AN EAGLATONIAN ANALYSIS OF EVIL
IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

Sevcan AKÇA

Master Thesis
English Language And Literature Department
Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN
2014

T.C.

ATATÜRK UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE DEPARTMENT

Sevcan AKÇA

AN EAGLATONIAN ANALYSIS OF EVIL IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

MASTER THESIS

ADVISOR

Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN

ERZURUM - 2014

T.C.
ATATÜRK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ

TEZ BEYAN FORMU

23.07.2014

SOSYAL BİLİMLERİ ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

BİLDİRİM

Atatürk Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim ve Sınav Yönetmeliğine göre hazırlamış olduğum "AN EAGLATONIAN ANALYSIS OF EVIL IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*" adlı tezin/raporun tamamen kendi çalışmam olduğunu ve her alıntıya kaynak gösterdiğimi taahhüt eder, tezimin/raporumun kağıt ve elektronik kopyalarının Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü arşivlerinde aşağıda belirttiğim koşullarda saklanmasına izin verdiğimi onaylarım:

Lisansüstü Eğitim-Öğretim yönetmeliğinin ilgili maddeleri uyarınca gereğinin yapılmasını arz ederim.

☐ Tezimin/Raporumun tamamı her yerden erişime açılabilir.

☐ Tezim/Raporum sadece Atatürk Üniversitesi yerleşkelerinden erişime açılabilir.

☐ Tezimin/Raporumun …. yıl süreyle erişime açılmasını istemiyorum. Bu sürenin sonunda uzatma için başvuruda bulunmadığım takdirde, tezimin/raporumun tamamı her yerden erişime açılabilir.

23.07.2014

Sevcan AKÇA

TEZ KABUL TUTANAĞI

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN danışmanlığında, Sevcan AKÇA tarafından hazırlanan bu çalışma 23/07/2014 tarihinde aşağıdaki jüri tarafından. İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Anabilim Dalı'nda Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Başkan : Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN   İmza: ....

Jüri Üyesi : Prof. Dr. Mehmet TAKKAÇ   İmza: ....

Jüri Üyesi : Doç. Dr. Ahmet BEŞE   İmza: ....

Yukarıdaki imzalar adı geçen öğretim üyelerine aittir. 23 /07 /2014

Prof. Dr. Mustafa YILDIRIM
Enstitü Müdürü

F-85/00/22.02.2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE
ASPECTS OF EVIL

CHAPTER TWO
EAGLETON'S CONCEPT OF EVIL IN *ON EVIL*

CHAPTER THREE
AN EAGLETONIAN ANALYSIS OF 'EVIL' IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

ABSTRACT

MASTER THESIS

AN EAGLATONIAN ANALYSIS OF EVIL IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

Sevcan AKÇA

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN

2014, 125 pages

Jury: Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN
Prof. Dr. Mehmet TAKKAÇ
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet BEŞE

This thesis aims to analyze *the Sleep of Reason* by C. P. Snow according to Terry Eagleton's views about evil with reference to *On Evil*, and to see to what extent his views on evil sheds light upon the novel. Eagleton has an unconventional attitude towards evil. This becomes more recognizable especially when he introduces a rare category of evil, that is, without an apparent reason. A chapter entitled 'Aspects of Evil' is designed to understand both the evil concept which is a complicated phenomenon and the reason why Eagleton's perspective of evil is unconventional. In this chapter different definitions and types of the concept, and the changing attitudes towards it from Ancient to Modern times have been briefly discussed. Then, Eagleton's views on evil have been discussed with reference to *On Evil* in which there is a close relationship between the concepts of evil and the death drive, freedom, free will, responsibility, destructiveness, and the influence of external factors on human beings, etc. After he has studied the characteristics of evil he tries to refute the suggestions for the existence of the present evil. Thus, he strengthens what he has discussed about the motivelessness of evil. Eagleton's views on evil are the critical tools to be used in the analysis of *the Sleep of Reason*. It has been concluded from this research that evil embodied in the novel by the murder of an eight year-old boy after being tortured by the two women has been explained in the light of Eagleton's perception of evil.

Key Words: Evil, the death drive, freedom, free will, motiveslessness and the murder.

ÖZET

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

SLEEP OF REASON ADLI ROMANIN EAGLETON'IN KÖTÜLÜK ANLAYIŞIYLA AÇIKLANMASI

Sevcan AKÇA

Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN

2014, 125 sayfa

Jüri : Prof. Dr. Kamil AYDIN
Prof. Dr. Mehmet TAKKAÇ
Doç. Dr. Ahmet BEŞE

Bu tez, C. P. Snow'un Sleep of *Reason* adlı romanının Terry Eagleton'ın *On Evil* çalışmasında tartıştığı kötülük kavramına göre açıklamayı ve Eagleton'ın kötülük kavramıyla ilgili görüşlerinin söz konusu romanı açıklamada ne kadar yardımcı olduğunu ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Eagleton kötülüğe karşı aykırı bir tutum sergilemiştir. Bu durum az karşılaşılan bir kötülük türünü yani görünürde bir neden olmaksızın yapılan kötülüğü tanıttığında daha da belirgindir. 'Aspects of Evil' başlıklı birinci bölüm hem karmaşık bir yapısı olan kötülük kavramını hem de Eagleton'ın kötülük anlayışının neden aykırı olduğunu anlamak için düşünülmüştür. Bu bölümde kısaca kötülük kavramının farklı tanımları, türleri ve antik çağdan modern zamana kadar değişen tutumları ele alınmıştır. Sonrasında Eagleton'ın kötülük kavramıyla ilgili düşünceleri *On Evil* adlı çalışması temel alınarak tartışılmıştır. Kitapta kötülük ile ölüm içgüdüsü, özgürlük, özgür irade, sorumluluk, yıkıcılık ve insanların üzerinde dış etkenlerin etkisi vb. arasında yakın bir ilişki olduğu görülmüştür. Eagleton kötülük kavramının özelliklerini tartıştıktan sonra var olan kötülüğü açıklamak için yapılan önerileri çürütmeye çalışır. Böylece kötülüğün nedensizliğiyle ilgili düşüncelerini güçlendirir. Eagleton'ın kötülükle ilgili öne sürdüğü düşünceleri C. P. Snow'un *Sleep of Reason* adlı romanın incelenmesinde eleştirel araçlar olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışmadan çıkarılan sonuç; romanda sekiz yaşında bir çocuğun iki kadın tarafından işkence edildikten sonra öldürülmesiyle somutlaşan kötülük kavramı Eagleton'ın kötülük anlayışı ışığında açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kötülük, ölüm içgüdüsü, özgürlük, irade, nedensizlik ve cinayet.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this thesis is to study Terry Eagleton's unconventional perception of evil in order to see to what extent his ideas help to shed light upon the evil portrayed in C. P. Snow's *The Sleep of Reason*. Eagleton's views on evil are important in evaluating the concept of evil in the twentieth century, because traditional views on evil, such as the privation theory, universal goodness theory, being possessed by evil spirits, original sin, resentment, attributing evil to women (with reference to Pandora or Eve), heredity, the superior-subordinate relationship, the imperfect nature of people, external factors, moral and natural evil, and the banality of the perpetrators among others which will be discussed in the first chapter, are inadequate to explain the evil done in this present century. Eagleton discusses a range of views on evil in his book *On Evil*, but he discusses them from different aspects, from the religious and literary to the philosophical and psychological. Thus, he opens up new perspectives of the concept. For example, he interprets original sin as 'at the roots' instead of 'at the beginning', which helps us to understand human nature better. In this sense, Eagleton's evaluation of evil can be considered as unconventional because, in contrast to the mainstream explanation of evil, he rather describes it as being 'without an apparent cause' and incomprehensible. He does not attribute evil either to external spiritual powers or to the banality of people. He regards it as a special and rare phenomenon done 'just for the hell of it' in his words. He defends this view because he believes that the evil does not expect practical gain at the end. He does not support the view that evil leads to universal goodness or that it is a punishment by God. Rather, he likens it to God who does not need any reason to exist except Himself.

The Sleep of Reason has been chosen to illustrate Eagleton's theories in the thesis because it is about the murder of a child, picked out at random by two women who torture and kill him. One cannot understand either the reason for this incident or the motives of the two women. Snow was inspired by a real case, that is, the Moors Murders. Two people, named Ian Brady and Myra Hindley, murdered five children after torturing them, and buried four of them on the Manchester Moors in 1965. When one reads this event in the novel, questions arise about the concepts of freedom, responsibility, morality, heredity, external influences on a person, evil and so on. One wants to understand it because it makes one discomforted to witness such an event and

leave questions unanswered. At this point, Eagleton's rare category of evil besides his other views on evil seems helpful to understand them. Snow wrote his novel three years after the Moors Murders and Eagleton wrote his book in 2010. Despite about four decades between them, they complement each other. Snow's novel does not age and lose its validity because it picks up a recurrent theme by asking questions about humanity and inviting us to think about different views of evil and related matters without giving answers for them. Eagleton's views in *On Evil* help us answer these questions.

In order to explain how Eagleton's perception of evil is unconventional, a general background of evil will be presented in the first chapter, showing a range of attitudes towards evil. Subsequent to the different dictionary meanings the focus will be on some distinctive features of evil. The tenets of the concept of evil will be explored with reference to a variety of philosophers, theologians and critics. In this way, the distinctive features of evil which differentiate it semantically from terms such as 'bad', 'wrong', 'wicked' and even 'sin' will be illuminated. Then, types of evil will be analyzed under two titles: moral evil caused by human will and the natural evil caused by Nature without human will.

Meanings of words can change depending on attitudes towards the things in time. Later, the changing attitudes towards evil will be discussed. For example, it has been witnessed that the ancients focused on goodness and ignored the existence of evil by attributing evil to worldly pleasures/matters or by treating evil as the privation of good. In contrast, the Middle Ages were dominated by a highly religious culture obsessed with the concept of evil. The world of the Middle Ages was constructed on the struggle between good and evil represented by Christ and Satan respectively. This was observed in every field of life from art and literature to public affairs and politics.

Enlightenment philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant or Friedrich Schelling, attributed evil to 'freedom' and 'will', to a choice between good or evil, whereas, in a more secularized modern century, the concept of evil, in contrast to its alluring metaphysical dimension in the Medieval Ages, has been described as banal, boring and lacking in vitality. There are different attitudes towards evil. The origin of evil can be discussed to witness the changing attitudes towards evil. For example, while the

rationalist thought finds the origin of evil in freedom, patriarchal cultures find it in the creation of women, either attributed to Eve or Pandora. And the perception and function of evil in religion will be explored to consider whether there are any differences in perception between the polytheistic and monotheistic religions. Later, the perception of evil in this century will be studied in connection with the claims asserted by Hannah Arendt who coined the term 'banality of evil' in *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*.

Eagleton's idiosyncratic evaluation of evil emerges from this general background of evil, and it will be more appropriate to study it from a position of knowledge. Otherwise, it will be hard to understand what he says about evil because he does not discuss the types and different dictionary meanings of it, or the changing attitudes towards it. Thus, the second chapter of the thesis aims to analyze Terry Eagleton's perception of evil with reference to *On Evil* (2010), which is considered as a good example of meditation by some critics and as a kind of extended essay, brainstorming or a narration by others. Eagleton is regarded as the most accomplished Marxist thinker by critics. His works have had a tremendous effect on the teaching of literary and cultural studies throughout Europe and around the world. He brings together his philosophical, literary and religious background in order to discuss the concept of evil in this book. He has previously explored the concept of evil, for example, in *Sweet Violence: A Study of Tragic* (2003), and *After Theory* (2003), *Holy Terror* (2005), and *Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics* (2008) but, in *On Evil*, he brings together and improves what he has discussed about evil so far .

On Evil is constructed in three parts (*Fictions of Evil*, *Obscene Enjoyment* and *Job's Comforters*) and all will be analyzed in detail in the second chapter of the thesis. In the first part of the book, the *Fictions of Evil*, Eagleton discusses examples from selected literary works to determine the tenets of evil. He especially studies the characters in these works. In the second part, *Obscene Enjoyment*, he introduces the basic features of evil and questions whether the literary characters or their actions discussed in the first part of the book are evil or not in the light of these features. In the last part of the book entitled *Job's Comforters*, he discusses theodicy, which means a

justification of the ways of God, and whether it can be considered as an answer to the existence of evil, and then he tries to refute the given solutions.

The third chapter of the thesis will deal with how C. P. Snow employs the concept of evil in *The Sleep of Reason* with reference to Eagleton's perception of evil. The action of the two women and their behaviour after their action will be highlighted by Eagleton's views. Charles Percy Snow (1905-1980) who is a versatile person "covering his work as a physicist, coordinator of British scientific talent in World War civil service commissioner, corporate director, and politician with a stint in the House of Lords, would demand more space than can be spared in this brief reflection on his stature as a writer"[1], as Edmund Fuller writes. He introduces the two phrases; 'corridors of power' and 'the two cultures' into English language and they have been used all around the world since then. Apart from his outstanding essays such as "The Two Cultures" in which he attempts to reconcile science and humanities and the "Scientific Revolution" (1959), Snow has written novels such as *Death under Sail* (1932), *A Coat of Varnish* (1979) and *Brothers and Strangers* (1940-1974), which is a sequence of eleven novels: *Time of Hope* (1949), *George Passant* (1940), *The Conscience of the Rich* (1958), *The Light and the Dark* (1947), *The Masters* (1951), *The New Men* (1954), *Homecomings* (1956), *The Affair* (1960), *Corridors of Power* (1964), *The Sleep of Reason* (1968), *Last Things* (1970).[2]

These eleven novels are considered to be autobiographical and can be read in order to understand the themes and events in the twentieth century in British culture since he discusses the changing class system, academic world, science, humanities and politics. Edmund Fuller writes that this sequence of novels "runs from about 1914 to late in 1968. They show us aspects of English life, public and private, over six decades, involving the rest of the world through the convulsive crises of this century. They cast light upon developments in morals, government, science, and other intellectual matters"[3]. Most of the characters are the same in the novels and the narrator of all them is Lewis who is also the protagonist of some of them. Each novel takes place in different times and deals with different matters. For example, *The New Men* is about

---

[1] Edmund Fuller, "C. P. Snow in Retrospect", *The Sewanee Review*, 89(2), 1981, p. 254, Jstor.
[2] Date of Access: 03.02.2014 http://www.fantasticfiction.co.uk/s/c-p-snow/.
[3] Fuller, p. 255.

nuclear science, and *Corridors of Power* deals with the relations between senior civil servants and politicians;[4]

> *Without discarding the values of poise and balance, he has insisted upon the unconscious and rampantly irrational springs of human behavior, specifically political behavior. Whether probing the motivations of a wealthy Jewish family in England (The Conscience of the Rich), or the vacillations of allegiance among parties to a struggle for academic office (The Masters), or the conflicts among scientists engaged in both "high" and "low" politics (The New Men and The Affair); he regularly touches the earth of individual personality in order to account for critical decisions. As he suggests in The Light and the Dark, Time of Hope and Homecoming, there are severe limits to the capacities of men to forestall the tragic fates which they carry buried well beneath the surface of their personalities.[5]*

In the same way, Gerald Levin states that "Snow's critics have emphasized his preoccupation with moral issues and states of mind, taking *the Strangers and Brothers* novels to be social history mainly and treating his characters as social beings important for what they reveal about their age"[6]. Snow discusses the social happenings resulting from the World Wars, atom bomb and the Moors murders. In his novels he portrays the characters as the ones who search for the answers, how they become as they are from the effects of social conditions such as time and accident and from the effect of their natures. For example, in *The Sleep of Reason*, the psychological and social conditions the two women are in have been analyzed in detail to see the effects of social conditions such as time and accident and the effect of their natures in their abducting and killing the child after having tortured him:

> *What distinguishes Snow is his sustained concern with the motivations and techniques of men who compete for power and influence. In his fictional mill, he grinds - with exceeding fineness, let it*

---

[4] George Watson, "The Future in Your Bones: C. P. Snow (1905-80)", *The Hudson Review*, 54(4), 2002, p. 597, Jstor.
[5] Merle Kling, "Science and Government by C. P. Snow", *The Yale Law Journal*, 71(1), 1961, p. 183, Jstor.
[6] Gerald Levin, "The Sadic Heroes of C. P. Snow", *Twentieth Century Literature,* 26(1), 1980, p. 27, Jstor.

> *be noted - the standard grist of political analysis: leadership, parties, rules of the game, propaganda, campaigning, decision-making.[7]*

Because his novels bravely discuss controversial matters in his society he is appraised by many scholars. But they are also criticized because of their "being documentary and message laden which is the novel writing style appropriate for the nineteenth century"[8]. For example, Suguna Ramanathan states that

> *When Snow's writing is bad, it is horrid. It can sound uninspired and monotonous and it can fall into bathos. Snow at his best utilizes a lean, 'deliberately plain' prose style 'which has its own austere appeal'; he reveals not only 'an excellent ear for contemporary idiom,' but the ability to address important questions regarding human nature even as he constructs a convincing, suspenseful story.[9]*

Furthermore, some critics have accepted that "his style effectively serves his purpose of examining our world and our behaviour with a persuasive sense of reality. I believe that C. P. Snow's novels will last, as have Trollope's with which they have much in common, and like Trollope's will help the next century to understand much of what his century was like"[10]. He did not try to have an elaborated way of writing because he believed that "people needed to be told things about the world around them, much as Trollope had done. Most fiction is about the leisure occupations of leisured people. Trollope and Snow, in their exceptional way, wrote about work"[11]. Besides, Stansky also states that one has to sacrifice aesthetics, the skill and experimentation of writing itself if s/he wants to read Snow.[12] He appears to favour the art provided that it serves for the progress of the society.

---

[7] Kling, p. 183.

[8] Brian Murray, *A Brief Biography of Charles Percy Snow*, Date of Access: 01.06.2014, https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fecmd.nju.edu.cn%2FUploadFile%2F27%2F13456%2Fsnowbio.doc&ei=cZ6EU7KwAbKp7Aa8l4CIBQ&usg=AFQjCNEP73a86-jIP1MUDiwfrDAPgjOaAQ

[9] Brian Murray, *A Brief Biography of Charles Percy Snow*, p.6, Date of Access: 01.06.2014, https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fecmd.nju.edu.cn%2FUploadFile%2F27%2F13456%2Fsnowbio.doc&ei=cZ6EU7KwAbKp7Aa8l4CIBQ&usg=AFQjCNEP73a86-jIP1MUDiwfrDAPgjOaAQ

[10] Fuller, p. 258.

[11] Watson, p. 598-9.

[12] Peter Stansky, "C. P. Snow and the Struggle of Modernity by John de la Mothe; The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 by John Carey", *A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies,* 25(3), 1993, p. 551, Jstor.

CHAPTER ONE

ASPECTS OF EVIL

1.1. DEFINITIONS OF EVIL

Born with regard to life, but existing essentially with regard to the good life.[13]

Observing the etymology of the concept of evil, the *Online Advanced Oxford English Dictionary* states that *evil* originates from "Old English *yfel*, of Germanic origin; related to Dutch *evvel* and German *übel*"[14]. Forsyth gives another account for its etymology relating it to pride:

The English word evil is of Teutonic origin, cognate with übel and Dutch evvel. It is thought to derive from a theoretical word ubiloz, cognate with up or over, and thus the etymology of evil connects it with the concepts of too much, exceeding due measure, over limits, what used to be thought of as hubris.[15]

There are different definitions in different dictionaries. Ahmet Cevizci, in *Dictionary of Philosophy*, describes the concept as "something caused by nature or resulting from human action intentionally and/or something, an event or a thing causing great harm to human life in this world"[16]. By describing evil as such, he underlines two types of evil; one coming from nature and the other called 'moral' evil that is caused by human will. Taking this perspective as a standpoint, evil embraces everything which may cause harm to creatures. Commonly, the concept of evil hosts negative connotations. Basically, it is outlined as:

A powerful force that some people believe to exist, and which causes wicked and bad things; all those wicked and bad things that come to happen in the world; an unpleasant or harmful situation or an activity that is morally bad; those who 'are very wicked by nature and take pleasure in

---

[13] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, (Electronic Version), Stanford University Press-Stanford, California 1998, p. 11.

[14] *Online Oxford Dictionary*, Date of Access: 08. 02. 20013.
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/evil?q=evil.

[15] Neil Forsyth, "Paradise Lost and The Origin of 'Evil': Classical or Judeo-Christian?", *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, 6(4), 2000, p. 521, Jstor.

[16] Ahmet Cevizci, *Felsefe Sözlüğü*, (3. Baskı), Paradigma Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1999.

> *doing things that harm other people, or, something that you think 'is influenced by the devil'.*[17]

Most definitions of evil converge on the point that it results in 'harm' or 'bad things', even though one of them explains it as an external force while another explains it as the bad consequences of that force, yet another relates it to nature while one relates it to human beings who cause evil on purpose.

Besides having different definitions, 'evil' is sometimes used interchangeably with words such as 'wrong', 'bad', 'wicked' and often 'sin'. However, there is no synonym having exactly the same meaning. Adam Morton explains the concept of 'wrong' by comparing it with its antonym as follows; "Right or wrong means primarily 'legal or illegal' and then secondarily 'consistent or inconsistent with the moral ideas of one's society"[18]. However, this does not highlight the harm that evil necessitates. Claudia Card notes that "evils, unlike lesser wrongs, are thought to do reasonably foreseeable intolerable harm"[19].

As for the difference between 'bad' and 'evil', Friedrich Nietzsche explores a superior-subordinate relationship based on class as follows:

> *The concept of evil is divided into two categories in Beyond Good and Evil. He describes two words meaning 'evil' in German; 'Schlecht' (bad) and 'böse' (evil). Schlect is used by the upper class to describe the lower class pejoratively and means bad, ordinary. Böse is used by the lower class for the upper class and means unreliable, dangerous and cruel.*[20]

Here, the distinction between 'bad' and 'evil' sounds similar to the difference between 'evil' and 'wrong'. 'Bad' includes a stronger sense of harm than 'evil' does. However, 'bad' can be used for anything one dislikes in daily life. For example, if somebody pours water on somebody else deliberately, one can call her/him bad. Yet, if a person spills oil on another person and burns him, one cannot just call her/him bad. 'Bad' seems inadequate to describe the situation. Thus, the right word will be 'evil'.

---

[17] Encarnación Hidalgo Tenorio, "The Discourse of Good and Evil in 20th Century Speeches", (Ed. Daniel E. Keen&Pamela Rossi Keen), *Considering Evil and Human Wickedness,* (p. 19), Inter-disciplinary Press, Oxford- United Kingdom 2004.
[18] Adam Morton, *On Evil*, Routledge, New York 2004, p. 75.
[19] Claudia Card, "Kant's Moral Exluded Middle", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, (p. 83), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.
[20] See Renate Reschke, *Nitezsche Forschung, Jahrbuch der Nietzsche Gesellschaft, Antik und Romantik bei Nietzsche* (Electronic Version), Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1998, p. 19**.**

To elucidate the dissimilarity between 'evil' and 'wicked', a quotation from Terry Eagleton's *On Evil* will be reasonably enlightening. He lays emphasis on the lack of purpose of evil while differentiating it from wickedness: "Evil has, or appears to have, no practical purpose. Evil is supremely pointless…In this, it resembles God, who if he does turn out to exist has absolutely no reason for doing so"[21]. However, for Jean Jacques Rousseau, "wickedness [*La mechanceté*] is basically only an opposition of the private will to the public will"[22]. In this sense, wickedness can be related to anarchism or belonging to the fringes of society.

Lastly, 'evil' and 'sin' are related; the difference can be illuminated with the help of Paul W. Kahn. He defines sin in *Out of Eden* as "the failure to place the self in a world of sacred meaning. It is not the violation of a norm but the turning away from God"[23]. Similarly, the Saint Augustine tradition takes sin as perversion.[24] Additionally, Anti-Climacus[25] articulates that "the opposite of sin is not virtue, but faith"[26] while that of 'evil' is 'good'. In addition, it is stated that "from the inception of Christianity the concepts of good and evil dealt with acts in support of or against God"[27]. Kahn, St. Augustine and Anti-Climacus all agree that sin is dealt with only religious terminology. Hence, contrasted to evil, it has a restricted area of usage, and one of the reasons why it is associated with evil is the concept of original sin. Original sin is explained in the Catholic Encyclopedia: "(1) the sin that Adam committed; a consequence of this first sin, the hereditary stain with which we are born on account of our origin or descent from Adam"[28]. James Wetzel writes about the original sin as narrated in Genesis, in a largely Augustinian tradition:

> *Adam and Eve had the freedom to choose good over evil, but by not doing so, they somehow compromised the freedom of their descendants to choose good over evil. Those of us in the postlapsarian world are born*

---

[21] Terry Eagleton, *On Evil*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2010, p. 80.
[22] David James, "The Role of Evil in Kant's Liberalism", *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy,* 55(3), Taylor and Francis, 2012, p. 244.
[23] Paul W Kahn, *Out Of Eden*, Princeton University Press, United States of America 2007, p. 35.
[24] Charles T. Mathewes, *Evil and the Augustinian Tradition*, (Electronic Version), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 60.
[25] One of the pennames of Soren Kierkegaard.
[26] David Roberts, *Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil*, (Electronic Version), MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall 2006, p. 149.
[27] Ester S. Buchholz and Joshua K. Mandel, "Reaching for Virtue, Stumbling on Sin: Concepts of Good and Evil in a Postmodern Era", *Journal of Religion and Health*, 39(2), 2000, Jstor, p. 125, Jstor.
[28] Original Sin, (t.y.), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11312a.htm

disposed to sin, for we have inherited the disposition to sin from our primordial parents, who brought it into the world originally out of an act of disobedience.[29]

Aside from original sin, there are some periods in which 'evil' and 'sin' are linked. For example, in the nineteenth century (moral) evil and sin were used interchangeably for those who steal, lie or murder were kept in asylums in Paris in order to free them from their sins.[30]

In addition to variances, the concept of evil has some distinctive features. Every occurrence that makes people unhappy or angry is not necessarily evil. Every one of those who attempt to define evil has emphasized one or two features of evil. From the attempted definitions, the distinctive features of evil can be expressed by six aspects: intolerable harm, intentionality, senseless destruction, unintelligibility, aimlessness and personally satisfying, which will be briefly explained.

Corlett evaluates evil actions as "extremely harmful wrongs, whether or not they puzzle the minds and hearts of people"[31]. It is the same for Ervin Staub's concept of evil in that actions are considered 'intensely harmful'.[32] Card also highlights the severity of the harm while explaining evil, declaring that "evils are foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing. The nature and severity of the harm, rather than the perpetrators' psychological states, distinguish evils from ordinary wrongs"[33]. In contrast to Corlett and Staub, even though Card implies the intentionality in evil by saying 'foreseeable' harms she focuses on the intolerable harm.

Marcus G. Singer lays emphasis on 'intentionality' in evil actions by expressing that "one cannot do something evil by accident or through thoughtlessness. Through accident or misadventure one can do something wrong or bad, even terrible, but not something evil"[34]. Similarly, Robert B. Louden claims that "…whenever people commit

---

[29] James Wetzel, "Moral Personality, Perversity, and Original Sin", *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 23(1), Jstor, 1995, p. 4.

[30] See, Michel Foucault, *Deliliğin Tarihi*, (1961), (Çev.: Mehmet Ali Kıçbay), İmge Kitabevi, İstanbul 1992.

[31] J. Angelo Corlett, "Evil", *Analysis*, 64(1), Jstor, 2004, p. 83.

[32] Ervin Staub, "The Roots of Evil: Personality, Social Conditions, Culture and Basic Human Needs", *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3, 1999, Jstor, p. 181.

[33] Claudia Card, *The Atrocity Paradigm: The Theory of Evil*, (Electronic Version), Oxford University Press, New York 2002. p. 3.

[34] Marcus G. Singer, "The Concept of Evil", *Royal Institute of Philosophy*, 79(308), 2004, Jstor p. 190.

evil, they have intentionally violated fundamental moral norms- they are 'conscious of the moral law' but have wilfully deviated from it"[35]. In contrast to Corlett, Staub and Card who emphasize the severity of harm, Singer and Louden emphasize intentionality in this harm. By implication, no matter how great the harm, it cannot be labelled as evil. However, this definition seems if not wrong, insufficient in some situations. For example, one intends to kill a man and throws a bomb at his house without knowing there is a party and the house is full of people and children. If 'intentionality' is taken as the basic criterion one cannot be blamed for evil because he causes other people to die. This is not evil according to those who emphasize intentionality in labelling something or somebody evil, while, according to those who emphasize the severity of harm, it is.

Jeffrey Burton Russell who wrote a history of evil in four books, concurs with the lack of purpose of evil in the same fashion. He explains evil as senseless, causeless destruction that does not build but destroys, it does not repair but breaks, and it does not tie but unties.[36] It is interesting to mention the unintelligibility of evil after mentioning the 'intentionality' in evil actions. One wonders, then, how an incomprehensible action can be done intentionally, which also makes it incomprehensible.

While Morton talks about evil he states that "the point of view of the victims of evil is usually that of incomprehension. How could anyone do this to me?"[37]. When there is intentional, intolerable harm or senseless destruction the victim cannot understand it. However, human beings want to understand evil because, as Wood says, "there are moral reasons (for me) not to do it, and these reasons are decisive. In principle, therefore, there could never be a fully satisfactory explanation of an evil action as an action for reasons"[38]. In a similar vein to Wood, McGinn also says that "an act that has good effects can explain why an agent performed it, but the bad effects of an act cannot explain why it was performed- though there exist both types of act"[39]. In contrast to evil, goodness can be explained in many ways. For example, one can

---

[35] Robert B. Louden, "Evil Everywhere, The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, (p. 99), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.
[36] Jeffrey Burton Rusell, *Şeytan, Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, (1977), (Çev.: Nuri Plümer), Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul 1999, p. 18.
[37] Morton, p. 13-14.
[38] Allen W. Wood, "Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, (p.148), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.
[39] Colin McGinn, *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, Oxford University Press, New York 1997, p. 72.

perform a good action to be appreciated by other people. Joel Feinberg also emphasizes the unintelligible nature of evil but he includes the harm evil causes as well by defining it as follows: "considerable harm to a victim, and the unintelligibility of the actor's reasons or motives for her wrongdoing and for the elements that ground her moral blameworthiness"[40].

Furthermore, Fisher remarks on another feature of evil. He argues that it is performed by human beings and composed of four basic tenets, to him, evil is

> a. *Peculiar to us as a species;*
> b. *İntelligently artistic;*
> c. *İntensely creative, and*
> d. *Personally satisfying.*[41]

For the first, that evil can be performed only by human beings can be deduced from other definitions mentioned before Fisher's. As there is intention while performing something, there must be consciousness. As a consequence of this, there must be a human actor in the action. For the second and third basics (being intelligently artistic and intensively creative), Shakespeare's Iago's actions can be given as good examples. For instance, when Othello asks Iago if there is something troubling him Iago answers 'nothing', which is ironically true[42], which can be taken as intensively creative. That he plots against Othello creating a net to ensnare him seems intelligently artistic. That is, one can admire how he carefully and elaborately plots against Othello. So, none of the characters manages to recognize his evil plans beforehand. As a natural consequence of the second and third basic tenets, the perpetrators of evil can feel satisfied and if this is taken as a feature that can be applied to all evil actions will become intelligible. However, not every evil action is done for personal satisfaction. There are evil actions done for the sake of it, which will be discussed in the second chapter.

Related to 'personally satisfying' some explain evil as "taking pleasure". For instance, Roy F. Baumeister suggests a 'myth of pure evil'. The myth claims that "evil individuals are sadistic: they intentionally perpetrate harm, destruction, and chaos on

---

[40] Corlett, p. 82.
[41] Robert N. Fisher, "The Catheter of Bilious Hatred", (Ed. Margaret Sönser Breen), *Understanding Evil: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, (p. 34), Rodopi, Netherlands 2003.
[42] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 89.

innocent victims merely for the pleasure of doing so"[43]. Similarly, Kevin Bales, who was a co-founder of the Free Slave organization, mentions that "the evil person intentionally inflicts harm on people. It is driven by the wish to inflict harm merely for the pleasure of doing so"[44]. Bales also mentions intentionality in evil actions but, in contrast to others who emphasize the intentionality in evil, he explains the reason why they intentionally give harm is for the pleasure.

1.2. TYPES OF EVIL

Although four types of evil as metaphysical, physical, moral and natural are suggested, there seem to be two basic types of evil: moral evil caused by human will, and natural evil caused by nature without human will. What critics do while determining the boundaries of the types is to take 'will' as the key criterion; hence, both metaphysical and physical evils are included in natural evil. As for physical evils, they inflict pain on human beings in the form of earthquakes, natural disasters or epidemics.[45] Metaphysical evil, mentioned above, is also independent of human will and identified with natural evil. In this context, A. R. Mohapatra explains that it is free from human will and dependent on the laws of nature, thus, beyond human beings' control.[46]

1.2.1. Moral Evil

Moral evil is defined by Alvin Plantinga as the results of events such as war, persecution, injustice or murder.[47] For instance, Kant defines moral evil "as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts"[48].

---

[43] Christopher T. Burris & John K. Rempel, "Just Look at Him": Punitive Responses Cued by "Evil", *Symbols, Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, Taylor and Francis, 33(1), 2011, p. 70.
[44] Kevin Bales, "Slavery and the Human Right to Evil", *Journal of Human Rights*, 3(1), Taylor and Francis, 2004, p. 56.
[45] Özcan Akdağ, *Kötülük Problemi ve Özgür İrade Savunması*, (MA Thesis), Ankara Üniversitesi-Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Bölümü, Ankara 2006, p. 25.
[46] Metin Yasa, *Tanrı ve Kötülük*, Elis Yayınları, Ankara 2003, p. 19.
[47] İsmail Işık, *Plantinga'da Tanrı ve Kötülük*, (Yüksek Lisans Yeterlilik Tezi Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri'nde), Atatürk Üniversitesi-Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum 2006, p. 81.
[48] Sam Duncan, "Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20(5), Taylor and Francis, 2012, p. 981.

Seeing that freedom, will and choice are human values; human beings are observed as the only actors of moral evil. In other words, "moral evil presupposes that there is a person, or victim, who is the object of the evil and a person, or perpetrator, who is responsible for those acts toward the victim"[49]. This idea, correspondingly, is noted by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz as follows:

> *At the time of creation there was nothing positively bad in created things. Evil came into the world as a result of man's lack of attention to God's commands. So, 'from an imperfection that was merely privative in the beginning, he [man] fell into something positively bad'. God cannot be blamed morally when man—who is created metaphysically limited and yet morally innocent—actually engages in moral evil. Just as God cannot change mathematical laws, God cannot create metaphysically limited, free beings who are also programmed to necessarily always act morally.*[50]

Leibniz stresses 'will', 'choice' and 'freedom' while discussing moral evil. He also implies that evil, at least moral evil, is inevitable in human beings' lives because of freedom. In other words, as Alfred J. Eppens writes, "the capacity for evil is a price we pay for having free will, and the human will is the accidental cause of moral evil"[51]. It is regarded by some that pain makes people mature and helps people understand the real value of things before they lose them; for instance, people cannot understand the importance of health before getting sick. That is to say, if moral evil is a kind of will gone awry it follows that "the real possibility of moral evil, is logically necessary for the existence of a good or goods"[52]. However, Mackie and McCloskey among others attenuate responsibility from human beings to God by asserting that "if the cause of moral evil is human will and God is omnipotent could not he create human beings as not having potential for evil and always capable of doing good?"[53].

---

[49] Suzanne M. Coyle, "Responses of Narrative Practice to the Effects of Evil", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions,* (Electronic Version), (p. 3), ABC-CLIO, LLC,USA 2011.

[50] Jill Graper Hernandez, "Moral Evil and Leibniz's Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence", *Springer Science+Business Media B.V,* 49, Jstor, 2009, p. 7.

[51] Alfred J. Eppens, "Evil in the Time of Thomas Aquinas", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 35), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

[52] T. J. Mawson, "The Possibility of a Free-Will Defence for the Problem of Natural Evil", *Religious Studies,* 40(1), Jstor, 2004, p. 24.

[53] Akdağ, p. 25.

1.2.2. Natural Evil

Though the cause behind moral evil may seem apparent, it is not the same, for natural evil caused by nature and independent of human will. Nonetheless Frank J. Murphy contends that

While natural evil is not due to bad moral choices, it often depends upon human choice in an incidental kind of way. For example, while a disease may not be created by anything that we do, it is often transmitted by things we do or, in the case of so-called lifestyle diseases, induced and intensified by how we choose to live. Floods and earthquakes injure people who choose to live in certain places and accidents typically result from people deliberately trying to do things.[54]

Even if this seems to explain epidemics or the damage following earthquakes, it does not explain, for example, being born disabled. Adults can choose where to live; however, babies and children cannot. The interpretation of natural evil as a consequence of moral evil is another possible elucidation. In other words, natural evil can be perceived as a punishment by God for the sins people commit. For example, Zeus sends the flies as a punishment on the public of Athens, who did not prevent their king's assassination.[55] Nonetheless, this clarification is not satisfactory if we consider Job's[56] pains which lasted a long time without an apparent reason, or King Oedipus's tragic fate, or the great Lisbon earthquake in 1755, which destroyed nearly all the city and caused a great many people to die. As Susan Neiman contends

Natural evils are neither just punishment for something despicable nor unjust punishment for something heroic, but framework of the human condition. That condition is structured by mortality and, even more generally, by finitude. Being limited is being who we are. If finitude isn't punishment, it is no evidence of sin.[57]

Neiman regards natural evils as built into the human condition instead of a punishment for a sin or unfair treatment by God. Because human beings are limited they cannot affect natural evils. Susan Robbins concurs with Neiman by referring to the Gospels

---

[54] Frank J. Murphy, "Unknowable Worlds: Solving the Problem of Natural Evil", *Religious Studies*, 41(3), Jstor, 2005, p. 343.

[55] *No Exit and Three Other Plays* by Jean Paul Sartre, (t.y.), http://teacherweb.com/FL/ReaganDoral/Prokopowicz/The-flies-27-to-69.pdf.

[56] He is narrated as a holy figure in Bible. He is famous for his patience. He had to endure long years of suffering without apparent reason but remained faithful to God.

[57] Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought, An Alternative History of Philosophy,* p. 60.

that "when asked 'who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?' Jesus answered 'neither this man nor his parents sinned, but that the works of God should be revealed in him"[58]. Searching for the cause behind natural evil in religion may make it easier to understand; it is believed that either there are rewards in the afterlife to compensate for present evils or there are explanations beyond human comprehension. Thus, people are expected to be patient to grasp the ways of God by looking at events from an omniscient perspective rather than a victim's perspective. This is known as the theory of universal goodness. The defenders of that school of thought, such as Leibniz, believe that some proportion of evil is necessary for universal goodness. The present evils lead people to universal goodness but people cannot comprehend this because of their limited natures. They can only be understood through a godlike perspective.

St. Augustine puts forth the proposition that "in fact, natural evil (except for what can be attributed to God's punishment) is to be ascribed to the activity of beings that are free and rational but nonhuman"[59]. Alvin Plantinga explains that St. Augustine, a free will defender, claims this as a possibility not as a fact. On the other hand, F. R. Tennant says the miseries of human beings are not caused by God for any purpose, "they are rather inevitable, if accidental, accompaniments or by-products of the world-order which, as a whole, and by means of its uniformity, is a pre-requisite of the actualization of the highest good that we can conceive a world as embodying"[60]. Nevertheless, that God could have created a perfect world without by-products contradicts the concept of an omnipotent God. But, still, there are people who believe that this is not contradictory. For example, Richard Swinburne disputes that "the existence of natural evil is logically necessary for human beings to acquire a knowledge of good and evil sufficient for their being able to make moral choices and to become responsible for their own moral development"[61]. Contrary to this idea, Nick Trakakis posits that:

> *The crucial difference between Eden and the actual world is that in the former, but not in the latter, there is no evil caused solely or mainly by natural processes. All evil in Eden is moral evil - that is to say, the*

[58] Susan Robbins, "Metaphysical Evil", (Ed. Daniel E. Keen&Pamela Rossi Keen), *Considering Evil And Human Wickedness*, (p.138), (Electronic Version), Inter-disciplinary Press, Oxford- United Kingdom 2004.

[59] Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom and Evil*, Harper&Row, USA 1974, p. 58.

[60] Murdith McLean, "Residual Natural Evil and Anthropic Reasoning", *Religious Studies*, 27(2), Jstor, 1991, p. 176.

[61] David O'Connor, "Swinburne on Natural Evil", *Religious Studies*, 19(1), Jstor, 1983, p. 69.

inhabitants of Eden (specifically, the morally autonomous agents of Eden) are morally responsible for all the evil that exists. In Eden, therefore, there are no 'naturally occurring' disasters - a plague or flood, for example, can only be brought about by the freely chosen acts or omissions of some human person). Furthermore, in Eden no-one is born with genetic defects that cause illnesses such as cancer or Down's Syndrome, unless some person is morally responsible for allowing or bringing about the genetic defect in question (e.g., a drug addicted mother giving birth to a drug addicted baby).[62]

Natural evil, then, does not have to exist because there is already moral evil which is enough to help people be mature.

Critics such as Joachim Leilich dispute whether nature is evil or not in the first place. He comments that "nature is not evil (nor is it good), since moral pronouncements become appropriate only when mind is involved"[63]. If nature does not have moral values, then, it cannot be argued as evil. Similarly, Silvia Völker does not hold that nature can be evil but suggests that "it very well can be ugly[64], for instance, on a stormy ocean with its fearsome breaking waves, or in the mountains of Patagonia, where certain people ascribe human qualities to them (the mountains of Patagonia), such as vanity and fickleness"[65]. That natural disasters cause harm makes people call these events evil. If an earthquake happens on an island where nobody lives, people tend not to call it a natural evil. In this context, C. Stephen Layman declares that "whenever such natural events occur without causing any suffering or loss, no natural evil occurs"[66]. Along these lines, Lawrence W. Fagg states that "the uniform symmetry of a tornado likewise revels its own awesome beauty"[67]. Eagleton sums up that "one can experience what art historians call the sublime (towering mountains, storms at sea,

---

[62] Nick Trakakis, "Is Theism Capable of Accounting for Any Natural Evil at All?", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion,* 57(1), Jstor, 2005, p. 38.

[63] Willem B. Drees, "Nature, Science and Value", (Ed. Willem B. Drees), *Is Nature Ever Evil, Religion, Science and Value*, (p. 9), (Electronic Version), Routledge, London 2003.

[64] Ugly means frightful and stems from the old Norse 'uggr', which means fear. (Silvia Völker, "Response to Mary Midgley's 'Criticizing the Cosmos", (Ed. Willem B. Drees), *Is Nature Ever Evil, Religion, Science and Value*, (p. 27), (Electonic Version), Routledge, London 2003.

[65] Silvia Völker, "Response to Mary Midgley's 'Criticizing the Cosmos", (Ed. Willem B. Drees), *Is Nature Evere Evil, Religion, Science and Value*, (p. 27-8), (Electronic Version), Routledge, London 2003.

[66] C. Stephen Layman, "Natural Evil: The Comparative Response", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 54(1), Jstor, 2003, p. 11.

[67] Lawrence W. Fagg, "Evil revisited: A physicist's perspective", *Theology and Science*, 5(3), 2007, Taylor and Francis, p. 233.

infinite skies) as either terrible or magnificent, or both"[68]. Likewise, J. Harold Ellens asserts that "natural disasters are merely the planet's normal functions working themselves out. Some of them create inconvenience, discomfort, or even kill humans; but to call them evil products of some evil agent is an illusionary human imperialism"[69]. Human beings regard everything to be in their service and they therefore evaluate everything according to taste or usefulness. Michael Bertrand agrees with Ellens and both regard natural evils as normal functions of the world.

1.3. CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS EVIL

A vital element in understanding the concept of evil is goodness. While some view evil as the privation of goodness, there are some who clarify evil as a cross-conflicting aspect of goodness. It has been suggested that good and evil come from the same source. The order of the universe has been claimed by some philosophers, such as Aristotle, as an evidence to refute the view asserting that good and evil were coming from the same source. Aristotle indicates that good and evil cannot be regarded as separate things seeing that there is not anything good or bad in themselves, rather, these terms can be applied in every category in nature.[70] Additionally, James Philips writes that "to know a thing only through something else is to have imperfect knowledge if the thing is knowable through itself. But evil is not knowable through itself, because evil of its very nature is the privation of good. And thus it cannot be defined or known except through good"[71]. Quite prevalent in antiquity, this privation theory, which claims that evil is an absence of goodness and there is only goodness in the universe, can be perceived from the fact that there is no Greek word having the exactly the same meaning as evil:

> *The Greek words for evil are not exact: to kakon is the closest, especially in tragedy, but it means so many things, including both cowardice and base birth (concepts of heroic origin), and is so often plural or merely particular; to aischron means rather shameful or disgusting; to aischron is*

---

[68] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 26.

[69] J. Harold Ellens, "Conclusion: Is There Really an Evil Force Out There?", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 320), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

[70] Russell, *Şeytan, Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 171.

[71] James Phillips, "From Radical to Banal Evil: Hannah Arendt against the Justification of the Unjustifiable", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 12(2), 2004, Taylor and Francis, p. 135.

usually opposed to to kakon as ugliness to beauty or vice to virtue; poneria covers any defects or blemish, moral or otherwise. No one Greek word covers all of what we mean by the concept evil, and there was no such thing as what theologians call 'the problem of evil'.[72]

Philip Brownell argues that "two words in Greek stood for the concept of evil. One was *kakos*, and the other was *pon eros*. *Kakos* meant 'bad' or 'evil' and its derivatives meant to harm, embitter, do wrong, and be an evil-doer. *Pon eros* pointed to being in poor condition, sick, bad, poor, evil, and wicked"[73].

Referring to the connection between evil and ignorance in *Euthydemus* as "wisdom as good and ignorance as bad"[74] Socrates ignores evil in the world. He believed that if knowledge could be taught to people, virtue could be taught as well. As noted above, his understanding of 'evil' implies 'wrong' or 'bad' and does not reflect a contemporary usage of 'evil'. In contrast to Socrates, Aristippos, a former student of Socrates, defines the word as 'soul pain' which includes all negative things, *malum*, a Latin counterpart of evil, comprises disaster, calamity, pain, unhappiness and all the other activities that threaten people's lives.[75] As it is seen, *malum* is pretty close to the word 'evil' in today's use in terms of meaning.[76]

While Antisthenes, a student of Socrates, declared that it was due to the proclivity of people towards worldly inclinations that caused evil; on the other hand, Sophism ascribed evil to the weakness of man.[77] Similarly, Orphism, which was a religious movement of the age, handled evil as human faults from an individualistic view.[78] That is, from an individualistic view people can do evil as it is committed by the choice of freedom. Orphism considers this choice as human faults instead of evil or sin. These views interconnect evil with human beings and materialism/worldliness.

Suggesting that "good and evil are correlative; or that evil is somehow mere non-existence, or better, is 'otherness'; or again, that evil is absence of limit and order, or

---

[72] Forsyth, 521.
[73] Philip Brownell, "Evil, Sin, and Imperfection: Ethics in Practice", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 220), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.
[74] Buchholz and Mandel, p. 126.
[75] Yasa, *Tanrı ve Kötülük*, p. 16.
[76] Forsyth, 528.
[77] Russell, *Şeytan, Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 164.
[78] Willim Greene Chase, *Moira, Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought,* Harper&Row, Publishers, Incorporated, New York and Evanston 1963, p. 66.

finally, that the created is inferior to the creator"[79] Plato's attitude towards evil was not stable but showed a process. He firstly accepts the existence of evil by claiming that they are correlative. Then, he regards evil as mere non-existence. And lastly, he notes that the created is inferior to the creator. He means the absolute truth/goodness in his world of ideas. He discloses that the world of ideas was perfect, real and absolutely good. However, the fact that the physical world could not completely mirror the world of ideas made it less real and, thus, less good; as good became less, then evil started to exist. Moreover, upon seeing so much evil in the world, Plato had to accept the existence of evil rather than saying that it was just a deficiency. He searched for evil in matter and body, but this did not satisfy him, either. It followed that as bare material cannot move itself, there should be either a disorder in the soul of the creator or there is another soul that brings evil to the world.[80]

Another attitude towards evil is the idea that everything exists with its opposite. For instance, John Philips explains that "the gist of Proclus's argument is that evil is something more than just privation as lack or negation of being, but less than privation as absolute opposition to the Good"[81]. Additionally, being one of the most important advocates of this view, Jalaluddin Rumi declares that everything reveals itself with its opposite.[82] That is, if one believes in goodness one should also believe in evil as it is the opposite of goodness. The Greek philosopher Heraclitus holds that good and evil are the same thing, and if we label certain things as evil and are not aware of goodness we deceive ourselves; however, evil things are prerequisites of goodness.[83] Briefly, according to these views, the existence of evil has a necessary function in the world, at least for the balance in the world.

The view claiming that the existence of evil is necessary is also suggested by Ernesto Spinelli in the sense that "the daimonic urge that is fundamental to the overall theory of personality in that 'the daimonic urge … [is]… the source of both our constructive and our destructive impulses'. To emphasize only the constructive aspects

---

[79] Chase, p. 297.
[80] Russell, *Şeytan, Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 165.
[81] John Phillips, *Order from Disorder, Proclus'Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism,* , (ed. Robert M. Berchman and Jacob Neusnerp) , (Electronic Version), Leiden, Netherlands 2007, p. 89.
[82] İbrahim Arslanoğlu, *Mevlana'nın Aşk ve İnsan Felsefesi*, Date of Access: 13 January 2013, http://w3.gazi.edu.tr/~iarslan/mevlanaaskinsan.pdf.
[83] Charles Werner, *Kötülük Problemi*, (Çev. Sedat Umran), Kaknüs Yayınları, İstanbul 2000, p. 108.

of the daimonic severely limits the potentials of any human being"[84]. Additionally, John Kekes comments that one should not ignore evil proclivities by taking only good ones as basic in human nature.[85] As observed, human beings have evil propensities as well as good. For example, Sigmund Freud mentions the death drive as the most dangerous instinct for civilization; however, he also mentions it as the most necessary one. All these views imply that "our psychological structure is such that we could not live or function, nor experience one of our most important sources of joy, our loving relationships with others, without mental operations that equally ground our capacity for evil."[86] In brief, the world is instituted on opposites: beautiful/ugly, black/white, or good/evil. That is to say, if everybody is black nobody is black; to tag something black or recognize it as black requires an awareness of the presence of white.

Another attitude towards evil is suggested by Carl Gustav Jung who endorses that a human being is destined to live always with it because he considers it as shadow of human beings. He argues:

> *In Hitler, every German should have seen his own shadow, his own worst danger. It's everybody's allotted fate to become conscious of and learn to deal with this shadow. But how could the Germans be expected to understand this, when nobody in the world can understand such a simple truth? The world will never reach a state of order until this truth is generally recognized?[87]*

Instead of attributing 'evil' to external factors, Jung considers it as the shadow of human beings, that is to say, it exists with a human being from birth to death. Accordingly, the notion that people committing evil were evil in their essence, a notion widely believed especially in the Dark Ages, has become old-fashioned. For evil is now regarded as a human potential; every human being has a potential to be either a saint or a murderer if Jung is to be credited. Unlike the situation of Shakespeare's Richard III who claims that he exists to prove a true villain, the human situation is like that of Macbeth who has the choice to commit crimes or not. Subsequently, while human beings may sometimes

---

[84] Ernesto Spinelli, "Therapy and the Challenge of Evil", *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling,* 28(4), Taylor and Francis, 2010, p. 562.

[85] Jon G. Allen, "Evil, Mindblindness, and Trauma", *Smith College Studies in Social Work,* 77:1, 2007, Taylor and Francis, p. 28.

[86] Michael Levine, "The Positive Function of Evil?", *Philosophical Papers*, 41(1), Taylor and Francis, 2012, p. 158.

[87] Carl Gustav Jung, (Ed. Murray Stein), *Jung on Evil*, Routledge, London 1995, p. 178.

choose to do evil, they may also choose not to do so. Rousseau notes that "both the problem of evil and its solution depend on the idea that evil developed over time. This assumes, in turn, that human beings develop over time, both as species and individual beings."[88]

Correspondingly, Mary Midgley realizes human beings' potential for evil and declares that;

> *However great may be the force of the external pressures on people, we still need to understand the situations in which those people respond to the pressures. Infection can bring on fever, but only in creatures with a suitable circulatory system. Like fever, spite, resentment, envy, avarice, cruelty, meanness, hatred and the rest are themselves complex states, and they produce complex activities. Outside events may indeed bring them on, but, like other malfunctions, they would not develop if we were not prone to them.*[89]

The pressure of external factors cannot be denied. However, as Midgley asserts, if people do not have a propensity for evil they cannot perform it. For instance, animals cannot feel envy, meanness or avarice in the same way people feel, therefore animals cannot act out evil actions related to these feelings.

1.3.1. The Origin of Evil

1.3.1.1. Human Centred Suggestions

For freedom is defined as the possibility of good and evil[90] by Schelling, 'freedom' and accordingly 'will' are suggested as causes for the origin of evil. If human beings can choose to do evil, it, in turn, implies that there is a choice not to do it. For example, Orestes in *The Flies* by Jean Paul Sartre goes to the temple of Zeus and wants a sign from him to leave the city. However, after he sends a lightning bolt as a sign for Orestes to leave the city, he suddenly realizes that he has the choice not to do so[91]. In

---

[88] Susan Neiman, *Evil in Modern Thought, An Alternative History of Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, USA 2002, p. 44.

[89] Mary Midgley, *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay,* Routledge&Kegan Paul plc, Boston-USA 1984, p. 131.

[90] Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,* (1809), (Çev.: Joan Stambaugh), Ohaio University Press, United States of America 1985, p. 97.

[91] No Exit and Three Other Plays by Jean Paul Sartre, (t.y.), http://teacherweb.com/FL/ReaganDoral/Prokopowicz/The-flies-27-to-69.pdf.

the end, he decides not to leave it. The point is not to argue whether Orestes's choice is good or evil but to show the role of freedom/free will in doing an action.

In Western Christian tradition, the origin of evil is related to Adam and Eve by many philosophers, writers and critics. There are some people who relate it only to Eve, when she tempts Adam to eat the fruit such as John Milton. Nonetheless, it is believed that they are only dismissed from Eden after Adam eats the fruit. Paul Ricoeur concurs with this view and states that "ethically, the whole Fall may be 'summed up in one act: he took the fruit and ate of it"[92]. This event is open to interpretation. For instance, John S. Tanner writes that *Genesis* does not charge Adam with all the accusations but shifts the blame from him to Eve and, similarly, shifts it from her to the serpent.[93] That is, although Adam and Eve were dismissed from Eden after Adam ate the fruit from the tree of knowledge Eve was accused of having tempted Adam. Similarly, the serpent was accused of having tempted Eve.

This suggestion can be related closely to the one mentioned above in the sense that if there had not been freedom to choose they would not have done the thing they were banished for. In this context, Erich Fromm interprets the situation of these first created human beings with a radical reading of *The Bible*. He proposes that "the Old Testament is a *revolutionary* book; its theme is the liberation of man from the incestuous ties to blood and soil, from the submission to idols, from slavery, from powerful masters, to freedom for the individual, for the nation, and for all of mankind"[94].

Pandora's box is accounted as a second suggestion about the origin of evil. The theme in the story of Adam and Eve is narrated in a similar way to the story of the first created woman named Pandora in Greek mythology which claims that all evil existing in the world originated from her box. Prometheus, the son of Titan Iapetos, steals fire from Zeus with the help of his brother Epimetheus and gives it to human beings. Thereupon, Zeus punishes Prometheus. He is bound on a rock and his liver is eaten by an eagle every day, but the liver renews itself every night. As for Epimetheus's

---

[92] John S. Tanner, "Say First What Cause: Ricoeur and the Etiology of Evil in Paradise Lost", *PMLA*, 103(1), Jstor, 1988, p. 50.
[93] Tanner, p. 47.
[94] Lewis Aron and ABPP, "The Tree of Knowledge: Good and Evil: Conflicting Interpretations", *Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives*, 15(5), Taylor and Francis, 2005, p. 686.

punishment, a woman called Pandora is created for him. Zeus gives her the box as a gift and Epimetheus admonishes her not to open it. However, she disobeys him and opens it. All the evils in it spread out across the earth as a consequence. Despite the fact that, according to the myth, those who make Zeus angry are Prometheus and Epimetheus and the creator of the box is Zeus, Pandora is accused of being the ultimate reason of evil like Eve even if there are a few who think differently. W. Headlam claims that "Prometheus is not the benefactor of man, the culture-hero, but the serpent that caused man to leave the Garden of Eden"[95] like Adam.

For Nietzsche, evil occurred with the revolt of the Jewish slaves against their masters. He writes in *On the Genealogy of Morality* as follows;

> *Masters use the term 'good' to refer in an approving way to this life and to themselves as people who are capable of leading it. As an afterthought, they also sometimes employ the term 'bad' to refer to those people – most notably, the 'slaves' – who by virtue of their weakness are not capable of living the life of self-affirming physical exuberance. The terms 'good' and 'bad' then form the basis of a variety of different 'masters' moralities'. One of the most important events in Western history occurs when the slaves revolt against the masters' form of valuation. The slaves are, after all, not only physically weak and oppressed, they are also by virtue of their very weakness debarred from spontaneously seeing themselves and their lives in an affirmative way. They develop a reactive and negative sentiment against the oppressive masters which Nietzsche calls 'ressentiment', and this ressentiment eventually turns creative, allowing the slaves to take revenge in their imagination on the masters whom they are too weak to harm physically. The form this revenge takes is the invention of a new concept and an associated new form of valuation: 'evil'. 'Evil' is used to refer to the life the masters lead (which they call 'good') but it is used to refer to it in a disapproving way. In a 'slave' morality this negative term 'evil' is central, and slaves can come to a pale semblance of self-affirmation only by observing that they are not like the 'evil' masters. In the mouths of the slaves, 'good' comes to refer not to a life of robust vitality, but to one that is 'not-evil', i.e. not in any way like the life that the masters live.[96]*

---

[95] Chase, 31.
[96] Friedrich Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morality,* (Elektronic Version), (1887), (Çev.: Carol Diethe), Cambridge University Press, UK 2006. p. XXI.

As Nietzsche states, masters refer to their way of life as good and to the way of the slaves' lives as bad. As indicated, the powerful name the things as they wish. Nietzsche calls this situation 'Will to power'. On the other hand, the slaves invent 'evil' to take revenge on their masters. Because of their physical weakness they can revenge in this way. However, 'evil' does not include traditional features of evil such as intolerable harm. In this sense, the slaves relieve themselves in their imaginations. Besides, Protagoras says that "human beings are the measure of all things"[97]. In his *The Meaning of Life*, Terry Eagleton says that according to New Testament, God creates the sheep and wants Jesus to name them.[98] As seen, nothing has an inherent meaning rather human beings put meanings on them.

1.3.1.2. The Suggestions Independent from Human Beings' Control

A different suggestion about the origin of evil is put forward by Leibniz who asserts that "the origin of evil must be sought in 'the ideal nature of the creature,' insofar as this ideal nature exists in divine understanding, since there is 'an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is essentially limited'"[99]. Being a theist, he associates perfection with God and, hence, believes that He represents absolute goodness. Thence, there is a relationship between perfection and goodness. Since human beings are limited, in other words imperfect, they do not have absolute goodness like God. Again, because of this imperfect nature, they cannot foresee the consequences of their actions and that is why they inevitably tend to do evil. On the other hand, for the same reason it seems an advantageous idea because it frees people from responsibility seeing that evil is due to human beings' imperfect nature and people cannot help themselves. However, it brings many disadvantages with itself. For instance, if human beings were perfect and could foresee everything beforehand, evil (at least in moral terms) would not exist. As a natural consequence of this, there would not be freedom and free will.

---

[97] Hasan Ocak, *Bir Ahlak Felsefesi Problemi Olarak Erdem Kavramına Yüklenen Anlamın İlkçağ'dan Ortaçağ'a Evrimi,* Date of Access: 28.12. 2013, http://www.flsfdergisi.com/sayi11/79-101.pdf

[98] Terry Eagleton, *Hayatın Anlamı,* (2007), (Çev.: Kutlu Tunca), Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul 2012, p. 99.

[99] Michael Latzer, "Leibniz's Conception of Metaphysical Evil", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55(1), Jstor, 1994, p. 1.

Another suggestion about the origin of evil is heredity, within the instinctual nature of human beings. Russell explains unconscious, 'genotyping' aggression as universal and strong enough to destroy all human beings when combined with technology. In recent years, much research has tended to focus on genetics rather than on social dimensions.[100] This can be observed in William Golding's novel *The Inheritors,* where the Neanderthals, a primitive tribe, were killed by Homo Sapiens, who were the predecessors of modern human beings. Homo Sapiens were more savage and egoistic than the Neanderthals. For instance, the Neanderthals could only eat a deer after they had said that "a cat has killed the deer and sucked its blood, so there is no blame"[101]. Since they did not kill it but found it already dead, they could eat without feeling guilty. On the other hand, Homo Sapiens were said to have killed without feeling guilty. Additionally, they were described by the Neanderthals as "the new people are like a wolf and honey, rotten honey and the river. They are like a fire in the forest"[102]. Seeing that there have always been atrocities caused by human beings' heredity, in other words, people's inclination towards evil seems a reasonable explanation for the origin of evil.

1.3.2. Evil in Religion

It is hard to explain evil in religious aspects; because God, supposed to be omnipotent and representing absolute goodness, contrasts with the concept of evil. In order to reconcile these two concepts, many religious men, philosophers and critics have developed several theories, one of which is a dualist belief system, which claims two different powers, one is for goodness and the other is for evil:

> *Zarathustra advanced the theory that there are two spiritual principles. The former is Ahura Mazda who is the god of good and light. The latter is Angra Mainyu (destroying or agonizing spirit) who is the god of evil and darkness. While Ahura Mazda chooses goodness with his own free will Angra Mainyu chooses evil with his own free will.[103]*

This belief system sacrifices God's being the almighty for the sake of His absolute goodness by attributing evil to some other god. Similarly, Manichaeism also claims that

---

[100] Russell, Şeytan, *Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 23.
[101] William Golding, *The Inheritors*, Faber and Faber, England 2011, p. 27.
[102] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[103] Russell, Şeytan, *Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 118.

both on earth and in heaven there is a struggle between two different powers, which are good and evil. Buddhism recounts the struggle of Buddha, who symbolizes goodness, and Mara, who symbolizes evil, sin and death:

> *Buddhism is a religious revolution against the evils that are dominant in Brahmanism…Gautama Shakyamuni recognized the existence of evil and sought salvation in the radical abolition of all selfishness through the extension of an all-comprehensive love toward all creatures.*[104]

Subsequently, following these dualist belief systems, monotheistic religions start to appear such as Christianity and Islam where the struggle between good and evil is represented by God and Satan respectively; since religion always commands goodness, there should be evil to fight against. For that reason, Ruth Stein writes "religion's preoccupation with a primordial, eternal, cosmic war between Good and Evil, and with how religion depicts its origins, vicissitudes and promises through the language of war"[105].

> *Christianity's view of God derives from both Hellenistic and Jewish traditions. From the former, Christians believe that God is omnipotent and completely good. From Judaism, Christianity retained the belief that there is both a good and an evil element created by God. From this dichotomy the idea of the devil or Satan is created. Satan is first presented in the scriptures in the book of Job; however, throughout the Old Testament he only makes that one appearance. Nevertheless, this cameo presentation is noteworthy, since it represents the powers of good and evil as equal. The conflict between God and Satan takes centre stage in New Testament theology. Some go as far as to say that without the evil of Satan there would be no need for the saving mission of Christ. Others set up a different tautology: The purpose of evil in Christian theology is to counter Christ, who came to earth so that humanity could be saved.*[106]

There is trust in the omnipotence and absolute goodness of God in Christianity. However, it is also posited that good and evil are created by God. These two statements contradict each other. As a result of this disunion, the concept of Satan is created. For

---

[104] Paul Carus, *The History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, The Open Court Publishing, London 1900, p. 104.

[105] Ruth Stein, "Evil as Love and as Liberation", *Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives*, 12(3), Taylor and Francis, 2002, p. 417.

[106] Ester S. Buchholz and Joshua K. Mandel, p. 130.

instance, Dionysus explains that Satan and other demons are evil not by birth but by their will.[107] God created them as good but they chose evil.

Satan means enemy in Hebrew, the equivalent is 'diabolos' in Greece, 'diabolus' in Latin and 'satan' in French.[108] Evil is personified by Satan, thus, it is not an intangible concept but a concrete and personified thing. Andrew Singleton states that "experiences of evil are generally considered to be encounters with evil spirits, who possess special powers enabling them to act against humans. Often, these evil spirits are identified by name"[109]. Besides, Satan was said to have been created as an angel who, then, turned to evil. For Muslims;

> *the being who became Satan had formerly been an archangel but fell from that divine grace to the status of an evil, rejected and accursed spirit. This was the result of disobedience to God's command to honour Adam. Satan refused. Since then, his work has been to beguile man into error and sin. Satan is, therefore, the contemporary of man and his machinations will cease only on the Last Day.[110]*

Satan's own act of disobedience is construed by *The Quran* as the sin of pride. As in Christianity, Islam refers to Satan as an archangel who fell into hell disobeying God because of his pride. Four main reasons are propounded for Satan as a source of evil. One of them is pride. It is narrated in *The Quran* that God created Adam from wet clay and asked the angels to honor Adam but Iblis (Satan) in contrast to the other angels, refused to do that.[111] The second reason is that there was a power struggle, for Satan feels superior to Adam because he was created *before* Adam and because he was created from fire rather than wet clay, which also makes him feel arrogant as well. The third reason is envy, Satan is jealous of both God and Adam.[112] According to Genesis, the last reason is sexuality; the people living on earth had beautiful daughters, God's sons saw them and took them as wives, and then, they had giant children as a result of their

---

[107] Russell, *Lucifer, Ortaçağda Şeytan*, (1984), (Çev.: Ahmet Fethi) Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul 1999, p. 34.
[108] Russell, *Şeytan Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 27.
[109] Andrew Singleton, "No Sympathy for the Devil: Narratives about Evil", *Journal of Contemporary Religion,* 16(2), Taylor and Francis, 2001, p. 178.
[110] J. Harold Ellens, "Evil in the Three Contemporary Abrahamic Faiths", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 204), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.
[111] Russell, *Lucifer, Ortaçağda Şeytan*, p. 34.
[112] Russell, p. 35.

unholy union.[113] Thence, evil spreads from these children over the Earth. These four reasons suggest that Satan acts consciously and intentionally. David McNaughton declares that "one is called as Satan if he wants to do it even though he knows it is evil. So in order to label an action as Satanic it needs to be done intentionally. The actor should know that it is evil and knowing that it is evil should be the impulsive drive"[114].

During the Middle Ages, it was not just Satan that was credited with evil; evil was embodied in human beings (usually female) who were labelled as witches, with the art of 'witchcraft' being defined as follows: "It is a deal made in order to get supernatural power to use against the order or Christianity. The point is not the power but the person making the deal refuses God intentionally. So witchcraft is generally evaluated as perversity"[115]. These so-called witches, who were mostly women, endured torture and spurious trials before being put to death; it is estimated that nearly six million people were murdered for crimes of 'witchcraft' during the Middle Ages in Europe.

The close proximity of sin and evil makes it problematic most of the time to assess where sin starts and evil stops. For example, Xolani Sakuba alleges that

> *sin gives birth to two types of evil: the evil people commit and the evil they endure. For a little further explanation, it may be advocated that the evil people endure includes anxiety, fear, disillusionment, suffering, other peoples' evil deeds, and the power that takes over their lives. The evil that people commit consists of cruelty that takes the form of deceit, discrimination, torture, destruction of other creatures (including the environment), and injustice.[116]*

'Sin' and 'evil' are identified here and both types of evil seem almost the same. Both the evil people commit and the evil people endure are performed by people. The moral evil is named as 'sin' in religious context. Additionally, Paul the Apostle relates evil to human nature and behaviour in this life and "because of the more developed arguments in his *Letter to the Romans*, he appears to have been primarily interested in or at least gave more importance to the transmission of sin as the human effect of evil, and to its

---

[113] Russell, *Şeytan Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, p. 41.

[114] Irit Samet-Porat, "Satanic Motivations", *The Journal of Value Inquiry, 41*, Springer, 2007, p. 78.

[115] Elliott P. Currie, "Crimes without Criminals: Witchcraft and Its Control in Renaissance Europe", *Law & Society Review*, 3(1), Jstor,1968, p. 8.

[116] Xolani Sakuba, "The Concept of Evil in African Christian Theology", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 165), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

remedy in the death and resurrection of Christ"[117]. On the same basis, the problem of evil in religion has become a highly debated topic since it was first discussed by Epicurus. The *Encyclopedia Britannica* asserts that evil is a problem of theology and maintains three propositions that "(a) God is almighty, (b) God is perfectly good, and (c) evil exists. If evil exists, it seems either that God wants to obliterate evil and is not able to—and thus his omnipotence is denied—or that God is able to obliterate evil but does not want to—and thus his goodness is denied"[118]. So, one of the three should be omitted because they contradict each other. As the existences of a good God and evil at the same time contradict each other some take this argument to discuss whether God exists or not. For example, John Leslie Mackie puts it:

> *If God existed, God would—as omnipotent—be able and—as perfectly good—be willing to prevent or eliminate any and every evil. If God existed, and were omnipotent and perfectly good, evils would not exist. Since they do, God doesn't. The existence of a perfectly good omnipotent being and the existence of evil are logically incompatible.[119]*

In view of all the assessments above, it can be established that these two premises are logically in a discrepancy; in other words, one negates the other. Therefore, this is used by atheists as a very strong argument against the existence of God; yet, free will is used by theists as a defence. For instance, John Hick suggests that "God could not create a perfect world and perfect people because people should keep an epistemic distance from God in order to act freely"[120]. Because freedom means the possibility of choosing good or evil, people need distance from God in order to act freely. In this sense, imperfection is the price for freedom or, in other words, being a human being. Freedom is also suggested as a requital of evil in the world. Martin Davies states that;

> *The free will defence (FWD) is a very good thing that there should be beings who perform free actions; God has created such beings; it is not then open to God to determine - causally or otherwise - just what actions those*

---

[117] Loren T. Stuckenbruck, "Demonic Beings and the Dead Sea Scrolls", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions,*(Electronic Version), (p. 134), ABC-CLIO, LLC,USA 2011.

[118] J. Harold Ellens, "Introduction: Setting the Course", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 1, Definitons and Developments,* (Electronic Version), (p. 2), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

[119] Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ignorance, Instrumentality, Compensation, and the Problem of Evil", *SOPHIA* (2013) 52, 2012, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, p. 8.

[120] Şaban Haklı, *Kötülük Problemi, Yaklaşımlar ve Eleştiriler*, 2002, http://www.ilafdergi.hitit.edu.tr/files/2.10.pdf

beings will perform, on pain of the actions not being free; so, in particular, it is not open to God (even though he be benevolent and omnipotent) so to organize matters - causally or otherwise - that those beings never perform evil actions.[121]

As seen, evil is held as a cost of freedom. As Davies maintains, God cannot intervene in the actions of free beings and, thus, cannot be responsible for their actions because there would be no point in creating them free in the first place. That free beings choose to do evil and God does not impede it proves the freedom of people. In this respect, Plantinga praises the benevolence of God and the present world:

Such is the generosity of God's goodness that He has not refrained from creating even that creature which He foreknew would not only sin, but remain in the will to sin. As a runaway horse is better than a Stone which does not run away because it lacks self-movement and sense perception, so the creature is more excellent which sins by free will than that which does not sin only because it has no free will.[122]

Here he highlights that beings who does not commit evil because they do not have the free will to do so are not considered praiseworthy. In this situation, they would be no different from a stone that is free from a valuation of good or evil. To sum up, free will is both logically necessary for the world and a good defence for the existence of evil.

1.3.3. Banality of Evil in the Twentieth Century

In spite of all the developments in social sciences and technology, the twentieth century is a period in which human cruelty and greed are very evident with the examples of two world wars, concentration camps, Cambodia, the Gulags, Hiroshima and more. People have lost their faith in religions, which has led to a rise of secularism. Accordingly, people have started to re-evaluate how they regard evil which is no longer considered mysterious or magical but has become a highly debated topic among intellectuals. Evil is now regarded as banal, which refers to the banality of the actors rather than to the action. That is to say, an ordinary person may cause hundreds of people to die.

---

[121] Martin Davies, "Determinism and Evil", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 58(2), 1980, Taylor and Francis, p. 116.
[122] Plantinga, p. 27.

In a letter to Jewish philosopher and historian Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt writes that "I do not think that evil is radical or it has neither deepness nor any satanic dimension. It spreads like a fungus on the surface of human existence. It challenges thinking because thinking tries to reach deepness or find the roots"[123]. Examining the case of Eichmann who played an active role in the 'Final Solution' which was a project designed to kill Jews and caused six million people to die, Arendt educes this 'banal' nature of evil in *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. During the trial, Eichmann did not accept the moral responsibility for his acts. Instead, he claimed that he did whatever he was told to do. He defended himself by saying that he was just obeying orders. After she observed his defence, Arendt claimed evil as one of the most ordinary actions done by a human being. Thus, she concluded that "Eichmann was not an extraordinary man. His capacity to understand what he had done lacked the clarity of what is at stake when we deal with moral judgments. He was only capable of conflating the Führer's orders with his moral duty"[124].

Similarly, Hood Jr. declares that "evil persons do not do evil deeds under specific historical or situational conditions; rather, evil deeds occur from simple acts of obedience, when a person in authority orders another to harm a third person. It is just this simple!"[125]. This explanation makes Eichmann's defence seem logical. For he saw himself as an innocent person or even a good worker who obeyed the orders of his employer. As Stein asserts, "there is a wide-ranging consensus among thinkers on the psychology of evil, that for the most part, evildoers do not themselves consider their acts to be evil"[126]. Instead of acknowledging themselves or their behaviours to be good or evil, they regard it as a duty they have to fulfill. In this context, Lizelle Franken states that:

> *Moral standards are irrelevant for the technical success of bureaucratic operations- within a bureaucratic organization, morality is instead measured in terms of how well you perform to your tasks. A moral person is a good, diligent and efficient worker. In the bureaucratic system,*

---

[123] Richard J. Bernstein, *Radikal Kötülük, Bir Felsefi Sorgulama,* (2002), (Çev.: Nil Erdoğan-Filiz Deniztekin), Varlık Yayınları, İstanbul 2010, p. 271.
[124] Maria Pia Lara, *Narrating Evil, A Postmetaphysical Theory of Reflective Judgement*, Columbia University Press, New York 2007, p. 36.
[125] Ralph W. Hood Jr., "The Psychology of Evil", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 1, Definitons and Developments,* (Electronic Version), (p. 20), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.
[126] Stein, 395.

the language of morality takes on a new vocabulary-loyalty, duty, discipline- and as Milgra points out, the subordinate person feels shame or pride depending on how well he has performed his tasks.[127]

For individuals there is only duty. Thus, in duty ethics, the person "appears as a potential offender, whereas rights ethics views the self primarily as a potential victim and in terms of duty ethics an individual is a potential criminal, especially when he does not fulfill his duty"[128].

In contrast, Franken asserts that "the overwhelming majority of modern genocides are not sadistic maniacs, but people who, in all other aspects of their lives, would have been considered completely normal. They are usually good citizens, spouses and parents"[129]. For instance, Slobodan Milosevic, the butcher of the Balkans, was described as "a man devoted to his friends and family, a very good paterfamilias. He is a good father and he is not a cruel person, as he is portrayed. For his children, Milosevic would do anything"[130]. Seemingly, he convinced himself and others for whom he cared that what he did was necessary.

Christopher Hamilton says of Hitler that "he was possessed of a smallness and meanness of soul: he was common and vulgar, consumed by petty hatreds and stuffed to the brim with what Nietzsche called *ressentiment,* roughly, the desire to make others pay for his own weakness and failures"[131]. Instead of a monster, Hitler is seen as a simple man who caused more than six millions to die. Seemingly, he had a grisly rationality which was to make other people pay for his failures. Even though the Nazis thought that he was a hero of their nation, he was shallow. Chad Neuman points out that "a hero was no longer seen as the person who sought and killed innocent people who happened to be of a different ethnic group; instead, the hero was identified as the person

---

[127] Lizelle Franken, *Evil, Morality and Modernity*, (Master Dissertation), Felsefe Bölümü, Stellenbosch university, Stellenbosch, Güney Afrika, 2012, p. 28.

[128] Molly Brigid Flynn, "Andreas Kinneging, The Geography of Good and Evil: Philosophical Investigations", *Trans. Ineke Hardy*. (Ed. Jonathan Price. Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2009, Taylor and Francis, p. 187.

[129] Franken, p. 76.

[130] Barbara Oakley, *Evil Genes*: *Why Rome Fell, Hitler Rose, Enron Failed and My sister Stole My Mother's Boyfriend*, Prometheus Books, New York 2002, p. 167

[131] Christopher Hamilton, "The nature of evil a reply to Garrard", *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 2(2), Jstor, 1999, p. 135.

who stood up against the senseless violence or who helped innocent people escape murder"[132].

In short, it is interesting to see that although evil is used by everybody in daily life to label more or less the same events, there has not been a clear definition of it. Neither is there an adequate explanation about its origin. Besides, there have been many different attitudes towards it. They sometimes ironically become different from each other. As has been discussed, for example, while the ancients did not accept evil as a reality of human life medieval people made it a very powerful force one could not resist. In the twentieth century, it becomes banal losing its fearsome aspect. Although these views about evil are valid at different times they may be inadequate to explain some events such as the Moor Murders and *The Sleep of Reason,* inspired by those killings. At this point, Eagleton's views on evil help us to understand and interpret the novel.

---

[132] Chad Neuman, "The Media's Capacity for Good and Evil'', *Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media Morality*, 27(1), Jstor, 2012, p. 74.

CHAPTER TWO

EAGLETON'S CONCEPT OF EVIL IN *ON EVIL*

Terry Eagleton is one of the most prolific literary critics of today. His ideas on evil are important in the sense that he discusses the concept from religious, literary, philosophical and psychoanalytical aspects. Another point that makes Eagleton's views on evil important is his discussion about the 'rare category of evil' done for its own sake. Generally, human beings look for a reason for the things happening around them and when a rare category of evil occurs people become perplexed and fearful. Eagleton's description of this kind of evil becomes important to help us understand, for example, the murder case in *The Sleep of Reason* which is beyond comprehension in many ways.

At the beginning of his book, *On Evil*, he does not discuss whether there is evil or not because he definitely believes in its existence as both a condition of being and a quality of behaviour declaring that "there are indeed evil acts and individuals, which is where softhearted liberals and the tough-minded Marxists alike are mistaken"[133]. This is a recurrent theme in most of his books. He starts by recounting the murder of a toddler named James Bulger who was abducted and tortured by two ten-year old children named Robert Thompson and Jon Venables in 1993 in the north of England.

Although this caused a public outcry, he is not surprised by it since he believes that "children, after all, are only semi-socialized creatures who can be expected to behave pretty savagely from time to time. If Freud is to be credited, they have a weaker superego or moral sense than their elders"[134]. This is an important statement because in many cultures children are believed to be innocent beings. Besides, Eagleton also implies that people do not do evil not because of their inclination towards goodness but because of their superegos and societal norms. This, in turn, implies that there is no inner impediment or inclination not to do evil in human nature. Eagleton adds that "we are born self-centred as an effect of our biology. Egoism is a natural condition, whereas goodness involves a set of complex practical skills we have to learn"[135]. By denying

---

[133] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 13.
[134] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 1.
[135] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 36.

people's inclination to goodness he also denies that people have potential for good and evil:

> *It is a barroom cliché that there is good and bad in us all. Human beings are mixed, ambiguous, morally hybrid creatures. But if this is so, why has not the good risen more often to the political surface?... On the contrary, they (humans) are for the most part corrupt, indolent creatures who require constant discipline and authority if anything of value is to be dredged out of them.*[136]

This statement can be supported by observation of people in daily life. For example, one can easily acquire bad habits from one's friends. However, as Eagleton mentions, goodness includes a set of complex practical skills one has to learn. If people stood at the same distance from both good and evil, it might be observed that good would occur as often as evil does.

Eagleton focuses on children in his Introduction because understanding children is useful in order to understand the basic features of human beings, as children have not yet been exposed to the civilization process, i.e. education, socialization or norms of society. They behave as they do because there is no rule or moral obligation which may deter them from doing as they wish. Accordingly, there is no blame, either. So they can do evil whenever they wish in the same way as they play whenever they are bored. Through the civilization process, human beings learn the difference between right and wrong and then live accordingly. In this sense, Eagleton is surprised that these kinds of murders do not happen more often.

One of the police officers in the Bulger murder case calls one of the boys evil, announcing that "I knew that he was evil"[137]. Thus, the police officer demonizes the boy, calling him 'evil' instead of the situation, which presupposes that evil is unbeatable. If the boy does evil because he is evil, then, there is nothing can be done to get rid of evil except to kill the boy. If one believes this view s/he can be led to justify what happened in the Great Confinement in Paris, where besides mad people, the evil were also gathered and 'treated', and in witchcrafts in which people, especially women, were accused of being evil and killed. It may be interpreted that 'evil' is used just as a

---

[136] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 147-148.
[137] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 2.

label attributed to those who should be gotten rid of. Secondly, the police officer most likely feels that if people search the past of the boy, then, as an excuse they may forgive him. Seemingly, the police fear this and, thus, aim to portray the boy as pure evil so that one cannot show any sympathy for him. Nonetheless, as Thomas L. Harris remarks, "understanding does not necessitate forgiveness, which should always remain a moral gift, never a demand"[138].

Eagleton seems to concur with Harris in the sense he believes that reason and freedom are closely related, asserting that "for those who do not grasp this point, trying to account for wicked acts is always a devious attempt to let their perpetrators off the hook. But to explain why I spend my weekends cheerfully boiling badgers alive is not necessarily to condone what I do"[139]. This is an important riposte to those who try to explain away evil acts with excuses. Eagleton denies these explanations, finding that evil people have a grisly rationality, although he does not deny that external factors have an influence on people. For example, if a person is hungry s/he cannot talk about virtue or helping other people. But Eagleton also mentions that "there are plenty of reasons, Freudian and otherwise, for believing that a fair amount of human nastiness would survive even the most deep-seated of political changes"[140]. Eagleton emphasizes that evil cannot disappear because of any external related changes as he believes that people have an inclination towards it.

However, to show this inclination as unavoidable is wrong because even if the external factors and inner motives have a degree influence, they are not ultimately binding. It seems that the important thing is the act itself rather than the excuses for it. Otherwise, there would not be any validity in the concepts of 'free will' and 'responsibility'. Eagleton explains that:

> *If the child killers did what they did because of boredom or bad housing or parental neglect, then (so the police officer may have feared) what they did was forced upon them by their circumstances; it followed that they could not be punished for it as severely as he might have wished. This mistakenly implies that an action which has a cause cannot be freely*

---

[138] Paul Formosa, "Understanding Evil Acts", *Human Studies*, 30(2), Jstor, 2007, p. 75.
[139] Eagleton, *On Evil,* 7.
[140] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 150.

undertaken. Causes in this view are forms of coercion. If our actions have causes, we are not responsible for them.[141]

Eagleton opposes the view that if there is coercion one can be excused from what one has done. His attitude is similar to that of Sartre in the sense that Sartre also dismisses all coercive reasons and focuses only on the agent's action. Although Eagleton is not as dogmatic as Sartre about dismissing the power of coercion, he emphasizes that evil is not caused directly by external factors. Rather, he relates it to freedom, stating that "it lies in the fact that we are self-contradictory animals, since our creative and destructive powers spring from much the same source. Hegel considered that evil flourished the more individual freedom did"[142]. Eagleton mentions that creative and destructive powers spring from the same source which is freedom. That is why people are said to be self-contradictory animals because they can choose destructive things while they have the power to choose creative ones even if this destructive power harms them.

This emphasis on freedom refutes coercion as a force impelling people towards goodness. By implication, if one is not good because of free will, s/he should not be praised for this goodness. For example, Eagleton comments on Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist*, that "if Oliver just can't help being good his virtue is surely no more to be admired than the size of his ears"[143]. In short, he evaluates situations as good or evil only when they are performed in freedom. Thus, he implies that nothing is either praiseworthy or blameworthy in itself. In other words, one should not be seen as good or evil if one cannot help it. One can be evaluated according to these values provided that one acts one's actions choosing them by free will.

Furthermore, Eagleton repeatedly mentions the direct relationship between evil and freedom. For instance, he states: "human beings must be seen as wholly autonomous (literally; a law unto themselves), because to invoke the influence of social or psychological factors on what they do would be to reduce them to zombies"[144]. Hence, he gives no place to views such as possession or being born evil. As mentioned

---

[141] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 3-4.
[142] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 30.
[143] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 10.
[144] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 11.

before, he does not refuse the influence of external factors totally. He remarks that it is sometimes hard to make a clear cut distinction between being influenced and being free:

> *A good many of the influences we undergo have to be interpreted in order to affect our behavior; and interpretation is a creative affair. It is not so much the past that shapes us as the past as we (consciously or unconsciously) interpret it…We can act as free agents only because we are shaped by a world in which this concept has meaning, and which allows us to act upon it.*[145]

As Eagleton explains, it is not easy to make a distinction between being influenced and having free will while evaluating a person's role in an incident, especially a bad one. Everybody interprets events and attitudes of people subjectively. People may make decisions unconsciously under the influence of their past actions, but they may not be aware of it. To sum up, social influences cannot be used as an excuse to evade responsibility because an event affects everybody on a different level, and even the persons themselves sometimes cannot be sure whether the impetus for an action is a malign influence or free will.

In addition, Eagleton discusses the notions of intentionality and consciousness in evil related to the concepts of freedom and will. For example, he states that "if the young killers of the toddler could not help being evil, however, then the fact is that they were innocent"[146]. To be judged guilty, they should have known the difference between right and wrong yet still chose to do evil. Eagleton emphasizes these aspects of evil more than once. For example, he praises choices made through free will and rejects theories of bad blood, malevolent genes or original sin. He considers terrorists in a similar vein. If terrorists, he says, are psychotic they should be treated in psychiatric hospitals and should be considered as morally innocent.[147] This is another important emphasis on the function of freedom and free will in evil actions since these concepts are not valid in madness or illness. That is, a mad or sick person who does not have freedom to choose cannot be evaluated as good or evil.

---

[145] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 11.
[146] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 5.
[147] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 5.

While Eagleton emphasizes the function of freedom and free will in evil actions he states that one of the direst things about evil is that the perpetrators are human beings. "If they really were inhuman, we might not be in the least surprised by their behaviour. The horrors they perpetrate might be trifles on Alpha Centauri"[148]. By attributing evil to human beings instead of animals or plants he implies that consciousness, besides freedom and will, is important in evil. It is also interesting to note Eagleton's surprise here, because he has already pointed out that people do not have any innate inclination towards goodness. If these are the truths about human nature then the surprising thing is that people do not commit evil actions more often, and that some people do good for no reason, like the Italian worker who regularly brought a piece of bread to Primo Levi in the concentration camp for six months as told in Levi's book *If This is a Man*.[149] However, this should not lead one to regard people as completely evil in nature, either; "Richard J. Bernstein writes that we must resist the temptation to see evil as 'a fixed ontological feature of the human condition' since this means confessing that there is nothing to be done about it"[150]. This is to claim that there are evil people doing evil non-stop without ever choosing goodness, which follows that there is nothing to be done about it. That is, because it is considered as fixed situation instead of a choice one cannot change or prevent it.

As Eagleton notes: "fixed ontological features are dogmatic, and thus not in the spirit of mutability, to believe so"[151]. In both statements noted by Bernstein and Eagleton the perpetrators of evil are described as being without 'will' or 'freedom'. This saves the perpetrators from blame for their evil deeds. What both of them imply is that evil is a choice instead of a fixed truth about human nature. Eagleton notes that "men and women who are evil are sometimes said to be 'possessed'. But if they really are the helpless victims of demonic powers they are to be pitied, not condemned"[152]. If perpetrators of evil do not act consciously they should not be condemned: "those who

---

[148] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 9.
[149] Primo Levi, *If This is a Man-The Truce*, (1958), (Çev.: Stuart Woolf), Abacus, Great Britain 1987, p. 10.
[150] Eagleton*, On Evil,* p. 38.
[151] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 39.
[152] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 6.

wish to punish others for their evil, then, need to claim that they are evil for their own free will"[153].

After focusing on 'freedom' and 'will', which are the basic conditions of 'evil', Eagleton attempts a definition:

> *It is not fundamentally mysterious, even though it transcends every day social conditioning. Evil is indeed metaphysical, in the sense that it takes up an attitude toward being as such, not just toward this or that bit of it. Fundamentally, it wants to annihilate the lot of it. But this is not to suggest that it is necessarily supernatural, or that it lacks all human causality.*[154]

Evil is viewed as mysterious, which in turn makes it metaphysical, in the sense that it does not have an apparent cause. In this sense, it transcends routine because people always look for causes to understand an event in daily life. However, it does not lack human causality. Even if people commit evil, they suggest explanations for it by such as envy or worldly pleasures. In addition, it is said that evil wants to annihilate everything. But it does not only annihilate others but also itself. In this context, Eagleton suggests that "evil is indeed all about death-but about the death of the evildoer as much as that of those he annihilates"[155].

2.1. "FICTIONS OF EVIL"

Eagleton discusses the concept of evil in selected novels starting with *Pincher Martin* by William Golding. Pincher Martin drowns at the very beginning of the novel, however, he does not know that he is dead. Eagleton searches for evil in analyzing Pincher Martin's character:

> *Martin uses other people as instruments of his own profit or pleasure, and on the rock he is reduced to using his own exhausted body as a rusty piece of mechanism for accomplishing various tasks. As the sinewy, muscular style of the novel suggests, the hero is stripped down to his*

---

[153] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 6.
[154] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 16.
[155] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 18.

animality to the instinctively self-preservative creature he has always been.[156]

As Eagleton defines 'evil' by using the characteristics of the protagonist it can be claimed, then, that an evil person is very self-centered and does not care about the feelings of other people. Eagleton describes his characteristics rather than his way of behaving in a particular case. That is, his behaviour exemplified here is the character he always shows not only in this particular event.

Eagleton believes that "evil involves a split between body and spirit between an abstract will to dominate and destroy, and the meaningless piece of flesh that this will inhabits"[157]. Martin's body is portrayed as being at the service of the 'will', like a slave, which is in opposition to philosophers such as Plato, who claimed that evil was caused by mere material such as a body, i.e., a body forcing the will to do evil by desiring worldly pleasures. Eagleton seemingly does not agree with this view, asserting that the 'will' dominates and destroys by using the body.

Furthermore, he observes that even if Martin dies on the rock he refuses to accept it and even uses his body to be alive as he uses others' bodies as far as the novel tells us. By doing this he brings his body under the domain of his cruel and rapacious will. Eagleton exemplifies this situation; "all that is still stirring in him is sublimely unquenchable will to survive, which derives from the lumbering machinery of his body like a despot. Because it transcends all natural constraints, this 'will' represents a kind of infinity"[158]. What Eagleton names 'will' Freud terms 'the death drive'. Describing Martin, Eagleton explains that:

> *This shipwrecked sailor, then, is a mass of lifeless stuff pinned together only by a relentless drive. This drive I located in what the novel calls the 'dark center'- the eternally vigilant core of consciousness buried somewhere inside Martin's skull, which seems the only place where he is truly alive (though even this will turn out to be an illusion). This dark center is the hero's monstrous ego, which is unable to reflect on itself. This can be understood in both a factual and a moral sense. Human consciousness cannot nip behind itself, since when we reflect on ourselves it is still we who*

---

[156] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 20-1.
[157] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 21.
[158] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 21.

are doing the reflecting. Our sense of the murky regions from which consciousness springs is itself an act of consciousness, and thus already remote from that realm.[159]

Eagleton describes Martin as if this relentless drive were dragging his body around like meaningless flesh. He refers to the death drive by this relentless drive and places it in ego. Ego is described as a dark centre because he informs that there is not a full explanation for it which is the core of consciousness. It is the only place where Martin is alive. Eagleton also apprises that this monstrous ego cannot manifest itself because even when people try to reflect on themselves it is they who are reflecting. After all, consciousness comes from these murky regions which do not clearly show themselves to people.

Martin does not have any respect for others' bodies and only thing he values is practical intelligence. He is defined as "a rationalist who treats the world, including his own and others' bodies, as mere valueless stuff to be moulded by his imperious will. All that counts is his own brutal self-interest"[160]. The interesting fact here is that he does not have respect for his own body, either. In other words, he wants to annihilate not only others but also himself. Because of his way of life, that is, he does not care others' feelings, he is told not to have anybody but himself. Eagleton continues that "since all he has ever had is himself, the only alternative to survival would be pure nothingness. And even his tormented half-life on the rock is preferable to no existence whatsoever"[161]. It is clear that Martin's will does not submit to the limits of being of mortal, which is a feature of evil advanced by Slavoj Zizek: "Evil is something which threatens to return for ever, a spectral dimension which magically survives its physical annihilation and continues to haunt us. There is a kind of 'obscene infinity' about evil- a refusal to accept our mortality as natural, material beings"[162]. Eagleton highlights the same idea: "like Faust, the damned are too proud to submit to limit. They will not bow

---

[159] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 21-2.
[160] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 23.
[161] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 23.
[162] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 50-1.

the knee to the finite, least of all to their own creatureliness…This is also why they are so terrified of death, which is the absolute limit of the human"[163].

In addition to refusing the submission to limits, Eagleton suggests another reason why Martin cannot die. People who do not have love inside cannot die since to die means giving up yourself. If one has not given anything to anybody else in life one cannot give oneself up either. So he regards *Pincher Martin* as a novel about purgatory. As Pincher does not accept death even though he is already dead he is not in hell because there is no life there. Accordingly, Eagleton describes hell as "a state of pure annihilation"[164]. Eagleton concludes that because all vitality comes from God there will be no life in hell and so being in hell means to be reduced to nothingness. He refuses to submit to the limit, that is, to die, by insisting that he is alive. That is why he is not in hell.

Eagleton further argues that one is in hell when he purposely refuses the love of God. Thus, hell is the most obvious sign of human freedom. In other words, people do not obey God by using their freedom. This is one of the reasons why sin is linked to evil in the highly religious context of the Middle Ages. In a sense, the existences of hell and heaven signpost the existence of freedom. Eagleton summarizes this situation by suggesting that "if one can even reject the blandishments of one's Creator, one would be powerful indeed."[165] This quotation shows first the freedom of people, if people were not free they could not reject the blandishments of God, and second the respect of God for human freedom. If God had no respect for His creation, He would not let people reject His rules since He is supposed to be almighty. However, the word 'powerful' does not seem very appropriate here if He is supposed to be almighty. In this respect, the word 'powerful' is interchangeable with 'free'.

Later, Eagleton discusses the Fall. He considers it as a *felix culpa* "in which human beings 'lapse' upward from the natural world and the innocence of the beasts into an exhilarating, sickeningly unstable history"[166]. Here the word 'beast' is important

---

[163] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 26.
[164] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 24.
[165] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 25.
[166] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 30.

because what differentiates people from beasts is their free will. The life in Eden was innocent because there was no evil there, but this kind of innocence is compared by Eagleton to the innocence of beasts or a baby who does not know the concepts of good or evil. In addition, observing the Fall he claims that

> *There is something potentially self-thwarting or self-undoing about humanity. And this is what the Biblical myth of the Fall is struggling to formulate, as Adam and Eve use their creative powers to undo themselves. Man is Faustian Man, too voraciously ambitious for his own well-being, perpetually driven beyond his own limits by the lure of the infinite. This creature cold-shoulders all finite things in his hubristic love affair with the illimitable. And since infinity is a kind of nothingness, the desire for this nothingness is an expression of what we shall see later as the Freudian death drive.*[167]

According to the Judeo- Christian tradition, Adam and Eve were not created by birth. So they do not have a past with bad experiences, and they are in Eden so they do not lack anything. They still chose to do evil and Eagleton regards this as self-thwarting or self-undoing thing about humanity. Adam and Eve became mortal as a punishment for actively choosing evil, and thus they were condemned to death or nothingness. Because human beings desire to be infinite they do not like finite things, and, as finite things, e.g. other humans, remind people of their finite natures this may be why they want to exterminate other people. Because nothingness is a kind of infinity they even prefer nothingness.

Moreover, Eagleton explains that "for evil, finite things are an obstacle to the infinity of will or desire and so must be annihilated. Creation for the evil-minded is a stain or blemish on the purity of the infinite"[168]. It is considered as a stain on limitlessness because creation includes limit in itself. As for people who want to be infinite, Eagleton thinks that they end up being nothing at all and he supports this view with the example of dismissal of Adam and Eve from Eden. In addition, he remarks that

> *Even so, this aberration is an essential part of our nature. It is a permanent possibility for rational animals like ourselves. We cannot think without abstraction, which involves reaching beyond the immediate. When*

---

[167] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 31.
[168] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 47.

abstract concepts allow us to incinerate whole cities, we know we have reached too far. A perpetual possibility of going awry is built into our capacity for sense-making. Without this possibility, reason could not function.''[169]

On the one hand, this possibility is to be condemned because it is a permanent possibility, on the other hand it should be accepted as a reality of human nature. However, the point that one should remember in discussion is that evil is only a possibility instead of an inevitable obligation in human life. A similar view is suggested by Leibniz who mentions metaphysical evil explaining that people do evil because of their limited natures. That is to say, they cannot foresee the consequences of their actions. Or they may misinterpret evil as good or vice versa. Or they can choose it by free will not being aware of that it is evil.

Eagleton takes the argument further and relates freedom to destructiveness. For instance, he remarks that "in the complex web of human destinies, where so many lives are meshed intricately together, the freely chosen actions of one individual may breed damaging, entirely unforeseeable effects in the lives of countless anonymous others"[170]. This statement can be interpreted in different ways. For example, people are believed to be born sinful in the Judeo Christian tradition as a consequence of Adam and Eve's free chosen action. Another example is that of a suicide bomber who wants to harm a certain group of people, but kills other, innocent people as well. Another example may be a case of a woman who used to be beaten by her husband and who kills another man when she sees him beating another woman. In brief, Eagleton shows that human lives are interwoven and people harm each other. He adduces that "the novelist Thomas Hardy knew that by a series of decisions which are both free and considerate of others, we can end up painting ourselves into corners where we cannot move an inch in any direction without inflicting grievous damage on those around us"[171]. Even if one does not do anything wrong intentionally, one may harm other people inadvertently. Eagleton almost agrees to mention that to exist is to be guilty.[172] So it is not surprising that he argues that "original sin is not about being born either saintly or wicked. It is about the

---

[169] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 32-3.
[170] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 33
[171] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 34
[172] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 34

fact of being born in the first place"[173]. Evil is about being human. This is why he interprets the word 'original' as 'at the root' instead of 'at the beginning'. The desire for the infinite and free will does not contaminate human beings from the first. Rather, as Eagleton points out, 'at the roots', it is about being human.

Apart from original sin, he also discusses the features people inherit from their ancestors. He suggests that "if psychoanalytic theory is to be believed, they are already imprinted with an invisible network of drives which bind their bodies to those of others, and which will prove a constant source of affliction to them"[174]. This includes the view that people may have an inner, inherited inclination towards good or evil. However, once people come into the world where there are already many established values, the concepts of freedom and will become really important. Otherwise, people would be reduced to animals which act according to their natures without thinking, and deciding without free will. In this respect, Eagleton comments that

> *The past is what we are made of. Throngs of ghostly ancestors lurk within our most casual gestures, preprogramming our desires and flicking our actions mischievously awry. Because our earliest, most passionate love affair takes place when we are helpless infants, it is caught up with frustration and voracious need. And this means that our loving will always be defective.*[175]

While refuting the concept of original sin, Eagleton accepts the inheritance factor. However, as he notes if one cannot help being good or bad, then, one is beyond being evaluated. In other words, if one takes one's good or bad features from one's parents, as one takes one's physical features, one's actions can neither be blameworthy nor praiseworthy. Besides, Eagleton refers to psychoanalytic factors. For instance, babies are believed to have a deep relationship with their parents, especially boys with their mothers and girls with their fathers. But this relationship breaks down in time, which has an effect on people's lives. Taking these factors into consideration, Eagleton seems to believe that people are not born free in a sense. Besides, actions done in the past may have influence on people, especially in their character development. In this sense, it may

---

[173] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 35-6.
[174] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 35.
[175] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 36.

become hard to decide whether a person is really responsible for their present actions. Moreover, it also becomes hard to decide who is responsible for an action in a group of people because people may influence each other. For example, Eagleton informs that

> *This is not to deny responsibility, simply to insist that our actions are no more inalienable than our property. Who can say for sure, in the great skein of human action and reaction, who really has ownership of a particular deed?...It is not always easy to say where my responsibility (or even interests, desires, or identity) ends and yours begins.*[176]

What he emphasizes is that people's responsibilities sometimes conflict. Then, the differentiation between them may become indistinct. The solution may be the view that human beings are the ultimate originators of their actions.[177]

Eagleton continues his analysis of literary characters with Pinkie from Graham Greene's *Brighton Rock*:

> *The fact that this minor hoodlum is only seventeen might account for his lack of experience. But the spiritual vacuity inside him runs much deeper than youthful ignorance. As such, it goes to confirm a certain ideological thesis underlying the novel: the belief that evil is a timeless condition rather than a matter of social circumstance...Pinkie is not evil because he kills people; he kills people because he is evil. There is a 'horrifying ignorance' or 'soured virginity' about him, which causes him to observe human affairs with the blank incomprehension of a Venusian. He has the worthless purity of those who have never lived.*[178]

Pinkie is a good example of denying that external influences are the ultimate factors in evil actions, because Eagleton states that Pinkie is an example of evil defined as a timeless condition. Pinkie is seventeen and inexperienced but Eagleton does not interpret his inexperience as innocence which is described like being a Venusian. Pinkie does not choose to avoid evil. His innocence is like that of a beast. Eagleton describes evil as a timeless condition of being in Pinkie's case because he explains that Pinkie kills people not because of any social circumstance. Only reason why he kills people is explained with his being evil.

---

[176] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 37.
[177] Robert Kane, "Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes", *The Journal of Ethics*, 4(4), Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views, jstor, 2000, p. 315.
[178] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 52-3.

Eagleton also refers to *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* by Milan Kundera and to his two faces of evil. Kundera names these two faces of evil as 'angelic' and 'demonic' states of humanity:

> *By 'angelic', Kundera means vacuous, grandiloquent ideals which lack a root in reality. The demonic, by contrast, is a cackle of derisive laughter at the very idea that anything human could conceivably have meaning or value…The angelic consists of high-sounding clichés like 'God bless this wonderful country of ours,' to which the demonic replies 'Yeah, whatever'.*[179]

Kundera defines 'angelic' as elaborate and bombastic but without an essence. The 'angelic' is too full of meaning, while the 'demonic' is so lacking in meaning that it annihilates everything. Eagleton comments:

> *One side of it- the angelic, ascetic side- wants to rise above the degraded sphere of fleshliness in pursuit of the infinite. But this withdrawal of the mind from reality has the effect of striking the world empty of value. It reduces it so much meaningless stuff, in which the demonic side of evil can then wallow. Evil always posits either too much or too little meaning- or rather it does both at the same time.*[180]

In the light of this view, Eagleton then examines Adrian Leverkühn's music in *Doctor Faustus* and sees two faces of evil. On the one hand, the music uses a very elaborate and bombastic language, and on the other hand when it is studied it is observed as devoid of meaning. It is like music in which there are good sounds and rhythms that give pleasure to the listeners but they do not make sense in the final place. The listeners do not get anything from it. In this respect, he states that "the curious thing about evil is that it seems to be both clinical and chaotic. It has something of Leverkühn's chilly, sardonic rationalism, but delights at the same time in the depraved and orgiastic…His music also revels in a kind of obscene meaninglessness"[181]. When it is looked at individually it may make sense but there is no meaning in overall.

Eagleton explores this dual face of evil in the case of the Nazis. Although they talked about heroism, nationality and pure race in elaborate language, they annihilated

---

[179] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 74.
[180] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 75.
[181] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 73.

millions of Jews. After so many deaths, all the Nazis had were corpses, worthless human flesh. The Nazis had looked for purity, non-being, but they got worthless flesh. As indicated, evil has either too much or too little meaning or both at the same time. Evil takes pleasure from this meaningless violence and Eagleton calls it 'obscene enjoyment'.

Eagleton, then, relates evil to destructiveness. For example, he suggests that "destruction is really the only way to trump God's act of creation. Evil would actually prefer that there was nothing at all, since it does not see the point of created things. It loathes them because, as Thomas Aquinas claims, being is itself a kind of good"[182]. This is why evil is linked to nothingness and takes delight from destruction. For example, Eagleton writes that "the prospect of nuclear holocaust, or of the world being swamped by its own oceans, turns evil weak at the knees with delight"[183]. Nothingness is preferable to creation because the world is seen as pointless. Eagleton also tells us that

> *Given the intolerable fact that things do exist, however, the best evil can do is try to annihilate them. In this way, it can seek to get on terms with God by inverting His act of creation, in a grisly parody of the Book of Genesis. Creation out of nothing can only be the work of an absolute power. But there is something just as absolute about the act of destruction. Just as an act of creation can never be repeated, neither can an act of destruction. You cannot smash a priceless Chinese vase twice, as opposed to smashing a reconstruction of it.[184]*

As has been indicated, evil does not like the idea that things exist as creation is regarded as good in itself. Accepting this fact, the only thing evil can do is to annihilate created things. As creation out of nothing is a sign of absolute power, destruction is seen as absolute by evil since one cannot destroy the same thing twice.

2.2. "OBSCENE ENJOYMENT"

Having discussed some general features of evil in selected literary works, Eagleton focuses on a special category of evil 'which is done for the hell of it' in his terms. Eagleton gives the tenets of this rare category of evil discussing some selected works. Firstly, he clarifies the misleading view that evil is glamorous while goodness is

---

[182] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 60-1.
[183] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 61.
[184] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 61-2.

monotonous and boring. He posits that for ancients, such as Aristotle, virtue was exciting, energetic and full of life, and something one had to be good at like being an accomplished tennis player.[185] He defines evil as "a kind of lack or negation, incapacity for life rather than an abundance of it. It is evil which is boring and brittle, not good, which is humorous and high-spirited"[186]. Furthermore, he thinks that "evil is boring because it is lifeless. Its seductive allure is purely superficial... It is boring because it keeps doing the same dreary thing, trapped as it is between life and death"[187].

However, nowadays the descriptions of these concepts have changed. That is, evil is considered alluring while goodness is considered as boring. Eagleton believes that one of the several explanations for this change is the rise of the middle class which adopts prudence, chastity, industriousness, long-suffering as virtues. Instead of considering virtue as a way of life, as self-realization or self-fulfillment in Eagleton's words, specific features are praised. As a consequence, Eagleton believes that a popular preference for vampires instead of virtue is not surprising and claims that "it is true that most readers enjoy *Paradise Lost*'s Satan, in all his glowering, doomed defiance of the Almighty"[188]. Nonetheless, Eagleton clarifies that it is positive qualities such as fearlessness, resistance, and so forth that are admired. Eagleton draws a parallel between the figure of Milton's Satan and the evil depicted in *Brighton Rock* which "thus helps to reinforce one particularly dubious myth about evil- that there is a kind of down-at-heel heroism about it…Better to reign in hell than spend your time nattering indignantly about right and wrong in squalid Brighton cafes"[189]. As Eagleton describes it, this has nothing to do with heroism in its accepted sense.

He then discusses the three witches in *Macbeth*:

> *The three witches of the play are hostile to the violent, hierarchical social order of Macbeth's Scotland, and wreak untold mischief within it. They are exiles from that status-obsessed regime, inhabiting their own sisterly community on its shadowy borderlands. They have no truck with the*

---

[185] The School of Life, Sunday Sermons, (t.y.), http://vimeo.com/15157413
[186] Trouble with strangers, 283.
[187] Eagleton, *On Evil*, 123-24.
[188] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 121.
[189] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 57.

*established social order of male rivalries and military honours, other than
to throw an enormous spanner in its works.*[190]

The witches are described as hostile to society because they are not accepted as part of it. They are regarded as weird instead of as members of it. They appear suddenly and vanish whenever they want, so their 'borderlands' are defined as 'shadowy'. It seems that they have nothing to do with at this patriarchal society. Yet they cause Macbeth and other characters' downfall by prophesying about the future. Moreover, they apparently do not expect any gain for their actions. Based on this, Eagleton declares that "evil has, or appears to have, no practical purpose. Evil is supremely pointless. Anything as humdrum as a purpose would tarnish its lethal purity"[191]. It follows that there is no cause and effect relationship in evil. He has already informed us that "evil rejects the logic of causality. If it were to have an end in view, it would be self-divided, non-self-identical, out ahead of itself"[192].

He maintains the same view in *Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics* describing this kind of evil seeming "to be autotelic, having its grounds, ends and causes in itself. It thus joins a privileged, somewhat underpopulated class of objects, which includes God and art. It is enigmatic because it is brutely itself, not because it has the inscrutability of something too deep to fathom"[193]. Perhaps Macbeth would have acted in the same way even if the witches had not prophesied his future. However, the point is that their intentional evil action was without gain for themselves. In this case, evil is defined as a very rare kind of wickedness by Eagleton, and that is why it is incomprehensible and looks mysterious or metaphysical. He defends the same view in his book *After Theory*. For instance, he acknowledges evil as mysterious and remarks that "its motive seems not to destroy specific beings for specific reasons, but to negate being as such. This sort of evil is a Satanic parody of the divine, finding in the act of destruction the sort of orgasmic release which one can imagine God finding in the act of creation"[194]. He also expresses this view in *Sweet Violence* by considering creation as evil's mirror-image. Further, he argues that "the two share in common their autotelic or

---

[190] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 79-80.
[191] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 84.
[192] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 84.
[193] Eagleton, *Sweet Violence*, p. 253-4
[194] Terry Eagleton, *After Theory*, Penguin Books, UK 2004, p. 216.

just-for-the-hell-of-it character…Evil resembles the being whose pure existence it finds so scandalously offensive, in subsisting just as much for its own sake. As being has no end other than to be, so evil has no purpose other than to negate it"[195]. The function of evil is to annihilate endlessly without explanation.

Additionally, Eagleton regards evil as a 'cosmic sulking'[196] and tells us that "only by persisting in its fury and proclaiming it theatrically to the world can evil provide damning evidence of the bankruptcy of existence. It is living testimony to the folly of creation"[197]. It is regarded as the bankruptcy of creation because even if everything was perfect in the universe evil would seek to annihilate everything. It is regarded as the folly of creation because in contrast to those such as Aquinas who believe that creation is good in itself, evil reveals inadequacy in creation. It can also be interpreted that Eagleton implies is that if evil did not exist, the world would be perfect because he considers evil as the bankruptcy of existence.

Then, Eagleton reveals another idea explaining that "part of the rage for the damned is the knowledge that they are parasitic on goodness, as the rebel is dependent on the authority he spurns"[198]. As the function of evil is to annihilate, it first needs to have something created to be destroyed. Additionally, Eagleton states that "evil believes that it is entirely self-dependent, conjuring itself up out of nothing, but the truth is that it is not its own origin. Something has always come before it. And this is one reason why it is eternally miserable"[199]. On the one hand, it wants to annihilate everything including goodness. On the other hand, it needs goodness or creation to annihilate as it is parasitic on creation. Otherwise it cannot exist as true to itself because white is defined by the existence of black. As Eagleton puts it:

> *The evil are slaves to the law: it is just that they keep themselves in existence by deflecting its destructiveness on to others, reaping obscene pleasure from their agonies as well as from their own. Stuck fast in the grip of the death drive, the damned delight in their own torments as well as in the afflictions of their prey, since clinging to their agony is their only alternative to annihilation…They treat themselves as the sadist treats a*

---

[195] Eagleton, *Sweet Violence,* p. 258.
[196] Eagleton, *On Evil*, 117.
[197] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 117.
[198] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 117.
[199] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 63.

victim he deliberately keeps alive so as to torture him still further. They spit in the face of salvation because it threatens to deprive them of the frightful jouissance which is all that is left for them of human life.[200]

In addition to its dependence on good, there are other features of evil revealed in this paragraph, such as the idea that evildoers take obscene pleasure from the destruction of the victim. The interesting thing here is that they even take pleasure in the annihilation of themselves, which is a feature of the death drive. They feel alive when they behave sadistically but, although sadists seek for pleasure above all, the primary aim of evildoers is not to take pleasure so much as to seek annihilation. Only at the end of this annihilation, can they take the pleasure which can be counted as a consequence of their action. Accordingly, they refuse salvation on purpose and do not repent because they like 'the frightful jouissance'. Eagleton explores this in *Holy Terror* as well: "The evil are not just prepared to wade through blood, but actually relish the prospect. This is a gratifyingly rare phenomenon though when it does happen it tends, like air crashes, to happen in a big way"[201].

Since evil, the source of which is unknown, is a common theme in Shakespeare's plays, Eagleton examines one of the most notorious villains of literature, Iago in *Othello*, who symbolizes causeless malignancy. Eagleton compares him with Shylock in *The Merchant of Venice*:

> *Iago offers various motives for his aversion to the Moor, just as Shylock does for his antipathy to Antonio in The Merchant of Venice. In both cases, however, the stated reasons seem oddly unequal to the virulence of the hatred. Both men also offer a suspicious surplus of motives, as though they are trying to rationalize a passion which they themselves cannot quite fathom.* [202]

One of the stated reasons for Iago's hatred is that Othello appoints Cassio as his aide instead of him. One of the other implied reasons in the play is that Iago is jealous of Othello's wife, Desdemona. Finding these reasons weak, Eagleton deduces that "*Othello* presents us with the spectacle of one man systematically destroying another, and for no apparent reason. Evil, it would seem, is an example of pure

---

[200] Terry Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, Oxford University Press, New York 2005, p. 120.
[201] Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, p. 118.
[202] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 85.

disinterestedness"[203]. Eagleton describes evil as 'pure disinterestedness' because Iago neither wants Desdemona nor to be an aide. The only thing he wants is to see Othello in pain. Observing Iago's character, Eagleton concludes that "debunkery can sail perilously close to the nihilism of those like Iago, who can win a vicarious kind of identity for themselves only by deriding and destroying. There is always a touch of bathos about this kind of evil, which takes a malicious delight in hacking things down to size"[204]. It seems right because Iago feels that Othello's status reveals Iago's ugliness. Except for his hatred against Othello, none of his other features are introduced in the play. It seems that he has one mission in life and that is to destroy Othello. He wins identity with this mission.

Another point that should be clarified is that Eagleton chooses words carefully. For instance, he describes evil as being without 'apparent' reason because there is no 'reason' in evil according to common sense. However, perpetrators of evil may have a motive which looks sensible or rational to them while it actually does not explain satisfactorily to others what they have done. Moreover, people are motivated by social and historical influences besides psychological ones. So it is more appropriate to use 'apparent' instead of saying that there is no reason for evil actions. Another word that Eagleton is careful to use is 'practical'. He claims that there is no 'practical' gain in evil because the annihilation itself may be a gain or satisfaction for the perpetrator. In this respect, he states that "as the philosopher John Rawls writes 'what moves the evil man is the love of injustice: he delights in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to him and relishes being recognized by them as the author of their degradation. Evil is pure perversity"[205]. This 'gain' is not a practical benefit but is a very particular manifestation of gain looked for by unusual people. That is why he adds 'practical' instead of saying there is no gain in evil at all. Related to this, he states that "unlike chartered accountants and real estate agents, evil does not believe that practical results are all that count"[206]. He also discloses that an evil man delights in feeling superior to others. That is to say, he likes humiliating people and being recognized as an authority by others.

---

[203] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 93.
[204] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 87.
[205] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 94.
[206] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 120.

Moreover, Eagleton reflects that if evil is defined as being 'without any apparent reason', other literary characters he has examined earlier cannot be described as evil. So, he reconsiders them and explains that

> *Golding's Pincher Martin, on the evidence the novel yields us, does not exterminate others for the hell of it. On the contrary, he is not the kind of man to do anything for its own sake, whether creative or destructive…Graham Greene's Pinkie, too, kills for practical reasons (to avoid being identified as a criminal, for example), not for its own sake…Thomas Mann's Adrian Leverkühn destroys nobody but himself, even if he holds himself responsible for the death of a child. Nor does he do away with himself just for the hell of it. There is an artistic purpose to his prolonged suicide.*[207]

Nevertheless, even accepting that these characters act from identifiable motives in the expectation of some practical gain, Eagleton believes that "any definition of evil which excludes such a rogues' gallery is self-defeatingly narrow…There are also dangers in too broad a definition of the term"[208]. The characters and their behaviours he has discussed are considered as 'evil' in a different category from the rare category of evil he has discussed in the second part of his book. He does not want to make too broad a definition. He takes, for example, what Stalin and Mao did to be evil even though they killed for a reason, for revolution. In addition, he evaluates Pol Pot's actions in the same way as Stalin's and Mao's and compares them with the Moors murderers. He suggests that Pol Pot's actions were not incomprehensible, as "they represented a certain kind of morality, one which perhaps did not delight in destruction simply for its own sake. From this standpoint, Stalin was not evil in the way that the Moors murderers were, even though what he did was a lot worse"[209]. Even though the Moors murderers killed fewer people than Stalin and Pol Pot, they could not be regarded as evil in the same way. However, it should not be assumed that Eagleton finds the Moors Murderers more repulsive than Stalin.

As he puts it, "throwing a complete stranger out of a railway carriage just for the hell of it, as happens in Andre Gide's novel *Les Caves du Vatican*, is not as bad as

---

[207] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 93-4-5.
[208] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 95.
[209] Eagleton, *Holy Terror,* p. 98.

throwing out half a dozen strangers in order to create more elbow room for yourself"[210]. He notes that "even if people only partly grasp the significance of what they are up to, or know exactly what they are doing but regard it as indispensable for some honourable end, they are perhaps not beyond the pale"[211]. If their actions are regarded as free from moral sanctions there will be really small numbers of events one can label as evil. The point is not to decide which one is a lesser evil. They are all 'evil' but in different categories according to Eagleton's understanding of evil. He focuses on a special category of evil which is done for its own sake and the perpetrators keep doing it even when they are harmed by it. He describes this kind of evil in *Trouble with Strangers*: "The purely evil make a point of transgressing the moral law, rather as the more naive sort of anarchist breaks rules as a rule. They do so even if it means acting contrary to their own interests, and even if it issues in their death. In this sense, they are mirror-images of Kant's ethical heroes"[212].

After having discussed evil done for its own sake in *Macbeth* and *Othello* Eagleton then focuses on the evil of the Nazi death camps:

> *The Holocaust was unusual because the rationality of modern political states is in general an instrumental one, geared to the achievement of specific ends. It is astonishing, then, to find a kind of monstrous acte gratuit, a genocide for the sake of genocide, an orgy of extermination apparently for the hell of it, in the midst of the modern era…One of the most grotesque features of the Nazi death camps was the way in which sober, meticulous, utilitarian measures were pressed into the service of an operation which had no practical point at all. It is as though individual bits and piece of the project made sense, but not the overall operation.*[213]

What makes this kind of evil so rare is that it is without an apparent reason and practical gain because people look out for their interest to do anything. In other words, in this modern century people do not do anything whether good or evil unless they think that they will obtain something from what they do. So, genocide for the sake of genocide does not make sense. As Eagleton has claimed 'meticulous and utilitarian measures are pressed into the service of an operation' that has no practical point at all.

---

[210] Eagleton, *Holy Terror,* p. 97.
[211] Eagleton, *Holy Terror,* p. 145.
[212] Eagleton, *Trouble with Strangers, A Study of Ethics*, p. 12.
[213] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 96-7.

Eagleton discusses the Nazis by linking their feeling of absence to their massacres. He acknowledges that those who caused mass murder for any reason felt a terrible 'non-being' at the core of themselves and concludes that in order to fill this aching absence they resorted to "fetishes, moral ideals, fantasies of purity, the manic will, the absolute state, the phallic figure of the Führer"[214]. That is, the Nazis did not kill the Jews to have a pure race or to fulfill what Führer commended, but to fill their feeling of 'non-being'. In this sense, what they fear is indeed themselves, that is, their feeling of absence in their selves, not others. By torturing or killing others, they try to fill their inner void which reminds them of their own fragility. Eagleton states that

> *The non-being at the core of one's own identity is, among other things, a foretaste of death; and one way of fending off the terror of human mortality is to liquidate those who incarnate this trauma in their own person. In this way, you demonstrate that you have authority over the only antagonist- death- that cannot be vanquished even in principle. Power loathes weakness because it rubs its nose in its own secret frailty. Jews for the Nazis were a kind of slimy nothingness or excrescence, an obscene marker of humanity at its most shamefully vulnerable. It was this which had to be annihilated if the Nazis' own integrity of being were to be preserved.*[215]

The Nazis wanted to get rid of the Jews because the Jews reminded them of human vulnerability. While the Nazis decreed themselves as the authority to decide whether the Jews should live or die, they felt superior even over death. The Nazis wanted to annihilate them because, as Eagleton claims, power loathes weakness. However, Eagleton explains that "non-being cannot be destroyed, which is why the whole project of trying to dominate it is both interminable and insanely self-defeating"[216]. Eagleton also states that "in any case, laying violent hands on those around you will bring you no nearer to murdering the non-being at your own heart, since without this abyss known as subjectivity you would be nothing in the first place"[217]. Eagleton mentions the non-being of one's heart. This can be interpreted as the death drive which seeks annihilation endlessly. Human beings cannot kill the non-being in their hearts no matter how many

---

[214] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 100.
[215] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p.100
[216] Eagleton, *After Theory,* p. 121.
[217] Eagleton, *After Theory,* p. 121.

people they kill in the name of killing the non-being. He mentions the non-being relating to the death drive in *After Theory*:

> *We have to find a way of living with non-being without being in love with it, since being in love with it is the duplicitous work of the death drive. It is the death drive which cajoles us into tearing ourselves apart in order to achieve the absolute security of nothingness. Non-being is the ultimate purity. It has the unblemishedness of all negation, the perfection of a blank page.*[218]

When one is in love with non-being, in other words, when one is driven by the death drive, s/he aims to destroy endlessly not only others but also her/himself and takes pleasure from this. In this way, it can achieve the ultimate purity as destruction is a kind of purity.

Kundera speaks about non-being in *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting,* asserting that:

> *Death has two faces. One is non-being; the other is the terrifying material being that is the corpse. Death is both a lack of being and an excess of it. It is portentously meaningful, but also as blank as an empty page. What these two dimensions of evil have in common is a horror of impurity. On the one hand, you can see impurity as the nauseating slime of negativity- in which case purity lies in an angelic fullness of being. On the other hand, impurity can be seen as the obscenely bulging excess of the material world, once it has been stripped of sense and value. Compared to this, it is non-being which signifies purity. The Nazis swung constantly between these two stances. They veered between the angelic and the demonic –between repelling chaos and revelling in it.*[219]

As Eagleton claims that there is no apparent reason for the rare category of evil, it is unexpected to see that he also suggests some possible reasons for the evil actions of the Nazis such as the absence of being, seeing others as threats for one's identity. He debates whether

> *evil is best seen as a kind of purposeless or nonpragmatic wickedness. In one sense, the answer is surely yes. Evil is not primarily concerned with practical consequences…Yet the evil do have purposes of a kind. They may*

---

[218] Eagleton, *After Theory,* p. 213.
[219] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 102.

seem to lay waste simply for the hell of it, but this is not the whole truth. We have seen already that they visit violence upon those who pose a threat to their own identity. But they also smash and sabotage to ease the hellish conflict in which they are caught. The evil are in pain, and like a lot of people in pain will go to extreme lengths to find relief. These, then, are reasons of a kind, even if they are not of the same order as butchering peasants for their counterrevolutionary views. In this sense, then, even evil has a grisly kind of rationality about it.[220]

He has asserted that evil does not look for practical effects. And, now he develops this view. For example, the Nazis killed the Jews for reasons which were not based on rational grounds. Moreover, he states that because evil people are in pain, their evil offers a release for that pain. Eagleton thinks these are reasons of a kind. This should not be considered as contradictory with what he claimed before, because here he confesses that evil has a 'grisly' rationality. Such reasons are not like the ones of butchering peasants for their counterrevolutionary views. So, instead of contradicting what he has claimed, he strengthens it. Most evildoers do not accept their evil deeds. Conversely, they suggest reasons to make their evil actions understandable. However, Eagleton refutes these kinds of reasons, finding them to have a grisly rationality. Eagleton explains:

In fact, there are times when we want to persist in an identity which we do not especially prize. It is simply that the ego has a built-in drive to keep itself intact. One can see, then, why the question of whether evil is functional or not is so ambiguous. Evil is committed in the name of something else, and to this extent has a purpose; but this something else does not itself have a point.[221]

An evildoer can commit an evil action claiming that s/he has a kind of purpose. But Eagleton states that there is no purpose in it in the first place. He considers that the given reasons are like a guise, which is aimed to justify. For example, Iago sees Othello as a threat to his own identity and uses this as a reason to destroy him. But why this is considered as a good reason to kill him is unintelligible.[222] Even taking into consideration, Eagleton sums up that "it is not quite true to say that evil is done for its own sake. Rather, it is purposeful action taken in the name of a condition which is not

---

[220] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 103.
[221] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 104.
[222] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 104.

itself purposeful"[223]. Actually, both these statements mean the same thing. But the second statement can be used to answer those who suggest a kind of purpose to their evil actions. Eagleton emphasizes his first statement with his second. He relates evil to a game[224] in this sense, and concurs with Primo Levi who remarks that the years of Hitler were characterized by "a widespread useless violence, as an end itself, with the sole purpose of creating pain, occasionally having a purpose, yet always redundant, always disproportionate to the purpose itself"[225]. In other words, their purpose was purposeless and their way of achieving their purpose was excessive. For instance, why does one want to have a pure race? Or why does one put so much effort both logistically and economically into humiliating and torturing Jews if one kills them in the end?

Eagleton relates evil to the death drive in several senses. The death drive aims to annihilate everything including itself and takes pleasure from this destruction. He defines the death drive:

> *The death drive is crafty, implacable, vindictive, and bottomlessly malevolent, rejoicing in the sight of gouged eye sockets and the bleeding stumps of limbs. It does not simply endorse such destruction, but actively revels in it. It sucks life from death, growing fat on human carnage. This is why those who actively pledge themselves to this force commit deeds which can genuinely be described as evil.*[226]

As indicated, Eagleton describes the death drive as unquenchable and incomprehensibly malevolent. These features of the death drive can be observed in the case of Iago's hatred and subsequent actions against Othello. It is also described as delighting and feeding on the human carnage. Then, he concludes that those who act according to the orders of this drive are defined as evil.

He explains that "savaged by the superego, ravaged by the id, and battered by the external world, the poor, bruised ego is understandably in love with its own dissolution.

---

[223] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 104.
[224] Eagleton discussess that one has some purposes to do in a game such as gathering some points. However, it is purposeless in the last place.
[225] Eagleton, *Sweet Violence,* p. 255.
[226] Eagleton, *Sweet Violence,* p. 17-8.

Like some badly mutilated beast, it finds that its only final security lies in crawling off to die"[227]. Eagleton defends the same view in *Sweet Violence*:

> *If desire levels its various objects to so many hollow shells, it is because what it is really hankering after is itself, a consummation which it can achieve only in death. The dynamic within this insatiable quest for fulfillment is thus Thanatos or the death drive, which seeks to abolish history, wind the clock back and attain a homeostasis in which the ego will be free from harm. Death is the goal of life, not just its end.*[228]

Human beings surprisingly want to go back to their inanimate situation, which is possible only by dying. This is why they want to annihilate everything including themselves because they are in pain in life. The ego is repeatedly attacked by the superego and oppressed by the id. This relentless drive wants to shatter history and turns the present order of the world upside down, so that the ego can be free from anything restricting it. Thus, death returns to be a goal of life instead of the end of it. As has been seen, the death drive seeks to annihilate both the victim and the evildoer her/himself. In this context, Eagleton explains that "even self-interest is set aside- for the damned are in their own twisted way entirely disinterested, eager as they are to bring themselves low along with the rest of creation. The death drive is a deliriously orgiastic revolt against interest, value, meaning, and rationality"[229]. In short, it is described as an unreasonable drive that destroys everything in order to obtain 'nothing'. Eagleton summarizes in *After Theory* that "the death drive is not a purposeful narrative, but the ruin of all narrative. It destroys simply for the obscene pleasure of it. The perfect terrorist is a kind of Dadaist, striking not at this or that bit of meaning but at meaning as such"[230].

Eagleton argues that the death drive is related to the superego which admonishes people for transgressions, though people even take pleasure from them when they feel guilty.[231] Human beings can be said to be masochistic creatures torn between superego and desire. In time, this can be addictive. Eagleton gives alcoholism as an example to demonstrate the relationship between addiction and the death drive. The alcoholic cannot relinquish alcohol: "It is not because he relishes the taste of the stuff…It is

---

[227] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 108.
[228] Eagleton, *Sweet Violence*, p. 248.
[229] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 109.
[230] Eagleton, *After Theory*, p. 215.
[231] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 109.

because the drink fills some wound or rent in his inner being…But the bottle is also hard to set aside because the alcoholic is addicted to his own destruction"[232]. Hence, alcohol is a type of fetish for the alcoholic, who seeks his/her own destruction. An alcoholic may not stop drinking until he dies. This is the same case with evil. The perpetrator of evil will continue to annihilate until he finally destroys him/herself

Eagleton believes that the death drive exists in every person and that: "just as desire for psychoanalysis is nothing personal, but rather an anonymous network into which we are inserted at birth, so the drive to destruction is purely formal, utterly impersonal, and implacably inhuman"[233]. This includes the view that evil lies in a possibility to choose rather than a fixed human condition. Everybody has these drives, but some people choose to do evil while others choose not to do so. Eagleton refers to the relationship between evil and the death drive in most of his works. For example, in *Holy Terror* he defines the death drive (Thanatos):

> *Thanatos is a fickle, duplicitous servant who is secretly in revolt, forever slipping free from the civilizing project and scampering off to do his own thing. In the forging of civilizations, the death drive is harnessed to soberly functional ends, growing strategic and astute; but it continues to betray a delight in power and destruction for their own sake, which continually threatens to undermine those ends. What this implies, then, is that the urge to order is itself latently anarchic. The enterprise of constructing civilization is infiltrated from the outset by death. What makes for human culture also mars it. The very force which is intended to subdue chaos is secretly in love with it.*[234]

Eagleton, like Freud, considered the death drive as both dangerous for civilization and also as an important element of it, which is why it is described as a 'fickle and duplicitous servant'. On the one hand, it commends order, on the other hand it operates anarchically to destroy the order leading to the important realization that civilization is built upon the death drive. Accordingly, it can be claimed that civilization is based on a thin layer. Eagleton supports what he has claimed by stating in *Holy Terror* that "the sacred is a Janus-faced power, at once life-giving and death-dealing, which can be traced all the way from the orgies of Dionysus to the shattering enthrallments of the

---

[232] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 110.
[233] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 113.
[234] Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, p. 12.

sublime. For late modern civilization, some of its primary incarnations are known as the unconscious, the death drive, or the Real"[235].

Eagleton comments that "because the death drive actually commands us to enjoy our own dismemberment, it is the place where the opposition between law and desire, superego and id, is most dramatically dismantled"[236]. Because of its oxymoronic structure, Eagleton relates the death drive to the god of obscene pleasure, Dionysus who combined and melded the opposites in himself. Eagleton describes him as "the god of wine, milk, and honey, he is also the god of blood… He has all the fathomless vitality of the unconscious, then, he also has its implacable malevolence and aggression. He is the god of obscene enjoyment or horrific jouissance"[237]. Here the enjoyment is described in *Trouble with Strangers* as "a terrifying, rapacious form of enjoyment, in which we reap gratification from the way that the law or superego unleashes its demented sadism upon us. It is a law as devoid of meaning"[238]. He is the god of the death drive which is as necessary for the establishments of civilizations as for destroying them. In this respect, it makes sense why Eagleton dedicates *On Evil* to Henry Kissinger who was awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the Paris Peace Accords, but who also played an important role in secretly bombing Cambodia. Since Dionysus is the god of wine and because "alcohol both ravages and invigorates"[239] Eagleton implies that civilization is established on slippery grounds: "A certain 'terrorism' is built into our preciously wrought civility. Without a dash of barbarism, no civilization can stand. But it cannot stand with it either, since terror in the sense of the slaughter of the innocent is properly inimical to it"[240]. A certain degree of barbarism seems necessary for civilization.

While relating evil to the death drive, he also discusses the transition from theology to modern psychoanalysis:

> *The modern age has witnessed what one might call a transition from the soul to the psyche. Or, if one prefers, from theology to*

---

[235] Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, p. 115.
[236] Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, p. 24.
[237] Eagleton, *Holy Terror*, p. 3.
[238] Eagleton, *Trouble with Strangers, A Study of Ethics,* p. 147.
[239] Eagleton, *Trouble with Strangers, A Study of Ethics,* p. 13.
[240] Eagleton, *Trouble with Strangers, A Study of Ethics,* p. 13.

psychoanalysis...Both are narratives of human desire-though for religious faith that desire can finally be consummated in the kingdom of God, whereas for psychoanalysis it must remain tragically unappeased. In this sense, psychoanalysis is the science of human discontent. But so, too, is theology. With Freud, repression and neurosis play the role of what Christians have traditionally known as original sin. In each case, human beings are seen as born in sickness.[241]

Discussion about the soul and religion has been superceded by psychoanalysis and psychology. However, both religion and psychoanalysis share a common tenet that human beings are unhappy because they cannot satisfy their desires. Even though it seems more possible in a religion in which desire can be consummated by God it remains unsatisfied eternally.

Lastly, Eagleton discusses evil, exploring what Schopenhauer means by the concept of Will:

Schopenhauer saw evil deeds as motivated by a need to obtain relief from the inner torment of what he called the Will; and this relief was to be gained by inflicting that torment on others. In psychoanalytic terms, evil is thus a form of projection. The Will, for him, is a malignant drive which lies at the very heart of our being but which is callously indifferent to our personal welfare. It ordains suffering to no end. In fact, it has absolutely no purpose in view other than its own futile self-reproduction.[242]

Both Eagleton and Schopenhauer see 'will' and 'evil' as a kind of projection. The Nazis wanted to fill their inner lack of being. In a similar vein, Schopenhauer sees 'evil' done by force of Will in order to get relief from inner torment. Both evil and Will are indifferent to people's needs. Eagleton notes that "evil appears on the scene only when those in what one might call ontological pain deflect it onto others as a way of taking flight from themselves. It is as though they seek to break open the bodies of others in order to expose the nullity which lurks inside them"[243].

---

[241] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 17.
[242] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 107.
[243] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 119.

2.3. "JOB'S COMFORTERS"

In the third part of the book, Eagleton discusses theodicy, which is advocated as accounting for evil in the world. Theodicy means to justify the ways of God to the people, and tries to account for evil in different ways. For example, Eagleton notes that evil is considered "essential for the building of moral character"[244]. Yet, Eagleton does not believe this and compares it with what Prince Andrew said during the Falklands war, which was that 'being shot in the war will be great for building character'.[245] It sometimes may be true that pain may make people mature to a degree but it cannot be applied to every person and every occasion. Nor can it be taken as a reason for atrocities in the modern century. Eagleton is also surprised by what Richard Swinburne said about evil in order to justify God: "God is justified by allowing Hiroshima, Belsen, the Lisbon Earthquake or the Black Death so that human beings can live in a real world rather than a toy one"[246]. However, two problems arise here: the first problem is to decide whether the 'real' world is the one that is full of pain or not. The second one is that even if a real world is supposed to include evil things how many evil things should the real world include?

Another defence of theodicy is that good comes from evil. Nonetheless, Eagleton disagrees with this, too, and states that "good does not always spring from evil; and even when it does, this is scarcely enough to justify it"[247]. For example, even if there was a little goodness in World Wars or the Holocaust, they were still evil. He quotes from philosopher of religion Brian Davies who asks "what are we to make of someone (i.e., God) who organizes evils so that goods might arise from them? Couldn't he have found some more agreeable way of testing our mettle than dengue fever, Britney Spears, or tarantulas?"[248]. In a similar vein, Eagleton subsequently asks "perhaps evil is inevitable in this particular kind of world; but then why couldn't God have created a different one?''[249]. Thus, in contrast to Leibniz, who claims that the present world is the best one of all possible worlds, stressing God's goodness in the sense that as God represents absolute goodness the one he chooses must be the best, Eagleton asserts that

---

[244] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 133.
[245] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 133.
[246] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 133-34.
[247] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 134.
[248] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 137-38.
[249] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 138.

"given any particular world, you can always imagine a better one"[250]. Nor does he find wider argument convincing "which claims that evil is not really evil, just good which we fail to recognize as such"[251]. In other words, these seemingly evil things, in wider context, ought to lead us to goodness when they are looked at from the godlike perspective. Eagleton accepts this to a degree: "Of course there is love as well as war, laughter as well as howling, joy as well as torture. But have these two sets of features, positive and negative, really balanced out in the account book of human history to date?"[252]. He believes that the answer is no. In this respect, Eagleton may seem pessimistic, but maybe theists are too optimistic in that they close their eyes to evils and prefer to believe that they are just by-products of creation.

Another defence of the existence of evil is the existence of free will, which is championed by Alvin Plantinga who argues that evil is necessary in this world, otherwise the concept of free will/freedom would be meaningless. Eagleton states that the question should be why people are free to do evil before the question of why there is evil in the world.[253] According to Christian belief humans are created in God's image, which is why they are free and capable of choosing between good and evil. Eagleton declares that God is free but does not perpetrate evil and then he wonders why he did not create people with the same values.

Eagleton also discusses 'privation theory' that was a very common view in ancient times claiming that evil is a privation of goodness. Eagleton notes that "for mainstream Christian theology things are good in themselves, and evil is a kind of bungling or privation of being"[254]. Thus, by ignoring all the present evil in the world it suggests that there is no evil. According to this idea, good and evil cannot exist simultaneously. There is only goodness and when goodness disappears, evil starts to appear. As a result, Eagleton questions why God could not create a different world. In conclusion, having discussed the existence of evil in the world with relation to theodicy Eagleton agrees with Paul Ricoeur and concludes that "theodicy is a mad project"[255].

---

[250] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 138.
[251] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 138.
[252] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 146.
[253] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 141.
[254] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 140.
[255] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 143.

Later Eagleton discusses Job's situation. While Job's friends are trying to find explanations for why he is suffering without sinning, God appears and challenges them by stating "how dare you imagine that you can apply your moral and rational codes to me?.. Who the hell do you think you are?"[256]. God's response to Job and his friends is significant in that people cannot apply their own norms and moral codes to God. Seeing this, Eagleton claims that God is not responsible for evil because he is not rational in the same way as people are. His perspective is different from that of people. Thus, Eagleton writes, Job decides to love God 'for naught' without accepting any satisfactory explanations for his suffering. [257]

Eagleton notes that good actions are distinct from good individuals. For example, the reason for a good deed is not important in the first place. One may not aim to help in one's actions, but this may be a good result for somebody. For example, one may help the poor by showing oneself as a good person. He explains the difference between evil actions and evil people by asking "can there be evil acts without evil persons to execute them? Not if the argument of this book holds water. For evil is a condition of being as well as a quality of behaviour"[258]. That there should be an evil person to do an evil action emphasizes the notion of intention. As discussed, if one does not do an evil action without one's free will one could not be blamed as being evil. Eagleton suggests that we "think, for example, of the difference between someone who practices sadism for erotic pleasure in a consensual sexual relationship, and someone who forces excruciatingly on another person in order to assuage his own nauseous sense of nonbeing"[259]. In Eagletonian understanding of evil, one in the first statement is not evil while the one in the second statement is evil.

---

[256] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 142.
[257] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 142.
[258] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 152.
[259] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 152.

CHAPTER THREE

AN EAGLETONIAN ANALYSIS OF 'EVIL' IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

3.1. AN EAGLETONIAN ANALYSIS OF 'EVIL' IN *THE SLEEP OF REASON*

In this chapter, reflections on Eagleton's concept of 'evil' will be studied in relation to C. P. Snow's *The Sleep of Reason,* which raises questions such as 'under what circumstances is one responsible for what s/he has done?', or 'how can one decide whether a person does something voluntarily?'. In order to answer such questions one should clearly understand the main event, which is the murder of an eight year old boy by the two women, in the novel and the reasons for it. Traditional views on evil discussed in the first chapter are inadequate to explain this incident. However, what Eagleton has put forward about 'evil', for example the meaningless violence caused by evil, its aimlessness, its seeking for annihilation for its own sake instead of a practical gain, its close relationship with freedom, and its angelic and demonic faces and so on would help to explain the characters of the two women and their attitudes both after the murder and during the trial.

The title of the novel *The Sleep of Reason* refers to the famous Spanish painter and printmaker Francisco Goya's etching named "El sueno de la razon produce monstros", that is, 'the sleep of reason brings forth monsters'. In this etching, Goya illustrates "a man asleep, his head resting on his folded arms. Owls and bats fly menacingly around his head; at his feet, a lynx sits motionless, alert and staring. Bats, bloodsucking creatures of the night, evoked associations with the devil; owls were at the time symbols of 'mindless stupidities' not of wisdom"[260]. This is what Snow wanted to convey for the readers of his novel by recounting the trial of two women who abducted, tortured and then murdered an eight-year old boy. In the course of this, he supports the view that reason is superior to instinct, which leads society to corruption when it is not under the control of reason. That is observed with the example of the two women who dreamed about ultimate freedom or the individual freedom defended by George Passant who advised people to live according to their natures. But both the women's action and George's advice to people led them to corruption and society to the chaos. By

---

[260] The Sleep of Reason, (t.y.), http://www.worldandi.com/newhome/public/2004/february/bkpub1.asp

implication, Snow shows that society can be an ideal place to live when it is governed by reason. In a similar context, A. K. Moniyar notes that

> *Snow views absolute individualism as a manifestation of an irrational impulsive and socially blind will. His concept of freedom resembles Rousseau's 'real will' and T. H. Greene's 'positive freedom' since for Snow, a will is free only when it wills rationally, in consonance with social interests. His 'new men' constantly assert their 'real will' and enjoy moral freedom by acting in accordance with the 'categorical imperative' of their duty to society. They distrust 'freedom without faith'.*[261]

Snow is told to believe in the superiority of reason, thus, it is a very apt title for his novel. The narrator of this novel is, as in other of Snow's novels, Lewis Eliot. Like C. P. Snow, this character comes from a lower-middle class family and they both rise to good positions in good universities, and both of them have problems with their eyes. Lewis, in *The Sleep of Reason*, reflects Lewis's university experiences which display the prosperity of post-war society and leisure impaired by violence, rioting and sexual corruption. However, the main event which inspired him to write this novel were the Moors murders that were considered the acme of evil. Ian Brady and Myra Hindley were found guilty of murdering four children and an adolescent, and they recorded the screams and pleas of the children and played games with them.[262]

Snow used many details of the case in his novel and superimposed the characteristics of Brady and Hindley onto the two women. It is narrated in the third person and as a realist novelist, Snow reflects the case as it was. He does this with the speech of some characters; for example, the judge warns the psychiatrists not to go beyond the facts when they are expressing their personal evaluations in the case. Moreover, the concepts of freedom, will and morality are important for understanding the concept of evil. Snow discusses these concepts in the novel as well. However, the focus is on the two women, their motives for this particular murder and the evaluation of this case by society.

---

[261] See: A. K. Moniyar, "The Novels of C. P. Snow: A Critical Introduction", p. 42, Atlantic Publishers and the Distributers, New Delhi, 1991.
[262] The Moors Murderers, (t.y.), http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/allanmassie/100065874/the-moors-murderers-were-evil-beyond-imagining-is-this-latest-twist-simply-ian-bradys-last-wicked-game/

Briefly, the story of *The Sleep of Reason* is narrated by Lewis who is a lawyer and although he comes from the lower middle class he is a wealthy person. He has two sons named Charles and Maurice. His father-in-law, Austin Davidson, is sick and Margaret who is his second wife is sorry for his father. Lewis and his brother Martin are interested in this case because one of the two women, Cora, is a niece of their lifelong friend George who lives apart from the mainstream, and advises people to live freely and according to their natures. The other woman is named Kitty. Kitty's father, Mr. Pateman, and her brother, Dick, accuse George and Cora of being a bad influence on Kitty while Kitty's mother, Mrs. Pateman, accepts the situation as it is and worries about her daughter without accusing anybody. Nobody knows what happened during the weekend when they kidnapped the child. We are informed with the evidence given during the trial mostly by Bosanquet and other lawyers, and psychiatrists. A lot of space is given to assessing the two women's mental condition because, in order to judge them as responsible agents for the murder at the trial, they should be proved to be sane and to have done what they did with their own free will.

The various attitudes towards evil discussed in the first chapter are observed through different characters. For instance, the police officer, Maxwell, demonizes the two women as in the Middle Ages. George Passant, however, believes that people have an inclination towards goodness and, accordingly, he advises people around him, including the two women, to live according to their natures without caring about society and the people in it. He ignores the possibility of evil in human beings. Other characters function to help the development of events and introduce the two women to us. Thus, Snow wants us to think in different ways what evil means to any of us, asking questions which are hard to answer such as 'what are reason, instinct, freedom/free will and morality?'.

To understand the concept of evil, knowing the difference between instinctual and learned things is important because, when people discuss the nature of evil, some link it to instinct while others link it to reason, that is, to freedom of choice. Snow discusses other notions such as freedom, responsibility or instinctive ties and subsequently their relationship with evil. For example, when Lewis and his son Charles have visited Lewis's father, Lewis confesses that Charles has only once so far paid a visit to his

grandfather because his grandfather did not want him to do so. Lewis explains that "to anyone outside, that must have sounded as though we had been heartless, not only without instinctive ties but without responsibility"[263]. Here, the phrase 'instinctive ties' is important because his grandfather seems to have no interest in his grandchild. Not long after, Lewis declares that "he was amiably and genuinely uninterested in his grandchildren"[264]. One wonders, then, whether there are really instinctive ties among people. In contrast to his grandfather, Charles looks back at him attentively. Lewis thinks that "this was a test, not only of instinctual ties, but also of insight"[265]. It is surprising to see that instinctual ties may be not instinctual. He seems to realize that he has responsibilities for Charles and thus gives him some cakes, which does not satisfy Lewis.[266] He advises Charles to sew five pounds to the seat of his trousers. So, besides instinctual ties, feeling responsible to a relative seems to be a learned thing instead of an innate one.

Lewis goes to his appointment with Vice-Chancellor Arnold Shaw. While he is standing outside the residence where the Vice-Chancellor lives, Lewis feels a pang:

> *I was still capable of walking down any street, seeing a lighted window, and feeling that same pang, which was made up of curiosity, envy, and desire; in that sense, one doesn't age: one can still envy a hearth-glow, even if one is returning to a happy home: it isn't a social chance, but something a good deal deeper, that can at untamable moments make one feel forever youthful, and, as far as that goes, forever in the street outside.*[267]

Lewis is said to be leading a wealthy life but he still feels envy. So it can be claimed that his feelings have a deeper base than his social condition. On the one hand, feeling close and responsible towards a grandson as a grandfather does not seem instinctual, on the other hand, feeling envy even when leading a wealthy life seems instinctual. As Eagleton asserts, it can be explained that there is no inclination towards goodness in people. To do good things people should learn some social skills. However, it is easy to feel envy or do evil without learning from outside. In this sense, Eagleton seems to be

---

[263] C. P. Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1968, p. 4.
[264] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 5.
[265] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 9.
[266] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 13.
[267] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 17.

right to assert that people do not stand at the same distance from good and evil. As has been observed, in daily life evil occurs more easily and often than goodness does.

This reminds us of Eagleton's interpretation of original sin. By 'original sin' Eagleton means 'at the roots' instead of 'at the beginning'. That is, everybody has potential for evil as a natural consequence of freedom. He does not hold that people are born evil. In the novel, both Lewis and Martin think about original sin. For example, when Lewis remembers that George advises people to "live by the flow of your instincts. Salvation through freedom"[268], he does not agree with him and confesses that "without possessing a religious faith, I nevertheless perhaps because I wasn't good myself couldn't help believing in something like original sin"[269].

In contrast to George, who seemingly believes that people can live in a good way according to their natures, Lewis believes in original sin in the mentioned sense. When Edgar Hankins, who writes for a Sunday paper, wants to talk to Martin and Lewis about the case after the trial they refuse, but Martin then says: "You know, we could write it for him. Great throbbing pieces about how we're all guilty. So really no one is guilty. So really everything is as well as could be expected in an admittedly imperfect world"[270]. Martin seems to think in the way Lewis thinks about human beings' natures. He also says that if being guilty or evil is common and unavoidable then nobody can be guilty. If it is the truth about human nature nobody can be evaluated as good or evil and it follows, then, that this murder is to be expected. Accordingly, it would be unsurprising if more murders than the present ones were committed.

However, this should not lead one to demonize people. For instance, when Lewis arranges a meeting with Maxwell, he tells Lewis: "Those two women are as bad as anything I've seen…I've seen plenty, but I've never seen anything worse"[271]. Lewis considers Maxwell's reaction exaggerated, but, once he has seen the two women Maxwell insists: "I'm going to tell you something. I mean every word of it. Those two are as sane as you or me. When we had them in here and found out what they'd done, if I could have got away with it, I'd have put a bullet in the back of both their necks. It

---

[268] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 327.
[269] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 327.
[270] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 324.
[271] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 235.

would have been the best way out"[272]. He has not learned anything about them except they committed a murder for the reason why they murdered the child. He emphasizes that they are not mad and asserts that "those two are as sane as you and me... I've seen them"[273]. His emphasis on their being sane is because he wants to make them pay for what they have done. If they are found to be mad or if there is something that made them act without free will, they can be forgiven for their action. This is what Maxwell fears. He demonizes the two women in order to punish them as severely as possible. He may also fear that if there is an understanding of the perpetrators, there will also be compassion for them. However, as Eagleton says, reason and evil are closely related. That is, to explain why someone tortures somebody else does not exonerate them from responsibility.

Eagleton accepts the influences of external factors on people because he believes that ignoring external influences reduces people to zombies.[274] People are social creatures and they have to live in cooperation with other people, which makes influences unavoidable in human beings' lives. That is what makes the notions of free will and freedom important. Especially while evaluating an event as good or evil these notions become the criteria. For example, when Lewis goes to the Patemans' house to deliver Cora's message, Mr. Pateman does not accept anything that is alleged about his child. His wife confesses to Lewis that "it's a good job he doesn't believe she's done anything, isn't it?... He won't believe it, whatever happens. It's just as well. He couldn't face it if he did"[275]. Lewis delivers Cora's message and Mr. Pateman responds that "I never liked the look of that woman, she was a bad influence all along. I always had my own ideas about her"[276]. He thinks the same about George: "I don't want to say this, but he's been the worst influence of all. Even if he is a friend of yours, he's a loose liver. There's bad blood in that family, and it's a pity my daughter ever came anywhere near them"[277]. Even though believing that his daughter has done something under the influence of Cora may make Mr. Pateman feel comfortable, if he cannot face the

---

[272] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 236.
[273] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 237.
[274] Eagleton, *On Evil,* p. 11.
[275] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 270.
[276] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 267.
[277] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 267.

situation, it is wrong to support this view if Eagleton is to be credited. Supporting this view suggests that Kitty is without free will which, in turn, makes her innocent.

Similarly, George does not accept his niece's involvement in the incident. After Lewis's eye recovers and Margaret's father gets better, Margaret decides to give a party. In the evening before the party, George visits Lewis and tells him anxiously that "the police have been asking his niece and Miss Pateman questions about the boy who disappeared. The one who was done away with"[278]. In response, Lewis does not react for a while standing immobile. Later on, George says that "it's bound to be a mistake. There's a ridiculous exaggeration somewhere"[279]. Lewis agrees and George is glad of that. Lewis's concurring with George is not based on rational grounds, because he barely knows George's niece and the other woman involved. Besides, George does not know his niece well. It is an interesting point that Mr. Pateman does not accept his daughter's involvement and, similarly, George does not accept his niece's involvement. Both the Patemans and George do not accept the women's involvement. Both the Patemans and George accept the murder case, but the Patemans do not accept the involvement of Kitty nor does George accept Cora's involvement. But if Eagleton is to be credited there cannot be evil actions without evil people.

Mr. Pateman and Dick accuse George as well as Cora of being a bad influence on Kitty. This echoes the shifting of evil from Adam to Eve, and from Eve to the serpent. However, George definitely rejects this. For example, when Lewis visits George he asks him about Cora. George is vague: "She was rather interesting at one time, but then she began to slip out of things. And of course there were always a lot of lively people coming on…She didn't join in much. I supposed she used to listen…I didn't notice anything special"[280]. Because he seemingly does not have a close relationship with her he has little information about her. Lewis accuses George of not knowing her well enough but George refuses to take responsibility for his niece or Miss Pateman:

> *I refuse to take any responsibility for either of them…I've told them*
> *what I've told everyone else, that they ought to make the best of their lives*

---

[278] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 208.
[279] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 208.
[280] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 247.

and not worry about all the neutered rubbish round them who've denied whatever feeble bit of instinct they might conceivably have been endowed with. Do you think I cared if they lived together? Not that I knew for certain, but if they did they were just acting according to their nature...I suppose you're trying to put the responsibility onto me. If they'd never been told to make the best of their lives, they'd have been just as safe as everyone else, would they? None of this would ever have happened to them? I won't accept it for a single instant. It's sheer brutal hypocritical nonsense. If that's all you've got to say, I'm not prepared to be attacked anymore.[281]

Given that the two women committed the crime of their own free will, George was right in his defence. One can either blame George because he advises them to live according to their natures or one can find George to be justified in his defence because, whatever he advises, their wills are the ultimate originators of their actions. It depends how one looks at it. Taking into consideration what Eagleton has argued, George does not seem responsible for Cora's involvement in the murder.

Similarly, Dr. Cornford shifts evil from Kitty by describing the conditions in which she lived. He notes

Because Miss Ross appeared to be playing a predominantly masculine role Miss Pateman was behaving like a woman, without the full satisfactions, without the children, that in her feminine role she was ready to demand. In her family the women seemed to be expected to be submissively feminine, more than ordinarily so. Perhaps that was why she had sought a relation with a woman- so as to be feminine, and rebel against males, at one and the same time. But in doing so, she took upon herself more guilt, more a sense of loss and strangeness, than Miss Ross.[282]

These may be counted as influences on her to choose a woman partner or to feel guilty and a sense loss as Dr. Cornford talks about. However, when the systematic torture of a child she is involved in is taken into consideration one cannot accept these reasons as excuses. She could have responded to these situations in a different way. For example, if she really had felt deprived of a child, she could have adopted one instead of torturing and killing one. Alternatively, she could have tried to empathize with the mother of the child she killed. She acted with a lack of any sympathy toward the mother. There will

---

[281] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 248.
[282] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 350.

always be conditions which have an effect on the decisions and action of a person to a degree. Otherwise, human beings will be like monsters[283]. In short, influences cannot be counted as justifiers in the final analysis.

Lewis has heard about the murdered child on two occasions and has not reacted to it until he learns of George's connection with Cora. It can be deduced that the point for Lewis is not the murder of a child but the perpetrators, though they meant nothing to him before this information. For example, while Vicky was talking about paediatrics she said that "a boy of eight had disappeared a day or two before, there was a wave of anxiety going round"[284]. However, he does not comment on this, but goes on to talk to Vicky about her father's situation. Neither of them says a word about the kidnapping. When he hears about the child for the second time, he is in hospital because of a problem with his eye. He cannot read newspapers so Margaret does it for him and reads an article about the missing child who has been found. They do not comment on it. Later, he confesses that "we were not interested. Margaret sat beside me in silence and held my hand"[285]. But now, when he has learned the connection between one of the two women and George, he reacts as if this is the first time he has heard the news. When he first hears the story he does not care because he does not know the people who have done it. Maybe he thinks that they are far away and do not resemble any one he knows. But now, he starts to think about the murder and hence about evil maybe for the first time in his life. This leads him to think about evil and related issues deeply.

Margaret and Charles do not feel interested in this event perhaps for the same reason. For example, George wants Lewis to attend court and Lewis agrees so as not to upset him. Martin, who is as affected as Lewis, decides to accompany him. However, Charles disagrees with his father because there have recently been accusations about Lewis in the newspapers. Lewis ignores his son and insists on attending court. Therefore Charles becomes furious: "That's sentimental. You're taking a stupid risk which won't do any good to him and will do you some harm. There's no justification at all"[286]. The more Lewis and Martin are affected, the less Charles and Margaret are affected. Even though they are all family members and share a common set of values,

---

[283] Monster is described by Eagleton as wholly independent of others. (*On Evil*, p. 12)
[284] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 139.
[285] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 148.
[286] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 277.

they react to the same event in very different ways. For example, Margaret is obsessed with her father's health while Charles is interested only in those situations that are practical and useful to him.

Dick does not agree with his father but believes that people commit crimes under the influence of external factors or their upbringing. He does not believe people can commit crimes without a cause. He believes that all crimes could be eliminated by better social conditions:

> *I don't agree with that. Passant (George) would have been all right if only they'd given him a chance…'They' were to blame, 'the whole wretched set-up,' the racket, the establishment, society itself. We should have to break it up. Look what they had done to his father. Look at what they were doing to him… Kitty would be happy in a decent society. There was nothing wrong with her. As for Cora Ross, if she'd 'done anything,' that was their fault: no one had looked after her, she'd never been properly educated, she'd never been found a place.*[287]

In contrast to Dick, Eagleton argues that "there are plenty of reasons, Freudian and otherwise, for believing that a fair amount of human nastiness would survive even the most deep-seated of political changes"[288]. If Dick is right, people would talk about bad social conditions instead of the concept of evil. Evil defined by Eagleton and exemplified with the murder has nothing to do with social conditions or education, as Dick has suggested. Lewis points out that Dick does not know the bare facts about the crimes and claims that "he seemed to accept that Cora Ross was involved. But his indignation comforted him and at the same time deluded him. It removed some of the apprehension he might have had about his sister"[289]. Dick defends this view because he believes that people can be improved under better conditions and because, just like his father, he cannot face the truth about his sister.

It is hard to say for certain whether one is acting under the influence of something or with free will, as one cannot know anybody else's mind. Besides, the story is told from Lewis's viewpoint, which is first person narration and thus limited sometimes sounding subjective except for the evidence and one outside of the story cannot know

---

[287] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 267.
[288] Eagleton, *On Evil,* p. 150.
[289] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 267-68.

everything. If it was narrated through an omniscient point of view one would know who was telling the truth. For example, when Martin asks which of those two was the prime mover for Bosanquet, he replies that "we don't know. There are plenty of things about this case we don't know…But we do know two things. They had planned this, or something like this, literally for months beforehand. And they were going to kill, right from the beginning. That was the real point all along"[290].

What happened at the university was similar. The members of the committee wanted to give a different punishment to the dominator, Myra Bold, but Arnold Shaw disagreed, claiming that identifying who was the prime mover was going beyond the facts. The women give different accounts about the murder and Bosanquet explains: "The accounts are different. One is, that he was put on a bus to take him back to the town. The other, which is Miss Ross's, is that they drove him back themselves in the borrowed car, and dropped him at the corner of the road leading to his parents' house"[291]. This is not their only lie. Because they are kept in different prisons, they sometimes contradict each other so that sometimes while one is denying something, the other is confirming it.

Furthermore, Eagleton also suggests that while one is doing something of one's free will it is hard to decide definitively whether one is actually free or under the influence of something. It is problematic because one decides to do something according to one's character, and character is shaped by social factors or past decisions.[292] For example, Martin wonders: "if it hadn't been for all hothouse air we used to know about- those two mightn't have done it?"[293]. Lewis answers that

> *It was impossible to prove. Was there ever any single cause of any action, particularly of actions such as this? Yes, they must have been affected by the atmosphere round them, yes, they were more likely to go to the extreme in their sexual tastes. Perhaps it made it easier for them to share their fantasies. But between those fantasies, and what they had done, there was still the unimaginable gap. Of course there were influences in the air. But only people like them, predisposed to commit sadistic horrors*

---

[290] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 317.
[291] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 297.
[292] Robert kane, "Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes", *The Journal of Ethics*, 4(4), Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views, 2000, Jstor, p. 317.
[293] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 368.

anyway, would have played on to the lethal end. If they had not had these influences, there would have been others.[294]

Lewis accepts that there may be influences. For example, George's advice about freedom might have led them to have fantasies about ultimate freedom. Or Cora's lonely upbringing and Kitty's wish to revenge herself on men, which will be put forward as evidence against their sound mental condition by the defence lawyers, may have influenced them. Anybody can have extreme fantasies but not everyone makes them a reality. This is what Midgley says about evil. She states that no matter how great the influence of external factors, it is important to comprehend how people react to influences, and maintains that infection causes fever but only in those who have the appropriate circulatory systems.[295] Lewis believes that the two women would have done it anyway, by claiming that if there had not been the present influences there would be others. At this point, Eagleton is right to state that "evil is a timeless condition rather than a matter of social circumstance"[296]. He precludes influence as the ultimate coercive factor in order not to evade freedom and, accordingly, free will.

Instead of focusing on the effect of influence one should look at freedom and will. Most of the time, people's actions cannot be explained by chance, instinct or influence but by freedom of choice. For example, one day, when Charles asks Lewis what he thinks about luck, he answers that "anyone who had avoided total failure had to believe in luck: if you didn't, you were callous or self-satisfied or both"[297]. Lewis comes to this conclusion with the experience he has undergone in his life. He feels that "without great good luck, I might shortly be coming up for retirement in a local government office. No, that wasn't mock-modest. I had started tough and determined: but I had seen other tough determined men unable to break loose"[298]. Although he explains his current situation by luck, he reveals that he has done something illegal or wrong in order to be what he is. When he visits his father he notes that "my father may have realized that I had played some part in affairs because I am not poor anymore"[299]. Besides, when he describes Charles he states "Charles knew a good deal about what had happened to me,

---

[294] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 369.
[295] Midgley, p. 131.
[296] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 53.
[297] Eagleton, *On Evil,* p. 93.
[298] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 93.
[299] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 10.

both the praise and blame"[300]. Luck may play some part in one's life but human beings are the ultimate originators of their way of life.

Lewis remembers:

> *All along, perhaps, even when I first knew him, he had been alienated (though at that time we didn't use the word) from the mainstream of living: now he had become totally so. I had to believe, against my will, that nothing could have changed him. It wasn't just chance, or the accidents of class and time. There were plenty who had lived alongside him, who thought they shared his hopes- like my brother Martin or me, when we were in our teens- who, whatever had happened to us, were not alienated at all. But George had gone straight on, driven by passions that he didn't understand or alternatively were so pre-eminent that he shrugged off any necessity to understand them…He was in search, not really of partners, but of objects which would set his imagination alight…And so he had finally come to desire young girls, one after another, each of them lasting just as long as they didn't get in his imagination's way. It had meant risks. Yet he seemed to be stimulated by the risks themselves…After each one, he seemed driven, compelled, or delighted to double his bets…To borrow the phrase he had just employed, he had lived 'according to his nature.' For him, that was justification enough. He wasn't one who felt the obligation to reshape his life.[301]*

Lewis believes this is not because of chance, or an accident of class or time. Even though Lewis and his brother Martin among others shared George's views, they did not become alienated from the mainstream. In contrast to them, George kept going on, driven by passions which he could not understand, 'living according to one's nature' in his words, enough to justify his way of life. This is the result of will which makes people good or bad, that is, individuals.

Another example in the novel is that Lewis's father-in-law, Austin Davidson has been sick for years, wants to commit suicide and asks Lewis for help. Davidson saves one red capsule every day to commit suicide. While he is talking to Lewis, Lewis comments on Davidson's suicide decision by stating that "he seemed to have the exhilaration of feeling that at last his will was free. He wasn't any more at the mercy of fate. There was an exhilaration, almost an intoxication, of free-will that comes to

---

[300] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 96.
[301] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 249-50.

anyone when the suffering has become too great and one is ready to dispose of oneself"[302]. He believes that committing suicide is a matter of free will because he decides when to die. In this way, he can rebel against fate because he refuses to endure the sickness he has. The point is not to discuss whether committing suicide is a good or evil act. Rather, the function of will should be observed while carrying out an action.

The issue is about being free and choice rather than about gender, ethnicity or anything else. For instance, upon the request of George, Lewis visits Cora in prison. When the officers ask Cora whether she wants to see him, she says that she does not mind.[303] When she comes in Lewis tries to avoid eye contact with her: "I took the chair on the other side of the table: and then, for the first time, I had to look at her"[304]. When he first heard about her in the Patemans' home he wanted to see her because of her relationship with George. However, he uses the words 'have to' now. When he first met her he felt nothing strange or fearful and did not have any negative feeling towards her. But he confesses in the prison that "I had to submerge or discipline what I felt. Going into the jail, preparing for this visit, I had been nervous. In her presence, I still was. It might have been anxiety. It might have been distaste, or hatred. But it was none of those things. It was something more like fear"[305]. As discussed in the first chapter, one cannot see evil in the perpetrators' eyes because it lies within the potential of people. For example, Adolf Eichmann did not cause anybody to die before he became an officer in the German army. Arendt observes that he looked quite dull, rather than an image of diabolical evil at his trial. This can be applied to the women in this novel as well.

These two women seem to be like everyone else in society. However, they have fantasies about ultimate freedom. Ultimate freedom or pure autonomy is regarded as the dream of evil by Eagleton. Cornford notes that

> *They had made fantasies about ultimate freedom. They had heard of people who talked about being free from all conventions; they had met people who prided themselves on not obeying any rules. They felt superior because they were breaking the rules themselves; that was not inconsistent with unconscious guilt, in fact it often went hand-in-hand with it. But they*

---

[302] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 103.
[303] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 253.
[304] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 255.
[305] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 256.

excited each other into being freer than anyone round them. They made fantasies about being lords of life and death. They thought of having lives at their mercy.[306]

He depicts the women as anarchists in the sense that they refuse any rules and want to have power over life and death. They feel superior because they feel freer than anybody else to do anything they want. One wonders, then, why the two women want to be freer than anyone else and to decide whether a child picked out at random should live or die without expecting any practical gain from it. Eagleton states that "there are times when we want to persist in an identity which we do not especially prize. It is simply that the ego has a built-in drive to keep itself intact. One can see, then, why the question of whether evil is functional or not is so ambiguous"[307].

Eagleton says that a pure act will have to be acted out just for the sake of it, thus, there is no more reason to do it than not to do it.[308] This can be observed in many aspects of the two women's actions. The first information about the event is given by Maxwell. He explains: "They played cat-and-mouse with him. He wasn't a very bright lad. They picked him up *at random,* they don't seem to have had a word with him before. They've got a hideout in the country, they took him there. They played cat-and-mouse with him for a weekend. Then they beat him to death"[309]. Because the victim was a child of only eight they could not have feared him or he could not have harmed them before. So there did not seem to be an apparent cause for the murder except murder itself. The key word here is that they picked him 'at random', which emphasizes what Eagleton means by evil's being autotelic, unintelligible and disinterested.

Lewis then asks: "why did they do it? Have you any idea why they did it?"[310]. In one sense, this attitude is a humanistic one. He wants to understand rather than demonize. Maxwell answers: "I think it was a sort of experiment. They wanted to see what it felt like"[311]. However, if Maxwell is right, it was a kind of experiment, what did they expect to find out? What were their expectations? Facing such a situation one becomes perplexed with the unintelligibility and autotelic nature of it, and wants to

---

[306] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 353.
[307] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 104.
[308] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 84.
[309] Snow, p. 236.
[310] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 238.
[311] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 238.

understand it. For example, whilst Lewis and Cora are sitting face to face in the prison, Lewis asks prosaic questions. Yet in contrast to these questions about which he does not care, he actually wants to ask questions such as "what have you done? What did you say to each other? When did that child know?...Who suggested it? Didn't you ever want to stop? Are you thinking of it now?"[312]. Lewis wants to learn how it happened because the killing does not make sense. On the one hand there are two grown-up women and on the other hand there is a child of eight whom they did not know before, they tortured and killed him. This is what makes 'evil' metaphysical, that is, its unintelligible nature.

Other characters are also curious about the reason for the murder. For example, Lewis has a conversation with Margaret who asks him what the worst part is in this horror. He answers that "I think that I'm outraged because I am so close to it. I feel it's intolerable that this should have happened to me. I believe it's as selfish as that"[313]. Then they start to talk about routine matters but Lewis reveals that

> *Just as, during my conversation with Cora Ross, so flat and banal, there had been questions pounding behind my tongue, so there were with Margaret. What did she do? What did they say to each other? What was it like to do it? For me, in the jail, for Margaret in our drawing room, those questions boiled up: out of a curiosity which was passionate, insistent, human, and at the same time corrupt. She was no purer than I was, and more ready to ask. I felt- with what seemed like a bizarre but unshakeable hypocrisy- that she oughtn't even to want to know. I didn't give her, or alternatively muffled, some of the information that I actually possessed. I showed her the reports of the committal proceedings which, although they made a stir in the press, were tame and inexplicit.*[314]

When Lewis visits Cora in the prison he feels uncomfortable and looks at his watch. When the time is over he asks if there is anything he can do for her. She asks him to deliver a message to Kitty's family, which is that "nothing was going to split her and Kitty"[315]. This message is important because it helps us to understand the character of Cora and her loyalty to Kitty. While being accused of killing a child the only thing Cora cares about is Kitty. Lewis reflects that "outside the jail, in the fresh night air, I

---

[312] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 256.
[313] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 274.
[314] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 274.
[315] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 258.

still felt the same intense relief, mixed with shame and lack of understanding"[316]. As for the shame he felt, it may be because he feels shame on behalf of humanity. As Eagleton mentions, this is also one of the most vicious thing about evil. If the perpetrators were not human beings the event would not have created either shame or a lack of understanding. He felt he could not ask any of the questions he wanted to ask, but even if she had given explanations for them he might not have felt satisfied. He felt lack of understanding because she is apparently like everybody else he knows. Besides, she is fond of Kitty and thinks about her even in jail. It is interesting to see that one who has so much compassion and love for her partner could kill a child. It only makes sense if we take into consideration Eagleton's view of evil as meaningless violence without the expectation of practical gain.

Besides causing shame and lack of understanding, the unintelligibility of evil stimulates fear as well. For example, when the police officers bring the women into the courtroom it becomes very silent as all attention focuses on them. Lewis notes: "it wasn't a natural silence. Something- not dread, more like hypnosis- was keeping us all still"[317]…As for the two women, at the beginning of the trial, Lewis recounts, "Cora's face was turned towards Kitty, with a steady undeviating glance. Kitty's glance, on the other hand, was all over the place. To say she didn't look at Cora wasn't true. She looked at everyone, her eyes darting round lizard-quick"[318]. Even if it is too early to make a judgment about their relationship, it feels like Cora is fond of Kitty while Kitty seems colder, which will be observed many times during the trial. Some in the courtroom cannot understand either the motive of the two women or the aim of the murder because they believe in people's inclination towards goodness and the superiority of reason. For example, George trusts in people as he suggests that people should live according to their natures. However, Martin says: "we'd had enough of the liberal illusions…Anyone is illusioned who doesn't get ready for the worst. If there's ever to be any kind of radical world which it's possible to live in, it's got to be built on minimum illusions"[319]. As Eagleton asserts, just as 'evil' is a parody of creation, these two women and their aimless action are a parody of the liberal illusions that attribute

---

[316] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 259.
[317] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 281.
[318] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 282.
[319] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 329.

evil to social conditions or anything else. Martin agrees with Eagleton in the face of such apparently meaningless violence.

This incident demonstrates the meaningless violence. While Eagleton is discussing the Nazis' project for the Jews he finds that their actions are meaningful when they are examined individually but there is no meaning in the overall project. That is, they kill Jews to have a pure race, but the reason why they want a pure race and their investment in this project logistically and economically does not ultimately make sense. He concludes that there is no meaning in the overall project. Similarly, it seems that there is no actual point with this murder, the women buy some instruments to torture the boy and change the car while abducting and burying him carefully. But they do not think that they are guilty despite the evidence is accounted against them. At the beginning of the trial the Clerk of the Assizes tells the prisoners: "It is alleged that you, Ross and you, Pateman, on a day unknown between September 20, 1963, and October 9, 1963, murdered Eric Antony Mawby. Ross, are you guilty or not guilty? Not guilty said Cora Ross in a hard modulated tone"[320]. At the beginning they both deny the accusation. However, Bosanquet informs the jury that

> *You will hear medical evidence that the child had been dead since approximately the time that he disappeared. You will also hear, however, that he didn't die on that first night and probably not for forty-eight hours afterwards. The pathological experts will tell you that he had received several mortal injuries, through his skull having been battered in, though with what precise implement or implements it is impossible to say. The pathological experts will also tell you that there were signs of lacerations and other wounds on his body, not connected with the mortal blows, which may have been inflicted many hours before death.*[321]

The striking thing in Bosanquet's summary of the incident is that there are signs of lacerations and other wounds which are not 'the mortal blows.' This takes the trial beyond just a murder case, to something rather more. The women did not want to kill the child in the first place, they wanted to torture him. What Bosanquet claims about the wounds are confirmed by the Home Office pathologist, Laurance McQuillin who gives his conclusions after examining the child:

---

[320] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 283.
[321] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 287.

One definite conclusion was that the boy's body showed two types of injury. The first type was wounds which could not have caused death and which had, with reasonable certainty, been inflicted some considerable time before the death. These wounds included lacerations on the back, buttocks and thighs. The exact number could not be decided. Well over twenty. There were also cuts on the breast and groin. A number of burns on the upper arms and shoulders. Not less than ten. Marks on the ankles and wrists…None of these injuries had any connection with the victim's death.[322]

As indicated, they did not kill the boy immediately. One wonders, then, how the two women could, systematically and without anger, torture the boy. They tortured him systematically because they used different methods to cause lacerations, cuts and burns, which did not have any connection with his death. It appears that the two women were seeking annihilation for the sake of it under the influence of the death drive. The final step was to kill him, thus feeding themselves on the human carnage as discussed by Eagleton. The murder can also be explained:

As the philosopher John Rawls writes 'what moves the evil man is the love of injustice: he delights in the impotence and humiliation of those subject to him and relishes being recognized by them as the author of their degradation. Evil is pure perversity.[323]

McQuillen also notes in court that "there was no trace of this blood on the inside of his clothes. Thus he must have received the body wounds some time before: possibly, and in fact probably, over a period of hours: presumably while he was naked"[324]. It is common practice in torturers to force victims to take off their clothes to humiliate them as if they were animals instead of human beings. Thus the torturers see themselves as self-righteous while torturing them. It may also be claimed that the fact that the victim is naked and tortured may remind the two women of human vulnerability. As Eagleton claimed, evil cannot stand finite things including human weakness. This may be one of the reasons the two women killed the boy after they had tortured him for two days. McQuillen continues:

He was killed by multiple head injuries, multiple fractures of the skull. There had been seven blows, and possibly more. Any one of several blows

---

[322] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 319.
[323] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 94.
[324] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 319.

would have been sufficient to cause death. One group of five had been delivered by something like a heavy poker or iron bar. The others, by a solid, obtuse, weighted surface, such as the anterior wooden portion of an axe-handle. Nothing bleeds so copiously as the scalp.[325]

If the women had any purpose for killing him, their method appears excessive. They could have killed him in a less severe way. As Eagleton discusses, evil continues to live by deflecting the destructiveness of existence on to others, and thus, they take obscene pleasure from suffering.[326] At this point, Lewis reflects that "I was remembering Auschwitz. To these two, I did not say much more than the name"[327].

Subsequently, Lewis continues to refer to Auschwitz:

While we watched those films (about Auschwitz), we had, as well as being appalled felt a shameful and disgusting pleasure. It was almost without emotion, it was titillating, trivial and (just as when Margaret asked me questions in our drawing room) seepingly corrupt. We were fascinated (the sensation was as affectless as that) because men could do these things to other men. The wretched truth was, it had been the same in the court room that afternoon. Not only in us, but in everyone round us. But it was enough to know it for ourselves.[328]

What Lewis calls 'disgusting pleasure' Eagleton calls 'obscene enjoyment' when he refers to the god Dionysus, the god not only of milk and honey but also of blood. On the one hand he is life-giving and on the other hand he takes pleasure from destruction. Even as Lewis feels appalled by images of Auschwitz, he takes a 'disgusting pleasure' in them.

In McQuillen's account of the murder, there had been at least seven blows and only one of them would have been necessary to kill the child. The reason for so many blows seems to be that the two women resign control of their bodies to their will, that is, to the death drive which is relentless. As Eagleton suggests, annihilation is a kind of purity. They do not expect any practical gain because evil has an autotelic nature as mentioned before. Eagleton explains that "even self-interest is set aside- for the damned are in their own twisted way entirely disinterested, eager as they are to bring themselves

---

[325] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 320.
[326] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 115.
[327] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 390.
[328] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 326-7.

low along with the rest of creation. The death drive is a deliriously orgiastic revolt against interest, value, meaning, and rationality"[329]. Moreover, if they do have any kind of purpose to their action, their methods are excessive. Bosanquet comments that the boy "suffered wounds on his body, according to expert judgment, many hours before death. These body wounds were healing when he was finally beaten to death by at least seven blows on the head, probably with something like a poker or a metal bar and also with a wooden implement"[330].

At the cottage, Detective-Sergeant Cross notices a small metal object pushed into a corner of a shelf. This seems like an angle joint that may belong to a Meccano set, so he asked the women to explain why it was there. "Miss Pateman said or screamed something across to her companion something like, though no one can be definite about the exact words. 'You blasted fool!'"[331]. While Cora denied that it belonged to them, Kitty explained that it was a present they had forgotten to deliver on time. The police then searched for the bill for the purchase of a Number One Meccano Set dated on September 18 last year, which was, as Bosanquet points out "two days before Eric's disappearance. The shop assistant who had made this transaction was visited at her home. She was able to remember the purchaser as someone answering to the description of Miss Ross"[332]. All the evidence is coherent pointing to Bosanquet's cause.

When kidnapping the child, the two women used a different car. The police found the owner of the car and asked him about the women and the date when they had borrowed it. He answered: "Not September, much earlier, more like July. Miss Ross just said they might want to borrow it sometime, she wanted to be sure that it was available. When they brought the car there back seemed to be a lot of mud on the number plate, although it was a sunny weekend"[333]. This shows that they planned the deed literally several weeks before. This removes the possibility that they might have killed him out of some hysteria or madness, but rather that the two women did the murder intentionally. As discussed, intention is one of the criteria to label a deed or a person as evil.

---

[329] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 109.
[330] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 297.
[331] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 292.
[332] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 292.
[333] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 299.

Seeing that the two women planned to borrow the car literally weeks before, Bosanquet concludes that "their domestic planning was far-sighted and full of common-sense. There were exchanges about insurance policies and savings. Altogether they had been more competent than most young married couples"[334]. They argued that their car was in the garage for repair. However, the garage manager reveals in an interview that "she (Cora Ross) could have put it right in ten minutes. She was a first class mechanic herself"[335]. The buying of objects to torture the boy and changing the car in order not to reveal themselves make sense when each is considered individually but they do not make sense in an overall picture, seeing that they do not have a purpose.

In terms of purpose, as discussed above, Eagleton considers evil as a purposeful action taken in the name of a condition which is not purposeful itself.[336] This can be clearly observed in this situation. For example, after all the evidence against them, they give up denying that they kidnapped the child, and give a reason for it. Bosanquet points out that "Miss Cora and Miss Ross had for some time past wanted to have a child alone, by themselves, to be in control of. She gave a reason for this desire. They wanted to teach it to behave"[337]. If they believed they had a convincing reason to kidnap him, then their action can be claimed to have a purpose, but there was no point teaching him how to behave. In this respect, Eagleton likens evil to a game in the sense that there are purposes/duties in a game one wants to fulfill but they are ultimately pointless. In this particular context, how could they know that he needed to learn how to behave since he was picked out at random, and from where did they assume the right to impose their will on someone else's child? Their purpose is not in balance with their action. At this point, Eagleton also posits that reason and freedom are closely related, in that one cannot save oneself from the crime one has committed by explaining it. Eagleton evaluates this kind of explanation as a 'grisly' rationality.

After his interview with the women, Maxwell declares:

> *Miss Pateman told me, we wanted to teach him to behave. She told me again, we had to teach him to behave…She said we gave him three aspirins*

---

[334] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 403.
[335] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 300.
[336] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 104.
[337] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 296.

and a glass of milk before he went to bed…On the Sunday, she did tell him, they had been obliged to be strict. But they had let him look at television at Sunday tea-time. 'What sort of condition was he in then, I asked her, but she never replied.[338]

The questionable point is why they saw this 'teaching activity' as an obligatory task they had to fulfill. When they say they were 'obliged to be strict', it is as though they did not want to behave as they did. Later, the two women also explained their torture of the boy as a punishment. This exemplifies what Eagleton means by angelic and demonic faces of evil. That is, on the one hand they wanted to teach him, which exemplifies the angelic face of evil because it looks full of meaning, on the other hand they tortured him severely, which exemplifies the demonic face of evil because it is devoid of meaning.

As Eagleton asserts, evil is often both meaningful and meaningless at the same time. What the women recounted about the event may not seem reliable because they lied on many occasions at the beginning of the trial. However, nobody knew what their secret plans were and how exactly they tortured, and killed the boy, except for the only eyewitness, who is now dead. Bosanquet argues: "all I need say is that this has been proved to be a deliberate, calculated, premeditated crime. That is enough"[339]. When Maxwell asks Kitty about the Sunday night he hears that "she didn't know, or seemed to have forgotten, what had happened on the Sunday night"[340]. However, they do not say that they did not kill him, either. They are aware of the fact that the boy was killed and buried but they claim not to remember how it happened.

In Eagleton's discussion of evil , it is the influence of one's will that is important in labelling one as good or evil, rather than the effect of hereditary factors on evil actions. For example, after he loses the sight of one eye, Lewis wonders if Charles will inherit this: "Once, when young Charles was conceived, I thought it might be beyond my limit if the genes had gone wrong, if he were born to a suffering one could do nothing about"[341]. As Lewis mentions one cannot do anything if one gets something good or evil through heredity because it is beyond one's control. This, in turn,

---

[338] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 336.
[339] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 298.
[340] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 337.
[341] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 177.

invalidates some features that are included in evil actions such as 'intentionality' and 'free will'.

Furthermore, to claim that one does something because of one's own will, one should be sane. That is, one should be aware of what one is doing and one should still want to do it. This is why the judge and other characters in the novel want to be sure that the two women are not mad. What psychiatrists and lawyers say about the mental condition of the two women will be given in detail now. It is important to show they are sane and they did what they have done consciously because, in a sense, the more sane they are the more evil they will be. That is, if they are not found to be mad, their action can only be explained by their being evil. Besides, their being sane makes their action more appalling, more meaningless and more purposeless.

Firstly, Bosanquet gives information about the two women:

> *So far as is known, Eric had not spoken to either of them before the evening of September 20. He may have never seen them before. There is evidence, however, that they had seen him. These two young women share a room in the house of Miss Pateman's parents. They have also, for two years past, rented a cottage in the country, where they have been accustomed to go at weekends…It may sound as though Miss Ross and Miss Pateman were living a luxurious life. It might remind you that they were each drawing good salaries, Miss Pateman as a secretary, Miss Ross as a trained clerical worker. They had left school with their O-levels, Miss Pateman with seven and Miss Ross with four, and in the normal run of things they were regarded as valuable employees whose security wasn't in doubt. For two years past they had been able to run a car, a Morris saloon. As it happens, that car had its own part, a negative but finally a significant part, in the story of Eric's disappearance.*[342]

From the outside, they look like very ordinary people and, even more, they lead a comfortable life compared to most people. They left school with good results and are good employees. Their performance in their working lives suggests a stable mental condition. Bosanquet gives information about the two women in a detailed way because he aims to show the women are of more than average intelligence.[343]

---

[342] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 288.
[343] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 289.

Then Bosanquet recounts the interviews with the women. He starts with the first one which was on October 6, namely three days before Eric's body was found, when "they were both calm and cooperative. They expressed themselves as horrified by the disappearance and anxious to help. They denied any knowledge of the boy, but were very willing to account for their movements in the weekend of September 20-22"[344]. Their behaviour suggests they were playing a game, and feeling very confident in themselves as they were willing to account for what they had done at the weekend. Bosanquet elaborates about the next interview: "They were not as cooperative as at the first. They refused to discuss the repairs to the car, and after a while refused to answer further questions"[345]. While Bosanquet sets out the evidence, Cora is looking at Kitty who starts to write notes for her solicitor. Kitty looks anxious while Cora looks fondly at Kitty and does not show and offer interest. Bosanquet clarifies: "The corpse of the child was found by dogs of Mr. Coe by chance on 19 October. It didn't take them long to find the body of Eric Mawby- although the grave was fairly deep and had been carefully prepared"[346]. Evidently, every movement of the two women was planned and executed with care. From this, it is obvious that they were aware of what they had done. Yet from the interviews, it seems that they showed no remorse. The reason why they do not show remorse can be explained by the view that evil does not seek salvation through remorse because if this is so they must give up any obscene pleasure from what they have done as Eagleton mentions. That is, remorse would invalidate their action.

Mrs. Pateman describes her daughter as having "such nice ways with her when she tries, Kitty has…And she often did good things for people. She was always free with her money, Kitty was. Her father used to tell her off about that. But it went in one ear and out of the other"[347]. She does not say that Kitty could not have done something like that in contrast to her husband who denied the accusation as soon as he heard it. Perhaps because she knows Kitty better than her husband does. It can be deduced from what Mrs. Pateman says that her daughter led a normal[348] life but did not listen to her

---

[344] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 290.
[345] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 291.
[346] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 287.
[347] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 271.
[348] Using 'normal' may not be the most appropriate word here. However, it does not mean to judge them and assuming one way of life superior to other. It is intended to mean 'not different from everyday or usual one'.

father, rather she did what she wanted. Mrs. Pateman continues that "she always kept herself to herself, even when she was a little girl. She had her secrets and she never let on what they were. I didn't handle her right, of course. I didn't. She was the clever one. She's got more in her head than the rest of us put together"[349]. As indicated, Mrs. Pateman mentions that she is clever and does not utter a negative word about her daughter's mental condition. Mrs. Pateman does not mention anything about Cora.

Mrs. Pateman gives another account of her daughter at the end of the trial. Lewis sees Mrs. Pateman who asks when they will let her daughter out. In response, Lewis tells her that the women will not be released until people are satisfied that they will not be danger to anyone else.[350] Mrs. Pateman responds that "she won't be, they needn't vex themselves about that. I'm not saying anything for her, she's done whatever she's done. But she's got her head screwed on, has Kitty. She'll be careful, she won't let the police get hold of her again"[351]. In other words, she does what she wants according to her will and she will be careful not to get into trouble with the police. If she had not done the action consciously, in her right mind, for example, or if she had done it under the influence of a part of her she could not control, or if she were mad, she would not be able to control herself in future either.

A similar account is given by Cora. When Lewis visits Cora after the trial she tells him that "we shan't do anything like that again. Why should we?"[352]. However, the question should be why they did it in the first place. They are sane enough to want to preserve their own lives and to avoid getting into trouble in future. Besides, after the trial, she wants to be put into solitary confinement in the prison. Maxwell concurs with her in that other prisoners may assault her. Lewis notes that "Cora was making a rational choice in opting for solitary. It showed that she has thought out how to preserve her own life"[353]. This is another important example supporting their mental stability.

Only George thinks that Cora and Kitty are mad. But his reason for this does not seem reliable. While he and Lewis are talking about possible results of the case, Lewis argues if the women are found to be mad they will not have to go to prison. Following

---

[349] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 271.
[350] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 343.
[351] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 343.
[352] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 455.
[353] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 452.

that, George replies: "of course, they must be mad"[354]. Lewis objects and asks why he thinks so. George replies: "I'm assuming they've done what you say. No sane person could have done it. That's all"[355]. George goes on: "it's as easy as that. They're criminal lunatics, that's what they are. Only lunatics could behave as they did. They're nothing to do with the rest of us"[356]. George does not ask anything about the murdered boy, and he is apparently not interested in the cause of it. Having almost immediately denied responsibility for his niece, he now concludes that she is mad. His emphasis on madness is because it is hard to explain this case. He is aware of the fact that the two women can be saved, that he too can be saved from the responsibility of his niece's action, provided that they are found to be mad. In addition to this conversation, while George was talking about his niece to Lewis he told him that he did not notice anything special and did not mention her mental condition.

Martin wants to believe that the women are mad and asks for Lewis's view about it. Lewis gives quite a long answer to this question:

> *I'm not certain what madness means. All I can tell you is, no one round them thinks they're mad…I am certain of one thing. In most ways, they feel like everyone else. The girl Kitty is in pain. She can't get comfortable, she's just as harassed as any other woman with sciatica having to sit there under people's eyes. I'm certain they wake up in the morning often feeling good. Then they remember what they've got to go through all day. It had been like that when I had the trouble with my eye. The moments of waking: all was fine: and I saw the black veil. I said that in the existential moments tonight, as they ate their supper and sat in their cells, they must be feeling like the rest of us. The horror is that they are human.*[357]

Neither Martin nor Lewis can grasp what has happened. While Lewis is undecided about the definition of madness he regards the two women like everybody else in many ways. The thing he cannot reconcile is how human beings can do such actions. If they were found to be mad, reconciliation would be easier. Martin asks about the women's chance for a diminished responsibility plea. Lewis comments: "it would be easier, of

---

[354] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 251.
[355] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 251.
[356] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 252.
[357] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 330.

course, for their families. It would be easier for George, it would save some pain"[358].
Martin adds that "it would be easier for everyone"[359]. What Lewis implies is that it will
be discomforting to see human beings in such an incomprehensible situation which can
be defined a brutal truth about human nature.

Dr. Adam Cornford is called to give evidence about the mental condition of the
women:

> *Miss Ross was in intelligence well above the average of the
> population. She was not in any recognized sense psychotic. She had some
> marked schizoid tendencies, but not to a psychotic extent. A great many
> people had schizoid tendencies, including a high proportion of the most able
> and dutiful citizens. Those tendencies were often correlated with obsessive
> cleanliness and hand-washing, as with Miss Ross…Schizophrenia was an
> extreme condition, which Miss Ross was nowhere near, and she was no
> more likely to be afflicted by it than many young women of her age.[360]*

Dr. Cornford explains that even the most able and dutiful citizens have schizoid
tendencies but they do not commit such evil crimes, which suggests that Cora could
have refrained from committing the crime. Benskin, one of the lawyers for the
defendant, asks Dr. Cornford whether her personality is disturbed, and he replies "I
should say that"[361]. Benskin asks whether the relationship between these two women is
an abnormal one. Cornford does not consider 'abnormal' to be the right word and
clarifies that "the two young women found each other; they responded to
complementary needs, they were driven to escape from unsatisfactory environments.
Very soon they began to live in a private world. A private world with their own games,
rules, and fancies"[362]. Knowing that nobody will accept the women are insane, Benskin
is trying to show that the two women have some abnormalities.

After Cornford, Matthew Gough, a Home Office Consultant who has been
working in these kinds of courts for several years shares his observations about the
women: "they had shown no detectable signs of mental disorder. Some slight

---

[358] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 331.
[359] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 331.
[360] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 348.
[361] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 348.
[362] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 351.

abnormality, perhaps, nothing more. Medically, their encephalograms were normal"[363]. Additionally, he remarks that "their behaviour was not much different, or not different at all, from other prisoners held on serious charges"[364]. Consequently, he does not see their responsibility as impaired. In response, Benskin protests that "weren't those opinions subjective, wasn't it difficult or impossible even for an expert to be absolutely certain about some mental conditions?"[365]. He may be right but he does not react in the same way when Adam Cornford claims that the two women's responsibilities are impaired. The different psychiatrists do not share a consensus among themselves. For instance, Gough believes that neither Cora's lonely upbringing nor Kitty's breaking up with a married man can be taken as causes for what they did.[366] Eagleton notes that

> *If people who maim and exploit really do not know what they are doing, to borrow a celebrated line from the New Testament, then they are no doubt morally mediocre rather than utter scoundrels. Even if they only partly grasp the significance of what they are up to, or know exactly what they are doing but regard it as indispensable for some honourable end, they are perhaps not beyond the pale. I say 'perhaps' because Stalin and Mao murdered for what they saw as an honourable end, and if they are not beyond the moral pale then it is hard to know who is.[367]*

It has been proved with the evidence about the two women's mental condition that they know what they have done. The conditions in which they live may have influenced or caused some disturbences in them, but they cannot be beyond the pale.

During the interviews with the women, Gough learns that

> *They were prepared to describe in detail, almost hour by hour, how they planned to kidnap the boy. They told me about what happened at the cottage and how they brutalized him. But they wouldn't go beyond the Sunday afternoon. Miss Pateman said they had finished punishing him by then. Neither of them at any time gave any account of how they killed him.[368]*

Kitty explains the torture as punishment, but they claim to have forgotten the time of the murder, which is regarded by Gough to be common among murderers. They accept that

---

[363] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 372.
[364] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 373.
[365] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 374.
[366] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 377.
[367] Eagleton, *On Evil*, p. 145.
[368] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 377.

they brutalized the child, which was proved by the evidence at the trial, even though they claim that they do not remember how they killed him. They may be lying because they lied many times at the trial. For example, Lewis tells that "as Kitty lied and weaved her answers in and out, most of us were as undecided as when we heard her first word"[369]. However, even if they were lying again, their confession about kidnapping and torturing is compatible with the evidence.

When Kitty goes into the witness box Lewis notes that "much of the time I, along with other observers, was certain that she was acting"[370]. No matter how much he claims that she is acting, one cannot be sure since he may have misinterpreted her behaviour or his own emotions. But he supports his view later. He gives an account of Kitty's evidence:

> *She had told the psychiatrists, but not everything, because she got flustered, and she didn't like to mention that she had heard voices. Yes, voices when she was eighteen that she thought someone was managing to produce in her radio set, tormenting her. Or perhaps taking charge of her, she didn't know at the time: she was frightened, she thought she might be going 'round the bend' or else something special was happening to her.*[371]

After listening to her, he notes that "she was mimicking the wrong kind of breakdown. If she were ever going to become deranged - or ever had been - it would be in a different fashion"[372]. He is convinced that she is lying and just acting. She attempts to show that she is mad, which ironically reveals that she is not mad. Lewis also wonders why she has not seen a doctor about this until now: "she had not at any time during this period considered consulting a doctor? She had been working effectively at her job, and living her life as usual in the room at home and out at the cottage?"[373].

When Kitty is in the witness box, Bosanquet asks when they first made plans to kidnap a child. She responds that "I was saying, we might have talked about catching hold of one for a little while, we talked about all sorts of things, anyone can make a suggestion"[374]. She acts very carefully and cautiously. Bosanquet asks her about books

[369] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 415.
[370] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 411.
[371] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 412.
[372] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 413.
[373] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 414.
[374] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 414.

she has read as she claims that she reads a lot. For example, she says that she reads Albert Camus. Bosanquet asks what she gets out of Camus. She hesitates and states that "oh, they go to the limit, don't they, I like them when they go to the limit"[375]. Lewis notes

> *I was now sure that she had been bluffing: somehow she had brought out a remark she had half-read. But it gave Bosanquet an opening. He didn't know about Camus, but he did know that she wanted to show how clever she was. Hadn't she enjoyed showing how clever she was- when they were planning to capture the child? Hadn't she felt cleverer than anyone else, because she was sure that she could get away with it? She had said a good deal to her counsel about being 'different' and 'special'- wasn't that a way of proving it?*[376]

Dr. Cornford and the defence lawyers claim that the two women have some abnormalities and they should not be held responsible while Bosanquet and the prosecution psychiatrists find the two women to be responsible for their actions claiming that they did it as a free choice instead of being under the influence of some abnormalities. Then, Lewis asks

> *Who had a free choice? Did any of us? We felt certain that we did. We had to live as if we did. It was an experiential category of our psychic existence…We had to believe that we could choose. Life was ridiculous unless we believed that. Otherwise there was no dignity left- or even no meaning. And yet- we felt certain we could choose- were we just throwing out our chests against the indifferent dark? We had to act as if it were true. As if. Als/ob. That was an old answer. Perhaps it was the best that we could find.*[377]

Lewis claims that people should believe in the existence of free will otherwise life will be devoid of meaning. In the situation of the two women free will plays an important role as they could have chosen to act differently.

Since one evaluates whether something is evil or not according to the presence of free will then, as Eagleton believes, it can be claimed that there cannot be evil actions without evil people. The judge thinks more or less the same way be stating that "I don't

---

[375] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 417.
[376] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 417.
[377] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 426.

believe in evil. But I certainly believe in evil people"[378]. A person becomes evil when s/he chooses to do something evil. In short, if there is an evil action there should be an evil person. Similarly, an evil person necessitates free will which brings responsibility with itself. For example, about responsibility, the judge says to his friends during the lunch break that "we are responsible for our actions, aren't we? I'm just deciding whether to have another gin or tonic. Eliot, if you give me five pounds on condition that I don't have one, I'm perfectly capable of deciding against"[379].

Although Benskin accepts the case is appalling, he argues that the two women were not responsible for their actions:

> *We now wish to prove to you that, while they were agents for killing, Miss Ross and Miss Pateman were not responsible for their actions in the sense that you and I would be, if we performed such actions…The Clause 2 from Homicide Act 1957. Persons suffering from diminished responsibility. He shall not be guilty if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility…You will notice that the definition is wide.*[380]

Benskin does not deny the murder but wanted to evade responsibility by claiming that they were suffering from a mental abnormality. The definition may be wide but the fact that the two women had healthy minds and free wills presupposes responsibility.

When George first hears about the event he reflects that "I ought to have kept more of an eye on them, I grant you. But the last two or three years, since my health went wrong, I've rather gone to pieces"[381]. He must be thinking that the action was caused because of his negligence of Cora as he claims that, if he could have kept an eye on them and looked after them they might have not done this deed. But, after the suspicions turn out to be true, he definitely refuses any responsibility either for Cora or for Kitty. He loses his temper while he is defending himself because this is a big responsibility to bear. On the other hand, because of the fact that they are grown-ups

---

[378] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 410.
[379] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 407.
[380] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 346.
[381] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 209.

and have their own free will, it is unclear how far George really should feel responsible for the murder.

At the end of the trial the judge tells the jury

I want you to put the nature and details of this crime out of your consideration. You are concerned only with whether these women are, or are not, fully responsible. It would be the same question, and the same problem, if they had committed some quite minor offence, such as stealing half a dozen pairs of stockings or a suitcase. It would be the same problem.[382]

The last phase is to decide whether they are responsible or not. The judge is objective in that he asks the jury to evaluate the case without including their feelings towards the child or his family and to ignore the gravity of the offence while judging the responsibility of the two women. The jury returns with their verdict which is 'guilty' for both of the women. The Judge asks the women whether they object to the verdict of the jury and hears that they do not. He declares that "the sentence is a statutory one, and it is that you, and each of you, be sentenced to imprisonment for life"[383].

Lewis reflects that:

Whenever we made attempts to loose ourselves, that confined us. And yet, in brutal terms, it also saved us to survive. Reason. Why had so much of our time reneged on it? Wasn't that our characteristic folly, treachery, or crime? Reason was very weak as compared with instinct. Instinct was closer to the aboriginal sea out of which we had all climbed. Reason was a precarious structure. But, if we didn't use it to understand instinct, then there was no health in us at all. Margaret said she had been brought up among people who believed it was easy to be civilized and rational. She had hated it. It made life too hygienic and too thin. But still, she had come to think even that was better than glorifying unreason. Put reason to sleep, and all the stronger forces were let loose. We had seen that happen in our own lifetimes. In the world: and close to us. We knew, we couldn't get out of knowing, that it meant a chance of hell. Glorifying unreason. Wanting to let the instinctual forces loose. Martin said anyone who did that either hadn't much of those forces within himself, or else wanted to use others' for his

---

[382] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 429.
[383] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 434.

own purpose. And that was true of private leaders like George as much as public ones.[384]

As Lewis says, if human beings' characteristics are folly, treachery, or crime it is expected that they cannot always act according to reason. Instinct is seen to be stronger than reason because people can live instinctually. As for reason, they have to learn to live according to it. Lewis advocates understanding instinct by using reason instead of glorifying reason or pretending that instinct can be easily tamed. Concurring with Margaret, he does not believe that it is an easy task to civilize people by reason. However, he prefers this when compared to glorifying unreason. He believes that putting reason to sleep and letting instinct loose does not make society an ideal place to live.

After the trial, neither Martin nor Lewis can shake off the effect of what has happened. As Martin says "it was wrong to forget. We had forgotten too much. This was the beginning of illusions. Most of all of the liberal illusions. False hope was no good. False hope, that you hold onto by forgetting things"[385]. Martin considers forgetting as the beginning of liberal illusions, because they attribute evil to social factors and think that it can be removed by better conditions. However, as Eagleton says "evil is the dark shadow that the light of Reason cannot banish. It is the joker in the cosmic pack, the grit in the oyster, the out-of-place factor in a tidy world"[386]. If one considers evil in this sense one cannot forget this case.

In contrast to Martin, Lewis reflects that

Political memory lasted about a fortnight. Legal memory lasted about a day after a trial. You had to forget in order to get along. It made men more enduring: it also made them more brutal, or at least more callous. One couldn't remember one's own pain (I had already forgotten, most of the time, about my eye), let alone anyone else's. In order to live with suffering, to keep it in the here-and-now in one's own nerves, one had to do as the contemplatives did, meditating night and day upon the Passion: or behave like a Jewish acquaintance of Martin's and mine, who, before he made a speech about the concentration camps, strained his imagination, sent up his

---

[384] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 445.
[385] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 444.
[386] Eagleton, *On Evil,* p. 132-33.

blood-pressure, terrified himself, in confronting what, in his own flesh, it would be truly like.[387]

Eagleton regards forgetting as a necessary element for the advance of civilization, because civilizations are established on great evils. At this point, Lewis is right to say that 'you have to forget to get along'. On the other hand, he claims that people become more brutal if they forget the past. Lewis also implies that forgetting is inevitable because he claims that people even forget their own pain let alone others'. In order not to forget, one should force oneself day and night to remember. Victims remind people of justice by their very existence. People can live in the world aware of the existence of evil and then they try to live accordingly, for example, they can control the death drive. Otherwise, it is not intended to say that one should remember evil day and night, which is not possible for human beings. For example, not long after Lewis's father dies, his nephew Pat gets married. Despite the fact that Lewis and Martin are sorry about him, they feel happy at the wedding and enjoy themselves without thinking about their father:

> *Whatever could be more natural? I meant an old man dies, his grandson gets married: after all that we had said, and felt, in this alcove a few weeks before, we were back in the flow of things. It mightn't be very grand: there was the splendid, of which we had seen a little, there was the hideous, of which we had seen enough: yet this was neither, it was what we lived in, in order to endure.*[388]

In conclusion, it can be deduced that Eagleton's views on evil shed light upon C. P. Snow's *The Sleep of Reason*. Eagleton's debate about freedom, will and responsibility is balanced in the novel with the emphasis on the two women's mental condition. That is to say, Eagleton labels one evil on condition that one does it by one's free will consciously. In the novel, before the judge decides whether the two women are responsible for their evil crime he insists on being sure that they are sane. Furthermore, while he mentions the rare category of evil, Eagleton's emphasis on the aimlessness, the search for annihilation without an apparent cause, and the autotelic nature of evil prove to shed light upon Snow's *The Sleep of Reason*. That is to say, there are two sane women who kidnap a child

---

[387] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 367.
[388] Snow, *The Sleep of Reason*, p. 481.

picking out *at random*. They allege that they kidnap him to teach to behave. They torture him about two days then kill him. They explain the torture as a punishment for the child. This event can also be explained by Eagleton's perception of evil instead of the traditional views on it.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, Terry Eagleton's perception of evil has been studied to see to what extent his views on evil shed light upon the novel *The Sleep of Reason* by C. P. Snow. While studying Eagleton's perception of evil *On Evil* has been used as a critical example. Besides, his other books in which he has previously explored the concept of evil such as *Sweet Violence: A Study of Tragic* (2003), and *After Theory* (2003), *Holy Terror* (2005), and *Trouble with Strangers: A Study of Ethics* (2008) have also been referred in the second chapter. Eagleton's views on evil, especially his discussion about 'a rare category of evil', are different from the traditional views on evil. The evil available in this novel is exemplified by this rare category of evil, besides Eagleton's other views on evil. Thus, *The Sleep of Reason* has been studied to see if Eagleton's perception of evil is applicable to it and if so, to what extent it sheds light upon it.

In order to make such a complicated subject more understandable firstly, the etymology of evil has been studied. Then, different dictionary meanings from different sources have been introduced and it has been noticed that there is not a clear cut definition of evil but there are a few common aspects on which critics, philosophers and theologians agreed. For instance, evil can be defined as intolerable and foreseeable harm including some other features. Subsequently, the difference between evil and other related words such as 'wrong', 'bad', 'wicked' and 'sin' has been illuminated. Thus, besides the different definitions, studying differences between evil and mentioned words has helped us understand the term clearly. Beside the differences, the distinctive features of evil have been grouped and discussed briefly under six items such as intolerable harm, intentionality, senseless destruction, unintelligibility, aimlessness and personally satisfying respectively. Furthermore, types of evil have been discussed as moral evil which is caused by human will and natural evil which is caused by nature.

The changing attitudes towards evil have been taken into consideration afterwards. Chronologically speaking, the understanding of evil by the Ancients have been discussed, briefly referring to the philosophers and the religious movements of the time. Then, there are different suggestions about the origin of evil, that is, how it first occurred. The suggestions about it have been grouped under the two headings; the first one takes human centred suggestions as the cause of origin, which includes free will and

freedom, the free choice of Adam and Eve, Pandora's box, and Nietzsche's narration of slaves' revolt. The second one is that evil is caused by factors independent from human beings' control, which include the limited nature of human beings as a cause and heredity factor. Next, the psychoanalytic approach to evil has been considered referring especially to Jung, followed by a discussion of religious attitudes towards evil under the subtitle 'Evil in Religion'. The changing attitudes towards evil in polytheistic and monotheistic religions have been compared and it has been observed that both groups of religions have established views on the war between good and evil. Finally, the banality of evil in twentieth century has been discussed by referring to Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. She coined this term in order to refer to people not the actions. The actions are still evil but the actors are ordinary people and commit their evil deed for simple reasons. For example, it is to obey the orders of Third Reich in the case of Eichmann.

In the second chapter of the thesis, Eagleton's views on evil with reference to *On Evil* have been analyzed. The three parts of the book (*Fictions of Evil*, *Obscene Enjoyment* and *Job's Comforters*) have been studied in detail. In the first part of the book, the *Fictions of Evil*, examples from selected literary works such as *Pincher Martin*, *Brighton Rock*, Leverkhün's Music in *Doctor Faustus* have been discussed. Besides, the relationship between evil and the death drive, freedom, destructiveness, responsibility, and influence have been studied. In the second part of the book, *Obscene Enjoyment*, Eagleton's introduction of 'a rare category of evil' has been introduced. It is a very special category of evil because of its autotelic nature. That is, it is the only reason for its existence and it has a view in itself. In this context, he has analyzed the witches in *Macbeth*, Iago in *Othello* and the case of the Nazis, among others.

After he has introduced it, he reconsiders the selected literary works discussed in the first part of the book. If this category of evil, which occurs without any apparent reason, is credited with the criterion of labelling one as evil the characters discussed in these literary works cannot be considered as evil because they have not done their actions without any apparent reason. In contrast, they all have reasons for their actions. For example, Pincher Martin uses his body and others' bodies to survive. Then, Eagleton suggests that these characters are evil but with different natures. That is, both

Pincher Martin and the witches in *Macbeth* are evil but in different categories. In the last part of *On Evil* entitled *Job's Comforters*, theodicy, which means a justification of the ways of God, has been discussed in order to answer the questions like can theodicy be considered as an answer to the existence of evil or is it a weak theory to explain evil in the world? Besides theodicy, the defence of free will, the big picture argument and the necessity of evil for character building are refuted by Eagleton in that they are counted too weak to justify evil in the world. By refuting these views as an account for evil Eagleton strengthens his view that the existence of evil is autotelic, that is, it happens without any apparent reason. In short, the third part seems to be written to support what he has written in the second part.

After giving a brief synopsis of *The Sleep of Reason*, Eagleton's views have been analyzed and the difference between instinctual and learned behaviour is mentioned with examples from the novel. Knowing the difference between instinctual and learned behavior is important in the sense that one should be aware of the difference in order to decide what evil is. If something is instinctual it becomes free from responsibility. Besides, the influence of external factors on people has been discussed. To know the difference mentioned above and the influence of external factors on people have been discussed to see to what extent the two women are responsible for what they have done. Learning this is important before discussing whether Eagleton's perception of evil sheds light upon *The Sleep of Reason* because Eagleton asserts that one can be labeled as evil only when s/he does it out of her/his own will.

In the novel, some of the psychiatrists and the defence lawyers allege that bad experiences in the lives of the two women have a big impact in their actions. But this is refuted by Eagleton's view claiming that people cannot live free from influences. Besides bad experiences, George is accused of being a bad influence on the two women because he mentions the ultimate freedom to them. Like George, Cora is considered a bad influence on Kitty by Mr. Pateman and Dick. At this point, Eagleton emphasizes the role of free will in doing an action. Eagleton's focus on freedom and will have been discussed with many examples because, in order to be labelled as evil, actions should come from one's free will. That is, the action should be done from choice instead of instinct. The emphasis on their mental condition is important because, in order to talk about freedom and will, one should be sane. So different psychiatrists and their attitudes

towards the two women have been given in detail to explore whether they are sane and have acted consciously.

The features of Eagleton's rare category of evil are exemplified in many ways in the novel. For example, the two women's abduction of the child randomly is an example of the motivelessness of evil. The fact that they do not expect anything from this incident is an example for the disinterestedness of evil, and also an example of its unintelligibility. Related to the disinterestedness, it also reveals that evil is done without expecting a practical gain. Thus, it has a view in itself. The two women explain that this abduction was in order to teach the boy to behave. This exemplifies the angelic and the demonic faces of evil. That is, they seemingly had a good purpose but what they had was the tortured corpse of the boy at the end. This event can be counted as an example of evil done in the name of a condition which is purposeless. That is, it seemingly has a purpose but there is no point in this purpose itself. Their torture also exemplifies the meaningless violence evil causes.

That the two women torture systematically and kill a child at the end a child suggests the two women are under the influence of the death drive because they seek for meaningless violence endlessly by taking obscene pleasure from it. They do not stop until they kill the boy. Apart from these, other features in Eagleton's understanding of evil have been discussed and seen to be helpful in understanding and analyzing *The Sleep of Reason.* So, it can be deduced that Eagleton's views on evil shed light upon C. P. Snow's *The Sleep of Reason* in terms of both explaining this event and the two women. This event can also be explained by Eagleton's view of the features of evil but not by the traditional ones.

REFERENCES

Adams, M. M., "Ignorance, Instrumentality, Compensation, and the Problem of Evil", *SOPHIA* (2013) 52:7–26, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012, Springer.

Agamben, G., *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, (Electronic Version), Stanford University Press-Stanford, California 1998.

Akdağ, Ö., *Kötülük Problemi ve Özgür İrade Savunması*, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Ankara Üniversitesi-Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Bölümü-Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara 2006.

Allen, J. G., "Evil, Mindblindness, and Trauma", *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 77(1), 2007, Taylor and Francis, 9-31.

Amstutz, J., "Origin and Types of Existentialism", *The Journal of Religion*, 41(4), 1961, Jstor, 248-262.

Anderson-Gold, S. and Muchnik, P., (Ed.), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

Aron, L. ve ABPP, "The Tree of Knowledge: Good and Evil: Conflicting Interpretations", *Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives*, 15(5), 2005, 681-707, Taylor and Francis.

Arslanoğlu, İ., *Mevlana'nın Aşk ve İnsan Felsefesi,* Date of Access: 13.02.2013, w3.gazi.edu.tr

Bales, K., "Slavery and the Human Right to Evil", *Journal of Human Rights*, 3:1, 2004, 53-63, Taylor and Francis.

Baourakos, J., "Deadly Persuasions: Encountering an Ethics of Objection, Cruelty, and Terror in Shakespeare's Macbeth, Othello, and Richard III", *Evil in English Literature Proceedings*, British Council, İstanbul 2002.

Bataille, G., *Literature and Evil,* (1957), (Çev.: Alastair Hamilton), Marion Boyars Ltd., London 1993.

Beer, G., ''Richardson, Milton, and the Status of Evil'', *The Review of English Studies, New Series*, 19(75), 1968, 261-270, Jstor.

Bejczy, I., "Tolerantia: A Medieval Concept", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 58(3), 1997, 365-384, Jstor.

Bernstein, R. J., *Radikal Kötülük, Bir Felsefi Sorgulama,* (2002), (Çev.: Nil Erdoğan-Filiz Deniztekin), Varlık Yayınları, İstanbul 2010.

Bertrand, M., "God Might Be Responsible For Physical Evil", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 87(3), 2009, 513-515, Taylor and Francis.

Bierce, A., *The Illustrated Devil's Dictionary*, Advanced Marketing (UK) Ltd, Bicester 2004.

Birmingham, P., "Holes of Oblivion: The Banality of Radical Evil", *Hypatia*, 18(1), *Feminist Philosophy and the Problem of Evil*, 2003, 80-103, Taylor and Francis.

Bohart, A. C., "The Feeling of Realness: Evil and Meaning Making", *The Humanistic Psychologist*, 30(3), 2002, 239-251, Taylor and Francis.

Brown, A., "Confronting 'choiceless choices' in Holocaust videotestimonies: Judgement, 'privileged' Jews, and the role of the interviewer", *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, 24(1), 2010, 79-90 , Taylor & Francis.

Brownell, P., "Evil, Sin, and Imperfection: Ethics in Practice", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (p. 220), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

Bryant, C. G., "The Orderliness of Disorder: Madness and Evil in Toni Morrison's Sula", *Black American Literature Forum*, 24(4), Women Writers Issue, 1990, 731-745, Jstor.

Buchholz, E. S. and Mandel, J. K., "Reaching for Virtue, Stumbling on Sin: Concepts of Good and Evil in a Postmodern Era", *Journal of Religion and Health*, 39(2), 2000, 123-142, Jstor.

Bufkin, E. C., "The Ironic Art of William Golding's The In heritors", *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 9(4), 1968, 567-578, Jstor.

Burkill, T. A., "Romanticism, Existentialism and Religion", *Philosophy*, 30(115), 1955, 318-332, Jstor.

Burris, T. C., and Rempel, J. K., "Just Look at Him": Punitive Responses Cued by "Evil", *Symbols, Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 33(1), 2011, 69-80, Taylor and Francis.

Caciola, N., "Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiology of Spirit Possession in Medieval Europe", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 42(2), 2000, 268-306, Jstor.

Calhoun, L., "We are Good and They are Evil", *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice,* 19(2), 2007, 237-245, Taylor and Francis.

Cannon, B., "Sartre and existential psychoanalysis", *The Humanistic Psychologist*, 27(1), 2010, 23-50, Taylor & Francis.

Capote, T., *In Cold Blood*, Penguin Books, England 1966.

Card, C., "Kant's Moral Exluded Middle", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnık), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

-------------, *The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil* (Electronic Version), Oxford University Press 2002.

Carel, H., "Born to be Bad: Is Freud's Death Drive the Source of Human Evilness?", Jstor.

Carus, P., *The History of The Devil and the Idea of Evil From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, The Open Court Publishing, London 1900.

Cevizci, A., *Felsefe Sözlüğü* (3. bs.), Paradigma Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1999.

Chase, W. G., *Moira, Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought,* Harper&Row Publishers, Incorporated, New York and Evanston 1963.

Cherniss, H., "The Sources of Evil According to Plato", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 98(1), 1954, 23-30, Jstor.

Cloud, D. L., "Beyond Evil: Understanding Power Materially and Rhetorically". Chapter 3: Human Evil and Human History, 531-38, 2003. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rap/summary/v006/6.3cloud02.html

Corlett, J. A., "Evil", *Analysis*, 64(1), 2004, 81-84, Jstor.

Coyle, S. M., "Responses of Narrative Practice to the Effects of Evil", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions,* (Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC,USA 2011.

Critch, R., "Principled Tyranny: Can Korsgaard Explain Evil Action?", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21(2), 2013, 277-287, Taylor and Francis.

Currie, E. P., "Crimes without Criminals: Witchcraft and Its Control in Renaissance Europe", *Law & Society Review*, 3(1), 1968, 7-32, Jstor.

Dalrymple, T., "Mr, Hyde & the Epidemiology of Evil'', *The New Criterion,* 2004, Jstor.

Davies, M., "Determinism and Evil", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 58(2), 1980, 116-127, Taylor and Francis.

Dews, P., *The Idea of Evil,* (Electronic Version), Blackwell Publishing, UK 2008.

Drees, W. B., "Nature, Science And Value, Introduction to Part I", (Ed. William B. Dress), *Is Nature Ever Evil?*, (Electronic Version), Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

Drees, W. B., "Nature, Science and Value", (Ed. Willem B. Drees), *Is Nature Evere Evil, Religion, Science and Value*, (Electronic Version), Routledge, London 2003.

Druker, J., "Ethics and Ontology in Primo Levi's "Survivial in Auschwitz": A Levinasian Reading", *Italica*, 83(3/4), 2006, 529-542, Jstor.

Duncan, S., "Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20(5), 2012, 973-991, Taylor and Francis.

Durston, K., "The Complexity of History and Evil: A Reply to Trakakis", *Religious Studies*, 42(1), 2006, 87-99, Jstor.

E. Jones, Gary, "Sartre, Consciousness, and Responsibility", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 41(1/2), 1980, 234-237, Jstor.

E. Santoni, Ronald, "Camus on Sartre's "Freedom": Another "Misunderstanding", *The Review of Metaphysics,* 61(4), 2008, 785-813, Jstor.

E. Schlosser, Markus, "Free will and the Unconscious Precursors of Choice", *Philosophical Psychology*, 25(3), 2011, 365-384, Taylor & Francis.

Eagleton, T., *On Evil,* Yale University Press, USA 2010.

-----------, *After Theory*, Penguin Books, UK 2004.

-----------, *Hayatın Anlamı,* (2007), (Çev.: Kutlu Tunca), Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul 2012.

-----------, *Holly Terror*, Oxford University Press, New York 2005.

-----------, *Reason, Faith and Revolution*, *Reflections on the God Debate*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2009. (Electronic Version).

-----------, *Reason, Faith and Revolution, Reflections on the God Debate*, (Electronic Version), Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2009.

-----------, *Sweet Violence*, Blackwell publishing, USA 2003.

-----------, *Trouble With Strangers*, *A Study of Ethics*, (Electronic Version), Wiley Blackwell Publishing, UK 2004.

Egan, Susanna, "The Drowned and the Saved: Primo Levi and Paul Steinberg in Dialogue"', *History and Memory*, 13(2), Fall/Winter 2001, 96-112, Jstor.

Ellens, J. H., "A Biblical Theology of Evil", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil VOLUME 1, Definitions and Development 1*(Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC Press, United States of America 2011.

-------------, "Evil in the Three Contemporary Abrahamic Faiths", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events*, (Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

-------------, "Introduction: Avoidance and Prevention", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions*, (Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

-------------, "Introduction: Setting the Course", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 1, Definitions and Development*, (Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

-------------, "Conclusion: Is There Really an Evil Force Out There?", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events*, (Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

Engen, J. V., "The Christian Middle Ages as an Historiographical Problem", *The American Historical Review*, 91(3), 1986, 519-552, Jstor.

Eppens, A. J., "Evil in the Time of Thomas Aquinas", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events,* (Electronic Version), (ss. 35), ABC-CLIO, LLC, USA 2011.

Erb, C., "Have you ever seen the inside of One of Those Places: Psycho, Foucault, and the Postwar Context of Madness", *Cinema Journal*, 45(4), 2006, 45-63, Jstor.

Fagg, L. W., "Evil revisited: A Physicist's Perspective", *Theology and Science*, 5(3), 2007, 233-234, Taylor and Francis.

Falconer, R., "Selfhood in descent: Primo Levi's The Search for Roots and *If This is a Man*", *Immigrants & Minorities*, 21(1-2), 2010, 202-230, Jstor.

Fisher, R. N., "The Catheter of Bilious Hatred", (Ed. Margaret Sönser Breen), *Understanding Evil: An Interdisciplinary Approach*, Rodopi, Netherlands 2003.

Flynn, M. B., "Andreas Kinneging, The Geography of Good and Evil: Philosophical Investigations", *Trans. Ineke Hardy*. (Ed. Jonathan Price Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2009, Taylor and Francis.

Forsyth, N., "Paradise Lost and The Origin of 'Evil': Classical or Judeo-Christian?", *International Journal of the Classical Tradition*, 6(4), 2000, 516-548, Jstor.

Foucault, M., *Deliliğin Tarihi*, (1961), (Çev.: Mehmet Ali Kıçbay), İmge Kitabevi, İstanbul 1992.

Franken, L., *Evil, Morality and Modernity*, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, Güney Afrika 2012.

Frechette, G., "Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21(5), 2013, 654-679, Taylor & Francis.

Formosa, P., "Understanding Evil Acts", *Human Studies*, 30(2), 2007, 57-77, Jstor.

Fuller, E., "C. P. Snow in Retrospect", *The Sewanee Review*, 89(2), 1981, 254-258, Jstor.

Cedric, G. B., "The Orderliness of Disorder: Madness and Evil in Toni Morrison's Sula", *Black American Literature Forum*, 24(4), Women Writers Issue, 1990, 731-745, Jstor.

Gemes, K., and Janaway, C., "Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 80, 2006, 321-357, Jstor.

Glicksberg, I. C., "The Literature of Existentialism", *Prairie Schooner*, 22(3), 1948, 231-237, Jstor.

Golding, W., *The Inheritors*, Faber Faber, England 1955.

Haklı, Ş., *Kötülük Problemi, Yaklaşımlar ve Eleştiriler*, 2002, http://www.ilafdergi.hitit.edu.tr/files/2.10.pdf

Hamilton, C., "The nature of evil a reply to Garrard", *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 2(2), 1999, 122-138, Taylor and Francis.

Hardré, J., "Sartre's Existentialism and Humanism", *Studies in Philology*, 49(3), 1952, 534-547, Jstor.

Heidegger, M., *Schelling's treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom,* (1809), (Çev.: Joan Stambaugh), Ohaio University Press, United States of America 1985.

Hernandez, J. G., "Moral Evil and Leibniz's Form/Matter Defense of Divine Omnipotence", *Springer Science+Business Media B.V.*, 2009, 49(1–13), Jstor.

Hernandez, J. G., "The Anxious Believer: Macaulay's Prescient Theodicy", *International Journal of Philosophy and Religion*, 73, 2012, 175–187, Jstor.

Hood Jr., R. W., "The Psychology of Evil", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 1, Definitions and Development*, (Electronic Version), Praeger ABC-CLIO, LLC, England 2011.

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/english/current_pdf/by%20Yahya%20Cheema.pdf.

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/culture/allanmassie/100065874/the-moors-murderers-were-evil-beyond-imagining-is-this-latest-twist-simply-ian-bradys-last-wicked-game/

http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Poetry/PopeMan.htm pope

http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/e/edmundburk377528.html burke

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/11312a.htm

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/evil?q=evil.

http://www.worldandi.com/newhome/public/2004/february/bkpub1.asp

Hvidt, N. C., *The Historical Development of the Problem of Evil*, Date of Access: 10.05.2013. http://faith-health.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Hvidt-CTNS-Final.pdf.

Ingram, V., "Evil Experienced by One Who Was There: Exodus—From Bondage to Deliverance and the Promised Land", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 1, Definitions and Development*, (Electronic Version), Praeger ABC-CLIO, LLC, England 2011.

Ireland, J., "Freedom as Passion: Sartre's Mystery Plays", *Theatre Journal*, 50(3), (IL) Legitimate Theatres, 1998, 335-348, Jstor.

Işık, İ., *Plantinga'da Tanrı ve Kötülük*, (Yüksek Lisans Tezi Felsefe ve Din Bilimleri Bölümü, Atatürk Üniversitesi-Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Erzurum 2006.

Istar, G. & Madeira, J. L.,"Introduction: The Need For an Interdisciplinary Approach to Evil", (ed. Istar Gozaydin and Jody Lyneé Madeira) *Evil, Law &State, Issiues in state power and &Violence*, Inter-Disciplinary Press, Oxford, UK 2006.

J . Band, Arnold, ''Two Travelogues: Bialik's "In the City of Slaughter" and Levi's *If This Is a Man*'', *Prooftexts*, 25(1-2), Special Issue: Kishinev in the Twentieth Century, 2005, 121-127, Jstor.

Timothy, J. W., "Sartre, Marcel, and The Flies: Restless Orestes in Search of a Café", ?

Jacques Derrida and Structural Evil, http://consumingjesus.org/wp-content/uploads/Jacques_Derrida_and_Structural_Evil.pdf

Waddell, J. A., "Biblical Notions and Admonitions on Evil in Pauline Literature", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions*, (Electronic Version), Praeger ABC-CLIO, LLC, England 2011.

James, D., "The Role of Evil in Kant's Liberalism", *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, 55(3), 2012, 238-261, Taylor and Francis.

Jones, E. G., "Sartre, Consciousness, and Responsibility", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 41(1/2), 1980, 234-237, Jstor.

Jung, C. G., (Ed. Murray Stein), *Jung on Evil*, Routledge, London 2009.

Kahn, P. W., *Out of Eden* (Electronic Version), Princeton University Press, United States of America 2007.

Kane, R., "Free Will and Responsibility: Ancient Dispute, New Themes", *The Journal of Ethics*, 4(4), Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Three Recent Views, 2000, 315-322, Jstor.

Kane, R., "Free Will and Moral Responsibility Freedom without Responsibility by Bruce N. Waller'', *Behavior and Philosophy*, 20(1), 1992, 77-82, Jstor.

Katz, A., "On 'Maelstroms Large And Small, Metaphorical And Actual': 'Gray Zones' in The Writings Of Prımo Levi", *Cultural Studies*, 13(3), 1999, 423-447, Taylor & Francis.

Keller, J. A., "The Problem of Evil and the Attributes of God", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 26(3), 1989, 155-171, Jstor.

Kiriş, N., "Tarihsel Olarak Kötülük Problemi ve Çözüm Yolu Olarak Teodise", (t.y.), Erişim Tarihi: 14 Haziran 2013, http://ateizmvedin.com/wpcontent/uploads/ 2013/04/TAR%C4%B0HSEL-OLARAK-K%C3%96T%C3%9CL%C3%9CK-PROBLEM%C4%B0.pdf

Kling, M., "Science and Government by C. P. Snow", *The Yale Law Journal*, 71(1), 1961, 182-186, Jstor.

Koning, N., "Witchcraft Beliefs and Witch Hunts An Interdisciplinary Explanation", *Springer Science+Business Media,* 24(158–181), New York 2013, Jstor.

Kraemer, E. R., "Holocaust Evils and Divine Limitations: A Re-examination", *Journal of Genocide Research*, 4(4), 2002, 569-580, Taylor and Francis.

Swartz, L. D., and Vera, L. Z., "Sartre for the twenty-first century?", *Theory and Society*, 36(3), 2007, 215-222, Jstor.

Lara, M. P., *Narrating Evil, A Postmetaphysical Theory of Reflective Judgement*, Columbia University Press, New York 2007.

Latzer, M., "Leibniz's Conception of Metaphysical Evil", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 55(1), 1994, 1-15, Jstor.

Layman, C. S., "Natural Evil: The Comparative Response", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 54(1), 2003, 1-31, Jstor.

Leilich, J., "Mind And Value Reflections on Max Weber", (Ed. William B. Dress), *Is Nature Ever Evil?*, (Electronic Version), Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

Leon, Philip, Existentialism and Metaphysics", *Philosophy*, 28(107), 1953, 342-347, Jstor.

Levin, G., "The Sadic Heroes of C. P. Snow", *Twentieth Century Literature*, 26(1), 1980, 27-37, Jstor.

Levine, M., "The Positive Function of Evil?", *Philosophical Papers*, 41(1), 2012, 149-165, Taylor and Francis.

Link, Luther, *Şeytan, Yüzü Olmayan Maske*, Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul 2003.

Louden, R. B., "Evil Everywhere, The Ordinariness of Kantian Radical Evil", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

Mathewes, C. T., *Evil and the Augustinian Tradition* (Electronic Version), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004.

Mawson, T. J., "The Possibility of a Free-Will Defence for the Problem of Natural Evil", *Religious Studies*, 40(1), 2004, 23-42, Jstor.

McGinn, C., *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, Oxford Press, New York 1997.

McLean, M., "Residual Natural Evil and Anthropic Reasoning", *Religious Studies*, 27(2), 1991, 173-188, Jstor.

Mele, A., "Moral Responsibility for Actions: Epistemic and Freedom Conditions", *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 13(2), 2010, 101-111, Taylor & Francis.

Mele, A., "Unconscious Decisions and Free Will", *Philosophical Psychology*, 26(6), 2012, 777-789, Taylor & Francis.

Midgley, M., *Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay*, Routledge&Kegan Paul plc, Boston-USA 1984.

Mills, J., "Reflections on the Death Drive", *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, 23(2), 2006, 373-382, Jstor.

Morton, A., *On Evil*, Routledge, New York 2004.

Mukadder Erkan, *Iris Murdoch: Bir Ahlak Filozofu Olarak Sanatçının Portresi*, Çizgi Kitabevi, Konya 2011.

Murphy, F. J., "Unknowable Worlds: Solving the Problem of Natural Evil", *Religious Studies*, 41(3), 2005, 343-346, Jstor.

Murray, B., *A Brief Biography of Charles Percy Snow*, Date of Access: 01.06.2014, https://www.google.com.tr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fecmd.nju.edu.cn%2FUploadFile%2F27%2F13456%2Fsnowbio.doc&ei=cZ6EU7KwAbKp7Aa8l4CIBQ&usg=AFQjCNEP73a86-jIP1MUDiwfrDAPgjOaAQ

Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J., "Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions About free Will and Moral Responsibility", *Philosophical Psychology*, 18(5), 2005, 561-584, Taylor & Francis.

Neiman, S., *Evil in Modern Thought, An Alternative History of Philosophy,* Princeton University Press, USA 2002.

Neuman, C., "The Media's Capacity for Good and Evil", *Journal of Mass Media Ethics: Exploring Questions of Media Morality*, 27(1), 2012, 73-75, Jstor.

Nicholson, M., "Alejandra Pizarnik, Georges Bataille, and the Literature of Evil", *Latin American Literary Review*, 27(54), 1999, 5-22, Jstor.

Nietzsche, F., *On The Genealogy of Morality* (Electronic Version), (1887), (Çev.: Carol Diethe), Cambridge University Press 2006.

Nietzsche, F., *Beyond Good and Evil*, Planet PDF.

No Exit and Three Other Plays By Jean Paul Sartre, (t.y.), http://teacherweb.com/FL/ReaganDoral/Prokopowicz/The-flies-27-to-69.pdf.

Oakley, B., *Evil Genes*: *Why Rome Fell, Hitler Rose, Enron Failed and My sister Stole My Mother's Boyfriend*, Prometheus Books, New York.

Hasan Ocak, *Bir Ahlak Felsefesi Problemi Olarak Erdem Kavramına Yüklenen Anlamın İlkçağ'dan Ortaçağ'a Evrimi,* Date of Access: 28.12.2013, http://www.flsfdergisi.com/sayi11/79-101.pdf

O'Connor, D., "Swinburne on Natural Evil from Natural Processes", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 30(2), 1991, 77-87, Jstor.

Openshaw, K. M., "Weapons in the Daily Battle: Images ofthe Conquest of Evil in the Early Medieval Psalter", *The Art Bulletin*, LXXV(1), 1993, Jstor.

Parussa, S., "The Shame of the Survıvor", *Journal of Modern Jewish Studies*, 7(1), 2008, 91-106, Taylor & Francis.

Pauley, J., "The Problem of Evil and the Possibility of Nihilism", *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 19(1), 2011, 95-114, Taylor and Francis.

Phillips, J., *Order from Disorder, Proclus' Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism,* , (ed. Robert M. Berchman and Jacob Neusnerp) , (Electronic Version), Leiden, Netherlands2007.

Phillips, J., "From Radical to Banal Evil: Hannah Arendt Against the Justification of the Unjustifiable, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 12(2), 2004, 129-158, Taylor and Francis.

Plantinga, A., *God, Freedom and Evil*, Harper&Row, USA 1974.

Primo Levi, *If This is a Man-The Truce*, (1958), (Çev.: Stuart Woolf), Abacus, Great Britain 1987.

Reschke, R., *Nitezsche Forschung, Jahrbuch der Nietzsche Gesellschaft,* Antik und Romantik bei Nietzsche (Elektronic Version), Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1998.

Ricoeur, P., *Evil, A Challange to Philisophy and Theology*, (2004), (Çev. John Bowden), Hampshire: Continuum, England 2007.

Roberts, D., *Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil* (Electronic Version), MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall 2006.

Rolston III, H., "Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil", (Ed. William B. Dress), *Is Nature Ever Evil?*, (Electronic Version), Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

Russell, J. B., *Lucifer, Ortaçağda Şeytan*, (1984), (Çev.: Ahmet Fethi) Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul 1999.

Russell, J. B., *Şeytan, Antikiteden İlkel Hristiyanlığa Kötülük*, (1977), (Çev.: Nuri Plümer), Kabalcı Yayınevi, İstanbul 1999.

Russell, P., "Free Will, Art and Morality", *The Journal of Ethics,* 12(3/4), The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility, 2008, 307-325, Jstor.

Sakuba, X., "The Concept of Evil in African Christian Theology", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 2, History, Global Views, and Events*, (Electronic Version), Praeger ABC-CLIO, LLC, England 2011.

Samet-Porat, I., "Satanic Motivations", *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 2007, 41(77–94), Springer.

Sanides-Kohlrausch, C., "The Lisbon Earthquake, 1755, A Discourse about the 'Nature' of Nature", (Ed. William B. Dress), *Is Nature Ever Evil?*, (Electronic Version), 2004, Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Shoshana, F., "Madness and Philosophy or Literature's Reason", *Yale French Studies*, No. 52, Graphesis: Perspectives in Literature and Philosophy, 1975, 206-228, Jstor.

Singer, M. G., "The Concept of Evil", *Royal Institute of Philosophy*, 79(308), 2004, 185-214, Jstor.

Singleton, A., "No Sympathy for the Devil: Narratives about Evil", *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, 16(2), 2001, 177-191, Taylor and Francis.

Snow, C. P., *The Sleep of Reason*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1968.

Spinelli, E., "Therapy and the Challenge of Evil", *British Journal of Guidance & Counselling*, 28(4), 2010, 561-567, Taylor and Francis.

Stansky, P., "C. P. Snow and the Struggle of Modernity by John de la Mothe; The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939 by John Carey", *A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies,* 25(3), 1993, 548-551, Jstor.

Staub, E., "The Roots of Evil: Personality, Social Conditions, Culture and Basic Human Needs", *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3, *Sage Journals*, 1999, 179-192, Jstor.

Stein, R., "Evil as Love and as Liberation", *Psychoanalytic Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives,* 12(3), 2002, (393-420), Taylor and Francis.

Stillwaggon, J., "The Problem of Propagation: Original Sin as Inherited Discourse", *Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht,* Stud Philos Educ DOI 10.1007/s11217-013-9362-7, 2013, Springer.

Stoekl, A., "What the Nazis Saw: "Les Mouches" in Occupied Paris", *SubStance*, 32(3), Issue 102: The Politics of French Literary History, 2003, 78-91, Jstor.

Stuckenbruck, L. T., "Demonic Beings and the Dead Sea Scrolls", (Ed. J. Harold Ellens), *Explaining Evil 3, Approaches, Responses, Solutions,*(Electronic Version), ABC-CLIO, LLC,USA 2011.

Robbins, S., "Metaphysical Evil", (Ed. Daniel E. Keen&Pamela Rossi Keen), *Considering Evil and Human Wickedness* (Electronic Version), Inter-disciplinary Press, Oxford- United Kingdom 2004.

Tanner, J. S., "Say First What Cause: Ricoeur and the Etiology of Evil in Paradise Lost", *PMLA*, 103(1), 1988, 45-56, Jstor.

Tenorio, E. H., "The Discourse of Good and Evil in 20th Century Speeches", (Ed. Daniel E. Keen and Pamela Rossi Keen), *Considering Evil and human Wickedness,* Inter-disciplinary Basım, Oxford- United Kingdom 2004.

Timothy, J. Williams, "Reflection, Reason, and Free Will", *Philosophical Explorations: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Mind and Action*, 10(1), 2008, 77-84, Taylor & Francis.

Trakakis, N., "Is Theism Capable of Accounting for Any Natural Evil at All?", *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 57(1), 2005, 35-66, Jstor.

Tufts, C. S., "Shakespeare's Conception Of Moral Order In Macbeth", Jstor.

Tulloch, D. M., "Sartrian Existentialism", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 2(6), 1952, 31-52, Jstor.

Inwagen, P. V., "When is the Will Free?", *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 3, Philosophy of Mind and Action Theory, 1989, 399-422, Jstor.

Inwagen, P. I., "How to Think about the Problem of Free Will", *The Journal of Ethics*, The Metaphysics of Moral Responsibility, 12(3/4), 2008, 327-341, Jstor.

Venkataraman, A., "Understanding How Religion Becomes Evil", *Strategic Analysis*, 31(1), 2007, 193-201, Taylor and Francis.

Ventegodt, S., Andersen, N. J., and Merrick, J., "The Life Mission Theory V. Theory of the Anti-Self (the Shadow) or the Evil Side of Man", *The Scientific World Journal,*3, Scientificworld, 2003, 1302–1313, Jstor.

Verinakis, T., "The (un)civilizing Holocaust: From the Colony to the Lager", *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 14(1), 2008, 53-62, Taylor & Francis.

Vilhauer, B., "The Scope of Responsibility in Kant's Theory of Free Will", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 18(1), 2010, 45-71, Taylor & Francis.

Völker, S., "Response To Mary Midgley's 'Critıcizing The Cosmos", (Ed. William B. Dress), *Is Nature Ever Evil?*, (Electronic Version), 2004, Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Watson, G., "The Future in Your Bones: C. P. Snow (1905-80)", *The Hudson Review*, 54(4), 2002, 595-602, Jstor.

Werner, C., *Kötülük Problemi*, (Çev. Sedat Umran), Kaknüs Yayınları, İstanbul 2000.

Wetzel, J., "Moral Personality, Perversity, and Original Sin", *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 23(1), 1995, 3-25, Jstor.

Wild, J., "Existentialism as a Philosophy", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 57(2), 1960, 45-62, Jstor.

Wilson, A., "Evil in the English Novel", *The Kenyon Review*, 29(2), 1967, 167-194, Jstor.

Wood, A. W., "Kant and the Intelligibility of Evil", (Ed. Sharon Anderson-Gold and Pablo Muchnik), *Kant's Anatomy of Evil*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

www.oxforddicitonaries.com

Yasa, M., *Eflatun'da Kötülük Problemi*, Date of Access: 05.02.2013, http://dergi.ilahiyat.omu.edu.tr/English/DergiArama.aspx?Turu=True&Kelime =Metin%20YASA.

Yasa, Metin, *Tanrı ve Kötülük*, Elis Yayınları, Ankara 2003.

You've Got To Change Your Evil Ways: The Limits On Forgiving Evil, (t.y.), Date of Access: 16.02.2013. http://inter-disciplinary.net/ati/Evil/Evil%208/white% 20paper.pdf

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler	
Adı Soyadı	Sevcan AKÇA
Doğum Yeri ve Tarihi	Gaziantep - 10.02.1988
Eğitim Durumu	
Lisans Öğrenimi	Atatürk Üniversitesi
Y. Lisans Öğrenimi	Atatürk Üniversitesi
Bildiği Yabancı Diller	İngilizce, İtalyanca, Almanca
Bilimsel Faaliyetleri	
İş Deneyimi	
Stajlar	
Projeler	
Çalıştığı Kurumlar	Bingöl Üniversitesi
İletişim	
E-Posta Adresi	
Tarih	