

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**CAN CYPRUS BE AN OBSTACLE ON TURKEY'S
ROAD TO EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP?**

M.A Thesis

AYSUN NUR BATMAZ

ISTANBUL, 2009

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

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The main purpose of this research is to analyze Turkey's accession to the European Union under the Cyprus conflict. This project is interested in knowing both key events of the Cyprus conflict and the process of peace talks between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots that resulted in failure. This thesis also tries to bring a detailed knowledge on the Annan Plan which can be seen as a new hope for the solution of a forty five-year conflict.

Turkey's accession bid has officially begun with the decision of 3 October 2005, and since that time Turkey's membership to the European Union has been subject to inter-state bargaining in the European Union's summits by using the Cyprus conflict as the case. After examining Turkey - European Union relations and Cyprus-European Union relations from the date of their first application to the EU, the aim of this research is to argue whether the Cyprus conflict and the accession of the Republic of Cyprus will have an effect on Turkey's membership in the European Union.

Key Words: Turkey's membership in the European Union, the Cyprus conflict, accession of the Republic of Cyprus, the Annan Plan, negotiation

ÖZET

KIBRIS TÜRKİYE'NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ÜYELİĞİ SÜRECİNDE BİR ENGEL OLABİLİR Mİ?

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Bu tezin asıl amacı, Kıbrıs sorunu eşliğinde Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne katılım sürecini analiz etmektir. Araştırmada hem Kıbrıs sorununun kilit noktaları hem de Kıbrıs Türkleri ve Kıbrıs Rumları arasında devam eden ve ne yazık ki bu güne kadar başarısızlıkla sonuçlanan barış görüşmeleri süreci detaylı olarak incelenmektedir. Ayrıca bu tez ile kırk beş yıldır devam etmekte olan Kıbrıs sorununun çözümünde yeni bir umut olduğu düşünülen Annan Planı'nın incelenmesi ve Annan Planı hakkında daha detaylı bilgi sahibi olunması amaçlanmıştır.

Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne resmi katılım süreci 3 Ekim 2005 tarihli karar ile başlamıştır ve bu tarihten itibaren Kıbrıs sorunu nedeniyle Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği Avrupa Birliği zirvelerinde üye ülkeler arasında pazarlık konusu olmuş ve çeşitli tartışmalara sebebiyet vermiştir. Tezin yazın sürecinde, hem Türkiye'nin hem de Kıbrıs'ın Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik için ilk defa başvuru yaptığı tarihten başlamak üzere Türkiye – Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri ve Kıbrıs – Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri öncelikli olarak incelenmiştir. Bu incelemeler sonrasında Kıbrıs sorunu ve Kıbrıs'ın Avrupa Birliği üyesi olmasının Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliğine bir etkisinin olup olmadığı tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye Avrupa Birliği üyeliği, Kıbrıs sorunu, Kıbrıs'ın Avrupa Birliği'ne katılımı, Annan Planı, müzakere

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ABBREVIATIONS

Before Christ	: BC
Confidence Building Measures	: CBMs
Customs Union	: CU
European Union	: EU
Greek Cypriot Administration	: GCA
Justice and Development Party	: AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Agoniston)	: EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	: NATO
Republic of Cyprus	: RoC
Turkish Grand National Assembly	: TGNA
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus	: TRNC
United Nation Keeping Force in Cyprus	: UNFICYP
United Nations	: UN
United States	: US

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkey's long-standing goal of being a member of the European Union took a new turn with the opening of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. By this decision, Turkey-EU relations have moved a historic step forward. The journey of Turkey has begun in 1959 and has not been the point of destination yet. The accession negotiations will be a long process, throughout which some difficulties can come into existence in some specific areas. During the accession negotiations, Turkey has to adopt the *acquis communautaire* that even current member states have problems in implementation. Thus, the negotiations will be easy neither for the EU nor for Turkey.

Turkey is a unique case in the EU, because of the several objections forwarded about Turkey's EU membership even after opening accession negotiations. Turkey is like a bridge in between Europe and Asia, but only a small northwestern part of the country lies in Europe. Because of this position, some Member States, especially France and the Republic of Cyprus, insist on that Turkey is not geographically part of Europe. If this is the case, the RoC which lies in the same meridian with Turkey, is also an Asian country. Additionally, it is believed that Turkey's large population with the low per-capita income would change the balance of power in the EU. She would have a considerable influence in the EU because she would be the second largest country after Germany. The other objection forwarded about Turkey's EU membership is being a Muslim country. The EU is much closer to the Muslim countries with the accession of the RoC. So, it is important to have good relations with Muslim countries. Besides being a Muslim country, Turkey has been governed by a secular and democratic regime based on rule of law. Under these characteristics, Turkey has a prestige around the Islamic countries (Snyder 1995). Thus, accepting Turkey as a full-member has vital importance for the EU and for relations between the Islamic world and the West. Considering other importance of Turkey's key strategic position, she lies between the oil-rich Middle East and the EU. However, for the time being, her Muslim neighbor countries in the Middle East have been politically unstable. Turkey negotiates with these countries to provide peace and security in the area. For instance, Turkey is in

dialogue with all groups in Iraq to make them meet in a common point. Therefore, nowadays, Turkey is a symbol of change and stability in this region. If Turkey arrives in its final destination, the EU's membership, the EU will border the Middle East. This accession will help the EU to spread democratic values to the Middle East and other several countries. After 11 September 2001 attacks, bordering with these countries became strategically important. At the same time, together with Turkey, the EU can be a global actor as it has desired so far.

Under these strict objections, Turkish government continues to make reforms vigorously. It is frequently stated that she has been adopting and implementing these new reforms not only as an obligation for the accession to the EU, but also for the benefit of Turkish people. Although Turkey has still been dealing with these issues, some problems to remit her efforts emerge time to time. One of the crucial reasons which stand as an obstacle on Turkey's road to the EU is unsolvable conflict of Cyprus which has also been a full-fledged member of the EU.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze Turkey's accession to the EU under the Cyprus conflict. The long-standing conflict of Cyprus, as one of the crucial factors that can block Turkey's accession negotiations, has been discussed almost in every summit of the European institutions. As being a protracted conflict, it has been going on for decades. Policy-makers, politicians, scholars and many others have dealt with this conflict for years in order to find a solution that would benefit both for the Turkish Cypriots and for the Greek Cypriots.

The historical background and the definition of "the Cyprus conflict" are given in Chapter I. The Cyprus conflict can be divided into two parts. The first part is from 1960 to 1974 and the second part is from 1974 to present. In this chapter, the events that took place between the years 1960-1974 will be evaluated. The objective of the concentration on the phase from 1960 to 1974 is to go back to the beginning and emphasize the importance of these years in understanding the conflict of Cyprus. If this conflict can still be discussed as an unresolved issue of international community and the gap between the two communities is widening increasingly, then its origins should be

investigated. Furthermore, this chapter will also endeavor to analyze the relations with the EU of both Turkey and Cyprus. While explaining these relations, especially, the fundamental turning points will be discussed.

The second part of the conflict will be analyzed with reference to certain points after 1974 in Chapter II. The period after the Turkish invasion in response to the Greek coup d'état of 1974 and the involvement of the UN as a new part of the conflict will be elaborated with respect to important events. This conflict has cost for both the Turkish Cypriots and for the Greek Cypriots, in terms of lives, economic crisis and psychological destruction. However, the Turkish Cypriots community had to a subject almost all the damages because of being an unrecognized state. Therefore, Turkey as the only country which recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has faced several struggles to reach its aims through the international community, for instance, being a member of the EU. The accession of Cyprus to the EU after the Athens summit in June 2003 composed another setback to the never ending story of Turkey.

The parties of the conflict have met several times under the auspices of the UN since 1964 after the UN sent a peace keeping force to the island. Every attempt started with peaceful declarations, but it could not be possible to reach a settlement. It was thought that the last hope disappeared, after the “no” vote of the Greek Cypriots to reunify on the Annan Plan. But, the stagnation period lasted only two years until the UN arranged a meeting between the two leaders in July 2006. Nevertheless, again, political disagreements prevented to continue the process. After the elections on the southern part in February 2008, the two leaders of the Cypriots decided to start peace talks on March 2008. This last effort and the current situation on the island, also, will be analyzed in Chapter II in order to understand the future of the Cyprus conflict and Turkey's EU membership process.

The Cyprus conflict is a very old and popular case in the conflict resolution literature. Since the division of the island, 1974, the parties have stated their desire not to be placed in this literature anymore. Nevertheless, the Cyprus conflict has still been protecting its place in there. During the history, different kinds of peace talks took

place and every stage of peace talks until the Proximity Talks will be elaborated in the first part of Chapter III. As mentioned above, the involvement of the UN has entered a new phase in peace talk's history and put the Secretary General of this organization in the position of a mediator in the conflict. This chapter, also, examines the ongoing conflict on Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in conjunction with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's last peace plan and discusses why the plan failed to produce a mutually- accepted solution.

Finally, Chapter IV will endeavor to discover the factors which have been at the bottom among the conflict parties not to reach a settlement. The UN has made a huge effort to overcome this conflict so far. This evaluation on deadlock process will help to understand what went wrong during the peace talks. Another purpose of this chapter is to provide an explanation about the involvement of the EU as a new part of the conflict. After the membership of the RoC, it was wondered if the EU could help to reunite Cyprus. Furthermore, in this chapter, the future of Turkey in the EU and "to recognize Cyprus" as another condition for Turkey's membership will also be analyzed.

Above all, Turkey's accession handicap, the Cyprus conflict, and its impacts will be analyzed in this thesis. As will be seen in the forthcoming chapters, the Cyprus conflict is still one of the unresolved and lingering issues in the international society. Therefore, the accession of the RoC on 1 May 2004 has been the main motive of the thesis, as Turkish-European relations has entered a new phase in history.

2. THE DEFINITION OF CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE RELATION BETWEEN EU & TURKEY AND EU & CYPRUS

2.1 EARLY SIGNS OF CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE PERIOD FROM 1960 TO 1974

Cyprus, being the third largest island in the Mediterranean, has always been a unique long-running international dispute. The island is located south of Turkey at the meeting point of Europe, Asia and Africa. In spite of being a small country, Cyprus has a cultural variety due to its historical background and key strategic location. The island has been attacked, sold or transferred from one power to another during its history.

The island was formed by Greeks in the second millennium BC. Since then, the population has remained Greek intrinsically, while under the control of Cypriots or other nationalities, like Mycenaeans, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Venetians, Turks or British (Mallinson 2005). The relation between Turks and Cyprus was established after the conquest of the island by the Ottoman Empire from the Venetians in 1571. It was governed until giving the island to the United Kingdom just for administration in 1878, but the sovereignty of the island was belonging to the Ottoman Empire on paper (Cyprus History <http://www.cyprusexplorer.com/history.htm> n.d.). The history covered by these external powers has affected all Cyprus; it has contributed to every single part of the island. Cypriots are not owners of their fortune, because outside powers have decided about their destiny so far. This attitude of external powers made the population less multicultural than might have been desired (Hannay 2005). At the end of World War I, the United Kingdom stated that the annexation of the island. With the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, Turkey and Greece approved that declaration (Müftüler 1999).

After that, the Greek Cypriots, who supported Enosis (union with Greece), started their violent attacks against the United Kingdom to end the British rule over the island. The United Kingdom had faced hard times during those attacks until the end of World War II. In the post World War II era, the Greek Cypriots, again, came up with a request of transferring Cyprus to Greece referring a historical argument which declares that, even if the Greeks have not governed the island since the 11th century, it is a Greek island with the Greek majority of the population (Müftüler 1999). In terms of historical background, there were sort of minorities in Cyprus. But during the time of independence, in 1960, the population of the island was composed of two communities; the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. These communities have played an important role in the island during the history.

In 1950s the voices of the Greek Cypriots who supported Enosis, became more organized. They were able to establish an organization called EOKA to serve their purpose. On 1 April 1955 the EOKA started a campaign with the support of Greece in order to end the British administration and establish Enosis with mainland Greece. The organization started their bloody attacks by murdering the Greek Cypriots who did not want to unify with Greece (Cyprus Issue <http://www.kibris1974.com/cyprus-issue-t1923.html?s=3688cc2242bfcad5d0d324ec4b753ca4&> 2008). Then, the EOKA organization began to attack the British and the Turkish community in all parts of the island. The Turkish community started to organize themselves to form self protection units, but was not successful because they were disorganized and had no weapons.

From 1955 to 1960 the EOKA fought for Enosis, not for independence. During the conflict hundreds of British people, the Turkish Cypriots, and the Greek Cypriots were murdered, and thousands of the Turkish Cypriots had to move from mixed villages where their homes had been destroyed. In 1960 the United Kingdom understood the impossibility of managing the island and gave up Cyprus to the two communities, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots. But, also, the two bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, were kept under British sovereignty (British Rule <http://www.cyprusive.com/?CID=67> n.d.). While the conflict between the communities was taking place by violence, on the other hand Turkey and Greece established good relations with NATO. “Both countries signed

the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952 and have been "key contributors" in promoting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, and more specifically, NATO's Southern Flank" (Turkey and Greece celebrate 50 years of NATO membership <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/02-february/e0218a.htm> 2002).

The civil war lasted during the 1950s and the political conflict between the two communities reached the peak levels at the end of the 1950s. On 19 February 1959 Britain, Turkey and Greece met in a conference which was called London-Zurich conference in London. They, as the guarantor countries, signed the London-Zurich Treaties (the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance) to end the civil war in the Cyprus' sovereignty. In addition to these agreements they also formed the basis of 'the Cyprus constitution of 1960' and drafted the basic structure of 'the Republic of Cyprus' by imposing a prohibition of Enosis (Zurich and London Agreements-The Constitution-The Treaties http://www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/p_zurich.html n.d.).

As a result of the consensus between the guarantor countries, the Republic of Cyprus was created and the Constitution of 1960 declared that Cyprus was going to be a Republic. The two communities as co-founder partners shared power to govern the Republic and the balance powers was going to control by guarantor countries Turkey, Greece and Britain. According to the Treaty of Guarantee; Turkey, Greece and Britain would be the guarantor countries and if the island was endangered, they had the right to act independently in case joint actions were not possible. The treaty also prohibited the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to any union or organization. According to the treaty, they agreed as follows:

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. ... They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island. ... In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim Of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty. (Documents Relating To The Founding of Cyprus, Including The Treaty of Guarantee, 1959 <http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/treaty.htm> n.d.).

The Treaty of Alliance got the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey together in their common interest about peace and security. Concerning those issues, a Tripartite Headquarters was going to be composed on the island with the participation of Turkey and Greece. The main sentences of the article about this issue as follows:

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defense and undertake by this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defense. ...In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfill the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic Of Cyprus. (Documents Relating To The Founding of Cyprus, Including The Treaty of Guarantee, 1959 <http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/treaty.htm> n.d.).

The third treaty was the Treaty of Establishment which was much more about territory and security of the island. According to that treaty, the island of Cyprus and the islands around its coast would compose the Republic of Cyprus. However the two areas, the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, would be under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. The Republic of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom would work together under the defense issue. The Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom also accepted to carry out the economics arrangements (Cyprus History <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/try-establishment.html> n.d.).

The London-Zurich Treaties guaranteed that the two communities as co-founder partners had equal political rights and one community could not dominate the other one. However, the Enosis hopes were still exist after the foundation of the Republic. The Greek Cypriots with the support of Greece tried to implement their plan with every form of pressure and violence (Bölükbaşı 2004).

After the founding of the Republic of Cyprus, some implementation and interpretation problems about the constitution emerged between the two communities. According to the Greek Cypriots, the constitution was unclear and unfair because of the articles to protect the Turkish Cypriots and they claimed that the unfair constitution damaged the efficiency of government. Almost all of the provisions guaranteed by the Three Treaties and 1960 Constitution were amended by the Greek Cypriots. Troubles restarted when

the Greek Cypriots started to amend the Constitution for making the Turkish Cypriots passive through government.

The 1960 Constitution did only last three years, because the Greek Cypriot leadership refused to fulfill the obligations. The EOKA once again started its campaign, and on 21 December 1962, a lot of Turkish Cypriots were killed in the operations which were called Bloody Christmas then (TRNC Public Information Office <http://www.trncpio.org/ingilizce/ingilizcesayfa.htm> n.d.).

The Greek Cypriots launched a plan, Akritas, aimed to unify with Greece and if Turkish community refused the plan, they would send the Turkish Cypriots away from the island. President Makarios wanted to amend the thirteen points of the 1960 Constitution about the rights of the Turkish Cypriots under the aim of changing their status as minority. The Turkish Cypriots did not accept these changes. They were ejected by force and the Republic of Cyprus of which the 1960 treaties guaranteed the bi-communal structure was destroyed. The Turkish Cypriots were squeezed into 3 per cent of the island's territory after the events of 1963 (Richmond 1998).

The island was divided into two by a line which runs east to west across the island. It was called the "Green Line". The UN Security Council with the Resolution 186 sent UN Peacekeeping Forces to Cyprus in 1964 for only six months, but the mandate of these forces has been extended every six months since then (Ibid, p.78). The United Nation Keeping Force was in the island to prevent conflicts, maintain order and recompose the constitution. However the existence of UNFICYP could not prevent the attacks of the Greek Cypriots on the Turkish Cypriots. In the same year, the Turkish Cypriots had to leave their houses because most of them were burnt and ruined down by the Greek Cypriots' attacks and a lot of people died as a result of the fight between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots.

Several attacks occurred in March and April 1964. As a result of these attacks, a huge number of the Turkish Cypriots' population had to move to the Turkish quarter of Nicosia (Turkish-American Relations concerning the Cyprus Questions <http://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/hist.html> n.d.).

After the nationalistic Greek junta overthrew Makarios in July 1974, a bloody conflict violated the order which had destroyed before. It became obvious that the Turkish community was at risk. The Turkish aim was both to stop Cyprus becoming a Greek island and to protect the Turkish Cypriots (Hannay 2005). As mentioned before, under the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey had the right to act independently in case joint actions were not possible. According to that article, the Turkish government tried to find a peaceful solution with a lot of diplomatic attempts and asking for Britain's cooperation to restore the previous structure of the RoC, but these efforts failed; thus, she instantly began to prepare its response. Turkey as a guarantor country intervened the island on 20 July 1974 with reference to its treaty rights and obligations.

The attempt of the Greek Cypriots leader to make the "enosis" real left no choice to Turkey except acting as one of the guarantor countries of the Republic of Cyprus and intervening in the island unilaterally. This intervention resulted in division of the island and the Turkish Cypriots settled in the northern part of the island (Bölükbaşı 2004). Many Greek Cypriots from the north moved to the south and many Turkish Cypriots from the south moved to the north or took shelter in the British Sovereign Base Areas (Hannay, Ibid, p.6). The movement from one part to another has become one of the traumatic events in the history of the island. It could be considered as the real beginning of the Cyprus conflict.

This intervention had different meanings in the two communities of Cyprus, for the Turkish Cypriots it was an obligatory operation to maintain peace and stability, whereas for the Greek Cypriots it was an occupation. In fact, the conflict between the Greek Cypriots leader and Greece to change the regime in Cyprus accelerated the Turkish military intervention in July 1974 (Uğur 1999).

Consequently, this intervention had not solved the conflict in Cyprus, it only helped to stop the bloody civil war. Cyprus has been divided since 1974, and its unresolved aspect has been one of the crucial issues on the international literature as well as for the people of the island.

2.2 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE EU

The Turks share a long history with the Europeans for more than thousands years. Even before the Republican period, during the Ottoman Empire, which lasted almost six centuries, they were effective in keeping the order through their important role of maintaining the balance of power in Europe (Inalcık 2006).

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the first president of the new state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk declared that the main goal of modern Turkey was to adopt Western modernity by implementing its political, economic and social structures to form an independent, secular and modern state, and also giving importance to industrialization process (Aydın and Keyman 2004). According to Atatürk's vision, the Turkish Republic's unchangeable main principles were reform, secularism, and modernism. These elements, which have been almost in all European political projects, would provide the survival of the Turkish Republic while dealing with both internal and external struggles (Dahlman 2004).

As has been stated above, the modern Turkey showed the desire to be a part of Western modernity and joined the NATO alliance in 1952. She has always followed Europe to be integrated, but the doubts about Turkey's European identity, large uneducated population, cultural differences, religious belief or the structural problems in its democracy have always been standing as a handicap on her road to the European Union. The other crucial objection which could be blocked negotiations is the Cyprus conflict which reached the peak in 1974. Because of these objections, Turkey's relationship with the EU is more complicated than any other candidate country seeking EU membership.

However, the importance of strategic position of Turkey is incontestable. The location of Turkey should be taken into consideration, because of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits in order to prevent the Soviet Union's reach to the Middle East. Turkey also would provide an easy access to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Persian Gulf states.

As mentioned before, after World War I and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey's new structure model to follow was Western Europe. Because of this ambition, Turkey applied for full membership right after the Greek application and Turkey's relations with the EU began in 1959 (Papanicoaou 2005). The response to this first application was to become an associate member, thus an Association Agreement, which was called Ankara Agreement, between the EU and Turkey was signed on 12 September 1963. This agreement implemented, on 1 December 1964, under the aim of guaranteeing Turkey's full membership to the EU. The Ankara Agreement would also help to complete integration between the EU and Turkey in order to establish a Customs Union (Turkey EU Relations <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=4&l=2> n.d.).

The Ankara Agreement would serve for the progressive establishment of a CU and bring the two sides together in order to work on the economic and trade matters. During the transition period, it was supplemented by an Additional Protocol and Financial Protocol which was signed in November 1970 in order to prepare a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods circulating between Turkey and the EU in transition (Turkey EU Relations <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=4&l=2> n.d.).

During the 1970s, Turkey tried to deal with its domestic struggles such as anarchy and political polarization until the military coup d'état took place in September 1980. Following the military intervention, the relations of Turkey and the EU stagnated. This stagnated period lasted until the following multiparty elections in 1983.

After the meetings to rebuild the relations, Turkey applied for full membership to the EU in April 1987. However, in 1989, the European Commission declared that Turkey's accession was not in the agenda, and also the Cyprus conflict was standing as an obstacle for Turkey's accession. However, the process to establish a CU would be lasted

due to the Association Agreement. More than thirty years later the signing of Ankara Agreement, the Turkey-EU Association Council decided that Turkey had fulfilled most of its obligations and in March 1995 Turkey signed a Customs Union Agreement with the EU (Müftüler 1999).

Even though Turkey applied for full membership in 1987, in the Luxemburg summit of the European Council, in 1997, it was declared that Turkey would not be in the next enlargement process. By this, the relations between Turkey and EU reached its crisis point and Turkish government decided to freeze relations with EU until when Turkey recognized as a candidate country (Müftüler 1998).

In December 1999 at Helsinki Council, EU declared the candidate status of Turkey and one year later, in December 2000, the framework of the pre-accession strategy drafted due to the decision of the EU Council of Ministers. In response, Turkey accepted the “National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis Communitare” in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in March 2001. In September 2001, the report about Cyprus that was written by Jacques Paas was accepted by the EU Parliament. In this report, the guilty for the failure of a settlement in the Cyprus conflict was Turkey. It was also declared that even if the conflict could not be solved, Cyprus would become a member of the EU. The year 2002 witnessed some important events through Turkey-EU relations. On February, the Commissioner for Enlargement, Günter Verheugen who visited Turkey and the first Reform Package came into force due to the Copenhagen Political Criteria (Turkey EU Relations <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=4&l=2> n.d.).

By the general elections, the AKP came into power on 3 November 2002. After the vote of confidence in the TGNA, the EU membership was stated as a primary goal of the party. Therefore, the leader of the party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visited some major Member States of the EU to ask for support in order to begin accession negotiations in the 2002 Copenhagen European Council.

In the Presidency Conclusion of the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, it has been stated that:

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. (The Council of the European Union http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf 2002).

This declaration was not adequate what Turkey expected. Nevertheless, Turkey did not give up to continue the reforms and this attitude was glorified in the Turkey's 2003 Progress Report and the Strategy Report published by the European Commission, in the summit of November 2003. The Council declared that Turkey had made a good start to negotiate for full membership (Chronology of Turkey-EU Relations <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2> n.d.).

In the next meetings, Turkey was praised because of its will to implement reforms and in the Brussels European Council meeting of June 2004, the phrase about to open accession negotiations was repeated and the meeting concluded that:

The Union reaffirms its commitment that if the European Council decides in December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. (The Council of the European Union <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=DOC/04/2&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en> 2004).

Eventually, in the 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, the Commission recommended the Council to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. Because the Commission affirmed that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and had the right to start accession negotiations (Turkey-EU Relations <http://WorldWarw.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2> n.d.).

In the summit of the Council of European Union, in December 2004, it was declared that Turkey made progress with reforms of the political criteria and this improvement was enough to start the negotiations on 3 October 2005:

The European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform. (The Council of the European Union http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf 2004).

In conclusion, the Council of the European Union decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. However, Turkey was requested to “sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States.” (The Council of the European Union http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf 2004). Thus, 42 years later, the EU journey of Turkey came near to final destination.

However, the decision allowed Turkey to begin negotiations was discussed several times by the Member States. Some of them insisted on not to allow Turkey’s accession or wanted to leave Turkey as an outsider. Thus, it was obvious that Turkey’s accession process would be difficult or even different than the previous accession processes.

Under the Austrian presidency, it was declared that absorption capacity might be used to veto the Turkey’s accession, even if Turkey fulfils the obligations of the Copenhagen criteria. (Barysch 2006) Following this declaration, another possibility for Turkey was started to mention such as privileged partnership. Actually, the crucial reason why the EU and some Member States are skeptical on Turkey’s full membership is Turkey’s long-standing dispute with one of the Member States – Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.

As is stated above, Turkey had been required to expand the Ankara Agreement to all new EU Member States. The protocol was signed in July 2005. However, Turkey made a declaration to emphasize that signing the additional protocol did not mean the recognition of Southern Cyprus as the Republic of Cyprus. In September 2005, the EU’ declared that Turkey had to recognize Cyprus and open its ports and airports to Cypriot

ships and planes, otherwise the negotiations might stall (Turkey-EU Relations <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2> n.d.).

Shortly after the accession negotiations have been started, six chapters of the Acquis Communautaire have been opened. These chapters are Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom to Provide Services, Company Law, Financial Services, Information Society & Media, Statistics and Financial. The chapter of Science and Research was opened in 12 June 2006 and it has still been the only chapter which was closed. By December 2006, the negotiation process came to an impasse because of the continued dispute over Cyprus. EU decided to freeze talks on chapters and declare that the chapters would not be closed until solving the Cyprus dispute. Despite these setbacks, the EU opened another chapter on Enterprise and Industrial Policy in March 2007. Finally, on 20 December 2007, the chapter on Health & Consumer Protection and on Trans-European Transport was opened (EU-Turkey-Monitor http://www.zei.de/download/zei_tur/ZEI_EU-Turkey-Monitor_vol3no2.pdf 2007).

To sum up, the earliest date for Turkey's membership to the EU is very hard to predict. Except a number of internal and external problems, the Cyprus conflict is still a major obstacle for Turkey's accession. In spite of these setbacks, Turkey closed its first chapter of negotiations in June 2006 and did not give up having a desire to become a member of the EU.

2.3 HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF CYPRUS'S RELATIONS WITH THE EU

The European Union has been confronted with the most expansive enlargement process by welcoming ten new Member States in 2004. The Republic of Cyprus, which represents only the South part of the island, was one of these new Member States even without a solution to the Cyprus conflict.

After an independence declaration, in 1960, The Republic of Cyprus was established. Since that time, a number of agreements were signed between the Republic of Cyprus

and the EU. But the two communities, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, could not maintain the stability, and after the Turkish intervention in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus was the only state which was recognized as the legitimate government of the island. The RoC has still been enjoying the advantages of international legitimacy (Yiangou 2002). Following the division, the two communities met several times for a settlement. Nevertheless, they could not solve the conflict. This situation did not leave any choice to the Turkish Cypriots and they established Turkish Republic of North Cyprus in 1983. Despite these circumstances, the Greek Cypriot Administration under the name of the Republic of Cyprus applied for EU membership for whole island in 1990 (Application for Membership-Pre-accession Strategy <http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&cid=31> n.d.). However, the Turkish Cypriots objected to this application, because the GCA was only representing the south part of the island. They also asserted that the government of the RoC could not apply for membership without their authorization. Thus, any progress about this application would not be binding for the Turkish Cypriots. Following the GCA's application to the EU, the Turkish Cypriots under the name of TRNC signed an additional agreement with Turkey. Due to this agreement, if the RoC became a member of the EU, Turkey and TRNC would unify (Oztürk et al. 2006).

According to the European Commission Opinion, on 30 June 1993, the application of the Republic of Cyprus for EU membership took into account for the whole island:

The Commission is convinced that the result of Cyprus's accession to the Community would be increased security and prosperity and that it would help bring the two communities on the island closer together. (Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/op_06_93_en.htm 1993).

The Turkish Cypriots also stated that they would never join to an organization of countries of which Greece was a member but Turkey was not (Yiangou 2002). Despite all these objections, the European Commission took a decision to approve Cyprus as adequate for membership under the significant hopeful progress in the UN talks for a

solution. According to the European Parliament's resolution on Cyprus's application for membership of the EU, in 1995, it was confirmed that:

'...negotiations for the accession of Cyprus would begin six months after the end of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference,...'
(*Resolution on Cyprus's application for membership of the European Union*
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pv2/pv2?PRG=CALDOC&TPV=DEF&FILE=950712&TXTLST=1&POS=1&LASTCHAP=4&SDOCTA=7&Type_Do c=FIRST&LANGUE=EN 1995).

Together with the Presidency Conclusions of Luxembourg in 1997, the European Council decided that the accession negotiations would start in the spring of 1998 and the Turkish Cypriots were asked to join the island's negotiating team. However, the Turkish Cypriot leadership refused this invitation (Application for Membership-Pre-accession Strategy <http://www.cypriosembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&cid=31> n.d.). The reason of this negative position about accession into the EU was the fear about Turkey's future presence on the island. After being a member of the EU, the Turkish Cypriots would be recognized internationally. In fact, this was a crucial desire for them, but Turkey could become ineffective to intervene in the issues about the Turkish Cypriots' minority status. The EU did not consider the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to participate to the negotiation team, and did not hesitate to start the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots under the name of the Republic of Cyprus in 1998.

Shortly after the decision on starting the accession negotiations, it was thought that the EU would act effectively in order to resolve the conflict. But there was no progress under the leadership of EU since that time. Starting negotiations without a solution was a historical mistake for the EU, because it was clear that Cyprus' EU membership would be a strong headache and deep problem. Both Turkey and Greece, as a part of the Cyprus conflict, pressed to adopt their interests. As mentioned before, for its part, Turkey declared its position about annexing the northern part of Cyprus to its territory if the Greek-Cypriots, namely the Republic of Cyprus, joined to the EU without a solution. On the other hand, Greece declared that she might use her veto power over EU enlargement in order not to welcome the Republic of Cyprus as a member in the next enlargement.

The EU could cope with this problem with a sign of hope raised in the Helsinki Summit of the European Council in December 1999. It was declared that the solution of Cyprus conflict was no longer a precondition on the accession of Cyprus:

The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors. (Presidency Conclusions http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#a 1999).

Due to the decision of the Helsinki summit, the promise, that the division of Cyprus would not block the EU membership of the RoC, made sure that accession process would reach its final destination. By rejecting to participate to the negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots could no longer be an obstacle for Cyprus' accession. The aim about offering candidacy to Turkey was to encourage Ankara to pursue economic, political and human rights reform and to prevent objections of Turkey for a while (Yiangou 2002).

Helsinki intended to help Turkey in order to meet in a common point for the long-standing conflict of Cyprus. Any positive attempt could be helpful for her future accession process. Following the Helsinki decision, an important improvement was taken place both in Turkey-Greece relations and in Turkish Cypriots-Greek Cypriots relations. As will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter, the leaders of the two communities met plenty of times under the UN auspices; however, every attempt resulted in failure that the EU did not expect.

As will be discussed detailed in Chapter III, the last attempt to settle the Cyprus conflict was a United Nations proposal, namely the Annan Plan. Before the Plan, the inter-communal negotiations between the two community leaders, Rauf Denktash and Glafcos Clerides, started with direct talks in 2002. During the negotiation process, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan's proposal was discussed and at the end, it was voted in the referendum in April 2004. The Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor. In spite of the results of the referendum, in May 2004, the Greek Cypriots who refused the solution in the referendum entered to the EU under the name of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: FROM 1974 TURKISH INVASION TO PRESENT

3.1 THE PERIOD FROM THE GREEK COUP D'ETAT AND TURKISH INVASION IN 1974 TO BEING A MEMBER OF EU IN 2004

The de facto division of the island has been critically important issue on the foreign policy agenda of the governments of Turkey and Greece since 1974. Turkey and Greece seemed as allies following the treaty of Lausanne excluding some disagreements such as sovereignty and border problems of the islands both in the Aegean Sea and in the Mediterranean Sea. Under these disagreements, the Greek coup d'état and then the Turkish Invasion in response to this coup added new problems to unstable relations between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus conflict without removing the old ones. The Turkish invasion caused a partition and the Turkish Cypriots had to move to the northern part of the island. The Turkish Cypriots settled down on the northern part, covering one third of the island, including Nicosia (Lefkoshia in Turkish) and Famagusta which is the largest port of the island. After this settlement, it was impossible to enter to the other part via the Green Line, which divides the island into two parts passing through Nicosia. Thus, by dividing the island into two parts, the history was repeating itself and the Cypriots were losing all hopes about permanent solution.

In 1975 today's political structure of Cyprus became into being, with the two ethnic communities in a divided island around a buffer zone under the UN peacekeeping troops (Hannay 2005). Because of the invasion and mandatory movement of population, economic and social discrepancies between the two sides have increased due to the ethnic segregation and weakened efforts and hopes for reunification (Joseph 2003). The Greek Cypriots had always stated Cyprus as a Grek island despite the Turkish Cypriots community, unfortunately they lost the sovereignty of one-third of the island. Many of the Cypriots had to abandon their property in one part and had to start their life from the beginning in other part. In fact, the two communities seperated when troubles restarted in 1963. During the history of the island, Cypriots had lived together by respecting each

other without any distinction between languages, ethnic groups or religions. The island had served to the international society as a culture area. But, after starting to enounce Cyprus conflict and bloody civil war in 1960s, Cypriot national identity was destroyed and the two communities confirmed that there was the lack of national identity. In fact, with the help of guarantor countries, the London-Zurich Agreements had created a state. Nevermore, they could not create a Cypriot identity and hold the nation together. Thus, Cyprus also divided along ethnic and religious loyalties.

Since 1974, due to the peacekeeping aim of UN, the UN Secretary-General as a special representative have been working together with the leaders of two communities on reaching a comprehensive settlement or, sometimes, on confidence building elements composed to manage the tension on the Green Line and to help in order to find the way for a permanent solution (Hannay 2005).

In January 1977, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots agreed on the principles which would pave the way of negotiations. This set of principles, namely 1977 High Level Agreement, was composed in order to establish a bicomunal Federal Republic in Cyprus. In addition, another ten-article agreement, which was called the 1979 High Level Agreement, was signed between the two communities in 1979 (Müftüler 1999). As Mr. Hannay stated that “these agreements were only thin skeletons of a settlement, not the real thing. But they did establish a framework for a solution based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.”(Hannay 2005). Even though all UN attempts to reach a settlement failed, there was still hope based on the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979. In terms of Cyprus Conflict, these agreements have been crucial documents, because either the Turkish Cypriots or the Greek Cypriots agreed to find a solution for the first time and these agreements still provide the basic rules for a settlement.

According to the first agreement, which was signed on 12 February 1977, the leaders agreed the following issues:

1. *We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.*
2. *The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.*
3. *Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.*
4. *The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.*

(High-Level-Agreement [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0_DC22571D30034D344/\\$file/February%201977.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0_DC22571D30034D344/$file/February%201977.pdf) 1977).

The second agreement was signed in 1979 to confirm the High Level Agreements of 1977. However, after 1979, the negotiations between the two communities came to a deadlock because of the obstinacy and hesitations of both sides until 1985.

After the failing of eight year negotiations, the Turkish Cypriots realised that the practical impossibility of the settlement and established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) through a unilateral declaration in 1983 (Müftüler 1999). The UN Security Council refused to accept this declaration and wanted UN members not to recognize TRNC. Thus, still, only Turkey recognizes TRNC (Hannay 2005). Nowadays, the southern part of the island is under the control of the Greek Cypriot administration, namely the RoC, which is recognized internationally as the legitimate government of the whole island. The northern part of the island is governed by the TRNC and only Turkey recognizes her. As a result, the RoC is not recognized by the TRNC and Turkey declaring that, in 1963, the Greek Cypriots wanted to amend the 1960 Constitution illegally in order to undermine the Turkish Cypriots' authority and give them a minority status by usurping their governmental rights (Atasoy 2003).

The declaration of independence made the Cyprus conflict more difficult to search for a solution. It also caused the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots from trade with other countries to participation in international competitions because of their unrecognized

status in the international community. These isolations have been widening the gap between the two communities.

After 1985, during the peace talks interrupted from time to time the parties could not reach a solution. Endless negotiations without a solution in the 1980s directed the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities to meet in common interests and get to know each other during the intercommunal talks in 1988 (Müftüler 1999). The two leaders met in August 1988 to make a consensus about the framework agreement due to the High Level Agreements. The negotiations faltered again, but, in 1992, the UN Secretary-General prepared the Set of Ideas to present to the two communities. According to the report, a bi-zonal federation of the two equal communities would be established under one international personality. However, the Turkish Cypriots' leader, Rauf Denktaş declared that the set of ideas was not acceptable while the Greek Cypriots' leader, Glafcos Clerides accepted it in principle. Nevertheless, the negotiations were again short lived (Migdalovitz 2002).

Therefore, the whole negotiations between the two communities, as will be discussed in detail by the forthcoming chapter, failed in every attempt. Either the Turkish Cypriots insisted on the Greek Cypriots to recognize their existence in Cyprus or the Greek Cypriots declared their aim to apply for membership to the EU. Under this struggle, the Greek Cypriots applied for EU membership in 1990 and the acceptance of this application made it obvious that Cyprus would be in the next enlargement despite the conflict. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots uttered the plea of illegality of this application in terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. Under the averseness of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, the relation between the Greek Cypriots under the name of the RoC and EU went further into the accession of Cyprus. As mentioned before, by the 1999 Helsinki European Council declaration, it became clear that a resolution of the Cyprus conflict was not required for the full membership of the RoC. Thus, during the 1990s, the objections of the Turkish Cypriots backed only by Turkey.

According to Hannay, a Cyprus settlement was critically important for Turkey's EU process. He stated that:

The prospect therefore loomed ever closer of a divided Cyprus joining the European Union well ahead of Turkey and thus being able to sit in judgement on Turkey's own application; and it was quite clear that such a Cyprus would not tolerate Turkish accession if a Cyprus settlement was still being blocked by Denktash's intransigence." (Hannay 2005).

The Cyprus conflict with its new dimension made a revision on Turkey's foreign policy agenda and Turkey realised that the road to EU was passing through the solution of Cyprus conflict. In December 1997, Turkey's long-standing application for EU membership proved fruitful by declaration on granting candidate status. After the EU Council's decision about candidacy of Turkey, EU membership became an important issue in the Turkey's foreign policy agenda.

While the parties of the conflict were discussing the future of the relations with EU, on the other hand, the UN appeared on the scene again to reach a settlement with Proximity Talks. This time, the negotiation process proceeded for a year; it was resumed at the end of 2001. The last inter-communal negotiations, which began in January 2002, might be the last chance for the Turkish Cypriots (Migdalovitz 2002). Because the Greek Cypriots made great strides in accession negotiations. They were almost in front of the door and ready to enter without the Turkish Cypriots. Thus, the Turkish Cypriots started to lose their hope for reunification. Unfortunately, the quick completion of accession negotiations by 2002 justified the Turkish Cypriots' doubts and proved that the Greek Cypriots' had half a mind to reunify Cyprus.

In November 2002, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented a plan. After the failure of bilateral talks, the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots voted the plan in separate referendum on 24 April 2002 (Papanicolaou 2005). The Annan Plan, which will be discussed in the following chapter, was an ambitious plan to meet the interests of both communities and the two motherlands. Nevertheless, the plan affected the interests of the two communities; therefore, the response to the Annan Plan in the referendum was different in both sides as expected. The Greek Cypriots refused it by 76 per cent, however the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the plan by 65 per cent.

(Chadjipadelis et al. 2007) One month later, on 1 May 2004, even the rejection of the Greek Cypriots to reunification of the island with the Annan Plan, Cyprus as the RoC was welcomed by the EU. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriots should notice that they have no support internationally for their rejection of the Annan Plan.

3.2 THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

After the declaration of independence, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of United Nations in 1960. Nevertheless, the outbreak of violence replaced the peaceful period because of the tension between the two communities in 1963. During this conflicting period, some efforts took place to restore peace on the island. However, by February 1964, after all efforts resulted in failure, the importance of the conflict was realised and the Cypriots wanted the Security Council of the UN to find an immediate solution. One month later, the Council adopted resolution 186 which recommended to establish the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)(Cyprus-UNFICYPBackground <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html> n.d.).

With the resolution 186, the United Nations became an active player in the Cyprus conflict and UNFICYP's contingents were deployed throughout the island. The hostilities between the two communities reached the peak in 1974. Thus, the UNFICYP could reorder the communities by establishing the Green Line (UN buffer zone) through the Nicosia as a cease fire line.



Map 3.1: UN Buffer Zone

Source: BBC News Website,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308474.stm>

By the UN buffer zone, the Security Council adopted new resolutions about the function of UNFICYP. The de facto ceasefire made the opposing forces, the Turkish soldiers, Turkish Cypriot forces and the Cyprus National Guard, deploy along the Green Line to observe the events. Also, some other contingents deployed in other important places on the island. Over the years, a lot of UNFICYP contingents redeployed through the island to manage the areas of tension. (Cyprus-UNFICYPBackground <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unficyp/background.html> n.d.). UNFICYP was in the island to normalize life. “The principal objective was to restore conditions that would enable all the people of the island to go about their daily business without fear for their lives and without being victimized, and in this connection to restore governmental services and economic activities disrupted by the intercommunal strife.” (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus Website http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1 2008). As being a part of the Cyprus conflict for more than forty years, it can be said that the UNFICYP achieved the principal objective. But, several UN attempts have failed without a consensus so far. Muftuler states how the UN’s position as:

The United Nations’ position is clear in the Security Council Resolutions ... that emphasized the political equality of the two communities and declared that the resolution of the Cyprus problem depended on the establishment of a federal state. (Müftüler 1999).

Nonetheless, the different understanding about political equality between the two communities set off several political crisis during the history of conflict and caused the failure of the UN attempts on settlement. In every crisis, the Secretary-General of the UN took the initiative and appealed to the leaders of Cypriot communities and to the governments of Greece and Turkey to avoid an outbreak of hostilities. However, Turkey and Greece have not worked together actively for a settlement and this disinclination have argued as the main reason behind the failure of peace talks until present. Since the Turkish military intervention in 1974, there have been several meetings between the two communities under the UN auspices. Unfortunately, all attempts resulted in failure. However, besides the UN, the two communities of the island and their two motherlands, which influences the domestic policies and shapes the position of the communities, was responsible for the failure of these negotiations.

In sum, the UN has been involved since the earliest stage of the conflict in order to maintain peace along the Green Line and to unify the island. She has been playing her role with a close relationship with the Turkish Cypriot leaders and Greek Cypriots leaders. Nevertheless, no consensus has been reached so far.

3.3 THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE ISLAND

The aim of this part is to analyze the changes on the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders' attitudes towards the Cyprus conflict after Cyprus joined the EU. By the accession of Cyprus without the Turkish Cypriots, the EU became another player in the Cyprus conflict. When she declared that the solution of the conflict would not be a precondition for Cyprus's accession, the Greek Cypriots had another opportunity to impose upon the Turkish Cypriots. Because, the Greek Cypriots have been enjoying the recognition by international community, while the Turkish Cypriots have been suffering from not being a part of international community since 1974. The 1974 Turkish intervention under the aim of protecting the Turkish Cypriots from the brutality of the Greek Cypriots has forced them to live in an isolated society. As Karalis stated; "An isolation that is unfair for the legitimate Turkish Cypriots who did not choose to be isolated, who

did not want a divided country. The only thing they wanted was to be respected as equal citizens and safe.” (Karalis 2008).

The accession of Cyprus also put a new face on the EU-Turkey relations. Turkey has a very low chance than she ever had. Even if the accession negotiations are completed successfully, Turkey will be confronted with double veto: Greece and the RoC.

The Turkish Cypriot community was represented by Rauf Denkash for more than three decades. But, in 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat won the presidential election and became the new president of TRNC. He is the second president after Rauf Denkash (<http://www.north-cyprus-information-map.com/en/north-cyprus-information/general-information/TRNC/Mehmet-Ali-Talat.html> n.d.). Unfortunately, during the Rauf Denkash’ presidency, from 1973 to 2005, a settlement could not be reached on the island. He was always blamed to block the negotiations by the Greek Cypriots. After this stagnation period, with the new president, Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriots started to hope to be recognized in a unified island. Because as an open-minded person, Mr. Talat really wanted to eliminate isolations over TRNC and give the Turkish Cypriots their rights back after more than 30 years. He also believed that the only way to make this aim possible was being a member of EU. He was in favour of UN reunification plan and the Turkish Cypriot community gave support to his idea.

Mr. Talat wanted the Turkish Cypriots to vote “Yes” in the 2004 referendum in order to unify Cyprus under the Annan Plan. This would be an advance for entry to the European Union, Talat promoted a ‘Yes’ veto among Turkish Cypriots.” (Rauf Denktas <http://www.north-cyprus-information-map.com/en/north-cyprus-information/general-information/TRNC/Mehmet-Ali-Talat.html> n.d.). Therefore, considering TRNC, the conflict is in a new era with a new leader which is in favour of reunification more and more. Mr.Talat asked the EU and the UN to exhilarate negotiations on the future of Cyprus conflict.

While these hopeful developments were taking place in the northern side, the president of the southern side, Tassos Papadopoulos, who took on office from Glafkos Klerides with the elections of February 2003, declared that he was in favor of negotiating in


order to solve the conflict. During the elections, the plank of his campaign was about to negotiate harder over the Cyprus's future, and for the Greek Cypriots. Thus, Mr. Papadopoulos wanted to unify Cyprus before joining to the EU and negotiate to reach an adequate settlement (Profile:Tassos Papadopoulos <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2769789.stm> 2003). Nevertheless, he campaigned against the 2004 referendum alleging the unsatisfactory of the Annan plan. The result of the referendum was what Mr. Papadopoulos wanted. The implementation of the Annan Plan was dependent on both communities' approval and the Greek Cypriot community's "No" vote made the plan uselessness.

In 2006, the two leaders met for the first time after the referendum. Both sides came together under the UN auspices to decide the details of new talks. But, again, the negotiations came to a deadlock until the presidential election in February 2008 in the Southern part. The winner side was left-wing Cypriot leader, Demetris Christofias. He, as the new president, was in favor of re-unification and pledged to realize a united island. This declaration was welcomed by the northern side. When Mr. Talat called Mr. Christofias to congratulate him, they declared their wishes to initiate the negotiations without delay (Cypriot Victor Rallies For Unity <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7261195.stm> 2008).

The earliest possible date was 21 March 2008. Cypriots have been facing the new era in Cyprus with the optimistic leaders for a settlement. In a joint declaration, they agreed that negotiators from both sides would come together to set up groups in order to determine details for a settlement. The two leaders decided to meet in three months to review the reports of working groups. They also decided to reopen the crossing at Ledra Street which runs along the Green Line (Peace Talks on Cyprus to Restart <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7308474.stm> 2008). Even though the first crossing points were opened during the Annan Plan negotiations, as being a symbol of the division, the agreement on opening the crossing point, Ledra Street, would help to precipitate the peace talks. The reopening was welcomed internationally and considered as a first step in order to put aside the struggles of the past.

Ledra Street was opened on 3 April 2008 and celebrated like a festival in both sides of the island. With this new crossing point, there are currently six checkpoints for crossing the Green Line in Cyprus (Crossing Details http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_name=crossing_details_1 n.d.). In 2003, five crossing points were opened under the aim of helping the unification (Border Checkpoints <http://www.cyprus.com/Cyprus-general-info-checkpoint.php> n.d.). Since 2003, a lot of people, especially old ones, have crossed the other side of the island to visit their friends, hometowns or houses.

The number of people crossing the UN buffer zone from north to south and vice-versa in three months of 2008 as shown in the graph:



Graph 3.1: The Number of People Crossing the UN Buffer Zone

Source: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS Website
Available at: http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_name=crossing_details_1

Ever since the de facto division of the island, Cypriots' attitude of expectancy has always encouraged the leaders, the representatives of the UN and the motherlands. In every effort, the communities start negotiations with a new hope. Despite the rejection of the Greek Cypriots for a settlement on the Annan Plan, the leaders did not give up to search for a permanent solution. Under this hope, the last attempt has been proceeding and positive declarations of the two leaders have been raising hopes of the communities for a real solution. It seems that this time Cypriots are ready to achieve the reunification and would celebrate the expected victory very soon.

4. SEARCHING FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT: THE ANNAN PLAN AND THE EU'S APPROACH

4.1 THE CYPRUS PEACE TALKS

From the beginning of the conflict, there have been many negotiation attempts which resulted in failure. Most of the time one side refused to come to the table or left the table during the talks. The last peace talks started in March 2008, and have still been proceeding.

The first effort for a settlement on Cyprus conflict was put in 1968 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General in order to revise the 1960 Constitution. The talks continued until the Greek coup d'état in 1974. After 1974, the main subject of negotiations was searching a federal solution. However, both communities had different understanding about a federal solution. Under this circumstance, the talks started again in 1975. From April to September, the leaders of the two communities met four times. At the third round, the leaders discussed the details of the exchange of population. If they wanted to do so, the Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part would move to the northern part or vice versa. This is the first time that the island was divided into two ethnic areas; the northern part and the southern part (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.).

4.1.1 1977-1979 High-Level Agreements

Signing the High-Level Agreements was another attempt to reach a settlement. On 27 January 1977 the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Rauf Denktaş, and the leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios, met in Nicosia. The two leaders agreed on the

guidelines as the basis of negotiations. Following this, they agreed upon to begin the intercommunal talks in Vienna in from March 1977 to April 1977. During these talks both sides proposed a federal solution for the Cyprus conflict. The second meeting was held in May 1979 between the two leaders under the auspices of the UN. The Ten Point Agreement, which supported the continuation of the intercommunal talks, was signed (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.).

4.1.2 1984-1986 Draft Framework Agreement

From 1980 to 1983, the two leaders met several times in order to continue negotiations. However, the talks resulted in failure in every attempt because of the refusal of the Greek Cypriots leader to accept the Turkish Cypriots leader as an equal partner. The failure of negotiations precipitated the declaration of the TRNC by the Turkish Cypriots community. Following this declaration, the two leaders continued to negotiate under the auspices of UN and they met three times during the year 1984. At the end of the three rounds proximity talks, a draft agreement on a possible settlement was represented to both sides. The Turkish Cypriots stated their positive opinion on the draft while the Greek Cypriots did not accept the plan as a basis for a settlement (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.).

Once again, in January 1985, the leaders came together in New York, but they left the summit without reaching a consensus. Nevermore, in 1986, the UN Secretary-General prepared a “Draft Framework Agreement” which was presented to both sides for consideration. Once again, the Turkish Cypriots accepted and the Greek Cypriots rejected the agreement. Thus, yet another chance to find a permanent solution on the Cyprus conflict disappeared because of the Greek Cypriots’ negativism (Migdalovitz 2002).

4.1.3 1992 Set of Ideas

In June 1992, the leaders of the two communities were invited by the UN Secretary-General to discuss a “Set of Ideas” which was known as an overall framework agreement on Cyprus conflict. The Set of Ideas was the most detailed plan with one hundred paragraphs and a map. After negotiating with the UN Secretary-General, the two leaders decided to meet again to discuss about territorial adjustments and exchange of population. After these talks it was stated that the Greek Cypriots accepted the “Set of Ideas” and the map as a basis for an overall framework agreement, however the Turkish Cypriots accepted only ninety one paragraphs of the whole document and refused to accept the map as a basis for reaching a settlement. Because of the basic differences remained between the two communities, the talks were postponed to March 1993 (Dodd 1996).

4.1.4 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

After the failure of the ‘Set of Ideas’, the UN realized the deep crisis of confidence between the two communities and started to work on building confidence between them. According to the UN Secretary-General, if it was succeed to adopt a number of confidence building measures, it would be easy to reach a settlement. Under these circumstances, the fourteen Confidence Building Measures were adopted concerning the settlement of the fenced area of Varosha (Maras), and the re-opening of Nicosia International Airport (Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council [http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/485BADA25EC29816C22571C6003D7A7B/\\$file/Report%20%204%20March%201994%20.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/485BADA25EC29816C22571C6003D7A7B/$file/Report%20%204%20March%201994%20.pdf?OpenElement) 1993). Nevertheless, the outcome of the talks was as usual and resulted in failure. The CBMs talks were highly politicized by both leaders of the communities.

4.1.5 Troutbeck and Glion Direct Talks

For almost three years, the Greek Cypriots' leader did not want to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriots' leader asserting the lack of a common ground. In 1997, the two leaders were invited again by the UN Secretary-General. Therefore, a number of talks were taken place first in Troutbeck, and then in Glion (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.). These face-to-face negotiations raised hopes to reach a settlement. However, the talks in Troutbeck and then in Glion ended without any substantial progress. Nevertheless, by the European Commission's decision, in its Agenda 2000 report, it was declared that the negotiations with Cyprus would open early in 1998 (Agenda 2000 <http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/overview/en/agenda.htm> 1997).

4.1.6 1999-2000 Proximity Talks

After the failure of the peace talks in 1997 and the negative atmosphere created by the "Agenda 2000" report of the European Commission dashed hopes for any progress towards a comprehensive settlement.

At the end of 1997, the Luxembourg European Council took the decision to begin the accession negotiation with the Greek Cypriots administration under the name of the Republic of Cyprus and put the final blow to the peace talks of 1997, by destroying the relations established by the UN Secretary-General. However, a number of foreign diplomats and special representatives for Cyprus of some countries and of the UN engaged in shuttle diplomacy between the two leaders, but no one could succeed in bringing the two leaders together. Following the unfortunate Luxembourg decision of the EU, Turkey and TRNC made a joint declaration, on 23 April 1998, to emphasize the existing cooperation between Turkey and TRNC as an independent state. On 31 August 1998 the Turkish Cypriots declared a proposal on the basis of confederal partnership by protecting important rights and interests of both sides. Whereas the Greek Cypriots, encouraged by the prospect of EU membership, immediately rejected it. After two years

of stagnation, the two leaders accepted to restart negotiations under the auspices of the UN (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.). However, after fifth round of talks, nothing considerable was achieved.

To sum up, from December 1999 to November 2000, the two leaders attended five sessions of proximity talks, in Geneva and New York, to prepare the ground for negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement. This process ended when Mr. Denktash refused the UN Secretary-General's invitation to a sixth session of talks in January 2001 (Migdalovitz 2002).

4.2 THE ANNAN PLAN: ANOTHER MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR A CYPRUS SOLUTION

The Cyprus conflict has been on the agenda of UN Security Council for almost 40 years. It is the oldest long-lasting issue on the Secretary-General's peacemaking agenda. The history of UN's attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict was not encouraging, because all attempts resulted in failure since the deploying of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The last effort was held under the auspices of UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, from 1999 to early 2003 in order to reach a comprehensive settlement on the Cyprus conflict. Due to the last peace talks process, proximity talks were held from December 1999 to November 2000, and direct talks from January 2002 to February 2003 (Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003).

The Helsinki summit of the European Council in December 1999 granted candidate country status to Turkey, and stated the fifth enlargement of the European Union with ten new members, including Cyprus. This declaration hastened the negotiation process (Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003). Moreover, on 8 November 2000, the EU published the Accession Partnership document in order to

make the Cyprus conflict as a political criterion and a precondition for Turkey's EU accession (Main Negotiations <http://www.trncpio.org/index.asp?page=91> n.d.). Thus, to reach a settlement on the Cyprus conflict became more important for all parties concerning Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Greece and Turkey.

As the time to close the accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots community draws closer, the resumed talks between the leaders of two communities appeared as the final chance to reach a settlement before the end of 2002. The direct talks in the presence of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, started on 16 January 2002, in the United Nations Protected Area of Nicosia. The leaders met two or three times a week until May 2002. When visiting Cyprus in May, the U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan wanted the leaders to agree on the four core issues by the end of June: governance, security, territory and property (Cyprus' Direct Talks at Very Difficult Point: Government Spokesman http://english.people.com.cn/200206/20/eng20020620_98205.shtml 2002).

While the direct talks were held in Nicosia, Mr. de Soto also held regular consultations with Greece and Turkey by guiding the discussions and he was making a recommendation to agree on a common ground by mid-2002. However, the representatives of the UN refrained from writing a document until 11 November 2002, when, no solution was achieved (United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003). On November 2002, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, presented a new peace plan due to the direct talks that began in January 2002 between the two leaders of the divided island. The name of the plan was "Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem" (Ibid, p.10). The plan was a UN proposal to find a solution for Cyprus conflict. It was also known as the Annan Plan in recognition of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who devised the proposal. The aim of this plan was to finalize the Cyprus conflict before the EU summit in Copenhagen on December 12, which was known as a summit to set an accession date for Cyprus. Also, Mr. Annan wanted the two leaders to put the plan to separate simultaneous referenda for approval the substantive parts of it after negotiation (Ibid, pp.1-3). Following the consultation process between the parties, Mr.

Annan released the second version of the plan on 10 December 2002. He hoped to bridge remaining gaps between the parties and to help them in order to reach an agreement in time for the Copenhagen European Council on 12 and 13 December 2002 (Ozturk 2004). Mr. Annan invited the two leaders to Copenhagen in the hope of reaching an agreement before the decision of European Council regarding enlargement. He also asked the guarantors to be represented at Copenhagen.

Due to the efforts of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his Special Adviser Alvaro de Soto, no agreement reached at Copenhagen. Mr. Denktash did not attend the Copenhagen summit, and only sent a representative with the authority to sign an agreement. After the negative attitude of Mr. Denktash, Mr. Clerides took a non-committal position. Nevertheless, the missed chance at Copenhagen was not the end of the efforts. Both communities were demanded to reach an agreement by 28 February 2003. To make this aim real, Mr. Annan proposed another attempt that was called three-track negotiation. Mr. Annan described this process as follows:

“the leaders should focus on achieving agreement on the substantive issues, which I hoped would be confined to one or two major questions; Greece and Turkey should focus on reaching agreement and finalizing the security aspects of the plan; and the technical committees, agreed to on 4 October 2002, should be appointed and begin meeting without delay to finalize laws and the list of treaties on the basis of my plan of 10 December” (United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003).

Unfortunately, during this three-track negotiation process, little substantive progress was made. The Presidential elections of the Greek Cypriots community, in which resulted the victory of Tassos Papadopoulos, interrupted the negotiations. Mr. Papadopoulos declared that the continuity of the reunified policy with that of Mr. Clerides, indicating that he did not reopen key concepts in the plan already agreed (Press Revels in Surprise Election Win <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2770897.stm> 2003). During the break of the negotiations on the island, Mr. Annan visited Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, and on 26 February 2003, he presented a third version of the plan (Ozturk 2004). By third version of the plan, Mr. Annan also said to the leaders that they should decide to put the plan to separate simultaneous referenda on 30 March 2003 and sign a

two-page “Commitment to submit the Foundation Agreement to separate simultaneous referenda in order to achieve a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem” commitment. Mr. Annan invited the two leaders to The Hague on 10 March 2003 to declare their decision about to sign a commitment to put the plan to referenda. In The Hague, Mr. Annan announced the two leaders that they reached the end of the road. Mr. Papadopoulos was positive and ready to sign the commitment to put the plan to referendum, as long as the people knew what they were being asked to vote on. However, Mr. Denktash did not ready to put the Annan Plan on a referendum and raised some objections to basic points in the revised plan (United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003). The Turkish government also stated that the Annan Plan had still shortcomings concerning the involvement of Ankara. She refused to sign the document at a later stage and confirmed her inability to make the commitment. According to the 1960 Treaties, the guarantors were important parties of the conflict and had to agree on a settlement. The motherland countries’ commitment was necessary before referendum could be held (Cypriot Leaders Meet at the Hague for a Final Round on UN Sponsored Cyprus Talks http://www.tusiad.us/specific_page.cfm?CONTENT_ID=325 2003).

After this declaration, Mr. Annan revised the plan to involve the guarantors, by suggesting an extension the deadline of negotiations until 28 March, and changing the date of the referendum to 6 April 2003. According to Kofi Annan, the last version of the plan would have required a hard work programme concerning an immediate effort of the technical committees in order to be ready before referendum. However, Mr. Denktash did not accept these requirements. Thus, to reach a comprehensive settlement before the Accession Treaty of Cyprus that would be signed by 16 April 2003 would not be possible. In addition, Mr. Annan declared that the last peace talk’s process on Cyprus conflict had reached the end of the road with the final version of the plan. He also mentioned that the plan was still on the table and all conditions were ready for the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement, if they had the will to do so (United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003).

Despite all circumstances and objections, Mr. Annan did not be demoralized and in every disclaimer he revised the plan to adjust what the parties wanted to have on the basis for a settlement in order to put the plan in a referendum.

Denktash's non-negotiating attitude was not welcomed by the Turkish Cypriots whose future was stolen from them decades ago. In reaction, the internal travel restrictions would be lifted in April 2003 by the Turkish Cypriots administration. After twenty nine years, they were going to go to the 'other side' and visit their old homes and friends they left after 1974 intervention. Within a week hundreds of thousands of Cypriots crossed to the other side (Keay 2003). This number showed that the two communities were ready for reunification of Cyprus and the two leaders had to take into account the interest of Cypriot communities. In spite of these hopeful developments, the two communities could not make any progress about the referendum almost a year. Both communities dealt with the inner problems more than the reunification during this one year period.

When the leaders met with the Secretary-General, they discussed about the core parts of the plan and declared the fundamental points that would be revised. Thus, after a short delay, on 24 April 2004, the fifth version of the Annan plan was voted on a referendum. The Cypriots were asked to choose ratifying or rejecting the Annan Plan in order to settle the Cyprus conflict. Both communities were informed that the implementation of the plan was dependent on the approval by them. Under these conditions, the Turkish Cypriots voted "Yes" with the rate of 65 per cent, however, the Greek Cypriots voted "No" with the rate of 76 per cent. Thus, the Greek Cypriots did not approve the Annan Plan and made it not to be implemented. Despite the refusal of the plan by the Greek Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots' leader signed an accession agreement with the EU under the name of the Republic of Cyprus as a whole island (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kıbrıs Konusundaki Son Gelişmeler http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-konusundaki-son-gelismeler_11-kasim-2002-tarihinden- itibaren_.tr.mfa n.d.).

4.3 CORE ISSUES OF THE ANNAN PLAN

As mentioned above, the core issues of the Plan were governance, security, territory and property. From the beginning of the conflict, parties have been trying to meet in a common point on these issues.

In terms of governance, the most important issue which should be solved before a settlement is presidency. Due to the Greek Cypriot community, the president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot. However, the Turkish Cypriot community has supported a rotating presidency process (Migdalovitz 2002).

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan, made a statement to a Greek Cypriot newspaper in May 2008 and he declared that Cyprus was a security issue and the articles on army or on security were only one part of the negotiations to be solved (Babacan: Talat has the Full Support of Turkey <http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/NewsDetails.aspx?id=2826> 2008). Thus, the Turkish Cypriot community with the full support of Turkey supported Turkish troop presence, but they also agreed on reducing the number of soldiers as the Plan offered. However, the Greek Cypriots stated that Turkish troops had to leave the island after the confidence between the two communities had built.

The two communities had different attitudes on territory issue. The Turkish Cypriot community which has been living on one third of the island refused to discuss on this issue until being recognized by the Greek Cypriot community. It was also stated that the territory of Turkish part of the island must have been at least 33 per cent, but due to the Greek Cypriot community this rate must have fallen under 29 per cent (Migdalovitz 2002). According to the Annan Plan, the rate of Turkish territory would be reduced from 36 per cent to 29 per cent and the Turkish Cypriots would leave this area within two years (Uras 2003).

The other important issue was property motivated by the exchange of population. The Plan offered to establish an independent property board to deal with these problems (The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf 2004). In fact, the property problems should be solved after making a deal on territory issue. Because the Plan was offered a detailed solution on this issue considering both sides interests. However, reaching a settlement on this issue would be a long and hard process due to the Greek Cypriots objection on compensation. The crucial issue was to compensate for properties which were owned by the other community in 1974. To agree on this issue, both Cypriot communities should try to understand each other and respect their properties before and after 1974.

4.4 THE ANNAN PLAN: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

The Cyprus conflict has to be resolved, because, a de facto divided island can not be explained in the optimistic agenda of global politics. In its over forty-year stalemate, the UN has always given a special importance and priority to the Cyprus conflict, and almost all the UN Secretary Generals dealt with this conflict by putting efforts to find a solution. Considering the all UN efforts, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan's plan has become the most important. Mr. Annan was determined to solve the long-lasting Cyprus conflict, coming up with a detailed peace plan in order to make Cyprus to enter to the EU as a unified island. The original plan first published on 11 November 2002 and changed several times due to the parties' objections and the final version of the plan was voted in a referendum on 24 April 2004. In the referendum, the Turkish Cypriots voted "yes", however the Greek Cypriots voted "no". For sure, the result was contrary to the expectations of international community. Furthermore, after the failure of the Annan Plan, neither the UN nor any other third parties through the international community could be successful in finding a solution to date (Yılmaz 2005).

After the Annan Plan failed due to the rejection by the Greek Cypriots community it must be discussed if the plan was a workable proposal to solve the Cyprus conflict or not. According to Kofi Annan, the plan was a well-balanced and comprehensive proposal, including all necessary issues, and leaving nothing to be negotiated. The plan with its main articles and annexes (including a Constitution) aimed to create the United Cyprus Republic, covering the whole island except for the British Sovereign Base Areas (United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/UNSC_SG_Reports2003Cyprus.pdf 2003). But, Mr. Annan made some mistakes during the peace process and the Cypriot communities could not meet in a common point in some specific issues through the Annan Plan.

Before all else, the Plan was formed by Kofi Annan and his consultants without consulting with the Cypriot leaders and communities sufficiently. This attitude could be considered as the most important and strategic mistake what Kofi Annan made while preparing the Plan. No matter how good a third party is, the Cyprus conflict can not be understood as much as the Cypriot communities themselves. Thus, despite having the excellent data or acting in a good intention, a third party as an outsider can not be as effective as the Cypriot communities on such a case like the Cyprus conflict (Yılmaz 2005).

The second mistake was that working especially with the Cypriot administrations. In other conflict cases, this may be considered natural, but in the Cyprus conflict there are also other parties as an outsider such as Turkey, Greece and EU, after the membership of Greece, have been pretty much involved in the issue. In fact, the conflict rooted in mutual historical hostilities and traumas between two clashing forces, Turks and Greeks. Therefore, a settlement on Cyprus can not be found without Turkey, Greece and, of course, the EU. Nevertheless, both Turkish and Greek governments made efforts during the negotiations for Annan Plan. Turkish and Greek governments, especially, felt that to be involved in the process was necessary because they could prevent to `sell out Cyprus` to the other side. Either Turkey or Greece have put the Cyprus conflict to an important place on their foreign policy agenda and made so much effort to solve the conflict since 1974. Thus, Mr. Annan could have followed a more appropriate strategy

with arranging a five-sided conference in which Turkish and Greek Cypriot administrations, as well as the representatives of Turkey, Greece and, may be, the EU could participate. Following this strategy, step by step, Mr. Annan could have supported the parties to meet in common interests. To sum up, at first, Kofi Annan should have played a passive role such as being a communicator, and then he should have passed to a more active role such as being a formulator. Disregarding the psychological barriers between the Cypriot communities was another failure of Kofi Annan. As mentioned above, the outside powers have a far reaching influence since the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. These powers did not consider about desires of the Cypriot communities. In fact, there is not a Cypriot identity on the island because of the dominance identities, Turkish and Greek. Nevertheless, some efforts to create a Cypriot identity have actually been made, time to time, by both communities despite the division of the island. But, recently, only the president of TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat, begun to soften this view. He declared that a state composes by people called nation. The Republic could have created as a nation-state if the two communities could have achieved to live together. Since 1960, the Cypriot communities did not want themselves to be called a Cypriot nation (Ibid, pp.36-37).

Both communities have lived apart after the de facto division of the island with their own political cultures. The plan, considering these different political cultures, would have created the United Cyprus Republic with two practicable ways: either there would be two federal states which would have integrated over the time or, the competences of the states would be strengthened following the general European trend of regionalism (Asmussen 2004). This means that if the plan was not rejected by the Greek Cypriots and could be implemented, TRNC would be recognized as an independent state. Besides the strategic mistakes of the Plan, this recognition can be considered the success of the Turkish Cypriot community which has been suffering from isolations for more than forty years. Also, during the peace talks, the Turkish Cypriot community was granted a minority status. Due to the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriots would be treated equally.

Property was another important issue in the Annan Plan for both communities. However, the provisions in accordance with property in the final version of the plan were extremely complicated. The Greek Cypriots were complaining about very few people would have a realistic chance of receiving any of their property back. Actually, except receiving property back, there were other choices for dispossessed owners like receiving compensation in the form of guaranteed bonds and appreciation certificates, choosing any of their properties for reinstatement or receiving title to such properties provided by paying for the value of the property in its original state. This article would have caused some problems for both communities and drifted the island to another conflict (The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf 2004). The other problem for the Greek Cypriots was the rate of people who would return to the northern part. With the last version of the Annan Plan, this rate would be declined from twenty one per cent to eighteen per cent until the 19th year or Turkey's accession to the European Union, whichever would be earlier (Ibid, p.168). This article may be a success for the Turkish Cypriots or a failure for the Greek Cypriots. But, when a lot of Greek Cypriots moved to the north side due to the property regime of the plan, a majority of the landownership could have been the non-residents in the Turkish Cypriot state. However, since the Turkish Cypriots were ready to take that risk, this problem would have caused some struggles in the future (Asmussen 2004). Thus, this article could be a failure for both communities.

According to the plan, the official languages of the United Cyprus Republic would be Greek and Turkish. Cypriots would be free to choose any of the official languages through the relations with the federal authorities, but all secondary school students would have to learn both official languages (The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf 2004). This article may be a success for Turkish Cypriot community, because it would help to preserve their national identity.

Due to the Annan plan, federal states would have some competences, but the federal government would have all important competences like managing the Central Bank functions and Federal finances, including budget, dealing with the issues about Cypriot citizenship and immigration, or combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime. Therefore, federal states would be equipped with less competence than they had before. This article could be a failure for both communities, after transferring some competences to the federal government, they would have lost their authority in some areas. But, also, it can be described as a success, because by transferring some competences they would have focused on other important inner issues.

For all that, the Annan Plan could be a comprehensive basis for a settlement. The Plan, still, is on the table with its negotiated and agreed issues. If the two leaders really want to find a solution, they can start from where they had to stop before.

5. THE CYPRUS IMPASSE: AND THE WAY OUT?

5.1 WHAT WENT WRONG?

During the long-lasting conflict, the communities' representatives have met several times under the auspices of the UN. Nevertheless, because of the problems and dilemmas have been stemming as an obstacle, no solution has been reached from the beginning. As mentioned above, talks between Cyprus' divided communities have been made since 1997. Then, proximity talks had been under way until 2000 when the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, walked out. He, then, made a U turn at the end of 2001, requesting face-to-face talks with the Greek Cypriot leader, Glafcos Clerides. Thus, talks started again on 4 January 2001 with a real hope that the year 2002 would see a solution to forty-year conflict of Cyprus.

As mentioned above, talks between Cyprus' communities have mostly shaped by the leaders. In terms of conflict, change in leadership is the crucial point and makes to reach a political settlement feasible. Nevertheless, in the case of Cyprus there was no leadership change more than fifty years. Both the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community have been presented by the same leaders through the years.

The Greek Cypriots' long term leader, Glafcos Clerides, played an important role in the political life of Cyprus from 1950 to 2003. He undertook important responsibilities during the conflict. For instance, he was the Head of the Greek Cypriot delegation in the London Conference in 1964 and in 1968; he was the representative of the Greek Cypriot community in the intercommunal talks. After the President Archbishop Makarios left Cyprus because of the military coup of 15 July 1974, Mr. Clerides was responsible for the duties of President of the Republic until December 1974. During this period he met with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, to talk about the humanitarian

problems between the two communities (The President of the Republic of Cyprus <http://www.kypros.org/UN/presiden.htm> n.d.). In 1993 Mr. Clerides became the President of the Republic of Cyprus and held this position until being defeated in the 2003 presidential election by Tassos Papadopoulos (Profile:Glaftos Clerides <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2625551.stm> 2003).

The first president of the TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, was as an important key factor in the Cyprus conflict history as Glaftos Clerides. He was a leader of the Turkish community since 1960 and served almost in every crucial point of the conflict. After the collapse of the partnership on the island and foundation of the TRNC, Mr. Denktaş became the first President of the new state in 1983. He held this position until the elections of 2005 and Mehmet Ali Talat was elected as a new President of the TRNC (Profile:Rauf Denktaş <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2623169.stm> 2003). Like Glaftos Clerides, Rauf Denktaş worked on the Cyprus issue almost all his political career.

Both leaders engaged in the Cyprus conflict for more than four decades under the UN auspices. They had the same aim to make the other side accept the rules which were closest the list on the agenda of each side. Despite the distinct attitude of both sides' leaders, the UN, as a mediator, has been supporting a number of negotiations between the communities since the de facto division.

The second important factor which affects the resolution process is the opposition party's pressures. The increase in political opposition can effect the decision of the leader during the negotiation process. Especially for the last few years, the voice of the opposition parties can be heard louder than it was in the past. They criticize the policies of the government and the decisions of the leaders.

In terms of TRNC's political history, the most effective opposition party was the Republican Turkish Party that was established by the Turkish Cypriot community, in 1970. The representatives of this party, always, declared that there were bases for the inter-communal talks and a realistic solution to the Cyprus conflict, as well as taking into consideration the security needs for both communities (Republican Turkish Party

Official Web Site <http://www.ctpkibris.org/English> n.d.). Before becoming the President of TRNC, Mehmet Ali Talat, was the leader of that party and he always criticized Denktash for being aggressive, and also stated that because of Denktash's aggressive behavior, not only the Turkish Cypriot community but also Turkey would lose too much. Nowadays, the TRNC pursues more positive policy with the new leader, Mehmet Ali Talat.

The economic gap between the north and the south part causes to increase domestic pressure which can be called as another factor to affect the resolution process. The Greek Cypriots community has a successful economy with its full employment conditions, and stability, however, the mainly agriculture based Turkish Cypriots economy has a poor structure. TRNC, as an unrecognized state, can not join the World Trade Organization or other global economic bodies. Also, since the TRNC has no direct airplane connections with any country, except Turkey, the tourist industry can not help to grow the economy. These situations have caused to deep the economic gap between the two communities, and especially on the northern part, the economic problems have created domestic pressure which has an impact on the decision of the leaders to start direct negotiations. The Turkish Cypriots have been suffered from the isolations and if there would be a solution, they could strengthen their economy. But the Greek Cypriots have fears on a settlement to be damaged by the weak Turkish Cypriots economy. That's way the domestic pressure on the southern part has been much more to block the negotiations under the cloak of the weak economic situation of the other side.

Another factor which will be discussed as an affect to the failure of peace talks is international environment. By Cold War era, a new world order system has emerged and changes in the politics can be faced easily all over the world. After the collapse of Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, Cold War has finished. Thus, socialist regimes of the Eastern Europe were broken up. The emergence of new states and the idea of nationalism brought ethnic conflicts in many places especially in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in the Caucuses. Because of the location of Turkey and Greece, the foreign policies of these countries reconsidered due to this new era. According to Bartmann;

The end of Cold War has fundamentally changed the landscape of the international system. ...The Cyprus Question can be usefully revisited against this backdrop of changing international norms and prevailing orthodoxies. Prior to the Cold War, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) stood alone as a pariah state subject to international shunning but nonetheless defiant, popularly supported and effective in its authority on the ground. (Bartmann 1999).

Because of the changing process in the post-Cold War era, a federal structure has become important in policy-making around the world. Both old states and new states have been trying to influence societies on ethnic, religious or linguistic issues to form adequate structures. During the Cold War years, Turkey and Greece, both NATO members, were up against the conflict of Cyprus. This opposition caused some problems through the members of NATO. In the post-Cold War era the island continued its strategic position that was vital for Western needs and the United States. Thus, a permanent solution to the Cyprus conflict is necessary not only for the Cypriots themselves, but also it is necessary for Turkey, Greece and others (Khashman 1999). To sum up, Cyprus has a strategic location in terms of maintaining security in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Also, lots of the countries tried to influence Cyprus, according to their interests such as reaching to the Central Asian energy resources and expanding trade routes to the Eastern Mediterranean or transporting water from Turkey to the other countries in the area.

Besides the new international environment, the third parties' pressure such as Great Britain, the United States, and the United Nations, should take into account to explain the failure of peace talks in the Cyprus conflict. Great Britain is the third guarantor country due to the Treaty of Guarantee and has two independent bases where aircraft can land and troops can be stationed. Thus, she can not isolate herself from the Cyprus conflict (*The Treaty of Guarantee, 1959* <http://www.kypros.org/Constitution/treaty.htm> n.d.). The United States has a relationship with all four sides, Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, so she can help to reach a settlement on Cyprus. The US supports and aids the UN Secretary-General's efforts to facilitate negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The UN Security Council first passed a resolution, in 1964, to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus. At the beginning, the force deployed on the island only for six months, but resolutions passed twice a year for the last 44 years and the force is still deploying on the island (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kibris Tarihçe <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-tarihce.tr.mfa> n.d.).

The other factor that needs to be considered is the deep mistrust, which separates the Turkish and Greek Cypriots like a wall. Besides the historic Greek-Turkish hostilities, which have been transported to Cyprus from motherlands, the Cypriots have faced many tragedies from 1963 to 1974. Past experiences affect the relations of the two communities in a negative way during the negotiation process (Yılmaz 2005).

The last concrete step was taken by the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in order to make communities founding a settlement before Cyprus entered to the EU on 1 May 2004. During the negotiation process under the shadow of EU–Cyprus accession calendar, Mr. Annan adopted another calendar to counter the aggressive attitude of the two leaders. But, this ‘deadline’ did not give enough time for the new Turkish Cypriots’ government to adapt the new requirements and establish a working relationship with the Greek Cypriots’ government (Michael 2007).

Besides the external factors, there are also the internal factors. For instance, the communication problem between the two communities was an important factor that contributes to the inadequacy of historical negotiation approaches. The physical separation of the two communities from each other and isolations that caused to increase the gap between the two sides has created a bipolar siege mentality and the absence of communication relations. Thus, in addition to a conflict solving mechanism, the peace talks act as a communicative process in the Cyprus conflict. The two leaders preferred not to meet or talk each other except the peace talks.

The Turkish Cypriot community with its long term leader, Rauf Denktash, had been blamed refusing all solutions since the beginning of the peace talks, but the change of government affected the results of the referendum, so the Turkish Cypriots attitude over

a comprehensive settlement. The president of TRNC, Rauf Denktaş did not support the plan and wanted the Turkish Cypriots to vote `No` in the referendum. However, during the campaigning terms, the new government with the new Prime Minister, Mehmet Ali Talat, stated that it was an important chance to reach a settlement and the Turkish Cypriots had to vote `Yes` in the referendum.

By the Annan Plan within the framework of European integration, the EU became as interested as the Cypriot communities themselves in the resolution process. The EU had a dilemma which was about considering a settlement on the Cyprus conflict as a precondition for Cyprus's accession. Under this situation, the EU had to decide what to do about Cyprus' membership, but at the end she allowed the Greek-Cypriots' accession. However this unconditional accession was a miscalculation because of their failure to adopt *acquis communautaire* perfectly (Alpay 2005).

For reasons outlined above, to reach a settlement became difficult and the conflict was transported as per day. With the Annan Plan, the conflict was close to a solution, but either the Cypriot communities' approach or the EU's inability to pursue a fair Cyprus policy contributed to the failure of the Annan Plan. The last hope had disappeared and left the communities desiring to another attempt for a settlement.

5.2 CAN THE EU HELP TO "REUNITE" CYPRUS?

The EU has faced a number of challenges within its borders in which internal and external actors are at play. The Cyprus conflict is a unique case in the EU's history which involves the TRNC, two member states Greece and the Greek Cypriots administration under the name of the RoC and a candidate country, Turkey. Considering the Cyprus case as a complex and long-lasting conflict, the parties involved should not allow any short-term solution to divert attention away from the search for an overall solution to the Cyprus conflict (Hannay 2006). Actually, the EU declares the importance of solving the Cyprus conflict almost in every report . EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, stated the Cyprus conflict as a real hurting problem for the EU (Kıbrıs:

Bölünme Sürecini Durdurmak http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/90_cyprus_reversing_the_drift_to_partition_turkish_translation.pdf 2008).

However, the EU has not played a major role in the Cyprus conflict in comparison with the UN. During the crucial turning points thus far occurred on the island, the EU had not formed itself as an international actor to intervene political processes in third countries yet. As a result, the EU which always declares the importance of some crucial ideas such as democracy, stability on economy and politics, human rights, and above all, peace, has not played an important role in the conflict up to the Greek Cypriot administration applied for membership, her impact on the Cyprus conflict has increased after this accession. This increase has caused the other external actors to continue their various types of involvement in the conflict. In fact, the Cyprus policy of these actors has changed after the EU-Cyprus relationship became more serious. In this way, Greece and Britain became more connected with the conflict for being a EU member states, whilst Turkey's involvement has addressed to her candidate country identity. On the other hand, in recent years, the UN has been collaborated with EU to achieve the accession of Cyprus (Demetriou 2004).

Considering the 1960 Agreements, Cyprus can not be a member of the EU, because one of the guarantor countries, Turkey, is not a member of the EU. Nevertheless, neither the UN nor the EU took into account this article and they made a rapid progress to reunify Cyprus before being a full member of the EU. With the UN's last peace plan, "Annan Plan", both communities met several times to make an agreement on common interests and at the end, in April 2004, they voted the plan on a separate referendum. In democratic regimes, referendum is one of the most effective ways to give citizens a chance to participate on government policies. However, another important opportunity to reach a settlement in Cyprus conflict resulted in failure due to a 'no' vote by the Greek Cypriot's. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of the Plan. The Turkish Cypriots' constructive approach proved their intention for an immediate solution and created sympathy in the international community. The representatives of the EU and the UN stated their appreciation due to the attitude of the Turkish Cypriots during the negotiations and then in the referendum. The referendum results of the

Turkish Cypriot community were welcomed and they would not be blamed for the impasse of a solution anymore. After this declaration, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan published a report to the Security Council on 28 May 2004 to draw attention the urgent need to lift all the isolations on the Turkish Cypriot community (Arslan 2006). In his wording, he invited the members of the Security Council to cooperate for eliminating the isolations as follows:

The decision of the Turkish Cypriots is to be welcomed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey have made clear their respect for the wish of the Turkish Cypriots to reunify in a bicomunal, bizonal federation. The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development - not for the purposes of affording recognition or assisting secession, but as a positive contribution to the goal of reunification".

(United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S2004437.pdf> 2004).

Contemporaneously with the UN Secretary-General's report, the European Commission entered a proposal in April 2004, and invited the European Council for a direct aid to help the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. They thought that this fund would bring the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the European Union (Arslan 2006). The aim of this proposal was "to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community." (European Commission Decision http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkish_cypriot_community/taix_instrument_tech_assistance_part1_en.pdf 2006). Even if Turkey applied for membership decades ago, the Greek Cypriot Administration under the name of the RoC has become a member of the EU on 1 May 2004, just fourteen years later from their application, after the "no" vote in the referendum. Accepting Cyprus without a settlement can be a historical mistake, but the EU has enough power to make amends for this mistake or manage the process of settlement with a more effective peace policy towards the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. The solution of Cyprus conflict is more important for EU than any other international actor. Because a solution would also maintain peace between NATO allies; EU candidate country, Turkey, and EU Member State, Greece (Tocci 2007).

As mentioned above, despite a 'no' vote from the Greek Cypriots prevented to establish a new state on the island and the Greek Cypriot administration does not have the right to present the Turkish Cypriots, all of Cyprus has become a member of the EU. The UN and the EU should have not allowed the Greek Cypriot administration to represent an entire island (Arslan 2006). As a matter of fact, with the accession of the Greek Cypriot government to the EU, the belief that the EU would act as a catalyst in the solution process of Cyprus conflict came up in the international community. After the constructive attitude of the Turkish Cypriots in the referendum in April 2004, the EU wanted to reward the Turkish Cypriots community. The EU approved this belief by adopting new regulations in order to narrow the gap between the two communities before unification. The hopes for a settlement did not disappear because of these new regulations.

At the end of the April 2004, the Green Line Regulation was adopted in order to make an order through the border crossings and trade between the sides. Due to this regulation, all citizens of the EU and citizens from the third countries can cross the line from north to south or vice versa. To support the economic development of the northern part, on 7 July 2004, the EU allowed to use the certificates of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce through the Green Line and by these certificates, the Turkish Cypriots would export some of their goods. Following the referendum the attempt of EU with the aim of simultaneously removing one of the significant barriers to reaching a settlement has made a positive contribution. However the regulation on financial aid which would support economic development in the North and the regulation on trade which would establish rules for trade to other EU countries are still pending in the European Council due to a Greek Cypriot veto (Ibid, p.9).

To sum up, the Cyprus conflict has been waiting to be solved for decades. In fact, it is obvious that the conflict can be solved with the intension of all parties. After the failure of the last attempt promoted by the UN and the membership of the RoC, the EU which has been supporting the UN's efforts from the beginning, became a new hope for a solution. Thus, in the new era of the conflict, the EU became the most effective actor.

Because every party related to the conflict has also close relations with the EU. The parties are either a member state or a candidate state or an international ally of the EU. However, since the referendum in 2004 and then the membership of the RoC, nothing really changed in the status of the TRNC or in the position of the Turkish Cypriot community in world politics. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriots believed that the Cyprus conflict would be over one day and pushed forward any attempt for a solution. As mentioned above, in October 2005, Turkey started accession negotiations with the EU and now the Cyprus conflict is a crucial point in the negotiations between the Turkish government and the EU. Turkey was required to recognize the RoC and extend the Ankara Agreement to include ten new Member States. That requirement caused another crisis related to the Cyprus conflict. Moreover, almost every attempt of the EU which would help to reach a settlement was prevented by Greece or the RoC vote. As Mr. Arslan mentioned, “the EU did not take a significant step forward to bring the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the EU. The only remarkable improvement remains the Green Line regulation that allows the crossing of persons and some goods.”(Ibid, p.10). As a result, the only way for the EU to maintain the peace and security does not only goes through the island but also goes through Greece and Turkey.

5.3 THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT AS A KEY FACTOR FOR TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE EU

5.3.1 “To Recognize Cyprus” as Another Membership Criteria is Fair for Turkey?

Cyprus stands as a key issue blocking Turkey’s membership of the EU since 2004. The never-ending story between the EU and Turkey shifted to another stage by the membership of the RoC. As is known, the European Council defined the membership criteria at the Copenhagen summit in 1993. Thus, the associated country should fulfill the obligations that are required in order to meet with the “Copenhagen criteria” (European Commission Enlargement: Accession Criteria http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm)

n.d.). However, for Turkey, the accession progress has not taken place as usual. Even if Turkey fulfills all requirements to be a full-member, the Cyprus conflict will affect the membership negotiations and recognizing the RoC will be another membership criterion for Turkey. Almost all Turkish governments traditionally declared that Turkey's relations with the EU and the Cyprus conflict were two different issues; nevertheless the EU has behaved contrary to that from the beginning of the nineties. Also, it was declared frequently the impossibility of recognition of Greek Cypriots administration unless a lasting solution for the Cyprus conflict was found (Müftüler et al. 2003). As mentioned in the previous chapters, when TRNC established by the Turkish Cypriot administration, the UN, so the members of her, stated their attitude towards not to recognize this new state. Therefore, only Turkey has recognized TRNC, and also, for Turkey, there is only one state in the island of Cyprus which is called TRNC.

In spite of the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU that started on 3 October 2005, the roots of Turkey's connection with the EU were formed with the Ankara Agreement in 1963. The aim to sign this agreement was to create a CU in order to help Turkey's full membership in the EU. However, to integrate necessary policies towards creating a CU lasted more than ten years and CU was completed in 1995. By signing the agreement of CU, Turkey accepted to open all ports and landing facilities to all EU Member States (Marchetti 2007). The fifth enlargement process of the EU ended with the membership of the RoC. After this accession, Turkey had to extend the Ankara Agreement to new Member States. However, any additional protocol would mean to accept the recognition of the RoC and caused another crisis between Turkey and the EU.

Nevertheless, on 29 July 2005, the Additional Protocol was signed between Turkey and the EU. Turkey also made an official declaration in order to clarify her attitude towards the recognition of the RoC. She stated that to sign the Additional Protocol did not mean recognizing the RoC (Turkey and EU http://www.turkishembassy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=235 n.d.). Following this declaration, Turkey reached her forty six-year dream and the accession negotiations started despite the Cyprus conflict.

Consequently, any candidate country which is in favor of the EU membership might face these double demands. However, Turkey's long journey to the EU showed that Turkey's slow entry to the EU was not only based on her current technical and legal difficulties, but also due to the differences of culture and historical relations such as the Cyprus conflict.

5.3.2 What will be the Future of Turkey Under the Cyprus Conflict

The possible future EU membership of Turkey has become one of the most crucial topics both in the EU and within Turkey itself. The EU's decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 represents a renaissance in Turkey-EU relations. However, there has been a slow progress since the disagreements over Cyprus conflict and the objections of some Member States on Turkey's membership. Even in the ordinary areas of European integration, the negotiations were bounded with a set of unresolved and highly sensitive political issues, of which the Cyprus conflict is the most important one. The EU accession negotiations have left Turkey with the question of how to overcome the foreign policy challenges, especially the challenge of Cyprus. While this unique situation of Turkey is difficult for the EU to comprehend, it does not mean that the Turkish case will eventuate in an alternative solution to full membership, such as privileged partnership. Considering all previous accession negotiations which were ended in full membership and also, after Turkey has made progress in implementing *acquis communautaire*, an exception to this tradition would give rise to international repercussions about Turkey's relations with the West and the EU's image in the Islamic world. Thus, Turkey, as a candidate country, probably is the greatest challenge of the EU in order to deal thoughtfully and rationally. Actually, Turkish government, frequently, declares that she is ready to work on a settlement which is sponsored by the UN. She also determines to pursue democratic reforms under the *sine qua non* perspective of full membership. However, if the UN-sponsored talks reach a solution, a wider set of complex issues will be faced in order to deal after the solution,

including Turkish-Greek relations, so Turkey's ongoing negotiations with the EU. At the same time, a comprehensive settlement will overcome the objections of the Republic of Cyprus to Turkey's accession process, thus, the major obstacle in the road of Turkey's accession process will disappear.

At the meeting of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission in Brussels, in May 2008, Turkey's Foreign Minister and Chief Negotiator, Ali Babacan, emphasized that in spite of Turkey's ability to adopt and fulfill the reforms, a lot of chapters was not opened due to negative attitudes of some Member States, but Turkish government would continue to make reforms for the benefit of the Turkish people, not as concessions to the EU (Turkish FM: Reforms are for the benefit of our people, not concessions to the EU <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=55704> 2008). Even though there are some objections towards Turkey's membership, the EU are pleased with Turkey's significant progress on EU membership path.

It is obvious that the Cyprus conflict has to be solved before Turkey joins the EU, not because that is a legal requirement but because Turkey will not become a member of the EU under the objections of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. In the words of Abdullah Gül, the President of Turkey, "There should be a lasting solution on the island under the leadership of the United Nations (UN), and after that, Turkey, Greece and a united Cyprus could be a region of cooperation in the EU." (Turkey not to recognize Cyprus unless lasting solution found http://english.people.com.cn/200510/09/eng20051009_213348.html 2005). If Turkey could not be a member of the EU because of some Member States' objections, the EU would lose touch with an important Muslim country, so the Islamic world in order to influence the democratization process and adapt her own values. Considering Turkey, as a role model connecting Islamic world with the Western world, the EU would lose much of her dominance in the Muslim community. Thus, during the Turkey's accession process, the EU must be loyal to the principle of pacta sunt servanda (Europe Cannot Afford to Reject Turkey! <http://www.turkishweekly.net/articles.php?id=16> 2004).

6. CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the Cyprus conflict and its adverse effect to Turkey's EU membership. Despite being a Eurasian country, Turkey has always desired to be connected with Europe. Thus, Turkey has built good relations with Europe both in politics and in economics: she is a member of NATO, the Council of Europe and a candidate country which is looking forward to entering to the EU.

For more than forty years, searching for a settlement on the Cyprus conflict has not worked out. Unfortunately, all parties of the conflict have not met on even ground. The aggrieved parties of the conflict are the TRNC and Turkey. Turkey intervened Cyprus in 1974 in order to put an end to Greeks' bloody operations over the Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 Treaties declared Turkey as a motherland and gave the right to interfere in a conflict if it would be necessary. Nevertheless, the Turkish intervention under the aim of peace is stated as an occupation in the international community. Turkey has also been supporting TRNC's economy besides protecting them with military forces. Because Turkey is the only trade partner of TRNC.

As mentioned above the other aggrieved party, the Turkish Cypriots, were subject to Greeks' bloody operations from 1960 to 1974. In 1983, they established Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but only Turkey has recognized it. Under the control of an unrecognized state, the Turkish Cypriots have been suffering from the strict isolations for decades. In addition, the Turkish Cypriot community was always blamed to block peace talks on reunification. However, they showed their desire on reunification by accepting the Annan Plan on the referendum. Despite the results of the referendum, the Turkish Cypriot community was punished once again by the EU with the accession of the Greek Cypriots under the name of the Republic of Cyprus without a solution.

The never-ending story of Turkey's EU membership came to a turning point after the accession of the RoC. In fact, the accession of the Greek Cypriots in spite of their rejection to reunification on the Annan Plan has been the historical mistake of the EU. Because, Cyprus is the only Member State which lies within a de facto divided territory and trying to search for a settlement will always be a headache for the EU. The Cyprus conflict has also been a headache for Turkey and the accession process of her after the EU declared the solution of the Cyprus conflict as a precondition for Turkey.

To conclude, the analysis of the Cyprus conflict towards Turkey' EU accession leads to two major conclusions:

The primary conclusion is that despite the EU's principle of equal treatment for all candidate countries, the EU has treated Turkey differently compared to the other candidate countries. There are several issues to prove this theory. Europeans are still skeptical about Turkey's accession, thus, enlargement of the EU to welcome Turkey has caused a lot of debates. Europeans are, especially, skeptical about the geographical position, Muslim population and poor socio-economic situation of Turkey. However, besides these shortcomings of Turkey, reality on slow candidacy of her is more complex. Even if Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen criteria and overcomes the other deficiencies, she has to deal with another obligation that is a new precondition just for Turkey, to reach a comprehensive solution on the conflict of Cyprus. Under these circumstances Turkey has continued to put into action the necessary economic and political reforms, but, still, there is not a positive sign in order to give hope to Turkey being a member of the EU. In other words, the reason of the long process of Turkey's accession has been due not only to Turkey's failure on implementing necessary reforms, but also the EU's unwillingness to welcome Turkey.

The secondary conclusion is that the accession of Cyprus made the settlement of Cyprus conflict even more complicated. The Turkish membership has been delayed in the foreseeable future by linking the accession with the solution of the Cyprus conflict. Thus, Turkey will not join to the EU unless a comprehensive solution is found on the

Cyprus conflict. This new precondition is like a political test for Turkey, especially, has required by Greeks. However, the EU should consider that accepting Turkey as a Member State after she adopts the Copenhagen criteria is necessary not only for Greek interests but the interests of the EU as a whole.

In short, this thesis has argued that even if Turkey fulfills all of the Copenhagen criteria, her accession is going to be influenced by specific issues, of which the Cyprus conflict is the most important.

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