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STRATEGIC CULTURE OF TURKEY

MASTER'S THESIS

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


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THESIS APPROVAL

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the elaboration of this thesis complies with scientific ethics, and refers to the appropriate scientific standards in case of utilization of others' works, as there has not been any tampering of the quoted data. This thesis is my original work and any part of this thesis has never been presented as another thesis in this university or any other university.

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Timur AKHMETOV

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Justice and Development Party
DP	: Democratic Party 1946 - 1961
EC	: The European Community
FPA	: Foreign Policy Analysis
NATO	: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	: National Security Council
PKK	: The Kurdistan Workers' Party
RPP	: Republican People's Party
UN	: The United Nations
USA	: The United States of America
USSR	: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Profound changes that took place in the political process of Turkish Republic in the last fifteen years among other things exerted a profound impact on how the national government views foreign policy. New trends resulted in reconsideration of traditional approaches in the Turkish foreign policy where views on utilization of military power has been holding a dominant place. To grasp these new tendencies, we should turn to the analysis of the nature of Turkish strategic culture, i.e. views, ideas and norms linked to the military power use outside national borders. Cases from modern Turkish history when political decision-makers were facing with security issues and were pondering over deployment of power may give us a factual background for formation of theoretical views on strategic culture of Turkey.

Keywords: Strategic Culture, Foreign Policy, Security, Foreign Policy Analysis, Diplomacy

Tezin Başlığı: Türkiye'nin Stratejik Kültürü**Tezin Yazarı:** Timur AKHMETOV **Danışman:** Doç. Dr. Tuncay KARDAŞ**Kabul Tarihi:** 28 Mayıs 2019 **Sayfa Sayısı:** 6 (ön kısım) + 95 (tez)**Anabilim Dalı:** Ortadoğu Çalışmaları

Türk siyasetinde son 15 yıl içerisinde meydana gelen hızlı değişimlerin aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin dış politika bakışında da derin tesirleri oldu. Bu yeni gelişme ışığında, askeri güç kullanmayı merkeze alan Türk Dış politikasının geleneksel ilkelerinin gözden geçirilmesine fırsat sundu. Bu yeni trendleri daha iyi kavramak için, ulusal sınırların dışında silahlı güç kullanımı kapsayan ilke, fikir ve görüşlerin oluşturduğu Türk stratejik kültürünün temeli incelenmelidir. Bu çerçevede, Türk yetkililerinin güvenlik sorunları ile ilgili karar vermek zorunda kaldıkları ve güç kullanımı konusunda kafa yordukları tarihsel vakalar, Türkiye'nin stratejik kültürü üzerine kuramsal görüşlerin doğması için kuramsal bir arka plan sağlayabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Stratejik Kültür, Dış Politika, Güvenlik, Dış Politika Analizi, Diplomasi

INTRODUCTION

The changes that took place after the collapse of the USSR led to tectonic shifts and change of power balance in all major geopolitical areas of the world. Tectonic shifts of the 1990s brought new challenges as well as new opportunities for Turkey. Being a member of the NATO alliance and an active partner of the European Union, on the one hand, and a country located on the cross-section of many cultures and even whole civilizations, on the other, provided Turkey a great inspiration and drive for transformation both at home and in its foreign policy. In a new world Turkey felt itself fit enough to become an active political actor capable of shaping the political processes unfolding in its neighborhood rather than being a passive observer.

With a formation of stable government under a new political party, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP), Turkish Republic in 2000s managed to bring about a number of important political and economic changes. This created an opportunity for Turkey to adapt to new global realities and become a strong regional power with due claims and ambitions beyond its national borders.

New pro-active stance of the Turkish government under AKP was dominated by new approaches in its foreign policy and was branded by new forms of interaction between main groups of elites and institutions responsible for foreign policy decisions. These policy innovations and political novelties were, however, implemented "within" the old institutional and ideational framework, some elements of which had been continuing since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. This makes any research on the foreign policy of Turkey both demanding and interesting.

In terms of a foreign policy a modern Turkey prepared ground for new trends and ideas to come forward because political elites felt more certain about their activist stance abroad. This assertiveness mainly was derived from a wide democratic mandate: electoral success of the new ruling party was mainly caused in the desire of the Turkish society to bring about radical changes in all spheres, including foreign policy and country's stance in a number of regional affairs. A new Turkey aims to shape its environment rather than to be a mere spectator of regional politics.

This active engagement and openness to more interaction with the world beyond its secured borders further deal with the questions of what coming Turkish foreign policy eventually should look like, what importance would be given to a military force as a political tool, what views future Turkish political elites would share on the use of force abroad and, finally, whether history would still have an impact on the Turkish foreign policy.

Concentration of attention on a military power and its deployment beyond national borders is supported by theoretical views on the essence and nature of state and its sovereign status within the context of the international relations dominated by states as primary players and actors. Being a central part of the so-called high politics, a military power is considered to be an intrinsic attribute of any state. To deploy a force within the national boundaries has been historically viewed as an ultimate expression of state sovereignty.

In contrast, being limited to exert force and violence against its own subject was interpreted as a sign of submission to some other political will, like it was the case in many colonial territories during the rise of the European powers between 17th and 19th centuries. By the same token, freedom to choose between diplomacy and war has been traditionally regarded as a manifestation of the national sovereignty vis-a-vis state's environment. This, in turn, may suggest that we can comprehend the nature of a given state by analyzing its foreign policy activism with the help of study of its strategic culture.

To be more precise, in order to be able to grasp the Turkish foreign policy we should first be clear about what place a major component in a foreign policy of any nation, a military force, occupies in it. We have to look at how the Turkish political elites have seen a military power and perceived any instances of its deployment outside national borders. What interaction between the armed force and diplomacy could be expect in critical situations when political elites and decision-makers were facing a scare of time for a thorough analysis of the situation and were forced to act rather instinctively.

To consider the views of elites on the use of military power as an alternative to diplomacy it requires, in its turn, to look at evolution of political elites' views on the nature of a military power as an instrument of the national foreign policy. In other words, we have

to understand what strategic culture of Turkey is, from what elements it is composed, in what circumstances it has been developing and what underlining characteristics it bears.

Our further premise is that after identifying major factors that have been shaping the Turkish foreign policy since 1923 we can see a hierarchy of these elements by scrutinizing instances when Turkish decision-makers were facing serious foreign policy challenges and when the idea of military power deployment beyond national borders was a part of discussions. Understanding of Turkish strategic culture may significantly contribute to better understanding of Turkish foreign policy.

Research Objectives

This study strives to explain how policy makers in Turkey react once confronted with a foreign policy dilemma, especially in cases when challenges necessitate discussions on military power use abroad as a foreign policy tool that may bring solution. In other words, aim of this thesis is to determine main parameters of the Turkish strategic culture by laying out its path of evolution throughout Turkey's history spanning from 1923 till 1998, dominating strategic traditions that can be found within the scope of this culture and to reveal how strategic culture is interconnected to the decision-making process, in which historical cases of force use outside Turkish borders are carefully analyzed.

In order to set a theoretical framework of the study, an analytical description of strategic culture concept will be provided as well. Author will show that foreign policy analysis can be applied to studies of strategic culture. The study will then focus on the changes of strategic culture's main contributing factors relevant in the Turkish context, like international constellations with regards to political situation on Turkey's political borders, arrangements of civil-military relations and gradual inclusion of broader population in the political process.

This will allow not only to understand the changes in apportionment of principal political forces that shape and channel the decision-making process in the Turkish Republic, but also will demonstrate principal trends in the Turkish society and general views on what place Turkey occupies and should occupy within the system of the international relations, what kind of relations this country should enjoy with its neighbors.

Methodology

To find the main parameters of Turkish strategic culture, this study utilizes a qualitative analysis by delving into critical junctures in Turkish political history. For such a research question, qualitative study is the most suitable method, and it will provide explanations concerning historical and internal dynamics of Turkish politics.

Author outlines main theoretical views on strategic culture and then summarize existing literature on the topic. Author expects to come out with several relevant factors that shape political elites' views on military power as a foreign policy tool. These factors, or areas of interests of this research, we be dealt further in the context of foreign policy analysis and, more importantly, in the context of their relevance in the Turkish strategic culture.

To select the most relevant factors that define strategic culture of Turkey author will focus on three analytical level where foreign policy is being shaped, namely international constellations with regards to political situation on Turkey's borders, arrangements of civil-military relations and gradual inclusion of broader population in the political process. Author thinks that these factors influence and shape foreign policy in Turkey and in essence should be relevant for strategic culture as well.

To demonstrate the existence and progressive evolution of strategic priorities, interplay between framework factors and use of power, several cases of challenges to the Turkish foreign policy will be scrutinized. Author will attempt to develop a definition of several historical cases of strategic dilemmas when the national government was forced to decide on use of power outside Turkey in the period from the birth of the Republic in 1923 till 1998.

Selected cases ideally should stand for various time spans, domestic political constellations, foreign environment examples and different examples of military power deployment as a political and diplomacy tool or when its use was considered as one of the strategic choices along with a more traditional diplomatic conduct.

Cases to analyze are those that deal mostly and exclusively with times when Turkish Republic had to make a decision on use\threat\ demonstration of military force abroad as a foreign policy tool. After demonstrating dominant strategic options Turkish decision-

makers were assisted during these periods, author will try to highlight contours of continuity of some strategic traditions that tend to dominate discussions or, in other case, treat into the background, but nonetheless occupy significant place in the agenda of state bureaucracy, thus, making the essence of the Turkish strategic culture.

In short, this thesis will utilize qualitative research method which is in line with the common understanding in the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy. It will help analyze the factors of strategic culture which are most relevant to the Turkish case.

Relevance & Significance of the Study

Relevance of research on the Turkish strategic culture can be evidenced by several underlying assumptions that deal mainly with the problem of how Turkey is gradually becoming a more assertive regional power with larger assets and more resources for a more proactive foreign policy and, by extension, for better use of military power abroad. On the other hand, we witness lack of relevant literature on this issue, thus major policy makers are deprived of theoretical tools to be prepared for Turkish foreign policy in the coming years.

On other words, to comprehend what strategic traditions have been underpinning Turkish foreign policy and what different arrays of strategic priorities have been engaging with each other is to be competent to anticipate general guidelines along which Turkey is set to accomplish its foreign policy vision in the next several decades. This would also mean that

For the last 30 years Turkey has demonstrated its ability to run independent foreign policy in harmony with its security and military agreements with Turkey's western partners. Being a country with steadily rising standards of living and expanding economic resources Turkey found itself wanting and being needed to be a part of many regional issues, ranging from humanitarian projects to logistic and security assistance during military operations.

Another trend that makes current research especially valuable for future policy makers has been ongoing since 2000s and deals with expanding scope of democratic values and procedures in the Turkish society. As a part of this broader process, relations between the

military and civil government, a major contributing factor to strategic culture, as this thesis endeavors to demonstrate, also undergo considerable changes in direction to more democratization and control of civilian authorities over the military apparatus.

These changes can potentially result in changes in Turkey's strategic culture, implying that future civilian governments will be looking differently at the world, perceiving outside threats and Turkey's role on the global politics. Most importantly, these changes can alter traditional views on the issue of military power used abroad as a means of achieving of Turkey's strategic goals.

This research can, therefore, serve as a contribution to more nuanced understanding of the Turkish foreign policy through specification of transformation taking place in strategic culture. In turn, a better understanding of the Turkish strategic culture may provide a valuable help to attempts to provide and prolong stability in various regions that witness Turkey's rising involvement and active foreign policy engagement.

Main Argument

Argument of this thesis consists of three interlinked and logically coherent parts. First hypothesis of this thesis is that due to historical legacy of the fall of Ottoman Empire and a nation-building process in Turkish Republic defined views of decision-making elites on use of military power abroad. Modern history of Turkey was marked with laborious adjustment of Turkish state to new international realities where new neighbours of Turkey were rarely friendly and more often than that suspicious to the latter's activism abroad.

This presupposes that Turkish decision-makers would be reluctant to use military forces as a foreign policy tool, instead relying on diplomacy to the very end. Possible explanation of this can be found in the fact that since the disintegration of the multinational Ottoman Empire and foundation of a row of national states around the newly founded Turkish border any act of defiance against the newly established regional order, supported further by the colonial interests of the European empires, could, in theory, trigger a formation of an anti-Turkish front, as it was the case during the First Balkan War. The clashes with neighbouring states could lead to more territorial losses of the modern Turkish Republic.

Further hypothesis deals with civil-military relations in Turkey and says that Turkish military, once dominating foreign-policy decision making process, reluctant to use military power abroad as a foreign policy tool if any such deployment risks escalation on Turkish borders and detrimental challenges to political regime at home, especially in terms of the Cold war's bipolar power constellations.

This hypothesis is further reinforced by assumption that since the first years of the Republic, the Turkish military gradually gained a prominent place within the political system and managed to proclaim itself a guarantor of the Kemalist regime, successfully circumventing civil political parties and bypassing the system of checks and balances. Interlinkage between the political status and engagement of the military and stability of the political regime, including in the face of the foreign intervention and pressure, has been exerting considerable influence on formation of strategic culture of Turkey.

Finally, another hypothesis stipulates that with deeper participation of population in democratic process, values and views of broader layers of society on use of power abroad are reckoned with by national elites. It further implies that decision-making process involving deployment of military force as a foreign policy tool gets influenced by such popular views.

Turkish voters' views on a foreign policy issues in such cases get more influential and, in the end, define final decision. This hypothesis tries to delve into interactions of domestic political processes, influence of the Turkish society and expression of strategic culture of Turkey. In other words, domestic democratic process may shape strategic culture.

Thesis Outline

This thesis consists of 6 chapters. In the first chapter, the concept of strategic culture is scrutinized in detail, where relevant literature is presented and principal views on the issue are explained. The second chapter deals with theoretical framework of foreign policy analysis and relevance for study of strategic culture. In the same chapter, Turkish foreign policy is dissected using longitudinal analysis to show relevant factors that can also be applied to Turkish strategic culture. The third chapter deals with strategic culture of Turkey itself by explain how factors, extracted from the previous chapter, can be relevant to the Turkish case. Three issues are taken into analysis: international environment, civil-

military relations and political system of Turkey and their perspective interrelation to decision-making process involving use of military power abroad. The fourth chapter takes 5 cases from Turkish history where each factor plays out or interplay with each other so that decision-making process gets crystallized. This approach would enable us to understand perpetual and permanent features of decision-making, thus, the essence of Turkish strategic culture. The sixth chapter concludes with final remarks on where hypotheses were confirmed by results of analysis of Turkish strategic culture.



CHAPTER 1: CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

To understand where we should focus our attention in research of the Turkish strategic culture, it is imperative to understand several things. We should, first, understand what strategic culture is and what place it occupies in the foreign policy, what areas of political life tend to exert profound influence on shaping elites' views on nature of military power used as a means of foreign policy. It is important, thus, to start with theoretical views on the subject and history of their evolution.

1.1. First Generation of Research on Strategic Culture

For the first time the concept of strategic culture as a part of the analytical framework was applied by Jack L. Snyder in the 1977 work titled "The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations" (J. L. Snyder, 1977). In his work Snyder on the example of the Soviet strategic thinking in the nuclear warfare tried to come out with a conceptual framework that would explain how certain ways of strategic thinking of political elites define decision-making process and their views on utility of use of nuclear weapon in terms of advancement of national interest.

To demonstrate his theoretical assumptions Snyder tried to establish certain patterns of behaviour and sets of motives and restraints of political elites when they had to come out with a decision in strategically vital issues, chiefly when an armed force, in case of Snyder's research – a nuclear weapon, is justified to be resorted to either in real-life warfare or as a political means within the power calculus.

When pondering over how strategic culture is formed Snyder notes that process of socialization of political elites plays a crucial role and is responsible for persistence of main elements in strategic culture: values, norms and worldviews. It is the very essence of strategic culture, meaning that through socialization elites and those groups that enjoy access to the decision-making, get exposed to prevalent cultural norms, regulating people's actions, including those linked to conduct of a foreign policy as a state. According to Snyder, during socialization principal views, notions, conceptions of the world around us that form the core of strategic culture are transmitted from a generation to a next generation of political elites and groups responsible for strategic decision-

making (J. L. Snyder, 1977). This emphasize on transmittance of values and norms further lead us to assume that strategic culture lives beyond the span of one single generation and forms the prolonged tradition of well-accepted conduct of foreign policy.

However, Snyder draws attentions to the fact that those very elites project society's various worldviews to the world outside, though to some extent diffracted and changed under the influence of elites' own presumptions, and eventually translate them into real life policy decisions that serve to find an optimal solution to the challenges coming from that outside world. This imply that under extreme conditions existing norms can be bended as a result of strategic cultural innovation done by creative decision-making by those very elites who find existing norms inadequate to given situations.

It is worth noting that in his work Snyder acknowledged the existence of other factors beyond strategic culture that affect the strategic decision-making process as well. Among them are personal qualities of leaders, who are responsible for running state policies. Creative approaches to new and unanticipated challenges lead to formation of new norms, in case such patterns of behaviour get repeated by further generations of decision-makers.

Besides, Snyder proposed the idea that there can be several strategic subcultures implying continuous competition between various sets of strategic choices supported and promoted by different clans and groups of elites, thus making it important to study political elites and their interaction with each other during decision-making process. This further implies the need for examination not only dominant political elites, but those political forces that for some reasons have potential rule, but, nevertheless, are excluded from the decision-making process.

While evaluating how historical factors exert influence on the formation of strategic culture Snyder notes that history presents itself as a context, in which strategic culture is formed in its initial phase. Historical evolution of a state, development of its foreign policy and ideas about and views on the world and international order, advance of mechanism of an elite circulation and technological progress also exert considerable influence in the process of evolution of strategic culture. Snyder describes the development of strategic culture as an evolutionary process with slowly ongoing changes,

where at a certain periods of time some parts of it come to prevail and others dwindle just to occupy fundamental place later on again.

In his other work "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor" Snyder adds details to his initial concept of strategic culture. Snyder points out that despite the fact that only political elites take final strategic decisions, broader society nevertheless exerts its influence on the decision-making process by the way how political elites are socialized within a given society and thus come out as bearers of society's prevalent worldviews.

Furthermore, when writing about interconnection between domestic and external political spheres Snyder underlines that differences in strategic cultures are there primarily due to different international environment in which given states had to operate. At the same time, Snyder claims that abrupt changes in the domestic politics tend to exert limited influence on strategic culture in the long run, since continuity of strategic culture is forced by the ongoing process of socialization of political elites, institutionalization and formation of political bodies that tend to be very resistant to sudden changes (J. Snyder, 1990).

Snyder, who laid a foundation to the first generation of studies on strategic culture, criticizes previous approach prevalent in the western academia dealing with analysis of decision-making process around the globe. Snyder along with other researchers of the first generation didn't agree with the claim that states and political elites act under the influence of omnipresent logic of rational choice. In other words, author reject the idea that decision-makers are perfectly aware of the matrix of choices, alternatives, advantages and disadvantages of such choices. Nor do the claim that elites are in a perfect condition of informational abundances surrounding the decision-making process.

Such approach, according to Snyder, effectively eliminates all cultural and national differences that normally can and should influence to some degree the way how strategic decisions are made. Alternatively, rational choice framework may lead to irrelevance of national studies of strategic culture. The very issue of national differences, therefore, became the main research subject of many later strategic culture scholars. For example, a British-American strategic thinker and professor of International Relations Colin Gray in his work "National Styles in Strategy: The American Example" tries to explain how

strategic culture, presented in the work as a certain type of thinking and actions about use of forces, is formed by history of a given society and its perceptions (Gray, 1981).

In his later paper "Strategic culture as context" Gray further develops his ideas on strategic culture and views it not merely as "a milieu within which strategic ideas and defense policy decisions are debated and decided", but rather as an ideational context of the strategic decision-making process, thus suggesting that although strategic culture may not define final decisions, it can, however, define the agenda (Gray, 1999). Mild approach to strategic culture as a encapsulating environment reduced determinism of decision-making process and opens doors to further stricter analysis of competition of alternative traditions of strategic culture.

Grey draws attention to the idea that extreme international conditions and events, when elites are faced with time limit, rationality as a factor seems to be playing less relevance, instead such things as strategic culture generally tend to come to the forefront as a mechanism of guidance for the ideal foreign policy based on past experience. When experimentation or application of creative policies have a high price due to impossibility of exact calculation and high chances of adverse feedback reaction of international environment, reliance on past experience, historical cases of successful decisions of the past generations, becomes the primary mode of action. In other words, in extreme conditions with highly inimical environment strategic culture impacts the decision-making process the most.

A more delicate analysis of the question which elements forming strategic culture can be found in David R. Jones' work "Soviet Strategic Culture". Author endeavors to explain how such factors as geography, ethno-cultural layout and historical development can influence the formation of strategic culture (Jones, 1990). Jones imply that strategic culture is not a collection of norms and values that form decisions per se, but rather a certain worldview, philosophy, lifestyle formed not only by life experience of whole generations, but rather of people, during various periods of its development.

On the other hand, a Professor of Strategic Leadership at the Naval War College, Carnes Lord in his work "American Strategic Culture" is more inclined to pay attention to the military armed forces, which are structured and used by a society in the service of its

political goals. The framework that provides traditional practices and habits of thought for such application is called a strategic culture. Lord works out six main factors that define and narrow the scope of strategic culture: the geopolitical settings, military history of a given state, international relations, political culture and existing ideology, the nature of relations between the civil govern and the military and military technologies available for use (Lord, 1985).

A special accent on the military as a ultimate decision-makers is put in the work of a Polish-American academic Richard Pipes, who in the article title "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War" tried to explain different strategic choices made in the USA and Soviet Union by differences in how the militaries of both states perceive use of forces and international order.

Pipes concludes that different socialization processes, historical experience, notions of rational use of force and view on diplomacy in the times of crisis, - all these factors contribute to the establishment of different and unique strategic cultures (Pipes, 1977).

Even though first generation authors did a great deal of work to establish a scientific framework for further discussions on the concept of strategic culture, their works had a series of flaws. Primary concern was attributed to the subjective character of analysis of given strategic cultures too much attention was paid to the individual experience and features of states without much elaborating on the methodological framework that could be applicable to other cases. Difficulties with operationalization of variables were also mentioned as a part of critique by authors of later generations. There were no single set of factors that make up strategic culture or, as in some cases, such set was so broad that left no space for a non-strategic culture explanation of strategic choice.

No less important points were raised by Alastair Iain Johnston, a Professor of China in World Affairs in the Government Department at Harvard University, who noticed that first-generation writers failed to mention the cases when strategic culture, which is not something "out there", is consciously manipulated by the elites who seek to secure their control over decision-making process (Johnston, 1995).

1.2. Second Generation of Research on Strategic Culture

New wave of research on strategic culture became possible with a rising influence of constructivism and structuralism in the international relations studies. Second-generation writers made a special focus on the pondering over robust methodology and coming out with a clear separation between cultural aspects and behaviour of decision-makers. A study on the American nuclear strategy by a historian Bradley Klein sets an illustration of such efforts. In his study Klein attempts to demonstrate how political elites and state institutions politically commodify and make use of culture. Author separated between what was said during discussions on the strategic dilemmas and what was really implemented within the political struggle between political elites.

For Klein, a state, which is solely responsible for improving of a strategy, naturally inclines to increase its own sphere of domination by all means available at any given moment. It therefore comes out with such a strategic culture that facilitates its control over society and power resources by designing a preferred image of hostile international order that requires application of force for security at home.

Klein goes on to state that "strategic culture is more than mere military style, for it emerges from an infrastructure of technology and an armaments sector. Most importantly, it is based upon the political ideologies of public discourse that help define occasions as worthy of military involvement." (Klein, 1988) In his another work "The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defense Manuals Lately?" Klein further notes that process, during which a national strategy is developed, must be approached as a manifestation of the power relations in both realms of domestic and international politics (Klein, 1989).

Yet another writer, who is being ascribed to the second generation of researchers of strategic culture, a political sociologist Robin Luckham by trying to understand the power relations encoded in the strategic discourse concentrates at the technological, military and security aspects. While doing this, Luckham in "Armament Culture" also tries to demonstrated that discussions on national security issues are being stimulated most of the time by the elite circles who are interested primarily in keeping their own power positions and getting more political resources.

The case of the military arms corporations shows that elites can misuse historical legacy, ideational narratives and broadly accepted ideas in a way to broaden their power and overcome restrictions imposed by a democratic system (Luckham, 1984). The securitization of public discourse serves the sole aim to bend the debates and convince society in mandating more power, prerogatives and resources to groups that are primarily responsible for the security issues. However, it should not be forgotten that public debates inevitably lead to such process, abuse of political power, however, should normally be prevented by stricter public oversight and exertion of transparent decision-making process, especially in regards to the budget spendings.

In a similar manner a Professor of Cultural and Political Geography at Durham University David Campbell in his book "Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity" suggests that development of strategic priorities and specifically foreign policy agenda is driven largely by political calculations of the given political elite establishment. Among major political considerations of these elites Campbell points at the need to sideline political rivals by supporting suitable identities and narratives. "The claim is not that foreign policy constitutes state identity *de novo* rather, it is that foreign policy is concerned with the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the containment of challenges to that identity.

In other words, foreign policy does not operate in a domain free of entrenched contingencies or resistances. Whichever foreign policy practices are implemented, they always have to overcome or neutralize other practices which might instantiate alternative possibilities for identity; and the intensive and extensive nature of the 'internal' and 'external' political contestation that this presupposes means the efficacy of one particular practice will more often than not be sharpened by the representation of danger" (Campbell, 1992). Campbell's insight emphasizes the connection between how elites formulate foreign policy priorities, and by extension strategic culture, and how the use of foreign policy decision-making process for own domestic political calculus.

The literature of the second generation of studies on strategic culture provides a unique insight into the nature of political discourse that surrounds the strategic debates. It is, however, worth noting that while paying their attention to the question how political elites use this discourse, writers generally overlook the fact that in formulation of strategy is

based on some political considerations of the elites, there is little cultural left in strategic culture. In other words, the role of objective determinants that exist beyond the politics is ignored.

The second-generation authors make a claim that while different countries and societies indeed have different cultural realms, underlying factors of strategic culture are in the non-cultural realms. Finally, while being rather vague on the dissimilarities of strategic culture across the globe authors fail to provide clear explanation how political elites sharing common realpolitik or interest-based posture may be a factor to the establishment of different strategic cultures.

1.3. Third Generation of Research on Strategic Culture

Building its research on the first two waves of literature on strategic culture the authors of the so-called third generation emphasized the role of strict methodological and falsifiable theoretical framework. Moreover, while stating that history indeed has a profound effect on the strategic culture formulation, third generation writers opted out to focus their attention of how strategic culture is shaped by the recent practice and experience, meanwhile getting a space for a rigid methodology.

One of the researchers who tried to approach strategic culture from this stance was American political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston, who among other things tried to combined cultural aspects of strategic culture with political realism by bringing into the concept of "strategic preference" into the issue under discussion. For Johnston strategic culture represents a set of established symbols (structure of argumentation, language, analogy and metaphor) that help to institutionalize long-lasting strategic preferences through formulation of military power's role and effectiveness in the interstate political interactions.

In his analytical article "Thinking about Strategic Culture" Iain Johnston gives a concise theoretical framework for study of strategic culture. Johnston underlines that strategic culture ideally fits with the notions of limited rationality: it simplifies reality, forms ranked preferences and limits options and, finally, it provides a guidance to decision by giving historical choices, analogies, metaphors and precedents. This approach further

enable the researcher to conclude that though strategic culture doesn't per se define the choice it is, however, defines the agenda and the scope of choices (Johnston, 1995).

In regard to the methodology, Johnston paid much attention to the "culture-bearing" units such as strategists, leaders of the military and national security elites; weaponry designs and uses; war plans; images of war and peace portrayed in various newspapers and other means of the mass media; military ceremonies; even war literature. Analysis of these units would provide us with set of preferences when use of force abroad is discussed.

Another set of issues on strategic culture, which third generation researchers try to resolve, mainly revolve around the question of how strategic culture is formed. A clue to how strategic culture is formed can be found in Jeffrey Lantis' work "Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism" who stipulated that "exogenous shocks, elites, or domestic disagreement on interpretive codes of acceptable behavior in foreign and security policy" are major factors that define strategic culture (Lantis, 2005). Professor of Political Science at The College of Wooster Kerry Longhurst in "The Concept of Strategic Culture" writes that strategic culture can undergo two types of change either "fine-tuning" or "fundamental change", with the former option occurring more often (Longhurst, 2000).

To sum up, the evaluation of the available literature on strategic culture demonstrates us several important notions that are of relevance for this research. There is an accent among these works on the idea that strategic culture is a direct product of the historical development, it is formed evolutionally with changes occurring either instantly, as a result of shocks, or progressively, through the natural advancement of political processes of a given nation. It makes, thus, factors of political change crucial for any analysis: be it a structure of political elites, a type of political system and openness of a political system.

Due to an evolutionary character of strategic culture, a factor of historical experience bears a special place in the analytical framework of any research on strategic culture. Moreover, it is a history of a nation's interaction with the outside world that is important for the researches. It forms a nation's worldview about the world, its neighbors, and effectiveness of diplomacy vis-à-vis military tools of foreign policy and, finally, it provides a good understanding about nation's capabilities to resolve the issues.

Ideas and views on use of military power are relevant to the worldviews of elites on nature of international relations as well. It is important to note that elites tend to adopt different approaches to diplomacy and war in different international environments. It means that not only historical experience of elites shape strategic culture: views of elites on outside world at a given time are also relevant for strategic culture.

As underlined above, closer examination of the political regime may disclose factors that influence strategic culture. It shows how far society takes part at the political process, therefore, how good communication canals between elite circles (a nation's decision-makers) and general public operate. Bearing different worldviews and cultural identities general public under good functioning democratic system can exert enough influence to bring forward its views on use of power into the decision-making process.

Besides, analysis of the political system provides an chance to understand the state of affairs between the civil government and military, i.e. two institutions that shape strategic culture with their decisions on the issue of power use abroad. Moreover, any analysis of political constellations provides opportunity to see the state itself with its system of checks and balances that encapsulate the decision-making procedure of strategic culture, among other things. Finally, inspection of political conditions in a certain nation sheds light on a role of charismatic influential political rulers and ideological notions in the decisions in the foreign policy.

Having outlining principle factors that writes on strategic culture tend to outline as important for any analysis, we have to deal with a question of what factors from the ones mentioned above are relevant for the Turkish case. To answer this question, we would like to turn to analysis of Turkish foreign policy. The reason for this lies in our understanding of strategic culture's in the national foreign policy. If we define foreign policy as a principle choice between diplomacy and war in pursuit of national interests, it is logically relevant to say that views on use of military power, i.e. strategic culture, occupy central place in foreign policy.

CHAPTER 2: FROM TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TO TURKISH STRATEGIC CULTURE

2.1. Looking for Strategic Culture in Foreign Policy

As was noted in the previous chapter, one of the major obstacles many researchers of strategic culture face today is an unbalanced methodological base. Studies of strategic culture mainly have had descriptive character and lacked rigorous methodological discipline. The problem is further complicated by lack of reasonable operationalization of variables and factors that contribute to establishment of strategic culture.

As part of efforts to overcome these difficulties we would like to suggest analyzing strategic culture within the realms of foreign policy analysis. This claim is based in the tight connection between foreign policy and strategic culture where the former is a situational manifestation of long-term "set of patterns of and for behaviour on war and peace issues" (Booth, 2005).

Being one of the dimensions of foreign policy, strategic culture is also formed both by internal and external factors, relating to the inputs coming from outside and inside realms of the sovereign domain. There are, however, many views on what group of factors exerts the most profound influence on foreign policy and, by extension, strategic culture. Some researchers, as it will be shown in this chapter, argue for a primary role of external environment of a state, in which it has to operate: be it international relations or global politics. This claim has gained much credibility with an increasing pace of globalization and concurrent rise of non-state actors that tend to penetrate national borders, thus influencing internal political process and foreign policy decision-making.

Another view is that foreign policy is to a much greater extent influenced by domestic political setting. This claim further entails that strategic culture is manifested through foreign policy decisions, though is formed within the continuous political dynamics taking place within the national borders (Gözen, 2001). It is, therefore, crucially important to take a foreign policy analysis as a starting point of research of strategic culture by focusing at long-term factors that form a given nation's foreign policy and extrapolating

the findings on strategic culture's realms of ideas, norms, sets of behaviour dealing with war-related issues in the external, outside environment beyond national borders.

2.2. Placing Foreign Policy in a Broader Context

It is important to review here theoretical views on a major issue that stands in the center of the current work: how a nation's foreign policy relates to levels of political process on social, bureaucratic and international level. In other words we should look at how academicians tend to view relations between a nation's behaviour outside its sovereignty, outside environment, and political developments taking place within national borders. The brief review of relevant theoretical approaches to the issue would give us a chance to understand what shapes foreign policy and, as a further extent of it, strategic culture.

Classical realist school of thinking, expressed most evidently by an American political scientist Hans Morgenthau, places foreign policy and domestic politics on a single logical presumption: all activities are driven by political considerations, the central of which is a struggle for power. However, classical realists emphasize that foreign policy, in contrast to the domestic politics, is determined by national interests, an objective sets of goals and principles intrinsically formed by factors like unchanging nature of a human being, geographical setting, history of a nation. National interests are realized by national elites but political regime through its activities vis-à-vis the outside world gives national interests a shape, but not the essence (Morgenthau & Nations, 1948).

Development under the influence of profound changes in the world the neorealist school of theory of international relations kept central ideas of realism updating them to suit new realities. States are described by the neorealists as rational actors (Waltz, 2010). Nevertheless, national interests don't enjoy fundamental importance in their analysis; it is rather a structure of international system, basically relations between states, that ultimately define each nation's actions (thus neorealism is called structural realism) (Waltz, 2000).

In contrast to realism, adherents of a liberal theory of international relations pay special attention to domestic political realities when they try to explain nations' actions with each other. Their assumption is that political actors, not only political elites, shape foreign policy through standing negotiation and tradeoffs. Rules of international relations, or

rather world politics (since liberalism tends to embrace other actors of global interaction), tend to promote cooperation and mutual prosperity (Moravcsik, 1997).

With further wave of globalization by the end of the 20 century liberals were motivated to update their assumptions so as to be able to embrace non-state actors' rising influence on the global politics. American academic Robert Keohane's liberal institutionalism proposes taking socio-political institutes, existing on the both sides of more and more transparent national borders, in effect implying a closer look at the domestic political conditions in explaining of foreign policies (Keohane & Martin, 1995).

As a further development of liberal views on international relations, the Democratic Peace Theory stipulated that due to internal characteristics of their regimes democratic states tend to avoid direct confrontation with each other. This approach implied methodological relevance of domestic political setting in explanation of states' behaviour.

Accent on the domestic environment is also characteristic to the Marxist theory which claims that foreign policy (and as a sum of its international relations), in effect, is a direct result of political struggle between classes with national borders and by extent is shaped by economic relations of a given nation (Buecker, 2003). With increased interdependence between states and formation of distinct groups of states divided by economic development, an American sociologist and historical social scientist Immanuel Wallerstein came forward with his world-systems theory, according to which international relations are defined by dominance of a richer North over a poor South, where each nation's foreign policy is shaped by dynamics within the system of economic dependence and exploitation (Wallerstein, 1974).

A novelist view on nature of foreign policy and international relations was also delivered by an American political scientist James Rosenau who emphasized a role of an individual in shaping the global politics in the age of expanding globalization. Rosenau's concept of coexistence of international, i.e. interstate, relations with network of relations between non-state and intrastate political actors contributed to developing methodological arsenal of foreign policy analysis (Rosenau, 2006).

Another theory of international relations, constructivism, tend to avoid tight reliance on material dimensions of relations instead focusing on ideas that influence states' behaviour

(Walt, 1998). Public discourse on political matters, identity formation and broader notions of power, enemy-friend relations, peace and war, national interests - all these things ultimately shape international relations. This claim suggest that domestic political environment through its ideational manifestation comes forward as an area of interest that can provide clues for understanding foreign policy and therefore, strategic culture.

To sum up, we see that majority of current theoretical approaches to state behaviour in the international behaviour tend to focus on both external and internal factors that define how states react to foreign policy challenges. Thus, it is now important to outline mechanism what levels of political process influence national decision-making process and how they are relevant to our research.

2.3. Analyzing Foreign Policy

Before outlining major views on main factors of the Turkish foreign policy which would contribute to understanding of a nature of the Turkish strategic culture, we first have to briefly focus on major theoretical approaches in the foreign policy analysis and reveal major views to apprehending the nature of decision-making process.

Many years the discipline of the foreign policy analysis, when scrutinizing a state decision-making process of foreign policy issues, was focusing on the agency of single individuals, politicians who had control over how decisions are formulated and implemented. Major assumption was that individuals follow well-defined patterns of rational thinking where goal is seen as either being connected to power-retention and power-expansion. A new trend in the foreign policy analysis was brought with understanding that power was not the only rationale during decision-making process, rather it is general interest of an agent that defines the process and therefore the goal setting (Hudson, 2013).

Another development in the foreign policy analysis was contributed by works that emphasized a role of groups like bureaucracy, parties, movements, elites etc. that in reality tend to framework any decision-maker's views on a given foreign-policy problem, thus, contributing to understanding, making and implementation of decisions. Individuals' cognition is framed through many venues by the groups she belongs (Breuning, 2007).

Identity, affection, group history and values – there are some factors that make individuals be influenced by the groups during the decision-making process.

Further development and a level of analysis in the foreign policy analysis was connected with views on the role of a state as a single unified political actor and decision-maker in itself. Views on a state mainly were focusing on its characteristics that live through a considerable time period and are structural rather than situational in their performance. History, long-term economic demands and capabilities, military power, national identity, culture of a given society are among factors that are studied at this level.

Furthermore, with a rise of globalization and its due influence on the decision-making process on the national level the foreign policy analysis included to its arsenal works on the nature of international environment's relations with the foreign policy decision-making process. Bigger role of global actors, redefinition of sovereignty, transparency of national borders, economic and military interdependency enriched the foreign policy analysis (Alden & Aran, 2016).

Taking these views in consideration, one can say that the foreign policy analysis tends to embrace several principle layers of decision-making process beginning from individuals to state institutions. By extrapolating these findings on strategic culture, we can say that these layers can be taken as reference points in our research. First of all, individuals tend to project their views during decision-making process and influence decisions on deployment of military power, on the other hand, individuals through electoral process may bring their worldviews into decision-making as well, exerting a limited control to alternative worldviews on use of military power.

Political forces, most common of which are political parties, tend to articulate popular views and demands, interpret them and introduce into decision-making process. Finally, bureaucratic bodies like the military or ministry of foreign affairs, in our case the principle state agencies that directly form, change and realize decisions on use of power, enjoy popular legitimacy to use that very power and represent a nation on the international arena.

2.4. Turkish Foreign Policy: Looking for Long-Term Patterns

Vigorous foreign policy of Turkey in its neighborhood and, in particular, in the Middle East in the last decade has opened the doors to more debates on what really constitutes Turkish foreign policy vision and if its traditional Republican foreign policy endures any qualitative changes. It is worth mentioning that these discussions began in the 1980s in conditions of rapid globalization processes when traditional principles of global interaction were gradually altered (Çelik, 1999).

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the bipolar world system and with a start of major geopolitical shifts, Turkey was forced to reconsider its basic approaches to handling of its environment. Back then, Turkish elites found themselves in a position when they had to adapt to new conditions thus being forced to reconsider traditional views on central issue of its foreign policy, especially on questions of intervention in the affairs of the Middle East, use of force outside Turkey and nature of Turkish national interests (Hale, 2002).

The changes in the global political environment contributed to the rise of works dedicated to the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy. Among first of such works was Mustafa Aydin's study on determining factors of the Turkish foreign policy where author tried to show that external factors, such as conjunctural changes in the international system and new geopolitical realities, influence the domestic decision-making process along with "structural factors", such as Turkey's geographic position, its historical legacy, cultural background national stereotypes, images of other nations and long-term necessities (Aydin, 1999).

Another interesting work on the issue of contributing factors of the Turkish foreign policy was produced by Alan Makovsky and Sayari Sabri in 2000. In their work titled "Turkey's new world: changing dynamics in Turkish foreign policy" published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy they showed that in many regards Turkish foreign policy is heavily influenced by political considerations at home. Major example of this hierarchy was the Kurdish issue that on many occasions was a driving factor for many cases when Turkey was engaging in the Middle East.

On the other hand, Makovsky and Sabri identified Turkish regime's search of domestic legitimacy in economic development as further contributing factor in the Turkish foreign policy. Turkish politicians, especially evident in the Kemalist elites' endeavors to raise the standards of living in a new republic to consolidate its popularity or at least acceptance of their nation-building efforts, have been seeking economic prosperity at home by running an appropriate foreign policy that could facilitate modernization efforts (Makovsky & Sayarı, 2000).

An valuable contribution to the debates over the determining factors of the Turkish foreign policy was delivered by Kaan Renda Kadri, who in his work "Learning New Roles and Changing Beliefs: Turkish Strategic Culture in Transition" presented at the 18th International Conference of Europeanists, claimed that Europeanization process can be regarded as a contributing element to the foreign policy evolution through Ankara's adaptation of new principles, ideas, norms, roles and changes in the domestic decision-making mechanism and its adaptation to "new narratives about the past and geopolitical thinking".

A central work of a Turkish historian and political researcher Baskin Oran on the Turkish foreign policy improved the understanding that Turkish foreign policy is steered, among other things, by several structural factors (Oran, 2002). Oran suggests several principle factors by setting them in four major categories. First, cultural factors comprise of the fact that Turkish society demonstrates a very strong Asiatic cultural affinity with its implication on views on the world, power and state. The same is relevant for its Islamic legacy and worldview. Finally, Oran defines desire for the Western standards of living and westernization in general, most evident in the Kemalist rhetoric, as another major element. Historical realm includes efforts to secularize initiated in the Ottoman Empire and nation-building modernization policy that was implemented from above, forming a permanent effect on the decision-making mechanism in the Turkish foreign policy.

A strategic factor primarily deals with Turkey's geopolitical situation between major political, economic and cultural areas which renders Turkey a potent international player and therefore affects its foreign policy by giving unique opportunities and challenges. Finally, Oran links domestic political constellations with foreign policy by demonstrating

how national question and ideological rivalry in Turkey has been contributing to the Turkish foreign policy choices.

Ulman and Sander in their detailed article titled "Defining factors of the Turkish foreign policy" try to show on how political elites that are responsible for foreign policy programs in fact serve as a conduit for certain societal worldviews and norms to exert influence on the decision-making process (Ulman & Sander, 1972). Authors demonstrate this relation through analyzing how security-based foreign policy, which was run for many years, was promoted by the Kemalist elites. Worldviews of the latter were formed in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and War of Independence with unfriendly foreign powers were trying to partition the Turkish state using every available opportunity to promote instability inside the Turkish population.

Elites' role in the foreign policy is further scrutinized in Ramazan Erdag's work "Turkey's Strategic Culture and its Manifestation in Foreign Policy". Although Erdag examines the AKP period, he nevertheless provides us with very significant results. Main contribution of his work is the finding that elites' change may cause a drastic change in the foreign policy. While certain elites may use foreign policy to consolidate their power at home, competitors may challenge an established foreign policy in their pursuit to break apart political domination of ruling elites by presenting a radically new foreign policy vision or focusing on previously less dominant foreign policy approaches (Erdağ, 2013).

Another fascinating work that touches upon the Kemalist legacy in the Turkish foreign policy is Okutan and Ereker's "Regime in Manifestation of the Turkish Foreign Policy" where the authors link existing political regime's logic and ideals and current foreign policy. Okutan and Ereken claim that Ataturk's plans to create a nation and modernize the Turkish society under restrained and hostile environment led to a peculiar foreign policy which is marked with a cautious activity outside national borders, distrust to the neighboring countries and security-based approach to problem solving in foreign policy (Okutan & Ereker, 2005).

Further work of Yasemin Celik on Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War among other things draws attention to the socio-economic factors that exert influence on the decision-making process in the foreign policy issues in Turkey. Issues of inequality and prosperity,

dependence on foreign trade and investments, a constant need for economic development, - all these factors framework political considerations, including foreign policy decisions. Another interesting point of Celik's work was his reference to the demographic factors in Turkey's foreign policy: the issue of the Kurdish separatism has both domestic and foreign political dimensions, rendering it important for any analysis on Turkish foreign policy (Çelik, 1999).

Onur Erpul's work on Turkey's foreign policy scrutinizes the international environment that can either permit or restrict any state's foreign policy. Erpul proposes that due to its historical experience Turkish political elites had long had a security-centric and statist Weltanschauung. This led to the situation where international politics was seen primarily in competitive realpolitik terms. As a result, Turkey had been for years demonstrating a defensive and antagonistic foreign policy posture, particularly towards the Middle East.

Nowadays, however, Turkey's activist foreign policy may be considered as a consequence of the turmoil of the Middle East, which offers more opportunities and policy options for Ankara, but also presents more security challenges, which, however, Turkey cannot ignore outright by taking a passive posture due to close interconnectedness of regional political events (Taşpınar, 2012).

Focusing at the development of the national security culture and thinking about historical traumas Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Ali Karaosmanoglu showed that while for the most part of the Cold War Turkey had been confined to the security-centered and offensive security culture, the post-Cold War world and developments in the military-civil government relations allowed Ankara to brace for more experimentation or rather moderate its traditional foreign policy of non-intervention and transform its reactive and defensive realpolitik into proactivity in its foreign policy conduct. Main merit of Karaosmanoglu's study is its focus on historical factors that framework the strategic culture of Turkey (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000).

A detailed work of Erol and Ozan titled "Political Regime as a Continuity Factor in the Turkish Foreign Policy" delves into the issue of how political regime in Turkey and its features can be viewed as one of the determinants in the Turkish foreign policy (Erol & Ozan, 2011). Authors base their evaluation on the constructivist approach of analyzing

political realities when claiming that the way how political regime defined themselves, see their place in the international system and finally perceive the outside world affects how a foreign policy is formulated.

Expressed in the critical conditions of the Independence War and collapse of the Ottoman Empire political worldview and values of the Kemalist ruling elites were concentrated around the need to protect, strengthen and develop sovereignty of a new state thought economic development, preservation of the status-quo on its borders and constant orientation of the Western civilization.

Studies on the Turkish foreign policy focused not only on revealing of factors that define it, but also on sustainable patterns of foreign policy behaviour of the Turkish republic thought throughout its history. In this regard, among these works, a research of Cameron Brown is highly informative. Brown demonstrated on the cases of Turkish government's decisions in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 that there are four consistent goals that form Turkey grand strategy, defined in his work as a set of foreign policy views persistent over time and shared by political elites. Turkey, according to the study, has been aiming to preserve its territorial integrity at all cost and avoid becoming a political satellite of a stronger power, thus, becoming too much dependent so that national interests are put at stake for the sake of a stronger power's interests (C. S. Brown, 2007).

Further, Turkish foreign policy is built upon a political goal of turning Turkey into full-fledged member of the Western world so as to ensure the West treats Turkey as an equal partner. A less pronounced goal of the Turkish foreign policy Brown sees in Turkish attempts to "ensuring the well-being of ethnic Turks abroad, and to a much lesser extent, supporting Muslims in general around the world". Finally, as Brown argues, Turkey is struggling to avoid intervening into foreign issues unless her national interests (defined in the three points mentioned above) are in an acute danger.

An attempt to establish patterns of foreign policy behaviour to the Ottoman times was undertaken by Omer Kurcuoglu in his work titled "What is Foreign Policy. Its Past and Present in Turkey". Kurcuoglu claims one should consider late Ottoman ruling elites' efforts to creatively use military actions and diplomacy to preserve the Empire in constant balancing between leading European powers (Kürkçüoğlu, 1980).

This approach was later adapted by a new Turkish republic with a great preference to the diplomatic tools. Another conclusion, apart from historical legacy being a contributing factor to the Turkish foreign policy, was demonstration that with further democratization of a political system a general public opinion comes to the forefront and is taken into account during decision-making. Finally, Kurcuoglu demonstrates that Turkish foreign policy is heavily influenced by political leaders who enjoy either substantial power over formal state institutions or\and claims for legitimacy in the society thus having opportunities to express personal values and views on the decision taken on the foreign policy issues.

Another major work that sheds light on Turkish strategic culture was written by Malik Mufti who developed a concept of changing strategic culture paradigms in his book "Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: Republic at sea" (Mufti, 2009). Before proceeding to explanation of the work it is important to emphasize here that Mufti tends to use strategic culture in a sense of a foreign policy tradition, thus, moving away from a classical notion of the term with its accent on the use of power and relations between military power and diplomacy.

Mufti insisted that the dominant and central strategic culture of Turkey, which he calls Republican, manifests itself through a belief that outside world is unsafe, unpredictable and threatening to Turkey's internal stability and social cohesiveness. While the Republican paradigm of strategic culture was predominant throughout most of the years, another paradigm of strategic culture expressed itself at times. For Mufti, this alternative "Imperial" paradigm reveals itself in terms of a more active foreign policy, confidence about Turkey's ability to guide the state of affairs in its adjacent environment and more openness to the outside world.

Though, the Republican paradigm of strategic culture has been prevalent it is under the constant pressure: Turkey stands at the cross-road where it has to maneuver between closer alliance with the West, especially in security matters, and preserve its sovereignty. Moreover, according to Mufti, Turkish political elites, who share different political identities, demonstrate no consensus over basic foreign policy precepts, in contrast to the previous decades. These factors of change may point at bigger shifts in the Turkish

foreign policy and therefore indicate the profound change in Turkey's strategic culture, Mufti concludes in his work.

Another study, worth mentioning in this paper, is also dedicated to the issue of change in Turkish foreign policy vision. Omer Taspinar in his work on the Grand Strategies of the modern Turkey speculated that nowadays Turkey is experiencing the merge of two dominant paradigms, which have been influencing Turkish foreign policy since foundation of the republic. For the sake of theoretical clearness it is essential to note that Taspinar under the Grand Strategy term seems to imply traditions in the foreign policy rather than a policy directed at management and deployment of power resources and other factors of power as part of preparations for a possible warfare (Feaver, 2009).

First grand strategy Omer endeavors to describe is Kemalist one: it involves modesty in foreign policy, caution in actions, and non-involvement in the Arab world due to inherent instability after the First World War. Omer notes that Kemalist grand strategy is increasingly influenced by rising reset towards the European Union and the West in general. On the other hand, the second grand strategy, which is Omer identifies as the neo-Ottoman, is characterized by willingness to synthesize Turkey's Ottoman and Islamic heritage at home and abroad.

In addition, this strategy envisions a more active foreign policy through mediation, economic ties, trade and soft power in the former Ottoman domains – the Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasus. On the other hand, within this strategy elites are more open to embrace of multiculturalism thus opening doors to a dialogue between the East and the West.

The originality of Omer's research is in his suggestion that Turkey is experiencing the conjunction of the two grand strategies mentioned above into a new one, which Omer titles as Turkish Gaullism. This new grand strategy is fed by collective strong sense of patriotism and attachment of the Turkish nation-state, whereas Turkish foreign policy is steered to unite the divided society around a sense of nation's magnificence and national strife for a full independence.

Before proceeding to the examination of Turkish strategic culture we should first recognize how long-term defining factors of Turkish foreign policy can be applied to our

subject. As it follows from the works on the structural factors and patterns of the Turkish foreign policy there are several arguments that can be incorporated in current research. One of the characteristic features of the Turkish foreign policy is its close relations on Turkey's international setting. Because of its geopolitical location, Turkey traditionally has been a focus point of many global and regional political processes.

Another central factor is Turkey's political system or, to be more precise, political constellations between national elites and general populations, military and civil government and, finally, relations between groups representing diverse political ideologies. It is possible to assume that due to peculiar nature of modernization efforts undertaken by the Kemalist elites, the top-down reforms led to polarization of political landscape. The ensuing confrontation between social groups penetrated political system as well.

The foreign policy decisions, by extent, have long been influence by political constellations between these forces, allegedly representing different political ideologies present in Turkey. It is, therefore, necessary to embrace political process as one of the leading factors shaping strategic culture. By applying interpretations on foreign policy and recent findings of the above-mentioned works on the study of Turkish strategic culture we will be able to focus our attention on few but very vital areas relevant for the issue of use of military power, relevant ideas and interpretations about it.



CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIC CULTURE OF TURKEY

In order to grasp the essence of Turkey's strategic culture and before delving into the cases where the contours of strategic culture become most evident we should first look at its environment or, rather, factors that frame the evolution and from the essence of strategic culture. As evident from the existing literature on the issue, strategic culture doesn't exist in the vacuum and can rightly be viewed as a reflection of political realities of a given nation and its surrounding. In our research we propose three main factors upon which we would like to focus first before proceeding to the cases, where these factors will be examined in their interaction under different circumstances.

First factor we would like to focus at is Turkey's international environment. Strategic position of Turkey, first between European continent and the colonized Middle East and the Straits, that were important for the expansionist Russia, therefore important in terms of competition between the European powers, then in the context of the Cold War as a frontier land between the capitalist and socialist camps, and finally as a bridge between civilizations, uniting the developed global North and Muslim part of the global South.

All these roles or modes of geopolitical settings were further nuanced by peculiar economic locations of Turkey, who is lying on major trade routes. The way how Turkey and political establishment sees at and deals with the outside world and its reflections on Turkey's place in the global politics are essential factors that influence and form strategic culture. In this regard, analysis of the Turkish environment, its development and historical background should contribute to the understanding of Turkish strategic culture or political establishment's views on utility of military power as a foreign policy tool.

Further factor that is seen as vital for our research is the complexity of relations within the political establishment. Political context of the Turkish case must be viewed in terms of a broader democratization process, where Turkey is considered to be a primary example of modernization and democratization process in the non-western nation. Our focus must be directed on the structural evolution of the Turkish political system, i.e. a history of evolution of relations within the political elites that used to have and still have

impact of the decision-making process in the foreign policy of Turkey and by extension on the issue of using nation's military power abroad.

Finally, a closer look at the civil-military relations will be useful in understanding Turkish strategic culture as well. The Turkish military has long been playing a considerable role not only in the decision-making process, as one of the main bodies responsible for shaping and articulating it, it also exerted disproportional influence within the political system, sometimes coming forward as a principle political actor that embraces, interprets and brings to realization popular views on use of power abroad within the military's control over national identity in Turkey.

3.1. International Environment and Use of Power Abroad

Evolution of Turkey's international environment can not be analyzed without first resorting to the study of the Ottoman legacy that profoundly defined history the Turkish Republic. Major focus of the analysis should be directed at the issue of relations between the Ottoman Empire and major European powers. The last two centuries of the Empire were marked by its confrontation with ever expanding Western domination and search for viable solution to protect its vast territories at the times when major European nation-states, equipped with modern administrative machineries, modern armies and functioning laws, were in a desperate need for new oversea markets and territorial gains.

Obviously, the Ottoman Empire, who had been lagging behind in economic development and administration methods, became one of the directions of the Western colonial drive. With the peace treaties of Carlowitz of 1699 and Kucukkaynarca of 1774 upon which Turkey had to abandon lands in Europe, it became clear that the Empire had lost its superiority in military aspects.

A growing threat from the Balkans and Caucasus coming from rising Russian Empire and increasing interference of European powers in the domestic affairs of the Empire showed that rapid reforms are needed for the Ottoman Empire to survive within its borders. Moreover, the change in the world trade routes and a rapid expansion of the global trade encouraged the Ottoman authorities to undertake radical steps towards implementation of new economic methods into the national economy, which had long stayed out of touch with the global trends.

It is important to note, however, that reforms were not the ultimate goal of the Ottoman rulers rather they have to be seen as a means to save the state and protect it from the outside interference by bringing the nation to the modern standards in economy, law, administration and military. The initial step to limit the modernization of state apparatus only to the Ottoman military proved to be a fallacious way to save the Empire since the military defeats on the battlefields were not rooted in the deficiency in the military machine per se. The reform programs of 1839, 1856 and constitutional process of early 1870s demonstrated that the ruling elite intended to fulfill complete modernization of the Ottoman state.

During the 19th century the Ottoman Empire, while implementing large scale reforms domestically, was forced to run a policy of maneuvering between major European powers as a way to minimize a risk of Western intervention (Hale, 2012). With deepening rivalry between rising powers of late modernization (Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy) and established status-quo powers (England, France) the task of avoiding of formation of the united anti-Ottoman front was relatively easy task for the Ottoman diplomats (Bernard, 1961).

Due to highly competitive environment and high risk of confrontation with a military superior enemy, decision-makers were less inclined to use military power in pursuit of national interests, instead relying on diplomacy or in extreme cases on building strong alliances that would make cases of power use less risk-bearing.

Domestic political turbulence of the late 19th century, swift changes in a balance of power between European states and, finally, an ever present threat of the Russian expansionism looming from the north, pressured the Ottoman Empire into participation in the First World War on the side of Central Powers. After initial optimism, caused by relatively successful defensive campaigns in the Middle East, the Straits and the Balkans and Russian exit from the war, the Ottoman Empire's ruling elite realized that war efforts put much pressure on the political situation at home.

A bizarre mixture of nationalist feelings emerged after the Balkan wars and expulsion of the Muslim populations from newly established states in the former Ottoman territories, a political atmosphere of the increasingly authoritarian Unionist rule in Istanbul after

1913 and consensus in the broader elite over a necessity for the Ottoman Empire to secure gains by leveraging between the Entente and Central Powers contributed to the decision of the ruling elite to enter the First World War. The Ottoman elites seemed to be expecting the coming war to be short and an alliance with Germany to eventually bring not only necessary guarantees against the Russian expansion in the Balkans and Caucasus, but also German military assistance and economic aid to hasten the ongoing domestic reforms (Aksakal, 2008).

With the Great Powers advancing in Europe and the Middle East, Ottoman elites came to realization that endeavor of the Unionist leaders was a disaster for unity and integrity of the empire. Under the extraordinary exigencies of the Western occupation and partition, National Movement, led by the Ottoman military and political elites, managed to disturb the plans to partition the state and found strength to self-organization around a political program that envisioned creation of a new national entity, the Turkish Republic.

Realities of the Balkan wars and First World War further restricted Turkish decision-makers in using power outside national borders. Immediate geographical environment was under control of enemy powers with considerable material resources. On the other hand, power use, like in the Balkan war, would not be effective due to strong anti-Turkish sentiments. Highly volatile setting, where power deployment could take place, was a contributing factor to emerging views against unrestricted power use. Efforts instead were directed at contributing to stabilization of political situation on borders and building stable relations with new nations.

The goal of the Turkish Republic's foreign policy in first years of its existence was defined by political plans of the Kemalist elites to create suitable conditions for its modernization project. Foreign policy was to be largely based on diplomacy and restrictive of power use. The newly founded political regime was facing several major threats domestically. The Kurdish separatism and rise of a conservative opposition represented a direct threat to the Kemalist project (Kösebalaban, 2011). Meanwhile, on the international arena Turkish Republic was challenged by the revisionist states in its neighborhood and a still present threat of colonial intervention. All these threats had to be uprooted by a new foreign policy.

First, the Kemalist elites believed that the Republic should be incorporated into the world system by active participation in the existing global and regional cooperation mechanisms. A membership in the League of Nations was gained in 1932 and was seen as a primary diplomatic success of the Turkish state.

On the other hand, for the Kemalists, Turkey had also to avoid being drawn into the conflicts and instead had to further cooperation, especially defence agreements, with status-quo countries in the Balkans and the Middle East. Neutral foreign policy was reshaped with Turkey's rapprochement with Britain and France in times when other European powers endeavored to challenge the post-WWI status-quo. The latter was demonstrated by the Italian interwar policy of expansion and revisionist foreign policy in the Aegean Sea (Kürkçüoğlu, 1980).

Secondly, Turkish leadership used its relations with the Soviet Union in its attempts to counter balance Western influence, especially in the first years of its existence. These views were supported by deep skepticism and mistrust of Western intentions. Diplomatic ties and economic cooperation with Moscow were designed to increase Turkey's chances of survival: Kars Treaty of 1921 and Treaty of Friendship of 1925 contributed considerably to Turkey's stance against the Western powers (Zarakol, 2010). Due to the Kemalist elites' views on the nation-building it was unrealistic to expect real and cordial convergence between Ankara and Moscow. With later rapprochement with Europe and Moscow's increasing ambitions, especially in relation to the Straits, Ankara finally decided to opt out for a closer alliance with the West at the expense of the relations with Moscow in the interwar period.

Finally, importance of regime survival necessitated a careful foreign policy in the Middle East, where European powers were trying to secure the postwar status-quo. Ankara was focused entirely on the domestic issues, thus, had withdrew from active engagement in the region. Moreover, Kemalist project of nation-building required a rupture from the Islamic civilization and concentration on the European culture (Yavuz, 1997). Nevertheless, absence of an active foreign policy didn't mean that Turkish political elites didn't have ambitions in the region.

Diplomatic initiatives directed at securing or at least revision of post-Lausanne borders in accordance with the National Pact of the Independence Movement. Where possible, Turkish diplomacy exploited interwar competition of the European states to revise its eastern border as evidenced on the Hatay issue. On the other hand, Turkey demonstrated that it is not ready to challenge the European powers directly in case when diplomacy doesn't work as was demonstrated in the Mosul question. Turkey was still vulnerable to the outside interference and had an unstable political regime.

A deliberate policy of avoiding direct confrontation with the European powers and efforts to keep Turkey neutral in the interwar period proved to be successful strategy during the Second World War. Prior the war Turkey had to develop even ties with both warring camps: Ankara's treaty with Britain and France signed in October 1939 was balanced with Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 1941. Turkish leadership managed to keep Turkey neutral during the war, despite immense efforts of both warring parties to win Ankara over. With a war on the European front approaching to its end, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945 to be formally qualified for joining the United Nations (Yalçın, 2011).

After the war, witnessing an increasing polarization of the world into two rival geopolitical camps and Soviet expansion, Turkish ruling establishment decided to develop closer ties with the US and Western states. A main motive behind the decision to expand cooperation with the West was elites' insistence to turn Turkey into a nation who enjoys equal respect and rights with other European states. This goal in turn was driven by necessity to mobilize popular support within Turkey around the Kemalist project of nation-building by showing that Turkey was accepted in the "civilized world" as an equal partner, therefore proving the rightfulness of the Kemalist nation-building endeavors (Efegil, 2012).

A road into the Western alliance was many-fold. To prove its faithfulness to the democratic ideals Turkey sent 5000 troops in 1951 as part of its efforts to assist the UN troops in Korea (Gokay, 2006). This was the case that showed Turkish decision-makers are eager to use power abroad when this step enjoys Western legitimacy and is carried out within Western initiatives. This step proved to be politically successful: it showed the western powers that Turkey is ready to commit to the western geopolitical interests. In

1952 Turkey became a NATO member where she had to play the eastern flank of Western alliance against the Communist camp thus raising its own profile in the eyes of Washington (Gokay, 2006). Military alliance was also supported by expanding economic cooperation as well.

The idea to prove itself as being an acceptable partner for the West was behind Turkey's proactive policy in the Middle East after the Second World War. Kemalist elites, despite unfolding of the multiparty system and acceptance of a limited degree of criticism, were in consensus over basic tenets of the Turkish foreign policy. In regards to Turkey's stance towards its relations with the Muslim neighborhood it meant that Turkey should conduct overtly pro-Western policy.

Formation of the Baghdad pact in 1955, support provided to the Western powers in multiple diplomatic crisis in the 1950's (1956 Lebanon, 1957 Syria, 1958 Iraq) was part of Ankara's attempt to be "more Western than Western powers themselves". No need to say that such an approach considerably contributed to the strained relations with the Muslim and Arab world in later years. Active stance on regional issues wasn't, however accompanied by military power use due to high volatile and explosive environment in the setting of the Cold War.

It was a shock for the Turkish elites to realize in early 1960s that the USA, who had by then became the dominant power within the Western camp, didn't perceive Turkey in a way Turkish elites would have liked Washington to do. The issue of Cyprus became the litmus paper for the American-Turkish relations. An outburst of intercommunal violence of the island in the spring of 1964 proved that attempts of Britain, Greece and Turkey to come up with a workable solution and mechanism of control over a situation on Cyprus between 1955-1964 were futile. Turkey, who had been planning to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, was abruptly stopped by the US administration (Şener, 2013).

The manner, in which the US President Johnson decided to treat Ankara in 1964 and subsequent Washington's reaction on Turkish plans to invade the island in 1967, caused deep disappointment with Western commitments to treat Turkey as an equal partner and fueled further anti-American sentiments. Dire situation was further complicated by the fact that Cyprus and fate of the Turkish Cypriots were a defining factor in Turkey's elite

views in rationality and legitimacy of power use on the island. Collision of two factors, with challenges to the Western-led promoted discipline within the NATO, led to adaptation of views of Turkish elites.

Disillusionment and suitable domestic conditions, where new political forces were allowed to bring forward their own vision of Turkish foreign policy, resulted in revision of Turkey's total alliance to the Western interests. Political elites were increasingly thinking about developing ties with the non-Western states and Soviet camp. The diversification of ties, though, didn't necessarily mean that Turkey intended to abandon the West.

Strained relations with Washington were further cooled in the 1970s with Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and following US sanctions and arms embargo (1975-1978). The decade was also marked with rapprochement with the Soviet Union and start of active engagement in the Middle Eastern affairs like support for the PLO in the UN. More cooperation with the Gulf states in 1970s was mainly driven by the desire to minimize repercussions during the oil crisis.

Overall, support for the public causes in the Arab world was also a result of the deliberate of efforts to win the Arab nations in the UN in Cyprus issue. Though, the latter proved to be in vain, with the Arab world having not forgotten Turkish pro-Western policies of the last decades, so the hopes for closer relations between Turkey and Arab states weren't realized (Uzer, 2010).

The Islamic Revolution in Iran and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan altered the US strategy in the Middle East and forced both Washington and Ankara to reconsider their relations toward more cooperation against the Soviet communist expansion and revolutionary Islamic wave in the Middle East. After 1979 Turkey was trying to present herself as an effective political regime against both threats that moreover enjoys working relations with all players in the region. With political developments at home that eventually opened the way for Turkey to develop more intimate relations with the Muslim world, Ankara found herself capable of deeper involvement in the region.

A rise of the Kurdish nationalism influenced profoundly Turkish relations with Iraq and Syria. With the collapse of the Socialist system Turkey had to further its profile in the Middle East as part of her efforts to raise importance for the West (Müftüler-Baç, 1996).

Rising instability and uncertainty in the region, increasing pace of political process and deepening distrust among principal political actors in Turkey in regards to Ankara's allies contributed to start of debates on Turkey's role as a more independent regional player, who would be able to addition to its diplomatic arsenal to use military power to protect its interest when necessary and under legitimate conditions.

The brief analysis of Turkey's relations with the outside world may bear several important implications for understanding of Turkish strategic culture. Throughout its history Turkey demonstrated no cases of waging an aggressive war against any nation, in several crises reviewed here Turkish decision-makers tried to seek a very persuasive legitimate reason to use military power in pursuit of its national interests. This may suggest that Turkish political leadership gives a great importance to diplomacy in resolving the international disputes. Alternatively, Turkey avoids using military power for fears of sever backlash, considering historical legacy of anti-Turkish sentiments.

In addition, Turkish history of interaction with the outside world evidenced that Turkish leaders perceive its neighbourhood as a very unpredictable, unstable and challenging environment. On the other hand, this attitude is driven by revisionist sentiments in the neighbouring countries and most serious challenges to domestic stability come in fact from adjacent territories, on the other hand – the security-oriented foreign policy, or rather outlook, is a result of domestic political constellations. This is the primary reasons why Turkish elites considered availability of military power or access to tangible security guarantees of high importance.

Finally, balancing between major global powers with a priority given to the core Western states due to political considerations of the ruling elites has been a traditional foreign policy line of Turkey. Despite the attempts to build an independent nation, the Turkish elites found themselves forced to align the nation with Western interests, especially at times using ties with non-Western world to counter the balance when its own ties with the West don't promote national security.

3.2. Civil-Military Relations and Use of Power Abroad

Turkey represents an example of how the military may considerably influence decision-making process on foreign policy. This makes any analysis of Turkish strategic culture incomplete without looking at how the military has been using its clout into realization in the Turkish political process and foreign policy decision-making process. Before outlining main constellations of the military-civil relations in Turkey and explaining how the Turkish army contributes to shaping of the Turkish strategic culture we should first look at the prevailing views on the military-civil relations in contemporary literature, then we should proceed to the historical development of the Turkish army's political ambitions before making final remarks on the army's role in the Turkish strategic culture.

Generally modern academic views on the military-civil relations focus at the differences in interests, view on political issues, values of both the army and broader society contribute to the various types of relations existing today. Another part of the academic works tends to take a closer look at how political system's character of a given state predefines relations between hierarchal social groups represented by the army and political system where a special attention is paid to the relations of cooperation, cooptation or completion between the political elites and army high-rank officers.

Normative approaches to the civil-military relations can be broadly categorized into two major groups. First approach, stipulated by Samuel Huntington, is based on the premise that the military can be politically controlled and formed into a democratic institution when the army is highly professionalized (Huntington, 1957). The officers are regarded as highly trained professionals, consulted by the civilian government and therefore feel necessary to avoid any substantial political activity that could theoretically end their privileged status and benefits. At the same time the military must develop a special ethic that would stipulate a subordinate role of the army and make it a servant rather than equal partner of the civilian government.

Yes another approach, generally expressed through ideas of Morris Janowitz, follows the idea that the army ideally should represent the people, all layers of society with their specific worldviews must be a part of the military so that the latter could be embraced in the democratic society rendering it a vital part of the political system (Janowitz, 2017).

Another group of works pays attention to the ways how interaction between the civil government and military occurs and what channels the military tends to use to influence the process of decision-making. Main argument of this group of academic works stipulates that the military seeks to avoid direct interference in the national politics fearing negative consequences for the army internal order and readiness to fulfill its functions (Finer, 2002). The military is generally sets as its goal to avoid seizing political power altogether because the officer corps understands it lacks both the knowledge of administration of a vast state apparatus and societal legitimacy for its direct rule.

Most cases of the military's interference of any kind deal with indirect interaction between the army command and the political institutions. Restrictions and difficulties which the military may potentially have to deal with make indirect influence a perfect choice. Under normal conditions, when the army is given a well-functioning avenue for delivering its views on the current issues usually make use of their possession over exclusive information relevant to the issue discussed.

If the military is sidelined from the decision-making process on national security issues, despite the army being a chief institution responsible for upholding the security, its influence can be transmitted through informal channels like meetings between the high-ranking officials and the military officers, deployment of the army's PR resources and connections with the national media and its own lobbying assets within the political system.

But the national security issues go beyond simple discussions, foreign policy decision-making also renders the army a critical institution (Betts, 1991). The civil government seeks to incorporate experience and knowledge of the army into the foreign policy arsenal. The reason of this lies in the fact that foreign policy requires creative adaptation to the emerging situations when the government doesn't always have ready options and plans of action. The military capabilities broaden the scope of available options making the army important and necessary for the national foreign policy mechanism (Allison, 1973). On the other hand, when a government tries to increase its military capabilities and include military options into the decision-making process, the role of the army rises along with it making the military's opinions hard to ignore.

Main contribution of the academia to the understanding of how relations come to existence, develop and change is the assertion that difference of the army from other social groups with political claims arises from the fact the military possesses a special kind of knowledge or expertise that is absolutely vital for a society's survival. Unique position in regards to other societal groups makes the military's views on a nature of military forces, force application in society, nature of politics and especially nature of the outside world is important contributing factor to the constellation of relations between government and the army. Different historical phases witness different constellations between the two.

Historical conditions may produce many variations of the relations between the civilian government represented by political elites and the army. Main logic that may be traced through all historical phases is that professionalization of the army must follow modernization of political institutions so that political relations could develop within a stable framework (Edinger, 1963). Attention to the modernization is not accidental since major academic works tend to focus on nations of late modernization that produced very peculiar situation where the army was a principal drive of the modernization efforts therefore having a strong stance vis-à-vis the political system. With a lack of functional political institutions, media, a middle class and civil society, - all players that could potentially resist the military's encroachment into the politics, the army-civil relations demonstrate a heavy deviation towards domination of the army (Johnson, 2015).

The soviet example of how the army can become a crucial political player due to its immense contribution to the national modernization efforts can be helpful to understanding of the Turkish military's role in politics. The young Soviet republics were mainly formed during intense military confrontations either with the outside invaders or internal political opposition. Thus the army began to be regarded as a foundation of the young nation's sovereignty placing the national security issues and therefore the army in the center of national politics. After political consolidation of a new Soviet regime, the military served as a tool not only for standardization and integration of peripheral territories into a single political polity, but also for oppressing political opposition. Analysis of the Soviet case suggests that the army managed to influence political process and interfere into decision-making beyond the scope of its duties only in cases when there

was an unstable political government who could limit the army's ambitions (Kolkowicz, 1981).

Numerous examples of army interference into politics with a weak political authority and governments incapable of resisting a growing influence of the military in the developing nations prompted a professor of political science and sociology at American University Amos Perlmutter to delve into evaluating of how exactly the army builds its hegemony over the political system. Perlmutter comes forward with an analytical tool of "a praetorian army" to describe the nature of army interference that expresses itself through formation of national political elites by the military. In this case societal divisions, weakness of political institutions, immature middle class contribute to hypertrophic influence of the army who just make use of the socio-political situation where political system doesn't work and a political regime doesn't enjoy broad social legitimacy (Perlmutter, 1969).

Amos Perlmutter also highlights that there are mainly two types of praetorian army or rather two ways of how the army controls political landscape of a given country. A so called arbiter type of a praetorian army gives more attention to professionalism of the army and avoids being a direct player and therefore prefers using friendly political forces, institutions and channels to direct the politics in a country and define general lines within which political process should take place. In contrast to the arbiter type of army, the ruler type is used by Perlmutter to describe the military, usually high-ranking officers, who resort to direct managing and prefer outright interference of state thus transforming the military into the central part of a political regime.

Regarding the Turkish case of the military-civil relations most academic works agree on saying that the Turkish army, despite being a major political player throughout the Republic's history, preferred avoiding direct interference in the politics. Multiple military coups were followed by a quick transition of power to the civil governments that suggests that Turkish army saw indirect steering of the political process as a most suitable way of interference (Sarigil, 2014). Most common way of interference was through institutional and legal channels, but, among other things, the Turkish army also ruled the country from the backside of official politics by using indirect and unofficial channels.

The ways of indirect but institutionalized influence is yet another interesting area of studies of the military-civilian relations in Turkey. The Turkish military demonstrated a creative power in establishing these channels. Not only media resources and assets within the civil society were successfully deployed to steer the political process, the military also used its clout in the education system, specific discourse on Turkish foreign policy and legal institutions as well.

It is now worth tracing the history of the civil-military relations in Turkey in order to grasp the logic of interaction between the army and political system and implications these relations may have had on formulation, realization and change of political establishment's view on power use beyond Turkish national borders.

A foundation for a special status of the Turkish military was laid in the Ottoman Empire (Burak, 2011), where modernization efforts were spearheaded by the military and bureaucracy. This step was dictated by the necessity to stop foreign intrusion and to fix administration problems. With increased stance in the Ottoman society and lack of any societal counter-balance against it (in the form of a coherent political elite supported by bourgeoisie), the military quickly began to pursue its own political interests and interfere in the political process, with a coup attempt against Abdulmecit in 1859 being a first case in a direct interference. Another way of influence through indirect interference in state affairs was registered in the army's participation in the constitutional revolution of 1876 when the Ottoman Sultan was limited in his power by the Parliament. Finally, 1908-1918 witnessed the army being a direct ruler of the Ottoman state in alliance with the ally forces hailing from the Ottoman bureaucracy.

In this period the Ottoman military's views on power use was defined by deepening crisis in the imperial administration and resulting instability in the provinces and colonies. Preparedness for military deployment was considered as a vital national interest. Modernization of the Ottoman army, therefore, was given priority. In practice, however, increasing warfare capabilities were coupled with cautious diplomacy and efforts to minimize isolation and chances of formation of alliances that were directed against the empire.

After the War of Independence the military was a primary source of the political elites in a new political regime. Though a considerable number of high-ranking officials were former officers, a Turkish political leadership sought to limit the army's influence on the state affairs (Rustow, 1959). These attempts were not always consistent and successful. The new regime was trying to consolidate power and therefore suppress political opposition that threatened its modernization efforts and aspirations for undisputed power in Turkey. The military was used by the state officials to silence opposition and consolidate authority (Şen, 1996). On the other hand, in spite of all efforts to depoliticize the military, the army managed to interfere in the industrialization efforts by emphasizing strategic needs of a young nation over purely economic necessities in the interwar period.

With introduction of a multi-party system after the Second World War and entrance of Turkey in the NATO and Baghdad Pact organizations the politization of the army along with expansion of its ambitions resulted in increased sensitivity against the current political affairs. With a deepening political and economic instability and increasing attacks of the ruling Democratic Party on the Kemalist principles of a regime the officers within the army felt ever more impelled to act. A feeling of urgency was further pronounced by a lack of political ambitions on part of the Republican People's Party who was trying to find its place in a newly introduced multi-party system and consequent competition of ideas and ideologies.

Both civilian and military's views on power use abroad didn't demonstrate noticeable differences. Broader elites were in consensus that a post-war period and political events on the Turkish borders didn't provide much opportunities and instances where power use could bring tangible results without endangering regime stability in Turkey itself.

With a coup of 1960 the army not only undermined all previous efforts of the Kemalist elites' efforts to depoliticize the military, it also established a legal and institutionalized framework for future interferences (Öztañ, 2014). Driven by rising problems in the country, the middle-ranking officers led by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş were advocating radical changes in the Turkish society and army's anchored position in the center of these political efforts. The internal struggle witnessed moderate camp led by General Cemal Gürsel come victorious. The latter envisioned the army leading the politics from behind the scenes by defining red lines for politicians and political parties, interfering only in

case of acute emergency through the newly established National Security Council envisioned by the 1961 Constitution that legalized a new role of the Turkish military (Uzgel, 1998). The NSC enjoyed a status of a constitutional body, through which military could channel its views on current agenda. By further reinforcing its presence in the political structure of the Turkish state, the military's views on power use began to be defined by political domestic interests of the military as a political actor rather than as a professional body (Çelik, 1999).

Political liberalization stipulated by a new constitution contributed to mushrooming of political activist groups and parties on both specters of political landscape with the left-wing organization seeking more changes in the Turkish society due to economic and social transformation, rapid industrialization and urbanization. Witnessing the failure of the Justice Party led by Süleyman Demirel to secure the order and prevent further escalation of ideological rivalry between far-right and far-left organizations, the military once again decided to interfere in hopes to correct the work of the political system.

The interference, however, was not direct rather indirect through publication of the memorandum on 12 March 1971 by the Chief of the General Staff Memduh Tağmaç. The military demanded from the ruling Justice Party to restore the order, the party, however, incapacitated by internal divisions signaled that it was unable to stabilize the nation.

High-ranking officers, in contrast to the middle-ranking officers, rejected the idea of taking the government in their own hands, instead relying on building a technocrat cabinet that would be acceptable both for the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. In the meantime, the army conducted a series of crackdowns on the left-wing organizations, allegedly to turn the political competition into the legal framework.

The fractured political landscape, economic turbulence and rise of violence in the 1970s prevented Turkey from returning back to normalcy. Turkish military was convinced that existing political system once again should be rescheduled to return the country back into the normalcy. While Turkish Parliament was unable to do its work due to internal divisions among and inside political parties, economic conditions deteriorated further (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). After the army seized power on 12 September 1980 the heavy

hand control over political life was introduced, political authority was transferred in the hands of the National Security Council headed by Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren.

The military regime, however, once again, was reluctant to stay in power indefinitely, instead focusing on transition of administration and, with it, responsibility in the hands of the civilian politicians. The military nevertheless retained control over the political process by securing its positions within the National Security Council responsibilities of which were considerably expanded and legalized through a new constitution of 1982.

Post-coup period of the military-civilian relations was marked with division of labor between the government led by Turgut Özal's Motherland Party and the military. The latter was responsible for security issues in domestic and foreign policy giving the government necessary recommendations. The Motherland Party, however, was trying to exploit existing political conditions of broad democratization and liberalization to review mutual relations with the army (Aknur, 2010).

After 1980 civil-military relations were further marked by heavy reliance of the military on the economic reforms led by Turgut Özal that could vitalize national economy and contribute to stabilization of political situation in Turkey. After having faced considerable pressure from its western partners, Turkish military adopted a more sophisticated tactics to influence national political process without any direct pressure in the governments (J. Brown, 1989). On the other hand, actions of the Turkish military were strained by expanding scope of societal participation in the political process. Entrance of new political forces, widening of electoral process improved positions of the civil government vis-à-vis the army, especially in the questions of foreign policy choices.

Strategic culture in the 1980s was considerable influence of the military, who was growingly preoccupied with increasing threats of the Islamist reaction and Kurdish separatism. While striking capabilities of the Turkish army was enjoying high priority and increasing cooperation with NATO and USA on modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces since the later 1970s may be a good indication for this. Attention of the military was directed to the domestic sphere and power use was substituted by less risk-prone foreign policy tools like deeper coordination with Western interests and coordination with regional governments.

After summarizing general development trends of the civil-military relations in Turkey, it is now important to demonstrate what implications it has on Turkish strategic culture. First of all, analysis shows that the army has been building its presence in the political system since the 1950s, even though its politization was a part of the Republic history from its very beginning. To anchor itself within the political system the army institutionalized its role as a principal political actor responsible for foreign policy. Civil governments enjoyed limited freedom in formulation and application of foreign policy and, especially, over issues like use of power. Modernization of the military forces was a way to gain influence in the political system that was witnessing increasing competition between the army and civilian-government.

Secondly, the military used security-based foreign policy during the Cold war period and later on – a discourse of a hostile environment (mainly manifested through Kurdish separatism and Islamic radicalism) to secure its positions in the political system in times when broader political freedoms seemed to challenge non-democratic political arrangements. The constant alertness and need for readiness to confront security challenges resulted in relatively easy availability of the military power, which was linked to political interests not the political elites, but of the army itself.

Finally, with a rise of political forces that wanted to limit influence of the military, primary political changes within this competition occurred in the realms of foreign policy. As an element of these changes rival political forces tended to change existing views on effectiveness of use of power in foreign policy. In its struggle against the military's clout and exclusive position in security related issues, civil government with considerable democratic mandate behind tend to challenge the military in the question of power use, intentionally preferring risk taking.

3.3. Political System and Power Use Abroad

The nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented changes in the Ottoman Empire, where authorities tried to modernize the state while pursuing a goal to withstand a competition and intrusion of the Western powers. Meanwhile, in line with broader reforms of the state apparatus, a diplomatic mechanism of the empire also underwent remarkable changes mainly through professionalization and more operational autonomy from the central

authority of the sultan. Already in the late 1790s a number of permanent diplomatic representatives were established in the European states.

Besides, in 1835 central authorities within the framework of Tanzimat initiative decided to establish a new Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Umur-i Hariciye Nezarek) that was responsible to the Grand Vizier. Despite multiple attempts of the Sultan to influence the foreign policy and, thus, the work of the Foreign Ministry, diplomatic elites still managed to regain their say mainly due to professionalism and expertise (Hale, 2002).

New elites within the state apparatus started having influence on the definition of policies of the empire. New elites hailed mainly from civil and military bureaucracy. They shared the view that state needs to undertake radical reforms in order to survive as a political entity. These new Ottoman elites were also similar in their increasing influence over state affairs. However, they tend to share different ideologies and views on how to further conduct reforms and modernization of the state (Akşin, 1994).

Major division lines between the intellectual and ruling elites of the 19-century Ottoman Empire were running along the debates over the further steps in the state reformation that had begun a century ago. One of the most important issues, upon which multiple groups had different opinions, was a creation of a nationhood based on a national idea or identity.

For a part of the Ottoman state bureaucracy western ideas of citizenship, whose political advent occurred during and after the French revolution (Bernard, 1961), were a foundation for restructuring of a malfunctioning state machine. Among other things, secularism was seen as an intrinsic part of a national identity, since there still were many hopes to keep the non-Muslim parts of society under the Ottoman rule. Interestingly, these elites regarded the reformation process as something that must be carried out by the enlightened, meaning that the populace would have limited scope of say in how society should be reformed.

Another part of elites consisted of people who declined to reject Muslim identity of the Ottoman society and therefore argued not for a westernization of the empire but rather for reformation of the existing social realities without abandoning its core values. These elites were optimistic about intrinsic potential of the Muslim identity and its reformist zeal that can further lead the Ottoman Empire to prosperity once it is cleared off from all

Western impositions (Yardim, 2016). To some extent, Turkish nationalist elites were falling together with these elites arguing however that their society should seek inspiration in the Turkish identity, especially after the Christian Balkan and Muslim Arab provinces were lost to the central government (Karpat, 1972).

When Ottoman officials undertook Westernizing reforms in the 18th century, they had no intention of changing the identity of both the state and the people. On the contrary, the purpose of the reforms was to protect the state and its Islamic character. However, with progressing reforms and problems met on the way were increasingly pointing to the fact that successful reforms were not possible without changes in ideational domain of the Ottoman society. The 19th century debates were not on the scope of the reforms, but on the way further reforms should proceed in regards to the national identity of the Empire. With the collapse of the latter, the mission of bringing the Turkish people to the age of prosperity and modernity was largely defined by the legacy of these debates.

The reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II was marked by rise of Islam-inspired political elites, who emphasized negative consequences of blind following of the West-imposed modernization and, instead, advocated reliance on the local traditions and sources of the Ottoman and rather Islamic civilization. They advocated a return to the roots of the society, its traditions and called for new interpretations of the Islamic legacy, which should lead the Ottoman state towards modernity. The rivalry between traditionalist forces and radical reformists spearheaded by the Young Turks movement and later by the Committee of Union and Progress became increasingly bitter with the sides becoming even more skeptical in compromising. Though the revolution of 1908 effectively limited the powers of the sultan and restored the constitution of 1876, the political instability and turbulence on the international arena hindered elites to stabilize the country and continue the reforms (Bernard, 1961).

The issue of effectiveness of military tools in promotion of national interest in the late Ottoman Empire was, as the above narrate line of events may suggest, was linked to pursuit of stable national identity through ethnic composition, cultural heterogeneity and geographical scope of the Ottoman policy. Power use in the Balkan wars was associated more with internal political demands rather than with regional foreign policy per se. On

the other hand, deployment of troops in Libyan war was to be regarded as part of foreign policy.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire put an end to the political forces advocating for a creation of a strong state based on the Muslim identity. New circumstances meant new opportunities for other forces to implement their ideological programs and fulfill their political aspirations. Many leaders of the Independence Movement of Turkey hailed from the Young Turk tradition, meaning effectively that the political elites of the modern Turkish Republic were viewing their task in creating a new nation from above as part of their broader modernization project without much regard for the public demands, concerns and participation.

Despite being a core of the Independence Movement, army as a single player was sidelined by the political elites of the young republic. Though, high rank military officers continued to enjoy considerable respect in society and influence over national defence issues, they nevertheless were silenced by the Kemalists, who in turn concentrated all decision-making process in their own hands (Feroz, 2002).

The Turkish Republic can be seen as a nation-building project designed and implemented by the former Ottoman elites that found themselves in new geopolitical realities after the First World War. To a great extent, these elites were inspired by the European example where reforms and modernization were carried out from the above, thus supposing that some limits must be put onto the democratic system (Kasaba, 2008). Modernization and nation-building were to be implemented through centralized government, consolidation on the basis of ethnic nationalism and securing the political regime's achievements and its legitimization among broader population through rapid Westernization, with Turkey being driven away from the Islamic world and religious aspects driven out from social life (Çiftçi, 2010).

Even within the civilian Kemalist elite the tendency to more power concentration was evident. Having almost no need and urgency to respond to the national demands through the democratic process, the leadership of Turkey had effectively all tools to implement the foreign policy they viewed as the best serving the national interests. Once again, in

the absence of democratic process these national interests were defined solely by the Kemalist elites themselves (Göymen, 2007).

These elites tied survival of their dominance over opposition to durability of state and stability on regime's borders. The latter in particular was to be achieved by diplomatic efforts to establish good relations with new governments rather than through imposition of Turkish demands. Therefore, it can be said that Kemalist elites tended to view effectiveness of power use as tied to domestic stability and preferred to rely on diplomacy in times of instability at home like it was in the first years of the republic.

The composition of Kemalist elites of Turkey's first 30 years was made of three major groups of liberals, statist and left-leaning socialists. All groups were advocating the continuation of reforms but differed in opinions over issues like nature of secularism, ties with the West and a role of a state in regulation of economy and political life in general. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, due to his unquestionable authority managed to balance these groups until his death and was in fact trying to hold a middle ground to find a best solution to the urgent problems Turkey was facing back then.

Apart from several cases when Turkish leadership was trying to experiment with creating a loyal opposition to the ruling narrative, there was no real institutionalized parliamentary opposition in Turkey in the interwar period. All factions and division, because of the efforts of Atatürk, were mainly limited to the internal discussions of the Republican People's Party. The Turkish President, Atatürk, was trying to balance three main groups within the Kemalist elites occasionally allowing representatives of each to have a say in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Three main camps in general included the nationalists with a radical statist program and decisive pro-Western foreign policy views, the liberals, who were in disagreement on the way how reforms are implemented in Turkey, and the socialist, who despite advocating for more state's role in domestic affairs were negative about Turkey's rapprochement with the West (Kösebalaban, 2011). On the whole, there was a visible consensus between nationalist and liberal camps on necessity for Turkey to keep strong ties with the West.

Views of the Kemalist elites during the interwar period on power use were mainly defined by necessity to strengthen legitimacy of political regime in the eyes of the liberal

democratic Western world. Solidification of borders was to be pursued by closer alliance with Western security mechanisms, where Turkey could rely on modernization assistance and diplomatic support. This alliance also limited political maneuvering on borders as the NATO strategic behaviour was in its nature defensive and didn't tolerate independent free-riders thus limiting any potential for power use on Turkish borders.

The introduction of the multiparty system didn't alter profoundly the political elite. After its foundation in 1946 the Democratic party managed to gain support of the social groups that were dissatisfied with the Kemalist project of nation-building and implementation of reforms from above without much concern for a public opinion. A multiparty system with two rival parties proved to be viable and allowed for an unprecedented political discussion over major issues. Though the Democratic Party was trying to create a difference in domestic issues, it nevertheless stayed loyal to the main tenets of the foreign policy formed by the previous governments. Even more, under the Democratic Party Turkey managed to deepen its alliance with the West, a further proof that political establishment, despite visible differences in political rhetoric, enjoyed consensus over fundamentals of the Turkish foreign policy.

Another interesting tendency in the first years after the war was the rise of profile of army in the national politics. With increased cooperation with NATO, junior Turkish officers, who were excluded from access to the social and financial benefits in contrast to their commanding officers were eager to increase its role in the national affairs. Their ambitions rose to the extent where they started feeling that they can and should take a responsibility for a state of affairs in Turkey and continue radical reforms of transforming Turkey into full-fledged modern nation (Noyan, 2014). The rising political instability, authoritarian tendencies demonstrated by the Democratic Party and prospects of violence offered these ambitious officers a great opportunity to act.

The changes that took places after the war were profound for Turkish politics. Introduction of a multiparty system was the Kemalist elites' tribute to the Western alliance and the step was designed to secure closer ties between Turkey and western powers. The success of the Democratic Party in the consequent elections evidenced yet another major change: understanding that top-down nation-building project had failed and less aggressive secularist national identity must be adopted as a result (İnan, 2007). On the

other hand, there was a prevalent consensus among the elites that Turkey had to stay closer to the West in their attempts to secure political regime.

With consolidation of political regime and stabilization of political process, political elites faced rising demands for further openness and economic welfare by the end of war. Attention to economic development after the war, especially with financial resources and technologies brought by the Marshall Plan program required stability on borders and heightened tolerance to challenges coming from outside. In the face of the Soviet threats, Turkey preferred to rely on Western help and deterrence potential (Çelik, 1999).

The military coup of 1960 was carried out in line with the expectations of further reforms in the Turkish society and broader modernization. The period 1960-1970 was marked by institutionalization of the military's intervention in the politics. The ruling National Unity Committee oversaw the work of a civil commission tasked with producing of a new liberal constitution. The control enabled the putschists to retain control over decision-making through establishment of the National Security Council.

Interestingly, concentration of power in the hands of the officers occurred not only within the realm of politics, but also within the chain of command as well: the High Command made sure that the junior officers are put under strict control to limit their actions in case of any new coup plans. The latter move proved to be effective as further coups in the Turkish history were carried out mainly by the high ranking officers.

The Turkish Constitution of 1961 provided a wide scope of civil and political liberties and created an environment where political parties of different creeds could bring their views into the mainstream politics. The 1960s were marked by a rising anti-American sentiments in the Turkish society as a reaction to the US foreign policy stance vis-à-vis Turkey. Major political parties were advocating development of relations with the non-western countries while stating that Turkish society can't achieve its full independence and reach higher levels of development when it is dependent on the alliance with the US. Thus, Turkish nationalism, fueled by the disillusionment with the West, advocated more independent foreign policy, however, the very issue of independence became central for ideological struggle of political forces.

The Turkish Constitution of 1961 created a free political environment in which major political forces representing social groups could participate without much pressure from the government. After the coup, the National Unity Committee witnessed an internal struggle between advocates of swift transit to the civil control over the government and proponents who favored a tighter control over the social processes for the sake of a rapid societal transformation. By November 1960 radical officers were defeated.

The Turkish left had been enjoying a steady growth of influence after the coup of 1960 mainly because of cooling of Turkey's relations with its western partners and increasing criticism of the current foreign policies of closer alignment (Gokay, 2006). The 1960s also witnessed rapid development of political organization of the religious Islamic movements who demanded restoration of traditional ties with the Muslim world by arguing that only accepting Turkey's Muslim identity ruling establishment could find a perfect formula for an independent foreign policy and therefore further means for development of the country. All these streams influence the ongoing debates over secularism in the Turkish society and country's national identity in a broader sense (Uzer, 2010).

The period between 1960-1970 was marked by a political struggle between a left-leaning Republican People's Party (Rubin & Heper, 2002) and a center-right Justice Party with an increasing influence of far right parties presenting the nationalist and Islamist strands of the Turkish political spectrum. Another major political development was increasing autonomy of the military both in the institutional and financial aspects (Erik J Zürcher, 2004).

Apart from left-right struggle of the 1970s, the following decade witness continuation of the radicalization of political struggle between major forces (Aknur, 2012). This decade was marked by a vibrant civil society and civil organizations' activity meanwhile political landscape was fragmented so that political debates over national identity couldn't bear any tangible results since political violence prevented any form of a civilized dialogue. Identity crisis of the Turkish society was reinforced not only by internal political instability, but also due to economic fluctuations, weakness of the Turkish economy in the globalizing economy and changing international environment.

Growing violence, standstilled work of many public institutions and absence of political stability led to the intervention of the military on 12 March 1971. Seize of power by the high-ranking military officers was followed by a tightened control over all public life in an attempt to stabilize the country and decrease the level of violence. After the military had eliminated the Turkish left organizations, the reins over the country were transferred into the civilian hands after 1973 elections.

Still, political stability was not achieved, fractured political landscape was coupled with absence of stable government for major parties were constantly held hostage to the smaller parties with radical political ideologies (Gunter, 1989). Further radicalization of the Turkish society couldn't but polarize state bureaucracy. This period witnessed a rise of politically organized Islamist movement, first around National Order Party, which was followed by National Salvation Party in later years.

Despite rising activity of broader layers of population, the Turkish military command still managed to keep their control over the political life by directing the processes from behind the scenes. The radicalization and growth of violence by the end of the 1980s forced the military to intervene again, this time with a goal of implementation of radical transformation of the Turkish political system.

Turgut Özal, exploiting the post-coup environment where previous dominant parties and famous leaders were banned from politics, managed to create a center and moderate party with a distinct economic program and ideology that could embrace major currents of the Turkish middle class (Rubin & Heper, 2002). Having almost no political rival, except for marginal left and right parties supported by the military, and enjoying the tacit approval of the army officers, Özal was able to minimize the level of involvement of a state in the economy and carry out activist foreign policy inspired by the globalization trends around the world whereby sometimes circumventing diplomatic bureaucracy and stepping back from traditional foreign policy behaviour of non-involvement into regional issues.

Up until his very death in 1993 Özal, using his political capital and resources, was trying to implement his vision of foreign policy that would enable Turkey to integrate into the global economy and find its rightful place in the emerging world order by expanding the

number of new ties and deepening the scope of existing relations with the West, especially with the European Community.

The military coup of 1980 eliminated the Turkish left scene leaving political space for the right parties. Among the latter were Islamist parties which enjoyed relative freedom of movement and speech especially in regards to the military-supported policy of promoting conservative politics of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as part of its efforts to reduce the influence of the communist ideology (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008). The military and political parties since the 1980 were openly acknowledging the Islamic character of the Turkish society. At the same time, with a demise of the Soviet Union, nationalist found a great opportunity to contribute to the identity debates by exploiting the nationalist feelings. Debates over the national identity were further galvanized by stalemate in the negotiations with the European Community.

The return of the veteran politicians into politics and establishment of new parties by the end of the 1980s contribute to the demise of Özal's ruling Motherland Party. Already in the 1990s political landscape of Turkey was marked by increased fragmentation with major parties desperately relying on populist policies in hopes of retaining enough votes to stay in politics. The decade of political instability coincided with radical changes on the international arena and rising instability both inside Turkey and on its periphery.

While political elites were trying to define an ideal foreign policy line for Turkey in discussions, defined by isolationist views on the other hand and active engagement in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans – on the other, the Turkish military was trying to retain the legitimacy of its political involvement by raising its profile in fight against the Kurdish separatism and radical Islamist movements (Aykan, 1999). All in all, the first decade after the end of the Cold war was marked for Turkey with increased uncertainty around its borders and growing political instability at home where political parties were trying to adapt to new realities.

With such conditions political elites were trying to find a source for stability. Reliance on diplomatic tools to minimize uncertainty and diminish threats to national unity didn't have desired effectiveness with states around Turkish borders demonstrating lack of capacity to hold to agreements and keep security mechanisms going.

Brief analysis of development of the Turkish political process may reveal several vital implications for analysis of Turkish strategic culture. First of all, gradual expansion of political space with concurrent changes in the demographics and socio-economic conditions led to arrival of new political forces representing radically views on the ideal Turkish foreign policy. For instance, new dynamics was brought in dealings with the Middle East, new forces adopted an activist position vis-à-vis the region, although constrained by existing institutional arrangements, and might have felt that use of power should be seen in radically new framework of ideas.

On the other hand, new forces bring into the discourse on national idea and by extent Turkish role in the world their worldviews and ideas. Turkish relations with the West are being challenged, reconsidered, re-conceptualized by new forces, so are security cooperation between Turkey and traditional Western partners. The issue of use of power outside national borders, in this connection, is scrutinized within the broader changes in the political process in Turkey as a result. Reliance on own resources and review of its commitments to Western ideals and designs for regions around Turkish borders stimulated debates on legitimacy of power use in the arsenal of the Turkish foreign policy.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL CASES

4.1. The Mosul Question

The Mosul Question represents a curious case of how a young Turkish Republic had to adapt to the hostile and unsecure environment after the First World War and how its political elites were defining national interests and giving priorities to the national interests if they contradicted to each other. The Mosul Question dates back to the National Pact of the Independence Movement of 1919-1923, upon which it was decided to deploy all available resource in attempts to unify territories that would constitute future Turkish state. One of the disputed issues was Mosul vilayet's status, an oil-rich and populated province of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire. An administrative center of the province, city of Mosul, was occupied by the British forces just hours after the Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Entente powers which foresaw suspension of all hostilities in the Middle East.

During the Lausanne Conference that started in November 1922, Turkish delegations using military successes was resolute to insist on keeping the Mosul under the provisions of the upcoming treaty (Coşar & Demirci, 2006). Even though, it managed to achieve considerable advantages during the negotiations, the delegation faced with Britain's reluctance to compromise over the status of the Mosul province, had to interrupt the conference in February 1923. Stalemate of the talks and lack of a progress on diplomatic arena, which was supposed to bring the Turkish state and its political regime necessary international recognition, fueled debates among the Kemalist elite over the national interests, though defined by a new regime without much public involvement.

Back then discussions on whether Turkey should proceed pushing on the Mosul issue while threatening the talks with the Western powers were heavily influenced by Atatürk who himself was insisting on keeping the Mosul question as a separate issue with Britain. Atatürk and his surrounding were in agreement that Turkish authorities should demonstrate willingness and readiness to a peaceful resolution of the existing issues with the European powers. Many in the elites were, however, insistent on realization of the National Pact principles, including return of the Mosul province under the Turkish control. Atatürk's main argument, however, was that Turkey needs an international

recognition and lacks diplomatic and military resources to resist the British position (Demirci, 2010).

Talks over Mosul between Turkey and Britain were continued after the Lausanne treaty was signed in July 1923. After unsuccessful negotiations Turkey decided to transfer the issue to the League of Nations in September 1924, effectively having abandoned any hope to return the province under its control: the international body was heavily influence by London thus meaning that any decision would be biased. Moreover, as the Sheikh Said revolt in February-March 1925 demonstrated, Britain was ready to use military resources to intervene in Turkish domestic affairs in order to destabilize fragile political situation of a new state. The rebellion put an end to Turkish plans to carry out military operations in order to pressure Britain to give into the Turkish demands over Mosul (Olson, 2013).

After signing the Frontier Treaty of 1926, Turkey de jure recognized that Mosul belongs to the Iraqi state and in return started receiving 10 per cent of the Iraqi government's royalty payments for the coming twenty-five years. Settlement of the issue, under the imposed conditions, resulted in improvement of relations with the Kingdom of Iraq in the 1930s.

The issue of Mosul demonstrates that Turkey back then was enjoying weak diplomatic stance on the international arena, the multilateral institutions, dominated by the European powers, were also no good in resolving issue that directly concerned Turkey. On the other hand, although there was a unity in worldviews of national elites, since all openly anti-Kemalist opposition was dully suppressed, silenced or incorporated in the mainstream Kemalist ideology around the People's Republican Party, existing evidence suggests that political elites were trying to prioritize national interests. It is the debates in the Parliament and increasing power of Ataturk, however, that may give us a clue why decision not to act militarily against Britain was made in the end.

The Mosul province was regarded as a physical embodiment of the Kemalist nation-building endeavour, the return of these territories under the Turkish control was rightly perceived as a national interest by majority in the newly-established political elites. Meanwhile, a necessity to assure the European powers that a new Turkey can be accepted as a nation that accepts the "rules of the game", thus avoiding openly challenging the post-

war order on its borders and, in turn, hoping for being accepted as an equal partner in the world was also defined as a national interest by the Kemalist elites and more importantly was given a special attention by Atatürk, a main architect of the Turkish state.

The differences in views on priority between stable borders and relations with leading European powers, on the one hand, and realization of an ideological program laid out in the National Pact, on the other, was evident throughout all process of diplomatic negotiations between Turkey and Britain. Main opposition to an idea of compromise with Britain came from a group of former Ottoman officers and then leading Turkish politicians (U. Mumcu, 1990), collectively known as the Second Group. Deputies like Hüseyin Avni, Ali Şükrü rallied behind a prominent military leader and diplomat who opposed any negotiations with Britain for the fears that the latter would eventually use its political clout in the international forums to resolve the Mosul issue to its favor. Important detail in the activity of the Second Groups was its staunch opposition against increasing influence of Atatürk on the political activity of a new state.

Though Ataturk was against Britain's occupation of Mosul after the Mudros armistice and was pondering over initiating military activities before the Lausanne talks in efforts to demonstrate that Turkish government is ready to resort to military means to secure its interests in Mosul (Kisikli, 1999), he nevertheless tried to stifle the domestic opposition and turn opinion of the Parliament to the idea that diplomatic resolution of the Mosul is vital for the Turkish state because in case of military hostilities with Britain or with the British proxies, Ankara wouldn't be able neither to resist international implications of this conflict, nor to handle domestic instability in the eastern provinces adjacent to the Iraqi territory.

The debates around whether to resort to the military power were, in effect, ramified by considerations whether a new nation has to challenge a major European power and protect its national sovereignty over occupied territories or make sure that the political regime, in its Kemalist manifestation, is given a chance to take roots and gain domestic and international legitimacy under more or less secure and stable conditions.

The Sheikh Said rebellion demonstrated that domestic situation in Turkey is far from stable, in addition to that, in regards to the Atatürk's own political calculations, existence

of the parliamentary opposition could be interpreted as a further obstacle to realization of the political nation-building project. Finally, lack of stable diplomatic stance of Turkey internationally also sent a signal to decision-makers in Ankara and made them consider both developing ties with other countries like USSR (Aydoğan, 2007) and mitigate existing diplomatic differences with the European states unless Turkish political regime is more or less immune to outside influence.

The present analysis of the Mosul case may contribute to understanding of Turkey's strategic culture in several ways. A major finding was notion that the Mosul issue was the first serious diplomatic conflict between Turkey and a foreign power, moreover, if we consider the War of Independence as a conflict that was an outright military conflict between the National movement and foreign invading powers, the Mosul case, in contrast, gives us opportunity to see how diplomacy and war means interacted during decision-making process of the Turkish political establishment. Along with the issue of Istanbul, the Mosul question in a way demonstrated that Turkish decision-makers eagerly used military power as, like army maneuvers or border hostilities, as a pressure factor accompanying diplomatic efforts.

The internal discussions, however, and the way how the Turkish leadership acted on the field made it clear that Turkey is reluctant to engage in a conflict with a European power due to its enormous diplomatic influence. The further finding is that it is worth noting that Turkish decision-makers distinguished between hostile countries and avoided a direct confrontation with the most powerful ones, while being not against any military actions against smaller or less influential ones.

Besides, during discussions on the possible consequence of military power deployment, on many occasions, opponents of an open conflict against Britain voiced a concern that political consequences of such conflict would inevitably hinder the building of the political regime in Turkey. In other words, calculations over military power deployment outside the borders were bound to the possible political implication to the Kemalist regime. These lines of argumentation will constitute a basis for the evolving strategic culture.

Decision on power use was discussed as part of broader competition between major decision-makers, like Atatürk's circle and his war-time comrades, on definition of what Turkey's national interests are. Mosul was considered to be an intrinsic part of the National Pact, elites' agreement, and by extension, a document that enjoyed wide legitimacy and represented wider views. Defending Mosul, with its larger Turkish and Kurdish population, was worth using military power. This approach was further legitimized by the fact that conflict around Mosul province was waged with a European power, meaning that Turkey would another war with yet another occupying power.

Atatürk's decision to rely on diplomacy prevailed, because domestic opposition failed to gain momentum in Turkey. Mosul case demonstrated, therefore, that power use against a Western state is less realistic if elites, whose interests linked to good relations with the Western interests, prevail in domestic politics. Further history shows that Kemalist elites, represented by the military and political allies in bureaucracy and politics, dominate over political system and therefore exert profound effect on Turkish strategic thinking, contributing to formation of contours of Turkish strategic culture for many years ahead.

4.2. The Korean War

Turkey's decision to enter the Korean war 1950-1953 as part of the UN plans effectively ended decades-long policy of Turkey's non-involvement in any regional or global war. The Kemalist establishment, both in the RPP and Democratic Party, were aware of the growing tensions between US and USSR, who had been showing inclination to reconsider its ties with Turkey and existing treaties. Alliance with the US and its security guarantees could be used to diplomatically counter balance increasing Soviet threats: in March 1945 Moscow announced that the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between Turkey and the Soviet Union would not be prolonged unless Ankara reviews the status of the Straits and the Soviet-Turkish border in the Kars and Ardahan provinces. Closer relations with the Western powers could also be used by the governing elites to restrain the rival political forces associated with the socialist Moscow inside Turkey (C. S. Brown, 2008).

An alliance agreement with the US could also bring necessary economic resources, technologies and investments for the Turkish economy, especially after the Kemalist

elites understood that state driven policy of economic growth hadn't brought tangible results (Lippe, 2000). In addition to the economic benefits, closer relations with the USA and the West in general could be used by the Turkish political elites to claim legitimacy for a current political regime and Kemalist nation-building experiment by pointing at the fact that Turkey is acknowledged by the world's leading powers as an equal partner (E. Yilmaz & Bilgin, 2006).

By the late July 1950 Turkey sent its first 4500 troops for the UN Command in Korea. The Turkish troops saw their fight in December after conclusion of training under the US supervision. After the Armistice Agreement was signed Turkish brigades counted more than 700 men killed in action, Turkey's first disposition of its army units in the foreign lands with such a high toll of losses. But still, the political leaders considered it a price for being accepted in the NATO, the only real security assurance against the Soviet danger. Indeed, after Turkey became a NATO member, the Soviets in the spring of 1953 (after Stalin's death in March) declared its readiness to renew the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, thus sending a message that it had renounced all claims to the Turkish national territories.

Turkish participation in the Korean civil war demonstrates that international environment of the Turkish Republic was not totally hostile, since there were hopes for more cooperation with the West. It was a Soviet threat that forced Turkey to consider closer relations with the West. Decision to send troops, i.e. in effect to deploy military power abroad, has to be seen as a part of Turkish diplomatic efforts to prevent broader military engagement with the Soviets in the immediate Turkish neighbourhood

Ostensibly, the increasing pressure from the swiftly expanding Soviet presence on the Turkish boundaries was present years before the Democratic Party came to power. A civil war in an adjacent Greece between 1946-1949, rise and defeat of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947) and the Azeri Azerbaijan People's Government (1945–1946) in Persia and Soviet diplomatic backing for Syrian independence from France in 1946 made Turkish political elites concerned about possible Soviet ambitions in Turkey.

Territorial claims, voiced by the Soviet government, finally drove Turkey into the sphere of influence of the western security arrangements (Ulgul, 2010). For the NATO, in turn,

Turkey represented a treasured element in its own strategy of containment of the Soviet expansionism in the Middle East and the Balkans.

The debates over deployment of the Turkish army units abroad were run within the Kemalist elites. The introduction of the multiparty system opened space to broader debates on major domestic issues, there was, however, a consensus between the Republican People's Party and the Democratic Party that in order for Turkey to survive as an independent and unified state it should seek support from the West, by then the only rival to the Soviet Union.

Both political forces opted out for Turkish participation in the UN-led efforts in Korea. For the Republican People's Party this step was a needed condition for broader legitimization of the current political regime, while for the Democrat party participation meant safeguarding ties with the West and democratic world and therefore, securing its own political position in the newly established multiparty system where the Democrats were under continuous threat from the hard-line Kemalists in bureaucratic echelons of power and within the army ranks (Sander, 1979).

Moreover, the DP's decision to send troops to Korea was dictated by its designs to protect economic and military aid to the country that ultimately would be converted to voting support and positive attitudes among the young army officers craving for technical upgrading (Kalkan, 2007).

Interesting enough that leader of opposition, İsmet İnönü came out to criticize the DP's decision to send troops. Main concern was not the fact that army units are to be send but the way how the decision itself was made. The RPP voiced opposition that the Parliament was not consulted (Bülent, 2012). Another item of concern was linked to alternation of other foreign policy guidelines in regards to the Turkish stance in the Middle East.

Since the foundation of the Republic, Turkey had been abstaining from active involvement in the region fearing repercussion from other powers and possible spill of instability into its territories. All of these concerns were still in existence when Turkey pursued an insistent policy for the establishment of a Middle East organization after 1952 and Baghdad Pact was founded in 1955.

It was clear that participation of Turkish troops in the Korean war and subsequent entrance of Turkey into the NATO alliance will inevitably impact its stance vis-à-vis the neighboring states. This situation allows one to conclude that the Middle Eastern policy of the DP was very different from RPP and that the new government had altogether different aims than its predecessor for the region.

A tougher alliance with the Western interests didn't seem to be an problem for the Turkish military since, on the one hand, by the 1950s the Turkish military was in a deprived shape in terms of military equipment and know-hows and, on the other hand, it was still loyal to the Republican Party led by Atatürk's comrades. After the introduction of the multiparty system there were concerns voiced in the military claiming that the Democrat Party should be overthrown in case the Kemalist principles of republican statehood are openly defied including active involvement of Turkey in the Middle East, but the RPP's leadership was against any such moves (Açıci, 2009).

Moreover, the military leadership, promptly altered by the Law 7527 in June 1950, was aware that closer dialogue with the NATO would mean for the army an increased economic clout, access to more technical resources and, with an active role of Turkey in the military plans of the West against the USSR, - higher position in the domestic political constellations. And these motives were further rooted in the army's desire to protect the Republican political regime against both outside and inside challenges.

It is, therefore, conceivable to argue that the decision to send troops to Korea was made for the sake of the national interest – preservation of the national independence. The move was undertaken within the ideology that facilitated closer relations with the West and wasn't in its effect directed against the Western global order.

The case of Turkish participation in the Korean War is informative from several perspectives. First of all, for the first time Turkey had a choice to be made in the framework of the global power politics. In these conditions military power in pursuit of own security was resorted to as a part of the Western alliance's attempts to curb the Soviet expansion. It must be mentioned that sending troops to Korea was the first radical decision in the military history of the Republic of Turkey. Before that, one of the main principles

of Turkish military history was not to participate in the conflicts unless there was a threat to Turkish security.

For example, Turkey abstained from taking side during the Second World War mainly due to absence of a direct threat to its own security. The case of Korean campaign suggests that analysis of the Turkish decision-makers' choice on whether to use military power abroad must begin with the clear realization how political establishment perceives existing threats and, at the same time, how global balance of power may contribute to improvement or deterioration of national security.

On the other hand, the Korean War case demonstrates that deployment of military power far away from the national borders (under internationally legitimate UN-mandate) can be viewed as part of the Turkish diplomatic efforts to keep stability in its immediate neighbourhood. This assumption can explain why there was an unanimity among national elite establishment (including the military, which back then was loyal to the Kemalist RPP) on sending of Turkish troops to Korea despite the İnönü's criticism of how the decision was undertaken.

In other words, for Turkish strategic culture a division between near and far-away territory is always important, because deployment elsewhere beyond the adjacent political space maybe have in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers a non-military utility, especially when national security in the more proximate environment is challenged by global or regional threats.

4.3. Cyprus Peace Operation 1974

A history of conflicts and violence between two island communities on Cyprus goes back to the 1950s when nationalist feelings were fueled by prospects of Britain's demise as an imperial power in the region which had been controlling the island since 1878. To regulate tensions and, ideally, formalize Greece and Turkey's role as guarantor states of affairs on the island, Britain agreed to sign the Zurich and London agreements in the 1960s, though international mechanism failed to prevent further intercommunal violence. As a response to the increasing number of attacks against the Turkish community in the late 1963 and early 1964, Turkey claimed its intention to use the military to deploy on the island in accordance with the provision of the agreements between Greece, Turkey and Britain.

The US President Lyndon Johnson's reaction on the Turkish statement and following diplomatic steps of Washington forced Ankara to give up on the idea of intervention as an extraordinary attempt, thus, angering the Turkish people and alienating political elites. Another similar episode occurred in 1967, when Turkey again reluctantly was required to toe the line within the NATO and finally to cancel current plans on use of army to secure the island Turkish communities.

The new wave of escalation, nevertheless, took place in the mid-1970s when in July 15 the National Guard of Cyprus, acting under the command of the Greek junta in Athens, toppled the President Archbishop Makarios III and replaced him with Nikos Sampson, a Cypriot Greek ultranationalist who headed the movement struggling for a unification with the mainland Greece. Different from the events of 1964 and 1967, international opinion in 1974 was on the Turkish side, attributing blame for renew violence to the junta-led Athens who was indeed responsible for situation on Cyprus,.

Cyprus was important for Turkey not only due to feelings of empathy to the kin relative Turkish Cypriots, but, more importantly, due to the island's geopolitical location that allows for an effective control of maritime routes and the southern waters of Turkey. In the 1960s the US and Britain appreciated Cyprus for its position vis-à-vis the Middle East, whereas in the 1970s the US, who by then had taken Britain's place as a principal regional power in the Middle East, already had access to the region via Israel, thus rendering Cyprus less valuable. Moreover, by the time of invasion in 1974 Turkey had developed robust dialogue with the Soviet Union making it easier to counter-balance possible US protests in case of Turkish military operation (Артамонова, 2011).

Domestically, in 1974 Turkish cabinet, like it was the case in 1964 and 1967, faced with a serious public pressure with major opposition political parties demanding assertive and rapid measures to break spiral of violence on the island (Adamson, 2001). Furthermore, a ruling Republican People's Party, which was in a coalition with the Islamist National Salvation Party, understood that operation could be a great opportunity to boost its own popularity among citizens and get rid of its ideologically rival coalition partner in the coming elections.

After the first phase of invasion in July 1974 Turkey secured its foothold on the island and proceeded to safeguarding its achievements on the diplomatic arena. After the Geneva talks didn't bring tangible results and feeling that international opinion started to tilt in favor of Greece, Turkey decided to advance its positions in August 1974, effectively capturing 40% of the island. In 1975 Turkish government decided to keep its presence on the island and establish separate political entity that would secure Turkish advancements there. As a reaction to the latter and Turkey's support to the partition of Cyprus, the US imposed arms embargo on Turkey that lasted from 1975 up until 1978, when dialogue between Washington and Ankara started thawing in the face of fundamental changes in the Middle East, revolution in Iran and oil-embargo of the Arab states.

The case of Cyprus operation of 1974 demonstrated a prominence of Turkish experience of dealing with the outside world and how this involvement, in turn, may influence decisions on use of military power beyond national borders.

During Cyprus crisis Turkish decision-makers were facing with the dilemma: support of the Turkish Cypriots and withholding of the island under its control/influence (or at least keep it neutral) and challenge to the Western "rules of the game", which say that Turkey and Greece should avoid direct confrontation and thus avoid further destabilization within the framework of the bipolar competition. The international setting was not entirely hostile to Turkey, instead, rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the Third World countries gave Turkey a necessary relief for a tougher stance against the western domination in its relations with Cyprus.

On the other hand, for principle decision-makers in Turkey their experience in dealing with the Western interests over Cyprus issue in 1964 and 1967 was seen in 1974 in purely negative terms (Asmussen, 2008). Diplomatic efforts to end the crisis and secure Turkish assets in Cyprus in the 1960s turned out to be futile mainly through the international resistance to concede to the Turkish requirements. In addition, Turkey in the 1960s was in a much antagonistic environment in terms of the Cold War hostility with the constant threat from the Soviet Union that meant Turkey's heavy dependence on the Western security guarantees.

During Cyprus crisis Turkey's political landscape was split with unstable governments and marked with disproportionately large influence of the smaller parties with radical agendas and marked by the broader participation of the Turkish social groups in the debates around general foreign policy course. The ideological environment of the debates over military deployment abroad was accompanied by the vocal anti-western attitudes and rapid rise of the nationalist feelings in general with the accent on importance of Turkey's self-reliance rather than dependence on the western security guarantees and search for better alternatives to the U.S. political domination.

Politically unstable governments were further influenced by presence of the military's intervention in the decision-making process, especially in terms of strategic choices (Birand, 1985). But despite the fact that the Turkish army favored military option and broader layers of society demanded immediate action (Asmussen, 2008) to secure lives of the Turkish Cypriots, the civil government under Ecevit seems to be both given a freeway and was willing to go for every available diplomatic opportunity to resolve the issue.

Then Prime-Minister Bülent Ecevit was hoping to secure civil authority's position vis-à-vis the military during discussions by using diplomacy, the stakes were, however, very high and repetition of a diplomatic fiasco could, on the contrary, inflict immense damage on unstable democratic process in Turkey by further undermining civil cabinet due to loss of society's support as it was in the 1960s under the Demirel government before the military coup.

A closer look at Cyprus case can disclose us further details of Turkish strategic culture. First of all, in cases when Turkish diplomatic engagement suffers serious setbacks decision-makers are inclined to incorporate the idea that limited use of military power under favorable circumstance may contribute to diplomatic efforts. Unresolved issues that have serious political implications for the political processes back at home, especially in terms of national identity, lead to altering of views on preference of military power as a means of foreign policy.

Further valuable finding is that, once again, Turkish strategic culture foresees use of military power as a supplement element of diplomacy. These two elements of Turkish

foreign policy are not of equal significance or impact per se. Even the military gives predilection to diplomatic means by letting the civil political cabinet handle the crisis and step in and contribute to defence of national security only when diplomatic activities need to be supported by some realpolitik actions to tilt the negotiating circumstances in favor of Turkey.

4.4. The Gulf War 1991

In the early 1990s Turkey was experiencing not only political and financial instability within its own borders, it was also facing with a rapidly changing international environment as well. Since the 1980s Turkey had been trying to secure its positions in the global politics mainly by sticking to the West (in its competition against the global socialist camp) and developing ties with third world countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and demise of the bipolar order in the world and resulting instability in Turkey's neighborhood, including the Middle East, Turkey had to choose between continuation of its policy of non-involvement in the regional conflicts and foreign activism. As the Gulf War of 1991 shows, there was growing realization among the political elites of Turkey that they can't afford ignoring its surrounding if they want stability at home, in other words, a growing number of political leaders came to conclusion that a change of foreign policy vision is necessary if Turkey wants to succeed and thrive in a new world order (Hale, 1992).

Prior the commencement of the US-led operation against Iraq in January 1991, there were intensive debates in Turkey as if it should allow Washington to use Turkish soil to conduct an operation in Northern Iraq which eventually could speed overall operation against the Saddam troops and expel Iraqi army from Kuwait. This period witnessed an active involvement of the then Turkish president Turgut Özal, who had been campaigning for allowing the US to use Turkish territories.

The president's main arguments were that Turkey would be able to have a say in the post-war Iraq, define state of affairs vis-à-vis the Kurds and finally and most importantly raise its profile in the Middle East and strengthen ties with Washington. Özal was legally tied in using Turkish troops abroad without parliament's approval, however he deployed all

his political resources to influence decision-making in the government and ministry of foreign affairs.

The Turkish army and political opposition were against deployment of the Turkish troops referring to the traditional stance on the Middle East affairs claiming that Turkey ought to keep neutrality in the upcoming war since any involvement could potentially hard Turkey's relations with the region (Haberman, 1991). After a long political tradeoff and debates Turkish parliament finally approved only limited use of Incirlik base for the coalition air forces, while Özal using its powers deployed around 100,000 troops with support and 35,000 reservists to the border, effectively hampering a considerable number of army units in northern Iraq and therefore helping the coalition military efforts in Kuwait (C. S. Brown, 2007).

In the long run, Turkey's limited involvement didn't save the country from having negative effects of the war. The Turkish economy suffered from the Western imposed economic sanctions and lost considerable revenues since Turkey wasn't allowed to buy and resell the Iraqi oil. Moreover, Turkey had to deal with massive refugee waves that pressed already ill economic situation in the eastern provinces of the country. Finally, Turkey found itself sidelined from process over the Iraqi Kurdistan and couldn't shape the political affairs there for a long time.

During the Gulf crisis Turkey found itself in a situation when it had to make hard choices: either to abstain from active involvement in the UN-sanctioned activities against the Saddam regime and thus directly interfere in the conflict between two Arab states, breaking a long-lasting tradition of abstaining from active involvement in the Middle East affairs, or to put its relations with the Western states at risk and thus obscuring country's political future in times of rapid changes and rising unpredictability. Broadly said, these two elements may constitute major principles of Turkish foreign policy and, by extent, the Gulf crisis represents a case of a peculiar interaction between the both.

When the crisis had just broken out, the initial reaction of the Turkish decision-makers was cautious non-involvement. Considering that Iraqi authorities enjoyed close relations with Turkey over coordination of mutual efforts against the Kurdish separatism, domestic instability in Turkey, mainly caused by the continuing Kurdish militant insurgency, could

further intensify in case the Iraqi state disintegrates or the central government loses its control over the Iraqi Kurdish territories. Any negative consequences in Iraq's position on the Kurds inevitably could lead to escalation of violence inside Turkey.

Turkish political establishment couldn't further allow itself to be involved in the anti-terrorist campaign using harsh methods as it caused sharp criticism in the West, especially in the European capitals, complicating Turkish efforts to develop full-fledged economic and political ties with the West and thus to contribute to the success of the Kemalist nation-building and modernization process.

Another point to review was continuing feeling of skepticism on part of the Turkish decision-makers, especially, of the military, about Turkey's commitment to the Western efforts elsewhere after the US put in question its NATO obligation to protect Turkey when Ankara indicated that it was about to invade Cyprus in attempts to prevent further communal violence and protect Cypriot Turkish minority on the island in 1964. Since then Turkish decision-making process and by extent strategic culture was influence by substantial calculations between Turkish war efforts and commitments and Western declared promises (Kuniholm, 1991). However, these calculations were further influence by new international environment marked with rapid political changes and concurrent rising instability in the Turkish neighbourhood. The end of the Cold war was interpreted by Turkey as a challenge to its usually preferred relations to the West and, in a broader sense, to the Kemalist political project that was designed in the framework of modernization through westernization (Taspinar, 2005).

The leading figure behind Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf crisis was the Motherland Party's leader Turgut Özal who through his dynamic foreign policy engagement to show that closer alliance with the Western interests in the new post-Cold war order would require new ideas and approaches in the foreign policy. Following the Özalist framework, Turkey has to ride the challenges, to be both interesting and important for the West as a conductor of the Western norms and ideas and interests, and at the same time to try to seize opportunities and establish itself deeper within the neighbouring regions and thus become a regional leader and influence developments on the ground and thus, once again, to gain importance in the eyes of the Western partners.

By comparing Turkish efforts in support of the UN-sanctions during the Gulf crisis with the Turkish war commitments during the Korean war, Özal effectively made it clear that development of Turkey's ties with the Western world enjoys higher priority than the traditional non-involvement in the Middle East (Erik Jan Zürcher & Gönen, 1995).

The post-Cold war period witnessed international trends towards more democratization of civil-military relations and decrease of external challenges to national security and concurrent neoliberal practices that put additional pressure to the military's involvement into the politics and economy. This partly explains why Turkish military tried to reconfigure its influence in the political process through reformulation of the Turkish army's duty of protection of the Turkish nation from solely from outside threats to the mixture of domestic and international challenges (Karaosmanoğlu, 2011).

Özal attempts to civilize relations between the government and the army were largely successful judging by the initiatives in limiting army's interference in the decision-making and curbing army's bureaucratic autonomy. Another indication of changes within the relations was interference of Özal in the process of command change and creation of parallel agencies responsible for home security issues (İba, 1998). These developments were the background of the decision-making process during the Gulf crisis.

The military was anxious about possible consequences of the direct Turkish involvement mainly due to the fact that it would further contribute to deterioration of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, army command also indicated that deployment of troops would not bring considerable political and strategic benefits to the Turkish nation as such move is not consistent with long-term interests (Uzgel, 1998).

Even though there was coordination between the military and civil authorities in regard to the production of a proper response to the crisis, in the heyday of the war, the military was effectively sidelined by Özal, forcing the Defence Minister Sefa Giray and Chief of the Staff Necip Torumtay to resign. Resignation was seen as the best way to influence the government, influence by the President Özal, in conditions when the direct interference of the military would be met with enthusiasm and when the government and elected president enjoy democratic mandate.

The political clout of Özal was created in the 1980s during which political landscape was influenced by absence of charismatic politicians like Demirel and Ecevit. Özal paid great attention to liberalization of the political and economic sphere in hopes that the unleashed social forces would eventually contribute to democratization of military-civil relations and strengthening of his Motherland Party's rule.

The return of charismatic politicians after the military-imposed ban was annulled as a result of referendum in 1989 made Özal anxious about his ability to continue liberal reforms via pure party politics as not only his Motherland Party now was forced to deal with the Kemalist forces, but also because there was a rising opposition inside the party. Only his election to the presidential post could let Özal to further concentrate resources on implementing his vision of the foreign policy (Feroz, 2002).

The Gulf crisis further revealed deep opposition on part of the traditional Kemalist political forces against the initiatives that foresaw Turkish direct involvement in the Gulf crisis. The consensus, however, was that Turkey should further stick to the Western world and Turkey could best facilitate its national interests through tight and developed relations with the EC and USA. Though main opposition parties criticized Özal's endeavour and pro-active stance directed to deeper involvement in the anti-Saddam war efforts, there was no clear alternative.

On the other hand, rapid changes in the world, shifts of power to the Western powers, instability and expanding globalization demanded from the Turkish decision-makers tangible strategies. Turkey had been long conducting negotiations with the European Community on its membership and Europe was considering changing the scope of cooperation with Turkey after the collapse of the Socialist camp. Security issues also dominated Turkish-NATO relations and Turkey was interested in presenting itself as a reliable partner for the alliance even in a new international environment.

Political instability in the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East raised the anxiety in Ankara, the military and majority of political forces, who by default relied on the traditional foreign policy framework, were in acute opposition to any idea that presupposed Turkish military involvement abroad without clear manifestation that any such deployment, though most likely serving the Western interests of providing security

and political stability under the Western political leadership, would pursue Turkish interests as well.

On a more theoretical level the Gulf crisis showed that a major element of the Turkish strategic culture – deployment of troops outside Turkish national borders within the framework of the Western war efforts – is accompanied by manifestation of how such deployment can serve immediate Turkish national interests other than long-term alliance with the Western world. Another major element of the Turkish strategic culture that had played a role at the decision-making process during the Gulf crisis was consensus among the political elites that deployment of troops in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood would be politically dubious endeavour as it can put a direct challenge to the domestic security.

4.5. The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998

The Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998 demonstrates that Turkish political elites, when faced with a combination of domestic and international challenges in the environment of uncertainty, are forced to act proactively and resolute to change the policy on non-involvement in the Middle East if there is a threat to national security and if diplomatic efforts don't bring necessary results.

Through the 1990s Turkey witnessed not only unstable governments due to deep ideological divisions between major political forces, it found itself in an increasingly hostile and unpredictable international setting. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its withdrawal from the Middle East, this region presented both threats for Turkish national interests and opportunity for their promotion as well. This was especially evident in the example of the PKK terrorism, a problem that had been on the agenda of the national establishment for more than two decades by 1998. Being not only purely domestic issue, especially in the issue of the military-civilian relations (Aras & Karakaya Polat, 2008), Kurdish terrorism influenced Turkish relations with its neighbors as well.

Since 1979 Syria became a primary and main supporter of the Kurdish terrorists from the PKK. The Syrian regime had been using the PKK factor as a tool in its dealing with Ankara over water distribution in the Euphrates (Aykan, 1999). Ankara tried to solve the issue by deploying diplomatic means: in 1987 then Prime-Minister Turgut Özal signed an agreement with Damascus regulation volume of waters assigned for the Syrian side.

Ties between Syria and the PKK, however, were not broken: Syrian regime tried to extort further concessions through its support to the Kurdish terrorists.

Ankara between 1992 and 1998 had attempted in several diplomatic efforts to mitigate its relations with Damascus over the PKK by signing security protocols in 1987, 1992, 1993, but as later events evidenced Damascus didn't give up on using the PKK in pressuring Ankara, especially after changes in the broader environment that facilitated Kurdish nationalism in the region. After the 1991 Gulf war Ankara had concerns over the prospects of a Kurdish independent polity in Iraq, these worries were further confirmed after US-brokered agreement between Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in September 1998. The rise of the Iraqi Kurdish nationalist movements was coupled with an expanding presence of the PKK-affiliated groups in Europe through the 1990s. Relations with the West were further complicated by Western criticism of human rights violations in Turkey in its legitimate fight against terrorism (M. E. Yilmaz, 2010).

Although the October crisis was not the first time when Turkey threatened to deploy army against Syria, the intentions of the political elites and political moods of the major political actors and popular support for such a move pointed at the seriousness of Ankara's threats. The resolution of Turkey to act military was clear to the regional players as well (Sezgin, 2002), as evidenced from the diplomatic efforts of Egypt to reduce the tension between Syria and Turkey.

For the latter, the issue was about survival and national integrity; therefore diplomatic efforts had to be followed by military steps. Given the regional and international dynamics and conditions, unfavorable for the Turkish efforts to settle the conflict through diplomacy, the risk of army deployment against Syria was very high.

The case of the Syrian crisis shows that in the conditions of hostility Turkey, when its national interests are at stake, tends to resort to the military power only as a last choice when all diplomatic tools provide no solution to any emergent crisis. In 1998 Turkish political elites were fragmented as never before with some of them directly challenging prevailing ideological order. In 1997 the military ousted the Islamist Welfare Party leaving the national government unstable (Kasaba, 2008). But the process was remarkable for the military-civil relations: on the other hand, the military realized that from now on

it can't directly intervene in the political system without popular mandate and support among political and societal groups for such a move.

On the other hand, the military was forced to utilize existing conflict with the PKK-terrorism and to mobilize popular opinion against the Islamist reaction (both, according to the military statements, were threatening secular and Kemalist character of the Turkish Republic) to secure its political clout (Balci, 2013).

The rise of the Kurdish nationalism made the military very sensitive and anxious about regional developments that could jeopardize Turkey's political stability and national security. Trying to resolve the PKK issue with the Syrian government through 1980s and 1990s Turkish elites avoided direct military confrontation, fearing that any move against the Arab state may result in alienation of Turkey in the Middle East and, thus, put Turkey in a more dangerous situation leaving no channels with the regional governments (C. Mumcu & Kahramaner, 2004).

Position of the military was later articulated by The Turkish Chief of Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu in his public statements. Kıvrıkoğlu made it clear that military back in 1998 was perfectly aware that Syria doesn't have enough military power to sustain any Turkish military attack due to the fact that the bulk of Syrian troops were stationed near Israel.

Moreover, Kıvrıkoğlu underlined that any military operation, be it limited army maneuvers near the Syrian border or deployment of troops in Syria, was designed to back up diplomatic pressure on Assad, but not to secure the border exclusively by imposing favorable conditions on Assad, because sooner or later such arrangements would destabilize situation even further.

Political parties found themselves in a precarious position during the October crisis of 1998 due to several factors. First of all, after removal of the Erbakan-Çiller government, Bülent Ecevit's cabinet was under enormous pressure from the military (Sezgin, 2002). Furthermore, civil government realized that diplomatic measures were unsuccessful in persuading Damascus to change its policy towards the PKK. Finally, the public opinion in Turkey was infuriated by how the PKK-issue is dealt and support of Syria and other states for the terrorist group.

Under these conditions, civil government were reluctant to openly confront with an Arab state and draw Turkey in a very unstable environment of the Middle East, following the traditional foreign policy line (Altunışık, 2002). Still, there were some factors that, in opposite, could drive civil government to favor a military option – once again, as it was in Cyprus case, Bülent Ecevit saw in a more belligerent stance an opportunity to boost its own popularity necessary for electoral advance for upcoming elections in 1999.

The case of Syrian crisis of 1998 exposes several aspects of Turkish strategic culture in regards to the deployment of military power. First of all, Turkish decision-makers demonstrate reluctance to openly confront an Arab state fearing repercussions from the Arab world that tend to react rather negatively to any Turkish attempts to infringe on sovereignty of any regional state.

Secondly, Turkish decision-makers tend to resort to their experience of handling the region when faced with diplomatic crises in the region. Turkish attempts to influence political process in 1957 seem to play a role (Makovsky, 1999) when Turkish diplomats in close cooperation with the military in 1990s decided to escalate situation in a controllable way by supporting diplomatic pressure on the Assad regime with demonstration of military power. Having an open card for use of military power against Syria seems to supplemented weak diplomatic resources of Turkey in region and weak security cooperation with the Western partners.

Finally, once again, the case of the Syrian crisis demonstrated that weak governments under serious pressure from the military can concede to military power deployment to appease national sentiments (especially when security threats outside national borders tend to have serious implications for domestic politics). By resorting to military means of foreign policy weak governments may want to mobilize public support in its own competition against the military even in the framework of defending democratic values.



CONCLUSION

Analysis of cases when Turkish decision-makers were forced to deal with major foreign-policy crisis reveals several crucial notions on Turkish strategic culture. A closer look at how Turkish political establishment and officials were deciding on how to approach the issue at stake and what political tools to use to alleviate the crisis may help us understand what role of military power plays in the Turkish foreign policy.

The first major finding of this research on Turkish strategic culture was a notion that Turkish decision-makers perceived military power as an extension and a supplement of diplomacy. Turkish Republic has never waged an aggressive war throughout its history and deployed a military force only in cases when international law allowed to do so. This notion seems to correlate with theoretical findings of Kurcuoglu about a well-established tradition in the Turkish foreign policy to rely heavily on diplomatic tools.

Moreover, when talking about political elites' deciding whether to use diplomacy or military action to cope with a rising challenge Turkish decision-makers don't neglect military option per se. In Johnston's words, it is rather fair to talk about "a strategic preferences" to use military power only within the diplomatic efforts.

There are several possible explanations for this preference for diplomacy over war. Following Campbell's idea that Turkish foreign policy demonstrates close connection to the competition of rival political identities in Turkish domestic politics, we can suggest that preference for diplomacy may be rooted in the Kemalist perception of its political reality and ties with the outside world. Kemalist ruling elite since the foundation of the Turkish Republic have been pursuing a goal to get legitimacy of its political regime in the eyes of the Western world.

Kaan Kadri's notion of Turkish foreign policy being influenced by the desire to stick to the western principles of behaviour may suggest that preference for diplomatic means in resolving the crisis could be a way to get legitimacy for the regime by proving its peaceful and non-threatening (to the Western interests, including in the Middle East) character.

Another possible explanation for the preference for diplomacy over military tools in Turkish strategic culture may lie in Okutan and Ereker's notion that the Kemalist regime was fearful of diplomatic isolation. Historical experience of the Ottoman Empire played a defining role in this regard in the first years of the Turkish Republic when Turkish strategic culture was forming and needed clear reference points in dealing with emerging crisis of the 1920s.

Finally, it is the Kemalist regime's notion of Turkey's neighbourhood that played a formative role in Turkish strategic culture that prefers diplomacy over military action. Erpul's idea that Turkish ruling elites have been avoiding military escalation with the neighbouring states for the fear that any such conflict may result in the rise of anti-Turkish revisionist aspirations and destabilize national borders may shed light on why Turkish strategic culture attaches great importance to diplomatic tools over military actions.

It would be, however, wrong to say that there military power occupies no place in Turkish strategic culture. One should turn back to Jeffrey Landis' notion of acceptable norms of behaviour in foreign policy and its relation to strategic culture to understand that Turkish political establishment sought ways to use military power when it was both necessary and acceptable. We are talking here about creative use of power in advancing own diplomatic positions or in resolving existing foreign policy issues.

Creative use of military power in the framework of Turkish strategic culture manifests itself in cases when Turkey uses its military power far away from its national borders to gain security guarantees of the global players in regards to the political and military situation on its own borders.

Another example of that creative use of military power may be revealed when Turkish decision-makers allow a foreign power, usually Turkish security partners, to use the Turkish soil to face existing challenges that seem to threaten, among other things, Turkish interests. In this regard, we should not forget related problem of competition of ideas in Turkish foreign policy, according to Brown, between national independence and need to make concession to foreign interests.

It is interesting to note here that creative use of military power in Turkish strategic culture was a result of Turkey's position within the global political arrangements throughout its

history. In this regard, Aydin's notion of importance of the geopolitical realities on the Turkish foreign policy makes sense: Turkish decision-makers enjoy a relatively wide range of choices due to the fact that Turkish national interests tend to overlap with many global interests.

Importance place in Turkish strategic culture is occupied by the views on when military power can be legitimately deployed. This research seems to confirm Johnston's idea on a prominent influence exerted by negative experience on willingness to avoid repetition of diplomatic failures.

Turkish strategic culture seems to opt out for military power only in rare cases when diplomacy fails to resolve the issue and when global conditions seem to favor such a move. Once again, as mentioned above, any use of military power is considered to be a part of efforts to advance diplomatic positions of Turkey, not to replace diplomacy outright.

Second important finding of this research deals with interaction between domestic political process and manifestation of Turkish strategic culture. In this regard, findings of Makovsky and Sabri on close interplay between political struggle in Turkey and country's foreign policy application provide a good theoretical foundation for further analysis of Turkish strategic culture. On the other hand, Klein's notion of utilization of discourse on use of military power abroad by political actors seeking to advance their own political at home is helpful as well.

There are two major instances when this interrelation between domestic politics and debates on use of power becomes evident. The first one is linked to the Turkish military's influence in the political system: political parties and ruling elites who seek to diminish the army's influence in the politics usually try to conduct a peaceful foreign policy by decreasing the chances when the military legitimacy can demand deployment of military power, thus, again drawing national resources and boosting its domestic support.

The second instance is dealing with cases when political parties may use bellicose rhetoric or seek power deployment to boost its own political positions vis-à-vis its rivals. The latter is especially evident when political forces may seek to utilize nationalist feelings to gain electoral votes and to defeat ideologically rival parties.

It is important to note, however, that although political forces in Turkey don't shy from using debates on immediate use of military power when national interests, manifested through nationalist aspirations, are threatened, Turkish decision-makers are seriously limited in their actions. Among the limitations that create obstacles on the way to power deployment in the Turkish adjacent neighbourhood are potential challenges to domestic stability in Turkey coming from the regions due to close connection between regional and domestic political processes.

Finally, the last major finding of this research was discovery that political leaders in Turkey may seriously influence decisions on use of military power, thus, playing a great role in Turkish strategic culture. Analysis of cases when single political figures used their clout to push through desired decisions on foreign policy seems to confirm Snyder's notion on considerable impact that strong leaders acting within weak political institutions may have on strategic culture.

Again, use of power is perceived as a political tool that can be used against rivals. Democratic mandate seems to give such claims a legitimate entourage, but weak institutions fail to limit single politicians in deploying troops when such move can result in destabilization on the national borders of Turkey and, by extension, at home as well.

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