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GUARDING THE STATE OR ADVANCING THE INTERESTS:

ECONOMIC MOTIVATIONS BEHIND MILITARY COUPS IN EGYPT AND TURKEY

Master's Thesis

ABDELRAHMAN MAHMOUD MOHAMED

ISTANBUL, 2018

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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I certify that this thesis meets all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of
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Prof. Dr. _____
Program Coordinator

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that we find it fully adequate in scope,
quality and content, as a thesis for the degree Master of Global Affairs.

"…And these days [of varying conditions] We alternate among the people…"

(Quran 3:140)

"I met a traveller from an antique land,

Who said—"Two vast and trunkless legs of stone

Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,

Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,

And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,

Tell that its sculptor well those passions read

Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,

The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;

And on the pedestal, these words appear:

My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;

Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay

Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare

The lone and level sands stretch far away."

Percy Bysshe Shelly, 'Ozymandias'

For Jana

and Khaled Hamza,

with love, respect, gratitude and hopes in a better future.

Acknowledgments

Abstract

GUARDING THE STATE OR ADVANCING THE INTERESTS:
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The causes of the coup d'etat have long been debated. The economic motives of the regime change by military coups have gained a significant momentum in the literature. This paper argues that economic motives preceded ideological and political motivations in the coups that were staged in Turkey (1980) and Egypt (2013). The paper analysis the expansion of military business in the civilian realm before and after military coups, along with other economic variables such as: GDP, per Capita GDP and the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the two cases of study. The paper also controls for socioeconomic conditions and civil-military relations in Turkey and Egypt attempting to develop a better understanding to the contexts in which military coups become more probable. The paper finds that the risk of military coups is higher in Turkey and Egypt if the military perceives a threat to its economic interests or if it saw an opportunity to advance its economic interests that wouldn't be achievable under the existing regime.

Key Words: Civil-military relations, Turkey, Egypt, Egyptian Armed Forces, Turkish Armed Forces, Arab Spring, Military Coups, Military Business.

Özet

DEVLETI SAVUNMAK YAHUT MENFAATLERI GELIŞTIRMEK: MISIR'DAKI VE TURKIYE'DEKI DARBELERIN ARKASINDAKI İKTISADI MOTIVASYONLAR

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Darbelerin arkalarındaki sebepler öteden beri tartışıla gelir konular arasındadır. Askeri darbe ile gelen rejim değişikliklerinin temelindeki ekonomik motifler ise literatürde önemli bir yer kaplamaya başlamıştır. Bu makale Türkiyedeki (1980) ve Mısırdaki (2013) darbelerinin ekonomik temelinin, ideolojik ve politik sebeplerinden önce geldiğini savunmaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu makale iki ülkede de gerçekleşen darbelerin öncesinde ve sonrasında sivil alanda etkisini artıran askeri ekonomiyi, Gayri Safi Yurtiçi Hasıla, Kişi Başı Milli Gelir, Doğrudan Yabancı Yatıtım gibi ekonomik verileri de göz önünde bulundurarak analiz etmektedir. Bunlara ek olarak bu makale Türkiye ve Mısır'daki sosyo-ekonomik koşulları ve sivil-askeri ilişkileri de kontol ederek askeri darbelere sebep olan bağlamları daha iyi anlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu makale Mısır ve Türkiyedeki askeri darbe riskinin var olan rejimin askeriye tarafınan onun ekonomik çıkarlara bir tehdit olarak algılaması yahut askeriyenin ekonomik çıkarlarını geliştimesinin var olan rejimle olanaksız olduğunu anlaması ile arttığını iddia etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Sivil-Askeri ilişkiler, Tükiye, Mısır, Mısır Askeri Kuvvetleri, Türk Askeri Kuvvetleri, Arap Baharı, Askeri Darbeler, Askeri Ekonomi

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1 . INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2012 hundreds of thousands of Egyptians stood in Tahrir square awaiting the results of Egypt's first-ever free presidential elections. The Muslim Brotherhood's candidate Mohamed Morsi was announced as the first democratically elected president in Egypt's history. A year later, the Minister of Defense, General Abdelfattah El-Sisi, overthrew Morsi, pointing to protestors in the street, framing his intervention as responding to popular outcry. Much Kenan Evren, who claimed that the 1980 coup in Turkey was staged to "to avert civil war and to save democracy" (Harb 2002), El Sisi cited his intervention as being motivated by public outcry in order to save Egypt from the specter of civil war (Cagaptay and Sievers 2015).

The façade of civility was maintained in the Egyptian scenario. A president, Adly Mansour, was appointed. Five weeks later, on 14th of August, security forces along with military troops and thugs raided two squares in Cairo, where tens of thousands of Morsi supporters held sit-ins to protest the military coup, killing more than 800 protesters in the process (Kingsley 2014). Soon thereafter, the security, political and economic conditions deteriorated rapidly.

Sisi's warnings of a civil war in Egypt became a self-fulfilling prophecy. In the months that followed the coup in the summer of 2013, Egypt witnessed a wave of insurgency, led by a militia that has pledged allegiance to ISIL, that swept Sinai peninsula on the country's eastern borders with Gaza strip and Israel. The attacks in Sinai alone led to the killing of more than 2000 military and security personnel and triggered a mass exodus of the Copts from the peninsula (Schenker, 2017).

Politically, Egypt has seen presidential, parliamentary elections that fell short of international standards of democracy (Kirkpatrick 2014). Many laws were designed to suppress freedom of expression including a law on Organizing the Right to Public Meetings, Processions and Peaceful Demonstrations known locally as the Protest Law and other laws

that are targeting the non-governmental organizations. In this context, independent monitors and human rights activists estimated the numbers of political prisoners to be as high as 60,000 Egyptians between 2013 to 2016 (Hamzawi 2017).

Economically, the military regained much of its dominance over the public and private sectors, assigned boards of army generals that manage the release and allocation of public procurements, and has taken over the distribution of welfare. With the rate of the military's expenditure increasing rapidly, reaching its highest rate since the declaration of the republic in 1952 (SIPRI, 2016), the role of the military seems to be moving beyond the boundaries El Sisi set of saving Egypt from civil war—prompting us to question the motives behind the coup.

This correlation between military coups and increase in military expenditures is apparent in the Turkish coup of 1980. Data shows that the military expenditure started to rise directly after the coup as in 1981, the defense budget witnessed a considerable rise, due primarily to the role of the Turkish military in political affairs (Chletsos and Kollias 1995).

Nine months before the coup, the Turkish government decided to adopt several austerity measures that aimed mainly to install a free market economy in Turkey. But because of the political turmoil, these measures were far from effective. One month before the coup, the then undersecretary to the prime minister, head of the State Planning Organization and architect of the austerity measures taken in January 1980, Turgut Özal stated his complains that the political climate was not ready for the new economic measures (Ahmad, 1981).

The political climate had been foul for many years, nonetheless. In the years between 1975 and 1980 more than 5000 Turkish citizens were killed and around 15000 were injured in politically-driven attacks and clashes (Harb 2002). The numbers of casualties reached its peak between December 1978 and September 1980 with 20 people killed each day (Aksin 2007). By the time the coup was held, political consensus could only be reached through extraordinary measures (Şener 2004).

In the few months following the 1980 coup, 650,000 activists were detained, 230,000 were prosecuted, and among those 517 were sentenced to death, 50 of whom were executed, and an additional 450 died under torture; 14,000 were stripped of their citizenship, and around 30,000 sought exile abroad (Helal 1999). Two years after the coup, Kenan Evren was elected as president of Turkey in a controversial public referendum where he revived 91.4% of the voters support (Nohlen 2001).

What is characteristic of the Egyptian and Turkish cases though, despite measures of civil unrest and instability prior to the military interventions, is the type of economic measures embraced afterwards. Both countries took measures to liberalize their economies, and made themselves more amenable and receptive to international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. They also saw increased levels of FDI, relative to their pre-coup measures.

1.1 RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

This paper deals with the economic motives of the military coups in both Turkey 1980 and Egypt 2013 by examining the changing in three main factors in each country: economic policies, military expenditure and the relation with the international economic organizations. In Particular, the research question this paper seeks to answer is the following: Does the military's economic motivation precede political and ideological drives in launching coups? I will closely at the 2013 coup in Egypt and the 1980 coup in Turkey?

This research builds on the body of scholarship that emphasizes the role of economic motives in military coups in general and in both cases of study. Gassebner et al (2016) finds that slow economic growth rates, previous coup experiences, and other forms of political violence to be particularly conducive to inciting coups. Armies also seem to always find a way to maximize their own budgets after the coups. Leon (2014) demonstrates that successful coups result in increased military spending.

In this paper, I use a comparative case study method to analyze the causes and motives of the military coups and the aftermath in two Middle Easters countries: Turkey and Egypt, trying to answer the question: Did the economic motivation represent the strongest drive to coups in the two countries: 1980, 2013?

In addition to analyzing the internal socioeconomic conditions in Turkey and Egypt, this paper also examines the nature of both militaries, and the roles of regional and International actors that resulted in the success of military coups in both cases. After the introduction, the second chapter will offer the historical contexts in which the militaries in both Egypt and Turkey developed over the years. The third chapter will present an overview on the motives behind military coups. The fourth chapter will describe the methodology, and fifth will be dedicated to reporting and analysis. Finally chapter 6 will offer a discussion of the findings as the concluding chapter of the thesis.

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Since the founding of the republics in Turkey (1923) as well as in Egypt (1952), the militaries of both countries have dominated the political scene in a way or another. In both nations, the military's political role was embedded in the constitution—giving them autonomous status in terms of budget and conscription. As the nations developed, officers in both countries thought of themselves as guardians of the state, and used such stances to legitimize their interventions in politics. Post intervention policies, however, show the contrary. In the following chapter I will shed light on the civil military relations in Egypt and Turkey. The chapter will off the a historical context explaining the development of state, the military, and their relationship. I will start by adressing the period between (1839-1980) in Turkey, and then the period between (1882-2013) in Egypt.

2.1 TURKEY

Although the roots of some institutions of modern Turkey can be traced back to the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, namely the Tanzimat period (1839-1871) which produced a modern army and a constitution, the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 represented a radical break from the ancient regime (Cook 2007). The nationalist movement that proclaimed the Turkish republic was composed of military officers such as: Mustafa Kemal, Ismet Inönü, Fevzi Çakmak, Kazim Özalp, Ali Fuat Gebesoy, Kemalettin Sami and Kazım Karabekir.

2.1.1 THE LAST DAYS OF THE CALIPHATE

The officers' movement to establish the republic was preceded by other attempts that aimed to modernize the country. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, modernizing officers had been trying to adopt Western-Inspired reforms in order to strengthen their weak empire, the Tanzimat was the first attempt. This attempt was interrupted by Abdulhamid II (r. 1876-1909) when he decided to suspend the constitution and to rehabilitate

his position as Caliph (religious leader of all Muslims). Abdulhamid's trials was a desperate reaction to the Ottoman's defeat against Russia in 1878 but his move backfired initiating the second wave of modernization.

The second attempt to modernize the country happened during the movement of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), commonly referred to as the Young Turks in 1908-1909. CUP, which consisted of junior officers and bureaucrats who were largely financed and supported by European countries, conspired against Abdulhamid II blaming the defeat and replaced him with his accommodating cousin Mehmed V Rasad (r. 1909-1918). At the time, the Young Turks were ruling effectively through a triumvirate of the three ministers of interior, navy and war (Anderson 2009).

In hope of hindering the breakdown of the empire, the CUP leaders decided to gamble by entering the Great War and by putting their weight behind the Germans. They lost gamble and the war. As the guns fell silent, the empire was in its worst shape in centuries. The Arab provinces had fallen to Britain and France. The French and the British also controlled large parts of Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea Coast, while the Italians and the Greeks occupied the city of Izmir and parts of Southern and Western Anatolia and the Aegean. Istanbul itself was put under a joint Anglo-French supervision where the occupiers installed a puppet Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahideddin (r. 1918-1922). In August 1920, the Sultan was forced to sign Sevres Treaty that formalized the victors' territorial gains and, among other humiliating conditions, permanently demobilized the Ottoman army allowing for rural and urban police forces.

But this situation didn't last for long. For logistical reasons, the victors weren't able to station enough troops in Anatolia, therefore the control over Anatolia remained in the hands of the Ottoman troops who were based there during the Great War. At the same time, the eastern parts of Anatolia neutralized because of the Bolshevik revolution and the following civil war that erupted in Russia. This allowed the Ottoman troops to concentrate their forces on the southwestern front on the borders with Greece (Kandil 2012). These two factors along with others such as: the degree of preparation to resistance among the CUP leadership and the divisions within the Entente came in favor of the then rising star in the Turkish military: Mustafa Kemal.

Kemal, who briefly joined the CUP before founding the Fatherland Freedom Society while stationed in Damascus in 1906, contributed in the most crucial way in the ousting of Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1909, and played a major role in Gallipoli where he prevented the invasion of the capital. These victories allowed Kemal to become the most popular officer in the Ottoman army. Kemal later led the covert nationalist resistance that quickly turned into the overt War of Liberation.

With the help of the newly installed Soviet regime in Moscow, and by playing diplomatic and economic cards against the Entente, Kemal was able to prevail militarily against Greece that led later to the signing of Mudanya armistice in October 1922 and the negotiations of peace in Lausanne in November of the same year. The opportunity was seized by Kemal, who pushed for a law through the General National Assembly to abolish the sultanate. Though the deputies weren't convinced to vote for the abolishing of the sultanate they took an oath to protect, they voted for the law after a threatening speech made by Kemal:

Sovereignty and sultanate are taken by strength, by power and by force. It was by force that the sons of Osman seized sovereignty and the sultanate of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and sultanate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact… If those gathered here, the Assembly, and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree…if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process (quoted in Yılmaz 2008).

The Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, defined the borders of modern Turkey, and strengthened the legitimacy of the new rulers of the republic. The modern Turkish republic was built on the military as its precedent empire was built on "the ideal of continuous war" (Finkel 2005).

2.1.2 A SINGLE-PARTY ERA WITH THE ARMY IN THE BACKGROUND

In a year, Mustafa Kemal established the People's Republic Party (CHP) and organized a tightly controlled election after which he was proclaimed as the president of Turkey. Five

months later, and in the spring of 1924, Kemal abolished the six centuries old Caliphate, igniting a wave of protests in the Muslim world (Anderson 2009). Kemal's reforms were radical and fast-paced.

After the chaotic period of the early 1920s, the military withdrew from the direct involvement in politics and the soldiers were settling in the background. Nevertheless, Kemal was aware of the fact that he needs to secure the loyalty of his military, Fevzi Cakmak, his friend and associate played a crucial rule in achieving this end. Cakmak lasted as a Chief of the General Staff for almost 22 years, and for Kemal, Cakmak was the perfect candidate to serve on the helm of the military. Fevzi Cakmak's main assets were his experience, his political reliability or maybe his lack of ambition, while his main defect was his conservatism on both religious and professional levels (Hale 1993). However, the military under Cakmak played a crucial implicit political role by indoctrinating the soldiers (virtually all Turkey's youth) with the new principles of the republic. This style of education allowed a new class of robust young men to come out of the military believing in the secular idea of the republic.

Despite this clear interest in using the army as an agent to spread the ideas of modernization and secular nationalism, the years between 1923-1939 witnessed a neglecting of the military modernization in terms of arms and artillery; the share of defense in the budget fell from around 40% in 1923 to 23% in 1932 (Hale 1993; Halpern 1962), this was mainly because Turkey didn't face any imminent external threat during this period and until the rise of Italy's Mussolini in the mid 1930s, However the fact remains that the Turkish military was largely outdated in the eve of the Second World War. The other note is that Ataturk redirected most of the budget to a civil modernization program that was adopted by the government in a five-year industrialisation plan between 1934-1938.

Officially and legally, the military did not have an explicit mission involving the internal politics of the republic. The armed forces Internal Service Law, enacted in 1935, stated that the "duty of the armed forces is to protect the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic". Throughout the republic's history, interpretations of this article were made to justify the military involvement in politics in order to save the republic and its Kemalist principles. Ataturk himself allowed such interpretations by encouraging the younger officers to think of themselves as the vanguard of the revolution (Hale 1993). This can't be

seen as a direct call from Ataturk to the Turkish military men to get involved in politics, as Ataturk was quoted saying "As long as officers remain in the Party we shall never build a strong Party nor a strong Army" (Kandil 2012; Brown 1988). He also regarded the close political involvement of the officers as a serious handicap, as he explained:

Commanders, while thinking of an carrying out the duties and requirements of the army, must take care not to let political considerations influence their judgement. They must not forget that there are other officials whose duty is to think of the political aspects. A soldiers' duty cannot be performed with talk and politicking (quoted in Hale 1997)

This separation between officers and political arena, for several analysts (such as Sakallioglu 1997 and Rustow 1959), aimed not to establish a civilian control over the state but to allow Ataturk, if necessary, to crush any kind of opposition without risking major cleavages in the society. In other words, Ataturk wanted the military not to be involved in day to day politics but to guard the overall values, principles and the character of the republic (Kandil 2012).

Following Ataturk's death in 1938 at the age of fifty-seven, his premiere Ismet Inönü smoothly succeeded him. Inonu, or the National Chief as he liked to style himself, managed to prevent Turkey from the active involvement in World War II by maneuvering diplomatically and politically on different fronts in order to avoid a direct confrontation with countries on both war sides. Inonu, did so successfully and by the end of the war in 1945. During this period, Inonu neither had the will nor the ability to proceed with the reforms Ataturk initiated. He, however was able to grant his country better opportunities for democratization later on. In fact, Inonu communicated the following instructions to his delegation to the founding United Nations conference in 1945:

The Americans may ask you when we will establish a multi-party regime. You will give the following answer to the question: 'In the history of the Turkish Republic Atatürk was the great reformer. The role of Inönü will be to institutionalize reforms and to establish a full democracy, which was the intention of Atatürk himself'. Inönü would like to have done this before. The many dangers and problems that came with the war held him back. It is the greatest desire of the President to achieve this goal as soon as the war will be over (quoted in Kandil 2012; Yılmaz 1997)

Though Turkish arms were not fired in the fight against fascism in World War II, Turkey had made a good use of the world order in the wake of the war. After joining the UN, Ankara rulers thought a crooked election such as the one held in 1946, was to ease the pressures and to silent Turkey's critiques in the West. They were wrong.

In the spring of 1947, Truman Doctrine promised U.S aid to Turkey among other countries on the fence with Russia to withstand the Soviet threat, Turkey was also received welcomingly in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but the sham elections didn't stop the critiques, on the contrary, the voices of congressional opponents to Truman's Aid Bill to Turkey were high that Truman administration almost withdrew the bill which later passed on condition that it gets to be reviewed annually by the Congress (Kandil 2012). The possible loss of the financial aid that Turkey desperately needed to revive its economy, the fierce discussions over the U.S support to Turkey because of its regime's autocratic tendencies and the similar concerns that were raised by the opponents of Turkey's joining NATO all were factors that pushed Ankara's leaders and its military to openly advocate democratic transition and multi-party politics. This policy came along with generational shift inside the armed forces from the conservative German-leaning officers to the junior officers who zealously embraced the American way of thinking alongside weapons and training (Kandil 2012; Uzgel 2003). In May 1950, Turkey witnessed general elections that brought to power the Democratic Party (DP) that was founded in 1946 by four dissident members of the CHP, it was no surprise for the military that Turkey's application into NATO wasn't accepted until the opposition, led by Celal Bayar, held power after the elections. The Democrats are now in power and the single-party system Kemal had installed was over (Anderson 2009).

2.1.3 TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRATS, TOO MUCH TO BE TOLERATED?

During the first half of the 1950s, the army kept its political role in the background. The early 1950s were successful years for the new government, as its economic program proved efficient. As of 1953 the national income grew by 40 per cent (Hale 1993). The achievements of the government strengthened public confidence in the whole political system but the secular and military elite saw a threat on two levels. The DP was true to its promise to its constituency that it will reintegrate Islam into public life (Kandil 2012; Yilmaz 1997), this was being seen as a direct threat to Ataturk's principle of secularism

and the economic policies of the Democrats were perceived as undermining to Ataturk's legacy, especially in the DP's emphasis on the private enterprise and its policy of curbing bureaucratic control of the economy.

This is not to say that all measures that were taken by the DP's government were democratic. On the contrary, the government led by Adnan Menderes started to take harsh measures against the now-opposition CHP and most of the party's property was confiscated. The government also tarnished much of international reputation after the eruption of anti-Greek riots in Istanbul in 1955 which was revealed later to be initiated by the government in order to strengthening its position in negotiations over Cyprus which were then proceeding in London (Hale 1993). These measures besides the slow economic growth and the rising inflation rates were reflected badly on the DP support in the elections of 1957. On the military side, the government tried to implement some reforms proposed by Seyfi Kurtbek, the Minister of Defence in November 1952, that aimed to purge the top-heavy officers' corps, but the reforms were dropped less than a year later out of Menderes's fear of an angry reaction from the commanders whose jobs were threatened and Kurtbek was forced to resign in July 1953 (Hale 1993; Ahmad 1988).

But Menderes didn't think of the junior officers reactions who were irked by the cancellation of the reforms that could've granted them better opportunities professionally and financially, similar to what their counterparts in the Western militaries and other NATO armies have. The government allowed the military men no say in defense and foreign policy formulation, and on the financial level, for example, officers were suffering in the late 1950s from their low salaries that had failed to keep up with the rising inflation rates which was produced by the government economic policies. Menderes's government also resorted to marshal law and to push soldiers against civilian demonstrators. Later on, It was the junior officers who managed to overthrow Menderes's government after convincing Cemal Gursel, The commander of Land Forces to join them and lead their movement, though symbolically, to topple the regime in 1960.

During the first months of 1960, the political crisis worsened and the government was involved in several incidents that ignited the anger within the military ranks including staging, or at least allowing, physical attacks against Ataturk's closest fellow Ismet Inonu who was highly respected among army officers and cadets. The continuous use of military

in internal suppression against protesters and civilian opposition also led General Gursel to apply for a leave in protest on May 3, 1960 (Harb 2002). By the early morning of 27 May, both Istanbul and Ankara were swiftly taken over by the military units, Menderis was arrested in the city of Kutahya to be sent back to Ankara and Istanbul and Ankara radio stations broadcasted the news of the take over to the public owing it to "the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide" (Hale 1993; Weiker 1963). Gursel returned from Izmir, his hometown, to suddenly find himself the leader of the revolution (Hale 1993; Batur 1985).

Immediately after his return from Izmir to Ankara, Gursel decided to install a temporary military regime, which would create a new constitution, hold elections and transfer power to the winning party in just three months, but things didn't fold out as he expected.

2.1.4 THE PATH TO 1980 COUP

In the aftermath of the coup, DP leaders and cabinet members were arrested, Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers were hanged, DP sympathizers within the armed forces were purged and the Democratic Party was dissolved. But this was as far as the plotters - now the National Unity Committee of 38 members- (NUC) could plan. There was no clear roadmap to what will happen next other than the vague notion of restoring order. The generational conflict between the original conspirators of junior officers from low rank on one side and the old commanders on the other presented itself clearly in the months that followed the coup. While the high command, including Gursel, wanted to be true to its promise of a short military rule, a group of fourteen members of the NUC led by Colonel Alparslan Türkes attempted to take matters further and to maintain power, the high command reasserted itself and crushed these attempts in September 1960 by expelling the fourteen officers from the committee and then exiled before they were pardoned. Incidents that expressed the cleavage between younger officers and their seniors occurred more than once. One example is the attempt of sixty nine junior officers of the Ankara War School to dissolve the parliament. The attempt was aborted easily when the rest of the armed forces refused to follow suit (Kandil 2012).

Later, a commission of jurists and university professors designed a new constitution that created a constitutional court and second chamber, strengthened the judiciary, guaranteed civil rights, academic liberties and press freedoms. The constitution also established a mechanism for the officers to monitor and influence politics by creating the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK) that was dominated by the military which acquired wide-ranging powers (Anderson 2009). Other than this, the military took one step further into enhancing its interests by establishing one of its long standing economic entities. In March of 1961, the military established the Armed Forces' Trust and Pension Fund (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu, OYAK), which was a holding company run by civilians that channeled 10 per cent of officers' salaries toward industrial investment (Kandil 2012; Uzgel 2003). Though OYAK was designed as an insurance system and means of obtaining subsidized mortgages and other loans for the officer corps and the civilian employees of the ministry of defense, It turned to be one of the three largest conglomerates in the country which businesses varies from insurance, banking, automotive, petroleum, iron-steel, cement industries, tourism, food marketing (Ince 2013).

As Kandil (2007) puts it, the coup of 1960 "was carried out in defense of military interests and political stability, not to safeguard the republic's secular nature." By October 1961, the military returned to barracks, but the MGK was convening monthly to supervise the political course and to make policy recommendations for the civilian government (Heper and Güney 2000). On the long run, the coup consolidated democratic principles in Turkey, especially after the crushing of two minor attempts of military coups during the first half of 1960s and the execution of their main plotter: Talaat Aydemir. From 1963 to 1968, the civil-military relations seemed to have reached a calm haven. The remnants of the dissolved DP regrouped in a new political party under the name of the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel. In the first elections after the coup, AP won 35% of the votes, while the CHP came first by a small margin of 37%, but Demirel's party came out of the second election in 1965 with 53% of the votes when the CHP got just 29% of the votes. Dimerl was leading the government while Gursel was occupying the chair of president then followed by Chief of Staff Cevdet Sunay in 1966. In fact, Demirel was no different in personality or principles of Menderes, who chose him

for bureaucratic office, but the fate of his predecessor made him more cautious (Anderson 2009).

Not very far from Menderes's economic policies were those of Demirel. The new premiere supported standard import-substituting industrialization that was already enshrined in the 1961 constitution. These policies, however, disrupted the agriculture economy of the country and ignited injustice grievances among different classes in the society. The economic distress led to radicalization of youth all over the political spectrum, and the foundation of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) by the returning officer Colonel Alparslan Türkes widened the polarization and raised the societal tensions in the country. This came along with the rise of the new Islamist movement that attracted people of lower classes in both rural areas and urban ones. The National View (Milli Görüs), was founded in 1969 was led by the engineering professor Necmettin Erbakan who will, one year later, form his first political party: National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP).

The polarization and radicalization outside the military alerted the chiefs of the army who decided to act by issuing a communique to the president and the speaker of the parliament on March 12, 1971. Demirel's government was replaced by a technocratic one led by Nihat Erim. The new government amended the constitution, minority groups, leftists, radicals and Islamists were suppressed through the amendments, the MNP was dissolved and a number of military senior officers were purged (Aksin 2007). The MGK later in 1973 obtained wider authority when its job description changed to allow officers to present specific recommendations to the cabinet, the military enhanced its autonomy and the defense budget could no longer be discussed neither in parliament nor by the press. (Kandil 2012; Sakallioglu 1997).

In January 1980, the Turkish government decided to adopt several austerity measures that aimed mainly to install a free market economy in Turkey. But because of the political turmoil, these measures were far from effective. In August, the then undersecretary to the prime minister, head of the State Planning Organization and architect of the austerity measures, Turgut Özal stated his complains that the political climate was not ready for the new economic measures (Ahmad, 1981). The political climate had been foul for many years, nonetheless. Twelve short-term coalition governments were formed and dissolved

between January 1971 and December 1979. In the years between 1975 and 1980 more than 5000 Turkish citizens were killed and around 15000 were injured in politically-driven attacks and clashes. Turkey was about to witness its new episode of military coups.

2.1.5 THE ARMY'S MOVE

On September 12, 1980, the senior command of the army, led by the Chief of the General Staff, Kenan Evren, moved to overthrow the government of Suleyman Demirel. The military took over the country, and it's worth mentioning that it acted in a cohesive manner from the start. Six weeks after the coup, a new law (the Law on Constitutional Order) entrusted the military members of the MGK with legislative and executive power, and delegated everyday governance to technocrats (Kandil 2012; Kili 2003).

Kenan Evren, who stated that his army launched the coup "in order to restore democracy with all its principles and to replace a malfunctioning democracy" (quoted in Brown 1988) changed his positions fast and declared on July 24, 1981, that he didn't say "return of democracy", but "re-founding democracy". In one of his speeches, Evren said "I did not say 'return of democracy', but 're-founding democracy'. This is because 'return' would mean going back to pre-12 September …the bitterness of these days still burns in our hearts. Because of a degenerate democracy, democracy in name only, this nation suffered bigger casualties up to 11 September than it sustained in the Battle of Sakarya" (quoted in Kandil 2012).

To re-found democracy in Turkey, Evren used brutal measures; Parliament was dissolved; municipal councils were dismissed; and prominent politicians (including all party leaders) were imprisoned or banned from practicing politics for ten years. In a few months, 650,000 activists were detained, 230,000 were prosecuted, and among those 517 were sentenced to death (though only 50 were actually executed), and an additional 450 died under torture; 14,000 were stripped of their citizenship; and around 30,000 sought exile abroad (Helal 1999; Sahin 2012; Kandil 2016).

But the most important measure was the one that institutionalized militarism in Turkish politics more than anytime since the foundation of the republic. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution obliged the cabinet to prioritize, rather than just consider, MGK recommendations. And these recommendations, in turn, extended beyond security issues to school

curriculums, television programs, and bureaucratic appointments (Heper and Güney 2000). Ironically, the economic-related policies were initiated in the political arena with the complete eradication of the Left which could have been an obstacle in the face of military's liberalization policies. This is to say that the political autonomy that was developed through the constitution and the following practices has empowered the Turkish army to rule the military-industrial complex.

2.2 EGYPT

Unlike Turkey, Egypt's military suffered from a humiliating defeat in 1882 under the pretext of protecting Khedive Tewfik, the Egyptian ruler, from his own army. This was just after an attempt from Ahmed Urabi, the officer whose roots goes back to a modest peasant family in the Nile Delta, to push for reforms in order to repel the Anglo-French control over the Egyptian sovereign and to abolish his absolutist regime of Muhammad Ali's dynasty in the country. The move which was initiated by Urabi and his followers in the military inspired a revolution that later was known as Urabi Revolution in 1882. The British, out of concerns that the nationalist Urabi may try to regain control over Suez Canal and wouldn't be able to fulfill Egypt's massive debts, invaded the country. Though Urabi's movement was widely spread among the Egyptians, but when his army was defeated at the Battle of Tal El Kebir in September 1882, no immediate widespread resistance movement erupted to fight against the British occupation that lasted for more than seven decades. This was the only attempt from the Egyptian military to directly intervene in politics since its foundation by Muhammad Ali, who was ruling Egypt on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan, when he decided to form an army based on conscription in 1820.

Urabi's movement was the direct reason that lead to the British invasion to the country, and this must have been in the minds of the Free Officers when they decided to move - for the second time in the history of the Egyptian army- and stage a military coup in order to overthrow the monarch in 1952. For the military, the British mandate did not only exploit Egypt's resources and control its political scene by appointing loyal politicians or dismissing disloyal ones, but it also managed to keep the army understaffed and largely controlled by depriving it from training and modern equipment for more than five decades. During the occupation, Egypt witnessed a bottom-to-top all-civilian revolution in

1919. The liberal led revolution resulted in relatively nominal independence and a constitution in 1923, however the continuous cleavages between the monarch and the political parties were in favor of no one but the British. By late 1940s socioeconomic situation was dire.

2.2.1 THE ROAD TO 1952 COUP

Though the British occupation wanted the Egyptian military to be as understaffed and unqualified as possible, the possibility of the eruption in a new world war pushed the occupiers in 1936 to allow an enlarged military that could defend the cities and provide logistical support. And in the following decade the army expanded from 3000 to 100,000 men then dropped back after the Second World War to 36,000 men (Kandil 2012). During this period, Egyptian economy was mainly based on agriculture where 0.5% of landowners controlled 34% of the arable land, and 94% of the owners controlled just 35% of the land while 11 million peasants (almost half the population of 21 millions) were landless (Al-Bishri 2002). Moreover, capitalists and industrialists were weak in terms of their political influence as well as their representation in the country's economy in opposition to the landowners to the extent that manufacturing accounted for just 8% in the national income in the beginning of 1950s. This class of capitalists and bourgeoisie was represented in the last parliament before the coup with around 13%, in comparison with 63% for the landowners which meant that the capitalists were ready to "surrender the sword to a military dictatorship" in order to save and enhance their economic and political interests (Kandil 2016; Helal et al. 1986).

The Second World War also led to direct economic crises in the country; the unemployment percentage among artisans skyrocketed to 25% of the 1.3 million workers, while 10,000 university graduates were unemployed and the goods' prices rose by 600% (Al-Bishri 2002). Moreover, the Brits were able to control the Egyptian economic elite by, among other means, controlling the exports of Egyptian cotton to the rest of the empire.

Militarily, the army had many reasons to intervene in the political scene. Kandil (2012) counts three main motivations for the military to stage a coup in 1952; *"first, humiliation*

at home and abroad; second, the increased reliance on the military for domestic repression; and third, transferring control over military affairs from elected government to the monarch". The military motivations were present so as the socioeconomic ones given that most of the officers who undertook the coup were coming from landless families. In the end, on July 23, 1952 a group of midlevel army officers staged the coup that ended 147 years of Muhammed Ali's dynasty's rule in Egypt.

The Free Officers movement was established almost three years before the coup under the leadership of infantry lieutenant colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser. The member officers had different political tendencies, some of them -including Nasser himself at some point- had links to the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist group that was established in 1928 by the school teacher Hassan Al-Banna in the port city of Ismailia and had around 2 million followers in Egypt in the late 1940s, and a very few of them had Marxist leanings. Though the first leaflet in the name of the Free Officers was distributed in November 1949 (Kandil 2016; Ahmed 1993), the politicization of the corps surfaced years before when the British tanks forced King Farouk in 1942 to replace his existing government. The following decade witnessed many incidents that ignited the officers anger against the British occupation and the monarch. The incident with the most propounding consequences was the military's defeat in Palestine War in 1948, shortly after the foundation of the state of Israel on Egypt's eastern borders, due to the shortage in arms, training and logistical support. The defeat was scandalous especially that it was revealed later, in May 1950 through a parliamentary hearing, that the weapons the military used during the war were bought from the damaged World War weapons of Europe which was bought by the King's courtiers who got generous commissions in return (Al-Bishri 2002). Therefore It wasn't a surprise that the first communique after the coup denounced the corrupt politicians and their role in the army's defeat in Palestine War.

2.2.2 THE OFFICERS REPUBLIC

On the night of July 23, 1952, tens of midlevel officers seized the leadership of the military and arrested the leaders who didn't endorse the coup. King Farouk, stripped off his army, was powerless, few days later he was ousted and then departed the country for his

exile in Italy just 9 days after the coup. Shortly after the coup, the officers established the entity that will rule Egypt for the coming four years: the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). At the beginning of their movement, the Free Officers sought to reform Egyptian politics and return power to the civilians, however the fourteen-member RCC which assumed wide executive authorities and included representatives of all military service branches began to view its intervention as a way to reshape the whole political system. Just 7 months after the coup, Nasser announced that bringing in a new government "is a minor objective compared to the wider aims of our revolution. The latter [objective] seeks to change the political system." (Cook 2007; Audah 1987).

Nasser, who recruited Major General Muhammad Naguib as a figurehead to the movement in order to lend the coup the credibility of a senior officer, was the de facto leader of the RCC. In order for Nasser's decisions to pass, he aways managed to have the majority of the RCC votes in his pocket, and when Naguib challenged him, he was able to push him away for good. Naguib, who later became the first president of the republic after its declaration in mid 1953, was not able to effectively lead his government, and Nasser consolidated his power further and further over the years following. Within 24 months after the coup, all Nasser's opponents in the RCC and the higher ranks of the military were either exiled, asked to retire, under house arrest or even imprisoned. Moreover, 71 officers were killed in "random accidents" in the months between March 1953 and the end of the same year (Kandil 2016). This is to say that Nasser succeeded to build post-coup regime in his own image, a military one with a special focus on security as Nasser's first post after the coup was that of Interior Minister.

As an Interior Minister, Nasser was able to understand the security apparatus the British and the monarchy built for seven decades, upon which he later established his security state. The police was no part of the coup, however the Free Officers cultivated their relations before the coup with few police officers in the high tier of the interior ministry. In December 1953, Zakaria Mohiyeddin, one of Nasser's aids and a member of the Free Officers, established the General Intelligence Service (GIS) before forming another intelligence unit under the name of President's Bureau of Information (PBI) that's directly run by Nasser himself after he held office in 1956. It's also noteworthy that during the early stages of the foundation of the republic's security apparatus, the Egyptians depended

heavily on the American financial support and expertise but later they turned to the Russian KGP and the Eastern German Stasi (Kandil 2016; Nasr 1999). At the same time, Nasser was widening his control over the military through his old friend and "soulmate" Abd al-Hakim Amer who was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces after Nasser pressured Naguib to promote him from major to major general (rising four ranks in a single shot) in his first days as a president. Amer's main task in the army was to coup-proof the military by monitoring suspicious activities.

Politically, Nasser was aware of the importance of mobilizing people and gaining their support. Therefore he worked hard through many mechanisms to ensure that he had the upper hand in propaganda, including forming a political entity to support his decisions and to organize popular rallies in the benefit of the government under the name of the Liberation Rally, he also founded the National Guidance ministry, a new ministry to spread his messages, enhance his political discourse and tarnish the reputation of his enemies (i.e: Naguib).

Anouar Abdel Malek (1968) specifies three main phases of the gradual control over the state and society by the officers' regime under Nasser; The first stage (1952-1956) aimed to modify the structure of the authority in order to establish a modern, independent, industrial society. Nasser was able to achieve this by abolishing the monarchy, the foundation of the republic, the dissolution of all political parties in 1953 (but the Muslim Brotherhood which he kept for one more year), the exclusion of the old efficient liberal political elite and replacing them by the trustworthy officers and technocrats with American and West German leanings. The officers hoped in this phase that the new laws they issued to encourage industrialization will be enough for the local capitalists to invest into manufacturing, however more than 70% of the new investments was directed to real-estate and the military regime failed to convince the financial and industrial sectors of the Egyptian bourgeoisie to help in the mission of social transformation.

The second stage (1956-1961) was marked by the Suez crisis in October 1956; After Egypt and Britain concluded an agreement on the phased evacuation of British troops from the Suez base in October 1954, the creation of Baghdad Pact in 1955 seemed to Nasser as a British attempt to divert the Eastern Arab bloc away from Egypt and closer to London. Nasser then decided to challenge Britain by calling to overthrow the Iraqi

Prime Minister Nuri Al Said, Britain's closest Arab ally. At the same time the American administration and Eisenhower :, angered by Nasser's recognition of the People's Republic of China, decided to withdraw all American financial aid for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser responded by Nationalizing the Suez Canal in front of an ecstatic crowd in Alexandria in July 26, 1956. His move led to the Franco-British-Israeli war against Egypt.

The result of the assault was unexpected; 55 French and British companies were 'Egyptianized' which gave the Egyptian public sector its biggest push and allowed the rulers of Egypt to partner with the most important groups of the country's bourgeoisie. This second stage could be described as the stage of coalition between the military apparatus and the financial industrial sectors of the bourgeoisie. In the political arena, this coalition wasn't that effective as the officers wanted it to merely focus on the economic issues. So when the parliament was elected, the bourgeoisie groups was represented but not at all effective in forging the policies of the country, they therefore didn't show support to the regime's economic policies and they were resistant to invest in the industrial sector which led the military regime to initiate the third phase of its hegemony over the state's economy.

The third stage (July 1961 - June 1967) started with the passing of the nationalization law and in few months the whole economic scene of the country was militarized. By the beginning of 1962, On one hand, all banks, heavy industries, insurance companies, and all major economic projects were owned by the state, on the other hand, it became mandatory for all new medium enterprises to accept a governmental partnership with 51% of its capital hence its management. The regime didn't let the small enterprises to work without allowing the government to have considerable shares. In August 1963, another 228 transportation, mining and manufacturing companies were nationalized, then in November 177 others including three weapons factories were nationalized. Now, for the first time in the republic's history, the public sector, controlled 80% of industries in opposition to 34% the year before. By the end of this stage, the officers corps were organically merged in the political, economic and managerial groups to the extent that there were 500 officers who were asked to leave the military and later were appointed on the top of public sector enterprises between 1952-1964 (Abdel-Malek 1968).

Less than one year later, in June 1967, Egypt suffered the worst defeat in its modern history against Israel. The reasons behind this defeat could be traced back to the unreadiness of the army, the cleavages between Nasser and Amer over military affairs and the reckless nature of the latter who, in May 1967, mobilized the army into Sinai; the move he never imagined to trigger the war that destroyed the Egyptian armed forces. In the 6 days following June 5, 1967, Egypt lost Sinai Peninsula and Gaza to the Israeli forces, 85% of its air force on the ground, 17 airfields, 700 tanks, 450 field guns, together with 17500 soldiers of whom 11500 were killed and the rest injured or captured (Kandil 2016; Gamasy 1993).

For Abd al-Ghany al-Gamasy (1993), the chief of staff and the War Minister between December 1973 to October 1978, the defeat occurred because of the focus of the armed forces on economic projects, "The armed forces became involved in land reclamation, housing, the national transport system…the growing power and presence of the army in civilian life was detrimental to its main responsibility, which was to be a fighting force, ready for battle" (Gamasy 1993)

Amer committed suicide (or was killed according to his family and other accounts) just few weeks after the Six-Day War. The defeat was humiliating, but it didn't spur a public revolt, on the contrary, it raised the popularity of Nasser who used the defeat to purge Amer's network in the army and minimize its direct political role. After All, when Nasser died three years later, seven million devastated mourners took part in his funeral.

2.2.3 SADAT'S ERA: THE RISE OF THE POLICE STATE

When Anwar Sadat (1918-1981) came to power in 1970 after Nasser's death, he was perceived as a week and unpopular leader. Sadat, who was serving as a vice president during the last years of Nasser's era, worked very hard to eradicate the political, security and military centers of power that Nasser left behind. By May 1971, Sadat had all of his rivals in intelligence, security and military (including Mohamed Fawzy, his War Minister) arrested by the Interior Ministry, they were tried by an emergency court and all of them were handed different prison sentences. On May 20, Sadat demanded the parliament to draft a new constitution, and on September 11, 1971 the "Permanent Constitution of

Egypt" was approved by the majority of Egyptians in a public referendum. Sadat referred to the arrests of his rivals and the dismantling of the power centers as the "Corrective Revolution". But this "revolution" led to a new phase of the Egyptian state, marked by the rise of the police apparatus and its infamous State Security Investigations Service aka State Security (SS). The rise of the Interior Ministry which pushed away the military from the center stage of politics created mutual hostility that will last for many years to come.

Away from the interior ministry, Sadat had a war to fight. By October 1973, Egypt had mobilized an army of 1.2 million, and on October 6, in order to liberate their lands from the Israeli occupation, Egyptian and Syrian forces staged massive attacks against the Israeli forces on two fronts in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights respectively. The war ended, on Sinai front, with what was described as Egypt's "lost victory" by the Sunday times (Kandil 2016; Ghaleb 2001). But this was what Sadat aimed for from the very beginning, a symbolic war to guarantee him a better situation in negotiations which started just few weeks after the end of the war and was concluded in Camp David six years later. But Sadat didn't wait long to re-direct the military as a whole from a combat-oriented to an economic institution, famously declaring that October 1973 was Egypt's last war and that the army should now direct its energy towards the 'war of economic development' against the will of many in the first tier of the armed forces, among whom the newly appointed Chief of Staff Gamasy (Kandil 2016).

Sadat's plans for the military and for the whole country were passing through the West. He used the negotiations with Israel to get closer to the Americans which he had mutual understandings with over all major issues. This mutual understanding lasted for all of his tenure until his assassination in 1981. During this period, Sadat secured a stable support and an annual military aid of 1.3$ billion from the United States, in return, he helped fighting the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran through Saddam Hussein regime during the early stages of Iraqi Iranian war, mobilized, trained and armed the Jihadis to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and finally adopted a new economic liberalization policies that were totally on the opposite direction of what Nasser planned for the country. In 1974 the country was open for foreign investments, however the sectors that benefited from the new policy were mainly the non-industrial services sectors and the real-estate ones. Sadat's policies, that required the lifting of governmental subsidies, angered the

people and ignited a wave of million-man protests in January 1977. And though Sadat was trying to marginalize the military in the post-war era, he used the armed forces to suppress the protests, but later asked the MOI's SS to keep tracking of all army personnel and vehicles deployed in the streets out of fear that his War Minister Gamasy is planning a military coup. Since then, the Interior Ministry became the indispensable coercive service in the regime replacing the military who held this role since 1952.

2.2.4 THIS LAND IS THE ARMY'S LAND

The armed forces, however, started to engage more and more in the civilian economic and industrial projects starting in mid 1970s. In April 1975 Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE each contributed $260 million to create and finance the Arab Military Industries Organization (AMIO), Egypt became the sole owner of the enterprise in 1979 after the other Arab states withdrew in protest of Sadat's unilateral peace treaty with Israel. Sadat then renamed it the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI). The organization which was meant to focuse on supplying the defense equipment needs of the Egyptian Armed Forces, expanded its work to the civilian realm including fields such as: water treatment projects, railways projects, vehicles, agricultural equipment, household appliances and medical equipment. The organization runs eleven factories across Egypt that produce military and civilian equipment and has several international joint ventures with European, American, and Asian conglomerates (Morsy 2014). But the development of the AOI was to some extent gradual, unlike other projects of the army. In 1978, Sadat effectively redirected the army towards economic developments projects through the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO). Established in 1979, the NSPO has the mission of helping the Egyptian military avoid dependence on the private market for obtaining goods. The body has created companies controlled by the military that invest in different sectors of the domestic economy. The website of the NSPO currently lists 21 companies that operate in a wide array of economic sectors including construction, agriculture, food production, and cement, in addition to directly managing hotels and security services.

The idea behind reproducing the military as an economic actor was, as Sadat decreed, for the army to maintain self-sufficiency and to contribute to the national economic development. This was reaffirmed by President Hosni Mubarak during his tenure as the military expanded its business establishing one more conglomerate in 1984 under the name of the National Organization for Military Production (NOMP). The organization, which run by the Ministry of Military Production, manages at least eighteen factories that produce mainly military armaments and munitions, in addition to some civilian goods such as electronics and sports equipment.

Few months before his assassination by a group of military men on October 6, 1981, Sadat issued a presidential decree that guaranteed around ninety-four percent of the country's overall surface area to the military for management allocation. According to the decree, ~~the military also has the right to auction off land originally used for military purposes, and to collect any proceeds for the construction of alternative military sites or facilities~~ (Barayez 2016). Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat smoothly, went one step further by establishing the Armed Forces Land Projects Organization (AFLPO), vesting it with the power to manage the sale of military-owned lands, as well as the returns from building alternative military facilities. This is to say that no plot of land in Egypt can be allocated without the initial approval of the Ministry of Defense, according to laws that were issued in 1981, which governs the use of state-owned desert land. These laws were amended several times to grant the military further flexibility in its management of the land. According to these laws, The Defense Minister determines which desert land is to be used for military or strategic ends, rendering these lands unavailable for other public agencies or for private use. In the same vein, only the Minister has the legal right to alter lands earmarked for strategic or military purposes. He is thus the ultimate authority controlling the use of desert land.

One of the main concerns about the military's grip over power is the fact that the generals are not entitled to disclose any information on the army's businesses to the public. Even the volume of the military's economy is being treated as a national security classified information to the extent that estimates of the share of the national economy that the military controls differs widely between 5 to 40 percent. The absolute power of the officers over the land, and the lack of accountability allowed corruption to spread within these

enterprises (Cook 2007), and the end that the army aimed at by engaging civilian projects were lost as Egypt's military enterprises were subsidized to such an extent that these business activities were an actual drain on the overall state budget (Springborg 1987).

The military under Mubarak kept enjoying a long list of privileges. In 1986, a law was issued on custom exemptions specified that imports of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Military Production are exempt from any taxation, this was followed by other laws such as the Article 47 of Egypt's 2005 income tax law which stated that the military businesses' profits are exempt from taxes and business licensing requirements.

2.2.5 THE LONG PAUSE BEFORE THE UPRISING

By the end of the 1980s, the Egyptian economy was suffering. The main sources of income was deeply harmed for different reasons; oil prices fell, Suez Canal tariffs dropped and millions of Egyptians working in the oil-rich countries were coming back to their country due to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, Egypt's debt was off the charts by $40 billion in 1987 and the government declared bankruptcy in 1989. The War against Iraq provided Mubarak with a way out, when U.S President George Bush offered his Egyptian counterpart to eliminate half of Egypt's foreign debt in 1991 in order for Egypt to take part in the war. Mubarak agreed, and in the same year, Mubarak adopted an IMF-tailored Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program that called for reducing social welfare and selling public companies in order to bring state expenditures and debt under control (Kandil 2016). The 1990s was a tough decade for the middle and lower classes of Egyptians; By 1999 most of the subsidies the government was providing in the 1980 were cut, the public sector was restructured by the force of law to allow privatization of the public enterprises.

Though the economic reform program brought some good numbers for the government reducing the budget deficit from 15.3 percent to 3 percent of GDP, and achieving a 5 percent growth rate (Kandil 2016; Mitchell 2002), the privatization process led neither to "state capitalism" nor to a genuine free-market economy, but to distorted capitalist development that pushed the military to tighten its grip over its economic enterprises. ~~And in order to hedge against the Mubarak government's campaign of economic liberalization

and privatization, Egypt's military leaders diversified their formerly statist economic portfolio with financing and technology from foreign and domestic private sector sources, as well as joint partnerships with a variety of nonmilitary businessmen and foreign interests (Marshall 2015). ~~

As of the beginning of 2000s, real estate replaced agriculture as the third largest non oil investment sector in the country, and given the fact that only 4 % of the country's land is populated while the rest is classified as public land, the military as an institution, being the main controller of the land, benefited in an unprecedented way form the real estate boom by selling the lands or giving licenses to investors who were investing in resorts, gated compounds and American-style suburbs. This boom didn't bring a positive change for the average citizens in the country. Indeed, more than 50% of the Egyptians were living below the poverty line (with less than $2 per day). Many of the Egyptians were either living in the graveyards in the outskirts of Cairo or in shantytowns with no schools, hospitals or sewage systems. This is to say that the economic boom benefited a very limited number of businessmen who later became the new political elite of Egypt. The public figure of this new political/business elite was no one but the president's son himself: Gamal Mubarak.

In 2000, Gamal, the former banker, started to shine as the new young face of the regime. He started by establishing the Future Generation Foundation, then Mubarak appointed him as the head of the Youth and Development Committee in the General Secretariat of his ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and in two years he founded a new entity in the party; the Policies Committee, which became later the main engine behind the party's campaigning and its grassroots organizing activities. The rise of Gamal's neoliberal friends into the political arena as the new government ministers in the summer of 2004 marked a new phase of Egypt's political history. The government which was basically formed of businessmen managed to stay in power, with a few ministerial changes, until the eruption of the Egyptian revolution in January 25th, 2011. This cabinet continued, with faster paces, the processes of privatisation of the public sector and the liberalization of economy. The rise of businessmen in the the executive branch of the state was preceded by a growing influence of the businessmen in the ruling party and the legislative one as well as well, with their share of the parliament seats doubled between 1995 and 2000

from 8% to 17% of parliament (Kandil 2016; Abu Reeda 2001). The rise of the neoliberal policies and the exponential growth of the public sector affected the military expenditure in an obvious way. For example, the military share of the budget was around 20% in the mid 1980s, this percentage started to decline in the 90s and reached its lowest point ever in the last budget estimation of Mubarak regime with about 6%. Though the military was pushed away by Mubarak's son and his friends in the government, the officers was compensated, not only by keeping their enterprises immune from the privatization epidemic, but also by allowing them to expand their economic activities in the civilian realm with the same old privileges of tax exemptions and governmental subsidies.

The economic scene in the beginning of 2000s was, as Zeinab Abul-Magd puts it, totally "militarized" with the military conquering "old and new markets targeting all socioeconomic groups in the nation, from the globalized bourgeois desiring luxury goods to the middle and lower classes in need of affordable supplies." (Abul-Magd 2017). This expansion of the military economic activities could be easily seen in the sectors of transportation, shipbuilding and steelmaking among other strategic economic sectors. The whole picture seemed to be bright, as the GDP increased between 2000 and 2009 from $92.4 billion to $187.3 billion and the economy was growing by 5% annually in 2009, but these numbers didn't reflect on the living conditions of Egyptians. The per capita GDP was 7% lower in 2006 than in 2000, and in 2010 the unemployment was estimated at 26.3% while almost four fifths of the Egyptians had no access to clean drinking water. So, despite the privileges the military enjoyed on the economic level, the rise of the neoliberal class in the government and parliament reflected badly on the Egyptians, so when millions of Egyptians (perhaps 12 millions through the 18 days between January 25th to February 11th) took to the streets in the beginning of 2011 chanting and demanding "Bread, Freedom and Social Justice", the military didn't seem to be willing to invest much to rescue Mubarak and his falling regime.

By the end of 2010, a rigged parliamentary elections were held that resulted in an NDP parliament dominated parliament with 93% of the seats (473 seats out of 508). The public political resentment was accompanied by a social one when a 28 years old man was tortured to death in the streets of Alexandria. The security situation was very worrisome for Egyptians as well; On Saturday, 1 January 2011. Twenty-three people died as a result of

an attack on a church in Alexandria too as Christian worshipers were leaving a new year service. In the wake of the attack, the State Security tortured Sayyed Belal, a 30-year old Salafi (a non-hierarchal apolitical religious group with ultraconservative tendencies) to death. All of these incidents along with the deteriorating economic situation, the rise of the mobilizing political discourse on social media platforms and the good news of the ousting of the long-ruling dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia were among the reasons of the Egyptian revolt On January 25th, 2011.

2.2.6 THE TRANSITION: SOLDIERS IN STREETS, SOLDIERS IN PALACES

The protests in January 2011 surprised the security apparatus in the country, and in just three days, on January 28, the ministry of interior was out of the game when all of its Central Security Forces troops left their positions running away in, mostly leaving their uniforms behind, from the furious protesters. The army deployed its forces the evening of the same day and the country's institutions went in a coma for the coming two weeks. On February 11, 2011, just 18 days after the eruption of the first protests in the Egyptian big cities, Mubarak transferred full executive and legislative powers to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the commanding body of the Egyptian Armed Forces. The SCAF is normally consisting of the minister of defense and his assistants, the chiefs of staff of the various branches of the army, heads of military intelligence and other services of the military, and finally the commanders of the five military regions. Though the SCAF has worked hard to convince the Egyptians that it represents the interests of the country, it has sought only to defend the privileged position of the military, straddling the state apparatus and economy through a network of active and retired officers (Sayigh 2012).

To objectively analyze the rule of the SCAF, we need to understand the reasons behind its intervention in favor of Mubarak's ousting in the first place. The SCAF, though controlled the political and security institutions, refused to undergo any revolutionary changes that could effectively change the position of the military to be put under civilian oversight. In fact, SCAF members had been looking to the revolutionaries in a paternalistic way to the extent that Mamdouh Shahin, one member of the SCAF, stated that the

relationship between the military and the revolutionaries "resembles a father whose son goes to school, and he encourages him to study every once in a while, saying: 'Study my dear for my sake'. Then the exam time draws near, and he has to yell at him: 'Attend to your studies!'" (Mamduh Shahin in Bahnasawy 2011; Kandil 2016). This paternalistic view was extended to include all politicians in Egypt regardless their ideological background. The course of actions that the military took afterwards showed that the military didn't save the revolution, which is the famous notion that was being repeatedly stated by the officers, but on the contrary, it saved the military and the state bureaucracy from all kinds of revolutionary changes.

Through its direct supervision of the new constitutional amendments (March 19th) and the whole transition process until the presidency was transferred to a civilian in June 2012 and even within the year of Morsi's tenure before the military coup in July 2013, the SCAF was able to advance its economic interests in an unprecedented way. For example, On February 11, 2011, the same day of Mubarak's resignation and when the whole country's institutions were frozen, the Egyptian navy renegotiated a $13 million contract with the U.S. firm Swiftships that had originally been signed in 2008. The revised contract, which came at an increased cost of $20, provided for an Egyptian shipyard to participate in the assembly and production of the vessels (Marshall 2015). And when the army deployed its soldiers, in the early stages of the protests and during the transitional period, to secure the strategic institutions of the state, it also deployed the troops to secure the economic partners of the military, such as the Kuwaiti conglomerate Al-Kharafi while failing to secure the economic firms of the neo-liberal friends of Mubarak's son, or even the firms that are owned by the Muslim Brotherhood figures. The SCAF knew it won't be able to sustain its power if there is a civilian supervision, so in May 2011, the SCAF amended the law on the military judiciary adding an article to give only military prosecutors and military judges the right to investigate illicit gains by army officers even the retirees. This law, which the SCAF engineered in the absence of the parliament, effectively shields them from any prosecution under the civilian system (Morsy 2014). The attempts of military to continue manipulating power lasted even after the election of a parliament in November 2011 and even after the rise of Mohamed Morsi to be the president in 2012, though with some opposition.

The opposition to the military control over political and economic realms of the country erupted since the first days of the revolution, but the political arrangements between the different parties and the SCAF allowed the military to keep its privileges and to give them a legitimacy needed from the major political players. But when the SCAF faced harsh critiques, the response was always harsher. In March 2012, when members of the parliamentary bloc of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, blamed the SCAF for the continued economic crises of the country after the revolution, the SCAF member and the Minister of Defense Assistant for Financial Affairs stated "We will fight for our projects, and this is a battle that we won't withdraw from. We will not give up on our 30-year long efforts for someone else to destroy. We won't allow anyone--no matter who-- to come anywhere near the armed forces projects." (Quoted in Gamal 2012). The military continue keeping its economic activities as a matter of secrecy even before the most powerful oversight agencies in the Egyptian state, including the significant Administrative Monitoring Authority which was established in 1958 with enormous authorities to combat corruption.

2.2.7 MOHAMED MORSI: A CIVILIAN PRESIDENT IN A MILITARIZED NATION

Mohamed Morsi became the first democratically elected civilian president in the history of Egypt after a difficult presidential elections between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) candidate, Mohamed Morsi and the Mubarak's regime last Prime Minister, Ahmed Shafiq, with a small margin of 51.7% of the popular votes. Morsi, the Engineering professor who served as the Chairman of MB's political bureau and the former head of the MB parliamentary bloc, was the second in nomination line of the Muslim Brotherhood after its strongman and deputy chairman Khairat Al Shater. The SCAF didn't allow Shater to run citing Mubarak's regime laws, so Mohamed Morsi ran as the "only Islamic candidate" as mentioned by his campaign.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which is a reformist Islamic organization, is not a revolutionary by nature. Formed mainly by middle-class professionals, the grassroots movement was able to maintain and grow its activism for more than 80 years in Egypt and beyond. Founded in 1928 as a religious organization, the group turned into politics in the 1930s,

supported the Free Officers in their coup of 1952 and received a preferential treatment at the beginning before the clash with Nasser occurred in 1954. And despite being under continues pressure since then, the MB has been one of the most active political players in Egypt since the foundation of the republic. And because of the dredging of the civil society soil in Egypt since the foundation of the republic, the MB, which was working underground as it has been legally banned, was the most powerful popular movement in the country when Mubarak's regime came to an end. Though the MB didn't participate in the first days of the 2011 revolution, the group joined the protests on January 28th, and took part in the negotiations with Mubarak's regime and the SCAF afterwards. So when the MB pushed Mohamed Morsi to run for president, he rightly knew that he was having the most powerful political machine behind him.

But because of its counter-revolutionary nature, which was clearly expressed by the founder Hassan El Banna several times in his epistles, the MB were not able to maintain a revolutionary agenda. The Islamist ideology and the confusing attitudes of the movement didn't allow it to be a trustworthy partner for the military. For At the early stages of the revolution, and given the zeal of the young revolutionaries and the power of the Brotherhood to pacifying them ideologically, the MB therefore became the player the SCAF aimed to both engage and contain. The coalition between the MB and the SCAF didn't mean a permanent mutual support, but rather a sort of circumstantial understanding that granted the MB relative powers as long as the elected leadership of FJP maintains noninterference policy on key issues.

Despite the early demands for accountability, some of which were called for by the FJP MPs, the constitutional principles that enshrines legal immunity for the army, such as those setting the military's budget and activities above the reach of conventional parliamentary oversight, was later included in the constitution that was ratified in a popular referendum under the MB rule in December 2012 (Eskandar 2013). Though Morsi managed to reshuffle the armed forces' general command without offending military sensibilities just six weeks after inauguration, the constitution came as the cherry on the top of the understanding between the FJP and the SCAF. Moreover the economic machine of the military was running in full power mode on the ground. In the first half of 2013, for example, the military acquired Al-Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company, in April,

Morsi was promised while in Moscow that Russia was going to invest in the automobile enterprise whose assets the EAF likely acquired for free (Marshall 2015). However, the spring came to an end when the MB and the military differed over the massive Suez Canal Corridor Development Project.

When the FJP announced the project of turning the Suez Canal into a major center of heavy manufacturing and a logistical hub, they were tackling one of the projects that was in the officers minds for a long time. The plan, in the military minds, meant a very lucrative project that would've benefitted almost every single military economic enterprise. Now with the FJP talking about Indian partnership, or foreign investments in general, the military viewed a real threat. Suez Canal holds an enormous economic and symbolic importance for the military, so the comments from military leaders rejecting the FJP plans didn't come of a surprise. In addition to the official stance, the media figures, which are known to have links with the military intelligence, waged a war against Morsi and his government for their alleged that the president is going to sell the canal to foreign powers. The sentiments adopted in the media were reminding Egyptians of the military's responsibility for securing the country's strategic resources. After public debates and contradicting statements from governmental officials and military spokespersons, the FJP's housing minister, Tarek Wafiq, was quoted in Almasry Alyoum newspaper stating that "There will be no development projects without the consultation with the Armed Forces.. as the development in Sinai is a matter of state security" (Fikry et al. 2013). This is not to say that the Suez Canal plan was the only reason for the dispute between the MB and the army that was concluded by the military coup in July, but one could argue that this was a major incentive for the military, along with many political and social reasons. The ill-judged moves of Morsi, the unwillingness of the state bureaucracy to cooperate with the MB government, the coalition between Mubarak regime's remnants and the revolutionaries, the support of anti-islamist Gulf states (namely the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia) and the media incitement against the Brotherhood were among the reasons for the mass protests which were supported by the security apparatus and the military intelligence on the 30th of June 2013. Three days later, On 3 July evening, Abdelfatah El Sisi, Morsi's Defense Minister, ended the first and only democratically elected president tenure in a televised speech

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"
Who will guard the guards?"
Juvenal

"Who will watch the watchmen"? This question had been in the center of the civil-military relations studies and is as old as the field of study itself. The paradox is quite clear; the very institution that was created to protect the state is given enough power to pose a threat to the state itself. How can the statesmen and the people guarantee that the guards and the militants won't turn against them? Most of the recent attempts to answer this question built upon the post World War II literature, namely the landmark study by Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (1975) which he introduced his thesis that the professionalization of the officer corps is the essence of a solution to ensuring effective civilian control of the armed forces. It won't be an exaggeration to say that most of what has been written since has been an explicit or implicit response to Huntington's argument (Feaver 1999).

Though the literature focused in its early stages on the American and West European experiences, the second half of the 20th century brought a lot of attention to the Latin American, Middle Eastern and African civil military relations. However, the Middle East has been characterized with its 'exceptionalism' as a region with very weak ability to develop a healthy civil-military relations (Owen 1992). While Roger Owen (1992) and Eva Bellin (2004) exclude Islam as a factor of the local tendency to military rule, Bellin counts a number of factors that explains the region's failure to democratize such as the lack of a strong civil society, a market-driven economy, adequate income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, and democratic culture (Bellin 2004). This is not to say that the regimes of the Middle Eastern states avoided calls for liberalization, on the contrary, countries

like Egypt and Turkey initiated their economic reforms in the 1970s and the 1980s respectively, however, as Ellen Lust (2015) suggests, there has been so little change in the very states that have announced the initiation of liberalization. This is more likely because the liberalization calls were initiated in both countries after military coups or in the times when military had an upper hand in politics and society. In order to understand the specifics of the countries studied in this paper, one should shed lights on the theories of military coups in general.

3.1 MILITARY CLASSIFICATIONS

The different types of military institutions have been always seen as a main factor in the decision of officers to stage a coup d'etat.

Eric Nordlinger (1977) classified military institutions into three types. The first is the ruler type and constitutes about 10% of all military institutions, controls government and dominates the political process, and remains in power for a long period of time (such as Egypt's 1952-1970 regime).

The second is the guardian type that takes over government for a short period of time, maintains the interests of the middle class and the status quo, and refrains from mobilizational politics (such as Turkey's 1980-1983 regime).

The third and last type is the moderator type that exercises veto power over civilian governments but refrains from actually taking over government, this might be the case of the Turkey's military during the 1971 memorandum.

3.2 COUP THEORIES

The body of scholarly work on the motives behind military coups[1] is considerable where many scholars have devoted their careers trying to explain why the probability of military coups is higher in some countries than others.

3.2.1 DIFFERENT TYEPES OF MILITARY COUPS

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[1] Military Coup is generally defined as a seizure of a state by members of the military, or other figures high-up in a national government.

This scholarly work also tackles the different types of military coups, Samuel P. Huntington in his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies classifies military coups into three categories: First, The breakthrough coup, in which a revolutionary group—civilian, military, or consisting of political opposition—overthrows the seated government and names themselves the new leaders. Egypt's 1952 military coup that was the direct reason for the foundation of the republic might be a good example for this type.

Second, The Guardian Coup which occurs when one elite seizes power from another elite, usually justifying the action by saying it's for the broader good of the nation. In this sense and given the very similar political discourses that was used by military leaders (Evren in Turkey and Sisi in Egypt) to justify their movement to topple democratically elected governments, I argue that both Egypt's 2013 and Turkey's 1980 coups could be considered as guardian coups.

The third type is the veto coup, which tends to occur when the military intervenes to protect a status quo from radical political change. Given the changes that were called for by the Islamist-led government after the elections of 1995, the case of the Turkish military intervention in February 1997[2] could be considered as a veto coup.

3.2.2 DRIVERS OF MILITARY COUPS

There is also a huge amount of theories, models, hypotheses and analyses that are completing, or even contradicting, each other. It's not of the scope of this paper to cover all the complexities of such work, but a brief summary of this literature was introduced by Steffan Wiking in his book on the Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa. Wiking (1983) lists a number of reasons that could explain the military corps intervention into politics.

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[2] The 1995 parliamentary election led to overwhelming gains for the Islamist Welfare party, which took power the following year as the head of a coalition government. In 1997 the military issued a series of "recommendations", which the government had no choice but to accept. The prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, agreed to a compulsory eight-year education programme (to prevent pupils from enrolling in religious schools), a headscarf ban at universities, and other measures. Erbakan was then forced to resign. The Welfare party was shut down in 1998, and Erbakan was banned from politics for five years. Some former members of the party, including president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, would eventually go on to found the now-ruling Justice and Development Party.

First, the foreign interests and the foreign influence as a decisive factor of military coups. Zoltan Barany, though answering a different question of how armies respond to revolutions, adds the foreign influence as one of the main factors for the officers to whether support or suppress a popular revolution (Barany 2016). The positive assessments of the military regimes in Latin America, Africa and Middle East by the Western theorists in the 1960s and 1970s give much credibility to this notion. Lucian W. Pye (1966) perceived the military rule as "a dynamic and self-sacrificing military leadership committed to progress and the task of modernizing transitional societies that have been subverted by the 'corrupt practices' of politicians". For Pye, the political stability that the military rule provides could offer "firmer policies against communism" (Pye 1966). This positive assessment was vital to, later, provide military and economic aid to military regimes in the region.

Second, the explanations connected with societal conditions. These societal conditions could be related to the military as a social institution or to the society in total. Bassam Tibi (1972) have concluded, after analyzing the the military coup in Peru and its aftermaths, that the officers had been influenced by their social awareness in their decision to stage the coup of 1968. Janowitz (1964) and Finer (1966) add more weight to the political culture and the strength of civil society and civilian institutional organization. On the military level, Huntington (2006), Abrahamsson (1972) and Nordlinger (1977) gives huge importance to the level of education and professionalism of the military that's affecting the officers' interpretation of the performance of civilian leaders. For Huntington, the failure of civilian governments, the slow development of political institutions along with the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics and the political violence could be main causes for the officers to intervene as the coup often "marks the end of a sequence of violence in politics" (Huntington 1968).

But the societal reasons are not agreed upon among scholars as the most decisive motives of military coups. Samuel Decalo (1990) focuses his analyses on the examination of national political institutions and the internal politics and dynamics of the military. However, as Amina Ibrahim clarifies, in her study of the Pakistan's military coups motives, the internal dynamics of the military do not exist in an isolated environment. They are

rather impacted by factors such as institutional interests, governmental efficiency and, of course, the economic context (Ibrahim 2009).

The economic difficulties also could create the opportunity for military coups. Welch (1970), Nordlinger (1977) and Hyden (1972), among many researchers, cite the economic stagnation, corruption and nepotism as reasons for the officers to intervene and change the political regime. Other than this, the relationship between the popular discontent and the economic decline on one hand, which leads for the political regime to lose chunks of its legitimacy, and the military coups on the other hand was mentioned by Goran Hyden. Wiking (1974) found that most of the poorest African countries witnessed military coups while the majority of the richest countries had not experienced coups (Wiking 1983). The case for Turkey or Egypt is not very far from these findings; in Turkey, for example, Before the 1960 and 1980 coups, 1971 and 2007 memoranda, as well as the failed coup attempts in 1962 and 2016, economic growth slowed down compared to a previous five-year period (Yagci 2017). The situation in Egypt was also similar with unemployment of 20% and where the currency had fallen 12% against the dollar in the first half of 2013. This paper draws from the aforementioned literature its first Hypothesis:

H1: Poor economic performance might lead to popular unrest and therefore might increase coup risk in Turkey and Egypt

3.3 CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN EGYPT AND TURKEY

The republics in both Turkey and Egypt were founded as a direct result of military coups in 1923 and 1952 respectively, therefore the officers in Ankara as well as in Cairo perceive themselves as above politics and even society (Sakallioglu 1997; Marshall 2015). This notion of paternalism didn't prevent the army from intervening to change political regimes. Samuel Finer's work is very important to understand the nature of regimes in the two countries.

Applying Finer's definitions, the regimes in Egypt and Turkey would be considered as regimes of military provenance. The regime of military provenance "is any regime that has owed its establishment to some military intervention" (Finer 1962). However, the regimes in the two countries are not necessarily military regimes. Turkey, for example, until the coup of 1960, was a regime of military provenance, but not a military regime. In

his seminal work "The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics", Finer proposes three different types of military regimes that come as a result of military interventions. The first is the indirect rule where a civilian government rules with constitutional responsibilities. In this type the military regime comes about when intervention is carried only to the level of blackmail (which presupposes a civilian government being blackmailed by the military) or of displacement (which presupposes one civilian government being changed for another). The indirect rule beholds two different classifications: Limited indirect rule (where the military intervenes from time to time to secure limited objectives) and Complete (where the military controls all activities of of the nominal government). The second type is a dual regime, where the regime rests on two pillars; the army and a civilian party. The third is direct rule, where "the army itself assumes responsibility, although it may well appoint a civilian cabinet. The direct rule also could be classified into two kinds: where the military rules directly or with a the help of an engineered civilian organization which Finer called it quasi-civilianized direct regime (ibid). Egypt's regime, for the most part, could be considered a quasi-civilianized or a dual military regime, While Turkey has been bouncing between direct and indirect military regimes for the most of the republic's history. Finer's typology, then, offers a broad explanation for the patterns of military interventions in both countries.

The civilian-military boundaries in Turkey and Egypt are undefined clearly, however, the social cleavages could provide a good explanation of civilian-military relations in both countries as Sakallioglu (1997) puts it.

Anouar Abdel-Malek offers a rich analysis of the Egyptian society and what he calls a Military Society. In his work, Abdel-Malek shows how the early policies of the military junta in Egypt established a society where the military on top and where the state's control is growing by the hour. In his own words, Nasser's Egypt could be described as an "advanced independent, autocratic State with a predominantly State-capitalistic planned economy" (Abdel-Malek 1968). During Sadat, As Hazem Kandil explains, the military started to lose much of its internal coercive power to the ministry of interior, but the assassination of Sadat by radical officers ended his eleven-year tenure and initiated Mubarak's era where he sought to achieve a balanced relationship between the military and the civilian security apparatus with him on the top (Kandil 2016). But with the early

1990s, the Egyptian Armed Forces expanded their thorough penetration of almost every sphere of Hosni Mubarak's crony patronage system. This outreaching powers grew more and more with the 2011 revolution, when the SCAF kept retaining its pervasive political reach, permeating both the state apparatus and the economy—not just at the commanding heights but at all levels (Sayigh 2012). According to Sayigh (2012), the military was seeking to grant itself a custodianship over Egypt civilians, this was clear during the meetings of the constituent assembly where the military representatives fought hard to embed exceptional powers for the SCAF in the new constitution. This custodianship reached its peak with the military coup of 2013 and its aftermath.

Turkey's military, not very different from the Egyptian one, has been agreed upon to be the most important force behind "the evolution of the social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state" (Karabelias 1999). The historical legacy of the Turkish armed forces goes back to the Ottoman Empire when the army had an important roles, not only militarily, but also modernizing roles in the 18th and 19th centuries which put him in a much important place in the Turkish political life (Tachau and Heper 1983) However, many researchers such as Sakallioglu (1997) and Karabelias (1999) argue that the Turkish army turned into a class within the society or even above it because of his roles as the guardian of the state and its secular principles. This is not to say that the Turkish military is similar in all aspects to its Egyptian counterpart. The main difference between the Turkish military could be understood from Brown's (1989) statement: The Turkish army "is sincere in its attachment to the democratic process and its concern that it works effectively."

Though Mustafa Kemal forced the Turkish military out of politics and envisaged a political system in which military do not intervene into political processes, Turkish military kept a watchful eye on civilian governments that resulted in three direct interventions. But the consecutive interventions and the past experiences of military regimes contributed in the democratic environment, which undermined the military's role (Halistoprak 2011). Demirel (2005) argues that society (from which the military draws its conscripts) compares between democratically elected governments and military rule, and while military

regimes were able to find fast solutions to the imminent problems of the country, a democratic knowledge accumulated in both civilian and military elites that ultimately consolidated democratic norms.

3.4 MILITARY BUSINESS

Economic theories of coups that are tackling the political economy of the militaries have gained some momentum in the recent decades. One concern of these studies is the military business. The economic activities of of the armies have been a pressing issue for decades in many countries in the world. As Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes (2003) explains; the businesses of the military range from corporations owned by the military as an institution, to welfare foundations belonging to the different services, to enterprises run at the unit level and individual soldiers who use their position for private economic gain. This kind of economic interests has been of the reasons for militaries intervening in politics in countries such as Pakistan (Siddiqa 2017), Indonesia (McCulloch 2003) and Latin American countries.

In her study on Pakistan's Milbus (the term for Military Business was coined by Brömmelhörster and Paes), Ayesha Siddiqa (2017) argues that the armed forces of the totalitarian political systems like Pakistan or Myanmar encourage policies and policy-making environments that multiply their economic opportunities. This is not to say that militaries in more democratic systems are not involved in economic activities, but according to Siddiqa, the military, in developed economies, is one of the beneficiaries of the investments in sales of military equipment and services.

In the Egyptian case, for example, The military fought hard to keep its assets secret and away from the civilian oversight. For researchers like Yazid Sayigh, the military was never going to give up its privileges for civilians to control. Less than a year before the coup in Egypt, Sayigh wrote commenting on the importance of asserting an effective civilian oversight over the detail of the defense budget and any other military funding streams:

"... The civilian leaders must tread carefully. The more progress they make, the harder the officers' republic will fight to hold on to its power, potentially using its extensive net-

works throughout the state apparatus to obstruct government policies and reforms, impede public service delivery, and undermine the nascent democratic order. Egypt's second republic will only come to life when the officers' republic ceases to exist." (Sayigh 2012).

Out of the aforementioned notions comes the second hypothesis of this paper:

H2: In the cases of Egypt and Turkey, the risk of military coups might be higher if the military perceives a threat to its economic interests or if it saw an opportunity to advance these interests that wouldn't be achievable under the existing regime.

3.5 PROFESSIONALISM AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

The civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do (Feaver 1996). The question of civilian control over the military has always been the main issue of the civilian military relations, yet no factor has gained attention as a decisive one in solving this dilemma as the factor of the armed forces professionalism.

Samuel Huntington (1957) understood professionalism as that quality that makes the military a fighting force employed in external defense. Praetorianism (the military's political interference) should not be feared if military officers remained true professionals dedicated to their missions. But in order to understand professionalism, one should define profession first. According to Huntington, a profession is identified to a fairly great extent by three distinguishing characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. These three characteristics will provide us with a baseline for evaluating the professionalism of the military officer corps (Huntington 1957).

Expertise demands that a professional possess a specialized body of knowledge and skills in a significantly important area of endeavor. In the context of army, the lengthy military education is the tool for delivering this knowledge to military officers and soldiers.

To understand Responsibility, a professional works in a social context and performs a service for which the client is society, either individually or collectively. In this context, the professional does not hold financial remuneration (let alone power) as his primary

motivating factor. Rather, a professional feels a social responsibility to put his special knowledge and skills to work serving society. To ensure that society is, in fact, benefiting from the application of its specialized knowledge and skills, a profession is counted on to largely police itself.

The third characteristic of a profession, corporateness, implies that the members of a profession see themselves as a distinct group, separate from the society the profession serves. This does not necessarily mean physical separation or isolation. Rather, it simply means that because they possess certain special skills and a particular body of knowledge and have the largely self-imposed responsibility to serve society in a manner which is consistent with their professional ethos, members of a profession "share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen." (Huntington 1957)

While Morris Janowitz (1960) agreed to some extent with Huntington's model of profession, he rejects Huntington's professional ideal and opts for a more "pragmatic professionalism." Janowitz, discussing the U.S military, argued that in the post World War II world, some politicization of the officer was inevitable due to the new requirement for an incredibly capable, globally reaching, standing military force focused on meeting the Soviet threat. (Feaver 1996). In other words, he argued that professionalism has led to intervention in politics because it prompted the military to seek to protect its interests.

But one of Janowitz notions could fill the gab in this regard, which is the one on military doctrine3. Janowitz observed that a "new doctrine seems to be designed to supply the military professional with opinions on many political, social, and economic subjects, opinions which he feels obliged to form as a result of his new role, and to which he was expected to be indifferent in the past" (Janowitz 1960).

In his work on the military and the features of military coups in Brazil and Peru, Alfred Stepan (1973), stepped further by warning against the military's "new professionalism" that defends the status quo and acts "police-like and managerial." In his work, Stepan used the cases of Brazil and Peru to discuss "how the ideology of new professionalism arose and how it contributed to the expansion of the military's role in politics."

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[3] In this research, I use the NATO's definition of doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.

Drawing on the work of Stepan, Bruce Farcau (1996) has argued that this new professionalism has resulted in the development of a "national security doctrine" that crushes all opposition in the name of fighting sedition and communism.

4. METHODOLOGY

In this paper, I use a comparative case study method to analyze the reasons behind military coups in two Middle Eastern countries: Egypt and Turkey. Specifically, I examine the historical contexts in which the militaries in both countries developed, the coup processes in Egypt and Turkey and their immediate aftermath. Through this, I will attempt to answer the question: Did the economic motivation represent the strongest drive to coups in the two countries: 1980, 2013? To achieve this, I analyze the socioeconomic conditions in both countries, the nature of their previous regimes with a special focus on the civil military relations and the process of regime change in each country.

4.1 CASE SAMPLE SELECTION

Choosing the right cases to study is always a challenging task for a researcher. While the cases should be representative to a larger population (e.g., Middle East countries or Latin America), the unique nature of each case makes it harder for the researcher to deduct general conclusions that could be applied on broader population of cases. In order for the research to be able to achieve its exploratory and analytical objectives, the researcher desires a representative sample and useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest (Gerring and Seawright, 2008); this is why Egypt and Turkey present themselves as the right case studies.

In order to avoid selection bias, an initial stratification of the countries in the region was done. The result presents Egypt and Turkey as two cases with histories of their militaries as direct political players. Egypt, which witnessed an uprising in 2011 that ousted its president for thirty years, went through a difficult transitional period that was concluded by a bloody military coup in the summer of 2013. Turkey, on the other hand, witnessed five successful military coups in its history, the strongest of which occurred in 1980. Both military coups led directly to regime changes in Egypt and Turkey, however the settings in which the coups were staged were dramatically different.

In addition, these two cases are a sample representative of the population of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Both cases share some similarities with other regimes in the region as well as developing countries writ large. For instance, one could easily notice the similarities between the regimes of Turkey and Egypt on one hand and those of Algeria and even Brazil at some point.

Another challenging factor of the studies of militaries in autocratic regimes is the lack of information on the coercive apparatus of the states. In Egypt, for example, the regime uses both rewards and coercion as means to manage the media and to prevent the "unnecessary questioning" of the army's budget. Though it's difficult to obtain information on the military's economic activities, some information was made available after the revolution of 2011. Therefore, and as a result of the inability to obtain credible and dependable data on the actual size of military's economy, this study depends more on a qualitative framework rather than a quantitative one. In this study I apply a qualitative most different comparative case study method in which the dependent variable is the outcome of a successful military coup, while the independent variable is the economic motives. Other variables this study tackles includes, but not limited to, the nature of previous regimes, the political history, the military history and the civil military relations in both countries.

4.2 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

This study is concerned with the motivations behind military coups in Egypt and Turkey and the question of the economic interests of the military and whether it's playing a decisive factor in the decision of a military coup or not. In order to understand this topic, defining terms such as regime and military coups and authoritarianism would be a necessity.

Liza Anderson (2014) defines the regime as "the set of rules, or cultural or social norms that regulate the relations between the ruled and the rulers, including how laws are made and administered and how the rulers themselves are selected" (Anderson, 2014). To define the military coups, I use William R. Thompson's definition published in his 1975 paper as "occurring whenever members of the regular armed forces remove or attempt to remove a state's chief executive through the use, or threat of the use, of force" (Thompson, 1975).

Authoritarian regimes usually follow military coups. Linz and Stepan (1996) defines authoritarianism as "Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones." (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Thus military regimes can be considered as a type of authoritarian regimes, or in Barbara Geddes's words it is "one in which a group of officers determines who will lead the country and has some influence on policy" (Geddes, 2003).

4.3 DATA AND ANALYSIS

In order to test whether economic factors precede other motivations for military coups, I utilize data from the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

4.3.1 QUANTITATIVE DATA GATHERING

From the World Bank, I utilize data on the Foreign Direct Investment in both Egypt and Turkey following military coups, I also use the data of the per capita GDP to measure the socioeconomic status of the country and to analyze the share of the military expenditure before and after the coups. I use the IMF data to gather information on the economic reform programs in the immediate aftermath of the coups. These data allows me to study the relation between the international economic organizations and the regimes following military coups. It also gives me the opportunity to test the Hypothesis that military regimes after the coups tend to adopt economic reforms offered by the international organizations in order to grant an international approval.

These sets of data will provide us with a better vision to the reasons behind public resentment that led the peoples of Egypt and Turkey to call for a military intervention or -at least- to welcome it as it happened.

One more source of data is Stockholm International Peace Research Institute which offers a wide range of data on military expenditure, military armament budgets and arms deals. The military expenditure figures alone do not explain much of the economic decisions of

the post-coups regimes, given the stealth nature of the military economies in these countries. This lack of information is a pressing problem, that's why this study depends much on qualitative analysis of the economic policies of the states before and after the coups as well as the horizontal economic expansion of the military in different sectors after the coups. The study will also be quantitatively studying the military expenditure, the GDP and the FDI data before and after the coups in order to show whether the military benefited economically from the coup d'etat and the direct gains of the officers from their intervention in politics.

4.3.2 QUALITATIVE DATA

In order to tackle the drivers and motivations of military coups, I'll be studying a number of the political discourses used by leaders of the coups in Egypt and Turkey as the speeches and statements made by the army chiefs and senior officers are good indicators of the military doctrine and the political ideology of the military. Moreover, in order to hold a valid comparison between Egypt and Turkey, it's crucial to understand the differences between both military discourses, and there is no better source for this more than analyzing the speeches and statements made by military leaders in both cases.

This comparison won't be complete without understanding the nature of the civil-military relations in the period post coups, for this, I control for the legislations that were made during the post-coup period in order to solidify the military's position in economy and politics.

In the case of Turkey, the legislations that were made to immune the soldiers from trials and prevent the civilians from holding them accountable, I'll also look into the legislations that gave the military more power in economy through the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK). While in the case of Egypt, in addition to the laws that immuned military leaders and the laws that gave more power to the military in the economic realm, I'll look into the legislations that gave the military more control over land ownership, dispossession and utilization.

This methodology has a number of limitations, mainly as it does not take into account other motives of military coups such as the social culture, loss of government legitimacy, the institutional interests of the military and the ideological factors. However, this study

doesn't neglect these and other factors that motivate military officers to intervene in politics by touching upon all of them in the Historical Context chapter as well as the Literature Review.

5. FINDINGS

This chapter is divided into two main sections in where I offer the findings on different factors and motives for the officers to stage the military coups in Turkey and Egypt in 1980 and 2013 respectively. The first section examines the changes in the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), GDP and Military Expenditure data before and after the military coups took place in Egypt 2013 and Turkey 1980. The second section discusses the expansion of both Turkish and Egyptian militaries into different economic sectors.

5.1 FDI, GDP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE

The literature suggests that there is a correlation between the military coups and the changes in the aforementioned figures.

Table 5.1.1: Changes in the FDI (Current USD) in Egypt (2010-2016)

Year	GDP $B	FDI	FDI of GDP %
2010	218.9	$6.386 B	2.917
2011	236	$-482,700,000	- 0.05
2012 (t-1)	279.4	$2.798 B	1.001
2013 (t)	288.6	$4.192 B	1.453
2014 (t+1)	305.5	$4.783 B	1.566
2015	332.7	$6.885 B	2.069
2016	336.3	$8.107 B	2.436

Source: World Bank Data

In Egypt, the FDI figures (shown in Table 5.1.1) dropped drastically in 2011 due to the political and security turmoil which followed the ousting of Mubarak in February of the same year. The instability that was caused by the absence of MoI security forces led the investors to flee the country in 2011 and the years following, many of whom were Egyptians such as one of the country's wealthiest businessmen Naguib Sawiris (Economist 2013). Though the foreign investments were starting to flow back in 2012, the public sentiment was not in favor of the country's rulers, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and then president Morsi.

The coup in 2013 and the years following gave an opportunity to the military to expand its foreign business relations.

One more figure to monitor is the military expenditure. Though Egyptian military has always kept the details of its budget hidden from the public and any kind of civil supervision, the military budget as a whole is announced as a part of the annual governmental budget. In 2013, the year of the coup where Mohamed Morsi was president until July, the military expenditure was in its lowest points in the six years from 2010 to 2016. Following the coup, as Table 5.2 shows, the military budget received a push to reach its highest point in comparison with the previous five years.

Table 5.1.2: Annual Military Expenditure (Current USD) in Egypt (2010-2016)

Year	Military Expenditure $M
2010	4419.4
2011	4292.2
2012 (t-1)	4176.1
2013 (t)	4141.7
2014 (t+1)	4518
2015	4790.3
2016	4513

These numbers, again, are not representing the nature or the volume of the military's economic activities. For example, the arms imports figures of the military, according to SIPRI, shows a huge increase from $657 million in 2013 to almost three times the volume with more than $1.7 billion of arms imports in 2016. The rise of the arms imports could be understood in the light of the continuous military operations against Sinai Jihadists, however, the numbers does not add up when compared to the announcements of the military and the news of the arms sales worldwide. Egypt reportedly spent €6.83 billion on French arms alone between 2014 and 2016 (Awny, 2017). This is to assert the fact that the fact that the economy of the Egyptian military is hidden is going to be a methodological limitation in this study and any other studies that touch upon the military's economic interests.

The changes in the FDI was much more clear in Turkey as it jumped from $18M in 1980 to $95M in 1981. As Table 5.2 shows, the FDI figures dropped in 1980 and started to rise again after the September 1980 coup. With just an increase of 3 per cent in the GDP during the year followed the coup, the FDI increased by 427 per cent. This rapid increase didn't come as a direct result, ironically, the reasons of the rise of the FDI started about 9 months before. Shortly before the 1980 coup, PM Demirel had decided to implement the IMF recommendations for economic readjustment, in the so-called 24 January Decisions, adopting an export-oriented market economy and abandoning the import-substitution model. However, as mentioned in the historical context, Turgut Özal stated his complains that the political climate was not allowing the new economic measures to be effective. Özal continued his work for two years under the military government, and for the next few years the FDI figures grew exponentially to more than $660 million in 1989. Özal's policies along with the suppression of the leftists among other political forces in Turkey in the post-coup era boosted the Turkish economy by the second half of the 1980s.

Table 5.1.3: Changes in the FDI (Current USD) in Turkey (1977-1983)

Source: World Bank Data

Year	GDP $B	FDI $M	FDI of GDP %
1977	58.68	27	0.046
1978	65.15	34	0.052
1979 (t-1)	89.39	75	0.084
1980 (t)	68.79	18	0.026
1981 (t+1)	71.04	95	0.134
1982	55	55	0.085
1983	46	46	0.075

Very similar to Egypt's case, the military expenditure of the Turkish Armed Forces witnessed a drop to its lowest points in the year of the military coup and the previous year (1980 and 1981). The Table 5.1.4 shows how the military expenditure witnessed an immediate spike in the aftermath of the coup.

Table 5.1.4: Annual Military Expenditure (Current USD) in Turkey (1977-1983)

Year	Military Expenditure $M
1977	8041.5
1978	7363.6
1979 (t-1)	6533.6
1980 (t)	6771.8
1981 (t+1)	7640.3
1982	8352.4
1983	7902.8

5.2 AS BIG AS THE STATE: HORIZONTAL EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY BUSINESS

The rapid expansion of the military's economic activities after the military coups in Egypt 2013 and Turkey 1980 is a story of benefits for the military as an institution and for its officers as secondary beneficiaries.

The military coup in 1980 was the third in the history of the Turkish republic, so when the military officers decided to intervene, they have had already a number of gains from the previous interventions to build upon.

5.2.1 ECONOMIC EXPANSION AFTER 1980 COUP

The 1960 coup introduced OYAK in 1961 and rooted the army in the political life, while the 1971 memorandum allowed the officers of the National Security Council (MGK) to present specific recommendations to the cabinet, enhanced the autonomy of the chief of staff in formulating defense policies, preparing the defense budget (which could no longer be debated in parliament or scrutinized in the press), weapons manufacturing and procurement, and the management of military personnel (Kandil 2016; Sakallioglu 1997).

According to İsmet Akça (2010), Turkey's military-economic structure stands on three pillars. The first pillar is the military holding company, the Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK), which affirms the military's presence as an economic actor. The second pillar is military spending, which reaches extremely high levels and is controlled almost absolutely by the military. The third pillar is the military industry, where fast-paced development is encouraged and leads to the militarization of the whole of Turkish industry (Akça 2010). These three pillars share one characteristic: their major developments and expansion could be traced back to the military coup in 1980. In this section, I focus on OYAK as an indicator of the expansion of the military's economy.

Founded in 1961, OYAK is first and foremost a compulsory savings institution. The permanent members of the organization are active officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civil servants in the Turkish Armed Forces. But OYAK is hardly just a social welfare institution since it operates as a capital holding by investing in production, trade,

services and finance sectors. Though formed of military men, OYAK investments and profits are never used for military spending and projects. OYAK's investments are concentrated in the automotive, cement, and iron-steel industries and are also distributed across the following sectors: finance, energy, mining, agricultural chemicals, food, construction, transportation-logistics, domestic-foreign trade, private security, technology-IT, and tourism (Cook 2007).

During the period between the military coups of 1960 and 1980, OYAK reaped the benefits of highly profitable protectionist policies applied as part of Turkey's import-substitution strategy. OYAK invested in automotive and steel sectors that were protected by bloated customs duties, bans on imports, tax freedoms, and state subsidies. But the neoliberal policies that were advanced by Evren and the military after the coup of 1980 gave OYAK its largest leap forward (Akça 2010). While OYAK's average rate of profitability was 16 units between 1961 and 1980, it jumped to 100 units in the period between 1981 and 2000, and then jumped to 165 units in the period from 1990 to 2001 (Akça 2010). The regulations in the law render OYAK a privileged institution which carries the characteristics of a private enterprise while enjoying the facilities of a state institution.

Yagci (2017) counts three common explanation for the military interventions in Turkey; In certain accounts, the military acts as an agent of foreign lenders who would like to reform Turkey's economic policies. In others, the military is seen rather like a technocratic arbiter that addresses problems created by populist politicians. Lastly, some on the left see the Turkish military in fusion with domestic industrialists and acting to protect their interests, especially after the military became deeply involved in the capitalist economy as an investor and employer through the commercial ventures of OYAK (Yagci 2017).

The rapid benefits OYAK gained after the coups of 1960 and 1980 suggest that the military was not only protecting its interests, but also advancing it. OYAK's average rate of profitability is a clear example for this. While it was 16 units between 1961 and 1980, it jumped to 100 units in the period between 1981 and 2000 (Akça 2017) benefitting a big deal from the neoliberal privatization and financial investment strategies initiated in the aftermath of the 1980 coup. For a number of researchers, After 1980, OYAK served as a socio-economic vehicle to restore the military hierarchy, discipline, and integrity that

were damaged during the 1960s and 1970s (Akyaz 2002; Akca 2017). While the neoliberal economic and social policies of the post 1980 coup exacerbated poverty and attenuated deprivation of the public at large, the Turkish Armed Forces consolidated its place in society as a privileged community. This wouldn't have been possible without the military intervention in September 1980.

5.2.2 EGYPT'S MILITARY POST 2013: A JACK OF ALL TRADES

In the year that followed the military coup of 2013, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense was awarded several contracts by the Ministries of Health, Transportation, and Housing and Youth worth over $1 billion to carry out large infrastructure projects (Morsy 2014). The governmental contracts were not enough for the military. As Barayez (2016) puts it, "there is anecdotal evidence that the military's increasing involvement in megaprojects in the post July 2013 period is indeed coming at the expense of private construction companies. Major examples are the second Suez Canal, which was completed in August 2015, and the proposed one million-unit housing and New Administrative Capital projects" (Barayez 2016). This notion was confirmed by Naguib Sawiris who stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that the officers "trust the military first ... and that the security can block any project. They have their own companies now. It's not a good situation." (Malsin 2018).

According to a recent report from Reuters, the Ministry of Military Production is projecting that operating revenues from its 20 firms will reach 15 billion Egyptian pounds in 2018/2019, five times higher than in the year of the coup, according to a ministry chart. However, the ministry does not disclose what happens to the revenues (Reuters 2018). The report also touches upon the expanding cement industry of the military. One of the most visible symbols of the military's commercial ambitions is in the city of Beni Suef, at the edge of the desert south of Cairo, where workers are putting the finishing touches to Egypt's largest cement plant, owned by the military's El Arish Cement Co. The cement industry is feeling the full force of the military's expanding activities. It took 8,000 workers 18 months to build the $1 billion dollar plant. At full capacity, it will produce 12.6 million tons of cement a year (Reuters 2018). The other projects of the military includes

fish farms, international schools, elevators and air-condition factories, agriculture, poultry, solar panels and the construction of intercity roads which originally was the project of the Ministry of Transport.

Though hidden, the volume of the military business is expanding in an unprecedented way. In February 2014, just 8 months after the coup, press reports mentioned that the Engineering Committee in the Egyptian Armed Forces was responsible for the planning and the implementation of 854 projects, of whom 473 were already completed. This means that the military was executing business of more than 50 million Egyptian pounds every day. The expansion of the military economic activities, which was not possible during civilian rule, questions the real motives behind the military intervention in politics and the coup of 2013 which was initiated on order to "save the country from the abyss of a civil war". This economic expansion gives us the needed answers too.

6. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter analyses the findings and discusses the substantial differences between the Egyptian military and the Turkish one. In this chapter, I'll provide a brief analysis to the sets of data outlined in the previous chapter. The chapter will also focus on the gains both militaries in Egypt and Turkey had in the post-coup era through legislations that gave them more power over economy, it also tries to understand the sociological reasons behind the army's economic expansion. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the role of foreign economic incentives that were given to the military officers in order for them to intervene in politics. These incentives could be either from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), regional or foreign countries. In the last section more lights is going to be shed on the the professionalism of the military and the discourses used by military leaders in Egypt and Turkey and the major differences between the two experiences.

6.1 WHAT DATA TELLS US

Data from Turkey and Egypt on the different figures outlined in the previous chapter shows similar patterns.

In Both Egypt, data shows that there was a steady increase of the real gross domestic product (GDP) in the pre-coup period. The GDP increase didn't reflect on the living conditions of Egyptians. For example, the Egyptian government already had too many public employees, and then Morsi's government regularized the temporary ones, which expanded the wage bill. Few weeks before the coup, Galal Amin, professor of economics at the American University in Cairo, and Samir Radwan, finance minister in the months

after Egypt's 2011 uprising, said Egypt is in dire predicament as foreign investment and tourism collapse (Kingsley 2013).

The Turkish economy before the 1980 coup wasn't much better. GDP fell from $89.4 billion in 1979 to $68.79 billion in 1980, the year of the coup. The political and the societal grievences that led to bloody clashes led the economy to worsen even more. Shortly before the 1980 coup, PM Demirel had decided to implement the IMF recommendations for economic readjustment, in the so-called 24 January Decisions, adopting an export-oriented market economy and abandoning the import-substitution model. However, Turgut Özal stated his complains that the political climate was not allowing the new economic measures to be effective.

Though military coups imply political and economic turmoil, which are repelling factors for foreign investments, the FDI net inflows rates witnessed a spike in Egypt and Turkey after the coups d'etat.

For example, in Turkey, Özal continued his work for two years under the military government, and for the next few years the FDI figures grew exponentially to more than $660 million in 1989. Özal's policies along with the suppression of the leftists among other political forces in Turkey in the post-coup era boosted the Turkish economy by the second half of the 1980s.

In Egypt, the FDI, between 2014 and 2017. rose annually by 25% to top $10B. The investments mainly came from the regional allies to president Sisi namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Feteha and Noueihed, 2017). The military was not absent away from these investments, on the contrary, the presidential decree no. 466 issued in December 2015 allowed the army through its Armed Forces Land Projects Organization (AFLPO) to establish commercial enterprises, which it either owns fully or jointly with private national or, for the first time, foreign capital.

The correlation here is noteworthy, as post-coup regimes in the two countries took radical steps in order to liberalize the economy and to allow foreign investors into their countries. In Egypt, for example, the UAE and Saudi Arabia was the biggest investors after the coup which they helped planning in the very early stages.

The Military Expenditure is also an interesting story in both cases. In the two cases of Turkey and Egypt, one could argue that the changing roles of the military after coups to be internally oriented and the involvement of the army in coercive crackdowns against civil opposition or/and a militant insurgents could have led the chiefs of the military to support their institutions with more arms and equipment. While this is somehow true in the case of Turkey, where the security forces were miserably incompetent in the pre-coup period, It's not the case for Egypt where the Ministry of Interior's budget was equal to the military's budget or even more in the years before the coup (Sayigh 2012).

Even in Turkey, to make sure that the military would not be dragged again into law and order missions, the junta tried to rehabilitate the police force. The Turkish police in the 1970s suffered from low self- standing because of its helplessness vis-à-vis regular crimes, let alone political violence. The anti-riot police (the so called Society Police) was thus replaced after 1980 with a new semi- militaristic force called the Active Force, which was focused mostly on anti-terrorism– though it only operated in 43 of Turkey's 74 cities. And the army still had to use its own troops to fight militants, especially in the Kurdish areas and in the face of massive social unrest (Caglar 1994; Kandil 2016).

6.2 LEGISLATIONS IN THE POST-COUP ERA

It is standard operating procedure for military regimes that come to power through coups to then seek to protect themselves legally and constitutionally from retribution. In the cases of both Egypt and Turkey, post-coup regimes had been working hard to issue laws that sustains the militaries' interests and immune the military leaders from the public and political vengeance.

6.2.1 TURKEY'S LEGISLATIONS

Six weeks after the coup, a new law (the Law on Constitutional Order) entrusted the military members of the National Security Council (MGK), i.e. chief of staff and service chiefs, with legislative and executive power, and delegated everyday governance to technocrats (Kili 2003).

More important, the 1980 intervention institutionalized militarism in Turkish politics more than any other period since the birth of the republic. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution obliged the cabinet to prioritize, rather than just consider, MGK recommendations. And these recommendations, in turn, extended beyond security issues to school curriculums, television programs, and bureaucratic appointments (Heper and Güney 2000). The new Constitution also decreed that in time of war, the chief of staff would assume the position of commander-in-chief on behalf of the president. In addition to these institutionalized mechanisms, it became normal, in the post-1980 years, for senior officers to make public statements on all matters of governance, sometimes even hold press conference to clarify their views on daily events (Uzgel 2003). As Kandil (2012) puts it, these changes were meant to provide the general command with a permanent veto power over government, and thus render "crude military intervention into politics redundant" (Sakallioglu 1997).

The legal actions taken by the Turkish military can be seen "not as the gateway to a dictatorship in Turkey, but to a democratic catharsis" (Anderson 2009). A new Constitution was drafted. In 1983, parliamentary life was once again resumed. Evren resigned his military commission and was elected president for a seven-year term. With regards to parliamentary politics, the participation of peripheral parties was limited by prohibiting those who receive less than 10 percent of the votes from entering parliament. This and other measures were designed to create a stable two-party system representing centrists on both left and right, rather than shifting coalitions between mainstream parties and extremists on the fringes. In addition, the role of the president was enhanced to help him smooth the functioning of the political system and mediate between political parties (Harb 2002; Kandil 2012).

The lasting effect of the post-1980 repression was the complete eradication of the Left. Other than this, one could safely say that the coup didn't, on the long term, stop the political continuum in Turkey. Just few years later, the center right was back in power when,In 1983, Turgut Özal and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) assumed power with Evren serving as president.

6.2.2 EGYPT'S LEGISLATIONS

The expansion of military activities in the economy has been achieved with the help of new legislation, which has further ensured that economic policy distorts the market and channels public contracts straight to the military. Most notoriously, law number 32 for 2014 – passed by the interim post coup government and reaffirmed by parliament in 2016 – bans third parties, including even Egypt's Public Prosecutor, from challenging the conditions of public contracts. In 2013 the interim military-backed government also amended the 1998 Tenders Law (Transparency International 2018).

This change has expanded the legal ability of ministers to sign contracts without competitive tendering, raising significantly the price ceiling requiring tender processes and completely excluding public bodies that are "subject to special laws or regulations" – that would include the armed forces – from its scope.

The legislations also gave the military unprecedented power over land in Egypt. For example, In December 2015, just before the Parliament's official assembly, Sisi issued a decree to amend Law 53/1981 that set out the governing framework of the Armed Forces Land Projects Agency (AFLPA). Sisi's amendment allowed the agency to expand its commercial activity and form for-profit corporations, both on its own and jointly with national and international capital sources. The mandate is similar to that which formed the National Service Projects Authority (NSPA), which was established by Law 32/1979 and owns and manages around 21 companies engaged in diverse commercial activities including food commodities, fertilizers, cement, mineral water, building materials and construction.

However, unlike the NSPA, the AFLPA has not historically engaged in investment or commercial activities. It was established in 1981, through the issuance of the desert land law, to receive money from the state's budget as financial compensation for military land possessed for commercial activities. The financial compensation was to be commensurate with the cost to relocate military infrastructure. The presidential decree completely changed the purpose of the agency to match that of the NSPA by allowing it to form for profit joint stock companies. Commentators expect that the move is a legal and structural decision to prepare the agency to use military land as capital in joint venture investments (Sawaf 2016).

One can't see the changes in land laws as a mere economic issue, but also an issue of power with no regard to the citizens of the country. As Saskia Sassen (2010) puts it "What may be good for the protection of the national state apparatus may go at a high (increasingly high) price to major cities and their people".

The Egyptian military's economic model is based on rent extraction. Through its broad legal and effective control of public assets, namely public lands that constitute around 94 per cent of Egypt's total surface area, the military translates its regulatory mandate into an economic return. The military also wields considerable, if less formal influence through the large number of former officers who hold high level posts in the civil service, particularly in public land management.

In Sinai, for example, military has been changing the urban nature of big chunks of the area. Near the borders with Gaza, the efforts to dispossess the residents of their houses is underway.

The Egyptian army has vastly expanded widespread destruction of homes, commercial buildings, and farms in the North Sinai governorate as part of its military campaign against an affiliate of the Islamic State group there (HRW 2018). The destruction, including hundreds of hectares of farmland and at least 3,000 homes and commercial buildings, is coming as a part of systematic campaign to evict the people of Sinai in what many see as an introduction to a new regional order.

In 2016, the military and other security institutions were given exemptions in a new value-added tax (VAT) law enacted as part of IMF-inspired reforms. The law states that the military does not have to pay VAT on goods, equipment, machinery, services and raw materials needed for the purposes of armament, defense and national security.

These legislations allowed the current portfolio of the military business to be very wide. For example, The military owns 51 percent of a firm that is developing a new $45 billion capital city 75 km east of Cairo. Another military-owned company is building Egypt's biggest cement plant. Other business interests range from fish farms to holiday resorts.

Between 2014 and 2017, the FDI rose annually by 25% to top $10B. The investments mainly came from the regional allies to president Sisi namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Feteha and Noueihed, 2017). The military was not absent away from these

investments, on the contrary, the presidential decree no. 466 issued in December 2015 allowed the army through its Armed Forces Land Projects Organization (AFLPO) to establish commercial enterprises, which it either owns fully or jointly with private national or, for the first time, foreign capital.

Moreover, officer networks stretch increasingly into the private sector as well: few formally registered firms do not have retired or reserve officers on their payroll, and officers may be forming their own private companies to capture subcontracts.

Recently, the Egyptian parliament issued a law to grant immunity to senior Egyptian military officers from prosecution for any acts committed following the 2013 military coup. The law stipulates that "senior commanders in the Armed Forces" shall be granted special privileges, such as entitlement to all the benefits associated with the highest ministerial and diplomatic positions and covers an "interim period" which runs from 3 July 2013, the date of the coup, to 10 January 2016, when parliament first met.

Unlike Turkey, the legislations made after the Egypt's 2013 military coup seemed to turn Egypt into a national security state, where the laws and legislations are designed to suppress the opposition. On one hand, presidential decrees, laws and legislations, after more than five years of the coup, seem to be solidifying the hegemony of the military over the society. On the other hand, the coup and its aftermath cut the democratic continuum in the country indefinitely, the post-coup regime turned to be much worse that pre-2011 Mubarak's era in terms of human rights violations, oppressing opponents, the extrajudicial killings and much more.

6.3 THE FOREIGN FACTOR

Military coups are not entirely internal decision. In many cases, the foreign support whether direct or indirect could be a decisive factor in the officers' decision. In the cases of military coups in Turkey 1980 and Egypt 2013, the foreign incentives were present.

6.3.1 1980 Coup in the Cold War Context

The explanations of military coups in Turkey, namely 1960 and 1980 coups, and to some extent the 1971 memorandum, can be partly explained as a result of conflict over economic policy-making. The explanation goes from reliance on foreign loans for growth,

through a balance of payments crisis, to political difficulties in implementing devaluation and stabilization programs (Yagci 2017). The explanation of the conflict over economic policies seems a valid one in terms of understanding the situation in Turkey prior and after the coup of 1980.

During the second half of the 1970s, the Turkish economy was thrown into a full-fledged payments crisis, which brought about a total collapse of its credit worthiness in international markets. The IMF appears in this period as an effective player in on the Turkish economic stage. From 1978 onward, the government started to adapt IMF-tailored measures in order to stabilize and protect the economy. These measures centered around various contractionary tools and export-promotion policies. Accordingly, the Turkish lira was devalued twice (23% in March 1978 and 44% in June 1979), and stronger export-tax-rebate schemes were introduced to improve the trade balance (Cecen et al. 1994). These stabilization and adjustment packages did not, however, succeed in reversing the declining performance of the economy.

The stabilization and adjustment programs introduced on 24 January 1980, shy of nine months before the coup, under the aegis of the IMF, the World Bank, and OECD were designed to curb inflation and circumvent the balance of payments difficulties in the short run and to restore equilibrium and economic growth in the long run. This wouldn't have happened without the iron fist of the military.

These international institutions, relieved with the military coup in September, started to provide financial assistance in what happened to be one of the largest operations of its kind: between 1980 and 1985 the IMF made available $1.7 billion in special drawing rights (SDR) under a series of stand-by arrangements, and the World Bank extended $1.6 billion in structural adjustment loans (Cecen et al. 1994). The short-term effects on the Turkish economy were drastic. The military rule paved the road for the new policies through different measures like silencing the leftist opposition and banning trade unions.

The Turkish relations with the international institutions are not very similar to other countries that witnessed foreign-supported military coups such as Iran (1953) or Guatemala (1954) where the foreign incentives were decisive in the officers' decision whether to stage the coup or not. However, the international acceptance of the post-coup regime and

the warm treatment the junta got from the international institutions suggest that the foreign factor had been present in the MGK's operation room before and after the coup.

6.3.2 THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY'S ALLIES IN THE GULF

If the foreign intervention in the Turkish coup of 1980 was indirect or in a stealth way, the one in Egypt's case was very far from stealth. When the Egyptian revolution erupted in 2011, several countries in the region saw a coming threat from Tahrir square. Troubled from the possibility of the revolution proliferation, Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (whose government cracked down harshly on the peaceful opposition) initiated a continuous effort in order to undermine Egypt's newborn democracy. This effort, led by Abu Dhabi, intensified with the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in the summer of 2012.

"When Morsi got elected, the Saudis and the Emiratis went into overdrive," a former senior American diplomat told New Yorker's Dexter Filkins (2018) . The following quote is offering one face of the collective effort exerted by the regional powers to pave the ground for the coming military coup.

According to several former American officials, Mohammed Bin Zayed and Bandar bin Sultan, the director of Saudi intelligence, began plotting with others in their governments to remove Morsi from power. Egypt's generals were already organizing against him. Bandar and M.B.Z. reached out to the Egyptian defense minister, General Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and promised twenty billion dollars in economic aid if Morsi were deposed. They also began financing an anti-government movement in Cairo, built around an ostensibly independent youth group called Tamarod. As the coup took shape, Bandar and Sisi used Mohammed Dahlan, a Palestinian confidant, to carry messages and money to collaborators in the Egyptian military. The former diplomat said that the foreign support was crucial to the coup: "For Sisi to move like that, he needed a promise that he would succeed." In July, 2013, the Egyptian military forced Morsi from power, and soon afterward it orchestrated a crackdown on suspected Brotherhood supporters, detaining at least forty thousand people. "It was terrible, terrible," the diplomat told me. "What the Saudis and the Emiratis did was unforgivable." (Filkins 2018)

The regional powers' role was apparent in the case of Egypt. The support el-Sisi got from his Gulf allies after the success of the coup he staged was unprecedented. As early as September 2013, regional media were reporting major new investments from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. A year later, Reuters reported that Egypt got $23 billion in aid from Gulf in the 18 months following the coup.

In her paper on the Egyptian military's economic expansion after the coup of 2013, Shana Marshall suggests that the military's preferred partners have also benefited. In the first half of 2014, the Egyptian military signed two housing projects with UAE-based firms, independent of the substantial funds that the UAE government has pledged to deliver in aid to Egypt. The first project was secured in February, when Emaar Misr, a subsidiary of the UAE-based company Emaar Properties, signed an agreement with the Ministries of Defense, Housing, and Local Development to build a retail development, Emaar Square, as part of the Uptown Cairo housing project. The Emaar Square deal involves relocating military camps and upgrading the area's infrastructure. One notable example is a $40 billion project for low-income housing that was awarded to Dubai-based developer Arabtec Construction (Marshall 2015).

The construction projects went one step further with the depossessioning laws that allowed the military to free wide lots of lands to the foreign investors, including the Emiratis. The Maspero Triangle case is a very evident case of this, where the military dispositioned more than 400 families of their homes in downtown Cairo in order to "develop" the area with joint investments from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and -of course- the UAE. The project that is being built on more than 70 feddans of land in one of the most expensive areas in the country led to the evacuation of hundreds of families and could have not been possible without the new legislations drafted after the coup.

The Emirati investments in Egypt expanded dramatically in many other sectors as well. The Emirati Minister of Economy Sultan Al-Mansoury stated in 2017 that there are more than 877 Emirati active companies investing in Egypt in 15 different economic sectors.

Suez Canal is another story, as by the summer of 2017, Sisi approved establishing joint venture between UAE's Dubai Ports World and the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SC Zone). Just few days before the announcement, Dubai Ports-Sokhna (DP World) launched

a corporate sustainability program for 11 projects in Suez and Ain Sokhna (Egypt Today 2017).

One more major investment is the UAE investments in the Egyptian health sector. The Abraaj Capital Limited (ACLD) – a member of The UAE Abraaj Group that is authorised and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) – has been gradually expanding its influence on health institutions in Egypt, especially after its purchase of the Al Borg and al-Mukhtabar laboratories, as well as more than 15 private hospitals. More-over, the UAE reportedly infiltrated the sectors of oil, transportation and the state-con-trolled communication and IT sector.

Military cooperation with the UAE has also ramped up in the wake of Morsi's ouster—including three joint training exercises between March 2014 and October 2014 and sus-tained intelligence and operational coordination in joint strikes against Islamic State tar-gets in Libya.

The success of the post-coup regime in Egypt was crucial for the Emiratis. A leaked doc-uments from the Emirati ambassador to Washington shows that the UAE has paid around $2.7m to hire a PR firm to whitewash Sisi's image in the U.S. just few months after the coup (Jilani 2017).

6.3.2 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE EGYPTIAN COUP

The international institutions is another story. By the time Morsi came to power, Egypt had experienced a drastic fall in both foreign investment (as shown in Table 5.1.1) and tourism revenues, leading to a 60% drop in foreign exchange reserves, a 3% drop in growth, and a rapid devaluation of the Egyptian pound. All this led to mushrooming food prices, ballooning unemployment and a shortage of fuel and cooking gas. Many suggest that most of these crises were deliberately made by the Egyptian deep state, the military supporters or the remnants of Mubarak's regime. For example, Morsi was taken into cus-tody on July 3. By July 4, the fuel lines had vanished (Marshall 2015).

The only way out for Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, as it seemed, was to accept the drastic measures of the IMF, which offered a $4.8 billion loan in exchange for major cuts to the food and fuel subsidies to the poor, that accounted for 3% of Egypt's GDP (Wight 2013).However, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood - a president and an organization

identified with the needs of the poor - refused to countenance cuts that would worsen their plight, though no doubt also anticipating an eruption of anger throughout the country if they had. In turn the IMF loan was stalled and Morsi was forced to try elsewhere. Loan requests to Germany and Russia were turned down, which left Egypt's regional allies as the only remaining source of desperately needed funds. His regional allies' assistance (mainly Qatar and Turkey) was not enough to save Egypt's economy or Morsi himself afterwards.

The government that followed the military coup reopened the negotiations with the IMF and was able to reach a deal in which the international institution approved a $12 billion extended fund facility in exchange of subsidies cuts, devaluation of currency and the use of monetary tools available to combat the rise in inflation (Butter 2017). This is not to say that the IMF loan would've saved Egypt from the military coup, however, the similarity between Egypt and Turkey is that the democratic civilian government was not able to take measures that were about to affect the majority of the people. On one hand, the military rule used its enormous coercive power to suppress civil society and opposition to pave the way for the new economic policies. On the other hand, the international institutions found in the Egyptian military, just like the Turkish army in 1980, an opportunity to implement their policies.

6.4 MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN THE POST-COUP ERA

As outlined in the literature review, Samuel Huntington (1957) understood professionalism as that quality that makes the military a fighting force employed in external defense. Huntington also defined profession by three distinguishing characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. These three characteristics will provide us with a baseline for evaluating the professionalism of the military officer corps.

Expertise demands that a professional possess a specialized body of knowledge and skills in a significantly important area of endeavor. Responsibility is the motivation to put the special knowledge owned by the professional to work serving society. While corporateness, implies that the members of a profession see themselves as a distinct group, separate from the society the profession serves.

6.4.1 TURKEY

The Turkish Armed Forces has developed into a highly professional organization as a result of the expertise, responsibility and corporateness it has possessed since the founding of the republic in 1923. The military education in Turkey is an established institution inherited from the Ottoman era.

In order to attain the level of expertise required of a qualified officer, an officer needs to spend one-third of his career in school. The remaining time is spent in unit level assignments and on headquarters staffs. Competition for entry into the military high schools is high, this is because of the prospects of a quality education and the societal appreciation of the military as the guardian of the nation and the most respected institution in the Turkish society.

The military schools aim at instilling in students a sense of duty and professional values related to the principles of democratic, secular, social justice state in line with Ataturk's principles and reforms and Ataturk nationalism. In other words, future officers are indoctrinated with the principles of Kemalism. The emphasis on Kemalism and secular ideas might change according to the domestic situation, so students might get more secular education in the times of political turbulence (Wick 2000). It's also important to say that there is a general consensus in the country will fall into domestic violence and economic woe if the politicians disregarded Ataturk's principles (Birand 1991; Wick 2000). This was the doctrine of the Turkish military in 1980.

The National sentiment is present in every single step along the way to being an officer, so it might be safe to say that the recruitment process also is revolving around nationalism and Kemalism.

So when the Chief of Staff Kenan Evren announced in a short broadcast on September 12, 1980, that the military invoked the power granted to it by the Internal Service Code to protect the republic from external and internal dangers and declared martial law, the majority of Turks looked hopefully to this move.

Ironically, the 1980 coup and the repression that followed it were "not the gateway to a dictatorship in Turkey, but to a democratic catharsis" (Anderson 2009). In 1982, a new constitution was drafted and in the following year, martial law was lifted, except in the southeastern Kurdish areas. In 1983, parliamentary life was once again resumed. Evren

resigned his military commission and was elected president for a seven-year term. With regards to parliamentary politics, the participation of peripheral parties was limited by prohibiting those who receive less than 10 percent of the votes from entering parliament. This and other measures were designed to create a stable two-party system representing centrists on both left and right, rather than shifting coalitions between mainstream parties and extremists on the fringes. In addition, the role of the president was enhanced to help him smooth the functioning of the political system and mediate between political parties (Harb 2002)

6.4.2 EGYPT

The Egyptian army is a cohesive organization with no appreciable ethno-religious splits. Egypt's military is based on mandatory conscription. For those with no education or only basic schooling, conscription is for three years. A large proportion of these soldiers receive minimal training—illiterates who enter the army are most likely to leave the same way and are often posted in front of some state building or facility for the duration of their time in the military. Those who have at least completed their secondary education tend to be drafted for one year. Most draftees of both categories consider the time spent in the military "as an unfortunate yet temporal ordeal. The conscripts represent every region of the country and help make the army a truly national institution.

Nevertheless, analysts have long raised problems regarding the professionalism of the military. According to two experts, the Egyptian army is not the tight professional force that many consider it to be. It is bloated and its officer corps is indulged, having been fattened on Mubarak's patronage. Its training is desultory, maintenance of its equipment is profoundly inadequate, and it is dependent on the United States for funding and logistical support (Quoted in Barany 2016).

Historically, the Egyptian military had a strong national sentiment, the officers consider themselves as the foundations of the republic, and the army perceive itself as the guardian of the nation. The recruitment scheme reflected this reality until 1979 and the signing of the peace treaty with Israel. President Sadat then re-directed the military as a whole from a combat-oriented to an economic institution, famously declaring that October 1973 was

Egypt's last war and that the army should now direct its energy towards the 'war of economic development'.

Since then, the recruitment model seemed to be changed dramatically, many saw an opportunity to join the military to have guaranteed social and financial benefits. On one hand, since the foundation of the republic in 1952 and the establishment of the ruler regime of Nasser (1952-1970), the officers, whether coming from the army or the military, are enjoying an exceptional status in the Egyptian society as a privileged community. The national sentiment in the recruitment to the officer ranks remained in the public discourse, however, the real motivations of the Egyptian youth joining the military academy are revolving around their aspirations of more power in the society and a much higher status.

This interest-centered doctrine was the reason for President Sisi to issue a decree allowing military and intelligence officers to establish their own private security companies. The privatization of security might be a very clear evidence on the current ideology of the Egyptian military and the lack of responsibility, hence the lack of professionalism of the officer corps.

7. CONCLUSION

In this research, I argued that public economic conditions and economic interests of the military in Turkey and Egypt have impacted the likelihood of military coups in both countries in 1980 and 2013 respectively.

In the beginning of the research, I suggested that "Poor economic performance might lead to popular unrest and therefore might increase coup risk in Turkey and Egypt" and that "The risk of military coups might be higher if the military perceives a threat to its economic interests or if it saw an opportunity to advance these interests that wouldn't be achievable under the existing regime".

Using the data of the IMF, World Bank, SIPRI and local resources in the cases of study, I analyzed how economic woes in both countries led to popular unrest that invited the military to intervene in both countries. Economic and political distresses that preceded the military coups of 1980 and 2013 in both countries seem to form a plausible justification for the army to intervene by staging a military coup.

The comparison between the two cases proved valid in many ways; Turkey witnessed a bad economy and a popular unrest before the coup, the military then intervened in order to "restate democracy". Egypt, which shares many characteristics with Turkey in terms of history and military position in society, also witnessed a bad economy and political turbulence just before the coup. The Egyptian army then intervened to "save the country from falling into a civil war abyss".

Analysing the socioeconomic conditions in the time of the two coups supports the suggestion of Cihan Tugal (2009) that the 1980 coup (as well as Egypt's 2013) represent a typical Gramscian-style 'passive revolution', which defuses popular revolutionary impulses through top-down reforms.

Nevertheless, substantial differences between the experiences of Turkey and Egypt disrupt the aforementioned hypotheses. First of all, the exponential economic growth of the military in Egypt is incomparable to the one of the Turkish military. In Egypt, the military leaders exploited their position as the new leaders of the country to issue legislations and decrees granting the military more powers over economy and land. The military also used

the legislative powers granted to president Sisi before the assembly of the parliament to issue hundreds of decrees that allowed it to expand its powers over security, business and media.

This was not the case in Turkey. Though the Turkish generals ruled the country for more than two years after the coup with an iron hand, Ironically, the coup and the repression that followed it were "not the gateway to a dictatorship in Turkey, but to a democratic catharsis". Of course, the Turkish military issued a number of laws that gave its leaders legal immunity and allowed its economic entities to advance their interests, but the political path that was implemented by the military leaders allowed Turkey to return fast to its democratic norms and allowed even its political elite to return back in power in a few years after the coup.

These differences couldn't be explained without one more factor, which is the military professionalism. Huntington (1957) identifies professionalism by 3 characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The analysis show that the Turkish military is a very professional entity in terms of the three characteristics, while the Egyptian military doesn't fit the same criteria, mainly because its interest-centered doctrine and its attempts to liquify its services in many ways such as establishing private security companies.

The political scene in Egypt, five years after the coup, is very dim. The executive authority is controlling the parliament, the judiciary and the media. Tens of thousands of Egyptians are in jail because of their political affiliations and dozens of death penalties are being issued against known political figures.

In Turkey, on the other hand, democratic norms seem to be much more stable. The military is under civilian authority and the international and regional contexts make it more difficult for the aspiring officers to find the will or the excuses to intervene in politics. However, the declining economy and the harsh measures taken after the failed coup attempt in 2015 could worsen the societal cleavages and therefore provides a stiff cause for another coup d'etat.

In Both Egypt and Turkey a collaborative effort between the civilian elites and military officers should be exerted to put an end to the secrecy over armies' economic activities. Without such effort, the risk of military coups will not get reduced anytime soon.

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