

THE SECOND RUSSO-PERSIAN WAR (1826-1828) AND THE IMMIGRATION OF
ARMENIANS FROM PERSIA TO TRANSCAUCASIA FOLLOWING THE TREATY
OF TÜRKMENÇAY OF 1828

A Master's Thesis

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Ankara
July 2010

To my beloved family

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OF TÜRKMENÇAY OF 1828

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ABSTRACT

THE SECOND RUSSO-PERSIAN WAR (1826-1828) AND THE MIGRATION OF ARMENIANS FROM PERSIA TO TRANSCAUCASIA FOLLOWING THE TREATY OF TÜRKMEŇAY OF 1828

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This work analyzes the Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828 and the migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia¹ following the Treaty of Türkmençay of 1828. This study covers the period from the forced immigrations of the Armenians of Julfa to Isfahan (New Julfa) by Shah Abbas I in 1604, to mostly the voluntary immigrations of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia under the control of the Russian Empire in 1828. The main aim of the study is to draw attention to the relationship between the Russian Empire and the Armenians in the region during and after the Second Russo-Persian War.

By the Persian Expedition of Peter the Great in 1722, the Armenians became hopeful that they would be emancipated from the Safavid rule, but owing to the highly strategic position of Transcaucasia and the pressure of the Ottoman Empire over the region, Peter the Great stepped back and the Armenians were disappointed. At the end of the 18th century, the Armenians hopes of emancipation were renewed with the brave

¹ The term Transcaucasia rather reflects a Russian perspective.

attempts of Catherine the Great in the attempt to establish an Armenian state in Transcaucasia. In fact, her intention was to establish a buffer zone against the Ottoman Empire under the umbrella of the “Greek Project” not to liberate the Armenians from the Persian rule. With the death of Catherine, the Armenians once more abandoned their hopes.

By the beginning of the 19th century, from 1804 to 1813 the Russian Empire was at war with Persia. The results of this war were unbearable for Persia; the Russian Empire had annexed all the Caucasus except the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan. After 13 years, because of the frontier problem these two great powers resumed the war, which continued until 1828. This second war was shorter than earlier but more costly. Although the role of the Armenians was not clear during the second war following the Treaty of Türkmençay approximately 45,000 Armenians emigrated to Transcaucasia from Persia, particularly from Azerbaijan.

Keywords: The Second Russo-Persian War, the Treaty of Türkmençay, Transcaucasia, the Armenian Migration, *Armyanskii Polk*.

ÖZET

İKİNCİ RUS-İRAN HARBİ VE TÜRKMENÇAY MUAHEDESİNİ TAKİBEN İRAN'DAN TRANSKAFKASYA'YA ERMENİ GÖÇÜ

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Bu çalışma 1826-1828 Rus-İran Harbi ve 1828 yılında imzalanan Türkmençay Muahedesini müteakip İran'dan Transkafkasya'ya gerçekleşen Ermeni göçünü ele almaktadır. Çalışma, tarihsel açıdan 1604 yılında I. Şah Abbas'ın emriyle Culfa'dan İsfahan'a (Yeni Culfa'ya) zorla yapılan Ermeni göçü ile başlayıp, 1828 yılında Rusya İmparatorluğu kontrolü altında İran'dan Transkafkasya'ya² daha çok gönüllü yapılan Ermeni göçlerini kapsamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın genel amacı ikinci Rus-İran Harbi süresince ve sonrasında, Rusya İmparatorluğu ile Ermeniler arasındaki ilişkiye dikkat çekmektir.

Ermeniler, Büyük Petro'nun 1722 yılındaki İran Seferi ile Safevi tahakkümünden kurtulacaklarına dair bir umuda kapıldılar fakat Transkafkasya'nın sevkülceyş bakımından önemli konumu ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bölgedeki etkisi sebebiyle Petro geri adım atmak zorunda kaldı. Bunu müteakiben Ermeniler hayal kırıklığına uğradılar. Petro'nun bu sefere çıkmasındaki gerçek amacı Ermenileri özgürlüklerine kavuşturmaktan ziyade bölgedeki ticaret yollarını ele geçirmektir. Bilahare, 18. Yüzyılın

² Transkafkasya kavramı daha çok Rusya'nın bölgeye bakış açısını yansıtmaktadır.

sonlarında, Ermeniler, Büyük Katerina'nın Transkafkasya'da bir Ermeni devleti kurması sürecindeki teşebbüsleriyle tekrar umutlandılar. Katerina'nın amacı İran hâkimiyetinde olan Ermenileri kurtarmaktan daha çok "Yunan Projesi" çerçevesinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile Rusya arasında tampon bir bölge oluşturmaktı. Katerina'nın ölümüyle Ermeniler bir kez daha hayal kırıklığına uğradılar.

19. yüzyılın başlamasıyla birlikte Rusya 1804'den 1813 yılına kadar İran ile harp halindeydi. Bu harbin sonuçları İran açısından çok ağırdı; Rusya İmparatorluğu Revan ve Nahçıvan Hanlıkları haricinde bütün Kafkasya'yı ilhak etmişti. 13 yıl sonrasında, hudut meselesi sebebiyle bu iki büyük güç savaşa kaldıkları yerden 1828 yılına kadar devam ettiler. İkinci harp ilkinde nazaran daha kısaydı lakin mali açıdan daha külfetliydi. İkinci harp sırasında Ermenilerin konumu tartışmalıdır fakat bir gerçek var ki Türkmençay Muahedesi'nin takiben İran'ın özellikle Azerbaycan bölgesinden yaklaşık 40,000 Ermeni Transkafkasya'ya göç etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İkinci Rus-İran Harbi, Türkmençay Muahedesi, Transkafkasya, Ermeni Göçü, Ermeni Alayı.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes within a broader historical background the impacts of Russo-Persian relations on the Armenians from 1826 to 1828, particularly on the migration of the Armenians from 1826 until the end of 1828. The historical importance of this migration from Persia to Transcaucasia in the mutual histories of these two great states and its place in the course of the possible construction of an Armenian state is emphasized.

The main reason for focusing on this subject was to find out how today's "Armenia" had started to become "Armenian" demographically. The era focused in this study represents the very beginning point in this process during the modern times. It is neither a simple nor a known era in most of the accounts. It is aimed to shed light on the history of this era for paving the way for future research. There is no published work that tries to describe the impact of this Armenian migration from Persia to Transcaucasia in the context of Russo-Persian relations in the first quarter of the 19th century. The first stage of the Armenian "emancipation movement" that began at the beginning of the 18th

century was completed with the foundation of the *Armyanskaya Oblast* by the *ukaz* of the Russian Emperor in 1828. Before the foundation of the *Oblast*, as a result of the Second Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828, the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan were annexed into the Russian Empire. After the annexation of these Khanates by Russia, the Muslim subjects in Nakhchivan and Revan migrated to other traditionally and religiously close states such as the Ottoman Empire and Persia. On the other hand, the Christians such as Armenians and Nestorians in Persia migrated to the newly annexed lands following the Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828. Strangely enough, although there was no specification as to whom the Russian Empire would allow to emigrate in the framework of the 15th article of the treaty, only Christians immigrated to Transcaucasia. Furthermore, as a consequence of the Treaty of Adrianople³ in 1829 following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829, approximately 100,000 Armenians⁴ from the eastern side of the Ottoman Empire emigrated to the newly annexed territories such as Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki and to the *Armyanskaya Oblast*. It is not an underestimate to say that the migration from Persia to Transcaucasia following the Treaty of Türkmençay was one of the most important parts of the transforming process of “Revan” to “Erevan.”

Considering the work that has been completed until now in Russian, Persian, English, French and Turkish about the related subjects, there was a striking lack in the literature about the collective use of works written in these different languages. These sources in several monographs and research studies were only based on two, and

³ *PSZRI*, Vol. IV, No. 3128 (1830), pp. 622-633.

⁴ Kemal Beydilli, “1828-1829 Osmanlı Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu’dan Rusya’ya Göçürülen Ermeniler,” *Belgeler*, Vol. 13, No. 17 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), p. 410.

occasionally in three different languages. This fact hinders the understanding of the details of the subject from the Russian and Persian perspectives. In this work, firstly, sources in Russian, English, Persian, French and Ottoman Turkish were employed. Secondly, the Ottoman primary sources are utilized in some parts of the work since it is considered that the Ottoman Empire could not be indifferent to the tension between the Russian Empire and Persia. It is interesting to note that the Ottoman archives contain many primary sources about the subject; however, the use of these archives is almost non-existent in other research. Thirdly, in this work, the Russian archival⁵ and published⁶ materials play a key role in the historical approach. Furthermore, the old Russian newspapers⁷ and journals⁸ are important in order to better understand the general perception of the situation in Russia.

This thesis was divided into 6 chapters. After this first chapter for introduction, the second chapter focused on the Armenian forced immigration by Shah Abbas I in 1604, subsequently the Persian Expedition of Peter the Great in 1722 and its impacts over the Armenians in Persia. The third chapter tried to explore the policies of Catherine the Great in the Caucasus, the progressive process of the Russian Empire via the Caucasus towards Persia and the cornerstones of the Russo-Persian relationship until 1826. Following these last two chapters, the fourth chapter tried to describe the

⁵ *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennii Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGLA)*; *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennii Arkhiv Voennomorskogo Flota (RGAVMF)*; *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennii Voennno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA)*.

⁶ *Akty, Sobramnye Kavkazskoyu Arkheograficheskoyu Komissieyu* (Tiflis: Glavnogo Upravleniya Namestnika Kavkazskogo, 1866-1904); *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya II Otdeleniya Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantselyarii, 1830).

⁷ *Russkii Invalid* (Sankt Peterburg, 1813-1917); *Severnaya Pchela* (Sankt Peterburg, 1825-1864); *Tiflisskii Vestnik* (Tiflis, 1873-1880).

⁸ *Kavkazskii Sbornik* (Tiflis, 1876-1912); *Vestnik Yevropy* (Sankt Peterburg, 1866-1918); *Sbornik Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva* (Sankt Peterburg, 1866-1917); *Russkaya Starina*, (Sankt Peterburg, 1870-1918); *Inzhenernye Zapiski* (Sankt Peterburg, 1826-1856); *Moskovskii Telegraf*, (Moskva, 1825-1834).

framework of the Second Russo-Persian War and the position of the Armenians in this process.

The Russia of the 18th century was a promising and rising power in the Caucasus. European-minded rulers transformed Russia into a Great Empire in the region. By the reign of Peter the Great in 18th century, the main political focus of Russia had been renewed. The control of the waterways around the Russian borderlines gained importance not only from a trade perspective but also from a military perspective since they could facilitate attacks on other states in the region. In the same period, in the 18th century, the Armenians in Persia had a promising trade connection from East to West. More than one century ago, the Armenians of Persia were forced to emigrate to New Julfa (in Isfahan) by Shah Abbas I in 1604. They had transformed New Julfa into a thriving trade centre, through which the Armenians controlled the main trade route from India to Europe. Even though the Armenians were generally content with the Persian rule, there were some emancipation movements under the leadership of the ecclesiastics and the nobles. It was impossible to rise against Persian rule without any support from abroad. From the collapse of the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia in 1375, the leaders of the Armenians were generally from the clergy class. It meant that the church possessed political and religious power at the same time.

Their first serious connection with the Russian Empire was in 1701. Before establishing contact with Russia, they had demanded the help of the European forces but were disappointed by them. The main reason for the Persian expedition of Peter the Great was to control the main trade routes than to emancipate the Armenians. For this period, the main source is G. A. Ezov's *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim*

Narodom [Relation of Peter the Great with the Armenian Nation].⁹ This work contains many primary sources about the activities of Israel Ori and other Armenian prominents at the beginning of the 18th century. Another important source was *Sobranie Aktov, Otnosyashchikhsya k Obozreniyu Istorii Armyanskogo Naroda* [The Collection of Acts, Relating to Overview of the History of the Armenian Nation] consisting of a set of three volumes edited by Sergei Glinka.¹⁰ In this work, Glinka presented significantly important documents about the history of the Armenian people in a broader perspective. There are also many monographs about the subject such as Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda* [The Armenian-Russian Relations During the Preparation of the Persian Campaign].¹¹

By the time of Catherine the Great, the Caucasus had once more attracted a great deal of attention in the Russian Empire. The main aim of Catherine the Great was to establish a buffer zone consisting of the Georgians and the Armenians in Transcaucasia. The first step was the Treaty of Georgievsk with the Kingdoms of Georgia, Kartli and Kakheti, in 1783; subsequently with the Expedition of Valerian Zubov in 1795, she tried to prove that the Transcaucasian Christians were not alone. By this connection, she aimed to protect Russian interests and to strengthen the position of Russia in the region. In this period, the Armenians also demanded the help of the Russian Empire but in this instance, they did not have military force to support the Russian army in the region. In

⁹ Gerasim Artyomevich Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom: Dokumenty, Izvlechenie iz Moskovskogo Glavnogo i S. Peterburgskogo Arkhivov Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, Avstriiskogo Pridvornogo i Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva, Korolevsko-Bavarskogo Tainogo Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva i Drugikh Uchrezhdenii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1898).

¹⁰ Sergei Glinka, ed., *Sobranie Aktov, Otnosyashchikhsya k Obozreniyu Istorii Armyanskogo Naroda*, Vol. I, II, III (Moskva: Tipografiya Lazarevykh Instituta Vostochnykh Yazykov, 1833-1838).

¹¹ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda* (Yerevan: Akademiya Nauk Armyanskaya SSR, 1980).

just the same way as during the reign of Peter, the members of their clergy class and tradesmen represented the Armenians. In general, Peter and Catherine have been compared with each other because of their policies in the Caucasus. Even though they had so many points in common, the strategy of Catherine was more reasonable than that of Peter.

Last but not the least; at the beginning of the 19th century, the Russian Empire still maintained its active military policy in the Caucasus. Following the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, the Treaty of Gülistan was signed with Persia in 1813; the Russian Empire annexed all the Khanates in the region except Revan and Nakhichevan. On this topic, the Russian and Persian literatures are extremely rich. One of the Persian monographs is Emine Pakrevan's *Abbas Mirza ve Fath Ali Shah: Nebordha-yi Deh Sale-yi Iran ve Rus* [Abbas Mirza and Fath Ali Shah: The Ten-Year Battles between Persia and Russia].¹² Another one is Naser Necimi's *Abbas Mirza ve Cengha-yi Iran ba Rus* [Abbas Mirza and The Wars of Persia with Russia];¹³ it generally describes Persia's two wars with Russia. Cemil Koşanlu's detailed *Ceng-e Deh Sale-yi Iran ve Rus* [The Ten-Year War of Persia with Russia],¹⁴ draws attention to the First Russo-Persian War. On the other hand, the Russian monographs show another side of the conflict. V. Potto's *Kavkazskaya Voina* [The Caucasian War]¹⁵ describes in detail the cornerstones of the Caucasian War in five volumes. Especially, the third volume is about the Second Russo-Persian War in detail. Furthermore, P. Zubov's *Persidskaya Voina v Tsarstvovanie*

¹² Emine Pakrevan, *Abbas Mirza ve Fath Ali Shah: Nebordha-yi Deh Sale-yi Iran ve Rus* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Fetakhi, 1376 / 1997-1998).

¹³ Naser Necimi, *Abbas Mirza ve Cengha-yi Iran ba Rus* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Tecdid-e Iran, 1326 / 1947).

¹⁴ Cemil Koşanlu, *Ceng-e Deh Sale-yi Iran ve Rus* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Do Hezar, 1362 / 1983-1984).

¹⁵ Vasili Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina* (Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007).

Imperatora Nikolaya I [The Persian War During the Reign of Nicholas I],¹⁶ and *Kartina Poslednei Voiny Rossii s Persieyu 1826-1828* [The Scene of the Last War between Russia and Persia 1826-1828],¹⁷ are significantly important sources in terms of the Russia's general perception of the situation at that time.

During this period, the Russian Empire was also in conflict with the Great Powers of Europe. The most important part of the process was between 1826 and 1828. Problems on the borderlines were used as an excuse by the Russian Empire to attack Persia before the Second Russo-Persian War in 1826. The Armenian military support for the Russian Empire was strengthened by the foundation of the *Armyanskii Polk* [The Armenian Regiment] in 1827. At the end of the war, the annexation of the Caucasus was completed by the Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828. Persia renounced all its rights over the Caucasus. The 15th article of the Treaty of Türkmençay was about the free migration of the Christians from Persia to Transcaucasia. Through this migration, the Russian Empire aimed not only to establish a buffer zone against Persia and the Ottoman Empire but also to draw advantage from the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. There are two works about the Armenian migration from Persia to Transcaucasia, one of them is S. Glinka's *Opisanie Pereselenie Arмян Adderbidzhanskikh v Predely Rossii* [The Description of Settlement of the Armenians from Azerbaijan into Russia]¹⁸ and the other is C. F. Neumann's *Geschichte der Übersiedlung von vierzugtausend Armeniern, welche im Jahre 1828 aus der persischen Provinz Adarbaidshan nach Russlan auswanderten*

¹⁶ Platon Zubov, *Persidskaya Voyna v Tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaya I* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Konrada Vingebera, 1837).

¹⁷ Platon Zubov, *Kartina Poslednei Voiny Rossii s Persieyu 1826-1828* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Konrada Vingebera, 1834).

¹⁸ Sergei Glinka, *Opisanie Pereselenie Arмян Adderbidzhanskikh v Predely Rossii* (Moskva: Tipografiya Lazarevykh Instituta Vostochnykh Yazykov, 1831).

[The History of Relocation of The Armenians, Emigrated from Persian Azerbaijan to Russia in 1828].¹⁹

Throughout the work, the titles of the sources and names in Russian, Persian, Armenian languages were transliterated according to the Library of Congress transliteration principles but names in Turkish were transliterated considering the Modern Turkish alphabet such as Şuşa instead of Shusha or Türkmençay-Turkmanchai. In the period covered by this thesis, the Julian, Celali and Hicri calendars were in use in Russia, Persia and the Ottoman Empire respectively. With regard to the dates used in the body of the text, all of them were converted to the Gregorian calendar, whereas in the footnotes the dates of the newspaper and other sources remain as they were published, that was according to the Julian, Celali and Hicri calendars.

¹⁹ Carl Friedrich Neumann, *Geschichte der Übersiedlung von vierzugtausend Armeniern, welche im Jahre 1828 aus der persischen Provinz Adarbaidshan nach Russlan auswanderten* (Leipzig, 1834).

CHAPTER 2

THE POLICY OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE OVER TRANSCAUCASIA AND PERSIA AT THE BEGINNING OF 18th CENTURY

2.1 The Armenian Merchants in Persia

Through the sixteenth century, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were the battlefields for discontinuous the struggle of the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Their wars had a calamitous impact on the peoples and economy of the region. Some of the different peoples inhabiting the region faced the reality of migration coercively or willingly. For instance, when Sultan Selim I of the Ottoman Empire occupied Tabriz in 1514, he took some three thousand-artisan families, majorities of whom were Armenian and he settled them in İstanbul.²⁰ The reason for these migrations was the trading struggle of these states. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Shah Abbas, the

²⁰ John Chardin, *the Travels of Sir John Chardin*, Vol. I (London, 1686), p. 360; F. Tournebize, "Schah Abbas I, Roi de Perse et l'Émigration Force des Arméniens de l'Ararat," *Huschardzan, Festschrift aus Anlass des 100 Jahrigens Bestandes des Mechitaristen-Kongregation in Wien (1811-1911) und des 25. Jahrganges der Philologischen Monatsschrift Handes Amsorya (1887-1911)* (Wien, 1911), p. 250.

Safavid ruler, violated the treaty of 1590 with the Ottoman Empire and occupied areas such as Tabriz and Nakhchivan.

Julfa was one of the prominent cities in the region in terms of its trading capacity. It was an important hub of East-West trade, and many of the merchants of Julfa served as representatives of various European or other commercial firms and interests.²¹ Prior to the occupation by Shah Abbas various Armenians had been accepted into the Shah's service and according to Sherley²² their capabilities made a great impression on Shah Abbas.

The trading contact of the Armenian merchants in Julfa was active from India to Europe in many of the strategic commercial centers.²³ By the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, English merchants were buying some of their major goods from the Armenian merchants of Istanbul, who had imported them from India and Persia.²⁴ Armenian merchant communities also existed in Georgia, Crimea, Kiev and Volga regions, Russia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania.²⁵ The international position and impressive trading impressive capability of the Armenians encouraged Shah Abbas to transplant the whole community of Armenians from Julfa to the New

²¹ Vartan Gregorian, "Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722," *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 7, No. ¾ (Summer-Autumn, 1974), p. 661.

²² Denison Ross, *Sir Anthony Sherley and His Persian Adventure* (London, 1933), p. 159-163.

²³ For the Armenian communities in India and their commercial contacts with East and West, see Mesrobian J. Seth, *History of the Armenians in the India, from the Earliest Time to the Present Day* (London: Luzac & Co., 1897).

²⁴ George Sandys, *A Relation of a Journey Begun and Done: 1610, Fovre Bookes, Containing a Description of the Turkis Empire, of Egypt, of the Holy Land, of the Remote Parts of Italy...* (London: W. Barret, 1621), p. 86

²⁵ Vartan Gregorian, "Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722," p. 662.

Julfa, in Persia.²⁶ The main reason for this massive compulsory migration was to divert the trade route India to Europe to a new route through Persia. In 1604, Shah Abbas I commanded the “compulsory” migration of Armenians and others to Persia where they were dispersed to Tabriz, Kazvin, Gilan, Enzeli, Derbend, and Kashan, but many of them were settled in New Julfa.²⁷ It is not clear that how many of them reached to New Julfa, but approximately 60,000 Armenians headed away from Julfa. For example, 13,000 families in the silk-growing northern provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran being adjacent to the Caspian.²⁸ In a short time, they established a chain of contacts from East to West. The Armenians in New Julfa reached prosperity under Shah Abbas but their privileges were diminished by Shah Hüseyin. Following the Afghan invasion, the prosperity of New Julfa was destroyed completely and the Armenians fled abroad such as Russia, Poland, Europe and India.²⁹

2.2 The Importance of the Armenian Merchants for Russia

According to George Bournoutian, “Armenians had contacts with Kieva Russia as early as the 10th century, but their presence in Moscow is recorded only at the close of the 14th century.”³⁰ In Golden Horde, they were used as merchants and emissaries,

²⁶ Vartan Gregorian, “Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722,” pp. 662-663

²⁷ F. Tournèbize, “Schah Abbas I, Roi de Perse et l’Émigration Force des Arméniens de l’Ararat,” pp. 251-252.

²⁸ Vartan Gregorian, “Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722,” p. 664.

²⁹ Cosroe Chaqueri, “*Introduction to the Armenians of Iran: A Historical Perusal*,” The Armenians of Iran, ed., Cosroe Chaqueri, (USA: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 4.

³⁰ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People* (California: Mazda Publishers, 2006), p. 235.

subsequently during the 17th century, “Armenians and Georgians petitioned the Christian Russians to expand their presence into Transcaucasia.”³¹ In 1667, Armenians became grantees of another major opportunity. The Russian Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov (1629-1676), who had rebuffed the attempts of the Europeans to take a direct role in the Eastern trade through Russia, granted the Armenian merchants³² of New Julfa the right to travel north from Astrakhan across Russia and to sell Persian products to European clients.³³ The Patriarch of the Holy See of Gandzasar,³⁴ Petro III (1653-1675), requested that the Tsar renew the earlier agreement made with the Armenian trading company with Grigory Lusikov as desired by all the Armenian merchants from Isfahan.³⁵ He added that they needed the help of Russia and complained about the current situation they were suffering from. By 1688, when the Armenian tradesmen made a commercial agreement with Sweden relating to the exportating of Persian commodities throughout Russia to Scandinavia, the unshakable position of the Armenians in Russia was further enhanced.³⁶

The two powers, Russia and Persia, did not hope to achieve military support from the Armenian communities, but they recognised the importance of the Armenians in terms of their commercial and financial networks abroad.³⁷ The Armenian merchants

³¹ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 235.

³² V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 500.

³³ Sergei Glinka, ed., *Sobranie Aktov, Otnosyashchikhsya k Obozreniyu Istorii Armyanskogo Naroda*, Vol. I, pp. 3-4, 9-10; S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 25.

³⁴ Name of the headquarters of the easternmost subdivision of the Armenian Apostolic Church, called the Catholicosate of Aghvank. Similarly, to several other subdivisions of the Church, the Holy See of Gandzasar retained a degree of autonomy from the Church's Mother See (seat of the Catholicos of Armenia and All Armenians) in the middle ages.

³⁵ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 25.

³⁶ Vartan Gregorian, “Minorities of Isfahan: The Armenian Community of Isfahan 1587-1722,” p. 670.

³⁷ *AKTY*, Vol. I, No. 297 (1866), pp. 274-275.

had trade possibilities in Russia through their base in the Crimea; furthermore, they had organized themselves as merchants and craftsmen in Moscow and Astrakhan in the later medieval ages. Thus, long before Russians ruled over a part of Armenia their intermittent contacts with Armenians clearly established two principal sources of Armenian identification, “commerce” and “Christianity” and these features were significantly related. As Christians in the Muslim world, Armenians were strategically located to engage in trade with Christians outside the Ottoman and Persian Empires. The Armenians did not have their own state, they were cosmopolitan people of trade and thus, were continually considered side by side with the Jews.³⁸ As a result of the competition between Russia and Persia, in order to gain the sympathy of the Armenian merchants, some prominent Russians and Persians recognized the region as a part of the “historical Armenia” and defined themselves as the guardians of the Armenians.³⁹

According to Grigor Suny, the Armenian leaders did not perceive the Catholic monarchs of Austria, Poland and the Orthodox tsar of Russia to be in the same category. The historians G. Ezov and A. B. Leo have debated that the European connection gave the Armenians an image of having better prospects than the Russian’s had. However, P. T. Harutiunian has commented that, a “Russian orientation” was already developing among some Armenian merchants in the second half of the seventeenth century.⁴⁰

³⁸ Ronald G. Suny, “Images of Armenian in the Russian Empire,” *The Armenian Image in the History and Literature*, edit. Richard G. Hovannisian (California: Undena Publications, 1981), p. 107.

³⁹ A. S. Griboedov, *Sochineniya* (Moskva, 1956), p. 428.

⁴⁰ Ronald G. Suny, “Images of Armenian in the Russian Empire,” p. 108.

2.3 The Arriving of Israel Ori to the Russian Court in 1701

Israel Ori (1659-1711), son of a *melik*,⁴¹ was from one of the Armenian families in Zangezour. Although the region, had been successively, under Mongol, Turkic and Persian rule, the *meliks* succeeded in keeping their status in the regions.⁴² In 1667, Ori was a member of the six member delegation to Europe established by the Catholicos⁴³ Hakob Jugayetsi (Hakob IV of Julfa, 1655-1680).⁴⁴ They travelled to Tiflis in 1679 and negotiated with George XI (known as Gurgin Khan or Shahnawaz II, 1651-1709), the King of Kartli, with their common problems about the Persian pressure and left for İstanbul in 1680.⁴⁵ When the Catholicos died in İstanbul on the way to Europe and the delegation fell apart; only Ori remained to continue the mission to Europe.

Ori spent approximately twenty years in different European states, and tried to gain their support for his people living in Persia. At the same time, the five Armenian *melikdoms*⁴⁶ called the princes of Karabağ (Artsakh) and Syunik signed the Treaty of

⁴¹ *Melik* is a hereditary Armenian noble title, in various Eastern Armenian principalities known as *Melikdoms* encompassing modern Revan, Kars, Nakhchivan, Sevan, Lori, Artsakh (Karabağ), Tabriz and Syunik starting from the Late Middle Ages until the end of the 19th century. For the details, see Hewsen Robert, "The Meliks of Eastern Armenia: A Preliminary Study," *Revue des Études Arméniennes*, No. 9, (1972), pp. 297-308; F. A. Brokgauz and I. A. Yefron, *Entsiklopedicheski Slovar' Brokgauza i Yefrona*, Vol. XIX (Sankt Peterburg: Semenovskaya Tipografiya, 1896), p. 26.

⁴² Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars* (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 111.

⁴³ The Catholicos is the head archbishop of Armenian Apostolic Church. This title was also used to describe heads of several subdivisions of the Armenian Apostolic Church in medieval times, such as the Catholicos of Aghvank.

⁴⁴ G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, pp. 2-6, 9-24.

⁴⁵ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁶ A principality in late medieval Armenia ruled by a *melik*. The five Armenians *Melikdoms* of Karabağ, Gülistan, Dzhraberd, Varanda, Khachen, and Dizak originated in the Principality of Khachen, an ancient feudal state that existed from the tenth to the sixteenth century. See for the details, Agop Jack Hacikyan, *The Heritage of Armenian Literature: from the Sixth to the Eighteenth Century* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), pp. 5-6. Persian Armenia was organized administratively into four khanates: Revan, Nakhchivan, Karabağ, and Gence.

Gence with Russia in 1697 and Armenians were to be supported by the Tsar against the Safavids.⁴⁷ Ori aimed to secure the help of the armed Armenians of Karabağ and Syunik. He found that the new Catholicos Nahabed Yegesasi (Nahabed I, Catholicos of Armenian Apostolic Church from 1691 to 1705) not only hostile to Roman Catholicism but also rejected the whole liberation movement.⁴⁸ Since he received no support from the Catholicos, Ori tried to win the support of other church dignitaries, but of these, only the Vardapet⁴⁹ Minas Tigranian,⁵⁰ *nastoyatel' monastyrya Svyatogo Yakova*, (the Father Superior of the Monastery of Saint James in Syunik) decided to accompany him to Europe in 1699 and remained with him until his death.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Ori had been disappointed with the lack of support from the European leaders such as Fredrick I of Prussia and Leopold I so he diverted his attention to Russia.⁵²

In 1701, after his great campaign in Europe “to liberate” the Armenians living under the control of Safavid Dynasty in Persia Ori arrived with his companion Tigranian in Moscow.⁵³ He was advised by the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold I to go there and seek support. Leopold I, who in fact, received Ori warmly and wrote encouraging letters

⁴⁷ M. Sadık Bilge, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Kafkasya: Osmanlı Varlığı Döneminde Kafkasya'nın Siyasi – Askeri Tarihi ve İdari Taksimatı* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2005), p. 169.

⁴⁸ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 28.

⁴⁹ Vardapet is a highly educated archimandrite in the Armenian Apostolic Church. For the details, see F. A. Brokgauz and I. A. Yefron, *Entsiklopedicheski Slovar' Brokgauza i Yefrona*, Vol. V-a (Sankt Peterburg: Semenovskaya Tipografiya, 1892), p. 515.

⁵⁰ Vardapet Minas Tigranyan (1659-1740) was one of the prominent figures of the Armenian liberation movement, together with Israel Ori, in 18th century. He was a well-known mediator between Armenians and the Russian Court from 1701 to 1740. See Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz, *The Chronicle of Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz* (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1988), pp. XVI-XVIII; Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Osmanlı-İran-Rus İlişkilerine Ait İki Kaynak: Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz'in Kronolojisi / Nadir Şah Devrine Ait Bir Anonim Kronoloji* (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1974).

⁵¹ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 28; Esat Uras, *the Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (İstanbul: İstanbul Research Center, 1988), p. 1006.

⁵² G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, pp. 57-59, 60-61.

⁵³ G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, p. XXVI.

to the Armenian *meliks*. However, Leopold I refused to be directly involved, saying that he could not take action due to the situation in Europe and the conflict over the Spanish throne. Moreover, warning that it would not be possible to send soldiers to the Caspian without the permission of the Tsar, he advised the Armenians to obtain the approval of Peter the Great.⁵⁴ He was well aware that Peter would not permit his soldiers to go through his territory.

Ori was welcomed by the Russian Court and received a promise from Peter to liberate his people from the Safavids.⁵⁵ According to Ori's plan, the Cossacks would link up with local troops to take Shemakhi, the hub of the Persian trade and the key to Armenia; they would move against Nakhchivan and Revan; and finally they would turn to Tabriz. The plan was ambitious and hardly realistic at the time.⁵⁶ Ori added that any conquest made by this army would be in the name of the Russian Emperor, and the territories occupied would be placed under his rule. In fact, he asked support from the Armenians as well as the Georgians.⁵⁷ Finally, after the campaign had achieved its objectives, Russian troops would remain stationed in "Armenia".⁵⁸ Ori explained that Armenia was a rich country and that it could feed large armies, and furthermore, within ten years the Armenians would be able to contribute more than a hundred thousand soldiers to the Russian army.

⁵⁴ Esat Uras, *the Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (İstanbul: İstanbul Research Center, 1988), pp. 1007-1008.

⁵⁵ For documentary evidence of Ori's correspondance with Peter the Great, see George A. Bournoutian, *Armenians and Russia, 1626-1796* (California: Costa Mesa, 2001).

⁵⁶ John P. LeDonne, *the Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 92.

⁵⁷ G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, p. 26.

⁵⁸ Esat Uras, *the Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, p. 1008.

After this unexpected visit, Peter the Great indicated his intention to have Russian supremacy over the Caucasus⁵⁹ and subsequently Persia, since Persia, Central Asia and India had a great importance in terms of trading routes. There was a considerable interest in the potential profit of expanding Russo-Persian trade. With canals being built to link the Volga with the Neva, the Baltic with the Caspian, and St. Petersburg with Astrakhan, this trade was expected to boom.⁶⁰ After the defeat by the Ottoman Empire in the Pruth Campaign in 1711,⁶¹ Peter completely diverted his attention to the Caucasus and Persia for the following years, encouraged by Ori's ambitious statements the desired dominance of Russia over the Armenians.⁶² When Ori informed the Armenian leaders and the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin of the promises made by Peter, the Catholicos once again refused to become involved.

In 1704 Ori entered into the service of Peter, subsequently in 1708, he was sent to Persia as a special envoy of the Emperor to organize Armenians in the region. During this journey, Ori reached an agreement with Esai Hasan Jalalian (1702-1728), the Catholicos of the Holy See of Gandzasar, to go to Moscow discuss the liberation of their people in the region.⁶³ Tigranian and Ori had spent several years together in Europe trying to gain support for the emancipation of their people before they returned to Russia. Furthermore, Ori had armed the Armenian voluntary forces in the region by the

⁵⁹ Kuh-ı Elbruz, as it was called during the Peter's reign.

⁶⁰ S. Soloviev, "Pyotr Velikii na Kaspiiskom More," *Vestnik Evropy* (Mart, 1868), pp. 163-164; John P. LeDonne, *the Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 92.

⁶¹ See for the details, Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Prut Seferi ve Barışı 1711* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1951-1953).

⁶² Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. IX (Moscow, 1857-79), p. 387.

⁶³ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armenyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 35.

permission of Peter with arms transferred from Amsterdam to Astrakhan.⁶⁴ In 1711, Ori died in Astrakhan when he was returning to St. Petersburg.⁶⁵ After Ori's death, Tigranian presented a plan to Peter concerning the Armenians being taken under Russian protection in 1714. In 1716, Tigranian was appointed as the Archbishop of all Armenians resident in Russia by Esai Hasan Jalalian in order for him to follow his activities with greater authority. Tigranian was also the representative of the Patriarchate of Holy See of Gandzasar, which was the institution which had embarked on the task of organizing the political activities for the national reawakening of the Armenians.⁶⁶ Tigranian also tried, but without success, to unite with the Georgians in a joint endeavor to liberate all Christians in the Caucasus and he accompanied the Russian army when it set out on its march to Derbend in August 1722.

2.4 The Persian Expedition of Artemy Petrovich Volinsky in 1715

During the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, in 1715 Peter sent his young cavalry officer, Artemy Petrovich Volinsky, to Persia to explore the Caucasus and Persia, situation in terms of geographical, political and commercial.⁶⁷ Peter was also

⁶⁴ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 36.

⁶⁵ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commisars*, p. 112.

⁶⁶ Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz, *the Chronicle of Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz*, p. XVII.

⁶⁷ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I (Sankt Peterburg, 1869), p. 4. Peter received his data from a number of sources, such as Alexander Archilovich Imeretinsky (Alexander, Prince of Imereti 1674-1711) and other Georgians on the one hand, and Armenians like Israel Ori. See for Ori's letters and others, G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom: Dokumenty, Izvlechenie iz Moskovskogo Glavnogo i S. Peterburgskogo Arkhivov Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, Avstriiskogo Pridvornogo i Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva, Korolevsko-Bavarskogo Tainogo Gosudarstvennogo Arkhiva i Drugikh Uchrezhdenii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Tipografiya Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1898), and P. T. Artunyan, *Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie Armyanskogo Naroda v Pervoi Chetverti XVIII Veka* (Moskva, 1954).

hoping for a military alliance with Persia against the Ottomans. Volinsky had an instruction list, consisting of twelve articles, written by Peter.⁶⁸ In particular, the Emperor had great interest about the rivers in Persia, because the commercial routes of India could reach via these rivers.⁶⁹ Volinsky collected information about the current political and economic situations of the Persia, its cities, harbors, mountains, rivers and fortresses.⁷⁰ According to Volinsky, the Ottoman Empire was the great rival and enemy of Persia, in contrast, the Persians had no problems with the Russian Court. It was a great opportunity for the Russian Court to use the Silk Road and furthermore to gain an ally against the Ottoman Empire.⁷¹

Artemy Volinsky reached Isfahan through the Caucasus by the route described by Israel Ori in 1717. At the beginning of this journey, there were no problems but after few days, the Russian ships under the command of Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky⁷² landed on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. The Persian side, under the control of Shah Hüseyin I, who had come to the throne in 1694, became suspicious and changed its behavior towards Volinsky as they heard of the construction of the forts by the Russian expedition under the Prince Cherkassky on the Caspian coast at the former

⁶⁸ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 72.

⁶⁹ Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 103-104.

⁷⁰ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, pp. 72-78. For the details of the expedition of Volinsky, see P. P. Bushev, *Posol'stvo Artemiya Volynskogo v Iran v 1715-1718 gg.* (Moskva, 1978) and F. M. Aliyev, *Missiya Poslannika Russkogo Gosudarstva A. P. Volynskogo v Azerbaidzhan 1716-1728 gg.* (Baku, 1979).

⁷¹ F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 315.

⁷² Paul Bushkovitch, "Princes Cherkaskii or Circassian Murzas, 1560-1700," *Cahiers du Monde Russe*, Vol. 45, No. 1-2, 2004, pp. 9-30. Peter's reasons for sending Cherkassky on this expedition were because Cherkassky had for a long time cherished the idea of opening up a safe trade route from Russia to India across the Caspian Sea and thence overland either through Persia or Khiva and Bukhara.

mouth of Oxus in 1717.⁷³ Nevertheless, after long negotiations with Persian officials in 1717 Volinsky signed a commercial treaty that permitted Russian merchants to trade freely in Persia.⁷⁴ However, the Shah refused to let him stay and Volinsky had to leave in September, and by 1718 he was back in St. Petersburg.⁷⁵

In 1720, Volinsky was appointed to the governorship of Astrakhan to keep a close watch on events with full military and diplomatic authority in Persia.⁷⁶ Then, until the occupation of Tiflis and Astrakhan would for a century, become Russia's military, naval, and administrative outposts for operations against Persia.⁷⁷ He informed the Emperor about the highly chaotic situation in Persia and encouraged him to attack there until the expedition of 1722. According to Volinsky, Peter would annex the northern side of the Persia, the region between the Caspian and Elburz Mountains, which was the center of silk production.⁷⁸ Moreover, this annexation would make the Caspian Sea into a Russian lake, so, it was a great step for reaching India.⁷⁹ It was impossible even to think of attacking Persia at that time, because Russia was already at war with Sweden.

⁷³ S. Soloviev, "Pyotr Velikii na Kaspiiskom More," *Vestnik Evropy* (Mart, 1868), p. 166; Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, pp. 105-106.

⁷⁴ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 3; Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 29-30.

⁷⁵ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 93.

⁷⁶ Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, p. 108.

⁷⁷ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 93.

⁷⁸ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 93.

⁷⁹ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 93.

2.5 The Persian Expedition of Peter the Great 1722-1723

2.5.1 General Description of the Expedition

After signing the Treaty of Nystad in 10 September 1721,⁸⁰ Peter launched a campaign to enter the Caucasus and Persia.⁸¹ Although Peter seemed to be so greatly concerned with the Baltic and Black Seas for most of his reign, he had not neglected the Caspian Sea,⁸² which was for him of great significance. Access through the Caspian Sea could provide a means of communication not only with Persia and the Persian Gulf, but also with India, furthermore, it would be possible to control commercial traffic from east to west.⁸³ Moreover, it was his excuse was ready to wage a war against the Persian Court. In 1712, approximately three hundred Armenian and Russian merchants were massacred and plundered by the soldiers of the Shamkhal⁸⁴ of Gazi Kumuk, Cholak Surhay Khan and Hacı Davud Khan in Shemakhi.⁸⁵ Peter had requested four million rubles and an apology in compensation for this event from the Persian Court.⁸⁶ The Shah, Hüseyin I, refused, and at that time; Persia was in turmoil because of the Afghan

⁸⁰ For the details of the treaty, see *PSZRI*, Vol. VI, No. 3819 (1830), pp. 420-431.

⁸¹ For the broader story of the expedition, see W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829 and An Account of the Conquest of Russia beyond the Caucasus from the Time of Peter the Great to the Treaty of Turkoman Chie and Adrinople* (London: Longman, 1856), pp. 1-13.

⁸² S. Platonov, *Histoire de la Russie des Origines à 1918* (Paris, 1929), p. 230; Boris Nolde, *La Formation de l'Empire Russe*, T. II (Paris: Institut d'Études Slaves, 1953), pp. 333-334.

⁸³ Boris Nolde, *La Formation de l'Empire Russe*, T. II, p. 333; Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, p. 59. According to Platonov, all Peter's wars were waged for the purpose of gaining and maintaining access to the coast of Baltic, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.

⁸⁴ Shamkhal or Samkhal is the title for the ruler of Gazi Kumuk and Tarku in Dagestan during the 12-19th centuries

⁸⁵ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 92; Guive Mirfendereski, *A Diplomatic History of the Caspian Sea, Treaties, Diaries, and other Studies* (New York, 2001), p. 5; P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 17.

⁸⁶ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 3.

invasion under the command of Mir Mahmud Hotaki (Ghalzai)⁸⁷ at the beginning of 1722⁸⁸. In addition to the existing pretext, this gave Peter a further reason to invade the northern side of Persia. The final excuse was another Lezgian attack⁸⁹ on Shemakhi in the summer of 1720 in which three hundred Russian merchants were killed.⁹⁰ The Shah's refusal to accept responsibility not only for the Sunni Lezgians but also for the Sunni Uzbeks of Khiva and Bukhara who raided the Russian caravans in Central Asia, although valid was not satisfactory for Peter.⁹¹

Peter declared war against Persia in 1722. The newly built Caspian fleet from Astrakhan under the command of Admiral Feodor Matveyevich Apraksin⁹² (1661-1728) attacked Persia in June 1722.⁹³ The Cossack forces from Tsaritsyn under the command of General Veterani began to move into Persia by mid-June. The Russian forces consisted of 22,000 infantrymen, 9,000 cavalry, approximately 20,000 Cossacks and Kalmyks, 30,000 Tatars and 5,000 sailors.⁹⁴ Before preparing his expedition to Persia,

⁸⁷ Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, p. 93.

⁸⁸ Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Osmanlı-İran-Rus İlişkilerine Ait İki Kaynak: Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz'in Kronolojisi / Nadir Şah Devrine Ait Bir Anonim Kronoloji*, pp. 3-22.

⁸⁹ Until now, there has been confusion in the published works about the subject because most authors are not sure which Lezgian raid was the real excuse for the Expedition of Peter the Great. There were two different attacks in 1712 and 1720; both were taken as pretexts by Peter.

⁹⁰ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armıano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, pp. 117-118.

⁹¹ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 94; Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, pp. 177-178.

⁹² Apraksin was appointed as High Admiral in 1705. Although he had no knowledge of naval matters then, he soon acquired it using his good sense and powers of application. He distinguished himself during the Swedish War, particularly at the naval battle of Hangö in 1714. See for the details, Alexander Gordon, *History of Peter the Great*, Vol. II (Aberdeen: F. Douglass & W. Murray), pp. 284-285.

⁹³ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voına: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," *Russkii Vestnik*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (1867), p. 567.

⁹⁴ John F. Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus* (New York: Longmans, 1908), p. 24; W. E. D. Allen, *A History of The Georgian People From the Beginning Down to The Russian Conquest in The Nineteenth Century* (London, 1932), p. 184; P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 14.

Peter had negotiated about the cooperation with the King of Kartli, Hüseyin Kuli Khan known as Wahtang VI, (1675-1737) and the Catholicos of Armenian Apostolic Church (1715-1725), Asdvadzadur.⁹⁵ Wakhtang VI had already sent a proposal with Volinsky for a combined action against Persia together before Peter prepared this expedition.⁹⁶ During this expedition, Dmitry Cantemir (1673-1723) was Peter's strategic guide.⁹⁷ Peter, while in Astrakhan, published a manifesto, in which he expressed his intention to carry out a campaign against Persia. The text was formulated by Cantemir and it was published in Turkish, Persian, and Tatar.⁹⁸ The war lasted from 1722 to 1723, the Russians successfully but temporarily occupied territories on the shore of the Caspian Sea from north to the very southern end. In 1723, they departed from the whole region only leaving a military post on the shore and retreated north.

Throughout the war, the Armenians and the Georgians⁹⁹ built up a force of 40,000 soldiers,¹⁰⁰ to join the main Russian forces.¹⁰¹ However, two weeks after the surrender of Derbend Peter returned to Russia. Although the Russian forces, under the command of Colonel Shipov, took the port city of Baku and part of Gilan in the next few

⁹⁵ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 118; M. Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'au XIX Siècle*, Vol. II, Part. I (St. Pétersbourg: De l'Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1856), p. 117.

⁹⁶ D. M. Lang, *The Last Years of Georgian Monarchy, 1658-1832* (New York, 1952), pp. 110-112; S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, p. 9.

⁹⁷ Georges Ciorenasco, "L'activité de Démètre Cantemir pendant la Campagne Russe en Perse (1722)," *Chaiers du Monde Russe et Sovétique*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1988, pp. 257-271.

⁹⁸ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, pp. 16-17.

⁹⁹ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," *Russkii Vestnik*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (1867), pp. 573-574.

¹⁰⁰ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 31; F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. 7, p. 318.

¹⁰¹ S. A. Ter-Avakimov, *Armyano-Russkie Otnosheniya v Period Podgotovki Persidskogo Pokhoda*, pp. 123-124.

months, Peter himself never returned to the area.¹⁰² The Armenian and Georgian forces were of no use to the Russians.¹⁰³ The Emperor's withdrawal from Persia had a very negative impact on the morale of the pro-Russian Armenians and the Georgians.¹⁰⁴ However, the measures taken by Peter did not imply changes in his Eastern policy nor did the Armenians lose their hopes of independence. The death of Peter in January 1725 put a temporary stop to the endeavours to extend the Russian influence in Persia.¹⁰⁵

2.5.2 An Armenian Profile: Davit Bek

In this process, Davit Bek (?-1728), a General in the service of Wahtang VI, was one of the most prominent figures in the region. In the 1720s, under the command of Davit Bek, the Armenian rebellion went beyond the planning stages and developed into a well-organized and sustained military movement.¹⁰⁶ Davit Bek was not alone in this process together with Avan Yüzbaşı and Mkhitar Sparapet they lead the Armenians dwelling in the territories of aforementioned five *meliks* to rebel against the Safavids and the *Melikdom* of Karabağ was founded.¹⁰⁷ From 1722 to 1725, Davit Bek headed the armed struggle of Syunik and Karabağ Armenians against the Safavids. This rebellious

¹⁰² W. E. D. Allen, *A History of The Georgian People From the Beginning Down to The Russian Conquest in The Nineteenth Century*, p. 184; Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), p. 5.

¹⁰³ Armen Aivazian, "The Secret Meetings of Armenians on Lim Island in 1722: Concerning the Possible Involvement of Western Armenians in an all-Armenian Liberation Movement," *Iran & the Caucasus*, Vol. 5, 2001, pp. 85-92.

¹⁰⁴ G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, pp. 345-347.

¹⁰⁵ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 13.

¹⁰⁶ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commisars*, p. 112.

¹⁰⁷ M. Sadık Bilge, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Kafkasya: Osmanlı Varlığı Döneminde Kafkasya'nın Siyasi – Askeri Tarihi ve İdari Taksimatı*, p. 169. *Sparapet* was a hereditary military rank that was supreme commander of the armed forces.

movement developed within in the context of the Russian advance in the south Caucasus and the decline of Persian power. Davit Bek sought to take advantage of these two important developments to liberate his people.¹⁰⁸ Peter the Great, on the other hand, was more interested in gaining a foothold on the shores of Caspian than in engaging in a war with Persia on behalf of the Armenians and Georgians.¹⁰⁹

2.5.3 The Newly Annexed Territories and the Settlement of Armenians

In 1723, under the command of Major General Mikhail Matyushkin, firstly, Rasht and later Baku were occupied in June,¹¹⁰ one result of the war was the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed on September 12, 1723.¹¹¹ By signing this treaty, the Russian Empire acquired Derbend and Baku, Rasht, Şirvan, Gilan, Mazandaran and Astarabad.¹¹² Despite the treaty, Russians did not occupy these gains permanently; they evacuated most of these places for logistical reasons. Moreover, the Emperor had made a promise to the Shah for the allocation of Russian troops to maintain order in Persia.¹¹³ The terms of this treaty made no provision for the independence of either Armenia or

¹⁰⁸ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commisars*, p. 113.

¹⁰⁹ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commisars*, p. 113.

¹¹⁰ For the Russo-Persian diplomatic relations between 1721 and 1735, see Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, pp. 232-253.

¹¹¹ *PSZRI*, Vol. VII, No. 4298 (1830), pp. 110-112.

¹¹² V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 30.

¹¹³ Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: a History and an Interpretation* Volume I (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 354-355.

Georgia. Indeed, the Russians openly reversed their policy towards the Armenians and ordered them to move to and develop the newly conquered cities.¹¹⁴

The Russian policy towards the Armenians fluctuated in the imperial period from declarations of protection of their fellow Christians to the persecution of a newly conscious national minority. The shifts in Russian perception of the Armenians were contingent on both the changes in Russia's interests in Caucasia and the developments taking place among the Armenians themselves.¹¹⁵ In general, the Russians' image of the Armenians was divided into three major categories: as Christians, as tradesmen, and as conspirators.¹¹⁶ The Christian image linked the Armenians "suffering under Muslim rule" to their Orthodox safeguards in the north. The image of the men of commerce also served the purpose for the most part to tie the Armenians to the expanding economic world of the Tsarist Russia. The image of conspirator revolutionary reflected a new reality, one of opposition and rebellion, which deeply alienated the Russians from their Armenian subjects.¹¹⁷ In this process, as soon as he had taken Derbend and Baku, on October 1722 Peter sent a set of instructions consisting of twenty-two articles in Astrakhan to his commanders in the region.¹¹⁸ In the 17th article, which was about the Armenians, he gave an order to General Mayor Matyushkin that the Armenian peasants and artisans should be settled around Baku and on the Island of Asalin (Salyane).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1010.

¹¹⁵ Ronald G. Suny, "Images of the Armenians in the Russian Empire," p. 106.

¹¹⁶ Ronald G. Suny, "Images of the Armenians in the Russian Empire," p. 106.

¹¹⁷ Ronald G. Suny, "Images of the Armenians in the Russian Empire," p. 106.

¹¹⁸ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," pp. 594-597.

¹¹⁹ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," pp. 596-597.

Moreover, Peter emphasized that the Armenians that had carried supplies that were necessary for the soldiers during the war should be given favorable treatment.¹²⁰

Furthermore, in the 18th article of the same letter, Peter stated that those Armenians, who wished to settle around the Fortress of *Svyatoi Krest*,¹²¹ between the Agrakhan and Sulak Rivers, they should be given the cropland around the fortress.¹²² According to another letter written by Peter on May 1724 in St. Petersburg, he ordered that not only the Armenians but also other Christians should be invited to Gilan and Mazandaran and advised his correspondent that at this stage, that the infidels, meaning the Muslims living around the aforementioned places, should not have noticed this migration.¹²³ Furthermore, the first Christian immigrants, nearly 700, founded two regiments in Gilan; the Armenian Dragoon Regiment and the Georgian Hussar Regiment.¹²⁴ The Persians in Gilan became so alarmed because of the feeling aroused by the Treaty of St. Petersburg that General Matyushkin was dispatched there with military support after the seizing of Baku. Despite the troubled conditions prevailing in Gilan, many Armenians and Georgians had settled there. According to Butkov, Peter's

¹²⁰ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," p. 597.

¹²¹ Peter left 18,000 men under General Veterani at the fortress to complete its construction and to serve as its garrison, see for the details, Peter Henry Bruce, *Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce* (London, 1782), p. 349.

¹²² V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," p. 597.

¹²³ V. Komarov, "Persidskaya Voina: Opisanie Pokhoda Gosudarya Imperatora Petra Velikogo k Lezhashchim pri Kaspiiskom More Persidskom Provintsiyam," p. 606-607; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 501.

¹²⁴ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 502.

objective was to encourage Armenians to live in Gilan, promising that, if they went in sufficient numbers, he would have the Persian inhabitants dispatched elsewhere.¹²⁵

Through this war, the Russian Empire gained valuable information about topographic, social, political and military characteristics of the Caucasus and Persia. The Christian peoples living in the region had a key role in stabilizing the new position of the Russian Empire and attempting to proceed in the Caucasus without gaining the support of these peoples was in vain. Furthermore, the Russian Court was well aware of that in order to reach the Silk Road of India and Central Asia through Persia; they needed to become familiar with the Caucasus. To set up a Russian military outpost in the Caucasus was vitally important for Russia. By doing so, Russia would kill two birds with one stone; by obtaining the support of the Christian peoples in the region, it would control the trade routes on its borders and secure a buffer zone against the Ottoman Empire and Persia.

2.5.4 Armenians from Kamianets-Podilsky Fight against Persia

During the Russo-Persian War of 1722-1723, not only the Armenians and the Georgians were ready to support Russia in the war zone against Persia. Furthermore, some Armenian groups from other countries such as Poland and some inner regions of Russia applied to join the war in order to liberate their people from Ottoman and Persian rule. Under the leadership of Mardiros Amerbek, nearly 500 Armenians sent a letter

¹²⁵ P. G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. I, p. 62; Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. VI, p. 54.

from Kamianets-Podilsky to Moscow. Their desire was to use the Russian territory to access the Caucasus to support their Armenian brethren against Persia.¹²⁶ They stated that until the Persian Expedition Tigranian had served in Etchmiadzin and Zangezur, subsequently, they emphasized that Peter had given his word to support the Armenians. They tried hard to persuade the Russian Court to accept the Armenians to join the military forces against the infidels.¹²⁷ They also informed Peter that a certain Davud Bey,¹²⁸ a feudal governor in Poland, was prepared to collaborate with the Porte against Russia.

The Armenian group also claimed that several hundred volunteers were ready to take up arms but this proposal was also left unanswered by the Russian Court.¹²⁹ After a while, the Russian Government sent an emissary but he died on the road. Moreover, they asked the Russian Government to keep the proposal secret, because if it were revealed, they would face a dangerous reaction in Poland. Some authors have argued that it was not only Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis but also Nestorians and Yazidis who became involved in the war at different stages.¹³⁰

According to another letter written by the same group, calling themselves Ukrainian Armenians, there were so many Armenians in other cities in Poland that had the same hope from Peter. After this letter, five members of this Armenian group were

¹²⁶ V. K. Voskanyan and V. M. Martirosyan, "Dokumenty po Istorii Armyanskogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya 1720-kh g.," *Istoriko-Filologicheskii Zhurnal*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1962), p. 17.

¹²⁷ V. K. Voskanyan and V. M. Martirosyan, "Dokumenty po Istorii Armyanskogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya 1720-kh g.," p. 18.

¹²⁸ Davud Bey was a feudal lord under the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region.

¹²⁹ V. K. Voskanyan and V. M. Martirosyan, "Dokumenty po Istorii Armyanskogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya 1720-kh g.," p. 18.

¹³⁰ V. K. Voskanyan and V. M. Martirosyan, "Dokumenty po Istorii Armyanskogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya 1720-kh g.," p. 19.

called to Moscow by Tigranian and the *Kollegium Inostrannykh Del* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). These Armenians first travelled to Kamianets-Podilsky and then went to Moscow. They stated that many leaders and soldiers were already armed and ready, as soon as they received the order from Peter they would make an effort to liberate their people from the Ottoman and Persian yoke. After a query by the *Kollegium Inostrannykh Del*, three of the delegation were sent to back in the company with Stepan Polyakov carrying a message from Peter to Kiev, approving their migration to Russia. After a short time, a new group of Armenians arrived in Moscow from Kamianets-Podilsky requesting permission to go to the Caucasus. Tigranyan presented their application to Chancellor Golovkin;¹³¹ soon, their Russian passports were given and they were sent to join the Armenian armed forces in the Caucasus with the support of Grigor Stepanov.¹³²

2.5.5 The Declaration of Peter the Great about the Liberation of Armenians in 1722

According to the declaration of 1722, the liberation of Transcaucasia from Persian and Ottoman oppression and its annexation took a prominent place on the agenda of the Russian Empire. In this declaration, Peter explained the reasons why the

¹³¹ Chancellor Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin (1660-1734) was at the head of ambassadorial order, in 1718 appointed to the head of the *Kollegium Inostrannykh Del*, and directed the foreign policy of the Russian Empire until his death.

¹³² Grigor Stepanov was one of the most important figures who left *Skhnakh*. He was given the rank of Colonel then *Yüzbaşı*. He organized a military campaign consisting of forces from the Kamianets, and in order to defend this region returned to the *Skhnakhs* via Russia. A *Skhnakh* was a strengthened settlement, a fortress or military camp in the East Armenian Principalities, particularly found in Karabağ and Syunik existing since the middleages. There were three regional *Skhnakh*; *Metz Skhnakh* (Big *Skhnakh*), was near Mravsky Mountains on bank of the river Tartar in the Principality of Dzhraberd. *Pokr Skhnakh* (Small *Skhnakh*) was located on a Kirs Mountain slope in a Principality of Varanda, and the third was in the province of Kapan.

Persian Expedition to Georgia and Armenia was stopped. The Russian attempt to annex Transcaucasia would bring forth a new war for Russia against the Ottoman Empire; and Peter had some hesitations about losing the success that had been acquired there. During this expedition and after, Armenian soldiers in particular won the Russian commanders' approval. A letter from Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov¹³³ to Chancellor Golovkin from Rasht on November 1726, stated that the Armenians had prevailed over the Turks so many times in the region.¹³⁴

2.6 The Treaty of St. Petersburg of 1723 and the Treaty of İstanbul of 1724

In the wake of signing, the Treaty of St. Petersburg, Russia knew that it was not possible to keep these newly annexed lands if the Shah Tahmasb II did not implement the provisions of the treaty. This expedition served the interests of the Armenians but with the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, Armenians felt abandoned by the Tsar.¹³⁵

The Ottoman Empire was aware of the turmoil in Persia, for this reason, had to take precautions in time. Through its envoy, Ahmed Dürrî Efendi,¹³⁶ the Ottoman

¹³³ Vasily Vladimirovich Dolgorukov (1667-1746), Russian General, was a member of *Verkhovnii Tainii Sovet* (Supreme Privy Council) founded in 1726 as a body of advisors to Catherine I (1684-1727). For the details, see Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. XIX, (Moskva, 1857-79).

¹³⁴ V. K. Voskanyan and V. M. Martirosyan, "Dokumenty po Istorii Armyanskogo Osvoboditel'nogo Dvizheniya 1720-kh g.," p. 19.

¹³⁵ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 501; Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, p. 22.

¹³⁶ For the details of Ahmed Dürrî Efendi's journey to Persia, see Münir Aktepe, "Dürrî Ahmet Efendi'nin İran Sefâreti," *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, Vol. 1-6 (İstanbul, 1967-1968); Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2008), pp. 59-61.

Empire obtained information about the political situation in Isfahan. The main policy of İstanbul was to be sure about the goal of Mir Mahmud.¹³⁷ On the other hand, with the Treaty of Pruth in 1711, Russia had lost its power over the Black Sea and even the Sea of Azak, thus, it focused all its attention on the Caucasus. After some problematic events in the region, Russia signed the Treaty of İstanbul with the Ottoman Empire in 1724, partitioning some parts of the Caucasus between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires.¹³⁸ The Ottoman Empire, in fact, also had suspicions about Peter's intentions. In this respect, İstanbul gave an order to the Governor of Erzurum, Abdullah Paşa, concerning the strengthening of the fort on August 1722.¹³⁹ Several ships arrived at Trabzon from İstanbul bringing arms and ammunition because İstanbul was not sure whether Peter would attack on the Ottoman Empire over Revan.¹⁴⁰

2.7 The Strategic Commercial Importance of the Caspian Sea

The progress of Russian forces along the Caspian shore was a challenge to the Ottoman Empire since the main strategic principle of the Empire was not to allow any "foreign" power to have military posts at the south of the Caucasus range over the Caspian sea.¹⁴¹ For this reason, the priority of the Ottoman Empire was to take control of

¹³⁷ M. Münir Aktepe, *1720-1724 Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri ve Silâhşör Kemânî Mustafa Ağa'nın Revân Fetihnâmesi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1970), pp. 14-15.

¹³⁸ For a complete text of the agreement, see *PSZRI*, Vol. VII, No. 4531 (1830), pp. 303-309; J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, Vol. I (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1956), pp. 42-45; *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, II, 1575-1918*, pp. 28-35.

¹³⁹ Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz, *The Chronicle of Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz*, p. 43.

¹⁴⁰ Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz, *The Chronicle of Petros Di Sarkis Gilanentz*, p. 44.

¹⁴¹ Ahmet Asım, *Asım Tarihi*, Vol. I (İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası), p. 15.

the city of Baku before Russia however, because of disagreements among the Ottoman commanders, Russia succeeded in seizing Baku.¹⁴² During this process, the Russian ambassador, I. I. Nepliuev, was called to the Palace and through the medium of the Ottoman ambassador in Moscow, Kapıcıbaşı Nişli Mehmed Ağa,¹⁴³ a diplomatic note was sent to the Russian Court protesting the invasion of Dagestan by the Russian forces.¹⁴⁴ Peter was well aware of the threat from the Ottoman Empire but he had no intention of leaving the Caspian Sea to any other state.¹⁴⁵

Peter had a plan to march forward into the southern Caucasus with the aid of Wahtang VI of Kartli, Catholicos Asdvadzadur and their followers but because of the threat from the Ottoman Empire, logistical problems after constructing the fortress of *Svyatoy Krest* they retreated to Terek.¹⁴⁶ By the Treaty of İstanbul, in exchange for the accession to the Persian throne of Tahmasb II, Gilan, Mazandaran and Astarabad were given to Russia and eastern Georgia, Şirvan, Gence, Revan, Karabağ, Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan and Iraq-i Acem remained under the patronage of the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁴² M. Münir Aktepe, *1720-1724 Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri ve Silâhşör Kemâni Mustafa Ağa'nın Revân Fetihnâmesi*, p. 19.

¹⁴³ Faik Reşit Unat, *Osmanlı Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri*, pp. 62-65.

¹⁴⁴ Ahmet Asım, *Asım Tarihi*, Vol. I (İstanbul: Ceride-i Havadis Matbaası), p. 20.

¹⁴⁵ Sergei M. Soloviev, *Istoriya Rossii*, Vol. IX, p. 397.

¹⁴⁶ Peter Henry Bruce, *Memoirs of Peter Henry Bruce* (London, 1782), 289; Jonas Hanway, *The Revolutions of Persia: Containing the Reign of Shah Sultan Hussein with the Invasion of Afghans*, Vol. III (London, 1753), p. 174; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, pp. 27-28.

2.8 The Invitation of the Armenians by Peter the Great

The Persian Expedition of 1722-1723 and subsequently the Treaty of İstanbul in 1724 were successfully military and diplomatic steps for Russia under Emperor Peter. The Russian Empire was accepted as a regional state on the Caspian shores. The struggle began with the occupation of abovementioned territories by the Ottoman Empire in Persia, which brought the problem of the non-Muslim peoples being alienated from the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Over time, the non-Muslim peoples began to feel closer to the Russian Empire however the Armenians had some suspicions about the Peter's policy. The Ottomans had also advanced beyond Tiflis to Karabağ and Kapan, under these circumstances, the Armenians sent a delegation of three to inform the Russian Emperor of the Turkish advance and to ask for help. According to the Treaty of İstanbul signed in 1724, the Western Coast of the Caspian Sea was to remain under Russian rule, and the remaining area, including Karabağ and Kapan, was given to the Ottoman Empire. Peter advised the committee to instruct the Armenian inhabitants of the occupied areas to migrate to the regions still under Russian control.¹⁴⁷ The reaction of the Armenians was one of shock and despair when they saw that the promises that had been made to them had been replaced by such recommendations. The tensions lasting 22 years until 1746 between İstanbul and Persia strengthened Russian power day by day.

¹⁴⁷ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, Persidskaya Voyna 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 501; Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1010.

2.9 The Russo-Persian Tensions after the Death of Peter

After the death of Peter in 1725, Russian interest in Persia lessened, while Tahmasp and his able General, the future Nader Shah, began to retrieve the lost provinces.¹⁴⁸ As soon as he had cleared Persia from the Afghans, he sent an embassy to Russia, requiring the evacuation of the Persian provinces.¹⁴⁹ Finally, Empress Anna signed the Treaty of Rasht in 1732,¹⁵⁰ and the Treaty of Gence in 1735,¹⁵¹ and all Russian forces based in the former Safavid provinces were to retreat. Russian interest in Persia remained inactive until the reign of Catherine II late in the 18th century. The Persian resurrection under Nader Shah (1736-1747) reasserted Persia's control over the region.¹⁵² Even before his crowning, Nader was effective in forcing the complete Russian withdrawal beyond the Terek, and a short time thereafter he succeeded in reclaiming eastern Armenia and Georgia from the Ottomans.¹⁵³ Georgia was divided in five principalities at that time; Kartli, Kakheti, Immeretia, Mingrelia and Gurelia. By the treaty of peace concluded between the Ottoman Empire and Persia, the whole of these principalities as well as Akhaltsikhe were ceded to Persia.¹⁵⁴ Although the rise of Nader Shah in Persia and subsequent events precluded such an arrangement, the hope of Russian intervention persisted among the Armenians.¹⁵⁵ The ten-year occupation of the

¹⁴⁸ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 232-233.

¹⁴⁹ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 17.

¹⁵⁰ *PSZRI*, Vol. VIII, No. 5935, (1830), pp. 614-620.

¹⁵¹ *PSZRI*, Vol. IX, No. 6707, (1830), pp. 492-496; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 40.

¹⁵² George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828* (New York: Mazda Publishers, 1992), p. 4.

¹⁵³ For further details on the reign of Nader Shah Afshar, see Laurence Lockhart, *Nadir Shah: A Critical Study Based Mainly on Contemporary Sources* (London, 1938).

¹⁵⁴ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 21.

¹⁵⁵ Sergei Glinka, ed., *Sobranie Aktov, Otnosyashchikhsya k Obozreniyu Istorii Armyanskogo Naroda*, Vol. II, pp. 44-45; G. A. Ezov, *Snosheniya Petra Velikogo s Armyanskim Narodom*, pp. 423-424.

city by the Ottoman Empire (1724-1734), the campaigns of Nader Shah, the despotic rule of local Khans, all forced the periodic migration of Armenians to Kara Kilise in the Pambak¹⁵⁶ region, seeking Georgian and, after 1783, Russian protection.¹⁵⁷ Empress Anna Ivanovna maintained the Peter's policy of encouraging Armenians to settle in Russia, on the contrary, Empress Yelizaveta Petrovna (1709-1762) limited the construction of new Armenian churches in Russia.¹⁵⁸

In line with its interest and alliances, Russia participated in five wars between 1725 and 1762. In 1733-35 Russia and Austria fought against France in the War of the Polish Succession, which resulted in the defeat of the French candidate Stanislaw Leszczynski and the coronation of the son of Augustus II as Augustus III of Poland. In 1736-39 Russia was again allied to Austria, waged a war against the Ottoman Empire that was supported by France. In 1746-1748 Russia participated in the last stages of the War of Austrian Succession, begun in 1740 when Frederick the Great seized Silesia from Austria. A much greater importance must be attached to the Russian intervention in the Seven Years' War, 1756-1763, fought again largely over Silesia.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ Pambak is a town in the Lori Province of Armenia.

¹⁵⁷ *AKTY*, Vol. II, No. 1205 (1868), pp. 604-605.

¹⁵⁸ George Bourmoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 238.

¹⁵⁹ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 252.

CHAPTER 3

THE POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE OVER TRANSCAUCASIA AND PERSIA AT THE END OF THE 18th CENTURY

3.1 The Expedition of Count Voivonovich in 1781 and the Treaty of Georgievsk of 1783

The calm process between Russia and Persia began to change with the increasing role of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus in the second half of the 18th century. The reign of Catherine the Great made better the position of the Armenian community in Russia. In 1763, Catherine gave privilege the Armenians of Russia and their prelate as a separate religious community.¹⁶⁰ After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774, the Armenians in the Crimea was forced to left for a new settlement along the Don River under the framework of the “Greek Project.”¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 238.

¹⁶¹ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 238.

In 1781, Aga Muhammad Khan contacted a Russian expeditionary fleet, consisting of four frigates and two sloops.¹⁶² Count Voivonovich, the head of the expedition, was appointed by Catherine the Great with the task of creating a fortified base at the Gulf of Astarabad, to protect merchants against the raids by the Turkmens.¹⁶³ The Voivonovich's expedition was closely connected with the Empress' plans for the occupation of the northern provinces of Persia.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, with Persia once again in turmoil, Russia under Catherine was approached by the Armenian community in Transcaucasia and received promises of support.¹⁶⁵ Catherine's positive reactions were echoed by the leading figures of the Armenian community in Russia and India.¹⁶⁶ The Empress attributed a special importance to the location of Astarabad because it had a strategic importance in terms of controlling the trade routes from Europe to India via Central Asia.¹⁶⁷ During this process, Aga Muhammad Khan had a tendency to establish relations with the Russian Empire but the fortress built by the Russians was too much for him. The members of the Russian expedition were seized and dispatched back to Russia.¹⁶⁸

The Kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti in Eastern Georgia were under the suzerainty of Persia until the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 when these two kingdoms became practically independent and united under the reign of Irakli II in 1762.

¹⁶² Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 290.

¹⁶³ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁴ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 154.

¹⁶⁵ J. Klaproth, *Travels in the Caucasus and Georgia Performed in Years 1807 and 1808 by the Command of Russian Government* (London: Elibron Classics, 1814), pp. 86-87.

¹⁶⁶ *AKTY*, Vol. I, No. 311 (1866), pp. 282-283.

¹⁶⁷ R. Fadeev, *Shestdesyat' Let Kavkazskoi Voiny* (Tiflis: Voenno-Pokhodnaya Tipografiya Glavnogo Shtaba Kavkazskoi Armii, 1860), pp. 9-11.

¹⁶⁸ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 290.

Subsequently, in order to stand up to Persia's ambitions they accepted the protection of the Russian Empire with the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783.¹⁶⁹ In this treaty, Russia guaranteed Georgia's internal sovereignty, territorial integrity and the continuation of Bagrationi Dynasty. Following the treaty, J. Reineggs, acting as an agent of Potemkin,¹⁷⁰ organized a journey to Transcaucasia, where he contacted Georgian elders. Imitating the Georgians, the Armenian Catholicos Gukas and some of the Persian Khans in the reign also desired to maintain their status through a similar cooperation with Russia.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, the Russian Empire tried to make contact with the Khans of Khoy and Tabriz.¹⁷²

On the other hand, Catherine had some hesitations about occupying Persia since the wars with the Western states and the Ottoman Empire engaged most of her armed forces.¹⁷³ Moreover, she did not want to rely on the Persian Khans and the Armenians.¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, the Russian Empire had an intention to seize the Fortress of Revan with the support of Irakli II. To achieve this goal, Russia put pressure on the Khans of Azerbaijan but the Ottoman Empire supported these Khans in order to hinder the

¹⁶⁹ For the details, see *PSZRI*, Vol. XXI, No. 15835 (1830), pp. 1013-1017; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 195; G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. II (Sankt Peterburg, 1869), pp. 70-80.

¹⁷⁰ For the memories of Potemkin, see *Memoirs of Potemkin* (London, 1813).

¹⁷¹ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. II (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya I. N. Skorokhodov, 1886), pp. 165-169; Sergei Glinka, ed., *Sobranie Aktov, Otnosyashchikhsya k Obozreniyu Istorii Armyanskogo Naroda*, Vol. II, pp. 45-46.

¹⁷² *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914* (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1992), pp. 76-77.

¹⁷³ M. Brosset, *Histoire de la Géorgie depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'au XIX Siècle*, Vol. II, Part. II (St. Pétersbourg: De l'Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1857), pp. 380-406.

¹⁷⁴ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 69.

progress of the Russian Empire.¹⁷⁵ The project of the Russian Empire and Irakli II, but, did not work well because the Khans of Azerbaijan, including the Khan of Karabağ, İbrahim Halil Khan, thoroughly defeated the Russian forces.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, for the Russian Empire Tiflis had an excellent strategic position in the region after Astrakhan and Russia, in order to strengthen its position in the region began to build new roads from Tiflis to Moscow.¹⁷⁷

3.2 The Battle of Krtsanisi of 1795 and the Destruction of Tiflis

Aga Muhammad Khan¹⁷⁸ considered the Treaty of Georgievsk as an act of bravado against his domination in the Caucasus and he waged war against Irakli II as retaliation for his collaboration with Catherine.¹⁷⁹ Despite the Treaty of Georgievsk, the Russians ignored the urgent request for aid from Irakli II. Count General Ivan Vasilyevich Gudovich¹⁸⁰ had serious concerns on the renewed strength of Persia and had withdrawn his forces from Tiflis.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, the Khanates of Şuşa, Gence, Daghestan and Şirvan did not obey Aga Muhammad Khan and together sealed an

¹⁷⁵ *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914*, pp. 74-75, 78-80.

¹⁷⁶ *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914*, pp. 84-85.

¹⁷⁷ *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914*, pp. 86-87.

¹⁷⁸ Aga Muhammad Khan (1742-1797) was the leader of the Qajar tribe. He became the Shah of Persia in 1794 and established the Qajar dynasty.

¹⁷⁹ For details of this battle, see “Kratkaya Letopis’: Voinam, Vedennym Russkimi Protiv Persiyan,” *Otechestvennie Zapiski*, Vol. 33 (Sankt Peterburg, 1828), pp. 81-106.

¹⁸⁰ Ivan Vasilyevich Gudovich (1741-1820), for the details, see M. I. Bogdanovich, *Voennii Entsiklopedicheski Leksikon*, Vol. IV (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Glavnogo Shtaba Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva po Voenno-Uchebnym Zavedaniyam, 1853), pp. 539-541.

¹⁸¹ N. F. Dubrovin, *Georgii XII, Poslednii Tsar Gruzii i Prisoedinenie Eya k Rossi* (Sankt Peterburg, 1867), pp. 19-20.

alliance against him.¹⁸² Subsequently, the Khan of the Karabağ Khanate was informed the Ottoman Empire about the prospective attack of Aga Muhammad Khan on Azerbaijan, Revan and Tiflis.¹⁸³ During the Battle of Krtsanisi in 1795 between Persia and Georgia, Irakli II was defeated and Tiflis was completely destroyed by the Persian forces in six days.¹⁸⁴ 15,000-20,000 Georgians were carried into slavery.¹⁸⁵ Aga Muhammad Khan had an intention to occupy the provinces of Şuşa and Revan, both of which were of more importance to him than Georgia.¹⁸⁶ Before and during this battle, Aga Muhammad Khan was followed by the Ottoman spies because the Ottoman Empire was concerned about the people living on its borders.¹⁸⁷ Then, Aga Muhammad Khan was crowned Shah of Persia in 1796.¹⁸⁸ Although Georgia was under the suzerainty of the Russian Empire under the Treaty of Georgievsk, Catherine could not keep her promise to Irakli II. It was a great loss of prestige for the Russian Empire in the Caucasus, notably for the Christians. Hence, the Russians were seeking a clearly defined defensive frontier with Persia, which they envisaged would be the line of either the river Kura or the Aras.

¹⁸² *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914*, pp. 140-144.

¹⁸³ *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, II, 1575-1918* (Ankara: Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, 1993), pp. 97-98.

¹⁸⁴ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, pp. 205-206; *Kavkazskaya Voyna i Eyo Geroy: Ocherk Voyny*, Part. I (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Minitestva Putei Soobshcheniya, 1876), pp. 1-2.

¹⁸⁵ George Bourmoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 239; W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 28.

¹⁸⁶ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 29.

¹⁸⁷ *Osmanlı Devleti ile Azerbaycan Türk Hanlıkları Arasındaki Münâsebetlere Dâir Arşiv Belgeleri: Karabağ-Şuşa, Nahçıvan, Bakü, Gence, Şirvan, Şeki, Revan, Kuba, Hoy, I, 1578-1914*, pp. 147-148.

¹⁸⁸ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 208.

3.3 The Expedition of Valerian Zubov in 1796

Aga Muhammad's destruction of Tiflis in 1795 provoked a strong Russian reaction and soon after, Catherine sent an army of 13,000 soldiers to Persia under a young commander, General Lieutenant Valerian Aleksandrovich Zubov (1771-1804).¹⁸⁹ It was not surprising that Catherine chose this young soldier to command the attack on Persia because of the influence of her lover, Platon Aleksandrovich Zubov, who was Zubov's brother. According to Potto, this expedition was shaped as a part of the "Greek Project"¹⁹⁰ to occupy Anatolia and subsequently Istanbul.¹⁹¹ Catherine II believed that Persia would present the key of Derbend to the Empress after this expedition.¹⁹² The Russian army set off from the Kızılyar fortress¹⁹³ in April 1796, one month later seizing the fortress of Derbend (Demirkapı) which was a great success for such a young commander. Soon after, the Russian soldiers easily captured Baku, Shemakhi and Gence.¹⁹⁴ After these successful attacks, by November, the Russian army had been reinforced with 35,000 additional soldiers. Under the command of Zubov in the newly conquered regions, Tarku, Rusei-Bulak and Baku, three new Russian fortresses were

¹⁸⁹ G. Butkov, *Materialy dlya Novoi Istorii Kavkaza, s 1722 po 1803 g.*, Vol. II, p. 135.

¹⁹⁰ The first mention of the Greek Project had appeared in 1779. In 1780, Alexander Andreyevich Bezborodko drafted the Greek Project in three levels. According to first possibility, Russia would annex the Crimea together with some Aegean Islands while the Habsburgs would claim parts of Serbia. The second option was the establishment of the Kingdom of Dacia over the lands of Danubian Principalities, which would be ruled by Potemkin independently. The last option was the total annihilation of the Ottoman Empire and the partition of its lands, while the old Byzantine Empire would be resurrected with its center at Istanbul and ruled by Catherine's grandson Constantine. For the details, see Hugh Ragsdale, "Evaluating the Traditions of Russian Aggression: Catherine II and the Greek Project," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 66, No. 1, (Jan., 1988).

¹⁹¹ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 215.

¹⁹² Sergei Glinka, *Russkoe Chtenie: Dukh Veka, Yekateriny Vtoroi*, Vol. II (Sankt Peterburg, 1845), pp. 264-265.

¹⁹³ It was built in the northeastern Caucasus in 1616 by the Russians.

¹⁹⁴ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 221.

built in October 1796.¹⁹⁵ However, in this month, Catherine died and by the order of the new Emperor, Paul I, the Russian forces were withdrawn from the Caucasus and Persia. Soon, the Emperor restored Gudovich to the status of commander of the military force. The main reason for the withdrawal of the Russian army from the region was directly related to the attitude of Paul I towards Catherine.¹⁹⁶ The next year, Aga Muhammad was assassinated in Şuşa, the capital of the Karabağ Khanate, during his military preparations against Russia.¹⁹⁷

It was clear that Russia pursued an active foreign policy throughout the 19th century, and the political elite of Russia were enthusiastic about gaining success in any manner. From this perspective, the removal of Zubov was a drawback in terms of international prestige. The death of Catherine II and the accession of Paul I resulted in the temporary cessation of the struggle for Georgia. The first result of the Russian invasion in the Eastern Caucasus was to provide a refuge for the Armenians living in other regions. The Armenians from Derbend and Karabağ settled on the borders of Russia.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ *PSZRI*, Vol. XXIV, No. 17854 (1830), pp. 505-506.

¹⁹⁶ Abdülhüseyn Nevâyî, *Iran ve Cehan: ez Qajariye ta Payan-i Ahd-i Nasri* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Senuber, 1369 / 1990-1991), pp. 22-23.

¹⁹⁷ Abdullah Mostavfî, *Tarikh-i Ejtema'a-yi ve Idari Dovre Qajariye: ez Aqa Mohammed Khan ta Akher-i Nasreddin Shah* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Hasha'a, 1384), p. 22

¹⁹⁸ *PSZRI*, Vol. XXIV, No. 18189 (1830), p. 761; *PSZRI*, Vol. XXV, No. 18611 (1830), pp. 330-331; *PSZRI*, Vol. XXV, No. 18990 (1830), pp. 674-675; *PSZRI*, Vol. XXV, No. 19166 (1830), pp. 832-835.

3.4 The Strategic Position of Georgia

In the Caucasus, the fortified line was extended throughout the Taman peninsula to the mouth of the Terek River, blocking the raiding parties from the mountain tribes to the steppe and cutting off their access to vital sources of salt. Russia's forward policy beyond that line and its success depended on close ties with Eastern Georgia beyond the mountains. It was a principle of this forward policy that the control of the passes on the inner side of the Caucasian mountain chain created position to see what is on the other side and controlled the entrances to the strategic paths. The purpose of the policy of creating a Christian state in Asia was to rally the Georgians of Eastern and Western Georgia and the Armenians of Persia under the Russian banner.¹⁹⁹

3.5 Joseph Emin and the Intersection Point of the Georgians and the Armenians

The last prominent figure of this period, who tried to gain European support to liberate his people, was Joseph Emin (1726-1809).²⁰⁰ Emin had struggled to found an independent Armenian Kingdom in alliance with Georgia under Russian patronage.²⁰¹ He had been born in Hamadan, Persia, but his family had immigrated to Calcutta, India. In 1763, he travelled to the Caucasus and tried to gain Irakli II's support for his plans of

¹⁹⁹ John P. LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917*, p. 108.

²⁰⁰ For the details of life and mission of Emin, see Joseph Emin, *The Life and Adventures of Joseph Emin 1726-1809* (Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1918).

²⁰¹ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars*, p. 113.

organizing a common front against the Muslim rule in the region.²⁰² Actually, Emin proposed the founding of an independent “Christian Transcaucasia,”²⁰³ but he received no reply however, soon after, Catherine invited him to Moscow to discuss the creation of an Armenian state.

After spending a fruitless time in Europe Emin returned to Armenia and Georgia. He presented his plan to local leaders, but encountered opposition and indifference from the native Armenians.²⁰⁴ Returning to London, he became acquainted with the Russian Ambassador, Golitsyn, and thereafter went to Russia, where he won the support of prominent Russian officials. Here he met Hovannes Lazarian, a wealthy and patriotic Armenian, who supported him financially and encouraged him.²⁰⁵

Like Israel Ori and Davit Bek, Joseph Emin desired the liberation of his people living in the Ottoman Empire and Persia. By the 18th century, under the reign of Peter, Russia began to develop its claims on the Caucasus. Partly because of Russia’s political plans and partly because of the religious affinity with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Armenians began to trust the Emperor too much. As stated above, Israel Ori, Davit Bek

²⁰² Joseph Emin, *The Life and Adventures of Joseph Emin 1726-1809*, pp. 222-223.

²⁰³ Manuel Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia* (India: Udyama Commercial Press, 1975), p. 33.

²⁰⁴ Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 23.

²⁰⁵ Hovannes Lazarian (Lazarev) was one of the most important leaders of the Russo-Armenian community. Born in 1700, in New Julfa, Persia, and as a member of the merchant class, he began to trade with Russia and by 1747 had moved to Astrakhan. In 1749, he and his family settled in Moscow, where they started a silk factory and other enterprises. He founded the Lazarev house in Russia, a family that received titles of nobility, and financed numerous Armenian projects. The most important of these was the Lazarev Institute of Eastern Languages in Moscow, in 1815. The pro-Russian Lazarevs were instrumental in influencing the Russian government’s decisions towards the Armenians and, by the late 18th and throughout the first half of the 19th century, supported many Armenian aspirations.

and Joseph Emin all had high expectations from a Russian intervention for the benefit of Armenians in the region.²⁰⁶

There was a crucial point for both the Armenians and the Georgians in the course of uniting that was because Armenian merchants and artisans controlled much of Georgia's economy; thus having important influence in the affairs of the state. Certain Armenian families received titles of Georgian nobility and hereditary state positions, as for example, Georgia's urban middle class and artisans consisted almost entirely of Armenians. Grigory Potemkin was charged by Catherine II with the creation of an Armenian buffer state, and he was even nominated as its prospective ruler,²⁰⁷ and the *meliks* of Karabağ were in agreement with this project.

3.6 The Armenian State Project of Gregory Alexandrovich Potemkin

The Armenians immediately took steps to make their own voices heard by the Tsar. The Catholicos Hovsep Argutian (1743-1801) submitted a petition, in which he proposed to found Armenia as a buffer state in the place, where the borders of the Russian, Persian and the Ottoman Empires met. In 1799, in St. Petersburg, a meeting was held which was significant for the future of Armenia. In this meeting, Hovsep

²⁰⁶ Razmik Panossian, *The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commisars*, p. 117.

²⁰⁷ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, Persidskaya Voyna 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 503; Manuel Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia* (India: Udyama Commercial Press, 1975), p. 34.

Argutian, Hovannes Lazarian,²⁰⁸ and Grigory Potemkin represented Armenians and the Russian Empire.²⁰⁹

In fact, the Russian Court had already received a program of Armenian separation from Persia and collaboration with Russia. Argutian and Catherine II had agreed with these principles. The Armenian provinces would constitute a kingdom under the protection of Russia; they would pay taxes to Russia and put an armed contingent to the service of Russia in case of war. In return, Russian garrisons would be positioned in Armenia for its protection for a certain period. The Armenians would create their own administrative laws; however, the Russian monarch would appoint the king of Armenia.²¹⁰

The independence of the *meliks* of Karabağ and the consequent lack of unity among them constituted one of the main reasons for the weakness of the realm. If chosen by the Armenians or the decision of the Emperor of Russia, an Armenian overlord or king, he would first have to make Derbend his base and also have his authority recognized in Shemakhi and Gence. In that case, Karabağ would also provide soldiers and unite under his rule. In this way, Revan and the other cities would be gradually brought under control. In fact, at the beginning, a force of two or three thousand men would be sufficient for the overlord to realize his initial objectives. After the capture of Revan,

²⁰⁸ Hovannes Lazarian became strongly influenced by Emin's ideas and in later years he, along with Bishop Argutyan, tried to interest the Russian government in the Armenian Question. Lazarian also had connections with the Madras (India) Armenians, who also became active in the liberation movement. The Madras Group was created in the 1770s by Movses Baghramian, Shamir and Hakob Shahamirian, and other intellectuals with the financial support of wealthy merchants. Its aim was to mobilize the public to support the Armenians' cause in both Persia and the Ottoman Empire, and to propagate the ideas of the European Enlightenment.

²⁰⁹ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, pp. 1010-1011.

²¹⁰ Manuel Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia*, p. 37.

which could be effected within two years, it would be possible to maintain a standing army financed by the Armenian cities. However, the Armenian ruler would need cavalry and artillery units in order to protect his throne.

There is no doubt that the unity of Karabağ could have been achieved by the desire and command of the Empress and in the shortest possible time. Such an enterprise would, not only enhance and increase Russia's honor and reputation but at the same time would enable her to overcome the Ottoman Empire and Persia.²¹¹ The reasons for this were obvious: if Armenia was united under one government and the country's borders were extended, then the agricultural production would increase since there would be more arable land, and thus be able to afford a standing army of 12,000 to 20,000 soldiers.

Catherine II approved this project and decided to appoint her favorite, Prince Potemkin, as the prospective ruler of Armenia. While the Russians were making plans for the reorganization of Armenia, they were at the same time reinforcing Georgia, with the intention of using these two Christian kingdoms of the Caucasus as buffer states against the Muslims. In order to establish the relations of Armenia and Russia on a sound basis and to define the rights and responsibilities of the two countries towards each other, a treaty consisting of two main parts, one containing the commitments of Armenians and the other those of the Russians, was prepared by Argutian.

²¹¹ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1011.

3.7 The Treaty Proposed by Hovsep Argutian

According to this treaty, former Christians who had converted into Islam would be baptized and a Russian contingency would be kept in Armenia for the defense of the realm against the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Armenia would undertake to be a tributary state of Russia, and pay taxes with gold and silver, and provide Russia with soldiers during any war. Furthermore, the Empress herself would appoint the King of Armenia.²¹² The Russian forces consisting of 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 infantry and 2,000 artillery forces would remain stationed in Armenia for twenty years in order to defend and protect Armenia.²¹³ Artisans and merchants would be able to import their products and goods into Armenia on condition that they pay the customs duty fixed by the government; the Armenians on their part, without any bans or limitations and, would also be able to export their goods to Russia.²¹⁴

Armenia would be governed in accordance with her traditional laws. The Russian Empire would recognize the Kingdom of Armenia and there would be an Armenian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. The Emperor would receive four tenths of the national income of Armenia in return for the expenses of the six thousand soldiers stationed in Armenia, another four tenths would be spent on religious establishments and would be distributed as alms to the poor, and the remainder would be left to the Armenian Treasury. In case of disagreements between the Russian and Armenian governments, uprisings and revolts would, on no account, be permitted. Two hundred

²¹² Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1014.

²¹³ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1014.

²¹⁴ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1014.

thousand copies of this treaty were printed in 1779, to be distributed to religious dignitaries, princes and the Armenian aristocracy. However, the proposed project was never realized. In 1791, the Empress died, and all the hopes of the Armenians were crushed.²¹⁵

This treaty project was never ratified since Russia claimed that Armenia was not a sovereign state and therefore a treaty could not be officially concluded. Furthermore, after the death of Catherine, even though Paul I was in disagreement with his mother about the policies over Transcaucasia, in 1799 he gave the Armenian community on Russian territory taxation privileges, to attract the Armenians away from Persia.²¹⁶ Like Prince Potemkin, he regarded the Armenians as valuable allies in the realization of Russia's goals. He hoped to use them to bolster Georgia's defenses and economy by offering land grants, and cash bonuses to Armenians who moved to Georgia from neighboring khanates.²¹⁷ He also shared the hope that Russia would be able to organize lucrative equivalents of the trading establishments of several European countries in Southeast Asia.

Essentially, the Persian policy of Catherine cannot be analyzed separately, but it has to be considered together with the Persian policy of the Ottoman Empire. The military power of the Ottoman Empire was much more advanced than that of Persia. For this reason, Georgia was an important staging post for Catherine II's ideas about the Caucasus and beyond. During the reign of Peter, Baku occupied the same place in Russia's strategy. Conquering Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, would pave the way for

²¹⁵ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and The Armenian Question*, p. 1014.

²¹⁶ Manuel Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia*, pp. 37-38.

²¹⁷ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 52.

launching a military attack on the Ottoman Empire and Persia. Moreover, in Catherine's meetings with the European intellectuals she said that she believed that the trading capacity of India would have a positive and wide reaching impact on Russia.

With the decline of interest in the southern coast of the Caspian Sea, the economic significance of the Eastern Caucasus increased. That area could become the site of the much-desired center of East-West trade. In addition to Georgia, the khanates with comparatively large Armenian populations (Revan, Karabağ and Gence) would be valuable assets because of the Armenians' commercial connections elsewhere in Asia.²¹⁸

3.8 The Last King of Georgia: Gregory XII

Aga Muhammad Shah had intended to attack Tiflis again but he was assassinated in 1797 and his nephew Fath Ali²¹⁹ took over in Georgia. One year later George XII (1746-1800) crowned.²²⁰ He was not hostile against Persia but after Fath Ali Shah²²¹ asked him to send his older son as a hostage in Tehran;²²² he gave his allegiance to the Russian Empire, which promised him protection against Persia. After a time, General Lazarev was appointed to secure Tiflis. The threats of Fath Ali Shah, reminded him of the devastated Tiflis during the reign of Aga Muhammad Khan and George XII did not have any option but to remain with the Russian Empire. However, George XII had some

²¹⁸ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 43.

²¹⁹ Fath Ali Shah (1772-1834) was the second King of Persia. He ruled from 1797 to 1834.

²²⁰ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 213.

²²¹ A. P. Berzhe, "Feth Ali Shah i Ego Deti," *Osobyie Pribavleniya k Kavkazu 1868*, (Tiflis, 1868), pp. 37-42. The same article was published in the sixth of *Russkaya Starina* in 1886.

²²² *AKTY*, Vol. I, No. 21 (1866), pp. 105-106.

hesitations about the military support of the Russian Empire since during the reign of Irakli II, he had received promises from Catherine but they were realized. George XII was very ill and there were some problems about the succession. Some Georgian nobles supported David Bagrationi, the son of George XII, who had been educated in Russia. Bagrationi was proclaimed Heir Apparent by his father but was not allowed to ascend the throne upon the death of his father in 1800.

Persia did not abandon her claim of suzerainty over Georgia and charged its representative, Hacı Ibrahim Shirazi to deal with the case. The Russian envoy, Peter Ivanovich Kovalensky and Shirazi had inconclusive discussions about the status of Georgia. Kovalensky asserted that by the Treaty of Georgievsk, Georgia was under the protection of army of the Emperor. In return, Shirazi threatened to send in the Persian army and destroy Tiflis. Following the death of George XII, in 1800 Georgia was annexed by the Russian Empire.²²³ “The plans of Peter the Great for the subjugation of all the adjacent kingdoms were now again an object of attention and every endeavor was made to carry them into execution.”²²⁴ David Bagrationi made several claims to become regent of Georgia but after the assassination of Paul I in 1801, the new Emperor, Alexander I, rejected requests and once more Georgia was formally annexed. After this process, Georgia, as a part of Russia, would be a bridge and strategic point for contact with her southern neighbor.²²⁵

²²³ *AKTY*, Vol. I, No. 122 (1866), p.181; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, ot Drevneishikh Vremen do Yermolova*, Vol. I, p. 232.

²²⁴ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 31.

²²⁵ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 312.

Alexander I, from early on, began to engage with the Caucasus. According to him, the frontier of the Russian Empire should have been drawn between the Rivers of Aras and Kura. It would, thereby, be easy to conquer the east and south of Georgia.²²⁶ Until the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, Russia's focus was Karabağ, whose Armenian leaders had long sought a Russo-Armenian alliance. After 1805, however, with the annexation of the Khanates of Gence and Karabağ, Russia's attention shifted to gaining more influence over the Armenian Holy See of Etchmiadzin, located in the Khanate of Revan. A number of prominent Armenians from Georgia, Karabağ, and Gence assisted the Russians in this endeavor.²²⁷

3.9 The Political Similarities between Peter and Catherine II about Persia

Peter and Catherine's Persian policies were similar in several ways. Both tried to justify Russian military intervention as a reprisal for Persia's unlawful attack on the Christians under their protection. In Peter's reign, the *casus belli* was the Persian attack in Şirvan on Russian trade convoys and secondly the Afghan threat to the Safavid authority. Catherine II legitimized her Persian Campaign as retaliation for the 1795 attack on Georgia by Aga Muhammad Khan. She declared that her intention was not only to protect the Georgians and the Armenians but also to protect all Persian subjects, including Muslims, from the tyrannical rule of Aga Muhammad Khan.²²⁸

²²⁶ F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. 7, p. 321.

²²⁷ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, pp. 70-71.

²²⁸ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voyny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. II, pp. 69-78.

Another common attribute of Russian policy towards Persia at the beginning and the end of the 18th century was the special interest in the Armenians and Georgians. Peter and Catherine II both exploited the idea of liberating the Caucasian Christians from Muslim rule, an idea definitely encouraged by the two Christian communities, which stimulated the Russians to send forces not only to take them under protection but also to occupy the central provinces of Persia. The Caucasian Christians promised military collaboration as well. In the 1720s, they enlisted troops to support Peter's forces however; he failed to take advantage of this opportunity. By the 1790s, neither the Georgians nor the Armenians were able to organize substantial military forces on their own. Nonetheless, representatives for both groups continued to promise full cooperation with the Russian troops should any to be sent to the region.

Both monarchs were interested in the Armenians and the Georgians also as valuable commercial contacts for trade with Russia. A consistent trait of 18th century Russian policy towards these groups was the acceptance of their declarations of support, which, in fact was not matched by effective Russian protection. In Peter's campaign, Wakhtang of Georgia was hopelessly compromised by his preparations to join forces of the Russians and as a result was forced into exile for the rest of his life. The Armenians who had cooperated with him took shelter in inaccessible mountain reaches. During Catherine II's reign, Georgians complained repeatedly about the inadequacy of Russian protection that had been guaranteed them by treaty, especially when nothing was done to prevent the sack of their capital, Tiflis, in 1795.

Despite the similarities, Catherine II's policy owed very little to Peter's influence.²²⁹ The real beginning of Russia's modern interest in Persia emerged in Catherine II's reign.²³⁰ She occasionally referred to Peter's activities and his treaty with Tahmasp but only as secondary arguments. Her campaign in the eastern Caucasus was not designed to be a replica of Peter's. Instead, she formulated her Persian policy based on her analysis of conditions that existed in her own time. Peter's example served to legitimize a policy that had already been formulated. For example, in her 1796 manifesto to the Persian and Caucasian peoples, which declared war against Aga Muhammad Khan, Catherine II cited the Petrine precedent but placed far greater emphasis on more recent events, especially Russia's obligation to protect Georgia and the evils of Aga Muhammad's brutal misrule. Therefore, she argued, Russia had a duty to destroy the tyrant and establish justice in the afflicted territories.²³¹

Catherine's references to Peter's achievements avoided any mention of his treaty with the Ottoman Empire, according to which the latter was recognized as the overlord of Georgia and most of the other territories were claimed Russia. Anna Ivanovna's two treaties, the Treaties of Rasht and Gence, were also conveniently forgotten until Alexander I's war with Persia. It is argued that the concessions were made only because Nader Shah had temporarily established law and order. In any event, Russia argued that it was not bound by the treaties since Persia had failed to honor them.²³²

²²⁹ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 6.

²³⁰ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 6.

²³¹ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. III (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya I. N. Skorokhodov, 1886), pp. 125-129.

²³² Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 6.

Peter's activities on the Caspian coast influenced later generations of rulers by raising the possibility of using Persian territory as a base for expanded trade with Asia. For a half century, the idea lay dormant while his successors gave their attention to other matters. Catherine II, who was as a vigorous advocate of Russian expansion as Peter had been, also developed an interest in that region. In doing so, she responded far more to the contemporary attitudes about imperial greatness of Russia and political turbulence in Persia than her predecessor. The one precedent that seems to have influenced her greatly was the apparent similarity between Persia's political fragmentation at the beginning and end of the century. Therefore, the likelihood of easy Russian success against a weak opponent was obvious. However, the similarity proved to be deceptive, and there were many obstacles to the duplication of Peter's achievement.

3.10 The Political Tension in the Region before the Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828

The progress of Russia towards Transcaucasia came at a time when France was presenting a strong diplomatic challenge to the British over the Middle East. In order to frustrate the Franco-Russian alliance, Britain sent a diplomatic mission to Persia. In 1801, John Malcolm succeeded in establishing friendly relations and a basis for a collaboration with the Shah, but the subsequent French failure in Egypt and the strong British position in India diminished the need for its immediate approval.²³³ In 1802,

²³³ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 13.

Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov²³⁴ was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus by Alexander I. Mingrelia and Imereti were annexed to Russian Georgia together with Gence, the Russian commander also seized the northern districts of the Khanate of Revan.²³⁵ Tsitsianov initiated the occupation of the Gence Khanate under the control of Cevad Khan²³⁶ in 1803, thus triggering the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813.²³⁷ His pretext was that Gence belonged to Georgia. On June 20, 1804, the Persian army under the leadership of Abbas Mirza²³⁸ came across the Tsitsianov's army near the walls of Etchmiadzin. The Persian army was defeated although it was consisted of 30,000 soldiers against the 14,000 Russians.²³⁹ General Tsitsianov received help from the Armenian communities of Gence and Karabağ.²⁴⁰ At the beginning of the 19th century, the Qajar policy over the Armenians was not as tolerable as they would have wished and heavy taxation and other discriminations helped the Russians gaining the trust of Armenians in Karabağ and Gence during the early years of the Russo-Persian War.²⁴¹

The campaigns of Tsitsianov and Gudovich in 1804 and 1808 encouraged more Armenians to move north with the Russian forces.²⁴² They from Revan left for Tiflis and

²³⁴ Pavel Dmitriyevich Tsitsianov (1754-1806) was a member of the noble Georgian family, Tsitsishvili, and was the Russian military commander from 1804. For the details, see M. I. Bogdanovich, *Voennii Entsiklopedicheskii Leksikon*, Vol. XIII (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Glavnogo Shtaba Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva po Voennno-Uchebnym Zavedaniyam, 1857), pp.544-547.

²³⁵ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 44.

²³⁶

²³⁷ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. 82. For the details of the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, see Cemil Koşanlu, *Ceng-i Deh Sale-yi İran ve Rus* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Do Hezar, 1362 /1983-1984).

²³⁸ Abbas Mirza (1789-1833) was a Crown Prince of Persia.

²³⁹ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 37.

²⁴⁰ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 240.

²⁴¹ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 78.

²⁴² George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, pp. 58-59.

with the exception of Tiflis, so many Armenians were all outside of the Caucasus such as Astrakhan, New Nakhichevan, Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Crimea, Ukraine and Poland.²⁴³ In 1804, Tsitsianov marched on Revan, another independent khanate at that time actually threatened by the Persian army, but failed. During that attack, some Armenians abandoned their homes and joined Tsitsianov's forces.²⁴⁴ During the campaigns of Gence and Revan under the command of Tsitsianov and Gudovich respectively, nearly 1500 Armenians joined the Russian forces with the inspiration of Archbishop Hovannes and Monk Nerses²⁴⁵ of Ashtarak.²⁴⁶ Revan then opened its gates to the Persians.²⁴⁷ The arrival of Hüseyin Kuli Khan and new policies originated from Tabriz and Tehran resulted in the return of Armenians who previously left Revan with the Russian forces.²⁴⁸ Furthermore, during the invasion of the Revan Khanate by General Gudovich in 1808, there was little support for the Russian forces by the Armenians.²⁴⁹ The Church's alliance with the Persian Court served the purpose of Hüseyin Kuli Khan and Abbas Mirza. Hereupon, restrictions on traditional rights, other social and religious activities were lifted; furthermore, Armenian clergy were allowed to travel freely within Transcaucasia.²⁵⁰ The relationship between the Persian Court and the

²⁴³ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 240.

²⁴⁴ *AKTY*, Vol. II, No. 1219-1221 (1868), pp. 611-612.

²⁴⁵ Nerses V of Ashtarak (1770-1857) served as a Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church between 1843 and 1857.

²⁴⁶ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 506.

²⁴⁷ John F. Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*, p. 69.

²⁴⁸ Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia: Sketches of the Nations and Races between the Black Sea and the Caspian* (London: Chapman, 1854), pp. 265-266.

²⁴⁹ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 79.

²⁵⁰ Jacques Morier, *Second Voyage en Perse, en Arménie et dans l'Asie Mineure fait de 1810 à 1816*, Vol. I (Paris: Librairie de Gide Fils, 1818), p. 321.

Armenian Holy See were sufficiently cordial to the extent that Abbas Mirza sent his sword to be blessed by Eprem for success against the Ottoman Empire.²⁵¹

In 1804, an Armenian *melik*, David Melik Shahnazar,²⁵² delivered a letter to the Persian Court from the French consul at Bagdad, asking the Persians to consider an alliance with France. It was accepted and in 1805 two envoys, Alexandre Romieux and Pierre Amédée de Jaubert²⁵³ were dispatched to the Persian Court for further discussions²⁵⁴ and subsequently the Treaty of Finkestein, signed on May 6, 1807, officially made Persia an ally of France.²⁵⁵ A French mission of about seventy military and civilian personnel under the command of General Claude M. Gardane arrived in Tehran at the end of 1807. Although the Franco-Russian Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 put into trouble the French mission on arrival, Persia still received some direct military aid from France.²⁵⁶

Russian concentration on the European and Ottoman campaigns let Persia move freely in Transcaucasia, creating an impression that Russia's withdrawal was because of France.²⁵⁷ Soon after, because of the Franco-Russian rapprochement, the Shah changed his mind and in late 1807 completely lost his trust for France and restarted negotiations for collaboration with Britain. In 1808, Gudovich finally decided to make a

²⁵¹ Manuel Sarkisyanz, *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia*, p. 37.

²⁵² For details of the life of David Melik Shahnazar, see Mir Davoud Zadour de Melik Schahnazar, *Notices sur l'État Actuel de la Perse* (Paris: Imperimerie Royale, 1818).

²⁵³ For the details of the journey of Jaubert, see Pierre Amédée de Jaubert and Camille Alphonse Trézel, *Reis in Armenië en Perzië Gedaan in de Jaren 1805 en 1806* (Amsterdam: Visser & Comp., 1823).

²⁵⁴ RGIA, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis': 76, List: 71.

²⁵⁵ For details of the treaty in Persian, see Gulam Reza Tebatebayi, *Mua'hadat ve Karardadha-yi Tarikh-i der Dovre Qajariye* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Behmen, 1373 / 1994-1995), pp. 40-48.

²⁵⁶ Alfred de Gardane, *Mission du Général Gardane en Perse sous le Premier Empire* (Paris: Librairie de Ad. Laine, 1865).

²⁵⁷ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 16.

move on the fortress of Revan. With the help of French built fortifications in Revan, Persia succeeded in driving the Russian troops out.²⁵⁸ In 1808, John Malcolm was dispatched on a second mission to conclude a British alliance with Persia. Another British mission, led by Harford Jones Brydges,²⁵⁹ was also dispatched in 1808. After some negotiations, Brydges was received by the Shah in March 1809, when he succeeded in procuring the dismissal of General Gardanne's mission.²⁶⁰ Later, Gudovich's attack on Revan and French inaction forced the Persians into the British camp. In 1809, Brydges finally concluded a preliminary treaty of alliance between Persia and Great Britain. By this treaty, the Great Britain engaged to pay an annual subsidy of 120,000 pound and to supply with necessary artillery.²⁶¹ Furthermore, Fath Ali Shah sent an envoy, Mirza Abu al-Hasan Khan, to London to secure the ratification of this treaty.²⁶²

Britain's aim was to sufficiently support Persia internally and economically to serve as a defensive bastion for India, but never as an offensive power against Russia.²⁶³ In 1810 Gore Ouseley, a new British envoy arrived in Persia; he conducted negotiations (1811-1813) for a Definitive Treaty of alliance. In this process, Persia and the Ottoman Empire seemed to be allies against Russia. Hüseyin the Khan of Revan and Abbas Mirza

²⁵⁸ *AKTY*, Vol. III, No. 254 (1869), p. 136.

²⁵⁹ Harford Jones Brydges (1764-1847) was a British diplomat and author. Early in life, he entered the service of the East India Company, acquiring great proficiency in the oriental languages, he was appointed envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the court of Persia, where he remained for four years, from 1807 to 1811.

²⁶⁰ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 56.

²⁶¹ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 57.

²⁶² His mission in Britain was also described in three volumes by James Morrier in *The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan* (London: John Murray, 1824).

²⁶³ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 20.

negotiated with the Governors of Erzurum and Trabzon,²⁶⁴ but the talks stopped when a Kurd from the Persian camp shot a Turkish commander.²⁶⁵

In 1812 Russia concluded the Treaty of Bucharest with the Ottoman Empire. In that year, the Russian forces under the leadership of Pyotr Stepanovich Kotlyarevsky²⁶⁶ defeated the Persian army commanded by Abbas Mirza in Aslandüz²⁶⁷ and Lankaran.²⁶⁸ The British, now allied with Russia against Napoleon, did not offer any direct help to Persia and instead acted as intermediaries, and strongly advised the Persians to conclude a peace treaty with Russia. Ouseley urged the Shah, Fath Ali and his son, Abbas Mirza, to reach an agreement with the Russians, which would help Persia to regain some of its lost territories beyond the Aras River. Otherwise, Ouseley warned, Britain would not help Persia in the future. Although Mirza Bozorg opposed this treaty, with no alternative or ally, Persia, in 1813 Mirza Abu al-Hasan Khan, signed the Treaty of Gülistan with Nikolai²⁶⁹ Fyodorovich Rtishchev in the name of the Russian Empire.²⁷⁰ According to the treaty, Persia had to leave the Khanates of Baku, Gence, Shaki, Qubba, Şirvan, Karabağ, parts of the Taliş region and renounced all its claims over Georgia.²⁷¹ By annexing Karabağ and Gence, Russian subjugated half of eastern Armenia but it was not

²⁶⁴ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 795, Gömlek No: 36397 (25/01/1811); *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 2, Gömlek No: 27 (23/12/1813).

²⁶⁵ John F. Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*, p. 81.

²⁶⁶ Pyotr Stepanovich Kotlyarevskii (1782-1852) was a prominent military official in the 19th century. For the details, see *Kavkazskaya Voyna i Eyo Geroy: Kotlyarevskii i Sleptsov*, Part. II (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Tovarishchestva, 1879), pp.3-20.

²⁶⁷ For the details of this battle, see W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, pp. 93-95.

²⁶⁸ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 114.

²⁶⁹ Nikolay Fyodorovich Rtishchev (1754-1835) was one of the prominent Generals in the Russian army.

²⁷⁰ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 115-116.

²⁷¹ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 127-128. For the details of the Treaty of Gülistan in 1813, see Gulam Reza Tebatebaji, *Mua'hadat ve Karardadha-yi Tarikh-i der Dovre Qajariye* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Behmen, 1373 / 1994-1995), pp. 72-86.

enough for the Armenian leaders and they wanted to emancipate the other part of the eastern Armenia, the Khanates of Revan and Nakhichevan. The Khanate of Revan was important because it included Etchmiazin.²⁷²

The Persian defeat in the First Russo-Persian War initiated a retrogression of relations between the Armenians and the Persian Court. Hasan Khan, the brother of Hüseyin Khan, continued to charge the Armenians with supporting the Russians against Persia.²⁷³ Both Hüseyin Khan and Abbas Mirza now became aware that the Catholicos and some of the Armenian secular leaders of the Revan Khanate did not control the entire Armenian population of Transcaucasia. The active Armenian support for Russia in the neighboring Khanates of Karabağ and Gence, in Georgia was more effective than the neutrality of Armenians in the Khanate of Revan.²⁷⁴

The situation worsened when Bishop Nerses of Ashtarak left for Tiflis in 1814, where he advocated the Russian occupation of the remainder of eastern Armenia without hesitation.²⁷⁵ The reduction of the Persian territories following the Treaty of Gülistan was a warning to the Persian officials that Russia intended to occupy all of Transcaucasia too. Despite the efforts of Ephrem and some secular Armenian *meliks* for Persia, the actions of other Armenians, Nerses in particular, gave several Persian notables the excuse to put pressure on the Armenian population.²⁷⁶

²⁷² George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 240.

²⁷³ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 81.

²⁷⁴ George A. Bournoutian, *the Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, pp. 81-82.

²⁷⁵ *AKTY*, Vol. V, No. 520 (1873), pp. 441-442. In 1824, Nerses established the Nersessian Academy in Tiflis, an institution that produced an entire cadre of Armenian intellectual and political leaders throughout the next centuries.

²⁷⁶ *AKTY*, Vol. VI, Part. I, No. 620 (1874), p. 458.

CHAPTER 4

THE RUSSO-PERSIAN WAR OF 1826-1828²⁷⁷

4.1 Reasons of the War and Its Background

Although Russia and Persia came to an agreement by signing of the Treaty of Gülistan in 1813, but this treaty did not put an end to the problems between Russia and

²⁷⁷ For details of the Second Russo-Persian War, see V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III (Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007); I. A. Zinov'ev, *Rossiya i Persiya: Epizod iz Russko-Persidskoi Voyny 1827 g.* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Vysochaishe Utverzhdenного Tovarishchestva, 1897); *Podrobnoe Opisanie Persii, s Prisovokupleniem Pokhoda Persiyan Protiv Rossii v 1826, 1827 i 1828 g.*, Part. 3 (Moskva: Tipografiya S. Selivanovskogo); E. V. Brimmer, "Sluzhba Artilleriiskogo Ofitsera, Vospityvavshagosya v Pervom Kadetskom Korpuse i Vypushchennogo v 1815 g.," *Kavkazskii Sbornik*, Vol. 15 (Tiflis, 1894), pp. 223-260; E. V. Brimmer, "Sluzhba Artilleriiskogo Ofitsera, Vospityvavshagosya v Pervom Kadetskom Korpuse i Vypushchennogo v 1815 g.," *Kavkazskii Sbornik*, Vol. 16 (Tiflis, 1895), pp. 1-44; Nikolai Nikolayevich Murav'ev Karskii, "Zapiski Nikolaya Nikolayevicha Murav'eva Karskogo: Persidskaya Voina," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 1 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 177-208; Nikolai Nikolayevich Murav'ev Karskii, "Zapiski Nikolaya Nikolayevicha Murav'eva Karskogo: Persidskaya Voina," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 1 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 571-604. Nikolai Nikolayevich Murav'ev Karskii, "Zapiski Nikolaya Nikolayevicha Murav'eva Karskogo: Persidskaya Voina," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 2 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 536-561; Nikolai Nikolayevich Murav'ev Karskii, "Zapiski Nikolaya Nikolayevicha Murav'eva Karskogo: Persidskaya Voina," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 3 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 60-97; Nikolai Nikolayevich Murav'ev Karskii, "Zapiski Nikolaya Nikolayevicha Murav'eva Karskogo: Persidskaya Voina," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 3 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 273-316; "Sovremennii Letopisi: Vzgl'yad na Podvigi Rossiyan v Persii v 1826 i 1827 g.," *Otechestvennie Zapiski*, Vol. 33 (Sankt Peterburg, 1828), pp. 168-202.

Persia permanently. Its vague content was enough to spark the problem again. The pressure of the *ulema* on the Shah was another dimension of this problematic process. Because of the loss of lands in Transcaucasia, the prestige of the Shah was under an intensive pressure. Furthermore, the mistaken analyzes of the Persian Court about the Decembrist Rising in Russia and the personal decisions of General Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov²⁷⁸ and Abbas Mirza brought about a new war between Russia and Persia.

4.1.1 The Treaty of Gülistan and Its Vague Contents

After the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, the British mediation with the assistance of Sir Gore Ouseley²⁷⁹ played an important role for the both sides to negotiate the peace treaty, which was signed on 12 October 1813, at Gülistan. It was a terrible defeat for Persia. As a result, questions were raised by the Persians on the role of Ouseley in promoting Russian and British interests rather than those of Persia.²⁸⁰ Most of Transcaucasia was annexed by Russia, except the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan. No power other than Russia was permitted to have battleships in the

²⁷⁸ Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov (1777-1861) was one of the prominent Russian Generals of the 19th century. For the details of his life in two volumes, see A. P. Yermolov, *Zapiski Alekseya Petrovicha Yermolova* (Moskva: Universitetskaya Tipografiya, 1865-1868). For details of his proconsulate in the Caucasus, see Sh. A. Gapurov, *Severnii Kavkaz v Period Prokonsul'stva A. P. Yermolova 1816-1827* (Nalchik: El'-Fa, 2003).

²⁷⁹ Sir Gore Ouseley (1770-1844) was an entrepreneur, diplomat and orientalist. Ouseley was made a baronet in 1808, appointed in 1809 as the *mehmandar* of Abu al-Hasan Khan (1776-1845), the Qajar envoy to George III of the United Kingdom (1760-1820), and designated as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Qajar court, although he was not a nominee or an official of the East India Company.

²⁸⁰ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 130; Manoutchehr M. Eskenderi Qajar, "Between Scylla and Charybdis: Policy Making under Conditions of Constraint in Early Qajar Persia," *War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present*, ed. Roxane Farmanfarman (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 36

Caspian Sea and this provision left the Persian shores vulnerable to a Russian attack.²⁸¹ The treaty also included commercial matters and the establishment of a permanent diplomatic mission of the Russian Empire in Persia. The most problematic provisions of the Treaty of Gülistan were that of the Russian recognition and support were promised for the legitimate heir to the Persian throne and the terms that delineated the border between the two states.²⁸²

Although from 1813 until 1825, the Russian Empire and Persia did not have any major problems, Yermolov, who became the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus in 1816 after the death of Tsitsianov, continued the progress of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus.²⁸³ Yermolov had been sent to Persia in 1817 to clarify some of the matters between the two states concerning some of the articles of the Treaty of Gülistan.²⁸⁴ By 1825, this stability would come to an end because of the vague provisions of the Treaty of Gülistan. The Persian Court was alarmed by the progress of the Russian forces but it was clear that to wage a new war against Russia would completely endanger the territorial integrity of Persia.

By the end of 1825, the tension between the Russian Empire and Persia had begun to increase not only because of the provisions, and vaguaries, of the Treaty of Gülistan but also for other reasons.

²⁸¹ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, Vol. I, pp. 84-86.

²⁸² F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. 7, p. 334.

²⁸³ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 167.

²⁸⁴ For details about the journey of Yermolov to Persia, see A. E. Sokolov, *Dnevnie Zapiski o Puteshestvii Rossiisko-Imperatorskogo Posol'stva v Persii v 1816 i 1817 g.* (Moskva: Sinodal'naya Tipografiya, 1910).

According to George A. Bournoutian, the loss of lands with a large Muslim population was unacceptable for the Persian Shah.²⁸⁵ It was right because the natural borders of Persia were determined in the reign of Ismail I (1487-1524) and strengthened by Aga Muhammad Khan. Thus, the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813 was a great defeat in the sense of the prestige of Persia in the Caucasus. Another assumption of Bournoutian is about the territory occupied by the Russians. The regions, situated on the shores of the Gökçe Lake, were beleaguered every summer by the Russians to save the Christian villages from Turkic nomads in the Şemseddin region.²⁸⁶ Considering this fact, the Russian Commander-in-Chief announced that he would not accept the territorial integrity of Persia. Furthermore, some events concerning the Russian troops accelerated the tension such as, assaulting Muslim women in the occupied provinces of Gence, Karabağ and Şirvan.²⁸⁷

4.1.2 The Pressure of *Ulema* on the Shah

Under the influence of these developments, the Persian theological class, *ulema*, began to call for a *jihad*, (the Holy War), against the Russian Empire. Under the strict control of Müçtehid²⁸⁸ Aga Seyid Muhammad Isfahani, *ulema* began to force the Shah

²⁸⁵ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 24.

²⁸⁶ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 24.

²⁸⁷ Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, trans. Heribert Busse (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 174.

²⁸⁸ A *Müçtehid* is an Islamic scholar, competent to interpret Sharia in practical situations using *içtihad* (interpretation).

to wage *jihad* against the Russians in terms of Sharia law.²⁸⁹ Regarding Islamic rules, *jihad* has more different dimensions and goals than the content of a classical war.²⁹⁰

The Russian Empire's aggressive policy over its neighbor increased Mirza Bozorg's²⁹¹ hesitations about the subject. According to Bozorg, it was definite that the Russians would conquer all the "Islam lands," and the occupation of some Khanates in the Caucasus during the Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813 was a kind of sign. Bozorg added that the Russians were the infidels and the Muslim lands should have been protected by the King of Islam. As Mirza Bozorg commented, "For the whole of the Persian public it is obligatory to obey his Excellency, who is the king of Islam and the chief commander in this regard, and to follow the *naib al-saltanah*, who is in charge of the matter of the *jihad*."²⁹²

The Russians were intent on maintaining a presence in the aforementioned territory by the end of 1825 and dismissed the idea of withdrawing from the occupied areas. In addition, they proposed to exchange this strategic corridor in Revan and Tabriz for disputed territory in Karabağ.²⁹³ Russia's encroachment triggered the *jihad*, and subsequently the use of *jihad* was approved for the protection of the homeland and the religion. The essence of the matter was that the *ulema* had already announced a great

²⁸⁹ Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, p. 174.

²⁹⁰ For details see Abbas Amanat, "Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain: Reflections of a Qajar Statesman on European Expansion," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 113, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 1993), pp. 35-56; Firoozeh Kashnai-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1997), pp. 205-234.

²⁹¹ Mirza Abbas Nuri, known as Mirza Bozorg, was a prominent Persian officier served at first as minister to Abbas Mirza, one of the sons of Fath Ali Shah (1797-1834), and then, late in the same Shah's reign, he was appointed governor of Boroujerd and Lorestan. Mirza Bozorg was in the circle of Mirza Abu al-Qasem, the Qaim Maqam who was then grand vizier.

²⁹² Firoozeh Kashnai-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," p. 211.

²⁹³ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 24.

jihad against the infidels after the Treaty of Gülistan, this was confirmation of that Shah would formally widen its effects broader in the Persian territory and other Khanates in the Caucasus formally.²⁹⁴ The *ulema* strongly insisted on declaring war because they had no reason for being afraid of war.²⁹⁵

Mirza Bozorg clearly stated his opinions about the Russians clearly, and the Shah of Persia was defined as *Shahanshah-i Islam Panah* or as protector of the Sharia against the current infidels. Furthermore, the official title of Persia had gained a new dimension it was defined as *Mamalik-i Mahrusih-i Islam* apart from *Mamalik-i Mahrus-i Iran*. This meant that the Shah had two important responsibilities to the *mulk* and the *din* (possession and religion).²⁹⁶

4.1.3 The Effect of the Decembrist Rising in 1825

For the Persian Court, it was hard to declare a war against the Russian Empire after the Treaty of Gülistan. Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza were aware of this reality and tried to find ways of maintaining the peace. The *ulema* had strengthened its position by the news and migrations from the occupied territories. Then, the death of Alexander I and overstated reports about the Decembrist Rising in St. Petersburg, in 1825, stimulated the Persian Court to attack to the Russians with the intent of taking back the occupied territories.²⁹⁷ Thereupon, the Persian forces in Karadagh, Ardabil, Tabriz, Khoy, Revan

²⁹⁴ Firoozeh Kashnai-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," p. 210.

²⁹⁵ *RGIA*, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis': 76, List: 67.

²⁹⁶ Firoozeh Kashnai-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," p. 211.

²⁹⁷ *RGIA*, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis': 76, List: 64.

and other cities started preparations for a war with Russia.²⁹⁸ In Tabriz, Şeyh Cafer encouraged the people to emancipate the Muslims from the oppression of Russia in Transcaucasia.²⁹⁹

According to Abbas Amanat, Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza improperly analyzed the reason for the Decembrist Rising as being the difference between state system and tradition of Persia and Russia. The news about the death of the Shah would have created turbulence in Persia but the reaction was not the same as suggested in the Russian Empire. The Ottoman Empire, as the other great power of the region, was also aware of the situation between Russia and Persia. According to the records of a meeting with Mirza Fazlullah, an envoy of Abbas Mirza to Erzurum, Persia wished to help Dagestan together with the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire.³⁰⁰ Even though St. Petersburg was in turmoil, Russia could wage a war against Persia because of an issue over the border.³⁰¹

4.1.4 The Process of Seeking a Solution

According to the Russian Court, the Treaty of Gülistan partly invited misinterpretation and conflict because of its vaguely worded content. Three districts lying between Revan and the Gökçe Lake remained in dispute and that was the occasion

²⁹⁸ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voiny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 591.

²⁹⁹ *AKTY*, Vol. VI, Part. II, No. 595 (1875), p. 333.

³⁰⁰ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 811, Gömlek No: 37223 (25/04/1826).

³⁰¹ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 813, Gömlek No: 37254 (27/05/1826).

for new conflict between these two states.³⁰² Russia and Persia through their own representatives, Yermolov and Abbas Mirza, tried to resolve that border problem but no compromise was reached and the region of Gökçe was occupied by Russian troops in 1825.³⁰³

In 1826 the Shah, the Crown Prince, the special British envoy Henry Willock (1815-1826) and senior bureaucrats came together in the *Sultaniye* Council to make a final decision about the current situation. Mirza Bozorg supported the *ulema* during the meeting in the Council; most probably owing much to criticisms of the *ulema*.³⁰⁴ For the *ulema*, there was no way but waging war against the Russians. Barrat claims that the ill-defined provisions of the Treaty of Gülistan were exploited as pretexts for the approaching conflict.³⁰⁵

In June 1826, Nicholas I sent a Russian envoy, Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov³⁰⁶ (1787-1869) to the Court of Tehran upon his accession.³⁰⁷ Apart from that, the Prince had different aims for attempting the stabilization of the frontier problems around the Gökçe. The *ulema* issued a *fatva* declaring that opposition to *jihad*

³⁰² George Bournoutian, "Husayn Quli Khan Qazvini, Sardar of Erevan: A Portrait of a Qajar Administrator," *Iran Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2/3 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 168.

³⁰³ David M. Lang, "Griboedov's Last Years in Persia," *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1948), pp. 318-319.

³⁰⁴ Abbas Amanat, "Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain: Reflections of a Qajar Statesman on European Expansion," p. 40.

³⁰⁵ Glynn R. Barrat, "A Note on the Russian Conquest of Armenia," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 50, No. 120 (July, 1972), p. 407.

³⁰⁶ For details of the life of Menshikov, see *Svetleishii Knyaz' Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Departamenta Udelov Litein, 1872). For his embassy in Persia, see V. A. Bartolomei, *Posol'stvo Knyazya Menshikova v Persiyu v 1826 g.* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Tovarishchestva Obshchestvennaya Pol'za, 1904).

³⁰⁷ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, pp. 122-123.

was a sign of unbelief.³⁰⁸ The occupation of the region of Gökçe, led to the extreme feelings of hostility towards Russia, which culminated in a national demonstration in favor of war.³⁰⁹ Menshikov's mission, nevertheless, was not successful because of the Persian *ulema*'s pressure on Fath Ali Shah and the Persian Court.³¹⁰ The Persian Court was certain about the prospective support of Britain. The Definitive Treaty of Defensive Alliance, which was signed on November 25, 1814,³¹¹ between Persia and Great Britain, had a great importance for the Persia, particularly for Fath Ali Shah and Abbas Mirza. In this Treaty, Great Britain guaranteed Persia either a force from India or a yearly subsidy in case of Persia being attacked by a European state.³¹² On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire was interested in this resolution process. Regarding the report of the Mutasarrıf³¹³ of Bayezid, Behlül Paşa, the peace negotiations between the Russian Empire and Persia had no result and thus, the Persian Khans in Transcaucasia began to prepare their military staff to engage in the struggle against their powerful enemy.³¹⁴

³⁰⁸ Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906* (Berkeley, 1969), p. 89.

³⁰⁹ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 317.

³¹⁰ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 317; F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. 7, p. 336.

³¹¹ For the full text of the Treaty in Persian, see Gulam Reza Tebatabayi, *Mua'hadat ve Karardadha-yi Tarikh-i der Dovre Qajariye* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Behmen, 1373 / 1994-1995), pp. 87-105.

³¹² F. Kazemzadeh, "Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union to 1921," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. 7, p. 336. For details see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, Vol. 1, pp. 86-88.

³¹³ *Mutasarrıf* was the governor of district in the Ottoman Empire.

³¹⁴ *BOA, Hatt-ı Humayun*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38095 (03/07/1826).

4.1.5 The Impact of Yermolov and Abbas Mirza over the Case

The incessant encroachment of Russian forces along the frontier in the Caucasus and Yermolov's brutal behavior left no option for large numbers of Muslims and even for some Georgian Christians, but to go into exile in Persia. Furthermore, many Georgians did not have good relations with Yermolov and tried to get the support of the Ottoman Empire against Russia. According to the Ottoman documents, they wished to get rid of the Russian Government in Tiflis.³¹⁵ A letter sent by Vantik Khan in Georgia to the Governor of Erzurum Galip Paşa, stated that all Georgian regions desired to be liberated from the Russian Empire.³¹⁶ In another letter sent to Galip Paşa, Vantik Khan wrote that most of the Georgian Khans did not want to be under the control of the Russian Empire and they were ready to rebel against the Empire.³¹⁷

Moreover, Yermolov belittled Abbas Mirza by overlooking him as heir and paid his respects to another son of the Shah, Muhammad Ali Mirza, a rival of the Heir Apparent. As a response to Yermolov, Abbas Mirza assigned Prince Alexander of Georgia to govern the boundaries close to his homeland where he had rebelled against the Russians, and appointed the murderer of General Tsitsianov to govern the disputed areas in the Taliş region.³¹⁸ These kinds of incidents were further reasons, to wage *jihād*

³¹⁵ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38094/B (09/03/1826).

³¹⁶ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38094 (23/05/1826).

³¹⁷ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38094/A (13/06/1826).

³¹⁸ P. W. Avery, "An Enquiry into the Outbreak of the Second Russo-Persian War 1826-1828," *Iran and Islam*, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Chicago, 1971), pp. 21-25.; V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina*

against the enemy, definitely paved the way for Aga Seyid Muhammad Isfahani by making pressure over the Shah.

The relationship between the Russian Empire and Persia as Yermolov desired, he wanted to declare an aggressive war against Persia and perceived the country as “a glass” that never has been taken beyond the Caucasus.³¹⁹ The Russian Court, nevertheless, had some reservations about Yermolov. Thus, in January 1826, Nicholas I, busy with the Ottoman situation in the Balkans, wrote to the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus that to obtain the support of the Persian Court would be more useful than to increase mutual dissatisfactions and quarrels.³²⁰ At the same time, the negotiations of Semyon Ivanovich Mazarovitch³²¹ in Tehran had not obtained a satisfactory result and the proposal of General Yermolov, using coercive methods against Persia, was not acceptable to St. Petersburg.³²² Thus, Yermolov ignored the wishes of the Emperor.³²³

Yermolov completely refused to discuss the problematic provisions of the Treaty of Gülistan, since he felt that returning the areas conquered from the Persian by sword was out of question. In his report to St. Petersburg, he stated that to return any part of the conquered territories would diminish the prestige of the Russian Empire among the peoples of the Caucasus.³²⁴ Another reason for his refusal was related to Yermolov’s own preference about the successor to the Persian leadership after Fath Ali Shah.

1826-1828 gg., Vol. III, p. 8. General Tsitsianov was killed by the governor of Baku during the surrender of the city in 1806.

³¹⁹ *RGIA*, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis’: 76, List: 63.

³²⁰ *RGIA*, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis’: 76, List: 18, 49.

³²¹ Simon Ivanovich Similoyevich Mazarovich (?-1852) was a medic from Venice. He got into the Russian service in 1807 and served as a chargé d'affaires in Persia from 1818 to 1826.

³²² *RGIA*, Fond: 1018, Delo: 2, Opis’: 76, List: 63.

³²³ I. K. Enikolopov, *Alexander Sergeevich Griboedov v Gruzii i Persii* (Tiflis, 1929), p. 44.

³²⁴ F. Abdullaev, *Iz Istorii Russko-Iranskikh Otnoshenii i Angliiskoi Politiki v Irane Nachale XIX Veka* (Tashkent, 1971), p. 57.

Yermolov was a supporter of Muhammad Ali Mirza, who was Abbas Mirza's elder half-brother but had been excluded from succession because his mother was a Georgian. Yermolov was completely aware of the problems between these two candidates for the Persian throne and Muhammad Ali Mirza's aggravation and jealousy made the business easy for Yermolov to apply his own plan during that chaotic process.³²⁵

According to Peter Avery, Abbas Mirza needed a new war to restore his standing in the bureaucratic circles after his great defeat at the hands of the infidels. During that process, the Prime Minister, Allah Yar Khan, and the prominent religious cleric, Aga Seyyid Muhammad Isfahani, put the pressure on the Crown Prince to renew the struggle against the infidels.³²⁶ Bournoutian states that the people who were most interested in resuming hostilities were the Sardar of Revan, Hüseyin Khan, the apparent, Abbas Mirza, and the Russian commander of the Caucasus General Alexei P. Yermolov. All three preferred war to peace because they had gained fame and fortune in war and would have been forgotten in peacetime.³²⁷ Bournoutian has two different ideas about the position of Abbas Mirza during the process before the war.

Abbas Mirza himself had no reason to fear from the second war with Russia, because his troops were trained and well equipped. As the British Envoy Sir John McNeil underlined to the Shah, climatic and local conditions could only work against an invading Russian force; or could the whole military force of Russia be brought to bear

³²⁵ F. Abdullaev, *Iz Istorii Russko-Iranskikh Otnoshenii i Angliiskoi Politiki v Irane Nachale XIX Veka*, p. 57.

³²⁶ P. W. Avery, "An Enquiry into the Outbreak of the Second Russo-Persian War 1826-1828," p. 28; Hamid Algar, *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906*, pp. 82-89.

³²⁷ George Bournoutian, "Husayn Quli Khan Qazvini, Sardar of Erevan: A Portrait of a Qajar Administrator," *Iran Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2/3 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 167.

on Persia in 1826-27. Nicholas I would take no chances, which could leave Russia exposed to attacks in Poland or the Balkans.³²⁸ In the eyes of Qa'im Maqam, regaining lost territories would restore Abbas Mirza's honor as well as Persia's glory. In his statements written after Emperor Alexander I's death in 1825, Qa'im Maqam advised Abbas Mirza to become like one of the great conquerors of the world. To realize this imperial vision, Qa'im Maqam exhorted Abbas Mirza to seize Crimea and Moscow from the Emperor and proceed to conquer Russia and the Ottoman Empire.³²⁹

Vanessa Martin interprets the situation from the Abbas Mirza's perspective and stating that it is generally believed that the war with the Russian Empire in 1826 resulted with two things. Firstly, the desire of Abbas Mirza to secure a victory that would strength his position as successor, and secondly the concerns of the *ulema* for the fate of Muslim under Christian rule in the Caucasus. Willock, however, remarked that Abbas Mirza realized the dangers of going to war, but was afraid of losing popularity among the military.³³⁰

4.2 The Outbreak of War

Before Prince Menshikov left *Sultaniye*, news was received that the chief of the Taliş region had expelled the Russians from Lankaran.³³¹ Hostilities broke out at Karabağ and Şuragöl in 1826. During this process, Yermolov and General Valerian

³²⁸ Glynn R. Barrat, "A Note on the Russian Conquest of Armenia," p. 407.

³²⁹ Firoozeh Kashnai-Sabet, "Fragile Frontiers: The Diminishing Domains of Qajar Iran," p. 217.

³³⁰ Vanessa Martin, "An Evaluation of Reform and Development of the State in the Early Qajar Period," *Die Welt des Islams*, New Series, Vol. 36, Issue 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 16-17.

³³¹ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 123.

Grigor'evich Madatov³³² (Rüstem Madatian) were engaged in a campaign against the Chechens.³³³ In the meanwhile, intelligence arrived that the inhabitants of Gence, taking advantage of the absence of the Russian garrison, had possessed themselves of the fortress. The Persian Court sent Mirza Muhammad Sadik, to St. Petersburg to discuss the issue.³³⁴ Yermolov had no patience to discuss any matter concerning the Caucasus and detained the Persian envoy on his way, from Tiflis to St. Petersburg.³³⁵ According to the report of the Ottoman spy in Tabriz, Russia had an aim to cross the Aras River that meant Russia would annex the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan.³³⁶ In May 1826, the Russians occupied and armed Mirak, a locality in the Revan Khanate, to catch Mir Hasan, the Khan of the Taliş region, escaping from Lankaran.³³⁷ The Persians protested the new encroachment just as they had protested against Russia's advance in the area of Lake Gökçe. The violation of his territory gave the Khan of Revan a pretext to attack to the Russian forces without specific orders from the Persian Court.³³⁸ Meanwhile, the Russian occupation of Mirak effectively blocked the Persian border and interrupted commercial relationships between other places and Revan.³³⁹

³³² Valerian Grigor'evich Madatov (1782-1829) was an Armenian prince and Lieutenant-General of the Russian Empire. For details of the life of Madatov, see V. Terzibashyan, *General-Leutenant V. G. Madatov* (Yerevan: Izdatel'stvo Armfan, 1942); S. A. Madatova, "Knyaz' V. G. Madatov," *Russkaya Starina*, Vol. 7 (Jan., 1873), pp. 85-102.

³³³ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 124.

³³⁴ N. F. Dubrovin, *Istoriya Voyny i Vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze*, Vol. VI, p. 579.

³³⁵ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, Persidskaya Voyna 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, pp. 18-19; Glynn R. Barrat, "A Note on the Russian Conquest of Armenia," p. 407.

³³⁶ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 813, Gömlek No: 37254 (02/06/1826).

³³⁷ V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voyna, Persidskaya Voyna 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 20.

³³⁸ George A. Bournoutian, *the Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 24.

³³⁹ I. K. Enikolopov, *Alexander Sergeevich Griboedov v Gruzii i Persii*, p. 45.

4.3 The First Attacks of Persia

The Persian progress began in July 1826 with raids across a broad front from Georgia to the Taliş region and Baku. Abbas Mirza, passing over the Aras River, with his army of 60,000 soldiers, defeated the Russian forces on several points and seized the Russian military hub of Şuşa and Baku.³⁴⁰ In the Persian army, there were also two Russian regiments that were composed of deserters generally from the Russian forces in Georgia.³⁴¹ These regiments were under the control of Samson Yakovlevich Makintsev, known as Samson Khan.³⁴² The deserter regiments, known as *bahaduran*, were regularly paid soldiers with a well training and they were prepared against any rebellious movement in the Persian army.³⁴³ Nevertheless, Samson Khan refused to fight, expressing “we swore on the Gospel that we would not shoot our coreligionist and we will not change our oath.”³⁴⁴ The Ottoman Empire was following the developments in the course of the war. In August 1826, the Sardar of Revan Khanate, Hüseyin Khan, expressed in his letter to İstanbul that Persia had begun to wage war against the Russian Empire.³⁴⁵ After the successful Persian attacks, General Ivan Ivanovich Dibich³⁴⁶ was sent by Nicholas I to Tiflis in order to check the current situation there. According to the report of Dibich, Nicholas I recalled Yermolov and Ivan³⁴⁷ Fyodorovich Paskevich.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁰ A. V. Fadeev, *Rossiya v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 1815-1848 gg.* (Moskva, 1961), p. 42.

³⁴¹ Stephanie Cronin, “Building a New Army: Military Reform in Qajar Iran,” *War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present*, ed. Roxane Farmanfarmanian (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 59.

³⁴² P. Berzhe, “Samson Yakovlev Makintsev: Russkie Begletsy v Persii,” *Russkaya Starina*, Vol. 15, (Jan., 1876), pp. 770-804.

³⁴³ Stephanie Cronin, “Building a New Army: Military Reform in Qajar Iran,” pp. 59-60.

³⁴⁴ P. Berzhe, “Samson Yakovlev Makintsev: Russkie Begletsy v Persii,” p. 775.

³⁴⁵ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38095/C (15/08/1826).

³⁴⁶ Ivan Ivanovich Dibich (Hans Karl von Diebitsch, 1785-1831) was a German born General serving as Russian Field Marshal.

³⁴⁷ Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich (1782-1856) was a military leader in the Russian service. He was awarded with the title of Count of Erevan by the Russian Court in 1828. For details of the relations between

General Yermolov's requests for reinforcements were ignored by the new Emperor Nicholas I, who suspected from Yermolov of having Decembrist sympathies.³⁴⁹ Before the beginning of battle, the Russian forces were unprepared with an entire Russian regiment being captured marching towards Şuşa, and half of the soldiers entered into the service of the Shah right away. The Persian forces and volunteers from Gence defeated the Russian garrison, and in the official documents from the Governor of Çıldır, İsmail Hakkı Paşa to Galip Paşa, it was stated that the Persian forces began to move to Georgian territory.³⁵⁰ So successful were they that in less than a month Şirvan, Şeki, the Taliş region, and Gence had all been liberated by the Shah's troops. Şuşa, however, defied all the efforts of Abbas Mirza. Inhabitants of Gence, Karabağ, Şirvan, Şeki, the Taliş region and the Muslim parts of Georgia battled fiercely against the Russians, wiping out whole garrisons in several places and there were reports of the triumphs of the Persian forces in the first hours of the war against the Russians.³⁵¹

4.4 Similarities between the First and the Second Russo-Persian War

The Second Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828 erupted for similar reasons and shared many of the same results as the first Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813. Both began because of border disputes. The second war was shorter than the first although the

Yermolov and Paskevich, see V. Andreyeva, "Yermolov i Paskevich," *Kavkazskii Sbornik*, Vol. I (Tiflis, 1876), pp. 197-213.

³⁴⁸ For details of his military career until his appointment to the Caucasus, see Ivan Paskevich, "Iz Zapisok Fel'dmarshala Knyazya Paskevicha," *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 1 (Tiflis, 1889), pp. 407-424.

³⁴⁹ George Bourmoutian, "Husayn Quli Khan Qazvini, Sardar of Erivan: A Portrait of a Qajar Administrator," p. 168.

³⁵⁰ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38095 (02/08/1826).

³⁵¹ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 767, Gömlek No: 36148 (29/10/1826).

results of the second one were more unbearable. The Russian army had same problems such as insufficient soldiers and leaders such as Yermolov, who wanted to manipulate the conflict towards their own ends. The Persian army was large but their military skills were not at the same level with the Russian army. Due to the competition among the tribes, there were serious problems about the command chain, although the Persian soldiers were trained in the Western style after the foundation of *Nizam-i Cedid* but were unable to rid themselves of their tribal past. Although there were so many soldiers from every corner of Persia, the Persian military expenses were met by Persian Azerbaijan that was under the governorship of Abbas Mirza.

4.5 The Battles of Şemkir and Gence in 1826

The Russian forces were already well prepared in terms of a prospective military engagement in Tiflis, and the first battle began in Şemkir,³⁵² a district of Gence in July 1826. The Russian forces of 2000 soldiers, under the command of General Count Madatov, were superior to the Persian forces. The Persian commander, Emir Khan, maternal uncle of Abbas Mirza was killed at the beginning of the battle. The Persian cavalry was dispersed by the Russian artillery fire and the death of Emir Khan, and subsequently the Cossacks attacked them after they already lost their morale.³⁵³ General Madatov occupied the fortress of Gence.³⁵⁴ In the meanwhile, Abbas Mirza was in the

³⁵² For details of this battle, see V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, pp. 93-108.

³⁵³ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 417.

³⁵⁴ For details of this battle, see V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, pp. 108-126.

fortress of Şuşa. When news of the capture of Gence arrived, Abbas Mirza left for the region with his all army, 30,000 soldiers, with the approval of the *ulema*,³⁵⁵ to stop the disaster, but he was met by General Paskevich on the Akstafa River. At the beginning of the battle, the Persian forces were victorious but when the Russian forces began to fire up, Abbas Mirza made the same tactical mistake as he had done at Aslandüz in 1813, and he withdrew his soldiers.³⁵⁶ These instructions discouraged the whole army and critically changed the direction of the battle.³⁵⁷ “The ulema, the instigator of this war, made good their escape faster than all the others.”³⁵⁸ By the way, the Ottoman spies were sending reports about the battle to İstanbul, one of these reports stated that, there was a great battle around the Gence between the Russian soldiers and the Persian forces.³⁵⁹

4.6 The Battles of Etchmiadzin and Revan in 1827

After the occupation of the fortress of Abbasabad³⁶⁰ in June 1827, Count Paskevich and Konstantin Khristoforovich Benkendorff³⁶¹ began the counteroffensive against the Persians.³⁶² After the first battle between the two powers, near

³⁵⁵ Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, p. 178.

³⁵⁶ Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, p. 179.

³⁵⁷ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 418.

³⁵⁸ Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, p. 179.

³⁵⁹ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 427, Gömlek No: 21863/A (18/11/1826).

³⁶⁰ For details of the occupation of the fortress of Abbasabad, see Inzhener-Pol'kovnik Litov, “Osada Abaz-Abada Proizvedennaya v Iyule 1827 Goda, Pod Nachal'stvom Komandira Otdel'nogo Kavkazskogo Korpusa, Generala ot Infanterii General-Adyutant Paskevicha,” *Inzhenernie Zapiski*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1839), pp. 1-13.

³⁶¹ For details of the life of Benkendorff, see S. Novoselov, *General-Adyutant, General Leitenant Konstantin Khristoforovich Benkendorf* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya Yakova Treya, 1858).

³⁶² V. Potto, *Kavkazskaya Voina, Persidskaya Voina 1826-1828 gg.*, Vol. III, p. 215.

Etchmiadzin³⁶³ and Ashtarak,³⁶⁴ where Armenian volunteers joined to the Russian troops, General Paskevich immediately laid siege to Sardarabad in September 1827,³⁶⁵ a large fortified village, inhabited by Armenians,³⁶⁶ the Persian force was fragmented and the Russian forces made a camp on the border of the Ottoman Empire, and finally the Russians took the fortress of Sardarabad and forced Hasan Khan to flee to Revan.³⁶⁷ In this war, the some Georgians and some Azerbaijanis as well as the Armenians were on the Russian side, according to Fadeev, they did not want to remain as slaves of the Shah³⁶⁸ and that, 1500 Armenians had stood shoulder to shoulder with the Russians and fought against the Persians.³⁶⁹ There was a concern in the Ottoman Empire resulting from a recent letter from Hüseyin Khan stating that the Persians had begun to battle against the Russian forces in Revan.³⁷⁰ Soon after, in order to inspire confidence on the Ottoman Empire, the Russians sent a letter to the Ottoman administration expressed that they did not have any evil intention towards the borders of the Ottoman Empire.³⁷¹ Moreover, another letter was dispatched by a Russian commander, Major David, to the

³⁶³ *Ruskii Invalid ili Voennii Vedomosti*, Materialy dlya Rossiskoi Voennoi Istorii, No. 125 (May 18, 1835), pp. 499-500; No. 126 (May 19, 1835), pp. 503-504; No. 128 (May 21, 1835), p. 512; No. 129 (May 22, 1835), pp. 515-516; No. 130 (May 23, 1835), pp. 519-520; No. 131 (May 24, 1835), pp. 523-524; No. 132 (May 25, 1835), pp. 527-528; No. 133 (May 28, 1835), pp. 531-532; No. 134 (May 29, 1835), pp. 535-536; No. 135 (May 30, 1835), pp. 539-540; No. 136 (May 31, 1835), pp. 543-544.

³⁶⁴ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 945, Gömlek No: 40705/A (22/09/1826).

³⁶⁵ For details of the occupation of the fortress of Sardarabad, see General-Mayor Truzson, "Osada Sardar-Abada Proizvedennaya Pod Nachal'stvom Komandira Otdel'nogo Kavkazskogo Korpusa, Generala ot Infanterii General-Adyutant Paskevicha, v Sentyabre 1827," *Inzhenernie Zapiski*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1839), pp. 14-41.

³⁶⁶ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 136; General-Mayor Truzson, "Osada Sardar-Abada Proizvedennaya Pod Nachal'stvom Komandira Otdel'nogo Kavkazskogo Korpusa, Generala ot Infanterii General-Adyutant Paskevicha, v Sentyabre 1827," *Inzhenernie Zapiski*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1839), p. 18.

³⁶⁷ George Bournoutian, "Husayn Quli Khan Qazvini, Sardar of Erevan: A Portrait of a Qajar Administrator," p. 169.

³⁶⁸ A. V. Fadeev, *Rossiya v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 1815-1848 gg.* (Moskva, 1961), pp. 42-43.

³⁶⁹ A. V. Fadeev, *Rossiya v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 1815-1848 gg.*, p. 43.

³⁷⁰ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 850, Gömlek No: 38095/E (24/07/1827).

³⁷¹ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 427, Gömlek No: 21863/N (24/07/1827).

Muhafiz of Kars that their arrival in Gümrü and Şuragöl from Karabağ was not an indication of any hostility against the Ottoman Empire and that some ill-intentioned figures had presented information to the contrary, and he also gave information about how the Russians defeated the forces of Hasan Khan.³⁷²

Immediately after the fall of Sardarabad, General Paskevich laid a siege to Revan.³⁷³ In both places some amount of goods and ammunitions were captured, and the Russian army continued to advance towards Tabriz.³⁷⁴ They not only recaptured the lands surrendered to the Russians by the Treaty of Gülistan, but advanced into the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan. The Russians had now gained possession of the whole country beyond the Aras River. Revan was the key to Persian control however, it had been further strengthened since 1808 with the fortresses of Sardarabad and Abbasabad, built to support Revan. The territory of Revan was on the major invasion route and, if it could not be taken, the Russian advance would find it extremely difficult to access northern Persia. These defeats discouraged the Persian forces and there was no option but concluding a peace.³⁷⁵ According to a report of the Ottoman spies posted around Revan, the Russian Generals with their forces gathering around the city of Nakhchivan had an intention to march on Tabriz.³⁷⁶

³⁷² BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 427, Gömlek No: 21863/P (24/07/1827).

³⁷³ For details of this siege, see “Dva Pis’ma iz Erivani 1827,” *Moskovskii Telegraf*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1828), pp. 157-190; “Neskol’ko Dnei iz Moego Zhurnala vo Vremya Persidskoi Kampanii,” *Moskovskii Tejegraf*, Vol. 21, No. 9 (1828), pp. 3-46.

³⁷⁴ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 139.

³⁷⁵ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 419.

³⁷⁶ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 801, Gömlek No: 37091/A (26/06/1827).

4.7 The Surrender of Tabriz in 1827

After the occupation of Abbasabad, Sardarabad, Revan,³⁷⁷ and Nakhchivan there were no obstacles on the way of the Russian army. It had not been certain that the whole army under General Paskevich was sufficient to take Tabriz but before the battle for Tabriz, Abbas Mirza had sent his soldiers home to save the expense of feeding since he has not received the necessary payment from Fath Ali Shah. The lack of money was a serious problem for the Persian Court and the arsenal of Tabriz was nearly empty.³⁷⁸ Soon after, Abbas Mirza received news that the Russians had crossed the Aras near Julfa.³⁷⁹ Realizing the loss of Persian morale and the city of Tabriz was defenseless; the Russian commander of Nakhchivan decided that Tabriz could be captured with a small force of 4,000 men.³⁸⁰ The Russian forces under the command of Count Eristov were close to a Persian post, which was about 14 hours from Tabriz. From an Ottoman document, it was recorded that Abbas Mirza considered, that taking refuge with the Ottomans was a better choice than being captured by the Russian forces.³⁸¹

Abbas Mirza was unable to reassemble his army and remained in Khoy. By this success, the Russians captured all his cannons in Tabriz. There was no way for Persia except waiting for the Russian dictations about concluding a peace.³⁸² The Russians

³⁷⁷ For details of the occupation of Abbasabad, Sardarabad, Revan see S. E. Skrutovskii, *Leib-Gvardii Svodnyi Polk na Kavkaze v Persidskuyu Voynu s 1826 po 1828 g.* (Sankt Peterburg, 1896), pp. 33-44.

³⁷⁸ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 419.

³⁷⁹ W. Monteith, *Kars and Erzeroum with the Campaigns of Prince Paskiewitch in 1828 and 1829*, p. 142.

³⁸⁰ Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 419.

³⁸¹ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayün*, Dosya No: 767, Gömlek No: 36145 (24/03/1827).

³⁸² Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, Vol. II, p. 419

occupied Tabriz,³⁸³ at the same time, Abbas Mirza had withdrawn back his few forces to Hamedan. After the occupation of Tabriz, a letter was sent from İstanbul to Paskevich, expressing the wish for peace between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires be sustained.³⁸⁴ Russia and Persia were ready for concluding a peace treaty as well.³⁸⁵ According to Galip Paşa's report to İstanbul, these two sides agreed that Tabriz and Khoy would remain in the borderlines of Persia and the Russian Empire would annex the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan.³⁸⁶ The Ottoman Empire maintained its close monitoring of the Russian forces in Persia because it was dangerous for the Ottoman Empire in terms of Tabriz's close geographical and strategic position to Şehrızor / Süleymaniye-Dohuk.³⁸⁷

One of the main reasons for the Second Russo-Persian War was the *ulema*'s pressure on the Persian Court but they did not show the reaction that they showed against the Persian Court before the beginning of the war against the Russian soldiers. Some members of *ulema* in Tabriz even collaborated with the Russian forces. Aga Mir Fattah was the symbol of this collaboration with the Russian occupation forces.³⁸⁸ When the Russian army reached to the vicinity of Tabriz, the Şeyhülislam of Tabriz, "backed by many of the chief citizens, had taken the key of the city from the gate-keeper, whom

³⁸³ For details of the Russian occupation, see *Severnaya Pchela*, *Sovremennaya Istoriya*, No. 81 (July 7, 1828), pp. 3-4; No. 82 (July 10, 1828), pp. 3-4; No. 83 (July 12, 1828), pp. 3-4).

³⁸⁴ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 803, Gömlek No: 37114/L (12/12/1827).

³⁸⁵ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 803, Gömlek No: 37114/J (19/12/1827); *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 803, Gömlek No: 37114/I (19/12/1827).

³⁸⁶ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 733, Gömlek No: 34786 (30/12/1827).

³⁸⁷ *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 766, Gömlek No: 36116/D (08/12/1827); *BOA, Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 1090, Gömlek No: 44289/B (22/12/1827).

³⁸⁸ Abbas Amanat, "Russian Intrusion into the Guarded Domain: Reflections of a Qajar Statesman on European Expansion," p. 45. For details about Aga Mir Fattah, see Hasan Fasais, *History of Persia under Qajar Rule*, p. 182.

they threw down from the top of the wall, and proceeded to the Russian camp where they invited the general to take possessions of the place.”³⁸⁹

During the Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828 the Ottoman Empire emphasized its neutrality, thus every incident that happened near its eastern frontiers was significant for İstanbul. For example, Galip Paşa sent a letter to the Muhafız of Kars and the Governor of Çıldır in which he expressed that an Ottoman merchant, Şerif Aga, had passed across the Persian border to help the Persians. In order to show her loyalty to the neutrality law, the Ottoman Empire sent a report to the Russian Court informing that they already recalled the merchant and will be penalizing him.³⁹⁰ Other events also took place on the borders of the Ottoman Empire. For example, the Russian forces of approximately 1,000 cavalry and infantry, passed through Arpaçay and Şuragöl and came close to the Ottoman Empire’s border. According to a letter from İsmail Hakkı Paşa, the Governor of Çıldır, to the Russian General, if the Russians were keeping track of Şerif Aga that was not necessary (given that, the Ottomans already decided to punish him) and it was better for the Russian General to withdraw his soldiers.³⁹¹

On the other hand, Great Britain was also worried about the outcome of the war because the progress of the Russian Empire to the south was not in harmony with Britain’s interests in Persia. The East India Company’s representative, Sir John MacDonald was in Tehran when Tabriz was occupied by the Russians and he set out for

³⁸⁹ Robert Grant Watson, *A History of Persia from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Year 1858* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1866), p. 236.

³⁹⁰ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 427, Gömlek No: 21863/H (24/07/1827).

³⁹¹ BOA, *Hatt-ı Hümayûn*, Dosya No: 427, Gömlek No: 21863 (24/07/1827).

Tabriz to make a contact with the Russia diplomat Aleksandr Sergeevich Griboedov.³⁹² Previously, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Gülistan, Sir Gore Ouseley was the mediator between Russia and Persia on behalf of the British interests. The Russian Court was aware of the insidious British policies and Nicholas I had definitely decided, this time, to accept no foreign mediation in Russian's relations with Persia this once. All sides agreed that in 1813, the Treaty of Gülistan between Russia and Persia, the intervention of Ouseley created complications about the specific borders being drawn.³⁹³ Nevertheless, it was impossible for the Russian and Persian sides to come to an agreement without a mediator and Great Britain was again placed in that role since Paskevich did not want to accept the intervention of a third party but there was no way to negotiate about the peace with the Persians without MacDonald.³⁹⁴ Even though the Persian Court had not achieved what it expected through the Ouseley's mediation in 1813, but there was no alternative and furthermore this time, in the spring of 1826, Persia received a subsidy of 728 thousand rubles from Great Britain.³⁹⁵

4.8 Armyanskii Polk in 1827

During the Second Russo-Persian War, according to report from Paskevich to the Emperor in 1827, Nicholas I ordered the formation of voluntary militia groups consisted

³⁹² For biography of Griboedov, see D. G. Eristov, *Aleksandr Sergeevich Griboedov 1795-1829* (Tiflis: Tipografiya S. Melikova, 1879).

³⁹³ David M. Lang, "Griboedov's Last Years in Persia," p. 320.

³⁹⁴ David M. Lang, "Griboedov's Last Years in Persia," p. 321.

³⁹⁵ A. V. Fadeev, *Rossiya v Sisteme Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 1815-1848 gg.*, p. 42.

of Armenians and Georgians.³⁹⁶ Furthermore, there would be a group of Tatar cavalry against the Persian forces.³⁹⁷ After the *ukaz* of the Emperor, an *Armyanskii Polk* was formed on 24 May 1827 by Nikolai Martianovich Sipyagin, the War Governor of Tiflis.³⁹⁸ Before its formation, the first step had been taken by Nerses V of Ashtarak³⁹⁹ when he presented a proposal for the creation of an Armenian military regiment within the Russian army it would initially consist of 800 men⁴⁰⁰ and later it would be increased up to 1,000.⁴⁰¹ By the invitation of Nerses V, most of the Armenians that had migrated from Persia to Russia joined this regiment, which had as its emblem Mount Ararat adjacent to an ark. On May 14, 1827, a group of Armenians applied to Tiflis Governor as volunteers for the *Armyanskii Polk*. Their names were published in a newspaper as; Yegor Lazarev, Yegor Alikhanov, David Korganov, Aleksandr Nazarov, Aryutin Khandamov, Markar Babaev, Badal Sarkisov, Avetik Arzumanov, Papa Abelov, Zurab Kuzanov, Artyom Iprumov, Georgii Areshov, Ovakim Agadzanov, Mikirtum Babants, Bezhan Beburov, Glakha Babanashvili, Kazar Abraamov, Stepan Sagatelov, Sarkis Khalatov, Allahverdi Vartanov, Yegiazar Mirzoev, and Stepan Khodzhaev.⁴⁰² They swore their allegiance to Russia in the Church of St. Georgia, in Tiflis, in the company of Nerses V and Archpriest Aryutin Alamdarov on May 15, 1827.

There were some basic rules about the Armenian Regiment. It would be consisted of battalions which could be united on-demand and recruits between 19 and 30

³⁹⁶ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 1a.

³⁹⁷ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 1b.

³⁹⁸ *Tiflisskii Vestnik*, *Armyanskii Polk*, *Sformirovannii v 1827g.*, No. 116 (2 July 1877), p. 1

³⁹⁹ For details of the activities of Nerses V of Ashtarak in Revan, see "Otryvok, iz Dnevnika Puteshestiviya dlya Osmotra Erivanskoï Oblasti," *Moskovskii Telegraf*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1828), pp. 560-567.

⁴⁰⁰ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 3b.

⁴⁰¹ *Tiflisskii Vestnik*, *Armyanskii Polk*, *Sformirovannii v 1827g.*, No. 116 (2 July 1877), p. 2

⁴⁰² *Tiflisskii Vestnik*, *Armyanskii Polk*, *Sformirovannii v 1827g.*, No. 116 (2 July 1877), p. 2.

years-old were considered to be suitable. Furthermore, each volunteer would have to own his dagger;⁴⁰³ they should wear a green *arkhalukh*,⁴⁰⁴ a cap, similar to that of the Georgians, and a cloak.⁴⁰⁵ Each ordinary soldier would be paid ten silver rubles, and officers fifteen silver rubles.⁴⁰⁶ A small number of horses that had been obtained from the enemy (i.e., from Persians) last year would be distributed among these battalions,⁴⁰⁷ and all the rest of their needs would be met by the Russian army.⁴⁰⁸ These volunteers would serve in the army until end of the war, then they would be free to return home or continue their service in the army and their families would be exempted from all taxes and duties during the aforementioned war. The commander of each battalion would be an Armenian, who would command in his native language,⁴⁰⁹ there would be at least one priest and a doctor. Each soldier would have been given a rifle with its bayonet.⁴¹⁰

According to the report of Sipyagin to Baron Dibich on June 1, 1827, the first voluntary group consisted of 117 Armenians in the *Armyanskii Polk* and sent to Etcmiadzin to join their regiments⁴¹¹ under the command of Paskevich.⁴¹² In a report by General Lieutenant Count Sukhtelen to Sipyagin, this first voluntary group arrived in Etchmiadzin on June 9, 1827.⁴¹³

Sipyagin reported to Baron Dibich on July 5, 1827, that the second Armenian armed group had been formed and sent to Revan under the command of Second

⁴⁰³ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 3b.

⁴⁰⁴ An Azerbaijani national cloth, widespreadly used by all Caucasian nationalities.

⁴⁰⁵ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 4a.

⁴⁰⁶ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 4a.

⁴⁰⁷ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 4a.

⁴⁰⁸ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 4a.

⁴⁰⁹ *Tiflisskii Vestnik*, *Armyanskii Polk*, *Sformirovannii v 1827g.*, No. 117 (3 July 1827), p. 1.

⁴¹⁰ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 3b.

⁴¹¹ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 6a.

⁴¹² S. E. Skrutovskii, *Leib-Gvardii Svodnyi Polk na Kavkaze v Persidskuyu Voynu s 1826 po 1828 g.* (Sankt Peterburg, 1896), p. 32.

⁴¹³ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 8a.

Lieutenant Yakimov, the commander of Kherson Grenadier Regiment.⁴¹⁴ There was also a Georgian armed group created by Sipyagin and he stated in his report to Baron Dibich on June 15, 1827, that this group of 100 volunteers was sent to Revan under the command of Count Second Lieutenant Tumanov, the commander of 7th *Karabinernii* regiment.⁴¹⁵ The numbers of Armenian volunteers increased day by day. According to another report by Sipyagin to Baron Dibich on August 21, 1827, the third Armenian armed group of 67 soldiers was formed and sent to Revan under the command of Captain Esburosy in order to support the brigade of Krasovsky.⁴¹⁶ Finally, the Russians had a network of Armenians and Georgians in Persia. This network provided extremely useful data about the state Persian military forces and mood of the Persian commanding class during the war.⁴¹⁷

4.9 The Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828

By the beginning of the 19th century, Persia was under a serious pressure from the Russian Empire in the Caucasus. As a result of the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813, Persia had lost most of its territories in Transcaucasia except the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan. The Treaty of Gülistan of 1813 was inconsistent and unsatisfactory for the both sides. Its ill-defined articles gave Russia the opportunity to maintain its policy in Transcaucasia. After the Second Russo-Persian War, although the

⁴¹⁴ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 9a ; *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 10a.

⁴¹⁵ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 12a; *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 13a.

⁴¹⁶ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4336, List: 14a.

⁴¹⁷ *RGVIA*, Fond: 846, Delo: 16, Opis': 4338, List: 1a.

Persian army had superiority in numbers, the Persian forces were not sufficiently trained to withstand against the highly modern Russian army. Despite the positive efforts of Abbas Mirza, there were many military and disciplinary problems in the Persian army. Persia's second serious encounter with its northern neighbor not only resulted with the loss of the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan but also with an economic disaster. The Treaty of Türkmençay was signed by Abbas Mirza and Count Paskevich on February 22, 1828.⁴¹⁸

The treaty contained 2 parts; the Peace Treaty consisting of 16 articles and the Commercial Treaty consisting of 9 articles. According to the 3rd article of the peace treaty, the Russian Empire annexed the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan into its Transcaucasian territory. With this article, the occupation of Transcaucasia was completed and the borders of a prospective Armenian state were shaped. The demographic and social results of this article had an important impact on the future of the Russian policy in the region. The 6th article had the worst effect on the Persian economy. According to this article, Persia had to pay 10 *crowrs* silver tomans⁴¹⁹ or 20,000,000 silver rubles as reparation to Russia for the cost incurred in waging the war and the losses suffered by Russian subjects.

The new border between Russia and Persia was shaped by the 7th article of the Peace Treaty. Russia recognized the Shah's decision for the heir to his throne. This reflected Russia's desire to increase its influence over Abbas but also meant that Russia

⁴¹⁸ For the full Persian text of the Treaty of Türkmençay in 1828, see Gulam Reza Tebatabayi, *Mua'headat ve Karardadha-yi Tarikh-i der Dovre Qajariye* (Tehran: Chaphane-yi Behmen, 1373 / 1994-1995), pp. 122-157, 419-422.

⁴¹⁹ Persian currency.

needed an opportunity to intervene in the succession struggle. This article was crucial in terms of the future political relations between Russia and Persia following the treaty because the Russian Empire wanted to guarantee its newly annexed lands. According to the 8th article, the Russian merchants and military vessels would be free to use the Caspian Sea and no other state would be permitted to have battleships in the Caspian Sea. Thus, Persian shores were completely vulnerable to Russian attacks. According to 13th article, all prisoners of war, whether captured in the course of the war or before, would be freed. The commercial treaty compelled Persia to allow the establishment of Russian consulates anywhere in Persia and guaranteed extraterritorial privileges, a sharp contrast with the Shah's previous objection to the revival of the Russian consulate at Enzeli. However, the most important article was the 15th, which is described in detail in the next chapter.

4.10 The Importance of Nerses V for Russia

From the beginning of the Russo-Armenian relations, the ecclesiastics and the tradesmen played an important role. In Transcaucasia, Etchmiadzin the most important Armenian religious center was a key strategic point for not only regional powers but also for the Armenian ecclesiastics. Nerses V of Ashtarak was one of the religious officials who believed that only the Russians could help to free the Armenians from the Persian rule. He was a pragmatist whose aim was to collaborate with the Russians until the foundation of an Armenian state in Transcaucasia. Nerses V was also active in mobilizing the Armenians against Persia and persuaded them to fight for the Russian

Empire in the war. In this context, Nerses V was aware of his strategic position during the Second Russo-Persian War.

In 1827, Nerses V was with Benkendorff during the occupation of the Khanate of Revan and encouraged the Armenians to fight against the Persian forces. It is not clear how successful his preaching was during the battle of the Revan Khanate because according to Bournoutian, “although much has been written on Armenian aid on participation in this war, the Armenians of the Khanate of Revan, on the whole, took little active part in the struggle.”⁴²⁰ The Persian forces were well prepared to fight against the Russians before the battle in the Khanate of Revan. This fact discouraged the Armenians of Revan from the formation of any volunteer groups to support the Russians. Bournoutian also added, “Although numerous Armenians of Karabagh, Gence, and parts of Georgia rose up against the Persians and openly assisted the Russians, the Armenians in the Khanate of Revan did not follow suit.”⁴²¹

Nerses V also played a great role during the migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia. In order to persuade the Armenians for this migration, the Russian Empire utilized commanders with Armenian origins such as Lazar Lazarev Yakimovich and Nerses V. This migration served the aims of Nerses V as well as those of the Russian Empire because with the migration, the Armenian population of the Khanate of Revan increased and this demographic fluctuation had an effect on the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the relationship between the Russian Empire and Nerses were based on the mutual interests. In principle, Nerses V would

⁴²⁰ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 86

⁴²¹ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 87

support the Russian forces with the encouragement of his religious and political power over the Armenian community in return for Russia allowing the foundation of an Armenian state on the border of the newly annexed territories. During this process, Abbas Mirza also made a contact with Nerses V seeking for a support to the Persian interests during the war. It was clear that Nerses had some doubts about the Russian intentions because he replied that if debts of the Armenian Church were reduced and if Etchmiadzin was to be given to him, he would consider the Persian offer.⁴²² On the other hand, not all the Armenians wanted to fight against the Persian forces because of their good relations with the Persian Court.

4.11 The Migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia

4.11.1 The 15th Article of the Treaty of Türkmençay

During the Second Russo-Persian War, the Russian forces occupied Etchmiadzin, Nakhchivan soon after Abbasabad, Sardarabad, Revan, Marand, Tabriz, Khoy, Urmia and Ardabil were occupied by Russia.⁴²³ The Türkmençay Treaty put, the Persian Court under serious pressure, in particular with the 15th article, which addressed the issue of the “Christians” living in Persia. In fact, there was no explicit expression that the permission for the migration to Russia was only given to the Christians but it was known that the Armenians wished to settle in the newly annexed territories. Peter the Great had also applied this policy after his Persian expedition in 1722. According to

⁴²² George A. Bournoutian, *the Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 85.

⁴²³ Sergei Glinka, *Opisanie Pereselenie Armyan Adderbidzhanskikh v Predely Rossii*, pp. 10-11.

the 15th article, the Persian Court would not expose those who were to emigrate from Persia to Russia to any restriction. They would sell or take their moveable possessions with them in the latter case; they would not have to pay any tax at the border. As for their fixed property, a term of five years would be given to sell or dispose of them. During these five years, they could enter Persia to sell their immovable properties and they would be allocated two passports for the next five years.

The Russian Empire thought that by this article, it had guaranteed the properties of the Armenians who had migrated and had saved them from financial losses and tax liability. However, this article did not work in practice because; the prospective migration would be completed in less than one year. When both parties in Türkmençay Village signed this treaty, Tabriz was under the occupation of the Russian forces. The Russian Court thought that they could be there forever, because they did not think that the Persian Court would be able to pay the 20,000,000 silver rubles reparations. The Persian Court, with the monetary and diplomatic support of Great Britain, paid its first installment thus, the Russians had to leave Tabriz and its neighboring settlements. This meant that the Christian families would also have to leave their own settlements with Russians and this migration would be under the protection of the Russian forces.

4.11.2 The Report of Colonel Lazarev about the Armenian Migration

Nerses followed the Russian army and before the war ended he reached Etcmiadzin, where he began to campaign for an autonomous Armenia. He was aided by Colonel Lazar Lazarev Yakimovich, a member of the aforementioned influential

Armenian clan in Russia, and by A. S. Griboedov, the liberal Russian poet and diplomat. Immediately following the war, these men urged General Paskevich and his staff to use all means to encourage the Armenians in northern Persia to migrate into the Khanates of Revan, Nakhchivan and Karabağ, hoping to elevate their population from a minority to a majority of the region.⁴²⁴ The Khanate of Revan was completely occupied by Russians on October 1, 1827. The Revan Mosque was converted to a Russian church by the name of *Pokrov Presvyatya Bogoroditsy* by the command of Nicholas I,⁴²⁵ and, in two months, the Russian Empire began to send its own clerical officials.⁴²⁶

According to the report of Colonel Lazar Lazarev Yakimovich, the migrating Armenians would be directed to Revan, Nakhchivan and Karabağ. According to Lazarev, the Armenians and their church had been under the rule of Persians for approximately 400 years, and he was proud to be in the service of Paskevich, and liberate the Armenians. Lazarev thought at first, the migration of the Armenians from Persia to Russia would be harder than the signing of the Peace Treaty with Persia. However, the Armenians trusted the Russian Empire and they were willing to migrate, they left everything behind; all their homes, gardens, workplaces, fields and the graves of their relatives. Firstly, the Nestorian migrants and later the Armenians demanded from that the Russian Empire to pay for the possessions that they left behind but Russia only gave them one third of what they have asked for.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Another important leader in these events was V. G. Madatov, who was also an officier in the Russian army. *AKTY*, Vol. VI, Part. I, No. 1293-1294 (1874), p. 848.

⁴²⁵ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 433 (1878), p. 481.

⁴²⁶ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 433 (1878), p. 481.

⁴²⁷ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 4a.

More than 8,000 Armenian families migrated to the newly annexed territories despite all difficulties. Persian and British agents tried to prevent their migration to Russia.⁴²⁸ Furthermore, although Lazarev tried to persuade many Nestorian families to migrate to Russia, only 100 families accepted.⁴²⁹ Others demanded more money for their possessions that they would leave in Persia. Lazarev used the power of money to persuade two Armenian Meliks, Sarhosh and Alaverd to influence the Nestorians.⁴³⁰ However, the Nestorians did not agree to migrate to Russia without sufficient in advance payment for their goods.⁴³¹

Lazarev received the instruction about the migration of Armenians and other Christians dwelling in Persian Azerbaijan to Revan, Nakhchivan and Karabağ *Oblasts* on February 26, 1828.⁴³² He commented that he had only received 8,000 *chervonets*⁴³³ out of 16,000 *chervonets* sent to Paskevich from Russia for this purpose.⁴³⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Prince Melikov of 41th *Egerskiy Polk* was assigned to deal with the immigration of the Armenians from the Üzümcü Village and its neighboring settlements,⁴³⁵ and Lazarev appointed Lieutenant Colonel Prince Argutinskii-Dolgorukii of the Georgian Grenadier Regiment in Tabriz together with other officers to manage the migration of the Armenians from the city center and its villages. Furthermore, a similar budget was sent to Melikov and Argutinskii-Dolgorukii.⁴³⁶

⁴²⁸ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 4b.

⁴²⁹ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5a.

⁴³⁰ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5a.

⁴³¹ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5a.

⁴³² *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5a.

⁴³³ *Chervonets* equals ten rubles.

⁴³⁴ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5a.

⁴³⁵ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5b.

⁴³⁶ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5b.

Soon after the Treaty of Türkmençay, the Khanates of Revan and Nakhchivan were united together under the name of *Armyanskaya Oblast*⁴³⁷ by the order of Nicholas I on 21 March 1828.⁴³⁸

When one of the groups got ready to move, the officer in charge of Tabriz or the *Magals*⁴³⁹ for the migration, it was sent northwards in the presence of an officer. The groups were accompanied by a group of Cossacks, a priest and some armed migrants.⁴⁴⁰ According to the report of Lazarev, when he began to deal with this duty, there were no great problems but day by day, there emerged new difficulties. The Armenians were willing to migrate to Transcaucasia although they had to leave their all possessions they were hopeful that the Russian Empire would compensate their losses and needs when they arrived in their new settlements.⁴⁴¹

Because Persia was able to pay reparations, so quickly the Armenian migrants did not have enough time to be prepared for their departure. Lazarev explained to the Persian Court that the because of their rapid departure the Armenians were not able to sell their land, property and other possessions. The immigrants left their possessions to their relatives who decided to remain in Persia. Nevertheless, the Persian Court secretly forbade this. Lazarev stated that, all these possessions would be taken under the control of the Persian Court after the migration,⁴⁴² and that nobody would dare to buy these

⁴³⁷ For details of the Armyanskaya Oblast, see N. Nefed'eva, *Vzglyad na Armyanskuyu Oblast iz Putevykh Zapisok* (Sankt Peterburg: Tipografiya N. Grecha, 1839).

⁴³⁸ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 437 (1878), p. 487.

⁴³⁹ *Magal* is district or province. For the details, see ; F. A. Brokgauz and I. A. Yefron, *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar' Brokgauza i Yefrona*, Vol. XVIII (Sankt Peterburg: Semenovskaya Tipografiya, 1896), p. 299.

⁴⁴⁰ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 5b.

⁴⁴¹ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 6a.

⁴⁴² *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 6b.

possessions from the migrants. Following this report, the Russian Empire paid each family 10 silver rubles for their estates.⁴⁴³

According to a letter from Paskevich to Amburger on 9 March 1828, all the Armenians who had migrated raised complaints about the Persian Government. The Persians claimed that the Armenians had been forced to leave by the Russian officers into Transcaucasia. Some Armenians tried to sell their properties secretly and when the Persian Court discovered this, they have already sold a considerable amount. A Persian official, Aga Kerim, asked from the Armenians to give back the money, which they made after selling their landed properties such as gardens and houses.⁴⁴⁴

In a report Lazarev wrote to Paskevich from Urumia, on 2 April 1828, expressed that although so many obstacles and difficulties, created by the Persian Court, 700 Armenian families migrated from the Khanate of Maraga to the newly annexed Russian territories.⁴⁴⁵ According to Gamazov, there were no remaining Christian families in the Maraga Khanate.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, Colonel Argutinskii-Dolgorukov reported that 329 families from Tabriz and its nearby villages had migrated and half had already settled near the Aras River; only six families had not wished to migrate.⁴⁴⁷ Lazarev expressed in his report that he passed through so many Armenian villages from Tabriz to Urumia over Salmas, and their appreciation was expressed to him.⁴⁴⁸ In Urumia, he met so many obstacles and absurd rumors diffused by the Persian Court to frighten the Armenians.

⁴⁴³ *RGIA*, Fond: 383, Delo: 29, Opis': 539, List: 6a.

⁴⁴⁴ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 564 (1878), p. 606.

⁴⁴⁵ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

⁴⁴⁶ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

⁴⁴⁷ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

⁴⁴⁸ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

The Persian officials tried to make them believe that there were negative weather conditions and famine at the other side of the Aras River.⁴⁴⁹

Moreover, the representative of the English mission, Willock explained to Lazarev that these Armenian migrants had faced bad conditions. He claimed that on the way to Karabağ, there was a great lack of bread in Revan and Nakhchivan, which had been partly destroyed by the war. According to Lazarev, not only the Persians but also the English mission tried everything within their power to a stop to the Armenian migrants.⁴⁵⁰

In order to prevent the Persian Court from imposing pressures on the migration programs, Colonel Lazarev announced that he guaranteed to protect the rights of the Armenian migrants in their new settlements. Lazarev appointed his two officials, Galazov and Korganov, to visit one of the Christian villages with Willock. The aim of Lazarev was to show Willock that the Russian Empire has not put the migrants under pressure. Willock was shocked because all of the residents of the village stated that they were willingly migrating to Russia,⁴⁵¹ and Willock signed a document confirming the statements of the peasants.

Colonel Lazarev controlled the migration of the Christians from Tabriz and Maraga into the Russian Empire but there was a problem about the migrants. They left most of their all possessions and landed properties in Persia. For this reason, Colonel Lazarev was under a great pressure to provide the necessary compensations to the

⁴⁴⁹ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

⁴⁵⁰ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 608.

⁴⁵¹ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 609.

migrants. In this connection, he sent a letter to Paskevich in the Provisional Government of Revan, requesting that all necessary measures for the migrants should be taken. The situation in Salmas and Urumia was disastrous rather and Lazarev requested an urgent amount of 25,000 rubles from Paskevich.⁴⁵² Furthermore, Lazarev demanded 3,000 *chervonets* from Pankrat'ev because the reparations the Persian Court should pay had been sent to Tabriz and Lazarev had intended to take that money for distributing among the migrants in Urumia. Moreover, Lazarev, in his report, underlined that Archbishop Nerses V, Bishop Stefan, Archimandrite Grigory, and officials, Gamazov and Voynikov had encouraged the Armenians to leave Maraga.⁴⁵³

According to the report from Lieutenant Baron Ash to Major General Pankrat'ev, when Baron Ash arrived in Maku, he delivered him a letter from the Provisional Government of Revan. In reply, Pankrat'ev stated that he did not know of any attempts to limit the migration process of the Armenians and added that Abbas Mirza granted full freedom to those who wished to migrate. In order to prove it, he showed four villages in Maku where all families with all their properties passed through the Aras River.⁴⁵⁴ Others in the village did not want to leave their estates because of the harvest. Furthermore, Ali Khan expressed that if Baron Ash wished, he would get into contact with the remaining peasants of these four villages and officials from 39th *Egersky* Regiment would come there to accompany the peasants to pass through the Aras.

⁴⁵² *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 609.

⁴⁵³ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 570 (1878), p. 609.

⁴⁵⁴ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 572 (1878), pp. 610-611

In Maku, 40 of the 250 Armenian families wished to migrate to Russia. Nevertheless, Baron Ash had some suspicions about Ali Khan's statement that all Armenians were free to leave for Russia. However, if they did, there would be no inhabitants left there except some Tatar (Azerbaijani) families.⁴⁵⁵ As was seen, the poor Armenian families moved for the north in the hope of improving their economic conditions with Russian however, the rich Armenian families were content to remain in Persia. Baron Ash also raised another question about the provisions that should have been presented to the Russian forces. Ali Khan replied that he had no authority to do this without permission from Abbas Mirza.⁴⁵⁶

It was so clear to Baron Ash that Ali Khan was aware of that part of Maku on the border with Azerbaijan was under the control of Russia until arriving of half *kurur* to the treasury of Russia. However, as Baron Ash noticed, Ali Khan did not intend to comply with Russian demands.

According to a report of Colonel Lazarev from Urmia to Paskevich on 12 April 1828, about 700 families had already migrated from Maraga. There were some severe problems about essential needs such as bread and shelter. From Lazarev's perspective, there were two solutions to this problem; the complete cessation of the migration or the provision of additional supplementary funds.⁴⁵⁷ Lazarev had only received 800 of 1,500 *chervonets* to be given for the inhabitants of Tabriz, and he wrote to Pankrat'ev, requesting of 3,000 *chervonets* but he received only 1,000.⁴⁵⁸ In his letter, Lazarev

⁴⁵⁵ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 572 (1878), p. 611.

⁴⁵⁶ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 572 (1878), p. 611.

⁴⁵⁷ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 573 (1878), pp. 611-612.

⁴⁵⁸ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 573 (1878), pp. 611-612.

expressed that the money would be under his use and he guaranteed that this amount would be paid to Armenians.

There was another problem about the Nestorians. Although Lazarev had given each family 10 tomans, he had some suspicions about their sincerity in migrating to Russia. The real worry on the part of the Nestorians actually was about paying taxes in their new settlements in Russia. They were half-hearted about it.⁴⁵⁹ On the other side, the Persian officials tried every possible way to prevent Lazarev's projects. In this connection, an Armenian convoy was not allowed to take the road by this time, because they did not have enough cattle to carry their property. Considering the statements of Lazarev, there were about 4,000 families, which did not wish to live under fire of two states in Urmia.⁴⁶⁰ Furthermore, approximately 200 families from Urmia negotiated with Colonel Lazarev and gave back the money given for their costs during prospective migration because they had some fears about the attitude of the Persians.

According to another report of Pankrat'ev from Khoy to Paskevich on April 19, 1828, Abbas Mirza was disturbed about the last migrations from Urumia, particularly from Salmas region.⁴⁶¹ Abbas Mirza sent a letter to Pankrat'ev with Mirza Masud. Abbas Mirza blamed Pankrat'ev in his letter because of his compulsory impact over the Armenians in the region. However, Pankrat'ev did not accept this and reminded Abbas Mirza of the 15th article of the Treaty of Türkmençay.⁴⁶² Furthermore, Amburger, the Russian emissary in the Persian Court, sent a letter to Pankrat'ev in which Amburger at the request of Qa'im Maqam demanded that policies over the Armenians should be

⁴⁵⁹ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 573 (1878), pp. 611-612.

⁴⁶⁰ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 573 (1878), pp. 611-612.

⁴⁶¹ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 580 (1878), p. 615.

⁴⁶² *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 580 (1878), p. 615.

pursued in an honest manner. However, according to the statements by Pankrat'ev, there had been no compulsion and everything was organized under the control of the Russian Empire.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶³ *AKTY*, Vol. VII, No. 580 (1878), p. 615.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

By 1828, the Russian Empire completed its military conquest of Transcaucasia with the signing the Treaty of Türkmençay. From this perspective, it was a cornerstone in Russian and the Armenian relations in the region. One of the most important immediate results of this treaty was to bring a demographic fluctuation in the newly annexed territories. Its impact remained until the end of the 20th century. It should be highlighted that today's Transcaucasian capitals, such as Tiflis, Erevan and Baku, had a cosmopolitan population of Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis. However, with the effect of the Treaty of Türkmençay and the mass migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia, this cosmopolitan structure was changed.

The apparent Armenian emancipation movement made sporadic progress from the very beginning of the 18th century. It was clear that the military power of the Armenians in Transcaucasia was not sufficient to ensure emancipation from Persian rule. For this reason, they first pinned their faith upon the European states but in fact, the Armenians obtained nothing but verbal promises. Subsequently, they changed their

allegiance to Russia. The reaction of Russia was more promising than that of Europe. The geographical connection with Transcaucasia and the mutual interest between Armenians and Russia paved the way of the collaboration. As stated earlier, after 1375, the Armenian Apostolic Church had developed the religious and political power furthermore; the Armenian tradesmen were considered as the other pillar of the Armenian representation. Thus, although the general policy was based on the Courts of the regional states, some prominent figures were seen as symbols of Armenian emancipation in Transcaucasia. Since the geographical and social structure of Transcaucasia did not allow any state to have an absolute control; several military, religious and diplomatic figures, such as Yermolov, Paskevich, Griboedov, Abbas Mirza, Lazarev and Nerses V, became significantly influential in the region. From this point on, it can be more easily understood that during the migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia, the value of the encouragement of Lazarev and Nerses V on the Armenians was undeniable because of their symbolic position among the Armenians in the region. Furthermore, the Russian Empire charged its Transcaucasian originated military officers during the war and particularly for the migration of the Armenians.

The process of migration of the Armenians from Persia to Transcaucasia can be interpreted from a number of dimensions. First of all, this migration brought about a national consciousness among the Armenians firstly in Transcaucasia, later in other regions such as Bessarabia. The news of this migration from Persia encouraged the Armenians living another places, such as the Ottoman Empire, the other parts of the Russian Empire and Poland to migrate to Transcaucasia. Secondly, not all the

Armenians in Persia did wish to migrate to Transcaucasia but mostly they accepted to live under a Christian monarch only if they are paid enough compensation for the possessions they were leaving in Persia. Another important point was the economic disaster of the Persian Court because of the migration of the Armenians. The disastrous impact of the migration over the Persian treasury would have been felt in the long term. In the Treaty of the Türkmençay, the article, which was about the properties of the Armenians had drawn a general framework but it did not work in practice.

Despite all the efforts of Nerses V and the Armenian volunteers, the Russian Empire did not grant them an independent Armenian state. Instead, they were awarded with a 12 years-long lived (1828-1840) of the *Armyanskaya Oblast* in Russia. The wishes of Nerses V for an independent Armenian state soon clashed with the new Russian administration in Revan, which had orders to incorporate the region into the Russian Empire. The Russians were thus able to neutralize the power of Church far more and quicker than the Persians had ever attempted, and it is not surprising that some Armenians became increasingly embittered toward Russia.⁴⁶⁴ Thereupon, some of these Armenians did indeed complain about their life under the Russians and left the Russia to return to their previous homeland, Persia.⁴⁶⁵

During the Second Russo-Persian War, the Russian army gained key military and geographical experiences in the region that would be used during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829. Furthermore, the Treaty of Adrianople that was signed between the Russian and Ottoman Empires in 1829 was so similar to the Treaty of Türkmençay in

⁴⁶⁴ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 90-91

⁴⁶⁵ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 90.

terms of their contents. In particular, the article considering the migration of the Armenians from the Ottoman Empire following the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829 was written more cleverly than that of the Treaty of Türkmençay. In this latter case the compensation for the possessions of Armenians were to be taken directly from the Ottoman government, whereas in Türkmençay this issue was left quite gloomy.

In assessing the role of the Armenians and the Armenian Church in the Russo-Persian conflict, some historians have emphasized the Armenians' role in ousting the Persians from Transcaucasia as crucial. Although it is true that since the seventeenth century a number of Armenian leaders living in Transcaucasia had envisioned an autonomous Armenia and had sought aid from various powers, the vast majority of Armenians did not expect the restoration of an Armenian state and did not engage in any kind of patriotic activity. Rather, it was the Armenians living outside Revan, in Karabağ, Tiflis, Moscow, India and even Bessarabia, who were the engine force behind the concept of an autonomous Armenia.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁶ George A. Bournoutian, *The Khanate of Erevan under Qajar Rule 1795-1828*, p. 91-92

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: The Treaty of Türkmençay between Persia and Russia on February 22, 1828⁴⁶⁷

1. THE TREATY OF PEACE

ART. I. There will be, dating from this day, peace, friendship and perfect understanding between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russians on one hand, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia on the other hand, their Heirs and Successors, their States and their perspective Subjects, in perpetuity.

ART. II. Considering that the hostilities taken place between the High Contracting Parties, and happily terminated today, have brought to an end the obligations which the Treaty of Gülistan imposed upon them, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah in Shah of Persia have judged it appropriate to replace the said Treaty of Gülistan by the present Clauses and Stipulations, which are designed to regulate and to consolidate more and more the future relations of peace and friendship between Russia and Persia.

⁴⁶⁷ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record: 1535-1914*, Vol. I, pp. 96-102

ART. III. His Majesty the Shah of Persia, both in his name as in that of his Heirs and Successors, cedes in entire ownership to the Russian Empire the Khanate of Erivan on both sides of the Araxes, and the Khan of Nakhchevan. In consequence of this session, His Majesty the Shah undertakes to turn over to the Russian Authorities, within six months at the latest, from the date of signature of the present Treaty, all the archives and all public documents concerning the administration of the two Khanates abovementioned.

ART. IV. The two High Contracting Parties agree to establish, as the frontier between the two States, the following line of demarcation: In parting from the point of the frontier of the Ottoman States, the nearest in a straight line from the summit of the little Ararat, this line will continue to the summit of this mountain from whence it will descend to the source of the river known as the Lower Karasu which flows from the southern side of the Little Ararat and it will follow its course until its discharge in the Araxes, opposite Cherour. Arrived at this point, this line will follow the bed of the Araxes to the Fortress of Abbas-Abad; around the exterior works of this place which are situated on the right bank of the Araxes, there will be trace a radius of a half agatch, or three versts and half from Russia, which will extend in all directions; all the land which will be enclosed in this radius will belong exclusively to Russia and will be demarked with the greatest exactitude in the space of two months, dating from this day. From the locality where the eastern extremity of this radius will have rejoined the Araxes, the frontier line will continue to follow the bed of this river to the ford of Yedibulak, from whence the Persian Territory will extend the length of bed of the Araxes for a distance of three agatch or twenty-one versts from Russia; arrived at this point, the frontier line

will traverse in a direct manner the plain of Mugan to the bed of the river known as Bolgarou, to the place situated at three agatch or twenty-one versts below the conjunction of the two small rivers known as Odinabazar and Sarıkamış. From there, this line will reascend from the left bank of the Bolgarou to the junction of the said rivers Odinabazar and Sarıkamış and will extend the length of the right bank of the river of Odinabazar to its source and from there to summit of the heights of Djikoir so that all the waters which flow towards the Caspian Sea will belong to Russia, and all those watershed is of the Persian side will belong to Persia. The limit of the two states being marked here by the crest of the mountains, is agreed that there declination from the side of the Caspian Sea will belong to Russian and that their opposite slope will belong to Persia. From the crest of the heights of Djikor, the frontier will follow the summit of Kamarkouia, the mountains which separate the Taliş from the district of Archa. The crests of the mountains, separating on all sides the watershed, will determine here the frontier line in the same manner as stated above concerning the distance included between the source of the Odinabazar and the summits of Djikoir. The frontier line will follow thereafter, from the summit of Kamakouia, the crests of the mountains, which separate the district of Zouvante from that of Archa to the limit of that of Welkidji, always conforming to the principle enunciated in connection with the watershed. The district of Zouvante, with the exception of the part situated on the opposite side of the summit of the said mountains, will fall in this way in division to Russia. Beginning with the limit of the district of Welkidji, the frontier line between the two states will follow the summits of Klopouty and of the principal chain of mountains, which traverse the district of Welkidji to the northern source of river, called Astara, always observing the

principle relative to the watershed. From there the frontier will follow the bed of this river to its discharge in the Caspian Sea, and will complete the line of demarcation, which will separate in future the respective possessions of Russia and Persia.

ART. V. His Majesty the Shah of Persia in testimony of his sincere friendship for His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, solemnly recognizes by the present Article, both in his name as in that of his Heirs and Successors to the throne of Persia, as belonging forever to the Russian Empire, all the countries and all the islands situated between the line of demarcation designated by the preceding Article on the one side, and the crest of the mountains of the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea on the other, as well as the peoples, nomads and others who inhabit these countries.

ART. VI. With a view to recompensing the considerable sacrifices that the war, which occurred between the two States, has occasioned to the Russian Empire, as well as the losses and damages which have resulted there from for Russian subjects, His Majesty the Shah of Persia undertakes to make them good by means of a pecuniary indemnity. It is agreed between the two High Contracting Parties that the total of this indemnity is fixed at ten kupours of silver tomans or 20,000,000 silver rubles and that the method, the terms and the guarantees of payment of this sum will be regulated by a special arrangement which shall have the same force and value as if it were inserted word for word in the present Treaty.

ART. VII. His Majesty the Shah of Persia having judged it fitting to appoint as his Successor and Heir Presumptive his August Son Prince Abbas Mirza, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, with a view to giving to His Majesty the Shah public evidence of his friendly dispositions and of his desire to contribute to the consolidation

of this order of succession, undertakes to recognize as from today, in the August Person of His Royal Highness Prince Abbas Mirza, the Successor and Heir Presumptive of the Crown of Persia and to consider Him as the Legitimate Sovereign of this Kingdom from his ascension to the throne.

ART. VIII. Russian merchant vessels will enjoy, as in the past, the right to navigate freely on the Caspian Sea and along its coasts and to land there. They will find in Persia aid and assistance in case of shipwreck, the Persians will receive reciprocally aid and assistance.⁴⁶⁸

As for vessels, those which bear the Russian military flag being *ab antiquo* the only ones which have had the right to navigate on the Caspian Sea, this same exclusive privilege, is for this reason, equally, reserved and assured today, so that, with the exception of Russia, no other Power shall be able to have war vessels on the Caspian Sea.

ART. IX. His Majesty the emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, having at hearth to strengthen by all means the ties so happily reestablished between them, are agreed that the Ambassadors, Ministers, and Chargés d’Affaires, who may be reciprocally delegated near the respective High Courts, whether to discharge a temporary Mission or to reside there permanently, will be received with the honors and distinction befitting their rank and conformable with the dignity of the High Contracting Parties, as with the sincere friendship which unites them and conformable with the

⁴⁶⁸ On the 24th November 1869, a decision of the Council of the Empire of Russia was published, prohibiting the establishment of companies for the navigation of the Caspian Sea, except by Russian subjects, and the purchase by foreigners of shares in such Companies.

customs of the country. An understanding to this effect will be reached by means of a special Protocol regarding the ceremonial to be observed by both sides.

ART. X. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, considering the reestablishment and the extension of commercial relations between the two States as one of the first benefactions which the return of peace should produce, have agreed to regulate in a perfect accord all provisions relative to the protection of commerce, and to the safety of the respective subjects, and to embody them in a separate Act annexed hereto, drawn up between the respective Plenipotentiaries and which is and will be considered as forming an integral part of the present Treaty of Peace.

His Majesty the Shah of Persia reserves to Russia, as in the past, the right of appointing consuls or commercial agents wherever the good of commerce will demand it, and he undertakes to endow these consuls and agents, none of which shall have a suite of more than ten persons, with the protection, the honors and privileges belonging to their public character. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises on His side to observe a perfect reciprocity in respect of the consuls and commercial agents of His Majesty the Shah of Persia. In case of well-founded complaint on the part of the Persian Government against one of the Russian consuls or agents, the Minister or Chargé d’Affaires of Russia, residing at the Court of His Majesty the Shah, and under the immediate orders of whom they will be placed, will suspend him from his functions and will confer provisionally the office upon whom he will deem fitting.

ART. XI. All the affairs and suits of the respective subjects, suspended by the intervention of the War, will be resumed and terminated in accordance with justice after

the exclusion of Peace. The debts that the respective subjects may have the one in favor of the other, as well as to the treasury, will be promptly and entirely liquidated.

ART. XII. The High Contracting Parties agree by common accord in the interest of their respective subjects to fix a term of three years in order that those among them who (own) immobile property on both sides of the Araxes may have the right to sell or exchange it freely. His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias excepts, however, from the benefit of this provision, so far as it concerns Him, the former Serdar of Erivan, Hüseyin Khan, his brother Hasan Khan and Kerim Khan, the former Governor of Nakhchevan.

ART. XIII. All prisoners of war made in one way or another, whether in the course of the last War, or before, as well as the subjects of the two Governments reciprocally fallen into captivity, at no matter what time, will be freed within a period of four months and, after having been provided with food and other necessary objects, they will be directed to Abbas Abad in order to be turned over there into the hands of Commissioners, respectively charged with receiving them and to decide upon their eventual return to their homes. The High Contracting Parties will undertake the same in respect of all prisoners of War and all Russian and Persian subjects reciprocally fallen into captivity, who may not have been freed within the period above-mentioned, whether by reason of the isolated distance where they are to be found, or for any other cause or circumstance. The two Governments reserve expressly the unlimited right to reclaim them at no matter what time, and they obligate themselves to restore them mutually in the measure that they may present themselves for that purpose, or in the measure that they may reclaim them.

ART. XIV. The High Contracting Parties will not demand the extradition of fugitives and deserters who shall have passed under their respective jurisdiction before or during the war. At the same time, in order to prevent the mutually prejudicial consequences which might be able to result from the correspondence which some of these deserters may seek to hold with their former compatriots, or vassals, the Persian Government undertakes not to tolerate in its Possessions, situated between the Araxes and the line formed by the River known as Tohara, by Lake Urumiah, by the River called Djakatou and by the River known as Kızıl-Ozan, to its descent into the Caspian Sea, the presence of individuals who will be designated now by name or who may be nominated to it in the future. His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias promises equally on His side not to permit Persian deserters to establish themselves or to remain fixed in the Khanates of Karabag or of Nakhchevan or in the part of Khanate of Erivan situated on the right bank of the Araxes. It is, however, understood, that this clause is and will only be obligatory in respect of individuals possessing a public character of a certain dignity, such as the Khans, the Begs and the spiritual leaders or mullahs, whose personal example, intrigues and clandestine correspondence may be able to exercise a pernicious influence on their former compatriots, those formerly under their administration or their vassals. In so far as concerns the mass of the population in the two countries, it is agreed between the High Contracting Parties that the respective subjects who shall have passed or who may pass in the future from one State into the other, will be free to establish themselves or to sojourn wherever the Government under whose domination they will be placed will find it proper.

ART. XV. With the beneficent and salutary aim of restoring tranquility in his States and of removing from his subjects all that may aggravate the evils which have brought on them the war to which the present Treaty has put an end so happily, His Majesty the Shah accords a full and complete amnesty to all the inhabitants and functionaries of the province known as Azerbaijan. No one of them, without exception of category, may not be either pursued, either during the war or during the temporary occupation of the said province by Russian troops. There will be, moreover, accorded them a period of one year dating from this day in order to transport themselves freely with their families from Persian States in to Russian States, to export and to sell their moveable property, without the Governments or the local authorities being able to place the least obstacle in the way thereof, nor to deduct previously any tax or any recompense on the goods and objects sold or exported by them. As for their immovable property there will be accorded a term of five years to sell or to dispose thereof as may be desired. There are excepted from this amnesty those who may have rendered themselves culpable within the period of time above-mentioned of one year of some crime, or misdemeanor liable to penalties punished by the Courts.

ART. XVI. Immediately after the signature of the present Treaty of Peace, the respective plenipotentiaries will hasten to send the necessary notices and injunctions in all localities for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

2. THE COMMERCIAL TREATY

ART. I. The two High Contracting Parties desiring to make their respective subjects enjoy all the advantages which result from a reciprocal liberty of commerce, have agreed upon the following:

Russian subjects provided with passports in proper order shall be able to engage in commerce throughout the whole extent of the Persian Kingdom, and to proceed equally in the neighboring States of the said Kingdom.

In reciprocity thereof Persian subjects shall be able to import their merchandise in to Russia, either by the Caspian Sea or by the land frontier which separates Russia from Persia, to exchange it or to make purchases for exportation, and they will enjoy all the rights and prerogatives accorded in the States of His Imperial Majesty to the subjects of the most favored friendly Powers.

In case of the decease of a Russian subject in Persia, his movable and immovable property, as belonging to the subject of a friendly Power, will be turned over intact to his relatives or associates, who will have the right to dispose of the said property as they may judge fitting. In the absence of relatives or associates the disposition of the said property will be confided to the Mission or to the Consuls of Russia without any difficulty on the part of the Russian authorities.

ART. II. Contracts, bills of exchange, bonds and other written instruments between the respective subjects for their commercial affairs will be registered with the Russian Consul and with the Hakim (Civil Magistrate) and there, where is no Consul, with the Hakim alone, so that in case of dispute between the two parties one can make the researches necessary in order to decide the difference in conformity with justice.

If one of the two parties without being provided with the documents drawn up and legalized as stated above, which will be valid before every court of justice, should desire to institute a suit against the other in producing only proofs of testimonials, such pretensions will not be admitted at all unless the defendant himself may recognize the legality thereof.

Every undertaking entered into between the respective subjects in the forms above prescribed will be religiously observed and the refusal to give satisfaction therein which may occasion losses to one of the parties will give place to a proportional indemnity on the part of the other. In case of bankruptcy of a Russian merchant in Persia, his creditors will be recompensed with the goods and effects of the bankrupt, but the Russian Minister, the Chargé d'Affaires or the Consul shall not refuse if demanded their good offices to assure themselves whether the bankrupt has not left in Russia available properties which may serve to satisfy the same creditors.

The provisions drawn up in the present Article will be reciprocally observed in respect of Persian subjects who engage in commerce in Russia under the protection of its laws.

ART. III. With a view to assuring to the trade of the perspective subjects the advantages which are the object of the previous stipulations, it is agreed that merchandise imported into Russia or exported from that Kingdom by Russian subjects and equally the products of Persia imported into Russia by Persian subjects, whether by the Caspian Sea or by the land frontier between the two states, as well as Russian merchandise which Persian subjects may export from the Empire by the same means, will be subject, as in the past, to a duty of five per cent, collected one time for all a entry

or departure, and will not be subject thereafter to any other customs dues. If Russia may judge it necessary to draw up new customs regulations or new tariffs, it undertakes however not to increase even in this case the rate above-mentioned of five percent.

ART. IV. If Russia or Persia find themselves at war with another Power it will not be forbidden to the respective subjects to cross with their merchandise the territory of The High Contracting Parties to proceed into the confines of the said Power.

ART. V. Seeing that after existing usages in Persia it is difficult for foreign subjects to find for rent houses, warehouses or premises suitable as depots for their merchandise, it is permitted to Russian subjects in Persia not only to rent but also to acquire in full ownership houses for habitation and shops as well as premises to store therein their merchandise.

The employees of the Persian Government shall not be able to enter by force in the said houses, shops or premises, at least without having recourse in case of necessity to the authorization of the Russian Minister, Chargé d'Affaires or Consul who will delegate an employee or dragoman to assist in the visit to the house or the merchandise.

ART. VI. At the same time the Minister or the Chargé d'Affaires of His Imperial Majesty, the employees of the Russian Mission, Consuls and Dragomans, not finding for sale in Persian neither the effects to serve for their clothing nor many objects of food which are necessary to them, shall be able to introduce free of tax and of dues, for their own account, all objects and effects which may be destined solely to their use.

The public servants of His Majesty the Shah residing in the States of the Russian Empire will enjoy perfect reciprocity in this regard.

Persian subjects forming part of the suite of the Minister of Chargé d'Affaires or Consuls, and necessary for their service, will enjoy, so long as they shall be attached to them, their protection on an equality with Russian subjects, but if it may happen that one amongst them renders himself culpable of some misdemeanor and that he makes himself liable thereby to punishment by the existing laws, in this case the Persian Minister of Hakim and, in his absence, the competent local authority, shall address himself immediately to the Russian Minister, Chargé d'Affaires or Consul, in the service of which the accused is to be found in order that he may be delivered to justice; and if this request is founded on proofs establishing the culpability of the accused, the Minister, Chargé d'Affaires or Consul will interpose no difficulty for the satisfaction thereof.

ART. VII. All suits and litigations between Russian subjects and will be subject exclusively to the examination and decision of the Russian Mission or Consuls in conformity with the laws and customs of the Russian Empire; as well as the differences and suits occurring between Russian subjects and those of another Power where the parties shall consent there to.

When differences or suits shall arise between Russian subjects and Persian subjects, the said suits or differences will be brought before the Hakim or Governor and will be examined and judged only in the presence of the Dragoman of the Mission or the Consulate.

Once juridically terminated, such suits may not be instituted a second time. If, however, the circumstances were of a nature to demand a second examination, it may not take place without notification to the Russian Minister, Charge d'Affaires or Consul and in this case the affair will only be considered and judged at the Defter, that is to say,

in the Supreme Chancellery of the Shah at Tabriz or at Tehran, likewise in the presence of a Dragoman of the Russian Mission or Consulate.

ART. VIII. In case of murder or other crime committed between Russian subjects the examination and the decision of the case will be the exclusive concern of the Russian Minister, Charge d'Affaires or Consul by virtue of jurisdiction over their nationals conferred upon them.


If a Russian subject is found implicated with individuals of another nation in a criminal suit he cannot be pursued nor harried in any manner without proofs of his participation in the crime, and in this case even as in that where a Russian subject may be accused of direct culpability, the courts of the country may only proceed to take cognizance and give judgment concerning the crime in the presence of a delegate of the Russian Mission or Consulate, and if they are not to be found at the place where the crime has been committed, the local authorities will transport the delinquent there where there is a constituted Russian Consul or Agent.

Testimonies for the prosecution and for the defense of the accused will be faithfully collected by the Hakim and by the Judge of the locality, and invested with their signature; transmitted in this form there where the crime has to be judged, these testimonies will become authentic documents or parts of the suit unless the accused proves clearly their falsity.

When the accused shall have been duly convicted and sentence shall have been pronounced, the delinquent will be turned over to the Minister, Charge d'Affaires or Consul of His Imperial Majesty who will return him to Russia to receive there the punishment prescribed by the laws.


ART. IX. The High Contracting Parties will take care that the stipulations of the present Act may be strictly observed and fulfilled, and the Governors of their Provinces, Commandants and other respective authorities will not permit themselves in any case to violate them, under penalty of a grave responsibility and even of dismissal in case of complaint duly proven.

Appendix II: A Map of the Persian Expedition of Peter the Great in 1722⁴⁶⁹




⁴⁶⁹ Laurence Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, p. 181.

Appendix III: A Map of Persia During the Reign of Aga Muhammad Khan⁴⁷⁰




⁴⁷⁰ Gavin Hambly, "Aga Muhammad Khan and the Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty," *The Cambridge History of Iran, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*, Vol. VII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 105.

Appendix IV: A Map of Northern Persian During the Reign of Aga Muhammad Khan⁴⁷¹



⁴⁷¹ Gavin Hambly, "Aga Muhammad Khan and the Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty," p. 123

Appendix V: A Map of Northwestern Persia During the Reign of Aga Muhammad Khan⁴⁷²



⁴⁷² Gavin Hambly, "Aga Muhammad Khan and the Establishment of the Qajar Dynasty," p. 140.

Appendix VI: A Map of Persia's Territorial Losses During the Reign of Fath Ali Shah⁴⁷³




⁴⁷³ Gavin Hambly, "Iran During the Reigns of Fath Ali Shah and Muhammad Shah," p. 162.

Appendix VII: A Map of the Khanates of Azerbaijan at the Beginning of 19th Century⁴⁷⁴




⁴⁷⁴ http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/Azerbaijan_khanates_all_XVIII-XIX.png (23/07/2010)

Appendix VIII: Armenian Communities in Persia (19th Century)⁴⁷⁵




⁴⁷⁵ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 405.

Appendix IX: A Map of the Occupation Process of the Russian Empire in the 19th Century⁴⁷⁶




⁴⁷⁶ Muriel Atkin, *Russia and Iran 1780-1828*, p. XV.

Appendix X: A Map of the Caucasus in the Late 18th Century⁴⁷⁷



⁴⁷⁷ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 403.

Appendix XI: A Map of the Russian Occupation of Transcaucasia from 1801 to 1829⁴⁷⁸



⁴⁷⁸ George Bournoutian, *A Concise History of the Armenian People*, p. 404.