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UNITED STATES' FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
CENTRAL ASIA: THE CASE OF TAJIKISTAN

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MASTER THESIS

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Scientific Ethics Page

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ABSTRACT

Central Asia has been and remains to be a region in which the interests of world and regional powers are intertwined. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a vacuum in Central Asia and it drew the attention of the main centers of power. The first steps of the U.S policy toward the Central Asian countries – Tajikistan inclusive, was to make a careful assessments of events marking the transformation of the Soviet Union and also an initial search for a points of contact with each country in the region. The United States was not only interested at preserving the statehood of Tajikistan at any cost but also to prevent the spread of religious extremism in Tajikistan. Consequently, the U.S assistance to the process of peaceful construction and the adoption of the role of the Russian Federation and Iran as the main mediators in this matter proceeded from the logic that the mandatory initial stability in Tajikistan was to lay the foundation for active U.S policy in the Tajik state. Thus, this paper seeks to analyze the U.S foreign policy towards Central Asia and particularly towards the Republic of Tajikistan and its implementation mechanisms and explore the main trends in Washington's foreign policy, taking into account the geopolitical role of the Central Asian region.

Keywords: United States, Soviet Union, Central Asia, Tajikistan, World Power, Regional Power, Foreign Policy.



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ÖZET

Orta Asya, dünya ve bölgesel güçlerin çıkarlarının iç içe geçtiği bir bölge olmuştur ve olmaya devam etmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü Orta Asya'da bir boşluk (siyasi bir vakum) yaratıp ana güç merkezlerinin dikkatini çekmiştir. ABD'nin Orta Asya ülkelerine yönelik - Tacikistan da dahil olmak üzere, politikasındaki ilk adım, Sovyetler Birliği'nin dönüşümünü işaret eden olayları dikkatli bir şekilde değerlendirmek ve aynı zamanda bölgedeki her ülke ile bir temas noktasını bulmaktır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Tacikistan'ı sadece her ne şart olursa olsun korumakla kalmadı, aynı zamanda Tacikistan'daki dini aşırılığın yayılmasını da önledi. Sonuç olarak, ABD'nin barış sürecine yardım etmesi ve Rusya Federasyonu ile İran'ın bu konudaki ana arabulucu rollerini kabullenmesi Tacikistan'ın istikrarını sağlama ve ABD'nin aktif politikasının temellerini atma mantığına dayanmaktadır. Böylece, bu çalışma ABD'nin Orta Asya ve özellikle Tacikistan Cumhuriyeti'ne yönelik dış politikasını ve onun uygulama mekanizmalarını incelemeyi ve Orta Asya bölgesinin jeopolitik rolünü dikkate alarak Washington'un dış politikasındaki ana eğilimleri araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Sovyetler Birliği, Orta Asya, Tacikistan, Dünya Gücü, Bölgesel Güç, Dış Politika

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ABBREVIATIONS

AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BC	Before Christ
CA	Central Asia
CACI	Central Asia Counter-Narcotics Initiative
CAR	Central Asian Republics
CASFOR	Caspian Regional Security and Peacekeeping Forces
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
EU	European Union
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HPP	Hydroelectric Power Plants
Ibid	Ibidem (Latin word meaning “in the same source”)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
IRA	Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
IRI	Islamic Republic of Iran
K-2	Karshi-Khanabad Air Force Base
NADRP	Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PfP	Partnership for Peace

PRC	People's Republic of China
RATS	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
RF	Russian Federation
RT	Republic of Tajikistan
RU	Republic of Uzbekistan
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TIKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
USA/ U.S	United States of America
USAID	United States' Agency for International Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	United Nations
UNESCAP	United Nations' Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
XUAR	Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

INTRODUCTION

The subject of the thesis is to critically analyze United States' Foreign Policy towards Central Asia using Tajikistan as a specific case of study. The significance of U.S foreign policy towards Central Asia should be emphasized, because for a period it used to determine what should happen in this region. The U.S struggle to have some influence in Central Asia reflects the growing importance of the states of the region on the world stage.

The evolutionary course of the United States in Central Asia can be singled out in two stages: U.S foreign policy towards CA prior to September 11, 2001 and after September 11, 2001. Prior to September 11, Washington showed a relatively weak interest in the region and the prevailing view was that the United States did not have vital interests in it. In a concentrated form, the essence of U.S policy was to prevent the emergence of an intra-regional conflict in Central Asia, which was the key to solving domestic problems, achieving stability and establishing democracy based on successful economic development. At the end of B. Clinton's presidency, the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia changed. Adopted in March 1999 by the U.S Congress, the "Silk Road Strategy Act" directed American diplomacy to support the economic and political independence of the region. This approach reflected the desire of the U.S to officially consolidate itself as the only superpower dominating on a global and regional scale.

After September 11, the mobilization and consolidation of the world community under the flag of combating international terrorism, the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition against al-Qaeda and its ally (the Taliban regime in Afghanistan), accelerated and facilitated the penetration of the United States into Central Asian countries. The main objectives of the U.S military presence in the region were identified as combating terrorism, economic and political reforms, as well as ensuring the security of the Caspian energy resources. Uzbekistan became the key, basic country for the deployment of Americans. To strengthen their positions, the U.S began to increase the amount of

financial assistance to countries in the region. In general, the United States could temporarily locate its military forces in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as could have access to the airspace and limited use of bases in Kazakhstan and even in Turkmenistan.

The recent history of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century has pushed Central Asia among the regions that have a tangible impact on the security of the world. Central Asia is a middle geopolitical space, traditionally important on a global and regional scale. Generally, the Eurasian continent played a huge role in world politics, and now its significance has increased even more. Being at the junction of continents and civilizations, occupying a strategic geopolitical position, having the richest resources and profitable transport routes and communications, the region remains the focus of the vital interests of Russia, the West and the East.

Historically, Central Asia maintained contacts with China, Persia, India and Russia. The region reached its heyday in the Middle Ages, which was noted by the scientific achievements of Bukhara and Samarkand, the rise of the Great Silk Road and the conquests of Timur. However, since the era of the Great Geographical Discoveries, it has gradually become isolated from the sea trade routes and new centers of emerging international life. In the 60-90s of the XIX century after the occupation of Turkestan, Maverannahr, Turkmen oases and a number of other territories by the Russian Empire, the Central Asian peoples became part of the Tsarist Russia and then USSR, where they remained for more than a century. In 1991, with the end of the existence of the USSR, a new stage of their independent development came and at the same time the place of Central Asia in the geopolitical picture of the world changed.

At the end of XIX century, the fate of the region was determined mainly in the so-called "The Great Game" - the confrontation of the Russian Empire and the Great Britain. The strengthening of St. Petersburg on the southern flank of London regarded as a threat to the Great Britain's colonies in Asia and, above all to India which was the most valuable diamond in the British crown. The first reports seriously alarming the

British government were sent to London in 1807. They learned that Napoleon Bonaparte, encouraged by victories in Europe, invited Tsar Alexander I to jointly invade India and free her from British rule. The aggression of Napoleon against Russia has put an end to this kind of plans. But then the expansion of Russian possessions to the south as well as the British to the north continued. By the middle of XIX century in Central Asia, the ancient Central Asian caravan cities and khanates on the former Silk Road came one by one under the rule of the Russian Empire. In 1865, the Russian Tsar occupied the large fortified city of Tashkent. Three years later, the turn of Samarkand and Bukhara came, and five years later the Russians seized Khiva in the second attempt.¹

Despite the constant assurances of St. Petersburg about the absence of hostile intentions towards India and the fact that every next offensive will be the last one, it seemed to many that they were all part of a gigantic plan to subordinate all of Central Asia to Tsarist power. There were fears that if this plan was implemented, the last offensive on the pearl of the British Empire, India would begin. The English, constantly sent their agents, trying to organize resistance, sought to set up Persia and Afghanistan against Russia, despite the fact that they themselves had expansionist plans for these countries. The Russo-British rivalry in the region continued, as Russian Central Asia and British India were separated in some places by a few dozen kilometers. With the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917, British fears revived again, and British agents took a very active part in organizing and supporting the Basmachi movement, which resisted the establishment of Soviet government in Central Asia.²

The Basmachi movement was a military-political and religious movement of the local population of Central Asia in the first half of the 20th century, which arose after the revolution of 1917 in Russia. The story of Ibrahim Bek is very indicative in this

¹ Шлезингер А. М., *Циклы Американской Истории*, Москва: Прогресс, 1992, с. 93-97.
(Schlezinger A. M., *Tsikli Amerikanskoj Istorii*, Moscow: Progress, 1992, p. 93-97.)

² Андрей Медведев, “Война Империй. Тайная История Борьбы Англии Против России”,
<http://flibusta.site/b/470444/read> (28. 08.2018)
(Andrey Medvedov, “Voyna Imperii. Taynaya Istoriya Borbi Anglii Protiv Rossii”.)

respect. Ibrahim Bek was the leader of the Lokai tribe and the Gissar bek. Uniting diverse tribes in the struggle against the Bolsheviks and having won several victories on the left bank of the Vakhsh, in the vicinity of Dushanbe and in Gissar, he achieved certain military successes. The first stage of the Basmachi movement under his leadership began in December 1922. In 1924-25, Ibrahim Bek organized and led a new campaign of Basmach troops on the territory of Eastern Bukhara. In 1929-1930, he tried to unite under his command all Basmachi forces in newly organized Soviet Socialist Republic of Tajikistan and Afghanistan and repeatedly began a new resistance against the USSR. In April 1931, Ibrahim Bek's troops liberated Soviet Tajikistan, but were soon forced to retreat. On June 23, 1931, Ibrahim Bek was captured by a special detachment under the command of Mukum Sultanov in the valley of the Kofarnihon River. Under escort, he was taken to Tashkent, where he appeared before the court and was immediately executed after the trial.³

Nevertheless, after World War II, Britain was forced to give its “pearl” independence and on the spot of British India emerged new independent states - India and Pakistan. British influence in the region has sharply weakened. Paradoxically, this contributed to both the Soviet Union and the United States of America, which in a sense took the place of Great Britain, but not on the basis of a policy of direct colonial rule. The USA used other methods. Soviet-American rivalry reached its apogee in 1979 when the Soviet leadership introduced a military contingent to Afghanistan, which was interpreted by the West as a renewal of Russia's longstanding aspiration to reach the “warm southern seas” by force. At the same time, after the overthrow of the pro-American Shah's regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, which opposed itself to both the USA and the USSR, became independent, pursuing its own line of strengthening influence in the region. As a result of Soviet-American rivalry in December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, which according to the President Vladimir Putin “The

³ Л. Е. Бляхер и И. Ф. Ярулин, “Кто Такие Басмачи? Советское Мифотворчество и Стигматизация Гражданской Войны в Средней Азии”, *Полития*, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2016, с. 117.
(L. E. Blyakher i I. F. Yarulin, “Kto Takie Basmachi? Sovetskoe Mifotvorchestvo i Stigmatizatsiya Gradzhdanskoj Voyni v Srednoy Azii”, *Politiya*, Vol. 81, No 2, 2016, p. 117.)

collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”.⁴ Today, in addition to many smaller actors with their own independent goals (Iran, Turkey, India, European and Arab states), there are three main forces which focused on the Central Asian direction and they are; Russia, China and the United States that made the situation of the region more complex and dynamic.

Given the geopolitical and resource-strategic capabilities of the Central Asian countries, China, the EU, Turkey, India and Japan are making efforts to strengthen their positions in the region. The Islamic countries also, saw the possibility of their return to the Muslim world as the Central Asian republics gained independence. However, the United States had the opportunity to penetrate the previously inaccessible Central Asia and exert direct regional pressure on Russia, China and Iran. The U.S had significant economic interests in the states of Central Asia. If in the 1990s, Washington’s task of establishing control over Central Asian resources was mainly considered in the potential plan, the events of September 2001 made it possible to begin its practical implementation.

The U.S widely used its military and political influence as one of the most important instruments for strategic consolidation in Central Asia. However, this was not the only means in the spectrum of the U.S foreign policy capabilities. Along with the military component, Washington also used political, diplomatic, economic and humanitarian opportunities for interaction with the countries of Central Asia. The decision to use this or that instrument in foreign policy is made by the American leadership on the basis of its own national interests. The U.S leadership considers the space of Central Asia, including the Republic of Tajikistan, as a zone of its “national interests”, the protection of which implies the use of all available instruments of state policy. This is due to the availability of the raw and hydropower potential of Central Asian states and their favorable geopolitical location. Another strategic interest of U.S

⁴ Владимир П, “Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации”, *Федеральное Собрание*, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931> (28.08.2018)
(Vladimir P, “Poslanie Federalnomu Sobraniyu Rossiyskoy Federatsii”, *Federalnoe Sobranie*.)

policy in Central Asia is to ensure security in the region, which is related to the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, the fight against the spread of terrorism, extremism and organized crime in Central Asia. The Central Asian countries play a key role in countering the above mentioned threats. The relevance of the study is due to the fact that the official position of the U.S administration regarding political processes in Central Asia and the Republic of Tajikistan possesses a dual nature. On the one hand, the growing role of Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries in regional politics is recognized, on the other hand, the dispute among U.S strategists and the expert community about the relevance of expanding U.S influence in the region processed. Nevertheless, an analysis of the U.S foreign policy strategy shows that the U.S will seek to strengthen its influence in Central Asian countries.

After the deployment of U.S troops and NATO units to Afghanistan in 2001, as a result of successful foreign policy actions in the Central Asian region, Washington was able to significantly improve its economic, political and strategic influence in Central Asia. The United States of America for the first time had the opportunity to implement a number of foreign policy initiatives in Central Asia to gain a foothold in parts of the Heartland space, including the territories occupied by modern Central Asian republics. Since Heartland is crucial for strategic control of the world's political and economic space, studying the policy of the United States in Central Asia is also important for understanding the possible evolution of the U.S foreign policy strategy in Eurasia. In this regard, it is of considerable interest to study the mechanisms for securing the United States in the Central Asian region, since this will also help to determine possible directions for China and Russia's foreign policy strategies to counter U.S policy in Central Asia. After September 11 (until 2014), the U.S had a military-political influence on Central Asia and particularly on Tajikistan, taking advantage of the military strength and economic capabilities of the countries of the region. This was the aim of a whole range of American doctrines and concepts, such as the doctrine of George W. Bush (Junior), the concept of "Greater Central Asia", and the Obama doctrine. In this regard, it seems relevant to study these doctrines and concepts, to consider how effective they

were, and how they could be used to implement American policy towards CA and particularly towards the Republic of Tajikistan. A scientific analysis of these concepts and the current foreign policy activities of the United States in Central Asia and the Republic of Tajikistan also make it possible to predict the development of the American regional strategy in the future.

There is no doubt that inspite of analysing the interests of U.S, the scientific significance of the topic is also an analysis of the interests, compatibility and inconsistency of some leading powers in Central Asia like Russia, China, EU, Iran and Turkey. Claiming global and regional influence the United States, Russia and China are interested in strengthening their leadership in Central Asia and in reducing the influence of rivals. Especially, the United States, Russia and China were able to determine their geopolitical interests in the region, and also have the greatest influence on the political, economic and military - strategic situation in Central Asia. The interests of the three largest states - the U.S, China and Russia in Central Asia, as well as EU, Iran and Turkey are also investigated throughout the independence of the states of the region.

According to many analysts, Russia is returning to the big international arena again. The reason for this conclusion is given primarily by the military and economic success of the country. Naturally, as Russia's economic situation improves, its influence on neighboring countries will increase. Russian business is expanding its position in neighboring countries, causing fears in the West about strategic penetration into neighboring countries. Strategists and ideologists of the West are also concerned that the new states with a market-oriented economy led by Russia that have arisen in place of the USSR are a powerful and influential factor whose interests objectively prevent the U.S from establishing their strategic leadership in many parts of the world and especially in Central Asia. Therefore, the actions of the United States and the West in the Central Asian region had and have the primary goal of economic disintegration of the CIS space,

the weakening of economic unity within the Russian Federation itself, and further political fragmentation of Central Asian states.⁵

Central Asia has a great importance for the Russian Federation from the point of security. And it's about protecting national borders, and maintaining a stable buffer between Russia and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The threats and challenges coming from Afghanistan and the CIS's southern neighbors are forcing Russia to look for ways to block them. The main threats coming from the South are terrorism and religious extremism. The emergence of these threats beyond national borders requires the coordination of the activities of special services and law enforcement agencies from Central Asian countries and Russia, as well as the formation of a unified security system. The main area of concentration of religious extremists is Afghanistan. Although NATO forces are quartered in the country, the threat of destabilization of the region remains and clashes between warring armed factions don't end.

Summing up the consideration of the role of the Russian factor in the formation and implementation of Washington's policy in Central Asia, it should be noted that in the 21st century for all countries of Central Asia, Moscow will remain the most important partner and neighbor in all parameters. Russia as a recognized guarantor of sustainability of CA wants the region to be a zone of stability and dynamic development and not to be burdened by any internal or adjacent sources of tension. RF is again turning into a strategic axis for a huge part of the former Soviet space and it has achieved a sharp increase in the antiterrorist orientation of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.⁶

⁵ Рудов Г, *Внешняя Политика России И Государства Центральной Азии*, Москва: Научная Книга, 2003. с. 118-120.

(Rudov G, *Vneshnaya Politika Rossii i Gosudarstva Tsentralnoy Azii*, Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2003. p. 118-120.)

⁶ Бажанов Е, *Стратегические Интересы России На Ближнем Востоке*: Современный Мир, Москва: Научная Книга, 2004, с. 167.

(Bazhanov E, *Strategicheskie Interesi Rossii na Blizhnom Vostoke*: Sovremenniy Mir, Moskva: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2004, p. 167.)

As for Beijing's interest in Central Asia, it is determined by the fact that the rapid economic development of China in one or two decades will turn it into one of the largest importers of oil and gas. According to the calculations of analysts, by the middle of this century, China may well surpass the U.S in economic and military power. The energy carriers of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia play an important role in the implementation of this task by China and the region can become an important source of energy imports for China. Strengthening the U.S economic, political and military presence in Central Asia can seriously hinder China's progress. In addition, the U.S presence in this region (along the borders of China), opens up additional opportunities for Washington for all sorts of political maneuvers against Beijing and to create serious complications in such explosive areas. That's why, China's relations with the independent states of Central Asia are crucial for the geopolitical interests of PRC and especially for its security.

Summing up the brief review of the Chinese factor in the region, it should be noted that the strategic tasks that China is addressing in the beginning of the 21st century in relation to Central Asian states are aimed at preventing the redistribution of raw materials without their participation, ensuring access to oil and gas, having access to markets and raw materials, as well as to transport corridors. In addition, for ensuring internal stability and limiting the influence of the United States, EU member states, and some Muslim countries in the region PRC has to strengthen its relations with CAR. However, in order not to fall into a steady dependence on Central Asian sources of oil and gas production, China pursues a policy of diversifying the markets of these energy sources. As its clear, Beijing is also receiving oil and gas from the Middle East and from Russia.

The EU has been maintaining mutual relations with the five Central Asian countries since the very moment of their declaration of independence in the early 1990s. However, at the beginning of the 21st century, in the context of globalization, the time has come for a qualitatively new partnership between the EU and the countries of

Central Asia. Presented documents during political summits between the EU and the countries of Central Asia contained mutually agreed solutions on important regional security issues as water, energy resources, border control and WMD safety. Central Asia has become a full constituent part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was pursued by Dr. Javier Solana, high representative and former Secretary General of the EU Council. In order to fully appreciate the role of the EU in CA, documents such as the EU Security Strategy adopted in 2003 and bilateral agreements between the European Community and the countries of Central Asia as well as aid programs of the EU member states should be considered very important in bilateral relations between EU and CAR. The Central Asia strategy of EU and its programs provide a framework that allows to work in complete synchronization.

As for Iran, it is important to emphasize that from the perspective of economic development, it has a powerful potential that can enhance its influence on the countries of the region. Practice shows that Iran, despite its economic opportunities, is trying to establish good - neighborly and mutually beneficial relations with all countries of the region, especially with the Republic of Tajikistan, as they are linked by a common socio-historical past as well as linguistic and cultural characteristics. The study of cooperation between Iran and Russia (against U.S) in Central Asia, which belongs to the category of normal bilateral relations, is also of significant importance.

In addition, Turkey as a strategic partner and a loyal ally of the United States is very active in Central Asia. In the United States, Turkey is viewed (regarding its activities in the region) as a counterweight to Russia and the ideological expansion of Iran in the Central Asian states. In this regard, the United States and the European Community have provided Turkey with additional benefits. The Turkish factor is very important for the Central Asian policy of the United States. That's why, the United States does not obstruct the expansion of Ankara's spheres of influence in the region.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the U.S foreign policy strategy shows that U.S will seek to strengthen its influence in Central Asia and especially in the Republic of

Tajikistan. The peculiarity of U.S policy is aimed not only at strengthening its position in the political, military-strategic and economic spheres of Central Asian societies, but also at forming a foreign policy of Central Asia including Tajikistan beneficial for the United States.

1. Literature review

The American foreign policy towards Central Asia has regularly been analysed and researched by Russian, American and other Western experts. Among the Russian scientific centers that study U.S policy toward the Republic Central Asia as a whole are; the USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of International Security Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Moscow State Institute of International Relations. The greatest works and researchs of Russian and Central Asian scientists on U.S foreign policy towards Central Asia were written by A. Bogaturov, K. Hajiyev, P. Tsygankov Gumerov Rodion, Tashmatova Saltanat, Parkhomenko Sergey Aleksandrovich, Popov Dmitry Sergeevich, Saidmurodov Ahmad, G. Arbatov, M. Bratersky, A. Kopylov, F. Lukyanov, and A. Utkin, as well scientists from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry like E. Bazhanov, S. Zhiltsov, A. Zadokhin, T. Zakaurtseva, G. Kadymov, V. Kotlyar, I. Kravchenko, K. Kulmatov, V. Matyash, Y. Melnikov, T. Mosel, O. Ivanova, G. Rudova, A. Shutova and others.

Among the American and other Western experts scientists who have completed great works and researchs on U.S foreign policy towards CA are; Jonathan O'Hara, Eugene Rumer, Richard Harvey Solomon, Martin S. Edwards, Zbigniew Brzezinski etc, as well as employees of influential centers in the USA and Europe - the Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus at John Hopkins University, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, the Institute of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies, the Institute for Central Asia and the Center for National Security at the National Defense University.

In Tajikistan, U.S policy is studied by experts from the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Center for Geopolitical Studies of the Russian-Tajik Slavonic University. Scientific works of Tajik experts and political scientists regarding the topic were written by Z. Sayidzoda, R. Abdullo and others.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to determine and describe the development of the situation inside and around the Central Asian region at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries and, accordingly, the influence of U.S foreign policy on the development of this situation with reference to both the region as a whole and Tajikistan in particular. Particularly, the study will analyze U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan, implementation mechanisms and explore the main trends in Washington's foreign policy, taking into account the geopolitical role of the Republic of Tajikistan in the Central Asian region.

3. Significance

In this context, U.S foreign policy and the importance of the U.S strategy towards the Central Asian countries, especially Tajikistan is being discussed. It should be mentioned that most of Western sources (regarding the topic) based on Western perspective are written in english and similarly, Russian sources based on Russian perspective are written in russian language. So one of the differences between this work and other works is that this one is (most likely) based on Russian perspective but written in english language.

4. Assumptions

Understanding the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of Central Asia in global politics, the United States has always a desire for dominance in this region. This insatiable desire for dominance in this region had always been manifested in the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia. Part of the assumptions of this research is

that the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union was to support emerging states from the dependence of Kremlin towards independence and thus weakening the influence of the Russian Federation in those new states such as; Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In this research, it is also assumed that Tajikistan as a country was not a specific target for the implementation of the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia, but rather one unimportant piece of the Central Asian puzzle. In other words, the issue of Tajikistan does not carry much weight in the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia but for security issues related to Afghanistan.

This research dismisses the assumption that the United States foreign policy towards Central Asia after the September 11, 2001 twin tower attacks, was not centered on the fight against terrorism and extremism in Central Asia, but rather an extension of American imperialism and also a strategy to ensure stable access to oil and gas fields in Central Asia.

5. Limitations

The limitation of this study is that its timeframe includes periods since the independence of Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 until 2011 (20 years). However, various parts of the study will rely on scientific sources which will be used. Also for analyzing and criticizing (if it's needed) U.S foreign policies towards the Central Asian region most of references are being used from Russian sources. In other words this thesis is most likely based on Russian perspective.

6. Definitions

Central Asia is seen as a vast and landlocked region of Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Some modern researchers believe that it would be more geographically accurate to call this region

Central Eurasia.⁷ However, in this research the region is being called “Central Asia” because in our days the most common name of the region (especially in political sciences) is “Central Asia”. Having made a geostrategic breakthrough in the Central Asian region, the United States gradually began to declare its intention to gain a foothold here on a long-term basis, without determining the time limits of its presence. The American focus on strategic energy facilities, resources and communications of CA is an invariable attribute of most American developments in the region, and this is supported by a number of concrete measures.

Foreign policy is one of the wheels with which the process of international politics operates. Foreign policy is not separate from the national policy instead it is a part of it and U.S foreign policy is not exception in this case. In the context of globalization within the framework of foreign policies and the configuration of contemporary international relations, geo-economics is increasing as if it is replacing geopolitics. However, in the Central Asian region, the geopolitical factor for Washington is no less important than geo-economics. In the big geopolitical game in Central Asia, the main vector of the efforts of the American self-assertion is aimed at driving out of the region influential rivals primarily Russia, as well as China and Iran. In general, taking advantage of the situation and its wide possibilities for projecting its own power in the region, Washington is pragmatically fixed here with the primary goal of establishing control over the energy and other resources of Central Asia, with which it is very rich. For this purpose, the Americans intend to build in the region such a security system that would best fit their interests.

7. Method

The research is based both on theoretical and political (political history) studies. In this research, articles, books, documents, academic theses published in Russian, Tajik,

⁷ В. Д. Камынин, и.д., *Центральная Азия на Рубеже XX–XXI Веків: Політика, Економіка, Безопасність*, Екатеринбург, Изд-во Урал Ун-та, 2017, с. 3.

(V. D. Kamynin, a. o., *Tsentralnaya Aziya na Rubedje XX–XXI Vekov: Politika, Ekonomika, Bezopasnost*, Ekaterinburg, Ural Un-ta, 2017, p. 3.)

English and other foreign languages and texts of scientific meetings (symposium, congress etc.) made in this area will be obtained. As well as the official sources and the reports by governmental and non-governmental organizations will be valuable source of this study. The study is structured into three main chapters. The first chapter discusses the Geopolitical Position of Central Asia and U.S Foreign Policy towards the Region. The second chapter discusses the Influence of other Powers in the Context of U.S Interests in CA. The third and the last chapter which is the core of the study analyzes U.S Foreign Policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan.

8. Sources

The first group of sources includes works and researches of Russian scientists. A significant influence on the analysis of the topic being studied was made by diverse general theoretical studies on international relations and U.S foreign policy, conducted by scientists from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. The second group of sources includes works of Tajik academic scientists and experts of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the Center for Geopolitical Studies at the Russian-Tajik (Slavic) University in the field of U.S foreign policy. The third group of sources includes researches by American and other Western experts and official documents. In the course of the study, a whole stratum of American official documents of a doctrinal nature is carefully studied and summarized. These include the U.S National Security Strategies, regional strategies, and reports from the U.S State Department on Human Rights and Religious Freedom. In addition the speeches of U.S top officials, state secretaries, deputy state secretaries and ministers of defense regarding U.S foreign policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan and in general Central Asia have been studied.

PART ONE

THE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF CENTRAL ASIA AND U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE REGION

The current geopolitical situation of Central Asia in which its hydrocarbon reserves have strategic importance for leading actors and the region itself that is crucial for international security determines the format of interaction of Central Asian states with other countries. The high importance of Central Asia in the system of international relations forms a situation in which none of the influential foreign states can fully control strategic, political, economic and cultural space of the region. This is due to the desire of the countries of Central Asia in conditions of a favorable regional and world conjuncture, using the contradictions between the United States, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and a number of other states, to pursue a balanced foreign policy line. In such conditions, the dominance of only one state or international organization in the Central Asian region is impossible, and therefore it is advisable to discuss both the U.S foreign policy towards the region and the distribution of influence among the main actors of international relations in Central Asia.

I. 1. The Geopolitical Position of Central Asia

Before characterizing the geopolitical aspect of Central Asian, the term of “Geopolitics” should be shortly defined. Francis Sempa who is a professor in political sciences at Wilkes University defines geopolitics in his book “Geopolitics From the Cold War to the 21st Century” as:

“Geopolitics is about the interaction among states and empires in a particular geographical setting”.⁸

It's clear that the term of “Geopolitics” is a much-overused one and especially in political sciences writers, practitioners, observers, and researchers frequently use this

⁸ Francis P. Sempa, *Geopolitics from the Cold War to the 21st Century*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002, p. 5.

term to describe, analyze or explain specific foreign policy problems and issues. In international politics geographical position of regions is also one of the most fundamental factors on decision-making in foreign policy matters. Because, it presents opportunities to states or imposes limitations on them. If a region (or country) is geographically located relative to other regions (or countries) and its position is more important than its size it means that the region has an important geopolitical position.⁹

In general since the emergence of geopolitics as a science, English geographer and politician Halford Mackinder stated that Eurasia is the center of global political processes.¹⁰ Since that time, the world has changed a lot. Empires arose and fell apart and mankind experienced three wars: two world wars and one Cold War. The development of communications, new types of weapons and their means of delivery have repeatedly changed the principles of geopolitics. A hundred years have passed and Eurasia is becoming the “axis of geopolitics”, a zone of strategic interests of the leading states of the world and especially for America its more important, as Zbigniew Brzezinski said “For America, the chief geopolitical prize is Eurasia”.¹¹

As for geopolitical position of Central Asia, after the collapse of the USSR the region became one of the most important regions of a qualitatively new Eurasian space which its importance mentioned above. At the same time, the political, economic and demographic situation has radically changed in the region. Central Asia is the peripheral territory of the former USSR which at the beginning of the 21st century moved to the forefront of world politics and became the object of geopolitical, economic and military-strategic rivalry between leading powers and global centers of power. The importance of Central Asia is determined not only by a favorable geopolitical position, but also by its sufficiently large mineral reserves. Central Asia is seen as a vast and non-oceanic region of Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

⁹ Francis *ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁰ Halford J. Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace”, *Journal of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1943, p. 595-605.

¹¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Washington, D. C: Harvard International Review, 1997, p. 29.

Uzbekistan. Some modern researchers believe that it would be more geographically accurate to call this region Central Eurasia.¹² However, in this research the region is being called “Central Asia” because in our days the most common name of the region (especially in political sciences) is “Central Asia”.

The Central Asian region as a geopolitical space is located between a giant Eurasian triangle: from the north - Russia, from the southeast - China, from the south - Islamic Iranian-Afghan-Pakistani array. Ethnically, except Persian-speaking Tajiks the other peoples of Central Asia are quite close to each other as they are Turkic origin. The overwhelming majority of the population are Muslim. The population of the region is steadily growing and in 2018 it has exceeded 72,104,000 people.¹³ This tells that the region also possesses good labor force. Central Asia is a region deep inside the Eurasian continent. For several thousand kilometers it is far from the coast of the world's ocean and sea trade routes. Nevertheless, since ancient times, for many neighboring and regional powers, Central Asia has maintained a fairly high transit potential. The strategic position of the region is largely determined by its importance in the system of global communications. It passes through an important section of the so called “Silk Road” linking the rapidly developing countries of East Asia with Western Europe. The Caspian region also has acquired a qualitatively new role in the hierarchy of world economic and political interests. Given that estimates of oil reserves in this region range from 3 to 20 billion tons, it takes an increasingly prominent place in the strategy of the world's leading powers, primarily the United States, which sees it as the second largest energy store in the world, after the Persian Gulf.¹⁴ A. D. Bogaturova, a Russian researcher on

¹² В. Д. Камынин, и. д., *Центральная Азия на Рубеже XX–XXI Веків: Політика, Економіка, Безопасність*, Екатеринбург, Изд-Во Урал Ун-Та, 2017, с. 3.
(V. D. Kamynin, a. o., *Tsentralnaya Aziya na Rubedje XX–XXI Vekov: Politika, Ekonomika, Bezopasnost*, Ekaterinburg, Ural Un-ta, 2017, p. 3.)

¹³ Worldometers, Central Asia Population, <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/central-asia-population/> (25.09.2018)

¹⁴ Ташматова Салтанат Изатбековна, *Політика США в Отношении Стран Центральной Азии*, Неопубликованная Кандидатская Диссертация, Москва: Дипломатическая Академия МИД Российской Федерации, 2008, с. 15.

competent opinion says, “The growing attention of the most powerful powers to Central Asia in the first decade of the 21st century is a sign of the region's return to the focus of main international politics”.¹⁵

One of the main geopolitical features of the region is its dual nature. On the one hand, Central Asia continues to retain many of the features and characteristics inherent in it as the southern territory of the former USSR which has close ties with Russia and other former Soviet republics. On the other hand, the multilateral ties of the Central Asian states with their southern neighbors are growing and developing. Therefore, in modern conditions, Central Asia and the South Caucasus connected with each other through the Caspian Sea can already be considered as part of a hydrocarbon-geopolitical space stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Northern Caspian and from Turkey to the borders with China. Here, geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic factors that determine the policy of external powers, the states of the region and the direction of the region's further development for the long-term perspective are most closely intertwined. This duality imposes its own peculiarities on the formation of a new geopolitical image of Central Asia and on the solution of its security problems on the forms of cooperation between states like Russia, USA, PRC and the countries of this region.¹⁶

Assessing the geopolitical role of Central Asia at the present stage of development of this region, it is expedient to take into account its geo-economic aspect. The importance of the region in the system of the world economic relations and first of all in geoenergy (this term is a collective name for all kinds of energies derived from the earth, like gas, oil etc) is determined for:

(Tashmatova Saltanat Izatbekovna, *Politika S.Sh.A v Otnoshenii Tsentralnoy Azii*, Neopublikovannaya Kandidatskaya Dissertatsiya, Moscow: Diplomaticeskaya Akademiya MID Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2008, p. 15.)

¹⁵ Богатуров А. Д., *Международные Отношения в Центральной Азии: События И Документы*, Москва: Аспект Пресс, 2011, с. 13.

(Bogaturov A. D., *Medjdunarodnie Otnosheniya v Tsentralnoy Azii: Sobitiya i Dokumenti*, Moscow: Aspect Press, 2011, p. 13.)

¹⁶ Tashmatova, *ibid.*, p. 15.

a) The energy potential of the region. Central Asia has an undeniable value as a rich storehouse of mineral reserves of global importance. First of all, this applies to oil and gas reserves. Kazakhstan is among the ten leading countries in the world for hydrocarbon reserves. The state balance of minerals accounted for 233 hydrocarbon deposits. According to British Petroleum Company, Kazakhstan's oil reserves are 5.3 billion tons (39.8 billion barrels), which is 3.2% of the world's reserves. The gas reserves of Kazakhstan are estimated at 1.82 trillion cubic meters. (1% of the world).¹⁷ Based on current production figures, Kazakhstan is provided with oil for more than 70 years and gas for 70-75 years. The basis of Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry is the Tengiz and Karachaganak fields. The Tengiz field, discovered in 1979, is one of the deepest and largest oil fields in the world. According to recent estimates, its recoverable oil reserves are about 1.3 billion tons. The Karachaganak oil and gas condensate field in the northern part of the Caspian basin was discovered in 1979. The recoverable oil reserves of the field are more than 200 million tons.¹⁸

At the end of 2008, 149 gas and gas condensate fields with reserves of 7.94 trillion cu. m were discovered in Turkmenistan, including 139 on land and 10 on the shelf. The main operating fields in Turkmenistan are Malay and Dovletabad (it provides about 80% of gas exports). These fields require serious investments, including gas processing, which requires thorough cleaning before transport. Despite considerable volumes of prospecting and exploration, the study of the territory of Turkmenistan remains relatively low. Practically only the upper layers of oil and gas bearing deposits have been studied. Taking into account that the explored reserves and accumulated production make up only about 25% of the hydrocarbon resources, the continuation of geological prospecting opens up opportunities for a significant increase in the industrial categories of reserves. Prospects for the development of oil and gas production in the country for

¹⁷ Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, <https://www.bp.com> (18. 08. 2018)

¹⁸ В.Гусейнов, А. Гончаренко, *Центральная Азия. Геополитика и Экономика Региона*, Москва: ИСОИА, 2010, с. 33.

(V.Huseynov, A.Goncharenko, *Tsentralnaya Aziya. Geopolitika i Ekonomika Regiona*, Moscow: ISOIA, 2010, p. 33.)

the coming decades are primarily related to the active development of the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea.¹⁹

Uzbekistan occupies the second place (after Kazakhstan) among the Central Asian countries in oil reserves and the third (after Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) in natural gas reserves. More than 60 billion cubic meters of natural gas are produced annually in the republic. The confirmed oil reserves in the country are about 82 million tons and gas - 1.58 trillion cubic meters. At the current production level, Uzbekistan is provided with proven natural gas reserves for 31 years and oil for 21 years. In the five oil and gas regions of the country (Ustyurt, Bukhara, Khiva, Hissar, Surkhandarya, Fergana), 211 hydrocarbon fields have been discovered. About 75% of the oil reserves are concentrated in the Kashkadarya region, first of all, on the largest field in the country which is called Kokdumalak.²⁰

The energy resources of the Caspian Sea region are at the center of the interests of many countries. The volume of already identified and confirmed oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan makes it possible to say with confidence that the Central Asian states are among the most significant and promising producers and exporters of hydrocarbons in the world. At the same time for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan oil and gas reserves are almost the only real source of funds for survival, overcoming socio-economic problems.²¹

Confirmed reserves of natural gas in Kyrgyzstan are estimated at 6 billion cubic meters. The development of gas fields is difficult due to geological features and underdeveloped infrastructure. Own extraction of natural gas in the country is about 30 million cubic meters per year. The prospects for gas production in Tajikistan look more real. According to preliminary data, the forecasted gas reserves in Tajikistan may total up to 70-80 billion cubic meters that will fully cover domestic needs and lead the country out of fuel dependence. Despite the absence of large gas reserves, Kyrgyzstan

¹⁹ Huseynov, *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

and Tajikistan occupy a prominent place in Russia's energy policy in Central Asia. Nevertheless, the current economic potential of the states of the Central Asian region is different in compare with each other. In 2013, Kazakhstan accounted for 67.0% of total regional GDP, for Uzbekistan - 16.4%, for Turkmenistan - 11.8%. The shares of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are much smaller - 2.2 and 2.6% respectively.²²

b) Water resources of the region. In the economic activities of the peoples and states of Central Asia, the water and energy complex occupies one of the main places. This is clearly seen in the example of irrigated agriculture since ancient times, which was one of the main directions of water and energy resources. The appearance of irrigated agriculture in Central Asia dates back to the 6th and 7th centuries BC and since then, its role has been constantly increasing. The Central Asian countries are located in such a natural and climatic zone where it is impossible to cultivate agricultural crops without irrigation. Therefore, in almost all states of the region there is and prevails irrigation, which requires a large number of water resources. Central Asia has very large surface water resources which over 90% are currently being used. Water resources between the states of the region are divided unevenly. Over 90% of surface water resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And the main consumers of water in the region are Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, with Uzbekistan accounting for more than half of the regional water resources consumed. In terms of water resources, Tajikistan ranks the second place in the CIS after Russia and its total annual potential hydropower resources are about 600 billion kWh. In addition, Tajikistan has significant freshwater reserves in glaciers (more than 60% of Central Asia's reserves).²³ There are two large rivers in the basin of the Aral Sea: the Syr Darya in the north and the Amu Darya in the south and between these main rivers is the Zerafshan river. The Syr Darya is the second river in terms of water content and the first longest river in Central Asia.

²² Дадабаева З. А., Кузьмина Е. М., *Процессы Регионализации в Центральной Азии: Проблемы и Противоречия*, Москва, Научный Доклад: 2014, с. 17.
(Dadabaeva Z. A., Kuzmina E. M., *Protsessi Regionalizatsii v Tsentralnoy Azii: Problemi i Protivorechii*, Moscow, Nauchniy Doklad: 2014, p. 17.)

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

From the sources of Naryn, its length is 3.019 km, and the area of the basin is 219 thousand square kilometers. The Amu Darya is the largest river in Central Asia. Its length from the sources of Panj is 2.540 km, and the basin area is 309 thousand square kilometers. In addition, there are many types of lakes in the mountainous regions and hollows of Central Asia. Mostly large lakes occupy basins of tectonic origin. There are also karst lakes. The water in the lakes is usually fresh or brackish, depending on the quality of the inflow. The water sector (of lakes) requires further study.²⁴

c) The communication potential of the region. Central Asia and the Caspian-Black Sea region are crossroads of two new global communication routes: North-South and West-East. The development of these communications is just beginning, but these transcontinental highways have very good long-term prospects. In the 21st century, obviously, they can become a series of major arteries of world economic ties, especially for the Eurasian continent. China's plans to invest \$ 46 billion in strengthening the China-Pakistani economic corridor will also significantly improve the communication between South and Central Asia, as they imply the modernization of the Karakorum highway. China is also developing rail links to the south and has provided Uzbekistan with a \$ 450 million loan for railway construction, which is China's largest loan in this sector in Central Asia. The Chinese project "The Silk Road Economic Belt", also provides the construction of the southern highway through Tashkent, Tehran and Istanbul with a large loop through Moscow. This route will allow European commodity producers to find a shorter entry into markets of East Asian countries using the southern and eastern ports of the PRC. The Northern Corridor is studied in detail in the framework of the work of the Organization for Cooperation between Railways, the International Union of Railways and UNESCAP. Beijing has developed specific transport and communication projects that go through the territory of Central Asia. In total, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan launched 87 transport routes. Similarly, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway can stimulate trade growth not

²⁴ Dadabaeva, *ibid.*, p. 23.

only between these three countries, but also between Russia, China and South-West Asia.²⁵

I. 2. U.S Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia Prior to September 11, 2001

Before discussing the topic in details “foreign policy” should be defined. Carlsnaes Walter, who is an analyst of international relations and senior professor at Uppsala University (Sweden), defines “foreign policy” as following:

“Foreign policy consists of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy”.²⁶

Foreign policy has three tools; Diplomacy, Foreign aid and Military forces that are considered the main ways of conducting state’s foreign policy for protecting its interests. The United States of America has the same instruments but different institutions of decision making and foreign policy implementation. The U.S Constitution divides power between the three branches of government that also have great influence on foreign policy decision making: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. It also gives each branch some check on the other. The President can veto legislation; Congress can override the President’s veto; the courts can declare a law of Congress or an act of the President unconstitutional. Foreign policy of U.S as well as its internal policy are split amongst different governmental structures; the President, the Congress and the Courts. The Department of State, the Pentagon and Security and the Intelligence community which includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the

²⁵ Shamshad Akhtar, *North and Central Asia as a Transit Hub: Potential, Challenges and the Way Forward*, Bangkok: U.N Publication, 2017, p. 15-18.

²⁶ Carlsnaes W, “Foreign Policy”, Carlsnaes, W, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Publications, 2008, p. 331.

Defense Intelligence Agency are also considered institutions for conducting foreign policy under the president of U.S.²⁷

The United States of America showed interests in Central Asia immediately after the independence of Central Asian countries. According to the general American policy of globalism, Central Asia was a part of its considerable interests. By the end of XX century, these ideas have acquired new features, based on the changed geopolitical situation in the world - the disintegration of the USSR and the weakness of the new independent states that emerged instead of it (primarily renewed Russia), the growth of China's economic power and globalism in U.S foreign policy. The United States is embarking on a course to prevent the appearance of a dominant antagonistic forces in Eurasia that will limit the ability of the U.S to exercise global leadership. We are talking about Russia and China as capable states that especially with joint efforts are trying not only to restrict U.S activities in Eurasia, but also to deprive it of claims to world domination. In this regard, on the one hand, the U.S is trying to prevent the restoration of Russia's strategic control in this territory, as well as the creation of a political alliance between Moscow, Beijing and Tehran. On the other hand, the U.S needs cooperation with Russia in order to avoid destabilization in Eurasia which also threatens Central Asian countries. According to experts, any form of U.S-Russian confrontation threatens to split Central Asia.²⁸

China is also the main potential competitor to the United States, which is seriously building up its military and economic power that can weaken the American position in the world. Most analysts believe that China's military potential after 2025 will come close to the U.S, and in the future the PRC may begin to outperform the United States in

²⁷ Felix Chidozie, Jide Ibetan, Ese Ujara, "Foreign Policy, International Image and National Transformation: A Historical Perspective", *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences & Humanities Research*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2014, p. 50.

²⁸ Гумеров Родион Альфредович, *Геополитические Интересы США, Китая И России В Центральной Азии*, Неопубликованная Кандидатская Диссертация, Москва: Дипломатическая Академия МИД Российской Федерации, 2009, с. 36.
(Gumerov Rodion Alfredovich, *Geopoliticheskie interesi SShA, Kitay i Rossii v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Неопубликованная Кандидатская Диссертация, Moscow: Diplomaticheskaya Akademiya MID Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2009, p. 36.)

economic and military development. In order to prevent China and Russia from dominating, the U.S is pursuing a policy in Central Asia aimed at preserving its military presence under the pretext of fighting the drug trade and Islamic extremism. The U.S is interested not only in limiting the influence of individual states in Central Asia, but also in a number of so called transnational threats - terrorism, drug trafficking and the proliferation of WMD, uncontrolled migration and human trafficking. This was mentioned in the U.S National Security Strategy of 1999.²⁹

James Collins, who was a Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for New Independent States in the second half of the 1990s most clearly formulated U.S interests in the region:

- a) U.S support for the independence, sovereignty and security of Central Asian States
- b) U.S assistance for the establishment of free-market economies and democratic governments of the region
- c) The integration of Central Asian States into the world community of political and financial institutions and their participation in the Euro-Atlantic security dialogue and cooperative programs
- d) Encouragement of Central Asian States to pursue peaceful relations among themselves, as well as such relations with their neighbors and to seek new avenues for regional cooperation and to resolve local conflicts as soon as possible
- e) Prevention of weapons of mass destruction's trafficking and their elements across Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and across the borders of the region

²⁹ <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=487539> (22. 07. 2018)

- f) Enhancement of American commercial interests with expansion and diversification of global energy supplies.³⁰

This was the list of U.S interests in Central Asia which then repeatedly mentioned in official documents of the U.S administration. It should be noted that Washington reached its aims and could protect American interests prior to September 11, but one. That was the establishment of democratic governments in the region.

The United States as a global force viewed Central Asia not as a separate geopolitical region, but as part of broader geopolitical designs that presented in various American strategic concepts. Thus, over 28 years U.S foreign policy in the region has gone a long way. It has systematically and gradually developed.

From 1991 to 2001 in the ruling circles of the United States prevailed the view that the economic interests of the United States in the region as a whole are insignificant.³¹ Nevertheless, the administration of Bill Clinton paid great attention to ensuring the access of American goods, services and capitals to the markets of Central Asian states. These contradictions in U.S policy were related to the narrowness of the Central Asian market, the minimum weight of the region's countries in the world economy and the underdeveloped infrastructure.

Another significant issue of U.S diplomacy of this period is whether to intensify political and, especially, military-political relations with the Central Asian states to control the radical regimes of neighboring states, primarily Afghanistan or to expand economic ties with these countries without an active military and political presence. In 1996, after the capture of Kabul by the Taliban, the State Department first announced recognition of their authority but gradually this policy began to be corrected. This was not only due not the barbarous actions of the Taliban, but also to the reaction of the Central Asian leaders to U.S actions.

³⁰ Iftekharul Islam, The U.S. Role and Policy in Central Asia: Energy and Beyond, *The Arts Faculty Journal*, July 2010-June 2011, p. 35-36.

³¹ Michael Mandelbaum, *Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 125.

Military cooperation with Central Asian countries continued to strengthen. By that time, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had already cooperated with NATO, where the United States occupied a leading position within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Gradually, bilateral cooperation was also established. First, Washington attached great importance to Uzbekistan in this area. In 1997, an American-Uzbek joint commission was set up under the chairmanship of the special adviser to the U.S Secretary of State for New Independent States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan. Within its framework committees for political, military, trade, investment and energy, economic reforms and assistance were formed.³² During this period, the military-political ties between U.S and Kazakhstan developed intensively. In 1997, Kazakhstani officials declared the need for greater U.S involvement in state building and expressed their willingness to develop cooperation with the United States and NATO. The strengthening of military cooperation was not only due to the U.S desire to reduce Russia's influence on the countries of Central Asia, but also to prevent a significant expansion of the Chinese economic, and in the long term, its military and political presence in the region. However, in the second half of the 1990s, Washington tried not to publicize the policy of opposing Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia. An essential element of U.S policy in the region remained to contain Iran's influence and to limit Iran's economic cooperation with the Central Asian states. Thus, in 1997, the United States blocked the construction of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Iran.³³

One of the most important economic and geostrategic objects for the United States was the Caspian, which was considered and is considered as part of U.S energy interests. Already in 1997, Senator S. Brownback presented to the Senate a bill “Silk Road

³² U.S Department of State. Press Statement by Nicholas Burns, “U.S-Uzbekistani High-Level Bilateral Consultation and Formation of a Joint Commission”, June 12, 1997, <https://1997-2001.state.gov/briefings/statements/970612.html> (22. 06. 2018)

³³ Троицкий Евгений Флорентьевич, *Центральная Азия в Системе Международных Отношений (1992 – 2009 гг.)*, Томск: Издательство Томского Университета, 2010, с. 81.
(Troitsky Evgeny Florentyevich, *Tsentrálnaya Aziya v Sisteme Medzdunarodnikh Otnoshenii (1992-2009 gg.)*, Tomsk: Izdatelstva Tomskogo Universiteta, 2010, p. 81.)

Strategy XXI century”, which talked about the need for the United States to provide targeted political, financial, humanitarian and technical assistance to the countries of the region for the implementation of the Caucasus-Asian corridor. According to the developers of this document, hydrocarbon reserves in the Caspian Sea can reduce the dependence of the United States on Middle Eastern energy resources. However, there is a direct political dominant that blocks this desire. Russia and Iran are trying to keep the Caspian Sea as an internal reservoir of coastal countries. Moscow and Tehran are against the possible military presence of non-regional countries in the Caspian and they are also seeking to limit the transportation of Caspian hydrocarbons in violation of their interests.

In 1999, the U.S Congress adopted the Law on the Great Silk Road Strategy, which legally formalized the U.S foreign policy strategy for Central Asia and the Caucasus, recognized as a single region.³⁴ The law determined the procedure and conditions for the provision of economic assistance and the maintenance of political independence of these countries. During this period, the greatest emphasis in the Central Asian policy of the United States was made on Kazakhstan as a state with significant hydrocarbon reserves and the most favorable policy of attracting foreign investments into this sphere of the economy. Also, in 2005 a Turkmen-American training program was launched to ensure the safety of the Turkmenbashi seaport. As the U.S policy in Central Asia encounters Russian policy of the region, Moscow regards the Caspian Sea as an internal reservoir of the Caspian states and can provide security in the Caspian without any external assistance. According to Moscow, it is necessary to create a Joint Task Group to ensure security in the basin of the Caspian Sea, which will be formed only from military units of the Caspian countries. At the same time, many analysts believe that Russia is not in a position to implement this program alone, because of the contradictory nature of the interests of the countries in the region.³⁵ The idea of creating CASFOR uniting the naval forces of the Caspian states was first put forward by Russia

³⁴ H. R. 2867 (105th): Silk Road Strategy Act of 1997, November 7, 1997: <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/105/hr2867/text> (25. 06. 2018)

³⁵ Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 41.

in 2003.³⁶ These forces were supposed to fight against real threats and dangerous situations in the Caspian.

I. 3. U.S Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia After September 11, 2001

The next stage in American policy in Central Asia came after the events of September 11, 2001, when NATO troops were deployed to Afghanistan within the framework of the international anti-terrorist coalition and its military bases were opened in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Actually after September 11, American penetration into Central Asia through the military line was very quick. The U.S military presence in Central Asia increased dramatically as opportunities were given not only by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan but also by Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (for having access to airspace and limited use of bases). There was also an opportunity to begin the creation of coalitions by sending high-level missions to the region.

Already in 2002, the act to Support Freedom in Afghanistan was adopted, in which Afghanistan and Central Asia are mentioned for the first time as a whole and the U.S intentions to promote the establishment of democracy and civil society not only in Afghanistan but also in Central Asia were voiced. The “National Security Strategy” (2002) also confirms U.S geopolitical interests in the Caspian and Central Asia. The main ally of the United States in this period is once again Uzbekistan, as a state with a favorable strategic position, the largest population and the most pro-American oriented. At the same time, American companies continued to invest heavily not only in the development and production of hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan, but also in uranium and gold mines in Uzbekistan. The American press began to show speeches of officials who talked about intentions to help the countries of the region to reform the economy. Thus, at the end of 2002, U.S Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Edward Jones, during a visit to Central Asia, declared that the countries of Central Asia are asking U.S to participate more actively in their affairs, and America would like to

³⁶ <http://militaryarticle.ru/voenno-promishlennii-kurer/2006-vpk?start=275> (22. 08. 18)

strengthen its participation and it will not leave the region's countries alone with their problems.³⁷

The peculiarity of American foreign policy activities after September 11, was the fusion of two concepts: Revolution in Military Affairs and the Revolution in Strategic Affairs. This means that the U.S armed forces can be deployed anywhere in the world for global power projection and they have the political support of the U.S State Department. For Central Asia, this meant that the region has become the strategic base for the long-term unilateral domination of the United States.³⁸

To increase the efficiency of aviation use and maximize the full utilization of the given freedom of action in the sky over Central Asia, the Pentagon has achieved the opening of its military air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to the context of the October 2001 agreement, rights were obtained to NATO for basing at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Force base in Uzbekistan (according to the American reduction – “K-2 base”). The facility was intended to support the fighting in Afghanistan. The base accommodated about 1,500 U.S troops, including the Green Berets of the Fifth Special Forces Group, the light infantry of the 10th American Mountain Division, as well as the heavily armed AC-130 aircraft, the C-130 H transport aircraft and C-17, fighter jets and combat helicopters.³⁹ At the same time, the United States and NATO have increased the volume of military assistance to Uzbekistan. The base was used to supply troops, conduct combat operations and perform unmanned aerial vehicles which lasted until the Andijan crisis of 2005 and the subsequent sharp deterioration of U.S relations with Uzbekistan. Considering Washington's approach to the events in the Ferghana Valley as a violation of partner commitments, Tashkent demanded to withdraw the object from its territory. By November 2005, the U.S Armed Forces ceased all operations with the K-2,

³⁷ Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁸ Кузьмина Екатерина Михайловна, *Геополитика Центральной Азии*, Москва: Наука, 2007, с. 78. (Kuzmina Ekaterina Mikhailovna, *Geopolitika Tsentralnoy Azii*, Moskva: Nauka, 2007, p. 78.)

³⁹ Steven R. Weisman and Thom Shanker, “Uzbeks Order U.S. From Base in Refugee Rift”, *The New York Times*, July 31, 2005, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/world/uzbeks-order-us-from-base-in-refugee-rift.html> (23. 08. 2018.)

having transferred part of the personnels to Kyrgyz International Airport Manas. The new American administration of B. Obama has already succeeded normalization of the dialogue with the former Uzbek leader Islam Karimov. Thus, in May 2009, it achieved the opening of an air supply channel running through Navoi airport in the central part of Uzbekistan. For the U.S, the facility was attractive as an intermodal transfer point, which is located just 400 kilometers from the border with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in a safe area and has convenient access to major automobile and railway highways and is suitable for landing any type of aircraft. The mediator of the deal was South Korea. Despite the fact that Tashkent regained its status as the main military-political partner of the United States in the region, the distrust of the parties to each other after the Andijan events did not end, and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted in 2012 prohibited the establishment of new foreign military facilities on the territory of the republic.⁴⁰

On December 11, 2001, the parliament of Kyrgyzstan approved an agreement on U.S use of Manas International Airport in Bishkek. Access to this airport was also received by France, Canada, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands and other members of the Western coalition. An important role in Bishkek's decision was played by the absence of Moscow's direct objections and the fact is that after September 11, 2001, the United States was perceived as a victim of terrorist aggression, which the Central Asian republic experienced twice - in the fall of 1999 and in the autumn of 2000 (when Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan began to provoke a revolution in Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan). In accordance with the agreement of the parties, the U.S base could be used by both transport and combat aircraft. Its staff by status was equated with the administrative and technical staff of the embassy and it was under the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the United States. The staff was allowed to enter Kyrgyzstan using American identity cards and was also given the right to carry weapons. The U.S aircraft

⁴⁰ Попов Д. С, *Центральная Азия во Внешней Политике США*. 1991–2016 гг, Москва: РИСИ, 2016, с. 46-50.
(Popov D. S, *Tsentrálnaya Aziya vo Vneshney Politike SSHA*. 1991-2016 gg, Moskva: RISI, 2016, p. 46-50.)

and vehicles were not subject to verification. The base received extensive tax and administrative benefits, as well as the opportunity to use any telecommunications systems and all the necessary spectrum of radio frequencies.⁴¹ The initial contingent of Manas was 450 American servicemen, 18 F-16 fighters of the Norwegian Air Force, Denmark and the Netherlands, helicopters, military transport and refueling aircraft.⁴²

Favorable contracts for the supply of fuel for the base were received by organizations related to the relatives of the President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev. In November-December 2004, the Americans initiated closed negotiations on the deployment of AWACS E-3A aircraft to Manas and their reconnaissance flights along the border with China, however, after consultations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation members, Bishkek refused. Moreover, A. Akayev did not give guarantees of preserving the U.S base after the next parliamentary elections. Such changes in the foreign policy course of Kyrgyzstan did not go unnoticed beyond the ocean. Americans perceived it as a challenge and took the policy of shifting the government of the republic as Askar Akaev commented after his resignation.⁴³

Having seized power in coup d'état in March 2005, the new leadership of the country led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev expressed loyalty to the White House in maintaining the base. At the same time the Bakiyev clan switched over to the supply of air-kerosene to Manas. Moreover, as it follows from the criminal cases instituted in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, U.S military men were involved in corruption schemes. In the first half of 2009,

⁴¹ Князев Александр Алексеевич, *Влияние Афганского Кризиса на Безопасность Центральной Азии*, Неопубликованная Кандидатская Диссертация, Бишкек: Кыргызско-Российский Славянский Университет, 2004, с. 319-321.

(Knyazev Alexander Alekseevich, *Vliyanie Afghanskogo Krizisa na Bezopasnost Tsentralnoy Azii*, Neopublikovannaya Kandidatskaya Dissertatsiya, Bishkek: Kirgizsko-Rossiyskiy Slvyanskiy Universitet, 2004, p. 319-321.)

⁴² Глумсков Д, “Антитеррористическая Коалиция Несёт Потери”, *Коммерсантъ*, 20 декабря, 2002. (Glumskov D, “Antiterroristicheskaya Koalitsiya Nesyot Poteri”, *Kommersant*, 20 dekabrya, 2002.)

⁴³ Акаев А, “США Предпринимали Попытку Вести Разведывательные Полеты над Китаем с Базы в Киргизии”, *Regnum*, 18 ноября 2009, <https://regnum.ru/news/1226556.html> (28. 05. 2018) (Akaev A, “SSHA Predprinimali Popitku Vesti Razvedivatelnie Polyoti nad Kitayems Bazi v Kirgizii”, *Regnum*, 18 noyabrya 2009.)

Bishkek formally denounced the agreement with Washington. However, in the summer of 2009, after receiving the first tranches from Russia, the Kyrgyz authorities agreed with the Pentagon to maintain the air base under a new name of Transit Center and to increase in rents from the previous 17.4 to 60 million dollars per year and modernization of the airport infrastructure. After the bloody events of spring-summer 2010 and the run of the Bakiyevs from the country, the new authorities of the republic initiated negotiations with the U.S about the future of the air base. President Almazbek Atambayev, in one of his first political statements after his election in October 2011, questioned the advisability of extending the term of the U.S military presence in Kyrgyzstan, which expired in 2014. At the same time he announced the intention to retrain Manas airport into a civilian facility.⁴⁴

The State Department perceived this statement as the beginning of a new big bargaining and stressed that U.S will seek to maintain the base, because Washington needed Manas airport even after 2014 (that was, the official end of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan) for military support of the pro-American government in Kabul. Nevertheless, its results did not take long. The Transit Center in Bishkek airport was closed in June 2014. The Pentagon was forced to redirect air travel to its base in Romania, which is increasingly claiming to be the main outpost of the U.S Department of Defense in the western Black Sea region.⁴⁵

In 2001 Kazakhstan sanctioned free and unlimited flights of U.S air forces in its airspace, which allowed including transportation of any types of cargo, including lethal ones. From 2001 to 2010 the number of such flights was about 9 thousand or more than 1 thousand per year.⁴⁶ In 2002 Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian country that allowed emergency landing of U.S aircraft at the international airports of Almaty and

⁴⁴ “Атамбаев Заверил, что После 2014 Года Манас Будет Гражданским Объектом”, *PIA Новости*, 20 сентября 2012, <https://ria.ru/world/20120920/754791579.html> (25. 08. 2018). (“Atambaev Zaveril, chto Posle 2014 Goda Manas Budet Gradzdanskim Obektom”, *RIA Novosti*, 20 sentyabr ya 2012).

⁴⁵ Попов, *ibid.*, p. 46-50.

⁴⁶ Roger N. McDermott, “Kazakhstan Hosts Steppe Eagle 2012”, <https://jamestown.org/program/kazakhstan-hosts-steppe-eagle-2012/> (20. 07. 2018)

Astana in case of bad weather or an emergency. Although the agreement prohibited the unloading of troops from such sides in the land of Kazakhstan (which created additional inconvenience for U.S servicemen), by 2010 the Americans exercised this right 85 times. In addition, here they had the opportunity to refuel with aviation fuel.⁴⁷ Kazakhstan also granted U.S rights of overflight through Kazakhstani airspace, as well as transportation of goods to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan through its territory.⁴⁸ As a whole, we are not talking about the possibility of temporary deployment of American military units in Kazakhstan. The Americans have significantly increased their assistance to Astana in training Kazakh military personnels and supplying them with some types of equipment. In 2005, Astana opened additional air corridors for U.S aviation, and in April 2010 President N. Nazarbayev at a meeting with B. Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington agreed to carry out through the territory of the republic the transpolar flights from the USA to Afghanistan. Transpolar flights became possible only after opening of a corresponding air corridor by Russia and the appearance of the United States of new long-range C-5M Super Galaxy aircraft which was created for ferrying heavy cargo into warzon.⁴⁹ A direct route through the Arctic allowed U.S transport aircraft to reach Afghan Bagram in less than 12 hours and became an alternative to the traditional long-distance route of the U.S - the Ramstein airbase in Germany - the Persian Gulf - Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A special position on this issue was taken by Turkmenistan, the only state in the region that had previously established official relations with the Taliban government and those relations were characterized as very good by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Taliban Movement, V. A. Motawakil.⁵⁰ Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the Turkmen Foreign Ministry said that it excludes the possibility of

⁴⁷ Wikileaks, Kazakhstan: <https://wikileaks.kz.wordpress.com/2010/02/22/> (30. 08.2018)

⁴⁸ Tashmatova, *ibid.*, p. 74.

⁴⁹ Michael W, *C-5M Super Galaxy Utilization with Joint Precision Airdrop System*, Master Thesis, Ohio: Air Force Institute of Technology, 2012, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Фахим Сабир, "Туркменистан и Афганистан: От Нейтралитета К Сотрудничеству", <http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/23210.html> (30. 08. 2018). (Fakhim Sabir, Turkmenistan i Afghanistan: Ot Neytraliteta K Sotrudnichestvu)

participation in the coalition led by the United States in Afghanistan, citing the status of permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan, approved by the UN General Assembly on December 12, 1995.⁵¹ Subsequently, Ashgabat nevertheless agreed to airlifts through its territory and allowed refueling of aircraft following humanitarian purposes, but publicly tried not to advertise this fact, and flights that were incompatible with the classical neutral status were presented as accomplishment of a humanitarian mission.⁵²

The North Atlantic alliance also began to actively use Tajikistan with its longest border with Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, NATO began to pay to local authorities from 3 to 5 thousand dollars for each flight of NATO countries.⁵³ Tajikistan also allowed the Pentagon (and later the French military) to use Dushanbe airport in emergency cases and for refueling aircraft. From December 2001 to October 2014, the Dushanbe International Airport was used by the French Air Force to support the French contingent in Afghanistan. During this period 170 servicemen, C-160 military transport aircraft and Mirage fighters were deployed to the airport at different times. 11 thousand air missions were carried through the airport, 89 thousand servicemen were transported and over 14.5 thousand tons of cargo were also transported through the same airport. In return, the French side has allocated a soft loan of EUR 20 million for the construction of the Dushanbe International Airport terminal. In addition, Americans were granted the rights of flight in the airspace of the country and even they have involved Tajikistan in military training of the new Afghan army.⁵⁴

Not surprisingly, the U.S, which declared war on international terrorism, at the first stage found full support from the leaders of the former Asian republics of the USSR. But, as further practice showed, the deployment of U.S military facilities in

⁵¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 50/80a “Permanent Neutrality Of Turkmenistan”, 12 December, 1995, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r080.htm> (13. 09. 2018)

⁵² Попов, *ibid.*, p. 44.

⁵³ Старчак М, “США VS Россия В Сотрудничестве С Таджикистаном В Военно-Политической Сфере”, Центральная Азия и Кавказ, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, с. 20-21.
(Starchak M, “SShA VS Rossiy v Sotrudnichestve s Tadjikistanom V Voenno-Politicheskoy Sfere”, Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz, Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, p. 20-21.)

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Central Asia gave rise to a whole range of threats to the security of host states, and Washington's desire of preserving them provoked frank interference in internal affairs.

The presence of the alliance forces in the Central Asian states was coordinated with Russia. But the U.S military strategists in our days believe that this was not a gesture of goodwill, but a tactical concession from Moscow. Because at that time, Russia could not cope with the threat from the south on its own. The military presence in Central Asia enabled the United States to solve its strategic tasks like influencing oil and gas field in the Great Caspian, isolating Iran, being able to exert pressure on China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and strengthening control over Afghanistan. Even some U.S Broadcasts spread such information: “The United States is waging a war on terrorism in Afghanistan and for the first time sending troops to the reach energy-resource regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus and new boundaries of the American empire are outlined. The strategic regions, firmly embedded in the Russian and former Soviet sphere of influence, together with the Middle East bridgeheads today are home for 60,000 U.S troops. Some of these soldiers build long-term bases in remote corners of Central Asia, which raises critical questions about America's future role in the region”.⁵⁵

Following the course of globalism, the United States was looking for opportunities to influence large geopolitical and strategic spaces. So, in 2004, President George W. Bush put forward a strategy for creating a “Greater Middle East” to unite the Muslim world under the control of the United States. Central Asia was considered in this connection as part of the supposed geostrategic association. The intentions of the U.S were negatively perceived by the Muslim community and both the EU and Russia did not support the U.S strategy. This project directly provided for the obligations of all countries of the Greater Middle East to adopt the American system of democracy.⁵⁶ Among the fundamental principles of expressing American security interests in the Central Asian region were; the prevention of hostile domination in key areas and the

⁵⁵ Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 43.

⁵⁶ Примаков Е, “В чем Сущность Плана “Большой Ближний Восток” ”, <https://inosmi.ru/world/20040625/210712.html> (21.06.2018) (Pirmakov E, “V chem Sushost Plana “Bolshoy Blizhniy Vostok””.)

maintenance of a stable balance of power, access to key markets and strategic resources, counteract the emergence of threats from the territories of weak states, the preservation of coalitions and finally the willingness to intervene in the event of unexpected crises.

The United States declaring Central Asia a zone of its strategic interests definitely wanted to take advantage of the chance to establish itself in a region that was previously a dead zone for it. Of course, it is very important for Americans to ensure stability and predictability of Central Asia in the field of security, which is hampered by attempts of terrorist and other extremist forces to penetrate into it. The U.S activity in Central Asia is largely related to the results of the operation in Afghanistan and Iraq and, accordingly to the establishment of American control over Iraqi oil, its delivery routes and world oil prices. In this regard, the professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Doctor of Historical Sciences K. Kulmatov noted that if the U.S successfully accomplishes its tasks in Central Asian countries, then they can be used as a springboard for spreading its influence in Iran. Also, some members of the Bush administration have repeatedly mentioned that after the disarmament of Iraq, the turn of Iran, where spiritual leaders are irreconcilable enemies of the United States and Israel wil come. And at the same time, Washington intended to gain access to Iranian oil.⁵⁷

It is clear that the Americans tried to keep their military bases in the region for a long term. First of all for the protection of their own interests, as well as the need for assistance in building and reforming the national armed forces of the countries of the region, maintaining their internal stability and protecting democracy. This approach of the U.S administration was not shared by all in the American Congress and the political science community. A number of influential figures believed that after the end of the Afghan operation, the U.S will need to withdraw from Central Asia, limiting itself to political arrangements for cooperation in the event of emergencies, and not only with the countries of the region, but also with Russia and China. But such discreet people were an

⁵⁷ Кулматов К. Н, *Мир в Начале XXI Века. Размышления Российского Дипломата и Ученого*, Москва: Известия, 2006, с. 245.
(Kulmatov K. N, *Mir v Nachale XXI Veka. Razmishleniya Rossiyskogo Diplomata i Uchyonogo*, Moskva, Izvestiya, 2006, p. 245.)

overwhelming minority. Another influential group of figures went further, they argued that Washington's thinnest line will lead to a great weakening of the relations and positions of the U.S in Turkey, an alliance with which has incomparably greater significance for the West than Central Asia. Nevertheless, since 2001, Washington's military programs in Central Asia have been implemented with the aim of solving the tasks that the American army had in Afghanistan. However, the future of these projects will largely depend on the development of the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.⁵⁸

I. 4. The Economic Aspect of U.S Foreign Policy in Central Asia

By the beginning of the 21st century, the world community entered a period characterized by a rapid population growth, the rate of economic development and rapidly growing depletion of energy resources. At present, the Middle East and Siberia are the largest sources of oil and gas in the world. In addition, one of the most promising new regions, where large reserves of energy are concentrated, is the Caspian Sea basin, as well as some Central Asian countries. Naturally, in the process of rapid depletion of energy sources, some world and regional powers seek to gain access to Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries which are considered new promising oil and natural gas reserves for them. So, if in the nineteenth and early twentieth the Russian and British empires competed for predominance in Central Asia, now the United States as a superpower competes with all world and regional powers which interested in Central Asia. Cardinaly changed the rates in this new “Great Game”. In the last century, the Russian Empire, carrying out its expansion into Central Asia, considering it as a region from where it would receive cotton and through which it could reach the Indian Ocean. The British Empire sought to include Central Asia in its sphere of influence in order to protect its possessions in India and their possible expansion in the north. But now the main competition between powers in Central Asia is most likely for imperialistic aims as

⁵⁸ Рюриков Д. *Американский Фактор в Судьбе Афганистана После 2014 Года*, Москва: РИСИ, 2016, с. 80.
(Ryurikov D, *Amerikanskiy faktor v sudbe Afghanistana Posle 2014 Goda*, Moskva: RISI, 2016, p. 80.)

well as for its energy resources. Of course, we can not ignore the traditional military and military-political diplomacy, but in the case of Central Asia its economical aspect is also important. In such circumstances, the U.S had a strong position and economic expansion of the American giants in the oil and gas regions of Central Asia which was provided by the multilateral political support of Washington.⁵⁹

For decades, the unconditional economic priority of the United States in all parts of the world remains access to oil. In Central Asia, this resource is mostly concentrated in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Western companies massively rushed to the newly opened republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia immediately after the collapse of the USSR, assessing the prospects of the Caspian Sea as one of the few undeveloped areas of world oil and gas production. In 1993-1994 they signed the first major contracts with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Movement in the area of corporations was supported by the administration of President B. Clinton. Stimulating the commercial interest of Western transnational oil companies, government structures, the press and expert community of U.S spread obviously overestimated forecasts about the Caspian concentration of oil reserves comparable to the resources of the Persian Gulf.⁶⁰ As it turned out later, they were made without the necessary geological research and were not subsequently confirmed. At the same time, companies that expressed a desire to work in the region were offered assistance from American and international financial institutions, in particular, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the American Corporation for Private Foreign Investments, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. These steps were taken by the White House not only to expand access to strategic raw materials, but also to distance the Caspian republics from Moscow.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Тренин Д, “Россия Между Китаем и Америкой. Трехчленная Конструкция Пекин - Москва - Вашингтон Вновь Приобретает Реальные Черты”, *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 32, No. 43, 2005, с. 3-5. (Trenin D, “Rossiya medzdu Kiitayem i Amerikoy. Trykhchlennyya Konstruktsiya Pekin – Moskva-Vashington Vnov Priobretaet Realnie Cherti”, *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 32, No. 43, 2005, p. 3-5.)

⁶⁰ Разумов А. Я, “Большая Казахская Нефть” - Конец Мечты?, <http://www.iarex.ru/articles/41334.html> (06.09.2018)

(Razumov A. Y, “Bolshaya Kasakhskaya Neft”-Konets Mechti?,)

⁶¹ Сырлыбаева Б. Р, *Каспийский Регион: Актуальные Проблемы Развития*, Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 2012, с. 49.

Generally, in the 1990s, the activity of American financial and industrial groups in the Central Asian countries was not so significant. This was explained by the lack of well-established mechanisms of trade and economic cooperation with the states of Central Asia. The total amount of money of direct and private U.S investments in Central Asia by 2001 approximated only \$ 1.5 billion. The greater part was in Kazakhstan, where their volume by this period was about \$ 990 million. In Kazakhstan, foreign investors were largely interested in mineral-raw resources and particularly in the development of oil. According to statistics, in the total volume of foreign direct investment, capital investments in oil production were about 60%.⁶² Thus, as it mentioned before, within 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and before the events of September 11, 2001, the influence of the United States on the economic life of the countries of the region was not so significant.

However, at the time and after the transient anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, Washington gradually began to strengthen its participation in the raw materials industries of the region and this has become possible due to following several factors:

- a) the American administration, which is interested in participating in the division of the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea, has intensified the promotion of American capitals to Central Asia.
- b) American economic interests were reliably secured by the presence of the military bases of Washington.
- c) United States was forced to accept the economic challenge against Russia, which creates integration structures (SCO, EurAsEC etc.), threatening not only the economic, but also the military and political presence of Washington in the region.

(Syrlybayeva B. R, *Kaspiyskiy Region: Aktualnie Problemi Razvitiya*, Almaty: KISI pri Prezidente PK, 2012, p. 40.)

⁶² Музапарова Л, Карин Е, “Транснациональные корпорации в Казахстане”, *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, Vol. 18, No. 7, 2000, с. 52.

(Muzaparova L, Karin E, “Transnatsionalnie Koorporatsii v Kazakhstane”, *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*, Vol. 18, No. 7, 2000, p. 52.)

One of the main goals of the George W. Bush Administration in Central Asia was to reduce Russia's influence in the energy sector of Europe by participating in the redistribution of the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian Sea. According to the U.S State Department, the total Caspian oil reserves for 2000 were approximately 31 billion barrels and gas - 1.3 trillion cu. m.⁶³

In April 2002, Bernard Jelbom, a member of the Congressional Research Service, prepared a report entitled “Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects”, which noted the limitations of export routes for Caspian hydrocarbons bypassing Russia and the need for their diversification. One of the most acceptable corridors was the transit of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea through Turkey to Europe and also from Central Asia to India and Pakistan.⁶⁴ This approach of an American expert fully met the interests of the U.S administration to strengthen Turkey's positions in Central Asia and the European Union as a transit state. In this issue, Azerbaijan also had a strategic importance for the U.S, because it was the only state through the territory of which it is possible to lay pipelines in the European direction from the Caspian basin. It should be noted that, in particular, Kazakhstan did not refuse to participate in the “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan” pipeline project. The State Department made major financial investments in the development of an extensive strategy to create conditions for the Caspian states and the international consortiums operating in the region to export hydrocarbons to the west via pipelines oriented to Turkey. It is worth pointing to the fact that a number of American experts considered it inexpedient to build a pipeline. So, according to the senior researcher of the Washington Center for Historical Studies Alec Rasizade “from the perspective of a

⁶³ Коэн А, “США, Страны Центральной Азии и Кавказа: Проблемы и Перспективы Взаимоотношений”, *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, Vol. 24, No. 8. 2000, с. 58.
(Koen A, “SShA, Strani Tsentralnoy Azii i Kavkaza: Problemi i Perspektivi Vzaimootnoshenii”, *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*, Vol. 24, No. 8. 2000, p. 58.)

⁶⁴ Bernard A. Gelb, “Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects”, *CRS Report for Congress*, <https://www.amazon.co.uk/Caspian-oil-gas-Production-prospects/dp/B0006RZ1PQ> (22. 05. 2018)

reasonable economy, these costly projects (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Trans-Caspian gas main from Turkmenistan) never made sense”.⁶⁵

In September 2002, the first stage of the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was started in the framework of the project, which began in 1997. According to this project, the pipeline should ensure the export of crude oil from the Caspian Sea to Ceyhan, which is a Turkish port on the Mediterranean coast. The official launch of the pipeline took place at the end of May 2005. Its capacity was 50 million tons of oil per year, and approximately 1 million barrels per day.⁶⁶

In early 2007, with the active assistance of the U.S Administration, another project was launched - the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi Erzurum) with a length of 690 km. The throughput capacity of this pipeline is 20 billion cubic meters. The route carries gas from the Azerbaijani gas condensate field “Shah Deniz” to Georgia and Turkey. One can believe that the “Black Gold” of Central Asia is a fundamental strategic interest for the economy of the United States as a valuable natural resource and Kazakhstan which acts according to its national interests plays a major role in this issue. For example, in the conditions of increased world prices for hydrocarbons, the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan through the promotion of tax and environmental claims has taken a course to increase its share in oil projects previously ceded to the U.S business on preferential terms. In parallel, Kazakhstan opened its oil market to China. As a result, by the beginning of 2011, the U.S share in Kazakhstan's oil production had declined to 24%, and China had grown to 22%, and KazMunayGas, which is the national company of Kazakhstan, had accounted for 28%.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Расизаде А, “Миф об Углеводородном Изобилии Каспия и Геополитическая Стратегия “Трубы””, *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, Vol. 13, No. 8, 2001, с. 25.
(Raiszde A, “Mif ob Uglevodorodnom Izobilii Kaspiya i Geopoliticheskaya Strategiya “Trubi””, *Tsentrlnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*, (13), № 8, 2001, p. 25.

⁶⁶ Mark Tran, “Q&A: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline”, <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2005/may/26/businessqandas.oilandpetrol> (25.08.2018)

⁶⁷ Raiszade, *ibid.*, p. 28.

Nevertheless, the American still occupy strong positions here. As in 2015, U.S Transnational Corporations were represented in all three of the country's largest mining projects. In the Tengiz field, which accounts for about a third of Kazakh oil, 75% belong to Americans (including 50% to Chevron and 25% to ExxonMobil). In Karachaganak, Chevron controls 18% of liquid hydrocarbons. In the world's fifth largest super-giant Kashagan, where industrial oil production has been postponed since 2005 and with which Astana is linked by the future of its energy sector, 16.8% belong to ExxonMobil.

It can be stated that the initial full loyalty of the Kazakh authorities to the oil and gas interests of Washington was replaced by Astana's efforts to balance Western influence with a Chinese factor that not only slowed American expansion into the Caspian raw material sector but also helped the withdrawal of some U.S players from the market. In 2014-2015, serious adjustments to the investment plans of Western companies made a general drop in world oil prices, which collapsed from 100-110 to 40-50 dollars per barrel. Earlier it was expected that the launch of a new Tengiz line and the delayed start of production at Kashagan could occur already at the turn of 2016-2017. These projects should have allowed Kazakhstan to make a real leap in increasing the volume of oil production that has been fluctuating around 80 million tons per year. The upper ceiling for the expansion of Tengiz was approximated to 40 billion, and Kashagan to 187 billion dollars.⁶⁸ But changes in the price made these plans unprofitable and led to their transfer, most likely, for an indefinite period until the macroeconomic situation will improve. Another problem for the American side remains the geographic isolation of the Caspian region, and transportation of raw materials to Western markets using the pipeline system of Russia. Washington sees the solution in laying pipelines along the bottom of the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus, bypassing Russian territory.

⁶⁸ Бутырина Е, “Миллиарды в Инвестиционной Корзине. Топ-3 Самых Дорогих Нефтегазовых Проектов, Реализуемых и Планируемых К Выполнению в Казахстане в Сегменте Разведки и Добычи”, *Kazenergy*, Vol. 61, No. 06, 2013, с. 20.

(Butyrina E, “Milliardi v Investitsionnoy korzine. Top-3 Samikh Dorogikh Neftegozovikh Proektov, Realizuemikh i Planiruemikh K Vipolneniyu v Kazakhstane v Segmente Razvedki i Dobichi”, *Kazenergy*, Vol. 61, No. 06, 2013, p. 20.)

Generally, since the beginning of the 2000s until now (2018) the U.S focused on economic interaction with Central Asian countries and primarily with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. However, the main industries that attracted significant investments from U.S corporations were oil and gas production, the pipeline sector, mining, food, textile industries, air transport and telecommunications, industry and the agrarian sector (primarily cotton and wheat).⁶⁹ Indeed, these branches of the economy of Central Asian countries will retain their attractiveness for corporations with the United States as well as with other countries.

I. 5. The American Efforts on the Fight Against Drug Trafficking in Central Asia

The long-term uninterrupted drug trafficking through Central Asian countries has led to a rapid increase in its own consumption of heavy drugs, accompanying the increase in the incidence of HIV/AIDS and the criminalization of society. Many factors contributed to the drug trafficking through Central Asia, such as high levels of poverty and unemployment, corruption and labor migration, and ethnic ties with the population of the North Afghan provinces. But the decisive role in the approval of the route was played by the elimination of a unified system for the protection of the state border with Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁷⁰ Under these conditions, the United States offered its approach to the drug problem in the Central Asian region. The fight against drugs was declared one of the priorities of the American security policy in Central Asia. The main vector of American efforts was the expansion of contacts with the state bodies of the countries of the region. U.S took responsibility for combating the drug threat and providing Central Asian state bodies with institutional and logistical support. Assistance was provided through several programs of the State Department like,

⁶⁹ Парканский А, “США - Страны Центральной Азии: Экономические Взаимоотношения”, *СШАКанада: Экономика, Политика, Культура*, Vol. 65, No. 7, 2003, с. 52
(Parkansky A, “SShA-Strani Tsentralnoy Azii: Ekonomicheskoe Vzaimootnosheniya”, *SSHA Kanada: Ekonomika, Politika, Kultura*, Vol. 65, No. 7, 2003, p. 52)

⁷⁰ Князев А. А, *К Истории и Современному Состоянию Производства Наркотиков в Афганистане и их Распространения в Центральной Азии*, Бишкек: Илим, 2003, с. 61
(Knyazev A. A, *K Istorii i Sovremennomu Sostoyaniyu Proizvodstva Narkotikov v Afghanistan i ikh Rasprostraneniya v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Bishkek: Kirgizsko-Ilim, 2004, p. 61.)

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Foreign Military Financing, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Program and the Pentagon (Section 1004 of the National Counter-Narcotics Program). In the U.S foreign policy department, the Office for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Drug Enforcement Administration under the U.S Department of Justice, FBI and other competent structures, a number of which have concluded separate agreements with Central Asian countries and placed their representatives here are responsible for their execution. Some of the programs are implemented jointly with international organizations.⁷¹ Financing in the direction of fighting drug-trafficking since 2001 has exceeded 640 million dollars. It increased significantly in the mid-2000s with the deployment of Western troops in neighboring Afghanistan, reaching a peak in the final stage of Operation Enduring Freedom. However, after the completion of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2014, the U.S financing for security in Central Asia, including anti-drug projects, began to decline. In general, these projects covered the entire region, but the Americans could establish the most dense care of the anti-drug agencies created at the turn of the 1990s and 2000s in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. For their staff were provided, including external stimulating surcharges to wages. Ashgabat traditionally showed interest in cooperation less than others.⁷² However, at the core of Washington's position were the motives of the global confrontation with Russia and the desire to weaken its influence. In June 2011, the State Department launched the creation of the Central Asia Counter-Narcotics Initiative. The essence of the proposals of the department was limited to the creation of special and operative-search units for combating drugs in five republics, with the financial support of the White House. These groups, according to the American side, had to exchange operational information and conduct joint cross-border raids against drug traffickers in close cooperation with the U.S military and law enforcement services. The idea was also expressed to expand the staff of the U.S Drug Enforcement Administration working in Central Asia. But the

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁷² _____ "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report", *Policy and Program Developments*, https://defenseoversight.wola.org/primarydocs/1503_incsr.pdf (03. 06. 2018)

initiative did not find support, as it allowed elements of external control over the bloc. The position of the Central Asian negotiators was also influenced by the opinion of Moscow, as it perceived the CACI extremely negatively, calling it an instrument of penetration into Central Asia and strengthening the U.S military and political influence in the region. Among other things, Russia pointed to Washington's desire to duplicate the already established mechanisms of interstate cooperation within the CSTO framework.⁷³

Since the early 2000s, the world has a unique geopolitical situation. The United States, through its military contingents, instructors and private military companies, were entrenched immediately in two key centers of world drug production - Afghanistan and Colombia. In both cases, the White House declared war on terrorism and drug crime, but in practice it acted selectively and in the spirit of double standards. On the scale of Afghanistan, Americans abandoned the most effective way to combat drugs - the destruction of opium poppy crops, in particular, by spraying defoliants, herbicides and other chemicals. If only 1.8% of drug crops were destroyed in Afghanistan in 2010, then in South America, 52% of cocaine plantations were eliminated during the same period. In Afghanistan, U.S representatives began to convince the world community that the destruction of drug crops is not justified, as it pushes peasants into the ranks of armed groups, strengthening the Taliban Movement. As a result of this policy, by 2014 the area of illicit cultivation of the cocaine bush in the world has shrunk to a minimum, and the opium poppy has reached a record level in the history of international observations. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, by 2013, Afghanistan accounted for more than 80% of the world's opium production, which is equivalent to about 5.5 thousand tons of raw materials.⁷⁴ From 2002 to 2013, already during the occupation of

⁷³ Черненко Е, “Антинаркотическую Инициативу Заблокировали в Вене”, *Коммерсантъ*, Vol. 15, No. 29, 2012, с. 7.

(Chernenko E, “Antinarkoticheskuyu Initsiativu Zablockirovali v Vene”, *Kommersant*, Vol. 15, No. 29, 2012, p. 7.)

⁷⁴ World Drug Report 2014, “The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014”, *Vienna: United Nations Publication*, Vol. 11, No. 14, 2014, p. 21,

https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf (13. 07. 2018)

the IRA by American troops, the area of opium poppy cultivation increased from 74,000 to 209,000 hectares, covering previously free provinces.⁷⁵ By 2010, the country also entered the world leaders in the production of hashish, ahead of Morocco. The main centers of drug production are located in the areas of the greatest concentration of the armed forces of NATO countries in the south and the southeast of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.⁷⁶

Summarizing what has been mentioned, one can come at the following conclusion. There were two main reasons for the increase in drug trafficking in Central Asia, as well as the consumption of illegal drugs. First, was the rapid increase in the supply of opiates in Afghanistan during the years of the occupation of this country by American troops and the second was the weakening of control over the Central Asian States borders with the IRA after the collapse of the USSR. Refusing to support the destruction of poppy fields on Afghan territory and opposing the preservation of the Russian border presence in Central Asia, the White House, contributed to the aggravation of the causes and severity of the drug problem in the region. The grotesqueness of the situation was that at the same time, America has become the largest foreign donor in Central Asia in terms of anti-drug programs. Washington concentrated funding on equipping and training local police and border agencies and undertook a series of attempts to introduce supranational anti-drug mechanisms with a dominant U.S role. Thus, the western influence on the local law enforcement system was expanded, and the front of the fight against drugs was moved closer to the borders of Russia, which fundamentally contradicts Moscow's approach to destroying drug crops in the places of their cultivation. At the same time, U.S programs, as predicted, were not able to significantly improve the situation with drug trafficking in Central Asia. As reported, in June 2014, the United States spent a huge amount of \$ 7.6 billion on anti-drug programs in Afghanistan. But the most part of this money went on so called development of the anti-drug capabilities of the Afghan

⁷⁵ World, *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁷⁶ Арунова М.Р, Иваненко В.И., *Афганская Политика США в 1945–2014 гг*, Москва: РИСИ, 2015, с. 132.

(Arunova M. R, Ivanenko V. I, *Afghanskaya Politika SSHA v 1945-2014 gg*, Moskva: RISI, 2015, p. 132.

government, including support for law enforcement and the development of legislation. As a result, U.S initiatives in this area turned out to be completely ineffective, which is recognized by many American specialists, such as the U.S Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction John Sopko.⁷⁷



⁷⁷ “Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction”, SIGAR-15-10-SP Special Report: “Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction”, 2014. October 14, p. 2-4, <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/sigar-15-10-sp.pdf> (15. 07. 2019)

PART TWO

THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER POWERS IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S INTERESTS IN CA

The independence of Central Asia countries in the early 1990s opened it up to external influence and turned this region into an object of the post-bipolar policy of USA, China, Russia, EU, Iran and Turkey - actors historically competing with each other for the most favorable presence in it and access to its resources as well as the inclusion of Central Asian countries in their spheres of influence. Historical analogies demonstrate the permanent presence of this process in the field of attention of the leading powers of XIX century Britain and the United States at the turn of the XX - XXI centuries. British and American attention is linked to the likelihood that the access of the world powers to the geopolitical and geo-economic potential of Central Asia will allow them to change the regional balance of forces in their favor and at the same time challenge the global position of possessing a world advantage.

II. 1. Geopolitical Interests of Russian Federation in Central Asia

In the Russian political establishment there is no integral program of interaction with the states of Central Asia. This is due to the fact that Russia is only forming a strategy for foreign policy and foreign economic cooperation with Central Asia as a single region and with the CIS in general. These factors can also be mentioned. First, Russia just overcame the political and economic crisis in which it remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, in the political and scientific elite there was no single position on foreign policy and economic interaction with various regions of the world. So, despite the officially existing documents, no integral Russian foreign policy doctrine has been developed.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Сорокин К. Э., *Геополитика Современности и Геостратегия России*, Москва: Известия, 2015, с. 24.
(Sorokin K.. E, *Geopolitika Sovremennosti i Geostrategiya Rossii*, Moscow: Izvestiya, 2015, p. 24.)

However, since 2005, Russia's policy in the Central Asian direction has been gradually becoming more specific. This is evidenced by the dynamics and quality of meetings at the highest level, the conclusion of treaties on strategic partnership and allied relations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Speeches of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin in 2006-2007 at the summits of the organizations like the SCO, EurAsEC and CSTO which the Central Asian countries are also considered their members, showed not only considerable interest in this region from the Russian side, but also Russia's new long-term interests in Central Asia. The Russian Federation cannot allow its influence to be minimized by new world and regional players like the United States, China, European Union and Iran. So Russia had to form a coherent strategy for the CIS and Central Asia.⁷⁹

Central Asia has a great importance for the Russian Federation from the security perspective. First of all it's about protecting national borders, and maintaining a stable buffer between Russia and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. The threats and challenges coming from Afghanistan and the CIS's southern neighbors are forcing Russia to look for ways to block them. The main threats coming from the South are terrorism and religious extremism. The emergence of these threats beyond national borders requires the coordination of the activities of special services and law enforcement agencies from Central Asian countries and Russia, as well as the formation of a unified security system. The main area of concentration of religious extremists is Afghanistan. Although NATO forces are quartered in the country, the threat of destabilization of the region remains and clashes between warring armed factions don't end. Most Afghans consider the presence of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan as an occupation of the country. The fight against NATO soldiers is regarded as a war with unbelievers, which increases the widespread anti-Western sentiments. Moreover, the actions of American and European military are one of the reasons for the radicalization, both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Muslim states.

⁷⁹ Sorokin, *ibid.*, p. 26.

Another serious threat is drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia through Central Asian territories.⁸⁰ The complex relief of the border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics makes the fight against drug trafficking extremely difficult. Criminal groups use international airports of the Central Asian states and their rail routes for transporting drugs to Russia. The most difficult situation is in Tajikistan. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the country, approximately 40% of the total volume of illegal drug trafficking in Russia is transported through the territory of the republic annually. An important problem in ensuring Russia's national security in the early 1990s was the lack of a settled border in the south and west. New independent countries that appeared on the border with Russia in Central Asia also faced the issue of border protection. They were not ready for their independent protection, especially with Afghanistan. In 1992, the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops of the CIS countries was formed to coordinate the protection of external borders.⁸¹ Thanks to the collective efforts and leading role of the Russian Federation, the Central Asian republics managed to maintain a stable system of border protection. On December 24, 1993, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on the protection of external borders, which stipulates that the protection of external borders is a common thing and should be carried out by concerted joint efforts. Over the first 15 years, more than 3000 armed extremists and drug smugglers have been killed or captured on the borders of Central Asia. Russian border guards that guarded the borders of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, involved in assisting Turkmenistan, seized more than 38 tons of narcotic drugs, of which heroin is about 12.5 tons. Out of illegal circulation, more than 1,000 firearms and about 500,000 various ammunition and explosives were seized.⁸²

⁸⁰ Arunova, *ibid.*, p. 144.

⁸¹ Sorokin, *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸² Тихонов М, *Историческая Роль Пограничных Поисков России в Обеспечении Безопасности Южных Рубежей СНГ*, Бишкек: Илим, 2007, с. 106.

It should be admitted that in the most difficult period of the formation of the border troops of Tajikistan, Western assistance to Tajikistan in comparison with the Russian was very limited. For example, during the crucial period of the transfer of the state border in 2004-2006, the countries of the West allocated Tajikistan \$ 12 million for the construction of the Afghan border. This is approximately 4 million dollars a year. At the same time, Russia spent at least \$ 30 million annually to protect the Tajik-Afghan border, and another \$ 30 million-\$ 40 million each year was supplied by various logistical means.⁸³ In addition to protecting the border, Russian and Tajik border guards cooperated in the fight against the international drug business. During the years of protection of the Tajik-Afghan border by the Russian border guards, the share of the Republic of Tajikistan accounted for up to 82% of heroin seized in the Central Asian CIS member countries. More than half of the narcotic drugs detained in Tajikistan were seized by Russian border guards.⁸⁴ The transnational nature of the drug trade requires the joint efforts of the countries of the region and its neighboring countries, the coherence of their actions at all levels, beginning with the adoption of political decisions and concluding with the practical implementation of the agreements. Obviously, in the near future, the parties will have to take larger joint actions to improve the situation.

In order to reduce the flow of drugs from the south, the creation of cordons on the border with Afghanistan is only the first step necessary. Operational border groups of Russian advisers function in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which, at the level of the command of the border troops and frontier detachments, actively help to organize and plan operational and service activities. In addition, the accelerated training courses for junior officers of the border, organized by Russian officers, are successfully functioning in Kyrgyzstan. Over a few years more than 100 junior officers were trained.⁸⁵ The

(Tikhonov M, *Istoricheskaya Rol Pogranichnikh Poisk v Obespechenii Bezoposnosti Yudznikh Rubedzey SNG*, Bishkek: Ilim, 2007, p. 106.)

⁸³ Назаршоев М, *Военная История Таджикистана*, Душанбе: Дурахш, 2014, с. 422.

(Nazarshoev M, *Voennaya Istoriya Tajikistana*, Dushanbe: Durakhsh, 2014, p. 422.)

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

⁸⁵ Сумароков Л, *История Российской Пограничной Охраны на Тянь-Шане и Памире*, Бишкек: Илим, 2006, с. 48.

presence of Russian border guards, troops and military advisers in Central Asia contributed to the stabilization of the military and political situation in the region. Russian border guards have for all these years served as a guarantor of stability and a reliable barrier to the proliferation of hotbeds of tension, terrorist and armed actions in the territory of Central Asian countries.⁸⁶

It should be noted that there were no external threats common to the CIS countries as a whole, but for the countries of Central Asia and Russia such a threat was the Taliban of Afghanistan and the threats connected with it. To solve these and other problems in 1992, an agreement for creating the Collective Security Treaty Organization was signed, which included all the countries of Central Asia with the exception of neutral Turkmenistan. In October 2002 CSTO created as a military alliance. This agreement stipulated refusal to join military alliances, from participation in groupings of states, as well as in actions directed against the state party to the CSTO. It was agreed that if an act of aggression was committed against any of the participating States, all other participating States would provide necessary assistance to the state directly affected, including military assistance, and also provide support to the means at their disposal in the exercise of the right to collective self-defense in accordance with Art 51 of the UN Charter. According to experts, within the framework of the CSTO, two vectors of security can be identified. First, it is the formation of allied relations and the creation of a mechanism for preventing crises in the territory of member states. Secondly, joint deterrence of aggressive aspirations and countering possible threats from the outside environment by the combined capabilities of the participating States.⁸⁷

An effort to create a regional security system in Central Asia is also carried out within the framework of the SCO which was founded on 26 April 1996. Here, a more

(Sumarokov L, *Istoriya Rossiyskoy Pogranichnoy Okhrani na Tyan- Shane i Pamire*, Bishkek: Ilim, 2006, p. 48.)

⁸⁶ Nazarshoev, *ibid.*, p. 434.

⁸⁷ Бондарец Л, *Военно-Политический Аспект Интеграции В Центральной Евразии*, Бишкек: Илим, 2007, с. 90-91.

(Bondarets, L, *Voенно-Politicheskiy Aspekt Integratsii V Tsentralnoy Evrazii*, Bishkek: Ilim, 2007, p. 90-91.)

significant result was achieved, for example; the countries resolved disputes over the former Soviet-Chinese border and reached agreements on all disputed territories with the PRC. In 1996, multilateral agreements were signed to build confidence in military cooperation. This resulted to mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area, which allowed the forming of a hundred-kilometer zone of confidence on both sides of the Chinese border. However, the SCO was forced to adjust its security activities after the Batken events of 1999 in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the terrorist attacks in Tashkent and the invasion of illegal armed groups in Uzbekistan in 2000. The leaders of the SCO member states agreed on a joint fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. In 2000, the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was signed and in 2003 the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure was established. By 2006 it became clear that within the framework of the SCO it was difficult to create a military structure that would suit all the members of the Organization, especially in the light of its possible expansion. As a result, it was decided that it would be possible to move an effective collective security system into the CSTO format. Within the framework of this Organization, the annual exercise “Southern Shield of the Commonwealth” was launched, aimed at countering intra-regional security threats. The Collective Rapid Deployment Force was established in the combat units of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan with the air support of the Russian Air Force. Since 2003, Kant aviation base has been stationed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan.⁸⁸

The main obstacles to further development of the process of military-political integration in the format of the CSTO and the SCO are:

1. Fear of the states of Central Asia, less developed in economic and military relations, to get into political, economic and military dependence on the stronger Russia and China in the CSTO and the SCO.

⁸⁸ Князев А, *Афганский Кризис и Безопасность Центральной Азии (XIX- начало XXI в.)*, Душанбе: Доншн, 2004, с. 430-433.
(Knyazev A, *Afghanskiy Krizis i Bezopasnost Tsentralnoy Azii (XIX- nachalo XXI v.)*, Dushanbe: Donish, 2004, p. 430-433.)

2. The absence of a real external military threat. Afghanistan, the most problematic of neighboring states, carries a number of threats and challenges to security, but does not involve fighting with the countries of the region, as the Taliban intended to do.⁸⁹

In the issues of the formation of a regional security system in Central Asia, there are a number of contradictions that prevent the completion of this process. On the one hand, it is the progressive development of the SCO and the CSTO which led to the strengthening of their influence on the states of the region and implementation of their geopolitical and geostrategic plans in Central Asia. On the other hand, it is the European and American presence in Afghanistan and various Western assistance programs in reforming the armed forces of the Central Asian states, that make it very difficult to create a unified security system for Russia and China with the Central Asian countries.

Russia's political leadership understands that preserving the security of Central Asian countries and stable Russian positions in their economies makes it possible not only to preserve Russia's security on its southern borders, but also to strengthen its political influence in Eurasia and in the world. However, the economic interests of Russian business and political interests of Russia in the Central Asian region do not always correspond to each other. A full political presence in the region requires certain material costs, which are often not available. The entry of the new independent republics of Central Asia into the world economic system as independent units has weakened and changed Russia's economic ties with them. Over the past 10 years, Russia's economic interests were mainly related either to the receipt of natural resources from Central Asian countries or to the sale of goods and services. However, at present, the cooperation with Central Asian countries helps the Russian Federation to strengthen its position on the international arena. Gradually, the geo-economic importance of interaction with the Central Asian states is being increased. This is due to economic growth in the partner countries, increase in their attractiveness for Russian investors and primarily in the energy and metallurgy sectors. It should be noted that cooperation with Central Asian

⁸⁹ Bondarets, *ibid.*, p. 95.

countries, especially with Kazakhstan, is an important factor in the development of the border regions of Russia. There are Russian projects which Moscow cannot rely only on bilateral cooperation in Central Asia. First of all, building transport communications, which not only connect the countries of the region with Russia, but also form an integral part of transport mega-projects of the South-North. Secondly, building oil and gas pipelines in the Central Asian states, which have strategic importance for the Russian Federation on a regional and global scale. Thirdly, it is cooperation in the field of hydropower that the transportation of electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Russia goes through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Fourth, the economic aspects of cooperation in combating drug trafficking and illicit drug trafficking which cannot be implemented only on a bilateral basis.⁹⁰

Interaction between Central Asian countries and Russia in the oil and gas complex is most effective. This is due to the mutual interest of the parties in the cooperation of the fuel and energy sector, and the need for Russia to maintain the existing levers of influence, especially to Europe, using the combined oil and gas potential. A feature of the oil and gas sector in Central Asia is a faster increase in reserves compared to production dynamics. Russia has the opposite picture. Therefore, the largest Russian companies such as Lukoil, Rosneft, and Gazprom are seeking to expand their assets in the region. Russia intends to become the main supplier of regional hydrocarbons to the European market and for solving this problem it needs to transport gas and oil from the fields of Central Asia mainly through its pipelines. Russia is also trying to limit the capabilities of other geopolitical players like U.S, EU and China in the construction of other pipeline routes. At the end of December 2007, a trilateral agreement was signed on the construction of the Caspian gas pipeline. The Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a protocol of intent in May at the same time as the agreement on expanding the capacities of the Central Asia-Center gas pipeline system, which was also signed by Uzbekistan. Both agreements were to be implemented simultaneously. In fact, Russia managed to beat its Western rivals at this stage. However, this cannot be said

⁹⁰ Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 93.

about rivalry with China in the construction of pipelines, and most importantly their filling with Central Asian gas. Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, as well as investors in the eastern part of the Caspian, benefit from the construction of the pipelines. China does not lose anything directly. But the main thing is that the strategic task is being solved and the prospects of the Trans-Caspian project are becoming completely vague.⁹¹

Russia, having solved the problem of gas Transcaspia, must solve a more serious task to win or minimize losses from competition with China. Since the agreements signed by the Central Asian countries with the two largest neighbors Russia and China, they have been left for years in the region isolated. This issue is more complicated with Kazakhstan. In the future, the Kazakh transit will be about 80-100 billion cubic meters of gas per year, the republic will become a crossroads where Turkmen and Uzbek gas will be turned either to Russia or to China. The risks of the Kazakh transit are still minimal, but it is impossible to exclude their sharp growth in the future.⁹²

Hydrocarbons are not Russia's only strategic interest in the natural wealth of Central Asia. Today, the Russian Federation has to re-establish cooperation for accessing the resources of the mountainous regions of the Pamir and Tien-Shan (gold, silver, uranium rare-earth metals), which in the 1990s were received by the USA, China, Japan and some other countries. Some Russian experts even consider that Russia now cares not so much for a foreign military presence in the region as for the prospect of an expensive and long struggle for control over the region's natural and industrial resources. First of all, it is important for Russia to cooperate in the field of uranium mining and processing. In Russia, the demand for uranium is projected to increase to 18,000 tons of raw materials by 2020. In Kazakhstan, there is a joint Russian-Kazakh-Kyrgyz enterprise "Zarechnoye" for uranium mining. Russia's investments in this project should amount to \$ 14.5 million. The final product is sent to Russia after processing. Participation in the development project of the existing silver deposit of Greater

⁹¹ Bondarets, *ibid.*, p. 97.

⁹² Sumarokov, *ibid.*, p. 53.

Kanimansur and in the development of the Mayhura tungsten deposit in Tajikistan is also significant interest for Russia. The revival of production at the Vostokredmet plant will allow Russia to diversify its sources of supply and reduce dependence on Kazakhstan and Ukraine.⁹³

The cotton market of Central Asia is very important for the development of the textile industry of Russia. Today, Russia faces the task of reorienting at least part of cotton exports from the region, especially from Uzbekistan. The decrease in purchases of Uzbek cotton was also facilitated by Russia's gradual withdrawal to alternative suppliers. A certain role in improving the current situation in the cotton trade can be played by the transition to direct supplies of cotton fiber to Russian enterprises. To solve this problem, Russian and Uzbek partners need to look for mutually acceptable schemes of cooperation without involving intermediaries like Western banks and traders. Russia has also comprehensive cooperation with Tajikistan in the cotton sector, from the production of long-fiber cotton to the production of textiles and garments. In this cooperation, the Tajik side is also interested in inviting Russian investors to take part in cotton production under contracts. Under the terms of such contracts, European firms operate in Tajikistan, supplying cotton to Russia through intermediaries, which naturally raises its price.

Cooperation in some industries with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan plays an important role. Russia is extremely interested in maintaining control over the Baikonur cosmodrome, which provides almost 100% of the launches of Russian TV satellites, 90% of launches under international cooperation programs and launch of the majority of satellites for retransmission as well as communications and navigation. In Baikonur, the Russian State Space Research and Production Center named after Khrunichev and the Kazakh state company Infrakos set up a joint venture to produce single-engine T-411 aircraft "Aist". There is a great potential in the field of aircraft building with Uzbekistan

⁹³ Бедрицкий А, *Россия и Международные Транспортные Коридоры*, Москва: Известия, 2002, с. 186.

(Bedritsky A, *Rossiya i Medzdunarodnie Transportnie Koridori*, Moscow: Izvestiya, 2002, p. 186.)

too. In February 2008, Russia and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the integration of the Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft Production Association into the United Aircraft Corporation.⁹⁴

The hydroelectric complex of Central Asia is very significant for the Russian Federation. Joint development of rich energy resources of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan can contribute not only to solving energy supply problems of partners, but also to accelerate the economic development of these two countries in Central Asia. Imports of cheap Tajik and Kyrgyz electricity are profitable for Russia, as it dilutes the price on the wholesale electricity market of adjacent regions of the Russian Federation. In fact, appropriate institutions and organizations are being formed to implement the mutual economic interests of Russia and the countries of Central Asia at both country and regional levels. The institutions of bilateral cooperation retain a special role. In the system of institutes an important place is occupied by national peculiarities of business conditions for non-residents. It is very important for Russia to achieve favorable conditions for Russian companies doing business in the countries of Central Asia.

Interests and opportunities of the Russian Federation in cooperation with the Central Asian countries are most likely gained within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In addition to SCO, Russia can also pursue its interests in Central Asia through the Eurasian Economic Community. In EurAsEC, Russia has the greatest economic potential. The countries of the Community members set themselves the tasks of coordinating economic policy and forming a customs union and common economic space. At the present stage, the formation of the Customs Union is being completed. The most prepared for its creation are Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia. To achieve these goals, it is expected to complete the registration of the full free trade regime, the formation of a common customs tariff and a unified system of measures for non-tariff regulation of foreign trade, ensuring freedom of capital flow and the formation of a common financial market and the phased creation of conditions for the transition to

⁹⁴ Bedritsky, *ibid.*, p. 191.

a single currency within the Community. For the EurAsEC countries, only partial compliance with these conditions is possible. This is due primarily to the difference in the economic potential and market capacity of countries. The most powerful in EurAsEC is Russia: its potential is more than 8 times greater than the total potential of the remaining members of the Community. An important feature of cooperation within the Community is the considerable transport costs of mutual relations due to the large territorial extent of the EurAsEC (more than 20.3 million square kilometers) and a high share of transit in mutual relations.

It is impossible to resolve most of Russia's major economic and social problems within the framework of the Community. But at least, this organization helps Russia to strengthen its position as an independent subject of international relations. In addition, the activities of the Eurasian Economic Community contribute to the preservation of strategic stability in Central Asia, in which Russia is vitally interested. The member countries of the Community are forced to toughen the regime of border and migration control in order to strengthen security. At the same time, the visa-free and soft customs regimes are the main instruments of this group's activities. In fact, further tightening of the regime of cross-border traffic will call into question the expediency of the existence of EurAsEC. The member states can resolve the problem of creating a functioning regional security system only within the framework of the CSTO.⁹⁵

The geo-economic importance of cooperation with the countries of the Community for Russia is due to economic growth in the partner countries and increase in their attractiveness for Russian investors, primarily in the energy and metallurgy sectors. The free trade regime in the Eurasian Economic Community will facilitate the arrival of Russian companies in the countries of the Community and the creation of transnational companies. But the high state share in the economies of Belarus and Uzbekistan and foreign companies in key sectors of Kazakhstan, as well as the weakness of the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan make this process more difficult. At the present

⁹⁵ Sumarokov, *ibid.*, p. 78.

and in the future the attraction of labor force from the countries of the Community is a great importance for Russia. However, the uncontrolled influx of migrants can create tensions in regional labor markets. That's why it is necessary to create a non-discriminatory, transparent and stable system of attracting foreign labor force and its social protection.

Thus, Russia has a fairly large range of interests in the Central Asian region from security issues to economic interests. After overcoming the systemic crisis, it begins to strengthen its position in the region. The most serious rival of the Russian Federation in the realization of its economic interests in Central Asia in the near future will be China. In military-strategic terms, Russia managed to ensure the security of its southern borders. However, today there are a number of threats to Russian security coming from Afghanistan. The countries of the region are transit countries of these threats, which forces Russia to seek ways to cooperate with them in the military and security spheres within the CSTO and the SCO. The interaction within the framework of the EurAsEC has significant potential for strengthening the Russian economic position in the CAR as well as economic cooperation with the states of the region.

II. 2. Geopolitical Interests of China in Central Asia

China at the present stage is the world second largest economy, claiming the role of future leader in Central Asia. At the beginning of the XXI century, the Chinese Communist Party adjusted the country's economic development strategy and it assumed the transformation of the PRC into a part of the global economy. In addition to strengthening economic influence in the world, it is necessary for PRC to expand its geopolitical space. Central Asia at the present stage seems to be one of the most promising directions for achieving these goals for Beijing. China cannot expand its space to India, because India itself has sufficient geo-economic, human and political development potential. The movement to Southeast Asia is limited because the states of the region suffer from an overabundance of population and minimum of natural resources and moreover their markets are already divided between Japan and Western

countries. In addition, Asian tigers which are located here themselves can compete with China in expanding economic influence and can withstand Chinese expansion.⁹⁶ So, Central Asia is the best field for expanding Chinese influence and the region also can be considered by PRC as a promising territory for the resettlement of part of the Chinese diaspora, especially in the sparsely populated Kazakhstan.

Chinese experts believe that China has passed the period of an outside observer in the region. Beijing carefully thought and planned its own Central Asian strategy. This strategy aims to actively participate in solving the problems of the region, relying on the SCO, developing relations with its countries, promoting stability and prosperity, as well as implementing its strategic interests, which are primarily focused on the development of the resources of Central Asia.⁹⁷

The main emphasis in relations between PRC and the states of Central Asia is on economic cooperation. China's economic interests in the region are multifaceted:

1. Expanding cooperation in the field of energy resources for ensuring energy security. China's dependence on energy imports has increased dramatically in recent years. And this trend in the coming decades will continue or even intensify due to the unprecedented scale of the processes of industrial modernization and urbanization of the country. China is one of the three largest energy consumers in the world (along with the United States and Japan). According to the forecasts of Chinese experts, in 2020 China's oil demand will be from 380 to 400 million tons per year. China is no less interested in gas supplies from the region. Its needs for natural gas imports by 2020 will reach 50-60 billion cubic meters per year. In the energy sector, China practices a centralized approach with elements of a market economy, and the Chinese government also believes that economic security is too important to address this issue solely by market

⁹⁶ Александр Х, “Тихая Экспансия”, <https://www.apn.ru/publications/article1896.htm> (10.07.2018)
(Alexander Kh, “Tikhaya Ekspansiya”)

⁹⁷ Ли Лифань Д, “Геополитические Интересы России, США и Китая в Центральной Азии”, *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, с. 164.
(Lee Lifan D, “Geopoliticheskie Interesi Rossii, SSHA i Kitay v Tsentralnoy Azii”, *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, p. 164.)

mechanisms. This is reflected in the aggressive policy of acquisitions conducted by Chinese national companies, as well as in the high diplomacy of Chinese government to solve its energy problems. The Chinese leadership attaches great importance to the diversification of sources of oil and gas imports. This is due to the fact that the country receives most of the oil resources from the Middle East and in the event of an unfavorable military and political situation in the Taiwan and Moluccas straits, China may be cut off from these energy flows. At the same time, the PRC does not intend to depend too much on the import of Russian gas and oil. China's economic and geopolitical approaches to Russian and Central Asian energy producers are very considerable. Beijing believes that access to Russian energy resources is less reliable than to hydrocarbons in Central Asia.⁹⁸ Although there are political and economic problems, which have a negative impact on all pipeline projects. Moreover, China's expansion of its Central Asian land routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to northern Iran is perceived as an intention to create a Chinese-Arabic highway with access to the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf. According to Beijing, transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asian countries is relatively safe, short and carried out by land pipelines. It is therefore not surprising that China has placed its stake on this region in its energy security policy aimed at ensuring the diversification of imports and eliminating the risk of excessive dependence on one supplier. More important for the PRC was the end of the military presence of the United States. This makes Central Asia an attractive source of energy in the eyes of Chinese strategists. While oil imports from Central Asian countries are only 5%. According to experts, the development of energy ties will be carried out primarily with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and in the future with Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is the most significant for China among the countries of Central Asia. Beijing has already invested significantly in the economy of Kazakhstan, declaring its intention to become the largest player in the development of the oil and gas sector. The resources acquired by China, and those that will be bought by them in the future, regardless of the ways of their delivery, will help the PRC diversify sources of

⁹⁸ Kuzmina, *ibid.*, p. 10.

imports and strengthen its economic and geopolitical positions in the region and in the world. Cooperation between China and Kazakhstan is not limited to exploration and production of hydrocarbons. Beijing and Astana also cooperate in expanding the pipeline system to provide communication between China and the Caspian Sea, which opens direct access to the PRC for the oil-bearing region. The pipeline, diagonally crossing Kazakhstan, is intended not only for the export of oil to the PRC, it must also ensure the transportation of natural gas to the internal regions of Kazakhstan.⁹⁹

Kazakhstan views China's pipelines as one of the guarantees that none of the powers will be able to exercise strategic control over its energy routes, as well as economic and political ties with Western, Mediterranean and Asian partners. However, despite the encouragement of Chinese investment, Kazakhstan continues to doubt the advisability of expanding the presence of the eastern neighbor in the country's economy. Some Kazakh politicians insist on caution towards China, primarily because of the practice of the Chinese to import their labor force. The Kazakh parliament has repeatedly expressed concern over China's excessive presence in the country's oil industry. So, in 2007, a member of the party "Hur Otan" Valery Kotovich made a statement in Parliament on the fact that China's aggressive policy of buying up assets poses a danger to the independence of the country. In response, the head of the Ministry of Energy announced his intention to block the Chinese acquisitions in the Kazakh energy sector in the future. At the same time, some analysts believe that the leadership of Kazakhstan is using the PRC as an instrument of influence in negotiations with Russia.

China has also shown interest in Turkmen gas. According to the 2006 agreements, Turkmenistan will supply annually up to 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China from the right bank of the Amu Darya (along the border with Uzbekistan). In addition, by 2009 a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to China had to be built, in accordance with the agreements signed in 2006-2007 with Turkmenistan and

⁹⁹ Parkansky, *ibid.*, p. 58.

Kazakhstan. China-Turkmen cooperation can develop in the field of liquefied gas production and oil refining. China has oil and gas interests in Uzbekistan. In 2006, a subsidiary of the China National Corporation for Exploration and Development of Oil and Gas began to operate in the republic, which will participate in geological exploration at Ustyurt, Bukhara-Khiva and Fergana.¹⁰⁰

The analysis shows the growing economic and strategic importance of the Celestial Empire in the new world system and the significant influence exerted by China's growth on diplomacy and world demand for energy resources. Over time, China's position on global energy markets and geopolitics will grow. Today, within the framework of the SCO, an energy club is being created, which can be the first step in this direction. However, the solution of intra-regional contradictions and problems is a very difficult task. The countries have separate different market behavior, political and economic systems. The energy markets in these countries are relatively undeveloped and are characterized by harsh barriers to imports. Cross-subsidies for energy prices and complex tax laws also do not contribute to the creation of a competitive energy market. The intention of the Central Asian countries to ensure their energy security through unification at the multilateral regional level is also quite controversial.

2. Another aspect of China's energy security is its interaction with the Central Asian countries in hydropower sector. It should be noted that the State Electricity Company of China is one of the world's top hundred largest corporations and annually allocates \$ 15-20 billion in investments in energy. Cooperation in this area is conducted with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Unlike Kazakhstan, China's cooperation in hydropower with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is developing quite well. Thus, the PRC allocated more than \$ 60 million for the construction of a high-voltage power transmission line South-North in Tajikistan. According to the Asia-Plus news agency, the Chinese company Sinohydro intends to build the Yavan hydroelectric power station in the Sughd region of the republic with an estimated cost of \$ 96 million and, possibly,

¹⁰⁰ Ахметова Г. Р, *Коррупция в Нефтедобывающих Странах*, Алматы: Кульжахан, 2015, с. 93 (Akhmetova G. R, *Korrupsiya v Neftodobivayushikh Stranakh*, Almaty: Kuldzakhan, 2015, p. 93.)

several more hydroelectric power stations on the Zerafshan River.¹⁰¹ The hydroelectric power station will become Tajikistan's property right after commissioning, and the funds invested in construction will be given the character of a loan that will be repaid in accordance with a separate agreement. In August 2006, China and the Kyrgyz Republic signed a protocol of intent in long-term cooperation in the energy sector. Projects that are of interest to Chinese investors include the Cascade of the Saryjaz and Kambarata hydroelectric power stations, the construction of a power transmission line in Kashgar, the construction of coal-fired power plants, and the reconstruction of the Uchkurgan hydroelectric power station and a thermal power plant in Bishkek.¹⁰²

3. Improving the structure of road, rail and air transport. Cooperation in the transport sphere will allow not only to lay new modern transport communications in Central Asia and internal China, but also to create the Eurasian land transport system. Great hopes for China are placed on the development of the Northern Corridor of “The Silk Road Economic Belt”, which passes through the territory of China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany. Actually, proposal for the creation of the “The Silk Road Economic Belt” was announced in September 2013 by the President of the PRC Xi Jinping during his official visit to Kazakhstan. This has caused increased attention both in China and abroad. The opinions of experts are divided; the majority believes that China will play a significant role in stimulating regional economic cooperation, while others express their concerns about the new strategy. In order to understand this, it is necessary to understand the true meaning of the concept of the “The Silk Road Economic Belt”. The project is an initiative to strengthen economic cooperation in Eurasia: it aims to unite the Eurasian space, including China, Central Asia, Eastern and Western Europe.¹⁰³ Such a model of cooperation will allow countries

¹⁰¹ Панфилова В, “В Ожидании Экспансии”, *Независимая Газета*, 15 январь 2007.
(Panfilova V, “V Odzidanii Ekspansii”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 15 yanvar 2007.)

¹⁰² Akhmetova, *ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁰³ Надежда Ивановна, “Экономический Пояс Шелкового Пути: Интересы и Противоречия Китая и России”, *Актуальные Проблемы Современных Международных Отношений*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2015, с. 173.

to maintain closer ties, deepen economic cooperation and expand space for development. Many Russian experts believe that the Chinese project is an attempt to force Russia out of the economic space of Central Asia. However, as the Chinese side claims, the Russian Federation has nothing to worry about. China does not intend to hinder the interests of Russia and put forward projects to the detriment of its interests and bilateral relations, which Beijing highly values. Another argument is that within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt project, cooperation in the field of mutual investments, strategic projects, construction of oil and gas pipelines, the Western China-Western Europe highway, etc will be expanded.¹⁰⁴ The present northern route and the proposed southern route are different, as the first passes through Astana and includes the Russian Federation as a transit country on the way to the EU.

The Chinese offered the Central Asian states an even more ambitious transit project with a length of 4,000 kilometers, from the Chinese border through Kazakhstan, and further to Turkmenistan and Iran. And it is planned to build the newest railway by European standards. According to official Chinese calculations, this highway will become the central part of the large transit corridor “East-West”. Cargoes from the port of Lianyungang on the east coast of China should reach Rotterdam in Holland within 13 days. However, it is necessary not only to build these roads and create a land transportation system, but also to implement a set of interstate measures to maximally reduce transport costs and transit tariffs.

4. Gradual expansion of cooperation in agriculture. According to forecasts, by 2030 China will need 650 million tons of food each year to feed 1.6 billion people. In this regard, Chinese investment could well be directed to the agricultural sector of the region, primarily to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.¹⁰⁵

(Nadejda Ivanova, “Ekonomicheskiy Poyas Shelkogo Puti: Interesi i Protivorechiya Kitaya i Rossii”, *Aktualnie Problemi Sovremennikh Medzunarodnikh Otmoshenii*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2015, p. 173.)

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 174-175.

¹⁰⁵ Сатпаев Д, “Китай на Проводе” *Независимая Газета*, 22 январь 2007.
(Satpayev D, “Kitay na Pravode”, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 yanvar 2007.)

5. Stimulate liberalization in trade and investment to improve customs structures and normalize their work. China seeks to reduce trade barriers and work out issues to improve the conditions that stimulate the development of cooperation between enterprises. China's trade with the countries of the region has insignificant volumes; its main flow is directed to Kazakhstan. The trade balance between China and the Central Asian states is characterized by a stable surplus in favor of the PRC. The Central Asian states supply raw materials and energy resources to the People's Republic of China. Although the trade between China and the Central Asian countries shows a fairly stable tendency to increase the volume of bilateral trade, the current structure of trade exchange remains the same as resources in exchange for finished goods. The economic benefits from such trade seem more profitable for China than for the countries of Central Asia.¹⁰⁶

Analysis of the statistics of the foreign trade balance of the Central Asian countries with China shows that the rates of trade between China and Kazakhstan are the highest, and this is due to the sale of energy resources. There is a danger in the transformation of the CAR into a raw material appendage of China. In this regard, the Central Asian countries, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, try to avoid full involvement of their economies in the Chinese orbit and pursue a multi-vector economic policy if possible. Within the framework of the SCO, China is carrying out systematic work to create a free trade zone and regional infrastructure that promote a stable growth of mutual trade in goods and services. The attitude of the Central Asian countries towards these proposals is ambiguous. Countries bordering China, especially Kazakhstan express concerns that, from the markets of these states, their own products will be driven out. Only Uzbekistan is more loyal in assessing the prospects for a free trade zone. It is also alarming for the increase in legal and illegal labor migration to neighboring countries, as well as the growing Chinese diaspora through the adoption of citizenship.

¹⁰⁶ Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 71.

Cooperation in security issues plays no less a role in Central Asia than economic cooperation. This is due to a number of reasons:

First, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region bordering Central Asia which its population is mainly Muslim Uyghurs, who have repeatedly stated their desire to create Uyghur state. Experts say that there are about 30 organizations associated with XUAR.¹⁰⁷ In this regard, Beijing is working with the governments of the Central Asian states to tighten policies on local Uyghurs and joint action against separatist rallies. There are agreements with Kyrgyzstan on the extradition of Uyghurs.¹⁰⁸

Secondly, Beijing seeks to maintain stability on its borders. The situation in the Central Asian states itself causes considerable fears for China. Political and economic upheavals, the arrival of pro-Western leaders or the predominance of narrow-clan interests of ruling elites raise China's fears in terms of stability in the region.

Afghanistan does not add stability. Despite the presence of the anti-Taliban coalition forces, Afghanistan is still not a peaceful state. The situation in the country is becoming tenser. The Taliban are once again strengthening their positions in the country, and their support from the Afghan population is growing. The troops of NATO and the United States have significant lost in the fight against Taliban. China believes that it is possible to settle the situation in Afghanistan only by economic methods, and proposes, together with Russia, within the SCO framework, to establish economic cooperation with Afghanistan. The proposals of the Chinese side are connected, both with attempts to strengthen their political and economic weight in Central Asia, and to prevent the U.S from carrying out the recently announced doctrine of Great Central Asia. The Chinese authorities attach a fight against the established routes of drug

¹⁰⁷ Куртов А, *Шанхайская Организация Сотрудничества, Россия в Азии. Проблемы Взаимодействия*, Москва: РИСИ, 2006, с. 282.

(Kurtov A, *Shankhayskaya Organizatsiya Sotrudnichestva, Rossiya i Aziya. Problemi Vzaimodeystviya*, Moscow: RISI, 2006, p. 282.)

¹⁰⁸ Хуашен Ч, *Китай, Центральная Азия и Шанхайская Организация Сотрудничества*, Москва: Московский Центр Карнеги, 2005, с. 32.

(Huasheng Z, *Kitay, Tsentralnaya Aziya i Shankhayskaya Organizatsiya Sotrudnichestva*, Moscow: Moskovskiy Tsentri Karnegp, 2005, p. 32.)

trafficking through the territory of Central Asian countries from Afghanistan. In China, drugs come along routes from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Despite tough measures against the drug business inside China itself, the authorities are unable to block drug trafficking from Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹

The activity of illegal religious extremist organizations in Central Asian countries also causes concern in Beijing. The problems of religious extremism in Central Asia force China to intensively cooperate with Russia and the states of the region, both bilaterally and within the framework of the SCO. However, in the framework of SCO, China interacts with the Central Asian states through RATS which was established in January 2004. RATS coordinates and carries out information and analytical support for special national departments of member states. The foreign ministers of the SCO member states signed the Agreement on the SCO RATS, which records data on all terrorist and extremist organizations and their members operating in the territory of the member countries.¹¹⁰

Thirdly, official Beijing assesses the military presence of the United States in Central Asia as a major threat to the country's security. China also negatively viewed the prospect of a long U.S military presence in the region. The Chinese side constantly works with the political elites of the Central Asian states to limit the scope and forms of their military cooperation with the United States. The leadership of the PRC realizes that it has insufficient forces to fully confront the United States in Central Asia and prefers to establish a regional security system within the SCO. China also insists that security issues in the region, including those related to Afghanistan can be resolved within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization without the participation of the U.S and NATO member states that are not part of Central Asia. Some Chinese analysts generally support a significant expansion of the SCO's area of responsibility and they

¹⁰⁹ Huasheng, *ibid.*, p. 34.

¹¹⁰ Sergey K, "Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", <http://eng.sectsco.org/structure/> (22. 09. 2018)

believe that the SCO should take responsibility for stability not only in Afghanistan, but also in South Asia and the Caucasus.¹¹¹

Russia and China are coincided in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Weakening the positions of any of them within the Organization will inevitably lead to the individual leadership of the other. The SCO differs from other Asian structures because it does not only include economic cooperation issues but also geopolitical goals which were declared in its documents. The main collision is that the two regional leaders Russia and China, according to the logic of development, are competitors. Although the language of diplomacy does not allow them to talk openly about this rivalry, but it's very clear that there is a struggle between them for Central Asia and especially for its energy and territorial resources. The SCO turned out to be not just an organization that is called upon to stabilize the situation in the region and limit the influence of the United States, but also some kind of restraining structure so that neither Russia nor China become sole monopolists in the political and economic markets of the region. The SCO turned out to be a mutual deterrence structure for the two leaders. For China, the SCO is a tool of access to cheap energy resources without which it simply cannot enter a new round of the race for world leadership. It is important for Beijing to receive the support of the Central Asian countries in all political and economic initiatives. On the other hand, deepening relations with the Central Asian states, Beijing creates a competition between them for increasing trade with China, large-scale loans and integration into the vast and promising trade, economic and political space of Asia. The format of the SCO also helps Russia to solve some strategic problems like stabilizing cooperation with the countries of Central Asia, to limit here the position of the United States and coordinate its actions with China. It acquires an additional lever of soft restriction of China's penetration into Central Asia, both military and, as far as possible, economic.¹¹²

¹¹¹ Чжао Х, “ШОС и Соотношение Великих Держав на Фоне Новой Ситуации в Регионе ЦА”, *Analitic*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003, с. 3.
(Zhao H, “ShOS i Sootnoshenie Velikikh Derzhav na Fone Novoy Situatsii v Regione TsA”, *Analitic*, Vol. 14, No.1, 2003, p. 3.)

¹¹² Gumerov, *ibid.*, p. 78-79.

Since the SCO is not going to become a counterargument of NATO in the region, on this background it is necessary to expand forms of mutual cooperation, leading them beyond the fight against terrorism and switching to more creative methods. Of course, the SCO minimizes the development of U.S influence in Central Asia, but does not eliminate it, because the region is also being used by the U.S to support the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan (directly or indirectly).

Thus, China's interests in Central Asia are not few. One of the main directions of Chinese diplomacy is the involvement of Central Asian states in its economic orbit. In order to preserve and develop the national economy, Beijing is making considerable efforts to ensure its access to the region's energy resources. Also security issues like ensuring stability in the border areas, combating terrorism, separatism, extremism and counteraction to drug trafficking from Afghanistan are very important for China.¹¹³

II. 3. Strategy of the European Union in Central Asia

One of the main contenders in the Central Asian region is the European Union. The document regulating relations between the European Union and Central Asia was the Strategy for a New Partnership. Especially, Germany and France showed a special interest in cooperation. Nevertheless, it can be diagnosed that the increase in the influence of these states in the region is not yet great. Undoubtedly, the European direction of foreign trade and EU investments are priorities for Central Asia. However, the intentions and actions of the European states do not significantly affect their strategic interests and did not have a significant impact on interstate relations in Central Asia and the socio-political development of the countries of the region. In spite of this, from the whole Western world EU is most closely connected with Central Asia, which is interested in expanding its influence in the region. At the same time, it is important to note that rapprochement is important not only for the European Union, but also for the Central Asian countries themselves. Certain communication isolation is observed in the Central Asian region, and the lack of direct access to the leading transport arteries is a

¹¹³ Kurtov, *ibid.*, p. 286.

source of economic vulnerability.¹¹⁴ Therefore, the European Union attaches great importance to the transformational processes taking place in the region. The new situation in Central Asia, as well as the changes in the world as a whole, in fact, pushed the European Union to work out a common course for the countries of the region, taking into account the geopolitical interests of other countries, in particular Russia, the United States, China, Iran and India.

The development of a concrete effective policy towards Central Asia began at the end of 2006, when Germany, which was to chair the European Union in the first half of 2007, called Central Asia one of its priorities. As a result, a strategy was formulated in which five priority areas of work in the region were identified: security, economic development with investment and trade, environmental protection, respect for human rights, and the development of a qualified system of education. In order to implement the declared program outlined in the Strategy, from 2007 to 2013 the financial support of Central Asian countries was doubled. The investment flow and grant assistance for the implementation of these areas in the five countries of the region amounted to 750 million Euros. The funds were provided on the basis of bilateral programs of cooperation with EU member states and through international financial institutions. At the same time, special attention was paid to the creation of an energy market. Strategic interest in the region from the European Union was fueled by complications with the supply of Russian gas to Europe. In this regard, the task was set to expand access to energy resources in various parts of the world and the countries of the Central Asian region were named among the priorities.¹¹⁵

The adoption of the new Strategy had very important consequences for the development of relations between the European Union and Central Asia. For the first

¹¹⁴ Syglybayeva, *ibid.*, p. 53.

¹¹⁵ Лапенко М. В., *Стратегия Европейского Союза в Центральной Азии*, Неопубликованная Кандидатская Диссертация, Саратов: Саратовский Национальный Исследовательский Государственный Университет Имени Н. Г. Чернышевского, 2016, с. 5-6.
(Lapenko M. V., *Strategiya Evropeyskogo Soyuza v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Neopublikovannaya Kandidatskaya Dissertatsiya, Saratov: Saratovskiy Natsionalniy Issledovatel'skiy Gosudarstvenniy Universitet Imeni N. G. Chernishevskogo, 2016, p. 5-6.)

time this document provided a legal platform for building long-term partnerships. Until 2007, Central Asia did not appear on the foreign policy guidelines of the EU countries. The only document that linked them was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in which there was no structured system of cooperation. In the economic sphere, the adoption of this document has contributed to the expansion of regional infrastructure in the transport, energy and trade sectors which should contribute to better utilization of the economic potential of Central Asia. Developing cooperation with the Central Asian countries, European Union will receive what its Energy Strategy aims at improving energy supply and diversifying its sources of supply, which makes it less dependent on a narrow range of suppliers.¹¹⁶

The first stage of the interaction of the European Union with the countries of the Central Asian region (1992-1997) is characterized by the intensification of the political actions of the European Union, which have as their obvious goal of the rapprochement of political and economic interests. However, the question remains open as far as the policy in the region is self-sufficient, the goals of the Central Asian policy often turned out to be hierarchically subordinate to the goals of Russian EU policy. Even alternative transport projects, which are the main subject of disagreements with Russia, were often used as an instrument in dealing with it. The regulatory framework that provides the basis for cooperation with Central Asia was established by the founding documents of the Treaty on the European Union of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Since 1992, with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the key direction of the development of the European Union has been the development of a joint foreign policy and the concept of ensuring security. The basis for foreign policy cooperation of the countries descending to the Union was the principle of expanded cooperation between states, rather than integration. The expansion of the spectrum of EU interests in Central Asia was associated with the strengthening of the integration factor. The implementation of a common energy policy in the region has led to a stable interest of the European Union in

¹¹⁶ Yunusov Khaydarali, "Partnership and Cooperation Agreements of the European Union with Central Asian Countries", *Studii Europene*, Vol. 1, No. 9, 2014, p. 4-7.

the energy resources of the countries of Central Asia. It is therefore quite natural that the European Union undertook the first initiatives towards cooperation in the energy sector with the countries of Central Asia, based on an assessment of the potential of the countries of the region in the production, consumption and export of hydrocarbon resources. In 1997-2001 in the policy of the European Union towards the Central Asian region there have been significant changes. This was due to the establishment of a single and significant goal of maintaining regional cooperative mechanisms in the region. The European Union was beginning to establish contacts with individual states. The closest ties were established with Uzbekistan, as it was the country that assumed the security function in Central Asia. Economic cooperation was expressed in the development of commodity exchange, but until the end of 2001, its investment component did not develop.¹¹⁷

The EU Strategy for Central Asia for 2002-2006 was adopted in 2002.¹¹⁸ It was about the importance of ensuring security and conflict resolution, removing sources of political and social instability, improving the investment climate in the Central Asian countries and developing education according to European standards. In February 2006, the European side prepared proposals for the draft of the new Strategy for 2007-2013. The active role of Berlin in the creation of the new Strategy was explained by many factors. In 2000, the leading German institute for foreign policy, the German Foreign Policy Society developed for its government the concept of the so called Stabilization Pact for the Caspian Sea. So, summing up, let's say that the Strategy took into account the main proposals of the Central Asian countries. But there were negative moments, when the countries of Asia in the process of rapprochement with Europe wanted to acquire new opportunities. The EU helped the Central Asian countries to use these opportunities less than they could, and the mutual benefit that Europe and Central Asia

¹¹⁷ Lapenko, *ibid.*, p. 15.

¹¹⁸ Çiğdem Şahin, Turgay Düğen, "The European Union In Central Asia: A One-Dimensional Strateg", *MANAS Journal of Social Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2015, p. 53.

could derive from the development of transcontinental trade was not mentioned in the EU's strategic documents of 2002-2006 and 2007-2013.

Unlike the planning period 2007-2013 in the planning period 2014-2020, the global portfolio of bilateral and regional cooperation between the countries of the European Union and Central Asia has increased. Expansion of the global portfolio will contribute to the rational and effective implementation of multi-year programs for the Central Asian region. In 2015, a new program of cooperation with the countries of Central Asia for 2014-2020 was approved, providing for an increase in aid by 1.5 times.¹¹⁹ Two programs which were developed within the framework of the updated Strategy involve the introduction of mechanisms for joint actions aimed at managing water and other environmental resources in the area.¹²⁰

The updated EU Strategy for Central Asia is the foundation upon which future cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian partners is built. The strategy reflects areas of cooperation of mutual interest and is supported by impressive multi-year demonstration programs for the region and for each country whose regional budget reached 1.068 billion Euros for the current 7-year planning period. The new EU strategy is adopted not just as a document, as a paper, but as a strong sign of political investments by all the EU member states and all EU institutions, taking into account the fact that they want to invest in strategic partnership and strategic relations with Central Asia and they have a clear vision of what is happening in this part of the world. Nevertheless, the EU policy pursues its own obvious goals. The desire of the West to establish control over the rich gas resources is an alternative to Russia which is the supplier of hydrocarbons to the European continent.

Over the years of the existence of independent Central Asian countries, the policy of the European Union towards the region has been changed many times. In total, there are three stages in the development of sustainable partnership between regions. At the

¹¹⁹ Şahin, *ibid.*, p. 58.

¹²⁰ Lapenko, *ibid.*, p. 34.

first stage, the EU got acquainted with the countries of Central Asia. During this period, Europe's own problems did not allow it to show special interest in the new subject of world politics. At the second stage, the stable relations began to develop between the European Union and Central Asia, since 1997. One of the reasons for the rapprochement was the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which meant the spreading of terrorist and extremist groups and groupings on its territory and the worsening of the situation with the drug trade and the arms trade. The last stage, which began in 2013, the partnership relations between the European Union and Central Asia are starting to develop.¹²¹

II. 4. Strategy of Iran in Central Asia

Researchers characterize Iran's policy in Central Asian region as cautious, pragmatic and moderate. The course of this actor is evaluated through the prism of its purpose to transform the balance of power in space from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia in such a way that Iran would occupy the status of a strategic center in the region. American experts also highlight other Iranian interests in Central Asia like preservation of peace and stability, to be an obstacle to the penetration of Western companies into the energy-resource sector, development of bilateral economic relations, and preservation of independence of the Central Asian states from Russia and creation of transport routes through Iranian territory. Iran uses to overcome international isolation through expansion of influence in the Islamic world, increasing economic power and becoming a key figure in the international energy trade.¹²²

In addition to the Middle East, Iran is also deeply interested in Central Asia. Especially, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Iran tried to gain influence in Central Asia by supporting Shiite communities and parties. Such actions aroused dissatisfaction

¹²¹ Ryurikov, *ibid.*, p. 87.

¹²² Дорофеев Д. В, “Центральная Азия В Интерессах Ирана, Китая, России И Турции”, <file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Documents/%20Iran%20in%20Central%20AsiaDorofeev.pdf> (24. 08. 2018)
(Dorofeev D. V, “Tsentralnaya Aziya v Interesakh Irana, Kitaya. Rossii i Turtsii”.)

among the elite of Uzbekistan, who believed that Iran has no right to interfere in the affairs of the countries of Central Asia. Uzbekistan sought to support Uzbek communities, to become a regional security guarantor in Central Asia and to earn a reputation as a fighter against Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, in the region, the interests of the two countries collided, which did not always contradict each other. Despite mutual distrust, Iran and Uzbekistan had to join forces to help Tajikistan and resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. It was after the coming of the Taliban to power in 1996, which led to increased anxiety in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, whose people were unhappy with the low standard of living. Turkmenistan, which nevertheless tried to maintain neutrality in all matters, and Uzbekistan, which was one of the strongest and most influential countries in the region also faced the same problem. Also, the two countries brought closer cooperation in the field of transport communications, from which they were not ready to refuse even to please the allies (Russia and the United States). Plans for the construction of a transport main from Mashhad to Tashkent through the territory of Afghanistan promised benefits to both sides, but the situation in Afghanistan significantly complicated the implementation of these plans. Nevertheless, there could be no friendship between the countries. Iran has no Uzbek population, but there millions of Tajik inhabitants in Uzbekistan whose roots is Iranian. There were also many politicians in Uzbekistan who had Iranian roots. The political elite of Iran knew this and tried to use it for their own purposes. But any attempts by Iran to establish ties with the Tajiks were suppressed by the Uzbek authorities, and officials of Iranian origin also did not want to act in the interests of Iran because of their loyalty to their country.¹²³

Speaking about Kazakh-Iranian relations, it should be noted that Kazakhstan became the richest country in the region and consequently, both Iran and Kazakhstan are interested in developing trade to sell their products and solving problems related to Caspian Sea. At the moment, all modes of transport are operating between both countries. Iran and Kazakhstan are participating in joint conferences and relations between countries are becoming increasingly warm. Although the bilateral relations

¹²³ Bogaturov, *ibid.*, p. 36-41.

between Iran and Kyrgyzstan are not very dynamic, however, they are developing fairly smoothly, right after the establishment of diplomatic relations between them on May 10, 1992. Iran and Kyrgyzstan are also considering the construction of a railway along the route China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran in the framework of cooperation in transport, with the subsequent inclusion of Russia and Uzbekistan in it. Positive changes in the relations between Tehran and Bishkek have become more noticeable in recent years, although the potential of bilateral cooperation has not yet been fully realized. There are also allegations that Iran and Kyrgyzstan intend to raise the level of the annual volume of bilateral trade to 5 billion U.S dollars.¹²⁴

Considering the relationship between Iran and Turkmenistan, it should be noted that their main feature is that the mutual cooperation of the two countries is conditioned by the absence of another choice and both are doomed to have active bilateral relations. In this regard, such a feature of Turkmenistan's international status, as the declaration of permanent neutrality as the basis of its foreign policy, is of considerable interest to Iran. This pragmatic approach to determining the status of Turkmenistan allowed its political leadership to successfully maneuver between the poles of the power of the modern world, without fearing to irritate a strong and authoritative America. The neutrality declared by Turkmenistan acts as a deterrent that allows it to distance itself from participation in international military and political block structures, which is very important for Iran.¹²⁵

Regarding Tajik-Iranian relations it is difficult to predict that activation of contacts between Tajikistan and Iran is a harbinger of major changes on the geopolitical map of the region. However, the Tajik-Iranian relations cannot remain unclear because, there are a number of factors that revise these relations. Firstly, the historical ties of the Tajik-

¹²⁴ Холмуродова З. И, *Взаимоотношения Ирана и Стран Центральной Азии: Состояние и Перспективы*, Душанбе: Дурахш, 2018, с.15.
(Kholmurodova Z. I, *Vzaimootnosheniya Irana i Stran Tsentralnoy Azii: Sostoynie i Perspektivi*, Dushanbe: Durakhsh, 2018, p. 15.)

¹²⁵ <http://csef.ru/ru/politica-i-geopolitica/484/regionalnaya-politika-irana-na-postsovetskom-prostranstve-4207> (23. 08. 2018)

Persian, although not the most ideal, but pushing to improve relations. Secondly, the geographical location obliges to coordinate actions to ensure regional security. Also, Tajikistan can become a certain channel for dialogue with the Central Asian states, and so on for Iran.¹²⁶

Ethno cultural affinity of Iranians with the population of Tajikistan, the popularity of the anti-American positions of Iran in the Muslim world and the geographically close proximity of Iran to the region is attributed to positively influencing factors for the realization of Iranian interests. However, there are also many obstacles to the realization of Iranian interests like international isolation restraining the development of Iranian nuclear power, the limited cultural and religious influence of Iran on the ethnos of Central Asia due to the presence of religious and ethnic distance with them, the interests of the U.S, PRC and Russia in containing this actor, a high degree of sensitivity of the Iranian leadership to ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, Iran's dependence on Russia in the some military and political issues as well as unpopularity in the Central Asian countries of the Iranian species of radical Islam. The contact of Iran with the region's space along the border with Turkmenistan is not also a sufficient prerequisite for increasing its influence. In general, analysts interpret the limited Iranian opportunities to influence the balance of power in Central Asia.

II. 5. Turkish Interests in Central Asia

In the early 1990s, post-Soviet Central Asia became an arena for the active work of Turkish diplomacy. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, traditionally perceived by the Turkish military and political elite as one of the main threats to Turkey's security, which has been weakened and separated from Turkish borders by the countries of the Transcaucasia and deprived of most of the Black Sea coast. At the same time, however, there was a risk of erosion of Turkey's strategic importance for the U.S and its role within the NATO bloc, which could adversely affect the U.S-Turkish alliance and the prospects for the country's accession to the EU, which remained the

¹²⁶ Bogaturov, *ibid.*, p. 17.

priority areas of Turkey's foreign policy. In developing close ties with the new independent states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Ankara saw a chance to consolidate the strategic consequences of the disintegration of the USSR favorable for Turkey, limiting Russia's ability to once again strengthen on adjacent borders, preventing the spread of Iranian influence in these regions and emphasizing Turkey's importance for the U.S and leading Western-European countries.¹²⁷

The establishment of relations between Turkey and the Central Asian countries was facilitated by its undoubted economic achievements, ethnic kinship and linguistic closeness between the Turks and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and the attractive image of the Turkish model of development - a state with a Muslim population and a strong Islamic tradition that created a secular political system and elements of Western democracy. Moral and political support of Ankara's desire to establish close ties with the countries of Central Asia was rendered in late 1991-1992. The United States, Britain and the NATO leadership, concerned about the prospect of Iran's political and ideological expansion in the region. Taking advantage of the disorganization of Russian foreign policy, the Turkish leadership made an attempt to convert these advantages not only into accelerated development of political, economic and cultural interaction with Central Asian countries, but also to gain regional leadership. The main regional interests of Turkey in Central Asia are reduced by specialists to maintaining stability and developing democracy, liberalization of economies, expansion of the Turkish presence reducing the influence of Iran and Russia, using the geo-strategic location advantages to increase alternative energy sources and being corridor country for transportation of energy resources to world markets through Turkey.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Троицкий Е. Ф, “Политика Турции в Центральной Азии (1992-2000 гг.)”, *Вестник Томского Государственного Университета*, Vol. 21, No. 328, 2009, с. 84-88.
(Troitsky E. F, “Politika Turtsii v Tsentralnoy Azii (1992-2000gg.)”, *Vestnik Tomskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta*, Vol. 21, No. 328, 2009, p. 84-88).

¹²⁸ Budak T, “Söylemler ve Eylemler Bağlamında: Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikası”, *Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, BİLGESAM Analiz/Orta Asya*, Rapor No: 1345, Eylül 2015.

However, realizing its incapability of replacing Russia in the region, Turkey has tried to maintain its existence through soft power policy which created areas of economic cooperation for reconstruction and development of the Central Asian countries. The fact that after the collapse of the USSR, all Turkic countries began to search for their own identity pushed them towards Turkey, which at that time was considered more developed. The key departments and institutions of Turkey implementing and coordinating activities in the field of “soft power” are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Tourism and Culture, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), the Foundation Yunus Emre etc. TIKA was founded in 1992 as a technical assistance agency under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose of the establishment of TIKA and other institutions was to carry out economic, social and cultural activities in the Turkish speaking countries as well as to help the developing countries.¹²⁹ Soon, Turkey opened cultural centers in the countries of the region and implemented educational programs for students allowing them to study at universities in Turkey.

The creation of joint educational institutions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as a part of “soft power” policy has become a successful practice. In 1991, the International Kazakh-Turkish University named after Khoja Akhmet Yassawi was established in the city of Turkistan (in Kazakhstan). Currently, about 20 thousand undergraduate and graduate students from Kazakhstan, Turkey, and other countries of the region are studying at 11 faculties of the university. The beginning of relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan can be considered the visit of N. Nazarbayev to Turkey in September 1991 (after the collapse of the USSR), which resulted in Turkey’s recognition of this state. With the disappearance of the iron curtain, socio-cultural, economic and political ties between the two countries developed at a rapid pace. Over the past 25 years, the volume of exports between Kazakhstan and Turkey has increased 39 times, and the volume of

¹²⁹ Emrah Denizhan, Türkiye’nin Kafkasya ve Orta Asya Politikası ve TIKA, Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, p. 21.

imports - 110 times. Among the countries investing in the economy of Kazakhstan, Turkey takes the 4th place in non-energy sectors.¹³⁰

Among the countries of Central Asia the second largest object of “Turkish soft power” is Kyrgyzstan (after Kazakhstan). In March 1992, an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of education, culture and science was concluded between the countries. The Turkish Language and Literature Department at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek State University, the Turkish Cultural Center at the Naryn State University, and the Bishkek Cultural Center were opened as part of the “Turkology” (study of Turkic Language) project. In 1995, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University was established in Bishkek, where students from 16 countries are studying. The university implements 32 areas of study bachelors, 12 areas for graduates and the university carries out educational activities free of charge.¹³¹ From 2004 to the present, Turkey has provided and continues to provide material support to Kyrgyzstan in the amount of about \$ 850 million in the framework of TIKA activities.

As for Turkmen-Turkish relations, due to social and cultural affinity, Turkey became the first state to open its embassy in Ashgabat after the collapse of the USSR. After establishing diplomatic relations, the economic and cultural dialogue between the two countries continued. In recent years, Turkish construction companies have implemented the largest number of projects in Turkmenistan. The trade turnover between the two countries is more than \$ 4 billion. As for Uzbek-Turkish relations, Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of Uzbekistan and in 1992 established diplomatic relations with it. After the collapse of the USSR, relations between states began to develop rapidly. Former president of Uzbekistan I. Karimov made more than 10 official visits to Turkey. However, the fact that in the mid-90s Turkey sought to take the place of the “elder brother” of the Turkic states began to cause

¹³⁰ Troitsky, *ibid.*, p. 89.

¹³¹ Сафонкина Елизавета Андреевна, “Турция как Новый Актор Политики Мягкой Силы”, *Вестник Международных Организаций*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014, с. 154.
(SafonkinaElizavetaAndreevna, “Turtsiya kak Noviy Aktor Politiki Myagkoy Sili”, *Vestnik Medzdunarodnikh Organizatsii*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2014, p. 154.)

some kind of antipathy towards Turkey in the region and as a result, relations with Uzbekistan deteriorated sharply.¹³² In 2017, the new president of Uzbekistan made the first state visit to Turkey in 20 years. After the meeting of the two leaders, 26 agreements were signed in the fields of economy, education, culture, health, banking and the military industry. Two leaders set the goal to increase trade turnover between the two countries to \$ 10 billion over 10 years. Today it is \$ 1.5 billion.¹³³

Turkey recognized Tajikistan in 1991 and the following year diplomatic relations were established between the countries. The fact that Tajikistan is ethnically closer to Iran than Turkey did not prevent it from establishing very good relations with Ankara. At the end of the 20th century, relations between countries could not develop due to the civil war in Tajikistan, at the same level as with other countries of Central Asia. However, at the moment, trade turnover between the countries is more than \$ 600 million, and Turkey has so far provided material assistance to Tajikistan in the amount of about \$ 90 million, 60% of which is carried out as part of TIKА activities.¹³⁴

¹³² Аркадий Дубнов, “Как Центральная Азия реагирует на конфликт России и Турции”, <https://carnegie.ru/commentary/62182> (8. 11. 2018)

(ArkadiyDubnov, “KakTsentralnayaAziyareagiruetnaKonfliktRossiiiTurtsii”,

¹³³ <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/86085/ozbekistan-orta-asyada-her-acidan-stratejik-bir-ulke.html> (8. 11. 2018)

¹³⁴ Safonkina, *ibid.*, p. 161.

PART THREE

U.S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

The disintegration of the USSR was one of the main events of the late 20th century, on the shrapnel of which there appeared many new independent states scattered across different corners and regions of the Eurasian continent and Tajikistan was one of these states. At the initial stage of the existence of the Republic of Tajikistan U.S interests in the country differed from other Central Asian countries. The main goal of U.S at that period was to preserve the statehood of Tajikistan. Therefore, U.S assistance to the process of peaceful construction and accepting the role of the Russian Federation and Iran as the main mediators in this matter proceeded from the logic that mandatory initial stability in Tajikistan should have laid the foundation for active U.S policy in the Tajik state.

III. 1. The Evolution of Bilateral Interaction in American-Tajik Relations Prior to September 11, 2001

International activities of the Republic of Tajikistan began on September 9, 1991 after the Declaration of State Independence of the Republic of Tajikistan, which laid the foundations of her foreign policy. The country was recognized by more than 40 states of the world.¹³⁵ At the same time, the country was in an internal political crisis, which subsequently passed into a civil confrontation that lasted from 1992 to 1998.¹³⁶ The senseless civil war that sowed chaos in society had a serious impact on the internal policy of the Republic of Tajikistan, which in turn prevented the definition of the fundamental foundations of the country's foreign policy. The systemic crisis of

¹³⁵ Шарипова Дж. *Дипломатия Таджикистана*, Душанбе: МИД РТ, 1994, с. 47.
(Sharipova J. *Diplomatiya Tajikistana*, Dushanbe: MID RT, 1994, p. 47.)

¹³⁶ Muriel Atkin, "Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan" in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot(eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and Caucasus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 290.

statehood, created a problem in domestic politics and the government was faced with the task of explaining the influence of major powers in Tajik local politics.¹³⁷

Diplomatic relations with the United States were very important for new Tajikistan. According to the official position of Washington, voiced after the independence of Tajikistan, the administration is interested in a stable and peaceful Tajikistan, which must maintain its newly acquired territorial integrity.¹³⁸

With the strengthening of statehood and for the purpose of diversifying foreign policy activities, the policy of Tajikistan on the international arena began to take on first shape. To impart liberal policies to foreign policy, an important criterion was the development of political relations with western countries, primarily with the United States of America.¹³⁹ Given the difficult circumstances that appeared before the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan, the United States recognized that from all Central Asian countries the official Dushanbe was less prepared to strengthen its independence by its own forces.¹⁴⁰ According to the Tajik political scientist R. Abdullo, “Tajikistan attached importance to relations with the United States as much as it did to cooperation with Russia and China, and from the first days of independence, Dushanbe regards the development of strong relations with the United States as its strategic task, as a guarantee of the preservation of newly acquired sovereignty, which in turn, was and remains the most important condition for ensuring the ethnic security of the Tajiks (coupled with the strengthening of statehood)”.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Лев Консевич, *Хронология Восточных Стран и Центральной Азии*, Москва: Восточная Литература, 2011, с. 9.
(Lev Konsevich, *Khronologiya Vostochnikh Stran i Tsentralnoy Azii*, Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2011, p. 9.)

¹³⁸ Евгений Тройский, *Политика США по Отношению Центральной Азии*, Томск: Наука, 2003, с. 27.

(Evgeny Troyskiy, *Politika SShA po Otnosheniyu Tsentralnoy Azii*, Tomsk: Nauka, 2003, p. 27.)

¹³⁹ Troyskiy, *ibid.*, p. 28.

¹⁴⁰ Lev Konsevich, *ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁴¹ Абдулло Р, “Политика США в Таджикистане: от признания независимости к партнерству”, *Центральная Азия и Кавказ*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2007, с. 82
(Abdullo R, “Politika SShA v Tajikistane: ot priznaniya nezavisimosti k partnyorstvu”, *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 2007, p. 82).

Diplomatic relations between the U.S and Tajikistan were established on February 14, 1992. The U.S Embassy in the Republic of Tajikistan was opened in March of the same year, thereby Washington became the second after Tehran, appointing an extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador in Tajikistan. The visit to Dushanbe by U.S Secretary of State J. Baker, held in February 1992, was crucial for the development of Tajik-American relations. This visit took place against the backdrop of the internal political crisis in the republic and, under these conditions Tajikistan's future largely depended on the position of the United States as the world's only superpower.¹⁴² The United States proceeding on its own national interests supported the Republic of Tajikistan as a Tajik state.¹⁴³

The U.S has several objectives in Tajikistan and some of these objectives include but limited to the following:

Primarily, at the official and expert level, determining the process that resulted in the Republic of Tajikistan gaining its independence and sovereignty are in the United States' regional and global interest. This shows that the United States' interest in the Central Asian region was a key factor that determined the Tajikistan's independence, development and proclamation of the U.S official position with regard to the Republic of Tajikistan as a new independent country in Central Asia.¹⁴⁴

Additionally, the U.S gave assistance to measures that ensure domestic political stability in the Republic of Tajikistan. These assistance were mediated through external actor. Simply put, in order to prevent the outbreak of civil war for a long time, the U.S did not oppose the process of political dialogue of the warring parties with a multilateral format.

¹⁴² Михаил Алексеевич Конаровский, *Центральная Азия: Борьба С Терроризмом*, Москва: Издательство Наука, 2007, с. 75.
(Mikhail Alekseevich Konarovsky, *Tsentralnaya Aziya: Borba S Terorizmom* , Moscow: Izdatelstvo Nauka, 2007, p.75.)

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹⁴⁴ www.dissercat.com/.../evolyutsiya-politiki-ssha-v-otnoshenii (12. 04. 2017)

The U.S was not only interested at political stability in Tajikistan but also in economic security. Given that there was little or no bilateral interaction, as such, Washington's goal was to identify and develop, as far as possible, practical steps in the “polico-economical security” field, which meet the national interests of the United States.¹⁴⁵

In addition, the United States has special interest in implementing policies and steps aimed at establishing a secular form of government and preventing the entry of religious fundamentalists into power in the Republic of Tajikistan. The stable and secular development of all the countries of Central Asia during the post-Soviet existence was obviously in the interests of the United States, which could not allow the penetration of extremism and radicalism into the countries of the region through unstable Afghanistan.

A very smart way of preventing religious fundamentalism was to Promote democratic change in Tajikistan on the basis of the 1992 constitution on support for freedom. In this regard, the possibility of opening the first American NGOs on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan was decided.

Washington was also interested in the establishment of mechanisms for launching and implementing the first economic projects and financial assistance to Tajikistan through the American Agency for International Development. Thus, the U.S also actively participated in the establishment of military contacts both through direct assistance to the armed forces of the Republic of Tajikistan and through the program of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) – “Partnership for Peace”. Perhaps one of Washington’s interests was non-admission of the strategic consolidation of the external actor in the foreign and domestic policy of the Republic of Tajikistan.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Хуршед Сафаров, *Постсоветская Центральная Азия*, Худжанд: Пионерский Издательский Центр, 2002, с. 18.
(Khurshed Safarov, *Postsovetskaya Tsentralnaya Aziya*, Khujand: Pionerskiy Izdatelskiy Tsentr, 2002, p. 18.)

¹⁴⁶ Сиявуш Раджабов, *Центральноазиатская история*, Душанбе: Дурахандагон, 2008, с. 32.

The post-conflict stage of Tajikistan's life activity (since 1997) launched an attempt to introduce a qualitatively new format of U.S-Tajikistan relations. The political direction and dialogue with the United States for the Republic of Tajikistan played a significant role at that time.¹⁴⁷ Since 1997, the constant meetings of high-ranking officials of the U.S administration with the leadership of Tajikistan had to clarify the significance of this country for Washington and identify those areas in which U.S interests can be affected to a greater extent.¹⁴⁸

In September 1997, the government delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan, headed by President E. Rahmon, held bilateral meetings and talks with U.S Secretary of State M. Albright, with her deputy and many congressmen, as part of the program of participation in the UN General Assembly session.¹⁴⁹

In April 1999, in the building of the U.S State Department, during the working visit of the leadership of Tajikistan, First Deputy Secretary of State S. Talbott received the President of the Republic of Tajikistan E. Rahmonov (now Rahmon). The subject of the talks did not differ from the subject of previous meetings of American and Tajik colleagues. The position of the Washington establishment was clearly expressed by S. Talbott, who expressed the U.S desire to see a real start to democratic reforms in Tajikistan.¹⁵⁰

The policy of the USA in the Republic of Tajikistan in the political direction did not change in 2000. On September 6, 2000, the special ambassador of the U.S President

(Siyavush Radzhabov, *Tsentralkoaziyatskaya istoriya*, Dushanbe: Durakhandagon, 2008, p. 32.)

¹⁴⁷ <http://mfa.tj/ru/diplomaticheskie-konsulskie.../oae.html> (16. 04. 2017)

¹⁴⁸ Рудов Г, *Центральная Азия. Кавказ. Балканы. Региональные Подсистемы и Региональные Проблемы Безопасности*, Москва: Мысль, 2005, с. 43.

(Rudov G, *Tsentrlnaya Aziya. Kavkaz. Balkani. Regionalnie Podsystemi i Regionalnie Problemi Bezopasnosti*, Moscow: Misl, 2005, p. 43.)

¹⁴⁹ Сайидзода З, *Внешняя Политика Таджикистана В Период Его Становления Как Суверенного Независимого Государства (1992-2004 гг.)*, Душанбе: ООО "Контраст", 2010. с. 28.

(Sayyidzoda Z, *Vneshnyaya Politika Tajikistana V Period Ego Stonovleniya Kak Suverennoego Nezavisimogo Gosudarstva (1992-2004)*, Dushanbe: ООО "Kontrast", 2010, p. 28.)

¹⁵⁰ Саидов З, *Внешняя Политика Республики Таджикистан На Современном Этане*, Душанбе: «Авасто», 2006, с. 69.

(Saidov Z, *Vneshnyaya Politika Respubliki Tajikistan Na Sovremennom Etape*, Dushanbe: Avasto, 2006, p. 69.)

for the newly independent states, Steve Sestanovich met with the President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon in New York. Having exchanged views on issues relating to the state and prospects of bilateral cooperation, S. Sestanovich confirmed the readiness of the U.S to continue to assist Tajikistan in post-conflict peace building and the restoration of the national economy.¹⁵¹

Thus, the evolution of the development of U.S-Tajik relations in 1991-2001 shows that the U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan had the character of “insufficient interest”. This was due to the following features:

The first was the new geopolitical configuration on the political map of the world that arose after the collapse of the USSR that showed the inability of the United States to respond quickly to these processes. The U.S leadership was not sufficiently prepared to develop and instantaneously implement the “strategy of action” both for the Central Asian region as a whole and for each country. The 1992 “Freedom Support Law” reflected transitional functions and key concepts for U.S policy, but an analysis of the evolution of U.S-Tajik relations shows that Washington's interest was “inadequate”.¹⁵²

The second was the inability of the United States to soberly assess the real state of the domestic political life of the Republic of Tajikistan. Linking the provision of economic assistance and the implementation of projects in this area with the demands of immediate “democratic transformations” was a misconception. The Washington establishment could not soberly assess the difficult conditions that the official Dushanbe had in the course of implementing democratic reforms in the country. The state of the national economy and the actual collapse of the world economic ties in the Republic of Tajikistan during the years of the civil war and the first years of post-conflict existence showed the inability of official Dushanbe to conduct real democratic transformations. Washington's policy in this direction was more in providing humanitarian assistance to

¹⁵¹ Saidov, *ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁵² Константин Сыроежкин, *Средняя Азия Между Гравитационными Полями России и Китая*, Армонк Пресс, 2002, с. 203.
(Konstantin Syroezhkin, *Srednyaya Aziya Mejdru Gravitatsionnimi Polyakami Rossii i Kitaya*, Armonk Press, 2002, p. 203.)

Tajikistan and lobbying for the allocation of grant and credit tranches from major monetary and financial organizations to Tajikistan. The total amount of U.S financial assistance to the Republic of Tajikistan for 1992-2002 amounted to \$ 490 million.¹⁵³

The third is the scope of the legal framework between the U.S and the Republic of Tajikistan was insignificant. The total number of bilateral documents was only four formal agreements. Comparative comparison of the signed bilateral agreements of the Republic of Tajikistan with other countries (with Iran - 50, with Turkey - 22, with China - 21) shows that the U.S-Tajik interaction was minimal.¹⁵⁴

The Fourth is the weak academic understanding and development of policy towards the Central Asian states by the leading analytical centers of the United States. The Harriman Institute at Columbia University, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Washington, the John Hopkins Institute for Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the National Security University's National Security Center have shown the inadequate capacity of their centers to assess the processes in Central Asia and failed to provide the U.S leadership with the necessary constructive recommendations in the external Policy.¹⁵⁵

It seems that the course taken for the “Open Door Policy” in Tajikistan's foreign policy in 1991-2000 did not reflect the situation in reality. In this vein, the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan realized the key role of the Russian Federation in preserving peace and stability in the country. The representatives of the Tajik political elite also played a significant role in this process. Thus, despite a rational approach to the recognition of new independent states, U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan until 2001 tended to link the development of all bilateral relations with the requirements of “freedom ideas” or, in other words, democratic reforms and transformations. The U.S policy to promote democratic reforms, (as Washington believed) was a necessary

¹⁵³ Шарипова Дж. *Дипломатия Таджикистана*, Душанбе: МИД РТ, 1994, с. 59.
(Sharipova J. *Diplomatiya Tajikistana*, Dushanbe: MID RT, 1994, p. 59.)

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁵⁵ <http://inosmi.ru/politic/20160321/235793015.html> (22. 04. 2017)

condition for the development of both bilateral U.S-Tajik and multilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia.¹⁵⁶

III. 2. U.S Assistance for Implementing Democratic Reforms in Tajikistan

The early years of the post-Soviet existence were marked for the young Tajik state by the most difficult time of the formation and functioning of the country in the conditions of the new architecture of the political map of the world. The formation of statehood in the Republic of Tajikistan was difficult and painful. This is caused by regional clannish contradictions of Tajik society, which eventually resulted in a five-year civil war from 1992 to 1997. As a result of these processes, the formation of the foreign policy of the Republic of Tajikistan was delayed and slower than that of other Central Asian states. The emergence of a new independent Tajikistan has become a signal in the expert analytical circles of Washington for the start of analysis and elaboration of a strategy that would determine the main vectors of interaction with the Republic of Tajikistan and other countries of Central Asia. Analysis of U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan and the evolution of bilateral relations of 1991-2001 showed that the main indicator is the policy of “aggressive liberalism”, and issues of democratization are the basis for the development of cooperation.¹⁵⁷

The legislative basis governing the strategy of actions in U.S policy towards Tajikistan was the “Law on the Support of Freedom”. This bill, adopted in October 1992 by the U.S Congress, formed and defined the main principles in the provision of assistance to Russia and other former Soviet countries, including Tajikistan. According to this law, the countries of Central Asia are at the stage of formation and Washington is ready to make a significant contribution to the implementation of reforms. The Law asked for the countries to which it was assigned the so-called “transitional functions”, and the key criteria in U.S policy in implementing this law were the following:

¹⁵⁶ Гаджиев К, *Международные Отношения*, Душанбе: Дурахш, 1997, с. 125.
(Gadzhiev K, *Medjdunarodnie Otnosheniya*, Dushanbe: Durakhsh, 1997, с. 125.)

¹⁵⁷ Бокиев Фарход, *США Против Международного Терроризма*, Душанбе: Дурахш, 2014, с. 16.
(Bokiyev Farhod, *SSHA Protiv Medjdunarodnogo Terrorizma*, Dushanbe: Durakhsh, 2014, p. 16.)

- Significant progress of newly independent states to a democratic system based on the principles of the rule of law, individual freedoms, and representative government, determined through free and fair elections.

- Progress in economic reforms based on market principles, private property and integration into the world economy.¹⁵⁸

The objectives of U.S policy to promote the implementation of measures for initial democratic reforms in independent Tajikistan were to maintain a secular regime of government, implement measures to initiate democratic reforms, introduce market principles of economic policy, support the membership of the Republic of Tajikistan in international financial institutions and create conditions for American NGOs.¹⁵⁹ Washington's policy was aimed at supporting secular power, because it was based on the adherence to democratic values shown by the current authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan, which gave Washington hope for accelerating democratic transformations in Tajikistan in the post-war period. The policy of promoting democratic reforms in the Republic of Tajikistan had as its primary task the orientation toward a political elite dependent on U.S aid. Likewise, support for reforms has contributed to the creation of favorable legal and infrastructural conditions for foreign investment and thereby to enable the projection of American influence on them. However, in reality these attempts were so insignificant that the picture of Washington's participation in investment projects of the Republic of Tajikistan in comparison with other external state actors looks so that the USA occupies one of the last roles in real participation in the projects of the beginning and the end of the 90s XX century.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Борис Ромет, *Поиск Стабильности в Центральной Азии*, Алматы: Армонк Пресс, 2002, с. 57.
(Boris Romet, *Poisk Stabilnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Almaty: Armonk Press, 2002, p. 57.)

¹⁵⁹ Рустам Бурнашев, *Региональная Безопасность в Центральной Азии*, Алматы: Армонк Пресс, 2002, с. 117.

(Rustam Burnashev, *Regionalnaya Bezopasnost v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Almaty: Armonk Press, 2002, p. 117.)

¹⁶⁰ Сергей Леонов, *Средняя Азия и Мир*, Москва: Наука, 1998, с. 224.

(Sergei Leonov, *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Mir*, Moscow: Nauka, 1998, p. 224.)

Thus, the policy aimed at linking the development of bilateral relations between the U.S and Tajikistan with the requirements of democratic reforms and reforms in Tajikistan has not led to success. In general, U.S foreign policy in Tajikistan can make us doubt that the U.S authorities really expect to achieve their high-profile goals, which are outlined in the “Law on the Support of Freedom”.¹⁶¹

III. 3. Politico-Diplomatic Aspects of American-Tajik Relations after September 11, 2011

The events of September 11, 2001 made significant changes in the nature of US-Tajik relations. The United States, having defined its foreign policy strategic priorities, namely, the struggle against international terrorism and the “democratic reorganization of the Greater Middle East”, shifted its main strategic objectives to the Muslim East, including the Central Asian region. As noted by former U.S Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Central Asia is not crises and instability, but new opportunities”.¹⁶² The significance of the Republic of Tajikistan has sharply increased for the United States.¹⁶³ U.S-Tajik relations have acquired a radically different character from the political point of view than it was possible to observe in the 90s of the XX century.¹⁶⁴ Regular visits by high-ranking representatives of the American leadership, which was a novelty for bilateral contacts between the two countries, marked the following goals for Washington:

1. To enlist the support of Tajikistan in providing its territory for the deployment of ground and air military vessels (containers) to facilitate their transfer directly to the field of operation in Afghanistan.
2. To promote the activation of bilateral U.S-Tajik relations which after the independence of the Republic of Tajikistan took the form of “extremely

¹⁶¹ Sergei, *ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁶² Бажанов Е, *Америка: Вчера и Сегодня*, Томск: Известия, 2005, с. 174.
(Bazhanov E, *Amerika: Vchera i Segodnya*, Tomsk: Izvestia, 2005, p. 174.)

¹⁶³ Иванов О, *Военная Сила в Глобальной Стратегии США*, Москва: Восток-Запад, 2008, с. 244.
(Ivanov O, *Voennaya Sila v Globalnoy Strategii SSHA*, Moscow: Vostok-Zapad, 2008, p. 244.)

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

disinterested” U.S interest both in the CA region and in the Republic of Tajikistan.

3. To create the illusion that Washington, in bilateral cooperation, is ready to switch from rendering assistance to the RT exclusively through USAID to comprehensive cooperation, including the implementation of economic projects and possible U.S investments in a country in which Dushanbe is very interested.¹⁶⁵
4. To show to official Dushanbe all the benefits of potential interaction with the U.S for economic prosperity and democratic development of the country. In this context, Washington's goal was also to create the illusion that the U.S authorities are ready to move away from the rigid demands of the democratization of society to a balanced policy that takes into account the diversity of the ethno-cultural identity of the country, taking into account its traditions and the social structure of society.¹⁶⁶

The priorities of U.S foreign policy in Central Asia after September 11, including the activation of bilateral U.S-Tajik relations, are directly linked to the U.S National Security Strategy of 2002 dubbed “The Bush Doctrine”. As it’s known, the National Security Strategy is the main document that determines the priorities and goals of U.S foreign policy in the world. The establishment of a regular political dialogue between Washington and Dushanbe was the main indicator of the new and strategic role of the United States. The politico-diplomatic direction was to become the basis that would develop the economic, military-technical, cultural and other areas of U.S policy in Tajikistan. So, on October 26, 2001, the new U.S ambassador to the Republic of Tajikistan, F. Haddle, after presenting the credentials of the extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to the Republic of Tajikistan, noted that “The U.S

¹⁶⁵ Котляр В, *Развитие Стратегических Концепций США и НАТО после 11 Сентября 2001 г*, Москва: Научная Книга, 2003, с. 211.
(Kotlyar V, *Razvitie Strategicheskikh Kontsepsii SSHA i NATO posle 11go Sentyabrya*, 2001 g, Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2003, p. 211.)

¹⁶⁶ Kotlyar, *ibid.*, p. 212.

government decided to build the building of its embassy in Dushanbe and shows interest in the early opening of diplomatic Representation of RT in Washington”.¹⁶⁷

On December 8, 2002, the President of the Republic of Tajikistan arrived in Washington on an official visit. At the Andrews airbase, the delegation of Tajikistan was met by U.S Assistant Secretary of State L. Pasco.¹⁶⁸ On the same day, during the official visit of the head of Tajikistan to the United States in the White House within the framework of the first in the history of U.S-Tajik relations, George W. Bush met with E. Rahmon. The main achievement of the negotiations at the highest level was the “Treaty on Strategic Cooperation” between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan.¹⁶⁹

A new surge in U.S activity in Tajikistan began after the appointment of Khamrokhon Zarifi, the Republic's ambassador to the United States, in December 2006. This appointment, apparently, spoke of Tajikistan's readiness for closer cooperation with the U.S in the development of political and diplomatic relations, coupled with economic and military-political content, which were considered the main directions of U.S policy.¹⁷⁰ In July 2009, the first political contact of the new official with the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan was held. R. Blake, head of the Bureau for South and Central Asia, negotiated with the President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon and profile ministers. Following the talks, the U.S side confirmed that the U.S interest in Tajikistan

¹⁶⁷ Кравченко И, *Дипломатическая История США*, Москва: Научная Книга, 2002. с. 334.

(Kravchenko I, *Diplomaticheskaya Istoriya SSHA*: Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2002. p. 334.)

¹⁶⁸ Кулматов К, *Мир в начале XXI века. Размышления Российского Дипломата и Ученого*, Москва: Известия, 2006, с. 234

(Kulmatov K, *Mir v nachale XXI-go veka. Ramishleniya Rossiyskogo Diplomata i Uchenogo*, Moscow: Izvestiya, 2006, p. 234.)

¹⁶⁹ Лаумулин М, *Центральная Азия в Зарубежной Политологии и Мировой Геополитике. Внешняя Политика и Стратегия США на Современном Этапе и Центральная Азия*, Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 2006, с. 155.

(Laumulin M, *Tsentrlnaya Aziyanv Zarubejnoj Politologii i Mirovoy Geopolitike. Vneshnyaya Politika i Strategiya SSHA na Sovremennom Etape i Tsentrlnaya Aziya*, Almaty:KISI pri Prezidente RK, 2006, p. 155.)

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

is growing and Washington is ready to further develop them in exchange for Tajikistan's cooperation in full on the operation of the U.S and its allies in Afghanistan.¹⁷¹

2010 year gave impetus to the development of bilateral U.S-Tajik relations in the political arena. The United States launched a new format for interaction with Central Asian countries “Annual Bilateral Consultations”. The first round of negotiations between the U.S and Tajikistan was held in February 2010 in Washington. During the talks, four issues were arisen: the political and economic situation in the region, the implementation of water-energy and transport projects, as well as the situation in Afghanistan.¹⁷²

On October 21-22, 2011, Secretary of State of the United States of America Hilary Clinton officially visited Tajikistan. On October 22, Hillary Clinton met with the President of the Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, during which a fruitful conversation was held in the spirit of mutual understanding, solidarity and constructiveness.¹⁷³ The interlocutors exchanged views on a wide range of issues of bilateral, regional and international cooperation between Tajikistan and the United States, as well as effective cooperation to ensure stability in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁴

It is vital for the Republic of Tajikistan to maintain a level of strategic partnership with the United States, but only on the condition that other centers of power also participate in the political plane of the country and it is also necessary to create conditions in which each of the main external actors holds or balances the other.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Назарбаев Н, *На Пороге XXI Века*, Алматы: Армонк, 1996, с. 143.
(Nazarbayev N, *Na Poroge XXI veka*, Almaty: Armonk, 1996, p. 143.)

¹⁷² Примаков Е, *Мир После 11 Сентября*, Москва: Мысль, 2002, с. 163.
(Primakov E, *Mir Posle 11 Sentyabrya*, Moscow: Misl, 2002, p. 163.)

¹⁷³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, Bilateral Relations of Tajikistan with United States of America, <http://mfa.tj/?l=en&cat=92&art=191> (25.09.2018)

¹⁷⁴ President Of The Republic Of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon Received Hillary Clinton, <http://www.president.tj/ru/node/1111> (25.09.2018)

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

III. 4. Military, Economic and Humanitarian Directions of the U.S Policy Towards Tajikistan

The military-strategic, economic and humanitarian aspects of U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan occupy a significant place in the U.S strategy in Central Asia. The implementation of these activities includes a wide range of steps. The goals of U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan can be determined through these three aspects, and it's important to study each of them separately due to track the evolution of development.¹⁷⁶

Military-strategic direction - On October 30, 2001 General T. Franks, commander in chief of the U.S Central Command, arrived in Dushanbe on a visit. During the meeting with the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan, issues of cooperation between the Republic of Tajikistan and the United States in solving the problems and prospects of the military-political situation in the Islamic State of Afghanistan were discussed. The visit of a high-ranking American general to Tajikistan can be considered the first contact between the leadership of the United States and Tajikistan, which, according to some estimates, played a significant role in the consent of Tajikistan in facilitating the counter-terrorist operation of "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan.¹⁷⁷

On November 3, 2001, President of the Republic of Tajikistan E. Rahmon held talks in Dushanbe with the U.S Secretary of Defense, D. Rumsfeld, who visited Tajikistan for the first time. The U.S delegation also included deputy defense ministers, U.S Deputy Secretary of State Bolton, as well as several other high-ranking officials. During the meeting, the U.S leadership received confirmation of the intentions of the RT to take an active part in the international anti-terrorist coalition. The sequence of visits by senior U.S officials to the Republic of Tajikistan with the aim of obtaining approval

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/NATO-US-Perspective-9-11/RU/index.htm> (11. 05. 2017)

¹⁷⁷ Рудов Г, *Центральная Азия. Кавказ. Балканы. Региональные Подсистемы и Региональные Проблемы Безопасности*, Москва: Мысль, 2005, с. 154.
(Rudov G, *Tsentralnaya Aziya. Kavkaz. Balkani. Regionalniye Podsystemi i Regionalnie Problemi Bezopasnosti*, Moscow: Misl, 2005, p. 154.)

for opening the territory and facilitating the U.S-NATO counterterrorism operation in Afghanistan by Dushanbe resulted in the meeting in Dushanbe of the commander in chief of the U.S Central Command, General T. Franks and President of Tajikistan E. Rahmon, on January 24, 2002.¹⁷⁸

The decision of the Tajik leadership to support the U.S anti-terrorist operation of “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan was supported by experts’ convictions that this decision could turn out to be very real political success for Dushanbe. Thus, from December 2001 to October 2014, the Dushanbe International Airport was used by the French Air Force to support the French contingent in Afghanistan. Because, in order to support the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, Tajikistan had taken the following steps:

- Provided its airspace for humanitarian and rescue operations in Afghanistan.
- Ground structure for the deployment of the air forces of the antiterrorist coalition.¹⁷⁹

In June 2007, another high-ranking official of the highest rank of the U.S leadership visited Tajikistan. The country was visited on a working visit by U.S Central Command commander W. Fallon, who held talks with the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the people responsible for national security issues. Continuing the series of visits, on October 26, 2009, the new Commander of the U.S Central Command, General D. Petraeus visited Tajikistan, holding regular talks with the leadership of Tajikistan, specifying additional details of the transit of U.S non-military cargo to Afghanistan.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Rudov, *ibid.*, p. 155.

¹⁷⁹ Саидов З, *Внешняя политика Республики Таджикистан на Современном Этапе*, Душанбе: Авасто, 2010, с. 241.

(Saidov Z, *Vneshnyaya politika Respubliki Tadjikistan na Sovremennom Etape*, Dushanbe: Avasto, 2010, p. 241.)

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

At present, the interaction of the USA and the Republic of Tajikistan in the sphere of military-technical cooperation is carried out within the framework of two programs: Foreign Military Financing, which finances the armed forces of the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Military Education and Training, which implies financial programs that allow the allocation of monetary grants to foreign states in the field of military cooperation and security. Thus, within the framework of strengthening its military policy in Tajikistan, the United States has given and will devote a key knowledge to the stabilization factor of Afghanistan within the framework of the Tajikistan-USA-Afghanistan format.¹⁸¹

Economic direction - It should be noted that the economic aspect of U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan is always the least active area of bilateral cooperation. Officials in Dushanbe understands that U.S assistance in implementing economic projects in Tajikistan would significantly increase interest in it from other states. By the beginning of 2000, the Republic of Tajikistan experienced serious problems of economic growth, which required intensification of bilateral and multilateral economic interaction with such countries as Russia, the United States, China, India, Iran, Japan and the EU.¹⁸²

As part of his first official visit in 2002, the President of Tajikistan held a meeting with U.S businessmen. It is worth noting that the interest of economic interaction with Tajikistan, which was almost invisible from the 90s of the XX century, attracted the attention of many representatives of American business, both through official bodies and private businessmen.¹⁸³ Representatives of the U.S Department of Commerce, the largest banks, companies and firms “Vachovia”, “Hydropower”, “Caterpillar”, “Cadvolder”, “Aqua International” and others took part in this meeting. There was a

¹⁸¹ Хозин Г, *США в Мире 90-х годов*, Москва: Знание, 1990, с. 142.
(Khozin G, *SSHA v Mire 90-ikh godov*, Moscow: Znaniye, 1990, p. 142.)

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹⁸³ <https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/transformatsiya-vneshney-politiki-ssha-posle-teraktov-11-sentya-2017> (16.05.2017)

useful exchange of investment proposals in many areas in the sphere of industry, agrarian and hydropower sectors of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United States.¹⁸⁴

In 2007-2009, the development of the Tajik-American relations was of the nature of point cooperation. Washington showed interest in Tajikistan's energy projects, which more than once invited world financial centers to participate in these projects. The projects related to the construction of a cascade of hydroelectric power plants on the Vakhsh River in the south (Rogun, Sangtuda HPPs 1 and 2) and Dashtidzhumskaya HPP on the Pyanj River.¹⁸⁵

In early 2009, the staff of the U.S State Department experienced personnel reshuffle. Robert Blake came to the office of the head of the Bureau for South and Central Asia, thereby becoming an assistant to the Secretary of State. In early July 2009, a new official visited Tajikistan. It was recognized that the U.S is ready to help create favorable conditions for small and medium-sized businesses in Tajikistan.

Economic interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan stands in the last place in the spectrum of opportunities used by Washington for the development of its policy. The U.S remains committed to continuing lobbying for the allocation by the world financial institutions - the IMF and the World Bank - of loans for the development of Tajikistan's economy in exchange for gradual concessions to Dushanbe for the U.S military and political presence in the country.¹⁸⁶

Humanitarian direction -The U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan in the humanitarian sphere is basically reduced to providing assistance through the USAID (American Agency for International Development) governmental organization and a number of non-governmental organizations. At present, the U.S conducts its

¹⁸⁴ Шахзад Айтматов, *Враг Моего Врага Мой Друг*, Хорог: Памир Публикация, 2002, с. 37. (Shakhzad Aitmatov, *Vrag Moeogo Vraga Moy Drug*, Khorog: Pamir Publication, 2002, p. 37.)

¹⁸⁵ Shakhzad, *ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁸⁶ Штоль В, *Роль и место НАТО в Системе и Международной Безопасности в Условиях Глобализации*, Москва: Научная Книга, 2006, с. 344. (Stol B, *Pol i Mesto NATO v Sisteme i Medjdunorodnoy Bezopasnosti v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii*, Moscow: Nauchnaya Kniga, 2006, p. 344.)

humanitarian policy through the involvement of American state and non-governmental organizations, such as the Open Society Institute, the International Center for Legislation in the Field of Public Organizations, the Institute of International Law Development, the American Association of Lawyers, whose activities began almost from the moment of independence of the Republic of Tajikistan. The cooperation of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan and the program of civic education of International Foundation for Electoral Systems, funded by USAID, continues. The program supports the ministry's efforts to teach civic education for more than 10,000 students, at about 500 schools in Tajikistan.¹⁸⁷

III. 5. Perspectives of U.S Foreign Policy Towards Tajikistan in the 21st Century

An analysis of the evolution of U.S-Tajik bilateral relations from 1991 to the present has shown that U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan, as well as the entire Central Asian region, tended to increase Washington's influence in four main areas: military-strategic, political, economic and humanitarian.¹⁸⁸

Military-strategic area - It seems that the prospects for cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan in the field of military-technical cooperation will continue or increase. Considering in general the U.S military strategy in Central Asia and Afghanistan, it can be concluded that Washington will in the future lobby the quartering of airbases and the creation of transport hubs in the region. The possibility of deploying the U.S Armed Forces in the Republic of Tajikistan cannot be excluded either. The evolution of the growing U.S military political interest in the Republic of Tajikistan, which is reflected in the gradual increase in joint exercises by the U.S and Tajik military departments in the fight against the drug threat, border forces, customs units in the near future may lead to a general revision of the military component

¹⁸⁷ Shtol, *ibid.*, p. 348.

¹⁸⁸ Худри Худронович, *Американские интересы в Центральной Азии*, Хатлон: Chaman, 2009, с. 112. (Khudri Khudronovich, *Amerikanskie Interesi v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Khatlon: Chaman, 2009, p. 112.)

of bilateral interaction.¹⁸⁹ In the future, there may also be an imbalance of military parity between the United States (since there is a large contingent in Afghanistan) on the one hand, and the Russian Federation and the PRC on the other. The process of distribution of “Excess defense products” which the U.S launched in the light of the withdrawal of U.S troops and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan will also affect the Republic of Tajikistan.¹⁹⁰ It is not ruled out that some of the equipment, namely military vehicles, Hummers and other products of this kind will be transferred to the armed forces of the Republic of Tajikistan. At the same time, it is clear that the United States in the near future will not be able to change the foreign policy orientation of the Republic of Tajikistan from the Russian Federation in military-strategic cooperation or to create a military organization or integration association with the entry of the Republic of Tajikistan into it. In the near future, U.S policy will be aimed at coordinating its actions with Dushanbe and Moscow in the Russia-Tajikistan-US format with the defense ministries of the three countries to limit drug traffic from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, which will serve as a favorable basis for improving the effectiveness of Washington's policy in Tajikistan.

Political area - The prospects for political interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan in the coming years will be carefully analyzed and revised both in the direction of activation and minimization. This ambiguity in the prospects for the development of the political dialogue is explained by the fact that Washington is not entirely satisfied with the administrative methods of governing the country of the current government in Tajikistan.¹⁹¹ This concern is expressed in various annual reports of the U.S State Department on Human Rights, Religious Freedom and Human Trafficking in the Republic of Tajikistan. Thus, the political interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan in the short term can not be predictably

¹⁸⁹ Филоченко Комилов, *Стратегия стратегии Шелкового Пути от 1999 года*, Нурек: Издательство Нурек, 2007, с. 67.

(Filochenko Komilov, *Strategiya Shelkogo Puti ot 1999 goda*, Nurek: Izdatelstvo Nurek, 2007, p. 67.)

¹⁹⁰ <http://www.law.edu.ru/article/article.asp?articleID=1274844> (22. 04. 2017)

¹⁹¹ Лаумулин М, *Стратегия и Политика США в Центральной Азии*, Москва: Знание, 2007, с. 127. (Laumulin M, *Strategiya i Politika SShA v Tsentralnoy Azii*, Moscow: Znaniye, 2007, p. 127.)

unambiguous. A close assessment of this conclusion is given by E. Feygenbaum, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, who in a report on February 22, 2011, expressed that “during the entire period of political interaction between Washington and the countries of Central Asia, no U.S president has visited any country in the region on an official visit”.¹⁹²

Economic area - Prospects for economic interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan in the short term will obviously grow. The economic content of U.S policy in the Republic of Tajikistan will be expressed in support of Tajikistan's participation in regional energy projects for the supply of electricity generated by Tajikistan to markets, primarily South Asia, through the relatively calm northeastern provinces of Afghanistan. In the near future, Washington will continue lobbying the allocation by the world financial institutions (IMF and World Bank) of loans for the development of the economy of Tajikistan in exchange for concessions to Dushanbe for the U.S military and political presence in the country.¹⁹³ In the next few years, the U.S is likely to initiate the construction of a number of small and medium-sized hydroelectric power stations on Tajikistan's internal and transboundary rivers. Washington is expected to participate in the consortium for the construction of the Roghun hydroelectric power station, which is currently being built by internal funds of Dushanbe itself, however, if the ecological expertise is successfully carried out by the Poyry Group, it is expected that Washington will directly participate in the completion of this project . Washington is also expected to participate in a number of investment projects in the Republic of Tajikistan for the extraction of gold and other mineral resources, including in the framework of Free Economic Zones in Tajikistan.¹⁹⁴

Humanitarian area - The prospects for U.S policy in Tajikistan in the humanitarian sphere in the near future will have the form of continuing the line of financial assistance to Dushanbe in various areas of state development through USAID. It seems that the U.S

¹⁹² <https://ria.ru/spravka/20150911/1239866112.html> (02. 05. 2017)

¹⁹³ Богатуров А, *Центральная Азия в Современной Политике*, Москва: Знание, 2010, с. 246. (Bogaturov A., *Tsentralnaya Aziya v Sovremennoy Politike*, Moscow: Znaniye, 2010, p. 246.)

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

policy in the field of humanitarian interaction with Tajikistan will be aimed at presenting the formulation of the principle of “non-violent democratization” for the existing leadership of Tajikistan. This is indicated by the fact that the senators of the democrats under the administration of George W. Bush (Jr.) consistently initiated a number of bills, in which the intention was to cooperate with NGOs committed to the principles of the peaceful establishment of democracy. The basis of NGOs will be citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan, graduating from the U.S universities, as well as various training programs in USA. The leading agency will remain the United States Agency for International Development. It also seems that the number of U.S NGOs focused on the creation and development of local civic associations and independent self-government bodies will be increased.¹⁹⁵ Thus, the prospects for U.S policy toward the Republic of Tajikistan in the coming years will take the form of a slow but not expansion of its military, political, economic and strategic influence.

¹⁹⁵ Майтдинова Г, *Геополитика Центральной Азии. Международное Сотрудничество В Центральной Евразии По Обеспечению Безопасности*, Душанбе: Авасто, 2015, с. 192.
(Maitdinova G, *Geopolitika Tsentralnoy Azii. Medjdunorodnoe Sotrudnichestvo V Tsentralnoy Evrazii Po Obespecheniyu Bezopasnosti*, Dushanbe: Avasto, 2015, p. 192.)

CONCLUSION

Studying and analyzing the geopolitical position of Central Asia, the wide spectrum of interaction of the United States of America with the states of Central Asia and especially with Tajikistan, Washington's policy towards regional organizations with the participation of Central Asian countries, as well as the influence of the Russian Federation, China and other regional powers in Central Asia one can come to such general conclusions.

First of all, we have to note that the analysis of the main sources and documents related to the U.S foreign policy planning shows that the Central Asian region is positioned by the administrative elites of the United States as the space necessary for changing the configuration of forces in the global energy market. At the same time, the control of Central Asia – attributed by American theorists as the Heartland - allows the United States to influence the territory of the Heartland directly and implement its strategic initiatives within Europe, Arabia and Indochina. U.S policy toward Central Asia is one of the main external factors influencing the formation of the situation in and around this region. The evolution of the American approach to defining the role and place of Central Asian states in the U.S foreign policy strategy, as well as the methods and forms of interaction with them reflects the growing importance of this group of states on the world stage. In general, this approach is characterized by the perception of the region as a historically established socio-political, economic and military-political whole.

Actually, a new geopolitical region - Central Asia, appeared in the early 90s of the XX century after the collapse of the USSR. It is located at the crossroads of routes from Russia to Asia, from China to Europe and South Asia. Such a middle location in the center of Eurasia contributes to the expansion of interests of all the leading global and regional centers of power. Despite the geographical insularity of Central Asia and the lack of a sufficient number of communications necessary for full-scale entry into the world economic system, it has so many mineral reserves that it cannot but be in the

center of attention of the leading powers of the world. The world's greatest interest towards Central Asia is Central Asian hydrocarbons, whose reserves have only recently begun to be developed. Gold, uranium, rare earth metals and other natural resources of Central Asia are also in the interests of the leading powers. Another causal attention to it is its neighborhood with unstable states, which are a source of extremism and terrorism.

Central Asia today is located at the crossroads of the geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic interests of the three largest countries in the world - the United States of America, China and Russia as well as some regional powers. If the view of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, is that Central Asian countries are neighbors and part of the mega-region, which is formed in the SCO format, then for the United States with its global interests is the possibility of penetration into internal Asia, previously inaccessible to Washington. For the United States, penetration into the region allows influencing the policy of the whole Eurasia, and U.S seeks to prevent the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic force in Eurasia. This role can only be played by Russia and China, which together can limit the capabilities of the United States in Eurasia and deprive Washington of its claim to world domination. The main task of the United States is to prevent the restoration of Russia's strategic control in Central Asia, as well as the creation of a political-strategic alliance between Moscow, Beijing and Tehran. At the same time, any form of American-Russian confrontation can split the region and lead to global changes. The U.S also needs to have a direct impact on its main potential rival, China, which is building up its military and economic power in order to weaken the American position in the world. Therefore, Washington's policy in Central Asia was aimed at preserving the American military presence in the region under the pretext of combating drug trafficking, extremism and terrorism. The United States is not only interested in limiting the influence of individual states in the region, but also in a number of so-called transnational threats - terrorism, drug trafficking, the proliferation of WMD, uncontrolled migration and human trafficking.

The evolutionary course of the USA in Central Asia makes it possible to single out in two stages. At the first stage (1990s), Washington showed a relatively weak interest in the region, dominated by the view that the United States had no vital interests in it. In a concentrated form, the essence of the policy of the United States was to prevent the occurrence of an intraregional conflict in the Central Asian space, which was thought to solve internal problems, achieve stability and establish democracy based on successful economic development, while the CIS format with the leading role of Russia was considered sufficient for ensuring security in the region. At the end of B. Clinton's tenure as president of the United States, there was a turn in United States policy towards Central Asia. Adopted in March 1999 by the U.S Congress, the "Act on the Strategy for the Silk Road" focused American diplomacy to support the "economic and political independence" of the region. This approach reflected the desire of the United States to formalize the status of the only superpower dominant globally and regionally. With the arrival of the Republican administration of George W. Bush in the White House in 2001, Washington set a course for the open affirmation of American superiority in the world (the "Bush doctrine").

The mobilization and consolidation of the world community under the banner of counteracting international terrorism after September 11, the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition to fight Al-Qaida and its ally - the Taliban regime in Afghanistan accelerated and facilitated the U.S penetration into Central Asia, which was carried out with the consent of the leadership countries of the region, as well as understanding the need for this from the Russian side. Terrorism, economic and political reforms, as well as ensuring the security of the Caspian energy resources were identified as the main objectives of the American presence in the region. Uzbekistan has become the key, basic country for accommodating Americans. To strengthen its position, the United States began to increase the amount of financial assistance to the countries of the region, which in the 1990s was insignificant and was strategically directed mostly to the elimination of the USSR nuclear heritage. In general, the United States had the opportunity for

temporary forward bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as access to the airspace and limited use of bases in Kazakhstan and even in Turkmenistan.

Having made a geostrategic breakthrough in the Central Asian region, the United States gradually began to more decisively declare its intention to consolidate here on a long-term basis, without defining the time limits for its presence (in August 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that the United States intends to ensure permanent access to strategic sites in the region). The focus of Americans on strategic energy facilities and resources, communication is a constant attribute of most American developments in Central Asia, and this is supported by a number of specific measures. In general, taking advantage of the situation and its wide possibilities of projecting its own power into the region, Washington was pragmatically fixed here with the primary goal of establishing control over the energy and other resources of Central Asia, with which it is very rich. To this end, the Americans intended to build a security system in the region that would best fit their interests. After the completion of anti-Taliban operation, the United States and its Western allies also intended, to make Afghanistan as their base in the region from whose territory it will be possible to project its influence on neighboring countries.

In the region of Central Asia, the geopolitical factor for Washington is no less important than the geo-economic one. In the big geopolitical game in Central Asia, the main vector of self-assertion of Americans is aimed at ousting influential competitors from the region, primarily Russia, as well as China, and Iran. A new era of oil geopolitics, the struggle begins for control over the fields and routes of oil transportation. It is in Washington's policy that its most visible signs are noticeable: the desire to diversify the ways of supplying resources from the Caspian region (as an alternative to the Russian routes), and to hinder China's free access to energy resources. In this regard, the intention of the Americans to remain in the region was a clear confirmation and caused concern to these countries, primarily Russia and China.

As for Russia, its position in Central Asia is strong enough. For the countries of Central Asia, Russia as a main guarantor of stability and security, has been and will remain the main partner. Any attempts to squeeze Russia out of the region and to undermine its strategic interests are not only counterproductive, but also dangerous for region's stability. For protecting national borders, and maintaining a stable buffer between Russia and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan, Central Asia has a great importance for the Russian Federation. The emergence of the threats beyond national borders requires the coordination of the activities of special services and law enforcement agencies from Central Asian countries and Russia, as well as the formation of a unified security system. The main area of concentration of religious extremists is Afghanistan and as long as NATO forces are quartered in the country, the threat of destabilization of the region remains and clashes between warring armed factions don't end. Most Afghans consider the presence of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan as an occupation of the country. Moreover, the actions of American and European military are one of the reasons for the radicalization, both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring Muslim states. Thus, Russia has a fairly large range of interests in the Central Asian region from security perspective.

Also, the future rivalry between the U.S and the PRC in Central Asia as two superpowers is confidently predicted, and it will largely determine international policy in the 21st century. The American military presence caused hidden irritation in Beijing which of course, has its own views of the Central Asian region. Chinese experts believe that China has passed the period of an outside observer in the region. Beijing carefully thought through the Central Asian strategy. This strategy aims to actively participate in solving the problems of the region, relying on the SCO, developing relations with its countries, promoting stability and prosperity, as well as implementing its strategic interests, which are primarily focused on the development of the resources of Central Asia.

The main emphasis in relations between PRC and the states of Central Asia is more about economic cooperation and from China's economic interests in the region is expanding cooperation in the field of energy resources. China is one of the three largest energy consumers in the world (along with the United States and Japan). According to the forecasts of Chinese experts, in 2020 China's oil demand will be from 380 to 400 million tons. That's why Chinese leadership attaches great importance to the diversification of sources of oil and gas imports. This is due to the fact that the country receives most of the oil resources from the Middle East and in the event of an unfavorable military and political situation in the Taiwan and Moluccas straits, China may be cut off from these energy flows. At the same time, the PRC does not intend to depend on the import of Russian gas and oil. Beijing believes that access to Russian energy resources is less reliable than to hydrocarbons in Central Asia. Moreover, China's expansion of its Central Asian land routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to northern Iran is perceived as an intention to create a Chinese-Arabic highway with access to the oil terminals of the Persian Gulf. According to Beijing, transportation of hydrocarbons from Central Asian countries is relatively safe, short and carried out by land pipelines. Over time, China's position on global energy markets and geopolitics will grow. Today, within the framework of the SCO, an energy club is being created, which can be the first step in this direction.

The other aspect of China's energy security is in hydropower sector. Cooperation in this area is conducted with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Unlike Kazakhstan, China's cooperation in hydropower with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is developing quite well. Thus, the PRC allocated more than \$ 60 million for the construction of a high-voltage power transmission line South-North in Tajikistan. According to the Asia-Plus news agency, the Chinese company Sinohydro intends to build the Yavan hydroelectric power station in the Sughd region of the republic with an estimated cost of \$ 96 million and the hydroelectric power station will become Tajikistan's property right after commissioning, and the funds invested in construction will be given the character of a loan that will be repaid in accordance with a separate

agreement. Improving the structure of road, rail and air transport is another aspect of economic cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. Cooperation in the transport sphere will allow not only to lay new modern transport communications in Central Asia and internal China, but also to create the Eurasian land transport system.

PRC is also expanding cooperation in agricultural sector and regarding this, Chinese investment could well be directed to the agricultural sector of the region, primarily to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For improving customs structures and normalizing their work, Beijing is also trying its best for Free Trade and investment in Central Asia. China seeks to reduce trade barriers and work out issues to improve the conditions that stimulate the development of cooperation between enterprises. China's trade with the countries of the region has insignificant volumes; its main flow is directed to Kazakhstan. Chinese cooperation with Central Asian countries in security matters plays no less a role than its economic cooperation. In the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region bordering Central Asia which its population is mainly Muslim Uighurs has repeatedly stated their desire to create a Uyghur state. Experts say that there are about 30 organizations associated with XUAR. In this regard, Beijing is working with the governments of the Central Asian states to tighten policies on local Uighurs and joint action against separatist rallies.

As a result about the two leaders of Central Asia - Russia and China one can say that their interests are mainly coincided in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Weakening the positions of any of them within the Organization will inevitably lead to the individual leadership of the other. The SCO differs from other Asian structures because not only including economic cooperation issues but also geopolitical goals which were declared in its documents. The main collision is that the two regional leaders Russia and China, according to the logic of development, are competitors. Although the language of diplomacy does not allow them to talk openly about this rivalry, but it's very clear that there is a struggle between them for Central Asia and especially for its energy and territorial resources.

Iran is also rapidly gaining strength with its nuclear program and ambitions to become the leader of the Muslim world by a sub-regional power. This country acts as a radical anti-American force, which also has a high conjuncture of relations with Russia and China and has declared its intention to join the SCO. In Central Asia, Iran has traditionally acted in a balanced and almost flawless manner, as opposed to the Middle East region, where Iranian policy to increase influence was perceived as a claim to exert a decisive military and political influence on the situation. On this basis, all Central Asian states perceive Iran as an independent and significant player in the region, which allowed it to develop diverse relations (although not at the same level) with all of them. Interaction and cooperation with Iran gives the Central Asian countries a complementary potential to diversify their external communications, inseparably incorporated into the policy of multi-vector and balancing between different centers of power. Although Iran seeks leadership in Central Asia, however, in the first place it has pragmatic interests, not values, which indicates a rationalistic and restrained course in its foreign policy. As the researchers note about the political priorities of the IRI and interests in Central Asia, it is closely linked to the stubborn intentions of this country to spread political Islam, fundamentalist in its ideological essence. The Islamic revolution in Iran has become a vivid expression of political Islamism in its international and interstate aspect. The events of recent years in international relations of the IRI with the countries of Central Asia, in particular with Tajikistan, show the correctness of the forecast that Khomeinism claims global Islamization of international life turning into a tool to regulate and realize the political interests of Shiite clericalism in order to strengthen its role and position in international arena. In the foreign policy sphere, Iran acted under the slogan of the struggle against imperialism, meaning under it the struggle both against imperialistic influence and against the penetration of the ideas of socialism and communism into the country, considering the USA and the USSR as two imperialist superpowers. Inside the country, this part of the clergy fought both against the monarchy and against leftist and democratic forces. In other words, Iran cherished the hope of returning Iran to the early Islamic society with the dominance of traditional small-commodity relations and the

complete dominance of Islamic ideology. Naturally, there was nothing revolutionary in the position of this part of the clergy. In general, the Russian, Chinese and Iranian factors are largely constrained by U.S ambitions. Although the Bush doctrine is not inclined to take into account the interests of U.S foreign opponents, the increase in these factors confronts Washington with the need, on the one hand, to moderate its appetites to avoid confrontation and complication of the situation, and on the other hand to look for common ground with Russia and China.

In advancing its interests in Central Asia, the United States relies on its allies above all, NATO and the EU, as well as individual countries above all, Turkey. NATO is almost completely dominated by Americans, and the situation with the EU is more complicated. Although the United States and Europe are united in their desire to oust Russia from all azimuths of Central Asian politics, differences and contradictions between the Americans and Europeans themselves arise, stemming from the visually delineated prospect of Europe becoming a U.S competitor at the global and lower levels.

As mentioned above, the EU has been maintaining mutual relations with the five Central Asian countries since the very moment of their declaration of independence in the early 1990s. By 2007, these relations were sustainable and revealed the closeness of values and interests in the field of economics, politics and security. The growing dynamics of bilateral relations between the European Union and Central Asia confirmed the presence of significant potential for strategic cooperation of the EU with the countries of the region. EU member states recognized that their bilateral relations could be improved through a more coordinated and focused common approach towards the countries of Central Asia. As a result, the EU-Central Asia Strategy was adopted, which includes a whole range of goals and values. This document takes into account the peculiarities of the countries of Central Asia and developed individual approaches to each of them, alongside elements of regional cooperation. The next stage was initiatives focused on the practical application of the Strategy in such priority areas as general security challenges, the rule of law, education, environmental protection, and water

resources. Activities under these initiatives also integrate regional and bilateral approaches. The EU's firm commitments to its eastern neighbors in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy will also bring Europe and Central Asia closer together through political cooperation and economic development. The development and consolidation of stable, fair and open societies and the observance of international norms are essential for the full realization of the partnership between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia. Responsible governance, the rule of law, human rights, democratization, education and training are key areas in which the EU is ready to share experiences.

The EU can share experiences of regional integration, which leads to political stability and prosperity. The EU can also offer lessons learned from political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. With rich traditions and a long history of exchanges, the EU and Central Asia can make a significant contribution to the dialogue among civilizations. Many of the problems that the world faces in the process of globalization equally affect Europe and Central Asia and require their joint solution. Issues of security and regional economic development require close cooperation of the EU with each country of Central Asia, taking into account their geographical location, in particular, in relation to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. In addition, it is related to development in the field of border management, migration, the fight against organized crime and international terrorism, as well as trafficking of human beings, drugs and weapons. The EU's dependence on external energy resources and the need for a diversified energy supply policy to increase energy security open up new prospects for cooperation between the EU and Central Asia. EU efforts to strengthen local energy markets will help improve investment conditions, increase energy production and efficiency in Central Asia, and diversify energy supply and distribution patterns in the region. As a result one can conclude that the overall goal of achieving stability and prosperity through peaceful interaction makes Europe and Central Asia partners in developing cooperation. It cannot be excluded that the interests of the United States and the European Union after the end of the operation in Afghanistan and Iraq may diverge.

The active development of the EU's own military-political component, including the emergence of supranational structures, can lead to the emergence of an independent European component of the geopolitical layout in the Central Asian region.

Turkey looks like a loyal ally of the United States and is very active in Central Asia. The activity of Turkey is encouraged by Western states, primarily the United States, who fear ideological and political expansion of Iran in the Central Asian states. Nevertheless, the United States does not think about how beneficial, for example, Great Turkish State will be to Washington, whose plans are being hatched by certain circles in Turkey. The coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in this country would mean a failure for US policy. Therefore, the latest support for Ankara's Central Asian ambitions should have its limits.

As a conclusion, Central Asian region and the Republic of Tajikistan, as an integral part of it, have acquired significance in international relations. The region including the Republic of Tajikistan occupy an important place in the U.S strategy. At the heart of the current U.S policy toward Tajikistan are the interests of national security and the military and political domination of the United States in Central Asia and neighboring regions in the 21st century. Having made a geostrategic breakthrough in the Central Asian region, the United States gradually began to declare more resolutely its intention to gain a foothold here on a long-term basis, without determining the time limits of its presence. In August 2004, U.S President George W. Bush announced that the United States intends to provide itself with permanent access to strategic facilities in the region. The Americans' focus on strategic energy facilities and resources, communications is an invariable attribute of most American developments in Central Asia, and this is supported by a number of concrete measures.

The main conclusion in the analysis of U.S-Tajik relations until 2001 is that in the foreign policy of the United States of that period there was insufficient interest in Tajikistan. Recognition of the independence of the Republic of Tajikistan by the U.S was a rational decision. Nevertheless, there was no consistent and holistic policy

towards Tajikistan. Based on an analysis of the evolution of U.S-Tajik relations in the early 1990s, two main conclusions were drawn.

First, the United States was not able to really assess the state of the domestic political life of the Republic of Tajikistan. Linking the provision of guarantees of U.S economic assistance and the implementation of projects in Tajikistan with the demands of immediate democratic transformations in Tajikistan was a mistake. The total amount of U.S financial assistance to the Republic of Tajikistan for 1992-2002 amounted to \$ 490 million.

Second, the scope of the legal framework between the U.S and the Republic of Tajikistan was insignificant. The total number of bilateral documents was only four formal agreements. Comparative comparison of the signed bilateral agreements of the Republic of Tajikistan with other countries (with Iran - 50, with Turkey - 22, with China - 21) shows that the U.S-Tajik interaction was minimal.

The current U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan in the political and diplomatic sphere tends to increase bilateral cooperation. The factor of “intermediate refusal of the requirements of democratic reforms” in relations with Dushanbe and the creation of new formats of political contacts are traced. Since the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan, until 2014, serious transformation phenomena have taken place in U.S foreign policy, which, in turn, led to a qualitative reassessment and revision of the role and significance of the Republic of Tajikistan in regional politics. It is obvious that the prospects for political interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan in the coming years will be carefully analyzed and revised both in the direction of activation and minimization. Such an ambiguity in the prospects for the development of political dialogue is due to the fact that Washington does not quite accept the administrative methods of the current authorities of Tajikistan. This concern is reflected in various annual reports of the U.S State Department on Human Rights, Freedom of Religion and Human Trafficking in the Republic of Tajikistan. At present, the Republic of Tajikistan adheres to a balanced

tactic, maintaining a level of relations with the United States that contributes to strengthening statehood, while not allowing a situation that could challenge the integrity and sovereignty of Tajikistan.

The military-technical component of modern U.S policy towards the Republic of Tajikistan, on the one hand, is of key importance in the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan within the framework of the Tajikistan-U.S-Afghanistan format, on the other, there is an escalation of bilateral military-technical cooperation between the U.S and the Republic of Tajikistan.

Economic interaction between the United States and the Republic of Tajikistan stands in the last place in the spectrum of opportunities used by Washington for the development of its policy. The U.S remains supporters of continued lobbying by the world financial institutions - the IMF and the World Bank - of loans for the development of the economy of Tajikistan.

Obviously, in the political and diplomatic sphere Tajikistan adheres to a balanced tactic, constantly maintaining with the U.S the level of relations that promotes the strengthening of statehood, while not allowing situations that could challenge its integrity and sovereignty. It is vital for the Republic of Tajikistan to maintain a level of strategic partnership with the United States, but only on the condition that other centers of power also participate in the political plane of the country and it is necessary to create conditions in which each of the main external actors holds or balances the other.

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