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FERTILITY INTENTION OF WOMEN IN TURKEY FROM  
A GENDER EQUITY PERSPECTIVE  
WITH FOCUS ON THE DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN  
THE HOME

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## SUMMARY

Fertility levels have witnessed a dramatic decline, especially since the 1970s, and despite many diverse studies, the reasons for these unprecedented low levels of fertility have remained elusive. Many of researches have attributed the low levels of fertility to the status of women, although they typically take into consideration only their status in the public sphere, which represents only half of the picture. Gender equality theory can overcome this shortfall by focusing on the different social institutions that exist in both public and private spheres.

This thesis provides an empirical test of gender equity theory by focusing on particular dimensions of gender equity, being the allocation of housework, education and employment. Considering fertility as a purposive behavior that is based on intentions, the aim in this thesis is to establish a model of the fertility intentions of women in Turkey from a gender equity perspective. To this end, micro-level analyses are carried out using nationally representative data from the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, 2008. The results show that after controlling for education level and current working status, the allocation of housework has a significant effect on the fertility intentions of women in the 25–34 age group; while the effect is not in the expected direction for women in the 15–24 and 35–44 age groups. It is concluded that the inconsistent levels of gender equity attributable to different social institutions has a decreasing impact on the fertility intentions of women in the 25–34 age group.

This study is expected to provide some important contributions to the existing body of literature on the relationship between fertility and gender equity in Turkey. It is the first study relating the status of women in not only the public realm but also the private realm -by focusing on allocation of housework- with fertility intentions.

## ÖZET

1970’li yıllardan günümüze dramatik bir düşüş sergileyen doğurganlık seviyeleri ile ilgili literatürde birçok çalışma olmasına rağmen doğurganlık seviyelerindeki benzeri görülmemiş düşüşün nedenleri tam olarak açıklanamamıştır. Düşük doğurganlık seviyelerinin nedenini kadının statüsüne atfeden birçok araştırma, kadının, asıl resmin sadece yarısını temsil eden, yalnızca kamusal alandaki statüsünü dikkate almıştır. Toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği kuramı hem kamusal hem de özel alandaki farklı sosyal kurumlara odaklanarak söz konusu boşluğu doldurabilir.

Bu tez, cinsiyet eşitliğinin belirli boyutlarına odaklanarak (ev işlerinin paylaşımı, eğitim ve istihdam) toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği kuramına ampirik destek sağlamaktadır. Bu tezin amacı doğurganlığın niyete dayalı ve amaca yönelik bir davranış olduğu düşüncesinden yola çıkarak Türkiye’deki kadınların doğurganlık niyetlerine yönelik cinsiyet eşitliği perspektifinden bir model oluşturmaktır. Bu amaçla 2008 Türkiye Nüfus ve Sağlık Araştırması’nın ulusal temsiliyeti olan verileri kullanılarak mikro düzeyli analizler yapılmıştır. Sonuçlar eğitim düzeyi ve şu anki çalışma durumu kontrol edildikten sonra, ev işlerinin paylaşımının 25-34 yaş grubundaki kadınların doğurganlık niyetleri üzerinde önemli bir etkiye sahip olduğunu göstermektedir; ancak bu etki 15-24 ve 35-44 yaş gruplarındaki kadınlar için beklenen yönde değildir. Çalışma farklı toplumsal kurumlara atfedilen tutarsız toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği düzeylerinin 25-34 yaş grubundaki kadınların doğurganlık niyetleri üzerinde azaltıcı etkisi olduğunu göstermiştir.

Bu çalışmanın Türkiye’de doğurganlık ve toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği arasındaki ilişkiyle ilgili mevcut yazına önemli katkılar sağlaması beklenmektedir. Çalışma, kadının sadece kamusal alandaki statüsünü değil -ev işlerinin paylaşımına odaklanarak- özel alandaki statüsünü de, doğurganlık niyetleriyle ilişkilendiren Türkiye üzerine ilk çalışmadır.

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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ABPRS	Address Based Population Registration System
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
GGs	Gender and Generations Survey
HIPS	Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies
NUTS	Nomenclature D'unités Territoriales Statistiques / Statistical Classification of Territorial Units
TDHS	Turkey Demographic and Health Survey
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Ehrlich, in his 1968 best-selling book *Population Bomb*, alerted policy makers and scholars to the possibility of a population crisis resulting from overpopulation and high fertility. He asserted that world population numbers were going to explode, and that the world would experience famine and large-scale deprivations even in the 1970s and 1980s. Happily, the predictions of Neo-Malthusian demographers like Ehrlich did not materialize, at least for many parts of the world. That said, there are today a number of other significant problems being faced by countries around the world, including global warming and HIV, but the problem that is becoming a significant source of concern for many countries, especially in the developed parts of the world, is the issue of low fertility.

There were by the 1980s already a number countries suffering from very low levels of fertility – a historically unique problem that triggered a wave of new discussions on population. Chesnais (2000:2) suggested that, “The well-known mechanism of population explosion (multiplication) gives place to a *population implosion* (division, or exponential decrease).”

Concerns related to low fertility spread even to Turkey, although when measured against the declining global fertility trend, in Turkey, especially since the 1970s, the total fertility rate<sup>1</sup> (TFR) has never fallen below the replacement level.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, in 2008 the prime minister at the time, supporting higher population growth for the country, declared that every family should have at least three children to ensure the Turkish population remains young.<sup>3</sup> Since low

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<sup>1</sup> TFR refers to the average number of children a woman will have in her lifetime if she experiences the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime and she survives until the end of her reproductive life.

<sup>2</sup> Total fertility levels are about 2.1 children per women.

<sup>3</sup>“[Başbakan'dan kadınlara '3 çocuk' mesajı](#)”, *NTVMSNBC*, 10 March 2008.

fertility was never publicized as a population problem after the pronatalist population policies applied in the first decades of the Republic, this new perspective was an unexpected surprise for the members of a society in which having two children has, for some time, been perceived as the norm.

Low fertility and its possible consequences gained attention not only in political circles, but also in the academia. Several approaches have attempted to explain reasons of low fertility, with different theories linking the decrease in fertility to the diffusion of contraceptive methods controlled by women, the changes in the value of children for families, changing economic conditions, changes in the nature of households' economic conditions, changes in cohort size, the rise of opportunities for women outside home, and a shift in the norms and changes in values related to individualism. All of these make a valuable contribution to the understanding of low fertility, yet they fail to explain the very low levels experienced in Western countries. This theoretical review highlights the need for a more gendered approach to explaining the very low levels of fertility, which is where gender equity theory can make a mark.

Gender equity is considered in this thesis as central to the understanding of the fertility intentions of women, in that gender is a cross-cutting variable that reigns over all of the varied attributes of life. Before explaining gender equity theory, it would be helpful to define the concept of gender equity. Fraser (1994: 594-595) says that gender equity has to date been associated with either equality or difference, with equality implying women are treated exactly the same as men, and difference suggesting that women are treated differently insofar as they differ from men. Theorists have deliberated the comparative virtues of these two approaches; however their discussions have generally misfired. On one hand, proponents of difference point out that equality strategies usually disadvantage women and impose a distorted standard on everyone; while on the other hand, the proponents of equality argue that difference approaches usually reinforce the existing stereotypes, and confine women within the existing gender divisions. In this regard, neither concept represents a

practical conception of gender equity. Referring to this point, Fraser (1994: 595) suggests that gender equity should be treated as a complex notion that includes a plurality of distinct normative principles.

Assume, for example, that gender equity requires not only equal respect for women and men, but also some more substantive kind of equality, such as equality of resources or equality of capabilities. Assume, in addition, that it requires not only parity of participation in socially valued activities, but also the decentering of androcentric measures of social value. In that case, each of four distinct norms must be respected for gender equity to be achieved. Failure to satisfy any one of them means failure to realize the full meaning of gender equity (Fraser 1994: 595).

Gender equity theory, which constitutes the theoretical frame of this thesis, suggests that a correlation exists between the lowered fertility rates and changing gender arrangements. As the gender system evolves, fertility declines in both less and more developed countries (Mathews 1999: 23). Male dominance over women has endured through most periods in history, and so to understand why fertility rates were higher in the past, one must examine the means by which society channeled the activities of women (Keyfitz 1986: 148). Up until the 1970s, the male breadwinner model prevailed in all currently advanced countries (McDonald 1997: 15), with the “male breadwinner model” referring to a gender relationship that can be characterized as the gender specific division of labor into paid work and housework. Since that time, the gender relationship has been undergoing a process of change all around the world (Lauk & Meyer 2005: 3).

After gaining rights in regards to property and suffrage, women in the West have gone on to gain many other rights related to individual-oriented institutions<sup>1</sup> that were once entirely male dominated (McDonald 2000: 436). These rights provided a pathway for gender equity in the public sphere, which saw women start to enter the labor force in great numbers and to take advantage of the educational opportunities that were newly opened to them. This was a revolution in gender

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<sup>1</sup> By individual-oriented institutions, McDonald means institutions that deal with people as individuals, such as the education and labor markets(2006).

relations that it was thought would lead to another revolution in the gendered division of housework. Yet, as Hochschild puts it, the revolution in the family institution “stalled” (1989). Despite the changes in public life, gender equity within family-related institutions<sup>1</sup> has continued to change, but at a very slow pace (McDonald 2000: 433). In Primeau’s words, “Women have moved into the traditionally-male domain of paid work at a faster rate than men have moved into the traditionally-female domain of household work” (2000: 118). Although women in many Western countries now enjoy high levels of education and participation in the labor market, the role of women and the division of housework within the family has remained relatively the same (Mills et al. 2008: 2).

Women in Turkey have enjoyed civil and political rights since the establishment of Republic. Free elementary education became mandatory for both men and women in 1923, and the right to vote and to run for office in both municipal and national elections were endowed on women in 1930 and 1934 respectively (Arat 1994: 57). The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions gave civil and social liberties to both women and men, with no discrimination between genders (Arat 1996: 29), and these rights and liberties made women more visible in the public space. It should be noted, however, that the gender gaps in many areas of life continue to exist. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2014, Turkey is in a better position regarding its gender gap in the areas of educational attainment and health and survival than other areas regarding gender gap, although it maintains only an average position related to the gender gap in the areas of economic participation and political empowerment (2014). While many women today have become a part of institutions in the public sphere, such as in education and the labor market, this revolution in the public space has been unable to permeate into the home. Just like their counterparts in the West, although Turkish women participate in the public space as workers, housework retains a strong cultural association with women, and this “stalled revolution” results

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<sup>1</sup> By family related institutions, McDonald means institutions that deal with people as members of families, such as industrial relations, services, government transfers and the family itself (2006).

in unequal distribution of housework between women and men.

Family organization, according to McDonald (2000: 433), is a significant aspect of cultural identity. The family is a conservative institution that will normally change only very gradually. In all societies, the family organization is protected from radical change by an idealized family morality that is generally supported by religion. As a result, regardless of any sudden changes in public life, gender equity within the family unit has continued to change only very slowly.

Ruppner's study (2010) of data garnered from the 2004 European Social Survey (ESS)<sup>1</sup> confirms that in spite of any revolutionary changes in public life, the evolution of the private lives of women is only very gradual. Using the allocation of housework as a measure of gender equity in the family, Ruppner (2010: 967-968) analyzed how much time women and men spend on housework, and at which proportions they allocate household chores. The mean hours spent doing housework in all 25 of the countries surveyed were considerably higher for women than men. The highest mean hours spent by men doing housework were recorded in Slovakia, while the lowest corresponding figure was in Turkey; and the highest proportions of housework were reported by the men of Sweden, and the lowest, again, by the men of Turkey.

According to the 2006 Time Use Survey carried out by TURKSTAT,<sup>2</sup> in Turkey, the average time spent on household chores and family care by unemployed women in urban areas is proximately five and a half hours, whereas for unemployed men it is less than one hour. In rural areas, the average time spent on household

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<sup>1</sup> European Social Survey that includes data for 25 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

<sup>2</sup>The Time Use Survey was conducted in 2006 by TURKSTAT. Data is based on the activities of people aged 15 years and above in Turkey.



chores and family care by unemployed women in rural areas was about six hours, while for unemployed men it was around one-and-a-half hours (TURKSTAT 2007). These figures show that women spend at least four times more hours than men on household chores and family care, and these figures differ very little among the employed women and men in Turkey. The average time spent by employed women on household chores and family care in urban areas is almost three-and-a-half hours, whereas for men, it is around 45 minutes. In rural areas, the time spent by women on these activities is around four-and-a-half hours, corresponding to 45 minutes for men (TURKSTAT 2007).

Considering all the points mentioned above, it is obvious that women face different levels of gender equity in different social institutions. According to McDonald, the inconsistency between the levels of gender equity in different social institutions can explain the very low fertility levels in advanced countries (1997: 27). Like their counterparts in the West, an inconsistency in the levels of gender equity, which McDonald smoothly pointed out, has been experienced by some women in Turkey, and may also have affected their fertility intentions and behavior. Since fertility is seen as a purposive behavior that is based on intentions (Schoen et al. 1999: 799); changes in fertility intentions lead to changes in fertility behavior.

The objective of this thesis is to develop an empirical test of gender equity theory for fertility intentions through an examination of the levels of gender equity in different social institutions in both the public and private realms. Focus is on particular dimensions of gender equity, being employment and education among the individual-oriented institutions; and the allocation of housework among the family-related institutions. These three areas of life can be considered essential not only in the arrangement of gender relationships, but also in understanding the powers that affect the level of gender equity. While taking into account education and employment, this thesis has a specific interest in the allocation of housework, since relationship between the division of housework and fertility is a subject that has to date remained untouched in Turkey. To subject gender equity theory to an empirical

test, micro-levels analyses are carried out on nationally representative data garnered during Turkey Demographic and Health Survey in 2008. Considering deficiency of the institutions which aim at reconciling work and parenthood for women and standing of the two child norm which has a significant impact on women's<sup>1</sup> fertility intentions in Turkey, this thesis tests three hypotheses in the country, which are:

1. Controlling for level of education level and participation in the labor market, a larger share of housework would lower the fertility intentions of women.
2. Not only larger share of the housework, but also a greater number of children women have would lower the fertility intentions of women in Turkey.
3. Not only larger share of the housework, but also gainful employment would lower the fertility intentions of women in Turkey

This study aims to make some important contributions to the body of existing literature related to the relationship between fertility intentions and gender equity in Turkey. First of all, it is one of very few studies analyzing the allocation of housework in Turkey; and is the first study that aims to relate the status of women, both in the public (focusing on education and employment) and private (focusing on allocation of housework) realms, their fertility intentions through an analysis of nationally representative data.

This thesis comprises seven further chapters, which are designed as follows:

In Chapter 2 the context of Turkey is discussed, beginning with a presentation of the changes in fertility levels since the establishment of the Republic. The chapter continues with a discussion of gender equity in the public lives of women, followed by an analysis of gender equity in the private realm in Turkey.

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<sup>1</sup> Fecund and currently married women aged between 15 and 44 are employed in the analysis of this thesis.

Chapter 3 presents a literature review, in which, first, the concept of low fertility is defined, after which, theories and discussions on the reasons for low fertility are described, with emphasis on gender equity theory. Second, after identifying what constitutes housework, three main theoretical approaches are put forward, which are the time availability perspective, the relative resources perspective and the gender perspective. Last, the relationship between low fertility and allocation of housework is discussed in this chapter.

Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework, with the intention being to explain the researcher's approach to the relationship between fertility and gender equity in Turkey.

The methodology is set out in Chapter 5, beginning with a description of the main source of data for the thesis – the Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008. Secondly, the key variables used in both the descriptive and logistic regression analyses are introduced and defined. The limitations of the study are discussed in the third part, while in the fourth part, the aims of the descriptive analysis are stated. Finally, after making a general introduction to the aim of the logistic regression analysis, the models of this thesis employed in the logistic regression analysis are presented.

In chapter 6, the results of the descriptive analysis are presented. First, the basic social and demographic characteristics of all of the women employed in the analysis and their relationship with individual oriented institutions are provided. Second, the allocation of housework in Turkey is described, while the fertility intentions of women are presented in the third part. In the fourth section, the percentage distribution of the index used in the regression analysis is defined, followed in the fifth part with a description of the basic characteristics of women whose fertility intentions are not coherent with the two-child norm in society. The chapter concludes with descriptive tables of the regression models.

In Chapter 7, the logistic regression results of models constructed to test the three hypotheses of the thesis are presented.

Finally, Chapter 8 concludes the study by providing a brief summary of the entire content, as well as a discussion of the findings of the study. The chapter also highlights the scope for possible expansions of the study in the future.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **TURKEY CONTEXT**

Because this thesis attempts to establish a model of the fertility intentions of women in Turkey from a gender equity perspective, it would be good to introduce the fertility trends and the socio-demographic structure of Turkey. This chapter, which presents the relevant context of Turkey, is divided into three parts. In the first part the changes in fertility since establishment of the republic is explained. Second part is devoted to gender equity in public lives of women and final part discusses gender equity in private lives of women in Turkey.

#### **2.1 FERTILITY**

According to the first census carried out in 1927, population of Turkey was 13.6 million. After many years in war, it started to grow rapidly and this population was doubled in 1960s. Although starting from 1960s population growth rate has begun to decrease, population has continued to grow and in 1990 it doubled again by reaching 56 million (Koç et al.: 2010). According to data from most recent Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), in 2014 Turkey's population is 77.7 million of which 8 % consists of persons aged 65 and over while 24% consists of persons aged 15 and lower (TURKSTAT 2015).

The change in growth rates is closely related to varying population policies in nearly a century, (92 years). After establishment of republic, there was a shortage of human power due to loses in the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and the War of Independence. Because the aim was to increase population to rebuild social and economic life, the pronatalist laws were intended to grow population both directly and indirectly. For example the importation, production and sale of contraceptives were forbidden and financial incentives were provided in order to encourage citizens to have larger families (Ergöçmen 2012:120). The decline in fertility was triggered by the change in the governmental policy which was before pronatalist in 1965. The

new policy was antinatalist i.e. supporting limited population growth. Voluntary surgical contraception and induced abortions up to tenth week of pregnancy were legalized in 1983. Apart from those changes, that make child bearing as a choice rather than inevitable role of women, the society as a whole was experiencing social and economic transformations which bring changes in women's status. This affected demographic behavior, especially fertility (Ergöçmen 1997: 81).


Two laws related to population planning were issued in 1965 and 1983 in Turkey. After 25 years, in 2008, determinants of population size and structure, especially fertility attracted politicians' attention, again. Since 2008, prime minister at the time has started to give speeches to encourage people in Turkey to have at least three children. In 2012 he went one step further and described abortion as tantamount to murder. Referring population projections by TURKSTAT which suggest population aging in 2050, lowering fertility rates have been seen as hazardous for future population by the prime minister and his government. The discourse used by them was pronatalist just like the discourse in first decades of the Republic. In 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan of Turkey, one of the goals of "Program on Protection of Family and Dynamic Population Structure" action plan was identified as increasing TFR above replacement level. It was the first tangible step based on this discourse that supports higher fertility. This program includes financial incentives to make families have more children and give opportunity to work part-time for employed mothers. Finally in January 2015, "Draft Law on Amendment of Some Laws and Decree Laws in order to Protect Family and Dynamic Population Structure" was presented in the parliament. Because the concrete efforts to boost fertility are quite recent, their effects on TFR have not been observed.

In addition to population policies, the changes in women's status (especially in public domain), according to Ergöçmen, (1997: 81) play a significant role in the demographic transition of Turkey. The rapid social and economic developments occurred in the country throughout the modernization process (which will be mentioned in the next section) has led changes at the demographic level as well.

Actually, the societies experiencing a transformation from traditional to modern, generally show a decrease in fertility. The changes undergone in women's lives result in a decrease in desire for fertility. New opportunities appeared for women and this generally leads women to limit their fertility and creates the opportunity to have a greater voice in planning of when and how many children the couple has. Accordingly, modernization process brought a decrease in fertility of Turkey.

Figure 2.1.1 shows the changes in total fertility rates between 1923 and 2013. It indicates a decline in TFR towards replacement level and stabilization around it. Before 50s, thanks to incentives to encourage people to have more children, TFR was increased to 7 births per women. In mid-1950s, a rapid decrease in TFR was observed. TFR was around 6 births per women in 1960s, around 3 in 1980s, and 2.5 in 2000. The most recent two TFRs released by TURKSTAT are 2.09 for 2013 and 2.17 for 2014. According to the results of TDHS-2013 it is 2.26 (HIPS 2014).

**Figure 2. 1. 1 Changes in Total Fertility Rates, Turkey 1923-2013**



Source: SIS 1995; TURKSTAT 2015

According to TDHS-2008, whose data is used in this thesis, TFR for Turkey is 2.16. This rate being just above the replacement level points out that fertility transition in Turkey is ongoing. TFR for urban areas is 2.00 and for rural areas is 2.68 (Table 2.1.1). The gap in levels of fertility in urban and rural areas was greater in the past. Besides, approximately 70 percent of births occur before age 30 and births to women aged below 20 and over 35 constitute about one-fifth of the all births. The highest age-specific fertility rates are detected in the 25-29 age group while the 20-25 age group was the cohort with the highest age specific fertility rate, before. This specifies that childbearing is increasingly postponed to later ages (HIPS 2009).

Table 2.1.1 presents total fertility rates from TDHS-2008 by region and residence. Results of TDHS-2008 suggest that all regions in Turkey, except the East and the Central regions, display fertility rates below 2.1. Among NUTS1 regions the lowest TFR belongs to Istanbul (1.78) and the highest one belongs to Southeast Anatolia (3.47). In general it can be concluded that regions located in eastern part of Turkey tend to reveal higher TFRs and regions located in western parts of Turkey tend to indicate lower TFRs.

Marriage, which is directly related to fertility behavior in Turkey, is universal, in other words, everybody eventually marry at least once in their life time. Median age of marriage has been increasing and it is 25 for the year of 2014 (TURKSTAT 2015). Here, it should be noted that almost all births in Turkey occur in marriage. Like marriage, having children is universal, too. Besides, Turkey has a two-child norm for a while.



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**Table 2.1.1 Total Fertility Rates by Region and Residence, Turkey 2008**

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	<i>TFR</i>
<b>Type of place of residence</b>	
Urban	2.00
Rural	2.68
<b>Region</b>	
West	1.73
South	2.09
Central	2.20
North	2.08
East	3.27
<b>Region (NUTS1)</b>	
Istanbul	1.78
West Marmara	1.38
Aegean	1.91
East Marmara	1.80
West Anatolia	2.40
Mediterranean	2.09
Central Anatolia	2.09
West Black Sea	1.90
East Black Sea	2.10
Northeast Anatolia	2.59
Central East Anatolia	3.33
Southeast Anatolia	3.47

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Source: HIPS 2009

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## 2.2 GENDER EQUITY IN PUBLIC SPHERE

The Republic of Turkey bridges East and West not only geographically but also culturally. Since 1923 with the adaptation of Parliamentary Democratic Government System, it has officially been a secular state. Republican era is defined as modernization with a strong emphasis on liberalization and emancipation of women (Aycan and Eski 2005: 454). After declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923, two objectives are aimed: building of an independent Turkish state and modernization of this state. Sultanate and sharia law were abolished and in 1926 the Swiss Civil Code was adopted (Gündüz 2004: 116).

The new laws prevented polygamy, instituted civil marriage, allowed the initiation of divorce by both partners, and guaranteed equality of women before the law. In 1934 women gained the right to vote and eligibility to be selected (Gündüz 2004: 116). According to Özbay (1999: 556), modernization process which spread all over Turkey after Second World War, actually started in late 19th century and establishment of nation state brought the ideological and legal basis for this process.. The changes which were made for the sake of modernization and westernization of Turkey, facilitates women new opportunities in education and work place (Gündüz 2004: 117).

Considering the points above, it is certain that those rights granted brought changes to people's lives in the public domain. It should be underlined that although the door of employment has opened to women, limited number of women has come through the door, even today. The labor force participation rate of women in Turkey is 30.3% in 2014. Among women who are not in labor force 57.6% of them is housewife and 11.2% them is student and 7.5 % of them is not seeking a job but available to start to work. Among women in labor force 29.5% is unpaid family worker and 60.2 % is regular or casual employee. Besides, 93.4% of women are literate (TURKSTAT 2015). However, granting equal rights could not solve the women's problem, patriarchal gender roles remained same (Gündüz 2004: 117).

Despite changes towards the empowerment of women in public space, gender inequity especially in the private domain i.e. in family has maintained.

### **2.3 GENDER EQUITY IN PRIVATE SPHERE**

To start with, despite the modernization processes, Turkey remained mainly patriarchal on the social level. Therefore, in Turkey modern and traditional exist together in a highly heterogeneous social and cultural structure (Ergöçmen 1997: 81). The rights granted to women change their lives outside home –at least lives of some women-; yet slightly affected what is happening inside. Therefore, housework is still a strong cultural prescription for women which cause unequal allocation of it. In other words, housework remains to be a reflection of being a good wife and mother in Turkey, like as it is in most parts of the world.

According to Frangoudaki, and Keyder women (2007: 205), after the establishment of Republic, education institutions, specifically the girls' institutes attain great importance in emotionalization of housework. In these institutions, the focus was on the extra-material qualities of housework and domestic technology, such as facilitating the family's happiness or contributing to the personal development or self-esteem of women.

What is important and distinct in the Turkish case is that new forms and standards of housework were not only introduced as necessary conditions for being a "better housewife or mother", but also as the main ways of embracing modernity and the modern way of life. In this respect, reformation of the domestic sphere and shaping a bourgeois domesticity have all along been part of the general context of the state's modernizing project (Frangoudaki, and Keyder 2007: 205).

In short, during modernization process of Turkey, the main aim was never emancipation of women directly, rather modernization of country though emancipating women. This costs some contradictions for women, in Özbay's words "The double standard of modern society that expects women to be a 'lady' outside the home and still something of a servant within it remains." (1999: 563).

There is no study on the effect of allocation of housework on demographic behaviors in Turkey. The studies on housework in Turkey which are very limited in number, have one common conclusion: today, it is still women who is doing most repetitive tasks and spend enormous time on housework. To illustrate, it would be good to recall Time Use Survey whose results released in 2006. Survey suggests that in Turkey women spend 5 hours 17 minutes in a day on household activities while men spend 51 minutes (TURKSTAT 2006). It is obvious that women perform approximately six times greater time on housework than men. If the subject under discussion is quantity of labor, it can be concluded that women in Turkey have been doing enormously large share of the housework.

Bespinar's study (2014: 252) on data from Research on Family Structure in Turkey suggests that division of housework among members of family has a highly gendered structure. In general, such types of housework like cooking and cleaning are performed by women whereas such types of housework like paying bills and reparations are performed by men. Housework participation of daughters and sons are just like their mothers and fathers, it is highly gendered. Considering socialization function of family institution, it may be inferred that there will not be significant changes in allocation of housework in the future.

Results of Research on Domestic Violence against Children Aged 0-8 Years in Turkey (2014: 62) reveal that fathers' participation in housework and child-care are at very low levels. Only 3.6% of cooking, 3.4% of cleaning the house, 2.1% of doing laundry, and 6.9% of doing the dishes are performed by fathers. On the other hand, 48.1% of shopping for house and 41.6% of taking care of children are performed by fathers. It should be here detailed that even if the percentage of taking care of children seem high, the tasks men more frequently perform are not "repetitive and boring" tasks: fathers are performing 3.4 % of changing diapers, 9.7% of putting to sleep, 9.5% of feeding, 6.9% of taking bath and 8.3% of reading. When it comes to tasks having a leisure component, percentages become higher: 27.8 % of playing, 30.0% of taking a stroll is performed by fathers.

Another study on housework is Erkal and Çopur's study (2013) on the views and behavior of women on the distribution of responsibility in household activities. Based on 600 women interview, their results show that even if women are performing many of the physical and social activities, women think that men and women should share the responsibilities. They interpret this finding as women demanding a change in the traditional structure in household activities.

Hatun's study (2013) on data of TDHS-2008 examined the effects of cultural factors on division of housework. He specifically looks at gender ideology and religion's impact. He concluded that religious variables and routine housework<sup>1</sup>'s relationship is positive whereas religious variables and residual housework<sup>2</sup>'s relationship is negative.

Child care is another issue to be discussed regarding the gender equity in private lives. In Turkey, institutionalized child care services are far from adequate. The care of children at pre-school age is not regarded as a public liability; rather, it is a responsibility borne by relatives, especially women. Public child care services are extremely poor and private child care services are accessible for a limited socio-economic segment of the society. Besides that, there are regional inequalities regarding access to child care services (Bogazici University Social Policy Forum 2009: 2). According to Ecevit (2010), in Turkey institutionalization of childcare services has been run behind and these services are still home-based and family-oriented. There are scarcely any institutionalized childcare services for children in very early years of life (0-3 years). In both private and public kindergartens and pre-schools, which has been increasing in number, children aged 4-5 are educated. In Turkey, there are nurseries that provide care and education for children of employees in public institutions. Workplaces subject to labor law are supposed to have nurseries

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<sup>1</sup> Including cooking, setting and cleaning the dining table, cleaning such as wiping and sweeping, washing the dishes, washing the clothes and ironing

<sup>2</sup> Including shopping for the kitchen, managing household budget, handling paper work at governmental offices and paying the bills

if they employ a certain number of women workers, however they typically do not fulfil this obligation.

Considering inadequate child care system in Turkey, women's working life is being interrupted by a birth. Some women have to face a dilemma of choosing between taking care of the child and working. In such a country where child care services are costly, many women after giving birth stop being part of labor market and stay home to take care of the child (Kakıcı et al. 2008: 24). Because culturally, they are women who are mainly responsible for child care, they have to sacrifice their work life for the sake of being mother.

Hereby, despite the modernization process, Turkey remains its patriarchal structure especially in family-related institutions. Also despite many rights women acquired, there are still serious obstacles to enjoy their rights. Therefore, women continue to be responsible and perform most of housework and childcare.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

In this chapter the remaining body of literature on low fertility and housework will be discussed. This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, after introducing the concept of low fertility, selected theories towards fertility will be presented. In the second part, after describing housework, three main theoretical approaches towards housework which are time availability perspective, relative resources perspective and gender perspective will be mentioned. In the final part the relationship between low levels of fertility and allocation of housework is discussed.

#### **3.1 LOW FERTILITY**

Fertility as measured by the period total fertility rate (TFR) has been showing a declining trend all around the world since 1970s. This decrease which had been welcomed at first place has lately become the nightmare of many countries after fertility rates fell below 2.1 births per women<sup>1</sup>. In fact, in 2001 total fertility levels for more than half of the Europe's population are at or below 1.3 (Sobotka 2004: 212).

Considering persistent declining fertility levels, especially for developed parts of the world, Chesnais, who proposed that the mechanism of population explosion gives way to population implosion, seems to be right. The modern fertility decline usually happened from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, yet in some countries like China it was earlier and some regions like Southern and Eastern Europe it was later (Chesnais 2000: 2). In 1970s and 1980s total fertility rates had already been below the replacement level in considerable number of the European countries. The term "low fertility" became insufficient to refer total fertility rates around 1.0 experienced

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<sup>1</sup> According to World Fertility Report, Some 67 countries in 2011 had fertility rates below replacement level. (United Nations 2013)

by many European countries since 1990s (Sobotka 2004: 195). McDonald (2006) draw a line for safety zone for at 1.5 and Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2001) coined the new term “lowest-low fertility” to define period fertility rates below 1.3.

**TABLE 3.1.1 Total Fertility Rates for The World, Development Groups And Major Areas**

	<i>Total Fertility</i>		
	<i>1970-1975</i>	<i>1990-1995</i>	<i>2005-2010</i>
World	4.44	3.04	2.53
More developed regions	2.15	1.67	1.66
Less developed regions	5.36	3.38	2.69
Least developed countries	6.75	5.77	4.53
Other less developed countries	5.18	3.08	2.40
Africa	6.66	5.71	4.88
Asia	4.99	2.96	2.25
Europe	2.17	1.57	1.54
Latin America and the Caribbean	5.02	3.02	2.30
Northern America	2.01	2.00	2.02
Oceania	3.23	2.49	2.47

Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. New York: United Nations.



World Bank reported that 99 of the countries had total fertility rates below replacement level in 2012 (2015). In other words, fertility level below replacement level exists for nearly half of the world population (Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2013: 13). Table 3.1.1 exhibits fertility transitions between 1970 and 2010 for the world, development groups and major areas. Total fertility rates have dropped for whole world with varying levels (with the exception of Northern America). It is obvious that, for more developed regions and Europe, fertility has been under replacement level between 1975 and 1990. It cannot be concluded that very high national fertility rates have disappeared, yet they are mostly concentrated in least developed regions, especially Africa. On the other hand, low and lowest–low fertility rates are prevalent in more developed regions, especially Europe.

Examining empirical studies on low fertility, Morgan and Taylor (2006: 383-384) set following frameworks:

- Contemporary low fertility is significantly related to timing shifts.
- The age at which women have children would affect the number of children women will bear.
- Parents calculate direct and indirect costs in having and rearing children in most contemporary contexts.
- Active birth control is justified by dominant norms and values.
- Low parity births become strongly normative.
- High parity births become rare and non-normative.

Morgan and Taylor put together above information on what is known about low fertility. Low fertility is not an unexpected occurrence, in fact; it is inevitable in the final stage of demographic transition. Demographic transition theory suggests

that industrialization and modernization, increasing survival, a growing culture of individualism, growing socially mobile urban populations, rising consumer aspirations, loss of various family functions to factory and school, and decline in mortality would facilitate fertility decline (Szreter 1993: 662). At the final stage, a new equilibrium is reached between birth and death rates with a stabilization of the population with zero population growth and no need for immigrants. However, decline in fertility did not stop around two children on average as expected (Lesthaeghe 2010: 211) and fertility levels below 1.3 are clearly not a demographic equilibrium and persistent lowest-low fertility levels indicate important demographic, economic and social outcomes (Kohler et al 2001: 2).

Is this a temporary phenomenon or are these very low levels of fertility, here to stay? Reviewing assessments on permanence of low fertility, Goldstein, Sobotka and Jasilioniene (2009: 666) distinguished two opposing approach: Some scholars like Bongaarts and Sobotka argue that lowest low fertility is a transient period which will end when delays in childbearing cease. Other view, on the other hand, suggests that lowest-low fertility will be persistent because of the persistence of tempo-induced declines<sup>1</sup> in TFR and their potential future consequences and the socio-economic and cultural conditions of lowest-low-fertility societies. Different approaches on whether or not low fertility is persistent, relate low fertility to different causes. Next section is devoted to varying explanations of low fertility.

### **3.1.1 Explanations of Low Fertility**

#### **3.1.1.1 Diffusion of contraception controlled by women**

According to Keyfitz (1986), low fertility is caused by biological, economic and political-social circumstances. On biological side, the decline of births is associated with effective means of contraception. If biological part of the fertility has come under control, extra- biological causes of change should be considered. That

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<sup>1</sup> Tempo-induced declines in fertility are related to the timing of births over women's life cycle.

attracts attention of those, who seek the causes of fertility change, into economic variables. An example of economic variables may be the assertion that families small in numbers let women have more free time and consequently let them participate in the market greatly as put by Smith and Ward (1984: xxi cited in Keyfitz 1986). Highlighting proximate causes are economic, Keyfitz (1986: 140) moves on a “further layer” which is related to political-social changes. When the authority structure in household falls apart, fertility falls down; he asserts. In other words, when negotiation power of women grows through institutions like education or employment, fertility decreases.

These three levels of justification do not oppose to each other. Keyfitz (1986: 141).asserts that contraception controlled by women (using the pill, foam, and diaphragm) rather than men (using condom or withdrawal) influenced the birth rate immediately which would further give birth other indirect outcomes grounding low fertility

Like Keyfitz, Bumpass highlighted the significance of contraception controlled by women. According to Bumpass (1973: 67), diffusion of pills had created a concept of revolution in fertility control values which led not only a quantitative increase in efficacy but also “a qualitative leap that changed the rules under which fertility decisions are made”. The greater efficacy of pills could ensure women plan and control their fertility unlike even the most effective traditional contraceptive methods. As a matter of fact, it was then possible for women to prevent unwanted fertility and even plan a lifetime of childlessness which was unlikely before. This new regime brought by pill made adoption of other means of contraception like IUD, sterilization and abortion easy and resulted in a reduction in the fertility of U.S. women. In other words, diffusion of pills brought a change in attitudes and practices towards fertility control (Bumpass 1973: 68).

Being able to control their fertility, having a/another child appeared as a choice for women which had never before existed: motherhood becomes “a matter of

rational evaluation”. Since it was not inevitable anymore, non-familial roles for women came to be a realistic option. Women could consider on the cost and benefits of having a/another child and decide accordingly. Now equality of opportunity for women could be in the agenda (Bumpass 1973: 68).

Bumpass, (1973: 67) commenting on the decline of fertility in United States in 1973, predicted that fertility would be below replacement level and perhaps even rather far below, because of transitional delays in marriage and births. He described maintenance of low fertility as a modern fertility regime, might be across modern countries. He foresaw that fertility below replacement level was simply as an intrinsic characteristic of a modern fertility control society (1973: 69). In sum, he stresses on a change in the ideology brought by diffusion of pills. He asserts as follows “My interpretation does not rest on universal diffusion of modern methods but on the diffusion of the gestalt associated with these methods.” (Bumpass 1973: 68).

### **3.1.1.2 The demand of children and income**

Becker also proposed that the development and diffusion of contraceptive knowledge directed attention of researchers of family size towards decision making processes. He analyzed fertility by using an economic approach in 1960. Since children were source of satisfaction, they would be considered as a consumption good in economist’s terminology. Furthermore, due to the fact that they sometimes provide money income, children would be considered as a production good, too. Therefore, for Becker, it is possible to relate the demand for children to a well-developed economic theory and he used the theory of demand for consumer durables to analyze demand for children (1960: 209). Determinants of fertility, he asserts, are income, child cost, knowledge, uncertainty and tastes just like any other durable goods. If income increases and price decreases, demand for children increases. At this point it is necessary for him to distinguish between quantity and quality of children. Since quality of children is directly related to the amount spent on them, an

increase in income would have stronger effect on quality rather than quantity (1960: 231). He empirically tested the relationship between number of children desired and income, and crude cross-sectional data confirmed a negative relationship between them (1960).

Later, Becker's further analysis showed that the rise in income under the path of economic development leads the rising demand for the quality of children and that results in fertility decline as this simply increased the cost of children for families. In other words, for the sake of higher quality of children, parents reduce the quantity of children (1991). As an example for Becker's explanation, rising education costs in Korea is seen as one of the significant determinants of the fertility decline (Suzuki 2008: 33).

#### **3.1.1.3 Nature of household's economic conditions**

Another economic approach comes from Lesthaeghe and Wilson (1986). Analyzing fertility decline in Western Europe between 1870 and 1930, they find out that nature of household's economic conditions shape fertility behavior. When a familial, labor intensive mode of production prevailed, there was little movement in the direction of family limitation. However, when mode of production has replaced with a wage-earning sector, children have become more independent from their parents which wrinkled social and economic reasons for continued high fertility. However, this incentive was not enough, according to them, there was a need for change in moral values to control fertility and the process of secularization allowed this change.

#### **3.1.1.4 The changes in family's internal economic structure**

Like Lesthaeghe and Wilson, in "The wealth flows theory of fertility decline", Caldwell focuses on transactions between family members. He used the term "wealth" instead of "income" to highlight that transactions between family

members can be goods, services, not necessarily monetary. He proposed that fertility decline is resulted from the changes in family's internal economic structure. In agriculture societies children provide economic benefits i.e. wealth flow was from children to older members of the family. When high fertility was an economic advantage for families, there was no need to limit fertility. However, in modern and urban societies the flow changed direction and high fertility was no more an economic advantage. This reversal according to Caldwell is a reversal of the intergenerational wealth flow resulting in lower fertility (1982). According to Kaplan and Bock, a large amount of evidence confirmed that higher costs of rearing children are related to fertility transition and people in high fertility societies have higher expectation concerning economic support during old age than people in low fertility societies (2001).

#### **3.1.1.5 Size of birth cohorts**

Easterlin's cyclical change is also worth to mention when thinking about fertility transition. In his work, he underlines the changing size of birth cohorts. He focuses on different economic status according to which decision on desired number of children would be made. According to him, small cohort size increases economic opportunities for its members and results in higher income than standard of living they grow up with. Members of this cohort live according to their family ideals. On the other hand, for large cohort size, wages are depressed and income becomes reduced, therefore, members of this cohort cannot live according to their ideals. Lower economic status triggers lower fertility. In other words, fertility patterns follow cycles with large birth cohorts producing small cohorts and small cohorts producing large cohorts (1973 and 1987).

#### **3.1.1.6 Rising economic power of women**

Another explanation for low fertility is from Becker, again. He puts rising economic power of women as the main cause of fertility changes since 1950s.

Occupational opportunities for women increased the time they spend in work and consequently increased the cost of children. Besides, because of the fact that the value given to marriage has reduced and divorce, female-headed households, cohabitation and extramarital births has risen, fertility became low (1991).

### **3.1.1.7 A dramatic shift in norms and values to individualism**

Having observed that after completion of first demographic transition, fertility rates of Europe continued to decline below replacement level, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa carved out second demographic transition theory (1986). Second demographic transition theory suggests that a dramatic shift in norms and values to individualism is responsible for this unbalanced population decline and only measures get along well with this shift could slow or reverse the fertility decline (van de Kaa 1987). Some of demographic features of second demographic transition, according to Lesthaeghe (2010), are fall in proportions married, rise in age at first marriage and divorce, persistent sub-replacement level fertility, different living arrangements other than classic heterosexual marriage, full control of fertility, and increasing number of children out of wedlock.

### **3.1.1.8 Gender equity**

Considering different approaches above, changes in fertility are associated with transformation of social and economic conditions. Varying theories above find an affiliation between low fertility and diffusion of contraceptive methods controlled by women, the changes in value of children for families, changes in economic conditions, changes in nature of households' economic conditions, cohort size, rising opportunities for women out of home and a shift in norms and values towards individualism. The final approach towards to low fertility, which detailed below, focuses on the relationship between fertility and gender equity.

McDonald (2006: 486) pointed out that there is a relationship between the level of gender equity and fertility. Gender equity theory suggests that low fertility is the unplanned outcome of changing social and economic institutions. Before explaining the gender equity theory, what is meant by gender equity should be clarified, here. According to Mason, in every society there prevails a *gender system* which refers socially-constructed expectations for male and female behavior and these expectations not only command a division of labor and responsibilities between women and men but also give over different rights and obligations to them. Furthermore, they generate inequality in power, autonomy, and well-being, generally to the disadvantage of females (1995: 1-2). Gender system has two components: First one is gender stratification which means institutionalized inequality between male and female members of society. Second one is gender roles meaning the division of labor between men and women (Mason 1995). Gender equity originates from both of these elements of the gender system (Mc Donald 2000).

The male breadwinner model, which reached its peak in 1950s, appoints the man to be provider and protector, and the woman to be carer and reproducer. In gender equity model of family, which is the opposite of the breadwinner model, gender has no specific relationship to who does which type of work such as income earning, caring and nurturing work. (McDonald 1997: 15-16)

The male breadwinner model was seen as universal institutional form of family in the past (McDonald 1997: 16). An example of it is William Goode's book named as "World Revolution and Family Patterns" which was published in 1963. According to Cherlin (2012) Goode proposed "Convergence Hypothesis". This hypothesis suggested that when economic system expands through industrialization; young adults would rationally choose to form "conjugal families" which fits industrial age very well. He foresaw that family patterns would change in a way in which kinship ties become weaken; lineage patterns dissolve; and a kind of nuclear family which he called as "conjugal family" being a type of male-breadwinner family becomes a more independent kinship unit. In conjugal families only husbands



pursue a career outside home and the families are small in number. Even if women moved into labor force; few women would move into prestigious occupations because they would still be required to do domestic work. He found an affinity between industrialism and conjugal family. Goode, like the modernist thinkers of his time, thought in a way that conjugal families were last stage of development meaning this family type was better and superior; also would not change anymore.

However, family continued to transform further, unlike Goode's limited expectations. Different institutions in society have been moving away from the assumption of male breadwinner model of the family in the direction of a gender equity model at differing speeds. This leads to substantial gaps between social and economic institutions in regard to the model of family that they presume and transformed the type of family in the direction of gender equity which results in low fertility rates (McDonald 1997: 17-18).

At this point Mc Donald (2006: 489) argues that low fertility is associated with two waves of social change that have been occurring since 1960s: social liberalism/reflexive modernization and economic deregulation/the new capitalism. The first wave that prevailed in 1960s and 1970s brought a rapid growth of social liberalism or reflexive modernization. Individuals started to pursue personal autonomy and construct their own identities and are freed from institutional and normative constraints in these years. Besides, cohabitation and delayed child-bearing started to become acceptable. Furthermore, greater level of gender equity started to be seen in some institutions, especially in paid employment sector. Also, women's education levels have increased rapidly. Through this process which is modernization of the principles of industrial society that contain assessment by individuals or groups of the correctness of present social institutions for modern life, people become more responsible for the outcomes of their actions. Along with these changes, social liberalism makes women and men face increased personal risks, however risks are greater for women.

Second wave of social change which is economic deregulation or the new capitalism occurred in 1980s and 1990s. In this era, welfare state capitalism gave way to provide greater autonomy to market actors i.e. firms, investors and workers in accordance with neo-liberal philosophy (McDonald 2006: 490).

The most important features brought by second wave are lowering job security, less protection of wage levels, no standard of working hours and other work-related benefits. These two waves of social change have led a movement to gender equity focusing upon individual oriented institutions, yet family related institutions, especially family itself, persist to be characterized by gender inequity (McDonald 2006: 492). By individual oriented institutions, McDonald refers institutions dealing with people as individuals like education and labor market and by family related institutions he means institutions dealing with people as members of families like industrial relations, services, government transfers and the family (1997: 13). In labor markets where little or no provision is made for combination work and family, women exercise careful control over their fertility, delay family formation and have fewer children. Furthermore, engagement in the deregulated labor market brings greatly increased risk. To avoid risks individuals need to invest themselves and their employers through working longer hours, rather than family and consequently family formation and fertility can be delayed (McDonald 2006: 494).


After two waves of change mentioned above women's lives outside home have changed considerably, yet this change has not been followed by changes inside home.<sup>1</sup>At this point fertility shows very low trends. Figure 3.1.1 indicates that the gradual change in gender equity applying in family oriented institution lead to a transition from high fertility to replacement level fertility. When gender equity in individual oriented institutions rise sharply and is not followed by changes toward gender equity in family oriented institutions there appear very low levels of fertility. Therefore, very low fertility is the result of the inconsistency between high levels of

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<sup>1</sup> The changes occurred inside home will be detailed in the next part.

gender equity in individual oriented social institutions and persistent gender inequity in family-oriented social institutions (McDonald 2000).

**Figure 3.1.1 Conceptual Representation of Changes in the Level of Gender Equity over Time in Family-Oriented and Individual-Oriented Institutions in the West and Their Interaction with The Transition from High to Very Low Fertility**



Source: McDonald 2000: 435.

To conclude, if the reasons of low fertility are sought in the relationship of it with gender equity, the level of gender equity only in public life would not be sufficient enough. In other words, analyses only including variables such as women's working status or education would not satisfactory enough to reveal whole picture on gender. Therefore, gender equity in family also should be included in analyses. A simple indicator of gender equity in home may be share of housework. In the next section, theories of housework are presented.

## 3.2 HOUSEWORK

Considering the changes occurred in last several decades, it is possible to say that women started to participate previously in male dominated areas like education and paid labor market. However, despite the gains women have made outside, the gender inequity inside home has been relatively persistent i.e. allocation of housework remained its gendered structure. Analyzing allocation of housework can be used to measure gender equity inside home. Before reviewing theories on allocation of housework it would be practical to define what housework is.

Housework is generally defined as the unpaid tasks performed to meet the needs of family members or to maintain home and family's possessions (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010: 769). The tasks generally include physical tasks like cooking, cleaning, gardening. Eichler and Albanese (2007) produced a critique of assumptions underlying empirical studies of housework. In their critique, they defined household work as follows:

Household work consists of the sum of all physical, mental, emotional and spiritual tasks that are performed for one's own or someone else's household and that maintain the daily life of those one has responsibility for (Eichler and Albanese 2007: 248).

They stated that housework was seen performed exclusively by couples within their own homes; that it consisted primarily of a set of repetitive physical tasks; that it included childcare, but not care of adults; that it remains largely stable over the life course (Eichler and Albanese 2007). The studies analyzing housework generally uses such restrictive definitions which may cause to ignore a significant amount of labor devoted to housework. Therefore definition of housework must be inclusive.

### **3.2.1 Allocation of Housework**

Studies analyzing allocation of housework typically use three theoretical frameworks: economic perspective, sociological perspective and gender perspective.

#### **3.2.1.1 Economic Approach**

Economic approaches to allocation of housework employ the central suppositions of neo-classical rational to human behavior in a household context. Economic perspective discuss time availability hypothesis. It suggests that housework is rationally allocated according to availability of household personnel in relation to the amount of housework needed to be done (Becker 1981; Hiller 1984; England and Farkas 1986; Shelton, 1992). Time spent in market as laborer and family composition strongly affects how much time women and men spend for housework (Bianchi et al. 2000: 193).

In 1965, Becker developed first systematic approach to a general theory of time allocation. So-called the New Home Economics model suggest that a household can be handled as an economic institution and like other economic institutions uses market commodities and time utility to produce enhancing commodities for members of household. Different members of household specialize in different activities so that various members can take comparative production advantages. Members who have a higher potential income will specialize in paid work whereas members who have a relatively lower potential income perform housework (Lauk and Meyer 2005: 5).

Besides, this perspective suggests that members allocate housework according to availability of their time in house i.e. who spend more time in on paid work will spend less time in housework (Artis and Pavalko 2003). Therefore, it is expected that women's participation in paid work would reduce women's share in allocation of housework. According to Bianchi et al.'s study (2000) the wife's hours

of paid work increases her husband's housework and decreases her housework in US, which confirms the time availability perspective. On the other hand, same study suggests that unemployed husbands perform less housework than employed husbands and this finding shows an inconsistency with economic perspective.

At this point, the term *second shift* coined by Hochschild (1989) should be recalled. She points out that even if women participate in paid work, they continue to perform considerably large amount of housework and childcare. Time availability perspective fails to explain this finding which is prevalent in most parts of the world.

### **3.2.1.2 Sociological Approach**

Second perspective is a sociological one which is relative resources perspective. Allocation of housework expresses power relations between men and women (Bianchi et al. 2000: 194). Its basic argument is that housework is unlikable so that most people do not want to perform it (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010: 771). Family decisions on consumption and production is, in modern world, the result of a bargaining process between partners seeking to maximize their personal interests (Gonzales et al. 2009: 2). According to this perspective, who will be doing housework is negotiated in households and people's relative resources like income and education have a significant effect on their share of housework by providing them power to bargain (Bittman et al. 2003). To put it another way, this perspective expects that the higher levels of income and education one has, the lower share of housework one performs. Women's increasing education and earning opportunities have changed their bargaining power (Gonzales et al 2009: 4). Still, why women are primarily responsible for housework is because of the fact that they generally economically dependent on their husbands and therefore do not have enough power to bargain according to this perspective (Brines 1994 Bianchi et al. 2000: 194). Gender has an indirect effect on allocation of housework in this perspective (Gonzales et al. 2009: 2).

Considering the points mentioned above it is expected that women's increased levels of education and income would reduce the time they spend on housework, there is to be a linear relationship between levels of education and income and time spent on housework. However studies propose curvilinear link between the allocation of housework and economic dependence: Allocation of housework is more traditional both in households where women earn less than their partners and households where women earn more than their partners, whilst it is more equal in households where women's and men's earnings are approximately equal (Greenstein 2000).

### **3.2.1.3 Gender Approach**

Time availability and relative resources perspective have been criticized by feminists by arguing that division of housework is not simply related to time availability or rational choice of individuals (Bianchi et al. 2000: 194). Third perspective which is gender perspective suggests that people are socialized into male and female gender roles that would determine their behaviors (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010: 772).

According to Risman (2004), gender can be defined as a social structure which differentiates opportunities and constraints based on sex-category. This has consequences at three different levels: 1) at individual level, for the development of gendered self; 2) during interaction as men and women face different cultural expectation; 3) at institutional level, where explicit regulations on resource distribution and material goods are gender specific. This means that, in explaining the gendered allocation of housework, it is important to study expectations at the cultural level (i.e. the differential expectations attached in a given society to being a mother and a father, a husband and a wife) and to the institutional level where explicit regulations on resource distribution, organizational practices, ideology and legislation are gender specific. (Gonzales et al. 2009: 4).

Gender perspective proposes that housework is a symbolic performance of gender relations and this explains why there is not a simple exchange between time

spent in unpaid and paid labor among women and men (Ferree 1990; South and Spitze 1994). Therefore, it does not have neutral meaning, its performance by women and men somewhat help to define and express gender relations within household (Bianchi et al. 2000: 194).

Early formulations of gender approach centered gender role ideologies of individuals which they learned through socialization processes (Coverman 1985). Through this processes individuals believe in gender-segregated work and roles conforming those norms (Gonzales et al. 2009). Thompson (1991), for example, parallel to this view suggest that, during childhood, children socialized with other individuals and learn how to behave according to expected gender ideology. Varying studies shows that despite the unequal share of housework to disadvantage of women, women are happy because they see family and children are their main priority in life, in other words, it is related to women's preferences and lifestyles and seen as if it is a product of their free choice (Gonzales et al. 2009).

Other theoreticians went beyond the passive role of individuals and shifted to a new perspective which is "doing gender". The central argument of doing gender is that individual behavior is affected by expectations from others and in everyday activities individuals "do" and produce gender. The unequal division of labor between women and men is not only created by women and men but also by social institutions like family, the welfare state and the labor market (Gonzales et al. 2009). Wives and husbands do their gender roles through the amount of housework they perform also through the type of housework they perform. Women do lion's share of housework including least attractive housework activities such as cooking, laundry and cleaning (Bianchi et al. 2000: 195).

At this point, it should be detailed that there are significant differences between housework tasks performed traditionally men and women. Men tend to perform tasks having a well-defined beginning and end; also the task should have a leisure component (Meissner 1977). On the other hand, women tend to perform



housework tasks having the opposite qualities such as washing dishes or cooking which are repetitive and perpetual (Coleman 1988).

In accordance with gender perspective towards division of housework, Folbre challenged neoclassical assumptions which take on individual utility functions of household members are independent from each other by pointing out the mothers who give up leisure time, not work time, in order to care for children. They impose costs primarily on themselves not family as a whole (1983: 286). The reason of this can be explained by gender perspective very well: since mothers see child care as their duty, they take whole responsibility on their own shoulders.

Brines shows that if husband is more dependent on his wife economically, he does less housework because he wants to reassert his masculinity (1994). Bianchi et al.'s finding (2000) which is unemployed husbands perform less housework than employed husbands also, become meaningful through this perspective.

According to Coltrane, even though men perform more housework when compared to past, it is significant that in general, standards for housework are still set by wives. Furthermore, most of the couples characterize husbands' contribution of housework as "helping their wives" (1996). Since cleanliness of one's home is seen as a reflection of being good wife and mother not a reflection of good husband and father, they are women, independent from their working status or educational level, who are responsible from a considerable large part of housework.

### **3.3 LOW FERTILITY AND ALLOCATION OF HOUSEWORK**

What is the relationship of low fertility with allocation of housework? Considering discussion on what have been happening in the post-industrial world, that has made fertility be persistent at very low levels, two major conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, female employment rates has increased since 1970s (Jaumotte 2003). The gender gap in employment rates have appeared to be closer in developed world

(García-Manglano et al. 2014). Secondly, male participation in housework and child care has experienced at a much lower rate. Men who have increasingly involved in housework live in the countries who regain fertility levels around replacement level (Bianchi et al. 2000; Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla 2012). Therefore, higher levels of fertility may be possible with greater female labor force participation, as long as men embark a fair share of household responsibilities, just like gender equity theory suggested (García-Manglano et al. 2014: 7).

Many scholars emphasize the role of gender equity and the changes in gender structure as crucial to understand demographic change (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). Women's increasing labor market participation have not caused a major decrease in their responsibilities in home. According to Goldscheider et al. (2015) regards this as a reason of the fact that some women postpone marriage and motherhood or reduce the number of children they would like to have. Countries which eliminate this through institutional approaches that support the combination of work and family will have higher fertility (McDonald 1997; 2000; 2006). The countries which try to eliminate very low levels of fertility, than, can solve these problems by a move towards increased gender equity (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). Women's participation in public sphere is related to the first phase of gender *revolution* in the second part men's share of responsibilities in private sphere become larger (Goldscheider et al. 2015). The end of the revolution, women and men share both paid work and housework equally.

Therefore, an allocation of housework based on gender equity would finalize gender revolution and eventually expected to facilitate higher levels of fertility-around replacement level.

## CHAPTER 4

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The intention in this chapter is to describe the researcher's perspective of the relationship between fertility intentions and gender equity in Turkey; in other words, the theoretical framework of the thesis.

As the focus of the thesis is fertility intentions rather than actual fertility behavior, it is first necessary to highlight how the two factors are related. Studies of fertility intentions make the presupposition that fertility is a purposive behavior that is based on intention. Addressing this issue, there are a number of academic discussions stating that fertility intentions are a significant predictor of actual fertility behavior in the future (Bumpass 1987; Rindfuss et al. 1988, Thomson 1997; Schoen et al. 1999; Berrington 2004).

A study by Schoen et al. of data from the National Survey of Families and Households conducted in the United States revealed a strong relationship between fertility intentions and future fertility behavior (1999), while a study carried out in England and Wales investigated whether or not women who stated they would like to have a/another child actually went on to have a child. The study suggested that half of the women at different ages that stated a desire to have another child did so within the following six years (Berrington 2004: 117). The situation seems to be similar for those who stated that they did not want any/more children. Westoff's study (1990), based on national data garnered during 134 surveys, pointed to a strong association between total fertility rate and the percent of women with no further fertility intentions. His analysis demonstrates a high level of validity, even for developing countries, and since it has been ratified by many studies that people generally follow their intentions related to fertility, fertility intentions can be regarded as a suitable predictor of actual fertility behavior.

In this thesis, fertility intention among women refers to whether or not a woman would like to have a/another child sometime in the future. Since the starting point of this thesis is low fertility, women who claimed they definitely want more children are referred to the “want more children” group, while those women who are undecided, those who do not want more children and those who have been sterilized are denoted as “want no more children”.

Why the concept of gender equity is preferred instead of gender equality is to be elaborated here. According to McDonald (2000; 2013), the concept of gender equality is straightforward which can be measured solely by comparing consequences for women and men in areas such as education, labor market and so forth. The concept of gender equity, on the other hand, allows for different consequences for women and men, as long as they regard the consequences as fair. In the concept of gender equity there is equality of opportunity rather than equality of consequences.

Gender equity, therefore is related to perceptions of fairness and opportunity instead of equality of outcome. The concept of gender equity in relation to fertility let couples to define the relative caring roles of mother and father as long as both perceive the outcomes to be fair (McDonald 2013). It is a more appropriate concept to be used in relation to fertility.

Before describing researcher’s position, it would be good to re-evaluate the theories on low fertility discussed in the literature review. Persistent below replacement-level fertility rates indicate that the propositions of classical demographic transition theory, which asserts that a new equilibrium is reached between birth and death rates through a stabilization of the population with zero population growth in the final stage, are discarded. Easterlin’s cyclical change was also rejected when it became obvious that developed countries are unable to regain replacement level fertility for decades (Suzuki 2012: 60).

The second demographic transition theory proposed a change in value from familism to individualism, which led to an increase in cohabitation, extramarital births, voluntary childlessness and divorce, and in turn, resulted in low fertility. That said, a paradoxical situation has emerged: today, fertility is lower in countries with more robust marriages, more affective gender segregation and stronger familism, such as Italy and Germany, while countries that experienced so-called postmodern family changes, such as the Scandinavian countries, have higher birth rates (Suzuki 2012: 61). Changes in the nature of the household's economic conditions and wealth flow theory can be considered useful in understanding low fertility, but fail to explain very low levels of fertility.

Approaches blaming changes in the status of women in public domain as the main reason for low fertility can be criticized as unidirectional, dichotomous and incomplete. Although some evidence suggests that women with a higher level of education or those engaged in the labor market have lower fertility intentions and behavior, the mechanisms behind it cannot be understood if one considers only the status of women in individual-oriented institutions. This paints only half of the picture, as economic motives, opportunity costs of having children, and the increased participation of women in education and employment can provide only partial explanations for low and lowest-low fertility. In order to see full picture, focus should be not only on the public, but also the private lives of women.

Considering the total fertility rates in the developed world, industrial countries with very low fertility rates are generally those that can be characterized as having more unequal gender systems, as mentioned above. This suggests that there is a need for a gendered approach to explaining low fertility. Power relations in the household become significant when thinking about fertility, according to Folbre (1983: 267). One example of proxy of power can be participation in education or the labor force, but while education level is a useful indicator of power and equity in the family, the allocation of housework is a more direct measure (Mills et al. 2008: 6).

At this point, it is necessary to mention another approach. According to Neyer et al., micro-level studies into the relationship between gender equity and fertility sometimes focus only on the effect of the allocation of housework, although this can provide only a partial explanation of the relationship between fertility intentions and behavior (2013: 246), and so can be considered an incomplete approach. The authors claim that, yes, there is a need for a gendered approach, but suggest that it should involve different aspects of life, such as employment, household chores, etc.; and claim further that there is a need to explore the effects of gender equity on fertility in different life-course constellations, like across parities (Neyer et al. 2013: 247). Other different life-course constellations may be listed as the number of living children, the type of place of residence, and so forth.

Another significant issue raised by Neyer et al. in their analysis of gender distribution is that one should be aware of that gender distribution can describe the degree of gender difference, but cannot inevitably explain gender inequity (2013: 247). For this reason, in the case of micro level studies, they recommend:

... we need to regard gender differences not merely from the perspective of “performance”, that is, as differences in doing, but we also need to regard them as “power”, that is, as constituting unequal relationships, unequal life chances or unequal opportunities to act. We thus need an approach that allows us to distinguish between “gender as performance” and “gender as power”, and capture the dimensions of power, agency, justice and fairness in the gender differences in doing (Neyer et al. 2013: 247).

The aim of this research is to model fertility intentions in Turkey. This necessitates the use of an inclusive gendered approach that includes variables on gender equity from different institutions of society; more specifically, the individual-oriented institutions and family-related institutions defined by McDonald. Regarding individual oriented institutions, McDonald refers to institutions that deal with people as individuals, such as the institutions of democracy, education and employment – all of which were previously male-dominated institutions. Family-related institutions, for him, are those that deal with people as members of families, such as industrial relations, services, government transfers and the family (1997: 13). The micro-level

analysis made in this study follows a focused gender approach related to particular dimensions of gender equity; specifically, employment and education as individual-oriented institutions, and housework as a family-related institution. These areas of life can be considered essential not only for the arrangement of gender relationships, but also to understand the power that adjusts the level of gender equity.

The employment factor was selected not only because it allows one to form and maintain a household and live independently, but also due to the economic independence it can provide (Neyer et al. 252). At this point it is necessary to differentiate between informal and formal employment. The key characteristic of the informal sector, which constitutes a considerable part of economic life in Turkey, is its noncompliance with legal and administrative regulations (Tansel 2000: 1). Employment in the informal sector is associated with lower wages, no social security and no health benefits, and so may not bring enough income to allow women to form and maintain an independent household or assure them independent protection. For this reason, informal employment can bring only limited bargaining power within the family, and for this reason, employment in the formal and informal sectors should be treated differently.

The education level factor was selected for study due to its common use as a proxy in the measurement of the bargaining power of women (Doss 2011: 2). Generally, the higher the level of education, the more options are open to women outside the home. Through education, women acquire skills that give them the possibility to earn more in the employment market, thus bringing the potential for a more equal division of labor between women and men through reconciliation. When one half of a couple does not have the necessary skill required to carry out a task (for example, household budget preparation), they have no power of negotiation in the matter. For this reason, the power education provides to women is accepted as a significant issue in this thesis.

The allocation of housework is seen as a significant indicator of gender equity (Neyer 1997: 253), and as has already been mentioned, the perceived fairness of the allocation of housework is just as important as the actual share, although the actual share may provide some clues to understanding the level of gender equity in home. In this thesis, focus will be on actual share of housework. In this thesis, allocation of housework is considered as fair if women's share of housework is equal or less than 75 percent<sup>1</sup>. Considering the issue of housework, it has been concluded that women and men perform qualitatively different housework tasks, and it would be useful at this point to make a distinction between the traditional male and female housework tasks, which is a subject that has been covered in many studies (for example, core tasks and outdoor chores in Bianchi *et al.* 2000; as routine and occasional housework in Jibu 2007; and as routine and residual housework in Hatun, 2013). For this thesis, two types of housework are defined: Routine housework, including cooking, setting and clearing the dining table, cleaning work such as dusting and sweeping the house, cleaning dishes or putting them in the dishwasher, laundry and ironing; and occasional housework, comprising kitchen shopping, running errands to public offices, paying the bills, making household repairs and amendments. Housework has been defined in many different ways in various studies, but for the purpose of this thesis, housework comprises the sum of some physical and/or mental tasks mentioned above.

Based on this framework, this thesis puts forward three hypotheses: First, that controlling for education level and labor market participation, a larger share of housework (more than 75%) would lower the fertility intentions of women in Turkey. Considering the fact that couples with different life course constellations agree on varying arrangements in the division of labor, three areas of life together are included in hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that it is not only a larger share of housework (more than 75%), but also a higher number of existing children (more than 1) lowers the fertility intentions of women in Turkey. This hypothesis

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<sup>1</sup> 75 percent as cutoff point for fairness is used in many studies on gender equity (for example Mills *et al.* 2008).



concentrates on the interactions between the share of housework and the number of living children while controlling for other areas of life. The reason for this is that the number of living children is expected to affect not only indirectly the amount and perceived fairness of the allocation of housework, but also directly the fertility intentions of women in such a country where the two-child norm prevails. The third and final hypothesis is that not only a larger share of housework (more than 75%), but also gainful employment lowers the fertility intentions of women in Turkey. Participating in the labor market is anticipated to have an impact on both the fairness of housework allocation and immediate fertility intentions at varying levels, depending on whether the work is formal or informal.

The main supposition of this thesis is that inconsistencies in the levels of gender equity in different institutions can lower fertility (McDonald 2006), with particular focus on the micro-structure in which women reside. In Turkey there is a distinct lack of institutions to reconcile work and parenthood for women, there being few public or subsidized childcare service providers. A male-breadwinner model also prevails in Turkey, which reinforces a highly unequal division of housework, even if women are part of the labor market. In such a context, where the two-child norm is prevalent, the goal of this thesis is to make an empirical test of gender equity theory related to the fertility intentions of women.

## CHAPTER 5

### METHODOLOGY

This chapter is divided into five parts. In the first part main data source of this thesis, Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008 is described. Second part is devoted to introduce and define key variables used in both descriptive and logistic regression analyses. In the third part, aims of descriptive analysis are expressed. In last part of this chapter, after introducing purpose of logistic regression analysis in general, models employed in logistic regression analysis are shared.

#### 5.1 DATA SOURCE

The data obtained by Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008 (TDHS-2008) which is a nationally representative survey used in this thesis. Survey data includes information on demographic, socio-economic and health characteristics of a sample population with an emphasis on fertility. It is 9<sup>th</sup> of quinquennial nationwide demographic surveys which have been conducted since 1968. Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys are the only national representative surveys producing indicators for “fertility” which is one of the main concerns of this thesis.

##### 5.1.1 Sample Design of TDHS-2008

The aim of the survey was to provide estimates for a variety of characteristics for various domains; therefore, the TDHS-2008 has a complex sample design. In the selection of the sample a weighted, multistage, stratified cluster sampling approach was used. Tabulations of major indicators from the data can be employed for Turkey as a whole, urban and rural areas<sup>1</sup>, each of five

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<sup>1</sup> Urban area is defined as settlements having a population size larger than 10,000 and rural area is defined as the opposite, regardless of administrative status.

demographic regions of the country (i.e. West, South, Central, North and East regions), the 12 NUTS1 regions<sup>1</sup> for selected indicators and the seven metropolitan cities (İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, Adana, Konya and Gaziantep) having a population size larger than one million (HIPS 2009).

36 separate strata were created for the sample design of the survey. This included the 15 divisions by urban and rural stratum, and the seven metropolitan cities as mutually exclusive strata. 25 households per standard urban segment and 15 households per standard rural segment were selected in order to have an adequate representation of clusters (HIPS, 2009).

### **5.1.2 Data Collection Strategy of TDHS-2008**

Face-to-face interviews were conducted to obtain data. In order to collect information on households an adult member of every selected household and all ever-married women aged 15-49 in the selected households were interviewed. 10,525 households and 7,405 ever married women in reproductive ages (15-49) were interviewed in TDHS-2008 (HIPS, 2009).

Two types of questionnaires were used: the Household Questionnaire and the Individual Questionnaire. Household Questionnaire was used to obtain information about socio-economic status of the households and enumerate all usual members and visitors of the households. Information on relationship to the household head, sex, age, place of birth, place of residence for visitors, maternal and paternal survival, literacy and education status for age 6 and over, school attendance for ages between 6 and 24, and marital status for age 12 and over were included in first

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<sup>1</sup> NUTS is a geo-code standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes regulated by European Union (EU). In 2002, in order to adopt EU standards three levels of NUTS regions were defined by State planning Institute and Turkish Statistical Institute based on Law no. 2002/4720. In NUTS3 level there are the 81 provinces, in NUTS 2 level, 26 sub-regions were designated and in NUTS 1 level 12 regions were formed.

section of Household Questionnaire. It was also used to identify eligible individuals for individual interview (ever-married-women aged 15-49), never married women module (women 15-49) and welfare of the elderly module (ages 60 and over). Second section was devoted to get information on background characteristics of never-married women. Data on welfare of elderly was gathered in section three. Final section is on housing characteristics (HIPS, 2009).

Second questionnaire, Individual Questionnaire for ever-married women in reproductive ages, included questions on following topics: background characteristics; migration history; marriage history and information on marriage; pregnancy, birth history and fertility preferences; assisted reproductive techniques; knowledge and use of contraceptive methods; antenatal and postnatal care; breastfeeding, nutrition and diarrhea; immunization; women's work history and status; and anthropometry (HIPS, 2009).

## **5.2 VARIABLES**

In order to analyze the effect of allocation of housework on fertility intentions of women in Turkey, a number of selected variables are used in both descriptive and regression analysis. In this part, the variables used, constructed and recoded are explained.

The dependent variable of the analysis is fertility intentions. A number of independent variables are used in both descriptive and logistic regression analyses to explain whether or not respondent have an intention to have a/another child. The independent variables included in analyses are: number of living children, current working status of respondent, education level of respondent, allocation of housework, interaction of working status by allocation of housework, interaction of number of living children by allocation of housework, region, wealth quintile, and type of place of residence. Although some variables exist in TDHS-2008 dataset, some others are recoded or created to serve thesis' purposes.

The variable of “*fertility intentions*” is measured by two questions that appeared in the TDHS-2008 ever-married women questionnaire investigating whether or not women want to have a/another child and if they want to have more children in the future how long they would like to wait before the birth of a/another child. Women who are not fecund are excluded from the analyses (whose reasons will be detailed in the next part). Also, sterilization is conceived as no intention; as use of a long term non-reversible contraceptive method reflects no intention to have a/another child in the future. Considering the points, it is decided that the variable of “*fertility intentions*” has two categories: women who definitely want are classified as having an intention to have a/another child sometime in the future (yes) and women who are undecided, want no more and sterilized are classified as having no intention to have a/another child sometime in the future (no).

The variable of “*number of living children*” is recoded version of a basic variable existing in TDHS-2008 data set. This variable involves pregnancies at the time of interview. This is useful for the analysis. This is because of the fact that although there exists mortality risks for fetus, women would think that it will survive and have fertility intentions accordingly.

Having two children has been norm for families in Turkey for a long while. Therefore the women who are married with no or one child and having no further fertility intentions are the women having preferences not coherent with the society’s norm. In order to distinguish these women from other women having preferences in accordance with society’s 2-child norm, “*number of living children*” variable has two categories: having 0-1 child and having 2+ children.

Another variable constructed is related to women’s labor force participation. Third hypothesis suggests that interaction of larger share of housework and current working status would have an effect on fertility intentions of women. Therefore current working status of women appears significant for the analysis. Since working either in formal or informal sector provides different benefits for women, the

variable of “*working status*” has three categories: not currently working, working with social security and working without social security.

Variables related to division of housework used in descriptive analysis are recoded versions of following basic variables indicating main responsible person for different types of housework in TDHS-2008 data set: housework-cooking, housework-dining table, housework-wiping/sweeping, housework-washing dishes, housework-washing clothes, housework-ironing, housework-shopping, housework-budget, housework-official business, housework-reparations or amendments. Original variables in data set have answers in 9 categories: respondent, husband, female children, male children, paid servant/maid, other women (mother-in-law, sister-in law, mother, or sister), other men (father, brother, father-in-law, or brother-in-law), no one, and not applicable.

Allocation of housework in Turkey is highly gendered i.e. most of routine housework tasks are primarily performed by women whereas most of occasional housework task are primarily performed by men as family is the primary place for reproducing gender roles. Thence, if respondent is not main person responsible for routine housework tasks, generally it is not the husband, but female child or other woman in the house (mother-in-law, sister-in law, mother, or sister). The reverse of this situation is valid for occasional housework tasks, too. Consequently, to see gender effect on distribution of housework the basic ten variables on housework existing in TDHS-2008 data set are recoded. The recoded versions of variables, namely, “*cooking*”, “*dining table*”, “*wiping/sweeping*”, “*washing dishes*”, “*washing clothes*”, “*ironing*”, “*shopping*”, “*budget*”, “*official business*”, and “*reparations/amendments*”, have now 6 categories: respondent, husband, other women, other men, paid servant, and not applicable. The category of other women in new variables comprises female children and other women category of original variables, meanwhile the category of other men includes male children and other men. Because there is no information on sex of paid worker, paid servant category remains in recoded versions. The original categories of no-one and not applicable,

and missing are joined into not applicable category.

Since TDHS-2008 asks for main person responsible from specific housework tasks and does not include information on how much time spent performing housework, there shows up a need for an index which would be valuable for putting together allocation of all housework tasks into one variable. Different housework tasks consume different length of time. For instance cooking is a very repetitive task which is performed everyday while paying bills is performed only once a month. Hence, in index which shows overall scores for all housework tasks, each housework task's weight must be different.

For the index, firstly factor analysis was carried; however it was decided not to be used. In the results of factor analysis the weights of cooking and paying bills are equal, hence; time dimension is discarded. Since time spent on each housework task determine workload of the main responsible person for it, a simple index which takes into account time dimension is constructed. For the index on allocation of housework, tasks of housework are divided into three categories, considering the length of time each required. The most time consuming tasks weighted by 3, middle time consuming tasks weighted by 2, and the least time consuming tasks weighted by 1.

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**Table 5.2.1 Score of Housework Tasks**

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<i>Housework task</i>	<i>score</i>
Cooking	3
Dining table	1
Wiping/sweeping	3
Washing dishes	2
Washing clothes	2
Ironing	2
Shopping	3
Budget	2
Official business	1
Reparations/amendments	1
total	20

---

The most time consuming housework tasks are cooking, wiping/sweeping and shopping and weighted by 3 while the least time consuming tasks are preparing dining table, official business and reparations/amendments in the house. The rest of housework tasks which are considered as middle time consuming are weighted by 2. Since there is no a calculated standard length of time for each different housework tasks, these simple and practical weights are used in calculation of the indexes used in this thesis.

Each case gets relevant score if main person responsible for the housework task is respondent, whilst it gets “0” if any of other persons in the family or no one is responsible from this task. By doing it for every housework task, 10 new variables, which indicate scores of each case for every housework task, are created. **“Index for All Housework Tasks”** is computed by summing up all these 10 variables. The range of index varies between 0 and 20 -0 means respondent is not main person responsible from any housework tasks while 20 means respondent is main person responsible from all housework task. These scores are created not only for respondents, but also for husbands and paid servants separately. Besides, scores for occasional housework tasks for respondents are computed using the same way mentioned above.

From respondent’s scores for allocation of all housework tasks, the index is created. The cutoff point is set as 75% considering gendered structure of families in Turkey. Also, this cutoff point is used by some other studies on housework (for example Mills et al. 2008). In Table 5.2.2 details of the index are described. According to index for allocation of all housework tasks, 59.8 percent of respondents belongs to “performing max 75% of all housework tasks” category by getting scores between 0 and 15, whereas 40.2 percent of respondents fit to “performing more than 75% of all housework tasks” category by getting scores between 16 and 20.



The interaction between fertility intention and number of children is critical for the analysis of this thesis. The variables of “*number of living children*” and “*fertility intentions*” are jointed to be used in descriptive analysis. The new variable created which is “*interaction of fertility intentions by number of living children*” has four new categories which are “0-1 child and no intention”, “0-1 child and intention”, “2+ children and no intention” and “2+ children and intention”.

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**Table 5.2.2 Categories of Index**

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	<u>score</u>	<u>percent</u>
	<u>range</u>	
<b>Index for allocation of all housework tasks</b>		
Max 75% <sup>1</sup>	0-15	59.8
More than 75%	16-20	40.2
<b>Index for allocation of occasional housework tasks</b>		
Continuous	0-7	100.0
Number of women		5890

---

Some of the variables used in analyses are found as basic variables in the TDHS reports. These variables are age in five years, region, type of place of residence, wealth index, and educational categories. “*Age in five years*” variable in TDHS-2008 offers ages between 15 and 49 in 7 categories: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, and 45-49. First 6 age groups are used in the analysis for the reasons which will be described in the next part. “*Age*” variable used in logistic regression analysis has 3 categories: 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44. The variable of “*region*” has 5 categories which are West, South, Central, North and East. These five regions were distinguished according to differences in socio-economic development levels and demographic conditions within the country. The west region

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<sup>1</sup> This category refers performing 75 or lower percent of housework.

is the most populous, industrialized and socio-economically advanced region including İstanbul which is the largest city of Turkey. East region is the most disadvantageous region representing least developed part of the country (HIPS 2009). “*Type of place of residence*” variable describes place of residence as urban or rural. Urban area is defined as settlements having a population size larger than 10,000 and rural area is defined as the opposite, regardless of administrative status (HIPS 2009). “*Wealth index*” variable, which is composite index of household, has 5 categories which are poorest, poorer, middle, richer, and richest. Variable of “*educational categories*” has four categories: No education/primary incomplete, first level primary, secondary, and high school and higher. This variable used in descriptive analysis. Also, “*education*” variable which is used in logistic regression analysis have 3 categories: no education/maximum primary education, secondary education and high school or higher education.

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**Table 5.2.3 Matrix Used to Compute Interaction Variables**

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	<i>Share of housework</i>	
	<i>More than 75%</i>	<i>Max 75%</i>
<b>Number of living children</b>		
0-1 child	Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and having no or 1 child	Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and having no or 1 child
2+children	Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and having at least 2 children	Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and having at least 2 children
<b>Working status</b>		
Currently working	Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and currently working	Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and currently working
Not currently working	Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and not currently working	Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and not currently working

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Since two hypotheses concern not only larger share of housework but also participating in labor market and already having two or more children in relation to fertility intentions of women, two interaction variables are needed for regression analysis. In table 5.2.3 matrix of jointed variables used in construction of interaction variables is shown.

As it is detailed in Table 5.2.3, for interaction1 which is “***Interaction of housework by number of living children***” there are four categories, “performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and having no or 1 child”, “Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and having at least 2 children”, “Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and having no or 1 child” and “Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and having at least 2 children”. Other interaction variable which is “***Interaction of housework by working status***” also has four categories, “Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and currently working”, “Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks and not currently working”, “Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and currently working” and “Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks and not currently working”.

In Table 5.2.4, all variables used in the analysis are summarized.

**Table 5.2.4 Variables Used and Constructed**

<b><u>Variable Name</u></b>	<b><u>Categories</u></b>
Number of living children	(1) 0-1 child (2) 2+ children
Age in five years	(1) 15-19 (2) 20-24 (3) 30-35 (4) 40-44 (5) 45-49
Age	(1) 15-24 (2) 25-34 (3) 35-44
Region	(1) West (2) South (3) Central (4) North (5) East
Type of place of residence	(1) urban (2) rural
Wealth index	(1) poorest (2) poorer (3) middle (4) richer (5) richest
Educational categories	(1) No education/Primary Incomplete (2) First level primary (3) Secondary school (4) High school and higher
Educational categories (3 categories)	(1) Max. primary complete (2) Secondary school (3) High school and higher
Working status	(1) Not currently working (2) Working with social security (3) Working without social security

**Table 5.2.4 Variables Used and Constructed (continued)**

Cooking	
Setting and cleaning dining table	
Cleaning work	(1) Respondent
Washing the dishes	(2) Husband
Doing laundry	(3) Other women
Ironing	(4) Other men
Kitchen shopping	(5) Paid servant
Preparing household budget	(6) Not applicable
Running errands in public offices	
Doing reparations and amendments	
Desire for more children	(1) Wants within 3 years
	(2) Wants after 3+ years
	(3) Wants unsure timing
	(4) Undecided
	(5) Wants no more
	(6) sterilized
Fertility intentions	(0) no
	(1) yes
Allocation housework	(1) max 75
	(2) more than 75%
Interaction of fertility intentions and number of living children	(1) 0-1 child and no intention
	(2) 0-1 child and intention
	(3) 2+ children and no intention
	(4) 2+ children and intention
Interaction of index of all housework tasks and number of living children	(1) <75, 0-1child
	(2) <75, 2+ children
	(3) >75, 0-1 child
	(4) >75, 2+ children
Interaction of index of all housework tasks and working status	(1) <75, 0-1child
	(2) <75, 2+ children
	(3) >75, 0-1 child
	(4) >75, 2+ children

### 5.3 LIMITATIONS

This thesis has its limitations on various subjects. First one of these limitations is that in TDHS-2008, questions regarding division of housework are asked to only ever-married women in reproductive ages. Therefore comparisons on how much of housework is done by wife or husband relies on information from wife. This may have two negative consequences: First one is that respondents may overestimate their share of housework. Second, if respondent has a traditional gender ideology, she might tend to report according to traditional division of housework rather than actual allocation.

Other problem is that in TDHS-2008 questions are investigating the *main* responsible person from various types of housework; hence, data on cases for which some tasks are shared between different members of household is missing. Furthermore, this data do not provide information on time spent for performing housework which would be a more direct measure to understand division of housework.

Another limitation is related to definition of housework. As mentioned in chapter 2, housework includes all physical, mental, emotional and spiritual tasks performed to maintain daily life in person's own home or home of someone else who one has responsibility for (Eichler and Albanese 2007). Since this thesis uses a secondary data, definition of housework is confined to some physical and/or mental work which as defined in TDHS-2008.

The data used is cross-sectional which remains as another limitation. Therefore, while some variables -like education- are cumulative; some others like – fertility intentions- are cross-sectional used in the analyses.

## 5.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

In this thesis, descriptive analysis seeks to represent basic social and demographic characteristics of currently married and fecund women aged 15-44 in Turkey. In Chapter 6, age, type of place of residence, the five demographic regions, and wealth index of all currently married fecund women aged 15-44 is presented in comparison to currently married fecund women aged 15-44 with any children or 1 child and currently married fecund women aged 15-44 with 2 or more children. This comparison is tabled because of the fact that in Turkey having 2 children has existed as a norm for a long time. Therefore, observing basic social and demographic characteristics of women according to number of their living children would be useful for analysis.

	<i>frequency</i>	<i>percent</i>
Married	6999	94.5
Widowed	158	2.1
Divorced	186	2.5
Not living together	62	.8
Total	7405	100.0

Table 5.4.1 shows marital status of all women who are interviewed in TDHS-2008. From the table, it is observed that almost 95% of women aged 15-49 are currently married in Turkey. This presents how prevalent marriage is in Turkey..

Although civil marriages are widely practiced in Turkey, religious marriages also constitute a significant proportion of marriages (HIPS 2009). The inclusive definition of marriage in TDHS which embraces not only women having civil

marriages but also women having religious marriages and women who are co-residing with their partners and declared themselves as married regardless of their legal marital status is useful in Turkey context. In short, marital status of individuals in THDS-2008 data is determined according to their own statement. Therefore, marriage definition of this thesis is beyond legal marriage.

The marital status of women in the analysis is chosen as currently married because of two reasons: First one is that since research questions of this thesis are dealing with division of housework, presence of a male partner is significant. Second reason is that, from a demographic perspective marriage is very important in Turkey as almost all births happen within marriage (HIPS 2009). Thus, fertility intentions of women are expected to be strongly associated with their current marital status. Therefore, respondents who are not currently married are excluded from the analysis.

The age is restricted 15-44 years old. This is due to the fact that women older than 45 are unlikely to have further fertility intentions. Furthermore, women older than 45 have a higher risk of going through menopause which marks the end of a women's reproductive life cycle. Table 4.2.2 above exhibits percentage of currently married women aged 15-49 who are infecund. According to table, as the age increases, the proportion of infecund women also increases. The considerably higher proportion of infecund women belongs to 45-49 age group because of wider prevalence of menopause, which is a main determinant of infecundity, in these ages. 32.7 % of women aged 45-49 are infecund, according to Table 4.3.2. Consequently, women whose ages are 45 and older are excluded from the analysis. Also, all women declared themselves as infecund, regardless of their age group, excluded from the analysis as they are not able to have (a/another) child.



**TABLE 5.4.2 Percentage of Infecund and Currently Married Women in Reproductive Ages**

Age	<i>Declared infecund</i>	<i>Number of women</i>
15-19	10.0	180
20-24	10.4	819
25-29	7.5	1314
30-34	7.0	1327
35-39	4.1	1261
40-44	8.0	1096
45-49	32.7	1002
Total	10.9	6999

In addition to basic social and demographic characteristics of currently married and fecund women aged 15-44, women's relationship between individual oriented institutions which are conceptualized as education and working status in this thesis is revealed in comparison to currently married fecund women aged 15-44 with any children or 1 child and currently married fecund women aged 15-44 with 2 or more children in descriptive analysis. Also in order to display gender equity in family oriented institutions, division of routine housework and occasional housework is presented.

Besides in descriptive analysis, further fertility intentions of women and their relationship with individual oriented institutions, allocation of housework in family and number of living children they have are presented. Lastly, descriptive tables for logistic regression analysis are presented.

The aim of this thesis is exploring not only if there is a relationship between allocation of housework and fertility intentions of women in Turkey, but also if there is a relationship between interaction of division of housework by women's working status and women's further fertility intentions and interaction of division of housework by number of living children and women's further fertility intentions. Even though descriptive analyses provide comparison for basic social and demographic characteristics and present some differentiations according to independent variables, they are not suitable for exploring direct-indirect relations between variables. Thereby, linear logistic regression analyses are performed which is described in the next section.

## **5.5 LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS**

Logistic regression analysis aims to establish a relationship between a dependent variable and a bunch of predictor variables. It extends multiple regression analysis techniques to research situations where outcome variable is categorical which is prevalent in social researches. It can be simply categorized as regression model for categorical data.

Multiple regression models conceive a continuous outcome variable which is in theory a linear combination of a set of predictors and error. On the other hand, logistic regression models presuppose that outcome variable is categorical and does not model the outcome variable directly. Instead, Logistic Regression Analysis is based on probabilities associated with the values of outcome variable (Dayton 1992). In other words, in Logistic Regression Analysis, based on values of many predictor variables, the probability of occurrence of dependent variables is tried to be estimated.

The formal model of logistic regression is following:

$$L_k = \ln\left(\frac{P_k}{1 - P_k}\right) = Z_k = \beta_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_k X_k$$

Solving for p, it gives:

$$p = \Pr(Y = 1) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i x_i)}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i x_i)}$$

$L$  which is the logarithm of conditional probabilities is linearly related with the parameters.  $B$  expresses the change in conditional probabilities of dependent variable caused by a unit increase in the value of explanatory variable (Türkyılmaz et al. 2010: 103). Different from linear regression model for normally distributed dependent variable, there is no direct solution like the method of least squares to estimate regression coefficients in the logistic regression model (Heeringa et al. 2010: 232). The method generally used in logistic regression model is maximum likelihood method. Therefore, by interpreting how well data fit the statistical model, rather than conventional  $R^2$ ; statistics like pseudo  $R^2$ , or Nagelkerke  $R^2$  is used in logistic regression analyses (Türkyılmaz et al. 2010: 103).

$P$  shows the probability of an outcome occurs. Odds is the ratio of the probability that an event will occur to the probability that the event will not occur. Odds ratio which is exponential function of the regression coefficient with a unit increase in logistic regression analysis, is the ratio of Odds of two different events (Türkyılmaz et al. 2010: 103). It is expressed as  $Exp(\beta)$  in formula above. When one of two possible outcomes is measured and there is a supposed causative factor, the odds ratio is put to use (McHugh 2009).

Since outcome variable is a binary categorical variable in this thesis, binary logistic regression analyses are employed to test the effects of some selected variables on intention of women to have a/another child sometime in the future. Before designing logistic regression models, independent variables are tested for multi-collinearity. Analyses are performed by using IBM SPSS 21 program. Taking into consideration of weighted, stratified cluster sampling method of TDHS-2008, standard errors of models are calculated by “complex samples” module of the program.

### **5.5.1 Models in Logistic Regression Analysis**

A series of logistic regression models are applied to study the fertility intentions of women in Turkey. The first model examines the impact of variables including: education level, age, working status, number of living children, allocation of housework, region and type of place of residence. Second model excludes age variable since its over-shading impact on other predictors. Third model, further, excludes type of place of residence variable as its significance values fail to prove a statistically significant relationship with fertility intentions of women. The variables in the third model which is the base model to test first hypothesis are employed to woman living urban areas in Model 4 whereas, to women living in rural areas in Model 5. In model 6, 7 and 8, they are applied to women at different age groups<sup>1</sup> (15-24, 25-34 and 35-44).

Model 9, which is the base model to test second hypothesis, includes first interaction variable which is interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children and excludes number of living children and allocation of housework variables to prevent multi-collinearity between independent variables. It applied to women in three different age groups in Model 10, 11 and 12.

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<sup>1</sup> The grouping of cohorts is based on the fact that childbearing has increasingly been postponed to later aged in Turkey. At younger (15-24) and older (35-44) ages childbearing is rare, whereas it is more common at middle (25-34) ages.

Model 13 is constructed to examine impact of second interaction variable which is interaction of allocation of housework by working status. It is the base model to test third hypothesis. Other variables in this model are education level, number of living children and region. Variables in this model are applied to women in different age groups separately in Model 14, 15, and 16.

Final model is employed only for women who are currently working (fecund and currently married aged 15-44). Model examines impact of key variables which are age, education level and interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children. Table 5.5.1.1 presents models with dependent variable and independent variables included in 17 separate models.

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**Table 5.5.1.1 Models in Logistic Regression Analysis**


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	<i>Explanation</i>
<b>MODEL 1<sup>1</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Age in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Working status in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Number of living children in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Allocation of housework in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Type of place of residence in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories
<b>MODEL 2<sup>1</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Working status in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Number of living children in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Allocation of housework in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Type of place of residence in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories
<b>MODEL 3<sup>1</sup>, 4<sup>2</sup>, 5<sup>3</sup>, 6<sup>4</sup>, 7<sup>5</sup>, 8<sup>6</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Number of living children in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Working status in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Allocation of housework in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories

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**Table 5.5.1.1 Models in Logistic Regression Analysis (continued)**

	<i>Explanation</i>
<b>MODEL 9<sup>7</sup>, 10<sup>8</sup>, 11<sup>9</sup>, 12<sup>10</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Working status in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children in four categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories
<b>MODEL 13<sup>7</sup>, 14<sup>8</sup>, 15<sup>9</sup>, 16<sup>10</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Number of living children in 2 categories
Independent Variable	Interaction of allocation of housework by working status in four categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories
<b>MODEL 17<sup>11</sup></b>	
Dependent Variable	Fertility intentions
Independent Variable	Education in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Age in 3 categories
Independent Variable	Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children in four categories
Independent Variable	Region in five categories

<sup>1</sup> Model 1, 2 and 3 are employed to all currently married and fecund women aged 15-44.

<sup>2</sup> Sub-population for Model 4 is currently married and fecund women aged 15-44 living in urban areas

<sup>3</sup> Sub-population for Model 5 is currently married and fecund women aged 15-44 living in rural areas.

<sup>4</sup> Sub-population for Model 6 is currently married and fecund women aged 15-24

<sup>5</sup> Sub-population for Model 7 is currently married and fecund women aged 25-34.

<sup>6</sup> Sub-population for Model 8 is currently married and fecund women aged 35-44.

<sup>7</sup> Model 9 and 13 is employed to all currently married and fecund women aged 15-44.

<sup>8</sup> Sub-population for Model 10 and 14 is currently married and fecund women aged 15-24.

<sup>9</sup> Sub-population for Model 11 and 15 is currently married and fecund women aged 25-34.

<sup>10</sup> Sub-population for Model 12 and 16 is currently married and fecund women aged 35-44.

<sup>11</sup> Sub-population for Model 13 is currently married and fecund women who are working.

## CHAPTER 6

### RESULTS OF DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part aims to present basic social and demographic characteristics of all currently married and fecund women aged 15-44. Their characteristics are presented in comparison, according to number of living children women have. In this part, women's relationship with individual oriented institutions is presented, also. The second part is devoted to reveal how housework is allocated in order to investigate the level of gender equity in family oriented institutions. In the third part, fertility intentions of women are presented. The index of housework and percent distribution of basic characteristics of women by index value are presented in the fourth part. The fifth part is devoted to unfold basic characteristics of women whose fertility intentions are not coherent with society's two-child-norm. In final part, descriptive tables of regression models are given.

#### 6.1 BASIC CHARACTERISTICS

Table 6.1.1 presents number of living children of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44. If a woman was pregnant at the time of interview, this pregnancy was regarded as a living child in this table. Considering percent distribution of number of living children, it is obvious that the highest percentage belongs to 2 children category as expected for a country in which having 2 children is a norm. The lowest percent being 7.8 belongs to childlessness which seems to confirm the fact that like marriage, becoming parent is also universal in Turkey. To put it another way, almost all women in Turkey eventually marry and have at least one child. When number of living children, grouped into two categories, it reflects that in Turkey, 3 of every 10 fecund and currently married women have no or 1 child.



**Table 6.1.1 Number of Living Children**

**Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 by number of living children, Turkey**

Number of living children	<i>percent</i>
0	7.8
1	22.9
2	36.1
3+	33.3
0-1	30.6
2+	69.4
Total	100.0
Number of women	5890

Table 6.1.2 exhibits background characteristics of currently married and fecund women aged 15-44. Number of women in each age group is approximately even for the ages 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 while it is smaller for other age groups. The reason of smaller number of women in 15-19 and 20-24 categories is postponement of marriage to later years. Also, due to the fact that as age increases, the proportion of infecund, widowed and divorced women increases, there are fewer women in 40-44 age group.

It is observed from Table 5.1.2 that women with no or 1 child are majority among 15-24 age group (being highest with 92.2% among 15-19), while women with

2 or more children are majority after 25 (being highest with 91.0 % among 40-44 age group). Considering distribution of percentages among age groups, it can be concluded that as age increases, the proportion of women who are currently married with no or 1 child decreases. For ages 25-29 percentages for number of living children approaches each other -for currently married women with no or 1 child it is 42.4 while for currently married women with 2 or more children it is 57.6-. However for ages 30-34 percentage of women having 2 or more children rises sharply and accordingly percent of women having no or 1 child declines. This can be interpreted as women in Turkey, generally reaches society's 2-child ideal at their 30s.

Other variable presented in Table 6.1.2 is number of living children by type of place of residence. It may be inferred from the table that women living in urban areas tend to have no or 1 child. Percent of women having 2 or more living children is more in rural areas than urban, as it is expected because of the different socio-economic structures of urban and rural areas of Turkey.

Table 6.1.2 also presents percent distribution of number of children by region among currently married and fecund women. The distribution shows that women living in West have the highest tendency to be married with no or 1 child (36.4%), while women of East have the highest tendency to be married with 2 or more children (78.4%).

Considering distribution of women according to number of children by wealth index in Table 6.1.2, it may be concluded that the highest percentage of fecund women who are currently married with no or 1 child belongs to highest wealth category (38.3%), whereas the highest percentage of fecund women who are currently married with 2 or more children belongs to lowest wealth category (80.1%).

**Table 6.1.2 Number of Children by Background Characteristics**

**Percent distribution of number of children of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 by Background Characteristics, Turkey**

Background characteristics	<i>no children or 1 child</i>	<i>2 or more children</i>	<i>Number of all women</i>
<b>Age</b>			
15-19	92.2	7.8	180
20-24	65.9	34.1	818
25-29	42.4	57.6	1308
30-34	22.4	77.6	1317
35-39	12.7	87.3	1236
40-44	9.0	91.0	1032
<b>Type of place of residence</b>			
Urban	32.3	67.7	4456
Rural	25.2	74.8	1434
<b>Region</b>			
West	36.4	63.6	2506
South	26.0	74.0	709
Central	28.8	71.2	1317
North	30.7	69.3	376
East	21.6	78.4	983
<b>Wealth index</b>			
Poorest	19.9	80.1	953
Poorer	23.2	76.8	1171
Middle	34.1	65.9	1244
Richer	34.6	65.4	1253
Richest	38.3	61.7	1270
Total	30.6	69.4	5890

Table 6.1.3 represents relationship of women aged 15-44 with individual oriented institutions. The results are given in comparison to women having no or 1 child and women having 2 or more children. From the table, it can be observed that half of currently married women completed 5-year-primary school. Second biggest group of women belongs to high school and higher category, representing completing high school, vocational high school, university, master or PhD pointing out that they have at least 11-year-education.

**Table 6.1.3 Number of Children by Relationship with Individual Oriented Institutions**

**Percent distribution of number of children of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 by women's relationship with individual oriented institutions, Turkey**

Institution	<i>no children or 1 child</i>	<i>with 2 or more children</i>	<i>Number of all women</i>
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete	15.6	84.4	966
Primary Education	21.7	78.3	3080
Secondary Education	50.5	49.5	549
High school and higher	54.6	45.4	1296
<b>Working Status</b>			
Not currently working	30.4	69.6	4110
Working with social security	54.1	45.9	577
Working without social security	20.0	80.0	1179
Total	30.6	69.4	5890

It may be observed from Table 6.1.3 that, women who have higher level of education are prone to have no or 1 child (54.6%). On the other hand, women who have lower level of education are prone to have 2 or more children. According to Table 5.1.3, 84.4% of women having no education or incomplete primary education have 2 or more children. Almost 1 of every 5 women having 2 or more children completed primary school whereas only 8 of every 100 women having no or 1 child completed primary school. Consequently, as education increases, percent of women having no or 1 child grows while as education rises, percent of women having 2 or more children decreases.

Number of living children by working status of women is also presented in Table 6.1.3. Among all fecund women who are currently married, around 30 percent participate in labor market. It is significant that 7 of every 10 women are economically inactive. It can be observed from the table that, women staying out of labor force tend to have 2 or more children: 69.6 percent of women who are not currently working have 2 or more children. Besides that, among women currently working with social security the percent of women is slightly higher for currently married with no or 1 child category (54.1%) compared to percentage for currently married with 2 or more children category (45.9%). What is interesting is that 80 percent of women, working without social security, have 2 or more children, whereas 69.6 percent of women, not currently working, have 2 or more children. This can be explained by the fact that in Turkey 33.5 percent of working women's status is unpaid family worker especially in agriculture and this labor process is not as incompatible with housework and child care as other types of female labor force participation. More specifically, 78.8% of women who is unpaid family worker have at least 2 children.

## 6.2 ALLOCATION OF HOUSEWORK

Women's attitude about couple's housework allocation is important. If a difference between practice and attitude of housework allocation exists, more specifically, if women perceive allocation of housework as unfair, reaction of women towards this situation might be observed in their fertility related practice and attitude. Therefore, before presenting actual division of housework, it would be useful to examine women's opinion on gender roles about housework allocation.

**Table 6.2.1 Opinion on whether or not Men should also Perform Routine Housework Tasks**

**Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 by their opinion on men's participation in routine housework, Turkey**

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Agree	3944	67.0
Disagree	1919	32.6
DK/Missing	27	0.4
Total	5890	100.0

Table 6.2.1 above shows opinion of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 on whether or not men should also perform routine housework tasks. According to Table 6.2.1, approximately 3 of every 10 women think that men should not perform routine housework tasks. In other words, these women perceive routine housework tasks such as cooking, washing clothes and ironing as women's duty in the family. This approach toward housework is well represented in actual allocation of housework.



**Table 6.2.3 Distribution of Housework : Occasional Housework**

<b>Percent distribution of occasional housework tasks by main responsible person based on answers of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey</b>							
	<i>Respondent</i>	<i>Husband</i>	<i>Other women</i>	<i>Other men</i>	<i>Paid servant</i>	<i>Not applicable</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Housework</b>							
Shopping	45.9	44.0	4.8	5.0	0.0	0.3	100
Budget	20.3	69.4	2.3	7.5	0.0	0.6	100
Official business	20.1	66.7	2.3	9.7	0.0	1.2	100
Reparations/ amendments	6.4	74.1	1.2	11.3	6.1	1.2	100
Number of women							5890

Percent distribution of occasional housework tasks among family members is presented in Table 6.2.3. It is observed at the table that, main responsible person for occasional housework tasks is husband for most of the cases. Being diverged from other occasional housework tasks, the percent distribution of kitchen shopping is conspicuous. Highest percent for shopping belongs to respondent and followed by husbands. It is the only housework task that is not allocated according to gender. Male member of family is the main responsible person for shopping in 49 percent of households whilst female member of family is the main responsible person for shopping in 50.7 percent of households. Table 6.2.3 indicates that housework tasks which require skills and education and involves decision making like preparing household budget and accounting or running errands in public offices, paying bills are mainly performed by male members of household. The highest percentages for other men for this table belong to official business (9.7%) and doing reparations/amendments (11.3%) tasks. The use of paid help draws attention for



repairs/amendments task: In 6.1 percent of households this task is performed by a paid servant.

To sum up and aggregate allocation of both type of housework, the number of housework tasks performed by respondents and husbands are presented in Table 5.2.4. It is observed from the table that 75.8 percent of respondents/wives perform all routine housework tasks, yet 95.7 percent of husbands do not perform any of routine housework tasks. Besides, 46.7 percent of respondents/wives do not perform any of occasional housework tasks while 31.9 percent of husbands perform all occasional housework tasks. These descriptive results offer that allocation of housework is not only qualitatively gendered, i.e. female and male partners perform different tasks; but also, quantitatively disadvantageous for women, i.e. female partners perform most of housework tasks.

**Table 6.2.4 Number of Tasks Performed by Respondent and Husband**

**Percent distribution of number of routine and occasional housework tasks performed by respondent based on answers of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Number* of Housework Tasks	Routine Housework		Occasional Housework	
	Respondent	Husband	Respondent	Husband
0	1.9	95.7	46.7	12.2
1	1.8	3.0	27.8	11.9
2	2.7	0.9	14.3	17.2
3	3.1	0.3	8.7	26.8
4	5.1	0.0	2.6	31.9
5	9.7	0.0	-	-
6	75.8	0.0	-	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of women				5890

\* There are 6 routine housework tasks and 4 occasional housework tasks.

### 6.3 FERTILITY INTENTIONS

Fertility intentions of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 are introduced in Table 6.3.1. It may be observed from the table that 57.6 percent of women declared that they do not want to have more children and 7.9 percent of women are sterilized which can be interpreted as they also do not have further fertility intentions.

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**Table 6.3.1 Fertility intentions**

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**Percent distribution of fertility intentions of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

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	Percent
<hr/>	
<i>Fertility intentions in 6 categories</i>	
Wants within 3 years	18.5
Wants after 3+ years	11.9
Wants unsure timing	0.7
Undecided	3.4
Wants no more	57.6
Sterilized	7.9
<i>Fertility intentions</i>	
Yes/More	31.1
No/No more	68.9
Total	100.0
Number of women	5890

---

Table also presents that 31.1 percent of women want to have more children in varying times in the future. In order to show fertility intentions for recent period, the time women want to wait before birth of a/next child is divided into three parts: within 3 years, more than 3 years and wants unsure timing. The 3 year time limit on fertility intentions is used in ESSs. In order to see fertility intentions of women for near future, 3 year cutoff seems suitable considering data of this thesis includes pregnant women and they are also able to give another birth in 3 years. Besides, the mean of years currently married and fecund women want to wait before birth of a next child is 2.6 years<sup>1</sup>. If calculation is made for women who would like to wait at most 3 years the mean is 1.6 years. The mean of years is 5.4 years for women who would like to wait more than 3 years. The means are too asunder enough to round up year 2.6 to 3.

18.5 percent of women stated that they would like to have a/another child in 3 years following the survey and 11.9 percent of women declared that they would like to wait more than 3 years before birth of a/next child

Besides, Table 6.3.1 shows frequencies and percentages two-category-fertility intentions variable. 31.1 percent of women stating they would like to have more children is under the category of “yes” and remained 68.9 percent of women are regarded as “no”.

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<sup>1</sup>The mean is calculated through numeric answers and soon/now answer. If the preferred waiting time for a next child is more than 24 months; it is recorded in years during the interview. Months 1-12 and soon/now are categorized as 1 year and months 13-24 are categorized as 2 years. The range is between 1 to 15 years.

#### **6.4 SCORES AND INDEXES FOR ALLOCATION OF HOUSEWORK TASKS**

Tables in part 6.2 clearly suggested that distribution of housework between married couples is highly gendered in Turkey: most of routine housework tasks are performed by wives and most of occasional housework tasks are performed by husbands; yet, percent of wives doing occasional housework tasks are considerably higher when compared to percent husbands doing routine housework. That leads to conclude that it is women who perform almost all types of routine housework, and some of them perform some of the occasional housework tasks which adds extra responsibilities to their workload in home.

In order to aggregate different variables on allocation of all housework tasks into one variable, a housework load index which involves different scores for different tasks is conducted. As various housework tasks consume different length of time, each housework task's weight is set separately. Total score of housework load index is 20 which refers to perform all of housework task and lowest score of index is 0 which refers to perform none of housework tasks.

In Table 6.4.1, total index scores for respondent, husband and paid worker are presented. Table shows that 34 percent of women get 13 out of 20. Concentration on score 13 is an expected output, since 13 is the score if a woman performs all routine housework tasks but no occasional housework tasks. Considering number of tasks performed by respondent and husband tabled above, score 13 generally displays this result with a few exceptions. Next highest concentration of respondents is on score 16 with a percentage of 19.8. Mean index score for respondents is 12.89 out of 20. The most striking output of table is that the mean time respondents, wives, spend on all housework tasks triples the mean time husbands spend, on average.

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**Table 6.4.1 Scores for Allocation of All Housework Task**


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**Percent distribution of scores for respondent, husband, and paid worker based on answers of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Score	<i>Respondent</i>	<i>Husband</i>	<i>Paid worker</i>
0	1.2	12.0	93.2
1	0.1	8.7	5.8
2	0.5	6.5	0.2
3	1.0	10.0	0.1
4	0.7	20.3	0.1
5	1.5	2.9	0.1
6	1.1	6.5	0.1
7	1.2	30.9	0.0
8	1.9	0.8	0.0
9	1.2	0.7	0.1
10	2.8	0.2	0.0
11	3.5	0.2	0.0
12	1.9	0.0	0.1
13	34.0	0.0	0.0
14	4.1	0.0	0.0
15	3.1	0.0	0.0
16	19.8	0.0	0.0
17	6.3	0.0	0.0
18	5.6	0.0	0.0
19	6.4	0.0	0.0
20	2.0	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Count	5890	5890	5890
<i>Mean</i>	<i>12.89</i>	<i>4.2</i>	<i>0.11</i>

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Although mean index score for husbands is 4.2, highest concentration of husbands is on score 7 with a percentage of 30.9. An expected but still striking result of the table is that 12 percent of husbands perform no housework tasks as being main responsible person. Considering scores for paid workers, it is obvious that their concentration is on score 1 with a percentage of 5.8 in accordance with previous tables. This is because of higher use of paid help for doing reparations or amendments task compared to other tasks as detailed in Table 5.2.3 in part 5.2.

Table 6.4.2 below presents frequencies and percentages for Index for allocation of all housework tasks. Approximately 60 percent of women belonging to category “1” perform at most 75 percent of all housework tasks whereas 40 percent of them perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks.

<b>Table 6.4.2 Women by Index Category</b>	
<b>Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 by index category, Turkey</b>	
	<i>percent</i>
Performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks (1)	59.8
Performing more than 75% of all housework tasks (2)	40.2
Total	100.0
Total number	5890

Table 6.4.3 presents background characteristics of fecund and married women aged 15-44 according to the index for allocation of all housework tasks. It can be observed from the table that the highest percentage for category 1 fits women aged 15-19. In other words, 81.6 percent of women, aged 15-19, perform maximum 75 percent of all housework task.

**Table 6.4.3 Women in Index Categories by Background Characteristics**

**Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in index categories by background characteristics, Turkey**

Background characteristics	<i>index category</i>		Number of women
	Category 1 maximum 75%	Category 2 more than 75%	
<b>Age</b>			
15-19	81.6	18.4	180
20-24	71.3	28.7	818
25-29	62.8	37.2	1308
30-34	55.9	44.1	1317
35-39	52.9	47.1	1236
40-44	56.5	43.5	1032
<b>Type of place of residence</b>			
Urban	54.5	45.5	4456
Rural	76.5	23.5	1434
<b>Region</b>			
West	51.1	48.9	2506
South	54.4	45.6	709
Central	65.1	34.9	1317
North	64.9	35.1	376
East	77.1	22.9	983
<b>Wealth Index</b>			
Poorest	77.1	22.9	953
Poorer	64.1	35.9	1171
Middle	54.6	45.4	1244
Richer	52.4	47.6	1253
Richest	55.4	44.6	1270
Total	59.8	40.2	5890

The highest percentage for category 2 belongs to women aged 35-39 i.e. they are responsible from more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. As mentioned earlier occasional housework tasks require some skills and access to out of home environment that may be acquired through education. Women aged 15-19 in the table married at very young ages; therefore, probably do not spend enough time in education and they do not have required skills for these task. It can be concluded from the table that, as age increases the percentage of women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks increases with the exception of age group 40-44.

Considering percent distribution of index categories for urban and rural residences, it is obvious that 45.5 percent of women living in urban areas fit to category 2, whilst the percentage of this category is 23.5 for women living in rural areas. This difference implies that more urban women perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks than rural women. This can be explained by educational differences between women living in urban and rural areas of Turkey.

Percent distribution according to 5 regions presents that Central and North regions possess similar percentages for two categories with distribution of Turkey as a whole. Highest percentage for category 2 belongs to West which is most socio-economically advanced region, while highest percentage for category 1 fit East, being least developed region of the country. This differentiation can be explained by different levels of relationship of women in the West and the East with individual oriented institutions, again.

Among wealth quintiles, highest percentage for being responsible from more than 75 percent of the housework indicates richer women; on the other hand, lowest percentage points out women residing in lowest wealth quintile.



**Table 6.4.4 Women in Index Categories by Selected Characteristics**

**Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in index categories by Relationship with Individual Oriented Institutions, Number of Living Children and Fertility Intentions, Turkey**

Institution	<i>Index</i>		Number of women
	Category 1 maximum 75%	Category 2 more than 75%	
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete	71.3	28.7	966
Primary Education	56.6	43.4	3081
Secondary Education	59.7	40.3	548
High school and higher	59.1	40.9	1296
<b>Working Status</b>			
Not currently working	57.3	42.7	4110
Working with social security	66.7	33.3	577
Working without social security	59.9	40.1	1180
<b>Number of Living Children</b>			
0-1	62.8	37.2	1803
2+	58.5	41.5	4088
<b>Fertility Intentions</b>			
No	57.4	42.6	4057
Yes	65.2	34.8	1834
total	59.8	40.2	5890

Table 6.4.4 presents percent distribution of relationship with individual oriented institutions, number of living children and fertility intentions by index. It can be inferred from the table that as education increases, the proportion of women in category “2” of index grows. To put in another way, being more educated does not reduce women’s responsibilities on housework task by obtaining them negotiation power in family in the case of Turkey, on the contrary, it increases their responsibilities. Being more skilled means having extra burden about housework tasks.

Considering percent distribution for working status, it is obvious that the lowest percentage of women being in category “2” which refers performing more than 75% belongs to women currently working with social security followed by women currently working without social security and afterwards women who are not currently working. Consequently, it can be concluded from Table 5.12 that being part of labor force has an alleviative effect on women’s share of housework. However, since being an unpaid family worker is prevalent in working without social security category, the significant decrease is for women having a job with social security.

Number of living children seems slightly affecting the percent distribution between categories of index. It can be inferred from the table that less percent of women having no or 1 child perform more than 75 percent of housework tasks as main responsible person when compared to women having more than 2 children.

Lastly, Table 6.4.4 proposes that slightly more percent of women having more fertility intentions perform maximum 75 percent of housework tasks as main responsible person in comparison to women having no more fertility intentions.

In the light of above findings confirming that a significantly high percentage (75.8) of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in Turkey perform all types of routine housework, it may be useful to analyze second index of this thesis which is presented in Table 5.15 below.

**Table 6.4.5 Scores for Allocation of Occasional Housework Tasks**

**Percent distribution of scores for fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Score	<i>Respondent</i>
	Percent
0	46.7
1	3.4
2	2.7
3	23.4
4	6.9
5	6.5
6	7.9
7	2.6
Total	100.0
Total number	5890
<i>Mean</i>	2.0

Although mean of scores for respondents is around 2, highest concentration of women is on score 3 with a percentage of 23.4. From previous findings above, it is remarked that besides most tasks of occasional housework, some women perform some tasks of residual housework tasks which traditionally belong to male members of the society. However, an important result of table is that still, 46.7 percent of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 do not perform any of occasional housework tasks which confirm again highly gendered structure of allocation of housework in Turkey.

## 6.5 FERTILITY PREFERENCES OF WOMEN AND SOCIETY'S TWO-CHILD-NORM

One of the main themes discussed throughout the thesis is low fertility. According to McDonald (1997: 14), when fertility is at average level, it may become very low through decisions of some women, not all of them. If these women's fertility intentions and preferences are against society's average fertility level, it may "distort the story of fertility". The aim of this part is to focus on *these some women*. Number of living children is the main determiner of the future fertility preferences.

**Table 6.5.1 Interaction of Fertility Intentions by Number of Living Children**

**Percent distribution of interaction of fertility intentions by living children for fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

	<i>percent</i>
0-1 child no intention	7.5
0-1 child intention	23.1
2+ children no intention	61.4
2+ children intention	8.0
Total	100.0
Total number of women	5890

Table 6.5.1 presents fertility intentions for more children by number of living children of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 within four categories. Remembering Turkey's 2-child norm, it can be commented that women residing in categories of "0-1 child and no intention" and "2+ children and more intention" are women who have preferences not coherent with the society's norm. Besides, Preferences favoring two children are significant because it ensures replacement level fertility. Therefore, it may be concluded that around 16 percent of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in Turkey do not agree with society's two-child norm, whereas other 84 percent seems to confirm 2-child norm.

Table 6.5.2 presents background characteristics of women according to fertility intentions by number of living children. According to this table, because they are at the beginning of their reproductive ages, most of women aged 15-19 have no or 1 child and more fertility intentions, as expected. Besides, this table proves that women in Turkey reach 2-child-ideal at first half of their 30s, as it is mentioned before. Therefore, highest percentage for ages 30-34 belongs to having 2 or more children and no more fertility intentions. Also, considering percentages for 0-1 child, it is obvious that, even if as age increases percentage of having no or 1 child decreases, there are some decisive women who prefer not to have children or have only one child for their entire life. 5.9% of women aged 40-44 have no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions.

The distribution for type of place of residence points out that women living in urban areas tend to have no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions; while women living in rural areas tend to have at least 2 children and have more fertility intentions, as expected.

Percent distribution for regions declares that they are the women living in West, most developed part of the country, having highest percentage for having no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions, followed by North region. Not surprisingly, more women in the East, least developed part of the country, tend to have at least 2 children and more fertility intentions, followed by women in South region.

It can be clearly inferred from Table 6.5.2 that, as wealth raises the number of children women would like to have decreases; hence, more women in richest wealth quintile have no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions. The reverse is valid for women in poorest wealth quintile. Accordingly, more women in poorest quintile have 2 or more children and more fertility intentions and fewer women in highest wealth quintile have 2 or more children and more fertility intentions.

**Table 6.5.2 Fertility Intentions by Number of Living Children, by Background Characteristics**

**Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in categories of Fertility Intentions by Number of Living Children, by Background Characteristics, Turkey**

Background characteristics	<i>0-1 child no intention</i>	<i>0-1 child intention</i>	<i>2+ children no intention</i>	<i>2+ children intention</i>	<i>Number of women</i>
<b>Age</b>					
15-19	9.5	82.7	1.7	6.1	180
20-24	6.0	59.9	22.9	11.3	818
25-29	8.7	33.7	46.2	11.4	1308
30-34	8.2	14.3	67.1	10.5	1317
35-39	7.4	5.3	82.3	5.1	1236
40-44	5.9	3.0	89.3	1.7	1032
<b>Type of place of residence</b>					
Urban	8.4	23.9	60.1	7.6	4456
Rural	4.6	20.6	65.5	9.3	1434
<b>Region</b>					
West	11.0	25.4	58.5	5.1	2506
South	3.7	22.3	63.3	10.7	709
Central	6.4	22.4	63.4	7.8	1317
North	8.0	22.7	63.5	5.9	376
East	2.5	19.0	63.9	14.5	983
<b>Wealth index</b>					
Poorest	3.3	16.6	67.9	12.3	952
Poorer	4.0	19.1	65.9	10.9	1170
Middle	8.8	25.3	57.8	8.1	1245
Richer	6.2	28.3	59.5	6.0	1253
Richest	13.8	24.4	57.8	3.9	1270
Total	7.5	23.1	61.4	8.0	5890

Table 6.5.3 below presents percent distribution of relationship with individual oriented institutions and index for allocation of all housework tasks according to fertility intentions by number of living children. It may be observed from the table that more of women having no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions are the women having highest education, i.e. high school, university, master or PhD (16.3%). Besides, as expected, fewer percent of them are women having no education or went yet didn't complete primary school (2.0%). On the other hand, other group of women having preferences not coherent with society's 2-child norm, who have at least 2 children and want more children are more prevalent among no education or primary incomplete category with a percentage of 11.8 whereas only 3.2 percent of women having high school or more education have at least 2 children and more fertility intentions.

Percent distribution for another individual oriented institution which is current working status reveals that 19.6 percent of women working with social security have no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions whereas this percentage is for not currently working women is only 6.3. In other words, 1 of every 5 women working with social security has fertility intentions not coherent with society's norm. It is an expected output considering extreme loss of institutionalized child-care system in Turkey. Much fewer percentage of women working without social security have 0-1 child and no fertility intentions simply because of the fact that they are usually unpaid family workers and their work environment is suitable for reconciling work, housework and childcare. As it is expected the lowest percentage for women working with social security category belongs to have at least 2 children and want more children (3.5%).

Slightly more percentage of women who perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks have no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions when compared to women who perform maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks. The reverse is valid for women having at least 2 children and more fertility intentions.

**Table 6.5.3 Fertility Intentions by Number Of Living Children, by Relationship with Individual Oriented Institutions and Index**

Percent distribution of fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 in categories of Fertility Intentions by Number of Living Children, by Relationship with individual oriented institutions and index category, Turkey

	<i>0-1 child no intention</i>	<i>0-1 child intention</i>	<i>2+ children no intention</i>	<i>2+ children intention</i>	<i>Number of women</i>
<b>Education</b>					
No educ./Primary Incomplete	2.0	13.7	72.6	11.8	966
Primary Education	5.4	16.3	69.6	8.7	3081
Secondary Education	8.2	42.3	41.1	8.4	548
High school and higher	16.3	38.3	42.2	3.2	1295
<b>Working Status</b>					
Not currently working	6.3	24.0	61.0	8.7	4132
Working with social security	19.6	34.6	42.4	3.5	578
Working without social security	5.6	14.5	72.1	7.8	1180
<b>Index for allocation of all housework tasks</b>					
Max 75%	6.7	25.5	59.4	8.5	3525
More than 75%	8.7	19.6	64.4	7.3	2365
Total	7.5	23.1	61.4	8.0	5890



Table 6.5.4 presents mean of indexes according to fertility intentions by number of living children. Considering calculated means above, it may be concluded that there seems no significant differences among mean of scores for both allocation of all housework tasks and allocation of occasional housework tasks.

**Table 6.5.4 Mean Index Scores**

**Mean index scores for categories of fertility intentions by number of living children**

<b>Index of</b>	<i>0-1 child</i>		<i>2+ children</i>		<i>Total mean</i>
	<i>no intention</i>	<i>0-1 child intention</i>	<i>no intention</i>	<i>2+ children intention</i>	
allocation of all housework tasks	12.7	12.5	12.9	13.2	12.9
allocation of occasional housework tasks	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.9	2.0

## 6.6 DESCRIPTIVE TABLES FOR MODELS IN LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

In this part, descriptive tables for independent variables used in binary logistic regression analyses in relation to dependent variable are presented. Percent distribution of independent variables in models applied to all selected women is exhibited in table 6.6.1.

In order to observe the effect of age on fertility intentions clearly, the number of age categories included in logistic regression analyses declined to three. It may be observed from the Table 6.6.1 that as age increases there are lower percentages of women who have more fertility intentions. Women in the oldest age group (35-44) have significantly lower percentage for no more fertility intentions when compared to younger age groups.

Categories of education variable also are reduced to 3 for logistic regression analysis since the percent distribution for fertility intentions seems highly similar enough for no education/primary incomplete category and primary education category that they are jointed into one category. The percentage of women having no more fertility intentions seems higher for no education, primary incomplete and primary complete category. This can be explained by that older women, who usually have lower levels of education when compared to younger ones, fall within these categories in large numbers. Since they are close to complete their reproduction period and they have already had children as many as they want, they tend to have no more fertility intentions. It is showed in Table 5.6.1 that higher percentage of women with low education has no more fertility intentions. Besides that higher percent of women with high education (having a degree of high school, university, master and doctorate) have no more fertility intentions when checked against percent of women with secondary education, as expected.

Percent distribution for working status suggests that the highest percentage of women who would not like to have a/another child belong to woman who are working without social security.

Number of having children has an outstanding effect on fertility intentions of women. It may be concluded from the table that 88.55% of women having 2 or more children have no more fertility intentions as expected, whilst 75.6% of women having no or 1 child have more fertility intentions for the future.

The allocation of housework, particularly, respondent's share of housework appears to have an impact on fertility intentions of women. 66.1 percent of women performing maximum 75 % of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions while the percentage is 73.0 for women performing more than 75% of all housework tasks. This is probably related to age distribution, since younger women tend to perform less than 75% of all housework tasks and since they are young they have more fertility intentions.

**Table 6.6.1 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 9**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 9 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Age</b>			
15-24	25.8	74.2	998
25-34	65.1	34.9	2625
35-44	92.2	7.8	2268
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	74.9	25.1	4046
Secondary Education	49.2	50.8	549
High school and higher	58.5	41.5	1296
<b>Working status</b>			
Not currently working	67.3	32.7	4110
Working without social security	77.7	22.3	1179
Working with social security	61.9	38.1	577
<b>Number of living children</b>			
0-1	24.4	75.6	1803
2+	88.5	11.5	4087
<b>Allocation of housework</b>			
Maximum 75%	66.1	33.9	3525
More than 75%	73.0	27.0	2366
<b>Type of place of residence</b>			
Rural	70.1	29.9	1435
Urban	68.5	31.5	4456

**Table 6.6.1 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 9 (Continued)**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 9 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Region</b>			
East	66.5	33.5	983
South	66.9	33.1	708
Central	69.8	30.2	1317
North	71.3	28.7	376
West	69.5	30.5	2506
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b>			
<75, 0-1child	20.7	79.3	1133
<75, 2+ children	87.5	12.5	2392
>75, 0-1 child	30.7	69.3	670
>75, 2+ children	89.8	10.2	1696
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by working status</b>			
<75, not working	63.5	36.5	2366
<75, working	72.5	27.5	1158
>75, not working	72.6	27.4	1768
>75, working	74.8	25.2	599
Total	68.9	31.1	5890

Percent distribution of type of place of residence suggests no major variation. According to Table 6.6.1, 70.1% of fecund and married women aged 15-44 who live in rural areas do not have more fertility intentions, whereas the percentage for the ones who live in urban areas is 68.5%.

It can be inferred from Table 6.6.1 that North region have the highest percentage of women who have no more fertility intentions. Higher mean age of women in North region when compared to women in other regions may be underlying reason of it. Besides, East region seems to have the highest percentage of women who have more fertility intention, as expected.

Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children variable provides that among women having no or 1 child there is 10% variation according to housework share of women. Actually, 20.7% of women performing maximum 75% of housework want to have no more children, whereas 30.7% of women performing more than 75% of housework want so. However, among women who have 2 or more children, allocation of housework produces only a 2.3% change.

Last variable included in models employed to all fecund and married women aged 15-44 is interaction of allocation of housework by working status. It may be inferred from the table that the highest percent of women who have no more fertility intentions belong to working women who perform more than 75% of all housework and the highest percent of women who have more fertility intentions belong to women who are not currently working and perform less than 75% of all housework, as expected. However, percentages among categories are not too different from each other.

Table 6.6.2 presents percent distribution of independent variables in models applied to women living in urban and rural areas separately. These women are fecund, married and aged 15-44. Firstly, it may be inferred from the table that for urban areas highest percentage of women who have no more fertility intentions

belongs to women having secondary education, and the lowest percentage of women having more fertility intentions fits to women having no education or maximum primary education. Similarly, for rural areas, the lowest percentage of women having more fertility intentions fits to women having no education or maximum primary education. However, percentages for categories of secondary and high school and higher education do not present important differences.

What is expected is that working status would have a stronger relationship with fertility intentions for population of women living in urban areas, yet it is not the case. Percent distribution according to working status suggests that they are the women working without social security whose percentage is lowest for more fertility intentions for both urban and rural areas.

Number of living children suggests significant changes in percentages but in the same direction for both women living in urban and rural areas. According to Table 6.6.2, 74% of urban women having no or 1 child wants to have a/another child whereas 81.8% of rural women having no or 1 child wants to have a/another child. The percentages for women having at least 2 children do not present significant differences. In means that, both women living in urban and rural areas have fertility intentions in line with two-child norm.

What is supposed is that allocation of housework would have much bigger impact on fertility intentions of women living in urban areas. Allocation of housework put forward some differences in percentages, yet they are similar for women living in 2 different types of place of residence. For urban areas, around 65 percent of women performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions whereas around 73 percent of women performing more than 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions. For rural areas, around 69 percent of women performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions whereas around 75 percent of women performing more than 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions.

**Table 6.6.2 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 4 and 5\***

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 4 and 5 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	URBAN AREAS			RURAL AREAS		
	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes		No	Yes	
<b>Education</b>						
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	74.9	25.1	2846	74.8	25.3	1200
Secondary Education	49.9	50.1	435	46.5	53.5	114
High school and higher	59.7	40.3	1176	45.8	54.2	120
<b>Working status</b>						
Not currently working	67.9	32.1	3363	64.9	35.1	771
Working without social security	78.1	21.9	561	77.2	22.8	619
Working with social security	61.8	38.2	532	62.2	37.8	45
<b>Number of living children</b>						
0-1	26.0	74.0	1441	18.2	81.8	362
2+	88.8	11.2	3015	87.6	12.4	1073
<b>Allocation of housework</b>						
Maximum 75%	64.8	35.2	2427	68.8	31.2	1097
More than 75%	72.8	27.2	2028	74.5	25.5	337
<b>Region</b>						
East	66.0	34.0	621	67.4	32,6	362
South	68.7	31.3	504	62.9	37,1	205
Central	68.9	31.1	964	72.2	27,8	353
North	72.4	27.6	214	69.8	30,2	162
West	68.5	31.5	2154	75.3	24,7	352
Total	68.5	31.5	4457	70.2	29.8	1434

\* Sub-population for Model 4 is women living in urban areas and sub-population for Model 5 is women living in rural areas.

Lastly from Table 6.6.2, it can be said that percent distribution by region shows that the highest percent of more fertility intentions belongs to East region for urban areas and North region for rural areas. The lowest ones are North region for urban areas and West region for rural areas.

Table 6.6.3 below, presents percent distribution of independent variables in models applied to fecund and married women aged 15-24. The first inference from the table is that because women in this table are first stages of their reproductive period, they all tend to have more fertility intentions. It can also be gathered from the table that as education increases, the percentage of women who would like to have a/another child rises. The reason may be that the ones who have no or lower education are most probably the ones get married at earlier ages and have higher number of children compared to the ones having higher education.

Percent distribution according to working status suggests that they are the women working with social security whose percentage is lowest for more fertility intentions. It is an expected outcome in line with this thesis' suppositions. On the other hand they are the women working without social security whose percentage is highest for more fertility intentions. Working without social security most probably points out low-prestigious jobs which lasts long hours in a day, are not expected to provide maternity leave, child-care benefits or guarantee to turn back work. Therefore, women working without social security may have not have children as many as they want yet or event any children at all that would lead them to have an intention to have a/another child sometime in the future. Also, they can be unpaid family workers especially in rural areas.

Number of living children presents significant changes in percentages. According to Table 6.6.3, 90.5% of women having no or 1 child want to have a/another child sometime in the future. What is interesting is that for such a young age cohort, 9.5% of women having no or 1 child do not have more fertility intentions in such a country where having two child is a norm for a considerable length of time.



**Table 6.6.3 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 6, 10 and 14**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 6, 10 and 14 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-24, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	31.1	68.9	578
Secondary Education	18.3	81.7	240
High school and higher	17.9	82.1	179
<b>Working status</b>			
Not currently working	26.6	73.4	847
Working without social security	18.6	81.4	118
Working with social security	30.3	69.7	33
<b>Number of living children</b>			
0-1	9.5	90.5	705
2+	64.8	35.2	293
<b>Allocation of housework</b>			
Maximum 75%	26.6	73.4	729
More than 75%	23.4	76.6	269
<b>Region</b>			
East	32.2	67.8	214
South	20.5	79.5	117
Central	25.8	74.2	256
North	18.9	81.1	53
West	24.6	75.4	358

**Table 6.6.3 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 6, 10 and 14 (Continued)**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 6, 10 and 14 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-24, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b>			
<75, 0-1child	9.8	90.2	520
<75, 2+ children	68.1	31.9	210
>75, 0-1 child	8.2	91.8	184
>75, 2+ children	56.0	44.0	84
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by working status</b>			
<75, not working	27.7	72.3	611
<75, working	21.0	79.0	119
>75, not working	23.7	76.3	236
>75, working	21.2	78.8	33
Total	25.7	74.3	997

It cannot be concluded from Table 6.6.3 that allocation of housework suggests major differences in percentages. This can be illuminated by the fact that women in this age simply want to have more fertility intentions in all probability.

Percent distribution by region reveals that the highest percent of more fertility intentions belongs to North region, whereas the lowest one fits to east region. However, it should be underlined here again; regardless of which region they live in most of women aged 15-24 tend to have more fertility intentions.

In Table 6.6.3, it is shown that percent distribution by interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children variable suggest that among women having 2 or more child there is around 12% difference in percentages according to housework share of women. Table 6.6.3 reveals that 31.9% of women having 2 or more children and performing maximum 75% of housework want to have more children, whereas 44.0% of women having 2 or more children and performing more than 75% of housework want to have more children. On the other hand, among women who have no or 1 child, allocation of housework yields only 1.6% change. Women having no or 1 child, simply, would like to have more a/another child.

It may be inferred from the percentages by interaction of allocation of housework by working status that the highest percent of women aged 15-24 who have no more fertility intentions belongs to working women who perform less than 75% of all housework. It would be interesting if the differences between percentages by interaction of allocation of housework by working status were not that small.

Percent distribution of independent variables by dependent variable in models applied to fecund and married women aged 25-34 is presented in Table 5.6.4 below. It may be deduced from the table that as education grows, the percentage of women who would like to have a/another child increases, similar with women aged 15-34. Again, since women who have no or lower education tend to get married at early ages and have already have as many as children they wanted to have, they would not like to have no more children.

Percent distribution by working status for women aged 25-34 proposes output dissimilar to the ones for women aged 15-24. This time, they are the women working with social security whose percentage is highest for more fertility intentions. Actually, it is not surprising because women working with social security are supposed to be more educated and plan their fertility. By the age of 25, they have graduated from their school and been ready to have a child and by the age of 34, they feel like they have close to the end of the biologically best ages to give birth.

Therefore the ages between 25 and 34 are perfect ages to have an intention to have a child. However, they are the women working without social security whose percentage is lowest for more fertility intentions. Women working without social security aged 25-34, even if they have not have children as many as they want, working conditions can cause them to prefer not to have any more children.

Table 6.6.4 suggests that number of living children presents important changes in percentages: 74.0% of women having no or 1 child want to have a/another child sometime in the future. What is interesting is that for such a young age cohort, 16.2% of women having no or 1 child does not have more fertility intentions, as expected.

Allocation of housework suggests some minor differences in percentages. Around 64% of women performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions whereas around 68% of women performing more than 75% of all housework tasks have no more fertility intentions. This is an expected result and in line with what first research question claims.

Other variable, region shows that the highest percent of more fertility intentions belongs to West region, whereas the lowest one fits to North region. This is because of the fact that more women in the West, which is most developed part of the country, have higher education and work with social security which make them not have had as many as children, yet; therefore they have more fertility intentions in these ages.

Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children variable implies that among women having 2 or more children there is 4% difference in percentages according to housework share of women. It can be observed from the table that 82.2% of women having 2 or more children and performing maximum 75% of housework want to have no more children, while 86.2% of women having 2 or more children and performing more than 75% of housework want to have no more

children. Furthermore, among women who have no or 1 child, allocation of housework gives way 4.6% change. 75.3% of women having no or one child and performing maximum 75% of housework want to have a/another child, whereas 71.9% of women having no or 1 child and performing more than 75% of housework want to have a/another child. What is worth to mention here that number living children has a dominant effect which determines power of relationship to fertility intentions.

It may be seen from the percentages by interaction of allocation of housework by working status that the highest percent of women who have no more fertility intentions belongs to non-working women who perform more than 75% of all housework tasks. It may be the case that non-working women aged 15-24 may have already has as many as children they want. Also, the variation of percentages for different categories seems small.

**Table 6.6.4 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 7, 11 and 15**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 7, 11 and 15 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 25-34, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	70.4	29.6	1692
Secondary Education	63.4	36.6	186
High school and higher	53.5	46.5	747
<b>Working status</b>			
Not currently working	66.2	33.8	1809
Working without social security	73.9	26.1	471
Working with social security	47.5	52.5	345
<b>Number of living children</b>			
0-1	26.0	74.0	849
2+	83.8	16.2	1775

**Table 6.6.4 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 7, 11 and 15 (Continued)**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 7, 11 and 15 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 25-34, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Allocation of housework</b>			
Maximum 75%	63.5	36.5	1558
More than 75%	67.6	32.4	1067
<b>Region</b>			
East	64.7	35.3	436
South	65.9	34.1	311
Central	69.5	30.5	587
North	67.9	32.1	165
West	62.4	37.6	1125
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b>			
<75, 0-1child	24.7	75.3	507
<75, 2+ children	82.2	17.8	1051
>75, 0-1 child	28.1	71.9	342
>75, 2+ children	86.2	13.8	724
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by working status</b>			
<75, not working	63.8	36.2	1008
<75, working	63.0	37.0	551
>75, not working	69.3	30.7	801
>75, working	62.3	37.7	265
Total	65.1	34.9	2624

In Table 6.6.5, percent distribution of independent variables by dependent variable in models applied to fecund and married women aged 35-44 is presented. Before analyzing each independent variable separately, considering all percentages shown in the table, it may be concluded that, women aged 35-44 have a tendency to have no more fertility intentions in general.

It may be observed from the table that the lowest percentage of women who would like to have a/another child belongs to lowest education category, simply because of the possibility that they have married at earlier ages and have already have as many as children they want. The percentages for secondary education and high school and higher category are very similar.

For women aged 35-44, percent distribution by working status for women aged 25-34 does not propose huge differentiation for each category. However according to 5.6.5, number of living children proposes important changes in percentages: 61.0% of women having no or 1 child want to have a/another child sometime in the future whereas 96% of women having 2 or more children want to have more children. Even if, women in this table, aged 35-44, generally tend to have no more fertility intentions, the higher percentage for more fertility intentions in no or 1 child category is another proof of that having at least 1, mostly 2 kids is a norm in Turkey. Therefore the relationship between number of living children and fertility intentions seems quite strong even for women aged 35-44.

Allocation of housework, variable at the focus of this thesis, does not propose meaningful differentiation in percentages for this age cohort. Another variable, region shows that the highest percent of more fertility intentions belongs to South region (12.5), whereas the lowest one fits to Central region.

**Table 6.6.5 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 8, 12 and 16**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 8, 12 and 16 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 35-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	93.3	6.7	1776
Secondary Education	87.8	12.2	123
High school and higher	87.9	12.1	371
<b>Working status</b>			
Not currently working	92.1	7.9	1478
Working without social security	92.4	7.6	591
Working with social security	92.0	8.0	199
<b>Number of living children</b>			
0-1	61.0	39.0	249
2+	96.0	4.0	2019
<b>Allocation of housework</b>			
Maximum 75%	92.6	7.4	1237
More than 75%	91.7	8.3	2268
<b>Region</b>			
East	91.0	9.0	333
South	87.5	12.5	281
Central	93.7	6.3	475
North	93.0	7.0	157
West	93.0	7.0	1022



**Table 6.6.5 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 8, 12 and 16 (Continued)**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 8, 12 and 16 which are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 35-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b>			
<75, 0-1child	55.2	44.8	105
<75, 2+ children	96.0	4.0	1132
>75, 0-1 child	65.7	34.3	143
>75, 2+ children	95.9	4.1	887
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by working status</b>			
<75, not working	92.4	7.6	748
<75, working	92.8	7.2	489
>75, not working	91.7	8.3	731
>75, working	91.7	8.3	300
Total	92.2	7.8	2270

According to Table 6.6.5, interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children variable implies that among women having 2 or more child there is about no difference in percentages according to housework share of women. On the other hand, among women who have no or 1 child, allocation of housework set forward around 10% change. As it can be observed from the table that 55.2% of women having no or 1 child and performing maximum 75% of housework want to have no more children, while 65.7% of women having 2 or more children and performing more than 75% of housework want to have no more children. This

finding is in line with what second hypothesis asserts. Lastly, percent distribution by interaction of allocation of housework by working status does not present substantive changes in percentages for each category.

In Table 6.6.6, percent distribution of independent variables in the model applied to working women aged 15-44. It may be observed from the table that as age increases there are lower percentages of working women who have more fertility intentions, as expected.

The percentage of women having no more fertility intentions seems higher for no education, primary incomplete and primary complete category, for working women. Percentages for secondary and high school and higher categories seem quite similar. It can be concluded that for working women, having no education or maximum primary education creates difference on fertility intentions.

It can be inferred from Table 6.6.6 that West region have the highest percentage of women who have no more fertility intentions. However, the percentages do not seem significantly different.

Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children variable, which is crucial for this model, provides about no variation according to housework share, among women having 2 or more children. Furthermore, among women who have no or 1 child, allocation of housework gives way around 6% variation. 69.4% of working women having no or 1 child and performing maximum 75% of housework want to have more children; whilst, 63.9% of working women no or 1 child and performing more than 75% of housework want to have more children. Therefore, the dominant effect of number of living children is observed here, too.

**Table 6.6.6 Fertility Intentions by Dependent Variables in Model 17**

**Percent distribution of fertility intentions by dependent variables in Model 17 which is employed to working, fecund and currently married women aged 35-44, Turkey**

Independent variables	<i>Fertility Intentions</i>		Number of women
	No	Yes	
<b>Age</b>			
15-24	21.2	78.8	151
25-34	62.7	37.3	816
35-44	92.4	7.6	789
<b>Education</b>			
No educ./Primary Incomplete/ Primary	79.9	20.1	1136
Secondary Education	58.7	41.3	109
High school and higher	58.9	41.1	513
<b>Region</b>			
East	69.2	30.8	195
South	71.6	28.4	194
Central	72.6	27.4	368
North	72.3	27.7	191
West	73.4	26.6	809
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b>			
<75, 0-1child	30.6	69.4	366
<75, 2+ children	90.1	9.9	791
>75, 0-1 child	36.1	63.9	183
>75, 2+ children	91.6	8.4	417
Total	72.5	27.5	1756

## CHAPTER 7

### RESULTS OF LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES

In previous chapter the results of descriptive analyses are presented. They indicate some important conclusions. First important output from descriptive analysis suggests that two-child norm seems highly accepted for most of women in Turkey, even though some of them insist to have no or 1 child. The prominent characteristics of women having no or 1 child are following: Firstly, they are younger and residing in highest wealth quintile. They are currently working with social security and have higher education.

Second substantial result of descriptive analyses is that allocation of housework is qualitatively and quantitatively gendered in Turkey. Women and men perform different types of housework and overall, women perform a greater percentage of housework.

Further from descriptive analyses, general conclusions on division of housework are following: Women generally tend to perform less (maximum 75 percent) housework. However, this should not be interpreted by higher gender equity; rather it is about women lacking acquired skills to perform some tasks like preparing budget. As education increases the proportion of women performing more (more than 75 percent) housework also increases. Women's higher education which is supposed to help to build a fairer allocation of housework by giving women more negotiation power do not provide a more equal allocation in Turkey. Higher levels of education open the doors of houses not to gender equity, but to extra burden on women's shoulders. The highest percentage of women performing more housework belongs to West region and when women's higher education level when compared to their counterparts in other regions is taken into account, it is an expected result. Besides, women living in urban areas, older and richer women have a tendency to perform more housework. On the other hand, women working with social security tend to perform less housework.

Moreover, descriptive results suggest that higher percentage of women who have at least 2 children perform more housework. Also, women with more fertility intentions tend to perform less housework.

Two types of women who do not follow society's two-child norm are defined in descriptive analyses: women having no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions and women having 2 or more children and more fertility intentions. On one hand, women in the highest wealth category, women with highest education, those working with social security and those living in West region consist of more women having no or 1 child and no more fertility intentions. On the other hand, women in the lowest wealth category, women with no or low education, those who are not currently working and women living in East region comprise more women having 2 or more children and more fertility intentions. Percentage of women performing more housework is slightly higher for women having 0-1 child and no fertility intentions.

These findings provide some clues on the relationship between gender equity and fertility intentions in Turkey. Inclusive gender perspective this thesis used as framework proposes that in order to see full picture of the relationship between fertility and gender equity, levels of gender equity in different areas of life are to be considered together. In the light of literature and descriptive findings, this chapter aims to provide an empirical test of gender equity theory for Turkey through logistic regression analyses.

Before interpreting logistic regression results, the issue of statistical significance ( $p$  values) is to be illuminated, here. Almost all introductory texts suggest that statistical significance does not equal to practical importance and, the use of a binary significant/non-significant decision rule discourage people to pay attention to potentially important observed differences during interpreting results (Gelman and Stern 2006: 328). Pointing out prejudice against non-significant results Filho et al suggest that "...scholars should focus on the size of the expected effects,

instead of worrying about the significance of the difference” (2013: 31). P value can tell neither about the magnitude of the effect of a predictor on dependent variable, nor which variable explains the most. Therefore p value is unable to answer research question. Therefore, statistically non-significant results do not always imply there is no relationship between dependent variable and predictor. Likewise, statistically significant results do not certainly provide practically important results (Filho et al. 2013). Considering the discussion above, the aim of the researcher is to focus on magnitude and the direction of relationship between predictors and dependent variable. To this aim, while interpreting results, statistically non-significant results are also taken into consideration.

Table A.1<sup>1</sup> provides results of logistic regression analysis for model 1. The dependent variable for this and all models is fertility intentions of women. Some predictor variables employed in the model are age (reference 35-44), education (reference= high school and higher), number of living children (reference=2+), working status (reference= working with social security) and allocation of housework (reference = more than 75%). Although, in hypotheses, main concern is on women’s relationship with individual oriented institutions and allocation of housework in family; Model 1 includes type of place of residence and region variables to control for systematic factors. Model 1 is employed to all fecund and currently married women aged 15-44. Model 1 explains around 54% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child.

Considering age predictor, the significance value is 0.000. This suggests that there is extremely strong statistical evidence that age is related to probability of having an intention to have a/another child. In step with descriptive results, logistic regression analysis for Model 1 confirms that as age decreases, the probability of having an intention to have a/another child increases. There is approximately 5 times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child for women aged 25-34 whilst the probability is approximately 12 times greater for women aged 15-24 when

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<sup>1</sup> Table is presented in Appendix A.

compared to probability for women aged 35-44.

Results of first model suggests that women with secondary education have around 40% higher probability of having more fertility intention whereas having no education or maximum primary school education provides 25% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women with high school or higher education. However significance values for both categories are high that indicates the differences among the probabilities on fertility intentions are not statistically significant.

Concerning number of living children, women having no or 1 child have approximately 20-times greater probability of having more fertility for future when compared to women having 2 or more children. This is an expected result, considering 2-child-norm in Turkey that is prevalent for a long time. Significance value points out there is credible statistical evidence that number of living children matters for having more fertility intentions.

Odds ratios for working status indicate minor differences: women working without social security have 17% higher probability of having intention to have a/another child and women who are not currently working have 25% higher probability when compared to the probability for women working with social security. However, significance values suggest that these differences among probabilities are not statistically significant.

Looking at relative risks for having intention to have a/another child, it can be concluded that there is 9% higher probability to have more fertility intention for women performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks, when compared to women performing more than 75 percent of all housework task. However, there is no credible statistical evidence that allocation of housework is related to fertility intentions of women.

Considering structural factors, it is obvious that there is no convincing statistical evidence that intention to have a/another child is related to type of place of residence. Taking probability for women in the East as reference, region predictor suggests that the highest probability of having more fertility intention belongs to women in the East. They have 2 times greater probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women in East. Significance values suggest that there is strong evidence that region where women live is related to fertility intentions of women with the exception of North region.

It can be concluded from Table A.1 that although model appears statistically significant, the impact of allocation of housework on fertility intentions is suggestive but not statistically significant for fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 when controlled for age, education, number of living children, working status, type of place of residence and region variables.

Two variables in this model, namely age and number of living children has an extreme impact on fertility intentions. Considering results of the model 1, it can be crisply concluded that fertility intentions of women in Turkey diminish at later ages, since they have already have as many as children they want. Accordingly, younger women have higher fertility intentions as they do not reach to the number of children they want. Therefore, the variables of age and number of children are highly correlated as it is exhibited in Figure 7.1. Especially age has an over-shading effect in the model, i.e. it represses the impact of other variables which have relatively minor power on fertility intentions. To observe the minor power of other variables more clearly, age is excluded in Model 2.



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**Figure 7.1 Correlation of Age and Number of Living Children**


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


Table A.2<sup>1</sup> presents results for logistic regression analysis for Model 2 which is employed to all fecund and currently married women aged 15-44, like Model 1. This model is specifically constructed to test first hypothesis which is “Controlled for education level and employment status, a larger share of housework (more than 75%) would lower fertility intentions of women in Turkey”. Model 2 explains around 50% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child.

Model 2 proposes that there is 97% higher probability of having more fertility intention for women with secondary education and 25% higher probability for women with no or maximum primary education when compared to the probability of

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<sup>1</sup> Table is presented in Appendix A.

women with high school or higher education. Besides, there is reliable statistical evidence proving the relationship between education level and fertility intentions.

It can be inferred from results of Model 2 that women having no or 1 child have approximately 30-times greater probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women having 2 or more children. It is obvious that the odd ratio is statistically significant.

Relative risks of having intention to have a/another child by working status shows that women working without social security have 14% higher probability of having more fertility intention and women who are not currently working have 57% higher probability when compared to the probability for women working with social security. Significance value for working without social security category here is a little bit lower than corresponding value in Model 1; however, still not low enough to prove a statistically significant relationship for this category, whereas it seems significant for not currently working category.

Among two variables included in Model 2 to test structural factors, type of place of residence suggest that women living in rural areas have 7% higher probability of having intention to have a/another child in the future, however significance value is quite high failing to prove a statistically significant relationship between place of residence and fertility intentions. Results for region predictor suggest that women living in the east of Turkey have approximately 2.4 times greater probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women living in the west of Turkey. The probabilities are 2-times greater for South region, 35% higher for Central region and 12% higher for North region. Significance values propose that there is credible evidence, which points out region women live in is related to fertility intention with the exception of North region.

Considering the effect of allocation of housework is conditional on the values of other variables, findings can be interpreted as controlled for education, number of living children, working status, type of place of residence and region; larger share of women in allocation of housework has a lowering effect on further fertility intentions. This finding is line with claims of first hypothesis.

In Model 3 which is the base model to test hypothesis 1, type of place of residence is excluded as it is neither statistically significant nor size of its affect is large. Variables included in Model 1, 2, and 3 are presented in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 Variables in Model 1, 2 and 3**

**Independent variables which are included or excluded in Model 1, 2 and 3**

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
<b>Variables in the model</b>			
Age	included	excluded	excluded
Education	included	included	included
Working status	included	included	included
Number of living children	included	included	included
Allocation of housework	included	included	included
Type of place of residence	included	included	excluded
Region	included	included	included

Results of Model 3 reveals that women with secondary education have 98% higher probability of having more fertility intention; whereas having no education or maximum primary school education provides around 27% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women with high school or higher education. There is enough statistical evidence that education matters for fertility intentions.

Another outcome of Model 3 is that women having no or 1 child have approximately 31-times higher probability of having intention to have a/another child sometime in the future when compared to women having 2 or more children. For this model, number of living children appears as a strong predictor with a significance value of 0.000.

Odds ratios for working status in Model 3 shows that women working without social security have 17% higher probability of more fertility intention and women who are not currently working have 57% higher probability, when compared to the probability for women working with social security. These were expected results considering lack of institutionalized child-care systems in Turkey that would make being a mother and a full-time laborer compatible. In remaining system in which being a working-mother is challenging so that women face a dilemma of choosing between motherhood and employment. Especially women working with social security in this sample intend to limit their fertility to cope with this incompatibility. However, the significance value for women working without social security category is statistically insignificant yet it is for not currently working category is significant.

Considering relative risks for having intention to have a/another child in Model 3, it can be concluded that there is around 33% higher probability to have more fertility intention of women performing maximum 75 percent of housework , when compared to women performing more than 75 percent of housework. There is extremely strong statistical evidence that allocation of housework is related to fertility intentions of women which conforms this thesis first hypothesis.

Final variable of Model 3 suggest that that women living in the east of Turkey have the highest probability of having more fertility intention among all regions. Women in East have 2.4 times greater probability when compared to women living in West of Turkey. The probabilities are around 2-times greater for South region, 36% higher for Central region and approximately 12% higher for North region. Significance values explain that there is credible evidence that region where women

live is linked to fertility intentions with the exception of North region.

Variables in Model 3 are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 living in urban areas in Model 4 and to fecund and currently married women aged 15-44 living in rural areas in Model 5 in order to focus on women living under various structural settings which may end up with not only different fertility intentions but also different allocation of housework. The results for these three models are presented in Table 7.2.

Model 4, explaining approximately 49% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child for fecund and currently married women living in urban areas, proposes that women with secondary education have around 2.2-times greater probability of having more fertility intention whereas having no education or maximum primary school education provides 29% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women with high school or higher education. The significance values suggest a statistically significant relationship between education level and fertility intentions

Related to number of living children in Model 4, it can be concluded that women living in urban areas and having no or 1 child have approximately 29-times greater probability of having more fertility intention compared to women living in urban areas and having 2 or more children. Significance value proposes that there is trustworthy statistical evidence that number of living children matters for having more fertility intentions.

Model 4 also suggests that women working without social security have 6% higher probability of having more fertility intention and women who are not currently working have 55% higher probability when compared to the probability for women working with social security. However, significance values fail to prove that these differences among probabilities are statistically significant for working without social security category; however it is able to prove for not currently working category.

**Table 7.2 Results of Logistic Regression Analyses for Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5**

<b>Results of logistic regression analyses on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 3, Model 4 and Model 5</b>						
Variables in the model	<i>Model 3 (Turkey)</i>		<i>Model 4 (urban)</i>		<i>Model 5 (Rural)</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)						
No educ./Primary education	<b>1.265</b>	0.033	<b>1.292</b>	0.031	0.821	0.415
Secondary Education	<b>1.978</b>	0.007	<b>2.180</b>	0.007	0.940	0.875
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)						
0-1	<b>30.953</b>	0.000	<b>28.679</b>	0.000	43.501	0.000
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)						
Not currently working	<b>1.574</b>	0.010	<b>1.552</b>	0.016	1.376	0.644
Working without social security	1.172	0.422	1.061	0.791	1.137	0.856
<b>Allocation of housework</b> (reference=performing more than 75%)						
Performing maximum 75%	<b>1.329</b>	0.001	<b>1.290</b>	0.010	<b>1.483</b>	0.023
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)						
East	<b>2.403</b>	0.000	<b>2.185</b>	0.000	<b>4.188</b>	0.000
South	<b>2.044</b>	0.000	<b>1.711</b>	0.002	<b>4.435</b>	0.000
Central	<b>1.360</b>	0.038	<b>1.243</b>	0.185	<b>2.343</b>	0.015
North	1.151	0.373	0.956	0.782	<b>2.081</b>	0.044
<hr/>						
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.494		0.488		0.524	
Wald F	130.677		93.985		51.936	

In Model 4, odds ratios of allocation of housework for having intention to have a/another child for women living in urban areas, propose that there is 29% higher probability to have intention to have a/another child for women performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks, when compared to women performing more than 75% of all housework task. The difference in probabilities seems statistically significant.

Model 4 additionally proposes that that women living in rural east have 2.1 times greater probability when compared to women living in west of Turkey. The probabilities are around 71% higher for South region, 24% higher for Central region and approximately 5% lower for North region. The discrepancies in the probabilities seem statistically significant with the exceptions of Central and North region. Considering the results for Turkey and urban areas, it is obvious that in women living in urban areas performing larger share of housework tend to have less fertility intentions, just like women living in Turkey

Model 5 explains around 52% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child for fecund and currently married women living in rural areas. It can be inferred from the model women having secondary education have around 6% less probability of having intention to have a/another children while women having no education or maximum primary school education have 29% higher probability when compared to women having high school or higher education. Yet, the significance values fail to point out a statistically significant relationship between education level and fertility intentions.

For Model 5, it can be concluded that women living in rural areas and having no or 1 child have approximately 43-times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child when compared to women living in urban areas and having 2 or more children and this huge variation is statistically significant.

Working status does not statistically matter for fertility intentions. Still, Model 5 presents that women working without social security have around 14% higher probability of having intention to have a/another child while women who are not currently working have around 38% higher probability when compared probability for women working with social security.

Considering relative risks for having intention to have a/another child in Model 5, it can be concluded that there is around 48% higher probability to have intention to have a/another child for women performing maximum 75% of all housework tasks, when compared to women performing more than 75% of all housework tasks. There is strong statistical evidence that allocation of housework is related to fertility intentions of women living in rural areas of Turkey.

Odds ratios for Region predicable in Model 5 seem higher variation when compared to urban areas. As can be observed in Table 7.1, women living in rural east have around 4.2 times greater probability, women in rural south have around 4.4 times greater probability, women living in rural central have 2.3 times greater probability and finally women in rural north have around 2 times greater probability when compared to women living in rural west. There is credible evidence that the relationship between region and fertility intentions is related.

Above three models do not include age as predictor. Yet, author is well aware of strong impact of age on fertility intentions. Therefore in order to observe its effect without clouding relatively minor impact of other variables, following three models are employed to distinct sub-groups consisting of women at different ages. Same predictors of Model 3 are employed to fecund and currently married women aged 15-24 in Model 6, to fecund and currently married women aged 25-34 in Model 7 and to fecund and currently married women aged 35-44 in Model 8.

Table 7.2 presents the results of logistic regression analyses for Model 6, 7 and 8. 42% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child for



fecund and currently married women aged 15-24 is explained by Model 7. According to model, they are women having secondary education who have highest probability of having intention to have a/another child sometime in the future. They have 15% higher probability while women having no education or maximum primary school education have 13% higher probability compared to women having high school or higher education. Though, these minor variations do not seem statistically significant.

Number of living children seems extremely significant for this model, too. According to the model, women aged 15-24 who have no or 1 child have approximately 22-times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child sometime in the future when compared to women aged 15-24 who have 2 or more children.

Considering working status, it can be concluded from Model 6 that women working without social security have around 7 times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child while women who are not currently working have around 3.5 times greater probability when compared probability for women working with social security. Significance values suggest that working status matters for fertility intentions.

Looking at odds ratio for having intention to have a/another child in Model 6, results for allocation of housework is interesting. There is around 38% lower probability to have more fertility intention for women performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks, when compared to women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. In other words, women performing more housework have more fertility intentions. There is trustworthy evidence that relationship between region and fertility intentions is statistically significant. This output is the reverse of first hypothesis' claim, women who perform more than 75 percent of housework seems to have higher fertility intentions. The underlying cause of this result may be that the sub-population analysis employed to consist of woman aged 15-24 and already married. It is known from descriptive analysis that women with higher

education perform more housework. The reason might be that: Women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks are probably educated ones, spending many years in education, they have not had the chance of reaching as many as children they would like to have.

Region, for the first time appears as statistically non-significant for most of the categories in Model 6. It can be inferred from the table that highest probability of having more fertility intention belongs to women in the South, whereas the lowest probability fits to women in the North when compared to women in the West.

Explaining 40% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child for fecund and currently married women aged 25-34, results of Model 7 are also presented in Table 7.3. It can be inferred from the table that women having secondary education have around 49% more risk of more fertility intention while women with no or maximum primary school education have around 39% higher risk when compared to women with high school or higher education. Although significance value proves a statistically significant relationship for no or maximum primary education category, significance value for secondary education fail to prove it.

In Model 7, predictor of number of living children suggests that women, aged 25-34, having no or 1 child have approximately 20-times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child when compared to women, aged 25-34, having 2 or more children. There is extremely strong statistical evidence that number of living children is related to fertility intentions of women.

Results of Model 7 propose that working status does not statistically matter for fertility intentions. Still, it is observed from the model that women working without social security have 18% lower probability of having more fertility intention whilst women who are not currently working have around 7% higher probability when compared probability for women working with social security. Even though, these

ages are suitable ages for childbearing, women working without social security have lower probability of having more fertility intentions. The reason of it may be incompatible conditions of informal sector with parenting.

About impact of division of housework, it can be concluded from the model that there is 24% higher probability to have intention to have a/another child for women performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks, when compared to women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. The significance value is just above a marginal significant level.

Model 7 proposes that among women aged 25-34, the ones living in East have around 2 times greater probability of having more fertility intention when compared to the ones living in West. The probabilities are 2% higher for the ones in South, 78% higher for the ones in Central and 79% higher for the ones in North. Evidence supports that the relationship between region and fertility intentions is related with the exceptions of Central and North regions.

Findings from Model 7 are in line with first hypothesis' claim. It can be concluded that when controlled by education, working status, number of living children and region, allocation of housework matters for fertility intentions of women aged 25-34.

Model 8 explains around 27% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child for fecund and currently married women aged 35-44. There is no credible evidence for this model that education, working status, and allocation of housework are related to fertility intentions of women aged 35-44. Still the variations of probabilities among categories are worth to mention.

**Table 7.3 Results of Logistic Regression for: Model 6, 7 and 8**

<b>Results of logistic regression on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 6, 7 and 8</b>						
Variables in the model	<i>Model 6 (15-24)</i>		<i>Model 7 (25-34)</i>		<i>Model 8 (35-44)</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)						
No educ./Primary education	1.134	0.644	<b>1.386</b>	0.015	0.887	0.683
Secondary Education	1.151	0.684	1.486	0.282	1.491	0.438
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)						
0-1	<b>22.087</b>	0.000	<b>19.652</b>	0.000	<b>21.590</b>	0.000
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)						
Not currently working	<b>3.559</b>	0.021	1.070	0.752	1.764	0.199
Working without social security	<b>7.057</b>	0.002	0.820	0.421	1.897	0.166
<b>Allocation of housework</b> (reference=performing more than 75%)						
Performing maximum 75%	<b>0.623</b>	0.045	<b>1.240</b>	0.107	1.033	0.886
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)						
East	1.368	0.180	<b>2.078</b>	0.000	<b>3.131</b>	0.001
South	<b>1.748</b>	0.086	<b>1.652</b>	0.024	<b>3.235</b>	0.000
Central	1.067	0.830	1.054	0.784	<b>1.902</b>	0.066
North	0.878	0.760	1.056	0.793	1.457	0.253
<hr/>						
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.424		0.401		0.266	
Wald F	24.605		47.138		22.087	

Women with no or maximum primary education have 11% lower probability to have intention to have more children and women with secondary education have 49% more probability when compared to women with at least high school education. The reason behind it may be that women having lowest education probably already have as many as children they want to have. Also, like descriptive analysis suggested they are women with highest education that constitute most of women with no more fertility intentions, women having secondary education seems to have higher fertility intentions even for women aged 35-44.

Considering working status, it may be inferred from the model that there is around 90% higher probability of having more fertility intentions for women working without social security and probability is 76% higher for women not currently working when compared to women working with social security.

About allocation of housework, the focus of this thesis, model proposes a tiny (3%) change in probability to have a/another child which indeed is not statistically significant. Number of living children remains as an extremely significant predictor and proposed that having no or 1 child provides approximately 21.6-times greater probability of having intention to have a/another child when having 2 or more children for women aged 35-44. Besides that, region proposes statistically significant odds ratios. According to Model 8, the highest probability to have an intention to have a/another child belong to South region and the lowest one belongs to West region.

Considering the results of model 6, 7 and 8, it can be concluded that first hypothesis of this thesis, which is controlled by education level and employment status, a larger share of housework (more than 75 percent) would lower fertility intentions of women in Turkey is rejected for women 15-24. For women aged 15-24, the results showed exactly the opposite of what is expected. Even though significance values for women aged 25-34 are not low enough to statistically support hypothesis 1, directions of differentiation between odds are significant. Women, aged 25-34, performing more housework, have lower fertility intentions. This finding is in

line with hypothesis 1. For women aged 35-44, the results shows no important variation on probabilities.

Above models proposed that number of living children is highly related to fertility intentions of women. In all models without an exception this predictor appeared as extremely statistically significant. That leads this thesis' analysis into models constructed to test second hypothesis that is "It is not only larger share of housework (more than 75 percent) but also higher number of children women already have (more than 1) would lower fertility intentions of women in Turkey". Model 9<sup>1</sup> below is constructed to examine the impact of interaction of share of housework and number of children on further fertility intentions of women. Therefore, interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children is included and to prevent multi-collinearity variables of number of living children and allocation of housework are excluded in the analysis for next four models.

Model 9 which explains around 50% of the changes in probabilities for having intention to have a/another child, excludes age variable however following three models (Model 10, 11 and 12) are employed to women at different ages because of the reasons explained earlier in this chapter. Model 9 suggests that there is 95% higher probability of having more fertility intention for women with secondary education and 26% higher probability when compared to the probability of women with high school or higher education and these probabilities are proved by reliable evidence as statistically significant.

In Model 9, relative risks of having intention to have a/another child by working status indicates that women working without social security have around 20% higher probability of having intention to have a/another child and women who are not currently working have around 60% higher probability when compared to probability for women working with social security. Significance value points out a statistically significant relationship for not currently working category, although it

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<sup>1</sup>Table of results of logistic regression analysis for Model 9 is Table A.3 in the Appendix A.

fails to prove that for working with social security category.

Another predictor of Model 9 which constitutes focal point of second hypothesis is interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children. It can be inferred from the model that women having at least 2 children and who performing less than 75 percent of all housework tasks have 15% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women having at least 2 children but performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. Furthermore, among women having no or 1 child, the ones who perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks have 25.7 times greater probability and the ones perform less than 75 percent of all housework tasks have 40.6 times greater probability, again when compared to women having 2 or more children and performing more than 75 percent of housework tasks. It is obvious that there is strong statistical evidence that, interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children is related to fertility intentions of women in these two categories. This output can be interpreted as, even though number of living children has a dominant impact on fertility intentions, housework share of women also has an important effect especially among women having no or 1 child.

Final variable of Model 9, region, proposes statistically significant results. It suggests that women in the East have 2.4 times greater probability of having more fertility intention when compared to probability of women in the West. Probability is 2 times greater for women in South region; around 35% higher for women in Central region, and 14% higher for North region.

Table 7.4 presents results of logistic regression on intention to have another child for Model 10, 11 and 12. The aim of these models is to test second hypothesis for women at different age groups. Model 10 which is employed to all fecund and currently married women aged 15-24 explains around 43% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child.

According to logistic regression analysis for Model 10, there is approximately 13% higher probability of having more fertility intention for both women with secondary education and no or maximum primary education when compared to probability of women with high school or higher education. Nevertheless, significance values for this model are not low enough to provide reliable statistical evidence to assert that there is a relationship between education level and fertility intentions of women aged 15-24.

There is credible statistical evidence that working status matters for fertility intentions for this model. Model 10 proposes that women working without social security have 7 times greater probability of having more fertility intention and women who are not currently working have 3.5 times greater probability when compared to the probability for women working with social security.

Odds ratios for interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children put forward that women who perform maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks and have 2 or more children have 47% less probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women who perform more than 75% of all housework tasks and have 2 or more children. This is a striking result proving exactly opposite of what hypothesis-2 expects. On the other hand, the probability is 16.7 times greater for women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks and have no or 1 child; whereas, it is 12.9 times greater for women performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks and having no or 1 child. Significance values point out a statistically significant variation. To interpret these results, firstly it should be highlighted that women at these ages simply have more fertility intentions. Since it seems from the model that women who perform more housework have more fertility intentions, education status of them would have an impact on it. 50% of women having no or 1 child and only 18.5% of women having minimum 2 children have secondary or high school and higher education.



Region for this model seems as statistically insignificant, yet indicates that highest risk for having more fertility intention belongs to women in South and lowest risk is for women in North among women aged 15-24.

Model 11 explains 40% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child. It is employed to fecund and currently married women aged 25-34. It proposes that women with secondary education have 49% higher probability and women with no or maximum primary education 38% higher probability when compared to women having high school or higher education. The result is statistically significant for no education or maximum primary education category; nevertheless it is not for the secondary education category.

Odds ratios for working status, which appears as statistically insignificant, says that women working without social security have 18% less probability of having more fertility intention and the probability is 6% higher for women not currently working when compared to the probability for women working with social security.

Relative risks for interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children for women aged 25-34 for Model 11 point out that there is 27% higher probability of having more fertility intention for women having 2 or more children and performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks compared to women having 2 or more child and performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. Among women who have 0-1 child, the probability is 20.3 times greater for the ones performing more than 75 percent of housework, but it is 24.4 times greater for the ones performing maximum 75 percent of housework. There is trustworthy evidence to prove statistical significance for the categories belong to women having no or 1 child and for the category of performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks and having 2 or more children it is above marginal significance level. These results can be interpreted as they are in line with hypothesis 2.

According to Model 11, among women aged 25-34 highest probability for having more fertility intention belongs to women in East region and the lowest risk is for women in Central region.

Model 12 explains 27% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child. It is employed to oldest women in the analysis; fecund and currently married women aged 35-44. It puts forward that women with secondary education have 50% higher probability and women with no or maximum primary education 11% less probability when compared to women with high school or higher education. Nevertheless, the variations on risks are not statistically significant.

It can be observed from the Table 7.4 that for Model 12 women working without social security have 2 times greater probability of having more fertility intention and the probability is 82% higher for women not currently working when compared to the probability for women working with social security. This evidence points out that informal working conditions providing deficient support to women trying to balance work and family, may not allow women aged 35-44 have had as many as children they would like to have, yet.

Odds ratios for interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children for Model 12 propose that there is 15% less probability of having more fertility intention for women having 2 or more children and performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks compared to women having 2 or more child and performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks. However, this result is not statistically significant. Among women who have 0-1 child, the probability is around 17 times greater for the ones performing more than 75 percent of housework, but it is around 23 times greater for the ones performing maximum 75 percent of housework. There is trustworthy evidence to prove statistical significance for these categories. These two categories provide some empirical support for hypothesis 2.

**Table 7.4 Results of Logistic Regression for Model 10, 11 and 12**

<b>Results of logistic regression on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 10, 11 and 12</b>						
Variables in the model	<i>Model 10 (15-24)</i>		<i>Model 11 (25-34)</i>		<i>Model 12 (35-44)</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)						
No educ./Primary education	1.125	0.666	<b>1.384</b>	0.015	0.892	0.698
Secondary Education	1.131	0.722	1.487	0.283	1.507	0.415
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)						
Not currently working	<b>3.530</b>	0.022	1.066	0.766	1.822	0.175
Working without social security	<b>7.125</b>	0.002	0.817	0.413	2.001	0.134
<b>Interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children</b> (reference=>75. 2+children)						
<75, 0-1 child	<b>12.902</b>	0.000	<b>24.363</b>	0.000	<b>23.380</b>	0.000
<75, 2+ children	<b>0.529</b>	0.043	<b>1.269</b>	0.138	<b>0.852</b>	0.511
>75, 0-1 child	<b>16.697</b>	0.000	<b>20.271</b>	0.000	<b>17.136</b>	0.000
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)						
East	1.389	0.164	<b>2.074</b>	0.000	<b>3.126</b>	0.001
South	1.746	0.085	<b>1.655</b>	0.024	<b>3.131</b>	0.000
Central	<b>1.073</b>	0.817	1.055	0.781	<b>1.838</b>	0.076
North	0.884	0.773	1.056	0.792	1.391	0.322
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.425		0.401		0.268	
Wald F	22.654		43.211		20.660	

Additionally, Model 12 suggests that among women aged 35-44 highest probability for having more fertility intention belongs to women in South region and the lowest risk is for women in West region.

Considering all four models (Model 9, 10, 11, and 12) that are constructed to test hypothesis 2, it can be concluded that for women aged 15-24, the results showed exactly the opposite of what is expected. Therefore the hypothesis is rejected for those women. On the other hand, statistical evidence support claims of hypothesis 2 for women aged 25-34 and having no or 1 child. Even though significance value high for women aged 25-34 and having 2 or more children, relationship between interaction of number of living children by women's share of housework is in expected direction. Women aged 35-44 the claims of the hypothesis are supported by the ones having no or 1 child; however, results are the opposite of claims of hypothesis for the ones having 2 or more children.

Last five models constructed seeks to test third hypothesis which is "It is not only larger share of housework (more than 75%) but also gainful employment would lower fertility intentions of women in Turkey". Therefore, interaction of allocation of housework by number of living children is included and to prevent multi-collinearity variables of number of living children and allocation of housework are excluded from the analysis. Model 13<sup>1</sup> explains around 49% of the changes in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child.

According to logistic regression analysis for Model 13, there is approximately 2 times greater probability of having more fertility intention for women with secondary education and 31% higher probability when compared to probability of women with high school or higher education. Significance values for this model are low enough to provide reliable statistical evidence to assert that there is a relationship between education level and fertility intentions.

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<sup>1</sup> Table of regression results for Model 13 is Table A4 in the Appendix A.

Number of living children is a statistically significant predictor for Model 13. Analysis for Model 13 suggests that there is approximately 30.8 times greater probability of having more fertility intention for women having no or 1 child when compared to the probability for women having 2 or more children.

Relative risks of having more fertility intention by interaction of allocation of all housework tasks by working status shows that women who perform maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks and not working have approximately 19% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women who perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks and participate in labor market. Among women who are not working, the probability is around 30% higher for women who perform more than 75 percent of all housework tasks and around 79% higher for the ones who perform at most 75 percent of all housework tasks. These findings are consonant with what hypothesis 3 claims. However significance value points out a statistically significant explanatory power to only performing less than 75 percent of housework and not working category.

Region predictor in Model 13 suggests that higher probability of having more fertility intention belongs to women in East and the lowest probability fits to West region.

A quick look at table 7.5 reveals that, explanatory power of interaction of allocation of all housework tasks by working status does not seem to be statistically significant for all three models. Focusing on this variable, first of the notable outputs is that women aged 15-24 performing maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks and not working have around 14% higher probability of having more fertility intention when compared to women performing more than 75 percent of all housework tasks and working. However, the situation becomes reversed for both women aged 25-34 and 35-44, interestingly. Working women performing more than 75 percent of housework have more fertility intention in both these two age groups. Among working women aged 25-34 who perform maximum 75 percent of housework

have around 18% less risk and risk is 25% less for working women aged 35-44 who perform same amount of housework when compared to working women who perform more than 75 percent of housework. This is very interesting and not in line with hypothesis 3's claims.

**Table 7.5 Results of Logistic Regression for Model 14, 15 and 16**

**Results of logistic regression on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 14, 15 and 16**

Variables in the model	Model 14 (15-24)		Model 15 (25-34)		Model 16 (35-44)	
	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)						
No educ./Primary Education	1.345	0.247	<b>1.297</b>	0.035	1.072	0.796
Secondary Education	1.281	0.462	1.398	0.362	1.698	0.286
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)						
0-1	<b>20.576</b>	0.000	<b>20.145</b>	0.000	<b>21.516</b>	0.000
<b>Interaction of allocation of all housework tasks by working status</b> (reference= >75, working)						
<75, not working	0.842	0.787	1.219	0.333	1.169	0.718
<75, working	1.135	0.869	0.822	0.396	1.154	0.749
>75, not working	1.360	0.652	0.822	0.406	1.244	0.621
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)						
East	1.370	0.175	<b>2.061</b>	0.000	<b>3.157</b>	0.000
South	<b>1.806</b>	0.069	<b>1.653</b>	0.023	<b>3.240</b>	0.000
Central	1.129	0.683	1.049	0.800	<b>1.899</b>	0.073
North	1.042	0.923	1.037	0.861	1.495	0.226
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.412		0.403		0.264	
Wald F	23.526		47.545		22.763	

After these unexpected results, for a closer examination the last model of this thesis is employed to only fecund and married working women aged 15-44. Model 17 explains 53% of the variation in probabilities of having intention to have a/another child sometime in the future. It suggests that age is a strong predictor of this risk, as expected; older women have lower fertility intentions. Women aged 20-29 have around 4.4 times greater probability to have more fertility intention and the probability for women aged 15-24 is around 16 times greater when compared to women aged 35-44.

Education seems statistically insignificant, yet proposes that women with no or maximum primary education have approximately 3% higher probability of having higher fertility intentions whereas women with secondary education have approximately 58% higher probability when compared to women with high school and higher education.

Odds ratios for interaction of division of labor by living children reveal only 2% increase in probability of having more fertility intention among working women who have 2 or more children when woman perform maximum 75 percent of all housework tasks. Among women having no or 1 child, the probability is around 16 times greater for women performing maximum 75 percent of housework and it is around 19 times higher for women performing more than 75 percent of housework. This finding confute hypothesis 3 for good. The number of living children, not working status has an important effect on fertility intentions, according to findings of this model.

In line with all many model explained above, Model 17, again proved that women in East region has the highest probability of having more fertility intention and women in the East has the lowest probability. Low significance values for East and South region are thanks to women's participation in agricultural work –generally as unpaid family workers-.

**Table 7.6 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 17****Results of logistic regression on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 17**

Variables in the model	<i>Model 17 (working women)</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Age</b> (reference= 35-44)		
15-24	<b>15.966</b>	0.000
25-34	<b>4.447</b>	0.000
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)		
No educ./Primary education	1.027	0.902
Secondary Education	1.582	0.366
<b>Interaction of division of housework by living children</b> (reference=>75. 2+children)		
<75, 0-1 child	<b>15.519</b>	0.000
<75, 2+ children	1.021	0.941
>75, 0-1 child	<b>19.190</b>	0.000
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)		
East	<b>2.452</b>	0.000
South	<b>2.364</b>	0.001
Central	1.494	0.122
North	1.510	0.044
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.530	
Wald F	36.415	



Interpretations on findings from last four models are following. Firstly, women aged 15-44 present fertility intentions in the opposite direction of hypothesis 3. Secondly, among women aged 25-34, only women not working and performing less housework suggest expected result. Thirdly, attention grabbing output is that for women aged 35-44 the highest probability of having more fertility intentions belongs to women who are working and performing less housework. Lastly, among working women aged 15-44 results do not submit expected conclusions: Women having no or 1 child have fertility intentions in the opposite direction of this thesis' claims. Even though direction is in line with the thesis' claims for women having 2 or more children, differentiation of probabilities are too small to comment on. Hence, it can be concluded that empirical evidence from Turkey fails to support third hypothesis.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Low fertility has been discussed as a significant population problem for a couple of decades, especially in developed countries. Starting in the 1970s, fertility began to follow a declining trend all around the world, although it was its fall far below the replacement level of 2.1 that first raised serious concerns among policy makers, given the serious consequences of such a drop that include a rapid population aging and shortages in labor supply. The extremely low levels of fertility brought about a need for new terms to define the problem, such as “safety zone”<sup>1</sup> and “lowest-low fertility”<sup>2</sup>, as the term “low fertility” became insufficient to refer to total fertility rates at around 1.0. This topic has risen up the agenda not only of policy makers, but also researchers and academicians; and several attempts have been made to explain reasons behind low fertility. Researchers studying the impact of the status of women on fertility generally take into consideration only their standing in public life; however this looks at only half the picture when attempting to define the low levels of fertility. Accordingly, different theories related to changes in fertility have resulted in a number of other explanations, such as the diffusion of contraceptive methods controlled by women, the changing value of children for families, changing economic conditions, cohort size, the changing status of women, individualism, and so forth. The review of related literature in this thesis revealed the need for an inclusive gender approach to fertility – one that embraces the predictors of gender equity in different social institutions, namely individual-oriented institutions and family-related institutions.

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<sup>1</sup> McDonald (2006) draws a line for the safety zone at 1.5.

<sup>2</sup> Kohler et al. (2001) coined the new term “lowest-low fertility” to define period fertility rates below 1.3.

Different social institutions have been moving away from the assumption of the male breadwinner model<sup>1</sup> in the direction of a gender equity<sup>2</sup> model at differing speeds. McDonald (2006: 492) argues that the social liberalism and new capitalism that have been experienced over the past 50 years have led a shift towards gender equity, but suggests that this movement focuses only on the individual-oriented institutions. In contrast, family-related institutions, especially the family itself, continue to be characterized by gender inequity. In the aftermath of the waves of social liberalism and new capitalism, women's lives outside the home have changed considerably, yet this change has not been mirrored inside home. While the participation of women in the labor force and in education saw significant progress, this revolutionary movement *stalled* at the doors of the private realm. In other words, while gender equity in individual-oriented institutions has risen sharply over the past 50 years, this has not been mirrored in family-oriented institutions, leading to very low levels of fertility.

Despite the gender revolution in the public sphere, gender inequity in the private realm has remained relatively unchanged, with the allocation of housework maintaining its gendered structure. Understand what has been happening inside the home necessitates an analysis of the allocation of housework, as this can be used to measure gender equity in the private lives of women behind the closed doors of their homes. Studies on the allocation of housework are usually based on three theoretical frameworks: economic perspective, sociological perspective and gender perspective. The economic perspective, which utilizes time availability theory, and the sociological perspective, which proposes relative resources theory, have been criticized by feminists, who argue that the division of housework is not simply related to time availability or the rational choice of individuals, but is rather a symbolic performance of gender relations (Ferree 1990; South and Spitze 1994).

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<sup>1</sup> The male breadwinner model of family appoints the man as provider and protector and the woman as carer and reproducer.

<sup>2</sup> In the gender equity model related to the family, who does which type of work, such as income earning and housework, is attributed to no specific gender.

Accordingly, it has no neutral meaning, in that how it is carried out by women and men somewhat helps to define and express gender relations within the household (Bianchi et al. 2000: 194). Other feminist theoreticians go beyond the passive roles of individuals to look from a new perspective – “doing gender” – in which it is argued that individual behavior is affected by the expectations of others, and that the unequal division of labor between women and men is not only created by women and men, but also by such social institutions as the family, the welfare state and the labor market (Gonzales et al. 2009). Wives and husbands *do* their gender roles through the amount and the type of housework they perform. There are significant differences between the traditional household chores carried out by men and women, with men tending to carry out tasks with a well-defined beginning and end, and a leisure component (Meissner 1977), and women engaging in household tasks that can be characterized with the opposite qualities (Coleman 1988).

Considering the context of Turkey, it can be said that women have enjoyed civil and political rights since the establishment of the Republic, although the actual status of women in Turkey is still somewhat enigmatic. Despite the many rights acquired by women, at least on paper, there are still serious obstacles to their liberation in the persistent patriarchal structure of the country. A clear majority of women in Turkey lack the opportunity to enjoy their rights (Müftüler-Bac 1999: 303), and many academicians claim that women in Turkey are emancipated yet unliberated in the Republican period (For example, Arat 1994; Kandiyoti 1987). According to Müftüler-Bac (1999: 304), there is a dichotomy between two types of women in Turkey: the open, Western, emancipated woman, and the closed, traditional, “unliberated” woman. That said, although higher levels of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions are enjoyed only by emancipated women, persistent low levels of gender equity in family-related institutions are prevalent for all women in the country. There is still a strong cultural belief that housework is the realm of women, and these inconsistent levels of gender equity in different social institutions, which lead to lower fertility intentions, are experienced also by some of Turkey’s emancipated women.

Drawing upon the findings of previous literature, this thesis deals with the relationship between gender equity and fertility intention, rather than actual fertility behavior. Studying the issue of fertility intention points to a supposition that fertility is a purposive behavior that is based on intention. Previous academic discussions related to this issue confirm that fertility intentions are a significant predictor of actual fertility behavior in the future (Bumpass 1987; Rindfuss et al. 1988, Thomson 1997; Schoen et al. 1999; Berrington 2004).

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the fertility intentions of women in Turkey by using an inclusive gender approach, gender equity theory offered for which variables related to gender equity in different social institutions of society, in both the public and private realms, should be included. As an empirical test of gender equity theory related to the fertility intentions of women in Turkey, a micro-level analysis is carried out using nationally representative data from TDHS-2008. It is expected that the inconsistent levels of gender equity in different institutions engaged in by some women in Turkey will be a factor in lowering the fertility intentions of some women.

Descriptive analyses provide some important outputs that must be recalled here. Firstly, the two-child norm maintains its impact on the fertility intentions of most of women in Turkey, although some women insist to have no or one child. Younger women, women in the highest wealth quintile women, women with the highest education level and women working in formal employment (i.e. paying social security) have a higher tendency to have no or one child. These women can be considered the emancipated women of Turkey. Second, the descriptive analyses show that the allocation of housework is gendered in Turkey, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is apparent that almost all women are responsible for routine tasks which underlines the highly patriarchal structure and gendered division of housework in Turkey. That said, some women, chiefly those who have obtained skills through education and have the possibility to participate in decision-making processes in home, perform also some of the occasional tasks. In general, women tend to have

little involvement in certain household tasks that require certain skills (such as the preparation of the household budget). Women in the west of Turkey, those living in rural areas, older women and richer women are more likely to do more housework, while those working in formal employment are inclined to carry out less housework. This can be attributed to the fact that working with social security provides more income, increasing the negotiation power of women, and leads to a lower share of the housework. Furthermore, a higher percentage of women who have at least two children carry out more housework. It is an important issue for this thesis that women who have more fertility intentions tend to carry out less housework. Third, the descriptive analyses provide some conclusions related to women having preferences not to follow society's two-child norm. Women in the highest wealth quintile, women with the highest education, women working with social security and women in the west tend to have no or one child and no more fertility intentions. In contrast, women in the lowest wealth quintile, those with no or the lowest education, women who are not currently working and women in the east are more likely to have two or more children and higher fertility intentions.

In the logistic regression analyses, focus is on particular dimensions of gender equity, namely employment and education among the individual-oriented institutions, and housework among the family-related institutions. These three areas of life are essential not only in the arrangement of gender relationships, but also in the comprehension of the power that adjusts the level of gender equity. The employment factor is chosen for study, in that it facilitates the forming and maintenance of a household and provides economic independence. On this issue, however, it should be noted that the lower wages associated with employment in the informal sector may prohibit women forming and maintaining an independent household. In this regard, in the analysis, not only whether or not women are currently working is a key factor, but also whether or not women work with a social security. In education, as the other area chosen for analysis from the individual-based institutions, generally, higher levels open up more opportunities for women outside the home. Through education, women acquire skills that allow them to earn more

when participating in employment, leading to a potentially more equal division of labor between women and men in the home through reconciliation. Representing family-based institutions, the allocation of housework is chosen for analysis as a direct proxy of the power of women inside the home.

This thesis tests three hypotheses. The first concentrates on the allocation of housework controlling for education level and labor market participation. The second hypothesis takes into account the number of living children, in that this affects not only indirectly the amount and perceived fairness of the allocation of housework, but also directly the fertility intentions of women in a country in which the two-child norm prevails. The second hypothesis centers on the impact of the effect of the share of housework of women and number of living children on fertility intentions. Since gainful employment is significant, the focus of third hypothesis is on the interaction of employment and the women's share of housework on fertility intentions.

The results of the logistic regression analyses aimed at testing the three hypotheses reveal some noteworthy outcomes. Before going into the results, it should be noted that age has a significant effect on women's fertility intentions. When age is included in the analyses, the education, working status and allocation of housework variables lose their significance (both statistical significance and the significance of the magnitude of change). Since age is highly correlated with the number of living children, which is already part of the analysis, age is excluded from the many models. That said, in order not to ignore the impact of age, the same models are applied to women of three different age groups: 15–24, 25–34 and 35–44.

The most significant results of the logistic regression analysis are as follows. Firstly, the division of housework was expected to have a greater impact on the fertility intentions of women living in urban areas, however the results of logistic regression analyses suggested that it has a greater effect on women living in rural areas. Controlling for education, the number of living children, working status and region, the allocation of housework, or more specifically, the women's share of

housework, has less influence on fertility intentions of women living in urban areas, and more influence on fertility intentions of women in rural areas when compared to Turkey as a whole. This may be due to the fact that more time is spent on housework in rural areas, and since women are responsible for most household chores, women in rural areas spend more time on housework than women in urban areas (Lawrence et al. 1987). Accordingly, spending more time on housework may have an increased explanatory power related to the division of housework on women's fertility intentions.

Secondly, Hypothesis 1, which regards higher housework share of women as unequal, is rejected for women aged 15–24. Being married at such young ages, these women are less educated and lack the necessary skills to carry out certain housework tasks (for instance, preparing the family budget). Women in this group generally do less housework (less occasional tasks in particular), since they are not able to perform, or are prohibited from performing by their husbands. Accordingly, there are two possible reasons for the lower performance of housework by women in this group: either the lack of skills or the lack of power to participate in decision-making processes in the home (in some cases, both of these reasons are valid at the same time). The relationship between education level and fertility intention suggests that women with a higher level of education have no more fertility intentions. Since the number of highly educated women in this age group is low, and the level of education and share of housework are interrelated, it can be concluded that a lower share of housework does not necessarily mean a more equal allocation. This situation highlights the importance of looking at the effects of the predictors that represent different institutions together. Taking into account not only their share of housework, but also their employment status and education level contributes substantially to understanding the overall gender equity experienced by these women.

The significance value of the allocation of housework among women aged 25–34 is not low enough to statistically support Hypothesis 1; however, focus is on the magnitude and the direction of change in the likelihood of having more fertility



intentions. This thesis concentrates on the size of the expected effects, rather than worrying about the significance of the difference, and so it can be concluded that women aged 25–34 who carry out more household chores have lower fertility intentions, as suggested by Hypothesis 1. The results for this group are especially important, since the women of this age group fall within the socially and biologically perfect age range for childbirth. In this regard, their reaction to an unequal share of housework is important when controlled for education level and labor market participation, and this finding represents one of the most important conclusions of this thesis.

Neither the significance value of the allocation of housework, nor the magnitude of change in the probability of having more fertility intentions seem to be significant for women in the 35–44 age group; therefore, the fertility intentions of women aged 35–44 fail to support the claims of the first hypothesis. Since fertility intentions have a strong relationship with age, as shown in the analyses, it is likely that women falling within this age group, who are close to the end of their reproductive lives, simply do not want to have another children, and in most cases, have already had as many children as they want.

Thirdly, for the second hypothesis, in which focus is on the interaction between the allocation of housework and the number of living children, it is proposed that the results for women aged 15–24 point to a relationship between this predictor and fertility intentions in exactly opposite direction. In this regard, like Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected for the women of this age group.

On the other hand, statistical evidence supports the claims of Hypothesis 2 for women in the 25–34 age group who have no or one child. Even though the significance value seems high for women aged 25–34 who have two or more children, the relationship between the number of living children and the share of housework is in the expected direction, with the magnitude of change in probabilities being significant. This finding suggests that the claims of Hypothesis 2 are supported

empirically for the case of women aged 25–34 who have no or one child, and the results for women aged 25–34 who have two or more children are suggestive.

Among women aged 35–44, the findings for those with no or one child are in line with the claims of Hypothesis 2, although the results for those who have two or more children point to a reversed relationship. The effect of allocation of housework alone on the change in probabilities of fertility intentions shows a small magnitude, as described above, and so it can be concluded that the significance of the results can be attributed to the dominant impact of the number of living children. Consequently, the results related to women aged 35–44 fail to prove the claims of Hypothesis 2.

Fourthly, the results for Hypothesis 3, which centers upon relationship between housework and working status, appears to be statistically insignificant for all women, regardless of their age or working status. For women in all three age categories the results are inconsistent with the claims of the hypothesis. The final model, applied only to working women to measure the impact of the allocation of housework, also refutes the hypothesis. Consequently, empirical evidence from Turkey fails to support third hypothesis. This is indeed unanticipated, since working women would be expected to respond more to gender inequity in home by limiting their fertility as the ones who face the incompatibility of being both a worker and a mother, and considering the absence of institutions to facilitate work and family life and the gendered structure of the division of housework in Turkey. This important output requires further evaluation, as the researcher considers that these results cannot rule out a relationship between these variables. It should be underlined that the analysis employed here is a uni-directional analysis that concentrates only on the effect on fertility of working status; while in practice, fertility also has a significant effect on the working status of women in Turkey. Since institutionalized child care services are far from adequate and childcare is considered to be a woman's duty, becoming a parent has a direct effect on the working lives of women, and not men (Ecevit 2009: 159–160). According to a study of the labor force participation of women, 55 percent of women put their careers on hold for reasons related to family

and children, and 77 percent quit their jobs for good, since there is no one to take care of the children while they are at work (Eyüpoğlu et al. 2000: 107). In this regard, many women face the dilemma of choosing between parenthood and paid employment; and for this reason, the true effect of the relationship between working status and the allocation of housework cannot be observed in the expected manner in this study.

Overall, the results suggest that for women aged 25–34, the traditional division of housework in the home prevails and that women do not have lowered fertility intentions. However, when the traditional division of labor is disrupted by women carrying out not only routine housework, which seen traditionally as women's work, but also residual chores, thought of traditionally as male housework, women have lower fertility intentions. It can be said that the results for women in the 25–34 age group provide empirical evidence of gender equity theory.

For younger women (aged 15–24), the levels of gender equity are not inconsistent, in that the level of gender equity is low in both their public and private lives; and this situation is the same for the women in the 35–44 age group with a lower level of education, and who either do not work, or who work without social security. These two groups in Turkey tend to comprise the more unliberated women in the country, and so there would appear to be no inconsistency between the levels of gender equity in different social institutions that would affect their desire for more children.

On the other hand, women in middle age group (aged 25–34) would be expected to be more affected by the inconsistent levels of gender equity applied in different social institutions. This group tends to be made up of the more emancipated women in Turkey, who generally do not marry at very early ages, who do not have many children, and who are more likely to have a higher level of education and are employed in the formal sector with the benefits of social security. Therefore,

different levels of gender equity are experienced by women at those ages, and the empirical results related to these women fall in line with McDonald's propositions.

This study has focused on Turkey, which is a patriarchal society in which only some women are emancipated, while others face serious obstacles in accessing their rights. In such a context, where female labor force participation is low, the state offers few services and benefits in support of working mothers, meaning that childcare arrangements rely on the altruism of women. In such a context, it may be thought that the contribution of men to domestic chores would be higher; however, in such a patriarchal country, where domestic chores are considered traditionally to be the work of women, support comes not from the husband, but from other women (daughters, mothers, grandmothers, female neighbors, relatives etc.). In short, women ease their burden with the help of other women in Turkey.

The subject of the relationship between gender equity in different institutions and fertility has remained untouched in Turkey, and so more researches and studies by independent researchers, universities, institutions and organizations are required in this field. The present study, based on cross-sectional data, investigates only the fertility intentions of women in Turkey, and so it would be an interesting approach in a future study to test whether or not these intentions come true. In this regard, there is the need for panel surveys, like Gender and Generations Surveys (GGS), to improve the understanding of the various factors affecting gender relations and demographic behavior. Data from these panel surveys, including information on both women and men so as to gain a complete understanding of gender relations in Turkey, would be much more appropriate for the testing of gender equity theories related to fertility behavior.

Also, more detailed time use data would contribute to an accurate analysis of the allocation of housework, in that the data of the Time Use Survey conducted by TURKSTAT in 2006 provides no comparison of the division of housework in the

family and fertility intentions. In this regard, it is suggested that any future Time Use Survey should include questions on fertility intentions.

Another important extension of this study may be the inclusion of childcare and care of the elderly. Changes in allocation of childcare and childcare support services may have a significant effect on the future fertility intentions of women in a country where the system is currently under-developed, and where gender inequity is prevalent in family-oriented institutions.

Another significant extension to this study may be to follow a gendered approach based on the concept that gender equity should include the perceived fairness of the division of work in the family. In this regard, it is recommended that future Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys add questions related to the perceived fairness of the allocation of housework, which may be even more important than the actual allocation of housework when analyzing gender equity and fertility.

Finally, a number of suggestions can be made to policy makers. If low fertility is seen as a danger for the future of the country, there are some policy options that are available: Firstly, accessible, qualified and free childcare services must be provided by state. Also, to give women the opportunity to have economic independence after becoming a mother, generous maternity leave packages and job security once maternity leave is over should be ensured. Furthermore, awareness must be raised on the importance of gender equity, not only in the public sphere, but also in the private realm.

To conclude, this thesis provides empirical support for gender equity theory on the issue of fertility, providing significant contributions to the body of existing literature. Firstly, it is one of only a few studies into the allocation of housework in Turkey. Secondly, and more importantly, it is the first study that aims to relate the status of women, in both individual-oriented and family-related institutions, with

their fertility intentions through an analysis of nationally representative data. The study clarifies that in Turkey, gender equity affects the fertility intentions of women aged 25–34, as the most suitable years for childbirth, not only socially but also biologically.

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## APPENDIX A

## ADDITIONAL TABLES

**Table A.1 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 1****Results of logistic regression analysis on intention to have another Child by selected variables: Model 1**

Variables in the model	<i>Model 1</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Age</b> (reference= 35-44)		
15-24	11.897	0.000
25-34	4.548	0.000
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)		
No educ./Primary education	1.250	0.056
Secondary Education	1.397	0.205
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)		
0-1	19.952	0.000
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)		
Not currently working	1.248	0.236
Working without social security	1.174	0.434
<b>Allocation of housework</b> (reference= performing more than 75%)		
Performing maximum 75%	1.088	0.352
<b>Type of Place of Residence</b> (reference=urban)		
Rural	0.996	0.972
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)		
East	2.000	0.000
South	1.932	0.000
Central	1.159	0.318
North	1.096	0.582
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.562	
Wald F	92.323	

**Table A.2 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 2****Results of Logistic Regression Analysis on Intention to Have another Child by selected variables:  
Model 2**

Variables in the model	<i>Model 2</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)		
No educ./Primary education	1.255	0.038
Secondary Education	1.971	0.007
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)		
0-1	30.939	0.000
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)		
Not currently working	1.570	0.011
Working without social security	1.144	0.504
<b>Allocation of housework</b> (reference= performing more than 75%)		
Performing maximum 75%	<b>1.318</b>	0.002
<b>Type of Place of Residence</b> (reference=urban)		
Rural	1.072	0.502
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)		
East	2.374	0.000
South	2.027	0.000
Central	1.351	0.041
North	1.136	0.413
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.495	
Wald F	118.689	

**Table A.3 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 9****Results of Logistic Regression on Intention to Have another Child by selected variables: Model 9**

Variables in the model	<i>Model 9</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)		
No educ./Primary Incomplete	1.269	0.029
Secondary Education	1.946	0.008
<b>Working Status</b> (reference=working with social security)		
Not currently working	1.597	0.009
Working without social security	1.197	0.371
<b>Interaction of division of housework by living children</b> (reference=>75. 2+children)		
<75, 0-1 child	40.624	0.000
<75 , 2+ children	1.150	0.200
>75, 0-1 child	25.713	0.000
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)		
East	2.429	0.000
South	2.026	0.000
Central	1.350	0.042
North	1.142	0.406
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.495	
Wald F	120.391	

**Table A.4 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Model 13****Results of logistic regression on intention to have another child by selected variables: Model 13**

Variables in the model	<i>Model 13</i>	
	Exp(B)	Sig.
<b>Education</b> (reference=high school and higher)		
No educ./Primary Education	1.313	0.008
Secondary Education	2.029	0.004
<b>Number of living children</b> (reference 2+)		
0-1	30.752	0.000
<b>Interaction of allocation of all housework tasks by working status</b> (reference= >75, working)		
<75, not working	1.787	0.001
<75, working	1.194	0.338
>75, not working	1.297	0.182
<b>Region</b> (reference=West)		
East	2.400	0.000
South	2.060	0.000
Central	1.371	0.032
North	1.174	0.305
R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)	0.494	
Wald F	130.936	

## APPENDIX B

### GLOSSARY OF GENDER TERMS

**Doing gender:** The main argument of doing gender is that individual behavior is affected by expectations from others and individuals “do” and produce gender in everyday activities. The unequal division of labor between women and men is not only created by women and men but also by social institutions like family, the welfare state and the labor market (Gonzales et al. 2009).

**Gender:** It is a social structure which differentiates opportunities and constraints based on sex-category. This has costs at three different levels: at individual level, for the development of gendered self; during interaction as women and men confront different cultural expectation; and at institutional level, where regulations on resource distribution and goods are gender specific. (Risman 2004)

**Gender equity:** It is a complex notion which requires equal respect for women and men, equality of resources or equality of capabilities, parity of participation socially valued activities and the decentering of androcentric measures of social value. (Fraser 1994).

**Gender equity model of family:** In this model of family gender has no specific relationship to who does which type of work (McDonald 1997)

**Gender revolution:** Gender revolution has two phases. In the first phases gender equity is achieved in the public space for example women's participation in public sphere marks the first phase of gender revolution. In the second phase of gender revolution, gender equity is accomplished in private sphere for instance men's share of responsibilities in domestic work becomes larger (Goldscheider et al. 2015).

**Gender roles:** It is the socially-constructed division of labor between women and men. (Mason 1995).

**Gender stratification:** It means the institutionalized inequality between women and men. (Mason 1995).

**Gender system:** It refers to socially constructed expectations for male and female behavior and these expectations not only command a division of labor and responsibilities between women and men but also give over different rights and obligations to them that is generate inequality in power, autonomy, and well-being, generally to the disadvantage of females (Mason 1995).

**Male breadwinner model of family:** In this model of family, which is the opposite of gender equity model, woman is appointed to be carer and reproducer whereas man is selected to be provider and protector (McDonald 1997)

**Patriarchy:** In general patriarchy refers to male domination over women (Folbre 1983).