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BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ

CHANGE IN THE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND
PERCEPTIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR AND THEIR
REFLECTIONS ON SECURITY STRATEGIES

Master Thesis

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İSTANBUL, 2008

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SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

MASTER IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

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To My Dad...

ABSTRACT
CHANGE IN THE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND PERCEPTIONS AFTER THE COLD
WAR AND THEIR REFLECTIONS ON SECURITY STRATEGIES

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After the Cold War, the bipolar international system's balance of power replaced its place to a multipolar and multileveled international system. Since the multipolar international system's dominant economic and political ideology was liberalism; the winner ideology of the Post-Cold War era promoted its own structures and values to the rest of the world. As a consequence of changes in the political and economic environment and in technology; the states' perceptions of security had also changed. Evolution of this change was observed both in the content and in the scope of the security concepts.

The traditional security concept shifted and broadened from its military dimension through economic, social, human, environmental and other alternative dimensions. The requirement of adaptation to the multipolar system, in order to survive was inevitable for the states. Thus, the national or state security concept, was no longer focusing on only the state itself as a referent object and not only consists of merely the military threats. The threat concept gained an asymmetric character with its nonmilitary aspects such as; poverty, ethnical and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, tendency of increasing nationalism, migration, population growth, organized crimes, equal access and share of the natural resources, environment problems, epidemic diseases and political and economic instability or weakness of the developing world's states. Due to their spread out characters; these nonmilitary threats' possible effects to generate an "instable security zone" considered crucial within the threat perceptions of states.

With the globalization process and mainly after September 11; the states' perceptions of security changed ambiguously while defining the enemy, threat and warfare as main concepts of security. World security agenda was introduced with the Global War On Terror (GWOT) concept, as well as the pre-emptive war concept. Since the isolation of a state in this multipolar interconnected system was impossible and the growing need to continue and protect liberal structures of this global world was vital; security understanding of the remaining hegemonic ideology – as a winner- demonstrated itself within the collective security perception recognizing structures on the international level; like in NATO, UN and EU.

Therefore in Chapter II, the thesis analyzes change and the evolution in the security concepts after the Cold War and several definitions of security concept had given, as well. By taking account of the globalization process in Chapter III; the change in the threat, enemy and warfare concepts and partially the international terrorism which are tightly dependent on the security perceptions, had been examined. Finally in the Chapter IV, a brief comparison of security strategy documents of the USA and the EU were mentioned as main examples. The methods guiding to analyze these evolution and changes on the security perceptions and approaches are realist and neo-realist theories of international relations discipline.

Key Words: Ambiguity in Security Concepts, Globalization, Security Perceptions, the USA, the EU.

ÖZET

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI GÜVENLİK KAVRAM VE ALGILAMALARINDAKİ DEĞİŞİKLİKLER VE BUNLARIN GÜVENLİK STRATEJİLERİNE YANSIMASI

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Soğuk Savaş sonrası iki kutuplu uluslararası sistemin güçler dengesi, yerini çok kutuplu ve çok düzeyli uluslar arası bir sisteme bıraktı. Çok kutuplu uluslararası sistemin başat ekonomik ve politik ideolojisi liberalizm olduğundan; Soğuk Savaş sonrası devrin kazanan ideolojisi dünyanın geri kalanına kendi yapı ve değerlerini yaydı. Politik ve ekonomik ortam ve teknolojiadaki değişikliklerin sonucu olarak; devletlerin güvenlik algılamaları da değişti. Bu değişimin evrimi, güvenlik kavramlarının hem içeriği hem de kapsamında gözlenmiştir.

Geleneksel güvenlik kavramı askeri boyutundan, ekonomik, sosyal, insani, çevresel ve diğer alternatif boyutlara doğru kaymış ve genişlemiştir. Çok kutuplu sisteme adaptasyonun zorunluluğu, devletlerin hayatta kalabilmesi için kaçınılmazdı. Böylece, ulusal ya da devlet güvenliği kavramı, artık sadece devletin kendisine odaklanmıyordu ve yalnızca askeri tehditlerden oluşmuyordu. Tehdit kavramı, yoksulluk, etnik ve dinsel çatışmalar, ülkesel anlaşmazlıklar, artan milliyetçilik eğilimi, göç, nüfus artışı, organize suçlar, doğal kaynaklara eşit ulaşım ve paylaşım, çevre sorunları, salgın hastalıklar ve gelişmekte olan dünya ülkelerinin politik ve ekonomik istikrarsızlığı ya da zayıflığı gibi askeri olmayan taraflarının yanında, asimetrik bir karakter kazanmıştı. Yayılma özelliklerinden dolayı, askeri olmayan bu tehditlerin “istikrarsız güvenlik alanı” oluşturmalarının olası etkileri; devletlerin tehdit algılamaları içinde çok önemli sayılmıştır.

Küreselleşme süreciyle birlikte ve en çok da 11 Eylül'den sonra, devletlerin güvenlik algılamaları düşman, tehdit ve savaş gibi temel kavramları tanımlarken, muğlâk olarak değişmiştir. Dünya güvenlik gündemi, Terörle Küresel Savaş kavramıyla olduğu kadar, önleyici savaş kavramıyla da tanışmıştır. Çok kutuplu ve birbirine bağlı olan bu sistem içinde izolasyonun imkânsız olmasından ve küresel dünyanın bu liberal yapılarını devam ettirmek ve korumadaki ihtiyacın artmasının hayatiyetinden dolayı, galip olarak kalan hegemonik ideolojinin güvenlik anlayışı, uluslararası düzlemde kolektif güvenlik algılamalarını tanıyan NATO, BM ve AB gibi yapılar olarak kendini göstermiştir.

Bu yüzden II. Bölümde, tez Soğuk Savaş sonrası güvenlik kavramlarındaki değişim ve evrimi tahlil etmiştir ve çeşitli güvenlik kavramı tanımları da verilmiştir. Küreselleşme süreci de göz önünde bulundurularak III. Bölümde, güvenlik algılamalarına sıkıca bağımlı olan tehdit, düşman, savaş kavramlarındaki değişimler ve kısmen de uluslar arası terörizm incelenmiştir. Son olarak IV. Bölümde, ABD ve AB güvenlik strateji belgelerinin temel örnekler olarak, kısa bir mukayesesine değinilmiştir. Güvenlik algılama ve yaklaşımlarındaki değişim ve evrimlerin tahlilinde yol gösterici yöntemler; uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin realist ve neo-realist teorileridir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güvenlik Kavramlarında Muğlâklık, Küreselleşme, Güvenlik Algılamaları, ABD, AB.

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“The problem is heightened because liberal democracies, as they prepare for a war they may fear, begin to look less liberal and will look less liberal still if they begin to fight one. I am tempted to say that the democratic peace thesis in the form in which its proponents cast it is irrefutable. A liberal democracy at war with another country is unlikely to call it a liberal democracy. Democracies may live at peace with democracies, but even if all states became democratic, the structure of international politics would remain anarchic. The structure of international politics is not transformed by changes internal to states, however widespread the changes may be. In the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy. Indeed, democracies have at times behaved as though today’s democracy is today’s enemy and a present threat to them.” Kenneth N. Waltz¹

1. INTRODUCTION

With the end of Cold War by 1989, the world’s balance of powers left a huge vacuum on the scale of balance, which has been still tried to be filled by the concept of “globalization”. The USA, with President George H. W. Bush (1990), declared the New World Order in 1990 where the “security perception” was starting to change. In his speech given to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, President Bush was announcing:

*Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a **new world order**—can emerge: A new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony... A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and the other leaders from Europe, the gulf and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.*

This optimistic discourse was reflecting the general mood of the time. The reason for this optimistic mood was the end of the Cold War which has perceived as the victory of the West by many people. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had the meaning of coming to an end for the external realm in Central and Eastern Europe for the Soviet Union. Moreover, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991

¹ Waltz, K. N., Summer 2000. “Structural realism after the cold war”, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No 1, , p. 10.

had the meaning of supremacy of Western structures as democracy and liberal economy. Also it meant that the old enemies were the new friends now. There was the hope for future and with his fully inspired speech; President Bush obtained full support of the international society, including the Arab World, against Kuwait's annexation by Iraq.

However, John J. Mearsheimer (1990, pp. 35-50) before one month from this speech wrote an article which underlines the long peace era of the Cold War order. According to him, the distribution of power in Europe within a bipolar system maintained and protected the long peace, which has two key elements: an equal balance of military power and nuclear weapons. "*The remarkably stable system that emerged in Europe in the late 1940s was the unintended consequence of an intense competition between the superpowers*" (Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 35-50)

Beginning from 1990s, newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe and in Caucasian region were the main security issue for the European Community and the USA in order to provide stability and peace. It was essential to integrate these areas into prosperous and stable economic and political structures of the Western structures; namely EC (which then become the EU, with the Maastricht Treaty). And again was essential to prevent the disorder in these newly democratic, ex-authoritarian countries where delicate and weak political and economic structures could drive these countries to the conflicts and even to a war. Such a probability meant a big threat for the West and Western values when the geographical distance considered as near to their borders. As a matter of fact, West Europe soon had the experience of religious and ethnical conflicts reaching to a war, near to its borders with the Yugoslav wars, which took place in 1991.

When taking into consideration the changing interpretation of threat and the balance of power in the new security environment; especially after terrorist attacks in September 11; all the concepts relating with security changed ambiguously and even sometimes distorted and manipulated. In a decade, with the developments in technology especially by the usage of internet; it was experienced how fast the information could circulate around the world and how interdependent the economic and political crisis and conflicts to each other. Hence in 1994 the financial crisis in Mexico and later in 1997 stock

market collapses of South East Asian² economies, signified how strongly correlated and interdependent the world economies are. These events were all comprehended and interpreted as the side-effects of the globalization process -needed to be corrected-not only by the proponents of the liberal economy; but also by the operators of the very system (Stiglitz 1998, pp. 2-34).

This thesis will try to explain the change and the evolution in the security concepts and their effect on the perceptions of the states after the Cold War. While trying to demonstrate this evolution, especially after September 11, the security perceptions, approaches, and strategies of the EU and the USA will be taken as main examples. The target is to examine this evolution of the concepts related with security, which are most of the time ambiguous in their contents today in a global world; by mentioning the undeniable impact of globalization process and terrorist attacks in September 11.

Besides, it will be tried to define these ambiguous concepts and compare their results on the applications of both the USA and the EU due to their security approaches emerging from different security perceptions, which reflect “unilateral and multilateral”³ attitudes respectively, towards world politics. From the point of view of the security dimension, the basic divergence between the United States and the European Union lies in the perception of threat and perception on security and cooperation in the future.

For the United States, the security strategy is primarily about threats, which are both traditional threats (including possible military and political attack by countries that are hostile to the USA interests) and new threats resulting from the terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the growing power of terrorist groups and other non-state actors, and the increasing vulnerability of the USA society to direct attack.

For the European Union, the security strategy is much broader, including dealing with terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure, actual threats to human security, addressing a

² Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand

³ “Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.”, European Security Strategy, December 2003, p. 9

“... we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country;...”, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.6

new set of challenges arising in a globalized world and building on new opportunities to consolidate democracy in Europe and beyond via the tools of neighbourhood and partnership policies.

Evidently, American and European security strategies' contents –as it can be observed in threat addressing and policies for tackling with them- illustrate some considerable divergence due to their perceptions of security.

Therefore, in Chapter II, the change and the evolution in the security concepts after the Cold War will be mentioned and several definitions of security concept will be given, as well. In Chapter III, the change in the threat, enemy and warfare concepts and partially the international terrorism will be examined which are tightly dependent on the security perceptions, while taking into account of the globalization process. Finally in the Chapter IV, a brief comparison of security strategy documents of the USA and the EU will be handled as main examples. The method guiding to evaluate security perceptions and approaches of the USA and the EU, as well as entire topics of this thesis, will be the realistic/neo-realistic methods.

The author of this thesis would like to overemphasize that, each of the chapters handled here are another topic of a dissertation on its own. Therefore, many of the details passed over without mentioning, in order to narrow this extensive field for the sake of not to be lost in details and deviate from the main subject as well.

This thesis has two main ideas related with each other, with the intention of propose and defend:

First, as a consequence of globalization; the ambiguous era of security today can and should create new and/or distorted concepts and applications in a comprehensive and large manner. I am considering this as "rules of the power" instead of "rule of law", therefore if the status-quo is changed; rules will be rewritten according to the winners. *Second*, although the security concept has broadened from its traditional; that is realist identity, towards alternative identities (which are criticized by the realists of degrading the importance of national security concept) such as environmental, human or individual and societal security concepts; the *survival* and the *national interest* of the

state entity will always motivate the states as a basic and mandatory instinct, unless the states do not prefer to prevail as they exist both in territorially and in political means.

To support my second idea; the following sub-reason can be given for the *survival* need of the state: The official and physical territories and borders have still meaning for the states as their essential founding prerequisite to prove their “abstract existence” as a political being, in an anarchic international system.

And the following sub-reason can be given to the *national interest* necessity of the state: Even in a cooperation or in a union, states still do compete with each other to maximize their own relative gains, rather than the collective gains; “in a self-help system by lessening, preserving, or widening the gap in welfare and strength between themselves and others” (Waltz 2000, p. 40) to assure their survival.

2. EVOLUTION OF SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AFTER THE COLD WAR

There has been always the security needs of the states exist as a natural consequence of *being*, since the states were established throughout the ages. As a concept “security” includes other concepts opposite to each other such as “enemy, threat, attack, terrorism and defence, measures, deterrence etc.” which are also indicators of how the security is defining by a state, still as the main actor of internal and international politics. Behind the security definition of a state; the intrinsic reason or the criterion is the state’s perception about the security matters which directs the state’s policies, strategies and practices. It is evident that the security perception can be effected by many variable factors such as; internal and international political conjuncture, technological improvements in the military, risk to enter into a war or a conflict and etc.

Especially after the Cold War, the traditional understanding of security has changed from military power and territorial defence content to a multi-dimensional content; including economic security, human security, environmental security, societal security and etc. Thus, the content of security concept had broadened. There are various definitions of security concept in the field of international relations, which differ from each other on the focal point, according to the theories.

Barry Buzan (1991, p. 117) is one these authors who modifies his argument of security from military field, to security within the political, economic, ecological, and societal fields. He supports his claim as: “Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes very swiftly, military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns. Military action can wreck the work of centuries in all other sectors. Difficult accomplishments in politics, art, industry, culture and all human activities can be undone by the use of force. Human achievements, in other words, can be threatened in terms other than those in which they were created, and the need to prevent such threats from being realized is a major underpinning of the state's military protection function. A defeated society is totally vulnerable to the conqueror's power which can be applied to ends ranging from restructuring the government, through pillage and rape, to massacre of the population and resettlement of the land. The threat

of force thus stimulates not only a powerful concern to protect the socio-political heritage of the state, but also a sense of outrage at the use of unfair forms of competition.”

The traditional definition of security in the literature of international politics emphasizes the protection of the territory and core values of states against foreign imposition as quoted from Barry Buzan in the writing of Ken Booth (2005, p. 23). From this definition, Booth (2005, p. 23) formed his security definition as follows: “Security in world politics is an instrumental value that enables people(s) some opportunity to choose how to live. It is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas about being human.” Also, Booth (2005, p. 13) claims as: “One theme that unites critical perspectives on security is a recognition of the idea that security is essentially a derivative concept; this means, simply, that contending theories about world politics produce different conceptualizations of what security is all about in world politics. ... It is political theories that shape the political meanings of how one understands world politics.”

Booth (2005, p. 13) supports his idea of “security as a derivative concept” by defining the source of the ideas which effect the security studies during the Cold War, “derived from a combination of Anglo-American, statist, militarized, masculinized, top-down, methodologically positivist and philosophically realist thinking, all shaped by the experiences and memories of the interwar years and World War II and the perceived necessities of the Cold War.”

Another author, Steve Smith (2005, p. 27) mentioned at his paper’s title as “The Contested Concept of Security” by arguing that; the concept of security is essentially contested. Smith (2005, p. 27) explains his usage of the term by referring an article published in 1956 whose author was W. B. Gallie. He points; Gallie acquainted the notion that certain terms used in social theory are, “essentially *contested concepts*”. Smith (2005, p. 27) gives this phrase the meaning by stating that; “there are some concepts whose meaning is inherently a matter of dispute because no neutral definition is possible”. He supports his argument by; “there is no neutrality in the meaning of the

concept of security because all definitions are theory-dependent and all definitions reflect normative commitments” (Smith 2005, p. 28).

A further security definition is of which Bjørn Møller (2000) quoted from Arnold Wolfers, in his paper as: “security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” Møller (2000) mentions the narrow concept of security in the traditional international relations approach; i.e. in realist theory; as “national security” which has characteristic of “the focus on the state as the referent object of security”. And later he defines the various 'dimensions' of security in the wider sense, namely political, economic, societal, and environmental or ecological security, at the same time by ignoring the military dimension.

Møller (2000) explains them as follows: The political dimension of security has several different facets, which has the relationship between the state and its citizens. Although the state was apparently “created” for the sake of its citizens' security, it can also constitute a threat to their security. When the interstate level is regarded, it has claimed by supporters of a traditional approach to security that, the security problem is neither about weapons nor about military matters at all. As he states, this claim has been used as a counterclaim of the critics of nuclear deterrence. While agreeing with the claim, Møller argues that weapons are still essential means. He criticizes the traditionalists by referring to the conflict of values of the systems of capitalism and communism, which he equalizes first with democracy and latter with totalitarianism.

For the economic dimension he continues as: “Economic security may mean (at least) two rather different things. Either, it may be understood narrowly as the economic foundations of military power; or, it may be seen as an aspect or dimension of security in its own right.” (Møller 2000) He explains the first interpretation by emphasizing the highly “fungible” feature of economic power, which is dependant on the time perspective and preconditioned functioning world market.

Møller continues his idea by giving the example of states may buy weapons from abroad with money and it may increase productivity, so that this will give the opportunity for a transfer of labor from the civil field into the field of arms production

or armed service. From this conclusion he arrives to the idea that the economic power of a nation unavoidably constitutes a hidden threat to its adversaries. He argues later then, states may apply embargo to trade with other states, instead of contributing to the economic development of their enemies or opponents from this very reason. He gives the attitude of the USA as an example throughout the Cold War period, including the détente of the early 1970s by defining it paradoxical and in contradiction with the liberal view of international trade developed by Smith, Ricardo, etc.

He explains the second interpretation from two ways. As the first way; he claims that economic warfare may be a useful alternative for the use of military power and military power may provide destruction in an adversary's economy, like in the case of blockades. Because of this reason, many states make an effort for the economic self-sufficiency as a means of security. This can be accomplished by gathering “strategic materials” as well as ordinary goods, so that states may make themselves less weak to economic warfare, consequently they will be more secure. And as the second way; he states that “economic security” should have the capacity to represent strength against economic hazards, which are not created purposely by a hostile state. Also, economic security should be “structural”, that is it should be arisen by the mechanism of the system instead of arisen by a particular actor.

In this respect he counts three different approaches to enhance economic security as follows: “autharky (a special species of the genus mercantilism), diversification and interdependence (including integration).” He explains the approach of *autharky* as advised by classical mercantilism; that it can enhance economic security. At the same time as giving the example of strategy of the USSR who regarded the world market as unsafe, not only because it was controlled by hostile capitalist powers, but also because of its capitalist nature. Here he attaches other researchers’ ideas parallel to his idea, like Galtung and supports his idea over their consensus as; economic self-sufficiency of defence provides invulnerability. *Diversification* is explained by Møller, as the deliberate distribution of a state's dependencies between many states and across many fields as possible, inside the point of view of traditional means of economic security. From this point, it can be claimed that, if states are dependent on one single group of supplier(s) for essential commodities, like raw materials for their industry; they are

vulnerable to an interruption of these supplies. In the global trade market, the states which have only one valuable commodity to export, are usually vulnerable to fluctuations of world market prices and plus to political manipulations. And lastly *integration* is explained by him as the advancing of interdependence, as a “modern” way of enhancing economic security. The example he gives is the approach taken by the EU countries, from the time when the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Communities realized.

Møller (2000) signifies here the core idea of the EU as; “the underlying understanding has been that a web of mutual interdependencies would serve as a powerful inhibition against war, in perfect conformity with the aforementioned tenets of classical liberalism, as well as with the writings of Norman Angell, and modern analysts of “complex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, among others).”

Author evaluates this as the “common security approach to economic security”, just as it is equivalent to the superiority of the national boundaries concerning the matter of security. By this common approach, the inner system would be made more secure and also its members, who could not accomplish the same level of security through their individual efforts.

For the *Societal Dimension*, Møller (2000) takes Ole Wæver’s definition (which will be mentioned later again in detail in this chapter) as: “...the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats. More specifically, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom.”

And finally for the *Environmental Dimension*, he connects the security concept by stating that “environmental problems could be caused by war, or preparations for war, or wars might ensue from environmental problems, as in the case of resource wars and environmental problems that might constitute a security threat directly (Møller 2000)”.

As mentioned above, Ole Wæver's (1998) definition for security is as a "speech act". He considers the security as "a concept and a word." He describes the traditional progressive approach as: "1) to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is "objective" or "subjective," is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second the more security, the better; and 2) to argue why security should encompass *more* than is currently the case, including not only "xx" but also "yy," where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc. With this approach, one accepts the core meaning of "security" as uncontested, pushing instead in the direction of securitizing still larger areas of social life (Wæver 1998)".


Wæver (1998) continues to his explanations as: "Widening along the *referent object* axis--that is, saying that "security is not only military defense of the state, it is also x and y and z"--has the unfortunate effect of expanding the security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda. This is not, however, just an unhappy coincidence or a temporary lack of clear thinking. The problem is that, as concepts, *neither individual security nor international security exist.*"

Wæver defines the national security as a "tradition and an established set of practices", specifically, the security of the state. And within the concept of national security he declares that, it has a prescribed referent to a certain extent. On the other hand, he also argues that the "security of who or what" is a very ambiguous issue. While claiming the entire literature, philosophy and tradition of "security" is merely in state terms and considering it in non-state terms, is out of imagine. He argues that only the critical idea performed against the concept and practices of state security, which other threats and referents have any meaning like the environmental or ecological security or societal security.

Author signifies that the abstract idea of "security" is a non analytical term, relating slight connection to the "concept of security" connoted by national or state security. After accepting that; the "concept of security" refers to the state; he concludes his idea by saying the national security is primarily dependent on international dynamics;

especially on the regional ones. According to him, this relationship is not the same as with the relationship between national security and international security.

As indicated below in Figure 2.1a, Wæver (1998) do not place security at three levels but at the center of the hourglass image. He clarifies the secure situation of the state with two determinants: 1) Seeing the "security" as a possessed and independent stable, which has context-free meaning that could be added to another stable 2) State as an independently defined object.



Source: Wæver, O. , April 1998. *On Security*.

Figure 2.1a Hourglass model of security


Historically security is a term which usually understood as; the sovereignty of the states, under the threat of other states, as a consequence of the challenge between them. And each state try impose its will on the other state so that; every state defend its independence. This independence includes many aspects like the independence of the territory which comes primarily for the states or economic and political independences through the decision-making processes and etc. Besides, security has not been a constant concept, which inherently exposed to evolution and transformation since World War II according to Wæver. But at the same time he continues by approving "challenges to sovereignty" and defense has remained standing central.

If we turn back author's examination about the Societal Security concept; firstly this concept developed after the Cold War within the alternative security concepts. Wæver deals with the concept within three perspectives of "traditional state centric, critical wider security concepts and the speech act approach." He continues his argument in the traditional state-centric perspective as giving the meaning to societal security: "making the state secure against *society*, against the types of situations in which a state might be destabilized as its society disintegrates or turns against it (Wæver 1998)". This would be perceived as a security problem by the state, if a society has a power to deprive of the state or being in a minority within the state which has means to be intensified by inner and outer factors.

From the conventional-critical approach of broadening the concept of security, he argues that the subject is locked into a debate about whether, for example, immigrants and refugees really do create a security problem to the state. He demonstrates the risks of this discourse on societal security by claiming that, the discourse has the possibility to be captured by neo-nazis who argue; "we are only defending *our* societal security". As another risk, he argues that the discourse could finish as a pedagogical project attempting to persuade people that, although they feel themselves under threat, there actually is no existence of a security problem.

Finally from the speech act approach, he distinguishes the societal security concept from the state security concept, in which the societal security every time takes the state as the *referent object*. Therefore this understanding becomes a reason for the societal security being comprehended as the security of a state, in comparison with its component societies. However this is not Wæver accepts; he analyzes them as two different concepts. State security possesses "sovereignty" as its vital principle whereas; the societal security possesses "identity" as its vital principle. Hence, "sovereignty" for the state and "identity" for the society represent "survival" for both subjects. If we consider both for state and society loosing their mentioned characteristics; then there will be no subject existing to search about. "A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live *as itself* (Wæver 1998)".

Regarding his claim, he modifies his “Hourglass Model of Security” as in Figure 2.1b, by adding state and society as two organizing centers for the concept of security, at the collective level between individual and totality. In the second level, there are also the "individual" and "international" levels, like it was illustrated in Figure 2.1a, which influence national or state, and societal security.



Source: Wæver, O. , April 1998. *On Security*.

Figure 2.1b Modified hourglass model

At this point; there exists the risk of dissolution of the modern state system, as political authority is allocated across multiple levels. Because the deepening in this duality, would create a tendency toward dissolution; as the author stresses. Besides he adds that, this process begins to weaken the exclusive, sovereign territorial state, as overlapping authorities begin to appear.

In fact, if we consider today’s globalized world; we can easily observe this weakening in the territorial state’s sovereignty, regarding “the multi dimensional governance” of the state entity. The continuous process first started with the “integration” idea of the EU and the supranational authorities have been empowered as an inherent result of giving utmost significance to the “European level” i.e. in a federal approach. Therefore, as the sovereignty of the nation-states has been weakened; nations and cultures have become defenseless proportionally.

As a result of this process, remarkable groups within a society feel threatened and feel their identity is endangered by immigration, integration, or cultural imperialism, and try to defend themselves. This situation is called “societal (in)security” by Wæver and preserving and strengthening of existing identities and cultures; is suggested by him as a remedy, in response to the threatened identities’ by internationalization or Europeanization. Consequently, “culture” turns out as a security policy.

Under the light of above signified expressions, the “Speech Act” definition of security by Wæver, could be explained as; the language game in the security field which is enjoyed by the policy determining elites of a state *jus necessitatis*, for securitizing any matter they wished to do, when they feel themselves under a threat.

To expand this view; first of all we should bear in mind that only the sovereign state has the exclusive right to claim any kind of development as a security problem. The state can not be restricted “to define” whatever the problem, the development or a challenge is as a “threat” against its sovereignty. As the elites of the state make concrete of this “exclusive right to claim” action; it can be said by far that, this is a question of language politics which connected with eventually what the elites desire to achieve. Therefore, whenever the elites or the power holders see something threatening their priorities, they can define the issue as a “security issue” in case of a necessity. By this way; the subsequent action of the state will be legitimized; like the US Army’s attacks and invasion of Iraq in March 2003; in order to “promote democracy, free Iraqi people and disarm from WMD”, while defining “pre-emptive war doctrine” and declaring a Global War On Terror (GWOT).⁴

Consequently, we can arrive to a situation of establishing new sets of rules and codes and a new approach of thinking; by using the concepts of national security, like threat and sovereignty, in a changed form which would be definitely and indivisibly bound to our intention. Besides, securitization of an issue will inherently provide opportunity and pretext to power holders to acquire control over the stated issue.

⁴See: *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, p.p.6, 15, 16. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, [cited 15.02.2007]

Among the alternative security concepts, the environmental security exists, which still has not been defined in the international level. But few countries like the Russian Federation, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the United States, have an official definition of environmental security that unifies thought and action. Moreover, the international organizations which have leading missions to guide policy in the world, namely; the United Nations Environment Program and the World Health Organization; also have not formed a definition on the environmental security concept. Except, the United Nations Development Program which refers to the issue briefly, in its 1994 annual report on human development, on page 28 as: “Environmental threats, countries are facing are a combination of the degradation of local ecosystems and that of the global system. These comprise threats to environmental security.”⁵

To give an idea, below mentioned countries’ official definitions will be used as examples i.e. the USA, the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The official environmental security definition of the USA: “The programmatic definition for the US Department of Defense Directive Number 4715.1 February 24, 1996 is: The environmental security program enhances readiness by institutionalizing the Department of Defense's environmental, safety, and occupational health awareness, making it an integral part of the Department's daily activities. Environmental Security is comprised of restoration, compliance, conservation, pollution prevention, environmental security technology, and international activities.”⁶

The official environmental security definition of the Russian Federation: “Environmental security is protectedness of natural environment and vital interests of citizens, society, the state from internal and external impacts, adverse processes and trends in development that threaten human health, biodiversity and sustainable functioning of ecosystems, and survival of humankind. Environmental security is an integral part of Russia's national security.”⁷

⁵ Environmental Security Study, Section 2, Definitions of Environmental Security, <http://www.acunu.org/millennium/es-2def.html> , [cited 09.06.2007]

⁶ Environmental Security Study, Section 2.3, Definitions of Governments and Regional Organizations, <http://www.acunu.org/millennium/es-2def.html> , [cited 09.06.2007]

⁷ Ibid.

The official environmental security definition of the Commonwealth of Independent States: “Environmental security is the state of protection of vital interests of the individual, society, natural environment from threats resulting from anthropogenic and natural impacts on the environment.” “Environmental danger is the state posing a threat to vitally important interests of the individual, to society and the natural environment as a result of anthropogenic and natural impacts on it (natural environment).”⁸

Finally as a regional organization, NATO has mentioned the concept in its 1997 NATO science program within the priority areas included as: “scientific problems related to environmental security including the reclamation of contaminated military sites, regional environmental problems and natural and man-made disasters; affordable cleanup technologies are of particular interest.”⁹

It will be attached here as the last definition of environmental security, from the international relations authors namely, Buzan and Wæver (1998), which they examine the concept by linking the economic liberalism and its two influential results of materialism and consumerism as follows: “In general terms, environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. In terms of causality, some parts of the environmental security agenda are completely detached from the liberal economy, as for example the concern about space rocks smashing into the planet. Other parts are only connected indirectly, such as concerns about our position in the planet's natural cycle of ice ages, or about water shortages in parts of the Middle East and South Asia. But a substantial chunk of the environmental security agenda arises from the interplay between a liberal world economy and the sustainability of the planetary environment. ... the finite capacities of the planet for food and energy production by land and by sea, and its fixed stock of non-renewable resources.”

Another definition of the security concept, namely the Cooperative Security, will be examined here, which also has been born after the Cold War era during the 1990s, as a term that is including four elements namely: Collective Security, Collective Defense, Individual Security and Promoting and Projecting Stability.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

We can argue that, the concepts quoted below, constitutes the core of the implications of NATO and the EU which their members share basic liberal democratic values and committed to each other formally, for a long-term period in multi lateral and interdependent approach.

Collective Security: Collective Security looks *inward* to attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states. The first modern Collective Security organization was the League of Nations founded in the aftermath of World War I. At the end of World War II, the United Nations (UN) took up the responsibility of Collective Security from the League of Nations (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 6).

Collective Defence: A Collective Defence organization looks *outward* to defend its members from external aggression. Collective Defence organizations constituted during the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Pact, all designed to provide Collective Defence to their members, were established after World War II (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, pp. 6-7).

Individual / Human Security: Individual Security or “Human Security” exists at the centre of all international security systems, which formed around liberal democratic ideals. Improvement and protection of the basic freedoms of the individual is the core, from which all other forms of security must spread out. Damage to the security of individuals in one country, by external or more often by internal forces, means that other peoples and their governments feel that their own security is decreased (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, pp. 7-8).

In addition to the authors’ individual or human security concept interpretation; it would be appropriate to attach here that; the origin of this concept’s definition was provided by above mentioned report of the United Nations Development Program in 1994 (UNDP Human Development Report 1994, pp. 22-34) as the first time to the international society. The Report, offered a shift on the focus of security concept, from nuclear to human security, in order to ensure security for the individual, not for the state.

According to this Report (1994, pp. 22-23), the human security concept has four main characteristics following as: “universal, interdependent, easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention and people-centred.” It explains the main aspects of human security as, “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life; whether in homes, in jobs and in communities (UNDP Human Development Report 1994, p. 23).”


Furthermore, the seven main categories of human security were determined in the Report (1994, pp. 24-25), as follows: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. Finally, the Report (1994, p. 34), listed the real threats to human security, with taking into account of the global challenges, in six main forms as: “unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking and international terrorism.” These threats and probable ones at future were identified as reasons to constitute the global framework of human insecurity in the mentioned Report.

Consequently, the human security concept which find its ground of application, within a transformation and adaptation process, since it has been introduced, in many international organizations and states as well, defined in the Report (1994, p. 22), like: “.... a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity.”

Promoting Stability: The second new component of Cooperative Security (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 9) is the active promotion of stability outside the boundaries of the states forming the Cooperative Security system. Stability may be troubled by the danger of conflict between states, but also by mass violations of individual security within neighbouring states, such as the one which occurred in Kosovo in 1998 and early 1999.

The following model of Cooperative Security is built on a series of widening concentric circles or rings. It attempts to bring together the four elements of Cooperative Security in a practical framework to form a real and effective security system (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 10):

***Cooperative Security
The Four Rings***



Source: Cohen, R. , Mihalka, M. , April 2001.

Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order.

Figure 2.2 Cooperative Security, The Four Rings

Cooperative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and practical and transparent, economic, political, and defense cooperation. In a Cooperative Security system, individual states' national security objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

Ring One: Promoting and protecting human rights within their own boundaries and added a field (**Individual Security**)

Ring Two: Maintaining peace and stability within their common space (**Collective Security**)

Ring Three: Mutual protection against outside aggression (**Collective Defense**)

Ring Four: Actively promoting stability in other areas where conflict could threaten their shared security, using political, informational, economic, and, if necessary, military means (**Promoting Stability**)

The below Chart 2.1 (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 15), is based on the perceived effectiveness of the current leading international security organizations in a particular role, rather than on its formal organizational commitment to one security role. It is attempted to match with the characteristics of the Cooperative Security system, which was described before. "Yes?" indicates, only partial effectiveness in fulfilling a particular role:

Chart 2.1 Institutionalizing Cooperative Security

| Institution | Ring One: Individual Security | Ring Two: Collective Security | Ring Three: Collective Defence | Ring Four: Promoting Stability |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| United Nations | Yes? | Yes? | No | Yes? |
| OSCE | Yes? | Yes? | No | Yes? |
| EU | Yes | Yes | No | Yes? |
| NATO | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Source: Cohen, R. , Mihalka, M. , April 2001. *Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order.*

As it can be noticed from this table, according to the model of Co-operative Security, authors claim that; NATO is the world's only working example of a Co-operative Security system.

Another figure (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 18) indicating the Cooperative Security concept of NATO below, emphasizes also the effectiveness of the Alliance's promoting stability in the areas beyond its boundaries within the institutional framework examples as follows: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and its successor, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the NATO-Ukraine Joint Commission and the Mediterranean Dialogue.



Figure 3

Source: Cohen, R. , Mihalka, M. , April 2001.
Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order.
Figure 2.3 Cooperative Security: A NATO Model

Furthermore, the Crisis Management as an operational tool of NATO creates maintenance of stability in areas on its periphery. Crisis Management includes Conflict Prevention (active diplomacy and preventive deployments) and Crisis Response operations, like Bosnia and Kosovo. Other tools, which supplies NATO to promote stability outside the traditional area, can be stated as the NATO enlargement process, Partnership for Peace, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative.

In addition, as projected by the author, in Figure 2.4 (Cohen and Mihalka 2001, p. 24) below, the eventual objective of the NATO in the longer term, has introduced as establishing stable and strong Eurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security system, incorporating Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.

Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security System




Figure 4

Source: Cohen, R. , Mihalka, M. , April 2001.
Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order.

Figure 2.4 Eurasian-Atlantic Cooperative Security System

3. CHANGE IN THE THREAT AND ENEMY CONCEPTS

During the Cold War; security was essentially based on the national security and survival of the states which the *enemy* concept was defining against to a one bloc. Each of the bloc's essential security concern was the threat of invasion, involving an attack from the enemy bloc toward their territorial and national integrity. It was much easier to estimate the threat and essentially was defining as *military threat*. Besides, the possible attack's damage could be measurable when the nuclear weapons considered. Therefore the Cold World order security perceptions and strategies had mainly the military dimension, which caused an escalating effect on the military budget expenses of the states; mainly the USA and the USSR. Eventually, the challenge between two superpowers, further escalated competition with the commencement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (www.nuclearfiles.org) announced by Ronald Reagan in 1983 that only resolved with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989.

Another feature of the threat was its *symmetric* character which means tank to tank, aircraft to aircraft, infantry to infantry, and ballistic missile to ballistic missile and etc. In this sense, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were the military institutions serving to the *collective defense* of the blocs. As the only political actors in the international and national politics, states were acting according to the power politics rules i.e. the realistic principals. Mutually, both the communist and the capitalist blocs were obsessive with the security matters, in other words; the defensive realism was leading during the Cold War era.

There was a balance of powers, in which two major powers dominating the world in a bipolar international system. The equality in military power in the means of nuclear weapons, provided the deterrence between two blocs so that, peace was obtained by the risk of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Hence, it was difficult for the international crisis or conflicts to be occurred, when the costs of a probable conflict or war calculated by the states – where the military power was distributed symmetrically among East and West Europe.

3.1 The Globalization Effect and 9/11

With the end of the Cold War, since the bipolar system of balance had finished, “economic liberalism became the only hegemonic ideology and the dominant mode of the organization which created a new framework for insecurity (Buzan and Wæver 1998)” for the international system. The climb of the liberalism to hegemonic status caused new forms of insecurities (Buzan and Wæver 1998); in an unintended and unanticipated way; with its spillover effects which started in the global market economy and spread through the military, political, societal and environmental sectors.

Besides, other liberal ideas especially like “individualism and human rights” augmented the pressure on societies that do not share them. “The liberal peace is not universal, and in many respects it is imperial towards the remaining non-liberal societies (Buzan and Wæver 1998)”.

With the effect of, democratization in the state structures as a consequence of liberal values and policies; other actors other than the state, occurred in the political and legal domain within and between states. These actors benefit from this new internal and international liberal environment with higher degree of autonomy and freedom of action than before. These new actors enjoying power are; Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) and Business Oriented International Non-Governmental Organizations (BINGOs).

Henceforth, in a system of multi polar and multi level world, defining and estimating the concepts of enemy and threat became difficult when compared with the Cold War era’s bipolar stable world security system. Buzan; who modifies his discussion of security in military terms, to security in the political, economic, ecological, and societal sectors; explains the situation as (Buzan and Wæver 1998): “What can be clearly observed is that the state is less important in the new security agenda than in the old one. A range of new referent objects for security and sources of threat is being set up above, below and alongside the state. Above the state as new referent objects one finds the set of rules, regimes and institutions that constitute the liberal international economic order (LIEO); the global climate system; and the various regimes that attempt

to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” We can easily argue that, the remaining bloc’s economic and political ideologies gave a pace to the transformation of internal structures (society, governments and elites) of the ex-communist states, which were newly independent and vulnerable to sociologic, economic and political developments and changes in order to rebalance the ambiguous international sphere. As a matter of fact; this was tried to be accomplished by the enlargement and integration policies of the European Union for the Eastern and the Central part of the Europe, in order to determine a secure and stable economic and political environment around the wealthier part, i.e. the EU with 15 members. Under this will, lies the simple reality of internal ethnic, religious, military or political conflicts are tend to leap to the regional and international systems.

On the other hand, the rest of the world was still in a slippery economic and political situation where a huge challenge of adaptation to the multi level and multi polar systems been lived. As before mentioned, the arisen war from the ethnic and nationalistic incentives in the Balkan region and the financial crises in the South East Asia in 1990s were then be interpreted how important effects could be observed of the *nonmilitary threats* and also be included to the security strategy agendas of the states later on¹⁰. States started to take into consideration of these nonmilitary threats, which existed before, and to perceive them as important as the military threats, especially after the September 11.

It can be argued that; these nonmilitary threats caused inherently from the liberal hegemonic ideology, which triggered the globalization process and can be counted as; poverty, ethnical and religious conflicts in the society, territorial disputes, national identities, migration from economically and politically instable regions to the wealthier and stable regions, population growth, organized crime including illegal trafficking of drugs, women and weapons, equal access and share of the natural resources, environment problems, epidemic diseases and political and economic instability or weakness which can resultantly arouse from one of the former mentioned.

¹⁰ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA September 2002 and European Security Strategy December 2003.

Thus, it is evident that, one of the parameters which directly effect the threat and enemy concepts is the globalization process. Globalization can be explained as; the result of rapid technological developments which give the opportunity of free communication and interaction throughout the world without borders in seconds of time. Accordingly, speed, interconnectedness and interdependency are the other aspects of globalization.

As a matter of fact, change was inevitable in the security understanding of the “global world” which demonstrated a shift from the collective defense of the Cold War security perceptions through the *collective security* perceptions of this new international system, relating to above mentioned interdependency and interconnectedness aspects and effects of the globalization. All the organizations like NATO remained after the Cold War reshaped their security perceptions and strategies according to the collective security understanding, in order to survive in the new era.

Moreover, the globalization process, created other actors than the state, who has unpredicted immense influences on the economic and political systems, that at the end creates a forcing effect on the states when evaluating and analyzing the nonmilitary threats. For instance, individuals or multinational or international business companies catch the opportunity to influence economic and political balances of the states ever than before, in a global world.

If the globalization process did not give George Soros, the opportunity to break the Bank of England in 1992, via currency speculation, then what? Or how can the states limit themselves by committing conventions on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states, i.e. multinational or international business companies, in order to settle the international investment disputes between governments and foreign investors, by binding themselves to recognize and enforce arbitral awards of so called arbitrary institutions, and relinquish from their sovereignty to enforce internal law to these companies –which is an authority under the monopoly of the state emerge per se from “being a state”- for the sake of foreign investment and trade, if the liberal economic order so the globalization process did not allow and empower a justifiable

legitimate basis for the BINGOs to do so? As today, more than 150 states throughout the world, bind themselves with these kinds of conventions.¹¹

Furthermore, in addition to the economic liberalism, the political liberalism also established its required global criterions via governance, privatizations, enhancing micro-ethnic national identities and cultures and so on, among not only in the newly independent states of the Eastern Bloc but also in the rest of the world. We can say that we are still living in a transformation of state, structures, values and concepts because; globalization is a continuing process which replaced the Balance of Powers, during the absence of no other option left behind the bipolar world.

If we continue to identify the change in the threat concept after the Cold War, while the military threats still having serious concern of international society, with the terrorist attacks of September 11, there are other serious threats emerged in the security perceptions of the states such as; international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery and threatening of vital resources supplies.

A further changed characteristic of threat after the Cold War can be observed as its *asymmetric* feature, in the changed understandings and perceptions era of the post-Cold War security environment. Beginning in the 1990s, since the global distribution of power was asymmetric; it was ensued that asymmetric strategies depending on the perceptions, would be a natural evolution.

Accurate acknowledgement of asymmetry, as a concept, can be defined in a very simplistic and limited sense as follows (Metz and Johnson 2001, pp. 2-3): “asymmetric engagements, as those between dissimilar forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, and so forth.” From this very narrow concept of asymmetry which has limited practicality, approach to the issue broadened in the content during the 1990s, and included terrorism, the use or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, and information warfare as asymmetric challenges.

¹¹ See: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm> or Permanent Court Of Arbitration, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=363. [cited 08.06.2007]

During the process of evaluating the threats, asymmetric feature of the threat is one of the determining factors while planning a strategy in response. However, “Phrased differently, asymmetry is *important* to strategy, but not *everything* is asymmetry. Strategic leaders and thinkers must be clear on what asymmetry *is* and what it *is not* (Metz and Johnson 2001, p. 4)”.

In addition to the concept of asymmetry, which has a significant role on the security strategies; the broadest official handling of asymmetry can be found on page two of the Joint Strategy Review 1999 provided by The Joint Staff of the USA as: “Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States’ expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied at all levels of warfare— strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the spectrum of military operations (Metz and Johnson 2001, p. 5)”.

A more general and complete definition of strategic asymmetry would be (Metz and Johnson 2001, pp. 5-6): “In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’s weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions.”

To repeat once again; during the Post-Cold War era all the concepts of security changed, depending to the new system of the world, which is in a multi polar and multi level appearance. The old enemies of the Cold War era became new allies but, there still

existing enemies like “rogue states”¹² for the *winner* of the Cold War, i.e. the USA and its ideology that is the economic and political liberalism.

The *enemy* was not “a single political regime or person or religion or ideology”¹³ anymore, the enemy is *terrorism*; which is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents”¹⁴ now. This was the new enemy concept, identified by President Bush, right after the terrorist attacks on 14 September 2001, in his speech addressed at the National Cathedral, Washington, D.C. However, it is observed that, this new definition of enemy concept exposed to a rapid change - due to globalization’s speed aspect- only within five years of time. In year 2006, President Bush was redefining the enemy as:

“Yet the enemy we face today in the War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 11. Our understanding of the enemy has evolved as well. Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”¹⁵

A new distinguishable era was starting, where the enemy is identified as “whether a state or non-state actor”¹⁶ that is different from the Cold War era’s security perceptions and contents of concepts.

Furthermore as a response to this *terrorist enemy*, who is “defined by religious intolerance”¹⁷, the freedom of the right of people to believe and worship according to the commands of their own conscience, free from the oppression of the state, majority or the oppression of a minority that wants to dictate what others must believe, should be defended.

¹² (North Korea, Iran and Iraq), See: The National Security Strategy of the USA September 2002, pp. 13-14, The National Security Strategy of the USA March 2006, pp. 12-18-19.

¹³ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA September 2002, p. 5.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ See: National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, “Today’s Terrorist Enemy”, September 2006, p. 5 and See: 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges, September 2006, p. 4.

¹⁶ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. 30.

¹⁷ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, March 2006, p. 7.

Consequently, the enemy concept is not simply another state and its ideology anymore, but within the threat perceptions of today's world, now it is inside an ambiguous process of evolution through international organizations, networks, individuals and religious fundamentalism tightly bounded with the process of globalization and sudden changes due to the multipolar structure.

3.2 Evaluation Of Threat Concept After The Cold War

During the Cold War, only choice was the Balance of Powers, which two blocs used to perceive security matters. However under multipolarity, in order to evaluate the concept of threat; sources of the threat should be determined, at first. As Walt (1990, pp. 22-26) argues, *balance of threat* approach suggests four important sources of threat to be considered, to facilitate better understand balancing and / or bandwagoning behaviors of different actors as a response to threats. These sources of threat are: "Aggregate Power, Geographic Proximity, Offensive Power and Aggressive Intention."

1- Aggregate Power: The assumption here is that the greater a state's total resources (e.g., military capability, population, social solidarity, industrial and technological development, etc), the greater a potential threat it can pose to others (if all other factors are equal). However, states with great power have the capacity to either punish enemies or reward friends. Therefore a state's aggregate power may provide a motive to other states for balancing or bandwagoning.

2- Geographic Proximity: The hypothesis here is that powers that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away (if all other factors are equal). Also approximate threats can lead other states either to adopt balancing response (encircling the approximate threat with on alliance or more) or to bandwagoning behaviour (especially when the approximate threat demonstrates its ability to compel obedience).

3- Offensive Power: The idea here is that states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to pose a greater threat than those acquiring defensive capabilities (if all other factors are equal). Most probably, offensive power leads to balancing response aiming to counteract it, however, in some cases, bandwagoning becomes the only way when other states are so vulnerable to hold the hope for resisting.

4- Aggressive Intentions: All else being equal, perceptions of intent are likely to play such a vital role in alliance choice. States that are perceived as aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them. However, when a state is believed to be unalterable aggressive other states may prefer to bandwagon as a protective measure (Finlandization syndrome).


It is claimable for the Cold War system that, as only two great powers dominating center stage, i.e. containment reigns while the two powers compete with each other, ganging up and bullying are largely unknown in a bipolar system, because of the reason that, it is impossible to produce the power asymmetries that result in ganging up and bullying (Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 35-50).

Another method of evaluation of the threats is the one below, developed by Blechman and Wittes (1999), particularly about the threat and use of force in the American military power, in the post-cold war period. In order to reach a better understanding of the security perceptions of the USA in the foreign policy area, authors called the conditions that facilitate the effective use of military threats as “enabling conditions.”

According to these variables, which are termed as “enabling conditions” by the authors; most enabling conditions shape the credibility of the U.S. threat in the mind of the targeted foreign leaders. Authors claim that, enabling conditions cover both conditions belonging to the context wherein the U.S. threat is made and to the character of the threat itself.

Notwithstanding the credibility of the U.S. threat, on the other hand, some demands are more difficult for foreign leaders to comply with than others. And some of the enabling conditions directly influence this perception of how costly it would be to comply with the demands. Indeed, both the credibility of the threat and the degree of difficulty of the demands, shape together the targeted leader’s evaluation of the likely cost of complying or of not complying with U.S. demands.

As a result, the balance between the cost of compliance and the cost of defiance represents the potency of the U.S. threat. These relationships are explained in Figure 3.1 below.



Source: Blechman, B. M. and Wittes T. C. November 1999.
Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy

Figure 3.1 Evaluations of Threats

According to this figure, enabling conditions are the *context*, “in which a threat is made and the character of the threat itself together, shape the credibility of the threat. The degree of difficulty of a demand is evaluated through this credibility display to determine the likely costs of compliance and noncompliance (Blechman and Wittes 1999)”. When evaluating the threats; the context and character of threat are the main variables, which are effective on establishing the threat’s credibility in the mind of the target.

While explaining the *context of the threat*; authors claim that; reaffirmations of long-standing positions are more likely to be taken seriously than declarations of new demands and this is observed in the precedent coercive uses of military power by the United States. The existence or nonexistence of broad *public support* for military action is the second contextual factor, which is supposed to shape the credibility of U.S. military threats. And the third contextual factor, which appears to influence perceptions of the credibility of a U.S. threat, is the existence or nonexistence of third-nation or international support for the U.S. position. And the last contextual factor which is believed to influence the credibility of U.S. threats is the *reputation of the president and other high-level U.S. officials*.

Character of the threat has three contributing factors; namely, “urgency, tangible actions and communication of will”, which have an important influence of reflecting the threat’s credibility due to their conveyance. There must be an *urgency* aspect of the threat or the targeted leader can think that a strategy of delay and inaction will be effectual in avoiding compliance. Especially, determining the deadlines has a significant importance regarding this factor.

Tangible military actions become more effective, when associated with vocal threats. Also these are the steps that demonstrating how serious the U.S. taking responsibility. Manifesting the U.S. president’s willingness to pay a price for the situation with his vocal demands when together with the movements or other actions of military units; would add credibility to his verbal demands and consequently increase the reality feature of the threats. In this respect, the greater the commitment confirmed by the action, the more probable the threat is to be successful. Blechman and Kaplan, claim that; the deployment of forces on the land in the potential scene of operations (Blechman and Wittes 1999), than the movement of naval forces; would be more effective, in order to make threats credible. Because of the reason that; land deployments demonstrate a willingness to pay the political price by putting U.S. soldiers, at risk. In the same way, the mobilization of military reserves has been an effective way of giving credibility to threats. As a matter of fact, deploying the U.S. soldiers on active duty far from home, while separating them from their families, indicates definitely the president’s willingness to pay a high political price.

Degree of difficulty of the demand is conditioned by the demand itself, for a foreign leader when it is time to choose to comply with a U.S. demand. A demand must obviously be specific, clearly articulated and must be understandable by the target in order to be effective. However, some demands may not be met by the target; due to its burdensome *content*. Including *positive incentives* in the overall U.S. diplomatic strategy, is an essential means of progressing the targeted leader's perception of a U.S. demand.

Positive incentives can change perceptions of the *content of a demand* itself as well as offering a political excuse for the target, to do what it might have expected to do anyhow (Blechman and Wittes 1999): "admit defeat and accept the U.S. demand."

Another influential factor which is determinant on the targeted leader's perception of the difficulty of a demand is the *degree of visibility* of the retreat necessary to be complied with. This means, "A retreat which is visible and humiliating may often be perceived as something to be resisted at any cost." It is claimed by the authors (Blechman and Wittes 1999) that; the visibility factor of the threat can be tested on both "deterrent threats and compelling threats", which on the prior the success can be observable. For the reason that the compelling threats require to fulfill a positive and usually a visible action from the target, the success can not be obtained as it was anticipated to be.

The result, which is expected to be obtained by the combination of these enabling conditions - which briefly are; context of the threat, character of the threat, and degree of difficulty of a demand - constitute *Potency of the Threat*. As a final indicator, potency of the threat contributes to the targeted leader's perception of the cost of complying or not complying with U.S. demands. This evaluation will be deliberately calculated by the target and it is evidently dependent on the target's perception of the credibility of the threat. If the threat is perceived to be completely incredible, the estimated cost of noncompliance will be low. If the context and character of the threat increase the applicability of the threat; the difficulty of the demand will be calculated carefully, related to the cost of noncompliance. Finally, it can be claimed that, an adequately potent threat should produce compliance in a rational adversary.

3.3 Change in the Warfare Concept and Emergence of International Terrorism on the Security Agenda

Beginning with Gulf War in 1991, the world's eyes not only witnessed but also used to see "the war" as a computer-game on a green screen where some white lights sparkling during the air bombardment of Iraq with the "precious" efforts of CNN World News. The Gulf War was the first proof of globalization, in the terms of "interconnectedness, speed, spreading information and convergence and/or divergence of old and new concepts" which one hardly understands and believes what he or she saw on the screen of TV.

It was an end of an era where the nuclear deterrence was preventing the two blocs to attack each other's territories and as a result of the containment policy, it was difficult for the potential conflicts to lead a war, under bipolarity. Therefore, since the multipolar system has many potential conflict situations due to the major power dyads, it becomes convenient to declare that, "ceteris paribus, war is more likely in a multipolar system than a bipolar one (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 14)".

The technologic developments in the military and non-state actor's possibility to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction due to the slight control and track on these weapons after the dissolution of the USSR; led the conventional warfare understanding of the Cold War era to replace its place with the *asymmetric warfare* regarding the asymmetric threats perceived by the states, which was mentioned above.

In a world where only one ideology remained, standing with its military power, not only the warfare understanding was changing but also the enemies (rogue states), security perceptions (economic interests like petroleum, should be defended in the energy reserve fields), *the land, the borders* to defend (defensive warfare shifted to aggressive/offensive warfare; in order to defend the national interests) and battle fields (such as websites, regarding the popular usage of internet) were also changing. It was a time that the states were sending their troops *abroad*; for defending vital economic interests of whole world, *far from home* as in Operation Desert Shield which started on

17 January 1991, in Iraq; while getting the international support to legalize the use of force by military and justify the war.¹⁸

“America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will. Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.”¹⁹

It can be claimed that, with the commencement of globalization process the shift and broadening in the security perceptions from military field (defending the territory) through political and economical field (defending the economic and political interests) reshaped the security strategies and priorities of the hegemonic liberal ideology (if we recall Buzan) proponents i.e. the USA and the EU.

Maybe reason for a quite late intervention by NATO air forces with Operation Deliberate Force ²⁰(air strikes were conducted on eleven days during the period 29 August - 14 September 1995) to the ethnic cleansing and mass rapes realized by Serbs to Bosnians during the Bosnian War - which started in March 1992 ended in December 1995 with Dayton agreement - was the nonexistence of economic vital interests or the weak existence of political interests for the rest of the world to involve in Bosnian war.

This process of change in the concepts' contents had escalated with and by the attacks to World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 and now there was another concept introduced to the security agenda and perceptions of the world namely as *pre-emptive war*. As a concept, preemption (Arend 2003, p. 89) is the use of military force in advance of a first use of force by the enemy.

¹⁸See: UN Security Council Resolutions: 660, 661, 662 and 678. <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm> and Arab League Resolution adopted on 3 August 1990 by the Extraordinary Session of the League of Arab States held in Cairo, http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/english/details_en.jsp?art_id=423&level_id=226 [cited 15.02.2007]

¹⁹See: “Toward a New World Order”, by George H. W. Bush, 11 September 1990. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Toward_a_New_World_Order, [cited 15.02.2007]

²⁰ See: <http://www.afsouth.nato.int/factsheets/DeliberateForceFactSheet.htm> [cited 07.04.2007]

However, it was promulgated in President Bush's speech on 1 June 2002, which then be termed as "Bush Doctrine" for the purpose of creating a legitimate basis for future interventions, on the way of the USA's global war on terror, as follows:

"We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense *by acting preemptively* against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and.... Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, *the immediacy of today's threats*, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. ... The United States has long maintained the option of *preemptive actions* to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction— and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, *act preemptively*. The United States will not use force in all cases to *preempt* emerging threats, nor should nations use *preemption* as a pretext for aggression."²¹

As a matter of fact, *the right of self-defense by acting preemptively*, as a concept, which was articulated in the so-called Bush Doctrine, describes this "self-defense" as: "acting against such emerging threats before they are fully formed."²² And exactly this *content of preemption* concept; provided the policy construction for the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, with the Operation Iraqi Freedom which has a clear mission: "to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people."²³

²¹ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA September 2002, pp. 6, 15.

²² Ibid, p. ii.

²³ "President Discusses Beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom", President's Radio Address, 22 March 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html> [cited 18.02.2007]

Hereof, if we remember that era's news spreading in the entire (press, radio and television) communication - as one of the apparatus of *Ideological State Apparatuses*²⁴; (Althusser 2000) which is in fact a cultural one - about the allegations of Iraq was possessing nuclear weapons; then it would become understandable not only the below discourse of President Bush; but also how we -the people- admit the things told to us by alienating the existing reality with a distortion in our perceptions.

By alleging that Iraq was possessing nuclear weapons, President George W. Bush's one of the speech remarks at the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002 as follows:

“Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.Today, Iraq continues to withhold important information about its nuclear program -- weapons design, procurement logs, experiment data, an accounting of nuclear materials and documentation of foreign assistance. ... It retains physical infrastructure needed to build a nuclear weapon. Iraq has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should Iraq acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year.”²⁵

Hence there are debates about this permissive (Arend 2003, p. 89) preemption approach of the Bush Doctrine has or has not acceptable lawfulness under the international law, the answer to this question depends on how one understands the contours of contemporary international law.

²⁴ For more information see: <http://www.marxists.org> or <http://newleftreview.org>. [cited 01.05.2007]

²⁵ Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 12 September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html>, [cited 16.02.2007]

The USA's on the way of global war on terror, "which has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology from the beginning"²⁶ after September 11; international terrorism became one of the essential threats for the multi polar world. And as it is announced by President Bush; the war against terrorists "is a global enterprise of uncertain duration."²⁷

Indeed, terrorism was not a new fact, there were many states having been exposed to terrorist attacks and terrorism all over the world before September 11. For instance: the IRA terror in UK, the PKK terror in Turkey and etc. But what was changed is the threat perception of the USA towards terrorism, which generated a grave psychological trauma inside the American society. Since it was declared the ineffectiveness of the deterrence policy²⁸ of the Cold War by the USA, preferred action²⁹ rather than the reactive posture were experienced manifestly by the world both in Afghanistan and in Iraq after 2001. Actually, there still "ambiguity" prevails on the future of Iraq today.

²⁶ See: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 7.

²⁷ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. i.

²⁸ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. 15

²⁹ Ibid, p. ii, "the only path to peace and security is the path of action."

4. SECURITY STRATEGY DOCUMENTS OF THE USA AND THE EU

Since it was afore mentioned, there will be a brief evaluation made under this chapter without mentioning some points such as, history and the background developments of the below compared security strategy documents of the USA and the EU. Time perspective of the history of these documents will be limited by the terrorist attacks of September 11; therefore comparison will merely include developments after the year 2001.

Within a dual dimensioned comparison; the first comparison will pay attention to formal logic of these documents. And the second comparison will include similar and divergent security concepts in these texts. During the determination of similar and divergent security concepts of these texts; a *closed (literal) interpretation* will be preferred as a manner, rather than a *broad interpretation*; which consists of both the letter and the spirit of the text. Hence the manner of broad interpretation requires specialized knowledge of international law, it will be tried to avoid from exceeding the literalist approach.

Before starting the comparison, it would be helpful to remind that during the elapsed time, the USA revised and extended its first³⁰ security strategy document in March 2006. Whereas, the European Union has still the same security strategy document³¹, which was approved in December 2003. Besides there are other documents relating with security, particularly about terrorism approved and continually revised by both the USA and the EU.

*For the USA mentioned documents from previous to current are:*³²

- i) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002
- ii) National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 2006
- iii) National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006
- iv) 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes And Challenges, September 2006

³⁰ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002.

³¹ See: A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003.

³² See: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/> [cited 07.06.2007]

For the EU mentioned documents from previous to current are:³³

- i) The European Arrest Warrant, 07 August 2002 (entry into force)
- ii) Declaration on combating terrorism, 25 March 2004
- iii) The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 24 November 2005
- iv) EU Action Plan on combating terrorism, 13 February 2006
- v) The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 09 March 2007
- vi) Implementation of the Strategy and Action Plan to Combat Terrorism, 21 May 2007³⁴

After giving above information, it would be necessary to make clear that the documents which will be compared and examined under here are;

*European Security Strategy, December 2003 and
The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002.*

For a handy usage, abbreviations will be utilized for these documents as follows: *ESS* for European Security Strategy and *NSS* for The National Security Strategy of the USA.

4.1 A Comparison in the Formal Logic of ESS and NSS:

The first thing prominent when the National Security Strategy of the USA (NSS) examined is its *composite* structure. Actually, NSS is constituted by gathering *extensively* the *contents of speeches* of President George W. Bush, which addressed in various times and separate places. Whereas the European Security Strategy (ESS) is an entire piece of act drafted under the responsibility of the EU High Representative Javier Solana and approved by the European Council concurrently; i.e. on 12 December 2003.

Except the first three pages (in place of an introduction as well as without page numbers) written and signed by George W. Bush on 17 September 2002, NSS is consisting of 31 pages and possesses a Table of Contents; which indeed is the national

³³See: The Council of the European Union, Key documents, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>. [cited 09.06.2007]

³⁴ First adopted in June 2004 and revised most recently in March 2007.

security strategy *goals* of the USA (among chapter two and chapter nine) and actually, efficacious for a reader. These goals are also stated in first chapter and within first two pages of NSS. As above mentioned, NSS is *extended* compiled speeches of the President and each of the nine chapters arranged according to the order of contents of the speeches other than the chronological order of the speeches. On the other hand, ESS consists of 14 pages and has a one page of introduction, three chapters and a conclusion paragraph.

In the Table of Contents (i.e. NSS Goals) below speeches' contents extended:

- I. Overview of America's International Strategy,
West Point, New York, 1 June 2002
- II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity,
West Point, New York, 1 June 2002
- III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks
Against Us and Our Friends,
Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral) 14 September 2001
- IV. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts,
Berlin, Germany, 23 May 2002
- V. Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with
Weapons of Mass Destruction,
West Point, New York, 1 June 2002
- VI. Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free
Trade
Monterrey, Mexico, 22 March 2002
- VII. Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the
Infrastructure of Democracy
Washington, D.C., Inter-American Development Bank, 14 March 2002
- VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global
Power
West Point, New York, 1 June 2002
- IX. Transform America's National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and
Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century
Washington, D.C., (Joint Session of Congress) 20 September 2001

ESS Text Structure is as follows:

Introduction

I. The Security Environment: Global Challenges And Key Threats

Global Challenges

Key Threats: Terrorism, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Regional Conflicts, State Failure, Organised Crime.

II. Strategic Objectives

Addressing the Threats

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

An International Order Based On Effective Multilateralism

III. Policy Implications For Europe

More active, More Capable, More Coherent, Working with partners

Conclusion

As it can be noticed on the Table of Contents of NSS, the extended speeches' contents are clearly overlapped and coincided with *where* they were given. To give an example; the goal to promote free trade beyond America's shores, the importance of free markets and sustainable global economic growth are considered within the U.S. national security interests and the speech covering concept of "free trade" as a *moral principle*³⁵ addressed at the U.N. Conference on Financing for Development³⁶ in Monterrey, Mexico not by accidentally.

Another example is the fourth chapter's³⁷ extended content which emphasizes international coordination and cooperation requirement of U. S. with regard to finite political, economic and military resources to meet global priorities. After counting couple of several states engaged in regional conflicts like Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan and states which have troubles about terrorist and extremist groups, drug trafficking, and functioning of markets and democracy like Indonesia and Colombia and civil wars existing in Africa; it is stressed to engage actively in such critical regional

³⁵ See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. 18.

³⁶The International Conference on Financing for Development, 18-22 March 2002, <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/Monterrey/Conference/index.html> [cited 11.06.2007]

³⁷See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, pp. 9-11.

disputes' settlement (with European allies and international institutions³⁸), in order to avoid challenges of war zones, that inherently are threats to global security environment. This chapter's related speech³⁹ was addressed in the German Bundestag, Berlin during a trip to Europe, just before the Summit Meeting of NATO and Russia⁴⁰ at the level of Heads of State and Government in Rome, Italy. This summit was held on 28 May 2002 and under the "NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality" concept; formally established the NATO-Russia Council. Moreover, in this summit NATO member countries and the Russian Federation signed the Rome Declaration at the same date, which was about the common decision to intensify cooperation further between NATO member countries and the Russian Federation, including the development of joint assessments of the terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic area. Accordingly, it can be claimed from above mentioned speech of President Bush -which he also states that America is not defending just itself or Europe but also defending *civilization*,⁴¹ in its war on global terror- NSS chapter contents completely overlaps with the speeches vis-à-vis, when considering the total logic of the chapters both all together and one by one.

When ESS glanced, it will be seen that, it is much plainer both in the quality and quantity dimensions. Although does not possessing a table of contents; the bold written phrases attract attention with intention of distinguishing the independent topics and headlines from each other. To give an example; in the third chapter of ESS, under the headline of "Policy Implications For Europe"⁴², the phrases "More Active, More Capable, More Coherent, Working with partners"⁴³ were written in bold character so that; the reader has the opportunity to comprehend and distinguish the policies offered for the EU to be implemented for the future.

³⁸ Ibid, p. 11.

³⁹ "President Bush Thanks Germany for Support Against Terror", Remarks by the President to a Special Session of the German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany, 23 May 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020523-2.html> [cited 11.06.2007]

⁴⁰ For more information see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/0205-rome.htm> [cited 11.06.2007]

⁴¹ See: Footnote 31 and "The National Security Strategy of the USA", September 2002, p. ii. "...because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization."

⁴² A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, p. 11.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 11-13

Consequently, the last difference to append to the above mentioned formal features of two documents could be; the absence of a Conclusion part in NSS whereas ESS possesses it, within a four sentences which compose a single paragraph.

4.2 Similar and Divergent Security Concepts Comparison on NSS and ESS

Before comparing the similar and divergent security concepts -within a closed interpretation- articulated in both security strategy documents; it should be set aside that, ESS was drafted after more than one year later from NSS. Thus, it is very natural of ESS to having impacts and inspirations from NSS since; there is an existing close cooperation and common values system between the EU and the USA, for more than a half century. Moreover, it can be even claimed that, USA will continue to play an interventionist role in Europe as a result of economic and historical ties and the support acquired by the Atlanticist states (Duric 2005, pp. 63-64).

On the whole, both strategy documents include;

similar security concepts (such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) but diverge from each other;

within *the scope of the concepts* (such as the divergence under the threat concept's scope i.e. organized crime is considered as a key threat in ESS but does not exist as a threat concept in NSS)

on *the methods* of dealing and resolving the security concerns of global system, (such as the EU's approach of policy implication has a multilateral cooperation aspect, on the other hand, the USA's approach of policy implication includes *also* the *probable* unilateral preemptive action while dealing with terrorist organizations under the Global War On Terror (GWOT) concept),

on *the means* to confront threats; (since ESS demonstrates a support for the international organizations and treaties to be effective with confidence building and arms control regimes whereas; NSS prefers a decisive, direct and continuous *action* – destroy and attack- to defeat the threats if deterrence fails, with all elements of power, including military power),

which are dependent on different security perceptions that resultantly create different identifications, *ambiguous* (lack of internationally recognized definition in some concepts such as terrorism) and *distorted* contents (debates on self-defense by acting preemptively and imminent threat concept usage of USA) of security concepts.

4.3 Similar Security Concepts' Reflections on NSS and ESS and Their Divergence

As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, the first common security concept in both security strategy documents is definitely; terrorism. The other similar threats (except military threats) were identified as: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, global health and environmental threats, such as diseases like HIV/AIDS, climate change, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations and other global threats as poverty, hunger and malnutrition.

Divergence on the threat concept for ESS is that, it also includes organized crime, as an internal threat which has probable links with terrorism and has significant external facets like: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons. Besides, competition for natural resources especially, water, is another threat for ESS due to the global warming. In addition; distant threats other than near threats are also considered under the threat concept of ESS due to globalization era. These distant threats under the concern of ESS expressed as; nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia and proliferation in the Middle East. And finally, energy dependence is considered as a particular concern in ESS, regarding the world's largest importation of oil and gas as a continent.

Divergence in NSS on the threat concept is the usage of "imminent threat" relating with "the self-defence right of USA by acting preemptively" which was mentioned in the previous chapters.

Thus, it will not be examined here in detail but, it can be claimed that its impact on the security applications, particularly for the future warfare operations of the USA, seems to be an everlasting source for the debates in international law and political science fields.

Furthermore, another divergence on the threat concept can be observed as radicalism and technology in NSS, as they are described “the gravest danger for American nation.”⁴⁴ And it can be claimed that radicalism is linked with Islam in NSS, when considering the policy goals defined as: “for supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation”⁴⁵, during the USA’s war against international terrorism. (It can be observed that, this discourse has been relatively softened with “proud religion of Islam” phrases, in the recent security strategy and combating terrorism documents⁴⁶ of the USA.)

On the other hand, ESS utilizes the word “religious extremism”⁴⁷ under the terrorism concept, without explicitly referring to any religion. Besides, within the terrorism concept; “the threats inspired by foreign governments and groups”⁴⁸ can be added as another divergence on the threat concept by NSS.

As the threat and enemy concepts directly associated security concepts; “enemy” as a security concept, find its reflection on NSS as: rogue states, tyrants, hostile states, states which harbors, sponsors and supports terrorists and enemy whether a state or non-state actor. In 2002 strategy document, non-state actors were not identified but in National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006) on page five and in and in 9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges (September 2006) on page 4 these non-state actors, explicitly identified.

Meanwhile, divergence in ESS is the lack of enemy concept. Once this strategy document scrutinized, it would be revealed that there are no words exist other than “terrorists and criminals”, under the enemy concept. With relation to organized crime under the threat concept; criminals and criminal gangs and criminal networks can be given as an example of ESS’s enemy perception.

⁴⁴See: The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. ii.

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 6.

⁴⁶National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, p. 5 and The National Security Strategy of the USA, March 2006, p.9.

⁴⁷A Secure Europe In A Better World - European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, p. 3.

⁴⁸The National Security Strategy of the USA, September 2002, p. 30.

In conclusion, although there are similar security concepts utilized in both strategy documents; their contents and scopes diverge from each other. Therefore, this divergence demonstrates its impact on the followed policy applications and approaches by the both parties. And in the core of this different approach and applications lies the different security perceptions about security matters, which were

Finally, it would be useful to make clear that; this brief comparison is limited with the threat and enemy concepts of both ESS and NSS, purposely. As it was mentioned in the introduction part of this thesis; due to the extensiveness of the subject, limiting this comparison of concepts both by a closed (literal) interpretation manner and by the number of the concepts to be examined was a must for the author of this thesis. Therefore, other security concepts such as warfare, terrorism, conflict prevention, use of military force and etc. were not mentioned under this chapter, due to the time restrictions.

Besides, this study could be a topic of another dissertation on its own, when reminding the fact that; there is no examination realized about the *recognized definitions* of these concepts within the international law and international relations disciplines

5. CONCLUSION

After the Cold War, the bipolar international system's balance of power replaced its place to a multipolar and multilevel international system. Since the multipolar international system's dominant economic and political ideology was liberalism; the winner ideology of the Post-Cold War era started to promote its own structures and values to the rest of the world. The technological developments when accompanied with the political and economic liberalism implications; initiated a remarkable transformation within and between the structures of the states, considering with the bipolar system structures. As a consequence of changes in the political and economic environment; the states' perceptions of security were also changing. Henceforth, evolution of this change was observed both in the content and in the scope of the security concepts, which are directly reliant to security perceptions of the states.

Primarily, the traditional security concept shifted and broadened from its military dimension through economic, social, human, environmental and other alternative dimensions. These alternative security dimensions were inherently caused by liberal economic and political approaches of the states towards internal and external structures. In addition with globalization process, which has significant characteristics of interdependency, interconnectedness and speed; the requirement of adaptation to the multipolar system, in order to survive was inevitable for the states. Thus, the national or state security concept, was no longer focusing on only the state itself as a referent object and not only consists of merely the military threats.

While the state's economic and political structures inevitably altered according to the liberal values such as individualism, free trade and human rights; there were other actors emerged other than the state like NGOs, BINGOs and even the individuals, who utilize the advantages of these changes both in political and economic fields, with an increasingly freedom of transaction that cause significant influences on the internal and external balances of the states.

In this new international system, yet the enemy was defeated and there was no "other bloc" i.e. communist bloc, existing to be identified under the concept of enemy. Accordingly, the concept of threat's dominant aspect was not military anymore.

Considerable focus attached by the remaining ideology's institutions and organizations to nonmilitary threats -which existing before- as a consequence of increased challenges experienced by the defeated "other bloc" or non-liberal states, during the adaptation and transformation process to the liberal hegemonic global system.

These nonmilitary threats also have an asymmetric character which may create – as affirmed by the late 1990's South East Asian economic crisis diffusion to the world markets- unexpected crisis and conflicts in world's security agenda; regarding the interdependent aspect of globalized world. Since the isolation of a state in this multipolar interconnected system was impossible and the surfacing need to maintain and preserve liberal structures of this global multilevel world due to nonmilitary asymmetric threats was urgent; security understanding of the remaining hegemonic ideology – as a winner- demonstrated itself within the collective and/or cooperative security perception recognizing structures on the international level such as NATO, UN and EU.

Before existing, but yet considered as a security matter and included within the security agendas of the states as nonmilitary threats; are the following issues: poverty, ethnical and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, tendency of increasing nationalism, migration from economically and politically instable regions to the wealthier and stable regions, population growth, organized crimes as illegal trafficking of drugs, women and weapons, equal access and share of the natural resources, environment problems, epidemic diseases and political and economic instability or weakness of the developing world's states. These nonmilitary threats' possible effects to generate an "instable security zone", resulted them to be considered crucial within the threat perceptions of states, due to their spread out characters.

Furthermore, the nature of the warfare concept also changed in respect with the asymmetric threat perception of the states. Besides, the possibility of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) increased the concern on related serious threats like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, threatening of vital resources supplies and terrorism; especially after September 11.

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, the enemy concept is not referring simply to another state anymore, enemy declared as terrorism; and it is inside an ambiguous process of evolution through international organizations, networks, individuals and religious fundamentalism, within the process of globalization and in relation with unexpected changes due to the multipolar structure.

Moreover, world security agenda was introduced with the Global War On Terror (GWOT) concept as well as the pre-emptive war concept by the USA. However, the right to act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed for the purpose of self-defense; i.e. pre-emptive war identified and determined as an exclusive right of US military. It was declared in the strategy document of the USA, to use this right during the fight against terrorism and not in all cases and also other states warned clearly by the USA, to not to use the preemption concept as a pretext for aggression.

Furthermore, during this war on terror the sides declared to be taken as “Us and Them” by the USA. This simply means that; there will be allies to support the GWOT of USA and there will be enemies to be defeated due to their noncompliance to USA. In here it can be better understood why other representative states of liberal structures such as the EU and NATO members, demonstrate bandwagoning behaviours due to *their rational perceptions* about the aggregate and offensive power of USA. (Additionally geographic proximity can be also included to the above, for instance when the US naval forces positions or the military bases utilization in strategic partners considered)

Terrorism triggered an offensive approach on the security applications of the USA, via the preemptive war concept. This also has the meaning of abandonment of formerly recognized rules -at the international level- (deterrence and reactive posture applications) in warfare concept *unilaterally*, by declaring their ineffectiveness.

From this point; in order to make it clear; the below facts will be given as an evidence for the main two ideas of this entire thesis tried to propose and defend since the beginning.

The below given facts will be correlated with this thesis main ideas i.e. :

1- As a consequence of globalization; the ambiguous era of security today can and should create new and/or distorted concepts and applications in a comprehensive and large manner. I am considering this as "rules of the power" instead of "rule of law", therefore if the status-quo is changed; rules will be rewritten according to the winners.

2- Whether the security concepts changed in an alternative form (like including human security or environmental security as a result of liberal values) the *survival* and the *national interest* of the state entity will always motivate the states as a basic and mandatory instinct, unless the states do not prefer to prevail as they exist both in territorially and in political means. Because, the physical territories and borders have still meaning for the states, as their essential founding prerequisite to prove their "abstract existence" as a political being in an anarchic international system. And even in a cooperation or in a union, states still do compete with each other to maximize their own relative gains, rather than the collective gains; "in a self-help system by lessening, preserving, or widening the gap in welfare and strength between themselves and others" to assure their survival.

Therefore; the first idea will be correlated with the following facts:

Whether the preemption approach of the Bush Doctrine has or has not acceptable legitimacy according to the international law rules; -that is the "*rule of law*"- the usage of preemptive action found its ground of application in 2003 Iraqi invasion and created a legitimate basis for future interventions of GWOT and the multipolar world system has witnessed the rules rewritten by the power; i.e. "*rules of the power*".

Since the status-quo is turned out to the disadvantage of liberal economic and political values of where the system based on, with the effect of terrorist attacks; leaving the "terrorism" concept ambiguous and undefined-as an open door for future legitimacy providing for the entire perceptions, strategies and applications- or distorting and regenerating the imminent threat or preemptive action concepts according to the practical usages of the army; gave the USA (as a power of the anarchic international system) *naturally* the exclusive right to *rewrite the rules*.

Thus change in the rules can not be considered illegitimate, if we do not have any choice other than the “rules of the power”. And yet, the war against terrorists “is a global enterprise of uncertain duration” as President Bush declared on the first page of the national security strategy document of year 2002.

The second idea will be correlated with the following facts:

The national economic interest on petroleum, guided and driven the USA to send the US army to Iraq in 1991, for defending economic interests of USA, which defined “vital” by the President. While this vital economic national interest was defending by the US air force, it would be a very rational choice to ignore or not to take into account of environmental or individual security concepts, during the air bombardments of the oil refineries and wells of Iraq.

Hence the state is an abstract concept; it requires having concrete physical territories and borders in order to identify itself as a “state” even in an economically integrated union or cooperation. And with the aim of assuring its “survival” and maximizing its “national interests”; states still do maintain and preserve the economic and political structures like customs, the borders, the duties, the quotas and the armies.

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