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BAHÇEŞEHİR ÜNİVERSİTESİ

SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES IN DARREN ARONOFSKY'S FILMS *PI* AND *REQUIEM FOR A DREAM*

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

ÖZDEN ÖNCÜL DURĞUT

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Master Thesis

ÖZDEN ÖNCÜL DURĞUT

Supervisor: Yard. Doç. Dr. ERKAN BÜKER

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ABSTRACT

SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES IN DARREN ARONOFSKY'S FILMS *PI AND REQUIEM FOR A DREAM*

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Darren Aronofsky, with his films *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), aims to create a viewing experience that parallel the experience of his characters with altered states of minds. By using first person focalized narration, the director builds up similar visual and aural fields by exploiting spectator's shift of attention through subjective parameters. The audio-visual harmony in terms of camera movements, rhythm of music and polyphonic montage engage spectators both cognitively and emotionally. These two films by arousing experiences of heightened senses similar to main characters in the films, in fact, build up more than an intersubjective space. Thus, spectators do more than understanding another's perspective, they feel themselves as if they were the ones having the experience. You cannot understand exactly without experiencing it.

Key Words: Subjectivity, parametric narration, rhythm, phenomenology, empathy

ÖZET

DARREN ARONOFSKY'NİN *PI* VE *REQUIEM FOR A DREAM* FİLMLERİNDE ÖZNEL DENEYİMLER

Durğut, Özden Öncül

Yüksek Lisans Film ve Televizyon Araştırmaları

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Pi (1998) ve *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) filmleri ile Darren Aronofsky seyircilerine değişken ruh halinde bulunan karakterlerinin yaşadıklarına paralel görsel bir deneyim yaratmayı amaçlar. Birinci tekil şahıs odaklı anlatım biçimi kullanarak, yönetmen, öznel parametrelerle seyircinin dikkatini toplayan benzer görsel ve işitsel alanlar yaratır. Kamera hareketi, müziğin ritmi ve polifonik montaj ile kurulan görsel ve işitsel ahenk seyirciyi hem bilişsel hem de duygusal olarak filme bağlar. Bu iki film aslında filmdeki ana karakterlerin aşırı duyarlıklı deneyimlerine benzer deneyimler uyandırarak kişilerarası alanın bir adım ötesini oluşturur. Dolayısıyla, seyirciler olaya sadece başkasının perspektifinden bakmaktan ziyade adeta olayı kendileri yaşarlar. Hiçbir olayı başınıza gelmeden tam olarak anlayamazsınız.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Öznellik, parametrik anlatım, ritim, fenomenoloji, empati.

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I would like to dedicate this study to my son, questioning me again and again nearly each time why I am watching another film and my husband, reminding me that my life itself is just a film. Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents for all their patience and support they gave me through this study.

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Point Of View : POV

Requiem for a Dream : Requiem

1. INTRODUCTION:
'Narcissus in Wonderland'

They have dreamlike experiences in which
they feel as though they were in a different place, in a different time.
(Siegel 1989, p. 54)

New Punk Cinema (Rombes), *Dysphoric Style* (Simmons), and *Post–classical Narration* (Thanouli) are several labels which attempt to identify common features of a distinct group style of the contemporary American independent cinema in different perspectives. David Bordwell, however, highlights the persistence of classical norms and dominance of classical narration both in American and international filmmaking, but still recognizes some innovative elements which employ the notion of "stylistic assimilation" with techniques such as more rapid editing, free – ranging camera, bipolar extremes of lens lengths or closer framings in dialogue scenes (2006). This new style of 'intensified continuity' amounts to an intensification of established techniques which Bordwell (2002) considers as the dominant visual style in contemporary American film. Intensified continuity constitutes a selection and elaboration of options already on the classical filmmaking menu. Thus, contrary to claims that Hollywood style has become post-classical, Bordwell insists on that we are still dealing with a variant of classical film making (2002, p.18).

Spectators feel themselves overloaded when this style used in combination with parametric narration form where, according to Bordwell, "there is an actual audio – visual harmony in terms of rhythms of the camera movements and the rhythm of the music and the timing of the cuts" (quoted by Nielsen 2005, p.2). Bordwell, in his interview with Jakob Isak Nielsen, considers parametric narration as "a highly self-conscious and organized use of the decorative or ornamental function of style" and refers to the film *Magnolia* (1999) as an example (ibid.). However, the visual style used in Darren Aronofsky's films *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), has two important functions rather than solely being decorative. The key element for Aronofsky

here is to make his character's and spectators' experiences coincide temporally. By using first person focalized narration, the director builds up similar visual and aural fields by exploiting spectator's shift of attention through subjective parameters.

With his films *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) and *Pi* (1998), Darren Aronofsky presents a traumatic portrayal of addiction in the former and an oscillation between a psychosomatic and normal perception in the latter, and aims to arouse similar deviated, fragmented and decentred experiences on spectators. The director emphasizes his main characters mode of heightened senses by emphasizing them in his visual style through parametric narration form in his films. In his interview with Jeff Stark (2000), Darren Aronofsky calls his films *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for A Dream* (2000) as 'traumatic' and 'buzzingly difficult to watch'. Aronofsky states that "at certain points, the seductively beautiful film is so hard to watch that you want to shield your eyes and beg for release". Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify the ways in which the director constructs subjective space and time in order to accomplish to leave such an effect on spectators.

By using *Narcissus in Wonderland* as the subtitle of their book, Ulman, & Paul (2006) locate the mythical figure in the wonderland of Lewis J. Carroll's *Alice's Adventure in Wonderland*. Ulman, , & Paul underline the similarities between the words 'narcissism' and 'narcotic' as they both refer to a kind of 'deadening of sensation' or 'dulling of awareness' (2006, p. 8). Ulman , & Paul imply that "consciousness and self – awareness have been altered in the direction of self-absorption in the former and obliviousness in the latter" (ibid., 9). In the case of narcissism "an archaic form of self-love functions like a narcotic drug that induces a state of enraptured self – absorption"; whereas in the case of narcosis, a drug or other substance produces "a narcissistic state of bliss characterized by an ecstatic trance and euphoric obliviousness" (ibid., 10). In case of an addiction, such a narcissistic fantasy allows for the artificial alteration of the subjective reality of the sense of both one's self and one's personal world" (ibid.).

Each film creates its own wonderland for its spectators but the reason why I would like to use *Narcissus in Wonderland* here as a subtitle is two fold. Firstly, the director constructs a timeless time and a spaceless space, which puts spectators in a mood of being in a kind of wonderland similar to his characters in narcissistic illusion. The other reason is the ways in which the director posits his spectators in a similar way by

engaging them both cognitively and perceptually in order to leave a similar experience with the spectators. By constructing cinematic time and space as decentred and fragmented, with the help of several subjective parameters, Aronofsky takes spectators into the altered states of mind of his characters and their subjective experiences of heightened senses.

1.1. SCOPE AND FRAMEWORK

In addition to being heavily reliant on first person narration, both *Pi* (1998) and especially *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) include a subjective sequence which combines optical and aural subjectivity and character projection. Considering there is no past or future in the Wonderland, the director by "thickening the present" (Sobchack 1992, p.77) constructs a subjective temporality in which "the character's and the spectator's experiences coincide" (Branigan 1984, p.25). On the other hand, spatial parameters such as point of view shot, close-up, subjective camera, zoom – in etc. make the 'visual visible', in Sobchack's terms (1990, p.22). In order to convey an overall sense of embodiment, the director posits spectators as 'cinesthetic subjects' (Sobchack 1992, p.69). This consequently, for Maurice Merleau-Ponty, provides "a heightened sense of our embodied and intersubjective relation with the world" (1995, 58).

The role of sound, on the other hand, should not be neglected. As also discussed in chapter on sound, Doane stresses the sonorous envelope provided by soundtrack which sustains "the narcissistic pleasure derived from the image of a certain unity, cohesion and, thus an identity grounded by the spectator's fantasmatic relation to his / her own body" (1980, p. 45). The director's use of polyphonic montage either in combination with music (*Requiem for a Dream*) or with riddles (*Pi*) interchangeably do not leave any chance for spectators to escape from the rhythm which engages them cognitively and emotionally, and this I believe consequently leaves a kind of 'narcissistic pleasure' by building up 'a fantasmatic body' in Mary Ann Doane's terms.

Therefore, while, on the one hand, by building up fantasmatic bodies which arouses narcissistic pleasure, on the other hand the film by deviating spatial and temporal unification builds up its own fragmented wonderland. Furthermore, in order to leave

similar subjective experiences on spectators, the director builds up an audio - visual harmony by integrating the polyphonic montage, music and parametric narration.

1.2. Outline Of Chapters

This study is based on two seemingly opposing film theories: cognitivist narrative theory and a phenomenology of cinematic representation to discuss the subjectivities of film characters. However, the experiences of the character(s), having the role of narrator, coincide with the spectators' experiences temporally. Furthermore, considering Branigan's 'holistic theory of narrative' (1992, p. 156) which combines body and mind as whole, this study aims to use these two theories in collaborative manner. In that sense, after discussing subjectivity and relevant narration theories in the second chapter, in the third chapter in order to elaborate Branigan's 'holistic theory of narrative,' I will focus on phenomenology and film experience. Then, fourth chapter, expanding the role style to depict subjectivity in narration mentioned by Branigan, focuses on modes of narration and 'parametric narration' in specific. While the fifth chapter discussing subjective space, the sixth subjective time, the seventh chapter will focus on the role of sound in spatialization and temporalization of the image. To finalise, the last chapter analyzes the construction of time and space in building subjective experiences in spectators in the light of theories discussed.

2. SUBJECTIVITY

Branigan defines subjectivity as "the specific instance or level of narration where the telling is attributed to a character ..... and received by us as if we were in his / her situation" (1984, p. 73). Cinematic representations of subjectivity are very emphatic especially when the protagonist encounters something unusual or unexpected. Branigan states that subjective character narration is almost always articulated in terms of origin, vision, time, frame, object, and / or mind (ibid.).

Branigan states that subjectivity in the film depends on linking the framing of space at a given moment to a character as origin (ibid.). This link between the character and the frame may be direct or indirect. When the connection between a character and the frame is indirect, Branigan points out 'character projection' where space is linked with a character by other logical and metaphorical means (ibid.). In case it is direct, we are being presented with an optical point of view shot, so we can talk about 'optical subjectivity' (ibid., 64). In an optical point of view, both the character's and the spectator's experiences coincide temporally (ibid.). Branigan states that "reflection and projection occur in present time and depend on a metaphorical framing which links the character to a production of space, as opposed to a framing which is literally from the character's point in space as in point of view (POV) shot" (ibid., 123). In addition, Branigan identifies that "reflection reveals only the presence or normal awareness of the character (mirror shots, eyeline matches), whereas projection refers to a specific mental state of the character" (ibid.). After identifying the issues on subjectivity as narration, the second part of this chapter will focus on Edward Branigan's narrative theories on subjectivity.

2.1. SUBJECTIVITY AS NARRATION

Branigan insists on a dialectical relationship between text and spectator, in which the film "creates a set of subject positions for the viewer, just as the viewer is able to frame and reframe the film and create subject positions for the presumed "author" of the film (1984, p. 4). According to Branigan, "film achieves 'character filtration', or what Branigan calls 'the subjectivity in cinematic narration,' where telling is attributed to a

character in the narrative and received by us as if we were in the situation of a character" (ibid. 73).

Characters in fiction, other than functioning as an actor who defines or is defined by a causal chain, can also be considered as "a diegetic narrator, where the actor in a past event becomes the object of his / her narration in the present", in example (Branigan 1992, p. 101). Thus, character's role in a narrative may change from "being actual, or potential focus of a causal chain to being the source of knowledge of a causal chain" (ibid.). Branigan identifies three distinct types of narration: "a narrator offers statements about; an actor / agent acts on or is acted upon; and a focalizer has an experience of something" (ibid., 105). To be more precise, Branigan considers 'narration, action, and focalization' as three alternative modes of describing "how knowledge may be stated, or obtained" (ibid.).

2.1.1. Focalization

Branigan, in fact, adopts the term focalization from Gerárd Genette, who defines the term as "the various ways in which narrative is filtered through the sensibilities of characters in the novel" (ibid., 189). Genette (1980) distinguishes three types of restriction: 'zero-focalization / nonfocalization', meaning that "the narrator is unlimited spatially and unrestricted in psychological access to the characters"; 'internal focalization', "the narrator is limited spatially but has access to the mind of the focal character"; 'external focalization', though involves spatial limitation, the narrator has no psychological privilege and is limited to the role of witness" (pp 60-69). According to Branigan, while looking and listening has an intersubjective quality, and hence is appropriate in a communicative context; seeing and hearing is more closely related to a private (internally and externally focalized) experience or thought which is not open to inspection in the same way (ibid., 102). Therefore, Branigan considers focalization as "reflection which involves a character neither speaking (narrating, reporting, communicating) nor acting (focusing, focused by), but rather actually experiencing something through seeing and hearing it" (ibid., 101). Similar to Branigan, Murray Smith (1994), in his article "Altered States", has adopted the term into cinema studies; and for Smith, focalization involves.

> "two interlocking functions spatio-temporal attachment and subjective access... Attachment concerns the way in which the narration restricts itself to the actions of a single character, or moves more freely among the spatio-temporal paths of two or more characters. Subjective access pertains to the degree of access we have to the subjectivity of the characters, a function which may vary from character to character within a narrative" (p.83).

Branigan adds that focalization also extends to more complex experiencing of objects: thinking, remembering, interpreting, fearing, desiring etc. Branigan, furthermore, classifies "private experiences of a character, being rendered as 'external focalization' which represents a measure of character awareness from outside the character; and 'internal focalization', which ranges from simple perception to impressions (out of focus POV shot depicting a drunk or drugged character) or deeeper thoughts (e.g. dreams, hallucinations and memories)" (ibid., 103). In internal focalization, story world and screen are meant to collapse in each other (ibid., 102). Considering the relationship between the character with his/her own world, Branigan suggests below set of assumptions (ibid., 112):

1) Nonfocalized narration (Character as agent)
2) External focalization: Eyeline match
3) Internal focalization (surface): POV shot
4) Internal focalization (depth): "I remember.. wish.... fear... x"

Bruce Kawin (1978, p. 10), on the other hand, focuses on the ways of signifying subjectivity within the first person narrative field and identifies three different ways: voice-over (to present what a character says), subjective focus (imaginative angle of vision, subjective camera), and mind-screen (which presents what a character thinks). Kawin (ibid.), by introducing the concept 'mindscreen' (mind's eye), highlights a particular form of cinematic subjectivity. "Whereas subjective camera shows what a person sees, mindscreen shows what s/he thinks and feels: A mindscreen is a visual (and at times aural) field that presents itself as the product of a mind, that is often associated with systematic reflexivity, or self-consciousness" (ix). Kawin refers to the ability of camera to imitate consciousness by pinpointing that "film does not have a consciousness in a literal sense, but an image may be 'coded' in such a way that it appears to be seen or created by consciousness" (ibid., 12). For Kawin, the term 'mindscreen' attempts to articulate a sense of "image field as a limited whole, with a narrating intelligence offscreen, which selects what is seen and heard as a principle of narrative coherence" (ibid., 55). Kawin states that the film is its visual field, made

accessible to an audience through the technology of projection, where the narrator need not appear onscreen, but manifests himself in the narrative structure (ibid., 55). Similar to Branigan's assumption mentioned above, Kawin lists four different narrative voices as a part of which a mindscreen may appear as follows (pp. 18-19):

1. Third person narrative with no apparent narrator, except for the grand image – maker
2. Point of view narration in which the grand image – maker presents one person's experience, subjectivizing the world but not the narrative
3. First-person narrative where the first – person character presents her own view of herself and her world
4. Self-consciousness, which can appear as part of any of these voices and in which the film itself, or the fictitious narrator, is aware of the act of presentation

Kawin, furthermore, compares his subjective image classification system with Christian Metz's value judgments and underlines similarities in between as in Table 2.1:

Table 2.1: Kawin's subjective image classification system and Metz's value judgments

Bruce Kawin	Christian Metz	Example Film
Subjective camera (share my eyes)	"the truly subjective or analytical image"	*Lady in the Lake* (1947)
Point of view (share my experience, my emphases)	"the semi-subjective or associational image"	*The 400 Blows* (1959)
Mindscreen (share my mind's eye)	"the purely mental image", "the imaginary", and "the memory image"	*The Wizard of Oz* (1939)
Self-consciousness (share my reflexive perspective)		*Persona* (1966)

Source: Adapted from Kawin (1978, p.190)

Kawin, furthermore, considers sound, a highly expressive aspect of filmed world, as an indicative of subjectivity to present what a character hears. Kawin's assumption holds even in music where the sound's presentation is identified with the 'point of origin' (p.190), which will be discussed in detail in chapter on sonic space.

2.2. SUBJECTIVITY IN NARRATIVE THEORIES

Branigan refers to Julio Moreno in that "the film does not narrate, but rather it places the spectator directly without intermediaries in the presence of facts narrated" (1992, p.144). By equalising spectator's eye to camera's objective lens, Moreno finds cinema as too real to represent fictional subjectivity, as photography can capture only the external world not private experience (ibid., 114). In his criticism of Moreno, Branigan this time refers to Joseph Brinton (1947), who focuses on realistic utilization of a movie camera on "the psychological science of human perception rather than physical science of photography" (145). Brinton highlights some of the superiorities of the eye over the camera (greater mobility, efficiency, angle of view, resolution of depth, etc.) and argues that representing true subjectivity depends upon exploiting a spectator's shifts of attention and memory through a blend of subjective and objective techniques (ibid., pp.363-364). Brinton states that Robert Montgomery, in his film *Lady in the Lake* (1947), has based his camera work not on the human eye's apparent movement, but rather on the nature of perception itself by using three methods in order to enrich audience's range of cinematic experience (ibid.). First method is 'plastic suspense' which affords the subjective cameraman a special technique to accentuate the action, and 'plastic characterization' as a second method includes such devices as lighting for mood, music etc. (ibid., 364). According to Brinton, subjective camera adds a new dimension of value naturalistically projected. Brinton furthermore adds that "refinement of subjective camera imagery over a series of scenes should ultimately transform plastic characterization into a third kind of film experience that depicts not merely what a character thinks, but how he thinks, in terms of his physical individuality" (ibid., 365). Thus, for Brinton, the cinema will need to adjust all of its resources and techniques to the psychology of the spectator. Branigan, furthermore, discusses subjectivity by grouping and comparing several narrative theories in four main groups below, and applying them to explain the subjectivity of *Lady in the Lake* (1947). Branigan considers the film *Lady in the Lake* as a good example which focuses on POV shot for the film's narrative and how spectators relate generally to the experience of the medium of film where someone apparently has the power both to narrate and to share experiences with the spectator" (1992, p. 144).

2.2.1 Driven By Dreams And Instincts

First group of theory considers narrative as driven by dreams and instincts. Robert Eberwein builds his idea of narrative on the differences in material between film and literature, and states that a dream sequence in film requires a combination of subjective and objective shots "to maintain the integrity of art as opposed to life" (quoted by Branigan 1992, p.149). In explaining the failure of *Lady in the Lake* (1947), Stuart Marshall, on the other hand, focuses on psychic mechanisms such as scopophilia, fetishism, which refer back to original trauma of the recognition of sexual difference (ibid., 149). What Branigan notices as a problem with this "drive theory" is the difficulty to describe "the impact of an individual psyche of other forces, such as the social and political , or the impact of actual materials and style put forward by a textual object" (ibid., 152).

2.2.2. Narrative As A Manifestation Of Plots

In his second group, Branigan classifies "Narrative as a Manifestation of Plots", and refers to William Luhr who approaches *Lady in the Lake* (1947) by comparing the plot devices in the novel, screenplay and film. Branigan notes that similiar to Marshall, Luhr reaches a conclusion that the central character is actually Adrienne not Philip in the film (ibid., 153).

2.2.3. Narrative As A Manifestation Of History

In his third group 'Narrative as a Manifestation of History', Branigan (ibid.) quotes Dana Polan, who holds that "narrative is an imaginary solution to a problem posed ... by its social moment" and who pinpoints that *Lady in the Lake* (1947) is not "a triumph of a personalized vision but the mark of a loss of control ... The point of view (POV) shot in the film dramatizes a descent into paranoia, agression ..... to make conventional sense of the social issues of the 1940s" (pp. 154-155). Branigan, however, warns us about the danger that a narrative theory might imagine "history in its own image or attempt to explain it away by simply absorbing it" (ibid., 155). Similar to Eberwein, J.P. Telotte, finds dream at work in *Lady in the Lake* (1947) and argues that the pervasive POV shot functions to make Philip Marlowe 'lost' for much of the narrative and thus he becomes the object of the spectator's search for a social identity. For Telotte, the characters in

Lady in the Lake (1947) are "victims of their own mise-en-abyme", becoming "disconcertingly unfixed and unpredictable, much like the figures of dreams as they are caught up in a chain of actions: framing, framed, reframed, unframed, .and unhinged" (quoted by Branigan 1992, p. 155).

2.2.4. Holistic Theories Of Narrative

In his last group named 'Holistic Theories of Narrative', Branigan underlines the starting point for both Vivian Sobchack and Bruce Kawin in that the film possesses a body and a mind. Sobchack and Kawin, by abolishing separation, concentrate on a phenomenology of appearances that refuses to distinguish between subjective and objective, mind and material (ibid., p.156). Branigan quotes Sobchack's description *Lady in the Lake* (1947) in the following way:

> "Although the function of both Marlowe's body and the film's body is the same (i.e., to focus attention within a visible intentional horizon and express that perception as a viewed view), the bodily means by which that function is achieved are visibly different – and dependent upon the different material nature of the respective bodies... That is, the human lived – body does not attend to the world and realize its intentional projects of attention in the same visible manner as does the film's lived body ..... *Lady in the Lake* also problematizes another aspect of the failure of the film's body to disguise itself as human.... As the film's lived body emphasizes its perception as grounded in a human body, it becomes a slave to that body, afraid to leave it for fear it will lose its already tenuous hold on its disguise. Thus, *Lady in the Lake* becomes peculiarly claustrophobic to watch. Its perceptive and expressive behaviour is curtailed and constrained by bodily existence rather than enabled by it. Marlowe, and we as spectators, are literally grounded in bodily existence, and perceptually and expressively live the body through none of the other modalities of experience it should enable: dreaming, imagining images, projecting situations, temporarily assuming another's situation as a subject" (ibid., pp. 244-245).

Cognitive film theorist, Torben Grodal, similarly points to the importance of a holistic approach to the ways in which we experience moving images: The film experience is made up of many activities: our eyes and ears pick up and analyze image and sound, our minds apprehend the story, "which resonates in our memory; furthermore, our stomach, heart, and skin are activated in empathy with the story situations and the protagonists' ability to cope. Different fictions activate and foreground different aspects of the psychosomatic processes in our embodied minds" (p.11). Torben Grodal emphasizes the

holistic dimension of the film viewer's experience, claming that it is not possible to "isolate perception from cognition, memory, emotion, and action, and our perception of 'space' is not independent of our concepts of active emotion; our perception of object is not independent of memories and emotional relations." (1997, p.10). Although explicitly rejecting phenomenology's rigid separation of description and analysis, when concluding his study Grodal claims to have shown that "it is imperative to describe the relations between body, mind, and world as an interacting whole in order to understand the ways in which visual fictions cue a simulation of body-mind states." (ibid., p.278). Thus, the reason why I would like to consider holistic approach for my study is two fold. First, as being a focalized narration based on optical subjectivity, both character's and spectators experience coincide temporally. Second reason is that both *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) engage spectators not only cognitively and perceptually but also emotionally. Therefore, the fourth chapter will discuss phenomenology, film experience and subjectivity.

3. NARRATION

Representations of subjectivity usually involve an increased awareness of cinematic form and cinematic self-consciousness. Edward Branigan pinpoints the importance of form by also referring to David Bordwell who gives priority to style as controlling narration and the spectator's perception of plot and story (1985, p. 149). Related with his "parametric narration", Bordwell states that style becomes "palpable, working on us just as relentlessly as the projector" (ibid.). This chapter focuses on modes of narration and parametric narration, in specific, in which style is at the forefront to depict altered states of mind of characters in *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000).

3.1. MODES OF NARRATION

According to the schemata for understanding film narrative, Bordwell lays out, "the spectator seeks to construct an intelligent story, using cues from the film to guide in hypothesis making" (1985, p. 37). Bordwell's constructivist theory borrows two theoretical terms of narrative analysis, the fabula and the syuzhet. The fabula is "the story the viewer creates by picking up narrational cues, applying schemata, and framing and testing hypotheses" (ibid., 49). The syuzhet is "the plot, the way the film arranges and presents the fabula" (ibid, 50). In his article, "Principles of Film Narration", Bordwell pinpoints that "narration is the process whereby the film's syuzhet and style interact in the course of cueing and challenging the spectator's construction of fabula" (2005, 187).

Each mode of narration, identified by Bordwell, invites the spectator to build up a different strategy to get the overall meaning of the film. "Classical narration" asks the spectator to "construe the syuzhet and the stylistic system in a single way: construct a denotative, univocal, integral fabula" (1985, p. 205). The "art cinema" mode of narration charges the viewer with the task to "interpret this film, and interpret it so as to maximize ambiguity." (ibid., 212). The "historical materialist" mode of narration, exemplified by the Soviet cinema of twenties, asks the viewer to regard the syuzhet as a "rhetorical argument of conceptual simplicity accompanied by stylistic complexity." This is done by calling on "procedural schemata that urge: when in doubt, construct a fabula event as perceptually forceful and politically significant" (ibid., 243).

"Parametric narration" establishes a distinctive intrinsic norm, often involving an unusually limited range of stylistic options (ibid., 244). In his interview with Jakob Isak Nielsen, Bordwell identifies parametric narration as "a highly self-conscious and organized use of the decorative or ornamental function of style" (2005, p. 2).

3.1.1. Parametric Narration

In this mode of narration, film style creates patterns distinct from the demands of syuzhet system and treated as being at least equal in importance to syuzhet patterns (Narration 244). When artistic patterns compete for our attention with the narrative functions of devices, the result is parametric form, states Bordwell (1985, p. 244). In her book, *Breaking the Glass Armour*, Kristin Thompson (1988) also describes the same cinematic strategy as "artistic motivation" of devices as opposed to compositional, realistic, and transtextual motivation (p.180). Bordwell states that the crucial aspect of serialist doctrine is the possibility that large scale structure may be determined by fundemental stylistic choice (1985, p. 276). Thompson, moreover, identifies below three main ways in which parametric narration can be noticed (1988, pp. 248-249).

1) Order takes precedence over meaning.

Bordwell, by referring to E.H. Gombrich's concept of order that explains the viewing skills that allow us to grasp abstract elements even in narrative work (Thompson 1988, p. 248). Overwhelmed with sensory and informational details seemingly in lack of clearly discernible structures of ordering (i.e., redundancy; background), spectators are immediately led astray, left in the maze and vigilantly scanning the screen for some point of salience from which to build some kind of pattern, order, system of meaning and coherence (Bordwell 1985, p. 245).

2) Repetition of Stylistic Elements

Bordwell states that stylistic repetition encourages the viewer to stack scenes by technique in opposition to the horizontal unrolling of the action (1985, p. 289). The temporal thrust of the process of fabula construction is checked to some extent by the accumulation of 'paradigmatic' materials. (ibid., 316-317). Thompson states that parametric films tend to be either "unconventionally dense or unconventionally sparse" (1988, p. 249). Whereas in the sparse approach encourages us to look and listen

intensely for the few devices presented, the dense approach "often gives the spectator frequent signals as to what to notice, or they alternate between moments that are artistically and narratively motivated", emphasizes Thompson (ibid). Bordwell, by borrowing the term parameter from Noél Burch's *Theory of Film Practice* (1973), links parametric narration to total serialism in music (ibid., p.248). Thompson also quotes Bordwell in that

> Style must create its own temporal logic. But it is unrealistic to expect parametric form to exhibit detailed intricacies. As in serial music, the more convoluted and less redundant such form is, the more imperceptible it is likely to be. Consequently the parameters cannot all be varied at once. Several must be held constant if repetition and variation are to be apparent (1988, p. 249)

Thompson also adds that stylistic variation will tend to be additive and will not necessarily come to "a neat resolution of a pattern in the way that syhuzet might achieve closure" (ibid., 250).

3) Form can lure spectators into perceiving style

Thompson underlines the fact that if we co-operate the stylistic patterns as well as the narrative, our perception of the film as a whole can only be more complete, and more intense(ibid. 251).

3.1.2. Strategies For Parametric Narration

In parametric film, stylistic events can be noticed, their relation to the syuzhet can be hypothesized, aspects of their patterning can be noted and recalled (ibid., 284). In order for style to come forward across the whole film, it must possess internal coherence which depends on establishing a distinctive, often unique intrinsic stylistic norm (ibid., 285). Bordwell offers two strategies: "Ascetic or sparse option, in which the film limits its norm to a narrower range of procedures than are codified in other extrinsic norms; and 'replete' intrinsic norm which creates an inventory or a range of paradigmatic options"(ibid.). Whereas the ascetic option presents "a material similarity of procedures across differentiated syuzhet passages"; the replete option "creates parallels among distinct portions of the syuzhet and varies the material procedures used to present them" (ibid.).

A good strategy to cope with parametric narration is to pay attention to recurring motifs, objects or patterns, as if such occurrences and connections would display in some way a meaningful order. According to Bordwell, such a perceptual strategy provides us "with a sense of micro-compositional structure, a structure of a very different kind than what we usually find in narratives with a more evident macro-compositional structure (where the plot or storyline is typically the main structuring principle)" (ibid., 286). Writing about parametric narration, David Bordwell (1985) and Kristin Thompson (1988) describe parallel perceptual and cognitive phenomena in film. Parametric narration is characterized by foregrounding certain devices such as colors, camera movements, sonic motifs. In other words, "spatial distribution of elements from the paradigm is foregrounded at the expense of the hierarchical (temporal/linear) ordering of these elements to a syntagmatic structure, such as a narrative or storyline" (Bordwell 1985, 285). Such films, says Bordwell, have the chief effect of fragmenting the process of viewing into "a series of moments" (ibid., 286). When we cannot confidently project a schema to explain all that syuzhet and style display, we are forced to *choose strategies on a very atomic level* (original emphasis) (Thompson 1988, p. 320). Bordwell states that "this is exactly when spectators are faced with blurring of the figure-ground dynamics by continual foregrounding, where focus of attention is oriented towards recognition of details, objects, recurring images" (ibid.).

3.2. THE RHYTHM AS THE OVERALL STRUCTURE: POLYPHONIC MONTAGE

In his interview with Nielsen (2005), Bordwell highlights that in parametric narration, there is an actual audio – visual harmony in terms of rhythms of the camera movements and the rhythm of the music and the timing of the cuts (2). Thus, all the audio-visual qualities inherent in the images and sound, are joined and interconnected. In order to illustrate, Bordwell, refers to the film *Magnolia* (1999), as an example, in which Bordwell finds decorative dimension related with camera movements which are repeated symmetrically, because they are tied to music (Nielsen p.2). There are several scholars who highlight similar relationship in filmic images and musical tones. In *Photoplay*, Hugo Münstenberg (1970) argued that in moving pictures

> "…the freedom with which the pictures replace one another is to a large degree comparable to the sparkling and streaming of the musical tones. The yielding to the play of the mental energies, to the attention and emotion

> which is felt in the film pictures, is still more complete in the musical melodies and harmonies in which the tones themselves are merely the expressions of the ideas and feelings and impulses of the mind" (pp. 185-186)

The Russian director Eisenstein similarly emphasized the similarity in the structure of film and music by giving four of five types of montage musical names as metric, rhythmic, tonal, overtonal or polyphonic (Royal S. Brown 2008). In his work, *The Cinema of Eisenstein,* Bordwell quotes Eisenstein, who insists that film is phenomenological – an "aesthetic growth from cinematographic eye to the image of an embodied viewpoint on phenomena" (1993, p. 232). Bordwell states that "this embodied viewpoint is not smooth, transparent or mimetic; 'dynamism' emerges out of mechanically reproduced 'tension', a 'rhythm' produced through 'the collusion of independent shots' (ibid., 233). In order to achieve this physiological effect Eisenstein devised a system of what he called overtonal (polyphonic) montage, drawing an analogy from music, that would "take into account all the audio-visual lines, stimulants, vibrations, and secondary resonances that made up the shot" (ibid., 119). In polyphonic montage, shots are not mechanically joined along a dominant line, but sensitively orchestrated so that the perceiver can receive a multitude of organised stimuli. This would enable perception to be enhanced from: "a melodically emotional colouring to a direct physiological sensation" (ibid., 120). Bordwell states that Eisenstein's augmented montage takes into account the complex interwoven collection of secondary "stimulants" or "resonances" that make up the sum total of the effect of the audio-visual elements (ibid., 112). According to Eisenstein, the montage of music and image should be based on the "sense" of the sound. Thus, "the assembly of the moving image and the sound segments is done according to the feeling and rhythm of the music rather than the metric rule" (ibid., 170). This results into the fact that the spectator will not simply hear the sound and see the image, rather they will 'feel' them both in the process of expression and perception (ibid., 115).

Annabel J. Cohen, in the same way, refers to Bordwell (1985) and Thompson (1988*)* underlining the similarity between cognition of film and music. Cohen states that the terms used by Bordwell and Thompson's study, *Film Art: An Introduction*, such as 'motif' to describe "any significant repeating element in a film", "exposition*,* development, segmentation and parallelism" are all borrowed from musical terminology

(2008, p. 219). In her paper, Cohen focuses on similarities in cognitive processes that music and film each evokes with respect to three kinds of musical structure: "central reference (tonality), large scale form (rondo), and small scale form (motif)" (ibid. 220). First of all, tonality in music is functional in that sequences of tones are memorable, according to psychological research. Cohen argues that if a similar property were found in film, information in the film itself might be more easily followed and remembered (ibid. 221). According to Cohen, similar to tonal music, where a central reference facilitates the memory of the entire piece and enables the listener to keep track of sequential information, the presence of a central reference may allow a film audience to absorb and retain information sequentially presented over an approximate two hour period (ibid. 223).

Similarly, Pia Tikka, by referring to Eisenstein's own work, states that Eisenstein developed an exhaustive film montage theory, where 'orchestral composition' of the perceptual elements leads the spectator to the "intellectual level of experience and further to the conscious ecstasy of organic – dynamic holism" (Eisenstein, quoted by Tikka 2006, p. 141). Tikka adds that "the structural formation of Eisenstein's montage theory, vertical levels composed on horizontal dynamics of simultaneously flowing independent, but interrelated auditory and visual modalities, resembles the multilevel structures of mind" (p. 141). By drawing parallelism between Eisenstein montage theory and cinematic experience and consciousness, Tikka, furthermore, summarizes Eisentein's argument on cinematic experience and consciousness as follows:

> "The internal relations and properties of cinematic elements, which are chosen to appear or happen to emerge in the moment of image recording, are the constitutive mechanisms of cinematic experience. Eisentein's belief in cinema's power over the human mind links his work to the cinematic consciousness.. [of which] purpose is to scrutinize the recursive loops of cognition and perception as the basic structure of conscious enactment in authoring and sharing cinematic space." (p. 141)

4. PHENOMENOLOGY and FILM EXPERIENCE

In his work, "The Film and the New Psychology", Merleau-Ponty (1964a) links his philosophy of perception to a Gestalt psychology, and considers film not as a sum of total images but as "a temporal gestalt" (p. 54). Merleau-Ponty suggests that we can apply the perception of human body in general to the perception of film if we consider the film as a perceptual object. Jow-jiun Gong (2005) states that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's own phenomenological descriptions of cinema experience revealed a more integral perspective of phenomenology of cinema and outlined "a Gestalt of cinematic situatedness structured by image temporality, sound rhythm, and signification of the component parts as a whole" (p. 48). Vivian Sobchack, refers to Merleau – Ponty, who draws parallels between modes of consciousness and technical methods in relation to the cinema, and accordingly considers cinematic apparatus as an 'intentional technology'(1992, 165). Thus, when we go to the movie, cinema has necessarily detached us from our positional situatedness and the horizon of the world. Jow-jiun considers the experience of media images as "second intentionality" or second perception instead of direct perception in natural phenomenal field (p. 47). Film, for Merleau-Ponty (1962), provides "a heightened sense of our embodied and intersubjective relation with the world" (p. 58). The film takes on meaning within an embodied, and intersubjective situation, accomplishing a perception, which reproduces our way of being in everyday life (ibid., 59). Thus, the first part of this chapter will discuss the role of the film as a 'second intentionality' to embody spectators. In the second part, I will consider the relationship between deviated perception, subjectivity and embodiment.

4.1. FILM EXPERIENCE AS SECOND INTENTIONALITY

According to Jane Stadler (2002), the most significant contribution of phenomenology to film theory is the emphasis placed on the role of the perceptual engagement of physical body, rather than on the conscious or subconscious mind, or the socio-political body (p. 240). Vivian Sobchack takes Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and develops her theory of film experience. Sobchack states that for Merleau-Ponty, "the lived body is not merely an object, but also a subject in the world; as being both agent and agency of an engagement with the world that is lived in its subjective

modality as perception and in its objective modality as expression, both modes constituting the unity of meaningful experience" (1992, p. 40). Following Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack declares: "The senses are different openings to the world that cooperate as a unified system of access. The lived body does not have senses. It is rather sensible. It is from the first a perceptive body" (1992, p. 77). Sobchack underlines that we should consider human body as a "holistically sensible body in which each sense modality form cooperative and commutative system that structure existential perception" (ibid., 77).

Sobchack, accordingly describes the film experience as a system of communication based on bodily perception as a vehicle of conscious expression, which "entails the visible, audible, kinetic aspects of sensible experience to make sense visibly, audibly, and haptically." (1992, p. 9) Sobchack relies upon Merleau-Ponty's theory of lived, contextualized experience to define embodiment as "a radically material condition of human being that necessarily entails both the body and consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, in an irreducible ensemble." (p. 83) Considering the relationship between spectator and film in the film experience, Sobchack highlights a 'dialogical' rather than a 'monologic' one, and "dialectical engagement of two viewing subjects who also exist as visible objects" (p. 23). Sobchack concludes that both film and spectator are capable of viewing and of being viewed, both are embodied in the world as the 'subject of vision' and 'object of vision' (ibid.). Sobchack names this act of viewing as the 'address of the eye', which implicates both embodied, situated existence and a material world in which "the viewing subject must be a body and be materially in the world, sharing a similar manner and matter of existence with other viewing subjects, but living this existence discretely and autonomously, as the singular embodied situation that makes this existence also a unique matter that matters uniquely" (ibid.). Thus, "the address of the eye", Sobchack writes, forces us to consider "the embodied nature of vision, the body's radical contribution to the constitution of film experience" (ibid. 25).

4.1.1. Perception As Gestalt

Merleau-Ponty highlights that "before perception can be predicated (that is intended as an object of consciousness), it must itself provide the horizon and grounds that make predication possible" (1962, pp. 36-37). Sobchack furthermore emphasizes that

perception "predicates itself as an always reversible figure – ground correlation and makes itself, existence, consciousness, and the body – subject stand not only as the grounds of intentional activity but also as figures available to consciousness as intentional objects" (ibid., 69). Sobchack moreover stresses that "correlating consciousness and the world through the agency and action of the lived-body, perception is a living and organizing organization of the world, a textualizing of the sensing body in its contact with a sensible world" (ibid., 70). Sobchack concludes that "perception is always already the expression of intentionality in the world, and always already a judgment, an interpretation" (ibid.).

Sobchack refers to Husserl who emphasized the fullness of consciousness as it is experienced and nominated through the key phenomenological concept: 'intentionality' which designates "the nature of consciousness as a stream between two poles: subject and object, as a vector that effects an organized synthesis." (ibid., 34) Sobchack, in order to explain Husserl's concept of intentionality, states that "the phenomena of our experience, 'the noema' (intentional objects of consciousness) are always correlated with the mode of our experience 'the noesis' (intentional acts of consciousness" (ibid.). Stadler, on the other hand, emphasizes that the inseparability of "perception from the perceiver, of object from subject, or the intentional act (noesis) and the act's content (noema)" are crucial for phenomenological concept of film experience (ibid., p.238).

Sobchack states that vision has an intentional structure that is "irreducible in its correlation of a seeing act and a seen object" (1992, p. 129). This correlation is as irreducible in cinematic vision as it is in the film spectator's vision (ibid.). In her article, *The Active Eye: A Phenomenology of Cinematic Vision*, Sobchack, considers vision as "a dynamic system of commutation that is lived as the inherent reversibility of perception and expression of the visual and the visible" (1990, p. 21). Sobchack moreover identifies vision as "already a visual 'viewing view', producing visible moving images, which is a constitutive activity" (ibid.). In addition to being intentional in structure, Sobchack emphasizes that, the act of viewing is also existential. Sobchack adds that

> "Embodied vision is not only an intentional correlation of the seeing and the seen, the viewing view and the viewed view. Made in the context of existence, the act of viewing is also an act of choice that marks off the visible from the invisible as it finitely inscribes its field of intention and

> attention and gives it systemic value. Although existential vision maintains a structural reversibility of direction (what is seeing can be seen, what is invisible can become visible, what is an intentional act can be transposed to an intentional object), the act of viewing always diacritically chooses a direction and chooses its figures – thereby ascribing value to its objects." (*1992,* p. 130)

Therefore, Sobchack affirms that "the act of seeing not only echoes the irreducible but reversible structure of intentionality, but also the gestalt structure of perception as the organized and organizing relations of figure / ground" (ibid., 87). For Sobchack, in the event of viewing there is a simultaneous embodiment and enworldment of both the film and the viewer. Sobchack suggests that

> "the cinematic experience happens when the attitude of our consciousness towards the cinematic object simultaneously positions us as existential subjects in relation to the screen and posits the existential status of what we see there in relation to what we have experienced and know of the life – world we inhabit" (1999, p. 243)

Similarly, Sobchack quotes Merleau-Ponty in that "the movies are peculiarly suited to make manifest the union of mind and body, mind and world, and expression of one in the other" (ibid., p.218). Sobchack, furthermore adds that it is "an intentional and visual bodily presence (not an objectively present and intended visible body) that becomes inscribed in and as "the viewing view / viewed view, the perceiving → perceived relation visible as the film" (ibid.). Sobchack refers to the film as a viewing subject, one engaged in perceiving the world through the meaningful, intent gaze of the camera (Stadler 2002, p. 244).

The film expresses a human-like mode of perceptual consciousness: the camera and the microphones articulate a technologically inflected version of what a human body in that situation might experience (ibid., p. 240). Both camera and projector respectively function as mechanisms, as they are humanly incorporated, enable the 'reversibility of perception and expression' at an 'intrasubjective level'. This expression will later become intersubjectively visible through projection (Sobchack 1992, p. 193). Sobchack also adds that through the instrumentality of camera and projector brought together in their perceptive and expressive functions and reversible operation, "there arises a 'partial opacity' between the filmmaker's perception of the world through the camera and spectator's perceptions through the projector" (ibid.). However, Sobchack points

out a ‘partial transparency’ that “enables both filmmaker and spectator –through instruments- to perceive, express, and communicatively share a common world”. (ibid., 194).

4.1.2. Perception As Synaesthetic And Synoptic

Rather than considering perception as a sum of discrete senses being experienced as fragmented, Sobchack underlines that all our senses are modalities of perception and, are co-operative and commutable. Because our senses all figure on the finite and situated field that is our body, such cooperation and commutation of our senses occurs in existence (ibid., 76). Sobchack considers senses as different openings to the world that cooperate as a unified system of access and defines ‘synaesthesia’ as “the cooperative modalities and commutative system of the bodily senses that structure existential perception” (ibid., 77). In other words, it is a kind of “involuntary experience in which the stimulation of one sense causes a perception in another” (Sobchack 2000, p. 10).

According to Sobchack, perception is also ‘synoptic’; it is lived as “the entirety and entity that is the lived body as access to the world and to conscious experience” (1992, p. 82). There is a sense of orientation and a sense of centre (p. 83). In addition, the perceptual film experience, as Sobchack notes, contains its expressive purpose including “the representation of the direct experience of the filmmaker and presentation of the reflective experience of the film” (ibid.). It is worth to quote Sobchack at length here:

> “Unified spatially and temporally by its intensions toward the world and by its sensed as well as sensible encounter with that world’s material substantiality, perception co-heres as the Here where intentions emerge as existential action and where the world touches the lived body and begins to have substance. That Here will be eventually constituted as the “self” to consciousness – as the reflective and reflexive body-subject, the “I” who perceives its own being.” (ibid., p. 84)

Sobchack proposes that we can speak of the ‘cinesthetic subject’ of cinema, a neologism she forms from ‘synaesthesia’, ‘the exchange and translation between and among the senses’ and ‘coenaesthesia’ which refers to ‘the way in which equally available senses become variously heightened and diminished’ to convey an overall sense of

embodiment (p. 69). Cinesthetic subject, as Sobchack states, "both touches and is touched by the screen … experience the movie as both here and there rather than clearly locating the site of that cinematic experience as 'on screen' or 'off screen'" (2000, p. 12). Sobchack argues that spectatorship works by rebounding off the sensual experience represented on screen and returning to the spectator's own body such that, in experiencing what takes place on screen, "I touch myself touching, smell myself smelling, taste myself tasting, and, in sum, sense my own sensuality' thanks to the reversibility of subjective object and objective subject described by Merleau-Ponty as the shared flesh of the material world" (1964b, pp. 76-77).

4.1.3. Reflective Meaning

As Vivian Sobchack so eloquently describes filmic experience,

> "more than any other medium of human communication, the moving picture makes itself sensuously and sensibly manifest as the expression of experience by experience. A film is an act of seeing that makes itself seen, an act of hearing that makes itself heard, an act of physical and reflective movement that makes itself reflexively felt and understood." (1999, p. 37)

Sobchack understands film "perception turned literally inside out and towards us as expression" (1992, p. 12). Thus, the way Sobchack understands the film enables us to see from another's perspective. Sobchack, moreover, states that by locating the intentional structure of consciousness in existence and situated – lived body, Mearlau – Ponty dynamizes the static structure of intentionality in existential action, and furthermore adds that

> "The existential dynamization of intentionality through the lived-body also manifests the essentially correlational nature of consciousness as invariantly directed. That is, finite and situated as the lived body, intentionality is manifest in the always diacritical value we live through perception and expression as the experience of consciousness and the consciousness of experience – in other words – as prereflective and reflective meaning." (1992, 65)

4.2. SUBJECTIVITY, FILM EXPERIENCE AND FALSE BODY

Related with classical narrative, Sobchack suggests that the aim is "to cover film's perceptual tracks, to disguise the extra diegetic' situation of narrative's narrator, and so to transform an intentional and discursive activity (the viewing view) into the intended

and produced object that is historie (the viewed view)" (ibid., 227). This is done partly by means of classical conventions of film editing, conventions such as shot-reverse-shot where narrator's position in the text is disguised. The film does not generally refer to its material and bodily existence and Sobchack also adds that the system of suture also suppresses interrogation of the film's body (ibid., 229). However, for the cases when the disguise is made explicit within the film's enabling and visible perception, Sobchack underlines a major hermeneutic problem. Such instances, says Sobchack, demonstrate "the difficulty of sustaining the disguise as congruent with the introceptive activity of perception and expression, and the difficulty of inscribing an autobiography of visual experience through the instrumentality of a false body"(ibid.). Sobchack emphasizes that the disguise is forth as such:

> ".. the enabling narrator enunciating the perceptual subjectivity of the various enabled and narrated characters. The 'false body' in these instances is not so much false as it is borrowed, for the film does not claim it as its own body. Rather the film offers it to visibility as the character's my body, a body which the film has the omniscient access to any narrator has to the characters whom s/he enables, constructs, and controls through the activity of narrating." (ibid.)

To exemplify, Sobchack, refers to the film *Lady in the Lake* (1946), directed by Robert Montgomery, in which a character in the narrative, Philip Marlowe, is credited with "the perceptive and expressive activity that radically originates in the film's body and claims the perceptual power of constituting the narrative as the film's autobiography inscribed through a human body" (ibid., p. 230). Related with the strange discomfort, alienation, and disbelief experienced by the film's spectator, Sobchack comments that "the film's visual subjectivity is offered to visibility as supposedly identical to the character's visual subjectivity, accomplished by the human eye" (ibid.).

4.2.1. Visual Visible Movements

In fact, with her later article, *The Active Eye: A Phenomenology of Cinematic Vision,* Sobchack elaborates her concept of false body by identifying 'visual visible movements' which constitute intersubjective ground (1990). Sobchack emphasizes that the inscription of vision as movement is always "embodied, dynamic, and intentional action articulated in existence as diacritically meaningful" (ibid., 21). For Sobchack, the cinema's viewing view seems immobile and is experienced by the spectator as

"visual rather than visible mode of movement" (ibid.). Sobchack adds that "viewing view's significance as an existential and intentional visual activity is only as meaningful to other as it is perceived within the other's experiential knowledge of the possibility of being transformed from visual to visible movement" (ibid.). Sobchack identifies four basic forms of visual visible movements which constitute "the intersubjective ground upon which seeing body – subjects are mutually and visibly intelligible to each other as both intentional and material beings, as both subjects and objects of vision in a shared and social world" (ibid., 22).

1. Zero Degree Vision: The first and most primary, and least obvious form of visible movement which commutes the visual perception of the camera into visible expression through the agency of the projector.
2. Zoom – Optical Movement: What is visibly inscribed in this form is the movement of the films attention, not its material body.
3. Movement Animate or Inanimate Objects
4. Actual Subject Movement: Movement of the camera which functions as bodily agency through which film's intentionality can be seen and its actional projects accomplished.

Cinematic techniques such as a focus, point-of-view shots, close-ups, zoom-ins etc. are some of the examples which depict the relationship between film's intentionality and our bodily agency. As also stated by Sobchack, there is no such abstraction as point of view in the cinema; rather, "there is a specific and mobile engagement of embodied and enworlded subjects / objects whose visual / visible activity prospects and articulates a shifting field of vision from a world that always exceeds it" (1992, p. 62). Sobchack, stating that these four forms of visual and visible cinematic movement are systematic and relational, furthermore elaborates her classification in four main groups as follows: (1990, pp. 23-33).

4.2.1.1. *The movement of introception and projection*

Sobchack states that, in experience, the heartbeat, the blink, and shutter do not interrupt movement, nor do they "dissemble or disassemble movement"; rather they are 'consititutive' part of what movement is and what it means (ibid., p. 23). These

incremental photographic moments achive real movement as they are "introceptively perceived" through the visual camera in a commutative process through the projector (ibid.). Sobchack emphasizes that these are never experienced as 'moments', they inscribe a very real and 'intentionally directed momentum' (ibid., 24). Sobchack identifies these dynamic movements, in which the intrasubjective viewing view constitutes itself simultaneously as intersubjective moving image, as zero degree against the other visual /visible movement. A very good example for this, I believe, would be Chris Marker's *La Jetée* (1962) composed of still photographs rather than live action.

4.2.1.2. *The essential motility of viewing view*

The most quite and invisible mode of visual movement is an 'arresting gaze' and never an 'arrested gaze' – even in its manifestation as the freeze frame (ibid, p. 24). Sobchack argues that the latter represents "the static transcendence of photographic vision through the existential motility of a cinematic vision which is always presenting the representational" (ibid., p. 23). In other words, freeze frame as a choice of representation, "an immobile and objectified product of vision divorced from the agency and activity", Sobchack explains (ibid.).

4.2.1.3. *Optical movement: transformations of attention*

Sobchack suggests that rather than the close-up, visible optical movement such as the zoom and shifting or rack focus function as visible performance of attention (ibid., 28). Optical movement, for Sobchack, makes us visibly aware of the intentionality consciousness of cinema's viewing view. To exemplify, Sobchack states that while using zoom-in on a object, the film's viewing view is compelled by the object; in the forward track the film's material body and its viewing view literally move toward the object (ibid., 25). According to Sobchack, while the former is "an intrasubjective visual gesture, experienced only introceptively impressive", the latter is also "intersubjectively available as visible gesture, as expressive" (ibid.). She adds that the "zoom in" intensifies the object, making it more vivid than it was before, centring it – first immediately in film's consciousness, and second, mediately, in ours as spectators (ibid.). Conversely, "zooming out" releases the object from its implication in the viewing subject attention, and the object shrinks in its relation to the subject (ibid.).

The zooming gaze, by locating itself in its object, and literally transcends the space between "the film's situation as an embodied viewing subject and the situation of the viewed object" (ibid., 25). Thus, the grounded relationship between the viewing subject and object does not change with the visible movement. Sobchack concludes that the visible relations between "the viewed object and its background are relatively *flattened* as a function of attention which collapses and transcends the bodily meaning of distance" (my emphasis) (ibid., 26). Sobchack, furthermore, pinpoints the importance in that 'double nature of lived body movement' as 'the viewing view/moving image' simultaneously enacts and distinguishes "the movement of attention from body movement (clearly contrived to make the film's body isomorphic with the human characters)". To illustrate, Sobchack discusses Alfred Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958) in which Sobchack believes that the director constitutes vertigo as the dizziness which "emerges when the attention of consciousness and the intention of the body are at odds with each other. Sobchack refers to Münstenberg (1970), who states that, "the experience of movement is here evidently produced by the spectator's mind" (p. 56). Sobchack concludes that it is not the object which swells or shrinks, but the intensity and importance of its relationship with the viewing subject (ibid., p. 27).

Sobchack, furthermore, underlines the importance of attention as a lived – body movement, by referring to Merleau-Ponty, who puts it as "consciousness in the act of learning" (ibid.). For Sobchack, attention is a creative act, an alteration of the subject's relation with the world (ibid.). Sobchack concludes that optical movement in the cinema makes visible this creative and transformational activity of consciousness, this act of learning. So, we can consider optical movements as attempts to raise spectators' awareness by 'building up new figure / ground relations' and "overthrowing the viewing subject's previous perception and expression" (ibid.) There are two crucial points Sobchack stresses in relation to optical movement of the film's attention: first, the lived body tethers "the motility of attention to its incarnate intentionality"; and second, even as the movement of attention is creative or constitutes a new way of consciousness, "it creates new objects for consciousness" (ibid., p.28).

4.2.1.4. *Movement of intentional objects and intentional subjects*

As it is also in human quotidian experience, this is the most obvious and clearly visible movement, Sobchack describes. First motion pictures, says Sobchack, foregrounded what is "noematic movement – the movement of intentional object of vision – functioned only as the unmarked introceptive and projective ground against which the visible image of noematic movement was constituted and seen" (ibid., 29). Sobchack also refers to Bruce Jenkins, who states that "the character in the film becomes the percipient's surrogate in the world. It is by reference to and identification with the actors's bodily motion in its displacement of space, his dynamic involvement with the environment, that the space within the film image becomes articulated" (ibid., 30).

In conclusion, Sobchack identifies visual visible movements in cinema by considering a phenomenological inquiry based on human's natural attitude or direction and movement of consciousness towards intentional objects. It is worth to quote Sobchack at length here, to sum up.

> "The viewing subject (both film and spectator) "understands" movement through the intentional activity of its own "viewing view" and bodily movement – and then through a conventionalization and sedimentation of this "natural attitude" objectifies it. Nonetheless, object movement is lived as cooperatively constituted in the intentional engagement of the viewing subject with the world and others. Even prior to its own visible bodily movement, the film is active in the determination of the visible movement of both objects and, to a lesser degree, intending others" (ibid., 34).

5. SUBJECTIVE SPACE

William F. Edmiston, takes our attention to the importance of subjective space in direct relation to focalization and the first-person narrator. While the narrator can place the focus in his experiencing self in internal focalization, in external focalization, the narrator can view events and characters from his present vantage point as an observer in his here and now (1989, p.738). Spatially, in both forms, the subject's vision is limited to proximal objects found in his / her immediate environment (ibid., p.739). Considering proximity as an important factor in identifying our attitudes towards the object perceived, this chapter, after discussing the role of proximity and relevant subjective parameters, such as close-up and point of view (POV) shot, which violate personal space, will also focus on another group of parameters which flatten the space and their effects on spectators.

5.1. VIOLATION OF SUBJECTIVE SPACE

John R. Aiello (1987) quotes Edward Hall who proposes a proxemic classification of distances based on social situations, categorizing space relative to the human participants into four zones – the intimate, the personal, the social, and the public. Hall regards our perception of space as 'dynamic' in that it is concerned with actions which we can think of as occurring in 'a series of expanding and contracting fields' (quoted by Aiello 1987, p. 115). Here, it is important to underline Edward Hall's definition of 'intimate zone', "a region of space that defines not only intimate relations between people but also threatening invasions of that space that are interpreted as potential threats to one's body (ibid., 104). Thus, such close proximity can be positive, or negative, since we can feel threatened by unsolicited or unexpected proximity (ibid., 105). The voice is normally held at a very low level or even at a whisper and vision is a bit distorted (ibid., 106). The second zone – the personal – operates within arm's length, at the limit of possible physical contact (ibid., 108). The voice level is moderate, vision is no longer distorted. The social zone, which covers a distance from about four to twelve feet, is more impersonal – the zone of office and business transactions, casual socializing, and domestic contexts where one can engage with, or disengage from,

others at will (ibid., 110). The public zone, which conveys a certain detachment from involvement, covers distances from twelve to about twenty-five feet (between 3,5 -7,5 meters); over this distance our ability to resolve visual detail (facial expression) dissolves, we need to raise our voices to communicate across this space, and we can decide or not to approach, or to take evasive action should anything untoward occur (quoted by Aiello 1987, p. 116). Per Persson, considering Edward Hall's categorization, emphasizes that each of these zones provides a different level of sensory information with the intimate distance involving almost all senses (2008, p. 2).

Torben Grodal, on the other hand, highlights the source of objects perceived. Grodal emphasizes that the source of the seen or heard can either be "an exterior hypothetical or real world, or an interior mental world, or an ambiguous one" (1997, p. 158). In case it belongs to the 'exterior world', it cues the mental stimulation of 'an enactive world'; whereas if the perceived is constructed as belonging to 'the mental world', it cues 'a purely perceptual – cognitive, proximal experience' (ibid.). Related with the agents of fiction, Grodal, states that the viewer may perceive the agents with the same emotional distance that typifies his relation to inanimate objects, but he may also make a cognitive and emphatic identification with them (ibid., 158).

5.1.1. Close Up

In his *Phenomenology of Perception,* Merleau-Ponty (1962) states that "when, in a film, the camera is trained on an object and moves nearer to it give a close-up view, we can remember that we are being shown the ashtray or an actor's hand, we do not actually identify it. This is because the screen has no horizons" (p. 68). Merleau-Ponty did show his concerns of cinema by way of revealing a natural visual focal perception with horizon and depth for comparison with a close-up shot of cinematic image perception without horizon and depth. The close-up in general is "disengaged from the mise-en-scene, freighted with an inherent separability or isolation, a 'for-itself' that inevitably escapes, to some degree, the tactics of continuity editing that strive to make it 'whole' again" (Doane 2003, p. 93). Of all the different types of shots, it is the close-up that is most fully associated with the screen as surface, with the annihilation of a sense of depth and its corresponding rules of perspectival realism (ibid., p. 94). Doane states that "the image becomes, once more, an image rather than a threshold onto a world, or

rather, the world is reduced to this face, this object" (ibid.). To illustrate, Dreyer's *The Passion of Joan of Arc* (1928) is a well-known example with a chain of close-ups that seem to constitute the very revelation of the soul.

Béla Balázs, in his article "The Close up and the Face of Man", states that a good film with its close-ups reveals the most hidden parts in our polyphonous life, and teaches us to see the intricate visual details of life as one reads an orchestral score (2003, p.118). The close-up seems to produce a more direct effect of spatial or optical intimacy and greater involvement (Branigan 1992, 6). Paul Messaris (1994) furthermore states that close-up forms operate as an intensifier of content for most viewers (p. 91). In his article, Persson, on the other hand, takes our attention to a socio-psychological research on 'personal space' and its functions as having a protective boundary outside the body of the organism. Persson argues that a functional explanation of close-ups will have to take into account a certain spectatorial behavioural pattern, known in social psychology as 'personal space behaviour' (2008, p. 3). The most obvious function of close – up is directing spectators' attention by using variable framing in film. Noël Carroll proposes three different ways of directing the movie spectators' attention through camera positioning: 'indexing' (the motion toward the object functions ostensive like the gesture of pointing), 'bracketing' (what is inside the frame or bracket is important or vice versa) and 'scaling' (capacity to change the scale of objects through camera positioning can be exploited for expressive or magical effects) (85). Related with second function, Persson quotes Dubois in that "threatening to transgress its frame to burst the screen in order to invade the space of the spectator" (3). Early cinema productions can be a good example for the threatening and shocking effect of close-up as a second function. Tom Gunning, in his essay, describes how early cinema functioned to engage the spectator without recourse to storytelling. The tendency of the cinema of attractions was to prioritize visual pleasure at the expense of diegetic, the spectacular at the expense of familiar routines and conventional performances, exhibitionism in place of intimacy (1989, p.118).

As a third function, effects related with intimacy are associated with facial and bodily close-ups, as they produce "greater involvement" (Branigan 1984, p. 6). While protective function of personal space might explain threat close-up effects, the communicative function of personal space may shed some light on intimacy effects of

close-up; however, whereas the threat close-up seems to invade the personal space of the spectator, the intimacy close-up enables the spectator to invade the character's personal space (Persson 3). Persson draws our attention to differences between two types of intimacy: 'spatial or optical and psychological intimacy' (3). Though not threatening, being close to another thing would be too intimate and thus turn out to be vulgar or grotesque (Persson 4).

5.1.1.1. *Facial close-up*

> "The close-up modifies the drama by the impact of proximity. Pain is within reach. If I stretch out my arm I touch you, and that is intimacy. I can count the eyelashes of this suffering. I would be able to taste the tears. Never before has a face turned to mine in that way."
>
> Epstein (quoted by Persson)

Due to the fact that facial expression is the most subjective manifestation of man, a closer look at a person's face gives us significant hints about his/her mental states and also triggers very similar mental processes. A face in the close-up makes it possible for the spectator to generate hypothesis about the mind and feelings of the person and therefore get psychologically intimate. However, it should be noted that it is not the close – up but the face itself which generates this kind of intimacy. In his article, "Visible Man", Bèla Balázs (2007) states that

> "In general, facial expressions are more polyphonic than language. The succession of words resembles the successive note of a melody. But a face can display the most varied emotions simultaneously, like a chord, and the relationships between these different emotions is what creates the rich amalgam of harmonies and modulations. These are the chords of feeling whose essences is in fact their simultaneity. Such simultaneity cannot be expressed in words" (p. 100).

It is the very early infancy when exactly we start developing responses to the face. David MacDougall (1998) states that in film such responses are strongly evoked by close-ups, "which bring the viewer into a position of unusual physical intimacy with the film subject (51). The subject gives itself to the viewer, inviting particular emotions of commitment and potential exchange" (ibid.)

The facial expression on a face is complete and comprehensible in itself. However, facing an isolated face takes us out of space, our consciousness of space is cut out and

we find ourselves in another dimension: that of 'physiognomy' (Balázs 2003, p. 120). Béla Balázs, furthermore clarifies his concept of 'physiognomy' as follows

> "The expression of an isolated face is a whole, which is intelligible by itself. We have nothing to add to it by thought, nor have we anything to add to that which is of space or time. When a face that we have just seen in the middle of a crowd is detached from its surroundings, put into relief, it is as if we were suddenly face to face with it. Or furthermore, if we have seen it before in a large room, we will no longer think of this when we scrutinize the face in close-up. For the expression of a face and the signification of this expression have no relation or connection with space. Faced with an isolated face, we do not perceive space. Our sensation of space is abolished. A dimension of another order is opened to us" (ibid., p. 121).

As close-ups are reflected expressions of our own subconscious feelings, for Balázs, they are pictures expressing the poetic sensibility of the director (ibid). For Balázs, good close-ups are lyrical, and it is the heart not the eye, that has perceived them (ibid). Close-ups are often considered as dramatic revelations of what is really happening under the surface of appearances. Since these are expressions of our subconscious feelings, close-ups express poetic sensibility of director. "When the film close-up strips the veil of our imperceptiveness and insensitivity from the hidden little things and shows us the face of objects, it still shows us man, for what make objects expressive are the human expressions projected onto them" (Balázs 2003, p.119). The close-up, according to Doane, "transforms whatever it films into a quasi-tangible thing, producing an intense phenomenological experience of presence, and yet, simultaneously, that deeply experienced entity becomes a sign, a text, a surface that demands to be read" (2002, p. 94). Doane also stresses that the close up pushes us beyond the realm of individuation, of social role, and of the exchange underlies intersubjectivity (ibid., p. 97).

If we get too physically close to another person, the other's face loses its precise "visible presence as a figure in my visiual field even as it increases in haptic presence and the visible face partially blurs as it fills my visual field, thus becoming, in part, its ground" (Sobchack 1992*,* 185). For the extreme close-up, Sobchack states that it is centreed in my visual field, its entirety is the figure of my perception, not its ground, and thus does not flow into indeterminacy in my vision (186). Gilles Deleuze (2003) suggests that the face, in film, is usually associated with "three roles as 'individuating'

(to recognize or distinguish a person), 'socializing' (to manifest a social role) and or it is 'relational' (to ensure not only communication but also the internal agreement between his character and his role as a single person)" (99). However, all these three roles are elided. Deleuze argues that "the face which affectively presents these aspects in the cinema as elsewhere, loses all three in the case of close-up" (ibid.). Furthermore, Deleuze adds that the close – up retains "the same power to tear the image away from spatio-temporal coordinates in order to call forth the pure affect as the expressed" (ibid., 96). In other words, this process of abstraction, the divorcing of the face from "all spatio-temporal coordinates" turns the face into "pure affect" (ibid.). Deleuze pinpoints that even the background place loses its coordinates and becomes 'any space whatever' (ibid., 97).

5.1.2. Point Of View (POV) Shot

George M. Wilson (1986) states that every film necessarily controls and limits the nature of the visual access that we have to fictional events and that our task as spectators is "to work out how our perceptual comprehension of the relevant film is related to our normal modes of ordering and understanding perception in everyday visual experience (p. 2). Thus, point-of-view does not concern a film's value or the kind of information a film conveys, but rather when and how that information is conveyed: how the film manipulates an audience's "epistemic access to narrative" (p. 3).

Murray Smith proposes that fictional narrations elicit three levels of imaginative engagement with characters as recognition, alignment and allegiance comprising the structure of sympathy (1995, p. 40). Whereas recognition refers to the viewer's construction of a character as a unified person from the cues available in the text, alignment refers to the distribution of knowledge and information about the story world (ibid., p.41). Smith proposes two interlocking functions, 'spatial attachment' and 'subjective access', as means for analyzing alignment (ibid.). Smith argues that spatial attachment concerns "the capacity of the narration to restrict itself to the actions of a single character or to move more freely among spatio-temporal paths of two or more characters" (ibid.). Subjective access pertains to the degree of access we have to the subjectivity of characters (ibid., 42). A POV shot is one of the devices that align the viewer to a certain character by guiding the viewer's attention to what is significant in

the narrative. The last level that Smith describes is allegiance: the level at which the spectator morally and emotionally engages with the character (ibid.). In his article "Engaging Characters", Smith (1995) notes that there are two further points regarding the structure of sympathy: 'identification' and 'empathy', in which we are completely 'absorbed' or 'possessed' by a particular character (p. 168). By having access to his/her knowledge and other mental states, spectators are sympathetic with the character.

Smith (1995), furthermore, postulates three different types of mental process employed during the spectator's engagement with the narrative: "acentral imagining, central imagining, and non-cognitive responses such as affective mimicry and reflex responses" (p. 47). A main difference between these two types of imagining is that in the former case, one merely imagines that what is told is true in the fictional world, whereas in the later case, one projects oneself into the fictional situation, takes on the beliefs and desires of a character and imagines what it would be like to be in the situation in which that character is placed. Smith states that certain textual cues are elicitors, catalysts that tend to trigger certain cognitive mechanisms (ibid., 48). Moreover, Smith finds a closer link between POV shots and central imagining than any other structure. When we as spectators see optical POV shots, we imagine ourselves seeing the object of the character's gaze.

Gregory Currie, on the other hand, claims that subjective POV shots may encourage the viewer to imagine what it is like to have experience of the character. Similar to Smith, Currie (1995) distinguishes between two types of imagining – primary (impersonal) and secondary (personal) imagination – (p. 180). In his criticism of Currie's claim that POV shots seldom engage the central imagining but that subjective shots do, Smith argues that both subjective shots and objective optical point of view are likely to foster central imagining. According to Smith, there is one principal way of privileging subjective shots over POV shot in terms of giving rise to central imagining (1994, p. 422). POV shot has the potential to bring shot transitions forcibly to the viewer's attention and to administer perceptual shocks to the viewer.

While both Persson and Carroll claim that deictic gaze behaviour (the ability of a person to infer the object of another person's gaze) forms the basis by which a spectator is able to comprehend POV editing, Persson suggests a more 'dialectical interaction'

between nature and culture, one in which basic untutored psychological skills possess "a genetic basis that provides us with some predisposition to develop patterns such as deictic gaze but whose actual development probably demands a rich physical and social environment" (73). According to Persson, POV editing not only facilitates a spectator's comprehension of narrative space but also provides a greater psychological depth to characters (2008, p.65).

Whereas the comprehension of POV editing rested upon the psychological disposition to understand the deictic gaze behaviour of others, the comprehension of the narrative significance of variable framing instead relies upon the psychological disposition to understand personal space. Edward Branigan (1984, p. 103), when referring to POV editing, focuses on two shots: point-glance shot (person looking generally offscreen) and point-object shot (whatever the person sees). The elements of this structure can be iterated in various ways, and the point/glance shot my precede point-object shot or vice-versa in what Branigan respectively calls "prospective and retrospective structures" (ibid., 111). Noël Carroll (1996), furthermore, puts forward two hypothesis about these two shots, which rest on cinematic elaboration of ordinary perceptual practices and the ways in which POV editing is deployed to represent the emotional states of characters. The first hypothesis is a representation rooted in our recognition of an innate perceptual behaviour that moves from a gaze to its target (p. 129). Noël Carroll claims that in POV editing an information delivering practice is turned into an intentionally communicative practice (ibid.). The reason it can function communicatively is that it is a representational elaboration of natural information gathering behaviour (ibid.). It works especially with the use of prospective variety where point-glance shot may precede point-object-shot, since it relies on depicting biologically innate information gathering procedures.

Carroll argues that the point / glance shot is a device designed "to activate our capacities of recognition in such a way that we identify the global emotional state of the relevant character" (ibid., 130). In order to identify the emotional state, a person is in with any precision, one needs to specify the object of emotion in question. Thus, what specifies the particular emotion for us is the apprehension of the object. Related with the function of point-object shot, Carroll emphasizes that it is to supply the viewer with the cause or object of character's emotion in order to specify that emotion in a fine-grained way

(ibid., 131). We, as spectators, move from the glance to the target in order to ascertain the particular emotion of the character (ibid., 132). Moreover, Carroll, focusing on their functions, calls "the point/glance shot as a 'range finder' (as it sets out a global range emotions that characterize the neighbourhood of affective states of the character) and the point / object shot as a focuser (as it enables us to focus on particular emotion within broad categories of the affective range made available by point / glance shot)" (ibid., 132). In terms of reciprocal and functional relations between these two shots, point/glance shot sets the "range of relevant emotion and guides the reception of the point / object shot while point/object shot focuses or specifies the particular emotion represented" (ibid., 133).

5.2. FLATTENING THE SPACE: LOSS OF CENTRE

For Sobchack, film images plainly, simply represent a Renaissance perspective: representing the visible as originating in and organized by an individual, centred subject. The spectator thus experiences film as subjective and intentional. William C. Wees (1992) refers to James J. Gibson who associates subjective way of seeing with 'visual field' and objective one with 'visual world' (p. 68). Gibson finds that the 'visual field' has a frame: an oval boundary marking the limits of the eye's visual angle. Within that frame there is "a central-to-peripheral gradient of clarity." However, the 'visual world' has no frame and no noticeable centre; it is "panoramic" and seems clearly focused throughout because of the eye's constant scanning and shifting of focus (p. 69).

> "The 'visual field' is instable, changing with every movement of the eyes and turn of the head, the "visual world" is stable: things stay where they are, no matter how much our eyes move about. In the 'visual field' three-dimensionality is reduced. There is less distinction between figure and ground, or between objects and their interspaces. Forms eclipse each other, rather than seeming to be in front of each other, as they appear to be in the visual world" (ibid.).

Perhaps most important of all, the 'visual field' evokes a self-consciousness about the act of perception itself since we are aware of our special effort to see it, while the 'visual world,' on the other hand, seems totally independent of our act of perceiving it (ibid.). In other words, the 'visual field' results from our noticing the ambiguous or doubtful perceptual data that our visual system normally suppress or convert into the more useful and socially shared perceptions of the 'visual world' (ibid., 70).

By manipulating the cinematic apparatus, American avant-garde filmmakers such as Paul Sharits, Stan Brakage and Kenneth Anger challenged the standardized versions of seeing perpetuated by the dominant film industry. By using techniques such as superimposition, soft focus, unusual camera angles, extreme close-ups, flicker effects, quick cutting and painting on film, avant-garde filmmakers pose questions about seeing and leave the viewer with a more complex and dynamic experience of visual perception. Branigan states that it is the condition of sight itself and the way in which the character experiences difficulty in seeing (1984, p. 80). Wees argues that the cinematic apparatus and the human visual apparatus can be brought into a dynamic, creative relationship which Wees calls “dialectic of eye and camera” (1992, p. 4).

Similar to Merleau-Ponty, Stan Brakhage conceives vision to be a whole body experience, or the experience of “the body in the world” (see Sobchack 1992, pp. 89-92). Emotions, imaginings, dreams, the pulse of the heart, and the sparking of the synapses are all registered in acts of vision. For Brakhage, the connection of vision to the body is why he uses a hand-held, often shaking or trembling camera, unusual lenses, painted-on-film-footage, complex superimpositions, eccentric exposures and focusing, disjunctive cutting rhythms, - and why he usually makes silent (and emphatically wordless) films. In his article, “Seeing with Experimental Eyes”, Bart Testa (1998) states that all these techniques manifest Brakhage’s attempt “to come closer to a mimesis of holistic-corporeal acts of seeing.” (p. 275) These different stylistic moments in Brakhage’s filmmaking are, therefore to be accounted for by the themes that attracted him and the states of emotion or mind that gave rise to his films (ibid.). To wring a subjective visualization of sight out of the objective lens is what Brakhage had in mind when he recommended using the lens "against specifications." Superimposition automatically destroys the single, fixed point of view essential to perspectivist representations of space. Collage techniques and masking can produce disproportionate sizes and conflicting vanishing points within the same image. Rapid camera movement can flatten space and shatter the edges separating objects from each other and the space around them; if it is rigorously pursued, it can evoke totally new perceptions of space—as has been demonstrated in films as different as Brakhage's *Anticipation of the Night* (1958).

5.2.1. Subjective Camera

In his book *Narrative Comprehension and Film*, Edward Branigan redefines the camera not as an object but as “a construct of the viewer that allows him / her to make coherent spatial sense of the discontinuous stimuli of rapidly changing angles” (1992, p.124). Branigan divides functioning of camera as objective and subjective, and states that through its framings the camera seems to become the very embodiment of narration, of “knowing how to go on.... about a world it already knows” (ibid., 125). In order to construct a coherent rhetoric, the viewer is actively engaged in revising notions of shot organization. For the viewer engaged in such an activity, Branigan points out that "the camera is not a profilmic object which is shifted from place to place, but a construct of the spectator, a hypothesis about *space* … The camera is simply a *label* applied by the reader to certain plastic transformations of space"(1981, p. 16).

According to Branigan, a camera’s subjectivity becomes important when a narrative theory seeks to explain “how a spectator may be put in contact with an author who is a subject, as well as with a world of characters and narrators who are also subjects” (1992, p. 125). Our bodily sense of balance is based on gravitational and physical forces, this physical bodily experience is metaphorically mapped onto vision in film and use of subjective camera distorts spectator’s balance in parallel with character’s inner world. It is common to use subjective camera to give an impression of dizziness or drunkenness. Especially in order to highlight that we are seeing the world through a character’s point of view, a free ranging camera is often used for such exceptional situations. Subjective representations also put constraints on our ability to see, thus reduce the amount of visible detail. Grodal argues that the more obscure the image is, the harder the viewer tries to make sense of it (2002, p. 129). The constraints may trigger an emotional build-up that provides the subjective feeling (ibid.). Deviating lighting, scaling, camera focusing, camera movements, cutting etc. prevent the construction of whole objects and spaces, which furthermore underline the conditions of perception and point of view (ibid., 134). Deviations from perfect vision and hearing destroy our normal lack of awareness of the subjective aspects (the proximal aspects) and these deviations furthermore create stress and arousal in spectators (ibid.). Branigan, in his book *Projecting a Camera: Language-Games in Film Theory*, develops four major concepts related with camera as “motivation; anthropomorphism; point of

view; and movement" (2006, p. 28). Branigan defines motivation in terms of camera movement, position, articulation of plot and screen time, the camera's relation to narrative causality, and changing shot scales (ibid., p. 29). Many qualities of a camera are being related to a typical way of human viewing or moving. Anthropomorphistic camera takes on some of that character's subjectivity, in that sense (ibid.). With impossible camera angles and movements the camera traversing impossible spaces such as keyholes, Branigan, identifies non-anthropomorphic camera as disembodied camera (ibid., p. 30).

Unsteady, hand held camera work, inexact framing, restricted views and sudden zooms are among devices that can be used to create an impression that the filmmaker is capturing events as they unfold, unpredictably before the camera. The hand-held vérité style gives the impression of grounding the events in something that feels more real than would be the case if the camera were fixed or moved more smoothly on dolly tracks, but it also has an expressive impact, underlining the edgy and unstable nature of the relationships between characters (Geoff King 2005, p. 119). Similar shifts between vérité style and expressive effects also occur in the work of Cassavetes as stated by Ivone Margulies (1998):

> "Cassavetes' composition moves back and forth between an obstructed image (a realist causalness) and a shot design in which focus is used expressively. His cinema vérité impulse – to record the integrity of performances from a distance – yields an image that is abstract, sensual, and intense" (p. 299).

In his article, "Camera Movement and Cinematic Space", David Bordwell, on the other hand, for inconsistent subject positions created by camera movements, states that "the camera movement is no longer rendered as the movement of a subjective eye through an objective world" (2008, p. 24). In order to illustrate, Bordwell refers to Gance's superimposed tracking shots, the pendular and prismatic movements in Fernand Leger's *Ballet Mécanique* (1924), and split screen effects Vertov's films. The camera movement, alternatively, can block an anthropomorphic reading, "refusing it as an intelligible or likely surrogate for bodily movement" (ibid. p. 25).

6. SOUND

'We are enveloped by sound. It forms a seamless web around us.'
(McLuhan et. al. 1996, p. 111)

Mary Ann Doane argues that the first model of auditory pleasure is the mother's soothing voice and a major component of "sonorous envelope" (1980, p.33). At the cinema, on the other hand, the sonorous envelope provided by soundtrack sustains "the narcissistic pleasure derived from the image of a certain unity, cohesion and, thus an identity grounded by the spectator's fantasmatic relation to his / her own body" (Doane 1980, 45). In her article, Doane, describes fantasmatic body as "the body reconstituted by the technology and practices of the cinema, which offers a support as well as a point of identification for the subject addressed by the film (ibid., pp. 33-34). Doane also adds that "memories of the first experiences of the voice, of the hallucinatory satisfaction it offered, circumscribe the pleasure of hearing and ground its relation to the fantasmatic body" (ibid., p. 43).

This chapter will discuss the role of subjective sonic space and music in *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) in constructing the "the narcissistic pleasure" by engaging spectators both cognitively and emotionally at the optimum level. As there is no room for spectators to escape from the rhythm of the film, spectator's conscious attention is projected on to listening. Thus, the use of sound has a prominent role in constructing both cinematic space and time and accordingly this leaves relevant effects on spectators' perception. Deviating sound form results into deviated perception of cinematic time and space. In that sense, this chapter will analyze the effects of sound and its deviations of perception of time and space. In order to identify the role of sound, I will mostly refer to Michel Chion's sound theory and therefore the first part of this chapter will summarize theories on 'audio-vision' in Chion's terms and its possible effects. In the second part of the chapter, I will focus on subjective sonic space and its relevant effects on spectators.

6.1. AUDIO-VISION

By audio-vision, Chion refers to "audio visual relationships as complimentary and self-contained recreations of an imaginary natural entity (2007, p. 217). Sound provides an expressive and informative richness to the moving image, creating a feeling of imminence and expectation, as well as one of immediacy. Sound is important precisely as it gives the cinema volume in every sense, providing the sensations of depth and perspective that a flat screen cannot convey. Sound, for Chion, is "trans-sensorial", and it would be a mistake to think that all that is auditory is only auditory and a mistake to regard senses as self-contained entities (p. 57). The visual movement reverberates according to the sound, and the sound lines echo the visual movement. According to Chion, the most widespread functions of sound in the moving image medium is to bind the flow of images together, bridge the gap between visual breaks, and bring unity by establishing atmosphere (1994, p. 47). Furthermore, sound can be used to bring emphasis to the action or a specific part of the on-screen images, through punctuation. The sound works directly on the viewer by way of the entire embodied sensorium. As a result, the sound becomes a subtle means of affective manipulation that influences the perception of the image. It makes the viewer see more than what is actually present on the screen, or see it in a different way (Chion 1994, p.34). Chion, thus states that sound adds value to the image. Christian Metz describes the similar relationship as sound functions as an 'adjective' while visual as a 'noun' (1985, p. 155).

6.1.1. Value Added By Text

Chion states that "when sound adds meaning to the image, the meaning seems to emanate from the image itself" (2007, p.202). Thus, sound can add value to the moving image either as an on-screen element, floating on the surface of the images, or off-screen beyond the images, but always as an integral and reciprocal part of the moving image. By 'added value', Chion refers to "the expressive and informative value with which a sound enriches a given image so as to create a definite impression, in the immediate, remembered experience one has of it.." (2000, p.112). This sound-image relation is the expressive and informative value through which sound enriches the image. Chion adds that added value is partly bilateral the image likewise influences our perception of sound (2007, p. 203). As most of the time added value is experienced

unconsciously, in order to become aware of it, Chion underlines that it is necessary to separate out the audiovisual mix by observing the sound and the image of a given sequence independently (ibid., 202).

6.1.2. Value Added By Music

Music and other sounds can be used to raise expectations and direct spectator's attention to the future. The music which continues over the cuts and ellipsis gives the sequence a feeling of spatial and temporal continuity. In his article, *Projections of Sound on Image*, Chion developed the idea that there are two ways for music in film to create a specific emotion in relation to the situation depicted on the screen (2000, p. 114). 'Empathic music' can directly express its participation in the feeling of the scene, by taking on the scene's rhythm, tone and phrasing; 'anempathetic music', on the other hand exhibits conspicuous indifference to the situation, by progressing in a steady, undoubted and ineluctable manner. Chion also states that this juxtaposition of scene with indifferent music has the effect of intensifying it (ibid.). Stan Link states that suturing mechanisms like the point-of-view shot, transform the "eye of the camera" into "the constructed (capital) I of another identity"; similarly, a musical score's affective strategy is "potentially an erosion of the personal definition, location, and source of emotion" (2004, p. 77).

In narrative cinema, music actively crosses objective and subjective level to hallucinatory degree (Branigan 1992, p. 4). Mary Ann Doane, in the same way, adds that an image of corporeal unity is derived from the realization that the production of sound by the voices and its audition coincide (1980, p. 44). Doane, furthermore refers to Rosalato in that the voice in music makes appeal to the nostalgia for such an imaginary cohesion, for a veritable incantation of bodies.

> "The harmonic and polyphonic unfolding in music can be understood as a succession of tensions and releases, of unifications and divergences between parts which are gradually stacked, opposed in successive chords only to be resolved ultimately into their simplest unity. It is therefore the entire dramatization of separated bodies and their reunion which harmony supports" (1980, p. 45).

6.2. AUDIOVISIOGENETIC EFFECTS

Related with the cause-effect relationship between sound and image, Chion prefers to use the term 'audiovisiogenetic effect' which focuses on perceptions of "space, matter, volume, meaning, expression, and organization of space and time" (2007, p. 203). Chion then lists down psycho-physiological conditions for sound – image perception. First condition is synchresis (combination of synchronism and synthesis), which Chion defines, as "the spontaneous and irresistible weld produced between a particular auditory and visual phenomenon occurring at the same time" (1994, p. 63). Synchresis allows for the use of any sound effect. Chion also points out the fact that synchresis also permits effects based on contradiction and discrepancy (like a disproportion between voice and body). Without synchresis, "the audio would purely and simply break away from the visual", in other words, sound would have to "mimic reality and its range of possibilities of expression would be much smaller" (2007, p. 205). The second condition is 'spatial magnetization', the process whereby when we visually locate a sound source in a certain place in space, and when for diverse reasons, the associated sound comes mainly from the screen whereas we hear the sound through earphones (ibid., 206). Chion adds that a human – being's conscious hearing attention is structured and hierarchical, and in particular 'voice centred', "the process by which in a sound environment, the voice attracts and centres our attention, in the same way as the human face in the image of a film (ibid.). Another means of audio-visual expression is the variable use of 'materializing sound indices,' which reveals the nature of the source and often consists of unevenness, slight or more pronounced irregularities (which reveal the material conditions of the sound source (ibid., 210).

6.2.1. Effects Of Sound On Perception Of Space

Chion pinpoints that sound perception and visual perception have their own average pace by their very nature; basically "the ear analyzes, processes and synthesizes faster than the eye (1994, p. 10) Thus, Chion states that the eye is more spatially adept, and the ear more temporally adept (ibid., 11). Another important point related with the role of sound in spotting visual movements is that "sound superimposed onto image is capable of directing our attention to a particular visual trajectory" (ibid.). Chion adds that sound even raises the possibility of "sleight-of-hand effects", which sometimes it

succeeds in “making us see in the image a rapid movement that is not even there” (ibid., 12). Chion emphasizes that added value is working full steam, in accordance with a phenomenon specific to sound film that we might call ‘faster than the eye’ (ibid.).

6.2.2. Effects Of Sound On Perception Of Time

Everything that in a film sequence concerns the construction of time and rhythm through devices including ‘phrasing, punctuations and pauses, freeze frames, anticipation and release’, which Chion calls ‘audiovisual phrasing’ (2007, p. 213). Chion proposes three aspects of temporalization of sound (1994, pp.13-14). First is the temporal animation of the image, where sound renders the perception of time in the image as exact, detailed, immediate, concrete or vague, fluctuating, broad. Second, sound endows shots with ‘temporal linearization’, where a synchronous sound does impose a ‘sense of succession’. Last, sound “vectorizes or dramatizes shots, orienting them toward a future, a goal and a creating of a feeling of imminence and expectation” (ibid., 14). Temporalization also depends on the type of sounds present depending on density, internal texture, tone quality, rhythm and progression. To sum up, for sound to influence image’s temporality; first, the image must lend itself to it either by being static or passively receptive or by ‘microrhythms’ (rapid movements on images surface such as curls of smoke); second, the image should contain minimum structural elements of ‘agreement, engagement, and sympathy (vibrations) or active antipathy’ with the flow of sound (ibid., 16).

6.3. SUBJECTIVE SONIC SPACE

Subjective sound occurs only in the mind of a character and other characters in the film are unable to hear it. There are several terms to indicate subjective sound such as ‘metadiegetic’ (Gorbman 450), ‘intra-diegetic’ (Branigan, *Point* 68) and ‘internal diegetic’ (Bordwell , & Thompson 1993, p. 256).

6.3.1. Aural Point–of–view

“Unity through the coherence of senses and presence-to-itself are among the two important attributes of the fantasmatic body,” Doane states (1980, p.34). Doane,

furthermore, claims that the aural illusion of position constructed by the approximation of sound perspective and techniques which spatialize the voice and endow it with presence guarantees the singularity and stability of a point of audition (ibid. p. 45). Though Chion at first considers 'place of audition' or even 'zone of audition' rather than 'point of audition', he states that for it is the image that always creates the point of audition, which in this case is worthy of the term point (1994, p.91). Chion acknowledges that sound has a greater scope that it can do more perceptually to the experiencer than the visuals can. Chion, similarly, suggests that there could be vocal point of view which is equal to the visual point of view offered to us by the camera. However, because sound is omnidirectional, spatial awareness of this is complicated. He claims that it is the image that creates the point of audition, precisely because in many cases the sound is linked to a place in the image and the experiencer links the two together as part of the audio-visual contract of experiencer-ship (1994, pp. 79-80).

Branigan, on the other hand, distinguishes an aural POV – where we hear from the character's point in space – and an aural perception – where we hear something only the character hears (1984, p. 94). Chion makes a similar classification under the term 'internal sound' in order to indicate sounds corresponding to physical and mental interior of a character. Chion, furthermore, proposes two additional sub-categories as 'objective – internal sound' which includes physiological sounds of breathing, moans or heartbeats, and 'subjective internal sounds' which are mental voices and memories (1994, p. 76).

Chion adapts acousmatic sound to the cinema in terms of passive and active modes. The 'passive mode' would include ambient sound, such as traffic noise which does not invite spectators to question their sources. In the 'active mode', on the contrary, both characters in the film and spectators question the source and this use of acousmatic sound often drives narrative forward by engaging a character in the film to ask the same question and then search for the answer (1994, p. 33). Sound is used effectively in order to depict the moods of characters with altered states of mind. Use of active mode of acousmatic sound engages both characters and spectators in a similar way.

6.3.2. Visualists Of The Ear, Auditives Of The Eye

As Chion considers sound as a trans-sensorial element, the agglomeration of the moving image and the sound in a reciprocal and interdependent relationship, generates "rhythmic, dynamic, temporal, tactile, and kinetic sensations that make use of both the auditory and the visual channels" (1994, p. 152). As Chion says, while the eye must simultaneously explore space and follow along in time, the ear isolates details instantly and follows these details in time (ibid., p. 10). Quick bursts of multilayered lines of sound can be easily registered and analyzed by the ear, while rapid successions of complex visual lines causes the eye to struggle. Rapid movements that the eye struggles to analyze will be perceived by what Chion calls the 'ear-that-is-in-the-eye', an auditive eye that traces out the lines of rapid visual movements as a trajectory of a complex series of auditory phenomena, and subsequently etches them into our consciousness, quickly and clearly (Chion 1994, p. 134). In order to be converted into 'auditory impressions in memory', some kinds of rapid phenomena in images appear as 'ear-that-is-in-the-eye' (ibid., 135). Accordingly, a line of sound will be put together with a visual line that resembles or 'feels' similar or vice versa, generating an audio-visual flow in which the perception of the complex visual line is sustained by the reverberation of sound, and the audio is resounded by the moving image lines. Thus, the sound surrounds the viewers and reverberates within them, while constantly, and without drawing attention to the process, synergising with their vision. But the visible can also transpose a certain sonic velocity into the moving image. Chion argues that rapid visual movements are spotted by rapid auditory punctuation, they mark certain moments and leave a strong audio-visual memory (2000, p. 116). Chion concludes that whereas everything spatial in film is ultimately encoded into a visual impression, and everything which is temporal, including elements reaching us via the eye, registers an auditory impression (1994, p. 136). Chion's transensorial aspect is quite similar to Vivian Sobchack's phemomenological concept of 'synaesthesia' described as cooperation and commutation of our senses.

Stan Link, in his article, "Nor the Eye Filled with Seeing: The Sound of Vision in Film" elaborates Chion's transsensorial mode of perception. Links states that the soundtrack typically sustains the 'all-at-once' characterization of hearing, as a 'self-contained and self-containing auditory world' (2004, p. 80). Similar to Chion, Link argues that the

cinematic ear can behave as the eye when exchanging its all–at-once in favour of the active selection typical of vision. To illustrate, Link refers to Sam Raimi's *The Quick and the Dead* (1995) in which each image is accompanied by diegetic sounds enhanced well beyond any natural acoustic projection or the acuity of embodied hearing. Link puts that their 'hyperamplification' suggests essentially 'zero distance' from their visual sources, as though hearing has not been subjected to a mediating remove or acoustic (ibid., 80). Link finds such a technical nature of the sequence as 'highly objectified' and the framing of each shot with its auditory presence as 'intensely personal – tactile even' (ibid.). As a result, Link notices "an inversion of auditory syntax in which the precisely attenuated sound parallels the hyperselective editing and camera work" (ibid.). For Link, "the ear mimicks vision's focus in the anatomical and psychological senses of the word" (ibid.). By adopting a 'visual syntax', hearing has reached out, selected an object, excluded others, objectified them and sequentialized them (ibid., 81). Link concludes that hearing and seeing have become "interwined not simply with an image as the nexus, but with the very qualities of visual space as a shared style of perception" (ibid., 81).

7. EXPERIENCE of TIME

'All thinking is cinematic.'
Bernard Stiegler (1998, p. 26)

According to Martin Heidegger, temporality is one of the most fundamental dimensions of our existence as human beings, "in which we are so thoroughly and permanently steeped" (quoted by Polkinghorne 1988, p. 128). Susan Pockett, states that "…we never experience a now in isolation. Now always shades on one side into the past and the other side into the future" (2003, p. 56). Related with temporal experience, Monika Fludernik (1993), likewise, states that temporality cannot be experienced, as

> "..the past is constituted by our remembrance of earlier experience, and the future of course becomes experienceable only in so far as it has in turn become present and past. Current experience cannot be experienced objectively while one is experiencing it and the present qua present therefore eludes the conceptual grasp of the experiencer. As a result, none of the three temporal states (past, present, future) can be comprehended separately but only in a dynamic and dialectic process of ongoing experience and temporal unidirectional flux" (p.53).

This chapter, by focusing on subjective time and cinematic temporality, will first discuss the subjective experience of cinematic time from phenomenological perspective, and identify the relationship between consciousness and temporal unity. In the second part of this chapter, by considering the role of rhythm in a melody in experiencing temporality and I will focus on the rhythm in the film in which spectator's conscious attention is projected on (as also discussed in the previous chapter on sound).

7.1. CINEMATIC EXPERIENCE OF TIME

In his article, "Jean Epstein's Cinema of Immanence: The Rehabilitation of the Corporeal Eye", Malcolm Turvey (1988) quotes Jean Epstein in that cinema allows the spectator to perceptually experience events unfolding in time (p. 36). Unlike human beings whose experience of time is a perpetual missed encounter with the present, the cinema is an instrument that can capture and therefore manipulate time (ibid., p. 37). Only the cinema, according to Epstein, can capture the 'pure immediacy of time' in the present tense, the 'now' that is always missed during the spectator's standard perceptual

experience of the phenomenal world (quoted by Turvey 1988, p. 37). Vivian Sobchack, similarly identifies cinematic experience as follows:

> "…..as the multiplicity and discontinuity of time are synthesized and centred and cohere as the experience of a specific lived-body, so are multiple and discontiguous spaces synopsized and located in the spatial synthesis of a particular material body. Articulated as separate shots and scenes, discontiguous spaces and discontinuous times are synthetically gathered together in a coherence that is the cinematic lived-body: the camera its perceptive organ, the projector its expressive organ, the screen its discrete and material centre. In sum, the cinematic exists as a visible performance of the perceptive and expressive structure of lived-body experience" (2000, pp. 77-78).

Sobchack clarifies the issue by pinpointing the differences between temporal experience of photograph and cinema from phenomenological perspective. For Sobchack, the photograph announces 'the possibility of becoming'; however, it never presents itself as "the coming into being of being", as it is "a presence without past, present and future" (1992*,* 59). Thus, Sobchack states that when we experience the "timelessness that a photograph confers on its subject matter, we are experiencing the photograph's compelling emptiness; it exists as the 'possibility of temporality' but is a 'vacancy' within it" (59). Sobchack underlines that this temporal vacancy affects the space of still photograph and flattens it. For Sobchack, space here does not provide a 'situation'; therefore, "objects tend to seem insubstantial, thin, not firmly enworlded" (59). In her comparison of photograph and film, Sobchack notes that if the photograph is a 'hole' in temporality, which announces a 'vacancy', "the motion picture in its motion sufficiently fills up that vacancy and inaugurates a fullness" (60). Therefore, Sobchack argues that unlike photograph, the film exists for us as always in 'act of becoming' (60). In contrast to the photograph, which, for Sobchack, is "bound to a structure of possession, loss, pastness, and nostalgia; the cinema is bound to a structure of accumulation, ephemerality, and anticipation--to a 'presence' in the present informed by its connection to a collective past and to a future" (2000, p. 73)

On the other hand, Epstein persistently points to the cinema's 'synthetic ability' to stop time, to congeal it in a moment of presence, "rendering it palpable and latent within the image as a sensuous entity available to the spectator's gaze of inspection" (quoted by Turvey 1988, p. 37). Turvey insists on that Epstein valorizes the close-up precisely because it "arrests the flow of time and holds it in abeyance as pure potential" (37).

Here, time is something that becomes directly visible to the spectator. Turvey states that the result of this sensuous latency of time, for Epstein, is the production of a 'pregnant moment of presence' that punctuates and interrupts the standard, continuous, linear flow of time (ibid.). During such moments of presence, the linear organization of time into the discrete dimensions of past, present, and future is replaced by a "fecund moment pregnant with time in which past and future collapse or coalesce into the present (38). Past and future in effect become "visible to the spectator within the pure 'now' of the present captured by the camera" (ibid., 38). Therefore, Epstein argues that narrative, with its linear flow of time from past to future, is "antithetical to the true nature of cinematic temporality", and should therefore be rejected in favour of 'new dramaturgy' which he names "an art of indices or situations" (quoted by Turvey 1988, p.38). Thus, Epstein claims that "there are no stories and there are only situations without beginning, middle or end" (quoted by Turvey 1988, p. 38). It is also important to note that for Epstein, "time is a specific entity that the camera is capable of revealing to the spectator's bodily eye, 'crystallizing' it in a sensuous, palpable form" (ibid.).

7.1.1. Experience Of Subjective Time

"The cinema engages multiple temporalities on the level of the apparatus, narrative and as well as viewing" (Doane, *The Emergence* 30). According to Mary Ann Doane, "apparatus time denotes the linearity and chronology of cinema, which is a forward movement of the apparatus that generates a security and certainty of the irreversible flow of time (*The Emergence* 141). Related with cinematic experience of time, Sobchack states that:

> "While its visible structure of "unfolding" does not challenge the dominant realist perception of objective time as an irreversibly directed stream (even flashbacks are contained by the film's vision in a forwardly directed momentum of experience), the cinematic makes time visibly heterogeneous" (2000, p. 76).

In his work, Donald Polkinghorne (1988) refers to the phenomenological dimensions of time. Polkinghorne identifies that at any given moment the threefold phenomenological structure of time is present as a unified whole: *primal impression* 'a present about the present [attention]', *retention* 'a present about the past' and *protention* 'a present about the future' (ibid., p.129). The concrete and full structure of all lived experience is thus *primal impression-retention-protention* (my emphasis, 129). In his article titled "Time

and Presence", Georg Franck underlines that subjective time differs from physical time in that it passes and it is centreed in the "now" (2000, p.1). With the passage of time Franck means that "the now is in motion relatively to the chronological order of events" (ibid.). Different from objective time, the cinema's visible and audible activity of retention and protention constructs a subjective temporality (ibid., 2).

So, while watching film, we can perceive time in its subjective and objective modes demonstrated in a state of 'discontinuity' as they are actively 'synthesized' in a specific lived body experience (Sobchack 2000, p. 76). By using different kinds of temporal distortions (anachronies) such as flashbacks, flashforwards, freeze framing, reverse motion, fast motion and slow motion etc., the director may present the subjective temporality of memory, desire or mood. "From the moment, the spectator constructs a coherent series of events, then we can talk about a temporal orientation and a 'now' moment" (Genette 1980*,* 45). On the other hand, according to Gérard Genette, it is important to note that anachronies are not measured with respect to the time of enunciation but with respect to a narrative reference point created by the ordered unfolding of events (ibid., p.46). Genette calls this unfolding of events 'first narrative' and defines as "the temporal level of narrative with respect to which anachrony is defined as such" (ibid., 48). The relative coherence of the first narrative will reinforce the subordinate character of the anarchronies. If no coherent first narrative is formed there results a temporal constellation in which every element is defined and defines the others in equal measure (ibid., 50).

Sobchack, besides, states that the cinema's visible (and audible) activity of "retension and protension constructs a subjective temporality different from the irreversible direction and momentum of objective time, yet simultaneous with it" (2000, p. 76). Sobchack quotes Frederic Jameson who argues that the cinematic thickens the photographic with "the elegiac mysteries of durée and of memory." (76) Thus, Sobchack states that

> "in so 'thickening the present', this temporal simultaneity also extends cinematic presence spatially--not only embracing a multiplicity of situations in such visual/visible cinematic articulations as double exposure, superimposition, montage, parallel editing, but also primarily, expanding the space in every image between that Here where the enabling and embodied cinematic eye is situated and that There where its gaze locates itself in its object" (2000, p. 77).

7.1.3. Temporality And Consciousness

Michel F. Andrews (2007) refers to Edmund Husserl who argues that "every experience comes to consciousness in two ways: first, consciousness grasps every possible or actual experience under the rubric of 'temporal succession in total unity of the temporal stream of consciousness;' second, experiences are grasped under the rubric of simultaneity, which raises the question of essence of time" (pp.116-117). In other words, the meaning of every experience is constituted by a "present moment of experience that has about it a fringe of experiences that transcends the primordality of the Now-form of the absolute present" (117). Husserl admits that this is because "the fringe of experiences is itself the condition of possibility of coming-into-presence of the Now" (quoted by Andrews 2007, p. 117).

Andrews emphasizes that 'dual experience of protention and retention', or in other words, 'the experience of anticipation and duration' is constitutive in the sense that "it anticipates the structural 'present' of every just- Now experience" (2007, p. 124). Andrews, furthermore, underlines that without internal time-consciousness, there can be no before and after, since there would be no flow of apperception (ibid). Intentionality, for Andrews, takes 'temporality as a whole', a unity, a totality and "it explicates, unfolds, opens up everything that is implicit in it" (ibid). According to Husserl, 'the living Now' is "a process, a pure flux that constitutes the correlation between retention and protention" (1991, p.120). Husserl calls this principle of "temporal constitution as 'transitivity', which in turn constitutes the living stream of inner experience" (ibid, p. 125).

7.2. RHYTHM, MEMORY AND TEMPORALITY

Patrick Crogan (2007), in his paper discusses Edmund Husserl's theories about phenomenon of listening to a temporal object of consciousness. Husserl proposes that there are two kinds of retention which are operative in consciousness: "primary and secondary" (quoted by Crogan 2007, p. 1). Crogan, by referring to Bernard Stiegler, states that in a melody, Husserl explains, a "note only sounds through its rapport with preceding and following notes" (ibid., p. 1). Primary retention is the "maintenance of the having-just-passed" in the present of consciousness, so that "at each moment of

audition consciousness retains the previous note of the melody, it itself retaining the previous note, and so forth" (ibid.). This is what allows consciousness to constitute the 'temporal object' via a "dual retention and anticipatory protention that at each moment of hearing projects the coherence of the melody based on these retained moments and their protentions" (ibid., p. 2).

Husserl names the recollection of the melody at a time after it has concluded as "secondary retention," one which occurs in consciousness via "a dynamic operated by the imagination so that the memory is selectively recalled and reconstituted" (ibid.). That is to say, the memory is produced in dialogue with all the other recollections ordered in and comprising consciousness. Crogan emphasizes that "consciousness as continuity maintained beyond or beneath the temporal flux of immediate perception" (ibid.). Crogan identifies 'secondary memory' as "the domain of the operation of the imagination which forms the basis of the selection criteria that inform the specific, evolving shape of the individual's consciousness across the length of its continual flux" (ibid.).

Crogan states that 'primary retention' stretches "the present moment of living-present consciousness into an extended 'big now' maintaining presence across the duration of the object of perception" (ibid.). Crogan refers to Stiegler who proposes that immediate perception and recalled perception can never be absolutely opposed, but rather they compose together both the experience of the present and the ongoing development of consciousness as continuity beneath momentary impressions (ibid., p.3). Bernard Stiegler, furthermore, argues that cinema amounts to a process of the selection and assembling of retentions, "a process engaging the secondary retentional sphere of imagination/desire, and providing a protentional horizon to the flux of consciousness that coincides with its unfolding" (quoted by Crogan 2007, p. 3). In that sense, cinema can so engage the viewer precisely because it already structures his/her consciousness as a "schema of consciousness as such, that is, as a complex of perception, recollection and recognition unfolding in the flux of time" (ibid.). For Crogan, Stiegler accepts the phenomenological stance that consciousness is always intentional. According the Crogan, "the co-incidence of the flow of consciousness and of the unfolding of the cinematic industrial temporal object is what makes it the epochal form opening a suspension and reshaping of the schemes of contemporary experience" (ibid., p. 3).

While phenomenological perspective considers intentionality as utmost important element, which takes temporality as a whole unity, it is the principle of temporal constitution based on 'transitivity' between protention and retention which, in turn, constitutes the internal experience and consciousness of the present moment. It is this 'Just-Now-experience' in Husserl's term, 'thickening the presence' in Sobchack's term or 'big now' in Crogan's terms (based on Husserl) to build up spectator's consciousness in the film. In fact, this also clarifies the reason why the present moment is called as 'attention' in phenomenological term. The second part of this chapter, on the other hand, highlights the role of rhythm in constituting temporal object in film and its effects in building up traces in memory to be recalled within the process of a complete experience.

8. CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE AND TIME IN DARREN ARONOFSKY's FILMS

> "I look up to directors […] who basically surrender themselves to the story and create a visual style out of the story. That's really important to me – to start with the story, figure out its theme, and then build out a visual and audio language that can best tell that story."
>
> Darren Aronofsky
> (David Geffner 2006)

In his films *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for A Dream* (2000), Darren Aronofsky uses parametric narration in order to represent altered mental states such as hallucination, dream, memory, fantasy etc. The parameters used in these films should not be considered as gaps or fissures in the narrative, but they rather function as intensifier which takes spectators into the altered states of mind of characters. With the minimal storyline, the spectators can establish some degree of overall coherence by mapping musical analogies through polyphonic montage. In both *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), a narrow bunch of subjective parameters are used and repeated regularly across the films.

It is quite apparent that there is an actual audio-visual harmony in terms of camera movement, rhythm of the music and timing of the units. This harmonic development of the audio in connection with close-up images and rhythm has several functions. First and foremost, this never-stop rhythm, which is constructed by polyphonic montage and music interchangeably, engages spectators both cognitively and emotionally. For spectators, such an engagement results into building up a 'fantasmatic body' which gives a 'narcissistic pleasure' (Doane 1980). Second, repetition of stylistic elements (motifs) in polyphonic montage encourages spectators to follow the rhythm. This also requires spectators to recall and reconstitute similar motifs or experiences. To illustrate, in *Requiem for a Dream*, Sara's experience of taking diet pills; Marrion's injecting heroine or in *Pi* Max's migraine crisis. In fact, with the help of parametric narration and parallel editing, Darren Aronofsky, lets his spectators to accumulate all these similar experiences of four main characters as a total experience of consuming inorganic materials.

This chapter, after identifying how Aronofsky depicts subjectivity of his main characters, will analyze the ways in which Aronofsky constructs subjective time and subjective space with the role of sound in this construction. In order to discuss how the director depicts experiences of a drug addict in example, in this chapter, I will firstly classify the strategies used by Aronofsky and then discuss their perception by spectators in the light of theories overviewed so far.

8.1. SUBJECTIVITY

Main characters in Aronofsky's films, rather than having the role of actor solely, are mainly narrators and this consequently puts spectators into a case as if they were in the situation of a character. In that sense, both of these films can be considered as focalized narration depicting mainly 'internal focalization' with flashbacks, flashforwards and POV shots, and 'external focalizations' with eyeline matches (Branigan). On the other hand, with his concept of 'mindscreen (mind's eye)', Bruce Kawin suggests that film can create visual and aural fields which reflect character's mind (1978, p.10). Thus, Aronofsky in order to depict his character's mental world, creates such visual and aural fields as an indicative of subjectivity. Kawin also associates this product of mind with self-reflexivity or self-consciousness (ibid. 11).

As both of these films depict characters with mental disturbances, this causes them to lose control or act in an unusual way. In order to depict their subjective experience and perception, the director builds up the link between the character and the frame in two ways: direct or indirect. Branigan names the case when it is indirect as 'character projection' (1992, p. 73) shots, and the other as "optical subjectivity, where both character's and spectator's experiences coincide temporally" (ibid., 64). Aronofsky aims to represent his character's split of subject between real and virtual, external and internal world by building up visual and aural fields in parallel to character's perception and mood.

According to Grodal, such deviations from perfect vision and hearing create stress and arousal in spectators (134). To illustrate, the use of snorri-cam keeps actors' body in the focus while blurring the background directly separates the character from the environment. Here, in both *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), snorri-cam is

used to express the effects of opiated consciousness and especially to depict the isolated relation between the character and his environment. By expressing the affective disjunction between narcosis and normative perception, Aronofsky depicts the split of subject and object as relation between actual and imaginary is blurred. The shaky way of vibrating camera puts the spectators in the similar mood that is parallel with the characters. In Appendix 2, Picture B.1, Max Cohen (*Pi*) while wandering around the streets and use of snorri-cam isolates himself from the society.

8.2. SUBJECTIVE SPACE AND SOUND

Both with his visual style and his use of subjective internal sounds, Aronofsky aims to create viewing and aural experiences that parallel his main characters. There are three different strategies which the director uses to construct subjective space in his films: violation of subjective space, flattening the space and their combination.

8.2.1. Violation Of Subjective Space

As both films are heavily reliant on close-up, extreme close-up and POV shots, spectators automatically violate the very intimate zone of characters. While in the film *Pi* (1998), spectators automatically find themselves extremely intimate with the main character Max Cohen in extreme close up (see Appendix 2 Picture B.2), in *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), the scene, where we can see Marion and Harry from the point of view of a security camera in the elevator, signifies the violation of private space (see Appendix 1 Picture A.1).

In one of his interview with Anthony Kaufman (2000), Darren Aronofsky states that "You can really use sound to help capture the subjective experiences and suck audiences into the movie" (1). Thus, while spectators violate the subjective space of characters in several ways such as close up, POV shot etc., Aronofsky by using a higher level of sound not expected at such a proximity, automatically deviates the synchresis of sound effect. This consequently results into violation of subjective spaces of spectators themselves. To give an example, the sipping sound of having coffee in *Requiem for a Dream* or the sound of locking or unlocking doors in *Pi*. As another example from *Requiem*, instead of showing Sara eating the egg, the grapefruit and drinking the coffee,

he utilizes a jump cut paired with a sound effect, and thus heightens our sense of her dissatisfaction. Our temporal experience of the similar act does not match with Sara. Thus, the director creates similar sense of dissatisfaction for both Sara and spectators (see Appendix 1 Picture A.2, A3).

8.2.1.1. *Close up, POV shot, zoom*

Branigan (1992) argues that close-up produces a more direct effect of spatial or optical intimacy and a greater involvement. Likewise, Messaris, considers close-up as an intensifier of content. According to Torben Grodal, the source of objects perceived may belong to either 'exterior, interior or ambiguous world' (158). In case of being exterior, "it cues the mental stimulation of an enactive world", whereas for the cases of being interior, Grodal argues that "it cues a purely perceptual, cognitive, proximal experience" (1997, p.158). Grodal, furthermore, reminds that the spectator may perceive the agents and their relations to inanimate objects with the same emotional distance, which builds up their cognitive and emphatic identification with them (ibid.). There are two main ways Aronofsky uses close up in his films. First, Aronofsky aims to stimulate his spectators to develop same emotional distance with the characters and their relations with inanimate objects. With the help of extreme close-ups, spectators identify the similar type of proximity with the materials the characters using in *Requiem for a Dream* (see Appendix 1 Picture A.4, A5) or paying our attention to patterns in order to draw analogy in nature similar to Max Cohen in *Pi* (see Appendix 2 Picture B.3). Second, Aronofsky uses facial close-ups in order for spectators to read the faces of his characters and develop empathy with the characters, as discussed in detail in the following section.

While in POV, there is no indication of a character's mental condition, in the perception shot a signifier of mental condition has been added to an optical POV. Several perceptual states such as dizziness, being drunk or drugged are signified by the use of out of focus POV in *Requiem for a Dream* (See Appendix 1 Picture A.6, A7) and *Pi* (see Appendix 2 Picture B.4). As point of view shooting and editing presents experience in terms of glances and visions, both close up and POV shots reinforce narrative by offering an almost purely disembodied, non-sensory, de-realized model of experience (Carney 1994, 15).

In addition, Sobchack states that zoom-in intensifies the object and make it more vivid by centring it in both film's and spectator's consciousness (see Appendix 1 Picture A.8). Conversely, zooming-out releases the object from its implication in our attention and the object shrinks in its relation to the subject (1992, p.25). Sobchack states that optical movement in the cinema, an alteration of the subject's relation with the world, stimulates attention and results into an act of learning by creating new objects for consciousness (1990, 28).

On the other hand, Aronofsky uses voice-over to represent the interal voice of Max. This again while engages spectators also disembodies them. In a film, when the voice is heard in sound close up without reverb, Chion states that it is likely to be at once the voice the spectator internalizes as his/her own and the voice that takes total possession of the diegetic space (1994, p. 79). The 'I-Voice', which Chion calls, is the sound that both fills us and comes from us (ibid., 80). Chion adds that it is both completely internal and invading the entire universe (ibid.). Related with voice – over, Doane warns us in that the voice-over commentary in the documentary, the voice-over during a flashback, or the interior monologue as in *Pi* (1998), is, in effect, a disembodied voice (1980, p. 42).

Seeing from character's eyes, hearing from his/her ears and having the similar proximity with the objects in their world, build up similar intentions for spectators. Aronofsky with his close-ups and POV shots directs spectator's attention to the objects which can be considered as 'intentional objects' (noema) in Sobchack's terms within the emotional world of characters shared by spectators. This directly posits spectators as if they were having the similar experience.

8.2.1.2. *Facial close up*

With facial close-ups, the director creates the most intimate and emotional proximity between his characters and spectators. Mary Ann Doane underlines that close-up produces an intense phenomenological experience of presence and yet, at the same time this deeply experienced entity becomes a text to be read (2003, p. 94). This completely abolishes spectator's sensation of space. Bèla Balázs (2003) states that it is the heart not

the eye that perceives such shots as these are expressions of our subconscious feelings. In order for us to build up empathy with his characters, Aronofsky gradually takes spectators to the moments of crisis of Marion's life in example in *Requiem for a Dream* or Max in *Pi*. Spectators can be more than a witness of troubles Marion has been through in order to obtain drugs from a dealer (see Appendix 1 Picture A.9). The same strategy used in *Pi* enables spectators to build emotional proximity that Max Cohen has with other characters (see Appendix 2 Picture B.5).

An important scene, I would like to point out is the facial close up, in which Marian screams with her head drawn into the bath tube. According to Michel Chion, the scream serves a narrative function not as an end to conflict or reconciliation, but as an eruption, or a volcano. Chion brings another dimension by considering the 'screaming point' in terms of gender. Chion states that "while male does not scream, but shouts and this marks territory, exercising will and structure; female scream reaches the infinite, it is a sound or cry at the brink of death" (1994, p. 77). Chion concludes that the male shout structures, whereas the female scream "opens a black hole to the limitless" (ibid., 78). As being surrounded by water in the bath tube, we cannot hear Marion's scream, but this however leaves a kind of dissatisfaction as she cannot succeed in making us hear her voice of troubles.

8.2.2. Parameters Flattening The Space

Similar to Merleau-Ponty and director Stan Brackage, Vivian Sobchack also considers vision to be a whole body experience. Such corporeal and holistic acts of seeing can be realised only by deviating spectator's normal perception of space according to Renaissance perspective through techniques such as superimposition, fast editing, subjective camera etc. Darren Aronofsky, in that sense, accomplishes to build up a holistic corporeal perception by using several of these techniques in order to depict deviated perceptions of his characters. In that sense, the director focuses on the difficulties his characters have in building unification with other objects and subjects, due to their mental states. In fact, this creates a big gap or kind of hole that they can never fill in their life. Aronofsky, I believe, accomplishes to depict such difficulties in his visual style which leaves in spectators an effect similar to his characters. Here in Aronofsky's films each flattened image functions as a photograph. Vivian Sobchack

states that "when we experience the 'timelessness' that a photograph confers on its subject matter, we are experiencing the photograph's compelling emptiness (59). Sobchack considers this situation as a 'vacancy' rather than the possibility of temporality. Thus, Sobchack argues that photograph is a hole in temporality and announces a vacancy (60). In that sense, Aronofsky each time by creating black holes, takes his characters together with his spectators into a new bigger trouble which spectators can never release from. To illustrate, in *Requiem for a Dream* (2000), the rhythmic montage scenes of their weekly routine to make money by selling drugs ends up with a photograph. These are several cycles ending with a different photograph of Marion and Harry (see Appendix 1, Picture A.10). Despite of being a moment of happiness, this represents a moment of a vacancy or hole that they can never fill or they can never reach.

Another parameter to flatten the space used by Aronofsky is split screen. Aronofsky uses split screen in several different combinations to represent the split of subject. When confronted with split screen, spectators automatically build up an analogy in order to find out the relationship between two semi-screens. Each split screen scene, in that sense, depicts the black holes in character's life style. There are two different purposes Aronofsky uses split screen in *Requiem for a Dream* (2000). First, while one portion of split screen depicts one character, the other portion depicts his or her dream that s/he can never reach in their real life. In Appendix 1, Picture A.11 depicts the pillow talk between Marion and Harry. Although they share the similar moment and place, the split screen distorts their unification of space and time, as if each of them narcissistically live in their own world. In that sense, their dream of being together with their lover just remains as a dream. Thus, here Aronofsky employs split screen to show that even in the most intimate of moments, his characters are separate existentially. It is important to note that in order to intensify the seperation between characters, Aronofsky is using lighting techniques as seen in Appendix 1 Picture A.12. On the other hand, Sara goes on a deadly diet just to be a winner in literal sense. Sara, this time starts dreaming the real food which she replaces with inorganic drugs. It is just a dream for Sara to reach the real food, as also seen in Appendix 1, Picture A.13, Sara and the blurring image of refrigerator in her mind in split – screen.

Another way, Aronofsky uses split-screen is the scenes which combine characters with their own point of view. Aronofsky also depicts the separation between Sara and inorganic materials such as drugs in another split-screen horizontally. We can see Sara and drugs separately from her own point of view in Appendix 1, Picture A.14. Third, although characters are in separate places, split screen intensifies their seperation and Aronofsky emphasizes different perspectives of their characters by using point of view shots (see Appendix 1 Picture A.15).

8.2.3. Parameters Flattening And Violating The Space

Aronofsky, by integrating two of his strategies with subjective aural field accomplishes to cooperate our senses. According to Sobchack, as this cooperation and commutative system of the bodily senses structure existential perception; "stimulation of one sense causes perception in another" (2000, p. 10). This builds up "cinesthetic subject" of cinema, which convey an overall sense of embodiment (*1992,* 69). Anna Powell (2007), similarly, argues that with its invasive cinematography *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) stimulates "synaesthetic experience of virtual taste via image and sound" (p. 79).

The use of sound has an important role especially when used together with the parameters which flatten the space and violate the space at the same time. Chion states that "while the eye must simultaneously explore space and follow along in time, the ear isolates details instantly and follows these details in time" (1994, p. 10). These rapid movements, according to Chion, are perceived as "ear-that-is-in-the-eye" an auditive eye, which traces out the lines of rapid visual movements; that subsequently etches them into spectator's consciousness quickly (ibid.). On the other hand, similar to listening to a melody, each fast-edited motif constitutes a 'moment of audition' (Crogan 2007, p. 1). Spectators retain that moment of audition in their consciousness and repetition of same and similar moment of audition results into constitution of 'temporal object' via a dual retention and anticipatory protention for a meaningful coherence (ibid., 2). As Crogan refers to Husserl, this is an example case where the memory is selectively recalled and reconstituted (ibid.). So, while spectators' eyes struggle for meaning, the primary retention stretches the present moment of auditory experience and memory. As also stated by Crogan, the immediate perception and recalled perception compose together the experience of the present and the ongoing development of

consciousness as continuity beneath momentary impressions. The harmony of sounds with extreme close –up images also enables spectators to recall those images together for a complete experience.

Thus, in addition to the ways of split-screen mentioned previously, Aronofsky here, with his use of split screen, aims to intensify the similar feelings by synchronizing two characters' actions and moods. The drug scenes in *Requiem for a Dream* are in fast motion because the character's lives are buzzing by though they are not aware of it. They are dreaming about filling the void at the same time that they are making it bigger (see Appendix 1, Picture A.16).

8.3. SUBJECTIVE TIME AND SOUND

8.3.1. Temporality And Consciousness

In his films, Aronofsky presents his character's subjective temporality of decentred and deviated moods, and memory by using anachronies such as flashback, flashforward, fast-motion etc. By the use of flashbacks and flashforwards which represent dream, hallucination and fantasy, we can see that the distinction between objective and subjective time is blurred. These scenes leave the spectators feelings of being decentered and fragmented. Vivian Sobchack argues that "temporality becomes paradoxically constituted as a homogeneous experience of discontinuity in which the temporal distinctions between objective and subjective experience… disappear, and time seems to turn back on itself in a structure of equivalence and reversibility" (2000, p. 75). Similarly, the nature of the space experienced is redefined, disembodied: "Without the temporal emphases of historical consciousness and personal history, space also becomes abstract, ungrounded and flat – a site for play and display rather than an invested situation in which action 'counts'" (Sobchack, "The Adress" 19).

In order to signify the changes from character's opiated or deviated perception to normal perception, Aronofsky uses active mode of acousmatic sound, in Michel Chion's terms. Both characters and spectators hear the sound, but cannot exactly know about the source. According to Chion, this engages both spectators and characters in a similar way to question the source of sound and search for an answer. Especially in *Pi*, Aronofsky uses subjective internal sounds in order to emphasize schizophrenic type of crisis Max

has been through. It is sometimes horn of a train or ring of a telephone that wakes both Max and spectators up from Max's hallucination or illusion.

On the other hand, in order to build up spectators' consciousness in the film, Aronofsky intensifies the present experiences of his characters. Susan Pockett refers "sensation of duration" as "the speed at which time seems to pass subjectively" (2003, p.62). Aronofsky, by using anachronies, attempts to represent duration of any particular subjective sensation of his characters. To constitute the internal experience and deviated consciousness of his characters, Aronofsky intensifies the present moment (or 'thickening the present' in Sobchack's term). According to Georg Franc, subjective time passes and it is centred in the "now". Franc states that "the subjectivity of subjective time lies in its being centred in present awareness. The way we experience the present is the presence of consciousness"(2).

Merleau-Ponty states that "... time presupposes a view of time. To exist, true time demands the presence of a subject whose relationship to the world is intentional. True time is not a process of objective world; it can only be encountered in a personal relation to things" (1962, p. 477). In that sense, Aronofsky intensifies the present time by directing spectator's intention to make them pay attention or be aware of the current experiences of his characters.

8.3.2. Rhythm, Memory And Temporality

Another important element, I would like to emphasize, is the repetitive structure of anachronies in harmony with music and polyphonic montage. This drives spectators to build up analogies and recall previous motifs or similar motif which belong to another character in order to rebuild new experiences. The additive feature of parametric narration when combined with the rhythm of the film also enables spectators to accumulate these repeated motifs as experiences to build one complete experience of using inorganic items in *Requiem for a Dream*, in example. Tyrone ends up having to detoxify with no medication in jail (Appendix 1, Picture A.17) , while Sara has completely lost her mind (Appendix 1, Picture A.18). Worst off would have to be Harry, who loses his arm because his injection site had become so infected that it had to be amputated.

9. CONCLUSION

This study aims to analyze the ways in which Aronofsky constructs subjective time and space in his films *Pi* (1998) and *Requiem for a Dream* (2000) in order to create similar visual and aural experiences that parallel his main character's own experiences. I believe that Aronofsky, after developing a very good understanding of altered states of minds of people with opiated and psychosomatic perceptions, aims to adjust all the elements of the film –visual style, editing, subjective sound, rhythm and music- to the mood of the character and the first person focalized narration. With such an adjustment, Aronofsky accomplishes to represent such perceptions which I have referred as "Narcissus in Wonderland" in the very introduction of this study. Aronofsky, on the one hand, attempts to realise a double embodiment in spectators by using first person focalized narration and subjective parameters as intensifiers of content together with the rhythm and music which build up a 'fantasmatic body', on the other hand the director constructs film's subjectivity identical to character's visual and aural subjectivity with its deviated forms of time and space, which directly deviates spectator's perception. Thus, in order to represent opiated or deviated perceptions of his characters, Aronofsky constructs decentred and fragmented space and time, which puts spectators in a mood of being in a wonderland similar to the moods of his characters' world. Aronofsky, through a good blend of subjective and objective techniques, exploits spectator's shifts of attention and memory and consequently raises their awareness and consciousness.

In addition to focalized first person narration, which gives spectators as if they were experiencing the events, Aronofsky also emphasizes the specific feelings his characters have with his visual style. Considering the types of feelings of people with opiated or psychosomatic perception, Aronofsky creates the feeling of emptiness or vacancy by using photographs; dissatisfaction by using fast –editing and jump cuts; isolation and lack of unity by using subjective camera and split-screen. In addition to the visual style in harmony with polyphonic montage and music, Aronofsky brings the spectators gradually to the crisis moments of his main characters by using parallel editing. In *Requiem for a Dream,* we can see Tyrne's detoxification with no medication in jail, Sara's completely losing her mind, Harry's arm being amputated and Marion's

suffering at the sex party. In *Pi*, being in between the materialistic, scientific and spiritual world and turning each of them as a threat for Max prepares conditions for his last crisis (see Appendix 2 Picture B.6, B.7). Such an intensification of the mood of those characters whom spectators feel emotional intimacy builds up similar unbearable moments that spectators share with characters in the film.

Considering the reversible role of perceiving subject and perceived object in terms of phenomenological understanding, Stadler (2002) emphasizes an intersubjective nature of film perception. In engaging spectators in "the dialogic nature of spectatorship and reversibility of subjectivity and objectivity, the cinema instantiates a deeply felt, human requirement for intersubjectivity, a need to be understood ourselves and to be able to see things from another's point of view" (246). In that sense film enables us to see from another's eyes and perspectives. Aronofsky, however, by putting spectators in a similar context and mood of 'wonderland' and engaging them cognitively and emotionally in narcissistic illusion with rhythm and music and combined with the ways in which he adjusts his visual style to this mood and narrative, in fact builds more than an intersubjective space where spectators feel empathy with the characters whom they have this much emotional proximity with.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.1 Security Camera (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.2 Close-up (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.3 Fast Edited Scene (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.4 Zoom-in (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.5 Facial Close-up (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.6 Extreme Close-up (*Requiem*)





APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.7 Marion's Fantasy (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.8 Photo (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.9 Split Screen (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.10 Use of Lighting (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.11 Horizontal, &Vertical Split Screen (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.12 POV Shot in Split Screen (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.13 Use of Fish-eye Lens (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.14 Scream in Water (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.15 Fade Into Dream (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.16 Fast Edited 2 Shots in Split Screen (*Requiem*)



APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.17 Harry's Arm Being Amputated (*Requiem*)

APPENDIX 1 – Picture A.18 Sara and Shockwaves (*Requiem*)



APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Alienation of Max (*Pi*)

APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Alienation of Max (*Pi*)

APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 People Threatening Max (*Pi*)



APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Spiral Shapes (*Pi*)





APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Extreme Close-up (*Pi*)

APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Real or Imaginary? (*Pi*)



APPENDIX 2 – Picture B.1 Max's Brain in Extreme Close-up (*Pi*)

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