ARTICULATING SOCIALISM WITH NATIONALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NATIONALISM IN THE TURKISH LEFTIST TRADITION IN THE 1960s

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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August 2010

To my parents, *Güley* and *Aziz Doğan*

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By

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

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In this dissertation, it is argued that nationalism was one of the most important characteristics of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s. When we look at the socialist movement in Turkey in this period, we encounter with the concept of nationalism, in other words, Turkish socialists' deliberate attempt at articulating socialism with nationalism, presenting themselves as the real representatives of nationalism in Turkey. The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the uneasy relationship between nationalism and the Turkish left in the 1960s in particular and between socialism and nationalism in general. The main issue of this study is to explore why and how the Turkish left of the sixties incorporated nationalism into its political discourses, strategies, and programs.

One important concern of this study is to investigate the internal sources of the articulation of socialism with nationalism in Turkey. A 'leftist' variant of Kemalism, becoming a hegemonic discourse within the ranks of the Turkish left in

the 1960s, played a very crucial role in the attempts of the leftist intellectuals of the period at accommodating nationalist principles within the idiom of socialism. Turkish left in the 1960s re-invented Kemalism as a progressive, anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and developmentalist outlook. This study, in this sense, argues that Kemalism (together with nationalism) as the founding ideology of the Republican regime has not just only been the basis of the mainstream political parties and movements, but can also be found, in certain forms and amounts, among the ranks of the different factions of socialist movement in Turkey.

The sources of Turkish socialists' engagement with nationalism cannot be fully grasped merely by reference to the Turkish context. Rather, it should be located within an international context and perspective. Turkish socialists were not alone in their efforts to reconcile nationalism with socialism. The history of the ideological and practical accommodation between socialism and nationalism from mid-19th century to the post-colonial era reflects a change from "socialization of the nation" to the "nationalization of socialism" and shows us how this relationship changed from hostility to affinity. Turkish socialists of the 1960s received an important part of their strategic and tactical inspirations from those international experiences. But, their main sources of inspiration were Stalinism and the Third Worldism of the post-colonial period. In this sense, this study analyzes Turkish left's experience with nationalism also by reference to international experiences, with a special emphasis on the Third Worldist variant of the articulation of socialism with nationalism.

The main primary sources of this study are the journals, papers, books, pamphlets, programs, regulations, congress reports and resolutions, election manifestos and other published documents, generated during the political activities of

the main factions of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s. These primary sources are evaluated within the general literature on nationalism, its Marxist interpretations, Third Worldism, economic nationalism, develomentalism, imperialism, dependency, and the concepts of imitation and uniqueness.

Keywords: Nationalism, Socialism, Third Worldism, National Liberation, Anti-Imperialism, Developmentalism, Economic Nationalism

ÖZET

SOSYALİZMİ MİLLİYETÇİLİKLE EKLEMLEMEK: 1960'ların TÜRKİYE SOL GELENEĞİNDE MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİN ELEŞTİREL BİR ANALİZİ

Doğan, Erkan

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre

Ağustos 2010

Bu tezde, milliyetçiliğin, 1960'ların Türkiye sosyalist hareketinin en önemli karakteristiklerinden biri olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Türkiye'de bu dönemin sosyalist hareketine baktığımız zaman milliyetçilik kavramıyla karşılaşırız. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye'de kendilerini milliyetçiliğin gerçek temsilcileri olarak gören Türkiyeli sosyalistlerin, sosyalizmle milliyetçiliği bilinçli bir tercih olarak birbirine eklemleme çabalarına tanık oluruz. Bu tezin amacı, özel olarak, milliyetçilikle 1960'ların Türkiye solu arasındaki, genel olarak ise, sosyalizmle milliyetçilik arasındaki gergin ilişkiyi araştırmaktır. Bu çalışmanın temel meselesi, solun 1960'lar Türkiye'sinde milliyetçiliği neden ve nasıl politik söylem, strateji ve programlarına dâhil ettiğini incelemektir.

Bu çalışmanın ilgilendiği önemli konulardan biri Türkiye'de sosyalizmin milliyetçiliğe eklemlenmesinin dâhili kaynaklarını araştırmaktır. 1960'larda Türkiye solunun saflarında egemen söylemlerden biri haline gelen Kemalizmin 'sol' bir

varyantı, söz konusu dönemin solcu entelektüellerinin, milliyetçiliğin ilkelerini sosyalizmin diliyle harmanlama girişimlerinde oldukça önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Türkiye solu 1960'larda Kemalizmi ilerici, anti-emperyalist, anti-feodal ve kalkınmacı bir dünya görüşü olarak yeniden icat etmiştir. Bu anlamda, bu çalışma, rejimim kurucu ideolojisi olarak Kemalizmin (milliyetçilikle beraber) yalnızca ana siyasi partiler ve hareketlerin temelini oluşturmadığını, aynı zamanda, belli biçim ve miktarlarda, Türkiye'de sosyalist hareketlerin değişik parçaları içinde de bulunabileceğini tartışmaktadır.

Türkiye sosyalistlerinin milliyetçilikle olan angajmanlarının kaynakları yalnızca Türkiye bağlamına bakılarak tamamen anlaşılamaz. Aksine, bu durum uluslararası bir bağlam ve perspektif içine yerleştirilmelidir. Türkiye sosyalistleri, milliyetçiliği sosyalizmle birleştirme çabalarında yalnız başlarına değillerdi. 19. yüzyılın ortasından post-kolonyal döneme, sosyalizmle milliyetçilik arasındaki ideolojik ve pratik ilişkinin tarihi, "milletin sosyalizasyonu"ndan "sosyalizmin nasyonalizayonu"na bir değişimi yansıtmaktadır ve bize bu ilişkinin nasıl düşmanlıktan yakınlaşmaya dönüştüğünü göstermektedir. 1960'lı yılların Türkiyeli sosyalistleri, stratejik ve taktik ilhamlarının önemli bir kısmını bu uluslararası deneyimlerden almışlardı. Fakat onların temel esin kaynakları, Stalinizm ve post-kolonyal dönemin Üçüncü Dünyacılığıydı. Bu açıdan, bu çalışma, Türkiye solunun milliyetçilikle olan deneyimini, bu uluslararası deneyimlere referansla, fakat özellikle, sosyalizmin milliyetçilikle eklemlenmesinin Üçüncü Dünyacı varyantına özel bir vurguyla, analiz etmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın temel birincil kaynakları, 1960'lar Türkiye'sinin belli başlı sosyalist hareketlerinin politik faaliyetlerinin ürünü olan dergiler, gazeteler, kitaplar, broşürler, programlar, tüzükler, kongre raporları ve kararları, seçim bildirileri ve

diğer basılı materyallerden oluşmaktadır. Bu birincil kaynaklar, milliyetçilik ve onun Marksist yorumları, Üçüncü Dünyacılık, ekonomik milliyetçilik, kalkınmacılık, emperyalizm, bağımlılık ve taklit ve biriciklik kavramları üzerine genel bir literatür içinde değerlendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Sosyalizm, Üçüncü Dünyacılık, Ulusal Kurtuluş, Anti-Emperyalizm, Kalkınmacılık, Ekonomik Milliyetçilik

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

When we look at the history of Turkish socialism in the 1960s, we inevitably encounter the concept of nationalism, in other words, Turkish socialists' deliberate attempt at articulating socialism with nationalism, seeing themselves as the real representatives of nationalism in Turkey. The aim of this dissertation is to delineate the uneasy relationship between nationalism and the Turkish left in the 1960s in particular and between socialism and nationalism in general. The central research question of the dissertation is why and how the Turkish left of the sixties adopted and incorporated nationalism both as a symbolic power and as a political ideology into its political discourses, strategies, and programs.

The reason behind choosing the period of 1960s as the focus of the study is the significance of this decade in the history of socialism in Turkey, a long decade which starts with the 27 May 1960 military intervention and ends with another one on 12 March 1971. The genesis of socialism in the Ottoman-Turkish context goes

back to the turn of the 19th century. But the years following the 1960 military coup represented a distinctive period in this history. It was in this decade that socialism, for the first time, became visible both politically and intellectually within the Turkish political life. The rise of this new element of Turkish politics was also reflected in the Turkish press and literature. The publication of works sympathetic to leftist ideas flourished, as the radicalization of some large segments of Turkish society accelerated throughout the 1960s. Following the 27 May 1960 military coup, for the first time in modern Turkish history, various socialist currents acquired a real chance of making a genuine influence on Turkish society and politics. It is also in this period that we can clearly observe the tendency, within the different factions of Turkish socialist movement, of accommodating nationalism in their programs and strategies.

Turkish socialists in the 1960s frequently made references to words like nation and nationalism; and "*milli*" (national) was the most important signifier of the critical concepts used by socialist factions and leaders. What they proposed were a socialist nationalism, a national economy, a national development, a national foreign policy, a national democracy. We can easily detect the traces of nationalism in the political strategies and discourses of main factions of the Turkish left in the sixties (namely, the *Yön* (Direction) group, the National Democratic Revolution (*Milli Demokratik Devrim*) (NDR) movement and the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) (WPT)) and their most prominent figures and sympathizers (namely, Doğan Avcıoğlu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Niyazi Berkes, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, Fethi Naci, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Behice Boran, Sadun Aren, İdris Küçükömer, Selahattin Hilav, Doğan Özgüden, Mihri Belli, Muzaffer Erdost, Şahin Alpay and many others). Turkish socialists' affinity with nationalism

can easily be discerned from their formulations of the notions of "Turkish socialism" (*Türk sosyalizmi*), "second National Liberation War", and "national democracy". Various but similar definitions of 'Turkish socialism' developed in the 1960s were based on the principles of anti-imperialism, nationalism, political and economic independence. The idea was to put priority on the unique characteristics of Turkey in achieving socialism, since each country built socialism on its own and knew its problems best. Socialism should be built in Turkey in accordance with the country's own conditions. The Turkish left in the 1960s also saw Turkey as an underdeveloped country, and argued that Turkey's economic and social development could only be achieved by being against western imperialism, especially the US imperialism, and protecting the country's political and economic independence. They supported a fully independent and 'one hundred percent national' foreign policy. Their political strategies and programs stated that one of their most important objectives was to defend jealously Turkey's national independence, national sovereign rights, and national integrity. They launched political campaigns against the country's dependence on the West, primarily on the US, and likened their efforts to the war of liberation under Atatürk, calling it "second National Liberation War".

For the Turkish left, in short, their understanding of socialism could not be separated from nationalism. But, how did they define nation and nationalism? What are the constitutive elements of their conceptualization of nation and nationalism? How are these definitions reconcilable with socialism? How are they related with anti-imperialism, economic, political, cultural, and intellectual independence, modernism, Westernism, and/or secularism? This study, in this sense, will be built on the question of Turkish left's interpretation of the notions of nation, national, and nationalism.

In this dissertation, in addition to the questions posed above, I would also like to focus on other related questions: How did Turkish socialists interpret the official (Atatürkist) nationalism? How did Turkish left approach other nationalist political parties of the era like the Justice Party (a center-right party) and the Nationalist Action Party (an extreme-right party)? How did they differ in their understanding of nationalism from the interpretations offered by Turkey's mainstream "right"? How did they evaluate the issue of ethnic minorities in Turkey, how did they interpret the "Kurdish problem" as it appeared then?

One can trace the roots of the attempts at converging socialist ideals with nationalism in Turkey back to the decades following the establishment of the Turkish Republic. For instance, in the writings of the prominent figures of the *Kadro* (Cadre) circle in the 1930s, a circle which was composed of ex-communists who converted to Kemalism, we can find the early formulations of the articulation of nationalism with socialism. But, it was only in the 1960s that we witness the popularization (within the reading public of the country) of the idea of bringing these two different political ideologies, nationalism and socialism, together through a peculiar reading of the principles of the official ideology of the regime, Kemalism. Turkish left in the 1960s re-invented Kemalism as an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal outlook, involving also a national development strategy based on statism. It was portrayed as a 'progressive' stance, prone to socialism. In Turkish socialists' imagination, Kemalism appeared as an ideological (and discursive) medium, source and ingredient of their attempt at blending socialism with nationalism. In this sense, this study argues that Kemalism (together with nationalism) as the founding ideology of the Republican regime has not just only been the basis of the mainstream political parties and movements, but can also be found, in certain forms and amounts, among the ranks of the different

factions of socialist movement in Turkey.

However, the sources of Turkish socialists' engagement with nationalism cannot be fully grasped merely by reference to the Turkish context. Rather, it should be located within a world-historical perspective. Turkish socialists were not alone in their efforts to reconcile nationalism with socialism. There were many other similar experiences in the international history of the socialist movement, experiences ranging from the fall of the Second International during First World War to the rise of Stalinism in Russia in the 1930s and "Third Worldist" socialisms on the periphery of the world in the post-colonial era. Socialism in this period oscillated between "the aspiration to socialist internationalism and the persistence of fierce nationalist sentiment among its activists and constituents" (Hoston, 1996: 3). In this sense, this dissertation will start with examining the following general questions: How did socialism, the supposedly most uncompromising form of modern secular internationalism, come to be so closely identified with nationalism? How did the principles of socialist internationalism evolve into nationalism (see, Harris, 1993)?

The history of the ideological and practical accommodation between socialism and nationalism can be extended back to the writings of classical Marxist figures. The history of this accommodation from mid-19th century to the Cold War era reflects a change from "socialization of the nation" to the "nationalization of socialism" (Wright, 1981: 148) and shows us how this relationship changed from hostility to affinity. Marxian socialism's relation with nationalism historically evolved from trying to understand phenomena of nation and nationalism to supporting politically some nationalist demands of the 'oppressed' nations for strategic and tactical reasons, and finally to articulating

principles of socialism with those of nationalism. Two world-historical moments were very crucial in the history of articulation of socialism with nationalism. One was the First World War, culminated in the Russian Revolution. It was the Russian Revolution which assumed the mediatory role in the dissemination of socialism among peoples of the East (and the South). The other moment was the rise of Third World and Third Worldism after the Second World War. What we observe in that historical period, with those two historical turning points at its center, was the geographical shift of the axis of socialism from the West to the Third World. As the idea of socialism moved to the periphery of the world, it became more articulated with the idea of nationalism. Socialism within the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the post-colonial era was understood as nations' liberation from imperialist subjugation. Socialism in the Third World was mostly seen as a national attribute, which was assumed to lead the nation in its struggle for overcoming the wretchedness of underdevelopment and for achieving an independent and national social-economic development.

Turkish socialists of the 1960s received an important part of their strategic and tactical inspirations from those international experiences. But, it should be underlined that their main source of inspiration was the Third Worldism of the post-colonial period. The discourses, strategies, and policies of Turkish socialists in this era accordingly reflected a strong 'Third Worldist/national liberationist' outlook. In this sense, this study will analyze Turkish left's experience with nationalism also by reference to international experiences, with a special emphasis on the Third Worldist variant of the articulation of socialism with nationalism.

1.2 Methodology of the Study

The literature on Turkish socialist movement has mostly focused on the early founding years of the movement at the beginning of the 20th century, as well as on the 1930s, 1960s and 1970s. The works of the pioneering names in the literature on Turkish left (see, for instance, Cerrahoğlu, 1975; Harris, 1967; Harris, 2002; Dumont and Haupt, 1977; Tunçay, 1967; Tunçay and Zürcher, 1994), which has drawn academic interest to the history of Turkish socialist movement, have primarily focused on the origins of Turkish socialism. They were historical works, based on extensive use of primary sources, and revealing the movement's early history. The 1930s is another important period that the literature has focused on. The center of this interest (see, for instance, Gülalp, 1987; Özveren, 1996; Tekeli and İlkin, 1984: 35-67; Türkeş, 1998: 92-119; Türkeş, 1999; Türkeş, 200: 91-114) is a "patriotic leftist" group, the *Kadro* circle, which dedicated their intellectual efforts to develop an independent, national economic and social development strategy in Turkey in the 1930s. But the main interest in the literature (see, for instance, Aren, 1993; Altun, 2004: 135-156; Atılgan, 2002; Aybar, 1988; Aydınoğlu, 1992; Aydınoğlu, 2007; Doğan, 2005; Doğan, 2010; Karpat, 1966; Karpat, 1967; Landau, 1974; Lipovsky, 1992; Özdemir, 1986; Samim, 1987: 147-176; Ünlü, 2002; Ünsal, 2002) has focused on the 1960s (and, to a certain extent, on the 1970s). One can easily guess the reason behind this interest: it was in this period that Turkish socialist movement, for the first time, became a real, visible force in the political life of the country. The attention of these studies has centered on issues like the radicalization of working class and student movements in the 1960s and early 1970s, the main socialist movements of the period (i.e. the WPT, the NDR movement, and the *Yön* group), differences in their programmatic orientations, and political and organizational rifts among them.

Although there are a significant number of studies on Turkish left, the issue of radical left politics in Turkey is still an uncharted land of the field of Turkish politics. The existing literature on left does not offer us examples based on conceptual analyses and explanations that might help understand and explain the exact location of the left within the Turkish politics. These studies do not usually frame the issue within theory or tackle it under the light of explanatory concepts as they have been mostly descriptive historical narrations of socialism in Turkey. Unlike many other works on Turkish left in the literature, this study will try to be more than a historical account.

This dissertation aims to find the elements of nationalism in the political strategies and discourses of the main factions of the socialist movement and their leaders in perspective. As I have argued above, it was the attempts of blending socialist ideas with nationalism that characterized the Turkish socialists of 1960s. The relationship between nationalism and socialism in Turkey has been an almost untouched area of research in the literature on Turkish socialism.[1] This dissertation also aims to fill this gap. It aims to uncover intellectual and political roots of Turkish left's engagement with nationalism. Looking at socialism in Turkey through its relationship with nationalism will also help us to understand the nature of Turkish left's relationship with Stalinism, Third Worldism and Kemalism. This study will not be another historical narrative of the Turkish left in the literature. It aims to follow an interdisciplinary path of investigation, trying basically to bring the instruments of political science, history of political thought and political history together.

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[1] There are several works (such as, Belge, 2007: 105-113; Aydın, 1998: 58-89; Atılgan, 2009: 1-26) on the relation between socialism and nationalism in Turkey. But, the scope of these works and the sources (primary and secondary) used in them are very limited. It should be noted that Tunçay and Zürcher's edited volume (1994) is an exception. But, their study focuses on the late Ottoman period and the "old" left; it does not elaborate on the Turkish left of the 1960s.

In order to analyze the Turkish socialists' attempt at converging socialism with nationalism, the dissertation will take the Turkish case as the primary focus while capturing the international history of socialist movement in general, and the "Third Worldist" experiences that have emerged in the post-Second World War era in particular. As purely theoretical and sociological studies on nationalism and socialism tend to overlook geographical and historical specificities and therefore variations, this study, in this sense, will not also be a purely theoretical comparative account. The dissertation will avoid the major methodological pitfall of comparison, that is, it will not choose a single universal model of socialism and nationalism connection and measure Turkey's departure from it. This study uses the instruments of history in order to understand the specificities of the Turkish case and its similarities with other examples. It uses historical materials in order to understand theory. History enlarges and deepens our intellectual scope about a research problematic and serves as an important tool for locating ideologies and concepts within a contextual framework. That is why this dissertation will involve theory as well as history. As Breuilly (1996: 146) puts it, "theory which cannot be used in historical work is valueless; historical work which is not theoretically informed is pointless."

This study will be based on the literature on nationalism, its Marxist interpretations, Third Worldism, and economic nationalism. This literature will provide critical and explanatory conceptual instruments and frameworks that will be required in the examination of the relationship between Turkish socialism and nationalism. The dissertation is constructed around the concepts of nationalism, socialism, national liberation, economic nationalism, Third Worldism, imperialism and dependency. The history of Turkish left in the 1960s, in this

sense, will be evaluated through these concepts and within this literature.

The main primary sources of this study will be the programs, regulations, congress reports and resolutions, journals, papers, pamphlets, leaflets, circulars, election manifestos and other published documents, generated during the political activities of the main factions of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s, that is to say, the *Yön* group, the NDR movement and the WPT.[2] This material is complemented with the books written by the leading figures and intellectuals of the Turkish left in the same period (see, for instance, Avcıoğlu, 1969; Avcıoğlu, 1971; Aybar, 1968; Belli, 1970; Boran, 1968; Erdost, 1969). These materials primarily involve political orientations and strategies of the Turkish left in the 1960s, and their analysis of the political, social and economic structures of the country and their historical developments, and economic development strategies offered by the left. Yet the primary source on the Turkish left will be the leftist periodicals. Radical leftist organizations have always been identified with their periodicals and known by their names. Like the left itself, radical leftist press was also fragmented, and there were a limited number of periodicals which were able to survive for a long time and published regularly. In this study, I will focus on the leftist journals of 1960s and early 1970s, *Yön, Türk Solu, Ant, Aydınlık, Devrim, Sosyal Adalet, TİP Haberleri, Emek*, *Eylem*, which are notable for illuminating the political orientations of the main leftist factions of the period.

[2] I did the archival work for this dissertation at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam and at the Information Documentation Center of the Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı*) in Istanbul.

1.3 Organization of the Study

In the second and third chapters of this dissertation, the focus will be on the historical and intellectual sources of the gravitation of socialism towards nationalism from the mid-19th century to the post-colonial era. Chapter 2 will focus on the classical Marxian account of the national question, covering the analyses of the founding fathers of Marxism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and those of their leading disciples in the Second International period. At the theoretical level, Marx and Engels' evaluation of the issue changed, in the course of the time, from seeing the phenomena of nation and nationalism as ephemeral to considering them to be among the fundamentals of the capitalist system. But their interest in explaining the notions of nation and nationalism had always been very limited. At the political level, they supported some national movements of their age with some strategic reasons. Their most important strategic legacy to the next generation of the Second International period was the distinction between 'oppressed' and 'oppressing' nations. It was on this distinction that the Second International and its leading social democratic parties in Europe developed the strategy of standing for the full right of all nations to self-determination. The period of the Second International was the golden age of Marxian theory on the national question, composed of the contesting works of Kautsky, Bauer, Luxemburg and Lenin in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World War and the dissolution of major European empires. After the War and the Russian Revolution, the fate of the international socialist movement began to be shaped in the Russian context. Chapter 2, in this sense, will focus lastly on the Russian Revolution (opening the door to the implementation of socialism first in Asia and then in the other geographies of the Third World) and the rise of Stalinism in the 1930s (propagating the idea of 'national' communism and the model of

developmentalist state socialism in one country).

Chapter 3 will be an inquiry on the relationship between socialism and nationalism on the periphery of the world in the age of Third Worldism. After the Second World War and the fall of the colonial system of the preceding age, Third Worldism became a dominant mode of political imagination on the fringes of the world system, blending the idea of national liberation with the strategy of independent and national development under the state guidance. In this chapter, first, the notions of Third World, Third Worldism and Third World socialism is elaborated. Then, the modes of articulating socialism with nationalism in the Third World will be analyzed. The idea of economic developmentalism, preaching the possibility of economic and social development in the Third World by following an independent and national path of development strategy, was one of the most important modes of combining principles of socialism with those of nationalism in the Third World. After the inquiry on the notion of economic nationalism and developmentalism in Chapter 3, the attention will then be turned to some widely-referred academic works on nationalism in the Third World. In this part, I will investigate the nature of nationalist imagination in the Third World, with the aim of finding whether it has any peculiarities making its articulation with socialism easy and possible.

In Chapters 2 and 3, while surveying the history and intellectual roots of the articulation of socialism with nationalism, I also highlight and evaluate a series of explanatory conceptual instruments, such as, national liberation, Third World socialism and nationalism, developmentalism, imperialism, dependency, authenticity, imitation, that I will use during my investigation of the Turkish version of this articulation in the 1960s. The investigation on Turkish left's engagement with

nationalism in the sixties will be carried out in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. But, before starting this investigation, I will first give a background information in Chapter 4 about the socialist movement in Turkey that will help us to locate the debate on Turkish left's experience with nationalism in the 1960s into a historical context. Chapter 4 starts with an assessment of the origins of socialist activity in the Ottoman-Turkish context. Then, a brief historical account of the political atmosphere of the sixties will be given. Lastly, I will present a general picture of socialism in Turkey in the 1960s, with a special emphasis on the *Yön* group, the NDR movement and the WPT.

In Chapter 5, the issues of how and why socialism was articulated with nationalism in Turkey will be analyzed through examining the political programs and strategies of the Turkish left of the 1960s. In this chapter, it will be argued that Turkish socialism in this period was under the spell of the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the post-colonial era. Socialism was understood by then primarily as nation's liberation. After elaborating on the Third Worldist character of the Turkish left, I will focus on how Turkish socialists in the 1960s adopted the idea of nation's liberation to the Turkish context. Then, I will investigate what the left understood from nation, nationalism, internationalism, national foreign policy and national defense; how their understanding of nation and nationalism differed from other interpretations. Lastly, I will evaluate Turkish left's experience with nationalism through the prism of the Kurdish and Cyprus issues, as they appeared in the sixties.

After searching the tracks of nationalism in the political programs and strategies of different factions of Turkish socialist movement in Chapter 5, I will then focus in Chapter 6 on the notion of national developmentalism, as understood by the Turkish socialists of the sixties. The idea of developmentalism, promoting an

independent and national development strategy composed of statism, central planning, and nationalization of the key sectors of economy, was an important ideological characteristic of the Turkish left in the 1960s. According to this approach, development in underdeveloped nations of the Third World could only be achieved through breaking all ties with imperialist powers. In Chapter 6, I will first survey the internal and external sources of developmentalism that gained ground among the ranks of the Turkish left. Then, I will investigate how Turkish socialists interpreted the 19th and 20th century Ottoman-Turkish history in terms of the notions of imperialism, dependency and development. And then, I will lastly focus on the common characteristics of development strategies suggested by socialists in Turkey in the 1960s.

One of the concerns of the Turkish left in the sixties was to find out the underlying social, economic and historical structures of the distinctiveness of Turkey, when compared with the Western societies. It was by reference to this distinctiveness that the left in Turkey tried to develop their own national political strategies and development models, applicable to the peculiar conditions prevailing in Turkish society. This issue was also related with the dilemma of the intellectuals of the Third World, that is to say, the problem of generating a delicate balance between reaching the level of contemporary civilization (i.e. development) and remaining as themselves. In Chapter 7, I will initially focus on Turkish left's understanding of West and Westernism. Secondly, I will survey the attempts of the leftist intellectuals of the period at finding the Turkish uniqueness in the social and economic specificities of the Ottoman-Turkish history. Thirdly, I will put my emphasis on the efforts of generating a distinctive Turkish type of socialism in the sixties.

CHAPTER 2

CLASSICAL MARXIST APPROACHES TO NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

Walker Connor (1984: 19-20), in his voluminous work, *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*, points to three different strains of Marxist legacy in terms of its relationship to the nationality question. Historical appearances of these strains give us a chronological sequence. The first manifestation of the strains is represented by "classical Marxism" of Marx and Engels and leading figures of the Second International period, which insisted on the primacy of the class over the nation. The second strain, which is crystallized in the historical experience of the Russian Revolution and through its immediate consequences, recognizes the right of national self-determination and gives its support to certain national movements with political and strategic reasons. The third strain was represented in the 'national Marxism' of Stalinism. We can extend this historical sequence and add a new fourth strain, the Third World experiences of

the post-colonial era, which put emphasis on the geographical divisions and the nation rather than the class and class divisions. In the following two chapters, the history of the articulation of socialism with nationalism will be analyzed and a historically specific version of this articulation in the Third World of the post-colonial era will be focused on. The first chapter will elaborate on the classical Marxism, the experiences of the Russian Revolution and Stalinism with a view to ascertaining the nexus between nationalism and socialism. Third World experiences will be elaborated in the next chapter.

Nationalism and socialism are the ideologies of the modern times, whose origins can be extended back to the turn of the 18th century and to the "dual" revolutions, the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution, both of which determined the topology of the whole 19th century up until the First World War (see, Hobsbawm, 1962: 42-43, 44-99). The French Revolution was a nationalist revolution. It was the historical source of the idea of democratic nationalism, which is based on the idea of popular sovereignty and the republican form of government. This French type of nationalism saw the nation as the political community of equal citizens, based on democratic republicanism. The revolutionary upheavals of 1848/49 in the continental Europe, which represented further radicalization of the idea of democratic nationalism, were the first important encounter of nationalism and socialism. At this particular historical moment, which reflected, in a sense, the memories and the ideals of the French Revolution, democratic national movements and radical working class movements stood together against absolutism and European reactionism, which was set up at the continental level after the end of the Napoleonic wars. The key role in the democratic upheaval against the ancient regime was played by the

national movements of continental Europe, namely, the struggles for German and Italian unifications and Hungarian and Polish independence movements.

This first significant historical encounter of nationalism with socialism in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century drew also the attention of Marx (and Engels). Marx's early cosmopolitanism, which assumed that nations and nation-states would wither away in the near future by the internationalization of capitalism and by the rise of the international working class movement, and which, in this sense, mostly underestimated the national question, gave way to a new approach to the national phenomena after the upheavals of 1848/9. This new paradigm change in Marx's and Engels's approach to the national question represented a shift in their account from seeing the issue in terms of an optimistic cosmopolitanism and, hence, underestimating it, to deciding to encounter with the question. It should be noted, however, that, even in this second stage, Marx and Engels's intellectual interest in nationalism is mostly limited and does not provide a complete theoretical explanation.

In this chapter, I will first elaborate on Marx and Engels's analysis of nationalism, in which the paradigmatic shift of the years following the social and national upheavals of 1848/9 occupies a central place. I will then focus on the other most important classical Marxian debate on the national question that took place among the leading members of the Second International. The classical Marxian debate on nation and nationalism, which began with the formulations of Marx and Engels, continued with the culturalist approach of Austro-Marxists (like Otto Bauer), Rosa Luxemburg's excessive internationalism, and culminated in the statements of V. I. Lenin. Lastly, the emphasis will be on the Russian Revolution, which led to the geographical shift of socialism from the West to the

peripheries of the world, and on the experiences of Stalinism and state socialism/capitalism in Russia in the 1930s, which represented one of the first significant attempts of articulating the idea of socialism with nationalism.

2.2 The Early Marxian Accounts of Nationalism: Marx and Engels

There has been a great deal of discussion and analysis of the relationship between nationalism and socialism, especially Marxist socialism (see, for instance, Avineri, 1991: 637-657; Connor, 1984; Davis, 1967; Davis, 1978; Forman, 1998; Harris, 1993; Löwy, 1981; Löwy, 1998; Munck, 1986; Munck, 2010: 45-53; Nairn, 1981; Nimni, 1994; Purvis, 1999: 217-238; Schwarzmantel, 1991; Szporluk, 1991). However, for a significant group of scholars (Nairn, 1981: 331; Anderson, 1983: 3), "the theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure" and "nationalism has proved an uncomfortable anomaly for Marxist theory, and for that reason, has been largely elided, rather than confronted."[1] The works of Marx and Engels on the national question, indeed, do not reveal a systematic theory on the issue. In their work, although they made some important contributions to our understanding of the subject, they never directly addressed themselves to nationalism as a theoretical problem. But why did Marx and Engels not develop a satisfactory explanation of the national question? Or "[H]ow could Marx, who was such an acute observer of contemporary history as well as a social theorist of genius, have been so theoretically unconcerned about one of the dominant political phenomena of the 19th century Europe, and apparently blind to

[1] Same arguments can also be seen in Avineri (1991: 638), Kolakowski, (1988: 88). Nimni (1994: 42) also accepts the argument that Marx –and Marxism- has not been able to explicitly conceptualize theoretical arguments about nationalism and the rise of the nation-state, but on the other hand, sees the work of the founding father of Marxism on the national question as "a coherent corpus literature", but an evolutionist, a deterministic and Eurocentric literature. Jhon Glenn suggests a middle way. He (1997: 79) holds that it is more precise to say that "[Marx and Engels's] weakness was in failing to develop a systematic theory of nationalism rather than lacking an understanding of nationalism."

its significance for world history?" (Szporluk, 1988: 58) For Glenn (1997: 96), the answer should be sought in their universalism, "in which the final conditions of humanity was presented as one in which a society of free and equal producers would obtain." The other reason, which can be seen in their early writings, was their proposition about the temporality of nationalism and nation-state which made them predict that national differences and antagonisms would definitely disappear in the future.

In the early writings, especially in *The Communist Manifesto*, we can see a deep and uncompromising anti-patriotism in the form of cosmopolitan/universalistic humanitarianism. Their perception of world without borders is based on the idea of humanity as the supreme value, the final aim, the *telos*. And in their perception, the idea of a world without frontiers, that is, communism, can only be established on a world scale since capitalism, from its very beginning, has always been a world system. Seeing capitalism as a world system is a point of central importance to understand Marx's analysis of national question. The unit of historical analysis in Marx's writings was the whole world, the totality of human society, not any of its sections divided by geographic, political or linguistic criterion (Szporluk, 1991: 49). For Marx, history means world history. He never promoted the idea of 'revolution in one country', since he never believed in the possibility of 'history in one country.' Marx and Engels (1970: 55) believe that when history is transformed into world history "then will the separate individuals be liberated from various national and local barriers, be brought into practical connection with material and intellectual production of the whole world and be put in a position to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided production of the whole earth."

Marx and Engels' (2000: 248-249) insistence of temporality of nation-states should be understood within his explanations of the dynamics of world capitalist system:

> The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.

What we see in these passages, as Löwy (1998: 6) observes, is a kind of 'free trade optimism' and a certain amount of 'economism' which assume that growing expansion of and uniformity of the capitalist mode of production is supposed to lead to the decline of national differences and conflicts. National differences and antagonisms like pre-modern production relations, values, and customs are destined to disappear and vanish, "owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto." (Marx and Engels, 2000: 260) This process of the disappearance of national differences and antagonisms will be reinforced with the supremacy of the working class:

> The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word… The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them [national differences and antagonism between peoples] to vanish still faster. United action, of the leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another will also be put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end. (Marx and Engels, 2000: 260)

What does the motto, 'the working class has no country', mean? Does it mean that the working class is immune to nationalism, nationalist fantasies? For the founding fathers of Marxism, the national state does not belong to the working class but to the bourgeoisie; and the working class, all over the world, are exposed to the same material conditions, and as a result, have the same material interests. The working class is the only "universal class"[2] which is no longer national, which has common world-historical interests and which can only lead to the establishment of a universal society where national frontiers will be overcome.

> The proletarians of all countries have one and the same interest, one and the same enemy, and one and the same struggle. The great mass of the proletarians are, by their nature, free from national prejudice and their whole disposition and movement is essentially humanitarian, anti-nationalist. Only the proletarians can destroy nationality. (Quoted in Harris, 1993: 40-41)

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[2] In the Hegelian sense, "universal class" is identified with modern state bureaucracy, and perceived as a class for whom "the private interest is satisfied through working for the universal." (Quoted in, Callinicos, 2000: 74) The Marxian concept of the universal class, on the other hand, draws our attention to the working class, "a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering." (Callinicos, 2000: 75)

According to Avineri (1991: 639), we can detect two distinct phases in Marx's analysis of the national question: "pre-1848" or "the pre-modern paradigm", and "the post-1848" or "the bourgeoisie paradigm".[3] In the 'pre-modern paradigm', national differences are "likened to other pre-modern traits, like local customs and dress" and assumed to wither away by the onslaught of world capitalist system, and then by the supremacy of the proletariat at the international level. Marx and Engels believed that nationalism was a temporary phase and that internationalism was the norm as it was revealed in their famous motto, 'the working men have no country.' The task of the proletariat was to emancipate humanity, not a particular country.

The 'post-1848 paradigm' is crafted in the national class upheavals of the revolutionary years of 1848 and 1849. Under the experience of the 1848/49 revolutions, "during which nationalism appeared as a major force for the first time on a massive scale" (Avineri, 1991: 640), Marx and Engels began to change their views about the national question. The free-trade optimism of the pre-1848 period in the writings of Marx and Engels left its place to the explanation of nationalism as a modern superstructural expression of the need of the bourgeoisie for larger markets and territorial consolidation. Marx's claim of the temporality of the nation states and unavoidable disappearance of the national differences and antagonisms in the near future, thanks to the growing internationalization of the world capitalist system, was replaced by seeing nationalism as a major "building block" of capitalist system (Avineri, 1991: 640). What we can deduce from their

[3] Szporluk (1991: 171) shares with Avineri the same idea that after 1848 Marx and Engels faced the nation, and "the first major modification of their original stand on nationalism occurred in 1848-9." For Munck (1986: 15), on the other hand, the real break occurred with the "Irish turn" in the 1860s when "Marx and Engels came to revise their attitudes towards the national question."

writings in this period is the definition of the nation as a world-historical entity essentially related to the rise of capitalist mode of production and to the political and economic needs of the rise of new ruling class, bourgeoisie. The capitalist nation-state, in this new explanation, is the political expression of that world-historical entity, the nation.

In the post-1848 period, their writings on Poland and Ireland provided the first Marxian political strategies concerning the national question. These writings were the first indications of the long, ambiguous and difficult relationship between socialism and nationalism. Their work on the national question reveals great differences in interpretation from one historical context to another. They faced different contexts and drew different tactical conclusions. They supported the right to national self-determination in the Irish and Polish cases, but they (especially Engels) opposed any self-determination for the southern Slavs, that is to say, Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Croatians, Serbs, Slovenes, Dalmatians, Moravians, Ruthenians, etc. In Engels's writings, one can find the formulation of "the nations without history" (or "non-historic nations"), which, originated from Hegel, argues that nations which have not been able to create a state , or whose state have been destroyed long ago, are "non-historic nations" and are destined to wither away.

Engels, following the footsteps of Hegel, condemns these small nations (southern Slavs including Bretons, Scots and Basques) for being the agents of counter-revolution during the 1848/49 revolutions and of counter-revolutionary forces in Europe, like Russia, Prussia and Austria. Engels (quoted in Löwy, 1998: 139) argues that these small nations, these "remnants of a nation, mercilessly crushed, as Hegel said, by the course of history, this national refuse, is always the

fanatical representative of counter-revolution and remains so until it is completely exterminated or de-nationalized as its whole existence is in itself a protest against a great historical revolution." [4]

Similarly, the founding fathers of Marxism were also accused for their Eurocentric attitudes toward non-Western nations, 'nations without history'. Some of their writings, for instance *Communist Manifesto*, can be seen as an apology of capitalism in destroying the pre-modern, archaic social relations in the non-western societies. They can be perceived as if capitalism plays a revolutionary role in (Europe and) outside Europe, for instance in India. In Marx's writings on the non-European world one can easily find the remarks about the unchanging, stagnant characteristics of the oriental societies like India and China. He (quoted in, Avineri, 1969:10) claims that Asian societies have no history in the Western sense: "Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive invaders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society." The drive for change in these Oriental societies, in this sense, will be triggered by the Western capitalism's penetration into non-European societies. As Avineri (1969: 24) suggests, Marx divorces moral condemnation of Western colonialism from his historical analysis of the consequences of this penetration. In the Indian case, for instance, Marx (quoted in, Young, 2001: 108), on the one hand, condemns the brutality of British rule in India, but on the other hand, underlines the benefits of British colonial rule, bringing India back into world-historical stage: "England, it is true, in causing a

[4] Marx and Engels's opposition to self-determination for small nations reveals their preference for large centralized states. As Szporluk (1991: 171) has suggested, for Marx and Engels, "large states would make it easier for proletariat to advance its class goals."

social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution."

The idea of the revolutionary role of capitalism is presented as the evidence of the ethnocentric, teleological character of Marxism. The well-known quote of Marx in *Capital* (1976: 19), "the country that is more developed industrially shows, to the less developed the image of its own future", can be seen as an early version of Modernization School. But, as Löwy argues, we can also find passages in Marx and Engels's writings which can be read as a critique of evolutionary and Eurocentric statements concerning less developed nations and the non-European societies. Marx (quoted in, Löwy, 1998:19), for instance, in a letter written to a Russian journal in 1870's, warns the Russian reader about the danger of imposing "historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself." Marx (quoted in, Munck, 1986: 19), here, claims that "there is no iron law of development stages applicable to all nations equally" taking the specificity of nations for granted. The critique of ethnocentrism and evolutionism can also be seen in their writings about the cause of Irish freedom: "*It is in the direct and absolute interest of the English working class to get rid of their present connection with Ireland*… For a long time, I believed that it would be possible to overthrow the Irish regime by English working class ascendancy… Deeper study has convinced me of the opposite. The English working class will never

accomplish anything before it has got rid of Ireland… The lever must be applied in Ireland.(quoted in, Harris, 1993: 45)" This quote is the opposite of the quote, that is, 'the country that is more developed industrially shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future', from *Capital*. In the Irish case, it is argued that the less developed can emancipate the more developed, a non-historic nation a historical nation. The victory of the national liberation (and also agrarian) struggle in Ireland can pave the way for a socialist revolution in the England. "The overthrow of world capitalism depended upon an English proletarian revolution which… could only be initiated at Britain's weakest point, Ireland" (quoted in, Harris, 1993: 47).

Marx and Engels's evaluation of the Irish question is relevant for nationalism and socialism nexus in two senses: first, it stresses the notion of the dichotomy of dominant and oppressed nations (the nation oppresses another can not be free) and second, it comes up with the idea that the liberation of the oppressed nation contributes to the revolutionary struggle of the working class of the dominant one. The Irish example also represents another shift in Marx and Engels's attitude towards the national question. The motivation behind their recognition of Ireland as a historical nation is not "economic" but "political": In the Irish case "the concept of nation was not defined according to *objective* criteria (economy, language, territory, etc.), but rather was founded on a *subjective* element: the will of the Irish to liberate themselves from British rule" (Löwy, 1998: 21). This new conceptualization of the national question separates itself from economic reductionism and puts, instead, emphasis on the importance and significance of a political definition of nation and national identity (Löwy, 1998: 21).

In sum, the chronology of Marx and Engels' account of nation and nationalism began with an underestimation and negative view of the prospects of nation and nationalism. Then they changed their views about it and faced the national question especially after 1948-9 and with the help of 'the Irish break'. But, what was the legacy of Marx and Engels in the nationality problem for the next generation of Marxist thinkers? The brief and short answer is that their work on the national question does not provide a general theory. Their support for nationalist movements was always specific not general, strategic not theoretical.

2.3 The Second International and the National Question

The period of the Second International, which lasts from 1889 to 1914, constitutes one of the peak points of the international socialist movement. Kolakowski, in the second volume of his widely referred three volume book titled as *Main Currents of Marxism* (1988:1), claims that this particular period represents "the golden age of Marxism." In this period, "Marxism seemed to be at the height of its intellectual impetus", and "appeared in the intellectual arena as a serious doctrine which even its adversaries respected" (Kolakowski, 1988: 2). The international which was established in Paris in 1889, at the 100th anniversary of the French Revolution, brought together powerful mass parties and organizations, especially in Europe, like the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), the leading organization of the international (for a history of the Second International see, Haupt, 1986). The Second International had come to an end as a historical force with the outbreak of the First World War. When the war came, the concept of nation triumphed over the concept of class. The result was a dramatic and significant moment of the convergence of nationalism and socialism, a

significant step in the process of the nationalization of socialism. Almost all the social democratic parties of the Second International, despite their earlier commitments to the contrary, had sided with their governments and supported their war efforts.

The Marxist tradition's difficulty of dealing either theoretically or practically with the national question continued in the period of the Second International. The national question was among the hotly debated and controversial issues of the agenda of the International. This period, as Harris (1993: 49) has put it, can be seen as "the heyday of theory" on the national question. Karl Kautsky, the leading and most influential intellectual of the Second International period, provided the conceptual framework which became the official account of the economic basis of the emergence of modern nationalism and nation-state: the modern nation-state is the result of the drive to create a unified market for capitalist development (Harris, 1993: 53). The history of modern nation is linked to the history of capitalism. The origin of nation is understood within the process of the consolidation and development of capitalist mode of production. The debate on the national question focused on the Russian and Habsburg imperial relations to Eastern European nations. In this sense, the national question seemed particularly important to Russian, Polish and Austrian members of the international. The concept of national self-determination had become popular and had been sophisticated within the debates among the social democratic figures of those countries including Germany. In 1896 at its London Conference, the Second International, for the first time, decided to support the right of national self-determination.[5]

It is possible to point out three different positions among the thinkers of the International: the debate in this period on the national question oscillated primarily between the competing formulations of Austro-Marxists (like Bauer), Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin. As an uncompromising disciple of Marx, Luxemburg embraced an uncompromising internationalism within this debate, insistently supporting the primacy of class over nation. At the opposite pole of this stance, there were the arguments of Austro-Marxism. The Austro-Marxist legacy was one of the first classical systematic attempts within the Marxist tradition at reconciling nation and nationalism with socialism. But, this legacy did not have a real impact in the world created after the First World War. In the 20th century the fate of the relationship between socialism and nationalism was determined in the Russian context. Although the accounts of Austro-Marxists and Rosa Luxemburg are not directly related with our inquiry of finding the intellectual roots of the articulation of nationalism with socialism in the 20th century (especially in the post-colonial era and particularly on the periphery of the world), their accounts, still, can help us to understand the boundaries and the other extents of the Marxian socialist debate on the nationality question consisting of diverging standpoints. So our evaluation of the era of the Second International will start with brief analyses of Austro-Marxism and Luxemburg. Then, the focus will be on the Russian context.

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[5] At the London Conference, it was declared that the international "stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination and expresses sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism" (quoted in, Forman, 1998: 69). The question of ethnic and national conflict within the multinational empires was not the only concern of the International in terms of the national question; the colonial question was also in its agenda. The dominant position on the colonial question in the International was "a straight condemnation of colonialism as robbery" (Harris, 1993: 52). The deepening of the international competition and rivalry among Western powers at the turn of the 19th century seemed to change the atmosphere even within the ranks of the International. Some delegates of the International did not hesitate to give their support to a kind of "humanitarian colonialism" at its international conferences and congresses. For instance, a Dutch delegate of the International, Van Kol, supporter of a "positive colonial policy", argues that "The new needs which will make themselves felt after the victory of the working class and its economic emancipation will make the possession of colonies necessary, even under the future socialist system of government." He then asks "Can we abandon half the globe to the caprice of peoples still in their infancy?" (Quoted in, Harris, 1993: 51-52).

2.3.1 Austro-Marxist Perspective

At the one pole of the debate on the national question in the period of the Second International, there was Austro-Marxist policy of cultural autonomy, which is best represented in the works of Otto Bauer.[6] For Bauer, there was no conflict between working class internationalism and national cultural diversity. Socialism, in this sense, would release nationality, not abolish it. Bauer's formulation recognized the forces of nationalism and sought to find the ways of an intertwining of class and national factors. The irony of Austrian context is that, as Nimni (1994:130) maintains, "the political nightmare of the national struggles in the collapsing dual monarchy", in somehow, "produced some of the most theoretically sophisticated Marxist discussions of the national question."[7] Austrian social democracy's answer to the burning question of ethno-cultural conflict was the solution of cultural autonomy. Austrian socialists favored the establishment of a democratic federation of autonomous national states which

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[6] At the turn of the century Vienna became one of the significant intellectual and artistic centers of Europe. The works of Strauss, Mahler, Klimt, Zweig, Freud, Wittgenstein, and Mach represent the intellectual and cultural richness of the city. Austro-Marxism emerged within this intellectual climate. The main adherents of this school comprised of names like Max Adler, Friedrich Adler, Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, and Karl Renner. Their general attitude posits an alternative to the dominant understandings of positivism and empiricism in the Marxian interpretations of social world. They differ, in this sense, from the German orthodoxy of the Second International. Austro-Marxists aim to enrich Marxism by opening it up to new concepts, ideas and questions from non-Marxist philosophy and social science. For instance, under the influence of neo-Kantianism which became very popular in the academic circles of the continent, especially in the German universities, Austro-Marxists put an emphasis on a linkage between Kant and Marxism. This Marxist neo-Kantianism tries to provide an epistemological and ethical base for Marxism by a specific reference to Kant. For neo-Kantianism's influence on Austro Marxism see, Kolakowski (1988) and Nimni (1994: 131-141).

[7] Behind Bauer's intellectual interest in the national question, there was the nationalities conflict in the Habsburg Empire at the turn of the 19th century when the Habsburg Empire had a significant population of more than 15 different ethno-cultural groups (Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, Rumanians, Croats, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Romanies, Italians etc.) The processes of rapid industrialization, demographic movements from rural areas into industrial districts, and the dramatic rise of urbanization made much more difficult the nationalities problem in the empire. The population change in the capital of the empire, Vienna, can give us a clue about the rate of urbanization: "In 1857 the population of the capital was 427,220; in 1910 it was 2,031,498" (Nimni, 1994: 122).

would transcend, in a positive way, the multinational Habsburg Empire. National groups in this new federation would receive juridical protection; and each national group would have the right of self-administration in the affairs of cultural and national significance other than economic and political matters (Nimni, 1994: 128).[8]

For Nimni (1994: 119), Bauer's work, although partial, represents a "break with economism" of the orthodox Marxism of the Second International.[9] Bauer rejects the classical Marxist understanding of the temporality of nations which argues that nations are already withering away because of the destructive effects of the expansion of the world capitalism and growing internationalism of working class, and will finally disappear after the establishment of socialism at the world scale. He thinks that there is no contradiction between socialist internationalism and national cultural diversity. Bauer (1996: 48-49) argues that only after socialism, the national culture would indeed come fully into existence, since only socialism can give nations for the first time their complete autonomy. Socialism does not mean fading out national cultural differences, but it means "drawing the entire people into a national cultural community, the attainment of full self-determination by the nation, growing mental differentiation of nations" (Bauer, 1996: 50).

But, what makes up a nation? Bauer, in his own account rejects defining nation according to a set of empirical characteristics or various peculiarities such as language, religion, territory, law, customs, origin or *volkgeist*. In his definition

[8] Austrian social democrats built their parties in parallel to their solution to the nationalities problem of the Habsburg Empire. They always indicated the multinational character of their party. At the turn of the century, the party decided to convert itself into a federative body of six nationalities with a common executive community (Nimni, 1994: 126).

[9] It should be noted here that Nimni's *Marxism and Nationalism* constitutes the most extensive account of Otto Bauer's analysis of nationalism in English.

of nation, two concepts are highlighted: 'national character' and 'community of destiny.' National character is the historical manifestation of national existence at a given period. According to Bauer (1996: 51), the definition of nation can not be fully understood without understanding the concept of national character which, on the other hand, should be conceived as "the totality of physical and mental characteristics that are peculiar to a nation, that unite its different members and divide them from other nations." Bauer does not see national culture as a fixed, unchanging expression of the essence of the nation. National character is unfixed; it is a historically constructed entity. As a historical construction, national character, for Bauer (1996: 42), "is no explanation, it rather requires explanation."

The other primary determinant of the nation is the notion of 'community of destiny'. A community of destiny is defined by Bauer (1996: 51) as "common experience of the same fate in constant communication and ongoing interaction with one another", which, thus, distinguishes the nation from other nations. He makes a distinction between the notions of 'commonality' and 'similarity' of destiny. He (1996: 52) argues that although both English and Germans experienced industrial capitalism in a *similar* way, this does not mean that they experience capitalism in *common* ways: what creates the nation is not similarity of destiny, but common experience and suffering of destiny, that is to say, a community of destiny. For Bauer (1996: 52), international solidarity of working class should be seen as an example of the crystallization of a similarity of destiny because working classes of different countries share "the same joy in struggle, the same revolutionary sentiment, the same class morality, the same political desire", but what created these similar characters of community of international working

class, what links the English and German workers to each other, is not the commonality of destiny but the similarity of destiny. Both English and German workers are the consequences of similar world-wide economic, social and political processes and transformations and, in this sense, share similar class features and have similar class interests. But, these similarities, which characterize the relationship between the members of the community of international working class from different nations, can not be reduced to the commonalities of a national community (like common past, common destiny and common culture) which distinguishes its members from the members of other national communities (Bauer, 1996: 52).

The nation, for Bauer (1996: 52), is not "a rigid thing, but a process of becoming", whose nature is determined by the change of world history through the development of mode of productions, and transformations in production forces and relations. Nationalist perception of history finds the driving forces of history in the struggles of nations; for Bauer (1996: 60-61), on the other hand, history does not "reflect the struggles of nations, but the nation itself appears as the reflection of historical struggles." In modern times, industrial capitalism by uprooting rural population, transcending the limits of local bounds, by mass education, military service and by means of democracy (equal suffrage) creates for the first time the possibility of a genuine national culture of the entire population (Bauer, 1996: 46). Bauer claims that in capitalism (and in previous class societies) subordinated classes are not allowed to participate fully in the creation and enjoyment of the national life and culture. Capitalism, "not only through exploitation itself, but also through the need to defend this exploitation", does not let working class involve in the national cultural community. It is only

through the establishment of socialism and a classless society that, Bauer proposes, the total integration of population into a national cultural community would be achieved.

2.3.2 The Uncompromising Internationalism of Rosa Luxemburg

Rosa Luxemburg represents the opposite pole of the debate on the national question in the period of the Second International. She was against Polish nationalism and generalized this position into an extreme internationalism in opposition to any notion of national self-determination. As J. P. Nettl (1969: 519) argues, for Luxemburg, the Marxist concept of class is the primary social referent: "Rosa Luxemburg stands at the apex of the attempt to make operational the Marxist concept of class as the primary social referent, and to break once and for all the old alternative stranglehold of nation. In this respect her contribution is second to none." In her analysis, nationalism was the 'constitutive other' of the principal of working class internationalism. Her writing can be read as the direct opposite of any attempt at articulating socialism with nationalism.

From the era of the founding fathers of Marxism up until the Second International period, the establishment of a democratic, independent Polish state had always been supported and seen as an essential blow to the heartland of the European reactionism, that is to say, Russia with Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. This tradition of support for Polish independence was inherited by the social democrats of the turn of the century and became their key political demands. Rosa Luxemburg's position on Poland in particular and national question in general appears as a significant break with the dominant position in

the Second International.[10] She was, in general, against the involvement of social democracy in any national project, including the demand of national self-determination. Her answer to the dilemma of how to reconcile a class viewpoint with the recognition of the right of national self-determination was simple: an uncompromising anti-nationalism. She thought that the right of self-determination was a demand of bourgeoisie; and echoing this slogan in the ranks of the Second International was the sign of a bourgeois infiltration into the political discourse of social democracy.

Luxemburg's perception of capitalist society comprised of rival classes let her to come to the conclusion of the theoretical impossibility of a conception of nation as a uniform and political whole: "In a society based on classes, the nation as a uniform social-political whole simply does not exit. Instead, there exist within each nation classes with antagonistic interests and 'rights'. There is literally no social arena –from the strongest material relationship to the most subtle moral one- in which the possessing classes and a self-conscious proletariat could take one and the same position and figure as one undifferentiated national whole" (quoted in, Nettl, 1969: 507). Nations, for Luxemburg, are temporary phenomena. The national problem is the direct historical result of expansion of capitalism and can be solved only after abolishment of capitalist rule and establishment of socialism. Socialism would bring about the end of national oppression with all other forms of oppression.

Although Luxemburg's comment on Poland has no parallels with that of Marx, her elaboration of the question is based on the Marxian principle, the

[10] Luxemburg's political career was actually shaped within German social democratic movement; but she was also a leading figure of Polish social democracy and always concerned with the political and social issues related with Poland. For biography of Luxemburg see Nettl (1969) and Kolakowski's second volume (1988: 61-97).

principle which sees the class analysis as the foundation of politics. Nationalism, for Luxemburg, is incompatible with socialism, and it is not an ally of the social democracy of the Second International. Wright (1981: 155) in Luxemburg's analysis sees "an extreme and doctrinaire internationalism, heroic in personal terms but rigid and schematic in its failure to understand the political dimension of nationalism." Luxemburg adopts a purely economist approach to the national question and ignores its political dimension (see, Löwy, 1998: 33-34).

2.3.3 National Self-Determination in the Russian Context

The third important position on national question in the Second International, which is best represented in the works of Lenin, sought to define a relationship between internationalism and national rights. The reason behind Lenin's interest in the national question was obvious: Russian Empire confronted a growing national question at the turn of the 19th century, especially just before the First World War.[11] This development, combined with the Balkan Wars and rising nationalism in the Habsburg Empire, stimulated Russian social democrats to pay an increasing attention to the issue of nationalism in this period. Lenin appeared as the undisputed author on the national question in the Russian context.[12] He rejected both Luxemburg's anti-nationalism and Bauer's national

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[11] Russia as a multinational empire which had ruled over a vast territory of Asia since the 16th century consists of highly diverse populations and languages of many different ethno-cultural groups. Pipes estimates that "the growth of the Russian Empire between the end of 15th century and the end of the 19th century proceeded at the rate of 130 square kilometers or fifty square miles a day." According to first systematic census in 1897, the majority of the population of the Russian empire, that is, 55.7 per cent of the whole population, includes non-Russians, such as Ukrainians, Poles, Belorussians, Turkic peoples, Jews, Finnish peoples, Lithuanians, Latvians, Caucasians, Georgians, Armenians, Mongolians, Iranian peoples, Germans etc. At that time, the total population of the empire was 122,666,500 (see, Pipes, 1954: 1-2).

[12] It should be noted that Joseph Stalin's "Marxism and the National Question", which was written in 1913 with the recommendation and guidance of Lenin, appears as another reference on the national question in the Russian context before the First World War. But his work is generally quoted in the

cultural autonomy and he advanced the slogan of national self-determination of national minorities even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state. Among the leaders of European Social Democracy, Lenin came to make the greatest emphasis on issues associated with the oppression of national minorities, and on the need for dominant nationalities to show their rejection of this oppression. But the issue for Lenin was a tactical one, not a matter of general principle. National liberation was an instrument to support the unity of the working class and the achievement of socialist revolution in Russia.

What does Lenin say about the concepts of nation and nationalism? Lenin's definition of nation and nationalism basically follows Kautky's analysis. Like Kautsky, he makes a strong emphasis on the role of language for the initial development of capitalism. The unity of language is considered by Lenin (1964: 396) as the foremost requirement of capitalist development: "For the complete victory of commodity production the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and its consolidation in literature eliminated. Therein is the economic foundation of national movements… Unity and unimpeded development of language are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce on a scale commensurate with modern capitalism." In his elaboration, there is an organic correspondence between "the economic logic and organizational tendencies of the capitalist mode of production" and "formation and consolidation of national states" (Nimni, 1994: 78). The emergence of national movements, in this sense, is

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literature as an example of a too rigid and scholastic definition of nation. He tires to describe a nation in terms of so-called objective criteria: "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture" (Stalin, 1936: 8). The Stalin impact, in terms of Stalinism, will be elaborated in detail in the following pages and chapters.

the reflection of "the superstructural response to this organizational tendency" (Nimni, 1994: 78). Since the hegemonic class of the period of capitalist expansion is the bourgeoisie, national movements, accordingly, represents the needs and requirements of the bourgeois class (Nimni, 1994: 78).[13]

For Lenin, nations, national movements and nation-states are among the principal outcomes of the emergence of capitalist system. They stand at the historical edge which separates the ancient regime from the capitalist system. Democratic national movements under the leadership of bourgeoisie struggling against feudalism and absolutism and aiming at establishing a democratic republic is one of the preconditions for the development of working class struggle and, in this sense, should be supported. But, after its initial democratic stage, bourgeois-democratic national movements achieve their maturity and lose their revolutionary democratic potential. At this stage, social democrats should cease to support the nation and national cause. The struggle, at this stage, takes place between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

According to Lenin, every national formation, in capitalist system, consists of two distinct cultures, which reflects the worldviews of the two main social classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class. That is to say, in every modern nation, there are two distinct nations. The idea of the cultural unity of a national formation at the hands of the bourgeois class turns into a hegemonic ideology that fosters the bourgeois power itself. The dominant culture in any capitalist nation is the culture of ruling classes. The struggle between bourgeoisie

[13] Lenin's analysis of the emergence of nation and nationalism looks like to be an early version of Gellner's functionalist explanation of nationalism. Nationalism was perceived by Lenin (and by many other classic Marxist figures) as a phenomenon causally linked to the rise of capitalism; and its emergence was explained in terms of the requirements of the capitalist system. In Gellner's case, the notion of capitalism was substituted by industrialization and the appearance of nation and nationalism was explained in the terms of the requirements of the modern industrial society (see, Gellner, 1983).

and working class avoids any possibility of a single, common national culture in capitalist system.

Lenin's genuine contribution to the debate on the national question does not center on the definition and the historical origins of nation, nation state and national movements, but instead, on his theory and strategy of the right of nations to self-determination. What does the right of nations to self-determination come to mean? Lenin (1964: 397) gives a very explicit definition of self-determination: "The self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state." Self-determination, in this definition, is not confined to cultural and administrative autonomy. Lenin (1964: 400) argues that the concept "can not… have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state." Behind this call for national self-determination lies the distinction between the oppressed and oppressor nations, the genealogy of which can be extended back to the writings of Marx and Engels on the Polish and Irish questions. Although Marx did not generalize and universalize his support for Polish and Irish independence, Lenin made an explicit emphasis that to support the national independence of the oppressed nations against the oppressor ones is among the democratic tasks of the working class.

Lenin attaches a positive, democratic and progressive quality to the nationalism of the oppressed national minorities. He (1964: 412) repeats the Marxian motto of "a nation can not be free if it oppresses other nations" and writes that "the bourgeoisie nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support." His strategic aim is to remove obstacles to the unity

of the workers of both the oppressed and oppressor nations. For Lenin, national prejudices, which hinder the free and voluntary union of the working class of different nations, can only be overcome through the recognition of the right of national self-determination, that is, through the recognition of the oppressed nation's right to self-determination by the workers of the oppressor nation. This strategic arithmetic is considered as the only antioxidant to the dangers of possible national prejudices and chauvinism among the ranks of the working class. The best way for Lenin, to minimize the influence of nationalism within the international movements of the working class, in this sense, is to support the right of oppressed nations to self-determination against the nationalism of the oppressor nations.

According to Lenin, national self-determination is a matter of political democracy. In his famous example, he likens the right of national independence to the right of divorce. He (1964: 422) argues that "to accuse those who support freedom of self-determination, i.e., freedom to secede, of encouraging separatism, is as foolish and hypocritical as accusing those who advocate freedom of divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties." What is important for Lenin is not whether the right of self-determination would be practiced or not, but is the recognition of this right. He, like other Marxists before him, is actually against federation and decentralization, since capitalist development requires "the largest and most centralized possible states." He (1964: 45) underlines the advantages of big market and big state and argues that "other conditions being equal, the class-conscious proletariat will always stand for the larger state." In this sense, Lenin supported national independence without actually advocating it. As the legal existence of the right of divorce does not necessarily mean that every individual

would choose to divorce, the existence of right of national self-determination does not mean that every nation has to choose it.

Lenin's account of the national question reflects the ultimate principle of his strategic thinking which was "the tendency to grasp and highlight the political aspect of the every problem and every contradiction" (Löwy, 1998: 41). He, in this sense, focused on the political dimension of the national question and underlined the relative political autonomy of national phenomena from the other sites of social world, such as economy and culture. As Löwy (1998: 41) has argued, "on the national question, while most other Marxists writers saw only the economic, cultural or 'psychological' dimension of the problem, Lenin stated clearly that the question of self determination 'belongs wholly and exclusively to the sphere of political democracy', that is, to the realm of the right of political secession and the establishment of an independent nation-state."

Lenin attaches a strong *political* and *strategic* meaning to the national question and ignores its other features. As Richard Pipes (1954: 35) has suggested, there are three separate stages in the development of Lenin's approach to the national question. In the first stage from 1897 to 1913, he developed his basic strategy on the question. In the phase between 1913 and 1917, the national question for Lenin was related to the strategy for overthrowing Tsarism. In the second phase, from 1917 onwards, it was a matter of practical politics, and the issue was related to the overthrow of world capitalism. Once the preoccupation of the revolution was extended to the world, the significance of national liberation became much greater and less conditional. In this phase, Lenin's strategy was based upon the alliance of European workers and the nationalist movements of Asia.

Pipes (1954: 49), in his interpretation of Leninist strategy of self-determination, makes the comment that, at the end of the First World War, "the slogan of self-determination was assuming the same role which it played in Europe during the period of the French revolution." It was also in this era that the tectonic center of national movements began to shift from Europe to the colonial and semi-colonial geographies of the world (Pipes, 1954: 48). Lenin's strategy of national self determination was based on the Marxian distinction of oppressed and oppressor nations originally developed by Marx himself to contrast English and Irish nationalisms and to give his support to national liberation movement in Ireland. Lenin, in this sense, "extends the distinction of oppressed and oppressor nations to the colonial context and declares Asian and African nationalism progressive, while European nationalism comes to be seen as reactionary" (Avineri: 1991, 645).

Behind the attempt of extending the strategy of national self-determination to the colonial context and combining the colonial and national questions, there was Lenin's theory of imperialism, which should be seen, according to Avineri, as Lenin's major contribution to the Marxian theory of nationalism in twentieth-century conditions. This theory makes him widen the understanding that nationalism does not only belong to the period of the emergence of capitalism, but it is intensified in the era of imperialist expansion. Nationalism of the periphery, for Lenin, turns into "an anti-capitalist force, as the national movements in the non-European colonies emerge as a response to the exploitation of the colonial people by the European capitalist powers" (Avineri, 1991: 645). The aim is to establish an alliance between European workers and national liberation movements of colonial and semi-colonial areas of

underdeveloped world. Lenin insists on the anti-imperialist character of the national liberation movements of the oppressed people. The national war on the periphery of world capitalism would be waged against imperialism:

> National wars waged by colonies and semi-colonies in the imperialist era are not only probable but inevitable. Some 1,000 million people, or more than half of the world's population, live in the colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia). Here, national liberation movements are either already very powerful or are growing and maturing. Every war is the continuation of politics by other means. The continuation of policy of national liberation by colonies will inevitably lead them to wage national wars against imperialism. (Quoted in, Young, 2001: 125)

The classical Marxist theory of imperialism was developed before and during the First World War by Rosa Luxemburg, Rudolf Hilferding, Nicolai Bukharin and Lenin. The themes which these writers focused on were the formation of monopolies on a national basis and the growing of competition at the international level between these national systems of capitalism. The dramatic results of these tendencies, on the other hand, were the acceleration of the process of partition and colonization of the areas on the fringe of the capitalist development and expansion and the inevitability of war among imperialist powers.[14] With the outbreak of the First World War, the majority of the social democratic parties of the Second International and the mass of workers supported the war endeavors of their national governments. Bukharin and Lenin's works on

[14] The main concern of Hilferding in his magnum opus, *Finance Capital*, was the process of the centralization of capital. His main contribution to the theory of imperialism was the concept of finance capital, which was the outcome of the fusion of industrial and financial capital. Although Hilferding is seen as the real founder of the classical Marxist theory of imperialism, Bukharin, according to Anthony Brewer (1987), is the one who puts already existing ideas together into a coherent conceptualization of imperialism. According to Bukharin, the era of imperialism was characterized by both the concentration and nationalization of economy and the internationalization of capital. In his pamphlet, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, which was based on the works of Hobson, Hilferding and Bukharin, Lenin (1934) defines imperialism as a new stage of capitalist development. Lenin's work, for Brewer (1987: 79), does not provide a substantial theory of imperialism: "His contribution was primarily to popularize the theories of Hilferding and Bukharin." For Marxist theories of Imperialism see also, Wolfgang J. Mommsen (1982), David Horowitz (1969), Alex Callinicos (1994: 11-66), Chris Harman (2003: 1-72).

imperialism also aimed at giving an explanation to the rise of national sentiment among the ranks of the working class and its parties on the very eve of the war. This explanation is based on the assumption that the rise of nationalism among workers has a material basis. According to Lenin's definition of 'labor aristocracy', some sections of the working class in the western imperialist countries gain some material advantages from the success of their national states in the fierce competition with rival imperialist powers. This, according to Lenin, explains the support the working class movement gives to its national states during the First World War.

This observation has also other important corollaries: the shift of attention from worker revolutions in Europe to nationalist revolutions in the East (see, Harris, 1993: 116). The underdeveloped, colonial or semi-colonial nations on the borderlands of the capitalist expansion were now seen as "the weakest link where the chain of the capitalist world system could be broken" (Kolakowski, 1988: 492). National liberation movements were considered as an essential component of the Marxist conceptualization of revolution:

> To imagine that social revolution is conceivable without revolts by small nations in the colonies and in Europe, without revolutionary outbursts by a section of the petty bourgeoisie with all its prejudices, without a movement of the politically conscious proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against oppression by the landowners, church, and the monarchy, against national oppression, etc.- to imagine all this is to repudiate social revolution. So one army lines up in one place and says 'We are for socialism', and another somewhere else and says, 'We are for imperialism', and that will be a social revolution! Only those who hold such a ridiculously pedantic view could vilify the Irish rebellion by calling it a 'putsch'. Whoever expects a 'pure' social revolution will never live to see it. Such a person pays a lip-service to revolution without understanding what revolution is. (Quoted in, Nimni, 1994: 83)

2.4 The Russian Revolution and the Rise of Stalinism

The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by the outbreak of the First World War. The immediate consequence of the war was the collapse of the multinational empires of the continental and Eastern Europe (Russian Empire, Habsburg Empire, and Ottoman Empire). The most striking development after 1914, however, was the Russian Revolution. As Hobsbawm (1994) has put it, it was the revolution that shaped the "short twentieth century".[15] The national question was at the very center of this catastrophic chain of events. This historical epoch opened the door to the further development of the relationship between socialism and the nation. The first several decades of the twentieth century was characterized by the rival strategies of national self-determination proposed by Lenin and Wilson (see, Neuberger, 1995: 310).

Antonio Gramsci (1990: 34-37) defines the Russian Revolution as "a revolution against *Capital*". It was so, because the Russian revolution took place in an economically backward country, which was at the beginning of its capitalist and industrialist development, and constrained by the structural (agrarian, social and economic) problems. For the founding fathers of Marxism, revolution mostly meant both a working class revolution and a European revolution. The center of the geography of revolution was Europe and its subject was the working class of these advanced capitalist national states. For the leaders of the Russian Revolution, on the other hand, their revolution represented "the link between worker revolution in Europe and the nationalist revolution in Asia" (Harris, 1993: 116). The strategy is to transform the desire of national liberation in the colonial areas into an anti-capitalist political force against imperialism under the leadership of European working class.

[15] Hobsbawm (1994: 4) writes that "the world that went to pieces at the end of the 1980s was the world shaped by the impact of the Russian Revolution."

The Third International (or the Communist International, or the Comintern as it was generally known) was, perhaps, the most important organization that was designed with the purpose of putting this strategy into practice.

The Third International, which was established during the chaotic years immediately following the Russian Revolution, was considered by its founders as an organization of world revolution. The main preoccupation of the Comintern was the revolutionary prospect in Europe, especially the revolutionary situation in Germany after November 1918, which was seen by the leadership of the Russian Revolution as a sign of the internationalization of their revolution at a European level. Lenin was an internationalist and always considered the Russian Revolution as a part of an international/world revolution. He (1964: 465) stated in 1919 that "complete and final victory… cannot be achieved in Russia alone; it can be achieved only when the proletariat is victorious in at least all the advanced countries, or, at all events, in some of the largest of the advanced countries. Only then shall we be able to say with absolute confidence that cause of the proletariat has triumphed, that our first objective –the overthrow of capitalism- has been achieved."

The second most important concern of the international was the issue of reconciling nationalist and socialist aims. As Munck (1986: 88) has observed, it was the Russian Revolution and the Third International that "brought the national question into the forefront of Marxist politics." World revolution was generally perceived by the leaders of the Russian Revolution as a European revolution, a revolution in the West. However, the decline of the hope of an immediate European revolution and the isolation of the Russian revolution in the world led the leaders of the revolution and the Third International to focus their attention on the East with the belief that national liberation movements in the periphery of the world capitalism

against imperialism had a revolutionary significance. This strategy reached its climax at the Second Congress of the Comintern[16] and the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East[17]. These meetings also became first significant assemblies to debate the first early formulations of Third Worldism, and "contains some of the most fruitful contacts between Marxism and nationalism" (Munck, 1986: 89). But the most important center for the spread of these ideas was the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV). KUTV, according to Bennigsen and Wimbush (198: 110), from its establishment in 1921, "became the intellectual headquarters for revolutionary high cadre from the colonial world." The international meetings, congresses and KUTV attracted many pre-eminent figures of tricontinental socialism

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[16] The non-Western nationalities and countries did not occupy a central place in the debates of the First and Second Internationals. It was the Third International and especially its Second Congress in June 1920 which aimed to develop a consistent policy for the national and colonial question of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Second Congress, unlike the First Congress, had a real international attendance, delegates of which were mostly drawn from advanced Western countries as well as from non- Russian peoples of the former Russian Empire and third world countries like Turkey, India, Persia, China, Korea, Dutch East Indies. The major agenda of the congress was to incorporate the Eastern peoples of Asia into the common struggle against British imperialism (see, Carr, 1953: 187-200, 251-261).The main thesis on the national and colonial question adopted in the Second Congress was as follows: "The entire policy of the Communist International on the national and colonial questions was based on primarily upon uniting the proletarians and toiling masses of all nations and countries in common revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie. Only such a unification will guarantee victory over capitalism, without which it is impossible to national and oppression and inequality." See, Jane Degras (1956: 139-144).

[17] Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East was held in the city of Baku in September 1920 after a call issued in the Second Congress of the Comintern to develop a coalition of Western working class with the people of Asia in their common struggle against imperialism. The Second Congress made its call originally to "the peasants and workers of Persia, Armenia and Turkey." (Quoted in, Riddell, 1993: 36) The Baku Congress was attended by nearly 2000 delegates from more than two dozen peoples of Asia with socialists from Russia, Western Europe and the United States. The majority of the delegates of the congress were from the Muslim-Turkic countries of Central Asia and Caucasus as well as from Turkey, Iran, and Armenia. There were also Indian, Chinese, Arab, Korean, Kurdish delegates. According to their nationalities, the number of delegates was as follows: 235 Turks, 192 Persians and Farsis, 157 Armenians, 100 Georgians, 82 Chechens, 61 Tajiks, 47 Kirghizians, 41 Jews, 35 Turkmens, 8 Chinese, 8 Kurds. According to Riddell, the number of delegates from Turkey was 105 (Riddell: 1993: 242-243). Enver Pasha and representative of the Ankara government, Ibrahim Tali were present at the Baku Congress. A declaration of Enver Pasha was read in the congress, in which he regrets that "if the Russia of today had been in existence then [during the First World War] , fighting the war with its present aims, we would have been fighting on your side, just as today, with all our energy" (quotedin, Riddell, 1993: 123). Enver's declaration was followed by the statement of İbrahim Tali, which underlined the close friendship between revolutionary people's government of Ankara and revolutionary Russia, and argued that the destiny of the Anatolian peasants and the revolutionaries "is bound up with that of the Third International" (quoted in, Riddell, 1993: 128).

like Sultan Galiev, M. N. Roy, Malaka, Ho-Chi-Mih, Liu Shao-Shi, Nazım Hikmet, Vala Nurettin, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir.[18]

In the period beginning with the mid-1920s, especially in the 1930s, the idea of world revolution was replaced by the defense of 'fatherland', and evolved into the idea of 'socialism in one country.' Socialism in one country was a new a doctrine which was developed by Bukharin and adopted by Stalin in their struggle against other rival circles within the leadership of the Russian Revolution after 1924. This doctrine represented a deflection from the original policy of seeing Russian revolution as a part of an international socialist revolution. After 1924 the priority was shifted from internationalism to national pride, self-sufficiency, seeing revolution as a Russian achievement. Socialism in one country led to a strong appeal to nationalism and actually meant the nationalization of the Revolution (see, Carr, 1959: 36-51; Carr, 1979: 68-83).

Stalin emerged as the most important political figure in the process of 'Russification' of the October Revolution. His interpretation of the national question and ideals of socialism played an important role in this process. Internationalism, for

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[18] Among these figures, the Tatar Muslim Sultan Galiev is regarded by scholars like Bennigsen and Wimbush and Abdel-Malek as the founding father of Third World socialism (see, Bennigsen and Wimbush, 198: 108-120; Abdel Malek, 1981: 84-87). Until his exclusion from the Comintern in 1923, Sultan Galiev worked as the assistant of Commissar of Nationalities under Stalin. He was executed in 1937. His distinction of proletarian and non-proletarian nations is his main contribution to the Third World socialism which replaces the Marxian conception of class divisions with spatial conflicts. Sultan argues that "All Muslim colonized people are proletarian peoples and as almost all classes in Muslim society have been oppressed by the colonialists, all classes have the right to be called 'proletarians.'… Muslim peoples are proletarian peoples. From an economic standpoint there is an enormous difference between the English or French proletarians and the Afghan or Moroccan proletarians. Therefore, it is legitimate to say that the national liberation movement in Muslim countries has the character of a socialist revolution" (quoted in, Bennigsen and Wimbush, 198: 4). Bennigsen and Wimbush (198: 108) argue that Sultan Galiev's ideas about the synthesis of nationalism and socialism, about adapting Marxism to specific national conditions, about the division of the world into oppressed and oppressing nations penetrated into nearly every corner of the Third World. Sultan Galiev and his ideas had also an impact on Turkish nationalist-leftist movements and their prominent figures. It is generally assumed in the literature on the *Kadro* movement of 1930s that Galievism had an effect on *Kadro* journal and its writers like Şevket Süreyya Aydemir through its emphasis on the distinction between proletarian nations and metropole nations (see, Türkeş, 1998; Türkeş, 2001).

Lenin, had always remained a point of reference. For Stalin, it was an instrument to be used in geopolitical struggles. Lenin had never suggested a proletarian nationalism; Stalin, however, based his project on it. The first formulations of the notion of 'national Bolshevism' was developed by a group of Russian émigrés, leaded by N. V. Ustrialov, who abandoned the White cause and their previous anti-Bolshevik stance, and instead, decided to embrace the idea of 'national Bolshevism' and began to support the idea that Bolshevism was a Russian national phenomenon (see, Duncan, 1988: 55-61). This early formulations of 'national bolshevism' paved the way for the use of Russian nationalism in the Stalinist era for the purpose of legitimizing the regime. Nationalism was used as a means of mass mobilization of the industrialization of the country and of the resistance to the German invasion during the Second World War. Russia had become the leading nation of the Soviet Union by the end of the 1930s, which was followed by a general process of cultural Russification in the whole union. Under Stalin's leadership the Comintern also became an instrument for the Russification of the international communist movement. This strong appeal to Russian nationalism, strong state and its integrity in the Stalinist era is generally compared to the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire in the literature.[19]

In the Stalinist era, socialism in Russia itself changed its meaning from "the self-emancipation of the working class" to national economic development. Stalin reduced socialism to a mode of industrialization, to a strategy for rapid economic development. In the beginning of the 1930s he declared:

> To slacken pace would mean to lag behind; and those who lag behind are beaten. We do not want to beaten… Russia was

[19] For the marriage of Stalinism and Russian nationalism see, Terry Martin (2001), E. A. Rees (1998: 77-106), Maureen Perrie (1998: 107-127), Héléne Carrére d'Encausse (1995: 11-31).

> ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness… For military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness… We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do this or they crush us. (Quoted in, Leftwich, 1992: 33)

Socialism became a technical project that presupposed the creation of appropriate tools to increase state and productive capacity.[20] Under Stalinism, socialism was perceived as economic planning and state ownership. Marxism, in this transmuted version, came to mean not the emancipation of working class but the liberation of productive forces (Roxborough, 1979: 133).

2.5 Conclusion

The experience of Stalinism and state socialism/capitalism in Russia had an extraordinary effect both on the East and the West. The transformation of internationalism into Russian nationalism was, for instance, echoed in the ranks of the Western communist parties, especially in the 1930s. The left in non-fascist countries managed to recapture national and patriotic sentiment in their resistance against Nazi Germany. "Anti-fascist nationalism" acquired a strong association with the left in this period. The Third International, which had already become an international bureau serving to the foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union, tried to spread the idea of communists leading national coalitions of different classes for alliance with "the socialist fatherland", and for opposition to fascism in mid-1930s (see, Hobsbawm, 1993: 145-148).

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[20] The regime of Stalinism in the literature on the nature of Soviet Russia is generally considered within the concepts of "state socialism", "state capitalism". This type of society is distinguished by a state-owned centrally administered economy, controlled by state and party bureaucracy. "State socialism/capitalism" transforms Marxism into an ideology of development and develops an alternative to Western type of industrialism. For the nature of Stalinist regime see, David Lane (1996: 36-55); and Marcel van der Linden (2007).

The experience of Stalinism in Russia, a developmentalist state socialism in one country, also served as a model for national liberation socialism in the Third World. It became a new model of industrialization and modernization for the Third World countries and their intellectuals and politicians. It appeared that the long and complex history of socialism in the Third World was shaped under the impact of the development and experiences of Stalinism and state socialism in Russia. In the Third World context too, socialism meant the rapid national economic development and national liberation of forces of production. This revised version of Marxian socialism was adopted by the revolutions and national liberation struggles in the Third World; and in turn, these Third World revolutions and Third Worldist regimes made their own 'unique' contributions to this process of transmutation of Marxian socialism (Roxborough, 1979: 133-134). The debate on the Third World socialism and its close articulation with nationalism will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD

3.1 Introduction

After the Second World War, the centers of gravity of both socialism and nationalism moved from the West to Asia, Africa and Latin America. This move was another historical moment in the articulation of nationalism with socialism; a move which brought socialism and nationalism into very close contact. Perry Anderson (2002: 16-17) provides us with a fruitful description of this shift from "West" to "East" in terms of the changing reletionships within the matrix of capital, labor, nationalism and internationalism:

> [I]n the new phase that opens in 1945 and runs till, let us say, 1965, there occurs a sudden, spectacular exchange in the respective relations of capital and labour to nationalism and internationalism... Hitherto the dominant forms of nationalism... were always an expression of the propertied classes, while from the 19th century onwards the corresponding froms of internationalism... were an expression of the labouring classes. After 1945, this double connexion –capital/the national, labour/the international- capsizes. Nationalism becomes predominantly a popular cause, of exploited and destitute masses, in an intercontinental revolt against Western colonialism and imperialism. Internationalism, at the same stroke,

> starts to change camps –assuming new forms in the ranks of capital... The new type of nationalism that became dominant on a world scale after 1945 was anti-imperialism, and its principal geographical zones were Asia, Africa and Latin America.

After 1945, socialism appeared to be an ideology of the Third World. In this period, a nationalist interpretation of socialism became one of the dominant political idioms of social change and development on the periphery of the world (Ehrenreich, 1983: 1). A growing literature on neo-imperialism, neo-colonialism, dependency based on classical theories of imperialism produced at the beginning of the twentieth century began to gain prominence in the post-war era, which considered the spatial conflict between developed and undeveloped countries as the primary antagonism of the world of the second half of the twentieth century. Nations on the periphery of world capitalism began to take the place of the working class as the main protagonist of the social change. The integration of "revolutionary nationalism" into socialism in the Third World opened the door to new revisions within the socialist ideology in the period following the Second World War. In the Third World, as George Lichtheim has argued, "nationalism is identified with socialism, the peasantry with the proletariat, anti-imperialism with anti-capitalism, until all the distinctions painfully elaborated in Marxist literature for a century are cast overboard in favor of a simple dichotomy: Western imperialism versus the starving masses of the Third World" (quoted in, Szporluk, 1991: 234-235).

In the following pages of this chapter, I will focus, firstly, on the terms of 'Third World' and 'Third Worldism'. What do these terms mean, in which historical context are they invented? Then, the emphasis will be on the intimate relation between nationalism and socialism in the Third World. The question is which conditions lead to the nationalization of socialism in the Third Worldist context.

Thirdly, the attention will be turned to the idea of economic nationalism in the Third World, the idea which was seen as the basis of an independent national economic development. Third Worldist economic nationalism, i.e., independent economic development and industrialization under the control of state bureaucracy, which was inherited from the experience of the Soviet type of state socialism as an ideology of economic self-determination, seems to be one of the most significant discourses that provided the medium for the articulation of socialism with nationalism in the Third World. And lastly, the focus will be on recent scholarly theories on nationalism in the non-Western world which are relevant for the research question of this dissertation. This inquiry, which will be built on a conceptual matrix of dependency/independence, imitation/difference, might provide us with an explanation of the essence of nationalism in the Third World which allows its articulation with socialism.

3.2 Third World, Third Worldism

The idea of the Third World (and Third Worldism) is generally conceived in the literature to be the outcome of the de-colonization process in the post-Second World War era, by which the former colonies of Asia and Africa and the Middle East acquired their political independence (for Third World and Third Worldism, see, Berger, 1994: 257-275; Berger, 2004: 9-39; Dirlik, 2004: 131-148; Dirlik, 1994: 328-356; Tomlinson, 2003: 307-321; Mallay, 1996: 1-33; Harris, 1986; Isbister, 1991; Worsley, 1970; for a good and brief study on the decolonization process, see, Chamberlain, 1985). The terms of Third World and Third Worldism are closely connected to the national liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s and their anti-imperialist ideologies. Third World revolutions in the post-war era had an

important impact on the creation of the three world idea. In this period, more than two dozen states in the Third World were subjected to deep political upheavals with a socially revolutionary character. These states considered and used nationalism as a mobilization myth for mobilizing their peoples or for imposing greater state control on their territories (see, Halliday, 1990: 24-32; for Third World revolutions, see also, Chailand, 1977; Schutz and Slater, 1990).

Third Worldism, as a world-historical movement, was the result of the activities and ideas of the proponents of national liberation movements and their efforts to integrate romantic interpretations of pre-modern and pre-colonial traditions and cultures with the experiences of state socialisms and western understanding of modernization, industrialization and development (Berger, 2004: 11). Third Worldism, in this sense, was a blend of national liberation, economic development and state socialism/capitalism. After 1945, national liberation became a struggle for economic independence, a movement which aims at eliminating economic subordination to the world economy. What characterized the programme of national liberation in the post-1945 period was radical economic nationalism, with its emphasis on state-led national development and import-substitution industrialization. It was argued that political independence gained in the post-1945 period did not mean the restoration of full sovereignty; political independence also required economic self-determination. Third Worldism as "an anti-imperialist ideology of national self-determination" can be conceived as the interaction of political ideas like socialism, nationalism, developmentalism, historical experiences like colonialism and social and economic underdevelopment (Malley, 1996: 8).

The idea of Third World and Third Worldism was not only considered as a spatial category related to the peripheral countries of the "East" or "South". It was a

political ideology and an all encompassing world view "that became a style of thought and a means of coming to terms with the world that was appropriated by political leaders as a language of power, by activists as a vocabulary of dissent, and by historians, journalists, economists, and sociologists as an interpretive tool" (Malley, 1996: 3-4). As a style of thought, Third Worldism, affected the production of knowledge on and political activism in the Third World. The Third Worldist ideology was geographically rooted mostly in the Third World, but it was also echoed in the West among the ranks of left-wing radicals and activists.[1] This ideology was the outcome of the territorial and ideological encounter of the Third World with the West and was created by both the intellectuals of the Third World and the West.[2]

The usefulness of the notion of the Third World has often been subject to criticism in the sense of whether the notion itself has a relevance and explanatory power as an analytical concept and workable reference. Most of the commentators argue that the idea of the Third World is not coherent in itself since it does not exist as a political union or a homogenous geographical ensemble or as a set of socially and economically comparable societies. This type of criticism does not consider the notion of the 'Third World' as an analytical and descriptive term (see, Malley, 1996: 7-8; Dirlik, 2004: 131-148; Grant, 1993: 567).[3] Indeed, the Third World countries

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[1] In the 1960s, "during the world-wide radical ferment," Third Worldism was not only a source of mobilization in the Third World; it also "appeared as a source of inspiration for change in the First World" (Dirlik, 2004: 135). For instance, "the events in China during (the 1960s) would have a world wide impact, as first the Sino-Soviet split and then the Cultural Revolution (officially 1966-9), brought the People's Republic to the center of world radicalism and turned the Chinese revolutionary experience into a paradigm not only in the Third World but also in the First World" (Dirlik, 1999: 299).

[2] Third Worldism, as Malley describes, "was pervasive in that not only Third World statesman but also Third World and Western sociologists, historians, economists, anthropologists, and political scientists drew inspiration from its outlook" (Malley, 1996: 2).

differ in their levels of economic and political development, political ideologies, historical experiences, social and cultural structures. But, these criticisms towards the relevance of the notion of the Third World do not relegate the notion's explanatory power, and do not indicate that it has no meaning (see, Tomlinson, 2003: 308). It was the outcome of a collective imagination and the historical-social manifestation of a similar experience of a common epoch and a similar consciousness. It provided a blur, but nonetheless an explanatory identity that helps us to understand the Cold War era and help us to distinguish a group of countries from those of the First and Second Worlds of the Cold War order. Third Worldism was grounded in the junction of different dynamics, like decolonization and national liberation. It should not be forgotten that the notion of the Third World grew also out of the context of the Cold War in the pos-war era (for a general history and definition of the Cold War see, Halliday, 1987: 1-45; Halliday, 1990: 9-23; Cronin, 1996: 1-31). It was this spatially, economically and politically divided world that gave rise to the idea of Third World. The idea derived its meaning from the Cold War confrontation between liberal capitalist and state socialist/capitalist regimes (see, Dirlik, 2004: 133).

Third Worldism in its first formulations came to refer to Third World countries which were reluctant to align themselves with a great power and instead supported a nonalignment (neutrality) strategy in the Cold War period. As an outcome of the rivalry between the US and the USSR, the Third World "was the world that was not socialist, but was also a world that was pre-capitalist, the world that had been left behind as some moved out of it through the agencies of capitalism and socialism. This world experienced capitalism as an alien force of colonial or

[3] Some other commentators, on the other hand, points out the disadvantages of the term Third World, and instead prefer to use other notions like the "three continents" and the "tricontinental" (that means Asia, Africa, and Latin America), which were first introduced in the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana, and adopted by commentators like Anaour Abdel Malek (1981: 78-80) and Robert J. C. Young (2001: 4-5).

semi-colonial exploitation and oppression, but for that very reason did not yet have the qualifications to move on to socialism" (Dirlik, 2004: 135-6). The idea of the Third World was imagined by the newly independent countries of the decolonization period within the rhetoric of the Cold War to keep distant from the super power rivalry. The non-alignment movement "was specifically designed to be based on the coexistence of states with different political and social systems," with its emphasis on "peaceful coexistence, equality in inter-state relations, and the end of colonialism" (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1989: 131).

The Bandung Conference appeared as the first international platform for the propagation of the idea of non-alignment. The Bandung Conference of 1955, which was held in Indonesia and attended by representatives from new nation-states and national movements from Asia and Africa, was regarded as the first symbolic event which "became the touchstone of a wide array of initiatives associated directly or indirectly with Third Worldism" (Berger, 2004: 10).[4] Under the impact of the legacy of Bandung Conference, a substantial number of nationalist proponents of the idea of Third Worldism, such as Nehru and Sukarno, came to define the notion as an alternative third way between the liberal capitalism of the West and state socialism of the Soviet Block. But, this definition is not the only variant of Third Worldism. As Dirlik (2004: 138) has argued, the Third Word is not a fixed category; it "appears as a discursive construct, constructed in different ways according to historical contexts and ideological dispositions." In this sense, the period of the 1960s also gave birth to new definitions of Third Worldism, that is to say, Soviet and Chinese variants. The

[4] The Bandung Conference was attended by delegations from 29 countries and movements in Asia and Africa. The leading figures of the conference were names from the panhtheon of Third Worldism such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ho Chi Minh, Kwame Nukrumah, Zhou Enlai. According to Mark Berger, the Bandung Conference did not succeed in creating a long-term organizational legacy, but it provided a political spirit for various Third Worldist movements all over the world (Berger, 2004: 12). For Bandung Conference see also, Young (2001: 191-192).

Soviet variant was adopted by regimes in the Third World which preferred making alliance with the Soviet Union. The strategy of the Moscow orientated Third Worldism was to advocate a broad union between the Soviet Block and the Third World against the First World. In the Maoist variant of Third Worldism, China was seen as a leading nation of the Third World. The Chinese version was designed against the First World consisting of the two super powers of world domination, the US and the USSR.

The Bandung spirit inspired the first-generation Third Worldist regimes of 1950s and 1960s in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The leading figures in this period were Nehru in India, Sukarno in Indonesia, Nasser in Egypt, Nkrumah in Ghana, Ahmet Ben Bella in Algeria. What brought these different experiences together under the same banner was their endorsement of economic nationalism crystallized in their common strategy of state-guided national development. The key policy in this strategy was to achieve rapid industrialization. The historical model behind their strategy of national development was the Stalinist version of development and industrialization which was originally experienced in Russia after the 1930s, the experience which dramatically brought the country from an agrarian to an industrial one in a very short time under the control of state bureaucracy. What these Third Worldist leaders advocated was a synthesis of nationalism and state socialism in one country. They proposed a socialism which was assimilated to national characteristics and circumstances. The Third Worldist agenda in their strategy made possible to develop a strong discourse on political and economic independence linking nationalism, economic development, and industrialization to the struggle against neocolonialism. Although national liberation made the Third World countries politically independent, national liberation in the full sense,

according to Third Worldist leaders, could not be achieved until these societies attained economic independence by breaking their economic and political ties with neocolonialism.

The first generation Third Worldist regimes of 1950s and 1960s were followed by a broader second wave of Third Wordlist movements and regimes of 1960s and 1970s. The second wave started with Fidel Castro's coming to power in Cuba in 1959 and ended dramatically with the Sadinistas experience in Nicaragua at the beginning of 1980s.[5] The second generation Third World regimes and movements shared many common features with the first wave regimes but, as Berger argues, the late comers were more radical than the former examples in the sense that the second generation considered their approach to national liberation and national economic development as socialist in a more explicit way (Berger, 2004: 19-21). While the Bandung Conference of 1955 represents the spirit of the first generation regimes and movements, the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana consisting of delegates from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America symbolizes the ethos of the second generation regimes and movements. The Tricontinental Conference represented a more radical anti-imperialism; and as a practical complement to new Marxian dependency theories of late 1960s and 1970s, it also represented a more radical strategy of state guided national development in the name of socialism and even Marxism (for the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana see, Young, 2001: 211-216).

The legacy and the relevance of the idea of the Third World and Third Worldism have been subjected to severe criticism, developed by a growing body of

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[5] This second generation Third Worldist regimes involved those of Algeria under Ahmet Ben Bella, Tanzania under Nyerere, Chile under Allende. There were also other countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and prominent Third Worldist figures like Ho Chi Minh, Che Guevara, Lumumba that can be evaluated within this second wave.

alternative literature known as post-colonial theory and critique, since the late 1970s and 1980s. Post-colonial criticism has repudiated the idea of the Third World as a fixed category, as an explanatory term. Post-colonial theory shifted the intellectual attention from structures, socio-economic perspectives to culture and cultural representations. As one of the most sophisticated manifestations of the idea of Third Worldism, dependency theory, for instance, was criticized since it failed to give enough attention to the cultural dimensions of imperialist/neo-colonial domination. While dependency theory emphasizes the economic and political mechanisms of domination and control, "seeing imperialism as tied to the unfolding capitalism"; post-colonial theory adopts a cultural perspective, "linking imperialism and agency to discourse and the politics of representation" (Kapoor, 2002: 647-648; for a postcolonial critique of developmentalism see also, Tucker, 1999: 1-26). The attempt at creating a distinctive and coherent idea of the Third World in the post-war era was also undermined by a series of dramatic changes in the balances of inter-state relations and new orientations in the field of international political economy during the late 1970s and 1980s.

One of the most important developments in this period that contributed to the dissolution of the radical Third Worldism was open confrontations and wars between radical Third Worldist regimes especially in the Southeast Asia between Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and China (see, Anderson, 1983: 1-3). These rifts and cleavages in the Third World 'internationalism' was accompanied with the onset of the Second Cold War, initiated under the leadership of the neo-conservative administration of Ronal Reagan in the US, and directed against the Soviet block and 'radical' Third Worldist regimes (see, Haalliday, 1987: 11-23). The period of the late1970s and 1980s also witnessed restructuring of the world economy on the basis of neo-liberal

principals endorsed by neo-conservative governments of the Western world such as Reagan in the US, Thatcher in the UK, and Kohl in (West) Germany. International economic institutions like the IMF and the World Bank supported by those neo-conservative/liberal governments encouraged the Third World regimes to adopt the principals of market mechanism, the strategy of the privatization of their public sectors, export-oriented industrialization and abandon import-substitution development strategy, state-guided industrialization and economic development. The rise of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in the East Asia and Latin America has been considered as the success of neoconservative/liberal re-orientation. The economic success of the NICs has also weakened the Third Worldist idea that the uneven economic relations between the Third Word and metropole countries are the main reasons behind the underdevelopment of Third World countries. This success has been seen as the indication of the failure of state-guided development agenda contained in the idea of the Third World and Third Worldism (Berger, 2004: pp.24-27; Tomlinson, 2003: 313-317, Harris, 1986: 187-203; Keyder, 2004: 9-25; 29-47).

3.3 Nationalization of Socialism

In the Third Worldist context, nationalism was mostly considered as a means of national liberation and a resistance to the penetration of foreign capitalism to the periphery, and thus, was associated with the transition to socialism. The struggle for national liberation was seen as an indispensable stage in the socialist transformation of the Third World. It was supposed that the national liberation movement was an integral part of the struggle for socialism in the periphery of the world. This link between national liberation and socialism was based on the assumption that national liberation struggle was characterized by its inherent anti-imperialism. This anti-

imperialist feature was supposed to provide the opportunity of the historical combination of the demands and aims of *national* and *social* liberation. The result was the idealization of national liberation struggles as the primary means of historical change. It was proposed that the class struggles in the Western metropoles came to lose its significance as the main mover of history especially after 1945, and the nations on the periphery, the weakest links in the imperialist system, appeared as the new anti-capitalist forces (Amin, 1980: 173-207).

The Marxist theories of imperialism played a crucial role in building a bridge between socialism and nationalism in the Third World. This bridge was originally constructed in the context of the First World War by Lenin's theory of imperialism. He argues that, in the age of imperialism, national liberation functions as an anti-capitalist force since the national movements in the colonies emerge as a response to the exploitation of the colonial people by the Western capitalist powers. Lenin's work on imperialism also blends political subordination with economic exploitation in the colonies. After 1945, national liberation became a struggle for national economic independence, a movement which aims at eliminating economic subordination to the world economy. What characterizes the programme of national liberation in the post-1945 period was radical economic nationalism, with its emphasis on state-led national development and import-substitution industrialization.[6]

As the idea of socialism had moved, in the post-war era, from the advanced centers to the less developed periphery of the world capitalism, socialism became an ideology of rapid national economic development guided by the state. Nationalism in the Third World manifested itself mostly as a radical critique of the existing

[6] The concept of 'economic nationalism' will be elaborated in detail in the next section of this chapter.

distribution of power and wealth in the world. It was this element that won supporters on the left and brought them together with the idea of national economic development under the rigid and centralized mechanisms of state control. When a radical political movement came to power in the Third World, the class issues of equal distribution of wealth, overcoming mass poverty, became subordinated to national issues and interests. At this stage, "socialism became entirely encompassed by radical nationalism, even though nationalism and the belief in a strong state were by tradition part of the politics of the right" (Harris, 1986: 122).

As already noted, after the Second World War and collapse of the Third International the center of the socialist movement moved from the West to the Third World countries struggling against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Chinese Revolution in this sense was one of the most significant epicenters of this shift from the "West" to the "East". The Chinese experience was also a significant attempt at synthesizing nationalism with socialism. But what is the nature of this synthesis? In the Chinese version of the three worlds theory, China was seen as the natural leader of the Third World which covered the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this schema, the First World embraces two super powers, the US and the USSR, of the international hierarchy. In this version of Third Worldism, both the US and the USSR were portrayed as imperialist powers which were responsible for the exploitation and oppression of the Third World.[7] In the Chinese theory, each world was identified with a social class; the Third World with proletariat, the First World with super-power imperialism. Between these two worlds lies the second world,

[7] Chinese variant of Third Worldism was formulated in the context following the Sino-Soviet conflict after Stalin's death. Maoist theory of three worlds claims that the USSR had experienced a transformation which turned the country into a social imperialist power. For Chinese 'three worlds' theory, see Amin (1980: 218-224); Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1989: 99-112); Munck (1986: 12).

which can be won by the Third World in it struggle against world imperialism [8] In this definition, relations between states take the place of the relations between social classes. Nations in the Third World were portrayed by three world theories as 'proletarian nation'.[9] The exploitation and suffering of third world countries under the yoke of world capitalism and imperialism makes their oppression more unbearable and gives those countries a proletarian character in their unequal relationship with the imperialist powers. As Kubalkova and Cruickshank have argued,

> The nationalism inherent in the theory of the proletarian nation is obvious. There was the implicit assumption that class differences within China have dissolved in the face of China's external enemies. If, then, the entire nation was proletarian, the national struggle and the class struggle were one, and nationalistic interest and motivations were sanctioned as legitimate forms of China's contribution to the world revolution. The theory in fact implied that China had a special role to play in the international proletarian struggle, for if indeed the whole Chinese nation was proletarianized, then China was presumably more revolutionary than the capitalist nations the West… The proletarian nation theory raised China to a position of superiority, for the revolutionary struggle thus redefined had no longer anything to do with oppressor and oppressed classes but instead with oppressor and oppressor nations. (Kubalkova and Cruickshank, 1989: 110-111)

Anouar Abdel-Malek (1981: 92) argues that the Chinese experience "is neither cosmopolitanism nor nationalism." What constitutes the Chinese case is the

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[8]Munck's analysis of Chinese foreign policy after the revolution is, in this sense, illuminating: "The world was divided into three areas: the first world was composed of superpowers, the second world was an 'intermediate' zone (the middle class) composed of the other advanced industrialized countries, and the third world was composed of the underdeveloped or 'proletarian' nations. This somewhat shaky distinction, based on nation-states rather than social classes, was to frame China's foreign policy" (Munck, 1986: 120).

[9] The notion of 'proletarian nation' can be extended back to the writings of Tatar national communist Sultan Galiev. As one of the founding fathers of the idea of Third Worldism, Galiev separated the world into the oppressed people and the oppressors. In this schema, people in the Third World were proletarian since they were all dominated by the foreign oppressors. This identification of the Third World nations with proletarian peoples was a radical break with the classical Marxian understanding of 'class'. Classes were now understood not in terms of production relations but in terms of geographical rivalries. For Galiev, see also, Chapter 2.

transformation of universal principles of Marxism on the basis of the specific conditions of China, with the purpose of finding the proper mixture of national liberation and socialism (Abdel-Malek, 1981: 92). The expression of this attempt is very well revealed in the report of one of the leading members of the Chinese Communist Party, Liu Chao-Chi, to the 7th party congress:

> The practical struggles of the Chinese people, added to the experience acquired in them would inevitably lead to the formation of our own great theories, making of the Chinese nation not only a nation capable of sustaining a war, but one endowed with a modern, scientific revolutionary theory. Mao Tse-Tung's thought is the theory that brings together the practical Marxist-Leninst thought of the Chinese Revolution- Chinese Communism, or Chinese Marxism. Mao Tse-Tung's thought is a new development, an admirable example of the nationalization of Marxism; it is Chinese and, at the same time, it is entirely Marxist. It is the highest expression, and the highest theoretical level of Chinese wisdom. (Quoted in, Abdel Malek, 1981: 92)[10]

The result of nationalization of Marxism is to abandon the classical Marxist theses and instead "invent" and provide new ones. The intimate relationship between nationalism and socialism in the Third World context blurs the boundaries of the notions, 'class', 'nation' and 'people'. The principal question was who would be the historical agent of the social, political and economic transformation in the peripheral societies. The working class, now, lost its historical significance as the subject of the revolutionary transformations in the Third World societies. As Harris (1986: 183) has argued, "the nationalists expropriated the concepts of the left, and the left became dominated by nationalism. The social basis for revolutionary change became equivocal. The vehicle for the emancipation of the world had been, for Marxists, and

[10] The same logic also echoes in the words of the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, MaoTse-tung: "A communist is a Marxist internationalist, but Marxism must take on a national form before it can be applied… If a Chinese communist, who is the part of the great Chinese people and bound to his people by his very flesh and blood, talks of Marxism is merely an empty abstraction" (quoted in, Harris: 1993: 164).

even for many other socialists, the industrial working class. But in the post-war period, the agency of change became different things at different times: the people, the poor, the peasantry, even the lumpen-proletariat, sometimes students, ethnic minorities, and many others."

But, the new significantly rising social class in the post-colonial era was the peasantry. The peasantry occupied an important place in the Chinese Revolution and came to be seen by many intellectuals and radical political movements as the chief revolutionary class. As Roxborough has observed, "although the working class had played no role in the revolution, the Chinese leadership continued to describe their revolution as 'proletarian'. The word changed its meaning; it no longer referred in a way to a specific social class; rather it defined a particular constellation of ideological themes" (Roxborough, 1979: 133). After the Chinese Revolution national liberation movements began to identify themselves with the peasantry rather than the working class. It was assumed that peasantry rather than working class constitutes the principal revolutionary force in the Third World. Even in most cases this process was taken one step further; and the working class, Marxism's historical agent of social change, was replaced by more vague notions like "people", or "popular masses".

Another important characteristic of Third World socialism, diffused from Chinese experience to the other parts of the Third World, was the conflation of spatial entities like "east"/"west", "first world"/"second world"/"third world", or "center"/"periphery" with social classes. Comprehending capitalism, world capitalist system and the relations between its hierarchically divided parts in terms of geographical and spatial classifications had become an orthodoxy in both scholarly and popular discourses of the period. Dependency theory of the late 1960s and 1970s

was the best known example of these discourses.

Classical Marxist theories of imperialism were not the only 'radical' studies on the Third World. Dependency theory was another significant discourse of new Third World radicalism of the post-1945 period. Dependency school was an outgrowth of the works of Baran, Sweezy, Prebisch, and the most important figures among the dependency theorists were Frank, Amin, Wallerstein (for dependency theory see, Preston, 1996: 213-233; Leys, 1996: 45-63; Roxborough, 1979: 42-69; Brewer,1987: 158-181; Berberoglu, 1992: 25-36; Martinussen, 1997: 85-100; Spybey, 1992: 20-33.) Although the dependency school was not a homogenous voice and consisted of different variations, it offered a critique of the modernization school, and provided a different way of conceiving the causes of underdevelopment in the Third World. Underdevelopment in the Third World is the outcome of the internationalization of Western capitalism through the creation of a world capitalist system and through mechanisms of imperialism, colonialism and, after 1945, neo-colonialism.

Frank and Wallerstein's definition of capitalism puts emphasis on exchange and commercial relations. They reduce capitalism to a system of unequal *exchange* relations in which the center, by using its monopolistic position, determines the terms of exchange itself and transfers the surplus from the periphery. Seeing capitalism in terms of production for exchange on the world market significantly differs from Marxian account of capitalism which concentrates on relations of production, the wage relations between the direct producers and their exploiters. In the dependency approach, economic hierarchy is identified with a spatial hierarchy of world nations (for critiques of Frank and Wallerstein's works see, Laclau, 1971: 19-38; Brenner, 1977: 25-92; and Brewer,

1987: 172-173). Frank holds that "looking at the capitalist system on a world scale the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the metropole now appears as only one aspect of capitalist exploitation, which now takes the relation between metropole and periphery, between development and underdevelopment, as its principal and most acute form" (Frank, 1975: 101). Dependency theorists reduce relations of exploitation between social classes to relations of transfer of value among geographical regions. However, the removal of value from one region to another does not automatically mean the same phenomenon as the direct exploitation of labor power (Roxborough, 1979: 46).

Considering class relations as occurring between geographical categories opens the door to the growing articulation of socialism with radical Third World nationalism. As this idea was applied to the every day radical politics of the Cold War era, the fundamental contradiction of the system came to be seen as occurring between the underdeveloped periphery and the developed center, between the poor masses or people of the periphery and the capitalists of the center. So, "'exploitation', supposedly for Marxists a relationship between capital and labor, came to describe relations between governments or countries or groups of countries. In the more extreme cases, countries became homogenous classes, with 'proletarian' nations being exploited by 'bourgeois nation'" (Harris, 1986: 122).

3.4 Economic Nationalism

The idea of economic nationalism appears to be the main mediator between nationalism and socialism in the Third World. It can be argued that the program of the Third Worldist economic nationalism (i.e. rapid, independent

economic development and industrialization under the auspices of state bureaucracy) meets both the criteria of Third World socialism and nationalism. Nationalization of socialism in the Third World can only be understood by focusing on what economic nationalism comes to mean in the Third World context. But before dwelling on economic nationalism in the Third World, I will first elaborate on its emergence and development in the 19th century, its founding father (Friedrich List), and its relationship between Marxian socialism.

3.4.1 Industry, Nation and Class: List vs. Marx

In his widely referred work titled *Communism and Nationalism, Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List*[11], Roman Szporluk (1991: vii) bases his analysis on the observation that socialism and nationalism, in the era opened up by the French and Industrial Revolutions, "addressed very similar –if not identical- questions, but gave different answers to them, provided competing programs for their realization, and in general offered alternative visions of the world." He does not agree with Gellner and Anderson, who argue that nationalism does not have its own "grand thinkers".[12] For Szporluk, nationalism, like socialism (or Marxism), also has its own grand thinkers. His favorite candidate for this role is German economic nationalist Friedrich List. Both Karl Marx and Friedrich List were the outcome of "dual" revolutions, the Industrial Revolution and the Great French Revolution, which shaped the whole 19th century. These two historical moments are seen by many modern social scientists as the historical impetus behind the

[11] For a good analysis of Szporluk's book, one can see Ernest Gellner's article titled "Nationalism and Marxism" in Gellner (1995: 1-19).

[12] For Gellner (1983: 124-12), these so-called nationalist thinkers "did not really make much difference... no one is indispensable." Anderson (1983: 5), in a similar way, proposes that "unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbesses, Tocquevilles, Marxes or Webers."

emergence of modern political ideologies like socialism, nationalism, and the nation-state building processes in the Western Europe. The common concern of the intellectual representatives of these two 19th century discourses, for Szporluk, was industrialization and industrial society. But who are the agents of this new historical era? There are essentially two different answers to this question: classes and nations.

It is List who, as the most important of economic nationalists of the 19th century, first effectively sought to find the signs of national glory in economic development and industrialization. The emergence of the ideology of the economic nationalism in the 19th century is generally perceived as the result of the nationalist challenge to the rise of economic liberalism and its cosmopolitanism. As Eric Helleiner (2002: 307) puts it, "when economic liberals were last such a central global political force during the 19th century, they faced challenges not just from Marxists but from economic nationalists too." It is generally assumed that economic liberalism is the dominant form of the 19th century economic thought, the rise of which is closely related to the rise of the British hegemony at the international level during this period.[13]

The nationalist challenge to the rise of economic liberalism in the 19th century was centered on the opposition to liberal cosmopolitanism. The archetype of this kind of challenge was developed in Germany, which is rooted in the

[13] In the 19th century, "when British industrial and imperial hegemony was still secure, economic liberalism moved from a marginal position to become the ideological orthodoxy of the strongest power" (Mayall, 1990: 77). The principle at the center of this new liberal international order was free trade. This principle is based on the understanding of mutual gain (or comparative advantage) brought about by free trade. Economic liberalism, in general, emphasizes the ideas of free market mechanism and minimal state intervention. The unit of analysis in this economic school is individual and his/her interests, not nations or any other social groups. But, the economic liberal orthodoxy, "the self-evident rationality of free trade", was challenged by the nationalists of those societies which came late to industrial race (Mayall: 1990:79).

tradition of Romantic Movement.[14] The German Romanticism rejected the modern industrial society as the root-cause of poverty, alienation, destruction of traditional social ties and values. Against the cosmopolitanism of modern urban and industrial society, nationalist thinkers of the German Romantic movement developed an idealized image of the old, integrated community.[15] List represented the other important strain of nationalist challenge to liberal international order. As Gellner (1995: 16) has put it, List "was a nationalist, but not a romantic. He welcomed, and did not repudiate, the industrial revolution. The nation was to be protected not by insulating it from industrialism, but on the contrary, by adopting and mastering it." The German nationalist tradition was essentially preoccupied with culture and politics, mostly ignored the economic realm, and did not pay much attention to the great transformation of the economic way of life that had begun in England at the turn of the 18th century. It was List, according to Szporluk (1991: 95), "who linked the economic aspect of a nation's life to the nation's culture and politics in a synthesis that enabled nationalism to compete successfully with its rivals, including Marxism." List inherited some important features of German Romanticism in his analysis of economic nationalism. For

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[14] German understanding of nationhood was constructed by the Romanticism and German unification movement. The Romantic Movement was not directly related to nationhood, but provided the pattern of thought for the celebration of ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood and represented its dark, anti-rational aspects. German Romanticism posed itself against the Enlightenment and its rationality. It celebrated intuitions and emotions against reason; traditional *volk* culture against artificiality of cosmopolitan culture. For German Romanticism and the German understanding of nationalism, see, Mosse (1999); Brubaker (1992).

[15] Cultural nationalists of German Romanticism were aware of the process of industrialization in Britain and its consequences. Their response was to condemn modern industry with its theories and practices as an alien development to German nationality. German Romatics, like Adam Müller and Joan Gottlieb Fichte, were against the development of modern industry in Germany and highly critical towards free trade and liberal cosmopolitanism. Their objection to economic liberalism can be seen as a kind of romantic anti-capitalism and anti-industrialism. Adam Müller is considered as the leading figure of "economic Romanticism" and an early romantic critic of capitalism. Both Müller and Fichte advocated an early type of autarchic economic nationalism, which underlines the necessity of a closed economy and economic self-sufficiency. For Müller and Fichte's economic romanticism see, Szporluk (1991: 99-102); Mayall (1990: 79-81); Helleiner (2002: 317-319).

instance, he did not reject the importance of the state and its regulatory role in social and economic spheres. The state, for List, should advocate and lead a social and economic change in general and industrialization in particular. List's original contribution to German nationalist tradition, according to Szporluk (1991: 101), was his formulation of "the transformation of society into an industrial and commercial nation under the state's aegis." List was not the first figure who analyzed nationalist doctrine in terms of economic issues. But, he was the first supporter of the industrial revolution in the German nationalist tradition: "What really distinguished List from those of jurists and instead drew him closer to Saint-Simon was his enthusiasm for modernity in science, technology and manufacturing. Like Saint-Simon, List was an ideologist of industrialism and industrialization" (Szporluk, 1991: 102).

The main theme of List's work on economic nationalism, which was systematically elaborated in his most important study, *The National System of Political Economy* (1841), was the proposition about Germany's economic national unity (for an extensive review of List's *National System of Political Economy* see, Henderson, 1983: 165-202). In his work, List advocates the cause of the underdeveloped countries of the world and elaborates the question of how an agrarian society can be transformed into an urban society with an industrial economy. He rejected the hegemonic free trade economic theory that had been developed in England aiming to naturalize the liberal international system of the 19th century. He argued that nations, like Germany, which came late to the industrial race and lagged behind the industrialization level of Britain, had to abandon free trade and adopt a system of the protection of national economy and industry through custom unions and high tariffs under the auspices of the state.

'Infant industries', like German industry, need a policy of state intervention to catch-up a high level of economic development and modern industry. In this sense, some parts of List's ideas can be conceived as an early formulation of what is known as the theory of uneven development. As Mayall (1990: 86) argues, "[List's] argument provided the model for much twentieth-century developmental nationalism. The third world, it might be said, once began on the Rhine."

Alexander Gerschenkron, in his work on the relationship between economic backwardness and delayed industrialization in 19th century Europe, argues that countries, like France, Germany and Russia which entered the path of industrialization after England, needed an "ideology of industrialization", a "quasi-religious fervor", in favor of industrialization policies. For Gerschenkron, theories of Saint-Simon appear as "a spiritual vehicle of an industrialization program" in France. In Germany, the doctrines of List play the same role. And lastly, in conditions of late 19th century Russia, "a much more powerful ideology was required to grease the intellectual and emotional wheels of industrialization"; and this role, in Russia, was assumed by Marxism (Gerschenkron, 1962: 25-26). In the writings of Gerschenkron, Marxism and nationalism appear as competing doctrines of industrialization and rival programs for a modern society.

Economic nationalism's unit of analysis is the nation as a whole, which goes beyond the boundaries of classes. The distinctive feature of Marxism, however, is that it perceives society and economy in class terms rather than nation. In his "List Critique"[16], Marx clearly put forward his position about nationalism:

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[16] Marx's "List Critique", which was a critical article on List's *National System of Political Economy*, was written in 1845 and was among Marx's early writings. This article consists of Marx's early analysis of nation and nationalism. For, a detailed study on "List Critique" see, Szporluk (1991: 30-42).

> The nationality of the worker is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is *labour*, *free slavery*, *self-huckstering*. His government neither French, nor English, nor German, it is *capital*. His native air is neither French, nor German, nor English, it is *factory air*. The land belonging to him neither French, nor English, nor German, it lies a few feet *below the ground*. (Quoted in, Szporluk, 1991: 35)

List and Marx's understanding of the consequences of industrialization and capitalist economic development differs in many ways from each other. For List, the problem is the absence of an indigenous German national industrialization. But for Marx, on the other hand, the problem is capitalism: "England's industrial tyranny over the world is the domination of industry over the world. England dominates us because industry dominates us. We can free ourselves from England abroad only if we free ourselves from industry at home. We shall be able to put an end to England's domination in the sphere of competition only if we overcome competition within our borders. England has power over us because we have made industry into a power over us" (Quoted in, Szporluk, 1991: 33). According to Marx, industrial progress deepened the contest between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which would, in the end, lead to the collapse of the capitalist system at the international level. For List, the Industrial Revolution paved the way for the intensification of national differences and conflicts among nations. Whereas Marx proposes that the expansion of world capitalism would lead to the disappearance of national differences and national borders; List, however, welcomes industrialization with the belief that this process would strengthen national power. While List supports the idea of 'a national road to capitalism' or 'capitalism-in-a-single-country', Marx rejects the possibility of socialism and capitalism in one country because, for him, both capitalism and socialism are international, worldwide systems.

Listian nationalism in its critique of liberal cosmopolitanism and adoption of an industrialization program for 'infant industries' can be seen as an alternative party in the rivalry between socialism and capitalism: "Nationalism was a response to the dominance of the advanced capitalist powers of the West and a critique of the ideology of free trade in particular, and thus in a sense it was an ally of socialism. At the same time, however, it functioned as an alternative to not only classical, 'cosmopolitan' capitalism, but also to Marxism" (Szporluk, 1991: 14-15). But, what is interesting here, as Gellner (1995: 13) has observed it, is that Marxists coming after Marx himself are, in fact, "crypto-Listians": "The actual role of Marxism in the form in which it actually came to be implemented in the real world was Listian, the national road to either capitalism or socialism was not only viable, but mandatory. It was the *national* path to industrialism that was essential."

3.4.2 Economic Nationalism in the Third World

For many commentators on the Third World, the most important feature of Third World nationalism seems to be anti-imperialism and anti-Westernism, which led many Third World leaders to pursue an alternative ideological outlook to liberal capitalism. Most of them found this alternative vision in socialism (although the attraction of socialism was generally limited and superficial) (Mayall, 1990: 114). One of the reasons behind why socialism (especially a Soviet type of socialism) was attractive to many Third World leaders was that the doctrine could easily be translated into the anti-imperialist idiom of Third World nationalism. Moreover, Third World leaders were also attracted to socialism since it provided them with an economic development strategy combining a monopoly

of the means of production in the hands of the state with a concentration on rapid industrialization (Mayall, 1990: 114). In the period following the Second World War, in the post-colonial world, the idea of economic independence and economic development came to occupy a central place in the nationalist objective. As Mayall (1990: 116) has argued, "third world nationalism was, in most countries, almost synonymous with the drive for economic development."

Third Worldist national economic development was shaped within the experience of Stalinism, and statist/corporatist tendencies in the Western world in the 1930s, both of which were the outcome of economic crisis and an age of world wars. Stalinism as an example of "a militarized '*blitzkrieg*' process of capital accumulation" for undeveloped countries had a profound impact on the construction of Third Worldism in the post-world era. The transformation of the discourse of Marxism, in particular, and socialism, in general, into Third Worldism occurred within the legacy of Stalinism, "along with an admiration for a heroically simplified account of Russia's economic development" (Harris, 1986: 181). Stalinist experience in Russia in the 1930s led to a series of radical changes in the classical meaning of Marxian socialism, which resulted in the new formulations of 'socialism in one country' and substitution of the principle of the liberation of the working class with that of the emancipation of the means of production. In this formulation, socialism was identified with economic planning and state ownership. It changed its meaning from the abolition of the state to the obsession with the state and the construction of the most rigid and centralized mechanisms of state control (Clapham, 1992: 13). An ideology of rapid economic development guided by the state was an attraction to the radical political movements and regimes in the Third World. It was this version of socialism that gained importance in the Third World and in the experiences of

Chinese and Cuban revolutions and the national liberation struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Roxborough (1979: 134-135) argues that "in common with a familiar post-Stalin transformation of Marxism in the Third World, socialism … came increasingly to be viewed as a recipe for economic growth rather than as the self-emancipation of the working class." In this transformation, socialism "takes the place of technocratic incrementalism. Again, the Stalinist equation of socialism with economic planning and state ownership of the means of production is reproduced."

The economic development strategy of the most of the Third World economic nationalists was to follow a "non-capitalist development" for rapid industrialization. The "non-capitalist development" was considered as a development strategy of the transitional stage from national liberation to socialism. Berberoglu (1992: 76) defines the 'non-capitalist development' as the nationalist, state capitalist path of independent economic development which considers the state as the central apparatus in charge of national industrialization.[17] The idea is that there is a third road of social development which is neither capitalist nor socialist but turns its face towards socialism. For the proponents of the strategy, the "non capitalist development is a whole transitional stage in itself, a multistage progressive revolutionary process of carrying out anti-imperialist and democratic transformations that step by step bring a country up to the point of building a socialist society" (Solodovnikov and Bogoslovsky, 1975:) The program of the non-capitalist development was based on the policy of the development and implementation of a rapid industrialization program under the control of the state. Moreover, the state was supposed to remove the remnants of pre-capitalist relations in the rural social structure,

[17] He (1992: 80) holds that the startegy of the 'non-capitalist development' is actually a "Soviet conception of state-capitalist development in the Third World."

nationalize the major means of production, and control the flow of foreign capital. It was assumed that it was through this transitory stage that Third World nationalist regimes would evolve into socialism (Berberoglu, 1992: 84).[18]

This new ideology of state-capitalist development was based on a collection of propositions about the possibility of an independent national economic development in the periphery of world capitalism. This development strategy in the post-war period became an orthodoxy, a norm for the underdeveloped countries of the Third World (Harris, 1986: 18). The decolonization process that marked the period following the Second World War undermined the direct colonial domination of the European imperial powers. The claim of a growing current of theories of neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism which became popular after 1945 was that although Third World societies had gained their political sovereignty, they nevertheless remained subject to the economic dependency and control of the major world powers. According to Kwame Nukrumah, "the essence of neocolonialism is that "the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus political policy is directed from outside" (quoted in, Young, 2001: 46).[19] The thought is obvious: A country may be formally independent, yet remain economically dependent at the same time. The idea that introducing an independent economic development

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[18] For "the non-capitalist development" see also, Harry Magdoff, pp.1-8. In the words of Magdof: The "'non-capitalist development' is supposed to be achieved by those Third World countries which introduce democratic reforms of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-feudal nature. Nations that undertake such reforms are thought to be ipso facto in a clear-cut transition stage between national liberation and socialist revolution." Ibid., p.1. For the notion of non-capitalisy development see also, Chapter 4.

[19] It is generally assumed that the term 'neocolonialism" is first introduced by Kwame Nukrumah, the first president of Ghana and one of the most important figures of the idea of Pan-Aficanism, in his *Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*. For the notion of neocolonialism see also, Ania Loomba (1998: 1-19); Young (2001: 44-56).

in the Third World could only be achieved by breaking the link with neo-colonialism was reinforced by neo-Marxian dependency theories of 1960s and 1970s.

For the proponents of the dependency theory, underdevelopment was not seen as a consequence of the internal conditions in the underdeveloped countries but as a result of the external factors. Frank (1966: 23) holds that "underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself." For dependency theories, the unit of analysis is one single world system divided in a hierarchical way as metropoles/satellites or center/semi-periphery/periphery countries. It is through the mechanism of metropoles/satellites that economic surplus is transferred from the periphery to the center; and it is this mechanism that prevents national economic development on the periphery and condemns it to underdevelopment. An independent national economic development can be achieved on the periphery if underdeveloped countries disassociate themselves from the world capitalist system by breaking the chain of metropolis-satellite relations.

The policy of controlling imports from the advanced industrial societies of world capitalism under the control of the state, which was called "import-substitution industrialization", was at the center of an independent national economic development program and was seen as an essential instrument to increase the level of growth of indigenous manufacturing industry in the Third World. The import-substitution program of state-guided industrialization,

according to Harris (1986: 118), was "directed to creating a national economy independent of the rest of the world. The growth of this economy was "to be sustained by the growth of the domestic market, a 'self-sustaining' growth. For such an economy to be reasonably self-sufficient at a tolerable level of income, it would have to produce all the main sectors of a modern economy; it would become a microcosm of the world economy… and would have no specialized role in world trade." The emotional, moral and political principles of this new strategy were based on a nationalist position: "local companies should be owned by local peoples, profits should be invested at home rather than sent to other countries, innovations in technology should be developed in the country concerned rather than imported."

The import-substitution strategy, by its proponents, was seen as an effort to build up an independent national economy, an attempt at a national economic self-determination, and was presented as a natural complement to national political liberation. As Harris (1993: 246) has argued, in the post-war era, "national liberation became explicitly and emphatically a struggle for national *economic* independence– a movement to halt, reverse or eliminate economic integration. The right to political self-determination now needed to be also an assertion of economic self-determination."

3.5 Theories on Third World Nationalism

In the mainstream (non-Marxian liberal/conservative) social theory, the emergence of nationalism in the Third World has been generally considered as the outcome of diffusion of Western ideas to the underdeveloped societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America as part of the worldwide process of

modernization.[20] The diffusionist version of the theory of nationalism argues that nationalism in the Third World should be understood in terms of the penetration of Western modernization into the fringes of the Western world. The argument is simple: the nationalist thought, like the ideas of liberty and democracy, is Western invention and is diffused outwards to the peoples on the periphery of the world.[21] However, the claim that Third World nationalism is actually a replication of the nationalism of the West can even be seen in relatively recent new-left studies on nationalism like those of Anderson and Hobsbawm's.

Third World nationalism in the nationalism literature produced before the end of the Cold War in 1970s and 1980s is generally considered as the "last wave" of the history of the expansion of nationalism in the 20th century. Anderson (1983: 113-140) argues that this "last wave" of nationalism as a response to colonial experience in the Third World was actually the result of the adaptation of a modular example of nationalism inspired by the Western examples and experience. For Hobsbawm, the period between 1918 and 1950 was the apogee of nationalism in which the movements for national liberation and independence had become the main historical force for the political emancipation of most of the world. Anti-fascist nationalism of the left in Europe in the 1930s as a response to the rise of fascism in the continent was complemented with the experience of anti-imperialist struggle on the periphery and the upsurge of Third World nationalism. According to Hobsbawm (1993: 169), although, in practice, they deviated from the western examples, "these national liberation movements in the Third World were in theory modeled on the nationalism of the west." These

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[20] For an example of mainstream 'diffusionist' study see, Rupert Emerson (1960).

[21] For a critical evaluation of 'diffusionism' see, James M. Blaut (1987: 29-32; 76-100).

diffusionist studies have come to be criticized by new 'cultural' studies since 1980s. For these new thought of school, Third World nationalism is not simply the result of diffusion of ideas through modernization from the West to the periphery.

The accounts of the emergence of nationalism outside the west have focused on essentially two types of accounts: materialist/economic and cultural explanations. Both of the explanations have tried to provide a framework to examine the nature and content of nationalist thought in the non-European contexts, and to establish its links with modernity and modernization. For the proponents of the former explanation (as I have tried to show above) nationalism in the Third World should be understood in terms of uneven development of capitalism, imperialism, underdevelopment and responses to these processes. They link nationalism to the peripheralization of the Third World. This model is sophisticated by new-left scholars in the 1970s and 1980s, like Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter, according to whom nationalism is basically a reaction to uneven geographical development of capitalism. Supporters of the second type explanation, like Partha Chatterjee, on the other hand, examine the features of Third World nationalism in terms of cultural and discursive practices.

Although Nairn (1981) and Hechter (1975) explain late twentieth-century European sub-state nationalisms, the intellectual roots of their account can be found in the theories of imperialism and dependency and in the studies of Third World nationalism (for Nairn and Hechter, see also, Smith, 1998: 49-69; Özkırımlı, 2000: 87-104; Orridge, 1981a: 1-15; Orridge, 1981b: 181-190). This is because; their works are based on the analogy between the peripheries in Western Europe and those in the Third World. They draw on theories developed to understand the

relationship between the Third World societies and Western capitalism and apply them to a quite different context. Although they particularly focus on Britain, their definition of nationalism as an unequal relationship between the periphery and the center seems to have wider theoretical implications.

In the analyses of Nairn and Hechter, the main impact behind the emergence of nationalism in the periphery is not capitalism itself but the *uneven* development of capitalism which divided the world into advanced capitalist centers and underdeveloped peripheries. This uneven diffusion of capitalism from the Atlantic coast of Europe to the rest of the world led to the peripheralization of some regions of the world and the domination and exploitation of these areas by the others. Nationalism is the outcome of the unequal confrontation and conflict between periphery and center. The periphery adopts nationalism as a reaction to the center's aim of dominating and exploiting the periphery. As A. W. Orridge (1981a: 3) observes, nationalism has been seen by Nairn and Hechter as "the response of the suffering regions, ranging from the reactions of fragmented European nationalities such as the Germans and Italians in the last century to the last, tiny, newly-independent Pacific island."

According to Nairn, uneven development of capitalism not only produces clashes between social classes within any given society but also led to spatial/geographical conflicts among different parts of the world. This spatial conflict between the periphery and the center, for Nairn, is even more essential than the class conflicts. Nairn (1981: 353) argues that "as capitalism spread, and smashed apart the ancient social formations surrounding it, these have always tended to fall apart along the fault lines of fissure were nearly always ones of nationality… They were never ones of classes." It is this conception of the

uneven geographical development of capitalism that makes possible the transformation of the theories of imperialism and dependency into a theory of nationalism. The idea of the emergence of nationalism in the periphery as a reaction to subjection and domination was based on the works of Marxist theories of imperialism produced at the beginning of the 20th century and the works of neo-Marxian scholars like Frank and Wallerstein, who regard the territorial conflict between development and underdevelopment as the primary division of world system. The main claim of this kind of argument "is to place peoples rather than classes as the central actors on the world stage and it is thus especially appropriate as the basis of a theory of nationalism" (Orridge, 1981a: 15).

Nationalism in the non-Western world, as I have mentioned above, historically fused with the experience and consciousness of being dominated economically and politically by foreign imperial powers. The assertion of national identity was therefore interpreted as a form of reaction to foreign economic and political domination. The emergence of new studies produced by scholars like Edward Said, Partha Chatterjee in the 1980s marks a watershed in the nationalism literature as well as in our understanding of the nature of Third World nationalism. David Mc Crone (1998: 103) argues that this change represented "the end of materialist and Marxist accounts, and their replacement by more 'cultural' approaches." One of the main issues of these new studies is centered on the distinction between the concepts of "authenticity" and "imitation". They draw our attention to the main underlying problem of nationalism in the non-European world, that is to say, the dilemma of choosing between cultural authenticity and imitation of the Western institutions, norms, and technology.

John Plamenatz (1976: 23-36), in his "Two Types of Nationalism", argues that there are two kinds of nationalism, the Western type (having emerged primarily in the Western Europe) and the Eastern type (having emerged in the Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America), both of which, although take political forms, can primarily be understood in cultural terms. Eastern nationalism, according to Plamenatz (1976), emerged "among peoples recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards." The response of Eastern type of nationalism is to re-equip and change the nation culturally according to western oriented cosmopolitan standards. But since it is also aware that these global standards have originated from an alien culture, it can not easily imitate the alien culture; otherwise the imitator will lose its distinctive national culture. Eastern nationalism, in this sense, both accepts and rejects the models it imitates. It accepts the cosmopolitan standards of the West, but at the same time, rejects both alien Western cultures and its own ancestral traditions. In this sense, Eastern nationalism consists of two rejections (and two acceptances): "rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity" (Plamenatz, 1976:)

According to Partha Chatterjee (1993: 2-3), this distinction between Eastern and Western types of nationalism is actually an indication of the dilemma of the liberal-nationalist approach in dealing with nationalist thought.[22] Within

[22] One of the first and most influential typologies of this distinction between the two types of nationalism was made by Hans Kohn. For Kohn, Western nationalism was connected with the spirit of the Enlightenment, with the notions of individual liberty and cosmopolitanism. The Western type was

liberal-rationalist approach, nationalism is considered as an integral part of the story of progress, liberty, rationalization and modernization; and when historical records do not confirm this, a distinction is constructed between the normal and abnormal types (in our case between the Western and Eastern types), while the deviant type is explained only with a sociological consideration of the *internal* conditions. Chatterjee argues that Marxist discussions of nationalism share the same dilemma with the bourgeoisie-rationalist approach. Marxists "have adopted exactly the same methods as those of the liberals." This means

> fitting nationalism to certain universal and inescapable sociological constraints of the modern age, or alternatively, reducing the two contending trends within nationalism, one traditional and conservative and the other rational and progressive, to their sociological determinants, or invoking a *functionalism*, i.e. taking up an appropriate attitude towards a specific nationalism by reference to its consequences for universal history. (Chatterjee, 1993: 22)

When translated into the realm of Third World nationalism, this sociologism and/or functionalism reduces Westernist-modernist and traditional-conservative ideas and trends to their sociological roots and reads the history of nation as a struggle between the forces of progress and reaction (Chatterjee, 1993: 23).

Chatterjee, in his critique of liberal-rational approach to nationalist thought, follows the footsteps of Elie Kedourie. Kedourie (1994: 1), in his *Nationalism*, sees nationalism as "a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century" first developed by alienated intellectuals of German romantic tradition. Nationalist doctrine was not authentic production of the non-Western world but spread from Europe to the Third World. Nationalism deriving its intellectual roots among the ranks of European thought was entirely alien to

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optimistic, universalistic and rationalist. Non-Western nationalism, on the other hand, cast itself against the legacy of the Enlightenment. It was emotional, irrational and authoritarian.

political traditions and cultures of the non-Western world. The nationalist doctrine "is neither something indigenous to these areas nor an irresistible tendency of the human spirit everywhere, but rather an importation from Europe clearly branded with the marks of its origin" (Kedourie, 1971. 29). Kedourie exposes the dilemma of liberal understanding of nationalism: nationalism in the non-Western world is adopted to oppose Western domination, but the doctrine itself was a European invention. Chatterjee goes beyond Kedourie's critique of liberal doctrine of nationalism and extends it to its logical conclusions. Nationalist thought, in the non-Western world, according to Chatterjee, does not constitute an autonomous discourse; and this contradicts with the central claim of nationalism, namely, with the idea of uniqueness, autonomy, self-determination and the expression of national character. The problem of liberal, Marxist and conservative doctrines of nationalism is to reject the issue of the lack of autonomy of nationalist discourse as a theoretical problem. What Chaterjee (1993: 11) prefers instead is to adopt a new methodology of situating nationalist discourse within a matrix of culture, knowledge and power:

> From such a perspective, the problem of nationalist thought becomes the particular manifestation of a much more general problem, namely, the problem of the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought… Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become 'modern', accepts the claim to universality of this 'modern' framework of knowledge. Yet it also asserts the autonomous identity of a national culture. It thus simultaneously rejects and accepts the dominance, both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture. Is knowledge then independent of cultures? If not, can there be knowledge which is independent of power? To pose the problem thus is to situate knowledge itself within a dialectic that relates culture to power.

Chatterjee tries to problematize the intellectual premises of the nationalist

thought. For him, the dilemma of the nationalist thought is the reflection of the dilemma of the Enlightenment view of rationality and progress and its conception of knowledge.

Chatterjee tries to deal with the problem of the nationalist thought with an analytical framework based on the distinctions between the levels of "thematic" and "problematic" (originally developed by Anour Abdel-Malek and then adopted by Edward Said). Chatterjee argues that, at the level of thematic, nationalist thought embraces the Orientalist paradigm which is centered on the distinction between 'the East' and 'the West'. At the problematic level of nationalist thought, on the other hand, the East (the Orient) is depicted as possessing subjectivity, as autonomous and sovereign. This distinction between levels of the national thought highlights the inherent contradictions in nationalist thinking. Nationalist thought, at one level, rejects the dominating implications of post-Enlightenment framework of knowledge, and at the other level, accepts its domination (Chatterjee, 1993: 36-39).

Chatterjee tries to build a solution to "the theoretical insolubility of the national question" in the Third World by proposing another distinction between "material" and "spiritual" spheres. In "Whose Imagined Community?", he (1996: 214-225) challenges Anderson's and Gellner's propositions of seeing Third World nationalism as a modular example of Western nationalism and suggests that nationalism in the Third World should not be understood simply in terms of imitation and borrowing, but also in terms of difference and autonomy. Chatterjee tries to make a distinction between seeing Third World nationalism as a political movement which challenges foreign Western domination, and as a cultural entity which marks its distinction and difference from the West. This distinction is built

on his separation of the material domain from the spiritual one. The material domain represents the sphere of the outside, which consists of the economy, the statecraft, science and technology; and it is in this domain that the West shows its supremacy. We see in the history of nationalism in the Third World a challenge to the West in the domain of the outside (the material) as well as an acceptance of the superiority of the West. Chatterjee (1996: 221) argues that "'difference' is not a viable criterion in the domain of the material." The spiritual domain, on the other hand, is the domain of imagination, difference, a domain which is identified along the lines of cultural identity. It is in this domain that nation finds its uniqueness, distinctiveness and autonomy.

The debate on the nature and content of nationalist thought in the non-European contexts looks like the debate on the nature of the Third Worldist socialism. Those debates are so similar, because it is sometimes impossible to distinguish the nationalist discourse from the socialist one on the periphery. Third World socialism is defined in a such way that it is destined to be nationalist. That is to say, it is as if socialism cannot be separated from nationalism in the Third World.

Those who advocate the attempts at articulating socialism with nationalism in the Third World argue that the common features of the experiences of Third Worldist socialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America are the overemphasis on the specific national conditions, authenticity, and uniqueness. For Anouar Abdel-Malek, Marxism of the Third World (or if we use his conceptualization, Marxism of the Three Continent) can be defined as the adaptation of Marxism on the basis of specific national reality of Third World countries. Tri-continental Marxists transforms the principles and methodology of Western Marxism within the national

framework of their own countries (Abdel-Malek, 1981: 98). To be a Marxist in the Third World, Abdel-Malek asserts, requires a deep nationalism. Nationalism is the most important constitutive component of the Third World Marxism or socialism. As he (1981: 99) argues, "in many tricontinental countries, one finds an insistence on the *national* character of Marxism; it is always regarded as the first consideration… And one never, or almost never, finds it relegated to the second place."[23]

For Young, sharing a similar approach to the Third World socialism with Abdel-Malek, the virtue of Third World socialism is its ability "to mediate the translatability of Marxist revolutionary theory with the untranslatable features of specific non-European historical and cultural contexts." The Third World socialism puts emphasis on "the significance of subjective conditions for the creation of a revolutionary situation." This socialism is the result of the process of modification, reformulation and transformation of Western Marxism to suit non-Western contexts (Young, 2001: 6-7). In other words, socialism in the Third World, according to Young, is "a hybrid of East and West." Young, like Abdel-Malek, sees combination of socialism with nationalism as the primary feature of tricontinental socialism. Nationalism, as a part of this combination, stands for "the untranslatable features of specific non-European historical and cultural contexts."

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[23] The same pattern of adaptation of socialism to the specific conditions of national frameworks, the emphasis on authenticity, uniqueness can also be observed in the writings of leading proponents of African Socialism, Arab Socialism, like Nkrumah, Cabral, Nasser. The same development can even be seen in Latin America in relatively very early times. José Carlos Mariategui from Peru, one of the founding figures of Latin American communism, was an enthusiastic supporter of developing an indigenous socialism that would suit to the specific conditions of Latin American countries. He, like the Russian *narodnik*s of the 19th century who saw their socialist future in the egalitarian features of Russian village communes, sought the roots of Peruvian socialism in the past and tradition: "Socialism is ultimately in the American tradition. Incan civilization was the most advanced primitive communist organization that history has known. We certainly do not wish socialism in America to be a copy and imitation. It must be a heroic creation. We must give life to an Indo-American socialism reflecting our own reality and in our own language" (quoted in, Löwy, 1998: 86).

The distinction between 'translatability of Marxism' and 'untranslatable features of specific non-European historical and cultural contexts' resembles those of Chatterjee's differentiations of 'thematic'/'problematic' and 'the inner ('spiritual') domain'/'outer ('material') domain'. In this case, at the level of 'thematic', tricontinental nationalist-socialists accept the distinction between the "Western socialism" and the "Eastern socialism".[24] At the level of 'problematic', tricontinental socialists try to accommodate socialism with nationalism in order to overcome the problems of non-autonomy and non-sovereignty. It is at this level that we see the 'imagination' of tricontinental socialists in inventing their own conception of socialism. They create their realm of sovereignty by separating the 'inner domain' from the 'outer domain'. In our case, the 'outer domain' is Western Marxism with its claim of being the universal knowledge of human liberation. The 'inner domain', on the other hand, is identified with the untranslatable features of specific national, historical and cultural context. Tricontinental socialist 'imagination' becomes autonomous and sovereign when it is able to posit on the difference (which belongs to the realm of the inner domain) from the universal modular forms (which, on the other hand, belong to the realm of the outer domain).

The post-colonial critique of western modernization aims at questioning the Enlightenment view of rationality and progress, the epistemological foundations of the idea of modernity. Chatterjee (1995: 235) writes that "if there is one great moment that turns the provincial thought of Europe into universal history, it is the moment of capital –capital that is global in its territorial reach and universal in its conceptual domain. It is the narrative of capital that can turn

[24] For example, according to Abdel-Malek (1981: 93), "the historical conditions and sociological milieu in which Marxism appears in Europe" and "in which its makes its appearance in the Three Continents" are "in historical terms, fundamentally different."

the violence of mercantile trade, war, genocide, conquest and colonialism into a story of universal progress, development, modernization, and freedom." This critique also tries to problematize the claim of universal applicability of Western standards and values, which, according to the proponents of the post-colonial critique, are particularly specific to modern Western societies. For these critics, the argument of universal validity of modern Western thought is actually a disguised particularism and an attempt at concealing its ethnocentrism. Not only 'the narrative of capital', but also Marxian socialism comes to be seen as one of the intellectual targets of post-colonial critique. Marxian socialism, since it has been historically originated as an integral part of Western modern thought, is also considered to be Eurocentric. Such Western-originated radical ideologies (like Marxism) are even seen as a part of all-encompassing power-knowledge of Western colonial discourse. The post-colonial critique, indeed, provides important insights to the epistemological problems of Western modernity, but its excessive versions diminish the possibility of any attempt at a genuine universal understanding and dialogue, and fall into the trap of cultural essentialism and relativism. The emphasis in post-colonial theory is on particularity and locality; on difference, autonomy and uniqueness. But, the pessimistic versions of anti-modernism have the potential of turning into a romantic anti-capitalism. The problem with such a post-colonial critique is an absolute rejection of the philosophical possibility of a universal knowledge of human liberation at a universal level.

3.6 Conclusion

In the first and second chapters of this study, I have tried to make a critical discussion of the history of the ideological and practical accommodation between socialism and nationalism from the mid-19th century to the post-colonial era. In these chapters, I surveyed the historical and intellectual roots of the process of the nationalization of socialism and extracted a number of explanatory conceptual instruments and frameworks that will be required in the examination of the relationship between 'Turkish' socialism and nationalism in the following chapters. This investigation will be conducted around the concepts of Third Worldism, Third Worldist socialism and nationalism, national liberation, developmentalism, imperialism, dependency, uniqueness, authenticity, imitation. I will try to evaluate the Turkish way of articulating socialism with nationalism in the 1960s through these concepts and frameworks.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIALISM IN TURKEY IN THE 1960S: A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters, I tried to trace the historical and intellectual tracks of how socialism was articulated with nationalism, with a special emphasis on the Third Worldist variant of this articulation (becoming very popular in the post-Second World War era) and its roots of inspiration. The Turkish phase of this quite common political phenomenon of the Third World, articulating socialism with nationalism, will be elaborated by references to international and internal sources and experiences. But, before undertaking such an analysis, I will first give some brief background information about the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s that will help us to comprehend and situate the inquiry, which will be carried out in the next following chapters, within a political-historical context.

In the first part of this chapter, I will initially provide a short account of the left of the pre-1960 period in Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, a general and

brief political historical analysis of Turkey in the 1960s will be given, with an emphasis on the military coup of 27 May 1960, the 1961 Constitution and the ideologically fragmented political climate of the period. Thirdly and lastly, I will try to portray a general and introductory anatomy of socialism in Turkey in the 1960s.

4.2 A Short History of the Old Left

The history of socialism in the Ottoman-Turkish context can be extended back to the turn of the 19th century. But, socialist organizations and their demands became publicly more visible after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. At this early period, socialist ideas first gained ground especially in the Balkans and in Macedonia, and among non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire, namely, Jews, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians.[1] Salonika became the first center of the socialist activity after 1908. Jews, the major community of Salonika, played a leading role in the establishment of the first Ottoman socialist organization, the Socialist Workers' Federation of Salonika (SWFS) (*Federasion Sosialista Lavoradera de Saloniko* or *Selanik Sosyalist Amele Heyet-i Müttehidesi*), in July 1909. The Federation was a multicultural organization, addressing not only to Jewish community, but also to Greeks, Bulgarians and Turks.[2] The national problem was

[1] The role played by the minorities in introducing socialism into the Ottoman Empire at the Second Constitutional period was very crucial. According to Feroz Ahmad, only these ethnic and religious communities were able to produce "a bourgeoisie and an intelligentsia capable of thinking in a modern idiom" (Ahmad, 1994: 13). For the role of minorities see also, Mete Tunçay (1994: 157-68).

[2] The Federation was built up by some Jewish intellectuals (led by Abraham Benaroya, A.J. Arditti, David Recanati, and Joseph Hazan) together with a small group of Bulgarian and Macedonian socialists (led by Angel Tomov and Dimitar Vlahov). After its establishment, the Federation joined the Second International. In August 1909, it launched a multi-lingual paper, the Workers Newspaper (*Amele Gazetesi*), published in four languages, Ladino, Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian. The leader of the Federation, Benaroya, explained the 'revolutionary Ottomanism' of the group as follows: "The Ottoman nation is composed of numerous nationalities living on the same territory and having each a different language, culture, literature, customs and characteristics. For the ethnic and philological reasons, we have considered that it is desirable to form an organization to which all the nationalities might adhere without abandoning their own language and culture. Better still: every one of them will be able to develop independently its culture and its individuality while working for the same ideal: the

one of the important issues of the agenda of the SWFS, which was trying to gain ground in a geography divided by contesting national and ethnic claims. Having inspired from the Austro-Marxist formulation of cultural autonomy, the leadership of the Federation embraced a federative solution in order to overcome the national and ethnic confrontations within the Ottoman society, and to create a unified party of the Ottoman laboring classes, coming from different national and ethnic backgrounds. But, under the pressure of the Balkan Wars of 1912-3, the popularity of the Federation began to wither away, as ethnic and national hatred dramatically rose.

The other noteworthy Ottoman socialist organization, the Ottoman Socialist Party (OSP) (*Osmanlı Sosyalist Fırkası*), was established in September 1910, in Istanbul, by a small group of Turkish socialists, and gathered around a weekly journal, *İştirak*, led by Hüseyin Hilmi (for the OSP, see, Tunçay, 1967: 25-42, 48-57; Harris, 1967: 21-30, 38-9). The OSP, mostly inspired from French socialism and its leader Jean Jaures, had a kind of social-democratic program with some nationalist and Islamic overtones. It stood against the authoritarian tendencies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), and offered some moderate political and social reforms for the well-being of the poor. Throughout its history, the OSP stayed as a small propaganda group. After the CUP's coming to power in 1913, the activity of OSP, with all other political oppositions of the period, was banned until the end of the First World War. The party re-emerged after the war, in the period of armistice, this time renamed as the Turkish Socialist Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası*), but it was not able to challenge the rise of new socialist and communist organizations, which started to gain ground after the Russian Revolution.

In the period following the defeat of the Ottoman state in the First World

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socialist ideal" (quoted in Dumont, 1994: 62). For the Federation see also, George Haupt (1978: 13-33); Paul Dumont (1978: 35-66); H. Şükrü Ilıcak (2002: 115-46); George S. Harris (1967: 17-8).

War, communist ideology began to disseminate in Turkey. The new movement basically recruited its members and sympathizers from the nationalist ranks of the Young Turk movement, who were disillusioned with the encroachments of the West, and who wanted to save the state and preserve the country's national existence during (and after) the turmoil of the First World War. The return of a group of people in 1919, sent by the CUP government to Germany for education during the war, composed of students and skilled workers, and heavily influenced by the German social democracy and the German Revolution of November 1918, intensified the revolutionary activity in Turkey. This group established the Turkish Worker and Peasant Socialist Party (TWPSP) (*Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası*) in Istanbul, in September 1919, and launched the revolutionary monthly, *Kurtuluş* (Liberation). In a very short time, the leading figure of the TWPSP became Dr. Şefik Hüsnü Deymer from Salonika, who studied medicine in France before the First World War (for the TWPSP, see, Tunçay, 1967: 143-51; Harris, 1967: 39-49; Harris, 2002: 50-3). But the occupation of Istanbul by Allied forces in March 1920 gave an end to the legal political activity of the group until the summer of 1921. After the occupation, some important members of the party moved to Anatolia in order to join the ranks of the Turkish national liberation war. The new center of Turkish communist movement now became Ankara.

The other source of the communist movement was originated in Russia among the Turkish war prisoners. The Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komunist Partisi*) was established by this Turkish émigré group, under the leadership of Mustafa Subhi (a former Unionist), in Baku, in June 1920, and became a member party of the Communist International (for the Mustafa Subhi and the founding years of the TCP, see, Tunçay, 1967: 100-23; Harris, 1967: 50-66, 89-91; Harris, 2002: 40-

5; Gökay, 2006: 17-30). The first congress of the party was held in September 1920 just after the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East with the aim of bringing various Turkish communist groups together under the leadership of the new party; and the congress decided to shift the party's political activity to Anatolia. The party in many occasions showed its willingness to support the Turkish struggle for independence against the Allied forces. From the end of 1920 onwards, the party leadership tried hard to move its headquarters from Baku to Anatolia in order to join the Turkish national liberation struggle and to broaden the party base within the Anatolian population. The TCP received permission from the Ankara Government in summer 1920 for shifting its center to Ankara. But, Subhi and his accompanies were killed in Trabzon by a local mob during their passage to Anatolia in January 1921.

Left-wing and communist activities gained momentum also in Anatolia during the national liberation struggle, especially in 1920, as the leadership of the struggle sought alliance with the new Soviet government to get support for the Turkish resistance against the Allied occupation.[3] The Green Army (*Yeşil Ordu*) (and its political wing in the National Assembly, the People's Group (*Halk Zümresi*)), the Peoples Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası*) were the other main radical organizations of the period, inspired by the Russian Revolution, and established in Ankara.[4] Although these organizations were always hindered by main factions of the leadership of the national liberation struggle, and forced to

[3] Partly for securing Soviet support, partly for controlling the rise of communist activity in that period, Mustafa Kemal encouraged some of his close associates (İsmet İnönü, Fevzi Çakmak, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Kazım Karabekir, Yunus Nadi, Adnan Adıvar, Celal Bayar) to establish an "official" Turkish Communist Party (*Türkiye Komünist Fırkası*) in October 1920 (see, Tunçay, 1967: 83-90; Harris, 1967: 80-5; Harris, 2002: 34-5).

[4] The program of these organizations was based on an articulation of Islamic principles with Russian communism, basically embracing a populist, corporatist, anti-imperialist, and anti-Western stance. For the rise of left-wing activities in Anatolia during the Turkish national liberation struggle, see, Tunçay (1967: 65-100); Harris (1967: 66-95); Harris (2002: 45-50).

operate in difficult, semi-legal conditions, they also enjoyed a sense of momentum during these freewheeling days. But, they never became effective and powerful enough to be a visible partner of the leadership of the national liberation struggle; and their activity in Anatolia was given an end by the spring of 1921.

Following the murder of Subhi and other TCP leaders, and the dissolution of communist activity in Anatolia, the leadership of the TCP was now assumed by Şefik Hüsnü's group in Istanbul, which started another journal, *Aydınlık* (Enlightenment), in June 1921, instead of *Kurtuluş*. After the establishment of the Republic, the TCP leadership continued their critical support to the leadership of the new Kemalist regime against "reactionary", "feudal" elements and "imperialist" forces. But the party could not escape from being banned by the state authorities. Following the Kurdish rebellion in 1925, the National Assembly passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*), granting the government extraordinary powers. Although the TCP supported the government policy against the rebellion, the party journals were closed down and the activities of party were officially forbidden in 1925; and eventually Şefik Hüsnü and many other party members were arrested and imprisoned in 1927 (for Şefik Hüsnü's group after 1920s, see, Tunçay, 1967: 151-90; Harris, 1967: 97-148; Harris, 2002: 54-92; 143-72).[5]

One of the noteworthy developments of the 1930s in Turkey was the emergence of a new political-intellectual circle around a theoretical journal, *Kadro* (Cadre), published under the leadership of a group of ex-members of the TCP, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Burhan Asaf Belge, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, converted from communism to Kemalism.[6] Seeing the Kemalist Revolution as

[5] For more information about the TCP's approach to the Kurdish question in the early years of the Republic, see also, Chapter 4 of this study.

the first successful national liberation struggle on the periphery of the world and as a model for the other national liberation movements of the Third World against imperialism, the *Kadro* writers assigned themselves with the mission of generating a systematic ideology that the Kemalist Revolution deserved. This new ideology of the Turkish Revolution would be a third way beyond liberalism and socialism, embracing an independent national development strategy based on an all-encompassing statism, regulating not only economic life, but also social and cultural realms. The group was dissolved in 1934, when the mentor of the group, Karaosmanoğlu, was sent to a diplomatic post in Albania (see, Karaosmanoğlu, 1984). But, as the forefather of left-Kemalism in Turkey, the programmatic views of the *Kadro* movement was revived again with some modifications in the new political atmosphere of the 1960s.

The left-wing movements in the early Republican period experienced heavy defeats and state oppression until the end of the Second World War. In this early Republican period, they were forced to continue their activities illegally and mostly performed a weak and inactive political opposition. The transition to a multi-party system in Turkey after the Second World War seemed to provide a new area of open political activity for the left-wing organizations. Just after the war, two socialist parties were established by the members of the illegal TCP, the Socialist Labor Peasant Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi Köylü Partisi*) by veteran Deymer, and the Turkish Socialist Party (*Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi*) by Esat Adil Müstecablıoğlu. But, this new relatively liberal era appeared to be very short-lived for these left-wing organizations. These new parties were closed down in December

[6] The other important figure of (and regular contributor to) the *Kadro* journal was Burhan Asaf Belge's brother-in-law, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, regulating the group's relationship with the new regime. For the *Kadro* movement, see, Aydemir (1932); Tekeli and İlkin (1984: 35-67); Türkeş (1998: 92-119); Türkeş (1999); Türkeş (2001: 91-114); Harris (2002: 115-42). For more information on the *Kadro* movement, see also, Chapter 5 of this study.

1946, and their political activities were prohibited. The decade of the 1950s was not different from the previous period in terms of the difficulties that the leftist and socialist movements encountered. During the rule of the Democrat Party (DP) (*Demokrat Parti*) government, the left in general and the TCP in particular were subjected to a Turkish 'McCarthyism', launched by the government; and eventually the leadership of the TCP including Deymer were arrested and put in prison in 1951. The socialist movement was silenced again until 1960 (for the left-wing activities in Turkey between 1945 and 1960, see, Landau, 1974: 113-121). But, when the socialist movement made a new fresh start at the beginning of the 1960s, the role of the leading leftist figures of the previous epoch was mostly limited and indirect in this period of regeneration.

4.3 Turkey in the 1960s: A Brief Political Historical Account

As it has been discussed above, the origins of socialism in Turkey can be traced back to the late Ottoman era. But the years following 1960 constitute a unique moment in the history of socialist movement in Turkey. The left, in general, gained momentum at the very beginning of the 1960s, and in the following years, its influence has been felt at different levels of Turkish society. In this period, we witness increase in the political mobilization of the newly emergent social groups, workers and students. Notwithstanding the socio-economic changes in the international and domestic contexts in the Cold War era which paved way to the emergence of class politics, the involvement of radical leftist political groups in domestic politics increased considerably as they were able to propagate their ideas and distribute their publications more freely within the more liberal context of post-1960.

To understand the conditions in which the Turkish socialist movements of the 1960s were established and evolved, an inquiry about the political climate of the period seems to be necessary. The 1960s were experienced in Turkey, like in many other countries, as a decade of rapid change. In the Turkish context, the decade was inaugurated by the 27 May 1960 military intervention, which marked a very crucial turning point in Turkish political history. Although, the military coup of 27 May 1960 did not change the basic foundations of the regime, the way politics was carried out was transformed in a quite radical way. To use a Gramscian terminology, the main support to the military takeover was given by an "historical bloc", composed of civil-military bureaucrats, intellectuals, big industrial and business circles of Istanbul and the majority of the constituents of the Republican People's Party (RPP) (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). Most of the leftist intellectuals of the period also genuinely welcomed the military intervention and the 1961 Constitution. For example, Behice Boran (1968: 59-60), one of the most important ideologists and leaders of the WPT, considered the coup as a significant event in Turkish political history since it gave the Turkish people a comprehensive constitution, and gave the Turkish socialist movement an important opportunity to organize itself, disseminate its ideas and bring out its publications freely within a legal framework. Mehmet Ali Aybar, who later became the chairman of the WPT, was of the same opinion. In an open letter to President Cemal Gürsel on 19 November 1960, he (1968: 179-188) was portraying the intervention of 27 May as a progressive movement, which, he also believed, would allow establishing socialist parties in Turkey.

Its actors and adversaries did not prefer to see the 27 May military intervention as a coup, and tried to identify the military takeover with the notion of revolution (*inkılap*), with the hope of elevating its status in the Turkish public

imagination. The coup and its supporters tried to justify the military intervention into politics by describing it as a legitimate and necessary act of putting an end to the increasingly corrupted, oppressive and reactionary Menderes government of the 1950s.[7] The justification of the removal of the DP government from power was also reinforced by references to the historical role and mission assigned to the Turkish military. The officers were seeing themselves as the guardians of the state, the regime and its official ideology, Kemalism, against the "praetorianism, instability, inefficacy, careerism, populism, lack of prudence, corruption, and irresponsibility" of civilian politicians (Cizre, 1997: 156). As Keyder (1987: 46) puts it, "the officers who carried out the coup of 27 May 1960 were, ideologically, the direct descendants of the CUP ... Their conception of social change was derived from the authoritarian, etatist ideology of the CUP- RPP elites." They believed that it was "their historical mission to intervene and save the state from usurpers who relied on the supporters of an ignorant electorate."

According to its proponents, the intervention did not just simply give an end to the "unlawful Menderes rule", but also transformed and re-regulated the political institutions of the regime, and led to a radical change in the social and political atmosphere of the country, through making and implementing a new constitution (the 1961 Constitution), new laws, and institutions. The new constitutional design

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[7] The officers' justification for the intervention, first stated in a radio broadcast on 27 May, was as follows: "Owing to the crisis into which our democracy has fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen" (quoted in, Weiker, 1963: 20). Just after the intervention, a committee of university professors (the Onar Commission, under the chairmanship of Professor Sıddık Sami Onar, the rector of Istanbul University), who were given the task of drawing up a new constitution, issued a declaration legitimizing the intervention: "It would be wrong to view the situation as an ordinary political coup... The political power that should have been the guardian of civil rights, and that should have symbolized the principles of state, law, justice, ethics, public interest and public service had... become instead a materialistic force representative of personal influence and ambition and class privileges... The state was transformed into a means of achieving personal influence and ambition" (quoted in, Karpat, 1972: 357).

reflected the victors' intention of controlling political parties and politicians through a new system of check and balances. The concentration of power at the hands of 'irresponsible' politicians would be prevented by dispersing and differentiating power with the creation of the Constitutional Court, which would review the constitutionality of legislation, the National Security Council, which would allow the military High Command having a constitutional role in government, and a bicameral parliament, composed of the National Assembly and the Senate.

The very well-known argument of the supporters of the 27 May coup was that the military intervention made a new constitution, the 1961 Constitution, with a social and democratic content, which had never been seen in Turkey before.[8] Under the new constitution, it was argued, a wider spectrum of political activity would be tolerated, and the citizens would now enjoy a remarkable degree of freedom and more civil rights. The new constitution was containing guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association and publication as well as other democratic liberties. It was within this new political liberalization that universities were guaranteed greater autonomy; students were given the freedom to organize their own associations; trade unions were given the right to strike and engage in collective bargaining. For the socialists of the sixties, the 1961 constitution also had a very strong social dimension; it was progressive, in favor of the people and did not present an obstacle to the social development. According to the spokespersons of the WPT, for instance, the new constitution was charging the state to remove all political, economic, and social obstacles restricting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the

[8] The referendum on the new constitution was held on 9 July 1961. The constitution was accepted with only 61.7 percent of the voters. This percentage was not very high, considering the governments propaganda efforts on behalf of the new constitution. It "was rejected outright in the 11 coastal provinces in the west where the DP had been strongest before 1960" (Zürcher, 2005: 246).

individual in such a way as to be incompatible with the principles of individual well-being, social justice and the rule of law; and to bring about the conditions required for the material and spiritual development of the individual. The logical conclusion of this argument was that the complete implementation of the constitution could only be realized by a socialist government (Sarıca, 1966: 12, 20-21).

The ideological differentiation of the Turkish political spectrum on 'left' and 'right' axes in the 1960s was the most significant feature of the decade, radically distinguishing it from the 1950s. Although there was a rivalry between the DP and the RPP in the fifties, this competition was not yet expressed within the idiom of the confrontations between 'leftist' and 'rightist' ideological stances. But, political and ideological fragmentation would soon be the defining characteristic of the Turkish politics in the 1960s (and 1970s). The RPP leadership's decision to move the party to the left of the center of the Turkish political spectrum in the second half of the 1960s changed the political nature of the controversy between the RPP and the main successor to the DP, the Justice Party (JP) (*Adalet Partisi*), and fortified the polarization of the political life after 1960. The process of the alignment of main political parties (the RPP and the JP) in the left and right wings continued with the establishment of relatively smaller parties with more obvious and radical ideological stances and with parliamentary representations. At one end of the political spectrum, there was the radical left, represented by the Workers Party of Turkey (WPT) (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which was founded just after the military intervention; and at the other, the extreme right, represented by the Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP) (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*), taken over by Alparslan Türkeş and his followers in 1965, and renamed the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) (*Milliyetçi*

Hareket Partisi) in 1969.[9]

The features of new political climate became more apparent especially during the 1965 and 1969 general elections.[10] The 1965 general elections, for instance, had essential political differences when compared to the earlier elections. For the first time topics such as socialism, capitalism, land reform, foreign policy and economic development became the issues of election campaigns and were debated by a variety of parties with different ideological perspectives (Szyliowicz, 1966: 473). In the election campaign of 1965, socialists, represented by the WPT, differed from the other parties in their insistence on social issues and reforms. They also used a considerably different discourse in its election propaganda. The WPT's manifesto for the 1965 elections started with an address to workers, day laborers, peasants, artisans, clerks, pensioners, Kemalist and social-minded intellectuals (TİP, 1965a: 3). In the manifesto (TİP, 1965a: 24-25), it was stated that "we are against all of the

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[9] It should be noted that Islamic movement was also a part of this ideological fragmentation in the 1960s. But Islamic movement established its political party (the National Order Party) (*Milli Nizam Partisi*) at a relatively late date, in 1970, under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan (see, Toprak, 1984).

[10] The return to political "normalization" started on 13 January 1961 with the removal of the ban on political activity and the allowance for the registration of new parties for the next general elections. The political legacy of the DP, dissolved just after the 27 May military coup, was inherited by two new parties (the JP and the New Turkey Party (NTP) (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*)). In the first general elections after the coup, held on 15 October 1961, the RPP won 36.7 per cent of the vote compared to the 34.8 per cent won by the JP. These two parties were followed by the NPT with 13.9 per cent and the RPNP with 13.4 per cent. But the 1961 election results could hardly be seen as a victory for the RPP. The results of the 1965 elections were another shock for the RPP. The size of the JP's electoral victory and that of the RPP's defeat were greater than expected. The JP received fifty-three percent of the total votes and won 240 seats in the parliament, giving it an absolute majority in the assembly. The JP was followed by the RPP, with twenty-nine percent of the votes and 134 seats. The other impressive result of the elections was the WPT's entrance into the National Assembly with fifteen deputies (received 2.83 per cent of the total votes). The new electoral system, guaranteeing proportional representation, and based on the national remainder system served to strengthen the representation of smaller parties in the Assembly. The electoral performances of the other parties were as follows: the NP won 31 seats, the NTP 19, and the RPNP 11. In the 1969 general elections, the national remainder system was abandoned and a new election method was adopted, disfavoring this time the smaller parties of the parliament. For instance, in the 1969 general elections, the WPT received 2.58 percent of the total votes, and won only two seats in the parliament. On the other hand, there were only slight differences in the competition between the JP and the RPP. In 1969, the JP gained 46.5 per cent of the vote, and the RPP got only 27.4 per cent.

other five parties. We are radically different from them: We are the party of the laboring people." In the elections, it was argued, "there are actually two parties contesting: One of them defends the interests of the landlords and snatchers (*kapkaççılar*); the other party is yours. It is the party of labor, the Workers' Party of Turkey" (TİP, 1965a: 24-25).

The 1965 elections were also characterized by the rise of anti-communism as being a basic tenet of all right-wing parties and groups, reflecting the polarized political atmosphere and intensified ideological tensions of the period. During the election campaigns, the left was faced with the physical and verbal attacks of right-wing parties. The people who played major roles in these attacks for the most part were supporters of the Association for Fighting Communism in Turkey (AFCT) (*Türkiye Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği*).[11] During the election campaigns, the WPT's electoral promises were equated with communism and the party members were accused of being communists, atheists, and enemies of family life (Abadan, 1968: 259). The attacks were not limited to these facile charges; on several occasions, meetings held by the WPT were sabotaged or assaulted (see, TİP, 1965c: 3-11).

These ideological fragmentations and confrontations in the parliamentary politics were also reflected outside the National Assembly. The politicization of the intelligentsia, students, and workers accelerated in this period. 1960s were also a period of rapid social change. Rapid capitalist economic development, industrialization, urbanization, and increasing mobilization of people transformed the Turkish society in a very dramatic way after 1950. The emergence of an industrial

[11] The main goal of the association was to fight against communism in Turkey. This extreme rightist organization was founded in 1963. The number of its branches throughout Turkey reached 110 in 1965 (Landau, 1974: 203-4).

working class and its growing number was accompanied with the rise of unionization and its increasing radicalization.[12] This industrial militancy was culminated in the establishment of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (CRWU) (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*) in 1967 by the split of a group of unions from the mainstream Confederation of Turkish Workers' Unions (CTWU) (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfedarasyonu*). The climax of the working class and trade union radicalization was the massive protests of workers on 15-16 June 1970 sparked off as a spontaneous response to the attempts at amending the Unions law. Another source of political radicalization was the universities. In the years between 1968 and 1971, anti-American demonstrations gained momentum. The most active political agent of the anti-imperialist, anti-American mobilization in these years was especially university students. In late sixties, university students began to engage with "domestic and international problems, and words like imperialism, reaction, Vietnam, socialism, and social justice became commonplace" (Szyliowicz, 1972: 52). Student participation in Turkish political life manifested itself in the form of "opposition to existing social, economic and political institutions, and hence of violent anti-Americanism, since the United States was regarded as an imperial power supporting the reactionary JP government through such channels as NATO" (Szyliowicz, 1972: 52-53). The symbols of the anti-imperialist struggles of the late sixties were student demonstrations against the U.S. Sixth Fleet's visits to Istanbul and Izmir. The most important of these demonstrations took place in Istanbul in July 1968 and January 1969.[13] The radicalization of university students shifted quickly

[12] In the period between 1950 and 1965, the number of wage earners had risen from 400,000 to almost 2 million. The number of unionized workers meanwhile rose from 78,000 in 1950 to 834,680 in 1967 (see, Karpat, 1966: 177; Işıklı, 1987: 316).

from occupations and sit-ins in the late 1960s to the establishment of radical armed organizations at the very beginning of the 1970s.

By early 1971, Turkey was in a state of social unrest. The growing activities of the radical leftist groups and, to some extent, rightist circles, and the increasing militancy of workers' demonstrations weakened the Demirel Government to the point of paralysis. The government seemed incapable of controlling the turmoil in the universities and the streets. On 12 March 1971, the high command of the Turkish military issued a memorandum, interrupting the normal functioning of the parliamentary regime and suspending democratic freedoms. After the 12 March military intervention, thousands of intellectuals, students and workers were persecuted, impriosoned and suppressed. The military intervention was trying to legitimize itself by reference to the guardianship role of the Turkish army, claiming that "the parliament and the government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest" (quoted in, Ahmad, 1977: 288-289). The memorandum demanded the resignation of the Demirel Government and its replacement by a new one. The period which started with a military coup (27 May 1960 takeover) ended dramatically and ironically with another military intervention.

4.4 Socialism in Turkey in the 1960s

After the military intervention of 27 May 1960, socialism appeared as one of the major ideological and political currents of thought and attracted many people.

[13] In July 1968, student demonstrations touched off by the arrival of the Sixth Fleet in Istanbul ended with one student's death, Vedat Demircioğlu, a member of the WPT (see, *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988: 2084-2085). In 1969, demonstrations against the Sixth Fleet were organized by student organizations and trade unions. In these demonstrations several people were killed and many others wounded (see, *Türk Solu*, 1969a; *Türk Solu*, 1969e; *Türk Solu*, 1969f).

In the newly liberalized atmosphere that followed the intervention and the new constitution, one of the most interesting developments was the growth of radical left groups. The major peak point of this process was the entrance of the WPT and its socialist deputies into the National Assembly after the 1965 elections, which made the Turkish left more visible both politically and intellectually.

Socialism in the 1960s was understood and introduced as an ideology and development strategy to achieve rapid modernization and social justice. To reach these goals, it proposed central planning based on state authority. Statism was one of the key concepts in the socialism of the 1960s, and it was understood as a major means of socialism (see, Karpat, 1967: 157; Karpat, 1968: 302, 305; Karpat, 1973: 341). For Turkish socialists, statism offered the only solution to the economic and social problems of the country. The socialist movement of this period had also an elitist character. Successors to the elite-bureaucratic tradition, socialists of the 1960s believed in a permanent revolution from above (Keyder, 1987: 52). Most of the Turkish socialist groups were "theoretically and politically shackled to an obsolete and romanticized vision of an alliance between the working masses and a 'progressive' state bureaucracy" (Samim, 1987: 154).

This strategy was best represented by a political group that emerged around a weekly review, *Yön* (Direction). Founded by writer-journalist Doğan Avcıoğlu, the first issue of *Yön* appeared on 20 December 1961 and its publication continued until 30 June 1967. The programmatic approaches and analyses that determined the political perceptions and perspectives of the Turkish left during the decade were first seen in the pages of this journal.[14] As Landau (1974: 50) writes, "for the five-and-a-

[14] The contributors of *Yön* included many well-known left-inclined thinkers and writers of the period, such as Nermin Abadan, Muammer Aksoy, Çetin Altan, Sadun Aren, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Fakir Baykurt, Mihri Belli, Niyazi Berkes, Erdoğan Berktay, Behice Boran, Edip Cansever, Fazıl Hüsnü

half years of its publication, it was undoubtedly one of the most discussed periodicals in Turkey."[15] *Yön* typified the socialism of the 1960's in many respects. *Yön* mainly had an eclectic social and economic policy, composed of Kemalism, Third Worldism, and to some extent Western European social democracy and Marxism. The *Yön* circle identified imperialism, feudalism, and the big comprador bourgeoisie as the main obstacles to initiating a rapid economic development and to establishing a "national democracy" in Turkey. So, for the *Yön* movement, the main political task was to construct a national democratic front in which all anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces would unite in order to carry out the national democratic revolution.

The strategy of the founders of *Yön* was to change the society from the top to down. They envisaged and promoted a military coup which would be undertaken by the progressive civil and military bureaucrats and intellectuals, and which would be more comprehensive and revolutionary than the 27 May military intervention. For the leading figures of the *Yön* group, seizing the political power in Turkey by electoral ways was impossible. They had serious doubts about the prospects of a regime change in a multi-party system. They declared, in their publications and on every occasion, their growing skepticisms about the parliamentary system. Avcıoğlu, the leading ideologist of the *Yön* circle, claimed that after the establishment of the multi-party regime in Turkey, all free general elections had brought conservatives to the government. He (1969: 509-510) held that a parliament under the control of the conservatives only expressed the interests of

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Dağlarca, Arif Damar, Abidin Dino, Muzaffer Erdost, Selahattin Hilav, Sırrı Hocaoğlu, Rıfat Ilgaz, Atilla İlhan, Abdi İpekçi, Orhan Kemal, Yaşar Kemal, Sait Kırmızıtoprak, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Hasan Hüseyin Korkmazgil, Onat Kutlar, Yalçın Küçük, İdris Küçükömer, Uğur Mumcu, , Fethi Naci, Nadir Nadi, Aziz Nesin, Fikret Otyam, Bahri Savcı, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal, Kemal Tahir, Ülkü Tamer, Cahit Tanyol, Taner Timur, Turgut Uyar, Can Yücel (for the *Yön* movement, see, Landau, 1974: 50-64; 79-87; Lipovsky, 1992: 85-108; Özdemir, 1986; Özdemir, 2000; Aydınoğlu, 2007: 73-85; 107-19; Atılgan, 2002; Altun, 2004: 135-156).

[15] *Yön*'s circulation reached nearly 30,000. This was a big number for a Turkish weekly at that time.

the ruling classes, specifically comprador bourgeoisie and the big land lords. The backward social and economic structures and conditions of the country would not allow the progressive forces to come to power through constitutional, parliamentary or electoral means, ways or methods. Underdeveloped countries like Turkey needed a radical change in their regime and a revolutionary breakthrough in order to develop. For this reason, a parliamentary system which favored conservatism, not revolutionism, was not convenient for any country making efforts to develop (Avcıoğlu, 1971: 135). To elaborate his view, Avcıoğlu asked which was more democratic, Atatürk's authoritarian one-party regime aiming at revolutions and land reform, or Demirel's liberal regime which refused to carry out the land reform. Answering his own question Avcıoğlu (1969: 509) said that "the Atatürk regime was authoritarian but more democratic. The Demirel regime is liberal but less democratic."

Since the parliament was under the influence of the conservatives and the progressive forces were unable to seize power by electoral methods, from the perspectives of the *Yön* circle, the transition to national-democratic regime could be brought about only by non-parliamentary means and forces. For this purpose, Avcıoğlu and his close associates, like İlhan Selçuk, İlhami Soysal, Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu, began to publish a new weekly called *Devrim* (Revolution) on 21 October 1969. *Devrim* was envisaged by its publishers to be a means that would ideologically fortify and legitimize a 'progressive' military coup, which was expected to be carried out on 9 March 1971. The majority of the Turkish left, especially the *Yön* group and the NDR militants, foresaw a 'revolutionary' junta as imminent. But, this attempt was failed; and *Devrim* was closed down after the military intervention of 12 March 1971, on 27 April 1971. Even just after 12 March, a majority of the leftist groups

published proclamations supporting the military's assumption of power (see, Samim, 1987: 158-160). But the military regime that took the power on 12 March 1971 reacted to these leftist groups with massive repression. The intervention showed, in a dramatic way, the failure of the theory of the leading role of the military and civilian intelligentsia in the revolutionary process in Turkey. The coup also showed that the Turkish left exaggerated the radicalism of the military and civilian intelligentsia and their 'revolutionary' potential. The idea of the revolutionary potential of the army, which was one of the most popular theories among Turkish socialists in the 1960s, was abandoned in the 1970s. In the 1970s, none of the factions of the socialist movement regarded military juntas as a serious and realistic way to socialism in Turkey (see, Lipovsky, 1992: 165-166).

In the second half of the 1960's, the strategy of a national democratic revolution became a dominant characteristic of one of the radical left-wing factions, the National Democratic Revolution movement (for the NDR movement, see, Lipovsky, 1992: 109-121; Aydınoğlu, 2007: 141-87, 211-6). In many respects, the political and ideological approaches of this newly shaped movement overlapped with those of the *Yön* group. The NDR circle also believed that in a backward country like Turkey, the main struggle would be against imperialism and feudalism. Since the proletariat was too weak as a class, revolutionary change could only be carried out by a broad national front of all the exploited social classes and groups, including intellectuals, officers and the national bourgeoisie. This revolution directed against landowners and compradors would be of a national and democratic character, not a socialist one. However, there were differences among the NDR movement and *Yön* regarding the methods of taking power. While *Yön* mainly advocated a coup led by intellectuals and officers, adherents of the NDR movement preferred an armed

guerrilla struggle. The national-democratic revolution movement formed itself first around a weekly called *Türk Solu* (The Turkish Left), which was accompanied then by a monthly magazine, *Sosyalist Aydınlık* (Socialist Enlightenment).[16] The leading figure of the movement was Mihri Belli, a former member of the Turkish Communist Party. Under his leadership, the NDR movement became one of the most significant socialist factions in Turkey, grown in membership especially among university students.

The NDR strategy, like the *Yön* strategy, believed in the impossibility of carrying out national liberation and attaining political power by electoral means within a multi-party system. Belli (1970: 194), sharing a similar view with Avcıoğlu, asserted that in the reactionary parliamentary system of Turkey, believing that a party could carry out change by electoral methods was an illusion. The establishment of the multi-party regime had unfolded as a counter-revolutionary attempt aimed at strengthening imperialist exploitation and domination (Belli, 1970: 239). For Belli and his followers, the aim of the implementation of the parliamentary system in Turkey was to give the impression that Turkey was a democratic country. But somehow, the representatives of the imperialists and their collaborators won all of the elections. The laboring people were so conditioned that they did not vote for their representatives but for those of their exploiters (*Türk Solu*, 1969c). Belli (1969) held that "bourgeois parliamentarism" in Turkey, which was closed to the left and open to the right, suited only to the interests of the conservative elements.

The NDR movement from the end of 1969 onwards experienced inevitable

[16] *Türk Solu* started publication on 17 November 1967 and continued until 14 April 1970. Among its contributors there were publicly known figures like Life Senator Suphi Karaman, ex-Senator Niyazi Ağırnaslı, İlhami Soysal, Uğur Mumcu, İlhan Selçuk, Aziz Nesin, Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, Reşat Fuat Baraner, Şevki Akşit, Erdoğan Başar, Muzaffer Erdost, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Küpeli, Şahin Alpay, Cengiz Çandar, Doğu Perinçek (for more information, see Landau, 1974: 75-79). The theoretical monthly, *Sosyalist Aydınlık*, began to be published in 1968. Its contributors included names like Mihri Belli, Muzaffer Erdost, Vahap Erdoğdu, Mahir Çayan, Şahin Alpay, Doğu Perinçek, Halil Berktay.

splits. The newly shaped organizations, established after these splits, mainly rested upon the university students. Students became the most militant and active element of the socialist movement in Turkey in this period. In the mid-sixties, the leftist students began to organize under the *Fikir Klüpleri Federasyonu* (Federation of Idea Clubs), backed by the WPT. However, in the late sixties, the Idea Clubs changed not only their name but also the very character of their political perspective. In the autumn of 1969, the *Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu* (Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey), briefly *Dev-Genç*, was established, with the NDR strategy as its ideological and political platform. For the adherents of *Dev-Genç*, the main revolutionary task became a national democratic revolution. From 1970 onwards, the youth groups around *Dev-Genç* decided to establish their own independent political organizations under the leadership of their own leaders.

The first split occurs in the NDR movement at the end of the 1969 with the break of a group of activists from *Sosyalist Aydınlık*, under the leadership of Doğu Perinçek and Şahin Alpay. This pro-Maoist group began to publish its own monthly, *Proleter Devrimci Aydınlık* (Proletarian Revolutionary Enlightenment), trying to implement Maoist teaching into Turkish conditions, and propagating a national-democratic revolution, the fundamental force of which would be the peasantry. They tried to distinguish themselves from other factions with a very radical discourse, for instance, claiming that, "we reject any reformist or parliamentary ways. The power of the workers and peasants can be established only through revolution and can be born only from the muzzle of a gun" (quoted in Lipovsky, 1991: 103). This split was followed by other splits in the early seventies, leading to the establishment of new organizations, with more radical discourses and strategies, led by figures like Mahir Çayan, Deniz Gezmiş, İbrahim Kaypakkaya. In the deepening political crisis and the

growing social conflicts, these new groups decided that political agitation was not enough by itself and came to the conclusion that an armed guerilla struggle was needed to carry out the national democratic revolution. All the NDR supporters agreed that a regime change in Turkey could only be brought about by armed force. However, those newly shaped organizations were the most eager to put this strategy into practice. From 1970 onwards the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu*), led by Deniz Gezmiş, and the People's Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (*Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi*), led by Mahir Çayan, the Turkish Communist Party- Marxist/Leninist (*Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marksist/Leninist*), led by İbrahim Kaypakkaya, began guerilla warfare. The state reacted to these guerilla groups with massive repression. On 12 March 1971, military regime took power. The embryonic guerilla groups were crushed, putting a bloody end to the romantic attempts of a generation.

Considering *Yön* and the NDR movement, the other most important political force of the Turkish left in the 1960's was the WPT. Actually, when comparing the WPT with the others, it can be said that the WPT was the main legal party of the left and it served as a "laboratory" (Zürcher, 2005: 247) for the Turkish socialists. The establishment of the WPT was an important milestone in Turkish political life. For the first time in Turkish history socialist ideas found formal representation in the parliament (see, Karpat, 1967: 171; and Ahmad, 1977: 187).[17] In spite of its limited weight in the parliament, the party played an important role as part of the opposition and changed the very character of the political debate. It introduced class politics, an ideological dimension absent among parties which differed in emphasis rather than in substance (Ahmad, 1977: 192).

[17] For the WPT see also, Aybar (1988); Aren (1993); Ünsal (2002); Landau (1974: 122-70); Lipovsky (1992: 11-82); Aydınoğlu (2007: 87-139).

For the advocates of the WPT, the main task of the Turkish socialists was not a national democratic revolution but a socialist transformation (which, of course, would be carried out by democratic and constitutional means). And proponents of the party gave the leading role in the revolutionary movement to the Turkish working class. They did not accept the view held by *Yön* and the NDR circle, that the proletariat of the country was politically immature. But the differences between the WPT's strategy and those of the NDR movement and the *Yön* group at the rhetorical level were not actually so much big in reality. Looking at the program of the WPT, it can be said that the party's objectives closely resembled those promoted by *Yön* and the NDR movement. The supporters of the NDR strategy often argued that the WPT's strategy was in practice very similar to their demands.[18]

There were serious political differences between the main socialist groups of the 1960's regarding the methods of taking political power. The distinguishing feature of the WPT, in this sense, was its insistence on parliamentary methods. The leaders of the WPT clearly stated, from the very beginning, their intention to follow the constitution and democratic ways and to act within a legal framework to reach their political aims. This intention was clearly expressed in the official party literature. In the party program (TİP, 1964a: 69), it was asserted that the WPT "comes to power by democratic electoral methods. By rejecting the exploitation of man by man, remaining loyal to basic human rights and freedoms, it remains in and is removed from the power by elections."

The WPT leadership described non-parliamentary strategies of the *Yön* group and the NDR movement as petty bourgeoisie claims, since socialism could be

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[18] Belli (1970: 123), for instance, argues that "the WPT program is generally a program of national-democratic revolution. Even if this program is fully realized, Turkey will become not a socialist but an independent and democratic state." For similar statements see also, Erdost (1969: 86-89).

built neither by military coups nor by guerilla strategies. For the other leftist groups (the NDR movement and the *Yön* circle), the preparation of the working class and its allies for power, the increase of their hegemony in domestic politics and the gradual attainment of power by these classes (through getting organized, learning through struggle, raising consciousness in a political organization) was a long, slow, useless way. According to the WPT, supporters of the non-parliamentary strategies wrongly believed that revolutionary intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin, students and the cadres of revolutionary officers, had the force to carry out a revolution and to build socialism. By resting upon these forces, the proponents of non parliamentary strategies desired to find a short-cut and a rapid way to obtain political power (Boran, 1975: 101). The WPT leadership chose to struggle within the framework of the constitution, and believed that, within this framework, the transition from capitalism to socialism could be realized in a peaceful and democratic way. Mehmet Ali Aybar (1968: 600), the chairman of the party, repeatedly asserted that, "Our constitution is, with no doubt, open to socialism... Our constitution with its understanding of state, social order, with its revolutionary character and with its principle based on *Kuvay-ı Milliyecilik* is in favor of the people and labor. For all of these reasons, it is open to socialism and closed to grasping (*kaptıkaçtı*) capitalism." The leaders of the party believed that the WPT would develop into a mass party and come to power through parliamentary elections.

The WPT was established on 13 February 1961 by a group of trade union leaders who believed that a political party represented in the parliament could promote and safeguard the interests of the workers (see, Aren, 1992: 31). On 1 February 1962 Mehmet Ali Aybar was offered the leadership of the WPT. After this date, the party entered into a new phase during which it developed into a socialist

party and became an active political force in the rest of the 1960s.

From the first national congress of the WPT held in İzmir in 1964, to its fourth congress in Ankara in 1970, the party's strategy and political orientation had always been an issue of controversy among its ranks. The first serious dispute within the ranks of the WPT occured between the party leadership and the proponents of the NDR strategy. In spite of the enduring opposition of the supporters of the NDR line, the party adopted the strategy of the indivisibility of the national-democratic and socialist tasks and made this strategy its official policy in the second half of the 1960s (TİP, 1966b: 6).

This dispute was followed by other factional controversies in the party. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 deepened and accelerated the political and ideological rifts within the party leadership. Aybar spoke out against the intervention of the Soviet armed forces. His protest against the invasion also gave him the chance to express his understanding of socialism. He clearly advocated a non-authoritarian, democratic socialism (for Aybar and his understanding of socialism, see, Ünlü, 2002; Doğan, 2005). Aybar was accused by the other party leaders, like Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, of adopting new non-scientific theories on socialism. The crisis beginning with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops was intensified by the failure of the WPT in the 1969 elections. The struggle between the two factions of the party resulted with Aybar's resignation from the position of party chairman and his replacement by Boran in 1970. After the 12 March memorandum, on 20 July 1971, the WPT was closed down and most of the party leaders were arrested. Following the normalization of the political life following the general elections of 1973, the socialist movement became active again. In this new political atmosphere, the party was formed again under the leadership of Behice

Boran and officially established on 1 May 1975. However, the new WPT, having lost its ideological and political hegemony and authority over the entire Turkish left, turned into one of the small sects of the 1970s.

The 12 March military intervention led to a temporary retreat of Turkish socialist movement. The interregnum that started with the military intervention ended in 1974, when the new RPP-led coalition government, which came to power after the general elections of October 1973, granted an amnesty to the political prisoners of the 12 March intervention. This date also marked the beginning of a new period in the history of Turkish socialist movement, which lasted until the next military coup on 12 September 1980. Although there was continuity, the socialist movement of the 1960s was different from that of 1970s in terms of organizational and programmatic orientations. The left in the 1970s "mutated into a wild variety of groups and sects, much more diverse and complex than in the 1960s" (Samim, 1987: 161). 1970s were characterized by deep rifts and splits, reflecting the alignment of socialist movement at the international level in the same period. The sharpening of the ideological fragmentation of political life and the rise of political violence in Turkey in the 1970s radically differentiated the two decades from each other. The agenda of the socialists of the 1960s was anti-imperialism and to build up and lead broad national fronts against imperialism. Anti-imperialism left its place in the 1970s to anti-fascism. The calls for fighting against fascism and building up anti-fascist populist fronts appeared as the basic preoccupations of socialist activity in the seventies.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, a concise history of the left in the late Ottoman era and the Republican Turkey, from the very beginning of the 20th century to the 12 March 1971 military intervention, has been presented. In this account, the focus has been on the general characteristics of the Turkish left and differences among its main factions in the sixties, with an emphasis on basic features of the political climate of the period. This background information will help us to navigate in the next chapters, while investigating the Turkish left's experience with nationalism in the 1960s. In the following three chapters, the nature of this experience and its different aspects and manifestations will be elaborated. The investigation of the relationship between nationalism and socialism in the Turkish context will start first with scrutinizing the political nature of the relationship in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 5

TURKISH SOCIALISTS' POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF ARTICULATING SOCIALISM WITH NATIONALISM

5.1 Introduction

One of the most important features of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s was the deepening rift among different parts of the movement. The fierce polemics on political strategies and programmatic issues deepened the rifts between the main factions of the movement. Although different divisions and factions of the left in the 1960s differed from each other on several major issues like methods of attaining political power and interpreting the social and economic conditions of Turkey, they also shared many common features, and nationalism being the most important one.

Nationalism in this study has been perceived as a modern phenomenon and as something related primarily with politics. In this sense, John Breuilly's analysis of the concept of nationalism provides us with some important insights to grasp the nature of the Turkish left's use of nationalism. For Breuilly, offering a political definition of the concept, nationalism "is used to refer to political movements

seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments." And nationalist ideology as a political doctrine is built upon three claims:

a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character
b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
c) The nation must be as independent as possible. (Breuilly, 1993: 2)

The political power of nationalism, in this definition, is based on its ability to create mass support, bring different social groups together and provide an underlying rationale for their separate social interests. Nationalist doctrine also "performs the functions of social mobilization, political coordination and ideological legitimation" (Smith, 1998: 84). In this picture, nationalists using the nationalist doctrine for their political ends "celebrate themselves rather than some transcendent reality, whether this be located in another world or in a future society, although the celebration also involves a concern with transformation of present reality" (Breuilly, 1993: 64). But it should also be noted that, although it is useful and illuminating, Breuilly's political definition of nationalism, to a great extent, neglects economic, cultural and discursive dimensions of nationalism (for a critique of Breuilly's analysis see, Smith, 1998: 89-92). Moreover, nationalism as a political ideology, also, is always open to new alterations and adjustments. It provides a discursive medium in which politics can be articulated with other realms.

In this study, although I will try to scrutinize the modes of the relationship between socialism and nationalism in the Turkish context at several interrelated levels, that is to say, political, economic and discursive/cultural levels, the emphasis will be on the political one. In this chapter, I will focus mostly on the political nature of the relationship between socialism and nationalism. Other aspects of the story (and their relation with the political side) will be elaborated in detail in the following

chapters. In this chapter, I will, first, argue that the type of socialism endorsed in Turkey in the 1960s was Third World socialism; it was understood basically as nation's liberation. Secondly, I will investigate the idea of nation's liberation in the Turkish context. I will, then, evaluate the Turkish socialists' understanding of nation and nationalism. Lastly, I will look at Turkish socialists' experience with the notions of nation and nationalism through the Kurdish and Cyprus questions.

5.2 Third World Socialism: Socialism as Nation's Liberation

For the leading intellectuals of the Turkish left of the 1960s, the post-colonial era following the Second World War was the age of socialism and national liberation and of the dissolution of the colonial system and the retreat of imperialism in the Third World. According to Turkish socialists, the ethos of the age could only be understood through the notions of nationalism and socialism. 20th century was the age of social and national revolutions. For instance, Doğan Avcıoğlu, as one typical representative and observer of that ethos, writes in *Yön* (*Yön*, 1965a) that "if one significant reality of our epoch is nationalism, the other is socialism. Today, as it was yesterday, the concept of nation is the ideological pillar of revolutionaries. Today's revolutions either have socialist qualities or are national liberation revolutions… In our epoch, the flag of nationalism should be raised by revolutionaries and socialists."[1]

In their account of the history of the 20th century, imperialism had a central place, the emergence of which at the turn of the 19th century gave an end to classical liberal capitalism of the 19th century and led to the imperialist-capitalist system

[1] For similar comments see also, Avcıoğlu (1967b); Belli (1969b); Belli (1970: 282-309); Aybar (1968: 354-5).

which is characterized with a dramatic increase in the internationalization and monopolization of capital. In their depiction of the 20th century as the age of imperialism, the period, beginning with the First World War and closing with the end of the Second World War, was portrayed as an important interregnum that prepared the historical stage for the emergence of socialist Second World and the Third World. For many Turkish leftist intellectuals, however, the emergence of the Third World which was result of the break up of the colonial system under the pressure of national liberation movements against colonial and imperial domination in Asia, Africa and Latin America was deserved to be defined as the most significant development of this period of turmoil, which put its mark on the post-world war period and dramatically changed and shaped the whole pattern of international relations. National liberation revolutions abandoning their subordinate position vis-à-vis socialist revolutions were now becoming a primary active element of the whole revolutionary process all over the world. As the logical conclusion of this argument, the triumph of successive national liberation struggles in the Third World after 1945 was considered to be the signal of the shift of historical center of socialism and nationalism from the West to the East and the South. Although socialism had lost its former attraction in the West, it was now gaining an immense popularity in Asia, Africa and Latin America.[2]

The identification of the era following the Second World War with the rise of national liberation movements of the Third World and their glorification by Turkish socialists of the sixties was, quite a certain extent, the reflection of the Third

[2] For Turkish left's analysis of international affairs (with a special emphasis on the Third World) after the Second World War see, for instance, Avcıoğlu (1962h); Avcıoğlu (1967b); Aydemir (1963a); Aydemir (1963c); Belli (1970: 200-2); TİP (1966a: 3-6); Aybar (1968: 345-6, 354-6, 620-1); Naci (1965a: 5-19); Hilav and Naci (1963).

Worldist orthodoxy which became very popular in the same period all over the world. The national liberation struggles aiming at a full political and economic independence were perceived by many radical intellectuals as progressive movements for revolutionary change in the Third World, as the initial stages of a long transition to socialism on the fringes of the world. This perception was based essentially on the analysis of neocolonialism as a new form of imperialist enslavement and exploitation. According to this analysis, former mechanisms of direct colonial domination were replaced by new imperialist methods of domination, which were concealed this time in the form of relations of economic (and political and military) dependence. The new mechanisms of imperialism aimed to keep the underdeveloped countries of the Third World within the orbit of world capitalist system, to continue the exploitation, and to hamper the progress of the oppressed people and the underdeveloped countries towards national liberation, economic and social progress and socialism. Imperialism now assumed new forms of domination. In this new context, political independence by itself was not enough to provide a complete and genuine independence and was not sufficient to solve the immediate social and economic problems of developing countries. It should continue to abolish pre-capitalist structures, to carry out a land reform, to build up a national economy and a national industry. The movement for political recognition and independence should be accompanied with the demand of national economic liberation and independence. The process beginning with the stage of gaining political independence and building up national states should be fortified and continued by a struggle for national economic and social emancipation from imperialism.

The question was about which path the backward and dependent countries should follow in order to overcome their problems of economic and social

underdevelopment and to reduce dependence on imperialism. The Third Worldist ethos of the period developed its alternative theories of development for Third World societies. Most of these theories proposed a "third way" between capitalism and socialism, which was supposed to bypass capitalism and evolve gradually into socialism. The source of inspiration of the "third way" strategies adopted by socialists and radical intellectuals in Turkey and many other Third World countries of the post-Second World War period were Soviet or Maoist type of explanations like "national democracy", "non-capitalist development"[3], "new democracy"[4]. The common suggestion of these formulations was a transitional stage, a "bridge", between the initial phases of national liberation and the phase of socialist construction, which, in most cases, resulted in the glorification and idealization of the transitional stage itself. The alternative "third way" was developed as a way of

[3] The Soviet state and academia was the principal source of the official formulations of stagism for the national liberation movements of the Third World. The idea of the "non-capitalist way" (and "national democracy") formulated and popularized by names like Ulyanovsky, Solodovnikov in the 1960s and early 1970s was concerned with the possibility of the gradual transition of the underdeveloped Third World countries to socialism through a transitory stage, without entering into capitalist path of development. For the proponents of the theory, the alternative to capitalism on the periphery of the world was the non-capitalist path. This path "is a whole transitional stage in itself, a multistage progressive revolutionary process of carrying out anti-imperialist and democratic transformations that step by step bring a country up to the point of building a socialist society" (Solodovnikov and Bogoslovsky, 1975). See also, Ulyanovsky, (75-99); Ulyanovsky (1984: 12-26); Solodovnikov, (1973: 6-63); Gordon (1984: 91-126); Khoros (1984: 127-178). For critical appraisals see, Thomas (1978: 17-37); Löwy (1981: 196-198); Hosseinzadeh (1989: 30-57).

[4] In his work "On New Democracy", Mao outlined a new historical stage suitable to the immediate needs of backward (semi-colonial, semi-feudal) countries like China, a historical stage which is neither bourgeois nor socialist, but designed as a necessary step to prepare the way to the construction of socialism in the Third World. Mao placed the Chinese Revolution in the category of democratic revolution focused on national liberation, national economic development and consolidation of a national state, led by a coalition of different classes, and directed against imperialism and its internal allies. Mao (1967: 16-17, 28) writes: "This new-democratic republic will be different from the old European-American form of capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship, which is the old democratic form and already out of date. On the other hand, it will also be different from the socialist republic of the Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat which already flourishing in the USSR … However, … this form is not suitable for the revolutions in the colonial and semi-colonial countries …Therefore, a third form of a state must be adopted in the revolutions of all colonial and semi-colonial countries, namely the new-democratic republic. This form suits a certain historical period and is therefore transitional; nevertheless, it is a form which is necessary and cannot be dispensed with." And, "without doubt, the present revolution is the first step, which will develop into the second step, that of socialism, at a later date… But today is not yet the time to introduce socialism. The present task of the revolution in China is to fight imperialism and feudalism, and socialism is out of the question until this task is completed." On the concept "New Democracy" see also, Hoston (1994: 369-380); Löwy (1981: 115-130); Dirlik (2005: 78-85).

transition to socialism in the Third World where indigenous capitalism was not developed, social stratification was weak and pre-capitalist forms of production relations and forces were predominant. The degree of economic and social development in backward countries of the Third World made an immediate and complete socialist transformation impossible in those countries. But, they did not have to choose a capitalist way of development either; they could instead enter, without experiencing the hardships of capitalism, into a "third" path, a transitional, preparatory stage which would allow those societies to initiate an independent and rapid national development strategy. The historical aim of this stage was to create the material preconditions for the further transformation of backward societies and to prepare the ground for building socialism.

The proponents of "third way" strategy championed its ideology of national revolutionary democracy as a form of Third World socialism which was claimed to be successful in combining the socialist ideals with national ideological traditions of Third World countries. This strategy brought together different classes, social groups and strata behind the politics of creating a genuine political and economic independence, implementing a rapid national development, and struggling against imperialism and its non-national internal allies, that is to say, comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords.

In the age of imperialism, according to this strategy, the leader of the national liberation against feudalism and imperialist oppression was not any longer the bourgeois class. A bourgeoisie appearing very late on the historical scene was incapable of providing a democratic and revolutionary solution to the problems created by feudalism and imperialism. In the age of imperialism, it was argued, the bourgeois class was a conservative force and lost its revolutionary character.

The anti-imperialist, national revolutionary democracy was supposed to be based on a broad, national anti-imperialist front composed of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, radical and patriotically minded military and civil bureaucrats and intellectuals and, in most cases, even national bourgeoisie. The primary struggle in the Third World context, it was claimed, took place not between working class and the bourgeoisie, but between an entire nation (and its representatives) and imperialism (and its non-national domestic allies). Because of the special social and economic conditions pertained in the backward countries, and because of the weakness of working class and bourgeoisie, the leadership of the national movement was mostly controlled by radical petty bourgeois elements (known also as intermediate elements) who were considered to be independent of and above social classes and supposed to represent the interests of a broad front of national anti-imperialist forces. In backward countries, "when a historical task faces a society and, the class that traditionally carries it out is absent, some other group of people… implements it." It is in such a historical condition that these intermediate elements appear as the leader and the unifier of the nation representing the interests of the whole nation as against conflicting sectional class interests. The members of this intermediate stratum "are great believers in efficiency, including efficiency in social engineering. They hope for reform from above and would dearly love to hand the new world over to a grateful people, rather than see the liberating struggle of a self-conscious and freely associated people result in a new world for themselves. They care for a lot of measures to drag their nation out of stagnation, but very little for democracy. They embody the drive for industrialization, for capital accumulation, for national resurgence" (Cliff, 2000: 45-46).[5]

It was in this specific historical environment that nationalism and socialism were begun to be identified with each other in the Third World context. Socialism in its Third Worldist version, in most cases, was equated with national goals of independence and development. This socialism expressed itself through the categories of nationalism. In this model, national and social questions were perceived as closely interrelated issues. The logical basis of this articulation of nationalism with socialism was the claim that national goals can not be separated from demands for social revolution in the Third World.

What we see in this specifically new type of socialism is a reevaluation and revision of classical Marxian concepts and categories such as class, class interest, class struggle and their replacement with new categories such as people, nation, national ends, and national liberation struggle. The struggle of the underdeveloped countries and the oppressed people of the periphery with imperialism took the place of the class struggle between the working and capitalist classes. If an internal class analysis of a backward country was needed, in most cases, it was simply defined along the division between "those who opposed foreign influence, and those who supported it" (Harris, 1974: 185). The consequences of this revision were "the elevation of national over class struggle and the eclipsing of the proletariat by the people" (Dirlik, 2005: 45-46). Actually, underdeveloped and oppressed nations were given a proletarian character; the nation itself in the Third World came to be understood as a proletarian nation. Since all the people living within the borders of underdeveloped nations of Third World were sharing the same poverty, the aim of the struggle for these people was to liberate their nations from foreign oppressors and their non-national domestic allies.

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[5] For a similar evaluation of the role of this intermediate stratum in the Third World see also, Harris (1970: 20-29).

The Turkish left of the 1960s, like their counterparts on the other parts of the periphery of the world, was under the spell of the same Third Worldist ethos. They believed in the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the period that the main struggle that would liberate all oppressed and laboring people of the world was taking place between the industrialized, developed, imperialist countries of the Western capitalism and formerly colonized or semi-colonized underdeveloped peoples and countries of the East and the South. And in this picture, Turkey was portrayed as a Third World country. Avcıoğlu (1965b), for instance, typically was arguing that "today, in many countries, billions of people have been giving a struggle against imperialism. A 'Third World' has been emerging. The place of Turkey, which carried out the first successful independence struggle against imperialism under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, is among the ranks of Third World countries and peoples."[6]

This Third Worldist ethos was strongly reflected in the leftist publications of the 1960s in Turkey. Leading leftist periodicals of the period such as *Yön*, *Sosyal Adalet*, *Turk Solu*, *Ant* were regularly devoting pages and columns to the news and debates about the revolts and national liberation movements in the Third World, their experiences and problems, preparing serials for presenting Third Worldism and its leading international figures.[7] This interest in the Third World affairs was not limited

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[6] For a very similar remark, see also, Avcıoğlu (1966a); TİP (1966a: 6).

[7] From its foundation onwards, *Yön* had always been a platform for discussing the experiences of national liberation and socialism in the Third World from Egypt, Algeria, and Ghana to India, China, Indonesia and Cuba. Pages reserved for world affairs were mostly devoted to the developments in the Third World. These topics were among the usual subject matters of the leading writers of the paper. See, for instance, Avcıoğlu (1966a); Avcıoğlu (1962f); Selçuk (1962c). Those articles were always complemented with series about the Third World experiences. See, for instance, the series by Fethi Naci, titled as "Üçüncü Dünya Konuşuyor", which began to be published in *Yön* in the issue, no.81 (16 October 1964); or the serial by Niyazi Berkes about the experiences of Arab countries, which began to be issued in *Yön* in no.157 (1 April 1966) with the title "Arap Dünyası Uyanıyor mu?" A very similar picture can also be found in other leftist papers and periodicals of the period.

to the periodicals or papers only; but it also included the book translation and publication efforts of the leftist publishers. Publishing houses like *Yön*, *Gerçek*, *Ant*, *Sol* under the editorials of the leftist intellectuals of the time like Doğan Avcıoğlu, Fethi Naci, Doğan Özgüden, İlhan Erdost were translating and publishing books about neo-imperialism/colonialism, underdevelopment, experiences of national liberation movements in the Third World countries like China, Cuba, Algeria, Vietnam, Palestine.[8]

As I have already argued, the historical and intellectual sources of Turkish left's engagement with nationalism in the sixties cannot be understood without taking international context of the post-colonial period into consideration. Turkish socialists were not unique in their attempt at reconciling nationalism with socialism. They borrowed most of their conceptual instruments from abroad. But, an analysis of the modes of articulating nationalism with socialism in the Turkish context can also give us many hints about the internal sources of this articulation. Especially, the re-invention of Kemalism (left-Kemalism) in a new context helped those efforts of blending nationalism with principles of socialism. The following sections will also focus on this internal source.

5.3 The Idea of Nation's Liberation in the Turkish Context

The "third way" strategy was strongly echoed in the ranks of socialists of Turkey in the 1960s. Socialists' evaluation of the various strategies of revolution in Turkey in terms of social structure triggered harsh debates within the leftist intellectual community of the 1960s. They all developed their own different and

[8] For these type of book translation and publication efforts see, for example, d'Encausse and Schram (1966); Jalée (1965); Naci (1965a); Bravo (1969); Guevara (1968); Mao (1967).

contesting strategies of radical transformation of Turkish society.[9] Despite the differences and divisions between the main factions of the Turkish left, the *Yön* group, the NDR movement, and WPT, they were, in one way or another, under the hegemony of the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the post-Second World War period. For them, the immediate tasks of the Turkish left were to achieve a national integrity, independence and rapid development. They were all attracted by "third way" strategies and "stagism" and, in certain extents, adopted them to their political programs. Socialism was understood by them as nation's liberation from foreign oppressors and their domestic allies. They all conceptualized (or invented) their understanding of national liberation as a continuation and complement of the first national liberation war of 1919-1922 led by Mustafa Kemal.[10] We will now look at how they comprehend national liberation and "third way" strategies in the Turkish context.

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[9] For an evaluation of those different strategies from the perspective of an contemporary observer of the period see, Muzaffer Sencer (1969: 7-42).

[10] The claim of the historical continuity with the first national liberation war of 1919-1922 had to be invented and re-invented by the Turkish leftist intellectuals in the new historical conditions of the 1960s. In the analysis of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983: 2), invented traditions were defined as "responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition." This attempt at inventing Kemalism as a leftist ideology in the 1960s, if we use the terminology of Hobsbawm and Ranger, tried to be achieved by references to a suitable historic past (in this case, the Turkish national liberation war led by Mustafa Kemal) with the aim of implying continuity with that specific past. They utilized every possible way to associate the years of independence war and early republic as an important part of their political tradition. They implied this historical continuity in their political programs, in their discourses and in their iconography. The typical example of strategies "which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition" was the glorification of the national days at every occasion, but in a different way from the official attempts. It was common in those years to encounter with commemoration articles about the national days in the leading socialist magazines of the period. See, for instance, some related articles from, *Turk Solu*: Kıvılcımlı (1968); Karaman (1968); *Türk Solu* (1969b); Satlıgan (1969); *Türk Solu* (1969d). All these articles had common themes like foreign influence, imperialism, anti-imperialism and independence. They likened their time to the first year of the Turkish national liberation war, 1919, the year in which the country was still under the foreign occupation but, national resistance was sparked off. They all perceived and presented their political activity as a continuation of the Independence War of 1919-22. One of the influential and symbolic activities, in this sense, of the left in Turkey in the sixties was the alternative 10 November commemoration initiated by the leading figures of the revolutionary student movements in 1968 and organized in the form of a long independence march from Samsun to Ankara. For this march see, Çandar (1968) and *Türk Solu* (1968).

5.3.1 The *Yön* Group

"National Democracy" (*Milli Demokrasi*) idea of the *Yön* group was the most typical example of adapting "third way" strategies into Turkish context. National democracy, for Avcıoğlu (1967c), was a political regime, which was neither capitalist nor socialist, but aiming a complete political and economic independence. National democracy was different from both bourgeois democracy and socialist democracy. In bourgeois democracy, the holder of power was bourgeoisie and, in socialist democracy, the working class held the power. National democracy, on the other hand, rejecting dictatorial and despotic methods, was a mixed type representing all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces of the society (Avcıoğlu, 1965c).

The question was how underdeveloped countries like Turkey would progress into socialism. Avcıoğlu claimed that the post-war period provided a fertile ground and new opportunities for the backward countries of the Third World to enter into the path proceeding gradually towards socialism. The logic of the age, according to Avcıoğlu, obligated national liberation revolutions of the Third World to go beyond the limits of classical bourgeois democratic revolutions. In its classical form, bourgeois democratic revolution envisages a transition from feudal to capitalist society, through which bourgeoisie eliminates feudal classes by changing agrarian structures and pursues industrialization by following a capitalist path of development. But, the weak bourgeoisie class in underdeveloped countries of the Third World does not have any power to implement a land reform or to initiate an economic development and industrialization (Avcıoğlu, 1965c). According to this argument, the formation of nations and nationalism in the Third World follows a different pattern from the emergence of those in Western capitalist countries.

Imperialism hampers economic development on the periphery of the world. The target of social struggle in those countries is directed outside of their borders towards imperialism. For Avcıoğlu, this was the reason of difference between classical bourgeois national revolution and contemporary national liberation revolution. The former one removes basically the internal feudal obstacles that hinder capitalist development whereas the latter one, while giving a national struggle against imperialism, provides a strategy of solving the developing countries' age-old backwardness and a gradual progress towards socialism (Avcıoğlu, 1967b).

What made such a transition to socialism theoretically possible in the Third word context was the political program based on strategies like "non-capitalist development" and "national democracy". This program chooses a non-capitalist path of development, but it is not anti-capitalist since it does not aim at eliminating the whole capitalist production relations. It tolerates non-monopolistic private enterprises to a certain extent and it does not preclude an immediate construction of socialism. Although this strategy of creating an independent national economy does not presuppose the immediate creation of socialism, it will, however, create suitable and fruitful conditions for a gradual transition to socialism (Avcıoğlu, 1967b).

According to *Yön*'s perspective, without eliminating feudalism, changing agricultural structures, constructing heavy industry, increasing level of production and letting the working class to develop, starting to build up socialism is an illusion in the underdeveloped countries. But, it is also not necessary to go through the stage of capitalist development in order to proceed towards socialism. A transitional stage which would bypass capitalist way of development is the shortest way for preparing the ground for the conditions suitable to the construction of socialism (Avcıoğlu, 1962i). Third World countries entering the path of development very late had no

choice but to adopt a strategy of non-capitalist development (Avcıoğlu, 1962j).

This was the strategy that the *Yön* group wanted to implement in Turkey. Turkey was a backward agrarian country, which had not been able to carry out its bourgeois revolution in the classical age of capitalism, involving the tasks of the liquidation of feudal relations and advancement of capitalist ones. The main agenda of socialists of Turkey, in the age of imperialism, was to wage an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal national struggle. The primary task was to achieve political and economic independence, and all other issues besides this cause were secondary. But, independence could not be achieved if radical economic and social reforms were not implemented. For this purpose, according to the *Yön* argument, the dependency relations with imperialist centers must be broken and the non-national domestic allies of imperialism must be defeated. At this moment of the struggle, it is argued, national and social contents of anti-imperialist struggle overlaps. That is to say, the anti-imperialist national struggle, since shaking the basis of capitalist system and presuming radical social and economic reforms based on a populist and statist outlook, has, at the same time, a social content.

The *Yön* group understood socialism as a natural consequence and complement of Ataturkism based on principles of populism, statism, revolutionism, laicism, republicanism and nationalism. Socialism, Avcıoğlu (1962j) argued, was the way of developing and advancing the reforms and principles of Ataturk. Turkish socialism, in this sense, was a continuation of our first National Liberation War which was waged with the purpose of building up a populist regime and elevating Turkish nation to the level of Western civilization (*Yön*, 1963). The *Yön* leadership believed that the national liberation movement that started under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was not completed yet. Kemalist Revolution was deflected from its

original national liberationist path especially after the transition from one-party regime to multi-party system after 1945. This process culminated in the victory of the reactionary forces, feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie. Turkey in the 1960s was still at the stage of national liberation revolution. The task of the nationalist-revolutionaries in Turkey of the 1960s was, according to Avcıoğlu (see, Avcıoğlu, 1969: 740-43; Avcıoğlu, 1970), to continue and complete the unfinished tasks of Kemalist national liberation revolution: gaining economic and political independence and achieving a high level of economic development. If the national liberation movement in Turkey was not completed, it would not then be possible to proceed towards socialism (Avcıoğlu, 1962i).

For the *Yön* movement, the backward social and economic structures and conditions of the country would not allow the working class to be the leading and hegemonic force of the national revolutionary front. Moreover, since the primary contradiction in Turkey was taking place between the nation and the imperialism and its domestic allies, the national liberation struggle in Turkey had to be carried out by a broad national liberation front consisting of all democratic and patriotic forces (Avcıoğlu, 1962i). Anti-imperialist struggle was a national struggle that should embrace whole nation comprising workers, peasants, intellectuals, the youth, middle classes, and national bourgeoisie. Intellectuals, civil and military bureaucrats, the university youth, although this intermediate stratum does not constitute a class when considered within the economic terms, were seen as dynamic and pivotal forces of the national front (Avcıoğlu, 1962i; see also, *Devrim*, 1970).

To sum up, the Yön circle believed that the main contemporary duty of Turkish socialists was to wage an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. At this poor level of economic development of the country, the path of socialism, it was

claimed, was passing through democratic national revolution. What was needed was a broad national-liberation front that would embrace all patriots of the country (Avcıoğlu, 1962i).

5.3.2 The NDR Movement

The idea of achieving a socialist transformation through a series of successive revolutionary phases can also be observed in the political propositions of the NDR movement which became one of the dominant factions of the radical left in Turkey in the second half of the 1960's. Like the *Yön* group, the NDR movement argued that the main struggle in Turkey should be against imperialism and feudalism. Accordingly, the proponents of the NDR strategy envisioned a two-stage transformation to socialism. The first stage would have a national and democratic content, which would then be followed by a second, socialist, revolution. The reason is simple: Turkey, being an underdeveloped country, was not ready economically and socially for an immediate socialist transformation. In the NDR strategies, Turkey was portrayed as a backward, dependent country within the imperialist world system, the development of which, like other underdeveloped Third World countries, hampered by Western imperialist powers and their domestic allies, i.e. comprador bourgeoisie and feudal usurpers (*feodal mütegallibe*). The arrival of these underdeveloped countries to the stage of socialist revolution can only be possible if these countries become truly independent and democratic, if they accomplish the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

Turkey as a backward country was not ready for a socialist transformation. But, Turkey should not also follow the Western model of economic and political development. The immediate aim of the NDR program was not to build up a socialist

Turkey, but to create an independent and democratic country, the making of which would, in turn, pave the way for a socialist revolution. The stage of national democratic revolution in the Third World countries which would implement a transitory third way development strategy, neither capitalist nor socialist, was seen necessary for the stage of socialist transformation (Belli, 1970: 197).

In the NDR strategy, the primary contradiction of the Turkish society takes place between the national forces of Turkey and the reactionary alliance of imperialism, comprador bourgeoisie and feudal usurpers. The domestic allies of Western imperialism are portrayed as the enemies of the nation. Their sole interests force them to take a deliberate non-national position and to make alliances with imperialism. Their non-national character manifests itself in the forms of different reactionary ideologies like cosmopolitanism, "ummahism" (*ümmetçilik*) and "caliphatism" (*hilafetçilik*) (Belli, 1970: 230-231). These classes deny all national values. On the one hand, they promote a religious reactionaryism, on the other hand, they spread Western cosmopolitanism, both of which threaten the very foundations of national integrity. Since they actually stand against any kind of transformation that would bring about a prosperous and decent life for Turkish people, they are not truly nationalist. Their use of words like nation, motherland, and democracy in their speeches does not mean anything; they are just empty rhetoric. In fact, they are against true patriotism which, according to Belli (1970: 20), presupposes a strong anti-imperialist and anti-feudal stance. He argues that our national independence and integrity which are under the constant attack of imperialist and feudal forces can only be protected by a NDR revolution. This revolution, Belli (1970: 30) argues, makes the nation sovereign over the territory it inhabits.

For the followers of the NDR strategy, the answer of the question of why

Turkey needed a new national liberation struggle was to be hidden in the recent history of the republic. After the victory of the first national liberation war of 1919-1922 and the establishment of the republic in 1923, a transformation was carried out under the hegemony of civil-military bureaucratic and intellectual stratum. But this transformation was not continued to its logical conclusions. It turned out to be an interrupted, superfluous revolution. Although it narrowed the sphere of influence of collaborators, retreated the feudal forces and structures at a certain extent, and elevated people of Turkey to a status of nation, it was not completed yet. Unfortunately, it mostly remained as a revolution at a super-structural level, a revolution in symbols and did not penetrate deep into the social and economic basis of the existing system. The other failure of the Kemalist revolution was its insistence on creating a national bourgeoisie and adopting a capitalist path of development. Their mistake was to ignore the fact that the path of capitalist development is closed to backward countries like Turkey in the age of imperialism (Belli, 1970: 90).

Belli argues that the years following 1945 were marked by an anti-Kemalist counter-revolution which was fortified in 1950 when the Democrat Party came to power. This counter-revolutionary attempt, the transition from one-party regime to multi-party system, was a betrayal to the revolutionary outcomes of the first national liberation war; it was also a betrayal to the legacy of Kemalism. This so called democratic transition was not a transition to democracy, since democracy did not mean elections and parliament. A true democratic transition (or revolution) involved the achievement of a full national independence and the dismantlement of all feudal social and economic structures. When it was looked at the issue from this perspective, the Turkey of 1930s, the climax of the Kemalist one-party regime, more deserved to be called democratic than the Turkey of the multi-party era. In this sense,

the former period was objectively more closed to socialism than the latter one (Belli, 1970: 40-41, 87-88). After the transition to multi-party system in Turkey, the reactionary coalition of comprador bourgeoisie, big land owners and feudal usurpers took the power from the Kemalist civil-military bureaucratic and intellectual stratum. Keeping Turkey as a dependent, underdeveloped country in the international imperialist system constituted the backbone of the counter-revolutionary program of the successive governments of the post-war period, a program which was supported by imperialism.

That was why Turkey, today, as it was yesterday, needed again a new national liberation war. But, who would be the motor force of the new liberation struggle? Belated development of capitalism and the persistence of feudal social and economic structures in backward countries like Turkey were interpreted by the NDR followers as the reason of the insignificance of class differentiation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the Turkish context. The adherents of the NDR movement argued that, since the proletariat was too weak as a class, revolutionary change could only be carried out by a broad national-democratic front of all national forces. The clash in this revolution would not occur between the working people and their exploiters, but between a broad front of national forces and non-national forces (i.e. compradors and feudal usurpers). The national front comprises all social classes, strata and groups in Turkey: working class, semi-proletarian elements, landless peasants, urban and rural middle classes, civil-military intellectual-bureaucratic elite, and national bourgeoisie.[11] In the NDR strategy, the question of who would lead the

[11] Belli considers the national bourgeoisie in the ranks of national-democratic front, and he carefully distinguishes it from the comprador bourgeoisie. He argues that as being a bourgeoisie of a backward, peripheral country and as also being oppressed by imperialism, the Turkish national bourgeoisie might play some certain revolutionary roles in the national-democratic struggle against imperialism and feudalism. But, at other times, Belli holds, the national bourgeoisie appears as a reactionary force unwilling to participate in a radical social and economic transformation and to break totally with the

national revolution was not clear enough. This was basically considered as a practical question. It was argued that the leadership would be acquired by any social force stronger and capable enough to win the hegemony during the revolution. Because of the weakness of the working class in the Turkish context, this leading force could be the "intermediate" groups, coming from a petty bourgeois origin, and consisting of radical and patriotically-minded officers, civil servants and intellectuals.

For the supporters of the NDR strategy, the petty-bourgeois class in the Third World countries played an important revolutionary role in the national-democratic revolutions of these countries. Without taking into consideration the progressive and revolutionary potential of radical petty-bourgeois strata in the Third World, one could not understand national-liberation movements led by Third World leaders like Mustafa Kemal, Nasser and Castro (Belli, 1970: 92). This new role of the intermediate stratum was explained by the rhetoric of 'new, unique historical conditions of our era.' In the age of imperialism, in the countries of belated capitalist development (and, of course, in the advanced capitalist countries), bourgeois class lost its historical revolutionary character (which manifested itself in the classical bourgeois revolutions of Western countries.) Since the bourgeoisie now feared any kind of national-democratic transition and its outcomes, it allied with feudal classes and imperialism. It was in this context that the petty-bourgeois stratum began to gain a radical democratic stance. During the 20th century, especially in the post-war era, the radicalization of the petty-bourgeois forces increased and a fusion of anti-imperialist nationalism with socialism began to take ground within the ranks of this class.

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world imperialist system. That is to say, this class has a double character as being both national and bourgeois, as being both revolutionary and reactionary. Belli, in this sense, considers the Turkish national bourgeoisie as a temporary, tactical ally which cannot lead the national-democratic revolution but should be won to the ranks of national-democratic front. See, Belli (1970) and Erdost (1969).

Bureaucratic and intellectual elites in Turkey, according to Belli, as the contemporary heir of the long Ottoman-Turkish state tradition, hold pivotal positions in the state machinery. They are the bearers of the legacy of the Ottoman modernizers of the 19th and early 20th centuries and the legacy of Kemalism. The situation of bureaucracy in Turkey has always been historically very different from the role of bureaucracy in Western European countries. In Europe, bureaucracy has basically represented the interests of the ruling classes. However, in Turkey and in some other underdeveloped countries, civil-military bureaucracy and intelligentsia have historically acted in a more autonomous and independent way in their relation to other social classes and appeared as democratic modernizers not hesitating to clash with the interests of the ruling classes. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the Kemalist revolution, the 27 May military coup are given the examples of the historical moments at which Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy appear as an independent political actor and marked its impact on the making of modern Turkish 'body politics' (Belli, 1970: 251).

According to the proponents of the NDR, what we witness in Turkey after the 1960 military coup was the rise of the political activity and influence of bureaucratic and intellectual elite, their radicalization, and their conversion to socialism. They were welcomed as the most conscious segment of the petty-bourgeois stratum (Belli, 1970: 16-19). Kemalism appeared as the basis of the revolutionary nationalist ideology of petty-bourgeois radicalism in Turkey. The NDR followers wholeheartedly approved the nationalism of these intermediate strata. It was claimed that this nationalism actually represented a revolutionary potential blending nationalist and anti-imperialist principles of Kemalism with the principles of socialism (Belli, 1970: 33). The NDR movement regarded the *Yön-Devrim* group as

the representative of the revolutionary nationalists and considered them as their closest political ally (Belli, 1970: 197-198; see also, Alpay, 1969: 450-452, 476-477). Belli (1970: 96) argues: "There are no impassible barriers between Kemalism and socialism. The biggest struggle of Atatürk was to inspire a Turkish national pride among the young generations. National pride is a positive faculty (emotion) which leads individual to socialism. The most firm socialist figures come to the idea of socialism through this path."

5.3.3 The WPT

According to the leading members of the WPT, the struggle for national liberation on the periphery of the world could not be separated from the task of constructing socialism. In the Third World, national liberation and socialism were like the two sides of the same coin; the fight for national liberation came to mean the fight for socialism (Aybar, 1968: 494). It was argued that this argument was also true for the Turkish case: national liberation against imperialism and its collaborators in Turkey in the sixties, which was crystallized in the form of the struggle against the US presence in Turkey, should also be understood as and be transformed into a struggle for socialism (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 465, 606). The completion of the national liberation in Turkey required the adaptation of a socialist orientation which, on the other hand, would fortify the political, economic and social basis of the national independence. So, in order to gain their national independence, the Turkish people had to embark on a national liberation struggle on the one hand, and engage in the task of the establishment of socialism on the other (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 443, 473, 494-495, 505).

The WPT also differed from the *Yön* group and the NDR movement in its

answer to the questions of from which classes and social groups the anti-imperialist, national-liberation front should be composed of and which classes and strata should lead this broad national front. The WPT was in agreement with other factions of the Turkish left in the strategy of forming a broad national front against imperialism and its collaborators. But, this national front should be led by the laboring people and their representatives. According to Aybar, such a national front, if it wants to be successful in its struggle against imperialism and its internal collaborators could not be led by petty-bourgeois strata. The anti-imperialist struggle should be carried out under the democratic leadership of the socialist party, the WPT. Moreover, for Aybar (1968: 505-506), there was no such category as national bourgeoisie in the Turkish society, so there could be no claim of considering national bourgeoisie as a part of anti-imperialist national front. Aybar believed that the concept of "national bourgeoisie" was an oxymoron, since the concept of capital had nothing in common with the concept of national, capital had no country. Aybar, in a sense, was reversing the famous motto of Marx in *The Communist Manifesto*, "working class has no country", and arguing that the working class, contrary to the bourgeoisie, was a national class in the Third World and the leading force of the national front against imperialism. Since capital had no country, so called "national bourgeoisie" was not a part of this national liberation front (Aybar, 1968: 604).

According to the most acute defender of the WPT's strategy of the indivisibility of national democratic and socialist tasks, Behice Boran (1968: 144-146, 271-274), the NDR and *Yön* strategy (which was originally formulated for countries where there was no working class or where it was weak) was not suitable for Turkey. Turkey might look like an underdeveloped country when compared to the developed capitalist countries of the West. But, it was also

different from many Asian, Latin American, and African countries in terms of the fact that Turkey had never been colonized, and had always been independent. From the first national liberation war of 1919-1922 onwards, Turkey had been undergoing bourgeois democratic reforms, a continuous development of capitalist relations, and the displacement of the vestiges of feudalism. In such circumstances, it was mistaken to talk about the need for the NDR strategy in Turkey. She (1968: 255) argued that "some would maintain that in present-day Turkey there is no democracy or freedom, that Turkey is without independence; therefore they contend that first of all the national-democratic revolution is necessary, and only then the socialist. We may ask those holding such view: What has happened in the course of half a century? If the national liberation struggle and the republican period were not a stage of the national democratic revolution, then what do they in fact represent?"

However, it was also the WPT leadership who argued that the main contradiction of Turkish society was between imperialism and its internal collaborators (the big bourgeoisie and landlords) on the one hand and all the laboring classes of the country on the other. On the one hand, the party argued that Turkey was developed enough to skip over the stage of the NDR. But, on the other hand, it was stated that, Turkey, like other underdeveloped countries, was a dependent country in the world imperialist system, destined to backwardness. The WPT's analysis about the chief contradiction of the Turkish society was the corollary of the proposition of the party sharing with the other factions of the Turkish left that the central antagonism of the period all over the world took place between imperialism and underdeveloped countries of the Third World (Aybar, 1968: 656-657). According to the WPT, in the classical period of capitalism, the

working class of the Western capitalist societies was the object of capitalist exploitation. However, in the imperialist era, the object of capitalist (and imperialist) exploitation was the backward countries of the Third World.

The contradiction between developed capitalist countries of the West and the backward countries of the Third World was the primary contradiction in the age of imperialism and neo-colonialism (Sarıca, 1966b: 9). This structural change in the world capitalist system shifted the epicenter of the revolution from the West to the East. In this new era, the prime revolutionary force appears to be the national liberation struggles of underdeveloped countries against imperialism and its internal collaborators (Sarıca, 1966b: 11). In this sense, even the WPT could not manage to escape from the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the period.

The WPT believed that the liberation of the country from imperialism and its internal allies was closely linked with the aim of achieving the national integration and independence. Gaining a complete national independence was presented as an essential part of Turkish socialism and as the key to solving all economic, social and political problems of the country (Aybar, 1968: 396-401). In this definition, the notion of national independence appears to envelope, affect and shape every thing within a broad spectrum of social life. Anti-imperialist struggle for national independence should be carried out not only at political and military levels but also at economic, social and cultural levels (Aybar, 1968: 494).

The Turkish national liberation war of 1919-1923 was portrayed by the WPT as the historical basis of its understanding of nationalism. In the party's narration of the liberation war, those years of national liberation were depicted as the era of the national awakening of the people living within the borders of the national pact. It was through this national liberation war against imperialism that the members

of the Turkish nation came to realize that they belong to a common community of fate and share a strong common material and spiritual features. Atatürk's nationalism was the flag of the battle against Western imperialism. The Turkish elements of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire acquired a national consciousness and personality through coming together and waging a national liberation war against Western imperialism attempting to invade Anatolia after the First World War (Sarıca and Devrim, 1968: 16).

For the WPT, the first National Liberation War led by Mustafa Kemal was not only crucial for Turkish nation, but was also important for the oppressed people of the Third World. The Turkish National Liberation War and the establishment of the government of the Turkish National Assembly in 1920 was a remarkable breakthrough in the history of the liberation wars of the people of the Third World. It was considered as the first successful liberation war against imperialism, the first link in the chain of successive national liberation wars in the 20th century, culminated in the Turkish Republic, the first nation-state established by a former semi-colonial people through its struggle against imperialism (Aybar, 1968: 256, 268). This was, for the WPT, of course, a source of national pride. But, unfortunately, the political independence gained through the liberation war could not be complemented and fortified by further radical structural transformations at the economic and social levels, and was undermined after the Second World War. Turkey began to lose its independence and moved into the orbit of Western imperialism after the death of Atatürk and then after the passage to multi-party system in 1946 (Aybar, 1968: 601-602).[12]

[12] The similar account can also be seen in the writings of Boran. According to her (1968: 20-21), the first Turkish national liberation war involved two different dimensions: At one level, it was an anti-imperialist war waged against the developed countries of the West and their collaborating country,

The party invented a parallelism between the years of the armistice following the First World War, during which the Ottoman land was occupied by the Entente powers, and the years following the Second World War, during which the main foreign enemy became the US imperialism (Aybar, 1968: 498). The response of the petty-bourgeois intellectual and bureaucratic strata and Turkish people at large to the invasion and partition of the homeland by the foreign imperialist powers was crystallized in the first National Liberation War of 1919-1922 led by Atatürk. But this national liberation war could not be deepened by radical economic and social reforms and confined itself mostly to changing the super-structural spheres of social life. All revolutionary gains of the first liberation war suffered a serious blow from the anti-Kemalist counter revolution of the post-Second World War which brought the party of comprador bourgeoisie and big land lords, the Democrat Party, to the power, put the country into the orbit of the US imperialism and undermined the country's national independence and sovereignty.[13] The contemporary revolutionary task, according to the WPT, was to wage a new, second, national liberation war which would bring together all national and revolutionary forces from all different classes and strata against imperialism and its internal collaborators. But this new liberation war would not confine itself just to achieving political independence and would be accompanied by radical economic and social transformations.

The party claims that it was the standard-bearer of the second national

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Greece. At another level, it was a revolutionary movement led by civil-military bureaucratic intellectual strata against the ancient (Ottoman) regime and its traditional agricultural structure. In this sense, it was a revolution implemented by an enlightened elite from above with the aim of modernizing a traditional backward society.

[13]The WPT's attitude towards the change from one-party regime to multi-party one is quite different from other leftist interpretations of the period. It is actually quite ambiguous. On the one hand, it sees the coming of the DP to the power as a counter-revolution; on the other hand, it considers this transformation as an important political turning point through which the Turkish people gave a historic lesson to the Ottoman-type despotic state administration in the first general elections of the multi-party era. See, Aybar (1968: 502). For a similar account see also, Boran (1968: 43-44).

liberation war in Turkey. The national liberation revolution would be completed this time under the leadership of the WPT.[14] After the national liberation and after achieving a complete national independence, Turkey would never again be a satellite in the orbit of imperialism. There would be no such thing again as the flag of another country flying in Turkey. Only one flag could fly in Turkey, the Turkish flag. The realization of this goal depended on the achievement of socialism in Turkey. The party asserted that it shared the ideal of socialism with all other exploited and oppressed peoples. It believed that socialism would liberate the whole world from the inhumane consequences of exploitation, wars, famine etc. The party, in this sense, was giving its support to all the oppressed people waging national liberation wars against imperialism and the laboring people fighting for socialism (Aybar, 1968: 495). But as the offspring of Turkey, the members of the party considered socialism foremost as a Turkish socialism. They believe that socialism in Turkey could only be build up by the eyes, minds and hands of Turkish people. Turkish socialism best

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[14] The WPT became the voice of an anti-imperialist policy in the National Assembly after 1965. The party was especially critical of Turkey's relations with the U.S. and always accused the Demirel government of serving the interests of U.S. imperialism. The WPT's first criticism of official foreign policy in the parliament was voiced by Aybar. In a speech directed against the Demirel government's program, he (1966: 47) stated that "35 million square meters of Turkish land are under American occupation." He (1966: 48-50) was raising the question of bilateral agreements with the US and the U.S. military bases in Turkey. He maintained that these bases were not really under the control of Turkish authorities but exclusively controlled by the U.S. command. Aybar (1966: 53-54) declared that Turkey was not the satellite of any foreign power: "We can not tolerate to be the satellite of either the West or the East... Turkey belongs to the Turkish people." The WPT continued its anti-imperialist policy with a campaign against the U.S. presence in Turkey. Aybar started this campaign with a speech at a meeting of the party organization of the Mersin region in July 1966. He declared the need for a second national liberation war against the American presence in the country. The U.S. would be forced to go out the way it had come in (TİP, 1966c). This war would not only be against the U.S. but would also be against its allies inside the country (TİP, 1966c). By the war of national liberation, Aybar actually meant a campaign of "passive resistance" (TİP, 1966c). This simply meant the rejection of any contacts with Americans in Turkey. Merchants were urged not to supply Americans, hairdressers not to do the hair of their wives, and ministry officials not to talk to American specialists (Aybar, 1968: 473). In a resolution adopted in the second congress of the party (TİP, 1966b: 7), it was declared that the WPT invited laboring people together with all progressive, nationalist, honorable citizens, and youth and intellectuals of the country to join the campaign. In an address to the second congress of the party, Aybar (TİP, 1966d) stated that "forty-four years after the completion of the first one, we must begin a second National Liberation Struggle... We are determined in the struggle until such time as the last American soldier has left our country."

represented by the WPT was an independent movement and would stay so (Aybar, 1968: 496).

5.4 Turkish Socialists' Experience with Nation and Nationalism

Turkish left's engagement with nationalism in the 1960s should be understood by reference to international political atmosphere following the Second World War. Turkey was one of the countries which directly felt the severe consequences of the political tensions of the Cold War. It was in this period that Turkish socialist movement, for the first time, became a real political agent and had a substantial impact on the political life of the country. The growth of the left in Turkey in this period polarized the political atmosphere, intensified the growing ideological tension, and led to the division of the parties into left and right poles. The close relations between Turkey and the US after 1945 helped the emergence of a Turkish type of McCarthyism which was turned into an anti-socialist (and communist) hysteria with the rise of the left in Turkey in the 1960s. It was in this political environment that right-wing writers like Tevetoğlu and Sayılgan produced their works (see, Tevetoğlu, 1967; Sayılgan, 1972) on Turkish socialism, describing it as a "foreign", non-national ideology. And it was in this context that the chairman of the WPT, Aybar (1968: 612-613), exemplifying the mentality of the socialists in Turkey in the 1960s, was declaring that

> The WPT is not a part of any international organization. It does not have any relation with any international. We do not take orders from anyone or from any center. We consider this kind of behaviors to be contrary to socialist solidarity. Solidarity takes place between independent, powerful, and equal entities. Socialism has developed everywhere in the form of independent movements since the end of the Second World War. Especially, in the Third World, socialist movements have been very tightly clinging to their independence. For instance, the newly independent states seek and find their way to

> socialism by their own forces and resources without accepting any tutelage… Socialism, above all, is a nationalist movement.

In this period (and in the rest of its modern political history) nearly every significant political party and movement in Turkey incorporated nationalism into its political program and discourse in a peculiar way. The claim of being the real representative of nationalism in Turkey was not only limited to the right-wing parties. Nationalism also maintained its popular appeal among some large sections of the Turkish left. This manifests so clearly the ideological domination and immense political power of nationalism in modern Turkish political history that nationalist ideology in Turkey can even subvert its opposite political ideologies, like socialism.

It can, on the other hand, be claimed that Turkish socialists' adaptation of nationalism into their ideological repertoires and political programs was the tactical responses of the Turkish left against anti-leftist popular sentiments of the period nurtured by the anti-leftist orientation of the Turkish political establishment. It seemed that Turkish socialists of the 1960s felt obliged to demonstrate at every occasion that they were the real Turkish nationalists fighting against non-national social classes and groups and their political representatives. This attempt at combining nationalism with socialism can be seen as a way of creating a medium in which the left could move more easily without any hindrance. But Turkish left's articulation of nationalism with socialism was not just tactical, but was also deliberately strategic. Nationalism was a part of the normative principles of their understanding of socialism. For them, in the backward countries, the issues should firstly be understood from and tackled within a *national* perspective (see, for instance, Boran, 1968: 134). In the Third World, according to this account, socialism

could not be separated from nationalism. This section will try to demonstrate this strategic and normative orientation of the Turkish left in the sixties.

Although all different factions of the radical left in Turkey in this period articulated nationalism and socialism in certain degrees, their mode of articulation differed in some manners. Kemalism, in this period, was reinterpreted by the Turkish left as an anti-imperialist, nationalist, populist, developmentalist and progressive ideology, and was used as a way of legitimizing their commitment to nationalism. Kemalism was utilized as a mediator between the ideologies of nationalism and socialism in the Turkish context. The leftist re-interpretation of Kemalism by the *Yön* group labeled sometimes as "Kemalist revolutionary nationalists" allowed them to accommodate the principles of socialism with their understanding of Kemalism. Their motto was, "Atatürkism before socialism" (*sosyalizmden önce Atatürkçülük*) (Avcıoğlu, 1963a). And, a parallel reinterpretation by the WPT and the NDR movement, on the other hand, let them to adapt Kemalism to their socialisms. In a similar manner, it can be argued that the *Yön* group started its journey with nationalism and arrived at socialism. Socialism was something which was attached to their nationalism. In the case of the WPT and the NDR circle, it seemed that nationalism was attached to their socialism. But the outcome of the process of these articulations made the differences negligible in most cases; and the result was the ideological convergence of different factions of the Turkish left. In what follows, I will evaluate the political nature of the articulations on the basis of the question of what the Turkish socialists' understanding of nation and nationalism was. Turkish socialists elaborated their account of nationalism in contrast to other nationalisms. How did they differentiate their accounts of nationalism from other accounts? What

did they understand from internationalism, national foreign policy and national defense?

5.4.1 Turkish Socialists' Understanding of Nation and Nationalism

The slogans of "nation", "motherland", according to Mihri Belli (1970: 289-290), were first cried during the classical bourgeois revolutions in the West. The long *durée* from the 17th to the 19th century in Europe was the age of nation building and democratic revolutions under the hegemony of the newly rising bourgeoisie. In its classical revolutionary period, bourgeoisie was a national class striving for establishing an integrated national economy and national market against the ruling classes of the ancient regime. However, the emergence of another revolutionary class, the working class, with the rise of capitalism and industrial revolution undermined the former national revolutionary characters of the bourgeoisie. This process was finalized in the age of imperialism; and the bourgeoisie in this period lost its last nationalist and revolutionary features. The slogans of "nation", "motherland" were supported now by the new revolutionary national social strata, the working class (the laboring people) and the oppressed people of the Third World. Although the idea of nation was first put forward by the bourgeoisie, it was now the laboring people which would embrace the flag of nation and nationalism. So, it was now the duty of socialists, the historical representatives of the laboring people, to rise up the flag of nationalism. This was so, because socialism could only be built up in an independent country which had already completed the process of becoming a nation. To become a nation, for Belli (1970: 284), was especially the primary task of the oppressed peoples of the Third World. This process of becoming a nation comes to mean to break the yoke of imperialism and feudalism hindering the national

development, to initiate democratic regulations that would elevate people to the status of free citizens, and to create suitable conditions for flourishing national culture. Peoples at the periphery of the world can reach a prosperous future only through finalizing their journey of evolving into a nation.

What Belli argued was shared and defended by an overwhelming part of the Turkish left. For the Turkish socialists of the 1960s, socialism came to mean nationalism in the Third World. Independence and nationalism appeared as two main pillars of socialism of the backward countries (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 621). On the periphery of the world, nationalism acquired a new meaning, defined by reference to notions like anti-imperialism, and was portrayed as an indispensable part of Third World countries' effort to gain full independence and to achieve economic development (Selçuk, 1965a). The claim that socialism had nothing in common with nationalism was a deliberative deception produced by capitalists and imperialists in order to prevent the awakening of the oppressed nations in the Third World. In the age of imperialism, socialism and nationalism had common meanings; one was possible only through the other, or one was not possible without the other (Aybar, 1968: 563).

But what was their definition of nation? Their source of reference was Stalin's (1936: 8) quite rigid and vulgar 'scientific' definition of nation: "A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."[15] They defined their understanding of Turkish nation and nationalism according to this definition. For them, the revolutionary task of the era in

[15] See also, Belli (1970: 285). Joseph Stalin's "Marxism and the National Question", which was written in 1913, is generally quoted in the literature as an example of a too rigid and scholastic definition of nation. He tries to describe a nation in terms of so-called objective criteria.

Turkey was to complete the process of making Turkish society a nation in its fullest sense by destroying all possible obstacles (Belli, 1970: 292). Since the definition of a nation was based on its four characteristic features, that is to say, a common territory, a common language, a common economic life, and a common culture, the real nationalists in the Turkish contexts were those who try to contribute sincerely to the construction of those commonalities (Belli, 1970: 292). A common territory (territorial integrity) presupposes a struggle against certain internal (feudal landlords) and external (imperialism) forces in order to avoid the danger of the partition of the common territory. A real nationalist fights for protecting the sovereignty rights of Turkish people on their common territory, and strives for territorial integrity against imperialism and feudal landlords. A common economic life, on the other hand, breaks up feudal relations and helps to the creation of a national market. So, if whoever struggles for a radical land reform and for a unified national economy against the feudal privileges, he/she is the real Turkish nationalist (Belli, 1970: 286-287). A unified national culture and a common language are other important features of nation. The real Turkish nationalist, according to Belli, is again someone who stands up against feudal culture and Western cosmopolitanism which undermine and corrupt our national culture, someone who defends, protects and contributes to our Turkish national culture and language.

The socialist groups of the period of the 1960s in Turkey were accused of spreading communism by intellectuals, newspapers, political parties standing on the right of the political spectrum. But for the left, the real target of the jingoism created around the anti-communist hysteria promoted by the right wing parties in Turkey was not communism, but national independence of Turkey (Belli, 1966c). Avcıoğlu asserted that accusing genuine Atatürkist nationalists who were demanding social

justice, land reform, a rapid economic development based on central planning and statism of being communist was a baseless argument. The *Yön* group was making a distinction between communism and socialism. Socialism as a method of rapid development based on social justice was an antidote against communism. That was why, for Avcıoğlu (1962a), socialism was the best expression of nationalism. Socialism would radically change the nature of class relations within nation. It would remove class antagonisms, and build up a moral and political unity. The private ownership of means of production, on the other hand, was breaking down the national unity and allowing to the domination of a part of nation by another part. In this sense, it was illusionary to think that, in capitalist system, people making up a nation could have a common interest. Every nation in the capitalist system was composed of classes of competing interests. The clash of classes produced by capitalism was destroying the very foundations of national unity and integrity. It was only in a classless society that national unity could be strengthened and national development could be achieved (Avcıoğlu, 1962a).[16] Private ownership was the reason behind the severe competition among nations. The common ownership of means of production forces, on the other hand, would galvanize national unity and

[16] The similar account can also be seen in the accounts of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir. Aydemir (1963b) perceives Turkish socialism as a patriotic (*memleketçi*) socialism characterized by being against the idea of domination of a class over other classes. Turkish socialism, for him, is concerned with avoiding the emergence of sharp class cleavages in Turkey with the purpose of maintaining national integrity. This perception of classless society looked liked to Kemalist solidaristic corporatism, which was characterized by an emphasis on the idea of social solidarity based on occupational groups, a rejection of Marxian account of social and economic class as a relevant category for understanding Turkish society, and a focus on the active leading role of the state in shaping and controlling the relations between these occupational groups. For this Kemalist corporatist conception of society, see Parla and Davidson (2004: 60-65; 80-86). The most important element of Kemalist solidaristic corporatism was the rejection of the perspective that Turkish society was composed of classes with conflicting interests. Mustafa Kemal states: "In my view, our nation does not possess various classes that would follow very different interests from one another and because of this be in a state of struggle with one another. The present classes are in the nature of being necessarily complementary of each other" (quoted in, Parla and Davidson, 2004: 60). All other approaches relegating "common and general" national aims and promoting "particular interests" were perceived by this solidaristic corporatist/populist perspective as something very dangerous and harmful to national integrity.

provide new prospects for a peaceful and equal collaboration of nations (Avcıoğlu, 1962a).

After the Second World War, Turkey entered into a capitalist path of development and abandoned the principle of "creating a classless, nationally integrated society" which was, however, to be one of the foremost aims of the Republic in its founding years. After 1945, a new method of development was adopted, which, eventually, increased the tension among classes and created an environment leading sharp class cleavages and struggles. The nationalism of the Yön group was a response to this picture. Their nationalism was different from deceptive (fake) and reactionary types of nationalism which had only empty rhetoric in their repertoire and did not have a contribution to the welfare and happiness of nation. The demagogic rhetoric of those kinds of nationalism helped actually to disguise their real intentions of keeping status quo going on. Turkish socialists alternatively presupposed a different nationalism based on Turkish people and their interests, a nationalism which would bind the members of the nation on the principle of respecting each other and would eliminate exploitative relations among its members, a nationalism which aimed to establish an independent Turkey respected by the international order as a self-confident and sovereign international actor (*Yön*, 1963).

5.4.2 "Our Nationalism, Their Nationalism"

Turkish socialists of the sixties tried to develop their nationalism by distinguishing it from racist, conservative, liberal/cosmopolitan types of nationalism. They accorded their understanding of nationalism on the distinction between their "genuine", "authentic", "real" nationalism and "false", "fake", "demagogic" nationalism of others pretending to be nationalist but actually not (see, for instance,

Selçuk, 1962b). For the leading figures of the *Yön* group (as well as for the others), nationalism should be constructive in the sense that it should not be based on notions like irrationality, intuitions and emotions. They were against irredentist type of nationalism that looks for adventures beyond the borders of the "National Pact". They condemned racist, conservative and liberal types of nationalism. Real Turkish nationalism had a humanist content; it was not compatible with subversive, narrow chauvinism (*Yön*, 1965a). They were in doubt about the patriotism of those (so-called) nationalists who were actually the yes-men of the US imperialism (Avcıoğlu, 1962h). A socialist, on the other hand, was someone standing up against the yoke of foreign imperialist powers. Socialists in Turkey as most conscious nationalists, leaving all secondary issues aside, put forward a program of national independence based on the idea of "national pact" that would assemble all genuine nationalists within its umbrella (Avcıoğlu, 1967a). Their distinction between real and false nationalism was complemented with the distinction between non-national (comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords) and national (all social strata, except compradors and landlords) classes and social groups. Of course, the non national classes' claim of nationalism was pretentious, not real (see, Avcıoğlu, 1964a; Selçuk, 1965a).

For the *Yön* group, whoever promotes the interests of foreign companies rather than national interests, whoever sells our national resources, minerals, and oils to foreigners and whoever exploits Turkey in cooperation with foreigners are traitors (Selçuk, 1966b). They identified capitalism with liberalism and cosmopolitanism. While condemning all these features of capitalism, they, instead, diametrically praised statism and nationalism. Their critique of capitalism was based on their endorsement of nationalism. That is to say, their understanding of nationalism was

something which was to be defined against capitalism (Selçuk, 1962a). The *Yön* group's account of nationalism denounced any type of cosmopolitanism. Their understanding of national economic development under state guidance and protection meticulously excluded the principles of liberal economic cosmopolitanism from their development strategy. But not only liberal economic cosmopolitanism, but any cosmopolitan/internationalist project leaving nationalism out was at the target of the *Yön* group. Avcıoğlu, for instance, criticized Tevfik Fikret's (a prominent late-Ottoman Turkish poet) famous verse about his perception of motherland and nation, which says, "earth is my motherland, humanity is my nation." Avcıoğlu saw in this line, from a "socialist" point of view, a superfluous internationalism which did not understand the necessity of national phenomena. He (*Yön*, 1965a) holds that the motherland of Turkish socialists was Turkey, and their nationality was Turkish: "We, Turkish socialists, are pleased and proud of being members of Turkish nation which for the first time in the world history defeated imperialism in a national liberation war." And, "the environment required for profoundly elevating the national culture of Turkish nation at every field to the highest summits will be provided by socialism."

Turkish socialists tried to distinguish their nationalism not only from liberal/cosmopolitan accounts but also from racist, irredentist, Turanist, conservative, reactionary type of nationalisms. The WPT (see, TİP, 1965b: 16; TİP,1969: 13), for instance, stated at every occasion that it had nothing in common with any irredentist (aggressive) fascistic type of nationalism insulting other nations and separating our people on the basis of ethnicity, religion, language and race. At the domestic level, the WPT (TİP, 1969: 16) considered all the members of the nation as an equal partner of an indivisible whole sharing similar historical and cultural experiences. At

the international level, nationalism, for the WPT (and for the others), was the prime source of moral impetus and support to the peaceful and fraternal competition for humanity, democracy, freedom, science and progress among the peoples of the world. The WPT's account of nationalism (TİP, 1965b) rules out any kind of exploitative and hegemonic relations among nations and promotes good peaceful relations between them. The WPT's nationalism (TİP, 1969: 12-13) was argued to be completely different from extreme types of nationalisms glorified by racists (*kafatasçı*) dreaming about adventures beyond the borders of the National Pact, those exploiting religion for their political ends (religion exploiters), reactionaries, the proponents of medievalism, the enemies of democracy and social justice. However, in some other accounts, Turanism was sometimes perceived as a movement with romantic features. For example, in one of the issues of *Yön* (*Yön*, 1965b), the leader of the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi*) (RPNP), Alparslan Türkeş (who several years later became the leader of the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*) (NAP) with a conversion of the RPNP into the NAP) was portrayed not as fascist but as romantic. Belli (1970: 296), on the other hand, argued that, in its formative years, Turanism was primarily a romantic movement. As far as Turanism had broken the hegemony of Ottomanism and its feudal theocratic features and rised up the level of nationalist consciousness in the society, it was a constructive and progressive movement. But when it diverted into irrational and irredentist extremes, it turned into a destructive, reactionary movement. For Belli (1970: 297), contemporary proponents of Turanism was using nationalism in a demagogic way and dividing the ranks of national forces. They were objectively backing up domestic non-national strata, the interest of which lied in keeping Turkey as an exploited and backward country under the yoke of the US imperialism.

For the Turkish socialists of the 1960s, the real Turkish nationalist was someone who did not accept Turkey's dependency on imperialism and the chronic backwardness of the country, and who wanted an honorable and decent life for Turkish people. They considered nationalism as a guiding principle of the Turkish people in its struggle against economic and social backwardness and fight for economic development and economic independence from imperialism (Sarıca and Devrim, 1968: 29). The proponents of the WPT, like other socialist factions, claimed to be the only true Turkish nationalists by virtue of their willingness to implement a rapid national economic development which would elevate the country to the level of contemporary Western civilization and, so, provide social justice and a prosperous life for its citizens. Their nationalism was aiming at preventing the country from being exploited by internal and external exploiters. Feeding an increasing population, preventing hunger, preventing labor exploitation, eliminating unemployment, educating Turkish children, saving Turkish nation from poverty, promoting a fair distribution of national income and implementing economic development and social justice were the real criterions of being a true real nationalist (TİP, 1969: 12-13).

Let's sum up this section with a long quote from the WPTs program (TİP, 1964a), which, I think, very well summarizes Turkish socialists understanding of nationalism in the 1960s:

> Turkish nationalism, at the ideological level, is the response of our people, who had lived under semi-colonial conditions for centuries, against foreign yoke and colonialism. Turkish nationalism which acquired its character in the Independence War cannot be considered without populism. Everyone who is bound to Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is Turk. Turkish nationalism considers all the members of the nation as an indivisible joint union in faith, pride and sorrow; it aims to elevate our nation as an equal respected member of the family of world nations at scientific, technical, cultural, economic fields and all other domains of social life. Turkish nationalism is never a xenophobic, racist, aggressive, exploitative ideology. Colonialist and

> aggressive circles in the West turn nationalism at the service of colonialism into an aggressive ideology which disdains other nations. Turkish nationalism is humanitarian since it accepts the principle that nations should live in peace, fraternity and solidarity. Turkish nationalism rejects racism and all reactionary, conservative views and prospects without any question. It accepts everyone Turk who is bound to Turkish Republic through bond of citizenship and does not allow any religious, linguistic, racial, sectarian discriminations and inequalities among its citizens.

5.4.3 Nationalism and National Foreign Policy

Socialists in Turkey in the 1960s held the view that the socialist principle of internationalism did not contradict with the principle of nationalism, but, socialism did conflict with the type of cosmopolitanism which rejected the national phenomena. Renouncing the national phenomena, according to them, was the result of a superfluous internationalism (see, Belli, 1970: 307). They rejected the view that socialist movement with its internationalist character repudiated the national phenomena and was against nationalism. This view, for them, was the result of a big misunderstanding (see, Avcıoğlu, 1967b). Internationalism, even nominally, was based on the national phenomena, and the first principle of internationalism was the nation itself. The revolutionaries internalizing internationalism in its deepest meaning saw their own country as their motherland; and the nation they belonged to was their own nation (Belli, 1970: 294). Turkish socialists believed that they could be as nationalists as they liked.

According to Turkish socialists, national phenomena were the most important fact of the 20th century without which the order of things that shaped the century could not be grasped. Nationalism was an effective means that could mobilize masses both in the capitalist and socialist countries. Belli (1970: 308) argues that: "Although the idea of nation emerged and developed with the rise of capitalism, it

does not disappear when the order of capitalist exploitation is replaced with a socialist order. On the contrary, those nations, the historical development of which was constrained by imperialism, would find the opportunity of flourishing their national cultures without any hindrance only in a socialist order. The socialist nations have been taking the place of bourgeois nations." This statement is not simply an observation about the spirit of the epoch, but it also contains very strong normative predispositions towards nationalism. Belli (1970: 282-283) does not problematize the Russification and nationalization of the October Revolution during the 1930s and 1940s; he even approves this development. He, for instance, welcomes the Soviet Union's adaption of a new national anthem, instead of *The International*, in 1940s, starting with a celebration of "Great Russia", or the insistence of The People's Republic of Bulgaria on preserving their former national anthems and national flag as their national symbols. He argues that it is normal and acceptable for nations which enter into the path to socialism to preserve their national values and let their national cultures flourish.

In the WPT's imagination of future international order, entities such as nations, states would continue to exist, and the future socialist world order would be composed of independent socialist states (Aybar, 1968: 661); but they would coexist in peace and solidarity and would be guided by freedom, equality, science, and art (Aybar, 1968: 389). Turkish socialists believed that their era was characterized with the process of the nationalization of the idea of socialism (and communism). What we witness in that age was a radical shift from the idea of international (or world) communism to independent national/or state communisms (see, for instance, Aydemir, 1963a; Aydemir, 1963c). They understood international socialism as a collection of independent national states each pursuing its socialist

development in accordance with its particular national ends. This internationalism was composed of nationally isolated socialist states.

The sources of this understanding of 'internationalism' were various ranging from theories of "socialism-in-one country" developed in the late 1920s and 1930s in Russia and the theories of Third World socialism becoming popular after the Second World War, especially with the Chinese Revolution in 1949. What the Turkish socialists of the 1960s actually wanted to achieve was not international working class power superseding nations, but independent national development within the borders of a single country against non-national and external forces supposedly undermining the process of national development. The formula summarizing the relationship between internationalism and nationalism was borrowed from Jaures. In his one of the famous quotations, Jaures was declaring that "a little dose of internationalism may estrange a man from patriotism, but a strong dose brings him back; a little patriotism may estrange us from internationalism, but a strong dose puts things right again."[17]

They advocated internationalism, but this was very different from the Marxian internationalism advocating the international unity and power of the working classes of all countries. The working class was substituted with the nation, which was now supposed the lead the world history and which was the new candidate for the agency of the revolution and internationalism. The idea of the international solidarity of the working classes of different countries against their respective ruling classes was replaced by the unity between backward countries and oppressed nations against the imperialist/capitalist countries. In this formulation, if

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[17] Quoted in "The Life of Jaures", http://www.marxists.org/archive/jaures/1907/military-service/appendix3.htm. These words are quoted by Belli (1970: 292); *Yön* (1965a); and Erdost (1969: 90).

we use the general observation of Nigel Harris (1974: 186) about Third World socialism, "alliances of states replaced the alliance of the workers against all states."

But this new internationalism had its own limits. Socialism advocated by the socialists of Turkey in the 1960s was jealously loyal to the principle of national independence and very sensitive to the national integrity of Turkey and to its sovereignty rights; and it was against any foreign power's intervention into the country's internal affairs. National independence should be protected against all foreign states, not only against the US but also against the Soviet Union (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 661). But, it should be noted that Turkish socialists' attitude towards the Soviet Russia was quite ambiguous. The Yön group, argued, for instance, that the emergence of a world with two blocks led by two superpowers created an international environment suitable to the ends of national liberation movements. The existence of a Soviet bloc rival to Western capitalist bloc was thought to enable newly independent states and other underdeveloped countries to adopt an independent, non-alignment position within the international system, to withstand against the hegemony of capitalist bloc, and to follow a non-capitalist path of development (see, Avcıoğlu, 1963a). As far as the Soviet Union respects Turkish national independence at the international level, it was possible to develop good relations with the Soviet Union (see, Avcıoğlu, 1964b).

Turkish socialists developed their understanding of national foreign policy on the basis of their understanding of inter-nationalism. They advocated a hundred percent national, full independent foreign policy (see, for example, TİP, 1969: 9). On the one hand, they stood for a peaceful foreign policy aiming at equal fraternal relations among nations but, on the other, put the independence and existence and permanence of their nation above everything (see, TİP, 1968a: 6). Their

understanding of national foreign policy was anti-imperialist and looking out for nation's own interests, but it also aimed to promote peaceful relations among nations for the development and progress of humanity (see, Aybar, 1968: 388).

For the chairman of the WPT, Aybar, the relationship between socialist states and movements in this era should be based on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries. The WPT stands against the idea of any kind of international organization giving advices to national organizations (Aybar, 1968: 621). Every nation should build up its socialist regime by its own national resources (material and spiritual). This means that every nation put the universal principles of socialist philosophy and morality into practice on the basis of their national potentials and features. This socialism would definitely be an indigenous socialism. The reflection of this type of "national" socialism at the level of international relations between socialist states was obvious: socialist states and movements should first defend and stand up for their countries' own national interests. Then there came the principals of non-intervention, recognizing and respecting each other (Aybar, 1968: 354-355).

Turkish left's policy of national defense in the 1960s was parallel to and part of their account of national foreign policy. National defense was one of the primary requirements of protecting independence and national dignity. The primary aims of the WPT's defense policy, for instance, were to protect nation's independence, its existence, its territorial integrity and its republic. In order to achieve these goals, the armed forces, as the backbone of the national defense, should be equipped with modern tactic and strategies of national liberation war; and the bonds of solidarity between the armed forces and the Turkish people should be increased (TİP, 1969: 9-11). There was a close relationship between national defense and national

development. Turkey could have a national defense power only through achieving its national economic development (see, for instance, Naci, 1965c; Belli, 1970: 209-210). In order to reduce Turkey's dependence on foreign defense aids and technology, the party would encourage the development of the national defense industry as part of a larger national industrialization strategy (TİP, 1969: 10-11).

In short, the WPT was a "peace-loving" party. But, if Turkey was attacked by foreign invaders, it would be defended by all means and by the whole nation. The Turkish homeland for Aybar (1968: 605) was the holy land that should be defended inch by inch by the Turkish patriots to the last drop of their blood in case of any foreign invasion.

5.5 Turkish Socialists' Practices of Nationalism

The Cyprus and Kurdish questions were among the hotly debated public issues in Turkey in the 1960s; and since then, they have always been a classical source of nationalist mobilization in Turkey. The Turkish left's position vis-à-vis these issues in the 1960s was quiet dubious. They were sometimes under the influence of the official discourses; and on other occasions they radically differed from them. Their perception of the Kurdish and Cyprus issues oscillated between these two poles. In the following section of this chapter, I will try to look at the experiences of the Turkish left of the 1960s with nationalism through the Kurdish and Cyprus questions.

5.5.1 The Kurdish Question

The reemergence of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in the 1960s placed the 'Kurdish Question' at the centre of the political debate. Turkish socialist of the 1960s tried to understand the Kurdish question by means of the explanations like regional backwardness and continued existence of ancient social and cultural traits in the Eastern regions of the country. They, in this sense, shared, to a certain extent, the official perception of the Kurdish question. In the official discourse, the question analyzed in terms of the controversy between the symbols, agents, institutions of the past and those of the present and the future. The Kurdish rebellions of the Republican era, for instance, was perceived by the Republican cadres as counter-revolutionary attempts carried out by the privileged classes of the previous ancient regime, feudal landowners and chiefs of tribes in the Eastern regions, against the new Republic, against its new cadres and their commitment to the construction of a secular, modern nation-state (see, Yeğen, 2007: 119-151).

The provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, unlike the Sevres Treaty, did not mention either the existence or the rights and status of the Kurds living within the borders of the National Pact. In Lausanne, only the non-Muslim religious minorities' rights and status were recognized by the Turkish part; and any definition of minority based on ethnic categories was rejected (see, Romano, 2004: 31-34; Taşpınar, 2005: 76-77). In their project of building up a central and homogenous nation-state, the ruling cadres of the new Republic, taking their legitimacy from the Treaty of Lausanne, officially denied the existence, rights and status of the Kurds. There were officially no Kurds living in Turkey. But, when the new regime was confronted with a growing Kurdish discontent in the 1920s and 1930s, which, in most cases,

manifested itself in the form of rebellions against the state authority; the state authorities, denying the ethno-cultural aspects of the problem, branded those revolts as religious, reactionary, counter-revolutionary attempts threatening the very foundations of the new secular nation-state, led by feudal landlords, sheiks, banditry. Those uprisings were seen as the manifestation of the clashes of two different world views; the one representing the past, religion and traditionalism and the one representing the present, modernism, secularism and progress.

In the first decades of the Republic, one of the most interesting supports for the Ankara Government against the Kurdish insurgents (typically, the Sheikh Said Rebellion) was coming from the illegal Turkish Communist Party (TCP) of the Republican era. The TCP was recognizing the existence and rights of the Kurds living in the National Pact and criticizing the inhuman methods used by the Kemalist regime to suppress the Sheikh Said rebellion; but they also perceived the demands of the insurgents as yearning for a return to the Ottoman ancient regime. The party considered the rebellion as a reactionary, religious revolt and denounced it as "the puppet of British imperialism", which was isolated from progressive forces of other countries. The solution of the question was understood from a social-economic perspective and they offered a land reform to abolish the feudal order in the East (Yeğen, 2007: 1209-1214; Gökay, 2006: 4042; Harris, 2002: 63).

The accounts of Turkish socialists in the 1960s about the Kurdish question were mostly borrowed from these formulations developed in the Republican era. Socialists of the 1960s, like their predecessors, saw the Kurdish question as an issue of underdevelopment and the endurance of feudal relations. But, they also differed very radically from the official discourse, and recognized and underlined the ethno-

cultural aspects of the question very clearly, but with the emphasis that the question can only be solved within the borders of the National Pact. The question was not only an issue of regional under-development but also an ethno-national problem.

It was also in the 1960s that an interrelationship was developed between the Turkish left and the Kurdish nationalist movement. It should be underlined that the emergence and growth of leftist opposition movements after 1960 provided non-traditional, urban Kurdish intellectual elite (fundamentally different from their predecessors) a new social medium and a political platform in which they found an opportunity to make themselves publicly visible and to express their views through taking part in these new leftist movements. These new Kurdish elite, having gained their first political experiences in the Turkish leftist groups, broke away from them and decided to establish their own separate organizations at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s (see, White, 2000: 129-134; Kirişçi and Winrow, 1997: 107-110; McDowall, 2000: 405-410).

The first considerations of the Turkish left in the 1960s on the Kurdish question appeared first in the Yön journal. The *Yön* journal was also one of the most important platforms in which the Kurdish intellectuals found chances to voice their viewpoints. The journal played a pioneer role in the 1960s to break the Kurdish taboo in Turkey by opening its pages to news and analysis about Kurds and the Kurdish question (see for instance, Kırmızıtoprak, 1962; Kırmızıtoprak, 1963; *Yön*, 1964; *Yön*, 1966).[18]

According to the leading figure of *Yön*, Doğan Avcıoğlu (1966e), Kurdish

[18] See also, Muzaffer Erdost's "Şemdinli Röportajı" (1966), published by *Yön* as a series from no.172 (15 July 1966) to no.189 (11 November 1966).

question always remained a forbidden issue within the Turkish public opinion, although unofficially and tacitly the existence of such a question was accepted, but, officially, the existence of which was denied. Avcıoğlu was very clear when he was declaring that whatever the official thesis about Kurds, there was a Kurdish question in Turkey. And, what so ever the official solution to the Kurdish issue, the official policies hitherto implemented were proved to be unsuccessful to offer a solution. He was arguing that the official policy of the Republic adopting quite harsh methods aimed a complete integration based on the strategy of incorporating an ethnic community (by making them to forget their language and culture) into the dominant ethnic group. However, this 40-years-old integration policy appeared to be unsuccessful. But, what was the solution? Even socialists feeling the very heaviness of the issue was very timid while providing a way out for the Kurdish question. The question had been traditionally evaluated by socialists in terms of the endurance of the social and economic backwardness and dominance of feudal and religious institutions in the region. According to Avcıoğlu, the classical example of this attitude could be seen in the approach of the TCP to the Kurdish issue in the first founding years of the Republic (as I have already mentioned above). The elimination of feudalism, which would be crystallized in a comprehensive land reform, was definitely one of the most important preconditions of solving the Eastern question in Turkey.

But, these economic and social measures were not enough to solve a question which was also characterized by a strong ethno-cultural dimension. All former experiences all over the world showed that such attempts ignoring the ethnic side of the issue were destined to fail. Avcıoğlu held that Turkish nationalism was not based on racism; the only condition of being a Turkish citizen was the loyalty to the

Turkish state. The norm of citizenship was neither religion nor sect. And, the existence of different ethnic groups in this nation did not hinder national integrity. Atatürkist nationalism and the (1961) constitution are constructed on this modern concept of nation. Yet, on the other hand, he was also very decided while warning against separationist tendencies threatening the national unity and integrity. The question had to be understood and solved within the confines of the National Pact: "At this point, there is no space for hesitation. We are one nation and we would not forfeit one inch of our land. If there are oblivious persons having separatist aims, may they be mindful! They must know that socialists would fight first for an inch of land… We will live on these lands as a one unified nation" (Avcıoğlu, 1966e).

The *Yön* group was not alone while asking the question of how the issue of other ethnic groups in Turkey should be evaluated, how especially the Kurdish question should be dealt with. According to the leading figure of the NDR movement, Mihri Belli (1970: 300), there was an Eastern question in Turkey; and the task of patriots was to find a solution to this problem that would also pursue the general interests of the country. Belli argues that the official state policy towards Kurds living within the borders of the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) changed after 1925 from recognition to assimilation. During the Independence War and the founding years of the Republic, the leading cadre of the Republic officially recognized the existence of both Turks and Kurds in the National Pact, the two close ethnic groups, the historical friendship of which was tested and fortified in the hard times (Belli, 1970: 300-302).

However, after 1925 the state initiated an assimilation (Turkification) policy towards Kurds. The reason behind this decision of assimilation was the emergence of Kurdish unrest in the Eastern provinces of the country, the most significant of which

was the Şeyh Said Revolt in 1925. For Belli (1970: 303), the Şeyh Said Revolt was not a national liberation movement, but was a reactionary, religious insurgency backed up by the British imperialism. A national liberation movement, according to him, was particularly an anti-feudal peasant movement. Such liberation movement could not be led by religious functionaries supported by Western imperialism. The Şeyh Said Revolt as an attempt against the revolutionary order was not much different from the incident of Menemen (Belli, 1970: 302). But, Belli adds, the very reactionary nature of the Şeyh Said Revolt could not be an excuse for implementing an assimilation policy against Kurdish people. Reactionary, feudal elements like Şeyh Said could only be defeated by employing a revolutionary democratic program and strategy involving a radical land reform against feudal forces.

This assimilation policy was one important reason behind the underdevelopment of the Eastern provinces of the country vis-à-vis the Western ones. The assimilation policy hindered the democratic, social and economic development of the East of Turkey. The policy, which did not help fortifying national integrity in Turkey, also prepared the ground for the new manipulations of imperialism in the region (Belli, 1970: 304).

Although Belli, to a certain extent, produces an apologist discourse for the Kemalist regime and its nationalist and laicist principles, his account of Kurdish question also radically diverges from the official understanding of the question. First of all, he recognizes Kurds as a separate ethnic group. Secondly, he suggests that the Kurds should be given the right to speak Kurdish language publicly and the right to have primary education in Kurdish language, but under the control of a unified, secularist, republican education system. These measures will unmake the plans of Western imperialism about the Kurdish issue, will fortify the historical brotherhood

between Kurds and Turks and, so eventually, will strengthen the national and territorial integrity (Belli, 1970: 304, 306). But these measures should definitely be complemented by radical socio-economic reforms that will destroy feudal relations in the region, free people from feudal bondages, and elevate them to the level of free citizens (Belli, 1970: 304).

During its founding years the WPT also believed that the Kurdish question could only be solved within the limits of the National Pact. In its party program, the WPT declared that the Eastern question was one of the important issues of the party's agenda. The party was considering the immediate solution of the Eastern question as a crucial task and precondition for the development of the country. The Eastern provinces of the country were not only economically backward, but people of these regions also lagged behind socially and culturally. The people of the East, although fulfilling their duties towards the state, were discriminated because of their ethno-cultural characteristics. Those people excluded from full citizenship rights would be treated by the WPT like first-class citizens. But the WPT (TİP, 1964b) also rejected without any hesitation all kinds of separatist tendencies threatening the indivisible unity of Turkey with its territory and nation. The WPT was against any policy of segregation between the citizens living in the Western and Eastern provinces of the country. This, according to the party officials, could be achieved under the guarantee of the 1961 Constitution, which declaring that everyone bounded to Turkey through the bound of citizenship was Turk (see, Sarıca and Devrim, 1968: 29).

But, WPT's account of the Kurdish question evolved gradually and changed in the course of the time. The WPT after its establishment, especially in the second half of the 1960s, enjoyed a strong support from Kurds, and many of them were

attracted to, and participated in the party. This intercourse was also reflected in the official discourse of the party. For the first time in modern Turkish political history, a legal party was referring to the Kurdish question in its official party documents. The interrelationship between Kurds and the WPT gained a new momentum with the 1965 general elections and after. Despite the party's former hesitations, the WPT was becoming one important legal political platform for Kurds to voice their demands. In this process, the Eastern meetings organized by the WPT in the Eastern provinces of the country in 1967 appeared to be one of the most significant moments of the friendly dialogue between Kurds and the WPT (see, for instance, Aren, 1993: 118-120).

At its fourth congress in October 1970, the party openly advocated the recognition of the national rights of the Kurds, and so it became the first legal political party recognizing the existence of Kurds living within the borders of Turkey. The resolution on the Kurdish issue adopted at its fourth congress was stating that: "There is a Kurdish people in the East of Turkey" and "the fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected the Kurdish people to a policy of assimilation and intimidation which has often become a bloody repression." The resolution had declared that,

> The fourth grand congress of the WPT... accepts and proclaims that... it is the natural and requisite revolutionary duty of our Party which is the unforgiving enemy of all anti-democratic, fascist, oppressive chauvinistic nationalist currents, to support the struggle of the Kurdish people, to make use of its constitutional citizenship rights and to realize all of its other democratic desires and hopes. (Quoted in, Aren, 1993: 291)

This resolution paved the way for the closure of the party. Just after the military

intervention of 1971, the WPT had been accused of supporting the separatist tendencies of the Kurdish people and taken to the court by the authorities.

5.5.2 The Cyprus Question

For the Turkish leftist movements of the 1960s, the most obvious characteristic of Turkish official foreign policy in the years following the Second World War, especially during the DP governments of the 1950s, was the establishment of close relations with the US and the West. This paradigmatic shift in the field of foreign policy was considered by the Turkish left as a radical divergence from the Atatürkist foreign policy of the early Republican era, the foremost characteristic of which was to be jealously independent and truly national. This shift was seen as a counter-revolutionary act against those nationalist, independent and self-respecting features of the Atatürkist foreign policy, an act which eventually put Turkey into the sphere of influence of the Western powers. Accordingly, the most important novelty that the left of the 1960s introduced into political life was its attempt to put a taboo issue like foreign policy on the public agenda. Issues of Turkish foreign policy had been considered to be immune to public criticism; and indeed, it had been not easy to discuss these problems publicly until the 1960s. The newly emergent leftist movements of the 1960s tried to overcome these difficulties and questioned the mainstays of the official foreign policy, namely Turkey's membership in NATO, and bilateral agreements with the US. The existing foreign policy of the period, according to them, was not national and independent enough to pursue the real national interests of the whole country against foreign imperialist powers. The outbreak of the Cyprus crisis in December 1963 gave the Turkish left the first sober chance to criticize the mainstays of the official Turkish foreign policy

of the period (see for instance, TİP, 1966a: 12; *Sosyal Adalet*, 1964: 4-5). The Turkish left tried to use the Cyprus crisis and President Johnson's letter as proof that Turkey could not depend unconditionally on its western allies.

The Cyprus question led to the first serious test of Turkish-American relations after the Second World War. In November 1963, Cyprus president Makarios's intention of revising the constitution of Cyprus which formed as a result of the final Zurich and London agreements of 1959 objected by the government of the Turkish Republic. This was followed by the outbreak of fighting and communal violence in Nicosia and in many other places on the island in December and then the demonstration runs of Turkish jets over Cyprus. Early in 1964, the Turkish government threatened to land its forces on the island. Turkey claimed that the United Nations forces were not providing adequate protection for the Turkish minority on Cyprus. However, Turkey's decision to invade was prevented by a letter from U.S. president Lyndon Johnson to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. This letter was received with great surprise and created disappointment in government circles.[19] The frustration over Cyprus led to the Turkish government's criticism of NATO and the U.S., but, as Ahmad (1977: 407) puts it, "it generated a great deal of noise and emotion but little action... (And) once the Justice Party came to power the (American) connection became

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[19] In this letter, Johnson called Prime Minister İnönü's attention to the obligations of NATO that member countries could not wage war on each other. He also warned that NATO allies of Turkey "have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies." President Johnson also recalled the direct American-Turkish agreements: "Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947... I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances" (see, "Document, President Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu", 1966: 387). The text of the Johnson's letter, after long discussions in the Assembly, was published by the newspaper *Hürriyet* on 13 January 1966. Although it was made public eighteen months after its arrival in Turkey, the contents of the letter had been partially known by the press (see, Ahmad, 1977: 406; and Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976: 304-305).

stronger than before." It, on the other hand, created a strong anti-Americanism in the public opinion. The Cyprus crisis reinforced what the radical intelligentsia had been saying about the U.S. and NATO and served to spread anti-imperialist and anti-American feelings.

The main movements of the Turkish left in the 1960s, the WPT, the NDR movement and the *Yön* circle, shared a common attitude, marked by a nationalist outlook on the Cyprus question (see, for example, Avcıoğlu, 1965e; Çamlı, 1964a; Çamlı 1964b; *Türk Solu*, 1967a; Naci, 1967c; Kemal, 1967d; Dino, 1967; *TİP Haberleri*, 1967: 14-15; Aybar, 1968: 450-458; TİP, 1968b: 5-7). Although they tried to differ themselves from other popular nationalists slogans of the period like "*Ya taksim, ya ölüm!*" (death or partition), or other nationalist demands like the annexation of the island to the National Pact, and although they criticized the strategy pursued by the newly emerging leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf Denktaş; the issue was portrayed by the Turkish left, like the larger public, as a national cause; a cause which would pursue not only the interests of the Turkish community on the island, but also Turkey's national interests.[20] But, this goal could not be achieved through a submissive foreign policy. It could not be handled with the instruments of the existing policy, with the interventions of the Western powers; the best solution serving to the national interests could only be achieved through an anti-imperialist, nationalist and independent vision in Turkish foreign affairs, a vision inspired from the non-aligned movement of the post-colonial period.[21] It was thought this vision would

[20] "*Ya taksim, ya ölüm*" was the slogan of the public meetings of the time span between 1955 and 1964 organized in Turkey and in Cyprus. Partition was symbolizing the right wing nationalist stand on the Cyprus issue, demanding a separate state for the Turkish community of the island.

help the realization of the real national solution that would guarantee the permanence of the Turkishness on the island and would protect the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriots. But, the Cyprus cause was also related with the Turkish national interests, more specifically, with national security. It was argued that the security of Turkey was bound up with the security of the Turkish community living on the island. The Cyprus cause was considered to be an indispensable part of the national liberation struggle of Turkey. It was even described by the WPT as the initial phase of the Turkey's second national liberation war (*TİP Haberleri*, 1967: 14-15).

For all the main leftist factions of the 1960s, the correct and acceptable solution of the Cyprus question was the federative solution (see, Çamlı, 1964a; Çamlı, 1964b; Fegan, 1970: 288; TİP, 1969: 10), which was thought to be a good alternative to undermine the enosis strategy of the pro-enosis elements in the Greek community of Cyprus aiming at the incorporation of the island to Greece (see, for instance, Çamlı, 1964a; Çamlı, 1964b). That kind of solution would guarantee complete independence and would find a peaceful solution without any foreign imperialist intervention, and would liberate Cyprus from any foreign imperialist interference. For instance, the WPT, as an exemplar of the left's stand on the issue, always argued during the Cyprus crises of the 1960s against policies advocating the interventions of Western powers into the Cyprus issue. The WPT claimed that the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus had lived together in peace for centuries. However, the outside interference of the imperialist powers-

[21] The Turkish left was very often highlighting the need to be in competition with the leadership of the Greek Cypriot population for gaining the support of the non-aligned movement for the Cyprus cause (see, for instance, Çamlı, 1965). Indeed, President Makarios was always clear in his intention of not joining any military alliances and keeping Cyprus in the neutralist bloc of nations (see, Adams, 1971: 119-121). Makarios was not alone in seeking support among the members of the non-aligned movement; AKEL, the Progressive Party of the Working People, also gave its support to the government in promoting and implementing the policy of non-aligned neutrality (see, for instance, "Resolution of the 12th Congress of AKEL", 1970: 14-15).

especially the maneuvers of English imperialism- had led to a serious problem on the island. The crisis on the island could not be solved with the involvement of Britain, the U.S., and the NATO councils, but had to be taken up by the parties, namely, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the Greek and Turkish states. Cyprus had to be cleared of military bases and demilitarized, its independence and territorial integrity had safeguarded (see, for instance, TİP, 1964a: 9-11; Aybar, 1968: 348-349). When the Cyprus crisis erupted again in 1967, the WPT repeated the same recommendations for the solution of the crisis. In the National Assembly, the party advocated the same idea of an independent and federative Cyprus purified from weapons and military bases, and neutralized under international guarantee (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1967: 77-81; *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1968: 467-469).

5.6 Conclusion

In this long chapter, I have examined the question of how the Turkish socialists of the 1960s described socialism. Socialism was identified by them simply as nation's liberation. Then I have detected the marks and tracks of the notions of nation and nationalism in the political programs of the main factions of the Turkish left in the 1960s and in the writings of their leading figures. And the last section of the chapter has focused on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues as understood by the Turkish socialists in the 1960s. But, this long analysis of the Turkish left's experience with nationalism has mostly focused on the political dimension of the experience. The emphasis was on political nature of the relationship between socialism and nationalism. That is to say, nationalism adopted by the different factions of the Turkish left to their political programs was used as a political

instrument in their competition with their political opponents for seeking and exercising state power. The economic dimension of the experience will be evaluated in detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE TURKISH LEFT

6.1 Introduction

Many recent theorists of nationalism see the emergence of nation and nationalism within the structural transformation of traditional society into a modern one. The best representative of this outlook is Ernest Gellner, who claims that nationalism is the result of the cultural requirements of industrial social organization. Gellner's theory of nationalism is based on his account of the transition from agricultural to industrial society. He argues that it is the cultural standardization required by modern industrial society that produces nation and nationalism.[1] In the Third World context, however, the causal relationship between nationalism and industrialization seems to be other way around; in this

[1] Gellner (1983: 46-48) argues that "it is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity… It is the objective need for homogeneity that is reflected in nationalism… A modern industrial state can only function with a culturally standardized, interchangeable population… Nationalism is not the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does present itself. It is, in reality, the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state."

case, nationalism precedes the process of industrialization. On the periphery of the world, one of the sources of nationalist ideology appears to be the responses to the underdevelopment imposed by the uneven development and expansion of capitalism dividing the world economy along center-periphery axis. In the Third World context, nationalist discourse seems to be fostered through the resentment directed against imperialism, which is seen as the cause of economic and social backwardness, and through the drive for development and industrialization. It is not surprising to see the call for rapid industrialization via an independent and national development strategy coming from political movements marked by nationalism. This is also true for the socialist movements of the Third World emerging especially in the post-Second World War era. The economic development strategy of the most of the Third World socialisms in this period was to follow a 'non-capitalist' and national development model for rapid industrialization. The Turkish socialists of the 1960s were not an exception in this sense.

But, what is the relationship between economy and nationalism in the Third World context? The notions of economic development, industrialization seem to be intrinsic to nation and nationalism on the periphery. Economic nationalism is generally associated with policies such as "the pursuit of self-sufficiency, the protection of domestic production against foreign competition and a favorable trade balance" (Mayall, 1990: 72). It is defined within the conceptual matrix composed of notions such as 'statism', 'industrialism' and 'protectionism'. In this definition, development and industrialization appear as the ultimate goals of the nation.[2] These goals in the Third World can only be

achieved by breaking all ties with the world capitalist system, fostering political independence by economic liberation, and implementing a state-led, independent and national development strategy.

In this chapter, I would like to elaborate on the idea of national development endorsed by the Turkish left in the 1960s. In the first part of the chapter, the external and internal sources of the ideology of national developmentalism advocated by the Turkish left will be focused on. Secondly, I will briefly evaluate the Turkish left's account of the late-Ottoman and modern Turkish history in terms of the concepts of imperialism, dependency and development. And lastly, the primary features of the national development strategy offered by the Turkish left will be analyzed.

6.2 The Ideology of National Developmentalism

The 1960 military coup was welcomed by Turkish bureaucratic and intellectual elite as the signal of the beginning of a new period of economic planning, industrialization and development (see, Keyder, 1987a: 146). The military takeover was considered to mark a change from the free market oriented economic program of the DP to a state-led development strategy based on a new policy of planning and coordination of the sources in the service of the rapid national development. The new strategy was supported by a coalition of the army, the intelligentsia, and the industrial bourgeoisie (see, Keyder, 1987a: 142-3; Keyder, 1987b: 45-7; Owen and Pamuk, 1998: 111). Manufacturers backed this strategy because they demanded state

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[2] As George T. Crane (1998: 65) holds, "images of economic life, or even industrialization itself, might be among the patchwork of symbolic resources available for national definition." Industrialization, Crane (1998: 69) argues, is not only the determinant of the construction of national identities; it is also used in the sphere of the imagination of national community. Economy can be a component in the construction of national identity trough common economic experiences. In the Third World context, for instance, this common economic experience is crystallized in the uneven economic relationship between imperialist powers and Third World societies. Or alternatively, industrialization can be taken as an ultimate aim of a national community, it can be perceived as "a sign of national glory."

regulation of the process of capital accumulation and state assistance with the hope of creating favorable conditions for domestic industries. The radical 'intermediate' strata, on the other hand, gave their support to this strategy because they believed that an underdeveloped country (like Turkey) could change location of its economy in the hierarchies of the world capitalists system dominated by industrial countries and carry out a genuine industrialization by protecting its national economy.

After 1960, the victors and supporters of the military coup and their representatives in the civil-military and intellectual elite offered "a new model of accumulation with its social policy, political balances and administrative mechanisms" (Keyder, 1987a: 144). The new model of economic regulation which was followed in Turkey in the 60s and 70s was the strategy of import substituting industrialization (ISI), which was considered as a successful economic growth model in combining the diverging interests of different social classes around the project of inward-oriented national development. The establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO) in September 1960 was the first serious official attempt at the realization of this new model of economic growth.[3]

The foundation of the SPO, "whose principal function was to supervise the workings of the economy in a rational manner within the context of a plan" was one of the most important long term decision taken by the new military rule four months after the 27 May Coup (Ahmad, 1993: 132).[4] The claim of the proponents of the idea of central planning was that the "liberalization" of the economy under

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[3] For the implementation of the ISI strategy and the establishment and role of the SPO see, Keyder (1987a: 148-53); Owen and Pamuk (1998: 110-5); Aydın (2005: 34-36); Eralp (1994: 210-2).

[4] The functions of the SPO would be "to assist the government in determining economic and socials objectives and policies, through the compilation and evaluation of exhaustive data on all types of natural, human, and economic resources and potentials in the country... prepare long and short-term plans for the realization of the objectives to be adopted by the government" ("Legal Provisions Related to the Establishment and Functioning of the State Planning Organization", 1967: 311).

the DP rule led to the bankruptcy of the Turkish economy in the 1950s as a consequence of the DP's unplanned and uncontrolled inflationary opening policies, the lack of any coordination and long-term perspective in the administration of the economy. In order to solve the problems of the DP years, it was argued, the new regime should replace the economic legacy of the previous period with an industrial development strategy based on an economic plan which would control the functioning of the economy in an effective way.[5]

It was the newly established SPO which institutionalized and formalized the four successive Five-Year Plans of the period between 1963 and 1980. The objectives and strategy of the first Five-Year Plan were to "attain and sustain the highest possible rate of economic growth and to achieve social justice within the democratic system" ("Resolution Adopted by the High Planning Council on the Objectives and the Strategy of the Development Plan", 1967: 322). Economic planning was considered by the SPO to pursue the common national good; it would give the priority to investments promoting public welfare. The general objectives of the planning was defined by the Second Five-Year Development Plan as achieving a rapid, balanced and sustained development within the principles of social justice, reducing the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign resources and attaining national economic self-sufficiency (*Second Five-Year Development Plan*, 1969: 3-5). The development plan would accelerate the rate of industrial activity through inward-oriented policies supported by a high degree protection from foreign competition of the national economy. These plans formulated a mixed economic development strategy in which the public and private sectors would function side by side.

[5] Planning was one of the buzz words and popular issues of the public debate of the sixties with some ideological connotations. It was argued that a government's progressive-mindedness could be measured by the criterion whether it stood by the plan more or less rigorously (Sönmez, 1967: 35).

According to the second development plan, for instance, the mixed economy system, which was considered as "the need for rapid development and of the necessity to reach quickly to the level of contemporary civilization by making use of all available resources", was "a characteristic feature of the Turkish nation and economy" (*Second Five-Year Development Plan*, 1969: 111). In this mixed economy system, the interests of the private sector "was served by the services and production provided by public enterprises" (Aydın, 2005: 35). The development plan, although it was imperative for the public sector, would also serve for the private sector as a guide and supporter and it would help individual entrepreneurs "explore and develop their enterprising potential" (*Second Five-Year Development Plan*, 1969: 109).[6]

It was in this context that the Turkish left made developmentalism an issue of public debate. Developmentalist ideology, strongly endorsed by a large section of the Turkish civil-military bureaucratic and intellectual elite of the period, became one of the orthodoxies of the 1960s. Development was understood in deeply nationalist terms oriented to achieving economic independence. The aim was to create a unified national economy and to reduce nation's dependence on Western imperialist powers. In that intellectual world, the idea of development was elevated to a virtue, an ultimate goal that should be reached up as rapidly as possible; it was considered to be the basic criterion for comparing nations. The developmentalist ideology of the 1960s glorified "the role to be played by technocratic elite in the industrialization of the country. The working class has not been yet discovered; the dominant intellectual current was a Baran-inspired dependency analysis with 'non-capitalist path' overtones, which required the transfer of state power from self-serving and corrupt

[6] The public sector would only enter those field of manufacturing industry "which the private sector cannot participate in despite the incentives and which may create bottlenecks in the economy" (*Second Five-Year Development Plan*, 1969: 112).

politicians to nationalist planners whose aim was to serve the people." And the building blocks of this desired order would be industrialization, economic autonomy and social justice (Keyder, 1987a: 146).

But, the rise of the idea of national developmentalism in Turkey should also be understood in a more general increasing trend of developmentalist discourse becoming very popular, especially, at the periphery of the world after 1945. In the post-war era, national liberation became also a struggle for national economic independence, a movement which aimed at eliminating economic subordination to the world economy. The program of national liberation in the post-1945 period was characterized by a radical economic nationalism, with its emphasis on state-led national development and import-substitution industrialization. Likewise, Turkish left of the 1960s endorsed a similar kind of economic nationalism, emphasizing the elements of economic development with a strong focus on industrialization and growing control of the state over national economy. *Independent* and *national* development was a central ideological feature of their political program.

The common sense of the radical intelligentsia of the period was explaining the root cause of underdevelopment in terms of the dependence on Western imperialist centers. This explanation was one of the basic creeds of the Third Worldist ethos of the post-colonial era. It found sympathizers not only among intellectuals of the Third World but also in the academic circles of the Western universities. The dependency literature was providing the more sophisticated versions of this explanation.[7] In this approach, dependency was interpreted as a relation of subordination to international capitalist system. In this

[7] The issues of imperialism, dependency, underdevelopment, Third Worldism etc. have been elaborated in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.

illustration, development and underdevelopment constituted each other through a relational process; the one was defined by reference to the other. It was the hierarchical and unequal structure of the world capitalist system that was re-producing underdevelopment on the periphery and development at the center of the system. In that unequal relationship, the center was determining the terms of the exchange through which the developed were getting more developed, whereas the underdeveloped were destined to eternal backwardness. For this approach, the diffusion of the foreign capital through economic and military aids to the underdeveloped countries and the growing economic, diplomatic and military ties with the imperialist centers did not lead to the development of the underdeveloped, but only increased their level of subordination to the Western imperialist powers.

The same Third Worldist credo also preached that there was still a way out of underdevelopment, or if we put it another way, to save the Third World nations from the wretchedness of underdevelopment. Delinking from the world capitalist system was the only solution for the question of backwardness. The major obstacle to autonomous national development was the capitalist system and the remedy was to delink. For the proponents of this solution, it was possible to break with the world capitalist system and to initiate an autonomous development strategy at the national level. Their answers to the questions of what the obstacles to national development were, how to achieve autonomous national development, were trapped in the ideology of national developmentalism. Development "was possible through a rational organization of society, where each nation-state could achieve an autonomous national development through the conscious, sovereign, and free control of their destiny" (Grosfoguel, 2000: 361).

The other (and internal) source of the nationalist developmentalist ideology of the Turkish left in the 1960s can be found in the early Republican Turkey. One can trace the origins of this ideology in Turkey back to the decades following the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In the writings of the prominent figures of the *Kadro* (Cadre) movement of the early thirties, which tried to develop a new interpretation of the 'Kemalist Revolution' and provide the new regime with an ideological content through which the regime could legitimize itself, we can find the first formulations of the national developmentalist ideology.[8] The *Kadro* movement was influenced by different intellectual sources. Marxist theories of imperialism, the Soviet experiences of economic development in the late twenties and the thirties, Galiyevism, the writings of German economists like List, Sombart and Wagner were among these sources of inspiration.[9] The movement was basically proposing an economic development model, blending nationalism with some socialist ideas in a selective way and suggesting the implementation of the outcomes of this combination in the Turkish context. The movement had also many non-socialist and non-liberal features. It questioned the relevance of class struggle in the Turkish context and perceived the concept of nation as its unit of analysis. The movement was actually suggesting a "third way", an autonomous national development strategy based on state-led planning, beyond capitalism and socialism.

The *Kadro* movement, "anticipating almost the entire set of theoretical arguments of the post-war dependency literature" (Gülalp, 1998: 954-955),

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[8] For the *Kadro* movement see, Gülalp (1987); Özveren (1996); Türkeş (1998: 92-119); Türkeş (2001: 91-114).

[9] Basic features and propositions of these sources of inspirations have been elaborated before in this study in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

argued that the development of capitalism in Europe produced underdevelopment on the 'periphery' of the world capitalism. The movement proposed that in the age of imperialism, the dominant conflict was between the developed and the underdeveloped countries, and development was achievable for the underdeveloped only through breaking from the capitalist world system and adopting an independent state-led development strategy under the guidance of progressive nationalist intellectuals. *Kadro*, in this sense, can be considered as "a forerunner of Third Worldist ideologies", a movement which "contained an astonishingly complete catalogue of all the arguments which again became current in the 1960s" (Keyder, 1987a: 243).

The *Kadro* circle formulated its proposals in a special historical context following the Great Depression, in which the new Republican regime decided to initiate an import-substituting industrialization strategy in 1932 and implement the first development plan in 1933 in response to the destructive consequences of the depression. The prevailing approach in the official circles about what should be the orientation of the Turkish economy in this period of turmoil was etatism, which lasted until the outbreak of the Second World War. *Kadro* agreed with the new regime on the issue concerning Turkey's urgent need for industrialization through state intervention into economy and central planning. But, development strategy suggested by the *Kadro* movement was much more inclusive and broader than the one advocated by the Republican regime.

Kadro writers' understanding of etatism and planning was more radical than the official interpretations. For the writers of *Kadro*, the state should take the leading role in national industrialization, and own the larger industries; it should take the control of the national economy from production to distribution. The

private sector, which was weak and not able to achieve the intended level of economic development, should be under the state control. The private sector would continue to exist in the *Kadro* writers' model of development, but it would be allowed to function only within the boundaries of the central planning controlled by the state. The type of etatism advocated by the *Kadro* movement was "nationalist etatism", which was carefully distinguished by the movement from other types, such as "fiscal etatism" (a liberal version) and "socialist etatism" (see, Türkeş, 2001: 95-100, 103-4, 106-7). In the model of nationalist etatism, the state did not represent any particular class/or classes and their interests. In this model, it was argued, the state, composed of a leading bureaucratic cadre, the 'universal class' (if we use Hegel's definition), could represent the national interests and act in the name of the whole nation.[10]

6.3 Political Economy of the Late Ottoman and Republican History

The "statement" (*Yön Bildirisi*) on economic and social development in Turkey that was published in the first issue of *Yön* gives us a general idea about the development strategy, the "philosophy of development", advocated by the Turkish left in the 1960s (*Yön*, 1961).[11] It stated that "the attainment of the level of modern civilization, the final solution of the problem of education, the enlivening of Turkish democracy, the realization of social justice and the establishment of democratic regime" can only be achieved by rapid economic development led and planned by the state ("Statement on Economic Development

[10] For *Kadro*'s understanding of etatism, see also, Boratav (1982: 151-60).

[11] The statement was translated into English by Frank Tachau (see, "Statement on Economic Development in Turkey", 1963: 75-78). The signers who backed the statement held different ideological and political views and belonged to different political party and organizations. Among the signers there were members of the left of the RPP as well as socialists close to Marxism.

in Turkey", 1963: 75). This strategy was sharing the goal of attaining the level of Western civilization with the tradition of modernizing bureaucratic-intellectual elite of the First and Second Constitutional periods and the Republican era. But, this goal could not only be achieved through the efforts for the implementation of institutional (or superstructural) reforms inspired from the Western experiences. Westernization, the primary goal of the Kemalist reforms, could only "be realized by approaching the level of productivity of the West" ("Statement on Economic Development in Turkey", 1963:75). The logic was simple:

> As the level of productivity in Turkey rises, the country's social structure will change, the dichotomy between city and village will disappear, opportunities will increase, and rationalism, the basis of Western civilization, will spread among the masses. ("Statement on Economic Development in Turkey", 1963: 75)

The level of development was the only criteria for measuring the progress; development was the key to all the economic, social and political problems of the country.

This *emphasis* of the Turkish left of the sixties *on* development can also be seen in their account of the history of Ottoman-Turkish modernization. They read this history from the prism of the notion of developmentalism.[12] In their account of the late Ottoman history, the period from the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839 to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War was portrayed as a history of semi-colonization. The Ottoman state never became a colony; it was

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[12] There were numerous works (from journalistic studies to more academic works) dealt with the modern Ottoman-Turkish history within the conceptual matrix of imperialism, dependency and underdevelopment, written and published in the 1960s and 1970s by the left-inclined authors. See for instance, Berkes (1964); Cem (1970); Çavdar (1970); Kurmuş (1974); Özkol (1969); Sencer (1977). But, Doğan Avcıoğlu's work, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, published first in December 1968, was more popular and well-known among many others in that period. In this section of the chapter, I will focus more on Avcıoğlu's *Türkiye'nin Düzeni*, since this work, in many ways, also represents the perspective of the Turkish left on the issue.

never directly colonized. But, during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state was turned into a semi-colony of the expansionist Western powers (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 121, 223).[13] The transformation of the Ottoman state in this period was considered to be a process of the integration (and subordination) of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalist system. The historical and symbolic turning point of the peripheralization of the Ottoman state in the world economy was the Free Trade Treaty signed with Britain in 1838 (see, Avcıoğlu, 1969: 102, 104-108; Avcıoğlu, 1985: 1065-1066). This treaty was followed by other similar commercial conventions between the Ottoman state and other European countries, which eradicated protective tariffs, state's restrictions on exports and imports, opened Ottoman markets and raw materials to foreign capital, and played an important role in the penetration of world capitalism into the Ottoman economy (see, Pamuk, 1987: 18-19). The declaration of the *Tanzimat* reforms of 1839, following the trade treaties, was considered as the admission of the dependent status of the Ottoman economy in the world economic system. Avcıoğlu argued that the *Tanzimat* reforms, just like the treaty of 1838, were imposed by Western powers: "The 1838 Treaty prepared the conditions for free trade. The *Tanzimat*, on the other hand, would bring the administrative, financial and other reforms dictated by this open market arrangement created in favor of Western interests" (quoted in Gülalp, 1994: 160).[14] So, for him, the Tanzimat reforms could not be evaluated as a glorious moment of the process of Ottoman-Turkish Westernization. Those reforms in essence served to the British interests and turned the Ottoman state into a semi-colony of Britain and the other Western

[13] See also, Aybar (1968: 269, 650); Boran (1968: 272).

[14] See also, Avcıoğlu (1969: 118).

powers (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 119).

In the accounts of the Turkish left in the 1960s, it was the penetration of world capitalism that hindered economic development of the Ottoman state. According to Avcıoğlu, for instance, this process of foreign penetration into the Ottoman economy undermined the development of Ottoman local manufacture. Within the international division of labor, the Ottoman economy shared the destiny of other peripheral economies and became an exporter of raw materials and importer of finished goods (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 108-118). The process opened up by free trade treaties was accompanied by external borrowing. The foreign loans, seen as a solution for raising state revenues, graved the process of semi-colonization and increased financial dependence of the Ottoman economy on the Western imperialism. The consequence of the external borrowing was the direct economic control of the Ottoman economy and its financial enslavement by the European powers, a process which was institutionally crystallized with the establishment of *Düyun-u Umumiye* (the Ottoman Public Debt Administration) in 1881 (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 126-134).

It was argued that the real beneficiaries of the reform movement in the Ottoman land were the Sultan, the Ottoman household, the bureaucrats, Armenian and Greek merchants of non-Muslim minorities and the Levantine population of the empire, all of whom acquired in the course of the time a comprador character. The nineteenth century Ottoman state and its high-ranked bureaucrats were labeled as the puppets of the European imperialism by the leftist intellectuals of the 1960s. The other beneficiaries of the Ottoman reform process, the Greek and Armenian merchants, were thought to constitute the basis of the empire's comprador bourgeoisie. Having enjoyed the privileges guaranteed by the *Tanzimat* reforms and

the protection provided by the Western powers, the minority compradors of the empire acted as agents of Western imperialist expansionism (see, Avcıoğlu, 1969: 118, 122, 193-4; Avcıoğlu, 1985: 1065-6; see also, Aybar, 1968: 650). As the trading collaborators of the Western European bourgeoisie, they were holding the key positions (commerce and industry) in the Ottoman economy located in the urban centers of the empire, such as İstanbul and İzmir, and increasing their effect through the expanding international trade networks. This comprador class composed of non-Muslim bourgeoisie was considered to have played a significant role in the semi-colonization of the Ottoman Empire.

The movements of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks were given a respectful status in this general picture. They were deserving respect for their opposition to superfluous and collaborationist *Tanzimat* Westernism and for their efforts to find solutions for the devastating problems encountering the Ottoman state and society. But, their propositions for saving the state and finding solutions for overcoming the backwardness of the Ottoman society were limited with the constitutional suggestions. Implementation of a constitutional and educational reform would be enough to save the state and liberate the society from the consequences of underdevelopment. Although well-intentioned, these proposals were deprived of any analysis of imperialism. However, it was argued, only this type of analysis could explain the root causes of the Ottoman backwardness (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 233-244). For instance, in his evaluation of Gökalp's ideas, Avcıoğlu argued that Gökalp could not give a satisfactory answer to the question of how development was possible. For Avcıoğlu, Gökalp just ignored the role of imperialism in the colonization of the Ottoman Empire. Avcıoğlu (1969: 262-263) wrote:

> How would civilization be achieved, that is to say, how would development be carried out? This task that we haven't yet accomplished for 150 years seemed very easy to him [Gökalp]. Muslim and Turkish entrepreneurs would bestir themselves, buy machinery from the West, build up roads, bridges, etc. By this way, Turkey would become civilized, and would develop… The key point was not to take the culture from Europe. Gökalp accused the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats of letting the Western culture in the country, but not of transforming it into a semi-colony in the economic sense. From the viewpoint of Gökalp, *Tanzimat* cosmopolitanism was not the direct consequence of economic colonialism. According to Gökalp, it was possible to be protected from the Western culture in a semi-colonial Turkey. This inadequacy in evaluating imperialism… led to the belief that those goals, civilization and development, can easily be achieved.

For Avcıoğlu, development was possible only through the liberation from the yoke of imperialism; that is to say, only delinking from imperialism could start the process of independent national development.

It was the national liberation war of 1919-22 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal that gave the first serious struggle, in the last 150 years of the late Ottoman-Turkish history, against imperialism and its internal collaborators for attaining civilization and development. According to this account, the Liberation War was waged internally against the Ottoman State, its representatives and the comprador bourgeoisie and externally against the Western imperialism. In this sense, the Kemalist Revolution, seen as the forerunner of the anti-imperialist Third World revolutions of the post-colonial era, was thought to represent a radical rupture with the Ottoman *Ancien Regimé* through an anti-imperialist revolution (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 268-9, 440; Boran, 1968: 16-7, 21). Unfortunately, this revolution, which was carried under the leadership of petty bourgeois military-civilian bureaucracy, was left no choice but to make concessions to some conservative forces like the local notables in order to secure the support of the peasantry. The Kemalist leadership was not able to deepen the

revolution by more radical social and economic reforms, and the effects of the revolution was mostly felt at the superstructural level of the Turkish society. The most important inadequacy of the Kemalist Revolution was its inability to carry through a fully-fledged land reform aiming at liquidating big land ownership and re-distributing confiscated land to landless peasantry. Such a land reform could have eliminated the reaction of the local notables and dramatically enlarged the new regime's support base through gaining the support and consent of the large masses of the peasantry (see, Avcıoğlu, 1969: 339, pp.504-5; see also, Belli, 1970: 216; Erdost, 1969: 28-30).

Although unfinished and interrupted, the Kemalist Revolution was considered as the first successful step on the way to achieving true national liberation and first attempt at implementing a national development strategy based on a sate-led central planning. Dependency-inspired developmentalism of the Turkish left of the 1960s legitimized their ideology "through a peculiar reading of the 1930s Kemalist experience" (Keyder, 1987a: 146). In the thirties, the Kemalist regime engaged in statism and industrialization through an early form of ISI strategy employed after the Great Depression, when the ties with the world capitalist system were weakened. Kemalist model of statist development was composed of state protectionist measures (state control of foreign trade and internal market), state-led industrialization, nationalization of some critical foreign investments in the fields of public utilities, mining and railroads.[15] All these efforts were complemented (and tried to be coordinated) by the First Five-Year Development Plan. Turkey, after the Soviet Russia, was the first country which adopted policy of state-led, central and compulsory planning (see, Hershlag

[15] Fort the statism and economic policies of the Kemalist era see, Boratav (1997: 165-90).

1988: 6).[16] It was this Kemalist model of development that was elevated to a status of virtue in the 1960s. The claims associating Kemalist regime with anti-imperialism and national developmentalism mostly took their arguments from the experiences of the 1930's industrialization impetus.

As the Kemalist regime of the early Republican era was glorified as an anti-imperialist, national developmentalist revolutionary breakthrough, the years following the accession of the Democratic Party to power in 1950 were condemned as the era of counter-revolutionary resurgence. The change of the government in the 1950 general elections was thought to signal the restoration of the *Tanzimat* Westernism and cosmopolitanism under the DP rule. For the Turkish left of the 1960s, the DP government was representing the interests of the alliance between the Western imperialism and its domestic collaborators, the big land lords and the new comprador bourgeoisie. In this period, it was argued, Turkey followed a different path of development from the one adopted in the previous period under the Kemalist rule. The DP government abandoned the policy of self-sufficiency and independent development strategy, and integrated (and subordinated) Turkey once again into the world capitalist system in the 1950s through opening Turkish economy to foreign capital (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 515-85; Aybar, 1968: 396, 399; Boran, 1968: 45-6, Belli, 1970: 216, 219-20).

The DP era ended with the 1960 military coup. The Turkish left interpreted the military takeover as a progressive act (of Kemalist civil-military bureaucracy) for giving an end to the counterrevolutionary government of the Democratic Party. The return to the ISI strategies once again, the establishment of

[16] A second development plan was conducted at the end of the thirties but, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, the implementation of the plan was abandoned. For the experience of the development plans of the thirties see also, Günçe (1967: 1-27).

the SPO and implementation of the new development plans after 1960 were approved by the Turkish left. But these measures were not radical enough and did not signify a genuine return to the independent and rapid development strategy which would break the dependence of Turkey on Western imperialism and would pave the way for the industrialization of the country.

6.4 Strategy for National Development

Turkey was described by the Turkish left as an underdeveloped country. For them, when its economic, social and political structures were considered, Turkey, like other developing countries, was a dependent country in the world imperialist system and exploited by the same order, from its raw materials and mineral resources to its foreign trade, politics and culture. The commonsense of the Turkish left was that Turkey "could long ago have become a developed, industrialized country and taken its place at the forefront of contemporary civilization. It is imperialism that has prevented this development" (qoted in, Mango, 1975: 41). It was Turkey's dependence on imperialist powers that was responsible for the backwardness of the country; it damaged national sovereignty and formed an obstacle to the economic and social development of Turkey.

It was argued that Turkey was brought into a close contact with the Western powers through foreign economic and military aids and was turned into a mere satellite of Western imperialism by the Turkish governments of the post-Second World War period. The attempts at developing Turkey through foreign capital, aids or loans were considered by all the main factions and leading intellectuals of the left in the sixties to be useless and destined to fail. The real reason behind the foreign economic and military assistance to Turkey was to

penetrate into the country, to undermine its national independence and sovereignty, and to takeover its economy. Dependency relationship with imperialism was hindering social and economic progress and producing underdevelopment in Turkey.

Any attempt at fostering close relationship with Western powers was severely criticized by the Turkish left. One of the popular topics of public debate in the 1960s, the issue of the integration of Turkey into the European Economic Community (EEC) was also elaborated from this perspective. The WPT, for instance, organized one of its first serious political campaigns against Turkey's integration with the EEC.[17] Just after the signing of the association agreement, on September 14, 1963, the party released a circular condemning the integration attempts of Turkey with the EEC (see, Aybar, 1968: 289-290; Aren, 1993: 64-66).[18] The aim of the accession process was claimed to incorporate Turkey into the world capitalist system. The party was sure that by entering the EEC, Turkey, in the long term, would lose its national independence. These attempts of economic integration with Europe were against the interests of the Turkish people. According to the party, the EEC was a collective colonialist association and this integration would only serve France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,

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[17]The first application of Turkey to the EEC commission for association with the EEC has been made on July 31, 1959. However, negotiations had been interrupted by the military intervention and not resumed until April 1962. The association agreement with Turkey was signed on September 12, 1963, in Ankara. The agreement envisaged economic union only after three stages: a five-year introductory stage, a twelve-year transition period in which a customs union could be established, and a final period when the customs union would develop toward full economic union. See, Vali (1971:130).

[18] Following this circular, Niyazi Ağırnaslı, a senator of the WPT who had joined the party in February 1963, made also a speech in the Assembly paralleling the political perspective of the circular (see, TİP, 1963: 1-8). After its entrance to the parliament, the WPT continued to oppose Turkey's association with the EEC. In a speech in the parliament Sadun Aren declared that the community actually protected the interests of the advanced industrial countries of Western Europe. A country like Turkey had no place in such a union (*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, 1967: 636). He also claimed that "Turkey will become the Hakkari of the Common Market" (quoted in Vali, 1971: 97). See also, Aren (1962c).

and Luxembourg, the six member states of the community, by supplying them with export markets, cheap raw materials and fields of investment. The accession to the EEC was considered to be a real threat to Turkey. The process would work against Turkey's national development and progress and would evaporate the last hopes of implementing an independent national economic development strategy for overcoming underdevelopment (see, Aybar, 1968: 284; Boran, 1968: 319-321).

For the Turkish left, there was only one way to save the country from its social, economic, political and cultural backwardness: to delink all ties with Western imperialist powers. It was impossible for Turkey to develop within the world capitalist system and through capitalist path of development.[19] After delinking the dependency ties with imperialism, Turkey should adopt a new autonomous and national development strategy, neither socialist, nor capitalist, but oriented to socialism. This new strategy would endorse the principles of economic nationalism; it would reject Turkey's dependent role in the world capitalist system and aim at implementing a non-capitalist, independent and rapid development strategy.

But, what was development? Development, according to the *Yön* group, was an effort that aimed to liquidate pre-capitalist social-economic system and comprador classes in order to create a unified and independent national economy and to implement a rapid modernization that would elevate the country to the level of Western civilization (Avcıoğlu, 1962e). The proponents of the national-democratic revolution were of the same opinion. The national goal of the NDR strategy was to

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[19] Belli was arguing, for instance, in the age of imperialism, there was no example of development through capitalist path except Germany and Japan. After these experiences, the way of economic and social progress through capitalist path of development was closed forever for the underdeveloped countries (Belli, 1970: 214). For similar remarks see also, Boran (1968: 251-252).

put an end to the domination of imperialism and comprador classes over the national economy and domestic politics (Belli, 1970: 220-221, 226). Comprador classes composed of exporters, importers, big land owners, foreign trade agents, domestic partners of foreign companies, and their representatives and salaried men were all self-seeking; they were not nationalist. Comprador classes were, in fact, against a real, national development and industrialization. They were portrayed as the strata pursuing their class interests in harmony with the Western imperialist powers, turning Turkey into a rental real estate and putting Turkish nation under the vestige of imperialist centers (Selçuk, 1965a).

The second main dimension of the economic program of the NDR strategy was about implementing a fully-fledged land reform which was supposed to dismantle feudal social and economic structures and relations, confiscate the lands of big land owners to landless people, and so, terminate the social, political and cultural hegemony of the landlords over the landless and poor peasants. Destroying feudal relations was considered as a big step in the way to the establishment of a real unified national economy which was assumed to be necessary for an independent and rapid national economic development (Belli, 1970: 221-222). Other major leftist factions also put their emphasis on the issue of the reform in landholding. They all advocated a fully fledged land and agrarian reform which would root up the economic bases of land lords, the backbone of the reactionarism in Turkey and the rural partners of the alliance with Western imperialism.[20]

[20] For instance, an important aspect of the WPT's program was its emphasis on the land problem. The WPT demanded that land ownership should be limited and that large agricultural lands should be distributed to landless and poor peasants. The party declared that land should be given to all the landless and that it would restrict land-holdings to 500 *dönüms* (a measure of land about ¼ acre) (TİP, 1965a: 13). See also, Belli (1970: 221-222).

The ultimate aim was described by the Turkish left as catching up with the contemporary civilization as quickly as possible. The task of bringing Turkey to the level of Western civilization, even above it, could only be achieved through rapid economic development. It was assumed that rapid development would change everything from social structure, institutions, behaviors, to health and education systems. Development in general was seen as a transition from agrarian society to industrial one. The corollary of this proposition was that development was possible only through industrialization (Aren, 1962b).[21] It was the industrialization process after all which led to the emergence of new ideas, new institutions and a new life style (Avcıoğlu, 1965a). Reaching to the level of contemporary civilization was identified with achieving social and economic development, the backbone of which would be heavy industrialization (Avcıoğlu, 1962c). For instance, in the *Yön* statement, it was typically argued that all the goals assumed by the Atatürk reforms "depend upon the success we will achieve in rapid economic development, that is, in the rapid increase in the level of national productivity" ("Statement on Economic Development in Turkey", 1963: 75). Kemalist goals of Westernization, attainment of the level of contemporary civilization could only be achieved through economic development, through the rise of productivity rate.

Turkish left understood socialism simply as a method of rapid development. Turkey as a backward country could achieve a development based on social justice only by adopting a development strategy prone to socialism (Avcıoğlu, 1962b). Socialism in this picture was reduced to the notion of national development and identified with nationalization of key sectors of economy, statism and central and

[21] For the necessity of (heavy) industrialization see also, Boran (1968: 258, 321).

compulsory planning. The leading figure of *Yön*, Avcıoğlu, identified three different types of socialism; i.e., Eastern socialism, Western socialism, and socialism of the underdeveloped countries (or Third World socialism). For him, Eastern socialism proved its success in providing a method of rapid development for underdeveloped countries. However, the humanitarian cost of such a development strategy was so high that its success in economic development was shadowed by its despotic and totalitarian features. The *Yön* group, although favoring in some respects, categorically rejected Eastern (Soviet) type of socialism. Western socialism of the highly developed countries of the West could not also be a model for backward countries dealing with the problem of carrying out a rapid, radical transformation from a pre-capitalist mode of social and economic relations to an industrial one. This task, according to Avcıoğlu (1962h), could only be achieved by a "third way", by the socialism of the underdeveloped countries.

Avcıoğlu (1969: 619) accordingly pointed to three distinct and alternative paths of development that Third World countries could choose for putting an end to their old aged backwardness. These were the communist path, the American (capitalist) path, and the statist or national-revolutionary path. The first path was out of the question, because of the brutality of the method it suggested (Avcıoğlu: 1963a). Capitalist path was also not an option for the underdeveloped countries of the Third World in the 20th century, in the age of imperialism. Turkey and other underdeveloped countries had not had a strong progressive national bourgeoisie. Capitalism was imported to these countries from outside. Capitalist classes of the Third World were dependent on Western capitalism. These classes were not mature, powerful and national enough to take the responsibility of liquidating pre-capitalist classes and structures and to lead a national industrialization

strategy, and so, to pave the way for social and economic progress. On the contrary, it was inclined to collaborate with reactionary feudal forces and imperialism (Avcıoğlu, 1963b).

The national-revolutionary path, on the other hand, was characterized by a new type of statism, in which the state sector would have the dominant role in the economy. In this path of development which was called new statism or progressive statism, the strategic branches and mechanisms of the Turkish economy would be under the state management. The state would control foreign capital inflow and its operations in the country as well as the activities of the indigenous private capital (Avcıoğlu, 1969: 671). Statism was described by the *Yön* writers as a social economic and political regime which encompasses not only state's intervention into economy, but covers all other important realms of national life. State, as the sole representative of the interests of the whole nation and the protector of the nation's permanence, would regulate economic, social and political orders of the country (Aydemir, 1962b).

The idea of statism as a strategy for industrialization and development was advocated by all different sections of the Turkish left in the 1960s. State was illustrated as the motor of national development and industrialization. They denied the policy that the national economy should be led by the private enterprise. Private sector was thought to be weak and unable to offer a rapid development strategy that Turkey needed; a rapid national development strategy could only be carried out under the guidance of the state (see, Aren, 1961; Aren, 1962a). The state should takeover the basic industries, the major part of the means of production and should control the mechanisms of production, circulation and distribution.

Not only statism, but also a central, compulsory and rational planning accepting state's dominant role in the economy and oriented to the construction of heavy industry was considered to be necessary for the rapid national development. Planning was seen as an effective instrument that would enable large scale changes in social, economic, political and cultural realms (see, for instance, Avcıoğlu, 1962d; Avcıoğlu, 1963b). Planning would be complemented with nationalization. The economic programs of the major leftist movements and organizations of the sixties was calling for nationalization of foreign companies, foreign trade, banking, credit institutions, insurance companies, and some large enterprises in heavy industry, transport, and mining (see, for instance, Aybar, 1968: 663-665; Belli, 1970: 220-221; Boran, 1968: 258-259, 268).

Statist model of development offered by the Turkish left was different from the existing models or the model applied by the Kemalist regime in the thirties. The new model was claimed to be more radical and wide-ranging, and not confining itself only with economy. In the new model, the state would control all pivotal points and mechanisms of the economy from the establishment and management of the key industries to the regulation and control of foreign trade, banking, insurance and other financial sectors. But, the state control over economy would also be exceeded to social, political and cultural realms. What was suggested was a kind of total, broad statism. The argument was that the state could only find solutions to social and economic consequences of underdevelopment (stagnation, poverty, unemployment, health and education problems) by implementing a national development strategy that would encompass every major realm of the social life. Statism was the most effective way of avoiding unequal distribution of resources and taxation of incomes. It

could increase the level of public savings and channelize them into new useful fields of investment in more rational way. As well as, while private initiative was considered to be profit seeking and pursuing particular interests, statism was approved for being a rational model and for pursuing the general good. New statism would stand not for particular, private interests but for general interests of the nation (see, for instance, Avcıoğlu, 1962g).

But, what would be the limits of state intervention into the national economy? What would be the role of the private sector in this schema? In the statist path of development, although state would play the leading role in the development of the national economy, the existence of private enterprise would be also guaranteed. But it would not be the major leading force of the economy. It would lose its privileged place in the economy and would be relegated to a secondary position; "the activity of the private sector will be oriented towards supplying the needs of the national economy" (Aybar, 1968: 391).[22] The interests and needs of the private sector would not determine the composition and orientation of the national economy any more. And, this did not mean a total rejection of the private sector. But, unfortunately, there existed no strong national private industry in Turkey. Avcıoğlu (1964a) interestingly argued that

> Private entrepreneurs will be surprised a little bit, but socialists will be the first acclaimers of the emergence and development of a real national private industry. Socialists have been yearning for a national industry, which can say no to the Common Market undermining our country's hope of development and

[22] The statist development strategy was sometimes identified with the term of 'mixed economy'. For instance, (although the party advocated a socialist revolution strategy in the Turkish context), the WPT employed the notion (mixed economy) in its official party program. The party was assuming a long (but necessary) transitory stage (to socialism), which would be characterized by a mixed economy in which both private and state sectors would operate. Naturally, the state would be the major force in the economy. The private sector, on the other hand, would be permitted only as a secondary measure and maintained in a supplementary role to the state sector. That is to say, the party favored a mixed economy under the dominance of the public sector (see, TİP, 1964b: 101).

> industrialization, which can oppose snatching assembly industry, and which can lead the process of elimination of land lords.

According to him, friends of national manufacturers were neither imperialists nor their internal comprador allies, working against national industrialization. The real friends of national industrialists were socialists, those who wanted to achieve economic independence, development, social justice, and democracy through statist strategies. For these reasons, national industrialists should give up following the directions of foreign capital, break up with imperialism, and take part in the statist national development strategy (Avcıoğlu, 1965d).

6.5 Conclusion

So far, I have focused on the ideology of national developmentalism as it was understood by the Turkish left in the 1960s. Developmentalism preaching an autonomous and national development strategy was one of the basic characteristics of the left in Turkey. The common belief was that a dependent and underdeveloped country could only develop by delinking from world capitalist system, breaking all ties with the Western imperialism and adopting a development strategy composed of state ownership, industrialization and central, compulsory and state-led planning. This strategy was thought to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization.

In the Turkish case, the idea of development was identified with the attainment of the level of modern civilization in many occasions. The Turkish left perceived the process of social-economic development as a progress, which should also be understood in terms of the dichotomies between traditional and modern. The idea of Westernization/modernization as the transformation of a traditional society into a modern and rational one was a good thing. But, on the other hand,

development could only be possible through fighting against the encroachment of Western imperialism. What was suggested was a kind of Westernization without being subordinated to the West; an amalgamation of 'dependency' and main stream 'modernization' accounts. The next chapter will focus a little more on the Turkish left's perception of West and Westernization as well as the idea of Turkish socialism (*Türk* or *Türkiye Sosyalizmi*) in terms of the notions of authenticity and uniqueness.

CHAPTER 7

THE TURKISH LEFT AND THE DEBATE ON THE UNIQUENESS OF TURKEY

7.1 Introduction

Nationalism of the Turkish left of the 1960s can be interpreted as a way of reflecting the resentment against the subordination of the country to the Western imperialist powers. But this resentment was also consisting of recognition of, if not an admiration towards, the material and spiritual achievements of the Western civilization. After all, it was the *level* of the Western achievements that should be caught up with. The attainment of this level could only be achieved through the secularization of all levels of social life, rapid social and economic development and social justice. This goal had many things in common with the Kemalist principle of attaining the level of contemporary civilization. But, in the age of imperialism, this aim, social and economic development and progress, could only be achieved by adhering to national independence. The success of the path of development and progress in Turkey was depending on Turkey's ability to break

its ties of dependency on Western imperialism. Moreover, Turkey as an underdeveloped country could not follow the path that was already passed by the advanced Western countries. Turkey was to pursue a different development model which would suit to its own historical development and its own specific economic-social conditions. What was needed was an independent and national strategy that would underline the distinctiveness of the Turkish context on the one hand, and elevate Turkey to the development level of contemporary civilization, on the other. The question was to reconcile the particularity of the national context, the inner domain, with the universal criterions of development and progress, the outer domain. That is to say, the issue was to build up a delicate balance between the national difference (and autonomy) and the cosmopolitan standards of contemporary civilization (its institutions, norms and technology).

In this chapter, I will first focus on the limits of Turkish left's understanding of Westernism and anti-Westernism, as it was discussed in the 1960s. This debate was also related to the common observation of the period that the patterns of Turkish history were different from those of the West. In the second part of the chapter, it will be argued that Turkish left sought the reasons of Turkish difference within the social and economic history of Ottoman-Turkish society. But, this inquiry on history also meant an inquiry on politics and political strategy that should be employed in the Turkish context for a specific path of revolutionary change. One of the consequences of the emphasis on the particularity of Turkish historical development was the growing interest in creating a distinctive, Turkish type of socialism. The last section of the chapter will focus on this idea of "Turkish socialism" (*Türk* or *Türkiye sosyalizmi*), invented and endorsed in the 1960s by some factions of the Turkish left.

7.2 The Limits of Westernism and Anti-Westernism

The strategy of the majority of the Turkish left in the 1960s was quiet simple: a genuine social and economic modernization (based on social justice), the criteria of which were tacitly accepted to be the standards of the contemporary Western civilization, could only be realized despite the West. This strategy seemed to be an articulated version of the arguments of the mainstream 'modernization' and 'dependency' approaches. On the one hand, it shared the basic features of the modernization school. The social change was understood as a unilinear transformation progressing through a series of stages shifting a traditional society to a modern one. The change was recognized in terms of an evolutionary classification of the notions of traditional and modern. Moreover, the Turkish left shared with the modernization theory the similar developmentalist assumptions, the similar idealization and glorification of the notion of development.

But, on the other hand, as it has already been discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish left differed from the modernization accounts in terms of the reasons of the underdevelopment of the Third World nations, like Turkey, and in terms of the path that should be followed by these underdeveloped societies in order to break through the vicious circle of backwardness. For the Turkish left, underdevelopment in the Third World was the consequence of the externalization of the Western capitalism through various forms and instruments of imperialism and colonialism. Development in the Third World could only be achieved by clinging to national independence. But, as Gulalp (1998: 957) has argued, "despite the seeming contrast between modernization and dependency theories, they were both concerned with how to achieve economic and technological development."

The central concern of development studies, from the beginning, "has been the nature of the original transition experienced by Western Europe and the possibility of its replication elsewhere. Modernization theory claimed that this replication was not only possible, it was inevitable. Dependency theory rejected this claim and argued that the replication was being blocked by the imperialism of the developed countries. But ultimately the theory shared the idealized notion of development derived from the Western experience and the associated implicit longing to replicate it. Dependency theorists argued that only through independence was it possible to replicate the Western experience" (Gülalp, 1998: 957).

This portrayal of the dependency-inspired strategies composed of both Westernist and anti-Westernist tendencies can also be seen in the developmentalism and secularism of the Turkish left of the 1960s. It seemed that the majority of the Turkish left in the 1960s identified two basic interrelated conflicts characterizing the Turkish society. One of these conflicts was between 'the anti-imperialist, national forces' and 'the coalition of Western imperialism and its non-national internal allies, comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords'. The other, on the other hand, was between 'the forces of reaction and tradition' and 'the forces of change and progress'. These conflicts were overlapped, because those classes, comprador bourgeoisie and big land lords, collaborating with Western imperialism at the expense of national interests were also the ones hindering change, progress and development.

The questions of what the West is, how Westernism should be understood, how the goal of Westernization should be reconciled with the idea of national independence were among the popular issues of the debates within the ranks of the leftist intellectuals in the 1960s. This debate does not only shed light on the Turkish

left's perception of progress and development, but also help us to comprehend the scope and limits of the Turkish left's understanding of Kemalism, nationalism and anti-imperialism. The leading figure in these debates was Niyazi Berkes. His articles in the *Yön* journal on the idea of Westernization and its relationship with nationalism and the idea of social revolution triggered the debate among the leftist intellectuals of the period.[1] At the one pole of the debate, there was a total rejection of the West as the source of all 'evil' in the Third World, a position advocated by uncompromising anti-Westernists, like Belli, arguing that Turkish socialism was irreconcilable with any type of Westernism. In this approach, anti-Westernism was identified with anti-imperialism, and Westernism was seen as a sign of compromising with imperialism. The issue of Westernism, simply, was not on their agenda (see, Belli, 1970: 271-281). At the other extreme of the debate, there were those, who argued that the West was not just only composed of imperialism, but also had some good values (its culture, science), which could (and should) be borrowed (see, for instance, Edgü, 1965). Most of the participants of the debate were in between these two poles. Despite the anti-imperialist and anti-Westernist stance of the proponents of this position, their Kemalism and their aim and strategy of reaching to the level of contemporary civilization, nevertheless, forced them to put the confrontation with Westernism into their agenda. Berkes was the most important name of this position. In the following pages, Turkish left's debate on Westernism and anti-Westernism will basically be evaluated through the works of Berkes.

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[1] Berkes's two books on Westernism, nationalism, developmentalism and social revolution (*200 Yıldır Neden Bocalıyoruz?* (1964) and *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* (1965)), first appeared in *Yön* in the issues between no.57-69 and between no.98-108. These two books were edited again by Berkes and the outcome was published in one volume and titled this time as *Türk Düşününde Batı Sorunu* (1975). For the Westernism debate see also, Küçükömer (1969a); Avcıoğlu (1969); Boran (1964: 5-9); Belli (1970: 271-81) [First published in *Yön* (1965a)]; Belli [E. Tüfekçi] (1965b); Belli [E. Tüfekçi] (1966a); Belli [E. Tüfekçi] (1966b); Sevin (1964a: 46-50) Sevin (1964b: 47-54); Sevin (1964c: 30-7); Edgü (1965: 32-9); Berkes (1965c: 13-7); Berkes (1965b); Berkes (1966a); Selçuk (1966a).

A very critical attitude towards the history of the Ottoman-Turkish Westernization and the intellectual history of Westernism in the modern Ottoman-Turkish society was shared by most of the contributors to the debate, including Berkes. Berkes especially put target on the Westernism generated by the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats of the 19th century, called pejoratively by him as *Tanzimat* Westernism. This caricaturized *Tanzimat*-type of Westernism/Westernizer, identified with imitation, opportunism, and inconsistencies, was criticized by every participant of the debate. The general opinion was that, in the 19th century Ottoman history, Westernization evolved into a cosmopolitan and reactionary ideology at the hands of collaborationist *Tanzimat* bureaucrats, making the country a mere satellite of the Western imperialist powers. Westernization was not understood as an all-encompassing economic and societal development and progress of the country, but mostly as imitations of Western ways in the form of superfluous and cosmetic innovations (Berkes, 1975: 178-184, 192-197, 201). Westernization could not be simply taking (or borrowing) some missing institutions or faculties from the West. This type of Westernism, according to Berkes, was the first branch of a longer historical lineage passing through the Westernism of the Abdülhamid era, reaching to the Westernism of the Menderes government. The issues of development and social progress and the goal of protecting national existence, sovereignty and independence could not be achieved through the policies of this type of Westernist tradition, prone to collaborate with Western imperialist powers (Berkes, 1975: 222, 279-281).

In opposition to this tradition, Berkes argued, there was an alternative league of the historical legacies of the Westernist intellectual-bureaucratic elite, expanding from the era of the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk oppositions to the Republican era, from the leading figures and organizations of the First and Second

Constitutional periods to those of the Kemalist Revolution. For him, they deserved a real respect at least for their critical opposition to the collaborationist, superfluous Westernism of the other tradition, which was identified by him with Tanzimat bureaucrats, Abdülhamit, and Menderes.[2] It was basically within the Young Ottoman, Young Turk and Kemalist tradition that the intellectual interest started to focus on the question of how the balance between Western civilization and local-national culture should be constructed in order to avoid the pitfalls of the process of Westernization. According to Berkes (1975: 202-203, 283-284), this tension represented one of the main issues of the modern Ottoman-Turkish political thought and constituted a great intellectual challenge for most of the late Ottoman and Republican political and intellectual elite.

Although the pre-Kemalist heritage of those historical-intellectual figures, such as Namık Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, managed to generate a critical relationship with the idea of Westernization, their Westernism also had their own limitations,

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[2] The glorification of the historical legacy of this intellectual-bureaucratic group, seen as progressive-Westernist modernizers, was the quasi-official approach of the left-Kemalist circles of the sixties; and this approach also received recognition from other leftist factions seeking alliance with the left-Kemalism. The left-Kemalist discourse of Berkes and the *Yön* group had a quite significant impact on a broad political spectrum ranging from the left of the RPP to the main factions of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s. But, it was also challenged by some important intellectual figures of the period, like İdris Küçükömer. In his book, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, Küçükömer focuses on the role played by Westernist-laicist bureaucratic elite in the modern Ottoman-Turkish history. In his quiet original analysis, this stratum was portrayed not as a progressive force of the Ottoman-Turkish history, but instead as a reactionary force. This intermediate stratum representing the statist tradition of the Ottoman past, functioning against the interests of the majority and *de facto* serving to the interests of the Western powers was an isolated group within and alienated from the society and unable to provide remedies to the old-aged problems of the country. All this group wanted was to continue its privileged and autonomous position within the political structure, and very reluctant to give up its regulatory role in the political life of the country. These bureaucratic elite were forcefully imposing their project of Westernization, their understanding of what good society was, on the people from above. They owed their power to their invented division drawn between Westernist/progressive/laicist and Easternist/conservative/Islamist sections of the society. Westernism of this group was inconsistent, rootless, and actually not sincere; it just helped to over shade the real divisions and tensions of the country. For Küçükömer, being secular or Westernist was not the necessary precondition of being progressive, or leftist; or to put it other way around, being pious was not an obstacle to being progressive, or leftist. See, Küçükömer (1969a: 9-14; 78-85; 138-41); Küçükömer (1969b); Küçükömer (1969c). For similar remarks on the role of bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish history, see also, Aybar (1968: 639-68).

inconsistencies and deflections. Their Westernism based on the possibility of the compatibility between Western civilization and local cultures (Islamic or national), and assumed a delicate balance between them, a balance which would be able to filter and distinguish between the good and the bad aspects of both realms.[3] These intellectual efforts were thought to be necessary for avoiding the traps of obscurantism and collaborationism. But these attempts at constructing such a balance was, as it has also been discussed in the previous chapter, deprived of any understanding of imperialism, anti-imperialism or any idea of necessity for a rapid economic and social development (Berkes, 1975: 240-241). For Berkes, it was the Kemalist Revolution which managed to bring together the Westernist and anti-Westernist (it can be read as anti-imperialist) tendencies in a very delicate balance, with the aim of developing the country along the lines of Western civilization, reaching the stage achieved by the civilized nations without being subordinated to

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[3] Namık Kemal was one of the most influential intellectuals of the 19th century Ottoman intellectual and political life, who engaged with the discussion of the problems of progress and Westernization. For Kemal, the Ottoman state should acquire everything that was superior and useful in Western civilization in order to halt and reverse the process of the Ottoman decline. The immediate measures that should be taken for this purpose would be the implementation of an educational reform and the institutionalization of a constitutional regime. But, Berkes argues, it is wrong to portray Namık Kemal as an unconditional Westernist. Kemal, according to Berkes, was an important intellectual witness of his era who warned the people against the dangers emerging from the severe consequences of the imitative and collaborationist Westernism of the *Tanzimat* bureaucrats. Namık Kemal was very much concerned with the search for those elements of local culture that were obstacles to progress and for those features of Western civilization that should not be taken over. Similarly, on the one hand, he appealed to local sources, like Islamic tradition of thought or Ottomanism, and on the other hand, he tried to synthesize the Islamic political concepts with those of the Western political thought, like the doctrines of natural rights and the sovereignty of the people. What he tried to achieve was to reconcile the conflicting demands of Islam, Ottomanness and the West. See, Berkes (1998: 209-218). See also, Berkes (1975: 206-216). Ziya Gökalp was another important intellectual figure attracting the interest of Berkes. Gökalp, following Namık Kemal's middle road, embraced the similar strategy that only the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its non-material aspects. See, Berkes (1959: 21). The main issue of Gökalp's intellectual heritage was "the question of how the Turks should adopt Western civilization, and how this effort should be harmonized with the Turks' two historic traditions, i.e. their Turkish and Islamic backgrounds; or in other words, what the Turks as a nation and Islam as their religion would look like under the conditions of contemporary civilization" (Berkes, 1959: 13). The distinction between culture and civilization holds a central place in Gökalp's thought. Culture is the site of nationalism, and is composed of the customs and traditions of a particular nation; it "is unique and *sui generis*." Civilization, on the other hand, is the site of modernization. Civilization without a cultural foundation, according to this schema, eventually turns into a process of mechanical imitation (Berkes, 1959: 23). For Gökalp, see also, Berkes (1975: 237-48).

the Western powers. Berkes (1998: 464) argues that "Mustafa Kemal's drive 'towards the West in spite of the West' by methods contrary to Western liberalism was merely the logical consequence of his belief that the struggle for national liberation was between advanced nations and nations that allowed themselves to be exploited by their insistence on their medievalism. The West was not a West of simply 'modern sciences and techniques." There were different facets of the West that should be confronted with; and imperialism was one of them. An underdeveloped nation had no other choice but "to strive to make itself equal to the developed nations if it did not want to continue to be exploited by them" (Berkes, 1998: 463).

The history of Westernization and nationalism before the Kemalist Revolution had its own paradoxes. In the pre-Kemalist era, Berkes (1975: 258) argued, Westernism without a national awareness tended to turn into collaborationism, and nationalism without a Westernist perspective, on the other hand, into racism and reactionism. He was criticizing the Westernizers of the late Ottoman era for being economically, diplomatically and militarily dependent on the Western powers, or for underestimating or ignoring the imperialist face of the Western civilization. For Berkes, not only the Westernism, but also the nationalism of the pre-Kemalist era was characterized by some negative attributes. The search for national identity had to be complemented with a sincere effort towards an independent and national economic-social development. But, nationalism of the early 20th century evolved into a racism (Turkism) or into reactionism in the form of religious nationalism. Neither Westernists nor nationalists were able to find a delicate balance between Westernism and nationalism, a reasonable method of reconciling them in a progressive way. They were not able to develop a strategy that

would solve the problems of development and social progress, on the one hand, and would fulfill the goal of protecting national existence, sovereignty and independence, on the other (Berkes, 1965a: 6-10).

For Berkes (1965a: 25), reactionism (*gericilik*), imperialism and underdevelopment (economic and social deprivation) were the main problems of Turkish society, hindering its progress. It was the amalgamation of an anti-imperialist and nationalist tendency and a Westernist outlook that could find solutions to these problems of the country. But, Turkish nation should jealously protect its independence during its relationship with the West; otherwise Turkish nation would not be able to avoid the imperialist pressure of the West. Turkey could keep its national independence and achieve a social and economic modernization and progress only by challenging the West (Berkes, 1975: 186-187). But, on the other hand, Westernization and preserving national autonomy and independence were not two different irreconcilable processes, standing against each other; there was a close relationship between them, one could not be achieved without the other (Berkes, 1975: 251). Berkes's formulation (1975: 187-188) was simple: a Westernism which was deprived of a real nationalism took the form of national treason; and a nationalism deprived of Westernism took the shape of reactionism. The desired reconciliation was achieved through the Kemalist Revolution. The lesson that should be drawn from the success of the Kemalist Revolution, according to Berkes (1975: 250), was the motto of 'Westernization despite the West'. Westernization should be approached neither with an admiration for, nor with an enmity toward the Western civilization.

So far, I have discussed the debate of Turkish socialists on Westernism and anti-Westernism in the 1960s, with an emphasis on Berkes's account. This debate is

important not just because it exposes what Turkish socialists understand from these concepts and how they reconcile them; it is important because it also reveals the content and extent of the Turkish left's engagement with Kemalism and nationalism in the same period. But, it should also be noted that the debate of the Turkish left on the concepts of West and Westernism was also a debate on the issue of Turkey's difference from the West. It was also this difference which was legitimizing the incorporation of nationalist discourse into the political strategies and programs of the main currents of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s. The next section, in this sense, will focus on Turkish left's quest of finding the historical roots of this difference.

7.3 Searching for the Turkish Uniqueness

The Turkish left of the 1960s, like the preceding Ottoman-Turkish intellectual traditions, was also concerned with the question of how to reconcile the demands and standards of modernization with national peculiarities, or how to meet the challenge of modernization within the discourse of nationalism. The local-national *cultural* peculiarities doubtlessly were important and should be taken into consideration when composing a balance between those tendencies. They were important, because the issue, actually, was to both distinguish and bring together the material domain of social-economic progress, in which the West has supremacy, with the domain of spiritual, in (and through) which the indigenous national culture can attain its autonomy and marks its difference from the West.

But, what did the Turkish left of the 1960s understand from the notion of national culture? Common culture, together with common language, territory and economy, were thought, by the Turkish left, to be among the basic criteria of being a

nation. The task of a real revolutionary nationalist, according to this definition, was to fight for these commonalities, including a unified national culture and language. The common sense of the leftist reading public of the Turkey of the 1960s was that Turkey was under the hegemony of imperialist and semi-feudal cultures, which reflected imperialist and feudal interests, and which together formed a reactionary alliance against the real national interests. Reactionarism and cosmopolitanism of those cultures were undermining and corrupting the national culture and hindering its full development.[4] A new understanding of culture, both revolutionary and national, and composed of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and democratic features, could only sweep away obstacles placed by reactionary and cosmopolitan cultures in the way of the realization of national culture. The new national revolutionary culture would be purified of racist, irredentist, conservative, reactionary, cosmopolitan-decadent qualities, but it would also protect the self-esteem and independence of the Turkish nation and would make its members to be proud of being from Turkish nation (see, for instance, Belli, 1970: 287-288, 333-349).

For the Turkish left, imperialist domination was not limited only to the economic, military and diplomatic fields; a different kinds of domination was thought to be carried through in the Third World by means of cultural oppression.

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[4] These reactionary, cosmopolitan cultural traits were generally attributed to certain political worldviews and parties standing on the right-wing of the political spectrum and identified with popular political figures of the period, like Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Justice Party. They were all portrayed as hypocrites pretending to have national qualities, but in fact, serving to the reactionary and non-national interests of imperialist and feudal forces at the expense of national progress and development. They were simply exploiting the national and religious feelings of ordinary people. See, Avcıoğlu (1966b); Alkan (1962); Ay (1962); *Yön* (1962). Dominance of feudal relations and culture, especially in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country, was thought to be another source of cultural corruption and backwardness. The enmity of the Turkish left in the 1960s towards feudal relations and forces could also be seen in their evaluations of the Kurdish question. They interpreted the first Kurdish uprisings of the early Republican period as reactionary, religious uprisings, serving to the interests of the British Imperialism. And, for the majority of the Turkish left in the sixties, the Kurdish question was an issue of underdevelopment and endurance of feudal relations. For a detailed discussion of Turkish left's approach to the Kurdish question in the sixties, see, Chapter 5.

This form of domination, in alliance with internal feudal forces, deformed the indigenous culture, and led to the alienation of the nation from its own national cultural roots. It was not possible to have a national cultural development without a radical break with imperialism and without dismantling feudal structures and relations. But, this did not mean that some good, progressive aspects of the Western culture should not be incorporated into the national culture. Similarly, national culture could not be separated from the ancestral ways, from the old indigenous culture; but it should also not be bounded by tradition. But, at the same time, it should be bred by the inspirations taken from the past and tradition. If we use the terminology of Partha Chatterjee (1993: 2), Turkish left's understanding of culture seemed to be based on two rejections and two acceptances. It rejects the Western culture, on the one hand; and on the other hand, it accepts the social and economic development standards set by the West. Similarly, it discards certain forms of old local culture as signs of reactionism, as obstacles to progress; but it celebrates other good faculties of the indigenous culture and re-invents them as revolutionary marks of national culture. For the Turkish left, the democratic and revolutionary essence of the old culture should carefully be separated from reactionary and decadent aspects of the feudal culture. That is to say, those aspects of local and national culture standing in the way of progress, and serving to the reactionary interests of the feudal and imperialist forces should be rejected; and those of others sharing and helping the cause of national liberation and unity against feudalism and imperialism should be accepted. Turkish culture should have its own national form; and the content of national culture should be composed of democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist credos.[5]

However, the Turkish left made its search for the local and national peculiarities and difference not basically in the realm of culture. Their analysis seemed to suffer from a sort of economic reductionism. It was giving priority to economic and political aspects of social process and seeing cultural determinations as the reflection of the economics and politics. So, those national, local particularities were tried to be found mainly in the history of the social-economic formations. Turkey's difference from the West was searched not within the realm of national culture and its history, but in the economic, social and political structures of the pre-modern era of the Ottoman-Turkish history. This urge of the leftist intellectuals of the 1960s to detect Turkey's social and economic distinctiveness was manifested itself in the growing interest in analyzing the Ottoman legacy of modern Turkey (see, for instance, Küçükömer, 1969a; Avcıoğlu, 1969; Boran, 1968; Boran, 1962; Aybar, 1968: 645-57; Divitçioğlu, 1966a; Oya Sencer, 1969; Muzaffer Sencer, 1969; Berkes, 1972; Niyazi Berkes, 1966f; Erdost, 1969: 58-75; Erdost, 1969a; Başar, 1964: .4-13). This section of the chapter will focus on the contesting investigations made by the Turkish left on the structural peculiarities of the Ottoman-Turkish history.

Debate on the Turkish left in the 1960s over the nature of the Ottoman society focused on the problem of whether it should be seen as feudal or Asiatic. The debate was roughly divided alongside the proponents of feudalism thesis and the advocators of the approaches based on the theory of the Asiatic mode of production (AMP).[6]

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[5] See, the series on national culture, edited by Fethi Naci (1965f), and published in *Yön* between no.127 (September 3, 1965) and no. 132 (October 8, 1965). In this series, some well-known writers of the period, such as Niyazi Berkes, S. Eyüboğlu, Melih Cevdet, Ferit Edgü, Mehmet Fuat, Mehmet Seyda, Demir Özlü, Orhan Duru, Turgut Uyar, İlhan Berk etc, were asked to comment on the notion of national culture and what kind of relationship it should have with Western and local ancestral cultures.

[6] Many participants in the Turkish discussion were not aware of or interested in the details of the feudalism debate in the international arena. One of those famous international debates on the

The interest in detecting the nature of the Ottoman past before its incorporation into the world capitalist economic system was thought to be very crucial for understanding not only history but also the present. One of the main motivations of these investigations was to identify the Turkish uniqueness, its difference, especially, from the West. The issue was to uncover the problem of which historical stages Turkey had already passed. This interest was also related with finding the answers to the questions of why the Ottoman-Turkish society lagged behind Western capitalist societies and why capitalism did not develop in the Ottoman-Turkish context as it developed in the West. The significance of the debate was not limited to the growing intellectual interest in Ottoman history; different approaches to the issue were also leading to different political and strategic conclusions. The participants of the debate wanted to understand the Ottoman past in order to comprehend the nature of the dynamics of contemporary Turkish society which they wished to transform in a radical, revolutionary way.

The proponents of feudalism thesis[7] insisted that the type of social relations which were to be found in the Ottoman-Turkish history was feudal. Not only economic structure of the Ottoman society, that is to say, its production relations and the mode in which surplus was extracted and distributed, but also the Ottoman state should be approached through the terms of feudalism in order to grasp their true

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transition from feudalism to capitalism, in the 1950s, contributed by Sweezy, Dobb, Takahashi, Hilton and Hill, was culminated in an edited volume in 1970s by Hilton (1974). But, the international AMP debate was echoed enthusiastically in Turkey in the 1960s. This interest in the AMP debate could be seen in the efforts of translating international works on the AMP. For examples of such efforts see, Godelier (1966); Godelier et al. (1970). It should be noted that from the second half of 1970s onwards, a younger generation of left-inclined Turkish academicians, such as Keyder, İslamoğlu, Akat, Berktay, contributed to the Turkish debate with international references. See, Keyder (1976: 178-96); İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977: 31-55); Akat (1977: 34-48); Berktay (1987: 291-333); Berktay (1992: 109-184).

[7] Belli, Erdost from the NDR movement, Avcıoğlu from the *Yön* group, and Boran from the WPT were among the leading figures of this position. See, for example, Avcıoğlu (1969); Boran (1968); Boran (1962); Erdost (1969); Erdost (1969a).

nature. Feudal system was understood by them basically as a set of extra-economic coercions imposed on the peasantry, extracting a good portion of the economic surplus it produced, hindering the development of internal class differentiation within the rural structure and the transformation to capitalism. Ottoman feudalism, it was argued, was distinguished by a centralized bureaucratic state, autonomous from the society over which it rules, and extracting surplus through its own appointed agents. These intermediate agents, acting in the name of the central authority and standing between the state and the peasantry, were members of bureaucratic elite, different nominally from hereditary nobility of Western European feudalism. They understood feudalism as a broad category involving not only Western European type of feudalism, but also non-European pre-capitalist social formations locating between tribal and capitalist modes.

In their analysis, the contemporary Turkey was no longer a feudal society, but it was a semi-feudal and semi-capitalist one. It was still semi-feudal because incorporation into the world capitalist system did not lead to the disappearance of feudal relations in the agrarian structure of the country; feudalism was not totally eradicated with the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This formulation had several conclusions. First of all, the agrarian question appeared as a crucial issue of the political program of the proponents of the feudalism thesis. This question seemed to be based on the assumption that the Turkish agrarian structure was characterized by large-scale ownership, on the one hand, and landless peasants, on the other. It was this social-economic composition of the Turkish agrarian structure that was thought to need a far-reaching land reform aiming at a radical dissolution of feudal relations, the confiscation of the lands of the big land lords, and their distribution to the landless peasants. According to this approach, one of the immediate political tasks of

Turkish socialists was to remove the last vestiges of feudalism (and the other was to remove Western imperialist domination). The Turkish society did not *yet* reach a capitalist stage and was on the eve of a national-democratic revolution, the success of which would stimulate national economic development and would break with feudal stagnation.[8] Since Turkey was an underdeveloped country with feudal characteristics and its working class was too weak, this national democratic revolutionary change could only be brought about by a broad coalition of all national classes (even including national bourgeoisie) under the leadership of civil-military bureaucracy and intellectuals. The advocators of feudalism approach perceived some (progressive) sections of the Turkish state and its bureaucracy as a potential progressive ally of the national-revolutionary forces in their struggle against feudal and comprador interests.

This approach, seeing civil-military bureaucracy and intellectuals as an organic and progressive part of the broad national revolutionary coalition, was challenged by those who supported the idea that the Ottoman society was not feudal. In this second approach, the underlying feature of Turkish politics was considered to be found in the division between the central state (and its bureaucracy) and the population. According to this perspective, the social origins of Turkish politics should be sought in the absence of big land ownership in the agrarian structure. This observation was a replication of Marx's famous motto about the Asian societies, which says: "The basic form of all phenomena in the East [Turkey, Persia, and Hindustan]… is to be found in the fact that *no private property in land existed*. This

[8] But, it should be noted that Boran, although advocating semi-feudalism approach, differed from other proponents of the approach, like Avcıoğlu, Belli, Erdost, who argued that Turkey needed a national and democratic revolution strategy for the national liberation. As it has been already discussed in Chapter 5, Boran, on the other hand, like other leading figures of the WPT, suggested a socialist revolution strategy for Turkey, which of course would be achieved through peaceful and constitutional means.

is the real key… to the Oriental heaven" (quoted in, Anderson, 1993: 473). The proponents of this perspective in Turkey in the 1960s provided a different account of the Ottoman-Turkish history, characterized by a strong emphasis on the AMP, in which the mechanisms and relations of production and surplus extraction were under the control of the central political authority.[9]

According to the supporters of the AMP approach, the Ottoman society was characterized by a land regime which did not allow the sultan's subjects to possess large-scale landed properties. Alienable private property rights were not recognized by the central authority; and all land was considered to belong to the sultan. The backbone of this model was thought to be an independent peasantry, the surplus produced by whom was extracted in the form of a proportional tax to the central authority through extra-economic mechanisms run by the bureaucratic servants appointed by the center itself. In this picture, there was no place for a landed aristocracy with an autonomous social base. The relationship between the state and the peasantry was mediated by the sultan's bureaucrats, taking their power not from being a member of a propertied, aristocratic class, but from being appointed by the central political authority. The members of the bureaucratic stratum were not permitted to inherit their status to their children and they always felt the danger that their wealth could be confiscated and their status and privileges could be repealed. But, on the other hand, the nature of the agrarian structure and the role of the bureaucratic stratum in that same structure ascribed the sultan's servants an important status in the system, a power which could not be constrained by a landed

[9] The debate on the AMP became one of the most prolific debates of the Turkish leftist public in the 1960s. The debate was divided between those who were close to the AMP theory, such as Divitçioğlu, Küçükömer, Hilav, Sencer and to a certain extent, Aybar and Berkes, and those who argued that the Ottoman society was based not on the AMP but on the feudal mode of production. For this debate see, Küçükömer (1969a); Divitçioğlu (1966a); Muzaffer Sencer (1969); Berkes (1972); Oya Sencer (1970); Avcıoğlu (1966c); Divitçioğlu (1966b); Hilav (1965: 1-8); Hilav (1966a); Hilav (1966b); Hilav (1970: 10-22); Belli (1970: 322-332); Boran (1969a: 4-6); Boran (1969b: 5-6).

aristocracy. In this model, the main conflict was between the despotic central state (and its bureaucracy) and the peasantry, which was thought to be very dissimilar from the European case, characterized by a tension between the landed aristocracy and the peasantry. The absence of the autonomous intermediary classes like landed aristocracy between the central political authority (and its bureaucrats) and the peasant masses also meant the absence of constrains to the state's power.

The possibility of the emergence of an independent, Ottoman landowning nobility as a counter-force to the central authority was always prevented by the sultan and his bureaucratic servants. This picture was thought to be the historical source of the absence of civil society and predominance of the state and its bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish history. The bureaucracy in this historical account was portrayed not as a progressive force but as a despotic, reactionary force trying to keep the statist tradition going on. The history of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy from the modernizing/Westernizing bureaucratic elite of the 19th century through the bureaucratic cadres of the Republican era to the proponents of the 1960 military coup within the bureaucratic-intellectual strata was seen as the history of the attempts of the bureaucracy to protect and continue its historically acquired privileges and autonomy.[10] This approach analyzing the Ottoman-Turkish history within a conceptual matrix, the instruments of which were derived from the arguments of the AMP thesis, represented an intellectual position in the Turkey of the sixties, opening the door to some critical analyses of the bureaucratic modernization attempts of the

[10] Kemal Tahir, one of the leading figures of Republican literature in Turkey, also known for his unorthodox Marxist interpretation of Ottoman history, was distinguished from other proponents of the AMP thesis by his attempt at combining a kind of Ottomanism with the AMP theory. His novels and writings on Ottoman history enriched the debate on the AMP among Turkish leftist intellectuals. In his analysis, the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition was glorified, and the state was portrayed as a benevolent, protective agent, very different from the intolerance and injustice of European feudal state. See, Kemal Tahir, *Notlar/Osmanlılık/Bizans*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992). On Kemal Tahir, see also, Hilav (1974: 8-18).

late Ottoman and Republican periods.[11]

The followers of the feudalism and AMP theses, as it has been discussed, differed from each other in terms of the strategies that should be implemented in Turkey. While the majority of the proponents of the feudalism thesis envisaged a broad national-democratic coalition, including 'progressive' sections of civil-military bureaucracy, against the last remnants of feudalism and collaborationist bourgeoisie; the supporters of the AMP approach pointed to a historical conflict between the 'center' and the 'periphery', that is to say, between the central political authority, its bureaucrats and the rest of the population. But they had something in common in their efforts to distinguish the social-economic history of the Ottoman-Turkish entity from the Western European example. It should be noted, however, that the AMP thesis, when compared to the feudalism argument, was based on an idea of a deeper, essential difference of the Ottoman-Turkish history (its despotic and Asian character) from the history of the Western societies; and the proponents of the AMP thesis praised the theory for highlighting and helping to understand the uniqueness of the Ottoman-Turkish polity.

Those, who maintained that the Ottoman society was historically constituted as feudal before the Western capitalist/imperialist penetration, also believed that feudalism of the Ottoman society was quite different from European feudalism. Ottoman society might have some resemblances with European feudalism, but their social structures, inner dynamics and internal contradictions and the nature of the state and its role in each system were quite dissimilar. Moreover, the process of social change was experienced differently in each case. In the European example, internal dynamics were the basic cause of social change, whereas in the Ottoman

[11] For such critical works see, for instance, Küçükömer (1969a); Hilav (1970).

case, the change occurred as a result of the influences from outside the system. The Ottoman state was incorporated into world capitalist system essentially as a result of the expansion of the same system, as a result of the economic, military and diplomatic pressures of the expanding Western imperialism. These differences were thought to eradicate the possibility of the applicability of the model of social transformation derived from the historical experiences of the West into the Ottoman-Turkish context. Experiences of the Western world could not be simply replicated in the underdeveloped world without serious adaptations.

For the proponents of the AMP theory, on the other hand, the stages of historical development which Turkey had already followed (and would follow) could not be identical with those of Western Europe. The peculiarities of the Turkish society, distinguishing it from its Western counterparts, could be found in its specific social-economic history, characterized by some basic features of the AMP. The AMP theory seemed to provide Turkish leftist intellectuals an escape from a rigid, unilinear model of historical development. Those, who tried to figure out Turkey's uniqueness, its difference from the Western examples found their arguments within the AMP theory. The Asiatic features of the Ottoman-Turkish history was thought to be enough to demonstrate the distinctiveness of Turkish experience from those of the West and to repudiate the possibility of replicating the model of original Western transition (from pre-capitalist to capitalist mode of production) in the Turkish context.

All these inquiries were also related with an epistemological question of whether socialism (or Marxian socialism in particular), as an intrinsically European current of thought, could be adapted to the conditions of Turkey. The question was more or less about the translatability of socialism to local conditions, about whether a

form of thought originally developed as a response to the problems of the Western world and reflected on the historical experiences of the Western societies could be transformed into a totally different historical context. This question seemed to be the natural outcome of the common observation of the Turkish left that Ottoman-Turkish history and its economic, social, and political structures were different from those of Western European examples. This difference was thought to be the reason of the failure of the Ottoman-Turkish society to evolve towards capitalism as it was evolved in the Western Europe. Similarly, because of the same difference, the liberation of Turkey from its age-old backwardness would pass through different set of changes, different from those already experienced in the West. This questioning of the idea of the applicability of West European historical experience, and the Western knowledge produced on this specific experience, to Turkish context also meant the denial of the universality of the Western historical development. This means that "if societies differ historically, there is no reason to think that… socialism must assume the same form everywhere" (Dirlik, 1985: 222). And it was the insistence on this difference that motivated the Turkish left of the 1960s to develop their own type of socialism, adapted to the peculiar historical-social conditions of Turkey. The next section will focus on the term of Turkish socialism (*Türk* or *Türkiye sosyalizmi*), as invented in the 1960s.

7.4 "Turkish Socialism, Our Socialism"

For the majority of the Turkish left in the 1960s, socialism in the Third World could not be separated from the nationalist thought. They all believed that, in the Third World, problems could only be solved within a national perspective; and they all strongly emphasized the importance of the specific national conditions and

peculiarities. Their strategy was to reconcile some central arguments of nationalism, that is to say, the claims of uniqueness, difference, and the demands of autonomy and self-determination, with principles of socialism in a selective way. It would be a reconciliation which would provide a strategy of escaping from economic and social backwardness and challenging the infringements of Western imperialist powers, on the one hand, and preserving national distinctiveness, on the other. In this sense, Turkish left's efforts to 'indigenize' socialism seemed to be attempts at creating their own distinct realm of sovereignty, autonomy (and imagination) in which they could compete with the challenges posited by foreign powers.

The idea of "Turkish socialism" was invented (or imagined) by the Turkish left in the 1960s with the aim of adopting the idea of socialism, through a process of modification and reformulation, to peculiar historical and social conditions of Turkey. The term was used and propagated by different leftist intellectuals with different political allegiances. It was, for instance, referred in some journalistic books, giving some descriptions about what socialism was and what kind of socialism Turkey should seek.[12] It was the *Yön* group and its leading intellectuals, like Avcıoğlu, Aydemir, that enthusiastically defended the notion of Turkish socialism and contributed to its popularization within the leftist public (see, for instance, Avcıoğlu, 1969; *Yön*, 1965a; Aydemir, 1962a; Aydemir, 1962c; Aydemir, 1963a; Ataöv, 1962; Karan, 1962). But, there were also others who used the term to express their understanding of socialism, such as Aybar (see, 1968: 493-497, 504-507, 610-613, 639-668), the chairman of the WPT. With the adoption of the term,

[12] Works written by left-inclined figures, like Hilmi Özgen, Cemil Said Barlas, Muvaffak Şeref, in the 1960s were among the most very-well known examples of those kinds of books. These works were giving readers some preliminary, popular information about socialism, offering some prescriptions for national economic development, and, of course, suggesting a national way for building a socialist alternative in the Turkish context which would take the special historical-social conditions of Turkey into consideration. See, Özgen (1962); Özgen (1963); Barlas (1962); Şeref (1968).

'Turkish socialism', to political programs of the leading factions of the Turkish left in the 1960s by some of their leading figures, it became one of the popular issues of the debates and divisions among the socialists of the same period. Although majority of the Turkish left believed that construction of socialism in Turkey could only be achieved by taking the national peculiarities and conditions into a serious consideration and socialism in Turkey should assume an independent and national form, a substantial part of the left criticized the attempts at forming a 'Turkish' type of socialism.

Other prominent figures of the WPT, such as Boran and Aren, rejected the idea of Turkish socialism. They argued that although existing socialisms were slightly diverging from each other in some issues and occasions, the theory of socialism was a single whole and had a universal, scientific essence. The project of inventing a Turkish socialism, according to them, was a revision of the theory of scientific socialism (see, for instance, *Emek*, 1969a: 12-13).[13] But, despite its adversaries, the idea of Turkish socialism had many supporters within the Turkish left in the 1960s and the term was one of the catch-words of the leftist public of the period.

Turkish left's attempt to invent a 'Turkish' type of socialism should be understood within the prevailing political atmosphere of the post-colonial era, within the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the period. Turkish socialists of the 1960s defined Turkey as a Third World country, as an underdeveloped, agrarian society with a semi-colonial historical background. The consequence of their overstatement of the social and economic backwardness of the country and its dependence on the West was that Turkish socialists also adopted models of "national development" employed

[13] The supporters of the NDR movement also objected Aybar's formulation of Turkish socialism. See for instance, Erdost (1969).

in the third world countries after the end of the Second World War. Since the Turkish case exhibited symptoms similar to those of Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, Turkey's post-Second World War socialists decided to include in their intellectual repertoire the socialist-nationalist development strategies of those countries. Their formulation of "Turkish socialism", although never having an international reputation, resembled those of African socialism, Arab socialism, Castroism, Maoism etc. But in the Turkish case, attempts at creating a Turkish version of socialism appeared as an unsuccessful try when compared with those other well-known examples of Third World socialisms.

The measure of success and failure in this comparison was very much related with the issue of taking or coming nearer to taking political power. Turkish socialist movement was a relatively small but also a significant force of the Turkish political life in the 1960s; but it never had a chance of getting close to taking or sharing political power. The other widely-known socialism experiences of the Third World, on the other hand, had the opportunity to enjoy the advantages of the political power to institutionalize (and propagate to a wider public) their understandings of socialism, common defining feature of which was to put a strong emphasis on national peculiarities.

In the *Yön* group's version of Turkish socialism, socialism was understood, above all, as a national phenomenon. Turkish socialism, as being a socialism of an underdeveloped country, was a variant of Third World socialism, different from socialism of the Western countries and the Eastern socialism of the Soviet Union. Leading figures of the group believed that although socialism as an ideal had an essence, a universal, single goal, envisaging the construction of a social system in which the well-being of all individuals would be guaranteed and they all would have

a decent life on the basis of the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity; this ideal, in the real life, manifested itself in a broad spectrum of different socialisms, diverging noticeably from each other, and representing the peculiarities of the societies in which they were created (Avcıoğlu, 1962h). Their Turkish socialism, which would be one those existing socialisms of the Third World, was an eclectic amalgamation of various ideological sources, ranging from anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, national developmentalism to anti-communism and Kemalism.

The first basic defining feature of *Yön*'s Turkish socialism was its anti-Western stance which found its manifestations in the principles of anti-imperialism and nationalism. For the *Yön* group, Turkish socialism would protect national independence and autonomy not only against the encroachments of Western imperialism, but also against the hegemony of the Soviet Union or any other foreign power. Turkish socialism was not in principle against to develop good relations with the Eastern Block, as far as they respected Turkish national independence and sovereignty. But, Turkish socialism, defining itself as an independent movement, was rejecting the communism of the Soviet Union. The *Yön* group considered Turkish socialism to be antidote to the dangers of communism, the idea of the dictatorship of working class. Their goal was to create a nationally integrated, classless (solidaristic) society, avoiding the emergence of sharp class divisions. But these characteristics attributed to Turkish socialism were not exclusively Turkish features; they could also be found in the socialisms of some other Third World countries of the period. But, what was specifically *Turkish* in *Yön*'s definition of socialism? It was the *Yön* group's understanding of Kemalism, which was argued to be the indigenous source of their socialism. The principles of Kemalism and the legacy of the Kemalist Revolution were the building blocks of *Yön*'s socialism.

Turkish socialism was actually a type of Kemalist socialism, reconciling Kemalist perception of Turkish national modernization with the credos of the Third Worldist orthodoxy of the post-colonial era.

Aybar's Turkish socialism shared some features of the Turkish socialism of the *Yön* group, and at the same time, radically diverged from it. According to Aybar, construction of socialism in Turkey would be carried out according to the peculiar national conditions and to the needs and interests of the Turkish people. His emphasis on the independent character of Turkish socialism was taking its legitimacy from the claim that every society should built up its own socialism by its own national forces and resources. Socialism formulated by Aybar would have a nationalist and independent character and would not take any orders from any international power; it would protect national independence against all foreign powers, either Western imperialism or the Soviet Russia. Aybar's efforts of distinguishing his understanding of Turkish socialism from the official socialism of the Soviet Union, which was described by Aybar as authoritarian, increased especially after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In this period, Aybar enriched the content of his understanding of Turkish socialism with new attributes such as being non-authoritarian, humanitarian, free and democratic. This socialism, called sometimes as "socialism with human face" or "smiling Socialism", and rejecting all kind of class dictatorships, would be brought about not from above by military coups or guerilla strategies, but from below by the participation of the people through peaceful and constitutional means.

Aybar's analysis and critique of the despotic state tradition in Ottoman-Turkish history was other important aspect of his account of Turkish socialism. For Aybar, Ottoman-Turkish history was characterized also by a struggle between an

oppressive state and the rest of the people. In this sense, socialism in Turkey could not be brought about by a top-down reform movement initiated by an enlightened, benevolent, modernizing bureaucratic elite. Aybar's socialism, giving initiative to the people, would be determined to give an end to the hegemony of bureaucratic tutelage in Turkish politics. But, in this analysis, Kemalism was distinguished from other bureaucratic–reformist traditions of the Ottoman-Turkish history. The first National Liberation War of 1919-22 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal was given a significant place in Aybar's analysis. It was through their struggle against the Western imperialism in the first national liberation war that the Turkish people acquired a national consciousness. Aybar argued that the anti-imperialist, nationalist and populist essence of the *Kuvay-i Milliye* spirit of the era of Kemalist Revolution was contained by his understanding of Turkish socialism, which would, according to him, be the new ideology of the second Turkish national liberation war in the 1960s. The new national liberation war would be waged not only against imperialism, big landlords, and comprador classes but also against the despotic, Ottoman-type state tradition and its representatives.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the focus was on Turkish left's search for finding the underlying structures of Turkish distinctiveness as a basis for their political strategies. The arguments for articulating socialism with nationalism took its legitimacy from the claim that Turkey historically had always some social and economic peculiarities, distinguishing it from Western examples. The discourse on history was also a discourse on politics. The peculiar patterns of Turkish history were essentialized by the Turkish left and turned into the main intellectual source of

inventing a Turkish type of socialism. But, Turkish left's relation with the idea of the West was not so clear cut; rather it was quite dubious and uneasy. This difference, that is to say, the emphasis on national particularity, should go hand in hand with the aim of catching up with the universal standards of a genuine modernization, development and social progress. The majority of the Turkish left's strategy resembled to (and inspired from) that of Kemalism; '[an independent and national] Westernization despite the West'.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have tried to demonstrate that nationalism was one of the most significant characteristics of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s. Turkish left's relationship with nationalism in this period was not just a tactical preference; it was a deliberate strategy. The claim of the main factions of the socialist movement and their leading figures was that Turkish socialists were the real standard-bearers of nationalism in Turkey. Nationalism was an indispensable part of their understanding of socialism.

In this study, Turkish socialists' articulation of socialism with nationalism has been analyzed at three different but interrelated levels, that is to say, political, economic and cultural/discursive levels. This analysis shows that Turkish socialists of the 1960s used nationalism for mobilizing people and for ideological and political legitimation. But, they did not just simply use nationalism in their political strategies and for their political aims; nationalism became an organic part of their understanding of socialism. Socialism was understood by Turkish socialist as *nation*'s political, economic and cultural liberation from foreign imperialist powers

and their internal collaborators. Socialism was seen as something which would make nation politically, economically and culturally independent and developed.

In this dissertaion, I focused on internal and external political and intellectual roots of Turkish left's engagement with nationalism and analyzed the nature of this engagement through evoking the questions of how and why socialists of Turkey articulated socialism with nationalism. One important concern of this study was to understand Turkish left's engagement with nationalism within an international context. It is obvious that articulating socialism with nationalism was not a Turkish invention. This phenomenon has been experienced in many other countries within different contexts and with different motivations. Turkish socialists of the sixties borrowed many things from these international experiences and debates, and used them in their efforts of developing their own modes of articulation in the Turkish context. In this respect, this study was not only an investigation on Turkish left's experience with nationalism, but also an inquiry on nature of the relationship between socialism and nationalism, in general. When we look at the international history of socialism, we see a change from "socialization of nation" to "nationalization of socialism", an abandonment, a divergence from the founding premises of socialism, in general, and Marxian socialism, in particular. There were some important stages of the historical oscillation of the left between internationalism and nationalism. The shift of the axis of socialism and nationalism to the periphery of the world after the First World War and the rise of the Third Worldism in the post-colonial era were among the significant phases of this oscillation towards nationalism. From its origins to the 1960s, Turkish socialists' intellectual and ideological repertoire was primarily shaped within this context. Their political programs and strategies bore the mark of the experiences and debates of the

period expanding from the Russian Revolution to the born of the Third World after the Second World War.

The other important concern of this study was to investigate the internal sources of this articulation. A 'leftist' variant of Kemalism, becoming a hegemonic discourse within the ranks of the Turkish left in the 1960s, played a very crucial role in the attempts of the leftist intellectuals of the period at accommodating nationalist principles within the idiom of socialism. The hegemony of this new interpretation of Kemalism was felt over the entire left of the period, ranging from the left of the RPP to the main socialist factions of the decade, and to the new young generation of activists, primarily composed of university students, and massively recruited to the ranks of the left in the second half the of the 1960s. Kemalism in this new interpretation was presented as a progressive/secular, national liberationist, that is to say, anti-imperialist, and developmentalist ideology. There was considered to be a logical and historical continuity between socialism in Turkey and Kemalist achievements and principles, finding their best expression in the deeds and words of Mustafa Kemal in the period expanding from the very beginning of the Turkish national liberation to the golden age of Kemalism in the 1930s. The "first" National Liberation War of 1919-1922 and the following Kemalist Revolution was glorified as the first successful uprising of the oppressed nations in the Third World against Western imperialist encroachments. But, unfortunately, this revolution led by Mustafa Kemal and Kemalist cadres remained as an unfinished revolution, confined to the super-structural level, and was not able to change radically enough the social and economic bases and relations of the existing system. And finally, according to this account, this revolution was deflected from its path with the passage to multi-party politics after 1945 and the DP's coming to power in 1950. Socialists of the

1960s in Turkey took upon themselves the responsibility of completing the unfinished tasks of Kemalist Revolution through a new, "second" national revolution war against the nation's internal and external enemies (imperialism and its domestic allies, feudal land lords and comprador bourgeoisie). This second national liberation struggle would achieve a full political and economic independence from imperialism, dismantle feudal social and economic structures and implement a rapid national development strategy under the guidance of state.

This new interpretation of Kemalism provided a discursive medium, in which Turkish left found their arguments for legitimizing their efforts of articulating socialism with nationalism. Socialism was perceived by the Turkish socialists of the sixties basically as nation's liberation from non-national alliance of external and internal enemies, continuously undermining independence, development, progress, integrity and prosperity of the nation. Turkish socialists portrayed their nationalism in their political imaginations as something totally different from other already existing nationalisms. It was described as a non-liberal, non-cosmopolitan, non-reactionary, non-racist, non-expansionist, anti-imperialist, developmentalist, statist, secular nationalism. Nationalism was an attribute of their socialism; these two notions were inseparable like the two different sides of the same coin. Socialists of Turkey were insistent on following a national path in their efforts of establishing socialism in Turkey. In their accounts of socialism, they argued that they would create their own form and brand of socialism adapted to Turkish social and economic conditions.

For the leading factions of the socialist movement in Turkey in the 1960s and their leading figures, Turkish socialists were the real nationalists, fighting for the independence and integrity of the nation (created within the *Misak-ı Milli* spirit of the

National Liberation War of 1919-22) against imperialist, collaborationist and feudal forces; striving for the creation of a national economy based on a rapid, independent development strategy; defending national culture against decadent reactionary, cosmopolitan infiltrations. In the age of imperialism, it was argued to be the task of socialists to embrace national principles and rise up the flag of nationalism on the periphery of the world. For Turkish socialists, socialism could only be established in an independent and economically developed nation. Nationalism was seen by them as a very basic pillar of socialism in the Third World, because it was this principle which would pave the way for socialism in the Third World. On the periphery, it was argued, nationalism obtained new connotations, described by reference to concepts such as anti-imperialism, developmentalism, and presented as an important impetus of Third World nations' struggle to achieve independence and economic development.

This inquiry on Turkish left's engagement with nationalism via Kemalism also gives us very important clues about the nature of Turkish politics; it shows us the hegemony of the discourses of Kemalism in general and nationalism in particular over the entire of the Turkish politics from the extreme right to the radical left in the 1960s (and in the most of the 20th century). Of course, there have always been different interpretations of Kemalism and Turkish nationalism in Turkey, but nearly every ideological stance in this period tried to prove its legitimacy within the Turkish political system and underline its difference and significance from others through its understanding of Kemalism and nationalism. Turkish socialists' experience with nationalism can be extended back to the origins of socialism in the Ottoman-Turkish context and with Kemalism to the years following the establishment of the Republic in 1923. But it was in the 1960s (when the radical left started a new beginning and

became a visible political and intellectual force for the first time in its history) that we witness a growing affinity within the main factions of the radical left towards nationalism and Kemalism.

This affinity weakened in the following decades, in 1970s and 1980s, mostly as a result of the succeeding military interventions of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980. But, this affinity has never withered away. It regenerated itself in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. In this period, at the international level, politically and economically bipolar world gave its place to a new one in this era, characterized by the process of globalization and the rise and prevalence of neo-liberalism. At the domestic level, on the other hand, this period witnessed the rise of Islamic and Kurdish movements and their identity claims. It was within this context that Turkish left's old-aged affinity with nationalism and Kemalism was rejuvenated again.

It should be underlined that the recent resurgence of this affinity was among the inspirations of this study. One of the main leitmotifs of the dissertation was to find out the political and intellectual sources of this affinity within the history of the Turkish left. The 1960s were the first important historical stage of Turkish left's attraction to nationalism and Kemalism. This attraction has recently reappeared again with a full bloom, but in a new context and with a new content. Since the design and range of this study allowed only focusing on the first significant manifestation of this attraction in the 1960s, its second and recent reappearance and its comparison with the first one unfortunately was not included to this study. But, it should be noted that the nature and context of the second comeback and its relation to the original one seemed to be an appropriate topic for future and further research. Such an investigation and comparison might give us some important clues about the changing

parameters of the Turkish politics within this time span, its transmutations, metamorphoses, from a different standpoint. So, I would like conclude this chapter with a very brief remark on the recent re-emergence of Turkish left's affinity to nationalism.

In the 1990s, during the Kemalist restoration efforts of the 28 February military intervention, some large sections of the left participated in the secularist mobilization of the period against the Islamic rise. In the 2000s, we witness, this time, the rise of a new radical nationalism in Turkey, sometimes, in popular idiom, called as *ulusalcılık*. The upsurge of this radical nationalism, especially since the beginning of the 2000s, has been accompanied by a growing feeling of 'insecurity', a reaction to other ethnic groups and other nationalisms, and a growing anger against the West. The classical sources of nationalist mobilization in Turkey, like the Cyprus and the Kurdish issues, have been complemented by the US invasion of Iraq and EU-Turkey relations. In this period the claim of being the real representative of nationalism in Turkey has not only been limited to the right-wing parties. Nationalism has also maintained its popular appeal among some large sections of the Turkish left. The very recent manifestation of this appeal has been the rise of 'nationalist left' (*ulusalcı sol*) and the ongoing 'dialogue' between its adherents and some factions of extreme right. The supporters of the idea of 'nationalist left' have re-invented the political program of the Turkish left of 1960s, especially its anti-Western, Third Worldist, and nationalist agenda, and adopted these to the conditions of the post-Cold War era. But there has been an anachronic side of this attempt. Actually, the nationalist left's claim of being the inheritor of the legacy of the Turkish socialism of the 1960s looks like the situation described in one of Marx's famous quotes in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis*

Bonaparte, which says (1962: 247), "Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. Caussidière for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre, the Montagne of 1848 to 1851 for the Montagne of 1793 to 1795, the nephew for the uncle. And the same caricature occurs in the circumstances of the second edition of the Eighteenth Brumaire."

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