisis. When the skirmishes started with the intervention of the Federal Army right after Croatia and Slovenia declaring their independence in 1991, the EU declared that it supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and tried to control the situation and to mediate by sending observers during the Croatian-Serbian skirmishes in the Yugoslavia crisis. However, when it was not effective, the discussions regarding implementing the economic sanction decisions were raised.

In the middle of 1991, as a result of Serbians attacking Croatia with the support of the Federal Army, the EU enabled the parties engaged in war to come together in the La Haye Conference on Peace. The EU’s political solution proposal, which foresaw the present borders of the Republics forming Yugoslavia, was not accepted by Serbia in the conference. The Mini Yugoslavia suggestion brought by the Serbians covered everybody, especially the Serbian autonomous regions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina besides Serbia and Montenegro. Upon not reaching to conciliation in the conference, establishing a buffer region between the conflicting parties and disposing peace force soldiers in this region was proposed. In this issue no action was taken on the EU side and as the skirmishes continue the UN Security Council decided to send peace force to Yugoslavia. In addition, in November 1991 the EU decided to apply economic sanctions to Yugoslavia. The economic loss of Yugoslavia due to the sanctions varied between USD 650 million and USD 1.2 billion. The third financial protocol at the value of ECU 807 million which covered the years 1991-1995 between Yugoslavia and the EU and the ECU 100 million allocated to Yugoslavia from the PHARE programme were cancelled. The EU made ECU 14.6 million humanitarian aid to the civil population affected from the skirmishes in November – December of 1991.

After founding out that, besides the Serbians, also the ones who were subject to attack were also affected from the economic sanctions applied by the EU to Yugoslavia in December 1991 the sanctions were annulled for the Republics other than Serbia and Montenegro.

The turning point for the EU in the Yugoslavia crisis was the city of Vukovar being occupied by the Serbians and in the declaration made by the EU it was stated that “in

the case that the conditions are formed, the Republics separated from Yugoslavia could be recognized starting from January 15, 1992.” A Commission was established in order to make evaluations on this issue.

Germany recognizing Croatia and Slovenia, which declared their independence before December 23, 1991, brought up the fact that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was at a point of no return and at the same time displayed the weakness of the common foreign policy of the EU. Even the Commission report was not waited for recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. This attitude of Germany was caused by its wish to put forth its claim of global leadership and its weight in the EU, besides its expectations on the internal policy. Germany suggested that recognizing would end the Serbian attacks. However, it was just the opposite and following the decision the severity of the skirmishes in Yugoslavia was increased. Following Germany, the EU recognized Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992. Thus, the EU, which defended the “territorial integrity of Yugoslavia” in the beginning of the crisis, started to recognize the Yugoslavia Republics, which declared their own independence. The EU recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 17, 1992.

6.1.2. The Inactivity of the EU and the CFSP

In the first stage of the skirmishes, which broke out in the former Yugoslavia, in what manner the skirmishes would be intervened was discussed by the EU countries. The EU formed in 1991 the truce control unit under the name of European Community Observer Mission and this unit tried to mediate besides controlling. However, with the spreading of the war, France put forth the option of intervening with military power and requested WEU peace force to be sent in order to control the truce in the skirmish areas. After the remaining members accepted this suggestion, the UK stated that a force sent without making a comprehensive preparation would cause chaos.

“In the beginning of the 1990s the EU was unable to reconcile the conflicting views of its member states, who disagreed not only on what to do and how to do it, but also on the very nature of the problem. To mention but a few; France, a historic ally of Serbia and a centralised state itself, favoured keeping the Yugoslav state intact; Italy supported this approach largely due to its strong links with Yugoslav government; whilst Germany, itself unified only a few months earlier and influenced by a strong public

opinion supporting the moves for independence in Slovenia and Croatia and with traditionally strong ties to Croatia through the many ethnic Croats living in Germany, stressed what it called “its moral duty to help other nations coming out of an era of Communism”. The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and France favoured an early UN intervention in Yugoslavia assuming that the conflicting parties would then agree to a cease-fire. France pushed for the Western European Union (WEU) to take action, but without support from any other members. The UK was reluctant to sending in troops, in the light of its recent experience in Cyprus and Northern Ireland, which had proved the difficulty to withdraw troops once they were sent in; Germany was still forbidden from sending troops to any area out of NATO. EU perceived as an indecisive, inconsistent and effectively weak international actor, dismissed by US President Clinton as “incompetent” in handling the Yugoslav crisis”.²⁶

When the EU Member States on forming a peace force could not reach a consensus, the looks started to intensify on the UN. Thus, the option of the EU intervening to the Yugoslavia crisis was cancelled.

The UN Security Council decided to establish United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) with the purpose of protecting truce between the Serbian and Croatian forces in Croatia in February 1992. The UK and France were actively present in this force. In the following months and years, when the area of duty of the UNPROFOR was expanded to cover Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, the contribution of the EU states continued increasingly. However, Germany, due to its constitutional obstacles, could not take place in this force.

NATO fulfilled the peace force duty in the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war between 1992 and 1995 under the umbrella of UN. During this period NATO and WEU against Montenegro and Serbia in the Adriatic Sea and in the River Danube applied a sea blockade. The function of UNPROFOR in Croatia and Macedonia was in the limits of traditional peace force, whereas the Bosnia-Herzegovina operation was carried out under conditions which most of the time required using force. However, in order to avoid risking the soldiers of the governments supporting the UN peace force, using force was not allowed. The EU states which were in integrity in supporting the peace plans and diplomatic efforts, fell into difference of opinion in the issue of using force by

the peace force under UNPROFOR. As a result of the bomb assault which gave way to a massacre in the marketplace of Sarajevo in 1994, NATO declared the Serbians in Bosnia to transfer their heavy weapons out of Sarajevo in 10 days, otherwise such would be destroyed. Following the assault in 1995, NATO bombardment was commenced towards the Serbian emplacements in Bosnia. The three and a half year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was ended by an air assault made by NATO forces under the leadership of the USA towards the Serbian emplacements. The parties engaged in war in October 1995 signed the Dayton Agreement.

The crisis in Yugoslavia influenced negatively the political reputation of the EU. The EU did not have any action, which carried its name to the front in the minds of the international society in the skirmishes between 1991 and 1995. Some of the EU states took place in the peace force operations and the air intervention carried out under the leadership of NATO, with their own national identities. In all these events, especially in terms of intervening the skirmishes, the EU did not have any action in terms of the CFSP. On the contrary, issues such as the difference of views between the UK and France on the intervention issue, the inactivity of the EU before the attacks, Germany recognizing Slovenia and Croatia by itself without waiting the remaining EU states, Greece hindering the common attitudes of the EU states due to the name of Macedonia, created a disappointment on the expectations from the CFSP formed in the Maastricht Treaty.

The foreign policy pursued by the European Union in the integration of Yugoslavia did not have any integrality within itself and in addition it is possible to say that the said event lead to the deepening of the European Union on the foreign policy and security issues.

The failure of the European Union in the Yugoslavia crisis first of all was caused by not having an early warning and skirmish preventing mechanism. In this sense, Yugoslavia crisis was a misfortune for the CFSP that was just in the beginning of formation. Besides the EU lacking the military power and infrastructure to allow intervention, lack of common wills in intervening the crisis accelerated the events and this showed clearly that the EU does not have a long-term strategy for the Balkans.

6.2. THE CFSP TEST OF THE EUROPIAN UNION: CRISIS IN IRAQ

We examined the conflicts experienced in its own territories during the disintegration of Yugoslavia in order to evaluate the level of the CFSP of the European Union. However, these problems took place in the years in which the EU just carried the issue of the CFSP to the founding agreements. In order to make a more objective evaluation, examining the Iraq Crisis which took place right before the Union had a Constitution and the attitude of the Union members before this crisis will give us the opportunity to make a sounder evaluation on the common foreign and security policy of the EU.

From the point of view of the USA, we can interpret the Iraq War not only the ‘War of Saddam’ but also the first step of restructuring the Middle East because this war is the first and the most significant move made towards the new order. From now on, the chessboard of the international game of strategy is at the most sensitive geography of the world and the players of this game are the most significant ‘super’ actors. In this context, the Iraq Crisis gives an important opportunity to the EU to be an active player in the global area.

With the start of the Iraq Crisis, various voices were raised in the EU. Especially the attitude of the UK against the France-Germany axis gave the signal that this State will be completely beside the USA. The UK suggested that Iraq should be controlled and therefore the mass destruction weapons of Iraq will be made harmless. In the EU especially Germany believes that this issue is not dangerous as the USA reflects. The view of the international law on the issue is as follows:

First of all the USA suggested that mass destruction weapons are found in Iraq and this casts a threat for itself and therefore it has the legitimate defense right. The situation related with Iraq is the truce status in legal terms for the period before the USA’s attempt to occupy Iraq. Therefore it is not possible to mention the legitimate defense right here. Another attempt of the USA to legalize its occupation is in the field of preventive legitimate defense. The USA declared that it would apply preventive legitimate defense against Iraq. Thus it suggested that it was not necessary for Iraq to attack it or another country and that Iraq constituting a threat is sufficient for attacking Iraq. However, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Treaty, in order to mention the preventive legitimate defense right, the armed assault should be

present or should be indispensable to take place. And this left the USA's efforts of legitimizing the war futile. Consequently, it is possible to say that the war in Iraq lacks the basis of legitimacy in terms of both of the situations, which allow using power in the international law.

Before this war that is even not legitimate why the EU was inadequate in determining a single voice policy? It is possible to answer this question with the difference in the views of the Member States of international events due to historical reasons. The existing structure of the CFSP allows Member States to view the foreign issues from their national point of view. Thus the EU could not adopt a single attitude towards this crisis.

If, in this diverse approach of the EU, we view the issue from the point of view of the UK, then we can base the support given by the UK to the USA on its 'private relationship' with the USA. France and Germany was against the USA and showed attitudes for not approving military intervention.

When we hold the French point of view, the post-War vagueness of the region annoys France. The Muslim population living in France at a rate which may threaten the security of France if they are incited makes France one of the territories most suitable for the ones who wish to have a real "conflict of civilizations" and the important strategies of France in the Middle East helps us to understand the reactions of France.

In the beginning of the war only the quarrels of the leader States were conspicuous; however, later on the UK, by taking some of the Member and Candidate States, suggested the formation of the 8. Thus the EU, which exerts efforts to form the CFSP, received a great blow in this issue. These eight States supported the idea that Iraq was a big threat for the world peace and security and that it is necessary to act in a resolute manner in harmony with the USA in disarming this State. Consequently, the deep sections of the problems in the CFSP issue come under the light.

France and Germany, with a joint declaration before the war, declared that they would not accept a draft decision, which grants using power in Iraq, whereas the UK and Spain held a meeting with the USA, which they called as 'war council'. Following this meeting they declared that there were not much chances left for diplomacy.

As we mentioned above, Candidate States participating in this forming of cliques by the leader states deepened the problem the EU was experiencing in the common foreign policy. Such discussions virtually divided the EU into two.

Iraq Crisis has shown that the EU has serious problems in the CFSP. When we consider the situation before and during the war, the EU has seen how inadequate it is in implementing the steps it has taken in the field of common foreign policy since Maastricht Treaty. In this context, we can say that Iraq Crisis forms a significant example for the CFSP. The EU had serious difference of opinions both with Member States and with the Candidate States. And this causes the EU not to have the power to influence what is happening in the world.

Consequently, the CFSP, of which foundations were laid in the Maastricht Agreement, is inadequate for a common foreign police although it was revised in the founding agreements. A being a very important example in practical terms, the Iraq Crisis has shown that the EU is not at the expected level in the field of common foreign policy. Before the new order planned to be established in this significant geography by the sole super power of the world, what is expected from the EU as a candidate super power is to show an effective and common foreign policy. However the EU could not present a joint position in which the interests of the Union are held in the foreground, independent from the national interests of the members. Transferring the national policies to a supra-national structure does not seem to be easy due to the historical differences in views. Especially the closeness of the UK and the Eastern Europe States to the USA causes these problems to deepen. Such developments hinder the EU to show a joint position towards the foreign events.

The patched image of the EU, which claims to be a global actor, in the Iraq Crisis shows us how inadequate it is in the CFSP. In this context we can say that the EU will be a 'silent' 'super Union' 'without an army.'

7.THE EXAMPLE FOR THE SUCCESSFUL OF THE CFSP'S

OPERATION CONCORDIA

The European Union launched a military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003.

“Operation Concordia fell within the remit of military crisis management operations of the Union and was the first ever deployment of EU military forces under the terms of its security and defence policy. It comprised 400 soldiers from 26 countries, thus again including non-EU contributor states. Operation Concordia was also the first case for EU-NATO cooperation in the framework of the Berlin Plus agreements, i.e., the EU made use of NATO capabilities in conducting Operation Concordia.”²⁷

“At the end of March 2003, when the mission was launched, the British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw described Concordia as ‘the start of a new strategic partnership between the EU and NATO’. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson echoed this view. At an official ceremony for the launching of Operation Concordia he stated that “as NATO hands over the mission to the European Union, a new chapter in European security has opened. By taking on its first military mission, the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defence Policy has come to an age”.

The perspective that Operation Concordia marks the beginning of a new transatlantic strategic partnership implicitly is built upon two assumptions: first that the operation will prepare the ground for the EU to become an equal partner to the USA in external security and second that it will contribute to the strengthening of ESDP and Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP).”²⁸

As I mentioned above, EU became successful in some operations and became unsuccessful in some operations. In my opinion, member states generally behaved for own interest instead of for EU's interest. According to me, EU can always be successful provided that the Union becomes concrete on CFSP and tries to become mono. The joint position to be put into force by EU in following possible operations will designate this.

8. TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In this section of my thesis, I would like to analyse Turkish foreign and security policy and also possible contributions of Turkey to the CFSP of EU after become a member.

Since the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey adopted the principle of "Peace in the Homeland, Peace in the World", under the light of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's heritage. With its democratic and secular political system, solid free market economy in the customs union with the EU, and its social tradition harmonizing modernization with cultural identity, Turkey pursues a foreign policy which produces security and stability in its region and beyond

"In the Atatürk period (1923-1938), Turkey's Western orientation was gradually affirmed, and firmly established in the 1930s. This was true both internally and externally: internally, the Turkish elite initiated radical modernising reforms along Western lines whilst externally, in the turbulent events of that decade, they preferred to align themselves with the Western alliance instead of the Revisionist powers, the main aim being securing inclusion into the Western system of states, of which Turkey became a status quo power in the 1930s." ²⁹

Since the major purpose of the Turkish foreign policy is to create a stable regional and international environment based on cooperation and enabling the social development in peace and prosperity in Turkey or in neighbor countries and beyond, "the foreign policy of Turkey has revolved around two main concepts: 1) the maintenance of the nation's independence, and 2) the preservation of the country's modernist, secularist, national regime. This foreign policy, to which the utmost importance is attached by the Turkish leadership, evolved from a combination of standard practical and strategic considerations and, as well, historical factors unique to the country." ³⁰

Turkey tries to achieve the purpose mentioned above by pursuing a peaceful and active foreign policy in a wide range such as being a member of NATO and integrating to the EU, leadership in the regional cooperation processes, developing good neighborhood relations and economic cooperation, participating in operations for preserving peace,

humanitarian aids, resolving the conflicts and contributing to the reconciliation and restructuring efforts after conflicts.

Being an active member of today's globalized world, Turkey pursues a multidimensional foreign policy which reconciles West and East, North and South and is active in all of the regions. With its geographical position right in the center of Eurasia and historical and cultural bonds spreading to a wide area, Turkey functions as an important bridge serving to intercultural dialogue and interaction.

Turkey's membership of many international and regional organizations demonstrates the multidimensionality of its foreign policy in the best way. Besides the EU membership process, Turkey is a member of various organizations such as United Nations, European Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Security and Cooperation Organization (ESCO), World Trade Organization (WTO), Islam Conference Organization (ICO), Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BECO), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), D-8, etc. Turkey also participates to the Euromed/Barcelona process and participates in the activities of the American States Organization, Caribbean States Union and African Union as a standing observer.

Turkey is the initiator of efforts which will facilitate the strategic cooperation between different cultures. In the period following the 9/11 events, Turkey hosted the EU-ICO common forum, which met in 2004 for the first time, in order to promote the intercultural dialogue. And, due to the reason that ICO Secretary General position is undertaken by Turkey, Turkey played a more evident role in increasing the activity of this Organization. Our President is the standing chairman of ICO Economic and Commercial Cooperation Standing Committee, which meets in Istanbul annually.

Being a country which has a rooted tradition on mutual understanding, tolerance, dialogue and respect towards other cultures and religions, Turkey undertook the co-presentator of the "Initiative for the Alliance of Civilizations", which was started in 2005 by the UN former Secretary General Kofi Annan due to the need of a true dialogue between different cultures.

8.1. EVOLUTION OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Republic of Turkey, trying to complete internal structuring in the period after Lausanne, in its foreign relations searched to resolve issues such as the Ottoman debts and border problems, which could not be resolved in the Lausanne Peace Treaty. It carried out its relations with the neighbor countries based on a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. Towards the middle of 1930, during which the international environment ruined rapidly, Turkey showed efforts in order to establish security belts in its west and east borders. Turkey played a leading role in establishing the Saadabad Treaty in 1937 between the Balkan Entente and Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, together with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. In 1936, the Montreux Convention, which regulated the passes from the Straits and gave back the sovereignty of Turkey on the strategic Turkish Straits, was signed. In this way, “Turkey did not permit the passage of Axis troops, ships, or aircraft through or over Turkey and its waters, and the Montreux Convention was carefully enforced in the Straits.”³¹

Following the end of the WW II, Turkey became a founding member of United and Nations in 1945 and of the European Council in 1949. In 1952, it participated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed due to the consequences of the increasing security threats in Europe, and became partner member of the European Economic Community, which is the premise of the European Union. In 1970s, with the formation of a positive environment in Europe, it started to improve its relations with the Soviet Union and the East European countries.

In the beginning of 1990s, changes such as the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Europe, reintegration of Germany, disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty, disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and coming out of the new independent states, spreading of the free market economies, etc. brought an end to the competition between East and West. Nevertheless, the world witnessed the emergence of new security threats such as ethnic nationalism, hostility to foreigners, radicalism, and international terrorism, etc.

In parallel with, “The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed Turkey’s security environment. Changes in international and regional politics in the early 1990s had an enormous impact on

Turkey's threat perception, and on her perception of herself and her foreign relations. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from Europe created a sense of vulnerability with respect to her position in the fast-changing international and regional environment. In this new environment, some Turkish elites began to reassess the country's international position. Since the historical parameters of a 200-year period had disappeared, there emerged discussions about the need to reorient foreign/security policy in response to these changes. Both Turkish and Western analysts also questioned the role of NATO and Turkey's role within NATO in the new security environment. However, they soon came to the conclusion that both NATO and Turkey needed each other in the post-Cold War period. From the Western perspective, the end of the Soviet threat did not mean the end of Turkey's role. Given its geographical position, her contribution would continue to be vital for the West, especially in NATO's new (out-of-area) missions.”³²

In the post-Cold War period Turkey found itself right in the middle of Eurasia, a wide geographical region with an ever increasing geopolitical significance and reaching from Europe to the Central Asia. By using the experience in democracy and economic development, Turkey supported these countries. In this context, Turkey pioneered the foundation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BECO), the first successful example. Turkey, for a period of 6 months starting from May 1, 2007, will undertake the Term Presidency of the ESCO again and will host the Summit to be held in Istanbul on June 25 due to the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the Organization.

Turkey played a leading role in the formation of Black Sea Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR) (2003), designed by the States having coast on the Black Sea. The Black Sea Harmonization Operation, executed by Turkey since March 2004 in order to observe the asymmetric threats in the Black Sea coasts gained a multinational quality with the participation of the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

The number of members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), founded in 1964 with Iran and Pakistan under the title of the Regional Cooperation for Development, expanded in 1992 with the contribution of Turkey to cover Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian Republics. The energy and transportation infrastructure projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and its frame

agreement, which carries the Caspian petroleum to the western market since 2006 and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway which is signed in 2007, demonstrate the tangible examples of the regional cooperation.

Turkey, within the context of activities for preserving peace which gained importance in the post-Cold War period, continued its contribution to the operations for preserving peace in many places of the world under the leadership of the UN, NATO, ESCO and EU. Over 10 thousand Turkish soldiers participated in various international operations for preserving peace. Turkish Armed Forces currently continues to contribute to the NATO operations and missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan, KFOR in Kosovo, Operation Active Endeavor in Mediterranean, and Iraq Training Mission.

Furthermore, Turkey is the foremost country among the non-EU Member European Allies in terms of the number of ESDP operations and of the capabilities it provided to the police missions carried out under the leadership of the EU in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also EUFOR-ALTHEA, which replaced SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina is included in these operations. Besides its contribution to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon, with its over 1000 civilian police on duty in the UN operations in various regions of the world from Haiti to Kosovo, from Liberia to Sudan, from Georgia to East Timor, Turkey is among the countries which provide the largest contribution to the UN.

One of the major priorities of Turkey is to make humanitarian aids to the countries affected from natural or human caused disasters. In this context, Turkey, besides the aid activities on mutual levels, also contributes to the international aid efforts. The total amount of the humanitarian aids made by the Turkish Government and Turkish Red Crescent in the first 6 months of 2007 is around UDS 7 million. Turkey is rapidly ascending to the position of a world-wide “donor” country with official and private Development Aids at a level of USD 1.7 billion corresponding to 0,18% of its GNP.

8.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EU

Turkey’s relations with the EU rely to a longer period than that of the all new members and candidate members. In order to explain the significance of the point achieved today

in the Turkey-EU relations, first of all the historical development of this integration should be remembered.

The Ottoman State has been in Europe since its emergence. Besides the conflicts, cooperation was also made in its interaction with Europe. The Turkish threat which struck Europeans since the beginning of the 15th century has been the most significant element uniting Europe which was broken with the reformation movements and caused the formation of the nation-states. Although the Ottoman Empire took place in the European system officially with the Paris Agreement of 1856, the Empire started to disintegrate with the powerful nationalism current emerged in Europe in the second half of the 19th century. This current also caused the Turkish national consciousness to arise. Our National Independence War was in fact a struggle to establish a nation-state suitable to the European model of the 19th century and all of the theory trends of the 19th century Europe such as nationalism, humanism, constitutionalism, secularism, freedom, democratization, and industrialization, etc. are found in its roots.

Being the sole secular democracy in the Islam world, Turkey places great importance to its relations with European states. Historically Turkish Culture has significant effects on the Eastern and Southern Europe. When we examine the relations between Turkey and the EU, after the WW I, we see that Turkey, which turned its face to the West since the proclamation of the Modern Republic, took place in the international organization efforts rapidly developing in the European continent after the WW II: Turkey participated in the European Council in 1949 and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. And, following the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958, Turkey applied to the Community for partnership. The Council of Ministers of the EEC accepted the application submitted by Turkey and suggested to sign a partnership agreement which will be valid until the membership conditions are met. In 1964, after putting into force of Ankara Agreement signed in 1963, the partnership relationship between the EU and Turkey has commenced.

The objective of the Ankara Agreement “is to promote reinforcing the commercial and economic relations between the parties seamlessly and in a balanced manner, considering the necessity of rapid development of Turkish economy and elevating the employment level and living conditions of the Turkish nation,” as stated in Article 2.

Another very important provision of the Agreement is Article 28 which regulates the membership of Turkey. With the expression “Where the operation of the Ankara Agreement shows that Turkey is capable of undertaking the entire liabilities arising from the Treaty Establishing the Community, the Signatory Parties shall examine the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the Community,” the final aim of the partnership is determined as the membership of Turkey.

Ankara Agreement foresees an integration model for the membership target of Turkey consisting of three stages, namely “preparation period”, “transition period” and “final period”: the first period starts as of 1964 in which the Agreement was put into force. In this period entitled “Preparation Period”, Turkey does not undertake any obligations. However, the Community, within a framework of Additional Protocol put into force in 1973, unilaterally decreased the customs duties and amount quotas applied to all of the industrial goods imported from Turkey down to zero starting from 1971. With the enforcement of the Additional Protocol, the preparation period was ended and the conditions of the “Transition Period” were set. In this period, the industrial products, agricultural products, free circulation of individuals and completing the Customs Union were foreseen between the parties.

Turkey – EU relations showed an unstable development from the beginning of 1970s until the second half of 1980s due to the political and economic reasons, and following the coupe d’état dated September 12, 1980, the relations were totally suspended. After freezing the relations, the Partnership Council met again only in 1986. At this point Turkey stated that its aim was to apply for full membership and in 1987, without waiting the end of the periods stipulated in the Ankara Agreement, Turkey applied for membership. The Commission declared its view on this application in 1989 and declared that the Community is not ready to accept a new member without completing its internal integration. In addition, it was also stated that Turkey should improve in economic, social and political fields.

Upon this Turkey first aimed to complete the Customs Union and accelerated necessary works for this aim. In this context, the Customs Union was completed in 1996 and the “Final Period” started in the relation between Turkey and the EU. After completing the Customs Union, the Turkey – EU relations gained a new dimension because the

Customs Union constitutes one of the most significant phases of the partnership relation of Turkey towards the aim of integration with the EU.

In this period the EU Commission drafted the “Agenda 2000” Report. In the Report it was stated that Turkey would not be included in the expansion process due to its political and economic problems. In the Summit which was held in Luxembourg in 1997 and in which the Economic and Monetary Union and Expansion issues were discussed, Turkey’s candidanship was not confirmed officially, however, a “strategy” was suggested. Upon such an approach of the Council, Turkey declared that it would not withdraw its membership application, that it would continue applying Customs Union, however, will suspend political dialogue with the EU.

The turning point of the Turkey-EU relations was confirming the status of candidanship of Turkey to the EU and the decision stating that Turkey would participate in the system created in the context New Expansion Policy of the EU at an equal status with the other candidate States, reached in the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

“Arguably the single most important decision of the Helsinki Summit of European Union (EU) leaders in December 1999 was the declaration recognizing Turkey as an official candidate state for full membership in the EU, on equal terms with all other candidate countries. Representing an essential step toward the long-cherished Turkish goal of Westernization, full membership in the EU would at last fulfill Atatürk’s dream of attaining a place within European civilization. In the words of the Turkish former Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, full EU membership would allow Turkey to join ‘the (European) family’ and, as such, it would be an event of truly historic significance.”³³

The Final Report of the Helsinki Summit also foresees that Turkey benefits from the pre-accession strategy just like other candidate states and that an Accession Partnership Document is prepared for Turkey. During the candidanship period which started following the Helsinki Summit, Progress Reports were drafted for Turkey as others were drafted for other candidate states.

Accession Partnership Document of the EU Commission is prepared to determine the short and long term objectives of Turkey in terms of completing necessary works for fulfilling Copenhagen Criteria and undertaking the Community legislation. The EU accepted the first Accession Partnership Document drafted for Turkey on March 8,

2001. The Accession Partnership Document revised under the light of progresses made by Turkey and emerging new necessities was accepted in 2003. The first National Program, which was drafted by Turkey and shows the priorities found in the first Accession Partnership Document will be realized by which tangible measures and according to which schedule, was in force in 2001 and the revised National Program was in force in 2003.

With the “Laeken Summit” of 2001, a new perspective was given to Turkey on the route to full membership and it is decided Turkey to participate in the convention, which will submit recommendations to the international conference foreseen to be held in 2003 on the future of Europe, on an equal status with other member states.

Another important turning point in the European Union expansion period is the Copenhagen Summit held in 2002. In this Summit, it was stated that if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria sufficiently in accordance with the 2004 Progress Report and recommendations, the accession negotiations would start without delay. Following the Helsinki Summit, Turkey entered an intense reform period and adopted the 8th Harmonization and 2nd Constitution Amendment Package which included many law and legislation regulations with the purpose of harmonization to the EU political criteria.

Turkey registered a significant progress in the membership process in 2004 in the EU relations. Following the tangible progress made during the reform period, the EU Commission declared in 2004 the Progress Report in which the stages completed towards harmonization to Copenhagen criteria and the existing deficiencies. In this Report the Commission stated that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria sufficiently and suggested to commence the accession negotiations. The EU leaders, stating that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria sufficiently, have agreed the negotiations to commence on October 3, 2005.

As we see when we examine the short background of the Turkey – Europe relations, Turkey is a country which turned its face to the West. We can say that the EU membership of Turkey has many positive contributions both to Turkey and to the EU.

“The principal conclusion of this examining is that the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU represents a historic opportunity for a comprehensive European peace, further

prosperity and a security zone in the Balkans and the Middle East. Without stabilizing these regions around Western Europe, it is futile to view the ESDI as an instrument peace and security in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Including Greece and Greek Cypriots, but excluding Turkey, in fact, would destabilize the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is an essential part of both the Balkans and the Middle East, and, its cooperation and contribution are vital in stabilizing these regions. Greek-Turkish cooperation and friendship, therefore, hold the key to regional peace and stability. The EU can make or break Greek-Turkish relations, or put differently, it can stabilize or destabilize the Aegean.”³⁴

9. THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP ON THE CFSP

In this section, before making an evaluation regarding the consequences of Turkey's accession to the EU's CFSP integration and to European Union, I would like to discuss and to make pre-evaluation the possible consequences of Turkey's strategic position on the political issues, geostrategic and geopolitical dimension of Turkey. Then I will try to find Turkey's potential contributions to the EU's security and defence policy with its military power and relations with neighbor countries etc.

Turkey is positioned in a region which is significant for the EU in strategic terms. Turkey is in a transit position for the land and air communication with Asia and naval communication with Russia and Ukraine. When we consider the water resources, Turkey's neighbors provide with Europe vital energy supply. When it comes to economy and population, Turkey has a growing economy and as an EU Member, it will be the largest State. Being a secular Muslim country governed by democracy, it occupies a significant place in the region as a balancing factor. Turkey also contributes to the security of Europe and neighbor States with its integration with the Western alliance and as a member of many economic and regional organization.

It is possible to say that Turkey's EU membership will have a wide range of effects on the CFSP of EU. In line with Turkey's geographical and strategic location, its relations with its neighbours, with the Islamic world, with Mediterranean countries and relations with the Middle East will affect EU's CFSP in a positive way.

In this part of thesis, I will try to evaluate the potential effects of Turkey's EU membership on the foreign and security policy of the EU under the following headings in conformity with the strategic objectives of the EU which I summarized above paragraph:

- Geostrategical dimension of Turkey
- Geopolitical dimension of Turkey

- Turkey's potential contributions to the EU's security and defense policy;
- Turkey's potential contributions to the EU, with its military power
- Turkey's potential contributions to the EU in the field of struggle against terrorism and struggle against weapons of mass destruction
- Turkey's potential contributions to the EU in relations with neighbor countries and regions
- Turkey's other potential contributions

9.1. GEOSTRATEGICAL DIMENSION OF TURKEY

Throughout the history, the many struggles and the changing of hand of this geography between the civilizations are the most beautiful examples of the geostrategic importance. This area which was a field of struggle in the periods before the tenth century in which Turks started to get hold of this geography brought a period of peace, tranquility and confidence for all of the nations which recognized and lived under the Turkish sovereignty. In addition, Turkish geography, due to its geostrategic significance, has preserved its presences as the territories of which the parties of the east and west struggle were eager to dominate.

The fact that the region is positioned at the passage way between Europe and Asia in the East-West and North-South directions and between the North of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and of Islam and Christianity is the most significant component of the geostrategic significance of the region. This geostrategic significance of the region causes all of the countries to have a target of invading this region. This was the triggering factor of the chain of events which concluded with the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. For this reason, dominating the Turkish geography entails the necessity of being prudent all the time.

Turkey's geostrategic significance showed itself again and in a very clear manner in the Middle East policies of the United States of America. One of the facts underlying the efforts of the USA to get the support of Turkey in its Iraq policy during the 1990s was the geostrategic significance of Turkey. Following the experiences of the first Iraq operation of the USA and especially the panorama the USA encountered in the second

Iraq operation of 2003, and the situation which occurred after the March 1 Official Communication, once again revealed how indispensable for the USA the significance of Turkey in geostrategic terms. Moreover, it was suggested that the reason for the USA's situation, after the Iraq operation, lays in the fact that the USA could not occupy Iraq from the north due to the March 1 Official Communication issue of Turkey.

Turkey's geostrategic significance once again came on the agenda for the nuclear crisis Iran experienced with the USA and the European states and also with the States which seek to be active in the region. Again, the USA support to Turkey for entering the northern Iraq and carrying out an cross border operation to the PKK terrorists, which seemed to be impossible after the March 1 Official Communication, are notable developments. The USA Foreign Affairs Minister's visit to Turkey coincided with the troubled period experienced between the USA - European States and Iran and with the cross border operation of Turkey performed in the northern Iraq. These are attempts for pleasing Turkey based on the geostrategic significance of Turkey in a possible attack of the USA to Iran.

When the issue is viewed from the Iran's perspective, Turkey's geostrategic significance is evident. Under the light of such developments, Iran's bombing the PKK camps as a counter attack to becoming closer of Turkey and the USA can be viewed as Iran's effort to get close to Turkey.

Being at an intercontinental transition point, positioned over the transit ways in economic terms, and possessing the water resources which are shown as the most significant weapon of future, Turkey will always preserve its geostrategic significance. Therefore, Turkey should employ the gained opportunities and should utilize the opportunities given by this geostrategic significance it possesses.

When we look at the potential effects of Turkey's EU membership on the CFSP because of Turkey's geostrategical dimension we can say that;

“The paramount positive consequence of Turkey's inclusion in the second pillar lies in Turkey's geostrategic importance. Turkey lies at a bridgehead which links the Eurasia land mass to the Middle East and Europe to the Caucasus. Thus, Turkey's chances for convergence with the EU increases when its geostrategical importance is borne in mind. A good deal of the areas that might require the RRF's (Rapid Reaction Force)

deployment are very close to Turkey; the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and even Central Asia. To exemplify, during the war in Afghanistan in the past one year, many Western troops were airlifted from Europe to Afghanistan through and from Turkey. For this reason it is perfectly reasonable to argue that Turkey would be a good addition to the CFSP considering its logistical importance. More important than the deployment of the RRF, Turkey's geostrategic importance for the EU has several other meanings. First, Turkey is very close to the oilfields of the Middle East and the South Caucasus. It is the oil that comes from here that has, and will continue to, constitute a good deal of the EU's energy needs. Moreover, a good deal of the Caucasus and Middle East oil passes, or is going to pass from Turkey, for consumption in the West. Moreover, the oil pipeline projects that will be carrying Central Asian oil and natural gas to Europe will be passing from Turkey. Hence, it is quite important for the EU to have a secure source of energy. In this respect, Turkey's role as a secure route for energy supplies. As the EU is severely dependent on oil, the safety of the passageways of oil is of utmost importance for the EU. Thus, convergence with Turkey in that respect would be a wise move on the part of the EU.”³⁵

9.2. GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION OF TURKEY

Turkey is positioned right in the center of four of the regions which seem to have problem in the world: Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and the Gulf. This position makes it indispensable for the States which have interests on the region.

Especially the world police position of the United States of America (the USA) during this period of “globalization” and the USA's distance to these regions causes an increase in the strategic importance of Turkey on earth.

Another strategic evaluation is the economic, cultural and political opportunities possessed by Turkey for the independent states and autonomous governments which came out after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Both of the situations drag Turkey to become a “regional power.” Especially the political, military and economic garboil in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and the Gulf will continue for long years, it seems that Turkey's significance in being a regional power will also continue long years.

“For very differing reasons, Turkish membership could also be decisive for the EU. Turkey will have between 80 and 90 million citizens in less than a generation and will be the most populous country in Europe, excluding the Russian Federation. If Turkey were to be a full member, the EU would acquire a Middle Eastern dimension and external borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria. Moreover, Turkish membership would be a clear sign for Israel, Morocco and maybe some Caucasian states to apply for membership of the EU.”³⁶

9.2.1. Economic Dimension of Turkey

Being a rapidly developing, urbanizing, continuing its economic and cultural integration with the world, and ever growing country, Turkey is an important market. With its developing technology and entrepreneurship, Turkey opens to the world both as a “market” and an economic power making “production.” Such qualities Turkey seems to have a structure which helps it to establish and improve “significant” economic relations with European Union on one side and Japan on the other.

It is possible to say that Turkey has an important economic potential for the independent states and autonomous government which substituted the former Soviet Union.

9.2.2. Political-Cultural Dimension of Turkey

To be an “Islamic country” increases Turkey’s importance in the world. The reason for this is the fact that it is the sole secular and democratic Islam country. With this characteristic Turkey gains importance as an economic-military-political power and at the same time casts a different model for the “Muslim World.” Turkey as a secular and democratic example for Muslim communities is important not only for the region but the whole world and the history of humanity.

Turkey established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the most beautiful example of the fact that “Islamic model” does not pursue a route different from the universal line of change and development. Its presence proves that both secularity and democracy can exist in a Muslim society and change and development take place towards this direction.

Consequently, evaluations made in terms of political-cultural, economic, geostrategical and geopolitical dimensions, show that Turkey does not have an importance on the regional level only but also in the world history.

9.3.TURKEY'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Cooperation between the EU and Turkey in the field of ESDP has made progress since the middle of 1990s. As a result of this cooperation, a significant convergence has been provided between the perspectives of the EU and Turkey in the field of the CFSP.

“Turkey, under the prevailing conditions of the 1990s decided to make important changes in her defence policy. The new threats to Ankara have been declared as weapons of mass destruction, religious fundamentalism, drugs, terrorism, political and economic instability and regional/ethnic conflicts. In the wake of these threat perceptions, Ankara’s military strategy in the 2000 Defence White Paper of Turkey is redefined as deterrence, military contributions to crisis management and intervention, forward defence and collective security. Both of these ideas were then the extensions of the current NATO and American strategic vocabulary.”³⁷

“In order to meet the requirements of the new security environment, like other Western countries and leading international organizations (like NATO and the EU), Turkey has decided to upgrade her military capabilities. Ankara’s main objective behind this move was to maintain a realistic deterrence capability that aimed to provide the security of the homeland. For this reason, Turkey has embarked upon a new transformation process in her Armed Forces. These modernization efforts have certainly helped Turkey to become, more than ever, a net contributor to Western security in the field of peace-keeping operations.”³⁸

The level of Turkey’s participation in the EU’s political declarations, in the Common Positions, in the Common Actions and in the other the CFSP measures, point out the multiplicity of shared opinions.

Turkey’s interest in the ESDP, its experience in the NATO’s peacekeeping operations as well as other international peacekeeping operations, lays a positive groundwork for its inclusion in the CFSP / ESDP structures after the accession to the EU. Turkey is capable of making an earnest contribution to the EU’s security and defence through its major military spending and its manpower.

The ratio of Turkey's military spending to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the highest when it is compared to the NATO countries. Moreover, Turkey's military personnel constitute an important portion of the military force belonging to the NATO's European members.

As I mentioned above sections, in the European Security Strategy document, which was prepared in the scope of ESDP, was emphasized that the possibility of any EU Member State being target to an attack is abolished, however Europe faces more varied and less predictable threats and the threats which Europe is subject to, namely terrorism, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, regional conflicts, disintegrating states and organized crime, are listed.

Taking into account these threats, The European Union aimed at three strategic objectives to defend its security;

First, addressing the threats: The Union continues to take steps to tackle the key threats. It responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant and steps against terrorist financing. The Union continues to pursue its policies against arms proliferation, in part by strengthening international treaties and their verification provisions. It has intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed States back on their feet. Restoring good government promotes democracy and is a way of tackling organised crime.

Until the end of the Cold War, EU's traditional concept of self-defence was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, however, the first line of defence will often be abroad. Today, each threat requires a combination of responses, which the Union is particularly well equipped to provide.

As I mentioned above, "The two very important events that the world community had witnessed at the turn of the century really affected the foundations of international relations, international organizations, as well as the strategies that dealt with the concepts of 'threat' and 'security'. Since then, the international community has experienced a great transformation process. Firstly, the end of the Cold War created an opportunity to bring about a United and free Europe. But it has also brought new and unpredictable challenges like regional conflicts and civil wars. Secondly, the tragic events of 11 September, 2001 certainly marked an important turning point in the field of

security. International organizations have inevitably found themselves responding to this radically changed environment. NATO members, starting from the 1990s onwards, have initiated a very important transformation process by adapting a new strategic concept as well as accepting new missions and capabilities. Simultaneously, the EU, in accepting a new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and also initiating its enlargement process, tried to be an effective security actor. In NATO's two strategic concepts and European Security Strategy document 'terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed/failing states' have been redefined as the new security threats of twenty-first century."³⁹

Second, building security in its neighbourhood: It is in the Union's interest that countries on EU borders are well governed. EU's task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the east of the European Union and on the shores of the Mediterranean with whom EU can enjoy close and cooperative relations. Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. If Turkey becomes a member country of EU, the effects of well governed Turkey will contribute EU's objective related to security in its neighbourhood policy.

Third, developing an international order based on effective multilateralism: According to EU; "Its security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The Union aims to develop a stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions - such as the United Nations, whose Charter constitutes the fundamental framework for international relations - and a rule-based international order. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic States. EU policies are aimed at bringing this about".⁴⁰

It can be seen that each of the said threats are listed above is totally valid for the threat perception of Turkey and each of the strategic objectives of EU is also valid for Turkey. For long year Turkey advocated that the method for struggling terrorism is international cooperation and that the international resources of terrorism should be dried out. Following the 9/11 events, the EU included various terrorist organizations including PKK, which are active in Turkey into its terrorist list. The EU considering terrorism as the first threat as stated in its strategy document is a significant development. For this

reason, I think that it will make serious contributions to activating the cooperation in fighting with terrorism.

“The Osama bin Laden-inspired terrorism attack on the USA on 11 September 2001 puts Turkish-EU relations in a new perspective. Secular Turkey has suddenly re-emerged as a critical Western ally in the fight against international terrorism. Accordingly, Turkish membership in the EU should henceforth be assessed constructively precisely because Turkey is a Muslim country. The Turkish secular state is the most realistic model of development for the entire Muslim world. Thus the expected payoff from an eventual Turkish full membership in the EU is greatly heightened, and can lead to the following positive-sum outcomes:

- First, inclusion of Turkey in the EU would contribute to European security, especially in relation to the escalating problem of international terrorism. In economic and trade terms, it would also create the world’s largest and most prosperous single market comprising some 500 million inhabitants living in a huge territory extending from the Scottish highlands to the borders of Caucasia. Europe, then, would become an increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-religious union; it will be a richer, post-modern European civilization with an identity that would signal the end of “a Crusade Millennium”, for, by incorporating Turkey in its midst, Europe would transform itself into a cultural bridge between the Christian and Muslim worlds and show the way to harmonious governance within the Global Village, ridding it of such global public “evils” as terrorism, religious intolerance, racism and xenophobia.
- Second, a new post-modern Europe, inclusive of Greeks and Turks, would at last halt competing ethno-nationalisms in this region. Through constructive and evenhanded diplomacy, the EU could play a valuable role as a “catalyst” in promoting friendship and cooperation between Turkey and Greece. The Aegean can then truly become a sea of peace and cooperation, in the spirit of the Atatürk-Venizelos grand reconciliation.”⁴¹

As it is known, proliferation of the mass destruction weapons causes more concern in the recent times. Especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this threat is much more revealed. I believe that in the EU Member States, besides taking precautions

at the borders, international cooperation and information sharing should be developed in order to bring an end to these threats. There are many fields in which the EU and Turkey – occupies a position between the Middle East, Asia and Europe – can make joint studies.

When we evaluate the issue in terms of regional conflicts, due to the events occurred after Europe finding itself suddenly right in the middle of regional skirmishes with the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and to the lack of a structure which has the capacity to intervene such conflicts because of the difference of opinion between the powers of Europe, accelerated the search of the EU to be more active in preserving peace and preventing such conflicts. In this field Turkey made significant contributions in establishing a mechanism, which will increase the cooperation between NATO and the EU. Turkey, as a full member of the EU, will contribute to developing the operational features of the European Security and Defense Policy. Consequently, Turkey's geographical proximity and its historical and cultural relations will constitute an important advantage in contributing to intervening, even preventing, and the regional conflicts occurring in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East.

Regional conflicts should also be evaluated in terms of their forming a suitable environment for terrorist activities, proliferation of mass destruction weapons and organized crimes. In addition, the government gaps arising in the disintegrated states cause such threats to grow. Many such examples can be given from the history. The threat perception of Turkey and the EU is common in this issue and cooperation for active fighting seems necessary.

In fighting with organized crimes, which is another threat in the EU Strategy Document, the cooperation between the EU and Turkey increased in the recent years and this cooperation yields positive results.

Turkey will continue to support the development of the ESDP both as a European ally that is not a member of the EU and as a candidate for membership to the EU. Besides, it is capable of making a considerable contribution to the ESDP also after being a member of the EU.

In this framework, both in terms of the number of operations, to which our country has made a contribution, and also in terms of the quality of its civilian and military

contributions to every single operation, Turkey is in the front ranks within the countries that contribute to the ESDP although they are not EU members.

Turkey's contributions to the ESDP operations till the end of 2005 are listed below:

- Turkey sent about 370 personnel for the operation European Union Force (EUFOR) – ALTHEA since its beginning, and it has also sent 23 constables for the Integrated Police Unit within the context of the operation named above.
- 6 staff from Turkey's General Directorate of Security and 6 staff from the General Command of Gendarmerie Headquarters (12 staff in total) were sent to the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia Herzegovina, which was the first civilian crisis management operation in the context of the ESDP, beginning in January 1, 2003.
- one police officer from Turkey was under duty in the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) Kinshasa between March 31, 2005 and October 13, 2005. After that another police officer from Turkey was charged in the Mission by December 16, 2005.

Turkey also makes contribution to the European Union Battle Groups (EU BGs). It is envisaged that the Battle Group, which is composed of Turkey, Italy and Romania, will reach its full operational mobility by the end of year 2009, and it will be declared to the EU in the second half of the year 2010.

9.4. TURKEY'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS WITH ITS MILITARY POWER

The military power of Turkey has the capacity to contribute to the EU's 2010 capabilities aim and Common Security and Defense Policy activity. For this reason, we can say that Turkey can contribute to the military capabilities of the EU and the EU, of which Turkey is a full member, will be an actor more effective in the global level. Also, Turkey will contribute to the civil force aims of the EU due to its geographical position, to the fact that it reflects a fusion of democratic and Islamic values and that it is a key country in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus.

“Turkey, with about 402,000 personnel has the second largest army in NATO after the US. In the last couple of decades Turkey’s Air Force has been upgraded and she now maintains the second largest air force in NATO. Similarly, Turkey has NATO’s second largest tank inventory, and is continuing to modernize her navy component consistent with the insecure environment.”⁴²

Turkey’s contribution to the EU in the field of military power depends on two significant military opportunities of Turkey. These are its geostrategic position and its military potential.

The fact that the success of the military operations to be undertaken by the EU in the geography neighbor to Turkey depends on Turkey’s support and logistic assistance shows the significance of Turkey’s geostrategic position. The most recent example of this was experienced in the evacuation of the EU citizen civilians in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and the EU citizens could be transferred from the war zone to their own countries without encountering any problem thanks to the efforts shown by Turkey.

The experience of its army and the dimension of its military possibilities form the basis of military contributions of Turkey. Therefore, one of the most important trumps of Turkey in EU membership negotiations is the Turkish Armed Forces. In NATO, Turkey have the second largest land forces after the USA and fifth largest naval forces. In addition Turkey owns the 10.5% of the war aircraft, 20% of the carrier aircraft and 22.5% of the detection aircraft of NATO.

Turkey also develops its military capabilities according to the new criteria in war. By purchasing 50 SLAM-ER missiles in October 2006, Turkey became the first in Europe and second in the World after the USA who has these missiles. When we look at the issue from this viewpoint, participation of Turkey in the operations under the leadership of the EU will increase the chance of success of the EU and its reliability as an international actor.

Examining its role up to now can see the possible contributions of Turkey to the EU’s military capabilities. Turkey took part actively both in the Althea operation in Bosnia and in the Concordia operation in Macedonia. Turkey has supported the UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1995 with 1,450 men, and IFOR and SFOR forces of NATO with a 1,200 men, with units and equipment. It took part in the Kosovo operation of NATO with its

ten F-16 fighters and has sent approximately a unit of 940 men to the KFOR force. Turkey participated actively in the EU's EUFOR-Althea operation with 370 personnel and for personnel from the Gendarmerie took place in the PROXIMA Police force established by the EU in Macedonia in December 15, 2003. Turkey took part in the EU's operation made to ensure the security in the Congo elections in the summer of 2006 with a unit of 3,000 men. In addition, Turkey contributes to the EU's military capacities aim by establishing a European Combat Group together with Italy and Romania. This Combat Group is designed to gain the full mobility in 2009.

Another participation of Turkey, which is not in the body of the EU but shows its place in the new system, is its role in NATO operation ISAF in Afghanistan. Since the ISAF operation NATO's reflects the changing role and mission of NATO in the post-Cold War international security system, it is very important in terms of the security of Europe. Turkey participated in the ISAF with 1,400 men and undertook the defense of Kabul Airport. Turkey also undertook the command of ISAF two times, first one being for 8 months in 2002 – 2003 and the second one for 8 months since 2005. Turkey's former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin between 2003 and 2006 carried out the Civilian Representative duty of NATO in Afghanistan. Turkey's presence created a security medium in Afghanistan and showed Turkey's active role in military terms.

Besides the support it gives with 900 men to the Kabul Regional Headquarters in Afghanistan as of October 2006, Turkey is charged with duty in the ongoing ALTHEA operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with 300 personnel and in Kosovo with 400 personnel. In addition, upon a NATO Council decision, four F-16 fighters and 80-personnel unit participated in the "air police" operation in the air spaces of Baltic countries, namely Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, between April 1 and July 31 2006. Turkey also participated in the EU peace support operation in the Congo Democratic Republic elections with a C-130 military carrier and 17 personnel. Again within the scope of Congo operation, an officer in the operation headquarters in Germany, which undertook the leadership of the operation, and another officer in the headquarters in Congo Gabon are on duty. This operation bears the characteristic of a pre-Combat Group under the leadership of Germany. On the other hand, 11 personnel in on duty in the observation operations carried out in Georgia, El Halil and Sudan.

9.5. TURKEY'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU IN THE FIELD OF STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM AND STRUGGLE AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

After I analysed WMD and terrorism issues of EU in first section, I would like to analyse explain the issue of terrorism from the Turkish perspective and Turkey's possible contributions at this section.

Turkey is also sensitive to the global issues on the security. Active participation to the international efforts in this field, harmonization to the regulations and supervising the full implementation of the agreements and arrangements are significant components of Turkey's national security policy.

In this context, Turkey places a special importance to the controlling of weapons and disarmament issues. Active participation to the international efforts in this field, harmonization to the regulations and supervising the full implementation of the agreements are significant components of our national security policy.

Proliferation of mass destruction weapons and launching mechanisms for such weapons constitute an increasing threat component in 21st century. Before the threat of terrorism and mass destruction weapons, Turkey sincerely desires that all of the States reach to a level on which joint effort is shown for a safer and more stable world order where the objective of preventing the proliferation is shared. Turkey is a party to all of the international regimes on preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons including the Agreement on Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Additional Protocol of this Agreement. Turkey is also a member to the international export control regimes related to items which can be used to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Turkey plays significant role in its own region and beyond with its powerful defense capacity, its active participation in the efforts for preventing international conflicts and constructing peace.

“Turkey's inclusion into the second pillar will significantly determine the success of the CFSP and the RRF (Rapid Reaction Force) in the near future due to Turkey's military strength as it has the sixth largest standing army in the world. In this sense, Turkey's

large military can present itself as a source of well-trained and disciplined combat forces. Moreover, Turkey has gained a good deal of combat experience, owing to its fight against the PKK. For that reason, including Turkey to the CFSP would be very helpful when carrying out the types of low-density counter-terrorist operations which the Turkish military is experienced; just the types of operation which are part of the CFSP's Petersberg tasks.”⁴³

9.5.1. Contribution of Turkey to the International Operations in the Field of Struggle against Terrorism

Turkey, which is deeply influenced by the negative consequences of terrorism, decries all sorts of terror and terrorist actions roundly. It is one of the first countries joining the global cooperation formed in order to fight terrorism. In November 2003, Turkey was also targeted by the terrorist attacks that had been experienced in a number of grand cities of the world within the past few years.

The 1373, 1546, 1566, and 1624 numbered decrees of the United Nations Security Council lay the foundation of endeavours for the fight against terrorism. Turkey is a party to all of the twelve UN agreements and protocols about the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, in September 14, 2005, Turkey signed the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement of UN, too.

Turkey signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in January 19, 2006; and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism in March 28, 2007.

Again in the same framework, in February 12-13, 2007, Turkey hosted the second meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, in Ankara. Therefore, Turkey has become an important partner of the above mentioned initiative, in which the United States and the Russian Federation assumed the joint statement.

Turkey believes that the UN has to occupy the centre of international actions for combating terrorism, and the support of other organisations can only be complementary and supportive to the UN's operations.

Turkey, in the light of the experiences gathered from the long combat against destructive and separatist terrorist organizations, knowing well the relationship between terrorism and organized crime (drug trafficking, illegal emigration, human trafficking etc), and earnestly trying to explicate to its addressees the danger emanating from the exploitation of freedom of thought, freedom of association, and freedom of economic activity especially in the Western countries, provided the general acknowledgement of the connection between terrorism and organized crime, after much effort.

The Lists of Designated Terrorist Persons and Organizations, which was accepted and periodically updated following the September 11 events, is a concrete step made to prevent this kind of activities.

It was a positive step that, the EU decided to include the separatist terrorist organization PKK, and the radical leftist DHKP/C in the list of terrorist organizations in May 2002. Yet another positive step was its decision in April 2004 to include KADEK and KONGRA-GEL (new names of PKK), and also IBDA-C in the list.

Turkey always attends the activities implemented within the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) actively and it also extends financial aid.

In the UN and in other concerning forums, whenever the occasion arrives, Turkey supports passing of the most determined and effective measures as to combat terrorism. Following the September 11 attacks, based on the fact that terrorism is a universal problem, Turkey continues its activities in terms of the combat against terrorism in a condensed manner, both by international and regional organizations such as the NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). It also increases its activities on the same issue in the framework of the bilateral agreement. We can see the active efforts and contributions of Turkey in many documents and declarations adopted in this issue.

I can conclude that, although the issue of combat against terrorism comes up in the Third Column of the EU, in the aftermath of September 11 events, this combat has become the most important goal in the EU's domestic safety field, while it has also become a part of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (THE CFSP). On the other hand, Turkey is a country that has both faced with and combated against the

terrorist actions (PKK) for years. We can say that, somewhat this is the reason behind its strong army. Therefore, Turkey is a country, which can contribute to the EU positively in the senses that it both has the experience of years, and also owns a strong army. Turkey can also make additional contributions after its accession to the EU through transferring its experience in the area of international terrorism that is gained in collaboration with the EU.

9.5.2. Contribution of Turkey to the International Efforts in the Field of Struggle against Weapons of Mass Destruction

Turkey places a special importance to the controlling of weapons and disarmament issues. Since it is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery is a serious concern for Turkey. Therefore, it participates to the international efforts in this field. Turkey also maintains a common stance with the EU on non-proliferation and disarmament issues. Turkey has supported a great majority of EU Resolutions on non-proliferation and disarmament issues.

Turkey attaches great importance to arms control and non-proliferation treaties and also to export control regimes as a means of preventing such proliferation. Turkey is a party to;

- Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Chemical Weapons Convention
- Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
- Wassenaar Arrangement
- Missile Technology Control Regime
- Zangger Committee
- Nuclear Suppliers Group
- Australia Group
- Ottawa Convention

- Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
- Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (Additional Protocols I, II, IV)
- IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (including Additional Protocol) Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials (PPSNM)

“The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear weapon States”.⁴⁴

“As a party to the NPT, Turkey undertakes to sign an agreement with the IAEA and accepts the IAEA inspections on all nuclear materials within its territory. IAEA has duty related to safeguards inspections. According to the Article III. A. 5 of the Statute of the IAEA; the Agency is authorized: to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request or the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of atomic energy”.⁴⁵

Turkey is also welcomed the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and Resolution 1673 extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee. “According to the Resolution 1540 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, on 28 April 2004; “Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security” the Security Council,

- “Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;
- Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear,

chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

- Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials.”⁴⁶

Furthermore, it supports the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities. Turkey has become an initial partner of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2007. The export of sensitive and dual-use materials covered by international arrangements and export control regimes is controlled by means of a two-tier mechanism. The applications for export are evaluated in accordance with the UN lists as well as the EU restrictive measures which Turkey aligns herself with. The control lists of the international arrangements against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or international export control regimes are also taken into consideration. Turkey also supports EU policy related to Iran’s nuclear programme and tries to find a diplomatic solution to the problem. Turkey has joined all recent EU statements on Iran. “Turkey has adopted the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 which imposed sanctions on Iran for failure to halt uranium enrichment. According to the Article 2 of UN Resolution 1737, UN Security Council decides that “ Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities:

- all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and
- work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA.

Furthermore, according to Article 3 of the same Resolution, UN Security Council decides that “all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology

which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems".⁴⁷

Consequently, as a party of international arrangements, Turkey contributes to international efforts in the field of struggle against WMD in parallel with EU. Turkey also supports EU policy related to WMD in international arena.

9.6. TURKEY'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU IN RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOR COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

After the participation of Turkey, the borders of the Union will reach to South Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan), Syria, Iran and Iraq. This will include in the foreign policy of the Union the issues which were mutual relations between Turkey and its neighbors. I will explain Turkey's position related to its neighbours and near regions and I will try to comment possible effects of these issues on the CFSP of EU.

9.6.1. The Middle East

Having rich natural resources, the Middle East has been in disorder and skirmishes for tens of years. Turkey is affected adversely from the instability in the region. Due to the historical and cultural bonds between Turkey and the states in the region, Turkey attributes contributing to the efforts for turning the Middle East into geography of permanent peace, security, prosperity and close cooperation as a responsibility.

Turkey has a Middle East vision. This vision also gives the opportunity to share the experiences of Turkey which participated in the cooperation processes at European level. It supports and promotes improving the economic, political and social conditions in the region. In this context, Turkey participated in the G-8 summit of 2004 as a democratic partner.

"Turkey's interests in the Middle East may be summarized as follows:

- 1) The resources of the area, including the Persian Gulf, are of vital importance. Two thirds of the world's known oil reserves are within the region; and, as Turkey has to import at least 80 percent of its oil, the free flow of this fuel at reasonable prices is of prime interest.

- 2) Because Turkey is rapidly becoming a “trading state”, it has an interest in the general maintenance of open sea lanes for all sorts of commodities in the Mediterranean.
- 3) As it is a close neighbor of the states of the Middle East, Turkey is immediately affected by events and policies such as political extremism and terrorism, war, the oppression of minorities, etc. that cause population dislocations or migrations. Turkey’s capacity to absorb refugees in great numbers is severely limited. Therefore, the maintenance of stability in the region, with the territorial integrity of all its states being respected and safeguarded, is of particular importance.
- 4) A major element militating against the stability of the region is the spread of arms of all sorts as the various states assert their need to defend their territories. Turkey desires to see the dismantling of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the reduction of conventional armaments in the area.”⁴⁸

Turkey believes that the permanent peace, security and stability in the Middle East can only be reached by resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict via negotiations. Turkey recognized both Israel and Palestine as two states on the secure and international level and considers that the UN Security Council (UNSC) Decisions number 1397 and number 1515 as significant steps towards this purpose.

Turkey contributes actively to the efforts shown by the international society for maintaining peace in the Middle East. With the help of the relations established with both parties, Turkey has a position to allow a constructive role which will complete endeavors towards this aim. Turkey’s diplomatic relations dating back to 1949 have improved in a manner beneficial to the two States and to the stability in the region throughout all this time. Turkey believes that as peace develops roots in this problematic geography, its relations and cooperation with Israel will be an example for the other countries.

Believing that the economic cooperation may increase trust between the parties, Turkey started a trio process so-called Ankara Forum in order to develop the economic and commercial relations between Palestine and Israel, with the participation of Turkey. Besides other issues, the Forum focused on revitalizing the Erez Industrial Zone which

bears a crucial significance for the Palestine economy after Israel withdraws from the Gaza Strip. Turkey, Palestine and Israel have signed bilateral agreements for starting the project. Within the context of an action plan accepted in 2003, Turkey made humanitarian aids at significant amounts to the Palestine nation.

Turkey is the sole regional States which contributed to the UNIFIL, the UN mission in Lebanon, with a frigate, two corvettes, and 260 person additional personnel. The decision reached by Turkey in 2006 for participating in UNIFIL was an indication of the trust for Turkey's capacity to contribute to re-establishing the stability in the region. Turkey took part in the first 15 countries which made humanitarian aids to Lebanon.

The relations of Turkey with its neighbors such as Syria and Iran progress in the positive ways. Turkey supports the diplomatic efforts for the inclusion of these countries in the international cooperation. In this sense, Turkey promotes Syria and Iran to cooperate with the international society in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Middle East Peace Process. As for the Iran's nuclear program, Turkey supports diplomatic solution and promotes Iran to fulfill the expectations of the international society in this issue.

“Finding a just and peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem has first priority on the agenda of the European Common Foreign and Security Policies. According to European common wisdom, there is an urgent need to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to the problems of Iraq. Without solving these two problems, it is believed that stability in the Middle East, and beyond, cannot be guaranteed.”⁴⁹

After the analysed Middle East when we look at the the effect of Turkey's EU membership on relations with the Middle East with regard to EU's CFSP; we can say that;

Even if oceans separate the EU, it wishes to be represented in the Middle East and be an important actor in the region. Because as we know, the Middle East affects the EU in areas such as oil, immigration, smuggling of human beings, terrorism and drugs. Also, the conflicts in the Middle East affect the EU. Therefore, EU usually faces problems originating from the Middle East. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be given as an example. Allocating its financial resources to this conflict, the EU faces problems in resolving the situation because the EU has not been able to assume the role of the United States in the Middle East. The attacks of September 11 and the Iraq war have

explicitly shown us that the developments experienced in the Middle East will also affect Europe. If the EU fails to engage in mediation and get involved, the Middle East will be shaped beyond its will. At this point, full membership of Turkey can provide the desired tools and the power of impact.

We can summarize Turkey's approach to the region with the performance it has shown in the Iraq war. The attitude adopted by Turkey in the Iraq war has decreased the prejudice against Turkey in the region and eliminated the misunderstandings. Turkey has been the strongest supporter of the territorial integrity of Iraq both during and after the war. Turkey has strived to ensure that there is no more disintegration in the region while supporting the taking of steps towards integration. This attitude has eliminated the view that Turkey has an interest in the disintegration of Iraq and that it wishes to have access to Northern Iraqi oil.

We can say that the basis of Turkey's policy for the Middle East is integration and regional cooperation. And this is important in that it is parallel to the approaches of the EU. Turkey is increasing its commercial, social, cultural relations with the region and striving to avoid a new war in the region. It finds it against the interest of the region to have conflicts in Syria and Iran similar to those in Iraq. This approach of Turkey is in harmony with the EU's Middle East policies.

Firstly, there must be national integration in the Middle East. The countries of the region must ensure their national integrity in line with human rights, democracy and minority rights. Secondly, it is important to ensure regional integration. That is, relations and communication among the countries of the region must be increased and regional integration must be achieved. Thirdly, failure of the Middle East to integrate with the global order threatens both regional stability and has a negative effect on the entire world. The main aim of Turkey is to ensure full integration of the Middle East in the global system. These policies of Turkey are in line with the EU's policies for the Middle East. Turkey's EU membership will assist the EU in realizing its policies with regard to the EU's CFSP in the Middle East. Turkey, which has solved to great extent bilateral problems with the countries of the region and which defends the view "zero problems with neighbours" follows policies that are the strategy sought by the EU for the region. Full membership of Turkey will provide the EU with the necessary tools to

implement the strategy it targets for the Middle East and with an implementer like Turkey; the EU will have more weight.

9.6.2. Iraq

When we look at the Iraq, we can say that; The developments experienced in Iraq and the worsening security issue continues to claim its place in the agenda of Turkey as well as the international community. Turkey has been the regional state which was most affected negatively from the security problems emerging as a consequence of the incidents taking place in Iraq and surroundings. Therefore, re-establishing order in Iraq is among the priority interests of Turkey.

Turkey wishes to see an Iraq of which territorial integrity is preserved, stability and trust is established again, religious sect conflicts are not seen, is democratic, and in peace with itself as well as its neighbors. Among the priority aims of Turkey regarding Iraq, preserving the territorial integrity and the union of the country takes place.

For this reason, Turkey supported the political transition period in Iraq and is decisive in assisting Iraq in maintaining security, peace and stability again. Turkey played an important role in ensuring that the Iraq society, especially the Sunnite community, to participates in the political process.

Being aware of the significance of re-establishing the Iraq's national security network and capabilities, Turkey contributes to the NATO Training Mission in Iraq. Our government assigned an Iraq Special Representative in order to enable the coordination of Turkey's national and international efforts on Iraq. In addition, in order to ensure the coordination of our aids to Iraq, a high level Restructuring and Humanitarian Aid Special Coordinator is also charged with duty. Turkey committed an aid of USD 50 million to Iraq and currently allocated 20% of this amount to the restructuring works and granted USD 5.4 million for humanitarian aids.

In this period Turkey expresses its concerns shared by other members of the international community regarding the developments in Kirkhuk. Kirkhuk belongs to all of the Iraq communities. It should not be permitted for any group or community to claim right on Kirkhuk in political and administrative terms.

Turkey continues to promote the consultations process between Iraq and its neighbors. Within the context of Initiatives of States Neighbor to Iraq, which was started by Turkey in 2003, before the military information to Iraq under the leading of the USA, nine official and three unofficial meetings are held up to now on the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The EU and ICO were delegated for the first time, upon invitation of Turkey, in the 8th Official meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Neighbor to Iraq held in Istanbul in 2005. This forum was expanded to cover the G8 states together with the Standing States of the UN Security Council, due to the proposal of Turkey. Finally, the States which participate in the meeting held in Egypt in May 2007 reiterated their support to Iraq for fortifying the national unity and achieving to stability. In the meeting, it is decided to accelerate the establishment of 3 working groups on the cooperation for protecting security and the borders, on granting aids to Iraqis forced to leave their homes and on the energy and electricity requirement of Iraq. Another leg of the Initiatives of Neighbor States is the one in which the cooperation in the field of security is discussed.

Turkey clearly expressed to the attention of all the relevant parties that the terrorism threat in the Iraq territories targeting itself requires urgent and effective measures under the light of “zero tolerance to terrorism” principle. Turkey expects that Iraq declares and removes this terrorist organization which attacks to its neighbor.

When we view relations with Iraq, we can summarize the contribution of Turkey’s EU membership to the EU’s CFSP as follows:

Once Turkey becomes a member, the EU will become a neighbour to Iraq. However, the developments being experienced in Iraq closely affect the EU. Furthermore, some EU members such as the UK have taken part in the war in Iraq and other countries have provided logistical support to countries at war. Even in Germany and France, who have had a critical approach to the war in Iraq, the developments have been a most important part of the agenda from domestic policy to security. Despite all these, the EU does not have the sufficient effect and power of intervention in the developments in Iraq. It falls short of a country like Turkey with a local vision.

Views of Turkey and the EU on the need to a stabilized and democratic Iraq are very close. Starting many diplomatic initiatives with the Iraq’s neighbor states regarding the

shared concerns on fighting with terrorism and ending the ethnic conflicts, Turkey played a constructive role. Turkey has an ongoing interest on protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq. Another source of concern is the presence of PKK, a Kurdish organization found in the EU's terrorist organizations list, in the Northern Iraq. Turkey has an important role in the stabilization and restructuring of Iraq and has a notable economic interest in Iraq.

When we look at the Middle East and Iraq, we can say that two different views are prevalent: the first of these is termed the "hawk" view and asserts the reshaping of the Middle East mostly via military means. As in the example of Iraq, if and when necessary, the leaders of the regimes in countries such as Iran, Syria and Libya can be changed. The second view termed "Dove" attaches importance to dialogue and socio-economic instruments. Turkey has the standing that regimes should not be changed through force of arms. Today, post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is much more unstable than before and has become a source of terrorism. Thus, it can be said that similar practices in countries such as Syria and Iran will lead to a major catastrophe in the Middle East, EU and the entire world. It would be fair to say that the Middle East needs new unifications rather than new conflicts. As I mentioned above, we can say Turkey has the will and the tools for Iraq to regain stability. The increase in trade between Turkey and Iraq and its neighbours can be seen in the rapidly increasing investments in these countries. In this picture, we can say that Turkey will make very important contributions in Iraq. Economic and political limits will determine the dimension of Turkey's contribution. Full membership in the EU will expand these limits. Because an EU member Turkey can turn Iraq into a less dangerous place. All these developments will positively affect the EU's CFSP.

9.6.3. Palestinian

When we examine the effect of Turkey's EU membership on the Palestinian issue with regard to the EU's CFSP;

The events of September 11 and the ensuing developments have shown that the Palestinian issue does not involve only Israelis and Arabs. The Palestinian issue nurtures the misunderstandings among civilizations at a global level, lays the ground for terrorism and undermines security. Although the US is one of the countries that suffer

the most from this, the special relation between Israel and the US prevents the US from playing an effective role in the resolution of the problem. Turkey can act as a mediator between Israel and the Arabs and play an integrating role in the Israel-EU relations. Turkey's full membership can be said to expand EU's jurisdiction in the Palestinian issue.

It can also be said that the trade relations between Turkey and Israel are escalating. In the same way, there is an increase in Turkey's trade relations with Syria and other Arab countries. Another activity of Turkey in the region is that it is working on the modernization and connection of the transportation line running through Turkey-Syria-Lebanon-Israel-Egypt-Jordan as well as the interconnection of the energy lines.

Another tool that Turkey has used for integration has been water. The water need of the countries of the regions and the proposal of Turkey to direct a part of its water resources to the region through a pipeline will bring the countries closer together.

Having relations and commercial interests with the Arab world, Turkey tries to fortify its role in the Islam Conference Organization. Meanwhile Turkey has a developed in cooperation with Israel. The relations with Israel are solidified by entering a series of strategic agreement. Turkey makes great endeavours to increase the flow of energy, capital and commodities between Israel and Arab countries. However, it is obvious that Turkey cannot fully achieve these aims without a strong supporter like the EU. Together with full membership in the EU, the integration movement will gain momentum and security and stability will be built in the most problematic region in the world. Turkey's membership will strengthen EU's vision for a solution in Palestine. The policy of Turkey to bring together the people and states of the region through economic and social instruments is fully aligned with EU policies. Including the Palestinian-Israeli issue, it can make a contribution in the resolution of many problems in the Middle East.

9.6.4. Iran

The effect of Turkey's EU membership on relations with Iran with regard to EU's CFSP;

After the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has become the symbol of radical movements and has been perceived especially by the US as a challenge to the Western world. It has

been voiced that Iran is next in line after the Iraq war. Israel on the other hand voices concerns asserting that Iran wishes to produce nuclear weapons and reiterates its threats to strike Iran with military weapons. Iran's nuclear program continues to be a source of concerns for Turkey as it is for the EU.

However, earning the trust of Iran is important in many aspects. Iran has a strategic location. It prevails over all the eastern coasts of the Persian Gulf and is in a key position for democratization in the Arab world. If we consider that Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and the Arab world boast a very large part of the world's energy reserves, Iran, which is an important country with respect to oil and natural gas, rests right in the middle of this wealth. As a result of all these, the securing of the Turkey-Iran line and its coming closer to the EU will mean the securing of the future energy need of the EU economic area. Turkey is an important country in affecting and opening Iran to the world. There is a comprehensive energy and natural gas cooperation between Turkey and Iran, and the EU has the potential to be an important natural gas market for Iran.

Turkey is also a good example for the changes that are planned to take place in Iran. For the EU, which is looking for alternative perspectives on Iran, the partnership of Turkey will be of utmost importance. It is possible to expect the relations between the EU and Iran to intensify as a consequence of a common border after the EU membership of Turkey. Together with EU membership, Moslem-Democratic Turkey will set an example for Iran and similar countries. And the EU will gain from these developments. The security problems experienced because of Iran will decrease and contributions will be made for the Middle Eastern, Central Asian and Caucasian energy lines to extend to Europe. The transportation lines of Europe-Middle East, Europe-Central Asia, and Europe- Indian Ocean will become safer and the EU will be a more effective actor in these areas.

9.6.5. Syria

The effect of Turkey's EU membership on relations with Syria with regard to EU's CFSP;

Syria and Lebanon have passed through an era full of instability and conflicts in the 20th century. After the civil war in Lebanon, the effects of the radical fundamentalist

movements of the Iraq war are perceived as the signs of a new period of instability. When we add the military threats from the USA and Israel, Syria draws attention as the potential Iraq or Afghanistan of the future. This problem carries a greater importance for the EU and Turkey. It is evident that an EU member Turkey will make significant contributions on Syria and Lebanon. The positive period which started in 1998 when Syria, under the pressure of Turkey, finished its support to PKK and deported the leader of the organization, gained acceleration depending on the developments in Iraq and due to the shared interests regarding the protection of Iraq's territorial integrity. Turkey can play an effective role in the solution of problems as well as strengthen the interests of the EU in the region. The use of force is not the only way to "domesticate" Syria. On the contrary, Turkey can work together with the EU to prevent a new Iraq war in Syria, and can also bring economic and political gains to itself, Syria and the EU.

9.6.6. Central Asia

"Turkey was an ideal model of development for the Central Asian republics as it is a modernist, secularist, and economically relatively prosperous western-oriented, free – market democracy".⁵⁰ Turkish nation has close cultural and common language bonds with the Central Asian nations. Therefore, we have close relations with the states in this region. Initiatives such as Summit of the Presidents of States Speaking Turkish (Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan), which the first meeting was held in Ankara in 1992, promote solidarity between these countries. The joint aim of the countries participating in the 8th Summit held in Antalya in November 2006 was to improve the cooperation in Central Asia and to increase visibility of the region on the international level.

Turkey's existing commercial volume with the states of the region was around USD 3 billion in 2006. The investment of Turkey in this region reaches up to USD 4 billion. Turkey aims to support the democratic and economic development efforts of these countries through credits, technical assistance, scholarships, training of the public servants, military assistance and training at significant amounts. "Turkey has assumed leadership in the establishment of regional economic organizations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group, with the purpose of creating for itself a position of leadership in the Black Sea basin-which, in addition to the littoral states, takes in

Azerbaijan and Greece. The already established economic cooperation arrangement with Iran and Pakistan has been expanded to include the Central Asian states.”⁵¹

When we look at the effect of Turkey’s EU membership on relations with Central Asia with regard to EU’s CFSP we can say that;

The Central Asian republics, (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan) draw the attention with their energy resources, mainly natural gas and oil. When we examine these countries with respect to geographical location, there is an unstable country like Afghanistan in the south, Iran and Pakistan where there is religious sect fanaticism. In the north, there is the Russian Federation. In the east of the region, there is the China. The competition between China-India and India-Pakistan lead to tensions in the south of the region. When we look at such a picture, it is obvious that the development of the region in line with the models of Russia, China and Iran is not a favourable development for Turkey and the EU. The people of the region have stated that their preference is the liberal economic model and democracy. In order not to experience similar results like in the Palestinian issue and the Iraq war, economic instruments must be put in place in Central Asia and political initiatives must be continued. There must be an approach that is not foreign to the region in order to keep all these in place and increase the effect of these instruments. Turkey, who has strong linguistic, racial and religious ties with the region can be said to be strong enough play this role.

Following the accession to the EU and by using strong historical, cultural and economic ties, turkey may help the Central Asia to gain stability and may promote the democratic values in the region which was subject to political instability after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Turkey will make an important contribution in bringing stability to the region and the integration of the region to Europe and the world. In terms of foreign policy and security, the leading role of Turkey for assisting the “Partnership for Peace” program of NATO in the region will reinforce the international defense connections of the Central Asia.

Because these countries come from the same roots, when we consider that they take Turkey as a model, turkey, as a strong member of the western world can strongly defend EU’s interests and encourage the democratization and liberalization movements in these

countries. With the EU effect that will extend to Central Asia via Turkey, the Eurasia vision of Europe will strengthen. Central Asia will allow for the EU to be stronger in the policies of South Asia and China. Turkey has made a great effort in carrying values similar to EU values to Central Asia and integrates Central Asian countries to the EU. Full membership to the EU will increase both Turkey's strength in Central Asia and strengthen it as a country that illustrates EU's vision in the region as a representative.

9.6.7. Caucasus

It is important for Turkey that peace, stability and cooperation is sustained in this neighbor region. Turkey has close political, economic, social and cultural connections with the Caucasian communities. Turkey's approach to the southern Caucasus is in the direction of creating a comprehensive cooperation environment covering all of the states in the region.

Although Southern Caucasus has a big potential for the prosperity of the nations living in this geography, due to the existing conflicts, this potential cannot be utilized. For this reason, Turkey shows every kind of effort to reduce the tension in the region and to contribute to the progress of the regional states to integrate with the world, especially the European-Atlantic institutions. Due to the energy resources and petroleum pipelines, this region has a strategic significance for the stability and prosperity of Eurasia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline are good examples for this.

Recognizing the independence of three new states in the Southern Caucasus after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey developed a close partnership relation with Azerbaijan which it shares a common language, culture and history. Turkey support Azerbaijan in fortifying its independence, sustaining its territorial integrity, and utilizing its economic potential based on the rich natural resources in the Caspian Sea.

The Mountainous Karabagh problem and political stability in Caucasus are significant obstacles before economic development and realizing the regional cooperation. Being a member of the Minsk Group under the ESCO, Turkey takes the advantage of this period in order to establish a peaceful resolution in the context of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.

Turkey has been among the first countries which recognized the independence of Armenia. However, problems arising from the policies pursued by Armenia hindered the establishment of the diplomatic relations. Turkey is not against normalizing the relations with this country provided that Armenia revises its existing policies and adopts policies in harmony with good neighborhood principles.

Turkey also has close relations with Georgia and places a great importance on preserving its territorial integrity. Problems of Abkhazia and the Southern Osetia threaten peace and stability in the whole region. Turkey supported resolving these problems in peaceful manners within the context of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia. Our President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili paid mutual official visits in 2006.

On the other hand, Turkey gathered all of the states in the region under the roof of Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization with the purpose of contributing to the establishment of a security and cooperation environment among the actors of the region.

Turkey also believes that it can be an active actor in implementing the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, which aims to promote stability in the region, towards Southern Caucasus. In this context, Turkey welcomed concluding the Action Plans of the EU towards the states in the Southern Caucasus in November 2006, with the opinion that it would promote dialog and cooperation in the region.

“Turkey’s Caucasian legacy from the Ottomans includes a large measure of good will; its relations with the Azeris are, as has been shown, special; and furthermore, a large number of Chechens, Daghestanis, and other Caucasian Muslims living in Turkey have reestablished contact with their kin since the breakup of the Soviet Union and on such a scale that both the Russians and the Iranians have become alarmed. In the long run, however, Russia does not have the necessary support in Azerbaijan and Georgia to maintain its supremacy unless the West agrees to name Russia the “peacekeeper” for the area. There are indications that Russia, under the present leadership, may be ready to accept the independence of the Caucasian republic and to regard Turkey as a partner rather than a competitor provided that the West does not decide to allow Russia reestablish its military hegemony there.”⁵²

When we look at the effect of Turkey's EU membership on relations with the Caucasus with regard to EU's CFSP we can say that;

When we speak of the Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Iran and Russia are the countries that come to mind. It is well known that oil is an important factor in the increasing significance of the region. After the Cold War, different approaches have gained importance in the region. The first of these is the approach of Iran, the second the wish of Russia to withdraw from the region and Turkey's wish to integrate the region with the West. When we look at Georgia and Azerbaijan we see that these countries wish to intensify their relations with Turkey, the USA and NATO. Because these countries see Western institutions as the continuation of their existence. When we look at the vision of Turkey in the region, we see that the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline is important. The energy line that originates in Azerbaijan, passes through Georgia and ends in the Southern coasts of Turkey connects these three countries. This line connects the Caucasus to the Mediterranean that is Europe. Turkey has the will that supports stability among the big regional powers. The model Turkey adopts is one in which Russia and Iran is not outcast but supported for integration. It is also known that Georgia and Azerbaijan are in close cooperation with Turkey and these two states look warmly at NATO and the EU and wish to become a member of these institutions. Turkey's EU membership will strengthen the region's orientation towards Europe and make a serious contribution to the European Caucasian integration. At the same time, it will allow for the EU to have a strong and practicable vision in the Caucasus and to become an important actor in the regional policies.

Turkey's accession will expand the EU borders up to Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Provided that Turkey is willing to work in order to resolve the conflicts with its neighbors before the accession, Turkey may have an impact to ensure stabilization in the Southern Caucasus. Especially the relations with Armenia need to be developed by establishing diplomatic relations and opening the currently closed land border. The negligence of Turkey in taking part in the tragic incidents and especially to the human suffering experienced in the region in 1915/16 should lead to improve the mutual relations with Armenia and to reach a compromise. The relations of the EU with Azerbaijan, Georgia and the petroleum rich countries may be improved with the membership of Turkey.

When we look at the Turkish – Russian relations which date back over 500 years entered to a new era after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation. Being a significant neighbor for Turkey throughout the history, Russia is the first big power which recognized the Ankara Government during the Independence War. Both of the countries share the aim of working for improving peace, stability and prosperity in their region. Changes in the international arena and new threats and risks emerging for peace and stability showed that an improved cooperation between Turkey and Russia is important for the security and stability on both global and regional levels.

The tangible results of the cooperation can be seen especially in the trade and energy fields. The agreement so-called “Blue Stream Project”, signed for transferring the Russian natural gas through a pipeline passing under the Black Sea to Turkey, is an indication of this cooperation. Turkey receives natural gas from this pipeline starting from February 2003. Approximately 70% of the natural gas consumed in Turkey is imported from Russia. Russia is also advances to be the second largest commercial partner of Turkey.

At the same time, mutual visits made between two countries contributed to strengthening the mutual bonds and increasing the variety of the cooperation fields.

RF State President Putin’s visit to our country in December 2004 is the first official visit made by Russia at the highest level to our country in the whole Turkish-Russian relations history. This historical visit accelerated bilateral relations with the “Common Declaration on Deepening Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership” published after the contacts. And former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s visit to Moscow in June 2006 is significant in terms of being the first visit from Turkey on the level of President since the establishment of the Russian Federation.

After explaining the historical developments, when we examine the mutual relations between Turkey and Russia following the disintegration of the Soviets, we see that Turkey’s search for expanding its influence in the areas where Moscow has strong historical interests causes new political competitions. In the recent years the intersecting interests focused on the Caucasus and the Central Asia. Russia is second after Germany as a major commercial partner of Turkey and is the country which exports the highest

amount of natural gas. And Turkish construction companies are active in the Russian market. In the field of energy, Turkey's accession to the EU will increase the importance of the relations between EU and Russia in terms of energy interests and the developments in the Caucasus and the Central Asia.

9.6.8. Greece

Turkey acts with the belief that the relations with our neighbor Greece should be based on close cooperation, alliance and trust. Since 1999, notable progress is made in the relations between Turkey and Greece. Nevertheless, there are still many things to do. In this context, the problems related with Aegean and the problems of the Turkish Minority in the Western Thrace continue to be a source for disagreement.

With the friendly period starting in 1999 between Turkey and Greece, the mutual relations which survived problematic periods in the past are started to be defined in a more constructive understanding. There are approximately 30 agreements signed in many fields covering the issues of commerce, tourism, energy, transportation, security, environment and culture. These agreements contributed to developing the cooperation. New communication channels are found between two countries. Within this frame, the mutual visits of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meetings of the Guidance Committee Working Group, political consultations, negotiations for Preventions to Increase Trust, and contacts regarding the Aegean are carried out regularly. The increase in the frequency of high level contacts and mutual visits, the positive and constructive mood in the mutual relations, led to develop close cooperation for the benefit of both countries, cooperation in the energy sector and improving the commercial volume.

Turkey believes that the improvement in the mutual relations has a very significant role in creating a cooperation medium which will resolve the entire problems in the future and will contribute to the peace, stability and security of the whole region.

“Good Turkish-Greek relations, which traditionally had a stabilizing role in the Balkans. Turkey has as its goal for the Balkans the restoration of peace and the establishment of a climate of mutual recognition of and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty and religious, national, and ethnic rights.”⁵³

9.6.9. Balkans

The Balkans is a region which played an important role in the history of Europe and the world. This strategically sensitive region is the passage way of Turkey to Continental Europe. Turkey and the Balkan states have strong historical and cultural bonds.

The Balkans has been a region in which skirmishes containing radical changes in the political and security issues during the post-Cold War period. Believing that the peace and stability will be maintained by establishing closer ties between the Balkan countries, Turkey approached to the conflicts in the Balkans not with the purpose of finishing the skirmishes, but with an aim to create a permanent cooperation environment throughout the region. In this context Turkey has been in the front lines in the international initiatives for resolving the Kosovo conflict.

The unit contribution of 480 persons allocated to KFOR in Kosovo and the 400 military personnel provided to EUFOR-ALTHEA, the largest peace preserving operation undertaken by the EU ever, are concrete indications of the commitment of Turkey on establishing peace in the Balkans. Turkey will undertake the command of Southern Region the Multinational Task Force of KFOR for one year starting from May 2007. Furthermore, Turkey contributes to the Integrated Police Unit and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the UN Police Mission (UNMIK) in Kosovo.

Turkey has been a pioneer in starting significant initiatives such as Multilateral Peace Force for Southern Europe (MPFSEE), South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBGRIG), Southern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) being the first. Besides various economic initiatives in the region, Turkey pursues an active policy in the transformation period to Regional Cooperation Council under the scope of SEECP of the South Eastern Europe Stability Treaty, started by the Southeastern European Cooperation Initiative).

Turkey claims that the integration of the Balkan states with the European-Atlantic structures will bring peace and stability to the region. In this context, it supports the membership wishes of Albania, Croatia and Macedonia to NATO and considers that the timely EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania as positive developments. In addition, Turkey is among the first countries which recognized and established diplomatic relations with Montenegro which claimed its independence.

“The principle conclusion of this review is that the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU represents a historical opportunity for a comprehensive European peace, further prosperity and a security zone in Balkans and the Middle East. Without stabilizing these regions around Western Europe, it is futile to view the ESDI as an instrument of peace and security in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Including Greece and Greek Cypriots, but excluding Turkey, in fact, would destabilize the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is an essential part of both the Balkans and the Middle East, and, its cooperation and friendship, therefore, hold the key to regional peace and stability. The EU can make or break Greek-Turkish relations, or put differently, it can stabilize the Aegean.”⁵⁴

9.6.10. Afghanistan

Close cooperation between Afghanistan, the second State which recognized Turkey, and Turkey continued throughout the history. Important aids were granted to Afghanistan in establishing the public organs, universities, hospitals, cultural institutions and army. Turkey places great importance to the independence, national unity and territorial integrity and prosperity of the nation of Afghanistan. Turkey supported the political process towards the establishment of peace, stability and democratic political structuring, right from the beginning.

Participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from the establishment, Turkey undertook the command of ISAF-II between June 2002 and February 2003 and of ISAF VII between February and August 2005. Turkey continues to contribute to peace and stability with its 1200 personnel under the flag of ISAF in Afghanistan and gives training to the Afghan National Army and to the Police Force at the same time.

Making a grant of USD 100 million to the re-development works in Afghanistan, Turkey undertook a series of projects heavily in the field of education, health and agriculture. The total amount of the official development assistance is USD 42 million up to now. All of these are tangible, permanent and strategic contribution of Turkey not only to the efforts in Afghanistan but also to the search of international security and regional stability in the world after the 9/11 attacks.

9.7. TURKEY'S OTHER POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Turkey can be a significant model as a country having a Muslim population mostly and loyal to the fundamental principles such as freedom, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, etc. This issue is especially important under the light of the discussions and perceptions that rose after the 9/11 attacks. According to the German former chancellor Schröder: “Turkey will harmonize the values of a country of which population is mostly Muslim and the values of the EU. Thus it will both contribute to the democracy and stability in the region and to its own democracy and its structure as a state governed by the rule of law.”

The security interests of the EU cover the management of energy, transportation and borders. Due to the fact that Turkey shares borders with the most energy rich countries of the world, Turkey can have a significant function in the security of the energy supply of an expanded EU. Turkey's accession will ensure the EU's access to the said energy resources and the transportation of such resources to the single market of the EU in a secure way. Turkey's accession will also open alternative exportation routes from Russia, the Central Asia and the countries around the Caspian Sea, by increasing the diversity of the EU's supply channels. After completing the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in addition to the Straights and the Northern Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline, Turkey is expected to be an important transit country for petroleum. For the natural gas, Turkey will have a transit country position whose importance increases between the EU and the Central Asian and Caspian producers. The geography in which Turkey is present is quite important both stopping the security risks of the EU and rendering the New Neighborliness Policy of the EU valid. The foreign policies pursued by the EU on the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East will be reliable with the participation of Turkey. According to İler Türkmen, Turkey's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Since Turkey occupies a critical position in the policy, security and energy transportation equation of the Black Sea, Caucasus and the Middle East, the significance of the potential contribution of Turkey to ESSP is generally appreciated. When it comes to the neighborliness policy, Turkey again undertakes a significant role in the implementation of this policy in the Black Sea and Caucasus.”

Turkey's accession will have many important impacts on the issue of transportation. In this context, Turkey's role of an energy corridor, which includes the land routes, railways, airways, maritime lines, sea and land pipeline connections between Europe and the southern region of Europe, will increase.

Turkey's full membership will create certain hardships in border management and cooperation in the field of organized crimes such as human/drug trafficking, illegal migration, etc. will be developed parallel. Turkey's relations with its neighbors and other third countries will be affected from the visa applications. Following words of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of England, Jack Straw, points to the same direction: "Turkey is a country which undertook the key role in the security of Europe. It is a significant market for the exporters of the Union. In addition, Turkey has a significant role in fighting with illegal human trafficking, drug smuggling, and cross border crimes. By keeping our word we gave to Turkey, we can carry the European Union to a more powerful, more secure and more competitive position."

In the field of fighting with terrorism, which is another dimension of the security issue, Turkey's accession will develop the existing cooperation. In the recent years Turkey has been a target to many terrorist actions made by extreme left and radical Islamic groups. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Turkey has participated in many EU initiatives in fighting with terrorism and organizations qualified as terrorists by Turkey are included in the terrorists list of the EU. German Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer says "Accepting Turkey in the Europe means establishing a bridge between Islam and the West." Former Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder also sets forth the same ground and says "A Turkey, which compromises democracy, human rights and Islam, may cast a model for the other Muslim countries surrounding us. Therefore, Europe can have an important gain in terms of stability and security." When we look to another statement of German Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, in his statement made to the Bild, noted Turkey's significance of Turkey's accession to EU with his words "Turkey's being a member of the EU is very important for our children and grandchildren to live in peace and for Europe to be powerful. Turkey is the central building stone of Europe."

Another important issue in the region is the access to water which is necessary for development and irrigation. The strategic significance of water problem in the Middle East will increase in the following years. International management of the water resources and infrastructure projects (damns and irrigations projects in the Euphrates and the Tigris basins) will be important issues for the EU after the accession of Turkey.

10. TURKEY'S DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The contributions and the positive role of Turkey I mentioned in the above sections should not give the impression that the relationship between Turkey and the EU is free from problems in terms of foreign and security policy. Turkey's accession to the EU will create serious contributions in terms of the security interests of both Turkey and the EU. However, the factors and problems should not be undervalued. I believe if both parties produce policies to solve the problems, they can overcome the future hardships.

I can say that the problem of Cyprus comes at the first line of this hardships list. After Greece became a EU Member State in 1981, it carried its problems with Turkey to the European level. Cyprus is the first one among these problems. In 1997, when the expansion process of the EU started, the Greek Republic of the Southern Cyprus, which had applied for membership in 1990, took its place among the candidates and started the accession negotiations in 1998. The refusal of the Annan plan by the Southern Cyprus, of which EU negotiations were completed and the EU membership was finalized in 2002, showed that the EU cancelled the activity of the UN regarding the issue. Consequently, the Southern Cyprus was acceded to the Union on May 1, 2004.

This situation has serious effects on the deliberations of Turkey. Since the EU Council takes decisions unanimously as the titles opened and closed in each step of the deliberations, the veto right of Southern Cyprus renders Turkey's work more complicated. Turkey's Deliberation Framework accepted in 2005 states that Turkey should normalize its relations with Cyprus and should maintain its support for finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict within the frame of UN.

In my opinion, following should both parties develop the policies: the EU members should prevent Southern Cyprus to damage the interest of the Union solely for its own interests. The veto of Southern Cyprus should be under control in the EU Council meetings. This is also a very hard exam for Turkey. Although it is requested that Turkey

recognizes Southern Cyprus in diplomatic terms, it is very hard for Turkey to accept this. However, it is likewise hard for Turkey to negotiate with a Union of which member it does not recognize. Turkey should regularly and consistently transfer its assertions to the EU Member States on this issue.

Turkey resolving its existing border conflicts stated in the negotiation document implies indirectly its closed border with Armenia and the ongoing Aegean Sea conflicts with Greece. Turkey should take steps, which will not conflict with its interests but will present its good intentions on the Cyprus issue. Certain steps such as opening the borders in Cyprus by Turkish side can be taken. Policy changes such as opening the ports to the vessels sailing under the colors of the Greek side and opening the Maraş region to the control of United Nations will reflect the good intention of Turkey and will accelerate the situation. A possible solution here can be opening certain ports symbolically to the vessels sailing under the Greek colors. Removing the isolations applied to the Northern Cyprus will be the best step for the EU. This step will also bear a message for the Greek side and will increase the solution possibilities. As a result, I believe that the problems will solve if the both side produce solutions to overcome these difficulties and that Turkey is necessary for the security and future of the EU.

11. CONCLUSION

Assessment of the potential influence of Turkey's accession on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is dependant upon several factors. These factors can be listed as: Uncertainty of Turkey's potential accession date, unknown character of the general international developments, the question of how will the EU be remodelled in the following 10 – 15 years, and the question of how will the future development of the Turkish foreign policy be influenced by the Turkish domestic developments in the fields such as the role of the military, religion, and the civil society.

It is very natural that, the EU enlargement process, which will include Turkey, with the greatness of its population, its economical capacity, and its geographical position in a region loaded with conflicting economical and energy interests and international tensions, will be quite different than the previous enlargement processes. However, I think this difference will contribute positively to the EU's CFSP and consequently to the EU itself. As a result of points that I have made in the previous parts of my thesis, I also consider Turkey's overall position to be in harmony with the EU's CFSP, except for the differences in some sensitive matters.

In the first chapters of my thesis, I have strived to furnish detailed information about the historical development of the EU's formation of the CFSP and about the achieved results of the EU's implementation of the CFSP in the experienced events. What we can infer both from the historical information and from the cases is the fact that, the EU couldn't achieve its goal as to the CFSP in spite of all the efforts. The EU had to move in accordance with the policies of some potent member states and thus, it wasn't able to leap from the intergovernmental level to the supra-governmental level.

The basic worry of the EU Member States is caused by not acting jointly to a sufficient extent in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Still considering the foreign policies, a fundamental field of national sovereignty and the lack of political will is the origin of this problem. Resolving this problem is based on the fact that EU

Member States should evaluate the foreign issues on a supra-national level beyond inter-national level and cooperate closely with the other powers in the world. When look from these points of view, the synergy, which should be present between Turkey and the EU on defense and security issues, catches eyes once again. Improving the cooperation between Turkey and the EU will help the EU to achieve a more powerful position in the international arena, besides contributing to the resolution of the regional problems. The single step in improving the cooperation between Turkey and the EU on defense and security issues is Turkey's membership to the EU. If Turkey's position is combined with the experience and credibility of the EU, the EU's visibility in the international arena will increase and the problems around Turkey will decrease, new opportunities for new expansions will be revealed.

In order to strengthen its own policy with military power, EU wishes to form military units capable of intervening crises. Pursuant to the European Security Strategy, the EU should become an independent actor effective in the global manner, working for stability and influence on crisis management and conflict resolution in especially the near surroundings of Europe. However, the EU is ready for such a crisis management in the predictable future neither in military nor in political terms.

More active policies, are required in managing and preventing crises. Having management experience in conflicts and a strong army, Turkey's accession to the EU which has not sufficient experience in crisis and conflict management will contribute to strengthen the EU's the European Security and Defense Policy. Besides that, having historical, cultural and ethnical ties with many problematic regions surrounding it, Turkey has also an exceptional advantage for preventing crises. As a full member of the EU, the duty of Turkey, is to enable civilian contributions in preventing and managing crises besides its military capabilities.

One of the main objectives of Turkey in terms of foreign and security policy is to create a security, stability, prosperity, friendship and cooperation environment around the territories of the States found at the natural intersection of Europe and the Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea, Middle East, Mediterranean and Central Asia, which occupy a significant place in the foreign policy of Turkey. I believe that Turkey's armed forces of high level capacity, experience in the operations for preserving peace, democratic and

secular political system, economy based on free entrepreneurship, industrial infrastructure will help Turkey in realizing its objective. The EU's aim is also to contribute to forming a circle of good governed States with good relations based on cooperation. This aim overlaps with the priorities of Turkey. It is clear that as a member of the EU, Turkey will support the EU in achieving its regional power role in accordance with this aim. For this, besides the geostrategic and geopolitical position, its good relations with these regions will play an important role.

The military power of Turkey has the capacity to contribute to the EU's aim, related to military capabilities. For this reason, we can say that Turkey can contribute to the military capabilities of the EU and can also contribute the EU's army which EU wish to establish. The possible contributions of Turkey to the EU's security came under the light with the Iraq Crisis of 2003 in a more tangible way. The crisis in Iraq in 2003 led to a Transatlantic crisis in which the USA and the USA supporting EU members, namely the UK, Spain and Denmark were on one side and France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg were on the opposite side. In fact this crisis showed us the fragility of the Transatlantic balances in the security of Europe and that the security risks are perceived differently in the EU. In addition, it helped us to understand that the common foreign policy of the EU is yet on a very slippery floor and that it may disintegrate in a crisis that affects the security of Europe. A significant point reflected by the Iraq crisis in terms of Turkey's role is the fact that the success of the operations carried out in the Middle East depends on the Turkey's support and participation on the large scale. The opinion of the USA that the grounds of its military failure in Iraq is found in the fact that the occupation did not start from Turkey, fortifies this argument. Turkey did not pursue a USA-supporting policy in the Iraq crisis and led its foreign policy in a manner based on the EU.

Turkey is an integral part of the European democratic values system. Because of having different cultures and traditions, Turkey will contribute significantly to the harmonization and dialogue of cultures both in the EU and beyond. Turkey's membership will be the new indication for the ethnic, religious and cultural tolerance, which forms the essence of the EU. Turkey's inclusion to the peace, stability, economic prosperity and social justice environment in Europe would contribute this area to expand towards the Balkans, Middle East, Caucasus and the Central Asia.

Turkey, which is positioned in a junction of Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea and Caspian Sea basins as a center for transportation, energy transfer and commerce has a key importance for EU. In the case that the peace and stability cannot be preserved in the Eastern Mediterranean, the security and stability of the main transportation and energy transfer lines can not provide. This will be weaken Europe's aim claim of being a global power. The EU is aware of Turkey's economic dynamism and the contribution it will bring to the Union in a global competition environment with its strategic importance, which gained new dimensions in the post-Cold War period.

The EU will gain power geostrategically with Turkey's accession to the EU. Because Turkey's membership will give the EU a new strategic location in the Near- and Middle- East. This location will increase the influence of the EU on the Near- and Middle- East boiling with conflicts. The former German Minister of Foreign Affairs Fischer's words, such as "Turkey's accession will progress the EU on the road to be a global power," also support this comment.

Turkey establishes peaceful relations with its neighbours and constitutes a source of inspiration with its secular, pluralistic democracy for the other states in the region eager in reforms. Therefore, with the membership of Turkey, EU will have a more powerful voice in strategic terms in the international relations and regional developments.

Consequently, I think that, one of the most important points that can be assessed in Turkey's accession process to the EU is the future impact of Turkey to the EU's foreign and security aspect. Both in terms of hard power and in terms of civilian power, Turkey will highly contribute to the EU's foreign and security policy, which still includes various shortages within itself. I believe that, unless Turkey's EU membership turns into a reality, the European integration project will not be completed and EU's being a global power vision will not be realized.

12. PROGRESS REPORT OF TURKEY ON CHAPTER 31: FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

As known, 31st Chapter opened in the context of Turkey's harmonization with the EU acquis is discussed under the title "Foreign, Security and Defense Policy." In the progress report of 2006 drafted by the EU for Turkey it is stated that Turkey's harmonization in this field "continued on the large scale with the harmonization of Turkey's foreign and security policy with the policies of the EU in this field. The regular political dialogue, established and reinforced as a part of the accession strategy with Turkey, continued."⁵⁵

"In the report, also the following issues are mentioned by stating that Turkey has a strong relation with developing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP):

- Turkey participates in the police missions under the leadership of EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) and Congo Democratic Republic (EUROPOL KINSHASA). Turkey also continues its contributions to certain UN and NATO peace missions in the Balkans. After participating in the UNPROFOR, IFOR, KFOR and SFOR missions, Turkey took part in the EUFOR-ALTHEA mission since December 2004.
- Certain hardships continued in spite of Turkey's active participation to the CFSP. Turkey resists to including Cyprus and Malta to the EU-NATO strategic cooperation based on the "Berlin Plus" agreement. On the Cyprus issue, Turkey continues to block its membership to certain supplier groups such as Wassenaar Regulation on the Control of the Export of Conventional Weapons, Dual Use Materials and Technologies.
- Turkey is a party to most of the existing international regulations on preventing the proliferation of the mass destruction weapons, including the conventions and protocols for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and although there

is no official communication on the Government decision in this context, it is stated that it is in harmony with the EU Code of Conduct on Weapon Export.

- Works for full harmonization of Turkey to the EU system continue. Following with an active implementation manner both the Code of Conduct and the Joint Action on Small and Light Weapons will enable Turkey to have an active control on the production, supplies, commerce, transfer, and confiscation of small and light weapons. Turkey has ratified the UN Fire Arms Protocol.
- In the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy, Turkey's wide harmonization to the sanctions and restricting measures, statements, notices and initiatives of the EU continued.
- Turkey continued to support the Peace Process in the Middle East. Turkey declared in February 2006 that it will share the objectives of the EU Joint Attitude on implementing certain measures in fighting with terrorism and that it will harmonize its national policies with the said Joint Attitude. Hamas is included in the list under this Joint Attitude.
- Turkey stated its interest on participating in the European Union Police Mission for the Palestine Territories.
- Relations with Syria were carried out on a positive level. Turkey, especially on the UN Decision Number 1636 in the context of the UN Commission's investigation on the assassination of former Lebanon President Hariri, showed efforts to convince Syrian leadership in obeying the international requests. The Government written communication on the participation of Turkish soldiers to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon was accepted by the Assembly in September.
- Turkey made concrete attempts in order to establish stabilization in Iraq by starting a dialogue between the USA authorities and the Sunnite Arabs. Turkey claims that there is a connection between the increasing skirmishes between Turkish Armed Forces and PKK and the "PKK members sneak" from the Iraqi border. Significant number of soldiers is emplaced in the Iraqi border in order to prevent the sneak of the PKK terrorists from the Northern Iraq.

- Turkish authorities promoted Iran to obey the requests of the international community. Turkey supported the EU's efforts on providing long term guarantees between Iran and the IAEA for implementing the Treaty on Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Agreement of Nuclear Guarantee Control connected with it.
- Turkey continues its strong support to "Bonn process" on the restructuring of Afghanistan. Turkey, in rotation with France and Italy, undertook the shared leadership of the Kabul Regional Command as of August 2006.
- No significant developments are seen in the relations with Armenia since the official correspondence between Turkish President and the Armenian President in April 2005. Turkey did not open its border with this country. This will be an important step for creating good neighbor relations. This will be beneficial for both sides in commercial terms.
- Turkey's official attitude on the relations with the Southern Caucasus and the Central Asian countries is observed to be in close harmony with the EU's attitude. Turkey repeated its support to the European Neighborliness Policy. Turkey participated in GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), with the status of observer. Turkey observed closely the elections in Azerbaijan. Turkey took part in the declaration made by the EU Presidency on the elections made in Azerbaijan on November 10, 2005.
- No progress was made on Turkey signing the International Penal Court Status.
- Turkey continues to play an active role in the international campaign carried out on fighting with terrorism. Turkey signed the International Convention on Preventing Nuclear Terrorism Activities in September 2005 and the European Council Convention for Preventing Terrorism in January 2006. Turkey should continue its harmonization with the EU's attitudes. The laws and policies on fighting with terrorism should be in harmony with the EU implementations.

In the context of administrative capacity, the structure of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in harmony with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Affairs Assistant Counselor carries out the political director's duty. At the

same time, there is the European responsible and the European responsible assistant. The communication on the Common Foreign and Security Policy is carried out under the ACN information network to which the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is connected.”⁵⁶

Consequently, positive expressions are found on the Turkey’s status in the report which states that Turkey is generally in harmony in many fields with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy except Northern Cyprus, Armenia and the international penal court status.

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