



Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences

Department of International Relations

**TURKEY'S ANOMALIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR  
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME**

Gün ÜNAL

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2019

**TURKEY'S ANOMALIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR  
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME**



Gün ÜNAL

Hacettepe University Graduate School Of Social Sciences


Department of International Relations

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2019

## ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL


The jury finds that Gün Ünal has on the date of 03 September 2019 successfully passed the defense examination and approves her master's thesis titled "*Turkey's Anomalies in the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*".



Professor Dr. Haldun Yalçinkaya (Jury President)



Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem Udum (Advisor)



Asst. Prof. Dr. K. Kaan Renda

I agree that the signatures above belong to the faculty members listed.

Graduate School Director

## YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI

Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarım bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır.

Tezin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinleri yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan "**Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge**" kapsamında tezim aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır.

- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren 2 yıl ertelenmiştir. <sup>(1)</sup>
- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ..... ay ertelenmiştir. <sup>(2)</sup>
- Tezimle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. <sup>(3)</sup>

03/09/2019

Gün ÜNAL

<sup>1</sup>"Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge"

- (1) Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü teze ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu** iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir.
- (2) Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internetten paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulunun** gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir.
- (3) Madde 7. 1. Ulusal çıkarları veya güvenliği ilgilendiren, emniyet, istihbarat, savunma ve güvenlik, sağlık vb. konulara ilişkin lisansüstü tezlerle ilgili gizlilik kararı, **tezin yapıldığı kurum** tarafından verilir \*. Kurum ve kuruluşlarla yapılan işbirliği protokolü çerçevesinde hazırlanan lisansüstü tezlere ilişkin gizlilik kararı ise, **ilgili kurum ve kuruluşun önerisi** ile **enstitü veya fakültenin** uygun görüşü üzerine **üniversite yönetim kurulu** tarafından verilir. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler Yükseköğretim Kuruluna bildirilir. Madde 7.2. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler gizlilik süresince enstitü veya fakülte tarafından gizlilik kuralları çerçevesinde muhafaza edilir, gizlilik kararının kaldırılması halinde Tez Otomasyon Sistemine yüklenir.

\* Tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü veya fakülte yönetim kurulu tarafından karar verilir.**

## ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Doç Dr. Şebnem UDUM** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



Gün ÜNAL

## ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL

The jury finds that Gün Ünal has on the date of 03 September 2019 successfully passed the defense examination and approves her master's thesis titled "*Turkey's Anomalies in the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime within the Scope of Regime Theory*".

Professor Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya (Jury President)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem Udum (Main Adviser)

Asst. Professor Dr. K. Kaan Renda

I agree that the signatures above belong to the faculty members listed.

Graduate School Director

## YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI

Enstitü tarafından onaylanan lisansüstü tezimin tamamını veya herhangi bir kısmını, basılı (kağıt) ve elektronik formatta arşivleme ve aşağıda verilen koşullarla kullanıma açma iznini Hacettepe Üniversitesine verdiğimi bildiririm. Bu izinle Üniversiteye verilen kullanım hakları dışındaki tüm fikri mülkiyet haklarını bende kalacak, tezimin tamamının ya da bir bölümünün gelecekteki çalışmalarda (makale, kitap, lisans ve patent vb.) kullanım hakları bana ait olacaktır.

Tezimin kendi orijinal çalışmam olduğunu, başkalarının haklarını ihlal etmediğimi ve tezimin tek yetkili sahibi olduğumu beyan ve taahhüt ederim. Tezimde yer alan telif hakkı bulunan ve sahiplerinden yazılı izin alınarak kullanılması zorunlu metinleri yazılı izin alınarak kullandığımı ve istenildiğinde suretlerini Üniversiteye teslim etmeyi taahhüt ederim.

Yükseköğretim Kurulu tarafından yayınlanan **“Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge”** kapsamında tezimin aşağıda belirtilen koşullar haricince YÖK Ulusal Tez Merkezi / H.Ü. Kütüphaneleri Açık Erişim Sisteminde erişime açılır.

- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulu kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren 2 yıl ertelenmiştir. <sup>(1)</sup>
- Enstitü / Fakülte yönetim kurulunun gerekçeli kararı ile tezimin erişime açılması mezuniyet tarihimden itibaren ..... ay ertelenmiştir. <sup>(2)</sup>
- Teziminle ilgili gizlilik kararı verilmiştir. <sup>(3)</sup>

03/09/2019

Gün ÜNAL

<sup>1</sup>“Lisansüstü Tezlerin Elektronik Ortamda Toplanması, Düzenlenmesi ve Erişime Açılmasına İlişkin Yönerge”

- (1) Madde 6. 1. Lisansüstü tezle ilgili patent başvurusu yapılması veya patent alma sürecinin devam etmesi durumunda, tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulu** iki yıl süre ile tezin erişime açılmasının ertelenmesine karar verebilir.
- (2) Madde 6. 2. Yeni teknik, materyal ve metotların kullanıldığı, henüz makaleye dönüşmemiş veya patent gibi yöntemlerle korunmamış ve internetten paylaşılması durumunda 3. şahıslara veya kurumlara haksız kazanç imkanı oluşturabilecek bilgi ve bulguları içeren tezler hakkında tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulunun** gerekçeli kararı ile altı ayı aşmamak üzere tezin erişime açılması engellenebilir.
- (3) Madde 7. 1. Ulusal çıkarları veya güvenliği ilgilendiren, emniyet, istihbarat, savunma ve güvenlik, sağlık vb. konulara ilişkin lisansüstü tezlerle ilgili gizlilik kararı, **tezin yapıldığı kurum** tarafından verilir \*. Kurum ve kuruluşlarla yapılan işbirliği protokolü çerçevesinde hazırlanan lisansüstü tezlere ilişkin gizlilik kararı ise, **ilgili kurum ve kuruluşun önerisi** ile **enstitü** veya **fakültenin** uygun görüşü üzerine **üniversite yönetim kurulu** tarafından verilir. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler Yükseköğretim Kuruluna bildirilir.  
Madde 7.2. Gizlilik kararı verilen tezler gizlilik süresince enstitü veya fakülte tarafından gizlilik kuralları çerçevesinde muhafaza edilir, gizlilik kararının kaldırılması halinde Tez Otomasyon Sistemine yüklenir.

\* Tez **danışmanının** önerisi ve **enstitü anabilim dalının** uygun görüşü üzerine **enstitü** veya **fakülte yönetim kurulu tarafından karar verilir.**

## ETİK BEYAN

Bu çalışmadaki bütün bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar çerçevesinde elde ettiğimi, görsel, işitsel ve yazılı tüm bilgi ve sonuçları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduğumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduğumu, tezimin kaynak gösterilen durumlar dışında özgün olduğunu, **Doç Dr. Şebnem UDUM** danışmanlığında tarafımdan üretildiğini ve Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Yazım Yönergesine göre yazıldığını beyan ederim.



**Gün ÜNAL**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study is dedicated wholeheartedly to my maternal grandparents Hüseyin U. and Müyesser U.

First and foremost, I have to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem Udum, my thesis advisor, for inspiring me to study on nuclear nonproliferation as a woman. I can not thank her enough for her invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout this study and specially for her confidence in me.

I also would like to thank Professor Dr. Haldun Yalçınkaya and Asst. Prof. Dr. K. Kaan Renda for their contribution to my thesis.

To all my friends, thank you for understanding and support in many moments of self-doubt and discouragement. Last but not least, I would like to thank Resul Baysal for his support and contribution to this study.



## ABSTRACT

Unal, Gun. *Turkey's Anomalies in the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2019.

Turkey is in compliance with the global nuclear nonproliferation regime in both legal and verbal terms. It voices support for the norms of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology. It adopts supplementary practices in order to strengthen the regime like export controls and the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements. It emphasizes the right to exercise peaceful use of nuclear technology based on the Article IV of Treaty of Nonproliferation of the Nuclear Weapons that is granted to Non Nuclear Weapon States in good standing with the IAEA.

However, the thesis draws attention to two deviations in Turkey's behavior. Turkey advocates keeping access to proliferation-sensitive technologies such as uranium enrichment and reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel despite lacking the current nuclear infrastructure for these technologies. Turkey also welcomes the attempts to realize a weapons of mass destruction free zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East. But also, Turkey continues to host tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik Airbase that is located in Adana, a city in the southeastern region of the country, with abstention to call for their removal.

The thesis argues that despite Turkey's commitment to the nonproliferation regime, Turkey's particular behavior in nuclear nonproliferation regime in those cases stems from its conceptualization of power pertaining to nuclear field. Thus, it is argued that Turkey's anomalies in the regime relate to its hesitance to let go off the subjective 'virtual power' it attributes to nuclear energy and NATO nuclear umbrella.

### Key Words

Turkey, security, nuclear, energy, regime, NPT

## ÖZET

ÜNAL, Gün. *Türkiye'nin Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesine İlişkin Uluslararası Rejimle Uyumsuz Olduğu Örnekler*, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2019.

Türkiye, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesine Yönelik Küresel Rejim'e yasal ve politik açıdan riayet etmekte, bu rejimin temelini oluşturan nükleer silahların yayılmasının engellenmesi, nükleer silahsızlanma ve nükleer enerjinin barışçıl amaçlarla kullanılması normlarını desteklemektedir. Türkiye, rejimi güçlendirmek amacıyla oluşturulan ihracat denetim mekanizmaları ve UAEA'nın Ek Protokol'ünü kabul etmiştir. Ayrıca Türkiye, Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Engellenmesi Anlaşması'nın 4. Maddesi uyarınca, UAEA ile uyumlu olan Nükleer Silahsız Ülkeler'in nükleer enerjiyi barışçıl amaçlarla kullanabilme hakkını savunmaktadır. Ancak, bu teknolojiler için altyapısı yoktur. Buna rağmen, uranyum zenginleştirme ve kullanılmış nükleer yakıtın yeniden işlenmesi gibi iki hassas teknolojinin kendisi gibi UAEA ile uyumlu devletler için engellenmemesini uluslararası platformlarda savunmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin uluslararası rejimle ilgili tutumuyla çelişen diğer bir nokta, Türkiye'nin nükleer silahsızlanma normunu ve Ortadoğu'nun kitle imha silahsız bölgeye dönüşmesini desteklerken, İncirlik Üssü'nde taktik nükleer silahları bulundurmaya devam etmesidir.

Bu tez, uluslararası rejime bağlı kalmasına rağmen Türkiye'nin nükleer teknolojiye ilişkin öznel güç kavramsallaştırması nedeniyle rejime karşı duruşuyla çelişen iki karar verdiğini savunmaktadır ve Türkiye'nin güvenlik algısı incelendiğinde, bu yaklaşımını nükleer silahlanmaya yönelik bir eğilim değil, Türkiye'nin nükleer teknolojiye ve NATO'nun nükleer şemsiyesi altında yer almaya atfettiği güçten vazgeçmekteki isteksizliği olarak yorumlamaktadır.

### **Anahtar Sözcükler**

Türkiye, güvenlik, nükleer, enerji, rejim, NPT

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL.....  | i   |
| YAYINLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI.....   | ii  |
| ETİK BEYAN.....   | iii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....  | iv  |
| ABSTRACT.....   | v   |
| ÖZET.....   | vi  |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....  | vii |
| ABBREVIATIONS.....  | ix  |
| INTRODUCTION.....   | 1   |
| CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....  | 9   |
| 1.1 TURKISH SECURITY FRAMEWORK.....   | 9   |
| 1.2. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....  | 11  |
| 1.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....   | 17  |
| 1.3.1. Realism.....   | 18  |
| 1.3.2. Neoliberalism.....   | 20  |
| 1.3.3. Regime Theory.....   | 22  |
| CHAPTER 2: TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY AND ITS IMPACTS ON<br>FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR<br>NONPROLIFERATION..... | 25  |
| 2.1. MAIN DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY.....   | 25  |

|   |    |
|---|----|
| 2.2. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1920- 1945.....                         | 26 |
| 2.3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE COLD WAR.....                        | 31 |
| 2.4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-COLD WAR.....                           | 32 |
| 2.5. TURKEY’S NON NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE STATUS.....                          | 35 |
| CHAPTER 3: TURKEY’S ANOMALIES AS A NNWS IN THE REGIME .....                 | 42 |
| 3.1. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND NNWS.....                          | 42 |
| 3.2. FIRST ‘ANOMALY’: PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE<br>TECHNOLOGIES.....          | 45 |
| 3.3. EXPLANATION OF FIRST ANOMALY: ‘NUCLEAR ENERGY’ AND<br>NNWS STATUS..... | 48 |
| 3.4. SECOND ‘ANOMALY’: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN<br>INCIRLIK.....         | 50 |
| 3.5. EXPLANATION OF THE SECOND ANOMALY: SECURITY<br>ASSURANCE.....          | 54 |
| 3.6 ASSESSMENT.....   | 57 |
| CONCLUSION.....   | 61 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY.....   | 64 |
| APPENDIX 1: Tez Orijinallik Raporu.....                                     | 75 |
| APPENDIX 2: Thesis Originality Report.....                                  | 76 |
| APPENDIX 3: Etik Kurul İzin Muafiyet Formu.....                             | 77 |
| APPENDIX 4: Ethic Comission Form for Thesis.....                            | 78 |
| APPENDIX 5: TABLES.....   | 79 |

**ABBREVIATIONS**

|      |  |
|------|--|
| CD   | Conference on Disarmament                                |
| CSA  | Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement                       |
| ENR  | Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies                 |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency                       |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                       |
| NBCR | Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Radiological (weapons) |
| NPT  | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons       |
| NSG  | Nuclear Suppliers Group                                  |
| NWS  | Nuclear Weapon State                                     |
| NNWS | Non- Nuclear Weapon State                                |
| NPDI | Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative              |
| PSI  | Proliferation Security Initiative                        |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organizations                      |
| WMD  | Weapons of Mass Destruction                              |
| TNW  | Tactical Nuclear Weapons                                 |



## INTRODUCTION

Nuclear energy is used in various fields. One of them is nuclear energy generation in power plants and is called 'peaceful use of nuclear energy'. Today, controlling carbon dioxide emissions and associated climate change as well as reducing dependency on fossil fuels is a must. Since nuclear energy yields massive amount of energy, releases low carbon and alleviates political dependency on hydrocarbons, peaceful use of nuclear energy has become popular for responding to political, social and environmental goals of states to reduce dependence on imported fuel.<sup>1</sup> Thus, with peaceful use of nuclear technology, states might be able to alleviate their energy security concerns and pursue clean, reliable, affordable and environmental friendly energy.<sup>2</sup>

However, unlike the other sources of energy, nuclear energy relates to International Relations and a broader international security context. Basic knowledge of nuclear technology and type of nuclear reactors could therefore enable understanding the link between nuclear energy and international security. Because with technical know-how and political will to proliferate, certain nuclear technologies are susceptible to be hijacked for military purposes such as developing nuclear weapons. Thus, states using nuclear technology for peaceful purposes are subject to an international regime on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. As such, nuclear technology was initially used for building atomic bombs in that were used as instruments of political and military advantage or prestige in politics.<sup>3</sup>

According to Krasner, regimes are set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.<sup>4</sup> The states join the regime on the premise of committing to the norm of nonproliferation and undertake

---

<sup>1</sup> "Energy", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 17 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/energy>.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> "Nuclear Weapons", United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed 19 August 2019, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/>

<sup>4</sup> S.D Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables", *International Organization*, no.36 (1982),186.



obligations. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter NPT) reads as the framework to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, to eliminate existing nuclear weapons and to foster the peaceful use of nuclear technology.<sup>5</sup> NPT distinguishes non nuclear weapon states (hereafter NNWS) from nuclear weapon states (NWS) and entitles them to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy on the condition of IAEA safeguards in order to ensure safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter IAEA) functions as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the nuclear field.<sup>6</sup> Further, Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group provides export control guidelines to ensure that nuclear materials are not used for non-peaceful purposes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is comprised of states exporting nuclear material and technologies and provides guidelines for export items to track and prevent attempts to clandestine nuclear proliferation.

As nuclear technology remains susceptible to clandestine proliferation<sup>7</sup> and states without nuclear weapons that are in compliance with their obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation regime are entitled to enjoy nuclear technology as a clean, sustainable and independent source of energy, the nuclear nonproliferation regime is challenged with balancing security risks with the inalienable right of NNWS to pursue peaceful nuclear technology.<sup>8</sup> Similarly, NNWS that pursue a civilian nuclear agenda for their prospective energy security goals face unique challenges at the intersection of right to peaceful use of nuclear technology and prevention of clandestine proliferation. Proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel is among the unique challenges.

---

<sup>5</sup> Article I, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT) (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>6</sup> "Overview", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 17 June 2019 <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview>

<sup>7</sup> IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, "Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Future Challenges", (1998, April 23), accessed 15 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/control-nuclear-proliferation-future-challenges>.

<sup>8</sup> Article IV, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT) (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

Proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies enable converting fissile material to nuclear fuel to be used in nuclear reactors on the condition of verifying their nuclear activities via IAEA safeguards. However, proliferation-sensitive technologies could pose severe security risks when and if they are used for developing nuclear weapons clandestinely. Accordingly, use of proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies by NNWS has become an international security concern after the resumption of Iranian nuclear program in early 2000s.

As NPT does not prohibit proliferation sensitive technologies to NNWS or limits any technology for peaceful use on the condition of complying with IAEA safeguards, Iran's uranium enrichment activities and failure to report its nuclear activities to IAEA resulted in nuclear exporting states to adopt stricter export controls on NNWS. Because Iran's nuclear activities is concerned for triggering states, especially those in the region, to develop nuclear weapons against Iran and undermine nuclear nonproliferation.<sup>9</sup> The measures included providing nuclear fuel from a nuclear fuel bank and including materials relevant to these technologies in export lists to NNWS without relevant nuclear infrastructure. However, there is already a framework to ensure nuclear nonproliferation via international safeguard agreements and Additional Protocol under IAEA to alleviate undeclared nuclear activities.<sup>10</sup> Thus, additional measures to limit proliferation-sensitive technologies led to a contention between nuclear exporters and NNWS that are already in compliance with IAEA safeguards, yet do not have nuclear infrastructure for proliferation sensitive technologies.<sup>11</sup>

Turkey is a non nuclear weapon state that faces this challenge as Turkey's interests in nuclear area has increased over the years due to growing energy and status needs. Thus, nuclear technology has been a matter of concern for

---

<sup>9</sup> Pier Goldschmidt, "The Increasing Risk of Nuclear Proliferation: Addressing the Challenge", (2003, November 26), International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 26 June 2019, , <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/increasing-risk-nuclear-proliferation-addressing-challenge>.

<sup>10</sup> "Verification and Other Safeguards Activities", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 16 August 2018, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/verification-and-other-safeguards-activities>

<sup>11</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?" Discussion Papers 2, (2010),10

Turkey's energy security policy. Accordingly, Turkey aims at diversifying its energy resources and reduce dependence on hydrocarbon sources for its long term energy security goals. Nuclear energy is a part of Turkish energy security agenda as Turkey aims to provide for %15 of its electricity via nuclear energy in 2030<sup>12</sup> and is concerned about the developments regarding the application and accessibility of peaceful use of nuclear technology as a NNWS.

Turkey as a NNWS has no record of diversion or misuse of the nuclear technology for non-peaceful purposes despite several occasions Turkey was portrayed as a nuclear weapons aspirant. Although Iran's nuclear weapons capability is argued to trigger Turkey's nuclear proliferation, NATO and especially the United States as Turkey's historic security assurances and ongoing process of candidacy to European Union would be constraints on Turkey when and if it seeks to develop nuclear weapons capability individually<sup>13</sup>.

Turkey signed NPT in 1969 and ratified it in 1979. As NPT enable non nuclear weapon states to have the inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy,<sup>14</sup> Turkey signed and ratified international safeguards agreement with IAEA in 1981 that were enforced for all nuclear facilities as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State party to NPT.<sup>15</sup> Also, Regulation on Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control, which was prepared in accordance with Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and IAEA for the application of Safeguard in Connection with the Treaty on NPT, has been put into force in 1997.<sup>16</sup>

Turkey has been compliant to the norm of nuclear nonproliferation and never developed nuclear weapons. Accordingly, it joined several instruments of

---

<sup>12</sup> "Turkey Starts Construction of its First Nuclear Power Plant", International Atomic Energy Agency News, accessed 18 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/turkey-starts-construction-of-its-first-nuclear-power-plant>

<sup>13</sup> A. Stein, Ş. Udum, "A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran's Nuclear Footsteps", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 11, no.2, (2012),148

<sup>14</sup> Article IV, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>15</sup> Ayhan Yilmazer, Aysun Güncel, "The Present Status of Safeguards in Turkey", I. Euroasia Conference on Nuclear Science and Its Application, Vol 1, (İzmir: October 2000)

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

nuclear nonproliferation regime and has taken steps to prevent proliferation as a continuation of its nonproliferation commitment.<sup>17</sup>

On nuclear disarmament, Turkey is a party to Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that are components of the regime to support norm of nuclear disarmament. Turkey shares the vision towards elimination of all existing nuclear arsenals in the world as a part of United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD). Conference of Disarmament focuses on prevention of nuclear war, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in armaments.<sup>18</sup> In addition, Turkey actively participates in the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). NPDI is founded by Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates in September 2010. It is a ministerial-level group of states within the framework of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and focuses on practical steps to the advancement of the nuclear disarmament agenda and greater transparency in the way nuclear weapons states fulfill their disarmament commitments.<sup>19</sup>

As NPT endorse strengthening nuclear disarmament by regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,<sup>20</sup> Turkey supports the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Turkey's policy over nuclear nonproliferation deviates in two issues complicating its policy vis-à-vis nuclear nonproliferation. The thesis

---

<sup>17</sup> "Arms Control and Disarmament Republic of Turkey", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament, accessed 14 July 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>

<sup>18</sup> "An Introduction to the Conference of Disarmament", United Nations Office of Geneva, accessed 10 June 2019, [https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument](https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument).

<sup>19</sup> "Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative", The Nuclear Threat Initiative, accessed 16 June 2019, <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/non-proliferation-and-disarmament-ini>

<sup>20</sup> Article VII, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

argues that Turkey, a NNWS, keeps NATO nuclear weapons without possessing nuclear weapons and supports nuclear nonproliferation regime at the same time. Also, Turkey seeks retaining access to technologies irrelevant to its nascent nuclear infrastructure as a NNWS despite its ongoing efforts in nuclear nonproliferation.

However, the thesis supports that deviations in Turkey's foreign policy on nonproliferation that can be interpreted as 'anomalies' departs from non-technical reasons. In order to explain them, the thesis adopts security conceptualization of Turkey as a context and aims at alleviating misinterpretation of Turkey's nuclear intentions. Because security conceptualization is key to understand why Turkey feels secure in face of a nuclear attack from external threats without possessing nuclear weapons and supports nuclear nonproliferation regime at the same time. The thesis supports that Turkey is highly unlikely to develop its own nuclear weapons to exert military power given that clandestine proliferation via proliferation sensitive technologies is both detrimental to its ties with the West along with its NNWS status, and irrelevant to its nascent nuclear industry.

There are articles and theses written in Turkey regarding nuclear nonproliferation regime studies however their scope does not focus on Turkey's anomalies in the nuclear nonproliferation regime from a security perception context.<sup>21</sup> Their scope covers international law, regime formation for nuclear terrorism and Turkish nuclear debate.<sup>22</sup> There is not any thesis written abroad on Turkey's anomalies in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The research question of this thesis, however, departs from an article on Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Dr. Mustafa Kibaroglu that defines Turkey's anomalies in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The thesis attempts to define them in detail to alleviate any doubts on Turkey's commitment to international security and the root causes of these anomalies.

---

<sup>21</sup> Accessed at Council of Higher Education (YÖK), Thesis Center on June 10, 2019.

<sup>22</sup> Accessed at ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global on June 10, 2019.

Given two deviations in Turkey's standing with the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, the thesis will attempt to answer following research question:

*Why is Turkey, a committed member of the global nonproliferation regime, behaving differently in two specific issues, that is, nuclear disarmament and the proliferation-sensitive technologies?*

In order to support the research question, the thesis attempts to answer following sub-questions:

*What are the obligations of NNWS in the nuclear nonproliferation regime?*

*What is Turkey's security policy and how does the status of Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) status fit into it?*

*What meaning does Turkey give to proliferation-sensitive technologies and NATO nuclear weapons?*

The thesis is structured as follows:

The first chapter *will attempt to introduce the conceptual elements of the thesis* that are key to the research question. *Accordingly*, the chapter briefly explains elements of Turkish security policy underlying the 'anomalies' in Turkey's foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, nuclear technology relevant to International Relations will be introduced to understand proliferation-sensitive technologies and their relevance to Turkey's first anomaly.

The thesis will make use insights of International Theories in the first chapter rather than testing a particular theory against Turkey's 'anomalies'. *Accordingly*, the section only provides insights to state behavior and regimes. Nevertheless, Realism has more explanatory power in Turkey's security policy leading to its 'anomalies' as a NNWS in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Theoretical insights on the transformation of regimes is also key to understand the emergence of 'anomalies'.

The second chapter will attempt to answer to '*What is Turkey's security policy and how does the status of Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) status fit into it?*' This section argues that Turkey's foreign policy decisions are linked to its security policy in the field of nuclear nonproliferation: proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey. But also, Turkish security policy is built on a combination of historic experience and geopolitics. This chapter is key to understand whether Turkey is a 'clandestine proliferation aspirant' and a 'threat to international security' or it behaves as such for completely different reasons.

The third chapter will attempt to answer to Turkey's anomalies and '*What meaning does Turkey give to proliferation-sensitive technologies and NATO nuclear weapons?*'. This section will attempt to examine specific determinants of Turkey's foreign and security policy that results in 'anomalies' in its nuclear nonproliferation policy. The section is instrumental to assess that Turkey is not an outlier of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a threat to international security.

The thesis adopts descriptive data from primary sources such as, international treaties, reports, speeches, interviews and secondary sources such as peer-reviewed articles, books, internet sources including official web sites. The sources used are written in English or Turkish.

The next chapter will offer a conceptual framework including political implications of nuclear technologies, theoretical knowledge on international regimes and the approach the thesis adopted for understanding the research question.

## CHAPTER I

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will attempt to build a framework of the concepts instrumental to understand the problematique of the research question. Therefore, the approach to security and foreign policy embodied in Turkey's state behavior, relevant theoretical knowledge on state behavior in International Relations and technical information key to understand the link between International Relations and nuclear technology will be introduced.

This chapter is instrumental to understand the main determinants of Turkey's view of security, state behavior in a regime, the scientific background of nuclear technology and its political implications.

#### 1.1. TURKISH SECURITY FRAMEWORK

State behavior is divided into four levels: individual, organizational, state and systemic level, the thesis adopts a state-level analysis, looking for a domestic concept leading to 'anomalies' in Turkey's foreign policy towards nuclear nonproliferation. Accordingly, the thesis argues that 'anomalies' are conducive to components of Turkey's security policy that are not looked at from nuclear nonproliferation context.

Security policy of a state is the behavior based on security conceptualization. Security conceptualization refers to how states define security, which actors are influential in the process, how a threat perception emerges and what means are used to address to this threat.<sup>23</sup> Within theoretical approaches to security, this study adopts 'security policy' as a 'context' to read both behaviors in the scope of nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The thesis will attempt to introduce determinants of Turkish foreign policy with a focus on external threats as follows: Turkey's strategic location, historical

---

<sup>23</sup> Tarık Oğuzlu, Security Culture and Turkish Foreign Policy, Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World Vol.72, (2015), 228



experience as a successor of late Ottoman Empire and political ideology of governing elite combined with systemic changes in World politics.

Turkey is a middle power state with unique features and severely affected by the regional developments due to its location controlling Turkish Straits between Black Sea and Mediterranean at the crossroads of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Persian Gulf. Geopolitics enabled Turkey playing a bigger role as a middle power in world politics uniquely because of its strategic value.<sup>24</sup>

Besides geopolitics, historical experiences has shaped Turkish threat perception and means to address to these threats. As Turkey's history as a nation state dates back to the end of the First World War, security perception of Turkish society was gravely affected by the political consequences of Sevres Treaty followed by a security and foreign policy focused on survival instinct for the indivisibility of Turkish society and territory.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, foreign policy choices and strategic alignments are built on this motivation in throughout systemic changes Turkey's status in the international community.

The thesis also argues that the 'anomalies' in Turkey's foreign policy on nuclear disarmament is an 'involuntary defection'. Involuntary defection is the inability of a party reaching or supporting an international agreement to sustain its political commitment based on domestic political constraints.<sup>26</sup> As the domestic political constraint, the thesis refers to Turkey's security policy in the conceptualization of power in being eligible to 'nuclear capabilities' as a technology and its position as a NNWS in the international community. Turkey's foreign policy leading to the friction between Turkish state behavior and its stance on the proliferation sensitive nuclear technologies is further influenced by the transition from a passive and indifferent foreign policy towards the Middle East to a

---

<sup>24</sup> Mustafa Aydın, 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.35, no 4 (Oct. 1999), 152.

<sup>25</sup> See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, (2000) 199-217; Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2003),306-331.

<sup>26</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "The Logic of Two-Level Games: International Cooperation, Domestic Politics, and Western Summitry, 1975-1986," *American Political Science Association*, (Washington. D.C:1986), 13.

contrastingly active one in the post-Cold War period. This is an important conjunctural element in Turkish foreign policy.

The study argues that the anomalies in Turkey's foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation are conducive to the main traditional determinant of Turkey's security policy, that is, the survival instinct of Turkish state and society. The thesis also argues that anomalies are not in Turkey's NNWS status but Turkey's approach to the transformation of nuclear nonproliferation norms in the regime. Accordingly, the thesis will attempt to explain why Turkey, with deviations in its nuclear nonproliferation policy, should not be seen as an outlier of the nuclear nonproliferation regime or a threat to international security. For that, Turkey's anomalies in nuclear nonproliferation are given the relevant variables of Turkish foreign policy both in traditional and conjunctural terms. Further, in order to understand 'the first anomaly' in Turkey's behavior regarding the access to proliferation-sensitive technologies, the significance of these nuclear technologies to International Relations is introduced.

## **1.2. NUCLEAR ENERGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

Nuclear energy uses fission and chain reaction. Nuclear fission is a scientific process that an atom absorbs a neutron and splits into two atoms, as was experimented in 1934 by Fermi.<sup>27</sup> Each splitted atom yields at least two neutrons in nuclear fission. As atoms split repeatedly and release a flux of neutrons, a chain reaction can be sustained that releases massive amount of energy as heat.

In order for an atom to split repeatedly to sustain a chain reaction, it has to be 'fissile'. Uranium and plutonium are fissile materials. Uranium is found in nature as a mixture of fissile and non-fissile isotopes. Plutonium, on the other hand, is a by-product of burnt nuclear fuel. Since fissile materials are radioactive,

---

<sup>27</sup> "Physics of Uranium and Nuclear Energy", World Nuclear Association, accessed 18 September 2019, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/physics-of-nuclear-energy.aspx>

application of nuclear fission requires special facilities such as nuclear reactors to avoid any environmental hazard and contain the massive energy released from chain reaction. Accordingly, reactors operate using fissile material as fuel. Therefore, nuclear technology for energy generation is based on the use of fissile nuclear material as 'fuel' to release massive amount of energy in a reactor. For that, entire process from mining of natural uranium to reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel is called a full nuclear fuel cycle.




Table 1: World Nuclear Transport Institute, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, retrieved from <https://www.wnti.co.uk/nuclear-transport-facts/what-is-transported-how.aspx>

There are two types of nuclear reactors; light water reactors or heavy water reactors. Heavy water reactors use natural uranium as fuel whereas light water reactors that are widely used in the world requires enriched uranium.

Uranium, as a nuclear fuel is found in nature as a mixture of fissile U-235 and non-fissile U-238 isotopes. Isotopes are atoms that have same number of protons, but, different number of neutrons that is key to nuclear fission. After natural uranium is mined and milled, it is preserved as uranium oxide concentrate as known as 'yellowcake'. In order to extract U-235 in the natural uranium that is necessary for fuel fabrication, the yellowcake is converted to gaseous form at low temperature to be converted from uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride, or '*enriched*'. The scientific processes from the mining of uranium to the fabrication of nuclear fuel and its use in a reactor are called the front end of nuclear fuel cycle.

### 1.2.1. Proliferation-Sensitive Technologies

The phases in nuclear fuel cycle are key to the use of civilian nuclear technology within the current capabilities of nuclear science unless a technological breakthrough alters the course of nuclear fuel cycle.

Nevertheless, some technologies particularly used for enrichment and reprocessing in the limits of nuclear science has implications for international security for their particular role in a possible diversion and misuse of nuclear technology.

Only %0.7 of natural uranium is made of U-235, that is the suitable isotope for nuclear fission.<sup>28</sup> Thus, in order to sustain a chain reaction with U-235 as nuclear fuel in a light water reactor, uranium needs to be '*enriched*'. Enrichment is a physical process in nuclear science to concentrate a particular isotope via different technologies. Similarly, uranium enrichment is the concentration of U-235 isotopes in natural uranium via technologies such as diffusion and centrifuge in an enrichment facility.<sup>29</sup> Today's enrichment plants widely use the centrifuge process.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, enriching uranium from %20 to %90 requires less effort than enriching natural uranium up to %20 (Table 2).




Table 2: World Nuclear Association, *Uranium Enrichment*, retrieved from <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx>

<sup>28</sup> "Enrichment", World Nuclear Association, accessed 17 June 2019, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel.aspx>

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Nuclear fuel made of %4-5 enriched uranium is sufficient for power reactors. For research reactors, nuclear fuel made of %20 enriched uranium is used. On the other hand, enrichment above %90 makes uranium suitable material for developing a nuclear weapon. Therefore, uranium enrichment has dual use:<sup>31</sup> It is a requirement for the application of peaceful nuclear energy in light water reactors with current nuclear technology (heavy water reactors use natural uranium) and a proliferation-sensitive technology at the same time. Thus, without an international mechanism that verify peaceful nuclear activities, enrichment capacity could enable diverting uranium enrichment technology for non-peaceful purposes, for example a military nuclear program. Accordingly, International Atomic Energy Agency allows no more than %20 enrichment capacity for non nuclear weapon states.

Enrichment is the only proliferation-sensitive technology in the front end of nuclear fuel cycle, but, is not the only proliferation-sensitive technology in the full nuclear fuel cycle. As fuel rods are assembled using enriched (light water reactor) or natural (heavy water reactor) uranium and used in a reactor, they become spent nuclear fuel.<sup>32</sup>

Spent fuel of light water reactors contains U-235 and PU-239 and can be repurposed for fuel fabrication in a reprocessing facility. PU-239 is a fissile material and a by-product of nuclear fuel cycle that can be extracted from spent fuel and refined in a reprocessing facility.<sup>33</sup> Fissile U-235 can be used as fuel again at light-water reactors.<sup>34</sup> On the other hand, PU-239 in the spent nuclear fuel is susceptible to be misused for developing nuclear explosives.<sup>35</sup> Further, heavy water reactors use natural uranium and the yield of PU-239 in their spent

---

<sup>31</sup> "Enrichment", World Nuclear Association, accessed 17 June 2019, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel.aspx>

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> "Plutonium", World Nuclear Association, , at <http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/plutonium.aspx> (last accessed 13 June 2019).

<sup>34</sup> "Fuel Fabrication", World Nuclear Association, accessed 17 June 2019, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/nuclear-basics/how-is-uranium-ore-made-into-nuclear-fuel.aspx>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

fuel is more suitable for building nuclear explosives and more susceptible to nuclear proliferation.<sup>36</sup>

Therefore, enrichment and reprocessing are not only scientific processes in the nuclear fuel cycle as proliferation-sensitive technologies, but, are concerns of international security and the integrity of nuclear nonproliferation regime. Accordingly, each non nuclear weapon state undertakes safeguards for the purpose of verifying the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under NPT with a view to preventing 'diversion' of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<sup>37</sup>

Accordingly, non nuclear weapon states are expected to commit to NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards. Safeguards are IAEA's activities to verify that a state is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapons purposes.<sup>38</sup> The majority of safeguards agreements are comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA). As of 2019, IAEA concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with 175 States including non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. According to comprehensive safeguards, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in the territory, jurisdiction or control of the State.<sup>39</sup>

Nevertheless, clandestine proliferation of Iraq under the nuclear nonproliferation regime led to common concerns on the verification of undeclared nuclear activities by NNWS. Hence, additional Protocol was introduced by the IAEA against undeclared nuclear material and activities to verify the peaceful use of

---

<sup>36</sup> World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power Reactors, <https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/nuclear-power-reactors.aspx> (last accessed 18 August 2019)

<sup>37</sup> Article III, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>38</sup> "Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols", International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), <https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview>

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

all nuclear material in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements.<sup>40</sup> Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities.<sup>41</sup>

As nuclear nonproliferation regime is already challenged with undeclared activities, Iran's uranium enrichment activities has become an international incident on the interpretation of NPT and rights of NNWS under safeguards to enjoy proliferation-sensitive technologies. NPT does not prevent NNWS that are compliant to IAEA safeguards from using proliferation-sensitive nuclear technology. However, Iran's uranium enrichment activities at proliferation-sensitive facilities, its failure to report planned nuclear activities and adopt Additional Protocol led to Iran's nuclear intentions have been questioned.<sup>42</sup> Amidst political tension and assumptions that Iran's nuclear activities are likely to encourage NNWS in the region to seek nuclear weapons, Iran's nuclear issue is settled with technical measures, affecting NNWS new to nuclear energy.

Iran's right to uranium enrichment at 3.67% under enhanced safeguards, which is sufficient for converting nuclear fuel for energy generation is restored by Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue is followed by stricter measures to further include proliferation-sensitive technologies in export control lists to NNWS that have not developed capacity to use these technologies. Consequently, it has been a source of contention for NNWS newly developing nuclear capabilities including Turkey. Limit on proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies to NNWS that haven't developed them was interpreted as detrimental to the long term energy

---

<sup>40</sup> "Additional Protocol", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 18 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol>

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Udum, p.69.

<sup>43</sup> International Atomic Energy Agency, *New IAEA Uranium Enrichment Monitor to Verify Iran's Commitments under JCPOA*, 16 January 2016 <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-iaea-uranium-enrichment-monitor-verify-iran%E2%80%99s-commitments-under-jcpoa> (last accessed 18 June 2019)

goal of reducing dependency on imported fuel. Moreover, Turkey interprets this limitation beyond its energy-security concerns and being categorized as nuclear have-not, a new distinction detrimental to states newly developing nuclear capabilities close to unstable regions. In Turkey's understanding, nuclear fuel cycle is a technological process and access to nuclear technologies on fuel cycle as a NNWS under Enhanced Safeguards and Additional Protocol is enshrined in the Article IV of NPT.<sup>44</sup> As nuclear energy can be used for civilian purposes such as generating electricity efficiently and conducting scientific research, expertise on nuclear technology and nuclear infrastructure to pursue military nuclear activities is susceptible to non-peaceful purposes when and if sensitive nuclear technologies are deliberately spared for a nuclear weapons program. Turkey's any deliberate attempt to develop interest in non peaceful uses of nuclear technology would be contrary to its rights and international obligations under NPT and legal and political commitment to the regime.

Moreover, nuclear weapons capability for a state is a political decision as much as technical know-how in nuclear technology. Nuclear technology as a means of nuclear weapons capability vis-a-vis scientific processes for peaceful use diverges on the intention of state behavior on which International Relations discipline has several assumptions. Similarly, in order to explain the state behavior in the thesis, relevant theoretical information on regime formation and changes will be introduced in context of a state become and remain a part of a regime. Next section gives theoretical context of International Relations key to explain Turkey's standing and the stem of anomalies.

### **1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

Rather than testing a particular theory against Turkey's state behavior, the thesis benefits from the insights of International Relations theories that are instrumental to understand (i) the pretext of Turkey's state behavior in nuclear nonproliferation and (ii) why these behaviors qualify as 'anomalies'.

---

<sup>44</sup> Şebnem Udum. Interview by the author. Personal interview. Ankara, June 2019, 2017.



Nevertheless, Realist theory has more explanatory power in Turkey's concerns as a part of international community and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

In International Relations, the international system lacks an overarching authority that is defined as anarchy. Anarchy is the absence of order and conditions of chaos that no agency exists above individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes.<sup>45</sup> In the anarchic environment of international politics, states are sovereign actors and can make commitment and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliances and punished deviations.<sup>46</sup> In anarchy, states distrust each other's intentions and become suspicious of their capabilities.<sup>47</sup>

### 1.3.1. Realism

According to strands of Realism, constant insecurity and self-help defines the environment states coexist where the state is the main actor of the International Relations. As rational unitary actor, state faces constant risk to survival in the competitive nature of international system. Classical Realism argues that competition for power is conducive to selfish and rational human nature. On the other hand, Neorealist strand of Realism puts forward the international structure.

Inter-state relations are the focus of Realist strands since states are considered the main actors in the system. In anarchy, a state either survives by gaining power vis-a-vis its adversaries or risks its destruction.<sup>48</sup> To alleviate the insecurity, states have to rely on their own capability to protect their interests, and because of this, they may use force to realise national interests as each

---

<sup>45</sup> Milner, H, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, (1991), 67-85.

<sup>46</sup> R. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-NeoLiberal Debate", *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, (1994), 330.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> See Classical Realist scholars: Thucydides, *Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War*, Rex Warner tr., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Classics, 1972; Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

state is its own judge.<sup>49</sup> The power a state possesses is therefore key to realise its national interests in the face of constant insecurity regarding its survival.

The conceptualization of power in Realist theory is material power exercised by states as the key actors, predominantly the military power followed by economic power. State's power is based on its military capabilities to inflict physical harm and the likelihood of winning a war. Therefore, military capabilities define the strength of a state and the survival of one depends on its management of its vital resources to sustain state power and ensure security.<sup>50</sup>

Further, such power is not confined to military power. Economic power, as much as military power, is characterized by a zero-sum game which grants the independence to follow a foreign policy towards its political goals such as energy security.<sup>51</sup> A state should be able to maintain uninterrupted and reliable supply of energy required for the continuance of its economic activities without developing a political dependency.<sup>52</sup>

States would engage in disputes and conflict rather than cooperation to consolidate their power, which are ultimately resolved by war.<sup>53</sup> Because the magnitude of physical harm inflicted during a war would lead to the acceptance of the winner's terms, which otherwise would be unlikely to happen<sup>54</sup> and influence the position and power of the state determining its foreign policy.<sup>55</sup> Where war is instrumental to realize political goal(s) by destructing the military power of the adversary,<sup>56</sup> states seek more effective weapons and capabilities to inflict destruction on a larger scale. Similarly, the impact of nuclear weapons

---

<sup>49</sup> L.Neack, *The new Foreign Policy: U.S and comparative foreign policy in the 21 st Century*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, pp. 126-127.

<sup>50</sup> See Classical Realist scholars: Thucydides, *Thucydides: History of the Peleponnesian War*, Rex Warner tr., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Classics, 1972; Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

<sup>51</sup> Brenda Shaffer, *Energy Politics*, Pennsylvania: Univerity of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.p.91.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> See R. Jackson, and G. Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches* (2nd ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p.83

<sup>55</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw Hill, NY, 1979.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p.95

could ensure a victory in a war that is instrumental to boost state power make a state with nuclear weapons a great power.

However, when one state becomes too powerful and secure, it creates a security dilemma, threatening the security of others. Accordingly, states can cooperate to promote equilibrium of power to prevent another state's domination.<sup>57</sup> This is called the balance of power that an actor either individually balance the rising power to avoid its domination on the system or bandwagon with other states that is capable of balancing its power.<sup>58</sup> Thus, bandwagoning can be a means of survival for less powerful actors in the system.

In Realism, cooperation of actors amidst anarchy is possible. However, Realist strands are sceptical about the reliability of international cooperation. Further, cooperation is confined to states, i.e. the main actors where the influence of non-state actors on state behavior for cooperation, such as institutions, are disregarded. Because, according to Mearsheimer, institutions are reflections of power calculations by great powers and has no direct impact on state behavior.<sup>59</sup> Similarly in state-level relations, the main actors barely manages to cooperate for common interests as anarchy undermines cooperation.<sup>60</sup> First and foremost, there is no higher authority to ensure that states abide by the terms of cooperation in anarchy. Further, according to Grieco, states would pursue their relative gains individually in this self-help environment as opposed to absolute gains.<sup>61</sup>

### 1.3.2. Neoliberalism

---

<sup>57</sup> John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics* 2, no.2 (1950), 156. Also see Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985.

<sup>58</sup> Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, Volume 25 no.1, (2000), 38

<sup>59</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions", *International Security*, Volume 19, no.3 (1994), 7

<sup>60</sup> Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the New Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organizations*, Volume 42, no.3, (1988), 48.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

Similar to Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism adopts a state-centric assessment on international cooperation. Neoliberal Institutionalists acknowledge that international system is anarchic due to the lack of a superior authority, but, argue that it is possible to manage. This strand of liberalism focuses on cooperation among existing actors in the system i.e. states and other actors.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, states in the international system can coordinate policies through negotiation<sup>63</sup> and form institutions when their interests align.<sup>64</sup> Nevertheless, the behavior of actors in the system, especially the states, should be well-organized in order for all actors to benefit international cooperation.<sup>65</sup> Thus, institutions can act as contracts between states to 'manage' anarchy and alleviate constant distrust and suspicion of each other's intentions.<sup>66</sup>

An institution is a general pattern or categorization of activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized.<sup>67</sup> For example, an institution can facilitate international cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy which are both beneficial to actors based on nuclear nonproliferation norms. Thus, actors should maintain interaction regarding their shared interest and form institutions to facilitate the process.<sup>68</sup>

Neoliberal Institutionalists argue that compliance with the cooperation, and consistency in the behavior of different actors towards shared interests is achievable via globalization.<sup>69</sup> Globalization is the condition that actors are transnationally linked through circulation of 'capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force' thanks to the advance of technological developments

---

<sup>62</sup> Sean Kay, "Neoliberalism" in *Making Sense of International Relations Theories*, y ed. Jennifer Sterling Folker, 2nd ed. (Colorado: 2013), 75-91

<sup>63</sup> See Robert O. Keohane, "Cooperation and International Regimes," in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, (1984), 51

<sup>64</sup> R. Keohane and Lisa Martin, 'The Promise of Institutional Theory', 41-42

<sup>65</sup> R. Keohane, "Cooperation and International Regimes," in *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, 1984.

<sup>66</sup> R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Liberalism" in *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford University Press:2007), 113.

<sup>67</sup> R. Keohane, *International Institutions: Two Approaches*. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32:4,1988, p.382

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

enabling such access on a global scale.<sup>70</sup> Thus, as states are unitary and rational actors that maximize their interest, interstate cooperation and transnational activities can create interdependence,<sup>71</sup> that is likely to avert the tension and conflict as states interact and are affected by each other.<sup>72</sup> Thus, the pursuit of relative gains and risk of cheating as argued by Realist strands can be alleviated. Because, reciprocal ground and risk of losing gains that cooperation provides would prevent states from war and conflict that are averted with the formation of international law and institutions.<sup>73</sup> In such a complex structure, global governance is instrumental to problem solving, policy administration of common interests, tackling the issues of a more interdependent world where technology continuously improves interdependence and new non-state actors emerge.<sup>74</sup> Besides states as main actors, global governance endorsed the intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, individual experts, multinational cooperations as actors of the global system.

### 1.3.3. Regime Theory

The formation of regimes is one way to maintain interdependence via global governance. According to Stein, if states did not quit individual decision-making and it was not for preventing or ensuring a specific outcome collectively, regimes would not have existed.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, a regime is an intersection of interests and states form regimes instead of individually dealing with the dilemmas of common interests and aversions in the international system<sup>76</sup> for benefiting desired outcomes with less effort.

---

<sup>70</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power, Interdependence, and Globalism," in *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Longman, 2012), p. 225.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Jackson and Sørensen, (2003), 110-111

<sup>73</sup> Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, 'The Promise of Institutional Theory', *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1. (Summer, 1995),45-47.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World", *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2 (1982): 299-311.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

Moreover, according to Krasner, regimes are set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.<sup>77</sup> Because a regime is a 'permanent' arrangement that exists in an area of International Relations wherever there is regularity in behavior.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, they are not static and subject to transformation.<sup>79</sup>

Norms play a key role in navigating political action in international relations and give it a context.<sup>80</sup> The permanent nature of a regime is embedded in the norms that unites states and non-state actors. According to Krasner, values are determinant in the development and integrity of a regime creating a sense of obligation to states rather than mere 'patterns of state behavior and practice' without a context.<sup>81</sup> Therefore, states should respond to the normative pull of an international regime and rely on reciprocity to monitor each other's level of compliance towards the institutions, in turn promoting transparency and accountability between states that build confidence<sup>82</sup> as in the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

Furthermore, norms are necessary to create a sense of obligation through a process of becoming appropriate forms of behaviour based on ideas.<sup>83</sup> According to M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, institutions refer to a collection of norms that are interrelated.<sup>84</sup> Norms, on their own, refer to a single set of standards of behaviour. Thus, regimes are collection of these norms that establish standards of behavior for states and "norms arise because they are

---

<sup>77</sup> S.D Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables", *International Organization*, vol. 36 no.2, (1982),186

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Oran Young, "Regime dynamics: The rise and fall of international regimes", *International Organization*, vol 36, no.2 (1982), 290.

<sup>80</sup> Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis", 61-91.

<sup>81</sup>S.D Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables", *International Organization*, Vol 36 no.2, (1982), 186.

<sup>82</sup>R. Jackson and G. Sorensen, "Liberalism" in *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (Oxford University Press:2007), 113.

<sup>83</sup> Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol.40 no.3, (1996), 364

<sup>84</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political change", *International Organization*, Vol.52, no.4, (1998), 890.

needed to bring about the cooperation in a mixed-motive setting”<sup>85</sup> where self-help and cooperation are conflicting standards of behavior.

However, According to Young, the emergence of the regimes as social institutions comes in different forms; mostly imposed or negotiated orders where provisions are accepted intentionally.<sup>86</sup> Regimes as negotiated orders are characterized by formal commitment to shared norms and voluntary participation leading to actual political consequences.<sup>87</sup> On the other hand, imposed order are the domination of hegemon’s interest in the regime where provisions are forced on less powerful actors. Moreover, regimes change on two occasions (i) when the interests change and influence norms that governs state behavior and (ii) when the power relations shift. But, since nuclear nonproliferation regime is focused on a special issue on a particular norm, the transformation of norms rather than power relations is highly likely based on inner dynamics of regimes such as political, economic and social changes.<sup>88</sup>

According to Regime Theory, international regimes can build an interdependence between states on a reciprocal ground. Nevertheless, the interests of actors can change and influence norms that underlies state behavior. As norms of the regime are set of ideas that define standards and they can change through experience. Then, members of the regime are expected to adjust to new standards. Krasner argues that regimes consist of norms and principles around an issue that navigate state behavior and require joint decision-making rather than individual pursuit of short-term interests.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, the core of an international regime to navigate state behavior against a common problem, such as nuclear weapons, is the norms and principles.

As regimes are dynamic institutions that has an influence on the behavior of its members, the transformation of norms could lead to new expectations on state

---

<sup>85</sup> Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms”, (1996), 365.

<sup>86</sup> Oran R. Young, “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society”, *International Organization*, vol. 45, no.3 (1991), 307.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> S.D Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables”, *International Organization*, vol. 36 no.2,1982, 190-194.

behavior. Nevertheless, the transformation of the norm could be disadvantageous for some states and threaten their existing gains and goals in foreign policy.

Foreign policy is the choice of a government to deal with a particular issue with other countries.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, it is constructed on a complexity of national interests. Therefore, the thesis analyzes the particular impact of transformation of regime norms on individual state behavior based on historic experience and geopolitics.

Accordingly, the thesis argues that the 'anomalies' in the thesis on Turkish foreign policy on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament exemplify an 'involuntary defection'. Involuntary defection is the inability of a party reaching or supporting an international agreement to sustain its political commitment based on domestic political constraints.<sup>91</sup> As the involuntary defection, Realist instinct of state survival can be observed in Turkish foreign policy in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that reveals an involuntary defection preventing Turkey from fulfilling the expected NNWS behavior in accordance with the expectation of new behavior on ENR as known as the "proliferation sensitive technologies". Further, Turkey's desire to maintain tactical nuclear weapons in the face of an attack to Turkish territory from the Middle East.

---

<sup>90</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "The Logic of Two-Level Games: International Cooperation, Domestic Politics, and Western Summitry, 1975-1986," American Political Science Association, (Washington. D.C:1986), 13.



## CHAPTER II

### TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY AND ITS IMPACTS ON FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS RELATING TO NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

This chapter will attempt to give main determinants of Turkish foreign and security policy besides Turkey's position on nuclear nonproliferation, peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear disarmament and the nuclear nonproliferation in general. The chapter will attempt to answer '*How does Turkish security policy fits into Turkey's Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) status?*'.

#### 2.1. MAIN DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S SECURITY POLICY

Turkish security policy has structural and conjunctural elements. As structural elements refer to continuous aspects of Turkey such as geopolitics and historic experiences, ideologic orientation of the Republic, conjunctural elements develop as the influence of domestic and external changes demands.<sup>92</sup>

Unchangeable nature of structural elements are historical experience inherited by Ottoman Empire, geopolitical impacts of Turkey's location in a problematic and constructive way and founding ideology of the Turkish Republic adopted by the elite.<sup>93</sup> These elements are predominant on the long-term foreign policy.

Geopolitics is the study of the relations between the international implementation of power policies and the geographical context they emerged into.<sup>94</sup> Turkey is located on both Asia and Europe extending to the Balkans, Black Sea and Mediterranean that expands Turkey's reach to several states in the region from Europe to the Arab world. As located on the crossroads of regions such as Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southern Europe,

---

<sup>92</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctions During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 36 (Jan 2000), 2.

<sup>93</sup> Ersel Aydınli, "The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s", *Middle Eastern Studies*, (2004) 40: 3, 120-128

<sup>94</sup> See Pierre M. Gallois, "Geopolitics, The Ways of Power", Foundation of National Defense Studies, 1990.

Turkey has historical ties with the region over ethnic, religious and cultural aspects.

Geographic proximity to such diversity is a political and social factor in Turkish foreign policy that remarks both challenges and opportunities. As geopolitics makes Turkey more susceptible to external threats in the region, it also enables Turkey enjoying a unique middle power status.<sup>95</sup>

Another traditional determinant of Turkish security policy is the historic experience of being one of the successors of Ottoman Empire, especially at the early onset of its collapse. Turkey inherited the heartland of Ottoman settlement and its governing elite.<sup>96</sup> However, especially in early years of republic, Turkey disowned Ottoman legacy.

## **2.2.TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1923- 1945**

Turkey is a nation-state founded in 1923. The interim that had begun with Sevres Treaty and occupation of Turkish mainland by Western powers and ended with the recovery of invaded territories has gravely shaped Turkish security perceptions, and accordingly the founding ideology of Republic of Turkey.<sup>97</sup>

Founded as a nation-state in Anatolia and Thrace, Turkey is located at the center of the former Ottoman settlement in 1923 after years of armed resistance to occupation of Anatolia by the Allied Powers under Sevres Treaty. Sevres Treaty formally abolished the Ottoman Empire in 1920 and obliged Turkey to renounce its rights on former Ottoman territories, and spared a significant portion of Turkish mainland for the new nation-states of ethnic communities that were once under Ottoman rule.

Upon the occupation of Turkish territory by the Allied Powers, Turkish community formed a new administration based in Anatolia populated by the

---

<sup>95</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctions During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 36 (Jan 2000), 2.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> "Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues", Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues, accessed on 01 Apr 2019, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey\\_s-security-perspective\\_-historical-and-conceptual-background\\_-turkey\\_s-contributions.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa).

military elite of late Ottoman Empire that denied the provisions of Sevres Treaty. Accordingly, Sevres Treaty was followed by an armed resistance by Turkish forces and the declaration of the Republic. Nevertheless, this interim impacted Turkish security policy over the fear of 'being attacked' again by external threats to the integrity of Turkish territory and population. Rejected by the new Turkish government, the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 upon the victory of Turkish forces and evacuation of Allied Powers from Anatolia.

Turkey inherited Ottoman Empire's strategic heartland and the established tradition of state administration by the Turkish governing elite along a severely Realist approach on foreign policy as has been surrounded by neighbors it shares historic ties.<sup>98</sup> Turkey's ties to Ottoman legacy has been a complicated issue extending to discussions on 'state identity. In Turkish foreign policy, Turkish elite pursued discontinuation from the Ottoman legacy and a passive foreign policy towards Middle Eastern states that were former Ottoman territories especially in early years of Republic.<sup>99</sup>

Despite historic continuances, Turkey has been built on remote differences from the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, Ottoman experience had taught Turkey to adjust to contemporary trends in the world and avoid political insulation.<sup>100</sup> In early years of the Republic, Turkish alignment with Western bloc and the international community is a disclosure of the intentional discontinuation from Ottoman tradition in Turkey. Being a part of the contemporary civilization and resemblance to Western bloc was conducive to Turkey's survival instinct in the international system.

In early years of the Republic, Turkey aligned with the Western bloc and has gone through a modernization period. This period estranged Turkey from its Ottoman heritage at the time. Moreover, Turkey adopted a passive and indifferent foreign policy towards Middle East that remained until the end of Cold

---

<sup>98</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctions During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 36 (Jan 2000), 4.

<sup>99</sup> For further discussion, See Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

War. After adopting a neutral foreign policy towards world politics until the Second World War, former Soviet Union's expansion on Turkey's northeastern border became an imminent threat to Turkish territorial integrity. Thus, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the collective defense organization of Euro-Atlantic states against Soviet expansion.

Based on that assurance in the face of external threats, Turkey's alignment with NATO for collective defense enabled Turkey's NNWS status. Over time, it became an identity as a means of prestige in the international community. Nevertheless, aspects of Turkey's NNWS status clashed as norms are evolving in the regime at the expense of states like Turkey close to Middle East.

Its national security policy therefore has three constant elements; geopolitics, Ottoman heritage and ideological orientation of the republic whereas conjunctural determinants are political trends mostly based on domestic changes.<sup>101</sup> The thesis cites conjunctural determinants of Turkish foreign policy that have not caused a major shift in its security perceptions or national goals, yet reshaped national priorities for a certain period based on the orientation of domestic politics. Nevertheless, they had important consequences such as rapprochement with the states in Middle East and the deviations in Turkey's overall foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation.<sup>102</sup> These components can be further observed in Turkish state behavior constituting the 'anomalies' in this study, yet not Turkey's policy on being a NNWS.

Turkish national security policy is based on the measures that are deemed imperative for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of the

---

<sup>101</sup> Tarık Oğuzlu, "Security Culture and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World*, Vol.72,(2015),229

<sup>102</sup>Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctions During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*; Jan 2000; 36, 1.

society.<sup>103</sup> National security referents are fundamental to Turkish foreign policy and defensive stance especially in its foreign policy towards Middle East.

Nevertheless, Turkish security policy has roots in the Ottoman Empire and its norms of security are heavily influenced by the late political developments in the Ottoman Empire's decay.<sup>104</sup> As the Ottoman Empire had exploited the balance of power among European states in 19th century and cooperated with European powers to defend its territory against external threats,<sup>105</sup> Turkey, as one of its successors, adopted a similar policy before and during the Cold War and allied with the West. Thus, Turkish foreign policy was shaped predominantly by external factors.

Turkish alignment with the Western bloc attempted to align the country with 'the contemporary civilization' to boost development and modernization at the time.<sup>106</sup> As Turkish education, military, economy, state administration was renovated in accordance with Western political thought, there was a detachment from the late Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, this approach also bore the expectation of not being attacked by the West and sparing the elements of Turkey's security which are ensuring the survival of the population; protecting territorial integrity and preserving the basic identity of a nation.<sup>107</sup> Because as long as Turkey does pursue this foreign policy, it could hold on to its domestic and international safety and security, thus being a part of the West has been also beyond an identity, but a means for the survival of the state.<sup>108</sup> Accordingly Turkish security policy has a Classical Realist core of survival instinct in its foreign policy that approached its strategic alignments in foreign policy as

---

<sup>103</sup> "Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Apr 1 2017, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i\\_-turkey\\_s-security-perspective\\_-historical-and-conceptual-background\\_-turkey\\_s-contributions.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa)

<sup>104</sup> Ersel Aydinli, "The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, no.3, (2004), 120-128

<sup>105</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, Changing Patterns and Conjunctions During the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, no.36, (Jan 2000) 36, 5.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, (2000) 199-217; Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation", *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2003), 306-331.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

means of power. Therefore, Liberalist and Constructivist aspects of Turkish alignment with the Western bloc and international community by the extension of this policy are arguably power instruments such as its NNWS status. .

Thus, Turkish conceptualization of security is defined in a three-fold nature; ensuring the survival of the population, protecting territorial integrity and preserving the basic identity of a nation.<sup>109</sup> National Security Council (Hereafter NSC) further defines the elements of national security as the preservation of the constitutional order, maintaining the national unity and integrity; counteract... external threats directed against these aspects.<sup>110</sup>

With a strong emphasis on the integrity, indivisibility and 'identity of nation', Turkey's political and social experience of being occupied by the West and insulated by the former territories and communities of Ottoman Empire has remarked its interpretation of security challenges combined with its location.<sup>111</sup> Because Turkey is located on the former Soviet Union's southern border, neighbouring Iran, and being directly affected by the conflicts and the wider process of change underway in the Middle East.<sup>112</sup> As a new nation state, imminent interpretation of these structural challenges led Turkey to adopt a rational and cautious foreign policy. Thus, Turkey had pursued a balanced neutrality and autonomous foreign policy refraining from strict alignment with any of the major powers and benefiting from a balance of power between them from the early years of Republic until the end of Second World War.<sup>113</sup>

### **2.3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING COLD WAR**

As Turkey remained neutral until the end of the Second World War, nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 ended the Second World

---

<sup>109</sup> "Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed on Apr 1 2017, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey-s-security-perspective-historical-and-conceptual-background-turkey-s-contributions.en.mfa>.

<sup>110</sup> Amendments to Law. No 2945 in Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution regarding National Security Council, January 15,2003.

<sup>112</sup> See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", *Survival*, Vol. 52, No. 2, (April-May 2010).

<sup>113</sup> Mustafa Aydın (2000), "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.36 no.1, 105.

War by the certain victory of the Allied Powers. As a bipolar world order emerged after the Second World War led by the Soviet Union and the United States, it made neutrality the least favorable option for Turkey as a combination of history and geopolitics. As Turkey had gone through a Westernization period in state administration, education and economy from the early onset of the Republic, its rapprochement with Western bloc in the face of an expanding Soviet Union adjacent to its northeast border was a natural consequence.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, Turkey's unique geopolitical location made it a valuable asset for the Western camp as Turkey formally became a part of the Western camp and beneficiary of the Marshall Fund by the U.S. under the Truman Doctrine. Accordingly, the fund provided financial and military assistance to alleviate the Soviet influence on Turkey. This political alignment has become a permanent collective defense alliance with Turkey's admission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952.<sup>115</sup> The alliance has played a central role in Turkey's security and contributed to its integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. During this period, Turkey's alignment with West has evolved into a permanent alliance in the Cold War amidst a political climate of exclusion from regional politics.

After decades old neutrality in diplomatic relations and Turkish foreign policy, NATO membership has made Turkey and the Western bloc closer as cooperation in security, economics and transnational issues expanded.<sup>116</sup> But also, Turkey further alienated itself from the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey benefited from the deterrence extended by NATO throughout the Cold War against any external threat, especially from the Soviet Union or the Middle East. As Turkey was concerned about any attempt by the Soviet Union to invade Western Europe and whether the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons for Turkey's defense.<sup>117</sup> Accordingly, Turkey called for the deployment

---

<sup>114</sup> Mustafa Aydın, "Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.36 no.1, (2000),106.

<sup>115</sup> "Turkey's Relations with NATO", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 16 June 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa>

<sup>116</sup> "Turkey- NATO Together for Peace and Security Since 60 Years", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 17 June 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-nato-together-for-peace-and-security-since60-years.en.mfa> (last)

<sup>117</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Nuclear Contradictions", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 2015.

of NATO deterrents. As Western-Turkish alliance predominated Turkish foreign policy from 1947 to 1960s Turkey followed a pro-Western foreign policy at the expense of its relations with the Middle Eastern states, that viewed Turkey as a tool of the West. As Turkey adopted a pro-Western approach on the account of its NATO membership in Suez Crisis, Iraqi Coup, US-Syrian crisis and recognition of Israel, Turkey-Middle Eastern states deteriorated.<sup>118</sup> Accordingly, Turkey made strong calls for the deployment of a nuclear deterrent. In 1959, the United States deployed Jupiter missiles in Turkey under American custody. The missiles were intermediate range ballistic missiles with a nuclear warhead and has an impact of 1 megaton.<sup>119</sup>

However, improvements in nuclear technology enabled submarine-based missiles (Polaris) as Jupiter missiles has become less significant to NATO 's and Turkey's defense.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, to Turkey's dismay, Jupiter missiles were assessed as a vulnerability rather than a deterrent by the United States in the face of a nuclear strike from the Soviet Union.<sup>121</sup>

During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, nuclear deterrence led to an impasse between the Soviet Union and the United States over the threat of use of the nuclear weapons deployed in Cuba and Turkey. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on bilaterally removing nuclear weapons, i.e. the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of all Russian nuclear weapons from Cuba.<sup>122</sup> Accordingly, Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in 1963. The crisis was followed by reciprocal reductions in intermediate range ballistic missiles after the crisis and the formation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime under the peaceful use, disarmament and nonproliferation norms.

---

<sup>118</sup> Baskın Oran ed, "Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar", Cilt I: 1919-1980,(2001) (İletişim: İstanbul), 115.

<sup>119</sup> Treaties and Other International Act Series 4191, "Cooperation: Agreement between the United states of America and Turkey, (Washington D.C) (March 5, 1959).

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Nur Bilge Criss, "Strategic nuclear missiles in Turkey: The jupiter affair, 1959-1963" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.20 no.3, (1997),122

<sup>122</sup> "The Cuban Missile Crisis", Arms Control Association, accessed 26 August 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002-11/features/cuban-missile-crisis>



However, intermediate range ballistic missiles were only a portion of the nuclear arsenals deployed in Turkey.

As Turkey's security assurance from the NATO and particularly United States remains to date, The Cyprus Intervention led to concerns about the willingness of the United States to support Turkish security in public. Turkish and American interests severely clashed over Turkey's position on unilaterally intervening in Cyprus for the Turkish Cypriots. Cyprus remarked the questioning of determination of public on the detachment of Turkish foreign policy from the Western alignment and especially the United States. The 'Detente' period in 1970 enabled middle powers to pursue a more independent foreign policy as the bipolar tension in world politics was relatively low.

During the "Detente", Turkey was able to pursue an autonomous foreign policy and developed relations with the Middle East and the Soviet Union. After Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and imposition of arms embargo by the United States severely strained Turkish-American relations. Nevertheless, Turkey's independent foreign policy has come to an end as amid three major developments in the Middle East: 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War. National security concerns resulted in the resumption of Turkish- Western security relations as NATO membership and the Western alliance for Turkey's defense regained military and political significance in Turkish security and foreign policy.

Under the leadership of Özal, Neoliberalism has risen in Turkish foreign policy from 1983 with an emphasis on economic relations to create complex interdependence and benefit from economic gains reciprocally and avoid conflicts with one another. Amid instability and radical political transformation in its southern neighborhood, one of the priorities of Turkish foreign policy was developing trade and economic relations and transition to market economy under NATO's nuclear umbrella. Combined with a Neoliberal approach to international relations, Turkey focused on enhancing its international economic and political dependence and has become a candidate state to the European Union.

Turkey adopted historic and cultural ties as means of a more active foreign policy and developed closer relations with its neighbors.<sup>123</sup> Accordingly, Turkey developed closer diplomatic relations with the Balkans, Turkic communities in the Central Asia Caucasus as well as the Middle Eastern states. Moreover, conjunctural elements in Turkish foreign policy has been ethnic and religious politics that influenced Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy based on Kemalism that takes the alliance to Western bloc a means of survival was criticized for predominating Turkish foreign policy at the expense of religious and ethnic diversity in Turkish politics.<sup>124</sup>

As Turkish conventional forces and NATO's nuclear umbrella that is extended to NATO allies to deter attacks and defend Turkish society and territory,<sup>125</sup> collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 ended bipolar power struggle where Turkey's post as southeast border of NATO lost its significance.

#### **2.4. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-COLD WAR**

As the post-Wold War multipolar order altered the security threat perceptions of Turkey especially in the Middle East, NATO's collective defense remained a valuable security guarantee for Turkey.<sup>126</sup> However, subsequently its relations with NATO on extended deterrence changed after the Soviet threat is alleviated. Nevertheless, occupation of Iraq by the United States in 1991 during the Gulf War, remarked Turkey's post-Cold War strategic value in the war in search of a more distinguished role in the Middle East. Despite repeating calls from Turkey, NATO refrained from implementing Article 5 of Washington Treaty as an act of 'collective defense' and approached Turkey's threat perceptions from the Middle East as an 'out of area' conflict after the Gulf Wars.<sup>127</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence", *Middle East Review of International Relations*, vol. 5 no.2, 66-74.

<sup>124</sup> James G. Mellon "Islamism, Kemalism and the Future of Turkey", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 7, no.1, (2006), 67-81.

<sup>125</sup> "Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues, accessed on 01 Apr 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey-s-security-perspective-historical-and-conceptual-background-turkey-s-contributions.en.mfa>.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Cameron S. Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, 2007, 85-119

As Turkey had to revise whether NATO will be a supporter for Turkey in the face of security threats from the Middle East, closer strategic partnership were built with Israel and the United States in early years of post-Cold War period. Despite lack of trust on NATO's involvement in Turkish security concerns over Middle East, Turkey's ties to NATO and its deterrence remained the cornerstone of Turkey's defense<sup>128</sup> and security<sup>129</sup> policy and an integral part of Turkey's global identity since the early onset of Cold War.

9/11 also severely impacted the definition of 'threat' with the rise of transnational terrorism activities. Accordingly, Security conceptualization of the Western bloc, especially of United States where a particularly aggressive and preemptive view of security is adopted. This transformation impacted the priorities of Turkey on threats from the Middle East and expectations from its security assurance. However, The United States completely ignored Turkey's opposition to Iraq War<sup>130</sup> and some of Turkey's NATO allies hesitated to label PKK as a terrorist organization.<sup>131</sup> Further, as Turkey has called for NATO's implementation of Article V of North Atlantic Treaty regarding the developments in the Middle East threatening Turkey's security in many occasions, not all NATO member states have shown interest in involving in such an out-of-area conflict in the Middle East.<sup>132</sup> Turkey and the United States disagreed on several regional issues negatively affecting Turkey's security perceptions especially on Iraq, risk of a Kurdish state in Turkey's vicinity and the stance against Iran over its nuclear activities.

Turkey's foreign policy has shifted from external factors with the influence of domestic factors on Turkish foreign policy as political Islam started to gain influence in Turkish politics. Further, debate of Turkey's identity as a state between the East and West has come forward. Turkey is the only Muslim country in NATO and has an ongoing candidacy process to European Union.

---

<sup>128</sup> "About TAF", Turkish Armed Forces, accessed 20 March 2019, <http://www.tsk.tr/AboutTaf/History>

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Nuclear Contradictions", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 2015.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

With the political orientation of ruling party in early 2000s as influenced the course of Turkish foreign policy into prioritizing its historic role in the East as a regional power and a successor of the Ottoman legacy, leading to rapprochement with the politics of Middle East and diplomatic mediation in regional conflicts including Iran's nuclear deal. Accordingly, Turkey has adopted an active foreign policy in regional issues that it previously remained out of during Cold War with its WMD and missile-capable neighbors such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. Its involvement in the Middle East included several issues with its neighbors from water and border issues to ethnic conflicts and terrorism. Turkey's immediate concerns in the region included the foundation of a Kurdish state in Iraqi-Turkish border and PKK's activities in Turkey's neighbors, an ethno-separatist terrorist organization that costs 40.000 lives since 1984.<sup>133</sup>

As traditional determinants of foreign security policy remained, post 9/11 and post-Cold War period has influenced the way Turkey sees deterrence and defense in its threat perceptions from the Middle East. Unlike external factors having been more influential in Turkish foreign policy, domestic factors (especially ethnicity and religion) predominated Turkish foreign policy especially in the Middle East.

Turkish Armed Forces emphasize Turkey's strategic position amidst the Middle East, Caucasus and Caspian basin and denominates instabilities in those regions among current challenges to Turkey's security.<sup>134</sup> The Middle East has been the core of the threats directed at Turkey especially after Gulf War.

In this political environment, threats directed at Turkey are not solely interpreted as military powers in the regional countries as in the past. New threats include political, economic, and social instabilities, border conflicts, sovereignty rights and power struggles, and terrorism are referred to as threats to Turkish security.<sup>135</sup>

---

<sup>133</sup> "PKK", Republic of Turkey", accessed 19 August 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa>.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> MSB, "Beyaz Kitap", 2000 paraphrased in "Mustafa Aydın, Fulya Ereker, "Türkiye'de Güvenlik: Algı, Politika, Yapı", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Volume 11 no.43, Fall 2014, 135.

Since Turkey is close to regions posing high risks of proliferation as a matter of serious concern <sup>136</sup> where easy access to WMDs through trafficking and willingness of some states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist or organized crime groups increase the concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands.<sup>137</sup>

Accordingly, starting from peacetime Turkey, is compelled to keep its national means of security intact, and render its armed forces capable and strong against any possible coercion.<sup>138</sup> The emphasis on national means of security prevails the conditionality of NATO's extended deterrence for conflicts emanating from the Middle East and Turkey's reliance on its conventional forces as deterrent. Per political representation of NATO's, specifically American commitment to Turkey's security.

## **2.5. TURKEY'S NON NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE (NNWS) STATUS**

As Turkey formed a permanent security alliance with the Western bloc by joining NATO in 1952, this alliance enabled Turkey to refrain from individual assurances of security to deter threats as in Classical Realism that extended NATO's nuclear deterrence to Turkey.

Amid rapid nuclear proliferation of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China, President Eisenhower delivered the 'Atoms for Peace' speech in 1953 that remarked the role of nuclear weapons in world politics as an obstacle to peace and stability. <sup>139</sup> The historic speech emphasized the hazards of nuclear proliferation and endorsed 'peaceful use of nuclear technology' for civilian purposes. Eisenhower argued in favor of nuclear nonproliferation against military use of nuclear weapons and called for an international nonproliferation agreement. The speech enabled the use of

---

<sup>136</sup> "Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed Apr 1 2017, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i\\_-turkey\\_s-security-perspective\\_-historical-and-conceptual-background\\_-turkey\\_s-contributions.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_-turkey_s-security-perspective_-historical-and-conceptual-background_-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa).

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> "About TAF", Turkish Armed Forces, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://www.tsk.tr/AboutTaf/History>,

<sup>139</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace", 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (1953), accessed 17 August 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/about/history/atoms-for-peace-speech>

nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed nuclear technology.

Accordingly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 to monitor nuclear activities in states and verify peaceful use of nuclear energy before the formation of nuclear nonproliferation regime.<sup>140</sup> Nevertheless, nuclear nonproliferation regime was not formed until the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis, the brink of a nuclear war.

Turkey joined nuclear nonproliferation regime to support and categorically holds a *Non Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS)* status. Turkey signed the NPT in 1969 and ratified it in 1979 as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon-State, therefore legally committed not to receive, manufacture or acquire any nuclear weapons and do not seek or receive any assistance to manufacture nuclear weapons.<sup>141</sup> Accordingly, Turkey does not own and committed not to develop its own nuclear weapons.

For efforts towards nuclear disarmament and arms control, all parties to the NPT agree to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.<sup>142</sup> As Turkey supports Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, it is an active member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) since 1996 and Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). Conference on Disarmament (CD) provides a platform for disarmament-related issues in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In addition, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) are components of the regime towards the eventual elimination of existing nuclear arsenals in the world.

Despite achievements towards norm of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear nonproliferation regime has been challenged by de-facto nuclear weapons

---

<sup>140</sup> "History", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 26 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history>

<sup>141</sup> Article II, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, Article VI.

states that are outside the NPT and failure to include such states to the global disarmament. Based on Article VII, NPT endorses regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories such as Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.<sup>143</sup> Similarly, the regime attempts to stabilize regions of new nuclear states through the endorsement WMD Free Zones and regional initiatives. In accordance with Article VI on the cessation of nuclear weapons race and Article VII on creation of regional treaties, NPT affirms that Member States can assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories<sup>144</sup>. Accordingly, Turkey supports the creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East and disarmament initiatives. Turkey is also a signatory of Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Moreover, as a NNWS that is party to the NPT, Turkey 'undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.'<sup>145</sup>

Turkey welcomed 1540 Resolution of the United Nations Security Council in 2004. The resolution affirms that

"Proliferation of nuclear...weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security and states must refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear...weapons and their means of delivery".<sup>146</sup>

As the resolution encourage international cooperation and imposes binding obligations on all States to establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent illicit trafficking, it affirms that none of the provisions of 1540 conflicts with or alters the rights and obligations of state parties to the

---

<sup>143</sup> Article VII, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>144</sup> Article VII, *ibid*.

<sup>145</sup> Article VI, NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>146</sup> "1540 Factsheet", United Nations Security Council (2004), accessed 15 September 2019, <https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/1540-fact-sheet.shtml>

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.<sup>147</sup> Nevertheless, Turkey has already integrated international preventive practices into its domestic controls over related nuclear materials in compliance with its NNWS obligations. In accordance with Resolution 1540, Turkey monitors the developments in nuclear nonproliferation field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend.<sup>148</sup>

Turkey is a part of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a middle power initiative, it promotes the creation of a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East due to the security situation in the region requiring the establishment of as a matter of urgent collective responsibility.<sup>149</sup> Because Turkey's neighbors with ballistic missile capabilities in the Middle East have the range that covers Turkey's highly populated areas and therefore a high impact on Turkey's security perceptions.<sup>150</sup> Being close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, Turkey takes a firm stance against proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

The next chapter will attempt to examine Turkey's 'anomalies' in accordance with the elements of Turkey's security policy and Turkey's background as a NNWS. The next chapter is key to accurately contextualize Turkey's intentions.

---

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> "Arms Control and Disarmament", Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed 1 April 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>,

<sup>149</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's nuclear contradictions", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Development and Disarmament Roundtable, Vol. 71, No.5, (September- October 2015)

<sup>150</sup> "Ballistic Missile Capabilities in the Middle East", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (April 26, 2002), <http://carnegieendowment.org/2002/04/26/ballistic-missile-capabilities-in-middle-east-pub-11802>



## CHAPTER III

### TURKEY'S 'ANOMALIES' IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

This chapter gathers the findings in the previous chapters on Turkey's state behavior on a theoretical basis, its foreign and security policy and place the arguments in the thesis in the right context along with Turkey's view of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use. The thesis will attempt to answer to the question '*What are the obligations of NNWS in the nuclear nonproliferation regime?*' and '*What meaning does Turkey give to NATO nuclear weapons and proliferation-sensitive technologies?*'

#### 3.1. THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND NNWS

Nuclear fission is discovered in 1934 by Fermi in the United Kingdom. First application of nuclear fission was for military use as the United States conducted a nuclear test in 1945. Imminent use of nuclear technology was to finalize the Second World War by means of the unprecedented destructive capabilities of nuclear bombs.

The United States, The Soviet Union, The United Kingdom, France and China developed nuclear technology subsequently to acquire nuclear weapons and conduct nuclear tests. Accordingly, The Second World War has come to an end with the immediate surrender of Japan by two nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefects in 1945.

In subsequent years, the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain conducted several nuclear weapons tests. In 1954, President Jawaharlal Nehru of India called for a ban on nuclear testing. It was the first large-scale initiative to ban using nuclear technology for mass destruction.

In 1958, nearly 10,000 scientists deemed it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect an international agreement to stop testing of all nuclear weapons.”

France exploded its first nuclear device in 1960 and China entered the "nuclear arms club" in October 1964 when it conducted its first test.

Norm of 'nuclear nonproliferation' is introduced by President Eisenhower's 'Atoms For Peace' proposal amid peaking nuclear proliferation. The historic speech emphasized the hazards of nuclear proliferation and endorsed 'peaceful use of nuclear technology' for civilian purposes. Eisenhower argued in favor of nuclear nonproliferation, that is, the stop of the spread of military use of nuclear weapons and called for an international nonproliferation agreement. The speech enabled the use of nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed nuclear technology. Accordingly, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was founded in 1957 to monitor nuclear activities in states and verify peaceful use of nuclear energy before the formation of nuclear nonproliferation regime. Nevertheless, nuclear nonproliferation regime was not formed until the aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis, the brink of a nuclear war.

In 1968, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter NPT) is opened for signature. NPT is the framework of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, which entered into force in 1970.<sup>151</sup> NPT identifies the states that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967" as Nuclear Weapon States (hereafter NWS).<sup>152</sup> NWS are United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. States which do not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 are as known as Non Nuclear Weapon States (hereafter NNWS).

NPT has three main principles: prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology. The pillars of the regime are dependent on each other. Norm of nuclear disarmament requires elimination of existing nuclear weapons. Thus, states without nuclear weapons would not be inclined to pursue military nuclear programmes out of security

---

<sup>151</sup> Article I, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

<sup>152</sup> Article IX/2, Ibid.

concerns. Accordingly, attempts towards nuclear disarmament would inherently contribute to the norm of nuclear nonproliferation.

*The obligations of NNWS in the nuclear nonproliferation regime* are as follows : Non nuclear-weapon states, as part of the NPT, agree not to ‘manufacture, transfer or seek assistance in acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly’.<sup>153</sup> Nuclear weapon states agree not to transfer or control over nuclear weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>154</sup> IAEA is the component of the regime that ensures peaceful use of nuclear technology and addresses the risk of nuclear proliferation from a technical perspective.

Non nuclear weapon states are expected to commit to NPT and comply with IAEA safeguards. Safeguards are IAEA’s activities to verify that a state is living up to its international commitments not to use nuclear programmes for nuclear-weapon purposes.<sup>155</sup> The majority of safeguards agreements are comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA). As of 2019, IAEA concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with 175 States including non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. According to comprehensive safeguards, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied on all nuclear material in the territory, jurisdiction or control of the State.<sup>156</sup>

IAEA as the inspectorate of the nuclear nonproliferation regime verifies that states benefiting from nuclear technology do not use it for non-peaceful purposes.<sup>157</sup> However, Iraq’s clandestine proliferation under NPT and IAEA

---

<sup>153</sup> Article III, *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> Article I, *Ibid.*

<sup>155</sup> “Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols”, International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview>

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>157</sup> “Overview”, International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 24 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/about/overview>

safeguards has become a concern of international security and required new measures to address challenge of nonproliferation. Similarly, several states such as Iran, Libya, and North Korea had pursued clandestine enrichment or reprocessing programs while they were signatories of NPT and allegedly developed nuclear weapons.<sup>158</sup> Thus, illicit acquisition of nuclear technology and nuclear material has emerged as a threat to international security and the integrity of the regime. As a result, IAEA adopted Additional Protocol in 1997. Additional Protocol is a voluntary safeguards agreement to detect clandestine nuclear activities and undeclared nuclear material in States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA).<sup>159</sup> It gives IAEA more authority to verify that there is no ongoing undeclared nuclear activity in its territory.<sup>160</sup>

Further, IAEA released the “trigger list” (triggering safeguards as a condition of supply) of nuclear-related strategic goods to assist NPT Parties in identifying equipment and materials subject to export controls prepared by Zangger Committee.<sup>161</sup> The list specified the nuclear materials that can not be exported unless the respected state is subject to IAEA safeguards. Additionally, Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group prepares export control guidelines to ensure that nuclear materials are not used for non-peaceful purposes. Zangger Committee is an initiative to identify the components of equipment and materials that are broadly referred to in Article III.2 of the Treaty such as “especially designed or prepared equipment or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.”<sup>162</sup> Similarly, Nuclear Suppliers Group prohibits the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to non-

---

<sup>158</sup> See P. Lettow, “Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime”, Council Special Report No 54, Council of Foreign Relations, (2010),11

<sup>159</sup> Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols”, International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 30 August 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview>

<sup>160</sup> “Additional Protocol”, International Atomic Energy Agency, (January 12, 2016), accessed 30 July 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol>.

<sup>161</sup> “The Mission of Zangger Committee”, Zangger Committee, accessed 4 May 2019, <http://www.foi.se/en/Customer--Partners/Projects/zc/zangger/history/>

<sup>162</sup> Treaty on the Nonproliferation of the Nuclear Weapons (NPT), INFCIRC 140, 22 Apr 1970.

NPT states, or to those that are party to NPT yet fail to fully comply with IAEA safeguards.<sup>163</sup>

### **3.2. FIRST ANOMALY: PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES**

This section will attempt to unite theoretical knowledge supporting Turkey's NNWS status with its historic stance against nuclear proliferation to refrain from misinterpretation of Turkey's nuclear intentions and gives the context that Turkey's deviation from its foreign policy on peaceful use of nuclear technology emanates from. This section will also attempt to unite Turkish foreign policy and technical aspects to better understand the weight of proliferation-sensitive technologies and Turkey's standing with proposals on their restrictions, especially on the emerging de-facto classification of NNWS without an advanced nuclear infrastructure in the vicinity of unstable regions and nuclear exporters in the regime.

Nuclear technology remains susceptible to clandestine proliferation<sup>164</sup> as the nuclear nonproliferation regime is challenged with undeclared activities. As nuclear technology diversifies and spreads, verifying that nuclear technology is used for peaceful purposes is challenged despite existing export controls and verification mechanisms. Similarly, Iran's nuclear programme has become an international issue of proliferation-sensitive technologies and their use by NNWS.

Theoretically, NPT does not prevent NNWS compliant to IAEA safeguards from using proliferation-sensitive nuclear technologies. But, in early 2000s, Iran's uranium enrichment at proliferation-sensitive facilities and its failure to report it

---

<sup>163</sup> "About Us", Nuclear Suppliers Group, accessed 24 June 2019, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-us>

<sup>164</sup> Mohamed ElBaradei, "Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Future Challenges" (April 23, 1998), accessed 27 May 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/control-nuclear-proliferation-future-challenges>

planned nuclear activities resulted in concerns regarding Iran's nuclear intentions.<sup>165</sup>

Consequently, negotiations amidst political tension making Iran a target for using proliferation-sensitive technologies and denomination of Iran by G.W. Bush administration's a part of an 'axis of evil' has sought to resolve the disagreement with technical measures. Further, former IAEA Director ElBaradei argued the merits of limiting the use of weapons usable material (plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes, by permitting it only under multilateral control.<sup>166</sup> Accordingly, a proposal was introduced by the United States under President G.W. Bush administration via the Nuclear Threat Initiative to restrain the export sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states without existing facilities in 2006.<sup>167</sup> The proposals included a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA, however, it is declined in the voting process due to its friction with Article IV of the NPT Treaty.<sup>168</sup> Another proposal to limit the spread of sensitive proliferation technologies was proposed in 2009 as a multilateral enrichment facility in Siberia, Russia by a consortium of Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan under IAEA's supervision. The proposal designated a low enriched nuclear fuel bank entitled "Russian Initiative to Establish a Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)" and suggested the release of controlled amounts of low enriched uranium to prevent proliferation.<sup>169</sup> Negotiations with Russia on its proposal were approved at the November 2009 at the Board of Governors meeting, but with eight states voting against (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Africa and Venezuela), three (India, Kenya and Turkey).<sup>170</sup> The proposal is considered a disincentive to enrich uranium nationally vis-a-vis a guaranteed flow of fissile

---

<sup>165</sup> Şebnem Udum, Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers, *Perceptions* (Summer-Autumn 2017), Vol 22, no. 2-3,,68.

<sup>166</sup> IAEA Director General M. Elbaradei, IAEA General Conference, 2003.

<sup>167</sup> "The Bush Proposals: A Global Strategy for Combating the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology or a Sanctioned Nuclear Cartel?" Nuclear Threat Initiative, (2004), accessed 15 June 2019 <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/bush-proposals>.

<sup>168</sup> Article IV, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT), (1970).

<sup>169</sup> IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank", International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 15 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/iaea-low-enriched-uranium-bank>

<sup>170</sup>R. Woods and A. MacLachlan "Developing countries wary board-approved fuel bank proposal may limit options", *Nuclear Fuel*, (December 14, 2009), 10.

materials from multilateral facilities. Only state in the Middle East to object the proposal was Egypt as Turkey abstained from voting.

NSG followed the proposal with a criteria which restrict the transfer of ENR equipment and technology to countries that have signed the NPT and have implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement.<sup>171</sup> The criteria specified as follows:<sup>172</sup>

“Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and material usable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities.”<sup>173</sup>

ENR having been a concern of international security and nuclear suppliers after the Iranian nuclear program led to a multilateral approach on the nuclear fuel cycle prevailed vis-a-vis rights and obligations of NNWS under the NPT and accordingly their right to individual nuclear capabilities in sensitive technologies. The NSG decided to strengthen its guidelines regarding to enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR), equipment, materials, and facilities. The adjustment led to a disagreement on the fundamental norms of the regime. Similarly, Turkey argued that Middle Eastern States would suffer under any sort of regulations that imposed an export ban on items for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing to countries without such capabilities, even under a criteria-based rule.<sup>174</sup>

---

<sup>171</sup> “Guidelines”, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), accessed 18 March 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>,

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Fred McGoldrick, “Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options”, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School, (2011),3.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid, 7.

### 3.3. EXPLANATION OF FIRST ANOMALY: NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NNWS STATUS

Turkey's emphasis on Middle East has multiple dimensions. First and foremost, Turkey's concerns about regional dynamics is relevant to its expectations in national security threats. Further, politically Turkey faces the transformation of nuclear nonproliferation norm towards a stricter interpretation of preventive measures vis-a-vis undeniable rights of NNWS enshrined in the NPT. According to a survey conducted by Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and the UAE as emerging nuclear energy states by 2030 as the majority of these states are located in the Middle East.<sup>175</sup>

As an NNWS close to an unstable region, of which it does not consider itself a part, Turkey is dissident of developments that it interprets as a vulnerability as in a threat to its national and energy security goals and prestige of being a NNWS.

The fuel bank initiative received criticism from NNWS that are newly developing nuclear capabilities including Turkey, although has a nascent nuclear infrastructure and proliferation-sensitive technologies are currently irrelevant to its nuclear program, for denying the right granted to them by the Article IV of NPT.<sup>176</sup> As nuclear supplier countries such as United States, France, Japan, and South Korea have made a more strident effort to control the transfer of nuclear technology to recipient states since the early 2000s, Turkey was among the states that rejected stringent export control guidelines due to concerns about the Middle Eastern states.<sup>177</sup> Although a regulatory framework already exists under the nuclear nonproliferation regime to reassure supplier countries

---

<sup>175</sup> "Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States", Center For International Governance and Innovation, (2009), accessed 27 June 2019, <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/survey-emerging-nuclear-energy-states>

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Sinan Ulgen, "The Security Dimension of Turkey's Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy and Non Proliferation Policies", EDAM Discussion Papers, (2012), 156



that the technology will not be used for military use, Turkey argued that subjective guidelines enables nuclear suppliers denying critical technologies to nuclear aspirants, where the Middle Eastern states would be negatively effected from these restrictions.<sup>178</sup> The fear for states like Turkey is that once established and operational, these facilities may provide an excuse for the owners of sensitive nuclear technologies to fundamentally alter the present day modus operandi and strive to constrain the ability of states to engage in uranium enrichment.<sup>179</sup>

Hence, Turkey denies any new distinction between nuclear have's and have-not's in terms of nuclear technology which is a right as long as it is used in compliance with countries' respective international obligations.<sup>180</sup> As far as Turkey concerns, if there is a new category of states, that could create dependence for have-nots, and might be used as leverage in politics.<sup>181</sup> Thus, vulnerability of political dependence imposed on NNWS that haven't developed these technologies could negatively affect their energy security policy. Because as a country in progress of developing nuclear energy, the protection of this right is deemed to be crucial for preventing any future bottlenecks of supply.<sup>182</sup>

Apart from Turkey's nuclear infrastucture and its inconvenience with these sensitive technologies, and how incorporated the NPT and nonproliferation into its national security policy, an independent nuclear weapons capability would be harmful to Turkish interests in the short and long term.<sup>183</sup> Given scientific and political aspects of Turkey within the NPT, Turkey works towards strengthening the goals of the regime and endorses its status as a non-nuclear-weapon state as a security asset instead of individual security assurances against external

---

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?", Discussion Papers, No.2 (2010), 7

<sup>180</sup> Ş. Udum, Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers, *Perceptions* (Summer-Autumn 2017), Vol 22, no. 2-3, 69.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey?", Discussion Papers, No.2 (2010), 7

<sup>183</sup> A. Stein, Ş. Udum, "A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran's Nuclear Footsteps", Volume 11, Number 2, (2012), 148

threats.<sup>184</sup> Turkey's standing with the IAEA is invested in its political reasons not to proliferate and several initiatives that promotes the norms of nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy are clear.

Therefore, Turkey's deviation from its foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation and full compliance to nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy is relevant to partially its long-term energy security concerns and mainly political concerns pertaining to regional developments. Accordingly, Ankara disagrees to the language regarding the transfer of technology to countries close to unstable regions.<sup>185</sup> Further, Turkey objects to the dichotomy imposed on NNWS in compliance with their international obligations in contrast with the principles of NPT.<sup>186</sup> The clash of discourse between the exclusive and international NPT principles free of regional biases and the Classical Realist rhetoric of Post-Cold War period in Middle East politics is the foundation of Turkey's friction with the rationale behind this dichotomy, not the NPT principles or its NNWS status. Because the pillar of Turkey's NNWS status is the Constructivist, Classical Realist and Liberalist combination of ideational power Turkey attributes to nuclear capabilities, accessibility to nuclear options and virtual deterrence of American commitment to Turkish security.

However, misinterpretation of Turkey's nuclear intentions departing from this deviation in its foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation and its support of NNWS access to proliferation-sensitive technologies will be conclusory. Because Turkey's likelihood of seeking individual security guarantees is highly unlikely given its security assurance by NATO. Moreover, if Turkey were to ever conclude an agreement for the import of either enrichment or reprocessing facilities, the provisions in Turkey's nuclear cooperation agreements would

---

<sup>184</sup> Şebnem Udum, "Turkey's Non-Nuclear Weapon Status, A Theoretical Assessment, *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, (2007), 57-65.

<sup>185</sup> Şebnem Udum, "The Role of Turkey in the 2015 NPT Conference", EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2015/1, (May 4, 2015),22

<sup>186</sup> Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, and William H. Tobey, "Limiting Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints and Options", Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, (May 2011), <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf>.

place limits on the levels of enrichment and the circumstances that would permit reprocessing using foreign equipment.<sup>187</sup>

Therefore, Turkey's insistence of keeping access to proliferation-sensitive technologies should be revisited on projection of 'ideational power' over being a fully compliant NNWS and entitlement to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear technology based on NPT. Turkey is a dissident of new measures that alienates the inclusive terms of the Treaty and create new classifications among NNWS that are new to nuclear technology and close to unstable regions such as Middle East, yet already compliant with the regime. Otherwise, Turkey has severe legal and political constraints for nuclear proliferation even though it faces severe threats from the WMD capable states in the Middle East.

### **3.4. SECOND ANOMALY: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN INCIRLIK**

Turkey is a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter NATO) since 1952 and accordingly a non-nuclear-weapon state that attaches great importance to arms control and the norm of disarmament as a part of its foreign policy.<sup>188</sup> Turkey is a NATO ally, a part of international collective defense organization. Further, its historic alliance to NATO is an integral part of Turkish foreign policy, but also a restraint on Turkey's individual options in maximizing its military power.<sup>189</sup> Thus, Turkey's NNWS status is a consequence of its strategic alliance that Turkey sees as a tool of power as much as a restraint on its "nuclear options."

Since the Cold War, Turkey hosts tactical nuclear weapons that were deployed as part of NATO's collective defense posture against external threats.<sup>190</sup> The

---

<sup>187</sup> A. Stein, Ş. Udum. "A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran's Nuclear Footsteps", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 11, Number 2, (2012),148

<sup>188</sup> "Arms Control and Disarmament", Turkey's Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa> (Official Website)

<sup>189</sup> Şebnem Udum, Interview by the author. Personal interview. Ankara, June 19, 2017.

<sup>190</sup> S. Lunn, "The Role And Place Of Tactical Nuclear Weapons—A Nato Perspective" in Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, Jeffrey D. McCausland (eds) *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*, Strategic Studies Institute, (2012), 235-255.

nuclear deterrence extended by NATO is predominantly the nuclear deterrence extended by the United States, that is not confined to only NATO members. There are also major non-NATO allies, a status designated by the United States for close strategic partners of U.S. Armed Forces under the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. are namely Australia, a WMD Free Zone state, Bahrain, Egypt, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan and Israel, de-facto nuclear state, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.<sup>191</sup> Thus, the scope of American nuclear deterrence extends beyond NATO's borders and includes de-facto nuclear weapon states and Non-Nuclear Weapon states in the Middle East. Accordingly, nuclear deterrent extended to Turkey is a security assurance to remind American commitment to Turkey's defense and its possible adversaries in the face of external threats from Turkey's imminent neighborhood in the Middle East whereas excluding Gulf States, Israel and Egypt under their alliance with the U.S.

In accordance with the threat perception and political history of Turkey, nuclear weapons were deployed in the vicinity of Turkey's southern border during Cold War. Despite the lack of an official declaration of the location of tactical nuclear weapons, Incirlik Air Base in Adana is assumed the location of 90 B-61 type nuclear bombs that are under U.S. custody in times of peace.<sup>192</sup> In times of war, 40 B-61 bombs can be reportedly delivered by the F-16 jets of the United States, which does not have a wing in Incirlik Base and Turkish Air Force is not certified for pursuing any nuclear mission on behalf of NATO.<sup>193</sup>

Given lesser military significance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the contribution of tactical nuclear weapons (hereafter TNW) deployed by the United States in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey to NATO's

---

<sup>192</sup> See "İncirlik'te Nükleer Silah İddiası", accessed 17 July 2019, <https://www.dw.com/tr/incirlikte-n%C3%BCkleer-silah-iddias%C4%B1/a-49615748>.

<sup>191</sup> "Security Assistant Management Manual Defense", Security Cooperation Agency, accessed 2 September 2019, <https://samm.dsca.mil/glossary/major-non-nato-allies>.

<sup>193</sup> Alexandra Bell, Benjamin Loehrke, "The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey", *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (2009), accessed 10 March 2019, <http://thebulletin.org/status-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>

security is revisited by its members.<sup>194</sup> In Lisbon Summit (2010), NATO announced that the Alliance is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia.<sup>195</sup>

When the status and practicality of the TNWs are debated shortly before the summit, the advocates of retaining nuclear weapons in Turkey argued that in case of the early removal of the TNWs, Iran's controversial nuclear program could catalyze Turkish nuclear proliferation. Further, TNWs in Turkey could be redundant and an inviting target for terrorists.<sup>196</sup> On the other hand, the argument in disagreement with this scenario put forward that Turkish government would deny any attempt to jeopardize its NPT commitment and develop nuclear weapons and that it would support the withdrawal of American TNWs.<sup>197</sup> As the latter argument is supported in the thesis in terms of Turkey's security policy, political motivation and nascent nuclear infrastructure, and the former argument is an extremely Classical Realist interpretation that disregards Turkey's NNWS history, removal of TNW in Turkey lacked strong calls. Because, tactical nuclear weapons are interpreted as the United States' enduring commitment to the alliance and assumed that they discourage NATO members from developing their own nuclear weapons.<sup>198</sup> Where proposal to TNW's removal is criticized for being dangerous and ill-advised without reciprocal steps in disarmament from Russia.<sup>199</sup> Thus, objecting parties see TNWs a symbol of alliance cohesion and a demonstration of how the United States and NATO have committed to defending each other in the

---

<sup>194</sup> D. Browne, "Current NATO Nuclear Policy" in Ingram, P. and Meier, O. (eds) "Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Perspectives and Proposals on the NATO Policy Debate", (2011), 5-8.

<sup>195</sup> "Article 27, "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review: The Contribution of Nuclear Forces", North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed 18 June 2019, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1D41DDB0-87E01C8/natolive/official\\_texts\\_87597.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-1D41DDB0-87E01C8/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm)

<sup>196</sup> Eric Schlosser, "The H-bombs in Turkey", *The New Yorker*, (July 17, 2016), accessed 15 June 2019, <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-h-bombs-in-turkey>

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> See Mustafa Kibaroglu, *Turkey's Nuclear Contradictions*, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2015

event of an attack.<sup>200</sup> Although Soviet nuclear threat is eliminated and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe is reduced around %90, remaining stockpile in Europe relates to a 'virtual deterrence' concept, which enables abolishing nuclear weapons, that the United States maintains primarily to deter, or prevent, other states from attack.<sup>201</sup>

While Germany and Netherlands hold NNWS status and are signatories of the NPT-related treaties as Turkey, their approach to tactical nuclear weapons hosted on their respective territories severely differ from that of Turkey. Although NATO and the Department of Defense of the United States of America do not publicly release information on the deployments, German government works toward the withdrawal of U.S. weapons according to a study by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC).<sup>202</sup> There are 150 U.S. weapons in Germany that is the highest number of TNWs in Europe.<sup>203</sup> The Belgian parliament also passed a similar resolution.

### **3.5.EXPLANATION OF SECOND ANOMALY: SECURITY ASSURANCE**

Turkey, in particular, has a desire to maintaining the weapons on its territory and expects other NATO countries to continue their post as part of the Alliance's burden sharing principle.<sup>204</sup> Hence, lack of strong calls inside Turkey and further deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, constitutes an 'anomaly' in its standing with the nuclear nonproliferation regime and efforts to a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East region.

As European hosts of TNWs are taking initiatives to remove U.S. nuclear weapons deployed under NATO, TNWs remain an affirmation of Turkey's

---

<sup>200</sup> Ibid.

<sup>201</sup> See Christopher Ford, "Nuclear Weapons Reconstitution and its Discontents: Challenges of Weaponless Deterrence", Hudson Institute, 2011.

<sup>202</sup> Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe", Arms Control Association, accessed 30 July 2019, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005-06/belgium-germany-question-us-tactical-nuclear-weapons-europe>

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's nuclear contradictions, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 2015. <http://thebulletin.org/hiroshima-and-nagasaki-lessons-learned/turkeys-nuclear-contradictions>, 17 Sept 2015.

security conceptualization with NATO, specifically the United States as the cornerstone of Turkey's defense and security policy, and an integral part of Turkey's global identity.<sup>205</sup> During Cold War, Turkey's relations with the West and with NATO in particular were founded on a clear and reciprocal security commitment: Turkey was committed to wider European security in the face of Soviet threat and the rest of NATO was committed to the defence of Turkey.<sup>206</sup> As TNWs symbolize a Western, particularly American commitment to Turkish security, Turkey feels secure in the face of its southern border and remained a Non Nuclear Weapon State despite grave security concerns out of its alignment with the West.

Turkey is estimated to host around 90 B61 gravity bombs under the inventory of tactical nuclear weapons that can only be delivered by the F-16 jets of the United States.<sup>207</sup> 50 B61 gravity bombs are assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, as 40 are assigned to Turkish Air Force. However, Turkish Air Forces is not certified for pursuing any nuclear mission on behalf of NATO.<sup>208</sup> Therefore, their imminent contribution to Turkey's military capabilities is disputable. Moreover, in the Middle East, Turkish military power is already favorable vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq and roughly the same with Iran, and its NATO guarantee constituted the main deterrent against any unconventional attack with ballistic missiles from these states.<sup>209</sup>

Apart from their military significance, TNW are considered a symbol of status. Moreover, the assumption that they were removed, Turkey's status in NATO would have been negatively affected as much as a means of minimum deterrent.<sup>210</sup> Thus, assurance from NATO enables Turkey to see TNW as a security asset which makes Ankara to avoid thinking about a national nuclear deterrent. Moreover, Turkey approaches to the status of being a NNWS as a

---

<sup>205</sup> Ibid.

<sup>206</sup> Tarik Oguzlu, "Turkey and the Transformation of NATO", SETA Policy Brief 33, (July 2009), 6.

<sup>207</sup> Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke, *The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey*, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 23 November 2009. <http://thebulletin.org/status-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Aaron Stein and Şebnem Udum. "A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran's Nuclear Footsteps", vol. 11, no.2, (2012), 147

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

security asset.<sup>211</sup> Given its economic ties, its candidacy to European Union, and cooperation-based alignment with Western bloc as a security reference, Turkey is highly unlikely to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.

Nevertheless, the principle of NATO on defense is that “an armed attack against a member state... shall be considered an attack against all NATO members.”<sup>212</sup> However, Article V of the Washington Treaty, the Founding Treaty of NATO, is not a promise of collective defense act regarding threats emanating from the Middle East to Turkey based on the experience of NATO and Turkey being on different sides of interpreting NATO’s collective defense. Because the willingness of NATO members on Turkey’s key security threats about the indivisibility of its territory and population emanating from the Middle East is questionable, especially after the Cold War as Turkey experienced in Gulf Wars in 1991.

TNWs are considered a reminder to both Turkey and its possible opponents in the Middle East, they also reminds Turkey ‘the anomaly’ in its foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation and commitment to nuclear disarmament along with its hard work as a part of NPDI in promoting a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East.

Given Turkey’s standing with the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, Turkey has to revisit its assessment of TNWs and weigh their actual and symbolic contribution to Turkish national defense policy. Even though, any possible opponent to NATO nuclear umbrella is likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella.<sup>213</sup> Turkey needs reassurance that it will be effectively supported with regard to any threats emerging from the countries it borders in the Middle East.<sup>214</sup> Because this reassurance can be instrumental to how Turkey

---

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Founding Treaty, 4 April 1949, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_67656.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>213</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Nuclear Contradictions”, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, (2015).

<sup>214</sup> Ian Kearns, “Turkey, NATO and the Nuclear Weapons”, Joint Occasional Paper with ELN, Royal United Services Institute, (January 2013),24.



reconciles its commitment to disarmament with its immediate security concerns.<sup>215</sup>

The next section explains the theoretical ground, technological and political aspects of Turkey's anomalies and argues that Turkey is not an outlier of the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a NNWS.

### **3.6. ASSESSMENT**

Turkey's NNWS status can be explained in International Relations Theories combined with the key aspects of Regime Theory. As a part of regime transformation based on norms, the set of ideas underlying certain standards of state behavior, the thesis argues that norm of peaceful use of nuclear technology has transformed with ENR technologies after the resumption of Iran's nuclear program as a NNWS. The transformation of norm of peaceful use of nuclear energy in the nuclear nonproliferation regime shifts the expectation of state behavior from NNWS in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The regime emphasizes 'security' of ENR vis-a-vis NNWS 'capability' to develop sensitive nuclear technologies. Changing attitude towards. According to Regime Theory based on the insights of International Relations Theories on Turkey's NNWS,

The thesis benefits from the insights of Classical Realist, Neoliberal Institutional thought and Regime theory to fully understand the layers of Turkish state behavior in the regime, but, it argues that Classical Realism has more explanatory power in evaluating Turkey's 'anomalies' as results in its standing with the nuclear nonproliferation regime via conceptualization of power.

Instead of seeking individual security assurances to balance Soviet Union, admission to NATO has been an example to bandwagoning against Soviet nuclear threat and influence in Realist terms where NATO's nuclear umbrella combined with Turkey's own conventional forces is the utmost deterrence towards any threat to Turkey's territorial integrity from the Middle East.

---

<sup>215</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey and the Bomb", The Carnage Papers (2012),14.

Nevertheless, Turkey's non nuclear weapon status is not confined to Realist thought given its ties to the liberal ground. As Being a Non Nuclear Weapon state and joining the nuclear nonproliferation regime has become the 'accepted' state behavior from the standpoint of Turkey's security and foreign policy instead of seeking nuclear weapons as instruments of military and political advantage and prestige.<sup>216</sup>

Turkey's non nuclear weapon status has a Liberalist dimension marking its ties to being a part of both international community and Western bloc. Thus, gains and assurances from this cooperation is highly likely to be at stakes had Turkey had nuclear weapons. This basis relates to its NNWS status in the nuclear nonproliferation regime, its candidacy for European Union and NATO membership. Turkey's affiliation with the international community also has a Realist framework that relates to foreign policy as a means of national security, by building alliances that is key to assure Turkey's defense. Similarly, as power has many definitions and, it can be related to ideas through inducing something through reasoning or argument.<sup>217</sup> "Ideational power" is therefore the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements.<sup>218</sup> Accordingly, a state that complies with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, may attribute ideational power to being a prestigious member of a group. Similarly, Turkey's foreign and security policy is influenced by the ideational elements that Turkey attributes to its alignment with the international community and Western bloc and the nuclear capabilities that NNWS in good standing with the regime are entitled to, as an extension of this choice.

Realist instinct of state survival can be observed in Turkish foreign policy in nuclear nonproliferation regime that reveals an involuntary defection that

---

<sup>216</sup> Şebnem Udum, Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers, *Perceptions* (Summer-Autumn 2017), Vol 22, no. 2-3, 63.

<sup>217</sup> M. B. Carstensen, "Bringing Ideational Power into the Paradigm Approach: Critical Perspectives on Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice", in J. Hogan et al. (eds.), *Policy Paradigms in Theory and Practice*, (2015), 309.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid*, 311.

prevents Turkey from fulfilling the expected NNWS behavior in accordance with the new behavior of access to proliferation sensitive technologies. Further, Turkey's desire to maintain tactical nuclear weapons in the face of an attack to from the Middle East.

The mindset of Turkish security on negative assurances to its possible adversaries and its interpretation of sensitive technologies is remotely different and seeking the status-quo of the previous rights under the NPT. Further to its concerns over its civilian nuclear program with the possibility of new restrictions and bottleneck of supply in nuclear technology, Turkey's stance against the additional criteria on the transfer of ENR is also a political concern over its NNWS prestige. As a NNWS that haven't developed ENR Technologies, Turkey is unwilling to be a 'nuclear have-not' in the new norm of peaceful use of nuclear energy at the expense of Turkey's NNWS status in the regime and international relations as a source of prestige.

Accordingly, the thesis argues that the 'anomalies' in the thesis on Turkish foreign policy on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament exemplify an 'involuntary defection'. Involuntary defection is the inability of a party reaching or supporting an international agreement to sustain its political commitment based on domestic political constraints.<sup>219</sup> As the involuntary defection, Realist instinct of state survival can be observed in Turkish foreign policy in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that reveals an involuntary defection preventing Turkey from fulfilling the expected NNWS behavior in accordance with the expectation of new behavior on ENR as known as the "proliferation sensitive technologies". Further, Turkey's desire to maintain tactical nuclear weapons in the face of an attack to Turkish territory from the Middle East relates to a continuous concern about national security and willingness of NATO, especially the United States to support Turkey's defense after the evolving characteristics of world politics after the Cold War.

---

<sup>219</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "The Logic of Two-Level Games: International Cooperation, Domestic Politics, and Western Summitry, 1975-1986," American Political Science Association, (Washington. D.C:1986), 13.

## CONCLUSION

Current energy costs and its drive to expand nuclear energy, growing concerns about the environmental impact of fossil fuels, spread of scientific and technical knowledge attracts more interest on civilian nuclear energy programs today. However, the major challenge nuclear energy faces today is to provide an impermeable solution for managing the nuclear fuel cycle in order to prevent proliferation and to eliminate the risk of diversion of nuclear material.<sup>220</sup> Even though international community closely controls these technologies verification mechanisms and deterrents like strident sanctions and political isolation, the rise of illicit procurement networks, as well as the spread of technological know-how, does not preclude states from developing enrichment technologies by themselves as in Iran.<sup>221</sup> Accordingly, unless a technological breakthrough in nuclear technology alters the entire course of full nuclear fuel cycle, proliferation-sensitive technologies of uranium enrichment and reprocessing is likely to remain a challenge.

Nevertheless, risk of non-peaceful use of nuclear technology as a threat to the regime is accompanied by absence of de-facto nuclear states under IAEA safeguards' verification, past experience of clandestine proliferations under NPT, NWS privileges to temper with the context of the nuclear practices and lack of subtle nuclear disarmament efforts.

NNWS newly developing nuclear infrastructure seeking reliable, affordable and environmental-friendly energy sources to diversify hydrocarbon sources and reduce dependency on imported fuel, has faced unique challenges at the intersection of international security and nuclear technology. Because after Iran's nuclear deal, clandestine proliferation of NNWS in the Middle East has been an international concern and nuclear suppliers applied stricter measures on NNWS without nuclear infrastructure for proliferation-sensitive technologies.

---

<sup>220</sup> Erkan Erdoğan, "Nuclear power in open energy markets: A case study of Turkey", *Energy Policy*, vol. 35, (2007), 3066-3067.

<sup>221</sup> Sinan Ülgen, "Turkey and the Bomb", *The Carnegie Papers*, February 2012, 22.

Turkey, as an NNWS in compliance with international nuclear nonproliferation regime has been a critic of this dichotomy.

However, Turkey has a nascent nuclear infrastructure and can not be immediately affected from measures against use of proliferation-sensitive technologies for clandestine nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, Turkey objected to attempts to deny NNWS proliferation-sensitive technologies. The thesis supports that this objection is a deviation from Turkey's foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation, however, it is neither an indicator of a hidden nuclear agenda nor Turkey is a threat to nuclear nonproliferation regime and international security. Because its membership to NATO, pursuing further political and economic engagement with the Western bloc such as candidacy to European Union, is an indicator of Turkey's NNWS and constitutes constraints on Turkey's nuclear options. Further, Turkey's pursuit of national security assurances would be detrimental to its historic choice of alignment and long-term interest, thus remaining a NNWS is the continuation of Turkey's long time foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation. Therefore, Turkey with a nascent nuclear infrastructure and political ties to Western bloc is highly unlikely to be a clandestine proliferation aspirant such as Iraq or North Korea.

To understand Turkey's approach to proliferation sensitive technologies, the thesis use ideational power Turkey attributes to these technologies with references to both Classical Realist and Constructivist terms. Because Turkey is a dissident of the proposals by nuclear exporters at the expense of NNWS new to nuclear technology that comply with the regime and entitled to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear technology, as a power. Therefore, attempts to limit supply-side of nuclear proliferation such as limiting access to sensitive nuclear technology for states that haven't developed them, clashes with the undeniable right to pursue peaceful use of nuclear technology granted by the NPT <sup>222</sup>. Thus, why Turkey is behaving differently on this matter in the nuclear nonproliferation regime is conducive to its concerns about the prospective

---

<sup>222</sup> Article IV, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), (1970), <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text>.

implications of this dichotomy on NNWS. Because this dichotomy can yield new political dependency on nuclear suppliers.

Turkey's other deviation from its foreign policy on nuclear nonproliferation is related to the norm of nuclear disarmament. Despite its standing with initiatives towards a Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East as part of NPDI, there are nuclear weapons deployed by the United States on Turkish territory in the Cold War. Moreover, Turkey is unwilling to remove these tactical nuclear weapons given their disputable military significance. The removal of the tactical nuclear weapons relates to the commitment to Turkey's security as a member of a collective defense organization. Because lack of will to remove tactical nuclear weapons is a symbol of the political commitment to one's security and these weapons relates to the ideational power Turkey attributed to aligning with the Western bloc.

Technical outlook suggests that Turkey would be unlikely to develop a nuclear weapon in near future and is highly unlikely to proliferate given the state of its nuclear infrastructure and the security dynamics. Given how incorporated the NPT and nonproliferation into its national security policy, an independent nuclear weapons capability would be harmful to Turkish interests in the short and long term.<sup>223</sup>

---

<sup>223</sup> A. Stein, Ş. Udum. "A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran's Nuclear Footsteps", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 2 (2012), 148.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books and Articles

Aydın, Mustafa and Fulya Ereker. Türkiye’de Güvenlik: Algı, Politika, Yapı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Volume 11(43), Fall 2014, 127-156.

Aydın, Mustafa. “The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation,” *Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2003, pp. 306-331.

Aydinli, Ersel. “The Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the Late Ottoman Era to the 1930s”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.40, no.3, (2004), 102 — 133.

Barkey, Henry J., ‘Turkey’s Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament’ in Barry Bleachman ed, ‘Unblocking The Road to Zero, Perspectives of Advanced Nuclear Nations, Turkey, Japan, Brazil’ Stimson Nuclear Security Series, Volume VI, 2009.

Baylis J and S. Smith, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Bell, A. and Benjamin Loehrke, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 23 November 2009. <http://thebulletin.org/status-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>

Bowen, Wyn. “Libya,” in James E. Doyle, ed., *Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy*, Butterworth-Heinemann, 2008.

Brown, C.S. “Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003”, *Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol.8, 2007, 85-119

Bunn, Matthew Martin Malin, and William H. Tobey, “Limiting Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints and Options,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2011.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Beatrice Heuser. Translated by Peter Paret Michael Howard. Oxford University Press, 2007.

Erdoğan, Erkan. Nuclear power in open energy markets: A case study of Turkey, *Energy Policy*, Vol 35, 2007, 3061-3073.

Finnemore, M and K. Sikkink, *International Norms Dynamics and Political Change*, *International Organization*, 52(4), 1998

Florini, A. The Evolution of International Norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3),1996.

Gillinsky, Victor. "A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors," *Nonproliferation Policy Education Center*, October 22, 2004,

Harvey, C. "From Theory to Reality: The Evolution of Multilateral Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 24, 2011, [www.nti.org/e\\_research/e3\\_fuel\\_cycle.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_fuel_cycle.html)

IAEA Safeguards Glossary. *International Nuclear Verification Series*, No. 3. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002.

Nuclear Security Culture. *IAEA Nuclear Security Series*, 7. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2008.

Ikenberry, G.J. Institutions, strategic restraint, and the persistence of American postwar order. In R. Little & M. Smith eds., *Perspectives on World Politics* 3rd ed. (pp. 133-141). New York: Routledge, 2006.

Jackson, Robert H. and Georg Sørensen. "Liberalism." In *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, 99-131. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Kant, I. *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*, translated with Introduction and Notes by M. Campbell Smith, with a Preface by L. Latta. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917.



Karaosmanoğlu, A. "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2000, pp. 199-217

Kearns, Ian. 'Turkey, NATO and the Nuclear Weapons', Royal United Services Institute - A Joint Occasional Paper with ELN, January 2013.

Keohane, R. "Governance in a Partially Globalized World." In *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, 245-71. London: Routledge, 2000. 115

Keohane, Robert O. "Cooperation and International Regimes." In *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, 49-64. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Keohane, Robert O. "Reciprocity in International Relations." *International Organization* vol.40, no. 1 (1986): 1-27.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* vol.20, no. 1 (1995): 39-51.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. "Power, Interdependence, and Globalism." In *Power and Interdependence*, 224-58. Boston: Longman, 2012.

Kibaroglu, Mustafa. Turkey's nuclear contradictions, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 17 Sept 2015.

Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization*, vol.36, no. 2 (1982): 185-205.

Kristensen, Hans M. *US Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, D.C. Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005.

Larrabee, F.S. 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', *Survival*, Vol. 52, No. 2, April-May 2010.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996.

Lettow, Paul. *Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*, Council Special Report No 54, Council of Foreign Relations, 2010, 1-47.

Lorenz, Thomas and Joanna Kidd, Turkey and Multilateral Nuclear Approaches in Middle East, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol 17 No: 3, 2010, 513-530.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. United Nations Institute for Disarmament, 2011.

Mearsheimer, John J. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49.

Mearsheimer, John J. "Structural Realism." In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 77-93: New York: Oxford University Press, 3. ed., 2013

Mellon, J.G. "Islamism, Kemalism and the Future of Turkey", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, vol. 7, no.1, (2006), 67-81.

Milner, H, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, (1991), 67-85

Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. INFCIRC/540. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, September 1997.

Morgenthau, Hans J. and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*. 6th ed. New York: Knopf, 1985. Neack, L. *The new Foreign Policy: U.S and comparative foreign policy in the 21 st Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. Peter Bondanella and Mark Musa, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Oguzlu, Tarik. 'Turkey and the Transformation of NATO', SETA Policy Brief No. 33, July 2009

Oğuzlu, Tarık. Security Culture and Turkish Foreign Policy, *Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World* Vol.72, (2015), 223-248

Onuf. N. Constructivism: A User's Manual. In V. Kubáľková, N. Onuf & P.Kowert eds., *International Relations in a Constructed World*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 58-78

Powell, R. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-NeoLiberal Debate. *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2, (1994), 330. pages 313-344.

“Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” In *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years*, edited by David Fischer, 471-92. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997.

“Review of the Operation of the Treaty, Taking into Account the Decisions and the Resolution Adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.” In *2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Final Document*, vol I, 1-22. New York, 2000.

“The United Nations Response.” *UN Chronicle* 38, no. 3 (2001): 6.

Schlosser, Eric. The H-bombs in Turkey, *The New Yorker*, July 17, 2016. <http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-h-bombs-in-turkey>

Stein, A and Ş. Udum. A Complicated Decision: Why Turkey Is Not Likely To Follow in Iran’s Nuclear Footsteps, Volume 11, Number 2, 2012, 141-148

Strange, S. The Declining Authority of States. In F. J. Lechner & J. Boli eds, *The Globalization Reader*, 2. Ed, 2004.

Udum, Şebnem. Interview by the author. Personal interview. Ankara, June 19, 2017.

Udum, Şebnem. Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers, *Perceptions*, Summer-Autumn 2017, Volume XXII, Number 2-3, 57-84.

Udum, Şebnem. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, *Energy and Diplomacy Journal*, Issue 4 ,2015. 94-115

Udum, “Turkey’s Non-Nuclear Weapon Status, A Theoretical Assessment,” *ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2007, pp.57-65

Udum, Şebnem. The Role of Turkey in the 2015 NPT Conference, *EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2015/1*, May 4, 2015.

Udum, Şebnem. Understanding the Nuclear Energy Debate in Turkey: Internal and External Contexts, Ph.D. Dissertation, Bilkent University, 2010.

UN, Office of Public Information, The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945–1965, UN Publication 67.I.8, 28.

Ülgen, Sinan. Turkey and the Bomb, The Carnaige Papers, 2012.

Ulgen, Sinan. 'The Security Dimension of Turkey's Nuclear Program: Nuclear Diplomacy and Non Proliferation Policies' in The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power, EDAM, 2012.

Waltz, Kenneth. Structural Realism after the Cold War, *International Security*, 25(1), 2000, 5-41.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, McGraw Hill, NY, 1979.

Wendt, A. "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992, pp. 391-425

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Thucydides, Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner tr., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Classics, 1972.

Puchala, Donald J. and Raymond F. Hopkins. "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 245-75.

Stein, Arthur A. "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 299-324.

Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. "Neoliberalism." In *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, 114-31: New York: Oxford University Press, 3. ed., 2013. Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, edited by Robert O. Keohane, 322-46. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Young, Oran R. "Regime

Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes.” *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 277-97.

Young, Oran R. “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society.” *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (1991): 281-308.

Young, Oran, “International regimes: problems of concept formation.” *World Politics* 32(3), 1980, 331-56.

Yılmaz A., Güncel, A. “The Present Status of Safeguards in Turkey”, I. Euroasia Conference on Nuclear Science and Its Application, Vol 1, (İzmir: October 2000)

### **Web Sources**

Arms Control and Disarmament, Turkey’s Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accessed 16 June 2019, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/arms-control-and-disarmament.en.mfa>

“About the NSG.” Nuclear Suppliers Group. Accessed February 23, 2017. <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-us>.

“About Us.” International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed February 21, 2017. <https://www.iaea.org/about>.

“Additional Protocol.” International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed February 21, 2017. <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol>.

Bush Proposals, NTI, <http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/bush-proposals/>, (2004)

“Guidelines.” Nuclear Suppliers Group. Accessed February 23, 2017. <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/guidelines>.

“Energy”, International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed 17 June 2019, <https://www.iaea.org/topics/energy>.

“History.” International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed February 21, 2017.  
<https://www.iaea.org/about/overview/history>.

“The IAEA Fact Sheet.” United Nations. Accessed February 21, 2017.  
[www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/IAEA%20factsheet.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/pdf/IAEA%20factsheet.pdf).

International Atomic Energy Agency, Additional Protocol, (last modified in January 12, 2016). <https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol>.

IAEA, Low Enriched Uranium Bank <https://www.iaea.org/topics/iaea-low-enriched-uranium-bank,2009>

Ministry of Customs and Trade, Frequently Asked Question on Export Regime, 13 July, 2015, <http://ggm.gtb.gov.tr/frequently-asked-questions-faq/export-regime>

Nuclear Powerplants and Turkey, Division for Project Implementation in Nuclear  
 Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey, Energy,  
[http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2f1%2fDocuments%2fSayfalar%2fNukleer\\_Guc\\_Santralleri\\_ve\\_Turkiye.pdf](http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2f1%2fDocuments%2fSayfalar%2fNukleer_Guc_Santralleri_ve_Turkiye.pdf) ,(2015)

Nuclear Suppliers Group, <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-us>

Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines,  
<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1978/infcirc254r13p1.pdf>

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Turkey Profile,” (updated in 2014),  
[www.nti.org/country-profiles/turkey](http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/turkey)

World Nuclear Association, Uranium Enrichment, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/conversion-enrichment-and-fabrication/uranium-enrichment.aspx>, updated November 2016

President Announces New Set of Measures to Countering the Threat of WMD,  
 National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004,  
<http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html>.

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Perspectives and Policies on Security Issues, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i-turkey-s-security-perspective-historical-and-conceptual-background-turkey-s-contributions.en.mfa>

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Turkey's Membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, accessed 25 June 2019, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-turkey-s-membership-to-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-unofficial-translation\\_\\_br\\_no\\_114--\\_june-26\\_-2000.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-turkey-s-membership-to-the-nuclear-suppliers-group-unofficial-translation-br-no-114--june-26_-2000.en.mfa), ,

Secretariat-General of the National Security Council of Turkey, About Secretariat-General, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/en/index.php/secretariat-general/about-us>,

Strategic Plan 2015-2019, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, accessed 30 July 2019, <http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2f1%2fDocuments%2fStrategic+Plan%2fStrategicPlan2015-2019.pdf>.

The Mission of Zangger Committee, Zangger Committee Official Website, <http://www.foi.se/en/Customer--Partners/Projects/zc/zangger/history/> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), INFCIRC 140, (Apr 22 1970), <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf>.

"Status of the Treaty, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed February 20, 2017. <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt>.

"Treaty Verification: Understanding IAEA Safeguards." Nuclear Threat Initiative. Accessed February 21, 2017. [http://tutorials.nti.org/nonproliferation-regime-tutorial/treatyverification-understanding-iaea-safeguards/#\\_ednref2](http://tutorials.nti.org/nonproliferation-regime-tutorial/treatyverification-understanding-iaea-safeguards/#_ednref2).

"Types of Nuclear Weapons." Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty Organization. Accessed February 12, 2017. <http://www.ctbto.org/nucleartesting/types-of-nuclear-weapons/>.

Turkey-Japan Atomic Deal Allows Use of Weapon-Sensitive Technology, 'Global Security Newswire', Nuclear Threat Initiative, Jan 8 2014, <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/draft-atomic-deal-japan-would-allow-turkey-enrich-uranium-extract-plutonium/>

Turkish Armed Forces, Accessed 24 June 2019, <http://www.tsk.tr/AboutTaf/History>

Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237, 26 September 2004, <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/tr/tr171en.pdf>

Turkish Energy Minister Denies Uranium Enrichment Intention, Hurriyet Daily News, 9 January 2014, <http://www.hurriyetsdailynews.com/turkish-energy-minister-denies-uranium-enrichment-intention.aspx?pageID=238&nID=60787&NewsCatID=348>.  
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwzf/>

United Nations Security Council, Initial Report, 6 December 2004, [http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/turkey-1540-initial-report.pdf?\\_=1316791231](http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/turkey-1540-initial-report.pdf?_=1316791231)

An Introduction to the Conference." United Nations Office For Disarmament Affairs. Accessed February 22, 2017. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/cd/anintroduction-to-the-conference/>.

"Key Roles." International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed February 21, 2017. <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/npt/key-roles>.

"NSS History." Nuclear Security Summit. Accessed February 27, 2017. <http://www.nss2016.org/about-nss/history/>.

"Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones." United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Accessed February 24, 2017. <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwzf>.

"Nuclear Forensics." International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed February 11, 2017. <https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-forensics>.



“Nuclear Security Summit 2016 Communiqué.” Nuclear Security Summit. Last modified April 01, 2016, Accessed February 27, 2016.

<http://www.nss2016.org/s/Communique-qdbv.pdf>.

“The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Last modified January 31, 2017, Accessed February 23, 2017.


<http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/nuclearsuppliers-group-nsg/>.

“Overview.” International Atomic Energy Agency. Accessed March 26, 2017.

<https://www.iaea.org/about/overview>.

“Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States”, Center For International Governance and Innovation, (2009), accessed 27 June 2019,

<https://www.cigionline.org/articles/survey-emerging-nuclear-energy-states>



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 27/09/2019

Tez Başlığı: Türkiye'nin Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesine İlişkin Uluslararası Rejimle Uyumsuz Olduğu Örnekler

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 90 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 26/09/2019 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 8 'dir.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1-  Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- 2-  Kaynakça hariç
- 3-  Alıntılar hariç
- 4-  Alıntılar dâhil
- 5-  5 kelimedenden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

27/09/2019

**Adı Soyadı:** Gün ÜNAL  
**Öğrenci No:** N11227020  
**Anabilim Dalı:** Uluslararası İlişkiler  
**Programı:** Yüksek Lisans

**DANIŞMAN ONAYI**

UYGUNDUR.

Doç Dr. Şebnem UDUM



HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
MASTER'S THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Date: 27/09/2019

Thesis Title : Turkey's Anomalies in the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 26/09/2019 for the total of 90 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 8 %.

Filtering options applied:

- Approval and Declaration sections excluded
- Bibliography/Works Cited excluded
- Quotes excluded
- Quotes included
- Match size up to 5 words excluded

I declare that I have carefully read Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences Guidelines for Obtaining and Using Thesis Originality Reports; that according to the maximum similarity index values specified in the Guidelines, my thesis does not include any form of plagiarism; that in any future detection of possible infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility; and that all the information I have provided is correct to the best of my knowledge.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

27/09/2019

Name Surname: Gün ÜNAL

Student No: N11227020

Department: International Relations

Program: Graduate

**ADVISOR APPROVAL**

APPROVED.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem UDUM



HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU

HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA

Tarih: 24/09/2019


Tez Başlığı: Türkiye'nin Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesine İlişkin Uluslararası Rejimle Uyumsuz Olduğu Örnekler

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmam:

1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
4. Gözlemsel ve betimsel araştırma (anket, mülakat, ölçek/skala çalışmaları, dosya taramaları, veri kaynakları taraması, sistem-model geliştirme çalışmaları) niteliğinde değildir.

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Etik Kurullar ve Komisyonlarının Yönergelerini inceledim ve bunlara göre tez çalışmamın yürütülebilmesi için herhangi bir Etik Kurul/Komisyon'dan izin alınmasına gerek olmadığını; aksi durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

  
24.09.2019

Adı Soyadı: Gün ÜNAL  
Öğrenci No: N11227020  
Anabilim Dalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler  
Programı: Yüksek Lisans  
Statüsü:  Yüksek Lisans  Doktora  Bütünleşik Doktora

**DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI**



Doç. Dr. Şebnem UDUM

Detaylı Bilgi: <http://www.sosyalbilimler.hacettepe.edu.tr>

Telefon: 0-312-2976860

Faks: 0-3122992147

E-posta: [sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr](mailto:sosyalbilimler@hacettepe.edu.tr)



HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
ETHICS COMMISSION FORM FOR THESIS

HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Date: 24/09/2019

Thesis Title: Turkey's Anomalies in the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime  
My thesis work related to the title above:

1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
3. Does not involve any interference of the body's integrity.
4. Is not based on observational and descriptive research (survey, interview, measures/scales, data scanning, system-model development).

I declare, I have carefully read Hacettepe University's Ethics Regulations and the Commission's Guidelines, and in order to proceed with my thesis according to these regulations I do not have to get permission from the Ethics Board/Commission for anything; in any infringement of the regulations I accept all legal responsibility and I declare that all the information I have provided is true.

I respectfully submit this for approval.

*final*

24/09/2019

Name Surname: Gün ÜNAL

Student No: N11227020

Department: International Relations

Program: Master's Degree

Status:  MA  Ph.D.  Combined MA/ Ph.D.

**ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL**

*Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem UDUM*

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Şebnem UDUM

**APPENDIX 5: TABLES**

International, Multilateral and Bilateral Agreements Turkey signed

**International treaties, conventions and agreements signed/ratified**

|   | NAME   | SIGNED ON        | RATIFICATION      |
|---|--|------------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Convention on Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field Between the NATO Members and Its Amendment  | 22 June 1955     | 10 September 1956 |
| 2 | Paris Convention (1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy)   | 29 July 1960     | 13 May 1961       |
| 3 | Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water   | 05 August 1963   | 13 May 1965       |
| 4 | Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960   | 28 January 1964  | 13 June 1967      |
| 5 | International Labor Conference Convention Number 115 Concerning the Protection of Workers Against Ionizing Radiations  | 17 June 1962     | 25 July 1968      |
| 6 | Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons   | 28 January 1969  | 28 November 1979  |
| 7 | Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution   | 16 February 1976 | 12 June 1981      |
| 8 | The International Convention on Railway Transportation   | 21 March 1985    | 01 June 1985      |
| 9 | Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 | 16 November 1982 | 23 May 1986       |

|    |  |                   |                                 |
|----|--|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| 10 | Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material  | 23 August 1983    | 07 August 1986                  |
| 11 | Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution From Land-based Sources   | 17 May 1980       | 18 March 1987                   |
| 12 | Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency   | 28 September 1986 | 03 September 1990               |
| 13 | Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident   | 28 September 1986 | 03 September 1990               |
| 14 | Convention on the Protection of the Black Sea Against Pollution  | 21 April 1992     | 06 March 1994                   |
| 15 | Convention on Nuclear Safety   | 24 September 1994 | 14 January 1995                 |
| 16 | Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty  | 03 November 1999  | 26 December 1999                |
| 17 | Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna and the Paris Conventions   | 21 September 1988 | 19 November 2006                |
| 18 | Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982 | 12 February 2004  | -                               |
| 19 | Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management  | -                 | Ratification process is ongoing |

### Cooperation agreements with IAEA in the area of nuclear power

|   | NAME  | SIGNED ON    | RATIFICATION    |
|---|---|--------------|-----------------|
| 1 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with NPT                            | 30 June 1981 | 20 October 1981 |
| 2 | Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with NPT | 06 July 2000 | 12 July 2001    |

### Bilateral agreements with other countries or organizations signed/ratified by the country in the field of nuclear power

|   | NAME  | SIGNED ON       | RATIFICATION      |
|---|---|-----------------|-------------------|
| 1 | Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy                          | 18 June 1985    | 29 June 1986      |
| 2 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Argentine Republic for Cooperation in the <b>Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy</b>   | 03 May 1988     | 08 February 1992  |
| 3 | Agreement Between the Government of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities   | 28 July 1997    | 11 September 1997 |
| 4 | Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy | 14 January 1998 | -                 |



|    |   |                   |                  |
|----|---|-------------------|------------------|
| 5  | Agreement Between the Government of Korea and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy   | 26 October 1998   | 12 April 1999    |
| 6  | Agreement Between the Government French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy  | 21 September 1999 | 18 May 2011      |
| 7  | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities                  | 23 November 2000  | 02 May 2001      |
| 8  | Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy  | 26 July 2000      | 09 July 2006     |
| 9  | Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Turkey And The Government Of Romania On Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident  | 03 March 2008     | 16 May 2008      |
| 10 | Memorandum of Understanding for Technical Cooperation and Exchange of Information in Nuclear Regulatory Matters Between the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority and The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine | 07 June 2005      | 22 October 2008  |
| 11 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes  | 06 August 2009    | 12 February 2011 |
| 12 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Exchange of Information on Nuclear Facilities             | 06 August 2009    | 12 February 2011 |

|    |   |                  |                 |
|----|---|------------------|-----------------|
| 13 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Relation to the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant at the Akkuyu Site in the Republic of Turkey                        | 12 May 2010      | 06 October 2010 |
| 14 | Agreement Between Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (The Republic of Turkey) and The Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service (The Russian Federation) for Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Licensing and Supervision | 08 June 2010     | 08 June 2010    |
| 15 | Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the Cooperation in the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes.  | 17 February 2011 | -               |