

WHERE IS THE ANCHOR NOW? A POLIHEURISTIC ANALYSIS OF TURKISH  
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AKP PERIOD

A Master's Thesis

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Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences

of

İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **WHERE IS THE ANCHOR NOW? A POLIHEURISTIC ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AKP PERIOD**

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This thesis analyzes Turkish foreign policy in the *AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and Development Party)* era. It summarizes the post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy literature and proposes a formal model of the AKP leaders' decision-making process. The thesis asks one methodological and one empirical question. The methodological question aims at proposing a formal and holistic model integrating multi-level and multi-dimensional variables to explain the shifting foreign policy orientations of Turkey in the post-Cold War era. The application of Poliheuristic (PH) decision-making Theory is proposed as an answer to this question. The empirical question aims at explaining the major factors that determined the foreign policy orientation and re-orientation of Turkey in the AKP period. The thesis argues that, among others, the prospect of EU membership; the impact of Ahmet Davutoğlu and his arguments on Turkey's "strategic depth"; the domestic political conditions of the period; and the political background of the AKP have been the major determinants of these shifting foreign policy orientations.

Keywords: Formal modeling, Turkish foreign policy, Decision-Making, Poliheuristic Theory, the AKP

## ÖZET

Çapa Şimdi Nerede? AK Parti dönemi Türk Dış Politikasının Polihöristik Analizi

Sula, İsmail Erkam

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu Tez AK Parti dönemi Türk dış politikasını incelemektedir. Soğuk savaş sonrası Türk dış politikası literatürünü özetler ve AK Parti liderlerinin karar alma sürecine dair bir formel model önerir. Bir yöntemsel bir de ampirik soru sormaktadır. Yöntemsel soru Türkiye' nin soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde değişen dış politika yönelimlerini açıklayabilecek çok-düzeyle ve çok-boyutlu değişkenleri entegre eden formel ve bütünsel bir model önermeyi amaçlar. Yöntemsel soruyu Polihöristik Karar Alma Kuramı' nı uygulayarak cevaplar. Ampirik soru ise AK Parti dönemi Türk dış politikasındaki yönelim değişikliklerini belirleyen temel etmenleri açıklamaya çalışır. Tez, diğer birtakım etmenlerin yanısıra, Türkiye' nin AB üyeliği beklentisinin, Davutoğlunun stratejik derinlik konusundaki görüşlerinin, dönemin iç politika koşullarının ve AK Parti' nin siyasi arkaplanının değişen dış politika yönelimlerini etkileyen temel etmenler olduğunu öne sürer.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Formel modelleme, Türk dış politikası, Karar alma süreci, Polihöristik kuram, AK Parti

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## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Foreign policy-making is a fundamental component of state behavior in the international arena. Understanding the dynamics behind foreign policy-making processes of states entails a holistic approach that captures the interactive relationship between domestic, state and international level variables. However, integrating these variables in a single study is a challenging task. When Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy is considered, this task becomes even more challenging because of two main reasons. First, Turkey's foreign policy orientations display changing patterns and trends depending on the ideological and political profiles of the ruling elite. Second, most of the major international events and structural changes of the Post-Cold War era including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the two Gulf wars, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the rising tensions between Islam and the West occurred in Turkey's immediate neighborhood. These circumstances have made it difficult for Turkey to adopt a unidirectional approach to foreign

policy. Capturing these changing patterns requires a multi-level and multi-dimensional framework. However, most of the studies on Turkish foreign policy (TFP) remained descriptive without necessarily providing a holistic approach. The descriptive nature of the large TFP literature resulted in the introduction of a complex set of variables making it difficult to capture the main dynamics that explain why a particular foreign policy orientation is preferred over other possible alternatives. This study demonstrates that an application of the poliheuristic (PH) decision-making theory generates a concrete, simple and organized explanation of TFP in the 2000s.

The literature on TFP contends that Turkey has followed an “active” foreign policy throughout the post-Cold War era (see Çelik, 1999; Hale, 2000; Makovsky and Sayari, 2000; Oran, 2001; Kut, 2001; Rubin, 2001; Robins, 2003; Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; Martin and Keridis, 2003; Murinson, 2006; Davutoğlu 2009; and Güner 2011 among others). Especially with the AKP’s (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- the Justice and Development Party) accession to government in 2002, the previous foreign policy activism gained momentum. A significant shift in traditional Turkish foreign policy orientation is observed after the AKP founded the majority government in March 2003 (the 59<sup>th</sup> government of the Turkish National Assembly)<sup>1</sup>. The AKP policy-makers supported a new foreign policy orientation that emphasized Turkey’s EU

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<sup>1</sup> The first AKP government was founded after November 2002 election by Abdullah Gül. The government served for five months, until March 2003, when Erdoğan was elected as a Member of Parliament and founded the 59th government. The foreign policy orientations of the first and second AKP governments are assumed to be identical in the thesis.

accession process and active involvement in its immediate neighborhood. Although these components were also observed in TFP of the 1990s, TFP of the 2000s represents a significant divergence from the activism of the previous decade. Whereas Turkey followed a “confrontational” and “security/defense” oriented foreign policy activism in 1990s, it followed a “peaceful” and “soft power” oriented one in the 2000s.

The AKP’s foreign policy orientation is studied in two periods (Öniş, 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009). It is argued that the AKP government pursued a new wave of activism in the first period (2003-2005) by emphasizing Turkey’s commitment to EU membership. However, Turkey-EU relations fell into a stalemate when the negotiations for full membership started in October 2005. This stalemate decreased the AKP leaders’ enthusiasm for EU membership. Thus, in the second period (post-2005) the heavy emphasis on Turkey-EU relations was replaced by an emphasis on Turkey’s “pivotal role” in its immediate neighborhood.

This thesis aims to understand the underlying dynamics in the AKP’s foreign policy-making process. Accordingly, it tries to answer two interrelated questions, one methodological and one empirical. The methodological question is the following: “How is it possible to propose a formal and holistic model integrating multi-level and multi-dimensional variables to explain the shifting foreign policy orientations of Turkey in the post-Cold War era?” Utilizing the PH decision theory, the thesis provides a formal model that



integrates domestic level variables (such as election results, the domestic political and economic conditions, and the leaders' domestic politics considerations), individual level variables (such as leaders' foreign policy visions and their political background) and international level variables (such as the role of Turkey-EU relations and the impact of major international developments). The model serves as an abstraction of the foreign policy decision-making process in the AKP era. It conceptualizes the foreign policy orientation alternatives faced by the then AKP leaders' (R.Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül<sup>2</sup>, Ahmet Davutoğlu) and evaluates those alternatives across different dimensions (including political, economic, military/strategic and cultural/ideational dimensions). In addition, the information given in the post-Cold War TFP literature is organized in line with AKP leaders' expressions (selected from speeches given throughout 2003) of their foreign policy vision.

While answering the methodological question the thesis asks an empirical one as well: "What are the major factors that determined TFP orientation and re-orientation during the AKP period?" It argues that the prospect of EU membership; the impact of Davutoğlu (the chief foreign policy advisor of the 59<sup>th</sup> government) and his arguments on Turkey's 'strategic depth'; the domestic political conditions of the period; and the political background (the National Vision tradition- *Milli Görüş Hareketi*) of AKP have

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<sup>2</sup> Abdullah Gül, who was one of the founders of the AKP, was elected as the 11th (and current) President of the Republic of Turkey in August 28<sup>th</sup>, 2007. He cannot be regarded as an AKP Leader due to the legal impartiality of his current position.

been the major determinants of AKP's foreign policy decisions. The empirical question is divided into three sub-questions: First, why did the AKP government follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the government in 2002 given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of their political background (the National Vision tradition)? Second, why did the AKP leaders decide to diverge from the foreign policy orientation of the 1990s by leaving the confrontational and military based orientation towards a more "soft-power" oriented one? Third, why did the AKP government shift the foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy emphasis on EU after starting the accession negotiations in 2005?

The thesis is composed of three main chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical and methodological framework of the thesis. It exposes the roots of the PH decision-making theory, its main authors, and the main cases that the theory is applied. It also lists the basic steps in building a PH decision-making model and builds a sample PH decision matrix.

Chapter 3 reviews the literature on TFP in the post-Cold War era while comparing the foreign policy activism in the AKP period with the activism of 1990s. It summarizes the explanations provided by the literature on the relationship between Turkey's EU membership perspective and its foreign policy.

Chapter 4 presents the formal model. It builds a PH model to analyze AKP's decision to follow a new foreign policy orientation after assuming the government in 2003 by following the basic steps described in chapter 2 and in line with the literature on TFP in the AKP period given in chapter 3. The chapter also organizes the information given by the literature in line with AKP leaders' expressions of their own foreign policy vision. The chapter ends with a discussion section where it interprets the findings. Finally, the conclusion (Chapter 5) summarizes the main arguments of the thesis, discusses the limitations of the methodology, and shows directions for further research.

## **CHAPTER II:**

### **POLIHEURISTIC DECISION-MAKING THEORY**

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the thesis and serves as a transition towards the main argument. The thesis utilizes the PH Decision-Making model introduced by Alex Mintz to the foreign policy analysis (FPA) literature. It is a relatively new framework compared to the other decision-making models including cybernetics model, expected utility model, and bureaucratic politics model. The theory provided fruitful results with more than forty scholarly articles published in leading journals of the political science and international relations discipline.

The PH decision model is chosen because it can deal with both domestic and international level variables. The variables range from domestic ones (such as the domestic economic and political conditions, election results, and the leaders' political background), leaders' foreign policy vision (the 'grand

strategy' in leaders' mind to achieve a central regional power status for Turkey in the region) to international variables (such as the role of the EU ).

The chapter is composed of two main parts. First, it gives a brief overview of the FPA literature showing the roots and basics of the PH theory. Additionally, it lists the main figures in the PH theory literature, applications of the theory and presents its core principles. The second part explains how to build a PH model and exposes the basic steps in PH modeling and analysis. The conclusion summarizes the basic principles of the PH theory.

## **2.1. Understanding the Roots and Basics of the Poliheuristic Theory**

### **2.1.1. A Brief overview of the FPA literature:**

FPA has been systematically studied as a part of the social sciences literature since the end of the Second World War. In the early 1950s, most of the studies were based on system-level explanations without necessarily referring to the cognitive, psychological and social factors that exist in the decision-making processes of human beings. They explained major developments in IR by keeping their explanatory mechanism as parsimonious as possible; thus, refrained from adding new variables to their explanations. The main aim of these studies was to develop testable generalizations of behavior and improve the predictability of future outcomes in an environment that contains a

significant possibility of a 'nuclear war'. Following this aim, scholars like James Rosenau (1966), Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956; 1957; 1965), Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin (1954; 1963) have set up the roots of the field. Particularly, Snyder et al. (1954) have argued that rather than just focusing on external factors, foreign policy analysts should be aware of the "dual-aspect." By referring to the dual aspect, they emphasized that the foreign policy analyst should also examine the domestic-level so as to see the impact of domestic factors that impinge upon the decision-making process. Thus, Snyder et al. (1954: 53) invited foreign policy analysts to incorporate domestic factors within the study of foreign policy decision-making. Since then, different scholars have focused on different aspects of internal and external factors that affect foreign policy decisions (Hudson and Vore 1995: 212-215).

Throughout 1970s and 1980s cognitive and psychological factors have been introduced to the FPA literature. For instance, Graham Allison (1971; 1972) and Morton Halperin (1974) have focused on the impact of intra-state bureaucratic dynamics on foreign policy-making. Kalevi Holsti (1970) argued that states have national role conceptions which they seek to capture through the conduct of foreign policy. Margaret Hermann (1974; 1977; 1980a; 1980b) and Ole Holsti (1977; 1989) have developed studies on the impact of individual leaders (such as their leadership style, the leaders' psychology and perceptions) in foreign policy-making. Jervis (1976) and Cottam (1977)

focused on the impact of leaders' perceptions and misperceptions upon foreign policy (Hudson, 2005: 11; see also Hudson and Vore, 1995: 212-220). By the end of 1980s, Robert Putnam's (1988) emphasis on the "two-level game" emphasizing the interaction between domestic and foreign policy was crucial, as it raised major questions regarding the impact of domestic social groups on the foreign policy of a state. As Hudson (2005: 12) points out, Levy (1988), Levy and Vakili (1989), Lamborn and Mumme (1989), Evans et al. (1985), Hagan (1987), and Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry (1989) were important contributors to the study of domestic - foreign policy relationship.

FPA has developed an actor-specific study perspective in the post-Cold War era. Through utilizing political psychology, FPA researchers have developed theories on leadership styles and cognitive processes involved in decision-making. They have used methods such as "content analysis, in depth case study, process-tracing, agent-based computational models and simulations" (Hudson, 2005: 14).

In time, FPA has evolved into a large literature that focuses on a variety of aspects including culture, psychology, regime type, economy, social factors, bureaucratic structure, and identity. Within this large and complex structure, one can see that these scholars have generally been divided between two general approaches in their analysis: the "Rational" and "Cognitive" approaches. The latter argues that decision-makers' beliefs, perceptions, desires and/or moods play an important role on how they perceive their

environment and make decisions. The former, which is better known as the “Rational Actor Model (RAM)”, has generally ignored the cognitive processes that occur within the state (Rosati, 2000). As Neack (2008: 43) points out; “typically, foreign policy scholars explain that the rational actor model and the cognitive model are incompatible.” While Cognitive approaches study the impact of “beliefs” and the dynamics of the decision-making “process”, RAM deals with “preferences” and “outcomes” (Neack, 2008: 43-45; Rosati, 2000). However, contrary to this “incompatibility” argument, there are also studies that try to bridge the two approaches. Specifically, Poliheuristic Theory develops a foreign policy decision-making model that uses both cognitive and rational approaches.

### **2.1.2. The Poliheuristic (PH) Theory: Main Authors and Cases**

Alex Mintz, who is one of the main figures in PH theory literature, mentions that the term “Poliheuristic” can be “broken down into the roots poly (many) and heuristic (shortcuts), which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision-makers to simplify complex foreign policy decisions” (Mintz et al., 1997: 554). The theory was offered as an alternative to the existing decision-making models such as the rational actor, bureaucratic politics, cybernetics, and the expected utility models.



The difference stems from the 'two-stage' decision-making model of the PH theory. The theory argues that decision-makers follow "a two-stage decision process consisting of (a) rejecting alternatives that are unacceptable to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) selecting an alternative from the subset of remaining alternatives while maximizing benefits and minimizing risks" (Mintz, 2004: 4-5). The critical dimension mentioned in "stage a" is argued to be the domestic political dimension. The cognitive approach is applied to analyze the first and the rational approach is applied at the second stage of the PH analysis. The policy makers tend first to eliminate some of the alternatives by considering their domestic political implications when they are faced with a number of policy alternatives ( $A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4 \dots A_n$ ) and with a number of utility dimensions (domestic politics, economic, military, strategic ...etc.). This elimination is based on the leaders' 'decision rule' (which is identified by the policy analyst) that is used as a 'cognitive shortcut' (or 'decision heuristic') in the first stage. Then, in the second stage, they make their decision through rational utility calculations. As many proponents of the PH theory mentioned: "domestic politics is the essence of decision" (see Mintz, 1993, 2003, 2004, 2005; Mintz and Geva, 1997; Mintz et al., 1997). With its focus on this two stage process, the PH Theory "integrates elements of the cognitive psychology school of decision-making with elements of the rational choice school" (Mintz, 2004: 4).

Although the PH theory is relatively new (since it has been introduced in 1993) it has been published in more than 40 articles in leading journals such as “the *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *International Studies Quarterly*, as well as in book chapters, edited volumes, and numerous conferences” (Mintz, 2004: 4) The theory has been applied to a variety of decisions including: decisions to use force ( Mintz, 1993; DeRouen, 2001, 2003), tests of Nuclear weapons (Sathasivam, 2003), Coalition formation and intraparty rivalry (Mintz, 1995), Influence of advisers (Redd,2002), War and peace decisions (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty, 2000), Conflict resolution (Astorino-Courtois and Trusty, 2000) and military uprising (Mintz and Mishal, 2003). It proposes a model to explain how and why leaders make certain foreign policy decisions and what factors affect their utility calculations in the process (see Mintz, 2004: 4). In that sense, it focuses on both the “process” and the “outcome” of decision-making.

The PH theory has been applied both to democratic and authoritative contexts including decisions made by American presidents and the decisions made by the leaders in the Middle East. It has been tested through multiple methods such as case studies, formal and statistical models, and experimental analysis (See Mintz, 2004). By these applications and tests, the theory has built its basic principles and proposed several steps of constructing a decision-making model. The following two sections explain the core principles and basic steps in building a Poliheuristic decision-making model.

### **2.1.3. Basic Principles of the PH Theory**

This thesis argues that cognitive processes play a significant role in foreign policy-making, especially under conditions of uncertainty where actors face a large number of policy alternatives to choose from. A bridge between cognitive and rational approaches is argued to be useful to have a better understanding of specific foreign policy actions. Individuals generally have “a set of beliefs and personal constructs” about their environment which make them perceive the complex “physical and social environment” in a more coherent and organized way. “These beliefs and constructs necessarily simplify and structure the external world”(Rosati, 2000, p. 57).

The PH theory contends that leaders make their foreign policy decision in a two-stage process. “The first stage of Poliheuristic Theory involves a non-compensatory, non-holistic search. It uses decision heuristics and primarily corresponds to the cognitive school of decision-making” (Mintz, 2004: 4). The argument is that when faced with a set of alternatives, under complex situations and uncertainty, decision-makers tend to use “cognitive-shortcuts” in order to simplify the situation. The decision-makers tend to eliminate the alternatives that do not fit their personal perceptions and expectations (Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes, 1997; DeRouen, 2000; Redd, 2001; Sathasivam, 2002). The process is, therefore, conceptualized as the “Non-compensatory principle” in decision-making (Brule, 2005; Mintz, 1993).

Mintz (1993: 598) posits that while making decisions, foreign policy makers act with a “non-compensatory strategy” in the first stage of decision-making. According to this strategy, “in a choice situation, if a certain alternative is unacceptable on a given dimension (e.g., it is unacceptable politically), then a high score on another dimension (e.g., the military) cannot compensate/counteract for it and hence, the alternative is eliminated” (Mintz, 1993: 598). A policy alternative will be regarded as unacceptable or acceptable according to the decision rule of the leaders which is identified by the policy analyst. The non-compensatory principle uses a “non-holistic” way of analysis rather than analyzing and comparing different dimensions of the policy alternatives in a “holistic” manner like expected utility theory and cybernetics models (these models apply a compensatory principle). As Mintz et al. (1997) explain “Non-holistic models (...) employ a simplified process whereby the decision-maker sequentially eliminates or adopts alternatives ‘by comparing them to each other, or against a standard, either across dimensions or across alternatives’” (Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1997: 442). The PH theory proposes a “non-holistic” model by emphasizing that foreign policy makers choose a critical dimension (this is generally the political dimension). It argues that the decision-maker, rather than making “detailed and complicated comparisons” of all dimensions of each alternative, eliminates those that do not satisfy the expected value at the “critical dimension” (Mintz, 1993: 598-599; See also, Mintz 2004; Redd 2002, 2005;

and Brule, 2005; see Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1997 for a detailed explanation of holistic/non-holistic decision rule).

To put it in a simple example, suppose that a foreign policy maker has two different alternatives ( $A_1$ ,  $A_2$ ) and each alternative has three utility dimensions (political, military, and economic). The policy-maker attributes values between 3 and 0 to each alternative on each dimension based on the utility of each alternative. The table is as follows:

**Table 2.1.** - A Simple Decision Matrix

Alternatives	Dimensions			Total Units of utility (Sum)
	Political	Military	Economic	
<b>A<sub>1</sub></b>	3	1	1	<b>3+1+1= 5</b>
<b>A<sub>2</sub></b>	1	3	3	<b>1+3+3= 7</b>

According to the table the policy-maker attributes a higher value to  $A_1$  in the political dimension but a higher value to  $A_2$  in the Military and Economic dimensions. A foreign policy analyst using the compensatory strategy (with a holistic model of analysis and in its simplest sense) might argue that the decision-maker will sum the values of each alternative and make his decisions based on the maximum utility. Following the compensatory strategy then, the decision-maker expects to gain 7 units of utility by choosing  $A_2$  whereas s/he gains 5 by choosing  $A_1$ . Accordingly, a decision-maker following the compensatory strategy will choose  $A_2$  instead of  $A_1$  since the expected utility of the former is greater than the latter. However, a non-compensatory strategy might bring a different choice. As mentioned above, a non-

compensatory, non-holistic model argues that one of the dimensions might be taken as the critical one. For instance, if the decision-maker takes the political dimension of the alternatives as the “critical dimension”, then he will choose  $A_1$  since it provides a greater value than  $A_2$  in the political dimension. In other words, since the decision-maker follows a non-compensatory strategy, the additional 4 units of utility provided by  $A_2$  in military and economic dimensions will not “compensate” the loss of 2 units in the political dimension. Since the political dimension is the most critical one for the decision-maker, other dimensions of the policy alternatives will not be comparable with it; hence, the other dimensions will not be compensatory. When a decision-maker faces a number of policy alternatives ( $A_1, A_2, A_3...A_n$ ), each having a number of utility dimensions (Political, Economic Military, Cultural...etc.), alternatives that do not satisfy the ‘decision rule’ are eliminated. In terms of the theory, the decision-maker eliminates the alternatives that do not fulfill his/her utility conditions by using “cognitive shortcuts”. The example given by Mintz (1993: 599) might simplify this description: “a person who suffers from high levels of cholesterol is unlikely to buy himself items rich in cholesterol, even if these are offered at a huge discount.” (See Mintz, Geva and Derouen, 1994: 453-457 for a more sophisticated and formal explanation of the non-compensatory principle)

The decision-maker starts “analytical processing” in the second stage after eliminating some of the foreign policy alternatives (those do not provide

enough utility in the critical dimension) with a non-compensatory principle in the first stage. The surviving alternatives are generally compared using rational actor models. As Mintz (2004: 4) points out: “Cognitive heuristics are more important in the first stage of the decision, whereas rational choice calculations are more applicable to the second stage of the poliheuristic decision process.”

## **2.2. Building a Poliheuristic Decision-making Model:**

The PH theory proposes a unified set of principles that could be applied to leaders’ decision-making processes. As Mintz (2005) points out:

The PH procedure consists of two key steps:

1. Identify the decision matrix of the leader (e.g., the alternative set, dimension set, and implications of each alternative on each dimension)
2. Apply PH calculations to the decision matrix to explain or predict the ultimate choice.

The theory is argued to be “generic” meaning that it could be applied to almost all foreign policy decisions including: “national security decisions”, “foreign economic decisions”, as well as “domestic decisions” (e.g., Astorino-Courtois, 2000; DeRouen, 2003; Sathasivam, 2003)” (Mintz, 2005: 95).

The foreign policy analyst builds the decision matrix of the leader in the first step. While building the “Decision Matrix” the analyst needs to identify: 1. The Foreign policy alternatives ( $A_1, A_2, A_3... A_n$ ) 2. The Utility

Dimensions of each alternative ( $D_1, D_2, D_3 \dots D_n$ ) 3. The implications of foreign policy alternatives on each dimension. 4. The ratings of each alternative at each dimension. 5. The weight of each dimension (Mintz, 2005).

The foreign policy alternatives are those options that are available to the foreign policy maker before the decision is made. The foreign policy analyst asks the following question: "what are the set of available options that the foreign policy maker can choose from". For example, in a crisis situation the leader might have the following foreign policy alternatives: use force ( $A_1$ ), do nothing ( $A_2$ ), and use economic sanctions ( $A_3$ ).

The analyst decides on the dimensions of each alternative after the identification of the set of alternatives. These dimensions are used to evaluate and compare the utility that each alternative is expected to provide. For the crisis situation example the dimensions could be: 1. Domestic political dimension ( $D_1$ ), 2. Military / strategic dimension ( $D_2$ ) and 3. Economic dimension ( $D_3$ ).

The dimensions are used as utility criteria. Each foreign policy alternative has implications (which are used to identify the utility of each alternative) at each dimension. For instance, the economic sanctions alternative has economic implications, military implications and domestic political implications.

According to these implications each foreign policy alternative will have a value on each dimension. Based on these values, although it is not



compulsory for the model, the foreign policy analyst can rate each alternative on each dimension from “-10 (very bad) to +10 (very good)” (Mintz, 2005: 96). For example the “Do Nothing Option” in the above mentioned example has domestic political implications such as harming the domestic political support of the leader. In addition it might be less costly in the economic dimension (since no military or economic action is taken) and more costly in the military/strategic dimension (since it will give the message to the opposition that the country is not powerful enough). Based on these implications, when compared with choosing the “economic sanctions” alternative, “Do nothing” might be rated -9 in political, +8 in economic, - 10 in military dimensions whereas the “Economic Sanctions” alternative is rated +5 in political, -5 Military/strategic and -8 in economic dimensions. These ratings will help the analyst to compare the alternatives and propose the best option to be chosen in the foreign policy-making process. After the identification of the set of alternatives and dimensions and the rating of each alternative based on their implications on these dimensions, the policy analyst can also identify weights for each dimension if he thinks that the economic, military and political dimensions of the policy alternatives do not have equal weight.

According to these explanations the decision matrix of the crisis situation can be built as follows. Suppose that there is a crisis situation. In a simplified model the alternatives are: 1. Do nothing ( $A_1$ ), 2. Apply Economic sanctions ( $A_2$ ), 3. Use Force ( $A_3$ ). The dimensions are: 1. Political, 2. Strategic,

and 3. Economic. A<sub>1</sub> is rated -10 in political, +5 in Strategic and +5 in the Economic dimension. A<sub>2</sub> is rated +5 in political, +5 in strategic and -5 in the economic dimension. A<sub>3</sub> is rated +3 in political, +8 in strategic and -8 in economic dimensions. The decision matrix in this crisis model is as follows:

**Table 2.2 - The Decision Matrix of a Hypothetical Crisis Scenario**

Alternatives	Dimensions			Total Utility provided by alternatives (Average)
	Political (D <sub>1</sub> )	Military (D <sub>2</sub> )	Economic (D <sub>3</sub> )	
<b>Do nothing (A<sub>1</sub>)</b>	Implications (or Rating) -10	Implications (or Rating) +5	Implications (or Rating) -5	-10/3 (-3,33)
<b>Econ. Sanctions (A<sub>2</sub>)</b>	Implications (or Rating) +5	Implications (or Rating) +5	Implications (or Rating) -5	5/3 (1,66)
<b>Use force (A<sub>3</sub>)</b>	Implications (or Rating) +3	Implications (or Rating) +8	Implications (or Rating) -8	3/1 (1)

“PH theory predicts that alternatives that have a very negative value on the political dimension will be discarded first, while remaining alternatives will be evaluated based on rational calculations ”(Mintz, 2005: 97). As mentioned above, the non-compensatory principle argues that other dimensions of the foreign policy alternatives cannot compensate for the political dimension. Since the poliheuristic theory assumes that domestic politics is the essence of decision, the policy analyst will eliminate the alternatives that have negative values in the political dimensions. In the crisis example above the alternative of “do nothing” will be eliminated in the first stage of decision-making. In the

second stage the decision-maker will compare and “select from the remaining alternatives, the alternative that has the best net gain on all dimensions (or on the dimension most important to the decision-maker -a lexicographic decision strategy)” (Mintz, 2005: 97). At this stage, the proponents of PH theory generally use “expected utility calculations” in order to select the alternative that provides the greatest utility. As Mintz (2005: 97) posits: “The ultimate decision then is a combination of discarding infeasible alternatives in the first phase of the decision and selecting the best alternative from the subset of acceptable alternatives in the second phase of the decision.”

A crucial task for a foreign policy analyst applying the PH theory to a foreign policy decision is to justify the values allocated to foreign policy alternatives in different dimensions. Avoiding biased and subjective evaluations will provide a more acceptable analysis of the foreign policy making process. In the application chapter (see Chapter 4), the thesis uses an alternative evaluation method to overcome this risk. As it analyzes AKP leaders’ decision to choose a new foreign policy orientation instead of other alternatives, the thesis uses two types of information: first the TFP literature is explained in chapter 3. Then, AKP leaders’ speeches in 2003 are analyzed and their foreign policy vision is summarized in chapter 4. The information given in the literature about the major determinants of TFP is organized in line with AKP leaders’ foreign policy vision while constructing the PH decision matrix. With reference to both sources of information the thesis defines some

evaluation criteria in order to rank the foreign policy alternatives in terms of an 'order of preference'. Finally, scores are assigned according to these preference orderings. Existing foreign policy orientation alternatives, the utility dimensions, the evaluation criteria are all identified with reference to these two sources of information.

### **2.3. Conclusion:**

This chapter provided a brief overview of the roots, and the basic principles of the PH decision-making model. It serves as a transition to the model that will be applied to TFP in the fourth chapter. To sum up, the PH theory has two core assumptions. The first, and arguably the most important, principle of the PH theory is that domestic politics is the "essence of decision". The argument is that leaders, while choosing their foreign policy actions, tend to simplify their decision environment first by focusing on the domestic politics implications of their policies. As seen in the FPA literature (section 2.a of this chapter) the argument is not unique to PH theory. Many foreign policy analysts have emphasized the interaction between the two levels (domestic and international). The PH theory has conceptualized the importance of domestic political dimension by claiming that the foreign policy makers act with the 'non-compensatory principle'. According to this principle, the utility provided by the foreign policy alternatives in other dimensions- be it military, economic, strategic or ideational- cannot compensate for the loss of utility in

the domestic politics dimension; hence, domestic politics dimension is the critical dimension and it is non-compensatory.

The second principle of the PH theory is that decision-making is a two-staged process. In the first stage, the policy-maker tends to use cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) meaning that by applying the non-compensatory principle the decision-maker tends to simplify the decision environment through eliminating the foreign policy alternatives that do not satisfy the 'decision rule' in the domestic politics dimension. In the second stage, the policy-maker chooses one of the remaining alternatives by making expected utility calculations by using the rational-choice approach. In that sense the theory argues to be a bridge between cognitive and rational approaches.

The PH theory is argued to be "generic" and it provides a useful model to analyze foreign policy choices of leaders. The application of the poliheuristic (PH) decision-making theory is argued to be a useful way to provide a concrete, simple, and organized explanation for Turkey's foreign policy orientation in the AKP period.

## CHAPTER III:

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE TFP LITERATURE

Most of the post-Cold War studies on TFP claim that Turkey has followed an active foreign policy in the 1990s and 2000s (Çelik, 1999; Hale, 2000; Makovsky and Sayari, 2000; Kut, 2001; Rubin, 2001; Robins, 2003; Larrabee and Lesser 2003; Martin and Keridis, 2003; Murinson, 2006). Especially after the 2002 elections, when AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*- Justice and Development Party) formed a majority government, the previous wave of foreign policy activism has gained momentum. According to Öniş, the AKP government has pursued a new wave of activism, first, by speeding up the Europeanization process (between 2002-2005 as the golden age of Europeanization) and then, when the Europeanization process fell into a stalemate after the negotiations for full membership were formally opened in October 2005, by increasing Turkey's regional role as a "benign Euro-Asian

soft Power” through the establishment of economic, cultural and political ties in its region (Öniş, 2009: 16; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009).

The prospect of full membership to the European Union (EU) which was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, when EU granted candidate status to Turkey, was especially influential in the period between 1999- 2005. Although the Islamist background of the party generated some fear among the supporters of Europeanization in Turkey, the early years of the AKP government became the Golden Age of Europeanization when the government speeded up democratization (Özbudun, 2007) and economic reform process (Dervis et al. 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007) within the country. However, after 2005 a decline in AKP’s enthusiasm for Europeanization and increase in Turkey’s activism in the region is observed (Öniş, 2009; Çakmak, 2008).

In general, this chapter serves as an overall summary of the main arguments in the TFP literature about the major determinants of AKP’s foreign policy orientation. This part aims at answering two main questions: to what extent does AKP’s foreign policy activism represent a divergence from the activism in the previous period (the post-Cold War 1990-2002 foreign policy)? How does the prospect of the EU membership affect AKP’s new foreign policy activism? Accordingly, it consists of three sections. The first section explains TFP in the 1990s. The second section analyzes the similarities and differences between the immediate post-Cold War Foreign policy activism (1990s) and

the activism in the AKP period (2002 onwards). The third section, explains the impact of Turkey's EU membership perspective on AKP's foreign policy activism.

### **3.1. Turkey's Post Cold War Foreign Policy:**

#### **3.1.1. Foreign Policy Activism in the 1990s**

Systemic changes (the end of the Cold War), domestic political and economic crisis together with troubling developments in nearby regions, the Balkans and the Middle East, have been influential in TFP in the 1990s. Turkey was increasingly getting involved in the region and moving from a primarily Western oriented foreign policy towards a multi-dimensional one. This reorientation had impacts on its international relations. Turkey as an important regional actor, with the opportunities emerged after the Cold-War, has started to redefine its national interests in the period (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003).

One of the major reasons behind this redefinition was the end of the Cold War and change in the international bipolar structure. The strict East-West division of the previous period changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This change had both negative and positive effects on TFP. One of the positive effects was that Turkey did not share a land border with Soviet Union (then Russia) anymore. This has, to a great extent, decreased the Russian



threat in the eastern regions of Turkey. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum around Turkey, both in the Caucasus and the Balkans. This vacuum, in turn, provided Turkey with opportunities to improve its relations in those regions. Turkish foreign policy makers started to stress Turkey's leading role in the region and emphasize its historical and cultural ties with the Turkic and Muslim countries in the Caucasus and the Balkans. On the other hand, the negative effect was that Turkey's geostrategic importance for its Western allies has, to a great extent, decreased with the collapse of the communist Soviet Union. Turkey tried to overcome this negative effect by getting actively involved in the region and trying to obtain a regional leadership role. These conditions, in general terms, have led to an assertive, multi-dimensional and military-oriented foreign policy vision in Turkey (see Oran, 2001: 204-239; See also Larrabee and Lesser, 2003; and Murinson, 2006).

TFP was assertive in the sense that it followed 'confrontational tools' not only in Iraq against PKK (Kurdish separatists) but also against Syria (by deploying troops on the border in 1998) and Greece (especially on the Cyprus issue) until the end of 1990s (Öniş 2003; See also Kirişçi 2006). It was multi-dimensional since there had been a change in 'vision' from the "sacredness of the borders and the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli)" understanding towards an aim of "getting beyond the borders and creating a regional sphere of influence in the Balkans, Mediterranean and Caucasus" (Gözen 2006:80).

Two major developments have been crucial in Turkey's foreign policy vision in the period: the Gulf War (1990- 1991) and the opportunities that emerged in Eurasia, especially in the Caucasus, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Gulf War, by participating in the 'Operation Provide Comfort', Turkish Armed Forces utilized the opportunity to attack the bases of the PKK in Northern Iraq and establish a secure zone in Turkish- Iraqi border. Particularly in its south-Eastern border but generally in the whole surrounding regions, Turkey tried to establish a strategic sphere of influence, which was especially based on Military power and Geographical location. Turkey has followed a realist approach to foreign policy by trying to fill-in the power vacuum and to increase its influence in the region. The main aim was to obtain a regional leadership role through this active involvement (Gözen 2006: 79- 84). However, this realist approach has led to a more confrontational and military weighted foreign policy in Turkey.

The geostrategic discourse and use of confrontational tools was, partly, due to the increased role of military in foreign policy-making (see Bilgin 2005). The decisions given by the National Security Council (NSC), although they were constitutionally limited to be advisory, were taken seriously by the governments; so much that the military became the dominant actor even in the daily domestic politics of Turkey (see Özcan 2001). The involvement of military was due to the fact that Turkey was facing instability in its domestic politics because of the frequent government changes, the Kurdish separatist

movement and intensified PKK terrorist attacks, and the securitization of political Islam. As a result of these developments, Turkish Armed Forces obtained an important role in both domestic and foreign policy of Turkey which led to the re-emergence of the 'Sevres Syndrome' which was, in Aydın's (2004) words, a 'structural determinant' of TFP. The dominance of military, combined with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era, Turkey's perception that it is losing its geostrategic importance for its Western allies, and the Realist approach to foreign policy, made Turkey feel entrapped by the Greeks in the West, Syria in the South East and Kurdish separatists from inside (see Oran 2001: 236). Turkey's wish to utilize the opportunities at the end of the Cold War together with the fear of abandonment and losing territories have resulted in an active but *confrontational* foreign policy throughout the 1990s.

These developments, in turn, have put Turkey into serious dilemmas. For instance, Turkey's confrontational and active involvement in the Middle East was not appreciated by the EU. In Larrabee and Lesser's (2003) words, "the deeper its involvement in the Middle East, the more problems this poses for Turkey's Western orientation and identity." EU leaders were emphasizing problems about Turkey's Western identity and the possibility that the EU would be dragged into complex problems in the Middle East if Turkey became a member. Another dilemma was caused by Turkey's aim to improve its relations with the countries in the Caucasus. Turkey, whereas trying to

increase its commercial relations and economic cooperation with the region, was facing the possibility of confrontation with Russia. In this sense, Turkey's decisions were crucially important for the Russian- Turkish interactions in the 1990s. Additionally, Turkey's stance against the conflicts in the Balkans, during and after the dissolution of Yugoslavia did also create a dilemma for Turkey. While helping the Muslims in the Balkans, Turkey was taking the risk of falling into a conflict with Serbia.

Beside the above-mentioned negative aspects, there were also some positive improvements in Turkey's international relations in this period. Turkey's participation in the Gulf war and its contributions to the settlement of the disputes in the Balkans, improved Turkey-US relationship. The US started to regard Turkey as its 'strategic partner' and an influential actor in the region (Fuller et al. 1993; see also Larrabee and Lesser 2003). That is not to say that Turkey-US relations were totally positive in the period. For instance, Turkey's cross-border operations in Northern Iraq had some side effects because it was not appreciated by the US administration. However, in general, Turkey- US relations improved in the 1990s (Gözen 2006: 83).

In one of his articles, Robins (2007) mentions that major studies on TFP started after the 1990s. That is the case, not as a coincidence but because of the variety of foreign policy issues -including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the rising instability in the Balkans, the first Gulf War (1990-1991), NATO and EU enlargement, in which Turkey was

actively involved and which were crucially important developments for the emergent new post-Cold War world order. As Kut and Özcan (2000) points out, it was 'The Longest Decade' in TFP since the foundation of the Republic. The long decade of 1990s provided fruitful results for the 2000s. As it will be explained in the following section, although both foreign policy approaches were aiming at active involvement in the surrounding regions, TFP in the 2000s, especially during the AKP period, has slight differences from that of the 1990s.

### **3.1.2. Foreign Policy Activism in the AKP Era:**

The foreign policy activism of the previous decade gained momentum in the 2000s. However, the approach or 'vision' behind this activism was different from that of the previous era. Especially after 2002 elections, when AKP won the elections and established a single-party government, Turkey started to follow an even more active foreign policy than the previous decade. Contrary to the hard/confrontational foreign policy of the 1990s, AKP has followed a soft/diplomatic foreign policy (See Murinson 2006; Çakmak 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2005; 2009; Çakmak 2009; see also Davutoğlu 2010).

According to the literature on TFP, there are three main factors behind this change: The first factor is the role of the US and international system; the second factor is the role of the AKP government and domestic politics; and

the third factor is the role of the EU membership prospect. There was a boost in Turkish foreign policy activism due to the 1999 Helsinki decision of the EU when the Union decided to grant candidate status to Turkey. This, in turn, encouraged the Turkish government to enter into an active Europeanization process (Öniş 2009; See also Öniş and Yılmaz 2009; Gözen 2006) and a process of an active engagement in the region.

In the international arena, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US started to follow a 'unilateral' foreign policy, by waging a global war against terrorism without responding to the international criticisms against it. As a first step, it attacked Afghanistan and then Iraq for their support to terrorist activities. In response to this hard unilateralism, both European states and the states in the Middle East and the Muslim world developed a negative anti-American stance. It can be argued that, especially the war on Iraq, and the anti-American stance that emerged in the period was one of the reasons that have led Turkey closer to the EU and start the rapid Europeanization process. "In retrospect, the war has helped to tilt the balance of power within Turkey's domestic politics further in the direction of the 'pro-EU coalition' which had already been gathering strength particularly since the Helsinki decision of 1999"(Öniş and Yılmaz 2005).

Under that international system Turkey went to elections in November 2002 and AKP won a landslide victory. AKP, in Erdoğan' s words, was a 'conservative democratic' party but most of the people believed that it was

also a religious party since most of its members, including R.Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül (the leaders of the party), had previously been members of the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*). Although some religious connotations existed in its discourse, AKP did not establish a religion-based foreign policy orientation. Instead, by using Turkey's historical and cultural background and religious identity as an asset, AKP has tried to establish Turkey, in Öniş's words, as a regional 'Euro-Asian Soft Power' that connects the Muslim world with the Western Christian world (see Öniş, 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009). Accordingly Turkey followed a 'zero-problem with neighbors' policy, by getting actively involved in regional activities, establishing economic and strategic agreements, and attempting to solve its major disputes with its neighbors. Although the "Bridging the East with the West" discourse was not a new agenda for Turkey (see Yanık, 2009; 2011), compared to the previous governments, the AKP government has made the greatest effort among the Turkish governments in order to achieve this aim.

Some of the major policies of the period can be summarized as follows: Just after the elections, AKP government entered into a rapid Europeanization process and achieved a great progress so that the EU formally opened the accession negotiations in October 2005. Turkey did not respond to all the US demands during the American military operation in Iraq of 2003, which in turn led to a problematic situation for Turkey's military involvement in Northern Iraq against the PKK. Additionally, the AKP

government has made an important revision in Turkey's Cyprus policy, by supporting the Annan Plan which caused a great improvement in Turkey- EU relations. The government has actively involved in regional organizations and supported the UN led 'Alliance of Civilizations' which emerged as a response to the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis. The AKP government has also supported the spread of transparency, democracy and liberal values in other Muslim countries (see Gözen 2006).

As the above-mentioned foreign policy activities are analyzed it becomes apparent that Turkey has not followed the same confrontational vision of the previous decade. Although a national-interest based approach has continued, AKP's foreign policy vision is not so much confrontational as the previous era. One might argue that Turkey started to emphasize a combination of military/strategic values (emphasis on Turkey Regional leadership role and national interest) neoliberal/economic values (active involvement in regional IGO's and initiation of economic and political cooperation with neighbors) and cultural/ideational values (emphasis on Turkey's identity, shared cultural values with the regional countries and the construction of the ideational bridge between civilizations).

Compared to the 'status-quo' foreign policy (the foreign policy orientation of 1990s) there has been a revision in Turkish foreign policy understanding (See Güner, 2011). First of all, Turkey has left the heavy emphasis on protecting territory (the Sevres Syndrome). This has been so



because of the decreased impact of the military on foreign policy issues. One reason for this decrease is that the AKP government was a single-party government and Turkey did not suffer so much from domestic political instability as it did in the 1990s. Second, through the EU led democratization reforms the AKP government has managed to decrease the intervention of military in political affairs (See Özbudun 2007). These developments, in turn, have led Turkey to leave its heavy emphasis on strategy and military issues and follow a 'soft' and diplomatic foreign policy. So, the period was a period of: less emphasis on territory and more emphasis on economy; less emphasis on military, more emphasis on diplomacy; less emphasis on state-centricism, more emphasis on non-state actors (TUSIAD, Civil society organizations); and less emphasis on nationalism more emphasis on global dynamics (see Gözen 2006: 87-95).

Öniş and Yılmaz (2009) explain Turkish post- Cold War foreign policy in three periods: “an initial wave of foreign policy activism in the immediate post-Cold War context [1990s]; a new or second wave of foreign policy activism during the Justice and Development Party government era with a strong emphasis on Europeanization[2002-2005]; and the more recent tension between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism [post-2005 period]. The first two periods are explained above. In the next section the third period will be explained.

### **3.1.3. The impact of Europeanization and the post-2005 period**

The prospect of full membership, which was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki summit, when EU granted candidate status to Turkey, was especially influential in the period between 1999 and 2005. Although the Islamist background of the party generated some fear among the supporters of Europeanization in Turkey, the early years of the AKP government became the Golden Age of Europeanization, when the government speeded up the democratization (Özbudun, 2007) and economic reform processes (Dervis et al. 2004; Öniş and Bakır, 2007) within the country (Robbins, 2003; Çakmak, 2008; Öniş, 2009). It can also be argued that AKP leaders followed an active regional policy in order to show Turkey's role as an important regional actor and increase the prospect of membership. A careful reading of Davutoğlu's arguments and a parallel analysis of Erdoğan and Gül's speeches may clearly reveal this strategy.

For instance, in his book, *Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Standing*, Davutoğlu uses a "bow and arrow" metaphor to explain Turkey's new foreign policy direction (Davutoğlu 2010: 551-63). In the metaphor, Turkey represents the arrow which is directed at Europe, and its foreign policy environment represents the bow. The more Turkey strains the bow towards the Caucasus and the Middle East the faster it enters to the European Union. Following this analogy, one can argue that Turkey's regional foreign policy activism has been used as a strategy to increase the prospect of EU

membership. Turkey's leading role, together with Spain, in the "Alliance of Civilizations" project and Tayyip Erdoğan's speeches regarding Turkey's mediating role between the East and the West are all in parallel with Davutoğlu's bow and arrow analogy. For instance, in one of his speeches Erdoğan says that "The idea of 'Christian Europe' belongs to the Middle Ages. It should be left there. There should be no doubt that Turkey's full membership will re-enforce the desire and will for co-habitation between Christians and Muslims" (quoted in Kubiçek, 2004: 45). This expression can be used to exemplify the connection between Turkey's vision of its role in the region and its EU membership. So, it can be argued that by continuously emphasizing Turkey's bridging role, its role in the alliance of civilizations, and Turkey's moderating role between Islamic World and the Christian World the AKP government has tried to improve its EU membership prospect.

However, after 2005, although the EU formally opened the negotiations for full membership, it is observed by some scholars that there has been a decline in Turkey's enthusiasm for European membership and an increase in its activism in the region (For instance see Alpay 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz 2009). In the post- 2005 period, it is argued that the EU membership process fell into a stalemate. Some authors claim that, although the EU formally opened the negotiation process, Turkey has lost its European direction because of the increasing criticisms against Turkey's European(ness) and existing obstacles on the path to the EU (see Alpay 2009; Öniş and Yılmaz

2009; Elver 2005). Thus, Turkey started to turn towards its region and leave the EU path. According to Elver, this loss of enthusiasm was largely due to the obstacles on Turkey's way to the EU membership. One of these obstacles is the resurgent anti-Muslim feelings in Europe. In addition, the Kurdish problem and the Cyprus issue also stand as other problems that Turkey should deal with before it gets access to the EU. The European Commission, in one of its reports, stated that the negotiation period is an open ended process that could continue for a long time without even giving a final date for Turkey's accession (Elver 2005).

### **3.2. Conclusion:**

To summarize the argument so far, Turkey has followed an assertive-confrontational foreign policy, with a military/security emphasizing approach in 1990s. It was assertive because Turkey tried to utilize the opportunities that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was confrontational because of the uncertainties in the region and aimed strictly at state centric national Interest perspective. In the 2000s, contrary to the confrontational tools that were used in the previous decade, Turkey started to emphasize diplomacy and politics instead of military and strategy. The first period of foreign policy activism (in 1990s) gained momentum with the 2002 elections and establishment of the single party government of AKP. The increased

emphasis on diplomacy, regional activism, and soft power (power of attraction) capabilities is due to three main reasons. First, US unilateralism caused an anti-American tendency which opened the way for Turkey to prove its reliability in the Middle East. The Anti-American tendency also pushed Turkey to the European Union which in turn has led to increased political and economic reform process. Second reason, is the policies of single party-government and domestic politics. Especially the Strategic Depth doctrine of Davutoğlu and AKP leaders' emphasis on Turkey's historical cultural and religious ties with the region have led Turkey to be actively involved in almost all activities in its surrounding region including the conflict resolution processes, regional IGO's and economic and strategic initiatives. The existence of a single party government also decreased the political instability in the domestic politics of the country which left the influence of the Armed forces out of the political sphere. When the impact of Armed forces decreased in the foreign policy-making of Turkey, the emphasis on strategy, national power and confrontational tools have also decreased automatically. Finally the third reason was the prospect of EU membership which was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki decision of the union.

As Davutoğlu once said, "Turkey, without having a solid stance in its surrounding regions, cannot become member of the European Union." Until 2005, Regional activism was (arguably) used as a strategy to enter into the European Union. However the official start of the accession negotiations in

2005 has changed this picture. The literature on EU-Turkey relations states that EU member states like France and Germany increased their criticisms against Turkey's membership, Turkey will not overcome the obstacles on its path to EU, and because of such reasons Turkey has lost its enthusiasm to become a member of the union and started to turn its direction towards Asia and Middle East in order to become a regional power.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **MODELING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY**

The previous two chapters have listed the steps in building a PH model and explained TFP in the post-Cold War era. Academic works on TFP have generally remained descriptive without necessarily building a theoretical model. The aim of this chapter is to build a model in order to organize the information in the literature and provide an abstraction of the decision-making process of Turkish foreign policy makers in the 59<sup>th</sup> government (founded by AKP in 2003). Accordingly, this section builds a PH model to analyze AKP's decision to follow a new foreign policy orientation after assuming the government in 2003 by following the basic steps (described in chapter 2) and in line with the literature on TFP in the AKP period (given in chapter 3).

An analysis of AKP's foreign policy orientation generates at least three questions. First, given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of AKP's

political background (the Nationalist View tradition), why did the government follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the government in 2002? Second, why did the AKP leaders decide to diverge from the SQ foreign policy of the 1990s by leaving the confrontational and military based orientation towards a more “soft power” oriented one? Third, why did the AKP government shift the foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy emphasis on EU after starting the accession negotiations in 2005?

Following a new foreign policy orientation instead of the foreign policy of the 1990s is a decision that was affected by both domestic and international variables. The model proposed by the PH theory provides space to integrate these variables in a systematic, formal and organized way. Although the literature provides answers to the above-mentioned questions, a PH model could be useful to show the dynamics behind the decision in a more concrete and organized manner.

The chapter is composed of two main parts. The first part builds the decision matrix of the AKP leaders by the time they assumed the government. Following the steps of building a PH model listed in chapter 2, it will identify:

1. The Foreign policy alternatives ( $A_1, A_2, A_3... A_n$ )
2. The Utility Dimensions of each alternative ( $D_1, D_2, D_3...D_n$ )
3. The implications of foreign policy alternatives on each dimension and
4. It will give scores to each alternative at each dimension based on their implications.

The second part will apply PH calculations and analyze AKP's decision. The chapter ends with a discussion in



which the above mentioned three questions will be answered with reference to the “decision matrix” of AKP.

#### **4.1. The Decision Matrix of AKP in 2003:**

In order to build the decision matrix, the policy alternatives are to be identified first. The foreign policy alternatives are those options that were available to the foreign policy maker before making the decision. The foreign policy analyst asks the following question: “what is the set of available alternatives to choose from?” In the Turkish context these alternatives can be identified in Davutoğlu’s arguments, Erdoğan and Gül’s speeches, and the literature.

Ahmet Davutoğlu is argued to be the architect of TFP in the AKP period (Murinson, 2006; Walker 2011). In his book “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Standing” he explains his vision of TFP in detail. When analyzed comparatively, it becomes apparent that there is a significant parallelism between Davutoğlu’s vision and Erdoğan and Gül’s speeches. It is possible to argue that this vision was largely adopted by the 59<sup>th</sup> government and the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül; hence, any analysis of AKP’s foreign policy will be incomplete without referring to Davutoğlu’s arguments in detail. For the PH model at hand,

extracting some of AKP's foreign policy alternatives from Davutoğlu's vision of 'Turkey's Strategic Depth' might be a useful way to build the model.

According to Davutoğlu (2010: 221-225) Turkey has started to search for a new "strategic position" with the emergent unease and surprising conditions after the end of the Cold War. The aim to utilize the opportunities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union together with the existing power vacuum in the Caucasus, the crisis in Iraq, the first Gulf War, the undulant Turkey-EU relations, the "Sevres Syndrome" and the perceived threat against the country's territorial integrity have put Turkey into a confrontational stance in its foreign policy. The consequent heavy emphasis on security resulted in a conflictual relationship with the country's neighbors characterized by "reflexive" and military oriented responses to political crisis. This confrontational stance has put Turkey into a serious dilemma since the emergent international structure required a multilateral and active foreign policy with an aim to improve relations with the neighboring regions. Accordingly, Turkey has actively participated in the reorganization process of regional multilateral cooperation and alliance initiatives like ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization), OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference), D8 (Developing Eight). However, these initiatives have not been utilized in the desired way mostly because of their inefficient organizational structure and the lack of enthusiasm of the members. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey's turbulent

domestic political and economic structure and its heavy emphasis on Security and territorial integrity in the conduct of foreign policy have also negatively affected the expected improvement of relations with neighboring regions. Thus, unrealistic and populist desires like creating a “Turkic World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall” (*Adriyatik’ ten Çin Seddi’ ne Türk Dünyası*) or “putting one and reaping five” (*Bir koyup 5 Alma*) have characterized the foreign policy of the 1990s.

Davutoğlu (2010: 262) claims that throughout the 1990s, although Turkey aimed at active participation in its neighboring regions, it faced problems of credibility. Turkish foreign policy makers tended to regard regional cooperation initiatives like ECO, BSEC, OIC, and D8 as “reactive derivatives” of its relations with the west. More emphasis was given to these institutions when Turkey’s relations with EU or US did not continue in the desired way. This tendency had two-sided negative effects. On the one hand it decreased Turkey’s credibility in the Muslim world; on the other hand it did not have the desired impact over actors including US and EU. This, in turn, resulted in a multidimensional foreign policy in ‘rhetoric’ but a uni-dimensional policy in ‘conduct’. He argues that Turkey should perceive the neighboring regions independent of its political relationship with the west.

After explaining his perception of the 1990s, Davutoğlu proposes a new foreign policy orientation that would overcome the inefficiencies of TFP in the previous period. He argues that a country’s strategic depth becomes

meaningful if it is built upon the intersection of its “geo-cultural, geo-political and geo-economic” assets. Turkey has a strong infrastructure in terms of its historical ties, geographical location, population and culture to turn its potential power capacity into reality (Davutoğlu, 2010: 552-553). The “near land” (Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East), “near sea” (Black Sea, the Straits, Aegean and the Mediterranean seas, the gulf and Caspian seas) and “near continent” (Europe, North Africa, the Western and Central Asia) basins surrounding Turkey, puts the country geographically into the center of the world and historically in the central location where history took its shape. This gives an important strategic depth to the country which could not be utilized with a unidirectional foreign policy orientation; hence, Turkey has to follow a multidimensional foreign policy in order to use its historical, cultural and geographical assets efficiently. He argues that rather than isolating itself from the surrounding regions or following a single direction in foreign policy, Turkey should achieve a pivotal role among and improve its relations with the countries in its near land, near sea and near continental basins (see Davutoğlu, 2010: 551-563).

Davutoğlu proposes an active, multi-dimensional foreign policy aimed at improving Turkey’s prestige and credibility among the countries in its near land, near sea and near continental basins and achieving a central role through utilizing its geographical, cultural, and historical assets. By ‘active’ he emphasizes participation in regional cooperation initiatives and that Turkey

has to earn greater representative capacity and political efficiency in those institutions (Davutoğlu, 2010: 262). 'Multi-dimensional' refers to the necessity that Turkey's foreign policy approaches to its surrounding regions should be independent of each other. For instance, Turkey's approach to the Middle East should not depend on the country's undulant relations with the West. Thus, Turkey's relations with the Middle East should not be seen as an alternative to the country's relations with Europe or the US (see Davutoğlu, 2010: 221-289, 551-564).

A similar vision is also apparent in Gül and Erdoğan's speeches throughout 2003. For instance, Erdoğan (2003b) refers to Turkey as the "historical, cultural and economic center of the region". He argues that Turkey's foreign policy dynamics have not been utilized efficiently in the previous period. Therefore, Turkey could not realize its true potential. According to Erdoğan, Turkey's geographical, cultural and historical assets requires a multidimensional approach to foreign policy (Erdoğan, 2003e). Thus, the country, while preserving its EU direction, has to explain itself properly to the regional countries (Erdoğan, 2003d). In a speech given at his party meeting, Erdoğan clearly states that Turkey has followed an active and dynamic foreign policy aiming to "increase Turkey's prestige" and prepare "a future suitable to Turkey's past" (Erdoğan, 2003c).

In the foreword of his book called "Abdullah Gül: Horizons of Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Century" which was published by the Turkish

Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a collection of Gül's speeches during his Foreign Ministry, Gül makes a very similar definition of the TFP in 1990s. He conceptualizes the previous TFP as "problem-driven", "defense oriented", and "reactive". On the other hand he presents AKP's foreign policy as "pro-active", "soft-power oriented", "problem-solving" and "spreading stability to its surrounding regions" (Gül, 2007: 16; see also Erdoğan, 2003a). In a speech given at the "Chatham House" in 2003 he refers to Turkey's geostrategic importance, its "multi-dimensional" foreign policy and its relation to Turkey's EU membership. He mentions that Turkey is committed to its relations with the west and EU membership. However a significant emphasis on "Turkey's responsibility" to promote stability and "good future" in the Middle East is also visible in his speeches (Gül 2007: 32). Turkey's improving relations with its surrounding regions are presented as an opportunity for the EU. In Gül's words "Turkey's size, scale, location, demographics, vocation, orientation, political system and her multi-regional and multi-dimensional peaceful foreign policy are all vital assets to Europe" (Gül 2007: 30). Similar references are made throughout all his speeches in 2003. For instance, Gül stresses Turkey's participation in "regional cooperation" initiatives (2007: 33), its role to promote peace, security and cooperation in its neighboring regions including the Balkans and the African continent (2007: 51-52), its "historical and cultural" ties with the region (2007: 33-35, 47), its bridging role between the East and the West (2007: 43-46), its role to "remove the prejudices" against

Islam in the West (2007: 42), Its aim to promote the country's prestige and credibility in the region (2007: 54) and its "active", "multilateral", and "zero-problem with neighbors" oriented foreign policy (2007: 53-60).

Both Davutoğlu and Gül explain TFP in 1990s as "confrontational", "military and security oriented" and "problem-driven" whereas they propose a "non-confrontational", "pro-active", "problem-solving" foreign policy with an aim to improve the country's prestige and credibility. The following section conceptualizes the foreign policy alternatives in line with this vision.

#### **4.1.1. Foreign policy Alternatives and Utility Dimension:**

##### **i. The Set of Available Alternatives**

As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, the literature divides Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy into three periods: the period before AKP (the 1990s), AKP foreign policy with a significant EU membership direction (2002-2005) and AKP foreign policy with an emphasis on independent regional activism (post-2005). These periods can be conceptualized as foreign policy alternatives that AKP leaders' faced. For instance, while explaining TFP in the AKP period, Güner (2011: 1-2) conceptualizes two foreign policy orientation alternatives for Turkey: the "status-quo foreign policy (SQP)" referring to the preservation of Turkey's foreign policy stance in the 1990s and "New Foreign

Policy (NWP)" referring to the foreign policy orientation followed by the AKP government. By taking Turkey as a rational actor, he proposes a game theoretical explanation to "the re-orientation of Turkish foreign policy" in the AKP period (Güner 2011: 1). He argues that "gains and costs occur with some probabilities that constitute decision-makers' subjective estimates" and that these subjective estimations direct the leaders' decisions (Güner 2011: 12-13). AKP leaders' attribute utilities to these policy alternatives and choose the ones that are expected to provide the highest utility. By taking Güner's (2011) conceptualization as a starting point, this thesis applies an alternative decision-making method (PH theory) to explain TFP in the AKP period. At least four different foreign policy alternatives can be identified When AKP leaders' foreign policy vision is combined with the literature.

The first foreign policy alternative ( $A_1$ ) for the AKP was to follow the SQ (status-quo) without changing the foreign policy orientation of the country. The SQ foreign policy orientation refers to the foreign policy orientation of 1990s. It can be summarized as including the following components: 1. emphasis on Turkey's relations with the West; 2. active foreign policy in the region in order to increase Turkey's diminishing strategic importance after the Cold War; 3. confrontational foreign policy with a heavy emphasis on military power and security instead of friendly relations with the neighbors.

The second foreign policy alternative ( $A_2$ ) was to follow a new foreign policy orientation including a degree of convergence with and divergence



from the previous period. It can be conceptualized as New Foreign Policy-A (NFP-A) which has the following components: 1. Heavy emphasis on Turkey's commitment to EU membership; 2. An emphasis on Turkey's pivotal role in the region, its cultural/ideational assets and Turkey's role as a bridge between civilizations; 3. A Non-confrontational foreign policy orientation with an emphasis on friendly neighborhood and improving the country's international relations.

The third foreign policy alternative was slightly different from NFP-A in its components. It symbolizes AKP's foreign policy orientation after 2005. It can be conceptualized as New Foreign Policy-B (NFP-B) with the following components: 1. Regional activism without a specific emphasis on the EU direction; 2. an emphasis on becoming a central country/an important regional power (a benign Euro-Asian soft power); and 3. a Non-confrontational foreign policy orientation with an emphasis on soft-power and friendly neighborhood.

The fourth foreign policy alternative (A<sub>4</sub>) is identified with reference to the political background of the party. As pointed above most of the party members, including Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül (leaders of the party), had previously been members of the Virtue Party (VP- *Fazilet Partisi*). The VP had been an extension of the "National Vision (NV- *Milli Görüş*)" movement which had supported an anti-European and anti-Western foreign policy. They have been against Turkey's political union with the EU and did not support the

accession process. For the NV the EU was nothing more than an economic union to be benefited from (Doğan, 2005: 425). The Welfare Party supported a union with Arab and Muslim countries instead of Western ones. Since most of the members of AKP have previously been members of the NV movement, following the NV foreign policy was among the policy alternatives for AKP to choose from. This alternative is conceptualized as NV foreign policy (NVP) and has the following components: 1. an emphasis on regional activism aiming at a union with the Arab and Muslim countries; 2. an anti-European and anti-Western stance; 3. an emphasis on Turkey's pivotal role among the Muslim countries.

The set of available alternatives were possibly larger at the time AKP was making its decision. However, given the information available in the literature and with reference to AKP leaders' foreign policy vision these four alternatives stand as a good representation of the choice set that could have been constructed throughout that period.

## **ii. The Utility Dimensions**

The PH theory assumes that domestic politics is the "essence of decision". The alternatives that endanger the political survival of the leader would be eliminated at the first stage of decision-making based on the decision rule of the policy maker. Thus, any analysis applying PH model should take domestic

politics as the essential dimension of each foreign policy decision. Accordingly, for the model at hand, we will assume that the first dimension ( $D_1$ ) is the “domestic politics dimension”.

Although most of the scholars applying PH theory take military and strategic dimensions in their analysis of decision-making, these dimensions are decided with reference to the specific case at hand. Indeed, it is possible to argue that nearly all foreign policy decisions include military and/or strategic dimensions. In the Turkish case, as we analyzed in the first section of this chapter, AKP leaders have generally focused on military/strategic, economic and cultural/historical aspects of TFP. Thus for the model at hand, we will conceptualize the second dimension ( $D_2$ ) as the “military/strategic” dimension, third dimension ( $D_3$ ) as the “Economic” dimension and the last dimension ( $D_4$ ) as “Cultural/Ideational” dimension.

#### **4.1.2. Implications and the Evaluation Criteria:**

After identifying the set of alternatives and the dimensions, the alternatives will be evaluated and ranked based on the utility they are expected to provide. We need first to clarify the decision rule (or decision heuristic) of AKP leaders. According to the ‘decision rule’, the alternatives would be put into an order of preferences and evaluated consequently.

One needs to refer to the political background of AKP leadership and their vision on Turkey's future in order to identify the decision rule (or the decision heuristic) of AKP. AKP emerged out of the Nationalist View (*Milli Görüş*) as a revisionist (in terms of their understanding of the role of Islam in Turkey) and modernist trend of political Islam in Turkey. The leaders of the party were former members of the Virtue Party which was closed by the Constitutional Court in the Early 2000s. With the closure of the VP party, the National Vision movement was divided into two groups: SP (Felicity Party) the conservative strand of the NV movement and AKP the "Young reformers" (Doğan, 2005: 429). After facing a number of cases and party closures, members of the NV tradition had entered into a process of transformation throughout the 1990s. Their aim to achieve hegemony in the Turkish political system was moderated towards an aim to "ensure survival in a hostile environment" (Öniş: 287). "The February 28 process which had brought down the Welfare Party ... led the members and followers of the Virtue Party to the realization that democracy and human rights were basic needs that also applied to themselves"(Doğan, 427). Especially the founders of AKP –"Young Reformers"- have moderated their stance and left the traditional anti-EU discourse. Erdoğan was quick to announce that they have changed and that AKP is committed to Turkey's EU accession process (Erdoğan, 2002). It is argued that, after the February 28 process and the closure of Welfare and Virtue Parties, showing a commitment to EU accession and stressing its

democracy and human rights criteria served as a protective shield or a source of legitimation for AKP. In other words, following the same Islamic and anti-EU discourse of the NV tradition would be a political suicide since it would put the party in the verge of closure. As Güner (2011: 9) mentions “they learn to adapt to realities of domestic politics by avoiding mistakes other Islam-friendly parties committed...” (See also Cizre, 2008 quoted in Güner 2011).

Thus, in a strictly secular and anti- Political-Islam environment created by the 1990s, the first aim of AKP was to achieve legitimacy and survival in domestic politics by showing that they have “truly” changed. In that sense, emphasizing Turkey’s EU direction was a part of their political decision rule. In fact, it is possible to claim that this strategy worked, by looking to the percentage of votes they got in the elections. Whereas the NV tradition with its fundamentalist anti-EU stance achieved its highest votes in 1995 by 21.5 percent, AKP got 31, 2 in 2002 and gradually increased its share of votes later. Although moderation in discourse was not the only reason behind AKP’s gradual political success, it is clear that it had a significant impact. Now let us turn to the implications and ratings of each policy alternative.

**i. (D1) Domestic Politics:**

The decision rule of AKP serves as a cognitive shortcut for its policy makers to eliminate some of the alternatives based on their domestic politics

implications. “The decision-maker is expected to reject the alternatives that fail to satisfy some predetermined decision rule” (Brule 2005: 105). With regard to the literature given above, we assume that the decision rule of AKP was to “achieve legitimacy and political survival in an environment hostile to political Islam”. So the policy alternatives would be evaluated based on the answer of the following question: “Is  $A_x$  ( $x=1, 2, 3$  or  $4$ ) expected to result in the political survival of AKP?”

Those alternatives that result in a negative response will be eliminated in the first stage of the PH analysis. When analyzed, only  $A_4$  that is NVP results in a negative answer to this question. AKP leaders through a long “learning” process became aware that the discourse on political Islam should be moderated. In one of his speeches in 2003, Erdoğan distanced his party from the NV view tradition by claiming that they have “put off the Nationalist View shirt” and that they have “changed, changed and developed” just after the election (Radikal, 2003). They have entered into a period of struggle to show that they have “truly” changed. Thus, when domestic politics were considered, following a foreign policy orientation previously offered by the NV tradition could be expected to provide the least utility among others.

As we have previously stated, an emphasis on Turkey’s EU membership was regarded as a source of legitimacy for AKP leaders. In that sense, referring to the EU-led democratization process, the human rights and constitutional reforms would provide a protective shield for AKP leaders in their domestic

political activities. It also symbolized that they have changed their anti-Western political origins. Thus an EU direction in the conduct of foreign policy could be expected to provide greater utility than other alternatives. This assumption puts  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  that are the SQ foreign policy and NFP-A in the higher end of the order of preferences. That is to say  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  were expected to provide greater utility than  $A_3$  (NFP-B) and  $A_4$  (NV).

It is unrealistic to argue that AKP's electoral success depends only on the moderation of their NV discourse. AKP entered into 2002 elections within a country of domestic political and economic turmoil. Turkey faced serious economic and political crisis in the period before elections. In that sense, it is reasonable to argue that the 2002 election was unique among the others. As Öniş and Keyman (2003) points out, in the previous two general elections (both 1996 and 1999) major political debates revolved around the unitary and secular nature of the state. Accordingly the existing political parties conducted their electoral campaign on the 'hot topics' including the threat of 'political Islam' and 'Kurdish Separatism'. That is the reason why "the parties that fared the best, including the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), had state-centered or nationalist agendas" (Öniş and Keyman, 2003: 96-97). However in 2002, just before the elections Turkey experienced the most serious economic crisis of its history and criticisms of "effective governance", "accountability" and "social welfare" have replaced the previous hot topics. After years of problematic governments "the voters were ready to

cry 'Enough!' and to opt instead for a ruling structure that offered the prospect of being more responsive to society and its needs" (Öniş and Keyman, 2003: 96). AKP, as a new party, was a reasonable alternative to the existing political parties. The party leaders were able to catch these dynamics by conducting an electoral campaign on these topics. They have criticized the other main parties for being too close to the state and too distant from the society. By referring to the existing corruption in the banking and financial system, they presented AKP as the prospect of honesty and accountability in government that regards the principles of "fairness" and "integrity" as major assets. Additionally they stressed reforms in democracy, individual rights and freedoms, economic and fiscal policies as the solution to the country's crisis. They proposed to make reforms in Turkey's economic and political system according to the criteria presented by international institutions including IMF (International Monetary Fund), WB (World Bank) and the EU (Öniş and Keyman, 2003: 96-100).

In fact, these dynamics were also influential in the new foreign policy orientation (NFP-A) proposed by AKP. Although emphasizing Turkish membership to the EU was not a novel phenomenon in post-Cold War TFP, domestic dynamics in the 1990s were different from that of 2002; hence making the EU direction in NFP-A different from that of SQ. The EU emphasis was different for at least two reasons. First, the domestic political motivation for EU membership had not been as high as it was in 2002. As mentioned



above the hot topics of the 1990s were Kurdish Separatism and Political Islam. Second, the AKP inherited the government in the post-Helsinki period. The prospect of full membership to the EU was boosted after the 1999 Helsinki summit when EU granted candidate status to Turkey. This increased domestic political support for EU membership. In SQ foreign policy orientation the emphasis on EU membership suffered from what Uğur (1999) called “the Anchor-Credibility-Dilemma”. Whereas Turkey had been traditionally anchored to the EU, its leaders and society lacked the motivation for EU led reforms since there was no clear prospect for EU membership. Thus, in the SQ foreign policy orientation, emphasis on EU membership was a part of Turkey’s alignment with the West in its conduct of foreign policy. However, given the conditions under which AKP won the elections, the emphasis on EU membership could be regarded as a strategy to increase domestic support and achieve political legitimacy. Since membership to EU was a major component of  $A_2$  (NFP-A) then, it could be expected to provide greater utility than  $A_1$  (SQ) in domestic politics dimension. Thus, given the decision rule of AKP and the domestic political conditions of the 2002 elections the preference ordering is assumed to be the following and it will be rated accordingly when building the decision matrix:

Preference ordering in domestic politics dimension:  $A_2 > A_1 > A_3 > A_4$

## **ii. (D2) Military/strategic Dimension:**

In this section, foreign policy alternatives will be ordered based on their military and strategic implications. The military implications of a foreign policy orientation will be identified based on the inherent 'risk of conflict'. When deciding on the utility of a foreign policy orientation in the military dimension the basic aim of the policy-maker will be to avoid 'military costs'. Costs are defined as loss in logistics, capacity and human life which are generally associated with cases of war and/or kinds of military conflict. Those policy orientations that have greater possibility to lead Turkey into military conflict will be assumed to be more costly; hence, their utility will be less than others.

Additionally, strategic implications of a foreign policy orientation could be decided based on their likelihood to result in the "Grand Strategy" formulated by the policy-makers. "Grand Strategy" refers to what Gray (2007: 283) defines as the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community". The achievement of a "Grand Strategy" then, requires the mobilization of all available resources towards the achievement of a certain political goal. It is a broad term that "embraces all the instruments of statecraft, including the military" (Gray 2007: 1).

In the case of Turkey, Davutoğlu and Gül both refer to Turkey's "Strategic Depth" and its aim to increase its prestige and credibility in the surrounding geographies. This is followed by the need to have an independent

standing in the conduct of foreign policy. In addition, they have occasionally referred to Turkey's "peaceful", "problem-solving", "stability-providing" role as part of the foreign policy vision at their mind. So the grand strategy was to achieve a central regional power status for Turkey that could follow an independent, credible and peaceful foreign policy.

According to AKP foreign policy makers then, a foreign policy alternative would be in the higher end of the military/strategic preference ordering based on two considerations. 1. Is  $A_x$  expected to result in a more peaceful and less conflictual foreign policy-environment for Turkey? 2. Is  $A_x$  expected to provide a central power status for Turkey that could follow an independent foreign policy?

SQ foreign policy orientation ( $A_1$ ) was the most confrontational one among others. A heavy emphasis on the protection of national borders and security against threats brought the country on the verge of conflict several times throughout the 1990s. In addition to its military implications the SQ foreign policy also had negative implications for the Grand strategy. As stated above, since Turkey's active engagement with the regional countries was regarded as a 'reactive derivative' of Turkey's relations with the west, it, on the one hand, decreased Turkey's credibility in the Muslim world; on the other hand, did not have the desired impact over the West. The SQ foreign policy worked against Turkey's desire to achieve a central power status in the

region. Then, (A<sub>1</sub>) SQ Foreign policy orientation will be regarded as the one that is expected to provide the least utility in the military/strategic dimension.

The other three foreign policy alternatives resulted in a positive answer to the first question. A<sub>2</sub>, A<sub>3</sub> and A<sub>4</sub> did not have a confrontational stance in foreign policy. They were aimed at improving the country's credibility in its surrounding regions. However, a preference ordering could still be made with regard to the answer of second question. The grand strategy in AKP leader's mind was to have peaceful relations with the regional countries, improve the country's prestige through the achievement of a central regional power status. This would also lead the country to achieve a more independent stance in its conduct of foreign policy. When evaluation is based on the answer on the second question A<sub>3</sub> (NFP-B) is assumed to provide the greatest utility since it was the one that fit most to the grand strategy. NFP-B aimed at achieving a regional power status independent of an emphasis on EU membership. As Davutoğlu mentions "Turkey cannot wait forever at the EU door and needs to develop a genuinely multidirectional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages" (quoted in Murinson, 2006: 952).

In the preference ordering A<sub>3</sub> (NFP-B) was followed by A<sub>2</sub> (NFP-A) since it also aimed at improving Turkey's regional credibility. However A<sub>2</sub> also included an emphasis on EU membership which reduced the probability of becoming an independent central regional power. A<sub>4</sub>, although it was not confrontational, it was a reactionary foreign policy aimed at complete break

with the West and an orientation towards Muslim countries. So, whereas it included an aim to improve Turkey's relations with the regional countries, it sacrificed Turkey's long-term strategic relationship with the Western countries.

To put it more specifically,  $A_1$  did neither fit AKP's military considerations nor its grand strategy so it is assumed to provide the least utility.  $A_4$  was not confrontational but it risked Turkey's strategic position and its long-term relationship with the West. So  $A_4$  is assumed to have less utility than  $A_2$  and  $A_3$ .  $A_2$  (NFP-A), although resulted positive in both military considerations and in grand strategy, it provided less utility than  $A_3$  (NFP-B) in achieving an independent stance in the conduct of Foreign policy. So the preference ordering is assumed to be the following:

Preference ordering in military/strategic dimension:  $A_3 > A_2 > A_4 > A_1$

### **iii. (D3) Economic Dimension:**

This section aims to underline the preference ordering of AKP leaders based on the economic implications of policy alternatives. At this point, it is important to stress that the economic dimension does not include the domestic level economic variables since they were included in the domestic politics dimension. By economic dimension, the thesis refers to the international economic implications of the alternatives. So it refers to Turkey's

international economic considerations such as increasing trade, finding new export markets, attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), diversifying energy routes, and increasing tourist inflows.

The literature on TFP remains limited in explaining TFP with reference to economic factors. In fact the economic dimension is not studied as one of the major determinants of TFP in the post-Cold War era. However the thesis argues that economic dimension is also an important factor that affected the foreign policy considerations of AKP leaders. Although it is not elaborated in a detailed manner by Davutoğlu, the economic dimension received considerable attention. For instance, Davutoğlu stresses the geo-economic importance of the Middle East and Eurasia as important regions for economic resources (petroleum and gas) of the world (Davutoğlu 2010: 497-499). Improving economic relations with the surrounding regions is proposed as an outcome of Turkey's dynamic and active foreign policy. Most of the institutions proposed as tools for Turkey's active engagement in the region are economic cooperation initiatives. Efficient use of institutions including ICO, BSEC, ECO, and G-20 would eventually lead to further economic cooperation. Indeed, Davutoğlu regards the task of improving economic and political interdependency in the region as a means to increase Turkey's "prestige and credibility" so that it becomes a central regional power. A similar understanding is also visible in Erdoğan's speeches.

Beside AKP leaders' expressions there were also some facts defining Turkey's economic interests in the period. Especially in its trade relations, EU countries constituted the main destination of Turkey's imports and exports in the period. For instance, the EU-25 constituted approximately 57 percent of Turkey's total exports and 50 percent of the total imports in 2003. On the other hand, the Middle East constituted only 6, 5 percent of the total export and 11, 5 of the total imports (Turkish Statistical Institute-TSI, 2011). So when the economic dimension of a policy alternative is considered it is reasonable to assume that the policy-makers will seriously take this approximate 50 percent dependency into account. So any policy alternative that includes an anti-EU stance could be expected to provide the less utility in the economic dimension.

For a country aiming at an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy a 50% economic dependency constitutes a significant handicap. In fact when the trade statistics of the following years is analyzed one might see a pattern that leads to diversify Turkey's trade dependency. The statistics in the tables below show that Turkish policy-makers attempted to overcome the EU dependency by gradually increasing Turkey's import and export with the countries in the "near land, sea and continent basins".

**Table 4.1 - Import Destinations of Turkey by Regions (%)**

	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>EU (27)</b>	46,5	42,1	42.7	29.2	37.2	40.1
<b>Other Europe</b>	18.9	20.4	18.5	42.6	22.0	18.6
<b>Near and Middle East</b>	5.7	6.8	7.6	5.4	8.8	6.8
<b>Other Asia</b>	15.9	17.6	18.4	14.3	18.9	20.5
<b>North America</b>	5.2	5.0	5.0	3.8	2.6	6.8
<b>Central America and the Caribbean</b>	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
<b>South America</b>	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.1	1.6	1.6
<b>North Africa</b>	3.3	3.6	3.5	1.5	6.7	2.5
<b>Other Africa</b>	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.5
<b>Other Countries</b>	0,6	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.6
<b>Free Zones in Turkey</b>	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.7	0.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Table 4.2 - Export Destinations of Turkey by Regions (%)**

	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>EU (27)</b>	54,5	52,3	56.0	56.2	48.2	46
<b>Other Europe</b>	10.5	12.0	9.3	10.1	11.9	11.1
<b>Near and Middle East</b>	12.5	13.9	13.3	14	19.3	18.8
<b>Other Asia</b>	4.0	4.1	4.6	5.0	5.4	6.6
<b>North America</b>	8.3	7.2	6.4	4.2	3.6	3.5
<b>Central America and the Caribbean</b>	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.6
<b>South America</b>	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7
<b>North Africa</b>	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.2	2.4	7.3
<b>Other Africa</b>	1.2	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.6
<b>Other Countries</b>	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1.1	0.9
<b>Free Zones in Turkey</b>	4.1	3.9	3.4	2.7	2.3	1.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TIS- *Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu*, 2011; the Foreign Economic Relations Council (FERC- *Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Konseyi*)

According to the latest data provided by TSI the EU-27 constitutes 48 percent of the total exports and only 38 percent of the total imports (see Turkish



Statistical Institute 2011a; 2011b). The tables also show that there has been a tendency to overcome trade dependency on the EU which will lead to a more economically independent foreign policy.

The policy makers expected to develop economic cooperation with the countries in the surrounding regions without seriously harming the countries relationship with the EU. Since the country was more than 50 percent dependent on the EU in its trade then a policy alternative that damages Turkey-EU relations would be expected to be in the lower end of the economic preference ordering. The 50% dependency is quite high for a country aiming at an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation. This situation put Turkey in an important dilemma at the period. On the one hand, the policy makers wanted Turkey to achieve a more independent foreign policy orientation and a central role in the region on the other hand the country was economically dependent on the EU which puts a significant handicap on the grand strategy. Then, a foreign policy alternative would be in the higher or lower end of the economic preference ordering based on the following considerations. 1. Is  $A_x$  expected to result in a non-conflictual relationship with the EU? 2. Is  $A_x$  expected to result in a more independent international economic position to Turkey?

The answer of the first question puts  $A_4$  (NVP) in the lowest end of the preference ordering in the economic dimension. Following an anti-EU foreign policy would seriously harm Turkey-EU economic relations. Other three

foreign policy alternatives survive from the first question since none of them were against the EU. However these alternatives could still be ordered with regard to the answer of the second question.

Decreasing Turkey's economic dependence on EU would necessitate diversifying trade routes. The diversification of trade routes requires either entering into new economic cooperation agreements or using the existing cooperation initiatives more efficiently. AKP foreign policy-makers' emphasis on active engagement in Turkey's surrounding regions served this strategy in at least two ways. Improving relations with the near land, sea and continent basins would on the one hand decrease Turkey's economic dependency on the EU-27 on the other hand improve the country's trade income since the existing trade rates would be increased.  $A_1$  (SQ) was a Western-oriented foreign policy but the confrontational stance limited Turkey's positive engagements with its surrounding regions. Although it was not an anti-EU foreign policy orientation it would remain insufficient to increase Turkey's economic cooperation in the region.  $A_2$  was both emphasizing Turkey's EU membership and peaceful stance in the region.

In fact, in a period of economic crisis, the EU led reform process was expected to serve as a stability provider. The improvement of Turkey-EU relations increased FDI inflows towards the country. Besides, having peaceful and positive relations with the countries in the region increased the likelihood of economic cooperation with the neighboring countries.  $A_3$  did emphasize

neither EU nor the countries in the surrounding regions. It aimed at having an independent status in the region leading to a central power status for Turkey. Having a central regional power status without any international dependency can be assumed to provide the greatest utility in the economic dimension. However, given the existing situation in 2003- Turkey's economic dependency on the EU and the stability providing impact of EU led reform process- It is assumed to provide less utility than  $A_2$ . So the preference ordering is assumed to be the following:

Preference ordering in economic dimension:  $A_2 > A_3 > A_1 > A_4$

#### **iv. (D4) Cultural/ideational Dimension:**

The PH theory has generally been applied to single decisions and the cultural and ideational determinants of foreign policy alternatives did not take part in these applications. Scholars have generally focused on the military, strategic or economic aspects of foreign policies while disregarding the cultural ones. However, there is also space to integrate cultural and/or ideational factors since the PH theory claims that the utility dimensions of foreign policy alternatives can vary according to the analyzed foreign policy decision at hand. The thesis argues that any analysis of the 59<sup>th</sup> Government's foreign policy orientation cannot ignore the impact of the leaders' cultural/ideational calculations. By including the cultural/ideational dimension in its analysis, the

thesis tries to understand the use of AKP foreign policy makers' expressions including the historical and/or cultural ties between Turkey and its immediate neighborhood: Turkey's role as a bridge between civilizations; Turkey as the crossroad of different cultures; Turkey's Ottoman past; and the role of Islam in Turkey's international relations. In fact, many references were made to these kinds of ideational constructions throughout the post-Cold War era.

Especially Davutoğlu, Gül and Erdoğan made specific references to these ideational roles of Turkey and the country's responsibilities resulting from them. As it is also mentioned above Davutoğlu puts Turkey both geographically and historically in the center of the world (Davutoğlu 2010: 552-553). Turkey is argued to have unique cultural/ideational assets since it has historically been a part of a political entity that endured for centuries as a civilizational center and the crossroad of the world (the Ottoman Empire) (Davutoğlu, 2010: 81). That is why some scholars explained the new foreign policy orientation as a variant of the "Neo-Ottomanism" debate (see Murinson 2006; Yanık 2011 for a detailed overview). Neo-Ottomanism can be defined as "a discourse [or strategy] that highlights Turkey's Ottoman past and mixes it with geographical uniqueness to justify an active foreign policy in Turkey's immediate neighborhood" (Yanık 2011: 81). This strategy, however, is not unique to AKP's foreign policy since many references were made to the historical roots of the republic throughout the post-Cold War era (Yanık 2011:

81). By referring to Turkey's Ottoman past, AKP leaders attempted to justify their foreign policy activism in the period.

In addition to referring to Turkey's Ottoman past, AKP leaders also used the famous "bridge metaphor". For instance Gül (2007:35-42) states that Turkey has "a historic opportunity to reconnect Europe and Asia through the bridge of the Euro-Asian landmass, transforming the term Euro-Asia into a political and economic reality" (Gül 2007: 43). This opportunity would lead Turkey to engage in new trade and economic cooperation initiatives and achieve a "pivotal role" and a "central power" status in the region (Gül 2007: 43-46). He claims that Turkey has the capacity to increase regional cooperation for trade, security and political development by using its historical and cultural background as an asset. Turkey, according to Gül, is attaining a role "to promote peace, stability and development" in its neighborhood (Gül, 2007: 44) and it has "deep historical and cultural ties with the states and people of this vast region [Eurasia]" (Gül 2007: 47).

The bridge metaphor has also been used for a long time in TFP. As Yanık (2006: 534) points out, throughout the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy makers "portrayed Turkey as a country having a hybrid identity...with each foot in different continent...both belonging **equally** to different civilizations, Western and Eastern at the same time..." (emphasis added). However, starting with the AKP period this portrayal has changed. "Though some of these hybrid features of Turkey such as being in the two continents, etc., were

kept, religion was introduced into the discourse”(Yanık 2006: 534). The bridge discourse in the 1990s generally referred to Turkey’s role as mediating the relations between the countries in the East and the west. Starting with the AKP period it turned towards a role to bridge the Western civilization and the Eastern (Muslim) civilization (Yanık 2006: 538-539). Thus,” the meaning of the ‘bridge’ metaphor changed from one of mediator/stabilizer/facilitator to a spokesperson [for Islam]” (Yanık, 2006: 534). “The alliance of Civilizations” project initiated in 2004 under UN auspices by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and his Spanish counterpart Zapatero is one of the most concrete examples of this change.

The cultural/ideational references to Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and its role as a “bridge between civilizations” were used to justify and/or legitimize the new foreign policy activism in the AKP period. AKP leaders portrayed Turkey as a role model for Muslim countries and a link to the West. Gül significantly states that Turkey has a mission to accomplish: “to prove that a Muslim society is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary standards, while preserving its values, tradition and identity” (Gül, 2007: 37). He refers to the existing prejudices in the West about Islam that were “misled by those who claim to act in the name of Islam and resort to violence” and that these “misunderstandings and prejudices can be minimized by individuals and states that cultivate cross-cultural skills” (Gül 2007: 42). In fact, these arguments, in addition to legitimizing Turkey’s active

engagement in its immediate neighborhood, are altogether used as a strategy by AKP policy makers' to promote Turkey's EU accession process. The above mentioned "bow and arrow" metaphor (see chapter 3) clarifies this strategy. According to Davutoğlu (2010: 551-563) Turkey represents the arrow which is directed at Europe, and its foreign policy environment represents the bow. The more Turkey strains the bow towards the Caucasus and the Middle East the faster it enters into the European Union. This strategy is assumed to be an important determinant of the evaluation rule in the cultural/ideational dimension of the model.

The preference ordering in the cultural/ideational dimension will be made according to a number of considerations. For AKP leaders, a foreign policy alternative would be expected to facilitate the use of Turkey's cultural/ideational assets first as a means to promote the EU accession process and second as a means to increase Turkey's central power status making Turkey a role model for the countries in its surrounding regions. Foreign policy alternatives that fail to adopt one of these considerations would be assumed to be at the lower end of the preference ordering.

Security-oriented foreign policies would lead to the application of hard power measures which would be in contrast with the idea of increasing credibility and prestige in Turkey's neighborhood. The use of cultural/ideational assets in AKP leaders' mind was expected to increase the country's soft power that is "the power of attraction" in the region (See

Oğuzlu 2007). Since Turkey was portrayed as a role model in the region, emphasis on soft power, diplomacy and cultural/historical linkages is assumed to be more preferable than an emphasis on hard power and security. Thus, we assume that the confrontational nature of the SQ policy put it in the lowest end of the preference ordering in the Cultural/ideational dimension.

Although the foreign policy orientation of AKP took Islam as one of Turkey's cultural/ideational assets, TFP in the AKP period is not regarded as an Islamist foreign policy orientation (see Kirişçi 2009: 35-36). The period was dominated by the international developments such as the 9/11 attacks, the clash of civilizations thesis, increasing anti-Islam in the west and anti-Americanism in the East. In that period, AKP leaders portrayed Turkey in Yanık's (2006) terms as the "spokesperson of Islam". On the one hand the aim was to increase Turkey's credibility, prestige and the soft power in the region. On the other hand references to Turkey's Islamic values were altogether used as strategy to increase the likelihood of Turkey's accession to the EU. This puts the NVP at the lowest end of the preference ordering in the Cultural/Ideational dimension. Although it argues for the use of Turkey's Islamic assets, the NVP was against Turkey's membership to the EU. This anti-EU tendency of the NVP was in contrast with AKP leaders' "Turkey as an inter-civilizational bridge" strategy. Additionally AKP leaders did not refer to the use of Islamic values to establish a "Commonwealth of Islamic States" as it was supported by NVP.



$A_2$  (NFP-A) and  $A_3$  (NFP-B) were both soft power oriented foreign policies. The main difference stems from NFP-A's emphasis on Turkey's EU membership process. That is to say, whereas NFP-A aimed at facilitating Turkey's EU accession process, NFP-B aimed at achieving a central power status for Turkey in the region without specifically emphasizing any direction. Both policies necessitate the use of cultural/ideational assets of Turkey as a means to achieve the aim. NFP-B was not against Turkey's EU membership but it contained the use of cultural ideational factors to increase Turkey's soft power and independent status in the conduct of foreign policy. On the other hand NFP-A directly aimed at using Turkey's cultural/ideational assets as a means to promote Turkey-EU relationship. Thus NFP-A will be assumed to provide greater utility than NFP-B in the Cultural/ideational dimension. Thus the preference ordering becomes the following:

Preference ordering in Cultural/Ideational Dimension:  $A_2 > A_3 > A_4 > A_1$

#### **4.1.3. Ratings and the Decision Matrix:**

The previous section explained the implications of each foreign policy alternative on different dimensions and put the policy alternatives put into a preference ordering based on the evaluation criteria at each dimension. Those policies that are expected to provide the greatest utility are put in the higher end of the preference ordering. The preference ordering is assumed to be  $A_2 >$

$A_1 > A_3 > A_4$  in domestic politics dimension,  $A_3 > A_2 > A_4 > A_1$  in military/strategic dimension,  $A_2 > A_3 > A_1 > A_4$  in economic dimension and  $A_2 > A_3 > A_4 > A_1$  in the cultural ideational dimension. This section will rate (give scores to) each alternative in line with the preference orderings that were identified above. Then the decision matrix will be constructed and the total average scores of these four alternatives will be calculated.

Table 4.3 gives a summary of the PH Decision-making Model on TFP in AKP period. The first column summarizes the foreign policy alternatives the second column lists the utility dimensions and the third column shows the rating of each alternative at each dimension. Those policies that are at the highest end of the preference ordering will be assumed to have “4 units” of utility and those that are at the lowest end have “1 unit” of utility. According to the preference ordering in the domestic politics dimension ( $D_1$ ), NFP-A ( $A_2$ ) stands at the highest end of the preference ordering ( $A_2 > A_1 > A_3 > A_4$ ) making it the most preferable foreign policy alternative based on the evaluation criteria in  $D_1$ .  $A_2$  was followed by  $A_1$  (SQ),  $A_3$  (NFP-B) and  $A_4$  (NVP). Thus, they receive the following scores:  $A_2=4$ ;  $A_1=3$ ;  $A_3=2$ ; and  $A_4=1$ . Other policies are also rated with the same logic and the decision matrix is constructed accordingly (see Table 4.).

Table 4.3 - Summary of the PH Decision-Making Model on TFP in AKP Period (the 59<sup>th</sup> Government)

<p><b>1. Set of Alternatives:</b></p> <p><b>A<sub>1</sub>.</b> (Status Quo Foreign Policy - SQ):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Emphasis on the West,</li> <li>b. Confrontational,</li> <li>c. Security/defense oriented</li> </ul> <p><b>A<sub>2</sub>.</b> (New Foreign policy – NFP-A):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Emphasis on EU,</li> <li>b. Peaceful,</li> <li>c. Soft-power oriented</li> </ul> <p><b>A<sub>3</sub>.</b> (New foreign Policy – NFP-B):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Emphasis on Turkey,</li> <li>b. Peaceful,</li> <li>c. Soft-power oriented</li> </ul> <p><b>A<sub>4</sub>.</b> (National View Policy - NVP):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Emphasis on Muslim countries,</li> <li>b. Anti-EU,</li> <li>c. Islam oriented</li> </ul>	<p><b>2. Utility Dimensions and The Evaluation Criteria:</b></p> <p><b>D<sub>1</sub>.</b> Domestic Politics Dimension:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to result in the political survival of AKP?</li> </ul> <p><b>D<sub>2</sub>.</b> Military/strategic Dimension:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to result in a more peaceful and less conflictual foreign policy-environment for Turkey?</li> <li>b. Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to provide a central power status for Turkey that could follow an independent foreign policy?</li> </ul> <p><b>D<sub>3</sub>.</b> Economic Dimension:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to result in a non-conflictual relationship with the EU?</li> <li>b. Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to result in a more independent international economic position to Turkey?</li> </ul> <p><b>D<sub>4</sub>.</b> Cultural/ideational Dimension:</p> <p>Is A<sub>x</sub> expected to facilitate the use of Turkey’s cultural/ideational assets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. As a means to promote the EU accession process and</li> <li>b. As a means to increase Turkey’s central power status.</li> </ul>	<p><b>3. Preference order and Ratings</b> (4 &gt; 3 &gt; 2 &gt; 1):</p> <p><b>In D<sub>1</sub>-Domestic Politics Dimension:</b></p> <p><b>A<sub>2</sub>=4 &gt; A<sub>1</sub>=3 &gt; A<sub>3</sub>=2 &gt; A<sub>4</sub>=1</b></p> <p><b>In D<sub>2</sub>-Military / Strategic Dimension:</b></p> <p><b>A<sub>3</sub>=4 &gt; A<sub>2</sub>=3 &gt; A<sub>4</sub>=2 &gt; A<sub>1</sub>=1</b></p> <p><b>In D<sub>3</sub>-Economic Dimension:</b></p> <p><b>A<sub>2</sub>=4 &gt; A<sub>3</sub>=3 &gt; A<sub>1</sub>=2 &gt; A<sub>4</sub>=1</b></p> <p><b>In D<sub>4</sub>-Cultural/Ideational Dimension:</b></p> <p><b>A<sub>2</sub>=4 &gt; A<sub>3</sub>=3 &gt; A<sub>4</sub>=2 &gt; A<sub>1</sub>=1</b></p>
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**Table 4.4. - The Decision Matrix of AKP Leaders in 2003**

Foreign Policy Alternatives	Dimensions				Total Utility Score (Average)
	Political (D <sub>1</sub> )	Military/Strategic (D <sub>2</sub> )	Economic (D <sub>3</sub> )	Cultural/Ideational (D <sub>4</sub> )	
Follow the SQ (A <sub>1</sub> )	3	1	2	1	7 (1,75)
New Foreign Policy- A (A <sub>2</sub> )	4	3	4	4	15 (3,75)
New Foreign Policy- B (A <sub>3</sub> )	2	4	3	3	12 (3)
Follow the National Vision Foreign Policy (A <sub>4</sub> )	1	2	1	2	6 (1,5)

#### **4.2. Discussion:**

The previous part put the foreign policy alternatives in a preference ordering according to their domestic politics, military/strategic, economic, and cultural ideational implications in 2003. This section while analyzing AKP's decision to follow a new foreign policy orientation aims to answer the above mentioned three questions: Given the Islamic roots and the anti-EU stance of AKP's political background (the Nationalist View tradition) why did the government follow an enthusiastic EU direction after assuming the government in 2002? Why did AKP leaders decide to diverge from the SQ foreign policy of the 1990s

by leaving the confrontational and military/security based orientation towards a more “soft power” oriented one? Why did the AKP government shift the foreign policy axis of the country by leaving the heavy emphasis on EU after starting the accession negotiations in 2005?

As we have explained in chapter 2, the PH theory assumes that domestic politics is the essence of decision. Accordingly, while analyzing foreign policy decisions PH analysts identify the decision rule of the leaders in domestic politics and accordingly eliminate some of the alternatives in the first stage. As we have identified in the first part, the decision rule of AKP leaders is the following: “to achieve legitimacy and political survival in an environment hostile to fundamentalist political Islam.” In fact this rule gives the answer of the first question (why did AKP leave A<sub>4</sub>?). Policy alternatives that fail to satisfy the decision rule are rejected at the first stage of the decision-making process. Although AKP came from a fundamentalist political Islam background, the leaders of the party were quick to distance themselves from the NV tradition. They defined AKP as a “conservative democratic party” and regarded the EU direction as a protective shield for their actions. Following the NV tradition would be in direct contrast with their domestic politics considerations.

Indeed, an analyst following AKP’s election campaign would not expect to see a NV orientation in their foreign policy conduct. The ideational references to Islam did not aim at building an “Islamic union” against the

West. Those references aimed at strengthening Turkey's stance vis-à-vis the EU accession process as they put Turkey as an inter-civilizational bridge that could improve the EU's ideational role in the international system. A<sub>4</sub> achieved the lowest score (1.5) in the decision matrix of AKP at that period (see table 4.4). It was the least preferable option for the leaders at that time and as the PH theory assumes NVP was eliminated in the first stage of the decision-making process since it did not satisfy the decision rule.

Since 2002, AKP foreign policy makers have continuously referred to the need to improve Turkey's role in the region. They argued that Turkey should actively participate in regional cooperation initiatives including IGOs, bilateral and multilateral agreement, and regional peace-building initiatives. This aim required soft power (economic, ideational, diplomatic power of attraction) oriented measures instead of confrontational or military oriented ones. This clarifies the answer of the second question (why leave the SQ-A<sub>1</sub>?). As we have stated above (section 4.1) AKP leaders regarded the previous TFP as "problem-driven", "defense oriented", and "reactive" whereas they have argued that the Turkey's new policy foreign should be "pro-active", "soft-power oriented", and "problem-solving". According to the decision matrix (Table 4.4) the SQ policy scored 1.75 which is less than both new foreign policy orientation alternatives (NFP-A and NFP-B). Following one of those policies was more in line with AKP leaders' foreign policy vision.

A<sub>2</sub> achieved the highest score (3.5) making it a more profitable foreign policy orientation than the others. Under the conditions of 2003, A<sub>2</sub> stands as the best alternative among others. However, foreign policies change since they are not ahistorical and conditions are not static. It is generally argued in the literature that AKP leaders have changed their foreign policy orientation from what this thesis conceptualized as NFP-A to NFP-B. This argument brings us to the answer of the third question (why shift from A<sub>2</sub> to A<sub>3</sub> after 2005?). Starting with the formal opening of the EU-Turkey accession negotiations in 2005, scholars have argued that Turkey has lost its enthusiasm for membership for a number of reasons. We believe that the PH model might capture these conditions and explain this change.

In the domestic politics dimension we have analyzed a number of conditions. First, we referred to a domestic environment hostile to political Islam and AKP's need to prove itself as a new political movement distant from the NV tradition. Accordingly, "achieving legitimacy" has become the primary aim of AKP leaders in that period. Second, we referred to the EU as a "legitimacy providing actor" for the domestic political activities of AKP. Throughout the period between 2002 elections until 2007 AKP made a number of reforms in accordance with the EU accession criteria (such as limiting the role of the military) while entering into 3 elections and gradually increasing its share in the total votes (from .. to..). Thus, AKP leaders' dependency on a legitimacy providing actor (such as the EU) decreased.

Although keeping distance with NV tradition remained as part of the decision rule, by 2007 elections no one would argue that AKP was following policies in line with the NV tradition. Increasing criticisms against Turkey's possible EU membership coming from major EU countries like Germany and France together with a "privileged partnership" proposal instead of "full-membership" resulted in a significant decrease in Turkish public support for EU (from around 70% to 40%). Increasing domestic criticism against EU might have served as catalyst of the loss of EU enthusiasm in AKP leaders' vision through changing the preference ordering in domestic politics dimension. The previous preference ordering took EU as a major determinant of foreign policy alternatives. Those alternatives lacking an EU emphasis were assumed to provide less utility. However, by 2005 the EU emphasis was not a focal point of AKP leaders' foreign policy vision; hence, the domestic politics preference ordering changed from  $A_2 > A_1 > A_3 > A_4$  to  $A_3 > A_2 > A_1 > A_4$ . Limiting the impact of Turkey's EU membership perspective in AKP leader's foreign policy vision also changes the preference ordering in other dimensions, putting  $A_3$  in the higher end.

From our analysis of AKP leaders' speeches we understood that their "grand strategy" was to achieve a central regional power status for Turkey that could follow an independent, credible and peaceful foreign policy. However, given the domestic political and economic conditions of the period (2003) we assumed that  $A_2$  provided greater utility than  $A_3$ . However there is



a pattern in AKP leaders' conduct of foreign policy towards achieving a more independent role for Turkey in its region. Thus, the shift from  $A_2$  to  $A_3$  that has already started in 2005 is expected to continue in the current period if the criticisms in the EU front do not decrease or if the EU does not provide a more concrete membership perspective to Turkey.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **CONCLUSION**

The thesis argues that understanding the dynamics behind Turkey's post- Cold War foreign policy is a challenging task to accomplish because of two main reasons. First, Turkey's foreign policy orientations display changing patterns and trends depending on the ideological and political profiles of the ruling elite. Second, most of the major international events and structural changes of the Post-Cold War era (including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the two Gulf wars, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and the rising tensions between Islam and the West) occurred in Turkey's immediate neighborhood; making it difficult for Turkey to adopt a unidirectional approach to foreign policy. With an aim to explain these changing patterns and directions of TFP in the post-Cold War era the thesis asks two questions: one methodological and one empirical. The methodological question aims to provide a formal model with a holistic approach that could integrate multi-level and multi-dimensional variables in

its analysis. It is argued that applying the PH decision-making theory is a useful way to accomplish this task.

The empirical question aims at explaining the major factors that determined the foreign policy orientation and re-orientation of Turkey in the AKP period. In the literature, Turkey's post-Cold War foreign policy is generally studied in three periods: the period before AKP (the 1990s), the first period of AKP government with a significant EU membership direction (2002-2005) and the second period of AKP government with an emphasis on independent regional activism (the period after 2005). The AKP period foreign policy orientation is both converging with and diverging from that of the previous period. Although both policy orientations included a significant EU direction, TFP in the 1990s is defined as 'military/security oriented' and 'confrontational' whereas TFP in the AKP period is defined as 'soft power oriented' and 'peaceful'. After 2005, when EU formally opened accession negotiations with Turkey, a declining enthusiasm is observed in AKP's foreign policy orientation. The thesis argues that, among others, the prospect of EU membership; the impact of Davutoğlu and his arguments on Turkey's "strategic depth"; the domestic political conditions of the period; and the political background of AKP have been the major determinants of these shifting foreign policy orientations.

While analyzing AKP leaders' decision to choose a new foreign policy orientation instead of other alternatives, the thesis uses two sources of

information: First, the TFP literature is explained in chapter 3 and then AKP leaders' speeches are analyzed and their foreign policy vision is summarized in chapter 4. The PH decision matrix is constructed upon the information given in the literature about the major determinants of TFP. The literature is organized in line with AKP leaders' foreign policy vision. Accordingly, the thesis identifies four different foreign policy alternatives (SQ, NFP-A, NFP-B and NVP), evaluates the expected utility of these alternatives across different dimensions (political, military/strategic, economic and cultural/ideational), puts these alternatives into a preference ordering, rates them and explains the reasons behind AKP leaders' decision to follow an active foreign policy orientation instead of others. Given the information available in the literature and with reference to AKP leaders' foreign policy vision these alternatives and utility dimensions stand as a good representation of the choice set that could have been constructed at the period.

PH theory applies a two-staged decision analysis. While doing so, it uses both 'cognitive' and 'rational' approaches of FPA. Cognitive factors play a role in the first stage. It is argued that decision-makers have 'decision rules' in their mind which serve as 'cognitive shortcuts' to simplify the decision-making environment. When faced with a number of alternatives, the decision-maker eliminates the ones that do not satisfy the 'decision rule'. Thus, some of the alternatives are eliminated at the first stage before the foreign policy maker enters into rational utility calculations. For instance, as this thesis argues, AKP

leaders' decision rule in 2003 was to 'achieve legitimacy and political survival in an environment hostile to fundamentalist political Islam'. Thus, NVP was eliminated at the first stage of decision-making since it did not satisfy the decision rule. The second stage of foreign policy-making involves rational calculations. Each foreign policy alternative generates gains and costs. The leaders are assumed to have subjective estimations about the utility of each alternative. According to the possible gains and costs of these alternatives, leaders' attribute utilities to them and choose the ones that are expected to provide the greatest utility. So policy alternatives that survive the first 'cognitive stage' of decision-making are evaluated in the second 'rational stage' according to these expected utility calculations. While analyzing AKP leaders' decision in 2003, the thesis evaluated the implications of the foreign policy alternatives across dimensions and put each foreign policy alternative in a preference ordering. Those policy alternatives that are expected to provide the greatest utility are put in the highest end of the preference ordering and scored accordingly. Finally, as NFP-A got the highest score in the decision matrix it is assumed to be the best decision at that period.

Applying the PH theory provides the policy analyst a holistic framework that could integrate multi-level and multi-dimensional variables in an organized manner. However the model has limitations. Since it builds a formal model, which is a 'representative abstraction' of reality, it necessitates the analyst to work with idealized representations. For instance, while

building the model with reference to the literature and AKP leaders' foreign policy vision we assumed that there were four foreign policy orientation alternatives and analyzed these alternatives across four dimensions.

However, it is important to mention that the list of alternatives is non-exhaustive. One might add more policy alternatives and dimensions by conceptualizing them differently. On the other hand, we assumed that the utility dimensions are mutually exclusive. However it is not possible to exclude political from the economic or strategic considerations of policy makers in reality. We accept that all these dimensions work in an interrelated manner in real life. We believe that the model constructed in this thesis is a useful representation of the decision-making process in 2003. It is useful for at least two reasons. First, the literature on TFP includes a great number of empirical studies referring to many aspects of TFP including a complex set of variables in a disorganized way. Since most of the studies remain empirical and descriptive, building a formal model is proposed as a useful way to understand and explain shifting TFP orientations within an 'organized' and 'structured' framework. New variables that are introduced to the literature by empirical studies can be integrated in one of the dimensions proposed by the PH model. Second, the model proposed by the PH theory is falsifiable. The arguments and concepts are expected to be defined, stated, and justified clearly. The thesis attempted to construct its model in line with these considerations.

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