

T.C.
TURKISH-GERMAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

**A NEW MOMENTUM FOR THE COMMON SECURITY
AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EU: ANALYSIS OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENCE FIELD**

MASTER'S THESIS

Canan UZUNTAŞ

ADVISOR

Prof. Dr. Hartmut MARHOLD

İSTANBUL, June 2019

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
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ÖZET

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ORTAK GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI'NDA YENİ BİR İVMELENME: SAVUNMA ALANINDAKİ SON GELİŞMELERİN ANALİZİ

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, 2016 yılında Avrupa Birliği tarafından açıklanan – Birliğin Küresel Stratejisini de içeren- kapsamlı yeni savunma paketi sonrası savunma alanındaki son gelişmelere paralel olarak Avrupa Birliği Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nda yeni bir ivmelenme olup olmadığını incelemektir. Bu çalışmanın kapsamı; i) güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki egemen aktörler arasında işbirliği ve entegrasyon olasılığının teorik olarak incelenmesi; ii) savunma ve güvenlik alanında daha kapsamlı ve tatmin edici bir işbirliği ve entegrasyonun kurulmasını önleyen Avrupa Birliği üye ülkeleri arasında tehdit algısı veya stratejik kültür gibi bazı konularda temel ayrılıkların analizi; iii) son dönemde yaşanan güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki gelişmelerin iç ve dış etkenlerinin belirlenmesi; iv) 2016 yılında başlatılan Avrupa Birliği'nin Küresel Stratejisi doğrultusunda, savunma alanındaki işbirliğini ve entegrasyonu artırmak amacıyla başlatılan ana girişimlerin -- Avrupa Savunma Fonu (EDF), Savunmanın Koordineli Yıllık İncelemesi (CARD), Daimi Yapılandırılmış İşbirliği (PESCO), and Askeri Planlama ve Uygulama Kapasitesi (MPCC)- amaç ve yapılarının detaylandırılması şeklindedir. Bu çalışmada neorealizm, neoliberal kurumsalcılık ve yapısalcılık teorilerinden faydalanılmış, ayrıca teorik çerçeve olarak kabul edilmeyen ancak güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki gelişmeleri açıklamak için yaygın olarak incelenen Avrupa Birliği üye devletleri arasındaki ikili ilişkiler ile belirli dış faktörlerin etkileri teorik çerçeve başlığı altında kısaca incelenmiştir. Çalışmada kullanılan başlıca araştırma metodları ikincil veri analizidir ve nitel içerik analizidir. Elde edilen bilgiler ve yapılan değerlendirmeler sonucunda, Avrupa Birliği Ortak

Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası'nda yeni bir ivmelenmenin yaşandığı sonucuna varılmıştır; i) Avrupa Birliği üye devletleri belirlenen Küresel Strateji doğrultusunda ve kötüleşen jeopolitik çevrenin etkisiyle belirli konularda süregelen ayrılıklara rağmen Güvenlik ve Savunma alanında daha fazla işbirliğine destek vermişlerdir; ii) son birkaç yıldaki iç ve dış dinamikler incelendiğinde Güvenlik ve Savunma alanında daha etkin iş birliği için oldukça uygun bir dönem olduğu belirlenmiştir, iii) son üç yıl içerisinde faaliyete geçirilen savunma alanındaki girişimlere katılımın gönüllülük esasına bağlı olmasına rağmen çoğu üye devlet tarafından katılım sağlanmıştır ve bu da üye devletlerin bu alanda daha fazla iş birliği ve entegrasyonu bu iddiali girişimlere katılarak desteklediklerini göstermişlerdir.

Anahtar Kelime: Brexit, OGSP, Avrupa Birliği, İç ve Dış Faktörler, Küresel Strateji, Girişim, Önce NATO, Siyasi İrade, Güvenlik ve Savunma, Stratejik Özerklik.

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ABSTRACT

A NEW MOMENTUM FOR THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EU: ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENCE FIELD

The main objective of this study is to examine whether or not there is a new momentum in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU in line with the recent developments in defence field after the launch of the comprehensive defence package - including its Global Strategy- by the European Union in 2016. The scope of this study includes; i) the theoretical examination of the likelihood of cooperation and integration among sovereign actors in the security and defence field; ii) the analysis of the fundamental divergences in certain issues such as threat perception or strategic culture between European Union member states which have prevented the establishment of more comprehensive and satisfactory cooperation and integration in the field of defence and security in previous years; iii) the identification of internal and external drivers of recent developments in defence field; iv) the elaboration of the aims and structures of the main initiatives –namely European Defence Fund (EDF), Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the Military Planning and Conduct Capacity (MPCC)– that have been launched so as to increase cooperation and integration in defence field, which is in line with the Global Strategy of the European Union launched in 2016. In this study, neorealism, liberal institutionalism and structuralism were applied to conceptualize the developments within a theoretical framework, as well as the impacts of bilateral relations between certain European Union member states and certain external factors, which are not widely accepted as theoretical frameworks but commonly studied to explain the developments in security and defence, were briefly examined under the title of the

theoretical framework. The main research methods used in the study are *secondary data analysis* and *qualitative content analysis*. In the light of the data collected and evaluations made, it has been concluded that the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union has undergone a new momentum; i) due to the deterioration of its geopolitical environment, the European Union member states seem to have been supporting further cooperation in the field of Security and Defence in accordance with its Global Strategy despite certain long-lasting conflicts in various issues; ii) when certain internal and external dynamics in the last few years are examined, it has been deduced that it is a very suitable period for more effective cooperation in the security and defence field; iii) although participation in defence initiatives launched in the last three years is based on voluntariness, most of the member states have participated in ambitious initiatives, which shows that deeper cooperation and further integration in this area are supported by most of the EU member states.

Keywords: Brexit, CSDP, European Union, Global Strategy, Initiative, Internal and External Factors, NATO First, Political Will, Security and Defence, Strategic Autonomy.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

AfD	: Alternative für Deutschland
CARD	: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CDP	: Capability Development Plan
CFSP	: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMPD	: Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	: Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	: Common Security and Defence Policy
DG EUMS	: Director General of European Union Military Staff
EC	: European Community
ECSC	: European Coal and Steel Community
EDAP	: European Defence Action Plan
EDA	: European Defence Agency
EDC	: European Defence Community
EDF	: European Defence Fund
EDTIB	: European Defence Technological and Industrial Base
EEAS	: European External Action Service
EPC	: European Political Community
ESDP	: European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	: European Security Strategy
EU	: European Union
EUGS	: Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy
EUMC	: European Union Military Committee
EUMS	: European Union Military Staff
EUTM	: European Union Training Mission

FN	: Front National Party
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
G7	: Group of Seven
HR / VP	: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of Commission
JSCC	: Joint Support Coordination Cell
MPCC	: Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIP	: National Implementation Plan
OHQ	: Operational Headquarter
OPCEN	: Operations Center
PESCO	: Permanent Structured Cooperation
pMS	: Participating Member States
PSC	: Political and Security Committee
PVV	: Party for Freedom
SMEs	: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
US / USA	: United States / United States of America
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	: Western European Union
WWII	: World War II

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

“It is the most basic and universal of rights to feel safe and secure in your own home. [...] True security starts at home,” (Juncker 2017).

The European Union (EU), one of the leading international organizations established after the Second World War (WWII), has developed successful policies in several areas, i.e. economic policies, enlargement policy, agricultural policy. The EU member states have managed integration in most of these policy areas. Security and defence issues have also been at the table of European countries even before the establishment of the *European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*; yet, it has been one of the most hotly debated subjects among the EU (current name) member states and the EU organs up until today. Some attempts to develop the defence and security policy at satisfactory extent have been made a few times within the Community and the EU system, but because of either certain internal or external factors, the urge to develop a defence and security policy that can satisfy and meet the expectations of the certain member states or the EU organs in this field has been stifled at distinct moments of the European Union integration history.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, new global and regional developments have triggered the instincts that have been suppressed for a long time because of the inconvenience of the atmosphere -mainly political one- in Europe and in the transatlantic world. Currently, some of the EU member states in line with the EU organs have been stressing the need for more enhanced European Security and Defence Policy as Europe's security environment has experienced severe deterioration in just a short span of time. The external challenges such as the annexation of Crimea by Russia, election of Trump administration in the USA, global terrorism, illegal migration, and failed states, together with the internal challenges such as Brexit or migration crisis within the EU are some of the main variables that have encouraged some of the leading EU member states such as

Germany and France -supported by the EU organs - to be more eager and resolved in creating a more effective policy in this area. In 2016, the EU adopted the EU Security and Defence package comprising three pillars: 1) the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS); 2) the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); and 3) "a common set of 42 proposals for the implementation of the Joint Declaration signed [by the EU and NATO], which gives a new impetus to EU-NATO cooperation" (European Commission 2017c, parag 13-15). The main objectives of the future security and defence policy of the EU are defined with this EU Security and Defence package.

This research study will be conducted to examine not only the long-lasting challenges that have blocked the deeper integration and formation of the European Security and Defence Union but also the recent internal and external drivers that motivate -or force- the EU to revise its current defence and security policy. In addition, the ambitious initiatives that have been launched in accordance with the EUGS, the strategy that replaced the *European Security Strategy* adopted in 2003, will be scrutinized in order to find out whether it's a new momentum for the EU to finally achieve its long-standing goals in this field.

1.1. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY

After the Cold War period was over, everybody thought that the period of wars is over. Bipolar world system that brought world to the edge of nuclear wars ended, the communist ideology was defeated, ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy was admitted by all, and the remaining single world power, the USA, which has been accepted as the leading representative of the Western norms and ideals, would be the source of peace and democracy as it promoted and ensured them on the European land after WWII (Fukuyama 1989, 3-4). However, the positive vision for the future of the world has been broken into pieces after the 9/11 attacks at Twin Towers. *War on Terrorism* started and since then, security and defence have once more become the main concern for the whole world, including the EU. At present, the EU seems to be on the verge of a new momentum to develop a successful, satisfying defence and security policy that can allow the EU to become the global security provider as suggested in the EUGS.

Although several researches and analyses have been made on this subject beforehand, the adoption of the new Security Strategy and related initiatives recently developed in accordance with this strategy necessitate more studies to be conducted in this field in the light of these recent developments so as to give insights to policy makers and decision makers within the EU about the current and prospective impacts of their decisions and acts. The principal goal of this study is to analyze whether it is the high time for the EU to develop the CSDP to an extent that can satisfy all its expectations in security and defence field.

What this study will not include are NATO's internal problems, internal issues the USA has to deal with after Trump's election, or Brexit's political, or economic impacts on the EU, or the UK itself. The study will cover global terrorism and failed states as some of the external factors shaping the EU's security and defence policy, but it will not dive into the details of the Middle Eastern problem or its prospective solutions. In brief, this study will focus on the security and defence problems around the world as long as they have an impact on the security and defence policy of the EU.

1.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS

This study addresses the following main question and sub-questions regarding the current and future European security and defence policy in terms of its historical development, the challenges that have blocked deeper integration in this field until today, as well as the external and internal factors that have affected and shaped the CSDP:

Main Question: Is it a new momentum in developing the common security and defence policy of the EU?

The main sub-questions are stated below:

- 1) What are the challenges that have hindered deeper integration in security and defence policy?
- 2) What are the current external and internal drivers of recent developments in security and defence field?

- 3) What are the central features of the new initiatives recently developed in this field?
- 4) How does a renewal in the security and defence policy shape the future of the EU?

1.3. METHODOLOGY

This study is based on two research methods which are secondary data analysis and qualitative content analysis.

One of the two research methods that is used in this article is secondary data analysis, which is defined by Bryman (2012) as “the analysis of data by researchers who will probably not have been involved in the collection of those data, for purposes that in all likelihood were not envisaged by those responsible for the data collection” (p. 312). Due to the several advantages of the secondary data analysis, such as cost and time benefits, high-quality of collected data, opportunities for longitudinal analysis and some other advantages, it is a highly preferred method in the fields of social sciences (Bryman 2012, 313). However, this research method has some limitations. For instance, the researcher is not familiar with the data as s/he is not part of the data collection process, or the complexity of the data stemming from the abundance of variables or respondents, which makes it difficult for the researcher to deal with (Bryman 2012, 315). This study is based on a variety of resources. The researcher covered several primary documents such as official reports, speeches, or declarations as well as secondary resources such as academic or newspaper articles on EU’s defence and security policy, on its history as well as on the related actors and their prospective attitudes towards the developments in this field.

As this study is based on primary and secondary data obtained from various documents, qualitative content analysis, a qualitative research method, is the other method that is appropriate to analyze the themes and make interpretations of these various kinds of texts. Qualitative content analysis is a method that analyzes the documents and texts in a systematic and replicable manner. Holsti (as cited in Bryman 2012, 289) defines content

analysis as “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages’.” Bryman states that this method helps reader to analyze both manifest and latent content in the texts. As well as these advantages of the method, it is important that such an analysis provides data for the researchers about social groups which are not easy to have access (Bryman 2012, 289-290).

1.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

One of the limitations of this study is that everything changes really fast in the international system, mainly because there are too many sovereign actors in that system. For instance, the relationship between the EU and the USA was favorable before Trump’s election, but after his presidency started, the tensions started to be observed related to several subjects such as climate change, nuclear weapon production, etc. It means that analysis about cooperation possibility between the USA and the EU would reach totally different conclusion before and after Trump’s election. As a small change in one variable can affect the whole process of the development of a new policy, the conclusions that the researcher reaches can be slightly or highly different from the future realities. To eliminate this drawback of the study, information collected by the researcher needs to be perpetually updated. In that way, the risk of reaching invalid conclusions can be eliminated to a great extent.

Another limitation of the study is that the researcher can include only certain variables that affect the situation that is under scrutiny. However, the variables the researcher excludes can have some decisive impacts on the subject examined. The time and space limitation together with the other limitations of variables cause some defects in the study. Yet, it is still valuable to work on the main variables and analyze elaborately the situation in definite time and space line. Focusing on certain time and space line helps the reader to give more details about the subject. As a master thesis, this study does not aim to be exhaustive as its scope is limited to certain variables about the subject.

Additionally, the research data used is acquired from primary or secondary documents. Yet, several other effective data collection methods such as interview are excluded. By including documents from a wide range of sources, the impact of this drawback is also tried to be alleviated. Despite certain limitations, this study will contribute to its field by providing an analytical and structured evaluation of a conflictual issue within the EU and highlights some significant aspects necessary for conceptualizing the current developments in security and defence field.

1.5. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS

This study consists of eight chapters. The first introduction chapter gives information about the research topic, explains the rationale of the study, states the main research question and sub-questions, defines the methodology applied during data collection and suggests the potential limitations for the study. The second chapter gives brief information about the history of the cooperative and integrative developments related to the European security and defence policy. Third chapter discusses the possibility of further cooperation and integration in security and defence field within a theoretical framework and clarifies the conditions under which they are possible according to theories covered in this study. In the fourth chapter, the researcher reviews the long-lasting challenges having blocked deeper integration in this field. The fifth chapter concisely examines the current external and internal factors that have motivated recent developments in the security and defence field. In the sixth chapter, the researcher scrutinizes recently launched initiatives, namely the *European Defence Fund (EDF)*, the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)*, the *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)* and the *Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)*, which should be regarded as the concrete representatives of the willingness of the EU member states for deeper integration in security and defence field. The seventh chapter reviews the prospective three scenarios prepared by the Commission on the future of the CSDP in line with the current developments in the security and defence field. In the final chapter, the researcher discusses the data collected and analyzed, and shares the conclusions reached.

CHAPTER 2

2. BACKGROUND OF THE CSDP

Devastated after brutal, deadly World War II (WWII), European countries had to find a way to prevent prospective wars and promote peace on their territory in the following years. The solution was found in cooperation rather than in combating one another. The European countries decided to cooperate step by step in various fields, of which most successful and fruitful one was achieved in the economic cooperation called the *European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)*, regarded as the locomotive of European integration. In fact, the attempts for collaboration in defence and security field dates before the establishment of the ECSC, and has been most hotly debated subject thenceforth among the EU (current name) member states and the EU organs. Various failed or unsatisfactory attempts have been made for full integration and further advance in defence and security field up until now. To understand the current initiatives and the likelihood of their success or failure, the former attempts and their progress should be examined briefly so as to discuss all these developments within a historical context.

2.1. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

The post-Second World War period, when each country was seeking an alliance to cooperate with like-minded countries, was highly chaotic. Not only the losers of the war, mainly Germany and its allies, but also the winners of the war suffered from economic, political, or social problems. A comprehensive reconstruction was required in all fields in each country, especially in the European countries, of which territories had been the real battleground. The two winners of the World War II, the USA and the Soviet Union became the two hegemon countries shaping the new world order. The USA, due to its geographical advantage, was not affected by the war seriously, and its economy was quite good in comparison to its European allies. It took the leading role in

reconstruction of mainly the Western Europe, but had to do that within an institutional framework, so the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* was established. The North Atlantic Treaty (also known as Washington Treaty) was signed by 12 countries, namely Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, on April 4th, 1949 with three main purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration” (NATO, parag. 1). Its core function was collective self defence which was expressed within the famous Article 5th of the North Atlantic Treaty:

“[A]n armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and [...] if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, [...] will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, [...] including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 2009, parag. 8).

As new countries like Turkey joined NATO, it increased its sphere of influence and power. However, the accession of the West Germany to NATO triggered the Warsaw Pact, which was established by the Soviet Union against NATO in 1955. As a result, the block structure came out and the Berlin Wall, the symbol of the so-called Iron Curtain, was erupted in 1961. As NATO was providing security and ensuring collective defence for its member states, the European countries were able to focus on their economic and political developments (NATO parag. 9). Unlike several failed or ineffective attempts in the field of defence after post-war period, NATO has been the most successful and prominent, also the longest living international organization in the field of defence. Even if the Cold War is over, NATO has survived as it updated its functions and targets according to the renewed security environment of its member states (Warren 2010, 37).

2.2. EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY (EDC)

At the dawn of post-Second World War period, everybody was convinced that Europe needed to be reconstructed in several areas and tangible steps needed to be taken immediately. Reconstruction of the economy in European countries as well as the

prevention of Soviet expansion and of German reindustrialization -which could result in German rearmament- were among the main concerns (Smith 2002, 38). Despite the establishment of transatlantic defence organization NATO in 1949, collective European defence together with economic reconstruction remained as the strategic key areas the European countries decided to enhance their cooperation with each other.

While Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman initiated the economic integration through the ECSC, Jean Monnet suggested defence cooperation to be launched within a supranational structure as in the case of the ECSC. In accordance with this call for supranational defence cooperation, French Prime Minister Rene Pleven presented a project known as *Pleven Plan*, proposing an integrated “European army to be placed under supranational authority and [...] funded by a common budget” (EDA (a), parag 5). It was supposed to contribute to the European integration and to the cooperation with NATO (External Relations 2017, parag. 2).

In 1952, the *Treaty of the European Community* was signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to found the *European Defence Community (EDC)*, but it never entered into force as the French National Assembly, the very same country which proposed the establishment of the EDC in 1952, rejected to ratify the Treaty in 1954 (EDA (a), parag. 9). As the external threats, namely the end of Korean War and the death of Stalin, who was regarded as the main source of Russian aggression at that time, together with the sovereignty concern of French Gaullists and reluctance for German rearmament, resulted in the rejection of the ratification of the Treaty at the French National Assembly (CVCE.EU 2016, 2). In other words, France changed its approach to the idea of the establishment of the EDC as soon as the internal and external factors that forced French officials to propose *Pleven Plan* disappeared, which has been a repeated reaction until now.

2.3. FOUCHET PLAN

France, the country which submitted and rejected its own plan -*Pleven Plan*- for the creation of the European army under a supranational authority, submitted another

project that suggested the creation of a European security and defence institution after serious discussions with other member states. Prepared in 1961 by Christian Fouchet, the French ambassador to Denmark, *the Fouchet Plan* aimed at creating an intergovernmental institution rather than a supranational one as Pleven Plan promised. The main incentive for this initiative was that the USA wanted to “retain control of the launch of nuclear weapons,” a demand which seemed unreasonable for France, who was highly critical of extreme US dependency and promoted “a united European position under French leadership,” which would ensure France the privileged position it had always desired (Teasdale 2016, 10). France, who is always inclined to prioritize its sovereignty, especially under General de Gaulle’s authority, submitted and supported Fouchet Plan, which was anti-Atlanticist and intergovernmental, putting “the member states at the center of decision-making process” (External Relations 2017, parag. 3). Claiming that Europe should not be dependent on the USA for defence issues, General de Gaulle definitely had political aim in his mind: He wanted France to regain its full sovereignty and become the new leader of European countries in the international arena. He believed that European countries needed to take more active role in global issues as a united, powerful group (Teasdale 2016, 7). However, Fouchet Plan also failed to establish the ambitious European defence body that France dreamed of, mostly because of the fact that other member states were still relying highly on their Atlantic partners and enjoyed their protection for so long that they did not want to jeopardize that relationship (External Relations 2017, parag. 3). Whenever the USA has had a crisis with its European allies, the European member states have been motivated to retain their independence in defence field, but the moment these problems settle down, the incentive disappears and the former NATO dependent situation is admitted once more by European countries.

2.4. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

The supranationally designed *European Defence Community*, of which establishment was promoted by Britain and the USA, failed in 1954, so Britain offered to incorporate West Germany and Italy to the intergovernmental structure based on the Treaty of Brussels, signed by France, Britain, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg in March,

1948. With the Modified Brussels Treaty, signed in 1954, a new international organization including West Germany and Italy together with the original five countries was created: *Western European Union* (WEU), which replaced the Western Union of 1948 (WEU, parag. 1-6).

Even if its defence aspects were depicted as its main elements, the WEU mostly involved in monitoring the disarmament of West Germany rather than collective defence issue. The collective European defence was provided within NATO framework while the WEU was more like a contributing agency of NATO in defence aspects and of European Community (EC) in civilian aspects, which put it in a secondary role in European integration process. Accepted merely as a forum to discuss certain issues rather than as an important international organization whose potential was overshadowed by the presence of NATO and the EC, the WEU gained more prominence when the USA shifted its attention to non-European threats such as terrorist attacks and asked for more burden-sharing with its European allies in 1980s. France, Belgium, Germany, and Italy suggested using the WEU as a platform to discuss the matters about how to promote peace, ensure deterrence and strengthen European defence and stability. Along with the NATO framework, the WEU framework was supposed to be at work to develop more efficient defence and security policies in Europe. Revival of the WEU symbolized that the previous European defence ideal was alive although it was left aside for a long time and brought back to the table whenever the European integration was triggered in other fields. Certain European member states have declared several times that “the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did not include security and defence” (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011, 12-16).

2.4.1. Petersberg Tasks – Maastricht Treaty, 1992

As the WEU, which mostly had supplementary role in collective self defence provided by NATO with reference to Article 5th of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, attracted the attention of European countries in 1980s, so new roles and competences were attributed to WEU gradually. The most significant role

attributed to WEU was what makes European Union a normative power today. Current normative power of the EU shaped with Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 when the *Petersberg Tasks* that include the elements of soft power rather than hard power were stated as new tasks supposed to be undertaken by the WEU: “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” (WEU Council of Ministers 1992, 4).

Why did the European countries decide to integrate more in 1992? One of the primary reasons was definitely the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which necessitated the revision of threat perception resting mainly upon Russian aggression during the Cold War period. As the Cold War period was over and new security environment came out, the USA asked for more responsibility and burden sharing from the European countries; therefore, the EU decided to undertake new roles in security and defence field (External Relations 2017, parag. 5). While NATO remained as the military source of power for defence, the WEU acted mostly as the soft power undertaking actions in the name of European countries such as organizing and coordinating some European-led military operations i.e. the one at the time of the Iraq-Iran war, as well as assisting to the enforcement of some UN sanctions and to some humanitarian actions. However, the WEU also began to lose its prominence after a while, and its competences started to be gradually pooled into the European Union in accordance with the Nice Treaty signed in 2001. The WEU was incorporated into the newly established European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) step by step, and its final offices were closed in 2011, a process finalized with the Lisbon Treaty (Bailes and Messervy-Whiting 2011, 4-17).

2.5. COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)

While the economic reconstruction was achieved within one single framework, the ECSC, which was only updated and its scope was enlarged under different names but the same institution survived until today, several unsatisfactory -also failed- initiatives with different structures –supranational or intergovernmental- have been put forward in security and defence field at different times after WWII, primarily because of varying priorities and views about the purposes of these initiatives. There were differences in

threat perception and in strategic cultures of the member states that hindered them from integrating deeper in this field (Meyer 2004, 8). However, these divergences have never stopped European member states from seeking common grounds for effective cooperation in this field, especially in 1990s after the Soviet threat disappeared, and the need for NATO dominance in defence field diminished. The demand for more cooperation in defence and security matters was substantiated with the Maastricht Treaty which created three pillars, one of which was *Common Foreign and Security Policy* that replaced the *European Political Cooperation (EPC)*, which was founded in 1970 to establish a common foreign policy of the EC members in various fields except defence and security field as they were regarded within the competence of the nation states. With the Maastricht Treaty, the scope of foreign policy expanded and included defence and security areas as it aimed that the EC members would follow a common foreign policy in all fields in the international arena. The CFSP has an intergovernmental structure, in which the decisions are taken by consensus (Mix 2013, 2-3). Even though a common European defence was not established with the Maastricht Treaty, it has laid its foundations.

2.6. ST. MALO DECLARATION

While the WEU was bestowed upon new tasks and competences with the Maastricht Treaty, both Yugoslavia War in 1991 and the Kosovo War that broke out in 1998 shown that the EU, which was famous for its normative power, could not stop the war through diplomacy or other means of soft power within the WEU framework. The EU could not develop any other solution on its own as it did not have the capacity or the means to solve the problems even in its next door via military action. It had to knock the door of NATO to intervene in these wars. The disappointment in the EU member states led France and Britain -the most adherent supporter of the Atlantic Alliance via NATO- to discuss for more effective ways and structures for cooperation during the summit at St. Malo on 4 December 1998. In the summit conclusion, it is explicitly stated that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom 2015,

2). For the first time, Britain and France were on the same boat in terms of defence issues. Britain, who has always prioritized the NATO membership over EU membership in terms of defence matters, this time seemed to agree about the necessity of more Europe in defence area, which is also related to the fact that development of a common European security and defence policy does not necessarily lead to competition with NATO but instead, it would cooperate with it in all matters, so it would also make NATO stronger as its members would be more powerful (WEU Council of Ministers 1992, 1).

2.7. EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP)

The EU, which was getting economically more and more powerful, decided to be more active in the international stage. However, it was obvious that you cannot be regarded as a powerful actor or a powerful international organization if you cannot deal with the challenges within your neighborhood on your own, even in your immediate surrounding as in the case of Yugoslavia and Kosovo Wars. You cannot convince anyone that you are powerful despite your economic prosperity if you are begging for help in each military confrontation within your interest areas. Therefore, the EU, first of all, developed soft power elements through Petersberg Tasks, and then charged the WEU for military operations as well. However, the impact was not satisfactory, so at St. Malo summit, France and Britain decided to develop a foreign security policy that could allow the EU to fulfill its dream about being a leading international actor. The conclusions of St Malo were accepted by other EU member states at the European Council in Cologne, 1999. In line with the conclusions of the two summits, Javier Solana, the first Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union in 1999, submitted an initiative that created the *European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP)* - renamed as the *Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)* with the Lisbon Treaty- in accordance with the expectation to give “the means and capabilities to [EU so that it may] assume its responsibilities for a common European policy on security and defence” (EDA (a), parag. 27-28). The member states agreed on certain capability targets named as *the Helsinki Headline Goals* that had to be achieved by 2003. Afterwards, new permanent

bodies were founded for deeper integration in defence field, namely the *Political and Security Committee (PSC)*, *EU Military Committee (EUMC)*, and *EU Military Staff (EUMS)* (EDA (a), parag. 28).

2.8. EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA)

Even if the CSFP was initiated in 1992 as the third pillar, and the ESDP was created after the approval of St. Malo Declaration by all member states at Cologne Summit, the developments in defence and security policies were still not satisfactory as the member states' approach to defence and security matters was still mainly at national level, rather than at European level and the budget spared to spend in these areas, particularly in *the research & technology area*, was decreasing year by year. More ambitious politicians together with industry companies, who were lobbying for the establishment of a strong armaments agency which would manage to tackle with the shortfalls that former initiatives drastically suffered in this field, worked hard for the foundation of a strong integrated defence industry within the EU borders (EDA (b), parag. 2). During the European Council meeting in Thessaloniki in June 2003, the member states discussed this issue as well and decided on creating a new body named *European Defence Agency (EDA)*, which was instituted as “an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments” in 2003 (EDA (b), parag. 13). The aim of the new agency was stated as “developing defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting [...] research” (EDA (b), parag. 10).

Some of the capabilities and responsibilities of the WEU, which was decided to be incorporated in the EU structure with the Nice Treaty in 2003, were transferred into the *European Defence Agency (EDA)* instituted in 2004. With the foundation of the CFSP, ESDP and EDA, the EU has assumed a more active role in defence and security matters internationally as new operational and institutional developments began to be achieved due to more integration in defence and security fields. The EU started to carry out some

successful military operations in different regions such as some small-scale military operations in Africa and the Balkans and much more prominent peacekeeping operation performed in Bosnia Herzegovina (Operation Althea), a proof of impressive progress in security and defence field when compared with the disappointment felt during Yugoslavia and Kosovo wars just a few years ago. Newly initiated procurement programmes also contributed to the developments in security and defence field. The EU seemed to be rising up to the position as a security actor thanks to the significant developments in these fields together with the successes they reached in political, social and economic fields (Posen 2010, 150).

2.9. LISBON TREATY

The most promising development that could assure the EU its fully-fledged global security provider role in the international arena was the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which brought several changes and arrangements in various fields as well as in defence and security field. The Lisbon Treaty is an agreement which opens a way for various initiatives that can finally allow the EU to cooperate more deeply in these fields if its full potential is realized by EU member states (Solana 2015, 8). One of the main contributions of the Lisbon Treaty in defence and security areas is expanding the scope of missions that the EU can undertake beyond the *Petersberg Tasks* which consist of humanitarian missions, peace-keeping missions, peace-enforcing missions as well as crisis management missions (Solana 2015, 10). The Lisbon Treaty allows “new types [of missions] like common actions towards disarmament, prevention of conflicts, and fighting the terrorism – as well as with the aid of third countries,” which is a necessity in light of the emergence of new types of threats within the geopolitical environment of the EU (External Relations 2017, parag. 7). The second and most ambitious target of the Lisbon Treaty is to initiate a permanent structured cooperation in defence field, which had to wait until 2016 to be triggered. While its participation is voluntary, its membership necessitates participants to accept and follow certain legally binding commitments (External Relations 2017, parag. 8). In line with the developments in defence and security field, the diplomatic arm of the EU, the *European External Action Service (EEAS)*, was constituted in 2010 “to reunify the tools and the expertise coming

from the Commission and the experience of the diplomatic skills coming from the Member States in a single body” (Viceré 2015, 5).

CHAPTER 3

3. THERORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The previous chapter summarizes the historical developments in the EU security and defence. However, to conceptualize whether it is a new momentum for the European Security and Defence Policy or not, the reasons *why* the member states are eager to cooperate with each other and the ways *how* they will achieve it must be theoretically examined (Missiroli 2017, 9). Various international theories have been applied to explain the cooperative and integrationist developments in the security and defence field. However, as the EU has a *sui generis* nature that distinguishes it from all other entities analyzed according to the established theories, “which were initially developed to explain the behaviour of states” rather than an entity that is unique with its simultaneously supranational and intergovernmental structure, no consensus has been reached on the theory that thoroughly explains and gives the full picture of the future of the European Defence and Security Policy (ibidem). Schmitter (as cited in Popescu 2011, 4) also stresses that “no single theory will be capable of explaining dynamics and predicting its outcome. The EU is already the most complex polity ever created by human artifice and it is going to become even more so before it reaches its end-state - whatever that will be.” While most scholars preferred to explain the cooperation in security and defence field between European member states before the WWII –the time when the war-procreant *Westphalian State System* was prevalent- mostly from realist perspective, which mainly focused on the nature of man and of the state to explain these developments due to the endless wars between sovereign states, the liberal theories, which successfully explain economic integration and used for the rationalization of further developments in this field within the EU, gained favor after the WWII -the time European countries decided to integrate their heavy industries and established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Missiroli 2017, 9). In spite of the absence of a unified theory that is commonly accepted as the paramount theory explaining cooperation and integration in defence and security field, the available

theories need to be applied to understand these developments in security and defence field as effectively as the theories allow us until a more comprehensive theory -possibly apt to the *sui generis* nature of the EU- is developed.

Despite several theories have been applied to examine the integration and cooperation in the security and defence field within the EU, this study will cover only three dominant theories commonly applied to explain cooperation and integration in this field with their limitations: neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism in general terms since an exhaustive, elaborated review of all related theories is not within the scope of this study. Each of these theories approaches the defence and security area from different angles, so each of them manages to shed light on not all but certain aspects and distinct dimensions, but still valuable contributions they make to conceptualize cooperative developments in this field and give some clues about the possibility of the establishment of the European Security and Defence Union in the future.

3.1. NEO-REALISM

A common term applied in various ways in several distinct disciplines, *realism* highlights the causes for states to compete for power in accordance with their national interests in the International Relations discipline (Burchill et al, 2005, 29). Sub-categories of realist theories have been applied to explain the impact of power politics on the formation of the common security and defence policy of the European Union, yet this study covers only the most dominant one at present, Neo-realism, due to the limited scope of this study (Czaputowicz 2014, 107). Neo-realists claim that the possibility of cooperation on security and defence issues is highly low as no global supranational authority, which can control the states relations with each other or implement a sanction when there is an infringement of an international agreement, is present, the state that is called *anarchy* (Missiroli 2017, 9-10). As Labs and Walt (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 11) point out, “international system is one of uncertainty and competition in which the opacity of other states’ intentions forces states to adopt offensive strategies in order to maximize their security.” For realists, “states must

assume the worst, particularly about others' intentions, when making policy choices” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 43). Within the anarchic global order, each state has to ensure its self-protection, which necessitates the states to enhance their military capabilities and increase their military capacities (Missiroli 2017, 9-10). The balance of power between states is the inevitable consequence of this anarchic system, a fact that leads to everlasting exertion to hamper any state from attaining power exceeding other states' power as more power would mean a threat for other states' security in regard to neo-realists' viewpoint (ibidem).

According to neo-realists, when are states eager to cooperate or to conflict with each other? Even if all neo-realists share the view that “anarchical nature of the international system put particular constraints on co-operation,” there are distinct explanations made by neo-realists about the conditions under which the states prefer to cooperate (Sjursen 2003, 9). On the one hand, some neo-realists assert that states have a tendency to cooperate with other states on security and defence matters only if their security conditions collectively impair or if a direct threat to their security exists, but this cooperation is established as a military alliance as in the case of NATO during the Cold War, which has an intergovernmental structure (Missiroli 2017, 9-10). On the other hand, Hyde-Price stresses (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 11) the fact that how the material power within the international system will be distributed is the key point to decide whether to cooperate or to conflict. He identifies four primary “distributions of power [which are] unipolarity; bipolarity; balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity” (ibidem). In each system, varying degrees of cooperation is likely to be achieved in different forms. For certain neo-realists, the cooperation possibility lays in the maximization of their relative gains which is the main interest of the states; therefore, it is assumed that whenever a state is likely to maximize its relative gains, it is likely that they cooperate with other states (Sjursen 2003, 9). According to classical realists, who also assert that international system is anarchic, individual European states need to cooperate with each other so as to survive owing to their weakness as individual actors when the size of rising powers is taken into consideration as prospective threats (Missiroli 2017, 10).

Up to some neo-realists' point of view, what prevents deeper cooperation and integration among member states in security and defence field can be explained with *the Alliance Security Dilemma* in the EU and NATO, which highlights "the fears of abandonment or entrapment by alliance partners" (Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 17). When the USA's current actions such as its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (widely known as Iran Deal), from Paris agreement and from several other multilateral agreements, are considered, it is reasonable to doubt the bounding nature of any cooperation and no one seems to be able to ensure eternal loyalty to any cooperation. Even if the *balance of threat* would urge the individual states to share their resources with other states, these fears force them to be reluctant to cede their sovereignty in security and defence field to a supranational institution as the risk of alliance break-off is always present, which would signify "the potential threat of losses in relative power" (Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 18).

3.1.1. Limitations of Neo-Realism

Neo-realists highlight the fact that dependency of the CSDP on national capabilities and intergovernmental relations is ongoing (as it is an expected case within the anarchic system), yet neo-realists find it hard to explain the reasons "why EU member states would nevertheless willingly agree to cede certain responsibilities for their foreign policy, security and defence to supranational institutions such as the European External Action Service and the European Commission" (Missiroli 2017, 10). Another challenging fact for neo-realists, who adheres to the *balance of threat theory*, which suggests that "states will usually align together against a state that combines great power, geographical proximity, offensive capability, and policies that suggest malign intent" (Posen 2006, 162), is the launch of certain policies such as the CSDP even though there was not a direct threat to the security of the member states at the time of the CSDP's launch, only the disappointment felt within the EU due to the military failure experienced during the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Missiroli 2017, 10). Some neo-realists try to explain such cooperation with the argument that "the CSDP is not an attempt to deal with insecurity in Europe, but rather aims to address the global balance

of power” while some others put forward the view that “the CSDP is a vehicle through which Europeans can balance against US military power” (ibidem).

3.2. NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Same as the realist theories, liberal theories assume that international system is anarchic, in which the states act as the main actors in the absence of a legal authority that can assume the role of the world government, and it is regarded as a rationalist theory since it explains the foreign policy decisions of the states as a consequence of the instrumental aim of ensuring benefits after assessing the costs and benefits of the engagements and selecting the least costly means so as to reach their ends identified as state preferences (Moravcsik 2010, 2). On the other hand, liberalists are against the argument that power politics is the central feature dominating international relations. In contrast to the assertion of realist theories that anarchy always gives birth to war or military conflict, liberalist theories support the view that cooperation between states is possible within anarchical system, so military confrontation is not the foregone conclusion of anarchy (Missiroli 2017, 10). Some liberalists mention the EU as an evidence for successful cooperation in anarchic system between sovereign states, which has ensured peace on the European territory that used to be a battleground of numerous wars throughout the history (ibidem). Another common divergence between realist and liberalist theories is observed on their views about how interconnected international relations are. The realists take into account only the sovereign states as the actors in the international system, whereas the liberalists assert that there are other actors beside the sovereign states “such as companies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society, etc.” that play a significant role in international relations (Missiroli 2017, 11).

One of the theories coming from the liberal tradition has recently regained its popularity, *neo-liberal institutionalism*, which aims at explaining the role of institutions in how they shape the attitudes of the states acting within the international system that is accepted to be anarchical (Burchill et al, 2005, 64). Even if the institutionalists agree with the realist about the anarchical nature of the international system which “constrains

the willingness of states to cooperate, [institutionalists suggest that] states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions” (Greco 1988, 486). As Czaputowicz (2014) sets forth, “[i]nstitutions mitigate the anarchy of the international system, limit the influence of superpowers and provide weaker countries with an opportunity to express their opinion on the actions of powerful states” (p. 108). Similarly, Niou and Ordeshook (as cited in Swisa 2013, 130-131) also claim that “institutions matter because they somehow modify the actions of decision-makers both directly by altering the costs and benefits of actions and indirectly by modifying goals (of cooperation).”

According to neo-liberal institutionalists, the cooperative attitudes of the states depend on the rate of absolute gains that will be attained through cooperation and the level of predictability and regularity in international relations ensured by the regimes and institutions. As neo-liberal institutionalists suggest, states care about maximizing their own gains and are usually indifferent to what other states obtain as they are not interested in relative gains, which make cooperation possible as long as it leads to mutual benefits. The institutions role in this process is the arrangement and the implementation of regulations, which will be binding for all actors (Burchill et al, 2005, 65). At this point, international organizations gain importance as they establish the institutional mechanisms through various international agreements that ensure the rule of law globally, which remove the possibility of uncertainty that may prevent cooperation. The role of institutions includes “encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors” (ibidem). In addition to putting laws into force bounding for all actors, international organizations conduct diplomatic negotiations between states to find the middle ground between national state preferences, so it is obvious that the possibility of war diminishes between sovereign states. As a result, the states get eager to develop cooperation mainly in trade, but also in several other fields, which will contribute to predictability in international relations and will foster further cooperation (Swisa 2013, 132). According to the neo-liberal institutionalists, the rise in mutual understanding and trust is provided with the established institutional mechanisms. As a consequence of the establishment of norms

and understanding between states, integration in defence and security field has been fostered, i.e. establishment of the CSDP in 1991 (Bono 2002, 10).

3.2.1. Limitations of Neo-liberal Institutionalism

According to Bono (2002), one of the primary problems with this theory is that it considers international organizations as the main drivers for the development of policies within the EU, so it cannot effectively clarify the relationship between domestic elements and supranational ones (p. 10). This leads to giving extreme importance to “the balance of power and institutions in shaping a state’s behaviour, thus failing to explain the dynamics of interest formation within national, international and transnational policy making fora” (ibidem). Another shortcoming of neo-liberal institutional theory is that it does not clarify if one of the states that seeks for benefit from cooperation cannot actually gain benefit from that cooperation although one of the arguments of this theory is that “the institutional mechanisms put in place provide incentives to ensure that the state benefits more from cooperation than individual pursuit” (Swisa, 2013; p, 133). Under such a circumstance, the theory supposes that the state will rationally accept “what is best for all is best for the individual” (ibidem). When the achievements of the EU through integration since the WWII are considered, member states have been enjoying absolute gains they have attained in the long run (ibidem).

3.3. CONSTRUCTIVISM

Whilst neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are categorized as *rationalist theories*, which prefer to explain the international relations in terms of material aspects such as military capabilities, trade interactions or international institutions, constructivism is put into another category: *ideational theories* (Fiott et al, 2017; 11). Gained popularity after the end of Cold War, constructivism, of which primary tenet is “that socially and institutionally-embedded norms (rules of ‘legitimate or appropriate behaviour’) inform identities and, therefore, interests,” highlights the role of ideas,

identities, norms and socialization between states as the fundamental aspects of international relations (Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 9).

According to constructivists, the reality is socially constructed, so the analysis of global politics has to look beyond the material reality and need to involve norms, which are “intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural worlds” (Sjursen 2003, 11-12) and identities which are “relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, 397). The interests and worldviews of the actors are formed in line with their identities, which are constituted through collective understanding of self (Wendt 1992, 398). As people can have multiple identities at one time such as brother, father, doctor, ...etc, states can have several identities simultaneously such as “sovereign state,” “hegemon of the world system,” “security provider,” ...etc. (ibidem).

As ideas and beliefs, which are not fixed but subject to change over time, play a significant role in the global politics, it is accepted that interests and worldviews of the actors are constructed and reconstructed as time progresses as a result of social interaction between actors (Theys 2017, 37). The social interaction allows the states to reshape their perception of the other and leaves room for re-identification of the other, a fact that demonstrates that power politics and self-help are not inevitable constituents of anarchy (ibidem). It depends on how states identify the other states: as enemies or as friends. Neo-realism cannot explain on which ground this identification difference is based. To illustrate, one country can perceive the same military source of power - nuclear weapons- as a source of threat if it is possessed by an actor which it identifies as an enemy, but if an ally who is described as a friend owns the nuclear weapons, it is not perceived as a threat (Theys 2017, 36-7). Alexander Wendt (1992) explains this situation with his famous sentence, which becomes one of the basic premises of constructivism, “*Anarchy is what states make of it*” (Wendt 1992, 395).

As ideas and meanings are regarded as the main constituents of an identity by constructivists, it is believed that they play an important role in EU’s definition of itself as a global actor. Despite divergences in how member states perceive their own roles in global stage, the EU identifies its own role as a global actor, an approach promoted by

certain constructivists that “the EU [...] is able to develop its own beliefs, practices and *strategic culture* based on its historical experiences and the unique development of its institutions” (Missiroli 2017, 12). In contrast to realist belief that interests of states such as attaining power or surviving are constant, for constructivists, interests and strategic cultures as well as how foreign, security and defence policies are implemented are incessantly subject to change (ibidem). According to Cornish and Edwards (2001), Giegerich (2006), Howorth (2007), Rieker (2006) and Meyer (2005) (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 9), “CSDP provides evidence of the development of a European ‘strategic culture’ and the ‘Europeanisation’ of national defence and security policies.”

Webber, Croft, Howorth, Terriff and Krahnmann (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 10) point out another concept that is frequently related with defence cooperation within the EU, *Security Governance*, which refers to “the gradual erosion of the nation-state as the sole actor in defence and security policy agenda-setting and implementation.” Howorth (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 10) argues that *socialization* and *policy-learning*, which foster higher normative convergence at national level beside motivating states to cede more competencies to the supranational institutions within the EU, are gradually achieved as the consequence of the foundation of institutional structures above the nation-state and the development of multi-level policy agenda-setting. This argument builds its foundation upon the presumption that states attain a great amount of “*international agential power*” with this approach (ibidem). Webber et al (as cited in Dyson and Konstadinides 2014, 10) describes *the Europeanisation of security* embodied by the CSDP as a successful political revolution achieved in recent years. It is highly emphasized by constructivists that the possibility of deeper cooperation and further integration in the security and defence field within the EU rests upon the norms and collective identity building as *European identity*, which does not “[act] as a supra-nationalistic identity to compete with individual state identities, [but] works to complement national identities” (Swisa 2013, 129). Such a complementary approach adopted by European institutions seems to be a valid base to relieve concerns about the loss of sovereignty.

3.3.1. Limitations of Constructivism

The main criticism directed to constructivism is that it underestimates the role that material factors or power distribution within the system play on international relations while focusing mostly on ideational factors such as norms and identities (Czaputowicz 2014, 111). Some critics claim that constructivism cannot explicitly identify the social mechanisms required for maintaining established norms and identities. Additionally, the theory cannot specify the time when norms emerge or change and how these occur (Swisa 2013, 130). Another criticism uttered by Checkel (as cited in Swisa 2013, 130) is that constructivism cannot provide a systematic explanation about how social construction intrinsically emerges and why it differs from state to state.

3.4. BILATERAL RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Beside applying established theories to explain cooperation and integration in security and defence field within the EU, some scholars such as Howorth prefer to analyze bilateral relations between the EU member states such as Franco-British or Franco-German relations so as to examine the developments in this area. Even if these scholars do not present their arguments as grounded theories, several studies exist within the literature that analyzed bilateral relations to conceptualize their roles in alliance politics (Bono 2002, 10). Bono (2002) states that the main problem with such hypotheses is that “they elevate bilateral relations above other factors in an *a priori* manner and fail to situate the specificity of bilateral relationships in the context of their historical evolution” (p. 10) Some other non-theoretical hypotheses, developed to realize when and how the cooperation and integration are pursued in security and defence field within the EU, take the external factors such as transnational relations or external regional crises into consideration (Bono 2002, 11). Current external and internal factors are examined also in this study so as to be able to decide whether it is high time for deeper cooperation in security and defence field.

CHAPTER 4

4. CHALLENGES

After discussing the possibility of the deeper integration in security and defence field or the establishment of the European Security and Defence Union according to distinct integration theories, it is reasonable to clarify the challenges that have so far hindered such developments. Even though the EU has been an almost 70 years-old success story with several unprecedented integration achievements, comprehensive, satisfactory integration in security and defence field has been remaining as a longstanding disappointment for the EU. As it was reviewed in the second chapter of this study, the EU (under former titles as well) attempted to establish *Defence Union* or to achieve high level defence integration several times, yet these attempts either totally failed or the initiatives successfully launched could not fully satisfy the expectations. What has prevented the EU from accomplishing its goals in this field until today? Is it possible that they can undermine the current processes once more? In this chapter, the challenges that have blocked deeper integration in defence area or more ambitiously, the establishment of Security and Defence Union will be scrutinized in detail and their prospective impacts on current developments in security and defence field will be analyzed.

4.1. POLITICAL WILL

Despite several attempts for deeper integration in security and defence field, something really important -*political will*- was missing due to several reasons. What has been the source of this political reluctance for more cooperation in this field? The main concerns can be summarized as these: fear about the loss of national sovereignty, distinctions in threat perceptions and strategic cultures of member states, divergences among national state interests and preferences as well as the absence of mutual trust and solidarity among member states from time to time.

4.1.1. Sovereignty Concern

Integration policy followed in any field means the conferral of certain competences formerly belonging only to nation states to the EU institutions. Economic integration has been easily achieved as each member state and the citizens themselves benefit from such integration, so nobody questioned how it would affect the national sovereignty. However, the concepts of security and defence have always been seen as the emblems of national sovereignty, which roots in the steadfast bond developed between the state and the military throughout several centuries, and it is commonly suggested that it needs to be kept mainly within the member states' competences (France et al. 2017, 14). The treaties signed until today have ensured the absolute power that member states assume in security and defence field through the veto power that these treaties bestow upon them if the EU intends to engage in a military affair at any time (Howorth 2011, 5).

Having blocked integration in defence field for so long, the concept *sovereignty*, which gained prominence with the formation of the *Westphalian States System* formed after signing the *Peace of Westphalia* (1648) that ended the Thirty Years' War and stayed dominant throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, has still been a key means used by Eurosceptics and populists –as in the case of Brexit propagandas- to criticize the EU in various ways. But, what does actually sovereignty mean in 21st century? In political science, sovereignty is defined as “the ability to achieve a goal or to assert one’s will,” which means the existence of *supreme authority* which does not accept any other authority above itself (Frigot and Bonadonna 2016, 1-2). Eurosceptics usually adopt this interpretation of the term to blame the EU for seizing sovereignty -regarded as the synonym of independence according to this definition- from its members. On the other hand, the common EU approach to the concept seems complicated as a result of the positive and negative ideas concerning the sovereignty that simultaneously exist within the EU (*ibidem*). While historically dominant states such as the UK and France tend to favor national sovereignty over deeper cooperation in certain fields within the EU, smaller countries which benefit more from cooperation rather than individual acts have a tendency to leave sovereignty concerns aside in more cases. These two opposing

approaches illuminate the reasons why political agendas of member states and the methods they prefer to exercise power differ from each other in the EU (ibidem).

In the 21st century, *globalization*, which has brought forward interdependence between individual states in several ways and fields (one of which is defence and security field), is the key term that has been shaping the international relations rather than sovereignty (Tocci 2015, 138). Even though the nation states survive as the cement of the international system, their national sovereignty –in the classical meaning of *freedom of action*- has already been restricted and will continue to be challenged via more inter and intra-state dependences and interactions (France et al, 2017, 14). As Nathalie Tocci (2015) asserts that current world order is the stage of multiple players and has several layers each of which are interdependent like a spider web, through which power flows from one player to another (138).

It is an undeniable fact about the global world system that threats and problems have recently evolved so drastically that they cannot be individually tackled by a single state because one state's problem triggers other problems in other parts of the world as in the case of the ongoing Syrian Civil War that started in 2010. The Syrian Civil War, which turned into a proxy war as years passed by, has taken place in the Middle East, but its impacts have led to various global problems from refugee crisis to radicalist terrorist attacks in the capitals of several EU member states as well as in other countries. Since other current global threats such as hybrid wars or cyber-threats, or the global problems such as climate change also require global collaboration and effort, traditional state sovereignty appears to be just an illusionary, historical concept that is attractive but quite invalid under current circumstances. It is obvious that powerful member states still follow their own national interests in security and defence field, but the number of such member states within the EU is limited (Howorth 2011, 5-6). Jean-Claude Juncker (2018) highlights that deterioration in the geopolitical security environment of the EU requires the European member states to act as a Union so as to be able to allow the EU to determine its own destiny, which necessitates reconciliation with the idea of *European sovereignty* (p. 5). Juncker (2018) who coined a term for his view – *Weltpolitikfähigkeit*- stresses that the EU has to assume the role of a global actor that

can shape global issues, which requires the EU to be a more sovereign actor in international relations (ibidem). He also claims in his speech that “European sovereignty is born of Member States’ national sovereignty and does *not replace it*. Sharing sovereignty – when and where needed – makes each of our nation states stronger” (ibidem). With this explanation, it seems that Juncker aims at relieving the member states’ concerns about losing national sovereignty. Macron also states that the European sovereignty is complementary to national sovereignty, not competing with it, so the nation states do not have to sacrifice their national sovereignty for the sake of the European one, but they can enjoy both of them simultaneously (Tournier 2018, parag. 2). Most of the small member states are aware of the fact that they cannot protect their territory or effectively foster their national interests unless they cooperate with other states within the EU framework. This reality forces these states to cooperate in more and more fields within the EU framework as well.

In brief, it seems to be the high time for the sovereignty concern that has hindered the security and defence integration for so long to lose its long-lasting dominance and attractiveness in EU discourses despite the populists’ and Eurosceptics’ ongoing propagandas promoting state sovereignty in the age of globalization. France, Major and Sartori (2017) point out that “sovereignty in terms of freedom of action is actually lost already – dependency is reality for all EU member states, and it grows faster the longer states deny these realities” (p. 14) Participation of 25 member states in PESCO is one of the significant indicators that sovereignty is not such a big hindrance for deeper defence integration which can lead to the Security and Defence Union in the long run.

4.1.2. Threat Perception and Strategic Cultures

As well as the sovereignty concerns, divergent threat perceptions, strategic cultures, or national priorities of the member states have also hampered the development of the necessary political will for comprehensive defence integration. As member states have differed from each other in these aspects, it has resulted in –to a certain extent- mistrust and lack of solidarity among member states, which is a rational and natural impact according to the *Alliance Security Dilemma* promoted by neo-realists, and it has led to

the development of disparate approaches toward more integration in security and defence field so far (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 7). To clarify the impacts of such divergences on these aspects, they need to be explained in detail.

To start with, the divergences in threat perception can be taken into consideration. Even if each member state accepts that terrorism or illegal migration is a threat for them, or an aggressive Russia can be threatening for the whole world as well as for the EU member states, the security discourse of the member states is shaped mostly by geographical proximity to the source of threat (there are other –less influential- factors shaping threat perceptions as well). To illustrate this divergence, the main security priorities of eastern and northwestern EU member states can be roughly compared: (Terlikowski 2015, parag. 3).

The member states located in the eastern border of the EU, mainly the Baltic States, Poland, Finland and others, have prioritized the Ukraine-Russia crisis that broke out in 2014 in their security discourse (Pezard et al, 2017, X.). These countries, which have been under the risk of Russian invasion throughout the history, are highly worried about the aggressive attitude Russia has started to display towards former Soviet bloc countries. They worriedly follow the developments and turmoils in their neighborhood which are regarded as the sources of an existential threat to their sovereignty and to their territorial integrity as the case of the annexation of Crimea, an extremely shocking development in Europe in 21st century, has proven. These member states located in the eastern EU border have demanded NATO and the USA to deploy a number of troops on their lands out of the fear of Russian aggression while other member states that do not share borders with Russia are against such a movement as they do not currently see the Russian threat as such detrimental as the eastern members suggest it. They even believe that the deployment of NATO or US troops on Russian borders would only provoke Russia for developing more proactive policies rather than deterring Russia from more aggression and it would be a too costly precaution for actions stemming just out of a fear rather than a concrete action initiated towards these eastern member states (Pezard et al, 2017, 5).

While the eastern member states perceive Russia as the main source of threat and shape their defence policies in accordance, the northwestern member states identify terrorism and illegal migration originating from failed states in the Northern Africa and from the Middle East countries -mainly Syria- as threats since these member states are directly affected by these threats. When we think about the countries which have mostly been the target country for illegal migrants, it is seen that Italy, Spain and Greece are the first destinations due to their geographical proximity to the Northern Africa and the Middle East. Via these countries, the refugees mostly move towards their target countries that are mostly more prosperous northwestern member states rather than eastern member states. Similarly, terrorist attacks have happened mainly in the capitals or in the famous cities of the more powerful member states, which are internationally more active in military matters such as in Paris, in Berlin...etc. These northwestern member states claim that NATO should focus on real problems like terrorism originating in failed states or in countries undergoing civil war rather than less likely ones as the prospective Russian invasion of the eastern EU member states. On the other hand, eastern member states claim that terrorism and refugee crisis are distracting NATO's attention, which is an existential mistake as Russia is a more serious problem (Pezard et al, 2017, 5). These are the main sources of divergences in threat perception, but there are other minor sources of divergence as well such as natural hazards which is highlighted by certain countries as immediate threats that others do not regard them so (Terlikowski 2015, parag. 3).

Divergence in strategic cultures among member states that have led to distinct national preferences while developing policies has also averted the further security and defence integration. The main source of discrepancy is observed in the level of fostered Europeanism, which can be explained by analyzing the strategic cultures of two significant actors within the EU: France and Germany. It is well-known that France gives importance to national strategic autonomy and defines its Europeanism as a vehicle to pursue this culture, whereas Germany's Europeanism is a shield against national military drives -which may emerge- as a result of the post-WWII constraints engraved in its political and military culture. Beside this distinction, there are opposing views about the legitimate use of force among member states, which results in

questioning the role that the EU should play in any military affair. For instance, France historically has an interventionist culture, so it defines the EU as a means to multiply the capacity and legitimacy for its military actions, whereas Germany has a multi-dimensional approach on security matters both at national and EU levels. The distinctions in strategic cultures of these two countries are reflected in their political systems within their Constitutions as well. For example, the deployment of French armed forces is solely determined by the President (“[s]ince 2008, parliamentary approval is mandatory, but only if an operation is prolonged beyond four months from the initial decision“) while the deployment of German armed forces can be done only for defence purposes or within multilateral operations, and it must be approved by the Parliament in any case (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 7-8). These and other differences in strategic cultures have led to mutual mistrust and prevented solidarity in security and defence area, and it has discouraged the member states from pooling and sharing their military assets (ibidem). Similar differences in strategic cultures of each member states can be identified with the commonalities as well (ibidem).

In short, these divergences in threat perceptions and strategic cultures have been among main factors that have hindered EU member states to possess the necessary political will to make comprehensive initiatives in security and defence field. Currently, with the launch of EUGS, HR/VP Federica Mogherini has stressed that the threats are common, not divergent, and they need common solutions and have to put aside the diverging national strategic cultures and follow the global strategy launched in 2016 (Mogherini 2016, 4).

4.2. NATO-EU DILEMMA

In addition to the missing political will for deeper security and defence integration, *NATO first* tendency has blocked more integration and the establishment of European Security and Defence Union until today. It is well-known that NATO has been regarded as the ultimate security provider by its members since Cold War years. Currently, 22 EU member states are also NATO members (EPSC 2015, 4). Even if some international organizations founded during Cold War period disappeared after the collapse of block

structure like the Warsaw Pact or the WEU, NATO has managed to survive in contrast to the expectations for its vanishment as well (Daalder 1999, 7). As the positive atmosphere, which surrounded the world after the dissolution of the USSR that led to the emergence of the new unipolar global order in 1991, has been replaced with a negative, security-oriented – once again- atmosphere all around the world, NATO has regained its popularity and importance.

Even at times when the purpose or the necessity of NATO's existence was discussed, most of the EU member states have addressed NATO as the territorial defence provider for Europe and NATO has been the main reference point while defining and implementing their national defence policies even if the CSDP (former ESDP) has existed since 1999. After the dissolution of the USSR, initial instinct of the central and eastern European member states which were under former Soviet Union's governance was to participate in NATO as a source of security (Giuliani 2018, 2). As it is explained in threat perception section of this study, for these countries Russia is still the archenemy and main threat for their sovereignty, so NATO, of which deterrence capability is even questioned from time to time as it does not have its own military force same as the EU, is capable of protecting them against Russia at present since the USA, which owns the most powerful army and most advanced weapons and military systems, is its member as well (Camporini et al, 2017, 13). Today, most of the decisions on defence actions and the strategic analyses have been made within NATO framework. In fact, NATO's preeminence as the collective defence provider has been declared in the Treaty on the European Union as well (Gnesotto 2018, 2).

As the CSDP has an intergovernmental structure, it gives veto right to each member state over military issues, and particularly the Atlanticist UK has used its veto right at several times to prevent further integration in defence field after the launch of European Security Strategy in 2003 (Gnesotto 2018, 2). For years, NATO and the USA were also against the strategic autonomy of the EU within NATO. They were mostly worried about duplication of NATO's sources and its prospective negative impacts on strategic and defence-industrial interests. However, the USA and NATO's approach changed drastically after a while. Since Kennedy administration, the USA has been stressing

more burden sharing in NATO and with Trump administration, this demand has reached its peak. Currently, it is admitted that a powerful ally with advanced capabilities would be more useful than a dependent one which cannot practice anything on its own as in the case of Kosovo or Yugoslavia Wars, more recently in the Libya case. Since it has changed its strategic priorities towards Asia, mainly towards China, which is gaining more and more economic and military power each day and challenging the US global hegemony, the USA has been pushing the EU for becoming a self-sufficient NATO ally (EPSC 2015, 5).

Despite ongoing oppositions from certain USA policy makers, who claim that such a development will have detrimental impacts on NATO or transatlantic relations in general, most of the US officials accept the positive effects of deeper integration in EU security and defence (Coffey 2013, 1-2). As a result of Brexit, the UK -the most adherent Atlanticist which has been blocking most of the ambitious defence initiatives- is about to leave the Union while the Franco-German couple, which have the most pro-European leaders currently -Macron and Merkel, have been promoting deeper integration in security and defence. As it is scrutinized in the following chapter in detail, Trump administration's unpredictability has resulted in mistrust to the USA and has forced the EU to realize that "[t]he times in which [Europeans] could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over. [...] [Europeans need to] really take [their] fate into [their] own hands" as Merkel explicitly expressed after the G7 meeting that took place in May 2017 (Smale and Erlanger 2017, parag. 2-3). It is obvious that current conditions seem extremely fruitful for highly ambitious deeper security and defence integration.

4.3. PROTECTIONISM IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Less influential but still significant factor that has hindered deeper defence integration at European level is the conservationist attitude adopted by the member states while shaping their defence industry policies. Even if the negative consequences of *non-Europe* in defence field has been debated for ages, the EU member states have preferred to develop their defence policies at national level due to various concerns mentioned in former sections of this chapter. It is also well known that defence industry needs a lot of

investments and a huge budget is required for these investments. Yet, its financial returns are satisfactory and the costs can be compensated when the end products get into the market. The national small and medium enterprises do not generally support cooperative actions in defence field as they cannot compete with big companies, so member states do not want their national industrial companies to lose their market share in international arena, which is a protective approach that does not fit in liberal economic system that the EU has benefited in several other fields (EPSC 2015, 6).

The steadfast attitude to protect and promote their own industrial bases have resulted in the fragmentation of defence market, which led to the duplication of the same systems that are produced in small numbers due to the low capacity of the national companies and it costs more than “what could be possible if the nations had agreed a common design, with common equipment and components and establishing a common logistic” (Camporini et al, 2017, 8). When the cost of *non-Europe* in defence sector has been discussed at distinct times, the main causes of inefficiency in this field are identified as “duplications, a lack of interoperability and technological gaps” (European Commission 2016a, 3). To make matters worse, most of the EU member states reduced their defence budgets approximately by % 11 between the years 2005 and 2015, whereas countries like China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia have preferred to increase their defence budget at incomparable rates (ibidem).

In short, fragmentation of defence markets, which has led to the duplication of capabilities, budget cuts and protectionist attitude adopted towards national defence industries have cost a lot to the EU. Cooperation at EU level with financial support from the EU, which is aimed with the EDF, and rising defence budgets by % 2 -as it is committed by PESCO and NATO members- seems to be a good solution. As the small and medium enterprises will also get investments from the EDF under certain conditions, protectionist approaches are expected to disappear on its own. When the annual revenue that is equal to EUR 100 billion in total and the number of professional people with almost 1.5 million people in defence sector are taken into consideration, its economic prominence can also be realized. As duplications will be prevented, the EU

will be able to save more money while spending the same amount of money (European Commission 2016a, 3-4).



CHAPTER 5

5. CURRENT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DRIVERS

As it is stated in the theoretical approach section of this study, several scholars prefer to examine external or internal factors as well as bilateral relations between member states or the other actors in the international system so as to explain when and why the EU gets more eager to cooperate or have higher tendency to integrate in security and defence field (Bono 2002, 11). When all the policies developed within the EU are considered, it is obvious that no other policy has resulted in so many conflicts among the EU member states. The initiatives launched within the context of the security and defence policy have usually contained several disagreements; therefore, their formations have usually been dependent upon various internal or external factors that have motivated EU member states since the EU's establishment. For instance, former external shock, the Korean War that broke out in 1950, was one of the external factors that stimulated the Pleven Plan, proposing the foundation of the EDC; the oil crisis, the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War period as well as Yugoslavia and Kosovo Wars are among some of the other major external shocks that triggered various initiatives in defence and security field and ended in the foundation and updating of the CSDP (Viceré 2015, 6). As most of the researchers who study the developments in defence and security field usually analyze these factors in order to explain the motives behind each initiative, recent external and internal factors behind the current EU Security and Defence package need to be identified and analyzed to understand the recent initiatives more comprehensively and to be able to assess their prospective success or failure.

5.1. EXTERNAL DRIVERS

5.1.1. EU-USA Relations: Trump Administration and NATO

“The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over. [...] We Europeans truly have to take our fate into our own hands” Angela Merkel stated (as cited in Henley 2017, parag. 3).

The incentives for Europeans to adopt ambitious initiatives in defence and security field have commonly been inspired by the course of the relationship the EU has with the USA. Whenever the EU member states and the USA have conflicts about certain issues as in the case of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in 2003, or whenever the EU notices that it lacks the capabilities to ensure peace within its neighborhood as in the case of Yugoslavia or Kosovo wars, or in Libya on its own but needs the US assistance either for technical support or for professional governance on the field, it has urged the EU to seek for a way to reduce its dependency on the USA in defence field, which is mostly operated via NATO, the defence organization –informally- led by the USA. The Kosovo War, which convinced the Gaullist France –opposing dependence on the USA in security and defence field- and the Atlanticist UK –promoting the safety ensured by the US led NATO- about the necessity for capacity development in defence field, resulted in St. Malo Declaration, which proposed “the creation of an autonomous military army for Europe” while the *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in 2003 led to the organization of the Tervuren Summit –during which the establishment of a European army was proposed- by France and Germany not because of the EU deficit in defence field but because the US operation could not be rationalized and accepted by these countries while the UK and some other EU members support the operation (Thornton and Oder 2017, parag. 3). Despite certain developments in defence and security field after those summits, they could not achieve the intended level of independence from the US dominance in defence field.

After the election of Donald Trump in 2016 as the new US president, the credibility of the USA as a reliable partner started to be questioned quite loudly and more explicitly. Donald Trump, who propagated the motto of *America first* during his election

campaigns, made several discriminatory speeches against various groups such as Muslims and used a pejorative language against women from time to time, aroused negative feelings in millions of people all around the world even before his election (Keatinge 2017, 1-2). He put his *America first* approach into action right after being elected as the US President and started making shocking decisions by withdrawing from the *Paris Climate Accord*, a decision followed by withdrawal from the *Iran Nuclear Deal* signed in 2015, as well as laying extra taxes on aluminum and steel imported from several countries including EU member states. In addition, President Trump openly declared that the EU member states have to share the financial burden in NATO by rising their contribution to 2 percent of their annual GDP. Even if former presidents repeated the same unfair US spending in NATO, “Trump lifted the debate to another level by adopting a transactional approach to the Alliance and calling Article 5 into question” by not explicitly declaring that the USA is backing Article 5 (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 7). According to the polls made by Pew Research Center, the number of people who trust Donald Trump or his policies related to world affairs is incredibly low worldwide when compared with the former US presidents’ rates (Wike et al, 2017, 34). As stated before, deterioration of relations with the USA has once more motivated the EU member states to set goals that will reduce dependency of the EU on the USA in security and defence field.

5.1.2. EU-Russia Relations: Annexation of Crimea and Energy Insecurity

“For us, Europe is a major trade and economic partner and our natural, most important partner, including in the political sphere. Russia is not located on the American continent, after all, but in Europe.’ (Vladimir Putin)” (as cited in Lynch 2004, 99).

While the election of Donald Trump as the US president in 2016 has led to the retrogression of the USA-EU relations, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 by Russia deteriorated the relationship between the EU and Russia, which used to identify each other as strategic partners. Starting with the outbreak of the *Ukraine Crisis*, it has been obvious that Russia has been proceeding on the reverse angle of the European norms, values and laws that underlie the European security order (Anthony 2015, parag. 6); therefore, the EU depicted its relationship with Russia as a key strategic challenge rather

than a strategic partnership in the EUGS adopted in 2016 (European Commission 2016c, 33). When Russia militarily intervened in Eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014, the EU and the USA applied some sanctions on Russia, which did not prevent Russia from annexing Crimea, though. On the contrary, Russia started to act more aggressively in the Black Sea Region and the Baltic Sea, which aroused fear about more “destabilizing actions and policies go beyond Ukraine and include provocative military activities near NATO’s borders” (NATO 2018, parag. 8). As Kremlin Watch Report - 2017 suggests, Russia’s aggressive policies are not limited with military intervention to its neighboring non-EU countries, but it is claimed that Russia has been trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the EU member states by supporting right wing extremist leaders in the member states so that it can increase its sphere of influence within the EU (Janda et al, 2017, 2). Similar claims concerning the Russian intervention in the last US election, which resulted in Donald Trump’s presidency, are made by the US politicians, and currently there is an ongoing case aimed at revealing the truths about these assertions made against Russia.

Even though the EU adopted some sanction policies as a Union against Russia after the annexation of Crimea, some EU member states, including Germany, do not support harsher sanctions that may trigger sanctions from Russia in return as Russia has been one of the most important energy providers for certain member states including Germany, Austria, and Italy (Janda et al, 2017, 1). The energy dependence on Russia has prevented the adoption of an effective, common, rigid sanction policy against Russia as certain member states are “less concerned with the threats that other EU members [-mainly Eastern and Central European countries-] see emanating from Russia” (Janda et al, 2017, 12). Nonetheless, this does not change the fact that Russia has revived some former fears about Russian military aggression in the EU member states, particularly in the Eastern and Central European member states.

As previous disappointments the EU had such as the one experienced during Kosovo War motivated the EU to develop some initiatives in the security and defence field, the Ukraine Crisis attested to the weaknesses of the CSDP at times of crises: “there was no agreement among member states to dispatch an EU observer or police mission to

Crimea or eastern Ukraine to investigate or deter Russian infiltrations; the EEAS' Crisis Platform was not convened after the downing of flight MH17" (Solana 2015, 8). All these facts about the Russian aggression and the proved weaknesses of the CSDP have once more motivated certain countries to support deeper security and defence integration and to improve EU's defence capabilities and operability that can significantly contribute to EU's strategic autonomy. Even though NATO has still been regarded as the main framework for collective self defence, Trump's unpredictability and unreliability has cast some doubts on the future of NATO and increases the support rate for further security and defence integration.

5.1.3. Failed States-Civil Wars in Africa and the Middle East

The security environment of the EU has been disturbed also by the increase in the number of the failed states as the post-Ottoman order has been dissolving in the Middle East, a development having resulted in civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and several others. Similarly, Sahel and Mena regions in Africa have also been the battleground of civil wars (Solana 2015, 9). Terrorist groups have been using this chaotic atmosphere in places where central authority does not exist or cannot control the developments on its territory so as to spread its influence in these regions (ibidem).

Within the globalized world, no problem is limited to the region it is originated in but affects the whole world in one or another way. The failed states and rising terrorism in the EU neighborhood have resulted in an unprecedented migration crisis in 2015-2016 as well as more terrorist attacks in the capitals of European member states, starting with Charlie Hebdo attack in 2014, followed by "[t]he Paris attack on 13 November 2015 (130 killed), the Brussels bombing in March 2016 (32 killed) and the Nice truck attack in July 2016 (84 killed)" and several others in the following years (Nesser et al, 2016, 1). Some experts relate the terrorist attacks in France to "France's active role in interventions in the Muslim world – both in Mali from 2013 onwards and against the Islamic State from 2014" but it is obvious that keeping themselves away from threats by developing a *laissez-faire* approach against external turmoils in the globalized world where each country is interdependent in one or another way cannot protect the EU

member states from the impacts of external turmoils (Nesser et al, 2016, 14). The EU has to tackle with the creators of the chaos, *the terrorist groups*, as well as the victims of the wars who led to the unprecedented mass migration flow from the Middle East as well as Northern Africa, where also failed states and civil wars resulted in mass migration, towards the EU. The border control became impossible because of the illegal passages, mostly by the sea (Keatinge 2017, 5). That is why the EU developed *European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)* that allows the EU to contribute to the democratic, economic and social developments in its neighborhood. The EU authorities are constantly suggesting that common threats should be solved with common responds, a fact that signifies “European defence integration is no longer just a political option but a strategic and economic necessity” (EPSC 2015, 2).

5.2. INTERNAL DRIVERS

5.2.1. Brexit

As well as the external drivers, there are internal drivers which have encouraged –or forced- the EU to adopt initiatives in defence and security field. Among all, Brexit seems to be the most significant stimulant that has several implications for the remaining EU member states. First of all, the UK has been the most adherent Atlanticist among the EU member states, which has generally supported the USA’s position as a consequence of the Atlanticist belief that “the so-called ‘special relationship’ with the US gave Britain increased influence on the world stage,” whenever the EU member states and the USA have a conflict as in the case of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* in 2003 (Ralph 2005, 17). Even if the UK acted the leading role together with France during St. Malo Summit held in 1998, when the idea that the EU had to gain some autonomy supported by military force that could be deployed at times of international crises was promoted and the foundations of the ESDP were laid, the Atlanticist identity of the UK, which has always preceded over its Europeanist identity, has most of the time ended with blocking further development of comprehensive policies in security and defence field because the UK has a tendency to regard the CSDP as a complementary body to NATO that should not compete with NATO by gaining more autonomy (Græger and

Haugevik 2009, 33). It has blocked several ambitious EDA initiatives which would reduce the dependence on NATO and the USA in this field and would allow the EU to act without the USA's, or NATO's support (Black et al, 2017, 10). Even though some critics claim that "British veto has not been the only obstacle to closer [defence] integration" but the absence of strategic consensus and necessary financial resources have also hindered it, a remarkable number of optimistic critics assert that current inefficiency of the CSDP is mostly because of the UK's veto against more comprehensive further integration in security and defence field and so Brexit will have a positive impact on developments in this field (Black et al, 2017, 12) How Brexit opened the doors for further integration can be inferred from the fact that just a short while after Brexit, "the French and German Foreign Ministers published a letter in which they made a strong case for a European Security Union" (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 7).

However, there are negative implications of Brexit for the EU as well: First, the UK not only has been one of two nuclear powers of the EU but also has "formidable diplomatic and intelligence networks and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council" (Blockmans 2016, 24). In addition, it has been the biggest defence spender with 20 percent of EU total defence spending and has the biggest army within the EU (ibidem). In other words, Brexit results in losing the most significant sovereign defence actor within the EU, but it allows the EU to integrate further in defence field as the main veto player UK leaves the stage with Brexit. Under the presidency of pro-European Emmanuel Macron and under the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel, Franco-German leadership which has always been the engine in other integration moments, deeper integration in security and defence field seems more probable and more prone to be accomplished (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 7).

5.2.2. Revival of Franco-German Engine

The success of European integration has usually been achieved when the Franco-German engine is at work as the driving force since the birth of the EU under the title of the ECSC. However, this engine has been dependent on something else: pro-European

leaders who believe in the fact that the future of the member states rests in unity rather than individuality. Currently, populism is rising all over the world and right-wing parties are gaining more and more power in the EU member states as well such as *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* in Germany, *Party for Freedom (PVV)* in Netherlands and the *Front National Party (FN)* led by Marine Le Pen in France. These right-wing parties are mostly against the European Union and they offer to leave the EU as the UK applied for in 2016 via Brexit. The most critical election was held in France in 2017 and fortunately the pro-European leader Emmanuel Macron, who has formed “the most pro-European and pro-German government since the times of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing,” was elected (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 4).


From his election campaign period up to present, Macron has always emphasized the importance of developing defence capability of the EU member states as a unity as he explicitly stated during his pre-election speech at Humboldt University in 2017 that “security and defence were neither a luxury nor somebody else’s concern” as Yugoslavia wars, 9/11 attacks and recently Ukraine, Syrian crises or conflicts in Southern Africa have proven. Macron also declared in his speech that *End of History* theory brought forward by Francis Fukuyama is a delusion and the security environment of the EU is worsening day by day that requires the EU to take necessary initiatives under Franco-German leadership, the remaining most powerful member states of the EU after Brexit (Macron 2017, parag. 4).

As being the strongest supporter of sovereignty, France under Macron’s leadership points out that “sovereignty means the capacity of acting in concrete terms to protect ourselves and defend our values” which can be best ensured as a unity as the scale of the threats are bigger than a single country can handle with on its own (Macron 2017, parag. 22). Together with Angela Merkel’s re-election, German pro-European Chancellor, Macron’s election rose optimism about the prospective success of the initiatives such as PESCO, EDF, or CARD launched in defence field.

5.2.3. Public Support: Opinion Polls

As new security threats began to encircle the European Union such as terrorism and the alteration in US approach in several issues including security and defence matters after the election of Donald Trump, which has caused questioning the absolute dependence on NATO as the main framework for defence together with other developments related to security matters, a shift started to be observed not only in the leaders' approach but also in the European citizens' approach toward the priorities of the EU in defence and security fields. The opinion polls indicate that there has been an obvious support for more European Union in defence and security areas (EEAS 2017, parag. 4).

Table 5.2.3. Opinion Polls



Database: Euro barometer, 2018.

As the graph demonstrates, more than three-quarters of the EU citizens give support for more Union in common security and defence policy, which encourages the EU officials to adopt new initiatives in this field (European Commission 2018, 4). However, the expectations of the EU citizens and capabilities of the EU for more active role in these matters do not match as the EU currently lacks the necessary means. Therefore, in 2016 the Defence Package was adopted to provide the EU with necessary means to ensure these capabilities.

5.2.4. No Requirement for a Treaty Change

Another motive for deeper security and defence integration is that PESCO initiative as well as other initiatives does not require a Treaty change. While there is no obstacle to launch initiatives like the EDF or CARD, the Lisbon Treaty already promotes the launch of PESCO initiative in the article 42 (6), which points out that willing and capable member states who need to accept following the binding commitments that PESCO membership requires (EUR-Lex 2008, parag. 8).

Article 46 of TEU states the provisions for participation in the PESCO as well as identifying “operational requirements, fiscal targets – although still not quantified – and multinational industrial cooperation” in line with the Protocol 10 that elaborates the operational dimension of the PESCO. As well as identifying the provisions for PESCO, Article 42 (2) of TEU prevents legal discussions about the role of NATO and PESCO as Mogherini explicitly expressed in her speech (Fiott et al, 2017, 18):

“[T]he Treaty on European Union acknowledges NATO as the main forum to guarantee collective territorial defence for those Member States that are also part of the North Atlantic Alliance, and it foresees that the actions that EU Member States can carry out in solidarity with and assistance to a Member State that is the victim of an armed aggression on its territory should be coordinated and consistent with the action that the NATO can undertake in this regard” (Mogherini 2017, parag. 27).

As the legal requirements have been structured almost a decade before, the EU member states can take the necessary steps to act as they need to do without any legal discussions or working on Treaty change, which would be time consuming and discouraging for member states to work on. The only thing that remained for the EU was to wake the *Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty –PESCO-* up, which occurred on 11 December 2017, almost a decade later of its creation within the Treaty, with other ambitious initiatives.

CHAPTER 6

6. INITIATIVES: PESCO-EDF-CARD-MPCC

As the fifth chapter depicts the shifting geopolitical environment of the Union as well as the various turmoils within the EU, it is obvious that the Union has been going through tough times that should be overcome. These developments are forcing member states and the EU institutions to move forward as a Union. The EU analyzed the latest situations and decided to initiate a threefold defence package consisting of interrelated elements: (1) *the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)*; (2) the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP); (3) the Joint Declaration signed between the EU and NATO. The aim of this defence package is identified as making Europe a self-sufficient and reliable security and defence actor that protects its citizens, fosters its former achievements such as democracy and human rights worldwide, strengthens the resilience of the Union as well as the resilience of the states in its neighborhood through various ways of integration (Fiott 2018, 1).

When this defence package was launched in 2016, the EU was aware that it has a giant-like problem box to solve in its lap: plenty of military shortfalls, which can be summarized as: “[lack of] adequate numbers of high-end spectrum forces and [...] missing sufficient enabling capabilities in areas such as intelligence and strategic reconnaissance, air-to-air refueling, interoperable and networked command & control systems as well as adequate stocks of precision-guided munitions” (Camporini et al, 2017, 14). The unprecedented progress that started with this defence package was followed by more ambitious developments in security and defence field in line with the purpose of being a self-sufficient, reliable international security provider. Just in two years, three initiatives were subsequently launched so as to eventually fulfill the expectations that former initiatives in this field have failed to satisfy so far by not providing necessary ways and means: *European Defence Fund (EDF)*, providing fund for projects to fill capability and force gaps in the field; *Coordinated Annual Review on*

Defence (CARD), which will be used to identify the force and capability gaps; *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)*, representing the political basis of the triangle (Billon-Galland and Quencez 2017, 1). These initiatives are highly interrelated that they need to be analyzed and evaluated together to understand the recent developments in security and defence area because the success or failure of one of these initiatives will directly affect the prospective success or failure of the remaining initiatives (Mazurek 2018, 6). Several critics argue that success of these initiatives would draw a positive picture about the possibility of establishing the European Security and Defence Union in the long run. In addition to these ambitious inter-related initiatives, the *Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)*, the body which is established to plan and conduct non-executive military missions, will also be examined in this chapter as it has a symbolic meaning for strategic autonomy of the EU as well. In this chapter, all these initiatives will be scrutinized, their structures and goals will be elaborated and their prospective contributions to the momentum for the CSDP will be discussed in depth.

6.1. EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND (EDF)

As soon as the ambitious threefold defence package ignited the wick to become an international security provider, the EU ventured upon developing new ways and means to solve the present problems in defence field and started to launch necessary initiatives so as to improve current conditions in defence sector. Outlined by the Commission within the framework of the *European Defence Action Plan (EDAP)* in May 2016 and adopted by the Council in December 2016, the *European Defence Fund (EDF)* is one of the most promising initiatives in defence area. Its aim is to ensure that Member States spend more efficiently by mutually developing defence capabilities and to “foster a competitive and innovative industrial base,” which will serve to the goal of being a global security provider and to gain its strategic autonomy by developing its defence industry so that it can compete with other actors in this sector all over the world (European Commission 2016b, parag. 2). As Camporini, Hartley, Maulny and Zandee (2017) highlight, strategic autonomy that the EU aims at achieving with the EUGS

requires strengthening *the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)* and the EDF can be an invaluable tool to reinforce it (p. 2).

The motive behind such an initiative is the current economic cost and burden for individual member states caused by lack of cooperation in defence field. When the total expenditures made by the individual member states for defence are estimated, it is seen that the EU comes after the USA, the leading military spender, as the second military spender. Nevertheless, the USA's military power cannot be compared to the Europeans' military power which has fallen far behind of the USA's. In spite of the huge amount of total military spending, "duplications, a lack of interoperability and technological gaps" have prevented the formation of an effective military capacity (European Commission 2016a, 3). In addition to such problems, the constant decrease in national defence budget spared by the member states between 2005 and 2015 reached approximately to % 11, equal to about € 200 billion, whilst other countries such as the USA, of which defence spending has already doubled the EU's total spending, China, of which defence spending is % 150 higher than the one in the previous decade, and Russia, of which % 5.4 of GDP is spared for military expenses, have preferred to rise their defence budget constantly (European Commission 2016a, 3-4). Estimated annual cost of *non-Europe* in defence field is between € 25 billion and € 100 billion to the Union since almost 80 percent of defence procurement has been managed at national level and it leads to the duplication of military capabilities, which results in draining the EU of huge amount of money (European Commission 2016b, parag. 18).

Developing a competitive defence industry requires immense research and high-level technological basis, so a huge amount of investment is required to achieve them. National investments cannot provide such amount of investment that will allow the member states to develop a competitive defence sector on their own; therefore, cooperation is the ultimate remedy and the establishment of a common defence fund is supposed to be the only efficient solution that will provide the necessary budget for high amount of investments that will be more effectively allocated and spent. Deeper cooperation in defence field will also contribute to the European economy as more collaboration in defence will enhance defence industrial sector, which has already had

“a total turnover of EUR 100 billion per year and 1.4 million highly skilled people directly or indirectly employed [in this sector] in Europe” (European Commission 2016a, 3).

6.1.1. EDF’s Governance and Structure

The European Defence Fund consists of two windows: *research window* and *capability window* (European Commission 2016b, parag. 6-7). They are supposed to complement each other, but their legal basis and source of budget are distinct from each other (European Commission 2016b, Annex. parag. 2). While the *research window* will allow the EU to directly and fully finance the researches jointly made in “innovative defence products and technologies” from the EU budget rather than national budgets, *capability window* will “act as a financial tool allowing participating Member States to purchase certain assets together to reduce their costs” (European Commission 2017a, parag. 10-11). These windows are designed in a way to contribute to the realization of the priorities identified by the member states in accordance with the *Capability Development Plan*. In line with the capability window, member states are expected to make financial contributions in “the form of grants, financial instruments or public procurement to the defence industry” for collaborative development of defence capabilities whilst the EU will support member states with co-financing to motivate more collaboration among member states (Maulny 2017, 22).

Table 6.1.1. EDF’s Governance and Structure



Source: European Commission (2016). *European Defence Action Plan*.

The EDF has been incorporated into the current *EU Multiannual Financial Framework* that covers the period between 2014-2020: In 2017, € 25 million have been spared as the EDF budget, and €90 million will be allocated until 2020. The next Multiannual Financial Framework that will allocate the EU budget between 2021-2027 annually spares € 500 million for research programmes on defence, which will make the EU one of the most prominent research investors in defence field. However, there is a basic condition to be funded via the EDF: developing *collaborative* projects based upon the priorities identified in accordance with the CDP, each of which will include at least three member states, rather than individual national projects so as to prevent member states from using the EDF as “a modernization fund for the fabric of the European defence industry, particularly in those countries where the industry is least developed, instead of being focused on the development of the military industrial and technological capabilities associated with the notion of strategic autonomy” (Maulny 2017, 22). Apart from this, member states need to assure that they will buy the products that will be developed out of these joint projects. If the projects are related to PESCO, additional % 10 funding will be spared for the project so that EDF will complement and foster PESCO initiative as well. When defence capabilities are collaboratively developed, it will ensure “interoperability, economies of scale, support for a viable European industrial base, lifecycle savings in terms of maintenance, logistic support, and training facilities and command structure” (European Commission 2017a, parag. 38). EDF will also encourage more investments in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), startups and mid-caps as well as other suppliers within defence industry, which will improve the Single Market for defence as well (European Commission 2016b, parag. 8-9). As a matter of fact, no fund has ever been directly provided for defence by the Commission beforehand, so the EDF reflects how seriously the EU moves toward deeper integration in defence field (Himmrich 2017, 5). It can also reduce the protectionist tendencies in European defence sector as the EDF seems beneficial for all actors in this field.

6.2. COORDINATED ANNUAL REVIEW ON DEFENCE (CARD)

Adopted in June 2016, the EU Global Strategy seeks for “gradual synchronization and adaptation of national defence planning cycles and capability development practices” (EDA 2018, parag. 1). The aim of achieving higher strategic convergence and more collaboration among member states in defence field requires establishing a novel mechanism to strengthen European security and defence policy. The new mechanism was formed under the title of the *Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)*, of which scope, modalities and content were proposed by the HR/VP Head of the EDA in accordance with the EUGS in June 2017. Even though the EDA has had the same goal since its establishment in 2004, more structured CARD mechanism is supposed to ensure further capability development, contribute to better identification of capability shortfalls, more collaboration in defence field as well as more effective coordination in national defence spending and investments; thus, preventing waste of money occurring due to incoherence among member states’ defence budgets (Fiott 2017, 1). Launching CARD is expected to make the cooperation process more transparent and politically more visible for participating member states (pMS), which need to have more commitment for cooperation in defence field. Even if participation to the CARD is voluntary for member states, it is still one of the most ambitious initiatives that can strengthen the EU defence (EEAS 2017, parag. 1). CARD will enable the EU to access the comprehensive picture of its capability landscape, monitor the member states’ progress in implementation of capability developments and priorities in research and technology identified in accordance with the CDP, and allow the EU to evaluate overall success in defence cooperation. In addition, CARD mechanism will clarify new cooperation opportunities in defence field. The first year was accepted as a trial period as the member states need some time to adapt to the legal and administrative requirements of the CARD (EEAS 2017, parag. 4).

6.2.1. CARD’s Governance and Structure

The possibility of the success of the CARD depends on collecting the latest and most elaborated data about national defence plans and the EDA, which is the Secretariat of

the CARD (of the PESCO as well) - is the agency that is assigned with data collection task, which the EEAS and EUMS will assist, as the EDA has been the leading actor in EU-funded defence activities and so possesses the most expertise and networks to achieve the goals of the CARD (Domecq 2018, parag. 9). The trial run has given some clues about the system of the CARD mechanism. During the trial period (until the end of 2018), the CARD mechanism followed this methodology:

Firstly, the EDA together with the EEAS and EUMS, gathered all required accessible data that has already been available in the EDA database as well as the ones provided by participating member states (pMS) about their defence expenditure and capability development. Afterwards, three titles were identified in the Council Conclusions to classify the data: “(i) Member States’ aggregated defence plans, (ii) the implementation of the EU Capability Development Priorities resulting from the CDP, and (iii) the development of European cooperation” (EDA 2018, parag. 3). Next, individual *bilateral dialogues* with pMS were started in order to confirm and complete the missing data –if there was any- out of the collected data in the previous phase. When the data collection and confirmation processes were over, the third stage began: analysis of the collected data under the title of *CARD Analysis*, which will be used to “identify trends regarding defence spending plans, implementation of priorities resulting from the CDP and relevant to defence research programmes, as well as opportunities for defence cooperation” (EEAS 2017, parag. 9). Assessed together with the pMS, this analysis was used to create the final report that was submitted to the Defence Ministers. The final stage was the formation of *CARD Report* by the EDA according to the results of former stages and it stated the main conclusions drawn from the collected data and related recommendations. The whole process during the trial period and its results have been evaluated by the pMS and has shaped the future CARD cycle between 2019 – 2020 (ibidem).

6.3. PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)

As the turmoils in its geopolitical environment and internal crises have galvanized EU member states –primarily France and Germany- and the EU institutions to focus on

defence more deeply, from which the member states have refrained for decades because of the concerns summarized in Chapter 4. Indeed, the EU took the necessary legal step for deeper cooperation in defence field almost a decade ago with the Lisbon Treaty, which allows the formation of the *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)*, according to the Articles 42 (6) and 46 of TEU and Protocol 10 (Fiott et al, 2017, 18-19). As the EU decided to realize the full potential of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to security and defence field, the Council of the European Union launched the PESCO initiative, depicted by Jean Claude-Junker (2017) as the *Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty*, on 14 December 2017 so as to gain strategic autonomy in defence area. Surprisingly, 25 member states –except Denmark, Malta and Brexiting UK, whose exit lifted the blockage against ambitious defence initiatives it applied at various times-, have decided to participate in PESCO (European Council 2017, parag. 2). It is supposed to be the main mechanism that will be the basis of the new security and defence architecture together with the EDF and CARD (Mazurek 2018, 12).

Launched within the context of the EUGS, PESCO is the new Treaty-based European framework that allows member states “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in [defence] area with a view to the most demanding missions” to cooperate more closely in the context of operations and capabilities (EUR-Lex 2008, parag. 8). The primary aim of PESCO “is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations,” which will allow the EU to achieve its strategic goal to be a stronger and more reliable global security actor that protects EU citizens against day by day multiplying and changing security threats and to independently act at times of global crises (EEAS 2018a, parag. 4). It also assures better coordination with NATO so that the EU will be able to meet the expectations of the Atlantic Alliance about more burden sharing.

The most significant difference of PESCO from former initiatives made with similar goals is PESCO’s legally binding nature even if the sanctions for violations of the requirements haven’t been clearly identified. For decades, developments in defence area have been maintained at national level or via bilateral agreements among certain

member states outside the EU box, which has resulted in the enlargement of capability gaps –which is estimated to be more than % 25 in just last decade- and duplications in defence sector (France et al, 2017, 4). With PESCO, member states are to be encouraged to develop joint projects that would prevent duplications in defence sector that lead to waste of huge amount of money. If 25 member states are able to maintain the political will that they have shown while participating in PESCO, the initiative may be the cornerstone for long term coherence and cooperation in defence field which can spill over the other fields. As the timing of the EUGS and following defence related initiatives signifies, one of the reasons for the launch of PESCO and other initiatives is to demonstrate that –especially after Brexit- the EU member states have the will and capacity to cooperate and integrate in more fields despite some crises they have had to overcome (Greco 2017, parag. 15). If the EU can achieve further integration in security and defence field despite the long-term reluctance for a comprehensive defence movement, it will mean that the EU can survive any crises as a stronger entity.

After analyzing the common reasons for launching PESCO initiatives, the requirements for participation in PESCO and working within this initiative should be clarified. The four benchmarks accepted by the EDA Ministerial Steering Board in November 2007 are applied as the entry criteria for PESCO as well:

- “Equipment procurement (including R&D/R&T): 20% of total defence spending
- European collaborative equipment procurement: 35% of total equipment spending
- Defence Research & Technology: 2% of total defence spending
- European collaborative defence R&T: 20% of total defence R&T spending” (Platteau 2016, 2).

The pMS have to ensure complying with the requirements stated above as well as the other commitments specified within the Annex of the Council Decision of 11 December 2017 if PESCO is intended to be a success story (EUR-Lex 2017). The EDA has had the same benchmarks for its participating member states since 2007 as well, but most of the pMS of the EDA have not fully met these requirements, yet legally binding nature of PESCO makes the EU officials more optimistic about these criteria to be met this time.

Five main areas have been outlined in the Article 2 of Protocol 10 for the pMS to cooperate with each other:

- “to achieve approved objectives regarding level of investment expenditure on defence equipment;
- to bring defence apparatus into line with each other by devolving specific attention to training and logistics;
- to enhance availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces;
- to ensure the necessary coordination with the EDA Capability Development Plan (CDP) and initiatives within NATO;
- to take part to major multinational or European equipment development programmes within the framework of EDA” (France et al, 2017, 6).

If these ambitious targets of PESCO can be fulfilled in the long term –most experts have already accepted that PESCO’s contributions will be observed in the long run-, the EU will finally achieve integration to a satisfactory extent in defence field.

6.3.1. PESCO’s Governance and Structure

As mentioned within the Council Decision on 11 December 2017, member states are at the center of PESCO and will be steering the process. The main decisions will be made by participating member states while certain EU bodies will support and assist the management of PESCO process which is related to the CSDP. Unanimity is the common decision-making rule for the decisions made on PESCO except the case of new membership or the suspension of a membership, in which cases qualified majority rule is applied (Fiott et al, 2017, 33). The EDA together with the EEAS (involving EUMS as well) act as the Secretariat of PESCO (also of the EDF as mentioned before) and HR/VP supervises the process. The capability related common commitments will be in the responsibility of the EDA, whereas the operational aspects of the common commitments and the operational projects will be managed mostly by the EEAS (Fiott et al, 2017, 32-33). As far as the operational projects are taken into consideration, the governance mechanism of each project is established specifically for that project by its own participants and it is supported by the EDA and the EUMS.

PESCO is designed to have two-level structure: *council* and *project levels*. As PESCO has a member state-driven structure, the responsibility for the policy direction as well as decision-making belongs to the *Council level*. The *project level* is the key to prove the effectiveness of PESCO initiative as the success of projects will be regarded as the success of PESCO initiative as a whole. If the pMS fail at project level, PESCO would start to be regarded as another failed attempt in defence field. Each pMS has to take part in at least one of the joint PESCO projects, but different participating member states will be able to join in distinct individual projects according to their preferences. Common governance rules will be shaped at Council level and they will be applied to all projects under the PESCO umbrella. General conditions about the participation of third parties that are not EU member states to the PESCO projects will be defined at Council level as well (EEAS 2018b, parag. 8-11). So far, 34 projects have been identified and initiated within the PESCO framework in seven areas (European Council 2018, 1-15).

Assessment mechanism about the pMS' fulfillment of PESCO commitments will be made per annum by the EDA and the EUMS within the EEAS as well as the *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD)*, which has a central role within the CSDP and is responsible for "the integrated civilian-military planning within the EEAS" (EEAS, parag. 1). Operational dimensions of PESCO such as "availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of forces" will also be examined in detail. To be able to assess the progress in PESCO projects, each pMS has to prepare a *National Implementation Plan (NIP)*, which elaborates pMS' plans about how they will fulfill the binding commitments, and share it with other pMS. These NIPs will allow the pMS to follow how well the binding commitments are fulfilled by other pMS (EEAS 2018b, parag. 16). The HR/VP has to prepare an annual report about PESCO in order to present to the Council so that the Council will be informed annually about the fulfillment of commitments by the pMS (EEAS 2018, parag. 8-11). If a participating member state cannot meet the common commitments of PESCO, other PESCO members have the right to remove that country from PESCO membership, which can be done according to qualified majority voting rule (EUR-Lex 2012). However, this kind of membership suspension is not usually preferred due to political concerns (Fiott et al, 2017, 32).

6.4. MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY (MPCC)

The EUGS, which led to a domino effect in terms of the launch of unprecedentedly ambitious initiatives just in two years in the security and defence field within the EU, has also conducted to break a fifteen years-old taboo about the creation of EU Operation Headquarters (OHQs), which was first suggested “by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the so-called ‘Praline Summit’ in April 2003,” the year that several European countries -except Atlanticists such as the UK- conflicted with the USA over carrying out a military operation in Iraq (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 9). Nevertheless, formation of a permanent EU military planning and conduct capability, which was uttered a few times in the following years, was repeatedly vetoed by the UK on the pretext that it would lead to the duplication of NATO’s command structure, from which the EU has to refrain according to the *Berlin-Plus Agreement* signed between NATO and the EU in 2002 (Tardy 2017, 2). As a consequence of the Brexit, the UK veto hindering the creation of the OHQs has been eliminated, which paved the way for the creation of the body called the *Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)*. The member states avoided using the term of ‘*Headquarters*’ and kept its scope and size limited to find the middle ground between the strong advocates and main opposers to the establishment of such a body (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 9). In fact, the chief factor that brought out consensus is the fact that the MPCC structure does not require additional budget allotment from the EU budget (Tardy 2017, 4).

Officially founded in 8 June 2017, the MPCC -softened form of the OHQs- aims at “enabling the EU to react in a faster, more efficient and effective manner as a security provider outside its borders” (EEAS 2018c, parag. 1). The main responsibilities of the MPCC are to plan the operations and to conduct non-executive military missions in the name of the EU (ibidem). After the evaluation of the MPCC’s one-year performance as the commander of “the EU Training Missions (EUTM) in Mali, Somali and the Central African Republic” in 2018, the MPCC was found useful, and so a new responsibility is attributed to this body: “to plan and conduct one executive military operation of the size of an EU Battlegroup” (ibidem).

6.4.1. MPCC's Governance and Structure

After some discussions about where to place the MPCC within the EU structure, it is decided to be situated within the EU Military Staff, a body working within the EEAS (Tardy 2017, 3). The Director General of the EU Military Staff (DG EUMS) is also the head of the MPCC, meaning that the DG EUMS is double-hatted as the heads of both the EUMS and the MPCC, so the responsibilities of these two bodies are assumed by the same person (ibidem). The MPCC currently has approximately 30 staff, most of whom are transferred from the EUMS and the inactivated Operations Center (OPCEN) (Tardy 2017, 3-4). Preparing reports for the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and giving information to the EU Military Committee (EUMC) are some of the duties of this body (EEAS 2018c, parag. 12). The MPCC has to cooperate and act in coordination with its civilian counterpart, the *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)*, which “is the EEAS Directorate serving as the Operational Headquarters for the civilian CSDP Missions” (EEAS 2018c, parag. 10). The coordination between the MPCC and the CPCC is ensured through the recently-founded *Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC)* that brings civilian and military staff together so that the synergy between military and civilian CSDP missions is strengthened (Tardy 2017, 4).

Even though the MPCC is criticized for its small-scale structure with utmost 30 personnels and its mandate is restricted with “non-executive (training and capacity building) operations,” so excluding executive military operations, the MPCC has made a valuable contribution to the CSDP by finally “[filling the] gap in the chain of command for non-executive missions” (Koenig and Walter-Franke 2017, 10). The establishment of the MPCC indicates the rise in the political will of the EU in order to move towards more ambitious CSDP (Tardy 2017, 2). As the creation of the EU command structure has been regarded as one of the indicators of the strategic autonomy, the EU takes one more small but concrete step towards becoming a global security provider with the MPCC as the EUGS aims at achieving, and it also proves that it is a new momentum for the Common Security and Defence Policy (ibidem).

CHAPTER 7

7. PROSPECTIVE SCENARIOS

After the EUGS was launched and novel initiatives began to be made in accordance, their prospective impacts are started to be evaluated and various scenarios are produced by experts in order to provide insight for the future so that decision-makers in the field can assess their decisions and make the necessary regulations in accordance with potential developments that may lead to prospective success or failure. Since the future is open for change all the time as a result of day by day changing facts and factors, analyses and related scenarios are updated as well. Building scenario is a highly advantageous method used to provide insight about a subject as it can emphasize motivational or behavioral relationships and value-based trends in a case which cannot be identified with quantitative data. In addition, when people watch or listen to something in the form of a fictional story, they develop an emotion which helps them voluntarily suspend their denial on a subject and get readier to change their perception about this subject. To be able to make up our minds about the question whether it is a new momentum for the European Security and Defence Policy or not, it would be plausible to mention some of the scenarios built by the experts in the security and defence field in accordance with the current strategic drivers and distinct trends within the CSDP framework so that the decision-makers and policy makers can have better foresights about the probable impacts and results of their decisions and deeds as well as get ready for alternative developments in the mid or long term (Gaub 2019, 2-5).

In this chapter, three alternative scenarios prepared by the European Commission in 2017 on the future of European defence in accordance with the developments occurred after the launch of the EUGS and ambitious initiatives -EDF, CARD, and PESCO- are briefly reviewed:

7.1. SECURITY AND DEFENCE *COOPERATION* SCENARIO

In this scenario, like in the other two scenarios, there is an increase in the cooperation in security and defence field, but it still depends on the voluntariness of the member states to cooperate with each other. The EU actions related to defence and security fields still rest upon national contributions made on voluntary basis. Despite rising their defence budgets to a certain extent, member states do not spend most of this money for joint defence programmes or actions most of the time (European Commission 2017b, 12). Therefore, a large amount of the capability gaps remains as most of the “defence capabilities [are] developed and procured on a national basis” although some new capabilities are jointly developed (European Commission 2017b, 13). As a result, the EU cannot join in most of the highly demanding operations under the EU banner, but only most capable member states undertake an active role in such operations. However, the EU maintains its support to strengthen and develop national efforts in defence field. In this scenario, EU-NATO relations neither worsen nor boost, but remain at the same level and in the same structure. It means that the EU remains as mainly a soft power, which carries out civilian missions and operations to ensure crisis management, and as it does today, NATO steps in when large scale military action is required (ibidem).

7.2. *SHARED* SECURITY AND DEFENCE SCENARIO

The second scenario in which cooperation turns into a norm for member states envisages that member states demonstrate more political will and solidarity in security and defence field by pooling together some of their financial and operational assets. Divergences in threat perception and strategic cultures started to be replaced with convergences. In accordance with the norm of cooperation in defence and security field, defence plans of member states are accommodated, which allow the member states to develop and maintain defence capabilities that would upgrade interoperability. The EDF is used so functionally that member states manage to enhance multinational capabilities in various areas and duplication rate decreases due to better coordination between member states. As a result of such developments, the EU’s capacity to undertake much larger scale missions and operations outside of its border and its accomplishments in

crisis management strengthen its partners' resilience against threats, which demonstrates that the EU can ensure more protection for Europe inside and outside of its borders. The EU gets more active role against certain threats such as cyber security or protection of borders whilst developing new internal policies in various fields such as energy, health, or space to invigorate the security and defence policy of the EU. In other words, it can be argued that the EU manages to gain its strategic autonomy to a certain extent that it is regarded as a more reliable global security actor. Cooperation between the EU and NATO substantially increases, and they enhance coordination in several areas (European Commission 2017b, 13-14).

7.3. COMMON DEFENCE AND SECURITY SCENARIO

The last scenario depicts a common defence and security policy which ensures higher integration in defence and security field as the Article 42 of TEU allows the Member States sharing same level of motivation to deepen defence integration as much as they can do, including the integration of defence forces, a development which may end up with the establishment of the Security and Defence Union. In this scenario, solidarity and mutual assistance are accepted as the fundamental norms in security and defence field. Hence, member states commit themselves more sincerely and strongly to one another's security, and they start to take the protection of the Europe upon as one of their primary duty as the EU citizens expect from the EU. The security interests of the member states are converged and generate common European security interests. The EU uses full capacity of the EDF that several joint defence programmes are supported in the framework of the EDF and various capabilities in different areas such as space, air and maritime surveillance, cyber security...etc, are developed so that the EU rapidly responds to the threats and crises. In this scenario, the EU is capable of organizing high-end operations such as naval operations in dangerous regions, or operations against terrorist groups which are currently organized by NATO or the most capable member states. As the capability development increases, integration in defence forces of the member states increases simultaneously, which ultimately leads to use of these forces at EU level and they can be available for rapid deployment under the EU banner. As the necessary financial contribution is provided by the EU via the EDF, European defence

market is liberalized from its fragmented structure, which highly contributes to the EU's economy (European Commission 2017b, 14-15).



CHAPTER 8

8.1. DISCUSSION

“The purpose, even existence, of our Union is being questioned. Yet, our citizens and the world need a strong European Union like never before. Our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens’ lives. In challenging times, a strong Union is one that thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts together” (Mogherini 2016, 3). As the HR/VP Federica Mogherini explicitly states, the EU has survived some existential crisis such as Euro crisis, migration crisis, Brexit and some other minor crises in the last decade which have ended with the questioning of the purpose, even the existence, of the EU despite the long-lasting peace and prosperity it has provided on the European territory, which suffered from endless wars between European countries for ages. The deterioration of the strategic environment of the EU has contributed to the internal crises of the EU as well. In reaction to these internal crises and external factors worsening EU geopolitical security environment, the EU launched a new Global Strategy that replaced the *European Security Strategy* adopted in 2003. The launch of the EUGS, which is highly security-oriented, is followed by a series of ambitious initiatives in security and defence field in line with the aim of gaining strategic autonomy and becoming a reliable security provider stressed in the EUGS. The significant question is whether it is a new momentum for the EU to achieve further cooperation and deeper integration in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU, which this study aims at answering in light of these developments.

When the history of security and defence integration within the EU is considered, it is realized that the EU has made several attempts to increase cooperation and integration among European member states even before the establishment of the ECSC, most of

which either totally failed or the ones achieved to be launched could not meet the expectations set by ambitious advocates of deeper cooperation in security and defence field. One of the main reasons behind the total failures or unsatisfactory achievements in this field is the lack of political will stemming primarily from sovereignty concerns, divergences in threat perception and strategic cultures of member states, mistrust and lack of enough solidarity in this field. When we consider current conditions, no one can claim that these long lasting sources of political reluctance for deeper cooperation can be immediately surmounted, but as the EUGS representing the common interests of the EU member states highlights, current challenges cannot be individually tackled by member states but only as a Union. As Macron and Mogherini together with several other EU officials implied many times, the European sovereignty and national sovereignty are complementary, which means that national sovereignty does not have to be abandoned for the sake of the European sovereignty as they can coexist. When PESCO is considered, it is clear that inter-governmental decision-making structure ensured by the unanimity voting system except for new membership or suspension of a membership is an evidence that member states have remained in the driver's seat. In addition, participation in the newly adopted initiatives is voluntary, which signifies that member states have their free will to take part in them, but once they participate in these initiatives, member states are expected to assure commitment to the requirements of the participation. However, only PESCO initiative has legally binding commitments, which put other initiatives at risk of violations as it was witnessed in participants of former initiatives in security and defence field. All these voluntary participation of the willings and intergovernmental decision-making structure tend to alleviate the concerns about sovereignty concerns.

As the EUGS points out, the interests of the member states in deeper cooperation in security and defence area are common, which requires the member states to put aside the divergences in threat perception and strategic cultures as none of the threats are local or regional in the globalized world as the Syrian Civil War has proven since its impacts such as mass migration or religious radicalization that led to the birth of terrorist groups have directly or indirectly affected not only the immediate neighbours of Syria but most of the European member states. Therefore, it is not the age to identify a threat as *your*

problem or my problem, but to regard them as *our problem* as the Union. As for the divergence in strategic cultures of member states, the common ground needs to be found that can effectively solve the problems and European strategic culture must be established. According to some constructivists, the EU has already achieved European strategic culture with the CSDP. The normative power that the EU has effectively used to solve the problems so far has to be strengthened with the development of EU's hard power, which necessitates the EU to increase its military capacity and capability, what is exactly the EU aims with the launch of current initiatives. The decision-making still lies in the hands of member states, which will not force member states to dive into an adventure that is fully against their strategic culture. Even if realists would claim that interests and strategic cultures of the states are static so they would argue that recent initiatives would not be able to overcome the long-lasting divergences in national strategic cultures or interests, constructivist approach supports the view that they are subject to change, much the same as national foreign, security and defence policies as the adoption of CSDP has proven the *Europeanisation of security and defence policy*. For constructivists, who emphasize the role of identity in shaping an actor's role on the global stage, the EU has already adopted the role of global actor which has led to formation of its own beliefs and European strategic culture that aims at unifying its member states' interests.

NATO first instinct is another reason that has blocked deeper integration in security and defence field. Even if it was formerly regarded as a threat for NATO's existence and dominance in defence field due to the prospective duplication of NATO structure and adoption of territorial defence role, NATO and its –unofficial- leader, the USA, have recently ceased to refuse deeper integration in the CSDP since it is commonly admitted that the stronger its member states get, the more power NATO gains. Despite some US officials who still stress the old fears about duplication of NATO sources, the EU and NATO have clarified that they will increase their cooperation and coordination among their staff and institutions so that they will prevent duplication in any case. As Brexit means that the most adherent Atlanticist is about to leave the board, the obstacle which has prevented several initiatives in security and defence field with *NATO first* instinct such as the establishment of the *Operational Head Quarters*, it can be inferred that

Brexit has contributed to the momentum in security and defence field. Nevertheless, there are critics who argue that the UK is chosen as the scapegoat for the failures in security and defence field, and they claim that Brexit would not lead to a significant change in the destiny of the CSDP as other divergences such as sovereignty concern would prevent deeper cooperation, which have not been disclosed as the scapegoat was always there before the other factors were unfolded to block the developments in security and defence field. However, the establishment of the MPCC, which was prevented by the UK beforehand, in June 2017 has proven that the EU member states have achieved the establishment of the OHQs when not blocked by the UK, even though it was formed under a different title. It has a symbolic meaning for the positive effect of Brexit on developments within the CSDP: the future of the CSDP is brighter in terms of the launch of more ambitious initiatives formerly blocked by the Atlanticist UK.

Another primary obstacle for the deeper integration in the security and defence field is the protectionist approach that member states have developed so as to favor and protect their national defence industry, especially their small and mid-size enterprises, which cannot compete with international companies in the global defence market. However, *non-Europe* in defence field has annually cost the EU between € 25 billion and € 100 billion, which signifies that protectionism which has led to the fragmentation of defence market, has impaired the national interests rather than protecting them. Similarly, decline in national defence budget has also hampered investments in this sector. With the launch of the EDF, the EU aspires to incentivize member states to cooperate with each other on joint projects in which they prefer to participate, which will be financed directly by the Commission if the project is conducted within the *research window* of the EDF and will get supportive funding –not fully funded– for projects carried out within the *capability window*. After the Euro crisis that the EU has survived, the EU member states have realized that they have to act more strategically while launching an initiative that will have economical and financial implications. It is obvious that the EU member states need to seek for the most cost-effective ways and means not to drain the EU member states of money collected from their citizens. When costs and benefits of investments in security and defence field at European level rather than national level are

calculated at full length and its long term contributions or losses are analyzed, it seems highly reasonable to invest as the Union since more money will be saved while spending the same amount of money, the fact that seems a precious driver for joining EDF projects. Even if realists would reject the possibility of more Europe in defence industry as for concerns about the relative gains certain countries would achieve, liberalists would argue for the benefits of deeper cooperation as they would claim that all member states will benefit from it, so relative gains should be disregarded as absolute gains will be satisfactory for each member state. The EUGS explicitly states that the EU will take steps which will create win-win situations rather than a zero-sum game (Mogherini 2016, 4). In fact, more Europe in defence industry resembles the initial purpose of the establishment of the ECSC: merging heavy industries used in armament so that interdependence would increase among member states and contribute to approximately 70 years peace period so highly apt to the EU's interests.

While the enduring challenges having blocked deeper cooperation and further integration in security and defence field are addressed in the EUGS as matters that should be overcome with solidarity so as to allow the EU to gain its strategic autonomy and fulfill the aim of being a global security actor that can handle with global issues, certain external and internal factors can be identified which proves that the conditions have grown ripe for developing the CSDP. As various external and internal factors have been analyzed in order to explain the developments in this field in previous studies, the recent external and internal drivers are also examined in this study to determine whether it is a new momentum for the CSDP.

The main external driver for deeper cooperation is the election of Donald Trump as the US president, which ended with worldwide turmoils resulting from Trump's unprecedented unilateral actions favoring US interests to an extent that he has withdrawn from international agreements which are regarded as international victories such as the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* signed in 1987, the *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* (widely known as *Iran Deal*), *Paris Agreement* and several others, which have shaken the world to its foundations. The economic warfare he initiated with *America first* motto has dramatically affected third world countries, but

the EU is also affected by this protectionist economic approach with additional taxes levied on certain goods. In addition, Trump has put a lot of pressure on the EU member states about more burden sharing as NATO members. Trump's unpredictability and unreliability on global matters, which can be detected in global opinion polls, is expressed by the EU leaders and citizens as well. As the previous experiences demonstrate, the EU member states get more inclined to reduce their dependency on the US military power whenever they have conflicts with the USA; therefore, today seems to be another momentum in the EU history when member states seek for less dependency on US hegemony in security and defence field.

Another prominent factor is the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, followed by more aggression on the Black Sea and Baltic Sea regions, developments which have revived the ancient fears of Russian aggression on European member states, mainly in former Soviet member states. The speculations about the implicit Russian intervention in the internal affairs of EU member states as well as its insidious support for the right-wing, populist parties within the EU member states have also alerted the EU to take precaution against Russia, with whom the EU's relationship is depicted as a strategic challenge within the EUGS after defining their relationship as a strategic partnership for more than two decades. Rise in global terrorism, mainly originated from failed states or civil wars in Northern Africa or the Middle East, has forced the EU to seek for hard power to tackle with this global-scale concern. As the soft power elements such as diplomatic negotiations can be maintained with actors that use legal methods to express their interests and demands, it seems impossible to fight with terrorism only through dialogue. As the US has shifted its interest towards Asia, mainly China, the EU knows that it has to take its destiny into its own hands and has to ensure the protection of its citizens against these kinds of global threats emerging in its neighborhoods. The revival of ancient Russian threat and the spread of global terrorism have forced the EU to adopt the security-oriented EUGS. When these above mentioned external incentives are considered, it seems that the time is ripe for deeper cooperation and further integration in the CSDP.

The internal conditions are also suitable for deeper cooperation in security and defence field. First of all, the Franco-German engine, which has been the driving force in successful integration in other fields, seems to have revived as France has pro-European leader, Emmanuel Macron and Germany has Angela Merkel as the Chancellor, who has been regarded as the secret power who has assumed the leading role during the existential crises such as Euro crisis or migration crisis and supports more Europe in all fields. During his speeches, Macron explicitly expressed his support for further integration in security and defence field whilst Angela Merkel also stated that it is time for the EU take its destiny to its own hand after meeting Trump at G7 held in May 2017. In addition, the public support for more Europe in security and defence field is at its peak according to opinion polls, which proves that it is high time for further integration in this field. The current treaty that comprises the legal basis of the EU, the Lisbon Treaty, allows the EU organs and member states to move towards this direction without making a Treaty change that would take a long time.

The EUGS was the first spark towards more cooperation in security and defence field with the motto of shared vision and common action. The current vision of the EU in this field is set forth with the EUGS and common actions have followed it with ambitious initiatives immediately. The EDF has been designed to provide the necessary budget for research and technological developments; the CARD has been formed so as to identify force and capability gaps while PESCO, which has legally binding requirements for its participants, comprises the political basis for deeper cooperation in security and defence field. All these initiatives are launched with high expectations to achieve the goal of gaining strategic autonomy as a global security provider.

However, the history of EU is full of failed attempts for further integration in security and defence field. For instance, the entry criteria of PESCO were actually criteria for the EDA membership which have not been met in twelve years, so it results in questioning whether they will be met as PESCO criteria or maintained after participation to PESCO. Similarly, the lack of sanctions for the violations of rules bounding the EDF or the CARD also adds to the doubts about prospective success of these initiatives. Another aspect that leads hesitation about the maintenance of political will for deeper

cooperation lies in the history of cooperative initiatives that were launched when certain external or internal factors triggered them and left aside after these motivating factors disappeared. In other words, when the current external and internal factors that have motivated the launch of ambitious initiatives change, whether the political will would be maintained or not, is still an enigma.

8.2. CONCLUSION

By the end of 2017, HR/VP Mogherini stated that “we have achieved more in this last two years than we have achieved in decades of security and defence in the European Union” during an EU ministerial meeting, which has been regarded as an exaggeration by certain scholars and recent developments are underestimated by them who doubt whether it is a new momentum in CSDP or not (Brzozowski 2018, parag. 17). This study is conducted to analyze whether there is a new momentum that has driven or propelled the integration process in security and defence field or not by explaining causal relevance of certain external and internal factors. The research gap identified in this study is that the external and internal variables examined and the initiatives elaborated in the study are quite novel developments that they have not been widely studied by the scholars so there is a gap in the literature which this study aims at filling.

In this study, recent developments in security and defence field have been analyzed in detail so as to find out whether it is a new momentum for the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. The ambitious initiatives launched in the last three years are stated as the evidence of the new momentum, which means “an increase in the rate of development of a process” (Cambridge Dictionary). In order to contextualize the recent developments, three major theories, namely Neo-realism, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism, are analyzed and their tenets about the possibility of deeper cooperation and further integration in security and defence field are elaborated. Even if all of them admit some forms of cooperation under certain conditions, constructivist approach leaves more room for deeper cooperation if the Europeanization is achieved in security and defence field, which has been already achieved with the CSDP according to some scholars like Howorth. As Keohane states, “*cooperation* occurs when actors adjust their

behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a policy of coordination,” which can be achieved with *socialization* and *policy learning* that promote convergences at national level and convince member states to cede the competencies to supranational institutions of the EU according to constructivists. As constructivists explicitly state, deeper cooperation and further integration in the security and defence field is likely to be achieved within the EU only if the norms and collective identity building as *European identity* that will complement national identities rather than competing with them are ensured. When recent speeches uttered by pro-European leaders like Macron and the statements in recently launched EUGS and related documents are considered, it is obvious that the need for building European identity that will co-exist with the national identities is underlined repeatedly. When recent opinion polls are investigated, it is clear that European citizens are eager to see more Europe in security and defence field, mainly after migration crisis and terrorist attacks on European territory. As the European leaders and EU officials recurrently state the rise in geopolitical security threats in recent years by adopting a securitizing discourse through labeling certain developments as security threats, public opinion has changed its approach to the issues on security and defence. During the securitization process of an issue, the securitizing actor –in this case European leaders and EU officials- adds this issue to the agenda and the audience – in this case the European citizens- has the option either to accept or reject the agenda formed by the actor, which means that securitization process is an inter-subjective process activated through dialogue between the securitizing actor and the audience (Šulovic 2010, 4). The European citizens’ support for more Europe in security and defence field in opinion polls demonstrates that they are ready to give their consent for new agenda having been shaped by the EU in CSDP that will develop this policy.

In this paper, casual mechanisms are examined so as to identify the causes that motivate deeper cooperation and further integration in the security and defence field that leads to a new momentum in CSDP. The inputs within the causal mechanism are analyzed under the title of external and internal drivers, of which occurrence results in new momentum in the CSDP, the outcome in the causal mechanism. To state it more explicitly, as external drivers such as loss of US credibility after Trump administration or Russian

aggression since annexation of Crimea and internal drivers such as Brexit leading to exit of the main veto player on security and defence issues or revitalization of Franco-German engine under pro-European leaders, are the causes of further developments in security and defence field, of which evidences -ambitious initiatives recently developed such as EDF, CARD, PESCO, MPCC- are stated and scrutinized in this study. Even though none of these external or internal factors are sufficient conditions to develop CSDP on their own, they are supporting and highly contributing factors for its advancement.

As this paper argues, this momentum in CSDP is supposed to contribute to the aim of gaining strategic autonomy and becoming a credible security actor in the international arena, which is the answer for the last sub-question asked in this study, “How does a renewal in the security and defence policy shape the future of the EU?” The EU has taken a concrete step by launching certain initiatives aiming increasing coordination and cooperation in security and defence field at European level. Additionally, the symbolic meaning of deeper cooperation or further integration in security and defence field is that it gives the message to the member states and the rest of the world that the EU has suffered from severe crises such as Euro crisis or migration crisis, and is about to lose one of its members UK, but it has managed to survive as a stronger entity. Even if several international actors including some of the EU member states started to discuss the life expectancy of the EU and predicted for the dissolution of the EU, the EU has moved forward, even in the security and defence field which has stagnated at certain level for more than a decade. As Graeger (2019) argues that not only the USA but also Russia adopt policies based on “a rationality marked by the absence of predictability, disrespect for international rules and norms of conduct, as well as engagement in disinformation campaigns,” a fact requires also the EU to develop its policies with a rational approach as well despite its long term fame as a normative power, so it can be deduced that the EU is acting rationally by improving its military capacity and capability, a development signifying that the EU aims at assuming the role of a military power as well as civilian power in the future (92).

When the current conditions are taken into consideration, it can be deduced that it is a new momentum for the CSDP. As the three scenarios discussed in the previous chapter suggests, the current momentum can end up with distinct level of integration in this field. It is obvious that the momentum would meet the expectations for further integration in security and defence field as long as the political will aroused today can be maintained in following years, particularly if the Franco-German couple survives under the leadership of pro-European leaders, who are supposed to lead the process in the direction of the target of gaining strategic autonomy and becoming a global security provider. This study has analyzed current external and internal factors that have motivated recently launched initiatives under current conditions. However, all the recently developed initiatives have set forth long term goals; therefore, further studies need to keep monitoring the developments in this field to find out whether the member states are moving towards the final destination the policy makers would like to reach in security and defence field. Additionally, a new theory that is more apt to explain integration in security and defence field better than established theories, which are inadequate to explain deeper integration in security and defence field due to the sui generis nature of the EU, can be created to conceptualize the developments in this field within a theoretical framework so that the prospective success or failure of recently developed initiatives can be more thoroughly analyzed and assessed. As this study attempted to identify main external and internal drivers, further studies can analyze the impact of each factor on the development of the CSDP individually.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Article 42

(ex Article 17 TEU)

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy.

Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.

4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate.

5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44.

6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Article 43

1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.

2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political

and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks.

Article 44

1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task.

2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions.

Article 45

1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:

(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;

(b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods;

(c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes;

(d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs;

(e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.

2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.

Article 46

1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.

3. Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.

The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned.

The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.

6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.

Appendix II

PROTOCOL (No 10)

ON PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 42 OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

Article 1

The permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6) of the Treaty on European Union shall be open to any Member State which undertakes, from the date of entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, to:

(a) proceed more intensively to develop its defence capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, and in the activity of the Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency), and

(b) have the capacity to supply by 2010 at the latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 43 of the Treaty on European Union, within a period of five to 30 days, in particular in response to requests from the United Nations Organisation, and which can be sustained for an initial period of 30 days and be extended up to at least 120 days.

Article 2

To achieve the objectives laid down in Article 1, Member States participating in permanent structured cooperation shall undertake to:

(a) cooperate, as from the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a view to achieving approved objectives concerning the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment, and regularly review these objectives, in the light of the security environment and of the Union's international responsibilities;

(b) bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible, particularly by harmonising the identification of their military needs, by pooling and, where appropriate, specialising their defence means and capabilities, and by encouraging cooperation in the fields of training and logistics;

(c) take concrete measures to enhance the availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces, in particular by identifying common objectives regarding the commitment of forces, including possibly reviewing their national decision-making procedures;

(d) work together to ensure that they take the necessary measures to make good, including through multinational approaches, and without prejudice to undertakings in this regard within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the shortfalls perceived in the framework of the "Capability Development Mechanism";

(e) take part, where appropriate, in the development of major joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the European Defence Agency.

Article 3

The European Defence Agency shall contribute to the regular assessment of participating Member States' contributions with regard to capabilities, in particular contributions made in accordance with the criteria to be established, inter alia, on the basis of Article 2, and shall report thereon at least once a year. The assessment may serve as a basis for Council recommendations and decisions adopted in accordance with Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union.



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