

T.C.
TURKISH GERMAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS MASTER
PROGRAMME

**EXTREME RIGHT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PARTIES,
MOVEMENTS AND LONE-WOLFS**

MASTER'S THESIS

Hacı Mehmet BOYRAZ

1681011101

ADVISOR

Dr. Enes BAYRAKLI

Istanbul, June 2018



TÜRK-ALMAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ

T.C.
TÜRK - ALMAN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ SAVUNMA SINAVI TUTANAĞI FORMU

Öğrencinin,	
Öğrenci No	1681011101
Adı ve Soyadı	HACI MEHMET BOYRAZ
Anabilim Dalı	Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Programı	Ampa ve Uluslararası İktisat Yüksek Lisans
Öğretim Yılı ve Yarıyılı	2018 Bahar Dönemi / 4. Yarıyıl
Tez Başlığı	Extreme Right in the United Kingdom: Parties, Movements and Lone-Wolfs
Danışmanı	Dr. Enes Bayraktılı

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

Yukarıda bilgileri belirtilen Yüksek Lisans öğrencisinin tez savunma sınavı, 26.10.2018 tarihinde, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsünde birinci kat toplantı salonunda, saat 15.00... başladı ve saat 16.00...da tamamlandı.

Öğrencinin tez çalışması hakkında jüri üyeleri tarafından OYBİRLİĞİ / OYÇOKLUĞU ile aşağıdaki karar verildi.

Kabul

Ret

Düzeltme

Dr. Enes Bayraktılı
Jüri Başkanı

Dr. Ali Aslan
Jüri Üyesi

Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Wessels
Jüri Üyesi

TAU LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM-ÖĞRETİM YÖNETMELİĞİ

MADDE 40 – (1) Yüksek lisans tez jürisi, tezin kendilerine teslim tarihinden itibaren en erken yedi en geç otuz gün içinde toplanarak öğrenciyi tez savunma sınavına alır.
(2) Jüri üyeleri, aralarından birini başkan seçer. Tez savunma sınavı, tez çalışmasının sunulması ve bunu izleyen soru-cevap bölümünden oluşur. İlgili enstitü yönetim kurulunun aksi yönde gerekçeli bir kararı bulunmadıkça sınav izleyicilere açıktır ve en az 45, en çok 90 dakikadır.
(4) Tez savunma sınavının tamamlanmasından sonra jüri, izleyicilere kapalı olarak tez hakkında oybirliği ya da salt çoğunlukla kabul, ret veya düzeltme kararı verir. Bu karar, jüri üyelerinin bireysel tez değerlendirme raporlarıyla birlikte ilgili jüri başkanı tarafından tez sınavını izleyen üç iş günü içinde enstitüye tutanakla bildirilir.

Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu Kararı

Tarih:/...../20

Karar No:

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Hacı Mehmet BOYRAZ



ÖZET

BİRLEŞİK KRALLIK'TA AŞIRI SAĞ: PARTİLER, HAREKETLER VE YALNIZ-KURTLAR

Bu tez, uzun bir süre istisna olarak görülmesinden ötürü 2000'lere kadar aşırı sağ çalışmalardan ayrı tutulan Birleşik Krallık'taki aşırı sağ aktörleri analiz etmektedir. Tez esas olarak ülkedeki aşırı sağ aktörleri, üç düzeyde (partiler, hareketler ve yalnız-kurtlar) analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ancak ülkedeki bütün değişkenleri analiz etmek yerine, seçilen bazı örneklemelere odaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca, Birleşik Krallık'taki aşırı sağ oluşumlar kıta Avrupa'sındaki muadilleri (Almanya, Avusturya ve Fransa gibi) kadar güçlü olmasa da, bu tez hem şiddet içeren hem de şiddet içermeyen biçimlerde birey ve grup düzeylerinde aşırılığa için bir platform sunması nedeniyle aşırı sağın her şeyden önce Britanya toplumu için gerçek bir tehdit oluşturduğunu iddia etmektedir. Benzer şekilde bu çalışma, aşırı sağın ülke siyasetindeki kritik öneme haiz konularda önemli bir rol oynamaya başladığını iddia etmekte ve buna örnek olarak aşırı sağ oluşumların Brexit sürecindeki bayraktarlığını göstermektedir. Son olarak, tez ülkenin siyasi karakterinden ötürü ideolojik olarak nispeten "ılımlı" aşırı sağ partilerin ideolojik olarak daha "aşırı" olanlar karşısında seçimlerde daha başarılı olduğunu savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arz ve talep yönlü açıklamalar, aşırı sağ, BNP, EDL, popülizm, UKIP, yalnız-kurt terörü.

Tarih: 26.06.2018

ABSTRACT

EXTREME RIGHT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PARTIES, MOVEMENTS AND LONE-WOLFS

This thesis analyses the extreme right actors in the UK, a country that was mostly spared from the extreme right studies until the 2000s since it was seen as an exceptional case for a long-time. It tries to explore the dynamics of the extreme right actors in the country in three units of analysis (parties, movements, lone-wolfs). However, the study is limited in its scope since it does not analyse all of the cases and instead focuses on some selective cases. Also, though the extreme right in the UK is not as strong as in continental Europe (like in Austria, France or Germany); this thesis strongly claims that extreme right primarily represents a real threat for the British society as it inspires a platform for individual and collective extremism in both violent and non-violent forms. Likewise, the thesis argues that extreme right in the UK is already effective on the critical policies of the country as well because its protagonists, for example, were influential in the Brexit decision. Finally, the thesis asserts that ideologically “moderate” extreme right parties in the country perform more success in elections than the ideologically more “extreme” ones in elections due to the political culture in the UK.

Key Words: BNP, demand and supply side explanations, EDL, extreme right, lone-wolf terrorism, populism, UKIP.

Date: 26.06.2018

Table of Contents

ÖZET	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Questions and Arguments	2
1.2. Data Collection and Methodology	4
1.3. Literature Review	6
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	7
2.1. Main Characteristics of Extreme Right Ideology	9
2.2. Extreme Right and Populism	11
2.3. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Extreme Right	13
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	15
3.1. Demand-Side Explanations: Voters in Focus	16
3.2. Supply-Side Explanations: Political Systems and Parties in Focus	18
3.3. Categorizing the Extreme Right Parties	21
4. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT	22
4.1. Pre-World War II Period	23
4.2. Post-World War II Period	25
5. BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT IN CURRENT TIMES	28
5.1. Extreme Right Parties	28
5.1.1. British National Party	31
5.1.2. United Kingdom Independence Party	37
5.2. Extreme Right Movements	42
5.2.1. English Defence League	44
5.2.2. National Action	47
5.2.3. Pegida UK	50
5.3. Lone-Wolf Terrorists	51
5.3.1. David Copeland and London Nail Bombs	55
5.3.2. Thomas Alexander Mair and Murder of MP Jo Cox	56
5.3.3. Darren Osborne and Finsbury Mosque Attack	57
CONCLUSION	59
BIBLIOGRAPHY	63

ABBREVIATIONS

BBC: British Broadcasting Company

BBL: British Brothers League

BF: British Fascists

BFP: Britain First Party

B&H: Blood and Honour

BNP: British National Party

BUF: British Union of Fascists

C18: Combat 18

EDL: English Defence League

EEA: European Economic Area

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

MI5: Military Intelligence Section 5

MP: Member of Parliament

NA: National Action

NF: National Front UK

PEGIDA: Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West

UKIP: United Kingdom Independence Party

VOL: Volume

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>PAGE NUMBER</u>
Figure 1: “We Want Our Country Back” as a Slogan Used by Different Extreme Right Parties in the UK.....	12
Figure 2: Golder’s Formula.....	21
Figure 3: An Example Showing the Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and White Supremacy.....	26
Figure 4: One of UKIP’s Posters.....	38
Figure 5: The Cartoon Entitled “Europe is a Sinking Ship”.....	40
Figure 6: An EDL Supporter at a Rally in 2014 Holding an Insulting Poster.....	46
Figure 7: A Group of Youth-Based National Action Supporters.....	48
Figure 8: Pegida UK’s Logo.....	50
Figure 9: An Overview on Demand-Side and Supply-Side Theories.....	59

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>PAGE NUMBER</u>
Table 1: List of Extreme Right Parties in the UK.....	29
Table 2: BNP’s Election Performance.....	33
Table 3: UKIP’s Election Performance.....	37
Table 4: List of Extreme Right Movements in the UK.....	43
Table 5: List of Lone-Wolf Attacks and Attempts Up to Now.....	54

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude and most special thanks to my family for their encouragements during my whole life. They have always believed in me... Also, I am in awe of all of my relatives, but I dedicate this thesis to my grand grandfathers Hacı Gazi Akgül passed away in 2003 and Hacı Mehmet Gülhan passed away in 2016.

I would like to thank Emrah Utku Gökçe, Metin Erol, Ömer Faruk Aydemir and Yusuf Şadi Damar for our long time discussions since our university years. Likewise, I thank Dr. Fatih Erbaş, Kazım Keskin, Zeliha Eliaçık and Oğuz Güngörmez for their comments. Moreover, I thank my supervisor Dr. Enes Bayraklı for his patience and guidance.

Lastly, I need to say that I had a funny time at Turkish German University. Especially, it was a big privilege for me to be one of the scholarship holders of the International Summer School in Paris, Brussels, Cologne and Berlin in 2017.

Any errors of fact and any misinterpretations in the thesis are entirely my own responsibility...

1. INTRODUCTION

In the *Manifesto of Communist Party* in 1848, Karl Marx mentions “A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of Communism”. Today another spectre has been haunting the continent: “extreme right” with its all agents (Bayraklı 2016). This firstly means that unlike the common perception, extreme right as a whole does not only consist of political parties, rather consists of a couple of sub-forms. Here Ramalingam has a very useful typology towards the extreme right agents: parties, movements, smaller groups and networks, and lone-wolfs (2012: 6). Accordingly, an extreme right political party regularly contests elections; a social movement seeks to mobilise public support and activist involvement; a smaller group or network adopts more extreme ideological positions without formal membership or rigid structures, and a lone-wolf does not have any formal link to an established group, and acts in isolation.

Minkenberg proposes a similar typology for the extreme right agents in three dimensions. In accordance with this typology, a right-wing extremist *political party* tries to win public office through electoral campaigns, a right-wing extremist *social movement* mobilizes the support of people to offer interpretative frames for particular problems, and a right-wing extremist *smaller group* and a *socio-cultural milieu* operate relatively independent from a party or a movement, but might have propensities toward violence (2013: 13).

From this point of view, this thesis primarily attempts to analyse the extreme right agents in the UK, a country that was mostly spared from the extreme right studies since it was seen as an exceptional case until the 2000s. As stated above, because extreme right is not just about political parties, the thesis tries to touch upon the three main agents or units of this ideology: political parties, social movements and lone-wolfs. However, this does not mean that the thesis aims to analyse all of them in details since the movements and lone-wolfs are largely studied in different academic fields extensively. Rather, this thesis focuses more on the political parties as the leading actors of the extreme right ideology, but touches upon the other actors to some extent in order to see the rest of the picture.

On the other hand, the thesis consists of five chapters. This part presents an introduction about the research, which consists of the research questions, arguments, significance, objectives, scope and limitations of the study as well as a literature review on the research topic. Following this part, the second chapter deals with a conceptual debate on the extreme right ideology. This is a necessary task since the ongoing debates are largely surrounded around the question of how to define extreme right. In this part, main characteristics of the extreme right formations and

their anti-Semitic and Islamophobic aspects are debated from different aspects. Just afterwards, the third part focuses on the theoretical framework on the extreme right parties in two (demand and supply) sides.

The fourth section examines the history of extreme right in the UK by dividing it into the pre- and post-World War II periods. The reason behind this periodization is based on the emerge of fascist regimes in some European countries for the first time that deeply affected the whole continent. Later, the last part is devoted to the contemporary British extreme right in three units: parties, movements and lone-wolfs. For parties, the thesis compares the British National Party as a traditional extreme right party and United Kingdom Independence Party as a post-industrial extreme right party. Here their histories, ideologies, electoral successes in the European Parliament and national elections, social compositions and policies for three parameters (immigration, European integration and economy) are examined.

After the parties, social movements, namely English Defence League, National Action and Pegida UK are examined. Their histories, ideological arguments, backgrounds and activities are studied in this part. What follows is a focus on three lone-wolf cases: David Copeland as the organizer of the London Nail Bombs in 1999, Thomas Alexander Mair as the murder of politician Jo Cox in 2016, and Darren Osborne as the perpetrator of the Finsbury Mosque attack in 2017. Lastly, the conclusion part draws attention to the main findings and insights of the thesis.

1.1. Research Questions and Arguments

As the primary research question, this thesis aims to explore how the extreme right in the UK fits into the framework of the overall extreme right ideology. Related to this leading question, sub-research questions are as following:

- What accounts for the mobilisation of extreme right in the UK?
- What kind of danger does the extreme right pose to the British politics and society?
- Why do some of the extreme right parties have better electoral results?
- How do the extreme right parties in the country approach the following parameters: immigration, European integration and economy?
- To what extend are they merged or separated on these parameters?

Although extreme right in the UK is not strong as much as its continental counterparts (like Austria, France or Germany), this thesis strongly claims that extreme right is a real threat for the British society since it inspires a platform for individual and collective extremism in both violent and non-violent forms. In a similar manner, this thesis argues that extreme right discourses and parties have affected some critical political decisions of the country. For example, extreme right formations were one of the leading actors behind the decision of Brexit, which constitutes the most serious challenge for the contemporary British politics.

Moreover, as will be discussed in the related part of the thesis, one of the seminal scholars Ignazi divides the extreme right parties into two categories: “*traditional extreme right parties*” that have more fascist tendencies, and “*post-industrial extreme right parties*” that keep away themselves from the fascist groupings. In relation to this, Carter argues that moderate right-wing extremist parties perform better in elections since they attract more centrist voters. Starting from this fact, this thesis asserts that post-industrial extreme right parties, which ideologically perform “moderate” characteristics, are more successful than the traditional extreme right parties, which ideologically perform more “extreme” characteristics, in the elections due to the (liberal) political culture of the UK.

Meanwhile, “political culture” refers to the deep-rooted and collective political values and characteristics of a society that are embedded over a long-time process. It provides a framework to understand the political behaviours of a country. To illustrate, the British political culture is often associated with the following aspects: a long-standing tradition of constitutionalism, respecting freedom of express, embracing different cultural variations and ethnic minorities, deferring to the state authority, supporting a liberal market economy or the so-called *laissez faire* economy, and having Eurosceptic perceptions.

Concerning the research questions and arguments, there is another important point to be mentioned here. This thesis deliberately limits the usage of “success” for the political parties only for electoral success because Ramalingam argues that the success of a party is beyond passing a threshold or entering the parliament. She discusses that there are a couple of indicators of being successful for a political party such as electoral breakthrough, electoral persistence, government participation, media coverage, and influence on the policies, mainstream parties, the European counterparts, attitudes and extremism (2012: 22-26).

1.2. Data Collection and Methodology

This thesis is a case study of the extreme right ideology in a specific country. This method of research in social sciences is defined as following: “A case study examines a person, place, event, phenomenon, or other type of single subject of analysis in order to extrapolate the key themes and results that help predict future trends, illuminate previously hidden issues that can be applied to practice” (University of Southern California, 2010). In this direction, since the present extreme right studies mainly focus on Austria, France and Germany, this thesis preferred to examine the ideology in the UK, a country that was mostly spared from the extreme right studies until the 2000s. As a result of this, examples in the thesis are given on the UK as far as possible in order to make it easier to understand the conceptual and theoretical arguments. However, instead of focusing on every variation on the extreme right formations across the country, the thesis focuses on some selective cases. The main reason of focusing on them is the accessibility and availability of the literature. Additionally, since narrowing the context is always a valid situation for every research, this thesis narrows the extreme right parties by two cases (UKIP and BNP) that have showed the most dramatic performance in elections; narrows the extreme right movements by three cases (English Defence League, National Action and Pegida UK) that have gathered more supporters; and narrows the lone-wolfs by three cases (David Copeland, Thomas Alexander Mair and Darren Osborne) that represent some major turning points.

Moreover, this thesis is based on the primary and secondary sources in the available literature. On the one side, to have direct or first-hand evidence on the research topic, the thesis looked at legal documents, statistical data, party programmes, election manifestos, and official and unofficial statements. For the political parties in particular, their programmes and election manifestos played a central role in information gathering. On the other side, in order to discuss and interpret the first-hand sources, the thesis highly utilized the secondary sources like books, articles and conference proceedings.

Most importantly, the thesis is based on a qualitative research design in general, but uses the textual analysis method in the part regarding the political parties in particular since it is strongly required to uncover the hidden emphases in party programmes and election manifestos. As stated above, the thesis asserts that ideologically “moderate” extreme right parties perform more success than the ideologically “extreme” ones in the elections due to the (liberal) political culture of the UK. As a result of this, it is needed to measure the “level of extremity” by comparing the latest party publications including party constitutions, party programmes and

election manifestos in a qualitative way. Here more understandably, the thesis examines almost all of the party publications of both BNP and UKIP, but it took a closer look at the first one's actual party programme, and the second one's last election manifesto since BNP did not broadcast any election manifesto for the last election in 2017.

Primarily, a "text" is a human-readable sequence of characters and the words that mean something like articles, books, news, magazines, journals or manifestos. Related to this, an "analysis" is a method of breaking down something into its smaller parts to understand how and why those parts work together to accomplish something. From this matter of fact, according to McKee, textual analysis is "a methodology for those who want to understand the ways in which members of various cultures and subcultures make sense of who they are and of how they fit into the world in which they live" (2003: 1). Another definition for the textual analysis is as following: "it is the examination of how and whether a piece of writing or speaking achieves its aims, whether these are rhetorical and persuasive or aesthetic" (University of California). Hence it is now clear that the purpose of this qualitative research method is to systematically interpret the content, structure, and function of the messages in a text (Botan and Kreps 1999).

There are actually two main types of textual analysis: interpretive analysis and content analysis. The first one "seeks to get beneath the surface denotative meanings and examine more implicit connotative social meanings"; whereas the second one is a more quantitative method that "broadly surveys things like how many instances of violence occur on a typical evening of prime time TV viewing" (Cultural Politics). Although content analysis allows a researcher to evaluate the texts systematically and convert the qualitative data into quantitative measurements, it is often argued that a researcher cannot always capture the real meaning of a text by only counting the number of words or terms since they might have subtle, implied or connotative meanings. Hence interpretative method is more practical for this thesis since it allows hermeneutically uncovering the meanings and ideas expressed in the texts. Also, using this kind of analysis provides researchers to have a closer understanding towards a text by dicing it into easy-to-manage data pieces. Therefore, this thesis preferred to use the interpretive analysis method rather than the content analysis, but it should not be forgotten that there is not a right or wrong interpretation in this method since analysing a text naturally depends on the individual perspective of a researcher.

1.3. Literature Review

As Becker stated, attaching an idea to a tradition in which people have already explored is a good way to prove the originality of a study since it helps to assure that the study does not redo something already done (2007: 136). Doing a careful literature review is actually useful for a researcher for a couple of reasons such as showing the readers how well the researcher knows the field, helping steer clear of inadvertent plagiarism and providing the rationale for the research. Therefore, this part of the thesis presents a review on the extreme right studies in the literature, mainly regarding the UK.

Primarily, a plentiful amount of research has been conducted on the extreme right formations in Europe since the 1980s as they have gained popularity in politics and on streets. However, it was recognized that majority of the existing studies on this ideology has been shaped around the confusion on whether it is “extreme”, “far”, “populist” or “radical”. In other words, researchers have brought different explanations for the rise of extreme right parties since they are not able to reach a consensus regarding how to name it.

Secondly, the UK is a different case from its continental counterparts with regard to its historical development because fascism has never played a significant role in its history. Despite the significant process in the scholarship of active extreme right agents in the country, most of them remain understudied. Yet there has been a growing realisation in the literature that extreme right formations have become a major challenge for the country. Apart from its consequences on matters of public security and social cohesion, which the country has been facing especially since the beginning of the new century, it has also penetrated the public discourse and policy formulation.

Thirdly, a considerable number of the studies in the literature examine only one extreme right party while some others compare two of them. Moreover, there is no study in the literature that compares the British extreme parties along different parameters. In that respect, this thesis fulfils a gap in the literature by studying two different types of extreme right parties from different perspectives. In other words, this thesis is important in terms of providing a comparative analysis about the most successful two extreme right parties in the UK.

Finally, there is another tendency in the literature that most of the studies regarding the UK are written by British scholars. Put differently, there are few studies having an “outside approach” to the British extreme right. Therefore, this thesis differs from some other studies because it provides such an approach to the topic. Also, as a result of the fact that extreme right ideology

does not only consist of political parties, this thesis is one of the first studies that touch upon other extreme right agents (movements and lone-wolfs) in order to see the full picture in the country.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Conceptual framework of a scientific research consists of concepts that support and inform the research as well as interrelates with the objectives, variables and fundamentals. By doing so, a conceptual debate on the extreme right ideology is provided in order to have a background for this study. In this context, it is useful to begin with a definition of “ideology”. In accordance with Hainsworth’s definition, political ideologies are “bodies of interconnected ideas or systems of thought that constitute a basis for political action, reflection and debate” (2000: 66). From a broader social-scientific viewpoint, Heywood uses the term as “a more or less coherent set of ideas that provide a basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power relationships” (2013: 28).

As a second point, the ongoing debate on the extreme right ideology is mainly based on how to really name it. While the term “extreme right” is frequently used in the literature, there is no agreement on this term. In other words, despite the fact that there are many works on this phenomenon, there is an absence of an agreed-upon definition. Although most of the studies in the literature deal with the same phenomenon, scholars use different terms. In this direction, the following terms that are often used interchangeably show the conceptual complexity:

“Alt-right parties (US based usage), Anti-elitist parties, Anti-establishment parties, Anti-globalization parties, Anti-immigrant parties, Anti-multiculturalist parties, Anti-parliamentary parties, Anti-pluralist parties, Anti-Semitic parties, Anti-system parties, Anti-tax parties, Authoritarian parties, Ethno-centric parties, Exclusionary populist parties, Exclusionist parties, Extreme right parties, Far right parties, Fascist parties, Fundamentalist parties, Hard-right parties (US based usage), Islamophobic parties, Mimetic fascist parties, Nationalist parties, Nazi parties, Niche parties, Nostalgic-right parties, Pariah parties, Populist radical right parties, Populist right parties, Protest parties, Racist parties, Radical right parties, Revolutionary right parties, Right-wing fanatic parties, Right-wing radical parties, Single issue parties, Tea parties (US based usage), Totalitarian parties, Xenophobic parties...”

Moreover, there are also “neo-”, “new-” and “ultra-” versions of them. If those prefixes are added to the usage, the number comes to an incredible size. What all of them indicate is that there is a real inflation of terms regarding the extreme right; however, one can see that since the beginning of the 2000s, there has been a tendency of using “extreme right” and “radical right” among the seminal scholars:

- Hans Georg Betz (1994) prefers “radical right”,
- Herbert Kitschelt (1995) prefers “radical right”,
- Cas Mudde firstly (2000) prefers “extreme right”, but later (2007) “populist radical right”,
- Paul Hainsworth (2000) prefers “extreme right”,
- Piero Ignazi (2003) prefers “extreme right”,
- Roger Eatwell (2003) prefers “extreme right”,
- Elisabeth Carter (2005) prefers “extreme right”,
- Pippa Norris (2005) prefers “radical right”,
- Jens Rydgren (2008) prefers “radical right”,
- Matthew Goodwin (2007) prefers “extreme right”,
- David Art (2011) prefers “radical right”.

In a narrower sense, another conceptual debate on the extreme right studies is based on whether they are “extreme” or “radical”. Primarily the Oxford Dictionary defines “extreme” (from Latin ‘*extremus*’ meaning utmost) as “a person who holds extreme political or religious views, especially one who advocates illegal, violent, or other extreme action”, and defines “radical” (meaning root and origin in Latin) as “advocating a complete political or social change; representing or supporting an extreme or progressive section of a political party”. Although they are used interchangeably in the literature, Office for the Protection of the German Constitution defines “radicalism” as a radical critique on the constitutional order without any anti-democratic meaning or intention; and defines “extremism” as an anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and anti-constitutional approach (seen here Harrison and Bruter 2011: 31). According to this perspective again, “extremist parties” should be banned, whereas “radical parties” should be tolerated. However, as this distinction reflects the subjective German point of view, and as there is a difficulty of drawing neat lines between them, it is not fully accepted in the literature. The reason behind it is because different political, cultural and historical contexts of countries produce different notions of extremism.

Since terminology has a significant impact on the way a phenomenon is understood and addressed, and since there is no scholarly consensus regarding the terminology, this thesis preferred to use “extreme right” rather than other terms. The reason behind this choice is fourfold. Firstly, there has to be a conceptual integrity in the study in order to ensure compliance; otherwise using different terms throughout the whole study would cause confusion. Secondly, as will be discussed in the following part, “populist” cannot be used as a political ideology; instead it can only be a characteristic of a party or a movement. Related to this, thirdly, Carter argues that even though the term “far right” is used quite widely in the literature (and especially in media), it is a problematic usage because it is used only in the English-speaking world, and because it has no meaning in other languages (2005: 23). Finally, Mudde indicates that “radical right” is used more commonly among the American scholars, whereas “extreme right” is used more commonly among the Western European scholars (1996: 231). Related to this, it is known that the accepted usage of “radical” in the literature usually connotes revolutionary leftist politics.

2.1. Main Characteristics of Extreme Right Ideology

When analysing the extreme right, one cannot escape the simple question: what do “right” and “extreme” mean? Firstly, the term “right” and “left” are artefacts of the 1789 French National Assembly in which those members who supported the status quo positioned themselves on the “right” side of the presiding officer; and conversely those members who tried to change the status quo positioned themselves on the “left” side of the presiding officer. However, it has been often argued that this kind of left-right political spectrum is not able to meet today’s political environment. Be that as it may, Betz states that extreme right formations are right-wing because they reject the idea of individual and social equality, because they oppose to the social integration of the so-called “marginalized groups”; and because they appeal to xenophobia (1993: 413). About their extremeness, Hainsworth argues that it is “extreme” in terms of being extreme within the existing constitutional order (2000: 11). Therefore, the extreme right ideology can be defined as an umbrella term to define those that are “far” from the central or mainstream social and political right-wing spectrum.

A foreground scholar in the field Mudde counted 58 different features out of 28 authors in the existing literature about the features of extreme right parties. In order to limit this, he suggests that extreme right parties have three ideological elements (2007: 23). They are *nativist* as they argue that states should be exclusively occupied by the native group. They are *authoritarian* as they give importance to a strictly ordered society which severely punishes infringements of the

authority. They are *populist* as they believe that general will of the people should always take precedence. Similar to him, Ivaldi identifies four central aspects of extreme right parties: anti-immigration stances, authoritarian and security-minded discourses, neo-liberal economy policies of the 1980s with a social and protectionist nationalism, and anti-establishment populist aspects focusing on popular issues (Seen here Hainsworth 2000: 68-69).

Lastly, Ignazi proposes that these parties have five main characteristics (2003: 2). Firstly, they are anti-systemic parties as they undermine the democratic system's legitimacy. Secondly, they support direct mechanisms of representation like the Swiss referendum model rather than an indirect parliamentary representation. Thirdly, they are against the idea of pluralism as they believe it endangers the societal harmony. Fourthly, they are against the idea of equality as they believe that rights ought to be allotted on the basis of ascriptive elements like race, language or ethnicity. They are lastly somewhat authoritarian as they care more about the collective authority.

On the other hand, some studies suggest that certain social categories are more likely to take positions in the extreme right groups. In their study, Arzheimer and Carter identified four main points regarding this issue (2006: 421). Firstly, extreme right parties and movements attract a considerably higher number of male than female supporters. Secondly, they are more echoed among the young in the ages of twenties. Thirdly, workers in private sector are more tentative to the extreme right groups than those in public sector. Fourthly, people having a lower level of education exhibit a greater propensity to take positions in the extreme right formations. As will be discussed later, this group of people are also often called as "losers of modernization", who have been struggling to adapt to the new post-industrial environment.

Additionally, since the extreme right supporters are often associated with their anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiments, their Christian religious roots are important to be analysed. Interestingly, although Christian values are still valuable among many European extreme right groups and their supporters, a large of them does not affirm themselves as believing people (Camus 2008). Here Arzheimer and Carter find that "religiosity has a substantial and statistically positive effect on the likelihood of a voter identifying with a Christian Democratic or Conservative Party; and this in turn massively reduces the likelihood of casting a vote for a party of the radical right in many countries" (2009: 19).

Because of the social bases described above, extreme right parties are sometimes called as “pariah” (something that is not accepted by a society or political system) by the established or mainstream parties. However, since some of them have become influential in the political arena and have already gained some governmental and administrative positions in their country, labelling them as pariah simply is not adequate.

2.2. Extreme Right and Populism

Populism is another aspect of the extreme right parties and other extreme right agents. It is one of the frequently used labels on extreme right in a pejorative way even though the etymological background of the word, deriving from the Latin noun “populous” meaning “the people”, gives it an emancipative or empowering signification (Herkman 2017: 470). Yet in political usage, Mudde defines it as “the belief in the soundness of the common man; anti-elitism; support for direct democratic measures on the basis of letting the people decide; call for referendums at various levels and to go back to the grass-roots” (2000: 188). Because of this, those parties portray themselves as the real representatives of the people, and portray the mainstream parties as the representatives of the elite. In this regard, populism is seen as a communication style than a coherent ideology.

Also, there are two types of populism: inclusionary or exclusionary. According to a comprehensive study of Mudde and Kaltwasser, the first one that is more common among the contemporary left-wing parties in Latin America calls for material benefits and political rights to be extended to historically disadvantaged and excluded groups (2013: 158-166). Conversely, the second one that is more dominant among the extreme right parties in Europe seeks to exclude certain groups from “the people” and thus limit their access to these same benefits and rights.

Hereof, Zaslove discusses that extreme right parties’ successes (populist parties in his words) are very much connected to their style of politics. According him, the leaders of such parties “employ populist themes to mobilise voters around political, economic, cultural and social issues in the name of ‘silent majority’; speak out against corruption, entrenched political parties and bureaucracies; portray themselves as ordinary people through their casual dress, their style of oration and presentation, and their frequent use of vulgar language to attack established parties and politicians” (2017: 68-72).

UKIP’s former Chairman Nigel Farage and Party for Freedom’s present leader Geert Wilders represent a good example for populist leadership by presenting themselves as the voices of their societies in tune with the ideas and interests of the people. In a similar matter, the cliché slogans like “Save the Country from Refugees”, “We Want Our Country Back” or “No Immigrant in the Economy” are often used by different extreme right parties in order to prove they are doing a right job on behalf of the so-called silent majority. The former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s statement at a public meeting in September 2016 is another good example for such a discourse: “If you want to become French, you speak French, you live like the French. We will no longer settle for integration that does not work, we will require assimilation. I want to be the spokesman of the silent majority which today says enough is enough” (Osborne 2016).

Figure 1: “We Want Our Country Back” as a Slogan Used by Different Extreme Right Parties in the UK



As a matter of fact, the populist discourse of the extreme right parties is particularly visible in their economic programmes. Particularly the Scandinavian extreme right parties have been called as “welfare chauvinists”, who call employment and social welfare should be restricted to natives of the society. For instance, the extreme right party Sweden Democrats has been emphasizing the slogan that the Swedish money should be used for Swedish interests, and jobs should be taken by the Swedish workers.

2.3. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Extreme Right

The extreme right agents in European countries are often associated with the theocratic ideas of Christianity; whereas other religions, Judaism and Islam in particular, are religiously perceived as the “others” and the shadow of the “Christian Europe”. From an analytical perspective, Hafez argues that Judaism and Islam have a troubled relationship to Christianity, and supports his argument in three points (2016: 21). First, while Christianity is portrayed as the forgiving religion, Judaism and Islam are conceived as legalistic, vengeful, and merciless religions. Second, both religions (Judaism and Islam) have tended to be regarded as antithetical to the enlightenment process in Europe. Third, both are part of the history of Orientalism since the Jews were, for a long time, seen as the “Asiatic Oriental” within Europe, whereas the Muslim was the Oriental outside. Therefore, similar to populism, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiments of the current extreme right agents are quite noteworthy. However, since analysing the role of religion in the extreme right ideology requires a detailed study, this thesis only deals with the core of the issue.

Firstly, anti-Semitism refers to a hostility, fear, or hatred towards the Jews and their culture as well as active discrimination against them. This constructed image of hostility or prejudice towards them has deep historical and political bases. If someone goes back to the 1900s, it is the case that fascist formations in Europe firstly marginalized the Jewish and some other communities in the society; and later violently targeted them. This anti-Semitic policy resulted in the “Holocaust” in which European Jews (as well as members of some other persecuted groups) were subject to an ethnic cleansing during the Second World War. Strict legal regulations have been enacted from that date onwards, but this hostility is still valid in many European countries as proved by many quantitative researches. For instance, the Community Security Trust in 2015 recorded a total of 767 incidents in the UK targeting the Jews in the first six months of 2017 (Dearden 2017).

In a similar matter, Islamophobia is used to describe hostility, fear, or hatred towards the Muslims and their culture as well as active discrimination against them. Following the eruption of anti-Jewish hostility in the inter-war period in Europe, the post-Cold war period in general and post-9/11 period in particular has witnessed an increase in the Islamophobic attacks. For instance, according to a recent survey conducted by Chatham House (2017), Europe’s public opposition to further migration from predominantly Muslim countries ranks from 41% in Spain to 71% in Poland.

There is also a discussion about whether “Islamophobia” is the new “anti-Semitism”. Kalmar found in his research that there are very deep-seated similarities between these two forms of hatred, but he warns that those who propose “Islamophobia is the new anti-Semitism” do not mean either that anti-Semitism has now disappeared or that the two hatreds are identical (2017: 27). Instead he principally believes that Muslims are now the main perceived rival of prejudiced people, the way that the Jews once were. In other words, he indicates that Muslims are seen as the new “domestic threat”. Moreover, Kalmar and Ramadan (2016) debate that these two forms of hatred are founded in a specific history of intolerance with deep roots in Christian theology. They explain the notion as following: “the imagined Jewish God *Jehovah* and the imagined Muslim God *Allah* have many characteristics in common as a deity of authority and an uncompromising law, in opposition to the Christian God incarnated in *Jesus* to bring a message of Love”.

Moreover, such arguments are valid for the UK as a country that has socio-politically compensated liberal values over centuries, too. On the one side, British extreme right tradition dates back to the anti-Semitic group British Brothers League launched in 1901 in East End of London, where nearly one third of the Jewish community settled at the time. On the other side, current extreme right agents have strong Islamophobic tendencies. For instance, British National Party and English Defence League call for a ban on the burka, a halt to all Muslim immigration to the country, halal slaughter and the construction of new mosques; lone-wolf George Osborne, organizer of the Finsbury Mosque attack in 2017, yelled “I want to kill all Muslims” just after his attack; one of the current leaders of the British extreme right ideology Stephen Christopher Lennon, commonly known by his pseudonym Tommy Robinson, defines the Muslims as the “enemy of the state” in his book; and right-wing extremist journalist Katie Hopkins claimed that Islam teaches the Muslim men to rape white women Islam.

Last but not least, even though there is no serious attention extreme right literature, especially in case of Britain, plays an important role in the construction of the current Islamophobic discourse, and provides an ideological background and validation for the extreme right terrorists. For instance, “Eurabia” written by Bat Ye’or (the pen name of Giselle Littmann) in 2005 defends that Europe has been transforming into a so-called “Eurabia”, which performs anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western sentiments. Another example “Londonistan” written by the British journalist Melanie Phillips in 2006 mostly defends the same argument. Just after the London bombings in 2005, the book became one of the global best-sellers. According to Philipps, the UK has been the European hub of the so-called “Islamic

extremism” for more than a decade, and she defines this process as “creating a terror state within”.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For a study in social sciences, a theoretical framework is highly needed to make the arguments more logical as optical lenses do make it easier to see. According to Maxwell, the term “theory” is simply “a set of concepts and ideas and the proposed relationships among these, a structure that is intended to capture or model something about the world” (2012: 48). Like him, Bryman underlines the fact that for a researcher, especially in part of social sciences, theory is quite important as it provides a backcloth and rationale for the research that is being conducted (2012: 20). From this point of view, theoretical framework is quite valuable to understand the real dynamics and components of the extreme right parties.

However, it should be mentioned at the beginning that although there are explanations on the rise of extreme right parties in the literature, there is not a holistic, comprehensive or dominant theory that completely, or mostly, explains the rise of extreme right parties. Therefore, this thesis looks at the supply and demand side theories together to provide a better understanding for the extreme right voting.

There are a couple of theoretical studies for the rise of extreme right votes in many European countries, but the earliest study belongs to a pioneer scholar Eatwell, whose famous book chapter “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right” provides an overview on the theoretical debates. In his study, he developed ten theories on the phenomenon in two blocks: supply-side theories and demand-side theories. Following him, another prominent scholar on the extreme right studies Mudde enhanced Eatwell’s theoretical arguments in his book “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe”. He, for instance, divided the supply-side explanations into internal factors like party organization and quality or effectiveness of party propaganda, and external factors like institutional arrangements in a country.

To begin with, demand and supply are one of the most fundamental concepts of economics. While “demand” refers to how much quantity of a product or service is desired by buyers, “supply” represents how much the market can offer. As they are very much connected to each other, a change in one of them directly affects the other. Similar to this, in political science, from Eatwell’s definitions, *demand* refers to “the arguments that focus on primarily on socio-economic developments, such as the impact of immigration, unemployment or rapid social change” while *supply* refers to “the messages which reach voters, such as the leadership and

programmes of the parties or the media” (2005: 46). Put another way, demand-side explanations are mainly focusing on the changing preferences and attitudes among the voters, whereas the supply-side explanations are dealing with party competitions and strategies. Although they touch upon different aspects of the same phenomenon, they explain why and how extreme right voters head to the extreme right parties. Hence, demand and supply side theories are perceived as complementary rather than competing.

As stated above, theoretical framework on the rise of the extreme right parties is divided into two main blocks, but each of them is divided into pieces as well. Demand-side explanations that do deal with the positions of the voters consist of five theses: single-issue thesis, economic interest thesis, protest thesis, social breakdown thesis and post-material thesis. On the other hand, supply-side explanations focusing on party competitions and political regulations consist of the political opportunity structure, national traditions thesis, charismatic leader thesis, mediatisation thesis and programmatic thesis.

3.1. Demand-Side Explanations: Voters in Focus

In the last decade, immigration has become one of the most significant socio-political issues in many European countries. As the extreme right groups idealize their nation as a homogeneous entity, immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees are seen as a threat to their own national and cultural identities. Consequently, immigrants are perceived as the “others” in the society; and then a threat to national identity and the homogeneity of the country. Here the German political theorist Carl Schmitt’s (2007) Manichaeic universe “friend-enemy” dichotomy or duality is noteworthy. He defends that all true politics is based on the distinction between friend and enemy. Although his argument has been debated in the literature, it is a fact that the argument presents a perspective for the hostility and even xenophobic attitudes on the Jews in the past, and the immigrants and Muslims in the present times. Within this framework, the *single-issue thesis* mainly argues that popularity of extreme right parties do increase when there is a major concern in an essential policy area or idea especially in case of immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees. As a result of this, those parties that receive more support when there is a major concern in the country regarding immigrants, asylum seekers or refugees are often called as “single-issue parties”. To give a concrete example, National Front UK’s voting had some peaks in the 1970s just after the arrival of about 27.000 Ugandan Asians evicted by the Dada regime (Goodwin 2011: 29).

Economic interest thesis is another strong explanation on the rise of extreme right parties. Accordingly, as people are rational beings, their priority in elections is mainly related to their economic conditions. This is to say that if people are not satisfied with their current economic conditions (like problems of unemployment, high inflation rates, large-scale deindustrialisation and huge increases in rents); their voting behaviour begins to change. In most of times, they find the first alternatives in extreme right parties that have populist slogans such as “new jobs for us”, “more jobs to our own people” or “no immigrant in our economy”. However, some authors criticize that the extreme right voters are not simply likely to come from disadvantage groups, but from those who fear quick economic changes as well. On the other hand, Eatwell reminds that there is not a strong correlation between aggregate levels of unemployment and extremist voting; and exemplifies that extreme right support collapsed when unemployment rose dramatically in Britain during the early 1980s (2000: 418).

Thirdly, *protest thesis* discusses that extreme right parties are the vehicles to express discontent or disillusionment with the mainstream or established parties. In a broad sense, when voters start to dissatisfy with the mainstream parties at all, they protest them and their policies through the extreme right parties. To give a concrete example, according to a survey of British adults on the eve of the 2015 general election, over seven in ten UK citizens (73%) said that their country was not governed by the will of people, showing the highest dissatisfaction level with the UK political system (Globe Scan 2015). The approach is quite valuable for electoral volatility among elections, and the lower turnouts in the European elections compare to local and national elections. The reality behind the lower participation stands on the fact that extreme right voters protest the European elections by not participating in them. However, many respected scholars in the field strongly underline that protest votes should not be seen as the real representation of the extreme right parties since they are not support voters.

Another demand-side explanation on the extreme right voting is *social breakdown thesis*. According to it, as traditional social structures and norms based on class and religion have been breaking down, individuals lack a sense of belonging; and as a result of this ethnic nationalist parties attract them (Eatwell 2005: 50-51). In many studies, those individuals are labelled as “losers of modernization”. In a similar manner, Rydgren proposes that the isolated individuals living in atomized and disintegrated societies have more potential to support ethno-nationalist and populist politics (2007: 247). At that point, Eatwell states that the young, who have never experienced a secure milieu, tend to take positions in extreme right parties (2005: 50). Also, it

should be heavily underlined that this thesis was initially considered as one of the explanations of the emergence of fascist regimes in some European countries in the past.

The term “post-materialism” coined by Inglehart (1997) refers to a value orientation that emphasizes there has occurred a transformation in the society towards the values from material ones (such as economic priorities or physical security) to non-material ones (such as freedom of speech or self-realization). Related to the social breakdown thesis, the last explanation in demand-side block *post-material thesis* (sometimes used as *post-industrial*) proposes that over the past decades European societies have been confronted with various new developments; and the values have been replacing with post-material values. To be more precise, main reasons of the emergence of extreme right parties, especially since the 1980s, include: rise of post-materialist values (such as freedom of speech, gender equality and environmental protection), loss of traditional loyalties to mainstream parties, changing class structures, and growth of unemployment (Mohammadi and Nourbakhsh 2017: 155). Thus, this explanation assumes that extreme right voting is the greatest where post-material values have developed most strongly (Eatwell 2005: 53). However, Eatwell reminds that there is not always a clear connection between the extent of post-material values and the size of an extreme right vote.

3.2. Supply-Side Explanations: Political Systems and Parties in Focus

The core of *political opportunity structure* (hereafter referred as POS) thesis as the most foreground explanation in supply-side block is defined by an eminent political scientist: “consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent, dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow 1994: 85). And, Giugni mentions four main components of POS: relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; presence or absence of elite allies; and state’s capacity and propensity for repression (2009: 361).

Electoral systems are also important factors in this regard. Since disproportional representation systems penalize small parties by translating the votes into seats automatically, there is a strong tendency that extreme right and small parties have more chances in proportional electoral systems compare to majoritarian electoral systems (Carter 2002: 127). For instance, extreme right parties have not been able to show a consecutive success in House of Commons elections because a type of majoritarian electoral system (single member plurality or first-past-the-post) is used in the UK. Conversely, extreme right parties have been able to show visible successes

in the European Parliament elections whose the electoral system allows small parties to be represented.

National traditions thesis is another strong explanation in the supply-side theories. In a broad sense, it proposes that there is a correlation between the political culture of a country and extreme right voting; or some cultures are more conducive to the extreme right parties than others. Here Eatwell exemplifies three main European political conceptions of who can become a member of the national community: the French model in which anyone willing to be assimilated into the culture could become a French, the German model in which citizenship is traditionally based on blood, and the British model in which it is difficult to construct a legitimate discourse of exclusion as it is seen as the “mother country” of the Empire (2005: 59). Pisou and Ahmed reach the conclusion that the success of extreme right parties (far right in their word) lies in their ability to depict themselves as a legitimate part of the national tradition (2016: 173).

Charismatic authority as one of the authority types distinguished by Max Weber is another explanation in the supply-side theories. It is often observed that extreme right parties have the sense of increased personalization of leadership. From this point of view, *charismatic leadership thesis* holds the view that emergence of charismatic political leaders is an important factor in the rise of the extreme right parties. In such, Eatwell argues that “charismatic impact is normally considered in terms of the leaders’ direct appeal to voters, but it can also be considered in terms of an ability to hold a party together” (2005: 62). The explanatory power of this approach provides a good explanation for the declining votes of UKIP after its charismatic leader Nigel Farage.

On the other side, many researchers argue that media plays a crucial role in the emergence and rise of extreme right parties. In contrast to the three explanations discussed above, the fourth explanation in the supply block *mediatisation thesis* focuses on the role of media in extreme right voting. It criticizes the POS through the fact that most people perceive politics by what they read in the media rather than reading party manifestos; and then proposes that media vehicles are strong instruments in political communication between parties and voters. For instance, British National Party’s former Chairman John Tyndall expressed the unequal struggle between the media organs of his party and of mainstream parties: “...In the propaganda war we were like an army equipped with bows and arrows facing an adversary using heavy artillery, bombers, missiles and all the other accoutrements of modern fire-power” (Copsey 1996: 123).

Within this context, it is now more logical that access to media is one of the most important vehicles that help extreme right parties in conveying their message and mobilizing potential supporters. Also, media exposure is a critical political resource for all political newcomers since it can give new players legitimacy, and recognition (Ellinas 2010: 31). At this point, extreme right watcher Golder argues that the media can adopt two strategies toward the extreme right parties: either ignoring them and limiting the salience of the issues they raise or covering and framing them in a positive or negative way (2016: 487).

Lastly, *programmatic thesis* focuses on political campaigning and programmes of the extreme right parties because the style and quality of presentation of party ideology make sense for some voters. Eatwell stresses that this thesis points to three broad implications about the relationship between support and programme: specific issues can attract people especially if the issues are portrayed in a legitimate way; the most successful parties tend to have a somewhat ambivalent economic programme which balances the free market and protectionist principles; and most voters prefer to seek a limited change except perhaps at times of major crisis (2005: 60-61).

Unlike Eatwell, who specifies ten different explanations on the extreme right parties in both demand and supply sides, some authors attribute the success of extreme right parties to their alleged moderate ideology as an internal supply-side factor although there is a debate about whether the moderation is real or strategic (Mudde 2007: 257). To support this fact, Hainsworth (2000: 1) states that as much as the contemporary extreme right parties are able to distance themselves from past extremist forms they become more successful electorally. Likewise, Carter underlines that expecting a more moderate extreme right party to perform better than a more extreme one is that the former is able to attract more centrist voters (2005: 125).

Lastly, Golder (2016) proposes that there are four variations for the success of an extreme right party: “When the supply side is open, high demand translates into extreme right success. When the supply side is closed, high demand does not produce extreme right success. When demand is low, there is no extreme right success irrespective of whether the supply side is open or closed. Hence, high demand and open supply are both necessary for successful extreme right parties”. That indicates to the fact that there must be a strong demand of people, and the supply side needs to be enough to satisfy this demand at the same time. Also, Kitschelt (1995) proposes a simple winning formula for the extreme right parties: supporting a pro-market or neo-liberal position on the economic affairs on the one hand, an authoritarian position on the socio-cultural affairs (issues like crime, immigration, law and order) on the other hand.

Figure 2: Golder’s Formula

		SUPPLY	
		Closed	Open
DEMAND	High	Failure	Success
	Low	Failure	Failure

3.3. Categorizing the Extreme Right Parties

Three experienced extreme right researchers have developed different categorizations on the extreme right parties according to their subjective criteria. Among them, the oldest one belongs to Hans Georg Betz. In his comprehensive book, he suggests that although the extreme right parties (radical right-wing populist parties in his words) share some characteristics, they differ from each other in a number of ways. He distinguishes two ideal types: “*national populist parties*” and “*neoliberal populist parties*”; and asserts that the determination of whether a party is “national” or “neoliberal” is based on the relative weight it attributes to the respective elements in its program (1994: 108).

Likewise, Ignazi divides the extreme right party family into two types depending on whether they are linked to fascist ideology or not: “*traditional extreme right parties*” and “*post-industrial extreme right parties*”. He argues that the post-war economic and cultural transformations have blurred the class identification and loosened the traditional loyalties linked to precise social groups. As a result of this, while traditional extreme right parties like the British National Party has some ties to fascist heritage; post-industrial ones like Front National or Freedom Party of Austria are by-products of the conflicts of the post-industrial societies, where material interests are no longer so central, and the bourgeoisie and working classes are not neatly defined. Put differently, traditional extreme right parties as of their nature have a fascist tradition while the post-industrial extreme right parties present beliefs, attitudes and values to the post-industrial societies (Ignazi 1995: 6).

Last but not least, Prowe compares traditional extreme right parties and post-industrial extreme right parties (classic fascist and new radical right parties respectively in his words) in Western Europe in six aspects (1994: 303-309):

- Post-industrial extreme right parties are fuelled by the cultural fissures of multicultural society rather than class conflict and fear of communism.
- Post-industrial extreme right parties have emerged in a period of decolonization, whereas the traditional extreme right parties are born in societies built on colonial domination.
- Post-industrial extreme right parties have emerged from a long period of peace, whereas the traditional extreme right parties are shaped by the experience of the First World War.
- Post-industrial extreme right parties have developed in stable, prosperous and consumer societies, whereas the traditional extreme right parties grew from material despair.
- Post-industrial extreme right parties have cultivated its appeal in societies where democratic norms are widely taken for granted.
- Support base for the post-industrial extreme right parties are more urban than the base for historical fascism.

Merging the first two categorizations, it is seen that both classifications of Betz and Ignazi are in accord with each other. More openly, national populist parties of Betz and traditional extreme right parties of Ignazi on the one hand, and neoliberal populist parties of Betz and post-industrial extreme right parties of Ignazi on the other hand parallel to each other. However, the primary concern of Betz's categorization is based on their populist characteristics, and the weight given to nationalism or neoliberalism determines those parties' direction. Conversely, Ignazi primarily accepts that those parties are firstly "extreme right parties", and then their tendency to either traditional or post-industrial values determines the direction. Moving from this notion, this research prefers Ignazi's categorization since it is more applicable to the general bases and arguments of the thesis.

4. HISTORICAL LEGACY OF BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT

Contrary to common belief within the literature and media, extreme right is not a new phenomenon in the UK. It has often been debated whether today's extreme right is the continuation of fascism of the interwar period. In other words, the question "Is it the old wine in a new bottle?" has been in the minds of many researchers. For Hainsworth, this is not a surprising case since there are continuities in the make-up of the post-war and contemporary extreme right (2000: 13). Yet some extreme right groups are very careful not to be too linked with pre-war extremist parties and their methods. Within this context, this part of the thesis

debates the historical roots of the British extreme right in order to analyse the current extreme right agents in a better way.

4.1. Pre-World War II Period

The British extreme right tradition can be dated back to the anti-Semitic group British Brothers League (BBL) that was launched by Captain William Stanley Shaw in May 1901 in London. The motivation behind the establishment of BBL was a response to the Jewish immigration wave that began in 1880 and to the rapid increase in the numbers of Russian and Polish Jews into the area (Benewick 1969: 25). Throughout its short history it campaigned for a restriction on the Jewish immigration to the country with the patriotic slogans “England for the English” and “British Homes for the British Workers”.

Later, Britain’s first avowedly fascist movement was founded by a woman, Rotha Beryl Lintorn Orman. After serving as a member of the Women’s Volunteer Reserve in the First World War, she established the British British Fascisti/Fascists (BF) in 1923. The leading researcher on women fascists Gottlieb states that Orman is an important figure to be studied since female leadership was almost unique in the history of fascist movements during the inter-war period (2000: 11). However, Thurlow shares an anecdote that Orman’s position in the organization was explained in large by her financial resources. For instance, her mother handed over most of her fortune of £50.000 to her to fund the organization (Thurlow 1998: 34).

Following the BBL and BF, the British Union of Fascists (BUF) established by Oswald Mosley represents a critical benchmark for today’s extreme right groups since he is regarded as the “ideological father” of British fascism. He was actually born into an aristocratic family in 1896; and served as a MP in the House of Commons from 1918 to 1931. He founded the New Party in 1931, and visited the Italian Fascist leader Benito Mussolini in 1932. Just after his visit, he launched the BUF aligned with fascism, but changed the name to “British Union of Fascists and National Socialists” in 1936, and to simply “British Union” in 1937. The Union later merged with various small and patriotic groups like National Fascists, British Fascists and the Imperial Fascist League. The motivation behind the establishment was to establish a fascist regime in the country.

By analysing Mosley and his core ideas, one can see that there is a strong rejection towards the immigrants, which is still valid for the current extreme right agents. Mosley in his book entitled “Fascism” published in 1936 principally expressed that multiculturalism is not a viable basis for the society since it causes a culture clash and damages the social cohesion. He often argued

that since the UK and other European countries cannot become welfare centres for all of the economic migrants; the “open door immigration policy” must be stopped. On the Jews, in his book *Tomorrow We Live* he suggested that a suitable territory would have to be found for them to escape the “curse of no nationality”, and to have an opportunity of becoming a nation (1946: 110).

Also, rallies and demonstrations led by Mosley and his BUF were often held in the Jewish areas of the country. In one of them, Mosley addressed 12.000 supporters at London’s Olympia on 7th June 1934, but it was disrupted by the anti-fascist groups. Two years following the event, he planned to have a march to celebrate the BUF’s fourth anniversary on 4th of October 1936. However, in the so-called “Battle of Cable Street” Mosley’s 5.000 Blackshirts (paramilitary organization of the BUF) were blocked by an estimated 100.000 anti-fascist demonstrators including Jewish, communist and socialist groups (Tilles 2011). Just after the event, public order legislation banned the uniforms and political marches. Since the demonstration was seen as a test of political acceptability for the BUF, the event is regarded as a hard stop for Mosley’s fascist project.

Finally, though the British government disbanded the BUF in 1940, its activities continued in different names and platforms. For instance, Mosley launched the Union Movement in 1948 as an amalgam of 51 right-wing book clubs, but a number of prominent members were arrested and interned under the Regulation 18B of 1939, which was one of the security regulations used by the British government to protect the domestic security during the Second World War. Despite this, it should also be noted that BUF is still important because it left behind a legacy of support for today’s extreme right.

Besides Oswald, Arnold Leese is another historical figure in the pre-war period. He served on the Western Front and in the Middle East during the First World War. In 1924 he joined the British Fascists, but after becoming disillusioned with it he became a founding member of the Fascist League in 1926. Shortly afterwards, he joined the Imperial Fascist League in 1928 and became its leader in 1930. By 1933, the League had been eclipsed and overtaken by Oswald Mosley and his BUF. Because of this, Leese attacked Mosley for his failure to deal with the “Jewish question”, and eventually labelled the BUF members “kosher fascists”. Like Mosley, he was a prolific author and publisher of five books and more than ten booklets, among which he has been popularized with *Jewish Ritual Murder*. Leese claimed in this book that there is a ritual murder of Christians by Jews, and hatred of Christianity is a long-time tradition among

the Jews just as the hate of England (1938: 24). After being imprisoned in 1943 under the Regulation 18B, he lost his relative effect on the public.

4.2. Post-World War II Period

Mudde (2016) examines the extreme right scholarship in the post-war era in three distinct waves. Accordingly, the first wave of scholarship lasting from 1945 till 1980 focused on the continuity between the pre-war and post-war periods. In this “nostalgic” wave, as the emerging parties had direct links to previous fascist parties of the interwar years, they quickly disappeared. The second wave lasting from 1980 to 2000 faced with an infusion of social science literature in various forms on modernization theories. The scholars in this wave largely focused on the demand-side explanations on the rise of extreme right parties. On the contrary, the third wave since the beginning of the century turned its face to the supply-side explanations.

Based on Mudde’s scholar distinction, the period between 1945 and 1980 is the first wave of the extreme right in the UK. The primary focus of the newly established parties and movements in this wave was the opposition to immigration from the British Commonwealth countries. Almost all of the new extreme right parties and movements campaigned against immigration; and they acted as pressure groups opposed to non-white immigration and in favour of white supremacy. As time had passed, those extreme right formations turned their faces to other issues like anti-Communism and criticism to the European Economic Community membership. Extreme right parties contested a number of elections in this period as well, albeit without having any candidate elected.

In this direction, there are three noteworthy issues to be mentioned regarding the first wave. The first is the arrival of the Caribbean immigration to Britain. After the war, the British government encouraged immigration from Commonwealth countries to the “motherland” in order to rebuild the country’s economy as there was a shortage of labour especially in the textiles and steel industries. Hundreds of Caribbean people answered this call, and departed on arriving to the motherland in 1948. On June 22nd 1948, the ship called “MV Empire Windrush” that had 492 passengers from the Caribbean islands like Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago disembarked at Tilbury Docks in Essex (Phillips 2011). Within days, first anti-immigrant events in the post-war era took place in the country; and those events have become a benchmark in the history of anti-immigration in the country.

Figure 3: An Example Showing the Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and White Supremacy



(Source: Royal Air Force Museum)

The second issue regarding the first wave is Enoch Powell who was a Minister in Harold Macmillan's Conservative Government from 1960 to 1963. He has been seen as the symbol and real historical starting point of extremism in case of immigration in the country following his speech in Birmingham on 20th of April, 1968. In the speech, known as the *Rivers of Blood Speech*, Powell for the first time deeply criticized mass immigration from the Commonwealth countries; and warned the audience about the consequences of it. He particularly opposed to the 1968 Race Relations Act that prohibited discrimination. Following the speech, a poll at the time revealed that 74% of the country people agreed with Powell's opinions (Richards 2015). Although his extreme proposals to cease anti-immigration were never implemented, this episode (Rivers of Blood Speech) is regularly recalled by the extreme right supporters.

National Front UK (NF) is the last issue to be mentioned in the first wave. The party was founded by Arthur Chesterton in 1967 from a coalition of right-wing extremist groups, and quickly became the largest right-wing extremist political party in the country for three decades. It gained a great deal of publicity by organising many intentionally provocative marches through areas with large non-white populations, but its electoral story has been one of failure. Although still active today under the leadership of Kevin Bryan, it is no longer capable of getting a candidate elected at any election. As an important point, the return of the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher's leadership who advocated restrictive immigration policies played a key role on the decline of the National Front UK in the late 1970s. Actually Margaret Thatcher was a rational conservative politician who understood the need to address some of the issues of the right-wing extremists in this period. Hence, her promise of an end to

immigration into the country certainly contributed to the subsequent collapse in extreme right support in this wave.

The second wave lasting from 1980 to 2000 is the time of proliferation of minor social movements in the country since their number dramatically increased. Approximately 50 new groups emerged or merged with others in this period. Although most of them are short-lived, some are still active on the streets and effective on the public. For instance, Blood and Honour (B&H) was founded by Ian Stuart Donaldson and Nicky Crane in 1987 as a fascist group to bring Nazism to public attention through extreme right musical groups and a quarterly publication advertising extreme right events (Taylor 2017). It openly encourages its supporters to commit violence and mass-murder. Another example Combat 18 established in 1992 is intended as a paramilitary group to defend particularly BNP members from expressing extreme right views in public.

Lastly, UKIP founded as an opposition to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty has been the most influential extreme right party that emerged in this wave. Also, lone-wolf terrorism began to be more prominent by the end of this wave. Among them two-week bombing campaign in London in April 1999 by the so-called “London nail-bomber” David Copeland, a member of the National Socialist Movement at that time, is recorded as one of the deadliest lone-wolf terrorist attacks in the UK.

It should be noted that the leadership of British fascism revolved around two key figures in the first two waves: Colin Jordan and John Tyndall, who cooperated in some platforms. On the one hand, Jordan occupied a niche at the right-wing extremism in the 1950s and 1960s as leader of the White Defence League, National Socialist Movement and British Movement. Since he was a strong advocate of the deport of all Jews and non-white immigrants, he is sometimes figured as the godfather of British fascist tradition. On the other hand, Tyndall is still a dominant figure of the British extreme right. He actually served in many right-wing extremist platforms until his death in 2005, but associated with his active leadership in the National Front UK and BNP.

Compare to the second wave, in the third and last wave which began in the beginning of the 21st century there have emerged more extreme right movements like English Defence League, National Action or Pegida UK rather than parties. According to some researchers, people have begun to take active roles in social movements more than political parties because movements are loyal to their own policy agenda regardless of which party champions the government, and because the role of civil society has increased since the beginning of the 2000s. This wave is

also associated with Islamophobic faces of the current extreme right formations in the country. Especially the London 2005 bombings, often referred to as 7/7, in particular are a benchmark for the British extreme right groups and British Muslims. As known, four suicide bombers targeted the innocent people in central London, which killed 52 people and injured more than 700 people. The bombings are the worst single terrorist atrocity on the British soil. Media's putting the Muslim identities of the assailants in the forefront started the beginnings of a shift in the attitude of the extreme right agents from anti-Semitism to Islamophobia.

5. BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT IN CURRENT TIMES

Following the debate above extreme right formations in the UK cannot simply be framed simply as “new” since their context is both contemporary and historical, and their activism blurs older extreme right traditions with novel styles and techniques. Here it is very noticeable that Jackson has recently developed the term “accumulative extremism” to help draw attention to the historical dimension. According to him, discrete groupuscules (describing tiny groupings that seem to typify the history of post-war fascism) operate within a wider set of perceived traditions of activity, deemed to stretch back into past generations too. He argues that such formations want to give their activists an alternate history, and encourage their followers to identify with fascist past, stretching back several generations (2014: 101-113). Within this context, this chapter takes a look at the British extreme right in current times in three units of analysis: parties, movements and lone-wolf terrorists.

5.1. Extreme Right Parties

A political party is an organized body of a group of people having the purpose of winning government power by official means like elections or by unofficial means like a coup d'état. Since they typically aim to exercise the government power, they are the most critical actors in political sphere. As a result of this, this part of the thesis deals with the extreme right parties in the UK having two comparative cases: British National Party as a traditional extreme right party that does not or cannot distinguish itself from fascist discourse and practices, and United Kingdom Independence Party as a post-industrial extreme right party that rejects any form of fascism at least officially. Alongside those two parties, there are some active right-wing extremist parties in the country, but they are all marginalised in the political debate and have not achieved any electoral successes worth-mentioning.

In this part, historical benchmarks, ideological principles, electoral successes in two levels (European elections and general elections), social compositions and policies for the three parameters (immigration, European integration and economy) of these parties are examined. To remind, the thesis asserts that post-industrial extreme right parties perform more success in elections than traditional extreme right parties because of the political culture of the UK. As a result of this, this thesis measures the level of extremity by comparing and contrasting through the latest party publications, and by the textual analysis method.

Table 1: List of Extreme Right Parties in the UK

Party	Establishment Year	Activeness
National Party UK	1917	Dissolved in 1921
British Union of Fascists Party	1932	Banned in 1940
British People's Party	1939	Dissolved in 1954
Union Movement Party	1948	Dissolved in 1973
British Empire Party	1950	Dissolved in 1951
National Labour Party	1957	Dissolved in 1960
British National Party	1960	Dissolved in 1967
National Front UK	1967	Active
(New) British National Party	1982	Active
United Kingdom Independence Party	1993	Active
National Democrats Party	1995	Dissolved in 2011
White Nationalist Party	2002	Dissolved in 2005
England First Party	2004	Active
British People's Party	2005	Dissolved in 2013
Nationalist Alliance	2005	Dissolved in 2008
New Nationalist Party	2006	Dissolved in 2007
British Freedom Party	2010	Active
Britannica Party	2010	Active
Britain First Party	2011	Active
British Democratic Party	2013	Active
Liberty Great Britain Party	2013	Dissolved in 2017
Integralist Party	2013	Active
British People's Party	2015	Dissolved in 2016
For Britain Party	2017	Active

Moreover, regarding the general elections British National Party as a traditional extreme right party has never passed 1.9%, whereas United Kingdom Independence Party as a post-industrial extreme right party has performed 12.6% once. There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. One of them is based on their traditional or post-industrial tendencies that have direct repercussions on the voters. As an extension of this, the other explanation is based on the UKIP's successful application of Kitschelt's winning formula: supporting a pro-market or neo-

liberal position on the economic affairs and an authoritarian position on the socio-cultural affairs.

Last but not least, extreme right parties pose the most pressing challenges to the British politics and society in four dimensions. Firstly and most importantly, the main risk is that they have already been influential on the critical political issues of the UK because they, for example, have been the flagship block in the Brexit process, which has still been a big challenge for the contemporary British politics. Related to this, extreme right discourses have also affected the mainstream politicians' discourses. For instance, former PM David Cameron said that "Turkey would probably not be ready to join the bloc until the year 3000 on its current rate of progress" just before the 2016 referendum although Britain is a supporter of Turkey's accession to the EU and although he openly supported Turkey's application to join the EU many times. The reality that triggered this change of discourse at the highest political level stands on the instrumentalization of Turkey's EU membership by the "Vote Leave" block as the leading Brexit campaigner in order to raise public concern about a possible new immigration wave to the country. Here it should be remembered that the block used one billboard on the streets during the 2016 referendum: "Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU"; and supported the message through their Twitter account: "David Cameron wants Turkey to join the EU. How will our NHS cope? Let's #TakeControl on 23 June". In a similar vein, a critical discourse analysis on Cameron's political language during the period of 2010-2015 reached a similar result. Accordingly, Cameron's political language in this period adapted an aggressive rhetoric on the immigration and immigrants (Ágopcsa 2017).

Another threat is that they endanger the fundamental socio-political values of the country like respect for and tolerance to different faiths and beliefs. Third, those parties have been spreading hate speech in the country. Especially, the "us (British citizens as the in-group) vs. them (EU immigrants as the out-group)" rhetoric against any inside or outside "threat" encourages violence. Finally, those parties often resort to hypocrisy. Former BNP Chairman Nick Griffin's following statement in 2000 proves this argument: "There is a difference between selling out your ideas, and selling your ideas. And the BNP isn't about selling out its ideas, which are your ideas too, but we are determined now to sell them. And that means basically to use the saleable words. As I say, freedom, security, identity, democracy. Nobody can criticise them, nobody can come at you and attack you on those ideas. They are saleable..." (Barnett and Namazie 2011: 15).

5.1.1. British National Party

British National Party (BNP) is one of the active traditional types of extreme right parties in the UK. It was formed in 1982 by an influential opinion leader John Tyndall and some other members of the (New) National Front UK. Tyndall's admission actually remained identical to the National Front, and took its name from that of a defunct British National Party that operated in the country from 1960 to 1967. Since the early years, from a geographical point of view, the party has achieved its best results in the elections in those cities where patriotism is very strong like Batley, Bradford, Burnley, Oldham and Leeds. Here Copey argues that BNP skilfully succeeded in constructing and establishing itself as a legitimate defender of the white community by the "Rights for Whites" campaign launched in 1993. Yet he reminds that characteristics of such (urban) areas are largely associated with deindustrialization and unemployment (1996: 122-126).

Under Tyndall's leadership between 1982 and 1999, BNP was regarded as a neo-Nazi party because of its racist principles. For instance, the party in this era supported that only the whites should be citizens of the country. During his leadership, Tyndall often emphasised white supremacy as well as anti-Semitic and Islamophobic sentiments and Holocaust denial since he was a strong believer of the conspiracy theory that Jews seek to dominate the country. Copey (1996) states that main focus of BNP's political strategy in these early years was on long-term organizational development with a strategic focus to "self-legitimation" as a way of challenging the de-legitimizing effect of the media against the and other extreme right parties.

In the second half of the 1990s, BNP needed a leader change, one who could bring new ideas to the party and its supporters. Nicholas (Nick) Griffin as a long-time British extreme right activist offered an alternative strategy that caught the mood for the party. Therefore, after Tyndall, Griffin took the power in 1999 and served as the Chairman until 2014. Atton argues that since becoming the chairman in 1999, Griffin tried to reposition the party as "a party of racial nationalism to build a responsible movement that becomes the focus of the hopes not just of the neglected and oppressed white working class, but also of the frustrated and disorientated traditional middle class" (2006: 576). In this new era, Griffin unlike Tyndall favoured a decentralized government that is more close to the people, including a Swiss referendum model as well.

BNP under Griffin's new leadership also toned down its hostile rhetoric to Jews, but began to use direct Islamophobic sentiments in the post-9/11 attacks in general and London 2005 bombings in particular. Concerning the ongoing Islamophobic sentiments, the party portrays Islam as incompatible with the modern secular western democracy and British values (2010: 17). Indeed Griffin faced a trial in 2006 because of describing Islam as a "wicked and vicious faith". Moreover, in contrast to previous election campaigns, BNP in the 2010 Election Manifesto devoted an entire section of the manifesto to "Counter Jihad: Confronting the Islamic Colonisation of Britain", in which it promised a ban on the burka, halal slaughter, the construction of new mosques, and immigration from Muslim countries (2010: 5). In the same publication, Turkey's possible EU membership was rejected since "such a move would increase the Muslim population in the continent by more than 75 million". Such Islamophobic sentiments of the party have been issued many times in its official magazine called *Identity* as well.

Social bases of the party are largely consistent with the general tendencies of an ordinary extreme right group. For instance, Ford and Goodwin found out the social profile of BNP supporters under the name of "angry white men". Accordingly, the BNP supporters are largely middle-aged working-class men living in the declining industrial towns of the middle and north lands. Also, they have few educational qualifications; and are more worried about immigration and profoundly hostile to the political establishment (Ford and Goodwin 2010: 1-3).

As could be seen in Table 2, the biggest success of BNP in general elections is the 2010 general election in which it received 563.743 votes, corresponding 1.9% of the votes. This was not a surprising case for the country and party since it received 943.598 votes in the 2009 EP elections, corresponding 6.3% of the votes. In this election, BNP leader Griffin was elected as a Member of the European Parliament as well. Also, regarding the party's electoral performance, it should be stated that Derek Beacon won the party's first council seat in Tower Hamlets in the 1993 election, but the seat was soon won back by Labour Party member.

In accordance with the electoral results, it is striking to observe that BNP has been more successful in the EP elections although BNP and other extreme right parties perform Eurosceptic aspects. The notion behind this fact, as mentioned earlier, is based on the role of the electoral system. While the first-past-the-post election system in the UK marginalises the minority parties, proportional representation in the EP elections gives minority parties and independent candidates a better chance of getting into the parliament. Regarding this issue, the BNP founder Tyndall in an occasion declared: "The British system of first-past-the-post is

tailor-made to protect that inner establishment that acts as the real power in British politics by way of controlling the three major parties, including, most importantly, the two which habitually win elections under the system as it is” (Copsey 1996: 138). As a result of this, BNP and other small and extreme right parties always support the introduction of a proportional representation to secure their votes.

With regard to the elections again, the 2010 general election is noteworthy to be mentioned since the party received the highest score by 1.9% in all of the general elections in the country. Despite many possible explanations, media appearance of BNP since 2009 played a critical role in this “success”. Especially, it was surprising that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) invited the BNP Chairman in 2009 for the first time for a premier weekly television current affairs programme (Question Time) with a studio audience. In spite of many protests from the British public, BBC Director General Mark Thompson took the view that the BNP’s electoral results justified an invitation. According to polling reports following this TV programme, support for BNP started to increase, and the party leadership claimed that they received 3.000-4.000 requests for new membership (Husbands 2011: 108).

Table 2: BNP’s Election Performance

Year	Election Type	Percentage of Overall Vote	Total Votes
1983	House of Commons	0.0	14.621
1987	House of Commons	0.0	563
1989	European Parliament	-	-
1992	House of Commons	0.1	7.631
1994	European Parliament	-	-
1997	House of Commons	0.1	35.832
1999	European Parliament	1.1	102.647
2001	House of Commons	0.2	47.129
2004	European Parliament	4.9	808.200
2005	House of Commons	0.7	192.746
2009	European Parliament	6.3	943.598
2010	House of Commons	1.9	563.743
2014	European Parliament	1.0	179.694
2015	House of Commons	0.0	1.667
2017	House of Commons	0.0	4.642

On the other hand, 267 of the BNP candidates in the same election got less than 5% of the votes, and therefore lost their deposits, which cost the party £133.500 (Bolton 2015). Such a financial mismanagement as well as a dramatic decline in vote shares in the coming years forced Griffin to resign his position in 2014. Just after his resignation, the party under its new Chairman Adam

Walker only fielded 8 candidates in the 2015 election, a dramatic drop in numbers compared to the 339 BNP candidates who stood in 2010.

Another issue to be mentioned is based on BNP's relations with right-extremist movements such as Blood and Honour and Combat 18 (C18) although it rejects any of them. In their paper, Hitchens and Standing argue that despite the modernisation efforts of former Chairman Griffin, the party's links to such extremist groups have supposedly been severed, and claims that there is evidence that B&H is still tolerated by senior members of the party (2010: 13). Furthermore, a number of issues of B&H publications include clear support for BNP. For instance, the article titled "Fighting Back for Britain" celebrated the three seats gained by BNP in the 2002 local elections: "News the BNP has taken 3 seats in local government is reverberating around the world! Congratulations go out to all involved in the immense hard work, which went into this monumental victory. We salute the BNP! And all those amongst the Nationalist community who worked together to gain this first small step towards our common goal" (B&H 2009).

Also, it should not be forgotten that C18 was built on the premise of violence and street action in 1992, as a paramilitary group to defend particularly BNP members from expressing extreme right views in public (Taylor 2017). With this in mind, a card-carrying member of BNP 38-years-old Terence Gavan was convicted in 2010 on terrorism after 54 explosive devices in his home. Moreover, in 1994 following the party's first by-election victory in Tower Hamlets, the number of reported racist incidents in the borough increased by 300% in a period of just 12 months (Copsey 2008: 198). Lastly, that party's acting leader Walker is a former teacher who was banned from the classroom for life because of verbally abusing schoolboys and slashing their bike tyres is another criminal case of BNP (The Week 2014). The three cases openly show that there is a tendency of using violence among the party supporters.

Concerning the three research parameters of this thesis, in accordance with the interpretative analysis of the actual party programme immigration into Britain has been at the core of BNP. The party as a strict supporter of (white) nationalism claims that any kind of immigration is the greatest threat of the country because of three main reasons. First, immigration is the most precious and unique threat against the British identity because it has been changing and damaging the identity of the indigenous peoples of the country. Second, rapid influx of immigrants into the country has resulted in adding to the threat of Islamisation and breeding home-grown terrorism. Third, current "open door policy" and "uncontrolled immigration" have been leading to new and more material challenges like: higher crime rates, demand for more

housing, longer hospital waiting lists, lower educational standards, lower wages and higher council taxes (BNP 2018).

As a result of the arguments discussed above, BNP claims that it is the only political party that voters can trust to stop immigration into the country, and promises hard policies in order to “solve” or stop the immigration problem like: introducing a national security moratorium stopping all further immigration into the country, prosecuting the so-called Islamist hate preachers, deporting bogus asylum seekers and foreign criminals, offering generous grants to those of foreign descents who are resident in the UK and who wish to leave the country, no amnesty for illegal immigrants, cracking down on sham marriages, and rejecting all asylum seekers who passed safe countries on their way to Britain (BNP 2018).

One can also ask the question “what does Britishness mean for BNP?” since national identity plays a prominent role in the party’s discursive toolkit. Principally, BNP and other traditional extreme right parties have an exclusive type of national identity rather than a more civic or inclusive conception. More understandably, in a critical paper on the roots of BNP, John and others reached the finding that four components of BNPs “Britishness” are strongly related to hostility towards further immigration: being born in Britain, having British ancestry, having lived most of one’s life in Britain, and agreeing that it is impossible for those people who do not share Britain’s customs and traditions to become fully British (2009: 18). Those criteria clearly show that BNP is by default exclusionary on the national identity issue, and hence focuses on a linear progression of the nation through homogeneity and continuity.

At this point, BNP’s approach towards multiculturalism is also noteworthy. The party that has a long-time history of creating hate stories about ethnic minorities interprets multiculturalism as an attempt to *balkanize* the population, thereby undermining the integrity of the nation state and facilitating EU governance (Jamin 2014). Therefore, in order to deal with multiculturalism and its repercussions, BNP presents populist promises like ending public funding of organizations advocating multiculturalism or making Saint George’s Day a national holiday (BNP 2018a).

Based on the arguments discussed above, it is the case that BNP does not separate the immigrants coming from the European Economic Area (EEA) countries and non-EEA countries with regard to the economic considerations. However, that any kind of immigrant is a burden for the country’s economy has been falsified in many academic studies. To give an example, according to a 2014-year research by the University College London Centre for Research and

Analysis of Migration, people from the EEA countries have paid about 34% more in taxes than they received in benefits over the 10 years from 2001 to 2011 (Dearden 2014). This and many other statistical data openly show that not all kinds of migrants are a burden on the British economy, instead some have been visibly contributing to the country's economy. In a similar manner, a 2014-year study prepared by Johnson and Khattab for the Office of National Statistics found that Muslims were the most disadvantaged group in the country in terms of employment prospects. More understandably, the study revealed that "Muslim men were up to 76% less likely to have a job of any kind compared to white male British Christians of the same age and with the same qualifications; and Muslim women were up to 65% less likely to be employed than white Christian counterparts" (Dobson 2014). This data clearly shows the discrimination of Muslims in business sector; and falsifies the argument "immigrants coming from the Muslim countries take over the country's economy".

Regarding the second parameter on the European integration, the core argument of BNP criticises the large amount of power given to Brussels, which is often associated with the erosion of national sovereignty. According to many party publications, the EU is seen as an organisation dedicated to usurping British sovereignty, to facilitating the destruction of the nation state character of Britain, and to destroying the nationhood and national identity (Jamin 2014). Therefore, resolutely opposing the European integration process was the redline of BNP like any other extreme right party until the 2016 referendum. Indeed, during the UK's decision in 2016 referendum to leave the EU, BNP was one of the strong supporters of the exit from the EU. Also, the party has so far cooperated with strong Eurosceptic parties in Europe like the National Front in France and Jobbik in Hungary.

Aside from the anti-immigrant sentiments and Eurosceptic policies, the actual party programme clearly shows that BNP is opposed to laissez-faire capitalism and economic liberalism; and promotes for an economic protectionism in the country. Accordingly, it calls for the selective exclusion of foreign-made goods from domestic markets, the reduction of foreign imports and nationalization of the monetary system out of the hands of the private banking interests. It also promises to ensure that wherever possible the British manufactured goods are produced in British factories they will employ British workers. Moreover, BNP puts out that the national economy should be managed for the benefit of the British nation, and debates that other parties are enslaved to laissez-faire globalism (BNP 2018b). The party claims that when they take the government, they will bring an end to unemployment in this country with these policies.

5.1.2. United Kingdom Independence Party

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was formed in 1993 by some members of the “Anti-Federalist League”, which had been founded by a Eurosceptic academic Alan Sked in 1991, as an opposition to the Conservative government’s signature of the Maastricht Treaty. In other sense, the party as a product of the second wave of the extreme right ideology was launched on the bases of a single issue: “taking the UK out of the EU”. With regard to the election performance, the party experienced a drastic increase in its vote share between the 2010 and 2015 general elections from 3.1% to 12.6% by applying Kitschelt’s winning formula as well as some further factors that will be examined in the following parts. Despite this, it only received one seat (Douglas Carswell) in the 2015 election because of the electoral system in the country. In the same period, party membership rose from 12.000 to 40.000 from 2010 to 2015 compare to the declining party memberships in general (UKIP Mid Dorset and North Poole 2016). However, just after the EU referendum in 2016 it faced a sharp decrease in the general election votes. Indeed, UKIP received 590.000 votes in the 2017 snap election, corresponding 1.8% of the all votes. The logic behind this fact is clearly based on the disappearance of its *raison d’être* or achievement of the core aim of the party (Brexit). From an illustrator perspective, what UKIP has exactly experienced in the post-2016 era is like an epigram of bee: “once it has stung, it dies...” As a result of this, it is the case that UKIP needs new and longer-term policies to be able to achieve a new breakthrough.

Table 3: UKIP’s Election Performance

Year	Election Type	Percentage of Overall Vote	Total Votes
1994	European Parliament	1.0	155.487
1997	House of Commons	0.3	105.722
1999	European Parliament	6.7	696.057
2001	House of Commons	1.5	390.563
2004	European Parliament	16.1	2.650.768
2005	House of Commons	2.2	603.298
2009	European Parliament	16.6	2.498.226
2010	House of Commons	3.1	919.546
2014	European Parliament	27.5	4.376.635
2015	House of Commons	12.6	3.881.099
2017	House of Commons	1.8	593.852

Here the question “Who benefited from the collapse of UKIP?” is very logical. If someone compares the results of the 2017 snap election and the 2015 general election, it is seen that the regions that voted for UKIP in the previous one turned their faces to the Tories to a large extent. An election-day polling supports this argument as well: 57% of 2015 UKIP voters changed to Conservative Party and 18% to Labour Party on the snap election (Murdoch and others 2017). According to another poll, 84% of the surveyed said that UKIP is obsolete and irrelevant after the EU referendum (Talk Politics 2017). Also, UKIP faced a disaster in the last local election in England (May 2018) in which it just had 3 councillors and lost 123 councillors. Having a geographical distribution analysis of these lost votes, it is seen that loss of UKIP votes were shared between Labour and Liberal Democrat candidates. From this viewpoint, the argument “moderate right-wing extremist parties perform better in elections since the former ones attract more centrist voters” becomes more meaningful.

Concerning the first research parameter based on the last general election manifesto in 2017, UKIP places a great emphasis on the immigration to the country. Actually the former party leader Nigel Farage in 2013 described this issue as the biggest single issue for his party. Until the EU referendum in 2016, it blamed the EU’s “open-border policy” as the main reason of immigration to the country, which was often visualized on campaign billboards as could be seen in Figure 6. Before the EU referendum, the party proposed a five-year ban on any type of immigration in the 2009 electoral manifesto, but limited this policy only to unskilled immigrants in 2015. The Farage leadership also advocated a decrease of net annual immigration from the hundreds of thousands to between 20.000 and 50.000.

Figure 4: One of UKIP’s Posters



In the post-Farage era, it was argued in the last election manifesto that “Brexit offers an opportunity to calm public concerns about immigration that has placed huge pressure on public services and housing, and that has damaged the community cohesion” (Worthing UKIP). In the same publication, Farage’s successor Paul Nuttall, proposed to establish a Migration Control Commission and set a target to reduce net migration to zero, over a five-year period. Moreover, unlike BNP that does not care the differences between immigrants and asylum seekers, UKIP promised to respect the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and obligations to bona fide asylum seekers.

Regarding the second parameter of this study, UKIP’s main political objective was always an exit from the EU until the 2016 referendum. The official reason of such an attitude is explained in party’s own website: “Not because we hate Europe, or foreigners, or anyone at all; but because it is undemocratic, expensive, bossy – and we still haven’t been asked whether we want to be in it” (UKIP 2018). Clearer than this statement, Farage preferred to use a more open sentence on this issue in 2013: “Because the fact is we just don’t belong in the EU. Britain is different. Our geography puts us apart. Our history puts us apart. Our institutions produced by that history put us apart. We think differently. We behave differently” (The Spectator 2013).

Logically, if someone looks at the party’s all publications and party leadership’s discourse, it is easily seen that UKIP (has) always used the EU membership as a scapegoat for the UK’s socio-political challenges. For instance, UKIP as well as other extreme right formations often argued that the EU was responsible for uncontrolled immigration to the continent and to the UK; or the EU could not manage the Euro crisis that deeply affected the European and British economies in a negative way. Here the anti-Europeanist illustrator Ben Garrison’s debated cartoon entitled “Europe is a Sinking Ship” that was frequently used among the Brexiters presents an illustration for such arguments. On the one hand, when having a closer look at the EU ship and nearby, it is seen that this ship led by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel will surely sink because of economic failure, immigration, political correctness and some other factors, all of which are described through very metaphors like a sharp, wave or tornado. On the other hand, the illustration has some subliminal messages. For instance, the mermaid in front of the ship is being harassed by a Muslim-looking man; or there is a flag referring to Islam just above the EU flag. It is also seen in the cartoon that the ship that belongs to the UK is abandoning the sinking ship, and sailing to the sun.

Figure 5: The Cartoon Entitled “Europe is a Sinking Ship”



(Source: GrrrGraphics)

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that UKIP was the leading party of the Brexit referendum. To remember, in the so-called Bloomberg speech in January 2013 Conservative PM David Cameron promised an in/out referendum if his party won the 2015 election. Although he was not in favour of an exit from the EU, he had to keep his word because of the pressure of UKIP and other extreme right formations on his government through street demonstrations. Hence, in the so-called Brexit referendum on 23 June, 2016 51.9% of the Britons voted to leave the EU. Later, the process of leaving the Union formally began on 29 March, 2017 when the new PM Theresa May triggered the Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. After the ongoing negotiations between London and Brussels, the exact time was scheduled for the exit on 29 March, 2019. The decision was also welcomed by the leading extreme right leaders and groups in Europe like National Front's leader Marine Le Pen and Party for Freedom's leader Geert Wilders. From this point of reality, UKIP as an extreme right party showed that other extreme right organizations could actually determine the course of historic decisions in the country.

Meanwhile, UKIP is one of the founders of the Eurosceptic political group Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy in the European Parliament. It has been active since 2009, and chaired by Nigel Farage of UKIP and David Borrelli of Five Star Movement. That the members of the group have strong negative tendencies against the EU and European integration progress is stated in the group's charter: "...the group rejects the bureaucratisation of Europe and the creation of a single centralised European super-state". National parties of the group members

currently consist of the right-wing extremist parties like Alternative for Germany, Five Star Movement, Sweden Democrats, The Patriots and UKIP.

Lastly, on economic issues, UKIP has always supported neo-liberal economic policies that the country has been practicing since the 1980s. The party believes that free market competition, low taxes and low regulations would make the country's economy bigger and stronger. As a strong advocate of Brexit, the party leadership often argued that the EU membership was a factor in country's diluted economic growth, flat-lining wages, and diminishing influence on the world stage. Therefore, they regularly underlined that ending UK contributions to the EU would save 20-35 billion Pound a year until the EU referendum. Also, UKIP in the last general election manifesto underlined the importance of market competition once more: "increased competition offers opportunities for the transfer of expertise and technology, which in turn means more jobs and a stronger economy".

Aside from having authoritarian anti-immigrant and free market economy policies, there are three factors that allowed UKIP to have better results in elections and that differ the party from BNP. First, Farage's charismatic leadership was an important explanatory power for the rise of UKIP votes. Needless to say, a smiley face and positive body language, direct communication and empathy with the people, inspiring the party members to work together for a common purpose, regular speeches on corruption and entrenched political parties, and powerful oratory were the most visible characteristics of Farage. Yet he resigned on July 4, 2016 as UKIP saying he had fulfilled his political ambitions after successfully campaigning for Brexit. Second, relatively high media appearance of UKIP played another role for the success in elections. For instance, after reviewing the major trends and changes in national press reporting in the 2001 and 2010 UK general election campaigns, Deacon and Wring (2015) found that UKIP's aggregate media coverage more than doubled. Third, after having a long-time reading of both UKIP and BNP party publications, this thesis realized that UKIP's publications had some impact on the voting results because it has generally prepared better, simple and more logical publications that are academically supported.

On the other hand, in their 2014-year extensive study Ford and Goodwin revealed the social bases of the party. Accordingly, 57% of professed UKIP supporters are male and over the age of 54; 99.6% of supporters identified as white; 55% of them had left school aged 16 or under with only 24% having attended university; and 42% of supporters are in blue-collar jobs. In short, UKIP's support has a very clear social profile that largely overlaps with the BNP

supporters: old, male, working class, white and less educated (Ford and Goodwin 2014: 152-159).

What is more, it is seen that UKIP as a moderate extreme right party has been trying to distance itself from other extremist groups to protect its self-perceived moderate image. For instance, BNP tried for an informal alliance with UKIP in 2009, but Farage leadership refused it. In a similar vein, Sharia Watch UK head and Pegida UK co-leader Anne Marie Waters lost her position on the UKIP London Assembly election list due to her involvement with Pegida UK (Kassam 2016). The reason behind this contention between UKIP and BNP is that, as Hainsworth strongly underlines, as much as an extreme right party is able to mark distance itself from past extremist forms it electorally becomes more successful.

However, like BNP there has been a clear rise of Islamophobic sentiments in recent years among the UKIP leadership by taking the advantage of public concern about the so-called “Islamic terrorism” following the 2005 bombings. In an election publication called “Valuing Our Christian Heritage”, former leader Farage wrote that the UK is fundamentally a Christian nation, and Christianity should be recognised by the government at all levels (UKIP 2015). Likewise, in a 2014 occasion he called Britain a *Judeo-Christian country* that must stand up for its values if it is to counter the growing threat of the Islamic State and radical jihadism (Vale 2014). Farage’s successor Paul Nuttall proposed to ban full face coverings such as burqa, which would help the Muslims women’s integration to the society according to him (Walker 2017). Afterwards, UKIP leader Gerard Batten since April 2018 reiterated his belief that Islam is a “death cult” (Walker 2018). About Batten, it should be actually noted that he has close relations with the leading Islamophobe in the country Tommy Robinson. He, for instance, openly voiced support for the imprisoned Robinson; and gave a speech at Free Tommy Robinson Rally on June 9, 2018.

5.2. Extreme Right Movements

As stated in the introduction part, a social movement mobilizes the support of people to offer interpretative frames for particular problems. Although they differ in size, they essentially act in collective forms. Since they play an important role in the scope and direction of social change, this part of the thesis takes a closer look at the right-wing extremist social movements in the UK. However, this part of the study focuses on the most three visible organizations: English Defence League, National Action and Pegida UK.

First of all, social movements like parties act on behalf of a specific purpose or a couple of purposes, but do not seek access to political power as the final destination in their journey since they do not participate in elections. They are at least as important as the parties because they have a capacity to trigger and mobilize the society in collective actions. In the context of this thesis, extreme right movements are valuable to be mentioned here since they provide a platform for collective extremism in both violent and non-violent forms. Especially since social movements are like a meeting point of like-minded people, they promote exchanging extreme ideas among the members and participants. Also, as could be realized in the following parts, extreme right movements are often appeared with their violent and non-violent extreme actions, which often damage the public order and security.

Table 4: List of Extreme Right Movements in the UK

Movement	Establishment Year	Activeness
British Brothers League	1902	Dissolved in 1923
British Fascists	1923	Dissolved in 1934
Imperial Fascist League	1929	Dissolved in 1939
British League of Ex Servicemen and Women	1937	Dissolved in 1947
National Socialist League	1937	Dissolved in 1939
Right Club	1939	Dissolved in 1940
English National Association	1942	Dissolved in 1943
League of Empire Loyalists	1954	Dissolved in 1967
White Defence League	1956	Dissolved in 1960
National Socialist Movement	1962	Dissolved in 1968
Greater Britain Movement	1964	Dissolved in 1967
Racial Preservation Society	1965	Dissolved in 1968
British Movement	1968	Dissolved in 1968
League of Saint George	1974	Active
November 9th Society	1977	Active
Blood and Honour	1987	Active
Combat 18	1992	Active
(New) National Socialist Movement	1997	Dissolved in 1999
Racial Volunteer Force	2002	Active
English Defence League	2009	Active
White Nationalist Resistance	2009	Dissolved in 2012
European Defence League	2010	Active
Misanthropic Division	2013	Active
National Action	2013	Banned in 2016
Generation Identity UK	2013	Active
Pegida UK	2015	Active
(North and East) Infidels	2015	Active

Before dealing with the extreme right movements, it is better to give a concrete definition to “violent extremism” in individual and group formations. FBI defines this term as following: “encouraging, condoning, justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals”. In a similar way, Spaaij defines the term as “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change” (2012: 47). Related to this, Neumann argues that the concept of “violent extremism” is broader and more expansive than “terrorism” because it accommodates any kind of violence as long as its motivation is deemed extremist (2017: 15). Also, there are three broad types of violent extremism: ideological violence, issue-based violence and ethno-nationalist or separatist violence (Australian Government). Among them, the first type is directly related to the topic of this thesis. Those in this type of extremism have extreme interpretations of a political ideology or beliefs that advocate the use of violence, such as fascist, hate and nationalist groups.

5.2.1. English Defence League

English Defence League (EDL) is a right-wing extremist social movement that emerged from a group known as the “United Peoples of Luton” in 2009. Since then it has become the largest street-based social movement in the country. The movement opposes the spread of so-called Islamism and Islamic extremism in the country; and describes itself as “peaceful” and “democratic” with a “strong respect for English traditions”. In a similar matter, the group claims that it has separate Jewish, youth, woman, Pakistani, Sikh, disabled, Christian and LGBT divisions, but Anti-Fascist Network in the UK argues that despite EDL’s pathetic pandering to gender stereotypes, the women in the women’s division “EDL Angels” in particular are just as racist and keen for a fight as the men within the group (Anti-Fascist Network). Also, it is noteworthy that although EDL claims that the movement is open to everyone, there is no “Muslim branch” in the organization.

The research of DEMOS in 2011 provides a couple of key findings about the organization (Littler and Bartlett 2011):

- The total size of active membership is approximately 25.000–35.000 people;
- 72% of the supporters are between 16 and 25-years-old;
- 81% of the supporters are male;
- 28% of the 16-24 years-old supporters are unemployed;
- Supporters appear to care more about immigration than the so-called Islamic extremism.

As pointed out earlier, the principal activities so far have been based on street demonstrations. Since its first small scale demonstration in Birmingham in 2009, it has frequently demonstrated in areas with large Muslim populations. As Oaten (2014: 331) argues, the demonstrations have led to violence and community tensions in town and city centres throughout the country. The group organized over 50 street-based demonstrations between 2009 and 2012 that often mobilized less than 3,000 activists and led to significant policing costs (Goodwin 2013: 5-6). For instance, those demonstrations caused an estimated £500,000 worth of damage only in 2010, most of which were residential homes, cars and even a Hindu temple (Anti-Fascist Network). Compared to this estimation, as one analyst observed, the cost of policing demonstrations by September 2011 is estimated to be in excess of £10 million (Kassimeris and Jackson 2015: 172), which clearly shows that EDL poses a serious challenge to the integrity, functioning and public order of the society.

In a similar manner, EDL members are regularly engaged in violent behaviour despite a pure democratic self-presentation. To give a couple of examples, EDL supporters threw bricks and bottles at police during a protest in Birmingham in September 2009; 17 EDL supporters were arrested for throwing smoke bombs at police in October 2010; and EDL members stormed and caused havoc in a Muslim bookshop in October 2011 (Alessio and Meredith 2014). Those events prove that the discourse used by the EDL leadership regarding its “democratic and peaceful” actions is completely different in practice. Related to this argument, Roberta Moore, leader of the Jewish division, resigned in 2011 over the presence of alleged “neo-fascists” in the administration of EDL. More interestingly, the EDL founder Tommy Robinson left the group in 2013, saying they have concerns over the dangers of “extremism” in the group (BBC 2013).

On the other hand, EDL has a complex relationship with BNP. For instance, co-founders Robinson and Carroll are ex-BNP members. In a similar fashion, according to a 2009 year report of DEMOS, BNP was the most popular party amongst EDL supporters with 34% voting for it (Casciani 2009). However, the group published an open letter against such claims in 2011: “There are racist idiots involved in BNP. Its current leader was a member of the National Front UK and one of the founders, John Tyndall was a neo-Nazi. Why would EDL want to be linked to BNP?” (EDL 2011).

In the meantime, Robinson is an important figure for the current British extreme right. He has been very active on streets and a phenomenon among the extremist youth due to his charismatic aspects. However, he is perceived as a criminal man in the mainstream media. For instance, he was shown violating his bail conditions by attending an EDL demonstration in 2011; and he served a 12-month conviction for assaulting. What is more, he was also jailed for 10 months because of using someone else's passport to unlawfully travel to the US in February 2013. Just after a year, he was jailed once more for mortgage fraud; and served almost six months in prison. What is more, he was jailed in May 2018 because of publishing information regarding an ongoing trial via an hour-long Facebook Live. He is also known with his Islamophobic books "Enemy of the State" (2015) and "Mohammed's Koran: Why Muslims Kill for Islam" (2017) co-authored with Peter McLoughlin. Both of the books are directly aimed in constructing a pejorative image of Islam and Muslims. Lastly, his account followed by more than 400.000 people was suspended from Twitter on March 2018 after violating Twitter's official policies on hateful conduct.

Figure 6: An EDL Supporter at a Rally in 2014 Holding an Insulting Poster



(Source: Ashitha Nagesh)

Last but not least, EDL can be considered as a single issue group since it only deals with the so-called Islamic extremism in the UK. However, it is very important to argue that EDL's constructing Islam and Muslims as anti-modern, barbaric and extremists principally comes from a broad Orientalist perception of the world division into the East and West, and from a Huntingtonian perspective of an existential clash of civilizations between the East and West. Especially, rhetorical slogans like "We are defending our country from Islamic extremism and radical Muslims" allow EDL leadership to position Islam and Muslims as incompatible with the "Christian-based roots" of the country. After analysing EDL from different parts, Allen

(2011: 288) found that EDL's opposing the so-called Islamification of the country only promotes Islamophobia in his words in the country. Therefore, EDL can be considered as a major threat to the social cohesion of the British society, and to the integration of the Muslim communities into the British society.

According to Lowles, editor of Searchlight which campaigns against extremism in the country, EDL poses two main risks: acting as a standing army, and creating flashpoints, whipping up community strife and discord (BBC 2009). Moreover, Cruddas (2010) suggests that EDL is a much bigger threat than BNP since its street demos intentionally provoke a violent reaction from young British Muslims. Rather more worryingly, in 2010 it was reported that there is strong support among the serving army personnel. For example, an EDL spokeswoman, whose husband is a serving soldier, stated in an occasion: "The soldiers are fighting Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Iraq and the EDL are fighting it here... Not all the armed forces support EDL but a majority do" (Taylor 2010).

5.2.2. National Action

National Action (NA) is a right-wing extremist youth movement that was established in 2013 by 26-years-old Benjamin Raymond and 22-years-old Alex Davies. The small-sized movement operated within a wider milieu of extreme right ideology in the UK, and had branches across the country, which were conducting provocative street demonstrations and stunts aimed at intimidating local communities (Telegraph 2017). A 44-page document namely *Attack* uploaded in August 2014 highlights the way a British tradition of "fascist activism" was central to the group's identity (Jackson 2014: 110).

The group held many protest marches for as long as it was (legally) active until 2016. According to the official list of proscribed groups, the activities and propaganda materials of NA were particularly aimed at recruiting young people, and had a predominantly-northern membership consisting of no more than 100 supporters all over the country. With regard to this, the group's own literature claims activist numbers in the tens rather than the hundreds as well (Jackson 2014: 99). For instance, at a conference in August 2014, 35 people attended, some of which were connected to other groups like the British Movement and Western Spring.

Concerning the debate of whether NA is the product of the political and ideological demise of BNP, co-leader Alex Davies stated that he admired the earlier form of BNP under John Tyndall, but explained the difference that NA had more extreme sentiments than BNP since they believed that it was not extreme enough (The Week 2018). Likewise, NA founders were

formerly involved with other extreme right groups such as Autonomous Nationalists, British National Party and English National Resistance. Also, one of the founders Benjamin Raymond leded the Integralist Party based on a fascist nostalgia of Mosley.

The youth-based group had virulently open anti-Semitic sentiments, which were seen as the ultimate marker of being a good, authentic nationalist (Jackson 2014: 104). This theme was drawn out in their critical discussions of some parties. For instance, UKIP was described by the group as a “kosher” party. Concerning such sentiments, a member of NA Garron Helm was sentenced to four weeks in prison for sending an anti-Semitic message via social media to Jewish Labour MP Luciana Berger in October 2014 (Perraudin 2014). And, NA’s online propaganda materials contained extremely violent imagery, language and quotations by Adolf Hitler towards the Jews. It made prolific use of social media to spread its message of hate, and promoted lone-wolf terrorist attacks online. Here it is noteworthy to mention that the group repeatedly used the phrase “Hitler was right” at marches and in online propaganda (The Week 2018). Another example is that 26-years-old Lawrence Burns from National Action, who expressed admiration for Hitler, was sentenced to four years in prison because of referring the Jewish people as “sub-human animals” on his Facebook page.

Figure 7: A Group of Youth-Based National Action Supporters



NA was regularly in the headlines because of its provocative demonstrations as well as its slick and confrontational videos and social media posts. As a result of this, the most visible threat regarding the National Action is that it propagated hate speech for a long time in different platforms, and provided online extremism. For example, NA endorsed the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox. In November 2016, The Sunday Times reported that NA supported Thomas Mair, the murderer of Labour MP Jo Cox, by altering its listing on Google to state: “Death to traitors,

freedom for Britain”, that is a slogan used by Mair in the court when asked to give his name following Cox’s murder (Slawson 2016).

What particularly distinguishes the NA from other right-wing extremist groups is that the NA sympathizers have been trying to infiltrate the state institutions. Once the group was known for its youth-focused recruitment strategy within universities, British defence officials declared in September 2017 that four serving members in the British army were arrested on suspicion of being members of banned NA. Among them, a box of Nazi flags and a Hitler Youth knife were found in Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen’s garage. The arrest of army members clearly sends a worrying signal about the infiltration of extremists to the state institutions.

Within this context, the UK Home Office briefly described the ideology of this group as promoting the idea that Britain would inevitably see a violent race war, which the group claims it will be an active part of. The explanation behind this argument according to the office was that NA was against democracy, was hostile to the British state and tried to divide the society by implicitly endorsing violence against ethnic minorities and perceived race traitors (2017: 16). As a result of this, after being under surveillance by the anti-terror squad for a long time, the UK Home Secretary banned NA in December 2016 describing it as a “virulently racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic group”. Later, two other right-wing extremist groups Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action were outlawed in September 2017 after identifying them as aliases of “National Action”.

The youth-based National Action is the first extreme right-wing group in the country to be banned under terrorism laws. According to the Home Office, the proscription means that being a member of or inviting support for this organisation is a criminal offence. However, in accordance with the current news, a core of NA supporters simply ignore the ban and continue as before, but moved the organisation underground and started communicating by a wide array of secure communications (Lowles 2018). More alarmingly, Matthew Collins, Head of Hope Not Hate Group, declared that members allegedly were seen at a terror training camp in Warrington at the beginning of September, 2017 (Deaden 2017). Both concrete cases indicate that NA and its sympathizers will pose a greater threat to the social fabric of the British society.

5.2.3. Pegida UK

Pegida UK is the British branch of the right-wing extremist pan-European movement “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West”. It is a relatively new Islamophobic street movement in the country that was founded by the leading Islamophobe Tommy Robinson in 2015 after leaving prison. Like its pan-European partners, this movement principally campaigns against the growing influence of Islam in Europe and increasing immigration. Shortly after its founding, the original German Pegida published a position paper composed of 19 statements outlining the movement’s positions, all of which are accepted by the UK branch. The points 10 and 13 say that the movement is dedicated to the protection of the Judeo-Christian characteristics of the Western culture, and not to allow Muslims living here (Pegida UK).

Concerning the strong Islamophobic sentiments of Pegida UK, Robinson has been calling for a halt to all Muslim immigration to the country, the closure of religious Sharia courts, a ban on burqa in public, and an end to the construction of new mosques (Goldenberg 2016). More importantly, he claims that “moderate Muslims” are lying about their religion (Islam) since he has already seen their “real face” after reading the biography of the Prophet and his hadiths as well as the Quran (Buchanan 2015). However, it is obvious that there is nothing changed in the mentality as could be seen in his speech “I am not far-right, I am just opposed to Islam, and I believe it is backward and fascist” (Hall 2016).

Figure 8: Pegida UK’s Logo



Robinson, in an occasion, expressed that he hoped his new movement Pegida UK would be different from his former one (EDL) that it would attract a more middle-class demographic, and would discourage the alcohol-fuelled violence of EDL (Buchanan 2015). In fact, there has not been recorded any violent action regarding the movement so far, but it is seen that Pegida UK’s rhetoric is almost identical to that of EDL.

The movement is most notorious for organising street marches. It held its first protest march in Newcastle with around 400 people attending in February 2015; and in September a further demonstration attracted just a handful of supporters in London. During the marches, participants carried Islamophobic banners, such as “No more mosque” and “Stop Islamization of the West”. Also, though it does not have an official webpage, Pegida UK is very active on its Facebook account, which is followed by more than 35.000 people. However, a trending analysis discovered that they are not predominantly from the UK; and only about half of those liking the Pegida UK Facebook page are actually living in Britain (BBC 2015).

As an important issue, the term that EDL often uses “Islamization of the country” has not been clarified yet. If the EDL leadership and supporters use this term to refer to the increasing number of mosques or Muslims in the country or Muslim parliamentarians, current statistics show that there is nothing to “worry”. To illustrate this argument, there are 1.975 active masjid and prayer room landmarks in the whole country as of September 2017 (Muslims in Britain 2017), whereas there are more than 50.000 churches belonging to different Christian sects in the country as of September 2014 (Evangelical Alliance 2014). Moreover, according to the last census in 2011, 59.5% of the country are Christian, 4.4% are Muslim, 3.3% believe in other religions and the rest (32.8%) believes in no religion or states his/her religion (UK Office for National Statistics). The second statistic shows that the main problem in the country with regard to the religious affairs should be the fact that proportion of those who do not believe in any religion increases day by day, not the proportion of Muslims. In political sphere, there are currently 15 Muslim parliamentarians in the House of Commons, which constitute 2.3% of the whole parliament. Actually *The Muslim News* proposes that there should be 30 Muslim MPs at least to represent the Muslim population living in the country. At that point, Genova debates that the discourse of “Islamization” of this movement is a proxy for more elementary racist/nativist resentment. He (2015: 8) argues that the denunciation of this discourse concerns the ideological mobilization of the signs of “cultural” or religious difference as markers of a more fundamental racial difference between “us” and “Muslims”.

5.3. Lone-Wolf Terrorists

As partly mentioned in the introduction part, lone-wolfs are a part of the extreme right ideology. Here it is needed to present more information about them and their interaction with other agencies. This part of the thesis firstly aims to problematize the definition of lone-wolf and lone-wolf terrorism, and later investigates three lone-wolf attacks in the UK. However, as “how an individual becomes an extreme” and their motivational patterns are not a direct matter of

this research, the thesis does not deal with it in details. Nonetheless, it is accepted in the literature that a person does not decide to become a lone-wolf in one day; instead individual extremism is a long-time process affected from many different variables.

Similar to the term “extreme right”, there is not a single definition of “lone-wolf terrorism”. There are a sample of buzzwords often used interchangeably that characterize academic discourse on lone-wolf terrorism and lone-wolf terrorists: “domestic terrorism, home-grown terrorism, freelance terrorism, leaderless resistance, lone-avengers, lone-offenders, lone-wolf terrorism, lone-wolf pack, loner-terrorism, right-wing fanatics, right-wing terrorism, self-activating terrorism, self-directed terrorism, self-motivated terrorism, self-starters, solo-actors and solo-terrorists”. Ignoring this confusion, the term “lone-wolf” in academic usage is a metaphor to define a “criminal who prepares and commits violent acts alone outside of any command structure and without material assistance from any group” (Homeland Security Training Institute 2018).

For the leading authority in the field Spaaij, “lone-wolf terrorism involves terrorist attacks carried out by persons who operate individually, who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, and whose modus operandi are conceived and directed by an individual without any direct outside command or hierarchy” (2010: 856). From this definition, it is understandable that if more than two people carry out an act of terrorism, it cannot be labelled as “lone” act of violence. At that point, Saady (2017) from a critical point of view proposes that “a lone-wolf might be influenced or motivated by the ideology and beliefs of an external group”. Hence, Bakker and Graaf present a better definition for the term: “those individuals who are inspired by a certain group but who are not under the command of any other person, group or network” (Bakker and Graaf 2010). Both of them indicate to the fact that even though lone-wolf terrorists are not members of an identifiable extreme right party or movement, they may identify or sympathize with them or even have been a member of them in the past.

Interestingly that lone-wolf terrorists worldwide are frequently thought to only be Muslims is not a valid situation because this process cannot not be devoted to a specific religion, sect or ethnic nationality. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011: 4) here argue that individual extremism (radicalization in their words) is a psychological trajectory that, given the right circumstances, can happen to any person, group, or nation. For instance, according to a study, right-wing terrorist attacks by white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and anti-government radicals in the US killed 48 people between September 2001 and June 2015. By comparison, the same study found that so-called jihadist attacks killed 26 people in the same time period (Beauchamp 2015).

Another current study based on Europe shows that there occurred a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2016 in the continent; and the largest number of attacks was carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). What follows it is that left-wing violent extremists reached a total of 27. By comparison, the number of so-called jihadist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016 (Cordesman 2017). Regarding the UK, lone-wolfs David Copeland who carried out a two-week bombing campaign in April 1999, Thomas Alexander Mair as the murder of British Labour MP Jo Cox in 2016 or Darren Osborne as the attacker of Finsbury Mosque in 2017 were not Muslims as well.

From this point of view, as mentioned in the previous pages, this thesis argues that extreme right presents a real threat to the British politics and society since it has been inspiring individual extremism in both violent and non-violent forms. In order to prove this argument, three lone-wolf cases are chronically analysed: David Copeland, Thomas Alexander Mair and Darren Osborne, but there is a long list of other noteworthy cases as seen in Table 5. According to Koehler, collective violence attacks might be self-explanatory like a bomb attack against a synagogue motivated by anti-Semitic sentiments or against a mosque motivated by Islamophobic sentiments (Koehler 2016). He also argues that right-wing violent attacks are significant threats to states and societies for two critical reasons: they challenge the government's monopoly of force, and they create terror and fear in a wide target group beyond the victims of the attack itself (Koehler 2016). This argument was mentioned in EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report 2012 as well: "The threat of violent right-wing extremism has reached new levels in Europe and should not be underestimated. The threat will most likely come from lone actors, but organised underground groups also have the capability and intention to carry out attacks".

Finally, Military Intelligence Section 5 (MI5) of the UK considers the right-wing extremist groups and individuals as a part of domestic extremism, which is defined as "those individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts in pursuit of a larger agenda". The service accepts that they pose a threat to public order, but since they are not regarded as a threat against the national security, they are investigated by the police, not by themselves. However, the Ukrainian extremist Pavlo Lapshyn's attack against an 82-years-old Mohammed Saleem in 2013 inside the country openly shows that lone-wolf terrorism represents a danger against the national security of the country as well.

Table 5: List of Lone-Wolf Attacks and Attempts Up to Now

Case	Year
23-years-old David Copeland, a former BNP member, Combat 18 and British National Socialist Movement, placed three homemade nail bombs in three different parts of London targeting the black in Brixton, the Bangladeshi in Brick Lane and the homo-sexual in Admiral Duncan respectively. Three people lost their lives, and 139 people were injured in the attacks.	1999
49-years-old Robert Cottage, a former BNP candidate, built up a stockpile of explosive chemicals and ball bearings in anticipation of a civil war. He also told his wife that he wanted to shoot the Prime Minister of the country.	2007
31-years-old Martin Gilleard from the British People's Party kept four home-made nail bombs. He stated that he just wanted to "save" the Britain from "multiracial peril".	2008
35-years-old Nathan Worrell was imprisoned for possession of material for terrorist purposes. Police discovered a significant amount of extreme right propaganda as well as membership cards for right-wing extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, the November 9th Society and the British People's Party.	2008
44-years-old Neil Lewington, a follower of Blood and Honour, was jailed for planning a racist bombing campaign in the country.	2009
41-years-old Ian Davidson and his son 19-year-old Nicky planned a terror attack under the banner of the Aryan Strike Force.	2009
38-years-old Terence Gavan, a card-carrying member of BNP, was convicted in 2010 on terrorism after 54 explosive devices in his home.	2010
25-years-old Pavlo Lapshyn, an extremist Ukrainian PhD student in the UK, murdered 82-year-old Mohammed Saleem, and planted a bomb outside a mosque.	2013
26-years-old Zack Davies, a member of National Action, attempted to murder Sarandev Bhambra, a dentist of Sikh origin, in revenge for British Army soldier Lee Rigby's murder. Police found Combat 18 stickers at his flat as well.	2015
52-years-old Thomas Alexander Mair affiliated with Britain First Party and EDL murdered Labour Party MP Jo Cox in the middle of an anti-Brexit campaign. She became the first British female MP ever to be murdered.	2016
47-years-old Darren Osborne, an avid follower of Tommy Robinson and Britain First Party leader Paul Golding, allegedly drove a van into a group of Muslims near to the Finsbury Park Mosque in North East London after the community members had just finished tarawih prayer. Consequently 51-years-old Makram Ali originally from Indonesia died from his injuries and 11 others were wounded.	2017
20-years-old Ethan Stables, an online follower of Combat 18 and National Action planned to carry out a machete attack on a gay pride event in Cumbria, but he was stopped just after posting violent homophobic rants online.	2018
25-years-old Connor Ward was convicted of planning terrorist attacks on Muslims and some mosques in Scotland. Police found in his flat dozens of neo-Nazi propaganda materials, hundreds of ball bearings, knives and deactivated bullets.	2018

5.3.1. David Copeland and London Nail Bombs

On 17th, 24th and 30th of April 1999, David Copeland (a.k.a. London Nail Bomber and Mr. Evil) placed three homemade nail bombs in three parts of London targeting three groups: the black in Brixton, the Bangladeshi in Brick Lane and the homo-sexual in Admiral Duncan respectively. Three people lost their lives, and 139 people were injured in the attacks. Only 23-years-old Copeland admitted the full responsibility for the bombings, and he was given six life sentences in June 2000.

In accordance with the official information shared with the public, he accepted that he joined BNP in May 1997, became a follower of John Tyndall, read William Pierce's *The Turner Diaries* that depicts a violent revolution in the US, and learned how to make bombs from an online handbook (Guiora 2014). However, he left BNP as it was "too soft" for him; and he joined the right-wing extremist movements like Combat 18 and British National Socialist Movement in the following process. Moreover, Copeland during his education took part in acts of the 657 Crew, Portsmouth Football Club's notorious hooligan team. As an interesting point, it was reported in the court that Copeland never had a girlfriend, and this caused him to fear that people might think he was a homosexual (BBC 2000). This may explain the reason why he also targeted the homo-sexual community.

Besides this, security services discovered that the walls in Copeland's room were decorated with swastika flags, and found extreme right literature in his flat. Related to this, in the investigation he expressed that he was given a mission from the God to destroy the coloured people and homosexuals, who he believed were destroying the country (Tomlin 2011). He also explained the reason why he specifically targeted the black and Asian ethnic minorities by "Because I don't like them, I want them out of this country, I'm a national socialist, Nazi, whatever you want to call me, I believe in the master race". In a similar manner, Copeland spoke to a BBC correspondent that he would have bombed the Jews as well if he had got a chance (BBC 2000).

As one of the brutal disasters that the British society has ever seen, Copeland's attacks signalize a benchmark that the threat of individual right-wing extremism in the country has reached a new level. It is that his attacks not only caused the deadliest extreme right terrorist attack in the British history, but also brought a visible threat against the country's domestic security.

5.3.2. Thomas Alexander Mair and Murder of MP Jo Cox

A long-time after the London Nail Bombs, the Labour Party MP Jo Cox was assassinated by Thomas Alexander Mair on June 16, 2016 in the middle of the anti-Brexit campaign. She was shot three times and stabbed 15 times in the brutal pre-meditated attack. Just after the murder, the 52-years-old right-wing extremist Mair accepted that he riled by her support for refugees and “Remain” campaigning during the EU referendum. It was also the case that when killing Cox, he was yelling “This is for Britain, Keep Britain independent, Britain first”.

In the following process, according to the evidence gathered by the security services, it was proved that he was highly obsessed with the Nazis and notion of white supremacism/nationalism. For instance, police found a library of extreme right books on the Nazis and symbols reflecting white supremacism like Third Reich golden eagle on top of his bookshelf. It was also discovered that Mair had even been affiliated with the Islamophobic Britain First Party and EDL. Both of points were underlined by the judge Justice Wilkie as following: “There is no doubt that this murder was done for the purpose of advancing a political, racial and ideological cause namely that of violent white supremacism and exclusive nationalism most associated with Nazism and its modern forms” (Judiciary of England and Wales 2016).

Moreover, the Southern Poverty Law Centre shared the information with the public that Mair had a long history with white nationalism since he had spent money on reading material from the National Alliance US, which advocates the idea of an all-white homeland and the eradication of Jewish people. Likewise, Mair ordered a series of books and subscriptions from National Vanguard Books (the printing branch of National Alliance) including Chemistry of Powder and Explosives, Improvised Munitions Handbook, Incendiaries and Ich Kämpfe (a book given by the German Nazi Party to its new members).

After his judgement, the extremist Mair was sentenced to prison for the rest of his life. Yet this does not change the reality that a lone-wolf terrorist, who had highly affected from the extreme right ideology, can have influential effect on the society and politics. Especially, killing an innocent person, a woman and a parliamentarian at the same time, reflects the most extreme and violent form of an ideology against democracy and social cohesion in a country. This notion was supported by the judge of the court Wilkie again: “By your actions, you have betrayed the quintessence of our country and its reliance on Parliamentary democracy”.

5.3.3. Darren Osborne and Finsbury Mosque Attack

On 19 June 2017, 47-years-old Darren Osborne allegedly drove a van into a group of Muslims near to the Finsbury Park Mosque in North East London after the community members had just finished tarawih prayer. Consequently 51-years-old Makram Ali originally from Indonesia died from his injuries and 11 others were wounded. According to a couple of witnesses, Osborne yelled “I want to kill all Muslims... I have done my job...” just after the attack. Concerning this, Sue Hemming, Head of Counterterrorism at the Crown Prosecution Service, said Osborne was openly motivated by his hatred of Muslims; and because of this he must face the consequences of the actions (Al Jazeera 2018).

Following the attack, the right-wing extremists defended the attack. For instance, right-wing extremist Britain First Party posted on its Facebook page that “Finsbury Park Mosque was notorious as a haven for Islamist terrorists and extremists” (Lusher 2017). Another example Tommy Robinson claimed that the Finsbury mosque has a long history of creating terrorists, radical jihadists, promoting hate and segregation. Even more, an extremist man posed a video in front of a Nazi flag said: “I am happy right now as the English had grown some balls and a white man had driven into a bunch of Muslims” (Rushton 2017).

Winter and Mondon (2017) remind a quite noteworthy dilemma that “the politicians and media often depict the so-called Muslim extremists as representatives of the Muslim community, whereas they depict the white perpetrators, including those who commit violence in the name of a race or nation, receive a wait-and-see approach, often based on the assessment of their individual psychological state and social status”. However, they warn that the responses of the British government and media were different regarding this case. On the one hand, the PM Theresa May immediately identified Osborne’s act a terrorist attack targeting the Muslims living in the country; and the Prince Charles visited the mosque and conveyed a message from the Queen. On the other hand, The Times described Osborne as a “jobless lone-wolf”, and The Guardian simply tagged him “aggressive” and “strange” rather than referring to “terrorism”. As debated in the theoretical part, the role of media in legitimizing or delegitimizing the extreme right became sensible in this case, but interestingly, this is not a new tactic of the media. For instance, following the 2005 London bombings, The Economist shared an article named “The Enemy Within”. The whole article was completely devoted to figure out how a small minority of the continent’s Muslims shifted from discontent or personal frustration to active terrorism. The article also suggested that “Muslims must learn to police themselves” to stop extremism.


There are two more noteworthy evidences concerning the role of media and opinion leaders in this case. First, Osborne's partner Sarah Andrews said that in the weeks before the attack Osborne read a couple of right-wing extremist propaganda online (Dodd and Rawlinson 2018). More clearly, Osborne had become an avid follower of EDL founder Tommy Robinson and Britain First Party leader Paul Golding. Andrews also stated that in the weeks before the attack he had become obsessed with the Muslims after watching the Three Girls, a primetime BBC drama about the Rochdale child sex abuse ring. The first evidence in particular illustrates the potential role of the social media and online platforms in vicariously engaging with extreme right agents.

Unlike the murder of an "insider" Jo Cox, this attack on an "outsider(s)" also indicates to the fact that the rising wave of Islamophobic rhetoric by the extreme right agencies have turned its face to carry out violent attacks on Britain's streets. The lone-wolf Osborne's attack is visibly against the multi-cultural, plural and cosmopolitan structure of the British society. His attack also highlights that even though a lone-wolf is not a member of a right-wing extremist party or movement, he can sympathize with their discourse.

CONCLUSION

This study tried to provide an analysis on the considerable recent rise of the extreme right ideology in the UK, particularly in England, in three units of analysis: political parties, social movements and lone-wolfs. After analysing the ideology from different points, there emerged some conclusions. The first conclusion in accordance with the conceptual framework is that there is no consensus towards the definition of “extreme right”. Different authors use different concepts to define the same phenomenon according to different criteria. As a result of this, there is a confusion of concepts in the literature. Related to this, because there is no one theory that wholly explains the rise of extreme right parties, the second chapter examined the extreme right-wing voting in accordance with ten functional explanations in two blocks. Rather than juxtapose them, the chapter took both into account in order to show how each of them has something to say about the rise of extreme right parties.

Figure 9: An Overview on Demand-Side and Supply-Side Theories



Roughly speaking, the second conclusion to be drawn in this research is that extreme right is not a new challenge to the British politics and society, and dates back to the 19th century at least. As this shows, today's extreme right has not emerged in a vacuum, and its roots are in a wider set of inter-war fascism in the country. This is an important point that places the extreme right in its historical context, and falsifies recent claims that extreme right represents a flash-in-the-pan.

Thirdly, concerning the two types of extreme right parties, it is seen that some of the features of BNP as a traditional extreme right party and UKIP as a post-industrial party are in harmony with each other. They have hostility towards immigrants, and regard this issue as a source of economic competition and as a threat to the national culture. They overwhelmingly prioritised this issue and its subjects (immigrants) as a pressing political issue, and tend to be very negative about the existing immigration policies. However, unlike its traditional sister UKIP is not against some controlled immigration where it is in the interests of the country and its citizens.

Another commonality between BNP and UKIP is that they are typically opposed to UK's EU membership, and therefore called for a withdrawal from the Union until the 2016 referendum. The reason behind this opposition, similar to the anti-immigrant policies, is because they view the EU as a threat for loss of national boundaries and loss of cultural identity. In addition to the anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic policies, Islamophobic sentiments have been a key driver of the support for these parties. Moreover, since BNP and UKIP are not actually catch-all parties, they have a similar social background of voters. This is to say that majority of their supporters often appear to correspond to the following characteristics: male, middle and elder ages, lower-middle and working class, not highly educated, and economically not secure.

On the other hand, there are differences between these two types of extreme right parties. BNP and UKIP actually have a different heritage, history, language, culture and political agenda. While the core of BNP policies has been the belief that immigration to the country is a destructive agenda and must be immediately stopped, the core of UKIP policies was the belief that European integration process is a destructive agenda and as a result of this it had to be ended until the EU referendum. This can be interpreted that UKIP's *raison d'être* disappeared by the Brexit decision.

What specifically separates UKIP from BNP and other extreme right parties, which is also the main factor made the party successful in some elections, is based on its economy policies. As clearly shown in the relevant parts of the study, BNP has more protectionist economy policies, whereas UKIP has neo-liberal economic policies that the country has been practicing since the 1980s. Additionally, since BNP was built itself on a tradition that is considered illegitimate by a large proportion of the British citizens, it has struggled to present itself as a credible alternative to the mainstream parties. As a result of this, a more moderate level of extremity is a critical factor for an extreme right party in the UK in order to get a better electoral result.

The fourth conclusion is that resilience and occasional rise of the extreme right parties pose a serious challenge to the British democracy because they emphasize a homogeneous voice and threaten the rights and protection of minority groups in the country. Actually the UK is one of the countries that have strong committed and consistent advocate of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to prevent discrimination within its territories. Despite this, newly emerging violent face of those parties in the country, particularly in the case of BNP, has been directly damaging the social cohesion and social integration of the new comers or “others” in their sense. Moreover, even if they are “right” in their discourse it does not make any sense since they resort to violent in practice.

With regard to the right-wing extremist movements, they are important places since they present a platform for collective extremism in different forms, which directly cause a public disorder, security problem and significant policing costs. Additionally it is absolutely seen that because extreme right movements are divided into pieces within themselves, they cannot move act together. The leading reason behind this fragmentation is based on blaming themselves not being as extreme enough. Also, there seems a secret division of labour among those movements in the country because it is seen that while NA is foregrounded with its anti-Semitic sentiments, EDL and Pegida UK are foregrounded with Islamophobic sentiments.

On the lone-wolf cases, although some of them did not have any official membership, almost of them sympathized with an extreme right party or a movement. Put differently, they had broader ideological validations and some kind of motivational patterns in their actions. The cases examined in the thesis prove that lone-wolf terrorism is a real threat not only for the minority groups in the country, but also for the local Britons. If the frequency of such attacks continues, there is a strong risk of normalization of lone-wolf terrorism in the future. Therefore, the importance of having a coherent strategy for tackling with the individual extremism in general and lone-wolf terrorism in particular arises for the UK. Besides this, Ukrainian

extremist Pavlo Lapshyn's attack against an 82-years-old man inside the country openly shows that lone-wolf terrorism represents a danger against the national security of the country as well. As a result of this, MI5's consideration on the right-wing extremist groups and individuals as a "domestic security" matter loses its meaning.

Consistent with those findings above, extreme right in the UK fits into the framework of the overall extreme right ideology with some exceptions. It is also true that due to the long established political culture of the country, extreme right has never formed a government in the country, and it has not had the chance to achieve the back door route to power. Moreover, embedded liberal socio-political codes of the country based on civility, tolerance and accommodation between different ethnicities have prevented it from being attracted to an extreme right governing. However, the claim that extreme right in the country has been a complete failure and will continue as such is a simple statement because it denies the potential threat that it could pose in the long-term. Related to this, some considerable victories of the extreme right parties in elections, especially in case of UKIP, indicate that they cannot be simply labelled as "pariahs".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ágopcsa, R.: (2017), “Discourse in the United Kingdom on EU Immigration: Analysis of Prime Minister David Cameron’s Political Language on EU Immigrants between 2010 and 2015”, *Cojournal*, Vol: 2, Issue: 1.

Alessio, D., and Meredith, K.: (2014), “Black Shirts for the Twenty First Century? Fascism and the EDL”, *Social Identities Journal*, Vol: 20, Issue: 1.

Al Jazeera: (03.02.2018), “Finsbury Park Attacker Darren Osborne Jailed for Life”, retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/02/finsbury-park-attacker-darren-osborne-jailed-life-180202125638681.html>, on 03.02.2018.

Allen, C.: (2011), “Opposing Islamification or Promoting Islamophobia? Understanding the EDL”, *Patterns of Prejudice Journal*, Vol: 45, Issue: 4.

Anti-Fascist Network, “Who are the EDL?”, retrieved from <https://antifascistnetwork.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/edl-display-for-email-acc.pdf>, on 15.02.2018.

Arzheimer, K., and Carter, E.: (2006), “Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success”, *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol: 45.

Arzheimer, K., and Carter, E.: (2009), “Religiosity and Voting for the Radical Right”, *Keele European Parties Research Unit*, Working Paper No: 28.

Atton, C.: (2006), “Far-Right Media on the Internet: Culture, Discourse and Power”, *Journal of New Media and Society*, Vol: 8, Issue: 4.

Australian Government, “What is Violent Extremism?”, retrieved from <https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/aboutus/Pages/what-is-violent-extremism.aspx>, on 12.01.2018.

Bakker, E., and Graaf, B.: (2010), “Lone-Wolfs: How to Prevent This Phenomenon?”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, November, The Hague.

Barnett, A., and Namazie, M.: (2011), *Enemies not Allies: The Far-Right*, The One Law for All Campaign, London.

Little, M., and Bartlett, J.: (2011), *Inside the EDL Populist Politics in a Digital Age*, DEMOS, London.

Bayraklı, E.: (10.12.2016), “Avrupa’yı Dolaşan Faşizm Hayaleti”, retrieved from <https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/enes-bayrakli/2016/12/10/avrupayi-dolasan-fasizm-hayaleti>, on 12.02.2018.

BBC: (30.06.2000), “Profile: Copeland the Killer”, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/781755.stm, on 12.01.2018.

BBC: (11.09.2009), “Who are the EDL?”, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8250017.stm, on 16.02.2018.

BBC: (09.10.2013), “Tommy Robinson on Why He Quit EDL”, retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/av/uk-politics-24458976/tommy-robinson-on-why-he-quit-english-defence-league>, on 15.02.2018.

BBC: (04.02.2015), “Pegida in the UK: Don’t Believe the Likes”, retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-31117764>, on 09.02.2018.

Becker, H.: (2007), *Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book or Article*, University of Chicago Press, Second Edition, Chicago and London.

Benewick, R.: (1969), *Political Violence and Public Order*, Allen Lane, London.

Betz, H.: (1993), “The New Politics of Resentment: Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol: 25, Issue: 4.

Betz, H.: (1994), *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*, Macmillan, London.

Beauchamp, Z.: (24.06.2015), “Study: Right-wing Terrorism has Killed 48 People in the US since 2001”, retrieved from <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/24/8838659/right-wing-terrorism-new-america>, on 04.05.2018.

B&H: (2009), “Issue 24”, retrieved from <http://www.bloodandhonourworldwide.co.uk/magazine/issue24/issue24p07.html>, on 12.03.2018.

BNP: (2010), “General Election Manifesto”, Welshpool.

BNP: (2018a), “British Culture”, retrieved from <https://bnp.org.uk/policies/british-culture/>, on 12.03.2018.

BNP: (2018b), “Policies: Economy”, retrieved from <https://bnp.org.uk/policies/economy/>, on 10.04.2018.

BNP: (2018c), "Policies: Immigration", retrieved from <https://bnp.org.uk/policies/immigration/>, on 10.04.2018.

Bolton, D.: (14.04.2015), "General Election 2015: The BNP has Almost Vanished from British Politics", retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-2015-the-bnp-has-almost-vanished-from-british-politics-10176194.html>, on 06.03.2018.

Botan, F., and Kreps, G.: (1999), "Investigating Communication: An Introduction to Research Methods", retrieved from http://mason.gmu.edu/~afinn/html/teaching/courses/f03_comm250/fbk_chapters/09.pdf, on 22.01.2018.

Bryman, A.: (2012), *Social Research Methods*, Oxford University Press, Fourth Edition, New York.

Buchanan, R.: (03.12.2015), "Former EDL Leader Tommy Robinson will Launch UK Pegida", retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/former-edl-leader-tommy-robinson-will-launch-uk-pegida-a6759206.html>, on 08.02.2018.

Camus, J.: (18.10.2008), "The European Extreme Right and Religious Extremism", retrieved from <https://tempspresents.com/2008/10/18/the-european-extreme-right-and-religious-extremism/>, on 10.01.2018.

Carter, E.: (2002), "Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties", *West European Politics*, Vol: 25, Issue: 3.

Carter, E.: (2005), *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester.

Casciani, D.: (11.09.2009), "Who are the English Defence League?", retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8250017.stm>, on 15.02.2018.

Chatham House: (2017), "All Further Migration from Mainly Muslim Countries Should Be Stopped", retrieved from <https://infogram.com/63af14ef-8711-4002-b384-e6058ce56643>, on 02.02.2018.

Copsey, N.: (1996), "Contemporary Fascism in the Local Arena: British National Party and Rights for Whites", in (ed.) Cronin, M., *The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Copsey, N.: (2008), *Contemporary British Fascism: BNP and Quest for Legitimacy*, Palgrave Macmillan, Second Edition, New York.

Cordesman, A.: (2017), “Trends in Extremist Violence and Terrorism in Europe”, *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, Washington.

Cruddas, J.: (10.10.2010), “English Defence League is a Bigger Threat than BNP”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/10/john-cruddas-english-defence-league>, on 20.02.2018.

Cultural Politics, “Textual Analysis”, retrieved from http://culturalpolitics.net/popular_culture/textual_analysis, on 20.01.2018.

Deacon, D., and Wring, D.: (2015), “UKIP and the British Press: Integration, Immigration and Integrity”, in (ed.) Lachapelle, G., and Maarek, P., *Political Parties in the Digital Age: The Impact of New Technologies in Politics*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.

Dearden, L.: (05.11.2014), “European Immigrants Contribute £5bn to UK Economy but non-EU Migrants Cost £118bn”, retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/european-immigrants-contribute-5bn-to-uk-economy-but-non-eu-migrants-cost-118bn-9840170.html>, on 10.02.2018.

Dearden, L.: (26.07.2017), “Anti-Semitic Attacks Hit Record High in UK amid Warnings over Rise of Hatred and Anger”, retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/anti-semitic-hate-crime-attacks-british-jews-assaults-uk-incidents-record-high-cst-research-a7861721.html>, on 02.02.2018.

Dearden, L.: (08.09.2017), “National Action: Banned Neo-Nazi Terrorist Group still Active in UK after Finding Loophole”, retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/nazi-group-uk-national-action-banned-still-operating-loophole-soldiers-arrested-terrorism-plot-a7937206.html>, on 13.02.2018.

Dobson, R.: (30.11.2014), “British Muslims Face worst Job Discrimination of Any Minority Group”, retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/british-muslims-face-worst-job-discrimination-of-any-minority-group-9893211.html>, on 02.02.2018.

Dodd, V., and Rawlinson, K.: (22.01.2018), “Finsbury Park Attacker Wanted to Kill as Many Muslims as Possible”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/22/darren-osborne-appears-in-court-over-finsbury-park-attack>, on 23.01.2018.

Eatwell, R.: (2000), “The Rebirth of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol: 53, Issue: 3.

Eatwell, R.: (2005), “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right”, in (ed.) Merkl, P., and Weinberg, L.: *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*, Frank Cass Publishers, London.

EDL: (2011), “A Letter to Members and Supporters of the Turban Campaign”, retrieved from <http://web.archive.org/web/20110511073055/http://englishdefenceleague.org/content.php?329-A-Letter-To-Our-Ideological-Opponents>, on 15.02.2018.

EFD, “Our Charter”, <http://www.efddgroup.eu/about-us/our-charter>, on 08.04.2018.

Ellinas, A.: (2010), *The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the Nationalist Card*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Europol: (2012), *EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report*, The Hague.

Evangelical Alliance (18.09.2014), “How Many Churches Have Opened or Closed”, retrieved from <http://www.eauk.org/church/research-and-statistics/how-many-churches-have-opened-or-closed-in-recent-years.cfm>, on 04.05.2018.

FBI, “What is Violent Extremism?”, retrieved from <https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/what-is-violent-extremism>, on 21.02.2018.

Ford, R., and Goodwin, M.: (2010), “Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party”, *Political Studies*, Vol: 58.

Ford, R., and Goodwin, M.: (2014), *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain*, Routledge, Abingdon.

Genova, N.: (2015), “In the Land of the Setting Sun Reflections on “Islamization” and Patriotic Europeanism”, *Journal für kritische Migrations- und Grenzregimeforschung*, Vol: 1, Issue: 2.

Giugni, M.: (2009), “Political Opportunities: From Tilly to Tilly”, *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol: 15, Issue: 2.

Globe Scan: (25.04.2015), “New Poll Shows UK Voters Disillusioned with Political System”, retrieved from <https://globescan.com/uk-voters-disillusioned-with-political-system/>, on 29.03.2018.

Goldenberg, A.: (29.01.2016), “Tommy Robinson: The Man behind the British Version of Pegida”, retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35432074>, on 08.02.2018.

Golder, M.: (2016), "Far Right Parties in Europe", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol: 19.

Goodwin, M.: (2011), *New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party*, Routledge, New York.

Goodwin, M.: (2013), "The Roots of Extremism: EDL and Counter-Jihad Challenge", *Chatham House Briefing Paper*, March.

Gottlieb, J.: (2000), *Feminine Fascism*, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London and New York.

GrrrGraphics, "Ben Garrison Brexit Original Cartoon", retrieved from <https://grrrgraphics.wordpress.com/2016/07/08/ben-garrison-brexit-original-cartoon-on-ebay/>, on 08.02.2018.

Guiora, A.: (2014), *Tolerating Intolerance: The Price of Protecting Extremism*, Oxford University Press, New York.

Hafez, F.: (2016), "Comparing Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: The State of the Field", *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, Vol: 3, Issue: 2.

Hainsworth, P.: (2000), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, Pinter, London.

Hall, N.: (02.05.2016), "What does Tommy Robinson's anti-Islam Group Want?", retrieved from <http://www.newsweek.com/tommy-robinson-edl-pegida-uk-423623>, on 09.02.2018.

Harrison, S.: and Bruter, M., (2011), *Mapping Extreme Right Ideology: An Empirical Geography of the European Extreme Right*, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Herkman, J.: (2017), "Articulations of Populism: The Nordic Case", *Cultural Studies Journal*, Vol: 31, Issue: 4.

Heywood, A.: (2013), *Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, Fourth Edition, London.

Hewitt, C.: (2003), *Understanding Terrorism in America: From the Klan to al Qaeda*, Routledge, London and New York.

Hitchens, A., and Standing, E.: (2010), *Blood and Honour: Britain's Far-Right Militants*, The Centre for Social Cohesion, London.

Homeland Security Training Institute: (2018), "Domestic Terrorism: The Lone-Wolf Threat", retrieved from http://www.cod.edu/hsti/classes/domestic_terrorism.aspx, on 08.01.2018.

Husbands, C.: (2011), “The Situation of the Extreme Right in Great Britain”, in (ed.) Langenbacher, N., and Schellenberg, B., *Is Europe on the Right Path?*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Ignazi, P.: (1995), “The Re-emergence of the Extreme Right in Europe”, *Institut für Höhere Studien Reihe Politikwissenschaft*, No: 21.

Ignazi, P.: (2003), *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Inglehart, R.: (1997), *Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Jackson, P.: (2014), “National Action and National Socialism for the 21st Century”, *Journal for Deradicalization*, Vol: 15.

Jamin, J.: (2014), “The Ideology of the British National Party”, retrieved from <http://journals.openedition.org/lisa/7041>, on 14.03.2018.

John, P., and others: (2009), *BNP: The Roots of Its Appeal*, Democratic Audit Human Rights Centre, Essex.

Judiciary of England and Wales: (23.11.2016), “Thomas Mair: Sentencing Remarks of Mr. Justice Wilkie”.

Kalmar, I.: (2017), “Is Islamophobia the New anti-Semitism?”, *SETA Analysis*, No: 27.

Kalmar, I., and Ramadan, T.: (2016), “Antisemitism and Islamophobia”, in (ed.) Meri, J.: *Routledge Handbook of Muslim-Jewish Relations*, Routledge, New York and London.

Kassam, R.: (14.01.2016), “Exclusive: UKIP Drops London Assembly Candidate Anne Marie Waters for Pegida UK Link”, retrieved from <http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/14/exclusive-ukip-drops-pegida-member-anne-marie-waters-from-london-assembly-list/>, on 09.02.2018.

Kassimeris, G., and Jackson, L.: (2015), “The Ideology and Discourse of the EDL: Not Racist, Not Violent, Just Lo Longer Silent”, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol: 17.

Kitschelt, H.: (1995), *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, University of Michigan Press, Michigan.

Koehler, D.: (2016), "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future", *PRISM*, Vol: 6, Issue: 2.

Leese, A.: (1938), *Jewish Ritual Murder*, The I.F.L. Printing and Publishing Company, London.

Lowles, N.: (05.03.2018), "The Threat of Right-Wing Terror is As High as Ever", retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/state-of-hate_uk_5a9d5c6de4b0479c025562d1, on 07.03.2018.

Lusher, A.: (20.06.2017), "Finsbury Park: Right-Wing Extremists React to Attack on Muslims by Urging UK to Cast Islam out of Country", retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/finsbury-park-attack-muslims-islam-right-wing-extremists-response-uk-a7799901.html>, on 11.01.2018.

Maxwell, J.: (2012), *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach*, SAGE Publications, Third Edition, Virginia.

McCauley, C., and Moskalenko, S.: (2011), *Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York.

McKee, A.: (2003), *Textual Analysis: A Beginner's Guide*, SAGE Publications, London.

MI5, "Terrorism", retrieved from <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/terrorism>, on 12.04.2018.

Minkenberg, M.: (2013), "The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and East: Trends, Patterns and Challenges", in (ed.) Melzer, R., and Serafin, S., *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin.

Mohammadi, M., and Nourbakhsh, S.: (2017), "Examining the Social Basis of the Far Right Parties in Europe", *Journal of World Socio-Political Studies*, Vol: 1, No: 1.

Mosley, O.: (1946), *Tomorrow We Live*, Greater Britain Publication, Eighth Edition.

Mudde, C.: (1996), "The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family", *West European Politics*, Vol: 19, Issue: 2.

Mudde, C.: (2000), *The Ideology of Extreme Right*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Mudde, C.: (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Mudde, C.: (2016), “The Study of Populist Radical Right Parties: Towards a Fourth Wave”, *C-REX Working Paper Series*, No: 1.

Mudde, C., and Kaltwasser, C.: (2013), “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing the Contemporary Europe and Latin America”, *Government and Opposition Journal*, Vol: 48, Issue: 2.

Murdoch, J., and others: (09.06.2017), “Election 2017: How the UK Voted in 7 Charts”, retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/dac3a3b2-4ad7-11e7-919a-1e14ce4af89b>, on 03.04.2018.

Muslims in Britain (16.09.2017), “UK Mosque Statistics/Masjid Statistics”, retrieved from http://www.muslimsinbritain.org/resources/masjid_report.pdf, on 04.05.2018.

Nagesh, A.: (14.09.2017), “Here are the Far-Right Extremist Groups Spreading Hate in Britain” retrieved from <http://metro.co.uk/2017/09/14/here-are-the-far-right-extremist-groups-still-operating-in-the-uk-6926869/>, on 21.02.2018.

Neumann, P.: (2017), *Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation*, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Vienna.

Oaten, A.: (2014), “The Cult of the Victim: An Analysis of the Collective Identity of English Defence League”, *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol: 48, Issue: 4.

Osborne, S.: (20.09.2016), “Nicolas Sarkozy says Immigrants should ‘Speak French’ and Attacks ‘Medieval’ Burkini”, retrieved from <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nicolas-sarkozy-president-immigrants-should-speak-french-attacks-medieval-burkini-a7318016.html>, on 18.02.2018.

Oxford Online Dictionary, “Definitions for Extreme and Radical”, retrieved from <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/>, on 12.02.2018.

Pegida UK, “Position Paper (Manifesto) Pegida”, retrieved from <http://ukrants.co.uk/pdf/Pegida-Position-Paper-English-Translation.pdf>, on 08.02.2018.

Perraudin, F.: (20.10.2014), “Man Jailed for anti-Semitic Tweet to Labour MP”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/20/man-jailed-antisemitic-tweet-labour-mp>, on 13.02.2018.

Phillips, M.: (10.03.2011), “Windrush Passengers”, retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/windrush_01.shtml, on 20.03.2018.

Pisoiu, D., and Ahmed, R.: (2016), “*Capitalizing on Fear: The Rise of Right-Wing Populist Movements in Western Europe*”, in OSCE Yearbook 2015, Baden-Baden.

Prowe, D.: (1994), “Classic Fascism and the New Radical Right in Western Europe: Comparisons and Contrasts”, *Contemporary European History*, Vol: 3, Issue: 3.

Ramalingam, V.: (2012), “The Rise of the Radical Right in Europe”, in (ed.) Goodwin, M., *New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe*, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Richards, A.: (30.03.2015), “Enoch Powell: What was the Rivers of Blood Speech?”, retrieved from <https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/enoch-powell-what-rivers-blood-8945556>, on 22.03.2018.

Royal Air Force Museum, “Windrush and After”, retrieved from <https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/research/online-exhibitions/pilots-of-the-caribbean/legacy/windrush-and-after.aspx>, on 20.03.2018.

Rushton, K.: (19.06.2017), “Far-Right Celebrates Finsbury Park”, retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4619646/Far-Right-celebrate-Finsbury-Park-attack-online.html>, on 11.01.2018.

Rydgren, J.: (2007), “Sociology of the Radical Right”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol: 33.

Saady, A.: (24.03.2017), “The Far-Right’s Lone-Wolfs vs. Daesh’s Lone-Wolfs”, retrieved from <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-far-right-s-lone-wolves-vs-daesh-s-lone-wolves-5915>, on 08.01.2018.

Schmitt, C.: (2007), *The Concept of the Political*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.

Slawson, N.: (18.06.2016), “Jo Cox Murder Accused Gives Name as Death to Traitors, Freedom for Britain”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jun/18/jo-cox-murder-suspect-thomas-mair-told-police-he-was-political-activist>, on 13.02.2018.

Spaaij, R.: (2010), “The Enigma of Lone-Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment”, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol: 33, Issue: 9.

Spaaij, R.: (2012), *Understanding Lone-Wolf Terrorism*, Springer, London and New York.

Talk Politics: (20.04.2017), “History of UKIP, Put Simply”, retrieved from <https://talk-politics.com/2017/04/20/history-of-ukip-put-simply/>, on 26.03.2018.

Tarrow, S.: (1994), *Power in Movement*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Taylor, M.: (28.05.2010), “EDL: Inside the Violent World of Britain’s New Far Right”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/may/28/english-defence-league-guardian-investigation>, on 16.02.2018.

Taylor, R.: (15.04.2017), “History of the Far Right in Britain”, retrieved from <https://resistinghate.org/history-of-the-far-right-in-britain/>, on 23.02.2018.

Telegraph: (05.09.2017), “What is National Action and Why is the Neo-Nazi Group Banned?”, retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/national-action-neo-nazi-group-banned/>, on 12.02.2018.

The Economist: (14.07.2005), “The Enemy Within”, retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/4174660>, on 11.01.2018.

The Muslim News, “Record Number of Muslim MPs Elected”, retrieved from <http://muslimnews.co.uk/newspaper/home-news/record-number-muslim-mps-elected/>, on 04.05.2018.

The Spectator: (20.09.2013), “Nigel Farage’s Speech at the UKIP Conference”, retrieved from <https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2013/09/nigel-farages-speech-full-text-and-audio/>, on 29.03.2018.

The Week: (22.07.2014), “Adam Walker: Banned Teacher Becomes New BNP Leader”, retrieved from <http://www.theweek.co.uk/people/59592/adam-walker-banned-teacher-becomes-new-bnp-leader>, on 03.04.2018.

The Week: (03.01.2018), “National Action Arrests: What is the Far-Right Hate Group and Why is it Banned?”, retrieved from <http://www.theweek.co.uk/terrorism/88333/national-action-profile-of-a-neo-nazi-terror-group>, on 13.02.2018.

Thurlow, R.: (1998), *Fascism in Britain*, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London and New York.

Tilles, D.: (10.10.2011), “The Myth of Cable Street”, retrieved from <https://www.historytoday.com/daniel-tilles/myth-cable-street>, on 20.03.2018.

Tomlin, S.: (2011), *The Fanatics: Fighting for Race and Nation: A Wake up Call to Those Who Ignore the Rise of the Far Right*, Hakon Books, Fourth Edition.

UK Home Office: (2017), “Proscribed Terrorist Organizations”.

UKIP: (2015), “Valuing Our Christian Heritage”.

UKIP: (2017), “Britain Together Manifesto”.

UKIP: (2018), “About”, retrieved from <http://www.ukip.org/about>, on 29.03.2018.

UKIP Daily: (21.01.2017), “An Economic Policy to Win Elections”, retrieved from <https://www.ukipdaily.com/economic-policy-win-elections/>, on 09.02.2018.

UKIP Mid Dorset and North Poole: (21.05.2016), “UKIP: A Brief History”, retrieved from <http://www.ukipmiddorset.org/ukip-a-brief-history-2/>, on 30.03.2018.

UK Office for National Statistics, “2011 Census”, retrieved from <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion>, on 04.05.2018.

University of California, “Textual Analysis and Interpretation”, retrieved from <https://senate.ucsc.edu/committees/cep-committee-on-educational-policy/ge-requirements/textual-analysis-interpretation.html>, on 02.04.2018.

University of Southern California: (2010), “Organizing Your Social Sciences Research Paper: Writing a Case Study”, <http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/casestudy>, on 21.02.2018.

Vale, P.: (03.09.2014), “Nigel Farage Tells Fox News’s Sean Hannity That Britain Should Combat ISIS with ‘Judeo-Christian’ Values”, retrieved from https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/09/02/nigel-farage-tells-fox-news-sean-hannity-britain-is-a-judeo-christian-country_n_5756650.html, on 28.03.2018.

Walker, J.: (28.04.2017), “UKIP Leader Paul Nuttall says History Will Prove him Right about Burqa Ban”, retrieved from <https://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/ukip-leader-paul-nuttall-says-12961889>, on 29.03.2018.

Walker, P.: (18.02.2018), “UKIP’s Gerard Batten Reiterates His Belief that Islam is a Death Cult”, retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/feb/18/ukip-gerard-batten-islam-muslims-quran>, on 28.03.2018.

Winter, A., and Mondon, A.: (17.08.2017), “Normalized Hate”, retrieved from <https://jacobinmag.com/2017/08/islamophobia-racism-uk-far-right>, on 11.01.2018.

Worthing UKIP, “Fair, Balanced Migration”, retrieved from <http://www.worthingukip.org/ukips-manifesto/fair-balanced-migration>, on 11.01.2018.

Zaslove, A.: (2017), “The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right”, *Journal of European Integration*, Vol: 26, Issue: 1.



SHORT BIOGRAPHY

Hacı Mehmet Boyraz completed his undergraduate education in International Relations (major) and Political Science & Public Administration (double-major) departments in 2016 at Katip Çelebi University. Since then, he has been continuing his Master studies in the European and International Affairs programme at Turkish-German University. His research interests cover: Cyprus peace negotiations, extreme right formations in Europe, Turkey-EU relations and Turkish foreign policy. E-mail: boyrazhacimehmet@gmail.com

