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THE IMMIGRANT QUESTION IN FRANCE: FORMATION OF CLASS FRACTIONS FROM ANTI-COLONIAL STRUGGLES TO URBAN RIOTS

PHD THESIS

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIS: *Armée islamique du salut*
BPS: *Bloc populaire sénégalais*
CCCS: *Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham*
CFCM: *Conseil français du culte musulman*
CGT: *Confédération générale du travail*
CORIF: *Comité de réflexion sur l'islam en France*
ENA: *Étoile nord-africaine*
ESF: *European Social Forum*
FIS: *Front islamique du salut*
FLN: *Front de libération nationale*
FN: *Front national*
FNMF: *Fédération nationale de musulmans de France*
GCC: *Gulf Cooperation Council*
GIA: *Groupe islamique armé*
HLM: *Habitation à loyer modéré*
INED: *Institut national d'études démographiques*
INSEE: *Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques*
MB: *Muslim Brotherhood*
MNA: *Mouvement national algérien*
MTA: *Mouvement des travailleurs arabes*
NPA: *Nouveau parti anticapitaliste*
PDG: *Parti démocratique de Guinée*
PS: *Parti socialiste*
UJM: *Union des jeunes musulmans*
UMP: *Union pour un mouvement populaire*
UOIF: *Union des organisations islamiques de France*

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RÉSUMÉ

Ce travail propose deux thèses principales : premièrement, il affirme que les problèmes discutés très souvent aux débats publics en France en ce qui concerne les immigrés issus des pays maghrébins et sub-sahariens ainsi que leurs descendants de deuxième et troisième générations peuvent être évalués sous la rubrique de la « question immigrée ». En soutenant cette affirmation, il ne se limite pas par la définition légale de l'immigré dans la loi française qui le prend au sein d'un cadre plus étroit. Selon cette loi, les descendants des immigrés nés en France métropolitaine sont considérés comme des citoyens et pas comme des immigrés. Ce travail, par contre, approche aux immigrés et aux leurs descendants, sans regarder leur statut de citoyenneté, sous la même catégorie sociale d' « immigré » à travers le phénomène de transmission culturelle parmi les générations. Deuxièmement, il argumente que la question immigrée en tant que telle ne dérive pas essentiellement des particularités du modèle français républicain ni de la formation sociale française mais du mode de production capitaliste qui *implique* ces types de particularités, et que la question, par conséquent, a un profond caractère de classe en ce qui concerne les immigrés et leurs descendants qui sont dans le cadre de cette étude.

Dans ce plan, on a commencé en examinant les émeutes des banlieues de 2005 qui constituent le dernier et le plus efficace maillon des émeutes urbaines depuis des celles de Minguettes en 1981. Les émeutes de 2005 sont particulièrement importantes car elles portent les multiples aspects de la question immigrée et elles les jettent tous à la fois dans le débat public français afin d'être discutés depuis 2005. Nous avons d'abord mis au point les dynamiques « visibles » et « profondes » des émeutes de 2005 et cela nous a conduit à réexaminer une vaste littérature émergée surtout après les émeutes par même les universitaires et les figures politiques. Nous avons réalisé une revue des comptes sur les émeutes selon leurs points de vue et leurs positions déterminées par les motifs politiques, académiques ou l'ensemble de ces deux. Cependant, comme nous avons eu l'intention de montrer, un des problèmes

principaux dans ce vaste champ de recherche est le manque d'une telle approche qui s'en tient à une « théorie unitaire » qui saisirait la « totalité » des phénomènes reliés à la question immigrée qui sont éparpillés à tel point qu'ils sont examinés très souvent comme s'ils étaient indépendants les unes des autres. Alors nous avons proposé une « théorie unitaire » et accentué l'importance de la notion de « totalité » comme une tentative pour un état des lieux. Cette tentative est aussi strictement liée avec notre deuxième thèse où nous affirmons que la question immigrée dérive de mode de production capitaliste car les implications de cette question ne sont pas limitées à un modèle particulier de gouvernementalité (française) ou une formation sociale (française) mais les différentes versions de la question sont déjà existantes sous différents modèles et en différentes formations sociales. Dans ce sens, le mode de production capitaliste constitue un « fond » commun pour tous ces différents modèles et formations sociales qui sont déterminés par ce fond commun sous différentes conditions historiques propre à chaque pays afin de leur fournir différents modèles et formations sociales.

Déterminer le mode de production capitaliste comme la notion primaire pour un examen sur la question immigrée implique les rapports de production et de l'exploitation spécifiques à ce fond commun. De cette perspective, ces rapports de production et de l'exploitation nécessitent une approche à la question à travers une étude sur le caractère de classe des immigrés (et de leurs descendants) qui sont dans le cadre de notre travail. Pourtant et avant tout, il était impératif pour nous d'exposer ce qu'on veut dire avec le concept de « classe » pour la raison que ce concept, même en sciences sociales en général et au marxisme en particulier, engendre plusieurs conceptions, définitions et interprétations de classe qui varient dans une large gamme. Pour cette raison, nous avons réalisé une discussion théorique sur classe où nous avons exposé notre conception basée sur la séparation de l'économique et du politique au capitalisme, la critique des théories qui attribuent « autonomie » à la politique, l'unité contradictoire de production et de réalisation du travail surplus, et les expériences de classe surgissant des rapports de production afin de s'étendre vers le domaine du « non-économique » où apparaît le rôle de la culture ou l'identité. En suivant ce trajet, on a indiqué que les immigrés d'origine maghrébine et subsaharienne et leurs descendants en particulier se forment une fraction distincte dans la classe ouvrière en France. A l'objectif de montrer la formation de ces fractions de classe, on a d'abord examiné le processus actuel et contemporain de la

production et l'appropriation du travail surplus lors de la phase de production. Pourtant, cela ne s'agit qu'une seule face de médaille qui reflète les expériences de classe que subissent les fractions de classe des immigrés. Etant donné que les immigrés sont subjugués à la logique de l'échange inégal sous les conditions du marché de travail régné par la loi de valeur, nous avons dû remonter à la source des lignes historiques dans quel processus se formèrent les rapports de l'échange inégal. Cette obligation nous a emmené de nous plonger dans l'histoire coloniale de France étant donné que les immigrés et leurs descendants en question sont issus des géographies où la France avait établi une administration coloniale pendant bien longtemps. Et c'était de ces pays décolonisés dans ces géographies-là que la migration de travail se tira son origine afin de s'écouler vers le territoire français surtout dans les années 1960 et 1970.

Dans la formation des fractions de classe des immigrés, l'histoire coloniale trouve son importance pas seulement en raison d'être les origines historiques des rapports de l'échange inégal qui va de pair avec un processus de dépossession des populations indigènes et celui de leur prolétarisation ultérieure. Les forces « économiques » des classes capitalistes, qui ont trouvé de vastes opportunités pour l'accumulation du capital dans les colonies, sont soutenues par les forces politiques et militaires de la « grande puissance », y compris la France. Néanmoins, cette présence à la fois « économique » et « non-économique » dans les colonies n'était pas immunisée aux éventuelles résistances indigènes, insurrections armées ou bien luttes ouvrières, bref, les luttes anticoloniales dans l'ensemble. En plus, le caractère politique de ces luttes organisées d'en bas n'était pas du tout sans vision à long terme : mouvements intellectuels au caractère politique comme *al-Nahda* ou panafricanisme ont impact à la fois sur le Maghreb et l'Afrique subsaharienne. Les luttes anticoloniales qui ont ouvert la voie vers la décolonisation à la fin des années 1950 et aux années 1960 en Afrique sont profondément influencées et inspirées par ces mouvements. Ce qui est importante, peut-être, c'est que leurs impacts sur la formation d'identité propre aux populations indigènes ont été transfusés d'une génération à une autre afin d'être manifeste sur le territoire français qui était devenu une des plus importantes destinations de la migration de travail issue des ces anciennes colonies.

La formation des fractions de classe des immigrés a ainsi récupéré à travers la migration de travail ses conditions concrètes de la vie quotidienne avec les espaces sociaux de banlieues sur le territoire français. Les travailleurs immigrés dans les années 1960 et 1970 ont inondé ces espaces sociaux, et depuis la crise économique des années 1970 et tout au long du processus de désindustrialisation dans les années 1980 et 1990, ces immigrés se sont de plus en plus concentrés dans les banlieues des grandes villes comme Paris et Lyon. D'autre part, la période suivant la crise des années 1970 a vu une réorganisation du capitalisme sous néolibéralisme en déclenchant les phénomènes comme insécurité sociale, précarisation et chômage intensifiés qui ont principalement frappé, parmi les autres, les descendants d'immigrés. Mais les conditions qui se détériorent n'ont pas été limitées à la sphère économique ; au plan social et politique, ces conditions sont accompagnées par le racisme, exclusion sociale, discrimination et autres, qui ont prédominé comme les réactions hostiles contre les multiples identités propres aux fractions de classe des immigrés. Quant aux immigrés, à l'autre côté de la médaille, vis-à-vis leurs conditions dans leurs vies quotidiennes (y compris les lieux de travail) et en portant le poids historique sur leurs épaules, la formation des fractions de classe des immigrés a évolué de plus en plus vers une nature antagonique aux caractéristiques dominantes de la formation sociale française et du républicanisme français. Les néologismes des africanismes pour les immigrés d'origine subsaharienne en particulier et l'islam pour les immigrés d'origine maghrébine en particulier ont tout ensemble dominé la formation culturelle et identitaire dans l'espace social de banlieue tandis qu'ils étaient en relation constante avec les caractères de classe des immigrés.

Selon ce travail, les explosions comme les émeutes de 2005 sont des expressions politiques militantes de caractères de classe des immigrés qui ont formé des fractions dans la classe ouvrière causées par leurs expériences de classe et leurs consciences sociales façonnées tout au long d'histoire et transfusées tout au long des générations comme la culmination de ces expériences. Cependant, ce travail aussi indique que leur conscience sociale n'est pas catégoriquement « émancipatrice » pour la raison que leurs vies quotidiennes ne sont pas immunisées à l'aliénation. Au contraire, leurs vies quotidiennes préparent le terrain pour le constant mouvement de l'aliénation et de désaliénation. L'évolution de néologismes d'africanismes d'une part et les phases de l'islamisation en France d'autre part soulignent ce fait de

manière critique. Dans ce cas, la question immigrée curieusement se replie aux dépens des immigrés leurs-mêmes. L'extrême droite qui est en ascension non seulement en France mais aussi en Europe prend « avec succès » à sa derrière les vents du racisme, de l'islamophobie, de la xénophobie et autres, déclenchés par la « criminalisation », « violence » et surtout les récents attentats terroristes. Dans telles circonstances, la question immigrée nécessite une stratégie minutieusement élaborée pour l'émancipation non seulement limitée au contenu politique le plus étroit mais en son contenu social avec le mouvement des forces sociales des immigrés.

ABSTRACT

This study has basically two theses: first, it claims that the problems that often come into the public debate in France related to the immigrants issued from the countries of the Maghreb and Sub-Sahara and to their descendants of second and third generations can be identified under the rubric of 'immigrant question'. It does not rely upon the narrower legal definition of immigrant in the French law which accepts most of the descendants as French citizens and not as immigrants on the grounds that they were born on the French soil; instead, regardless their legal status of citizenship, it approaches the immigrants and their descendants under the same social category of immigrant through the phenomenon of cultural transmission between generations. Second, it claims that the immigrant question as such derives not essentially from the peculiarities of the French Republican model and the French social formation but from the capitalist mode of production which *implies* those peculiarities, and that the question, accordingly, has in fact a profound class character as regards the immigrants and their descendants that are in the scope of this study.

In that scheme, we first started with examining the 2005 French *banlieue* riots which constitute the last and most influential link of riots since the Minguettes riots in 1981. They are especially important for they borne the many aspects of the immigrant question and threw them all at once into the French public debate so as to be discussed ever since 2005. A special focus on the 'visible' and 'profound' dynamics of the 2005 riots led us to reviewing a vast literature emerged both among scholars and public and political figures especially after the riots. We reviewed the accounts on the riots according to their points of view and stances which are taken either politically or scholarly or both. However, as we intended to show, one of the main problems in this vast field of study is the lack of such an approach that sticks to a 'unitary theory' which would grasp the 'totality' of the phenomena related to the immigrant question that are scattered around even so much so that they are

elaborated often independently from each other. Hence, we proposed a 'unitary theory' and emphasized on 'totality' as an attempt for *état des lieux*. This attempt was tightly in relation to our second thesis, which claimed that the immigrant question derives from the capitalist mode of production, since the implications of the question are not limited to a particular (French) model of state governmentality or (French) social formation but its different versions are already at stake under different models and in different social formations. The capitalist mode of production, in that sense, constitutes a 'common ground' for all such different models and social formations, which are determined by this ground under different historical conditions peculiar to each country so as to give birth to different models and social formations.

Determining the capitalist mode of production as the primary notion for a focus on the immigrant question implies the relations of production and exploitation that are specific to this common ground. Therefore, these relations of production and exploitation necessitated approaching the question by examining the class character of the immigrants (and their descendants) that are subject to our study. Yet, above all, it was imperative for us to expose what was understood with the concept of 'class' for the fact that both in social sciences in general and in Marxism in particular, the concept of class has given birth to numerous class conceptions, definitions and interpretations varying in a wide range. For that reason, we made a theoretical discussion on class in which we exposed our conception relying on the separation of the economic and the political, criticism of the theories attributing 'autonomy' to politics, contradictory unity of production and realization of the surplus labor, and the class experiences that arise from the relations of production so as to extend towards the domain of the 'non-economic' in which appears the role of elements like culture or identity. Following this trajectory, we claimed that the immigrants particularly of Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan origins and their descendants form distinct class fractions within the working class in France. In order to show the formation of these class fractions, we first examined the actual and contemporary process of production and appropriation of their surplus labor in the phase of production. Yet, this was only one side of the medal reflecting the class experiences that immigrant class fractions undergo. Given the fact that immigrants are subjugated to the logic of unequal exchange under the conditions of labor market reined by the law of value, we had to trace back the historical lines in which process

the relationship of unequal exchange has been formed. This obligation forced us to delve into the depths of French colonial history as the immigrants and their descendants in question are issued from the geographies where France had established a colonial rule for many decades, and it was the decolonized countries in these geographies that the labor migration originated from so as to flow through the French soil especially in the 1960s and 1970s.

The colonial history is of much importance in the formation of immigrant class fractions not only due to being the historical origin of the relationship of unequal exchange which went hand in hand with a process of dispossession of the indigenous populations and their eventual proletarianization. The 'economic' forces of capitalist classes, which found vast opportunities in the colonies for the accumulation of capital, were backed by the political and military forces of the great powers, including France. However, this both 'economic' and 'non-economic' presence in the colonies was not immune to possible indigenous resistances, armed insurgencies, or working-class struggle, in short, anti-colonial struggles as a whole. Moreover, the political character of these struggles organized from below was not shortsighted at all: in the long term, intellectual currents having political character, *al-Nahda* and pan-Africanism had impacts on both the Maghreb and Sub-Sahara. Anti-colonial struggles that paved the way towards decolonization in the late 1950s and 1960s in the African continent as a whole were profoundly influenced from and inspired by these currents. Perhaps more importantly, their impacts over the formations of culture peculiar to the indigenous populations have been transfused from one generation to another so as to become apparent on the French soil, which became one of the most important destinations of the labor migration from these former colonies.

The formation of immigrant class fractions has thusly retrieved through labor migration its concrete conditions of everyday life on the French soil with the social spaces of *banlieues*. The immigrant workers of the 1960s and 1970s have flooded these social spaces, and since the economic crisis of the 1970s and throughout the process of deindustrialization in the 1980 and 1990s, they have been increasingly concentrated in the *banlieues* of the great cities like Paris and Lyon. On the other hand, the period following the crisis of the mid-1970s has seen the reorganization of capitalism under neoliberalism giving rise to phenomena like intensifying social

insecurity, precarization and unemployment which primarily hit, among others, the descendants of immigrants. But the deteriorating conditions have not been limited to the economic sphere; on the social and political planes, these were accompanied by racism, social exclusion, discrimination and the like, which prevailed as hostile reactions against multiple identities peculiar to the immigrant class fractions. As for immigrants on the other side of the medal, *vis-à-vis* the conditions in their everyday lives (including their workplaces) and carrying the historical burden on their shoulders, the formation of immigrant class fractions has evolved more and more antagonistic to the dominant characteristics of the French social formation and to the French Republicanism. Neologisms of Africanisms especially for the immigrants of sub-Saharan origin and Islam especially for the immigrants of Maghrebian origin have altogether dominated the formation of culture in the social spaces of *banlieues* while being in constant relation with the class character of the immigrants.

According to our study, explosions like the 2005 *banlieue* riots are militantly political expressions of the class character of these immigrants who have formed fractions within the working class due to their class experiences and their social consciousness shaped throughout history and transfused throughout generations as a culmination of these experiences. Yet, this study also points out that their social consciousness is not categorically 'emancipatory' for the fact that the everyday lives are not immune to alienation. On the contrary, their everyday lives in the social space set the stage for the constant movement of alienation and disalienation. Evolution of the neologisms of Africanisms on the one hand and phases of Islamization in France on the other hand critically underlines this fact. So being, the immigrant question curiously folds into itself at the expense of the immigrants themselves. The rising far-right politics not only in France but also in Europe 'successfully' takes behind the winds of racism, Islamophobia, xenophobia and the like, triggered by 'criminalization', 'violence', and especially recent terror attacks. In such circumstances, the immigrant question necessitates a thoroughly elaborated strategy for emancipation not only limited to the narrower political content but in its social content with the movement of the social forces of immigrants.

ÖZET

Bu çalışma temelde iki tez ortaya koyuyor: öncelikle, kökenleri Mağrip ve Sahra-altı ülkelerinde bulunan göçmenlerin ve ikinci ve üçüncü nesil göçmen çocuklarının alakalı olduğu, Fransız kamuoyunu da sıklıkla meşgul eden problemlerin "göçmen sorunu" olarak nitelendirilebileceğini ileri sürüyor. Bunu yaparken de, büyük ölçüde Fransa topraklarında doğmuş oldukları için, göçmen çocuklarını vatandaş olarak gören Fransız hukukunun daha dar bir çerçevede kabul ettiği göçmen tanımıyla sınırlı kalmayacağını söylüyor. Bunun yerine, hukukî anlamda vatandaşlık durumlarına bakmaksızın, hem göçmenlere hem de göçmen çocuklarına, kuşaklar arasındaki kültürel aktarım üzerinden, bir sosyal kategori olarak göçmenlik temelinde yaklaşmayı öneriyor. İkinci olarak, göçmen sorununun esasen Fransız Cumhuriyet modelinin ve toplumsal formasyonunun özgüllüklerinden değil, bu özgüllükleri *ihtiva eden* kapitalist üretim biçiminden kaynaklandığını, ve, buna uygun olarak, göçmen sorununun, çalışmamızı ilgilendiren göçmenler ve göçmen çocukları bakımından, gerçekte bir sınıf karakteri taşıdığını ileri sürüyor.

Bu çerçevede, öncelikle, 1981'deki Minguettes ayaklanmalarından bu yana süregelen ayaklanmalar silsilesinin son ve en etkili halkası olan 2005 banliyö ayaklanmalarını inceleyerek çalışmamıza başladık. 2005 ayaklanmalarının bilhassa önemli oluşu, göçmen sorununun birçok yönünü taşımasından ve bunları bir bütün olarak bir anda, 2005 yılından bu yana tartışılagelecek şekilde, kamuoyunun gündemine bırakmasından ileri geliyor. Öncelikle 2005 ayaklanmalarının "görünür" ve "derin" dinamiklerine özel olarak odaklanmamız, bizi daha sonra, özellikle de ayaklanmalar akabinde hem akademisyenlerin hem de politik figürlerin ortaya çıkardığı oldukça geniş bir literatürün taranması görevine sevk etti. Burada, ayaklanmalar hakkında yapılan muhasebeleri, politik, akademik veya her ikisinden kaynaklanan bakış açılarına ve pozisyonlara göre inceledik. Bununla birlikte, göstermeye çalıştığımız üzere, bu geniş çalışma alanındaki temel sorunlardan bir tanesi, göçmen sorunuyla alakalı olguların "bütünlüğünü" yakalayacak bütünlükçü

bir teoriye bağlı kalan yaklaşımların eksikliği olarak karşımıza çıkıyor. Bu sebeple de, sorunla alakalı olgular, çoğu kez, ortaya saçılmış ve dağınık bir hâlde bulunuyor, birbirlerinden bağımsızlarmışçasına inceleniyor. Bu sebeple, bu çalışmada bütünlükçü bir teori önerdik ve "bütünlük" mefhumunun önemini vurguladık. Bu vurgu, aynı zamanda, göçmen sorununun kapitalist üretim biçiminden kaynaklandığını ileri süren ikinci tezimizle de sıkı bir ilişki içindedir. Zira göçmen sorununun içerimleri yalnızca (Fransız) devlet yönetim biçimiyle veya toplumsal formasyonuyla sınırlı değildir, bunun ötesinde sorunun başka versiyonları farklı siyasal modeller ve farklı toplumsal formasyonlarda da hâlihazırda ortadadır. Bu anlamda, kapitalist üretim biçimi, bütün bu farklı siyasal modeller ve toplumsal formasyonlar için bir "ortak zemin" oluşturmaktadır. Ve bütün bu farklı siyasal modeller ve toplumsal formasyonlar, her ülkeye özgü olan farklı tarihsel şartlar altında ortaya çıkmak üzere, bu ortak zemin tarafından belirlenmiştir.

Kapitalist üretim biçimini göçmen sorununa odaklanmak üzere birincil mefhum olarak belirlemek, bu ortak zemine özgü olan üretim ve sömürü ilişkilerini ihtiva etmek anlamına geliyor. Öyleyse, bu üretim ve sömürü ilişkileri, soruna yaklaşırken, çalışmamızın konusunu oluşturan göçmenlerin (ve göçmen çocuklarının) sınıf karakterlerini incelememizi gerektiriyor. Burada, her şeyden evvel, "sınıf" kavramıyla bizim tarafımızdan ne anlaşıldığını ortaya koymak zorunlu oldu; zira sınıf kavramı, hem genel olarak sosyal bilimlerde, hem özel olarak Marksizm'de, geniş bir yelpazede yer alan birçok sınıf kavrayışına, tanımına ve yorumuna yol açmıştır. Biz de bu sebeple sınıf hakkında teorik bir tartışma gerçekleştirdik; bu tartışmada kendi kavrayışımızı, kapitalizmdeki "iktisadi-olan" ve "siyasal-olan" ayrışması, siyasete iktisattan "özerklik" atfeden teorilerin eleştirisi, artı emeğin üretilmesi ve gerçekleştirilmesinin çelişkili birliği, ve üretim ilişkilerinden doğan ve buradan kültür ve özdeşlik gibi unsurların rolünün ortaya çıktığı "iktisadi-olmayan"ın alanına yayılan sınıf deneyimleri temelinde geliştirdik. Bu yolu izleyerek, bilhassa Mağrip ve Sahra-altı kökenli göçmenlerin ve göçmen çocuklarının, Fransa'daki işçi sınıfı içerisinde ayrıksı bir sınıf fraksiyonu oluşturduğunu öne sürdük. Bu sınıf fraksiyonlarının oluşumunu gösterebilmek için, ilk önce, üretim safhasındaki mevcut ve yürürlükte olan artı emeğin üretilmesi ve artı emeğe el konulması sürecini inceledik. Ne var ki, bu yalnızca göçmen sınıf fraksiyonlarının içinden geçtiği sınıf deneyimlerinin yansıdığı madalyonun bir yüzüydü. Göçmenlerin değer yasasının hükmettiği emek pazarı şartlarında eşitsiz

mübadelenin mantığına maruz kaldıkları gerçeği göz önüne alınacak olursa, eşitsiz mübadele ilişkisinin oluştuğu süreçteki tarihsel çizgileri gerisin geriye izlememiz gerektiği ortaya çıktı. Bu zorunluluk da bizi Fransız kolonyal tarihinin derinliklerine dalmaya mecbur etti. Zira mevzubahis göçmenler ve göçmen çocukları Fransa'nın uzun bir dönem boyunca kolonyal yönetim tesis ettiği coğrafyalardan çıkıp gelmişlerdi, ve bu coğrafyalarda kolonyal yönetimden kurtulan ülkeler bilhassa 1960'lar ve 1970'lerde Fransız topraklarına akıp gelecek olan ucuz emek göçünün kaynağı idiler. Öte yandan bu dönem, bir taraftan kolonyal emperyalizmin sonunu ilân ederken, diğer taraftan eşitsiz mübadele ve bunun ortaya çıkardığı eşitsiz gelişme olguları sebebiyle, aradaki sürekliliği söz konusu edecek şekilde, neokolonyalizm adı verilen bir çağın da habercisiydi.

Kolonyal tarihin göçmen sınıf fraksiyonlarının oluşumu bakımından arz ettiği büyük önem yalnızca bunun yerli halkların mülksüzleştirilme ve nihayetinde proleterleşme süreciyle kol kola ilerleyen eşitsiz mübadele ilişkisinin tarihsel kökeni olması durumundan kaynaklanmaz. Kolonilerde sermaye birikimi için büyük imkânlar edinen kapitalist sınıfların "iktisadi" kuvvetleri, aynı zamanda, aralarında Fransa'nın da yer aldığı dünyanın büyük güçlerinin siyasi ve askeri kuvvetleri tarafından da arka çıkılmıştır. Ne var ki, kolonilerdeki bu hem "iktisadi" hem de "gayri-iktisadi" mevcudiyet, olası yerli direnişlere, silahlı isyanlara veyahut işçi sınıfı mücadelelerine, kısacası, bir bütün olarak anti-kolonyal mücadelelere bağışık değildi. Dahası, aşağıdan örgütlenen bu mücadelelerin siyasal karakterinin görüş menzili hiç de kısa mesafeli değildi: el-Nahda ve pan-Afrikanizm gibi siyasal karakteri haiz fikrî akımlar, hem Mağrip'te hem de Sahra-altı'nda uzun vadede etkili oldular. 1950'lerin sonlarında ve 1960'larda Afrika kıtasının bütününde siyasal kurtuluşa giden yolu döşeyen anti-kolonyal mücadeleler oldukça derin bir şekilde bu akımlardan etkilenmiş ve esinlenmişlerdi. Belki daha da önemlisi, bu akımların yerli halkların kültürel formasyonu üzerindeki etkilerinin bir nesilden diğerine aktarılması bakımından olmuştur. Öyle ki, bunların izleri, bu eski kolonilerden kaynaklanan emek göçünün en önemli güzergâhlarından biri olan Fransız topraklarında dahi görünür hâle gelmişlerdir.

Göçmen sınıf fraksiyonlarının oluşumu, böylelikle, emek göçü vasıtasıyla, Fransız topraklarındaki gündelik hayatın maddî şartlarına banliyö adı verilen toplumsal mekânlarla birlikte kavuşur. 1960'ların ve 1970'lerin göçmen işçileri bu

toplumsal mekânlara doluştular, ve 1970 ortalarındaki iktisadî krizden bu yana ve 1980'ler ve 1990'lar boyunca süregiden sanayiden arınma sürecinde, Paris ve Lyon gibi büyük şehirlerin banliyölerinde gitgide daha fazla temerküz edildiler. Diğer taraftan, 1970'lerin ortalarındaki krizi takip eden dönemde, kapitalizmin neoliberalizm adı altında yeniden organize edildiği bir sürece tanıklık edilmekteydi. Neoliberal politikalar bu dönemde gitgide yoğunlaşan sosyal güvencesizlik, prekerleşme ve işsizlik gibi olgulara yol açarken, bu olgular en başta ve herkesten ziyade göçmen çocuklarını etkilemekteydi. Fakat, kötüleşen şartlar yalnızca iktisadî alanla da sınırlı değildi; toplumsal ve siyasal düzlemlerde, göçmen sınıf fraksiyonlarına özgü çok sayıda özdeşlik unsuruna karşı düşmanca reaksiyon göstererek ortaya çıkan ırkçılık, toplumsal dışlama, ayrımcılık ve benzeri olgu bu koşullara eşlik etti. Madalyonun öbür yüzündeki tablo ise şöyle idi: işyerlerini de içerecek şekilde gündelik yaşamlarındaki bu koşullarla karşı karşıya kalan ve omuzlarındaki tarihsel yükün ağırlığını taşıyan göçmenler açısından, göçmen işçi sınıfının fraksiyonlarının oluşumu, Fransız toplumsal formasyonuyla ve Fransız Cumhuriyetçiliğiyle gitgide daha fazla uyuşmaz bir durumu ortaya çıkaracak şekilde gelişti. Özellikle Sahra-altı kökenli göçmenler açısından Afrikanizm neolojizmleri ve özellikle Mağrip kökenli göçmenler açısından İslam, hep birlikte, banliyö dediğimiz toplumsal mekânlardaki kültürel formasyon üzerinde hâkim konuma geldiler, ve bu esnada, göçmenlerin sınıf karakterleriyle de sürekli irtibat hâlinde bulundular.

Bizim bu çalışmamıza göre, 2005 banliyö ayaklanmaları türünden patlamalar, bu göçmenlerin (ve göçmen çocuklarının) sınıf karakterlerinin militan birer siyasal ifadesidir. Ve bu göçmenler, sınıf deneyimleri ve bu deneyimlerin tarih boyunca şekillenerek ve kuşaklar arasında aktarılarak zirveye ulaştığı toplumsal bilinçleri vasıtasıyla işçi sınıfının içinde ayrıksı fraksiyonlar oluşturmuşlardır. Bununla birlikte, bu çalışma, bu göçmenlerin toplumsal bilinçlerinin kategorik olarak "özgürleştirici" olmadığına, zira gündelik yaşamlarının yabancılaşmaya bağışık olmadığına da işaret ediyor. Bir taraftan Afrikanizm neolojizmlerinin dönüşümü, diğer taraftan Fransa'daki İslamizasyon sürecinin safhaları bu hakikati ortaya koymaktadır. Bu anlamda, göçmen sorunu, göçmenlerin hilâfına olacak şekilde, garip bir biçimde kendi içine katlanmaktadır. Yalnızca Fransa'da değil aynı zamanda Avrupa'da da yükselmekte olan aşırı sağ siyasetin, "suça bulaşma", "şiddet", ve bilhassa yakın zamanda gerçekleştirilen terör saldırıları tarafından tetiklenen ırkçılık, İslamofobi, yabancı düşmanlığı ve benzeri rüzgârları "başarılı" bir şekilde arkasına

almış olması bunun göstergelerinden birisi sayılmalıdır. Bu şartlar altında, göçmen sorunu, yalnızca daha dar siyasal içerikle sınırlandırılmış bir özgürleşme stratejisini değil, fakat göçmenlerin toplumsal kuvvetlerinin harekete geçmesiyle birlikte bu stratejinin toplumsal içeriklisini geliştirmeyi gerekli kılmaktadır.

'The tradition of all the dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living.'

Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

INTRODUCTION

From urban riots to headscarf debates, from racism to recent terror attacks, the French republican system represented by the connotations of its legendary tricolor flag are apparently passing through a systemic crisis with multiple facets: it is seen through various lenses as an urban question, or as an ethno-racial or religious question, or, as we employ the term, an immigrant question. A prediction on the sequel of this crisis, on the ultimate survival or failure of French republicanism—the chef-d'oeuvre of the great bourgeois revolution—will only remain a prophecy. Yet, the crisis still continues and, despite countless academic or political efforts, it still needs new elaborations. One might ask the following questions in that respect: what is new in this study in which such expression as 'immigrant question' is employed at the title? From what scarcity does a study on the immigrant question in France emerge as an urgent need that assumes to be a contribution to actual debates related to the crisis of the French republican system? Furthermore, the term 'immigrant' itself evokes questions: who is immigrant and what does the term precisely signify? Subtitle of this study, too, invites immediate questions: What is intended with the use of 'formation' and 'fraction'? Does the study develop a unique conception of class? How do the distant geographies of colonies bind with the urban spaces of *banlieues*, and what is their relevance to the formation of (immigrant) class fractions?

All these questions that have been posed separately in fact imply a unitary character. All of them are definitely related to each other; hence their answers cannot be given separately for the fact that they are essentially intermingled. Therefore, with the title of this study, we principally propose a 'unitary theory', in Lefebvre's terms,[1] for a possible explanation of the immigrant question in France. There are many

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[1] Lefebvre writes on unitary theory as follows: 'It has to be discovered or generated the theoretical unity between the 'fields' which are considered separately, in such a way like molecular, electromagnetic and gravitational forces in physics.' Henri Lefebvre, **La production de l'espace**, Paris: Anthropos, 2000, pp. 18-9. (Also see the first chapter of this book.) Therefore, we should understand with unitary theory the attempt towards conceiving 'separate' fields within a unity as well as comprehending a phenomenon's causes and consequences in their 'totality'.

studies on the immigrant question (and its derivatives) coming from several 'fields' within social sciences. Sociologists and anthropologists, urban planners and demographers, specialists in various fields ranging from history of colonialism to contemporary political Islam and philosophers working on social theories have so far produced an immense literature on the relation between the Republic and its antagonists. Yet we are still far from maintaining a unitary theory in order to grasp the obscure aspects of the question and to comprehend it in its totality. It is due to this proposition that our study aims to be an *attempt* towards the development of a unitary theory.

The trajectory of any study claiming such an aim is essentially decisive. In that respect, militant struggles (often considered and blamed as being 'violent') of the antagonists against the Republic appear to be a suitable starting point for this trajectory. For that reason, the 2005 French *banlieue* riots, arguably the most important link of a chain of riots starting with the Minguettes riots in 1981, hold a representative place in this history. This importance is not only due to their unprecedented length or spatial expansion which spread to almost entire French soil and lasted for three weeks. Besides them, there are others: first, the riots have attracted more attention of scholars and political actors (French or internationals) than ever. Second, they specifically signify the last noticeable link of that chain of riots compressed in roughly 25 years: after 2005, these riots have ceased to be the object of shocking images from the *banlieues* as presented in the mainstream media. Of these two, the first one points at the historical development of the reasons and dynamics of riots and of the immigrant question while the second points at the future course of the immigrant question and its reflections on the antagonists' ways of struggle (whether militant or not) against the Republic. So being, the latter is not within the scope of our study but the first must be including some indications for the future course of the question. Third, the rioters, as well as the victims of the police control which is prior to and trigger of the riots, represent the ethno-racial aspect of the discontent growing among certain inhabitants of the *banlieues*. This makes comparative critique of the literature concerning the riots and historical approach a necessary task in order to delve into the question. And fourth, the riots provide certain similarities in terms of ethno-racial aspect to other contemporary urban riots that took place in Britain and the US. Although the scope of this study will be limited with the French riots, those similarities point at the necessity of developing a broader

analysis which focuses not only on the contradictions of a specific model but also on those of a general and common 'ground', i.e., capitalist mode of production, that renders different models, different 'state governmentalities',[2] such as the French and Anglo-Saxon models, only variants that rule the same process.

Following that scheme, we will provide an exposé of the 2005 riots and a critical literature review on the riots in the Chapter I before delving into the heart of question through a historical approach in the following chapters. But, before we proceed, it is necessary to put forth our theoretical approach and our preferences in the usage of terminology and our methodology, which have all been determined in relation to each other.

Theorizing the Immigrant Question

Theorizing the immigrant question in France for a possible unitary theory involves not only a presentation of the 'problematic' but also a discussion of problems concerning the terminology and methodology used in the study. Therefore we will discuss some terms such as immigrant and descendant of immigrant, and our usage of them, through reviewing debates on ethnicity in relation to the context of French republican tradition.

Confusion starts at first with the term 'immigrant'. Its definition in the French legal system states that 'an immigrant is a person who is born foreigner and abroad, and resides in France.' In this definition we have another term that makes things more complex: foreigner. Legal system defines the term 'foreigner' as follows:

> A foreigner is a person who resides in France and does not possess French nationality, either because they possess another nationality (exclusively) or because they do not have one at all. (…) A foreigner is not necessarily an immigrant and may have been born in France (minors, in particular).[3]

In their comprehensive researches entitled *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (1973), Castles and Kosack write about this distinction

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[2] Michel Foucault, **The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979**, New York: Picador, 2008, pp. 191, ff.

[3] INSEE, **Dictionary of Definitions**.
http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/liste-definitions.htm Last updated: 27 August 2014, Retrieved: 19 November 2014.

that 'in France, *one group* of immigrants are not foreigners: those from the Overseas Departments'[4], however this note is incomplete because there is another group of immigrant that acquired French nationality afterwards while they still remain as immigrant. Since 'immigrant status is permanent: an individual will continue to belong to the immigrant population even if they acquire French nationality',[5] so says the law. This makes an immigrant either foreigner or of French nationality by acquisition, but his status remains always permanent. On the other hand, not every foreigner is necessarily immigrant, since the latter requires a juridico-bureaucratic procedure. Castles and Kosack also mention that 'the term immigrant is used even for temporary foreign workers, for they are all regarded as potential settlers'[6], but that should be so only informal since these two terms are distinguished by definition of the law as regards to this juridico-bureaucratic procedure of immigration.

Definition of the acquisition of French nationality also deserves a note. According to the law under the French Civil Code (Book I, Title I *bis*, Chapter III)—commonly known as the Napoleonic Code—French nationality is acquired in two ways: either 'by declaration further to personal events (primarily due to marriage to a French national and the early acquisition of French nationality for young foreigners born in and living in France)' or 'by decision of the public authorities (naturalization).'[7]

The legal distinction between immigrant and foreigner will demonstrate its importance especially when we evaluate statistical data of the immigrants for that these data are produced by the INSEE, French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Research and the INED, French National Institute for Demographic Studies, and they are based on these legal definitions. Therefore, in order to maintain an empirical consistency in our study, we have to deal with these data, which are based upon such definitions. However, this time arises the methodological problem which means a possible constraint in the extent of the term 'immigrant'. Who is immigrant, exactly? Legal system naturally makes its own definition and state-led institutions produce data for the public use upon this definition,[8] which poses a threat

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[4] Stephen Castles, Godula Kosack, **Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe**, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 12, (Emphasis ours.)
[5] INSEE, **ibid.**
[6] Castles, Kosack, **ibid**, p. 12.
[7] INSEE, **ibid.**
[8] For a discussion on the process of adoption of the term 'immigrant' by the French Haut Conseil à l'Intégration in 1990 and its application in statistical surveys, see: Alexis Spire, 'De l'étranger à

of narrowing the scope of the independent scholar's study. For scholars from various disciplines are not obliged to accept legal definitions of contested and vague terms such as immigrant. What do we mean with this claim?

In this study, we employ the term 'immigrant' with a broader content so as to imply the descendant of immigrants as well *given the assumption that a possible definition of immigrant in social sciences does not only have a legal but also socio-political sense*. Since between these immigrants and their descendants, there proceeds an intergenerational 'cultural transmission' which shapes the process of enculturation for the younger generations who find themselves in the midst of two cultures: 'their ethnic-heritage culture prior to migration, and the new culture of the society in which they currently reside.' Especially the 'second generation children will acquire their ethnic heritage through their parents and to a varying degree through their own ethnocultural network but no longer through the larger society.'[9] Therefore, for example, an immigrant can acquire French citizenship in the course of his/her stay in France and meanwhile s/he might have a baby (either from a foreigner or from a French citizen) born in the French metropolitan territory. In that case, the newborn will be a French citizen by birth while having at least one immigrant parent who was, say, naturalized only a few years before the baby's birth. Now our immigrant is both an immigrant and a French citizen who has a baby of French citizenship. Yet, especially during the early years of its lifetime, this baby who is born to a family in which at least one parent is immigrant will above all have an education in the household, will speak her maternal language which is probably not French, and will be acquainted with a culture peculiar to its parent's country of origin. The parent will tell it stories from his/her experiences in France as immigrant (mostly, as immigrant worker), and this newborn baby who is a French citizen by birth will definitely be into an immigrant identity apart from French identity which will try to penetrate into the child's world only years later from the birth through state's education system, etc. Moreover, in the cases such as migration from geographies like the Maghreb, which imply a 'colonial' history and a 'postcolonial' context within, the preponderance of this intergenerational transmission even

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l'immigré, La magie sociale d'une catégorie statistique', **Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales**, vol. 129 (1), September 1999, pp. 50-56.

[9] Kyunghwa Kwak, 'Adolescents and Their Parents, A Review of Intergenerational Family Relations for Immigrant and Non-Immigrant Families', **Human Development**, 2003, no. 46, p. 117.

becomes more crucial.[10] As this example puts forth the ambiguity and confusion, it becomes apparent that the term 'immigrant' does not *only* include those who are legally defined as immigrants. The socio-political (even socio-psychological) nature of the term thusly prevails: for that any juridico-bureaucratic change applied to any group of people is actually incapable of immediately converting their social reality into the predication of a legal definition which is manufactured by the legislative power. Like any other social 'category' in the eyes of official statistics, immigrant does not confine itself into the legal definition of authorities. It certainly evolves and changes, but the socio-political character of the immigrant transfuses through social relations (family, neighborhood, circle of friends, etc.) into those who are legally non-immigrant. Therefore, any study on immigrants in the fields of social sciences should definitely consider this transfusion based on biological reproduction. It is for this reason that with the term 'immigrant' we also intend those who are legally categorized as the 'descendants of immigrants'.

This logical consequence of our assumption leads us to the issue of 'origin'. Both for immigrants (whether naturalized or not) and for their descendants (mostly citizens by birth), any study will need to delve into the field with the knowledge on their origins in order to collect reliable data on the subject of study. However, the field offers new problems regarding the fact that France, unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, systematically promotes an 'assimilationist' policy that neglects the ethnic identities which are considered to be threats of 'balkanization of French society with (…) communitarianism (…).'[11] This polity of the French state governmentality naturally reflects in the Republic's way of seeing both itself and its people: itself, because the Republic is the embodiment of 'civic virtues' accumulated throughout the ages of the *Respublica literaria*, determinedly defined and defended by the gods/*philosophes* of the secular pantheon of the French Enlightenment which aimed the human liberty granted by the unconditional emancipation of humanity from any source of its bondage whose face looks to the past. And its people, because it is under the flag of the Republic that its people are on the path of emancipation

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[10] Jocelyne Cesari, 'De l'immigré au minoritaire. Les Maghrébins de France', **Revue européenne des migrations internationales**, vol. 10, no. 1, 1994, pp. 109-26.

[11] Patrick Simon, **French National Identity and Integration. Who Belongs to the National Community?** Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2012, pp. 2-3, Also see from the same author: 'La République face à la diversité. Comment décoloniser les imaginaires', in Pascal Blanchard, Nicolas Bancel, Sandrine Lemaire (eds.), **La fracture coloniale**, Paris: La Découverte, 2006, pp. 241-50.

regardless their colors, skins, religions or ethnicities. The French nation constitutes itself on the grounds of the principle that unites all 'primitive' diversities and identities in the 'French melting pot',[12] not the one that decomposes people into such compartments.

Following the footprints of this principle, the Republic's way of seeing is well represented in its 'politics of measurement' [13] through the production of statistical data in the field of demography. Institutions like the INSEE or INED have so far conducted surveys that do not take the 'ethnic' origins of immigrants into measurement but only confined themselves with their 'geographical' origins. Moreover, until late 2000s, none of them conducted a survey on descendants of immigrants taking their origins into measurement. It is in 2008-2009 that the joint report by INED and INSEE researchers entitled *Trajectoires et origins: Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France* was conducted and published which relied on data concerning descendants of immigrants. This was followed by the INSEE survey of 2012 on immigrants and their descendants, which made taxonomy according to geographical origins, but not ethnic or national. Geographical origin has an implicit sense, of course, since this solution applied by such state-led institutions has the capacity to demonstrate to a great extent ethnic or national origins of immigrants and their descendants while not employing officially and explicitly those notions that challenge republican principles.

Search of new directions in the French demographic studies and surveys, either funded and led by state institutions or privately, becomes evident with such attempts. Yet, it is not and has never been undisputable. On the contrary, a debate on ethnicity among demographers, notably between two demographers from the INED, Michèle Tribalat and Hervé Le Bras, was vigorous during the 1990s and 2000s. In 1991, Tribalat published an important research on immigrants, which caused polemics and debates in the French demographic studies since it was based upon the ethnic origins of immigrants even they were of French nationality.[14] Moreover, in this research, she also distinguished French nationalities according to 'French born-

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[12] Gérard Noiriel, **Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration, XIXe-XXe siècles**, Paris: Seuil, 1988.

[13] James C. Scott, **Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed**, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998.

[14] Michèle Tribalat, **Cent ans d'immigration, étrangers d'hier, Français d'aujourd'hui. Apport démographique, dynamique familiale et économique de l'immigration étrangère**, Paris: PUF, 1991.

and-bred' ('*français de souche*'), a notion partially unclear, which is to say that the French who have not any foreigner ascendant and who are not descendants of immigrants in recent generations, and 'French with immigrant-origin' ('*français d'origine immigrée*'). Tribalat's methodology was very controversial as critiques claimed that it evoked racist sentiments in the French society.[15] Challenging the republican principle concerning ethno-racial diversities, it was found a 'taboo-breaker' research among opponents and promoter of discriminations among proponents of the French republicanism.[16] From the 'academic' point of view, the target of the research was on the quantitative knowledge of immigrants which would help prevent inequalities through developing strategies so as to 'subsume' immigrant masses according to new principles promoting ethno-racial diversities which in turn replace with the old that have supposedly reached their limits. Color-blind approach of the state and its assimilationist polity were fiercely blamed as racism; and, for the promoters of the expression of diversities and Anglo-Saxon style multiculturalism, this polity was best represented by the Front national which was in ascendance in the late 1990s and early 2000s.[17] On the other hand, the 'republican' criticizers of Tribalat, including Le Bras, signed an '*engagement républicain contre les dicriminations*' appeared in the daily *Libération* claiming that such researches actually served racism itself and politics of the FN, and they passionately defended this republican principal.[18]

The two lines in the approach towards immigrants represented in the demographers' debate might be abstracted as two opposing traditions of Western capitalism: the French model and the Anglo-Saxon model, the first claiming to be the melting pot of diversities and the other promoting multiculturalism. Especially in the left-wing politics, the Anglo-Saxon model has found a broad ground during the 1990s and 2000s against the continental traditions, which have been more or less the approximates of the French model, and this 'importation' went hand in hand along with the rise of the 'discourse' of civil society[19]. If we attempt for a periodization particularly for France, this development in the 'sphere of ideologies' was ironically

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[15] Hervé Le Bras, 'Les Français des souche existent-ils?' **Quaderni**, no. 36, Autumn 1998, pp. 83-96.
[16] Patrick Simon, 'The Choice of Ignorance. The Debate on Ethnic and Racial Statistics in France', **French Politics, Culture & Society**, vol. 26, no. 1, Spring 2008, p. 13.
[17] Pierre-André Taguieff, Michèle Tribalat, **Face au Front national. Arguments pour une contre-offensive**, Paris: La Découverte, 1998.
[18] Simon, **ibid**, p. 13.
[19] For a critique of multiculturalism, see: Slavoj Žižek, 'Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism', **New Left Review**, no. 225, September 1997, pp. 28-51.

overlapped with the systematic retreat of the state from economy under the generic program of neoliberalism,[20] of which the applications in France have become even more influential in the 1990s (following the 'socialist' governments under François Mitterrand) and matured in the 2000s under the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy.[21]

We will not deal with the history of neoliberalism in France here, but this brief periodization would give an idea about the crisis of the French republican tradition, which is very much related to the crisis of capitalism. In the Keynesian period prior to the mid-1970s, the assimilationist republicanism was contested only to a minor extent: for example, in the course of bare class struggle, immigrant organizations like Mouvement des travailleurs arabes have been established when the representation of immigrant workers have become an issue in the working-class movement. Even in the second half of the 1950s and in early 1960s, i.e., during the Algerian War of Independence, the question at stake was French colonialism but not the promotion of ethno-racial diversities at all. In that period, the republican strategy was in good harmony with Keynesianism in terms of 'governing' the immigrants at home. During the 1990s, however, following the crisis of capitalism and, consequently, the process of deindustrialization, at least some factions of the left-wing politics have turned their eyes towards the issue of multiculturalism which was promoted by postmodern literature and in good harmony, this time, with neoliberalism. Nevertheless, what was at stake is the search of an ideal method of governance particularly for the Republic, whether under Keynesian or neoliberal economy: in each period and in either case, it is the 'survival of capitalism', but not a model of governance abstracted from the mode of production, which remains essentially same but only modified so as to gain particularities due to the necessities of its reproduction.

An example would be supporting this argument. During the 2005 French *banlieue* riots, the French daily *Le Monde* published an interview with Trevor Phillips, then head of the former Commission for Racial Equality in Britain. The headline of the interview was sort of 'taunting' the failure of the French Republicanism and Phillips was giving an advice: 'The French should borrow a little

[20] David Harvey, **A Brief History of Neoliberalism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
[21] Monica Prasad, **The Politics of Free Markets. The Rise of Neoliberal Economic Policies in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States**, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006, pp. 235-79.

bit from our pragmatism.' [22] However, it took only six years for the British pragmatism to avoid an explosion in the working-class neighborhoods of London, in August 2011, which was sparked with the murder of a Black resident, Mark Duggan, by the police in Tottenham—a story quite resembling the tragedy that sparked the French *banlieue* riots. In fact, Trevor Phillips was not offering the British system as an ideal model for the European countries which deal with the 'racial question', however he was still claiming that 'the British tradition was the best among the others.' Yet, he was confessing that the segregation question within the society was one of the weaker aspects of British multiculturalism. Nevertheless, he was going on to say that Britain had 'very much privileged the expression of historical identity of ethnic minorities at the expense of their loyalty to Great Britain today', and suggesting a revolution in integration policies through the enforcements of certain 'great values', such as democracy, freedom of speech, electoral participation.

One might easily come up with the idea that every 'model' has its peculiar problems and none of them is perfect, and that the solution to these peculiar problems lies in the improvement of these models through well-directed reforms and better policy-making. We do not oppose the idea that such reforms and policies might in fact improve more or less the social conditions of those who challenge these peculiar models. Yet, do not similar problems, social conditions, tragedies and challenges emphasize the major preponderance of a general and common ground, i.e., the capitalist mode of production, on which rely different models as distinct as the French and the Anglo-Saxon in the genesis and development of questions like the 'immigrant question'?

Thus, we arrive at one of the elementary theses of this study: that the crisis of the Republic of which reflections could be best observed in the 'immigrant question', is essentially related to the crisis of capitalism, to the problem of its 'enlarged reproduction' with peculiarities to France, and, the inverse: that the immigrant question is essentially a class issue, therefore a political issue *intrinsically related to* the economic, but not a political or civil question *autonomous from* the economic. It is true that the motives of the immigrant question greatly traverse several fields seemingly separate from the economic, such as culture, ethnicity, nation, religion,

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[22] 'Les Français pourraient emprunter un peu de notre pragmatisme', Interview with Trevor Phillips, **Le Monde**, 11 November 2005.

identity, etc., yet this study puts forth the argument that they are all related to class, and to the formation of immigrant class fractions in history and space.

We have, until now, insisted on the need of adopting a methodology which should take immigrants and their descendants into account together, and pointed out to methodological problems which are directly concerning the crisis of the Republic and the immigrant question. But the terminology still poses confusions: whom do we intend with immigrants? Or, the same question in another form: which immigrants, and their descendants, are in the scope of our interest in this study? It is natural that immigrants of each 'geographical' origin do *not* constitute a party of the immigrant question at the same rate. Taken as groups according to their countries of origin, some immigrants might have well been integrated and assimilated in France, due to several reasons such as cultural, language and geographical proximities which help individuals overcoming difficulties in settling in a new environment. In that sense, the Spanish, Portuguese and Italian immigrants, who have always been in great quantity in France historically, are not subject to what we call the immigrant question due to such proximities between their own countries and France.

The immigrants that are in the scope of our interest are those of Maghrebian origin, i.e., Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian, and of Sub-Saharan origin, i.e., Africans from Senegal to Guinea, from Ivory Coast to Mali. There are basically two reasons for this: *i)* each of these groups is represented in large numbers in the total immigrant population; *ii)* each of their country of origin has a colonial history in common. With these two reasons combined, they diverge from the immigrants issued from former French colonial territory of Indochina—for the latter have a colonial past but are not present on the French soil in large numbers—and from the immigrants issued from Eastern Europe and Turkey—for the latter do not have a colonial past although some sub-groups are significantly populous, such as the Turkish and the Polish (see Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 below for the numbers of immigrants and their descendants, and their geographical origins).

Therefore, it is not 'coincidental' that the victims of the incident that triggered the 2005 riots were the descendants of immigrants of Tunisian and Mauritanian origins, equally representing the Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan immigrants. Nor was it coincidental that both the images and concrete presences of the rioters were of the same origins. These non-coincidences confine what we name

the immigrant question undeniably within the scope of these two geographical origins—the Maghreb and Sub-Sahara—both having a common colonial history under French colonialism. First colonial exploitation, then imperialism under the conditions of unequal exchange and uneven development which led to massive proletarianization have all forged indigenous populations of colonies so as to become either urbanized proletarians or reserve army of labor which sought ways to be permanent in industrial production—a history of dispossession from early times of colonial conquest until decolonization and the subsequent labor migration. It is after the movement of deindustrialization in the European capitalism that the immigrant worker now has become usually unemployed or 'tertiarized' but steadily precarized more than ever. Academic literature has the tendency of seeing this development as a decline in the class character of immigrants, partly due to their new situations of not being industrial workers anymore, as opposed to the rise of 'identities'. We, however, claim that this evolution in the situations of immigrants does not diminish the class character but, on the contrary, it sharpens class antagonisms by distinguishing class fractions even more with the rise of identities. We therefore arrive at another thesis of this study which proposes that the class character of the immigrant question can be traced from this colonial history until today passing through the process of labor migration.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that from colonies to *banlieues*, the immigrants and the descendants of immigrants of Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan origins have historically formed *class fractions* within the working class through the history of their class struggle militantly expressed in forms of anti-colonial struggles and urban riots. The purpose of this study is to outline the formation of these class fractions which are in turn intimately related to the formation of their 'identities'. The immigrant question in France lies in the complexity of this process.

CHAPTER I:

THE 2005 FRENCH *BANLIEUE* RIOTS

What happened in Paris in 2005 might well be seen as the consequence of an out-of-time and out-of-place story, for sure a tragic one. Such tragedies, in any time and anywhere, open up with the following scene, as if it were a cliché form of narration of our times' tragedies:

> The night of (…), after a chase that began in (…) and ended some 50 blocks farther north, two (…) policemen, Caucasians, succeeded in halting a car driven by Leonard Deadwyler, a Negro. With him were his pregnant wife and a friend. The younger cop (who'd once had a complaint brought against him for rousting some Negro kids around in a more than usually abusive way) went over and stuck his head and gun in the car window to talk to Deadwyler. A moment later there was a shot; the young Negro fell sideways in the seat, and died. The last thing he said, according to the other cop, was, 'She's going to have a baby.'[23]

These lines belong to an American novelist, Thomas Pynchon, and they are not from one of his sensational novels but from an article written on the Watts Riots in 1966. A familiar 'usual suspect' case ending up with the shooting of a Black resident in a Western metropolis (Los Angeles), was the trigger of the riots as the response to the police violence—one kind of violence that is deemed to be legitimate since it represents the state's monopoly of violence—, thus the response, as well, to state authorities, to systematical racism and discrimination among the then-American society. Since that time similar police—suspect cases have reiterated (and also they had been reiterating before) in the US and elsewhere. This may be one of the universal stories especially in modern times: a violent action from the representative of the state authority towards the victim who belongs very often to a part of socially excluded groups, classes, etc. There is nothing strange or new here, in the sense of being a cliché narrative of modern tragedy.

However the ordinariness of the story does not diminish the impact of a

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[23] Thomas Pynchon, 'A Journey into the Minds of Watts', **The New York Times Magazine**, 12 June 1966, p. 34.

single tragedy. On the contrary, it makes a sense that many urban riots in Western metropolises are preceded by stories with such dramatic ends. Geographies and historical processes change, but the socially excluded, or the oppressed, take their places in those stories, albeit in different forms and in different contexts. But when we encounter with a specific Western context, like that of US, UK, or France, it would be seen that the oppressed often wears a black skin, carries a colonial history in his memories, holds an immigrant and/or working-class character within. The case of 2005 Paris *banlieue* riots reproduces more or less the same story with a different tone, additionally including the old colonial issue between the colonizer and the colonized which is transformed into the antagonism of the colonizer and the immigrant in the post-war era.

In the evening of 27 October 2005, a group of youngsters were at Livry-Gargan, a small commune situated in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, one of the constituents of the Île-de-France region which contains the city of Paris, to play football. While they were on their way back to Clichy-sous-Bois, the neighboring commune, a resident reported to the Livry police station an attempted robbery at a construction site. After a while a police patrol was held around the place and they wanted to investigate the group who were heading to Clichy. There was no evidence for that the youngsters, whose origins were almost entirely of North African and Sub-Saharan origin and whose ages varied from 15 to 18, were the robbers; however they were the first in line to be interrogated, since they were usual suspects. When the police arrived, with panic and fear, three of the group tried to escape from the police and they hid themselves in an electric substation. Bouna Traoré (aged 15, Mauritanian origin) and Zyed Benna (aged 17, Tunisian origin) terribly died by electrocution, while the third youngster Muhittin Altun (aged 17, Turkish origin) was seriously burnt but recovered after all. Soon after the news was heard at Clichy, it caused anger amongst the residents, especially the youth. They assembled together and made a manifestation at the *cité* at that evening, expressed their sufferings under current conditions and their anger at the seemingly everlasting repeating scenarios between the police and them.

During the manifestation, which gathered many CRS police (the well-armed riot police) and firemen along with the protestors, the tension was so high that it suddenly turned out into rioting: the explosion launched in Clichy and spread to Montfermeil (a commune nearby Clichy) caused 23 cars burnt and many public

buildings damaged. After the first night, riots expanded systematically towards the neighboring *cité*s of Clichy, those placed in Seine-Saint-Denis in the night of October 31st to November 1st and to the other *banlieue*s of the Île-de-France, of which the city of Paris is the core. On the night of November 6th, riots were almost everywhere in France, even, albeit much less significantly, in Belgium and Germany. According to this timeline, we can determine three phases of the riots,[24] which start at Clichy and its neighboring *cité*s, expanding towards the Île-de-France, and ending up with surrounding the entire France territories[25]—with the exception of Marseille, where there had not been remarkable riots.[26]

Our elaboration and analyses on riots, as phenomena of several determinants in a wide range, will be set upon a two-layer approach: i.) the layer of *visible dynamics*, namely the provocations that triggered the riots and helped the accumulation of anger and the expansion of riots; ii.) the layer of *profound reasons*, which are less visible and show that the riots are *the* moment of explosion and consequences of several historical, social, economic and political processes.

Visible Dynamics of the Riots

The visible dynamics start with the police intervention and the death of two adolescents, which caused the primary anger and it was in itself a reason for rioting everywhere on earth, as we intended to say above by citing from Pynchon. There is no doubt that this incident was important; but it was important not because it *created the riots*, but it was a tragic story strong enough to *trigger the effects of more profound reasons beneath the riots*. In that sense, Moulier-Boutang was right when he was commenting that 'the reasons that made them [the rioters] move never

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[24] We use the classification that Mucchielli maintains in one of his article on riots. Laurent Mucchielli, 'Les émeutes de novembre 2005: les raisons de la colère', in Laurent Mucchielli, Véronique Le Goaziou (eds.), **Quand les banlieues brûlent… Retour sur les émeutes de novembre 2005**, Paris: La Découverte, 2007, pp. 17-9.

[25] The entire story of the riots with scientific research is accessible in different languages. In her article, C. L. Schneider brilliantly narrates the story in English. Cathy Lisa Schneider, 'Police Power and Race Riots in Paris', **Politics Society**, 2008, no. 36, pp. 133-159. French sociologist Michel Kokoreff's 2008-dated comprehensive book 'Sociology of Riots', especially its first chapter presents one of the best narrations in French. Michel Kokoreff, **Sociologie des émeutes**, Paris: Payot, 2008, pp. 33-62.

[26] Marseille provides an exception mainly due to its urban organization as regards its habitants. For an analysis, see: Michel Samson, 'Pourquoi Marseille n'a pas explosé?', **Le Monde**, 15 December 2005. Also see: Kokoreff, **ibid**, pp. 70-3.

explain the moments of explosion.'[27]

So do not the other 'visible' dynamics. But still they are very important and have to be mentioned. One of them is the attitude of the then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy (who later became the president in 2007) whose words about the victim adolescents, rioters and youngsters of the *cité*s in general caused his infamous reputation especially in the *banlieue*s. His (and the police's) aggressive 'zero tolerance' policy during the riots, his stigmatization of the young rioters as scums ('*racaille*'), his provocative declaration 'We will clean up the neighborhoods with Kärchers', and finally his anti-immigrant politics and discourse in general[28] (which, in the necessity of holding a legitimate standpoint, often targeted the illegal immigration instead of immigrants) played an important role of catalyzer during the riots.[29]

Another visible and provoking incident was the 'teargas affair'. In the night of 30th October, police ('*gardien de la paix*', a police corps unit under the *Police nationale*) fired a teargas inside the Bilal Mosque at Clichy,[30] where the Muslim community of the *cité* was practicing prayers. Considering that those days corresponded to Ramadan and in a place where a significant number of habitants are Muslims and that many of them were attending the prayer after they broke their fasts, this incident was provocative and increased the ongoing tension between the rioters and the police. It also incited the cultural discordance between immigrants, especially the Muslim immigrants and France's so-called 'republican values'.[31] In short, the incident, in terms of radicalism, had much affected the rioters consisted of many Muslim youngsters along with others.

These 'visible dynamics' are, in fact, related with not the causes of the riots, but rather with their 'speed', i.e., their speed of expansion, and with the tone of rioters' actions. We have mentioned above how the riots expanded very quickly to a

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[27] Yann Moulier-Boutang, **La révolte des banlieues ou les habits nus de la République**, Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2005, p. 25.

[28] For an inventory of the words used by Sarkozy and his policy, see: Nasser Demiati, 'Nicolas Sarkozy, ministre de l'Intérieur et pompier-pyromane', in Mucchielli, Le Goaziou, **ibid**, pp. 58-76.

[29] Sarkozy, as Interior Minister and as President, never quitted his hostile discourse against immigrants. For a later criticism of Sarkozy's politics, see Alain Badiou, **The Meaning of Sarkozy**, London, New York: Verso, 2008. Especially see the fourth chapter: pp. 53-70.

[30] Contrary to the claims that the CRS police fired the teargas, the testimony of a geography teacher at Clichy tells that it was actually fired by a patrolwoman ('*une femme gardien de la paix*', whose unit is listed under the Police nationale. Antoine Germa, 'Clichy-sous-Bois, Zone de non-droits ou zone d'injustices?', **Collectif Les mots sont importants**, Cited in: Kokoreff, **ibid**, p. 53.

[31] See the last sub-section of the Chapter IV of this study.

very vast geography. Moreover, we would add another aspect to speed and tone: the length of the riots seems to be affected by those dynamics as well. Almost three weeks of urban riots: this length is still incomparable to any urban riot before and after 2005 Paris riots (if we don't take into account those during revolutions, recently witnessed in Arab Spring). Even the length of Los Angeles riots in 1992, which had an enormous impact in its time, was not more than one week. In this sense, the critical question regarding the length should not be: 'What caused the riots which are lasted for three weeks?' It rather should be: 'What kept alive the riots to last for three weeks?' We are, therefore, able to state that these visible dynamics are not the underlying, profound reasons beneath the riots; but they do affect the *performance* of rioting including the aspects of length, speed and tone.

Since we employed the term 'urban riots', we should also argue that the spatiality plays a considerable role in 2005 riots both as a profound reason beneath them and as an effect on the rioters' performance. Spatiality as a profound reason deserves a deeper elaboration (which is studied in the Chapter IV), however its effect on 'visible dynamics' has the priority according to our plan. The spaces of riots were not random, ordinary spaces. They started at Clichy-sous-Bois, a small commune of Seine-Saint-Denis, which is one of the surrounding departments of the city of Paris, from where, in a few days, they spread to the whole Seine-Saint-Denis, and finally captured most of the Parisian and French *banlieue*s. The spatial structure of these urban spaces and its consequent social and economic phenomena provide a convenient milieu for rioting. The 'central city' (in its Continental sense[32]) or city centers are more sheltered and protected against the explosive moments of social and/or political uprisings, whereas *banlieue*-type urban spaces are more 'dangerous', more likely to get out of control of state authorities. If one of the reasons for this particularity is their urban structure, a second—but not least—reason is apparently their demographics, i.e., their population structure. The peripheries of Paris and other French cities have been the spaces of working-class and immigrants for a long time; so the socio-demographic situation facilitates these urban spaces turn into concrete grounds for riots in certain moments specified by the above-mentioned visible

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[32] 'In France and in most other Continental countries on the other side of the Atlantic (…), the central city has traditionally been monopolized by the elites while workers and marginal categories were pushed out to the outskirts. Hence, although they are situated at opposite poles of the urban spatial system, the French working-class *banlieues* are indeed the structural counterpart of the 'inner city' in the United States.' Loïc Wacquant, **Urban Outcasts. A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 202.

dynamics. Hence, spatiality as regards the *banlieues*, according to our argument, points out the social space where the profound reasons meet with visible dynamics, where various deep-rooted conditions determines the nature of everyday life.

Before discussing the 'profound reasons', it would be helpful to know about the 'numbers' related to the 2005 riots. According to the statistics of the French Ministry of Interior, the year 2005 has seen a decline in the numbers of crime and delinquency following the consecutive years since 2002. On the other side, there is a considerable increase in police activities in these years, which would be translated as that the usage of police force in terms of state's control, discipline and punishment policies have gradually augmented.

However, in the year 2005, criminal acts and acts of delinquency concerning the 'urban violence', which is a classification being made by the Ministry of Interior, show that 110,206 incidents appear in the yearly statistical report issued by the Ministry. This number, apparently, was widely influenced by the riots in October and November, of which around 25,000 incidents, including the burnings of cars and public goods, violence against security forces, etc., occurred in November. This is roughly to say that the riots had the three-time impact over total incidents in the everyday life in the neighborhoods where the average was around 8,000 incidents per month in 2005. Besides the total damage, the number of persons who were interrogated and subjected to legal procedures was also quite high. In that sense, a graph of the combined numbers of burnt cars and interrogated persons may give an idea in terms of both rioting and police actions.

Graph 1: Criminality and delinquency

La criminalité et la délinquance

Graph 2: Action of police force

L'action des services : les infractions révélées
à leur initiative

(Sources: The Ministry of Interior of French Republic)

According to the data from the Ministry of Justice, between 29th of October and 14th of November, 2,734 persons were detained because of rioting and 483 of them were condemned to prison, of which 108 were underage. These numbers, in fact, give us an idea about that how the riots assembled large masses together and that the riots were a phenomenon participated in by a huge sum of protestors from *banlieue* neighborhoods in all France. It would be useful to see the map of riots (see Map 1 & 2) that took place in the Île-de-France department in order to understand how the riots are very much affiliated to the social space.

Graph 3: Burnt cars and interrogations combined

(Source: The Ministry of Interior of French Republic)

Map 1: The 2005 riots in Parisian *banlieue*s

(Source: BBC News)

In that case, regarding the given data, graphs and maps, it becomes evident that the 2005 riots are massive uprisings flourished in the *banlieue*s, i.e., the social spaces where mostly the immigrants are forced to live in. According to Map 1 and Map 2, only exceptions of riots which happened in the city center are those happened at the Place de la République (which is at the merge of the 3rd, 10th and 11th *arrondissement*s and a conventional manifestation place of Paris) and in the zone between the 17th *arrondissement* and the *Arc de Triomphe* at Étoile (another central place which connects peripheries with grand boulevards). These two exceptional spaces seem very suitable for rioting *en masse*.

Map 2: The 2005 riots in Parisian *banlieue*s and in other French cities

(Source: Libcom.org)

Besides all these details, one of the significant actions during the 2005 riots was the declaration of a state of emergency ('*état d'urgence*') by the government. On the 8th of November 2005, the then President of the Republic Jacques Chirac announced a state of emergency declared by the government, which has never been decreed since the Algerian War in 1962. Furthermore, it was prolonged for 3 months more on the 16th of November, making the 2005 riots the most serious conflict of the Fifth Republic ever since the Algerian War, which was a colonial war. Here, 'the tradition of all dead generations' reminds itself, and the riots connect themselves to its historical contexts this time via the legal procedures, i.e., the state of emergency.

Now, we can pass to the 'accounts' on riots from several political, intellectual and scholarly standpoints.

Accounting the Riots: A Literature Review

As we have mentioned above, the 2005 riots in France are link of a series of riots since early-1980s. This background had already provided a vast range of scholarly researches on the question of immigration, *banlieue*s, urbanization, precarity, etc., from different fields, such as sociology, anthropology, urban studies, political science, and the like. The 2005 riots, however, considerably augmented this literature while they paved the way for new or renewed political discourses, political formations, commentaries from intellectual figures and, of course, researches from various fields. The growing literature on the 2005 riots has become a separate 'field' waiting to be accessed and needing criticism.

In need of this criticism, we have delved into the literature and reviewed the accounts on the riots. We did not limit ourselves with only scholars both from France and outside of France, but we also included the opinion leaders, political figures, etc., whose accounts might have a representation for the French society. Additionally, we should remark that only notable studies and discourses have been included to this review. For example, far-right or racist approaches are not taken into account since they are often exaggerated and marginalized expressions of much more mainstream approaches, e.g., cultural reductionism, Islamophobia, etc.

The 2005 riots provoked many responses from different sides of the political,

intellectual and scholar spectra. One of the noteworthy responses among those could be identified as the reflection of a certain culturalist approach. A well-known Jewish-French writer, Alain Finkielkraut's approach perfectly represents some aspects of the culturalist account as well as the reception of Islam and immigrant question among the circles often emphasizing the republican values and the anti-communitarian claims. During the riots, Finkielkraut gives an interview on them to *Haaretz Magazine*, the weekly supplement of Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, which is titled as 'They are not unhappy, they are Muslims', where he states that most of the rioters are Blacks or Arabs with a Muslim identity adding that 'there are other immigrants whose situation is difficult and they do not take part in the riots. Clearly, this is a revolt with ethno-religious character.' He also mentions that at the French schools 'they teach colonial history in a negative way. We don't teach anymore that the colonial project sought to educate, to bring civilization to the savages.'[33]

This 'exclusive' interview for the Hebrew readers, which simply provokes the ideas behind the clash between the Islamic/Islamist and Semitist/Zionist ideologies with an additional motive of 'positive aspects of colonialism', is a cultural reductionist approach since it replaces the ethnicity and religion as the basic reason of the social conflict instead of the social mechanism that produces the cultural differences in the image of ethnicity and religion. It is a contradictory account that of Finkielkraut: as a 'French republican', he is ready to ignore all the ethnic and religious diversities for the sake of a higher common ground of citizenship, but at the same time he reproduces the most diverse communities on the basis of holding their cultures responsible for the genesis of existing problems. Apparently, Tariq Ramadan had a reasonable ground during the European Social Forum in 2003 when he criticized Finkielkraut and some other Jewish-French intellectuals with developing communitarian analysis instead of their former positions defending universalism.[34] As the evolution in Finkielkraut's thought shows, a stubborn republican and universalist thinker would become an ordinary cultural reductionist who produces

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[33] 'They are not poor, they are Muslims', Interview with Alain Finkielkraut, **Haaretz**, 14 November 2005. The interview is originally in Hebrew and can be found at http://www.haaretz.co.il/misc/1.1058999. A shorter French translation of the text is accessible at *Le Monde Diplomatique*'s website http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2005-11-23-Qui-a-dit and an integral French translation is accessible at the Ligue des droits de l'Homme's Toulon section's website: http://www.ldh-toulon.net/spip.php?article1027. Also see: Daniel Ben-Simon, 'French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut apologizes after death threats', **Haaretz**, 27 November 2005.
[34] Tariq Ramadan, 'Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires', **Oumma**, 2 October 2003. http://oumma.com/Critique-des-nouveaux.

arguments for the far right and racist political positions when he fails to diffuse the concrete reasons and when he is mistaken with the superficial images.

Finkielkraut was not alone in his controversial culturalist position. Then co-governing neoliberal party the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire's (UMP) members Gérard Larcher, who was the Acting Minister of Employment at that time, and Bernard Accoyer, who was the president of the UMP Assembly Group, 'argued that African polygamy was the root of both urban violence and job discrimination.'[35] Similar arguments in the same tone arose from the French right, producing and reproducing an implicit racist approach, this time, for the Black immigrants, habitants, and, at most, for rioters. It is well seen that any culturalist or cultural-reductionist argument directly posits itself on the very margins of racism, anti-immigrant discourse and a specific type of xenophobia directed particularly towards the non-European. Two years after the riots, in 2007, the election of Sarkozy as the president of France demonstrates how this right-wing culturalist, Euro-centrist, implicitly racist, anti-immigrant position, of which these ideologies often overlap the colonialist discourse of the 19th century colonialism, was awarded. In fact, the category that we label as the culturalist accounts, without need to cover its deficits, is the most visible right-wing discourse, which is eager to ascend the colonial war's basic antagonism between the colonizer and the colonized in a reconstructed form of the antagonism between the colonizer and the immigrant. And this antagonism turns out, eventually, to be directed at the working class itself of which immigrants have constituted the most fragile fractions in the age coming with the deindustrialization.

A second position as response to the riots could be identified as 'left republican', which attempts to *interiorize* the riots and rioters within the French republican values. French historian and sociologist Emmanuel Todd is the excellent representative of this standpoint. In an interview given to *Le Monde*, he interprets the riots as a 'refusal of marginalization' and he adds that 'all these wouldn't happen if these children of immigrants had not interiorized some part of the fundamental values of the French society, such as liberty and equality.' He continues with claiming that they revolt because they have been *integrated* in the French system.[36]

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[35] Schneider, **ibid**, p. 136.
[36] Emmanuel Todd, 'Rien ne sépare les enfants d'immigrés du reste de la société', Interview made by R. Bacqué, et al., **Le Monde**, 12 November 2005, Updated on 29.11.2005.
http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2005/11/12/emmanuel-todd-rien-ne-separe-les-enfants-d-immigres-du-reste-de-la-societe_709613_3224.html

The basic problem with this type of account lies, in fact, in the way of neutralizing the riots and praising the Republic and the republican values themselves. It is not actually an account on riots; it is an account on the virtues of the Republic since those virtues, according to Todd, have created a manner like rioting, or revolting, against the social injustice. It is neither against nor for the riots. But it does *tolerate* the riots magnanimously from a 'higher position', whether their significant elements are the ones, which have most publicly become the targets of critics, like burning, violence, etc., it focuses on the distance between the point of riots and the point of republican values while making its judgment by alienating itself from this antagonism.

The emphasis on the notion of 'value' seems quite critical here. Anyone who is familiar with French politics would recall that the main theme of the presidential campaign in 2007, which resulted with the victory of Sarkozy, was 'values'.[37] The aftermath of the riots arguably triggered the debates around the question 'What is being French today?' in the French public sphere. In the same way, the question was an elementary topic of the *Grand débat sur l'identité nationale* in 2009,[38] which was launched by Éric Besson, the then Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidary Development in the UMP government. Here a parenthesis for Besson is much needed, since he was a member of the *Parti Socialiste* before he converted to the UMP. Apart from the 'games of politics' on the scene, this is very much important to see that a 'former' socialist who was converted to neoliberalism is the holder of such a ministerial office and that he launches a debate on 'values'. Although the 'Sarkozist' way of debating values seems to be around nationality, i.e., 'French values', there is no doubt that it contained the 'Republican values' as well. Considering this, a debate on 'values', be they French or Republican (since '*the Republic*' is the signifier of the 'unique' *French* Republic), always has the tendency of mixing up the left and right republican standpoints together in the same bowl, where the difference between political left and political right disappears and each only start speaking for one single comprising signifier: *the Republic*. There remain only nuances in-between of the left and right, which are henceforth ready to regulate

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[37] 'Interview de Nicolas Sarkozy: Le vrai sujet de la présidentielle, ce sont les valeurs', **Le Figaro**, 18 April 2007.
[38] 'Besson relance le débat sur l'identité nationale', **Le Monde**, 25 October 2009. http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2009/10/25/besson-relance-le-debat-sur-l-identite-nationale_1258628_823448.html
We should also note that the debate then had a website which is not accessible anymore.

the political scene.

Thus, the left republican account modifies and reforms the culturalist-Eurocentric racial superiority claim *into* a Renanian way[39] of republican virtues' and values' superiority appraisal. In that sense, the real meaning of Todd's statement saying that the rioters have interiorized the republican values, is interiorizing, subsuming and neutralizing the riots and the rioters within the republican order with an interfering touch on inequalities and liberties coming from the 'left'. On the other hand, this position is the one directly confronting itself against the communitarianism and it does not repeat the *anti-communitarian communitarianism*, the mere contradiction of culturalists.

We might also identify a certain bourgeois-liberal way of accounting the riots, which is very much prevalent among the discussions and are often reiterated and largely diffused into the opinions commenting on riots. This position generally considers the riots *outside* the realm of politics, which is defined, in terms of bourgeois liberalism, within the manners of political bodies particularly acting *inside* an imagined, abstract political sphere.[40] First and maybe the most important reason for excluding the riots off the politics is, unsurprisingly, the use of violence. According to the famous formulation of Max Weber, it is that of state the *monopoly of legitimate violence*, and Weber pictures the state and the politics as regards this appropriation of the state in his 'Politics as a Vocation'.[41] Hence, the use of violence is illegitimate unless it is exercised by the state, which is to say that this conception logically interprets the use of violence as the lack of politics, or as the exclusion of violent action(s) off the political (public) sphere.[42]

A good example for this generic attitude towards the riots may be seen with the political historian Pierre Rosanvallon. In an interview on the riots made by the

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[39] Here, we use the term Renanian since Ernest Renan's idea of nation is not built upon the race or blood, on the contrary it rejects the 'military nationalism' based on blood and it is built upon the 'virtue' of will. Anthony D. Smith, **Nationalism and Modernism. A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism**, London, New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 9-10.

[40] The 'traditional' bourgeois-liberal conception of political sphere, or 'political public sphere', through the work of Bruce Ackerman, is well explained in a Benhabib article. Seyla Benhabib, 'Models of Public Space. Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas', in Craig Calhoun (ed.), **Habermas and the Public Sphere**, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 81-5. For an explanation of the term 'political (public) sphere', see the article of Habermas in the same volume. Jürgen Habermas, 'Further Reflections on the Public Sphere', in Calhoun (ed.), **ibid**, pp. 446-7, 452-7.

[41] Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in Max Weber, **The Vocation Lectures**, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2004. p. 33.

[42] Probably the most famous formulation of this view can be found at: Hannah Arendt, **On Violence**, San Diego: Harvest Book, 1970.

French daily *Libération* along with Jean-Pierre Le Goff, Éric Maurin and Emmanuel Todd, Rosanvallon makes a comparison of the riots with the '68 May and tells that on the contrary to '68 May, the 'violence, in some ways, takes up the place of words.' He claims that for some reasons the rioters from the *banlieue*s do not have words but their *chanson*s and rap, and the situation causes an 'infra-political silence': 'How would you expect a political consciousness from 17-year-old youngsters?', he asks.[43] This rhetorical question briefly summarizes the standpoint of the bourgeois-liberal view of politics, which is based on the communication of the political subjects with words, and which reserves all violent actions only to the state monopoly. This conception, on the other hand, would also be identified as conservative since it calls for preserving the order of things within the bourgeois-liberal conception of the political sphere with political bodies in constant communication with each other.

Among the accounts on the riots we may also identify several class-based approaches and these class-based accounts of the riots have basically two forms. These two forms are both considered as 'class-based', however they substantially differ from one another. The first of this genre is 'labor-oriented' while the second is 'consumption-oriented'. Labor-oriented class-based accounts are generally coming from *but not limited to* the Marxist approach and methodology, and to the socialist and variant circles in the political scene. This approach considers the riots in terms of labor and unemployment as regards the class character of rioters employing the terms precarity, precariat, underclass, outcast, etc. The use of these terms are so much frequent in the literature, thus it is not necessary to attest the representation of this idea to peculiar persons since those *banlieue*s in question are social spaces in which the working class, whether French or immigrant, is inhabited historically.[44] On the other hand, the existing literature does not provide a detailed study of the class formation (or 'structure') as regards the immigrants of today[45], and the notion of class mostly appears as a sort of flavor dripped into such accounts; so that it is intended with this study that we might contribute so as to overcome this gap.

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[43] 'Quelle crise des banlieues?' Interview with J.-P. Le Goff, É. Maurin, P. Rosanvallon, E. Todd. **Libération**, 21 November 2005.
 http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/0101548996-quelle-crise-des-banlieues
[44] Cf. Wacquant, **Urban Outcasts**.
[45] The 1973-dated study of Castles and Kosack still remains as the most accomplished work to-date in these terms. Stephen Castles, Godula Kosack, **Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe**, London: Oxford University Press, 1973. However, unfortunately and naturally, this work serves today only as a powerful historical resource for contemporary researches.

However, a secondary approach under the class-based accounts, the 'consumption-based' approach is much more elaborated than the first. This approach deals with the situation of the rioters, the immigrants, the *banlieuesard*s in their relation to the 'order of consumption', i.e., the consumer society. Baudrillard once put out in his *La société de consommation* (1970) that the logic of the consumer society flourished by 'naïve' needs of individuals/society and blossomed with 'modern' egalitarian discourse in sense of that every individual, in a democratic society, has the right to consume.[46] In this respect, an important French sociologist Olivier Roy elaborates the riots in terms of that the rioters 'want to be part of consumer society, even as predators,' as quotes Schneider.[47] This approach is quite notable since it considers the *material* conditions of rioters; however it needs criticism in terms of mode of production.

The consumption-oriented approach implicitly or explicitly places the relationship of consumption and sustainability of economy in the core of societal economies, whereas, since Marx, it is known that this core consists of the mode of production, appropriation of the surplus labor, relations of production, etc. Harvey notes the statement of Marx and Engels from *The Communist Manifesto*, which tells that '[c]apitalism, Marx and Engels observe, 'cannot exist without perpetually revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society' (including those of consumption).'[48] Thus, as reminds Harvey, consumption is not as a coral element as the production itself, but rather it is a part of the social relations consequent to the process of production. (We discuss this issue in the Chapter II of this study, below.)

This Marxian reminder shows that the consumption-oriented accounts are not essentially false or faulty, but to some extent they hide, even mystify, the *real* class-based relationship of rioters with economy and society.[49] A secondary criticism might be the one that this approach reduces the impulse of rioting into 'predatory desires' of consuming-bodies, which largely underestimates the political aspect of

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[46] 'People are equal before their needs and before the principle of satisfaction, for they are equal before the *use-values* of objects and goods (while they are unequal and divided before the *exchange-value*).' Jean Baudrillard, **La société de consommation**, Paris: Denoël, 1996, p. 61.

[47] Schneider, **ibid**, p. 137. Roy makes his analysis during a conference in New York in 2006, of which the text is available on internet. http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org/Roy/

[48] David Harvey, 'Introduction', in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, **The Communist Manifesto**, London: Pluto Press, 2008, pp. 5-6.

[49] We may suggest that this consumption-based approach essentially relies upon the Weberian class conception, which is outlined at: Max Weber, **Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology**, vol, 1, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, pp. 302-7.

riots based on the class character of the rioters as regards the capitalist mode of production.

It also appears for us possible to speak of certain accounts which tend to deal with the riots through the lens of 'social conflict' which attempts gathering various aspects of social conflict as arguments for the 'profound reasons' beneath the riots. A considerable part of these accounts are scientific sociological researches dealing with the sociology of *banlieues* and inhabitants, relations of the youth and the police, state policies on the urban space, etc. We might mainly determine four types of approach among these researches and such types of approach partially overlap each other: state and/or police oriented; space-oriented; local policies/administration-oriented; race/ethnicity-oriented.

State and/or police oriented approaches debate the riots in the context of discrimination towards the inhabitants of *banlieues*, i.e., the immigrants and those whose origins are non-French. One example for this approach is sociologists Marwan Mohammed and Laurent Mucchielli's co-written article, which is the product of an ethnographic field research mainly based upon the testimony of a 20-year-old young man as regards his experience with the police in the *banlieue* neighborhoods.[50] Through this field research, two sociologists claim that the police behavior in a discriminative or a racist way against youngsters constitutes a real problem in the everyday life in the *banlieue*s. In parallel, Professor Wihtol de Wenden points out the same issue as one of the major problems causing such social conflicts like the 2005 riots.[51] Schneider, on the other hand, insists on the momentous effect of a very single tragedy stating that 'the 2005 riots were provoked by a terrible incident of police brutality (and impunity), a tragedy among a litany of similar tragedies.'[52]

However, in these criticisms, an understanding of the police question in a wider context seems to be lacking. Discriminative/racist behavior of police or the often-mentioned police violence in the *banlieues*, either taken as a general problem or as single cases, should, in fact, be affiliated with the logic and mechanism of the state apparatus, for the police is an armed representative of the state on its territories, particularly in the social space. The issue seems much more relevant with the

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[50] Marwan Mohammad, Laurent Mucchielli, 'La police dans les quartiers populaires: un vrai problème!', **Mouvements**, no. 44, March-April, 2006, pp. 59-60.
[51] Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 'Urban Riots in France', **SAIS Review**, vol. XXVI, Summer-Fall, 2006, pp. 52-3.
[52] Schneider, **ibid**, p. 138.

discipline and control mechanism of the state in these 'sensitive neighborhoods' (as it is called in French, '*quartiers sensibles*') for the reason that the police is not an autonomous armed entity but it is the operator of a certain established mechanism and logic of the state as the oppressor on behalf of the ruling class.[53]

Space-oriented approach is such a generic way of handling the riots that most of its crumbles can be found in almost every analysis. When it comes to the French, especially Parisian, *banlieues*, the question deserves even more attention since no suburban space on the Continental Europe has such singularity given the ongoing history of (sub)urban riots from 1980s onwards, as is the case in France.[54] Still, space—in two senses (physical space and social space)—has an enormous importance on every society. As Bourdieu states, 'the *site* (*le lieu*) can be defined absolutely as the point in physical space where an agent or a thing is situated, takes place, exists' and the 'social agents are constituted in, and in relationship to, a social space (or better yet, to fields) (…).'[55]

Thus, through its both usages, the space is *besieging* (*assiégeant*) for things and bodies; nevertheless, the relationship between space and production should not be ignored. Lefebvre's contribution, or more accurately his 'field-founding' works, on the conception of that the urban space (which apparently includes the *banlieues*) is the space of capitalist production since the Industrial Revolution,[56] hence it cannot be considered apart from the process of production. Lefebvre, in 1974, writes that the '(social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity—their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. *It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations*, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or 'ideal' about it (…).'[57] As regards Lefebvre's statement, the space-oriented approach towards the riots should not exaggerate or depreciate the

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[53] For an explanation of this 'logic', see: Mark Neocleous, **The Fabrication of Social Order. A Critical Theory of Police Power**, London: Pluto Press, 2000.

[54] French geographer J.-P. Boyer states that the 'symptoms of the urban crisis appear much more marked up', however 'in Europe, the welfare state [Boyer uses the term '*l'État-providence*'—C.Ö.] in general, did not let the formation of ghettos.' Jean-Pierre Boyer, **Les banlieues en France. Territoires et sociétés**, Paris: Armand Colin, 2000, p. 172.

[55] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Site Effects', in Pierre Bourdieu, et al., **The Weight of the World. Social Suffering in Contemporary Society**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999, pp. 123-4.

[56] Henri Lefebvre, **La révolution urbaine**, Paris: Gallimard, 1970.

[57] Henri Lefebvre, **The Production of Space**, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p. 73. [Italics ours.]

role of the space but it should 'put the space in its place'; otherwise the linkages between the mode of production, the rioters and the space would be misunderstood and misanalysed. (For a detailed elaboration of the immigrant question in the nexus of social space and everyday life, see the relevant sub-section under Chapter IV of this study.)

Local policies or administration-oriented approach is partly related to spatial analyses, however it deserves a separate title. First and foremost, this approach focuses on the part of local and central authorities, and their policies concerning spatial issues. As Wihtol de Wenden remarks,[58] these policies, which are generally called as 'policy of the town' ('*politique de la ville*'[59] in French), are rather focusing on the prevention of social conflicts and the improvement of social conditions mainly in the troubled neighborhoods where the riots took place. Maybe the most influential commentary from this type of approach came from Cyprien Avenel in an article on the riots. He locates the 'policy of the town' in the core of his analysis and he interprets the riots through the malfunctioning of the administration in *banlieues*, stating that 'the question is not the absence of intervention of public power in the neighborhoods, nor the positive discrimination problem only, but the posture of intervention and the nature of relations bound on the terrain'.[60]

A more detailed work in this approach is the co-written book of Sophie Body-Gendrot and Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, which is entitled *Sortir des banlieues*. Their basic argument starts with determining the confusion in the usage of terms and then passes beyond this task:

> [W]hen we talk about *banlieues*, we actually talk about its population; when we refer to the habitants, we talk about the places where they live. Immigration policy ('*politique de l'immigration*') and the policy of the town ('*politique de la ville*') telescope each other: the French choice is, in priority, dealing with the territories to resolve the problems of the habitants of diverse origins. In other countries, the habitants are incited to move to less problematic places and public authorities ('*puissance publique*') pay the differential in the costs of rent. However, for some essentially political reasons coming from the pressure of the elected and the technocrats, this is not the case in France. The habitants, particularly those

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[58] Wihtol de Wenten, **ibid.**, p. 49.

[59] For a detailed definition and analysis for 'policy of the town', see: Maurice Blanc, 'La 'politique de la ville': une 'exception française'?', **Espaces et sociétés**, no: 128-129, 2007/1, pp. 71-86.

[60] Cyprien Avenel, 'Les émeutiers de la politique de la ville. Des espoirs d'intégration aux désespoirs d'insertion', **Mouvements**, no. 44, March-April, 2006, p. 40. For a similar approach in the same volume of the periodical **Mouvements**, see: Marie-Hélène Bacqué, Jean-Marc Denjean, 'Les émeutes urbaines, signe d'échec de la politique de la ville?', **Mouvements**, no. 44, March-April, 2006, pp. 115-20.

who are improperly being named as 'the second and third generations', have the chance of mobility as a dominant model while dealing with the places incites them to stay in their places by improving the habitat and state aid. The response, elaborated at the summit of the state from a utopia of social mixity ('*mixité*'), is maladjusted to the reality (most of the families move when they can). This is what we call the 'tyranny of the territories'.'[61]

Wihtol de Wenden, in the first part of this book, states that the 'tyranny of the territories' has certain reasons: '[France] dealt with problems essentially in terms of security, mediatization and rehabilitation of the habitat which sometimes neglect other tracks.'[62] However, the resolution of the problem depends on taking measures in 'other tracks', which would render 'the recognition and the participation' of the population who are largely of immigrant descents possible. These tracks should include the right to vote and eligibility of the foreigners in local scale; making the government officials sensible in struggling against racism to bring an end to discrimination and bad treatment; de-compartmentalization ['*décloisonnement*'] of territories for listing the neighborhoods in geographic and social mobility and in cultural mixity; more respect in need of equality of right and choice to school, in education and in access to work; presence of immigrant-descent populations in leadership of parties and parliamentary assemblies—all showing that the current French republican model does not work.[63] She also notes that '[the rioters] do not contest the republic; they want to be part of it.'[64] Professor Wihtol de Wenden's arguments clearly outline the weaknesses of the policies of the town on *banlieues* and inhabitants, and they also help concretizing the conditions of exclusion in these spaces. In that sense, Body-Gendrot and Wihtol de Wenden have a crucial point in depicting the situation as the tyranny of the territories.

However, the major problem of this and similar approaches is the underestimation of the *intrinsic* political character of the riots relying on the basis of the class character of rioters. Avenel, Body-Gendrot and Wihtol de Wenden themselves, as well, consider the precarious conditions of the *banlieuesards* and, to some extent, the discrimination that they are subjected to;[65] however they prefer arguing the main debate on this malfunctioning of the policy of the town. Avenel, for instance, considers the dissolution of the precarity question and the conflict arising

[61] Sophie Body-Gendrot, Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, **Sortir des banlieues. Pour en finir avec la tyrannie des territoires**, Paris: Autrement, 2007, pp. 6-7.
[62] **Ibid.**, p. 46.
[63] **Ibid.**, pp. 46-7.
[64] **Ibid.**, p. 47.
[65] Avenel, **ibid.**, pp. 37-8.

from it through the hand of 'good governance', improvement of qualities in the policy of the town; hence, by doing so, he even examines the riots as 'depoliticized' and 'self-destructive'—in sense of that the rioters destruct their *own* neighborhoods.[66] *Quelle honte!*

Race/ethnicity-oriented approach is the fourth and final type of the social conflict-based accounts. The question of racial and ethnic diversity, its appearances within social conflicts and consequences have already been widely argued in the French context. The 2005 riots have contributed to these debates around the arguments of a systematical racial and ethnic discrimination towards the immigrants and their descendants. These arguments are so largely employed that almost every text produced on the riots more or less has a place for them, discussing in one way or another varying from the criticisms of the French republican system to the accusations on the *disintegration* of the immigrant masses into communities.

However, there are notable contributions to the debates around the 2005 riots in terms of 'racial issue'. Perhaps one of the most important contributions comes from Didier and Éric Fassin's 2006-dated edition book. The book, however, is not dedicated to the 2005 riots, but it is edited 'under the shadow of the riots' and tries to expand the question of race within these debates. [67] John P. Murphy, an anthropologist working on the French *banlieue* question, notes that 'the Fassins concede that social class, long held to be an important organizing principle within French society, cannot today be discounted, they insist that mounting frustration born of unspoken racial inequality within the framework of France's 'color-blind' republican model has been a driving force behind recent bouts of social discord, including, notably, the 2005 riots.'[68] Murphy also points at Susan Terrio's 2009-dated work, which is another notable contribution to the debates examining the racial question through the juridical processes of those 'excluded', the immigrant youth of the *banlieues*.[69]

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[66] **Ibid.**, pp. 43-4.

[67] Didier Fassin, Éric Fassin, 'Introduction. À l'ombre des émeutes', in D. & É. Fassin (eds), **De la question sociale à la question raciale? Représenter la société française**, Paris: La Découverte, 2006, pp. 5-16.

[68] John P. Murphy, 'Baguettes, Berets and Burning Cars: The 2005 Riots and the Question of Race in Contemporary France', **French Cultural Studies**, 22: 33, 2011, p. 34.

[69] Susan J. Terrio, **Judging Mohammed. Juvenile Delinquency, Immigration, and Exclusion at the Paris Palace of Justice**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

We might also speak of a number of anthropological and sociological researches based upon field studies, to a lesser scale, on the rioters and, to a larger scale, on the *banlieuesards*. If we consider a much broader timeline, it would be claimed that, probably, the most important—and the most comprehensive and detailed—study in this kind of research is *La misère du monde* (published in 1993, translated to English as *The Weight of the World*), a collective work of Pierre Bourdieu and his disciples from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. Bourdieuian approach to the methodology of anthropological and ethnographic field studies aims a horizontal communication between the researcher and the interviewee.[70] In one of the chapters of this collective work, Bourdieu states that 'there is no more real or more realistic way of exploring communication in general than by focusing on the simultaneously practical and theoretical problems that emerge from the particular interaction between the investigator and the person being questioned.'[71] Similarly, in his *Urban Outcasts* (2008), Loïc Wacquant, a disciple of Bourdieu and a contributor to *La misère du monde*, due to Bourdieuian methodology, writes that the 'ethnographic observation emerges as an indispensible tool, first to pierce the screen of discourses whirling around these territories of urban perdition which lock inquiry within the biased perimeter of the pre-constructed object, and secondly to capture the lived relations and meanings that are constitutive of the everyday reality of the marginal city-dweller.'[72]

Given the fact that Bourdieuian methodology has deeply affected field studies in sociological, anthropological and ethnographic research, an important literature arose on the issue of 'advanced marginality', as Wacquant coins the term, in urban spaces—particularly in the French context. A very important ethno-sociological research, David Lepoutre's *Cœur de banlieue* (2001), also should be mentioned in this regard.[73] However, the 2005 riots, considering their *singularity* in planes of time and of single persons who actually made them, are posterior to these researches, which means that, according to Bourdieuian methodology, the 2005 riots can, to a

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[70] For the key aspects of Bourdieu's methodology, see: Pierre Bourdieu, **Le sens pratique**, Paris: Minuit, 1980; Loïc Wacquant, 'Toward a Social Praxeology. The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology', in Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, **An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, pp. 1-59.

[71] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Understanding', in Bourdieu, et al, **ibid.**, p. 607.

[72] Wacquant, **ibid.**, p. 9.

[73] David Lepoutre, **Cœur de banlieue. Codes, rites et langages**, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2001.

certain extent, be guided but cannot be fully 'understood' through these prior field studies and that they need fresh field studies and collected data from the field.

Due to and in respect of this need, it is possible to mention several field study-based researches, which try to ground the 'profound reasons' beneath the riots on the basis of experiences and testimonies of rioters. Most of these texts remain much more minor compared to the above-cited major works while they are still valuable. Probably the most important and comprehensive work among these researches is the *Banlieue de la République* of Gilles Kepel, which is conducted by him and his students from the prestigious Sciences Po in Paris between the summer of 2010 and the summer of 2011 in Clichy-sous-Bois (where the 2005 riots started) and Montfermeil (another 'troubled' *banlieue* situated in Seine-Saint-Denis). This research was born upon the proposition of the Paris-based Institut Montaigne, and it focuses on several questions related to *banlieues*: immigration, Islam, national identity, insecurity, etc.[74] Before discussing Kepel's research, we should note that the Institut Montaigne is a powerful think-tank/NGO with an annual budget of 3 million euros and supported by a wide range of French and non-French enterprises, and it was founded in 2000 and currently being presided by the honorary president of the AXA Group, Claude Bébéar.[75] According to this basic information, it can be assumed that Kepel's work is also reflecting the desire of reconciliation for the *banlieues* coming from certain agents in civil society significantly in cooperation with powerful capital owners. If we understand civil society as the realm in which social consent is produced in Gramscian terms through the mediation of not political power but economic power, then this attempt of French civil society focusing on the 'question of *banlieue*' through a comprehensive field research conducted by a prominent scholar would be considered as a *reconnaissance patrol* for the production of consent in the *banlieue*s backed by the agency of capitalist class.

Back to the content of Kepel's research, it consists of issues gathered around under six main headlines: urban renovation, education, employment, security, politics (in sense of 'political participation'), and religion. Each chapter deals with the main headline through partial interviews with one hundred habitants in total living in Clichy and Montfermeil. The questions posed to the interviewees are often

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[74] Gilles Kepel, **Banlieue de la République. Société, politique et religion à Clichy-sous-Bois et Montfermeil**, Paris: Gallimard, 2012, p. 11.
[75] For a more detailed information, see the institute's website: http://www.institutmontaigne.org/

simple and open-ended questions (such as 'Does the French government respect Muslims?', 'What does *being French* mean for you?', 'Does the democracy function well in France and in your country of origin?', etc.) that allow the interviewee talk as much as possible. These questions aim unveiling the 'hidden' inner-worlds of interviewees as regards their living space, their place in the society, their works and spare times, their relationships with state authorities, police, etc., their political attitudes in relation to the media, to political representation and participation, their confidence in politics, their religious statuses and practices, their behaviors derived from religion, their families, and so on.

This research, in its totality, offers valuable first-hand testimonies of the inhabitants of those *banlieues*, however the work does not develop a systematical explanation on the 2005 riots nor on the 'question' itself. It rather collects information or, in other words, it makes *investigation* through the spaces concerned, as 'reconnaissance patrolling' would do. Yet it reflects (and thus reproduces) a certain ideological point of view *en interligne* with its non-interfering or less-interpreting methodology as regards the fact that Kepel's project is structured as a sort of report and is operational for new 'policies of the town', for new strategies for confronting the 'rising threat' from the *banlieues*, and the like. The Gramscian conception of social consent is quite central here. Gramsci writes: 'The State does have and request consent, but it also 'educates' this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class.'[76] In that sense, this mission of patrolling also indicates the further strategies for requesting and educating the consent in various ways: requesting and/or educating the consent via the rehabilitation of the conditions in *banlieues*; educating the consent via changing the entrenched attitudes (such as xenophobia, racism, etc.) of a certain part of the French ('*français de souche*') towards the non-French ('*français d'origine immigrée*' plus non-citizen immigrants); and, most importantly, integrating the 'excluded', most notably the Muslims, into the system through the market relations regulated by the mere force of capital. Especially for this latter pillar of the civil society, the French way of dealing with the Muslim question and the response by the Muslim community have been, and

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[76] Antonio Gramsci, **Selections from the Prison Notebooks**, New York: International Publishers, 1997, p. 259.

continue to be, illuminating. (We will discuss this issue in the Chapter IV of this study.)

Kepel, however, is an important intellectual in the French public sphere. Following *Banlieue de la République*, he published another book soon after, entitled *Quatre-vingt-treize* (2012), in which he much more openly and systematically revealed his opinions on the development of Islam on the French soil through a historical perspective.[77] *Quatre-vingt-treize*, meaning 'ninety-three' in English, is the departmental code of Seine-Saint-Denis, where Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil (the research area of *Banlieue de la République*) are situated, and it had been the coral territory of the 2005 riots. Apart from this, Kepel's another intention with the title is the reference to Victor Hugo's *Quatrevingt-treize* (1874), a novel on the struggle of the revolutionary republican forces against the counter-revolutionary *ancien régime* supporters during the times of *La Terreur* (the Reign of Terror), of which the most sanguinary year was perhaps 1793. Hence, since the very beginning, with its double signifying title, the book intends to highlight the antagonism between the Republic and its challengers on the presupposition that the culture (with its every sort of components: everyday life, religion—particularly Islam—, politics, social relations, etc.) which is *already* created and *continuously* being created in the 'Ninety-three', i.e., in Seine-Saint-Denis and similar place in France, is opposing with the republican values as regards the parallelism with the antagonism that Hugo constructed in his novel between the *ancien régime*'s values and young revolutionary republican values. Kepel is not himself a supporter of this view: he certainly favors the republican values as well as the integration of the excluded into the Republic, rendering him a critique of both the state and the Muslim community from a safe distance and a star academic (a fairly earned title due to the work throughout his carrier) in cooperation with NGOs who seeks the cracks for a reconciliation between the two sides of what we name the Muslim question.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that Kepel focuses mainly on the issue of Islam in *banlieues*, for two reasons: first, Kepel is also well known with his studies on Islam (in France and abroad) and contemporary Islamism, and he has written several books consecrated on those. Islam, either as a social question or as a scientific problematic, has always been of interest for Kepel. Second, Islam is such

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[77] Gilles Kepel, **Quatre-vingt-treize**, Paris: Gallimard, 2012.

an issue that notions related to Islam are being presented as antagonist to republicanism in terms of 'values', given that modern Islamism is often contradictory, at least in the realm of discourse, with modernity (under which title republicanism is being represented), whereas it has much fewer contradictions with global capitalism. Contemporary scholars on Islamism often stress this tension between Islam and modernity (e.g. 'republican values') and deal with this 'binary opposition' while they do not see its coherence with capitalism as a paradox to that opposition on the realm of discourse, thusly blurring, if not erasing, the nexus of material life and epistemology.

For example, Mohammed-Ali Adraoui's work[78] on the issue of Islam in French banlieues through the case of quietist Salafism in the nexus of Gulf patrimony of global Salafism (which is actually his Ph.D. thesis defended at the CERI of Sciences Po Paris, under the direction of Wihtol de Wenden and Kepel) is striking in the sense how this specific interpretation of Islam diffuses among the Muslim community and organizes it on the basis of mere economic activity (especially petty business and trade) accompanied with a complete retreat from the public sphere. Adraoui's work relies upon a field study in France and several Muslim countries that constitutes part of the field study of Kepel's *Banlieue de la République*, for which some young researchers from the CERI have contributed a lot along with Adraoui. In his study, Adraoui interprets the quietist Salafism and its 'habitus' as antagonistic and marginal in comparison to the dominant French culture on the one hand,[79] and he considers and defines the political strategy of the quietist Salafism on the French soil in terms of 'militant apoliticism' on the other hand.[80] Yet, Adraoui's understanding of politics remains narrow and coincides with what we named above 'modernist-liberal' conception of politics, for it neglects the 'invisible' political character intrinsic to the quietist Salafi way of life, viz., to the Salafist political strategy in general, which regulates the everyday lives of its adherents, and this invisible political character certainly does not show up itself in forms of modernist-liberal system of representation in the political sphere. 'Militant apoliticism' of the quietist Salafism, however, is one elaborate strategy that implies a systematized political attitude grown among the Salafi adherents, a strategy which is developed by the most renown Salafi sheiks and which is imposed from above by the

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[78] Mohammed-Ali Adraoui, **Du Golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé**, Paris: PUF, 2013.
[79] **Ibid.**, pp. 135-7.
[80] **Ibid.**, pp. 139-42.

petrodollar monarchies of the Gulf who safeguards and sponsors these sheiks and smaller-scale agents in the Muslim field. In the Chapter IV of this study, below, we studied the quietist Salafism closely as regards its place in the process of Islamization among the immigrants in France.

One of the most notable names in the 'field-study based accounts' is sociologist Michel Kokoreff who produced several books and articles on the question. In one of his articles on the 2005 riots, Kokoreff rhetorically asks 'is not everything said on the sociological reasons of the *banlieue* crisis?', and adds that processes such as the increase of mass unemployment and institutionalization of non-employment, urban and educational segregation, ethnic and racial discriminations, stigmatization and criminalization of popular classes are all well-known.[81] Following a brief critique of the way through which public debate, media, political actors and most importantly the state approach to the *banlieue* crisis, he proposes to 'pass to the other side of the mirror' in order to proceed in understanding of the question. He goes on with the suggestion, which could be found similar to that of Wacquant, as follows:

> (…) [U]nderstanding the meaning of the riots and their adjacent logic (…) requires mobilizing the data of first-hand: observations and interviews on the field, in the rioter neighborhoods, as well as those who had not been involved, stories from third parties (pairs, parents, neighbors, educators, actors from the associations, etc.), testimonies collected by journalists or witnesses being in contact with these (very) youngsters who occupied the night and make everybody talking about themselves for three weeks and more. This material still reminds very lacking.[82]

Kokoreff emphasizes the importance of such a sociological methodology focusing on the agency in the field, yet, in this article, apart from referring to the journalism work, i.e., the interviews during the riots and appeared in journals like *Le Monde* or *Libération*, he points out the outlines of this approach and he only gives some examples from his own field study with the rioters, which immediately call attention to the urgency of well-known problems of the *banlieue* crisis like unemployment, police violence, discrimination, etc., that are all present in the social consciousness of the *banlieue* youth. He will later develop his ideas based on field study that he conducted in the communes of Seine-Saint-Denis in 2006 and 2007,

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[81] Michel Kokoreff, 'Les émeutiers de l'injustice', **Mouvements**, no. 44, Mars-Avril, 2006, p. 13.
[82] **Ibid.**, p. 15.

exposed in his 2008-dated book *Sociologie des émeutes*.[83] The importance of this book lies in the motive that the sociological approach that Kokoreff develops in the case of urban riots, particularly the 2005 riots, is oriented to underlining the political dimension of the riots and the political character of the rioters—a well-directed idea that was in the course of development in the previous works of the sociologist. For Kokoreff, this political dimension can be defined as the 'rioters of injustice':

> (…) [I]t is this tension between the denial of citizenship and egalitarian yearning, on the one hand, the experience of disgrace and demand of respect, on the other hand, that gives meaning to those scenes all the more easily qualified as 'urban violence' so that these aspects are not enough thought about.[84]

The real value of Kokoreff's sociological approach in relating the social to the political could be found in this attempt towards a political understanding of the riots—a most generally disregarded attempt in the literature which attributes a political character to the riots *in themselves*. Here, we need to have a break only to go on with Kokoreff's political reading of the riots in the following pages under the sub-section of 'politics-based accounts'.

Another field study-based account comes from the article by John P. Murphy who is a researcher working particularly on the *banlieues* of a relatively small city, Limoges, in center-west France. In his article, he gives several examples from his own research area, and focuses on the racial discrimination in everyday life experiences especially coming from the side of the police.[85] Alongside the racial discrimination issue that Murphy collects from his field study, he employs the concept of 'social destiny' inspired from Weber through his 'formulation of life chances'. With 'social destiny', Murphy refers to the social situations of certain people (those may be of 'lower-classes' or from certain living spaces, etc.) and 'the idea of inevitability'.[86] The concept of social destiny, in fact, would be useful regarding its strong emphasis on the given 'social structure' within the society; however, the main problem appears as the connotation of the term destiny ignores the political struggle of the rioters who find themselves, objectively and subjectively, within a class fraction that was formed throughout historical developments. Murphy's account treats with the human agency as if classes were fixed categories

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[83] Kokoreff, **Sociologie des émeutes**, pp. 287-94.
[84] **Ibid.**, pp. 22-3.
[85] Murphy, **ibid.**, pp. 39-40.
[86] **Ibid.**, p. 41-2.

and did not interrelate each other in different ways. In this sense we find Murphy's conceptualization remaining vague, flu, and nonconcrete, thusly helping to cover the material dynamics beneath the social phenomenon related to both political and class character of the rioters. So that it enforces, in one word, mystification.

The above-mentioned co-written article of Mohammed and Mucchielli, which emphasizes the police behavior against the *banlieue* youth, should also be noted as a smaller-scale ethnographic field study on the 2005 riots.

Until now, the only approach of which the political aspect we emphasized on while reviewing the accounts on the riots was the one related to the 'policy of the town' ('*politique de la ville*'). In French, there is no distinction between 'policy' and 'politics'; both terms are used as '*la* politique'. However, there is a need to make a distinction between 'policy' and 'politics' in the context of the 2005 riots, since a policy is developed by specialists and executed by local or central authorities, whereas politics is attributed to political actors, agents, structures, etc. In that sense, the accounts based on developing, reforming or modifying the policy of the town should be distinguished from the accounts focusing on the political character of the riots and rioters.

The first example among such politics-based accounts comes from Kokoreff. We have discussed his methodological concerns and suggestions on the 2005 riots above, yet his work also deserves to be examined in another aspect, since the sociologist is probably the scholar who wrote the most on the 2005 riots. As he reiterates in his various texts, Kokoreff's main political argument is that the rioters have a political character in the basis; hence, for him, the 2005 riots are certainly political, which he describes as the 'politics of injustice'. In an earlier article, he argues that 'the riots are the translation of a profound sentiment of injustice, which feeds the relations with the institutions in everyday life.'[87] 'It is in that sense', he writes in his book, 'the riots can be read as the manifestation of [the] passion of equality, which is peculiar to the moderns, and moreover, a claim of respect.'[88]

Kokoreff's politics-based account has a hesitant case though, when he is writing that the 'recent history of the *banlieues* confirms that the explosions have the advantage to attract the attention of the political class and the media than the social

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[87] Kokoreff, 'Les émeutiers de la injustice', p. 22.
[88] Kokoreff, **Sociologie des émeutes**, p. 23.

misery or the assignment to ethnic habitation. They have very well arisen the sprinkling measures of an audacious and perennial politics to deal with problems in the basis.'[89] In this sense, according to Kokoreff, the political character of the 'rioters of injustice', which was issued from the troubles of everyday life, ultimately becomes something dependent to a political class, which is a political entity distinct from the rioters themselves. Beneath the logic of this formulation, there lies the conception that the political character of the riots is actually attributed to 'other' political agents who are galvanized with the upsurge of the rioters in the *banlieues*. This argument has a sense as if the rioters 'cannot represent themselves, they must be represented'[90], since this upsurge, according to Kokoreff, does not render the rioters as a political agent. Of course! They do not automatically become political agents not for they, in fact, need to take their place in a relationship to the political class, but for that these 'rioters of injustice' (a description pointing at their political character) are not seen by the sociologist as the expression of the militancy of the class character of a certain social group who are destined to live in the *banlieues*. In other words, the problem beneath the politics-based account of Kokoreff lies in attributing a proxy to those who realize the political act (the act of rioting) for the fact that the militancy of the rioters is not sought in the class character of the rioters. If this were sought, then the militancy would have been considered as the expression of a certain fraction of the working class (which we argue throughout this study) in the form of class struggle. Otherwise, as becomes evident in Kokoreff's account, it could be claimed that the habitants of the *banlieue*s should be reconnected to the political sphere, of course via such proxies, and thus would be paved in this way the end of the discrimination.[91]

An even more intricate politics-based account comes from the philosopher Étienne Balibar who wrote a long article discussing the literature and many aspects of the 2005 riots. His main argument on the 2005 riots develops around the concept of 'anti-politics'. Balibar claims that the 'anti-politics' is determined with the exclusion mechanisms of 'the politics' over two main 'extreme' groups: those who are 'too rich' and those who are 'too poor', 'the owners and executives of multinational capitalism, on the one hand, and the subproleteriat or underclass of the

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[89] Kokoreff, 'Les émeutiers de la injustice', p. 22.
[90] Karl Marx, **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,** Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 106.
[91] Kokoreff, **ibid.**, p. 22.

insecure, immigrants, and especially youth, on the other.'[92] This 'double exclusion', according to Balibar, points at the conditions of anti-politics: politics excludes these two groups that cannot be *represented* in the political sphere. Balibar is certainly right with his commentary on that the modern-liberal politics *does* exclude certain groups, especially 'those who are too poor', so as to cause a 'failure of representation',[93] although a similar situation for 'those who are too rich' would probably be an exaggeration. However, what is odd in his approach is that his conception of anti-politics based upon a modernist-liberal political conception which, it seems, Balibar absolutizes, since he does not take 'internalization' mechanisms of *this* political sphere, which functions through various ways. It is true that politics excludes especially the 'too-poor' from the political sphere and political representation but it manages to do so only in the realm of formal representation. It cannot generalize its powers to an extent in which it would depoliticize the 'too-poor' or render them apolitical. On the contrary, their political character would still have persisted even if had they not been properly represented in the political sphere.

Balibar seems to be approving this too, yet for him, as the realm of politics is excluding the 'too-poor', he seeks to conceptualize the political sense of their act of rioting only to arrive at the solution where he finds the notion of anti-politics, conceptualized as the 'impossibility' of the politics, which he calls elsewhere as the unpolitical ('*l'impolitique*').[94] In this conception, the political violence itself would become the negation of politics, which finds its extremity in fascism [95] —a sufficiently strong emphasize to avoid the political usage of violence, not only in terms of morality but also in terms of rationality: he then goes on in his account after emphasizing the double determination of class and race on the rioters and the spatial fix accompanying it,[96] he criticizes the stresses on the colonial heritage coming from the 'side' of the rioters, since, for him, this 'colonial boomerang' troubles in making a future political identity,[97] considering the violence of the riots, which he sees as a 'violence without political objectives'. In fact, the stresses on the colonial heritage are themselves the product of a political strategy and Balibar opposes to this strategy,

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[92] Étienne Balibar, 'Uprisings in the **Banlieues**'. **Constellations**, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, p. 63.
[93] **Ibid.**, p. 62.
[94] Étienne Balibar, **La proposition de l'égaliberté. Essais politiques, 1989-2009**, Paris: PUF, 2010, pp. 170-1, ff.
[95] Étienne Balibar, **Violence and Civility. On the Limits of Political Philosophy**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, pp. ix, xii.
[96] Balibar, 'Uprisings in the **Banlieues**', p. 57.
[97] **Ibid.**, p. 60.

and consequently to the violent actions which are, in turn, employed as tactical elements in the discourse of such a post-colonial strategy. What he offers instead is a 'sustainable', non-violent civil rights movement inspired by the American and South African experiences.[98]

Here we should note that some three years later, Balibar published a lenghty book entitled *Violence et civilité*, in which he improved his thoughts on the contrast of violence and civility. In this book, likewise Arendt and other criticizers of violence, Balibar stresses that, '[t]he politics, as it thus presupposes and presumes *the political* (the autonomous order of the political), is at first the negation and the 'removal' ['*relève*'] of the violence. But if the violence cannot be removed, or worse, if the means and forms of this removal appear not in a contingent manner but essential, as the means and the forms of its continuation, consequently if there is a perversity intrinsic to *the political*, then *the politics* would become desperate and disappointing. And we know (or we believe that it is known) where the despair of the politics may lead to.'[99] From this brief statement, we can deduce two immediate notions: first, as Balibar himself approves, the political is attributed with an autonomous order, evidently an autonomy (complete or relative?) *from* the economic,[100] a conception on which Balibar's political philosophy relies upon. Second, within the political itself, a separation is intended: Balibar's conception of violence and politics explicitly distinguishes the two from each other and it emphasizes the margins of the politics and the political. Through both separations, he reproduces the conception of a bourgeois-liberal *nomos* of the political freed from the economic and of a political sphere in which the violence only remains as the tool of a monopoly power, that of, undoubtedly, the state.

Both in broader terms and in particular for the 2005 riots, we would argue that his remarks aim the reconciliation of 'the excluded' with the current

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[98] **Ibid.**, p. 54.

[99] Étienne Balibar, **Violence et civilité. Wellek Library Lectures et autres essais de philosophie politique**, Paris: Galilée, 2010, pp. 18-9.

[100] Attribution of autonomy to the political from the economic is well criticized by E. M. Wood who insists on the complete separation of the economic and the political in capitalism. Ellen Meiksins Wood, **Democracy against Capitalism. Renewing Historical Materialism**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 19-48. It should, therefore, be noted that these two are *not* the same processes. On the contrary, Wood's negation of the autonomy of the political implies the totality of the relations of the mode of production whereas her insistence on the separation of the economic and the political is a unique character of capitalism in which the appropriation of the surplus labor becomes a purely economic relation, exempt from political means and processes which were in good cooperation with economic means and processes in pre-capitalist modes of production, notably in feudalism.

representative democracy—a problem that should definitely be fixed, according to him— in terms of 'citizen-subjects'. Balibar describes this notion in the following passage: 'Now, it has to be thought inversed: a liberty founded on equality, engendered by the movement of equality. Thus, an unlimited liberty, or more precisely, auto-limited liberty: with any other limits than those which the liberty assigns itself for the realization of the rule of equality. In other terms, we should answer the question: *who is the citizen*? But not that question: who is citizen? (or: who are citizens?). The answer is: the citizen is a man who enjoys all of his 'natural' rights completely executing his humanity, a free man because simply equal to all others. This answer (or this new question in form of answer) will also tell that (…): *the citizen is the subject*, the citizen is always *supposed to be subject* (subject with rights, psychological subject, transcendental subject).' [101] Regarding this formulation—which seems to be a new invention, however, with the stress on the term 'subject', it gives a new form to a well-known, familiar description of the citizen— Balibar suggests the end of the exclusion mechanism and the reversal of the situation to that the excluded turn into the political agents on the political scene. Yet, the following question remains unanswered: on which grounds? Are those 'citizen-subjects', whether the excluded or the non-excluded, abstract political agents that have no social ground (what we will call 'class' in the following chapter) on which they are both objectively and subjectively determined? Balibar's political philosophy develops more and more without taking this social ground, i.e., class, into account, and it thusly becomes a plea for a political emancipation, ambiguous, vague and abstract. Hence, it constitutes one part of the 'radical theory' constellation that promotes an abstract libertarianism as a position for our age. On the other hand, as regards his account and his conception of the citizen, Balibar's approach remains very much like a *left republican*'s approach, with more elaborate 'discourse' and arguments, but, 'in the last analysis', with the same intentions. The radical theory curiously engages with a mainstream political position. Moreover, the (political) subjectivity, according to Balibar's formulations on violence and citizen-subject, is a particularity to be attributed to those who act politically within the modern-liberal sphere (the criticism of violence) as citizens (the formulation of citizen-subject). Left republicanism at its best!

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[101] Étienne Balibar, **Citoyen-sujet et autres essais d'anthropologie philosophique**, Paris: PUF, 2011, p. 52.

Along with the 'politics-based' accounts, we should also note that there are several accounts which deal with the historical 'meaning' of the riots. These historical explanations find their grounds at its best in the colonial history. During the 2005 riots, *Le Monde* journalist Philippe Bernard wrote an article stressing on the colonial background as regards the discourse of Sarkozy towards the immigrant youth (who were, in fact, mostly the descendants of immigrants and French citizens), and the state of emergency decree, which had not been issued since the Algerian War. As regards these facts, Bernard claimed that the current situation was a 'colonial provocation'. He stated that 'as long as the politicians, both from left and right, have troubles with considering the immigrant children as 100 per cent French, regardless their colors, as long as the reality on colonialism is not substituted with the 'positive role of French presence' sealed with the Law of February 2005, the youngsters of popular neighborhoods, who have never read Frantz Fanon, nor Che Guevara, will continue to feel how much the weight of this history still pervades the gazes directed on them.'[102]

The position of Bernard is, apparently, similar to that of the 'left-republican' Emmanuel Todd, since he actually proposes the recognition of colonial realities and the defeat of the discourse of 'positive aspects of colonialism' officially claimed with the Law of February 2005,[103] and the reconciliation of the sides in a plane cleared from culturalist/racist discourse. This position aims, in other words, the transcending of the ancient colonial antagonisms in favor of a reconciled French society free of discrimination, racism, etc. In that sense, Bernard's historical accounting corresponds to a certain strategy of 'internalization' ('*Verinnerlichung*') of 'the excluded'. But what is more important in his article is that he directly relates the situation of the excluded with the colonial heritage which they shoulder its weight. Furthermore, he makes an interesting innuendo with using the term 'indigenes of the Republic' for the rioters, a reference to the political movement with the same name (Indigènes de la République) born in the *banlieue*s of France in January 2005.

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[102] Philippe Bernard, 'Banlieues, la provocation coloniale', **Le Monde**, 18 November 2005.

[103] Often mentioned as the 'French colonial law of 2005', the most contested statement of this law, which could be considered so as to constitute the evidence of the thesis of 'permanency of colonialism', reads as follows: 'Scholarly programs recognize particularly the positive role of the French presence in overseas, especially in North Africa, and grant the eminent place of the combatants of the French Army from these territories to the history and to the sacrifices.' Loi no. 2005-158 du 23 février 2005 portant reconnaissance de la Nation et contribution nationale en faveur des Français rapatriés, Article 4, Paragraph 2.

A more elaborate historical approach comes from the philosopher Rada Ivekovic. In her article published a few months after the riots, she emphasizes a crucial point related to the thesis of 'permanency of colonialism'. She draws attention to the parallelism between the exceptions in colonies and the state of emergency decreed during the 2005 riots, and she states that through this 'question of security', these two historical parts connect each other: 'There is certainly a continuity between the exceptionality of the colonies and the generalization of the exception, today, in terms of national and international security.'[104] Ivekovic strongly processes her account in the article, but most interestingly she does not leave her historical account alone and she scratches the line between the historical context of the riots and the 'political subjectivity' of the rioters. Her historical account thusly goes hand in hand with what we would name as 'political subjectivity-based account'.

The accounts emphasizing the aspect of political subjectivity in the riots can be described as attempts to underline 'the political', who protests, clashes with the police, even violently makes politics in form of rioting. As regards this perspective, Ivekovic's above-mentioned article discussing the riots around the colonial context is a good example for this approach. Alongside the colonial context, Ivekovic's supporting argument is the 'return of the political', which refers to the 'political subjectivity' of the rioters via the permanency of colonialism in postcolonial conditions. Her account claims that the postcolonial conditions created such an environment for the descendants of 'the colonized' that the 'revolting bodies' emerged unexpectedly as a response to this very permanency.[105] Ivekovic discusses her ideas in terms of 'subaltern studies' around the notion of colonial permanency and the French system, and she arrives at the point 'dominance without hegemony', a concept employed by Ranajit Guha and other scholars of subaltern studies, which, according to Ivekovic, has been suitable not only for India but for every postcolonial situation. In that sense, Ivekovic's argument on 'revolting bodies' who are in relation to the colonial permanency is a consequence of this dominance without hegemony, that is to say that the rioters are dominated by the state authorities but this dominance is not due to state's hegemony over them, in other words, the state domination over the revolting bodies operates *without* the presence and reproduction of consent

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[104] Rada Ivekovic, 'Le retour du politique oublié par les banlieues', **Lignes**, no. 19, Février, 2006. p. 68.
[105] Ivekovic, **ibid.**, p. 65.

among them.[106] In this context, Guha writes that '[t]he colonized (…) reconstructed their past for purposes opposed to those of their rulers and made it the ground for marking out their differences in cultural and political terms.'[107]

It is understood that Ivekovic conveys this 'particularity' of the colonized in the geography of the colonizer's land in a postcolonial time and space, getting out of the colonial history of India and moving the idea into the French context. This approach has certain strong points, particularly her emphasize on the colonial permanency and underlining of the postcolonial situation, however it remains untouched and unclear how this permanency is maintained. Who exactly have been the 'colonized' during the colonial domination, and how they have simply shifted the colonial time and space so as to arrive at today's postcolonial situation? In the postcolonial literature, of which influences can be well traced in Ivekovic's historical account, such categories as the colonized and the colonizer are treated as they were solid and unchangeable, on the one hand, and as they were, within these categories themselves, non-contradictory, uniform and coherent. This is, in fact, an illusion caused by the non-historical treatment on the anti-colonial struggles and decolonization itself, which ultimately granted the *political* liberation of the colonized nations. Yet again, the *social* presupposition of this political liberation was not the non-contradictory alliance of the social forces flourished in the society. On the contrary, the political liberation in the colonies only presupposed the temporary alliance of social classes which, in return, developed the anti-colonial struggle in the 'best case' (e.g. the Algerian war of independence) in spite of these contradictions, postponing their urgent resolutions only to be ultimately resolved following the political liberation. Nevertheless, these anti-colonial struggles have often appeared 'infected' by the contradictions peculiar to their own social formations and those have been quite instrumental for their colonizers in order to prevent the 'national unity'. In sum, the 'colonized' have never been exempt from contradictions, i.e., class antagonisms, within themselves, and treating the colonized as a coherent and unchangeable category is an abstraction of a higher level in which social antagonisms become invisible. And Ivekovic's approach maintains the political character of the colonial permanency only through the political character of the

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[106] **Ibid.**, pp. 79-82.
[107] Ranajit Guha, **Dominance Without Hegemony. History and Power in Colonial India**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 3.

colonized abstracted from social bases, which makes this historical approach ultimately a-historical.[108]

Another political subjectivity-based account is that of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who do not deal with the riots deeply but only briefly mention them in their co-written book, *Commonwealth*. They basically define the 2005 riots as 'the struggle against the biopolitical regime of social production'[109]. Furthermore, stressing the spatial context (metropolis) of the riots, they note that these riots 'attacked the racial and wealth hierarchies by blocking the mobility of the metropolis, burning cars and educational structures, both of which the *banlieuesards* recognize as instruments of social mobility denied them. (…) French revolts combined race and labor antagonisms in a protest against the expropriation of the common and the impediments to encounters. These rebellions are not just *in* the metropolis but also *against* it, that is, against the form of the metropolis, its pathologies and corruptions.'[110] For Hardt and Negri, in this sense, these riots are the consequence of the double determination of class and race, a point of view similar to that of Balibar, but contrary to him, they stress the political subjectivity of the rioters flourishing in the basis of the 'social labor force' being exploited by the metropolitan mechanism of (capital) production and political control. Hardt and Negri's emphasis on the Foucauldian concept 'biopolitics' is due to this procession of contemporary capitalism. No doubt that Hardt and Negri are following a line of analysis on the contemporary formation of capitalism (which, in the mainstream academia and media, is called 'globalism' as opposed to 'imperialism') since their Empire thesis (2000) as well as on the modalities of resistance against the very much decentralized and localized sovereignty of Empire, based on a theoretical mélange consisting of Spinoza's philosophy (most notably his notion of 'multitude'), a de-Hegelianized understanding of Marxism and various notions borrowed from influential philosophers such as Schmitt, Foucault and Agamben. That line of analysis, which appears as a *pêle-mêle* signifying the postmodern character of episteme, seems to be undermining the coherence of the philosophers who steadily replace Marxist class perspective with a priority to *the* political as opposed to the economic. At the next level, given the preponderance of such notions as decentrality or multitudes in their

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[108] For a similar discussion, see: Vivek Chibber, **Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital**, New York: Verso, 2013.
[109] Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, **Commonwealth**, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 237.
[110] **Ibid.**, p. 259.

works, they tend to attribute an *emancipatory* character to all struggles confronting with Empire (which, for them, is everywhere) regardless the social beings of their components as though they were 'place[d] (…) under some homogenizing banner [of] multitude.'[111]

For sure, the intellectual project of Hardt and Negri is, beyond all, a political project aiming a controversy primarily among Marxism and left-wing politics so as to provoke a debate on the forms of domination, and their work should first be conceived in that way. Accordingly, the impact of their work found echoes among many circles especially in the Western left-wing intelligentsia and academia. We find one of the finest and most representative 'applications' of the line of analysis developed by Hardt and Negri in the case of the riots in an article published soon after the riots in the French 'autonomist' revue, *Multitudes*, penned by a French thinker, Judith Revel. In her article, Revel claims that the revolt was not a surprise regarding the given circumstances of the *banlieue*s of Paris and France, police violence and daily humiliations, etc., however she adds that 'the real surprise was rather that of a collective and acting (*agissant*) subjectivity, bewilderingly the time they last (three weeks) and the space (the neighborhoods in Paris *banlieue*s but equally in the province) (…)'.[112] This shows that Revel finds something 'unordinary' in the riots, since they demonstrated such a persistency with their cause and acting. Afterwards, she makes a classification between the discourses touching the 'political' aspect of the riots: *i)* One discourse stating that a movement or a political body 'not speaking the language of the political representation is necessarily aphasic or a more radical variant: infantine (…)'; *ii)* Another discourse stating that a movement or a political body, which destructs things, is in reality incapable of productive activity—this idea directly relates itself with the unproductivity of the *banlieue*s, and of course the components of the *banlieue*: the rioters, their historical-social realities, accordingly the connotation of 'savages'—which evokes the old colonial discourse—, etc.[113]

Revel defines the notion of unproductivity as a myth and she insists on thinking 'other way around' on the political which emerged with the riots through a set of concepts borrowed from Foucault and Agamben, albeit criticizing the latter.

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[111] David Harvey, **The New Imperialism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 169.
[112] Judith Revel, 'De la vie en milieu précaire. Comment en finir avec la vie nue', **Multitudes**, 2006/4, no. 27, p. 158.
[113] **Ibid.**, p. 160.

She starts with the etymology of the word *banlieue*, and she interprets the word as 'banned lieu', later relating it with Agamben's notion of 'ban' in *Homo Sacer*, which is to say that certain spaces are abandoned by the sovereign according to a certain logic of sovereignty.[114] However, Revel's attempt to put the *banlieue* in relation with Agamben's conception of the sovereign seems an over-reading for that the term *banlieue*, in fact, does not signify the 'ban', not even 'lieu'. Etymologically, *banlieue* refers to the spaces, which are leagues-distant from the city (*lieue*) and ruled by the law of feudal lords (*ban*). So that, *ban*, actually refers to a legal status of a territory where the *banlieue* is situated, and *lieue* (league, in English, approximately equals to four kilometers) refers to the distance where a specific feudal code begins to exercise.[115] Revel's assumption in that sense does not have any accordance with the notion of banishment in sense of Agamben's usage. Here, we should note that this is a very common misinterpretation of the term *banlieue*: there are several articles, even books based upon this false relation of the term with Agamben's thought.[116] However this relation might have been established with mere metaphor—as long as the etymological fact is not taken into consideration. *Banlieue*, as Revel insists, can in fact be an equivalent of the banished spaces of Agamben in modern society, where various types of confinements over the population exercise. Yet, such an approach is, for certain reasons (which we have discussed in the Chapter IV of this study), inadequate in conceiving the social character of space, which has immediate relations with production and everyday life.

After this 'over-reading', Revel makes the following commentary:

'(…) [W]hy control these places where there is nothing to win? The process of valorization has changed and production became something else. The *banlieue* is now officially declared unproductive. (…) It is affirmed that the *banlieue* is the non-place of production, or rather the place of radical unproductivity. And nothing is thus easier than to transform this so-called sterility in a metaphor of social entropy with moral connotations stressed very often ('the multitude and the evil, 'the savagery', the youth, blind violence, etc.): when we don't know how to produce anymore, not only we do not exist socially but we end up with devouring ourselves. Animalization is thus inevitable: dressage (in re-education camps for military-humanitarian framing), taming (of the scum), cleaning (with Kärcher) are all variations of the

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[114] **Ibid.**, pp. 161-2.

[115] Hervé Vieillard-Baron, 'Banlieue, quartier, ghetto. De l'ambiguïte des définitions aux représentations', **Nouvelle revue de psychosociologie**, 2011/2, no. 12, pp. 28-31.

[116] An example for this may be M. B. Kacem's pamphlet on the 2005 riots, in which he relates the **banlieue** with the banishment of the 'lieu' by the sovereign. Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, **La psychose française. Les banlieues: le ban de la République**, Paris: Gallimard, 2006.

same theme—because the (false) decree on unproductivity which was established with past criteria immediately permits denying every social value to *the subjects who are knocked out (superposition of the discourse on* banlieues*, on integration and citizenship: when you are not productive, you cannot be a citizen exactly), and the life in the* banlieue*, its formidable richness, is thus crushed out, pounded, reduced to a simple survival.* The power, with the mystification it operates through the judgment of unproductivity, searches, in fact, to transform *bios* into *zoè*, social and political existence into bare life.[117]

In this passage, Revel's critique has two targets, one being the technologies of power itself, as it becomes evident throughout the given text, other being Agamben's idea of unproductivity and similar approaches among the left-wing politics which take the notion of production in a narrow sense that implies a certain system of mass production, namely Fordism. Instead, according to Revel, unproductivity is a myth and this kind of approach 'condemns the *banlieue* in the name of a thing that does not exist', which is Fordist mass production itself that was historically replaced with what is called post-Fordism. Therefore, this approach ultimately operates so as to support, or at least become congruent with, the technologies of power which *confine* the *banlieue* and which render the social and political existence in these spaces bare life, i.e., *zoè*, 'which express[es] the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods)'—whereas the bios 'indicate[s] the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group'.[118] On the other hand, while targeting the concept of citizenship in the French political system (as a variant of modern-liberal political systems) through the critique of unproductivity, Revel's line of attack suddenly turns out to building a front line including a new fraction of the 'multitude' so as to gather the rioting *banlieuesards* under an 'homogenizing banner', borrowing the term from Harvey, as if the life in the *banlieues* and its 'richness' were *per se* emancipatory (politically or socially?) and exempt from alienation and their own contradictions.

A final example for the political subjectivity-based approach is that of Sadri Khiari, a Tunisian intellectual, who had been a political exile in France from 2003 onwards until the time he returned to Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali, and one of the founders of the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République. His book published soon after the 2005 riots, entitled *Pour une politique de la racaille*[119] [*'For A Politics*

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[117] Revel, **ibid.**, p. 166. (Emphasis ours.)

[118] Giorgio Agamben, **Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 1.

[119] Sadri Khiari, **Pour une politique de la racaille. Immigré-e-s, indigènes et jeunes de banlieues**, Paris: Éditions Textuel, 2006.

of the Scum'] outlines the political aspects of a possible political movement that also finds inspiration with the 2005 riots. As it can be seen even in the title of the book, Khiari speaks from somewhere *inside* the *banlieue*s and *amongst* the rioters, additionally appropriating affirmatively the pejorative 'scum' appellation that Sarkozy used for the discontent youth of *banlieue*s. This may already give an idea how much Khiari insists on the aspect of political subjectivity of the rioters.

Khiari's argument basically consists of following standpoints: *i)* the French political sphere, to a large extent, possessed by the 'white', that is to say, the non-whites (Blacks, Arabs, immigrants, etc.) are excluded from the political sphere, in other words, they do not politically exist within the representation system[120]; *ii)* this situation is a consequence of that 'the Republic pretends as if it were egalitarian and universal' while 'indigenes', i.e., the descendants of 'the colonized' in the French territory, 'do not exist in a juridical status'[121]; *iii)* thus, the 'indigenes of the Republic' must construct an autonomous political movement in order to exist and act politically, not within the system of representation nor in the existing white political sphere, but on an extended political scene, which involves a larger conception of politics.[122] This must-be-constructed political movement, according to Khiari, finds its premier roots in the colonial history and colonial antagonism, which has been evoked in a new form in postcolonial times in the ex-colonizer's mainland.

Therefore this political movement should largely rely upon ethno-racial antagonisms (for the fact that the colonial domination was due to such antagonisms) on the one hand, and upon cultural divergences (which were consequences of the ethno-racial antagonisms) on the other hand: those antagonisms and divergences separate certain parts of the population from the rest since colonial times when they were institutionalized, and they carry their existences on because of the colonial permanency. The issue of class finds its place in Khiari's approach as one of the antagonisms between the rulers and the oppressed of the postcolonial situation in the metropole, which implies a stress in relation to ethno-racial and cultural antagonisms, thusly becoming of secondary, even tertiary importance in the 'politics

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[120] **Ibid.**, p. 57. This argument is not new; it has been often uttered by various scholars. For instance, in the European context particularly for Muslim minorities, Talal Asad states that '[t]he ideology of political representation in liberal democracies makes it difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims as Muslims.' Talal Asad, **Formations of the Secular, Christianity, Islam, Modernity**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 173.
[121] Khiari, **ibid.**, p. 17.
[122] **Ibid.**, pp. 99-132.

of the scum'. Hence, the determining notion in the politics of the scum is apparently a 'postcolonial anti-colonialism'. The objective of this politics is, as Kipfer remarks, 'a form of emancipation with universal implications' from the colonial permanency by 'linking anti-colonial concerns with broader anti-capitalist forces, on the one hand, anti-colonial forms of *feminism*, on the other'—'through a practice of *mixity* that must modify the practice of autonomy.'[123]

In that sense, Khiari and the Indigènes, derive a political subjectivity from the riots and rioters as regards the colonial permanency and postcolonial situation, which translates as that the 2005 riots have accordingly become a historical moment for the making of a political body in form of a radical organization with a sharp discourse against colonialism, capitalism, and other forms of modern dominance which have always been strictly connected to each other throughout time and space. Kipfer summarizes the politics of the Indigènes, which is deeply inspired by Fanon's radical thought, as follows: '(…) first, put[ting] forward an *integral* understanding of colonization as a multi-dimensional process incorporating macro- and micro-dimensions of reality; second, analyz[ing] racism as a crucial *modality* of wider, political-economic dynamics of colonization; third, treat[ing] colonization as a multi-scalar *spatial relation* that begs for strategies of territorial re-appropriation linking national liberation to spatial transformations at various scales; fourth, see[ing] gender and patriarchy as crucial to analyze colonial rule and differentiate between 'true' and 'false' forms of decolonization; and, finally, usher[ing] in a new, dialectical, and cautiously universalizing *humanism* to transform the subjectivities of colonizer and colonized alike.'[124]

Like all political subjectivity-based approaches, Khiari's work, his political strategy called the 'politics of the scum' and the Indigènes as the embodiment of this strategy arrive at the strait when it comes to the issue of class. Khiari formulates a complex space of struggle against the modern forms of dominance including capitalism and racism. Yet, with the skill of prestidigitation, he impels his criticism towards Marxism by an assault on its most vulgar interpretation, which immediately equates the struggle against capitalism with the struggle against diverse forms of oppression, including racism and others. We call this interpretation 'vulgar' for there

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[123] Stefan Kipfer, 'Decolonization in the Heart of Empire. Some Fanonian Echoes in France Today'. **Antipode**, vol. 43, no. 4, 2011, p. 1156-7.
[124] **Ibid.**, p. 1157.

is an endemic misunderstanding among Marxists which preaches that regional, ethnic, gender, religious, and similar questions would be resolved 'ultimately' by the conquest of the political power. This interpretation is vulgar since it assumes a highly abstracted duality between the base and the superstructure, and understands such questions related to 'identities' solely belonging to the superstructure, which, in this mechanic view, will spontaneously be resolved once the political power is conquered by some revolutionary forces. It not only caricaturizes the complexity of social relations by confining them into a single base—superstructure duality but also the politically- and historically-manipulated over-emphasize on the *political* mystifies the reality of the *social*. Indeed, Khiari is right in his concern as regards this 'class-based' vulgarization since the endemic character of this simplification is surely a philosophical, theoretical and most importantly a *political* underminer of Marxism itself. Yet, does not his emphasize on the political at the expense of the economic reproduce not the identical but a similar scheme of the superposition of the political over the economic? It is true that the road to hell is paved with good intensions: the 'retreat from class' beginning with the 'forerunner' Poulantzas in 1970s[125] was due to a negation of orthodox Marxism with the good intension of abolishing the Stalinist vulgarization however it ended up with the actual experience of Eurocommunism in the 1980s, the emergence of a new true socialism and the influence of post-Marxism down to this time. Does not the politics of a 'postcolonial anti-colonialism', which downgrades the relevance of class to the burning immigrant question in France, rout out the political character of the riots and rioters of their path to becoming progressive political agents that find their social forces not *under* a homogenized banner but *upon* their social beings?

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[125] Ellen Meiksins Wood, **The Retreat from Class. A New 'True' Socialism**, London, New York: Verso, 1998, pp. 25-46.

CHAPTER II:

IMMIGRANTS AS DISTINCT CLASS FRACTIONS

OF THE PROLETARIAT

A Theoretical Investigation on the Concept of Class

In our accounts on the 2005 riots, we have seen that the riots are examined from various points of view, yet we have insisted from the beginning on the necessity of a 'unitary theory' which would enable us to approach to the wider 'immigrant question' with multiple facets in their *totality*. Therefore, it is necessary to expose what do we mean with the notion of 'totality', and what is its relevance to the concept of class through which we propose to approach the immigrant question. For this aim, we should respectively focus on these two.

If we were to begin with the notion of totality, Lukács would be illuminating in order to have an idea. He writes on the notion as follows: 'Only in [the] context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a *totality*, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of *reality*.'[126] Here it should be noted that totality has a strong connection with the Hegelian notion of the Absolute. G. A. Magee, a scholar of Hegel, explains this connection: 'Hegel's philosophy attempts to show how the being of each finite thing in existence just is its place *in the whole*, as part of the system of reality itself. (…) [T]he Absolute is active and dynamic, continually replenishing or reconstituting itself through the finite beings that make up the infinite whole.'[127] On the other hand, the philosophy historian Copleston points out this relation stating that 'the subject-matter of philosophy is the Absolute. But the Absolute is the Totality, reality as a whole, the universe. (…) Further, this totality or whole is infinite life, a process of

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[126] Georg Lukács, **History and Class Consciousness**, London: Merlin Press, 1983, p. 8.
[127] Glenn Alexander Magee, **The Hegel Dictionary**, London and New York: Continuum, 2010, p. 20. (Italics ours.)

self-development.'[128] Indeed, Hegel writes in the first volume of his *Encyclopaedia* on Logic as follows: 'The Science of [the Absolute] is essentially a *system*, since what is *concretely* true is so only in its inward self-unfolding and in taking and holding itself together in unity, i.e., as *totality*.'[129] Then he concludes in the addition to this paragraph: 'A philosophizing *without system* cannot be scientific at all.'

All these passages might give us an idea about what is the Hegelian methodology of dealing with things, phenomena, those 'finite parts' in their relation to the whole, and the integral part of this methodology, its basic standpoint is called 'totality' as Lukács emphasizes several times in his texts. Lukács's himself sees Marx's dictum from his *Poverty of Philosophy* which states that 'the relations of production of every society form a whole' constituting the 'methodological point of departure and the key to the *historical* understanding of social relations.'[130] One thing is well known: Marx always emphasized that the historical development of mankind lies on the *ground* of the 'mode of production' in every society that revealed themselves, in the course of history, in class forms into which the masses in a society divided. The term 'ground', which is an important notion again in Hegelian vocabulary, is explained in his *Encyclopaedia Logic* as 'the unity of identity and distinction (…) posited as *totality*.'[131]

The notion of 'ground' and the 'mode of production' as its equivalent in Marx might lead us a path. Hegel writes: 'Ground does not yet have any *content* that is determined in and for itself, nor is it *purpose*. So it is neither *active* nor *productive*; instead, an existence simply *emerges* from the ground. The *determinate* ground is therefore something formal (…).'[132] Following Marx's turning Hegel's idealism upside-down, we shall thus pass to the mode of production as the ground of the 'totality' of the material life. Mode of production, in this sense, does not act or produce by its own, it is solely the ground of the act of producing, the form of this or that material activity, therefore the form of the whole production process and the ensemble of relations of productions, which emerge from nowhere but this ground that constitutes the form of every material activity.

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[128] Frederick Copleston, **Modern Philosophy. From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, A History of Philosophy**, vol. 7, New York: Image Book, 1994, p. 170.

[129] G. W. F. Hegel, **The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the *Zusätze*). Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the *Zusätze***, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, §14. pp. 38-9.

[130] Lukács, **ibid.**, p. 9.

[131] Hegel, **ibid.**, §121, p. 188.

[132] **Ibid.**, §122, p. 192.

Before continuing with mode of production, let us shoot a glance at the act of producing itself. Marx and Engels discuss the question of the act of producing in a chapter on the premises of the materialist conception of history in *The German Ideology* (1845-1846). After stating that men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, religion, or whatever alike, the philosophers expand this statement into a premise: 'They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to *produce* their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization. By producing their means of subsistence men are *indirectly* producing their material life.'[133] Here we clearly see that Marx and Engels replace the act of producing beneath all other forms of human activity in order to create the material life; although the material life consists of not only producing but other forms of human activity, *it is only realized* when men produce their means of subsistence. Producing, thus, has a constituent force in men's lives, and effectively this is the case throughout the history; it has *indirect* consequences in the material life that men live.

Hence we arrive at the point that producing (the means of subsistence) is the driving force of all forms of human activity, however this driving force is not solely determinant in shaping the totality of material life: it is, to a certain degree, a conditioned activity, determined by objective conditions what Marx and Engels call 'restricted conditions of production' ('*Produktionsverhältnisse*') [134] in a given historical time and space. Production, thus, is *not* the activity of the philosophically categorical 'free man', who is isolated from his material world, who acts freely and who exists as freed from this world only because he is capable of thinking, reasoning, producing, exchanging, and so on. Engels's debate against Dühring on the issue of Crusoe and Friday strongly exposes the failure of this view as regards to the theory of force in particular.[135] Contrarily, production is very much dependent on the material world in a dialectical way, to the surrounding conditions of production, to its own consequences—just as its consequences are dependent to their primal cause, i.e., to the production—and, apparently, to the given nature of the actually existing world. Production causes, creates and determines; on the other hand it is conditioned,

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[133] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, **The German Ideology**, in K. Marx, F. Engels, **Collected Works**, vol. 5, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, p. 31. (Emphasis ours.)
[134] **Ibid.,** pp. 34-5.
[135] Friedrich Engels, **Anti-Dühring**, in K. Marx, F. Engels, **Collected Works**, vol. 25, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, pp. 147-9.

its means are created and it is determined by its own objective material world. It is in such a relation with its consequences that it both presupposes and is presupposed.

If we return to our previous problematic of mode of production, we will see that, precisely for this reason Marx and Engels write that 'mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite *mode of life* on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce.'[136] Mode of production is, therefore, the determined and determining ground, i.e., the form, of human activity, and, eventually, of relations of man with his kind, with his nature, and with his own—which are all flourishing from this definite form of activity. In this sense, the 'restricted conditions of production' also refers to the same ground, to this form; since these conditions do not act by themselves ('ground does not yet have any *content…*', as we quoted from Hegel above), they do only impose themselves as much as they are the consequences of the preceding human activities, which transform these conditions partially or wholly.

It is very well known that neither Marx nor Engels provided a specific definition of class, and that in the unfinished Volume 3 of *Capital*, Marx intended to make such a definition starting with the question 'What constitutes a class?', which was never completed. However, our chapter so far tries to follow the traces of Marx's turning Hegel upside-down, that is to say, the way how Hegel's conception of the universe was and what Marx did in order to turn this conception upside-down though conserving Hegel's holistic approach. Class, in that sense, finds its place exactly where we marked as 'ground', but the ground which Marx understood as 'mode of production', the birthplace of all human activities and his relations—including the 'relations of production.'

Following the Hegelian Marxist dialectic, class can thusly be specified through two determinants:

i.)   Mode of production as ground (form);
ii.)   Whole of the productive activity and the relations of production (content).

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[136] Marx, Engels, **ibid.**, pp. 31-2.

Mode of production as ground, i.e., a definite form of the productive activities of men, is explicitly economic for it implies the productive activities, and consequently the relations of production. It so imposes a general manner for the productive activity, which varies more or less in different contexts and depends on the specific conditions of this or that geographical space (i.e., culture, political forms and institutions, legal system, etc.), but in its essence it operates through the same logic wherein this given mode of production is established. Slavery of antiquity, feudalism, Asiatic mode of production, capitalism, etc., in this sense, are all modes of production and they are certainly historical for they exist in certain historical periods—including today—throughout human history. Slavery as a historical mode of production performs different apparitions in ancient Greece and Rome, or in Egypt and Mesopotamia, but as a form, as the economic ground of productive activity, it obliges the same Master and slave duality wherever it exists. This *objectivity* of the form also applies for other historical modes of production as well as capitalism. It is for this reason that Marx, in his Preface to the first volume of *Capital,* was quoting from Horace the famous line, '*de te fabula narratur!*' ['*The tale is told of you!*'], in order to make the German reader convince that the conditions in England, as regards his field of research on capital, were no different than in Germany in case one says that 'things are not nearly so bad' in the latter. This quote is a mere appeal to make us remember that the mode of production as ground is only the 'universal' generic form of the real and actual activities of men; despite and along with its variations depending on various geographical spaces, it is one and the same thing in the historical development of humanity. Speaking for capitalism, the most integral and essential, furthermore, the *constituent* element of this definite mode of production is capital—for it is capital that determines the capitalist mode of production (the ground) according to its own law of accumulation, which is proved to be at the same time capital's *modus operandi* and utmost end.

The notion of totality plays a key role in Marx's account on the unity of production and realization, which has a central place in our attempt for a Marxist class conception. For Marx, capital uniquely operates through the circulating process of production—distribution—exchange—consumption:

> '(…) production appears as the point of departure, consumption as the conclusion, distribution and exchange as the middle (…). The person objectifies himself in production, the thing subjectifies itself in the person; in distribution, society mediates between production

and consumption in the form of general, dominant determinants; in exchange the two are mediated by the chance characteristics of the individual.'[137]

In this circulation, there is a certain relationship between production and consumption, and vice versa: these two are *immediate* objects of each other, for that:

> production mediates consumption; it creates the latter's material; without it, consumption would lack an object. But consumption also mediates production, in that it alone creates for the products the subject for whom they are products. The product only obtains its last finish in consumption. (…) Production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption, not only objectively but also subjectively. Production thus creates the consumer. (…) Thus production produces consumption (1) by creating the material for it; (2) by determining the manner of consumption; and (3) by creating the products, initially posited by it as objects, in the form of a need felt by the consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the manner of consumption and the motive of consumption.[138]

We are now able to speak of the *immediate relationship* of production and consumption (the ending point circulation in the process of *realization*), not as one and single act but as phases of one and single process.[139] Only through this way capital becomes an end-in-itself and for-itself; therefore, and precisely for this reason, it relies upon, through this circulation, a 'unity', the unity of production of the surplus value and its realization. It is in this unity of the process that arises the 'capitalist' mode of production as ground, and it determines its content as parts of one and single process which starts with production and ends up with consumption, and then restarts the entire circulation once proceeding from consumption to production.

However, as Marx points out in the second volume of *Capital* and in *Grundrisse*[140], and as Harvey forcefully emphasizes the point in various occasions, this unity of production and realization is not a harmonious but a contradictory unity and is one of the foundational contradictions of capital.[141] One might immediately ask why does this 'contradictory unity' matter and what is its relevance to class conception. There are two reasons for the first part of the question. First, the issue of contradictory unity is essential to understand Marx's work in its entirety. Not only

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[137] **Ibid.**, p. 89.
[138] **Ibid.**, pp. 91-2.
[139] **Ibid.**, pp. 93-4.
[140] Karl Marx, **Capital**, vol. 2, London: Penguin, 1992, pp. 180-229 (Chapters 4-6); Marx, **Grundrisse**, pp. 401-58.
[141] David Harvey, **Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism**, London: Profile, 2014, pp. 79-85. Also see: D. Harvey, **A Companion to Marx's *Capital*,** vol. 2, London and New York: Verso, 2013.

due to scholarly reasons but also from a political point of view, Harvey has repeatedly stressed the general tendency to deal with the problems of capitalism more often through the content and scope of the first volume of *Capital*, which focuses on the production process of capital through the production of surplus value while disregarding the second volume which focuses on the process of the realization of surplus value. [142] Whereas the first volume gets into the 'hidden abode of production', [143] the second strolls through the market where the circulation process in the capitalist mode of production takes place once a commodity is produced in the 'factory'. In that respect, the separate 'spaces' of these two volumes, therefore their contents and scopes, constitute a unity that cannot be discarded. This unity is not essential only to understand Marx's work but also capitalism's own dynamics that galvanized in these two spheres.

Second, a fundamental contradiction of capital as such is of critical importance so as to develop a class conception since it is in this contradiction that the place of the worker's labor (as 'fixed capital') in the production phase crystallizes. In the capitalist mode of production, as distinct from preceding modes of production, the extraction and appropriation of surplus labor is, according to Ellen Meiksins Wood, a purely economic relation. The production of capital as commodity through the process of production of surplus labor is essentially its extraction and appropriation by the owner of the means of production, i.e., the capitalist, without any direct involvement of political power (that was the case e.g. in feudalism in which political power was directly involved in the relations of exploitation). [144] Therefore, the extraction and appropriation of surplus labor is directly linked to the production of surplus value. Yet, as Marx shows, the production of surplus value in commodity form has in fact *no value*, since capital has now been devalued in commodity form before the commodity goes through the process of exchange, of consumption, in which its value will be *realized*. Therefore the surplus value, as well as the extracted and appropriated surplus labor, can only be realized at the end of the entire circulation in the process that is unique to the capitalist mode of production.

In return, these remarks might be found provoking as if they were hinting to propose a replacement of Marxist class conception understood through the relations

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[142] Harvey, **A Companion to Marx's *Capital*,** vol. 2, pp. 1-3.

[143] Karl Marx, **Capital**, vol. 1, London: Penguin, 1990, pp. 279-80.

[144] Ellen Meiksins Wood, **Democracy against Capitalism. Renewing Historical Materialism**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 19-48.

of exploitation between the capitalist and the worker with an alternative conception which focuses on the relations of consumption. What do we intend to say is, instead, something else. By the help of a 'gross simplification',[145] the contradiction between production and realization can be described as follows: in order to maximize the conditions for the production of surplus value, the capitalist can extract and appropriate more surplus labor which immediately increases the surplus value while reducing the costs of the production by simply paying less to the worker. In that case, the worker, this time as a consumer in the market place, will have worse conditions in order to purchase the commodity *and* realize the surplus value. In other words, this way means shrinking the aggregate demand for the sake of production of surplus value and at the expense of its realization. At the opposite track, in order to maximize the conditions for the realization of surplus value by strengthening the effective demand ultimately means (relatively) better conditions for the part of the worker who goes on to the market as a consumer and is likely to purchase the commodity so as to realize the surplus value, which was, in return, reduced by the diminishing surplus labor. Harvey writes:

> Capital in the advanced capitalist countries tended towards a demand-management stance consistent with the Volume 2 prescriptions (emphasizing the conditions for realization of value) between 1945 and the mid-1970s but in the process increasingly ran into problems (particularly those of a well-organized and politically powerful working-class movement) in the production of surplus value. After the mid-1970s it therefore shifted (after a fierce battle with labor) towards a supply-side stance more consistent with Volume 1. This emphasized cultivating the conditions for surplus value production (through reducing real wages, crushing working-class organization and generally disempowering workers). The neoliberal counter-revolution (…) from the mid-1970s onwards resolved the pre-eminent problems of surplus value production but it did so at the expense of creating problems of realization in the marketplace.[146]

This brings us to the relevance of the contradictory unity to the issue of class, not only in terms of that it is from this contradiction that the 'political' struggle of the working class finds the most suitable ground, but also as regards the fact that it is in the process of realization that even one particular class which is determined by its status in the ownership of the means of production now disintegrates into a number of *fractions* which are determined both through economic and extra-economic

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[145] Harvey, **Seventeen Contradictions**, p. 82.
[146] **Ibid.**, pp. 81-2.

processes. In a renowned and often-quoted passage in the third volume of *Capital*, Marx writes explicitly as follows:

> The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labor is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers—a relation whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labor, and hence to its social productive power—in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the specific form of state in each case. *This does not prevent the same economic basis*—the same in its major conditions—*from displaying endless variations gradations in its appearance, as the result of innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural conditions, racial relations, historical influences acting from outside, etc., and these can only be understood by analyzing these empirically given conditions.*[147]

In order to make these explanations clearer, let us take an example from our main subject of study, i.e., the immigrants in France, in abstraction: A migrant worker, following his arrival in the country of destination, in some cases immediately and in others latterly (depending on which terms he migrated to this country as immigrant worker), gets into the process of commodity production once he comes to a deal with the capitalist in the labor market to sell his labor. In the hidden abode of production, he is subject to exactly the same process of extraction and appropriation of labor as the non-immigrant worker undergoes. The capitalist applies no extra-economic force in order to produce the surplus labor of the immigrant worker. Yet, the *conditions* of the immigrant worker are considerably different from the non-immigrant in purely economic sense. Since labor migration is essentially stimulated for the supplement of the existing labor force, and providing cheap labor, the immigrant worker sells his labor in the labor market relatively cheaper than the non-immigrant, especially due to their socio-economic status in which the immigrants from the Maghreb are relatively much more concentrated under the categories of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers.[148] Consequently, the production of surplus labor extracted and appropriated from the immigrant worker becomes more than that from the non-immigrant worker. In terms of wages,

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[147] Karl Marx, **Capital**, vol. 3, London: Penguin, 1991, pp. 927-8. (Emphasis ours.)
[148] Castles, Kosack, **ibid.**, p. 80. (See Table III:14.)

the non-immigrant, due to his advantageous position in his home country, earns more than the immigrant worker who, in return, poses a question from the point of view of the capitalist for the former will have less options in the marketplace in order to realize the surplus labor. Meanwhile, both workers immediately take part in the class struggle in order to improve the conditions for their livelihoods. Yet again, they are neither equal in this struggle for the fact that the immigrant worker is more precarious as regards his conditions which pose him vulnerabilities from different aspects. Among them, the most important one is immigrant's necessity of selling his labor *immediately* since he has less patience for a bargain with the capitalist—especially in the course of a heightening struggle which would take even longer time. Residential status, work contract or subjective difficulties in communication, problems in adaptation to environment and other factors will also contribute to these vulnerabilities. Therefore, the position of the immigrant worker in the marketplace, which belongs to the realm of circulation of capital and, hence, realization of surplus labor—as being in contradiction with its production—has direct impact on his position in the phase of production in which his surplus labor is appropriated by the capitalist. Furthermore, although in the capitalist mode of production the economic and the political are definitely separated, as emphasizes E. M. Wood, the marketplace, which has both economic and political character for it is regulated by exchange value (economic) and is the scene of class struggle that starts with the bargain between the worker and the capitalist (political), has a profound relation to the phase of production so as to forge, to a certain extent, the relations of exploitation which characterizes classes under capitalism. And this relation is even stronger in the case of the immigrant worker who has relatively more precarious conditions than that of the non-immigrant worker.

We need here a parenthesis in order to avoid confusion with the concepts that we employ while exposing our class conception and its empirical reflection in reality. The way we employ the term 'fraction' should not be confused with the sense attributed by certain 'structuralist' theorists. For example, Balibar frequently uses the term 'class fraction' which is, according to him, necessary for completing the conception of social classes in capitalism. Yet, in his analysis, class fractions are considered as being constituted through tendencies of the development of the means of production and constant movement in the division of labor, essentially relying

upon the uneven development and 'cutting' the working-class into fractions.[149] Contrary to our use of the term 'fraction', Balibar remains in the realm of production in which relations of exploitation prevail, but he is not interested in the process concerning the realm of circulation in which exist different social relations considered as belonging to the 'superstructure'. This contrariness is specifically due to two reasons: first, Balibar rejects the notion of 'totality' on the grounds that this notion was central in Hegelian dialectical idealism and not Marxist historical materialism, in which the central notion was contradiction, according to him.[150] This rejection was initially grounded in the work of Althusser who offered the notion of 'social whole' ('*tout social*') instead of totality.[151] Second, the works of both Althusser and Balibar, and structuralist Marxism in general, are constructed upon the duality of an economic base and extra-economic superstructure, which in fact appears as a rarely used metaphor in Marx's own work before vulgar interpretations of Marxism presented it as the main contradiction. It is ironic that Althusser with his structuralist Marxism had reproduced this metaphor and extensively used it when he first posited himself theoretically against these vulgar interpretations of Marxism and 'Marxist humanism' at once. Consequently, within a quite complicated set of concepts, this structuralist theory, especially with such theorists like Nicos Poulantzas[152] and others, ultimately went as far as attributing a relative autonomy to extra-economic spheres, most importantly to the political sphere, from the economic. In that scheme, the base structurally determines the superstructure in the last instance yet the latter is the realm of contingencies that is maintained with a relative autonomy as regards the former.[153] Structuralist theory thusly leads to the view that only renders the vulgarism offering the 'compartmentalization of self-enclosed spheres'[154] more sophisticated theoretically. It is contrary to this view that we offer a view that turns its face towards 'encompass[ing] historical specificity, as well as human agency, while recognizing within it the logic of mode of production.'[155]

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[149] Étienne Balibar, **Cinq études du matérialisme historique**, Paris: François Maspero, 1974, pp. 138-45.

[150] **Ibid.**, p. 133n.

[151] Louis Althusser, **Pour Marx**, Paris: La Découverte, 2005 [1965], pp. 161-224.

[152] Especially see: Nicos Poulantzas, **Les classes sociales dans le capitalisme aujourd'hui**, Paris: Seuil, 1974. For his critique, see: Ellen Meiksins Wood, **The Retreat from Class. A New 'True Socialism'**, London: Verso, 1999, pp. 25-46.

[153] For the source and systemic exposition of these criticisms, see: E. M. Wood, **Democracy against Capitalism**, pp. 49-75.

[154] **Ibid.**, p. 49.

[155] **Ibid.**, p. 59.

At what point we arrive, therefore, is that the entire circulation of capital which encompasses productive activities, relations of production and exploitation, etc., in other words the 'content' of the capitalist mode of production as the 'form', is as much penetrating the realm of social life as it implies many variables including elements often considered to be 'immaterial' such as culture, way of thinking, *Weltanschaaung*, ideology, etc., in itself, so that they impose themselves into the account while dealing with class. It is precisely this fact that makes any social being non-static and puts it into mere 'interactions' and 'intercourses' with itself, with its kind, with its nature, briefly with its real circumstances. Social being thusly becomes *conditioned* by these relations and inversely it subjectivates itself and appropriates its forces to transform these circumstances. So that, apart from the 'objective' determination of class(es), which is carried out as regards the relations of exploitation, this subjective aspect of the process also imposes itself in the determination of class(es), operating mainly through class fractions. How, then, do these economic and extra-economic processes bring the *formation* of class fractions into existence, particularly in the case of immigrants?

For a possible explanation to this question, the work of the historian E. P. Thompson might provide suitable tools and methodology. In his groundbreaking work *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), he starts with his own class conception as follows:

> By class I understand an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in consciousness. I emphasize that it is an *historical* phenomenon. I do not see class as a 'structure', nor even as a 'category', but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships.[156]

For the part of Thompson, he was after a more interpretive model of historical processes relying on a dynamic, albeit conditioned, human agency considered in the hub of vivid relations and processes rather than strict, rigid, unidirectional structural determinations. Thompson sought 'through class-struggle analysis', writes Harvey J. Kaye, 'to reconceptualize the materialistic dialectic of social being and social consciousness as much as possible away from a static model to a dynamic one.'[157] We have to emphasize here that the class struggle analysis in

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[156] E. P. Thompson, **Making of the English Working Class**, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 8.
[157] Harvey J. Kaye, **The British Marxist Historians. An Introductory Analysis**, London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 173.

Thompson's work is first and foremost a class formation analysis. 'As a study of class formation', Kaye notes, this work 'is written to counter the practice by sociologists in stratification studies of defining class as a static structure or category.'[158]

Without getting involved in dense philosophical debates in this work, Thompson briefly outlines the historical connection between 'class as relationship', class struggle and class-consciousness as follows:

> [C]lass happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born—or enter involuntarily. Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms. *If the experience appears as determined, class-consciousness does not*. We can see a logic in the responses of similar occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predicate any law.[159]

Therefore, in Thompson's work, 'class as relationship' involves experiences of class(es) through processes in which classes are *determined* by their situations as regards their relations to the means of production while by directly participating in class struggle simultaneous to their experiences they 'handle' them, in return, in the form of class-consciousness. This leads us to the idea that in the complex nexus of class, class struggle and class-consciousness, historical process that implies many modalities like traditions, culture, values, ideologies, etc., which are shaped in time and space, in everyday life and circle of alienation—disalienation—re-alienation, is the key for understanding the formation of classes as well as class fractions. On the one hand, it is the ensemble of these class experiences, class struggle and class-consciousness that *cuts*, or *breaks*, a certain class *into* distinct fractions such as 'immigrant class fractions'. On the other hand, it is in that frame that a class analysis would have an appropriate trajectory towards accurately depicting the class character of a phenomenon such as the 'immigrant question'.

For our case in France, we may specify several 'lines', or several components, in the formation of immigrant class fractions within the proletariat. These lines are constituted in range varying from colonial history to labor migration,

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[158] **Ibid.**, p. 174.
[159] Thompson, **ibid.**, pp. 8-9. (Emphasis ours.)

from culture to religion, from race to social space, which will be examined throughout the Chapters III and IV. But before the formation of immigrant class fractions, we should delve into the process of the production of the immigrant surplus labor which will expose the experiences of these fractions.

The Production of the Immigrant Surplus Labor

In this chapter, we have so far made a discussion in order to outline a Marxist class conception that would conceive class as a process and relationship in respect to the totality of 'content' of the capitalist mode of production. We have emphasized that, on the one hand, such a conception would be the key for a 'unitary theory' in order to formulate and understand the dynamics of the immigrant question and, on the other hand, it is in that scheme that the class character of the immigrants in the French society would become apparent instead of evaluating them through several autonomous, separate terms such as culture, identity, race, religion, etc., which are abstracted from class. For that reason, we have underlined the critical importance of one of the fundamental contradictions of capital, the contradictory unity of production and realization, which has direct consequences on both the class formation and formation of fractions within a particular class, i.e., the working class, in our case. From now on, we will delve into the empirical reality of immigrant class fractions as regards demography, their roles in the phase of production, their situation in the labor force and their function for capitalism in the age of neoliberalism as 'reserve army of labor', in short, the process of the production of immigrant surplus labor and its social implications.

i.) Demography of the immigrants in France

France is among the top European countries being a destination of migration since at least the middle of the 19th century. 'Since 1850', write Castles and Kosack, 'France has had an excess of immigration over emigration', and this fact historically reinforces its status as a choice of destination for immigrants from different geographies. [160] This fact shows up itself in official statistical data as well. Considering the population evolution since 1911 census, the number of French by

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[160] Castles, Kosack, **ibid.**, pp. 18-9.

birth steadily decreases from 96.5 per cent to 89.6 per cent in 2011 census while the number of French by acquisition grows up from 2.6 per cent in 1982 to 4.5 per cent in 2011. The number of French by acquisition tends to increase from 1982 onwards after a small decline between 1962 and 1975 (from 2.8 per cent to 2.6 per cent).

On the other hand, if the numbers of foreign and immigrant population over the whole population were to be evaluated, it would be seen that they increased as inverse ratio to the steady decrease of the number of French nationality by birth. The number of immigrants augmented from 7.4 per cent in 1999 to 8.7 per cent in 2011, a considerable increase in the last decade whereas the number of foreigners augmented from 5.6 per cent to 6.0 per cent in same years. Speaking for immigrants, their number estimated as 8.2 per cent in the 2006 census, which in fact reflects valuable information as regards to 2005 riots in October and November. It should also be noted that between 2010 and 2011, the number of immigrants continued its tendency of increase, as from 8.6 per cent to 8.7 per cent. However, this increase was not the case between 1975 and 1999, during which period the immigrant flux seems to be stabilized at 7.4 per cent (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Evolution of population in France

	Total Population (in thousands)	French by birth		French by acquisition		Foreigners		Immigrants	
		in thousands	Proportion (in %)	in thousands	Proportion (in %)	in thousands	Proportion (in %)	in thousands	Proportion (in %)
1911	39192	37820	96.5	212	0.5	1160	3.0	1110	2.8
1921	38798	37011	95.4	254	0.7	1532	3.9	1429	3.7
1926	40228	37570	93.4	249	0.6	2409	6.0	2288	5.7
1931	41228	38153	92.5	361	0.9	2715	6.6	2729	6.6
1936	41183	38468	93.4	517	1.3	2198	5.3	2326	5.6
1946	39848	37251	93.5	853	2.1	1744	4.4	1986	5.0
1954	42781	39948	93.4	1068	2.5	1765	4.1	2293	5.4
1962	46459	43038	92.6	1267	2.8	2151	4.7	2861	6.2
1968	49655	45775	92.1	1316	2.7	2664	5.3	3281	6.6
1975	52599	47765	90.8	1392	2.6	3442	6.5	3887	7.4
1982	54296	49160	90.5	1422	2.6	3714	6.8	4037	7.4
1990	56652	51275	90.5	1780	3.1	3597	6.3	4166	7.4
1999	58521	52902	90.4	2355	4.0	3263	5.6	4309	7.4
1/1/06	61400	55218	89.9	2640	4.3	3542	5.8	5040	8.2
1/1/10	62765	56271	89.7	2789	4.4	3705	5.9	5406	8.6
1/1/11	63070	56490	89.6	2807	4.5	3774	6.0	5493	8.7

(Source: INSEE)

We can emphasize some preliminary remarks according to these data. It is possible to infer that throughout the 20th century and in the 21st century so far, France has become more and more a country for immigrants. For the 20th century, we may speak of an overall tendency of increase in the immigrant population although this was stabilized in the last quarter of the century. This was primarily due to the halt of migration flux by the French government which was stimulated as a response to the economic crisis of the 1970s. Furthermore, an accelerating increase in immigrant

populations in France has become evident with the beginning of the 21st century. Between 1999 and 2011, 1.3 per cent of augmentation in these populations had been realized and this actually means 1,184,000 immigrants have been accepted in the country since the millennial turnout. Obviously this number is provided according to the 'narrow' official definition of the term immigrant, which does not count those 'descendants of the immigrants' into account while we do so. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that this number reflects not only *the* immigrants of our case study but those of every origin.

Data also show that a dramatic fall from 6.6 per cent of immigrants to 5.0 per cent between 1931 and 1945 had been realized. Only after 1945, the immigrant populations re-started to increase. This 15-year-period, with its starting and finishing point, indicates two major historical moments. The beginning of the 1930s was under the overwhelming influence of The Great Depression, which caused the immigrant flux to France not only stop but also decrease the immigrant population. Only in 5 years the ratio of immigrant population to the whole population was dropped for 1.0 per cent and this tendency remained until the end of Second World War in 1945. This critical period not only comprises a great world-scale economic crisis but also the rise of fascism in Europe and, eventually, the Vichy Regime in France. However, with the end of the Second World War a great flux of immigrants revived, which was ultimately corresponding the need of labor force for the reconstruction of Europe and particularly France. 30 years onwards from 1945 have seen, thus, a great increase in immigrant population, which ultimately means that the importance of immigrant labor force in the mode of production and immediately in the relations of production has been augmented.

After these preliminary remarks on which we will study in depth later on, the situation of the 'descendants of the immigrants' deserves clarification. According to the 2012-dated survey report on immigrants and their descendants conducted for INSEE, it is stated that 'by the end of 2008, among the 18-year-olds and the older who live in France, 4.5 million persons correspond' to the legal definition of the descendants of the immigrants. Additionally, 'among the minor children in France, 2.1 millions live in a family of which at least one parent is immigrant.' So it is being estimated, by this report, that 'around 6.7 million persons may be the number of the direct descendants of the immigrants born in France, making the 11 per cent of the

population.' [161] No more recent data is given about this 'estimation' however considering the increasing populations of the immigrants and consequently their families, the total number of immigrants and their descendants amount to more than 12 million persons.

We shall now deal with the 'origins' of the immigrant populations in France in order to *reduce* the immigrant populations suitable for the focus of our study. It should be remembered that foreign population would not be taken into account in this evaluation. Instead we will focus on the 'geographical origins' of the immigrants and their descendants. Emphasize on *geography* rather than *ethnicity* is also noteworthy since the French system does not—at least formally—concern with ethnicity, which constitutes, no doubt, to a certain degree a disadvantage for our study in so far as we cannot *exactly* determine the quantitative certitude of ethnic origins (a problem that we discussed in the Introduction). For instance, the Algerian immigrant supposes to indicate the immigrant's geographical origin but not ethnic origin, so that not every Algeria-born immigrant is ethnic Algerian. Yet it is evident that this will only remain as a minor exception which does not influence our study.

According to the data of the 2008 and 2010 census, the immigrant population is largely distributed between African and European immigrants. African immigrants constitute 42.8 per cent of the immigrant population while Europeans constitute 37.4 per cent. Regarding an approximate increase of 0.8 per cent in African immigrant population, it can be inferred that this population continues its uptrend. On the contrary, European population had decreased approximately for 0.6 per cent between 2008 and 2010, which shows a contrariwise downtrend in comparison to Africans. The quantitative superiority of Africans over Europeans is a quite new phenomenon; in 1999, the European immigrants were still more populated than Africans. The downtrend in their evolution of population resulted with the current situation in immigrant population today (see Table 2.2).

Second important fact that is revealed with these data is that more than two-third of African immigrant population comes from three countries, respectively Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, which altogether called as Maghreb. Only less than one-third of this population comes from Sub-Saharan Africa, alternatively called as French Africa ('*Françafrique*'), which still amounts to a considerable number of

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[161] INSEE, 'Population immigrée', in **Immigrés et descendants d'immigrés en France**, Édition 2012, p. 96. http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/sommaire.asp?id=618&nivgeo=0

immigrants with almost 720,000 persons by 2010. To be more precise the countries of French Africa apart from North African countries are Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo (alternatively, Congo-Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo (alternatively, Congo-Kinshasa), Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. It is also noteworthy that their proportion in the whole immigrant population neither increased nor decreased between 2008 and 2010, which shows that the 'Black'-African immigrant population is somehow stabilized, or saturated, in contemporary France while the preponderance of North Africans ('*Maghrébins*') has noticeably increased. Only between 2008 and 2010, roughly 100.000 North Africans had been recorded as new immigrants coming from these territories (see Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Repartition of immigrants by their countries of birth

	2008		2010	
	in %	numbers	in %	numbers
Europe	**38.0**	**2032000**	**37.4**	**2062207**
European Union	**34.0**	**1808000**	**33.0**	**1820983**
Spain	5.0	257000	4.5	248324
Italy	6.0	317000	5.5	303923
Portugal	11.0	581000	10.7	588276
United Kingdom	Unspecified	Unspecified	2.8	153598
Other Countries of EU	12.0	653000	9.6	526864
Other Countries of Europe	4.0	224000	4.4	241224
Africa	**42.0**	**2271000**	**42.8**	**2362099**
Algeria	13.0	713000	13.2	729814
Morocco	12.0	654000	12.2	671225
Tunisia	4.0	235000	4.4	241904
Other countries of Africa	13.0	669000	13.0	719157
Asia	**14.0**	**757000**	**14.3**	**791231**
Turkey	4.0	239000	4.5	245714
Cambodgia, Laos, Vietnam	3.0	163000	2.9	161484
Other countries of Asia	7.0	355000	7.0	384033
Americas, Oceania	**5.0**	**282000**	**5.4**	**298617**
Total	**~100**	**5342000**	**100**	**5514154**

(Source: INSEE)
(Note: Figures for 2008 are approximate values and taken from the INSEE report 'Population immigrée'.)

The common point in these countries of both North Africa and Sub-Sahara is that they all had been subjected to French colonialism until 1960s. Moreover it should be noted that not only the countries of French Africa but also other countries

of Africa had been subjected to other European colonial powers, especially the British, Portuguese, Belgian and German colonialisms. And immigrants from these territories as well are to various degrees present in France. This is to say that, France has been and is continuously being a destination of migration for immigrants issued from *all* formerly colonized African territories regardless whether they were colonized by the French or any other colonial power. Yet there is another fact that, due to language and adaptation requirements, immigrants from formerly French colonies prefer France for immigration. On the other hand, speaking for a more systemic plane of interstate relations, France's unbroken but redefined connections with its former colonies are to be examined, which will be thoroughly seen in the Chapter III of this study.

Through the context of colonial history, the Asian continent had also been an important part of French colonialism, however France's colonial activities in Asian colonies were not comparable to British colonialism. There are three important countries in today's world, which had been main territories for the activities of French colonialism: Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, three of them making an important portion of Indochina. Although being ex-colonies of France, immigrant population from these countries only amounts to 2.9 per cent of the total immigrant population while other Asian countries have not been subjected to French colonialism but British colonialism. Perhaps, at least partially, it is because of this sparse population that, as regards our case study of the 2005 riots, these Asian immigrants (and their descendants) did not collectively participated in militant action. Another reason is the success of the Asian immigrants in construction of communitarian neighborhoods based on 'identity' through establishing market relations on the basis of commerce.[162]

Official data on the population of the descendants of immigrants provide us information on both adult and minor (under-18) descendants. To begin with adult descendants, it will be seen that European-origin descendants by far constitute the majority of that group. Among Europeans, descendants of immigrants from neighboring countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal are dominant in the figures. Only one group from the outside of Europe is the descendants of Algerian-origin

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[162] Hu Khoa Le, **L'immigration asiatique. Économie communautaire et stratégies professionnelles**, Paris: Centre des Hauts Études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes, 1996; Justine Pribetich, 'La construction identitaire d'un quartier, l'example de Sedaine-Popincourt', **Hommes et migrations**, no. 1254, March-April 2005, pp. 82-90.

immigrants constituting 14 per cent of the total descendants, means to be second after Italian-origin descendants. However, interestingly, this percentage dramatically falls when this group is distinguished according to be born whether of two immigrant parents or only one immigrant parent. Algerian descendants show up with 9 per cent in this case—still being an important population—although incomparable with the Italian (23 per cent), the Spanish (16 per cent), or the overall European descendants (75 per cent). Apart from Algerians, the figures fall more dramatically when it comes to other geographical origins. These data are important in the sense that they provide veritable information on the issue of 'integration' of the immigrants in the host country, i.e., France, at least on the level of marriages with the French (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: Repartition of the adult descendants by the place of birth of their parents in 2008

	Born from two immigrant parents		Born from one immigrant parent		Whole	
	in thousands	in %	in thousands	in %	in thousands	in %
Spain	210	10	370	16	580	13
Italy	350	16	530	23	880	20
Portugal	280	13	170	7	450	10
Other countries of EU	220	10	560	24	780	17
Other countries of Europe	50	2	120	5	160	4
Algeria	430	20	220	9	640	14
Morocco	240	11	70	3	310	7
Tunisia	110	5	70	3	180	4
Other countries of Africa	120	6	80	3	200	4
Turkey	70	3	10	0	80	2
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	50	2	40	2	90	2
Other countries of Asia	40	2	50	2	80	2
Americas, Oceania	20	1	40	2	60	1
Whole	2180	100	2310	100	4480	100

(Source: INSEE, 'Population immigrée'.)

According to these figures, all African-origin descendants combined constitute approximately 29 per cent of the whole descendant population, which, in numbers, equal to 1,330,000 persons. Still speaking for adults, together with legally defined immigrants, these two combined figures recorded in 2008 constitute roughly 3,600,000 persons among the whole population of France, which was, in this year, around 62,000,000. This shows us that the adult immigrants and their adult descendants of African-origin constitute 5.8 per cent of the total population in France, in 2008. Considering the increasing tendency in this population, we would assume that approximately 6.0 per cent of the total population in France is African-origin, whether of North African or Sub-Saharan origin, but from those territories where France had been the colonizing power and where long-term anti-colonial struggles, consequently the wave of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s had taken place. We are speaking for adults and this has to be underlined for the

reason that precisely these adults are the suppliers of their labors in the labor market, at least officially, since working conditions for the minors (under-18s) are restricted by law according to working time and 'sectors', which is to say that the law supposes not to allow them to work especially in hard-working conditions.[163]

Table 2.4: Minor (Under-18) descendants of immigrants in France

	2008					1999
		Living with at least one immigrant parent				Living with at least one immigrant parent
	In a monoparental family in which the adult is immigrant	In a couple of two conjoint immigrants	In a couple in which one of two conjoints is immigrant	Whole		
	In thousands			In thousands	%	In thousands
Spain or Italy	< 10	< 10	70	80	4	150
Portugal	20	60	130	210	10	270
Other countries of EU	10	20	100	140	7	120
Other countries of Europe	10	20	30	50	2	30
Algeria	50	130	180	360	17	310
Morocco	40	190	120	350	16	310
Tunisia	10	50	50	110	5	120
Other countries of Africa	80	170	120	370	17	240
Turkey	10	100	40	140	7	100
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	10	40	20	70	3	80
Other countries of Asia	10	70	50	130	6	80
Americas, Oceania	30	30	50	110	5	60
Whole	**280**	**880**	**960**	**2130**	**100**	**1900**

(Source: INSEE, 'Population immigrée'.)

Another figure is needed this time for minors who are defined as descendants of immigrants. This figure might give an idea about the future situation of the immigrants' preponderance within French society and their relations within. According to the 2008 census, 720,000 minor descendants of African-origin have been recorded who are naturally supposed to be added to the 'adult' population of African-origin when they grow up (see Table 2.4). This number, along with the adults, makes in total more than 4,500,000 immigrants of African-origin in contemporary France. This one is a quite important figure especially when their preponderance in certain sectors of economy, hence their current and future positions in the mode of production and their relations within the mode of production are considered.

A final remark on the demographic situation of immigrants and their descendants is related with their localization on the French territory. This aspect in demography is specifically concerned in our study with the phenomenon of *banlieues*, which will be described in the Chapter IV as the social spaces of immigrants. Official data on the localization of immigrants prove this fact as well. According to data of 2008, two-third of the total immigrant population lives in urban

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[163] French Working Code of 2007-8 [Code du travail], Articles L3162-1, L3162-2, L3162-3.

areas of 100,000 to 2,000,000 habitants, and in Paris and its *banlieues*. This number increases as regards the immigrants born outside of EU, with a percentage of 73 per cent who live in these urban spaces. These figures indicate one simple fact: immigrants are populated in industrial or most urbanized cities where they would be more capable of taking part in an enhanced labor market and of bargaining the working conditions, undoubtedly, to certain degrees. This is by no means unexpected for the fact that the working class in Europe (and elsewhere) has always been settled in such urban spaces since the Industrial Revolution, however the case of immigrants in relation to their habitation issues becomes emblematic with the emerging phenomenon of *banlieues*, especially in France, throughout the history of labor migration. For instance, 17 per cent of the total population in the department of the Île-de-France, wherein the city of Paris situated, is constituted of immigrants. In this regard, 20 per cent of the total population of Paris is constituted of immigrants while this number augments up to 27 per cent in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis, coming second among all French territories after French Guyana. Seine-Saint-Denis is definitely the most important hub for the immigrant population, especially for those of Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan origin; it should be recalled that the 2005 riots started in Clichy-sous-bois, a *cité* of this department, and riots then spread like an epidemic to other *cités* of Seine-Saint-Denis and so forth.

ii.) Immigrants in the phase of production

The phase of commodity production is an integral part of the capitalist mode of production. As we have underlined it above, it is the primal and final phase of the entire vicious circle of production in which classes are determined objectively as regards the totality of this circle. Yet this vicious circle is fertile: it regenerates itself through the reproduction of the same phases in the circle, however this time its reproduction does not only consist of production-distribution-exchange-consumption circle but it is also being realized by the social relations among and within classes, in which the formation of a certain class is subjectively processed. After demonstrating the demographic picture of immigrants in contemporary France, we shall now continue with not 'figurative' but 'real' immigrants, i.e., the immigrants in the course of their productive actions both in the phase of production and subsequent phases of the capitalist mode of production before investigating their formation as distinct class fractions throughout the Chapters III and IV of this study.

In order to establish the connections between labor, laborer and market in a definite field of study, it must be started with the so-called 'economically active population', or shortly 'active population'. This term is defined in OECD's glossary as follows: 'Economically active population comprises all persons of either sex who furnish the supply of labor for the production of economic goods and services as defined by the United Nations System of National Accounts during a specified time-reference period.'[164] In the first place, then, active population amongst immigrants has to be specified, and this population should be distinguished according to their ethnic, or in legal terms, geographical origins. According to INSEE data, economically active immigrant population is recorded as 2,932,251 persons in total, of which men amount to 1,609,193 and women to 1,323,059 as of 2008. The unemployed portion of these active immigrants show up with 581,480 persons, more than half of this number is of unemployed women with 312,324 and men with 269,156. It also has to be noted that these figures are of persons of 15-age and more. However these immigrants according to their productive activity have to be constricted in terms of their origins so as to provide information on *the* immigrants that we deal with, thus their ethnic/geographic origins hold a crucial aspect.

The 2008 census of INSEE provides us the information on the geographical origins of the economically active immigrant population in France. According to data, there are 1,328,571 active persons in the labor market who are African-origin immigrants. This number, when compared to the whole active immigrant population, is nearly the half of the total immigrant labor force in France. That is to say, half of the immigrant laborers in France are African-origin and this is a quite powerful figure for it indicates the preponderance of the African immigrants in the French labor market. Among these figures, it is again being witnessed that geographically Maghreb-origin immigrants constitute an important part of this labor force with 882,166 economically active persons who come from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The Moroccan-origin immigrants are larger than the Algerian-origin immigrants according to data showing that the first group consists of 379,613 laborers while the latter consists of 369,354 laborers. These two groups come the first and second among all immigrant laborers classified according to their origins, and the Tunisian-origin immigrant laborers come the third. Maghreb is followed by other large

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[164] OECD, 'Economically Active Population', in **Glossary of Statistical Terms**, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=730 [Retrieved: 04.12.2014]

African countries like Senegal, Ivory Coast, Mali, etc., and these countries are still ahead of world's other countries in supplying the labor force of immigrants to the French labor market.

Step by step, our elaboration on the immigrants as regards their roles in the phase of production becomes more and more concrete in so far as we advance towards their actual processes of producing. A necessary analytical examination of the social division of labor in this sense will carry this study from this point to the very point at which prevails the producing immigrant laborer since the social division of labor 'forms the foundation of all commodity production.'[165] But what does the 'division of labor' actually mean to be? The term has always had an importance in different traditions of a varying range from political economy to sociology, in influential thinkers from Adam Smith to Émile Durkheim, however we will employ the term in a sense in accordance with our Marxist methodology rather than discussing it thoroughly as regards its different uses.

In Marx's analysis of capital, the division of labor emerges with a twofold meaning as the division of labor in the workplace (in manufacture) and as the division of labor within the society. This latter indicates the social division of labor, and it is *not* peculiar to the capitalist mode of production. It can be observed in any mode of social production in any historical period, i.e., the Asiatic, feudal, capitalist, etc., to more or less sophisticated extents.[166] However, the division of labor in manufacture, and in the workplace in general, *is* peculiar to the capitalist mode of production for the fact that it has a direct relation with the production of commodity which also implies the labor force itself as commodity. This division of labor in the workplace advances the division of labor in society. Following Marx's example of the commodity chain: 'the cattle-breeder produces hides, the tanner makes the hides into leather and the shoemaker the leather into boots'; this chain implies 'an invisible bond uniting the various branches of trade.'[167] Nevertheless, this example of social division of labor takes place where the workplace is *still* in the form of manufacture. With the advance of machinery, the social division of labor considerably increases:

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[165] Marx, **Capital**, vol. 1, p. 471.

[166] For instance, Marx gives an account of the ancient Indian society (as an example of the 'Asiatic mode of production') through the relation between its social formation and the social division of labor, and ultimately the objective determination of its political regime (as an example of the 'Asiatic despotisms'). **Ibid.**, p. 478-9.

[167] **Ibid.**, p. 474-5.

> In proportion as machinery, with the aid of a relatively small number of workers, increases the mass of raw materials, half-finished products and instruments of labor, the working-up of these raw materials and half-products becomes split up into innumerable subdivisions. There is thus an increase in the number of the branches of social production. Machine production drives the social division of labor immeasurably further than manufacture does, because it increases the productive power of the industries it seizes upon to a much greater degree.[168]

Therefore, in the age of 'late capitalism' where both industry and finance control almost the entire economy, and, moreover, with the aid of the unceasing super-growth of the information technologies, the social division of labor in any late capitalist society like France has exceedingly developed. On the other hand, the division of labor in the workplace has also developed as well. But these two types of division of labor pursue two inverse movements: 'The division of labor within manufacture' (i.e., the workplace) writes Marx, 'presupposes a concentration of the means of production in the hands of one capitalist; the division of labor within society presupposes a dispersal of those means among many independent producers of commodities.'[169] These two inverse movements ultimately make Marx come to the conclusion that in the capitalist mode of production there is an 'anarchy in the social division of labor and despotism in the manufacturing division of labor' while these two 'mutually condition each other.'[170]

After this terminological explanation from Marx, let us return to the facts as regards the immigrant workers in contemporary France. Here we will seek answers to following questions:

1) Is there a considerable division of labor within the contemporary French society in the basis of the distinction of immigrants and non-immigrants?

2) Does the ethnic or geographic origin of the immigrant correspond to any sectorial division within the labor market?

3) If so, how does this sectorial division affect the social division of labor within the contemporary French society in the basis of the distinction of immigrants and non-immigrants and in the basis of ethnic diversities?

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[168] **Ibid.**, p. 572.
[169] **Ibid.**, p. 476.
[170] **Ibid.**, p. 477.

One of the most significant phenomena in the recent period that we call 'late capitalism' [171] was the dramatic fall of the industrial activities in the advanced capitalist societies among which France takes part. Dormois writes that after the peak in 1974 with 38.5 per cent of the total employment within the industrial activities (amounting to 8,3 millions of workers), the French industry 'shed labor and contracted their payrolls' very quickly that until 1982 all the major industries were affected from the economic crisis of mid-1970s. In a longer term, between 1974-1998, 'industrial activities contracted from 38 to 23 percent of the workforce.'[172] This fall was one aspect of a global phenomenon in the organization of capitalist production over the globe, and this larger phenomenon remains out of the scope of our study, nonetheless it concerns us in so far as how it profoundly affected the division of labor in France with its particular impact on this part of the world.

If we briefly sum up what this reorganization of the production in late capitalism provided are, to the extent that our study concerns, the rise of industrial production in geographies commonly called as 'Global South'; the fall of industrial production in the coral capitalist economies (therefore a shift of place from North to South in terms of industrial activities on a world scale);[173] furthermore the rise of the tertiary sector (also known as the 'service' sector) in the latter; and the unceasing rise of financialization all over the world. It is precisely in this regard that the fall of industrial production has profoundly affected the division of labor in France. And this movement of capitalism had a two-side effect on the labor force in France: *i)* the immigrants *largely* withdrew from the industrial labor market; *ii)* the remaining

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[171] Although 'late capitalism' is a vague term to name a certain period of the history of capitalism, we use it roughly for 2000s and onwards, constituting yet another transition in the *production regime* within capitalism. However we have to remind that this period is not independent of the processes from mid-1970s to 1990s, and from 1990s to 2000s, therefore in each time necessary, we will point out this continuity-with-ruptures of the capitalism's transition in itself as regards the linkages between each period. For this term, Ernest Mandel writes in the introduction of his 1972-dated book *Der Spätkapitalismus*'s English translation as follows: 'We must express our regret at not being able to propose a better term for this historical era than late capitalism—a term that is unsatisfactory because it is one of chronology, not of synthesis.' **Late Capitalism**, London: Verso, 1978. p. 9. With this term, Mandel aims to describe the conditions of a certain period of capitalism, namely 'the post-war history of the capitalist mode of production in terms of the basic laws of motion of capitalism discovered by Marx in *Capital*.' (p. 10.) As this important book from this important economist fails to name a certain period with a better term, we have thus decided to name it once again as late capitalism, this time to signify a later period than that of the post-war.

[172] Jean-Pierre Dormois, **The French Economy in the Twentieth Century**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 119-20.

[173] For a brilliant history of this shift and its effects in the Global South, see: Vijay Prashad, **The Poorer Nations. A Possible History of the Global South**, New York: Verso, 2014.

industrial labor market is dominated, if not monopolized, by the 'national' working class or EU-origin immigrants.

After the peak in 1974, when almost two-fifth of the total employment consisted of immigrant workers who were active in industry, which means that there had been an intense concentration in industry in terms of immigrants' productive activities, immigrants in French economy are now dispersed into multiple domains of economic activity rather than that of industry. With this movement from concentration to dispersion, only 32 per cent of the immigrants show up in industrial activities according to the 2008 census. This number falls to 22 per cent for the category of the descendants of the immigrants.[174] Regarding these figures, despite the contraction in industrial activities, the withdrawal of the immigrants from these activities naturally culminates with the domination of the sector by non-immigrants. In other words, the contraction did not affect non-immigrants as much as it affected immigrants. Moreover, a second fact reveals at the same time: the fragmentation within the immigrant working class crystallizes in the form of a secondary competition within the labor market precisely for the industry. The more interesting competition is a trilateral one that, on the one side, immigrants from three European Mediterranean countries (Spain, Italy, Portugal), on the other side, immigrants from three African Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) and finally immigrants from Sub-Saharan countries compete each other so as to resist irredeemably the withdrawal from the industry. These European-African and inter-African competitions operate in various sectors of the industrial production, but at the first glance its noteworthy characteristic arises in the distinction of qualified and non-qualified workers. We should also add the employment of Turkish-origin and Indochinese-origin immigrants in the industry, which will provide us the figures in the Table 2.5.

Despite the densest employment per ethno-geographical category is that of Turkish-origin immigrants, and Indochinese-origin immigrants are also, in their own category, oriented to industrial activities, the actual numbers remain weak in comparison with other immigrants shown in the Table 2.5, precisely for the fact that their populations are not as much high as the populations of others (see Table 2.2). Therefore main competitions remain between Europeans and Africans, and among Africans. However, it should be clarified why particularly these competitions are that

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[174] INSEE, 'Situtation sur le marché du travail', **ibid.**, p. 193.

much important apart from the logic of the labor market. Does the industry, in late capitalism, have any meaningful advantages over other sectors of the capitalist production, including the service sector? These questions require satisfactory answers in order to comprehend the generalities of the economic activities in today's capitalist societies, particularly in France, and to define the affects of these generalities on the division of labor within society and specifically its respect to immigrant masses.

Table 2.5: Distinction of qualified and non-qualified workers according to origins (2008 census).

Origins of Immigrants	Qualified Workers	Non-Qualified Workers
Spain	21	6
Italy	19	4
Portugal	24	13
Algeria	19	15
Tunisia	20	16
Morocco	18	22
Africa	16	17
Turkey	32	29
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	23	11

(Source: INSEE. 'Situation sur le marché du travail'.)
(Note: Figures reflect the proportions per cent to their own categories.)

After its peak in 1974, which also signifies the end of thirty glorious years ('*Trente Glorieuses*'), the capitalist mode of production crashed into a historical crisis for a long period[175] and certain changes in the organization of capital was much needed. In fact, it can be said that, from mid-1970s until early 1990s, the history of this crisis is the history of the reorganization of capitalism. According to Mandel, the crisis of mid-1970s was a 'classical overproduction crisis' with 'specific particularities', but not simply the fault of the petrodollar sheikhs or of the unions and the excessive augmentations of the salaries.[176] However, the consequences of the crisis are directly reflected on the salaries of industrial workers in particular. On a socio-political scale the phenomenon of dispersion of labor force from industry to other sectors had been a primal solution in the reorganization of capitalism as regards the economic and political costs of high unionization and massive political struggles,

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[175] The economic historian Michel Beaud dates this crisis between 1973 and 1990 in his **Histoire du capitalisme (1500-2010)**, Paris: Seuil, 2010, p. 350; Ernest Mandel, in 1978, specifies its origin as 1974 in his **La crise 1974-1978. Les faits, leur interprétation marxiste**, Paris: Flammarion, 1978. We are not concerned with the exact year of its origin so that we roughly consider that the crisis started in mid-70s and that it underwent until 1990s as Beaud states. On the other hand, Mandel's text was written in the midst of the crisis, so it does not provide a longer history and an ending date for it.
[176] Mandel, **ibid.**, pp. 24-30; 31-4.

i.e., the class struggle of the workers.[177] Therefore the crisis of the industrial overproduction resulted forcefully, in the first place, in the contraction of industry so as to avoid two things: rising costs of production and rising costs of struggle. Precisely for that reason the global reorganization of capitalism adopted a new geographical scaling: industrial activities were to moved towards the Global South where the labor force was cheap and the political struggle was weak; and the advanced capitalist societies like France were to deindustrialized so that the labor force were to 'tertiarized', hence increasingly precarized; on the socio-political scale, the class struggle were to dispersed as did the labor force into other sectors than industry. Comparing the two consecutive periods of capitalism, the French sociologist Robert Castel brightly remarks that the waged-laborers before the crisis 'were *virtually* vulnerable without knowing it: their destiny was concretely linked to the pursuit of a progress of which parameters they were not controlling.'[178] As this progress incurred a sharp rupture with the crisis, the thing what once used to be *virtual* became *actual*. Beaud notes as follows:

> The demolition of Fordism is translated in the dominant liberal countries (USA, Great Britain) with the multiplication of jobs for low or very-low wages, for weak stability and for the aggravation of inequalities; in continental Europe, the efforts to save the essentials of the social protection of the salaried masses went with high levels of unemployment (…).[179]

With these two different measures in order to reorganize the economy in advanced capitalist societies, especially for the continental Europe, economic development have been reassured towards the end of 1990s.[180] However, the impact of this period on the labor force had been profound:

> In this period, the major difference between the Anglo-American development and the development of the European Union countries resides in the following: for the former, the plank of minimum wage is practically abolished; in real terms, low wages have decreased, the social protection backed away, and inequalities have highly augmented. On the contrary, for the latter, the plank of minimum wage and the social protection, on the whole, have been saved—and if inequalities have intensified, it was primarily due to the installation of an important and sustainable unemployment, which generated the exclusion of growing

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[177] 'The long period of full employment reinforced the objective influence of the working class, the force of its mass organizations (before all unions) and its combativeness in relation with an autonomous cycle of class struggle on an international scale.' **Ibid.**, p. 29.

[178] Robert Castel, **Les métamorphoses de la question sociale. Une chronique du salariat**, Paris: Fayard, 1995, p. 392.

[179] Beaud, **ibid.**, p. 353.

[180] **Ibid.**, p. 363.

fragments of society. In each case, flexibility and precarity of the work have progressed, first for the young and the non-qualified, but also for a number of 'aged' workers.[181]

Thus, we obtain two consequences in the case of European countries, particularly France: flexible and precarious work, and sustainable unemployment. We will deal with the problem of unemployment (in the case of immigrants) later on, but now the first consequence is of our interest. The rise of the flexible and precarious work presupposes certain conditions and that type of work was not possible in industry neither in France nor in any other advanced capitalist society. Labor force exploited in industry was to a large extent syndicated, and the socio-political power of the unions, especially in France, was a threat for such a precarization in industry. Therefore precarious work would only have developed in sectors other than industry, specifically in those newly emerged jobs appeared in the tertiary sector. The labor force fleeing with the contraction in industry thereafter shifted its place into this emerging sector as much as possible, and the shift has directly affected immigrants to a large scale. In this period, the 'tertiarization' had such an impact on the processing of economy in France that 'the share of knowledge-based services in the intermediary inputs of the total economy has risen from 17 per cent in 1970 to 34 per cent in 1990', a higher figure than the case in countries such as Canada, US, Germany, etc.[182] Consequently, the emergence of the tertiary sector had provided jobs for actives in the labor market, however these jobs implied precarious conditions and instabilities. Workers who had been affected by the distraction of industry hence found themselves in the midst of a terrible pincer: from one side the painful ache of unemployment, from the other the trembling vacillation of precarity. For the worker in a turbulence as such, even the burden of industrial work becomes alluring!

Due to this tendency in the labor regime of late capitalism, its most striking impact has been on, unsurprisingly, the immigrants. In a recent report, it is stated that 'whereas the immigrants have historically constituted a substantial part of the employment in industry, this part declined more than the proportional drop of the numbers within industry. This fall, since 1990s, reveals in the case of North African-origin immigrants whose overrepresentation [in industrial activities] greatly diminished in the process manufacturing (agro-alimentary industries, steel industry,

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[181] **Ibid.**, p. 364.
[182] Michael Peneder, et al., 'What Follows Tertiarization? Structural Change and the Role of Knowledge-Based Services', **The Service Industries Journal**, 23: 2. 2003, p. 58.

chemistry, etc.) and light industries.' As the main cause for this fall, the same report emphasizes that 'the industry had effectively acquired strong gains of productivity unfavorable for the jobs less-qualified in which immigrants were overrepresented.'[183] This fact, which applies not only in the case of North African immigrants but in a more general case of all immigrants, accurately signifies the passage from industry to tertiary.

As it is stated above, tertiarization in the social division of labor implies the rise of precarious labor, which had been found as a solution so as to diminish the effects of the crisis of the 1970s in the era called neoliberalism, and it was embedded within the labor regime of neoliberal capitalism on a massive scale throughout advanced capitalist societies. This fact, meanwhile, provoked discussions among sociologists and other social scientists a brand new conception called 'precariat' in order to name the newly emerging social phenomenon. Here, we have to emphasize the distinction between the apparent fact of the rising precarious labor and its recent sociological categorical formulation as the precariat. Guy Standing's account on this issue, *The Precariat* (2011), perhaps, provides the most accomplished definition of this socio-economical category and in this sense it needs emphasis through which the distinction of the precarious labor and the precariat will be revealed.

According to Standing, the precariat (for the moment we take this term only in sense of laborers who sell their labor forces in use of any productive activity under precarious conditions), as regards the basis of precarious labor, can be defined as 'people who lack the seven forms of labor-related security', which are respectively labor market security, employment security, job security, work security, skill reproduction security, income security and representation security. [184] These absences, therefore, refer to the basis of the phenomenon that is called precarious labor, and the term in our study is also being used in that sense. However in the realm of concepts, 'the precariat' poses several problems. Standing formulates his concept as a fragment within the working class, namely in his terms as 'fragmented class structure', and this 'structure' is defined explicitly upon a hierarchical conception of class since Standing sketches a social stratification and hierarchies among these strata while determining a 'place' for the precariat.[185] Along side the

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[183] Cécille Jolly, et al., 'L'emploi et les métiers des immigrés', **Centre d'analyse stratégique**, No: 2012-01. February, p. 25.
[184] Guy Standing, **The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class**, London: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 10-1.
[185] **Ibid.**, p. 7-13.

fact that such hierarchical class conceptions remain weak in understanding the 'class as relationship and process', Weberian social stratification argument upon which Standing's definition is based also remains distant from the complexity of social relations—precisely for that reason we have suggested a more fluid, dynamic conception of class through processes and relationships.[186] In return, we consider the fact of precarity as an epidemic tendency which diffused (and continuously diffuses) into the conditions of any sort of work, even penetrating into the more sheltered sphere of industry more or less, and consequently constitutes a prevalent norm of the labor regime in late capitalism. Nonetheless, Standing's emphasis for the precarious labor is still descriptive and we remain loyal to this emphasis on those absences that today's precarious labor suffers from.

We shall now proceed with elaborating these precarious conditions in France as regards the case of immigrants. In order to determine their conditions under the new precarious norms of the labor regime, keeping in mind the lacks in labor-related security, we shall regard the data of immigrants' activities by sector and by the type of income that they receive. These two parameters will explain at least to a satisfactory extent—if not fully—the conditions of immigrants in the labor regime and it will be helpful for us to better concretize their positions in the process of production of their surplus labors.

Table 2.6 provides brief data on the repartition of immigrants and their descendants by sectors of economic activity, furthermore it shows figures according to major geographical origins of migration that are preponderant in the labor market. Some conclusions can be deduced as regards these figures. The most apparent one is that, with the fall of industrial production, economic activities are tremendously concentrated within tertiary sector regardless the origins of immigrants and their descendants. However, detailed elaboration would show the critical importance of sectorial repartition of immigrants by their origins in terms of discerning the social division of labor in the specific case of immigrants for the very reason that most of the sectors under the tertiary forges the most robust conditions of above-mentioned precarious labor.

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[186] Ellen Meiksins Wood formulates this as 'class as process and relationship' as opposed to the 'geological model' which conceives class through stratification, structural location, layers in a hierarchical structure, etc. E. M. Wood, **Democracy against Capitalism**, p. 76.

On the other hand, Table 2.7 deals with the types of income that immigrants and their descendants receive. Type of income conveys not only the lack of income security, but due to its connection with the status of work contract, it also points out the fragilities in labor market security, employment security, job security and even representation security. Reasons are respectively as follows: type of income refers to the *limits* of income earning opportunities, which make the labor market an insecure arena for the laborers; it refers to uncertain conditions (firing, imposition of costs on employers in case of any failure, etc.) of the work itself, which make working insecure employment for the employees; it refers to rare possibilities of obtaining a secure position in the work, which make the job insecure; and eventually it refers to difficulties of raising the voice of the laborers due to restraints embedded within the precarious labor, which make the representation of the precarious laborers insecure.[187]

Table 2.6: Repartition of immigrants and their descendants by sector of activity in 2010 (per cent).

	Descendants of Immigrants		Immigrants						
	Born in EU	Born outside EU	Portugal	Other Countries of EU	Maghreb	Other Coutries of Africa	Turkey	Other Countries of Asia	Other Countries
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	**2**	**1**	**1**	**2**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**0**
Industry	**15**	**9**	**11**	**13**	**10**	**8**	**13**	**14**	**7**
including: Manufacturing Industry	13	8	10	12	9	8	13	13	7
Construction	**9**	**7**	**27**	**11**	**10**	**8**	**39**	**3**	**7**
Tertiary	**74**	**83**	**60**	**74**	**78**	**83**	**46**	**82**	**84**
Commerce, Motor Vehicle Repairs	15	14	10	10	13	9	9	17	11
Transportation, Inventory	5	7	4	2	6	5	2	4	2
Accomodation, Restaurants	3	6	3	7	8	9	15	18	5
Information, Communication	3	3	1	5	3	2	0	4	3
Financial and Assurance Services	3	5	1	2	1	1	1	2	5
Real Estate Activities	2	1	4	2	0	1	0	1	1
Specialized Scientific and Technical Activities	5	5	1	7	4	3	1	6	8
Administrational and Supportive Services	6	9	8	6	14	17	10	6	10
Public Administration	9	9	4	5	5	4	1	1	4
Education	6	6	1	7	5	5	2	4	7
Human Health and Social Action	11	12	8	10	11	14	1	6	13
Personal Household Services	2	2	13	5	4	7	2	7	7
Other Service Activities	4	4	2	6	4	5	2	5	8
Undetermined Activities	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**0**	**1**
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Numbers (in thousands)	**1270**	**810**	**380**	**410**	**610**	**330**	**90**	**230**	**180**

(Source: INSEE, 'Situation sur le marché du travail'.)

In this sense, new forms of employment that appear as types of income, having the common essential characteristics of precarization, can be defined as non-durable employment in which exist different sorts of working statuses such as fixed-

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[187] For the definitions of all these forms of labor security, see: Standing, **ibid.**, p. 10. It has to be emphasized that these forms of labor security are described under 'industrial citizenship' in which industrial work was the dominant form of economic activities and the socio-economic rights of workers, throughout the long history of struggles, are broadly defined as such.

term contracts ('*contrats à durée déterminée*'—CDD— in French use), interim or temporary works, etc.[188] Appropriately, if we consider Tables 2.6 and 2.7 together, types of work and sectors of activity according to the origins of immigrants will get into a dialogue with each other so as to unfold the complexity of current division of labor within the society as regards the immigrants. Speaking for immigrants from the Maghreb, it is seen that, apart from decreasing industrial activities and relatively less concentrated but still a considerable share in construction activities, they have been mostly confined to the tertiary sector in which types of work are highly due to insecure conditions. Evidently, not every sort of job poses the same insecurity; there are more and less insecure jobs as well as more or less prestigious jobs within the tertiary. However, the vulnerability embedded in this sector poses a general threat for the majority of the employees only to vary in degrees. Moreover, as a trademark of neoliberalism, decreasing proportion of the state in the economic realm is also substituted with the ever-increasing proportion of private institutions, and the tertiary sector in that sense has been an important domain for the organization of new investments for capitalists. This fact ultimately reflects in the labor market where the labor force finds employment chances opened up by these private institutions despite their vulnerable conditions. As a consequence, more vulnerable and less favorable (in sense of social status) works are being employed, in large numbers, by immigrants from the Maghreb and the rest of Africa. For example, works like security guards are mostly exercised by males of Algerian, Moroccan and Sub-Saharan-origin immigrants.[189]

Another fact concerning this time the descendants of immigrants is that fathers of the two-third of the descendants are workers while this number is only 39 per cent for the majority of the population, and these fathers are more numerous among the immigrants from the Maghreb and Southern Europe, according to a report from *Trajectoires et origins* (2010).[190] In the same report, it is stated that 'despite the rise of tertiarization of the economy and the fall of industrial activities observed from one generation to another, the [industrial] worker component of the professions occupied by the descendants of immigrants remains important even though there is a

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[188] Danielle Potocki-Malicet, **Éléments de sociologie du travail et de l'organisation**, Paris: Economica, 1997, pp. 85-7.
[189] Jolly, et al, **ibid.**, p. 31.
[190] Mahrez Okba, 'Métiers des descendants d'immigrés et de leurs pères: des heritages socioprofessionels différents selon les origines géographiques?', in **Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France**, Trajectoires et Origines. Premiers résultats, Octobre 2010, p. 64.

noticeable fall compared to their fathers.'[191] These two facts, combined, reveal a crucial situation: speaking for the descendants of immigrants, specifically those of North African-origin, they are the heirs of an immigrant working-class culture, and, despite the transformation in the labor regime, they still constitute a considerable part of the industrial working class.

Table 2.7: Repartition of immigrants and their descendants according to types of income in 2010 (per cent).

	Immigrants born in EU	Immigrants born outside EU	Descendants born in EU	Descendants born outside EU	Neither Immigrants Nor Descendants	**Whole**
Non-Salaried	**16**	**11**	**11**	**8**	**12**	**12**
Independants	9	6	5	5	7	**7**
Employers	6	4	5	3	4	**4**
Family Aids	1	1	1	0	1	**1**
Salaried in Private Sectors	**75**	**78**	**71**	**74**	**67**	**69**
Interns and Aid Contracts	1	1	1	2	1	**1**
Interims	1	4	3	4	1	**2**
Apprentices	0	1	1	3	1	**1**
Fixed-Term Contracts	5	8	4	8	5	**5**
Other Salaried	68	64	62	57	59	**60**
Salaried in Public Sectors	**9**	**11**	**18**	**18**	**21**	**19**
Interns and Aid Contracts	0	1	0	1	1	**0**
Fixed-Term Contracts	2	3	2	3	2	**2**
Other Salaried	7	7	16	14	18	**17**
Whole	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
In Numbers (in thousands)	790	1440	1270	810	21380	**25690**

(Source: INSEE, 'Situation sur le marché du travail'.)

We have to emphasize here that the tendency of tertiarization does not necessarily undermine but surely transforms this heritage, and, along with the industrial labor force among the descendants, there is certainly a growing proletarianization in every aspects: socially, economically and politically. The social division of labor, in this sense, *objectively* determines the positions of the immigrants (and their descendants) in the process of production of their surplus labors not only to the extent of the production phase but also of the entire circle of production: distribution, exchange and consumption. The rise of precarious labor and its consequences in terms of precarity and low quality of life, in this sense, create even more suitable circumstances for any kind of 'social conflict', principally for immigrants and most notably for North African and Sub-Saharan immigrants. Our proposal for an explanation of reasons why especially those two groups are closer to the focus of social questions lies in the *historical* process of the formation of immigrant class fractions which has both economic and extra-economic aspects. Before passing to this part, we shall finally deal with another important phenomenon

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[191] **Ibid.**, p. 65.

that goes closely in contact with contemporary precarity: the question of unemployment.

iii.) Unemployed immigrants: Perfection of the reserve army of labor

Thirty glorious years of capitalism until mid-1970s ensured a full employment economy.[192] However, with the crisis in mid-1970s, core capitalist economies experienced two major tendencies: the fall of industrial activities (and respectively the rise of tertiarization) and the ferocious reversal of full employment. We have already examined the consequences of the first tendency in the case of immigrants in France. On the other hand, second tendency of reversal in employment status made the unemployment phenomenon apparent. In France, the question of unemployment after the crisis have dramatically emerged: the rate of unemployment was around 6 per cent in 1981 and this number had risen up to 12,1 per cent in 1997.[193] Naturally the growing rates of unemployment have targeted immigrants as much vigorously as did the effect of deindustrialization over them. According to a 2008-dated report prepared for INSEE, in 2007, immigrants represented 16 per cent of the unemployed while they constituted 9 per cent of the economically active population. This figure alone shows how much the fact of unemployment has affected immigrants in comparison to non-immigrants: the ratios of the two are 15.2 per cent against 7.3 per cent.[194] The unemployment phenomenon becomes even more striking when it comes to young immigrants: among the actives between ages of 15 and 24, the unemployment rate rises up to 28 per cent while the rate for those in the age of 50 and above falls to 13 per cent.[195] If we think in relation to the 2005 riots, it becomes manifest that one of the most troubling socio-economic facts lies, therefore, in this uncertainty which the massive unemployment carries out for, especially, the young immigrants (and of course the descendants of immigrants) and which the immigrant masses confront in their everyday lives.

In depth, the ethno-racial dimension of the unemployment question reveals itself: in the exhaustive study *Trajectoires et origines*, it is stated that 'the rate of

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[192] Hobsbawm points out that 'full employment did not become general until 1960s, when the average of West European unemployment stood at 1.5 per cent.' Eric J. Hobsbawm, **The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1990)**, London: Abacus, 1995, p. 259.

[193] Dormois, **ibid.**, p. 26.

[194] Jacqueline Perrin-Haynes, 'L'activité des immigrés en 2007', **INSEE Première**, No: 1212, Octobre 2008, p. 1.

[195] **Ibid.**, p. 2.

unemployment among immigrants are particularly high for those whose origins are of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and Sub-Saharan Africa; and even more for the descendants of them. (…) For males, the weakest rates of employment are observed among descendants of immigrants, particularly the descendants of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (53 per cent), South-East Asia (60 per cent), Morocco and Tunisia (61 per cent), Turkey (67 per cent) and Algeria (69 per cent).'[196] Here again, the intensity of Sub-Saharan and North African populations in France should taken into account in order to determine the real unemployed immigrants in numbers.

With these figures, solely the economic conditions of the immigrants who engaged in 2005 riots become even more apparent. The massive unemployment conditions primarily target immigrants from the Maghreb and Africa, especially their young populations, dismantling them from *proper* means of subsistence so as to make them bare against the harsh conditions of living and to push them towards the edge of subsistence. As we have shown in the Chapter I, there are discussions that tend to situate especially young immigrants through this apparent fact of unemployment into an impasse in terms of exclusion from consuming society, marginalization, etc. We, on the contrary, tend to sketch a different picture for the linkage of immigrants to unemployment through a conceptualization to be more concrete: the reserve army of labor. In order to resituate the unemployed immigrants within the frame of the concept of reserve army of labor, a wider explanation is needed.

In Marxist analysis of capitalist mode of production, it is well known that the labor force is considered as the *variable constituent of capital* (or shortly, 'variable capital'). Given the mathematical formulae[197] of terms like *(1)* rate of profit and *(2)* rate of exploitation, the value of the variable capital plays a crucial role in the process of accumulation of capital.

(1) $Rate\ of\ profit = \frac{Surplus\ value\ (s)}{Constant\ capital\ (c) + Variable\ capital\ (v)}$ (2) $Rate\ of\ exploitation = \frac{s}{v}$

Therefore, labor power as variable capital is so much in a constant struggle with capital itself—a 'fundamental contradiction' intrinsic to capital which we have

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[196] Bertrand Lhommeau, et al, 'Situation par rapport au marché du travail des 18-50 ans selon l'origine et le sexe', **Enquête sur la diversité des populations en France**, Trajectoires et Origines, Premiers résultats, Octobre 2010, pp. 55-6.

[197] Marx, **ibid.**, pp. 668-72; David Harvey, **A Companion to Marx's *Capital***, vol. 1, London and New York: Verso, 2010, pp. 264-5.

emphasized above under the rubric of 'contradictory unity of production and realization'—that in so far as the capital has the tendency to be accumulated and thusly to multiply itself in every phase of its reproduction, it contradicts with its variable constituent, namely, with labor force. Marx accordingly sees that, in the process of accumulation of capital, the value of the variable capital has a tendency of diminution in proportion to the surplus value extracted: 'With the growth of total capital, its variable constituent, the labor incorporated in it, does admittedly increase, but in a constantly diminishing proportion.'[198] For instance, the constant rise in the replacement of machinery with manual labor, in other words the replacement of constant capital with variable capital, is much preferred by capitalists since it does not only extends the scale of production but it also diminishes the costs of labor and immediately increases the progress of accumulation of capital. Marx writes about this fact as follows:

> The increase of the difference between constant and variable capital is (…) much less than that of the difference between the mass of the means of production into which the constant capital, and the mass of the labor-power into which the variable capital, is converted. The former difference increases with the latter, but in a smaller degree.[199]

This difference had eventually led Marx to arrive at the conclusion that not in any other mode of production but only in the capitalist one, a surplus population has been generated and this is essential for it. Surplus population is, in this sense, briefly defined as 'a population surplus in relation to capital's average requirements for valorization' [200] and it becomes a necessary condition for the reproduction of capitalism. This surplus population, consequently, forms the category what Marx called the 'reserve army of labor'. On the one hand the phenomenon of mechanization, on the other hand the greedy tendency of capital's accumulation: while these two movements within the sphere of production go hand in hand, the supply of labor increases more rapidly than the demand for labor even though the labor force needed in production does not fall absolutely. This development is accompanied by another fact which is over-work: 'The over-work of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of its reserve, while, conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by its competition exerts on the employed workers

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[198] Marx, **ibid.**, pp. 781-2.
[199] **Ibid.**, p. 774.
[200] **Ibid.**, p. 786.

forces them to submit to over-work and subjects them to the dictates of capital', Marx observes, and concludes:

> The condemnation of one part of the working class to enforced idleness by the over-work of the other part, and *vice versa*, (…) accelerates at the same time the production of the industrial reserve army on a scale corresponding with the progress of social accumulation.[201]

Surplus population with its creation of a reserve army of labor is therefore operational in two ways: more labor put in the production from a certain amount of workers and more laborers 'set free', i.e., unemployed, or drawn out of work. The terrible pincer of the unemployment and precarity that the worker found himself in between continues its pressure. As Marx finds it out, '*les dés sont pipés*' and 'capital acts on both sides at once':

> If [capital's] accumulation on the one hand increases the demand for labor, it increases on the other the supply of workers by 'setting them free', while at the same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those who are employed to furnish more labor, and therefore makes the supply of labor to a certain extent independent of the supply of workers. (…) Thus as soon as the workers learn the secret of why it happens that the more the productivity of their labor increases, the more does their very function as a means for the valorization of capital become precarious; as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of the competition amongst themselves depends wholly on the pressure of the relative surplus population (…).[202]

Precarious labor and unemployment combined, therefore, complete the perfection of a surplus population and consequently a reserve army of labor as the necessity and condition for the reproduction of the capitalist mode of production. In this sense, phenomenon of tertiarization is nothing more than a historical aspect of capitalism, a visage of its historical development relying on the spatio-geographical organization of capital; precarity is relatively the general form of this aspect of historical development; unemployment is the excessive expansion of the reserve army of labor quite in deal with the running rules of the tertiary and the fact of precarity, in short, with the actual conditions of the labor regime. Without taking these intimate relations into consideration in their organic unity, without situating them in historical development, each phenomenon can be interpreted in exaggeration, as in such tendencies like replacing the 'proletariat' with the 'precariat',[203] or even more arrogant claims on the 'death of class.'[204]

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[201] **Ibid.**, pp. 789-90.
[202] **Ibid.**, p. 793.
[203] Cf.: Standing. **ibid**.

Peculiarities of these intimate relations unfold when the structure and the formation of the surplus population is examined. Here, we mention both terms 'structure' and 'formation', since it was at the time of Marx when this structure was already established and distinguished in several forms, and it conserves this very structure since then; on the other hand, it has changed and modified in respect to the inner dynamics of capitalism. According to Marx, the surplus population can be identified in three forms: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant.[205] Harvey sums up these forms as follows:[206]

—*Floating:* people who are already proletarianized; who are already full-time wage workers; who are temporarily thrown out of work; who survived the period of unemployment; who are reabsorbed back into employment. 'In contemporary terms,' as Harvey emphasizes, 'the floating are roughly equivalent to the pool of unemployed, as recorded in the unemployment statistics, plus those classified as underemployed or as discouraged workers.'[207]

—*Latent:* people who have not yet been proletarianized; peasant populations (who have been proletarianized only after the destruction of the peasant or indigenous subsistence systems which will push massive numbers in these systems into the wage-labor); petty bourgeois independent producers; artisans; also the groups who had escaped proletarianization only to be brought back into the fold (like the medicines and those in the higher education system).

—*Stagnant:* people who are irregularly employed; who are hard to mobilize; pauperism; vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in short, lumpenproletariat; paupers who are able to work, especially orphans and pauper children who constitute candidates for the reserve army; the demoralized, the ragged, those unable to work,

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[204] Among the first bearers of this banner was the French economist André Gorz who announced in 1980 the farewell to the working class: **Farewell to the Working Class. An Essay on Post-Industrial Socialism**, London: Pluto Press, 2001. Resonances found suitable places, of course, in academic circles as well, such as: Jan Pakulski, Malcolm Waters, **The Death of Class**, London: Sage, 1996. An excellent critique of the tendencies towards the class-free socialist strategies and theories formulated by left-wing intellectuals, namely the wave what used to be called post-Marxism, came from Ellen Meiksins Wood in her 1986-dated book: **The Retreat from Class. A New 'True Socialism'**, London: Verso, 1999.

[205] Marx, **ibid.**, p. 794.

[206] Harvey, **ibid.**, pp. 278-80. The passages that Marx deals with these forms can be found at Marx, **ibid**, p. 794-802.

[207] Harvey, **ibid.**, p. 278.

in Marx's saying, those who constitute 'the hospital of the active labor army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army.'[208]

In this model, as it is seen, contemporary usage of the term unemployed is not equal to what it used to be called the 'reserve army of labor', or its precise form of floating reserve; it constitutes only part of the reserve along with those who are *floating* within not only industry but also the contemporary generalized form of work that is called precarious work. From this point of view, the enormous swell of the unemployed population, as well as the precarious labor, is subject to the rationale of the accumulation of capital and it has direct political usages. We will largely discuss its political usage in the Chapter IV as regards immigrant masses, e.g. the 'Muslim question' and the Islamization of the Muslim immigrants or the alienation in the everyday life in the social space of *banlieues* in which immigrants inhabit. However, before finishing our task in this chapter, we shall illuminate a few more points.

In contrast between two periods before and after the crisis of mid-1970s, it was seen that the former was a period of full employment. However, the state of full employment does not mean the vanishing of the reserve army, since the reserve army does not consist of *only* the unemployed. That is to say, precarity, irregular jobs, unemployment itself (although being in a relatively small amount), pauperism, etc., existed during that prosperous period of Western capitalism. Additionally, in this contrast, there is a crucial point that should not be missed: not only economic but also political strength of the labor organization. Harvey states:

> In the 1950s and 60s, there was a general reluctance on the part of the bourgeois corporate class throughout much of the capitalist world to create unemployment, *in part for fear of social unrest*. The preference was to find latent reserves. There were two ways you could do that. You could take capital abroad or import workers. (…) Shortages of labor in French automobile industries led to state-supported in-migration of Maghrebians (…).[209]

Harvey's point here is essential in remarking especially the political weakness of today's working class, and particularly its most fragile and vulnerable fraction, the immigrants—as we have shown, principally immigrants from Maghreb and Africa. Those who bear the most destructive effects of capitalism are in return those who suffer their political weakness in economic terms and consequently in their everyday lives. This sequel, in our view, is largely due to dismantling of the working class as a

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[208] Marx, **ibid.**, p. 797.
[209] Harvey, **ibid.**, p. 280. (Emphasis ours.)

whole from its class-based politics and its harshest impacts have been on immigrant fractions of the working class.

Harvey's passage, on the other hand, also needs clarification from another point of view. His emphasis on the 'fear of social unrest' does not, by itself, explain the contraction in the reserve army of labor. For a better appreciation of the point, it may be useful to look at Ernest Mandel. Mandel emphasizes a certain parallelism between the increasing accumulation of capital and the downsizing reserve army of labor. 'Accumulation of capital', he writes,

> has a contradictory effect on the volume of employment and on the tendency of salaries. In so far as man is substituted with machine, the reserve army grows. However, in so far as the surplus value is accumulated, that the capital expands, that we constantly see new enterprises emerge and existing factories extend, the reserve army is reduced and the capital starts seeking new labor force to exploit.[210]

Here, on the other hand, contraction in the reserve army is explained through the massive accumulation of capital and the need of simply more labor power. However, considering Marx's own theories on accumulation of capital, it had to be stated that this contraction on the reserve army is not absolute but relative contraction, for that it has been assumed an inverse ratio between variable capital and total capital. Harvey's point, in this sense, positively emphasizes the political aspect of this contradiction, and Mandel does so elsewhere, however the latter just strides over this crucial assumption. How could this contradiction be explained in addition to the political aspect? This question brings us to the organization of capitalism on a world scale at least up until the crisis of mid-1970s wherein reveals the secret of import-substitution in the so-called 'Third World'. This strategy peculiar to the developing countries in the capitalist peripheries might had such an impact on advanced industrial countries so as to arrive an extent of overproduction (the moment of crisis) which involved *too much* labor force in industries; so that while the accumulation of capital was provided through a systematic increase both in rates of profit and in rates of exploitation, the reserve army was not necessarily expanded, instead it had relatively reduced. This is a crucial point in the linkage between past and today, between earlier and later periods of post-colonialism, between advanced and post-industrial times, etc., which in fact points at the 'actuality' of imperialism and unequal development. Today's immigrant worker, whether if he works in

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[210] Ernest Mandel, **Traité d'économie marxiste**, vol. 1, Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1962, p. 184.

industry or in the tertiary or else he is unemployed for a long time; whether if he is neutralized or legally defined as immigrant; whether if he is immigrant or descendant of immigrant; as being part of this colonial history, he shoulders the weight of the past in his own class character, in that distinct fraction within his class wherein he is arithmetically counted with the other, e.g. European, worker, but he is condemned back to his suffering alone.

Therefore, all of a magic, we shift the space-time of our focus: we leave the blurry surface of today and get into the dusty vault of history only to come back and set that surface clear…

CHAPTER III:

FORMATION OF IMMIGRANT CLASS FRACTIONS IN FRANCE

In accordance with what we have discussed theoretically on the issue of class in the previous chapter and how we applied our conception of class for the actual situation of immigrants in the capitalist mode of production in order to expose that the 'immigrant question' in France essentially has a class character, we will now deal with the components of the formation of immigrant class fractions. For the reason that the focus of our study is the immigrants and their descendants issued from former colonies of France in the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa, our prime task is to delve into the depths of the French colonialism in these geographies. Here it is equally important to draw attention to both major and minor 'levels' of the processes related to the colonial history, i.e., France's 'colonial politics' and changing economic policies (flux and reflux between free market and protectionism) and the driving motives behind them relying on the 'sphere' of economy on the one hand, and the responses, resistance, and challenges to the French colonialism developed in the colonial territories by indigenous people in a range varying from class struggle and anti-colonial struggle to class consciousness and formation of identities. In oscillation between these two levels, we will expose how the social formations of the countries and people colonized have fundamentally been transformed with the introduction and implementation of capitalist social relations in a relatively short period of roughly one and half a century. If we take *these* immigrants and their descendants in the focus of our study, their 'genealogical' lineage going back to labor migration and to the process of proletarianization before their migration will be of crucial importance in order to sketch out the formation of class fractions in which we approach these immigrants.

However, a historical survey through the French colonial history in major and minor planes is not only of crucial importance in order to demonstrate that the ancestors have been proletarianized under the colonial rule of France whose political

tutelage enabled French capitalists and settlers deform the existing social relations and radically transform them into capitalist social relations. This is a historical fact and it is known to anyone who is more or less interested in this history. What is even more important is the question *how* the social relations fundamentally transformed due to prerequisites of the capitalist mode of production and its reproduction under close association of the 'economic' and the 'political' forces of the French colonialism. This question will ultimately lead us to the problems of unequal exchange and unequal development which will not only determine the economic and political settings in the colonial territories but also the course of their social formations once they are introduced and conquered by the logic of capital. The course of social relations will also thereafter dramatically change due to this unequal relationship between the colonizer and the colonized, even among the colonized themselves, and it will ultimately reflect in the labor market in which the immigrant worker enters to sell his/her labor in competition with other workers. We, therefore, propose to understand the logic of actual inequalities through their formation in the historical process in which men, as individuals and class, experience the relations of exploitation. A survey on colonial history has a lot to tell about these relations of exploitation and their nature since it is this colonial history itself that rendered these relations possible.

In the first chapter, we have underlined that the formation of class (and class fractions) has a direct connection to the experiences of a class in the relations of exploitation. Those experiences, which are ultimately expressed in the form of class-consciousness, reflect on the forms of culture, identity and ideology. Therefore, the culture which was inherited from 'dead generations', which was carried from native lands to immigrated lands, and which was throughout the historical processes pretty much articulated *vis-à-vis* various historical moments and conjunctures, plays a determining role in this process. So as to permeate this field, in this chapter and in the following chapter, we will stress on the link between social beings and cultures of immigrants (as class fractions) in time and space. The formation of identities in the cases of pan-Africanism and Islam (which is also related to national consciousness in the Arab-speaking world) is in that sense essential in order to understand the responses to the French colonialism whose the social forces fundamentally relied upon the remnants of the ruined social formations of the past which in return became the cradle of flourishing social formations of the future.

Space, on the other hand, whether rural or urban, associates with the transformation of the social formation as well: if, both before and after such moments as decolonization and labor migration, the engine of this transformation were proletarianization, it was effectively materialized by and to the extent of urbanization. And, in so far as the masses involved into the process of capitalist production, hence production of their surplus labors, the way in which they experienced the relations of exploitation has engaged with their experiences of urbanization. In this chapter, we also emphasize this fact with 'proletarianization by urbanization', and this process of both proletarianization and urbanization (and pauperization) will become vehemently apparent for the immigrants (and their descendants) issued from the former colonies of France who will be destined to inhabit the social spaces of *banlieues* (which will be elaborated in the Chapter IV of this study).

We shall, then, begin with history, wherein these fractions find their origins…

Colonial History: Historical Origins of the Immigrant Class Fractions

We should first start with emphasizing that the modern colonial history led by European powers has a profound relation with capitalism. It has many aspects concerning politics, economy, society, culture, military, etc.; all combined, it has provided as fundamental support in the organization of capitalism on a world scale as it has constituted an indispensable *fil conducteur* for the accumulation of capital. In these terms, colonialism (along with the consequent period of imperialism) plays majorly a two-fold role in the course of capitalist development in which the capital is transformed from merchant's capital into the essence of a world economy: *i)* being a source for the 'primitive accumulation of capital', or in a more explicit concept, 'accumulation (of capital) by dispossession'; *ii)* enabling the penetration, dispersion and diffusion of capital issued from Western Europe into the rest of the world. Due to the track we follow, these two characteristics are pretty much related to each other.

i.) Colonialism and the accumulation of capital

At the final part (Part 8) of the first volume of *Capital*, we find Marx in quest for the origins of the accumulation of capital and this quest leads him to evaluate a

concept which supposes to precede the growth of capital: the so-called primitive accumulation. In so far as to precede the current accumulation, Marx emphasizes on a primitive accumulation which is attributed a sort of 'pre-historical' role for capital. 'The whole movement,' writes Marx, starting from labor force to the accumulation of capital 'seems to turn around in a never-ending circle, which we can only get out of by assuming *a primitive accumulation (...) which precedes capitalist accumulation*; an accumulation which is *not the result* of the capitalist mode of production *but its point of departure*.' Thereafter, he critically (and ironically) notes that this primitive accumulation in political economy plays the same role as the 'original sin' in theology. Yet, with an important difference: while the legend of original sin points at that men have no other means than to earn their livelihoods with the sweat of their brow, the bourgeois political economy mystifies this legend with the story speaking of 'two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal élite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. (…) Thus it came to pass that the form sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort finally had nothing to sell except their own skins.'[211] After this attack on the 'protestant ethic', he bends the stick on the opposite direction and clarify the bourgeois mystification: the primitive accumulation is, in fact, 'nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.'[212]

Since, as Marx intends to show, the primitive accumulation is a process divorcing the producer from the means of production rather than a pre-historical original sin of the accumulation of capital, it acquires a continuous, permanent character for the fact that the historical separation of the immediate producer from his means of production under capitalism is an actual, ongoing process. Therefore, the colonization of the world by major European powers which have been the forerunners of the extension of capitalism over the globe, in that sense, depicts one of two pillars of this historical process. According to Luxemburg, 'capitalist accumulation as a whole' is, in fact, an 'actual historical process', and it has two

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[211] Marx, **Capital**, vol. 1, p. 873. (Emphasis ours.)

[212] **Ibid.**, pp. 874-5. For how Marx criticizes Adam Smith and other classical economists on the notion of 'primitive accumulation', see: Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'Logics of Power. A Conversation with David Harvey', **Historical Materialism**, vol. 14:4, 2006, pp. 19-20. For Harvey's response to Meiksins Wood's critiques, see: David Harvey, 'Comment on Commentaries', **Historical Materialism**, vol. 14:4. 2006, pp. 157-66.

different aspects: one concerning the relations between the capitalist and the wage-laborer, the other concerning 'the relations between capitalism and the non-capitalist modes of production.' [213] This latter implies some predominant methods, as Luxemburg points out, such as colonial policy, international loan system, war, etc., and this view ultimately extends the scope and utility of primitive accumulation for the expanded reproduction of capitalism. For Luxemburg, 'the conditions for the reproduction of capital provide the organic link between these two aspects' and the 'historical career of capitalism can only be appreciated by taking them together.'[214] As regards this comprehension which takes capitalism on two pillars, the historical role of colonialism in the development of capitalism emerges crucially and the historical background of today's immigrants from former colonies imposes itself as a determining factor in their class formation.

The second aspect of Luxemburg's formulation of capitalist accumulation is the attempt to extend Marx's formulation of primitive accumulation. Marx does not involve his work in depth in the relationship between capitalism and colonialism yet his followers especially who lived in a period that saw colonial imperialism at its apogee have intensively worked on the issue. When the critical importance of colonization prevailed in this period, the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production implied what in fact the colonial policies of imperialist powers had already been through for decades: the destruction 'natural economies' of non-European countries. In that sense, the struggle against natural economies implied following ends:

(1) To gain immediate possession of important sources of productive forces such as land, game in primeval forests, minerals, precious stones and ores, products of exotic flora such as robber, etc.

(2) To liberate labor-power and coercing it into service.

(3) To introduce a commodity economy.

(4) To separate trade and agriculture.[215]

At the apogee of colonial imperialism, which corresponds to a period in the first quarter of the 20th century when this struggle between capitalism and natural economies still existed, Luxemburg points out that, for the achievement of these ends of capital, 'force [was] the only solution open to capital,' because 'if capital were to

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[213] Rosa Luxemburg, **The Accumulation of Capital**, London, New York: Routledge, 2003 [1913], p. 432.
[214] **Ibid.**, p. 433.
[215] **Ibid.**, pp. 349-50.

rely on the process of slow integral disintegration [of natural economies], it might [have] take[n] centuries.' Therefore, as Luxemburg concluded, 'the method of violence (…) [was] the immediate consequence of the clash between capitalism and the organizations of a natural economy which would restrict accumulation,' for the very reason that

> the primitive associations of the natives are the strongest protection for their social organizations and for their material bases of existence, capital must begin by planning for the systematic destruction and annihilation of all the non-capitalist social units which obstruct its development.[216]

The purposes of capitalism in the colonization of the world thus serve it basically through the transformation of 'natural economies' into the capitalist mode of production which implies the exploitation of natural resources in the process of commodity production, the genesis of a labor force in form of commodity through the process of proletarianization, the *generalization* of the commodity economy,[217] and the subjugation of trade and agriculture—traditional economic activities in non-capitalist economies—for the reproduction of capitalism. The historical necessity of colonialism for capitalist development lays precisely in this formula. Although some classical political economists claim that 'the establishment of the European colonies in America and West Indies arose from no necessity,'[218] the historical role of the colonization was not limited to the extent of Americas (where a different colonial history has developed in the earlier period of capitalism than the rest of the world) but to the extent of the whole globe—an extent that it reached during the *belle époque* of capitalism, or in Hobsbawm's appellation, in 'the age of empire' corresponding roughly between 1875-1914: 'A world economy whose pace was set by its developed or developing capitalist core was extremely likely to turn into a world in which the advanced dominated the backward; in short into a world of empire.'[219]

ii.) French colonial history in major and minor planes

The 'age of empire' which was sealed with the establishment and perfection of colonial empires has, at the first glance, two dominant aspects, which are present

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[216] **Ibid.**, pp. 350-1.
[217] Marx, **ibid.**, p. 733.
[218] Adam Smith, **An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations**, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981, Book IV, Chapter VII, p. 735.
[219] Eric J. Hobsbawm, **The Age of Empire (1875-1914)**, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 56.

in a quite interrelated position: economic and political aspects. Our emphasis on the accumulation of capital in the fashion of Luxemburg's conception, as regards this interrelation, combines and implies these aspects in a historical unity. It is much needed, however, to get into the depths of the colonial history itself in order to maintain the linkage between our study and the political and economic aspects of colonialism. For this aim, first of all, we need a periodization for colonialism, and secondly, a historiography for the French colonialism specifically in Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa, in what we may call major and minor planes: in the major plane, France's own colonial actions including political, military and economic dimensions in these geographies in the context of global power balance of the era; in the minor plane, the struggle and resistance against the colonial rule on the one hand, and the transformation of the pre-capitalist social formations on the other hand.

Common periodization for the history of modern colonization mainly consists of three phases: *i)* from the early expeditions and invasions of Americas, or so-called *West Indies*, primarily under the Spanish and Portuguese campaigns of the late 15th and 16th centuries until around the third quarter of the 19th century, generally being marked as 1870, at which time some leading European powers, including Great Britain, France, Netherlands, etc., were involved in search and acquisition of colonies particularly in Americas (until the Monroe Doctrine of 1823), South and East Asia (India, several Asian peninsulas and islands, China) and Africa (especially its Mediterranean shore and southern end); *ii)* from 1870 until 1914, in other words, 'the age of empire', during which period the expeditions and invasions of European powers (the former cadre added with Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the only non-European exception of the Meiji's Japan) resulted with the annexation of many territories of the planet into colonial empires of these powers, hence a global phenomenon called 'partition of the world'; *iii)* from 1914 until the period of decolonization in 1960s, during which period, with the exception of WWII, a more stable balance of powers is witnessed in terms of competition on non-European territories and nationalist and/or socialist independence movements have grown up in colonies to a very large extent (from India to Africa, from Middle East to South Asia) so as to succeed their anti-imperialist and nationalist causes during the period of decolonization.

France, as an integral part of this balance of powers, bears its own peculiarities in the history of colonization. First and foremost, the colonial politics of

France from the *ancien régime* until decolonization had been pretty much depended on the overall political atmosphere in the country, mainly the political regime. The history of France in this period had seen enormous political turmoil. The revolutionary way opened up in 1789 was followed with *la Terreur*, the Empire, the Restoration, the July Monarchy, the Second Republic, the Second Empire and the Third Republic in the first hundred years; in other words, this political turmoil was only relatively stabilized after one hundred years especially with the 1893 legislative elections when counter-revolutionaries, including monarchists, Boulangists and Bonapartists, were heavily defeated. The French Revolution was, in this sense, more than something to be marked with one or many *moments* in the history but a whole *process* itself. It was only secured and its 'enemies' were only eliminated under the Third Republic; it was only realized *in* and *by* this process. And once it was realized, it was already something else than what it was in its beginning. Therefore until 1870, when the Third Republic was established among the ruins of the Second Empire—if we borrow a phrase from Melville, 'a sort of innocent and transformed Marius brooding among the ruins of Carthage!'—, we deal with the dizzy character of the French political struggles, which has ultimately reflected on France's colonial politics in the first place. From the Third Republic onwards, through remarkable events of the two world wars and the Vichy Régime, the foundation of the Fourth and Fifth Republics until the decolonization, we witness a period when colonialism reached at its apogee and then its ultimate decline.

All this political turmoil is, on the other hand, accompanied and stimulated by the gradual evolution of the economy, which has directly affected the colonial politics of the great powers, including France. The passage from pre-capitalist, medieval, feudal economy to mercantilism in France consorted with, in the political sphere, the rise of a centralist monarchy in the 17th century until the revolution—a time when the initial colonial activities of France primarily in the 'New World' were already at stake. This was followed by the revolutionary period that imposed a certain break in France's colonial activities and it soon coincided with the newly emerging industrialism in the first half of the 19th century. However this economic development, or the development in the means of production, was not fully satisfied by the bourgeois revolution's colonial politics due to wars, inner political struggles and the radicalism that the revolution inherited from the Age of Enlightenment—especially on the grounds of human liberties and egalitarianism.

This attitude of the French Revolution should be credited on the account of Jacobins who have long objected and opposed especially to the slave-trade and slavery itself, and their revolutionary way even inspired the first 'successful slave revolt', i.e., the Haitian Revolution of 1804.[220] Napoléon's empire, on the other hand, operated, until its collapse, quite like a war machine of which main field of operation was Europe. Except the expedition of Egypt and Syria between 1798 and 1801, this period was more of the 'externalization of the French revolution' by Napoleonic wars.[221] Bourbon Restoration, on the other hand, from the fall of Napoléon in 1814 until the July Monarchy in 1830, 'restored' the colonial politics of the *ancien régime* as well, which is followed by the Orléanist regime's own colonial politics. During this passage in the hot summer days of *Trois Glorieuses*, i.e., the July Revolution, the invasion of Algiers was happening.[222]

The invasion of Algiers and its aftermath, in other words the spread of the French invasion to entire Algeria, was surely of a new epoch for the French colonialism. It does not only constitute one of the main pillars of the French colonialism but it also embodies such a case that is sort of representative for the colonization of other territories with its history of violence, struggles, riots, famines, exploitation, and so on. Algeria, therefore, stands as a unique case of study both with its peculiarity and ordinariness in respect to general history of the French colonialism, and this case needs a closer look. Here, then, two critical questions arise: why the invasion of Algeria was necessitated in the beginning and, how and through which means France managed to colonize Algeria until its decolonization?

North African coast of the Mediterranean, especially its Western part, had historically, been a base for the corsairs until the first quarter of the 19th century. For

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[220] C. L. R. James, **The Black Jacobins. Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution**, New York: Vintage Books, 1989.

[221] Arno J. Mayer, **The Furies, Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions**, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 533-606. Also compare: 'In terms of political geography, the French Revolution ended the European middle ages. The characteristic modern state, which had been evolving for several centuries, is a territorially coherent and unbroken area with sharply defined frontiers, governed by a single sovereign authority and according to a single fundamental system of administration and law.' Eric J. Hobsbawm, **The Age of Revolution (1789-1848)**, New York: Vintage Books, 1996, p. 88. For the way how Napoleonic wars transformed the political systems in Europe, see: Charles Tilly, **Coercion, Capital, and the European States, AD 990-1990**, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Tilly writes as follows: 'As Napoleon and the French reached out into Europe, national-state nationalism swelled on the French side and on the side of the states France menaced; by the time Napoleon lost, however, his imperial administrations had created the basis for new nationalisms of both types—Russian, Prussian, and British, to be sure, but Polish, German, and Italian as well—through much of Europe.' (p. 118)

[222] Frédéric Mauro, **L'Expansion européenne 1600-1870**, Paris: PUF, 1996, p. 244.

a long time their pirating activities posed a threat for the European commerce in the Mediterranean: a great source of insecurity and instability, which puts the fragile dynamics of commerce into even more acute position, and taxes agreed to be paid to local authorities by the European governments as the only way to eschew being target of the pirates, those *barbarian* ('Berber') corsairs were antagonistic to the merchant's capital in its primitive accumulation period and its sequel, not only to the extent of French commerce[223] but also that of European, even of the newly founded United States.[224] For the part of the French, the threat of piracy explicitly found its voice with Alphonse de Lamartine, who was rhetorically asking if they were to 'abandon those seas [the Mediterranean] to those pirates' during a famous speech at the Chamber of Deputies in 2 May 1834.[225] In 1846, he was urging for the complete conquest of Algeria in order to 'flush the Mediterranean out the pirates who humiliate the Christian nations by tributes over them, flush the Mediterranean out those bandits who infest it, and settle the popularity of the French naval force, not only in France but also on the coasts of Italy which, without having a navy, is even more subject than us to depredations and insults of the barbarians of Algeria.'[226] At the other side of the Sleeve, Francis Bacon, English thinker and statesman—embodiment of the intellect and state power—, was paying great attention to the pirates, 'the common enemy of human society', according to his categorization of those who should be extirpated, coming only after the Caliban and the Canaanite who simply signify, respectively, the non-European and the dispossessed commoner. 'In selecting this enemy,' write Linebaugh and Rediker, 'Bacon was acknowledging the corsairs of North Africa, who during the reign of James I and after attacked not only English shipping (…) but the coasts of England and Ireland in slaving raids.'[227] Bacon's account on the corsairs should not be

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[223] Lahouari Addi, 'Colonial Mythologies. Algeria in the French Imagination', in L. Carl Brown, Matthew S. Gordon (eds.), **Franco Arab Encounters. Studies in Memory of David C. Gordon**. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1997, pp. 93-105.

[224] Barbary Wars of the United States in 1801-1805 and in 1815 were directly aiming the annihilation of this threat which posed several difficulties after the American War of Independence. The victory of the US Navy in 1815 in Tripoli has thus provided a ground for the establishment of the American power in the Atlantic world since it secured the US trade and navigation and marked a turning point for it in its opposition to the British and the French. For an early history of it, see: Edgar Stanton Maclay, **A History of the United States Navy from 1775 to 1901**, vol. 1, New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1906, pp. 214-302.

[225] Alphonse de Lamartine, **La question d'Orient. Articles et discours**, (Edited by Sophie Basch and Henri Laurens), Brussels: André Versailles, 2011, p. 112.

[226] **Ibid**. p. 281.

[227] Peter Linebaugh, Markus Rediker, **The Many-Headed Hydra. The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic**, London: Verso, 2012, p. 62.

considered as representative only for the British colonial mind; on the contrary, it is even apparent in the discourses of Lamartine and others that, especially in the course of 19th century colonialism, this view has become the basis of the European colonial mind in general as well as the French in particular.[228]

What is the most devastating thing in the basis of colonial minds, whether they are 'European', British or French, lies on the fact that it was generated with the needs of either free trade, historically represented by Britain—an economic policy in affiliation with what Karl Polanyi once called as the 'liberal creed'[229]—, or trade protectionism, historically represented by France, which involves state's direct interference on the transactions through tariffs and regulative laws.[230] A certain contradiction between British and French economic policies appears here so much so that it will dominate the entire history of struggle between the two powers throughout colonialism. Yet, with an important nuance: this contradiction is a dialectical one so as to influence and advance each colonial policy and strategy. On the other hand, they had a common cause where their interests concur: the security of the trade, whether free or protected. Therefore, every needed condition for the life and habitat of free trade and trade protectionism, of their capitalist accumulation motive, was provided only by the coercion of arms, only *manu militari* of great Western powers. Therefore, the invasion of Algeria, the most important base of Mediterranean pirates, was of necessity in terms of granting the security of navigation in the Mediterranean as well as in the Atlantic, which ultimately made of the notion of insecurity the reason of providing security. This securitarian logic, which was, in that time, in its course of formation, comprises a multi-dimensional net[231] of which aspects reciprocally feed each other.[232] It is thus no surprise that a

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[228] For a detailed collaborative work on the 'French colonial mind', see: Martin Thomas (ed.), **The French Colonial Mind,** (in two volumes), Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2011.

[229] Karl Polanyi, **The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time**, Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. See especially chapters 12 and 13: pp. 141-170.

[230] For the brief aspects of the French economy under the Restoration and the July Monarchy periods, see: François Caron, **Histoire économique de la France, XIXe-XXe siècle**, Paris: Armand Colin, 1995, pp. 93-8.

[231] Foucault's account on the notion of security which he relates with state governmentalities might be helpful for a better conception of this multi-dimensional net. Michel Foucault, **Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978**, New York: Picador, 2009.

[232] The notion of security appears to have a more important place once France acquired the territorial control of Algeria, especially *vis-à-vis* anti-colonial struggles of the local tribes which often rendered the French presence insecure. For instance, during 1840s when the insurgency of Abdelkader was at its apogee, Tocqueville, an advocate of the French colonial expansion in the Maghreb, was preparing reports to the parliament for measures to be taken against the insurgency. Alexis de Tocqueville, **Travail sur l'Algérie**, in Œuvres, vol.1, Paris: Gallimard, 1991 [1841]. Especially see: pp. 695-9.

contemporary conservative American writer was defining the First Barbary War as the 'America's first war on terror'[233]; it was indeed the case.

While, hence, the Antichrist trilogy of the Caliban, the Canaanite and the pirate proposes the tripartite ground of European colonization, the 'war on pirates' takes the lead in an efficient French way of colonialism with the invasion of Algeria in 1830. Algeria's geographical proximity to France and France's *potential* vulnerability before 'Barbarian' corsairs have prioritized French interests in this territory. The word 'potential' is emphasized here, because, in fact, unlike the English and the American, 'France enjoyed more satisfactory relations with the Regency of Algiers,' the political entity that ruled Algeria during Ottomans, 'than did the other European powers. As recent as 1816, France had refused to join the squadron of Lord Exmouth of Great Britain that administered a devastating nine-hour bombardment to Algiers in retaliation for Barbary slaveholding.' Eventually the unwillingness of France for this alliance 'had netted her in the very next year the return of the trading concessions at La Calle and Bône that she had forfeited to the English during the war.' Consequently, historical fact reveals that France was the only power 'that most consistently counseled moderation when sanctions against the Barbary state were proposed.'[234]

However, in 1830, France's privileges and trading concessions have become unsatisfactory in quest of a security under a full French control.[235] Military action stimulated by the security of the trade paves the way to the violent action stimulated by the transformation of the 'natural economy' against the Caliban, the 'uncivilized', and the Canaanite, the dispossessed, or rather those who were to be dispossessed during the process of primitive accumulation that Luxemburg mentioned—or in Harvey's terms 'accumulation by dispossession.'[236] We may witness in any colonial history this splendid compound: military, coercion and state power go hand in hand with sciences like political economy, anthropology, geography—in short, the

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[233] Joseph Wheelan, **Jefferson's War. America's First War on Terror 1801-1805**, New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003.

[234] John Ruedy, **Modern Algeria. The Origins and Development of a Nation**, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 45

[235] **Ibid**, pp. 45-8. The author, here, specifies that the financial dispute between the French and Algerian authorities has contributed to the rise of what we precise as 'need of control.'

[236] David Harvey, **The New Imperialism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 137-82. Also see the use of the concept in the actual 'neoliberal' context: D. Harvey, **A Brief History of Neoliberalism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Especially see the chapter 6 on 'neoliberalism on trial': pp. 152-82.

bourgeois knowledge. And the principal object of this alliance is, following Luxemburg, the accumulation of capital. It was with this purpose that France invaded Algeria in 1830.

On the other hand, seemingly contradictory to our depiction of the sources of the colonial drive, most historians of colonialism or North Africa do not mention this stimulating aspect at all. For example, an accomplished historian, Mahfoud Bennoune, describes the reasons for the French colonial expansion in Algeria in a typical manner on the ground of colony's function of 'provid[ing] the *metropole* with raw materials' and its usage 'as an outlet for dumping French manufactured goods.'[237] Although this motive is pretty much real, it still does not fully explain the actual takeover of the political control of colonies whereas privileged concessions, for instance, would have fulfilled the same reason that Bennoune and many others argue. Referring to the 'anti-imperialist analyses of imperialism,' Hobsbawm notes that 'the growing economic significance of such areas for the world economy does not explain why (…) there should have been a rush by the leading industrial states to carve up the globe into colonies and spheres of influence.'[238] Although we do not intend here to provide an integral theory of colonialism and imperialism, we find it important to stress that, despite their influences and strength in emphasizing economic motives of colonization, these accounts remain somehow weak in demonstrating the linkage between these economic motives and the formation or accomplishing of a political and territorial entity, which put these motives into realization. In this sense, emphasizing the securitarian needs (e.g. the case of pirates) would be useful to connect these two essential pillars of economy and politics each other in different contexts of European colonial conquests so as to understand how economic motives engage with a political strategy in a quite complex manner. Therefore, references to statesmen such as Jules Ferry, as does Bennoune, do not by alone constitute a 'proof' for the reasons of colonialism, although they are surely helpful in seizing the 'logic of domination.' In our view, emphasis on French securitarian needs of trade perfectly describes the driving motive for the *moment* of Algerian invasion since it is situated at the very junction of economy and politics.

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[237] Mahfoud Bennoune, **The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830—1987. Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independence Development**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 35.
[238] Hobsbawm, **The Age of Empire**, p. 65, ff.

Due to the specific conditions of the accumulation of capital, the moment of securing trade in 1830 was followed by the complete colonization of Algerian and consequently other Maghrebian territories. The process of colonization, which follows the moment of securing, is one of longer-term politics that include various techniques and considerable struggles. However, the most significant development of this period is that it coincides with the *economic* pillar of the 'dual revolution'[239] at the apogee of the Industrial Revolution. The blossom of the Industrial Revolution—its capacity of revolutionizing the means of production, its dissemination from Britain to continental Europe and the definite passage from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism—defined the logic of any type of colonization, including the French. Therefore the French colonization of Algeria, necessitated with the securitarian needs of trade, was soon leaped to an upper level that corresponds the needs of the accumulation of industrial capitalism despite the fact that there was no industrial production in the colonies at that time. Here the trade and the industry are not substitutes for each other; during the times of merchant capitalism there was industrial production and under industrial capitalism there was trade. What differ under their hegemonies are the techniques being developed and employed as regards the 'logic of domination' of their times.

Outside the spaces of capital, in the first half of the 19th century, there were neither industrial production nor capitalistic social relations. In geographies such as Algeria or the Maghreb in general the production basically relied on agrarian economy, which was of course supported with trade. Traditional social relations were in charge as the extension of agrarian economy and the division of labor imposed by it. Apart from peasantry a considerable part of the indigenous population belonged to nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes who have developed their means of subsistence throughout many centuries. Politically, the Algerian territory, as well as other territories of Maghreb which were then subjects to Ottoman suzerainty, was ruled by the *deys* ('*dayı*' in Turkish) who were semi-autonomous governors of the Ottoman Empire. A distant and semi-autonomous province, Algeria's geopolitical importance increased, as it is stated above, with its situation as the base for the Mediterranean pirates which concerned the security of the seas. Here the geopolitical importance of Algeria, alongside that of the entire Maghreb, overlaps with the

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[239] This term was first coined by Hobsbawm to emphasize the correlation between the 'political' French revolution and the British 'industrial' revolution. Eric J. Hobsbawm, **The Age of Revolution (1789-1848)**, New York: Vintage Books, 1996.

economic aspects of its colonization: territorial geopolitical importance itself becomes an economic reason for its colonization, and definite economic policies launched after colonization become the motive of colonial politics.

Within such a set of interaction bonds, this colonial politics particularly in Algeria, starting from its invasion onwards, has operated in accordance with a cruel struggle against the 'natural economy' so as to transform it and establish not only the capitalist mode of production but also give rise to capitalist social relations. It should always be borne in mind that capital is, first and foremost, a social relation. Therefore its reproduction presupposes not only the capitalist mode of production but also the totality of these social relations. Colonialism thusly appears as a project directed towards the process of capitalization of non-capitalist territories, economies and societies through, in most cases, coercion and violence. It is, at first, *a process*, since this coercive transition to capitalism does not *immediately* fulfill its aims—of which the ultimate one is a capitalist society.

Following Luxemburg's statements on the aspects of colonization (see the cited passage to the footnote 215 in this chapter) the first pillar of the struggle against natural economies was indeed the immediate grabbing of the land and resources. This task was by no means achievable unless a systematic settlement policy although, in the case of Algeria, it was responded by a restive population that 'proved their wills of resistance and independence.'[240] Facing with such a local insurgency, the primary strategy of Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, the French general governor to Algeria, who thought the only way of colonization would have been militarily,[241] was to populate the Algerian territory with French soldiers.[242] It was under his governance and pretty much coinciding with his *representation* of a certain 'colonial mind' that the infamous Dahra Massacre has taken place on 17 June 1845. Dahra Massacre was committed by the order of Colonel Aimable Pélissier, who served under the rule of Bugeaud and was in charge in the battles against the armed groups of Abdelkader El Djezairi, the religious, political and military leader of a

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[240] Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer, 'La France coloniale de 1830 à 1870', in Jean Meyer, et al., **Histoire de la France Coloniale. Des origines à 1914**, Paris: Armand Colin, 1991, p. 394.

[241] '[Bugeaud was a man who] strutted around, proud in his role as the exterminator of the Arabs. He was unremitting and wholly committed to burning their harvests, killing their animals, cutting down their trees, driven to use every scourge of war.' Eugène Bodichon, **Considérations sur l'Algérie**, Paris: Schneider and Legrand, 1845, p. 35 cited in: William Gallois, 'Dahra and the History of Violence in Early Colonial Algeria,' in Martin Thomas (ed.), **ibid.**, vol. 2, Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism, p. 14.

[242] Rey-Goldzeiguer, **ibid.**, p. 395.

long-term insurgency which had been effective especially between 1830-1837 but continued to exist until his surrender to the French in 1846.

A significant tactic that the Algerian insurgency adopted was to use caves as shelter in maneuvering against French brigades—a generic tactic within the scope of partisan or guerilla warfare. This tactic was responded by the Bugeaud Doctrine, which authorized the use of an already practiced tactic called *enfumades* ('filling with smoke') in the case of insurgents' retreat in caves as part of a wider counter-insurgency method called *razzia*.[243] Dahra Massacre, only a single example for the usage of the *enfumades* technique, has resulted with one of the deadliest actions at one time—not to forget mentioning that the victims included women and children.

Dahra Massacre, therefore, embodies in itself several *concrete* facts to be revealed as regards the French colonialism. First, the colonial settlement policy goes hand in hand with a systematic extermination policy towards the indigenous population, at least in certain periods, as seen with the Bugeaud Doctrine. This one appears as a mere contradiction embedded to colonialism (yet a dialectical contradiction, not an Aristotelian one) between rendering new life flourish through settlement and old life sacrifice through extermination for the sake of the well-being (security, reproduction, etc.) of the new life in the colonies. Second, from the very beginnings of the French invasion, the insurgency movement has generated in certain territories, like that of Algeria with Abdelkader El Djezairi, hence the economic struggle of capitalism against the natural economy has found its conjugations *immediately* in the political and ultimately military struggles—between the French and the indigenous, between France and Algerian local forces, between regular army and insurgent resistance. It should also be noted that the historical importance of Abdelkader arises not only from his persona but also his ability to unify different local resistances under a wider one and his efforts to establish, in return, an independent state system on Maghrebian territory,[244] which worked only to a limited extent before its dissolution. Third, as it is seen that the victims of the massacre included women and children, the insurgency is *not* separable from the social life profoundly rooted in the territory, at least in rural areas where the semi-nomadic tribal life dominantly keeps up; on the contrary, social life and insurgency arrived at

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[243] For the Bugeaud Doctrine and the *razzia*, see: Thomas Rid, 'The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine', **Journal of Strategic Studies**, no: 33:5, 2010, pp. 727-58.
[244] Jean-Claude Vatin, **L'Algérie politique. Histoire et société**, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1983, pp. 137-41.

an interchangeable meaning whereas the French settlement policy targeted the uncontrollable or hard-to-control population as exterminable for its ends. Life and struggle becomes, in this context, and it *has to* become, at one and the same time, the same thing for the insurgents. This is the exact moment when the dialectics of the colonizer and the colonized arises in the form of colonial exploitation and anti-colonial struggle, and this anti-colonial struggle will take various forms ranging from armed struggle to class struggle throughout the colonial rule in these territories.

Table 3.1: European population and land ownership in Algeria (1841-1954)

Year	Land in Hectares	Population
1841	20,000	37,374
1851	115,000	131,283
1861	340,000	192,746
1872	765,000	279,691
1881	1,245,000	412,435
1891	1,635,000	530,924
1901	1,912,000	633,850
1921	2,581,000	791,370
1954	2,818,000	984,031

(Source: John Ruedy, *Ibid*, p. 69.)

The political economy of this threefold process, which reveals its symptoms with the Dahra Massacre, stands basically upon two pillars: systematic settlement policy that populated the Algerian (along with North African) territory with French settlers ('*colons*') which is strictly connected to the process of 'land grabbing', i.e., the distribution of the land to the new settlers. 'By the time Bugeaud outlined his master plan for destroying the state of Abdelkader,' writes Ruedy, 'colonization had become both the engine of conquest and guarantor of its permanence.' This had led the French invasion to develop into a systematic colonization that 'during the bloody decade of the 1840s,' the number of the settlers in Algerian territory had 'more than quadrupled.'[245] As it can be seen in the Table 3.1 above, this increase had been even to a greater extent associated with the distribution of the land to the new settlers. The size of the land ownership of the settlers amounting to 20,000 hectares in 1841

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[245] Ruedy, **ibid.**, p. 68.

almost sextupled and reached to 115,000 hectares in 1851. Apart from rural areas, the process of dispossession was in full speed in the urban centers as well. As early as 1831, 'Algiers had lost 30,000 inhabitants, who were either killed or exiled,' which is accompanied with, according to Aristide Gilbert's observation, the coming under the state's control of 3,000 buildings out of a total of 5,000[246]—a ruthless dispossession and extermination. Given the territorially organized insurgency against the French colonization (despite its weaknesses and irregularities) and clashes between the colonizer and the indigenous forces, the boost in the figures of both populations and land grabbing, along with the process of 'accumulation by dispossession' that took place in the urban areas, describes the scale of the French colonial activity and its coercion peculiar onto Algeria.

Among the accounts on colonialism, 1870s are generally taken as a turning point in terms of financialization of global capitalism in the realm of economy and of structural transformation in the colonial policies of the great colonial powers. The crucial importance of this turning point lies in the overlap of these two strides, which form a reciprocally breeding unity. These two aspects apply for French colonial history as well, with an important addition that the free trade economic policy has been substantially replaced by protectionism after the fall of Napoleon III. From 1860 until the end of the Second Empire, with the Anglo-French treaty, also known as the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860, France adapted the free trade economy under the rule of Napoleon III for several reasons. One of the reasons was that Napoleon III sought a 'policy of friendship' with Great Britain, which was 'partly to gain political status and respect.'[247] Although this view utters a truth, it remains superficial since it does not provide a ground for the preference of this search of friendship policy, especially when it is considered that the passage to free trade did not reflect the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie who benefited for a long time the French protectionist system.[248] In parallel, Luxemburg, for instance, emphasizes that the free trade policy was 'concluded by Napoleon III without the consent, and even against the will, of parliament, industrialists and agrarians, who constituted an

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[246] Bennoune, **ibid.**, p. 36.

[247] Rondo Cameron, **A Concise Economic History of the World. From Paleolithic Times to the Present**, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 298.

[248] For an account written during the early years of the Second Empire on the positions of capitalist class fractions of the time, see: Karl Marx, **The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon**, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, **Collected Works**, vol. 11, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1979.

absolute majority, being in favor of protective tariffs.'[249] On the other hand, Louis Bonaparte's ability to reconcile the common interests of all bourgeois parties under his authoritarian rule—which came to be known as Bonapartism—, and the support of finance aristocracy given to his rule for the sake of the interests of the Bourse,[250] had subsequently led economic policies of the Second Empire turn out to be in favor of finance capital which was in explicit strong relation with large-scale trade. The passage from protectionism to free trade, 'policy of friendship' with Great Britain, and a need for a large-scale free trade zone thusly became necessary.

Indeed, by the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty and its consequences, mostly thanks to its 'most-favored-nation clause', which meant that 'if one party negotiated a treaty with a third country, the other party to the treaty would automatically benefit from any lower tariffs granted to the third country,' an almost complete free trade zone in Europe was effectively created.[251] This situation has considerably contributed to the already-increasing tendency of the trade volume of the European powers, mostly showed its effects on intra-European trade but also on trade with overseas nations.[252] But, for us, the most important aspect of the free trade epoch was its impress over the 'reorganization of industry forced by the greater competition,' especially in France, and consequently 'inefficient firms that had been protected by tariffs and prohibitions had to modernize and improve their technology or go out of business.'[253] The 'coercion' of free trade over industrial production and its constantly revolutionizing of the means of production will be of ultimate importance in the later period of colonialism, that between 1929 until 1960s (we will return to this question in the following pages under the sub-section on the Marseille thesis).

However, the 1870s met with remarkable political, military and economic events since its very beginnings. Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71 resulted with the victory of Prussia; during the war, in 1870, the surrender of Napoleon III to Prussian forces on the battlefield declared the overthrow of the Second Empire and the foundation of the Third Republic; between March—May 1871, the proclamation of the Paris Commune and its sanguinary repression… This political turmoil was accompanied by a long period of economic depression first triggered by panic in

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[249] Luxemburg, **ibid.**, p. 428.
[250] Marx, **ibid.**, p. 170.
[251] Cameron, **ibid.**, pp. 299-300.
[252] **Ibid.**, p. 300.
[253] **Ibid.**, pp. 300-1.

Vienna and then New York in 1873, and later spread out to all capitalist economies, of which effects stroked until 1879 in all these geographies. France was particularly among the most vulnerable among these economies, especially after accepting paying Prussia war reparations amounting to 5 billion francs with the Treaty of Frankfurt.[254] Under these circumstances and given the newly founded bourgeois republic principally backed by French industrial capitalists who were in favor of protective tariffs anyway, the passage from free trade to protectionism did not happen all of a sudden. Although Adolphe Thiers, the first President of the Third Republic, and the republican bourgeoisie had the tendency towards protectionism, France had to remain mostly loyal to the Cobden-Chevalier Treaty until 1892 when the Méline Tariff was introduced. In between, attempts like the tariff of 1881 were countered by new trade treaties signed in 1882 upon the Cobden-Chevalier system, which remarked the political victory of free traders. Cameron writes that 'after the elections of 1889 returned a protectionist majority to the Chamber of Deputies, they succeeded in passing the infamous Méline Tariff in 1892.'[255]

Apart from other aspects, the passage from free trade to protectionism as regards colonial policies was as vital in France and also in Continental Europe to maintain proper circumstances of accumulation of capital through colonialism as confronting both in European and world scales the supremacy, i.e., the political and economic hegemony, of Britain[256] who 'alone could stand so loyal to Free Trade,' as writes Luxemburg; and she points out the very contradiction between great powers on the ground of distinct economic policies: 'primarily because [Britain] had long had immense possessions of non-capitalist areas as a basis for operations which afforded her almost unlimited opportunities for capitalist accumulation.'[257]

This contradiction pretty much coincides with the development of the colonial possessions of great powers throughout the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. In probably the most known analysis of imperialism, Lenin relates the

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[254] This number would have amounted to at least $5 billion in 1973 according to Turgeon's calculation. Lynn Turgeon, 'The Political Economy of Reparations,' **New German Critique**, no. 1 (Winter, 1973), p. 112.

[255] Cameron, **ibid.**, p. 303. We find interesting to note here that the period between 1889-1892 also corresponds to the defeat of the counter-revolutionaries in France in parliamentarian politics, which had at last stabilized the bourgeois revolution triggered in 1789—one century ago. The fate of separate political and economic successes of the republican bourgeoisie seems to be bound to each other.

[256] Giovanni Arrighi, **The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times**, London and New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 164-5.

[257] Luxemburg, **ibid.**, p. 431.

fall of free competition, which constitutes the basis of free trade policy, with the rise of colonial annexations dated to 1870s, the period when the monopolization tendency of capitalism becomes largely obvious and dominant. 'It is beyond doubt,' he writes, 'that capitalism's transition to the stage of monopoly capitalism, to finance capital, is bound up with the intensification of the struggle for the partition of the world.'[258] There may be, therefore, a close relation between the rise of protectionism, which is directly related to monopoly capitalism, or finance capital, and the *acceleration* of the partition of the world from 1870s onwards. The crucial problem, however, is related to the question in which ways protectionist policies, or the tendency towards protectionism (note that the exact return to protectionism in France was in 1892 with the Méline Tariffs), have responded to the aims of great capitalist powers, except those of Britain, and precisely of France, so as to provide the very basis of the accumulation of capital with the aid of colonial annexations. What actually protectionism did and what was its relation to monopoly capital? In order to understand the basis of this critical turning point of the 1870s, we should historicize the reversal towards protectionism.

First of all, 1870s remarks a significant increase of the European population, and the 'great vague of colonization corresponds to this apogee,' states Miège. He interestingly emphasizes that 'it is not a coincidence if decolonization accompanies the decrease of the European population before the demographic explosion of the Third World.'[259] Direct relationship between demography and colonization seems quite apparent here and not limited to the French case. An 1895-dated well-known statement of the famous colonialist Cecil Rhodes, 'millionaire, king of finance, the man responsible for the Boer War,' confirms it for the British case:

> I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for 'bread', 'bread', 'bread', and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism… My cherished idea is a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the United Kingdom, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods

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[258] Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, **Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism**, London: Penguin, 2010, p. 95.

[259] Jean-Louis Miège, **Expansion européenne et décolonisation. De 1870 à nos jours**, Paris: PUF, 1993, p. 155.

produced by them in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.[260]

This 'bread and butter question' not only peculiar to the United Kingdom imposed eventually waves of emigration from Europe to colonies throughout the 19th century and in the first quarter of the 20th century. We have already demonstrated above how Algeria was systematically populated with the French settlers. The waves of emigration, on the other hand, were accompanied with the development of transportation whose 'service always preceded colonial conquests,' basically for the reason that 'the concentration of the colonial traffic following the growing size of the ships favored the positions of [the] influence networks ['*réseaux d'influences*']', i.e., certain companies which appeared as pressure groups that have centralized and monopolized transportation, and 'thus played a determining role in the first establishment of an economic infrastructure.'[261]

These demographic and 'infrastructural' developments in Europe have been polished with the profound transformation of the credit system, especially between 1852 and 1864. '(…) The development of public companies through directing the money of the new layers of subscribers to themselves; rise of the investment banks and then the depository banks'—such as Crédit Lyonnais created in 1863 and Banque de Paris et de Pays-Bas founded in 1872—'(…) have permitted the concentration of considerable masses of capital,' and thusly necessitating 'a new strategy for their investment.'[262] Part of these investments have found their places in underdeveloped peripheral countries, such as Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Tunisia along with Spain and Italy, which had the need of this capital for a 'difficult modernization.' Especially for the part of France, this exodus of capital was mainly oriented towards the coasts of the Mediterranean, as it can be seen in the Table 3.2 below.

This table primarily shows that during the period of the Second Empire and the first decade of the Third Republic, which suffered a long depression, the concentrated French capital was primarily invested in underdeveloped but still sovereign countries. Imperialism, of which footsteps are being heard louder and louder throughout that period and which operates through monopoly capital, sought

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[260] This famous statement can be found elsewhere; we cite it from Lenin, **ibid.**, p. 97.
[261] Miège, **ibid.**, pp. 157-8.
[262] **Ibid.**, p. 159.

in the first place peripheries where the kernel of a capitalist economy was sowed so as to create 'emerging markets': much profitable and less venturous investment with the advantage of controlling related institutions which are in charge of administration of loans, such as the Ottoman Public Debt Administration founded in 1881.

Yet, the amount and preponderance of French investments in colonies poses a question in terms of the intimate relation between capitalism and colonialism. We can provide an easy reply stating that the territorial amount of French colonies until 1880s remains still minor as compared to the British colonies—0.7 million squares for the French and 7.7 million squares for the British in 1880[263]—and this effectively reflects over the invested amount of capital in colonies. However, during the period between 1880s and 1914, when the territorial gains of the French Empire had nearly quintupled from 0.7 per cent to 3.7 per cent in 1899, the rise of the capital investment in colonies did not show the same rate. Whole period of 1882-1914 has only seen an average of 11 per cent of the total French capital investments in colonies, and this figure even falls to 9 per cent in 1914.[264] If we put it out briefly: French colonies did not attract as much French capital as the non-colonized, or only 'semi-colonized,'[265] peripheral economies were able to. Lenin once put it out splendidly: 'Unlike British colonial imperialism, French imperialism might be termed usury imperialism.'[266]

Table 3.2 shows another important fact, this time directly concerning colonies, that more than half of the French capital investment in colonies is made in the sector of transport instead of government securities, or industry and banking (2.3 per cent against 0.7 per cent and 1.3 per cent). This fact shows us that, at least until 1880s, expectancies of the French bourgeoisie from colonies mainly relied to the construction of a modern infrastructure, which would supposedly pave the way for the flourishing of capital (as social relation) and capitalism (as social formation) in the colonial territories. We may therefore conclude that capital tends to invest on the conditions that would give birth, in its so-called 'naturalness', to the social relations and social formation on which the capital relies; however it can only do this with coercion, with military, with bare power, which appears contradictory as if the notions of naturalness and power are antagonistic to each other, while they are not

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[263] Lenin, **ibid.**, pp. 94-5.
[264] Rondo Cameron, **France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914**, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 486.
[265] Wolfgang Reinhard, **Petite histoire du colonialisme**, Paris: Belin, 1997, pp. 218-9.
[266] Lenin, **ibid.**, p. 77.

antagonistic for the accumulation of capital in its homeland, in Europe, in its most natural habitat, given the history of capitalism, has also been a great deal of violence in the course of its flourishing.

Table 3.2: French foreign investments, 1852-1881: Geographic and industrial distribution

	Government Securities (1)	Transport (2)	Industry and Banking (3)	Total (4)
APPROXIMATE SUMS INVESTED (millions of francs)				
Mediterranean	2200	2450	735	5385
Near Eastern	2850	400	200	3450
Central Europe	800	1450	550	2800
Eastern Europe	990	240	100	1330
Northwest Europe	100	285	200	585
Colonies	100	350	200	650
Rest of World	700	75	25	800
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION				
Mediterranean	14.6	16.4	4.9	35.9
Near Eastern	19.0	2.7	1.3	23.0
Central Europe	5.3	9.7	3.7	18.7
Eastern Europe	6.6	1.6	0.7	8.9
Northwest Europe	0.7	1.9	1.3	3.9
Colonies	0.7	2.3	1.3	4.3
Rest of World	4.7	0.5	0.2	5.4
Total	51.6	35.0	13.4	100.0

(Source: Rondo Cameron. *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914*. London: Routledge. 2000. p. 88.)

(Note: The category Mediterranean indicates only Italy, Spain and Portugal while Near Eastern indicates Ottoman Empire and Egypt, and rest of world chiefly Western Hemisphere.)

Nevertheless, foreign capital investments are not the only indicators of the relation between the French capitalism and French colonialism. If this is the one side of the medal, the other is, evidently, the place of colonies in the whole of French

capital's transactions, namely of its trade. Verily, with this aspect, reveals itself the determinant role of protectionist economic policy within French colonial policies in general. Let us, then, turn back to the passage from free trade to protectionism, which is closely linked to the ultimate ends of French colonial policy so as to create a sort of 'free trade zone' protected under tariffs and customs regime, on the one hand, and a zone large enough for the circulation of the capital and commodities within it, on the other hand. The phenomenon of the 'scramble for Africa', therefore, arises under these circumstances from 1880s onwards, which was for the part of France a mere quest of a large-enough protected economic zone as opposed to the largest territorial possession of the United Kingdom. The British free trade policy was sufficiently supported by its colonial possessions, and it needed not any significant tariffs for the international trade while an important proportion of the colonized territories of the world belonged to it. France, on the other hand, in lack of these possessions, has seen the scramble for Africa as a great possibility for itself to provide annexations of large colonial territories that would function as a vast ground for the exchange of commodities, of their production, trade, and circulation of capital. It is not surprising in that sense the first significant attempt for the return to protectionism came in 1881, which failed against free traders, but eventually succeeded in 1892 with Méline Tariff. If we ever attempt to conceptualize the relation between protectionism and colonialism, along with its political power both represented by and embodied in the French Colonial Empire, the French capital—not only seeking survival but also challenging the British capital for the world hegemony[267]—was in search of *spaces of flight*, which would offer to its power the greater, to its capacities the more varied, to its accumulation the more. In that sense, those spaces of flight were colonies, the promised lands for the capital, possible territorial annexations that will merge with the metropole so as to establish a fully controlled and governed territory by the sovereign power of France, and a fully fortified land against its antagonists.

Despite its function for the French capitalism, colonialism has also created side effects in the long term. Lacking the conditions of competition, the French industry could not be able to renovate itself and revolutionize its means of production, and that has resulted with a disadvantageous situation with the Great Depression of 1930s. Until the decolonization in the 1960s, this 'backwardness' has

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[267] For an excellent analysis of the British hegemony and its historical context in terms of accumulation of capital, see: Arrighi, **ibid.**, Especially: pp. 47-58 and pp. 159-74.

so much so affected French capitalism that the colonies in this later period were no more an asset for France but rather became a burden for it. We will return to this argument, which we call the 'Marseille thesis', towards the end of this chapter. But, before, let us conclude the relation between protectionism and French capitalism at the apogee of colonial expansion.

Apart from this thesis, according to another study of Jacques Marseille,[268] colonial markets did amortize the fluctuations in the international conjuncture in the last quarter of the 19th century within the context of the general movement of exportations. They have seen net drops for six times between 1880 and 1914, and this picture is completed by the fact that in this period importations have surpassed exportations, speaking for the balance of the two (see Table 3.3 below). Under such circumstances posing threat and insecurity for exporters, Jules Ferry proposed a 'safety valve' ('*soupape de sûreté*') in 1885 in favor of a protectionist system, which constituted another pave to the upcoming Méline Tariff. Marseille also emphasizes that the Méline Tariff was anticipated with a 16.8 per cent drop in exportations in 1892. Becoming a true safety valve and remarking the definite return to protectionism, the Méline Tariff, on the other hand, distinguished the French Empire into two parts as 'assimilated territories' and 'non-assimilated territories.' Assimilated territories consisted of Algeria, Antilles, Guyana, Réunion, Mayotte, Indochina, New Caledonia, Gabon and Madagascar, which were given the right of tax exemption for their exchanges with France, and, on the other hand, they had to apply the same tariffs that are valid in the metropole for the imported commodities from foreign countries. Non-assimilated territories, on the other hand, remained autonomous in their customs regime, which did not please among exporters who have tirelessly attempted to align their customs regime to the common law.[269]

In the middle of this insecurity, the demand of exporters was that providing the investment security of the national product should be the state policy. This demand, consequently, returned with the support on the French exportations to the Empire, in other words, protectionism established a real line with colonial politics. Between 1880-1913, the value of this exportation improved with the rate of 4.2 per cent per year while the exportation to foreign countries improved with the rate of 1.8

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[268] Jacques Marseille, 'Les relations commerciales entre la France et son empire colonial de 1880 à 1913', **Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine**, T. 31ᵉ, No: 2, April-June 1984, pp. 286-307.
[269] **Ibid.**, p. 288.

per cent. Moreover, the sales within the Empire fell only in 1903: every drop in total exportation after 1893 (1894, 1902, 1908, 1911) was compensated with the rise of the proportion of exportation to the Empire. This exportation, therefore, became the stabilizer of the economy playing the same role as it did in the British economy between 1860 and 1890 (see Table 3.4 below).[270] However, in a different way: 'For the British economy, that was because it occupied a dominant position in the world economy so that the Empire was able to play this stabilizing role. For France, that was done by the intervention of customs protectionism which reached the same result.'[271]

Table 3.3: France's commodity trade, 1852-1913 (millions of francs).

	OFFICIAL DATA			CORRECTED DATA		
	Exports	Imports	Surplus/Deficit	Exports	Imports	Surplus/Deficit
1852-1861	17,886	16,477	1,409	19,676	16,972	2,704
1862-1871	28,445	28,507	-62	31,288	29,363	1,925
1872-1881	35,575	40,496	-4,921	39,133	41,711	-2,578
1882-1891	34,117	43,921	-9,804	37,528	45,239	-7,711
1892-1901	35,934	41,425	-5,491	39,527	42,670	-3,143
1902-1911	51,764	57,452	-5,688	56,941	59,075	-2,134
1912-1913	13,593	16,652	-3,059	14,952	17,152	-2,200

(Source: Rondo Cameron, *France and the Economic Development of Europe, 1800-1914*, London: Routledge, 2000, pp. 523-4.)

(Note: All corrected data belong to Cameron only the exception that there is a minor mistake in corrected data for the surplus/deficit between 1902-1911 summing up to -2,274, which we have corrected.)

Given the preponderance of colonies in the French economy, it becomes clear that the survival and prosperity of the Empire was indeed essential for the French capitalism. Therefore, after 1885, the 'colonial turning point'[272] led by Jules Ferry, one of the fathers of the Third Republican ideology[273] and a moderate republican who was at the same time in charge of secularizing the educational system and formulating the legitimacy of colonialism under his prime ministry, the French bourgeois political sphere little by little came close to a consensus on an official colonial politics. Victories of the moderate republicans in the elections of 1889 and 1893 thus consolidated the power of the 'partisans of colonial expansion (…) without

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[270] **Ibid.**, pp. 289-91.
[271] **Ibid.**, p. 291.
[272] Gilles Manceron (ed.), **1885: Le tournant colonial de la République. Jules Ferry contre Georges Clemenceau, et autres affrontements parlementaires sur la conquête coloniale**, Paris: La Découverte, 2007.
[273] Marc Ferro, **Histoire de France**, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2003, pp. 412-8.

interruption,'[274] as states Thobie. This consolidation, which was only opposed by socialists to a limited extent,[275] constituted a power bloc coherent with France's part in the scramble for Africa.

Table 3.4: Share of the Empire in France's foreign trade, 1880-1913 (millions of francs).

	Total Importation	Importation from the Empire	%	Total Exportation	Exportation to the Empire	%
1880	5033,2	244,6	4.8 %	3467,9	219,5	6.3 %
1890	4436,9	362,9	8.1 %	3753,5	296,1	7.8 %
1900	4697,8	363,6	7.7 %	4108,7	477,7	11.6 %
1913	8421,3	797,2	9.4 %	6880,2	894,8	13 %

(Source: Jacques Marseille, 'Les relations commerciales entre la France et son empire colonial de 1880 à 1913', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, T. 31ᵉ, No: 2, April-June 1984, p. 288.)

Probably the best representation of this power bloc has found itself in the *parti colonial*, not a formal political party but a political group, which consisted of three main operational bodies: the French Africa Committee (1890), Colonial Group in the French Chamber of Deputies (1892), and The Colonial Union (1893).[276] Such a power bloc formed within the French political sphere in the early 1890s was in fact preceded by the Berlin Conference of 1884-84, which established a wider, an international-scale power bloc that affirmed and legitimized the European invasion of Africa so as to regularize and formalize it. We should note that there is again a dialectical process of war and peace amongst the world powers that was opened by this conference: on the one hand, the scramble for Africa was based on the condition of a 'peaceful competition', on the other hand, this period has ultimately led these powers towards a great war of imperialist partition of the world between 1914-18.[277] The power bloc was constituted and has arrived on a consensus of the partition of Africa in 1885 whereas its components were only loyal to this bloc in so far as the conflict of their interests comes up to its extent where it became non-absorbable and

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[274] Jacques Thobie, 'La France coloniale de 1870 à 1914', in Jean Meyer, et al., **ibid.**, p. 639.

[275] There were several tendencies among socialists of the time, and one of them, in the representation of the influential socialist Jean Jaurès, defended a sort of humanitarian and peaceful colonialism. Moreover, Thobie writes that this limited opposition to the colonial politics 'gives the impression of constituting no more than an insignificant scratch against the convergence and the consensus of a political class (…).' **Ibid.**, pp. 641.

[276] **Ibid.**, pp. 641-7.

[277] George Shepperson, 'The Centennial of the West African Conference of Berlin, 1884-1885', **Phylon**, vol. 46, no. 1, (1ˢᵗ Qtr., 1985), p. 45.

non-subsumable within the holy alliance. Eventually, almost the entire continent of Africa was colonized after the Berlin Conference. Short before the Great War, there were only a few uncolored territories on the maps of the time (see Map 3).

Map 3: The Colonization of Africa, 1870-1910.

(Source: Ward, Prothero, and Leathes, *The Cambridge Modern History Atlas*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912.)

iii.) Pan-Africanism and Islam: formation of identities

From the very beginnings of colonization of Africa until its decolonization, political struggles particularly against the French colonialism principally relied on two fundamental notions: Islam, on the one hand, and pan-Africanism, on the other hand. These two notions operated in some cases independently and in others interdependently, and, thus, they have a complex history even up until today. In this respect, it has to be noted that Islam has been a core element of already-established social formations in many regions that colonial powers invaded while pan-Africanism mostly refers to a modern era. Although it is always hard to formulate the place of Islam in Muslim societies, we may assume that the religion has powerfully diffused within all kinds of relationship in these social formations, in this or that way; either as in the form of an orthodoxy or heterodoxy, or contradictorily bearing both aspects at the same time, Islam has situated itself in the very capillaries of the 'Islamicate' social formation, as Hodgson suggests the term in his great study, so much so that it regulates and dominates the state and the market, power structures and trade, or at least it provides the moral basis of customs and manners in relation to the material life. However, Islam deserves another note that it underwent in many geographies of the Islamdom[278] through modern interpretations, or at least modern political, military, or social organizations especially in colonized lands—among which in the first place *al-Nahda* movement, the famous Arab Awakening, can be counted. Colonialism in that sense doubtlessly constitutes a moment of rupture for Islamicate societies as well as non-Islamic societies that had been all colonized. On the other hand, local resistances in all over Africa can also be distinguished, albeit roughly, as follows: passive or armed resistances to military invasions, revolts against the colonial rule, organized class struggle, and national opposition movements. [279] Although it is important to mention this distinction, which emphasizes the aims, perpetuities and scales of singular anti-colonial resistances, it implies the danger of obscuring the true characteristics of their cumulative forms.

At this stage of our study, we arrive at a crucial junction point. A cumulative approach to these resistance forms, in other words anti-colonial struggles in a broader sense, is extremely important as regards their characters for that they

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[278] For the introduction of these two terms, see: Marshall T. S. Hodgson, **The Venture of Islam**. **Conscience and History in a World Civilization**, vol. 1, **The Classical Age of Islam**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977, pp. 57-60.

[279] Miège, **ibid**, p. 210.

represent the political aspect of the relations of exploitation in the colonial period between the colonizer and colonial subjects. The colonial subjects who were to be subjugated to these relations of exploitation of which character takes an economic form in the first place (especially when they enter in the process of capitalist production) have sought the ways against colonial domination through various ways of struggle as a resistance to the process of accumulation by dispossession, of proletarianization, and eventually of exploitation. In that sense, any form of anti-colonial struggle implies both economic and political character in itself: one revealing the response to the 'purely' economic process in the realm of production, militarily and politically supported by the colonial power whose actions are stimulated by the economic needs of capitalists and accumulation of capital; the other revealing the response to the economically-supported political process in the realm of politics in which we see the military, political, ideological and other institutional presences of the colonial power. It is those economic processes (dispossession, land grabbing, proletarianization, urbanization, exploitation, etc.) that constitute the origins of the class formation in colonies and it is those struggles (armed resistance, peaceful resistance, organization of the labor force, strikes, etc.) that constitute the origins of their class struggle in colonies. Yet, none of those struggles have been organized all of a sudden and spontaneously. On the contrary, both the class formation in colonies and class struggle has direct relation to the components of the social formations in colonies, either those components belong to the past or future. The genesis of the new and the evolution of the old will have great impacts on the class formation and class struggle at the same time from colonization to decolonization until labor migration, and this will also be the key in order to understand the historical context of today's 'immigrant question'. In other words, what we will focus on now shapes the *kind* of an unequal relation between the colonial oppressor and the colonial subject which will result with a never-ending unequal development for the part of the latter. Let us, therefore, explore this 'garden of forking paths,' starting from pan-Africanism and concluding with Islam in relation to class formation and anti-colonial struggle.

The roots of pan-Africanism, both as an intellectual and a political movement, may be traced back to the unsuccessful slave riots especially in the new colonies of Americas in the 18th century. However the apogee of this series of revolts is definitely marked by the struggle led by Toussaint Louverture who led San

Domingo negro slaves in the path of Haitian Revolution throughout the last decade of the 18th century. The impact of the revolution, and personally of Toussaint, on Africans has been so much so that Haiti was established 'as a symbol of the possibility of successful liberation and African independence in the Western hemisphere.'[280] Apart from Toussaint's Haitian Revolution and its early antecedents, pan-African movement has a strong root also in the history of the United States until the Civil War and the abolition of slavery thanks to many slave riots that occurred in this country.[281] However, as the story is well known, the abolition of slavery did not announce neither political nor social emancipation of Blacks in the US; quite on the contrary, their 'freedom' was to mean only in legal terms and was to the extent of the conditions in the labor market. Their struggle for their 'civil rights', in other words, for maintaining the means of subsistence for their political and social beings has taken much more time. The Civil Rights Movement of African-Americans in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, in this sense, constituted a crucial turning point in the struggle against discrimination and racial segregation that are established and institutionalized in the American society; and this movement both with its point of departure and success, but above all, with its impact and resonance not only to the extent of the US but throughout the world also inspired and encouraged other Black movements in the West.

Nevertheless, the scramble for Africa until the turn of the 20th century, not maybe in its course but definitely with its consequences, has maintained the conditions of maturation of a more elaborated ideology and political project. The most influential intellectuals and leaders of pan-Africanism, albeit opposing to each other in some cases, have flourished in the turn of the century. Pan-African congresses in the diaspora first organized in London in 1900 then in Paris in 1919, and elsewhere (respectively: in London and Brussels in 1921, in London and Lisbon in 1923, in New York in 1927, in Manchester in 1945) during the first half of the 20th century have been accompanied by the rise of prominent figures, such as W. E. B. du Bois, Marcus Aurelius Garvey, and others, who have pretty much influenced the pan-Africanist movement both in the diaspora and in homelands. For the reason that there had already been formed a massive Black community in Europe and in the US, anti-colonial resistances during the scramble for Africa have progressed hand in hand

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[280] Hakim Adi, Marika Sherwood, **Pan-African History. Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787**, London: Routledge, 2003, p. viii.
[281] C. L. R. James, **A History of Pan-African Revolt**, Oakland: PM Press, 2012, pp. 51-63.

with the Black movement in the diaspora thusly forming together a diversified pan-African movement: on the one front, struggling against the rule of their native lands by a handful of Western powers, on the other, struggling against racism, humiliation, discrimination in the everyday life in the diaspora; on the one hand, search of a political emancipation, on the other that of a social emancipation. The quest of unification in the middle of disintegration: as such may be abstracted the scope of pan-Africanism.

Islam, on the other hand, constitutes a major component of the colonized territories where especially Arabic-speaking people lived. It is therefore quite hard to distinguish if it was a (proto-) nationalist or an Islamic notion that sparked anti-colonial resistances in the wake of the French colonial invasions most notably seen in Algeria with Abdelkader. 'It was Islam that welded Arabs,' writes Mellah, 'and it was Islam that united them politically.'[282] And it could have been successful in this task in so far as it could have been capable in reconciling the interests of the merchant classes throughout the Arab world for the fact that with the exception of Egypt, from the Maghreb to Arab peninsula, Arab societies have never been peasant societies due to geographical and climate conditions but they have been merchant societies: their ruling classes have always been merchants, and Islam, precisely the orthodox Sunni Islam, has thusly flourished and developed as the principal legal and ideological component in the course of the formation of Arab unity.[283]

Conversely, however, the colonial powers, which abolished the commercial monopoly of the Muslim merchant classes in the greater geography of North Africa, Sub-Sahara and Middle East on the one hand[284] and led the Muslim-majority natives of the Arab world towards the path of a vast proletarianization on the other hand, have found their political antinomies during their colonial rules among the resistance movements, again, inspired by Islam. From the early history of these anti-colonial resistances until the decolonization of the Arab-Islam world, particularly in the Maghreb, the role of Islam in the course of constituting a political subject that challenges the 'colonial rule' had been of crucial importance. In that sense, it is

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[282] Fawzi Mellah, **De l'unité arabe. Essai d'interprétation critique**, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985, p. 39.
[283] Samir Amin, **La nation arabe. Nationalisme et luttes de classes**, Paris: Minuit, 1976, p. 26.
[284] **Ibid.**, pp. 26-30. Abolishment of the monopoly of Muslim merchant classes, however, does not necessarily mean that they have vanished from the economic scene in these geographies. On the contrary, Muslim merchants in West Africa under the colonial rule have even gained importance so as to implement the formation of an 'Islamic public sphere' throughout the trade and its relation to local agents. Robert Launay, Benjamin F. Soares. 'The Formation of an 'Islamic Sphere' in French Colonial West Africa', **Economy and Society**, 28:4. 1999, pp. 497-519.

important to state that the prominent figures of these resistance movements had generally been the representatives of a heterodox Islam, i.e., Sufism, instead of an urbanized, orthodox Islam of merchant classes. Abdelkader, once again, a Sufi sheikh,[285] stands as the powerful evidence of this shift, and he was followed by others of this or that order of Sufism, including Muhammad ibn Abdullah Boumaza in Dahra, Sharif Boubaghla in Kabylie, Sheikh El Haddad in Rahmania and Sheikh Mokrani in Bordj Bou Arréridj.[286] On the contrast between the characteristics of Sufism and orthodox Islam, which is reformulated especially with Salafi currents of Muhammad Abduh[287] and others, Colonna writes that 'Sufism was the expression of tribal resistance, and Reformism of urban bourgeois resistance.'[288] In any case, in the Maghreb and elsewhere, Islam (heterodox or orthodox) was a central motive in the development of both Arab renaissance and Arab resistance movements. However, particularly in the last quarter of the 19th century, when the armed resistance led by the Sufi sheiks became exhausted and more and more unsustainable, a shift in the forms of resistance movements became observable:[289] in Gramscian terms, a passage from 'war of movement' towards 'war of position'.[290] It also has to be noted that all these shifts and passages point out, after all, a hegemonic conflict within the Islamic schools, conceptions or interpretations whose effects are reflected over resistance movements whether they were armed or not.

Both Islam—in close association with 'Arabness'—and pan-Africanism have thusly engaged with the anti-colonial resistance movements until the fulfillment of decolonization. However, since neither Islam nor pan-Africanism constitutes a uniform 'ideology' (in its wider sense), and since they have their internal conflicts based upon various parties, social classes, ideas and traditions, the two notions are being employed only to a certain extent of abstraction, and, therefore, of reduction. In this sense, the lineage between anti-colonial struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries

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[285] For his teachings and theology, see a collection of his writings in French: Emir Abd el-Kader, **Écrits spirituels**, Paris: Seuil, 1982.

[286] Fanny Colonna, 'Cultural Resistance and Religious Legitimacy in Colonial Algeria', **Economy and Society**, 3:3, 1974, p. 236.

[287] Albert Hourani, **Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. For the part on Abduh, see: pp. 130-60.

[288] Colonna, **ibid.**, p. 239.

[289] **Ibid.**, p. 236-7, 240.

[290] For Gramsci's usage of these terms, see: Gramsci, **Selections from the Prison Notebooks**, pp. 229-39. For example, in the movement led by Gandhi in India, Gramsci defines 'boycotts' as war of position and 'strikes' as war of movement (p. 229). In this scheme, each can take place at once in a certain historical period, but the preponderant one gives the character of the epoch. It is in that sense that we make such a distinction for the anti-colonial struggles.

and today's *banlieue* riots through the lineage between the colonial subjects and immigrant workers and their descendants (so as to render the 'immigrant question' emerged in today's France) becomes apparent: that both Islam and pan-Africanism gave today's Maghrebian and African immigrants (and their descendants) in France their most visible characteristics, i.e., their *identities*, as such: being Muslim, being Arab, being Black… All these identities are experienced and appropriated by them in the relations of exploitation during colonialism and after labor migration subsequent to decolonization.

There is, in fact, a two-way process that is in charge in the formation of these identities in the period of colonialism: first one operates through the fields of historiography, anthropology, ethnography, literature, arts, etc., produced particularly within the European world so as to 'stamp the otherness' of the non-European, as in the case of Orientalism, in such a way that is 'constitutive otherness, in an essentialist character.'[291] This essentialist construction of the other imposes both historical and a-historical being, which becomes the *object* of the European: 'historical, since it goes back to the dawn of history' and 'a-historical, since it transfixes the being (…) within its inalienable and non-evolutive specificity.' Anouar Abdel-Malek notes these lines as regards Orientalism, specifically traditional Orientalism; however, it becomes apparent that his emphasis also applies for a wider conception of the relation between the European and the non-European as he goes on:

> Thus one ends with a typology—based on real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential—which makes of the studied 'object' another being, with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent: we will have a *homo Sinicus*, a *homo Arabicus* (and, why not, a *homo Aegypticus*, etc.), a *homo Africanus*, [somewhat located in an antagonism to] the man—the 'normal man' it is understood—being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity.[292]

Therefore, the otherness of the non-European, which is constructed so as to be distinguished from the European,[293] not only encompasses the 'mythical frontiers' of the 'imaginary Orient'[294] but also arrives at the extent where it is not even named as Orient: Africa, in that sense, is such a place that from the Sahara Desert to its very

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[291] Anouar Abdel-Malek, 'Orientalism in Crisis', **Diogenes**, December, 1963, no. 11, pp. 107-8.
[292] **Ibid.**, p. 108.
[293] Samir Amin, **Eurocentrism**, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009, p. 172.
[294] Thierry Hentsch, **L'orient imaginaire. La vision politique occidentale de l'Est méditerranéen**. Paris: Minuit, 1988.

southern end it proclaims both oddity—since its *identity* does not simply fit in the antagonism of the Orient and the Occident—and a solid otherness to the *white* Europe—since its identity had already been constructed as Caliban.[295] However, this Orientalist or Eurocentrist construction of the Other's identity, unlike Edward Said's account on Orientalism,[296] has not been realized only by the means of discourse. Said's use of the concept of Foucauldian discourse, which is being found distorted by his critiques,[297] intends to place the Orientalist/Eurocentrist discourse as the cause of this construction whereas this discourse has surely been a useful means in the course of the reproduction of the relations set between the Occident and the Orient, the European and the non-European, but only within the scope of a close association with *concrete* measures taken by the colonialists and imperialists whose economic exploitation of and political domination over the colonial subjects were already in practice. Therefore, the alterative construction of the non-European identity by the European is not only a matter of discursive power, but it is all the more a matter of that intimate relation between economy and politics, which we often underlined so far throughout this study.

The most visible example for this fact is the *invention* of races, or ethnicities,[298] by the colonial administration of the French West Africa under the program of the '*politique des races*,' which consists of principal interacting and 'intimately bonded' domains of administration, economy and ethnography.[299] Here, it is important to be aware that 'ethnic distinctions were [not] created part and parcel by the French,' as Launay and Soares state, but rather the French 'stressed certain pre-existing distinctions, ignored others, and created yet others virtually *ab nihilo*.'[300] Given the fact that the production of the ethno-racial knowledge of the *homo Africanus* is preceded by either exploration or invasion, but always by a direct or indirect involvement of power as it has happened to be in both cases, we therefore

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[295] Apart from Linebaugh and Rediker's work, Silvia Federici also takes a good account of the Shakespearean Caliban figure and relates his colonial rebellion to the notion of rebellious proletariat. Silvia Federici, **Caliban and the Witch. Women, the Body, and Primitive Accumulation**, New York: Autonomedia, 2009. Especially see: pp. 133-62.

[296] Edward W. Said, **Orientalism**, London: Penguin, 2003 [1978].

[297] Aijaz Ahmad, **In Theory. Classes, Nations, Literatures**, London, New York: Verso, 2008, pp. 164-7.

[298] For the origins of racial studies in Europe and particularly in France, see: Nicholas Hudson, 'From 'Nation' to 'Race'. The Origin of Racial Classification in the Eighteenth-Century Thought', **Eighteenth Century Studies**, vol. 29, no. 3, Spring 1996, pp. 247-64.

[299] Jean-Loup Amselle, **Logiques métisses. Anthropologie de l'identité en Afrique et ailleurs**, Paris: Payot, 1999, p. 22.

[300] Launay, Soares, **ibid.**, p. 502.

arrive at the conclusion that the knowledge, or the African identity regarding race, ethnicity or nation, is indispensable for the colonizer only in the *reproduction* of the colonial relations (colonial exploitation and domination most visibly, the bare economic and political aspects of these relations) that are set primarily in the colonial territories.

The second way in the process of formation of identities, on the other hand, operates on the side of the colonized, and it has been actualized in a quite twisted way. First, we will have a brief look at the Arab-Islamic world before we turn back to Sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the early modernization attempts of the Ottoman ruling class, the *distanciation* of the Arab political élites from the Empire and, henceforth, the political autonomization of Empire's Arab subjects—the two crucial processes which have most strikingly taken place in Egypt—have been quickly associated with modernization. In this sense, Muhammad Ali Pasha, first an Ottoman *wali* (governor) to Egypt who then declared himself as *khedive* (viceroy) so as to imply his political autonomy from the central government, is certainly among the first prominent figures representing the political aspect of the Arab modernization although, ironically, he was not ethnically Arab. Muhammad Ali's proclamation of *Khedivate* and subsequently his struggle against the central government in Istanbul, which has been greatly successful especially in the battlefield, has opened up the path for a line of successive khedives in Egypt who were in charge of a modernization program particularly in this country. However, these efforts by the political élites did not remain limited to the narrower geography of Egypt but it was precisely their influences that have more or less affected the greater geography of the Arab world in the 19th century.

Within the scope of this modernization program, a modern Arab intelligentsia, who had been educated either in Western countries or at Western schools in their homelands, and who were introduced by a number of modernist ideas, had been flourished among the newly emerging modern public sphere in their countries and started to disseminate their ideas through certain means of cultural and ideological production based on literature, poetry, linguistics, religion, translation (of Western texts), even music and the like… This wave of *al-Nahda*, the Arab awakening, was represented by the first modernists in the Arab public sphere among whom Rifā'ah al-Ṭahṭāwī (1801-73) was the most prominent figure. Al- Ṭahṭāwī's modernism was accompanied by Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-93), not a direct produce of

the Egyptian modernization but rather of Western missionaries based in Lebanon in the first half of the 19ᵗʰ century; apart from his activities in translation, *viz.* the translation of the Bible into Arabic, his most significant production were consecrated in journalism. In the religious sphere, the efforts of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-97), a reformative cleric originally from outside the Arab world, have found tremendous impact on younger clerics such as Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1845-1905), 'whose writings were to have a great and lasting influence throughout the Muslim world,'[301] the Syrian Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), ʿAbduh's follower, and others. This was a reformative line in the Islamic epistemology of which the influence had been to an important extent and all this line was called *al-Salafiyya*. Despite its connotations in today's world, it was rather reformative at the time on the basis of 'a distinction (…) between the essential doctrines of Islam and its social teachings and laws,' as writes Hourani, and he continues:

> The doctrines have been transmitted by a central line of thinkers, the 'pious ancestors' (*al-salaf al-salih*, hence the name often given to this kind of thought, *salafiyya*). They are simple—belief in God, in revelation through a line of prophets ending in Muhammad, in moral responsibility and judgment—and they can be articulated and defended by reason. Law and social morality, on the other hand, are applications to particular circumstances of certain general principles contained in the Qur'an and acceptable to human reason. When circumstances change they too should change; in the modern world, it is the task of Muslim thinkers to relate changing laws and customs to unchanging principles, and by so doing to give them limits and a direction.[302]

Apart from the reformist lines within the Islamic sphere, a vast secular modernization wave had been witnessed in literature. Writers like Nāsīf al-Yāzijī (1800-71), poets like Aḥmad Shawqī, Khalīl Muṭrān (1872-1949), Ḥafiẓ Ibrāhīm (1871-1912) were accompanied by Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, the author of the 'first important novel' in Arabic entitled '*Zaynab*' (1914). In journalism, al-Muqtaṭaf's publishers Yaʿqūb Ṣarrūf (1852-1927) and Fāris Nimr (1855-1951) were of no less importance than the journalist Jurjī Zaydān (1861-1914) who was also the writer of a series of historiographical work including the famous *History of Islamic Civilization*.[303] The rise of such an intelligentsia, in this sense, owes much to the spread of modern education across Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, etc., and a number of this intelligentsia was also educated in

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[301] Albert Hourani, **A History of the Arab Peoples**, New York: Warner Books, 1992, p. 307.
[302] **Ibid.**, p. 308.
[303] **Ibid.**, pp. 302-4.

Empire-supported schools in Istanbul, which have seen several waves of modernization throughout the 19th century.

Therefore, *al-Nahda* did not only arise as a heterogeneous intellectual movement but it had a greater influence in the formation of a *modern* Arab identity unlimited only to the 19th century. A Tunisian-origin bookseller in Paris listening to the touching voice of the Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum mysteriously relates himself to the waiter at a tea saloon in Sana'a on more or less a common sense of belonging: belonging to the Arab-speaking world, to its community—albeit being quite incoherent religiously, socially, and politically—hence, to a set of vague emotions and feelings, to certain ways of dealing with life, of the living itself. No matter how much incoherent, even impossible, say, in a political aspect, is this Arab unity, it still manages to bind anyhow an ambiguous Arab nation on the basis of identity; and maybe most importantly, it does so anew, in a time of modernity of which the consequences on the Arab world have been not a political unity (except the brief merger of the United Arab Republic which gathered Egypt and Syria under one political entity and the confederation of United Arab States which added North Yemen into the alliance—all being unification attempts of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Arab world between 1958 and 1961) but rather a complete political disintegration, therefore, unlike the times of the Arab empire that of the Caliphs and the Umayyad when a political unity was established under the hegemony of the orthodox Islam.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the influential pan-Africanist movement did not emerge all of a sudden in the 20th century. The forerunners of pan-Africanism have prevailed especially in the second half of the 19th century and they have been the fathers of a modern African nationalism inspired by great milestones like the Haitian Revolution and the independence of Liberia (1847)[304] and have been inspiration to the pan-Africanist movement in the 20th century represented in a large range of fields varying from literature to politics by figures as distinct as Aimé Césaire, Kwame

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[304] The Haitian Revolution and the independence of Liberia might be regarded as two distinct phenomena based upon two ideas of liberty: while the first has been influenced by the French Revolution and its Jacobin tradition in particular, the other was inspired by the American Revolution (note that Liberia was formerly a settlement of the American Colonization Society). For example, Stephen Allen Benson, the second president of Liberia, was finding the Catholic culture responsible for the weaknesses of the Haitian regime founded after the revolution whereas considering the Liberian republicanism as 'grounded on the moral stamina of its Protestantism.' Henry S. Wilson, **Origins of Western African Nationalism**, London: Macmillan, 1969, p. 18.

Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois and others. These early modern fathers of African nationalism have also differed among themselves to a great extent. In the field of political thought, for example, Edward Wilmot Blyden was focusing on an 'African personality' affirmatively emphasizing the cultural uniqueness of African nations so as to customs such as polygamy (he later took a positive position vis-à-vis colonialism and imperialism which would help, according to him, establishing the African unity) while James Africanus Beale Horton was in favor of an African modernization, i.e., Westernization, which would lead Africans to the ultimate end of 'African nationality' on the basis of self-government and independence. His ideas have been influential in the establishment of the Fanti Confederation (1868-1874), which gathered several ethnic groups of the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) under a short-lived experience of self-government under a written constitution.[305] Joseph E. Casely Hayford, on the other hand, influenced by both thinkers, was in search of a regional identity and political unity under 'West African nationality' and his point of view for a 'broader African nationality' was for 'encourag[ing] race emancipation.'[306] His efforts have yielded fruits with the establishment of the National Congress of the British West Africa in 1920, of which he became the vice-president and subsequently the president.[307] Such thinkers and politicians were the fathers of pan-Africanism and have been influential on future generations all over the continent and the diaspora where pan-Africanist ideas involved into a movement; however, as Guy Martin points out, they were essentially influenced by the Western liberalism, especially its British version, unlike the dominant character of modern pan-Africanism critical against liberalism.[308]

The origins of pan-Africanism in the second half of the 19th century and its maturity in the 20th century have also been influential on the cultural scene. The Martiniquan French poet Aimé Césaire's *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal* (1939) was the artistic reformulation of the 'African personality' in the cultural sphere, and it directly associated with the anti-colonial struggles of the time. Having engaged with the surrealist movement in Paris, Césaire's impact was not only over some literary-art circles of the West[309] but also on younger figures like his compatriot

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[305] Guy Martin, **African Political Thought**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 47-9.
[306] **Ibid.**, pp. 49-50.
[307] Adi, Sherwood, **ibid.**, pp. 82-5.
[308] Martin, **ibid.**, pp. 46-7, 55-70.
[309] Adi, Sherwood, **ibid.**, pp. 20-5.

Frantz Fanon[310] who will later on join the Algerian war of independence and write influential books like *Les damnés de la terre* which relies upon an extremely abstracted and sharp dichotomy between 'the colonizer' and 'the colonized'. Yet, the nexus between politics/political thought and literature/art was not only limited to that case. Among others, pan-Africanist figures like Marcus Garvey were also inspiring for the Black Arts Movement in the US in the 1960s and 1970s,[311] which will in return trigger the genesis of a hip-hop culture first in the US and then in Europe, including France. We will examine this latter in its relation to everyday life, social space and alienation in the Chapter IV.

iv.) Paths to independence: Armed struggle, class struggle, peaceful passage

At the time of its arrival at the interwar period in Europe, the 'colonial imperialism' was mainly suffering on two major threats, one being internal and the other external to colonial powers. The external threat to this colonial imperialism, beyond the perils of the imperialist partition—an internal threat prior to the Great War—which were to a certain extent taken under control by the triumphant Allied Powers, was the stilly growing national liberation movements beneath the surface across the colonies all around the world. This development, moreover, bumped into a new internal threat, this time economically, most visibly after the economic crisis in capitalist economies. The Great Depression of 1929, which started with the slump in that year in the US and quickly spread all over the world so as to threaten the world capitalist economies during the 1930s, had had a great impact on the dysfunction of imperial economies and politics. Therefore, by the end of the Great War until 1960s, we may determine two major lines that disrupted the colonial imperialism, if not the imperialism itself, in broadly political and economic terms, which day by day made it impossible to sustain the survival of colonial empires, particularly the French colonial empire. This disruption of 1929, then, had a significant effect on the French capitalism as well as on French colonial policies. Once again in history, an economic crisis had implications on both economy and politics simultaneously, and this dual effect draws a determining background for decolonization all around the world and particularly those concerning the French Empire.

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[310] **Ibid.**, pp. 64-8.

[311] James Edward Smethurst, **The Black Arts Movement. Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s**, Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

For the part of France, its vast colonial empire had been challenged by anti-colonial liberation struggles mainly in three geographies: South Asia, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the destructive impact of the struggles in South Asia, particularly in Vietnam, on the French Empire was tremendous, the scope of our study—the content of the 'immigrant question' in today's France, which brings us to focus on the immigrants (and their descendants) of Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan origin—limits us only to deal with the latter two. In this sense, in the first half of the 20th century, Algeria constitutes the main case in the Maghreb, greatly due to its peculiar conditions as regards colonialism, whereas a considerable part of Africa has involved greatly into the anti-colonial struggles—a series of national liberation succeeded by nation after nation.

In Algeria, like in other Arab countries, anti-colonial liberation movements were led and organized by a number of nationalist leaders, radical or moderate, who have clearly been influenced by their antecedents in the 19th century and who constitute a historical link in the chain of *al-Nahda* movement. Among those nationalist leaders, there were early figures such as Messali Hadj, a radical, the founder of the Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), or Ferhat Abbas, a moderate in the 1920s, the publisher of Le jeune algérien[312] (a name resembling the Young Turk movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries Ottoman era), and who later in 1943 drafted the Algerian Manifesto which demanded independence from France as soon as the Second World War ends. Abbas's personal shift from being a moderate integrationist to a pro-independence nationalist is quite interesting since it reveals the reluctance of the French Empire in terms of making a radical reform so as to provide an equal citizenship for the Algerians with the French. When a reform, which is expected to be radical, does not take place, the moderate line gets radical—this was the case with Abbas. He was even to join in 1956 the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) while the radical Messali Hadj remained distant to the FLN due to violent confrontations between his Mouvement national algérien (MNA) and the FLN in terms of being the 'exclusive representative of the Algerian people'.[313]

The FLN, however, did not form up in one day. Since the formation of the first Algerian nationalist organization, the ENA, in 1926, the growing nationalist

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[312] Charles-Robert Ageron, **Genèse de l'Algérie algérienne**, Paris: Bouchène, 2005, pp. 107-30.
[313] Benjamin Stora, **Algeria 1830-2000. A Short History**, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 57-60.

dissent could not have been subsumed politically by the French authorities both in the metropole and in the colony. The incessant French repression on Algerian organizations throughout this period, dissatisfaction of the civil rights demands (the Popular Front under Léon Blum granted full rights of citizenship only to 21,000 Algerians)[314] and political demands (in 1947, France, this time, promised to grant full rights of citizenship to Algerians but an equal representation among the Algerian and the settlers in the legislature), manipulation of the local elections in 1953, etc., could be counted among those which helped the rise of the nationalist dissent.[315] At the threshold of the War of Independence, before 1954, almost every nationalist group joined the FLN with the greatest exception of Hadj's MNA, which also took part in the War of Independence alongside the FLN. Even the Algerian Communist Party, which was an offshoot of the French Communist Party in the beginning and which then opposed the national liberation on several reasons, joined the war of independence after the French authorities banned them in 1955.[316]

We will not get into the details of the 6-year war of independence. The stresses that we made until now, on the other hand, show how much a modern nationalist liberation movement would be capable of attracting such different segments of the society either to the organizations that arise as the vanguards of the movement or to the edges of the movement of the independence war. There is a dialectical relation between the organization and the movement that reveals itself in this particular case: the organization does not absolutely represent the movement by its own but the movement is, to a large extent, being shaped by the organization—in this case by the FLN, in the first place. Therefore, the organic relation between certain organizations (the FLN and the MNA, most notable ones) involved in the Algerian independence war and the movement of war (and the war of movement!) shaped and led by these organizations directly augments the potentials of the movement itself through the articulation of disintegrated units of the society into a more or less coherent unified political subject in the course of the struggle. However, the scope of this articulation is only in a temporary character since the unity that this articulation provides is bounded with the limited objective of its struggle: the *national* liberation. Once this objective succeeds, the political unity of the national liberation movement vanishes. Therefore, the objective of the national liberation

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[314] **Ibid.,** pp. 18-9.
[315] **Ibid.,** pp. 25-7.
[316] **Ibid.,** pp. 60-2.

movement is only temporarily capable of reconciling the interests of different social classes and social groups of different ideologies. A secular, left-wing organization, such as the FLN or the MNA, maintaining the support of Islamic clerics and communities, of left-wing (socialist or communist) and nationalist seculars, even of merchants and 'national' bourgeoisie along with the country's working-class only becomes possible under the circumstances of national oppression—struggle dialectics.

However, this temporary alliance destined to break up after decolonization plays its historical role in two ways: the formation of a national identity engaged with nationalism, religion, culture, etc., converges on a much more concrete ground in the course of the struggle, i.e., the anti-colonial war, since the war forges on the struggling masses a crystallized distinction between the friend and the enemy, on the one hand; the class lines which remain often invisible but yet exist under the national flag are to be sharpened in the course of the struggle since the national struggle largely consisting of working classes *also* implies the class struggle, on the other hand. In Algeria, the proletarianization in the society during the colonial period has thus greatly contributed to the national liberation movement while this movement had, at the same time, been the conduit of the development of the class-consciousness.

In that sense, for the case of the colonization of Algeria, we can determine three massive proletarianization waves between the years 1900 and 1960: *i)* the first decade of the century; *ii)* the inter-war period precisely until the Great Depression of 1929; *iii)* the post-war period until the beginnings of the independence war (see Table 3.5). This massive proletarianization is accompanied by a massive pauperization as the table shows below, in which *khammas* point out the share-croppers, the dispossessed working in the farms on the basis of 'cropping' the share of the product. This share-cropper mass interestingly disappeared to a large extent and proletarianized to a lesser extent especially during the Second World War. As constituting the reserve army of labor in the colony, their extinction is explained by the 'rapid increase of labor migration to Europe' along with the 'mechanization of colonial agriculture.'[317] Here, it is very much important to show that two inter-related phenomena, pauperization and proletarianization, have dramatically taken the scene

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[317] Bennoune, **ibid.**, p. 61.

while almost a steady decline in the peasant landholders with the exception of the period of 1910-1938, in other words, the dispossession of the rural population has been realized.[318] The assessment for only 60 years of colonization, of its latter period, shows us that a dramatic change in the Algeria, i.e., the penetration of capitalism in these territories, has turned the Algerian social formation upside-down, and accordingly prepared them for an independence war.

Table 3.5: The process of pauperization and proletarianization of the rural population, 1901-60.

Year	Peasant Landholders	% Change	Farmers	*Khammas*	Laborers	% Change
1901	620,899	---	37,455	350,715	152,108	---
1910	530,211	-14.6	n.a.	426,851	207,707	36.5
1914	565,218	6.6	40,755	407,050	210,205	1.2
1930	617,544	9.3	50,771	643,600	534,000	1.54
1938	549,395	-11	n.a.	713,000	462,467	-13.4
1948	537,800	-2.1	n.a.	132,900	483,900	4.6
1954	503,700	-6.3	n.a.	60,300	571,000	18.2
1960	373,000	-25.9	n.a.	n.a.	421,000	-26.4

(Source: M. Bennoune. *Ibid.* p. 61.)

Thus, the Algerian working class is already ascribed with a twofold identity: one being national often defined via religion (i.e., Islam), the other being class basically defined via relations of exploitation and 'experiences' in the process of production. This ascription of a twofold identity onto the Algerian working class constitutes a landmark in the formation of the immigrant class fractions as well. In the African world, on the other hand, a process more or less congeneric to the Algerian case takes place in the turn of decolonization. Let us now briefly look at how were the circumstances on the path towards decolonization in Africa.

The successive postwar decolonization of African nations starts as early as 1951 with Libya in North Africa, and continues after a few years of break in 1956 in East Sudan and in 1957 in Ghana in the Western Africa. Among the French colonies, however, the first declaration of independence took place in Guinea in 1958, under the leadership of Sekou Touré. Touré's political struggle goes back to his leadership

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[318] Catherine Coquerie-Vidrovitch, 'La colonisation française 1931-1939', in Jacques Thobie, et al., **Histoire de la France coloniale 1914-1990**, Paris: Armand Colin, 1990, pp. 234-8.

of the local trade unions of dockworkers and government employees. 'One of his initial successes was a large strike in 1953', notes Rothermund, 'which lasted for two months and ended with the official concession of limiting working hours to 40 per week.'[319] Here it should also be noted that these unions are related to the French Confédération générale du travail (CGT), which was at that time close to the French Communist Party. Having granted the support of the CGT, Touré remained the secretary general of the Parti démocratique de Guinée (PDG) since 1952. Moreover, he was also at the heart of the Western Africa-scale trade union, the Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire, which was founded in 1956. Personally, Touré was an influential figure, not only for his leadership in the Guinean working-class movement, but also for that he presented himself as the grandson of Samory Touré, a Muslim tribal chief, the founder of the Wassoulou Empire and the resistance leader against the French colonization, captured and exiled to Gabon in 1891. This hereditary lineage, albeit uncertain and mythical,[320] should have contributed to Touré's legitimacy for the leadership of the national movement. From the historical point of view, it becomes less important if it was really true that Touré had such a lineage going back to a 'hero' of the past time than the attempt to construct a historical narration through the lineage between the (popular) Islamic character of the traditional chiefdom which resisted to the French invasion and the nationalist character of the modern working-class movement. Whether 'constructed' or 'authentic', the historical narration has become history itself, as it is the case in many nation-building experiences.

During the Fourth Republic (1946-1958), the French colonial empire was reorganized as the French Union by the constitution.[321] However, with the new constitution of the Fifth Republic, France's relations with its colonies were to be reshaped under the French Community—a project proposed by Charles de Gaulle.[322] In 1958, in Guinea and in other colonies, a referendum was held for the participation of the colonies into the new French Community. Guinea was the only French African colony that rejected the participation; soon after the referendum the independence

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[319] Dietmar Rothermund, **The Routledge Companion to Decolonization**, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 136.

[320] Abdoulaye Diallo, 'Sékou Touré et l'indépendance guinéenne. Déconstruction d'un mythe et retour sur une histoire', **Outre-mers**, vol. 95, no. 358-359, 2008, pp. 271-2.

[321] *Constitution de 1946, IVᵉ République*. See the articles under 'Titre VIII' which was consecrated to the definition of the French Union.

[322] Articles under the abrogated 'Titre XIII' of the *Constitution du 4 octobre 1958* was defining the *Communauté française*. This title was abrogated by the constitutional law of 4 August 1995.

was immediately declared in the same year. With Touré's leadership, Guinea's attitude towards the new French Community project, which meant to constitute a 'soft' passage to independence under the protecting wings of Marianne—and, eventually, to neocolonialism—posed a challenge to the old imperialism pregnant to the new one. De Gaulle's government, in return, responded this challenge radically: the French fully retreated from Guinea, with their economic, military and political presences, for that de Gaulle was unwilling to make any concessions to Guinea in order to prevent encouraging other colonies.[323]

However, a tactic was developed among certain 'yes'-voter colonies, owing much to Léopold Sédar Senghor, the leader of Senegal. But before that, we shall briefly note the political character of Senghor and Senegal's path to independence. Senghor constitutes one of the most famous figures among the African leaders of independence not only in terms of politics but also culture. He was a brilliant scholar in linguistics and a renowned poet writing in French language. In his later life, he was even to be selected to the much prestigious Académie française—the modern Pantheon of the French culture and language. His political career, on the other hand, started with the encouragement of Lamine Guèye who was the representative of the urban regions of Senegal in the French National Assembly in the early times of the Fourth Republic. The constitution of the Fourth Republic, which also reorganized the empire in a new form, as it is mentioned above, gave the legal right to vote to the *citoyens* who lived in colonial urban regions. Guèye, in that sense, was the representative of these *citoyens* since his origin was urban while Senghor was from rural areas. After a reform in this practice, one representative of the rural areas was to be represented in the parliament and Senghor became the representative of the *sujets* of the countryside. Later on, in 1952 elections, he became even strong enough to dislocate his ex-mentor Guèye as to replace him with someone else he wished as the representative of the *citoyens*. As a member of the Catholic community, Senghor was successful in his relations that provided him the support of the Muslim-dominated countryside. One year after the establishment of the universal suffrage, which extended the right to vote in overseas, Senghor founded a new party in 1957, the Bloc populaire sénégalais (BPS), created only one month before the elections of territorial assembly in March 1957. The success that BPS gained had reinforced both the position of Senghor and his political line within the nationalist movement. An

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[323] Rothermund, **ibid.**, p. 130.

opportunist and reformist who was far from the revolutionary line of struggle that we witness e.g. in Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Senegal under his leadership voted 'yes' in the referendum of 1958, thus remaining in the French Union and accepting to be part of the French Community.[324]

Senghor, as a poet within the famous Negritude Movement, was, along with others like Léon-Gontran Damas, also representative of a reformist position vis-à-vis the established colonial order as well as its colonial humanism,[325] in this sense his career comprising various fields from poetry to politics each time presents this reformist position which remained almost stabile. Apart from being a compromiser who would not venture confronting explicitly with de Gaulle, Senghor had yet a reasonable ground for this sort of 'gradualist approach'[326]: the fear of a process of balkanization in Africa, which was also shared by radical politicians from other African countries, such as Nkrumah or Modibo Keïta of French Sudan. Therefore, for Senghor, the French Community would have played the role of a useful umbrella for a safe and peaceful regional development of the Black Africa. He then sought an alliance with Keïta so as to establish an independent federal state including French Sudan and Senegal under the name of Mali, and demanded de Gaulle to authorize this entity within the French Community. This tactic that we mentioned above broke de Gaulle's original project and forced him to revise the French Community so as to include independent states that would remain its members. Senegal thusly gained independence under the Mali Federation in 1960 along with French Sudan, which would keep the name Mali after the short-lived federation broke up. The Federation's life was only two months: the initial alliance between Senghor and Keïta soon turned out to be an opposition, not only in terms of politics but also ideology. Keïta was a hardline pan-Africanist and constituted a more radical figure than the moderate Senghor, hence he had already earned the doubts of de Gaulle.[327] Consequently, Senghor arrested Keïta in Dakar, the then capital city of the Federation, and sent him back to Bamako, the capital of French Sudan—with this event the end of the Federation came and two independent republics were formed.[328]

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[324] **Ibid.**, pp. 137-9.

[325] Gary Wilder, **The French Imperial Nation-State. Negritude & Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, pp. 252-5.

[326] Martin, **ibid.,** pp. 60-1.

[327] **Ibid.**, pp. 95-8.

[328] Rothermund, **ibid.**, pp. 139-40.

There are some other remarks to be noted as regards the examples of Guinea, Senegal, Mali—and also Ivory Coast where the process of decolonization was quite similar to that in Senegal under the political leadership of Félix Houphouet-Boigny. The most visible point in the decolonization of the French Black Africa is that in none of these countries the independence had been consequent to a war of independence. Quite on the contrary, it had been the result of a 'peaceful', 'democratic' process. This peaceful and democratic process, however, was only in an ostensible character; it had seemingly been so since as it is clearly seen in the course of the 1950s, the critical decade that led African nations to independence, that there had been a strong class struggle of the class-conscious working class in these colonies, which had direct political indications. Pro-independence organizations had organic relations with trade unions, moreover they were either outspoken socialist structures or they had to engage themselves in alliances with socialists and working classes, some of their leaders were prominent pan-Africanists and Marxists (Touré, Keïta, Nkrumah, and others), and some others had to take at least a temporary stance in these positions (Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny). [329] Therefore, we may briefly conclude that the class struggle during decolonization was *intrinsic* to the national movement, or, in other words, the national movements owed their successes partly to the class struggle of the working class during that period.[330]

In some cases, however, autocratic governments of the newborn national states eliminated the dominant working-class character or socialist tones in the independence ideology of the national movements. That was most clearly seen in the cases of Ivory Coast and Senegal. In Senegal, Senghor put much pressure on the Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, who had been in the office between 1957 and 1962. Being himself a Muslim, Dia posed a threat to the conservative heads of the Muslim brotherhoods in the rural regions of the country by 'establish[ing] rural cooperatives which would have broken the quasi-feudal control of the land by these brotherhoods.' Dia's politics was definitely a radical project, which reminds that of Nkrumah in Ghana, and it was pretty much in accordance with what it is called 'African socialism', but finally, Senghor accused him with involving in a plot of

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[329] For example, Rothermund writes as follows: 'Although Houphouet-Boigny had no contacts with trade unions, his leadership of the Rassemblement démocratique africain made him look like a champion of the working class', **Ibid.**, p. 141.

[330] This was also reflecting the Soviet strategy of the time. See: Kenneth W. Grundy, 'The 'Class Struggle' in Africa. An Examination of the Conflicting Theories', **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, vol. 2 (3), November 1964, pp. 379-93.

coup d'état and Dia was consequently overthrown in 1962. What is more, Senghor's oppression of the radicals was not limited to the governmental extent: Ibrahim Sarr, for instance, 'who had once organized [a] famous railway strike, shared Dia's fate.'[331] In Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny broke his pragmatic alliance with the communists in the late 1950s, until a moment when he found his ground much more solid. As a representative of the landowners in the countryside originally, his politics after independence relied rather on the farmers instead of workers and his economic policies were very much based on a liberal program. He had many French advisers in his technocratic cadre as well as ministers in his cabinets, and, according to Rothermund, there were 'more white expatriates resided in the Ivory Coast after independence than before it,' which supposed to mean for them a sort of 'neocolonial paradise' under his protection.[332]

v.) Notes on the disruption of colonial imperialism: the Marseille thesis

Before we proceed with the nature of neocolonialism and uneven development (a global phenomenon with peculiarities to Africa), we should still take a last look at the disruption process of colonial imperialism in the case of the French Empire. This process, as we have stated above, roughly coincides with the period started with the crisis of 1929 and ends with decolonization, which went throughout the Great Depression and the Second World War. Within this scope, Jacques Marseille's thesis which states that the colonial empire in this period had been a burden rather than an advantage to French economy points out to the historical limits of colonial imperialism.[333] Unlike the heroic comments coming from either sides of the critiques and apologies of this particular type of imperialism, the colonial empires, particularly the French empire, did not constantly benefit from colonialism in the course of its history due to the perpetual motion of an incessant exploitation mechanism being controlled by the colonizer. On the contrary, just like every other historical period, the colonial imperialism too had its own historical limits; in so far as a given method of capitalist exploitation comes to its extinction at the precise moment when the capital has to revolutionize the means of production as well as to transform the *regime* of production, and thus, of exploitation, it was inevitable for the colonial exploitation to arrive at an arduous phase of disruption before its definite

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[331] Rothermund, **ibid.**, p. 140.

[332] **Ibid.**, p. 141.

[333] Jacques Marseille, **Empire colonial et capitalisme français. Histoire d'un divorce**, Paris: Albin Michel, 2005.

collapse as a specific historical form. Yet, we must underline that its collapse happens for this specific historical form, the colonial imperialism, since we will speak of a *neo*colonialism later on, which constitutes both continuities in terms of uneven exchange between imperialists and underdeveloped countries and the subordination of the latter to the former, and discontinuities in terms of genesis of new types of relations between the two as *content* and a new mechanism as *form* which defines these relations.

What does, then, the Marseille thesis argue? It is not an easy task to summarize in a few paragraphs his exhaustive work originally composed in the French *doctorat d'état* style, but we will underline some important remarks in his research with referring to secondary works on it. A review of Marseille's book written by David K. Fieldhouse, a notable English economic historian of modern empires, may be useful while following crucial points in this work. Fieldhouse, in the first place, points out that 'Marseille shows at length that the assertion (…) that the colonial trade was unimportant to the metropolis was true only in relative terms and that it became both relatively and absolutely more important as time went on.' Then he gives data from Marseille's work and adds that 'the empire, both as a market and as what Marseille calls *le réservoir colonial*, as a resource base of raw materials, became important all the time, and especially from about 1930. The claims made by Jules Ferry in 1885 and 1890 seem to have fully justified in the event.'[334]

The story until here, however, is nothing new for the debate and the significance of Marseille's work appears at this moment. As Fitzgerald fairly states, despite the figures showing that the 'basic trade statistics [which] make a powerful case for the value of the imperial connection' are seemingly 'prov[ing] the utility of the remaining mercantilist commercial policies which France managed to preserve,' however, these arguments defending the empire is as weak as that if you 'pull hard enough at one strand and the whole bundle starts to unravel.'[335] Similar to Fitzgerald, 'reversing the picture,' writes Fieldhouse,

> it is important that the great majority of imports from the colonies were things such as wine, cereals, rice, coffee, cocoa, oil seeds and sugar which (…) were in ample supply on the world

[334] David K. Fieldhouse, 'The Economics of French Empire, *Empire colonial et capitalisme français, Histoire d'un divorce* by Jacques Marseille', **The Journal of African History**. vol. 27, no. 1, 1986, p. 170.
[335] Edward Peter Fitzgerald, 'Did France's Colonial Empire Make Economic Sense? A Perspective from the Postwar Decade', **The Journal of Economic History**, vol. 48, no. 2, June 1988, pp. 375-8.

market and in some cases competed with domestic production. Yet very few of the essential raw materials for French industry other than food-stuffs and soap came from the colonies (…). In no sense, then, did the empire provide raw materials which were essential to France and which could not otherwise have been obtained; nor did France get any price advantage by importing from the colonies; in fact, on the contrary.[336]

Thus the economic usage of the colonies, or in other terms, economic sense that the empire makes for the metropole is limited to both time and scale, i.e., the scale of the production realized in the metropole and colonies, and the quality of this production. Concluding from Marseille, Fieldhouse then notes that 'until about 1930 the autarkic system of protected colonial markets was, on balance, probably good for the French economy because the domestic market was too limited to provide economies of scale and protected western markets were too difficult for France to enter. (…) Autarky, that is, worked reasonably well so long as commodity prices were high enough to enable the colonies to pay protected prices for French manufactures and while France still depended heavily on the old staple industries which exported to the colonies. But from *c.* 1930 and the slump there developed what Marseille calls a divorce between the best economic interests of France and her autarkic practices.'[337] This reveals the fact that yet during the 1940s colonies continued helping France to counteract its deficit in terms of the money in circulation. Fitzgerald writes that the 'empire-sourced imports took *immediate* pressure off France's balance-of-payments position,' however, at the same time, 'they reduced the purchasing power of domestic consumers,' and moreover, what did this is that 'insofar as colonial imports served as intermediate goods, they also pushed up the price of French exports,' which ultimately added '*future* pressures to the payments balance.'[338]

Consequently, by the 1950s, the empire became a burden economically, since the trade surplus deficit was balanced by the public funds flowing from France to colonies. There were two sources for this flow: 'One part came from the higher operational expenditure of colonial administrations, the other from ambitious development schemes which concentrated on investment in colonial infrastructure. (…) Considering that this was the decade of postwar reconstruction, one can appreciate that any diversion of public spending away from France imposed a real

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[336] Fieldhouse, **ibid.**, p. 170.
[337] **Ibid.**, p. 171.
[338] Fitzgerald, **ibid.**, p. 378.

and immediate burden.'[339] Moreover it should be kept in mind that this burden was even aggravated with the costs of colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. At the end, Fieldhouse concludes as follows:

> The Empire was economically most valuable to France in its earliest years, before 1914, even though the colonial share of the metropolitan trade and investment was relatively small and most Frenchmen regarded the empire as a source of loss rather than gain. Conversely, by the 1930s, the empire had become to most Frenchmen an essential symbol of national greatness, an economic necessity and a source of employment for all classes; yet it was rapidly becoming an economic millstone for France.[340]

To be more clear: Fitzgerald emphasizes Marseille's point on that 'colonial product markets were something of a lifebuoy for French industry—but specifically for traditional small-scale, high-cost export firms, not for the large-scale modernizing industries in which the planners' hopes for qualitative economic progress reposed.' This proves the fact that the 'imperial preference merely gave the more backward corners of French industry on continued opportunity to remain backward.' Therefore, with the high costs of production these industries were only capable of selling their products in the colonial markets. What is more, 'the overall result was less happy,' as Fitzgerald emphasizes:

> At home, disincentives against cost-cutting investment; in the empire, direct and indirect upward pressures on colonial production costs. This rendered colonial exports less competitive in foreign markets and, via the circular nature of the imperial trading system, more expensive as inputs for French industry, thereby pushing up French export prices even further.[341]

In that sense, after this exhausting discussion, we arrive at the conclusion that 'whether or not the empire made economic sense, France could no longer afford it.'[342] Yet, it must be ironic that at the very stage when France could not afford its empire coincides the period of decolonization whereas this *coincidence* marks, in effect, the sphere of conjunction between the decay of the old and the rise of the new. We do not suggest from a teleological perspective that the rise of the new universally presupposes the decay of the old therefore implying that decolonization was impossible before the outset of this sphere of conjunction and that it was inevitable once this sphere prevailed. The Algerian War, along with the Indochinese War,

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[339] **Ibid.**, p. 379.
[340] Fieldhouse, **ibid.**, p. 172.
[341] Fitzgerald, **ibid.**, p. 380-1.
[342] **Ibid.**, p. 382.

constitutes an exception to such a 'historical law,' so to speak. Although the old was in decay in Algeria, the rise of the new was anyhow depended on the armed struggle, on the use of force itself, unlike the 'peaceful' decolonization of Africa. On the other hand, we may confidently suggest that the rise of the new, the rise of the national, of the anti-colonial, of working-class movement and other movements specially engages with the decay of the old in certain periods of history while these two do not necessarily presuppose each other. However, when these two exist, there appears a *force majeure* that is capable of overturning the given circumstances, i.e., positions of the rivaling political forces: the colonizer and the colonized.

vi.) Neocolonialism and the origins of uneven development

The political success of independence movements in Africa had immediately faced new questions and those were not limited only to the territorial scales of each independent state. One direct output of the Western colonialism particularly in Africa was the fact that the unequal character of the relationship between the colony and the metropole, i.e., the unequal exchange, continued to exist, even became more acute after decolonization. Therefore, in every particular case in the African world, programs—especially economic programs—of the national governments all laid with their burning question: the unequal development. This latter, in that sense, was endemic not only among the decolonized and independent states of Africa but also among those still under colonial rule, such as South Africa and Rhodesia. Moreover, as regards the entire sub-Saharan Africa, the unequal development was a crucial issue even on the intra-African scale so much so that the then-colonial 'South African complex' was comparatively much more 'advanced' than the 'back-warded' independent Africa whose inter-relations posed certain problems concerning the combined development of the continent.[343] This was a mere threat for the task of Pan-Africanism whose ultimate goal was the unity of the continent economically, politically and socially. The unequal development constitutes one side of the medal, and, as it is stated, it has certain generalized features applying for even most of the globe. Other side of the medal constitutes a second aspect as tricky as the first one: neocolonialism. While these two are very much intertwined and cannot be separated from each other, we will try to draw out in both respects the conditions of the late 1950s and the 1960s particularly in French Africa which has been the cradle of the

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[343] Giovanni Arrighi, John S. Saul, 'Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa', in **Essays on the Political Economy of Africa**, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973, pp. 44-102.

labor migration from Africa to France consequent to in-process dramatic social change that the two have accelerated.

Neocolonialism has immediately become a subject of debate after the successive decolonization waves in Africa among the critical, primarily Pan-Africanist and/or Marxist, circles in order to determine the postcolonial circumstances in the continent. Although Africa did by no means present a unitary and coherent social formation on a continental scale, it was intended by these circles with the term neocolonialism that the systemic exploitation of African nations by imperialists did not cease to exist and it was to be reorganized under a different political order unless a profound social revolution realized in the continent on a more or less unitary character. Therefore, neocolonialism is a term pointing out this very turn of decolonization which eventually *re*-subsumed the anti-colonial proclamation of independence into a new imperialist fashion that undermined the claims of autonomy of the new-born states and realigned them in a new order of dependency. Arrighi and Saul write as follows:

> The decisive fact about contemporary independent Africa is the continuance of its subservient economic position vis-à-vis the industrial centers of the West. This subordination originated, as is well known, in the pattern of trade and investment of colonial times, whereby Africa came to play, within the international division of labor, a role of supplier of raw materials and outlet for the manufactures of the centers of accumulation in Europe. It is important to reemphasize that, *as compared with other areas of the underdeveloped world, this 'classic' pattern of extractive imperialism has remained relatively untransformed in Africa.*[344]

The 're-subsumption' which came to be resulted with the subordination *de nouveau* of the ex-colonies (particularly in Africa) was manifest in most of these countries in the continent. Sally N'Dongo, a Senegalese immigrant who was a syndicalist activist in France during 1970s, was well aware of the situation of his country's dependence to the chiefs of its old mother country when he published his book on the 'cooperation' between Senegal and France in times of neocolonialism. He writes that, in fact, 'there is no cooperation: the French bourgeoisie only helps [Senegal] if this help brings benefits to it,' and quotes from the then French minister responsible from the coordination who stated that 'during this period, the value of the equipment financed in France by the French resources which come from the overseas

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[344] **Ibid.**, p. 68. (Emphasis ours.)

has *greatly* exceeded the investments financed by France in those countries.'[345] This fact underlining the unidirectional tendency of the unequal exchange within the new mode of relations established between the former colonizer and the former colonized countries shows a small fragment of the whole picture. But how, then, this unequal exchange came to be intrinsic *also* to the logic of neocolonialism of the post-independence era?

We have shown above, with theoretical references mainly to Luxemburg's work, how the imperialist powers penetrated in non-capitalist territories and did harm the 'natural economies' at the expense of indigenous populations. With this development, capitalism, whose core lies mainly in the Western world, became successful in creating a peripheral economy which is in its course to transform into a less developed capitalism but also containing some ancient characteristics of its 'natural economy'—either this economy is agrarian-based (in most cases, like those of sub-Saharan) or semi-nomadic (in most parts of North Africa except Egypt). Samir Amin summarizes the characteristics of a peripheral economic formation as follows:

> Despite their different origins, the peripheral formations tend to converge toward a pattern that is essentially the same. This phenomenon reflects, on the world scale, *the increasing power of capitalism to unify*. All peripheral formations have four main characteristics in common: (1) the predominance of agrarian capitalism in the national sector; (2) the creation of a local, mainly merchant, bourgeoisie in the wake of dominant foreign capital; (3) a tendency toward a peculiar bureaucratic development, specific to the contemporary periphery; and (4) the incomplete, specific character of the phenomena of proletarianization.[346]

Given these characteristics of a peripheral economic formation, which starts from being a 'natural' economy and dramatically transforms into being a peripheral capitalist economy in the course of colonialism, it should also be considered that these formations imply certain disadvantages in its relation with the core economies of capitalism in the West which have often been the colonizers of these peripheries. While the logic of decolonization *formally* liberates the individual destinies of the colonial world, the relation between the centrifugal and the centripetal forces reveals the everlasting inequality that was established in the course of colonialism and

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[345] Sally N'Dongo, **Coopération et néo-colonialisme**, Paris: François Maspero, 1976, p. 53.
[346] Samir Amin, **Unequal Development. An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism**, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1976, p. 333. (Emphasis ours.)

carried until its formal destruction even after this formal 'political liberation'. This relationship which would be duly understood as a relation of dependency, i.e., the sheer dependency of the periphery to the core, the decolonized to the metropole, etc., works effectively, in the first place, through the logic of a pure economic relation called the 'unequal exchange', which later turns out to be the logic intrinsic to political and social processes as well. The concept was first developed by the Franco-Greek economist Arghiri Emmanuel in the early 1960s, and he formulated, at the end of the decade, his theses on the concept as regards the contemporary imperialism focusing on the international economy in his book *L'échange inégal* (1969), where he claimed the idea that there has been, there still is and there will be a structural inequality between the peripheries and core of the capitalist economies as long as the antagonism deriving from the law of value persists; and he insisted to elaborate this intrinsic logic of the relationship, i.e., the unequal exchange, between these two economic formations through the lens of the theory of value in the political economy. Emmanuel writes on this as follows:

> Admitting (…) that the unequal exchange is but one of the mechanisms of value transfer from a group of country to another and that its *direct* effects are only due basically in a part of the differences in life levels, we can affirm that it constitutes the *fundamental* mechanism of transfer, and, so being, it permits the developed countries to regularly initiate and impel the *unequal exchange* which makes all other mechanisms of exploitation work and explains all the distribution of wealth.[347]

Therefore, the unequal exchange, although not peculiar to the capitalist mode of production but a general feature of all exchange relations based on the law of value, *also* becomes the substantial element within the relation between the core and the periphery of capitalism in which this relation of exchange reaches an unseen level on a global scale accelerated by the nature of colonialism and of the neocolonial situation in its aftermath, or briefly, by the nature of imperialism in its different phases. Ernest Mandel distinguished the unequal exchange in capitalism and in the non-capitalist modes of production in terms of the exchange of unequal quantities of labor from which the unequal exchange in capitalism derives.[348] In that sense, the unequal exchange was added as a substantial mechanism to the direct extraction of the surplus-profits from the peripheries in the imperialist epoch—even

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[347] Arghiri Emmanuel, **L'échange inégal. Essai sur les antagonismes dans les rapports économiques internationaux**, Paris: François Maspero, 1972, pp. 289-90.
[348] Ernest Mandel, **Late Capitalism**, p. 351.

to the degree of being the 'main form of colonial exploitation' in the late capitalism, and it meant that 'the colonies and semi-colonies tended to exchange increasing quantities of indigenous labour (or products of labour) for a constant amount of metropolitan labour (or products of labour).'[349]

In the case of neocolonial Africa, the persistence of the logic of unequal exchange based on this 'exchange of unequal quantities of labor' owes its conditions to the existence of the former colonial mechanism of production of commodities and exploitation of the resources as well as the direct or indirect interference of global economic powers whether they are states—mostly the former colonizer of a given African nation—or companies—mostly those issued from the country of a Western power which had been the former colonizer of a given African nation: e.g., France in its *Françafrique*, where it can be hegemonic in terms of economy, politics and culture, with a handful of monopolist companies operating 'freely' (in sense of '*libre concurrence*'!) under the maternal protection of their state. A similar mechanism applies for Britain and British companies as well as the US and US companies which had joined the competition in Africa soon after the Second World War with such a strong hand that they have then started to play more and more a leading role in the continent corresponding to their position in the postwar period as the world's new hegemonic power within the capitalist bloc.[350]

In sum, what was in charge is the foreign capital in circulation either through the ease of the consent on the market liberalism, or through the more or less intense coercion of the states executed in former colonies. N'Dongo, for instance, writes for Senegal that infrastructures in the country were designated for the needs of colonial exploitation, and Senegal were still using the same infrastructure that it inherited before independence[351] while the control of the industrial production in the country were still in the hands of the institutions and capital of foreign powers.[352] This actual situation 'on the terrain', seemingly contrary to the conception that is understood from the word of (political) independence, easily associates itself with the fact of (economic) dependence which ultimately arrives at the point of political dependence as regards the fragility within the circumstances of the new-born state's sovereignty

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[349] **Ibid.**, pp. 345-6.

[350] Arrighi, Saul, **ibid.**, p. 52. According to writers like Pierre Jalée, another fashion of interpreting this world hegemony was the concept of 'American super-imperialism.' Pierre Jalée, **L'impérialisme en 1970**, Paris: François Maspero, 1969, pp. 184-215.

[351] N'Dongo, **ibid.**, pp. 71-2.

[352] **Ibid.**, pp. 67-71.

over economic, political and social spheres. Voilà! The phenomenon of unevenness put a striking asymmetry between the sides of the old colonial relations in motion: the inspiring bullet of political independence triggered at the beginning turns out to be in fact nothing different than a boomerang inversely floating in the air with such a pace so that it smashes the claim of independence down with one strong hit. Given this consequence after all, it becomes evident that it was not a childish utopian demand that was in circulation among the pan-Africanists who were claiming the necessity of a unified Africa both in economic and political aspects[353] since the contrary only meant the increased vulnerability of the recently gained independence of African nations *contra* their old European masters.[354]

However, the uneven development that works primarily via the mechanism of unequal exchange, which becomes more and more crucial in peripheral economies, did not impel only the vector of independence so as to be bended in a reverse movement into a new form of political and economic dependence. 'On the terrain', it had a thoroughgoing social impact on the large masses of the local population since the neocolonial form of imperialism neither performed abstractly in the phase of commodity production nor it did only help exploiting the resources and potentials of the national wealth for the benefit of capitalists. Its vision was beyond: the complete annexation of the peripheral economy to the global capitalism which naturally presupposes the capitalization of the periphery. The formulation 'capital is a social relation' should echo in the ears in every instant possible. For whence 'capitalization' is subject to any social development in a certain social formation there accompanies the very process of 'proletarianization' so as to create an antagonism to the capitalist class through the formation of a modern working class. After all, class, too, is a social relation to the same extent that the capital is a social relation. In Africa, both in the Northern and in the Sub-Saharan regions, as well as in its 'southern complex' and eastern regions where European powers other than the French were predominantly the colonizers, a process of proletarianization parallel to

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[353] Nkrumah can probably be assumed as the forerunner of pan-Africanists who developed an explanation model for the African case, and his influence on the underdeveloped world's anti-imperialists is also notable. A brief study on Nkrumah's political and economic work in terms of African case can be found at: Kenneth W. Grundy, 'Nkrumah's Theory of Underdevelopment. An Analysis of Recurrent Themes', **World Politics**, vol. 15, no. 3 (April, 1963), pp. 438-54. Also see: D. Zizwe Poe, **Kwame Nkrumah's Contribution to Pan-Africanism. An Afrocentric Analysis**, London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

[354] On the threat of balkanization contrary to a vision of unification in the post-independence Africa, see: Arrighi, Saul, **ibid.**.

that of capitalization was always at stake during colonization and we have already demonstrated this in our previous discussions. Yet, the age of independence in Africa has initiated a new epoch for renewed social 'mobility', albeit a continuation of the old process of being upside-down within the society, its acceleration by the growth perspectives of the new 'independent' states on the one hand, and the pressure of the international/foreign capital exercised on the human population through ways which were facilitated by the neocolonial 'cooperation' of these independent states on the other hand. Most importantly, this development is strictly associated with the phenomenon of the 'exchange of unequal quantities of labor', from which the unequal exchange derives, as we have cited above from Mandel, and the labor base of the unevenness becomes most ardently manifest with the speed of the social mobility among social classes which meant essentially the phenomenon of massive proletarianization.

Yet, the process of massive proletarianization did not prevail in a complete and pure manner but it had a rather asymmetric and 'partial' character—this was not only valid in Africa but also elsewhere on the globe's underdeveloped part.[355] Although we cannot provide healthy resources for the figures showing the dimensions of the proletarianization process in the decolonized Africa, particularly in the Sub-Saharan French Africa, the extent of proletarianization reveals itself in the figures of a massive migration movement in the region. Therefore we imply two parallel processes that are almost identical to each other for that the rural populations in the region are subject, on the one hand, to the process of proletarianization, i.e., the process of their dispossession from their lands or simply their deprivation from subsistence economies, and, on the other hand, to the process of migration, i.e., their ripping off from their lands to seek work in several urban centers as wage laborers. For the vast populations of the peripheral underdeveloped world, these two processes are inseparable from each other thusly enabling us to draw out a unified process under the title of 'proletarianization by migration.'[356]

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[355] For a collective volume on the issue of 'partial proletarianization' in the cases of Latin America and South Asia, see: Shahid Amin, Marcel van den Linden (eds.), **'Peripheral' Labour? Studies in the History of Partial Proletarianization**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

[356] Apart from the phenomenon of what we call 'proletarianization by migration', we should also add the tragic aspect of migration and dispossession combined, the 'forced migration', which is usually the result of wars or civil wars, social and political crises, etc. Dominique Tabutin, Bruno Schoumaker, 'La démographie de l'Afrique au sud du Sahara des années 1950 aux années 2000. Synthèse des changements et bilan statistique', **Population**, 2004/3, vol. 59, pp. 521-622. (Paragraphs: 138-145.)

Proletarianization by migration, as a phenomenon of demographic flow from the peripheral regions to the coral hubs, has three different forms: *i)* from rural areas of a given underdeveloped country to the urban centers of this given country; *ii)* from rural areas of a given underdeveloped country to the more industrial urban centers of *other* countries of the wider region (from Senegal to, say, Ivory Coast); *iii)* from rural areas of a given underdeveloped country to the metropolitan countries of the advanced industrial world where cheap labor supply is needed. While the migrants found in the later aspect constitute our laboring immigrants in France, this tripartite migration process, which in fact extracts the masses into the process of proletarianization, forms a comprising mechanism that interacts each of the aspects tightly. Here, then, we should have a closer look at the figures respectively.

An overall view on the migration from rural areas to urban centers in Africa might be also expressed under another title that is urbanization. In African urban centers, especially in the capital cities of the continent, a significant increase of the urban population is witnessed during the second half of the 20th century. A comprehensive report provides data for this increase in two consecutive periods, first between the years 1950 and 1975, second between the years 1975 and 2000 (see Table 2.6 below). In the French African capitals, the urban population growth oscillate between 1.5 times in Brazzaville, Congo and 16 times in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, while Bamako, Mali's capital city, has seen a 6-time growth and Dakar, Senegal's capital city, 3.4 times. While there is an overall growth in population numbers in every African capital city, the growth rates differ greatly and asymmetrically from one another. Moreover, what is also remarkable is that the capital cities of the British Africa are usually larger urban centers than those of the French Africa, and in 25 years, in the wake of the economic crisis of the mid-1970s, which halted the massive migration waves from Africa to Europe (especially to France) to a significant extent, former British colonial centers have become much more crowded than the former French colonial centers—a situation that remained the same until today.

Figures shown in the Table 3.6 become more relevant when they are considered together with the figures shown in the Table 3.7 below. This time, the rates of urbanization in the underdeveloped world on the peripheries of global capitalism provide us a clue on to what extent the limits of the peripheral capitalism would have been developed, especially in the critical period of the economic

prosperity until 1970s. In the middle of this decade, while in Europe and North America where the 'developed world' situated a rate of around 70 per cent of urbanization was at stake,[357] Sub-Saharan Africa's urbanization was three times smaller than this, showing the considerable inequality between the two continents. Moreover we should also note that countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey or regions like Balkans have shown more rural characteristics in population than their counterparts in Europe,[358] reducing the rate of urbanization in the continent to a lower number. A similar effect of Mexican rural population over the rate of urbanization in North America should also be taken into account.

Table 3.6: Populations of the major African capital cities.

City	Country	Population (in thousands)			% in the total population of the country in 2000	% in the urban population of the country in 2000
		1950	1975	2000		
Abidjan(*)	Ivory Coast	59	960	3790	24	54
Addis-Ababa	Ethiopia	392	926	2645	4	27
Bamako	Mali	62	377	1114	10	32
Brazzaville	Congo	216	340	1306	43	66
Dakar	Senegal	223	768	2078	22	46
Dar-es-Salam	Tanzania	78	638	2115	6	19
Harare	Zimbabwe	84	529	1791	14	40
Khartoum	Sudan	182	896	2742	9	24
Kinshasa	DR Congo	173	1735	5054	10	33
Lagos	Nigeria	288	1890	8665	8	17
Luanda	Angola	138	669	2697	20	60
Yaoundé	Cameroon	50	276	1420	9	19

(*) Abidjan was the capital city of Ivory Coast until 1983.

(Source: Tabutin, Schoumaker. *ibid.*)

Table 3.7: Rates of urbanization in the underdeveloped world.

Region	1950	1975	2000
West Africa	10	26	39
Central Africa	14	27	35
East Africa	5	12	24
Southern Africa	38	44	54
Sub-Saharan Africa Combined	13	21	34
North Africa	25	39	49
East Asia	18	25	42
Southeast Asia	15	22	37
South America	44	64	80

(Source: Tabutin, Schoumaker. *ibid.*)

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[357] Cf. **World Urbanization Prospects. The 2014 Revision**, New York: United Nations, 2014. p. 8.
[358] A great narrative of labor migration from the 'peripheries' of Europe towards its core was penned by John Berger in 1975 with impressive photos taken by Jean Mohr concentrated only in the stories of the European workers who were deprived from their traditional lives in such countries to seek a job in the factories of West Germany, France, and the like. As a literary product of an inner-continent migration phenomenon, the book is a stunning text for the unequal circumstances of the inhabitants from different sub-regions even of the same continental region. John Berger, **The Seventh Man**, London: Verso, 2010.

Therefore, in comparison of the rates for the underdeveloped and developed worlds, the gap between the numbers widens to a larger extent, which shows the scales of urbanization in the capitalist coral regions and in the capitalist peripheral regions so as to represent the levels of development as a striking unevenness. For the fact that urbanization by alone does not properly represent but gives important indications for the levels of both proletarianization (hence the quantity of labor force exploited in the capitalist production and therefore the capital as labor is an organic component of it) and development (the volume of production and its possible positive consequences in terms of growth in the economic sphere accompanied by the access to civil services such as education, health, etc., in the domain of 'human development').

If, however, we return to the Table 3.6, a fact that is more interesting than the unevenness between the underdeveloped and developed worlds reveals itself: the unevenness *within* a wider region, such as the African continent, and, moreover, the unevenness *within* the sub-regions of this continent, such as the West African sub-region. Therefore, even among backward countries, certain degrees of unevenness could be found which determine the extents of the articulation of a number of peripheral economies, which are located in the same wider region, to the global system of capitalism. This picture leads us to a primary conclusion that the mechanism of unequal exchange is not ad hoc in the relation between the backward and the advanced but it also dominates the relation among the different components of the backward (and also of the advanced) since the phenomenon of unevenness is at charge for *all* levels of development (or underdevelopment). Precisely for this reason certain countries of the underdeveloped Africa shine like the stars of the continent and become much more favorable than the rest of their league in the eyes of the imperialist states and companies. In the mid-1970s, Nigeria and Ivory Coast (along with Gabon, Cameroon and Congo-Kinshasa) from the West African sub-region were much more favorable for the grand capital investments, for instance, of France, than Senegal or Guinea in terms of economic cooperation[359] since they have provided more advantageous resources for the rates of return and for the returns of foreign capital invested in these countries while the 'southern complex' (i.e., South Africa and Rhodesia) of the continent was showing even a greater level of growth and development under the then-ongoing British colonialism in parallel to that the

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[359] N'Dongo. **ibid.**, p. 43.

peasantry in this sub-region 'has been effectively proletarianized in the sense that the balance between means of production outside the capitalist sector (mainly land) and the subsistence requirements of the [southern] African population has been severely and irreversibly upset (…).'[360]

Graph 4: GDP in selected Francophone African countries (in billions).

Series : GDP (current US$)
Source: World Development Indicators
Created on: 08/28/2015

In terms of both gross national product (GDP) and GDP per capita (see Graphs 4 and 5 below), we may compare the levels of growth and development of

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[360] Arrighi, Saul. **ibid**., p. 64. Here we should note that the authors, as Marxist scholars favoring for an African revolution in the course of their scientific researches on different case studies in the continent, were expecting a socialist revolution from the southern complex where the rural population was more 'effectively proletarianized' into the urban centers of this sub-region which constitute the 'peripheral centers' of the entire African periphery. Besides, they distinguished this peripheral capitalism with the nature of the apartheid regime in the sub-region so as to arrive at the conclusion that capitalism here had its own political and social limits which were *structurally* determined and the organization of capitalism is very much dependent to that structure. Therefore, according to them, the survival of capitalism in the southern part of Africa was mostly, if not only, to mean the persistence of the socio-political regime of apartheid. This 'structuralist' analysis, however, failed when the dynamics of the national liberation movement in South Africa, which was led and organized primarily by the African National Congress, and the dynamics of imperialism in the country were reconciled with the independence in 1994. Although providing great data and analyses on the political economy of the Sub-Saharan Africa with their exhaustive scholarly research in the field, the authors' structuralist approach, in our view, does erroneously take a distinct political feature of imperialism in the region (the apartheid regime) as the necessary condition of the survival of capitalism as if apartheid and capitalism were constructed in an inter-dependent fashion but not *forming* a particular characteristic which would be perpetuated until the moment when its demolition becomes necessary, albeit very challenging. In this view, structure thusly becomes absolute and revolutionary strategy thusly dismisses the real nature of concrete circumstances.

several selected Francophone West African countries nearby the data already given on the urbanization. According to these data related to GDPs, Ivory Coast in the Francophone West Africa stands as the most developed country in terms of GDP until today. In terms of GDP per capita, however, Ivory Coast was surpassed by the Republic of Congo from early 1980s onwards, mainly due to the local drought and the effects of the recession in the global capitalism in that period—these two factors combined have dramatically influenced the country's growth (see Table 3.8 below). Senegal, on the other hand, appears as the second major economy in terms of GDP among our selected countries while its GDP per capita remained below that of Ivory Coast and Congo; as the end of 1990s drew near, Senegal was begun to challenge and then surpassed by Mauritania, the least developed country of our league. Mali, one of the most disadvantageous countries of our league due to its geographical and climate conditions, its landlocked territories largely consisting of southern parts of the Sahara desert, has shown a stabile performance in growth under the one party-rule both in terms of GDP and GDP per capita; in this league, it only managed to surpass Burkina Faso in terms of GDP per capita in the early 1990s yet it had been a larger economy than Congo and Mauritania until the end of 1970s and it still is larger than Mauritania today.

Graph 5: GDP per capita in selected Francophone African countries.

Series : GDP per capita (current US$)
Source: World Development Indicators
Created on: 08/28/2015

Table 3.8: GDP growth (annual %) in selected West African countries (1965-2000).

Country	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Mali	..	6.136954832	11.62504913	-4.32583988	-11.3563166	-1.85267598	6.209004783	3.2
Congo, Rep.	3.676467736	6.358470188	7.731596839	17.63660548	-1.18566085	1.000003567	3.985324378	7.575980392
Senegal	1.33218949	8.562045511	7.535662599	-3.31064774	3.283470706	-0.67563815	5.363472885	3.186639102
Cote d'Ivoire	-3.10965427	10.37503184	8.252886369	-10.9576973	4.501223175	-1.09590841	7.125744724	-2.06840006
Nigeria	4.884976838	25.00724193	-5.22774756	4.204831047	8.3228297	12.76600917	-0.30746897	5.318093381
Ghana	1.36899887	9.723472587	-12.431629	0.471695943	5.091617273	3.328817883	4.11241904	3.700000115
Burkina Faso	3.764545381	0.117019611	2.99838289	0.796878872	8.517364995	-0.60292848	5.716373867	1.820241893
Gambia, The	..	6.153846574	12.39342908	6.270079608	-0.81226466	3.558879369	0.881848176	5.500000174
Mauritania	16.13833044	11.98593111	-5.13437445	3.37121021	2.994760523	-1.77130453	9.819800448	-0.43040626

(Source: World Bank)

In the light of these data, we are thusly able to determine the different levels of development and growth among a number of equivalent countries which are more or less similar in terms of language, culture, geography, history, etc. The uneven development which is fueled by the logic of the unequal exchange operates so fiercely that it may even create such inequalities among those proximate societies in a given region that had been for a long period under the French colonial rule accompanied by the imperialist culture diffused into these societies. This asymmetry even widens when a larger territory, such as the whole of the Sub-Saharan region, is at stake. Compared to the 'southern complex' of Africa (i.e., South Africa, Rhodesia, Botswana), Western Africa remains significantly backward and less industrialized—a fact pointing out the gap between the 'peripheral centers' that are more favorable in the process of the accumulation of capital and the rest of the periphery. Therefore, in a wider peripheral region (e.g. Africa), there arise some favorable peripheral centers (e.g. urban centers of the 'southern complex,' like Cape Town) where capital finds more suitable environment for accumulation comparatively to the other centers (ranging from Abidjan to Dakar to Nouakchott, in a decreasing tendency) whereas those latters are still much more favorable than the rural regions of their own countries so as to restate the ultimate asymmetry between the rural and the urban.

The asymmetry of the uneven development triggered by the mechanism of the unequal exchange does not reflect only on the economic indications of a number of underdeveloped countries, but it also does have a tumultuous effect in the social, in the everyday lives of the great masses in these countries. The phenomenon of what we have named above as the 'proletarianization by migration' comes into the playground once again at this stage of our investigation. Within the circumstances of the unevenness among several urban centers in the wider underdeveloped region and, furthermore, of the asymmetry between the rural and the urban, the process of

proletarianization parallel to migration induces an intricate cleavage interior to the large masses that are already proletarianized or in the course of proletarianization as they are being deprived of their subsistence economies.

The reasons of this cleavage in the course of the emerging flux from rural areas towards urban centers may be found in the 'incomplete' characteristic of proletarianization. Samir Amin remarked some crucial aspects of the different forms of the peripheral proletariat in his work. According to him, the peripheral proletariat

> does not consist solely or even mainly of the wage earners in the large modern enterprises. It also includes the mass of peasants who are integrated into the world trade system and who, like the urban working class, pay the price of unequal exchange. Although various types of social organization (very precapitalist in appearance) form the setting in which this mass of peasants live, they have eventually become proletarianized, or are on their way to suffering this fate, through their integration to the world market system. The peripheral structure—the condition for a higher rate of surplus value—also gives rise to an increasing mass of urban unemployed.[361]

So as to conform to Amin's passage, Arrighi and Saul have similarly pointed out the 'stratification' inside the proletarianized population in the newly independent African nations as follows:

> Owing to an overall absence of population pressure on the land in most African countries and to the capital intensive character of production, *the wage-working class is polarized into two strata*. Wage workers in the lower stratum are only marginally or partially proletarianized as, over their life cycle, they derive the bulk of the means of subsistence for their families from outside the wage economy. Wage workers in the upper stratum, generally a very small minority, receive incomes sufficiently high (say three to five times those received by wage workers in the lower stratum) to justify a total break of their links with the peasantry. *This is a type of 'optional proletarianization' resulting from the steady impoverishment of the peasantry*. We therefore feel justified in considering wage workers in the lower stratum as part of the peasantry (*which participates in the wage economy through labor migration*) and in including the upper stratum with the much more important 'elites' and 'sub-elites' in bureaucratic employment in what we have called the 'labor aristocracy,' notwithstanding the confusion that the use of this term may generate.[362]

In the light of these two passages, we witness in fact the incomplete character of the proletarianization in an underdeveloped economy where the value of labor is not equal to that in a different environment with which the underdeveloped economy

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[361] Amin, **Unequal Development**, p. 361.
[362] Arrighi, Saul, **ibid.**, p. 69.

establishes a relation of exchange (of commodities), substantially through trade. Therefore, the labor force already affected by the detriment of the unequal exchange remains short of providing enough space within itself for the unsteady waves of masses in the course of proletarianization under the very circumstances of underdevelopment, which would ultimately be defined as the 'underemployment, both quantitatively (massive unemployment) an qualitatively (low productivity of labor).'[363] The process of proletarianization in the underdeveloped world causes, consequently, the inception of the following diversification within the working class:

i.) Urban wage-workers: The completely proletarianized layer of the working class who reside and work in the urban centers, and who make their lives on selling off their labors in return for wages. These laborers appear to constitute, at the same time, the most favorable layer within the proletariat since most often they have emigrated from peripheries towards centers long before the others and, accordingly, seize more privileged jobs in better conditions compared to the precarity of the new-comers.[364] Marxist theory often evaluates this layer with the term 'labor aristocracy.'[365]

ii.) Rural peasants: Those who have not yet emigrated towards urban centers and working in the plantations in the rural peripheries, in which the production of surplus value is transformed according to the need of compatibleness to capitalism, and in which the commodity production (mostly agrarian) is regulated as part of the global market system. As Samir Amin points out, those peasants should also be considered as a distinctive part of the proletariat who are yet to be proletarianized *completely*.

iii.) Reserve army of labor: Migrant urban wage-workers who largely suffer from unemployment in the circumstances of underemployment, thusly half-deprived of their rural origins but neither *completely* proletarianized nor urbanized—a status of the oscillation between the two forms of labor force in the service of capitalist exploitation.

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[363] Mandel, **ibid.**, pp. 60-1.

[364] Cf.: 'Wage workers in the upper stratum, generally a very small minority, receive incomes sufficiently high (say three to five times those received by wage workers in the lower stratum) to justify a total break of their links with the peasantry.' Arrighi, Saul, **ibid.**, p. 69.

[365] J. M. Barbalet, 'The 'Labor Aristocracy' in Context', **Science & Society**, vol. 51, no. 2 (Summer, 1987), pp. 133-53.

These last two layers within the proletariat of the peripheral African social formations constitute the most vulnerable and ironically the most populous groups under the conditions of underdevelopment. On the other hand, given the macro-economic data of the underdeveloped countries in terms of growth and development as well as the fact of underemployment, these two groups become largely open to seek survival with selling their labors outside of their countries, even outside of their regions and wider-regions. Thusly, our tripartite migration process accomplishes with the third pillar: massive waves of migration from underdeveloped peripheries towards developed centers, i.e., Europe and North America. These two layers have effectively been at the core of the migrant populations in the flux from South to North, from Africa to Europe, from, say, West Africa to France, from Tropical Africa to the UK, from Turkey to Germany, and so on…

Here, it is crucial to recall the peculiar conditions of a number of coral economies in the developed world which have attracted immigrants from the peripheries of proximate or distant geographies. In that sense, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia have been the geographical origins of the migrant populations searching for decent jobs in the developed world—along with several geographical origins proximate to the migratory destinations such as France, Germany, etc. Countries and regions such as Spain, Portugal and Italy of the Southern Europe, or Turkey and Greece of the Eastern Europe, have also been this kind of a source of labor migration flux in a period when especially the European economy was in rapid recovery after the destructive effects of the Second World War and when the growth in this wider-region was fortissimo. Since we have already demonstrated these peculiar conditions in the Chapter II of our study, we will not furthermore get into the depths of the nature of this rapid growth of Europe between the years *c.* 1945–1975, a period which is referred in the French economic literature with the term *Trente Glorieuses*.

Finally, we need to emphasize on the *reciprocal* feature of the labor migration from the underdeveloped to the developed countries. Although the flux was unidirectional between the two, the reasons beneath the migration due to the specific character of the labor supply (underdevelopment and unemployment) in the underdeveloped world have coincided with the reasons beneath the campaign encouraging and welcoming the migrant workers due to the specific character of the labor demand in the developed world. This coincidence, in effect, has enabled job-

seeking laborers migrate into the labor-seeking countries where especially the industrial sector was short of labor force—and this was quantitatively in two ways: first, the level of employment had almost reached to full employment, which necessitated new labor force to be bought from new laborers under the circumstances of a growing volume of production; second, an 'almost' full employment level simply meant increased wages in the labor market so that, for capitalists, those increased wages had to be balanced through new participants who will join into the labor market and thusly increase the competitiveness in the labor market while cheap labor simply meant the possibility of more labor in return of the needs of the growing industry in which the commodity production was greedily increasing—until when this process caused a crisis of overproduction in the mid-1970s. These two aspects perfectly coincide with the need of a surplus population, and in return, of a reserve army of labor, which underwent the process of perfection following the crisis of mid-1970s and during the whole period of what we now call neoliberalism.

On the other hand, the third pillar of our tripartite migration, i.e., the flux from overseas towards the metropole (the country), although (re-)connecting distant geographies to each other, often operated through taking some non-geographical proximities into consideration. In this regard, some sort of political and cultural (so as to include, above all, the language) affiliations have come into stake as preferences in establishing such migration routes; in that sense, for the majority of the Great Powers prior to the Second World War who have effectively been for a long time—until the 1960s—colonizers in most of the world, the former colonies became the sources of the needed cheap labor force to emigrate into the territories of their former colonizers. Thusly France has become a new land for the Algerian, the Senegalese and the Indochinese migrant for that there has been a cultural affinity in terms of spoken language and the like as well as the states of these newly independent former colonies had strong political connections with its former colonizer state in most of the cases. These non-geographical proximities which are founded as constituent aspects in the course of labor migration can also be regarded as the prove of the new regime of imperialism which has gone under a formal shift after the successive wave of decolonization so as to be re-established as neocolonialism.

CHAPTER IV:

IMMIGRANT CLASS FRACTIONS AND SOCIAL SPACE

In the previous chapter, we have dealt with the history of colonialism and imperialism in the African continent, with special focuses on the cases of Algeria and West Africa, in order to demonstrate the scale of the substantial transformation of the societies in these colonial geographies through the coercion of colonial powers, particularly France. Colonialism and imperialism, in that sense, are not only temporary chapters of history but also the periods in which the societies under colonial rule have been transformed in such a coerced way that they have become a part of the capitalist mode of production on a global scale which was founded by the social forces of the imperialists and expanded by their social, political and military forces. Yet, the articulation of these colonial geographies (implying not only their economies and territories but also their populations) to global capitalism remained substantially peripheral, weak, backward and underdeveloped in comparison to the core of the system from where the colonial powers of modern times were issued. Colonialism and its consequences, in that sense, have set the stage for an uneven relationship between the 'core' and the 'periphery', and this relationship was not due only on the plane of 'high politics' dominated by the state powers or great monopolies. Its scale was beyond: it implied a profound social aspect in which generates the phenomenon of unequal exchange. While the successive independent states in the course of decolonization created newborn modern nations, this inequality has taken a permanent character in the age of 'post-colonialism'.

For our theme of investigation, colonial history and the social, political, economic, demographic, etc. developments enveloped in it—both dictated from 'above' by the economic and political/military power of colonialists and flourished from 'below' by the social forces of indigenous and local people in these colonial geographies—have direct influences on the current situation of the immigrants issued from the former colonies of France who found themselves on the French soil as part

of the working class and who were followed by their descendants of second and third generations. Therefore, according to this narrative, these immigrants and their descendants in France whose origins are of North African or Sub-Saharan in particular appear to be the heirs of this unequal relationship. For they have emigrated from their own countries to France during the labor migration waves of the post-war period showing that they have been subjected to the force of the 'unequal exchange' within the environment where the dictum of underdevelopment prevails. Moreover, as we have previously shown, they have been at the most disadvantageous part of this inequality since they are mostly originated from the rural regions of their backward countries. These immigrants, therefore, have suffered a doubled outcome of the relationship that was set in the course of colonization of their native lands, and their migration towards the metropole has essentially moved the *space* of this unequal relationship in a *time* posterior to the times of colonialism. Labor migration of the colonized has thusly shifted the time-space of this ever-persisting unevenness.

As we have studied in the Chapter II on immigrants and class, the determinant effect of both colonialism and neocolonialism finds its ultimate impact on the formation of immigrant class fraction in contemporary France. There are basically two reasons for this: first, colonialism and neocolonialism have produced and reproduced an unequal relationship in so far as the unequal exchange dominated this interaction and, hence, led massive populations to seek better living conditions through migration towards urban centers (either those of the 'peripheries' or of the advanced capitalist countries). Arrivals of the labor migration to the French metropole have, in this respect, constituted the most vulnerable part of the proletariat from the very beginning of their journeys until today. Second, colonialism and neocolonialism have not resulted with only 'purely' economic consequences but also had impacts on the culture, everyday life, identity, consciousness (whether national, religious, ethno-racial, or class), etc., of the colonial subject and consequently of the labor migrant. Our focus on the Arab nationalism and Islam on the one hand and Pan-Africanism on the other hand aimed to show how this impact on large masses who faced with a colonial rule in their lands has pushed and mobilized them even as far as to organize armed struggles on the route to political liberation and inspired them, albeit less often, for a social emancipation.

It is in the junction of these two aspects, which result from the determinant effects of colonialism and neocolonialism, that the immigrants and their descendants

form 'distinct' class fractions within the working class in a geography where they undergo new experiences through relations of production and exploitation and where evolves their social consciousness inherited from the 'dead generations' so as to be bequeathed to the 'heirs'. However, the transmission and evolution of this social consciousness from one generation to another does not occur in an abstract level in which it would be philosophized or theorized in the remoteness from a concrete ground. On the contrary, the historical movement of social consciousness that we relate to the immigrants finds its trajectory in the concreteness of their everyday lives finding its setting in the social space. For the immigrants in France, the social space in the focus of our questioning as regards the movement of their social consciousness is *banlieue*. It is in the social spaces of *banlieues* that the 'abstract' form of consciousness is materialized and embodied in the form of distinct class fractions that will eventually give rise to what we call the immigrant question. Therefore, in order to depict the complexity of the immigrant question, we should delve into the complexity of the social space in which we will find the other, 'non-economic' components of the formation of immigrant class fractions.

Banlieue, the Social Space of Immigrants

In the Chapter I, while reviewing the accounts on the 2005 riots, we have seen how the approaches based on '*politique de la ville*' formulated the problematic of *banlieues* through cases of urban riots in terms of a question that has to be solved within the 'legitimate' realm of the state and capital—an approach that produces knowledge, and, hence, a solution to the 'crisis', in direct or indirect relation to state power. We will now try to develop our own critical approach for the problematic of *banlieues* in coherence with the path we are following for the formation of immigrant class fractions in France.

i.) Social space, banlieues, *and critical theories*

Fashionable 'critical theories' would approach to the problematic of *banlieue* through several concepts:

One would have conceived the *banlieue* as the space of confinement ('*enfermement*'), inspired by Foucault's work, and considered it as a unique sort of

prison in which inhabitants are concentrated for punishment due to potential criminalities as the society as a whole more and more turns out to be the subject of an act of incarceration by the state power while this incarceration operates asymmetrically, say, in a city center and in its periphery.[366] Another one would have conceived it as the space of flight ('*fuite*'), inspired by Deleuze's work, and considered it as being situated beyond the margins of a modern society of control which the state- and corporates-owned technology not only monitors but also regulates the life and its fluxes, without doubt within certain limits of freedom which in fact obscure the will to a complete emancipation. The space of flight, in contrast to the space of confinement, provides the sparseness of control, hence, to a certain degree, a '*distanciation*' from the locus of control if not completely getting rid of it, consequently becoming a space for a possible emancipation of the subject.[367] One would have conceived it as the space of exception, inspired by Agamben's work, and considered as the space where the law exercised in ordinary times is often suspended, and replaced—either momentarily or temporarily but always indefinitely—with the law of exception exercised in exceptional times. The security maintained by the state power and its authority is always fragile here, and this fragility points out a sort of sovereignty crisis, albeit to a lesser extent geographically, as this space of exception can be taken under control only with exceptional rules which legitimize the state violence and which render the life of the inhabitants of this space a bare life.[368] Another one would have conceived it as the space of closure, inspired by Wacquant's work, and considered as a space where inhabitants are relegated from the social life

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[366] For a brief definition of confinement, see a 1972-dated interview with Foucault: Michel Foucault, 'Le grand enfermement', in **Dits et écrits I, 1954-1975**, Paris: Gallimard, 2001, pp. 1164-74. In this interview, Foucault curiously writes: '(…) [W]hat is striking is that the marginal violent layers of the plebian population reassume their political consciousness. For example, those bands of youngsters in the **banlieues** or in certain neighborhoods of Paris, for whom their delinquent situation and their marginal existence take a political signification.' (p. 1171) Following this, Foucault relates the phenomenon of marginalization to the systemic functions of prisons in the contemporary society, and he certainly considers prison not only as a mere building with a number of officials responsible for the execution of the penalty, but in a wider sense, the partial or even complete transformation of the social organization into this or that prison model, into a 'penitentiary confinement'. Also see: Michel Foucault, **La société punitive. Cours au Collège de France, 1972-1973**, Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2013.

[367] For Deleuze's conception of 'society of control,' as the contemporary form in today's society and being one step forward from Foucault's disciplinary model, see: Gilles Deleuze, 'Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle', in **Pourparlers, 1972-1990**, Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 240-7. For the term 'flight' (which is always used in the notion of 'line of flight'), see: Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, **A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia**, vol. 2, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. (Especially pages 133-4.)

[368] For the conception of 'exception', see: Giorgio Agamben, **State of Exception**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. For the concept of 'bare life', see: Giorgio Agamben, **Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life**, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

in the rest of the city, isolated and separated from the city consequent to a historical development, that of capitalism and the state, in the course of deindustrialization and neoliberalism.[369]

All these theories might have a lot to say on the actual problems of the world, as well as for the problematic of *banlieues*; and for all conceptions deriving from these theories, many reasonable grounds might be found in the concrete reality. Who would completely reject the idea that the immigrant's *banlieue* has increasingly become an 'open prison' where the separation, isolation and relegation for the 'prisoners' operate as penalties of the confinement? And who would deny, at the same time, the idea that this *banlieue*, in comparison to the concentrated security in the city centers, has become a place for more exemption albeit under control, which makes the law exceptional as a weapon of this loose control over space, and which makes the exception suitable only for the conditions of this exemption? They would all contain valid grounds at the same time for a possible analysis of the problematic; however, each of them fails in developing a consistent 'unitary theory', which would relate the consequences of the phenomenon of *banlieue* to its cause and to its nature. Therefore the task of working on a unitary theory presupposes elaborating a phenomenon's consequences not separately from its causes and nature but emphasizing the relationality between them. Then, how to deal with the problematic of *banlieue* in the light of such a unitary theory, following the intricate traces that Lefebvre left behind?

First and foremost, space in Lefebvre's work, such that we deal with like city, or certain components of cities, e.g. *banlieues* and peripheries, is elaborated with the concept 'social space', for the reason that such a space is distinguished from natural space or abstract space through the aspect of its production and the involvement of relations of production into space. Lefebvre defines this social space as 'a (social) product', and emphasizes its resemblance to commodity, money, capital, but in a distinctive way in which the form of space constitutes a 'reality of its own.' He then goes on with the following statement: 'Space as a product also operates as the instrument of thought as well as the action; at the same time, it is a means of production, a means of control, therefore of domination and power—yet it slips away

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[369] Loïc Wacquant, **Urban Outcasts. A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality**, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, p. 2-3. Wacquant uses the term closure ('*Schließung*') in the sense that Weber's uses in his work.

partially, as being this, from what it serves for.' And, finally, he relates this last 'reserve' to the following passage: 'The social and political (state) forces that create space attempt to rule over it, however they cannot go as far as they want; it is those forces that push the spatial reality into a sort of autonomy which is impossible to dominate and that endeavor to drain this space, or to fix it so as to put it in their service.'[370] Therefore, it may be deduced from these passages that *i)* space, as a social product, cannot be considered apart from a given mode of production, and the production relations that this mode of production engenders, and *ii)* with this feature, space is created by a variety of social forces as well as political forces, i.e., that of the state, since these two kinds of force have ultimately mingled each other; *iii)* but still, space is not an ordinary commodity, it is 'not a kilogram of sugar or a meter of cloth,' as Lefebvre says:

> It is rather the condition and the result: the state and each of its composing institutions suppose a space and its organization according to their needs. Therefore, space cannot be reduced into a 'condition' *a priori* to institutions and to their encircling state. Is this a social relation? Yes, certainly, but being inherent to relations of property (…) [on the one hand], being tied to productive forces on the other hand, social space manifests its polyvalence, at the same time its formal and material reality. As an exploitable and consumable product, it is also a means of production; networks of exchanges, flux of primary materials and energies are shaping space and, in turn, they are determined by this space. This means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated from productive forces, from technologies and from knowledge, from division of social labor (…), from nature, from the state and from superstructures.[371]

iv) and as a condition and result at the same time, as a cause and consequence which is being determined by and determines a whole set of productive forces, economic relations, political power, and the like, (social) space has both characters of undergoing the domination of social and political forces and of 'slipping away' from them. Space, in this sense, does not only demonstrate a visage of this domination, on the contrary, it may also manifest the opposition to this domination. Here, critical theories *à la mode* in contemporary thought omit the two-sided aspect of this determinacy and focus on the outcome of a set of relations, thusly reducing the problematic into one practical question: whether space has a positive or a negative character for the human liberation. The response, following Lefebvre, is dubious, since it contains both negative and positive potentials; yet the question is tricky, since it overpasses all the mediating relations so as to arrive to a single immediacy.

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[370] **Ibid.**, p. 35.
[371] **Ibid.**, p. 102.

This means, after all, to neglect the dialectical process around space whereas space composes of dialectical contradictions and it is itself contradictory.[372]

Therefore, our *banlieues*, those of the modern era and those produced in order to meet the requirements of capitalism and the state, should be evaluated as social spaces and also social products in which the dialectical contradictions of modern capitalism reveal themselves. At the very first sight, on the RER train from the Charles de Gaulle Airport to Paris, a great contrast becomes manifest: detached houses, *maisons* of various stylish European forms of architecture contradict with great ensembles, with HLMs ('*Habitation à loyer modéré*'—rent-controlled housing) of vertical forms dominating the public housing. Yet, this 'social' contradiction is only the tip of the iceberg as regards the larger number of contradictions. Architectural difference between the forms of *habitats* includes in itself the contrast between those who live in the *banlieues*: the bourgeois and the proletarian, the rich and the poor, the French and the immigrant concurrently inhabit in the same or neighboring *banlieues*. These architectural forms thusly present some primary evidence for the social contradiction. Yet again, this tells only a little bit more of the tip of the iceberg. Crucial questions are therefore the following: how the conditions of social contradiction come into being? How and through which processes these conditions are related to the mode of production and relations of production that are peculiar to capitalism? Finally, as the complementary element of economic exploitation, how does the political repression of state, coming along with that of the non-political, i.e., of the social, become active in the case of *banlieues*?

Here again, we must emphasize the validity of the notion of totality. We have defended the idea that class could not be conceived as a pure economic category but rather as a social relation and process that was bound to economic relations, i.e., the relations of production. However, the mode of production and the relations of production, particularly those in capitalism, are not restrained only to the 'phase of production'; they extend to a much larger scale, and this scale embraces each process of the mode of production: production followed by distribution followed by exchange followed by consumption. And this *enchaînement* does not end up here; it restarts with the first phase so as to perpetuate the succession. The whole succession, therefore, not the one among various phases of the mode of production but also the

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[372] **Ibid.**, pp. 337-405.

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procession between one and successive *enchaînements*, points out the crucial compatibility of production and reproduction. In this sense, as we have underlined the importance of reproduction and its relation to production in the formation of class, we similarly claim the idea that the *banlieue*, too, as a social space and as a social product, can only be intelligible through taking reproduction into account alongside production—through this totality in which non-frozen, vivid, 'real' relations of production are encompassed altogether. The production of social space under capitalism comprehends the social relations of reproduction (respectively consisting of biological reproduction, reproduction of the labor force and reproduction of the social relations of production), which take place in this social space, and these are inseparable processes.

ii.) Spatial, socio-economic, and ethno-racial tensions of the urban

Social space of *banlieues*, extensions of cities or peripheries, elaborated under this scheme, cannot be properly studied without taking into account another notion, which is again a substantial theme in Lefebvre's oeuvre: everyday life. But, in order to render this notion intelligible within our study, we should trace a trajectory through which social space and eventually its users undergo a series of intervention imposed by the political power and capital—as for *banlieues* particularly in the Île-de-France, we will follow up a historical approach.

We are able to determine two primary tensions for the recent historical development of the urban space of the Parisian region, i.e., Île-de-France comprising of the city of Paris and its surroundings (nearby and distant *banlieues*). The first tension essentially has a *spatial* character which appears as the contradiction between the center and the periphery[373] (not to confuse with a separate contradiction between the urban and the rural) while the second tension essentially has a *socio-economic* character which appears as the contradiction between the habitat and the

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[373] Given the urban sprawl as regards the agglomeration of the Parisian region, the metropolis provides a polycentric model due to its spatial expansion from the historical center towards the periphery and the reorganization of the city center in the second half of the 19th century under Haussmann's governorate, and, in the 20th century, the genesis of suburban centers in the rural surroundings of the city supported by the creation of the 'new towns' as the outcome of a programmed *politique de la ville*. For tracing consequent historical developments of the city, see: David Harvey, **Paris, Capital of Modernity**, New York and London: Routledge, 2003; Alain Rustenholz **De la banlieue rouge au Grand Paris. D'Ivry à Clichy et de Saint-Ouen à Charenton**, Paris: La Fabrique, 2015; Jean-Paul Alduy, 'Les villes nouvelles de la région parisienne. Du projet politique à la réalisation', **Annales de la recherche urbaine**, no. 2, 1979, pp. 3-78; Anne Aguilera, Dominique Mignot, 'Urban Sprawl, Polycentrism and Commuting. A Comparison of Seven French Urban Areas', **Urban Public Economics Review**, no. 1, 2004, pp. 93-113.

workplace.[374] For each tension, we also witness, at any moment, the presence of this or that kind of political intervention varying in a wide range from *politique de la ville* to state coercion and violence (either on nature or on human).

Let us start with the socio-economic tension in which the contradiction of the habitat and the workplace reveals itself. At this level of contradiction, scholars determine that for a century-long period the depopulation process of the central neighborhoods of Paris is first realized by the hand of the replacement of offices with housing, then, especially towards the end of the 20th century, by the hand of a slackening process ('*desserrement*') for jobs in the center which is accompanied by the emergence of the peripheral poles in the close and distant *banlieues*. Between 1975 and 1990, the part of Paris in the employment in the Île-de-France decreased from 41 per cent to 36 per cent; that of the *Petite Couronne* (neighboring departments of the city of Paris including Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne) remained around 35 per cent; that in the *Grande Couronne* (the neighboring departments of the *Petite Couronne* including Seine-et-Marne, Val-d'Oise, Yvelines, Essonne) increased from 24 per cent to approximately 30 per cent. 'Between 1982 and 1990,' notes Berger, 'the *Grande Couronne* has received close to two-third of the employment growth in the Île-de-France,' while the '*Petite Couronne* hardly one-third and Paris less than 2 per cent.'[375]

Even in this picture, the *Grande Couronne* remains in deficit in terms of employment since it gathers more than 40 per cent of the Île-de-France population. Yet, the new towns of the Île-de-France, like Cergy and Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, which are much better linked to the city of Paris, thanks to their recent and more planned 'production', have seen a rate that is approximately half of the increase in the regional employment. Still, these towns do not stand as reliable hubs for structuring the employment basin in the Parisian region: 5 per cent of the jobs for the 5.5 per cent of the active population in the region. And, moreover, 'even in these new towns where an apparent equilibrium seems to be assured,' there was 'less than

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[374] Renowned American geographer Edward W. Soja argues on the dialectics of the spatial and the social in which these two tensions are considered together: Edward W. Soja, 'The Socio-Spatial Dialectic', **Annals of the Association of American Geographers**, vol. 70, no. 2, June 1980, pp. 207-25.

[375] Martine Berger, 'Paris. Desserrement de l'habitat et des emplois', in Françoise Dureau, et al, **Métropoles en mouvement. Une comparaison internationale**, Paris: Anthropos, 2000, p. 117. It should be noted that these figures are drawn from the 1990 census which was the most accurate figures when the work was published.

one active over four [who] works in the commune where he lives.'[376] Therefore, even in such balanced circumstances maintained in such well-planned new towns generally preferred as habitats by the bourgeoisie and 'middle class' professionals residing in the region, there is an important gap in terms of localities between the workplace and the habitat, simply put by these data that a spatial unit (a *commune* in French administration) where one inhabitant resides cannot provide workplace for this inhabitant.

For the part of habitation, the very strained situation of the real estate market in the Île-de-France and the slowdown of 'living apart' ('*décohabitation*') for the young generations, which had inverse effect on the derogating process of household scales, did not lead to a densification in the rates of the housing in the 1980s. On the one hand, the evolution of the family structures contributed to the decrease of the scale of households; on the other hand, families wishing to have more space were led to the individual house market. And these two tendencies often resulted with the moving away from the centers so that the households became able to improve their housing conditions. The logic of slackening applies mostly for those in the ages between 35-44 who represent the 75 per cent of the centrifugal flux and their volume increases by 25 per cent.[377]

At the threshold of 1990s, urban planning schemes fixed the objectives of 're-densification' in close *banlieues* and around 'exchange poles' particularly having good transport links in the medium and larger *banlieues*.[378] These objectives are quite coherent with the fact of slackening of the workplaces in the periphery. As Berger writes, 'even though the urban renovations or the re-conquest of former spaces of industrial or artisanal activity have augmented the housing offer in certain neighborhoods of Paris or certain communes of close *banlieues*', this slackening of the workplaces 'remains as the principal factor of evolution of residential spaces in the Île-de-France.'[379] Therefore, upon historical reasons that have created the tension between the habitat and the workplace in the case of Parisian region (the city and its surroundings), it becomes clear that a great number of shifts in terms of housing and employment had been in process during the turn of the 1990s. One historical reason for such shifts might be determined as the striking phenomenon of

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[376] **Ibid.**, pp. 117-8.
[377] **Ibid.**, p. 119.
[378] **Ibid.**, p. 120.
[379] **Ibid.**, p. 119.

deindustrialization in the Western world, which we have discussed in the Chapter II of this study, setting the urban spaces both in the center and in the periphery evacuated of industrial complex to a large extent.[380] This roll-back in industrial activities reducing the surplus profit from this sector has triggered in contrast the rise of the rentier interest on real-estate prices with the neoliberal turn[381] that coincides with the decade of 1980s—a period that France has experienced the passage to neoliberalism through, among others, taking a set of austerity measures under governments of the Socialist Party, paradoxically.[382]

Then, this fluctuation in the real estate market, especially the increase in real estate prices in the Parisian region as well as the increase of prices in credits, which suits the global and French context of neoliberal history, needs deeper elaboration. Graph 6 below shows a historical development of the house price index in four scales (Paris, the Île-de-France, province and France) in comparison, starting from 1965 until today. According to this chart, apart from predictable facts (e.g. downtrend prices in province, while prices in Paris are topping the graphic as well as the proximity to Paris also increases the prices), two periods of price increase can be determined in the beginning: the first one is that, for the Parisian region (the city and the Île-de-France), housing prices take an increasing trend around 1983 until taking a reverse trend around 1992, a decade-long period of real-estate bubble; the second is that, this time for entire French territory, housing prices are skyrocketed around the threshold of the millennium and the decade of 2000s has been a triumphant period for the proprietors. At the current evolution of this index, it is seen that the prices have been into a recession in the overall of the French territory, but still the prices in the city of Paris are sensibly higher than others, and despite its secondary status, the prices in the Île-de-France are also sensibly higher than the rest.

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[380] Neil Smith, 'New Globalism, New Urbanism. Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy', **Antipode**, vol. 34/3, 2002, pp. 430-1. It should also be noted that Saskia Sassen's famous study on global cities and another notable study on the relation of cities and global economy, in this context, could be regarded as explanatory works also for the Parisian case, since the logic of the recoil of industry and the rise of finance has dominated the city's transformation in the course of globalization and neoliberalization. Saskia Sassen, **The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991; Saskia Sassen, **Cities in a World Economy**, Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2000.
[381] David Harvey, **A Brief History of Neoliberalism**, p. 187.
[382] Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, Sarah L. Babb, 'The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed. Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries', **American Journal of Sociology**, vol. 108, no. 3, 2002. Especially see: pp. 562-8.

Through these data, it becomes more comprehensible how the urban mobility has been slowed down and, as a result of lower index and geographical proximity, the urban periphery of Paris have become a target not only for 'middle classes' but also for lower-income masses who could not leave off to province since they did not have enough savings for retirement, for future plans, or for their children, etc. In this case, the precarious proletariat issued from the former industrial activities as well as their descendants have increasingly become the most vulnerable social group in the midst of a great scale of replacement and displacement stemming from the tension between the habitat and the workplace which has uprooted the existing panorama of the city life. While those middle classes are led to subsidized housing for access to property in the peripheries, the working-class including immigrants is also concentrated in such public housings built in *banlieues* for 'moderate rents'.[383]

Graph 6: House price index (compared according to regions)

(Source: Conseil Général de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable)

The rise of rentier interest on space, along with the rise of credits, can be considered in the milieu of the conjunction of the already existing spatial segregation and the systematic gentrification process, precisely for the city of Paris, noting that the city was organized according to various functions (such as residential, industrial, commercial, administrative, etc.), and it is crucial to note that, as one scholar argues,

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[383] Martine Berger, 'Paris. Mobilités, trajectoires, résidentielles et système métropolitain', in Françoise Dureau, et al, **Métropoles en mouvement. Une comparaison internationale**, Paris: Anthropos. 2000, pp. 205-6.

this 'division of space (…) is being shifted by a powerful differentiation of housings in diverse hierarchized segments.'[384] Therefore, the mediation of the rentier interest, or in more general terms the ground rent, constitutes the correlation between segregation and gentrification, as put forth by Neil Smith. Smith argues his approach to city on the grounds of uneven development, basically defined as that 'the societal development does not take place everywhere at the same speed or in the same direction', and he uses the notion as regards the urban scale.[385] He then asserts that, at this urban scale, 'the main pattern of uneven development lies in the relation between the suburbs and the inner city', in which tension the determining element arises as the ground rent being equalized and differentiated between different places in the metropolis so as to fuel the motor of uneven development.[386] Smith notes that he was aware that, in this process, 'other social and economic forces are involved, but many of these are expressed in the ground rent structure. Wage and income levels are certainly expressed in class and race segregation in a city's housing market, but these differences are mediated through ground rent.' As a supplement to this fact, it should also be added the transportation system which makes some parts of the metropolitan region more accessible and favorable and others not.[387] If we are to sum up, we can briefly underline that the phenomena of gentrification and the segregation in such metropolitan regions like the Île-de-France are closely linked to each other through the mediation of ground rent, and that accordingly this ground rent, in association with the financial system,[388] attempts subsuming the social and economic contradictions related to class, race, and other 'identities'.

As for gentrification, a closer look at the transformation of Château-Rouge, a Parisian neighborhood at the margins of the inner city, would be meaningful in order to demonstrate how an African-origin immigrant neighborhood of Paris has been subject to a profound transformation in terms of class, racial and ethnic composition through a systematic gentrification process. Neighborhoods like Château-Rouge are

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[384] Patrick Simon, 'Paris. La division sociale et ethnique de l'espace parisien', in Françoise Dureau, et al, **Métropoles en mouvement. Une comparaison internationale**, Paris: Anthropos, 2000, pp. 299-309.

[385] Neil Smith, **The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the Revanchist City**, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 77.

[386] **Ibid.**, pp. 80-1.

[387] **Ibid.**, p. 81.

[388] For some of the recent critical studies around the financial system which also involves the real estate market in particular and ground rent in general, see: David Harvey, **The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism**, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Costas Lapavitsas, **Profiting Without Producing. How Finance Exploits Us All?,** New York: Verso, 2014.

not incidentally chosen for academic works in the urban geography discipline, since they are not only immigrant or working-class neighborhoods but also important locations as regards the spatial split of the urban space. For Paris, in the inner city, this split appears to be essentially between west and east, while the traditionally industrial *banlieues* of the north and northeast are opposed to the bourgeois *banlieues* of the northwest and south. Therefore the peripheral *arrondissements* of the east of Paris rounding towards city's northern periphery so as to join the north and northeast *banlieues* divided by the ring road (*Périphérique*) constitutes the historical working-class social space in the Parisian region both inside and outside of the city of Paris.[389] These neighborhoods formerly remaining at the peripheries of the city were included into the Parisian agglomeration since 1860 under the Second Empire while developing in straight connection (in terms of transportation, culture, economy and demographic composition) to the 20th century's massively inhabited working-class neighborhoods outside of the city (see Map 4 below). During the first three quarters of the 20th century, development of the urban tissue went hand in hand with industrial development, and it is only from the last quarter of the 20th century onwards that this tissue has been through a profound transformation. Neighborhoods in the east and northeast like Belleville, La Chapelle, La Goutte-d'Or since 1990s, as well as Strasbourg-Seine-Denis and the surroundings of the Canal Saint-Martin today, have become places for gentrification at the detriment of being peculiar to the working class and immigrants, hence they have been the scene for a displacement of 'lower classes' only to be replaced by 'middle classes', and this development is perceivable in real estate prices.[390] On the other hand, according to Chabrol, the gentrification in such neighborhoods have been somehow masked for that the rehabilitation of buildings and changes in the composition of the inhabitant population have limited effects on commercial activities which have already taken roots, so that the 'dynamism of commercial activities has an effect on masking the progression of gentrification in the urban landscape and it reinforces the Chinese, African, Indian images of these spaces' since the petty business here are in their hands making them the 'image' of the space.[391] During 1990s, the neighborhood has been deprived of former establishments which were substituted with the new,

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[389] Simon, **ibid.**, p. 300.
[390] Marie Chabrol, 'Évolutions récentes des quartiers d'immigration à Paris. L'exemple du quartier 'africain' de Château-Rouge', **Hommes et migrations**, 2014, no. 1308, p. 87.
[391] **Ibid.**, pp. 87-8.

globally creating a sort of 'commercial pole' consisting of *nouveaux boutiques* (public telephones, hairdressers, snacks, etc.) as well as street peddlers selling food, cosmetics, clothes, etc., and the sales of false documents, counterfeit medicines, drugs and prostitution.[392]

Map 4: City of Paris and its neighborhoods.

(Source: plandeparis.info)

In accordance with the skyrocketing of the real estate prices at the end of 1990s and in the course of 2000s, Château-Rouge and likewise neighborhoods have gone through a revalorization process. As the real estate prices were multiplied in the early 2000s, and the tendency which led buyers towards the north and northeast of the city have stunningly changed the demography of these neighborhoods both in terms of racial and ethnic planes and socio-economic plane. Now the new inhabitants have more and more become young architects, intermittent show business workers, instructors, social workers… in short, those who belong the newly arising 'middle class' from various sectors who have more competence than the former inhabitants in financing the rising costs of housing in such neighborhoods.[393] Graph 7 below briefly shows how the 'rush' to the existing homes in France has been since the end of

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[392] **Ibid.,** p. 90.
[393] **Ibid.,** pp. 91-2.

1990s and these figures become more explicable in such revalorized gentrification zones in the city of Paris.

Graph 7: Price index, amount and number of existing home sales

(Source: Conseil Général de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable)

Yet again, this revalorization does not apply in the same preponderance as the gentrification proceeds rapidly but also selectively. 'Heterogeneous structure of the neighborhood and its density of blocks' demonstrate that 'every flat does not have the same potential of revalorization' because of the existence of less bright ground floors, flats on the first floor full of street noise, and so on.[394] Besides, it should also be noted that the cheap products in sales either in the boutiques or on peddlers attract such racial, ethnic and class presence from close *banlieues* like Seine-Saint-Denis, of which inhabitants come here 'to save a few centimes over the price of a sack of rice.'[395] Thusly neighborhoods similar to Château-Rouge, like Belleville or Barbès, situated in the peripheral northeast and north axis of the inner city where the demographic composition in the beginning of 1990s have more or less in resemblance to this neighborhood,[396] 'constitute one of the commercial centers of the city in terms of commercial density and diversity as well as mobility.'[397] However, this heterogeneity also allows the gentrification in the neighborhood to be realized

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[394] **Ibid.**, p. 92.
[395] **Ibid.**, pp. 93-4.
[396] For a comparison with the figures of immigrant inhabitants of Belleville in 1990, cf. Simon, **ibid.**, p. 307.
[397] Chabrol, **ibid**., p. 93.

partially, leaving least favorable flats in the blocks reserved to either lesser-income households or the existing commercial activities that we have mentioned above, which in turn makes the neighborhood's transformation masked as scholars claim, since the visibility of certain racial, ethnic or class presence in the neighborhood becomes fixed. Therefore, the gentrification of certain central neighborhoods on the one hand and the segregation of immigrant inhabitants in the close *banlieues* in the north and northeast where the flux triggered by the rise of the ground rent have been maintained in a quite diversified and complex process.

As for segregation, on the other hand, which stands in connection with the process of gentrification through the mediation of ground rent, the social as well as ethnic and racial division of the urban space would make the class character of immigrants even more intelligible. Let us start with the division of space. In the Chapter II of this study, we have elaborated the deindustrialization as a global process that particularly took part in the West and France, a process corresponding to the neoliberal transformation of the society both from below (i.e., tertiarization replaced by industrial activities, emergence of a greater reserve army of labor, crude competence in the labor market, dramatically increased precarization, capital accumulation through dispossession, etc.) and above (i.e., structural reforms in the economy, reorganization of the state, state restrictions to the immigrant flux from former colonial territories, etc.). In this regard, the social division of space during subsequent periods of prosperity and scarcity, of growth and recession but always under the reign of industrial production was eventually to be subject to a profound change so as to render another contradiction, i.e., the ethnic and racial division of space, discernable—a contradiction which was borne consequent to the cleavage in the labor force. Thus, the social division of space becomes no more intelligible in itself but indicates the ethnic and racial division of space as well, albeit these two are non-intelligible through separate elaboration yet stuck to each other obscurely but firmly. In other words, the issues like urban segregation and division of space in relation to the categories of class and race (or ethnicity) are not only interlinked, but those issues related to each category are not 'pure' and involve the other category *per se*.

We are obliged here to note that societies like Britain or the US have long before the rise of neoliberalism been experiencing these two facets of the same

'question' due to their unique social formations, [398] which are traditionally distinguished from that of France and Continental Europe, although the French society also had had to deal with the question to a certain extent, particularly speaking for its working-class movement. The *Grève générale des travailleurs arabes* in 1973, organized on 3 September in the Marseillaise region and on 14 September in the Parisian region by the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA) against the rising racism against the immigrant workers in the workplace and elsewhere,[399] is a representative example of the question in France. However, such attempts from the MTA and the like were not responded within the working-class movement always sympathetic. On the ideological plane, the activism of the MTA was criticized by several organizations like Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) with the accusation of 'dividing the working class.'[400] Yet, as we have argued in the Introduction part, the social formation of French society, alike its continental neighbors, let its working-class movement to be more capable in absorbing the ethnic and racial question into the more compound labor movement during the Keynesian period until mid-1970s—albeit this movement had numerous factions in terms of organizations, and of representation.[401] And the limit of this capacity was marked by the defeat of the working-class movement on international scale and the gradual recession of the French working class under the neoliberal policies of the 'socialist' government in the 1980s.

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[398] Especially for the British case, in the late 1960s and during 1970s, scholars like Stuart Hall and his colleagues at the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies have extensively published works in the intersection of class, race and culture so as to develop a consistent approach within Marxism for the issue of race and its relation to class and they have principally defended the thesis of relative autonomy of race (as regards class). Prior to these efforts, the academic peer-reviewed journal *Race* has been active since 1959, and it was renamed *Race and Class* in 1974. The journal has accumulated a wide literature around the subject.

[399] Especially the year 1973 has seen the peak in the racist attacks against immigrant workers, particularly of Maghrebian-origin. Yvan Gastaut, 'La flambée raciste de 1973 en France', **Revue européenne des migrations internationales**, vol. 9/2, 1993, pp. 61-75.

[400] Rabah Aissaoui, 'Le discours du Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA) dans les années 1970 en France. Mobilisation et mémoire du combat anticolonial', **Immigration et marché du travail**, no. 1263, September-October 2006, p. 109; Abdellali Hajjat, 'Le MTA et la 'Grève générale' contre le racisme de 1973', **Plein droit**, 2005/4, no. 67, p. 40.

[401] For a classic work in the field first published in 1979, see: Gary P. Freeman, **Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies. The French and British Experience (1945-1975)**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. For another classic work for the Europe of *Trente Glorieuses*, see: Stephen Castles, Godula Kosack, **Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe**, London: Oxford University Press, 1973. For a fine historical approach from the part of North African immigrants, see: Rabah Aissaoui, **Immigration and National Identity. North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France**, London and New York: Tauris, 2009, pp. 151-217. For an account of a Senegalese-origin working-class militant in France written in the midst of the struggle, see: Sally N'Dongo, **ibid**.

Therefore, with the break in the mid-1970s, a break which slumped the capitalist economies of the West on the one hand, and obliged the governments to bring forth restrictions to the immigrant influx on the other hand, the labor regime would not have been remained the same as it were before, and hence the social reproduction of labor as well. The social reproduction of labor in this sense has a stronghold on social space, of which transformation and division create accurate circumstances of the living ['*le vivre*'] for classes. So for the working class and its various fractions which partially consist of immigrants. In this scheme, the two facets (social and ethno-racial) of the division of space, like the division of labor that we have discussed in the Chapter II, intersect each other and the spatial aspect of the immigrant class fractions reveals itself, gradually.

The evolution of the division of space in the Parisian region is remarkable. Catherine Rhein, a French geographer, summarizes this evolution from the 1920s until 1970s. According to her, in the 1920s, the urbanization was characterized primarily by the densification of the neighboring communes and by the considerable extension of the urbanization front beyond the limits of the Seine-Banlieue. Between 1930 and 1950, the urban tissue was less touched and modified, and the building blocks did not increase very much. Between 1950 and mid-1970s, the construction works were in charge at least in the close *banlieues*. She continues: 'The territory of the department of Seine was, thus, marked by two urbanization cycles; one relatively short', which was during the 1920s, 'the other longer, separated by a period of 25 years while the population has increased faster than the housing blocks.'[402] The period between 1954 and 1975, on the other hand, has seen the decrease in the number of households and flats by a rate of 6 per cent in the city of Paris and the increase has been by 44 per cent in the Seine-Banlieue. In this period, the population growth was moderately increasing by 13 per cent and, given the comparison between the housing in the inner city and in the *banlieue* to the population growth, the process of slackening ['*desserrement*'] that moves the population from Paris towards its *banlieues* has taken place.[403]

As regards this population movement from the inner city towards peripheries, the period between 1950 and 1990 has seen an intense construction in the peripheries

[402] Catherine Rhein, 'La division sociale de l'espace parisien et son évolution (1954-1975)', in Jacques Brun, Catherine Rhein (eds.), **La ségregation dans la ville. Concepts et mesures**, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994, p. 235.
[403] **Ibid.**, p. 236.

of the city of Paris, which has first taken place in the *Petite Couronne* and then in the *Grande Couronne* and its margins: new segments of habitat (such as public housings and their allotment on the one hand, and the creation of 'new towns' on the other hand) have emerged in the extending Parisian region. With such developments, these new segments of habitat have received social groups in accordance to their residential statuses. 'Conjoint to this extension, or rather, because of it', says Simon, 'the city center has seen a reorganization and renovation of buildings which brought forth a profound transformation.' Through these transformations, the contiguous sectors in the city had been the scene of an *embourgeoisement*, notably for the western neighborhoods and for departments like Yvelines and Hauts-de-Seine. Symmetrically, the industrial belt of the north inherited a residential extension towards east. The proletarianization of Seine-Saint-Denis and a part of Val-de-Marne was durably assured and fixed.[404]

In the light of these, the centrifugal flux on the urban scale had encompassed both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat only to be segregated according to the social division of space in the peripheries; two facets of this flux segregated the bourgeoisie in bourgeois communes of the west and the proletariat in proletarian communes of the east. French urban sociologist Edmond Prétéceille even claims that the fiercest segregation was realized for the part of the 'upper classes', according to empirical researches.[405] The *Grande Couronne* where, in general, the upper and the middle classes inhabited its 'new towns' also contrasted with the *Petite Couronne* where the lower or 'popular' classes inhabited. However, as we have underlined above, this 'social' division of space did not remain as it were, especially after the 1980s and 1990s, which triggered the split of this division so as to expose the ethno-racial division of space. The proletariat which was (re-)moved by such a centrifugal flux was, after all, embodying the immigrant workers as well, and the flux had certainly affected them, probably more than the non-immigrant workers.

This result leads us to examine the ethno-racial division of space, in other words, the circumstances of immigrants *vis-à-vis* urban segregation, in the Parisian region. We should first of all remind that, in 1974, the government of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has stopped the immigrant influx to the French territory as

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[404] Simon, **ibid.**, p. 302.
[405] Edmond Prétéceille, 'La ségrégation contre la cohésion sociale. La métropole parisienne', in Hugues Lagrange (ed.), **L'épreuve des inégalités**, Paris: PUF, 2006, pp. 211-2.

the *Trente Glorieuses* halted. This was followed by a voluntary return aid program in 1976 to promote the immigrants' return to their home countries and by the Bonnet Law of 1980, which was attributed to the name of the then Interior Minister Christian Bonnet and which has made the legal conditions of immigration stricter especially to prevent the clandestine immigration. In terms of population, all these measures have, on the one hand, stabilized the proportion of immigrants in the total population around 14 per cent in 1982 onwards, but, on the other hand, the concentration of immigrant population have risen up to 18.6 per cent in the city of Paris, at a time when the city center was not yet intensely gentrified, and have passed 50 per cent, even 65 per cent in certain neighborhoods of peripheral communes such as Aubervilliers, La Courneuve or Saint-Denis. [406] This increase in the immigrant population which clearly becomes manifest in the Île-de-France was a direct consequence of the repartition of the immigrant population on the entire French territory. Simon borrows the expression 'piling up' used by Beverly Duncan, an American urban sociologist, in the case of this repartition, and tells that the immigrants were redistributed to these urban spaces in the Parisian region during the continuing process of piling up.[407]

The argument is supported with data on the immigrant households provided in a detailed report prepared within the framework of the *Programme régional d'intégration des populations immigrées* (PRIPI). According to these data, 'in comparison to 1999, the immigrant households in the HLM public housings have slightly decreased in 2012, from 27.9 per cent to 26.8 per cent.' This decrease in a decade-long period might give a clue how the immigrant housing is more or less stabilized, also adding that many descendants of immigrants are categorically out of account as they are not considered immigrants but French citizens. On the other hand, proportion of the proprietors within immigrant households has stayed stable, persisting around 41.9 per cent and remains noticeably inferior to that of the non-immigrant households (59 per cent).[408] In addition to these data, Table 4.1 below shows the proportion of proprietor households and households in the public housings according to the country of birth, or in other words, the geographical origins of the households. Given the fact that being proprietor of a dwelling or being resident

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[406] Simon, **ibid.**, p. 308.
[407] **Ibid.**, pp. 307-8.
[408] Nicole Cadenel, Jean-Patrick Bernard, Yannick Croguennec, **Atlas national des populations immigrées**, PRIPI 2010-2012, Ministère de l'intérieur, p. 26.

(whether as proprietor or as tenant) in public housings indicates the socio-economic situation of a household, preponderant proportion of the immigrant households of diverse African origins in the HLMs perfectly coincides with the issue of *banlieues* which were once designed for the industrial working class before evolving into the social space of immigrants.

Table 4.1: Proportion of proprietor households and households in the HLMs

Country of birth	Proportion of propriator households	Proportion of households in HLMs
Europe	61%	13%
European Union -25	62%	17%
Portugal	55%	18%
Italy	71%	10%
Spain	65%	14%
Outside of EU	50%	17%
Ex-Yugoslavia	41%	27%
Africa	24%	43%
Maghreb	26%	44%
Algeria	24%	48%
Morocco	26%	43%
Tunisia	29%	36%
Other African countries	19%	40%
Mali	9%	52%
Senegal	13%	49%
Asia	38%	26%
Turkey	31%	41%
Americas, Oceania	36%	45%
Total - immigrants of third world	28%	34%
Total - immigrants	42%	27%
Total - non-immigrants	59%	13%

(Source: Cadenel, et al. *Atlas national des populations immigrées.*)

If we were to adapt the data on households to the distribution of immigrants across the urban scale of the Île-de-France, it would be useful to analyze Table 4.2 below. The table demonstrates very clearly that the department Seine-Saint-Denis has become the hub wherein the immigrants especially of African origin reside. Both the numbers and percentages of diverse African origins are incomparably high in this department where the most 'notorious' communes (e.g. Clichy-sous-Bois, La Courneuve, Sevran, etc.) defined by state authorities as *zones urbaines sensibles* are situated. On the other, it should also be noted that this table primarily provides data for the immigrant population, however it also gives the option to compare these data with the total population in each department, thusly giving an idea how the immigrant population and, moreover, immigrants of diverse African origins in particular are segregated in urban zones.

Table 4.2: Repartition of the immigrant population in the Île-de-France (based on 2012 census)

Country of birth	Essonne		Hauts-de-Seine		Paris		Seine-et-Marne	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
Europe	51533	34%	69890	28%	135495	31%	51100	37%
European Union -25	48445	32%	62696	25%	116846	27%	48328	35%
Portugal	29528	20%	27113	11%	31658	7%	27698	20%
Italy	5596	4%	6421	3%	13830	3%	4859	4%
Spain	3836	3%	6749	3%	14817	3%	5169	4%
Outside of EU	3088	2%	7194	3%	18650	4%	2771	2%
Ex-Yugoslavia	1544	1%	3946	2%	11307	3%	1716	1%
Africa	72199	48%	130184	52%	174198	40%	55297	41%
Maghreb	39201	26%	86361	35%	108832	25%	30054	22%
Algeria	17600	12%	35691	14%	43030	10%	15439	11%
Morocco	14765	10%	39213	16%	35615	8%	10495	8%
Tunisia	6836	5%	11458	5%	30187	7%	4120	3%
Other African countries	32997	22%	43824	18%	65366	15%	25243	18%
Mali	3080	2%	2560	1%	9068	2%	2149	2%
Senegal	3128	2%	4636	2%	9471	2%	2113	2%
Asia	20922	14%	36122	14%	91650	21%	26024	19%
Turkey	6003	4%	3791	2%	6261	1%	5922	4%
Americas, Oceania	5530	4%	14060	6%	34989	8%	4064	3%
Total Immigrants	150184	100%	250256	100%	436331	100%	136485	100%
Total Population	1257065	-	1606154	-	2265886	-	1377102	-

Country of birth	Seine-Saint-Denis		Val-de-Marne		Val-d'Oise		Yvelines	
	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%	Numbers	%
Europe	81514	21%	69295	30%	46387	25%	63851	39%
European Union -25	67144	17%	63360	27%	43480	23%	60366	37%
Portugal	34299	9%	36488	16%	25312	14%	31177	19%
Italy	9303	2%	8378	4%	5030	3%	4831	3%
Spain	7786	2%	4791	2%	4084	2%	4469	3%
Outside of EU	14370	4%	5934	3%	2907	2%	3485	2%
Ex-Yugoslavia	12416	3%	3384	1%	1894	1%	1692	1%
Africa	227931	58%	114436	49%	94622	51%	72855	45%
Maghreb	139749	35%	69092	29%	58762	32%	47279	29%
Algeria	73625	19%	37120	16%	26546	14%	18063	11%
Morocco	44863	11%	19010	8%	23229	13%	24881	15%
Tunisia	21261	5%	12962	6%	8987	5%	4335	3%
Other African countries	88182	22%	45344	19%	35861	19%	25576	16%
Mali	17917	5%	6634	3%	3647	2%	2616	2%
Senegal	8651	2%	3563	2%	3720	2%	4864	3%
Asia	70918	18%	41088	18%	37326	20%	18045	11%
Turkey	17822	5%	6302	3%	13444	7%	4567	3%
Americas, Oceania	14467	4%	9496	4%	7277	4%	7189	4%
Total Immigrants	394830	100%	234315	100%	185613	100%	161940	100%
Total Population	1551739	-	1354911	-	1203920	-	1440274	-

(Source: Cadenel, et al., *Atlas national des populations immigrées*; INSEE)

According to this comparison, departments like Seine-et-Marne, Yvelines and Essonne gather less immigrant concentration as the part of immigrants in the total population is, respectively, 9.91 per cent, 11.24 per cent and 11.95 per cent while Seine-Saint-Denis gathers the most immigrant concentration with the peak rate of 25.44 per cent and the inner city of Paris follows this with 19.25 per cent. For the city of Paris, certain neighborhoods that are subject to gentrification process still seem to have a lot way to go in terms of displacement of the lower class population including diverse African-origin immigrants. Moreover, thinking hypothetically, if the scale were narrowed from department down to neighborhood, to even certain streets and blocks, the dimension of segregation would have dramatically grown, as Simon emphasizes for certain neighborhoods of La Courneuve, Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis communes (see referred passage to footnote 407 above).

Immigrants and the problematic of segregation have also implications in terms of discrimination. As Prétéceille writes in an article, 'the intensity of the segregation of immigrants is clearly superior to that of popular categories [i.e., low-income social groups in the non-immigrant status—C.Ö.] that are more segregated', especially the immigrants of Maghrebian- and other African-origins. [409] He also claims that although the segregation of immigrants certainly has an aspect rooted on their class positions but the ethno-racial segregation is obviously brought to light.[410] Simon, too, affirms Prétéceille's claim as he underlines that the immigrant families' quest of 'residential ascension' is often subject to ethno-racial discrimination in addition to the existing socio-economic constraints. According to him, 'these discriminations show up with the refusal of applications to proprietors, or with the filtering of access for certain types of dwelling', a discrimination which 'orientates the most stigmatized groups towards the least attractive habitats.' [411] Consequently, the discrimination directly becomes a factor in the milieu of the relation between segregation and 'relegation'—a relation operating much more sensibly on immigrants, and especially certain immigrants—and it also has an aspect rooted in the workplace or in the access to work eventually making the precarious conditions of immigrants even more vulnerable.[412]

It is an important discussion that, as regards methodology, whether if discrimination would be measurable or not, or how much reliable such empirical investigations would be, [413] yet certain studies should also be taken seriously, especially those conducted by/for state institutions like INSEE or INED. In the report on the immigrants and their descendants, perceived discriminations ('*discriminations ressenties*') are regrouped according to nationalities or original countries of the immigrants and their descendants. Apart from such motives in perceived discriminations like skin color, nationality or ethnic origin, which always show up high among those of Maghrebian and African-origin, it is also noteworthy that the

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[409] Prétéceille, **ibid.**, p. 207.
[410] **Ibid.**, pp. 207-8.
[411] Simon, **ibid.**, p. 307.
[412] Prétéceille, **ibid.**, p. 208. Also cf. Matthieu Delage, Serge Weber, 'L'espace residential des étrangers dans la métropole parisienne. Une exploration statistique', **Hommes et migrations**, 2014, no. 1308, pp. 13-26. The authors in this article criticizes Prétéceille's work in general claiming that the urban segregation in Parisian region as regards immigrants and foreigners is less considerable than Prétéceille thinks, and they ground this critique on Prétéceille's definition of immigrant (p. 14), though still affirming that the segregation is neither negligible nor unserious.
[413] For a discussion of methodology and approach in measuring discriminations, see: Emmanuel Duguet, et al, 'Measuring Discriminations. An Introduction', **Annals of Economics and Statistics**, no. 99-100, July/December 2010, pp. 5-14.

place of habitat or the neighborhood is responded as a motive specifically among the descendants of immigrants of Maghrebian and African-origin, as well as those of Turkish and Asian-origin.[414] Therefore, it becomes manifest that the segregation becomes more susceptible on the descendants of immigrants, i.e., on the youth, who perceive discrimination in diverse occasions due to motives of living place.

At this point, the issue of division of space needs to be reconsidered in the light of such consequences it has produced. The question arises: how does the immigration become *utile* in the (social and ethno-racial) division of space? Answer to this question implies many parameters ranging from the interest of ground rent on the economic plane to the governance of ethno-racial and cultural 'identities' on the socio-political plane. Some scholars, in this context of immigration and division of space, argue that 'immigration is a central element of the city's productive system, much for the transformation activity than for the residential economy, particularly the urban production, social reproduction and commerce: the migrants make Paris and Parisians live.'[415] In this argument, affirmative or neutral, the position of immigrants *vis-à-vis* urban space primarily takes a capitalist character at the uppermost level rather than the economy based on everydayness (so as to include residential economy); eventually the position of immigrants comes to have a specific usage in the production and transformation of the urban space through large-scale processes like gentrification in which the state and capitalist class cooperate in the most visible way. Verily, the transformation of Paris and its surroundings has reinforced the urban polarization especially during the period between 1975 and 1990,[416] and this process has been realized through the outputs of the phenomenon of immigration, which was, in a period of restructuration of the global and national economies under the representative label of neoliberalism, instrumentalized *for* such a large-scale operation so as to obtain 'a significantly restructured urban geography.'[417] Immigrants, as well as other 'vulnerable' social groups like non-immigrant working class (albeit to a lesser extent), have thusly become the motor and the victim of this process.

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[414] INSEE, **Immigrés et descendents d'immigrés en France**, Édition 2012, pp. 242-3. http://www.insee.fr/fr/publications-et-services/sommaire.asp?id=618&nivgeo=0

[415] Marie Lazaridis, Serge Weber, 'Les Paris des migrants', **Hommes et migrations**, 2014, no. 1308, pp. 9-10.

[416] Michelle Guillon, 'Immigration. Le renforcement de la polarisation parisienne, 1975-1990', **Espaces, populations, sociétés**, 1993-2, pp. 371-8.

[417] Smith, **ibid.**, p. 173.

Therefore, through the instrumentalization of immigration along with many other arguments we have claimed, we are able to specify close ties between social division of space and ethno-racial division of space—two seemingly autonomous aspects of division of space which, in fact, stand in a relation of mutual determination. Accordingly, this mutual determination has a direct implication in the relation between class (generally considered on the basis of isolated economic relations) and identity categories (principally implying ethnicity, race, culture and religion). We will now examine these relations in the light of evidences that we have obtained from our investigation on space.

iii.) Class-identity nexus on the social space

The nexus of class and identity is not an easily depictable relation in contemporary societies, particularly of the West. Inquiries into this nexus often deal with a specific category of identity, which is race, and assume class as a category, which belongs to the 'economic base'. In this regard, the literature on class and race seems to be unsatisfactory in meeting our inquiry on class and identity, as we define class on a broader ground and consider identity composing of many components including race along with ethnicity, culture, religion and so on. This is not to say that this literature, for the aspect of identity, does only concentrate on the category of race and dismiss others, however, in societies where such a literature arose, i.e., in the British and American societies where race, and especially racism, have been burning questions in the 19th and 20th centuries, and still are in our 21st century. Therefore, it has to be admitted that this Anglo-Saxon literature and inquiries on the nexus of class and identity are products of a specific social conditions that envelop the patterns of the state, their ruling and subordinate classes, their social relations as a whole, in short: what certain philosophers and sociologists name as the 'structure' of that definite society. In such societies where racism becomes the most chronic social and political 'problem', it is not of coincidence that the prime focus category of identity appears as race. That such literature and inquiries are the products of specific social conditions is, however, not exempt from a grounded criticism by which we will only attempt to point out certain deficiencies.

The focus primarily on the category of race is, as shown above, adjourns other categories of identity, e.g. ethnicity or religion, to get into the nexus with class. As the British and American societies have not been into such *immediate* problems

related to these categories, it is natural not to find the traces of other categories in relation to class. Yet, today's Western society, not limited to the Anglo-Saxon model but also comprising the Continental European models and particularly the French republican model, suffers social and political problems globally related to identity issues, and these issues are not restricted to race. Ethnicity, culture and religion are also at stake especially as regards immigrant populations in these societies. Moreover, race issues formulated around the phenomenon of racism are facing with an increasing sensitivity in the social and political spheres by the civil society, NGOs, political organizations, the state authorities, and so on. Yet, it is doubtful whether if such awareness on race issues is also being developed, at this rate and at this scale, on the issues linked to other identity categories.

This is only one side of the medal. On the other side lies a profound dispute on the class conception particularly among several Marxist circles. Class basically understood as a social category based on relations of productions in the realm of economy paves the ways of approach leaning either to economic reductionism or to structuralism, or in Miliband's terms, 'structuralist abstractionism',[418] precisely in the class issue. Historically, economic reductionism has been object of several Marxist critiques of vulgar interpretations of Marxism, especially that of Stalinism and subsequent Soviet ideologies. However, some critiques of these have not completely escaped this vulgarized interpretation of Marxism, which basically reproduces the dichotomy of the base and the superstructure, the economic and the non-economic (so as to encompass the political and the ideological), etc. We have pointed out in the Chapter II that, especially in the works of Althusser, Balibar and Poulantzas, who themselves were opponents of Stalinism at the camp of structuralist Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s, the conception of class among such circles has effectively reproduced the basic assumptions of economic reductionism on the 'economic' and the 'political' while trying to prevent and escape from that. Meanwhile, on the plane of 'ideas', French structuralist Marxists and their associates in the Anglophone world, especially circles like New Left Review, have together developed a hegemonic approach in Marxism in the 1960s and 1970s as opposed to figures like Thompson and Miliband who did not agree on several issues ranging from the class conception to the nature of the capitalist state. Especially the

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[418] Ralph Miliband, 'Poulantzas and the Capitalist State', **New Left Review**, I/82, November-December 1973, pp. 85-6.

Miliband-Poulantzas debate [419] and Thompson's critique of Althusser [420] were of extreme importance in order to show distinct approaches in the Western Marxism *vis-à-vis* the questions related to class, state, economy, politics, autonomy, etc. Yet, the effect of structuralism was epidemic: theoretical and philosophical works produced by Althusser, Balibar, Poulantzas and the like have echoed on the Anglo-Saxon's world influential thinkers, who were mostly found in the academic world, such as Stuart Hall, Bob Jessop, Perry Anderson, Erik Olin Wright, and others. [421]

This 'theoretical' cleavage in the Western Marxism is important not for it is only of interest for Marxists but also it sealed the discussions around the nexus of class and race (and other forms of 'identity') especially in the Anglo-Saxon circles. Structuralist school's emphasis on the 'relatively autonomous' character of the political and the ideological from the economic has also become hegemonic in this nexus. In fact, according to the British sociologist John Solomos, there exist three distinctive models in the relation between class and race: relative autonomy model, autonomy model and migrant labor model. [422] The relative autonomy model, which is based on the structuralist negation of 'economism', is represented by the works of Stuart Hall and the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies among which *Policing the Crisis* (1978) and *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain* (1982) can be mentioned as most notable studies. Solomon emphasizes three principles of this model for a critical Marxist analysis of racism: *i)* racism is *not* a general feature of all human societies but there actually exist *historically specific racisms* (without implying that there may be common features as well); *ii)* racism cannot be reduced into *other* social relations, but it cannot be explained in abstraction from them—therefore, racism has a relative autonomy from other relations (economic, political, ideological, etc.); *iii)* race and class are not dichotomous, rather

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[419] Miliband, **ibid.,** pp. 83-92. This was Miliband's second article written as a counter-attack which criticizes Poulantzas's work, *Pouvoir politique et classes sociales de l'état capitaliste* (1968). The debate started with Poulantzas's critique of Miliband's work, *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969). Nicos Poulantzas, 'The Problem of the Capitalist State', **New Left Review**, I/58, November-December 1969, pp. 67-78. Miliband's first article was a response to this critique: Ralph Miliband, 'The Capitalist State. Reply to N. Poulantzas', **New Left Review**, I/59, January-February 1970, pp. 53-60.

[420] E. P. Thompson, **The Poverty of Theory or an Orrery of Errors,** London: Merlin Press, 1995 [1978].

[421] See the remarks of Ellen Meiksins Wood on Stuart Hall's critique of Thompson, which was based on this Althusserian approach: Meiksins Wood, **Democracy against Capitalism** pp. 100-3, ff.

[422] John Solomos, 'Varieties of Marxist Conceptions of 'Race', Class and the State. A Critical Analysis', in John Rex, David Mason (eds.), **Theories of Race and Ethnic Relations**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 89.

we may talk of a *racially structured society*.[423] Referring to an article written by Hall, Solomos summarizes this model in the nexus of class and race as follows: 'Race has a concrete impact on the class-consciousness; organization of all classes and class factions. But class in turn has a reciprocal relationship with race, and it is the articulation between the two which is crucial, not their separateness.'[424]

Furthermore, the collectively produced *Empire Strikes Back*'s arguments mainly lies in the following themes: *i)* Marxist approaches to race and racism are too weak and they even reproduce ethnocentric or common-sense views of race; *ii)* the work dedicates greater emphasis on the role of state racism, i.e., the role of state activity in reproducing racism as well as an emphasis on the ways through which racism is being structured, e.g. education, policing, youth policy, the position of black women in the labor marker, etc.; *iii)* the work attempts to reconceptualize the complex relationship between race and class[425]—an attempt seen especially in the article of Paul Gilroy, but here again we see his class conception essentially lies upon structuralist arguments.[426]

According to Solomos' taxonomy the second model for the relation of race and class is the autonomy model represented by Gideon Ben-Tovim and John Gabriel who developed their arguments based on Ernesto Laclau's theoretical work.[427] In several works that they have published separately and collectively, they claim that 'the bulk of neo-Marxist theory on racism is still based on implicit, if not explicit, economic and class-reductionist assumptions.'[428] Here, the target of the authors' critique is the earlier Marxist attempts on the relation between class and race developed by Oliver C. Cox and Eugene Genovese, which may be considered as 'primitive'—for the work of Cox, Solomos writes that it 'is by no means seen by contemporary Marxists as an adequate analysis of the complex historical determinants of racism or of the relationship between racism and capitalist social relations.'[429] It is quite noteworthy that in most of the debates, the main line of attack to the other camp consists of the critique on being 'economic reductionist', and it

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[423] **Ibid.**, pp. 89-92.
[424] **Ibid.**, p. 92.
[425] **Ibid.**, pp. 92-4.
[426] Paul Gilroy, 'Steppin' out of Babylon. Race, Class and Autonomy', in Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, **The Empire Strikes Back. Race and Racism in 70s Britain**, London and New York: Routledge, 1982, pp. 275-313.
[427] **Ibid.**, pp. 276-8.
[428] Solomos, **ibid.**, p. 95.
[429] **Ibid.**, p. 87.

should be understood that this is not related only to taking an advantage in terms of political position. Beneath this lies a profound reason to make such accusations to this or that extent relevant to the opponent's position, which is in fact the class conception itself. As long as the class conception conceives class as a social category purely based on economic relations, the accusation of economic reductionism becomes functional. On the other hand, as for the critiques of such economic reductionisms, it is ironic to witness how do they understand and accept their opponents' class definitions and reproduce their opponents' class conception. Once again, the simplification of the relation between the economic and the non-economic in the dichotomy of base and superstructure could be given as example for this 'unintended' reproduction. In this regard, a critique of economic reductionism only criticizes the presumed class conception's validity in this or that field, for this or that phenomenon. Autonomy model's proponents, in this sense, only criticize the validity of Cox's own economistic conception of class in relation to the issue of race whereas this particular conception of class is presumed as the ultimate definition of class. This vicious circle reminds of the famous biblical expression: 'If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch (Matthew, 15:14).'

The third model proposed by Solomos is the migrant labor model represented in the works of Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea. The authors' main position is the focus on the political economy of the migrant labor instead the problematic of race relations since 'they see race as itself an ideological category which requires explanation and which therefore cannot be used for either analytical or explanatory purposes.'[430] This attitude should be understood not as a total neglect of the category of race but rather conceiving race in its 'socially constructed' usage through the process of racialization or racial categorization in the service of ideological reproduction: 'This process of attributing meaning to race', Solomos explains, 'results in a reification of real social relations into ideological categories and leads to the commonsense acceptance that race is an objective determinant of the behavior of black workers or other racially defined categories.' Therefore, they suggest two programmatic conclusions: first, race cannot be the object of analysis itself; second, the object of analysis should be the process of racialization or racial categorization. Thusly, they 'insist on the importance of racism, and the discriminatory practices which it produces, as the crucial factor in the formation of what they call a racialized

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[430] **Ibid.**, p. 98.

fraction of the working class and of other classes.'[431] Robert Miles discusses the literature and his own position in an article where he criticizes attributing to certain racialized fractions of the working class a sort of semi-vanguard role in the class struggle from the part of figures like Sivanandan, CCCS contributors, and others, and eventually alludes to the importance of the relations of production which are either dismissed or ignored.[432] In Miles' approach, the economic character of the relations of production becomes so inclusive that it even subsumes racial features in itself so as to generate racialized fractures of a definite class. Therefore, in order to understand the racial question in its relation to class, the process of racialization becomes the object of such a study but not the race itself.

While Miles and other defenders of the migrant-labor model attempt to consider 'racial question' within the relations of production (and exploitation) and the object of the question within the working class as a 'racialized fraction', the relative autonomy model takes exactly the opposite tack—so much so that the migrant-labor model is described as being a 'sociologistic pseudo-Marxism (…) advanc[ing] a social stratification problematic.'[433] For example—perhaps it is in order to avoid this 'stratification' trap—Hall and his colleagues write in their influential *Policing the Crisis* [1978] that 'the constitution of [racialized] class fraction as a class, and the class relations which inscribe it, function as race relations. The two are inseparable. Race is the modality in which class is lived. It is also the medium in which class relations are experienced.'[434] There are two basic problems in this view. First of all, it is problematic to claim that a class fraction can be *constituted* as a class rather than that this class fraction only remains as a distinct fraction within this given class. Although it is certain that different class fractions undergo different processes of the lived experience, it would be erroneous to dismiss the inner logic of exploitation reigning in the workplace. And this logic of exploitation may still operate unevenly (e.g. discrimination in the workplace) for the distinct fractions of a given class. Yet, it is evident that Hall and his colleagues propose this argument so as to provide a strategic for the class struggle of which the vanguards would be those constituting the 'Black community' for the sake of the

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[431] **Ibid.**, p. 99.
[432] Robert Miles, 'Marxism versus the sociology of race relations?', **Ethnic and Racial Studies**, vol. 7, no. 2, April 1984, pp. 217-37.
[433] Gilroy, **ibid.**, p. 280.
[434] Stuart Hall, et al., **Policing the Crisis. Mugging, the State, and Law and Order**, London: Macmillan, 1982, p. 394.

working class as a whole. The racialized class fraction becomes 'autonomous' from the class, therefore from the relations of production and exploitation, by the help of race relations (with the exploiter? or the oppressor?), only to return back to this class as the vanguards in the course of class struggle. Second, it is true that class relations inscribe this class fraction, maybe not as it is constituted as a class but *as being in the course of its formation* through the articulation of the lived experience and through the processes of acquiring consciousness. These two are quite distinct propositions. While the first implies the 'structured subordination' of race as an ahistorical category the latter implies the process of racialization in which the relations of production and exploitation specifically for the case of immigrant worker are manipulated by the objective conditions of unequal exchange.

This quick review on the models of class-race relations ultimately leads us to an overview of the process of 'racialization' of the working class for the case of France in which immigrant workers form fractions *within* the working class. Yet, this process of racialization implies class experiences stemming from the (capitalist) mode of production on the one hand and it is realized through the immigrants' everyday lives conditioned by the social space on the other hand.

iv.) Forms in everyday life and the problem of alienation

At this point returns the Lefebvrian moment. We have previously underlined the fact that, in Lefebvre's work, the concept of social space, through which we elaborate *banlieues*, cannot be properly understood without the concept of everyday life—a pair of concepts in connection. After examining the social space of *banlieues* in concrete data and through a historical perspective, we can now associate it with the everyday life: studying the everyday life will bring the discussions on the immigrant class fractions, the 'racialization' of class, the nexus of class and identity, etc., into the context of social space (*banlieues*) and time (history).

What makes Lefebvre's conception of everyday life so vital lies in his effort in associating this concept with his approach to space. The production of space and its content (e.g. buildings, monuments, parks, even 'new towns'), in Lefebvre's thought, becomes the spatial condition of the lived experience ['*le vécu*'] as well as the spatial condition of everydayness which can never be considered apart from such conditions. The other way round is also true: the social space has also a similar relation to the conditions of everydayness and to the lived experience; therefore we

may speak of a mutual determination between space and everyday life. The everydayness, accumulated throughout time, constitutes the conditions of the space where the lived would be experienced. Hence, it is manifest that there is a close, a dialectical relationship of time and space, city and culture, suburb/*banlieue* and its peculiar '(sub)culture'.

The notion of alienation has a central role in the relation between social space and everyday life to the extent that cultural forms and identities (such as race, ethnicity, religion, etc.) have an ambiguous relation to class. After all, alienation is a notion related to consciousness in general and class-consciousness in particular. Lefebvre refuses to consider alienation as a bloc and as an entity in such formulations like the 'alienation of man'; instead, for him, there are multiple and multiform alienations. Similarly, he refuses to consider disalienation as an absolute and a general end of alienation. 'In the so-called philosophical thought of Marx', writes Lefebvre, 'alienation that is speculatively represented by Hegel becomes a historical fact.' He goes on to say that Marx, in front of his limited case as regards the condition of the proletariat, the action of economic fetishes, money, capital, commodity, and so on, had to reduce alienation in its multiple forms into the economic alienation, and with this reducing, disalienation would only be realized by a 'revolutionary coup'—a historical, but a unique, act of the proletariat. Against this reductionism, following the traces of Marx's most valuable attempt at historicizing alienation, Lefebvre develops several propositions. According to him,

> (…) there is no conceivable and determinable alienation other than that placed in a cadre of (social) reference as regards an ensemble real and conceptual at the same time. Absolute alienation and disalienation are equally inconceivable. Real alienation cannot be thought and determined but as regards a possible disalienation. Disalienation, in return, cannot be thought and determined but as regards an accomplished alienation or by another possible alienation. Alienation is not a 'state of being,' nor is the disalienation. Both of them have to be conceived in a movement.[435]

Therefore, this brings us to the 'perpetual dialectical movement' among alienation, disalienation and new alienation. In this movement, 'alienation and disalienation characterize concrete situations taken in their movement and they cannot be considered through a non-movable manner according to fixed structural schemes. To be more precise,' says Lefebvre, 'the dialectical movement of alienation

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[435] Henri Lefebvre, **Critique de la vie quotidienne**, vol. 2, **Fondements d'une sociologie de la quotidienneté**, Paris: L'Arche, 1980, p. 209.

and disalienation permits determining a structure in concrete and changeable situations. A disalienation can thus alienate, and vice versa (…).'[436]

Given the perpetuity of the dialectical movement of alienation and disalienation and the necessity of social reference of alienation so as to save it from its speculative representation confined to philosophy, we thusly confront with two critical notions through which the succession of alienation and disalienation is rendered *mouvant*, hence dialectical: the lived ['*le vecu*'] and the living ['*le vivre*']. Between these two notions, Lefebvre again emphasizes a dialectical movement in which the everydayness and social consciousness are enveloped. 'The lived is the present and the living is the presence', distinguishes Lefebvre: 'The lived is also the alive or dead work of the living: it is what I do and what I know—in my own light and within my own horizons: as a social being *par excellence*, the lived is the part of the living that I have been able to appropriate for myself and that did not belong to me.'[437]

It can be determined through these arguments that the everydayness and the social consciousness together have a mediating role in the dialectics between the lived and the living since they are together included in this relation. And it is through these two mediations that the perpetual movement of the alienation—disalienation dialectics takes place. In the course of this perpetual movement, the lived experience and the appropriated way of living forge the everyday lives and social consciousness of subjects. Moreover, the forged everyday life and social consciousness are *related* to the social space in which the lived experience and the way of living are being realized. In this scheme, we may find an extremely vivid interaction among those notions which are never hanging vaguely in the air but based solidly on the ground. For our case, this ground is nothing but *banlieues*, the social space of the immigrants. And at each moment we will observe the traces of this perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation on every plane: in cultural forms and codes, everyday life, social relations and organizations, politics, and so on.

An elaboration on cultural forms that flourish in the social space of *banlieues* will give us a picture of the cultural codes of the immigrants as well as their everyday lives. In this regard, a hegemonic cultural form in the *banlieues* has great importance in terms of the formation of the immigrant class fractions in the contemporary French society, especially concerning the younger generations; and

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[436] **Ibid.**, pp. 209-10.
[437] **Ibid.**, p. 219.

this cultural form is hip-hop which engenders a rich content, from dance styles to clothing and ornaments, from way of speaking to musical forms. Hip-hop as a cultural form gathers these sub-divisions in itself as its content, and each sub-division is itself a form consisting of content. Nonetheless, in order to grasp the totality of hip-hop culture, we should first regard at its sub-divisions where we will determine the perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation through their contents.

Among the sub-divisions of hip-hop culture, rap music as a musical form holds a critical place. We may argue that rap music, with the feature of generating sounds, provides rhythms to hip-hop culture, and that it is the 'spirit' of this cultural form. Let us examine this issue briefly. First of all, hip-hop culture, and, hence, rap music, emerged as an *alien* cultural and musical forms to the immigrants in France in the late 1980s. The place of birth of rap music was the US, particularly the Bronx, and it only later spread out the Old Continent and elsewhere. Therefore both forms, the cultural and the musical, were alien to societies where they were to diffuse, and the perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation begins with this emergence and diffusion. Adam Krims defines 'musical structures and processes as key elements in social formation',[438] and, in the very specific context of African American community, as Cheryl Keyes puts it out, 'rap music grew in response to a number of socio-economic factors idiosyncratic to the Bronx',[439] the notorious proletarian quarter of New York City. Yet, before this emergence, it is crucial to underline the relation of musical form to space and its users, whether this space is social, residential or the workplace. In this regard, the African American community, who developed rap music in the heart of such 'inner-cities' of the US where they have inhabited, has invented and associated themselves with various musical forms and genres since the times of plantations until today, throughout their social and political struggle during their existence in American history. In each of these musical forms there appear the marks of socio-economic conditions: southeastern rural capitalism led African Americans to invent the blues; the abolition of slavery, urbanization and industrialization to invent the urban forms of blues and jazz; deindustrialization and the 'dismantlement' of inner-cities and ghettos to invent rap and hip-hop culture.

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[438] Adam Krims, **Music and Urban Geography**, New York and London: Routledge, 2007, p. xxxvii.
[439] Cheryl L. Keyes, 'At the Crossroads. Rap Music and Its African Nexus', **Ethnomusicology**, vol. 40, no. 2, Spring-Summer 1996, p. 228.

Indeed, rap music in its genesis was a form conditioned by the dismantlement and deindustrialization of certain social spaces, such as the Bronx, Harlem, etc. In 1959, the construction of an expressway through the Bronx led this immigrant working-class neighborhood into transformation, not in the way of *gentrification* but *degradation*, since the 'property owners sold apartments at lower rates to slumlords who neglected apartment up-keep, yet charged exorbitant rent. African American and Hispanic residents were forced to live in dilapidated housing and rodent-infested conditions.' This made conditions worse and eventually crime escalated for the fact that 'some youth felt the need to form neighborhood groups or gangs to police their apartments, housing projects, streets, and neighborhoods from outside invaders. As soon as one gang formed', writes Keyes, 'so did others, eventually leading to fierce territory rivalry.'[440] We will later argue that hip-hop promotes, or in other words relies on, an agonistic and outlaw culture, and at the origins of this form can be found the imperative of local autonomy and self-defense under such 'concrete' conditions.

In musical terms, rap finds its roots in various African forms[441] and as a modern form it is the successor of genres like jazz,[442] funk and disco. For the relation of rap to those previously 'mainstream' musical forms that are in practice, circulation and cultural industry, a longer passage from Keyes would be illuminating:

> Musically disco and funk were in contrasting ways, creative impedes for rap. Where clubs become the house for disco music, the streets became the context for rap. When disco was commodified in the American mainstream, overshadowing these black artists who primarily appeared to African American listeners, mobile disc jockeys recaptured their community's taste by mixing funk records rather than commercial disco. As a result, musical change along with socio-cultural and geopolitical discord paved the way for a youth arts movement called hip-hop whose ideology totally rejected the mainstream dress code, middle classism, and alternative culture that disco seemingly promulgated in lieu of rawness, streetism, and unadulterated blackness. Rap music is much more than dance music. It is a display of cultural values and aesthetics, a vehicle for social control and cohesiveness, a political forum, and more importantly, a phenomenon of consciousness.[443]

Rap music comes into the American scene in the 1970s, an important decade in which emerges the economic, and social, crisis of global capitalism. This period is

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[440] **Ibid**.

[441] Patricia Tang, 'The Rapper as Modern Griot. Reclaiming Ancient Traditions', in Eric Charry (ed.), **Hip-Hop Africa. New African Music in a Globalizing World**, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012. pp. 79-91; Michelle Auzanneau, 'Identités africaines. Le rap comme lieu d'expression', **Cahiers d'études africaines**, 163-164, XLI 3-4, 2001, pp. 711-34.

[442] Christian Béthune, **Le rap. Une esthétique hors la loi**, Paris: Autrement, 2003, pp. 30-46.

[443] Keyes, **ibid.**, p. 243.

also important as it has been the course and aftermath of the civil rights and Black Nationalist movements in the US on the one hand, and the Black Arts Movement on the other hand—each of them gave birth to hip-hop culture and rap music in this period.[444] In this regard, scholars often underline that hip-hop and rap are parts of the African American movement, and one of them writes that 'in a strange way, 1979 represents both the beginning and the end of the hip-hop movement.' In that year, 'hip-hop, once invisible, became visible to the wider public. Hip-hop, once largely recreational, became increasingly commercial. Throughout that year, hip-hop unbeknownst to most, was embarking on a journey that would make it a cultural and economic juggernaut.'[445]

What can be deduced from this brief history is that rap music in particular and hip-hop culture in general are the 'authentic' products of a profound African musical tradition spatially fixed in the American inner-city conditions on urban scale coinciding to a context of political and social struggle of the African American community *vis-à-vis* racism and discrimination, and of an economic and social crisis of industrial capitalism at the threshold of a fundamental transformation under neoliberalism. However, these 'authentic' products have been immediately commodified once they have become endemic among the younger generations of the African American community. Given the circumstances of poverty related to the urban geography of hip-hop and rap, Krims points out 'the deep perversity of the economic process (…), by which poverty itself becomes a source of surplus value (specifically relative surplus value) for a certain commodity, namely rap music.'[446] Authenticity and commodification constitute a compound process here, a process that signals the movement of alienation and disalienation. Krims notes that the 'realness' in the ghetto representations of hip-hop has an important role in depicting the authenticity of rap music, 'just as authenticity in the blues has long been associated with black rural (usually southeastern) life.' However, Krims determines a major difference between blues and rap authenticities: 'the different *mode* of its poverty and the way this mode is projected mark hip-hop as a specific product of

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[444] **Ibid.**, p. 225. We have emphasized in the Chapter III that these political and artistic movements have all grounded on the pan-Africanist ideology whose origins go back as far as the 19th century.

[445] S. Craig Watkins, **Hip-Hop Matters. Politics, Pop Culture, and the Struggle for the Soul of a Movement**, Boston: Beacon Press, 2005, p. 10.

[446] Adam Krims, 'The Hip-Hop Sublime as a Form of Commodification', in Regula Burckhardt Qureshi (ed.), **Music and Marx. Ideas, Practice, Politics**, New York, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 65.

late, or multinational, capitalism.' Then he goes on as follows: 'There were, of course, inner-city black ghettos in the monopoly phase of capitalism; but the ghetto projected in hip-hop culture is generally the dangerous, decaying place that arose in the wake of the deindustrialization and urban gentrification of the 1970s.' Therefore, so as to reproduce the authenticity of rap music we obtain a central theme: 'ghetto-centricity', through which the ghetto becomes the locus of authenticity.[447] Krims continues his striking analysis as follows:

> Hip-hop's poverty signals a condition well-known to be endemic to capitalist social organization—a permanent urban underclass, often ethnically marked. The videos signal their urbanness in widely recognized ways—quick shots of city-scapes, lyrics focusing on urban geography, inner-city streets, subways, buses, housing projects, abandoned buildings, and so on. Detached from earlier images of the pre-capitalist 'state of nature,' representations of the late-capitalist ghetto geography are thus deployed symbolically, to become an aesthetic libidinal object: the hip-hop song, the hip-hop video. It is this deployment of poverty as a use-value for the production of new capital—especially, though not only, record company profits, which are in turn profits of large conglomerates—that brings us the new mutation in surplus value.[448]

This analysis gives us a clue about the relation of cultural industry and reproduction of everyday life. But before its interpretation in the French context, we should continue tracing the process of commodification of rap in this cultural industry. Commodification of rap, as it is shown, is first realized through the image of ghetto, the emblematic social space of the African American community, and later this commodification embraces other aspects:

> [T]he commodified image of the ghetto forms a libidinal object. This, in turn, leads (…) to a surplus value generated precisely from the commodification of *lack of value*. In other words, the music industry has found a way to refold some of the most abject results of world economic production, through a direct transformation, to the most fabulous multibillion-dollar wealth. It is this *refolding* (…) that constitutes hip-hop's own mutation in the workings of surplus value.

Therefore, what do we find at our hands is a process that the 'decimated by-products of capitalist production can be recycled and turned into robust economic activity. So the ghetto produces a new use-value; it becomes through commodification, a safe, portable image for pleasurable consumption. Through representation, profit is produced that exceeds the value of the crumbling material structures and infrastructures, and that exceeds, of course, the congealed value of the

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[447] **Ibid.**, p. 66.
[448] **Ibid.**, pp. 66-7.

workers' labors, by they rappers, DJs, sound technicians, or record company executives.'[449] It is through the commodification of rap and hip-hop that these commodities immediately acquire a fetishistic character. With this commodity fetishism, the commodification process in rap music as a whole becomes 'a means of mystifying the social conditions of inner-city African Americans.'[450] Transformed into such a commodity, rap music continues its own historical trajectory with a global extension: it is produced and reproduced as a commodity form with such a content, it gets globalized and extends towards other geographies, to Europe, particularly to France, and even back to Africa from where its cultural origins derived. From here onwards, we will only be interested in its history in France.

We have above mentioned that rap music, at the moment of its emergence in France, was alien to this society. It has arrived to the French soil almost a decade after its birth as a discernable musical genre in the US. 'Rap did not come from the streets' in France, 'it was poured by the media as a ready-to-consume product', especially by music programs on French televisions.[451] As of 1983, it became popular via various sorts of spectacles in which dance styles associated with hip-hop (breakdance, popping, etc.) were performed,[452] and through such programs it became widespread among younger generations, especially the descendants of immigrants inhabiting in the *banlieues*. It was almost natural that rap music and hip-hop culture have found their 'bed' in the immigrant *banlieues* and their audience in those descendants of immigrants in the course of their diffusion in France,[453] due to similarities between the ghetto/inner-city culture and *banlieue* culture.[454] Yet, there are also important differences between these two contexts. The most important difference is, perhaps, that the ethnic diversity of rap musicians in France is in contrast with those in the US. 'Ethnicities represented in the rap groups in France are as diverse as the populations of the *banlieues* in the big cities of France. There can be found members issued from the ancient French colonies, from families of French-

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[449] **Ibid.**, p. 67.
[450] **Ibid.**, p. 70.
[451] Béthune, **Ibid.**, p. 208.
[452] Jean-Raphaël Desverité, Anne-Marie Green, 'Le rap comme pratique et moteur d'une trajectoire sociale', in Anne-Marie Green (ed.), **Des jeunes et des musiques. Rock, rap, techno**, Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002, p. 176.
[453] Laurent Béru, 'Le rap français, un produit musical postcolonial?', **Volume!**. 6: 1-2, 2009, p. 62.
[454] André J. M. Prévos, 'Le business du rap en France', **The French Review**, vol. 74, no. 5, April 2001, p. 903.

origin as well as members of diverse ethnic groups.'[455] Nonetheless, it is no surprising that 'those who do not come from a poor *banlieue* neighborhood or a working-class neighborhood, as regards many rap groups from Seine-Saint-Denis like Tandem (Aubervilliers) and La Caution (Noisy-le-Sec), are rare (…) among French rappers who managed to become famous. For a French rapper, arising from a low social stratum and coming from working-class neighborhoods is almost a guarantee of legitimacy.'[456] Therefore, in the context of such a greater diversity of ethnicities and the quasi-imperative of urban poverty, rap music in France, once alien to this society, quickly becomes the musical form of a common hip-hop culture peculiar to *banlieues*; in other words, the movement of alienation at the emergence of rap music in France turns out to be the movement of disalienation as the musical form, along with the cultural form, finds itself a convenient, if not 'authentic', ground in the social space of *banlieue*.

This argument is validated in the ethnographic field. David Lepoutre's 1997-dated comprehensive research at La Courneuve (a commune in the department of Seine-Saint-Denis), *Cœur de banlieue*, shows how hip-hop culture, rap music, and several dance styles related to them, are endemic among the *banlieue* youth and, most importantly, being reproduced since they have become elements of everyday life in these social spaces. 'Whatever is its influence degree', writes Lepoutre, 'hip-hop constitutes with no doubt the most accomplished and the most coherent form of the 'cultivated culture' issued from the streets of *grands ensembles*.'[457] Here again, we should remind Keyes's underlining the fact that 'rap music is undoubtedly an amalgam of street language coding, style, and musical sounds. Through its creative processes, rap represents a continuity of African-derived concepts consciously or unconsciously.' She even goes further and adds that 'on a non-musica-lingual level, Africanisms are further suggested through posturing, dress, jewelry, and hair-styles, all of which suggest political statements about an artist.'[458] Rap music, as a musical form and as an essential part of hip-hop culture, therefore associates itself with the existent non-musical elements of everyday life so as to become their *rhythm*,[459] and

[455] **Ibid.**, p. 907.
[456] Béru, **ibid.**, p. 62.
[457] David Lepoutre, **Cœur de banlieue. Codes, rites et langage**, Paris: Odile Jacob, 2001, p. 404.
[458] Keyes, **ibid.**, p. 241.
[459] Our proposal claiming rap music has become the rhythm of everyday life merits a distinct and elaborate study which we cannot be engaged in this work; however, we would like to underline the conceptual affinity of this proposal to Lefebvre's post-mortem work on *Rhythmanalysis* (1992), which associates rhythms to space and everyday life—a work that could be seen as a complementary volume

thusly engages with the lived (experience) ['*le vécu*'] and the (way of) living ['*le vivre*'] on a primary level, with the everyday life itself and its appropriate social space on a secondary level, and with the formation of culture and, eventually, of class and class fractions on a tertiary level. We will continue tracing the *transitionality* among these three levels with sticking to the concrete ground of the lived experience and the way of living on the social space.

The musical form (rap) and the cultural form (hip-hop) will continue to help illuminating our way. For these two associating forms, Béthune writes that 'hip-hop (…) represents nothing but a modality of a long-term ['*séculaire*'] culture with multiple avatars, and rap remains the manifestation of an aesthetics in which it was exceeded and incorporated.'[460] In that sense, while speaking for this pair of forms, and specifically for their French context, it should be understood precisely that:

i.) hip-hop has become one of the avatars of the long-term tradition of African culture, even Africanisms;

ii.) rap can be conceived *within* the larger context of the aesthetic aspect of everyday life which is being formed and transformed in space and time.

We have, here, several questions to response, and one of them is related to the term Africanism. As regards the given social space of *banlieues* and the inhabitants of these social spaces, how can we possibly associate the non-Africans, i.e., those of Maghrebian origin, to the existent Sub-Saharan cultural tradition in France in which rap music, transferred from the US, has found a 'convenient' ground in France? As a matter of fact, for the Maghrebian immigrant culture in terms of musical forms, there has been around a century-long history of practice of traditional or 'authentic' Maghrebian music, especially carried out by Algerian immigrants. Diaspora musicians in France had performed these musical forms, and their production reached to the French public audience even during the time when Algeria was under the French colonial rule.[461] Even in the 1980s, a period that was not long before the emergence of rap music in French *banlieues*, the dominating musical form produced and consumed among the Maghrebian, particularly the Algerian, immigrants in France was *raï*—an 'authentic' genre originated back to the 1920s in rural areas of

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to his long term engagement in the quest of these themes. For this study, see: Henri Lefebvre, **Rhythmanalysis. Space, Time and Everyday Life**, London and New York: Continuum, 2004.

[460] Béthune, **ibid**, p. 19.

[461] Hadj Miliani, 'Diasporas musiciens et migrations maghrébines en situation coloniale', **Volume!**. 12:1, 2015, pp. 155-169.

Algeria, such as Oran, but certainly in a modernized fashion with westernized instruments.[462] However, unlike rap music, *raï* quickly became popular among not only Maghrebian or Algerian immigrant community, but also among the general French public, perhaps mostly due to its representation within the so-called world-music genre, and to its relatively stronger dependence to the French cultural industry *vis-à-vis* rap music.[463] Rap music, after all, has the advantage of the 'facility of access' and those who exercise this form enjoy the 'rapid and direct appropriation,'[464] while, in contrast, *raï* necessitates more professionalism and elaboration in the course of musical production. Although the larger proportion of rap music compared to *raï* in today's cultural industry and its circulation among 'consumers' directly influence the reproduction of this form among the *banlieuesard* immigrant youth,[465] this contrast as regards the facility of musical form's production and reproduction also seems to have a considerable effect. What is for certain is that rap music, throughout the 1990s onwards, became the dominant musical form among not only the Sub-Saharan immigrant youth but also the Maghrebian immigrant youth—the *banlieue* youth, in a totalizing expression—who have become both the consumers and the producers of this musical form as part of the cultural form, i.e., hip-hop. It is in that sense that the non-African immigrants have affiliated themselves to such a neologism within Africanisms, and this happened, so to speak, with the appropriation of the non-African immigrants of rap music as much as they have contributed to it with their own cultural formation.

The nexus of cultural industry of capitalism and reproduction of musical and/or cultural forms on the social space makes the tension between these two levels manifest: on the one side, a given musical form is being produced and diffused so as to be consumed, thusly commodifying the musical *product* in the course of cultural reproduction. On the other hand, the musical form (e.g. a rap song produced by an amateur rap group and performed in a non-profit underground rap scene) and the cultural form (accompanying dance styles, clothing, way of speaking, etc.) take place in constant reproduction on the social space of *banlieues* in its 'naturalness', even

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[462] Nabil Echchaibi, 'We Are French Too, But Different. Radio, Music and the Articulation of Difference among Young North Africans in France', **International Communication Gazette**, vol. 63 (4), 2001, p. 305.
[463] Ted Swedenburg, 'Beur/Maghribi Musical Interventions in France. Rai and Rap', **The Journal of North African Studies**, vol. 20:1, 2015, pp. 110-1.
[464] Desverité, Green, **ibid.**, p. 189.
[465] Krims, **ibid.**, p. 67.

almost spontaneously—in so far as the inhabitants or the users of this social space identify themselves with the themes of this cultural form commodified by the cultural industry. What is quite complicated here is that the moments of alienation and disalienation are assembled in such a complex way so that each process of production and reproduction of the musical and the cultural forms triggers the perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation. Yet, this determination lacks interpretation on the ground which elements are *alienating* or *disalienating* apart from the process of commodification, hence the reification, of the musical and cultural forms. This question immediately leads us to the elements of the everyday life in a given social space, the *banlieues*.

Is a form, a notion or a concept being alien to a social group (a society, a community or a class) necessarily alienating for this social group? In that sense, rap as a musical form and hip-hop as a cultural form, both neologisms of Africanism, are alienating for the non-African/Maghrebian immigrants only due to their characteristics finding roots in an alien cultural and historical tradition? A similar question can be formulated: are these forms alienating for African immigrants in France, since these forms in their mature states are originated not in Africa but in a completely different, an alien, context of the US? These questions are important but they do not have clear answers. However, a reversed version of the question would be more functional: is the encounter of Maghrebians with such an Africanism disalienating? A similar version of the same question can be produced as regards African immigrants as well. Our proposition as regards this question is that the encounter of Maghrebian and African immigrants with such a neologism of Africanism is disalienating in so far as these two distinct 'identities' find expressing themselves on a common ground in terms of form. However, this encounter occurs only after a process in which Maghrebian and African immigrants are introduced, through the means of mass media and the cultural industry in general, with such forms that are commodified in the course of their production, distribution, exchange and consumption. Therefore, the moment of introduction of such forms to those 'alien' social groups is itself *alienation* not because they are 'alien' but they are in fact mere 'commodities'. Precisely this point is the moment of alienation and it applies at the same time for the African immigrants in France, as well as the Maghrebians, since, they are introduced with such Africanism through the same process manipulated by the cultural industry. However, in return, the reproduction of

the cultural and the musical form on social space points out the moment of disalienation in sense that these two distinct identities express themselves in one 'unificatory' form, both musical and cultural. Yet again, the way of living ['*le vivre*'] on this cultural basis has, at the same time, alienating and disalienating aspects as regards the lived experience ['*le vécu*'].

In this sense, the nexus of musical form and cultural form that incorporates the former in the wider frame of everyday life and its attributed social space necessitates considering the aesthetic aspect of everyday life, following Béthune's above mentioned statement. According to him, this aesthetic aspect can be described as 'agonistic' in character, and he claims that 'since its origins, the Afro-American culture conveys agonistic values.'[466] These agonistic values perhaps become most visible via themes such as challenge, competition, rivalry and the like, and such themes are preponderant elements of hip-hop form's aesthetic as regards the participants of the cultural form's components, whether it is break-dance, graffiti or tagging.[467] This is not only concerning dance styles, which could be considered as the exaltation performances of the athletic, warrior-like body, or street arts, but also the musical form as well—even so vastly that not only limited to the flows, rhymes, or the beats of the music but extended to the entire commodification process itself: 'The public success revealed in the number of discs sold and the consequent economic wealth materialized by the possession of luxury cars, skills in managing (licit or illicit) affairs, physical and mental force, sexual proverbs, even sometimes moral rigor are all issues of showing off smug and perpetual one-upmanship.' Béthune continues his analysis as follows:

> Whatever is the question coming up—social problem, political situation, relations with the show-business, critique of institutions, etc.—rap puts up its questioning of society, of established power (…) and its dominant ideology in the form of defiance, appeals to confrontation. The *Agon*, here, overflows the frame of rivalry on the grounds of expression; it does not oppose artists among themselves anymore, it is the entire world that the rapper confronts his art.[468]

Defiance, appeal to confrontation, rivalry, challenge… each notion modulates the agency's culture *vis-à-vis* both a given social group (peer groups in an African American inner-city or a French immigrant *banlieue*) and the society as a whole (the

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[466] Béthune, **ibid.**, p. 93.
[467] **Ibid.**, pp. 96-7.
[468] **Ibid.**, p. 104.

American or French society). Béthune accordingly relates these two distinct social cases as follows:

> If the poetical expression is constructed as a symbolic reflection of the human condition, this generalization of the *Agon* in rap music refers, then, to a very much real situation. First of all, in the US, every member of the Afro-American community has to live under the regime of double competition. Competition within one's own community in which the construction of the personality, and principally, for historical and cultural reasons, that of the male individual, passes by the confrontation with the others and affirmation of the self within the peer group, but equally a competition, this time falsified, within the entire society in which everybody seems to be organized so as to put the Blacks apart from the American dream.
>
> (…)
>
> Neither this impression of being played with loaded dice in advance is alien to the immigrants and others who are left aside of the French society. Appearance based prejudice facing with the police as well as the employers, administrative annoyances, insidious discriminations and abuse of power incite perceiving the social life as a rigged game. The colonial past of France replaced by a policy of cooperation, which constructs the way of things within communities and the local corruption, does nothing but reinforce this impression (…). In these conditions, living or even simply surviving becomes in itself a challenge (…).[469]

From its original African American inner-city hotbed to the French immigrant *banlieue*, the forms of rap music and hip-hop culture have essentially been reproduced on the ground of such social spaces, and thus they stimulate, due to the reality of these social spaces, definite lines within a social class. These lines might primarily appear, following the long tradition of political struggles of the African American community, in the form of 'race' in the US, while in France, following the long history of colonization, decolonization and labor migration, appear as either ethnicity, race or culture, even religion. Such identity categories which have been the subject of oppression *and* exploitation, explicit or implicit, throughout many decades during which period the relation between the colonizer and the colonized have been established and evolved, have in fact worked, and continue working, on the 'nerves' of a definite fraction of a given social class. It is in this historical perspective, on the one hand, and on the basis of this everyday life, on the other hand, that the social class of the proletariat is fractionated into fractions that are commonly described by identity categories so as to obscure the class characters of those fractions, hence, their presences conditioned by the totality of social relations.

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[469] **Ibid.**, pp. 105-6.

Rap and hip-hop, as musical and cultural forms, have great importance in the formation of the immigrant class fractions in France. Typically considered under the general category of 'culture', such forms in fact have an intimate and direct relation with class itself, as E. P. Thompson argues in his influential *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), which demonstrates the English working class' class-consciousness in relation with culture. As he writes, '[c]lass-consciousness is the way in which (…) experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.'[470] While tracing the formation of the working class particularly through the lenses of social and cultural formation, he looks up folkloric elements, songs, poems, customs, way of living, etc.,[471] and evaluates this line of development *along with* economic processes as well, implying that these two categories, that of the social or the cultural and the economic, are in fact inseparable. It is in that sense that we have, to the utmost, elaborated various aspects of rap music and hip-hop culture both as forms and as in their experiences within the French social context and the social space of *banlieues*.

Nevertheless, there are other sorts of experiences that directly engage with the 'way of living' as regards the everyday life in the *banlieues*, among which, perhaps, the most significant is related to the spoken language in the everyday life, that is known to be *verlan*. In the beginning, we should underline some of the similarities between *verlan* and hip-hop and rap. First of all, *verlan* is the product of a post-industrial period of capitalist society in the unique French context as much as rap music and hip-hop are the products of the same period in almost most of the Western societies. Secondly, as part of the agonistic culture that was promoted and supported by hip-hop, *verlan* itself is a sort of challenge to, or rather a defiance of, the French language that has developed very elaborately throughout many centuries. Hence, speaking *verlan* became one of the typical features of the *banlieues*' immigrant youth and is widely practiced in daily language and communication within 'peer groups' in particular.[472] Let us look at closely at this: *verlan* originally comes from the word '*l'envers*' (inverse), and as the word itself implies, it is the inverted form of the pronunciation of this word. Accordingly, many French words, as well as Arabic and other African words, are inverted in the same logic in order to produce the *verlanized*

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[470] E. P. Thompson, **The Making of the English Working Class**, London: Penguin, 1991, p. 9.
[471] E. P. Thompson, **Customs in Common. Studies in Traditional Popular Culture**, New York: The New Press,1993.
[472] Lepoutre, **ibid.**, pp. 153-8.

version of these words. Most familiar examples, even to those who do not live in the *banlieues*: *Arabe* becomes *beur*, *mec* (guy) becomes *keum*, *femme* becomes *meuf*, *racaille* (scum, a word that has both pejorative and informal usage senses varying to the case such that if Nicolas Sarkozy, the then interior minister when the 2005 riots happened, calls the *banlieue* youth as scums, that will be an insult, but if the youth among themselves call each other as scums, that will be something equivalent of the US African Americans calling each other as 'Nigga') becomes *caillera*, even first names like *David* becomes *Vid'da*, as David Lepoutre exemplifies from his own field experience at La Courneuve.[473] There are even re-verlanized usages like *feum* deriving from *meuf* ('femme').[474]

This distortion of language, for it appears as a characteristic feature of the *banlieue* youth, remains not only a simple inversion of the language but it immediately becomes the measure of a status within peer groups over the social space.[475] In an article published as early as 1984, based on a field research, argues that *verlan* is, though being in use in the high schools, in fact peculiar to the streets of *banlieues*,[476] i.e., that it cannot be regarded only as a youth phenomenon or related to a sort of adolescent culture but is something that encompasses and transcends it within the everydayness lived in these social spaces. Furthermore, *verlan*, being a method of encryption,[477] consequently becomes the encryption of the everyday life usage of the language mostly employed by immigrant youth in given social spaces largely inhabited, again, by immigrants. In that sense, what accompanies to the *banlieue* culture influenced by hip-hop and rap reveals itself in the verbal form of an encrypted (and distorted) language called *verlan* and this form becomes one of the features of the immigrant class fraction, at least partially as regards the youth generations which bear the potential of radicalization in the everydayness of their social space and which indeed take action radically especially during such events like the 2005 riots.

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[473] **Ibid.**, p. 158.

[474] For the rules of verlanizing the words, see: Vivienne Méla, 'Le verlan ou le langage du miroir', **Langages**, no: 101, 1991, pp. 73-94.

[475] Lepoutre, **ibid.**, p. 154.

[476] Christian Bachmann, Luc Basier, 'Le verlan. Argot d'école ou langue des Keums?', **Mots**, no. 8, March 1984, pp. 169-87.

[477] **Ibid.**, p. 171, ff.

v.) Zur Muslimfrage[478]

The culture peculiar to *banlieues*, in its totality, encrypts and occasionally distorts the dominant culture, given that these two are negating each other on social and political planes; therefore, the formation of the dominated culture in the course of its confrontation to the dominant culture engages with the formation of the class fraction in which this dominated culture has flourished, evolved and developed. Notions like racialization of the working class, or fractioning of class in terms of identities like race, ethnicity, culture, religion, etc., thusly engender similar trajectories comparable with each other in different social contexts. In the nexus of France and its African and Maghrebian immigrants, their cultural formation and its elements—whether they are of contemporary or outdated forms, in so far as they progress in an interacting succession throughout history and history's various phases comprising a number of different economical, political and social regimes—have direct effect on fractioning of distinct classes to which those immigrants individually belong (for the fact that the immigrants as a whole do not belong solely to the working class but to the others as well, albeit in much smaller proportions), as if this effect were a vertical line while classes were horizontally separated.

Formation of this class fraction and its potential of radicalism in social and political terms is thusly correlated to the cultural forms flourished in the bosom of this fraction so as to distantiate it from other fractions as regards the logic of identities on the one hand, although, on the other hand, such fractioning on the ground of identities does not conceal the objective determination of this precise fraction's accurate positioning within the relations of production. Hence divulges the social reproduction and its garden of forking paths formed through the perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation of the immigrant class fraction.

After this brief theoretical reminder, we may consider another aspect of the formation of the culture enrooted in the *banlieues* on which we did not argue until now: the Muslim question. One may ask a very simple question regarding the long years of protestations, riots and social unrest carried out and expressed by the immigrants of Maghrebian and African origins who inhabit in large numbers in the

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[478] In this sub-section, we base our argumentation upon and borrow some of our notions, such as civil society, political state, emancipation, etc., from the famous discussion of Marx in his *Zur Judenfrage* (1843) against Bruno Bauer. Karl Marx. **On the Jewish Question**, in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, **Collected Works**, vol. 3, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975, pp. 146-74.

social spaces of *banlieues* of Paris, Lyon and other cities of France—such a period of long years from the very beginnings with the Minguettes riots in 1981 and the *Marche des Beurs* in 1983 to the 2005 *banlieue* riots: why, since 2005, not a single riot like that of 2005 or even one of a smaller impact occurred in the French *banlieues*, not necessarily in Paris but elsewhere on the French soil? Has the 'immigrant question' dissolved all of a sudden with the touch of a magic wand, and have the contradictions ceased so as to integrate these class fractions within the embracing arms of the Republic regardless class, ethnicity and race? The answer is clearly negative. Then, why does it seem that such movements came to an end as of 2005 riots?

Our answer is the opposite: the immigrant question have not been 'resolved' after the 2005 riots, but during the 'silent' 10 years since then, we have been witnessing a curious shift in its form—a shift that is pretty much based on the formation of the immigrant culture and, eventually, the formation of the immigrant class fractions. As we have implied before, inasmuch as we speak of the perpetual movement of alienation and disalienation on the ground of everyday life, we also stress the fact that the formation of a class, of class fractions, even of culture, is a matter of incessant process. The concept of formation does not approach such notions as if they were congealed in space and time; on the contrary, it implies the *making* of such notions, albeit non-spontaneously but within the dialectical relation of agency and conditions, of subjectivity and objectivity, of voluntariness and conditionedness. Therefore, the curious shift of the immigrant question in France presupposes an existent phenomenon influential both on class and culture, on agency and its objective conditions so as to become even more hegemonic in the course of formations of these notions. This phenomenon is Islam, more concretely, Islam in France, in relation with the problematic that we describe as the *Muslimfrage*.

At first sight, there seems to be a gap that needs clarification between the phenomenon and the problematic. In our comprehension, the phenomenon of Islam is a notion that is more or less alien to the French society as a whole, increasingly becoming a public concern with several national and international incidents and affairs (from political Islamist revival to jihad, from international terrorism and 9/11 attacks to issues of freedom of speech and debates on the caricatures of Prophet Muhammad) eventually making Islam one of the burning questions of Western societies, even leading to a rising Islamophobia in the Western world. On the other

hand, this phenomenon has, for countries such as France and Germany where considerable Muslim populations live, increasingly become an urgent issue, which had to be governed by state authorities, either by their direct involvement or by partnerships with emigrant countries' authorities.[479] Therefore, the problem of 'governing Islam' comes to mean 'governing Muslims', and it is in that frame that the phenomenon of Islam is inscribed into the Muslim question—a question consisting of social, civil, political and economic aspects.

However, the Muslim question did not emerge suddenly so as to put the phenomenon of Islam atop of the issues to be governed for the part of the French state. It has been the consequence of a number of historical developments inside and outside France, which, in the course of roughly 35 years, immediately incorporated with the immigrant question. This historical process, which could also be described as the Islamization of Muslim immigrant masses, merits close attention. For this purpose, it is necessary to trace the 'dialectics of Islamization', in Gilles Kepel's words, which involves a period from *c.* mid-1970s until today. According to him, this process consists of three main historical periods attributed to the hegemonic understanding of Islam among the Muslim populations and generations, which are shaped throughout national and international social, political and economic developments, and which succeeded each other via two swells that connect these phases: *i)* Islam of fathers ['*Islam des darons*']; *ii)* Islam of brothers ['*Islam des frères*']; *iii)* Islam of the youth ['*Islam des jeunes*']. It is also important to note that, according to Kepel's periodization, the first and the second phases are connected to each other via the Tabligh movement while the second and third phases are connected to each other via Salafi movement.[480] In this periodization, each period is represented by some of the existing or newly founded institutions that have the purpose of governing Islam, either practically over all Muslims (e.g. the role of the Great Mosque of Paris, though its affiliation with the Algerian state) or over distinct national communities, such as Algerians, Moroccans, Turks, etc. For example, in the period of Islam of brothers, which appears to be the second age of Islam in France, is

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[479] A recently concluded comparative study on the governing of Islam in France and Germany is noticeable: Benjamin Bruce, **Governing Islam Abroad. The Turkish and Moroccan Muslim Fields in France and Germany**, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 2015. Also see, from the same writer: Bruce, 'Not Quite In, Not Quite Out. Islamic Organizations in France and Germany and Their Ties to Their States of Origin', in Matthias Kortmann, Kerstin Rosenow-Williams (eds.), **Islamic Organizations in Europe and the USA. A Multidisciplinary Perspective**, London: Palgrave, 2013, pp. 129-49.
[480] Gilles Kepel, **Quatre-vingt-treize**, Paris: Gallimard, 2012, pp. 156-62.

represented by the Great Mosque of Paris for the part of the Algerian immigrant community and by the Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF), established in 1985 and funded by the Moroccan state, for the part of the Moroccan community. In this history, which ironically corresponds to the years of economic crisis of the mid-1970s and the triumphant neoliberalism afterwards, it is stunning that the issue of governing Islam either by the national bodies formed by France or through the cooperation of the emigrant states has become both the basis of the Muslim question and of curious engagement of the politics of Islam with the scene of 'high politics' dominated by a series of governments in which right-wing (e.g. Jacques Chirac's Rassemblement pour la République and Nicolas Sarkozy's Union pour un mouvement populaire) and left-wing parties (e.g. most notably the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand's two-term presidency) were in power. Therefore, at first sight, supposing that the Muslim question has become an instrument of the 'high politics' dominated by the central forces of the political spectrum is a justifiable thesis. Yet, the relation between the Muslim question and the high politics is much complex and it needs the profound elaboration of the development of Islam, or the 'dialectics of Islamization'.

During the period what may we name as the 'prehistory' of Islamization on the French soil—i.e., the period from the very beginnings of Muslim populations' migration until mid-1970s covering the first migrants of the late 19th century and early 20th century up to the Harkis and, later, the immigrant workers of 1960s—the Muslim question was not an issue neither in the public debate nor even among the Muslim immigrants, especially the more populous immigrant workers. Grassroots immigrant organizations like the Mouvement des travailleurs arabes (MTA), which was founded in 1973 at the apogee of the intensified class struggle of the 1970s, did seek no religious identification for their social bases other than national. In effect, given the long period from the earlier Étoile nord-africaine (ENA, founded in 1926) to the MTA, the national struggle of the North Africans in France and in the North Africa (especially in Algeria) was unified with Islam, as we have argued for the character of the formation of Arab-Islam identity among colonized Arab nations since the Nahda movement of the 19th century.[481] Yet, the postcolonial era after the

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[481] Messali Hadj's ENA can be regarded as the best example of the identification of Arab-Algerian nationalism with Islam, which caused conflicts with the existing left-wing movements in France like the Communist Party. See: Rabah Aissaoui, **Immigration and National Identity. North African Political Movements in Colonial and Postcolonial France**, London, New York: Tauris, 2009, p. 38.

independence of Algeria in 1962 had been of a distinct character in national consciousness for the part of Algerians in particular and other Muslim communities in general for the basic reason that the independence movements in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa were *secular* in essence which eventually transformed the post-independence period's emigrants to the French soil who prevailed to be secular as well. This nuance indeed necessitates the distinction between *Islamic* tones inscribed within secular ideologies of the national identifications and the process of Islamization among the Muslim immigrant communities in the period posterior to the mid-1970s—a process in which Islamic tones were enforced by the rise of politically biased *Islamist* movements.

Therefore, the Islam of fathers, in Kepel's terms, signified the period prior to the Islamization starting as of the mid-1970s, and, in this first period, Islam was only inscribed as a tone within the national and class-consciousness of the Muslim immigrant workers issued from the Maghreb and the Sub-Sahara. The position of Islam in this period had been maintained by idea that immigrant workers were into the 'project of a temporary life on the Hexagon's territory.' In that scheme, these temporary immigrant workers were 'less loquacious adherents of a popular Islam'; they lived as single men apart from their families in their countries of origin, they were 'carriers of a simple man's religion ['*foi du charbonnier*'] in which the month of Ramadan was put in brackets on the grounds that immigration incorporates voyage (which excuses this obligation), and in which beer, cheap wine and pastis featured a good place in the proletarian conviviality.'[482] Though these immigrants identified themselves as Muslims, this identification was nevertheless confined to a non-public and personal domain; following the distinction made by the great historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson, this 'popular Islam' can be described on the basis of *islâm* (in minuscule) 'lived' and practiced in a solely confessional way which constitutes the ethico-philosophical nucleus of Islam as a religion.[483] This does not mean that popular Islam is secular in essence nor it is necessarily heterodox (such as some orders of the Sufi tradition), but rather it has a more simplistic and practical approach to the faith of *islâm* which is not mediated by the orthodoxy of institutionalized theologies of Sunni or Shiite Islam and which is not, in modern times, engaged in political formulations of different currents of political Islamism.

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[482] Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 164-5.
[483] Hodgson, **ibid.**, pp. 72-9.

On the other hand, popular Islam can naturally associate itself with the heterodoxies *and/or* Sufi orders easier, as it is often described that popular Islam is being lived at the peripheries of the orthodoxy centers where 'scripturalism' and *madrasah* dominate the religious conception and practices while peripheries remain, more or less, immune to this domination.[484] The Sufi sheiks often close to heterodox Islam and the Marabouts often carriers of syncretic interpretations in the North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa since the early Muslim invasions and the diffusion of Islam have found their social bases among the Muslim populations who, in return, practiced their popular Islam throughout many centuries. We have seen in the Chapter III that a Sufi sheikh, Emir Abdelkader, was one of these important figures among the semi-nomadic Algerians; he himself preached and taught non-orthodox Islam to his followers and organized an insurgency movement in the rural areas where the colonial French power was at pains in exercising its sovereignty in full.

Kepel's Islam of fathers, in this sense, was indeed a popular Islam: *i)* distant from the Islamic centers where the scriptualist conception of the religion is exercised, and *ii)* urbanized, often shockingly, in the case of rural emigrants who found themselves in the Western world's most populous and industrious cities shoulder by shoulder with other workers who mostly did not belong to Islamic tradition and living. These two factors rendered Islam of fathers open to the non-Islamic influences on the plane of social relations, reducing the Algeria-controlled Great Mosque of Paris influence on Muslims to minimum, so as to make Islam in France, in this period, out of the frame of public debate and civil issue, which became the Muslim question only after the mid-1970s economic crisis. It was this crisis of capitalism that was born as a ground swell amidst the deteriorating economic, social and political conditions of Muslim immigrants in France. The crisis blew them first with massive dismissals as the industrious sectors and the labor force went under recession; as the most vulnerable and precarious parts of the working class, immigrant class fractions (evidently including Muslims) were the first to be hit by this blow. This was followed by the spatial fix as regards the *banlieues* and criminalization of the immigrant youth under these circumstances, which was accompanied by the growing sentiment of racism, chauvinism and xenophobia against the immigrants, that already had roots among the non-immigrant working

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[484] Cf. Martin van Bruinessen, 'Sufism, 'Popular' Islam and the Encounter with Modernity', in Muhammad Khalid Masud, et al, (eds.), **Islam and Modernity. Key Issues and Debates**, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, pp. 125-57.

class during the 1960s and 1970s [485] and that was the 'bitter' outcome of the contracting and more competitive labor market. [486] These economic, social and political problems have rapidly grown during the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s—so much so that the left-wing activists having ties to the Socialist Party have founded SOS Racisme in 1984 along with immigrants, one year after the famous *Marche des Beurs*, with the intention of subsuming the anti-racist movement and its social basis in the *banlieues* (prevailed with the Minguettes riots of 1981 in Lyon) within the body of the bourgeois politics under the socialist guise. [487] However, the 'socialist' strategy of subsuming the immigrant class fractions did not pass beyond the boundaries of a forced marriage between several immigrant and Muslim organizations with the Socialist Party during the decade of 1980s and its failure cleared the field so as to leave it eventually to the consequent waves of Islamization.

According to Kepel's periodization, the passage from the Islam of fathers to the Islam of brothers was maintained by the ground swell of the Tabligh movement which had been influential among the deindustrialized immigrant workers and their descendants, who, especially the latter, were pinched between unemployment and criminalization after the mid-1970s and during 1980s. [488] After two prior periods comprising the foundation (1927-1945) and the first expansion of the movement towards the predominantly Muslim countries (1945-1965), this period in France coincided with the third period of the Tablighi Jamaat, in the years between 1965 and 1985, when the movement expanded towards predominantly non-Muslim countries like France, in which considerable number of Muslims lived. [489] What made the Tabligh movement so influential both in the Muslim and non-Muslim world lies indeed beneath their method which imposes the act of *khurūj* obligatory to the adherents, eventually helping this movement rapidly expand from its cradle in India first to the surrounding regions and then to the Western world. *Khurūj*, which derives from Arabic standing for 'exit', is an act of proselytism conducted by the adherents of the Jamaat for the purpose of inviting people (Muslims and non-Muslims) to

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[485] Castles, Kosack, **ibid.**, pp. 432-3, ff.

[486] Gérard Noiriel, **Le creuset français. Histoire de l'immigration, XIXᵉ-XXᵉ siècles**, Paris: Seuil, 1988, pp. 274-5.

[487] For the contradictions between this grassroots movement and the Socialist Party government of the time, see: Abdellali Hajjat, 'La marche pour l'égalité et contre le racisme', in Michel Pigenet, et al, **Histoire des mouvements sociaux en France**, Paris: La Découverte, 2014, pp. 671-80. Also see: Kepel, **ibid.**, pp. 188-9.

[488] Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 179.

[489] **Ibid.**, pp. 180-2.

Islam—a methodology consisting of a number of tasks and principles.[490] In France, this persuasive method found the most suitable terrain at the time corresponding to the process of deindustrialization, precarization and criminalization: the social space of *banlieues*. The movement effectively played the 'role of social cure *vis-à-vis* drug addiction and criminality' especially during the 1980s, helping Muslim immigrant *banlieuesards* quit addiction and give up delinquency through their 're-Islamization'.[491]

Therefore the process of re-Islamization among the Muslim immigrants was given way by the impact of a multiple-faceted historical crisis (having economic, social and political aspects) in the mid-1970s that followed a considerable period of secularization during the reign of the Islam of fathers. This does not mean that the Islam of fathers essentially preached secularism, but the popular Islam upon which this hegemonic conception of religion is based was and has always been elsewhere more eager to cooperate with secularism, hence, relatively open for the transforming effects of secularization. The re-Islamizing influence of the Tabligh movement, in that sense, could be well interpreted as the wake of a process of what a renowned sociologist of religion, Peter L. Berger, names counter-secularization, or desecularization. According to Berger, much of the theories of secularization (including his own earlier works) are falsified for the reason that modernization and secularization do not necessarily lead religions into decline; on the contrary, historical facts and developments show that religions have strongly persisted under secularization and that the waves of counter-secularization contemporary to those of secularization have been in coexistence. Moreover, with the falsification of secularization theories of the 1960s and 1970s in the light of historical development in the contemporary world (starting as of at least 1980s), it became evident that the religion has become more powerful along with the tendency of desecularization on a world scale (Berger exempts the Western academic world outside this desecularization tendency; in fact, he specifically criticizes the elite American university professors for neglecting this phenomenon). In this respect, he mentions the most serious religious upsurges among the global religious scene, of which Islam

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[490] Muhammad Khalid Masud, 'The Growth and Development of the Tablīghī Jamā'at in India', in Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), **Travellers in Faith. Studies of the Tablīghī Jamā'at as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal**, Leiden: Brill, 2000, pp. 24-8.
[491] Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 184.

constitutes a solid place due to its revival.[492] This analysis deserves both appreciation and criticism; appreciation for it puts a contemporary development in its right place by asserting that the secularization and its insurgent dissident have co-existed,[493] and criticism for it does not mention a word for desecularization's gaining the upper hand through processes in which capitalism played a central role, as seen in the case of the dialectics of Islamization in France after the historical crisis of the mid-1970s. Moreover, Berger exempts his 'overview' from the engagement of such religious revivals (e.g. the Islamic revival both in the Muslim and non-Muslim world) with the development of capitalism*s* over different regions of the world, thusly assessing the phenomenon a sort of natural character almost innate to history's *sui generis* course—an overlook even connotes under its pretext that secularization itself has been a deviation in this course.

At this point, our account on Islam in France and on the Muslim question needs elaboration in terms of the movement of alienation-disalienation and its nexus in social space and everyday life. For this account, Lefebvre's conception of alienation will be guiding again, for which he reminds that alienation is *not* a state of being but a part of a dialectical movement in which alienation is constantly being negated by disalienation and disalienation is constantly being negated by a new alienation, thusly stirring a perpetual movement. Therefore, the dialectics of alienation is at stake in a period when the dialectics of Islamization takes place in the social space where Muslim immigrants inhabit and in the everydayness in which an outmoded way of living ['*le vivre*'] is in change and consequently transforming experiences are lived ['*le vécu*']. With this first ground swell caused by the Tabligh movement, the old habits (concerning everyday life and spaces of habiting) that were outmoded by the coup of the historical crisis (i.e., the 'violence' of state and capital combined) had been substantially transformed, desecularized and redefined according to the least needs of the Muslim community; once those least needs were met (e.g. avoidance of

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[492] Peter L. Berger, 'The Desecularization of the World. A Global Overview', in Peter L. Berger (ed.), **The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics**, Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999, pp. 1-18.

[493] However, such views were known to at least a certain part of the globe before Berger, especially in 'late modernities' and 'capitalist peripheries' like Turkey. Niyazi Berkes, who was a distinguished Turkish historian and sociologist, already wrote in 1973 that secularization and desecularization are contemporaries for that 'desecularization is an attempt of protection similar to a turtle's retreat in its shell (…). After each period of secularization, a fever of desecularization takes place.' Niyazi Berkes, **Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma**, Istanbul: YKY, 2005 [1973], p. 20. This study is the re-written Turkish version of the English work which was originally published in 1963. Niyazi Berkes, **The Development of Secularism in Turkey**, New York: Routledge, 1998.

criminality and drug addiction), immigrants were quickly attempted so as to be incorporated within the new order of the post-industrial capitalism (consisting of new regimes of governance, of capital, of labor, of habiting, of living). Desecularization by Islamization has indeed served for establishing such regimes, but not without contradictions: when the new order constituted itself at the expense of the intensified class struggles in the 1970s, it has nonetheless laid the foundations of the Muslim question. The part of the Muslim immigrants within the existing class struggle could have only been eliminated and the Muslim question following the process of desecularization and Islamization of the Muslims could have only been emerged by their alienation to the rest of the working class.

Yet, as concrete persons supposedly participating in *civil life* and as supposedly members of *civil society*, Muslim immigrants' alienation, which was imposed by the violence of state and capital from above and driven by the desecularizing Islamization effect from below, must have a background prior to the historical crisis of the mid-1970s—given that alienation is not a state of being but a perpetual movement. In the period what we described as Islam of fathers was hegemonic among Muslim community, in other words, in their 'secular' period, Muslim immigrants were not exempt from alienation; they were even then alienated as they had been subject to a 'submission' and 'obedience' within the proletarian movement at that period. This submission or obedience was both that of the religion's submission as regards its relation to other religions and to the French *laïcité* and that of the carriers of the religion as regards their relations to adherents of other religions (or to non-religious persons). In either cases, the Muslim immigrant as a member of civil society *barely* existed in the public sphere qua abstracted from his religious identity. Moreover, as abstracted from his religious identity, the Muslim immigrant still *barely* existed in the public sphere since they were by and large bereft of their civil rights (including citizenship). This was one of the reasons for establishment of the MTA, the grassroots immigrant union, which received controversies from the existing organizations of the class struggle. The Muslim immigrant *barely* existed in the public sphere as emigrant from his country of origin for a temporary period and as a single man apart from his family and wife, who would later on bring forth the issue of, for instance, headscarf at the heart of French public debate and of their existence in the civil society. The Muslim immigrant was already alienated in this 'secular' period of Islam in France since he faced a double oppression as a Muslim

person—in the case of, say, a Christian Black Senegalese immigrant, the same double oppression prevailed this time through the mechanism of racism and racial discrimination. This problem has been even aggravated with the period of deindustrialization until today. In more recent times, when it is the case of Muslim immigrants of Sub-Saharan origin, who 'are less likely than North Africans to be legal residents and to have permanent employment', and who 'are more likely to live in crowded quarters and, for cultural reasons, to live in polygamous families', are being 'targeted by the larger society as insufficiently adapted to France, and whose problems and actions are most often framed in racial terms.'[494] In short, far from being disalienated, the Muslim immigrant as such in the so-called secular age of Islam in France was simply *neglected* as a member of the public sphere since he was deprived of many, if not all, of his civil rights for the two basic interbreeding facts: being immigrant and being Muslim. Although the 'political state' in France, a *laïc* and a constitutional one, does not adopt a theological attitude towards any religion including Islam, the distantiation of its secular law from *each* religion seemingly operates in order to alienate, de facto, *some* of these religions more than others, hence giving rise to an inequality among the practitioners of several faiths. The Muslim question's social, political and civil background thusly emerges even back in its prehistory, at the 'Islam of fathers', in the period when there was no such public debate among the civil society, namely in the period of negligence of the existence of Islam on the French soil.

Under these circumstances, the consequences of Islamization of the Muslim immigrants given way by the violence of state and capital from above and led by the ground swell of Islamic proselytism from below caused what we may term the becoming visible of the Muslim question as of 1980s until today. The consecutive period that Kepel names the 'Islam of brothers' ['*Islam des frères*'] will then be the hegemonic presence of Islam in France, as well as the hegemonic understanding which girds on an autonomous political character in respect to other political currents and actors existing in France while having a strong nexus with the 'reviving' Islamist movements flourishing in the Muslim world (shortly referred as *bilād* in Arabic which stands for 'country' and Francized as *bled*; Kepel often refers to this period as the *Islam des blédards*, i.e., those of Muslim countries origin) and often preaching

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[494] John R. Bowen, **Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 17.

radically in tone and in discourse for the political struggle. The rise of this interpretation of Islam corresponds roughly to the late 1980s, at the end of a decade when the Islamization from below by the Tabligh movement reached at its apogee and the historical moment of the fall of the Berlin wall occurred. Also it was in this decade that, as discussed above, became clear the failure of a number of 'socialist' attempts at subsuming immigrants (particularly Muslim immigrants) within the bodies of a number of establishments (ranging from the Socialist Party to SOS Racisme) via campaigns like *Touche pas à mon pote!* (Do not touch my buddy!), as those attempts backlashed among the North African immigrants in particular towards a 'sentiment of instrumentalization (…) for the service of the interests of Socialist Party's politicians, who did not provide them any significant social improvement.'[495] The Islam of brothers, reminding the offspring worldwide Islamist movement that was inaugurated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) founded in Egypt in 1928, has indeed borne such ideology which would be termed as *ikhwānist* ['*frériste*'], and, apart from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviets, it found a more relevant international context which gave sense to this ideology and firmly interested the Muslim North African immigrants in France, especially the Algerians: The Algerian Civil War of the 1990s. The decline of socialism and the rise of Islamism remind the famous Aristotelian postulate, 'nature abhors a vacuum', and the vacuum was quickly filled with such a replacement. In that respect, the conditions of war and other international issues evolving around the rise of Islamism had direct impacts on the emergence and development of the Islam of brothers in France.

In fact, the jihadist groups engaged in the Algerian Civil War in opposition to the Algerian regime (the Groupe islamique armé, GIA, being the most notable one among these jihadists) have failed in attracting Algerian immigrants in France into their campaigns in Algeria, the concern of defending the public order at the upper side of the Mediterranean has forced France taking measures in preventing terrorist activities in this country and dealing with the organization of Islam.[496] Events until the outbreak of the civil war, however, were much complicated in the lower side of the Mediterranean. In the 1980s, the regime controlled by the triumphant FLN resorted to enforce its nationalist ideology with the improvement of its religious dimension, thusly 'disalienate' the young generations and all popular classes in favor

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[495] Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 190.
[496] Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 192.

of the existing regime. The regime thusly invited two influential sheikhs of the Muslim world, Mohammed al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, both being Egyptian Islamic scholars, and this attempt came into being in a time when a local 'Islamist intelligentsia consisting of students and school teachers was preaching in popular neighborhoods.' Yet, both of these scholars were once companions of the Muslim Brotherhood before getting involved within the petro-monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula and they 'encouraged an Islamic revival within the society' rather than working in consolidation of the regime.[497] This in fact gave rise to the conflict in terms of the Front islamique du salut's (FIS) gaining strength as opposed to the FLN in the legal political area before the civil war in which GIA and other jihadist groups had been the dominating forces. Given the political rivalry between the Muslim Brotherhood and the petro-monarchies, especially the Saudi regime, the lines of distinction both in the Algerian and French Islamic fields become much more blurred. Nonetheless, we may roughly outline these intermingling relations as follows: the Islamist revival, which was preached by theologians like al-Qaradawi and al-Ghazali who also campaigned for Arabization in instruction, invoked a loosely defined Islamist *Weltanschauung* inspired by the *ikhwānist* ideology based upon 'strong but confused ideas',[498] and this has eventually echoed among the natural extensions in the emigrated countries to which countries like Algeria have sent considerable numbers of emigrants. On the other hand, these immigrants did not largely welcome the jihadist campaign launched by groups like the GIA and the Armée islamique du salut (AIS), which, in turn, have subjected them to taxes in order to finance the armed *Moujahidin* against the regime when they visit their countries in holidays during the civil war.[499] On the level of international *Realpolitik*, the legal FIS and other Islamic movements were financed by the Saudi regime while, as of 1992, *vis-à-vis* an 'Islamist threat' in case of a takeover of power, France has followed the policy of backing and financing the Algerian regime in order to avoid consequences such as massive immigration and export of terrorism.[500]

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[497] Gilles Kepel, **Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme**, Paris: Gallimard, 2000, pp. 172, 390n.

[498] Brigitte Maréchal, **The Muslim Brothers in Europe. Roots and Discourse**, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2008, pp. 42-3, 284-305.

[499] Luis Martinez, **The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 140.

[500] **Ibid.**, pp. 23n, 228-30. In 1994, the threat was admitted by the then Minister of Defense François Léotard as follows: '(…) the fundamentalists are on the point of taking over power in Algeria.' Cited in Martinez, **ibid.**, p. 81.

We have mentioned above that these strong but confused ideas related to the Muslim Brotherhood movement have echoed in France among the natural extensions of the Muslims of the *bilād*. In the 1990s, this extension, which was already preceded as early as the 1980s through the foundation of a number of Muslim organizations in affiliation (often inorganically) to the MB,[501] has gained a new sense under such circumstances in the international political arena concerning the Islamist revival. The earliest and most important of these organizations is apparently the grassroots Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) founded in 1983 in Paris; this organization was itself bearing traces of the *ikhwānist* ideology as it was founded and filled by former students educated in the *bilād*, i.e., by *blédards*.[502] Furthermore, what renders the field even more complex was the direct influence and control of the foreign states, among which Algeria and Morocco were leading actors, as regards the *living* of Islam in France: Algeria had for a long time been into this influence via the Great Mosque of Paris, and Morocco, in competition with Algeria, gave support and financed the Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (FNMF) which was founded in 1985 and later evolved to the Rassemblement des musulmans de France in 2006. For the part of the French state, apart from these institutions under the control of foreign states in coordination with France, such grassroots organizations were attempted to be taken under control and to be coordinated by a series of state-led organizations which were inaugurated, in 1989, by the then Minister of Interior Pierre Joxe (of the Socialist Party) with the formation of the Comité de réflexion sur l'islam en France (CORIF).[503] However, in the period of Islam of brothers, none of these measures taken by Muslims in terms of organizing and counter-measures taken by the state in terms of controlling has appeared unconditional to the developments in France. On the contrary, they have been shaped and reshaped according to various affaires such as wearing headscarf in the school first came into the public debate in 1989—an issue proclaiming the Muslim question in the midst of the French society. The importance of the issue of headscarf and its derivatives lies in fact in the intermingling of the immigrant question with the Muslim question, historically the latter flourishing in the heart of the first; it arose as the natural consequence of the family reunions for the case of single immigrant workers who *lived* the first period of

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[501] Lorenzo Vidino, **The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West**, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 42.
[502] Kepel, **Quatre-vingt-treize**, p. 202.
[503] **Ibid.**, p. 193.

Islam of fathers before their descendants, who were socialized and politicized with the waves of Islamization (first with Tabligh, then with Ikhwān), have started to dominate the immigrant field in the 1980s and 1990s. This issue was succeeded until today by many similar affairs which caused protests and manifestations on the one hand and revived with laws prohibiting headscarf or full face covering in the public on the other hand.

Another complementary issue concerning the public debate has been around *halal* meat, which posed similarities to the Jewish *kosher*. This was, contrary to the headscarf issue, less challenging for the French state since it related much less the public space than did the headscarf; it only posed problem at times when the public school students' diets in the school restaurant showed disrespect to Muslim preferences. Additionally, taken within the capitalist logic of order, *halal* meat issue gave rise to a semi-autonomous Islamic sector operating both in production and trade, binding the 'French Islamic capital' (either that of Muslims or non-Muslims) to the European and the international.[504] Yet, this 'positive' outcome in the economic sphere constituted only a small part of the consequences that the Muslim question caused more visibly in the political and public sphere.

Given this picture both in France and in the international scene, it is not a coincidence that, since 1990s until today, have come into being many grassroots organizations and state-led organizations which deepened the dimensions of France's Muslim question. The 1990s thusly became the decade when parties to the Muslim question (both the French and foreign states from which Muslim immigrants were issued, and Muslims and their organizations) have accelerated their efforts. Among these efforts, the most notable grassroots organizations founded in the 1990s are youth organizations like the Union des jeunes musulmans (UJM) founded in Lyon in 1992, and the Union islamique des étudiants de France (UISEF) founded in 1989, which became the Étudiants musulmans de France (EMF) in 1996. The UJM is particularly very important since it had been more influential and attractive for the

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[504] S. Romi Mukherjee, 'Global Halal. Meat, Money, and Religion', **Religions**, 2014, no. 5 (1), pp. 22-75. Here we term the 'semi-autonomous' for the reason that the economic activity had emerged not only on the Islamic conception of *halal* but also on the capitalist logic as well, therefore making the Islamic business quite bound to the capitalist market. Apart from *halal* meat, the Islamic sector in business, which created its ground in non-Muslim countries, had developed in other areas of economic activity, especially in the finance. Thusly the so-called Islamic finance has gained importance especially in the UK in Europe and the US, whereas it has, so far, failed in developing in countries of more Muslim populations like France and Germany due to legal constraints. See: Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic Finance in Europe', **RSCAS Policy Papers**, no: 2007/02.

then Muslim youth as a carrier of the *ikhwānist* ideas into public issues. It was also organizationally persisting; it first became Collectif des jeunes musulmans in order to be more efficient outside Lyon and then, in 2000, became Collectif des musulmans de France (CMF) as the founder and leaders have grown older. The counter-measures, on the other hand, first came under Charles Pasqua's ministry (1993-1995) with the foundation of the Conseil représentatif des musulmans de France (CRMF) in 1994, which eventually failed and gave way to a following, albeit failed, counter-measure in the late 1990s with the foundation of the Istichara (the Consultation) under the ministry of Jean-Pierre Chevènement (1997-2000). All these attempts tried to control and monitor the French Islam through cooperating with the already-existing Muslim institutions and organizations (including mosques) as well as cooperating with their foreign financers, i.e., the states of the *bilād*.

The decade of 2000s has seen many important debates and issues that evolved and changed the course of the Muslim question. For the part of the state, the major counter-measure taken was the foundation of the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) in 2003, under the ministry of Nicolas Sarkozy, which aimed to bring several existing Muslim organizations and other actors under one umbrella. This attempt was, in turn, should be taken into account with the incident of 9/11 attacks in 2001 and its aftermath that brought forth a global campaign named by the then George W. Bush administration of the US as the 'war on terror'. Here it is quite noteworthy that both the application of the war on terror within the French territories and the counter-measure in order to take the French Islam under control was committed to the Ministry of Interior, which was, in most critical periods (2002-2004 and 2005-2007), occupied by Sarkozy who later became the president between 2007-2012. Main issues and debates in this decade have been around the headscarf and its derivatives, consequences of the war on terror (e.g. from the American invasion of Iraq to Israel's military operations in the Gaza Strip), anti-terror laws based upon the war on terror, rise of the anti-immigrant sentiment and Islamophobia, increasing social and economical problems particularly in *banlieues*, and so on.

In the 2000s, under this national and international conjuncture, the UOIF and other organizations and institutions mostly affiliated inorganically to the MB, in other words, the Islam of brothers dominating the French Muslim scene has intentionally adopted a 'moderate' position in order to operate 'within rather than against the system'. For example, in 2004, those organizations did not engage in the

protests against the ban of wearing *hijab* (headscarf) in the primary and secondary public schools, which caused controversies on the nature of the French *laïcité* and on the Muslim question not only in the French public debate but also echoed in the international society.[505] In return, the answer of *blédards* was retreat to the non-public, *private* sphere of the 'civil society', where religiously conforming education would become possible through establishing a number of private schools. For example, the imam of the Clichy-sous-Bois Mosque, Dhaou Meskine, has thusly founded his own private school where Muslim children could receive education without the legal restrictions on headscarf and the like, although those schools still had to follow the French education system strictly (such as courses on the theory of evolution) in order to stick to it.[506] In order that the Muslim to 'liberate' himself as a species-being, he could only take refuge in the sphere of the economic, that of the private, i.e., in the civil society where man in general exists as an alienated and non-political man; so that with this solution it is not only the Muslim takes refuge in the civil society but also the state itself by the mediation of the economic sphere in its relation to its citizen (noting that Muslim children are largely French citizens as they were born in France and acquiring citizenship by birth). This retreat to the economic sphere demonstrates itself even more forcefully in the case of quietist Salafism, which will be elaborated soon.

The *ikhwānist* re-positioning in France towards a 'moderate Islam' in this decade, however, remains in the academic literature not well elaborated. Apart from a few mentions, it can be comfortably said that among academic circles there is an underestimation on the MB's political position in general (comprising the *Ikhwānist* ideology, affiliates and adjacent movements or organizations in the *bilād* and in Europe), which is in constant tendency towards this 'moderate' line after the milestone of 9/11, due to MB's political opposition to 'jihadist' Salafism like that of al-Qaʿida and Taliban on the one hand, and to 'quietist' Salafism backed by petro-monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula on the other hand.[507] Among these two sorts of political Islam which sought the revival of the 'Golden Age', *ikhwānist* position

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[505] Vidino, **ibid.**, p. 83. The law mentioned here carries the full title: 'Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics.'

[506] Bowen, **ibid.**, 114, ff.

[507] C. Rosefsky Wickham's study on the evolution of the MB can be counted as an exception: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, **The Muslim Brotherhood. Evolution of an Islamist Movement**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 101.

seems to have redefined itself according to the 'middle way'[508] and seeking for itself the conditions of coexistence within such secular regimes like that of France. Not surprisingly, this position gave an often secure way to *ikhwānists* (again, in its broader sense, i.e., including its affiliates and adjacent movements or organizations) such conditions here and there in the Muslim world: in 2002, only one year after its foundation, comes to power the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, founded by the 'moderates' of the radical *Milli Görüş* which was itself an adjacent movement to the MB ideologically;[509] through the end of the decade, an affiliate of the MB, Hamas starts to rule over the Gaza Strip after a virulent split-up with the Fatah in 2006-2007; after the so-called Arab Spring, another affiliate, the Moroccan Parti de la justice et du développement (PJD) becomes the ruling party in 2011; and finally, the MB itself takes a considerable part in the Egyptian Revolution, and its political organization, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), strongly comes to power in 2011 and makes the party's chairman Mohammad Morsi elected as the president before its ousting one year later. Despite the fall of Morsi and the MB in Egypt by a coup d'état in 2012, it is very much clear that the strategy of the war on terror made the bed of the *ikhwānist* ideology redefined on a moderate Islam. It is in this sense that the Islam of brothers has dominated the global Islamic scene from early 2000s until early 2010s, as opposed to the jihadist Salafism and quietist Salafism in and out the Muslim world, turning this 'vacuum' out into a successful political strategy. Indeed, the nature abhors a vacuum!

Yet again, the nature abhors a vacuum, and the vacuum in the political sphere created by the smooth shift of the Islam of brothers needs to be filled. As much these *blédards* gained power on the prosperous ground of representation and 'high politics' widely opened by the French state in the Islamic field as their hegemony on the onerous ground of grassroots movements and organizations has gradually eroded. In addition to the headscarf affair in 2004, the year 2005 marked a real rupture in this divorce: the 2005 *banlieue* riots. But before proceeding with this divorce, which 'emancipated' the younger generations' own Islamic approach in social, civil and political terms, and unfolded the third period of Islam on the French soil as what we name, after Kepel, the 'Islam of youth', we should continue with a second ground

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[508] Vidino, **ibid.**, p. 49.
[509] Kepel, **Jihad,** p. 335.

swell which, along with the Islam of youth, filled the vacuum left in void by the *ikhwānists*. This ground swell is represented by the quietist Salafism.

Though not as much influential in terms of quantity of its adherents and breadth of its social base[510] as the Islam of youth has been throughout the 2000s and 2010s, as we shall see later, the quietist Salafism had certain impacts on both the nature and the evolution of the Muslim question. First of all, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to make the following distinction *within* Salafism that the jihadist interpretation of Salafism differs in some political and ethical aspects from the quietist. While, on the political plane, the quietist interpretation relies basically to the petro-monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula (most notably, the Saudi Kingdom) ideologically and financially, the jihadist interpretation takes non-state but globally influential organizations (generally considered as 'terrorist' organizations by the international public) into pivotal place, as those organizations such as Taliban or al-Qaʿida have broken their ties with the petro-monarchies in the last quarter of the 20th century due to their alliances with the Western powers.[511] On the theological plane, while these two interpretations are based upon a more or less uniform understanding of Qur'an, what differs each other is the understanding of *Sunnah*, in other terms, the ethical conception of the Prophet's practice. It is in that ethical plane that the distinction arises: whether to accept the legitimacy of an already existing Islamic state (such as Saudi Arabia, but not, say, Turkey which is a Muslim country but a *laïc* state, and definitely not Iran, which is a Shiite state) and follow its political agenda regardless its position in the international scene, or to go after a series of military campaign often including terror actions led by non-state organizations in order to establish a 'true' Islamic state by claiming territory in the corrupt countries of the Muslim world. The quietist Salafism overtly accepts the first way of interpretation and accordingly preaches, especially in the non-Muslim Western world, that the adherents of the *Minhaj Salafi* (Path of the Virtuous Ancestors) should reorganize their 'ways of living' ['*le vivre*'] on a non-political, quietist basis, which eventually desocialize them through isolating to a large degree from the rest of the society (i.e., from the non-adherents) and reducing their existences to an

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[510] Although quietist Salafism finds adherents from various sectors of 'ethnicity', including post-Christians of Antilles and Africa and Europe along with most significantly adherents of Algerian-origin and other North Africans, their exact number remains unclear but is considered to be confined to the limits of a 'deviant' minority perceived as unusual and abnormal. Mohammed-Ali Adraoui, **Du Golfe aux banlieues. Le salafisme mondialisé**, Paris: PUF, 2013, pp. 31, 40.
[511] **Ibid.**, pp. 73-4.

otherworldly, puritan life supported only by economic activity limited to a minor extent. In this minor extent of economic activity, it is not favored the quietist individual to work, say, in the 'public sector', which belongs to and run by a non-Muslim state; therefore the reproduction of the quietist everyday life relies upon either the conditions of an individual's own petty business sufficiently sheltered from 'forbidden deeds', i.e., *haram*, that might likely be caused within mechanisms of capitalist economy (such as interest), or finding a place at a companion's business.[512]

In this Salafi strategy attempting to regulate the everyday life of the individual adherent, it becomes even more manifest than our previous example of the retreating *blédards* that the economic activity confined to a virtual private sphere is organized for the 'true' Muslim as the *emancipating* medium, which has two immediate consequences: *i)* After sharply distinguishing the public and private spheres, the individual adherents are *recommended* to escape to the safe zone of the economic activity by alienating them from the political life of the public and the state[513] (e.g. voting in the elections in a non-Muslim country or manifestations on 'touching' issues such as the bombardment of Gaza or the headscarf affair are not welcome),[514] accordingly reducing them into apolitical citizens divorced from their political forces through effective depoliticization;[515] *ii)* As a last resort, when the conditions of the reproduction of the quietist everyday life become impossible or hard to realize, the solution of a reversed direction of migration towards Dar al-Islam, a modern Hegira, is offered as inevitable.[516] The Salafi strategy, with such consequences, forces the individual adherent, perceived as deviant, abnormal and unusual by the society by large, either to almost complete isolation from the French public space as though their existence is ghost-like, visible only in definite spaces and in certain times, or to leave the country of unbelief ['*Kufr*'] for a country where the law of Allah, the Sharia, is applied, or at least the everydayness of a true believer is not bound to any legal restriction. Therefore, this second ground swell that came with quietist Salafism plays an isolating, de-socializing role (but then re-socializing adherents within peer groups so as to create strictly close communities) instead of

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[512] **Ibid.**, p. 97.

[513] Samir Amghar, 'Le salafisme en France. De la révolution islamique à la révolution conservatrice', **Critique internationale**, 2008/3, no. 40, p. 112.

[514] For instance, the Grand Mufti of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has issued a *fatwa* that forbade the solidarity manifestations with Gaza in 2009. See: Adraoui, **ibid.**, pp. 94-5.

[515] **Ibid.**, pp. 85-90.

[516] **Ibid.**, p. 91. Samir Amghar notes in 2008 that 'around 300 persons have quitted France since 2007 and most of them have settled in Arab countries.' Amghar, **ibid.**, p. 109.

that of the first that came with the proselytizing Tabligh movement. Comparing these two, both ground swells relied upon a purist and moralizing ideology drawn from their own interpretations of Qur'an but they remained each other in competition and opposition;[517] while the Tabligh movement was insufficient in answering the otherworldly needs of its adherents due to their proselytizers' limited capacities in Islamic knowledge, Salafis have knitted such an organizational hierarchy that this has enabled the diffusion of this knowledge well from the very top, i.e., from renowned Salafi sheikhs and muftis down to the most bottom, i.e., to the ordinary true believer,[518] through the mediation of medium-ranked adherents who are encouraged to go to the centers like Saudi Arabia or Egypt where the Islamic theology is taught to these adherents in order that they diffuse what they learnt during their brief educational sojourns.[519] Nonetheless, these two currents have been operational in *distanciation* of some of the Muslims from the public space through alienating them to political processes and reducing them into bare civil persons who do not seek to fulfill their political existence or who are only willing to assign their political existence to great established proxies like petro-monarchies. This ambiguous depoliticization, in other words, separating some definite Muslims from the public and the political so as to confine within the economic, is itself a *political* process: foreign sovereign states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) do conquer over a troublesome population to which extent the counterparts invest in each other's economy;[520] a hard-to-solve problem's human source is silently drifted away from the spatial heart of the problem, that is the public space; a process leading a reversed migration that carries away the disgruntled who could not *exist* in the public as they would… In short, a mere political process that attempts to crumble the Muslim question and to sweep its crumbles under the rug. Meanwhile, capital flows in the

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[517] Kepel, **Quatre-vingt-treize**, p. 181; Adraoui, **ibid.**, p. 106.

[518] Adraoui, **ibid.**, pp. 46-7.

[519] **Ibid.**, pp. 120-9.

[520] In this regard, Qatar and Saudi Arabia appear to be the most important economic partners of France among the GCC countries. For instance, '(…) in late September 2012, [Qatar] made itself talk in France with its proposition to grant a fund of 50 million euros in favor of *banlieues*. Becoming a polemical issue, this fund was finally transformed into a common fund of 300 million euros with the *Caisse des depots [et consignation]* for the French small and medium-sized enterprises.' Perla Srour-Gandon, 'La stratégie économique du Qatar. Politique énergétique et diversification économique', **Confluences Méditerranée**, 2013/1, no: 84, p. 55. For a brief inventory of bilateral agreements between France and Qatar, see: Jean-François Coustillière, 'Qatar: chance ou menace pour les intérêts français?' **Confluences Méditerranée**, 2013/1, no: 84, pp. 90-1. For the part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the relations have even reached to high-amounted bilateral agreements. As recent as October 2015, the two countries agreed on a €10 billion worth of economic and military deals. 'France Signs €10 Billion Worth of Deals with Saudi Arabia'. **France 24**, 13 October 2015.

poor *banlieues* of Seine-Saint-Denis and in the rich neighborhoods of Saint-Germain-des-Prés at the same time, as it flows in Doha and Riyadh. Capital is liquid; it even moves faster than ideas.

Despite all these impacts galvanized by the ground swell of the quietist Salafism, this interpretation of Islam remained marginal among the Muslims in France. In return, what became hegemonic among the Muslim immigrants after the curious decline of the Islam of brothers was the 'Islam of the youth' ['*Islam des jeunes*']. Bowen notes that '[t]he triple threat of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the passage of the 2004 law against Islamic scarves in schools had galvanized Muslims into more social action than before.'[521] Indeed, when the *ikhwānist* Muslim establishment in France adopted a compromising strategy in such a conjuncture and took a moderate position as regards the evolution of the Muslim question, and when the quietist Salafism backed by petro-monarchies has gradually evacuated the public sphere in which the Muslim question has flourished, those galvanized young Muslim immigrants (most of them legally being descendants of immigrants and of French nationality) striving for social action have found for themselves an enormous field to be organized in which they could engage in political struggle. It was under these circumstances that the Muslim youth has found a convenient ground to make alliance with left-wing movements, which were, on an international scale, 'revived' with the anti-globalization movement forcefully echoed in Seattle and Genoa, in 1999 and 2001, respectively. Their agendas were common in many aspects. They were against anti-terror laws which were leading the 'liberal' governments of the West towards a permanent state of emergency in objective terms;[522] they rejected the American invasion of Iraq which frustrated not only Muslims but also anti-imperialists in France and elsewhere; as a national case, they were concerned with the rise of Le Pen's far-right Front national, which was only defeated by the socialist votes went to Chirac's candidacy at the 2002 presidency elections—this exigency *vis-à-vis* the far-right threat thusly sustained the neoliberal center-right to stay in power and eventually paved the way for the rise of Sarkozy's even harsher and stricter neoliberal program from which both immigrants

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[521] Bowen, **ibid.**, p. 187.
[522] For one of the best formulations of this thesis, see: Jean-Claude Paye, **La fin de l'État de droit. La lutte antiterroriste, de l'état d'exception à la dictature**, Paris: La Dispute, 2004. In this book, the Belgian sociologist claims that it was not 9/11 that triggered the endemic anti-terror laws but it has accelerated a tendency that could be seen throughout the 1990s.

and left-wing politics were to suffer.[523] Therefore, it is not a coincidence when the state-backed CFCM under Sarkozy's ministerial periods has embraced the *ikhwānist* Muslim establishment,[524] the young generation's own initiative met with the left-wing politics as the conditions of the period necessitated them to be in alliance.

Following those burning issues related to the Muslim question, the real moment of rupture between *blédards* and the youth comes with the 2005 riots. During the riots, the Muslim establishment remained not only passive but also became a barricade opposed to the riots, specifically with the means of monopoly on Islamic theology: the UOIF issued a *fatwa* forbidding rioting, which actually had no influence on rioters but only alienated the Muslim youth from this now outmoded *ikhwānist* organization and eventually caused the loss of influence over the mass.[525] Meanwhile, the in-rise Islam of the youth was mainly represented by the now Collectif des musulmans de France, the former UJM, and through this organization developed the relations with the left-wing movements. In fact, the Collectif had a 'double objective' as regards young Muslims and the Muslim question's future: 'convincing the whole of young Muslims of their French identities—against the Maghrebian nostalgia of parents or Arabist internationalism of Ikhwān—and, in order that the youth could appropriate this nationality and citizenship, forcing the state and the society to re-read the colonial past in the logic of repentance.'[526] (This latter objective has found a more forceful voice with the Indigènes de la République founded in 2005.) Furthermore, the Collectif and, hence, the Islam of the youth, found their charismatic orator with Tariq Ramadan, a Genovese scholar mainly writing in English and French, and the grand-son of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.[527] In this nexus, the connections of the Collectif with certain left-wing milieus in France or in England have been of much importance. Those milieus were the Socialist Workers Party in England, a Trotskyist party distinguished from others with Tony Cliff's specific interpretation of Trotskyism, and the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire in France, the SWP's sister party which later became the Nouveau parti anticapitaliste (NPA). Having much affection on the New Left's ideological development on a global scale, these milieus

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[523] Jérôme Sgard, 'Nicolas Sarkozy, lecteur de Gramsci. La tentation hégémonique du nouveau pouvoir', **Esprit**, July 2007/7, pp. 10-22.
[524] Gilles Kepel emphasizes the *ikhwānist* ideological basis of the CFCM. Kepel, **ibid.**, p. 203.
[525] Kepel, **ibid.**, pp. 206, 275-6.
[526] **Ibid.**, pp. 256-7.
[527] **Ibid.**, pp. 248-9.

have been dominating actors in the organization of the European Social Forum (ESF), of which second conference was held in Paris in 2003 and young Muslims dressed in their own fashions (including headscarves), was present at the forum.[528] Tariq Ramadan, too, was invited to this forum as a speaker, who published short before the forum his famous article on the 'critique of the new communitarian intellectuals' in which he targeted figures like Alain Finkielkraut, Bernard-Henri Lévy and André Glucksmann accusing them with taking positions so as 'to meet the logic of communitarianism as Jews, or nationalists, as defenders of Israel'.[529] Apart from controversies, this alliance went as further as that the NPA has shown Ilham Moussaïd, a young Muslim woman with headscarf as candidate during the regional elections in 2010—a candidature which triggered controversies among the French left on whether a woman with headscarf could be feminist and secular.[530]

Now *also* at the heart of the left-wing politics, the Muslim question still raises many issues and debates in the French public space. The Islam of the youth constituting the third historical period of the 'venture of Islam' on the French soil has yet to find an 'exodus' that would emancipate both the Muslim *vis-à-vis* the French and the French *vis-à-vis* Islam. Quite on the opposite, the French far-right, after the historical crisis of capitalism of late 2000s that shook Europe including France, appears to be the winner of the turmoil at least in the short-term. In so far as the immigrant question in general continues to be dependent on the development of the Muslim question in particular, this radicalism coming from the right side of the political compass is likely to impact against not only the Muslim but also the immigrant.

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As we draw near to the conclusion, we should emphasize on some of the signs that the Muslim question brings into light. For instance, the debate of Tariq Ramadan with the new 'communitarian' intellectuals points at one of them. As some part of the intellectuals (particularly, according to Ramadan, the Jewish ones) falls

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[528] **Ibid.**, p. 266.

[529] Tariq Ramadan, 'Critique des (nouveaux) intellectuels communautaires', **Oumma**, 2 October 2003. In turn, Ramadan received many criticisms on the grounds of being anti-Semitist and he was blamed with bearing a 'double discourse' by authors like Fourest. Caroline Fourest, **Frère Tariq. Discours, stratégie et méthode de Tariq Ramadan**, Paris: Grasset, 2004.

[530] Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the Parti de gauche (which issued from the PCF), was critical against both the candidate and the NPA. 'Mélenchon: la candidate voilée du NPA relève du racolage'. **Marianne**. 4 February 2010. Against such criticisms, NPA activists were in defense: 'Islamophobia and France's NPA. Interview with John Mullen', **SocialistWorker.org**, 15 December 2010.

into the trap of communitarianism instead of defending universal values ideally promoted and represented by the Republic, the dialectics of Islamization takes almost the same communitarian path. And, as we intended to show with our account on Islamization, it was not only the Muslim communities 'from below' who run this process. Geisser and Zemouri argue that, on the contrary, the French statesmen themselves intended such a process.[531] For that reason, it is not surprising that many Muslims refer to the Jewish community practices each time when a controversial issue, say, that of *halal* meat, occupies the public debate. This is not only because of the proximities of religious deeds between Judaism and Islam but also because of the tendency of Muslim communitarianism of taking the Jewish communitarianism as an example *vis-à-vis* the French social formation and French Republicanism.[532]

The case of the quietist Salafism in that sense appears as the most salient example for this tendency towards communitarianism. However, the ultimate retreat to civil society seen with that case signals a general tendency for the entire Muslim field. And as shows the argument of Geisser and Zemouri, this tendency indicates coherence, at least partially, with state's position in the Muslim question: leaving the question to the realm of civil society while waiting for it to dissolve there as much as possible. Yet, the Republic's strategy itself pretty much contradicts with the foundational values of the Republic. Given that this strategy is persistent in the period of neoliberalism, could not we assume that the Republic is being alienated to itself, in parallel to the movement of alienation in the social spaces of *banlieues* counting on behalf of the immigrants?

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[531] Vincent Geisser, Aziz Zemouri, **Marianne et Allah. Les politiques français face à la 'question musulmane'**, Paris: La Découverte, 2007. Also see: Nora Fellag, 'The Muslim Label. How French North Africans Have Become Muslims and not Citizens', **Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe**, vol. 13, no. 14, 2014, pp. 1-25.

[532] Esther Benbassa, **La République face à ses minorités. Les juifs hier, les musulmans aujourd'hui**, Paris: Fayard, 2004.

CONCLUSION

The point of departure in this study was the French Republican model. All the implications related to the 'immigrant question' naturally point out the deficiencies of the French model, and the model itself becomes the question. Given the French model as a specific, distinct form of 'state governmentality', there is nothing unusual with that the social, economic, political and civic issues at stake in the public debate are naturally attributed to it. As a representative moment of the immigrant question in France, we first took the case of the 2005 French *banlieue* riots in which the implications of the question revealed themselves at once: spatial fix, state/police violence, unemployment, social insecurity, precarity, criminalization, ethno-racial and religious issues, and so on. Although such issues have peculiar appearances in the contemporary French context, it is evident that they are not limited only to France: spatial fix is a problem not only in Paris but also in the great metropolises of the world; state/police violence has always been an issue not only in France but also, for instance, in the US and UK (most recently causing Baltimore and Ferguson riots in the US and Tottenham riots in the UK); unemployment, social insecurity, precarity, etc., are all striking phenomena of world's most advanced economies; ethno-racial and religious issues are going hand in hand with criminalization either giving birth to or accelerating racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia and the like. Under these circumstances that shake the advanced countries of the West, we assumed that such 'generalities' force us to focus *primarily* on something else rather than the peculiarities of the French model.

For that reason, we intended to bend the stick through focusing primarily on the common ground on which several models of state governmentality as distinct as, say, the French and Anglo-Saxon models, are rendered only modalities that come forth as different political forms in different social formations for governing the social, economic and political outcomes of an identical process: the capitalist mode of production. Our thesis was, accordingly, that the immigrant question—with its

implications as a whole—is directly related to the capitalist mode of production and, hence, to the relations of production and exploitation. Following this trajectory, the proper meaning of the immigrant question can only become intelligible by examining the class relations in which the immigrants are involved. Alternatively formulating, the immigrant question in France has in essence a concrete class character which determines and, in turn, is blurred by the natures of the implications of the question. This latter often leads the commentators on the various aspects of the question to approach them through the lenses of culture, identity, space, violence (either deriving from the state or from immigrants), and so on as regards their places in the distinct French model in such a way as abstracted from class relations formed in the capitalist mode of production, in the relations of production and exploitation. What do we propose, instead, was that, on the one hand, these various aspects become materialized once they pass from the lens of class relations so as to that they reacquire their class character. On the other hand, the specificities of the French model are *secondary* in comparison to the 'common ground' of the capitalist mode of production from which stem various models of governmentalities and similar social, political and economic issues in many social formations.

While bending the stick towards the opposite side, our proposition was not to suggest neglecting the peculiarities neither of the French Republicanism nor of the French social formation. On the contrary, our aim was to show that both the French Republicanism and the French social formation become more comprehensible in so far as they are understood in their relation to capitalism, and that, in the same way, the immigrant question become more comprehensible in so far as it is understood by examining the class character ascribed to it. In different contexts, the same common ground gives birth to different models and social formations and, in turn, similar social, political and economic problems in different contexts gain their specificities according to the natures of those different models and social formations. For that reason, we have dealt with the peculiarities of the immigrant question *in* France throughout this study always in their relation to this common ground, the mode of production. And, in order to do that, we underlined the necessity of a 'unitary theory' which provides the possibility of dialectically relating the various aspects of the immigrant question with each other under the logic of capitalist mode of production that determines the nature of the relations of production and exploitation.

We have discussed at length why we limited ourselves with the immigrants of Maghrebian and Sub-Saharan origins while defining the immigrant question, and also why we did not stick to the narrower legal definition of immigrant and instead took the descendants of immigrants into our account as well. *Vis-à-vis* this 'field' of study, the immigrants in our scope and their class characteristics engender a highly complicated, intermingling set of issues from which arises the necessity of a unitary theory with all its urgency. Here, too, peculiarities show themselves: in one and the same process of capitalist production, the immigrants as situated in the working class do not share the same conditions as the non-immigrants nor they deal with the same outcomes of the process. First of all, because of their status of being immigrant, they enter the labor market and the workplace under more disadvantageous conditions which are stimulated by the 'contradictory unity of production and realization' (of the surplus labor). Second, their disadvantageous conditions imply a profound historical context in which the law of value determines the conditions of an unequal exchange for the part of immigrants in the capitalist mode of production. Third, under these circumstances, immigrants undergo different class experiences in the process of capitalist production than the non-immigrants, thusly forming fractions within the working class. Fourth, the formation of these class fractions is realized throughout time and space so as to imply several 'non-economic' aspects such as identity, culture, religion, etc., which are always in relation to the actual relations of production and exploitation as well as the historical development of the social consciousness in time and space. And finally, the historical reasons that paved the way for labor migration from geographies like the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa point at the history of colonialism and imperialism, particularly of the French, during which periods the ancestors of the labor migrants of the 1960s and 1970s have been subjected to the process of dispossession exercised by the colonial power and eventually proletarianized or semi-proletarianized in the course of the process. While this process maintained the accumulation of capital by the hand of colonial exploitation, the 'natural economies' and traditional social formations rooted in these colonial geographies have seen dramatic transformations by the coercion of economic, political and military forces of colonialists and imperialists.

These transformations have been parallel to the class experiences of such proletarianized and semi-proletarianized masses whose divorce from their means of production, dispossession and surplus labor extracted and appropriated during the

colonial rule had all been catalyzers of the accumulation of capital for the part of the capitalist classes of colonial powers such as France. Moreover, it was in this period that the law of value operating under the capitalist mode of production had created a relation of unequal exchange between at the expense of pre-capitalist social formations so as to condemn them to the vicious circle of uneven development in the course of the social, economic and political transformations of the societies subjected to the French colonial rule. Labor migration was one the direct outcomes of this unequal relations between two geographies, one being at the core of global capitalist system while other being at its peripheries.

In that sense, the immigrant workers of the 1960s and 1970s who contributed to the *Trente Glorieuses* (*c.* 1945-1975) of European capitalism in general and of French capitalism in particular, and the descendants of immigrants of second and third generation who have effectively been the victims of the process of deindustrialization following the crisis of the mid-1970s—a crisis eventually necessitated the reorganization of capitalism, along with the political and social institutions peculiar to each capitalist social formation, under the rubric of neoliberalism—have been the *carriers* of a historical class line of which the genesis dates back to colonial times. The continuity of this class line is translated into actual processes in two ways: while cultural transmission provides the continuity of social consciousness (including class-consciousness), albeit inconstantly, from one generation to another, the political response against economic exploitation and non-economic domination/oppression provides the nexus between anti-colonial struggles, class struggles and urban riots as forms of political struggle in different contexts of time and space. This firm relation between consciousness and politics implies the class experiences not only confined to the economic sphere but also their extensions in the non-economic. Following the conception of 'class as process and relationship', it becomes obligatory to incorporate such extensions as identity, culture, race, religion, etc., with class experiences from which stems 'class formation', or formation of distinct class fractions.

So we did. We tried to show that processes peculiar to immigrants like the formation of culture, identification, etc., have essentially been involved into the formation of immigrant class fractions throughout the historical process of the development of their social consciousness and political struggles. In the colonial period until decolonization, social consciousness and political struggle have engaged

with currents like *al-Nahda* and pan-Africanism while they were often relying upon the indigenous working-class struggle in the centers of colonial production and other political militancy (including armed insurgency) against colonial dispossession. In a dialectical relation with the colonial economic policies and colonial politics of the great powers including France, these movements from below paved the way for successive political liberations of the newborn nations in the Maghreb and Sub-Sahara. In the period of neocolonialism following the decolonization of the French colonies in these geographies, the waves of labor migration triggered by the uneven development have essentially caused for these immigrants who flooded the working-class neighborhoods in the *banlieues* of French industrial cities like Paris, Lyon, etc., to acquire a new spatial context. It was in this spatial context that the experiences of the immigrant class fractions deriving from the relations of production and exploitation and extending to identity, culture, race and religion have gained a concrete form. Furthermore, with the end of the Keynesian period which announced massive unemployment and intense precarization so as to render first among others the immigrants and especially their descendants this spatial context has become more and more a spatial fix in which culminated economic and non-economic implications of the experiences of the immigrant class fractions.

In that respect, *banlieues* as the social spaces of immigrants play a critical role in the processes of their production and reproduction for the formation of immigrant class fractions. While immigrants and their descendants are concentrated in these social spaces with a growing rate, their everyday lives that are in relation to their class experiences have become more and more visibly antagonistic to what the French Republicanism intended with integration so as to meet its assimilationist policies. On the one hand, along with the common 'language' of *Verlan*, Islam as the banner of the cultural, religious, ethnic, even national identity of the Muslim immigrants especially from the Maghreb and the neologisms of Africanisms such as rap music and hip hop culture as the banner of the cultural, ethnic, racial identity of the Black immigrants from the Sub-Sahara have set their seals on the antagonism against the French model. On the other hand, from the Minguettes riots in 1981 to the 2005 riots, the 'tradition' of urban riots has borne and revealed, in a militant and often 'violent' way, the political character of the immigrants' experiences based on class relations. Moreover, to the extent that these experiences are influenced by ethno-racial tension, cultural codes, religion and the like, the political character of

these experiences has found the ground of interpretation in terms of the 'politics of identity'. Yet, such interpretations have often dismissed the fact that these influences have in fact been grounded on class relations at their expense of comprehending the immigrant question in its totality.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

Perhaps, it would be safe to claim that the immigrant question in France is now being dominated by one of its specific implications, which we named the *Muslimfrage*. More than 10 years after the 2005 *banlieue* riots, there had been no urban riot that was caused by the immigrant question; however, the public debates on the one hand, manifestations and protests on the other hand, have particularly been concentrated around the Muslim question. This claim could be underlined by the terror attacks that caused bloodsheds at Charlie Hebdo, which was targeted as 'vengeance' of the depiction of Prophet Muhammad in caricatures, and at Bataclan, which was hit by the terrorists of Daesh. Can the Muslim question be discernable from these terror attacks that shook France in particular and even Europe in general? There is not an easy answer for this question. As we have shown, the Muslim question is now characterized by the 'Islam of youth' who broke off their ties with the formerly hegemonic Islamist movements that reined the Muslim field for years. It is now the loosely defined Islam of the descendants of immigrants that became hegemonic in France and challenging the Republic. On the other hand, the ground swell of the quietist Salafism that made a number of Muslims retreat from the public sphere to the sphere of civil society has an ambiguous (and suspicious) relation with its kin, the jihadist Salafism. And each time this jihadist Salafism hit France with terror, it is not these 'marginal' groups but the Muslims as a whole that are being judged in the conscience of the layman whose rage is incited by the far-right politics. The jihadists may well raise an army and claim territory in Syria or Libya but their 'sleeping cells' or their potential recruits amounting to hundreds or a few thousands on the French and European soil (thanks to visa-free borders) will always have more impact than their social forces. *Vis-à-vis* this multiplier effect, the Muslim question itself will become a question *for* Muslims, and the immigrant question itself will become a question *for* immigrants, even before the Republic.

How could this contradiction be transcended? The descendants of immigrants have now on their shoulders the burden of the dead generations weighing more than ever. Would a possible strategy of 'religion against religion' be the accurate response for such a transcending? Possibly not, for that the Muslim question is now the dominant but only one aspect of the immigrant question. In the midst of tightly knitted net, derivatives of the immigrant question have perniciously telescoped. And as long as they remain distant to their own class characters, as long as they remain distant to the totality of their own class conditions, as long as they remain reluctant to a possible strategy of 'class against class', the thread of being trapped in the fantasy of a 'political emancipation' will be permanent at their own expense. The other way might be signing a path for a 'social emancipation'.

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