

**T.R.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE**

**THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF SAUDI ARABIA
AND IRAN IN INDONESIA**

MASTER'S THESIS

Muhammad RAVI

Department: Middle East Studies

Thesis Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Othman ALI

APRIL – 2019

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


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THESIS APPROVAL

This work headed The Foreign Policy Objectives of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Indonesia
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Date of Acceptance: 13.05.2019.

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
Approval

I approve that the signatures above belong to the aforementioned teaching fellows.

13.05.2019.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tuncay KARDAS

Institute Director



DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is written in accordance with the scientific code of ethics and that, this work is original and where the works of others used has been duly acknowledged. There is no falsification of used data and that no part of this thesis is presented for study at this university or any other university.

Muhammad RAVI

13.05.2019



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Title of Thesis: The Foreign Policy Objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Indonesia	
Author: Muhammad RAVI	Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Othman ALI
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<p>This thesis seeks to understand Iran's and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives in Indonesia and how these relations impact both the government's decision making and people. Iran and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives have been discussed in so many literatures but special attention has not been given on their competitive influences as a mean of gaining soft power in Indonesia. This study will focalize only on Indonesia to determine the bilateral and diplomatic relations between the country and Iran and Saudi Arabia. The thesis intends to make a comparative study between Iran's and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives, and see the similarities and differences in the objectives of the foreign policy between the two countries. The foreign policy of the two countries are based on national interest but the objective of spreading religious doctrines continue to act as a fundamental factor in the foreign policy objectives of the two countries. This study uses a qualitative research method and the sources are based on secondary data that have been used in literature. The study concludes by showing the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and some cases are provided to see how their foreign policy objectives have led to the creation of religious institutions and organizations in Indonesia. Some of these institutions and organizations have been involved in religious conflicts and even terrorist attacks.</p>	
Keywords: Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Foreign Policy, Ideology	

Tezin Başlığı: İran'ın ve Suudi Arabistan'ın Endonezya'daki Dış Politika Hedefleri	
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<p>Bu tez, İran'ın ve Suudi Arabistan'ın Endonezya'daki dış politika hedeflerini ve bu ilişkilerin hem hükümetin kararlarını hem de insanları nasıl etkilediğini anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. İran ve Suudi Arabistan'ın dış politika hedefleri birçok literatürde tartışılmıştır, ancak Endonezya'da yumuşak güç kazanma hedefi olarak rekabet etkilerine özel bir ilgi gösterilmemiştir. Bu çalışmada, Endonezya ile İran ve Suudi Arabistan arasındaki ikili ve diplomatik ilişkileri belirlemek için yalnızca Endonezya'ya odaklanılmıştır. İran ve Suudi Arabistan'ın dış politika hedefleri arasında karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma yapmak ve iki ülke arasındaki dış politikanın amaçlarındaki benzerlikleri ve farklılıkları görmek amaçlanmıştır. İki ülkenin dış politikası ulusal çıkarlara dayanmaktadır, ancak dini doktrinleri yayma hedefi, iki ülkenin dış politika hedeflerinde temel bir faktör olarak hareket etmeye devam etmektedir. Bu çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır ve kaynaklar literatürde kullanılmış ikincil verilere dayanmaktadır.</p> <p>Çalışma sonucunda, İran ve Suudi Arabistan arasındaki rekabet gösterilmiş ve bu iki ülkenin dış politika hedeflerinin Endonezya'da dini kurum ve kuruluşların oluşturulmasına nasıl yol açtığını görmek için bazı vakalar sunulmuştur.</p> <p>Bu kurum ve kuruluşların bazıları dini çatışmalara ve hatta terör saldırılarına karışmıştır.</p>	
Anahtar Kelimeler: Endonezya, İran, Suudi Arabistan, Dış Politika, İdeoloji	

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ABBREVIATIONS

AHIF	: Al Haramain also known as Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation
AMAL	: Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance
AMED	: Asia-Middle East Dialogue
BBC	: The British Broadcasting Corporation
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency
D8	: Developing Eight
EFEQ	: Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient
FPI	: Front Pembela Islam
G15	: Group of Fifteen
GIGN	: National Gendarmerie Intervention Group; the Setara Institute for Peace, an NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
IC	: Islamic College
ICAS	: Islamic College of Advanced Study
ICC	: Islamic Cultural Center
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IRNA	: Iranian News Agency
ISIS	: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JI	: Jemaah Islamiyah
JIL	: Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network)
Komnas HAM	: Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia
LIPIA	: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam & Arab
MUI	: National Ulama Council
NKRI	: Negara kesatuan Republic Indonesia
NU	: Nahdlatul Ulama
OIC	: Organization of Islamic Conference
PAS	: Party of Islam – Malaysia
PKI	: Partai Komunis Indonesia
PPP	: Unified Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
UAE	: United Arab Emirates

UIN	: State Islamic University
UIN	: Universitas Islam Negeri
UN	: United Nation
UNSCR	: United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNMO	: United National Malay Organization
YAPI	: Yayasan Pesantren Islam



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INTRODUCTION

In order to know if Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is motivated by dogmatic anti-Shiism or more pragmatically by geopolitical rivalry with Iran for regional hegemony, it is important to know that in order to counter the potential effects of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and in an attempt to establish its economic interests, Saudi Arabia has set up and financed several organizations for teaching Arabic and spreading of its Wahhabi doctrine in Indonesia since early 1980s.

One of the main foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia is to reduce its economic dependancy on oil and gas, by doing this they intend to serve pilgrimage business and Indonesia sends an estimated number of 200.000 people, which is the highest in the World, for pilgrimage every year. Meanwhile, Iran seems to be an isolated country with its own version of Islam, and its clashes with the West, therefore, Iran is trying to capitalize on indonesia's neutrality in the muslim World, with the hope to win support and vote in the United Nation meetings. This arguement supports the fact that Indonesia abstained from voting at the United Nation to bring the issue of Iran's nuclear program before the Security Council in 2006.

Iran's foreign policy has been marked by two different phases, each defined by an essential policy in Iran's regional and international role. First, the one conducted under the Shah characterized by the strengthening of ties with the West and, that led by Khomeini since his accession to power in 1979, and which bases the foreign policy of Iran on geostrategic and ideological considerations. It is this foreign policy, translated into diplomacy, which today and since the end of bipartisanship, allows Iran to play a growing regional role and regain a place in regional affairs. The transformation of Iranian society induces changes in the direction of its foreign policy.

In the implementation of Iran's Asian strategy, the Iranian authorities paid particular attention to Malaysia and Indonesia, in a logic to promote and enhance pan-Islamic strategy. Iranian links with Malaysia are above all economic, which encourages Iran to politicize its trade. It is worth knowing that the aim of this strategy is to encourage investment by companies from countries that have chosen a moderate line with Iran on

its nuclear issue. On the other hand, relations between Iran and Indonesia remain more political than economic.¹

Despite differences over the political role of Islam, the most populous Muslim country and the largest Shiite country on the planet have similar views on international issues. Therefore, they are both part of the non-aligned movement and are working together to unite Muslim countries through meetings between Shiite and Sunni clerics.² Indonesia's rejection of a draft Security Council declaration of June 2007 condemning the Iranian President's words about Israel's 'disappearance' was that Jakarta believed that, on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, The Security Council was biased and it was not 'fair' to condemn the Iranian position without denouncing Israeli policy. In March 2007, Indonesia voted in favor of the Security Council's coercive measures against the Iranian nuclear program. This vote provoked the opposition of 117 deputies who, in an open letter, considered it a 'betrayal' of Muslim solidarity. The authorities countered that this was a diplomatic success, since the Jakarta amendment calling for 'the establishment of a free zone of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.'³ This vote is nonetheless a diplomatic failure for Tehran, which supports the candidacy of Indonesia as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.⁴

Iran is also a member of several regional forums associated with Middle Eastern and Asian countries. Example of these regional forums include Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED), which brings together fifty Middle Eastern and Asian countries.⁵ Iran is also a member of the Developing-8 (D-8) group,⁶ an arrangement created in 1997 for the establishment of development cooperation, and the establishment of Group Fifteen (G15),⁷ whose objective is to facilitate national efforts for economic progress and

¹ Bilateral trade amounted to 368,75 million dollars in 2005 compared to 259,32 million dollars in 2004. See Jakarta Post, February 19, 2007.

² See "Majlis Speaker: Iran, Indonesia Enjoy Good Relations," BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 5, 2007.

³ D. Susilo, Iran's Nuclear Resolution for Victory for Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, March 29, 2007.

⁴ The Iranian president said it was an "Islamic duty" to support the Indonesian bid. See "Iran Says Will Support Indonesia's Permanent Seat at UNSC", BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 30, 2006.

⁵ See member countries on <http://www.amed.sg.english/>

⁶ This Developing-8 (D8) organization aims to strengthen economic ties between major Muslim countries. It was created in 1997 at the initiative of Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and brings together Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Nigeria.

⁷ It brings together 18 members: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

development. At the D-8 Summit in Bali in May 2006, the member states of this organization concluded a preferential trade agreement.⁸ It is also worth knowing that Saudi Arabia is not part of the above mentioned regional forums and cooperation. This implies that Iran and Saudi Arabia might be pursuing different foreign policy strategies and objectives.

Background and Scope Of The Research

This thesis seeks to understand Iran's and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives in Indonesia and how these relations impact both the government's decision making and people. Iran and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives have been discussed in so many literatures but special attention has not been given on their competitive influences as a mean of gaining soft power in Indonesia. This study will focalise only on Indonesia to determine the bilateral and diplomatic relations between the country and Iran and Saudi Arabia. The thesis intends to make a comparative study between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and see the similarities and differences in the objectives of the foreign policy between the two countries.

Iran

Both Indonesia and Iran are seen as representing Islamic World globally⁹ due to their large Muslim population. Indonesia represents the largest Sunni Muslim population while Iran on the other hand is the home of many Shiite Muslims¹⁰. According to World Service Poll conducted by BBC in 2013, Indonesian's perception of Iran is the second most favorable in the World and most favorable in Asia.¹¹ In the poll 36% of Indonesians viewed Iran negatively while 34% viewed it positively.

Iran has also financed the building of the Islamic Cultural Center (ICC), which was completed in 2002. The ICC is the largest site of Shia activity in Indonesia, it offers courses in religion, Arabic and Persian language and also facilitates scholarship to Iran.

⁸ Thierry & Clément, " Les ententes multipolaires de l'Iran Aspects russe et asiatiques de la politique étrangère de Téhéran", Dans *Politique étrangère* 2007/4 (Hiver), pages 875 à 887.

⁹ Priyambodo RH (March 19, 2012), "RI-Iran relations have no limit", Antara News, (2012): Last retrieved: December 21, 2018,

¹⁰ Yon Machmudi, "Cultural Cooperation between Indonesia and Iran:Challenges and Opportunities". Academia.edu.

¹¹ GlobeScan (22 May 2013), "Views of China and India Slide in Global Poll, While UK's Ratings Climb", BBC World Service.

Subsequently, this thesis seeks to understand the impacts of Middle Eastern countries relations and activities in Indonesia, one blatant and good example of these impacts was seen in 2014, when a National Anti-Shia Alliance of Indonesia was founded in Bandung, West Java. Before the creation of this Anti-Shia Alliance, an East Java branch of the National Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa against Shia Muslims in 2012. Several Shia were driven out of their homes in the same year. One explanation for the previously mentioned intolerance against Shia is a growing popularity of Saudi Salafism.¹² However, this thesis does not intend to study the rise of Fundamentalism in Indonesia. It seeks to understand Saudi Arabia and Iran relations with Indonesia and the impact of such relations on the government's decision making and people.

Saudi Arabia

On March 1, 2017, Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud arrived in Indonesia with a large entourage of 1,500 people for a three-day official visit. The trip was, by far, one of the most publicized visits of a foreign leader to Indonesia under the Jokowi administration. In addition, the last time a reigning Saudi monarch (King Faisal) paid an official visit to Indonesia, was 47 years ago, in June 1970.

The relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia was formally initiated in 1948, with the establishment of the Indonesian Embassy in Jeddah. Two years later Saudi Arabia opened its representative office in Jakarta that was eventually turned into a formal embassy in 1955. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was among the first country, which recognized Indonesia in 1945, when it gained Independence. In 2015, the total trade between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia amounted to 8.6 billion dollars, Indonesia's main exports to Saudi Arabia are palm oil, motor vehicles, tuna, rubber, pulp, wood, charcoal and textile.¹³ In 1980, the Saudi government founded LIPIA, a branch of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, which serves as an ideological bulwark in Jakarta.

¹² Krithika Varagur, "Iran-Funded Center a lifeline for the Jakarta's marginalized Shia Minority," (2017) VOA, Retrieved December, 2018

¹³ <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/05/05/indonesia-saudi-arabia-to-double-trade-by-2020.html>

The institution comes under the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education and is entirely financed by Saudi government.¹⁴

From all the arguments provided above, we can see that both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been involved in several activities which aim to disseminate their ideologies and this thesis will study this phenomenon in details. Meanwhile Turkey, which is also one of the most influential countries in the Islamic world, is not studied in this thesis. The absence of Turkey in this study is a major limitation of this work.

Problem Statement

As the largest Muslim country in the World encountering the growth of ethno-religious conflicts, studying the topic is of high importance. As stated before, after the oil boom in the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia started investing a lot in the education sector that aimed to spread its ideologies and language. This is seen as a foreign policy objective of Saudi Arabia to counter-balance the influence of 1979 Iranian revolution particularly in the Islamic World. In the case of Indonesia, as the country, well-known for its pluralistic society, those main foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia and Iran can capitalize on or trigger sectarian issues in the country.

Indonesia is often expected to be among the most vocal and influential voices of the Muslim World, but its long standing approach to foreign affairs has emphasized its disengagement from the World's Islamic affairs.¹⁵ Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia's foreign policy has not showed much influence in the Islamic World. Indonesia has followed a foreign policy of neutrality in order to prevent outside powers including the West and Gulf Countries from exploiting its internal division that threatens national unity.¹⁶

The Islamic World's expectation on Indonesia might be preserved, however, many countries in the Middle East, especially the Arabs, view Islam in South East Asia,

¹⁴ Mansur Juned and Mohamd Hery, "REVITALIZING PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN INDONESIA AND SAUDI ARABIA: MODERATE MUSLIM'S PERSPECTIVE IN PROMOTING PEACE AND COOPERATION FOR MUTUAL BENEFITS," Proceedings of 91st The IIER International Conference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 12th -13th January 2017, ISBN: 978-93-86291-85-1 http://www.worldresearchlibrary.org/up_proc/pdf/635-1487394027131-134.pdf

¹⁵ Faudi Pitsuwan, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the International Politics of the Islamic World," *The Indonesian quarterly* (2012) 40(4):331

¹⁶ Sterling Jensen, "Indonesia-UAE Relations in the context of Regional Governance", *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, (2017) vol, 11, No,4: 101

including Indonesia as second-class or impure.¹⁷ This lack of credibility labeled to Muslim countries in South East Asian often led to several tension over a play role in Islamic World. The clash between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia over political issues in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) is a real example.¹⁸ According to Wirajuda, OIC didn't allow Indonesia to play a role in the organization.¹⁹ Nevertheless, in April 2005, the Indonesian President announced that "Indonesia will continue to increase its role in the OIC and continue to give its support for the liberation of Palestine"²⁰

Such views of many Middle Eastern countries towards Indonesia in particular could possibly explain the motives of those middle eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran, which is to impose their version of Islamic purity in Indonesia.

Pitsuwan argued that there is an absence of Islamic rhetoric in Indonesia's foreign policy. This argument shows that one of the main objectives of Saudi Arabia and Iran in this study, which is to spread their ideologies in Indonesia, has no effect on the foreign policy decision making in Indonesia. Therefore, the study emphasizes on how this objective of spreading ideologies affects the population. According to Pitsuwan, after the events of 9/11 orchestrated by al Qaeda and the Bali bombing of 2002 by its associate, Indonesia attempted to be more dynamic within the Islamic World. It is the shift that Indonesia make in its foreign policy by retreating and abandoning its Islamic Identity and embrace a new Islamic identity, which proclaimed a new international identity as the largest Muslim country in the World, whose Islam is compatible with Western ideologies of democracy and human rights.²¹ As the former president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono desired for Indonesia to act as the bridge between Islam and the West.

¹⁷ Ann Marie Murphy, "US gives a long overdue nod to Indonesia," *Asia Times Online*, 18 March 2009, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/KC18Ae02.htm

¹⁸ Ann Marie Murphy, "Global Insider: Indonesia-Saudi Arabia Relations," *World Politics Re-view*, 13 May 2011,

<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8841/global-insider-indonesia-saudi-arabia-relations>

¹⁹ Indonesia Former Foreign Minister

²⁰ Ann Marie Murphy, "Democratization and Indonesia Foreign Policy: Implication for the Unit-ed States," *The National Bureau of Asian Studies*, (2012):96

²¹ Faudi Pitsuwan, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy and the International Politics of the Islamic World," 347

From this statement, it can be clearly seen that Indonesian foreign policy in the Islamic World only changed after the Bali bombing of 2002 and the events of 9/11. This argument opposes the fact that this change in Indonesia's foreign policy is affected by Iran and Saudi Arabia. It states that the shift in Indonesia's foreign policy was not convinced by the policies and activities of Iran and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. Therefore, one of the central focuses of this study is based on how the activities of Iran and Saudi Arabia affects the Indonesian population.

Objectives and Research Questions

From the above arguments, this study tries to make a comparative analyses of the roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran in both Indonesian foreign policy and the impacts of these roles on the population, that is, how the population has been reacting due to the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the country.

The topic attempts to answer the following research questions

1. The determinants and objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia relations with Indonesia. The study argues that beside the attempt of reinforcing the trade ties with Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Iran are also attempt to disseminate their ideologies in the country.
2. The second and most important research question of this study is to see the impact of Saudi Arabia and Iran's foreign policy on the future of Indonesia's foreign policy, decision making and how the population in general reacts to this. According to previous research, one of the aims of the Saudi government is to stop the growth of Iran's influence in Indonesia, this supports the recent attacks on the Shii minority in Indonesia.

Contribution to Literature

The main contribution this study makes to literature is to analyze the determinants and objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia activities and roles in Indonesia. This discusses how the stand of Indonesia's foreign policy due to the growth of Saudi Arabia and Iran's influences and competition for hegemony in the Muslim World and how these objectives impacts the behaviors and reactions of people. Plethora of significance needs to be given to this topic as the growth of Iran and Saudi Arabia religious activities will eventually capitalize on the sectarian division in the country.

Research Limitations

This study would have been more thorough and truthful and had I had access to the formal archives of the three countries valued in this study. Time, financial limitation and the inaccessibility of these archives have been the biggest challenge and major limitation in this work. In addition, initially i thought of giving some coverage with Turkey's foreign policy in Indonesia during the same period would have given me a better space to test my assumptions in this work.



CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main research methodologies in this study and also the existing literatures on the topic. The research design for the countries is explained in details and under the literature review, specific information is given on past research of the foreign policy objectives of both Saudi Arabia and Iran in Indonesia. A brief introduction to Indonesia is also provided in this chapter.

1.1. Research Methodology

This study will make use of a qualitative research method since no numerical data will be used in the study. Credible and reliable data will be used for this analysis. The study uses both primary and secondary data sources. The analysis of the case studies serve as the primary data analysis interpretation. Another case study will focus on the causes of sectarian division and conflicts that have occurred in the country. The secondary data sources have been commonly used in past research. Secondary data sources are used because it is more reliable, cheap, easily accessed, and not time consuming like the primary data sources. The main secondary data sources are taken from text books, articles in credible journals, magazines, policy documents, newspapers, documentaries, academic journals etc.

1.2. Research Design and Sampling Method

The research in this study is more pertinent with the case study. The sample size (N) of case studies of this study is Middle East and out of which a sample size (n) was chosen. The countries chosen are Iran and Saudi Arabia because they are the most influential Muslim countries in the World.

The period studied in this thesis is from 1998 till present because this is the period when Islamic World expected to see a more active involvement of Indonesia in the Islamic World following the events of 9/11 and the Bali bombing of 2002 because these events had a tremendous impact on Indonesia's foreign policy. This was also the period when the Arab Spring started. However, the thesis extends to the time before 1998 in some cases because of the origin and historical analysis that were studied in some chapters.

1.3. Iran

Iran is chosen in this study because it is one of the most influential Muslim countries in the World. Its practice of Shiism and its export of the ideology makes the country an important area of study. Iran is chosen because it is the center of Shiism and being the center of Shiism makes it one of the most influential Muslim countries in the World. This part of the thesis will give a brief history of the rise of Shiism in Iran and how it became a global exporter of this sect.

This phenomenon, which is first Arabic, the history of Shiism is closely linked to that of Iran. The branch of Shia Islam in Iran refers more specifically to "Twelver Shiism",²² which refers to the number of revered Imams (Twelve), through whom the history of truth is revealed or "Imamite Shiism" according to the theory of the Imamate to which it corresponds. Ali is the first of the Twelve Imams that the Shiites recognize, giving him special spiritual importance. The Shiites, etymologically, are the followers of Ali, cousin, and husband of the daughter of Muhammad, Fatima, those who accompany him. Another important milestone in Shiism is the death - or rather the martyrdom in the Shiite tradition - of Husayn during the Battle of Karbala in 680, which opposes Husayn's troops, refusing to pledge allegiance to the new caliph, to the Umayyad army. This battle and the death of Imam Husayn are commemorated annually in Ashura on the 10th day of the month of Muharram, year 61 AH. The other key dogma of the Shiite tradition is the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi (the Mahdi), who went into occultation at the death of his father in 874 when he was a young boy. The Shiites, therefore, await the return of this Imam, the Parousia and the final revelation, unlike the Sunnis for whom the cycle of prophecy is closed.

Shiism became a state religion in Iran in 1501, when Shah Ismail I, the first Safavid ruler - a dynasty that reigned from 1501 to 1732 over a territory stretching from Anatolia to the west of present-day Afghanistan – this was possible with the help of

²² While Twelver Shi'ism represents about 80% of Shi'ites, Shi'ism includes other branches: Zaydies, present in Yemen, they recognize only five imams; the Ismailis, present in Syria, who recognize only seven imams; the Druze, a branch of Ismailism under the Fatimids (mainly found in Lebanon where they make up about 10% of the population) and Syria; the Alawites, long ostracized minority and composing 10% of the population of Syria, the eleventh Imam is considered by them as the ultimate descendant of the Prophet; The Alevis, faithful to a heterodox and syncretic cult, are especially present in Turkey (20 million individuals).

Arab clerics. If the Safavid period is a period of radiation for Shiite Islam, the clergy, used to territorialize the state is however subject to the latter. Even more than the presence of Shiite groups on the territory of Iran, the rapprochement of this branch of Islam with Persia takes place in that it is part of the continuity of the Iranian Iran. There is, indeed, a spiritual continuity from the beliefs of Zoroastrianism, eschatological religion devoted to a supreme god in which the spirits of good eventually triumph over those of evil.

The Shiite clergy, on which any new government must rely, is more involved in politics from the nineteenth century and in favor of a doctrinal evolution favoring the production of Islamic law (*ijtihad*). Since the end of the nineteenth century, the *Ulamas* in Iran are an autonomous social body and financially independent of the state, thanks in particular to the doctrine of imitation (*taqlid*), by which each faithful chooses a model (*marja*).²³

The doctrinal evolutions gradually elaborate a religious hierarchy and a relationship between believers and scholars, which leads to the concept of guidance (*wilâya*), theorized by Ruhollah Khomeini in 1970 and integrated into the Revolutionary Constitution, that is to say that the supreme authority belongs to the most prominent religious jurisconsult (*faqih*) and represents the missing Imam. The Islamic revolution of 1979 marks the seizure of power by clerics. This power is institutionalized: article 110 of the Iranian constitution, which gives the Supreme Guide, elected by an assembly of eighty-six experts, themselves elected by universal suffrage, extensive powers: it defines the general policy of the country and supervises its good execution, disposes of the army or referee the conflicts between the powers.²⁴ The Shiite clergy constitutes a dense network and integrated into the economic or administrative spheres.

For the ideologues of the Islamic revolution, the export of the revolution is central. Directly or indirectly Iran intervenes in many countries (Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia,

²³ See the evolution of the concept of *marja'iyya* C. Arminjon Hashem, *Shia and State: Clerics to the test of modernity*, (Paris: CNRS Edition, 2013)

²⁴ See a translation of Potocki (2004), *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, 1989*, L'Harmattan, Paris.

Egypt, Afghanistan, Sudan, Western Sahara and Bosnia); more than a Shia space, the Islamic revolution must extend to the entire Muslim world.²⁵

In practice, it is the transnational networks of Shiite clerics in which were the first support for the export of the revolution in the Middle East.²⁶ At the time of the revolution, the priority of the Iranian government led by Mehdi Bazargan is not the export of the revolution but the consolidation of central power and the continuity of diplomatic relations. Two main networks were used: the clerics of the religious school of Najaf in Iraq, under the influence of the al-Da'wa party which carries a political project for the entire Muslim world, and that of Hassan al-Shirazi who, in conflict with the Najaf school, set up in 1975 a religious school in the southern suburbs of Damascus, Sayyida Zaynab, which houses the mausoleum of Zeinab, the daughter of Mohammad and daughter of Ali.

Iran has used the religious factor in its foreign policy by relying on various Shia networks. However, alliances are formed first according to the Iranian national interest and not to the benefit of Shiism. This is indeed the application of a pan-Islamic doctrine stemming from the revolution and in which the support on Shiite communities, main targets of the Iranian foreign policy to the detriment of alliance which would be more profitable in the region, is the key. Moreover, the evolution of the regional geopolitical balance reinforces the sectarian dimension of Iranian foreign policy, that is to say linked to Shiite objectives, while the re-emergence of Iran supports a reading by the States of the region based on the denominational prism.

In fact, Arab countries criticized Iranian proselytism, which was particularly keen at the time of the Iranian revolution. The Shiites are assimilated as a fifth Iranian column and to counter this threat, the conservative regimes (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), allow the rise of Sunni radical groups, of Salafist inspirations. According to Olivier Roy, if "the maneuver succeeds in isolating Iran, it sets up a whole radical device that will be found

²⁵ The Guardian of the Revolution journal, Payam-e Enqelab of April 1980, materializes this essence: "We will export our revolution throughout the world. As our revolution is Islamic, the struggle will continue until the call "There is no God but God" is taken up all over the globe. Quoted by A. Ostovar, *Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.

²⁶ L. Louër, "Shia and Politics in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Gulf Monarchies," *Otherwise*, Paris, (2008) and L. Louër, *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf*, (Newyork: Columbia University Press, 2008)

later in al-Qaeda network."²⁷ This argument could possibly explain that Saudi Arabia's foreign policy goal is not just to disseminate its ideology but to counter the rise of Shiism of Iran. In Indonesia, Shiites are regularly the object of intimidation, even of aggressions, in the same way as the other minority religions like the Muslim sect of the Ahmadis or the Christians, probably due to the rise of Salafism in Indonesia. According to human rights organizations, religious intolerance is even more common: the Setara Institute for Peace, an NGO, has counted 308 "incidents" affecting minority religions (assault or closure of places of worship for example) during the first half of the year 2012, a sharp increase compared to 2011 (543 cases for the whole year), 2010 (502) or 2009 (491).²⁸

In the end, the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989 marks the end of the expansion of the Revolution, President Rafsanjani sets up a more pragmatic policy that consists of both negotiating with Sunni groups and making Shiite groups stakeholders in the domestic politics of the states in which they operate, as opposed to an attachment to Iran.

Finally, not only did the Sunni Islamist movements quickly break away from Iran in the aftermath of the revolution, but also it breaks through Iran-Iraq war that began in September 1980. In addition, "the Iranian Islamic Revolution shut itself in the ghetto of the Shiite minorities, without becoming hegemonic within these communities".²⁹ Today, it is the administration and the networks of the Supreme Guide, who are careful to preserve the revolutionary ideology.

Iran's support for the Houthis, the Zaydite tribe of Yemen, is extremely thin. This conflict is not part of an ideological relationship between Sunnis and Shiites. On the contrary, prevailing tribal logics related to the isolation of these populations, while the Saudi intervention of March 2015, conducted with the support of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly explained by the fear of an uprising within the conservative monarchy and social demands.

²⁷ O. Roy, "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution in the Middle East" in S. Mervin, *The Shia Worlds and Iran*, (Kartala and IFPO, Paris, Beirut, 2007)

²⁸ OBS (2012), Indonesia: taxed as heretics, Shiites reduced to pariah, OBS see <https://www.nouvelobs.com/societe/20121211.AFP7520/indonesie-taxes-d-heretiques-les-chiites-reduits-a-l-etat-de-paria.html>

²⁹ O. Roy "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution in the Middle East,"

In fact, and as Afshon Ostovar notes, "most of Iran's relations are not based on ideological or religious considerations".³⁰ Iran's policy towards the Middle East is driven by a desire for regional balance; a counterbalance to the influence of Saudi Arabia, allied with the United States since the Quincy pact of 14 February 1945. In the Kingdom of Bahrain, an island connected to Saudi Arabia and an outlet for the Saudi, the Iranian influence is limited. Following the "Arab Spring", the February-March 2011 demonstrations were suppressed thanks to Riyadh's intervention, without Iran interfering. While the presence of the US Fifth Fleet may explain this distance to a country conquered by the Safavids and considered as a province until recently by an Iranian nationalist fringe,³¹ Tehran respects the sovereignty of this former British protectorate, which became independent in 1971.

Iranian diplomacy is based on pragmatic alliances, without the Shia factor being constantly decisive: with Dubai, Qatar or Oman, or with Tajikistan, Indonesia, Persian and Christian Armenia³². Today, support for the loyalist forces in Syria is mainly due to the fear of a seizure of power by Saudi Arabia and its allies in Iraq.³³ This alliance sometimes faces conflicting interests. For example, while Iran supported a Shiite power in Iraq, Syria supported the idea of a government associating Sunni and Baathist elements.

The Iranian Embassy in Indonesia recently celebrated the 39th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the National Day of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Jakarta. In his speech, the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, Rudiantara, said that Indonesia and Iran have been establishing friendly relations and socio-cultural relations for a long time. Communities in both countries have been involved in the business of teaching and learning about Islam. The kinship relationship between the two countries has been strengthened since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1950. In the future, Indonesia and Iran will

³⁰ A. Ostovar, "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2016)

³¹ B. Hourcade, *Geopolitics of Iran*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2016)

³² The geopolitical environment of Shiite Iran is that of Shiite or not, thus constituting an "archipelago" (B. Hourcade). This term is apt to understand the geopolitics of Iran in that it highlights the types of alliances scattered in the region that Tehran is united.

³³ B. Hourcade, "Iran against the Sunni encirclement," in. F. Burgat and B. Paoli, *No Spring for Syria*, (Paris: The Discovery, 2013)

explore and strengthen relations between the two countries.³⁴ According to the Minister "there have been several exchanges of visits between senior officials, as well as many signatures of cooperation documents. Iranian President Hassan Rousani's visit to Indonesia in 2015 and President Joko Widodo's visit to Tehran, Iran, in 2016, renewed the two countries' commitment to strengthening their bilateral relations at the highest level, encouraged by the enormous potential of both countries". This needs to be explored further, Rudiantara added that Iran and Indonesia should work together to eliminate trade barriers and bring business communities closer to each other. The implementation of the global joint plans allows both countries to explore cooperation in the energy sector, such as oil and gas, electricity and renewable energy products. At the same occasion, Iran's ambassador to Indonesia, Valliolah Mohammadi, said relations between Indonesia and Iran continue to move towards better leadership. Both countries have been creating the relationship for 67 years and will grow in the future.

The statement in the above paragraph by the Indonesian Minister of Communication and Information Technology supports the argument that Iran's foreign policy objective in Indonesia is not to disseminate or promote its ideology but to reinforce the diplomatic relations between the two countries by promoting and removing every barrier to trade.

Studying Iranian foreign policy objectives in Indonesia is significantly advantageous even if the foreign policy objective might not be aimed at spreading Shiism but the growing hostility towards the Shia communities of Indonesia is a result of both Iran's and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objective in Indonesia. This is supported by the the propaganda of Indonesian groups hostile to Syrian power puts forward the supposed Shia character of the regime. It is about legitimizing "jihad" by designating Shiism not only as heresy, but as a threat to pure Islam. This speech led Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to describe the "Syrian Shiite regime" as "worse than the infidels and Jews". For Navhat Nuraniyah of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, this propaganda has already borne fruit: in 2011, a plot was aimed at murdering the main Indonesian Shiite figures; in 2012, a thousand villagers attacked a Shia community on the island of

³⁴ Maysaroh, "Indonesia and Iran strengthen cooperation," *Voice of Indonesia*, Last retrieved: December 17, 2018
<http://voineews.id/french/index.php/component/k2/item/388-l-indonesie-et-l-iran-renforcent-leur-cooperation>

Madura; a Sunni mob attacked a school in East Java. While some fifty Indonesians are known to be fighting in Syria. As a policy recommendation, Indonesia should adopt a law that penalizes hate speech before endangering civil peace.

1.4. Saudi Arabia

In order to understand why Saudi Arabia is chosen in this study and why it is known as one of the most influential Muslim countries in the World, it is important to look at the rise of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. The country is also important because it is the birth place of Islam containing two of its holiest sites. From the arguments pertaining Saudi Arabia roles in countering Iranian influence in Indonesia, one can say that the main foreign policy objective of Saudi Arabia, beside economic and commercial interest in Indonesia, is to control the influence of Iran among Indonesian Muslim society.

In this part of our research design, Saudi Arabia, its ideology and how its foreign policy has changed are discussed.

On March 28, 1975, Emir Khaled Ben Abdelaziz succeeded Faisal on the throne of Saudi Arabia. The dramatic disappearance of this illustrious elder, projects on the front of the stage a prince again little-known outside of his country, although he enjoys a real prestige inside of it. At the same time, the authority of the new Crown Prince, former Minister of the Interior, Prince Fahed Ben Abdelaziz, considered the leader of the trend modernist in the royal family. This succession occurs at a moment where Saudi Arabia, thanks to the expansion of its financial strength and the weakening of its main rivals in the Arab World, has gained an unprecedented international audience in its history: The Kingdom is now not only a power, in some respects a world power. The New Government's Policy Doctrine was stated in the statement read in the King's name by the Crown Prince on the day of the enthronement of the sovereign: Islamic Solidarity, inter-Arab cooperation, restitution of its supports to the Palestinian people, special responsibility of Arabia in the world economy order, desire for cooperation with all people to the exception of the communist bloc were the fundamental points.

The Wahhabis have been in Mecca since 1750. Before, the sacred territories were under the religious authority of the Prophet's descendants and under the political and administrative authority of the Ottoman Caliphate. The Mawlid (celebration of the birth of the Prophet) was then freely practiced in the sacred mosque and the tomb of the

Prophet was visited without restriction. The "Kitab al-Tawhid" or "Treatise on the Divine Oneness" of Muhammad Ibn'Abd Al Wahhab An-nadjdi is considered as the reference work of Wahhabi theology.³⁵

Wahabbism is part of what some Sunni scholars call "As-salafiyya An-nassiyya"³⁶; the "salafiyya" which is content strict with the text³⁷ and therefore imposes a vertical legal treatment to any case, without considering time and space (of the context) (even for the cases with known divergence and current issues).

Wahhabism began in the middle of the 18th century (1158 AH) when a preacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, came to take refuge in Diraya, the capital of a small lord, Muhammad ibn Saud, located at the bottom of a valley, northwest of Riyadh. At the time, most of the Arabian Peninsula escaped Ottoman rule. The sheikh preached the return to the purity of Islam and therefore to the Oneness of God, banishing all idols: cults of the innovators, the holy places, lost scholars and Shiites. The marriage of ibn Saud's son with a daughter of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab sealed the alliance between them. As an Imam, ibn Saud had to wage jihad against all forms of idolatry.

The Saud of the first dynasty (1745-1818) led in fact real raids. In 1801, they seized Karbala, the holy city of the Shiites, they killed between 2000 to 5000 people, seizing immense wealth; they demolished all vestiges of the pre-Islamic period. Worse still, a few years later, those who are now called Wahhabis conquered Mecca and hastened to demolish monuments, tombs and mausoleums; In Medina, they plundered until the tomb of the Prophet and imposed the moral order: ban on smoking, litanies, feasts like that of the birth of the Prophet. Yet, breaking with Bedouin simplicity, the Imam lived in wealth and his capital, Dariya, became a prosperous city. The Wahhabi sect was then

³⁵ See "Al-Bashir al-mahmoudi," "Al-bin al-mawlid An-nabawi," ed.: Al-matba'atu wa al-warrakatu Al-Wataniya: Marrakech, 2006: pages 36--39.

³⁶ Also, in this category are the "salafiyya at-taymiyya" and the "salafiyya hanbaliyya" which are moderate and take into consideration the arguments of companions and ancient scholars: they recognize the Sufism and theological doctrine of Ash'arism. The second category of Salafism is the "salafiyya fihiyya", which represents a continuity and a concordance with the logic and the legal instruments of the four doctrines: therefore for it, there is a horizontal and vertical legal treatment of the cases (which takes into consideration the variables of time and space while remaining linked to the traditional text and its purpose: using the rules prescribed by the companions and by the four doctrines for Ijtihād). Same reference page 40.

³⁷ Their doctrine is based on their personal interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah. Wahabbism sees itself as a movement and not as a doctrine, but the reality and impact of its fatwa makes it only classed as a doctrine, or even as a dangerous ideology.

hated by Sunnis who eventually obtained a military expedition from the Ottomans against Dariya, which in 1818 was captured and destroyed.

As stated before, the foundation of the doctrine is "The Book of Unity" written in 1741 by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. While all Muslims believe in the Oneness of God (tawhid), the Wahhabis believe that Muslims of their time are not faithful to it by multiplying the prayers of intercession, venerating the graves of holy men, listening to Ulama and addressing the marabouts. From the very beginning, however, the Wahhabi sect met with strong opposition from orthodox Sunnism. The founder of Wahhabism was accused of demolishing the tombstones and his rejection of the intercession of the saints. It was not until the 1920s that Wahhabism emerged from this heretical situation when Abdelaziz ibn Saud (1880-1953) began the third dynasty of the Saud; supported by the English during the First World War, if it cannot seize Iraq and Transjordan, it conquers Mecca, in 1924, with troops composed of sedentary nomads. From then on, he imposed his vision of Islam on the Ulama. His troops introduced, as stated by Redissi, asceticism, fanaticism and the cult of martyrdom. The hatred of Shiites, apostates, Sufis, Christians and Jews justifies all crimes. Holder of the two main holy places of Islam, the Saud imposed Wahhabism as orthodox Islam. The plane that allows pilgrims to flock en masse then consolidates the confusion between Wahhabism and Sunni Islam.

The Committee of Great Ulamas set up in 1971, consisting of 17 members appointed by the King, represents the main legislative body with the Council of Ministers. He issues fatwas that govern the daily life of the Saudis and, if necessary, supports the regime when it is disputed. Petroleum revenues, supplemented by those from the pilgrimage, are considerable and offer the Saud the means to expand his influence through his Islamic universities. The first was created in 1961 in Medina; today, facing the prestigious Islamic University of al-Azhar, the Saud have eight universities that attract students from around the world. Courses of study have been shortened to three years to attract foreign students, the University of Medina grants scholarships and to democratize recruitment, has simplified programs, limited theological teachings to definitions of the lawful and unlawful.

Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, The Saudis were also targeted in this first phase of the revolution because the Iranians challenged them about the exclusive control

of the holy places which, according to them, should belong to the whole of the Muslim ummah. In November 1979, a commando of exalted Sunnis seized the holy places of Mecca for ten days, during Hajj, taking pilgrims hostage (the minister of the Saudi interior had requested the reinforcement of a commando of French gendarmes of the GIGN). At the same time, there was an uprising of the Shiite minority in the east of the country (strategic oil region), who chants Khomeini's name. This uprising gave rise to a bloody repression and the two episodes gave the signal of a regression on the internal level with the return of Wahhabism in force. Indeed, in the 1970s, in Saudi Arabia, there were cinemas and women could move without abaya. Feeling threatened by Iran's ideological expansionism, Saudi Arabia then built its own expansionism. This is the beginning of all-out Wahhabi proselytism, support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which has never worked very well but was designed to make a bloc against Iran. We are also witnessing the rise of the Saudi military arsenal, with the purchase of long-range Chinese ballistic missiles that can hit Tehran. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the time of the Shah is crystallizing again on other bases. King Khaled and King Fahd supported Saddam Hussein. By letting down the price of oil from 1985, on the advice of Americans, they gradually put Iran on their knees. At the same time, the Soviet Union too.

In the 1980s, some Indonesian students received scholarships to complete their studies in Saudi Arabia, and some of them went on to Afghanistan for practical purposes. They found themselves in the region of Kunar, an isolated region under Saudi domination. It is these Indonesians who have gone through the Saudi literalist teaching and the Afghan armed struggle who, on their return to the country, gave their seat to the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, an organization whose goal is the dawah (proselytism) in view of promotion and implementation of Sharia law. Their ultra-conservative positions and their targets are classic for such a movement: the corruption of the government, the Javanese mysticism and the other religions in general, the Muslim liberalism and the challenge of a certain economic domination of the Chinese.

One of the means used by the Salafists, who are wary of the Indonesian authorities, is radio. Numerous stations are created or brought closer to this movement originating from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Salafists are mostly quietists, but some advocate the armed struggle. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) for instance, is the largest Islamic

organization in the country. The latter has been actively fighting for several years against this means of promoting Salafism particularly used in Indonesia (rather than door to door). In an article in the Jakarta Post of 2016, experts estimated about a hundred of these radios, with wide dissemination means throughout the country.³⁸ The scholar and specialist of Salafism Ayang Utriza Yakin (Syarif Hidayatullah of the State Islamic University (UIN) who analyzed the sermons of the most popular of them (Radio Rodja) concluded that the Islamic teachings of these made the promotion of intolerance and rejection of modernity. A very detailed study of this phenomenon was made in 2016:³⁹ It explains the central purpose of these media, the dawah. They are part of a challenge to religious authority with many subdivisions, all claiming to represent "true Salafism" (a constant in Islam). Several notable features: the absence of commercial breaks, music, entertainment programs were all devoted exclusively to the recitation of the Qur'an donated rhythmically, hadiths and prayers loop. The only entertainment is the daurah broadcasts, a sort of workshop where Middle Eastern preachers are sometimes invited for readings, which usually end up on widely distributed CDs and podcasts.

Since 1980, Saudi Arabia has spent millions of dollars exporting its ideological brand, Salafism and Wahhabism, to a historically tolerant and diverse country. It has built more than 150 mosques (the country already has 800,000), a huge "free" university in Jakarta and several institutes of Arabic language; it has provided over 100 boarding schools with textbooks and teachers (in a country with between 13,000 and 30,000 boarding schools); to which are added cohorts of Saudi preachers and teachers.⁴⁰

³⁸ Haeril Halim and Fadli, "Salafi Movement Gains Ground in Public Sphere," The Jakarta Post, Last retrieved: December 17, 2018, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/09/02/salafi-movement-gains-ground-in-public-sphere.html>

³⁹ Sunaworto, "Salafi Dakwah Radio: A Contest for Religious Authority," Archipel, (2016): 203-230, Last retrieved: December 18, 2018, <https://journals.openedition.org/archipel/314#tocto1n2>

⁴⁰ Ammar Belhimer, "A lost funds Indonesia: Wahhabi overdose," *Algeria News*, Last retrieved: December 17, 2018, <https://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/articles/2017/03/14/article.php?sid=210673&cid=8>

1.5. Literature Review

This section of the thesis discusses the past literatures and other works that have been done on this subjects. After a preliminary literature review, past works are analyzed on both Iran's and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives in Indonesia. A general introduction to Indonesia and the rise of Islam in Indonesia is also given in this section.

An article titled “Indonesia-UAE Relations in the context of Regional Governance” published by Sterling Jensen, aimed to analyze the relations between Indonesia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) and gives a description of its main drivers in Regional Governance. According to this article, the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean region of Southeast Asia and Arab Gulf countries is a factor that promotes bilateral agreement between Indonesia and UAE. This Indian Ocean region can also be a determinant of Saudi’s foreign policy and trade in Indonesia. One of the main determinants of Iran and Saudi Arabia relations in Indonesia can be because of its proximity to both South East and East Asia. Most scholars agree that Indonesia is a gateway for trade and investment in both South East and East Asia.

In the 1980s and 1990s, when Western economies were facing growth and inflation while Asian economies were experiencing a high growth rate, many Western companies moved to Asia, which prompted Gulf countries to follow.⁴¹ The Arab Gulf countries started looking East to Asia not only for economic purposes, but also geopolitical interests too.⁴²

The Arab Gulf countries believed that dependence of U.S geopolitical power was not always dependable and reliable and Arab Gulf countries were convinced that more strategic relations with Asia as partners in regional security is dependable.⁴³ In addition, the Indonesian government is capitalizing on Asian growth potentials and sees this as opportunity in the Indian Ocean region.

The current regional atmosphere of sectarian division and rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is impacting Indonesia’s foreign relations and policy with the Gulf States.

⁴¹ Sterling Jensen, “Indonesia-UAE Relations in the Context of Regional Governance,” *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, no. 2(4), (2017): 101

⁴² Sterling Jensen, “Indonesia-UAE Relations in the Context of Regional Governance,” 101

⁴³ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine," *Atlantic Monthly* 317, no.3 (2016): 70-90

Iran and Saudi Arabia have all tried to influence religious discourse in Indonesia.⁴⁴ This statement supports the main assumption of this thesis, which proposes that Iran and Saudi Arabia try to disseminate religious ideologies in the country. However, Saudi Arabia is principally concerned about Iranian Influence in Indonesia.⁴⁵

During the final decade of the cold war, both Khomeini's Iran and Suharto's Indonesia adopted an opposing positions to the West. The government of president Abdulrahman Wahid reinforced relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and this would later provide Iranians more access to Indonesia. Iranian presidents, government officials and delegations started visiting Indonesia and gave scholarships to Indonesian students to study in Iran. In addition, trade ties between Indonesia and Iran increased soon after Indonesia abstained from the UN vote to impose sanctions against Iran in 2007⁴⁶ when the UN Security Council and other countries began imposing sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program in 2006. In a press conference in April 2007 Indonesian President called Iran's nuclear program peaceful and the UN resolutions against the country illegal. However, in 2008 Indonesia voted in favor of UNSCR 1835 against Iran. The head of the Iran-Indonesia parliamentary friendship Group, in another part of his remarks, he touched upon the issue of Iran's support for peace and stability in the World, saying 'the colonial countries support terrorist groups in the region, while Iran supports any measures to stabilize security and peace in the region'.

In an article by Siwage Negara named 'The Impact of Saudi King's visit to Indonesia', the author concluded that there has been a mismatch between Saudi's intentions and Indonesia's expectations. The Saudi King pledged a 1 billion US dollars investment in Indonesia while it pledged 7 billion US dollars investment in neighbouring country Malaysia. The Indonesians were too optimistic to calculate that approximately 25 billion US dollars would be invested by the Saudi government. Meanwhile, the King's main objective is to increase bilateral trade between the two countries, due to the fact that Saudi economy has started to decline since the fall of oil prices. According to the

⁴⁴ Yon Machmudi, *Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy Conflict and Cooperation*, (London: I.B Tauris, 2016)

⁴⁵ Sterling Jensen, "Indonesia-UAE Relations in the Context of Regional Governance," 102

⁴⁶ Shireen Hunter, *Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order*. Santa Barbara, CA; Praeger, 2010

International Monetary Fund (IMF), Saudi Arabia's fiscal deficit has significantly expanded from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2014 to 15.9 percent of GDP in 2015. The Indonesians also expected the two governments to address the issues of Indonesian migrant workers in Saudi, this issue was not discussed during the King's visit.⁴⁷ From this explanation, the King's visit had no concrete impact on Indonesia's foreign policy, though both governments agreed to reinforce ties in combatting extremism, radicalism and terrorism in the Islamic World.

According to Amanda Kovacs, Saudi Arabia often take advantage of the lack of some home countries (most especially developing countries including Indonesia) to provide quality education and modern education facilities. Therefore, they use educational institutions to stabilize the system. The author argues that after Indonesia switched to democracy in 1998, the country has still been influenced by Salafi religious discriminatory activities and violence.⁴⁸ Most of this violence often comes from the graduates of LIPIA college in Jakarta, which was established in 1980 by Saudi Arabia. In addition to this, the author states that LIPIA portrays a Saudi microcosm where Salafi norms and values predominate. LIPIA also act as an entrance to all of Southeast Asia. Finally the author argues that, Saudi Arabia, in order to tackle the influence of Iran and confronts Iran for religious hegemony in 1979, has started building schools and universities worldwide to propagate its educational traditions and ideology.

One interesting thing about the above article is that the author gave a policy recommendation by arguing that Muslim countries need to improve their educational systems and infrastructures in order to stop the coming in of religious radicalization because one of the easiest ways this foreign policy objective is achieved is by building schools and religious centers.

1.5.1. Indonesia

The first of the Pancasila (five principles) that constitute the ideology of the Indonesian state is the belief in one God. Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees freedom of

⁴⁷ Siwage, Negara, "The Impact of Saudi King's Visit to Indonesia," *ISEAS*, (2017): 10

⁴⁸ Amanda Kovacs, " Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims," *German Institute of Global and Area Studies*, no.7, ISSN 2196-3940 (2014)
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184727/gf_international_1407.pdf

worship and does not give precedence to any religion. Moreover, the constitution does not refer to any religion in particular.

The Indonesian government recognizes six official religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The population is predominantly Muslim, but unlike some other countries, the code of laws does not explicitly refer to sharia, or Islamic law. Indonesia is thus an example of successful secularism including Islam⁴⁹. As Joseph Yacoub, professor of political science at the Catholic University of Lyon affirms, "the Arab countries would be honored to inscribe in their constitutions their pre-Islamic heritage, like the example of Indonesia, which was Buddhist before to be Muslim."⁵⁰

Indonesia advocates an Islam embracing values of respect and openness. Religion is considered personal and is not considered a political issue. Christians, whom are the country's largest minority representing 10% of the population, are well integrated.

The national motto is besides "Bhinneka tunggal ika" that is to say, "Unity in Diversity". Until 2015, however, it was forbidden to be an atheist. Indonesians were forced to choose one of these six official religions to fill out their identity card application form.⁵¹ This obligatory mention was imposed by President Suharto (1966-1998) to fight Communism. Indeed, the Communists being supposed atheists, each Indonesian had to provide proof that he or she belonged to a religion. Since 2000, there was also a seventh opportunity to complete the identity card application form with the heading "other". But many Indonesian citizens declared themselves to be Muslims, (Islam being the dominant religion), to access jobs in the civil service and other services from which they were often excluded (care, education). Some minorities such as Christians and the 200,000 Ahmadis (minority from Islam and perceived as heretic) Indonesians thus declared themselves Muslims to escape persecution in heavily Islamized areas.

In May 2015, Tjahjo Kumolo, Minister of the Interior in the cabinet formed by President Joko Widodo, abolished the obligation to mention religious affiliation on the

⁴⁹ The wearing of the veil is even forbidden in public schools in order to respect the Hindu minority

⁵⁰ The World of Religions Magazine - January and February 2015 - No. 69

⁵¹ Religious Affiliation & National Identity: Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) [archive]

identity card. Indonesians now have the option of no longer filling in the "religion" section or registering an officially unrecognized religion. The Minister asserted that Indonesia "protects religions for the good of the people but is neither a secular country nor a country based on religion"⁵²

According to the 2010 official census, 87.2% of Indonesians are Muslim, 7% Protestant, 2.9% Catholic, 1.7% Hindu, 1.3% other or unanswered, which includes Buddhism, Judaism and Orthodox Christianity⁵³ and Animism.



Figure 1 : Religious Demography of Indonesia

Source: "Geo Currents" "Mapping Religion in Indonesia." Geo Current, (2010).

<http://www.geocurrents.info/cultural-geography/mapping-religion-in-indonesia>

⁵² LaCroix, "Indonesia ends the mention of religion on the identity card," *LaCroix*, Last retrieved: December 19, 2018, <http://www.la-croix.com/Religion/Actualite/L-Indonesie-met-fin-a-la-mention-de-la-religion-sur-la-carte-d-identite-2015-05-30-1317837>

⁵³ "Penduduk Menurut Wilayah in Agama yang Dianut" [archive] , Sensus Penduduk 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia, Badan Pusat Statistik (accessed November 20, 2011): "Religion is belief in Almighty God that must be possessed by every human being. Religion may be divided into Muslim, Christian, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist, Khong Chu, and Other Religion. Muslim 207176162 (87.18%), Christian 16528513 (6.96), Catholic 6907873 (2.91), Hindu 4012116 (1.69), Buddhist 1703254 (0.72), Khong Hu Chu 117091 (0.05), Other 299617 (0.13), Not Stated 139582 (0.06), Not Asked 757118 (0.32), Total 237641326

One of the first questions that can be asked is about the transition from one religious' system to another. Rémy Madinier, a French specialist in Islam in Southeast Asia, writes - in his 2012 book, *Indonesia, Between Muslim Democracy and Integral Islam: History of the Masjumi Party (1945-1960)* - that "the arrival of Islam in Indonesia still remains a very controversial issue. " The American historian Peter Sluglett,⁵⁴ a specialist in the Middle East, considers him to be thinking of the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia, and particularly in Indonesia, as a series of stretched and progressive developments, beginning with the arrival in the region of Muslim merchants in the eighth century, perhaps even earlier Arab and Chinese texts of the time attest to the presence of merchants and even Muslim communities in the ports of southern China in the ninth century, and Sriwijaya (the present Palembang in southern Sumatra) in the tenth century.

In Indonesia, the conversion of the population to Islam seems to be a process rather than an event. The rise of Islam in the archipelago began around the end of the 13th century. In his book *A History of Islamic Societies* (2002), the American historian Ira M. Lapidus tells us that in 1282, the king of Samudra on the north coast of Sumatra was still Hindu. The earliest known written testimony to the establishment of Islam in Indonesia is the tomb of Malik Al-Salih, king of Samudra who died in 1297.

When in 1292 Marco Polo, on his return from China by sea, stopped in the port of Perlak near Samudra, he saw the presence of a well-established Muslim community. The Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, who stopped at Samudra in 1346 during his trip to China, was received by prince, Al-Malik Al-Zahir, who was therefore a Muslim. Also, more characteristic of the Indonesian world is the Troloyo cemetery, near the capital site of the Hindu-Buddhist Kingdom of Majapahit in East Java, where Muslim tombs dating from 1376 to 1611 are found. Louis-Charles Damais of the French Far East School (EFEO) thinks that they are important figures, perhaps even members of the royal family. These tombs thus attest to the presence of Islam at the very heart of the most prestigious of the Javanese kingdoms of the Hindu-Buddhist period, from its peak in the fourteenth century.

⁵⁴ Peter Sluglett, "The Spread of Islam in Southeast Asia c.1275-c.1625," *Middle East Insight*, no. 55 (2012)

The origin of merchants who introduced Islam to Indonesia is uncertain. According to Sluglett, the various elements found in Aceh and other places in Sumatra suggest as origin of the first Muslim merchants who came to the archipelago, the Indian regions of Gujarat and Malabar. In the case of Java, Chinese have also played a role in the spread of Islam on the north coast of the island, where in the fifteenth century they formed important communities. The Javanese tradition associates Chinese with Islam, including Admiral Zheng He, who made a stopover on the island during his various expeditions from 1405 to 1433.

A fundamental factor in spreading through the Indonesian archipelago is the policy of Parameswara, a Buddhist prince from Palembang who founded Malacca around 1400. To cope with the ambitions of the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya, Malacca, put himself under the protection of Chinese empire. This protection enabled the city-state to prosper and become the largest port in Southeast Asia. Parameswara was pushing Muslim traders who controlled the network linking the Middle East and India on the one hand, to China and the archipelago on the other, to use its port. Malacca found itself at the head of a vast merchant network that covered the entire Indonesian archipelago. This network allows the diffusion of both Malay (the language of Parameswara, native of Sumatra) and Islam.

In the eighteenth century, excluding Bali, all the coastal states of the archipelago were led by a Muslim ruler. The spread of Islam across the archipelago had resulted in an ideological and cultural space that extends from Aceh to the northern tip of Sumatra to the west, north of the Maluku Mountains to the east, through the Borneo coastline, the north coast of Java and the south of Celebes. This is already a good part of present-day Indonesia. The vast majority of Indonesians, including Muslims, seem however to hold to their pluralistic state and nation. The score of the parties claiming Islam during the parliamentary elections stagnates around 15%. The bulk of the vote, around 70%, goes to so-called "nationalist" parties, a term that the Australian political scientist Michele Ford calls euphemism for "secular". But the construction of this pluralistic state and nation is not complete.

However, due to the rise of various religious sect, Indonesia has witnessed several religious and sectarian conflicts. In the mid-1990s, Indonesia, until then was presented

as a model of coexistence between religions, interdenominational and interethnic violence. The anti-Chinese riots that erupted in Medan in 1994 reproduce in multiple locations in Java the following year. In 1996, the incidents took a distinctly anti-Christian turn with the clashes in Situbundo (East Java) during which 24 churches and Christian schools were destroyed in one day. In December, riots broke out in Tasikmalaya (West Java): several Buddhist churches and temples were ransacked. In 1996 alone, 71 places of Christian worship sites were destroyed, burned or damaged. This type of incident multiplied during the following years: 92 in 1997 and 134 in 1998, the year of the fall of Suharto⁵⁵. This first wave of interfaith violence culminated in the Moluccas, where a real civil war between Christians and Muslims caused nearly 5,000 deaths and caused the displacement of about half a million refugees between 1999 and 2002. This same year Indonesia became the target of international terrorism on a large scale. One year and one day after September 11, 2001, the first bombing in Bali killed nearly 200 people.

The above argument does not intend or support that sectarian and religious conflict started in Indonesia as a consequence of the foreign policy objective of Iran and Saudi Arabia, but many literatures have praised Indonesia for its religious tolerance in the past, but one can argue that the growing number of religious activities and other economic and socio-political factor are responsible for these changes. This is further discussed in the last chapter of the thesis.

⁵⁵ SIDEL John T., *Riots, pogroms, jihad: Religious violence in Indonesia*, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007)

CHAPTER 2: SAUDI ARABIA'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN INDONESIA

This chapter discusses in detail the history of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. The main determinants discussed in this chapter are both economical and religious. The economical determinants focus mainly on the cheap labor Saudi Arabia finds in Indonesia especially in relations with female migrant workers, the chapter also discusses the history of these migrant workers. The religious aspect of the determinants focuses more on the main research question.

2.1. History of Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy in Indonesia

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are the diplomatic relations established between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Indonesia. These relations are particularly noteworthy because Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam, and Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world; both are Muslim majority countries. The economic and trade relations are also particularly important, especially in the oil (energy) sector and human resources (migrant workers) sectors. Saudi Arabia has an embassy in Jakarta, while Indonesia has an embassy in Riyadh and a consulate in Jeddah. Both countries are members of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the G-20.

The history of the influence of the Arabian Peninsula in Indonesia is old: We could go back much further but one significant date is 1803 when three Indonesian pilgrims inspired by the conquest of Mecca by the Wahhabis, undertook some steps to transform the Minangkabau society in west Sumatra. In 1912 Muhammadiyah was created in Indonesia by some Indonesian religious leaders. In response to this, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was created in 1926. The founders of the NU saw Muhammadiyah as a Wahhabi enterprise. Today, the NU is the most determined organization to fight Wahhabism in Indonesia. The Front Pembela Islam (FPI), the most vocal Islamic movement in the country, which is discussed in the case studies, is also worth mentioning; it is sometimes considered Wahhabi because of the proximity of its founder, Habib Rizieq,

with Riyadh. However, this organization remains unrepresentative with "only" 200,000 members.

It should be kept in mind that a very large majority of Indonesian Muslims are attached to "Pancasila", the five great founding principles of the Indonesian state. The first of these principles is that Islam is not the foundation of independent Indonesia, even if this religion is the majority. The fifth concerns the belief in one God: it might seem paradoxical, but this principle is supposed to allow Christians to pray to God according to Jesus, to Muslims according to Muhammad, to Buddhists according to Buddha, etc. Indonesia especially satisfies the central principle of Islam, which is Tawhid, namely the very foundation of monotheism in Islam.

It is in order to counter the potential effects of the Iranian revolution (1979) and while trying to establish its economic interests that Saudi Arabia has set up and financed several organizations in the archipelago (teaching Arabic, Salafist doctrine, etc.) since early 1980s.

The beautiful story of an overwhelming and tolerant Muslim majority Indonesia has been in question for several years. Remember that in fact, inter-religious marriages are disputed. The Gulf monarchy, including Saudi Arabia, has invested in Indonesia, as elsewhere by transforming part of the cultural landscape of a multi-religious archipelago, whose practice of the inhabitants is very strongly imbued with local rites.

From 1885, Snouck Hurgronje, during his visit to Mecca, already noted the presence of a Jawah community consisting of 8 to 10,000 emigrants from the Dutch East Indies, sixth of the total population of the city which was then only 50 to 60.000 inhabitants.⁵⁶ This thriving community that had maintained links with its community of origin traded, studied and organized the recruitment and conveyance of their compatriots. The report on the pilgrimage of 1913-1914⁵⁷ emanating from the consul, counted several types of migrants, while claiming that the main reason of the development of this community of Insulinde in Mecca resided in the attraction exercised by the Holy Land of believers. This is how some, like Hadji Abdul Karim, head of Kampung Jawah in the Malaysian

⁵⁶ Snouck Hurgronje, C, *Het Mekaansche Feest*. PhD Dissertation, University of Leiden, (1880)

⁵⁷ Laffan, M, *Islamic nationhood and colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds*, (2003)

state of Selangor,⁵⁸ and about a hundred Indo-Dutch studied a few years in Saudi Arabia following the pilgrimage. Or that others stayed there for a few years so that their children could continue to study theology there. Likewise, elderly pilgrims frequently settled in Mecca for the rest of their lives, others who have also simply joined members of their family already settled. The report on the pilgrimage of 1913-1914 mentions even a few wealthy and idle youths spent a few years of fun in Mecca.⁵⁹ This first category of Jawah migrants lived from funds sent from their country of origin.

The second category, less numerous, lived on commerce. Among them, three quarters of the 200 sheikhs who managed the pilgrims from India Dutch, and a very small number of people owning a shop or exercising manual work. One of the main lucrative activities for those who had to find their livelihood on the spot was to make clothes from pilgrimage for newcomers. The Jawah community of Mecca counted so in 1913, seven shops selling pilgrim outfits, 17 seamstresses and 1 tailor selling at home, and 17 street vendors wearing ritual clothes. In addition to this, the city had 23 daily tailors, 13 goldsmiths and 12 stalls. If we report the number of shops to the size of the Jawah community, the proportion of people making their living in Mecca remained weak. But the consul specifies that 25 years earlier, around 1890, there was only one Indo-Dutch, originally from the province of Aceh who worked as a salesman in a local shop. He adds even that the hard work of the building did not suit his compatriots, too sensitive to sun and heat and that, unlike Indians, Indo-Dutch did not engage in wholesale trade. Simply because the trip was not undertaken for strictly profit-oriented purposes, but mainly to perform the hajj and to learn. Important mention, which should be completed in stating that this education acquired at a high price abroad, in a place as renowned as Mecca, was the pledge of great prestige - which accompanied material benefits - once back home. The report on the pilgrimage of 1913-1914, however, suggests that the reputation of Al-Azhar University in Cairo began to shade Mecca, and mentions 25 students registered in Al-Alzâr, including 22 who would have initially opted for Mecca. Since the passage of Snouck Hurgronje and the few observations made on the Jawah

⁵⁸ Benda, H, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the foundations of Dutch Islamic policy in Indonesia," In *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Journal Articles of Harry J. Benda*, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, (1972):117

⁵⁹ Laffan, M, *The makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the narration of a Sufi past*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011)

community of Mecca, no study has been devoted to it. These Overseas Indonesians therefore remain very poorly known, but it seems that they occupy sometimes, even today, high social positions in Jeddah and are not accultured. At the time, these extensions of stay or these facilities of Malay, registered by the Netherlands Indies Consulate or Malaysian colonial officers to write the annual report of the pilgrimage, were all easier because no restrictive law on immigration came to slow down these movements. But since the end of the Second World War, the length of stay has drastically decreased to four or even two weeks of travel organized without the possibility of extension or installation. Still, a long time perceived as the cradle of Islam and a place of obligatory pilgrimage, mostly male. In present days, the Gulf countries, and particularly Saudi Arabia, have a strong attraction for young Indonesians, both men and women, often low-skilled and of rural origin, who wish to combine pilgrimage and the possibility of working for a salary higher than those offered at home - a housekeeper earns about 120.000 rupiah, housed, in the Indonesian capital, about 300 F monthly - and half as much province, while Indonesian and Filipino domestics receive 350 dollars per month (about 1,800 F) in Saudi Arabia.⁶⁰

This choice of destination is relatively easy, as long as links political, economic and cultural relations between the Malay world and the Middle East exist long time. On the economic front, the two most important facts are: the investments of the Gulf States in South-East Asia and, on the other hand, large-scale expatriation of an entire South-East Asian workforce in the Arabian Peninsula. This region has become an important and coveted destination during the 1980s.

After the oil boom, the countries of the peninsula minimized their dependence on non-Islamic countries, and therefore decided to use more in addition to Muslims, while wary of the potential for political unrest or religious of the Arabs. Moreover, in 1980, a fatwa proscribed the female work of local. Saudi Arabia was starting to look for its manpower priority in Asia, Pakistan and India, and the preference quickly immigrants from Southeast Asia, Buddhists from Thailand, Christians from the Philippines and especially Muslims from Indonesia who are particularly appreciated for their "humility and patience ". Thus, Southeast Asia has become the privileged reservoir of emigration to

⁶⁰ Ricklefs M, *Polarizing Javanese society: Islamic and other visions, c. 1830-1930*, (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007)

the Gulf countries, with "turnkey contracts" being the key element of the growth of Asian immigration in this region for ten years. In the same years 1980, Indonesia, which seeks to increase its non-oil resources, wants to promote its exports of labor. But Indonesians, arrived late on the labor market - already in recession - from these countries, could not compete with other who already established migrant populations. The Indonesian migration has never taken the proportion of Pakistani migration, or Sri Lankan, or Filipino. One niche: the jobs of servants and maids for which the demand is all stronger because India prohibits the sending of women workers to Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan allows it only if they are accompanied by their husbands and the Philippines only let them work in the royal family. Since 1974, the Saudi authorities have refrained from publishing any statistics on the number of foreigners for fear of rising xenophobia among its population. However, we know that Indonesian emigration has not stopped to increase after 1983, when the Saudi government put a brake on immigration. 99.8% of Indonesian immigrants leaving for the Middle East arrive in Saudi Arabia. And it's no wonder that 72.5% of Indonesian workers in this country are women (Diederich, 1995). At this stage of this thesis, it is not a question of making an exhaustive assessment of Indonesian emigration to Saudi Arabia, but rather to highlight between pilgrimage and labor migration and how this contributes to the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia. This is how migrations Indonesia workers shed light on a little-known aspect of relations between the Middle East and Indonesia, which is reminiscent of the diplomatic relations maintained between these two regions in the colonial era. On one hand, the consuls of old had to help their often abused citizens while making sure not to offend local authorities, and today, as the Indonesian press reveals sporadically the tensions that are many women emigrants, shared between unemployment and abuse still too often inflicted on migrant workers in this part of the world - between January 1984 and February 1986, nearly 3,600 migrants have lodged a complaint to their embassy for non-payment, confiscation of passports, abusive exploitation, beatings and sometimes rapes⁶¹ - the Indonesian authorities, yielding to Saudi pressure, ask the immigrants to not publicly express their eventual misadventures. Indonesia, for the sake of maintaining good diplomatic relations, other, its economic

⁶¹ Cremer G, "Deployment of Indonesian Migrants in the Middle East: Present Situation and Prospects," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* no. 24(3), (1988): 73-86.

dependence on Saudi oil imports, can not effectively protect its immigrant workers. Some voice, including those of the members of the Muhammadiyah Muslim Association, for example, of an Indonesian ambassador stationed in Saudi Arabia expressly wanted to stop this female migration.⁶²

2.2. Determinants and Motives of Saudi Arabia's Foreign Policy in Indonesia

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives in Indonesia are based on some interests. They are multiple. Economic first because it must be remembered that the pilgrimage is the second source of income for Saudi Arabia and, obviously, and as the largest Muslim country in the World, Indonesia sharpens the interest of the Saudis. It should also be noted that nearly 1.5 million Indonesians work in Saudi Arabia as of 2014.

Recently King Salman made an exceptional visit (the first of such magnitude in 47 years) confirming the weight that Saudi Arabia intends to have on this country. Under criticism for its proven propagation of a particularly intolerant Islam, Saudi Arabia multiplies the diplomatic steps aimed as much as to mark its goals on the Muslim world in order to perpetuate its regional domination (rapprochement with Israel, isolation of Qatar, struggle of domination against Iran, war in Yemen, etc.). In this context, a rapprochement with a rather progressive image of Indonesia seems highly strategic beyond this simple defense of economic interests. Here is what the Saudi Prince said during his visit: "The challenges that the Muslim community and the world in general are facing, such as terrorism and the conflict of civilizations and the lack of respect for the sovereignty of the people and nations require us to unite to fight against it." The 11 agreements signed between the two parties during this visit concerned mainly economic issues.⁶³

The visit was also a success for the Indonesian president at the international level: "This geopolitical issue should play in favor of Indonesia, which Saudi Arabia sees as an intermediary between the two countries. Iran has already agreed to a range of

⁶² Cited Finfin. Aswatini Raharto, "Indonesian Female Labour Migrants: Experiences Working Overseas (A Case Study Among Returned Migrants in West Java)," *Research Center for Population, Indonesian Institute of Science*, Jakarta, (2002): 16

⁶³ "Middle East Eye" "Indonesia and Saudi Arabia sign deals as king starts landmark visit," *Middle East Eye*, (2017), Last retrieved: February 11, 2019, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/indonesia-and-saudi-arabia-sign-deals-king-starts-landmark-visit>

cooperation with Indonesia, now Saudi Arabia wants guarantees that Indonesia remains on its side," said Zuhairi Misrawi (observer of the political life of the M-O).

We must go back. In the 1980s, some Indonesian students received scholarships to complete their teaching in Saudi Arabia, and some of them went on to Afghanistan for practical purposes. They found themselves in the region of Kunar, an isolated region under Saudi domination. It is these Indonesians who have gone through the Saudi literalist teaching and the Afghan armed struggle who, on their return to the country, gave their seat to the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, an organization whose goal is the dawah (proselytism) in view of promotion and implementation of Sharia law. Their ultra-conservative positions and their targets are classic for such a movement: the corruption of the government, the Javanese mysticism and the other religions in general, the Muslim liberalism and the challenge of a certain economic domination of the Chinese and the case of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, a.k.a Ahok, former governor of Jakarta, imprisoned for blasphemy. Obviously, they are radically anti-Christian and anti-Amadhis (the amadhis are a Muslim sect judged heretical and apostate by the rest of the Muslims).⁶⁴

But on one hand, this type of movement remains minor, on the other hand, the religious competition rages and in September 2014, the Council of the Ulama of Aceh condemned Salafism as deviant. Clashes occurred several times. Salafists linked to centers in Yemen are particularly in the spotlight and initiatives funded by funds of Saudi and Qatari origin are considered with suspicion. It is difficult to assess what factor, between incompetence and relative complicity of the authorities, leads to the existence of such movement. The latter explains that Islamists remain nevertheless relatively spared by the repression.

I have in the first part of this thesis, evoked the preponderant role of the education lever in the Saudi influence. The aftermath of the May 2017 anti-Christian attacks of which we spoke earlier, more broadly⁶⁵ demonstrates that the University is one of those used

⁶⁴ Nourhaidi Hasan, "Madrasas salafistes de l'Archipel," *CAIRN.INFO*, Last retrieved: February 11, 2019, <https://www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-de-l-orient-2008-4-page-15.htm>

⁶⁵ "VOA" "Saudi Arabia Uses University Scholarships to Influence Indonesian," *VOA*, Last retrieved: January 11, 2019
[http://www.voaspecialenglish.cn/2017/01/2017-01-30-\[Education-Report\]-Saudi-Arabia-Uses-University-Scholarships-to-Influence-Indonesians.htm](http://www.voaspecialenglish.cn/2017/01/2017-01-30-[Education-Report]-Saudi-Arabia-Uses-University-Scholarships-to-Influence-Indonesians.htm)

by Islamists to rake broadly. The Indonesian police raided the University of Riau and found explosives, 4 bombs similar to those used in Surabaya, grenades and weapons. One of the arrested suspects was Muhammad Nur Zamzam, who was also enlisted with two other suspected individuals.⁶⁶

Fortunately, there is now a de-radicalization school in Indonesia founded in 2015 that rehabilitates children who have been involved in terrorist activities. A short, interesting report about these very young children, who have been brainwashed and to whom this school intends to apply a brainwashing method has consistently been realized. The professor himself was once convicted of terrorism and involved in the Islamist movement of Jemaah Islamiyah which was, among others, behind the attacks in Bali (2002 and 2005) attacks. This man himself indoctrinated children to become terrorists when he was in the organization. According to him, 300 children are involved in terrorist activities throughout Indonesia.

As I have said, it is necessary to distinguish between the Salafist Quietists, whose growing tendency is to pour into politics, and Jihadist Salafism Minority. Even though both pose a problem for Indonesian authorities.

One of the means used by the Salafists, who are wary of the Indonesian authorities, is radio to achieve some of the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia in Indonesia. Numerous stations have been created or brought closer to this movement originating from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Salafists are mostly quietists, but some advocate the armed struggle. I have previously mentioned the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the largest Islamic organization in the country. The latter has been actively fighting for several years against this means of promoting Salafism particularly used in Indonesia (rather than door to door). In an article in the Jakarta Post of 2016, experts estimated about a hundred of these radios, with wide dissemination means throughout the country. The scholar and specialist of Salafism Ayang Utriza Yakin (Syarif Hidayatullah of the State Islamic University (UIN)) who analyzed the sermons of the most popular of them (Radio Rodja) concluded that the Islamic teachings of these made the promotion of

⁶⁶ Rizal Harahap, "Explosive Material, Weapons Seized at Riau University," The Jakarta Post, Last retrieved: January 15, 2019, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/06/03/explosive-material-weapons-seized-at-riau-university.html>

intolerance and rejection of modernity. A very detailed study of this phenomenon was made in 2016 that explains the central purpose of these media, the dawah. They are parts of a challenge to religious authority with many subdivisions, all claim to represent "true Salafism" (a constant in Islam). Several notable features are present such as the absence of commercial breaks, music, entertainment programs. They are devoted exclusively to the recitation of the Qur'an donated rhythmically, hadiths and prayers loop. The only entertainment "is the" daurah broadcasts, "a sort of workshop where Middle Eastern preachers are sometimes invited for readings, which usually end up on widely distributed CDs and podcasts.

One of the reasons explaining the use of the radio is the fatwas pronounced in the Middle East by the Salafist Ulema in this respect: the use of the radio is allowed, provided that nothing of haram (prohibited by Islam) be broadcast. This limits their use to reading the Quran, hadiths and some important news about Islam. The same goes for television but the ulamas are much more reluctant about it because people could hear music or, even worse, see presenters. They make a clear difference between Salafist radios and "corrupt radios" on one hand.

Salafism has thus gained momentum over the past three decades. For Din Wahid (of UIN), the center of the Salafist scene in Batam (an Indonesian island not far from Singapore) is Hang Radio. Originally a radio broadcasting music, its owner, a businessman (Zein Alatas), has converted himself. In 2016, this radio (now heard in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia) was involved in a scandal: Two men became radicalized and were preparing to leave for Syria to join the ISIS. Once arrested, they explained that listening to Hang Radio would have radicalized them. The radio has been summoned to stop broadcasting extremist preaching and the problem seems settled but until when? One thing is certain, this Salafist influence tends to grow which has been a direct result of one of the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia, which is to disseminate its ideology.

As mentioned before, special attention is given to the case of Ahok, a former governor of Jakarta. In 2016, the life of this Christian of Chinese origin rocked: accused of blasphemy for saying that "the interpretation, by some theologians, a verse of the Qur'an that a Muslim should elect only a Muslim leader, was wrong. Massive demonstrations

took place in the capital, with Ahok supporters on one side and fanatics on the other feeling insulted. At his trial, the five judges of the court largely exceeded the prosecutor's demands for a suspended sentence, with a two-year probation. It is Islamist circles that have exploited the street to put pressure on justice. Ahok took 2 years firm and incarcerated from the verdict pronounced. The Islamists would have wished 5 years.

On the front line of this anti-Ahok front, there was the FPI already mentioned here, which organized several events bringing together 200 to 700 000 people, the most important events since the fall of Suharto. Although Indonesia remains an open country, attempts to reverse women's rights are on the rise. In the same way abortion remains prohibited and domestic violence hardly recognized by justice.

The NU is availing itself of a tolerant, peaceful and hostile Indonesian Islam, and it is true that it is this Islam that is widely practiced in secular Indonesia. However, there is a growing crack within this Indonesian national consensus. The case of Governor Ahok imprisoned for blasphemy and massive mobilization of radicals showed that times had changed. One of the paradoxes of Indonesia is that when Suharto was in power and held the media in full, he valued a liberal Islam such as that of the NU and that since its fall, radicals (especially influenced by Saudi rigorism- Yemeni) were able to take flight. By managing social issues- and this is often the way these Islamists act, everywhere, and by using the media such as radio, their influence has been able to grow. This is the irony of the fate of a central power that has become democratized and, in doing so, has opened the door to fundamentalists who have been able to sow their seeds through a determined proselytism. A single survey that summarizes everything: 87% of respondents say they want to keep the rules of cohabitation that found national unity but 58% believe that a non-Muslim cannot lead Muslims. From there, one can conclude that the end results of one of the objectives of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has caused religious problems and division among Indonesian society.

To go to the Holy Land, to embrace the "black stone" (hajar aswad), located in the Ka'ba, drinking water from the Zamzam spring are the dearest wishes of every Muslim. Even though, from the XVI-XVIIIC centuries, various sources mention that Sumatranese and Javanese pilgrims go to Mecca, it was only a tiny minority of scholars or princes. It is with the improvement of maritime transport, that the pilgrimage started to take off.

The number of pilgrims, however, has fluctuated over the years: it slowly increased around 1878, then became strongly increased after 1910, it experienced a first peak of intensity after the First World War and even an absolute record in the years 1926-1927 with 52,412 participants. More still noticeable, the contingent of pilgrims from the Netherlands Indies accounted for almost half (42% to 49%) of the total number of hadji in 1914- when the war brakes pilgrims from around the Mediterranean- 1921, 1924, 1927, 1928 and 1931.⁶⁷

Departures remained numerous until 1932, when the crisis world economic crisis dramatically reduced the number of pilgrims. They resumed in 1937 to slow down seriously during the Second World War. The Japanese occupation and the Indonesian revolution put an end to pilgrimage in 1949. The pilgrimage to Mecca has really taken off in India Dutch during the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1850, only 71 pilgrims went to the Holy Land, while five years later they were already 1688. The "Fashion" was launched since in 1870, 3258 people were able to perform their religious duty on the land of the Prophet.⁶⁸ So much so that the Government of the Netherlands Indies decided, in 1872, to open a consulate in Jeddah.⁶⁹ It should be noted that the emergence of an Islam bearing an anticolonial character was causing trouble for the Dutch in rebellion in Java and Sumatra. In 1825, to limit departures, the Government of the Netherlands Indies imposed that the future pilgrim should equip himself with a compulsory passport costing the sum, important for the time, 110 florins. The pilgrimage was therefore more and more considered a threat to the still precarious political stability of the Indies Netherlands. And all the same, that the pilgrims enjoyed on their return of a very great prestige and had a lot of influence on the social life. The orientalist Bousquet, quoting the Indo-Dutch Government adviser for Muslim affairs Snouck Hurgronje, however, denied the threat: "Just as naive as the opinion of the hajjis that their journey into Arabia erases their sins, and the opinion of some European circles according to who these natives - piled up like herrings during their crossing for Jeddah and back, dragged to Arabia by compact masses from one sanctuary to another, thanks to the care of an interested guide, and stay a few weeks in the middle of agitated crowds

⁶⁷ Ricklefs M, *Polarizing Javanese society: Islamic and other visions, c. 1830-1930*, 34

⁶⁸ Ricklefs M, *Polarizing Javanese society: Islamic and other visions, c. 1830-1930*, 134

⁶⁹ Ricklefs M, 36

they do not understand the language - could, having been recognized spiritual, to return home as wild fanatics. In fact, the spiritual influence of the pilgrimages on the mass is very weak, if not nothing. At most the pilgrim will have been able to get an idea of the importance and the variety of peoples who share his faith".⁷⁰ As it may be, the government of Batavia, like that of The Hague feared that pilgrims might be trained by their fellow believers against the Dutch authorities during their stay in the Hejaz. The mission of the consulate was therefore eminently political: it was to monitor the pilgrims and to investigate possible suspects- returning pilgrims or Arab nationals preparing to smuggle to the Dutch East Indies subversive messages and even weapons. At the same time, the consulate also had the task, which was both delicate and difficult, to protect its pilgrims from all sorts of dangers, in particular slavery, looting, scams of all kinds and epidemics. Even though the Qur'an describes the postage of a slave as an action noble in honor of Allah, slavery is not explicitly condemned by the Prophet. As a result, it was a common practice in the Ottoman Empire and especially in the province of Hedjaz, near Mecca and Medina, where slaves were publicly auctioned. Jeddah, throughout the Nineteenth century, was even the largest slave market of the Hedjaz.⁷¹

The central government of Constantinople which, under the pressure of European powers- tried to take measures against the import and the public sale of slaves, quickly ran up against the discontent of the authorities locals and merchants of the Hedjaz who are heavily involved in this lucrative and thereby outraged by this serious violation of "local traditions". In fear of a rebellion, Constantinople had to quickly specify that it was not the system slavery that was involved, but only his business, and was obliged to admit that every Muslim had the right to own property slaves. In 1857, the slave trade was abolished throughout the Ottoman Empire, except the Hedjaz. Since it was tolerated, the importation and sale continued normally throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Only change, the sale of the "merchandise" was done secretly and no longer in the public square. Finally, let us remember that it was not until 1962 to see officially slavery was abolished in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Netherlands Indian Consulate in Jeddah was opened, faced with the fact that some of its subjects were held in slavery. The slave depot was even located in front of the consulate, and the

⁷⁰ Ricklefs M, 35

⁷¹ Laffan, M, *The makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the narration of a Sufi past*, 118

consul could attend the daily walk of men chained by groups of twelve in the streets of the city (BZ Archief, file n ° 74, Jeddah 15/02/1875).

The pilgrimage was indeed organized by a kind of broker (hadji sheikh) who took care of food, housing and paperwork during the travel from Java to Jeddah. This sheikh is himself headed by a chief sheikh (Sheifch-al-Masjaich) whose function- deemed superfluous- was much criticized by the consuls and to whom he owed an absolute obedience. Both charges were from \$ 500 to \$ 700 for a simple sheikh and from \$ 6,000 to \$ 10,000 for a chief sheikh (De Indische Gids, 1897: 390). On arrival at the destination, the pilgrims were taken care of by a sheikh from Mecca or a representative of the mighty guild of guides (mutawwif, dalil), who accompanied them in all their movements in the Holy Places. During all the ceremonies of the little (umra) and the great pilgrimage (hajj), the mutawwif indicated to the pilgrims the gestures to be made, the formulas to be pronounced and encouraged the indispensable alms. These brokers operating in Java ports but also in Singapore were not necessarily Arab; these were often Indonesians who had already pilgrimage or having worked in Mecca. Vredembregt (1962) notes that in 1880 the exploitation of pilgrims from the Dutch Indies was in the hands of 180 sheikhs, rising to around 400 in 1914. The Malaysian Haji Abdul Majid who completed the Trip in the 1925 mentioned 600 to 700 Sheikhs (1926: 270). They also had relationships with religious leaders (kyai), or ulamas teacher in pesantren (Quranic secondary school) of Insulinde, in charge of finding candidates for the pilgrimage for a premium. And some companies shipping masters or boat captains also paid a premium to the broker each ticket sold to a pilgrim. The latter, because of these various intermediaries, profits from all sides had to pay exorbitant amounts to brokers.

Oil has made Saudi Arabia a rich country and Indonesia a country with a high rate of economic growth. This prosperity has considerably and favorably modified the conditions of the pilgrimage. Ongoing interventions by Indonesian and Saudi governments (especially Ibn Saud and his successors) have greatly improved the conditions of transport, housing, hygiene, etc. In order to give as much brilliance as possible to the pilgrimage. In 1965, the number of pilgrims Indonesians, still subject to the quota, was 15.000. In 1980, 73 000 and ten years later, 91,000 Indonesians made the trip to Mecca by plane. The pilgrimage is now strictly orchestrated by the government and pilgrims receive technical and medical information as well as solid religious

preparation. It should be noted that this increase in the number of "overseas" pilgrims (overseas pilgrims) is not unique to Indonesia but is part of a moving world. While the total number of pilgrims did not exceed 100,000 before the World War II, it rose to more than 300,000 in the 1980s, of which 15.2% of Indonesians, 7.4% of Malaysians and 10% of Indians.⁷²

Three factors contributed to the steady increase of the faith in the holy places: the worldwide growth of the Muslim population, the emergence of middle classes increasingly affluent and the development of air transport and charter flights. The hajj candidate must first obtain a medical certificate and then pay the price of the trip and the expenses of stay in one of the very numerous agencies of specialized travel. The current price of the pilgrimage, whose marketing is a state monopoly, reaches about seven million rupiah (about 16 000 F), the sum that it is almost necessary to multiply by two, taking into long festivities that precede and follow the event. However, the choice exists between a so-called economy trip, and a "VIP" trip, costing one and a half times more the pilgrim to stay in Saudi Arabia in a certified hotel, an air-conditioned bus transportation and return flight on a scheduled airline. Then, equipped with his medical certificate and bill, he (haji) goes to a regional office of the Hajj, which depends both on the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and who will issue his travel permit, will provide him with the first necessary information and give him the guide of the pilgrim. He will then have to spend the two preceding nights departure to a reception center of the cities of embarkation (Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan or Ujung Pandang), where he will undergo a new medical check, and will receive a detailed program (brochures, conferences and even practical work) as well as its pilgrim holding (pakaian ihram). Some past Indonesian literature on haj (Hamka, 1985; Zaini 1989) suggested that a number of inconveniences still remained: the difficulty in performing ritual ablutions and praying on the seats of the plane, the impossibility of sleeping during the flight due to speeches and conferences, formalities in customs authorities, the difficulty of identifying their baggage because of their uniformity recommended by the Indonesian authorities, the small size of the rooms, the water cuts. To these risks are added the difficulties of adaptation of the pilgrims of rural origin who prefer to pile up

⁷² McDonnell, Byrne, "The Conduct of the Hajj from Malaysia and Its Socio-economic Impact: A Descriptive and Analytical Study," *Columbia University*, (1990): 112

on the ground floor and in the hallways of residences rather than in their room, or the urban people who forget their religious duty in favor of the shopping and even those who lose the group causing many delays, as well than the problem of food. However, the speed of travel and the best health conditions mean that travel now has a much lower impact on the health of pilgrims. The death rate decreased from 10% in the 1920s to 1.5% in the 1980.⁷³ That same year, 20 pilgrims disappeared however, despite strict supervision. These disappearances suggest that it may be a form of illegal migration. As the borders of Saudi Arabia are in fact highly controlled, only one very few people are able to migrate illegally, thanks to obtaining a visa of pilgrim or by parallel routes, working on the spot to finance the trip.

As early as 1977, a coordinating commission was set up to deal with question of illegal workers. And the Saudi press like that of the Gulf regularly announces expulsions of illegal Asian workers. But it is not hardly possible to develop the question, for lack of precise information. It is by against certain, that exists in Mecca a Malay community installed long dated. It must be remembered that at the beginning of the twentieth century travel and pilgrimage easily lasted six months and can be considered as a migration in itself. It should also be noted that the pilgrimage is at the origin of a some "Arabomania" already old. Not only because this region is the cradle of Islam, but also because of the economic importance of the hajj, then the riches sprung from the desert, have long been the source of many dreams.

2.3. Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has holistically studied the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia in Indonesia. The chapter discussed the history of most of the phenomenons and the research questions of this thesis. From this analysis in this chapter, we can see that the main determinants of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy in Indonesia is based on religion but the motive they pursue is different. The motives discussed thouroughly includes, religious motives, economic motives, cheap labor, and hegemony power (that is support from Indonesia).

⁷³ Van Dijk, *Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013): 55

Another common point, I want to postulate here in the conclusion is, the presence of intermediaries in the recruitment of pilgrims as immigrants. Even if the recruitment of migrant postulants in a very formal way in Jakarta agencies, however, brokers arrive at fully playwith their lucrative role as intermediaries and touts. They walk the customers, inform them and direct them by means of finances to Jakarta. To note that the costs are two to three times higher for men than for women whose travel expenses are borne by the employer. Anyway, the middleman often manages to advance the cost of the trip to Jakarta, as well as accommodation costs in the capital where the candidate will have to follow a training course; it will pay off very widely, applying interest rates often around 200%. This system will continue as long as migrants linked by village dependency relationships with village chiefs or religious leaders always prefer to rely on one of their own and on unofficial networks, rather than to go through administrations whose existence they do not always know and that they consider too restrictive.

CHAPTER 3: IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN INDONESIA

3.1. History of Iran's Foreign Policy in Indonesia

Iran is also a state whose foreign policy has been transformed by an Islamic revolution, which is essentially pan-Islamic and hostile to any foreign influence. In 1979, the street took up slogans such as "neither East nor West, Islamic Republic" (na sharqi na gharbi, jomhuri-e eslâmi). Today, the regional balance has changed since the renaissance of Iran as a player in international relations, a consequence of the recognition of the Islamic Republic by Barack Obama on the occasion of the Persian New Year in March 2009, by the joint action concluded on July 14, 2015 or by the place acquired by Tehran in the settlement of the Syrian crisis. This Iranian renaissance redefined the regional balance of powers, especially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, but also the place of religious conflict between Sunnism and Shiism. In such a context, what place does the Shia factor occupy in the foreign policy of a country generating an Islamic revolution?

This part of the thesis, which cannot be exhaustive about the issue and the complexity of Shiite networks, demonstrates that the revolutionary Iran's foreign policy, which values a Shiite identity inherited from history, relies on a Shia network in the Middle East. Although Iran's foreign policy is not exclusively Shiite, the new regional geopolitical balance exacerbates its denominational character.

The history of Shiism is closely linked to that of Iran. The branch of Shia Islam in Iran refers more specifically to "Twelver Shiism",⁷⁴ which refers to the number of revered Imams (Twelve), through whom the history of truth is revealed or "Imamite Shiism" according to the theory of the imamate to which it corresponds. Ali is the first of the Twelve Imams that the Shiites recognize, giving him a special spiritual importance. The Shiites, etymologically, are the followers of Ali, cousin and husband of the daughter of

⁷⁴ While Twelver Shi'ism represents about 80% of Shi'ites, Shi'ism includes other branches: zaydies, present in Yemen, they recognize only five imams; the Ismailis, present in Syria, who recognize only seven imams; the Druze, a branch of Ismailism under the Fatimids (mainly found in Lebanon where they make up about 10% of the population) and Syria; the Alawites, long ostracized minority and composing 10% of the population of Syria, the eleventh Imam is considered by them as the ultimate descendant of the Prophet; The Alevis, faithful to a heterodox and syncretic cult, are especially present in Turkey (20 million individuals).

Muhammad, Fatima, and those who accompany him. Another important milestone in Shiism is the death - or rather the martyrdom in the Shiite tradition - of Husayn during the Battle of Karbala in 680, which happened when Husayn's troops opposed and refused to pledge allegiance to the new caliph, of the Umayyad army. This battle and the death of Imam Husayn are commemorated annually in Ashura on the 10th day of the month of Muharram, year 61 AH. The other key dogma of the Shiite tradition is the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi ("the Mahdi"), who went into occultation at the death of his father in 874 when he was a young boy. The Shiites therefore await the return of this Imam, the Parousia and the final revelation, unlike the Sunnis for whom the cycle of prophecy is closed.

Shiism became a state religion in Iran in 1501, when Shah Ismail I, the first Safavid ruler - a dynasty that reigned from 1501 to 1732 over a territory stretching from Anatolia to the west of present-day Afghanistan – which was imposed with the help of Arab clerics. If the Safavid period is a period of radiation for Shiite Islam, the clergy, used to territorialize the state is however subject to the latter. Even more than the presence of Shiite groups on the territory of Iran, the rapprochement of this branch of Islam with Persia takes place in that it is part of the continuity of the Iran. There is, indeed, a spiritual continuity from the beliefs of Zoroastrianism, eschatological religion devoted to a supreme god in which the spirits of good eventually triumph over those of evil.

The Shiite clergy, on which any new government must rely on, is more involved in politics from the nineteenth century and in favor of a doctrinal evolution favoring the production of Islamic law (ijtihad). Since the end of the nineteenth century, the ulamas in Iran are an autonomous social body and financially independent of the state, thanks in particular to the doctrine of imitation (taqlid), by which each faithful chooses a model (marja).⁷⁵

The doctrinal evolutions gradually elaborate a religious hierarchy and a relationship between believers and scholars, which leads to the concept of guidance (wilâya), theorized by Ruhollah Khomeini in 1970 and integrated into the Revolutionary

⁷⁵ See the evolution of the concept of marja'iyya C. Arminjon Hashem, *Shia and State: Clerics to the test of modernity*, CNRS Edition, Paris, 2013.

Constitution, that is to say that the supreme authority belongs to the most prominent religious juriconsult (faqih) and represents the missing imam. The Islamic revolution of 1979 marks the seizure of power by clerics. This power is institutionalized: article 110 of the Iranian constitution gives the Supreme Guide, elected by an assembly of eighty-six experts, themselves elected by universal suffrage, extensive powers: it defines the general policy of the country and supervises its good execution, disposes of the army or resolves the conflicts between the powers.⁷⁶ The Shiite clergy constitute a dense network, which is integrated into the economic or administrative spheres.

For the ideologues of the Islamic revolution, the export of the revolution is central. Directly or indirectly Iran intervenes in many countries (Lebanon, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Sudan, Indonesia, Western Sahara and Bosnia); more than a Shia space, the Islamic revolution must extend to the entire Muslim world.⁷⁷

In practice, it is the transnational networks of Shiite clerics in which were the first support for the export of the revolution in the Middle East.⁷⁸ At the time of the revolution, the priority of the Iranian government led by Mehdi Bazargan is not the export of the revolution but the consolidation of central power and the continuity of diplomatic relations. Two main networks were used: the clerics of the religious school of Najaf in Iraq, under the influence of the al-Da'wa party, which carries a political project for the entire Muslim world, and that of Hassan al-Shirazi who, in conflict with the Najaf school, set up in 1975 a religious school in the southern suburbs of Damascus, Sayyida Zaynab, which houses the mausoleum of Zeinab, the daughter of Mohammad and Wife of Ali.

Supporters of an armed struggle known as the "Shirazists" also wanted to overthrow the regimes that oppress the Shiites and were particularly active in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the months following the Islamic revolution.

⁷⁶ Mr. Potocki, *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, 1989*, (Paris:L'Harmattan, 2004)

⁷⁷ The Guardian of the Revolution journal, Payam-e Enqelab of April 1980, materializes this essence: "We will export our revolution throughout the world. As our revolution is Islamic, the struggle will continue until the call "There is no God but God" is taken up all over the globe. Quoted by A. Ostovar, *Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.

⁷⁸ L. Louër, *Shia and Politics in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Gulf Monarchies, Otherwise*, Paris, 2008 and L. Louër, *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008)

Today, one of the powerful vectors for exporting Iranian Shiism is Al-Mustafa University. Located in Qom, it trains thousands of foreign students and has a network in many countries. The Iranian revolution encourages Shiite minorities in the Middle East who are marginalized to demand more political rights. This is the case in Lebanon, where the militancy of Moussa al-Sadr brings out the Shiite minority as a political force. This Iranian Imam trained in Qom arrived in Lebanon in 1959 to lead the Shiite community of Tire. He is the originator of the creation in 1967 of an official body representing the Shiite community with the Lebanese State (the Higher Shiite Islamic Council) and in 1973 with the Movement of the Disinherited, which channels the Shia youth of Lebanon. A militia is created within the Movement: in 1978 was born AMAL (the acronym of Brigades of the Lebanese Resistance).

Iran is gradually supporting the struggle against Israel, taking advantage of the death of Moussa al-Sadr in 1978. Following Operation Peace in the Galilee, launched by Israel on 6 June 1982, Iran is participating in the development of an aggregating movement of various Shiite militias, Hezbollah, which had the support of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Between one thousand and two thousand Guardians of the Revolution are sent to the plain of Bekaa. The al-Quds Special Force of the Revolutionary Guards Army was created in 1982 to oversee volunteers wishing to fight in Lebanon - Qods means Jerusalem - and allows Iran to show support for a central cause for the Arab countries. Lebanon, where there is a strong Shi'ite community, of which it is possible to say, in spite of the absence of a census, that it forms from now on the largest denominational minority of the country, constitutes a key axis of the foreign policy of the Islamic republic. The first is to export the Islamic revolution, through Shiite networks - notably those of Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, then Dauphin of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and a pro-Iranian cleric Muhammad Husayn.

In attacking Israel, it is also a question of overcoming the cleavages linked to Shiism or Persian nationalism. This strategy materializes in renewed support for Hamas, as well as in more discreet support for the al-Sabirin movement. Iran's influence in Lebanon is, however, limited. While in Syria, Hezbollah fought for Iran alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad since spring 2013, illustrating notably at Qousseir, the links between

Hezbollah and the Supreme Leader have been flexible since the early 1990s: the Hezbollah is treated like other political forces in Lebanon.⁷⁹

Syria has been an important ally for Iran since the alliance of interests during the Iran-Iraq conflict (1980-1988). In 1982, Iran's ambassador to Damascus Ali-Akbar Mohtashamipour coordinated Iran's policy towards Lebanon and Israel. Since then, not only is Syria a gateway to the Middle East for Tehran, but it is also a place of pilgrimage for Iranian Shiites, including the Zeinab Mausoleum, located in the southern suburbs of Damascus. The development of economic and tourist activity around this pilgrimage site, also a gathering place for Hezbollah during the Syrian crisis, reflects the rich links between Iran and Syria.

In December 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan introduced in an interview for the Washington Post the concept of "Shia arc" as a geopolitical representation. It is a question of denouncing the risks of Shiite power in Iraq following the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein in April 2003 - the elections of January 30, 2005, materialize this new political balance, Nouri al-Maliki became the prime minister. However, Nouri al-Maliki, like his predecessor Ibrahim al-Jaafari, comes from the secular branch of the al-Da'wa party, which opposed to clerical authority and Iranian influence.

In addition, the Shiite movements in Iraq have become autonomous, like the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a party created in 1982 by Iran to federate the Iraqi opposition but which broke away from Iran by removing the revolutionary reference in its own name and then recognizing the guidance (*marja'iyya*) of Ali al-Sistani, the Ayatollah of Najaf, to the detriment of that of Ali Khamenei. This "Iraqization" of the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Assembly, Laurence Louër notes, is part of the pragmatic shift in Iranian foreign policy that began in the late 1980s: "alliances are based on tactical rather than ideological bases".⁸⁰ This independence, however, does not mean the end of the Iranian influence that supports all Shiite movements, can they be competitors?, like support for the movement of Moqtada al-Sadr whose militia "the

⁷⁹ Moreover, the Iranian influence in Lebanon is reduced, as demonstrated by the political balance: Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri was close to Saudi Arabia.

⁸⁰ L. Louër, "Shiism and politics in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Gulf monarchies," *Autrement*, (2008): 12

army of the Mahdi yet is in conflict with the militia of the Supreme Islamic Assembly, the Badr brigades controlled by the body of the Revolutionary Guards.

In addition, Iran has used the religious factor in its foreign policy by relying on various Shia networks. However, alliances are formed first according to the Iranian national interest and not to the benefit of Shiism. This is indeed the application of a pan-Islamic doctrine stemming from the revolution and in which the support on Shiite communities, main targets of the Iranian foreign policy to the detriment of alliance which would be more profitable in the region, is the key. Moreover, the evolution of the regional geopolitical balance reinforces the sectarian dimension of Iranian foreign policy, that is to say, linked to Shiite objectives, while the re-emergence of Iran supports a reading by the States of the region based on the denominational prism.

3.2. Determinants and Motives of Iran's Foreign Policy in Indonesia

The proximity of Iran and Shiism in history cannot be enough to conclude that Iran is the center of the Shia world. Indeed, among the spiritual leaders of Shiite Islam, marja or "grand ayatollah" (Ayatollah ol-Ozma) representing a model that every believer decides to follow, it is not the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, who is the most followed but Ali al-Sistani, the Najaf ayatollah in Iraq. Several features of the Supreme Iranian guide are holding back his hegemony. A first institutional limit is found in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 1979, which politicizes the religious through a two-round election of the Guide. In fact, most of the Great Ayatollahs of the day opposed the velayat-e faqih. In the second place, a limit concerns the very person of Ali Khamenei who, when he was elected in June 1989, is not a marja, a "model to imitate" but a religious of lower rank. Finally, and as a consequence of the above, in the theoretical diversity that animates the Shiite world, the Iranian Supreme Guide is assimilated to the Iranian national interests, preventing it from exercising a transnational power.

In fact, Arab countries criticized Iranian proselytism, which was particularly keen at the time of the Iranian revolution. The Shiites are assimilated as a fifth Iranian column and to counter this threat, the conservative regimes (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan), allow the rise of Sunni radical groups, of Salafist inspirations. For Olivier Roy, if "the maneuver

succeeds in isolating Iran, it sets up a whole radical device that will be found later in al-Qaeda networks".⁸¹ In the end, the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989 marks the end of the expansion of the Revolution, President Rafsanjani set up a more pragmatic policy that consists of both negotiating with Sunni groups and making Shiite groups stakeholders in the domestic politics of the states in which they operate, as opposed to an attachment to Iran.

Finally, not only did the Sunni Islamist movements quickly break away from Iran in the aftermath of the revolution, a breakthrough in the Iran-Iraq war that began in September 1980, but in addition, "the Iranian Islamic Revolution will shut itself in the ghetto of Shiite minorities, without becoming hegemonic within these communities".⁸² Today, it is the administration and the networks of the Supreme Guide, who are careful to preserve the revolutionary ideology.

The study of Iranian diplomatic practice proves that Iran does not operate a purely Shiite policy. The regime has thus developed close ties with atheist regimes such as China, North Korea or Venezuela. Iran's relations with Azerbaijan, 85% of which are Shiites, also bear witness to this. The Iranian policy towards Baku is quarrelsome: that it is about the energy and fishery resources of Caspian (in 2001, Iran ordered militarily, with a ship of the British Petroleum then on mission of Azeri warranted exploration, to leave an area of the Caspian Sea claimed by Tehran) or different morals, these arguments support the fact Iran is more involved in economic relations with Indonesia than disseminating Shiism. When the Eurovision Song Contest in Azerbaijan was organized in May 2012, Iranian officials denounced the perversion or homosexuality supported by the neighboring Shiite.

Finally, Iran supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that began in 1988. Recently, in December 2016, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Armenia to develop economic relations between the two countries. Yerevan and Tehran, which regularly express "the friendship that binds them", evoke the establishment of a communication corridor from Iran to the Black Sea. Relations between the two states

⁸¹ O. Roy, "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution in the Middle East," in S. Mervin, *The Shia Worlds and Iran*, (Kartala and IFPO, Paris, Beirut, 2007): 61

⁸² O. Roy, "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution in the Middle East," 64

could be strengthened, a free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union is being negotiated.

Similarly, Iran's support for the Houtis, the Zaydite tribe of Yemen, is extremely thin. This conflict is not part of an ideological relationship between Sunnis and Shiites. On the contrary, the prevailing tribal logics and related to the isolation of these populations, while the Saudi intervention of March 2015, conducted with the support of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council is mainly explained by the fear of an uprising within the conservative monarchy and social demands.

In fact, and as Afshon Ostovar notes, "most of Iran's relations are not based on ideological or religious considerations".⁸³ Iran's policy towards the Middle East is driven by a desire for regional balance; in counterbalance to the influence of Saudi Arabia, allied with the United States since the Quincy pact of 14 February 1945. In the Kingdom of Bahrain, an island connected to Saudi Arabia and an outlet for the Saudi, the Iranian influence is limited there. Following the "Arab Spring", the February-March 2011 demonstrations were suppressed thanks to Riyadh's intervention, without Iran interfering. While the presence of the US Fifth Fleet may explain this distance to a country conquered by the Safavids and considered as a province until recently by an Iranian nationalist fringe,⁸⁴ Tehran respects the sovereignty of this former British protectorate which became independent in 1971.

Iranian diplomacy is based on pragmatic alliances, without the Shia factor being constantly decisive: with Dubai, Qatar or Oman, or with Tajikistan, Indonesia and Christian Armenia.⁸⁵ Today, support for the loyalist forces in Syria is mainly due to the fear of a seizure of power by Saudi Arabia and its allies in Iraq.⁸⁶ This alliance sometimes faces conflicting interests. For example, while Iran supported a Shiite power in Iraq, Syria supported the idea of a government associating Sunni and Baathist elements.

⁸³ A. Ostovar, "Sectarian Dilemmas in Iranian Foreign Policy: When Strategy and Identity Politics Collide", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2016)

⁸⁴ B. Hourcade, *Geopolitics of Iran*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2016):16

⁸⁵ The geopolitical environment of Shiite Iran is that of Shiite or not, thus constituting an "archipelago" (B. Hourcade). This term is apt to understand the geopolitics of Iran in that it highlights the types of alliances scattered in the region that Tehran is united in.

⁸⁶ B. Hourcade, *Geopolitics of Iran*, 23

In the early 2000s, several major events lead to a re-emergence of the Shiite as a solidarity: the US decision, following the attacks of September 11, 2001, to change its foreign policy in the Middle East: the fall of the Taliban Afghanistan, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the influence of Hezbollah and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Later, Iran, called for better participation in the political life of Shia minorities, is seen as the instigator of the waves of protests related to the Arab Spring in Bahrain and the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are resurrecting sectarian sectarianism in regional reports. Thus, the arrest in 2012 by Riyadh Shiite cleric Nimr Baqer al-Nimr and its execution in January 2016, the response of the Iranian street by the rampage of the Saudi Embassy and the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the two country or the refusal to issue visas to Iranians to make the pilgrimage to Mecca are all demonstrations of the radicalization of the positions of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Moreover, the Syrian crisis and the strategic preponderance of the Guardians of the revolution are worrying. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan regularly accuses Iran of wanting to destabilize the region. The Foreign Ministry Mevlut Cavusoglu formulated in February 2017 at the Munich conference on security a denominational fear, which hides a geostrategic concern: "Iran wants to return Iraq and Syria Shiites".

This formula reflects the fear that similarly to the period following the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Shiite minorities are currently being encouraged to sedition.

The influence of the denominational factor on Iran's foreign policy noted since the first demonstrations against the regime of Bashar al-Assad and the organization "Islamic State", is at present an obstacle to regional expansion from Iran.

The United States, Russia and the European Union countries have shown interest in Iran playing a regional role, especially as Iran wants to express both an alternative and a brake against terrorism. Wahhabi's ideology carried by Saudi Arabia, but also to be responsible for the international jihadist in Syria and Central Asia. Yet Iran's support for the July 14, 2015 nuclear deal is on a lean footing. Thus the new administration in place in the United States since January 20, 2017 is hostile to Iran, qualified by US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, "the largest state supporting terrorism in the world": executive order of 27 January 2017 targeting seven countries in the Middle East, including Iran,

renewed on March 6, 2016 - excluding Iraq; repeated threats by President Donald J. Trump and new sanctions imposed on 12 companies and 13 individuals on February 3, 2017, following Iran's ballistic missile strike on January 29, 2017. This situation weakens Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, promoter of an independent but non-isolationist position. Media close to the "hard" conservatives, like the daily Kayhan, blame Iran's weakness towards the West while the Chief Justice, appointed by the Supreme Leader in August 2009, Sadeh Larijani asked the government to draw lessons from the "bitter experience" of the Action Plan and to be firm with the United States. In sum, the regional context and the need for the Rouhani administration to act against the critics of the conservative camp are a limit to the national interests of Iran, which could be both commercially and diplomatically directed towards different neighboring states. In addition to the case of Central Asia, neglected by Iran in the East, Iran's relations with India supplant those with Pakistan, where the Saudi Wahhabi influence is prominent and which has supported movements anti-Shia, but also by providing help to the Afghan Taliban.

The rise of Shiism in Indonesia is debatable as there is no crucial source to clarify how Shiism started in Indonesia, but the effects have been on several occasions. The following quote is a support for this statement. "The conversion of Shiites is the solution". This shocking headline, on the front page of The Jakarta Post, was stated by the Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali. For him, the conversion to Sunnism of followers of Shiism is the only solution to the recurrent violence between the two Muslim communities on the island of Madura, located in north-east Java. The minister spoke a few days after the attack by Sunni Muslims against Shiite families from the Sampang region, on August 26. But, far from providing a solution in the conflict, the minister's remarks fuel religious intolerance, says a chronicler of the daily Kompas. The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in Madura would have been encouraged, according to Kompas, by a fatwa pronounced by the Council of ulemas Indonesians (MUI) from Sampang. This edict indicates that Shiism is a heretic sect of Islam. Although the council has not yet pronounced anything on the subject, this local fatwa legitimized the attackers. The case ignites the national opinion and the Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs, Nasaruddin Umar, tried to delay by declaring on the Jakarta Post: "We never condemned Shia Islam as a heresy or banned its practice in our

country, because Saudi Arabia, for example, has never forbidden its followers to come on his soil to make the pilgrimage to Mecca." The magazine Tempo, in its version online, broadens the debate by giving the President of the Indonesian Shiite Council (Jabir), Jalaluddin Rakhmat. "Some of us advance the figure of five million Shiites in the country. For my part, I think we are about 2.5 million," he says. Only a few openly claim their Shiite membership in the archipelago of about 200 million Sunni Muslims. "Better for us to live hidden than in the conflict," adds Jalaluddin. According to him, first members of the Shiite community reportedly arrived in Aceh (Sumatra) around the eighth century. Several traditions attest to their ancient presence in the archipelago. Thus, the tabot, the typically Shia processional rite during which the followers replay the tragedy of the assassination of the family of the prophet and the death of Hussein in Karbala, is today practiced by the Sunni community of Bengkulu. A wave of conversion to Shiism then developed in the early 1980s, with the Islamic revolution in Iran. For many Indonesian Muslim militants then muzzled by the dictatorship of Suharto, the Imam Khomeini was a hope. Students who did not have the right to protest returned to the mosque. They began to devour books on the Iranian revolution and on Shiism. At first, the company thought it was just an intellectual movement. But tensions arose when newly converted students to this branch of Islam began to be interested in canon law, thus opposing the Sunni interpretation of Koran.

The foundation, at the turn of the year 2000, various Shia associations, including Ijabi, recognized by the Ministry of the Interior, also led to renewed interest in this practice of Islam. "Today we do not put the emphasis on canon law but on religious morality and social activities. Because canon law is the cause of conflict. So, for us, what is important is that Islam remains united and Indonesia in peace," says Jallaludin at Tempo magazine.

2 years ago, some cooperation agreements were signed between Iran and Indonesia in energy, law, banking and private sector incentives. According to Iranian official news agency (IRNA), President Joko Widodo met with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at Sadabad Palace in Tehran, where he came for official contacts with a group of high-ranking crowds. After the meeting, 4 agreements were signed in the presence of leaders, on the issue of renewable energy between the two countries and on the legal issues that require the extradition of criminals. Then, 8 more cooperation agreements were signed

for the promotion of investment in banking and the private sector. Speaking at a joint press conference after the signing of the signatures, Rouhani said that during the negotiations, they decided to remove the barriers to the relations of the two countries saying that "I have no doubt that the cooperation between Iran and Indonesia will serve the security and stability of the Islamic World and the region." Rouhani said that there are opportunities for cooperation between the two countries on various issues, particularly energy. Rouhani, Iran and Indonesia have high potential for cooperation in the field of energy, stating that "the energy cooperation between Iran and Indonesia is strategic. Iran will meet the needs of Indonesia's crude oil, gas and petrochemical products. Iran, in particular, has significant potential for technical and engineering. Iran is ready to operate on technical issues such as construction of power plants and dams in Indonesia. Indonesia can operate in the oil and gas industry in Iran.

President Widodo added that Iran will invest in power plants in Indonesia and build oil refineries on the island of Javanese.

Another important instrument that Iran used to spread Shiism is the International Eht Beyt Congress'. The International Ahl-i Beyt Congress has representative offices in 90 countries. 39 of these representations are in Asia, 42 in Africa, 18 in America and 40 in Europe. The foreign missionary network of the International Ahl-i Beyt Congress is one of the major areas of activity on which the congress is focused. In this context, young Shiite people from various countries are sent to Iran with scholarship and then returned to their own countries after they have been educated in accordance with the Shiite understanding of Iran. These young people, who have been educated in Iran and returned to their own countries, are carrying out some non-governmental organizations in accordance with the laws of their countries and carry out propaganda activities with the support of Iran. According to the information on the congress website, the International Ahl Beyt Congress has a network of 5,300 foreign missionaries operating in 70 countries including Indonesia.

Another strength of Iran is its universities. For example, International El-Mustafa University Soz is one of the most important strengths. Mezheplerüs religious education in Turkey was engaged in religious institutions in response to Iran's Shiite based on the information contained on the web site. By 2017, it has representatives in 60 countries

and 25,000 of the 50,000 foreign students who have started to study at this university have graduated. The rector of this university and members of the board of trustees are appointed directly by "Veliy-i fakih". He gives religious and sectarian education to foreign students (Shiite religion mullahs).

The International El-Mustafa Research Center, which is affiliated to El-Mustafa International University, conducts 17 social research projects. The publications of the University are published by the International University of Al-Mustafa University in 13 different languages. Representatives of this publishing house are located in the UK, Indonesia, Malaysia, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Thailand. According to the figure numbered 114400 of the 7th table of the Iranian government budget proposal for the year 2018, the figure of the system code of 114400 states that the budget of 84 million dollars has been allocated to the International Hand-Mustafa University.

Another instrument is the Shiite Cultural Centers that surround the world as a network. For example, this center has 45 Shiite Cultural Centers in the Americas. Among the non-Muslim countries in Asia, India has the highest Shiite population and has a specific place in the Shi'a literature. In India, where approximately 50 million Shiite populations live, Shi'ism has a deep-rooted tradition and has a strict sectarian and cultural relationship with Iran.

As it is seen, Iran is investing both in Shiite and private institutions in order to expand it and expand the field of activity. The spread of Shiism, especially Iranian Shia, cannot be read as the spread of Islam and the Muslim brotherhood. Because the Iranian Shia believes that the Sunni world has confiscated its own rights and that the leadership of the Islamic world must be on a ruling elite that is connected to the "Innocent Imams".

When the Iranian Revolution took place in 1979, some Southeast Asian Islamic observers predicted that some countries, such as Indonesia, could be a "new Iran". In fact, the events that took place before and after the revolution in Iran were far from having such an effect. This part of the thesis examines the effects of the revolution on two important Muslim countries Indonesia and Malaysia. The focus of this part of the thesis is; interstate relations constitute the government's efforts to suppress the local effects of the revolution and general attitudes towards revolution. But before focusing on the last decade, it is necessary to understand the environment, the Islamic model in

Southeast Asia, the character of the Islamic awakening in the region, the pre-revolutionary interaction, relations between Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern Muslims.

Both Malaysia and Indonesia are pluralistic religious communities. The Malaysian population has a little more than the Malay people, the remaining 37% is Chinese, 11% Indians, and the rest are of different ethnic groups. The definition of religion and tribe is used in a close sense. Almost every Malay is considered to be Muslim and every Muslim is accepted as Malay. Relatively a small percentage of other ethnic elements is also Muslim. The differences in belief and worship among this Muslim population are very few. All the Malay Muslims are really Sunnis; Shiite Muslims have practically never existed. Historically, Malaysian Muslims have traditionally adapted to Islamic religious behavior and religious worship. Indonesia's religious pluralism is largely related to its own internal Muslim community. Approximately 90% of all Indonesians are Sunni Muslims; the remaining ones are mainly Christians, Indians, Animists and Buddhists. However, there are big differences within the Sunni community (again, the Shiites have almost never existed), in faith and in worship. The main difference is seen between traditional animists and Muslims who followed the synthesis system called Jawa or Abangan, which was deeply influenced by pre-Islamic factors, and among the Muslims who were trying to follow a more universal model, called the centri. while the other group's castles are religious schools and Islamic organizations.

The Islamic awakening was more ancient in the East Dutch Islands [today's Indonesia] and especially.⁸⁷ Current Islamic developments in Southeast Asia have lasted for the last two decades, even though there is evidence that they were based on the pre-World War II era. Various local factors, including dissatisfaction with secular solutions to social and political problems, rejection of undesirable value judgments of the modern West, the development of pride and identity among Muslims and parallel to the increasing

⁸⁷ For further information on the phenomenon of awakening, see: J. Nagata, *The Reflowering of Malaysian Islam* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984); Fred R. von der Mehden, in "Malaysia and Indonesia", S. Hunter's *The Politics of Islamic Revivalism* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1988); and the same author, *Islamic Empowerment in Malaysia* John, compiled by John L. Esposito in *Islam and Development* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980). For details of the pre-war developments, see: D. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973); and J. Peacock, *Muslim Puritans* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978).

economic and political importance of the Islamic world increasing the efforts for the dissemination of the 'case' facilitated the increase of the effects of Islam. The policies pursued by the authorities in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have been reversed and the policies given against the Islamic awakening have reversed. While the efforts to cooperate with the Malaysian government provided with government authority and legitimacy, the more confrontational approach imposed by Indonesia helped develop solidarity in the Muslim community. Re-awakening is more common in Malaysia but has shown itself in several ways both in Indonesia and Malaysia. Some of the clearly visible signs include increased numbers of women turning to simple clothing, increasing the importance of prayer, fasting and other Islamic worship to the public and political class, in particular the publication of religious programs in Malaysia more than television; politicians to turn to Islamic propaganda and increase participation in international Islamic organizations. While these phenomena are experienced in the Islamic community in Indonesia, it should be noted that the national political leadership tends to reduce the decisive role of Islam in both domestic and foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Malaysian government participated in many activities under the name of Islam; Hosts international conferences involving Islamic issues, establishment of Islamic bank, support of Islamic education, etc. There are coercive domestic political factors for these different approaches to be discussed later.

In both countries, there are sophisticated invitation organizations covering common religious groups on local university campuses.⁸⁸ Youth is particularly influenced by the messages of Ulemas and consciously participates in the events of the guests. The excitement and repercussions of re-awakening are often emphasized, although not often. These demonstrations, bombings of airplanes, shops and other public buildings, attacks on official facilities, destruction of religious buildings belonging to non-Muslims, plans to kill cabinet members and secret conspiracies said to overthrow the existing government in order to establish an Islamic government. There is a general consensus that, despite all of its infamous reputation, these actions are the work of a minority of people with little support.

⁸⁸ M. Lyon, "Inviting Movement in Malaysia", *Revision of the Indonesian and Malayan Affairs*, 13 (December 1979): 34-35.

There are other important but less common manifestations of revival. The most important of them; It is the development of intellectual interest in religious issues, including the ideas of rising awakening in the Middle East. Islamic publications such as *Dakwah* (the publication of Indonesia and Malaysia), *Risaleh*, *Al Nahdah*, *Panji Masyarakat* and *Qiblat* give wide coverage to the religious ideas of local and foreign authors.

The influence of the Iranian Revolution on the change in the structure of relations between the Middle East and Southeast Asia should be analyzed, and the effects of the revolution on the intergovernmental relations between Iran and Malaysia and Iran and Indonesia were examined. If we look at official statements and official departures, the revolution has little to do with these relations. However, this external likelihood holds the serious interest of Southeast Asian authorities about the effects of events in Iran on the people. Nonetheless, neither Jakarta nor Kuala Lumpur seemed willing to openly criticize Islam's apparent victory over Western imperialism and the secular attitude.

In particular, the official response to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979 was to remain silent; No favorable, unfavorable or impartial explanation has been provided by the Indonesian and Indonesian regimes. This silence lasted until the response of the Foreign Minister of Malaysia to a question asked at *Dewan Rakyat*. In this response, the Minister stated that the relations between Iran and Malaysia were "normal" and that the establishment of the revolution in Iran was "Iran's internal affairs". He also noted that the diplomatic staff had fulfilled their duties as usual.⁸⁹ The Indonesian government was more silent. It had carefully avoided commenting on the Shah's forced escape and the release of American hostages.⁹⁰ Even during the Iran-Iraq War, the Malaysian government maintained its silence while the Malaysians were preparing to join the OIC's Peace Committee to mediate. Prior to these peace efforts, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur implemented a neutral attitude towards both warring countries.

Perhaps the fact that there are incidents that both governments face and that the media has attracted a lot of attention can be seen as a reason.

⁸⁹ Malaysia, *Foreign Affairs*, 12 no. 4 (1979)

⁹⁰ S. Siddiki, "Contemporary Islamic Developments in the ASSAN", *Southeast Asian Affairs* 1980 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 90

For the past ten years, however, Indonesia and Malaysia have continued their links to Iran through diplomatic and official visits. In 1981, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who would later become President of the Assembly, visited Kuala Lumpur and met with Prime Minister Mahathir. In 1982, the official Iran mission was opened in Malaysia. In 1984, the official Indonesian delegation visited Iran and the Iranian Foreign Minister went to Malaysia. In 1985, Khomeini accepted the Malaysian delegation; In 1987, the Indonesian Foreign Minister went to Iran and went to Tehran, the Malaysian Foreign Minister, and Rafsanjani went to Malaysia again and Khomeini received his sympathetic Indonesian envoy.

But diplomatic relations continued in the "normal" course, but the revolution and the next Iran-Iraq war severely restricted trade and investment relations between Iran and Southeast Asia. While other Middle Eastern states increased their economic ties with Indonesia and Malaysia, trade with Iran remained the lowest among the Middle East countries. Between 1978-79, the small amount of Indonesian labor in Iran was lost in 1980, and Iranian investments in Southeast Asia did not actually exist.⁹¹ In summary, we can say that inter-state relations were generally politically calm and economically stagnant.

While diplomatic relations continued in a seemingly pleasing calmness, the efforts of Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to control the internal undesired effects of the revolution showed the interest of the rulers in the events in Iran. To understand this interest, it is necessary to become familiar with some aspects of the internal politics of these two Southeast Asian states and, in particular, the attitudes towards religious opposition in both countries.⁹²

⁹¹ Export Indonesia 1982 (Jakarta: Department Perdagangan, 1983); and Five Year of the Indonesian in the Middle East, *Economics* 4, No. 8 (March 1983): 5. In September and October 1980, Malaysian newspapers reported about the return of Malaysian workers from the war zone and immediately following their return to the country. (*New Straits Times*, 29 and 30 September 1980, 1 and 16 October 1980.)

⁹² For details see: Fred R. von der Mchden, "Political and Social Challenge of Islamic Awakening in Malaysia and Indonesia", *The Muslim World*, 76 (July-October 1986): 219-233; and S. Barraclough, "The Attitudes Towards the Challenges of Islamic Awakening in Malaysia", *Asian Survey* 23 (August 1983): 958-975.

3.3. Conclusion

The religious opposition to the Suharto regime in Indonesia mainly comes from the so-called centric community, which includes traditionalist and modernist elements. Tension arises from the power of pure Muslims who are not interested in the social and economic problems of rural Muslims, who do not carry original Muslim values, are polluted by western influences and are trying to develop non-Islamic ideologies. The main complaint was that Pancasila was turned into an ideology of the state, five of which were formulated during the Sukarno regime, and then was developed by Suharto. The most important part of the subject is the desire of all groups to accept Pancasila as their own ideologies. Moreover, he calls his fifth principle to be believed in the Supreme Being, which is formulated to include all Indonesian religions. Since President Sukarno's dismissal in the late 1960s, strong opposition to the Suharto regime had come only from dissatisfied Muslims. While the leaders of Muslim mass organizations generally favor peaceful opposition and even advise on avoiding politics, there have always been elements that attempt to highlight violence or harsh opposition to the governance they perceive as infinite and non-Islamic. Faced with this challenge, the government decided to weaken the power of the Muslim party, reduce Islamic political influences, and impose serious penalties on preachers who were seen as provocative attacks against the state, and the danger of the perverse interpretation of Islam was emphasized.

Malaysia is a deliberate parliamentary democracy that largely determines the political life of religion and ethnicity. The National Front is a coalition holding national and most state governments. The National Front is headed by the United National Malay Organization (UMNO), which has been chaired by the National Front and has been chaired by all the presidents of the country and most senior ministers since independence. The main opposition to UMNO is from the Party of Islam - Malaysia (PAS), whose leaders have consistently emphasized the traditional values of religion and Malay. The UMNO is obliged to protect the pluralist race policy to meet the expectations of the multiethnic coalition and, on the other hand, to act before the possible attacks from the PAS in order to satisfy its Muslim members. The need for support in UMNO's own Muslim electoral districts is one of the reasons for the state's

efforts to support Islamic events at home and abroad. At the same time, the Malaysian regime fears the danger of extremism in Islamic interpretations. These fears are increased by more radical exits in the PAS supported comments and by more radical Islamic groups using violence against the state. Thus, as in Jakarta, the leaders of the National Front in Kuala Lumpur are constantly focusing on the perverse Islamic danger.

There are serious restrictions on the analysis of the efforts of the governments of Malaysia and Indonesia regarding the effects of the events of the Iranian Revolution. First, in both regimes, they do not show their policies publicly, so both of them are unable to intervene openly to movements with strong religious and sensual ties, but they are caught up in the dilemma of wanting to control unwanted behavior. Secondly, although the claims of the Middle East intervention to the Islamic problems in Southeast Asia are considerable, there is little evidence. Finally, the only source of the interpretation of Islam as "perverse" is not Iran. Thus, it is not always easy to determine the target when the accusations are made. Although there are some claims in Indonesia, there is no sound evidence of the existence of provocative groups supported by Iran or Libya. For example, the so-called Islamic Revolutionary Council of Indonesia was accused of receiving Iranian support to overthrow the Suharto regime. However, there are also accusations that Muslim radicals are trying to establish an Islamic state in the Iranian model. One of the most well-known cases was Irfan Suryahadi, editor of the Muslim youth magazine *al-Risale*, who was sentenced to thirteen years in prison for his devastating ideas. Among the articles published in the journal, one of the offenders was published under the title of "Recommendations from Ayatollah Khomeini". It is claimed that this article provoked the revolt of the Islamic revolution for the destruction of the non-Islamic government and called on the Muslims of the whole world to bring Islam. It is also explained that Suryahadi accepts his close relations with the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta. During the raid on his office, the authorities told him that they had confiscated the Iran Embassy bulletin called *Yevmü'l-Quds*. They also claim that *al-Risale* received financial support from the Middle East and called on the Iranian Embassy to send copies of these bulletins to the Indonesian government before the local distribution. (Such a similar control was also seen in Malaysia). However, Indonesian authorities refrained from underlining the Iranian connection in the consecutive trials of the "radicals" of Islam accused of overthrowing the regime or attempting to speak against

the regime's policy. The revision of the defense and accusations of the religious opponents in 1985 and 1986 revealed that there was little reference to the Iranian revolution and the Iranian connection.



CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1. Case Studies

As stated before, the foreign policy objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Indonesia are principally pushed by economic and religious interests. Recently, Indonesia has frequently been accompanied by remarks on the rise of religious intolerance, which sometimes lead to tensions.⁹³

In 1998, Suharto (1921-2008) left power after 32 years of an authoritarian regime held by the military. A transitional period opened with a series of violent conflicts that spared no major Island in Indonesia. These conflicts are between government forces, armed groups, and ethnic or religious communities (which also clash with each other).⁹⁴ Since the fall of President Suharto, a strong federalist trend asserts itself in Indonesia. Some provinces took the opportunity to introduce the sharia, mainly in the form of clothing requirements for women, laws against pornography and sanctions for offenses like theft and adultery.⁹⁵

This chapter of the thesis will focus on how the foreign policy objectives of the two countries in the research design have affected the Indonesian societies. Most of the cases discussed in this chapter are religious based, that is, to explore the religious activities, organizations and centers that have been financed by both Iran and Saudi Arabia, and to explore how these religious activities, organizations and centers have contributed to religious and sectarian conflicts in the country.

Some writers have attributed the rise of religious intolerance and conflicts to the economic situation, the fractures between communities, the structural intolerance of Islam and the passivity of a large part of the faithful to the abuses committed by

⁹³ The case of Ahmaddiyah sect has attracted international attention since 2008, after a multi-religious rally organized in Jakarta on June 1 was attacked by militias including FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Front of the Defenders of Islam). On June 9, an anti-Ahmaddiyah decree was adopted by the government, forbidding adherents of this sect to profess their religion outside their home. Many acts of violence against Ahmaddis have been reported since 2008 in Indonesia. See in particular Pearson E., "For Ahmadiyah, the official line kills", *The Jakarta Globe*, February 25, 2011.

⁹⁴ Rekacewicz, "Conflicts and Displaced People in Indonesia," *Visionscarto*, (2015), <https://visionscarto.net/conflits-et-personnes-deplacees>

⁹⁵ Franz, "Indonesian Islam Two Contrary Currents," *Choisir*, (2009): 19

legislative apparatus and the authorities⁹⁶ in Indonesia but these cases support the ongoing arguments that some of the foreign policy objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia have led to extremism. Finally, four (4) different cases are discussed in this chapter.

4.1.1. CASE 1: Front Pembela Islam

In Indonesia, most of the violent acts against Muslim minorities and other religious sects are orchestrated and executed by members of FPI⁹⁷, a Salafi Islamic defenders front that was created in 1998 by Habib Rizieq. The members of FPI are often dressed in white robes and turbans, they often attack other Islamic establishments, which in their opinion are un-Islamic. The FPI has also been responsible for attacking restaurants that serve alcohol, discotheques and nightclubs.⁹⁸

The FPI is modeled on Saudi religious police and its founder Habib Rizieq, is a graduate of LIPIA (the Saudi Islamic and Arabic College), which was founded and is financed by Saudi Arabia. Habib Rizieq furthered his studies in Saudi Arabia with a scholarship from the Saudi government. From this brief introduction on the origin and the founder of FPI, it is certain that FPI is a direct product of LIPIA.

The idea that the FPI serves as an organization for the defense of Muslims was particularly pronounced in the early days. Shortly after its founding, the FPI sent a team of investigators to Banyuwangi in East Java to investigate the earlier killings of

⁹⁶ Qirotatif, "Indonesia: History, terrorism, Islam and news - Part 3 - Reasons for inter-religious tensions," *AgoraVox*, Last retrieved: April 7, 2019,

<https://www.agoravox.tv/tribune-libre/article/indonesie-histoire-terrorisme-78205>

⁹⁷ Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or the Front of the Defenders of Islam is the largest radical Islamic mass organization, led by Habib Rizieq Sihab with branches in 28 provinces and claimed to have four million members. The violent nature of the FPI is influenced by its founders. There are 20 of them, for example Habib Rizieq, KH Misbahul Anam, KH Cecep Bustomi, and Habib Idrus Jamalullail who are all extreme Mubalig in Jakarta. FPI was founded only three months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998. Although the community elements called for political, economic or legal reasons, but FPI called to reform the morale of the company. FPI's mission is to perform amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar or to spread justice and prevent injustice. But law enforcement after reformation is weak and unable to handle immorality. Thus, FPI was founded as the anti-immoral organization that attempts to conquer the power of legal agents to maintain order. The inspiration of FPI is the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad who says, "If you have seen injustice, fight with your hand, if you cannot do it, do you by your words, and if you are unable to do it. to do, do yourself by your hearts, but it is the weakest form of faith. " With this interpretation, the FPI does not want to be considered as having the weakest faith, so they choose to fight injustice by physical hands or strength. See Hasani, Ismail and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *The Faces of Islam 'Defenders', Religion Radicalism and Its Involvement in Insurance of Religious / Beliefs Freedom in Jabodetabek and West Java*, Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2010: 133 - 134

⁹⁸ Amanda Kovacs, "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims," 2

religious clerics. They concluded that these murders were committed mainly by men disguised as Ninja warriors. Therefore, on October 28, 1998, they declared jihad in a fatwa on this group of Ninjas.⁹⁹ A month later, on November 22, 1998, the FPI was involved in a bloody confrontation with a Christian ambassador. Militia involved in Ketapang, in central Jakarta.¹⁰⁰

In addition, the FPI called for the initiation of an investigation into the human rights violations perpetrated against Muslims during the Orde-Baru period. The leaders of the FPI see this period as very negative: the government was dominated by Christians and with their help, a Christianization of Indonesia took place. 80% of the corruption of civil servants during this period was committed by Christians.¹⁰¹ On March 29, 1999, the FPI issued a statement calling for an investigation into the role of Christian General Leonardus Benyamin Moerdani in some riots¹⁰² which is related to the Tanjung Priok massacre, an incident in September 1984 near Jakarta, where the Indonesian army killed a large number of Muslims. The army was commanded by Moerdani.¹⁰³

On 10 January 2000, 200 FPI members demonstrated at the headquarters of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in Menteng Jakarta and called for their dissolution. On this occasion, they hung a banner at the building saying: "Komnas HAM is sealed by the FPI" (Komnas HAM Disegel oleh FPI).¹⁰⁴ The FPI criticized the Commission for ignoring the following:

1. human rights violations against Muslims, such as the Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon, the Tanjung Priok massacre and the military operation in Aceh, and
2. human rights violations in East Timor only focus and suspect the main Muslim generals. They regarded this as a discrimination against Muslims. In addition, the FPI requested the dismissal of five members of the board, whom they considered to be the cause of the problem.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Rizieq Syihab, *Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, 2008: 589

¹⁰⁰ Wilson, "Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Indonesia," *Critical Asian Studies*, no. 38(2) (2006): 282

¹⁰¹ Purnomo, *FPI disalahpahami*, (2003): 117

¹⁰² Rizieq Syihab, *Dialogue FPI amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*, 2008: 582

¹⁰³ Munajat, *How democracy and religion favor violence*, 2015: 201

¹⁰⁴ Purnomo, *FPI disalahpahami*, (2003): 50

¹⁰⁵ Munajat, "FPI (Islamic Defenders' Front): The Making of a violent Islamist Movement," (2012): 134

Due to the large number of Christians represented on the Commission, the FPI considered this body biased.¹⁰⁶ The FPI sees Indonesian Muslims threatened primarily by Christianity. In a statement adopted by the organization at its first National Assembly in December 2003, the FPI is called upon to act to prevent Christianization.¹⁰⁷ Several of the existing actions were directed against Christian churches. On November 2, 1999, several hundred FPI militants set a Protestant church south of Jakarta on fire.¹⁰⁸ In addition, the FPI has always been against the so-called "wild churches", churches that were built in Muslim inhabited areas without permission. In June 2007, the FPI launched an attack on a church of the Assembly of God in Katapang, Soreang, West Java.

Rizieq defends against the accusation of intolerance and hostility of the FPI towards unbelievers. On the contrary, the FPI keeps decrying the principle stated in Sura 109: 6, "You have your religion and I have mine", which clearly states the religious tolerance in the Quran. Following the suicide bombing of three churches in Surabaya in May 2018, the FPI issued a press release criticizing the attacks and stating that they opposed terrorist violence against other religious communities. At the same time, they also called on the public not to associate these attacks with a particular religious doctrine and its followers.¹⁰⁹

Since 2000, the FPI has called for the reinstatement of the Jakarta Charter, which requires Indonesian Muslims to comply with Sharia law. In August 2000, it issued a statement and organized a Jakarta Charter parade in which the FPI's activists went to the Indonesian Parliament.¹¹⁰ In a book published in October 2000, Rizieq Syihab argued that the omission of the Jakarta Charter by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta In August 1945, is a betrayal of democracy and a reversal of the constitution should take place. The reintroduction of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution is a drug that would allow them to recover their stolen rights. In this way, a chronic

¹⁰⁶ Jahroni, "Defending the Majesty of Islam," (2008):26

¹⁰⁷ Rizieq Syihab, 646

¹⁰⁸ Hefner, *Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence*, 2004: 286

¹⁰⁹ Bimo Wiwoho, "FPI Minta Publik Tak Kaitkan Bom Surabaya dengan Ajaran Agama," *CNN Indonesia*, Last retrieved: April 8, 2019, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20180514082709-20-297929/fpi-minta-publik-tak-kaitkan-bom-surabaya-dengan-ajaran-agama>

¹¹⁰ Rizieq Syihab, 317

ideological conflict can be resolved.¹¹¹ In recognition of its request for the re-introduction of the Jakarta Charter, the FPI organized "Islamic Sharia" (Pawai Syariat Islam) parades in August 2000 and 2001, respectively. The slogan of the rally in August 2001 was: "Die in defending sharia is better than living without sharia."¹¹²

In a landmark text published on the FPI website, Rizieq, in 2007 said the FPI is a kind of Indonesian lobbying group urging state leaders to "improve the morality and beliefs of the Muslim community". At the same time, the vision that the FPI seeks is to implement sharia law in Indonesia, which is both substantive and formalistic. The implementation of sharia, for example, means passing laws that clearly prohibit prostitution.¹¹³ The purpose of the FPI is "the application of Islamic Sharia in a comprehensive manner" (penerapan syariat secara kaffah). A passage from the new version of the draft FPI quoted by Gumilang indicates that the application of sharia is "largely intended" to refer to its application in all areas of life.¹¹⁴

However, Sobri Lubis, general secretary of the FPI, said in an interview in 2001 that the struggle for the implementation of Sharia law was constitutional.¹¹⁵ Unlike other Islamist groups operating in Indonesia, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia, the FPI is loyal to the Republic of Indonesia and has never questioned its presence. The founding of the organization on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of Indonesia's declaration of independence already expresses this. Many of their documents and the oath taken by FPI members make this loyalty visible. Every year, on the occasion of Independence Day, thousands of members of the FPI display the red and white flag of Indonesia in the city. This flag has special meaning for the FPI because it believes it is based on a hadith, according to which an invincible Islamic state with a red and white flag should emerge at the end of time.¹¹⁶ The FPI also supports the 1945

¹¹¹ Greg Fealy, "Virginia Hooker: Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia," *A Contemporary Sourcebook, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies*, Singapore, (2006): 236

¹¹²it is better to die defending Islamic law than living without shari'a, vgl. Rosadi: Black white FPI. 2008: 27

¹¹³ Habib Rizieq: Tentang FPI: Perspektif Organisasi 2007

¹¹⁴ Prima Gumilang, "Seruan Khilafah Rizieq Shihab di Jantung FPI," *CNN Indonesia*, Last retrieved April 8, 2019, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20170815154404-20-234919/seruan-khilafah-rizieq-shihab-di-jantung-fpi/2>

¹¹⁵ Efendi, Pramuko, Habib-FPI gempur Playboy, (2006):154

¹¹⁶ Jahroni, *Defending the Majesty of Islam*, 41

constitution and Pancasila as the dominant ideology of the state. However, the FPI argues that the Islamic foundations of Pancasila have been misunderstood.¹¹⁷ At a public event in Bandung in February 2012, Rizieq uttered radical words on the following formula: "The Pancasila of Sukarno is the belief in God's ass while he is at the head."¹¹⁸

Since 2013, FPI has been using the buzzword NKRI Bersyariah ("Sharia-based Statehood of the Republic of Indonesia") for its concept of statehood. NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia "Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia") is an abbreviation used primarily by the Indonesian military for the State of Indonesia. It is associated with the aspirations lost after the fall of the Suharto regime to take a central role in the state. The concept of NKRI Bersyariah assumes that sharia is compatible with the principles Since 2007¹¹⁹, the FPI has been active against Ahmadiyya and liberal Islam. The FPI believes that Ahmad has been betrayed by the Ahmadis and liberal reformers such as the Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid, the liberal Islamist network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL).

For their own funding, some branches of the FPI charge membership fees to their members. In addition, the FPI often receives donations from outside donors for its demonstrations.¹²⁰ Rizieq himself writes that the willingness to sacrifice his fortune for the FPI struggle has been the most important funding model since the founding of the organization. The principle of financing the FPI is the following principle: "Umma, Umma and Umma." All activities of the FPI, says Rizieq, are funded by joint contributions from activists of the FPI. From time to time, FPI supporters also provide support. However, the FPI has no external funders permanently involved in the financing of the organization.¹²¹ In the report submitted by the FPI at its second National Assembly in 2008, it stated that the FPI's donations have been low since 2003. Even the amount of money needed to buy the small building in Petamburan, where the

¹¹⁷ Wilson, *Resisting Democracy*, 3

¹¹⁸ Das Video vom 15. Februar 2012 ist auf dem Youtube-Kanal der FPI abrufbar
Das Video vom 15. Februar 2012 ist auf dem Youtube-Kanal der FPI abrufbar
Habib – Pancasila Soekarno & Pancasila Piagam jakarta (ASLI) abrufbar
Habib – Pancasila Soekarno & Pancasila Piagam jakarta (ASLI) abrufbar
Last retrieved: April 8, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOAWJeHIYY4>

¹¹⁹ Yandry Kurniawan, *The Securitization Policy in Democratic Indonesia*, Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2018:116

¹²⁰ Hasani and Naipospos, *The faces of the 'defenders' of ISLAM*, (2010): 98

¹²¹ Rizieq Syihab, 187

FPI secretariat is located, has been difficult to assemble for the FPI. According to Hasani and Naipospos, the FPI opened individual businesses. In addition, it has income by selling its uniforms and attributes.¹²² Although this argument does not support the facts that FPI is financed by Saudi Arabia, FPI in Indonesia is a direct result of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy objectives to disseminate its ideology. The founder of FPI is a product of LIPIA, which was established by Saudi Arabia as a means of teaching Islam and Arabic language. Furthermore, Krithika Varagur, a Jakarta-based writer argues that "Saudi Arabia, for decades, has been making investments" in Indonesia, and has created an infrastructure, including universities and scholarships, "aimed at influencing Indonesian culture and religion."

On December 13, 1999, 4,000 FPI fighters occupied the Jakarta Regional Government for more than ten hours, urging Governor Sutiyoso to close all nightclubs, cinemas, restaurants and massage parlors during the month of Ramadan.¹²³ The action followed a government order to close entertainment facilities during the first two days of Ramadan.¹²⁴ After a long meeting with the FPI, which was also attended by the Chief of Police, Nugroho Jayusman, the governor expressed his support for the FPI's demands and banned a circular opening of the entertainment venues during Ramadan. The Governor's concession was a brilliant strategic achievement for the FPI, which also received a circular letter the following year about the closure of entertainment venues in Jakarta during Ramadan.

Joko Widodo after being the winner in July 2014 presidential election his deputy, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok Herit was declined by FPI because he is not a Muslim. To avoid Ahoks taken office, FPI organized a series of protest rallies. At a rally on 25 September 2014, Ahok, whom the FPI called "Chinese Disbeliever" was not worthy to govern the Muslim majority and local citizens of Jakarta. The Jakarta Mutual Assistance Organization has clarified that the racist language of the FPI violates the Indonesian constitution and various laws. The FPI was not sued for doing so. The spokesperson of FPI, Muchsin Alatas, in a newspaper interview, said there were no non-Muslim leaders, and also accused Ahok of banning the holding of Tabligh Akbar Monas

¹²² Hasani and Naipospos, *The faces of the 'defenders' of ISLAM*, 98

¹²³ Hefner, *Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence*, 286 and Wilson, *Continuity and Change*, 282

¹²⁴ International Crisis Group (ICG), "Indonesia: Indonesia: Violence and radical Muslims," (2001)7b

events, Takbir keliling parades.¹²⁵ One particular event was the protest rally organized by the FPI on October 3, 2014, which ended in violent riots. a pre-conference on October 7, 2014, calling on the National Police to dissolve the FPI. The police then announced that it would prepare a recommendation to the Home Office to ban the FPI.¹²⁶

The FPI held further rallies against Ahok in front of the provincial government building in Jakarta in the following weeks. FPI spokesperson Muchsin Alatas described Ahok as part of a dragon mafia (Mafia Naga).¹²⁷ Ahok responded to the protests by sending two official letters to the Ministry of the Interior and Justice on 10 November in support of the dissolution of the FPI. He pointed out that the FPI had organized demonstrations against his investiture, thus violating the Indonesian Constitution. He also suggested that the FPI tended to be racist because it challenged his affiliation to the Chinese ethnic group. The FPI reported Ahok on November 13, 2017 in exchange for defamation and improper conduct. However, other groups supported Ahok's recommendation. The Muslims of Indonesia (Gerakan Silat Aksi Muslim Indonesia) stated that the forced preaching of the FPI "does not reflect the principles of the one who was sent by God" and that their dissolution is therefore not a problem.

In November 2016, the FPI led the protests against Ahok's candidacy for governorship in Jakarta, accusing him of being a blasphemous insult to the Qur'an. The protests resulted in two mass rallies in Jakarta on November 4 and December 2, 2016. The FPI brought supporters from all over Indonesia to Jakarta for the first protest. The first gathering drew from 150,000 to 250,000 people, the second, also called Aksi Bela Islam III ("Action for the defense of Islam III"), had a capacity of 500,000 to 750,000 people. However, the action was also dismissed. The governor was finally brought down by a series of Islamist alliance including the FPI in ending of 2016.

Finally, from all the explanation provided in this case, it is clear that a foreign policy objective of Saudi Arabia has impacted the lives of people in Indonesia. Indonesia used to be praised as a religious tolerance country and it has been seen on several occasions

¹²⁵ Linda Hairani, "Kenapa FPI dan FBR Menolak Ahok? in Tempo.co, Last retrieved: April 8, 2019, <https://metro.tempo.co/read/611836/kenapa-fpi-dan-fbr-menolak-ahok>

¹²⁶ Wardhani and Perdani, Police respond to Ahok's challenge to ban FPI. October 8, 2014.

¹²⁷ Muchsin Alatas in CNN Indonesia: FPI controversy. October 2014

as a model for Middle East Countries. Taking FPI as a case study has supported one of the research questions in this thesis. Saudi Arabia might not have financed FPI, but this case study has shown that FPI is a direct product of Saudi foreign policy in Indonesia.

4.1.2. CASE 2: Jemaah Islamiyah

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is the group that organized the attacks on the island of Bali in 2002. This group is also responsible for several other bomb attacks in Indonesia. Its origin goes back to Indonesian independence. Specifically, JI is one of the groups created by former members of Darul Islam. The latter, active during the struggle for independence from Holland, launched an armed rebellion to establish an Indonesian Islamic State as a credible alternative to Indonesian democracy.¹²⁸ It is therefore partly from this movement, from this group, that the idea of a rebellion or militarization of the struggle as a method of achieving their ends starts.

Another connection can be made with the beginning of the Suharto New Order, an army general who seized power in Indonesia by force, and established new political structures centralizing power in his hands in 1967. Sukarno, first president of Indonesia, had previously put in opposition the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) and the army. A certain alliance between the military and the Muslims was created when Suharto took power to fight the PKI. Between half a million and one million communists were killed in this jihad, by this Muslim guerrilla, which was allowed by the military.¹²⁹ It is highly likely that this militarization of politically motivated Muslims has played a long-term role in terrorism as a response to perceived problems.

The Suharto regime has also been characterized by strong political repression, forcing Jemaah Islamiyah to first settle and organize in Malaysia. When Suharto came out of power in 1998, tensions between Muslims and Christians, hitherto repressed, broke out, and the government could no longer control them. This event allowed the leaders of the JI organization to return to Indonesia (in Maluku / Maluku and Suwalesi / Celebes), and

¹²⁸ Oak Gillian, "Jemaah Islamiyah's Fifth Phase: Many Faces of a Terrorist Group," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* no.2 (2010): 295-320

¹²⁹ Yong Mun Cheong, "A Political Structure of the Independent State," *The Cambridge History of South-east Asia*, no.4 (1999): 59-131

take advantage of the situation to gain legitimacy.¹³⁰ Suharto's repression did not eliminate tensions, but only temporarily prevented them from being used in a violent manner. Upon its return, Jemaah Islamiyah took advantage of its explosive tensions to present the organization as a viable political alternative (in the current of political militarization of Muslims at the beginning of the Suharto regime).

The ideology behind the foundation of Jemaah Islamiyah is therefore to replace the Indonesian government, which they consider incompetent by an Islamic state based on sharia law. However, the targets are often inconsistent with this goal: Western symbols / communities and local Muslims rather than representatives of the Indonesian government.¹³¹

The alleged founder of JI is Abdullah Sungkar. His name was mentioned for the first time in 1978, along with that of Abubakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of the JI, when they were arrested for links with Darul Islam¹³² (a movement that led a rebellion with the aim to create an Islamic State in Indonesia between 1948 and 1964). Ba'asyir and Sungkar had founded a pesantren (Muslim religious school) in Ngruki, near Solo in central Java. They were sentenced to 9 years in prison but released in 1982.¹³³

They then undertook to organize clandestine cells, which was quickly dismantled by the authorities but this will constitute the pool of the future of JI. In 1985, with their initial conviction confirmed, they fled to Malaysia, a country that was very welcoming to Islamist movements from all countries.¹³⁴ They were followed by many supporters. More than 200 members received training in Pakistani camps before going to fight in Afghanistan. However, none of them is on the list of "martyrs" who died in the fight against Soviet troops.

¹³⁰ Oak Gillian, "Jemaah Islamiyah's Fifth Phase: Many Faces of a Terrorist Group," 318

¹³¹ Putra Idhamsay and Zora A. Sukadbi, "Basic Concepts and Reasons behind the Emergence of Religious Terror Activities in Indonesia: An Inside View," *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, no.2 (2013): 83-91

¹³² Rommel C. Banlaoi, "Jemaah Islamiyah Briefer: Evolution, Organization and Ideology," (2011), Last retrieved: April 12, 2019 <http://declassifiedrommelbanlaoi.blogspot.com/2011/01/jemaah-islamiyah-briefer-evolution.html>

¹³³ Abuza Zachary, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, (Boulder, Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003)

¹³⁴ Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia," *ISIM and Utrecht University*, (2002), Last retrieved: April 12, 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20021228170302/http://www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm#_ftn1

JI has involved in violence between Christians and Muslims in the Poso region (central Sulawesi province) and especially in the Bali bombings (the largest in the region, with 202 deaths on 12 October 2002, as well as October 1, 2005), the Australian Embassy in Indonesia (September 9, 2004) and the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (July 17, 2009).

Ba'asyir was arrested in October 2002 following the Bali bombings. A first lawsuit was brought to him, at the end of which he was sentenced to 4 years in prison for "subversion with the intention of overthrowing the government". His sentence was first reduced to 3 years on appeal and then 18 months by the Indonesian Supreme Court. He was immediately arrested when he was released from prison in 2004 on the basis of the Balinese case, as part of a new anti-terrorist law that has just been passed. The Constitutional Court rejected the principle of retroactivity of this law. He was then sentenced to 30 months in jail for the Marriott bombing.

Hambali, the JI's operational manager, has also been selected as Al-Qaeda's chief of operations for Southeast Asia. However, JI can be described not as a regional branch of al-Qaida, but as veterans seeking to recreate and transmit what they have experienced in Afghanistan.

Some argue that the goal of the JI is to establish a "Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara" ("Nusantarian Islamic State", "Nusantara", the name that Indonesians give to their archipelago) that would group all of Asia together. South-East insular and Muslim peninsular, that is to say the current states of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, as well as the southern Philippines and Thailand.¹³⁵

A. Feillard and R. Madinier demonstrated the lack of credibility of the project "Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara".¹³⁶ According to them, the various rebellions conducted in the name of Islam in Southeast Asia have always had as a framework and perspective in the nation-state in which they took place. The Indonesian Darul Islam wanted to create an Islamic state in Indonesia. Muslims in the southern Philippines or Thailand are asking for recognition of their identity, rights and autonomy. Be that as it may, no JI document mentions "daulah islamiyah nusantara".

¹³⁵ Barton Greg, *Jemaah Islamiyah: radical Islam in Indonesia*, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005) ISBN 9971-69-323-2

¹³⁶ Feillard Andree and Madinier Remy, "The end of innocence? Indonesian Islam facing the radical temptation from 1967 to the present day," *Les Indes Savantes*, (2006)

Saudi Arabia and Jemaah Islamiyah

According to an article in New York Times, Al Haramain also known as Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), is an example of an organization that has been used to finance terrorist organization in Indonesia.¹³⁷ According to this article, a formal memorandum to finance educational institutions in Indonesia was signed between Al Haramain and the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs. Additionally, Umar Faruq, a senior member of JI, told the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Al Haramain provided money to JI when he was arrested and held in US custody in early 2003.¹³⁸

Al Haramain was a charity and humanitarian foundation that was first founded in Karachi, Pakistan in 1988 with the objective of charity, humanitarian assistance and religious propaganda, it moved its headquarters in Riyadh in 1992. It had several branches in Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia etc. All these branches operated under different names.¹³⁹ The organization has participated in the construction and renovation of Mosques and Qur'anic schools in Indonesia. The organization is said to have raised between 40 and 50 million US dollars at its peak every year in contribution.¹⁴⁰

Terrorist Attacks Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah

Below is a list of four major attacks that have been linked to JI. Just a summary of the attacks is discussed in this section. Although Al-Qaeda has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, JI and its members have been labelled as the perpetrators.

The Bali Bombings of 2002

The bombings in Bali are a double bombing that occurred on 12 October 2002 in Kuta town on the Indonesian island of Bali, killing 202 people and wounding 209 others.

¹³⁷ Jane Perlez, "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia," *The New York Times*, (2003), Last retrieved: April 12, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/05/world/saudis-quietly-promote-strict-islam-in-indonesia.html>

¹³⁸ Jane Perlez, "Saudis Quietly Promote Strict Islam in Indonesia,"

¹³⁹ See The United States Treasury Department has designated Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation as a "specially designated global terrorist" organization list of affiliates of al-Qaeda and the Taliban <https://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/tablelist.htm>

¹⁴⁰ Cosgrove-Mather Bootie, "Al Qaeda Skimming Charity Money," *CBS News*, (2004), Last retrieved: April 12, 2019, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-skimming-charity-money/>

Most of the victims were foreign tourists, mostly Australian. This attack is considered the deadliest attack in Indonesia's history.

To date, 33 Indonesians have been sentenced for their involvement in the attack, including three with the death penalty and four with life imprisonment. In August 2004, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, whom several intelligence agencies suspect to be the spiritual leader of the organization Jemaah Islamiyah, was accused of being the instigator of the attack. He was charged with organizing or motivating persons to carry out terrorist acts or providing assistance or facilitating the carrying out of a terrorist act.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was released on June 14, 2006 and he was greeted by hundreds of supporters. Al-Qaeda leader Omar al-Farouq, who planned the attacks, was killed on 25 September 2006 by the British army in Basra. Dulmatin, one of the planners of the attack, whose head had been priced at 10 million US dollars by the US State Department and the Philippine government was killed in a raid by Unit 88 of the Indonesian Police on March 9, 2010.

The Jakarta Marriott Hotel Bombing of 2003

The bombing at the Jakarta Marriott Hotel on August 5, 2003 was an Islamist suicide car bomb attack. It took place shortly before noon, killing 12 people and injuring 150 people. Most of those killed were Indonesian, with the exception of a Dutch businessman, a Danish and two Chinese tourists. The hotel was considered a symbol of the West and had been used by the US Embassy for various events. As a result of this terrorist act, the hotel was closed for five weeks and reopened on September 8, 2003.

On August 11, six days after the attack, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the bombing through the Al Jazeera TV channel and specifically mentioned Australia. The message said: "This operation is part of a series of operations that Dr. Ayman Al-Zaouahiri has promised to lead. This is a fatal slap in the face of America and its allies in the Muslim Jakarta, where faith has been denigrated by the dirty American presence and the discriminatory Australian presence."

Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be responsible for the attack. Indonesian Defense Minister Matori Abdul Djalil confirmed that officials have been training in the

organization's camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On August 11, 2003, he also said that the terrorists were connected with the small group arrested earlier in Semarang.

The Australian Embassy Bombing of 2004

The Australian Embassy 2004 bombing or the so-called Brass Bombing took place on September 9, 2004 in Jakarta. This was the third major terrorist action aimed at Australia that occurred in Indonesia after the 2002 Bali Bombing and 2003 JW Marriott Bombing. The bomb left a hole of 3 meters.

A car bomb exploded in front of the Australian Embassy at 10:30 in the Kuningan area, Jakarta. The number of fatalities was not very clear- the Indonesian side identified 9 people but the Australians mentioned about 11 people. Among the dead victims were the embassy's security guards, visa applicants, embassy staff and residents who were around the scene when the bomb exploded. No Australians died in this incident. Several buildings around the scene were also damaged.

The Indonesian police suspected that the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group is behind the incident. The motive for bombing is still unclear, but there were possibilities related to the upcoming Presidential Election then.

The bombing was believed to be carried out by a suicide bomber named Heri Kurniawan alias Heri Golun using a green minivan. Heri was successfully identified through a DNA test.

On November 5, 2004, police arrested four people who were considered perpetrators of the event, namely Rois, Ahmad Hasan, Apuy, and Sogir alias Abdul Fatah in Kampung Kaum, Leuwiliang, Bogor Regency, West Java. On September 13, 2005, Rois was sentenced to death by the South Jakarta District Court. A day later, another suspect, Hasan, was also sentenced to death.

The Bali Bombings of 2005

The 2005 Bali bombing was a series of bombings that took place in Bali on October 1, 2005. Three bombings occurred, one in Kuta and two in Jimbaran with at least 23 people killed and 196 others injured. This suicide bombing has a significant impact on

tourism in Bali considering that on October 12, 2002, a similar bomb attack killed 202 people.

According to the Head of the Anti-terrorist Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Inspector General (ret.) Ansyaad Mbai, preliminary evidence indicates that the attack was carried out by at least three suicide bombers in a model similar to the 2002 bombing and over-destroyed bodies are considered evidence of suicide bombings. But there is also the possibility that the backpacks were hidden inside the restaurant before being blown up.

Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty said that the type of bomb used appeared to be different from the previous explosion that most victims died and were injured due to “shrapnel”, and not a chemical explosion. Medical officials showed x-rays that a foreign object was described as a “pellet” inside the victim's body and a victim reported that the ball bearing entered the back of his body.

Inspector General of Police Ansyaad Mbai, an Indonesian anti-terrorism official reported to the Associated Press that the bombing was clearly a “terrorist work”. Jemaah Islamiyah has been accused of these bombings.

However, there is no credible source to support the statement that JI has been fully sponsored and financed by the Saudi government as a foreign policy objective to promote its Wahhabi and Salafi doctrine but the Saudi government has built religious schools¹⁴¹ and centers and promoted Islamic propaganda, which has eventually led to extremism and radicalization.

Finally, this section of the thesis has briefly discussed Jemaah Islamiyah as a case study. The origin of JI, how it evolved, its link to funds from Saudi Arabia and the attacks linked to the organization have been discussed. One organization that has been involved in financing JI is Al Haramain, although one cannot say Al Haramain is financed by Saudi government, most of its funds have been contributed by Saudis. And according to

¹⁴¹ AFET, *The Involvement of Salafism and Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World*, 18-19

Abuzza, some of the Saudi funds allocated to charity activities has been channeled to radical and terrorist groups, especially Al-Qaeda and JI.¹⁴²

4.1.3. CASE 3: The Spread of Shi'ism and Iranian Educational Institutions in Indonesia

This case study discusses the spread of Shi'ism in Indonesia shortly before and after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Educational Institutions that were created and financed by Iran. Some of these institutions and organizations were created by members of the Shi'a sect. These institutions have in some ways eased the spread of Shi'ism in Indonesia.

The Spread of Shi'ism in Indonesia after the Iranian Revolution

Indonesians, who consider themselves Shia often evoke their Persian origins and acclaim descent of the saints who Islamized Java in the fifteenth century. The inhabitants of Bengkulu and Pariaman, in West Sumatra, still play the reconstruction of the Battle of Karbala (called Tabuik), transmitted by descendants of South Asian Sepoys (soldiers) brought to the archipelago by British colonials in the early 19th century, and new converts who respect Jafari identify Imam Khomeini, Indonesian *asadidha* (teachers) trained at the *hawza* (seminary), and the books printed by *Majma Jahani*¹⁴³ as ultimate sources of authority and orthodoxy.¹⁴⁴

In the 1970s, as Iran entered the revolutionary phase and Muslims around the world took part in what is usually called "Islamic revival," Indonesia- under the New Suharto Order (1965-1998)- experienced a narrowing of the sphere of Islam of action in the public domain. Conscious of the fact that Muslims in the archipelago had been closely linked to the Ummah World for centuries¹⁴⁵ and that Indonesia could not be considered as isolated from regional and international developments, the regime pursued a complete de-politicization of the country. While supporting the "revitalization" and

¹⁴² Abuzza Z, *Funding Terrorism in South east Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah*, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Studies, 2003): 12-21

¹⁴³ The missionary branch of the Islamic Republic, the *Majma Jahani Ahlu Bait (Ahl al-Bayt)*, World Assembly

¹⁴⁴ Chiara Formichi, "A big family?" In *Shiism in Southeast Asia: "Alid Piety and Sectarian Constructions"*, eds., Chiara Formichi and Michael Feener (London: Hurst & Co, 2015)

¹⁴⁵ Michael Laffan, *Islamic Nation and Colonial Indonesia: The umma below the winds* (London: Routledge, 2003)

"renewal" of Islam as an aspect of the personal piety and culture of the citizens. In 1973, all Islamic parties were forced to merge with the Unified Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP) and, in 1975, Suharto sponsored the establishment of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, or MUI), another way to "Cooperate, fragment and neutralize Islam as an autonomous political force".¹⁴⁶ In 1977, the army crushed the clandestine militant group Komando Jihad.¹⁴⁷ From 1984, no organization was allowed to base Islam on its ideological foundations and security forces violently clashed with groups of Muslim civilians.¹⁴⁸

It is in this context that the MUI issued a recommendation (tawsiyya) warning Indonesian Muslims against the dangers of Shia Islam. Following a previous fatwa against "the currents of Islam that reject the prophetic hadeeth and the sunnah", the MUI published a tawsiyya in March 1984, identifying Shiism as a potentially disruptive force for the social harmony of Islam. While the tawsiyya text established the unacceptability of Shiism for religious reasons, highlighting differences in the theological, exegetical and jurisprudential areas between the Sunni and Shiite agreements¹⁴⁹, the wider scope of the recommendation was to launch a political campaign in response to the Iranian revolution, which was openly acknowledged by the members of the MUI, the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Chief of Police.

In the mid-1980s and 1990s, the press supported the government's efforts to criminalize Shiite Islam and Iran's negative influence on Muslims in Indonesia. Not only did the bombing of the Buddhist temple in Borobudur in 1985 target an alleged Shiite who would have spent years in Iran and took refuge there before being arrested, but also several cases of young girls sexually abused by teachers appeared a decade ago. This

¹⁴⁶ Donald Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, 2002)

¹⁴⁷ See Quinton Temby, "Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 89 (April 2010): 1-36

¹⁴⁸ The apex of this was the Tanjung Priok incident, when Muslims praying at a mosque in north Jakarta were attacked by police forces for openly rejecting the azas tunggal policy. On the Tanjung Priok incident, see KontraS Report, "Massacre of Tanjung Priok in 1984," <http://www.kontras.org/tpriok/data/Massacre%20of%20Tanjung%20Priok%20in%201>

¹⁴⁹ Mohammad Atho Mudzhar, *Fatwa-Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia: Sebuah Studi Pemikiran Hukum Islam di Indonesia 1975-1988* (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), 114-126.

was also discussed as a consequence of muta practices (temporary marriage authorized by Ja'fari fiqh) inspired by Iran¹⁵⁰

Despite these negative representations, Indonesia witnessed the proliferation of Shiite religious schools in the 1980s (a phenomenon that began before the revolution), as well as the growing influx of students to Iran, although clandestine. This was followed by the clandestine dissemination of Iranian Shiite literature- mainly among university students- throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and by the creation of organizations of Ahl al-Bayt worshipers in Indonesia who directly linked Iran to Indonesia on the cultural level, educational and religious motives. The following sections provide an analysis of these exchanges in terms of education, print publications and institutions.

Between 1979 and 1982, very few Indonesian authors wrote books on Shiism or Iran, but several texts circulated in foreign languages. By mid-1983, there was still no new Indonesian material on Shiism, but "many [Iranian] organizations were printing books on Shia Islam in several languages (such as Arabic, English, French and in Persian), in a luxurious format, and these writings were distributed free of charge "to the Iranian embassy in Jakarta."¹⁵¹ The direct involvement of the embassy in the dissemination of these Shiite thoughts and the principles of the revolution through the dissemination of literature attracted the attention of the government, as indicated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs' survey of the Indonesian Embassy magazine, *Yawm al- Quds*.

The spirit of the revolution has spread widely throughout Indonesia through the press and, most importantly, through the circulation of books in dawa circles. In the mid-1980s, the Muslim-inspired *Usra* movement which became strongly established throughout the country, with groups of students gathering in mosques, high schools, and university campuses in Java and beyond. Like their peers in Egypt and Malaysia, they discussed the work of Hassan al-Banna, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. However, even though the dawah movement (which arose in Indonesia in the form of both *tarbiyya* and *usra* groups) was generally identified with Sunni Islam, these groups were also receptive to the literature that emerged from the Iranian revolutionary context of that time. Reflecting the trend of the early days of the revolution when leftist groups

¹⁵⁰ Chiara Formichi, "Violence, Sectarianism, and the Politics of Religion: Articulations of anti-Shi'a Discourses in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 98 (October 2014)

¹⁵¹ "Buku-buku Syi'ah," *Panji Masyarakat*, 395, 11 May 1983, 7

occupied a prominent place in the anti-Shah movement, the most widely read and discussed author was Ali Shariati, followed closely by Muthahhari a few years later. While in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood engaged in anti-Shiite and anti-Iranian propaganda (largely as a result of the Iran-Iraq war), the Indonesian circle of Usras known as Islam Kampus seemed to give no thought to "sectarian" allegiances. This approach was so entrenched among Usra members that their print shops translated and broadcasted a variety of equally eclectic works.¹⁵²

It is worth knowing that East Java has been a hub of Shi'ism since the 1960s. For example, in the city of Bondowoso, the Shiite Yayasan (foundation) al-Sadiq was created in 1966, a pesantren Shiite Rural Religious School al-Wafa was established in 1972 and the Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YAPI) (still today one of the largest 'Islamic school in the country') was founded 1973 before being transferred to Bangil in 1976. Similarly, in central Java, Abdul Qodir Balfagih founded the pesantren al-Khairat in Bangsri, near Ipara, between 1974 and 1975. The founders and teachers of these rural schools were the first nucleus of self-taught *asatidha* or (more rarely) *hawza* (in Indonesian, *ustaz*). As a niche phenomenon, education in *hawza* was expanding, creating close ties between Indonesia and Iran. While in the 1980s only a handful of Indonesians managed to reach Iran (usually Singapore and Pakistan), in the early 1990s there were about 50 Indonesians in Iran at a time, and in the early 2000s, 50 new students arrived there each year. In the 2010s, the figures were closer to 100 per year and it should be noted that over the past decade¹⁵³, some *pesantrans* have taught the Iranian program alongside the Indonesian one to better prepare their students for transition. They mainly enroll in El-Mustafa International University of Qom and its female branch, Bint al-Huda, but some also enroll in Imam Khomeini International University in Qazvin and Tehran's Alzahra University.

Educational Institutions and Organization Affiliated to Iran

1. One of the most important institutions and organizations mentioned in the above paragraph is YAPI (known as an influential Shi'a educational institution in

¹⁵² Chiara Formichi, "Contemporary Patterns in Transregional Islam: Indonesia's Shi'a,"

¹⁵³ Chiara Formichi, "Contemporary Patterns in Transregional Islam: Indonesia's Shi'a," *Middle East Institute*, (2014)

Indonesia)¹⁵⁴, which is an Islamic boarding school founded by Husein al-Habiysi, an Indonesian citizen of Arab descent.¹⁵⁵ He was originally a Sunni Ulama but converted to Shi'ism. YAPI has grown in recent years into a highly-respectful educational institution, dealing in studies from elementary to high school. YAPI is considered 'the most important teaching center for Shi'ism' in a predominantly Sunni Indonesia.¹⁵⁶

2. The Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) was probably the first institution to connect Indonesia to Iran. It was created in Jakarta in 1998 by a group of Iranians who wanted to improve mutual understanding between the two countries. With this in mind, the center has since offered Persian courses and has facilitated the sending of Indonesian students to Iran. In its early days, the ICC had no connection with the Islamic Republic's political establishment, but a change of direction in 2011 brought the embassy center closer to the cultural attaché's office (a post designated by the the Supreme Council of the Iranian Cultural Revolution), which plays an important role in the design and implementation of activities and the management of funds. The center's activities are spread outside Jakarta, as it sends teachers- regularly Qom graduates for occasional lectures across the archipelago and donates books and newspapers to numerous pesantren scattered throughout the country.
3. Another important educational institution and organization is the Islamic College of Advanced Studies (renamed the 2009 Islamic College or IC), also located in South Jakarta. It is an institution of higher education offering undergraduate and graduate degrees in Islamic theology, philosophy and mysticism. In addition to its national links with the ICC, it also has close international ties, as it is affiliated with ICAS (established in 1999 in London) and Jami'atul Mustafa in Qom. Not only are the two institutions funded by the Iranian Supreme Leader's

¹⁵⁴ Zulkifli, *The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia*, (Canberra: Australian National University E Press, 2013): 62

¹⁵⁵ Samsu Rizal Panggabeh, "Policing Sectarian Conflict in Indonesia: The Case of Shi'ism," in *Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia*, eds., Tim Lindsey and Helen Pauscker, (New York: Routledge, 2016): 280

¹⁵⁶ Zulkifli, *The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia*, 161

office, but the IC's own director in Jakarta comes from the Qom Institute. Yet qualifying and labelling the IC as a Shia university would be a mistake.¹⁵⁷ It is only recently that the IC has absorbed a large number of Qom graduates and has become a platform for Indonesians interested in specifically Shia thinking. In fact, its origins arose from the combined efforts of a number of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and an Iranian citizen to create a sister institution of Paramadina University, devoted solely to the teaching of philosophy and metaphysics.

It is important to know that, Shi'a are the second-most frequently attacked groups, after the Ahmadiyah, in Indonesia,¹⁵⁸ and the Shi'a Sunni violent attacks that happened in 2012 in the Sampang region, East Java is an example of this. According to Jalaluddin Rahmat, a well-known Shi'ite intellectual in Indonesia, there have been three waves of growth in the awareness of Shi'ism in Indonesia, before the Iranian Revolution, after the revolution, and the rise of Indonesian scholars whom graduated from Qom. The most important wave here is the second wave, which cultivated anti-Shi'ism among the Sunni majority in Indonesia and according to Ken Miichi, this anti-Shi'ism reflected the Saudi campaign of financial support against the exporting of Iran's revolution.¹⁵⁹

A very significant factor that contributed to the rise of Shi'ism and Shi'i institutions in Indonesia is the Qom graduates also known as the 'Qom Alumni'. These graduates pursued Islamic education in the Colleges of Learning in Qom, Iran, which is presently the most important center of Shi'i Islamic in the world. Among this Qom Alumni are Umar Shabab and his brother Husein Shabab, who are two of the most popular Shi'i figures engaged in educational and dawah activities in Indonesia.¹⁶⁰

In conclusion, we can see that most of the Shi'i educational institutions and organizations in Indonesia came to public awareness after the Iranian Revolution and some of these institutions were established by Indonesian Shi'is. One can also argue

¹⁵⁷ Umar Faruk Assegaf, "Aspects of Shi'ism in Contemporary Indonesia: A Quest for Social Recognition in Post-Suharto Era (1998-2008)," in *Shi'ism in South East Asia: Alid Piety and Sectarian Constructions*, eds., Chiara Formichi and Michael Feener (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

¹⁵⁸ Ken Miichi, "Minority Shi'a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia," *Middle East Institute*, (2016)

¹⁵⁹ Ken Miichi, "Minority Shi'a Groups as a Part of Civil Society in Indonesia,"

¹⁶⁰ Zulkifli, *The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia*, 27-8

that the Shi'i community have not been extensively involved in religious propaganda and hate speech compared to the Saudi supported Sunnis and Wahhabis in Indonesia. Most of the Shi'a and Sunni conflicts in Indonesia have been linked to the activities of the Sunni groups. This is probably the case because of the small Shi'a population compared to the Sunni in Indonesia. However, this thesis is more directed to the activities in which both Iran and Saudi Arabia have been involved in as a means of promoting their ideologies, which is one of their foreign policy objective in Indonesia and how these activities have caused religious violence and even terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

One assumption that can be derived from this case is that Iran has not really focused its foreign policy on the spread of Shi'ism compared to the spread of Wahhabi and Salafi doctrines by the Saudi's in Indonesia. This supports an early assumption that stated that Iran is more concerned about reinforcing its bilateral and trade ties with Indonesia.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

This thesis has studied the foreign policy objectives of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Indonesia. Indonesia is not only strategic because of the trade and economic interest Saudi Arabia and Iran have in there, but its large muslim population makes the country a strategic geographical location for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to exercise their foreign policy.

The arguments provided in this thesis shows that the foreign policy objectives of the two countries are an instrument of obtaining more influence in Indonesia. The most important value that these three countries (Indonesia, Iran and Saudi Arabia) share is Islam; in which two distinctive dominant religious sects aim to excercise their foreign policy as a mean of attaining their main objectives.

The thesis shows that Saudi Arabia started investing in its religious objectives immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. One of the principal objectives of the Khomeini's regime in Iran was to spread Shiism all over the World and Indonesia was a suitable place to do this due to its large Muslim population. In order to counter-attack the spread of Shiism in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia started building Islamic schools and Mosques to spread the Wahhabi Ideology.

In the wake of the consequences of the Islamic revolution, the ideology that brought the supreme leader into power continues to influence Iran's foreign policy. In the years following the regime change, Iran tried to "export" its revolution to neighboring Muslim countries. Indeed, at the time, the latter was presented as a model to follow, the first step of a larger movement. However, the Iranian designs met with very strong resistance and this strategy was a failure.

This setback did not prevent Tehran from pursuing a foreign policy tinged with its ideology. In fact, it has often denounced the oppression of the Arab populations vis-à-vis the Western powers, American in particular. For example, Iran is a strong advocate for the Palestinian cause and has a very tense relationship with Israel. Moreover, Tehran believes that Western interventionism in the Middle East is responsible for political and economic difficulties that would not otherwise exist. Thus, the creation of the state of Israel is seen as the ultimate example of this external control.

Nevertheless, despite the ideological differences between Tehran and the West, Iran's foreign policy remains close to national interests. Indeed, by its glorious imperial past, Iran is strongly committed to the idea that ancient Persia must remain a major regional political actor.

Banished by the international community, Iran wanted to defend her model of government. Also, Iran's foreign policy has been strongly marked by the perception of an external threat and the need to survive. This is reflected in particular by the fear of an American intervention that would aim to tip the regime in place. Indeed, Supreme Leader Khamenei has on many occasions accused the United States of attempting to destabilize its power by supporting the opposition, weakening the economy through sanctions, or arming its regional enemies.

In the end, Iran's foreign policy oscillates between ideology and pragmatism. Divided between the perception of an external threat and the desire to be an important global player, Iran leads a diplomacy that can sometimes seem erratic and irrational. However, this false impression should not obscure his real motives, for fear of producing a caricatural analysis of his diplomacy.

Saudi Arabia on the other hand is still accused of being a country that spreads Wahhabism around the world by financing mosques and Islamic Centers without providing tangible and concrete evidence. Saudi Arabia has been committed since its inception to help Muslims around the world: either in the construction of mosques or the distribution of the Holy Quran. The country has built and financed Islamic institutions and organization for the spread of its doctrine and the Arabic language in Indonesia.

After Suharto's departure, the trend towards a grotesque and fundamentalist interpretation of monotheistic religions continued. Saudi Arabia, with its Wahhabism favored and sponsored by the West, is playing an increasingly important role in Indonesia.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have been on a ups and down since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution. The two powers most often disagree on the crises in the region, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Futhermore, they accuse each other of

seeking to broaden their influence. They had broken off their relationship from 1987 to 1991, after bloody clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi forces during the Hajj in Mecca in 1987.

The following factors and historical timelines mentioned below have not only changed the foreign policy objectives of Iran and Saudi Arabia but also have put the two countries in an intense competition for a fight for hegemony in the Muslim World.

Iranian Revolution

In April 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran was established. Its guide, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was accused by Sunni Gulf countries of wanting to "export" the revolution to their homes.

Iran-Iraq War

In September 1980, Iraq attacked Iran. Saudi Arabia financially supported the regime of Saddam Hussein, and encourage other Sunni Gulf countries to do the same.

First break

In July 1987, Saudi security forces in Mecca repressed a banned protest by Iranian pilgrims. The clashes killed more than 400 people, mostly Iranians. The Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran were ransacked. And in 1988, Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Iran, whose pilgrims were absent from the Mecca pilgrimage until 1991. The situation calmed down in 1997 after the election of moderate President Mohammad Khatami, when he visited Saudi Arabia in 1999.

But the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 revives tension by pushing Baghdad into Iran's sphere of influence with the rise of Shiite rule. Recently, Saudi Arabia and his allies have returned to the Iraqi authorities to try to distance themselves from Iran.

Arab Spring

In March 2011, Saudi Arabia sent a thousand soldiers to Bahrain to quell the mainly Shiite protest, accusing Iran of inspiring the disturbances. From 2012, Tehran and Riyadh also oppose the Syrian conflict. Iran, aided by the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement, is the main regional supporter of Bashar al-Assad's regime, providing

military and financial assistance. Saudi Arabia opposes the Syrian president and supports rebel groups.

Yemen

In March 2015, Ryad launched a military operation at the head of an Arab coalition to prevent the Shiite Houthi rebels, accused of being supported by Tehran, from gaining control of all of Yemen.

New break

In September 2015, Iran denounced the "incompetence" of the Saudi authorities after a stampede that claimed the lives of hundreds of Iranians on the pilgrimage to Mecca. In January 2016, Saudi Arabia executed 47 people convicted of "terrorism", including a Shia official. The next day, Ryad breaks diplomatic relations with Tehran after the attack on his embassy in Iran.

Hezbollah

In early March 2016, Hezbollah, accused of serving as a bridgehead to Iran, is classified as "terrorist" by the Gulf Arab monarchies. The day before, his leader had accused Saudi Arabia of working for a "sedition between Sunni and Shiite Muslims". In November 2017, it is from Riyadh that Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri announced his resignation, accusing Hezbollah and its Iranian ally of "stranglehold" on Lebanon.

Qatar

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar. They accuse the emirate of "supporting terrorism", and getting closer to Iran.

Nuclear

In October 2017, the Saudi kingdom welcomed the decision of US President Donald Trump not to "certify" the historic agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, signed in 2015 by Iran and six major powers.

By the time this thesis is written, Indonesia has just held a Presidential Election (on April 17, 2019), in which the incumbent, Jokowi, is running againts the former Military

General, Prabowo. Meanwhile, FPI has been harshly criticizing Jokowi's leadership, and now FPI has also been actively involved in mobilizing public opinion by turning the wheel supporting Prabowo. However, the FPI leader and founder has not truly shown his trust for Prabowo and keep questioning his faith on Islam. Regardless this claim, one could assume that if Prabowo wins the last Presidential Election, FPI will have a say in decision making of the country. As an assumption, this would probably give Saudi Arabia a perfect opportunity for having more space in Indonesian domestic politics by using FPI as an intermediary to promote its ideology and conservatism. In order not let this happen, the Indonesian government should meticulously control the activities of foreign-funded religious organizations and should reduce their involvement in state politics if Indonesia wants to maintain its religious tolerance.

It should be kept in mind that a very large majority of Indonesian Muslims are attached to "Pancasila", the five great founding principles of the Indonesian state. The first of these principles clearly states that Islam is not the foundation of independent Indonesia, even if this religion is the majority. The first concerns the belief in one God: this might seem paradoxical, but this principle is supposed to allow each religion to conduct its practice accordingly.

As a policy recommendation, foreign-funded educational institutions and centers should be well monitored because some of the arguments presented in this paper stipulate some particular activities that trigger sectarian, ethnic and religious conflicts, which violates the main principle of the nation, Pancasila. In addition, the growing numbers of foreign-funded educational institutions shouldn't overshadow the quality and quantity of state-owned institutions. That is, the Indonesian government should pay more attention to public educational infrastructures.

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