

**THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
BAHÇEŞEHİR UNIVERSITY**

**TRANSLATION OF GEORGIOS GEORGIADES-  
ARNAKIS' STUDY TITLED:  
“THE FIRST OTTOMANS – CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE PROBLEM OF THE FALL  
OF ASIA MINOR HELLENISM (1282-1337)”  
IN ENGLISH AND  
REVIEW OF THE STUDIES PUBLISHED  
AFTER 1947 UP TODAY**

**Master's Thesis**

**ANASTASIOS LOUARIS**

**İSTANBUL, 2015**



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**Supervisor: Prof. Dr. HEATH W. LOWRY**

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Name/Last Name of the Student: Anastasios Louaris

Date of Thesis Defense:

The thesis has been approved by the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Assistant Prof. Dr. Burak Küntay  
Graduate School Director  
Signature

I certify that this thesis meets all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Dr. Heath W. Lowry  
Program Coordinator  
Signature

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and we find it fully adequate in scope, quality and content, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Examining Committee Members

Signature

\_\_\_\_\_

Thesis Supervisor  
Prof. Dr. Heath W. Lowry

-----

Thesis Co-supervisor  
Assistant Prof. Emrah Safa Gürkan

-----

Member  
Dr. Fikret Yılmaz

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**Bu tezdeki tüm bilgilerin akademik kurallara ve etik ilkelere uygun olarak elde edildiğini ve sunulduğunu; ayrıca bu kuralların ve ilkelerin gerektirdiği şekilde, bu çalışmadan kaynaklanmayan bütün atıfları yaptığımı beyan ederim.**

Adı, Soyadı : Anastasios Louaris

İmza :

To my wife Gül

For her support and patience...

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## ABSTRACT

TRANSLATION OF GEORGIOS GEORGIADES-ARNAKIS' STUDY TITLED:  
“THE FIRST OTTOMANS-CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE FALL  
OF ASIA MINOR HELLENISM (1282-1337)” IN ENGLISH AND REVIEW OF THE  
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Anastasios Louaris

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Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis' study “Οι πρώτοι Οθωμανοί: Συμβολή στο πρόβλημα της πτώσεως του Ελληνισμού της Μικράς Ασίας (1282-1337)” (The First Ottomans: Contribution to the Problem of the Fall of Asia Minor Hellenism (1282-1337)”, is based on his PhD thesis (1943) and was published in 1947 in Greek. Although the book was sold out quite early, it was republished only in 2008 in modern Greek language. The purpose of the present Thesis is the translation of the aforementioned study in English, making it accessible to a much wider public. In addition, having the ambition to provide the reader a first insight on the origin of the Ottomans and the factors that had been the driving force for their subsequent brilliant evolution, in a long introductory part are detailed the studies that created the prevailing lines on the topic and also the studies that were published after 1947.

**Keywords:** Early Ottoman State, Ghaza, Ghazi, Holy War, Looting.

## ÖZ

GEORGIOS GEORGIADES-ARNAKIS'IN "İLK OSMANLILAR-KÜÇÜKASYA'DAKİ HELLENİZM'İN DÜŞÜŞÜ SORUNUNA KATKISI (1282-1337)" İSİMLİ ÇALIŞMASININ TERCÜMESİ VE 1947'DEN SONRA BU GÜNE KADAR YAYINLADIĞI ÇALIŞMALARIN İNCELEMESİ.

Anastasios Louaris

Tarih Yüksek Lisans Programı

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Heath W. Lowry

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Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis'in "Οι πρώτοι Οθωμανοί: Συμβολή στο πρόβλημα της πτώσεως του Ελληνισμού της Μικράς Ασίας (1282-1337)" (İlk Osmanlılar-Küçükasya'daki Hellenizm'in Düşüşü Sorununa Katkısı (1282-1337)) isimli çalışma, yazarın 1943 Doktora tezine dayanmaktadır ve ilk defa 1947'de o dönemin Yunancası ile yayınlanmıştır. Kitap oldukça erken tükenmesine rağmen, günümüz Yunancasıyla sadece 2008 yılında tekrar yayınlanmıştır. Mevcut tezin amacı, daha önce yukarıda bahsı geçen çalışmanın İngilizceye çevrilerek çok daha geniş bir kitleye ulaşmasını sağlamaktır. Buna ek olarak, giriş bölümünde, okurlara Osmanlıların kökeni ve parlak gelişimlerinin itici gücü olan etkenleri ile ilgili bir bakış açısı verme tutkusuyla, geçen yüzyılın başında bu konuyla ilgili ana hatları oluşturan önemli çalışmaları ve 1947'den sonra yayınlanan çalışmalar sunulmuştur.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Erken Osmanlı Devleti, Gaza, Gazi, Kutsal Şavaş, Yağmalama.

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**PART I**  
**(INTRODUCTORY)**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

As a general rule, the history of a state starts being recorded when the state in question, after having been strengthened, begins to take action dynamically against the countries which borders with, especially after a major event, usually a confrontation. Again as a general rule, the lacuna in history regarding the genesis of a state is called upon to be filled in by oral narratives, myths and traditions, and also by their subsequent chronicle, which takes place under a different psychology, aiming to create legitimacy and national consciousness to its population. What is sought is continuity with the past – which can only be glorious – and, certainly, a strong personality which, by being gifted with all the necessary qualities, assembled the people who formed the original core of the state and led it to its first steady steps. Of course, the supernatural element and the divine will is something that is not missing from these narratives.

Without being an exception to that rule, due to the lack of sources, the origins of the Ottomans and the genesis of the Ottoman State, still constitute a dark spot in History. No matter how vague and exaggerating the ottoman chronicles and the histories of the last Byzantine historiographers are, they are still sources providing important information if examined carefully and used wisely. By exploiting the known sources, historians try to come to rationale conclusions and interpretations. Nevertheless, speculations and emphasis on ethnic, racial or religious elements are not missing from their studies, giving them a congruent tone. The studies that were published in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – to be more specific in the inter-war period – created trends that were followed by others, even by modern scholars. However, a revisionist interest started during the 1980's; researchers and historians, by studying alternative sources or by reading again the primary sources that were not adequately studied or were totally ignored in the fundamental works of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, are trying to form a revised and more accurate picture of the early ottoman period.

However, there is still room for more discussion.

The work of Georgiades – Arnakis “Οι πρώτοι Οθωμανοί: Συμβολή στο πρόβλημα της πτώσεως του Ελληνισμού της Μικράς Ασίας (1282-1337)” (The First Ottomans: Contribution to the Problem of Asia Minor Hellenism's Fall (1282-1337)) is based on

his PhD thesis (1943) and was published in 1947, in Greek. Although the book was sold out quite early, it was republished only in 2008, in the Modern Greek language.

Purpose of this study is the translation of the aforementioned study in English and review on the studies, published after 1947, up today. As far as I am aware, the present study will be the first attempt to translate Georgiades-Arnakis' work into English. The only reference to Georgiades-Arnakis' book in English was a few pages review<sup>1</sup>, written by Robert Lee Wolf in 1951. This review, which gives a rough idea of what Georgiades-Arnakis deals with in his study, was used as bibliography by many scholars. Having the ambition to provide the reader a first insight on the origin of the Ottomans and the factors that had been the driving force for their subsequent brilliant evolution, the study would not be considered complete without a brief reference to the studies that created the main trends on the issue.

The present study is consisted of two parts: the first, which is the introductory part and the second, which is the translation of Georgiades-Arnakis' study. At the first part, initially are presented the fundamental studies which, it should be noted that created the main trends relating with the identity of the Ottoman state, which came to evolve into successor of the Byzantine Empire. Afterwards, a book summary gives the main lines supported by Georgiades-Arnakis in his study. Next, are presented the studies published after 1947, which follow or criticize the one or the other trend, or try to follow a middle path. Finally, at the conclusion, are displayed the writer's thoughts and opinions about the issue.

By presenting what was published before and after Georgiades-Arnakis' book, the present study might be considered an inaugural reading for further studying of the origins of the Ottoman state. I hope that the attempt of the present study will be the first step that will be followed by the publication of a book, making Georgiades-Arnakis' study accessible to a much wider public.

## 2. HOW DID THE DISCUSSION START

Who were the Ottomans? Were they Turks and fanatic Muslims? Which were the factors that led to the genesis, development and the final transformation of the Ottoman emirate to an empire? Were they religious, ethnic, or racial? How did the first Ottomans succeed to attract men under their banner? What was their driving force? Was it the religion and the ethos of *Ghaza* (Holy War) against the infidels, or the potential profits from looting and enslavement? How was the terms Ghaza and Ghazi interpreted by the historians? How was the condition at the border communities? Did the ottoman population grow by flows of Turk immigrants that came from the East? And what happened to the indigenous population? Did they all flee or were there people who decided to stay? Did those who remained play any role in the formation of the Ottoman state? How was the Ottoman state organized? How did some 'barbarian' nomads manage to build an empire that ruled for centuries without any major problems a huge population with different religions, languages and traditions? Were the adapted administrative and social institutions inherited from the Seljuks and the Ilhanids or were they Byzantine? Should these questions be considered as dipoles, excluding the one or the other or should some middle ground be followed?

The question of the emergence of the early Ottoman State began to concern the historians in the early 20th century, during the First World War, since it seemed that its dissolution was imminent. As it was mentioned above, the studies that were published created reactions and trends which still exist.

In 1916, Herbert A. Gibbons attempted to demonstrate that, in fact, the Ottomans were a political community that resulted from the involvement of people with varied ethnic and religious origin, with Islam to function as the adhesive material of that amalgam. Pointing out that the oldest Ottoman sources dating back to the 15th century were subsequent inventions, he concluded that, given the absence of contemporary evidence and unanimous tradition, Osman should be judged solely on the basis of his achievements. According to Gibbons, Osman and his followers were pagan Turks living as pastoralists at the Byzantine border and, taking advantage of the weak Byzantium defense, they were successfully engaged in robbery. At some point of his career, Osman

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Lee Wolff, "G.G. Arnakis: Hoi Protoi Othomanoi," *Speculum*, V. 26, no. 3, (Jul. 1951): pp. 483-

embraced Islam; then, his followers were possessed by proselytizing zeal and forced many Christian neighbors to convert to Islam. The expansion of the Ottoman power was not so much accompanied by new elements coming from the East, but, by the increasing defections and conversions of Byzantine Greeks. The proselytes of Bithynia constituted the majority of the first-Ottomans and played crucial role in the founding of the Ottoman State, because the establishment of its administrative mechanisms relied on their experience. The process by which the Ottoman state expanded, assured the continuity of the Byzantine practices under the Islamic guise. The Ottomans were the heirs of the Byzantine traditions and administrative practices and remained a kind of Islamo-Byzantine mixture until the conquest of the Arab world, in the early 16th century. In consequence, the creative power of the Ottomans must be attributed to European elements, because it wouldn't have come from purely Turkish and Mongolian bases<sup>2</sup>.

It did not take long for the critics to appear. The beginning was done in 1922, when the Turkish historian Mehmed Fuad Köprülü wrote a study and demonstrated the extent to which the Ottoman institutional foundations came from Seljuk and Ilhan precedent, vehemently rejecting Gibbons' speculation, that the Ottomans did not possess the appropriate cultural skills to create a state and also that the Ottoman administrative mechanisms had Byzantine origins<sup>3</sup>. The same was repeated in 1934, when a series of lectures at Sorbonne, which were published under the title *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, stressed the thesis of the purely Turkish nature of the Ottoman State<sup>4</sup>.

Köprülü was representing the views of the Turkish History Thesis, namely the views of the newly established Turkish state, which was trying to define itself, seeking continuity in time and space (Anatolia), not only by the Muslim but also by the Turkish national

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<sup>2</sup> Herbert Adams Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Osmanlis up to the Death of Bayezid I (1300-1403)*. Oxford (Clarendon Press), 1916. pp. 27, 49 and 51. Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis, *Οι πρώτοι Οθωμανοί, Συμβολή εις το πρόβλημα της πτώσεως του Ελληνισμού της Μικράς Ασίας (1282-1337)*, Athens, 1947. pp. 10, 25-28. Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London (University of California Press), 1995. pp. 10, 32-34. Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*. Albany (State University of New York Press), 2003. pp. 9-10

<sup>3</sup> Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, "Anadolu'da İslamiyet: Türk İstilasından Sonra Anadolu Tarih-i Dinisine bir Nazar ve bu Tarihin Menba'ları," *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 2 (1922): p. 281-311, 385-420 and 457-486.

<sup>4</sup> Lowry, *The Nature* (2003), pp. 26-28.

identity<sup>5</sup>. Thus, by contradicting Gibbons, he defended the view that the Ottoman State mostly relied on the Turkmen, namely the Turkish element of Anatolia, and that it was the Seljuks and their institutions that contributed to the organization of the administration, the army and the society of the new state and not the Byzantines, whose contributions were described as completely marginal<sup>6</sup>. He argued that, the origins of the Ottoman State should not be studied as an isolated phenomenon that occurred in the region of Bithynia and also that the historians should focus their research not on isolated politico-military incidents, but rather on the social morphology, the cultural traditions and the institutional structures of Asia Minor Turks, particularly those who in late 13<sup>th</sup> century were living at the border zone. He perceived the border society as a broad canvas comprised by various social forces, all of which contributed significantly to the ability of the Turco-Islamic hegemonies to form states. During the second half of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the demographic pressure that was applied by the Turkish tribes, which were fleeing before the Mongols, carried the border to the western part of Asia Minor and triggered the dynamics of Anatolian Turkish society, supporting thus the development of a state like the Ottoman. The strong personality of Osman and his followers happened to be in the right place at the right time. Osman's direct environment was constituted by tribal members who, probably, were of common origin. As the Ottomans began to establish their statehood, they were strengthened by other Turkish populations, which arrived in the area together with experienced religion and administration representatives from the hinterland. There were islamizations, but the Ottoman state was essentially Turkish, was created by Turks and nearly all its institutional elements were inherited from the Turco-Islamic Central Asia and the Middle East. Among the great men of the Ottoman state, who emerged in the 14th and even the 15th century, very few were Christian converts. Almost everyone at the top of the government and the army was Turk<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> In the context of this quest for continuity was attempted the creation of a connection between Anatolia - i.e. the territories of the modern Turkish state, which, at the same time, also constituted the core of the Ottoman territories - and the Turkish-speaking nations who were living outside of the borders.

<sup>6</sup> Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, "Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Te'siri Hakkında Bazı Mülâhalazalar," *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası*, (1931): 165-313. Also, idem., *Les origines de l' Empire Ottoman*. Paris (Études orientales, publiées par l'Institut Francais d'Archéologie de Stanboul, III) 1935. English translation, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, trans. and ed. by Gary Leiser, Albany (State University of New York Press), 1992. pp. 14, 83, 87, 100.

<sup>7</sup> Georgiades-Arnakis, *Oi πρώτοι Οθωμανοί* (1947), p. 29. See also Lowry, *The Nature* (2003), p. 6, and Kafadar, *Between two Worlds* (1995), pp. 10-11, 33-34, 37-40.

In 1924, Friedrich Giese<sup>8</sup> expressed an opinion contrary to that of Gibbons, focusing in the racial and ethnic origin of the Ottomans and supporting the Turco-Islamic roots of the Ottoman administration. Furthermore, he introduced a new element to interpret the Ottoman conquests: the Akhi brotherhoods, their relationships with Osman and the support they offered him, but also the key role they played in transferring the administrative infrastructure from the earlier Muslim states of Anatolia. Moreover, he criticized Gibbons for the way in which he used the testimonies, especially for basing his argumentation on the legend of a dream<sup>9</sup>.

In 1932, Willian L. Langer and Robert P. Blake, with their essay *The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background*, gave a new tone to the discussion that had started by Gibbons, introducing material and sociological factors such as geography, the development of trade and the social organization of the religious orders and associations of craftsmen. They noted that, their settlement at the weakened Byzantine borders contributed to the rapid spread of the Ottomans and also that, the heterodox nature of the islam and the Turks of Anatolia explains the ease with which the Byzantine Christians were converting to the religion of the ruler. They rejected Gibbons' view that the Ottoman administrative structure was totally inherited from Byzantium and argued that the infrastructure that was provided by the Akhis confederations at the cities of Anatolia created the substructure of the early Ottoman administrative practice and served as a bridge uniting the people of Bithynia<sup>10</sup>.

In 1935, the Romanian Historian Nikolai Jorga<sup>11</sup>, although he emphasized the long historical development of the Turks as background of the Ottomans, he argued that they did not possess the life forms that were necessary to establish an empire, so, excluding religion, the Ottoman conquerors had almost totally adopted the Byzantine life. Thus, the Ottoman Empire was a Byzantium after Byzantium<sup>12</sup>.

However, the main dispute against Gibbons broke out in 1938, when the Austrian Orientalist and Historian Paul Wittek developed his Ghaza Thesis, which was to

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<sup>8</sup> Friedrich, Giese, 'Das problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches', *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete* 2 (1924).

<sup>9</sup> Georgiades-Arnakis, *ibid.*, pp. 13, 29-30. Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 6, and Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

<sup>10</sup> Georgiades-Arnakis, *ibid.*, pp. 30-31. Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 6, and Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 34, 36, 42.

<sup>11</sup> Nicolai, Jorga, *Byzance après Byzance. Continuation de l'histoire de la vie byzantine*, Bucharest 1935 . Translation in Greek, *To Byzάντιο μετά το Byzάντιο*. Trans. by G. Karas, Athens (Gutenberg), 1989.

<sup>12</sup> Georgiades-Arnakis, *ibid.*, pp. 27, Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 32, 34-35. Lowry *ibid.*,

become the most convincing and widespread theory among scholars. Since then, two fronts<sup>13</sup> were formed and, with more or less intensity, most experts supported one of the two views.

The essence of Wittek's theory is that, the real cause of the splendid rise of the Ottoman State was the presence of hordes of Turkish holy warriors for Islam (Ghazis), who, inspired by a missionary spirit, turned against the Byzantine Empire, because they wanted to exterminate the religion of the infidels. For that reason, they were attracted to the territory and constituted an irresistible military force for the small Ottoman State and its evolution to an empire. According to Wittek, the ghazi-state, aimed at military conquest and the acquisition of booty. Wittek agrees with Köprülü that the rise of the Ottoman State should be studied taking into account the centuries of conflicts, cultural transformation and assimilation at the medieval Asia Minor that preceded the Turkish and Muslim settlement. Furthermore, like Köprülü, he believed that the hinterland should be differentiated from the border in terms of social structure and cultural characteristics, emphasizing that the border society allowed more room for heterodoxy, unevenness and mobility. Both of them believed that the population of the hinterland consisted of persianized courtier cycles and permanently settled producers who, actually, wanted peaceful relations and coexistence with the Byzantines or, at least, did not want to live in ongoing hostilities. In contrast, the border population consisted by nomads, warriors, adventurers and dervishes, motivated by the searching for pasture, loot and glory or by a religious behest.

By rejecting the allegations about the Kayı<sup>14</sup> origin of the Ottomans, Wittek differentiates from Köprülü regarding the racial character and the national identity that was given by the latter at the Ottoman State. He alleges that Islamic religious war and ghazis played crucial role to the Ottoman State and its development. His views, which would evolve into the 'Ghaza Thesis', were based on the 15th century's Ottoman chronicles, which were animated by the Ghaza ethos, but mainly by the Turkish text of Ahmedi's<sup>15</sup> İskendernâme and a stone inscription of 1337, mounted over one of the

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<sup>13</sup> Gibbons and Wittek.

<sup>14</sup> Branch of the Oğuz Turks.

<sup>15</sup> Ahmedi Taceddin (Taj al Dîn ibn Hizr Ahmedi) (1334-1413). He was one of the greatest poets of the 14th-century Islamic world, student of the famous literary Akmal ad-Din al Babarti in Cairo. After the battle of Ankara he wrote "Iskendername", an ode (qasida) for Tamerlane. He also wrote collection of

entrances of a mosque in the first Ottoman capital, Bursa. Focusing on Ghaza, he considers that the Ottomans were a Ghazi community, namely a community of border religion warriors who, during the formation of their state, were united by the common desire and the primary objective of the Holy War against their infidel neighbours<sup>16</sup>. Always according to his Thesis, the religion was the element that attracted increasingly larger numbers of men, who were integrated into the Ottoman war machine. Driven by the Ghaza ethos which, along with religious motivations was also combining searching for loots or pastures and political opportunism, the Ottoman, like the other emirates, aimed at broadening its territory and power. However, the Ottomans, due to circumstances and being settled at the undefended and unstable Byzantine borders, had a different future and evolved into a lasting empire

Wittek stressed also the continuation of Turkish-Islamic culture and argued that the territory of the new Ottoman State was organized by experienced scholars and bureaucrats who had come from the centers of the Islamic civilization. Initially, the heretical border culture was in tension with those bureaucrats.

However, it was the culture of the border that made Ghazis and nomads adaptable to the culture of the occupied countries. The same mentality had led many Akritae and the inhabitants to join massively and with ease the occupier and resulted to the voluntary subjugation of many small towns and castles.

Wittek also referred to the Islamisations and cooperation between Christians and Muslims, but his insistence on the ideology of Holy War had left no room for the examination of other factors<sup>17</sup>.

Summarizing, we can say that, the burning issue that the scholars tried to answer was "whose achievement was this important state". Since the nationalistic and racial approach Köprülü didn't receive any acceptance beyond the borders of the Turkish Republic, among the three trends that were shaped, the views that prevailed was those

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poems (divan), the poem Cemsid u Hürsid and a preceptive work entitled Tervib al-Ervab (The enjoyment of spirit). Lowry: *ibid.*, Gr. trans. by S. Papageorgiou, Athens (Papazisis), 2004, f.n. 9, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Wittek, *The Rise of Ottoman Empire*. London and New York (Royal Asiatic Studies), 1938, translation in Greek, *Η γένεση της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας*. Trans. by E. Mpalta, Athens (Poreia) 1991, pp. 14-15, 20, 43 and 51.

<sup>17</sup> Georgiades-Arnakis, *ibid.*, pp. 32-33, 116. Lowry, *ibid.*, pp. 3, 7. Also Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. xii, 10-11, 35, 37-38, 43, 47-49.

expressed by Gibbons and Wittek. Wittek's view was considered more convincing and was adopted by the majority of Ottomanologist and Orientalist historians.

The opening of the Ottoman archives opened up new horizons for the researchers revitalizing the interest of the historians. The volume and quality of the archival material, which consisted mainly of numeric data registers held by the state bureaucracy, led to more accurate interpretations and revisionist tendencies.

### 3. GEORGIOS GEORGIADES-ARNAKIS

Georgios Gregoriades-Arnakis<sup>18</sup> was born in Istanbul in 1912. He completed his secondary education at the Robert Academy (1924-29) and, at the Robert College (1929-33) of Istanbul, for that reason he was fluent in Turkish and English. He studied Philosophy (1933-39) and Theology (1941-43) at the University of Athens, from where he received his Ph.D. (summa cum laude) in 1943. While he was studying, among others, he attended Byzantine History courses, given by Constantinos Amandos.

His doctorate thesis, which was published as a book in 1947, dealt with the conquest of Asia Minor in the late 13th and 14th century and the decline of the Greek element in Asia Minor, especially in the area of Bithynia. Dionysios Zakynthinos, who held the seat of Byzantine History at the University of Athens, was his advisor. In 1947, his thesis was included in the prestigious international scientific series of monographs, founded by Nikos Bees (Βέης), entitled "Texte und Forschungen zur byzantinisch-neugriechischen Philologie". It was a scientific work of paramount importance, not only for the Greek-language literature, but also for the international scientific community, having been used as a fundamental tool, not only by well-known Byzantinologists, like Constantinos Amandos, Speros Vryonis, Donald Nicol, who dealt with the last Byzantine centuries, but also by Ottomanologist-historians, as Halil İnalcık, Stanford Shaw, Elizabeth Zahariades, Heath W. Lowry. The main reason for the widespread use of this work lies in the very good use - for the first time in a relevant specialized study - of the works of the early Ottoman chroniclers, the last Byzantine historiographers and also, the western historians, who had knowledge of earlier writings.

The fact that Georgiades-Arnakis' study was included in the table of abbreviations and quoted as a basic source at the entries of the reputable dictionary *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, (New York - Oxford, 1991), which was edited by the Russian Byzantinologist A. Kazhdan<sup>19</sup> (1922-1997), is another indication of its international establishment.

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<sup>18</sup> The information were drawn from Professor Alexios Savvides' foreword to the 2008 version of Georgiades-Arnakis study, also from Professor I.K. Hasiotis' necrology for Georgiades-Arnakis and from the text written in memoriam of Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis by Lorene L. Rogers, President of The University of Texas at Austin.

<sup>19</sup> Center of Byzantine Studies, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington.

Between 1933 and 1948, he worked to encourage the knowledge and use of English language in Greece by teaching, organizing and directing programs at secondary schools, at the Institute of English Studies and at Pierce College in Athens.

Although his active presence at faculties of Philology and Educational departments of various Greek universities would have benefited the Turkish studies of the past decades, at a time that the Greek tertiary education was marked by their substantial absence, he never succeeded in making a career at a Greek university. The only time he instructed in a Greek university was in 1963, when, in the context of a scientific and research exchanges program between USA and Greece, he gave courses (in English) in Near Eastern and Modern Greek History, as well in Ancient Roman and Greek History, as a visiting professor at the Aristotelian University of Thessalonica. At the same year, he was awarded the Diploma from the Theological School of Thessalonica's Aristotelian University.

Like so many other remarkable Greek scientists (in various fields), Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis was forced to leave his country, specifically he went to the US. There, between 1948 and 1955, he taught at the University of Kansas. Then, in 1955, he went to the University of Texas, at Austin, as a visiting Associate Professor of History. In 1956 and 1957, he taught at the University of Chicago and at the Texas (Fort Worth) Christian University respectively. In 1957, he returned to the University of Texas at Austin and finally, in 1961, he became Professor of History.

His literary production follows the phases of his scientific development. He wrote studies on the English language and English-Greek philology, historical researches on the late Byzantine period, articles on the Ottoman rule in Greece, on the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states and also on historical problems of the 20th century. Studies and articles that were occasionally published by Georgiades-Arnakis – both in English and Greek - in various scientific journals and yearbooks, are considered important for the literature.

Meanwhile, from the early 50's, in addition to his university occupation, he began to develop a remarkable literary and cultural activity (chronicles, translations, book reviews, articles, annotations) collaborating regularly with journals like *The American Annual*, *The United States Quarterly Book Review* and *The National Herald* newspaper in New York.

Through his scholarship in the field of Greek and Byzantine history, Georgiades-Arnakis gained international respect. He was frequently invited and was an active participant at symposiums, international congresses of Byzantine, Cretan and Balkan Studies, as well of Venetian Civilization.

*The Society of Byzantine Studies, the Christian Archaeological Society, the Epistimoniki Hetairia and the Institute of Balkan Studies* are some of the societies that he was member in Greece. He was also a charter member of the *Group for the Study of the Greek Enlightenment*, honorary Fellow of the *Society for Macedonian Studies* in Greece and Honorary member of the *Historical and Archaeological Society of Western Crete*.

In the US, he was a research associate (Fellow) of the *American Council of Learned Societies*, of the *Texas Research Institute* and of the *Guggenheim Foundation*. He belonged to *The American Historical Association, The American Philological Association, The Archaeological Institute of America, The Medieval Academy of America, The Middle East Institute* and *The Near East Society* and was a charter member of *The Renaissance Society*. He served as a member at *The Board of Directors for The American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association*, at *The Advisory Board of Editors for the Greek Orthodox Theological Review* and at *The US Committee of Byzantine Studies*.

His final settlement at Austin, gave him the opportunity to fulfill an earlier plan: the creation of a scientific institution, dedicated exclusively to the research and study of the history and culture of modern Greece. So, in 1965, assisted by a number of Greek-American scientists, he founded the *Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies* and served as its director, editing the *Bulletin of the Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies* and *Neo-Hellenika*, an international journal of Modern Greek Studies. His researches were supported by grants from the *American Council of Learned Societies*, the *University of Texas Research Institute* the *Guggenheim Foundation* and the *Fulbright Program of Cultural Exchange*.

The last decade of his life was devoted to the operation and the activities of the aforementioned center. Georgios Gregoriades-Arnakis died suddenly of an apparent heart attack on December 6, 1976.

### 3.1 EMBLEMATIC WORKS

#### 3.1.1 Books

*Ελληνο-αγγλικόν Λεξικόν. A Greek-English Dictionary*, ΑΣΤΗΡ, Athens, 1943.

*History of English Literature*, (in Greek), Athens, 1945.

*Studies in English Grammar and Idiom*, Athens, 1945.

*Selections from Thucydides in Basic English*, ΑΣΤΗΡ, Athens, 1946.

*The Early Osmanlis*, Contribution to the Problem of Minor Asia Hellenism's Fall (in Greek), Athens, 1947.

*The Byzantine Empire*, Kansas City, Mo., 1951. (hctograph)

*The Balkans in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Lawrence, Kansas, 1954. (hctograph)

*The Near East in the Twentieth Century*, Austin, Texas, 1965. (hctograph)

*Mount Athos Revisited (1963)* (a study of Byzantine monasticism), Austin and Thessalonica, 1968. (in Greek)

*The Near East in Modern Times*,

I: *The Ottoman Empire and the Balkan States*, Austin and New York, 1969

II: *Forty Crucial Years, 1900-1940* (with W.S. Vucinich), Austin and New York, 1972.

III: *The Second World War and After*, (with W.S. Vucinich), Austin and New York, 1973.

#### 3.1.2 Sections in Books and Encyclopedias

“*The Eastern Imperial Tradition*”, in: *The Development of Historiography*. (Edited by M.A. Fitzsimons, A.G. Pundt, C.E. Nowell), The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, 1954

“Byzantine Greece” *The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism* (Jelavich, Charles and Barbara. *The Balkans in Transition*, University of California Press, 1963, p.p. 115-144)

*The Church and the Greek Society*, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους Vol I, Εκδοτική Αθηνών, Αθήνα, 1974, p.p. 146-50

Bibliographies on Greece in *The American Historical Association's Guide to Historical Literature*, New York, 1961 and ACLS's *Bibliography of Southeastern Europe*, ed., Paul Horecky, Chicago, 1969.

### 3.1.3 Articles and Reviews

He has written over 300 articles and reviews in scholarly journals:

The Mosaics of St. Sophia, *The Robert College Herald* (3), Istanbul, 1932.

Ιάκωβος Μακφέρσον. Ένας ποιητής που συγκίνησε τον Σολωμό, *Νεοελληνικά Γράμματα* (1/213), 1940

Ο πρώτος Άγγλος ιστορικός του Βυζαντίου. Εδουάρδος Γκίμπον, *Νεοελληνικά Γράμματα* (1/216), 1941

Ο συμβολισμός του Γέιτς στο Βυζάντιο, *Νεοελληνικά Γράμματα* (1/222), 1941.

Το χιούμορ του Σαίξπηρ, *Νεοελληνικά Γράμματα* (1/227), 1941.

The Names of the Months in the History of Georgius Pachymeres, *Byzantinisch-neugriechische jahrbücher* (17, 1945-49), Athens, 1960.

Gregory Palamas among the Turks and Documents of his Captivity as Historical Sources, *Speculum* (26), 1951.

The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire, *The Journal of Modern History* (24), 1952.

Η περιήγησις του Ίμπν Μπαττούτα ανά την Μικράν Ασίαν and η κατάστασις των ελληνικών and τουρκικών πληθυσμών κατά τον ΙΔ' αιώνα, *Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών* (22), 1953.

Futuwwa Traditions in the Ottoman Empire: Akhis, Bektashi Dervishes and Craftsmen, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* (12), 1953.

Gregory Palamas, the Χιόνες, and the Fall of Gallipoli, *Byzantion* (22), 1952.

Two Inscriptions from Baltaliman (Phidaleia), *American Journal of Archaeology* (59), 1955.

Samuel Griedley Howe, Historian of the Greek Revolution, *Hellenic Cultural Circle* (1), Chicago, 1956.

The Tragedy of Man in the Poetry of George Seferis, *The Texas Quarterly* (1), 1964.

Η αγγλική λογοτεχνία κατά τον Μεσαίωνα, *Νέα Εστία* (37), 1945.

Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism, *Balkan Studies* (1), 1960.

George Pachymeres. A Byzantine Humanist, *Greek Orthodox Theological Review* (12), Brooklin, Mass., 1966-7.

Byzantium and Greece. A Review Article (A propos of Romilly Jenkins' Byzantium and Byzantinism), *Balkan Studies* (4), 1963.

The First American Volunteer in the Greek Revolution: George Jarvis, *Neo-Hellenika* (1), 1970.

Everett and the Question of Recognition of Greece in 1823-1824, *Neo-Hellenika* (2), 1975.

### **3.1.4 Books Edited by G. Georgiades - Arnakis**

Americans in the Greek Revolution. I: George Jarvis. His Journal and Related Documents, (with E. Demetracopoulou) *Institute for Balkan Studies* (No 78), Thessalonica, 1965.

Americans in the Greek Revolution. II, A: Samuel Gridley Howe. *An Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution*, Part. I. Books I-IV, Austin, Texas, 1966

*American Interest in the Cretan Struggle, 1866-1869. I: American Consul in a Cretan War: William J. Stillman*, Austin and Thessalonica, 1966

*American Interest in the Cretan Struggle, 1866-1869. II: William J. Stillman, Articles and Dispatches from Crete*, Austin, Texas, 1976.

*Historical Texts of the Greek Revolution. From George Jarvis' manuscripts* (with E. Demetracopoulou), Austin and Thessalonica, 1967

### **3.1.5 Congresses**

*Byzantium's Anatolian Provinces during the Reign of Michael Paleologus*, Actes du XIIe Congrès International d' études Byzantines, (Αχρίδα 1961), Vol II (Belgrade 1964).

*The Cretan Revolution of 1866 and the Mission of Alexander Rangavis to the United States*. Actes du Ier Congrès International des études Balkaniques et Sud-Est Européennes Vol IV p.p. 391-95, (Sofia 1969).

### **3.1.6 Journals Edited by G. Georgiades - Arnakis**

*Neo-Hellenika*

*Bulletin of the Center for Neo-Hellenic Studies*

#### 4. BOOK SUMMARY

Georgios Georgiades-Arnakis' study titled "The First Osmanlis - Contribution to the problem of Asia Minor Hellenism's fall (1282-1337), probably, is one of the most important Greek scientific compositions of the first half of the 20th century. As he himself says in his introduction, "by staying away from heroisms and nationalisms and staying within the framework of scientific research" he tries to shed light to the problem of the emergence and establishment of the Ottoman state at the late 13<sup>th</sup>, correlating it with the problem of the fall of the Hellenic element of Asia Minor, which had always been very strong and, fadeless, lasted for millenniums. The numberless sources that are taken under consider by Georgiades-Arnakis, including the last Byzantine historians, Ottoman chroniclers and also travelers' narrations, render his study valid and objective. As Georgiades-Arnakis notes, the immediate neighbouring of the Ottomans with the Byzantine undefended borders and the assimilation of the indigenous populations were of crucial importance for the establishment and the development of the Ottoman state. Consequently, the author discusses the conditions in Bithynia, at the Northwest part of Asia Minor, which constituted the living space and the operation theater for Osman and his followers. Chronologically the period that is studied begins in 1282, when Osman appears to the borders of Bithynia having come to the throne after the death of his father Ertuğrul, and ends in 1337, the year that Nicomedia was surrendered to the Ottomans and virtually signified the completion of Bithynia's conquest. Georgiades-Arnakis was an exception to the generalization that was against Gibbons and, with his study, criticizes and questions Köprülü's and Wittek's conclusions about the early Ottomans issue. However, since Greek language is inaccessible to Ottomanologists, his study was ignored in the 'discussion' triggered by Gibbons in 1916. He agrees with Gibbons that, essentially, the Ottoman Empire was a European and not an Asiatic creation and criticizes as 'newest Turkish nationalism' Köprülü's view, that the Ottomans were the embodiment of the essence of Islam and Turkism. By pointing out that the sources do not indicate any religious fanaticism in the military action of the first Ottomans, he challenges Wittek and argues that the sources cited by the latter in supporting his *Ghaza Thesis*, probably reflect the ideology of the established posterior Ottoman state and not the nature of the early Ottomans. To be more specific, he

considers that Ahmedi's poem *İskendernâme* was inspired by heroic and not by historical spirit and that the references of this poem and of the inscription of Bursa about the *Ghazis*, actually do not have the meaning that was ascribed to them by Wittek. On the contrary, the significance of the term *Ghaza* in relation to the first Ottomans, who allowed and facilitated the accession of indigenous Christian inhabitants into their classes to serve a common purpose, was not Holy War and, aim of the *ghazis* was neither to spread Islam nor to annihilate Christianity, but simply to gain wealth through looting and enslavement.

Since the expansion of the Ottomans occurred from South to North, in the NW part of Anatolia, and the first Ottoman conquests were in the Byzantine territories of Bithynia, which, for ages, were the most homogenous sections of Hellenism and was the chief Byzantine bulwark, where Persians and Arabs came and went without effecting any noteworthy ethnological change, the society and the culture that the Ottomans came in contact with were Byzantine.

In his study, Georgiades-Arnakis demonstrates the vital role of the indigenous manpower and connects its assimilation with the material development and the success of the first Ottoman State. So, in order to give a complete picture of the process of Bithynia's conquest, which lasted for over half a century, he draws a picture of the indigenous - mainly rural – population. By being victim of the anarchy and the Turkish raiders and abandoned from the central state, the Bithynians had lost every kind of support and were led to disorientation, apostasy, syncretism and affiliation to the Ottoman conqueror, whose tolerant attitude facilitated the widespread proselytizing and the subsequent assimilation.

Georgiades-Arnakis considers the occupation of Bursa as a turning point for the establishment of the early Ottoman State and the creation of urban life. The administrative experience and the urban traditions of the people of Bursa, Nicaea and Nicomedia and the adaption of Byzantine institutions played a key role in the establishment, the organization and the rapid advance of the early Ottoman State.

Georgiades-Arnakis' study consists of an introductory chapter and three 'books' where the author displays the condition in the late 13<sup>th</sup> century's Bithynia, the founding of the Ottoman state and finally the conquest of Bithynia, which closes with the conquest of Nicomedia in 1337.

In his introduction, the author introduces the reader to the existing sources. At first, he presents the primary sources and the way they were used by the historians. Excluding the narratives of the travelers whose value is unquestioned, he concludes that, between the Ottoman chroniclers - who wrote in a later era, influenced by the grandeur of the Empire and the orthodox Islam - and the last Byzantine historiographers, the latter, despite the vague and confusing information they provide, are the most reliable source for the history of the early Ottoman period.

Next, he refers to the Western writers who wrote about the Ottomans having knowledge of sources earlier than the Ottoman chronicles, free of political expediencies, poetic ornaments and closer to reality. These were contemporaries of recent or older and are characterized as being more reliable.

He introduces and criticizes the fundamental works that were published up to 1947 and, excluding those that avoided to raise the issue of the foundation of Ottoman State (Zinkeisen, Jorga), created the trends that dominated in interpreting the nature of the early Ottomans (Gibbons, Wittek).

In book I, entitled “Bithynia at the End of the 13<sup>th</sup> Century”, Georgiades-Arnakis, having previously stated that many and complicated factors such as topography, political and social ferments, economic and financial factors and the psychology of the population, contributed to the establishment of the Ottoman State, he draws a picture of Bithynia in the late 13<sup>th</sup> century. He supports that, not ethnic or racial but political and social were the reasons that had led Bithynia into such an economic decline and spiritual misery and finally to the end of its Byzantine life.

According to Georgiades-Arnakis, the founders of the Ottoman Emirate should be sought between the Turkmen nomads, who lived on the border between Byzantium and the Seljuk State, around Dorylaeon (Eskişehir). These nomads, who found themselves within an appropriate location and conditions conducive for their expansion, acquired political entity when they came into contact with Byzantium.

The power vacuum that aroused in the 13th century on that border region - from north because of Byzantium’s internal and external problems, and from the south, because the Seljuk State existed only formally after its defeat at Köseadağ in 1243 from the Mongols, who were focused towards another direction – had left the way clear for the creation of

emirates which were operating independently, but mainly for Osman's - virtually undisturbed - expansion northwards.

The internal conflicts and the disastrous policy of the Byzantine government, together with the Turkish inroads, had thrown the country into an acute economic crisis and a state of anarchy. The dissatisfaction and the cease of communication with the center resulted in the attenuation of ethnic and religious consciousness of the indigenous population. Bithynia was ready to fall an easy victim to the first invader. Therefore, there was nothing to prevent Osman and his numbered and poorly equipped followers to advance within Bithynia. Within this instability, Osman's penetration had been so gradual and unobtrusive, that it had been hardly noticed.

The fact that even the Byzantine lords and military commanders, instead of coalescing against the Turkish raiders they were cooperating with them, in a common purpose (material benefits), shows that there were not considerable religious, racial or ethnic conflicts among them, but mutual tolerance.

According to the writer, the serious decrease of the Christian rural population at the end of the 13th century, was mostly because of migrations to safer places and not because of urbanism and defection to the Ottomans. However, as the Ottoman State was gradually acquiring substance, normal life – as far as possible – was coming back to the rural areas and these migrations were decreasing to certain extent. The policy of tolerance, the freedom of work and the low taxation that was applied by Osman were of fundamental importance and created a new order, surely better than the previous one.

The Muslim religion became a significant factor only after Osman appeared on the outskirts of Bursa and Nicaea tightening the noose around the smaller fortified cities, which had strategic importance. From that time on, that rural population, having lost its hope and having realized that the future is with the Ottomans, began to collaborate massively with them, to embrace Islam and to assimilate. But, again, it is highly debatable if Ottomans had an Islamic or ethnic consciousness at that time.

As regards the Akhi brotherhoods, Georgiades-Arnakis argues that we cannot accept that they had played any role in the early years of the formation of the Ottoman State. Taking into account Ibn Battuta's narration, he disagrees with the allegations that describe the Akhis as a military factor, which had appeared and expanded before the occupation of the cities. Instead, noting that their existence presupposed smooth social

life and peaceful conditions, he supports that, only when a fair degree of order was established the Akhi Brotherhood began to spread among the Ottomans, contributing in social development and in creating an Ottoman town-population. Georgiades-Arnakis underlines their paramount role in speeding up the assimilation process at areas where different cultures and religions were coming into contact.

Regarding the existence and the rate of already established Turkish element in the Byzantine Bithynia, Georgiades-Arnakis claims that the Seljuks withdrew from the area without causing any deterioration and that the Turks who had settled in Bithynia, were a numerically and culturally powerless minority, which was assimilated within the predominant Byzantine environment. These minorities had never constituted a factor in the urban life of the region, where industry had shown strong growth and was an occupation which presupposed qualifications and permanent establishment in the cities. In order to substantiate his claims, he pointed to the lack of Turkish toponyms in the Northwest Asia Minor in the 13th century, which would document the re-establishment of Turkestan towns in Asia Minor. Essentially, he gives an answer to Köprülü, who, referring to Asia Minor on the eve of the establishment of the Ottoman State, writes that the Turkish migrations westward did not have only nomadic character, but also farmers as well as urban populations had settled throughout the peninsula and re-established towns and fortresses using the names of their old homelands. However, Köprülü never indicates these toponyms.

The study of the toponyms of Asia Minor confutes Köprülü's allegations and all the evidences converge in the conclusion that the origin of the Turks of Northwestern Asia Minor was nomadic and not rural and urban. They were few in number and, over time, some of them started farming the land. The transition from nomadic to rural life was under the influence of the Byzantine environment.

The second 'book' deals with the constitution of the Ottoman State. By noting that nothing is known with certainty about the origin of the Ottoman's House, he does not admit what is accounted by the later Ottoman chroniclers about the past of Osman and his family, considering them to be contrary to the facts and lacking in historical evidence. Following Gibbons' views he asserts that, the most logical scenario is that, Ertuğrul and Osman derive from the Turkmen nomads of the plateau of Eskişehir and

belonged to the Kayi<sup>20</sup> tribe. He concludes that, by the middle of the 13th century, the founders of the Ottoman Royal House must have been living as ordinary individuals in Söğüt or at Mount Temnos and Armenokastro and, apart from the inroads, whose importance and extent was exaggerated by the later Ottoman chroniclers, they had not developed significant military action that could attract the attention of Byzantium. In fact, other were the visible risks<sup>21</sup> and against them had been taken measures by Byzantium.

Osman's name is first mentioned by Pachymeres in relation to the battle of Vapheus<sup>22</sup>. According to Georgiades-Arnakis, it is the turning-point and the beginning of the Ottoman history. Byzantium was forced to mind Osman; this was the essential recognition of the Ottoman State and not the legendary recognition by the sultan of Iconium, which existed only formally. In the case of the Ottomans, the national sentiment which was raised by the victory in Vapheus, proved to be an incentive much stronger than religion. That sentiment, in addition with economic and social factors, prevented the absorption of the Ottoman State from neighbouring coreligionist states, which were speaking the same language and having similar expansionist policy.

The Ottoman State appeared as a product of a transitional period and its rapid ascent wouldn't have been possible in peacetime. The establishment of Osman's power was gradual. The Ottoman territories were constantly expanding in the rural areas of Bithynia and there was no military power to pose a threat or to claim these lands.

Although it seems that Osman and his followers had embraced Islam, it is undisputed that, at that time, they weren't inspired by the destructive religious fanaticism which was ascribed to them in the subsequent centuries. They were tolerant and this tolerance was an important factor for their rapid expansion. In addition, they relied upon the cooperation of many Christians of whom, Köse Michal, Evrenos and Markos are the most outstanding. The yoke imposed to the conquered was not heavy; in many cases, it was rather welcome because it was giving an end to the evils of anarchy and strife.

In this period of syncretism, it is fundamental and duly emphasized by the author, the role of the Akhi Brotherhood, who, with their effective sermon, their ethos, kindness and generosity touched the 14th century's oscillating society.

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<sup>20</sup> It was one of the branches of Oğuz Turks, which moved westwards from the east banks of Caspian Sea.

<sup>21</sup> Amur's sons and Karasu.

<sup>22</sup> 27 July, 1301

It is doubtless that there had been a big migration flow to safer lands until the cities of Bithynia pass to the Ottomans. However, the majority of the peasants preferred to stay and join the Ottomans. They were bounded with the soil and, because of their nature they stayed at their homelands. Osman's followers increased in number and, as a result, a steadily growing number of Christians, who either having fallen into despair or for other reasons, chose to unite their fortunes with the Ottomans and to embrace their religion. The redistribution of the land, the tolerance, and the sense of security that was provided by the relatively fair Ottoman administration, contributed to the massive affiliation of the indigenous population to the side of the Ottomans, and the assimilation between conquered and conquerors was completed in just a few decades.

Among the Battle of Vapheus and the Battle of Pelekanos is intervened a generation. It was the Turco-Byzantine generation - the first that was brought up under the Ottoman regime and the one which seized Bursa and defeated the Roman emperor in Pelekanos<sup>23</sup>. Disagreeing with Köprülü, who overlooked the affects of Byzantium and the indigenous population, Georgiades-Arnakis stresses their paramount role to the establishment of the Ottoman State.

At the third 'book' of his study, Georgiades-Arnakis deals with the fall of the three main cities of Bithynia, Bursa, Nicaea and, finally Nicomedia, which virtually marked the end of Bithynia's conquest.

The transfer, at around 1300, of the Ottoman capital / base of operations at Yenişehir, which was located to the northernmost point of their principality and very close to the field of their future expansion between Bursa and Nicaea, had clearly demonstrated their intentions. These nomad raiders were occupying the rural areas of Bithynia. They were not withdrawing after each attack; they had come to stay.

However, after the Battle of Vapheus, Osman withdraws and, for some years, no activity is recorded on his part. It is worth to note that, although he had made his presence felt in the battle of Vapheus, at the gates of Nicomedia and so close to the capital Constantinople, the Byzantine campaign in 1302 was not against him, but against Karasu and Germyan. Obviously, without Navy and in order to ensure the

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<sup>23</sup> Current Maltepe. K. Amantos, in *Σχέσεις Ελλήνων και Τούρκων. Από τον ενδέκατο αιώνα μέχρι το 1821*. Vol. I: *Οι πόλεμοι των Τούρκων για την κατάληψη των ελληνικών χωρών, 1071-1571*. Athens (Archipelagos), 2008, p. 55 disagrees with this location and claims that Pelekanos was between Eskihisar and Darica.

communication with the Aegean coasts, Byzantium's priority was to protect the cities near Hellespont.

Since Osman was aware of the risk and this was the only way to avoid the disastrous results of a possible collision with the strengthened imperial troops, his withdrawal can be considered as an act of prudence. This assumption is confirmed by his reappearance at the outskirts of Bursa and Nicaea, almost simultaneously with the departure of the Catalan troops. Osman's movements were now strategic and organized. Since he didn't have the potential to besiege tightly the cities used the tactic of blockade, from land and later from sea.

Byzantium, being degenerating from internal conflicts and having to face threats at the European provinces, was unable to provide material and moral support to the Bithynians, who kept on resisting. Additionally to Osman, Byzantium had also to face the other Turkish emirates, which operated as if there was a coalition in a common fight against a common enemy, without conflicting and without helping each other. It is obvious that, in the early 14th century, the Turkish emirates were following separate paths and would not compete against each other as long there was Byzantine booty available. This is confirmed by the fact that nobody rushed to provide assistance to the emirates of Karasu and Germyan, when the Catalan Company campaigned against them.

Despite the demoralization and the disappointment, the example of monk Hilarion shows that the Bithynians had still the will to fight and also that the raiders could have been faced even with an improvised army. It also makes clear that, no matter how weakened it was, if Byzantium had left aside the internal disputes, by the appropriate actions would have fought off anarchy and confronted the invaders. However, such initiatives were met with mistrust and men like Hilarion or Andronikos III were faced only with suspicion. As Georgiades-Arnakis concludes, the future wouldn't have been different; Bithynia's fall would only have been delayed for some decades.

In this chapter, Georgiades-Arnakis refers to another dark spot in history. Since Byzantines didn't have the potential to fight Osman with arms, they turned to the Mongols for help and made an agreement. It is unknown if there was a conflict between Ottomans and Mongols. The Mongol factor has been ignored by many historians; even Gibbons underestimated its significance. Georgiades-Arnakis, supports that we won't

move away from the facts if we admit that the rumor, written by Pachymeres, contains some truth. No matter how exhausted and few in number had the Mongol fighters arrived at Bithynia, they surely must have caused great inconvenience to Osman's plans. Otherwise, how else could the 20-year delay in the fall of Bursa<sup>24</sup> and Nicaea<sup>25</sup> be explained?

The prevailing conditions allowed Osman to operate undisturbed. Disappointed and abandoned, the inhabitants of the cities of Bithynia decided to surrender and opened the gates of their cities. Under the new regime, the safety was restored and economy started to function. Gradually, a sense of common interests and unity began to prevail. It was the first step towards the national consciousness. According to Georgiades-Arnakis, Bursa's fall unitized the Ottomans into nation and state. The people of the next generation, a Turco-Byzantine generation, were the first Ottomans, who supported the early Ottoman state. Actually, the cover of the society changed and, from Byzantine and Christian, became Ottoman and Muslim.

Orhan succeeded Osman and continued his work with success. Although the Ottoman chroniclers display the succession issue to have been smooth, since it is not known whether Orhan's brother Alaeddin was younger or elder, it constitutes another dark spot in the history of the early Ottoman State. Various important reforms in legislation, clothing and army are ascribed on Alaeddin; however, since the latter dealt with the public affairs only for a short period of six years until his death, Georgiades-Arnakis thinks these reforms impossible to have been materialized only by Alaeddin.

The battle of Pelekanos is another event of paramount importance, not mentioned by the Ottoman chroniclers. The outcome of this battle in which the son of the founder of the Ottoman State confronted the 'Roman' emperor placed Orhan at a special position among the other emirates. Unexplained are the reasons for the Byzantine withdrawal after a single day's fight - which was considered as skirmishes by the author - without any of the opponents to score success and despite the fact that purpose of the campaign was to save Nicaea. Perhaps, at a time that essential national interests were at stake, the political dispute had again played its negative role.

This was the last Byzantine campaign in Asia Minor. Any defense was beyond the capabilities of Byzantium. After the crashing defeat of Andronikos III, Nicaea's

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<sup>24</sup> April 6, 1326.

inhabitants opened the gates considering further resistance unnecessary. Since the national and religious conscience had been shaken, the inhabitants were trying to save themselves. The mild policy that was applied by the Ottomans and the propaganda aiming to emphasize the similarities between the two religions and underling the victory of Islam against Christianity led to massive Islamization, presented as voluntary decision.

With the first treaty of friendship between the Byzantines and the Ottomans in 1330, Andronicos III recognized the conquests of the latter and Orhan pledged not to attack Nicomedia - a promise which was to be broken. Nicomedia suffered the same fate<sup>26</sup>. The conquest of Bithynia was completed. The road for the Ottoman advance to Europe was open.

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<sup>25</sup> March 2, 1331.

## 5. STUDIES PUBLISHED AFTER 1947 UP TO DAY

As mentioned above, the opening of the Ottoman archives has opened new areas for historians. Economic and demographic data, when analyzed can serve History, filling some of the gaps left by the lack of sources. However, the basic lines that were outlined by Gibbons and Wittek continue to exist fueled by the publication of studies that followed the one or the other. Apart from a few studies without a significant resonance, there is nothing new for the issue. Despite the criticism, Wittek's Thesis still remains the most plausible explanation about the origins of the Ottoman Empire.

However, in the 1980s, new studies came to call into question the prevailing views. Opinions disagreeing with the interpretation which overemphasizes the ideology of Ghaza began to be expressed; the Ghaza ethos was considered to be incompatible to the heretical – with regard to Islam - behavior of the first Ottomans, who were receptive and tolerant towards Christians. The expansion of the first Ottomans, who were neither orthodox Muslims nor a close group of zealots, couldn't have been motivated by the Ghaza ethos. The Ottoman sources that talk about Ghaza and Ghazi were written later and were addressed to an Islamized public, seeking to cover earlier actions with pragmatically springs, such as looting and power acquisition, with religious motivations.

In 1955 was published the study<sup>27</sup> of the Greek Professor of Byzantine History Constantinos Amandos, who at the past was Georgiades-Arnakis' Professor at Athens University. Amandos presents the influx of the nomadic Turkish races into Asia Minor as a huge disaster for the culture of the peninsula, and throwback to nomadism. He considers that the Turks were not affected by religious fanaticism, but it was the physical strength and ferocity they had acquired from nomadic life the factor which enabled them to defeat easily the nations they had confronted with. The Ottoman-Turks were religiously indifferent Oghuz Kayi nomads. Despite their Islamization, after Osman had come to power, the policy of tolerance that was adopted towards the conquered Christians contributed to the assimilation with the conqueror. At this point, crucial was the action of the dervish orders in promoting the approach of the two religions and the

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<sup>26</sup> Nicomedia was occupied probably in 1337.

<sup>27</sup> Konstantinos Amandos, *Σχέσεις Ελλήνων και Τούρκων. Από τον ενδέκατο αιώνα μέχρι το 1821*. Vol. I': *Οι πόλεμοι των Τούρκων για την κατάληψη των ελληνικών χωρών, 1071-1571*. Athens 1955.

two populations. Amandos claims that according to conclusive evidence Turks and Christians had come very close, facilitating the conquest of Nicaea and Nicomedia. The indigenous Christians were prevailed by fear, but after their subordination they were safer and were practicing their religion freely. That's why many Christian lords had chosen to pass at the side of Osman and serve him as precious consultants. He says that it is hard to believe that, there were mass converts to Islam after the conquest of Nicaea; it is more likely that prior to the conquest existed a close approach because of the Ottoman policy of tolerance. Religious fanaticism existed only after the 16<sup>th</sup> century<sup>28</sup>.

Halil İnalçık, who - lets note - was Köprülü's student, is the only Turkish historian who has accepted and integrated fully - albeit with an important difference - the Wittek thesis in his works. He admitted that Osman Gazi's frontier hegemony was dedicated to a Holy War against Christian Byzantium<sup>29</sup> and embraced Wittek's Thesis that *Ghaza*, or Holy War, was an important factor in the foundation and development of the Ottoman state<sup>30</sup>. However, unlike Wittek and similar to Köprülü, he underlines the racial origins of the Ottomans<sup>31</sup>. Although he criticizes Gibbons, finally, he embraces his main argument, that a common ground was linking the Byzantine border troops together with the Muslim Ghazis and this relationship led to assimilation. Therefore, there was fashioned a real border empire, a cosmopolitan state, which was facing equally all religious dogmas and all tribes and joined the Orthodox Christian Balkan together with the Muslim Anatolia into a single state<sup>32</sup>. In addition, he emphasizes the importance of the Ghaza ideology as a unifying factor which urged the Ghazis to conquer and enslave the indigenous population. To sum up, he endorses the view that the Holy War and the settlement of a large number of Turkmen tribes into Anatolia<sup>33</sup>, were the dynamic elements of the Ottoman conquests and claims that the administrative forms which was adopted in the newly-conquered areas were derived from earlier Seljuk (Turkish and Islamic) standards. Therefore, İnalçık rejects Gibbons' aspect that supports the non-Turkish nature of the Ottoman's institutional base.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., republication Athens (Archipelagos), 2008, pp. xi, 1, 7-9, 13, 28, 36-43, 52-57.

<sup>29</sup> Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*. London (Phoenix Press) 1973. p. 5.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>31</sup> Halil İnalçık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, II (1981-1982): 71-79.

<sup>32</sup> İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire* (1973), p. 7.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp.71-79.

In a more recent study of 1994<sup>34</sup>, seems to support more emphatically the Ghazi nature of the early Ottoman State and mitigates the previous description of the Ottomans as a cosmopolitan state. In this study, Holy War is presented as a factor that united the groups of Ghazis to conquer and enslave the indigenous population. Therefore, by emphasizing the basically Turkish origin of the Ottoman State and leaving at the sideline the cohabitation of different groups, which, in fact, constituted the main feature of the first Ottomans, he comes closer to Köprülü's approach. In addition, always confusing Holy War with Ghaza, he fully endorses the view that, the latter, was the factor which assured the *raison d'être* of the Ottoman state, and contributed to its growth and expand, giving purely religious significance to a term that, during the 14th century, potentially has had a much more secular meaning<sup>35</sup>. Unfortunately, the reasonable question which seeks the factors that had united Muslims and Christians of Bithynia into a single state in the early 14th century, remains unanswered.

In 1985, an East-German Marxist, Ernst Werner, published a book devoted to the first two hundred years of the Ottoman history<sup>36</sup>. Werner focused on the detailed study of social conflicts inside but also around the growing Ottoman state, considering that they constituted the dynamic behind political developments. He argued that, the first two centuries of the Ottoman Empire represented the formation of a feudal system and the conquest of the pre-feudal and anti-feudal elements. He criticized the modern Turkish historiography and noted that it is possessed by chauvinistic tendencies. However, his study is delimitated because of his adherence to a rigid Marxist -Leninist interpretation of the early Ottoman history<sup>37</sup>.

In 1949 and 1950, Mustafa Akdağ, published two articles taking under consideration the importance of trade and exchanges between the Turkish tribe and their Christian neighbours. Based on the reports of the chronicles, he developed a bold theory, putting forward the existence of an "economy of Marmara basin", which appeared as a complete unit in the late 13th century. According to this theory, the semi-nomadic Turks and the established Christians from Asia Minor, who were suffering from Byzantium's

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<sup>34</sup> Halil İnalcık, Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press), 1994, p. 11.

<sup>35</sup> Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, (2003), pp. 7-9.

<sup>36</sup> Werner, Ernst. *Die Geburt Einer Grossmacht-Die Osmanen (1300-1481): Ein Beitrag zur Genesis des türkischen Feudalismus* Vienna 1985. The book first appeared in 1966 and was subsequently republished with significant revisions in 1972 and in 1985).

misrule and poverty, were associated without religious or ethnic enmities. Therefore, was created a border economic zone around Marmara basin, which was not affected by either the instability during the formation of the emirates, or by the measures taken by the Byzantine Empire against the Turks.

In summary, the arrival of the Turks at the lands of Anatolia was characterized by Akdağ as positive for both sides. Both Turk and indigenous populations benefited from the economic recovery and prosperity, which resulted from the new impetus that was given to economy by the Turks, since they began to enter into the lands of Anatolia. The conditions that were created and the specific border relations led the indigenous to approach the Turkish administration. The whole situation, which was created in the 13th century, paved the way for the Ottomans, whose commercial and territorial expansion in the Balkans took place on the trade routes that connected the basin of Marmara with other regional economies and was based on contact between the border populations.

The system they brought was better than the Christian feudal and contributed to the easy assimilation of the indigenous. Apart from the strata of the rich and the clergy, the majority of the Christian population remained and lived together with the Turks. Since the established atmosphere was suitable, the Ottoman expansion was mainly realized not by conquest but by the desire of people to live together. By establishing the characteristic Islamic institutions, the adoption of administrative institutions that were inherited from the Seljuks and the settlement of Turkish populations, in a very short time, the occupied cities acquired Turkish character. The origine of the Ottoman officials was Turkish; these officials changed the Ottoman state into an empire. The justice, the light taxation, the value that was given to the agricultural production, the trade connection with Europe and the competitiveness of local products, had led to the blossoming of the economy<sup>38</sup>.

Not long after, Akdağ's interesting theory faced strong criticism from Halil İnalçık, who rejected it for insufficient documentation and problematic reasoning<sup>39</sup>. Akdağ later, in a new book<sup>40</sup>, elaborated further the same views giving even greater emphasis on trade,

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<sup>37</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>38</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde: Türkiye'nin İktisadi Vaziyeti," *Bellekten* 13 (1949): 497-571 and *Bellekten* 14 (1950): 319-418.

<sup>39</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluş ve İnkişafı Devrinde Türkiye'nin İktisadi Vaziyeti Üzerinde Bir Tetkik Münasebetiyle," *Bellekten* 15 (1951): 629-684.

<sup>40</sup> Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi*. Ankara (Türk Tarih Kurumu), 1974.

coexistence and harmonious relations between Turks, Byzantines or other Balkan peoples, but without supporting them with new documents.

In 1971, Speros Vryonis, after Georgiades-Arnakis and Ernst Werner, is the third that follows the Gibbons' views. Although his study deals with the Hellenism of Asia Minor for the period from 11th to 15th century, unavoidable, he refers to the Ottomans. The islamization and turkification of the Byzantine Greeks of Asia Minor is a process that had began at about two centuries before the appearance of the Ottomans. Apart from the period that the Byzantine capital was transferred at Nicaea and the provinces of Asia Minor experienced again safety and growth, the decline of the Byzantine Hellenism went on in the same way and for the same reasons.

He claimed that the Turkish success was product of the dynamics created by the decline of Byzantium, and the increasing demographic pressure of the Turkmen nomads from the East. That situation resulted in a national and religious pluralism, and the bastions of Hellenism which were religion and language were shaken. Mobility was the common point of the Turkmen. Their military, social and cultural institutions were organized around the central axis of mobility, which was the key of their existence. By this feature, the nomads could obtain the necessary financial provisions for their living, either by stock-farming and marginal farming, or by raiding for loot. Their mass movement to the West was marked by raids and looting, which brought nomadisation, destruction and desolation. Bantitry, looting and enslavement were more profitable for the nomadic economy of the East than marginal farming and breeding. Their migrations had caused great inconvenience to the permanently settled population, Muslim and Christian. Despite the strong demographic deterioration that was caused, most of the Christian population remained at their homelands.

Vryonis refers to Wittek's theory but, without criticizing it, he just says that it is interesting. He asserted that the semi-nomadic life of the Turks matched ideally with the Ghaza (with the significance of the inroad) which more than any particular enthusiasm for Islam, had provided the motivation for the first Ottoman conquests. The martial habits and their tendency to plunder had found an easy way out, even a religious excuse in a "Holy War" against the Christians of the border. The Seljuk and the Ottoman sultans were officially Sunni Muslims; however, despite Islamization, initially, the

religious life of their people had changed only outwardly and superficially and maintained the basic infrastructure of much of the shamanistic heritage.

As regards the Islamisation, Vryonis separates the behavior of the leaders who were adhering to the Islamic tradition and in general were tolerant towards Christians, from the behavior of their people who were uncontrolled. So, according to the testimonies, he considers that, at a great extent, there must have been violent islamizations.

The role of the Akhis and other various dervish guilds was extremely important for the islamization and assimilation of pagan Turks and Christians. The collaboration between the conquerors and the indigenous Christian population bridged the cultural gap among them; the mixed marriages brought up the first Ottomans.

Regarding the organization of the Ottoman state and society, Vryonis writes that the Ottomans had inherited the old Arab institutions and formed them by adding their own Turkish traditions. In addition, the absorption of the local Byzantine aristocracy and the indigenous Christian population affected in maintaining local customs and traditions and in adopting Byzantine administrative institutions and military practices that were instrumental in the organization and the expansion of the Ottoman state<sup>41</sup>.

In 1979, the Hungarian Turkologist Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, in an article<sup>42</sup>, asserted that the Ottomans during the early centuries were only nominally or superficially Muslims and that neither their first conquests, nor their advance may be considered stemming from the commitment to the Ghaza. Therefore, during the first Ottoman period, there was no conflict between Christians and Islam as it is displayed by the Ottoman sources, which, according to Gyula Kaldy-Nagy are subsequent ideological constructions<sup>43</sup>.

In 1983, the American Ottomanist Rudi Lindner<sup>44</sup> posited the early Ottoman state as an inclusive tribal community. He criticized Wittek's Ghaza Thesis and claimed that it contradicts the receptiveness and heterodoxy of the first Ottomans. By analyzing the ties that connect the members of the tribal groups, he claims that the tribe is a political

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<sup>41</sup>Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*. Berkeley, Los Angeles (University of California Press), 1971 [Greek edition *Η παρακμή του Μεσαιωνικού Ελληνισμού στη Μικρά Ασία και η Διαδικασία Εξισλαμισμού (11<sup>ος</sup>-15<sup>ος</sup> Αιώνας)*], Athens (MIET), 2008 pp. 162, 164, 173, 189, 190, 204-205, 219-222, 224, 226, 234, 238, 316, 320, 323, 325, 407, 409-410, 414, 423].

<sup>42</sup> Gyula Kaldy-Nagy, "The Holy War (jihad) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire". *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3-4, (1979-80): 467-473.

<sup>43</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 10 and also Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>44</sup> Rudi Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington (Indiana University Publications), 1983, pp.2-50.

organization and the participation in a tribe is determined by common interests. So, based on examples of Christians who participated in the Ottoman conquests having a common purpose, he supported the racial nature of the early Ottoman state, which was receptive to heterogeneous elements. He considers that, later chroniclers, who depicted the early Ottomans as having been motivated by the *Ghaza* ethos, were in reality projecting their own contemporary views back in time<sup>45</sup>.

In 2010, Lindner was back with a new study<sup>46</sup>, this time studying the Ottoman pre-history, namely the period between the late 13th and the very early 14th century. He is trying to clarify who the Ottomans were and where the generations before Osman had come from, where they settled and why and what kind of relationships they had with their neighbours. He claims that the first Ottoman lands weren't taken from the Byzantines but from Germyan, a fact that was on propose depicted incorrectly by the later ottoman chronicles, which seem to be unreliable. So, trying to find truths he turns to numismatics and concludes that minting of coins by Osman can not be considered as a mark of independence but rather of his clientage to Ilhanid Gazan. He asserts that the year 1302, the year that the battle of Vapheus took place is the first date in the Ottoman history and, trying to explain how Osman had forwarded so north before attempting to occupy the important cities of Bithynia, combines it with the flooding of Sangarius that happened the same year.

In 1984, Pal Fodor, a Hungarian Turcologist, challenging one of the two key documents that Wittek quotes in order to support his Thesis, gave new impetus to the discussion that had begun in 1916. In his article<sup>47</sup>, he demonstrates that, the ideas of *Ghaza* and *Ghazi* in “İskendernâme” were a literary device, whereby “Ahmedi presents the Ottoman rulers as *Ghazis* in a manner that served well-definable political objectives<sup>48</sup>.”

In 1986, the American Ottomanist Ronald C. Jennings criticized<sup>49</sup> Wittek's insistence on the Ghaza ethos and the sources he used to support his Thesis. He underlines that the behavior of the first Ottomans towards their Christian neighbors is not in conformity with the Ghazi behavior and also that the conquest of the Balkans was clearly the result

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<sup>45</sup> Lowry, *ibid.* and also Kafadar, *ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Rudi Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*. (University of Michigan Press), 2007.

<sup>47</sup> Pal Fodor, “Ahmedi’s *Dasitān* as a Source of Early Ottoman History,” *Orientalia Hungaricae* 38 (1984): 41-54.

<sup>48</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 11.

of a shared endeavor by both Muslim and Christian Ottoman commanders and forces. Jennings claims that if the religious intolerance had indeed constituted factor for the expansion of the first Ottomans, then it would have been recorded by the contemporary Byzantine historiographers<sup>50</sup>.

The English Turcologist Colin Heywood (former Wittek student), in two articles<sup>51</sup> published in 1988 and 1989 respectively, criticized Wittek's Ghaza Thesis and introduced that the notion of a *Ghazi* hero as some kind of idealized figure, rather than providing information about the early Ottoman Empire, it reveals much more about Wittek's upbringing, education and experiences in the former capital of the Habsburg Vienna<sup>52</sup>.

Another English Turcologist, Colin Imber, in a series of three articles published in 1986<sup>53</sup>, 1987<sup>54</sup> and 1993<sup>55</sup> claimed that we don't have a sufficient number of contemporary sources to allow us to recreate that era of Ottoman history. He also asserted that those who attempt to reconstruct the history of this period are projecting the contemporary views and concerns of their own period backwards in time<sup>56</sup>.

In his 1987 article he promoted the theory that Ahmedi perceived *Ghaza* only as an act of war and not as means to obtain wealth by looting and plundering. In his 1993 article, he claims that the Arab term *ghazi*, met in the text of Ahmedi, in fact, is nothing more than a rendition of the Turkish *akıncı*.

Despite his criticism on the attempts to reconstruct the early period of the Ottoman history, in 1990<sup>57</sup>, he also writes a history, which covers the period in question until the death of Mehmet II, in 1481. In his history, after a useful overview of the available sources, having as primary concern their chronology, he accounts the principal events of the period.

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<sup>49</sup> Ronald C. Jennigs, "Some Thoughts on the Gazi Thesis," *Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde Des Morgendales* 76, Vienna, (1986): 151-161

<sup>50</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 11 and, Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>51</sup> Colin Heywood, "Wittek and the Austrian Tradition," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, No 1 (1988): pp. 7-25; "Boundless Dreams of the Levant: Paul Wittek, the George-Kreis, and the Writing of Ottoman History," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, No 1 (1989): 30-50.

<sup>52</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Colin Imber, "Paul Wittek's: De la défaite d' Ankara à la prise de Constantinople," *Osmanli Araştırmaları*, v (1986): 65-81.

<sup>54</sup> *Idem.*, "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth," *Turcica* 19 (1987): 7-27.

<sup>55</sup> *Idem.*, "The Legend of Osman Gazi." *The Ottoman Emirate, 1300-1389*. Ed. by E. Zachariades, Rethymnon, Crete (1993): 67-76.

<sup>56</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481*. Istanbul (ISIS), 1990.

However, he does not give something new and insists on the futility of the attempts to understand this period. At a later study in 2002<sup>58</sup> follows the same lines, but examines the period from 1300 to 1650. Imber has put himself outside the discussion we have already mentioned and does not follow the trend to refer to the Ottoman State and not to the Ottoman Empire<sup>59</sup>.

In 1993, the Turkish scholar Şinasi Tekin published two articles<sup>60</sup> in which, based on script and language, claimed that the inscription of Bursa, which was used by Wittek in supporting his Thesis, is falsified and its present position over a gate of Şehadet mosque cannot be its original position; in fact, he says, this inscription was carved copying the style of a 1417 or any other later inscription<sup>61</sup>.

In 1995, the Turkish Ottomanist Feridun M. Emecen<sup>62</sup>, stressed the extent to which the terms *Ghazi* and *Ghaza* appear in a wide variety of texts and inscriptions that have survived in other Turkish states of the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century's Anatolia. He criticized Lindner, Jennings, İmber and Tekin, and asserted that Wittek didn't back his Thesis only by one inscription, but he must have examined the style that was used in other neighboring beyliks. For this reason, he stressed that criticisms and objections should not focus only on the Ottomans and researches should be broadened at the whole border area<sup>63</sup>.

Again in 1995, another Turkish Ottomanist, Cemal Kafadar in a very interesting study<sup>64</sup> emphasizes the specific nature and the inextricable link between the liquid and volatile border environment and the spirit of *Ghaza*, separating it from Djihad and demonstrating that it didn't represent only conflicts, but, at the same time, it was

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<sup>58</sup> Colin Imber. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650. The Structure of Power*. Palgrave, New York, 2002

<sup>59</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, p. 11 and Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History, An Introduction to the Sources*, (Cambridge University Press), 1999. Greek translation, *Προσεγγίζοντας την Οθωμανική Ιστορία, Εισαγωγή στις Πηγές*. Trans.by K. Kampourides, Thessalonica (University Studio Press), 2006, p. 285.

<sup>60</sup> Şinasi Tekin, "Türk Dünyasında 'Gaza' ve 'Cihad' Kavramları Üzerine Düşünceler [Başlangıçtan Osmanlıların Fetret Devrine Kadar]," *Tarih ve Toplum*, No 109 (January 1993): 9-18. "Türk Dünyasında 'Gaza' ve 'Cihad' Kavramları Üzerine Düşünceler-II ['Gazi teriminin Anadolu ile Akdeniz Bölgesinde İtibarını Yeniden Kazanması]," *Tarih ve Toplum*, No 110 (February 1993): 73-80.

<sup>61</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, and Süleyman Demirci, "Erken Dönem Osmanlı Tarihi "Kara Bir Delik / A Black Hole" Mi? Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu "Gazi/Gazâ" İdeolojisi İle İlgili Tartışmalar," *International Journal of History* Vol. 5/1 (January 2013): 89-100.

<sup>62</sup> Feridun M. Emecen, "Gazâ'ya Dair XIV. Yüzyıl Kaynakları Arasında Bir Gezinti", *Prof. Dr. Hakkı Dursun Yıldız'a Armağan*, İstanbul (1995): 191-197.

<sup>63</sup> Süleyman Demirci, "Erken Dönem Osmanlı Tarihi "Kara Bir Delik / A Black Hole" Mi? Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluşu "Gazi/Gazâ" İdeolojisi İle İlgili Tartışmalar" *International Journal of History* Vol. 5/1 (January 2013): 91.

tolerant and receptive. At first, he gives a sophisticated analysis of the 15<sup>th</sup> - century's Ottoman chronicles, focusing on the meanings that are not found on the surface of the texts under investigation, which were implied by their writers, who were in the midst of different political and social conditions. Before he passes to the actual history, provides to the reader knowledge of the different ways the historians have approached the period and also of the sources and the debates over their use. His chief focus is on Köprülü and Wittek and their attempt to place Ottomans within the broader context of Anatolian history. He depicts the existing dipoles but, he tries to analyze the problem of the construction of the Ottoman State into a middle path that incorporates both the conflicting opposites. According to Kafadar, Osman was imposed to follow a *realpolitik* in which, different elements as conquered people, the Turkish tribe, Islamic religious war and Ghazis played crucial role, according to time, place and necessity. Up to a point he criticizes Wittek and claims that, the regulatory Islamism that was attributed to the *Ghazis*, overshadows the historical reality of the unique culture and the particular ethos of the border environment, where the Ottoman State was born. By making a detailed interpretation and comparison of passages of a particularly large number of interlinked sources and focusing on the political-social field, he mainly seeks to identify the place that Ghazi warriors and dervishes as well as their neighbors, members of tribes and permanently settled peasants, and townspeople, Christians and Muslims, were standing within a grid of changing alliances and conflicts in Asia Minor of the late Middle Ages. He does not reject the notions about ethnic or national identities and considers incorrect the orientalist approach that Ghazis did not play any role in the Ottoman State. The great conflict between the two universal religions did not determine every single action of all actors. Nor Muslims and Christians were in constant conflict. Coexistence and cohabitation was feasible and probably more common<sup>65</sup>.

Kafadar's study received harsh criticism by Colin Imber<sup>66</sup>, who described it as an endorsement of the amended by İnalcık<sup>67</sup> Wittek's Thesis, compromised with Köprülü's<sup>68</sup> ethnic view.

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<sup>64</sup> Cemal Kafadar, *Between two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman Empire*. University of California Press, 1995.

<sup>65</sup> Kafadar, *ibid.*, pp. 12, 14-15, 19, 24, 27, 57.

<sup>66</sup> Colin Imper, "Cemal Kafadar: Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State," *Bulletin of the School of the Oriental and African Studies* 60, no. 1 (1997): 211-212.

<sup>67</sup> İnalcık, *The Question of the Emerge* (1982), pp. 71-79.

In 1996, the Greek historian Demetrios Kitsikis approaching the Ottoman Empire in a different way, he expressed a view<sup>69</sup> that aroused reactions in his country. He claimed that the multinational and long-lived Ottoman Empire didn't mean 400 years of slavery for the Greeks, but, actually, it was a Greek-Turkish empire, which contributed to world history and created an environment where Greek culture developed freely. The 400 years of slavery is a west-centered approach, which served in creating hatred among the two nations. Kitsikis expressed the desire for the new generations of Greece and Turkey, to study common history books.

Again in 1996, a Turkish social scientist, Sencer Divitçioğlu<sup>70</sup>, while fully citing both the published texts and the extant secondary literature, discusses the founding of the Ottoman Principality in a theoretical framework and in a vocabulary largely unintelligible to the specialist (or any other reader for that matter)<sup>71</sup>.

In 2003, the American Professor Heath Lowry provided a revisionist approach<sup>72</sup> to the study of the formative years of the Ottoman Empire. Challenging the predominant view that, it was the desire to spread Islam that accounted for ottoman success during the 14th century's advance, argues that the first Ottomans were a plundering confederacy open to anyone -Muslim or Christian - motivated primarily by the desire for booty and slaves . Agreeing with the views of Gibbons and Georgiades-Arnakis, Lowry criticizes Wittek and, in addition, does something that none of the latter's critics have done: he attempts to demonstrate convincingly that the assumptions used by Wittek to support his Thesis were incorrect. By a carefull and complete rereading of the sources used by Wittek, namely Ahmedi's poem *İskendernâme* and a stone inscription of 1337 in Bursa, he attempts to confute the claim of the latter, that *Ghaza*, namely the spread of Islam against their Christian neighbors, was the driving force for the Ottomans in establishing and expanding their state. He concludes that Ahmedi's work had an advisory and not historical nature and that the terms *Ghaza* and *Ghazi* in the vocabulary of the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century's Ottomans were used as synonyms of the words *Akın* and *Akıncı*. According to Lowry, the lack of a strict religious orthodoxy, their syncretismic nature

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<sup>68</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, 12.

<sup>69</sup> Dimitri Kitsikis, *Türk –Yunan İmparatorluğu: Arabölge Gerçeği Işığında Osmanlı Tarihine Bakış*. İstanbul (İletişim), 1996.

<sup>70</sup> Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kuruluşu*. İstanbul (EREN), 1996.

<sup>71</sup> Lowry *ibid.*, p. 13.

and the willingness to preserve local customs and practices, allowed the Ottomans to gain and maintain the support of the Christians. The integration of the Christian population and, particularly, the integration of members of the preexisting Byzantine and Balkan aristocracy in the Ottoman administrative structure, lead to the conclusion that we should seek other motives rather than the religious, that was suggested by Wittek. The purpose of *Ghaza* wasn't the conversion of the infidels, who refused to accept the true faith, but rather the accumulation of war booty for those who practiced it, Muslims and non-Muslims, united under the same purpose, which constantly attracted increasing number of *Ghaza* warriors under the Ottoman banner.

Lowry claims that, to understand the genesis of the Ottoman State, we must stay away from the later historical tradition and focus on the Balkans where the Ottoman State matured. So, based primarily on a series of Ottoman tax registers (Tahrir defteri) from the island of Lemnos, dated in 1490 and 1520 and also on material drawn from similar sources from the hinterland of Thessalonika in Macedonia<sup>73</sup> and from Maçka valley of Trabzon in the northeastern Anatolia<sup>74</sup>, attempts to create an image of the 15th - century Ottoman Christian life, which, according to Lowry, is closer to the reality and reflects the continuation of practices which were developed during the previous two centuries. These testimonies depict an environment where the recently conquered Christians were used by their new sovereigns to safeguard the new conquered lands, a fact which is in contrast with the prevailing interpretations. The rapid spread of the Ottomans, which had dictated the use of the existing Byzantine manpower, demonstrates the 15th - century Ottoman reality and, as Lowry says, we should look at this reality in order to understand the nature of the early Ottoman State and its expansion in the 14th century's Bithynia and not at racial and religious views, which claim continuous flue of Turks and violent conversions<sup>75</sup>.

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<sup>72</sup> Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*. State University of New York, 2003, [Gr. eds. *Η Φύση του Πρώιμου Οθωμανικού Κράτους*, trans. by S. Papageorgiou, Athens (Papazisis), 2004]

<sup>73</sup> Idem., *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*. Birmingham and Washington DC (eds. A. Bryer-H. Lowry), 1986, pp 23-37.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, pp 97-128.

## 6. CONCLUSION

As it was mentioned in the introduction, due to lack of sufficient sources, the early years, the nature and expand of the Ottoman State, are veiled in a kind of mist. The interpretations given by the fundamental studies which were written during the interwar period are still being adopted by the modern historians. However, over the last few decades revisionist studies have been published. The available primary sources are the same. What remains is a complete and correct re-reading of these sources and the right interpretation of the given information in order to construct a history as close as possible to the reality. In this respect, crucial is the contribution of the first Ottoman tax registers. The history of the early Ottoman period is of decisive importance and explains how a small emirate expanded and became an empire.

Georgiades-Arnakis, with his study, took part in the ‘discussion’ initiated by Gibbons in 1916 and culminated by Wittek in 1937 and clearly follows the views of the first. With his analyses and documentation he contradicts both to the nationalist view of Köprülü, and the Ghaza Thesis of Wittek and highlights the influence and the contribution of the Byzantine factor in the establishment and spread of the Ottoman state.

Throughout his study he uses the term *Osmanides – Osmanikos* and avoids completely the use of the terms *Turk - Turkish*. In this way he wants to demonstrate that the Ottomans were a different entity, which was not determined by race, ethnicity and religion. The Ottomans were the followers of Osman and later the population of a multi-national and multi-religious empire; a group, a ‘confederation’ that anyone could participate freely, irrespective of ethnic or religious orientation. The only and common obligation was the contribution to a common - pragmatic purpose: enrichment through looting and enslavement.

This ‘confederation’ found itself at the right place – at the right time. The conditions that was created at the borders between the enfeebled Byzantium and the practically non-existent Seljuk State, had favored its almost uninterrupted expansion to the north and the establishment of a state, which had the same characteristics. The weakness of Byzantium and the moral decline of the Greek-Christian population in conjunction with the policy that was implemented by the Ottomans, either because of necessity (real

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<sup>75</sup> Lowry, *ibid.*, (2003), pp. 2-3, 15, 21, 29, 31, 40, 44, 45-47, 54, 64, 66, 71-74, 95, 97, 99, 101, 104, 112,

politic) or because of the particular idiosyncrasy that had been developed at the borders, had decisive impact to the indigenous population. Under these conditions the Bithynians didn't hesitate to join the Ottomans and convert to Islam. Besides, the convincing example of several former Byzantine officials who had already passed to the Ottoman side and held key positions beside Osman, as well as ordinary people who had maintained their religion and were working freely being imposed lower taxes, was a good motivation for their decision.

This is the only logical explanation for the decline of Asia Minor Hellenism, which was strong and standing for centuries. Within only a few decades, the Greek-Christian element of Bithynia was assimilated and turned into Ottoman-Muslim. The assimilated indigenous and the new generation which came from the mixed marriages, were the first Ottomans. The same people kept on living at the same place; the society had undergone only external changes.

However, there are still unanswered questions. Wasn't there any impact from the other side of the border to the first Ottoman core? They didn't inherit anything from the Seljuks or the Ilkhanids? Wasn't there any Turkish immigration from the East? Since Osman and his followers had embraced Islam at the late 13th century, weren't they possessed by the fanaticism of the neophyte and the desire for proselytism of the infidels? Weren't there violent conversions? How could the majority of the indigenous peasantry decide to stay while anarchy and inroads had made cultivation and survival impossible for decades? Why did the Byzantine army decide to withdraw hastily to Istanbul and suffer an embarrassing defeat at Pelekanos? Why was the occupation of the three main cities of Bithynia so delayed? Was there an alliance between Mongols and Byzantines against the Turkish emirates in Anatolia?

Due to the lack of sources many questions will remain unanswered. Perhaps they will be answered in the future by primary sources that have not been discovered yet. Until then we will confine ourselves to a history partly constructed.

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**PART II**  
**(TRANSLATION)**

## PREFACE

The foundation of the Ottoman state in Bithynia, the gradual subjugation of this country and the disappearance of most of the Greek population, all matters falling within the circle of Byzantine studies, despite the fact that Byzantinism has done a lot of progress and daily gains ground, have not obtained the required attention in Greece. However, in Turkey too, in contrast to what one would expect, the history of the first Ottoman has not sufficiently studied. This is because, when the science of history began to be cultivated systematically after the establishment of the Kemalist regime, Turkish researchers turned mainly to prehistoric era, even making some very audacious theories on the origins of the European civilization. Prehistory absorbed the general interest of the researchers and so, few were the Turk writers who have dealt with the fundamental problems of the first Ottomans. Works which saw the daylight in the last two decades merit of course our special attention; however, those synthetic studies based on modern researches, that would put on indisputable scientific base the major problem of the foundation of the Ottoman state, are still missing. Therefore, neither Turkey contributed to date to the study of the scientific field of the old Ottoman history, although such a contribution would be expected, thanks to the rich (because of the rich) relevant material which is scattered in libraries. In the West, many are those (the) scholars who have dealt with the Turkish things in a general or more specific basis, but these projects currently considered mostly obsolete. From the few recent studies, these dealing with the first Ottoman period due to Turkish scholars, who, with obvious unilateralism, wanted to present the foundation of the Ottoman state as a purely Turkish phenomenon. Under these circumstances, we can say that, despite the individual contribution of notable scholars, the problem of the formation of the Ottoman state still remains unsolved.

With the present study we do not aspire to offer the final solution of this problem, which is complicated and unexplored. Our main purpose is to place it within the context of historical research, away from each heroic or nationalist perception. Nationalism and heroic conception of history were factors that reduced the value of many books, just like the fact that those who wrote about the establishment of the

Ottoman state, as a rule, underestimated or silenced the importance of the Byzantine factor. We consider (believe) that this issue can be studied scientifically only in conjunction with the history of Byzantium and especially Bithynia, that is the region where the Ottomans emerged and developed.

It is for this reason the present study, which on the one side considers the establishment of the Ottomans on a ground which retained its Greek character despite all the invasions, while, on the other side, explores the fate of the last Byzantine provinces of the East, may be regarded as a contribution to the research of Asia Minor Hellenism of the Middle Ages. As for the problem of the fall of the Greeks of Asia Minor, it is one of the most important historical issues that cannot be ignored by any of the Byzantine history scholars.

As Papanigopoulos also wrote, the most dense and homogeneous Greek population of the Empire was enclosed within Asia Minor. It is this population that faced the Persian and Arab invasions without succumbing. With its rich material resources, but mainly with its manpower, Asia Minor offered the struggling Byzantine Empire life for many centuries. It was the compact and solid mass on which Byzantium was based throughout the Middle Ages. "Without Asia Minor", writes the respected professor Konstantinos Amantos, the hellenization of Byzantium wouldn't have been made possible and perhaps Hellenism would have also been lost". Given the above, a reasonable question is created: How it happened and the beyond the Aegean Greek-Christian population, which, according to some estimates, around 395 AD reached the thirty two million people, and was maintained vigorous, besting figures until the 11th century, shrunk in one and a half million refugees, who fled to Greece in 1922? The present study, dealing with the past remnants of the Empire in the East, particularly as regards the area between the rivers Rhyndakos and Saggarios, extending between the shores of Black Sea and Bosphorus and usually called Bithynia, aims to offer an adequate as possible answer to this question, an answer which is very important both from general and national perspective.

Finally, I wish to express sincere thanks to all those who helped me to bring to a successful conclusion end my study, particularly to Mr. D.A. Zakythinis, Ordinary Professor of Byzantine History at the University of Athens, who in various ways contributed to the more complete appearance of this study, and Mr. N.A. Bees,

Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Literature and Academic, editor of the *Byzantinisch – neugriechische Jahrbücher*, who put precious books, inaccessible in Greece, at my disposal, and included *The First Ottomans (Osmanlis)* in the annexes of this reputable journal.

Athens, 2 July 1941 – 21 June 1943.

G. GEORGIADES-ARNAKIS

## NOTES

The map we deemed reasonable to quote because of the confusion that exists among the earlier historians on most names of Bithynia, is mainly based on the studies of the eminent scientists V. Cuinet, Sir M. Ramsey, W. Tomaschek, A. Philippson, J. Solch, F. Taeschner and P. Wittek (see literature/bibliography)

As regards the transcription of Arabic and Turkish names, titles etc, commonly, we didn't follow the Turkish system of 1928, but the international as this is widely used by Turk scientists, not only for the east but also for the Slavic languages, is best known and easier to use. However, we preferred the Turkish spelling system in the case of titles of books and periodicals, as well as to the names of the current Turkish writers and some toponyms, because in more modern maps and indexes are usually encountered in this form.

We can summarize the essential differences between the two alphabets as follows: Č (tch) is written by the Turks as ç, ğ (tj) as c and š (ch, sh, sch) as ş. The Turkish letter ğ, usually corresponds to y or j of the international alphabet (as in the words Söğüt and Ertoğrul) and rarely extend the previous vowel (ie, kâğit). The element j of the current Turkish alphabet is not spoken as γ, but is equivalent to the French j. Consequently, while the words Πουρσάκ – τσάϊ, Καρατζάχισαρ, Μπλετζίκ, Γενήσεχιρ, μετζμουά (= periodical), are written as Pursakçay, Karacahisar, Bilecik, Yenişehir, mecmua with the latin-turkish alphabet, they are written as Pursakçay, Karağahisar, Bileğik, Yenişehir, meğmua with the international alphabet.

Referring to the Byzantine writers of the Bonn issue, except the page, we considered appropriate to mention the chapter and the verse, hoping that, after the war, the republication of these authors which started a while ago and, in this way, the outdated and largely inaccurate volumes of Bonn will fall into disuse.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AHR	:	The American Historical Review
AO	:	Acta Orientalia
BNJ	:	Byzantinisch – neugriechische Jahrbücher
BZ	:	Byzantinische Zeitschrift
ΔIEE	:	Bulletin of the Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece
EI	:	Encyclopédie de l' Islam
EEBΣ	:	Yearbook of the Society for Byzantine Studies
EO	:	Echos d' Orient
JA	:	Journal Asiatique
MOG	:	Mitteilungen zur Osamanischen Geschichte
NE	:	Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi [Impériale] et autres bibliothèques.
OLZ	:	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung
PG	:	Migne, Patrologia Graeca
TOEM	:	Tarihi Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası
VV	:	Vizantiskij Vremennik
ZDMG	:	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft
ZSem	:	Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete.

**INTRODUCTION**  
**THE HISTORY OF THE OSMANIC\* PROBLEM**  
**CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE SOURCES**

The emergence of the Ottomans at the end of the 13th century and the establishment of their state, which – over time – was to become the heir of the millennial Byzantine Empire and exert great influence for centuries in international affairs, is one of the biggest historical problems, which, however, has not been sufficiently explored so far. Many and remarkable scientific studies and histories of the Ottoman Empire have been written. Some of these, such as J. von Hammer's, J. Zinkeisen's, N. Jorga's, H. A. Gibbons', Mehmet Fuat Köprülü[zade]'s, W.L. Langer – R.P. Blake's and P. Wittek's, opened new horizons in historical research, but have not yet offer the ultimate solution to the fundamental issue of the establishment of the Ottoman state. Both lack of sources, contemporary to the events based on accurate knowledge of the facts, and the bias and prejudice that characterizes the works of ulterior chroniclers and historians, either Christians or Muslims, contributed in this fact. Both causes are being easily perceived. The lack of sources, simultaneous to the events, is mainly due to the unnoticed way in which the birth of the nations usually occurs and is historically recorded only after the fledging nation shows signs of political and military life, able to designate it as a national entity. Historians are awakened only when the life of a nation become sufficiently understood through its actions and pursuits. Then, they rush to record the events, while trying to explain the past, namely the *genesis* which had escaped their attention until then. In this research of the past, legends and local traditions have been formed by the people. The historians, who seek the origin of people and institutions, necessarily come into contact with that first source of legends and traditions, which are the spontaneous manifestation of people's historical thinking and its primal contribute to the concept of History.

During this period of palpating the dawn of history, the face of the national leader, the hero around which the new national assembly had coalesced and organized, is vigorously sought. This ethnarch is the symbol of national unity – the origin of the

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\* In this study, the term *Osmanikos* used mainly in what concerns the person of Osman and the vestigiary state of prehistory, that is direct his own work, while the term *Othomanikos* serves to identify the organized and thriving nation that has already started its historic course.

nation cannot be understood without him. This is how Theseus in ancient Athens, Romulus in Rome and Ottomans' Osman emerged from the twilight of prehistory and were recognized as archegetes or fathers of their nations and founders of the oldest institutions of their race. Although these figures are historical, they have a very special significance due to the fact that in popular perception were very closely associated with the national existence of the (ir society) mass. By examining the various events of the lives of these legendary heroes as preserved in traditions and legends, is pursued an interpretation of national institutions and the understanding of national development. The first history of every nation is very close to mythology and necessarily heroic.

The Ottoman history doesn't constitute an exception to this general phenomenon. Unsurprisingly, myths and traditions that gave him the glamour of the epic hero were formed around the national leader of the Ottomans. The victories that he achieved as the leader of his father's 444 horsemen, his fierce love and marriage to Sheikh Edebali's beautiful daughter and also the adventures that preceded the marriage<sup>76</sup>, the prophetic dream about the future of his tribe<sup>77</sup>, the legendary conquest of Bilecik (Βηλόκωμα) by warriors disguised as old women<sup>78</sup>, the ten years siege of Bursa (along the lines of Troy), the bloodthirsty cruelty after the battle of Agrilliou<sup>79</sup> or the justice and religious tolerance shown in Karacahisar<sup>80</sup>, and other similar – often contradictory and conflicting facts or myths, are the material of the Ottoman history in the late 13th and early 14th century. This material was registered to the books of the first but by far subsequent to the events Ottoman historiographers Aşikpaşazade (1400-1486 approx.), Neşri (+ 1520), Idris (+ 1520), Sa'adeddin (1536-1599), Ali (1541-1599)

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<sup>76</sup> See Hammer, Joseph von, *Ιστορία της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας*, Greek translation by K. Krokidas, Athens 1870, Vol I pp. 55-56 [Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Vol. I, Pest 1827. Translated in French by J. J. Hellert, Vol. I, Paris 1835. The bulk of the Ottoman myths is included in E.I. Stamatiades' work *The Catalans*, Athens 1869, pp. 30-38; cf H.A. Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford 1916, pp. 19-24.

<sup>77</sup> Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I pp. 57-58, paraphrase of Idris' poetic narration. The Turkish historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, *Les origines de l' Empire Ottoman*, Paris 1935, pp. 12-13, remarks that the theme of the tree which buds from the innards of the tribal chief and grows until it covers under its shadow the whole world is also met in other eastern nations, predating the Ottomans, as a proof that their power comes from God.

<sup>78</sup> Hammer, *ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

and Hacı Kalfa (1609-1657)<sup>81</sup>, who not only haven't checked the historical accuracy of these information, but also tried to create a more romantic hero on the face of Osman.

According to these historians<sup>82</sup>, the race of those that was later called Ottomans started from Mahan of Persia, fleeing under the pressure exerted from the hordes of Genghis Khan which were scattering death by fire and sword in the countries they were passing through. Under the leadership of Süleyman Sakh, large part of the refugees arrived to the banks of Euphrates, after years of wandering across Armenia. There, Suleiman, in his attempt to lead his followers to the east, drowned in the river, so the Turks who followed him were dispersed and returned to their places of origin. Only Ertogrul and Dundar of his for sons implemented the original plan of the course and entered to the Kingdom of Rum (Ἰκόνιο Konya), leading approximately four hundred nomadic families...

After a temporary stay near Ankara and Karacadağ, they headed to the west, when suddenly witnessed a bloody battle taking place between the sultan of Iconium and Tatar invaders. At that time, Ertogrul, inspired by a quote from the Koran that requires the protection of the weak<sup>83</sup>, he ordered his cavalry to be thrown irrepressible to fight beside those who suffered the greatest losses. The outcome of the battle changed and miraculously Sultan Alaeddin A' Kaykompas won. The king, appreciating the generous contribution of these foreign and unknown went to greet his unexpected ally offering royal gifts and granting the town of Söğüt at winter place of residence (kışla) and the foothills of Mount Dumanıç (Temnos) and Ermeni Dağ (Armenokastro) as his summer residence. These occurred between 616 and 634 Hijra (1219-1237)...

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<sup>81</sup> For chronologies, and any other information about the Ottoman historiographers, excellent tool is F. Babinger's work, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre*, Leipzig 1927. In this work are mentioned all the known chroniclers and historians, their biographies, manuscripts and publications and any relevant study. Especially for Aşikpaşazade, who has been studied more at the recent years, particularly in response to the critical edition of his work by F. Giese in 1929, memorable is Ahmet Refik's monograph, *Aşikpaşazade*, Istanbul 1932, and also P. Wittek's individual works, "Neues zu Aşikpaşazade", *MOG*, vol. 2, pp. 147-164, F. Giese', «Zum Aşikpaşazade-Problem», *OLZ*, vol. 35 (1932), pp. 7-17, and H. Kissling's, *Die Sprache des Aşikpaşazade*, Breslau 1936. Especially for Neşri, interesting is the recent study of P. R. Unat, "Neşri tarihi üzerinde yapılan çalışmalara bir bakış", *Belleten*, 1943, pp. 177-201. About Haği Kalfa, see. F. Taeschner, "Die geographische Literatur der Osmanen", *ZDMG*, vol. 77 (1923), pp. 31-80.

<sup>82</sup> As basis of the following narration is taken Neşri, ed. and trans. Th. Nöldeke, *ZDMG*, vol. 13 (1859), pp. 188-198, and Idris, in Hammer, *History*, vol. I, pp. 57-59. Neşri, who was aware of Asikpasazade, who was older, was in general followed by the other Ottoman historians. For anthology of their works see Leunclavius, *Historiae musulmanae Turcorum de monomentis ypsorum exscriptae*, libri XVIII, Francofurti 1591. Books II-IV, pp. 87-215, refers to Ertogrul, Osman and Orhan.

In Söğüt, Osman Gazi, the Champion of the Faith saw the daylight for the first time.

After he was installed with his followers and flocks in this border region, Ertogrul conducted victorious battles against the Romans and the Tatars. In recognition of his services, the sultan ceded him the area of Eskisehir as a fief, namely the territory between Söğüt northwards and Karacahisar southward. After several years, Ertogrul, old enough gave prominence as chief of his military forces to Osman, who very quickly accomplished deed worthy as those of his father's. Osman's respect to Koran and his zeal to prove his faith in Allah ensured for him and his successors the divine grace they were announced through an angel...

One afternoon, when he was guest of the old Sheikh Entempali, he saw in his dream a bright moon rising from the old man's chest and submerging in his chest. Just after this had happened a tree in blossom sprouted from Osman's body and covered the whole world with its branches. Under its shade one could descry Caucasus, Taurus, Atlas and Balkan Mountain Rages. The rivers Tigris, Euphrates, Nile and Danube sprang from its root. Wheat was flourishing in the fields, forests were covering the mountain areas and crowded cities were rising at the plains. The crescent was tinkling over the golden domes. Suddenly, an impetuous wind blew and the leaves of the tree were converted to swords which turned to Constantinople, which, as it was between two seas and two continents looked like a diamond between two sapphires and two emeralds, adorning the finger formed by the countries of the whole earth. While Osman reached out his hand to the diamond, he awakened. This prophetic dream appropriately interpreted, according to the words of İdris, conceived the old Sheikh to give his consent to Osman to marry with his daughter Malhatun (woman-treasure), which was renowned for her beauty.

Since then, he living a life as a faithful Muslim and engaged in valor and prudence deeds, extended his hegemony, conquering one after the other the cities and the fortresses of the infidels, until he died at the age of seventy, having the time to hear the good news that his son Orhan had captured Bursa. The aforementioned are based on references of the first Ottoman historiographers. Unlike these, the contemporaries or certainly closer to the events Byzantine historians George Pachymeres (1242-1310

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<sup>83</sup> “Και αν εκτελέση τις χιλίας ιεράς αποδημίας, δεν θα τύχη του επαίνου, όστις θα απονεμηθή εις τον

approx.), Nikiforos Gregoras (1295-1359) and Ioannes Kantakouzenos (+1583), who were wrote before time manage to throw a veil of mystery over persons and things, seem to completely ignore anything relevant to the establishment of the Ottoman state and are limited in reporting the events that brought in touch the newfangled Osman's hegemony and the Byzantine Empire. However, severe confusion may result in whatever concerning these specific events, and this is because, many times, the uncritical study of the Byzantine historians led to errors because these writers did not distinguish the Ottomans from the other Turkish tribes of Asia Minor, by calling them all Turks or even with the more ancient name 'Persians'. In this way, raids and pirate adventures of the early 14th century were attributed to the Ottomans, while it is undeniable that responsible for these were the rulers of coastal areas and specifically Aydın, Teke, Mendese and Sarukhan, who, at that time, were the only among the tyrants of Asia Minor who had fleet for such operations.

Despite the fact that often the information provided is vague and confused, those three Byzantine writers are the most reliable source for the history of the early Ottoman period. Despite his dark and obscure style that often makes his history extremely difficult to read, Pachymeres is characterized by Krumbacher as the "ultimate Byzantine polyhistor of the 13th century"<sup>84</sup>. He is conscientious in registering information and, as a historian, does not lack ingenuity and research intentions. On the other hand, contemporary with the great events which preceded the Turkish settlement on the European side of the Hellespont, Nikiforos Gregoras, continues Pachymeres' history until 1359 with his history entitled «Ρωμαϊκής Ιστορίας Λόγοι ΚΔ'» (Λόγοι of the Roman History). However, although he is very detailed in doctrinal discussions concerning church matters, when referring to military events he is surprisingly concise and therefore can be considered more objective than his contemporary emperor – author John Kantakouzenos, who, although he provides detailed and vivid images of the events - which often was an eye-witness - in his work, above all he ensures the vindication of his political career and, not infrequently, avoids revealing the true motivations of his actions. Ultimately, however, if used with caution and each of them is used as a

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απομακρύνοντα, κατά τον δέοντα χρόνον, την πίεσιν την βαρύνουσα τους ανίσχυρους”.

<sup>84</sup> Krumbacher, Karl, *Ιστορία της Βυζαντινής Λογοτεχνίας*, trans. G. Sotiriades, Athens 1897, Vol. I p. 584 [*Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströemischen Reiches*, München 1897].

complement to the other, both Gregoras and Kantakouzenos are highlighted as valuable resources as Pachymeres<sup>85</sup>.

Apart from these three authors, two other Byzantines dealt with the Ottomans, but, as real children of the 15th century, wrote under the influence of the impressions the fall of Constantinople caused to their contemporaries. From the perspective of this great event, Chalkokondyles and Frantzis gaze two centuries back, trying to discern traces of the Ottoman history's course<sup>86</sup>. Athenian Laonikos Chalkokondyles is the first historian who writes about the Turks and rather than Byzantium he puts the young and thriving Ottoman state at the center. Following the steps of his fellow citizen Thucydides seeks to explain the evolution of the Turkish case, dealing both with "the decline of the Greeks and what happened during their rule, but also how the Turks came to be strong, stronger than all the nations of their time"<sup>87</sup>. Concerning George Frantzis, personal friend and colleague of the last emperor Constantine, when recounting the tragic events about the Fall, he incidentally mentions the legendary of the time about the origin of the house of Osman, leaving the reader the option of selecting the most probable version<sup>88</sup>.

Both Chalkokondyles and Frantzis are aware and use the Turkish traditions. However, according to the Athenian historian<sup>89</sup>, instead of Suleyman Shah, as Osman's grandfather is mentioned someone named Oğuzalpis, who campaigned and conquered the Greek Asia Minor. His son Orthoğrulis, constructed fleet and plundered the Aegean Sea to the coast of Euboea, Attica and Peloponnese<sup>90</sup>. Osman (Otoumanos), who was born in Söğüt "which was called *κώμη Ιτέας*"<sup>91</sup> (town or large village Itea) very quickly

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<sup>85</sup> About the historic work of Nikephoros Gregoras see R. Guiland, *Essai sur Nicéphore Grégoras*, Paris 1926, pp. 228-257, especially pp. 251-256, where Kantakouzenos and Gregoras are compared as historians. About Kantakouzenos, see V. Parisot, *Cantacuzène: Homme d'état et historien*, Paris 1845. Also see. J. Draeseke, "Zu Johannes Kantakuzenos", *BZ*, vol. 9 (1900), pp. 72-84.

<sup>86</sup> Interesting studies about Chalcocondyles have been written by W. Miller, "The Last Athenian Historian: Laonikos Chalcocondyles", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* Vol. 42 (1922) pp. 37-49, και by K. Güterbock, "Laonikos Chalcocondyles", *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht* (Breslau) Vol. 4 (1910) pp.72-102. W. Miller has also written about Frantzes in his study "The Historians Dukas and Frandzes", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* Vol. 46 (1926) pp. 63-71.

<sup>87</sup> Chalcocondyles, A' 1 p. 4, eds. Bonn.

<sup>88</sup> *Χρονικόν*, A' 19-21, pp. 73-81, eds. I. B. Papadopoulos.

<sup>89</sup> Chalcocondyles, A', 5-7, pp. 11-15.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>91</sup> Söğüt means *Ιτέα* (Willow). However, J. Bury (see Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London 1902, Vol. 7, p. 23, n. 2), identifies this town with Sagoudaous mentioned by Anna Comnenos (*Αλεξιάς*, IE', 2, Vol. 2, p. 269, l. 11, ed. by A. Reifferscheid). It seems that Bury, by saying that when Anna Comnenos was writing Sagoudaous had in mind the Turkish name *Söğüt*, follows

stood out, as he was distinguished for his generalship and his justice. After Alladinos death (Alaeddin the 3d) he negotiated with the other rulers a treaty for the distribution of Asia Minor, and thus, annexing new territories, significantly increased his state. Among his achievements are also referred the repeated attacks he acted out against Philadelphia<sup>92</sup>.

Chalchokondyles, who was already translated in French in the 16th century<sup>93</sup> and was extensively studied in the West, is responsible for many erroneous beliefs, which were well received by the subsequent writers and prevailed until today<sup>94</sup>.

Equally responsible for spreading false information is Frantzis, who speaks about Ertogroul's naval action<sup>95</sup>, about a treaty for distribution (partition?) of Asia Minor<sup>96</sup>, about the conquest of Sevasteia by Osman<sup>97</sup> and many other fantastic events. According to Frantzis, Ertogroul was the son of Wu<sup>98</sup> and descendant of insignificant

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the aspect of W. M. Ramsay (*Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, p. 209). On this issue there will be a reference later on (I, note 75) because it is of great significance. The saving of even one Turkish toponym dating from the 11<sup>o</sup> century would be a serious argument in supporting the view that the Seljuq conquerors were an important factor in Bithynia at the time of Komninos, Laskaris and Paleologus. It should be noted that E. Darkò, at his version of Chalcocondyles, (p. 11) had accepted the writing *Itaia*.

<sup>92</sup> Chalcocondyles A' 10 p. 20, A' 11 p. 24.

<sup>93</sup> Vigenere, *Histoire de la decadence de l' Empire Grec et établissement de celui des Turcs*, Paris 1584.

<sup>94</sup> As an example, see E. Pears' book, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire*, London 1903. Although Pears speaks about a treaty of Asia Minor's distribution (p. 61), about the alliance between the Turkish satraps at the battle of Vapheus, about the Ottoman attack against Rhodes (p. 63) and other such erroneous information, his book was evaluated as a "good textbook" by A. Vasiliev (*Histoire de l' Empire Byzantin*, Paris 1932, Vol. II, p. 435). Some of these information were repeated by Pears at a chapter he wrote under the title "The Ottoman Turks and the Fall of Constantinople", for *Cabridge Medieval History* vol IV (1923 and 1936), pp. 653-663. Pears' fallacies were partially followed by Ch. Diehl - L. Oeconomos - R. Guiland - R. Grousset in their last work, *L' Europe Orientale de 1081 a 1453 (Histoire du Moyen Age, Vol. X)*, Paris 1945, p. 300 (Later on there will be a reference on Osman's attack against Rhodes and on the occupation of Lefkes by Roger).

<sup>95</sup> "Μετά τινος ημέρας νήας ληστρικάς ως ἐνὶ οἰκονομῆσας, δῆρις καὶ μονήρεις εὐθύς ετοιμάσας καὶ μετὰ ἀνδρῶν μαχίμων καλῶς παρασκευάσας, πολλὰς τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσους τὰς ἐν τῷ Αἰγαίῳ πελάγει τῆς Ἀσίας ἐληλάτησε καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαστο. Πέρασας δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν Θράκην ἐν τῇ ἐπαρχίᾳ Αἰνίου καὶ Περιθεωρίου πολλοὺς Χριστιανούς ἠγμάλωτισε καὶ ἕως τῆς Εὐρίπου ἐλθὼν καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα κατὰ τινος τόπους ἐξημίωσε. Φθάσας δὲ ἄχρι καὶ τῆς νήσου τοῦ Πέλοπος καὶ πολλὰ σκύλα ποιήσας, τὸν πλοῦν τρέψας ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἐπανέστρεψε μετὰ πλήθους αἰχμαλώτων καὶ πλοῦτου καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν ἐτέρων σατραπῶν καὶ τοῦ κοινῆς λαοῦ ἀσπασίως ἐδέχθη καὶ μετὰ φωνῶν ἐτίμουν αὐτὸν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐτέρων σατραπῶν ἐκτοτε μάλιστα ἦν εὐλαβοῦμενος καὶ προτιμητέος ἦν ἐκ πάντων διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἱκανοπλῶν καὶ θαλαπτοργόν". A' 21 p. 80. Almost the same are repeated as well by Hüseyin Hezarfen, trans. F. Pétis de la Croix, Vol. II, pp. 288-289.

<sup>96</sup> A' 22 pp. 81-82.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82. cf. Giovio, *Commentarii delle cose de Turchi*, Venetia 1541, p. 3, also by F. Sansovino, *Historia universale dell' origine et imperio de Turchi*, Venetia 1568, p. 216.

<sup>98</sup> A' 18 p. 73 l. 14. Oghuz (Arab. Ghuzz καὶ by the Byzantines *Ούζοι*) is the great Turkish race which was spread to Asia Minor and whose mythical patriarch was Oghuz-Khan, mentioned by Frantzis as *ο Γούς* (*του Γού* in genitive case) with apocope of the letter *o*, which was took for article. Concerning the Oghuz see T. Houtsma, "Die Ghusenstämme", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. II (1885), pp. 219-233.

military leaders, who managed to impose amid disorderly conditions or, according to some other version (Ertogroul) was the grandson of a nephew of King Ioannes Komnenos, who was also named Ioannes<sup>99</sup>. When in the course of a battle he clashed with his uncle, notwithstanding the assault, he defected to the Turks of Iconium, married the sultan's daughter and became the father of Suleiman Sakh. According to Frantzis, only Ertogroul saw prophetic dream<sup>100</sup>. Its content at first looks like the dream that Astyagis saw about Mandani, which is mention by Herodotus (A'107) of the sultan but then is identified with the subject of the tree in blossom as Osman saw it and was narrated by Idris in the first of his "Eight Paradises".

From the study of these two Byzantine historiographers comes out that, regarding the time of the Conquest (Fall?), their information is precious, but in matters related to the establishment of the Ottoman state is very confusing and legendary (invention). One would say that barely differ from the romantic narratives of the Ottoman sources themselves.

Doukas is contemporary to Frantzis and Chalkokondyles<sup>101</sup>. His work which is equally enlightening about the Fall, contains only basic information about the events of the past times and, as regards the things about the first Ottomans, is as meager as Gregoras' "Roman History", where it is based on.

Faced with such a shortage of resources, the researcher is in a difficult position. First he faces the problem of the reliability of the narratives of the Ottoman writers, and also those of Frantzis and Chalkokondyles. Will he appose them in a logical order as historical truths as did von Hammer<sup>102</sup>, or reject them as did Jorga<sup>103</sup>, considering that they are speculations and falsehoods useless for the historian? The American H.A. Gibbons<sup>104</sup> follows the middle path as he believes that, in the absence of historical sources, we can draw many and useful conclusions from the myths and the traditions,

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<sup>99</sup> A' 19 pp. 74-76. This episode, which took place during the battle of Neokaisareia, is mentioned by Nikitas Choniatis, pp. 48-49, 72, ed. by Bonn. Spandugino (ed. by K.N. Sathas, *Documents inédits*, Vol. X, p. 139, l. 26 et seq., and *Petit traité de l'origine des Turcqs*, Fr. trans. by de Raconis, 1519, ed. Ch. Schéfer, p. 11) names him Isaac, while according to Frantzes (p. 74 l. 4), who follows Choniatis, Isaacios is called the father of the prince who had defected.

<sup>100</sup> A' 21 pp. 79-80.

<sup>101</sup> About Ducas, apart from the aforementioned study of W. Miller (note. 11), worth mentioning is E. Tchernousov's study "Δούκας, εις εκ των ιστορικών του τέλους του Βυζαντίου" (in Russian), VV, Vol. 21 (1914), pp. 171-221 [Ducas, historien de la fin de Byzance].

<sup>102</sup> *Ιστορία της Οθωμανικής Αυτοκρατορίας* [Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches] Vol. I, p. 48 et seq.

<sup>103</sup> *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Gotha 1908, Vol. I, preface and pp. 149-153.

<sup>104</sup> *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford 1916, pp. 17-27.

because, in his opinion, these are allegorical representations of events, that kept dim in the memory of the nation. However, this view poses many risks, because it may result in subjective judgments and theories easily repulsed by anybody who thinks differently. Therefore, Gibbons' work, which, despite its disadvantages, is recognized as a very serious work on the subject by the majority of the scientists, during the last twenty years received harsh criticism from the Hungarian historian Julius Germanus<sup>105</sup>, the French Turkologist Clement Huart<sup>106</sup>, the German Friedrich Giese<sup>107</sup> and the Turkish novelist and historian Mehmet Fuat Köprülü, professor at Istanbul University<sup>108</sup>, who stressed, admittedly with a marked partiality, the Turkish and Muslim factor in the foundation of the Ottoman state.

Reservations about Gibbons work were phrased by the Americans W.L. Langer and R.P. Blake, in their study published a few years ago under the title "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background"<sup>109</sup>.

Thus, disputes about the reliability of the Ottoman historiographers' information and the very nature of that information, but, on the other hand, the lack of clear information on the part of the contemporary Byzantines, according to the aforementioned Turk historian's words, rendered this problem to a true enigma, whose solution was not possible until now<sup>110</sup>. To the darkening of things, important role also played the bias or the empathy, with which, various historians wrote about the Ottoman state, either they were Ottomans or not.

Let's first consider the Ottoman historians. As they were writing at a time when the Empire was at its peak, when Osman's descendants were world rulers and as themselves were living in the courtyards of lords and kings<sup>111</sup>, of course, always tended to raise the prestige of the dynasty, presenting the past as worthy as the present. By

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<sup>105</sup> Scientific journal *Turan*, Budapest 1918, p. 491 et seq.

<sup>106</sup> *Journal des Savants*, new series Vol. 15 (Apr. 1917), pp. 157-166, and *JA* 11<sup>th</sup> series, Vol. 9 (1917), pp. 345-350.

<sup>107</sup> *ZSem* Vol. 2 (1924), pp. 246-271.

<sup>108</sup> *Les origins de l' Empire Ottoman* (Études orientales publiées par l'Institut Français d' Archéologie de Stamboul, III), Paris 1935, pp. 7-19. Also in Turkish, at *Hayat* magazine, Vol. I-11, pp. 2-3 and 12, pp. 2 (Febr. 10 and 17, 1927).

<sup>109</sup> *AHR* Vol. 37 - 3 (April 1932), pp. 468-505.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6. This issue is almost hushed in *Tarih* Vol. 3, pp. 1-3, ed. by the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Cemiyeti).

<sup>111</sup> E.g. Sa'deddin was courtier of Selim I and Murat III, Neşri dedicates his work with many commendations to Bayezid II, İdris was also the favored of Bayezid II, Ali and Hağı Kalfa at first, were officers and then senior state officials, Evliya Çelebi was the son of a dervish and confidant courtier, and so forth.

exaggerating the royal house founders' accomplishments, not only flattered the rulers, gaining moral or material benefits, but subconsciously responded to some inner need manifested in the new nations and concerns the search in the past for those great and heroic achievements (things), which, in some way, may be the starting point of the national greatness. Consequently, those who wrote in Constantinople during the reign of Selim I or Suleiman the Magnificent, could not imagine those first Ottoman ethnarchs, Osman and Orhan, without the brilliance and epiboly of their successors.

As they were under the influence of Mohammedanism (Islam) and often belonging themselves to monastic orders, the Ottoman historians were emulating to present the founders of their dynasty as ardent and zealous protectors of religion, obviously overestimating the Islamic factor, as a regulator of events in the tiny state which was established in Bithynia two centuries ago. In this spirit, the founders of the Ottoman state were called Ghazi (Champions of Faith) and presented as friends and commensals of sheikhs and dervishes and benefactors of Islamic monasteries<sup>112</sup>. To identify the aforementioned, local traditions which testify their piety were discovered, privileges and grants assigned to monasteries and charitable institutions were attached to them, while, at the same time, the circumstances under which these privileges were given are stated<sup>113</sup>. In these narrations, almost always one can descry the monks' effort to legalize the achievements in question, surrounding them with the validity of one Osman or Orhan.

Of course, reasons of political expediency contributed to the dissemination of such fictions. Among them, noteworthy is what has been said by Evliya Celebi<sup>114</sup>, namely that Osman's marriage with Malhatun made him Prophet Muhammad's kinsman (relative?). Lively impress also causes Franzi's information, according to which the House of Osman draws its origin from the Komnenian genealogy.

It is obvious that both these stories were spread for political reasons. The first began on the abolition of the Egyptian Caliphate by the Ottomans (οσμανίδες), in order to convince the Islamic world for the legality of Selim's I action to appropriate the title of caliph for himself and his descendants. The second information was spread in the

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<sup>112</sup> Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13, p. 198. Šükrullah, *MOG* Vol. 2 p. 83. Ahmet b. Yusuf, Lat. trans. Rasmussen, *Annales Islamismi*, p. 62. Cf Mouradja d' Ohsson, *Tableau général de l' Empire Othoman*, Vol. I, p. 352, Vol. 4, pp. 479-481.

<sup>113</sup> Cf Hammer, *Ιστορία [Geschichte]* Vol. I, pp. 61, 72, 90.

<sup>114</sup> See En. trans. by J. von Hammer, *Narrative of Travels*, London 1850, Vol. II, pp. 4, 18.

time of the Fall, in order to safeguard Muhammad the Conqueror's sovereignty on the throne of Constantines with heredity arguments<sup>115</sup>.

The search for the cause of all sorts of inaccuracies said by the Ottoman chroniclers and historians would be a very interest topic that would lead the scholar to many and useful conclusions, because, by comparison, clearing of the waste material would be achieved and the work would be limited to viewing only the useful texts. However, necessarily, the research on this point will be based on the new discoveries of manuscripts dated before the 15th and 16th century. In this field, noteworthy was the contribution of the Turkologist Fr. Giese, who studied many anonymous chronicles, which, as noted, resembled each other, event that led him to the conclusion that they have a common origin<sup>116</sup>. These date from the years between 1490 and 1512. These were known to J. Leunclavius (Loewenklaue), from Verantio's Italian translation, and was included in his great work *Historiae musulmanae Turcorum de monumentis ipsorum exscriptae libri XVIII*, published in Frankfurt in 1591. Original source of Giese's Anonymous Chronicles – namely Verantianus' work interprets, as it is called by Leunclavius – is an older chronography, from which, the first known Ottoman historians Aşıkpaşazade and Neşri pumped material. According to J.H. Mordtmann, some of the anonymous chronicles, of the late 15th century, are Ruhi Edrenevi's works<sup>117</sup>.

Paul Vittek attempted to determine the relationship between the so-called Anonymus Giese, Aşıkpaşazade and Neşri<sup>118</sup>. He concluded that Neşri's global history,

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<sup>115</sup> Spandugino, ed. K.N. Sathas, *ibid.*, p. 139 l. 21 et seq.: “Vero è che lo invittissimo et vincitor di Constantinopoli sultan Mahemeth Ottomano non voleva per niente la casata loro esser discesa da pecorari venuti di Tartaria, come li historiographi Turchi dicono, ma dicea la casa loro esser discesa dallo imperator de Constantinopoli Comguino,” e.t.c. as in Frantzes. Leunclavius, *Pandectes historiae turcicae*, p. 103, quoting what Spandugino narrates, says that the version, according to which these were put into circulation by Mehmet II, seems probable. Even clear is J. Camerarius, *De rebus turcicis commentarii duo accuratissimi*, Francofurti 1598, p. 41, who says that Mehmet II was deliberately spreading that he descends from Isaac Comnenos, because he was ashamed of his humble origins. Cf Ch. Diehl, “La société byzantine à l' époque des Comnènes”, *Revue historique de sud-est Européen*, year 6 (1929) 7-9, pp. 232-233.

<sup>116</sup> Edited under the title *Die altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken*, Vol. I, text, Breslau 1922, - Vol. II trans., Leipzig 1925. See also Giese, “Einleitung zu meiner Textausgabe der altosmanischen anonymen Chroniken”, *MOG* Vol. I (1921-22), pp. 49-75.

<sup>117</sup> J.H. Mordtmann, “Ruhi Edrenevi”, *MOG* Vol. 2, pp. 129-136.

<sup>118</sup> “Zum Quellenproblem der ältesten osmanischen Chroniken”, *MOG* Vol. I, pp. 77-150. See also J.H. Mordtmann's review *Der Islam*, Vol. 13 (1923), pp. 152-169, and P. Vittek's article, “Neues zu Aşıkpaşazade” *MOG* Vol. II, pp. 147-164. See also F. Babinger, “*Chronologische Miscellen*”, *ibid.*, pp. 311-319, and F. Giese, “Zum literarischen Problem der frühosmanischen Chroniken”, *OLZ* Vol. 29 (1926), pp. 850-854.

whose sixth part refers to the Ottomans, was written around 1512 and was based on earlier texts. Aşıkpaşade's history dates back approximately to the year 1485 and survived until today in later collaboration by other authors. Wittek believes that Muhyeddin, Aşıkpaşazade's successor, and Neşri, pumped material from Aşıkpaşazade's original form, who said that was based on an oldest chronicler named Yahsi Fakih, whose work was not preserved<sup>119</sup>. This chronicler was the son of Sultan Orhan's imam.

World histories, like that of Neşri, were written in Persian by Şükrullah and in Arabic by Ibn Khaldun. The importance of the first work about the Ottoman history was stressed by Köprülü already from 1922<sup>120</sup>. This work, written in 1457, is the second in order of seniority, which provides information on the Ottomans. Ibn Khaldun is even older as he belongs to the years before 1402. In his work is included a very short but fascinating passage for the Ottomans, which was first noticed by Clement Huart and was published in French in his study about Gibbons' work<sup>121</sup>. Finally, F. Babinger discovered in the Bodleian Library of Oxford a manuscript containing the chronicle of Uruc Ibn Adil, which was written during the reign of the Conqueror<sup>122</sup>. It is therefore the oldest historical work about the Ottomans, after Ibn Khaldun and Şükrullah.

This purely literary work gave the opportunity to the researchers to study the value of the new discoveries. Unfortunately, both the chronichals and the general histories have doubtful value for the historian. Although they contain useful traditions, typically are characterized by childish naivety and are full of contradictions. At best they are inadequate monuments of a dark period of history.

The Moroccan traveler Abu Abd Allah Mohammed Ibn Battuta, whose travel memoirs were discovered in manuscripts in the middle of the 19th century, is more reliable than the chroniclers and historians<sup>123</sup>. Setting off from Tangier in 1324, Battuta

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<sup>119</sup> Hüseyin Namik wrote about this chronicler, *MOG* Vol. II, pp. 319-321.

<sup>120</sup> In his study "Bemerkungen zur Religionsgeschichte Kleinasien", *MOG* Vol. I, pp. 203-222. The part of Şükrullah about the Ottomans was issued in its original and also in German version by Th. Seif, *MOG* Vol. II, pp. 63-128.

<sup>121</sup> *Journal des Savants*, new series Vol. 15 (Apr. 1917), pp. 157-166. Shortly afterwards, R. Hartmann, without knowing Huart's work, he also dealt with this quote of Ibn Khaldun and edited a summary, *MOG* Vol. II, pp. 306-308.

<sup>122</sup> F. Babinger, *Die frühosmanischen Jahrbücher des Urudsch*, Hannover 1925. See also G. Bernstasser's review, *OLZ* Vol. 29 (1926), pp. 433-438. Afterwards, Babinger edited the *Διορθώσεις και Βελτιώσεις* [*Corrections and Improvements*], Hannover 1926.

<sup>123</sup> Edited with a translation in French by C. Defrémery and B. Sanguinetti, under the title *Voyages d' Ibn Batoutah*, Paris 1853-9, (4 volumes). The first volume was reprinted in 1893, the second and the third in

traveled in Asia Minor in 1333, visited the Courts of Turkish rulers and remained for quite a long time near them as a guest<sup>124</sup>. As he was eminently observant, he acquainted with persons and things and wrote about his travels in a sufficiently objective way. As regards the Ottomans of that period, his testimony is a particularly valuable source, which – unfortunately – was not known to von Hammer and, therefore, was not used by those many writers who faithfully followed the traces of this great Austrian scholar<sup>125</sup>. Even Gibbons himself, who pioneered the study of the Ottoman state and corrected many of the errors of previous researchers, does not utilize Ibn Battuta to a sufficient degree and, moreover, makes no reference to the union of Akhis that prototype Moslem organization, which, during the 14th century had great impact in Minor Asia things.

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1877, and the fourth in 1879. In Vol. II, pp. 255-355 is found the description of Asia Minor. Passages of the section about Asia Minor, translated in French by Defrémery; the first in 1851, entitled *Voyages d' Ibn Batoutah dans l' Asie Mineure*. About Ibn Battuta, remarkable is the article “The Travels of Ebn Batuta”, *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* Vol. 49 (No 307, May 1841), pp. 597-615. The article was written when the Arabic script was discovered. Until that time, Ibn Battuta was known by summaries of his travels, preserved in three manuscripts in the Library of the University of Cambridge. These summaries were translated in English by Stephen Lee, *The Travels of Ibn Batuta*, translated from the abridged Arabic manuscript copies, London 1829.

<sup>124</sup> The date 1333 is indicated by the editors of Ibn Battuta (*Voyages* Vol. II, p. xi). It is based on the traveler's information that, at the end of Ramadan 734 (May 1334) he was at the camp of the Sultan of the Uzbeks, from where he departed to Constantinople on the 10<sup>th</sup> of the month Šawwal (June 14, 1334). He visited the Sultan of the Uzbeks after Asia Minor. But, as the editors notice, the date 1333 is contradictory to Battuta's information that, during his visit to Constantinople “Tzirtzis”, who had resigned his throne in favor of “Takfur's son” and had become a monk, was in life (p. 427). Although this information is incorrect, its core is the dethronement of the elder Andronikos and the accession of his grandson Andronikos III. As we know, Andronikos the Elder died on February 13, 1332 (S. Lambros, «Ενθυμήσεων συλλογή πρώτη», *Νέος Ελλονομνήμων* Vol. 7 (1910), p. 140, chronicles No. 51 and 52). Therefore, the travel around the Asia Minor emirates must have been before 1332. But this reasoning depends on whether Ibn Battuta was aware of the contemporary dynastic and political events of Byzantium. It should also be considered that, in this case, this very investigative traveler didn't have the means to check and verify the truth, because he was in a foreign land, he had nothing common with the people of Constantinople and was very difficult to communicate and obtain accurate information. Due to this fact is the confusion as regards the founders of Hagia Sophia (p. 433). While, therefore, he is very precise in everything he himself saw in Constantinople, on the contrary, he fails when it comes to second-hand information. Hence, it is very easy to have misunderstood what was said in Constantinople about the clash of the two Andronikos, or to have missed regarding the names and to have fallen in chronological inaccuracies. In any attempt in determining the chronology of Ibn Battuta's Ottoman travel, the year 1331, when Nicaea was surrendered, must be considered as terminus post quem. On the arrival of the traveler at Nicaea, the city was for two years at the hands of the Ottomans. As terminus ante quem must be considered the end of the year 1333, because he mentions that, during his visit at Pergamon, sultan was Giaksi Khan (p. 315) and Balikesir was ruled by his son, Temir Khan (p. 317), while it is known from other sources that the emir of Karasu had died in 1333 and the rivalry of his sons gave rise to Orhan to intervene and annex the emirate. F. Babinger also admits the year 1333, but without any discussion, *ZDMG*, new series Vol. I (1922), p. 135.

<sup>125</sup> The two editions of *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* were released at 1827 and 1836, a few years before the discovery of the manuscript of Ibn Battuta. Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I, p. 191 και p. 357 f.n. A, doesn't know the Akhis as an association but, carried away by Idris, he considers them as aristocracy of wealth, confusing them with the *ayans*, namely the big landowners.

Şihabeddin al-Umari's (+1349) work under the title *Masalik al-absar fi mamalik al-amsar*, namely "Streets of the eyes at the Kingdoms of Various Countries" is an also valuable resource about Asia Minor of Orhan's time. It is a history and geography handbook for the merchants and politicians of his time<sup>126</sup>. Unlike his contemporary Ibn Battuta, al Umari never visited Asia Minor. He received his information from a Sheikh from the city Sivrihisar and also from Genoese renegade in Egypt. To the extent that can be verified, his information is mostly accurate regarding the Turkish emirates which succeed the Seljuk state.

A very significant source belongs to about the same time and comes from the pen of an eye witness, who, at the same time is one of the leading spiritual leaders of Byzantium's last period. This is the letter written by the great Metropolitane of Thessalonica Gregory Palamas, from his captivity in Bithynia. This text, which is extremely interesting as reading, is also of utmost importance for the study of the Ottoman state, but so far no one has taken it into account. The wise hierarch was traveling to Istanbul to reconcile Kantakuzenos with Palaiologos. While his ship was at Tenedos, an earthquake knocked down the walls of Gallipoli and opened the way for the Ottomans to establish on the European side of Hellespont. When the ship he was on arrived in front of Gallipoli the Turks were visible on the shores of the Thracian coast having dominated the straits. The fierce storm forced the captain to stop in the middle of the channel, so the Turks invaded by boats and captured the ship, taking prisoners the crew and the passengers. The prisoner Metropolitane was led from Lampsacus via Pige and Bursa, to Nicaea. Passing from Orhan's summer residence and - according to the desire of the sultan - he had a long discussion with Ottomans theologians, which was recorded in summary by Orhan's Greek physician Taronites, who was attending and did not fail to note the date ("month July ind. η' of the year ςωξγ" 6863 = 1355). The records of the "dialogue with the atheists Χιόνας" (apparently it is about the Akhis, a corruption of the word Akhiyan = Αχή, Χιών) as well as the letter of the bishop to the Thessalonians, were saved in a Code of Panteleimon Monastery on Mount Athos<sup>127</sup>.

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<sup>126</sup> The section of his work about Asia Minor was edited by F. Taeschner, *Al-Umari's Bericht über Anatolien*, Leipzig 1929. E. Quatremère translated passages of the work in *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, Vol. 13 (1838) pp. 151-384. The 5<sup>th</sup> chapter includes Asia Minor, pp. 334-381.

<sup>127</sup> The summary of the dialogue was published by A.I. Sakellion at "Σωτήρ" magazine Vol. 15 (1892), pp. 240-246 and the letter was copied by A. Adamandios for S. Lambros. It was published at *Νέος*

While the discussion records are primarily of theological interest, the letter enlightens the reader not only for the Ottomans but also for the condition of Hellenism in this recently conquered country.

Gregory Palamas, Ibn Battuta, al-Umari and their contemporary Byzantine and Eastern writers are unaware of the Ottoman myths that formed later. As for the Western historians, who, on the one hand and are beside the point (εκτός τόπου and χρόνου) on Turkish affairs and, on the other hand, are outside the influence of the 16th century's Ottoman writers<sup>128</sup> and follow a completely different direction in the research about the establishment of the Ottoman state. Most of them clearly reflect the rumor circulating in their time in Europe and admit that the royal house of the Ottomans hails from insignificant and obscure race which was brought to light by the circumstances. According to safer versions, Osman's father was a shepherd named Zich, who was distinguished in the courtyard of Sultan Alaeddin I' by dueling and killing a Byzantine knight who was considered invincible<sup>129</sup>. As a reward for his feat, the shepherd was appointed by the Sultan as garrison commander of Ottomanzich, from which he took the name Osman (Ottomanus)<sup>130</sup>. Although - prima facie - , this narrative seems simplistic and childish and confusing names, however, clearly comes up a point at which coincides the information of almost all the old Western authors and is also tacitly admit

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*Ελληνομνημόνων*, Vol. 16 (1922), pp. 7-21. Part of its information is found in a shorter letter, published in *ΔΙΕΕ*, Vol. 3 (1890), pp. 227-234. Prof. Gr. Papamichael, in his monography *Ο Άγιος Γρηγόριος Παλαμάς*, mentions briefly the captivity of the prelate, Alexandria, 1911, p. 142.

<sup>128</sup> The views of the Ottoman historians were spread in Europe by Leuclavius at the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>129</sup> Spandugino, *ibid.*, p. 138. Egnatius, *De origine Turcarum*, Paris 1539, p. 28. Donado da Lezze, *Historia turchesca*, ed. J. Ursu, p. 4. Giovio, *Commentarii delle cose de Turchi*, p. 3, and Sansovino, *Historia universal*, p. 216. Cuspinianus, *De Turcarum origine, religione et tyranide*, Lugduni Batavorum 1654, pp. 47-48. Ortelius, *Lleunclavius, Pandectes* p. 99. Lonicerus, *Cronicorum turcicorum*, Francofurti ad Moenum 1578, Vol. I, p. 10.

<sup>130</sup> Ottomanzich (Osmanğik), which is mentioned by Ibn Battuta, *ibid.*, p. 321, Ibn Khaldun, *Kitab el-ibar*, ed. Bulak, Vol. 5 p. 562 and A. Comnenos Ipsilantis, *Ta μετά την Άλωσιν*, pp. 13, 49, 270, is the diminutive of Osman. Ğik, here written zich, is obviously the diminutive suffix and couldn't be the name of a shepherd. S. de Sacy, *NE* Vol. 11 p. 56 f.n. 1, thought that it is corruption of the word *şeykh*, but given the information of Battuta, who mentions that Orhan was the son of Osmanğik (which means *little Osman* in Turkish), it is something baseless. As for the village Osmanğik, located South of Sinop, at the recent prefecture of Ğorum, while it was considered by Evliya (Vol. II, p. 95) as the birthplace of Osman, Cuspinianus (p. 47) writes: "Ottomanzich, quod a Prusia Trapezuntem versus sex dierum distabat, a se capto sic dictus Ottomanus». For this reason, these must be conferred by those written by Hađi Kalfa, namely that Osmanğik took its name because it was conquered by a 10th-century Turkish general called Osman. See A. D. Mordmann, "Die Dynastie der Danischmende", *SDMG*, Vol. 30 (1870), pp. 467-486.

by the first Byzantine historians, that, namely, the father of Ottoman state's founder was coming from the lower social strata<sup>131</sup>.

However, the most distinguished writers of the West, including John Kospinianos [Spiesshaymer], who occupies a special position among them, highlight the protagonists' normal evolution, although sometimes cite the myths that may know reluctantly. The writer, referring to the appearance of the Ottomans and the establishment of their hegemony, writes: "nec unus dux illis, nec certum imperium. Vagi, dispalatique, quoue cuique fors affuit, latrocinantes magis quam belligerantes, provincias vastarunt. Is [Ottornannus] obscuro loco et parentibus agrariis<sup>132</sup> natus, virtute ac calliditate singulari, conflata per seditionem manu, circumferre turcica coepit arma, in suae gentis homines non minus infestus, quam in nostros"<sup>133</sup>.

Cuspinianus also cites the opinion of another senior author, Nicolaus Euboicus, whose work, entitled 'De origine et rebus gestis Turcarum' and published in 1496 in Naples, is now very rare. This author says the following about the first Ottomans: "Hi parva manu primo, latronum more, clandestinis quibusdam excursionibus ac insultibus, vires vindicare conati sunt. Confluentesque subinde (ut fit) hujusmodi generis hominum multitudine, occupatis opportunis quibusdam montibus claustrisque, unde per occasiones facile irruptiones fieri possent, usque adeo emergerunt ac sublatis animis, ut palam jam, et pari Marte, adversus finitimos de agri possessione certare non vererentur ..."<sup>134</sup>.

That this opinion, namely about Osman's opportunistic origin, during the years of the Fall (of Constantinople), was the most prevalent in the West, comes out from those written by Lonicerus<sup>135</sup>, who, almost twenty years before Leunclavius, published a compilation (σύνπλημα) of the best known works, which dealt with issues about the Ottoman state. Especially for the historiographers of his time, Lonicerus states the

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<sup>131</sup> Leunclavius (*Pandectes* p. 102) says that Osman's father was called *Delis* by the Turks [deli, Turk.= crazy]... "propterea quod stulte temerarius et infimae condicionis homo fuerit".

<sup>132</sup> From the context arises that, here, the word *agrarius*, indicates the boulder, the uncivilized and not the rural who farms. Instead of *agrarius* we would expect the word *agrestis*, whose rendition is closer to what the author wants to tell. However, Donado da Lezze (p. 4), without knowing the sources he relies on, he mentions that Osman's supposed father Zich was "villano, arator, et zappatore di terra".

<sup>133</sup> Cuspinianus, *De Trurcarum origine* p. 13. The first edition of his writing was done in 1541. The writer is characterized by Boeclerius (*Commentarius* p. 72) as "homo eruditione et iudicio praestantissimus".

<sup>134</sup> Cuspinianus, p. 9. It seems that N. Euboicus follows the even older Sagundinus, whose work was written in 1476 and published by J. Ramus under the title *Othomanorum familia*, Vienna 1551. Euboicus' aforementioned passage is found, almost verbatim, on p. 10 (according to our numbering).

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

following: "Plerique obscuro eum [Ottomannum] genere parentibusque agrariis natum, singulari virtute et calliditate ad summum imperii fastigium evektum esse afferent.... De ortu huius Ottomanni auctores inter se dissentiunt. Nicolaus vero Euboicus, Saguntinus Episcopus et Baptista Egnatius Ottomannum scribunt exigui census obscurique inter privatos nominis, ex collectitio gregarioque milite, manu non exigua per seditionem conflata passim grassari coepisse, nec solum Christianos, sed etjam suae gentis homines sine discrimine oppressisse. Huic subscribit Andreas a Lucuna, qui Ottomannum liumili quidem loco natum ait, sed egregie postea genus suum nobilitasse".

Only Andreas Cambini, who wrote in the first half of 16th century, attaches aristocratic origin to the founder of the Ottoman dynasty, but, without supporting this view on historical data. Moreover, Cambini also mistakes the year of Osman's emergence, but we cannot eliminate the possibility that this error was due to the publishers, who, according to the custom of that time, after the first edition, from manuscript, uncritically and unconsidered, were reprinting the older forms. Otherwise, Cambini's information broadly coincides with those of the aforementioned Western historians. "Et cosi sendosi retti per lungo tempo», says Cambini<sup>136</sup>, "levatosi tra loro intorno a gli anni della gratia 1330 un certo Ottomano, huomo fra turchi di gran nobilta e di mediocre ricchezza, ma d'ingegno molto sagace e d'animo grande, messosi sotto con arte e con destrezza un numero di huomini arditi e cupidi di mutar conditione, comincio da principio (il che sapeva allo universale esser grato) a mostar con le scorrerie e con le rapine i paesi de Christiani a loro vicini et accrescendo al continovo usando liberalita grandissima per la dolcezza del guadagno, di seguito e di riputatione; poi che si vide sotto uno essercito di huomini: che volendo vivere in licentia di tutte lo cose: erano per accompagnarlo in qualunque imprese; havendo destinato nell' animo di volersi fare appresso de suoi Signore, cominciò appertamente a perseguitar con la guerra quelli che alla voglia sua si oppone vano. Nellaqual impresa fu aiutato assai dalla discordia e disunione che era fra capi e rettori di quella natione, pirche valutosi delle discordie loro, andandole continovamente accrescendo, col nutrirle et tenerle vive, dava hora favore a uno e hora all 'altro, di maniera che havendoli consumati et indeboliti non furono poi bastanti quando si rivolsero contro di loro con le forze a poter li contradire, e per questa via occupato appresso de suoi la tirannide li bastò l'animo, insignoritosi della

maggior parte de paesi loro, di intitolarsi Signore dell 'Asia Minore. Venuto poi Ottomano a morte, lascio successore del Regno Orcanne suo figliuolo, ilquale seguitare le vestigie del padre, non solo conservò l'Imperio lasciatoli ma grandemente l'accrebbe". According to them, Osman assembled vigorous men who wanted to change the status quo and, with them, was carrying out raids against the Christian countries. He was treating his followers liberally and in good faith, so the attraction of profit, wealth and fame was contributing to the accession of new staff in the ranks of his forces. To the achievement of his objectives also contributed the partition of the rivals, which was utilized by the Ottomans. In this way, Osman seized power and was proclaimed to master of Asia Minor (sic). After his death, his son Orhan ascended the throne, followed the footsteps of his father and not only kept the state fully in force, but significantly increased it.

Summarizing, we note that based on the information of most western historians, Osman raises through the crowd of the obscures, at first he was distinguished as a raider and finally, thanks to his virtues - but aided by the circumstances, becomes a dynasty founder. Given that the contemporary with the events Byzantines (Pachymeres, Nikiforos Gregoras, Gregory Palamas, etc.) do not mention anything contrary to these while the Ottomans who also wrote for the Osman's genealogy are his posteriors for approximately two centuries, we may admit that the above version, which is the simplest is probably the most likely. The historical significance of the testimonies mentioned above can be taken seriously. Sagundinus (or Secundinus) is one of the oldest and most conscientious Western writers who have dealt with the Ottomans<sup>137</sup>. Similarly, Nicolaus Euboicus and Egnatius are contemporary or earlier (Παλαιότεροι) than the Ottoman historians and seems very likely that they had in mind earlier sources. Therefore it is surprising that the Western authors mentioned above did not receive more attention from those who had dealt with the Ottoman issue.

Of course, many of the Westerners who wrote about the Ottomans are influenced by the spirit of their times, a spirit of intolerance and hostility towards

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<sup>136</sup> See Sansovino, *Historia universale*, Venice 1568, p. 149n. The year 1330 appears at any version of Sansovino, that we were able to consult.

<sup>137</sup> A. Cambini (see Sansovino, *ibid.*, p. 149n) characterizes Sagundinus as follows: "huomo moldo dotto, cosi nella lingua greca come nella Latina, e che delle historie antiche et moderne havena gran notitia per essersi in quelle lungo tempo essercitato, e per havere aggiunto alla lettione la esperientia del vedere i luoghi presentialmente havento cerco gran parte terra habitat".

Muslims, particularly as the constant vigor of the Ottoman power was sowing fear in Europe. It is also true that a significant number of these works, which were written by clergymen and others, had a quasi-crusade character, and served to create a fighting power against Mohammedanism<sup>138</sup>. However, as regards the older historians, and especially those who, either because of the distance or other reasons, didn't write under the State of tourkofobia, we can admit that those they account are free from the drawbacks of the Ottoman sources and, as for their reliability, they can be compared with the most important of the Byzantine sources. Although they lived far away from the events, these historians often interject information that is closer to the truth. Some of them explicitly admit that they were aware of the oral traditions circulating among the Ottomans in their time, while others, such as Theodore Kantakouzenos Spandonis [Spandugino] who was born and lived in Constantinople, undoubtedly had in mind sources prior to Nesri and Idris, which was also closer to reality, as they were derived from simpler societies and was free from the poetic load of later eras.

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<sup>138</sup> One of the last works of this school is entitled *Arca temporum mundi reserata, oder Der Welt eröffnete Zeit-und Geschicht Beschreibung bergreifend Perturbatum, das ist: Die Tyrannisirungs-Zeit der Ottomannischen Porten*, by a certain Filon Kosmografos, Augsburg 1693. The author also puts poems in between; among them, the following, about Osman, is the most characteristic (p. 5):

Ich bin der Ottomann, ein Sohn dess Ertucul,  
 Ein Enckel Solymann, erregt vom Hoellen-Pful,  
 Zu fuehren offne Krieg, die Christen zu bestreiten,  
 Den Magog zu mir fueg, sie in den Staub zu reiten,  
 Durch Brand, Mord, Raub und Wut, ein Forcht zu jagen ein,  
 Dass sie mit Leib und Gut mein Untergebne seyn;  
 Das Schwarz und weisse Meer, sampt Cappadocien,  
 Greifft an mein grimmig Heer, wie auch Bythinien,  
 Klein-Asien darzu; mir folgt mein Sohn Orchan,  
 Damit ja sey kein Ruh auf disem Krieges-Plan.

It should be noted that older Western authors overestimate the extent of Osman's conquests. Donado da Lezze (p. 4) mentions the champion of the Ottomans had occupied the following lands: Ruim [wr. Rum], Rota [Rhodes?], Sivas [Sevasteia], Bacan [=?], Oppolenia [Apollonia], Tripoli, Fenosia [Foinike!] "et altri luoghi". Richerius, *De rebus Turcarum*, p. 11, states: "Circiter MCCC Ottomannus... summam imperii... occupavit, seseque Asiae minoris sive Anatoliae imperatorem nominare sit aggressus. Syvam, quae eadem cum Sebaste est, expugnavit et oppida ad Euxinum poisita non pauca cepit". Lennelavius (*Historiae* p. 121) writes down the tradition that Iconium, Magnensia, Heraclea, Ankyra, Sivrihisar, Kütahya etc, were granted to Osman. Camerarius, who usually follows Leunclavius, writes on p. 21: "occupavit autem primum loca quaedam in Ponto et mox Sebasten...". The *Βραχύ Χρονικόν* 5 of S. Lambros – K. Amandos' collection (p. 8) mentions Osman as conqueror of Bithynia, Kappadocia and Asia. This chronicle was written in 1535.

The existence of such sources at the times of the Fall is clearly mentioned by both Spandugino<sup>139</sup> and Franzis in their words about Osman's origin. The first one writes<sup>140</sup>: "Poi altre opinioni de scrittori Christiani, si Greci come Latini, hanno involuppata la cosa, et descriveno la origine della casa Ottomana in varii et diversi modi, io voglio più presto dar fede a più et più historiographi Turchi li quali vogliono la casa Ottomana esser discesa da quel villano pazzo venuto da pecorari venuti di Tartaria dalla nation de Ogus che amazzò il cavallier Greco ... »

Frantzis says that he had consulted written sources on Osman's genealogy<sup>141</sup>. As it is known that Frantzis finished writing his Chronicle "Χρονικό" in 1478, the sources that he is referred couldn't be what had been written by the Ottomans at the late 15th or the early 16th century, which survived until our days. From Frantzis' writings it becomes undeniable that there were other earlier historians, whose works, if they had been saved today, would have the greatest importance, as they would be completing the meager information of the Byzantines and the writings of the Ottomans which have rich poetic exaltation and mythical narratives, but they are poor in historical evidence. Therefore, undeniable is the importance of works as these of Spandugino, Cuspinianus, Nicolaus Euboicus, Egnatius etc., which are based on these lost sources. Researchers who at the example of Hammer, ignored the Western writers and unilaterally turned to the Ottomans and the Byzantines, committed an error that hurt history much.

The only one of the contemporaries who did not ignore the Western writers, arguing that their information is not completely rejected, is H.A. Gibbons. This daring historian questioned the credibility of the narratives of the surviving Ottoman sources on the origins of the Ottoman house, developing his own view, which is short but convincing<sup>142</sup>.

Gibbons says that, if Suleiman-Shah was a real person, then, as head of 50,000 families<sup>143</sup>, he would have been great political factor in the region of Mahan, Erzurum (the Byzantine Theodosiupolis) or Erzican, where it is rumored that he moved at the

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<sup>139</sup> Sathas has already written about the fact that Spandugino knew byzantine and old Ottoman works, that aren't preserved today, *Documents inédits* Vol. 9, pp. XVI-XVII.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 139 l. 33.

<sup>141</sup> A' 18 p. 73: "and all the writings we have studied about this genealogy".

<sup>142</sup> *The Foundation*, pp. 265-267. Köprülü rejects completely the Ottoman myths (*Les origines* pp. 19, 29), but, in order to reach at others, that are in complete opposition to Gibbons concusions.

<sup>143</sup> Aşikpaşazade, ed. Constantinopolis and ed. Giese p. 3. Nešri, *SXMG* Vol. 13, p. 188. Leunclavius (*Historiae* p. 95) mentions that Suleyman had a thousand followers.

years of Alaentín A'. However, when Mohhamed-en Nesawi<sup>144</sup> writes that, the sultan of Chorasmias (Hivas) Celaleddin, known as Khârezm-sâh Ğelal ed-din Mankobirti at the Eastern sources, wintered with his army at Mahan in 1229, does not mention anything associated with Suleiman and his followers. If they were living at Mahan or at that region, the Turks of Suleiman Shah would have been under Celaleddin's sovereignty, because these lands belonged to him. But, when Celaleddin was fighting against the sultan of Iconium Alaentín A' Kaikompat and was losing the battle at the plateau of Mahan, Suleiman's Turks, who were amounting to such a large number, would never be idle. If they actually were living at those places, their presence would certainly have been perceived by both Celaleddin and his historian, Mohammed-en-Nesawi.

When the Sultan of Khwarasm reached to Erzincan and plundered the surrounding region, he didn't observe numerous nomads who could belong to the tribe of Suleiman-Sah. Erzurum is stated to belong to Rouknentín, Alaentín's cousin, who conducted two fronts fight against Iconium and Khwarasm<sup>145</sup>. In this fight, Ertuğrul's cavalymen could offer valuable service, but their presence is not felt at any point in the narrative of events, not only by Mohammed-en-Nesawi and Sihabeddin al-Umari<sup>146</sup>, but also by the almost contemporary Seljuk chronicler Ibn Bibi<sup>147</sup>, who wrote in 1282. Gibbons argues that the complete lack of such information may reasonably be regarded as reinforcing the hypothesis that Suleiman Shah and his followers were neither present in Mahan nor in Erzurum, or nearby, at the time which is suggested by the Ottoman historians. Gibbons's opinion is reinforced by the fact that before Tamerlane came into conflict with Bayezid I, called the Ottoman sultan child of obscure ancestors and that the Ottoman, in his response was limited to brag about his own and his father's accomplishments, passing implicitly the insult about his humble origin<sup>148</sup>.

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<sup>144</sup> *Histoire du Sultan Djelal ed-din Mankobirti, prince du Kharezem, traduit de l' arabe par O. Houdas*, Paris 1895, pp. 374, 392, 394, 399, 407.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 306, 328-329.

<sup>146</sup> *NE* Vol. 13 (1838), pp. 151-384, especially pp. 230-334, where is mentioned Turkestan, Khwarezm, the country of the Qipchaqs, the Kurds, etc.

<sup>147</sup> The only manuscript of Ibn Bibi's Selçukname tou Ibn Bibi lays at the Hagia Sophia Library (No. 2985). A summary written from an unknown hand, was published by M. Th. Houtstina, *Recueil de textes relatifs à l' histoire des Seldjoudes*, Vol. 4, Leyde 1902. Even older is the Russian version of P. Melioranski, *VV*, Vol. 1 (1894), pp. 613-640. Lately there was a Turkish version of the Seljuq historian by M. N. Gençosman and F.N. Uzluk, *İbni Bibi, Anadolu Selcuk Devleti Tarihi*, Ankara 1941.

<sup>148</sup> "Autobiography" of Timur, *Institutes Politiques et militaires de Tamerlan*, trans. L. Langlès, Paris 1787, p. 260. Also, Ali Şereffedin, trans. P. Pétis de la Croix, *Histoire de Timourbec, connu sous le nom du Gran Tamerlan, empereur des Mongols et Tartares*, Paris 1722, Vol. III, pp. 259-263, cf Gibbons, *The Foundation*, p. 267.

In this way, Gibbons shook the historians' faith in the Ottoman sources and suggested the need, the first European writers to be studied. These writers, who either were exhibiting scientific claims or were simply passionate, should not be ignored by the researchers because they constitute the necessary complement of the Ottomans and the Byzantines and in many cases are very close to the historical truth.

In the early 18th century, when the Ottoman Empire had obviously started showing the signs of decline and the risk for Europe was minimized, the Ottoman history ceased to be timely and was no longer causing the interest of the researchers' majority. At the same time appears the first scientific research which begins with the literate ruler of Moldova Demetrie Cantemir (1673-1723) and culminates a century later with the imposing figure of Joseph von Hammer (1774-1856). His work, though today is considered obsolete, is still the most fundamental monument of the Ottoman historiography. Hammer knew well most of the Turkish chronicles. Fifty sources are listed in the first volume of his history, however, since then, only five of them had been used by European scholars<sup>149</sup>. His work constitutes an inexhaustible source of knowledge about the Ottoman Empire throughout the course of acme. However, not always is possible to be argued that this monumental work meets the modern scientific claims. Regarding the issue of the first Ottomans, Hammer is satisfied with a simple but coherent narrative of events, based on the previously known sources. In general, Hammer's work is followed by the larger proportion of the later historians, who constitute one, somehow, special school around him. But both Hammer's followers and the much more noteworthy Zinkeisen and Jorga who write general Histories, studied only superficially the thorny problem of the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, perhaps because they hasten to draw away from that, as the ancient mariners did from the Simpligades rocks in order to sail to calmer waters. Of the few who have extensively dealt with this issue, deserving special mention is Gibbons and M.F Köprülü, who represent two very opposing views that, more or less, can be summarized as follows:

Gibbons starting from the assumption that the Ottoman nation was established ad loc through merger of the existing native elements with the Turkmen nomads and

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<sup>149</sup> Langer and Blake, *AHR*, Vol. 37, p. 468. Also, F. Baninger, "Die türkischen Studien in Europa bis zum Auftreten Joseph von Hammer-Purgstalls", *Die Welt des Islam*, Vol. 7 (1919), pp. 103-129. Additions by C. Ausserer, *Der Islam*, Vol. 12 (1922), p. 226 ff.

concludes that the Ottoman Empire does not have eastern but more likely a Byzantine-European origin, particularly because it was in Europe where it gained its military strength and prestige and subdued Minor Asia<sup>150</sup>. The Moslem religion, which was embraced by both conquerors and conquered, was the main binding factor, responsible for the creation of national consciousness and military momentum, merely things that emerged as the basic characteristics of the Ottomans during their heyday<sup>151</sup>. Wanting to reinforce this theory, Gibbons - inter alia - invokes the fact that the Moslem people of the Empire never called themselves Turkish, but always "Ottoman» (Osmanli), from the name of the state's founder, obstinately insisting on this distinction<sup>152</sup>.

Köprülü, from his part, argues that the term Osmanli rather than ethnological has administrative sense<sup>153</sup>, characterizes the Ottoman Empire as Turkish, both in terms of race and culture<sup>154</sup>. Dissident to Gibbons argues that during the late 13th century the Turkish races /tribes who lived within the territory of the Seljuk state was the predominant element in western Asia Minor and flourished quantitatively and qualitatively, developing their own national culture, without the contribution of the earlier / older residents.

Köprülü rejects the Ottoman narratives mentioned by the old Ottoman writers and simplifies things, saying that Ertogroul and Osman's race which was small in

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<sup>150</sup> *The Foundation*, pp. 78-81.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 25-29.

<sup>152</sup> At this point are coincided the comments of other writers, older and younger. Thus, i.e. Evliya (trans. Hammer, Vol. II, p. 241) refers to the Turks as if they were a separate nation, inferior to the Ottomans: "Although its inhabitants are Turks, *Turbalı Göylük* [Τουρμπαλή Γκιουλούκ] is a nice village", etc. The Armenian Mouradja d' Ohsson, who was born in Constantinople and lived his life there as a secretary of the Swedish Embassy, a few years before the French Revolution wrote: on emploie la denomination du *turc* à l'égard d' un home brutal et grossier... et ils ne conçoivent pas pourquoi en Europe on les appelle *Turcs*. Comme ils attachment à ce mot l' idée de l' insulte la plus marquee, aucun étranger dans l' Empire ne se permet jamais de la pfoférer", *Tableau général de l' Empire Othoman*, Vol. 4, p. 373. Sir Harry Luke, who had deep knowledge of the Turkish history, writes: "The Turk envisaged his state as a geographical unit imperial and comprehensive in character, with an impress that was Islamic and to some extent also Christian, but was so little Turkish that the name *Turk* actually found no place in its designations". *The Making of Modern Turkey*, London 1936, p. 9. The Hungarian Orientalist Herman Vambéry, who made great efforts for the spiritual union of the Turkish people, realized – during his stay in Istanbul – that the Ottomans were upset when they were equated with "nomadic people", because, for them, Turk meant an inferior nation. – *Das Türkenvolk*, Leipzig 1885, p. 612. Cf also F. Taeschner, *OLZ*, Vol. 42 (1939), p. 78. The name *Turk* began to prevail since the Tanzimat period and onwards, and was resulted from the arise of racial nationalism and the reaction against non-Turkish elements. Officially, it was established in 1923, when the Turkish Republic was proclaimed.

<sup>153</sup> *Les origins*, p. 14.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100: "L' état ottoman a été cutièrement fondé, au XIVE siècle, par l' élément turc".

number, had penetrated into Asia Minor with the first Seljuks and was established for three centuries at the border of the Byzantine State around Dorylaion (Eskisehir)<sup>155</sup>. According to him, the Ottomans were the early fighters of the Turkish Mohammedanism and their position in relation to the Seljuk State was similar to that of the Byzantines Akriton. According to him, the Ottomans were sufficiently developed in terms of political organization, so, taking advantage of the Byzantine Empire's collapse and relying on their own strength and vitality, they were imposed as masters of the situation.

At first sight, Köprülü's theory seems very probably, but we must admit that it is not based on historical monuments. Lacked evidence can be described as a brilliant effort which placed the issue within the framework of Turkish nationalism.

Köprülü's certain aspects, especially those relating the importance of the Turkish factor, expressed more or less in some studies published between the two World Wars.

The first is the work of Fr. Giese<sup>156</sup>, entitled "*Das Problem der Entstehung des Osmanischen Reiches*". The author, following the same directions with Köprülü, wants to exposit the foundation of the Ottoman State as a purely Turkish phenomenon. Showing absolutely no convincing evidence, claims that the mastermind Ottomans belonged to the Akhi's organization and, by the influence of the Brotherhood on the one hand and, Osman's personal virtues on the other, was shaped the living material which laid the Empire's cornerstones. According to Giese, Osman's followers, while having Moslem and Turkish consciousness, had a priori national mission awareness, which was displayed in practice by the conquest of the Byzantine provinces.

Of course, the complicated issue of the establishment of the Ottoman State is impossible to be adequately studied within the narrow limits of an article and the author admits that some further as far as they don't bank on written documents, clearly have the character of personal perceptions. However, Giese's article, released in Turkish translation<sup>157</sup>, enjoyed great response among the Turkish intellectuals.

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>156</sup> Eds. *ZSem*, Vol. II (1924), pp. 246-271.

<sup>157</sup> See *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, Vol. I (1925), pp. 151-177.

Apart from Giese, the Turkish view is supported by the professors W.L. Langer and R.P. Blake in their aforementioned study<sup>158</sup>. In contrast to Gibbons, the two authors accept the information of the old Ottoman historians, according to which Ertogroul received as fief the area around Söğüt, as the leader of one of the many Turkish groups penetrated into Asia Minor, probably pushed to the West by the Mongol advance. The fact that the area around Söğüt was granted to Ertogroul by the sultan, may be considered certain, because, otherwise can not be considered how he occupied, with his own wishes, one of the most important and best guarded areas - the borders of the Byzantine Empire - to settle nomadic and semi-nomadic populations<sup>159</sup>. Initially rested on these nomads (the number 50,000 should not be literally adopted), the Ottomans established their emirate at the same time the Seljuk State was collapsing. The Akhi brotherhoods, which not only had economic importance as guilds but were also deploying political and probably military action, provided them the men for the conquest of Bithynia. Thanks to them, without great difficulty, was conducted the Islamization of a significant part of the country, where - according to the writers – throughout the Middle Ages<sup>160</sup>, Hellenism was sparse and fictitious. The brotherhoods contributed to the subjugation of the cities and the administrative organization<sup>161</sup>. Over the years, while their forces were reinforced by new arrivals from Central Asia, the Byzantine State was steadily declining, so that the Ottoman, by taking advantage of their favorable position, to be able to expand their rule to the last corner of the Byzantine Asia Minor.

Langer and Blake tend to accept Giese's opinion Giese that Osman belonged to the ranks of the Akhis. The same view is also adopted by J.H. Kramers<sup>162</sup>, who develops his own theory about the origin of the first Ottomans. According to his assertions, Osman wasn't the son of the nomads' leader Ertogroul, who came from the East, but being an Akhi and settled in Osmancık, joined Ertogroul, when he happened to pass by this town. In the old correlation between Osman and the village Osmantzik, which, as we have seen previously, was introduced by the Western historians of the Renaissance

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<sup>158</sup> *AHR*, Vol. 37 (1932), pp. 468-505.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 490.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 481, 497, 503, 505.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 505.

<sup>162</sup> *AO*, p. 6 (1928), pp. 242-254.

and Evliya, in our years was brought back by Clement Huart<sup>163</sup>. Based on this view, Kramers claimed that Osman is likely to have taken his name from the town that, since the early 13th century, was known as Osmancık and, during the time of the first Ottomans Οσμανιδών, was center of vigorous religious life and Muslim organizations hearth. As Kramers supports, not infrequently, toponyms were appearing as names of persons and, under this spirit, interprets Ibn Battuta's information<sup>164</sup>, that Orhan's father was named Osmancık. The confusion that prevails among the old παλαιών chroniclers concerning the names of Ertogroul's sons, leads Kramers to the conclusion that Osman wasn't Ertogroul's son. In addition, the name Osman, which has Arabic origins and Muslim past, seems foreign to the names of the other sons of Ertogroul, which are definitely Turkish. According to Kramers, Osman was the spiritual leader of Ertogroul's followers.

But, this new theory also lacks a positive basis, as Köprülü noticed<sup>165</sup>, while Kramers also did not insist on his views in his later articles in the Islamic Encyclopedia.

Paul Wittek also wanted to highlight the spiritual factor in the relations between the first Ottomans<sup>166</sup>. In a study published in 1936 and in three lectures held next year at the University of London<sup>167</sup>, supported that the founders of the Ottoman State were Ghazi who inspired by missionary spirit turned against the Byzantine Empire, because they wanted to exterminate the religion of the infidels. Repulsing the hitherto known information on the genealogy and origin of the house of Osman, which considers contradictory and which, as it is well known, are posterior, Wittek considers that the first organization of the Ottomans was not racial but ideological. That is, Ertogroul and Osman didn't act as race leaders but as the leaders of a group of border warriors. At this point he disagrees with Köprülü, who accepts the results of Houtsma<sup>168</sup> and Marquart's<sup>169</sup> studies, according to which the Ottomans Οσμανίδες belonged to the

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<sup>163</sup> *JA*, 11<sup>th</sup> series, Vol. 9 (1917), pp. 345-350.

<sup>164</sup> See above, f.n. 55.

<sup>165</sup> *Les origins*, p. 83.

<sup>166</sup> "Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum", *Byzantion*, Vol. 11 (1936), pp. 285-319, particularly pp. 302-305, 310-313.

<sup>167</sup> "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire" (*Royal Asiatic Society Monographs*, Vol. 23), London 1938.

<sup>168</sup> "Die Ghusenstämme», *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Vol. II(1885), pp. 219-233.

<sup>169</sup> "Über die Herkunft der Osmanen", where is also found the second supplement of the study of "Über das Volkstum der Komanen", *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, Phil. Hist. Klasse", new series, Vol. 13 (1914), pp. 25-240.

Kayi tribe of the Oguz Turkish nation. Wittek<sup>170</sup> rejects the old historical traditions which show the Ottomans' nomadic character, claiming that the nomads came later and did not exert much influence on the events course. In the wording of his theory, is based on the poet Ahmedi, who in his epos *İskendernâme* (at about 1400) introduces the first Ottomans as Ghazi. Likewise, based on the ancient Turkish inscription of Bursa (1337), in which Orhan is referred as "Sultan, son of the Ghazi's Sultan, Ghazi, Ghazi's son, despot of the horizon, hero of the universe"<sup>171</sup>.

However, the title of Ghazi awarded to the Ottoman sultans from the older historians does not prove that the Ottomans was not organized as a racial group, and no Muslim army that could justify Wittek's opinion is mentioned by the contemporary writers before 1301. But then, as before, the Ottoman operations were designed for looting and not for the enforcement of the Moslem religion or the extermination of Christianity. Moreover, during the conquest of Bithynia, which occurred gradually and lasted for about half a century, were missing displays of religious fanaticism that would be natural to characterize an army consisting of Ghazi, who were struggling to eliminate the Christian religion. Furthermore, Wittek himself also notes that "the fact that the Ottomans were adapted to the culture of the country against which were raiding, was rendering easier the massive accession of [Byzantine] Akritas (defenders of the borderland) and the wilful surrender of forts and small towns"<sup>172</sup>. "Only the superficial Byzantine nuance was disappeared and replaced by the Islamic. The native underlay remained intact"<sup>173</sup>. The importance of this underlay is very important because, the expansion of the Ottomans in Europe without the cooperation of the indigenous inhabitants of Bithynia is very difficult to explain. On the part of Ahmedi, must be noted that, as a poet who was inspired by the spirit of Islam, often diagnose an ongoing heroic struggle for the faith of the Prophet.

To summarize the above, we notice that, after Gibbons, those who studied the Ottoman issue, considered the establishment of the Ottoman State as a product of Mohammedanism's militant force, which was represented by the Turkish element in Asia Minor.

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<sup>170</sup> *The Rise*, p. 33.

<sup>171</sup> Originally, it was published by Ahmed Tevhid, *TOEM*, Vol. 5 (1330/1914) – 29, pp. 318-320.

<sup>172</sup> *The Rise*, p. 42.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

In any case, from this brief review of the sources and ancillaries, arises that the issue of the Ottoman State's foundation is actually very difficult. The factors that contributed to the shaping of this state are numerous and complex. Moreover, the specific conditions the people in Bithynia were living under, the terrain and the geographic terms/ conditions in total, the political and social ferment that was breaking out in this country, as well as overall economic, financial and psychological factors, were the main causes for the establishment and the first evolution of the Ottoman Emirate. Likewise, we shouldn't underestimate the particular importance of the influence of Byzantium and the Byzantine institutions over the first Ottomans. Byzantium offered both to the Ottomans and the other neighboring nations, ample evidence of culture, which, over time, assimilated to such a degree of completeness, that were considered by these various nations as their own property; because, in history, general phenomenon is, when nations come into contact, the most advanced lends more culture elements, while the higher the standard of living is, the greater is the influence that it exercises to the neighbor. However, in particular, the Ottoman State which geographically was too close to Byzantium and was established on lands that just a few decades ago was the Empire's bastion and citadel, inevitably could not escape the influence of the senior Byzantine culture that had scattered its radiance for almost a thousands years. The influence of Byzantium on the Ottoman things can be found in every display of public and private life, in administration, army, justice, economy, art, the livelihood occupations, in customs and practices. For all these reasons, we have to accept that, the relationship between the Ottomans and the Byzantines extremely influenced the establishment and development of the Ottoman State and, therefore, the development of Osman's and Orhan's state, should be studied in parallel with the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, since these two major events are interrelated and interdependent.

## I. BITHYNIA IN THE LATE 13TH CENTURY

Towards the end of the 13th century, the northwestern part of Asia Minor, which formerly was the field of violent conflicts between the Seljuk State and Byzantium, had ceased focusing the attention of both of them, and was going through a period of stagnation and decline. Already half a century ago, the battle of Köseadağ (1243) caused the crash of the Seljuk Empire of Ikonion (Konya), which, having now lost its independence had essentially passed to the hands of Genghis-Khan's successors, who ruled via commissioners as a tributary<sup>174</sup>.

Since then, according to Neşri's expression, "only the name of the Seljuk kings was kept"<sup>175</sup>. The Mongols, after having consolidated their rule in Konya, they couldn't or were unwilling to fight for the territorial unity of the collapsing Seljuk State, restoring its previous territorial extent, by subordinating the parts that had become autonomous. The Byzantines, this time, for reasons we will display below, made no serious effort to regain Asia Minor taking advantage of the opportunity presented. The times of Herakleios and Nikephoros Fokas had long gone for ever. The Mongolian hordes had entered the Asia Minor peninsula, spreading destruction everywhere, but as genuine invaders withdrew or were scattered here and there, without making any effort to settle and organize the country. As there was no other ruler that could succeed the Byzantines or the Seljuks, Asia Minor was the ground proper for the creation of a state assembly by a nation who would demonstrate organizational capacity and assimilative power that would be essential to subdue and bind its various heterogeneous elements. That being the case, it was natural, since the mid-13th century, the various lords or adventurers of the border provinces and cities to want to undermine the dominance of

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<sup>174</sup> Acropolites, *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 65 (p. 138 l. 16 et seq., ed. A. Heisenberg) and 69 (p. 144 l. 15 et seq.). Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Παλαιολόγος* B' 24 p. 129. Aksaraylı Kerimeddin Mahmud, *Müsamerat-al-ahyar* (History of the Seljuqs and the neighbouring countries, written in Persian in the 14<sup>th</sup> century), Turkish trans. by M. Nuri Gençosman, with comments of F.N. Uzluk, Ankara 1943, pp. 130, 139-140. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen-âge*, Vol. I, p. 534. Hammer, *Ιστορία*, Vol. I, p. 39. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. I, p. 134. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der islamischen Völker und Staaten*, p. 234. İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatına Medhal*, Istanbul 1941, p. 83. Prof. N. Bees has written a short but very valuable overview on the last years of the Seljuq State, *Die Inschriftenaufzeichnung des Kodex Sinaiticus Graecus 508 (976) und die Maria-Spiläotissa-Klosterkirche bei Sille (Lykaonien), mit Exkursen zur Geschichte der Seldschukiden-Türken*, Berlin 1922, pp. 41-51.

<sup>175</sup> *ZDMG*, Vol. 13 (1859), p. 195.

Ikonio and to become gradually the leaders of independent states<sup>176</sup>. Many of these were short-lived and ephemeral<sup>177</sup> and quickly incorporated into powerful fellow hegemonies.

These political changes which initiated by the morrow of the battle of Kōşedağ and kept on throughout the century, found Osman as leader of a small and obscure nation, which, at the same time neighbored to one of the most fertile regions of Asia Minor, which, due to the soil nature, constituted the most appropriate ground for the extension of this nation. The successive mountain ranges of Temnos to the south and the raw and barren plateau in the east, the one that today is being run by the Eskişehir – Ankara railroad, were restricting the Ottoman territory and, at the same time were showing the way to the very fertile Bithynia and thence to Constantinople. For this reason, it is reasonable to notice that the geographical conditions were the most important factor for the development of the Ottoman State and, from the beginning, had prescribed its future evolution and fates.

In the same extent as the geographical conditions, the expansion of the Ottomans to the north was also abetted by the human factor, namely the general intellectual, social and economic condition of the population, as well as the internal fermentations which were then conducted in this area of the East της Ανατολής. However it is not possible to explain the development of Osman's state without clear knowledge of the conditions under which it took place, so before moving on recounting events, we will make a brief overview of the situation in Bithynia.

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<sup>176</sup> Gregoras E' 5 (Vol. I p. 138), Z' 1 (Vol. I p. 214). Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Παλαιολόγος* E' 9 p. 388. Šihabeddin, *NE* Vol. 13 pp. 374-375. Ducas, B' pp. 13-14, ed. by Bonn. Most of the older historians, and Hammer, converge on the view that Osman and the other dynasts of Asia Minor had defected from the state of Iconium at around 1299, when, according to version that is currently considered unfounded, died the last sultan, Alaeddin III Keykubad, and took place the final collapse of the Seljuk Empire. See Gibbons, *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 268-276. From those mentioned by the contemporary Byzantine writers, and especially from Gregoras' testimony, reasonably we can conclude that the partition of –at least - the most distant provinces of this state, had already begun shortly after the battle of Kōşedağ and, possibly, was completed around 1299. However, the Seljuk dynasty remained on the throne until 1308. The last emperors were, Giyaseddin Mas'ud III (1299-1303), Mas'ud II, for second time (1303-1305) και, finally, Alaeddin III Keykubad (1305-1308), who reigned from 1296 to 1299. Bees, *ibid.*, pp. 49-50. H. Löytved, *Konia*, Berlin 1907, pp. 4, 5, 10-11.

<sup>177</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 9 p. 389: “Αμούριοι και Ατμάνες Ατίναί τε και Αλυσύραι και Μανταχίαι και Σαλαμπάξιδες και Αλαϊδες και Αμνηραμάναι και Λαμίσαι Σφονδύλαι τε και Παγδίνας και παν άλλο χειρίστον και επίρρητον όνομα”. Some of them are not mentioned anywhere else. Besides, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to verify their identity because of their corrupted names. Cf P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche*, Istanbul 1934, p. 23.

The recapture of Constantinople in 1261 and the subsequent transfer of the administrative center from Nicaea resulted in the abandonment of the administrative regions of Asia Minor which were remaining under the Byzantine rule. The Byzantine territories which were limited only in Bithynia and in some solitary cities gradually fell into decline and decay, because in between the first two Palaiologs turned their attention to the task of restoring the old glory of Byzantium, and also to neutralize the risk at the western part of the state which was under threat because of the operations of Charles of Anjou. Thus, they involved in wars in Europe and, as a result, they forgot this corner of Asia Minor<sup>178</sup>, which had housed the Empire for more than fifty years. From this perspective, it seems destined to be verified that ominous prophecy of *protasikritis*\* [*πρωτασικρήτης*] Senacherim the Evil. When the news for the conquest of Constantinople arrived at Nicaea, he, amid spontaneous popular events of joy with which resented, allegedly said: “Του λοιπού καλόν τις μη ἐλπίζετω, ἐπεὶ Ῥωμαῖοι and αὐθις πατούσι την Πόλιν<sup>179</sup>”. We can understand how true those words have proved if we consider that, even before spending two generations, the Byzantine Empire had fallen into such decline and malaise that only the absence of a powerful conqueror and the self-interest machinations of the Western maritime towns, postponed its final fadeout. During this time, the imprudent management of public affairs by the first two Palaiologs had accelerated the collapse. The policy of trade privileges transferred transit trade to the Italian cities, depriving Byzantium of the majority of its revenues<sup>180</sup>. The

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<sup>178</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ*’ 22 p. 223: “[Μιχαήλ] προς τοις δυσικοῖς πάσαν εἶχε την ασχολίαν, τα εν ποσί καταπροϊέμενος”. “...ο δεσπότης φοβερός ην ὅπηπερ επισταῖη και μάλλον τοις δυτικοῖς, παρ’ ἦν αιτίαν και τα της ανατολῆς ἐξησθένουν, των Περσῶν επιθαρρουντων και εισβαλλόντων ταις χώραις παρά πάσαν του κωλύσοντος ερημίαν». Ibid., Δ’ 27 p. 310. Frantzes Α’ 3 p. 28, ed. Papadopoulos: “ἐπὶ της βασιλείας τούδε του αυτοκράτορος [Michael X] διὰ τους πολέμους τους εν τη Ευρώπη παρά των Ιταλῶν, αρχή των δεινῶν της εν Ασία ρωμαϊκῆς αρχῆς παρά των Τουρκῶν εγεγόνει”. About the turn of Michael Palaeologus to the West, see Paparrigopoulos, *Ιστορία του Ἑλληνικοῦ Ἔθνους*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., Vol. 5 A pp. 105-107. Also, C. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue*, Paris 1926, pp. 78-98.

\* [T.N.]Head of the imperial secreteriate. This office was conferred by the emperor since the reign of Heraklios (7<sup>th</sup> century).

<sup>179</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Β*’ 28 p. 149.

<sup>180</sup> The amounts that Byzantium was collecting from customs once were huge. As it is known, in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, under Manuel Comnenus, the Jewish traveler Benjamin of Tudela calculated that the daily collections from customs duties were amounted to twenty thousand golden coins (The Itinerary of Rabbi Benjamin of Tudela, ed. and trans. A. Asher, London-Berlin 1840, Vol. 1 p. 53). The absorption of the Byzantine gold from the West led to the practice of adulteration of the coin, mentioned by Pachymeres (*Ανδρόνικος ΣΤ*’ 8 p. 493 l. 17) and by Ibn Battuta (Vol. II p. 444). On the monetary policy of Paleologos (plural) see A. Diomedes “Οικονομικαί περιπέτεια του παρακμάζοντος Βυζαντίου”, *Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικῆς και Δημοσίας Οικονομικῆς*, year 8 (1939) Γ-Δ pp. 277-303, especially pp. 281-285. Also, G. Bratianu, “L’ hyperpère byzantine et la monnaie d’ or des républiques italiennes au XIIIe siècle”, *Études byzantines d’ histoire économique et sociale*, Paris 1938, pp. 229-235.

religious controversies absorbed the vitality of the people; the generalization of the mercenary system made citizens warless and fomented anarchy. Finally, the civil wars and dynastic strifes undermined the prestige of the state, devastated large areas and paved the way for foreign conquerors<sup>181</sup>. This situation, the first symptoms of which appeared immediately after the reestablishment of the Empire in Constantinople, brought from very early direct impact on Eastern matters.

First, the conflict between the Laskarids and Palaiologus, which became cause for Michael VIII Palaeologus' ascend to the throne, alienated the people of these regions, who were committed to the rightful heir of the throne, the juvenile John the 4th. This was quite natural, since the Byzantines in Asia Minor maintained a strong memory of those brave kings who from scratch created state, the moment when all seemed lost, and struggled with irresistible vigor for the national freedom of their people against numerous powerful enemies, in the East and the West. Their personality, the simplicity of their lives and their philanthropic actions had made them extremely popular. In fact, one of them, Ioannes Vatatzis, the most popular and philanthropist, was ranked by the people among saints. For these reasons, the blindness of the young successor reasonably provoked a popular rebellion in Bithynia, especially among the rural populations of Trikokkia<sup>182</sup>, where the imperial troops, after having committed many atrocities, managed with great difficulty to suppress the rebellion, achieving disruption of the revolutionary party with bribes<sup>183</sup>.

Following these events, aiming at the safety of his throne, Michael VIII took a series of measures that had as aftereffect repeal of Akrita's tax relief, strengthening of the mercenary guards and imposing heavy taxes on the inhabitants<sup>184</sup>. Finally, on the

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<sup>181</sup> See Paparrigopoulos, *Ιστορία* Vol. 5 A, pp. 101-111.

<sup>182</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 10-13, pp. 190-201: The stubbornness these men were thrown in the battle with, is shown by their slogan "ή νικάν η πάντας πίπτειν". Cf Diehl-Oeconomus-Guiland-Grousset, *L' Europe Orientale de 1081 a 1453*, Paris 1945, p. 201.

<sup>183</sup> "Προσπέμποντες ικανά, μόλις έπειθον και εδούλουν τας γνώμας χρυσίω μερίζοντες". However, since the fury of the peasants had not been bent, neither by fear nor by the power of gold, the fight hadn't been completely ceased. Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 12 p. 199.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, A' 4-5, pp. 17-18. "Και προσετίμων ζημίαις ου φορηταίς και μείζουσιν ή ώστ' ενεγκείν εκείνους" (Γ. 13 p. 201). "[The King] συχναίς αναγραφαίς την χώραν εκαλαμάτο" (Γ' 22 pp. 221-222). Pachymeres says that the rumor that Michael VIII, by imposing oppressive taxation and by confiscating of the estates of the inhabitants of the eastern provinces, intended to make them powerless to rebel again in favor of Ioannes IV. Patriarch Arsenios, in his will (*PG* Vol. 140 p. 956 A), wrote about Michael: "ήθελον δε ίνα μετάνοιαν ενδείξηται και την πολλήν βαρύτητα των φόρων και των κουμερκίων και ετέρων αδικιών διά την τοιαύτην αμαρτίαν [namely the blinding of Ioannes] εκκόπηται και ούτω συγχωρηθείη".

recommendation of the Earl of the royal horses Chadinos<sup>185</sup>, Michael decreed compulsory recruitment of semi-independent wealthy landowners and, at the same time, took new measures, restrictive for the individual land ownership, in a way that mainly affected the local economic and military factors<sup>186</sup>.

Although these plans were not applied permanently and throughout their extent, because, obviously, king's brother Ioannes intervened<sup>187</sup>, however they affect drastically the Minor Asian things. Michael the VIII's polemic against the rich landowners which was not based on a defined schedule, as happened between the Macedonians and Comnenos, but inspired by purely party calculations, induced, as we shall see below, the overthrow of the hitherto prevailing economic and social class. Indeed, from political aspect, the measures had a big impact because, through the bankruptcy of the men who according to Pachymeres "were deriving their wealth from battle operations", also paralyzed the defense against various internal and external enemies.

The result of the implementation of these measures was the dissolve of the border battalions, which had being proved the Empire's safest guardians and, in their

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<sup>185</sup> Chadinos is mentioned by Pachymeres with this title, *Μιχαήλ* A' 11 pp. 27, 29. But, Pančenko (*Īzvestija* of Istanbul Vol. 9 p. 101) identifies this man with prothieracarius Konstantinos Chadinos, to whom was addressed an order which is referred to Lemvos monastery and was published at *Acta et diplomata graeca*, Vol. 4 p. 285.

<sup>186</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* A' 5 p. 18: "[Chadenos] ἀνδρας βαθυπλούτους ευρών και κτήμασι και θρέμμασι βριθοντας, στρατεύει τούτους εκ των σφετέρων εκείνων και ος ο εκάστου βίος συνεκεκρότητο, και εις τεσσαράκοντα νομίσματα των ενί συμποσώσας, και τούτων το πλείστον εκ των αυτού, το λοιπόν του τεθέντος τέλους, ούκ ολίγον όν, τω βασιλικώ ταμειώ εισκομίζεσθαι έταξεν". This vague and obscure passage doesn't help in defining the measures suggested by Chadenos. J. A.B. Mortreuil (*Histoire du droit byzantin*, Paris 1846, Vol. III p. 115) writes that it was a forced expropriation of the large estates and that each of the affected landowners was paid a pension amounting to forty coins. P. Calligas (*Περί δουλοπαροικίας-Μελέται και λόγοι*, Athens 1882, p. 283) accepts this interpretation, adding that this amount was granted annually. K. Sathas (*Έλληνες στρατιώται εν τη Δύσει και αναγέννησις της ελληνικής τακτικής*, Athens 1885, p. 9) states that, it was an expropriation of the military lands, that was given an annual grant of forty coins and that the independent farmers were forced to serve the army as simple soldiers. According to B. Pančenko (*ibid.*, pp. 101-102) it had been done an inventory of movable and immovable property of the Akritaes. While an amount of forty coins was granted annually at each beneficiary, the rest of his property was devolved to the state Treasury. C. Chapman (*Michael Paléologue* p. 157) thinks that it was about expropriation of the large land ownership, with compensation payment of forty gold coins. Langer and Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 (1932), p. 493 are in support of Chapman's view. The aforementioned authors agree that the ownership of the large estates had devolved to the state, which paid compensation. However, the first evidence that comes up from the examination of this difficult passage of Pachymeres, is that the large land owners were forced to enlist for military service, which tended to limit their political power.

<sup>187</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Γ' 27 p. 243.

position, the settlement of foreign mercenaries<sup>188</sup>. Though the aforementioned were better paid than the native soldiers, whose wages [ρογες] were significantly reduced<sup>189</sup> and enjoyed greater favor and confidence from the kings, who supported them with scandalous favoritism<sup>190</sup>, when they were sent especially to the eastern provinces, did not hesitate to divert to extortions and looting against the inhabitants<sup>191</sup>.

However, because Palaiologs had suspicions about the faith of the Byzantine troops, especially those in Asia Minor, that was favorably disposed towards Ioannes IV, they went on entrusting the fate of the imperial arms to foreign mercenaries, neglecting the native army of the East, which thenceforth began to dissolve<sup>192</sup>. The most capable of the soldiers turned to other bread-winning activities, however, not a few, reaching the ultimate degree of despair, were defecting to the Turks<sup>193</sup>. On the other hand, the foreigners who through the state's favor were promiscuous quickly turned into unruly rabble.

As Pachymeres cites characteristically “they were inflicting great evils to the Romans by practicing predatory ways, by causing unexpected calamities to the residents, they were becoming bad encounter for passersby and bad neighbors in places where they were originally sent for help and then decided to settle”<sup>194</sup>. In this way, the remaining part of Asia Minor after it was stripped of its natural defenders, was under the protection of Alans Αλανοί, Catalans, Tatars and others, whose services, when not resulted to infliction for the nation was of dubious effectiveness<sup>195</sup>.

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., Α' 6 p. 20. – *Ανδρόνικος Δ'* 16 p. 308. Gregoras Ε' 5 (Vol. I p. 138). Cf Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Bury, Vol. 7 p. 24.

<sup>189</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Α'* 6 p. 19. – *Ανδρόνικος, Γ'* 8 p. 208.

<sup>190</sup> Gregoras ΣΤ' 10 (Vol. I p. 205). Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Δ'* 19 pp. 307-308. Moreover, it is mentioned that, Andronicus had given to the Alan mercenaries the horses of his soldiers. As noticed by Finlay (*History of Greece*, Oxford 1877, Vol. 3 p. 384), this measure was one of those which raise egoism and cause the dissatisfaction of the soldiers.

<sup>191</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* p. 309.

<sup>192</sup> Gregoras Ε' 5 (Vol. I p. 138). Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* p. 303: “[Ο Ανδρόνικος] κατωλιγώρει σχεδόν των Ρωμαίων ως γυναικισθέντων άντικρυς και εξ ανάγκης μεν τα πολλά καταμαλακισθέντων, ούχ ήττον και από κατοθελούς γνώμης και προαιρέσεως».

<sup>193</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 22 p. 222: «Εκείνοι τοίνυν, και μάλλον οι ταις άκραις προσκαθήμενοι, τω τε πάσχειν ενθένδε και τω ελπίζειν εκειθεν τα λώονα, ει μόνον προσχωροίεν εκόντες, προσχωρείν εγνωσαν και οσημέραι προσετίθεντο Πέρσαις, τούτο γουν επ' ούκ ολίγον γενόμενον, συνάμι' εκείνοις οι Πέρσαι οδηγούς άμα και συμμάχοις χρώμενοι καταθαρρείν είχαν των λελειμμένων». Cf Wittek, *The Rise* p. 18.

<sup>194</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Δ'* 16 p. 309.

<sup>195</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Α'* 6 p. 20. After the Alan's leave, Nikephoros Gregoras (στ' 11, Vol. I p. 207) says with irony: «ώσπερ αν ει διά μόνον τουτί προσεκλήθησαν εκ Σκυθών, ίνα του δέοντος πρωϊάτερον τους Τούρκους άχρι θαλάττης οδηγήσαιεν».

As was expected, the mercenaries' violence made the Palaiologan administration even more hated to the people of the East and its dissatisfaction was manifested by repeated local uprisings. The most memorable of them took place in 1296, when the people joined with the disgruntled army and proclaimed Alexius Philanthropenos, who had distinguished in the wars against the Turks, and - somehow - was a local hero<sup>196</sup>, as king. In order to deter such attitudes, both Michael and Andronicus were taking hard measures, severely punishing the responsible and stalking the suspects. Capable generals and popular rulers fell into disfavor and degraded because they were considered rivals dangerous to the throne. In this effort for imposition of the central government over the inhabitants of Vithynia, who were accustomed to autonomy<sup>197</sup>, were also committed injustices having as a result harm of the State's general interests. This conclusion connotes from the facts Pachymeres cited about Bithynia's general Ioannes, whom Michael ordered to be brought captive from Nicaea and blinded him. His sin was the great popularity he had acquired because of his impressive military successes<sup>198</sup>.

But as happens in such cases, the pressing measures were limiting the reactions outbreak for some time, but the discontent went on existing in a latent state and mainly was expressed in occasional ecclesiastical conflicts between Αρσενιατών and Ιωσηφιτών and in the issue of the churches unification, raised by Michael VIII in its most acute form, when patriarch was Ioannes Vekkos. The Bithynians was always advocated that portion which was unfavorably disposed towards Palaiologs, fighting for patriarch Arsenios<sup>199</sup> and the independence of the Eastern Church<sup>200</sup>. However, since

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<sup>196</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Γ'* 9-11 pp. 210-229. Γρηγοράς στ' 8 pp. 196-202. According to Pachymeres, (pp. 215-216) three were the causes of the rebellion: 1) the anger of the people against the unfair taxation, 2) the popularity of Philanthropenos and 3) the influence of the numerous Turkish army, which was under the general. As we will see below, this rebellion is the first clear manifestation of localism that united Christians and Turks in a common fight against Constantinople.

<sup>197</sup> The Bithynians enjoyed a great degree of autonomy already from the Roman times. See V. Schultze, *Altchristliche Städte und Landschaften, II. Kleinasien*, Gütersloh 1922, Vol. I pp. 240-243. Also see, M. Kleonymos – H. Papadopoulos, *Βιθυνικά*, Istanbul 1867, p. 24. Whenever the center tried to impose its power arbitrarily, the reaction was not missing. The revolt of Isaicius Angelos in 1185 was the manifestation of the most acute phase of the localistic spirit, a century before Alexios Philanthropenos. Nikitas Choniates, ed. by Bonn, pp. 349, 363, 364-375.

<sup>198</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* στ' 24 pp. 485, 487, and 25 p. 493. On pp. 484-492 are referred the persecutions caused to Raul brothers, Theodoros Kotys, Kantakouzenos, Pachomios et al.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*, Ε' 2 pp. 337-342. Pachymeres (Vol. I p. 338 l. 12 et seg.) mentions that patriarch Joseph, who then was favoured by Michael, hereupon conducted a tour at Anatolya attempting to win the sympathy of the church and the people by any means, even by bribes, but without success. The same thing had also happened previously, in 1260, when Arsenius' rival, patriarch of Ephesus Nikephoros had toured in order

spirits were exuberant, the religious conflict was most severe in this region, and took the form of an armed conflict between the people and the imperial troops. Rebel groups were going through the countryside, exercising unaffected polemics against Michael, which, relatively to the religious question had found lively response to the people and aroused the public opinion against the government of Constantinople.

Not long time passed and the religious zeal was replaced by the humblest human moods, given that, unsurprisingly, various criminal elements intending to plunder and terrorize the residents, regardless their religious convictions, were also operating by the rebels<sup>201</sup>. The result was that the countryside fell into anarchy, which in any respect had become destructive. When shortly before his death in 1282, Michael campaigned against the Turks who were settled over the Sakarya, but due to lack of sufficient forces degenerated into a military tour to Bursa and Lopadio<sup>202</sup>, confronted with the destruction and devastation brought by the religious wars under the pretext of which the old mutinies and revolts were keeping on.

Such was the damage to people and properties and the abandonment of cultivated land and so clear the traces of the civil war, that the king, “facing the abandonment, one could say that was pulling his hair out”. Expressing his grief to the patriarch of Alexandria Athanasios, who accompanied him, brought to mind the old acme of the site seen during the last years of Laskaris rule των Λασκάρων and compared that situation with the sight of desolated farmlands and abandoned fruit-

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to win over the Bithynians by threats or gold. Again, he had met the reaction of all the people and left “αποτιναζάμενος τον κονιορτόν των βλαυτών”. Ibid., B’ 17 pp. 118-119. Patriarch Arsenius, at his will (Migne PG Vol. 140 p. 956 A) states that Michael Palaeologus considered him to be responsible for the revolt of the Trikokkiots. Although he rejects the accusation that he had incited the revolt, there is no doubt that his strong attitude was inspiring the people and raising the tempers. Especially for the schism of the Arsenians wrote I. Sycoutres (*Ελληνικά* Vol. II 1929, pp. 267-332 and Vol. III, 1930, pp. 463-470), where V. Laurent had also published some texts on this issue (*BZ* Vol. 30, 1930, pp. 489-496 and *Ελληνικά* Vol. III pp. 463-470). I. E. Troitzki wrote about patriarch Arsenios, *Christianskoie Čtenie* Petroupoli Vol. II 2 (1869) p. 851 ff.

<sup>200</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* ΣΤ’ 24 pp. 484-485. – *Ανδρόνικος* Α’ 34, pp. 88-89. Γρηγοράς Ε’ 2 (Vol. I p. 127). As it is clear from the manuscript of Mount Athos (M. Gedeon, *Ο Αθως*, Istanbul 1885, p. 140) the two of the three strongholds of the fight against the Papacy were in Asia Minor. Among others is stated that Michael VIII “πάντας έσπευδεν εις τον κρημνον ελκύσαι της τοιαύτης παπικής αιρέσεως, όπως έξη την εύνοιαν του πάπα, εξαιρέτως δε τους εν τω αγιονύμω όρει του Αθω, τους εν τω Ολύμπω και Γαλλησιώ όρει οικούντας μοναχούς”, who were the leaders of the opposition. About the religious policy of Michael see Diehl-Oeconomos-Guilland-Grouseet, *ibid.*, pp. 212-218.

<sup>201</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Δ’ 27 pp. 312-313.

<sup>202</sup> Pachymeres recounts about this tour in *Μιχαήλ Παλαιολόγος* ΣΤ’ 29 pp. 502-505 and ΣΤ’ 34 p. 523 l. 3 et seq..

bearing trees<sup>203</sup> he faced. He told that the reason that caused the evil was “the onslaught of the zealots and the war of the king’s compatriots against him and the actions he had taken, saying that he was breaking the law”.

So, Michael Paleologos attributes the destruction to the attacks of those reacting to his religious policy, the so-called "zealots" who were defending the Church and its independence vis-à-vis the state. However, (Michael) by implying the guiltiness of the military lords<sup>204</sup> and describing the hostilities range and the subsequent devastation, leads us to conclude that it was no longer about those religious disputes that our Byzantine ancestors like to analyze, but rather was generalized revolutions, only superficially associated with ecclesiastical or dogmatic claims.

Probably, the separatist tendencies that caused the rebellions could be eliminated and the situation would be saved if there was continuous intellectual contact with the capital and if the trade dealings, which had made Bursa, Nicaea and the other cities of Bithynia vigor commercial and industrial centers for centuries, had been maintained uninterrupted. However, both the dissolve of the Byzantine navy, launched by Andronikos II for economic reasons, and the activity of predatory gangs in the interior of the country, were crucial blows for the regular transportation by land and sea<sup>205</sup>. The pirates appeared in Propontis (Marmara Sea) and attempting repeated raids up to the Prince Islands, sowed terror among seafarers<sup>206</sup>. The remaining small part of the maritime trade that was left in the hands of the Byzantines had become unsafe and gradually devitalized.

Apart from the sea route from Istanbul to the southern ports in Propontis, there was also that which, by land, was connecting Chalcedon with Aigialous (near the present Aretsou), from where the travelers were sailing across the Gulf of Nicomedia and, after disembarking at Kivotos (ancient Drepano, current Hersek)<sup>207</sup>, were following

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<sup>203</sup> “Πλήθος δ’ ἦν σπωρῶν εκκεχυμένων κάτω των δένδρων... το γαρ εισαχθήναι τισι των εδωδιμων διά το δέος απόμοτον ἦν”. Ibid., p. 503.

<sup>204</sup> Michael blames the greed of these rulers, which was “οὐ μέτρω και κόρω περιοριζομένην”, as responsible for the economic exhaustion of the country.

<sup>205</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Α’ 26 p. 70, Α’ 37 p. 105. Γρηγοράς Ε’ 5 p. 140, ΣΤ’ 3 σ. 174.

<sup>206</sup> Gregoras ΣΤ’ 3 p. 175. Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ’ 24 pp. 324-327.

<sup>207</sup> Paparrigopoulos (*Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. - by P. Carolides – Vol. 5 Α p. 187), Zinkeisen (*Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, Hamburg 1840, Vol. I p. 112) and Hammer (*Ιστορία* Vol. I p. 128) write that, in medieval times, *Kios* was called *Kivotos* [Κιβωτός]. However, a more accurate study of the Byzantine texts led W. M. Ramsay (*Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, London 1890, pp. 186, 201, 236) and W. Tomaschek (*Zur historischen Topographie von Kleinasien in Mittelalter*, Vienna 1891, p. 9) to locate Kivotos at the narrow part of the Gulf of Nicomedia. As regards Kivotos and the course that is

the great military avenue reaching to Dorylαιο<sup>208</sup>. But this route too was not free from risks. Apart from the wandering local gangs that were overrunning those places where anarchy reigned, in Bithynia were also debouching the Turks who were coming from the eastern banks of Saggarios, crossing the river aiming in plundering<sup>209</sup>. The defenses that Michael VIII had built in the aforementioned tour by placing logs at the passable parts of the river<sup>210</sup>, in such a way that “neither snake can get through”, by being neglected, having suffered the ravages of time and people and finally, having completely being disused because of changes to the riverbed and the embankment due to floods<sup>211</sup>, could not back up the impetus of the invaders. Nor the manpower which was arrayed by the Andronikos’ II government could provide the minimum security guaranty because, by the extermination of the local military factors, there were no longer men inspired by patriotism. The higher administration had no confidence to the eminent soldiers and above all, the fighting spirit that saves the nations at the time of risk was missing. Instead, a deadly fatalism and a disintegration adventurism were reigning.

In 1294 the defense of northern Bithynia was assigned to a Bulgarian adventurer who claimed to be the murdered Lachanas<sup>212</sup>. This man managed to become the inspirer of the war against the Turks and recruit large numbers of volunteers in the area of Saggarios. However in a short while, and even before the ability of the new army and its leader was judged, Andronicos dismantled its forces and pseudo-Lachanas was considered dangerous and held in custody. The guards who remained were forced

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followed by the travelers, enlightening are the following passages: Anna Comnena IA’ 8, Vol. II p. 128 l. 6. ed. A. Reifferscheid: “διαπεραιωθέντες τον της Κιβωτού πορθμόν” and IE’ 1, Vol. II p. 265 l. 20: “την τε Δάμαλιν διαπεράσας και τον αναμεταξύ Κιβωτού και Αιγιαλών διαπλωσάμενος πορθμόν και την Κιβωτόν καταλαβών εκείθεν εις το Λοπάδιον άπεισι”. Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* ΣΤ’ 25 p. 493 l. 12: “ο πατριάρχης τον κατά την Κιβωτόν της θαλάττης τράχηλον διαπεραιωσάμενος ευθύ Νικαίας ώρμα”.

<sup>208</sup> The travelers were also following the same route during the Turkish occupation. See F. Taeschner, *Das anatolische Wegenetz nach osmanischen Quellen*, Leipzig 1924-26, Vol. I pp. 72-77, 91, Vol. II p. 56-61.

<sup>209</sup> Gregoras E’ 5 p. 141. Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Γ’ 22 p. 223: “σκυλεύοντες (ού γαρ εθάρρουν μένειν) υπέστρεφον”.

<sup>210</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* ΣΤ’ 29 pp. 504-505. - *Ανδρόνικος* Δ’ 25 p. 330. *Γρηγοράς* Ε’ 5 p. 140: «Οι πολέμιοι .... κατιόντες άχρι του Σαγγαρίου ποταμού· όθεν απηγορευκώς ο βασιλεύς πολιχνίους συχνοίς ωχύρωσε τον ποταμόν Σαγγάριον, μη και αυτού επιβάντες κυριεύωσι Βιθυνίας”. Almost verbatim, Frantzes A’ 3 p. 28, copies Gregoras. Aleksandros Comnenos had fortified the river Saggarios, also aiming at the same purpose. Anna Comnena I’ 5 Vol. 2 pp. 72-73.

<sup>211</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ’ 25 pp. 330-331. About the old riverbed of Saggarios, Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı has recently written *Sakariya nehrinin İzmit körfezine akıtılmasıyle Marmara ve Karadeniz birleştirilmesi hakkında vesikalar ve tetkit raporu*, Istanbul 1940.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, B’ 30 pp. 138-139.

to withdraw and the across the river Turks, who during Michael's VIII reign had overwhelmed the army that was sent against them<sup>213</sup>, now (1296) they headed freely against Bithynia, making repeated raids<sup>214</sup>, led by Ali, Amur's son and tyrant of Kastamonu<sup>215</sup>.

Finally, Andronicus operated against them, undertaking personally the leadership of the campaign<sup>216</sup>. Only just a few months ago Andronikos Philanthropenos' revolt had been suppressed and Andronicos wanted to achieve a military feat worthy to these of his popular opponent. This explains the willingness to engage in battle against the Turks, a unique event in his long reign. On January 1, 1296, the king was in Damatry of Propontis (Marmara Sea), waiting for the last of his troops when a strong earthquake happened. The seismic activity lasted until July 17 and caused major damage throughout Asia Minor. Andronicus, who was the most superstitious than all the Byzantines of his era, shamelessly abandoned the campaign, because he considered the earthquake a bad omen. Indeed, feature of his attitude was that, during the disaster, his mind was up on the monuments of the Queen of the Cities. As Pachymeres mentions characteristically, the king was mostly concerned for the great temple (i.e. Hagia Sofia). And for that reason he continuously sent envoys to see from far if it was still standing in place.

Since the government had abandoned the plan for armed defense, was trying to find another way to secure the border. Again, were put back in place the political means, which, were instructed to the Byzantines by the long experience with barbarians, when, many times unwarlike kings handled public affairs. However, as noted above, apart from the organized Turkish forces, were also operating irregulars, who led the Byzantine diplomacy to a dead end, because, as Pachymeres says, if they managed to buy the peace from their leaders, the mobsters who were think nothing more than their personal gain, were founding other leaders and, kept on plundering, as they did

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<sup>213</sup> Gregoras E' 5 (Vol. I pp. 138-139).

<sup>214</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 25 p. 330. Particularly about Amur (or Umur) and his sons, see Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Vol. I p. 144 ff.

<sup>215</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 25 pp. 327, Δ' 30 p. 346 l. 9.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibid.*, Γ' 15 pp. 233-235.

before<sup>217</sup>. The only man who could save the day was Alexios Philanthropenos, but he was blind and imprisoned, punished for the revolution that had proclaimed him king<sup>218</sup>.

In this way, several years before the Ottoman conquest, the Turks across Saggarios and the local mobsters paved the way for Bithynia's conquest and, more than anything else, contributed in the devastation of the country.

Rural population was the first victim of this new situation. Pachymeres' testimony that the Bithynian farmers were unable to pay their taxes in cash but only in kind<sup>219</sup>, clearly indicate the lack of money, due to the mortification of the trade and mainly due to the lack of secure means of transportation. Only inside and close to the fortified cities were still few traces of the old commercial traffic. But here also people suffered from the impact of the anarchy that prevailed in the countryside. The feeling of security had disappeared and the walls could no longer remove διώχνω the fear of the citizens' souls. Pachymeres recounts that, in peacetime, a large and without sense panic shook Nicaea, when rumors, false as it turned out later, that hordes of irregular Tatars had occupied the city<sup>220</sup>, were spread. In order to save themselves from the nonexistent enemies, many inhabitants of Nicaea ran to hide even in graves, while others were spurned by the mob.

Under such circumstances it is intelligible that the economic collapse occurred. In the countryside anarchy and land abandonment was reigning. In the cities, which had been isolated, there was lack of provisions<sup>221</sup>. Exports from urban centers declined because there were no markets and means of transportation, crafts and industry declined, while the once thriving cities brought to a state of great recession.

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid., Δ' 30 p. 346 l. 11, Ε' 9 pp. 389-390.

<sup>218</sup> About the life and activity of Philanthropenos see *Επιστολαί Μαξιμου Πλανούδη*, ed. M. Treu, pp. 97, 141, 174, 177 και *Επιστολαί Νικηφόρου Γρηγορά* (*Correspondance de Nicéphore Gregoras*, ed. R. Guiland) pp. 167, 173. Also, *ibid.*, pp. 372-374, where is included a brief biography of Philanthropenos.

<sup>219</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 22 p. 222: "των μεν χρειωδών και γε λίαν είχαν ευπόρως διδούσης της γής, νομισμάτων δε πενιχρώς είχαν, ως πάντων γεωργούντων τα αναγκαία".

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, Γ' 28 pp. 244-250. The panic occurred on Monday, March 14, 1267 – "μηνός Κρονίου των θείων ημερών της νηστείας ημέρα της δευτέρας εβδομάδος Δευτέρα», as Pachymeres writes, p. 244. Cf Dölger, *Regesten* No 1944 (3d issue pp. 46, 50-51). It is very characteristic what Pachymeres mentions, namely that the commander of the city, Nicolaos Manouelides was a man «ούκ ευ ειδώς πολέμων αλλά λημμάτων», [he doesn't know about war but for profit], which demonstrates the mentality of that period.

<sup>221</sup> During the aforementioned tour, Michael VIII realized that the problem of provisioning was very serious, because anarchy had paralyzed the transportations. Despite his royal status he as well had to eat "τον σκληρόν πιτυρίαν και μέλανα", a concoction sample of which was sent to Constantinople as worth to be seen. *Μιχαήλ ΣΤ'* 29 p. 504.

From the celerity the Ottoman advance northwards was carried out, which, as we saw above, was restrained only by the walls of fortified towns, we conclude that the inhabitants of Bithynia were not able to oppose an effective defense against the few and poorly armed forces of Osman. This should be attributed not only to the economic exhaustion of the place, but also to the unfavorable demographic condition<sup>222</sup>, which was a natural consequence of the longstanding wars<sup>223</sup> and poverty of rural populations. But, paradoxically, the abandonment of rural areas did not contribute to proportional increase in urban population. Of course, there were cases of rural people seeking refuge in the fortified cities, but, after the risk, the number of city inhabitants showed no increase. This was happening because rural residents, unable because of the economic crisis to be absorbed into urban life, were forced to return to their former lives. Therefore, the reduction of agricultural component of the country, at least as much cannot be attributed to the direct effects of the war (ie death and captivity), should be due not to urbanization, which seemingly was imposed by the circumstances, but either to immigration or to the accession to the ranks of the assaulters.

As we have clear evidence from the Byzantine historians<sup>224</sup>, there is no doubt that settlements to safer lands and movements to the counteractive were realized. However, from Byzantine sources we derive the information, confirmed by Muntaner, Ibn Khaldun and Neşri that the Turks from northwestern Asia Minor, who would later be named Osmanli, hadn't completely abort their nomadic traditions until the early 14th century<sup>225</sup>. Therefore, we consider unlikely the defection of Bithynia's inhabitants on a

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid., ΣΤ' 29 p. 502. The depopulation of the countryside was one of the most obvious changes noticed by Michael VIII in 1282.

<sup>223</sup> According to J. Laurent (*Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoudides dans l'Asie Occidentale*, Paris 1919, p. 109) depopulation had already begun from the days of the Seljuk incursions, since the end of the 11<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>224</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Α'* 6 p. 20, Γ' 22 p. 222, Δ' 27 pp. 311-312. Gregoras *Z'* 1 (Vol. I p. 214). Cf Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 (1932) p. 493.

<sup>225</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Β'* 24 p. 133: "και τινας ούς αν είποι τις σκηνίτας και τη πολιτεία απηχθημένους". Kinnamos (*A'* 4 p. 9, ed. By Bonn) wrote about them in an older era: "ούπω γαρ γεηπονικοίς ενησκημένοι έργοις γάλακτος τε απερρόφουν και κρεών εσιτούντο κατά τους Σκύθας, αεί σποράδες τε ανά το πεδίων εσκηνημένοι ταύτη, τοις βουλομένοις αυτοίς εγχειρείν προχειρότατοι εγίνοντο". Nikephoros Vryenios (*A'* 7 p. 26, ed. by Bonn) describes the Turks as "έθνος γαλακτοφάγον" [a milk-eater nation]. Kinnamos calls these nomads Turkmens (*E'* 3 p. 207): "όσοι κλέμμασι διαζήν επίστανται, ούς δη Τουρκομάνους έθος καλείν έστι". That the Turks of this region were nomads comes also from another passage of Kinnamos (*Z'* 2 p. 295): "τότε δε Πέρσαι αμφί δισχιλίουσ περι ταύτην [the city of Dorylaion] νομάδες ως έθος εσκήνουν". Cf also Nikitas Choniates, p. 228. These were happening during the era of Komnenos, when the Turks of western Asia Minor were mentioned only as nomads. Orhan's contemporary, Ioannes Kantakouzenos (*B'* 6, Vol. I p. 341) says about the Ottomans before the battle of Pelecanos: "έτι γαρ εσκήνουν εν τοις πεδίοις, έαρος ήδη μεσούντος κατά μήνα Μάϊον" και "των

large scale before the pacification of the country, because, if Byzantines, who were farmers and townspeople had adopted the vagrant life of the nomads, it would be unnatural and contrary to the laws of social development.

But neither the Moslem religion could constitute a considerable factor in interpreting the weakening of the Christian population. At first, there are serious doubts about whether Osman's followers, during their nomadic period, ie around 1282, were consciously Muslims<sup>226</sup>.

Even today, the nomadic tribes of Asia Minor (Yürük<sup>227</sup>, Kızılbaş<sup>228</sup> etc.) have little to do with the doctrines of Muhammad. Moreover, it is also known that Oğuz, to

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βαρβάρων όσον ούπω από των πεδινών επί τα ορεινότερα αναχωρησόντων, την αλέαν εκκλινόντων την από του θέρους· ούτω γάρ είναι αυτοίς έθος· ούσι νομάσι». And farther: “επει δε ηγγέλθη τοις βαρβάροις ή του βασιλέως έφοδος, όσοι μεν ήσαν νομάδες κατά την Βιθυνίαν διεσκεδασμένοι σκηνάς τε αναλαβόντες και βοσκήματα και την άλλην αποσκευή, επί τα υψηλότερα ανήλθον των ορών και πορρωτέρω η εξ έθους ην αυτοίς» (p. 342). In 1303, , Muntaner had found Turks that had camped with their wives and children outside of Artaki, at the other end of Bithynia (Buchon, *Chroniques étrangères*, p. 419 B). Also, İbn Khaldun (Kitab el-ibar Vol. 5 p. 562 – trans. Cl. Huart, *Journal des Savants*, f.n. Vol. 15 p. 163) writes: “[Orhan] προσήρτησε την πόλιν ταύτην [Brusa] ως έδραν του κράτους του, χωρίς όμως ν’ απαρνηθή τας σκηνάς διά να ζήση εντός ανακτόρων. Έζη υπό σκηνήν, την οποίαν έστηνεν εις τους λειμώνας και εις τα υποστατικά του”. Cf the writings of the aforementioned author in his *Προλεγόμενα*, NE Vol. 19 A (1862) p. 257. As for Ertuğul’s and Osman’s nomadism, sufficiently clear is the information given by Nešri (*ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 191) and by Šükrullah (*MOG* Vol.2 p. 77). Also Cf Leunelavius, *Historiae* pp. 94, 100.

<sup>226</sup> Gibbons (*Foundation* pp. 25-26) and Rambaud (*Histoire générale*, Paris 1894, Vol. III pp. 822-824) argued that Islam was imposed by Osman. Although Köprülü (*Les origins* p. 58) always emphasizes the Muslim factor in the founding of the Ottoman State, he accepts that the nomadic Turkish tribes, being unable to comply with the Muslem precepts about the way of life, restaient fidèles à leurs nationales recouvertes d’un léger vernis d’ islamisme [remained faithful to their national [pre-Islamic] traditions, covered by a thin glaze of Islamism].

<sup>227</sup> M Tzakyroglu (*Περί Γιουρούκων*, Athens 1891, p. 27) writes that *Yörüks* are heretics, K. Humman (“Über die Ethnologie Kleinasien» - *Verhandlungen der Gesellschaft für Erdkunde* Vol. 7, 1880, p. 248), clearly exaggerating, he says that *Yörüks* were irreligious and F. W. Hasluck, (*Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Oxford 1929, Vol. I pp. 130-133) agrees with Tzakyroglu, adding that, when *Yörüks* do not appear totally indifferent to religion they recognize confused and heterodox beliefs which barely are Muslim.

<sup>228</sup> M.F. Grenard (JA 10<sup>th</sup> series Vol. III, 1904, pp. 511-522), wrote a remarkable study about Kızılbaş, which indicates that, today, this race embraces a religion which seems to have been formed in Persia and is a mixture of Christianity, Islam and Mazdeism. Also cf Hasluck, *ibid.*, pp. 140-149. The christianic elements of the religion of the Kızılbaş enhance the opinion expressed by R. Leonhard (*Paphlagonia-Reisen und Forschungen im nördlichen Kleinasien*, Berlin 1915, pp. 356, 360, 367) that this race consists of descendants of the older inhabitants of Asia Minor, including the Gauls. By analyzing the racial characteristics, Leonhard notes the great similarity between Kızılbaş and their Greek neighbors and also the equal difference between them and the Turks. G. K. Skalieres, at his work *Λαοί και φυλαί της Μικράς Ασίας* [Nations and Tribes of Asia Minor], Athens 1922, pp. 194-195, claimed that Kızılbaş (*Ερυθρίνοι*) were originated from the Greeks. However, given that it is very difficult to explain the origin of the Mazdeism elements in their religion without admitting their Persian origin, this is very difficult to be explained. It should be noted that Köprülü (*MOG* Vol. I p. 215) considers Kızılbaş as “genuine Turks who clearly had preserved the old national tradition”. – B. Mirmiroglu, *Οι Δερβίσσαι*, Athens 1940, pp. 218-234, described in detail the religious ceremonies of the Kızılbaş.

whom belonged the followers of Osman, had penetrated into Asia Minor as nomads<sup>229</sup>. The most capable of them were able to establish the Selcuk State of Rum<sup>230</sup>, settled in this land and embraced Islam, who prevailed in the neighboring countries. As the nomads of the Selcuk State were coming into frequent contact with the towns and villages that had Islamized, they were increasingly being absorbed from rural life getting in a position more ingratulatory for the principles of Mohammedanism to be learned. Among them, the influence of babas and the preachers could prove very important factor. However, at the westernmost parts of the peninsula, where Oğuz was (living) within Christian environment, it was impossible for the voice of muezzin calling the faithful to Allah to reach. Moreover, the effect of Akhi association, which had an urban character par excellence, due to the nature of things, could not be extended to the northwestern Asia Minor nomads. The Akhis, which were a major factor for the spreading of Islam in the East, was primarily a labor union with socialist orientations, representing the most modern element of Turkish Mohammedanism. But, apart from communal ownership they had no other common element with the nomads of southern Bithynia. Meanwhile, such was the anarchy in Bithynia that is difficult to imagine an expansion of the association before the pacification of the country and before the occupation of the cities, since the existence of an organization such as the Akhis, requires regular social life and peaceful conditions.

Apart from the territorial and social conditions, it is good to look whether we can learn something that could shed some light on the religious situation of the Turks in Bithynia from the names of tribes and individuals. Since the 11th century and onwards, Oğuzes were also called *Türkmen*<sup>231</sup>, while the Byzantines called them Tourkomanous (*Τουρκομάνοι*)<sup>232</sup>. The name *Türkmen* is preserved in Asia Minor until today and it is

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<sup>229</sup> See W. Barthold "Ghuzz", *EI*, Vol. I p. 178 B.

<sup>230</sup> Barthold, *ibid.*. Marco Polo, who visited the eastern Asia Minor around 1272, wrote that the population was divided into three races. The first, consisted of Turkmens who were nomads living at the mountains and the inaccessible places of the country. The second and the third were consisted of Greeks and Armenians who were living in the cities (Iconium, Kaisareia, Sevasteia) engaged with trade and small industry. *The Travels of Marco Polo*, Everyman's Library, London 1932, p. 33.

<sup>231</sup> See Barthold, *EI* "Ghuzz" (Vol. I p. 178 B), "Türkmen" (Vol. 4 p. 943 B) and "Türks" (Vol. 4 p. 951 B).

<sup>232</sup> Anna Comnena, Vol. II 2 p. 248 l. 16, ed. Reifferscheid. *Kinnamos* E' 3 p. 208 l. 1, ed. Bonn. *Acropolites*, Vol. I p. 136 l. 11, p. 160 l. 2, ed. Heisenberg. It should be noted that Acropolites makes distinction among the Turks of the Seljuk State and the Turkmen, calling the first *Πέρσας* [Persians].

referred to those being at the lowest level of culture, the nomads and irreligious<sup>233</sup>, just like the word *Türk*, which meant villager<sup>234</sup> for Ottomans while the Empire was flourishing, And, as it was natural, this term in order to have this meaning, those carrying the name *Türkmen*, should actually be at the lowest level of culture. Those of them who would evolve into farmers and townsmen were no longer called *Türkmen* and were taking the name of the state they lived within, e.g. Selcuk, Karamanlı, Osmanlı. However, they kept on calling / naming *Türkmen* the old underdeveloped members of the same race<sup>235</sup>. In this way, the word has been kept only to indicate today's nomads of Turkey and Central Asia<sup>236</sup>. It is of crucial significance the fact that İbn Battuta<sup>237</sup> calls the Osmanlis *Tourkomanous*, which shows that, in the year 1333, the name Osmanli had not completely prevailed in order to indicate Orhan's followers.

If now, like the other *Türkmen*, the Osmanli conquerors of Bithynia, were of nomadic origin, and during the first decades of the 14th century were living partly nomadic<sup>238</sup>, it is easy to conclude that sixty years earlier, that is before 1282, they did not have pure and developed Moslem consciousness. Many of them had names that were clearly Muslim names (Osman, Haşan, Bekir, Mehmet), but these names alone cannot be considered as proof of Islamic consciousness for those who carried them, because, as we know, nomads easily get names from the nations they were passing through on their course<sup>239</sup>.

While Turkmen from southern Bithynia and Eskişehir, throughout the 13th century, do not show signs of religious life, Ottomans, their direct descendants, when they appear in history that have that irrepressible vigor and missionary enthusiasm,

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<sup>233</sup> According to Tsakyroglu (ibid., p. 10), the word *Türkmen* is used as a synonym for *Yürük* and *göçebe* to designate the nomads.

<sup>234</sup> Cf H. Vambéry, *Das Türkenvolk* p. 612.

<sup>235</sup> About the nomadism of the Oahu and the *Türkmen* Leunclavius, *Historiae* p. 94 says: “quippe pro majorum suorum consuetudine, revera Nomades errant Oguzii, qui pascuorum causa de locis aliis in alia cum familiis commigrabant et tentoriis suis, vel mapalibus, sub dio contenti, nulla nec oppida, nec pagos, nec aedificia sibi struebant...cujusmodi sunt adhuc in usu Tataris et apud Turcos iis, qui hodieque suis cum gregibus hinc inde per Anatoliam, Caramaniam, Suriam et Arabiam vagantur et pascula certis pretiis conducunt ac Turcomanleri nominantur”.

<sup>236</sup> The Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan was established in 1925, as a result of the enormous civilizing project, which was implemented on the nomads by the USSR. This work which causes admiration to those who are aware of the conditions that prevail there, has not finished yet, because, many nomads, denying the civilization, keep on roaming at the plateaus having been little affected by the new organization.

<sup>237</sup> *Voyages* Vol. I p. 321.

<sup>238</sup> See Kantakouzenos' testimony, ibid., p. 51 f.n. 52.

experienced only by neophytes to Islam. Because, as stated by Paparrigopoulos<sup>240</sup>, who although not Turkologist, had acute crisis as a historian, over time, this extremely militant religion ceases to inspire war momentum and its followers drift in luxury and indolence. That is why the establishment and spread of the Ottoman state was primarily neophytes' task. According to the Greek historian, later when they rose to the highest state offices were the minds and, as fighters the hands of the rising Ottoman power.

Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the Turks that were living in the northwestern part of the peninsula, who were nomads and invaders and showed no signs of religious and political life, had the religious zeal and awareness of some spiritual mission so that to contribute to the spread of the Moslem religion before the Ottomans' predominance.

But, in addition, such were the conditions rural people were under that there was no good reason to defect to the foreign religion.

When Michael VIII toured in Bithynia and noted the abandonment of the country, since the Ottomans were unorganized, the Ottoman troops were not an immediate danger. From the other side, the real terror for the people of the region, were the bands of irregulars, who were raiding unexpectedly aiming in plundering and enslavements, without the minimum interest for the religion or the beliefs of the victims. That being the case and since the Christian populations of the countryside could not hope in a better fate if they espoused Islam, it was natural to remain faithful to their ancestral religion, giving a fight for their very existence, in very difficult circumstances.

Within this literally deplorable situation fleeing was the only salvation from suffering. If this was possible, the rural Christian populations, rather than changing religion, were taking the road to the sea and migrating to safer places, leaving their homeland and property. The evacuation of the country proved to be the worst misfortune and extensively helped the conqueror in his task.

It remains now to look whether the lack of men may be due to the leakage of the male population to the enemy camps. As was to be expected, after Michael VIII's unaffectionate policy toward native troops, the desertions multiplied daily, since the

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<sup>239</sup> As it is known, the same thing happens with the gypsies of the Balkan Peninsula, who besides their national names, at the same time, they have Christian and Muslim names.

<sup>240</sup> *Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed. Vol. 5 A p. 184.

pillage obtained by the deserters who were collaborating with the enemy was much richer than the scant and ever decreasing wages that would get from the royal treasury. The deserts that were being admitted by the Turks as allies and guides were becoming very dangerous for the security of the country. However, no matter how destructive were the devastation effects, can not alone explain the decline of the rural population. First, the vast majority of the soldiers and especially the deserts were not dealing with agriculture and secondly, compared with the masses of the people, the soldiers were few.

From the above it is clear that the abandonment of the country and the rural depopulation which occurred around 1282 was not due to urbanization or migration to the Ottomans. The Moslem religion constituted appreciable factor for things in Bithynia, only after Osman appeared at the outskirts of Bursa and Nicaea, tightening the siege noose around smaller fortified cities which were strategically important. Then, it became clear that the Ottomans had not come as mere raids but for permanent settlement, and, since then, the rural inhabitants began to collaborate with their opponents, to embrace Islam and to merge with the Ottoman people, in groups. As may be seen from the deserts to the Ottomans that were reported by the Byzantine historians are related with rather later period. During the last decades of the 13th century, apostasy and accession to the ranks of the Turks could not cause decrease of the rural population.

Instead, very likely seems the version that the shortage of men was due to migration of the most vital element of the country. Such population movements to the coastal cities and thence to Thrace in search for security, are clearly mentioned by Pachymeres and Nikiforos Gregoras, who, with obvious exaggeration, leave the impression, that the exodus from the interlard was almost general<sup>241</sup>. However, this exaggeration gives us an idea of the size of the migration flow, which, more qualitative rather than quantitative, impacted significantly on the demographic composition of the country, and was the main factor for its easy submission. This flow was also felt in the provinces neighboring to Bithynia, in particular the former Thrakesion, Boukellarion and Paphlagonon provinces, where the newly founded states of Kermian, Sarouchan, Sasan, Karasu and Amur still hadn't impose their authority on the provinces that

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<sup>241</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Δ' 27 pp. 310-311. - *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 18 p. 314, 21 p. 318, 26 pp. 335-337. Gregoras Ζ' 1 (Vol. I p. 214): "όσοι δ' έλαθον διαδράντες, οι μέν ες τας έγγιστα πόλεις κατέφυγον, οι δε και ες Θράκην άσκευοι και γυμνοί των προσόντων διέβησαν".

anarchy prevailed<sup>242</sup>. From the historians' further silence, is obvious that both there and in Bithynia, the massive movements of people came to an end just when these areas were conquered by the rulers mentioned above. Reasons for this phenomenon are the religious tolerance and modesty which Turks and primarily Osmanlis conducted themselves politically with, at the beginning of their historic course, providing security and freedom to work to their subjects and by establishing a new order that was by far preferable than anarchy and civil wars<sup>243</sup>. So, since after the domination of the Ottomans there was no good reason for a massive flight, we admit that, during the critical years of internal tumults, raids and economic disintegration, emigration remained intense but subsided the day after the establishment of the occupier, within the first three decades of the century. But meanwhile, it had managed to incur disastrous results for Hellenism, because it had left the way free to the occupier and would not be long to subdue even that last stronghold of the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor.

Probably a united and strong administration would be both able to hold the rural population leakage by opposing the causes that created it, and also to defend against the occupier. But, as in most cases, civil wars and disasters are followed by anarchy and negligence for the public interest, a situation highly favorable for the domination of selfish aims of local rulers, that as Byzantium had abandoned them, they had become virtually autonomous and regulated their affairs by themselves, at will. Principally in the most remote places, the Byzantine commanders, not only didn't unite to confront the Ottomans, but the conducted raids against each other; there were also cases in which they cooperated with their neighbors, who were of different race<sup>244</sup>. This cooperation and mutual tolerance prove once more that there were not strong racial or religious conflicts at this period<sup>245</sup> and if the Ottoman conquest hadn't interfered, the

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<sup>242</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Δ'* 27 pp. 311-312. Γρηγοράς Ζ' 1 p. 214.

<sup>243</sup> Cf Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 p. 482. Wittek, *The Rise* pp. 20, 43.

<sup>244</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 22 pp. 222-223. Cf Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I pp. 56, 62, 68. J.H. Krammers, *EI* Vol. 4 p. 1013 B.

<sup>245</sup> Similar cases of cooperation between Byzantines and Turks are repeatedly mentioned during the times of the Seljuks as well. Very important is Michael Attaleiates' (p. 306, ed. by Bonn): "επειπερ ο βασιλεύς [Nikephoros Votaneiates] τοιούτοις αγωνίμασι και τροπαίοις τα της εσπέρας καλώς διατέθεικεν, ενόσει δε τα της εώας και των Τούρκων επιδρομαίς και τη συνθήκη των κοινωνησάντων Ρωμαίων αυτοίς και κατά των ομογενών επανισταμένων, εστήριξε το πρόσωπον και προς την εκείσε κατάστασιν". Referring to the 12<sup>th</sup> century, Nikitas Choniates (p. 50, ed. by Bonn), narrating the events of Ioannes II Comnenos' campaign for the reoccupation of Frygia, (in 1142- Muralt, *Essai de chronographie byzantine*, Vol. I p. 141), gives us a very interesting information about the Lake Pousgousi and its islets: "ώκουν ούν ταύτας τηνικάδε καιρού Χριστιανών εσμοί, οι και διά λέμβων και ακατίων τοις Ικονιεύσι Τούρκοις επιμυγνόμενοι, ού μόνον την προς αλλήλους φιλιαν εντεύθεν εκράτουναν, αλλά και τοις επιτηδεύμασιν

two tribes would have lived together as peer neighbors, facing the same risks and a common fate. Philanthropinos' revolt, in which the Turkish mercenaries associated with the disappointed people, was a joint effort aiming at uniting the country and at its liberation from the domination of Paleologs. After the suppression of the movement, Bithynia returned to its former state. Since there was lack of a strong man that could be imposed to restore unity, emerge again the various local leaders. The division and fragmentation of the country into teeny portions whose basis was not moral courage, patriotic consciousness, the politic tradition and organization of the free Greek cities of antiquity, accelerated allegiance to the foreign conqueror, who appeared before the abandoned and totally suffering area with joined forces and a definite aim.

Yet, since there weren't bigotries and violent ethnic conflicts, one could assume that if the Turkish element was already settled in the Byzantine Bithynia would certainly accelerate or even facilitate the Ottoman conquest. Then arises the following question: were there Turks settled in Bithynia, and if so, what was their numerical and political power?

At first, from the thorough study of things arises that the Seljuk occupation of Nicaea, which lasted from 1078 until 1097, had not left traces on the country's culture. This leads us to conclude that the Turks who were settled in Bithynia were not only a numerically weak minority, but also, in terms of culture, did not prevail in relation to indigenous people. Those (if some) who had remained after the departure of the Seljuks, had never constituted a worth mentioning factor. Their fate is unknown to history, since they didn't leave behind writings or other monuments, apart from few tombstones built in the walls of Nikaia<sup>246</sup>. The title *tzaousios*<sup>247</sup> is met in the Byzantine hierarchy, but

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αυτῶν ἐν πλείοσι προσεσχῆκασιν· ἀμέλει καὶ ὡς ὁμορούσιν αὐτοῖς προστιθέμενοι Ῥωμαίους ὡς ἐχθροὺς ἐπεβλέποντο". Likewise, according to Kinnamos' testimony (A'10 p. 22), this king held a tough and bloody struggle to become the master of the lake, "τῶν δ' ἐν αὐτῇ Ῥωμαίων οὐκ ἐνδιδόντων ταύτην αὐτῷ (χρόνῳ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔθει μακρῷ Πέρσαις τὰς γνῶμας ἀνακραθέντες ἦσαν). – According to Ramsay (*Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, p. 389) Lake Pousgousi or Pasgousi is now called Beyşehir Gölü. Kinnamos (B' 8 p. 58) says that formerly it was called Lake Sklirou [του Σκληροῦ].

<sup>246</sup> See K. Otto - Dorn, *Das islamische Iznik*, Berlin 1941, p. 2. Cf A.M. Schneider - W. Karnapp, *Die Stadmauer von Iznik*, Berlin 1938, pl. 48. As for the Turkish expansion in the south of Bithynia in the late 12<sup>th</sup> century, P. Wittek (*Byzantion* Vol. 10, p. 37) notes that "someone looks in vain here for traces of the Seljuk urban civilization, which does not seem to have spread west of Sivrihisar". Sivrihisar is located halfway the road that leads from Kotyaeion to Ankara. The oldest Turkish inscriptions in this region, closer to Bithynia, are dating back to the times of stagnation of the Seljuks, when Kotyaeion was self-ruled and the power of the Nicaea kingdom showed steady progress. These inscriptions are located: at an inn (han) ten hours road South-East of Kütahya (dated 1210), at a bath two hours West of the city (dated 1233) and within the city dated 1236. Ismail Hakki, *Kütahya şehri*, Istanbul 1932, pp. 19-22). The oldest

apparently it entered the military language by the Turk mercenaries or for them. Before the establishment of the Ottoman State there are no Turkish toponyms in the area between Saggarios and Rhyndakos<sup>248</sup>. Therefore, these data converge to the interpretation that like Arabs, Seljuks also came in Bithynia as raiders and as long as they remained alien to its people, withdrew without causing any other vitiation except looting and destruction, which are presumed by war.

Apart from the Turk settlers of the period of Seljuk occupation Σελτζουκοκρατία (their presence in Bithynia can be speculated, but not proved) it is related that in the western part of Asia Minor Peninsula lived some Turkmen nomads who were arriving periodically from the East<sup>249</sup>. They are those who, as related by the

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Turkish inscription in Afyon Karahisar dates back to the years of Alaeddin A' (1219-1237). Wittek at R.M. Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia*, Cambridge 1931, p. 95. According to the researches of Wittek (*Byzantion* Vol. 10 p. 36) and Taeschner (*ZDMG* f.n. Vol. 7 p. 97), the oldest inscription that was found in Eskişehir, belongs to 1527. Based on the above, within Bithynia, except from the aforementioned tombstones we do not find any Turkish monument from the pre-Osman era. The first Ottoman inscription is located in Bursa and bears the hicrî date 738 (1337-38). Ahmed Tevhid, *TOEM* Vol. 5 (1330/1914), pp. 318-320. Wittek, *The Rise* pp. 14-15, 43, 53. Taeschner, *ibid.*, p. 85. R. Hartman, *Im neuen Anatolien*, p. 19.

<sup>247</sup> The Turkish çavuş. This title is mentioned by Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* A' 1 p. 13 l. 4, E' 23 p. 426 l. 4, ΣΤ' 30 p. 543 l. 8, Ζ' 28 p. 629 l. 14 and by Acropolites p. 123 l. 11, 14, 15. It is also known from the inscription at the village Platsa of Laconia, by a document of 1309 (*Actes de l' Athos* I, supplement of Vol. 10 of *Vizantiskij Vremennik*, 1903, p. 41 l. 33) where is met as ζαούτζιος [zaoutsios], *Acta et diplomata*, Vol. 4 pp. 266, 267 and elsewhere, see K. Zisios, *Βυζαντιδα* Vol. I (1910) p. 145, and S.B. Kougeas, *Ελληνικά* Vol. 5 (1932) p. 251. Regarding the use of the title see E. Stein, *MOG* Vol. II pp. 42-45, and G. Moravesik, *Byzantinoturcica*, Budapest 1943, Vol. II p. 260.

<sup>248</sup> The Turkish name *Söğüt* (= willow) does not predate the establishment of the state of Osman and Orhan. Much older is the town *Sagoudaous* (word of unknown etymology) mentioned by Anna Comnena (Vol. II p. 269, Reifferscheid). As we said above, although Bury and Ramsay claim that the two towns are identical, however, we cannot find any relationship between the two names through linguistics. Most likely the Turks, by corrupting the older name *Sagoudaous*, named it *Söğüt* making it comprehensive in their language. The older place name *Sagoudaous* is linked with the *Sagoudaous* Slavs of Macedonia. L. Niederle, *Manuel de l' antiquité slave*, Paris 1923, Vol. I p. 115). Niederle concluded that a branch of this Slavic race had migrated to Asia Minor. Given that at the rubric of Cosmosotiras Monasteri, near Ainos, edited by L. Petit, *Izvestija* of Istanbul Vol. 13 (1908), p. 52 l. 32 is mentioned as “emporeion or *Sagoudaous*”, together with other Slavic place names (Nevoselous, Delvotjianous etc.), this is not impossible. From the text, it is not clear whether this is about the Bithynian town of another homonym at a European province. And, if indeed there was a place name *Sagoudaous* at the European side of Hellespont before the invasion of the Turks into Europe, (the rubric / rite? Belongs to the year 1152), then, any claim that the word is linked with the Turkish of Arabic language collapses. If again it is about the Bithynian *Sagoudaous*, then there are two probabilities: either the word is Slavic and reveals Slav immigration at Bithynia or that it is oddment of an ancient Bithynian word, coming from the Greco-Roman times. ή ότι η λέξις είναι σλαβική και προδίδει μετοικισμόν Σλαύων εις την Βιθυνίαν, ή ότι είναι υπόλειμμα αρχαίας βιθυνικής λέξεως, προερχομένης από τους ελληνορωμαϊκούς χρόνους. In any case, the place name *Sagoudaous* is impossible to have any relation with Turks and Arabs. Ramsay and Bury would have better evidence on their disposal if they were aware of the rubric/rite? of Cosmosotiras Monastery. The place name *Sagoudaous* reminds us the analogous *Achyraous* [Αχυράους], which will be discussed below (II, f.n. 4).

<sup>249</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* B' 24 p. 133.

historian Georgios Akropolites<sup>250</sup>, arrested and stripped Michael Paleologos' attendance. Indeed, they almost captured himself Paleologos while he was heading to the sultan of Iconium, after he had lost Theodore II Laskaris' confidence. We should also seek the founders of the Ottoman Emirate in the same category with these nomads, who, according to the mutual concession of the Byzantine historians were living near Dorylaion, on the Byzantine and Seljuk state borders, conducting raids against the wealthy residential areas<sup>251</sup>. But as these nomads were in an developed country, amid rural and urban populations, had no political power before they come into close contact with the Byzantine culture. However, when the Turkish historian Koprülü was studying the general situation in Asia Minor at the eve of the Ottoman State establishment, writes that the Turkish migrations westward were not exclusively of nomadic nature, but agricultural and urban populations had settled throughout the peninsula and re-established towns and fortresses using the same names they had in their old homelands<sup>252</sup>. However, Köprülü do not cite these toponyms which, according to his words, were found both in Asia Minor and Turkestan. Nevertheless, by limiting our investigation in the northwestern part of the peninsula, in the environment where the Ottomans appears, no Turkish names that could justify the eminent Turkish historian's aspect was detected in the late 13th century.

From the study of the Northwest part of Asia Minor peninsula, namely of Bithynia and its immediate environment, one can easily understand that a large part of the current names of towns and villages is corruption or translation of the old Greco-Roman and Byzantine names. For example, Üsküdar is the Byzantine *Σκούταρι*, Kadiköy is *Χαλκηδών*, Sile is *Χηλή*, Kirpe is *Κάρπη*, Izmit (formerly Iznukumid and Iznikmid) is *Νικομήδεια*, Iznik is *Νίανδα*, Geyve is *Κάβαια*, Mudurnu is *Μοδρηνή*, Lefke is *Λεύκες*, Bilecik is *Βηλόκωμα*, Mihaliç is *Μιχαλίσιον*, Inegöl is *Αγγελόκωμα*, Bursa is *Προύσα*, Filadar is *Πελαδάριον*, Tirilye is *Τρίγλεια*, Ulubat is *Λοπάδιον*, Kermasti is *Κρεμαστή*, Perma is *Πέραμα*, Erdek is *Αρτάκη*, Kütahya is *Κοτυάειον* and Ermeni Derbent, which was later called Ermeni Pazarcık and today just Pazarcık, is the Byzantine *Αρμενόκαστρο*<sup>253</sup>. Even Balıkeser, which is considered Turkish word, is

<sup>250</sup> *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 65 p. 136.

<sup>251</sup> Cf Köprülü, *Les origines* p. 88.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.

<sup>253</sup> Wittek, refers to many of these place names at *Byzantion* Vol. 10 pp. 11-64, where is cited a map with the Greek and the Turkish namings. Particularly for Armenokastron, whose name is of great interest,

produced from *Παλαιόκαστρο*, as shown by Ibn Battuta's writing <sup>254</sup> بالى ك سرى and *Paleocastro* by Guazzo, who followed the Mehmed II's campaign against Rhodes (1480) and wrote relatively<sup>255</sup>.

Some other names reveal a distinctive feature of the soil (Aksu, Kurşumlu, Dil), or the production of a specific product (Incirli, Armudlu, Katırlı, Samanlı), or the name of the landowner (Umurbey, Karamursal etc.), as respectively indicate our toponyms *Κρυνέρι, Συκοχώρι, Πλάτανος, Αχμεταγά. Söğüt* (Ιτέα) also belongs in the same category. The parallel existence of such toponyms in central and distant Western Asia would, of course, have been a presumption that proves the re-establishment of Turkestan's towns in Asia Minor.

Besides, there is another category of toponyms met in today's Turkmenistan and East Turkestan that recall names similar to these of Asia Minor. These names can be divided into two groups. To the first one belong these related with the ground, like ours *ὅπως σ' εμάς υπάρχουν τα: Κλεισούρα, Βάλτος, Πηγάδια, Πέραμα, Βουρλοπόταμος* etc. The second group relates with names of Turkish tribes. However, neither the first nor the second category of toponyms can prove the re-establishment of Turkish towns and villages of Central Asia in tAsia Minor peninsula.

The first ones, even when they state flourishing cities of today's Turkish Soviet Republics and eastern Turkestan, aren't originated from urban but from rural life, i.e. such as *Ortakuyun, Uzunkuyun, Karaboghaz, Çıkışlar, Karakum, Kazıklıbent, Kavaklı, Pazar, Tahta, Kargalık, Kızıl pazar, Kızılsu, Uzunbulak, Arkadagh, Açikkul, Atikkul, Ayakkumbul*. Most of them reveal nomadic or semi-nomadic regimes.

The second ones, namely the names which indicate Turkish tribes, i.e. Başkır, Bayındır, Çaruk, Çepni, Turgut, Kınık, Kay, Bayat, Salur, Afsar and Zeybek, can prove nothing more than that these tribes inhabited those places carrying their name, when

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noteworthy is what wrote F. Taeschner, *Das anatolische Wegenetz* Vol. I pp. 119-120. It seems that the entire region of Armenokastron was called Ermeni by the Turks; later were formed the names Ermeni Derbend, indicating the narrow passage, and Ermeni Pazarı or Ermeni Pazarcık, denoting the commercial center. ارمنى, which was named *mons Ormenius* by Leunelavius (*Historiae* p. 100), was rightly verbalized by Hammer as *Ermeni*, but the Greek translator (pp.50, 51) converted it again to its Greek version, which is *Ορμήνιον*! Ermeni is mentioned by the old Ottoman historians together with Domaniç [Ντούμαντζ] as the summer residence of Ertuğrul, which was granted by the sultan Alaeddin. Aşıkpaşazade, ed. by Istanbul p. 4. Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 192. Anonymus Giese p. 5.

<sup>254</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II. p. 316. Cf Sa'deddin, trans. Brattuti Vol. I p. 52.

<sup>255</sup> *Compendio d. M. Marco Guazzo Padouano de la Guerra di Mohametto gran Turco fatte con Venetiani, con il Re di Persia....* in Venetia 1552, p. 17n, referred by Taeschner, *ibid.*, p. 175 f.n. 3.

they came there from the East<sup>256</sup>. Besides, the frequent appearance of such toponyms is not only due to the spread and dominance but mainly rather to the constant movements of these tribes from place to place, and it constitutes an additional proof of their nomadic life.

Those of the current Turkish names of Bithynia's villages and towns which did not come from corruption or wrong etymology of Byzantine toponyms, are traced back in times later than the descent of the Turks, in a time in which the Ottomans differentiated from nomadic to agricultural life and no longer retained the memory of their old country.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the study of Western Asia Minor toponyms Minor does not help Köprülü in strengthening his theory. There is no evidence that could undermine the old view that Northwestern Turks were of nomadic origin. Instead, there is every indication that the Turks who were intending to settle in Bithynia had come in limited number, as nomads or semi-nomads. The fact that they were nomads connotes from the thought that urban and rural populations wouldn't have manage to reach to the end of such a long and arduous course. Besides, they were few in number, because many were dispersing or would die while covering the vast and rugged area to Bithynia. Of course, this distance was being covered by short or long stopovers, depending on the environment and circumstances. However, the ease with which they were abandoning a site in favor of another is another element that strengthens the conviction that they were nomads. Since they arrived to the fertile lands of Asia Minor, some of them, over time, engaged in farming and, as they were evolving in farmers, they were taking care to maintain more or less good relations with neighboring towns and villages. Over time, the former nomads, from dangerous civilization enemies, now, as farmers, they were becoming positive and valuable elements who, by race intersection, offered new blood and vitality to the old and demographically declining populations. The transition from nomadic to agricultural life was realized under the influence of the Byzantine environment. The story of the Selcuk settlement<sup>257</sup> was repeated two centuries later with the Ottoman case.

Throughout this period, namely from the 11th to the 13th century, Turks, either as farmers or as nomads, in times of peace, were visiting the cities in order to

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<sup>256</sup> Cf R. Leonhard, *Paphlagonia-Reisen und Forschungen im nördlichen Kleinasien* p. 355.

exchange their products or to seek better luck. Many of the latter, by being more nomads than real farmers, were ranked in the imperial army as mercenaries. Under the Byzantine soldier status came to know even the most remote towns of the state. As long ago as the 11th century, Nikiforos Votaniatis and Alexios Komnemos led their Turkish troops within the walls of principal cities of the East, even within the walls of Constantinople (Βασιλεύουσα)<sup>258</sup>. However, they didn't constitute national core at no place πουθενά. Neither does the existence of the some more permanent and regular Turkish soldiers, the so-called Tourcopoloi [Τουρκόπολοι], which were organized in special battalions, prove that the Turks had settled in the Byzantine being conscious of their national identity. Tourkopoloi were usually recruited from an early age and, be it superficially, generally were Christianized. Those of the mercenaries that weren't returning to their homelands, over time, were blend in the the predominant Byzantine environment<sup>259</sup>. During the years of Lascarids and the first Palaiologs no cases of state motivated immigrations of Turks with their families, were noted at the eastern provinces, κατά το παράδειγμα on the example of "vardariotes".

For all these reasons, it is difficult to admit that Turks were an important factor in civic life of Asia Minor's Northwest end and especially Bithynia, where industry has shown strong growth. Generally they (the Turks) abstained from crafts, industry and similar occupations, which presupposed permanent establishment in cities and qualifications that was not met at the former nomads. Moreover, the fact that, two centuries later, Mohammed II called Greek hand craftsman to inhabit the City (Constantinople)<sup>260</sup>, reinforces the view that Ottomans of the Middle Ages weren't engaged in those occupations whose exercise creates urban life. That is precisely the reason that the few Turks didn't become constant and active inhabitants of the Bithynian cities. Conversely, in areas that, for a long time, experienced the Seljuk or Arab sovereignty, by having contact with the older inhabitants and certainly with their co-religionists Arabs, the Turkish element was able to rise to a culture level almost comparable with that of the Byzantines or the Arabs. However, at the region between

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<sup>257</sup> Cf Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 p. 479.

<sup>258</sup> Michael Attaleiates, pp. 215, 241, 265, 266, etc. – Nikephoros Vryennios, pp. 130, 137, 140, 142, 143, etc. Cf J. Laurent "Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoucides en Asie Mineure", *Βυζαντιδα* Vol. II (1911) A-B pp. 101-126, particularly pp. 122-124.

<sup>259</sup> Cf K. Amandos "Τουρκόπολοι", *Ελληνικά* Vol. 6 (1933) pp. 325-326.

the Rivers Ryndakos and Saggarios, where Arabs and Seljuks passed as conquerors and withdrew quickly without consolidating<sup>261</sup>, this cultural contact among Arabs, Seljuks and western Turks was impossible.

For this reason, Turk settlers of Bithynia never surpassed the stage/level of nomadic or rural life. As their majority remained nomads, Turks refrained from any political organization and remained away from the problems the country was facing. By extension, reinforced by the complete lack of contrary information from contemporary historians, we come to believe that we do not distance from truth if we conclude that, if we exclude the mercenaries, the Turkish element within the Byzantine Bithynia was primarily nomadic and secondarily agricultural and without having national consciousness and defined religion kept passive attitude towards the various political, social and economic ferments that occurred in this area, both in rural areas and cities, at the end of the 13th century.

After the Turkish element, it remains to consider/study whether any other people of other races that could affect the political and social situation in Bithynia were in the same area. Firstly let us come to the Slavs.

Russian historians V. Vasilievskij<sup>262</sup> and F. Uspenskij<sup>263</sup>, who wrote over sixty years ago, at a time that Pan Slavism was a very powerful ideological trend and the Russian policy was directed towards the Mediterranean, formulated the theory that the Frontiersmen (Ακρίτες) and the average rural class of Asia Minor were of Slavic origin. When later Slavic settlements were studied thoroughly and G. Ostrogorsky<sup>264</sup>, one of the youngest and most distinguished Russian historians, admitted that this theory lacks

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<sup>260</sup> Martini Crusii, *Turcograccia, Basiliae* 1584, pp. 13, 14. P. Carolides, *Ιστορία της Ελλάδος 1453-1863*, Athens 1925, p. 197.

<sup>261</sup> Regarding the Arabic incursion see J. Wellhausen, "Die Kämpfe der Araber mit den Römaern in der Zeit der Umajjiiden", *Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, phil-hist.* KI. 1901, pp. 414-447. E. W. Brooks, "The Arabs in Asia Minor from Arabic Sources", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* Vol. 18 (1898) pp. 182-208. Idem, "Byzantines and Arabs in the Time of the Early Abbassides", *English Historical Review* Vol. 15 (1900) pp. 728-747. About the Seljuk incursions see J. Laurent, *Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoudides dans l'Asie Occidentale*, pp. 91-111.

<sup>262</sup> *Zurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveščenija* Vol. 202 (1879) pp. 160, 232, 386-438 and Vol. 210 (1880) pp. 98-170, 355-404.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 225 (1883) pp. 77, 342-345.

<sup>264</sup> "Die ländische Steuergemeinde des byzantinischen Reiches", *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* Vol. 20 (1927) p. 12 ff. and *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates*, Munich 1940, p. 88 f.n. 2. However, as it is proved by P. Mutafčiev's study, *Vojniški zemi i vojnici v Vizantija prez XIII-XIV v.* (Military Estates and Soldiers in Byzantium During the XIII and XIV century), the resonance of the old Slavic theory of our times was not reduced. *Δημοσιεύματα της Βουλγαρικής Ακαδημίας των*

historical basis, this view was abandoned. However, it is worthwhile to go back to historical sources and look into the entire issue of the Slavic settlements in Bithynia.

The Byzantine chronicler Theofanis<sup>265</sup> records the information that, when Emperor Justinian II campaigned against Sclavinia and Bulgaria, "at areas of Opsikion settled (many) crowds of Slaves obtained either by war or by affiliation and passing them through Abydos". According to the chronicler, this fact took place in 688<sup>266</sup>. However, while Justinian II's still continued to reign, an army of 30,000 men was set up by these settlers and sent against the Arabs<sup>267</sup>. When they contacted by the enemy, the 20.000 defected to the Arabs, fact which angered the emperor to such an extent that he fundamentally destroyed the Slavic settlements which were constructed close to Lefkatis River at the Gulf of Nicomedia, and violently dispersed the Slavs he found there.

After such events, it would be natural all Slavs traces in Bithynia to be eliminated. However, Theofanis<sup>268</sup> cites a second Slavic settlement in the year 746, when Constantine VI was king. Not any other information is mentioned about them. However, we can assume that from 8th to 13th century, by the stronger Greek environment was accomplished the complete assimilation of the Slavs.

Finally, in the 12th century, John II Comnenos moved and installed again Serb captives near Nikomedia<sup>269</sup>. But their fate wouldn't be different than that of the other Slavs in Bithynia. Over time, all were completely assimilated, so towards the end of 13th century not any trace of Slavic element's national survive to be found. During the establishment of the Ottoman State, the Slavic factor is inexistent. However, after the spread of the Turks in Europe, this factor was gradually becoming more and more important so, reasonably Professor A. Vasiliev<sup>270</sup> to claim that: "Ottomans, in the mid-

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*επιστημών*, No. 27, Sofia 1923 (*Publications of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences*). Cf book review F. Dölger, *BZ* Vol. 26 (1926) pp. 102-113.

<sup>265</sup> Ed. C. de Boor, Leipzig 1883, Vol. I p. 364. Cf *Νικηφόρος Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, eds. de Boor, Leipzig 1880, p. 36.

<sup>266</sup> This date is been accepted unreservedly by Prof. D.A.Zakythinis (*Οι Σλάβοι εν Ελλάδι*, Athens 1945, p. 29) and with some reservation by Prof. K.I. Amandos (*Ιστορία του Βυζαντινού Κράτους*, Vol. I p. 334); However, it is disputed by G. Ostrogorsky, *Geschichte* p. 74. To the Slav settlers was also referred at a 7<sup>th</sup>-century lead-sealed, entitled "των ανδραπόδων των σκλαβών της Βιθυνών επαρχίας", which was first published by B. Pančenko, *Izvestija* of Istanbul Vol. 8 (1903) pp. 15-62. Pančenko's reading was corrected by G. Schlumberger, *BZ* Vol. 12 (1903) p. 277.

<sup>267</sup> *Θεοφάνης* p. 366.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 432. Cf. *Νικηφόρον* p. 68.

<sup>269</sup> Nikitas Choniates p. 23, ed. by Bonn. Cf R. Janin, *EO* Vol. 20 (1921) p. 317.

<sup>270</sup> *Histoire de l' Empire Byzantin*, Paris 1932, Vol. II p. 283.

15th century established a state that wasn't not only Greek-Turkish, but Greek-Slavic-Turkish, in which Serbs and the Bulgarians had also participated". Before the Ottoman expansion in Europe, the only element they came into contact with Asia Minor Hellenism, which was able to affect the development of the novel emirate, in the same way that formerly affected Stefan Nemanja and John Asan's hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula.

Besides Slavs small groups of Armenians, Gypsies αθίγγανους and Tatars could also be found. The presence of Armenians, says Theodoros Skoutariotes<sup>271</sup>, who places them near Scamandros (river), namely at the west of the area where the Ottoman State was first developed. Apart from them, in Bithynia's mainland, as evidenced by the toponym Armenokastron, is not unlikely the existence of more or less Hellenized Armenians.

There is no evidence about Gypsies' presence in Bithynia. Theofanis<sup>272</sup> mentions Gypsies in Asia Minor, but further south, in Phrygia and Lycaonia. According to the same chronicler's testimony, they suffered fierce persecution as heretics in the early 9th century and eventually exterminated. However, since the vast spread of gypsy tribes coincides with the decline of Byzantium, it is not out of the question that some groups were wandering in the plains of Bithynia. But eventually, since they were nomads, religiously undefined and politically indifferent, as they are today, their presence in the 13th century is considered insignificant and unimportant.

Concerning Tatars, we know that some of them that probably belonged to the hordes of Genghis Khan, which had overthrown the Seljuk State, penetrated to Bithynia and devolved the country plundering, enslaving and sowing panic sometimes even in Nikaia<sup>273</sup>. Tatars could affect the situation if they had political guideline and orientation. However, this does not seem to have happened. As they were remains of a raiders rabble, that had been abandoned or lost their way in a foreign country, they lived like bandits, they caused damages and finally disappeared without leaving any other memory than the disasters they caused.

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<sup>271</sup> Προσθήκαι εις την Ιστορίαν του Γεωργίου του Ακροπολίτου, ed. A. Heisenberg, p. 277.

<sup>272</sup> Eds. de Boor pp. 488, 495, 497.

<sup>273</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 28 pp. 244-250, Δ' 30 p. 323.

Apart from the Slavic settlers of Bithynia are also reported Cretans, who, without standing the Venice domination, emigrated from their homeland<sup>274</sup>. They settled in the eastern provinces, and most probably in Bithynia too, forming a mercenary army. Under the leadership of their leader Hortatzis took part in Philanthropenos' revolt, but then betrayed him by joining Andronikos' the service<sup>275</sup>. Moreover, nothing else is known about their fate.

As demonstrated by M. Kleonimos, Ch. Papadopoulos<sup>276</sup>, F.W. Hasluck<sup>277</sup> and M. Filindas<sup>278</sup>, based on toponymic and linguistic remarks, traces of Μανιάτες and Τσάκωνες have survived until our days. According to Hasluck, the residents of Pistikochorion were alleging that they come from Mani, while residues of tsakoniki dialect were preserved at village Vatika or Mousatsa. Although it is impossible to verify if Maniates had arrived there before or after the Ottoman conquest, we think that the name Vatika constitutes sufficient evidence of colonization from Mani. The most likely form/scenario is that they came after the establishment of the Ottoman State, because it would be very difficult to survive in such radical weathering<sup>279</sup>. There is no doubt that during the Turkish occupation Turcokratia, were performed migrations from the Greek mainland, mainly by Eperots, who lived in Agrafiotika, near Lake Apollonias. Among these subsequent settlements, probably to these of the 17th century, must also be included the Laconians. So, we conclude that, from all the foreigners who settled in the land of Bithynia, only Cretans exerted some affect situation by their participation in the Philanthropenos revolt/ movement. But after the suppression of the revolution, they also fell into obscurity.

Given the above, it is concluded that the decline that led Bithynia at the end of its national freedom originates not from racial antagonisms between the supposedly national minorities and the vast majority of the people. The causes of the fall of the Bithynian Hellenism were not ethnical but political and social. Bithynia, towards the end of the 13th century, on the one hand due to the long wars and invasions and on the other because of imperial Constantinople's strict policy, fell into economic decline,

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<sup>274</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Γ'* 8 p. 209.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, Γ' 9-10 pp. 221, 223, 227-228.

<sup>276</sup> *Βιθυνικά*, Istanbul 1857, pp. 97-98.

<sup>277</sup> *Cyzicus*, Cambridge 1910, pp. 148-154.

<sup>278</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

spiritual misery and anarchy, so reasonably is likened to mature fruit, ready to fall into the hands of the conqueror by the first blow of fate.

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<sup>279</sup> This opinion was supported by Prof. K. Amandos at a discussion on Prof. F. Koukoule's

## II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

The conqueror that was to occupy Bithynia was none other than Osman. If we believe the Ottoman traditions<sup>280</sup>, the last year of the 13th century found him (Osman) as independent lord/sovereign at the country that extends between Saggarios' branches, Pursak-çay and Kara-su which includes, Karacahisar and Dorylaion [Dorylaeum] (Eskişehir) to the South, Söğüt region to the east, Yenişehir<sup>281</sup> until the lake of Nikaea to the North and Aggelokoma (İnegöl) to the West, including the eastern foothills of Mount Olympus. The citizens of this miniature state could not be more than 50,000 at most, while its plottage was slightly bigger than Attica, about 3,000 kilometers square. To the South bordered with the emirate of Germiyan which had been established a few years earlier and had Kotyaeion (present Kütahya) as county town. To the east, from Saggarios (Sakarya) to Aly (Kızılırmak), were expanding the possessions of Amur's sons. It seems that, from this side, the borders of the Ottoman emirate were quite vague and unspecified, due to the chaotic situation and anarchy that was prevailing the territories beyond Saggarios. To the West, with his capital at Pergamum, was Karasu, who constantly was pushing his rule forward, towards Propontis, whose coasts, until then, belonged to the Byzantines. Each of these three states could compete dangerously the newly established Osman's hegemony, if he ever was coming into conflict with it. But to the north there was the part of Opsikion province which included Bursa and the whole former Optimaton province to Nicomedia and Nicaea where were maintained little remains of their old prosperity/acme. As mentioned previously, in the future the Ottoman state was going to expand towards this direction.

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announcement at the Athens Scientific Association. See *Aθηνά* magazine Vol. 36 (1925) pp. 314-316.

<sup>280</sup> Aşıkpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 5. Neşri *ZDMG* Vol. 13 (1859) pp. 205, 211. Şükrullah, *MOG* Vol. II pp. 77,79,81. Anonymus Giese p. 6. Ahmedi, *TOEM* Vol. I (1326/1910) p. 47. Neşri, *ibid.*, pp. 194,195 and Şükrullah, *ibid.*, p. 79, write that Karağahisar was conquered by Ertogrul. At that time – add the two authors - Kütahya and its outskirts was still at the hands of the infidels. This, however, does not seem to correspond to the truth. Cf P. Wittek, *Byzantion* Vol. 10 (1935) p. 37. According to the information of Anonymus Giese (p. 5) and Uruč bey (ed. F. Babinger, p. 6), when the Ottomans appeared, Eskişehir was governed by Christian rulers, who were paying tribute to the sultan of the Seljuks. R. Hartmann makes an interesting description of Karacahisar, see *Im neuen Anatolien*, pp. 60-63, Eskişehir pp. 63-72, Söğüt pp. 49-52, Yenişehir pp. 42-43, and İnegöl p. 41.

<sup>281</sup> According to A. Philippson (see map at *Reisen und Forschungen im westlichen Kleinasien*, III) the Turkish Yenişehir is Otroia [*Ότροία*] of Stravon. According to J. Sölch [*BN*] Vol. I, 1920, p. 277), Yenişehir should be identified with the Byzantine Melangea [*Μελλάγγεια* (*Μαλλάγιννα*)], which - according to the same researcher – was at the location of the ancient Otroia. Sölch's view, which has been accepted

The Byzantine Empire had not realized the Ottoman risk timely. When Michael VIII made his known military tour at the provinces of Asia Minor, took care only for the eastern boundary of the state, ensuring them with the best possible way against the raids of the Turks of Amur<sup>282</sup>. Indeed, if death hadn't prevented him, he also intended to fortify the borders of city Achyraous<sup>283</sup>, namely the area within which was being bred the emirate of Karasu<sup>284</sup>. There was no reference about the enemies from the south. If we believe the Ottoman historians, while Ertuğrul was spending the last years of his life in Söğüt, Osman was a 23 years young man. However, the country they are supposed to have live and act was, at least until 1261, within the bounds of the kingdom of Nicaea, which, during Ioannes III Vatatzes reign (1222-1254), included the entire northwestern part of Asia Minor<sup>285</sup>, west of Saggarios. According to the Arab geographer and historian Abu'l Fida (+1331), who relies on Ibn Said's (+1274 or 1285) information, Nicaea State's borders were reaching up to the Gulf of Makri and River Battal, which coincides with the present Dalaman-çay<sup>286</sup>. The Byzantine State

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and supported with convincing arguments by R. Hartmann, *ibid.*, p. 44, is also endorsed by us. See also below, f.n. 69.

<sup>282</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ ΣΤ'* 29 pp. 502-505. Δ' 27 p. 311, Γ' 22 p. 221 “ενόσει δε τα των Βουκελλαρίων, Μαρνανδηρών τε και Παφλαγόνων και λίαν οικτρώς”, namely, the region at the east of Saggarios. Maryandinoi [*Μαρνανδηνοί*] were called those who lived in Heracleia of Pontus, between Bithynia and Paphlagonia. C. Ritter, *Vergleichende Erdkunde des Halbinsellandes Klein – Asien*, Berlin 1858, Vol. I p. 755. Also, Gregoras E' 5 (Vol. I p. 140), Frantzes A' 3 p. 28 (ed. I.B. Papadopoulos).

<sup>283</sup> The toponym Achyraous [*Αχυράους*], from linguistic aspect is interesting because it reminds the Sagoudaous [*Σαγουδάους*] (see f.n. 60 at the first chapter). This town, which is located between Lopadion and Pergamon close to the current Balikesir, was often mentioned by the Byzantines: e.g. Pachymeres (Vol. I p. 23 l. 2, p. 523 l. 6, Vol. II p. 336 l. 16), Acropolites (p. 28 l. 1, p. 37 l. 7, p. 185 l. 24), *Acta et diplomata* Vol. I p. 119 and *Προσθήκας του Σκουταριώτου εις Ακροπολίτην* (p. 278 l. 22, ed. Heisenberg). At a quote of the latter is written: “το κάστρον των Οχυρών, ό και Αχυράους παρά τισι λέγεται” [... the castle Ochyron (Οχυρών), which is also called Achyraous (Αχυράους)]. As Ochyrai [*Οχυραί*] is also mentioned by Nikitas Choniates p. 44, ed. Bonn. Furthermore, it is also met as Achyrao [*Αχειραώ*] (*Βίος Θ. Στουτίδου*, *PG* Vol. 99 p. 209). Despite the impression that it is foreign, no one has ever conceived to correlate this toponym with the Turks. Probably, just like Sagoudaous, it is a relic of the old Bithynian language. The subsequent generations, by making it Ochyrai or Acheirao attempted to Hellenize it just like the posterior Ottomans succeeded to Turkificate Sagoudaous, changing it to Söğüt! Toponyms ending with the suffix *-ους* are not rare. Mostly, are met in European provinces, e.g. Gratzianous [*Γρατζιάνους*], Filippous [*Φιλίππους*], Provatous [*Προβάτους*], Sofous [*Σόφους*], Vanianous [*Βανιάνους*], and it seems that they had widespread use by the people, usually as syncopated types of longer words, like Gratianoupolis [*Γρατιανούπολις*], Filippoupolis [*Φιλίππουπόλις*]. Nevertheless, Prof. Amandos, “*Παρατηρήσεις τινές εις την μεσαιωνικήν γεωγραφίαν*”, *ΕΕΒΣ* Vol. I (1924) pp. 49-50, expresses the belief that the types ending with the suffix *-ους*, were inventions of the literaries. However, as it is evidenced by the names Nevoselous [*Νεβοσέλους*], Ravnianous [*Ραυνιάνους*], Delvotzianous [*Δελβοτζιάνους*], etc., this was not always the case.

<sup>284</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ ΣΤ'* 36 p. 523.

<sup>285</sup> Acropolites, *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 15, p. 28 (ed. Heisenberg). Doucas B' p. 13 (eds. Bonn).

<sup>286</sup> Abu'l Fida', *Taqwim al-buldan*, ed. Ch. Schier, Dresden 1846, p. 211. The relevant passage is given in German translation by P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesehe*, pp. 1-3.

maintained its prosperity also during the four-year reign of Theodore II Laskaris and the rise of Michael Palaeologos. Throughout this period, army was in excellent condition. A series of vallations that had been constructed on the outskirts of the present Bozüyük (Πιθηκάς), at the area of Vatheos River, were blocking the expansion of the Türkmen raiders to the north and their settlement in Karasu valley<sup>287</sup>. Dorylaeum and its immediate region was the nearest point to which the Seljuks' domination had ever reached during the years of the Laskarid. However, the Byzantine State, had already peace treaty with Iconium, and was undistracted dealing with war operations in Europe. The treaty of friendship and non-aggression<sup>288</sup>, which was signed in 1243, renewed in 1257 and remained in force until the last days of the Seljuks.

Consequently, the later tradition, which was preserved by the first Ottoman historians and Laonikos Chalkokondyles, and according to which Alaeddin I Keykubad granted to Ertuğrul Söğüt, the city that is supposed to be Osman's birthplace, seems extremely unlikely. Therefore, we are obliged to admit one of the following two possibilities: the founders of Osman's Royal House had either lived as ordinary individuals in Söğüt or Temnos and Armenokastro, but they were so obscure that their presence was not perceived, or, between the years 1261 and 1282, they weren't in this area at all.

The utter silence of Byzantine sources relatively Bithynia's southern borders, is reasonably construed as implying that nothing unusual was happening in this area, a fact that led Köprülü to assume that, Osman and his followers weren't in the area since they were cooperating with emir of Paphlagonia Amur and participated in the invasions from the East<sup>289</sup>. But this seems unlikely. The whole story of the Ottoman emirate's spread, from South to North, evolving step by step, shows primarily that the starting point for Osman's raids was at the southern border. If he (Osman) was aware of the Bithynian land, from the side of Saggarios, it would be much more natural to have occupied the lands near Nicaea before Karacahisar region. The fact that Osman's emirate developed from south to north rather than east to west makes more likely the opinion that Osman emerged as raider at the outskirts of Eskişehir, something that is

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<sup>287</sup> Cinnamos A'5 p. 38 (ed. Bonn). Nikitas Choniates p. 71 (eds. Bonn).

<sup>288</sup> Acropolites, *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 41, p. 69. Gregoras B' 6 (Vol. I p. 41). Cf Dölger, *Regesten*, No. 1776 (3<sup>rd</sup> issue p. 19).

<sup>289</sup> Köprülü, *Les origines* pp. 124, 127.

also admitted by Köprülü<sup>290</sup>, who contradicts his own words. In conclusion, the most likely scenario is that Ertuğrul and Osman were at the south of Bithynia, on the outskirts of Eskişehir or near Mount Temnos, not as ucbey (Ακρίται) (Akritai) settled on earth, but as silent and anonymous nomads.

As is clear from the testimonies of the Byzantine writers Attaleiates, Bryennios, Anna Comnenos, Kinnamos and Nikitas Choniates, since the 11th century, the plateau of Eskişehir was the prime living space of the nomads. It was an area where anarchy prevailed and Byzantine or Seljuk State's respective rule lacked of a substantial base, since nomads were the essential rulers. For quite a long time even Dorylaeum seems to have remained in their hands serving as gathering place and market<sup>291</sup>. The natural consequence of the nomad's prevalence was devastation, to which also involved the nomadic moves and nomadic lifestyle – characteristics that make tent-dwellers culture enemies<sup>292</sup>.

Under these circumstances, and within a period of twenty years of the capital's transfer from Nicaea to Constantinople, these nomads was impossible to establish an emirate capable to come into conflict with Byzantium, while Michael's reign was lasting. Both from the earlier events, and Michael's tour, we conclude that Osman just like Ertuğrul, apart from predatory confrontations, whose importance and extent was exaggerated by the subsequent Ottomans, had not developed serious military action that could draw the Byzantine State's attention. They were just one of the many bandit groups that ravaged south Bithynia<sup>293</sup>.

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid., pp. 87-88.

<sup>291</sup> Nikitas Choniates, p. 228. Wittek, *ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>292</sup> Sir Paul Rycout (*The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, London 1687, pp. 33, 83) was quite right by saying that, unlike the creators of the Roman Empire, who were great constructors, the Ottomans brought devastation and the demise of the urban areas. "No grass grows there where the Turkish Horse hath once set his foot" is, according to Rycout, a legendary apothegm. Cf K. Anandou, *Ο Ελληνισμός της Μικράς Ασίας*, p. 72. Cinnamos (*Z'* 2 pp. 294-295) vividly describes the destruction of Dorylaion: "το δε Δορύλαιον τούτο ήν μεν ότε πόλις ήν μεγάλη τε είπερ τις των εν Ασία και λόγου αξία πολλού. Ενταύθα [at the outskirts of Dorylaion] Μελισσηών ποτε καίσαρι οικία τε εξωκοδόμηται λαμπράι και κόμαι πολυάνθρωποι ήσαν, θερμά τε αυτόματα και στοαί και πλυνοί και όσα ανθρώποις ηδονήν φέρει, και ταύτα δη ο χώρος άφθονα παρείχεν. Αλλά Πέρσαι, οπηνικά ή κατά των Ρωμαίων ήκμαζεν εκδρομή, την τε πόλιν εις έδαφος βεβλημένη ανθρώπων έρημον παντάπασιν επεποίητο και τα τήδε πάντα μέχρι και επί λεπτόν της πάλαι σεμνότητος ηφάνισαν ίχνος». Also cf Nikitas Choniates, p. 228 l. 8 et seg. The vast expanse of the ruins of Dorylaion was noticed by the English traveler W. M. Leake, at the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, (*Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor*, London 1824, p. 17).

<sup>293</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 22 p. 223: "και πρώτον μεν εκδρομάς ποιούντες κατέθειον την γην εκείνων [their Bithynian neighbors] και σκυλεύοντες (ου γαρ εθάρρουν μένειν) υπέστρεφον· είτα των μεν υποκλινομένων, των δε και αποικιζομένων δέει τω περί του ζην, ευχερείν εκ του ράστα τοις εναντίοις ήν,

The establishment of Osman's rule was gradual and was keeping pace with the course of the circumstances. When he emerged on Bithynia's horizon as a nomad leader, following the general trend of the times and his place turned to raids against the landowners of the area. Mainly, by these raids he was deriving flocks, women, who were valuable for the propagation of the race, slaves, agricultural products and other mobile plunders<sup>294</sup>. However, most of the booty consisted of flocks, not only because they were primarily interested him and his nomad followers, but also because livestock had grown much, since under the rough conditions they could be moved easily and enter into security, landowners considered cattle purchase most appropriate investment for their capitals<sup>295</sup>. Land and its products were plausibly considered risky investment.

Raids brought Osman into contact with the rural population and gave him the opportunity to understand closely the various fermentations which changed the economic and social composition of the area. Osman's private interests were directly linked to the liquidity of the situation. As he owned more flocks, he should have larger land for grazing. Since local landowners were fluidizing, as much as they could, their belongings, were moving with their flocks to safer places. Osman only had to occupy the land they had abandoned. Thus, from nomadic flock owner, he became landowner<sup>296</sup>.

At the lands which came into his possession or close to them, was also settled several small holder farmers, who were unable to leave. Inevitably, Osman and these farmers came into contact. When Osman met the very fertile land of Bithynia, began to

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και κατασχόντες την χώραν κακόν ήσαν γειτόνημα τους πλησίον". Herein, Pachymeres refers to the Turks in general terms.

<sup>294</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Δ'* 26 p. 336: "απάγοντες μεν αιχμαλώτους, απαγοντες δε και ζώα και λείαν πάσαν και αυτόν δη τον καρπόν της γης τον επέτειον, ζώοις τοις εκ λείας διευθετούμενοι και ότι και έδοξεν ασφαλές μεταφέροντες".

<sup>295</sup> Pachymeres, writing on the fertility of the Meander valley [*Μιχαήλ* p. 310 l. 18 et seq.), says nothing about farming activities; besides, apart from "Monks from Ouranoupolis" he mentions only crowds of cattles and flocks. Transition to pastoralism was common in times of war and unrest, when agriculture was hard and disadvantageous. The initiative was mainly down to the large landowners, who possessed very large areas for grazing and relevant capitals. This phenomenon, which generally had unfavorable impact to the Byzantine economy, contributed, as we shall see below, to the demise of the large land ownership, because the flock owners were among the first who fled the territories where anarchy prevailed.

<sup>296</sup> Similar phenomena were also noticed during the period of the Seljuk rule. See I. Bogiatzides, "Ιστορικά Μελέται", *Επιστημονική Επετηρίδι της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* Vol. 2 (1932) p. 129 ff. – Concerning generally the transition from nomadic to agricultural life, very enlightening ar the information of F. H. Giddings, *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, New York 1906, pp. 467-473 and *Elements of Sociology*, New York 1905, pp. 267-269. The new science of Sociology comes to assist History, filling the gaps where there is lack of written documents.

extend its province between his neighboring farmers, who, someone would say, were within Osman's vital area. The dependence of these farmers on the goodwill of their powerful neighbor became progressively larger until it resulted to their full allegiance. Their fields essentially come into the conquerors' possession. Therefore, Osman could be included among those big landowners, called *φύλαρχοι* (*tribal chiefs*), *δυνατοί* (*strongs*) ή *άρχοντες* (*lords, sovereigns*) by the Byzantines. Farmers kept on cultivating the land, but always by Osman's tolerance, who was, somehow, their *feudal lord /seignor χωροδεσπότης*. It is not possible to determine whether Osman's relations with his neighbors were the usual between a feudal lord and his vassals. Byzantine and Seljuk feudalism substantially differed from the similar institution in Western Europe, but we do not know anything relatively to Osman's wages, about the obligations of his timariots, about the ties between lord and vassal and other details<sup>297</sup>. But, taking into account the conditions under which Osman was imposed, we must come to the conclusion that, in this place feudalism emerged in its most primitive form, as long as everything was depended on powerful feudal lord's will, who, until then wasn't aware of another social life than that of the nomadic phatry. Nevertheless, the essential fact remains that Osman, evolving into landlord, laid the first cornerstones of his emirate at the Bithynian earth. But, before the end of 13th century, the importance of the feudal factor is limited by the dominance of a new rural middle class, which was developed in Bythinia's hinterland during the critical years of anarchy and civil war.

Being linked with the Bithynia's rural population, Osman didn't completely forsake nomadic life. Residues of that nomadism had survived inside him and, as we saw above<sup>298</sup>, were also appearing in his successor Orhan's private live. However, his agricultural interests didn't prevent him from raids, which continued being very profitable. But, the hitherto nomad and raider, being imposed as feudal lord in a place that anarchy prevailed, was gradually evolved into a state leader.

This rather rapid growth would not be possible in peacetime, when things progress smoothly. However, those circumstances were extremely favorable for sudden changes. The Ottoman State emerged as a transitional period product. Liquidity and

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<sup>297</sup> As regards the Seljuk feudalism, see A. Belin, "Du régime des fief militaires dans l' Islamisme", *JA* series 6 Vol. 15 (1870) pp. 187-301. P.A. von Tischendorf, *Das Lehnwesen in den moslemischen Staaten*, Leipzig 1872. C.H. Becker, "Steuerpacht und Lenbwesen", *Der Islam* Vol. 5 (1914) pp. 81-92. M. Sobernheim, article "İkta", *EI* Vol. II p. 461-463.

<sup>298</sup> See above chap. I f.n. 52.

unceasing evolution are its main features during the first fifty years of its history. And even when Osman owned, more or less, considerable land, his emirate, being established in disputed territories, consisted of a heterogeneous population, with unstable and indistinct borders and, with gangs of Tatars, Turks and natives wandering here and there for looting, lacking organization and permanence, couldn't be called state in the strict sense of the word, nor could have political significance at the time that the first emperor Palaeologus was strengthening the fortresses that was on Saggarios, but also later, when Alexios Philanthropenos was proclaimed king by the rebelling people.

Throughout Michael VIII's reign and for much longer time, Osman remains unknown in history. The Byzantine authors did not mention him in the last quarter of the 13th century. His name was first mentioned by Pachymeres regarding the Vafeos battle that took place in 1301. The silence of the sources regarding his prior action reinforces the aspect of the Western authors mentioned above, that Osman came from obscure parents, and that, starting with limited action of more or less predatory nature, was gradually imposed as ruler over a land that no other stronger force had the intention to remove it from him. Offering on the one hand a relative rule of law to the residents of the area, where previously anarchy was reigning, rendered his domination tolerable and increased his followers, on the other hand, by conducting successful raids, extended his territories until the time when his victories in small conflicts and the lack of stronger opponents led him to think that conquering the provinces in the north wouldn't be impracticable or unnecessary.

From what has been said, it is evident that Osman was a creation of the abnormal circumstances, which often exalt obscure men in high positions. The monarchical office (Monarchy), by its nature, can easily fall into the hands of men with a dark past, as it testified in politically backward countries, even in the twentieth century. Under the conditions that were prevailing then, this phenomenon seems very natural and usual. For these reasons, we can not admit as true any of the claims of the subsequent Ottoman writers about the past of Osman and his family. Their information lack of historical base and, as shown by Gibbons, clearly is contrary to the facts. Given that the contemporary Byzantine authors are unaware of Osman before the battle of Vafeos, and the first Western writers to speak about the insignificance of his origin, the only possible explanation is that Ertuğrul and Osman belonged to the nomads of

Eskişehir plateau, who ignoring any rule higher than themselves turned that border region into a land where anarchy prevailed<sup>299</sup>. Taking advantage of the collapse of Byzantine rule and reinforced by new forces from the interior of the Seljuk state, Ertuğrul's nomads managed to penetrate into the Byzantine territories, sometimes after armed conflicts with local leaders and sometimes with the tolerance of the Byzantines, who weren't foreseeing the impending danger. Apart from the above, there were many cases where the two parts collaborated in organizing predatory raids.

The mode of penetration of the Turks in Bithynia described with sufficient clarity from the Byzantine historians. Pachymeres<sup>300</sup>, on the subjugation of the Mongols Seljuk states: "...καί τινας οὐς ἂν εἶποι τις σκηνίτας and τη πολιτεία απηχθημένους, μή θέλοντας υποτάττεσθαι, καθ' αὐτούς εἶναι, απειλημμένους των ημετέρων ὄχυρωμάτων, πλήν καί τόν εντεύθεν υποτοπάζοντας κίνδυνον, εἰ φανερώς ἐπιτιθοίντο, κατά μεν τό κοινόν καί καθόλου ἐνσπόνδους εἶναι τῷ βασιλεί, καθ' ἓνα δέ νυκτός λοχώντες τοις ἐκ των ημετέρων κλέμμασι χρήσθαι". Looting was the first and main purpose of these nomadic invaders. But over time, after the military organization of the border was paralyzed, "κατά πολλήν του κωλύσοντος ερημίαν κατέσχον οι ἐναντιοι τα οχυρώματα, ἐξ ὧν καί κατατρέχειν οιοί τε ἦσαν, οσάκις ἦν αὐτοῖς βουλομένοις, and κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐχ ὅπως τοῦς περιχώρους (τούτο γάρ εἶχον αὐτόθεν) ἀλλά καί ὡς εἰς μακράν ἀπείχον<sup>301</sup>".

The character of the frontier Turks was described by Akropolites before they invade the Byzantine territories. Speaking about Michael Palaeologus' flee to Iconium, and referring on the captivity of his followers by Türkmens says that<sup>302</sup>: "ἔθνος δε τούτο τοις ἀκροῖς ορίοις των Περσῶν εφεδρεύον, and ἀπόνδῳ μίσει κατά Ρωμαίων χρώμενον and αρπαγαῖς ταις εκ τούτων χαίρον and τοις εκ πολέμων σκύλοις εφραινόμενον, and τότε δη μάλλον, ὁπότε τα των Περσῶν εκυμαίνετο and ταις εκ των Ταχαρίων εφόδοις συνεταράττετο".

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<sup>299</sup> This view is reinforced by the fact that Ertuğrul's mausoleum near Söğüt was a sacred cite for the Yörük nomads, who were coming in groups to pray at his grave. See A. Körte, *Anatoische Skizzen*, Berlin 1896, p. 12, where is described the migration of Karakeçili yörüks (who have black sheeps), which is similar. Also, see Mehmet Ziya, *Bursadan Konyaya seyahat*, pp. 175-180, and F. Taeschner, «Anatolische Forschungen», *ZDMG* n.f. Vol. 7 (1928) p. 94.

<sup>300</sup> *Μιχαήλ Β'* 24 p. 133.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, A' 6 p. 20.

<sup>302</sup> *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 65, p. 136.

Pachymeres says that, their impetuosity was increased after the Seljuk power had collapsed, as they were reinforced by the arrival of new waves of compatriots from the east<sup>303</sup>. “Ἐντεύθεν and τοις των Περσών μαχίμοις and οἱς εν μαχαίρα το ζην, των άλλων υποκλιθέντων τοις Τοχάροις άρτι κατασχούσι την της Περσίδος αρχήν, συμφέρον εδόκει αφηνιάζουσι καταφεύγειν προς τα των ορών οχυρώτερα and τα πλησίον κατατρέχοντας νόμω ληστών αποζήν”.

From the other side, Nikiforos Gregoras<sup>304</sup> says that after the collapse of Turkish power [that was caused by the Mongols, the Tocharians of Pachymeres] ... “...ού μόνον σατράπαι και όσοι τών γενει and δόξη διαφερόντων, εις πλείστα τεμόντες, την όλην διέλαχον έπικράτειαν, αλλά και πολλοί τών άδοξων και ανωνύμων όχλους τινάς συρφετώδεις προσεταιρισάμενοι προς ληστρικών άπέκλιναν βίον, μηδέν τόξου και φαρέτρας έπιφερόμενοι πλέον· οἱ and τας των ορών δυσχωρίας ύποδυόμενοι συχναίς and λαθραίαις εχρώντο ταις εκρδρομαίς και τάς όμορους χώρας και πόλεις Ρωμαίων κακώς διετίθεσαν<sup>305</sup>”.

These hodgepodge mobs were the first wave which rushed to reinforce the border raiders who, in the future, would be called Osmanlis<sup>306</sup>. From the testimonies of the aforementioned writers, we understand that this wave rather than scholars, preachers or developed bourgeois, was consisted of landless adventurers motivated by material incentives<sup>307</sup>. As we will see below, Osman, during his conquest operation, was reinforced by Turks from other regions, who were acting in virtue of purely material springs. Only after the settlement of the Ottomans in Bithynia begins to be noted a remarkable immigration wave consisted of rural and urban groups, accompanied by Akhi and sheikhs, who became an important factor for the Islamization of the residents. However, around 1282, Osmanlis' aggressive action, more or less, intended to plunderage. As characteristically says Dukas<sup>308</sup> “ήν δε and εν ταις ημαίρες του Μιχαήλ

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<sup>303</sup> Μιχαήλ Α' 6 p. 18.

<sup>304</sup> Ε' 5 (Vol. I pp. 137-138). Gregoras is reproduced almost verbatim by Frantzes, Α' 20 pp. 77-78. According to Frantzes, Osman's grandfather was the most notable among these raiders.

<sup>305</sup> Richard Knolles, an English historian of the Elizabethan era, asserts almost the same in pp. 117-118 of his massive work entitled *The General Historie of the Turkes*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. London 1621, which demonstrates once again the prevailing opinion in Europe. Knolles' work was first published in 1603. About Knolles' work, see II. Bowen, *British Contributions to Turkish Studies*, London 1945, pp. 20-21.

<sup>306</sup> Doukas ΚΓ' p. 133, ed. Bonn.

<sup>307</sup> Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 197. Šükrüllah, *MOG* Vol. II p. 81.

<sup>308</sup> MB' p. 318.

τυραννών ο Οσμάν, πλην ληστρικόζ”, Osman's power had also become being felt on Michael's days, but in its predatory nature.

Summarizing the testimonies of the historians we have mentioned, with whom also agree the Western writers that was mentioned in the Introduction, we notice that, including the Ottoman State, the Turks who established the emirates in western Asia Minor, mostly came from nomadic tribes. Whether they were born in those places, or were fleeing to escape the Mongols, reached the verge of the Byzantine Empire, or crossed the border and lived there, initially due to tolerance of the Byzantines. However, not much time passed, and started robbing and raiding until they occupied some forts, from where they were conducting irregular war against the surrounding farms and villages. When with time they widened the radius of their operations, acquired greater wealth and more followers, and through them established various states that closely resembled the feudal ones. Before they come into contact with the Byzantines, all the founders of the emirates in Asia Minor were obscure and unknown.

More specifically, regarding Osman's house genealogy, nothing is known with certainty. Undoubtedly, the old tradition that was recorded by Frantzis, according to which Osman draws his origin from Comnenos line<sup>309</sup> or is direct descendant of Oğuz<sup>310</sup>, the mythical patriarch of the Western Turks, lack historical basis. However, most of the modern Turkologists accept as true the old historical tradition which was preserved and spread to Europe by Spandugino<sup>311</sup> and Leunclavius<sup>312</sup>. According to that tradition the Ottoman royal house belonged to the Oğuz tribe, which, from the Krasnovodsk Peninsula at Caspian Sea's eastern shore, came to the West and established the Seljuk State in Asia Minor<sup>313</sup>. Kayi, and among them the Ottomans, is one of the 24 subdivisions of the Oğuz. This is based on an old tradition mentioned by

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<sup>309</sup> Frantzes A' 19 pp. 73-76.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., A'. 18 p. 73. Chalcocondyles A'5 pp. 11-12 (ed. Bonn). Aşikpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 2. Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 pp. 185, 187. Šükrüllah, *MOG* Vol. II p. 77. Leunclavius, *Historiae* p. 90. Cantemir, *Histoire de l' Empire Othoman*, Paris 1743, Vol. I p. XCII.

<sup>311</sup> K.N. Sathas. *Documents inedits*, Vol. 9 p. 138 l. 7, 18. Sansovino, *Historia universale*, ed. 1568, p. 191.

<sup>312</sup> *Historiae* p. 94. Cf W. Barthold "Ghuzz" *EI*.

<sup>313</sup> Houtsma, "Die Ghuzentämme", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* Vol. II (1885) pp. 219-233. Marquart (in the general study W. Bang - J. Marquart, *Östtürkische Dialektstudien*) 2<sup>nd</sup> supplement "Über die Herkunft der Osmanen", *Abhandlungen der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen Phil.- Hist. Klasse*, n.f. Vol. 13 (1914) issue 1 pp. 187-194. Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 p. 489.

Idris<sup>314</sup> in his *Eight Paradises*, Dede Korkud<sup>315</sup> in his *Book* and Enveri in his chronicle<sup>316</sup>. Kayi, according to the historian Marquart, are related to the Mongolian race Kai<sup>317</sup>. This theory was abandoned after the formulation of the views of W. Barthold<sup>318</sup>, P. Pelliot<sup>319</sup> and Köprülü<sup>320</sup>, who taught that Kayi can not be related ethnologically to kai race for many reasons, but also because the name Kayi came from the word Kayigh<sup>321</sup>, which was previously used to indicate the specific Turkish tribe. However, Wittek<sup>322</sup> questioned the historical tradition about the Ottomans' origin. After the philological research he conducted on the Ottomans old genealogical trees, concluded that the tradition about Kayi was formed during Murad II's reign, when a "romantic" trend and an interest for the Turkish antiquities was developed. According to Wittek, the Ottomans' origin from Kayi and Oğuz is «an artificial creation of later speculative historiography» and should be attributed to the 15th century. The confusion is worsening when Kramers' theory, which is based on an Uruç bey's passage<sup>323</sup>, is taking into account. He concludes that Osman was not the son of Ertuğrul and didn't belong to the nomads, but to the Turks who were settled at the land and the Moslem tradition was stronger within their society<sup>324</sup>. As it is known, Kramers supported that Osman was one of the Gazi-i-Rum warriors, namely those who had declared religious war against the infidels. Having Osmancık as starting point, Osman was attached to Ertuğrul's followers and after his death took over the leadership of that faction of Turks that soon would be named Osmanli [Οσμανλήδες].

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<sup>314</sup> Köprülü, *Les origines* p. 82.

<sup>315</sup> Eds. W. Barthold, *Zapiski Vostochnago Otdelenija Imperatorskago Russkago Archeologičeskago Obščestva* Vol. 19 (1909) p. 77.

<sup>316</sup> Ed. Mükrimin Halil, *Türk Tarih Encümeni Külliyyatı* vol. 15 issue 2 (1930) p. 15. Cf *EI* articles "Kayi", Vol. I p. 886 B, and «Türks, vue d'ensemble historique et ethnographique», Vol. 4 p. 952 A, both by W. Barthold. Also J.H. Kramers, "Türks, histoire", *Ibid.*, p. 1013 A, and Köprülü, *Les origines* pp. 82-83.

<sup>317</sup> J. Nemeth, *ZDMG* Vol. 75 p. 278, and C. Brockelmann, *Das Nationalgefühl der Türken im Licht der Geschichte*, Berlin 1918, p. 17, agree with Marquart's opinion.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*, "Kayi" and "Türks", p. 952A.

<sup>319</sup> "A propos des Comans", *JA* series No 11 Vol. 15 (1920) pp. 125-185, particularly pp. 134-136.

<sup>320</sup> *Les origines* pp. 86-87. "Oğuz etnolojisine tarihi notlar", *Türkiyat Mecmuası* Vol. I (1925) pp. 185-191. Cf, *idem*, *Kay kabilesi hakkında yeni notlar*, Türk Tarihi Kurumu, Ankara 1944.

<sup>321</sup> The word is met in *Divan lügat al-Türk* vol. I p. 56.

<sup>322</sup> *The Rise* pp. 6, 13. Cf "Der Stammbaum der Osmanen", *Der Islam* Vol. 14 (1925) pp. 94-100.

<sup>323</sup> Eds. F. Babinger, p. 6.

<sup>324</sup> J. H. Kramers, "Wer war Osman?" *AO* Vol. 6 (1928) pp. 242-256. Cf *EI* article "Türks", Vol. 4 p. 1013A.

In all these, comes out that nothing is known with certainty about the origin of the Ottoman royal house and the only thing that seems likely is that Osman and Ertuğrul were the leaders of the frontier zone nomads.

However, Osman's invisible origin shouldn't overshadow his personality, which places him in the ranks of the history's most important leaders. Unlike the Byzantine leaders who lived in an environment of distrust and intrigues, it seems that Osman had the power to inspire faith and devotion to those around him, as well as to maintain unbreakable bonds of friendship. His contemporaries called him Osmancık [Οσμανάκη] and the tradition has preserved his name as "Kara Osman". This adjective indicates the brave man and, at the same time, the one who is endowed with personal charm and elegance<sup>325</sup>. Furthermore, the diminutive Osmancık, among other things, proclaims the intimacy that characterized the relations among leader and ruled.

It is natural that his first victories, which obviously accomplished with relative ease, infused him confidence and hot zeal to achieve his aim. However, his genius, is that, although he started from scratch, with political insight took advantage of the circumstances and laid the cornerstones of a state, which in two centuries managed to absorb all its neighbors, either of the same race or foreign nations, and indeed to break down even the Byzantine Empire. This wouldn't be possible if the founder of the young emirate, apart from valour didn't gather in him those political virtues necessary for the consolidation of major historical works. Thanks to these advantages, to the perseverance, the systematic and organizational spirit, within a few short years, gave to the area he occupied the form of a state. Since the early 14th century, the latter could rival the Byzantine Empire for supremacy in Bithynia.

Since the end of the previous century, Osman had managed to stabilize its borders, fighting contemporaneously the irregular Tatar squads and the insubordinate the Türkmens<sup>326</sup> who were traversing the country plundering. He also managed to embrace the various heterogeneous elements and come to a first friendly contact with the class of small farmers, who began to occupy the position that was left vacant by the wealthy landowners and finally - something that rightly is controverted by Gibbons<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> Cf Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I p. 93. G. Sagredo (*Memorie istoriche de' monarchi ottomani*, Venice 1688, p. 13) uses the adjective popular, and this is only one of the adjectives the old historian uses to characterize Osman – scaltro, vivace, armigero, ardito, cupo, e popolare.

<sup>326</sup> Hammer, *ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>327</sup> *The Foundation* p. 273.

and Kramers<sup>328</sup> – to be recognized by the leadership of Ikonion Seljuks<sup>329</sup>, which existed only virtually. Maintaining peaceful relations with his neighboring small Turkish states, transferred the seat of the state's government from Karacahisar, which was close to the "old city" Eskişehir, to Yenişehir, namely the "new town" at the northern extremity of his territory where his outposts were conducting operations against the Byzantines<sup>330</sup>. The new capital was between Bursa and Nicaea and dominated to the transport of these two cities. Osman's claims would move towards this direction.

The administrative center's shift to the north has a somehow symbolic character, revealing that around the year 1300, Osman had decided the conquest of Bithynia and outlined the plan of his state's gradual expansion. The military operations he carried out no longer have looting as sole purpose; instead it becomes obvious that they are conducted in the context of the implementation of a clear and predetermined military plan. Now we see him occupying strategic points that predominate over transport arteries, organizing the territories he have occupied and establishing his rule on a more permanent basis. Since that period we can talk about the Ottoman State in its present sense. The new state, which lacked historic past and hadn't seen another, more eminent patriarch, ignoring even the very Ertuğrul, was named Osmanli, a an indication of the fact that was created by the strong personality of a single man, who thus became the eponymous hero of the nation<sup>331</sup>.

Thanks to the action/efforts of this man, within thirty years, this side of Bithynia, where anarchy reigned, turned to focal point and base of operations of the

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<sup>328</sup> "Othman", *EI* Vol. III p. 1074.

<sup>329</sup> Aşıkpaşazade, ed. Istanbul pp. 18-19, ed. Giese p. 13. Neşri, *ZDMG* Vol.13 p. 206. Şükrullah, *MOG* Vol. II p. 79. According to Anonymus Giese (p. 6 l. 12 et seq.) and Uruç bey (p. 12 l. 4, p. 87 l. 1) the declaration of the independence of the Ottomans took place in hicrî year 689 (1290) when the Kadı and imam Tursun Fakih recited the prayer at Karacahisar in the name of Osman. According to Aşıkpaşazade, this event took place in 699 (1299). Neşri (ibid., p. 209) refers to that event without date. The passages of older and posterior Turkish historians relating to the declaration of Osman's independence was collected by Efdaleddin at his article "Studies on the chronology of the Ottoman independence" in Turkish, *TOEM* Vol.5 (1330/1914) pp. 36-48. The Turkish author concludes accepting the year 699 (1299). Also, cf Hammer, ibid., pp. 65, 71, and Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 p. 490.

<sup>330</sup> Neşri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 211. Rasmussen, *Annales Islamismi* p.39, "Othman" *EI* Vol.3 p. 1075. F. Taeschner, *ZDMG* n.f. Vol.7 p. 92. there is not any monument, either epigraphic or building in Yenişehir as well in Söğüt and in Karacahisar that belongs to Osman's era, fact which reinforces the view that the first Ottomans were nomads. The building known as Baba Sultan, which is situated on a hill near Yenişehir and is described by R. Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* pp. 42-43 (and table 14), belongs at a later period (at the years of Murat A'). it is a building with purely Byzantine style. Also cf Taeschner, ibid., p. 93.

Osmanlis. When, in the year 1329, the son and successor of the former obscure tribal chief, was conflicting with the emperor of the Romans [Ρωμαίων (Βυζαντινών)] at Pelekanos, it was obvious that they weren't predatory raiders but an organized state, fully aware of its claims. How this change was conducted is still one of the biggest historic problems. Since the few modern sources can not shed light to the mystery, we can draw some general conclusions from what the sources that survived mention about the next few years.

Firstly, from the study of the events between the years 1301 and 1331, turns out that the Ottoman conquest was neither an accidental event, nor the result of an unaccountable impulse/impetus/momentum, but a project that was designed with great care and had been applied with even greater caution. In the past, had been formulated and believed that, the qualification in which the Ottomans had their success was impetuosity. However, this view isn't based on a deeper assessment of the situations. Cities protected by strong walls, as Bursa, Nicaea and Nicomedia, couldn't be occupied by assaults from Osman's followers. The conquest of urban centers of this magnitude was the result of a systematic and rational effort that lasted many years or even decades. However, both the composition of Ottoman troops and the problem of their provision<sup>332</sup>, which was very difficult because of anarchy, abandonment of land<sup>333</sup> and other economic and psychological reasons, did not allow Osman to support a siege for a long time, remaining outside the walls. Consequently, the conquered cities did not concede after a fulminant action or siege. The most likely scenario is that these cities were forced to open their gates to the conqueror, devitalized by the economic war that Osman conducted against them, once he was found in front of them.

The nature of this economic war comes to light in clarity by Pachymeres' and Asikpasazade's information on the conquest of Bursa. The first states that the city,

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<sup>331</sup> Chalcocondyles A'8 p.16, eds. Bonn: "Τούτον δὴ οὖν ἐπιθόμεθα γενναϊότατον τε εἰς τὰ πάντα γενόμενον, ταύτη τε ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον νομισθῆναι δαιμόνιον, καταλιπεῖν τε ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῖς ἀπ' ἐκείνου γενομένοις, Οτουμάνου παῖδας ἐτι καὶ νῦν καλεῖσθαι".

<sup>332</sup> If we exclude the personal guard of the ruler, which was not big, before the conquest of Bithynia, the Ottoman troops consisted of nomads or farmers, who had to return to their jobs on time. Therefore, reasons of force majeure were imposing the abstention of long military operations. Besides, the first Ottomans were not gathering large powers, but – widely – were following guerilla tactics. As Pachymeres writes (*Andronicos* E' 21 p. 411): "οὐκ ἰλαδόν στρατεύουσιν ἀλλ' ἀσυντάκτως καὶ κατ' ὀλίγους", such forces were suitable for communication harassment but not for siege.

<sup>333</sup> If it happened and even small military forces were simultaneously found in the same area, they could not be supplied by food from the hostile territories, but only for a limited while. Food shortage had already been noticed before 1282 and, as we saw before affected even himself, king Michael VIII.

being cut off from the “beauties of the outer world”<sup>334</sup>, was suffering and that it had to pay tax to Osman<sup>335</sup>. The second author recounts how the conqueror built two forts outside the town<sup>336</sup>. Those forts, which were built at strategic places, dominated over the transports of the surrounding areas. According to Ottoman historians, the fall of the city was the result of a decennial siege. However, for the reasons we mentioned above, since there can be no question of siege, we conclude that it was about a blockade by the method of transport inhibition and trade languishment. Orhan, the son of Osman, was the one who, in 1326, when he entered the city, reaped the fruits of his father’s multiannual efforts.

In the early 14th century, this system was applied to all cities and small fortified towns and eventually, as we shall see below, led to their surrender. This new tactic, which followed the predatory raids of the previous century, evolved to the main characteristic of the Ottomans’ military in the entire period between the Battle of Vafeos and the Battle of Pelican. However, there is no doubt that it had began to be practiced in a much earlier date and, that became one of the most important factors that contributed to the Ottoman State’s expansion, in the last years of the 13th century.

The organizational spirit that Osman showed in his military operations is comparable to that he proved that he possessed in administrating the conquered territories and consolidating his power.

It is undeniable that the Turks of the time weren’t inspired by the destructive fanaticism attributed to them in later centuries. Unlike to Byzantines who were excessively dealing with theological discussions, Osman and his followers, although it seems that they had recently acquired purely Moslem conscience, were more religiously tolerant than many contemporaries. This qualification constituted an additional factor in the rapid expansion of their rule. In every respect, the yoke imposed on the conquered wasn’t heavy, on the contrary, in many cases the Ottoman yoke was probably welcomed by the people, because it put an end to the evils of anarchy and strife. History preserved

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<sup>334</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Ε’21 p. 415.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid.*, Ζ’17 p. 597.

<sup>336</sup> Aşikpaşazade, eds. Istanbul p. 22, ed. Giese p. 18. Evliya, *Narrative of Travels*, Vol. 2 pp. 3-4. Cantemir, *Histoire de l’ Empire Othoman* Vol. I p. 37. Cf. B.I. Kandes, *Η Προόσα* p. 73, and G.P. Hertzberg, *Geschichte* p.462. These fortresses were given the names Kaplica and Balabancık. The second bore the name of a friend of Osman, who could –perhaps – be identified with Palapanes, mentioned by Gregorios Palamas as present to the religious discussion which was prompted by Orhan at the period the prelate of Thessalonica was prisoner. See “Σωτήρ” magazine Vol. 15 (1892) p. 241.

the name of Michael Köse, who, while he was Osman's enemy became his close friend and faithful adviser, without ceasing to be a Christian for some years<sup>337</sup>. Besides Michael, the historical tradition also accounts the names of Evrenos (Dukas referred him as Avranezis, Frantzes and Chalkokondyles as Vrenezis) and Markos, who were the founders of the oldest Ottoman aristocratic families<sup>338</sup>. Again, Gregorios Palamas<sup>339</sup>, indicates Ετερείαρχη (head of the department of the Royal Guard) Mavrozoumis at *Piges*, who had great influence on the Turks. Mavrozoumis was Christian, while *Piges* had passed under the Turkish rule some decades ago. From the same source we derive the information that Orhan's doctor was a Greek called Taronites. From the few cases mentioned by name, we are led to the conclusion that a steadily growing number of Christians was at the Ottoman side. They had either fallen into despair or for other reasons, had chosen to join their luck with the rising Ottoman star. The Christian partners, in the late 13th and early 14th century had a major impact on the absorption of new populations, because were performing duties as liason between conquerors and conquered.

Besides, the imposition of the Moslem religion, seems not to have been forcibly. Gregoros Palamas, from Lampsacus to Nicaea, met Christian populations enjoying full religious freedom<sup>340</sup>. Despite the fact that the Christian population had shrunk to very small communities, yet, Christian churches and monasteries were surviving. Sultan Orhan, not only allowed religious discussions between Christians and Muslims in his immediate environment, but also encouraged them. If the local population had not fallen into such a state of extreme decline, and the Bithynian society

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<sup>337</sup> Hammer, *ibid.*, p. 67. Gibbons, *ibid.*, p. 52. Regarding Michael Köse and his family see also Babinger "Mikhaloghlu", *EI* Vol. III pp. 561-562. When Michael died in Andrianopolis bore the name Abdallah and was buried in the shrine which had erected in the city's western district. Therefore he lived during the reign of Murat A'.

<sup>338</sup> Lenclavius, *Annales*, ed. 1596, p. 125. [A. Geuffraeus] - G. Godelevaus, *Aulae turcicae Othomannique imperii descriptio*, Basileae 1577, Vol. I p.86. J. Camerarius, *De rebus turcicis*, Francofurti 1598, p.21. According to Hammer (*Ιστορία* Vol. I p. 132), Evrenos was the commander of Bursa, the man who delivered the town. Cf Gibbons, *The Foundation* p. 48, and J.H. Mordmann, "Evrenos" *EI* Vol. II pp. 37-38.

<sup>339</sup> *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων* Vol. 16 (1922) pp. 11, 12, 14.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 11, 14, 18. It seems that the peaceful coexistence of Christians and Muslims is also indicated by Nešri (*ZDMG* Vol.13 p. 197) when he says that "πιστοί και άπιστοι ετίμων τον Ερτογορούλ και τον υιόν αυτού Οσμάν". Also cf Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I p. 66. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant*, Vol. II p. 65. Köprülü, *Les origines*, pp. 70-71, 95-96. Gibbons, *The Foundation* p.81, describes that : "Whether their tolerance was actuated by policy, by genuine kindly feeling, or by indifference, the fact cannot be gainsaid that the Osmanlis were the first nation in modern history to lay down the principle of religious freedom as the corner-stone in the building up of their nation".

wasn't under dissolution, the Ottomans may have been Christianized. But, as things were standing, the conquerors' religion was predominant. The conquered mostly joined the conquerors' faith on their own initiative, aiming at offices and other material benefits. Since they had embraced Islam, immediately and without further formalities, were becoming Ottomans, equivalent to the master race.

Reading one patriarchal letter (pittakion) addressed to the inhabitants of Nicaea, we conclude that, around 1339, had taken place a strong secession flow from Christianity, given that now, the zeal for their ancestral religion had disappeared<sup>341</sup>. Such a psychological change was of course not possible to have occurred within a short period of time, nor could be the result of violence. From what the patriarch says, we can reasonably conclude that the gradual alteration in conscience had begun in a much earlier date, offstage and in an underground manner, so, reaching the first quarter of the 14th century led to the Islamization of large masses.

The events in Nicaea also took place elsewhere, in a similar range, as soon as the Ottomans became masters of Bithynia's towns and villages. We would say that the root of this change was the Ottomans' tolerance and free communication with the conquered. Otherwise, religious persecution and any oppression might have caused the reaction that would prevent merger with the strangers, reinforcing the Christian faith of the people. However, the possibility of an ideological reaction was bypassed by permissiveness and religion tolerance. Thenceforth, besides the religious, the exchange of cultural elements was also rapid in other sectors, resulting in full assimilation of large masses of the population, in only a few decades.

Another factor that contributed to the Ottoman State's consolidation was the sense of security that was provided to the conquered by the rather fair and tolerant Ottoman administration. The early Ottomans respected their subjects' life and property and provided protection to those who had suffered serious challenges/plights in the hands of adventurers of all sorts. Osman fought effectively the irregular hords and eliminated the risk of gangs in a big part of his conquered territory. Generally, from economic and social point of view, the condition of the Christian populations was not

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<sup>341</sup> *Acta et diplomata graeca*, Vol. I p. 183. The patriarch, in his letter, urges those who have been captured by the "evil and atheism" of the Ismaelites to come back to the Christian flock, "αποστάντες της των Μουσουλμάνων κακίας, εις ην εξεκυλίσθησαν". From the above arises that the Christian populations had voluntarily embraced Islam and were given the opportunity to return back to their ancestral religion. As it is known, later, the re-conversion to Christianity was punished by death penalty.

bad. Firstly, since the raids had been ceased and transportation had been adequately reinstated, the farmers could now devote to their meadows. Money, namely the Byzantine and Seljuk currency, began to circulate widely as transaction instrument, until the Ottoman coinage by Orhan<sup>342</sup>.

Very important was also the fact that, after the withdrawal of the Byzantine administration, which, as we have seen, had been linked with Chadinós' tax policy and show hostility towards the local population, the tax burden that was levied to the peasantry was lighter at the territories which had been subdued by the Ottomans for good. To those who had accepted the Ottoman power, nothing than the first two Palaiologos' unpopular administration, which had caused civil wars and local rebellions could look worse. Although it seems abstruse at first sight, Osman, despite the horror that caused to his enemies and the heavy taxes he imposed on those villages that hadn't been completely subdued, provided a sense of security and justice to his subjects.

What Gibbons<sup>343</sup> supports, namely that the poll tax that was levied to the Christians of the rural areas was heavy and involved farmer's dependence on the Ottoman feudal lord's greed, so in order to be exempted from the tax, Christians were forced to become Muslims, undertaking military obligations instead, or fleeing to the cities where there was more freedom, couldn't be the case at Osman's time and during the first years of his successor. During those years, it wasn't in the Ottomans' interest to exert pressure on their farmers, because, later, the urban populations' alimentation would be based on them. In that time, a practice of repressing farmers through taxes would have brought disastrous results to the newly created state, in a short time. First of all, by the migration of Christians that was living in rural areas to towns, valuable farmer hands would be lost, in an era that the Ottomans hadn't become rural actors yet. Then, while the Ottomans would be in need of money, the Islamization would reduce the number of taxpayers. As noticed by Gibbons<sup>344</sup>, the Ottomans did not attempt to increase the number of the Prophet's believers by practicing violent measures. For that reason, according to the testimony of Gregoras<sup>345</sup>, while they were levying heavy taxes on places which preferred to remain outside the Ottoman rule, they were applying a

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<sup>342</sup> This is testified by the need for coinage, which will be discussed below.

<sup>343</sup> *The Foundation* p. 77.

<sup>344</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>345</sup> *Θ'* 13, Vol. I p. 458.

lenient tax policy to their own subjects, which was completely contrasting to the measures applied by Michael VIII in order to eliminate Akritas and smash the opposing farmers. As we may infer from what İbn Battuta<sup>346</sup> mentions, the Ottoman fiscal policy towards their Christian subjects, especially concerning the poll tax, seems that wasn't different from that applied by the other Turkish rulers of Asia Minor. The traveler, at no point in his narrative, suggests that heavy taxes were levied. Instead, whenever he refers to the Greeks, gives the impression that, in places where the Greek element had survived, it was economically prosperous and enjoyed relative freedom. Of course, it's a pity that he doesn't write any information on the Greeks of the Ottoman emirate.

This policy of tolerance was de facto imposed, because the peasantry was to become the Ottoman State's basic foundation<sup>347</sup>. With regard to that time, since Osman hadn't yet conquered the forts of Brusa, Nicaea and Nicomedia and as soon as the larger towns of his territory (Melaggeia<sup>348</sup>, Vilokoma, Angelokoma etc.) numbered no more than 5,000 inhabitants, maximum, there can be no question for purely urban populations within the Ottoman Empire. The population's vast majority was mainly occupied in agriculture and animal husbandry. The Bithynian urban population that hadn't immigrated to safer places was outside the Osmanli State's boundaries, confined within the walls of cities, which, though pressed by the embargo, still remained under the

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<sup>346</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II p. 270.

<sup>347</sup> Köprülü (*Les origines* pp. 64-78), studying the state of the urban population in Asia Minor, speaks about the Turks of those cities that had remained in the hands of the Seljuks for about two centuries before Osman's appearance. Given that those cities were devolved to the Ottomans after a whole century, the urban population of those cities did not have any direct relation with the establishment of the Ottoman State. As pointed by Gibbons (p.302), the Ottomans prevailed in Asia Minor only after they had become a *European power* by being inherited the provinces of the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, there wouldn't be possible to have a migratory movement from those cities before the restoration of normality and before the creation of conditions congruent with the needs of the urban populations. Consequently, we can speak about influence from the Seljuk urban centers to the Ottoman State only after the conquest of the largest Byzantine cities.

<sup>348</sup> Melaggeia [*Μελάγγεια*] was incorrectly identified with Karacahisar by Hammer (*Geschichte*, ed. 1827, p. 54 et al.), who seems to have been diverted by the similarity of the meaning of the two words. Ramsay (*Historical Geography of Asia Minor* p. 202), based on a passage of Konstantinos Porphyrogenitos (Vol. I p.444, ed. Bonn) locates Melaggeia [or Malagina (*Μαλάγινα*)] near Lefkes [*Λεύκες*], claiming that the first camp was located at Malagina, the second at Dorylaion, the third at Cavorkin, the fourth at Kolonia etc. Since Dorylaion is very near to Karacahisar and the existence of two camps in the same area is out of question, the camp of Malagina [*Μελάγγεια*] should be sought to the north. Besides, it is required by Cinnamos' passage (B<sup>16</sup> p. 81, ed. Bonn) which locates Melaggeia on the road connecting Constantinople with Dorylaeon. J. Sölch (*BNJ* Vol. I, 1920, p. 277) seeks the Byzantine Melaggeia at the location of the current Yenişehir, which is identified with the ancient Otroia [*Ότροια*]. R. Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* p.44. stands also in favor of Sölch's view, but Philippson, while he identifies Otroia with Yenişehir, he locates Melaggeia at the location of the current Gönük Ören, at the south of Lefkes. As mentioned previously (f.n. 2 of chap. II), we consider Sölch's view more correct.

Byzantine emperor's scepter. Only intermittently succeeded the royal troops to penetrate into the Osmanli zone and if the enemy didn't fell in battle in array they managed to reach the cities and after having imported quantities of food for the next few years, were leaving and returning back<sup>349</sup>.

The already distressed rural populations were the first to feel the consequences of the Osmanli raids, but, once the conquest furor had subsided, again, were the first to enjoy the benefits of the strong rule. Of course, the emigration had also drifted some farmers, but certainly, compared with the commercial towns' residents, on a smaller scale. The reason is the generally observed phenomenon that those directly dependent on soil cultivation hardly abandon their land and instead of living an adventurous life in foreign places, often prefer to lose their lives defending it. For this reason, the farmers who migrated should be sought on the one hand at the wealthier strata, which, as already stated, had many flocks and other chattel and, secondly, to the landless farmers and vassals. Because of their wealth, the large landowners didn't feel the strong bond with the land that held their poorer neighbors and rushed to save what they could. As for the landless, they were either leaving voluntarily in order to seek a better life, or, as vassals, followed the *Strongs*, from whom they were depended to. However, many were the landless and vassals who either couldn't, or didn't want to leave and, joining the raiders passed to predatory life.

Because of the lack of clear evidence we cannot accurately determine the percentage of the rural population that preferred to flee. But we must admit that the *Strongs* were a small minority. Even though all of them had migrated, not any noticeable change would be attained on the number of the rural residents. But every rule has its exemption. Unsurprisingly, some of them, and probably those who held lands close to the Osmanlis', following the example of Michael Köse, early joined the opposite faction. Consequently, however much the migration of wealthy farmers had an impact on the affluence distribution in Bithynia, in numerical terms simply implied the loss of a small minority. If fugitive landless farmers are added to that minority as well, then of course the ratio increases significantly, but again, the whole of those who

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<sup>349</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ ΣΤ'* 29 p. 505: "σπαρκήσας τοίς εν τοίς φρουρίοις το ικανόν". *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 13 p. 588. Also Kantakouzenos (*A'* 45, Vol. I p. 220) mentions that Andronikos Junior went until Bursa "προσκομίζων τα επιτήδια· τούτου δε γενομένου ελπίζ αυτούς χρόνον πολύν προς την πολιορκίαν αντισχίσειν τάλλα γάρ η πόλις άπαντα κατεσκεύασται καρτερώς".

migrated, in no way approaches the whole of the farmers who remained, because Laskarids' Bithynia was an area where mainly middle peasantry was the strata that was flourishing.

The largest proportion of the rural residents was neither composed by large landowners and stockbreeders, nor could be drawn out of their hearths. Especially in Bithynia, which had always been an agricultural area, the attraction exerted by the land on the people who are dealing with its cultivation, since it was strengthened by the power of tradition, was even greater. As generally happens in rich agricultural countries, Bithynia sacrificed its national freedom in order not to be deprived of its earth's goods. Most farmers and especially the smallholders, rather than fleeing, preferred to remain. So, when they found themselves within Osman's vital area, helpless and defenseless, quickly succumbed accepting Osmanli protection as a lifeline<sup>350</sup>.

Initially, they were paying tribute to retain their autonomy. It seems that Osman considered that it was in his interest to take money giving the promise that he will not harm their lands<sup>351</sup>. However, although these promises were expensively bought, they weren't strictly observed. His followers (Osman's), who hadn't learned to respect the weaks' and, at the same time, independents' peace and freedom, periodically raided against them reaping whatever they could, for their own enrichment. Osman did not consider appropriate to interfere in his comrades' private operations. Discipline in an army, constituted by nomads and raiders, was necessarily loose, while personal profit and looting have always been an important factor in military operations. Incessant raids were necessary as a kind of drills that didn't allow Osmanli forces to degrade and reduce their military fury. For this reason, tributes couldn't achieve the intended goal. Before much time had passed, the previously free farmers were realizing that only by

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<sup>350</sup> Pachymeres' rather exaggerated descriptions about the evacuation of the rural areas by the indigenous peasantry have nothing to do with the situation in Bithynia. They are related to the areas of Meander and Kaustros, where the Turks had proved to be more feral and aggressive. *Μιχαήλ Δ'* 27 p. 310, ΣΤ' 20 p. 468. Also cf the information upon the destruction of Tralleis, *ibid.*, ΣΤ' 21 p. 472-474, and Gregoras E'5 (Vol. I p.142), and also those referred to Alexios Filanthropenos, written by Maximos Planoudes (*Επιστολαί*, ed. M. Treu, pp. 174, 176).

<sup>351</sup> We conclude these from Gregoras' (Θ'13, Vol. I p. 458) writings, which refer to the years of Nicaea's conquest and, at the same time, enlighten the previous situation. The barbarians, stresses Gregoras, are now holding the coasts of Bithynia and "βαρυτάτους επέθηκαν φόρους τοίς εναπολειφθείσι βραχέσι πολιχνίοις, δι' ούς τέως ούκ αΰτανδρα προς όλεθρον ήλασαν παντελή, μάλα ραδίως δυνάμενοι και εν βραχυτάτω χρόνω τούτο τελείν ουκ ελλείπουσι δ' όμως συχνάς ποιούμενοι τας εφόδους και ζωγρούντες των ταλαιπόρων τους πλείους έκ τε γης και θαλάττης αεί".

their voluntary and unconditional allegiance to Osman, would ensure their lives and properties<sup>352</sup>.

In this way, Greek small land holders who were cultivating their land under Osman's connivance, over time, after they had begun to assimilate to their conquerors, became the new nation's core. When, being drifted by the circumstances, they had embraced Mohammedanism, these farmers had, not only typically but essentially transformed to the first Osmanlis. And the role they played wasn't less important than the action of the warriors who flanked Osman, because nations and states are not composed of soldiers but of a silent and anonymous crowd of workers.

However, the most important change in Bithynia's rural element's composition came out as consequence of the disappearance of the large landowners. The latter<sup>353</sup>, having maintained their privileged position through hardships, sometimes suffering pressures from the powerful military kings and sometimes moaning under the derogative weight of taxation, which was appearing in the form of *αλληλέγγυον\**, but always ready to usurp the small property of the weak, now, in a period of economic stagnation and anarchy, those (large landowners) that had survived and weren't forced to leave, received a vital blow, which resulted to their eradication from the Bithynian earth.

In the second half of the 13th century they ceased to exist as economic factors. As known, Michael the 8th, following a close dynastic policy, fought them with very heavy taxes which negated even the Akritas' tax relief. The *Strongs* and the lords reacted with all their strength against the annoying collectors, which were sent by the

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<sup>352</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Γ'* 22 p. 222 – Only few of these peasants were large land owners. Most of them were small farmers.

<sup>353</sup> About the struggles of the large landowners see A. Diomedes, “Η πολιτική της Μακεδονικής δυναστείας κατά της μεγάλης ιδιοκτησίας”, *Ελληνικά* Vol. 11 (1939) pp. 246-262. G. Testaud, *Les rapports des puissants et des péttits propriétaires dans l' Empire Byzantin*, Bordeaux 1898. A. Vasiliev “On the Question of Byzantine Feudalism”, *Byzantion* Vol. 8 (1933) pp. 584-604, particularly pp. 601-604. Older is V. Vasilievskij's work “Υλικά διά την εσωτερικήν ιστορίαν του Βυζαντινού Κράτους”, in Russian, *Zurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveščeniija* Vol. 202 (1879) pp. 160-232, 368-438, Vol. 210 (1880) σπ.98-170, 355-404. Regarding allileggyon [*αλληλέγγυο*] see G. Ostrogorsky, *Die ländische Steuergemeinde* pp. 29-35. Idem “Das Steuersystem im byzantinischen Altertum und Mittelalter”, *Byzantion* Vol. 6 (1931) pp. 229-240, particularly p. 236 ff.. F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung*, Leipzig-Berlin 1927, p. 129 ff.. As regards Allileggyon, remarkable is also the study of M.G. Platon “Observations sur le droit de προτίμησις en droit byzantin”, *Revue Générale du Droit* Vol. 27 (1903), Vol. 28 (1904) and Vol. 29 (1905). Reprinted, Paris 1906.

\* [T.N.] The Macedonian emperors in order to protect the poor from the predatory moods of the strong [*δυνατοί*], whose power was increasing, took measures against them. The allileggyo [*αλληλέγγυο*] which

government. But their reaction caused state prosecutions, prosecutions and property confiscations led to revolts and rebellions, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, sometimes manifested as religious struggles and sometimes as dynastic conflicts, which always conducive to the spread of anarchy. Michael caved in only after the elimination of his opponents, the big land holders who, although numerically they were a small minority, they maintained a considerable economic power. The annihilation of this power virtually was the consequence of the drastic measures which were applied by the government of Constantinople.

Since monastic estates were in favor of the state, enjoying tax relief and other advantages they were usually excluded from these measures. There is no doubt that at the time of the Laskarids and the first Palaiologos, a large number of monasteries possessing vast lands were preserved in Bithynia<sup>354</sup>, constituting large capitalistic institutions. The dissolution of the large church property coincides with the establishment of the Ottoman State, and as we will see below, it was a result of social and political fermentation, which had arisen during that period. But, while Constantinopolis' governmental policy was destroying the Bithynian large landowners' economic power, it seems that monastic property still remained intact. But this couldn't bring any beneficial effect on the whole situation.

The fight against the large landowners and Akritas contributed to the country's desertification, for which, even himself Michael felt sorry, when he saw the situation closely. However, Michael was not the only responsible. In the struggle against the privileged classes, which was conducted through Chadinos and his people, mercenaries and wardens, had as assistants the irregulars and the bandits. Primarily, they stroke the wealthy people, who possessed chattels and flocks. As we have already seen, livestock had relieved them from the bonds with land and facilitated their flee.

Those of the *Strongs* who didn't leave, suffered the consequences of anarchy, which ultimately annihilated them. As natural victims of this abnormal situation, deprived of their money, they no longer had the ability to cultivate their wide lands,

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was implied by Vasileios II, defined that the rich were obliged to pay the tax of the humble, namely the poor, who were unable to meet their tax obligations.

<sup>354</sup> About the Byzantine monasteries, whose only few remains had survived until 1922 – mainly from those in coastal areas – see T. Evaggelides' study in “Σωτήρ” Vol. 12 (1889) pp. 93-96, 154-157, 275-285. Also see B. Menthon, *Une terre de légends – L' Olympe de Bithynie*, Paris 1935. Particularly,

which, in addition to the many resources, presupposed the existence of markets and means of transportation as well, things incompatible with the turbulent conditions of the time. Consequently, large areas which belonged to feudal lords or monasteries fell into the hands of many smallholders.

In some of these lands, Osman, following the example of the Byzantine kings, settled his loyal followers. In this way the *στρατιωτόπια stratiotopia* (khas, zeamet, timar)<sup>355</sup>, the first Byzantine institution that was adopted, appeared to the Ottomans, too. As it happened at the Byzantine State, through this measure was achieved the complete concurrence of individual and state interests, which proved to be considerable factor for the consolidation of the Osmanli rule in Bithynia.

But, since Osman's followers, in their majority, were nomads, few of them benefited from this opportunity and turned into cultivators. For this reason the abandoned lands passed to the hands of the poorer indigenous farmers and the landless, who divided them in small pieces, depending on the capacity of each one. Once the countryside recovered from the shock, which accompanied the collapse of Byzantine rule, followed a vigorous blossom of the rural population. In contrast to the *Strongs*, that large parts of their lands remained uncultivated, the small farmers had now the ability and the interest to cultivate their land intensively. Thus, the country became more efficient. However, now, Byzantium was not going to reap the fruits of this rural regeneration.

Similarly were disappeared the last remnants of the old aristocracy of Asia Minor, which had previously played a leading role in the political life of Byzantium, giving prominence to the great houses of Phokas, Skliros, Diogenes, Bryennios, Dalassenos, Dukas, Kekaumenos, Komnenos, Aggelos and finally Paleologos. Now along with this old list of seigneurs *αρχοντολόγιο*, was also disappearing the younger aristocracy, which emerged in Asia Minor after Constantinople's conquest by the Franks. Vatatzes, Cavallarios, Nostoggos, Kamyztas, Livadarios, Tarchaneiotis, Philanthropenos, Tzanantouros, Tornikios and others, either completely disappear or, after years, appear at the forefront, now settled in Constantinople<sup>356</sup>.

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regarding the Monastery of Medicius [Μονή Μηδικίου], as it was formerly, wrote A. Hergès, "Les monastères de Bithynie – Médičius", *Bessarione* Vol. 5 (1899) pp. 9-21.

<sup>355</sup> Aşikpaşazade, ed. Giese pp. 22, 38, 232.

<sup>356</sup> See S. Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization*, London 1933, pp. 103-104. These and some other families are mentioned by Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* pp. 64,65 et al..

The collapse of the residues of the *Strongts* at the former θέματα provinces of Optimata and Opsikion was not the work of the Ottoman State. It had already taken place during the crucial period of anarchy, before Osman had established his rule and Islam was established formally. Subsequently, the theory that Christian feudal lords in Bithynia disappeared because they acceded massively in Islam and became members of the Ottoman State proved to be incorrect<sup>357</sup>. The Ottoman state hadn't even seen the Byzantine feudalism of the East, which had sunk in the uproar of the general crisis that preceded the Osmanli conquest. Since Osman, in the era of his first territorial conquests, had become the dominant of the region and feudal lord χωροδεσπότης of large areas, acquiring anything that he could utilize for his or his comrades' benefit, he did not touch the recently formed estate. That was, not because he was consciously favored the redistribution of land, but because, as usual, he let things follow their natural course. In this specific issue, for reasons of political expedience, he took a neutral stand.

First, there were many abandoned lands and was extended the cultivatable area within which, his followers, if they wanted, would settle as farmers. Besides, since Osman was entering in a rural area as a permanent ruler, it was in his interest to tolerate the local farmers. And the farmers, who had benefited from the collapse of the *strongts*, had every reason to be dedicated to the Osmanli rule and become its loyal subjects. For them, the prevalence of the Byzantines would imply repatriation of the immigrants, reconstruction of the vast monasterial estates and thus loss of the lands which had recently acquired. Instead, the Osmanli rule was guaranteeing the solidification of land redistribution that took place recently and safeguarding of their interests. For these reasons, the new peasantry willingly accepted the osmanli domination and was proved its primary footing. Thus, without violent class conflicts, in areas where large land holdings, both ecclesiastical and secular, had survived, took place an economic revolution, which facilitated the establishment of the Tourkokratia.

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<sup>357</sup> Things at the Balkan Peninsula had developed differently. There, the Ottomans found a thriving class of plutocrats exploiting the land. In Thrace, Macedonia, Serbia and Albania it was the large landowners who had first joined the ranks of the Ottomans and embraced Islam. As we will see below (page???), devşirme, which was implemented by Mehmed A', contributed to that direction. According to Gibbons (pp. 118-119), the fact that while the Ottoman numerical strength in Europe had grown dramatically, until the rise of Mehmed the Conqueror, the Janissary corps numbered about a thousand men, constitutes proof of the massive Islamization of the Balkan peasantry. Janissaries were few because the landowners and mainly the wealthier rushed to convert to Islam not to lose their male children, who were a capital necessary for rural life.

Meanwhile, the settlement of the nomads in the rural areas kept on normally. First as stockbreeders and then as farmers, they were in close contact with the indigenous farmers, from whom they were taught the old Greco-Roman ways of soil cultivation. They also adopted some vital Byzantine institutions and embraced the traditions of the older residents.

Of course, the study of the broad issue concerning the Byzantine Hellenism's influence to the Turks, Seljuks and Ottomans, is not the objective of this study. However taking this opportunity we would enumerate key elements of public and private life, in which the influence of Byzantium is gross. And first, what should be studied is the Turkish language, which was cultivated in Asia Minor.

Here we notice that the conquerors assimilated many Greek (or grecolatin) words, showing in which sectors of life was the Byzantine influence more noticeable. Many of these words are associated with the house and its home and its objects; in example, *temel* (θεμέλιον = substructure), *keremit* (κεραμίδι[ο]ν = pantile), *kilit* (= κλειδαριά - lock, *kilit etmek* = lock up, from the word κλειδί[ο]ν), *anahtar* (= κλεις, from the word ανοικτήριο<sup>358</sup> = key), *iskemle* (= seat, from the word σκαμνί[ο]ν), *masa* (= table, from the lat. word *Mensa* > μήνσα - μένσα > μέσα [inside]), *firin* (φούρνος - oven), *külübe* (καλύβη = hut); as articles in common use, such as *kutu* (from the word κουτί <κυτίον = box), *fiçi* (from the word βουτζί[ο]ν < βουττίον = barrel), *küfe* (κώφα = scuttle), *iskara* (εσχάρα = grid, grill, grille), *lamba* (λάμπα = bulb), *fenos* (φανός = lamp), *fener* (φανάρι[ο]ν = lantern), *kandil* (κανδήλι[ο]ν = cresset), *sabun* (σάπων = soap), *mendil* (μανδήλι[ο]ν = cloth scarf, handkerchief, headdress). To this list must also be added the words *irgad* (εργάτης = laborer), *angarya* (αγγαρεία = chore), *efendi-efe* (from the word αυθέντης<sup>359</sup> = lord), *alay* (=ceremony, cortege, regiment, *miralay* = Colonel –

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<sup>358</sup> See S. Koumanoudes, *Συναγωγή λέξεων αθησαυρίστων*, Athens 1883, word ανοικτήριο. Also Cf *Ακάθιστος Ύμνος*: “Χαίρε Παραδείσου θυρών ανοικτήριο”.

<sup>359</sup> Cf E. Littman, *Nachrichten von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil-Hist. Klasse*, 1916 p. 102, and Koprülü, *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* Vol. I (1931) p. 277. A more specific and valuable study about the origin and use of this word is owed to Psichares and was published under the title “Efendi”, *Mélanges de philologie et de linguistique offerts à L. Havet*, Paris 1909, pp. 387-427. The title αυθέντης [master – lord] which was conferred on a Turkish mogul was preserved in a 1226 bibliographical note of a codex from Kaisareia [Kayseri] and refers to the sultan of Ikonium of the period: “έτελιώθη τό παρόν τετραβάγγελον... κατά τόν καιρόν ό και εκυρίευσεν ό άγιός μου αυθέντης ό πανυψηλότατος μέγας σουλτάνος Ρωμανίαν, Αρμενίαν...» etc., N.A. Bees, *Die Inschriftenaufzeichnung des Kodex Sinaiticus Graecus* 508 (976) p. 42. About the first appearance of this

from the word *αλλάγιον* > *αλλάγι*<sup>360</sup>) and *كرمك*, *كورموك* - *gömrük* (= duty office – from the word *κομμέρκιον*). The word *kanun* (from *κανών*, which, as known, was stating the ecclesiastical law), as Gibbons points<sup>361</sup>, was going to be used by the Ottomans to declare the law in general, both the state's and the religion's. It is surprising that Arabic words entered the Turkish language through the Greek, which received them from the West. In example: *tersane* (= dockyard) <*αρσανάς* – *τ(ο)αρσανά* <Ital. *arzena* – *darsena* - *arsenale*, Fr. *Darsine*, Sp. *darsena*, from the Arab word *accinaa'h* = *al-cinaa'h* (workshop) and *mağaza* (= store) <*μαγαζί[ν]* <Italy. *Magazzino*, Spain. *Magacen*, from the Arab word *Makhâzin*, which is plural of *makhzan* (warehouse).

Borrowing words as those above is a clear indication that the conquerors were in an environment, which, compared to the life they lived, was more developed, both from political and social aspect. And that is mostly because people borrow words to signify things that they do not have and encounter them for the first time. Later, when they will know the sea, they will adopt, with the same ease, Greek names of fish and Italian nautical terms, which, excluding few words of Greek or Turkish origin, would constitute the Turkish sailors' technical vocabulary. From the latter, representative samples are the words: *kadirga* (= warship from *κάτεργον*), *sandal* (-boat from *σανδάλι[ο]ν*), *liman* (= from the word *λιμάνι[ο]ν* = port) and *kalafat* = caulk from *καλαφάτης*). If, during the era of the Ottoman's emerge, Byzantium had a fleet, capable to overshadow the Italian maritime cities, then the naval terminology of the Turkish language would consist of Greek words.

Besides words, over time, the Ottomans were also taught some skills by the local populations, such as pottery, which flourished for centuries in Nicomedia and Nicaea, carpet weaving, textile weaving and especially silk weaving<sup>362</sup>, which had developed in Bursa region, mainly after the Normans conquered Thebes (1147) and kidnapped the specialized technicians to Sicilia. It was on the Greeks they based for metallurgy and metal procession<sup>363</sup>.

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title in Turkish, see F. Taeschner, *OLZ* Vol. 36 (1933) p. 486 f.n. 1. The salutation *efendi* was repealed by the Kemalist reform as foreign and was replaced by the Turkish *bay* (fem. *bayan*).

<sup>360</sup> E. Stein, *MOG* Vol. II (1923-26) p. 44. Köprülü, *ibid.*, p. 277.

<sup>361</sup> *The Foundation* pp. 72-73.

<sup>362</sup> The silk industry remained largely in Greek hands until the Catastrophe. Cf Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* pp. 32, 35, 45.

<sup>363</sup> Nikitas Choniates B'1 p. 99. The date is given by Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant* Vol. I p. 199.

Moreover, the Turks had also borrowed and some other Byzantine institutions crucial to the development of their state. We had the chance to talk about that issue above, when we mentioned the *Pronoia* or *stratiotopio* institution, which appeared to the Ottomans very early. According to J. Deny<sup>364</sup>, the word *timar* is of Persian and not of Greek origin and initially meant *care, forethought*. However, according to the same turcologist, the institution which is suggested, is imitation of the Byzantine *stratiotopio*, which, as is known, in the last centuries of the Empire was also named *oikonomia* (economy) or *pronoia* (care, forethought). Thus, *timar* belongs to that category of institutions, that the Ottomans took from the native inhabitants, but translated the Greek term in order to render it in a more understandable way.

As regards the organization of the administration, the first Ottomans copied the Byzantine *βάνδα*, or commonly called *φλάμουλα*<sup>365</sup>, which were subdivisions of *θέματα* (provinces). Turks called them *sangak* (in Turkish *sancak* = flag). As, in Byzantine times, the military commander of a province concentrated in his hands both political and military administration, in a similar way, *sangak bey*, who firstly was the commander of a military unit that served under the same flag, was also handling the political command of the area he was assigned. The organization of the Ottoman *sancaks* begins shortly after the conquest of Bursa. The city is the seat of the first *sancak*, where conqueror Orhan assigned his second son, Murat, also known as Hüdavenkâr (prince - master). The name Hüdavenkâr was kept to indicate the prefecture of Bursa (Hüdavenkâr vilayeti), until the time the administrative departments were reorganized at the years of Democracy. Few years after the conquest of Bursa, was formed a second Ottoman *βάνδον* in Nicomedia, which was given to Akça Koca, the conqueror of the region. The name *Kocaeli* (= Koca's dominance) remains even today to describe the old Mesothynia *Μεσοθυνία*.

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<sup>364</sup> A. Papadopoulos, “Οι Έλληνες υπό τους Τούρκους”, *ΕΕΒΣ* Vol. II (1925), pp. 98-101.

See “Timar” *EI* Vol. 4 pp. 807-816, particularly 807 B.

<sup>365</sup> C. Brockelmann (*Geschichte der islamischen Völker* p. 239) identifies the Ottoman *sancak* with the Byzantine *thema* [*θέμα-pl. themata*]. However, it would be more correct to identify the *sancak* with the *vando* [*βάνδο-pl.vanda*], not only because there is a linguistic correspondence between the two institutions, but also because the area of a *sancak* is almost equal with the area of a *vando*; a Byzantine *thema* often included an area equal to the Ottoman State of the time.

Another institution, that evidently was of Byzantine origin is Çiflik (çiftlik), derivative from the word çift (= pair). According to P. Calligas<sup>366</sup>, it came from the Byzantine ζευγάριον<sup>367</sup>, which is the roman *jugum* and corresponds to the land that a pair of oxen can cultivate in a year. Depending on the terrain, this amount of land varies between one hundred and two hundred acres<sup>368</sup>. The etymology from ζευγάριον that is suggested by Calligas does not seem unlikely. However, we consider equally likely that the term *çiflik* comes from the Byzantine ζευγηλατείον. Ζευγηλατεία were called the estates which King Ioannes III Vatatzes had set to appertain to “each castle and fortress” and were cultivated for the purpose of feeding the warriors<sup>369</sup>. Therefore the first τσιφλίκια fiefdoms in Bithynia had probably military origins. In other words, given that, for many years, the Osmanlis had neither the time nor the desire to deal with land, these must have been estates cultivated by local farmers for the needs of the Ottoman troops. If these notions are correct, we can consider that the first *çifliks* were commandeered farms for the upkeep of the Osmanli troops, especially during the time that Osman was being settled as feudal lord and the Ottoman emirate was passing through its feudal stage/period. This view is reinforced by the complete correlation between the words *çiflik* and ζευγηλατείον, since the suffix *-lik* is equivalent to the Greek *-είον*, while the word ζευγηλάτης (ζευγολάτης ή ζευγάς) (teamster or plowman) indicates the person who is leading a pair (*çift*) of oxen for plowing. No matter how it is, whether that is produced either from ζευγάριον or from ζευγηλατείον, at any rate, remains undeniable that the term *çiflik* has Byzantine origin.

Another point that the Ottomans copied the Byzantines is associated with private life and particularly the women attire. The face cover, with which the Europeans have identified the Ottoman women, was a Byzantine tradition transferred to the Turks, probably in the middle of the 14th century. Because it is known that Greeks women of the Middle Ages, due to the influence of the eastern people, wore στομομάνικο (mouth

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<sup>366</sup> See his old but fundamental study “Περί δουλοπαροικίας παρά Ρωμαίοις και Βυζαντινοίς και περί φορολογικών διατάξεων”, *Μελέται και λόγοι*, Athens 1882, p. 291.

<sup>367</sup> It is mentioned by Konstantinos Porfyrogennitos, *Ἐκθεσις βασιλείου τάξεως*, B' 49 p. 695 (ed. Bonn).

<sup>368</sup> Th. Uspesky, “Ζητήματα προς μελέτην της εσωτερικῆς ιστορίας του Βυζαντινοῦ Κράτους», *ΔΙΕΕ* Vol. II (1885) p. 544. The holders of such estates were paying tax, the so called *zeugolotion* or *zeugaritikon* [ζευγολόγιον or ζευγαριτίκιον]. See F. Dölger, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung* p. 53.

<sup>369</sup> Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Α'* 23 p. 69 l. 7.

sleeve?) or *προσωπίδιο* (visard?), the commonly called *τσιπά* (skim)<sup>370</sup>. In contrast, from Ibn Battuta's work, we are informed that, in Orhan's days, the women of Minor Asia Turks were moving around without wearing headscarf, something that the Moroccan traveler found very striking<sup>371</sup>. Since the Ottomans hadn't come into direct contact with Arab populations before the conquer Asia Minor, it is obvious that *γιασμάκι* (yashmak) and the Osmanli veil is a Byzantine influence.

As long as this habit had for many centuries remained a specific feature of the Ottoman Empire, the subordination of women has rightly been associated with the face cover. The reformers of the New Turkey declared that yashmak/veil was the symbol slavery for the Turkish women. However, it is considered certain that, this very slavery, which depicted the subsequent Ottomans retrogressive in the eyes of Europeans, was not known by the Turkish women at Osman's and Orhan's time. Ibn Battuta describes that at the times he was hosted by Turkish families the women appeared in front of strangers and spoke with them without any restraint<sup>372</sup>. In two cases, the traveler and his retinue were accepted by women belonging to the higher social level, who hosted them a symposium and, despite the fact that their husbands were absent. One of these ladies was emir Eretna's wife, who was residing in Kaisareia<sup>373</sup> and the other was one of Orhan's wives in Nikaea<sup>374</sup>. During his tour in Turkish emirates he refers that underway was happening to meet women traveling alone or with their servant, by a coach or on horseback<sup>375</sup>. Ibn Battuta remarked that, as for their appearance and behavior, women seemed much superior to men and as he characteristically says, when the husband accompanied his wife, it was easy to think that he was her servant<sup>376</sup>. This indicates that women not only weren't in a lower position, but instead enjoyed great honor, which, in some respects, placed them to a position superior to man. From this we might perhaps conclude that women, comparatively, were less than men, a fact that would reinforce the view that the origin of first Ottomans was nomadic.

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<sup>370</sup> See F. Koukoules, "Βυζαντινά και ούχι τουρκικά έθιμα", BZ Vol. 30 (1930), pp. 180-185.

<sup>371</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II pp. 256, 379. P. Carolides (Τα Κόμματα και τὰ ερείπια αυτών, Athens 1882, p. 42) notices that, even in our days, the women of the race Afsar do not cover their face and are not considered inferior to men.

<sup>372</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II p. 256.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 288.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 324.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 325, where is mentioned a woman traveling on horseback with the sole accompaniment of a servant. While they were crossing Saggarios River, the servant was drowned but the woman was saved. On p. 379 is described a women trip by coach.

The inferior position which was given to the woman by the posterior Turks firstly was because of the Byzantium's and later the Mohammedanism's influence. However, in this sector, the influence of Islam occurred slowly. Harems, with the current meaning of the word, before Murad II, didn't exist even in the sultan's court<sup>377</sup>. Polygamy, as an institution, was not widespread in the early Ottomans, not only because it was inconsistent with their notion about woman dignity, but also because there weren't many women among Osman's followers. Therefore, before they began intermingling with the Bithynian women, Osmanli women were necessarily small in number.

Byzantium's effects over the Ottomans were diverse and could constitute the subject of a special study<sup>378</sup>. By settling in the land of Bithynia and then by entering the cities, the Ottomans continuously adopt Byzantine customs, foods, baths, administration, charity organization, the architectural style. Even the Byzantine *άσπρον* was maintained among the first Ottoman coins that were called *akçe*.

Some of our contemporaries Turk scholars argued that *devşirme* (mass kidnapping of children) was also due to the influence from the Byzantine practice to recruit foreignness in special battalions. However, no institution that is proportional to the mass kidnapping of children was found in the Byzantine State, and we believe that a correlation between Janissaries and *Τουρκόπωλους* is completely frivolous. The origin of these two military corps is quite different, and no link can be certified among them.

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid., p. 379.

<sup>377</sup> Cf Gibbons, *The Foundation* p. 157 f.n. 1.

<sup>378</sup> Prof. Köprülü, in his study entitled "Bizans Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri", *Türk Hukuk ve İktisat Tarihi Mecmuası* Vol. I (1931), pp. 165-313 and also in a short announcement on the subject "Les institutions byzantines ont-elles joué un rôle dans la formation des institutions ottomanes?" on the International History Conference in Warsaw (1933), published in *Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences* Vol. 6 issue 23 (1933) pp. 297-302, underestimated the importance of the Byzantine institutions in shaping the Ottoman State admitting only the Greek origin of the words *alay* and *efendi*. In a review on Köprülü's article by F. Taeschner, *OLZ* Vol. 36 (1933), pp. 484-488, the German historian notes that the unilateralism of his Turkish peer is due to the fact that he does not use the Byzantine sources (p. 486). Besides Taeschner, R. Guiland had also disagreed with Köprülü in his article "Institutions byzantines -institutions musulmanes", *Annales d' Histoire Économique et Sociale*, July 1934, p. 426 ff.. Except the treatise of F. Koukoules that we have already mentioned, regarding the surviving of Byzantine institutions at the Ottomans, very important is the study of K. Dieterich, *Das Griechentum Kleinasien*, Leipzig 1915, p. 14 ff.. Especially for the Byzantine and Turkish baths, see Djelal Esad, *Constantinople-De Byzance à Stamboul*, Paris 1909, pp. 224-230, and F. Koukoules, "Τα λουτρά κατά τους βυζαντινούς χρόνους", *ΕΕΒΣ* Vol. 11 (1935) p. 205. As to the influence of Byzantine architecture on the early Ottoman buildings, see R. Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* pp. 22-23, 32, 43, and Cl. Huart, *Konia-La ville des derviches tourneurs* p. 13.

It was proved that the Janissaries institution is posterior to Osman and Orhan. While Gibbons<sup>379</sup> argues that it appeared during the reign of Murad I, Hasluck<sup>380</sup> places it at Muhammad the Conqueror's time. According to the recent researches of Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı<sup>381</sup>, the institution of Christian captives conscription (pençik kanunu) appears in the second half of the 14th century, during the reign of Murad I, but it was reorganized to its known devşirme form during the reign of Mehmed I and his successor, Murad II, when the Ottoman conquests in Europe had ceased and the lack of new captives led to the necessity of recruiting the children of the Ottoman State's Christian subjects. It was then that the devşirme terms was set, which, according to Professor Uzunçarşılı, aimed at a dual purpose: on the one hand the gradual Islamization of the Balkan Peninsula people and, on the other hand, to strengthen the Ottoman army. This new system, called devşirme kanunu, replaced the old pençik kanunu, namely that which provided the use of Christian captives in various military and non-military works and was kept in force for two and a half centuries.

Accordingly, the oldest evidence for the Janissaries, since 1385, doesn't relate them with the mass kidnapping of children. In an era in that mass kidnapping of children was still unknown and Osmanli had not evolved much beyond the nomadic stage, the concretion of the natives with the conquerors occurred not because the Byzantines supposedly joined the invaders' culture, but because the latter, after the first successes, when there was no longer ground conducive to plundering and since they were in a predominant environment, being attracted from Bithynian land's fertility, adopted rural life and Byzantine culture's key elements.

Even before the end of 13th century, the insightful Osman had foreseen that his and his followers' future would be the development of agriculture. The era of predatory raids and looting was heading towards its end, since after the outgo of the wealthy and exhaustion of affluence, there were no more valuable loot. Osman had timely realized that his mission was to become the leader of a rural nation, which waited a leader, capable to save it from anarchy and its aftermath. In earlier years, Bithynian people had found such a leader to the face of Alexios Philanthropenos. If his movement

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<sup>379</sup> *The Foundation* pp. 117-119. Cf Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 pp. 497-498.

<sup>380</sup> *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Vol. II p. 487-493.

<sup>381</sup> In a recent massive work of Kapukulu Ocakları (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*, Ankara 1943), Vol. I pp. 5-14, 144-146.

had prevailed, perhaps Osman wouldn't ever have managed to establish a Turkish state in Bithynia. However, Philanthropenos' failure led the country into chaos and the necessity for another powerful leader was more visible than ever. Osman appeared in the appropriate place and time.

His work was made much easier because, at that time, Bithynia's people were spiritually and mentally isolated. In the eyes of the people, Constantinople Βασιλεύουσα had become a distant and alien myth, stranger than Konya was for western Asia Minor Turkish rulers and their followers. During the recent decades, the relations among government and people had taken a purely hostile form and since there were no armed conflicts, people saw the representatives of the royal rule only as annoying tax collectors for wars that didn't interest him and erection of magnificent temples that he was not ever going to see. Michael VIII, and more his successor Andronicus, despite the fact that the Byzantine Empire had always been based in Asia and had drawn the bulk of its force, wanted to transform it to a European power,. Bithynia, from one end to the other, was dominated by local interests and close personal pursuits. There wasn't any local spiritual movement to transfuse a cultural content to the straggle against the invaders and vindicate the sacrifices of the people. As previously mentioned, the religious sentiment had softened. Alongside the religious consciousness had also begun to slack the linguistic sentiment which was closely connected with the national consciousness of the inhabitants throughout Asia Minor. But while language was not of great importance, in the cities, where the Greek element was united and had a potentiality to respond collectively against of foreign domination, in rural areas, every word that people learned from the Turks was another step to the Turkification and later to apostasy<sup>382</sup>. This was because at that critical juncture of history, people had ceased to wait his salvation from Constantinople and everyone was thinking how to save his life.

Under such conditions, the appearance of Akhi association was to have great influence in Minor Asia things. Based on the present state of knowledge about this

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<sup>382</sup> Mainly in the interland of Asia Minor the refusal of the language were reaching to the point the Christians to change their names. Without difficulty, the indigenou of Asia Minor were getting Turkish names, in the same way the Greek immigrants in the 20<sup>th</sup>-century America were changing their names making them English. Needless to say that the change of the name did not necessarily mean apostasy or lax towards the ancestral religion. From a memorial tribute of Istanbul Patriarch Paisios to the Monastery of Panagia Kamariotissa on the Prince Island of Chalki, we learn that the name of the patriarch's father was Latif! (Μ. Γεδεών, *Γράμματα πατριαρχικά περί της Μεγάλης του Γένους Σχολής*, Istanbul 1903, p.

organization<sup>383</sup>, we can conclude that it had all the essential features of a medieval guild, a communistic community, of monastic life - but without the strict ascetic tradition<sup>384</sup>, and finally, an Islamic mystical union, combined all together in a remarkable way, constituting an amalgam, unprecedented in history. The name of the association, as mentioned by Ibn Battuta (al-akhiyat al-fityan = Youth Brotherhood)<sup>385</sup>, indicates that initially was created by the youth which formed the first ideological directions, which, with few exceptions, remained in force throughout the course of Akhism history. And indeed, only young people νέοι, with an enlivening surplus of life and enthusiasm, could create such a social force.

Akhism's ideological content is incorporated in futuwwa codex<sup>386</sup>, which can be defined as "the array of praiseworthy qualities that characterize the chivalry young [fata] and, in particular, ethos courtesy and generosity". The central experience of

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105). It is also known that, until the recent years of modern Hellenism, Murat was a name common among the Christians of Cappadocia.

<sup>383</sup> Regarding the Akhis, until today, there have been written the following very interesting studies: F. Taeschner, "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Achis in Anatolien (14.-15. Jht) auf Grund neuer Quellen", *Islamica* Vol. 4 (1929), pp 1-47 (pp. 29-47 listing of the various sources). Idem., "Legendenbildung um Achi Evran, den Heiligen von Kirşehir", *Festschrift Friedrich Giese*, Berlin-Leipzig 1941. V. A. Gordlevskij "From Turkey's Quild Life, Contribution to the history of the Akhis", in Russian, *Zapiski Kollegij Vostokovedov* [Memories du Comité des orientalistes] Vol. 2 issue 2 (1926-27), pp. 235-248. Idem., "The Dervishes of Akhi Evran and Guilds in Turkey", in Russian, *Izvestija Akademij Nauk SSSR* [Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de l'URSS] 6<sup>th</sup> series issue 15-17, 1927, pp. 1171-1194. Idem., "Guild organization at the Krimaean Tatars", in Russian, *Trudi Etnografo-archeologeskogo Museja* Vol. 4 (1928), pp. 56-65. Except them, brief comments on the Akhis are found in the following works which are more general: Köprülüzade Mehmet Fuat, *Türk edebiyatında ilk mütesavvifler*, Istanbul 1918, p. 237 ff.. Idem., "Anadoluda İslamiyet", *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası* Vol. II (1922-23), p. 386 ff.. F. Giese, "Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches", *ZSem* Vol. II (1928) p. 254 ff.. H. Thorning, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des islamischen Vereinswesens auf Grund des Bast Madad et-Taufiq* [Türkische Bibliothek Nr. 16], Berlin 1913, p. 214 ff.. Epigraphic passages of Akhism were published by: Ahmed Tevhid, "Ankara'da Ahiler Hükümeti", *TOEM* Vol. 4 (1329/1913), pp. 1200-1204. Halil Edhem, "Ankara'da Ahilere Ait İki Kitabe", *TOEM* Vol. 7 (1332/1917), pp. 312-315. Mübarek Galip, *Ankara*, part I, Istanbul 1341, - part II, Istanbul 1928. Ismail Hakkı, *Kitabeler*, Istanbul 1345/1927.

<sup>384</sup> Remarkable is the fact that Ibn Battuta (Vol. II p. 437) mentions that the monasteries of the Romans correspond to the zaviyes, namely the Akhis communities.

<sup>385</sup> J. Deny, in his brief article "Fütüwwet-name et romans de chevalerie turcs", *JA*, 1<sup>st</sup> series, Vol. 16 (1920), pp. 182-183, notes that the word *Ahi* did not come from the Arabic *akh* (brother), but from the eastern Turkish *aqi*, which means "generous, chivalrous". Ibn Battuta as well, considers the word *akhi* foreign and prefixes the article *al* (al-akhi) when he calls them. Therefore, it is probable the Turkish word *aqi* to have been correlated with the Arabic *akh-i*, because of the similarity of their accent. We agree with Taeschner, *Islamica* Vol. 4 p. 15, and we consider probable that the word *Akhi* is a mixture of the two words, as it happened with the title *mevlana*, which originally meant "our Lord" and later was stating the literary. See E. Littman, *ibid.*, p. 102. Therefore, the original word *Aqi* may have been covered by the Arabic *akh-i*.

<sup>386</sup> Ibn Battuta Vol. II p. 261. Cf C. Van Arendonk "Futuwwa" *EL*, Vol. II pp. 130-131. Also, Vol. 4 p. 1011. Remarkable is Thorning's aforementioned work, particularly chap. 4, which is, devoted to futuwwa, also R. Hartmann's work "Futuwwa und Malama", *ZDMG* Vol. 72 (1918) p. 193 ff. and H. Ritter's "Zur

futuwwa can be expressed with a phrase of Christian invitation: “ithar 'ala nafsihi” (put your neighbor over thee). With this dynamic sermon, it was natural that Akhism would fascinate the 14<sup>th</sup> century society, and this is fair, because in the minds of the people of that era, who had suffered many hardships because of raids and anarchy, Akhism appeared as the only hope for a better and fairer world.

If Akhi's political program is added to the above ethical principles, then becomes obvious the crucial importance of the Youth Brotherhood. As mentioned by Ibn Battuta<sup>387</sup>, Akhis were undertaking “to overthrow tyrants, to eliminate the satellites of tyranny and those malignant associated with them”. The pursuit of this noble cause highlights Akhis to a political factor, that couldn't be ignored by the leaders of the Turkish emirates. The conclusion reached, based on Ibn Battuta's information regarding the good relations that various emirs maintained with the local Akhism organizations, is that, these intolerant Medieval Democrats, Akhis, didn't come into conflict with the leaders of the small Turkish states, presumably because the latter considered more advantageous to go into partnership with the Brotherhood, and, at the same time to adopt its essential principles<sup>388</sup>. Only in this way can be explained the Turkish emirates' rapid development from violent regimes (despotic totalitarian regimes) to order vectors, as well the lack of those bloody episodes that made the ideologically cognate Haşîşiyun (Assassins) organization unforgettable in the history of humanity. Unlike the followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, Akhis were law-abiding and peaceful element which passively affected public life. Moreover, such was their private life and their welfare and charitable activities that the wise traveler Ibn Battuta<sup>389</sup> admits that he hadn't met people so beneficial anywhere else in the universe.

Ibn Battuta's *Tour* constitutes the essential contemporary source regarding Akhis order. From there, we draw the information that, around the year 1333, Akhis were scattered across the Turk occupied East, and that their cores were everywhere in

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Futuwwa”, *Islam* Vol. 10 (1920) p. 244 ff. Hartmann stresses the secular nature of futuwwa unlike Thorning, who distinguishes aristocratic trends at the chivalrous organizations of the Turks.

<sup>387</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II p. 261.

<sup>388</sup> As V.A. Gordlevskij states in *Isvestija Akademij Nauk SSSR*, 6<sup>th</sup> series, issue 15-17 p. 1184, the Akhis would cooperate with the Ottoman State if the later was in agreement with their political principals. But, when the Ottoman power became authoritarian, division and rupture occurred in the relations of organization and the state.

<sup>389</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II pp. 261, 262, 264-265.

the province, in every city and village<sup>390</sup>. According to the Moroccan traveler, the organization's members were young bachelors living from their labour. They were divided into professional groups, formed an association and elected their leader, calling him Akhi. The latter gathered the common resources and established a community (*zaviye*), where, next to the completely necessary furniture, were placed luxurious carpets and candles<sup>391</sup>. Every night, the brothers deposited their collections to the communal fund and then ate and danced together until late at night. It is natural to assume that, as were the Mevlevi's dances, their dances were also religious in nature. In the *zaviye* was provided shelter and food, to every traveler, usually for three days<sup>392</sup>, displaying rare spirit of hospitality, which had won the Moroccan traveler's admiration.

But *zaviyes* didn't serve only as communes and hostels. They were also social hearths, with educational and religious mission. Ibn Battuta was hosted in Brusa<sup>393</sup> by Akhi Semseddin, who was one of the most distinguished members of the association in the Ottoman capital and was identified with Sheikh Entempali's brother, Osman's father in law. At that time because of the celebration of *aşura* (10 of month Muharrem) in addition to the association members were also present military leaders of the city, many residents and some important persons who happened to be in Bursa.

Among them stood the jurist preacher Megdeddin al-Kunewy (ο Ικονιεύς) and Sheikh Abdallah ai-Misry (the Egyptian), who was a wealthy man and had traveled all over the known world. After experts euphonious chanters had read the Quran, followed a sermon, given by Megdeddin. Then the rhetor addressed a very moving exhortation to the believers of Allah. Ibn Battuta writes that "it was a very emotional night". The attendees ate, danced, and under the influence of mysticism expressed enthusiasm tendencies. While sermon was still lasting, some believers came in a state of rapture and began uttering inarticulate cries. One of them lost his consciousness and shortly after died. He was buried the next day and Ibn Battuta took part at the funeral. However, it seems that such afflictive events weren't rare. Moreover, it seems that people who believed in this kind of religious exaltation did not consider mischance (accident) such an incident. As was expected, those alive were beatifying those dying under such

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<sup>390</sup> Ibid., p. 260.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid., pp. 261-263. Ibn Battuta notes that at the floors of the communes were fine Greek carpets, which indicates that carpet industry was in the hands of the Christians.

<sup>392</sup> Ibid., p. 295.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., pp. 318-320.

circumstances, considering that they went to meet Allah through the delirium of devoutness and with the vision of Paradise. For these reasons, it was the imposing figure of Megdeddin al-Kunewy that drew the attendees' attention that summer night and not that incident. Both his wisdom and the fact that he lived through the labor of his hands were causing admiration. What was stressed with particular emphasis was the fact that he didn't possess any property. In fact, he had nothing except his clothes. At night he slept in the cemetery. But he never failed to come to the meetings, to preach and encourage the faithful in the way of the Prophet. Such vivid impression made the personality of that sufi to the Arab traveler, that once the company was dissolved, rushed to the cemetery to meet Megdeddin in person. Unfortunately, luck did not favor him, because, that night, the Sheikh was missing.

These were happening in Bursa a few years after its conquest by the Ottomans. The reader of Ibn Battuta's description is not possible not to recall to his memory of the gatherings and the enthusiasm displayed by the Christians of the first apostolic years. Indeed, only neophytes can feel and express their religiosity in a similar way. In Ibn Battuta's homeland, where Islam had a long tradition, weren't marked such phenomena.

Except from Ibn Battuta there is another valuable source regarding akhism, which is posterior for about a generation. It is about Yahya Ibn al-Halil's work *Futuvvetname*. This source was studied in detail by the historian F. Taeschner<sup>394</sup>, in his valuable work *Contributions to Akhis' History in the East Συμβολαί εις την ιστορίαν των Αχί εν Ανατολή* East. Yahya Ibn Halil Ibn al-Coban al-Halil (this is his full name according to the Bosnian code, which is in Taeschner's possession), is among those who believe that any spiritual value collapses from the moment it come into contact with the mundane and the crowd of people. With this spirit, he attempts to compose/write the futuwwa's charter, on the one hand describing the earlier state of the organization and, on the other, proposing some reforms. In his preface states that Akhis had little epitome

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<sup>394</sup> F. Taeschner, "Beiträge", *Islamica* Vol. 4 pp. 5-10 and 37-43, where are mentioned the several manuscripts of *Futuvvetname* and is analyzed its content. See also, idem., "Das *Futuvvetname* des Jahja b. Halil", *OLZ* Vol. 31 (1928) p. 1065. Köprülü is the first who refers to a *Futuvvetname* manuscript (*Türk edebiyatında ilk mütesavvifler* p. 241 f.n. 1). Since this manuscript refers to the plunder of Alexandria in 1365 by the Franks, giving Ibn Battuta the opportunity to buy some books, this cannot be prior to that date; however, the Turkish historian considered that it was written before Ibn Battuta's time. As regards the chronology of the *Futuvvetname*, see Taeschner, *ibid.*, p. 5 f.n. 4 and p. 40. As regards the plundering of Alexandria, see Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant*, Vol. II pp. 52 and 431.

books on futuwwa and that, with his detailed book, which is supported by rich evidence from the religious literature, he came to heal this shortage.

Yahya claims that his work is the first Akhi Futuvvetname. From his writings we learn that candles had a particular position at the initiation ceremony, as well at the other gatherings of the Akhis, which relates to the terminology “λαμβάνειν φως” “be received light” (çırak almak) and “περιζωννύεσθαι” (kuşak kuşanmak) “to gird on a fabric belt”, which were used as synonyms for “λαμβάνειν άδειαν” (destur almak) “be received permission”, stating the completion of the initiation process. The importance attributed by Yahya to the symbolic character of candles, agrees with what Ibn Battuta writes<sup>395</sup>.

Apart from candle impartation, tonsure was a very important part of the initiation ceremony, namely another point of similarity between akhism and monastic life of Christians. Scissors were necessary component of the brotherhood’s neophyte member. Hence, the expression “λαμβάνειν ψαλίδα” (makaş almak) “be received scissors”, is used with the same meaning of the phrases mentioned above, to declaring the initiation.

Akhis’ uniform<sup>396</sup> was a long white robe/alb and kalansüve, a tall head cover of white woolen cloth. A strip, two fingers broad and a cubit long was fitted at its top. In ceremonial times, Akhis took this head cover off, placed it in front of them and put on another, made of thin silk fabric. This cover was called zerdhani. Around their waists they wore a belt from was hung a sword two cubits long<sup>397</sup>.

Regarding the origin of the Akhi organization, we cannot be informed accurately for anything from the sources that are known to date. An Aşıkpaşazade’s

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<sup>395</sup> *Voyages* pp. 263-264. Ibn Battuta describes the first *zaviye* that he entered. He noticed tall bronze tripod candlesticks, having candle with candlewick on their top. A special member of the organization, the so-called çırakçı, was commissioned to watch and take care of the candles. In Giovan Antonio Menavino’s work, *Trattato de costumi et vita de’ Turchi*, Florence 1548, pp. 115-117, is described a Turkish hospitality dinner with candles, which looks like the Akhis dinner described at Futuvvetname by Yahya bin Halil. Menavino’s work is closer to F. Sansovino’s *Historia universale dell’origine et imperio de’ Turchi*, Venice 1568 and 1654. The relevant passage is in s. 19 of 1568 ed. and in s. 36 of 1654 ed. The Italian author names *Console* the chairman of the symposium and *Leventi* the table companions.

<sup>396</sup> Ibn Battuta, Vol. II p. 264.

<sup>397</sup> The similarity between the Akhi and the Janissary attire led Giese (*ZSem* Vol. II pp. 259, 261) and Köprülü (*Les origines* p. 18) to the conclusion that the first organizers of the Ottoman State belonged to the ranks of the Akhis. However, although the similarity of the two uniforms cannot be attributed to a random coincidence since there was given particular emphasis to the outer dress, it can be explained in another way, as we will see below, when we will deal with the reforms of Orhan and Alaeddin.

passage provoked embarrassment to the researchers. There, Akhis (Akhiyan-i-Rum) are mentioned as being included among the four groups (tayfa) of foreign or travelers (müsâfir)<sup>398</sup>. These are the Ghazis (champions of faith), the Akhis, the abdals (dervishes) and the bagi (sisters). Then, arises the question: if Akhis were travelers, where did they come from? According to Wittek<sup>399</sup>, the term *traveler* has an allegorical meaning and indicates the militant power of Islam, which is on the move. This view is supported by the fact that Aşikpaşazade<sup>400</sup> distinguishes the Muslims of the Fall period into two categories: those that come under the ruler of Mecca and Medina (Padişah-i kibra-i Islam) and those that were subjects of the Ottoman sultan (Padişah-i seyyah-i Islam). However, Babinger<sup>401</sup>, who insist on a literal interpretation of the term traveler, believes that Akhis were immigrants from northern Persia (Khorasan) and Turkestan, where, because of its proximity to India and Buddhism, there was ground suitable for the development of a secretive religion and cenobitic religious life. In this region, especially in Persia, had also survived residues of mazsdeizm while of very significant importance is the fact that Christianity, according to the heretical teaching of Nestorios<sup>402</sup>, was spread among Central Asia's Turkish tribes. As far is generally noticed that religions are assimilated or suppressed by other dominants, but not completely destroyed, the pre-Islamic religious situation cannot be considered irrelevant to Akhism's emerge.

Köprülü<sup>403</sup> connects Achism with Batiniya (Batinismus), namely that mystical movement that sought for the allegorical interpretation of the holy books. Its doctrine's cornerstone was that "every external event, at the same time is also internal"<sup>404</sup>. However, as pointed out by Taeschner<sup>405</sup>, Batinismus is a very broad concept and, in its

<sup>398</sup> Aşikpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 205, Giese pp. 201.

<sup>399</sup> *Byzantion* Vol. 11 (1936) p. 310.

<sup>400</sup> Eds. Giese p. 220.

<sup>401</sup> "Der Islam in Kleinasien", *ZDMG* n.f. Vol. I p. 132 ff.

<sup>402</sup> Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 (1932), pp. 478, 485. Babinger, *ibid.*, p. 147. Apart from the biblical names Israil, Mihail, Yunus, Musa etc. which were broadly widespread and could be disseminated only through Christianity, also important is the contribution of the preserved epigraphic monuments, in respect of which D. Chwolson has written, "Syrischen Grabinschriften aus Semirjetschie", in *Mémoires de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences de St. Pétersbourg*, 1886, 1890 και 1897, and W. Barthold, "Christianity in Turkestan of the pre-Mongol period – The inscriptions of Semiretsensk", in Russian, *Zapiski* Vol. 8 (1893), pp. 1-32.

<sup>403</sup> *İlk mütesavvıfler* p. 241. Also, *Türk Yurdu*, year 14', Vol. II p. 132.

<sup>404</sup> The name batiniya came from the Arabic word batin = esoteric, mystic, pneumatic.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16. See also B. Curra de Vaux "Batiniya" *EI*, Vol. I. p. 697, and Cl. Huart "Ismailiya", *EI*, Vol. II. pp. 585-588.

various forms may include Shia, Isma'ilism, Mevleviye and some Christian heretical groups of Persia. At first glance, one can see a certain affinity between Akhism and Mevlevi order. This is because apart from Akhis' religious dances –as mentioned by Ibn Battuta - there is another common point: it is about the ascertainment that that Mevleviye's founder Gelaledin Rumi (1207-1274) holds a special place in Akhism, something that is also attested by Yahya Ibn Halil<sup>406</sup>. In addition, since Akhism adopts the social program of the Assassins, is not irrelevant to Isma'ilism. As for the relationship among Akhism and Shia, there is no proof. Although Ibn Battuta didn't know the Turkish language, since he was a Sunni, observant and theological educated, he was able to know if Asia Minor Turks were heretics or not. However, although he is given the opportunity to speak about their orthodoxy on several occasions, at no point of his narration indicates that they were Shi'a. In contrast, he accounts that, in Sinope, he was almost considered to be a Shi'a and since his complains for the contrary weren't capable to dispel the suspicion against him, he was forced to eat rabbit in front of witnesses to convince the mistrustful for the purity of his Muslim faith<sup>407</sup>. Not even their respect to Ali, which is clearly seen in Fütüvvetnâme, can be considered as proof for Akhis' Shia. And this is because many purely Sunni circles pay great tribute to the Prophet's groom<sup>408</sup>. Finally, Taeschner<sup>409</sup>, based on Yahya Ibn Halil, connects Akhism, as a spiritual entity with the strictly Sunni Egypt.

Moreover, Taeschner<sup>410</sup> stresses that the Christian factor must be considered concerning the birth of Akhism and admits that the association's conversion to ruling class at the cities wouldn't have been possible without the help and influence of the Byzantine urban culture. Despite the dark and enigmatic origin of Akhism, the fact remains that, within the cities of Asia Minor, where Turks had been in close contact with the Byzantine life, Akhis developed into a professional vocational organization. Akhis, extended from Konya, Ankara, Sivas, Caesarea, Dokeian (Tokat) to the rich western and northwestern Asia Minor, with the status of immigrant and missionary; however, they had always kept their urban character. For this reason, in Osman's

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<sup>406</sup> Taeschner *ibid.*, p. 16. Also Cf Ibn Battuta Vol. II p. 282.

<sup>407</sup> Ibn Battuta Vol. II p. 353.

<sup>408</sup> Taeschner, *ibid.*, pp. 18-19, Cf S. R. Trowbridge, "The Alevis or Deifiers of Ali", *Harvard Theological Review* Vol. II 2 (1909) p. 93 ff..

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*

emirate the ground was adequate for them, to live and act, only after the submission of the Bithynian cities. Since the Akhis were considered travelers for both the indigenous and their conquerors, it is very likely that they were first called *müsafir* in the Turkish emirates of Bithynia, Phrygia and Ionia. These names was easy to expand broadly from the west and northwest Asia Minor as synonyms of the Akhis and survive until the time of Aşikpaşazade who preserved them.

Not only the Brotherhood's urban and corporate character is due to the Christian environment, but also part of its ethical and religious beliefs, as happened in the case of Bektaşīye, which, according to G. Jacob<sup>411</sup>, in terms of intellectual content, is associated with Akhism. Just with a mere observation we realize that Akhism isn't clear Islam. It is the result of a syncretism, which arose from the interaction of the Eastern religions and flourished in Asia Minor, which had always been the bridge connecting the East with the West. Among the various elements that have fueled Akhism as a spiritual being and human society, we would say that the Christian (element) was not the less important<sup>412</sup>. Besides, as evidenced by the depiction of Christ and the saints on Seljuk coins<sup>413</sup>, the common worship of St. George, St. Amphilochius and St. Chariton<sup>414</sup>, and the salutation of the sultan as *master* (*αυθέντης*), which was preserved in the manuscript of a Gospel<sup>415</sup>, Christianity and Islam maintained virtuous relations at the state of Rum. Moreover, although the inscription of Akhi Pangalos<sup>416</sup>

<sup>411</sup> “Die Bektaschijje in ihrem Verhältnis zu verwandten Erscheinungen”, *Abhandlungen der Philosophisch – philologischen Klasse der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* Vol. 24 (1909) part III, pp 19-20. Regarding the relations between Bektashism and Christianity see pp. 33-39. Overall the Bektashis, significant is J.K. Birge's study, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, London 1937.

<sup>412</sup> V. A. Gordlevskij, *ibid.*, p. 1194.

<sup>413</sup> Ahmed Tevhid, *Müze-i humayun, meskukât-i kadime-i islamiye kütüğü*, part 4, Istanbul 1321, [Musée Imperial Ottoman, section des monnaies musulmanes, 4<sup>me</sup> partie. Catalogue des monnaies des Khakans Turcs, Constantinople 1903) table. 2 No. 92, 93, table 3 No. 111, 118, 145, table 4 No. 153, 211. S. Lane-Poole, *The Coins of the Turkoman Houses of Seljook*, Urtuk, Zengec, etc., London 1883, pp. VIII, 113. No. 306-309, 326-331, 372-374, 598-600, 635, 675, 691. tables VI No. 306, VII No. 329, VIII No. 372, IX No. 598, 635, XII No. 675. Cf N.A. Bees, *ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>414</sup> See F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Vol. I pp. 56-57, 319-322, Vol. II pp. 273-277.

<sup>415</sup> See f.n. 80 chap. II.

<sup>416</sup> This interesting inscription was copied and published by the later patriarch Kyrillos VI (*Ιστορική περιγραφή του έν Βιέννη προεκδοθέντος χωρογραφικού πίνακος της Μεγάλης Αρχισατραπείας του Ίκονίου*, p. 47). Kyrillos show the inscription in situ, at the monastery of St. Chariton (Ak Manastir) near Silla of Lykaonia, when he was Metropolitan of Ikonium. According to Kyrillos' copy, the text reads: “ενταύθα κείται ευγενεστάτων εικόν, καθαρόν τε λόγω δή του μακαρίτου, εικόν δε τρισμάκαρος Αχηπαγκάλου υιού δε πανευγενούς”. Undoubtedly the text is incomplete and its interpretation is very difficult. P. Maas (Taeschner, *ibid.*, p. 46) suggested that it is a Byzantine twelve-syllable verse, but at the place of the word *καθαρόν* would have been a four-syllable proper noun in possessive case and, at the end, a five-syllable

has not yet been satisfactorily interpreted, however, it constitutes a sufficient proof regarding the contacts among Christianity and Akhism around 1290<sup>417</sup>. The relevance of these two religious and social currents explains, furthermore, the purely urban character of the Brotherhood and also its spread throughout Asia Minor.

From what we know from the sources, we conclude that Akhis thrived in central Asia Minor cities at the same time that Osman laid his emirate's foundations, namely, between the years 1282 and 1290. However, it would be extremely bold to allege that Akhis had a remarkable effect on the ottoman things of that time. First, the prevailing social and political conditions, nomadism, anarchy, predatory raids, absence of Mohammedan masses, unstable borders and above all lack of urban centers, if not impossible, rendered Akhism's spread within the frame of the Ottoman emirate very problematic. At that time, Osmanlis were passing through the nomadic period, which was associated with their fulminant and destructive conquests. This correlation is quite normal, because under those conditions only nomads could be constantly at warpath and engaging in continuous raids because their way of life on the one hand rendered them warlike and adventurous and, on the other hand, by not having permanent homes and estates, they weren't afraid of retaliations. Instead, farmers and townsmen are usually peaceful people who are not involved in raids on foreign territories. Moreover, speaking about looting, the less civilized are those who attack those who live at a higher level of civilization.

For these reasons, Akhis who were advanced bourgeois/townsmen and professionals living an eminently social life, had no desire to move to Osman's emirate before Bithynia's complete conquest and subjugation of the cities.

Nevertheless, Giese<sup>418</sup> writes that the troops, by which the Ottomans established their rule, were formed from the Akhis' ranks. According to Giese, Akhis constituted Osman's immediate circle and, by his political virtues were transformed from religious association to fighting force, aiming in attainment of conquering goals. At the same time that the German turcologist formulates this theory, he also recognizes

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proper noun, which has been omitted. Note that the word "δή" which appears in Kyrrilos' publication, is omitted by Taeschner (p. 46) and Hasluck (ibid., Vol. II p. 383, V).

<sup>417</sup> The rest of the inscriptions of this monastery, which was studied by N.A. Bees (ibid., p. 62 ff.), date back to the first reign of Ma'sud II. We may assume that the inscription of Akhi Pangalos' tomb belongs in about the same period. Cf N.S. Rizos, *Καππαδοκικά*, Istanbul 1856, p. 129 ff., and V. Mirmiroglu, *Οι Δερβίσησαι*, Athens 1940, p. 316.

that sources do not provide any information regarding Osman<sup>419</sup>. In addition, although Giese is not quite sure if Osman's tribe had already embraced Islam, he is inclined to the view that, probably, since that time, they had been followers of the Prophet<sup>420</sup>. As he notes, he admits this possibility because it is hard to believe that within a single generation it was possible for Mohammedanism to score such prime as the one described by Ibn Battuta. According to Giese, the conclusion that Osman was surrounded by Akhis derived from some passages of Neşri<sup>421</sup> and Aşıkpaşazade<sup>422</sup>, where is mentioned that Osman's father in law, Sheikh Edebali, had a brother named Akhi Şemşeddin, whose son was Akhi Hassan and both, father and son, were Osman's friends and Orhan's supporters on the day of the conquest of Bursa. From the allusion of these two Akhis in Osman's immediate milieu, Giese<sup>423</sup> concludes that not only Sheikh Edebali but, it is likely that, even himself, the founder of the Ottoman State belonged to the brotherhood's ranks. In particular, regarding Edebali, and in order to strengthen his theory, Giese<sup>424</sup> cites another Aşıkpaşazade's passage, where is stated that Osman's father in law was a "dervish, but he belonged to Batiniya, possessed great wealth and his müsafırhane [hostel] was never empty". However, the term Batiniya isn't synonymous with Akhism. As has already been said, (Batiniya) is a very broad concept and, since Akhism is also a manifestation of mysticism, it comes under it. The fact that Osman's father in law believed in Batinismus, does not necessarily mean that at the same time was an Akhi.

Furthermore, Giese cites another passage of Aşıkpaşazade<sup>425</sup>, which refers to "sturdy youngsters"<sup>426</sup> staffing Osman's milieu. To these youngsters, the German

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<sup>418</sup> *Z Sem* Vol. II pp. 253, 256, 258.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258 l. 26 et seg..

<sup>420</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 251-252.

<sup>421</sup> *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 213 l. 8 et seg. And p. 215 l. 5. Also Leunclavius, *Historiae* p. 170. Also cf Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I pp. 88, 90.

<sup>422</sup> Ed. Giese p. 28 l. 13 et seg. and p. 29 l. 9. The first passage in ed. Istanbul, pp. 29, 36, is worn and referred only to Akhi Hasan by naming him, and not to his father. The quotation from the codes of Dresden and Uppsala is cited in Giese's study, *ibid.*, p. 257.

<sup>423</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258. Relying on Giese's assumption, Köprülü (*Les origines* p. 18), without debate and evidence, embraces the view that Edebali belonged to the brotherhood. Noteworthy is that Gibbons (*The Foundation* p. 27) considers Edebali as "the great Apostle of Islam, who at times of hard necessity found a race of champions for his religion, equal to reconstruct the caliphate and to spread – once more – the name of Muhammad at three continents. Gibbons believes that Osman was initiated to Islam by Edebali. Similarly, Babinger (*ZDMG* n.f. Vol. I p. 132) expressed the view that Osman had probably taken this name when he converted to Islam.

<sup>424</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258 l. 4. Aşıkpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 6.

<sup>425</sup> Eds. Istanbul, p. 9.

turcologist sees the Akhis and warrants his view as follows: “It is self-evident here that, not oldsters but youngsters step up for such predatory raids, so there is no reason for this remark. But if we signify fityan(s) among these youngsters, then the passage becomes meaningful.” But Giese’s reasoning is purely subjective and ignores the fact that, the early Ottoman historians’ and of course Aşikpaşazade’s work, are not without verbalisms and cliché. Finally, the Akhis described by Ibn Battuta and Yahya Ibn Halil, is improbable to be engaged in predatory raids.

Of course, Giese<sup>427</sup> recognizes that his views regarding Osman’s relations with the Akhis are not based on written data and rightly notes that, evidences on Osman’s time, can not be cited. However, Ibn Battuta’s valuable testimony changes the situation in the first decade of Orhan’s reign. Now the Ottomans had imposed order, their rule had acquired a permanent character, people had already begun to accede to Islam and Akhis could find appropriate ground for their operation/action in Bithynia. Under these circumstances, it is easy to understand the importance of men like Akhi Semseddin and Akhi Hassan. It is not insignificant that, in the old Turkish sources, these men, who were the first Akhi of the Ottomans, are for the first time mentioned in connection with Bursa’s surrender, while Osman was on his death bed. The fall of Bursa launch new political and social conditions that were conducive to Akhism’s spread.

Regarding Sheikh Edebali, unknown remains whether he was a member of the Brotherhood or not. But, even if we assume that he shared his brother’s and his nephew’s principals and that the latter, from the beginning, were on Osman’s side, again, we must conclude that, no matter how important these three Akhis were, they couldn’t create a bourgeoisie and a state without Bithynia’s inhabitants’ synergy. Osmanli emirate’s transformation from personalistic feudalism to rural middle class-based hegemony and the emergence of urban population in the ranks of the Ottomans, was primarily work of Bithynia’s Greek inhabitants with Akhis’ contribution – but only after the area was completely occupied and the new generation that was born under the Osmanli rule had grown mature.

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<sup>426</sup> As we note, Nešri says the same, with almost the same words in *ZDMG* Vol. Vol. 13 p. 197, where he also talks about hunting that Osman dealt with. Cf Langer-Blake, *AHR* Vol. 37 p. 503.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 258 l. 26 ff..

Only then was favorable time for the immigration of scholars and theologians from old Seljuk State<sup>428</sup>. These men, vectors of Islamic culture, which had come to Ikonion under the influence of the Byzantine world<sup>429</sup>, wouldn't be natural to migrate earlier departing to territories prevailed by anarchy and areas of standing conflict. These scholars arrived to the Osmanli State and the coastal emirates after the whirlwind of war had elapsed. As they were seeking refuge from Mongols' domination - namely a culturally lower nation - sheikhs and scholars have done for Islam work similar to that offered to western Renaissance by Byzantine fugitives.

To the task of transplanting Islamic culture to the rich Aegean and Propontis provinces, the Akhis brotherhood, which resided in cities of each region, had always been helper and supporter and the successive influx of displaced scholars. This brotherhood had greatly contributed to the Islamization of the inhabitants, because it represented Mohammedanism's best side, cultivating the sense of solidarity and love for others - qualities that once had made Christianity world religion.

The Ottoman bourgeoisie, which was formed under these conditions, over time, in conjunction with landowners and military leaders, came to power in the Ottoman State and replaced the nomadic element, which could be adjusted the new situation and eventually was supplanted.

Important role in these fermentations played also the Minor Asian Greek woman, who was the tragic victim of raids. From the beginning she saw abductions, rapes and slavery, situations to which she was condemned those evil days. Surrounded by primitive people under unimaginably harsh conditions, forced to renounce her race, eventually succumbed to destiny and became the first mother of the Ottoman people, as she was mother of the Seljuks in older times<sup>430</sup>. Of course, coherence of this breeding

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<sup>428</sup> R. Tschudi, in his short study *Vom alten osmanischen Reich*, Tübingen 1930, p. 8, writes that, during the 13<sup>th</sup> century, numerous Muslim man of wisdom came to Asia Minor. However, they settled in the cities of central Asia Minor, e.g. Celaleddin Rumi, who settled in Ikonium. Cf Cl. Huart, *Konia* p. 170. They came to the western emirates and to Bithynia, later, during the 14<sup>th</sup> and the 15<sup>th</sup> century. See F. Babinger, *ZDMG* f.n. Vol. I pp. 133, 136-137.

<sup>429</sup> See R. Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* p. 103. N. Jorga, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches* Vol. I pp. 122-123.

<sup>430</sup> V. Cuinet (*La Turquie d'Asie*, Paris 1894, Vol. 4 pp. 10, 307) writes that, among the current inhabitants of Asia Minor, there is a large number of descendants of the Greeks who had converted to Islam after the Ottoman invasion. H. Vambery, erudite researcher of all the Turkish races of Asia, in his exhaustive work *Das Türkenvolk*, Leipzig 1885, p. 594, describes the χαρακτηρίζει τον current Ottoman as "ein Mensch, in dessen Adern ein verschwindend kleiner Theil türkischen Blutes fließt, dessen Physikum auch nicht die geringste Spur des typischen Türken aufweist". Similarly, W.M. Ramsay, in his study "The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor", *Proceedings of the British Academy* Vol. 7 (1915-16),

was not only the combatants' and rural population's increase, but also the subsequent economic boom. When Orhan had conquered Bursa and other cities, wasn't facing provisioning problems as before. These masses of adventurers coming from neighboring areas were no longer flocking to the Ottoman army. Close to 1330, the Ottomans were drawing up regular and disciplined army, mainly coming from rural classes. A whole generation had intervened between the battles of Vafeos and Pelecanos. It was the Turco-Byzantine generation, the first raised in the Ottoman regime, the one that conquered Bursa and defeated the Roman emperor in Pelecanos.

At around 1326, after the Osmanlis had settled at the rural areas, the hostilities ceased and, gradually, the consciences reconciled with the new situation. The intermingling among conquerors and conquered was now smoother, without tragic oppositions and violence. At that point, Osman's race showed all its vitality. Thanks to the old nomads' indomitable intensity, without any commitment from the heavy Byzantine monastic tradition, devotees of a primitive hedonism, these healthy countrymen had many children with the daughters of the natives. Thus, within a relatively short time the normal rhythm of life was restored in this area that had suffered cruelly. From this generation, which grew up under smoother conditions in Bithynias' fertile plains being mainly under the Greek mothers' influence, arose the Ottoman peasantry, which gradually overshadowed the nomads and prevailed.

Summarizing the above, we can say that in the early 14th century, the Ottoman State was nascent. The leader of these nomad raiders who was assaulting Bithynia plundering rural populations had occupied fortified sites and fortresses and acquired unchallengeable power among local farmers. After acquiring numerous flocks, he had become the master of large areas, providing part of them for grazing and granting another part to his followers by the fief system *τιμάριο*. Besides, local farmers' complete dependence on his will, contributed to the formation of a regime similar to feudalism. This primitive feudalism is identical to the first stage of the Ottoman State's development.

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offprint, p. 27, says that there are two kinds of Turkish population: 1) the Turks that come from Greek mothers and 2) Islamized Greeks. Also cf I. Vogiatzides' comments, which are to the point, *Επετηρίδα της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* Vol. II (1932) p. 150, and also K. Amandos, *Μικρά Μελετήματα*, Athens 1940, p. 121. Indeed, as prof. Vogiatzides notes, regarding the question of misgeneration, many things might be proved by comparative anthropological researches at old Ottoman and pre-Ottoman graves.

After Osman had acquired what was possible to profit for its own benefit, he showed tolerance to the middle peasantry, which constituted the vast majority of rural people, who, after the annihilation or flee of wealthy landholders was waiting the coming of a prime period. The rural middle class benefited from Osman's good administration, collaborated with the new regime, married its daughters with the conquerors and collectively acceded Islam. After the rural middle class had identified its interests with Osmanlis and since was easily accepted in their society, taught the former nomads the Byzantine life and key Byzantine institutions. In this way, the Ottoman State reached the second stage of its evolution, which is characterized by the synergy among conquerors and local rural population.

With the indigenous people's help, Osmanlis formed a larger and more regular army and after they had occupied strategic points which prevailed over transportation arteries, turned against the urban centers. Then, they appeared as a state having as defined objective the conquest of Bithynia. After they had conquered the big cities too, entered the third stage of their evolution, which - as we shall see more extensively in the next chapter - as special features, displays the urban population's allegiance, the influx of Muslim immigrants – among them, Akhis and theologians were acting and moving as leading officials – and finally, the massive Islamisation of urban residents. Throughout this third stage, the Ottoman social organization was based not only in rural but also in urban population which, consisted by indigenous and immigrants joined through Mohammedanism, participates actively in the state's further development.

These fermentations that were going to give prominence to Osman's leadership, both as political and military factor in the East, were taking place slowly, following their normal development. But, as usual, in nations' lives, there should be an event, which, by its importance, awakes the national consciousness and somehow becomes an outward expression of the nation's intentions/guidelines. In Ottoman history, this event was Vapheus battle<sup>431</sup>, which took place on 27 July 1301.

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<sup>431</sup> Pachymeres is the only source on the battle of Vapheus (*Ανδρόνικος Δ'* 25 pp. 327, 333-335): “Μηνός γάρ Ανθεστηριώνος εικοστή και έβδομη περί που τον Βαφέα (χώρος δ' ούτος περί την θαυμαστήν Νικομήδειαν) Ατμάν συνάμα τοίς άμφ' αυτόν εις χιλιάδας πλείστας ποσουμένοις επιστάς αίφνης...”. By saying *Ανθεστηριώνα* Pachymeres means July, as it is apparent from the information that, this month is celebrated the feast of St. Anne (*Μιχαήλ* p. 149 l. 3) followed immediately by the feast of St. Panteleimon (*ibid.*, l. 7). Those days are mentioned by Pachymeres in relation to Constantinople's liberation in 1261. According to what the author says, the Queen of the Cities was occupied “εφ' εορτή της θεομήτορος Ανης, μηνός Ανθεστηριώνος” (*Μιχαήλ Β'* 27 p. 149). This important event is recorded by the

That year, Osman had advanced his forces up to Nicomedia, banning the city's land transports. He was leading a numerous army, which was supported by numerous volunteers that had flocked to the area from Meander and Paphlagonia, hoping for an exuberant payment from the war booty, that was foreseen to be abundant.

Since Nicomedia was close to Constantinople and the forts of Mesothynia and enjoyed grater security the whole region had maintained its economic vitality and was more populated. It was connected with the capital by quite regular transportation and, unlike the southern regions, despite the raids of Amur's son Ali, had not experienced anarchy and economic disintegration. For these reasons, Osman and the adventurers who surrounded him had great expectations for profit.

After having camped in this rich valley during spring, they were plundering its land and constantly reinforced by new reserves. Meanwhile, the harvest season was passing and raiders didn't leave. The panic-stricken inhabitants had taken refuge within the walls of Nicomedia. Psychologically, they were in a condition similar to the condition of the Athenians from rural areas during the Peloponnesian War, who, while Archidamos was destroying their farms, were locked inside the city. Since *Εταιρειάρχης*\* Mouzalou was not as imperturbable as Pericles, he succumbed to the population's pressures and, leading only two thousands Byzantines and Alans, went into battle against a more numerous enemy. The battle was waged at the open plain near the city, namely at a terrene quite suitable for the Turkish light cavalry's (akıncı) free movement, but unsuitable for the heavily armed Byzantine infantry.

The fact that the natives were fighting for altars and hearths was raising their spirits and, as Pachymeres says, underestimated the power of the opponent. However,

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contemporary Acropolites (*Χρονική Συγγραφή* 85 p. 183): “ή Κωνσταντίνου προνοία Θεού και αύθις υπό χείρα του βασιλέως εγένετο... Ιουλίου εικοστήν και πέμπτην άγοντος από γενέσεως κόσμου έτους όντος, ςψξθ”. *Ανθεστηρίων* is interpreted as July by the Latin translation found at the footnote. However, we considered good to check it, because we find mistakes and essential misconceptions of the texts in the Latin translations of Bonn editions. It should be noted that Zinkeisen (Vol. I p. 82) and Jorga (Vol. I p. 157) write that the battle of Vapheus took place on June 27. As regards the date everyone agrees with the year 1301, except Muralt (*Chronographie byzantine* Vol. II p. 480), who records this battle in the year 1302 (it seems that he follows Possinus' notes in the edition of Pachymeres, Vol. II p. 851), and E. Gibbon (*History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Bury, London 1902, Vol. 7 p. 24), who says and I quote: “It was on the 27<sup>th</sup> of July in the year 1299 of the Christian era that Othman first invaded the territory of Nicomedia”. Gibbon is unaware of the battle of Vapheus itself. But, both Possinus and Muralt are now considered obsolete.

\* [T.N.]From the early 9th century, in the context of military and civil service hierarchy of the imperial environment, was established the “*etaireia*”, the per se guard of the palace and was led by the

something similar didn't happen to Mouzalon, who had recently faced the risks of the war with Osmanlis. A group of only a hundred Turks, who attacked the Byzantines unexpectedly, caused them great damage. And when the Osmanlis, fleeing the mountains were chased by the Byzantines, Mouzalon fell into a trap and nearly captured. Eventually, he was saved thanks to the selfless of a warrior, who rushed on horseback against the leader of the kidnappers and in peril of his own life he took him from their hands. These events should have happened the previous spring and, therefore, the memory of his misfortune was still vivid and, in contrary to the majority of his followers, Mouzalon couldn't underestimate the Turkish forces. Obviously, other were the thoughts that led him to take that initiative in July 1301. Perhaps he was thinking that the raiders would be multiplied during summer and then, if not completely impossible, it would be very difficult to achieve something against them.

Meanwhile, times were rough. While farmers had to get out of the walls for the harvest, which could not be delayed any more, in terms of food supply, the situation in the city seems to have reached an impasse. Only desperation could have led the otherwise sensible Mouzalon in such a venturesome step, namely to confront with an opponent who was numerically superior, in completely inappropriate terrain. From the above becomes apparent that both the Byzantine leader and Nikomedia's inhabitants had to choose between two solutions: they would either lose the harvest and face the specter of famine, or be thrown in the fight risking everything. There was no other middle ground except of surrendering the city to the raiders. Since it was impossible to wait for help from the center, if Osman agreed to withdraw accepting money, without doubt, the inhabitants would be willing to give everything in order to get rid of such a neighbor. Under these circumstances, the conflict between Osman and Mouzalon was unavoidable. The result of the battle was pitiful for the latter.

From Pachymeres' narration we learn that, for reasons unknown to us, large part of the Alan horsemen did not participate in the first and most critical phase of the struggle and also that there was lack of coordination in carrying out the attack. *Etaireiarches'* army suffered heavy losses and fled, being chased by Osman's cavalry. Only the arrival of Alan mercenary reinforcements that eventually took over/assumed

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*"etaireiarches"*. Later, the *"etaireia"* would grow and divided into four separate Corps, recruited by Byzantines and foreign mercenaries. The *"Great Etaireiarches"* Mouzalon was Bithynia's governor.

the burden of the hostile attack, allowed Mouzalon to retreat with the remains of his army, and rescue in Nicomedia “ingloriously” «ακλεώς» as Pachymeres says.

The significance of this victory of Osman has not been given the proper prominence. For the first time in history, the insignificant leader of a state under formation clashes with the organized Byzantine forces and emerges as winner<sup>432</sup>. The official Byzantium is now forced to mind /guard him, event that itself constitutes the recognition of Osman’s State, which is incomparably more important than the legendary recognition by the sultan of Iconium. For this reason starting point for the Ottoman history is not 1299, when supposedly the Seljuk State collapsed and the sovereignty of Konya was transferred to Osman, but the day in which Osman defeats the Byzantine Empire’s regular troops<sup>433</sup>.

These two events, namely on the one hand the demission of the Seljuk rule, which took place in 1308 (in 1299 according to the older writers) and the battle of Vapheus on the other, although chronologically only a few years far, in causative terms, they are the sequence of the power found in two different historical currents which moved in two separate worlds. While the Seljuk State was heading to its decline

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<sup>432</sup> Those who have written about the battle of Vapheus up to date have identified it with the battle of Koyunhisar, which is mentioned by Aşikpaşazade, ed. Istanbul p. 21, ed. Giese p.18. However, from the confusion of the texts and since the information of the Ottoman historian does not coincide with Pachymeres’ information, we conclude that those are two separate battles. According to Aşikpaşazade, the battle of Koyunhisar was owed to the initiative of the governors of Bursa, Edrenos [Αδριάνων] and Kestel [Καστελίου], who joined their forces to chase Osman away from Bithynia. Osman marched against them and, from the battle which took place between Dinboz [Τύμβος?] and Koyunhisar, emerged victorious. The commander of Dinboz fled, the commander of Kestel fell and the commander of Bursa entered his stronghold. Osman lost his nephew Aydoğdu, who was buried between Nicaea and Kios, at the south of the lake, location that cannot be identified with Vapheus, at the area near the magnificent Nicomedia [τον χώρον περί την θαυμαστήν Νικομήδειαν], mentioned by Pachymeres. Pachymeres knew well the surroundings of Nicaea and wouldn’t locate Vapheus near Nicomedia if it was at the location of the Turkish Koyunhisar. Consequently, not only the descriptions of the two passages but also their own the toponyms led us to the conclusion that the two battles should be separated from each other.

<sup>433</sup> The collapse of the Seljuk State was associated with the establishment of the Ottoman State, not only by older but also by many young historians who considered the second as direct heir and successor of the first. e.g. Leunclavius (*Historiae* p. 121) writes that, after the death of Alaeddin, Osman inherited his territories. Ramsussen (*Annales* p. 39) writes: 1299, Osman sultanus praedicator. Boeclerius (*Commentarius* p. 110): Anno MCCC imperatoris nomen sumpsit post mortem Saladini [writes Aladini]. Sagredo (*Memorie istoriche de’ monarchi ottomani*, Venice 1688, p. 13) writes that when Alaeddin deceased without heirs, Osman and the other satraps shared the provinces of his state and Osman took Bithynia (Bitinia). Similarly by Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I p.73, E. Foord, *The Byzantine Empire*, London 1911, p. 386, E. Pears, *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4 (1936) pp. 653, 655, and Köprülü, *Les origines* pp. 29-30. Other historians e.g. Giovio (ed. 1541, p. 3 – from Sansovino, ed. 1568, p. 216), Donado da Lezze (*Historia turchesca* p. 4), Laurentius Scheurlus (*Familia Othomannica*, Pragae 1596, p. 3), accept the year 1300 or circa 1300, without associating this chronology with a certain event. In two *Βραχέα Χρονικά* [Short Chronicles] of S. Lambros-K. Amandos’ collection (No. 5 and 45, pp. 8 and 77),

because of the Mongol domination, the Ottoman State was emerging because of the Byzantine decline. However, most of those who have hitherto dealt with the Ottoman State, unquestionably record the old historians' information, that, in 1299, the Seljuk Empire collapsed and Sultan Alaentín III sent the symbols of sovereignty - the drum, the flag, the sword and the horse tail to Osman. But, as we said at the beginning of the previous chapter<sup>434</sup>, from the enquiry of the things comes out that the State of Rum had collapsed long before this date and that the title of sultan, which was kept until 1308, was only figurative<sup>435</sup>. No matter how improbable it may be, even if we assume that the recognition of the Ottoman State was realized by this authority (the Seljuk), as regards the development of Ottoman affairs, this event is irrelevant because they had proceeded regardless of Iconium, which had no effect on them, either positive or negative.

Indeed, Osman little interested about what happened in Iconium. Having turned his back on the old Seljuk capital, and being separated from it by vast and barren plateaus and the Salty desert, he was engrossed in gazing the Bithynian plains and the imposing cities. Perhaps he was attracted by the vision of *Eptalofos*, which - to use a poetic expression of İdriş - "it was shining like a diamond between two sapphires and two emeralds". The dream, which is narrated by the old Ottoman historians with their typical naivety, was the strongest motivation for his acts. His plan was to extend to the north. İkonium was out of the Ottoman vital space and its collapse didn't affect it at all. On the contrary, the first confrontation with the Byzantine Empire became the starting point for new conflicts, new successes and moreover consolidated Osman's position. The latter was morally ascended in the eyes of his people and the other rulers of Asia Minor.

Although the battle of Vafeos is followed by a period of inactivity of Osman's military forces, it was a good omen for a brighter future and the Osmanli's confident was de facto justified. The pride for the victory became the basis for Ottoman's national sentiment. The national sentiment was proved motivation stronger than religion in the Ottoman case. Moreover, in the late 13th century, Islam had no combat capacity, which formerly was given to the Arabs and later was to be given to the Ottomans too. This

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Osman's reign begins in the year 1300. However, Dresler in his *Χρονικό* (from Sasnovino, ed. 1568, p. 292) prefers the year 1301, but without any reference to the battle of Vapheus.

<sup>434</sup> See f.n. 3 of chap. I.

<sup>435</sup> Cf Gibbons, *The Foundation* pp. 272-273.

national sentiment, combined with the economic and social factors we saw above, prevented the Ottoman State to be absorbed by other neighboring states, either coreligionist or speaking the same language, which followed a similar expansionary policy. For all these reasons the battle of Vafeos constitutes a paramount event and introduces the Ottomans in History.

### III. THE CONQUEST OF BITHYNIA

Naturally, the battle of Vafeas aroused strong feeling in the population of the Byzantine Empire and hastened the fermentations which preceded Bithynia's complete subjugation. Osman's appearance "ante portas" of Bithynia sowed panic in the surrounding area and thousands of refugees with their animals embarked on the road to Constantinople<sup>436</sup>. Pachymeres, with very bright colors, describes the influx of refugees arriving from the Asian shores of Bosphorus, seeking asylum in the Queen of the Cities: "The straits once in a while were packed with crowds of animals and people bearing untold afflictions. There was neither one that wasn't lamenting the loss of a relative, the wife for her husband, son or daughter, the brother for his brother, his sister or other relative, and all together being in deplorable condition, others in the city and others outside, on the beach, crawling aimlessly, carrying the remains of a life. Only to hear infants, women and miserable old men wandering the streets, was causing unimaginable grief." The historian also accounts that a large number of refugees passed from Pylopythia to Prince Islands<sup>437</sup>. Those refugees came not only from the coast but mainly from the mainland, namely from the area between Bursa and in Nicaea which was the theater of Ottoman raids.

However, the Turk was not the only enemy. Just one year after the defeat of the Byzantine hetereiarches, thirteen Venetian ships collaborating with seven pirate (ships) appeared in Propontis (Sea of Marmara), plundered Prince Island and seized as slaves the refugees who had recently arrive there<sup>438</sup>. With the rawness that was usual at

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<sup>436</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Παλαιολόγος* Δ' 26 p. 335. Cf Muntaner (Buchon, *Chroniques étrangères*) p. 420 B. It is noteworthy that during the times of the Seljuk invasion, crowds of refugees fled to the the capital, where there was famine and excessive mortality and also lack of solidarity, which is described by Muntaner. *Μιχαήλ Ατταλειάτης* p. 211, ed. Bonn.

<sup>437</sup> Ibid., Δ' 24 pp. 324-325. Pylopythia [*Πυλοπόθια*] are the towns of Pylai [*Πύλαι*] and Pythia [*Πύθια*], at the right side entering Nikomedia Bay. Pythia, where is mentioned the existence of thermal baths, is the current Yalova. See Tomaschek, *Zur historischen Topographie von Kleinasien im Mittelalter* p. 11. Pyles [*Πύλες*] are also identified with Yalova. See Arif Müfid Mansel, *Yalova ve civarı*, Istanbul 1936, p. 49. The term Pylopythia is also met in *Acta et diplomata graeca* vol. 4 p. 304.

<sup>438</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* pp. 325-326. The pirate ships had even entered into the Horn, anchored across the palace of Vlacherna and landed sailors, who burned the cereals that was harvested at the fields, causing, as Pachymeres accounts, moral rather than material damage ("ου τόσον εις ζημίαν των κεκτημένων όσον εις χλεύην"). Those were happening under Andronicos' eyes, who was so powerless at sea that it occurred to him to deploy infantrymen in order to fight the ships with bows and Stones! (ibid., Δ'23 pp. 322-324). Until that extent had reached the misery which resulted from the dissolution of the

that time, the unfortunate prisoners were subjected to horrible tortures on board the ships that had sailed in the Strait, so Andronicos II was forced to redeem them by ransom amounted to four thousand gold coins. The inhabitants of the City were watching from the hill of Hagia Sophia for one day the martyrdom of these miserable beings, listening to their plangent cries and laments.

This situation, above all, proved the extreme impoverishment of the state itself. Both on land and at sea, Byzantium was now powerless to be enforced. At the same time that the people of Nicomedia and Nicaea were in despair because of Osman, while the ruler of Karasu was threatening the coastal towns of Propontis (Cyzicos, Piges, Artaki)<sup>439</sup>, Germyan (Karmanos Alisourios, according to the Byzantine authors), who had established the first Turkish emirate in western Asia Minor, was besieging Philadelphieia<sup>440</sup>. At the Aegean, Aydin (Aitinis or Atin, according to the Byzantines), with a strong fleet was plundering the islands<sup>441</sup>. A similar naval action had also been developed by the satraps of Sarouchan and Mentese, who, without differing in any way from the robber-pirates, were raiding against the Cyclades, Chios, Samos, Karpathos and Rhodes islands.

In other words, as the Turkish rulers were falling over their prey almost simultaneously, so that the actions of each one complemented the other's work, the sufferings were coming successively against the eastern provinces of Byzantine Empire. This fact explains the use of the word *coalition* by Nikiforos Gregoras, when referring to the Turk raiders<sup>442</sup>. This word indicates the coincidence in time of the attacks and not the existence of a formal treaty, as incorrectly assumed Edwin Pears<sup>443</sup>. However, if we take into account that still there was prey enough to saturate the conquest momentum of all the Turk rulers, the unity and the systematicity that the hostilities against Byzantium

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Byzantine Navy. Cf Diehl-Oeconomus-Guilland-Grousset, *L'Europe Orientale de 1081 à 1453*, Paris 1945, p. 230.

<sup>439</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 26 p. 336.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid., E' 21 p. 421.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid., Δ' 29 p. 344, ΣΤ' 17 p. 510. Muntaner, *ibid.*, p. 421 A. Ibn Battuta vol. 2 pp. 311-312. Šihabeddin, trans. Quatremère, *NE* Vol. 13 (1838) p.368.

<sup>442</sup> Gregoras Z' 1 (Vol. 1 p. 214): “επει γάρ έρημα στρατευμάτων τα προς έω της Ρωμαίων ηγεμονίας ελείπετο, συνασπισμόν οι των Τούρκων σατράπαι ποιήσαντες τά πάντα κατέδραμον άχρι θαλάττης απάσης...”. Frantzes quotes the same (ed. Papadopoulos p. 33) obviously copying Gregoras: “συνασπισμόν οι των Τούρκων σατράπαι ποιήσαντες πάλιν, νεωστί πάντα τόπον κατέδραμον άχρι θαλάττης άκτών· εν οίς σατράπαις ύπηρχε και ό Οτθμάνης, εις αυτών”.

<sup>443</sup> *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4 pp. 657, 658. - *The Destruction of the Greek Empire* p. 61.

where carried out seem natural. Besides, most of the remaining territories in Asia Minor, due to their geographical location were, by their nature, distributed among the various rulers, forming thus distinct claim zone for each one. That's why the Turkish rulers began to compete only after the Byzantine prey was finished. But being in front of the Byzantine Empire's last relics and without having contradictory interests, they were feeling united against a common enemy, in a common fight, which was aimed at the demise/abolition of the Byzantine rule in Asia Minor. Of course, there was not any distribution deal or some other kind of treaty, but, nor such an agreement would have any reason to exist under the circumstances of the time. The following incident may constitute proof for the above: when after some time the Catalan company's forces which numbered eight thousand men attacked Karasu and then against Germyan and became obvious that they were also going to attack against the other dynasts of Asia Minor, although some of them had military forces far superior to the Catalan's or the Byzantines', not any Turk emir rushed to help his neighbor.

From the above it is evident that, in the early 14th century, despite their common origin, the Moslem religion and the Akhi association that was under development, which constituted indications for a closer spiritual contact in the future, each of the unborn Turkish hegemonies followed its historical course, without any significant competition and without reciprocal help.

Therefore, like the other small Turkish states, Osman's emirate was developed independently from the development of its neighbors. It is rather questionable how Osman is not doing anything remarkable after the Battle of Vafeas, while the Turks, both official rulers and individual adventurers, during a period of approximately five years, develop large offensive action and Asia Minor becomes again theater of war events. Nicomedia, which ran utmost danger, was miraculously saved. Osman, victorious, ante portas of the Bithynian metropolis, as connoted from the complete silence of the sources and Byzantium military affairs as a whole, was no longer considered dangerous. Otherwise, it is inexplicable the fact that after such a dramatic conflict, which put at risk the most important Bithynian cities, the theater of the Byzantine military operations shifted west from the areas controlled by Osman, at ancient Phrygia – near Hellespont – namely at the emirate of Karasu. It is against Karasu and not against Mouzalon's defeater the expedition which was prepared in 1302

by Michael IX, son of Andronikos and co-emperor (1295-1320)<sup>444</sup>. When in September of the same year<sup>445</sup> Roger de Flor put at the emperor's service the eight thousand warriors of the Catalan company that could subdue Osman's newborn small state, the emperor send them to Cyzicus, from where in April 1303<sup>446</sup> would assume the counterattack against Karasu<sup>447</sup>. Even before the wider operations had started, the Byzantine forces led by General Maroulis, coordinating with the Catalan, achieve remarkable victory against the Turks, at a place called William's Tower [Γουλιέλμου Πύργος]<sup>448</sup>.

Ramon Muntaner<sup>449</sup> cites that, eight days after the departure from Constantinople, Roger's troops attacked and defeated the Turks at a position found about two leagues away from the wall that protected the peninsula of Cyzicus, between two rivers, which, while the Spanish writer does not name, we can identify with Makesto and Rhyndakos which are joined between the lakes Maniada and Apollonia. In May Roger and Maroulis were in the town of Achyraous in the heart of Karasu emirate, gathering their forces in order to advance further deep<sup>450</sup>. Near Avlakas they clashed with Germyan's troops and were also victorious<sup>451</sup>. Aliour, being wounded, fled. Roger arrived at Philadelphia, solved the siege and supplied the city with provisions. Germyan's despot, by retreating reached Amorio<sup>452</sup>, at the south of the Ottoman territory. At the same time, another part of the Catalan army captured Magnesia, where one of the royal grooms called Attaleiotis, had established an independent hegemony<sup>453</sup>. Attaleiotis, within the two years that followed, proved to be very harmful for Roger because, compelled by the Catalan's greed to interrupt the friendly relations that meanwhile had established with him, succeeded with Alans help to recapture Magnesia, came into armed conflict with the Company and occupied large parts of its forces in a

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<sup>444</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 10 p. 391.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid., E' 12 p. 393. Cf G. Schlumberger, *Expédition des Almugavares*, Paris 1902, p. 28.

<sup>446</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 21 p. 423. Muntaner, *ibid.*, p. 421 B.

<sup>447</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 13 p. 398, E' 14 pp. 398-400.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid., E' 21 pp. 417-418.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid., p. 420 A. Cf E.I. Stamatiades, *Οι Κατάλαντοι εν τη Ανατολή*, Athens 1869, p. 48, and Schlumberger, *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>450</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* pp. 423-424. The month Pyantion [*Πυαντιών*] is identical to the month Pyanepsion [*Πυανειμών*] used by Pachymeres, namely to May. See Possinus' notes in *Μιχαήλ Παλαιολόγος* pp. 692, 728 VI, 730 I.

<sup>451</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 23 p. 427.

<sup>452</sup> Gregoras Z' 3 (Vol. I pp. 221-222). "Έρχεται προς τό Αμούριον", writes Pachymeres, p. 428 l. 5. However, there is no doubt that it is about the city Amorion [*Αμόριον*]. Cf Possinus' notes, *ibid.*, p. 765.

<sup>453</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 24 p. 428.

costly, long and also gratuitous siege of the city<sup>454</sup>. Simultaneously, the struggle against the Turks was going on. At about that time appeared Bulgarian origin John, the so-called swineherd, who gathered voluntary corps and fought the Turks of Karasu, at the area of Skamandros<sup>455</sup>.

Throughout Roger's stay in Asia Minor, the Catalan forces did not expand towards the Ottoman emirate at the east of Lopadion<sup>456</sup> (current Ulubad), a fortress on the northwestern shore of Lake Apollonia, which, during the Seljuk wars, was Alexios Komnenos'<sup>457</sup> military base. Until that time, the danger that was coming from Osman had not reached that area<sup>458</sup>. During those critical and turbulent two years, while Roger was fighting to recapture Asia Minor provinces there was no reference to the defeater of Mouzalon<sup>459</sup>.

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<sup>454</sup> Ibid., E'26 pp. 439-442, 31 p. 451 l. 12 et seq., ΣΤ' 3 p. 480, ΣΤ'18 p. 511 l. 7 et seq..

<sup>455</sup> Ibid., E' 27 pp. 442-443.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid., ΣΤ' 22 p. 522 l. 12.

<sup>457</sup> Anna Comnena IE' 1 p. 265 l. 23, 28, p. 267 l. 1, 10 et al..

<sup>458</sup> This is also confirmed by the Ottoman tradition, according to which Osman had promised neither himself nor his successors to cross the bridge of Lopadion. Aşıkpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, pp. 21-22, ed. Giese p. 18. Sa'deddin, trans. Bratutti p. 15. Hammer, *Ιστορία* Vol. I p. 80. Cf Anonymus Giese p. 57. Tomaschek, *Topographie von Kleinasien* p. 12. The fact that, Osman's promise was however not faithfully kept by his successors, is witnessed by Doucas (ed. Bonn p. 196), who mentions that Murat II had crossed that bridge.

<sup>459</sup> It was not possible to find any evidence of sources that could support E. Pears' unproved phrase in *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4 (ed. 1923 and 1936) p. 657: "One of Roger's first encounters in Anatolia was with Osman whom he defeated near Lefke in 1305 and took possession of that city". First of all, this date seems improbable. Despite the confusion regarding the chronology of Roger's action (cf Possinus with Pachymeres' *Ανδρόνικος* pp. 796-804), we consider that, from Pachymeres' narrative (*Ανδρόνικος* ΣΤ' 4 p. 485 ff.) it is clear that after his rapid advance, Roger returned back to Trace, where he remained almost continuously to negotiate concerning the payroll of his army. His forces were still busy in the emirate of Germyan. However, the Catalan Company was no longer willing to continue the Asia Minor war and, after a while, began to disperse in the cities of the Tracian Peninsula (ibid., p. 480 l. 18, p. 481 l. 12, p. 484 l. 16, p. 496 l. 8. Cf Schlumberger, ibid., p. 88). According to Pachymeres (p. 525) Roger was murdered in Adrianople on Wednesday after Easter, namely on April 28, 1305, as Schlumberger, ibid., pp. 116-119, Stamatiades, ibid., p. 85, Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant* p. 451, and Muntaner's editor, J. A. C. Buchon, *Chroniques étrangères* p. 436, think. For these reasons, it is difficult for us to believe that, having his troops scattered and dissatisfied regarding their payment, he was able to invade the Ottoman State until Lefkes [*Lefkai*] and, yet, to defeat and seize the city. Furthermore, it is known that Roger was in Thrace throughout the most of the first three months of the year 1305, until his death. So, how was the campaign against Osman carried out? In Pears words is also noticed a serious contradiction: "One of Roger's first encounters" wouldn't be possible to be chronologically placed before the year 1305. If the battle had indeed happened, this would have been the last battle of Roger and not one of the first. Taking these into account, we conclude that it is a erratum which came from Muntaner's testimony about the battle which took place between the two rivers. Lefkes are located between the two rivers and, probably, this is the reason for the misconception. Roger, however, could not have reached from Istanbul to Lefkes via Kyzikos, crossing hostile lands and carrying out a battle in eight days. Besides, if this had happened, the date 1305 would be incorrect. According to Buchon (ibid., p. 419), the battle between the two rivers took place in 1303, while Stamatiades (p. 48) wrongly gives the year 1304. In any case, no matter how it will be examined, Pear's words do not correspond to the facts. Pear's mistake has also passed at the last history of Diehl-Oeconomos-Guilland-Grousset, Paris 1945, p. 300.

What was then the reason that Byzantium did ignore again the ruler of Bithynia? Does he not give the proper importance to the risk arising from this side? Does he underestimate the importance of Bithynia compared to the areas around Hellespont? Or does he aspire to turn his attention to the new enemy after he has preserved what he can from the rest of Asia Minor? We can answer affirmatively to these questions. Constantinople's regal power insisted not to turn against the enemy that was coming from Bithynia, underestimating both him and the importance of the area he was claiming. He was struggling to preserve the cities located near Hellespont, securing thus the communication with the Aegean coasts, which in the government's view, had much greater commercial and political significance than the uncertain benefits that might be offered by anti-dynastic Bithynia where anarchy prevailed. However, none of the above could explain the complete Byzantine inertia in Bithynia, if Osman hadn't ceased his victorious march as soon as he defeated Mouzalon. The presence of even a few thousand cavalymen ante portas of Constantinople, or even between it and Nicomedia, would be impossible not to be considered dangerous for the safety of the suburbs, which were feeding the urban population, and not to cause the military intervention of Byzantium. From the above stems that Osman did not benefit from his impressive victory, but after some predatory raids conducted in the summer of 1301, he withdrew to hibernate in his territory.

Indeed, it is possible that he came to a compromise with the Byzantine local authorities, which, after the defeat, would be willing to follow a pro-Turkish policy, assigning Turks and Tatars in high administrative offices, as evidenced by the case of Kouximpaxis and Solymampaxis in Nicomedia<sup>460</sup>. It is also possible, the negotiations with the Mongols, which, as we shall see below, began at that time, is likely to have affect - to some extent - Osman<sup>461</sup>, although the Mongolian risk itself could not be a determining factor, because their busy ruler Gazan-khan had turned his attention elsewhere. In any case, the upcoming Mongol intervention cannot have been the cause that explains Osman's withdrawal. One might say that the most important factor was the situation that prevailed in Bithynia. The battle of Vafeas brought Osman outside the walls of Nicomedia and Nicaea, but didn't render him master of the two cities. Whereas he knew that he didn't have the potential to attempt an attack against their walls with

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<sup>460</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 30 p. 345.

chance of succeeding, he was confined to show of power and looting, postponing the attack for a more appropriate time in the future.

However, that time would be late enough. For reasons unknown to us, Osman's inaction was extended from autumn 1301 until January 1303, when De Flor's Catalans and Almogavars landed at Cyzicus. If during this time Osman had moved dangerously, then, at least some of these new troops would have mobilized against him. As mentioned earlier, the fact that, instead of being sent to aid Nicomedia, the new army was sent to the west of Olympus, confirms that Osman didn't do anything noteworthy during this period. And since the fighters of the Catalan Company had settled at Cyzicus, at a distance of 120 km from the western border of his emirate, Osman wasn't possible to move against anyone. The only thing he could do was to withdraw to his old borders, temporarily abandoning the grandiose plans for conquests, and wait for the time in which the risk would have passed. He was aware that a conflict with the strengthened imperial forces would have disastrous consequences for the Ottoman people and quite possibly would terminate his aspirations and dissolve his newly established state<sup>462</sup>.

What followed De Flor's assassination (1305) was quite appropriate for the activities of all sorts of adventurers. A few years later, one of them, notorious Khalil, passed to Thrace with 1,800 men and after having fought and thrashed King Michael IX, he obtained very rich booty and nearly arrested him as captive. The royal tent fell to Khalil's hands who, to mock the emperor, was dressed with the royal diadem<sup>463</sup>. Thus, from the abundant loot, the irregular circumstances and successes of men like Khalil, we understand that there were great temptations for anyone who wanted only material benefits. But, the situation was not the same for Osman, whose wisdom and the plan to create a stable state in Bithynia did not allow him to get carried away into uncertain profit conflicts risking everything. Instead Khalil's ephemeral glory, Osman preferred

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<sup>461</sup> H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols* Vol. 3 p. 464.

<sup>462</sup> Gregoras (*Z'* 3, vol. I pp. 221-222) claims that, if Roger wanted, he could have captured the whole Asia Minor, while his campaign had spread the panic to the Turks.

<sup>463</sup> Gregoras *Z'* 8 (vol. I pp. 254-258). Frantzes *A'* 5 p. 35. Pears writes that Halil was Osman's ally (*Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4, ed. 1923 p. 658 ed. 1936 p. 659). Since this is not based on sources, it is extremely unlikely. Pears belongs to those who, being influenced by the later Ottoman and western traditions, focus the history of the Turks around Osman. Given that the Ottoman state had absorbed the other Turkish emirates and overshadowed their short-lived past, the works of his contemporary independent rulers was attributed or, as it happens in this case, were associated with Osman. Handy example of this delusion is the invasion of Rhodes, for which see f.n. 44 in chap. III.

the prudent organizational effort that establishes the major historical works. Thus, while in 1314 Khalil and his followers were being slaughtered ingloriously at Gallipoli, Osman was establishing the state that inherited the Byzantine Empire. From the behavior shown in the critical years between 1303 and 1305 and later, we can deduce the nature of the man whose destiny was to become the eponymous hero of a nation which was to spread across three continents.

From that period of apparent inactivity, consumed in reconstruction and contemplation, Osman returned stronger than before and with a more intensive attitude to conquer the entire Bithynia. Men like Osman do not waste their time in vain. Without giving any cause for conflict with neighbors, he had the potential to devote himself to internal issues, taking care of the administration and army. Army seems to have been his main concern, because, as soon as the circumstances allowed, proved ready to assume offensive struggle against Byzantium, with amazing results.

Osman's forces, almost simultaneously after the removal of the Catalans from Asia, appear at the outskirts of Bursa and Nicaea. Bursa came to a critical position and the king is forced to turn his attention in that direction. He sends Siouros the military camp commander of tzagkratoros, along with a few men and money, in order to recruit others from the region<sup>464</sup>. Pachymeres cites that the event gave courage to the inhabitants of Katoikia<sup>465</sup>, but after a short period it became "disaster and devastation". "Before the military camp commander gather his forces, the Ottoman army which numbered 5.000 men, occupied the main roads and attacks against the Byzantines, who suffer debacle. Many women and children who left trying to find refuge in the fortress fall into the hands of the defeaters as "easy prey". Siouros' people, while fleeing they lost the royal money too.

At the area of Nicaea, Osman occupies Vilokoma (Vilokomi according to Pachymeres)<sup>466</sup>, which was the last independent fortress within its territory. While the

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<sup>464</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 21 p. 414. Pachymeres does not narrate the events of that period in a strictly chronological order, making thus their tracking very difficult. The chronological tables of Possinus (p. 859) and Muralt (*Chronographie byzantine* Vol. II p. 487) record the campaign of Siouros earlier than the year 1305. However, the year 1306 seems to be more likely.

<sup>465</sup> *Katoikia* [*Κατοικία*] is the current town Kite, between the Lake Apollonia and the western foothills of Mountain Olympus, one mile south of the road of Bursa. Hađi Kalfa, *Ĝihannuma*, form. Ibrahim, p. 658 l. 12. About Katoikia [*Κατοικία*] and its buildings see Hasluck, "Bithynica", *Annual of the British School at Athens*, Vol. 13 (1906-7) p. 300.

<sup>466</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 21 p. 414. Ađikpařazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 15. Neřri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 204. The legend that the city was occupied by warriors disguised as women is mentioned by Ađikpařazade and

troops that were based in Vilokoma had left the fortress in order to strike Osman from the back, he was heading against Katoikia. But thanks to appropriate handling, Osman occupies Vilokoma deserted from its defenders. From the size and wealth of the loot, we understand that those living at the vicinity had moved their chattels within the walls long ago<sup>467</sup>. So, having secured the lands that were in his rear, he was free to turn against Nicaea<sup>468</sup>, something that he did in 1307.

Following a parallel plan, the Ottomans spread until Kroulla (current Gürle)<sup>469</sup>, at the western end of Lake Ascania, while at the same time they occupied the road which starts from Heracleios monastery at Astakinos Gulf, five kilometers east of ancient Prainetos, and ends in Nikaia<sup>470</sup>. Because of the Ottoman advance toward Nicaea, the city's communications were interrupted and, as Pachymeres cites, someone dared to travel only during the night, passing the lake by boat<sup>471</sup>. However, despite these efforts, Osman fails to conquer the city, which was protected by strong walls<sup>472</sup>.

At about the same time Ottoman cavalry contingents invaded Mesothynia and advanced towards Black Sea, Bosphorus and the shores of Propontis. In 1308, Osman's akıncıs appear at the Black Sea fortresses Chili and Astraviti [*Χηλή* and *Αστραβητή*]<sup>473</sup>. From there they advance towards the two ends of Bosphorus.

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Nešri. The Persian 15-century historian Šükrüllah (*MOG* Vol. II p. 81) writes that the fall of Bileğik [*Βηλόκωμα*] took place in A.H.699 (1299-1300). It is certain that Osman, since that year, was in the area of Vilokoma, but he does not appear to have occupy the fortress. In such a case, Pachymeres who was contemporary with the events and very interested in the fate of Bithynia, before the battle of Vapheus, would have mentioned the fall of this important city, which was vital for the surrounding area. Besides, the fall of Vilokoma is closely linked to the campaign of Siouros, because it was its last phase. About the town of Bileğik and its location see Hartmann, *Im neuen Anatolien* pp. 44-45. Taeschner, "Anatolische Forschungen", *ZDMG* n.f. Vol. 7 p. 93.

<sup>467</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 21 p. 415: "αὐτός δέ [Ατμάν] μυρίον πλοῦτον εὐρων ἐξολβίζεται".

<sup>468</sup> Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 212. Šükrüllah, *MOG* Vol. 7 p. 81.

<sup>469</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* E' 21 p. 413 l. 4. The identification of this location with the current Gürle is owed to Tomaschek, *Topographie von Kleinasien* p. 10.

<sup>470</sup> Pachymeres, *ibid.*, p. 413 l. 6: "ὡς γὰρ ἀποκέκλειστο μὲν ἢ ἐξ Ἡρακλείου καὶ Νεμικώμεως πρὸς τὴν Νίκαιαν". The monastery of Herakleios [*Ἡρακλείου*] was at the location of the current Erekli. Cf J. Sölch, *BNJ* Vol. 1 (1920) p. 276 f.n. 3 and p. 332. We consider that the cautiousness that Sölch phrases his opinion with is in fact not justified.

<sup>471</sup> Pachymeres, *ibid.*, p. 413 l. 11 et seq..

<sup>472</sup> About the walls of Nicaea, very valuable is the monograph of A.M. Schneider and W. Karnapp, *Die Stadtmauer von Iznik*, Berlin 1938, within which are published: an image - from distance - of the current city with its old walls, many interesting images and charts and also Byzantine inscriptions from the years of the Laskarids.

<sup>473</sup> Pachymeres, *ibid.*, p. 412: "οἱ δὲ [Ατμανες, i.e. Ottomans] μὴ μόνον Χηλή τε καὶ Αστραβητή, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἱερῶν φρουρίω προσβάλλοντες, τὰ πάνδεινα διεπράττοντο, ὡσπερ ὑπνώττοντος βασιλέως ἢ μὴ ζώντος". Also, Egnatius in Cuspinianus, *De Turcarum origine* p. 14. "magnam certe Bithyniae partem subegit oppidaque ad Euxinum posita non pauca cepit". - Chili [*Χηλή*] is the current Sile, as it is called by the Turks, a coastal town that had preserved its Hellenic character until the exchange of populations. See

Going down to the region of Chalcedon they plundered unprotected villages. It seems that, at that time, even the castle of Aetos (recent Aydos Dağ)<sup>474</sup> and the small town of Damatrys [Σαμάνδρα]<sup>475</sup> fall for the first time into the hands of the Ottomans. Damatrys lied at the foot of Mount Agios Auxentios, where once stood the last Asian lighthouse which lit to give the signal of alarm to Constantinople, when the enemies violated the border. It was long that the lighthouse remained off and only the crowds of refugees coming from the interior lands were witnessing the barbarians' invasions. Of course, cases that, the barbarians themselves, reaching until the hills above Bosphorus, were declaring in person their arrival, weren't missing. Formerly known for its palaces, the small town Damatrys was no longer mentioned by the end of the 13th century, so we can conclude that it was destroyed during those Ottoman invasions.

Rather than the permanent conquest, the aim of these invasions was looting and harming of the enemy. And this because the Ottomans didn't have the potentiality to keep for a long time these advanced positions, which were very close to the capital and the strong fortresses of Nikitilata of Filokrini and Ridgio located to the east. However, for a period of about twenty years, the villages of Mesothynia, but not the strongest fortresses, were constantly changing hands, passing sometime to Byzantine and, sometime - of course for smaller period - to Turkish. Due to the continuous transitions and terrorism, this area was deserted and its inhabitants took shelter at the city. It seems that panic was spread until Chalcedon, because the refugees who were coming from the east felt safe only within the walls of Constantinople<sup>476</sup>. Thus is explained the continuous flow of refugees who were sailing across the Strait, already from the day after the battle of Vafeas. The depopulation of Chalcedon and its environs

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N. Banescu, "Chilia (Licostomo) und das bithynische Χηλή", *BZ* Vol. 28 (1928), pp. 68-72. The author proves erroneous the view of the Romanian scholars, including Jorga, that the Byzantine Chili [Χηλή] is the Byzantine city Chilia, which was established at the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> century and is located close to the mouth of Danube River. – Pachymeres' Astraviti [Αστραβητηή] is obviously the current Astravikia [Αστραβήκια], a location at the Black Sea, at the East of Chili. This place name was preserved in *Acta et diplomata graeca*, Vol. II p. 178, as Astravikis [Αστραβίκις].

<sup>474</sup> Asikpasazade, ed. Istanbul, pp. 32-33, ed. Giese, p. 29. Sa'ded- din, trans. Bratutti, pp. 27, 28, 29-32. R. Janin, "La forteresse byzantine d'Aetos" has written about Aetos, *EO* Vol. 31 (1928), pp. 295-299.

<sup>475</sup> About Damatrys-Samandra [Δάματρως-Σαμάνδρα] see Janin, "La banlieue asiatique de Constantinople", *EO* Vol. 22 (1923) p. 290. Reverend Father Janin concludes that Damatrys was conquered by Orhan in 1328. However, on their course to the battle of Pelecanos, the troops of Andronicos Junior had passed undisturbed from this region, which shows that, in 1329, at least, the entire coastal zone was in Byzantine hands. It seems that, the definite conquest of these areas took place in 1330, because [then] Andronicos, leading his troops to rescue Nicomedia, avoids the overland road and prefers to carry even his cavalry by sea.

is revealed by the poverty of its Metropolitan, obligating the Patriarchate to deal with him in 1316.

At the north end point of Bosphorus the Ottomans attacked the fortress of Iero (close to the recent Anadolu Kavak), which was located at about thirty kilometers from Constantinople<sup>477</sup>. It is reported that, during one of these raids, Osman's akıncı managed to enter within the walls of the fortress, but, shortly after, because of lack of sufficient forces they withdrew, under the condition to be attributed regular tax<sup>478</sup>. If Osman possessed ships, from this position, he would be able to cut off the maritime transport between Constantinople and the Black Sea ports, something that Bayezid attempted to do in the years 1392-1397 and Mehmet II few months before the Fall, erecting towers at Bosphorus.

Despite the fact that he didn't have ships, for the operational sector of Propontis, Osman ensured the cooperation of pirate Kara Ali, with whom he conducted the only naval operation in his life<sup>479</sup>, namely the conquest of Kalolimnos Island (Vesvikos), in 1308<sup>480</sup>. Kara Ali, who was Aigoudalp's [Αἰγούδαλπ] son, Osman's old

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<sup>476</sup> Pachymeres, *ibid.*, p. 412 l. 7 et seq..

<sup>477</sup> The fort and the small town of Ieron [Ιερὸν] are mentioned by the Byzantine writers both before and during the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Cf Theofanes *Συνεχισταί* p. 424 l. 1: "προς τῷ του Ευξείνου Πόντου στόματι παρεδρεύων... ἐν τῷ Ιερῷ λεγομένῳ". Gregoras E' 4 (vol. I p. 134): "μίαν μεγάλην ὀλκάδα περί τὴν ἄκραν ἰσθησι τοῦ ἱεροῦ [wr. Ιεροῦ] (ὁ δὴ στόμα καλεῖται τοῦ Πόντου, ἔνθα τὰς Κυανέας καὶ Πλαγκτὰς ἔφασκον οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶναι)". Kantakouzenos Vol. II p. 522 l. 17: "καὶ πρὸς τῷ Ιερῷ γενομένης κατὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ Πόντου κειμένη πόλις". *Ibid.*, p. 563 l. 10: "ὁ βασιλεὺς νυκτὸς ἀφίκτο πρὸς Ιερὸν τὴν κατὰ τὸ στόμα τοῦ Πόντου κειμένην πόλιν». The importance attached to the fortress, gives us an idea of the impression that was caused to the Queen of the Cities because of its conquest by the Ottomans.

<sup>478</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 27 p. 627: "οἱ καθ' ἑῷ τῆς περαιῆς Τοῦρκοι... πολλάκις προσέβαλλον καὶ πολλοὺς κακῶς ἐποίουν εἰς τρυγητὸν ἐξιόντας, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ Ιερῷ ἀναγκαζομένους, ἐπεὶ ποτε καὶ ἐντὸς ἐκεῖνοι λαθόντες ἐγένοντο, εἰ καὶ αὐθις φοβηθέντες ἐξήρσαν, οὐχ ἰκανοὶ τὸ πλῆθος ὄντες κατέχειν τὸ φρούριον, καταβολαῖς τεταγμένων τελῶν τὰς σπονδὰς ὠνεῖσθαι".

<sup>479</sup> Pears, *The Destruction of the Greek Empire* p. 63, in *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4 p. 658, and Diehl-Oeconomus-Guilland-Grousset (p. 300) who follow him, claims that, in 1310, Osman had carried out a raid against Rhodes. This information was also written by the older authors, R. A. de Vertot, *Histoire des Chevaliers Hospitaliers*, Paris 1737, Vol. II p. 101, and Muralt, *Chronographie byzantine* Vol. II p. 507, but it is inaccurate. See Gibbons, *The Foundation* pp. 43-44, Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesche* pp. 56-57, Brockelmann, *Geschichte der islamischen Völker* p. 236. Raids against the Aegean islands were carried out by the emirs of the coastal emirates, like the emir of Menteche, and the pirate fleets which were roaming the archipelago throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> century. It is unfortunate that we do not have clear information about the action of each of the Turkish leaders of that period. As it was mentioned in the introduction, the confusion arises because Pachymeres, Gregoras and other sources, indiscriminately call them Turks or Persians or barbarians. The little information about the inroads at the Aegean can be partially completed by the western sources, especially the reports of the Franks, who were occupying the islands and, also, by other similar documents. Relatively see D.A. Zakythenos, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, Paris 1932, pp. 90-92.

<sup>480</sup> See Gibbons, *The Foundation* pp. 45-46. Hammer *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 80. Zinkeisen, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 90. - Hasluck in *Annual of the British School at Athens* Vol. 13 pp. 301-305, dealt with Kalolimnos [Καλόλιμνος], its Byzantine monuments and inscriptions.

comrade, probably belonged to the group of pirates who repeatedly plundered the Aegean islands. It is likely that, occupying Kalolimnos, he hoped to use it as base of operations against the nearby coasts and islands. In any case, Osman's and Kara Ali's cooperation was very beneficial for both of them. The shores of Propontis were for Osman ground of military operations, where the two men could act as partners and allies. Moreover, since the pirate Kara Ali had eastern Propontis under his control, navigation had become too dangerous for the Byzantines and thereby hindered the provision of Bithynia's fortresses. Under this cooperation, the essential relationship of the two men was rather allied than a relation between dominant and subject, because, since Osman had firmly established his authority at the coastal areas and didn't possess ships<sup>481</sup>, he couldn't practice any control on the island and its master<sup>482</sup>. Under these circumstances, since Kara Ali was under the high suzerainty of the nearest prince who had the same nationality and was adorned by so many feats, his interests wasn't harmed at all.

Kara Ali's pirate action seems to have a direct impact on the situation that prevailed in Bithynia. At that time, the pressure of Osman's forces had become more noticeable. According to Pachymeres' testimony, the king was at last forced to care for the provisioning of the exposed and tortured areas and sent by sea wheat shipments from the excesses of the capital's largest monasteries<sup>483</sup>. But the pirate ships and enemy contingents didn't remain inactive. Most probably, the wheat never reached its destination. If it had arrived, it would constitute not only material but also moral support, because it would convince Bithynia's inhabitants that the government had not forgotten them and thus, their resistance would have been longer. However, things did not develop in this way. In contrast, one after another, the Byzantine fortresses fell into the hands of the Ottomans. As the fortified location Kouvouklia (current Duvluce), located near Bursa, at the western foothills of Mount Olympus, was under pressure from the enemy, it asked help from Lopadio, where Makrinos possessed some forces

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<sup>481</sup> There was no Ottoman Navy until 1337. As we will notice below Μέχρι το 1337 δεν υπήρχε οθωμανικό ναυτικό. Όπως θα διαπιστώσουμε και πιο κάτω, if Orhan had ships, with few of them, he could have completed the siege of Nicomedia from sea as well, so Andronicos wouldn't have managed to supply the city.

<sup>482</sup> Even today, this island is called Emir Ali adası, namely the island of Emir Ali. As it is well known, the title Emir was usually given to autonomous rulers.

<sup>483</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 13 p. 588.

constituted by Byzantines and Almogavars<sup>484</sup>. The latter were residues of Roger's army and were fighting for the sake of their personal interests, remaining faithful to the reputation of their compatriots. When they were sent to help Kouvouklia, at the first opportunity they came into consultation with enemies, surrendered the fort, shared the booty with them and fled to Lampsacus. After the fall of Kouvouklia, Prusa isolated<sup>485</sup> and was forced to pay tribute to Osman, but, as Pachymeres accounts<sup>486</sup>, the return from the Ottomans was a peace spectrum in non-peaceful times. The permanent Ottoman garrison which was settled in the newly built fortresses of Kaplitzia, west of the city, and Balampantzik, at the bank of Niloufer River, had become the essential ruler of the whole area outside the walls, under the commands of Ak-Timour<sup>487</sup>.

At the area of Nicaea, the Ottomans reiterated the tactics of looting and desertification, aiming at forcing the city to surrender. Trikokkia (the Turkish Kocahisar), a very important fortress which dominated at Nicaea<sup>488</sup> and was once the center of the revolution against Michael VIII, was conquered by the Ottomans after an obstinate siege. However, any attempt against the strong city walls was stillborn to fail<sup>489</sup>.

At that time, Nicomedia was out of the Ottoman operations' epicenter, mainly because Osman did not want to expand further north before having subdued Bursa and Nicaea and finally secure his rear. Commander of Nicomedia was then one of Noga's old collabolators, the Christianized Tatar Kouximpaxis, whose daughter, after the recommendation of the king, had married Solymampaxi, commander of significant

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<sup>484</sup> Ibid., Z' 9 pp. 580-581. We consider that, the phrase in l. 9 "επιτιθεμένων των περί τόν Πέρσην Ατάριον", has an error, which must be attributed either to Pachymeres' oversight or to carelessness of the copyists. However, it is not excluded the possibility of a publishing or printing oversight. In any case, Atar must be identified with Aman for the following reasons: first, Atman became the ruler of Kouvouklia [Κουβούκλια] at that time, second, not any Turkish raider is mentioned with the name Atar and, third and most important, the word *Atar* is not a Turkish name of an individual, but, it is used as a synonym for Tocharos [Τόχαρος] (i.e. Tatar or Mongol) and probably comes from the name of the Mongol race Aktaw. Cf Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ Β'* 24 p. 129: "τών Τοχάρων, ούς η κοινή Αταρίους λέγει συνήθεια», and Scoutariotes, *Προσθήκαι εἰς Χρονικήν Συγγραφήν Ἀκροπόλιτου* p. 284. About Kouvouklia see Hasluck, *ibid.*, p. 301.

<sup>485</sup> Pachymeres, *Ἀνδρόνικος Ε'* 21 p. 415 l. 3. Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 213.

<sup>486</sup> *Ἀνδρόνικος Ζ'* 17 p. 597 l. 8.

<sup>487</sup> Ašikpašazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 22, ed. Giese p. 18.

<sup>488</sup> Pachymeres, *Ἀνδρόνικος Ζ'* 33 p. 638.

<sup>489</sup> Trikokkia [Τρικοκκία] is the only fortress that Osman seizes by assault. Throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the fortified cities were, mostly, conquered not by force but by deception, betrayal or capitulation. This was either because of the primacy of the defense means, particularly the walls, or because of the inadequacy of the offensive weapons.

Turkish forces<sup>490</sup>. These family ties had led Andronicos II to the thought that, with Kouximpaxi's appointment, would be achieved peace in the region around Nicomedia. But soon, since Amur's son Ali, after crossing Sakarya, conducted raids at Mesothynia and plundered the outskirts of Nicomedia while the local mobsters had created really chaotic conditions, Andronicos' hopes was refuted<sup>491</sup>. Given this situation, Osman did not consider appropriate to appear again at the plain of Nicomedia, where a few years ago had defeated Mouzalon. Such a venture would likely set him up against his eastern neighbor or cause him to quit, even for a short period, a steadily proceeding battle against the two other major Bithynias' cities of Bursa and Nicaea, which were already surrounded by hostile territories. Osman never aimed at ephemeral benefits. Rather than being exposed to danger in front of Nicomedia, he preferred to deal with the organization of his state, subduing the remaining territories and conducting economic warfare against Bursa and Nicaea, which was to cause their final surrender, twenty years later.

Meanwhile, the risk the two major cities of Bithynia were under had become clear at Byzantium. But the abnormal situation that had arisen at the European provinces following the action of the Catalan Company didn't allow the dispatch of troops at Bithynia. There is no doubt that the course of events would be completely different if the government had decided an expedition against Osman at that time. From Pachymeres and what he cites about monk Ilarion we get an idea of what a regular army with an efficient command could have managed<sup>492</sup>.

Ilarion, who belonged to Perivleptos monastery of Istanbul, was by chance at Elegmous, a town in the Gulf of Cios, in order to take care of property cases involving the monastery dependencies there. Feeling aggrieved about the inertia displayed by the government against Osman, Ilarion, being bold, gathered a military force constituted by locals, and became its leader. His action against the raiders was very successful; he

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<sup>490</sup> Ibid., Δ' 30 p. 345. Pachymeres and the references mention his name in its Hellenized form. In Turkish, his name must have been not Süleyman Paşa, as writes Gibbons p. 33 f.n. 1, but Süleyman bey *سولیمان بیک*, which, in medieval times was pronounced Soliman *bak*. The title *paşa* was not yet widespread (see J. Deny "Pasha" *EI* Vol. III pp. 1101-1104), while the title *bey* was in use from the times of the Seljuks and in Greek is met as *pekis* [πέκης] (see G. Moravesik, *Byzantinoturcica*, Vol. II pp. 214-215). Also cf the title *peklarpakis* [πεκλάραπακίς] (beylerbey), Acropolites *Χρονική Συγγραφή* 65, p. 138 l. 12. The word was in use in the Seljuk state and, later, was attributed to Lalaşahin, the conqueror of the Balkans, during the reign of Murat I.

<sup>491</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* Δ' 30 pp. 346-347.

<sup>492</sup> Ibid., Ζ' 17 pp. 596-597.

pushed them back and caused them heavy losses. The event caused lively impression in Istanbul, but from the one side the Patriarch and the clergy demanded his punishment, because he had acted in a manner inconsistent with the habits of a monk and, from the other, the king to whom the persecuted Ilarion had taken shelter, was confined in encouraging him verbally, giving him the promise that in due course he would intervene to the patriarch.

But while Ilarion was losing precious time to defend his case, the inhabitants of Bithynia, who had lost their motivator, neglected the fight against Ottomans. Thus, the latter reorganized and attacked again, killing all those who did not manage to save themselves within the walls of the fortress<sup>493</sup>. Then, following the king's intervention, the patriarch, albeit with some discomfort, allowed Ilarion to continue his work. But it was too late. The Ottomans were already rulers of the whole area around Elegmous and the efforts of this brave man couldn't alter the situation.

The estates defended by Ilarion were the last remnants of the monasterial property in Bithynia. Because of physical disability of the monks to oppose strong resistance against enemies who were very combative, following the fate of other large estates, most of the large dependencies that belonged to remote monasteries were dissolved quickly, immediately after Osman's appearance. The last hope to save the large land property, which, until then, had avoided the consequences of anarchy, was buried at the Bithynian dependences of Perivleptos monastery, which was located at the shore of Kianos bay.

But from military point of view, things would have gone differently if the example of Hilarion had found imitators on time. At that time Andronicos the Younger asked his grandfather to give him a thousand soldiers, arguing that he could guard the cities of Bithynia with them<sup>494</sup>. Taking under consider Ilarion's feat, this claim does not seem excessive. Unfortunately, Andronicos the Younger's suggestion wasn't heard, probably because the suspicious old king was, since then, afraid that his grandson would turn against the throne. The only representation/gesture he made was to send his groom

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<sup>493</sup> Apparently, the fortress was Peladarion [*Πελαδάριον*], which was overlooking the town. The "Castle of Peladarion" is mentioned in a document of Miklosich-Müller collection, Vol. I p. 38. Today, it is called Filadar and, until the Asia Minor Catastrophe, close to the town, was preserved a Byzantine monastery of Theotokos. Cf Kandes, *Η Προύσα* p. 143.

<sup>494</sup> Gregoras Θ' 2 (Vol. I p. 401).

and Great Primikirios\* [*Μέγας Πριμικήριος*] Kassianos at Mesothynia to entrench the fortresses and organize the defense of Constantinople's eastern suburbs. But, on the occasion of the taxes collection, Kassianos came into disagreement with his financial commissioner, Vardalis. The latter, calumniated Kassianos to the king, claiming that he had come to an agreement with the Turks. Thus, he was forced to withdraw with his armed forces at Chile, where he raised the flag of rebellion. Finally, after a betrayal of the people of Chile, he surrendered to the government and was imprisoned<sup>495</sup>. Thus, another attempt to salvage the last remnants of the Empire at the East ended ingloriously.

Rather than facing Osman with weapons, Byzantium was now trying to create distraction, prompting the Mongols of Persia to attack against the Ottomans. For this purpose, the Byzantine court recurred again to the old political ploy of acquiring allies by contracting relational bonds. A few years earlier, Andronicos' natural daughter Maria, was given as a wife for the powerful Mongol prince Touktai<sup>496</sup> [*Τουκτάη*]. Aiming to further strengthen the family ties and to renew the earlier alliance which was concluded by his father Michael<sup>497</sup>, Andronicos now presented another daughter, this time impure, whose name is not preserved by Pachymeris<sup>498</sup>. According to their agreement, Gazan-khan was assuming to compel the Turkish rulers to stop the raids against the Byzantine cities. But, the unexpected death of this meddling man (1304) canceled the marriage and currently disproved the hopes of the Byzantines<sup>499</sup>. But, not

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\* Latin *primus in cera* = the first in order, the first in the yearbook, the first advisor of the throne.

<sup>495</sup> Pachymeres. *Ανδρόνικος* Ζ' 24 pp. 618-620.

<sup>496</sup> *Ibid.*, Γ' 27 p. 268.

<sup>497</sup> Michael had also given his illegitimate daughter Maria to Abaka [*Απαγάς*], the Mongol ruler of Bagdad as a bride. At the beginning, she was intended for Apaga's father Hulagu Han [*Χαλαού*], but because meanwhile the latter died, the bride was given to his son and successor. Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Γ' 3 pp. 174-175, Ε' 24 p. 402. Abulfaragius, *Chronicon Syriacum*, trans. P. J. Bruns, Leipzig 1789, Vol. I pp. 567-568. Chapman, *Michel Paléologue* p. 148. Cf Ismail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti teşkilâtına medhal*, Istanbul 1941, p. 206. His other illegitimate daughter Euphrosyne, was given to the powerful leader of the Danube Tartars (the Golden Horde) Nogay [*Νογά*]. Pachymeres, *Μιχαήλ* Γ' 25 p. 231. Cf Chapman, *Michel Paléologue* p. 80.

<sup>498</sup> *Ανδρόνικος* Ε' 16 pp. 402-403. Although the name of the princess is not mentioned by Pachymeres, nevertheless, I. Mouradja d' Ohsson (*Histoire des Mongols*, Amsterdam 1852, Vol. 4 p. 536) and G. F. Hertzberg (*Geschichte der Byzantiner und des osmanischen Reiches* p. 461) as well, call her Maria, but their sources are unknown.

<sup>499</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος* ΣΤ' 1 pp. 455-460. In his work, Pachymeres registers a long necrology of Kazanis, as he calls him, highlighting his *ὅπως τον αποκαλεί, τονίζοντας* his feeling, that were sympathetic for the Christians, his administrative and military skills, his campaigns and his cultural action at the countries that he ruled. Preceding the Byzantine – above all – interests, states that, by his death “συνέφθιτο και η υπ' αυτώ των όλων ἐλπίς». These views reflect the public opinion that was formed in Byzantium, which was resting so many hopes in the friendship of the Mongol ruler. Valuable source

after very long, the treaty was renewed by Gazan's brother and successor, Mohammed Khodabendah (Charmpantas, according to Pachymeres) who promised to attack Osman and the other emirs from behind<sup>500</sup>. Then, in Constantinople it was learned that an army of 40,000 Tatars was preparing to start the battle and that half of them was already on the way to Konya.

Meanwhile, pending the Mongol intervention, the government of Constantinople was seeking to affect Osman in a different way. Hoping that the relationship with Charmpantas and the rumor about the Mongol army would deter Osman from new raids, he sent Maria with a military force at Nicaea. Maria, also known as "Dame of the Mougoulion" (Mongols) [Δέσποινα των Μουγουλίων]<sup>501</sup>, was the stepsister of Andronicos II and the widow of Charmpantas' grandfather Abakas.

However, the presence of Maria brought the exact opposite results, because Osman, instead of avoiding the hostilities showed an even greater vigor which, according to Pachymeres, is ascribed to his anger that was inspired from the Dame's threats and imperious attitude<sup>502</sup>. Osman probably thought that the rumors about the Mongolian army were excessive. Even he was benefiting from the fact that some of these forces should necessarily be occupied at the Aegean, where Sasan was besieging the fortress of Ouraia and Ephesus, cities which conquered later<sup>503</sup>. Finally, (Osman) he wanted to possess as many territories as possible before the Tatar forces appear. Moreover, the Byzantines' resort at the Mongolian weapons demonstrated the emperor's weakness to assume a serious battle against the Ottoman State. However, above all, Osman considered that the Mongol forces coming from the East or South would inevitably conflict with the emirates of Germyan and Amur Ali. Therefore, only part of the army would arrive until the Ottoman territory and Osman thought that he was able to confront the new enemies too, not only because he had forces that was experienced in battle but also because the morale of those forces were thriving.

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about Gazan and his dynasty is Aksaraylı Kerimeddin Mahmud, Turkish trans. Gençosman, Ankara 1943, pp. 250 ff., 328-331, where is also mentioned the date of his death, May 14, 1304.

<sup>500</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 13 p. 588.

<sup>501</sup> Ibid., Ζ' 25 p. 620. Despoina of Mougoulion (of Mongols) [Δέσποινα των Μουγουλίων] is mentioned in *Acta et diplomata graeca* Vol. I p. 312, in relation to the monastery she had established; A chapel of this monastery is still preserved and it is the only Byzantine church that remained in Greek hands. See A. Paspatis, *Βυζαντιναί μελέται*, Istanbul 1877, p. 388, and G. Sotiriou, *Χριστιανική και Βυζαντινή αρχαιολογία*, Athens 1942, Vol. I p.407.

<sup>502</sup> *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 33 p. 637.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid., Ζ' 13 p.589.

Unfortunately, there is no clear information about the battle between Osman and the Mongols of Charmpantas. Pachymeres' history closes with the year 1308, Gregoras and Kantakouzenos do not cite anything and the Ottoman writers speak confusedly about conflicts between Ottomans and Tatars<sup>504</sup>. At around 1308, in Constantinople, was revived the rumor that 30,000 men of the Tatar army had attacked the Turks and managed to penetrate until the Ottoman fortresses of Olympus placing Osman in a difficult position. But Pachymeres, who gives this information as a kind of epilogue of his writing, hastens to add that it is rumor. Also, from this passage<sup>505</sup> is not clear whether it was believed that the thirty thousand/huge crowd of Tocharians had all expeditioned against Osman or if a part of them had moved to provide assistance at Ephesus and the others against Bithynia. Finally, it is not clear if this force was allocated to the various fronts of Asia Minor and also, we know nothing about the stance taken by Alisyr, the powerful ruler of Germyan, as the Mongolian army had to pass through his territories to reach Olympus.

This is one of the darkest points of the Ottoman history. Both the old and contemporary historians have not given the appropriate importance to the battle of the Ottomans against Mongols, who in fact was the only dangerous enemies of the young state. Many of them have completely ignored this new factor at the Ottoman things and others, including Gibbons, underestimated its importance. Although we do not know details about the Mongolian intervention, however, from the course of the events, we conclude that, Tatars, no matter how exhausted and few in number arrived at Bithynia, brought major disruption to Osman's projects· otherwise how to explain the twenty-year delay of Bursa's and Nicaea's surrender? In 1308 Osman was ante portas of the two cities and, by the occupation of the surrounding fortresses, essentially he had become their lord. Since the food reserves couldn't last for long, their fall was a matter of little time. Through a tighter and more effective blockade, Osman could cause their surrender within very few years. Then, instead of the tribute of Bursa's inhabitants, all the treasures, which naturally was gathered inside the walls, would come at his possession

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<sup>504</sup> Ašikpašazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 25. Sa'deddin, trans. Bratutti Vol. I p. 27. Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I pp. 64-65, 86.

<sup>505</sup> Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Ζ'* 33 p. 637 l. 12 et seq., *Ζ'* 36 p. 651: “νύν δε επιεικώς φημίζονται καί τά βελτίω καί ένθεν μέν ως εγγύς τρισμύριοι Τόχαροι πεμφθέντες παρά του Χαρμπαντά μεγάλην καί ως ουκ ήλπισέ τις άναστολήν εργάζεσθαι άρχονται τών Περσών, ώστε καί όσα φρούρια Ρωμαίων εαλώκεσαν πρότερον, ανά δέ τά οχυρά του Όλύμπου παραβυσθήναι... αλλά ταύτα μέν τά της φήμης...”.

and he would become the lord of Bithynia's two largest cities. The fall of Bursa and Nicaea wouldn't have delayed until 1326 and 1331 under normal conditions.

For these reasons we believe that we will not come away from the real facts if we admit that the rumor given by Pachymeres contains some truth and Charmpantas' fighters gained until the blockaded towns forcing Osman to withdraw from there. Such was the disruption they caused so, for about one decade, Osman didn't attempt or didn't achieve to impede the supply of the two cities, which seem to have gone through a period of relative calm. Although the sources do not say anything about Osman during that time, it isn't unlikely to be forced to capitulate and perhaps levy the old tribute until he was given a chance to sally.

According to the Ottoman tradition, Osman's forces reappeared in front of Bursa in the year 1317, namely almost a decade before the conquest of the city<sup>506</sup>. During this period Osman was already the master of the whole Bithynia, except from Bursa, Nicaea and Nicomedia. The subordination of these three cities was the most difficult task that Osman and his son and successor Orhan had ever assumed. The old tactic of blockade through the occupation or construction of forts around the towns was again applied. However, Osman seems that didn't possess sufficient forces so his blockade would become really effective and bring the surrender quickly.

At least, that Bursa wasn't sufficiently guarded by the Ottomans results from the fact that Andronikos the Younger, who was always supporting the expedition plan for Bithynia's release and without having any support from his regnant grandfather, managed to land at Trigleia and, from there, to insert a quantity of grain at Bursa, reviving the morale of the people to continue the defense. As Andronicos himself says<sup>507</sup>, "hope was given to bear the siege for long, because, otherwise, the city is constructed strongly". But, apart from this strengthen in foodstuffs Byzantium did not take any serious action against Osman. In a letter he wrote to his grandfather during the civil war, Andronikos the Younger considers Andronicos the II responsible for the fall of Bursa and blames him for his inertia<sup>508</sup>.

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<sup>506</sup> See Gibbons, *The Foundation* p. 47.

<sup>507</sup> Kantakouzenos A' 45 (Vol. I p. 220).

<sup>508</sup> Ibid.

The fall of Bursa took place on April 6, 1326, while civil war raged between the two Andronicoses<sup>509</sup>. The Ottoman troops, led by Orhan, were before the city gates since it was realized that the time for its surrender was imminent<sup>510</sup>. The historians cite that famine forced the inhabitants to surrender· however, there was also another factor not of less importance. Even before famine become reality, Bursa's inhabitants had lost their morale. They were seeing that the city was surrounded by the Ottoman farmers, who, meanwhile, had settled permanently and merged with the natives of the rural areas. Long before the civil war had started, they knew that Byzantium had deserted their city to its fate. Even if there was a way to find the necessary provisions, the whole situation was leading them to the thought that, since the future belonged to the Ottomans, the extension of their resistance wouldn't have any benefit. For these reasons, they decided to open their gates<sup>511</sup>.

According to the Ottoman tradition<sup>512</sup>, renegade Michael, the so-called Kōse, negotiated with the commander of the city the conditions, the most important of which

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<sup>509</sup> We learn the exact date, which was unknown for the older historians, from to 15<sup>th</sup>-century chronicle notes, published by S. Lambros (*Βραχέα Χρονικά*, ed. K. Amandos, Athens 1932). “Την Προύσαν έλαβον οί Τοϋρκοί τω ζωλδ' έτει Απριλίου ς” (p. 31) and “Τω ζωλδ' έτει παρεδόθη η Προύσα τοις αθέοις Αγαρηνοίς μηνί Απριλίω ς” (p.88). As regards the value of the *Βραχέα Χρονικά* see P. Charanis, “Les Βραχέα Χρονικά comme source historique”, *Byzantion* Vol. 13 (1938), pp. 341-342. All those who refer to the date of Bursa's fall except Nešri (*ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 217) and Evliya (*Narrative of Travels* Vol. II p. 4), who support that the city passed to the Ottoman hands in A.H. 722 (1322), agree with the year 1326. But, both Nešri and Evliya often provide indistinct and legendary information. As regards the unreliability of Evliya see at the work of three of the authors, who recently dealt with the latter in Greece, namely N. Moschopoulos *EEBS* Vol. 14 (1937) p. 488, S.A. Choudaverdoglu Theodotos, *Ελληνικά* Vol. 4 (1931) p. 432 ff. and I. Spathares, *Θρακικά* Vol. 4 (1933) p. 114.

<sup>510</sup> Gregoras H' 15 (Vol. I p. 384): “ήλώκει δε και η Προυσαέων τω λιμό πολιορκηθείσα πόλις». Kantakouzenos A' 45 (Vol. I p. 220). Frantzes A' 22 p. 83, ed. Papadopoulos. Chalcocondyles A' 8 p. 16, ed. Bonn. Ašikpašazade, eds. Istanbul, pp. 28-31, ed. Giese pp. 28-29. Nešri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 pp. 214-217. Šükřullah, *MOG* Vol. 2 p. 83. Sa'deddin, trans. Bratutti p. 23. Ahmedi, *TOEM* Vol. I (1326/1910) p. 47. Leunclavius, *Historiae* p. 169, *Annales* p. 9. Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 89.

<sup>511</sup> Regarding the mental condition of the inhabitants, very characteristic are those mentioned by Ašikpašazade and Nešri, as if it had been said by the “vizier” and governor of Bursa. This man, which was called ضرور [*Zarour?*] by Nešri, was one of the first that prompted the surrender of the city. He was very rich and, on his own initiative, offered the sultan a big monetary gift. When he was asked why he had supported the surrender, he stated that the decision of the inhabitants came from the ascertainment of the following facts: 1) while the power of the Ottomans was increasing day by day, the Byzantine power was declining, 2) the fortresses built by Osman were paralyzing the commercial life of the city, 3) the Ottoman subjects were living in a state of peace and security, 4) the city governor, called ب ر س (Bers) by the Ottoman historians, although he had a lot of money, he was unreasonably parsimonious in spending for military expenditure and the fighters were lacked weapons, 5) famine was continuously becoming more urgent and 6) finally, prevailed the view that “the changes of luck and the vicissitudes are never missing from this world” and that “rather than dying violently at the hands of the Turks, it would be better to surrender the city and be freed”. Therefore, the surrender was the consequence of internal collapse and defeatism.

<sup>512</sup> Ašikpašazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 29, ed. Giese p. 28. Nešri, *ibid.*, p. 214. Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 89, Gibbons, *The Foundation* pp. 46-48.

was that the residents would be able to leave by paying a total of 30,000 gold coins as ransoms. Many embraced this opportunity and fled to Constantinople<sup>513</sup>. But it seems that the majority of the inhabitants didn't abandon their homes, preferring as last resort islamization than exile. In regard to the religious question, the Ottomans, here too, applied their old tactics, which meant tolerance and taxation of the infidels, as well as creating privileges for those who would accede to Islam. This tactic attracted large portion of the inhabitants to embrace the conquerors' religion in order to avoid taxation and achieve economic benefits and political influence.

Unlike the rural areas, in the cities, the first renegades were coming from society's higher strata because, by being wealthier, they had larger interests to protect and greater ambitions to fulfill. They constituted the developed class and, since they were distinguished among the members of a martial race that lacked staff/executives capable to organize state services, were qualified to occupy administrative offices. Similarly were also converted to Islam the local public officials – those who didn't flee to the capital – in order to maintain their privileged positions within the new regime as well. During the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> century, the majority of the Ottoman State's masterminds/leaders came from these bourgeois from Bursa and the other cities, who had converted to Islam.

Although this method to acquire new staff/executives had satisfactory results for the Ottomans in the Bithynian cities and especially in the populous Bursa, however, since it is proven that indigenous Christians never disappeared from Bithynia, there were also those who remained faithful to their ancestral religion. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the majority of the inhabitants had converted to Islam<sup>514</sup>. The testimonials from the patriarchal documents are sufficiently clear for Bursa and Bithynia's other large cities (metropolis). It is mentioned that, other provinces in Europe or Asia were

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<sup>513</sup> Nešri, *ibid.*, p. 215 l. 8, says that the inhabitants of Bursa descended to كملك (Gemilik) [the place of the ships] and, from there, they went to Istanbul. Noldeke, who was the editor and translator, transcribed this word as Kemlik, namely the Turkish name for Kios, identifying it with this place. However, as Taeschner points (*Anatolische Wegenetz* Vol. I p. 70) this identification is not absolutely accurate. It is likely that the fugitive inhabitants of Bursa had descended to Apameia [Ἀπάμεια] (the current Mudanya), which was the seaport of their town.

<sup>514</sup> Köprülü (*Les origines* pp. 96-100), also disagrees at this point without supporting his view on evidence from the texts. In his opinion, the islamised were an insignificant minority. The Turkish historian admits mass conversions only during the 15<sup>th</sup> century, in the Balkan countries.

offered by document\* to the prelates of these cities. The main reason for these transfers and abridgements was the fact that these prelates' old flock had significantly reduced to the extent that it couldn't sustain an episcopal region. Already, since 1318, the Patriarchate grants the Episcopal region of Apameia and Agavroi Monastery<sup>515</sup> [*Μονή Αγούρων*] to the Metropolitan of Bursa "in order to be able to offer help to those in need, since it came to this uncomfortable position because of the abnormality of the situations". At that time, the area around Bursa had yielded to the Ottomans, but it seems that Apameia and the areas around it were considered safer territories. However, since the Ottoman dominion spread to the shores of Propontis a few years later, this solution was temporary. In 1327 the Metropolitan of Bursa Nikolaos is referred as *chair* of Vizyi<sup>516</sup> [*Βιζύη*]. From 1347 until 1386 no one is mentioned as Metropolitan of Bursa<sup>517</sup>. Therefore we can assume that after the death of the elder Bishop Nicolaos, the throne was vacant for a sufficiently long period<sup>518</sup>. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the fact that the shepherd of such an important Episcopal region, which was located near the capital, may be missing from the Patriarchal record for forty years. In 1381, Bursa province is granted for life to the Metropolitan of Nicaea<sup>519</sup>. In order to maintain their prelate, the two formerly flourishing and populous Christian communities had now retracted into one, "because", as the relevant patriarchal sigillum states "Nicaea has been captured and destroyed by the infidels and its metropolis is not sufficient to provide the necessary". Only in 1386, when an overall effort for reconstruction of the Episcopal seats in Asia Minor was deployed, we will meet again a legitimate metropolitan of Bursa<sup>520</sup>, who was "εξαρχικώς"\* granted Kotyaeion and its whole

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\* [T.N.] "*Κατά λόγον επιδόσεως*": Epidosis (canonical law) was the temporary assignment of an ecclesiastical seat to supervise another one, in order the latter to continue operating. This was applied in case that, for reasons of force, the prelate couldn't go his ecclesiastical seat. The "*κατά λόγον*" epidosis was the assignment by document and not by ordainment and didn't negate the current ecclesiastical hierarchy.

<sup>515</sup> Acta et diplomata graeca Vol. I p. 80.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid., Vol. I pp. 144, 155, 157, 164. About the grant of metropolises "by document" and the meaning of the term *πρόεδρος* [president] see E. Alexandrides, "Πρόεδρος, τον τόπον επέχων", in *Ορθοδοξία* magazine, 2<sup>nd</sup> year, pp. 198-202, 254-259, 284-288, 341-344, 478-479, 3<sup>rd</sup> year pp. 74-79, 226-230, 285-291, 395-397, 4<sup>th</sup> year pp. 342- 347. Particularly 2<sup>nd</sup> year, pp. 257-259.

<sup>517</sup> Acta et diplomata graeca Vol. I p. 270 - Vol. II p. 90.

<sup>518</sup> A. Wächter, Der Verfall des Griechentums in Kleinasien p. 55.

<sup>519</sup> Acta et diplomata Vol. II p. 25.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., Vol. II p. 90.

\* [T.N.] A region which, from ecclesiastical aspect, does not come under the nearest metropolis, but it is directly administrated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate (so its income is assigned to a dignitary of the Patriarchate) or by a monastery which is also directly administrated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

parish, which, in 1371, was stated as a separate Episcopal region, under the same prelate<sup>521</sup>. But before passing a decade, the purse of Bithynia's churches was again the Patriarchates' subject of care. Panagia Romaniotissa Monastery which was located close to Kios and was in great recession belonged to Metropolis of Nicaea. Metropolitan of Nicaea borrowed "wine and a bushel of wheat" from this monastery, but the monks, "being destitute and poor monks and lacking the necessary" were asking return of the borrowed. Metropolitan was denying and their quarrel came to mind the Patriarch and the synod<sup>522</sup>. Such was the impoverishment of Bithynia's Christian population, before the end of 14th century.

The picture is complemented by the testimony of traveler Bertrandon de la Broquiere<sup>523</sup>, who cites that during his course from Kütahya to Bursa, met numerous travelers on the road who kissed his hand and clothes, because they thought that he belonged to a caravan of pilgrims returning from Mecca. These were happening in the early 15th century in an area that 150 years ago was the most Greek part of Asia Minor.

The fate of other Metropolitans was not different from that of Bursa and Nicaea<sup>524</sup>. Nicomedia resisted to the increasing Ottoman pressure for approximately ten years after the fall of Bursa. But, from 1327 until 1385 there is no Metropolitan of Nicomedia recorded in the patriarchal documents. The city comes under the Metropolitan of Silyria in 1356<sup>525</sup>. From 1381 until 1383 is ecclesiastically administrated by the Metropolitan of Hungarovlachia<sup>526</sup>. Even Chalcedon which was under the eyes of the Byzantine emperors, does not escape the common fate. By 1316, the Metropolitan of Chalcedon takes "by document" the archdiocese of Maroneia<sup>527</sup>, because he lacked the necessary revenues. After 1327, for a period of 27 years, no one is recorded as Prelate of Chalcedon<sup>528</sup>. It is notable that the Ottomans appeared at the

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<sup>521</sup> Ibid., Vol. I p. 541.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., Vol. II p. 237.

<sup>523</sup> *Voyage d'outre-mer (1422-1433)*, ed. Ch. Schéfer, Paris 1892, p. 131.

<sup>524</sup> Although it is somewhat outdated, A. Wächter's doctoral thesis, *Der Verfall des Griechentums in Kleinasien im XIV Jahrhundert* Leipzig 1903, where are studied the most important metropolises of Asia Minor, mainly based on the documents of *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*. The valuable material of Miklosich-Müller collection, which relates to the decline of the Hellenism of Anatolia, has not been sufficiently studied so far. Significantly, it was disregarded by those who want to represent the establishment of the Ottoman State as a purely Turkish matter.

<sup>525</sup> *Acta et diplomata Vol. I p. 362.*

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., Vol. II pp. 37, 43, 46, 48, 51.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., Vol. I p. 45.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid., Vol. I pp. 144-338.

outskirts of Chalcedon approximately in 1308. Due to the short distance that separates this city from Constantinople, it is reasonable to conclude that many of the residents sought safety within the walls of Byzantium. Most of those who remained in their homes were gradually converted to Islam. We conclude to this ascertainment from the patriarchal sigillum of 1387<sup>529</sup>: “Whereas Chalcedon was perished many years ago and its inhabitants are few, so they do not need a bishop ... .” From all the above evidences comes up the conclusion that the Christian communities extending from Mount Olympus of Bithynia to Mount Saint Afxentios were decimated by fire and sword and massive islamization. It is undeniable that many thousands of Byzantines defected to the ranks of the Ottomans and became pillars of the new regime. But let us return to the events of 1326.

With the conquest of Bursa Osman’s dream was realized. He could now bless himself because he had experienced and enjoyed his main endeavor being crowned with success. He died just after he learned the triumphal entry of his son and successor at the city, which, as it was his kingdom’s new capital, would receive him too, a little later, dead<sup>530</sup>.

1326, the year of Bursa’s fall, is memorable in the Ottoman history for two reasons. On the one hand it means the end of Ottoman State’s founder and, on the other, notes the emergence of the clear Ottoman bourgeoisie. Bursa was the first large city of the Ottoman territory and, until the years of its siege, it was an important industrial center. Without Bursa, the metropolis of Bithynia, the Ottoman State could be likened to a headless body. Bursa had united the small towns, the nomads, bourgeoisie, rural

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<sup>529</sup> Ibid., Vol. II p. 109.

<sup>530</sup> Aşikpaşazade, eds. Istanbul p. 35. Neşri, *ZDMG* Vol. 13 p. 217. He was buried in a Byzantine church, which was converted to a Muslim mosque. Ibn Battuta Vol. II p. 322. The temple is described by Hammer, *Umblick auf einer Reise von Constantinopel nach Brussa und dem Olympos*, Pest 1818, p. 42. It is also mentioned by W. Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor*, London 1842, Vol. I p. 72. A.D. Mordtmann, who visited the city before and after the earthquake of 1855, writes that, during his second stay, a more magnificent mausoleum was under construction. As he says, “previously it was a very old and small Greek chapel, which, now, was expanded and transformed into a nice building, but the main mausoleum was reconstructed in its original form and in small size”. (Mordtmann, *Anatolien*, ed. F. Babinger, Hannover 1925, p. 351). Also cf Kandes, *Η Προβόσα* pp. 104-105. Today, Osman’s and Orhan’s mausoleum is in a garden at northeast part of the citadel, very close to the ruined Byzantine church, within which was his first tomb. Aşikpaşazade writes that Osman died at Söğüt. The English traveler W. M. Leake (*Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor*, London 1824, p. 15), who visited Bithynia in the early 19th century, preserved the information that there was a local tradition at Söğüt, according to which Osman was buried in his homeland and, at Bursa there was simple cenotaph. About the tombs of Osman and Orhan and their inscriptions, valuable is the study of Ahmed Tevhid, “İlk Altı Padişahımızın Bursa’da Kain Türbeleri” *TOEM* Vol. III (1328/1912), pp. 977-981.

regions, Christians and Muslims, in other words, all the heterogeneous elements of Bithynia in a whole, which over time was attaining a characteristic uniformity. This happened because, when the smooth communication was restored with the surrounding areas, on whose products was depending the city's industries, began to crowd to it all kinds of people, coming from both the surroundings and the outermost extremities of the Muslim world. "After the capture of Bursa", Aşıkpaşazade cites<sup>531</sup>, "Muslims who were arriving from all known and unknown locations, began to enter the city". At that time is dated the Turks' greatest migratory impact towards the west. The numerous scholars coming from the Far East spread the Quran and, with it, the Arabic language, which, as it was the language of the religion, was quickly imposed on the first Ottoman inscriptions and coins. Islam witnessed a new vigor in Bursa which was largely due to the personality of the missionaries of Islam. Besides Meğdeddin, which was immortalized by Ibn Battuta, extremely interesting is also the figure of Abdullah Murad, a dervish who came from Khorasan on the eve of Bursa's conquest and established his hermitage in a charming location of Mount Olympus, probably on the ruins of a Byzantine monastery<sup>532</sup>. After his death, the place he lived in reclusive became popular pilgrimage, to which were attributed healing properties. Legendary had also become Geyikli Baba (father of deer), who lived in the forests of Mount Olympus and, as a second St. Francis of Assisi, had the ability to charm and tame the beasts<sup>533</sup>. According to contemporary Arab writer al-Umari<sup>534</sup>, who gives the information that "numerous patients seeking treatment for paralysis, arthritis, rheumatism and other similar illnesses were going to the hot springs of Bursa", one concludes the security the travelers were moving with. The curative properties of these waters were long ago known throughout the East and, justifiably, Orhan's patient subjects wanted to be the first that would be benefited from the city's annexation.

Bursa regained its commercial vigor<sup>535</sup>, which was owed to the fact that it was located in the center of an extensive road network and a staging point for the trips from

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<sup>531</sup> Ed. Istanbul p. 29.

<sup>532</sup> Kandes, *H Ilpoússa* p. 153.

<sup>533</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154. Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I pp. 133-134, where he also talks about other anchorites of Islam in Bithynia.

<sup>534</sup> *NE* Vol. 13 p. 365. About the waters of Bursa was recently written a study by Ihsan Uzer, *Bursa sulari*, Brusa 1943.

<sup>535</sup> About the commercial traffic in the Turkish occupied Bursa see Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant* Vol. II p. 352, and Sölch, *BNJ* Vol. I pp. 302-303.

Istanbul to the interland of Anatolia<sup>536</sup>. Gradually, thanks to trade, cooperation, peaceful contact and the roads of the new capital, the sense of a community of interests and unity began to be created; and as it is known that nothing contributes more than urban centers and trade to the merge of nations, something equivalent began to happen with national consciousness. Consequently, we can say that, when Bursa passed to the hands of the Ottomans, united them into a state and nation<sup>537</sup>.

The conqueror of Bursa, Orhan, proved thoroughly equal to his father. Rarely do we encounter in history a son who continues so harmoniously and skillfully the task that was entrusted by his father. Orhan became the constructor of the state, whose solid foundation was put by Osman and his collaborators. He followed the main lines of his father's internal and foreign policy in such a way that the establishment of the new leader passed almost unnoticed. Contributory to this was also the assistance offered to the new ruler by his father's old fellow combatants and friends, with renegade Michael Köse always outstanding among them. However, their work was mainly advisory. During Orhan's long reign (1326-1362)<sup>538</sup>, each initiative always belonged to the ruler, who was the soul of the Ottoman state, because, not only in terms of capacity but also in experience, was the most appropriate to command. The long military career close to his father taught him those virtues that had raised Osman from the anonymous crowd to state founder and dynasty leader. Exactly the same virtues, namely prudence, thoroughness, persistence and patience, courage combined with wisdom and tireless energy was to raise Orhan to the position of the regulator of the Byzantine Empire's fate.

A Subsequent tradition<sup>539</sup> accounts that Orhan offered to share the royal power with his brother Alaeddin (or Ali), but he declined under the pretext that he abhors the public life and its responsibilities. However, Orhan proclaimed him *vizier*<sup>540</sup> with full

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<sup>536</sup> Taeschner, "Die Verkehrslage und das Wegenetz Anatoliens im Wandel der Zeiten", *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, year 72 (1926) p. 203 B. Idem., *Anatolische Wegenetz* Vol. I pp. 70-74, 151-153.

<sup>537</sup> Cf Taeschner, *ZDMG* f.n. Vol. 7 p. 86.

<sup>538</sup> As for the year of Orhan's death which, until recently had not determined with precision, see Charanis, *Byzantion* Vol. 13 pp. 349-351. The exact date (mid-March 687=1362) was preserved in the chronicle No. 52 of the Lambros-Amandos collection p. 89.

<sup>539</sup> See Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 101, and "Orhan" *EI* Vol. III p. 1068.

<sup>540</sup> The title derives from the Arabic word which states the porter and the assistant. This etymology first appears in Ibn Khaldun's *Mokkadimat* trans. M. de Slane, Paris 1865, Vol. II p. 4. Today it is rejected by many Orientalists, who consider that the word has Persian origins. Cf CI. Huart, *JA* 11<sup>th</sup> series vol. 9 (1917) p. 345.

jurisdiction in the state's internal organization and legislation, tasks that he thrived. According to tradition, Alaeddin was not only the first vizier and also the first to receive the title of paša<sup>541</sup>. The truth is that there is a veil of secrecy over the person of Alaeddin. First, as noted by Gibbons<sup>542</sup>, the story of power sharing looks like a naive imitation of those referred in Koran's chapter K' (verses 30-35) about Moses and Aaron. It is likely that this story was created by later Ottoman authors, who were more theologians than historians. It is not also excluded that it was emerged during Orhan's reign to cover some abnormality in succession, given that it is not clear if Alaeddin was Orhan's younger or older brother<sup>543</sup>. The fact that the old Ottoman writers exalted his generosity when he refused participation in the royal rule, which creates the impression that he was resigned from his recognized rights, advocates the version that he was older. In addition, the title of paša, which derives from baš agha<sup>544</sup>, could perhaps enhance this version, as it is known that ağa bey or paša is the name of the older brother for Turks. Another dark matter concerning the person of Alaeddin is whether he was Orhan's real brother or they were just spiritual brothers<sup>545</sup>. Against the spiritual relationship theory, two things can be viewed: first, the historians' unanimous opinion that Orhan and Alaeddin were brothers and then, the information from *Güldeste-i-riyad-i-irfan*, which is work of Ismail from Bursa<sup>546</sup>, according to which Alaeddin was buried in Osman's family mausoleum in Brusa. In addition, there is the issue whether Alaeddin can be identified with Pazarlu, mentioned by Kantakouzenos as Orhan's brother, who took part in the battle of Pelekanos<sup>547</sup>. Finally, Ibn Battuta<sup>548</sup> accounts a certain Alaeddin (al-

<sup>541</sup> About the title of paša remarkable is J. Deny's article in *EI*, Vol. III pp. 1101-1104.

<sup>542</sup> *The Foundation p. 71.*

<sup>543</sup> See K. Sussheim "Ala'al-Din pasha" *EI*, vol. I p. 249. Hammer, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 96, considers him younger than Orhan.

<sup>544</sup> J. Deny, *Grammaire de la langue turque*, § 1156, and "Pasha", in *EI*.

<sup>545</sup> This issue was raised by Giese (*ZSem* Vol. II pp. 262-264) to bolster his theory, that the founders of the Ottoman State were Akhis. If Alaeddin was Orhan's spiritual brother, then, both of them would have had Osman as *yol atası*; according to Giese's reasoning, given that Akhi Šemseddin is mentioned to be brother of his father in-law Endebali, Osman must have been an Akhi.

<sup>546</sup> Giese, *Ibid.*, pp. 262-263. Cf Kandes, *Η Προύσα* p. 105.

<sup>547</sup> Καντακουζηνός Β' 6 (Vol. I pp. 349, 361). Hammer (*Geschichte* Vol. I pp. 116, 349) without any reserve, identifies Pazarlu with Alaeddin, while Jorga (*Geschichte* Vol. I p. 162 σημ. 1), although he considers that Pazarlu is Osman's brother, he does not identifies him with Alaeddin. Since the title paša usually do not precede the name, Giese (*ibid.*, p. 262), rightly questions that the name Pazarlu may have derived from the paša Ali. Besides Pazarlu, Kantakouzenos also mentions two other names, that belong to Orhan's companions and the name of his father *Kolaouzi Saliggari* [Κολαούζη Σαλιγγαρί] and *Kategialo Patatouri* [Καταγιάλο Πατατούρη]. Probably, these names are corrupted. These two people, who are not known from anywhere else, have not been identified until now. Note that Jorga (*ibid.*, p. 166) wrongly, considers that these names denote four men and not two.

imam al haġi al-muġavir Ala'al- din), who was imam and pilgrim and, during the traveler's stay in Nicaea, he received him with many compliments and accompanied him on the visit to Orhan's wife. Ibn Battuta, who usually is very attentive to issues relevant to family ties of prominent Turks from Asia Minor, doesn't provide any other information for this imam. Therefore, it is doubtful whether Alaeddin which is mentioned by the Moroccan traveler is Orhan's brother in question<sup>549</sup>. According to the information from *Güldeste-i-riyad-i-irfan*<sup>550</sup>, Sultan Orhan's brother named Alaeddin died at Piges in the year A.H. 732 (1332). At that time, Piges was not under the Ottoman state, but certainly this does not exclude that this man had died that year in this town.

Despite the fact that the person of Alaeddin is surrounded by the legend and nothing is known about him with absolute certainty, the work that has been attributed to his initiative is, in contrast, important and fundamental for the early Ottoman State's internal organization. This work consists of the following: drafting legislation, defining of the Ottomans' attire, coinage and organization of the army. But, even if we suppose that he administered the public affairs for more than six years and lived after 1332, these reforms, overall, couldn't be only on account to him.

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<sup>548</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II p. 324.

<sup>549</sup> Giese (ibid., p. 263) and Köprülü. (*Hayat* Vol. I, 1927, issue 12 p. 2) correlated with Alaeddin the passage of al-Umari (*NE* Vol. 13 pp. 367- 368) about نيق مملكة, which was translated by Quatremère as follows: "Le souverain, nommé Ali-Bascha, este frère et voisin de Sarou-khan. Il a pour capital la ville de Nik (Nicée). Ce pays est situé au nord de celui de Tinghizlou (wr. Denizli) et au midi de سررول [=? Taeschner, p. 44, read بديل]. Ce dernier canton, place au nord, est au delà de la montagne orientale qui entoure les provinces torques et s'avance dans le mer. Le prince a sous sa domination huit villes et environ trente forteresses. Son arinée se compose de 8000 cavaliers et une nuée de fantassins, qui pour la plupart combattent avec la fleche ou le javelot. Cette province s'étend tout entière sur la crête de montagnes, audessus de nuages et les hauteurs où l'aigle établit son nid". While Quatremere was translating, he had before him the manuscript of the National Library of Paris, fonds arabe No. 2325, which is one of Šihabettin's worst manuscripts. At the نيق where sufficient punctuation was missing, Quatremere and, after him, Giese and Köprülü added punctuation and read نيق [Nicaea]. However, since Nicaea couldn't be connected with the emirate of Sarouchan, Giese was forced to correct the script اورخان to صاروخان. Although the description of the Arab author does not correspond to Nicaea at all, after the two corrections, the passage could be used in order to prove that Orhan's brother Ali pasha had held commander of Nicaea between the years 1331, when the city was occupied by the Ottomans, and 1349, when al-Umari died. However, F. Taeschner's new version of al-Umari, which is based on better manuscripts (Hagia Sophia Library 3416, and Seraglio of Topkapı, Enderun 2797,2), evidences the error. Taeschner (p. 44) read in both manuscripts نيف, which, without doubt, is Nymfaion [*Νύμφαιον*] as it is known by the Byzantines (current Nyfio [*Νυφιά*] and Nif in Turkish), a thriving town located about thirty kilometers east of Smyrna and neighbouring with the emirate of Sarouchan of the time. Consequently, the sultan of this town was Sarouchan's brother and cannot be identified with the Ottoman Ali (Alaeddin). Note that this passage, as it was represented at the Paris manuscript and at Quatremere's translation and notes, had also rose concern to Gibbons (p. 295, Nicaea) and led him to the conclusion that although they were dealing with a city called Nicaea, this Nicaea should have be sought elsewhere.

In the first place, legislation was the product of a long evolutionary process and took its final form in Mehmed the Conqueror's Kanunname<sup>551</sup>. During Orhan's era and later as well, the law in force was necessarily an amalgam of Byzantine and Islamic legal traditions. There was no established code that would be applied throughout the dominion. Under these conditions, the administration of justice depended on the judge's personality and the customary law that prevailed in local level. But meanwhile, the Muslim factor was becoming more important in proportion to the Islamization of the inhabitants which was in progress and the immigration of Muslims to the Ottoman lands. And that was until the 15th century, when the theocratic view which governs the Ottoman justice prevailed.

The regulation of the Ottoman's attire was also attributed to Alaeddin. The importance of this issue should not be underestimated. Clothing was hallmark, manifesting not only the social class, but also the nationality<sup>552</sup>. They could also be used as means of influence in order to be achieved the inhabitants' Islamization. And although Ottomans continued being tolerant, since this measure was making evident the distinction between sovereign people and Christians, it was natural to contribute to the spread of Mohammedanism. It is plausible that this was not liked by a large proportion of the indigenous population; and this is because both the national and religious feelings had softened and Bithynians had linked their fate with the fate of the Ottomans.

The 15th century Ottoman historian Aşikpaşazade<sup>553</sup> states that upon Alaeddin's suggestion, Orhan established that those who belong to the army's ranks must bear conical white colored hat. However, the Sultan and the notables (bey), in their official appearances, wore *burma dülbent*<sup>554</sup> (commonly turban), which was a long strip of cloth wrapped around their heads. Besides these, there was also another head cover,

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<sup>550</sup> Hammer *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 127. Cf Gibbons p. 72 and Giese, *ibid.*, p. 262.

<sup>551</sup> See Gibbons pp. 72-73.

<sup>552</sup> Cf Brockelmann, *Geschichte der islamischen Völker* p. 241.

<sup>553</sup> Eds. Istanbul, pp. 39-40. The relevant passage is as follows: Alaeddin paşa said to his brother Orhan Gazi: "My khan, thank God, I saw you Padişah. Now, day by day, your army must be increased. For this reason, give to your army a distinctive mark that does not exist in another army". Orhan Gazi said: "Brother, I accept everything that you do". He said: "The headgears (*burk*) of the other *Beys* are red; let your own be white". Orhan Gazi gave order and the Gazis and his retinue at Bilecik put on white *burk*. Orhan wanted to increase his army from that area. His brother said: "Confer with the Judges". Karaca Halil, who was Edebali's man, was the judge (kadi) of Bilecik at that time. He conferred with him. He told: "Gather infantrymen (*yaya*) from the people". Πολλοί people offered to the Kadi baksheesh and said: "Write me to the infantrymen". And, then, they were putting on their heads the white headgear. – Part of this narrative is quoted in Latin translation by Leunclavius, *Annciles* pp. 9-10.

<sup>554</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40 l. 10 et seq..

the so-called şöküle, which, according to Aşikpaşazade<sup>555</sup>, was worn under the white conical hat.

According to this historian's testimony, the white head cover was imposed on account of a reaction to the rulers of the surrounding areas, who wore red cover on their heads. At any rate, the fact that burqa or şöküle of the Ottomans resembles Akhis' kalansuva, cannot be considered as proof of the assertion that the Ottoman State's founders came from the ranks of akhism<sup>556</sup>. At the imitation of the Akhis' white cover, of course if it is an imitation, it is reasonable to distinguish the Ottomans' attitude to win over Akhism, by adopting its external characteristics. However, this does not mean that they were Akhis. On the contrary, it is natural to think that if they really were Akhis, be it the external, they wouldn't be willing to impose their distinguishing features to the many and unversed; and this is because exclusiveness and secrecy had always been the particular characteristics of the Brotherhood.

Therefore, the similarity with the Akhis' head cover should be interpreted in a different way. Many times, the new regimes are in need to embrace the external characteristics of other organizations or institutions, for the simple reason that they cannot exterminate them. As a convenient example, it is enough to mention the official adoption of pagan celebrations by Christianity, in the early AD centuries, when the struggle between the two worlds hadn't come to an end yet. It is possible that something similar was happening with Akhis and Ottoman leaders. Orhan had understood the power of Akhism and it was natural to consider it as dangerous. He was aware that Akhis had vowed themselves to the task of pounding the tyrants and the satellites of tyranny. In any moment they could stand against him as well, in case he conflicted with their social and political program. For the above reasons, he considered it appropriate to

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<sup>555</sup> Ibid., p. 40 l. 16 et seq.. "At the council (divan) they were wearing burma dülbent and, at the campaign (sefer) they were wearing burk. Under the burk they wore şöküle. *Question*: What is şöküle? *Answer*: Şöküle is a night headgear short at the front and long at the back side. Its inner side was covered with leather". Ibid.. – However, we must confess that this description is not clear. Doukas (ΚΓ' p. 137) is more detailed when he refers to the cover of the Janissaries "ὁ κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν γλώτταν Ῥωμαίων ζαρκουλάν λέγουσι". He says that it is, "πίλος λευκότατος, ημισφαιρὲς ὅσον χωρεῖν κεφαλὴν, ἔχον περιττεῦον ἄνωθεν τῆς κορυφῆς ὅσον καὶ σπιθαμῆς, εἰς οὐδὲν καταλήγον". But, it is not possible to verify positively whether the şöküle mentioned by Aşikpaşazade is the cover described by Doukas. Note that, according to G. Moravcsik (*Byzantinoturcica* Vol. II p. 120) ζαρκούλας = goldgestickte Haube.

<sup>556</sup> Speaking about the Greek inhabitants of Laodicea, [Λαοδίκεια], Ibn Battuta (Vol. II p. 272) says that the characteristic part of their attire was the long head cover, which was red or white. This shows how arbitrary is to assume that, by adopting the white color for their attire, the Ottomans are defined as Akhi, and how bold it is to assert that, since they had preferred the white head-cover they were members of the brotherhood.

recur to an indirect but effective measure against the political power of the brotherhood in Bithynia. Thus, by usurping the most characteristic part of their uniform, he disrupted the brotherhood's external unity and exclusivity. As we have already mentioned, at that time, great was the importance given to attire. The measure taken by Orhan can be considered highly relevant also from the aspect that it could possibly be interpreted as a compliment to Akhism. Besides, throughout Orhan's reign, the Ottoman state not even once broke with the Brotherhood. In contrast, the relations between them seemed very friendly. If there was rivalry between them, perhaps it was latent and was never manifested openly. This is due to the political sagacity of the Ottomans' supreme ruler, who knew how to handle people and circumstances in order to accomplish his purposes and disarm his potential opponents, not only with violence, but also with his noble feelings.

Another reform measure that was attributed to Alaeddin's initiative was the mintage of Ottoman coins. This action, which, according to the oldest numismatists<sup>557</sup>, took place in A.H. 729 (1328-1329), or just one year after the fall of Bursa, according to the younger Turkish researcher Ali<sup>558</sup>, was the last step which complemented the consolidation of Ottoman domination. Until that time, Seljuk and Byzantine currency were circulating in tandem<sup>559</sup>. Given that just twenty years ago the area was under Byzantine administration, the later were circulating in a larger number. The Byzantine currency that was in circulation was coming either from the inhabitants' hoards or from the loot the ransom and the tribute paid to the Ottomans. Of course this money didn't stay stagnant, but was passing from hand to hand. The circulation/proliferation of the Byzantine currency among the Ottomans is also proved by the fact that their first coins were named akçe (ak = white + çe, hypocoristic suffix), imitating the Byzantine aspra [ἀσπρα].

Investigating the first minted akçe, we notice that some of them bear date and some others not. On the front side of most undated coins we see inscribed the sign/type of faith (la-allah-ul-allah, Mohammed re'sul Allah) and, around it, the names of the first

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<sup>557</sup> S. Lane-Poole, "On the Weights and Denominations of Turkish Coins", *Numismatic Chronicle*, 3<sup>rd</sup> series Vol. II (1882) p. 167. Ismail Galip, *Takvimi meskukâti osmaniye*, Istanbul 1307, p. 4. J. Allan, "Para", *EI* Vol. III p. 1096.

<sup>558</sup> In his article "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ilk Sikkeleri ve ilk Akçeleri", *TOEM* Vol. 8 (1334/1918) pp. 355-375, particularly pp. 356-357.

<sup>559</sup> Babinger, in his article "Orhan", *EI* Vol. III p. 1068, speaks only about the circulation of Seljuk coins.

four caliphs. On the reverse side there is the name of the Sultan ارخان with the wish khallada'llah-u mulkahu (= May God extend his sovereignty endlessly). Neither was his father's name indicated, nor was the place that they were minted<sup>560</sup>. But there is also another type of undated coin of the same period. On this coin is mentioned "Orhan the greatest Sultan, son of Osman" (al-sultan al-azem Orhan ibn Osman) which is followed by the same wish<sup>561</sup>. On the front side of the dated coins that are rarer, is also bore the type of faith, but without the names of the four caliphs<sup>562</sup>. On the reverse side are inscribed the names Orhan and Osman and, below them, the word Bursa. The date 727 is indicated fully written in Arabic script, written in a circle around the main inscription. The currency of Orhan was always silver<sup>563</sup>. During Orhan's reign some military reforms were realized, but they didn't imply revolutionary innovations. The institution of devşirme, which became one of the most peculiar characteristics of the Ottoman Empire, is undoubtedly subsequent to Alaeddin and Orhan and was implemented long after the settlement of the Ottomans in Europe<sup>564</sup>.

The improvement of the Ottoman troops that took place between Osman's first incursions and the Battle of Pelekanos (1329) should be attributed more to the overall development of the Ottoman nation/people, rather than to Orhan's or his advisor Allaeddin's individual initiative.

First, the transition of part of the Ottomans from nomadic to agricultural life significantly contributed to the creation of a more regular and disciplined army; because, while nomad warriors aimed mostly at looting, farmers, being in a superior

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<sup>560</sup> One of the well preserved akçe of this type is depicted on the cover of this study. It is taken from the aforementioned work of Galip, pl. A' No. 2. relatively, see σχετικά Ali, *ibid.*, p. 369, and Galip, *ibid.*, p. 3.

<sup>561</sup> Ali, *ibid.*, p. 363.

<sup>562</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 356.

<sup>563</sup> Jorga is mistaken writing in *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 162 that, after Osman's death and since the Ottoman rule had expanded, überall wurden seine Goldmünzen gern angenommen. Golden coins were minted after the Fall, by Mehmet the Conqueror (Lane-Poole, *Ibid.*, p. 167). Silver were also the coins that Orhan had sent to Ibn Battuta as a gift on his arrival at Bursa. (*Voyages* Vol. II p. 321). This is the first reference about circulation of Ottoman coins.

<sup>564</sup> Gibbons, pp. 117-119. Cf Giese, *ibid.*, pp. 264-268. The establishment of the Janissaries battalion was attributed to Orhan, based on the information of Sa'deddin Vol. I p. 42, and this view had prevailed almost overall. See Χάμμερ, *Geschichte* Vol. I p. 106, and Paparrigopoulos Vol. 5 A pp. 177-181. However, Hasluck (*Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* Vol. II pp. 487-493) asserted by very serious arguments that the correlation of Hacı Bektaş and Orhan with the organization of the Janissary battalion has mythical character, since the battalion in question is not did not exist before the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Cf Langer-Blake *AHR* Vol. 37 (1932) p. 497. Hasluck believes that the Janissaries were organized as an institution not earlier than the 15<sup>th</sup> century and that it should not be confused with the sulran's garrison, which consisted by captives and was an older institution. See above, pp. 107-108.

level of civilization and having altars and hearths to defend, were more loyal and had better knowledge about the assets of discipline and joint action than nomads. Therefore, while the rich booty was gradually exhausted and nomadic element was declining both numerically and qualitatively, Osman began to recruit farmers whenever it was imposed by the exigencies. The army which consisted of peasants, over time, became the main force of the Ottoman State<sup>565</sup>; and that was precisely because it represented that very class of residents, whose material interests were closely connected with the Ottoman dominance.

The strength of this army was progressively becoming larger, because Osman and later his successor, by using the Byzantine institution of *stratiotopia* (*στρατιωτόπια*), began to grant land to their old comrades in return for their obligation to take up arms when necessary. In this way, the most combative element of the Ottoman nation was settled in the land. The best fiefs/timars, the so-called *has* and *zeamet*, were granted to the military aristocracy, which emerged from the continuous wars<sup>566</sup>. *Hases*, at the same time, involved administrative authority within the province they were located and thus, the senior timariots/fief holders became the local representatives of the sultan. *Zeamets* were the estates which attributed an annual income of at least 20.000 akçe and were granted to eminent troops, but without providing them a general political jurisdiction. Feudal lords were undertaking to maintain, at their expense, a number of soldiers proportional to the value of their land.

Another, more populous warrior class<sup>567</sup>, *sipahi*, which constituted the permanent Ottoman cavalry, had also began to settle in the land, taking less valuable land in return for their military service. These estates were usually transferred from father to son, always with the same military commitments. Sipahis, mostly, were not subjected to the nearest feudal lord, but were independent farmers, accountable only to the sultan and later to the beylerbey. Thus, was avoided the potential for creation of

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<sup>565</sup> The English historian Paul Rycaut (*The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*, London 1687, p. 83), writing upon the Turkish military estates [*στρατιωτόπια*], calls their holders “the great backbone of the Turkish Empire”, which resembles Pachymeres who had used a similar phrase for the Akritae of the Byzantine State: “νεύρα πολέμου τόν σφόν πλούτον έχουσι” - *Μιχαήλ Α' 5*, p. 181. 1.

<sup>566</sup> See J. Deny, “Timar”, *EI* Vol. 4 p. 807-816.

<sup>567</sup> By the mid-17<sup>th</sup> century, Rycaut, who knew well the Turkish things, writes (*ibid.*, p. 86) that the sanjak of Chountavenkiar (of Bursa) had 42 *zeamet* and *khas*, and 1.005 timars of *sipahi*. These numbers must have been much more smaller during the reign of Orhan. However, they give an idea of the ratio between large and small feudal lords. For extensive comments about the sipahis see Rycaut, *ibid.*, pp. 88-90.

powerful feudal lords who could overthrow the kingdom or impose their will on the monarch, as was frequently happening in the West and the Byzantine State.

Beside the military feudalism were also flourishing on the one hand the old middle peasantry and, on the other hand, the small landholdings which had recently emerged. Both, these very important categories of peasants, emerged as considerable factors after the collapse of the Byzantine authority in Bithynia. There is no indication that the military feudalism came into conflict with the indigenous peasants. On the contrary, it seems likely that the relations of these two groups were good, especially given that the first sultans, who were feudal lords as well, were acting as counterforce not allowing *has* and *zeamet* holders to absorb smaller estates and, thus become dangerous rivals to the throne. Furthermore, since Bithynia was very fertile and sparsely populated area, the motivations that could drive feudal lords' greed against the smaller peasants were missing. The cultivable lands and fruit trees were available to anyone who wanted to profit from them. In peacetime rural areas could take in many thousands of young peasants without incur of living space issues and without manifestation of conflicts and predatory intentions. For the above reasons, the cohabitation of Turks and natives was peaceful since the time that Ottomans began to settle in the land.

The organization of the army consisting of peasants contributed to further limitation of the nomadic element, which constituted the first forces of Osman. Thus, more and more nomads were turning to agriculture. In this way, the living material, which the Ottoman power was based on, became more regular and the state that had come from nomads and was uncertain and unstable until the end of the 13th century, had now rooted to the earth and become a solid and unwavering structure.

Apart from the militant peasants and the warriors that were entitled to a share, there was also a small standing army, consisted of the ruler's personal guard, the so-called kapukulu. From this royal guard, which was strengthened with new people, after years of development, emerged the first units of the Ottoman infantry, *yaya* and *azab*. While *yayas* were the heavier armored infantry, *azabs* (the word means *unmarried, virgin*) were younger and lighter armed, corresponding to the *akıncıs* of the cavalry<sup>568</sup>.

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<sup>568</sup> About the Ottoman army, the work of Ahmet Djevad bey, *État militaire ottoman depuis la fondation de l'Empire jusqu' à nos jours*, Istanbul 1882, is still very useful. About the Ottoman army during Orhan's reign, see pp. 18-20. Also, Halil Ganem, *Les Sultans ottomans*, Paris 1901, Vol. I p. 39, and [H.

*Akıncıs* were assault battalions, consisted of volunteers who were not paid with regular salary but were compensated by sharing the loot of war. The leadership of the *akıncıs* was hereditary transferred to Michael Köse's family<sup>569</sup>.

During the third decade of the 14th century, the military organization of the Ottomans had progressed so, that during the siege of Nicomedia in 1330, Kantakouzenos<sup>570</sup> incidentally accounts that Orhan had used siege machines against the city walls.

As regards the numerical strength of the Ottoman troops, Orhan's contemporary Sihabeddin al-Umari<sup>571</sup> (+ 1349) gives us the information that the sultan had 25,000 cavalymen in combat readiness and that their total number could arise to 40,000. According to the Arab writer's information, infantrymen were "countless", which can be interpreted that, until then, there wasn't systematically organized infantry. Paradoxically, noted that al-Umari doesn't know things from autopsy, he doesn't have good information regarding Orhan's power. He refers that, "his troops<sup>572</sup> had a very low rate of militancy and was more dreadful in appearance than in reality". However, he adds that, Orhan, whose borders extend to the Straits of Istanbul, is in constant war with the King of the Romans<sup>573</sup>. "In the combats they conduct [the Ottomans], victory favors more often the Turkish ruler, who is the most annoying and dangerous enemy for the Romans".

From al-Umari we are led to the conclusion that, even after the improvements that were made by Orhan, cavalry had remained, as before, the basis of the Ottoman power and infantry was of secondary importance. When the battle was on, the light armed cavalymen (*akıncı*) preceded. *Akıncı* constituted the first Ottoman forces used by the Ottomans, as they were used by the older Turks, to carry out their raids. As a

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Smith Williams], *The History of the Turkish Empire - The Historian's History of the World*, London 1907, Vol. 24 pp. 315-318.

<sup>569</sup> Babinger "Mikhaloghlu" *EI* Vol. III p. 562, and Huart "Akıncı" *ibid.*, Vol. I p. 243.

<sup>570</sup> B' 24 (Vol. I p. 447). This fact had also affected Giovio, who says about Orhan: "fu copioso et ingegno so nell' apparecchio di guerra, inventando nuove machine et Bombarde". From Sansovino, *Historia universale dell' origine et imperio de Turchi*, Venice 1568, p. 216v.

<sup>571</sup> *NE* Vol. 13 pp. 339, 364.

<sup>572</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 364.

<sup>573</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 340.

general rule<sup>574</sup> they were moving with rapid maneuvers, falling unexpectedly over their opponents from several directions. Usually, they were divided into small groups, hitting from distance with their bows, withdrawing and coming back until confusion was caused to the hostile front, whose main force was constituted by heavily armed infantry, which was protected by cavalry. Immediately after the *akıncıs* and in combination with them, were coming the more organized *Sipahis* who, with their heavy armor and coordinated commandship, were inflicting decisively strikes against the enemy<sup>575</sup>. With this tactics which had designated Osman winner in Vafeas, Orhan defeated the imperial forces in Pelekanos.

This battle, which had particular importance for both the Ottoman State and the Byzantine Empire, wasn't mentioned at all by the Ottoman historians. However, it constitutes turning point in the history of the Near East; because if the former obscure leader defeated at Vafeas the Byzantine troops which came out to meet him, at Pelekanos, the son of this leader met with the Emperor of the Romans, who had expeditioned against him and forced him to withdraw stricken/humiliated from the battle. Therefore, after this battle, which took place 124 years before the fall of Constantinople, the Ottoman State occupies a special place among the emirates in Asia Minor, because he emerges as rival of the Byzantine Empire, which he defeats before the gates of itself the Queen of cities.

In 1328, the Ottomans, taking advantage of the civil war between the two Andronikos and the abnormal situation which prevailed in the Aegean due to the Turkish raids<sup>576</sup>, while knowing that they had nothing to fear from the side of Nicaea

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<sup>574</sup> Gregoras E' 5 (Vol. I p. 139): “ου συστάδην τήν μάχην ποιούμενοι, αλλά συχνώς εναλλασσομένην, ως έθος αυτοίς, νότα γάρ δεικνύουσι φεύγειν δοκούντες, είτα επαναστρέφουσι τάχιστα και συχνά τούτο ποιούντες διατελούσιν, ως άν τήν των αντιπάλων στρατοπέδων τάξιν ταραττώσι και της στάσεως εξιστώσι, κάπειτα ούτω τεταραγμένοις επεισπίπτοντες ράστα κατατροπούνται”. Cf Attaleiates p. 156 and Doukas ΚΓ' p. 133.

<sup>575</sup> Bertrandon de la Broquière (*Voyage d'outre-mer*, ed. Ch. Schéfer p. 220) notes that one hundred Christian soldiers make more noise than ten thousand Ottomans when the signal of departure is given. The foundations of this army were put during Orhan's reign, a century before the time of the French traveler.

<sup>576</sup> We learn about the extent of the Turkish emirates' pirate action from a letter of Marco Grandenigo, reported by Marino Sanudo (Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos* Vol. II p. 313). Writing from Euboea in September 1328, Grandenigo points that, since the Turkish population had already increased in an admirable way, if appropriate measures are not taken, the Turks will become masters of Euboea and the other Aegean islands. In a letter of 1325 Marino Sanudo mentions “Turchos et alias gentes malas, quae per mare transeunt, per quosque principatus Amoreae et suorum subtitorum insulae graviter molestantur” (ibid., Vol. II p. 292). Cf F. Kunstmann, “Studien über Marino Sanudo den älteren mit einem Anhang

and Nicomedia, invaded for the third time Mesothynia<sup>577</sup> and thereby, took the theater of war at a distance of only fifty kilometers from the seat of the Empire. The new king Andronikos III, who, as we saw above, was always indicating the need for a more effective policy against the Ottomans, as soon as he ascended the throne, he decided to assume in person the battle against them, making an expedition for the salvation of Nicaea<sup>578</sup>.

But, before any other action, he considered appropriate to conclude peace with the ruler of Karasu and the Bulgarians<sup>579</sup>. For this purpose he sailed to Cyzicus on the pretext that he goes to worship the *αχειροποίητος* icon of Virgin Mary at Artaki. From this, it is evident that, from the beginning, he wanted to keep his movements secret, in order Orhan to be taken up unprepared. From Artaki he headed to Piges, where, after prior communication, had also arrived Demir-Han<sup>580</sup>, the prince of Karasu (according to Kantakouzenos, Tamirchanis, the ruler of Phrygia), and concluded a treaty of friendship and non-aggression. A treaty of wider extent, which was equivalent to a coalition against Serbia, already existed with the king of the Bulgarians Michael III, who had met with Andronikos in a village called Krimnoi and was located between Sozopoli and Anchialos.

After these diplomatic successes, Andronikos III was prepared for the expedition. In May 1329, troops were gathered hastily and only from the nearby provinces, in order to ensure secrecy as far as possible. After they were gathered in

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seiner ungedruckten Briefe”, *Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* Vol. 7 (1855), pp. 743-744. Gregoras, in a letter to Alexios Philanthropenos refers to a Turkish inroad against Mytilene in 1334. Ed. by R. Guiland, *Correspondance de Nicéphore Grégoras*, Paris 1927, p. 167. The inroads went on and culminated in the mid 14<sup>th</sup> century. In 1340 Admiral Apokafchos [*Απόκαυχος*] said to Kantakouzenos (B’ 38 p. 537): “οίσθα γάρ ως ήδη και αυτοί [οι Τούρκοι] στόλοις όλοις χρώμενοι, νήσους τε ήδη εξηνδραποδίσαντο σχεδόν, και προς Θράκιην περαιούμενοι και την άλλην Μακεδονίαν, ου μήν αλλά και Ελλάδα και Πελοπόννησον κακώς ποιούσιν”. About the same are included in Pope Clement III’s letter to the Doge of Venice (1345). The letter was published by M.C. Faure, in his study “Le Dauphin Humbert II à Venise et en Orient”, *Mélanges d’Archéologie et d’Histoire* Vol. 27 (1907) p. 546. In order to reduce the naval action of the Turkish rulers a Crusade was attempted by Umberto II. Relatively see D.A. Zakythinos, *Le Despotat Grec de Morée*, Paris 1932, p. 92.

<sup>577</sup> The Ottomans had carried out inroads against Mesothynia [*Μεσοθυνία*] in 1301 and 1308. While the first was connected with the battle of Vapheus, the second brought them until the Black Sea and the Bosphorus.

<sup>578</sup> Gregoras Θ’ 9 (Vol. I p. 433).

<sup>579</sup> Kantakouzenos B’ 5 (Vol. I p. 339-341).

<sup>580</sup> The information given by Jorga (*Geschichte* Vol. I p. 164) that Demir Khan was Osman’s subject and, at the same time, member of his house has no base. - Regarding the rulers of Karasu, significant is the study of J.H. Mordtmann, “Über das türkische Fürstengeschlecht der Karasi in Mysien”, *Sitzungsberichte der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Classe*. 1911, pp. 2-7.

Constantinople, they advanced to Skoutarion, across Byzantium<sup>581</sup>. The King called the Commander of Mesothynia Protokynegos\* [πρωτοκυνηγός] Kontofre<sup>582</sup> for cooperation. According to the witness of Kantakouzinus<sup>583</sup>, he was considered experienced in the wars against Turks. Perhaps, the task of clearing the ground from the Ottoman invaders who, around 1308, had arrived to the fortresses of Iero and Aetos, should be attributed to him. This man prompted the king to rush in order to catch the Ottomans before they withdraw to more mountainous areas, according to their nomadic habit. Meanwhile, when the Ottomans were informed of the Byzantine's preparations, were consolidated/grouped and organized in rough terrain, very appropriate, both for the defense of their infantry and the abrupt cavalry charges. Kantakouzenos accounts that Orhan was pinning more hopes on this fortified site than on his available forces. Gregoras was putting these forces approximately at around 8,000 men and, according to the same historian, the Byzantines had 2,000 select fighters, while the rest and larger part of the army was consisted of "vulgar and brutal" men, having obvious will to distort the combat, since they were thinking to flee before they come into contact with the enemy<sup>584</sup>. Obviously, the haste the troops were gathered with, explains their inferiority.

After having traveled two days road, on the third day, Andronikos' forces arrived before the enemy. They spent the night at Pelekanos (near to current Maltepe), location where Alexius Comnenos had his base, during the operations for the liberation of Nicaea from the Crusaders, in 1097. There, a war council was established and was decided not to risk before the Ottoman positions but to limited to a simple show of strength. If the Ottomans fall into battle they would fight, otherwise they would return to Constantinople. On the basis of this plan, the next morning, the Byzantine army

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<sup>581</sup> Kantakouzenos B' 6 (Vol. 1 p. 342).

\* [T.N.] The first hunter of the emperor.

<sup>582</sup> Jorga (ibid., p. 165) considers that, this Contofre was one of the Catalans. However, it is not possible to have come at Anatolia with the Catalan Company because Kontofre family is known since the time of Ioannes Vatatzes, when a certain Manuel Contofre is mentioned as prince and duke of Thema Thrakision [Θέμα Θρακησίων]. (Ακροπολίτης, ed. Heisenberg, pp. 59, 66. *Acta et diplomata graeca* Vol. 4 p. 249, 250, 252. Cf Dölger, *Regesten*, No. 1769 and 1770, 3<sup>rd</sup> issue, p. 18).

<sup>583</sup> Although Kantakouzenos is a valuable source about the battle of Pelekanos because he was an eye-witness, he should be used with caution. In his detailed description of the battle, (B' 6-8, Vol. I pp. 341-363), sometimes there are passages which require more clarification, at other passages his motivations are not always disclosed and, overall, one gets the impression that he wants to hide things. Unlike Kantakouzenos, the other historians (Gregoras, Frantzes, Chalcocondeles) are much more laconic: Γρηγοράς Θ' 9 (Vol. I pp. 433-437), Frantzes A' 7 pp. 41-43, Chalcocondyles A' 11 p. 23, eds. Bonn.

arrayed as if it was going to give battle and so did Orhan. He took position on a lift and, from that spot, surrounded by three hundred select mounted archers, gave the starting signal of battle attacking against the Byzantines. Part of his army had occupied other important spots, while another part was hidden in nearby ravines in order to attack from ambush, in case that the Byzantines approached. According to these broad lines, the tactics followed by Orhan's forces was that, applied by his father in the past. As we have already mentioned, this practice was based, on the one hand, on attacking suddenly, violently and irrepressibly against the opponent and, on the other hand, on avoiding melees, on shooting against the enemy troops while leaving and attacking again as soon as they were withdrawing or encamping.

The King had also gathered his and he gathered his select numbering three hundred men as well. According to those mentioned by Kantakouzenos, the king gave the standard speech before the battle: "Be proved brave men and restore the lost glory of our ancestors ... We are fighting for freedom and each one for his country...". Then, followed the attack of Byzantines, which, according to Kantakouzenos' words, forced Ottomans to flee. But, it cannot be excluded that, this flee was part of a plan organized by Orhan, because he probably aimed at applying the aforementioned tactics. Shortly afterwards, the Byzantines were forced to stop the chase in order to regroup and receive reinforcements.

Then Andronikos' troops proceeded to a second attack. Turks resisted bravely, but suffered new losses and withdrew to their fortified posts. However, the battle continued without respite. As mentioned by Gregoras, following the example of the Ottomans, the Byzantines were divided into small groups and kept on attacking until fatigue began to exert their strengths. At this point, Orhan unleashed his big attack. The forces which were under the command of great etereiarches Exotrochos and had undertaken the main burden of the Byzantine attack were sidelined and replaced by others, under the leadership of great *στρατοπεδάρχης* (camp commander) Michael Tagaris. At sundown took place an insistent battle, which involved more forces under the direct command of the king, having as deputies Ioannes Aggelos at the left and Kantakouzenos at the right wing. If you believe the latter, since Ottomans were chased almost to Orhan's feet, the victory of the Byzantines was complete. While 150

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<sup>584</sup> Γρηγοράς Θ' 9 (vol. 1 α 433).

Ottomans were killed, not anyone was killed at the Byzantine side and only few were injured.

At this point ends the first phase of the battle, because the king withdrew his troops, considering that it wouldn't be advantageous to attack the hill where Orhan was at. Thus, during one day, Orhan would only succeed to lure the Byzantines at attacks in difficult terrain, fact which caused their fatigue.

The numbers of losses, as recorded by Kantakouzenos, is not possible not to cause consternation. During the hitherto battle, accounts Kantakouzenos, fell more than four hundred Ottomans and only one Greek. The number of injured is not mentioned, but we understand from Kantakouzenos' narration that it was much larger in Orhan's than in Andronikos' ranks. If the battle was so hard and the war rage so intense from both sides, then these numbers seem very unlikely. But if the number of casualties is accurate, then we easily conclude that it wasn't about a tough fight but just skirmishes, in which none of the opponents had remarkable success. Probably, the four hundred dead Ottomans were coming from the mounted scouts, the *akıncı*, whose preordination was to attract the first arrows of the enemy and create confusion in his ranks. For the Ottomans it wasn't of significant importance how many of these riders would be killed. And if we assume that Kantakouzenos hides his losses, then we have the testimony of the most impartial Nikiforos Gregoras, who accounts that towards the end of the day the Byzantine army didn't have fewer losses than the Ottoman, but it was fighting bravely and successfully pushing the attacks back. In that case, how can we explain Andronikos' and his consultant Kantakouzenos' subsequent behavior?

While the balance hadn't tipped in favor of the one or the other front and the hopes of the Byzantines were not dashed, a second war council was established and was accepted Kantakouzenos' proposal to gather the troops during the night and leave for the City in the morning. What was the reason for this hasty departure? If Orhan had been defeated, as Kantakouzenos alleges, then why was he considered so dangerous? If again we take as fact that Kantakouzenos biased in favor of his side and admit that Orhan had neither defeated nor been defeated, how to explain the Byzantines' departure from the battle? Of course, Orhan, according to his known tactics, could send his riders in small groups and harass the Byzantine army falling unexpectedly on it, where it was not expected. But since the Byzantines had successfully and without serious losses

repulsed the Ottoman forces, which were always following the same tactics, then this probability wouldn't be adequate to force men like Andronikos III and John Kantakouzenos to suddenly change their mind and leave without effect (ἀπρακτοι) and with so much haste.

From their prior action it is clear that these men weren't lacked in martial virtues or experience on the military things. The purpose of the expedition wasn't to exchange bickering with Orhan and withdraw leaving the matter unfinished, but to save Nicaea. If fearing attack from the rear didn't consider expedient to circumvent/turn Orhan traversing towards Nicomedia and Nicaea, or if they didn't have vessels ready to transfer their troops to the coast across Bithynia, near Kivotos or Piles, especially since their army hadn't suffered heavy losses, at least they could attempt a second attack against Ottomans. They could also have sent and call from Istanbul the ships by which they crossed Bosphorus, to disembark on the coast across Bithynia and, from there, either to rush to give help at Nicaea, where they wanted to reach much earlier than Orhan, or to force him to walk away from his positions and make fight on grounds much more suitable for the Byzantine forces.

But, they didn't any of these and after having stroke up *παϊάνισαν* as if they had won, they permanently withdrew from the battle. This was the first and last time that a Byzantine emperor took up arms against the Ottomans to defend Asia Minor. And without having been soundly defeated, they left the battle<sup>585</sup>.

Unfortunately, although Kantakouzenos gives rich detail, he falls short in the etiological part of his history, and this is because, primarily, he wants to justify his and his associates' actions. Gregoras, again, says nothing about the war councils and the decisions taken by them. Consequently, uncertain remains the reason that forced the king to order withdrawal towards the City. At any rate, we must admit that the decision to return to Constantinople was unjustified, either we accept that the losses of the Byzantines were larger than those cited by Kantakouzenos, or we embrace the naive

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<sup>585</sup> E. Pears, *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. 4, ed. 1923 p 662, ed. 1936 p. 661, does not narrate the events of the battle comprehensively. He says that Andronicos met Orhan at Pelecanos and defeated him. While the Byzantine troops were departing, the Ottomans dragged our soldiers into battle, caused disaster at their ranks, etc. – First, it is not about two separate battles, but for two phases of the same battle. These two phases were developed according to the Ottoman plan and the known tactics, namely with attacks which occurred first by the *Akıncı*-s and then by *Şipahi*-s and *yaya*-s. Secondly, Andronicos did not overfight. And this, because, after the first phase, Orhan remained at his positions and was the master of the state of affairs, while the Byzantines failed to fulfil their objectives.

aspect which is deduced from Kantakouzenos' narrative, namely that the successes the Byzantines had attained against the Ottomans through the two attacks they carried out, were enough, so to leave pleased with the results. The objective was Orhan's ouster and strengthening Nicaea; any deviation from this aim, if not a result of defeat, tantamount to giving up the battle.

The second phase of the battle consists of Ottoman attacks against the Byzantines who were retreating, until the time they disbanded them utterly. While the Byzantine troops were on course, the enemy detachments were realizing continuous surprising attacks. At first, the counterattack against the Ottomans was assumed only by some "young men, with unstoppable impetus", but soon the scramble was generalized in the whole army. The King was slightly wounded to the thigh by an arrow and Kantakouzenos ran the risk of losing his life, when his horse was killed. From these facts we speculate that both weren't seeking to avoid risk. In those critical circumstances, was also distinguished the Bulgarian born Sevastopoulos and his cavalymen. But the Turk's old tactics were implemented again and Orhan's cavalymen caused general confusion and severe losses. Andronikos III alerted protostrator (head of the royal grooms) to have ships at Bosphorus ready for boarding the army, while agents of his deposed grandfather were spreading rumors that the king, having been heavily wounded, was facing death<sup>586</sup>. Because of these rumors panic was caused and the army demanded immediate return to Constantinople. At the same time, the Ottoman forces were following the Byzantine army throughout the night, attacking from the rear and the sides. Meanwhile, Andronikos III, after trying in vain to hold back the panic and escapes, departed secretly to the City, although both Kantakouzenos and Gregoras state that his wound was not serious.

The bulk of the army sought protection within the walls of four forts on the coast of Propontis - Filokrini, Nikitiata, Dakivyza and Ritzio. But, at the same time, the rumors about the wound, the death or escape of the King were circulating with increasing intensity and from moment to moment, panic were taking larger dimensions. Gregoras and Georgios Frantzis who follows him, attribute to that panic the complete collapse of the Byzantine army. Gregoras cites that, while many were trampled and drawn trying to board at boats, others were killed by jumping out off the walls.

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<sup>586</sup> Cantacouzenos B' 8 (Vol. I p. 359).

According to this historian, Orhan had occupied the most critical points of the roads that lead to the city. For this reason the defeated believed that their only salvation was fleeing by sea and thronged rushing towards the inadequate boats that were ashore. The next morning, Orhan who was following the Byzantines, caught up a part of the retreating army out of Filokrini and crashed it. Among the fallen were Kantakouzenos' two nephews, Manuel Tarchaneiotes and Nikiforos Kantakouzenos and also the great eparch Exotrochos. The remains of the Byzantine army were gathered near Filokrini, walked to Skoutáron and, from there, passed to Istanbul.

At a short distance from the unfortunate battlefield was situated the fortress of Dakivyze [*Δακιβύζη*], where Ioannes IV Laskaris had spent his life in the darkness of prison; he had treacherously and unjustly been dethroned by the founder of Paleologos royal house, who caused so much suffering in Asia Minor. If Andronikos III had been thinking of the past, as had done before his namesake grandfather, who had come to those lands to console the unfortunate Ioannes<sup>587</sup>, he may have brought in his memory the conditions under which the head of the dynasty, Michael IX, by his misguided policies, prepared the submission of Bithynia to the Ottomans.

These were the conditions under which was conducted the Battle of Pelekanos, which lasted about a day, in June<sup>588</sup> 1329, and thus ended the last attempt of the Paleologos to draw the Ottomans away from Bithynia. Byzantium had committed the mistake to allow them first to settle permanently and secondly to occupy Bursa, which, as seen above, helped maximally to the consolidation of their state. If Byzantium had acted in time, according to Andronikos the Younger's suggestions, the chances to defeat the Ottoman forces would certainly be higher. Since the thin forces of monk Ilarion had managed to draw the Ottomans away from Kianos bay, someone could reasonably claim that sending regular troops and distributing them in prominent locations of Bithynia, would hinder their expansion to the north or at least would have significantly slowed it down. Meanwhile, the appeasement of the countryside would effect the improvement of communications and Bursa, Nicaea and the other cities would regain their old prosperity. Besides the above, the restoration of communications would have put an end to the spiritual isolation of Bithynia, the unpleasant past and political divisions of the last century would have been forgotten and this very Greek edge of Asia Minor

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<sup>587</sup> Gregoras ΣΤ' 2 (Vol. I pp. 173-174). Pachymeres, *Ανδρόνικος Α'* 36 p. 103.

wouldn't have been lost. Maybe, even the whole course of the Byzantine history would have been changed.

But to make these, Bithynia should have been converted into a permanent camp before Bursa had fall to the hands of the Ottomans. A Byzantine victory, no matter how decisive it would be, wouldn't effect complete destruction of the Ottoman State. This state which had stand up throughout the Catalan expedition and had survived the great Mongol invasion could not disappear after one or even more defeats. Its leaders, old nomads and bandits, could easily retreat to the mountains; from there, by conducting guerilla warfare would bring the Byzantine troops to a very difficult position. By their tactics to assemble secretly their followers, they had the ability to conduct surprising attacks against the Byzantines and inflict crucial blows on them. Even before the battle of Vafeas, only one hundred cavalymen who had used this tactics was enough to disband Mouzalon's forces and sow panic in Nicomedia<sup>589</sup>. Similarly, after the possible victory of the Byzantines, while the countryside would still be exposed to the Ottoman raids, the cities, no matter how secured they were against threats, would suffer from the impact of the unstable situation in the countryside.

From the above we conclude that a possible victory of the Byzantines in the year 1329 would neither defeat the Ottomans nor would result any radical change in Bithynia. Things in Bithynia could take another turn only if the eventual victory was accompanied by the settlement of permanent guards across the country and if, at the same time, was achieved a general reconstruction of the peasantry and especially reestablishment of the Akritas institution. However, these accounts are done in retrospect // 'ex post'. At the time when the Ottomans became dominants of Bithynia, Byzantium was tottering by various political and religious clashes, on the one hand, and struggling to rescue the remnants of the Empire from the threats coming from many and various enemies in Europe on the other. Nobody was taking care for reforms. But the time for reforms had passed. The state was now steadily on course to the ultimate decline. In Asia Minor, which once was the solid mass on which the Empire was based, now was surviving only Nicomedia and Nicaea, a narrow strip of land along Hellespont, and more southern Philadelphia, the city that was meant to be the last bastion of Byzantine Hellenism in Asia, since it fall only in 1391.

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<sup>588</sup> “Ιουνίου μηνός ἐνισταμένου”, Kantakouzenos p. 348 l. 14.

The peasantry of the old thema (province) of Opsikion, which had for many years severed from Istanbul, had linked its fate with the Ottomans and become the main basis of their state. For this reason, it was destined the two major cities of Bithynia to fall into Orhan's hands and no battle could change the course of history. If Andronikos III had emerged victorious in the battle of Pelecanos, his victory would have no other effect than slow the fall of Nicaea and Nicomedia. The organization of a permanent defense of Bithynia exceeded the capacities of the Byzantine Empire.

The conquest of Nicaea took place almost two years later, on March 2, 1331, as a result of the Ottoman victory at Pelecanos. As in the case of Bursa, the Byzantine historians, who represent the public opinion of Constantinople and rarely deal with Bithynia, are limited in mentioning incidentally and only in a few words the fall of the city<sup>590</sup>. These few information given by those historians can be completed by drawing from other sources, simultaneous or subsequent.

First, from the account given by Ibn Battuta<sup>591</sup>, who visited Nicaea two years after its conquest and remained there for forty days, we conclude that this city was surrendered peacefully to the Ottomans. Its walls, that once were considered unconquerable by Alexios Komnenos<sup>592</sup>, and Andronicos Comnenos hadn't succeed to

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<sup>589</sup> Pachymeres, *ibid.*, Δ' 25 p. 332.

<sup>590</sup> Gregoras Θ' 13 (Vol. I p. 458): “Εν τούτω τω χρόνω καί Νίκαιαν εἶλον οἱ βάρβαροι, τό μέγα καί περιβόητον ἄστυ, λιμῶ καί στρατῶ πολιορκηθεῖσαν μακρῶ”. Frantzes Α' 7 p. 43. Chalcocondyles Α' 11-12 pp. 23-24. Kantakouzenos keeps silent about the loss of Nicaea. The exact date of this essential, until recently, was not known. While Gregoras, numbers the fall of the city among other events of 1330 or 1331, Frantzes reports that Amir [αμηράς], a few days after [the battle of Pelecanos] had also become ruler of the city of Nicaea. The Ottoman historians are equally unclear regarding the date of Nicaea's conquest. Idris, Nešri and Sa'deddin, like Gregoras, mention it among other events of 1330 or 1331, while Ašikpašazade and Ali (in Leunclavius, *Annales* p. 10) among the events of the year 1333. From the younger historians, Hammer, Pears and Gibbons admit the year 1329, Cantemir (Fr. trans. 1743, p. 69), Gibbon, Herzberg, Heyd, Zinkeisen and Jorga the year 1330, Rasmussen the year 1331 and Leunclavius (*Historiae* p. 194) the year 1335. The last *Histoire* of Diehl-Oeconomos-Guilland-Grousset contradicts writing, in p. 301, that Nicaea was occupied in 1329 and, 1331 in p. 246. But, the aforementioned two short chronicles about Bursa, that were published, mention that Nicaea surrendered in the year ζωλθ' (1331). Another chronicle from the same collection is more detailed: “μηνὶ Μαρτίῳ β' ἡμερᾶς ἰδ' ἡμέρα Σαββάτο ἐπαρελαβῶθη (sic) ἡ μεγαλόπολις Νίκαια παρὰ τῶν Μουσοουλμάνων, ἔτους, ζωλθ'». The indiction corresponds perfectly with the definite year. The chronicle which comes from a code of London and dates back to the 14<sup>th</sup> century (Lambros – Amandos, *Βραχέα Χρονικά* p. 46), had been published by Lambros in 1910. “Ενθυμήσεων συλλογὴ πρώτη”, *Νέος Ἑλληνομνημῶν* Vol. 10 p. 154. Also Cf P. Charanis, *Byzantion* Vol. 13 (1938) p. 342-343.

<sup>591</sup> *Voyages* Vol. II p. 323.

<sup>592</sup> Anna Komnena IA' 2 (Vol. II p. 105, eds. Reifferscheid).

overcome during the revolt of Isaacios Aggelos<sup>593</sup>, were at that time completely intact and the surrounding moat was filled with water. The visitor was entering in the city through a mobile bridge, at which concluded a very narrow road, very difficult for horsebacks. Such was the strength of Nicaea's walls that they were in good condition even in the late 18th century, as writes the English nobleman John B.S. Morritt<sup>594</sup>, who traveled at Asia Minor and Greece during the years 1794-96. From the above concludes that the city was not conquered by force. Both from the inspection of the things and the written witnesses<sup>595</sup> we conclude that, when Andronicos' forces suffered the crushing defeat in Pelecanos, simultaneously collapsed the hopes of the inhabitants of Nicaea on the future of their city. Thus, they considered that further resistance was unnecessary and opened the gates to receive the winner who had already become dominant of the whole surrounding territory. There is little information available to shed light on the subsequent fate of the once flourishing city and the situation during the first decades of the Tourkokratia/Ottoman rule.

First in line should be mentioned the witness of Nikiforos Gregoras<sup>596</sup>, that many icons, holy books and the relics of two saints, coming from Nicaea, were sold in the markets of Constantinople. This is a tragic moment for the pietistic Hellenism of the time, which resembles similar incidents in the years following the national calamity of 1922.

Then, there are two patriarchal pittaciums<sup>597</sup> from the years 1339 and 1340, by which patriarch Ioannes XIV Kalekas strongly urges to the faith of the inhabitants of Nicaea, in order some of them to preserve the traditional religion and some others to come back to the Christian community, with the guarantee that they will be forgiven "like the prodigal son, the prostitute, the thief and Manasseh", who, for forty years, had

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<sup>593</sup> Nikitas Choniates, pp. 364, 370, eds. Bonn.

<sup>594</sup> The Letters of John B.S. Morritt of Rokeby, edited by G.E. Marindin, London 1914, p. 105.

<sup>595</sup> Chalcocondyles A' 12 p. 23: "και ειλέ τε [Νίκαιαν] ου πολλώ ύστερον ομολογία παραστησάμενος". *Βραχύ χρονικόν* 52, *ibid.*, p. 88: "τό ζωλθ' έτος παρεδόθη και η πόλις Νίκαια τοις Άγαρηνοίς". It seems that, the anonymous chronicler of chronicle 26 (p. 46), with the word *επαρλαβώθη*, wants probably to state 'surrender' rather than 'fall'.

<sup>596</sup> Θ' 13 (Vol. I p. 458). According to Ducange (note in Gregoras, ed. Bonn, Vol. II p. 1242), probably it was about the relics of Saint Antonina and Saint Theodoti, who martyred in Nicaea.

<sup>597</sup> *Acta et diplomata graeca* Vol. I, doc. LXXXII and XCII, pp. 183 and 197. Professor I. Vogiatzides, in his study "Έκτουρκισμός και εξισλαμισμός Ελλήνων κατά τον μεσαίωνα", *Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα της Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής του Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης* Vol. II (1932), pp. 142-151, worked upon these two patriarchal documents. Like Wächter (*Der Verfall des Griechentums* p. 56), the author attributes the first document to the year 1338.

imposed idolatry on the people. As is mentioned at the first pittacium, “Jesus Christ doesn’t dismiss nobody; it is enough to repent honestly, to apologize, to cry and pray in His goodness. The attack of the Ishmaelite was successful because God allowed it due to the multiplicity of our sins; and enslaving and exerting violence diverting many of our people prefer their evilness and heathenism. When these people realized the evilness which they had fallen in, a feeling that motivates to seek again the beliefs of Christians was born inside them. But there is another thought that comes to their mind that makes them reluctant and seek to learn something certain in order to achieve their salvation. To all those who are in this situation, if they prefer the true faith in God and to renounce/move away from the evilness of Muslims which they had fallen in, the Church of God guarantees and gives the certain information that they will be considered again among the Christians, they will be healed and will not find any obstacle to the salvation of their souls because of their old mistake”.

These two patriarchal letters, with a remarkable broadness of perception, aim to emphasize the spirit of Christianity, putting aside the external types of worship. “Those who, because of fear, want to live in obscurity embracing the principles and practicing the worship of Christianity without being noticed, they will also save their souls, providing that they will follow willingly God’s commandments”. These are cited in the first of the two letters and almost the same thought is also framed in the second, with the words: “If this happens and you will be captured by the enemies, if you remain masters of your soul and opinion it is at your own will to choose whether you will keep your faith or not”. With the above concessions were laid the first foundations of crypto-Christianism in Asia Minor.

However, despite the patriarch’s encourage, islamization carried on. When Metropolitite of Thessaloniki Gregorios Palamas had been captured after a maritime accident near Lampsacus, he was taken at Nicaea in July 1355 and lodged at Yakinthos monastery, which was the center of the salvaged Christian community<sup>598</sup>. One day, during his stay, he started a theological discussion with an Ottoman imam standing in the shadow of the city’s eastern gate. Gradually a crowd of listeners, Muslims and Christians was gathered. Defending his religion, the Turkish theologian was claiming that there were positive references for Muhammad in the Gospel, but the relevant

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<sup>598</sup> Gregorios Palamas, “Επιστολή”, *Νέος Ελληνομνήμων* Vol. 16 (1922), pp.14-17.

passages were on purpose removed by the fanatic Christian scribes. However, his main argument in favor of Mohammedanism's value was coming from the practical side of life: Islam excelled Christianity because Muhammad's followers were triumphing against their enemies. Both these arguments that were successfully rebuffed by the Greek prelate, sheds light on the nature of the Ottoman propaganda. They were trying to emphasize the similarities between the two religions on the one hand and, constantly stressed the victory of Islam against Christianity on the other. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, particularly favorable for slackening of religious conscience, breaking of the relationship with the spiritual center of Hellenism and the lack of staff to continue the fight for faith, this propaganda was destined to prevail. The missionaries of Islam worked patiently and methodically and against the unconvinced, like Gregorios Palamas, they were objecting spirit of tolerance and compromise by saying: "There will come the day we will agree".

As regards the poverty that was faced by the small Christian community of Nicaea mention has already been made with reference to the administrative reorganization of Bithynia's big cities during the last quarter of the 14th century. As mentioned above, this reorganization was concerned mainly incorporations and abrogation of episcopal seats and transfers of prelates at European provinces, for order and economy reasons. It was the reorientation of the ecclesiastical administration towards the new situation that had prevailed in the East. At the same time, it was an account and a survey of those that had survived after the first wave of destruction. Throughout Asia Minor, the Christian flock was continuously decreasing. Especially for Nicaea, noteworthy is the information from the 17th century, derived from a patriarchal note of *Notitiae Episcopatum*<sup>599</sup>: "The [Metropolitane] of Bithynia's Nicaea had six dioceses and today has none; nor he has province. His was granted only the archdiocese of Cios to which was adjoined with the Episcopal region". The starting point of the decline should be sought in the years of the first Turkish raids and anarchy that had prevailed in this region already from the time of Michael Palaiologos.

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<sup>599</sup> H. Gelzer, *Ungedruckte und ungenügend veröffentlichte Texte der Notitiae Episcopatum - ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen Kirchen und Verwaltungsgeschichte. Abhandlungen der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, I Classe, Vol. 21 (1900) part III p. 639. In Ibid., was also preserved a note about Nicomedia: "Ο Νικομήδειας τῆς Βιθυνίας εἶχεν επισκοπᾶς ἰβ' καὶ τὴν σήμερον δέ μίαν μόνον ἔχει".*

During the reign of Orhan, Nicaea is mentioned as regards the events of Halil's deliverance, the twelve-year old son of Orhan and Theodora Kantakouzini<sup>600</sup>. The child that had been captured by pirates was held at Frankish Phocaea. In order to achieve Halil's delivery, John V Palaeologos, by Orhan's order, besieged Phocaea, but without result. Finally, always pressed by the Ottoman ruler, the Byzantine emperor was forced to negotiate with the child's abductors, adducing in person the ransom requested, half of which was paid by the Byzantine government. And while the Ottoman forces were spreading in Thrace, the child was taken with royal escort to Nicaea where, in a short time, took place its engagements with King Ioannes' ten-year-old daughter. Ultimately, the Byzantine Empire was a country tributary to the Ottomans.

These were happening in 1359, three years before Orhan's death. Nikiforos Greogoras<sup>601</sup>, who accounts with tragic naivety the story of Byzantium's humiliation, gives a detailed picture of the events. As has been mentioned, the prince was taken with great solemnity "to a town which was one of the most famous and glorious centers of Bithynia. Its name was Nicaea. There had flocked all the Bithynians, barbarians and his compatriots (of Orhan) and *mixovarvaroi* (half barbarian – half Greek) and those of our nation who were forced by luck to be enslaved to the barbarians". All these were coming to worship Orhan, to offer their gifts<sup>602</sup> and take part in the celebrations in honor of the Prince's salvage. The Byzantine emperor, Ioannes Palaeologos was among them as well.

This quotation is particularly interesting because it offers an accurate and comprehensive overview of the composition of the Ottoman state. First in order of importance are mentioned the ruler's compatriots, namely Turks and the first turkificated native inhabitants. Second in order come the "mixovarvaroi", namely those resulted from miscegenation between Greeks and Turks, but hadn't been completely assimilated to the dominant race. Last and inferior, of course, were those who had remained loyal to the ancestral, keeping up to that time their Greek and Christian

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<sup>600</sup> Gregoras *ΑΣΤ'* 8 (Vol. III pp. 503-509). Kantakouzenos *Δ'* 44 (Vol. III pp. 320-322).

<sup>601</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 509.

<sup>602</sup> *The tradition of offering gifts to Kings and lords during the official days was – as prof. Koukoules notes (BZ Vol. 30 p. 184)– a Byzantine tradition adopted by the Ottomans as well. Also Cf the passage of Asikpařazade cited above, according to which gifts are offered to judge ředereli Karaca Halil, see f.n. 118 chapt. III.*

conscience. In this way, in the spring of 1359, the people of Bithynia and the manpower of the Ottoman state marched in the streets of Nicaea.

But, despite its temporary luster<sup>603</sup> and the fact that it was the second capital of the state, Nicaea fell into a state of decline and decay<sup>604</sup>. During the visit of Ibn Battuta, most of its houses were already in ruins and the city was very sparsely populated. Nevertheless, it was the permanent residence of Orhan's wife, who is called Beyalun Hatun<sup>605</sup> by the Moroccan traveler. Emir himself was also living there, but with intervals. The last days of Ibn Battuta's stay in Nicaea coincided with such a visit of Orhan.

The demographic and economic decline kept on without interruption from the day following the surrender of the city. From Morritt's<sup>606</sup> letter we learn that the situation was similar in the 18th century as well. As reported by the English traveler, "the walls enclose space three times the size of the city". The humble town of nowadays

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<sup>603</sup> As it is already pointed by the English traveler W. M. Leake (*Journal of a Tour in Asia Minor p. 11*), the older Ottoman ruins shows that although the city was small in comparison with the Byzantine Nicaea, during the first Ottoman years, it was bigger than it was at the time of his visit (early 19<sup>th</sup> century). This was because Orhan and his successors had constructed some buildings, mainly for the religious needs of their followers, even poorhouses (*Imaret*), which evolved into charitable initiative centers. *Leunclavius, Annales p. 10*. Regarding these buildings, see the recent study of K. Otto-Dorn *Das islamische Iznik, Berlin 1941, pp. 13-18, 50-59, 102-105*.

<sup>604</sup> *Voyages Vol. II pp. 323-324*.

<sup>605</sup> Of course, it is not about Theodora, the young daughter of *Kantakouzenos*, who later was married with Orhan and kept her Christian religion. *Kantakouzenos Γ' 95 p. 589*. We learn that the Hatun in question was a "devout" Muslim, but her identification with the legendary *Nilüfer* or *Louloufer*, daughter of the Byzantine ruler of *Yarhisar* and fiancée of the garrison commander of *Vilokoma*, who, according to the Ottoman tradition was taken as prisoner during the fall of this city, was given as wife to the twelve years old Orhan and became mother of *Süleyman* and *Murat*, is totally unfounded. *Aşikpaşazade, ed. Istanbul p. 17, ed. Giese p. 15. Neşri, ZDMG Vol. 13 pp. 199, 204-205*. However, *Giese (ZSem Vol. II p.263)* and *Taeschner (Islamica Vol. 20 p. 135)* believe that it is about the same person and due to a mistake of Ibn Battuta's copyist, instead of □□ □□□□ it was written □□□□□□ . Ibn Battuta also calls *Beygialun Hatun [Μπεϊγαλοῦν]* (*Vol. II p. 411*) the Byzantine princess, wife of Mohammed Uzbek Han, who was about to give birth and accompanied her until Constantinople, where he returned in order to be among his relatives during her delivery. It is probable that the traveler uses this term for the wives of Turkish rulers. The name *Nilüfer* does not betray Greek origin, as *Babinger* assumes in "*Nilufer*" *E I, Vol. III p. 985*), since it is unlikely a Bithynian Greek woman to be called *Nenoufar [Νενούφαρ]* or *Loulouferon [Λουλούφερον]*. The naturalistic names were not prevalent at the Byzantines; besides, the word *Nenoufar* was not totally naturalized in the Greek vocabulary, which is evidenced by the fact that remained noninflected at all cases. We consider equally unlikely the origin of the name *Nilufer* from *Loulouferon* and *Olivera [Ολίβερα]*. It seems more likely that the name is purely Persian and was given to the captive, after she had become Orhan's wife. During their transit from Persia, the Turkish nomads incorporated in their vocabulary Persian words. In any case, it remains unclear whether *Beygialun* from Nicaea is the same person with *Nilüfer*.

<sup>606</sup> *Ibid., p. 105*.

comes in sad contrast to the once thriving capital of the Laskarids, the “famous city” [περιβόητον άστυ] as it is called by Nikiforos Gregoras<sup>607</sup>.

From the two patriarchal pittaciums at our disposal, in a manner that cannot be called into question, arises that the inhabitants of the city, where a thousand years ago was formulated the Creed of the Christian faith<sup>608</sup>, were coming en masse to Islam before barely ten years since their subordination. Moreover, Ibn Battuta accounts that, at that time, the city was almost deserted. If we consider that the first major epidemic<sup>609</sup> hadn't reached to the East before 1347-48, the devastation of Nicaea must be explained otherwise. Besides, no group migrations from Bithynia to Constantinople or Thrace are mentioned after the fall of Bursa and Nicaea. Consequently, the vast majority of Nicaea's inhabitants, after having embraced Islam, were scattered across the entire dominion of the Ottoman State.

The motivations for this flight appeared to be mainly economic. Weaving and pottery which were the two industries that supported Nicaea's prosperity<sup>610</sup>, were devitalized because of lack of markets; because, while Bursa was situated in the center of a rich territory and a remarkable road network connecting it with all the parts of the Ottoman State, Nicaea was situated in the border region, which always suffered from the calamities of Saggarios and, after the conquest of Mesothynia by the Ottomans it was isolated because the commercial traffic of Chalcedon - Aigialoi - Kivotos – Dorylaion road was essentially interrupted. Being before an economic impasse, the inhabitants of Nicaea left their city seeking better luck. This fact accelerated their assimilation with the Ottomans, and thus, without massacres and persecutions but only with its allegiance to the Ottomans, Nicaea suffered an indirect blow, from which hasn't recovered so far.

The fate of Nicomedia was more favorable. Because of its location, which makes it accessible from the sea was able to resist for some more years after the fall of

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<sup>607</sup> About the population of Nicaea during the 13<sup>th</sup> century see Sölch's accurate remarks in *BNJ* Vol. I p. 281. The author estimates the inhabitants between thirty and fifty thousand.

<sup>608</sup> It should be noted that the church of St. Sophia, where, according to the tradition, took place the (Holy) Synod, was turned into mosque by Orhan. See Otto-Dorn, *ibid.*, p. 9, and N. Brouhoff, “L'église de Sainte-Sophie de Nicée», *EO* Vol. 24 (1925), pp. 471-481.

<sup>609</sup> Short chronicle from Doukas, ed. Bonn p. 515: “ζωνς' εγγέγονε τό μέγα θανατικόν, ... ζωπ' εγγέγονε τό δεύτερον μέγα θανατικόν”. Also, short chronicle 27 (Lambros – Amandos, p. 46). The first deadly epidemic, i.e. that of ζωνς' (1347-48), was much more light compared with the second and the third; this is reinforced by the fact that two short chronicles hush the first and, instead, refer to the deadly epidemic of ζωο' (1362). *Ibid.*, pp. 31 and 89.

the fortresses of Mesothynia. Andronikos III visited the city twice, supplying it with foodstuff and encouraging its residents. His first visit<sup>611</sup>, which, if we believe Kantakouzenos, had the nature of expedition, took place in 1330, while the city was besieged by Orhan. The King, accompanied by naval force, sailed across Astakinos Gulf, bringing with him landing corps, consisted of infantry and cavalry and shipped for more security<sup>612</sup>. When the Byzantine forces approached, Orhan dispatched an embassy in order to learn the intentions of the king; thus, they were led to an agreement for cessation of hostilities.

This agreement was equivalent to a *de facto* recognition of the new territorial status, from the Byzantine side. Orhan promised to be content with the *acquis* and stop attacking the towns that were still under Byzantine rule. This pleasant event was also crowned by gift exchange between the two kings. The Ottoman sent to Andronikos “horses and hunting dogs along with carpets and leopard skins”. Andronikos offered “silver glasses, woolen and silk fabrics and one of the royal robes; the barbarian satraps had always great respect and considered them assumption of honor and good will”. Given what we are in position know, this is the first treaty concluded between Greeks and Ottomans<sup>613</sup>. Orhan withdrew his troops from Nicomedia’s outskirts and the Byzantine emperor, after a seven-day stay in the city and the region, sailed for Constantinople.

However, Orhan didn’t adhere to the agreed. Next year, his forces appeared again in front of Nikomedia<sup>614</sup>. Nevertheless, the blockade of the city couldn’t be complete, since Astakinos bay was open to the Byzantine fleet, which received greater care after Andronikos III ascended the throne. The King came again to Nicomedia and stayed for two days; the ships which accompanied him supplied the city with the necessary grain, without Orhan being able to interpose obstacles.

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<sup>610</sup> Relatively see Hammer, *Umblick* p. 124, and Sölch, *Ibid.*, pp. 282- 283.

<sup>611</sup> Kantakouzenos B' 24 (Vol. I pp. 446-447).

<sup>612</sup> From this point we conclude that, the coastal forts which were on the road axis Chalkedon – Nicomedia, had fallen into the hands of the Ottomans as a consequence of the Battle of Pelecanos.

<sup>613</sup> Of course, during 1322 Turkish forces fought in Thrace against Andronikos Junior assisting his homonymous grandfather. See Kantakouzenos A' 31 (Vol. I p. 151). But, given that it is not mentioned whether these Turks were Osman’s subjects, we cannot consider this collaboration as the first known alliance between Greeks and Ottomans.

<sup>614</sup> *Ibid.*, B' 26 (Vol. I p. 459).

The tactics that Orhan applied against Nicomedia was not different from that applied in Nicaea and Bursa. In accordance with Kantakouzenos<sup>615</sup> words, Nicomedia which was surrounded by powerful walls and was naturally protected, was from any aspect unconquerable and was only threatened by a possible lack of wheat. So, the tactics of transportations harassment and isolation of the city were those followed by the Ottomans, with some intervals, for about thirty years before they conquer it. And since the seaway was open and Byzantium was able to supply Nicomedia, the city was resisting. But when the Ottomans acquired fleet which launched raids against the Thracian shores<sup>616</sup> and the surroundings of Constantinople<sup>617</sup> while Byzantium was busy with the situation in the Aegean and Europe and ceased to look after the last edge of Bithynia, Nicomedia was found in an impasse and, probably in 1337, was forced to surrender<sup>618</sup>. The cited Ottoman raid on the shores of Bosphorus that took place in the autumn of 1337 marks the end of Bithynia's conquest. When Khodabendah's successor Bahadur Han died two years before (+1317), event which marked the collapse of the Mongol State, disappeared also the last menace from the Mongol side. The latter had

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<sup>615</sup> Ibid., p. 459 l. 17 et seq..

<sup>616</sup> Kantakouzenos (B' 34, Vol. I pp. 505-508), with his known boasting, describes how the Ottomans departed from Trigleia on board 36 ships to plunder the outskirts of Byzantium and how he saved the day by defeating them on land and at sea. Again the numbers of the Ottoman losses seems exaggerated, since it is reported that only seven men were rescued from the landing forces and three ships from the whole fleet.

<sup>617</sup> Gregoras IA' 4 (Vol. I pp. 539-542). The Turks, after having agreed with the Genovese of Galata, were ready to depart by ships from Ieron and the Sea of Marmara. But the Byzantines attacked surprisingly against the Turkish fleet which was anchored in the Port of Rigio [*Ρήγιο*] and attained an overwhelming victory. Thereby, failed the first attempt of the Ottomans against Constantinople (1336). Cf Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant*, Vol. I p.489. The fall of Nicomedia is mentioned by Gregoras after these events.

<sup>618</sup> Gregoras IA' 6 (Vol. I p. 545): "εάλω καί η τών Βιθυνών μητρόπολις Νικομήδεια τώ πολλώ καταπονηθείσα λιμώ, διά τήν επίμονον τών εχθρών πολιορκίαν". Frantzes A' 8 p. 43. Aşikpaşazade, ed. Istanbul, p. 38. Sa'deddin, trans. Brattuti Vol. I pp. 36-37. There are still disputes regarding the year of the fall of Nicomedia. While the two Byzantine historians mention the city's occupation by the Ottomans after the surrender of Nicaea, the first Ottoman authors claim that Nicomedia passed to Orhan at the same year with Bursa, namely in 1326. Of course, Gregoras, as contemporary with the events is more reliable compared with the later Ottomans, which are followed by Hammer (*Geschichte* Vol. I p. 100). Among the younger historians, Brockelmann admits the year 1327, Wächter the year 1328, Heyd the year 1330, Rasmussen and Wittek the year 1331, Pears the year 1337, Sagredo and Finlay the year 1338, Gibbons and Köprülü the year 1337 or 1338, and Gibbon the year 1339. The likelihood that Nicomedia was conquered before 1330 and 1331 should be excluded, because there is an information which is not in dispute, although it comes from Kantakouzenos, namely that Andronicos III had visited the city in these years. Moreover, we know that Orhan possessed ships by 1337. Before seeking to expand at Europe it was natural to subdue Bithynia's last city Nicomedia excluding it both from land and sea by means of these ships.

thrown the Turkish emirates into panic<sup>619</sup>, when in 1327, led by Timourtas, had invaded southwestern Asia Minor. In fact, between the years 1333 and 1337, Orhan, taking advantage of the internal dissensions of Karasu dynasty, managed to incorporate all the neighboring territory, reaching to the shores of Hellespont. The way was now open for the spread of the Ottomans in Europe, where their development was going to continue for more than a hundred years before Osman's descendants ascend the throne of the Roman Emperors.

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<sup>619</sup> Šihabeddin, *NE* Vol. 13 pp. 345, 350, 377. Aksarayli Kerimeddin Mahmud, Turk. Trans. Gencosman, pp. 341-345. Howorth, *History of the Mongols* Vol. III p. 613.

## CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

1258	<p>Death of Theodoros II.</p> <p>Commissionership of George Mouzalon.</p> <p>Coup of Michael Palaiologos.</p> <p>Assassination of Mouzalon.</p>
1259	<p>Michael Palaiologos is nominated Emperor.</p> <p>Osman's birth.</p>
1261, 25 of July	<p>The reconquest of Constantinople.</p>
25 of December	<p>Blinding of Ioannes IV and his imprisonment at the fortress of Dacibyza [<i>Δακιβύζη</i>].</p>
1262	<p>Revolt of the inhabitants of Trikokia.</p>
1263	<p>The beginning of the negotiations with the Pope for the union of the Churches.</p>
1267, 14 of March	<p>Panic in Nicaea because of rumors for Tatar invasion.</p>
1282, Summer	<p>Michael Palaeologos' last tour and fortification of Saggarios River.</p>
1282, 11 of December	<p>The death of Michael Palaeologos.</p> <p>Andronicos II became monocrat.</p>
1294	<p>Pseudo-Lachanas, a Bulgarian fortune hunter who claimed to be Ivailo that had usurp the Bulgarian throne in 1278, organizes the defense of North Bithynia but after a short while he was discharged from his service.</p>
1296	<p>Inroads of Amur Ali at the West of Saggarios.</p> <p>The uprising of Alexios Philanthropenos.</p>
1 of July	<p>The campaign of Andronicus II against the Turks was canceled because of an earthquake that lasted until 17 July.</p>
1299	<p>Yenişehir became the capital of the Ottoman State.</p>
1301, 27 of July	<p>The battle of Vapheus.</p>
1302	<p>Inflow of refugees in Constantinople.</p> <p>The Tatar Couximpaxis becomes commandant of Nicomedia.</p> <p>Looting of the Prince Island by Venetian and pirate ships and</p>

- invasion into the Golden Horn.  
The forces of Karasu advanced towards the Sea of Marmara.  
Michael VIII assumes to organize the defense of the coastal towns.  
Turkish fleets plunder the Aegean Islands.
- 1302, September Roger De Flor arrives at Istanbul.
- 1303, January Landing of Roger at Kyzicos.  
Crushing defeat of the Turks at the South of Kyzicos Peninsula.
- 1303, April The Catalan Company invades in the Emirate of Karasu.
- 1303, May Roger de Flor in Achyraus.  
Battle near Avlakas. Defeat and wound of Alisir.  
End of the siege of Philadelpia by the Turks. Flight of Alisir.  
Subjugation of Magnesia to the Catalans.  
Martial action of the Bulgarian swineherd Ioannes at Skamandros region.
- 1304 Revolt of Attaleiates and  
Siege of Magnesia by Roger.
- 1305, 28 of April Assassination of Roger in Adrianople.  
The Catalans invade in Thrace.
- 1306 Siouros Stratopedarches' campaign against the Ottomans.  
Osman occupies Vilochoa.
- 1307 The Ottomans expand up to Lake Askania.  
Blockade of Nicaea.  
Mohammad Khodabendah, promises help to the Byzantines as an ally.
- 1308 The Ottomans at the coasts of Black Sea, outside Chili and Astrabiti.  
They capture the fortress of Aetos and Damatrys.  
They entered into Ieron and other fortified locations at the entrance of Bosphorus but they withdraw after the imposition of tribute.

	Kara Ali occupies Kalolimnos Island.
	New inflow of refugees in Istanbul.
	Osman captures Kouvouklia and blockades Brusa.
	Fall of Trikokia.
	Monk Helarion defends Eleggmos.
	Kassianos, the commander of Mesothynia, comes into rupture with Vardalis, withdraws at Chili and revolts. After a betrade he is arrested and emprisoned.
1311-14	Halil loots Thrace.
1317	The death of Khodabendah.
	Osman blocades Brusa once again.
1325-28	War between the two Andronicus.
1326, 6 of April	The surrender of Brusa.
	The death of Osman. The rise of Orhan.
1327	Invasion of the Mongols of Timurtas at the SW Asia Minor.
1328	New Turkish invasions at the Aegean islands.
1329, June	The battle of Pelecanos.
1330	Orhan sieges Nicomedia.
	Andronicus IV rescues the city and conclude of the first treaty between Byzantines and Ottomans.
1331, 2 of March	The surrender of Nicaea.
	New siege of Nicomedia and new campaign by Andronicus III.
1333, Summer	The traveler Ibn Battura at Brusa and Nicaea.
1333-37	Annexation of the Karasu hegemony by the Ottomans.
1337	The surrender of Nicomedia.
	Ottoman inroads in Trhace and the outskirts of Constantinople.
1338-39	The patriarch of Constantinople Ioannes Kalekas addresses appeal to the inhabitants of Nicae to stay faithful to Christianity and promises forgive to the renegades if they repent.
1341	Ioannes Kantakouzenos is proclaimed emperor.
1345	Kantakouzenos negotiates the wedding of his daughter

- Theodora with Orhan in order to seal the concluded ally.
- 1354 The Ottomans occupy Kallipoli and become the masters of the Straits.
- 1355 The Metropolitan of Thessalonica Gregorios Palamas captive among the Ottomans.
- 1358 Pirates captivate Orhan's son Halil and Theodora and kidnap him at Phocea.  
Siege of Phocea by Ioannes V Palaiologos to set free the Ottoman prince.
- 1359 Festivities in Nicaea before Orhan and Ioannes V for the return of Halil and engagement of the later with the daughter of Ioannes V.
- 1362, March The death of Orhan.

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